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Individual biological traits and behavior in economic games in two populations: Lebanon and Jamaica
Descriptive
TitleInfo
Title
Individual biological traits and behavior in economic games in two populations: Lebanon and Jamaica
Name
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NamePart
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Zaatari
NamePart
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Darine
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Darine Zaatari
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author
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Cronk
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Lee
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Advisory Committee
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Lee Cronk
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chair
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Trivers
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Robert
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Advisory Committee
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Robert Trivers
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internal member
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Palombit
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Ryne
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Advisory Committee
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Ryne Palombit
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internal member
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Johnson
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Dominic
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Advisory Committee
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Dominic Johnson
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outside member
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Rutgers University
Role
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(authority = RULIB)
degree grantor
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NamePart
Graduate School-New Brunswick
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school
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Text
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theses
OriginInfo
DateCreated
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2007
DateOther
(encoding = w3cdtf);
(qualifier = exact);
(type = degree)
2007
Language
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(authority = ISO 639-3:2007);
(type = text)
English
PhysicalDescription
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electronic
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application/pdf
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text/xml
Extent
xiii, 159 pages
Abstract
(type = abstract)
Individuals are expected to adopt different cooperative strategies depending on their ability to obtain resources and this is likely to have an effect on cooperative interactions. Some traits of the interacting party could also affect an individual's willingness to b initiate a series of benefit exchanges. Economic games have been a successful experimental tool in measuring cooperative behavior in interactions involving two or more people. The ultimatum game measures cooperative behavior in an interaction between two individuals. One individual can split money between him or herself and another, while the other has the option of accepting or rejecting the offer. Cross-cultural research showed variation in offer size and rejection rates.
Another game used in anthropological research is the public goods game. Here, a group of three or more are allocated an amount of money, from which they can make a contribution to their group's account. Money in the public account is doubled and divided over all group members. This is followed by a punishment option, where subject could pay to punish another group member. Research using both games is reviewed in chapter two.
This research investigates variations within individuals in two societies, Lebanon and Jamaica, by looking at some biological traits, facial and bodily symmetry, second-to-fourth digit ratio, waist-to-hip ratio and the degree of relatedness shared between the interacting individuals, among other individual traits.
Subjects increase offers when playing with an anonymous close relative, rather than a more distant relative or a member of their community (chapter three). Males with higher bodily asymmetry make higher offers (chapter four). Males with higher digit ratio made higher contributions to a public account (chapter five). Furthermore, females with low digit ratio are more likely to punish while those with high digit ratio tend to invest more in their punishment (chapter five). Younger and more symmetrical females make higher offers (chapter six). Finally, responding to partner's degree of facial symmetry, subjects either adopt an empathetic approach and offer more to an asymmetrical opposite-sexed partner, or express their attraction towards the more symmetrical partner and make a higher offer (chapter seven).
Another game used in anthropological research is the public goods game. Here, a group of three or more are allocated an amount of money, from which they can make a contribution to their group's account. Money in the public account is doubled and divided over all group members. This is followed by a punishment option, where subject could pay to punish another group member. Research using both games is reviewed in chapter two.
This research investigates variations within individuals in two societies, Lebanon and Jamaica, by looking at some biological traits, facial and bodily symmetry, second-to-fourth digit ratio, waist-to-hip ratio and the degree of relatedness shared between the interacting individuals, among other individual traits.
Subjects increase offers when playing with an anonymous close relative, rather than a more distant relative or a member of their community (chapter three). Males with higher bodily asymmetry make higher offers (chapter four). Males with higher digit ratio made higher contributions to a public account (chapter five). Furthermore, females with low digit ratio are more likely to punish while those with high digit ratio tend to invest more in their punishment (chapter five). Younger and more symmetrical females make higher offers (chapter six). Finally, responding to partner's degree of facial symmetry, subjects either adopt an empathetic approach and offer more to an asymmetrical opposite-sexed partner, or express their attraction towards the more symmetrical partner and make a higher offer (chapter seven).
Note
(type = degree)
Ph.D.
Note
(type = bibliography)
Includes bibliographical references (p. 144-158).
Subject
(authority = RUETD)
Topic
Anthropology
Subject
(authority = LCSH)
Topic
Economics
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TitleInfo
Title
Graduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Identifier
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rucore19991600001
Identifier
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http://hdl.rutgers.edu/1782.2/rucore10001600001.ETD.13449
Identifier
ETD_159
Identifier
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doi:10.7282/T3416XHV
Location
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NjNbRU
Subject
(authority = lcsh/lcnaf)
Geographic
Lebanon
Subject
(authority = lcsh/lcnaf)
Geographic
Jamaica
Genre
(authority = ExL-Esploro)
ETD doctoral
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The author owns the copyright to this work.
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Copyright protected
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Open
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Name
Darine Zaatari
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Copyright holder
Affiliation
Rutgers University. Graduate School-New Brunswick
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Non-exclusive ETD license
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Author Agreement License
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I hereby grant to the Rutgers University Libraries and to my school the non-exclusive right to archive, reproduce and distribute my thesis or dissertation, in whole or in part, and/or my abstract, in whole or in part, in and from an electronic format, subject to the release date subsequently stipulated in this submittal form and approved by my school. I represent and stipulate that the thesis or dissertation and its abstract are my original work, that they do not infringe or violate any rights of others, and that I make these grants as the sole owner of the rights to my thesis or dissertation and its abstract. I represent that I have obtained written permissions, when necessary, from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis or dissertation and will supply copies of such upon request by my school. I acknowledge that RU ETD and my school will not distribute my thesis or dissertation or its abstract if, in their reasonable judgment, they believe all such rights have not been secured. I acknowledge that I retain ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use all or part of this thesis or dissertation in future works, such as articles or books.
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