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THE MEDIA-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA'S
MEDIA COVERAGE OF FOREIGN POLICY

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Media-Government Relations: Comparative Analysis of the United States,
South Korea and North Korea's Media Coverage of Foreign Policy

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The purpose of this research is to evaluate the media-government relations through a comparative analysis of the United States, North Korea, and South Korea's news media coverage of foreign policy between 2000 and 2001 during which the three nations were actively involved in diplomatic talks, but failed. This study observes how reporting of foreign policy supports or challenges a government by analyzing themes, news sources, opinion direction, and media representation, and explores what determines the role of the news media in relation to government.

Content analysis is conducted to measure media attention, valence, news source, and media representation. Media attention is measured by grouping the thematic frequency into 48 bi-weekly intervals. Valence (opinion direction) is assigned to all voices appeared in a news story in accordance with its consistency with a nation's foreign policy. A nation's foreign policy is conceptualized on the basis of a President's frame of reference in order to distinguish a government's perspective from other contending forces' perspectives.

The research is conducted based on two key concerns and questions. First, there is a concern that the media reporting of foreign policy is constrained by a government. If so, how can the policy be contested by different forces? Second, if each nation's journalism practice represents a unique mode of media and political system, how can the role of media in relation to government be compared?

This study found that first, the role the news media shifts in the range from a site of struggle to a site of ideological reproduction, depending on the existence of political challenge and the construction of critical media discourse. Second, when a nation's foreign policy addresses national interests, it gains the support of its public. However, it has no guarantee to be equally supported by other nations if there is a conflict between two nations' interests. Constituting hegemony within a national boundary is not tantamount to constituting the same hegemony in the international community. The disparity between two nations' interests can cause damage to the leadership when it becomes a critical media discourse.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
LIST OF TABLES	x
LIST OF APPENDICES	xvi
Chapter I INTRODUCTION	
A. Purpose of the Study	1
B. Rationale	5
C. Significance of the Study	11
D. Theoretical Assumptions	13
E. Research Questions and Hypotheses	15
Chapter II LITERATURE REVIEW	
A. Comparison of Media Systems	17
1. South Korean Press System	17
2. North Korean Press System	21
3. The U.S. Press System	24
B. Media-Government Relations	27
1. Structural Perspective	29
2. Ideological Perspective	38
C. Hegemony	
1. Definition	43

2. State and Civil Society	46
3. Relation of Forces	46
4. National Interests	48
D. News Sources	49
E. Representation	55
Chapter III HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	
A. Summary	57
B. U S. Foreign Policy over the Korean Peninsula	61
C. The US-North Korea: Nuclear Diplomacy	66
D. The <i>Sunshine</i> Policy	71
E. The US-South Korea Economic Relations	76
Chapter IV METHODOLOGY	83
A. Flow of Data Analysis	84
B. Analysis Procedure	84
1. Sample	85
2. Sampling Procedure	86
3. Unit of Analysis	88
C. Variables and Operationalization	88
1. Themes	88
a. Thematic Variables	89
b. Operational Definition of Thematic Variables	91
2. News Sources	94
a. <i>The New York Times</i>	95

b. <i>Donga Ilbo</i>	96
c. <i>Rodong Sinmun</i>	97
3. Media Representation	97
a. Media Representation of Nations	97
b. Media Representation of Leaders	99
c. Operational Definition of Nations	100
d. Operational Definition of Leaders	102
D. President's Frame of Reference	
1. W. J. Clinton's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula	102
2. G. W. Bush's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula	104
3. Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy	106
4. Kim Jong-Il's Policy toward South Korea and the U.S.	107
E. Reliability	108
Chapter V FINDINGS FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY	
A. Comparison of Three Newspapers' Reporting Pattern	111
B. Comparison of Thematic Issue Construction	114
C. Comparison of News Source	122
D. Impact of International Relations	134
E. Media Representation of Nations and Leaders	150
F. Impact of Challenge on Politics	157
Chapter VI DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS	
A. Discussions	160
1. Role of News Media	161

2. Construction of Critical Media Discourse	164
3. Selection of News Source	170
4. Impact of International Relations	179
5. Media Representation and Ideological Struggle	187
6. Government Constraints?	191
B. Conclusions	194
1. Political Challenge	195
2. Construction of Thematic Issue	198
3. News Sources	201
C. Limitations and Recommendations	205
REFERENCES	207
TABLES	213
APPENDICES	263
VITA	277

