RUcore: Rutgers University Community Repository
Ontology, quantification, and fundamentality
Descriptive
TitleInfo
(displayLabel = Citation Title);
(type = uniform)
Title
Ontology, quantification, and fundamentality
Name
(ID = NAME001);
(type = personal)
NamePart
(type = family)
Turner
NamePart
(type = given)
Jason Theodore
DisplayForm
Jason Theodore Turner
Role
RoleTerm
(authority = RUETD)
author
Name
(ID = NAME002);
(type = personal)
NamePart
(type = family)
Sider
NamePart
(type = given)
Theodore
Affiliation
Advisory Committee
DisplayForm
Theodore Sider
Role
RoleTerm
(authority = RULIB)
chair
Name
(ID = NAME003);
(type = personal)
NamePart
(type = family)
Hawthorne
NamePart
(type = given)
John
Affiliation
Advisory Committee
DisplayForm
John P. Hawthorne
Role
RoleTerm
(authority = RULIB)
internal member
Name
(ID = NAME004);
(type = personal)
NamePart
(type = family)
Zimmerman
NamePart
(type = given)
Dean
Affiliation
Advisory Committee
DisplayForm
Dean W. Zimmerman
Role
RoleTerm
(authority = RULIB)
internal member
Name
(ID = NAME005);
(type = personal)
NamePart
(type = family)
Dorr
NamePart
(type = given)
Cian
Affiliation
Advisory Committee
DisplayForm
Cian Dorr
Role
RoleTerm
(authority = RULIB)
outside member
Name
(ID = NAME006);
(type = corporate)
NamePart
Rutgers University
Role
RoleTerm
(authority = RULIB)
degree grantor
Name
(ID = NAME007);
(type = corporate)
NamePart
Graduate School - New Brunswick
Role
RoleTerm
(authority = RULIB)
school
TypeOfResource
Text
Genre
(authority = marcgt)
theses
OriginInfo
DateCreated
(qualifier = exact)
2008
DateOther
(qualifier = exact);
(type = degree)
2008-05
Language
LanguageTerm
English
PhysicalDescription
Form
(authority = marcform)
electronic
InternetMediaType
application/pdf
InternetMediaType
text/xml
Extent
xii, 234 pages
Abstract
The structuralist conception of metaphysics holds that it aims to uncover the ultimate structure of reality and explain how the world's richness and variety are accounted for by that ultimate structure. On this conception, metaphysicians produce fundamental theories, the primitive, undefined expressions of
which are supposed to 'carve reality at its joints', as it were.
On this conception, ontological questions are understood as questions about what there is, where the existential quantifier 'there is' has a fundamental, joint-carving interpretation. Structuralist orthodoxy holds that there is
exactly one fundamental, joint-carving interpretation that an existential quantifier could have (cf. Sider 2008: ยง10).
This orthodox assumption could go wrong--either by there being too few fundamental-quantifier interpretations, or by there being too many. In this dissertation I examine the implications of these non-orthodox options.
Someone who thinks there are too many fundamental-quantifier interpretations might think this means standard ontological debates are in some sense defective of 'merely verbal', or she might think instead that the different quantifiers show that there are different 'ways' or 'modes' of being. I argue that the first option runs into problems with a certain sort of realism about logic, but that there is no general problem with the second option, despite its longstanding bad philosophical reputation. I also argue that realism about logic gives us reason to think the dispute between someone who thinks there are
many 'modes of being' in this sense and someone who thinks there is just one is not itself verbal. Finally, I turn to the case in which there are no fundamental quantifiers, arguing that it brings with it a host of theoretical problems we could avoid with quantifiers.
which are supposed to 'carve reality at its joints', as it were.
On this conception, ontological questions are understood as questions about what there is, where the existential quantifier 'there is' has a fundamental, joint-carving interpretation. Structuralist orthodoxy holds that there is
exactly one fundamental, joint-carving interpretation that an existential quantifier could have (cf. Sider 2008: ยง10).
This orthodox assumption could go wrong--either by there being too few fundamental-quantifier interpretations, or by there being too many. In this dissertation I examine the implications of these non-orthodox options.
Someone who thinks there are too many fundamental-quantifier interpretations might think this means standard ontological debates are in some sense defective of 'merely verbal', or she might think instead that the different quantifiers show that there are different 'ways' or 'modes' of being. I argue that the first option runs into problems with a certain sort of realism about logic, but that there is no general problem with the second option, despite its longstanding bad philosophical reputation. I also argue that realism about logic gives us reason to think the dispute between someone who thinks there are
many 'modes of being' in this sense and someone who thinks there is just one is not itself verbal. Finally, I turn to the case in which there are no fundamental quantifiers, arguing that it brings with it a host of theoretical problems we could avoid with quantifiers.
Note
(type = degree)
Ph.D.
Note
(type = bibliography)
Includes bibliographical references (p. 224-233).
Subject
(ID = SUBJ1);
(authority = RUETD)
Topic
Philosophy
Subject
(ID = SUBJ2);
(authority = ETD-LCSH)
Topic
Ontology
Subject
(ID = SUBJ3);
(authority = ETD-LCSH)
Topic
Metaphysics
RelatedItem
(type = host)
TitleInfo
Title
Graduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Identifier
(type = local)
rucore19991600001
Identifier
(type = hdl)
http://hdl.rutgers.edu/1782.2/rucore10001600001.ETD.17063
Identifier
ETD_791
Location
PhysicalLocation
(authority = marcorg);
(displayLabel = Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey)
NjNbRU
Identifier
(type = doi)
doi:10.7282/T33J3DB4
Genre
(authority = ExL-Esploro)
ETD doctoral
Back to the top
Rights
RightsDeclaration
(AUTHORITY = GS);
(ID = rulibRdec0006)
The author owns the copyright to this work.
Copyright
Status
Copyright protected
Availability
Status
Open
AssociatedEntity
(AUTHORITY = rulib);
(ID = 1)
Name
Jason Turner
Role
Copyright holder
Affiliation
Rutgers University. Graduate School - New Brunswick
RightsEvent
(AUTHORITY = rulib);
(ID = 1)
Type
Permission or license
Detail
Non-exclusive ETD license
AssociatedObject
(AUTHORITY = rulib);
(ID = 1)
Type
License
Name
Author Agreement License
Detail
I hereby grant to the Rutgers University Libraries and to my school the non-exclusive right to archive, reproduce and distribute my thesis or dissertation, in whole or in part, and/or my abstract, in whole or in part, in and from an electronic format, subject to the release date subsequently stipulated in this submittal form and approved by my school. I represent and stipulate that the thesis or dissertation and its abstract are my original work, that they do not infringe or violate any rights of others, and that I make these grants as the sole owner of the rights to my thesis or dissertation and its abstract. I represent that I have obtained written permissions, when necessary, from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis or dissertation and will supply copies of such upon request by my school. I acknowledge that RU ETD and my school will not distribute my thesis or dissertation or its abstract if, in their reasonable judgment, they believe all such rights have not been secured. I acknowledge that I retain ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use all or part of this thesis or dissertation in future works, such as articles or books.
Back to the top
Technical
Format
(TYPE = mime);
(VERSION = )
application/x-tar
FileSize
(UNIT = bytes)
750080
Checksum
(METHOD = SHA1)
1ddb486f345379f3f4ec1fdb3e3de8e02015c2ea
ContentModel
ETD
CompressionScheme
other
OperatingSystem
(VERSION = 5.1)
windows xp
Format
(TYPE = mime);
(VERSION = NULL)
application/x-tar
Back to the top
Statistical Profile