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Defending wireless networks from radio interference attacks
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Xu, Wenyuan Veronica. Defending wireless networks from radio interference attacks. Retrieved from https://doi.org/doi:10.7282/T3RJ4JW7

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Uniform TitleDefending wireless networks from radio interference attacks
NameXu, Wenyuan Veronica (author); Trappe, Wade (chair); Zhang, Yanyong (co-chair); Raychaudhuri, Dipankar (internal member); Gruteser, Marco (internal member); Horne, William (outside member); Rutgers University; Graduate School - New Brunswick
Date Created2007
Other Date2007 (degree)
SubjectElectrical and Computer Engineering, Wireless communication systems, Sensor networks, Radio--Interference
Extentxii, 132 pages
DescriptionWireless networks are built upon a shared medium that makes it easy for adversaries to conduct radio interference, or jamming attacks, which effectively cause a denial of service (DoS)
of either transmission or reception functionalities. These attacks can be easily accomplished by an adversary by either bypassing MAC-layer protocols, or emitting a radio signal targeted at jamming a particular channel. In this thesis, we examine the issue of
jamming wireless networks, and sensor networks in particular, by studying both the attack and defense side of the problem. On the attack side, we present four different jamming attack models that can be used by an adversary to disable the operation of a wireless network, and evaluate their effectiveness in terms of how each
method affects the ability of a wireless node to send and receive packets. In order to cope with the problem of jamming, we discuss a two-phase strategy involving the diagnosis of the attack, followed by a suitable defense strategy. For detection, we show that single measurement statistics are not enough to reliably classify the
presence of a jamming attack, and propose multimodal detection methods. To cope with jamming, we propose a technique, channel
surfing, which involves evading the interferer in the spectral domain. Several different channel surfing models are presented, and we evaluate their effectiveness using a testbed of MICA2 motes.
Beyond channel surfing, we overview a second defense strategy whereby it is possible to establish a low data rate jamming resistant communication channel by modulating the interarrival times between jammed packets.
NotePh.D.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references (p. 125-130).
Genretheses, ETD doctoral
Persistent URLhttps://doi.org/doi:10.7282/T3RJ4JW7
LanguageEnglish
CollectionGraduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.
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