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Number	Title	Page Number
1	Differences in Average Newspaper Scores for Positive and Negative Sources and Opinion Direction	112
2	Comparison of TNT and OPD in 48 bi-weekly Intervals in <i>Donga Ilbo</i>	136
3	Comparison of <i>Donga Ilbo</i> News Sources referring US-SK Relations and Diplomatic Strategy	140
4	Comparison of <i>Donga Ilbo</i> News Sources referring US-SK Relations and DJ Governance	140
5	Comparison of <i>Donga Ilbo</i> News Sources referring US-SK Relations and Ideological Conflicts	140
6	Comparison of TNT and OPD in 48 bi-weekly Intervals in the <i>NYT</i>	143
7	Comparison of the <i>NYT</i> Total Sources referring SK-NK Relations and US-NK Relations	145
8	Comparison of TNT and OPD in 48 bi-weekly Intervals in <i>Rodong Sinmun</i>	149
9.	Diagram featuring the Role of the News Media in Relation with Government	196

LIST OF TABLES

Table Number	Title	Page Number
1	Mean Value of Total Number of Themes (TNT), Total Sources (TS), Total Positive Sources (TPS), Total Negative Sources (TNS), and Opinion Direction (OPD) among Three Newspapers	112
2	Correlations among TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD in <i>Donga Ilbo</i>	213
3	Correlations among TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD in the <i>NYT</i>	214
4	Correlation among TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD in <i>Rodong Sinmun</i>	215
5	Lists of Themes issued in <i>Donga Ilbo</i> News and Editorials during 2000 and 2001	216
6	List of Themes issued in the <i>NYT</i> News and Editorials during 2000 and 2001	217
7	List of Themes issued in <i>Rodong Sinmun</i> during 2000 and 2001	218
8	Summary of Regression Analysis for Thematic Issues Predicting the Reporter's Selection of Positive Sources in <i>Donga Ilbo</i>	219
9	The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors with TPS in <i>Donga Ilbo</i>	220

10	Summary of Regression Analysis for Thematic Issues Predicting the Reporter's Selection of Negative Sources in <i>Donga Ilbo</i>	221
11	The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors with TNS in <i>Donga Ilbo</i>	222
12	Summary of Regression Analysis for Thematic Issues Predicting the Reporter's Selection of a Positive Source in the <i>NYT</i>	223
13	The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors with TPS in the <i>NYT</i>	224
14	Summary of Regression Analysis for Thematic Issues Predicting the Reporter's Selection of Negative Sources in the <i>NYT</i>	225
15	The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors with TNS in the <i>NYT</i>	226
16	Summary of Regression Analysis for Thematic Issues Predicting the Reporter's Selection of Negative Sources in <i>Rodong Sinmun</i>	227
17	The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors with TNS in <i>Rodong Sinmun</i>	228
18	Frequency Distribution of TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD of each Group of News Sources in <i>Donga Ilbo</i>	229

19	Frequency Distribution of News Sources Referring Each Theme Issued in <i>Donga Ilbo</i> between 2000 and 2001	230
20	Ratio of Positive to Negative Sources Referring Each Theme Issued in <i>Donga Ilbo</i>	231
21	Opinion Direction of News Sources Referring each Theme Issued in <i>Donga Ilbo</i>	232
22	Frequency Distribution of TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD of each Group of News Sources in the <i>NYT</i>	233
23	Frequency Distribution of News Sources Referring each Theme Issued in the <i>NYT</i> between 2000 and 2001	234
24	Ratio of Positive to Negative Sources Referring each Theme Issued in the <i>NYT</i>	235
25	Opinion Direction of News Sources Referring each Theme Issued in the <i>NYT</i>	236
26	Distribution of TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD in Government-related Anonymous Attribution in <i>Donga Ilbo</i>	237
27	Distribution of TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD in Government-related Anonymous Attribution in the <i>NYT</i>	238
28	Frequency Distribution of TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD of each Group of News Sources in <i>Rodong Sinmun</i>	239
29	Frequency Distribution of News Sources Referring each Theme Issued in <i>Rodong Sinmun</i> between 2000 and 2001	240

30	Ratio of Positive to Negative Sources Referring each Theme Issued in <i>Rodong Sinmun</i>	241
31	Opinion Direction of News Sources Referring each Theme Issued in <i>Rodong Sinmun</i>	242
32	Differences in the Mean Value of TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD in <i>Donga Ilbo</i> between the Clinton and the Bush Administration	136
33	Differences in the Mean Value of TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD for 6 most frequently issued Themes in <i>Donga Ilbo</i> between the Clinton and the Bush Administration	137
34	Differences in Mean Values of TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD in the <i>NYT</i> between the Clinton and the Bush Administration	142
35	Differences in the Mean Value of TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD for 6 most frequently issued Themes in the <i>NYT</i>	144
36	Differences in Mean Values of TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD in <i>Rodong Sinmun</i> between the Clinton and the Bush Administration	147
37	Comparison of <i>Donga Ilbo</i> Representation of North Korea between 2000 and 2001	243
38	Comparison of <i>Donga Ilbo</i> Representation of Kim Jong-Il between 2000 and 2001	244
39	Comparison of <i>Donga Ilbo</i> Representation of the U.S. between 2000 and 2001	245
40	Comparison of <i>Donga Ilbo</i> Representation of South Korea between 2000 and 2001	246

41	Comparison of <i>Donga Ilbo</i> Representation of Kim Dae Jung between 2000 and 2001	247
42	Comparison of the <i>NYT</i> Representation of North Korea between 2000 and 2001	248
43	Comparison of the <i>NYT</i> Representation of Kim Jong-Il between 2000 and 2001	249
44	Comparison of the <i>NYT</i> Representation of South Korea between 2000 and 2001	250
45	Comparison of the <i>NYT</i> Representation of Kim Dae Jung between 2000 and 2001	251
46	Comparison of the <i>NYT</i> Representation of the U.S. between 2000 and 2001	252
47	The <i>NYT</i> Representation of President G. W. Bush	253
48	Comparison of <i>Rodong Sinmun</i> Representation of the U.S. between 2000 and 2001	254
49	<i>Rodong Sinmun</i> Representation of G. W. Bush	255
50	Comparison of <i>Rodong Sinmun</i> Representation of South Korea between 2000 and 2001	256
51	Comparison of <i>Rodong Sinmun</i> Representation of Kim Dae Jung Between 2000 and 2001	257
52	Comparison of <i>Rodong Sinmun</i> Representation of North Korea Between 2000 and 2001	258
53	<i>Rodong Sinmun</i> Representation of Kim Jong-Il	259

54	Primary Cause of Political Challenge to Kim Dae Jung Government and its Impact on Politics reflected in <i>Donga Ilbo</i> between 2000 and 2001	260
55	Primary Cause of Political Challenge to the U.S. Policy over the Korean Peninsula and its Impact on Politics reflected in the <i>NYT</i> during 2000 and 2001	261
56	Primary Cause of Political Challenge to North Korea and its Impact on Politics Reflected in <i>Rodong Sinmun</i> 2000 and 2001	262

LIST OF APPENDICES

<u>Appendix Letter</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page Number</u>
A	Coding Protocol for the News Media Coverage of Foreign Policy and International Relations	263
B	President's Frame of Reference in a Nation's Foreign Policy	264
C	Coding Sheet	268

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the role of the news media through comparative analysis of the United States, North Korea, and South Korea's news media coverage of foreign policies and international affairs. In this research, I observe how the media coverage of a nation's foreign policy supports or challenges a government and a President's leadership through the analysis of themes, news sources, opinion direction, and media representation. By analyzing these factors, this study explores what determines the role of the news media in relation to government and if there is a difference and a similarity in the role of the news media developed in different political contexts. Additionally the study explores the influence of international relations in the reporting of foreign policy by comparing the cases of three nations that are actively involved in diplomatic talks, which failed, between 2000 and 2001.

The media-government relation is studied based on the following assumptions. First, it is assumed that the role of the news media is changing, depending on whether there are contending forces to contest their particular visions and representations of the world. Second, reporters use narratives in making a news story and the narratives as texts are elements of social events that entail ideological effects. The narratives consist of themes, news sources, and media representation.

The Gramscian concept of hegemony will be examined in this research. Different from hegemony studies asserting that a ruling class constitutes a dominant ideology, this research focuses on how contending forces' perspectives are contested in the media as a

site of struggle based on the idea that the process of contestation cannot be separated from the process of domination. In this sense, the news media are not merely regarded as a tool for a dominant ruling class, but a site where issues are brought up and conflicts are resolved through the legitimization process. Concerning the prevalent concept of hegemony as an ideological domination process, Schudson (2000) said that ‘hegemony’ explains far too much and this implies that it fails to explain specific details in a meaningful way. Handy a concept as it has sometimes been, it requires more critical consideration and more subtle deployment. He therefore argued that, since ideology in contemporary capitalism is contested terrain, the question is to ask what role the media play in the midst of or in relationship to social change (pp. 180-181).

There are two major concerns in the relationship between the news media and government. One is the belief that the news media coverage of foreign policy and international affairs is constrained by a government and its political ideology. Such belief implies concern for so-called professional journalism, particularly, in the role of the news media toward a government. Another concern is that the relationship between the news media and government is difficult to be generalized by using any single theoretical model due to the difference in each nation’s political and cultural context. Esser and Pfetsch (2004) contend that comparative analysis provides an antidote to naïve universalism, countering the tendency to presume that political communication findings from one’s own country also apply to other countries. It thereby helps to prevent parochialism and ethnocentrism (p. 384).

Therefore, this research attempts to respond to the following questions. First, if reporting of a nation’s foreign policy and international affairs is constrained by a

government, how can a government and its policy be contested by different forces?

Second, if each nation's journalism practice represents a unique mode of media and political system, how can the role of the media in relation to government be compared?

That is, what factors determine or influence the role of news media in relation to government?

Content analysis is conducted to measure media attention, valence, news source, and media representation. It is based on the following assumptions. First, a reporter uses narratives in making a news story and the narratives as texts are elements of social events that entail ideological effects. Second, government is not only a news source but is also a topic of news itself. Therefore, the relationship between the media and government should be observed from multiple dimensions.

Attention is the most common approach for measuring media salience and is usually gauged by the sheer volume of stories in newspapers. To evaluate the degree of attention, an individual story is categorized into each thematic issue and arranged into 48 bi-weekly intervals. It is based on the following assumptions. First, a nation's foreign policy reflects various aspects of national interest and each aspect of foreign policy receives a different degree of media attention. Second, the amount of media coverage in each interval indicates the level of media attention.

Valence as the emotional attributes of news story is gauged by averaging the total sources' opinion toward each thematic issue. Each source's opinion direction is measured in accordance with a government's foreign policy. A nation's foreign policy is conceptualized on the basis of a President's frame of reference which consists of the President's assumptions on national interests, threats, goals, and strategies. The average

score of total sources' opinion direction becomes an operationalization of the degree of the media supportiveness of a government's foreign policy. A president's frame of reference is extracted from inaugural speeches, State of the Union addresses, National Security reports, and other foreign policy-related documents. The summary of each nation's foreign policy are provided in the coding protocol. (Appendix B)

A news source contributes to determining who is responsible for a news agenda. Reporters select news sources to legitimize their narratives in accordance with thematic issues. Schudson (1995) states that, although a news story requires to answer the questions who, what, when, where, and why, understanding news as culture requires asking of news writing what categories of people count as who, what kinds of things pass for facts or what, what geography and sense of time are inscribed as where and when, and what counts as explanation of why (p. 14). Among many framing factors, the selection of a news source is one of the most significant methods for reporters to enhance the objective value of their stories. But, for this very reason, it could be the most strategically contrived way of naturalizing the public perception of world events. In this sense a reporter's selection of a news source is regarded as one way of controlling the issue.

Media representation of each others nation and leader is explored in connection with the media reporting of foreign policy. Fairclough (2003) claimed that media representation is a social practice through which people establish the relationship between two entities. It is a media's ideological work that contributes to establishing, maintaining, and changing social relations of power and domination (p. 27). In this sense, the media representation is regarded as part of ideological struggles.

As sample data, this research observes the three nations' mainstream newspaper

coverage of foreign policies between 2000 and 2001 during which the three nations were active in diplomatic talks that, however, failed. The selection of mainstream newspaper as sample data is advantageous in evaluating the media-government relations because the behavior of leading press organizations set professional press standards and influence the daily news agenda in comparison with local news outlets focusing more on the local interests and tastes (Bennett, 1990, p. 106).

B. Rationale

There are two reasons to explore comparative analysis of three nations' media coverage of a nation's foreign policy and international affairs. One rationale comes from the concern over the assertion that reporting of foreign policy is constrained by government. Another rationale comes from a comparative analysis perspective arguing that the study of media-state relations heavily depends on the works of the Western hemisphere and, therefore, does not fit to the media-state relations in nations having different political, economic, and cultural systems.

Rationale 1. Rationale one comes from the concern over the assertion that reporting of foreign policy and international affairs is constrained by government. The passive journalism practice in reporting of foreign policy was often criticized by claiming that the issue in foreign policy is more likely debated within the elite circle (Cohen, 1963; Brown et al. 1987; Bennett, 1990). The media's subordination to a government has been studied from structural, organizational, and ideological perspectives arguing that the journalism practice (professional journalism) in relation to government is problematic.

However, the sourcing pattern in reporting of foreign policy practically supported an elite pluralistic perspective rather than a classical democratic perspective, focusing on

diversity of debate within set parameters (Brown, 1987), and the media-government relation in the field of foreign policy is explored from an interactive perspective, arguing that although the role of the news media is not totally independent and autonomous from government pressure, the two entities influence each other in producing news in the field of foreign policy (Robinson, 2002; Entman, 2004). Therefore, Entman (2004) argues that the more important aspect of this relationship is the degree of association: Does it become cozier in some conditions than in others? How exactly is this connection reflected in the news? What are the effects on foreign policy and democratic accountability? (p. 2)

Since Cohen (1963) revealed that the media and government influence each other, although it is not known which institution is stronger, the media-government relation has been studied from various perspectives such as structural, organizational, and ideological perspectives. Various studies supported more a passive role of the media than an active participant role in relation to government.

From a structural perspective, for example, Herman and Chomsky (1988) contended that news sourcing becomes a significant governmental constraint on the news media. The relationship between the media and power sources is symbiotic by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest. Particularly the ideological filter has a profound influence on the mass media to dichotomize the world. “A propaganda approach to media coverage suggests a systematic and highly political dichotomization in news coverage based on serviceability to important domestic power interests” (p. 35).

Hall et al. (1978) contended that the structured relationship between the media and its powerful sources makes the media effectively but objectively play a key role in reproducing the dominant field of ruling ideologies. Therefore, in critical sense, the

media are frequently not the 'primary definers' of news events at all; but their structured relationship to power has the effect of making them play a crucial but secondary role in reproducing the definitions of those who have privileged access (p. 57).

The constraints also come from organizational factors. Concerning the organizational pressure, for example, Sigal (1973) contended that the journalistic conventions and routines developed in the notion of professional journalism became organizational constraints that made reporters vulnerable to manipulation by the government. Examples are objective reporting and authoritative sources (p. 67).

Bennett (1990) found that opinions voiced in news stories came overwhelmingly from government officials both before and after the collapse of congressional opposition, assessing the degree to which the news media achieved a reasonable balance of voices in the news with the case study of media coverage of U.S. policy making on Nicaragua. Among the institutional sources of opposition, Congress was the primary voice which became a base line for the implicit journalistic index operation (pp. 112-119). Based upon these findings, he argued that the version of journalist responsibility (professional journalism) is emerging in the industry as a rhetorical gloss on an underlying indexing norm, signaling an emerging justification for a passive press in a new American democracy. He contended that the indexing hypothesis recasts the liberal journalism thesis; liberal news messages rise with liberal tides in government and fall again with ebbing liberal voices (p. 110)

Several questions are raised regarding these theoretical concerns over the role of the news media in relation to government. First, if 'liberal tides in government' (Bennett, 1990) is conceptualized with a degree of congressional debate, the political and media

phenomenon seen in the polarized pluralist model¹ (e.g., The South Korea media system has been shifted from an authoritarian model to a polarized pluralistic model that is characterized as a low level of consensus and ideological division.) could be regarded as more liberal than U.S. journalism practice characterized by the liberal model². Does journalism practice in the polarized pluralist model provide more pluralistic viewpoints than the one in the liberal model? Or does it just reflect more a one-sided perspective?

Second, when an issue was raised on governmental constraints, was the media dependence on a governmental source at an all time high in reporting of foreign policy and international affairs regardless of differences in media and political context? When a government source is cited, does a reporter more likely interact with a primary government source?

Third, if the media stand in a position of structured subordination to the primary definers (Hall et al., 1978), does it mean that a government is a primary definer in reporting foreign policy and international affairs? If a government is a primary definer and the media reproduce the definition of those who have privileged access, how do opponents challenge a government's policy?

Robinson (2002) criticized the assumption of indexing model where journalists tend only to replicate elite views and cannot play an independent role during debates between elites. He argued that by focusing on the relationship between news sources and

¹ Polarized pluralism is characterized by integration of the media into party politics, weaker historical development of commercial media, and a strong role of the state. The concept is contrasted with moderate pluralism that is more conducive to the development of commercialized and /or professionalized media with less political parallelism and instrumentalization. Sartori (1976) says that in polarized pluralism, cleavages are likely to be very deep. Consensus is surely low, and the legitimacy of the political system is widely questioned. Polarized pluralism tends to be associated with a high degree of political parallelism: newspapers are typically identified with ideological tendencies, and traditions of advocacy and commentary-oriented journalism are often strong (p. 135).

² The liberal model is characterized by a relative dominance of market mechanisms and of commercial media.

journalists' elite manufacturing consent 'black boxes' the dynamics between media coverage and any given policy process, and therefore, tends to ignore the possibility that media might influence policy outcomes during elite debate. He developed the policy-media interaction model that features how the level of elite consensus and the policy certainty within government influenced the media-state relationship, which contributes to two-way understanding of the direction of influence between the news media and the state by showing. (pp. 14-31).

Entman (2004) suggested a more diversified view on the flow of idea from the White House to the rest of the system. By using the metaphor of the cascade, he emphasized that the ability to promote the spread of frames is stratified; some actors have more power than others to push ideas along to the news and then to the public. Each level makes its own contribution to the mix and flow of ideas, while each can be thought of as a network of individuals and organizations. Concerning the role of media, he argued that the growing relative independence of journalism in fact poses a variety of constraints and frustrations to leaders. But in general, while the idea is usually initiated by an administration in the field of foreign policy, actors in each stage respond to it based on their own motivation and interest (p. 11). The main achievement of his work is to break the conception of passive journalism in regard to the reporting of U.S. foreign policy and to establish the interactive model (interaction with each level as well as with among cultural congruence, motivations, power, and strategy). He also advised that the media should provide enough information independent of the executive branch that citizens can construct their own counterframes on issues and events (p. 17).

Therefore, the role of the news media in this research will be reconsidered not as a

dependent variable in relations to government, but as an independent social institution interacting with a government.

Rationale 2. The second rationale comes from a comparative analysis perspective on each nation's media system. The various media systems cannot be compared by normative theory that designates the proper role of the media in specific political and cultural systems. Furthermore, the media-government relation is difficult to be generalized by one paradigm or one model because each nation's media system has been developed within a different political, economic, and cultural context. Hallin and Mancini (2004) contend that most of the literature on the media is highly ethnocentric, in the sense that it refers only to the experience of a single country, yet is written in general terms, as though the model that prevailed in that country were universal. It is true in the countries with the most developed media scholarship; in countries with less developed traditions of media research, another pattern often emerges – tendency to borrow the literature of other countries and to treat that borrowed literature as though it could be applied unproblematically anywhere (p. 2). For this reason, comparative analysis is valuable to verify if theories developed in one area account various media phenomena developed in different political systems.

However, the question raised in a comparative analysis is if a journalism practice represents a unique mode of media and political system, how can the media-government relation be compared? It would be natural, for example, for reporters in a communist state to write news from their own perspectives and to believe it as the best form of newsmaking because they learned that reporters should be political agents for governing and educating people, although it was labeled propaganda and agitation by others. Since

each nation-state's journalism functions in its own value system, it is difficult to compare and judge which mode of journalism practice is specifically idealistic. It is especially true if we consider that, no matter what type of state governs a society, one thing in common in the media-government relation is that the news media inevitably confront governmental pressure because "governmental attempts to control and manipulate the media are universal because governments throughout the world believe media effects are important political forces" (Graber, 1980, p. 16). The difference in value system and the fundamental question in journalism practice raise the following issue: "How can we compare various nations' news media?"

Therefore, rather than judging which society is better informed through an idealistic journalism practice, this research focuses on analyzing universal components of newsmaking: theme, news source, opinion direction, and media representation. It is based on the assumption is that, although a philosophical foundation varies in different media systems, the philosophy would be inscribed in each system's journalism practice, 'reporting'. No matter what media systems and journalistic conventions have been developed in various political and historical contexts, the main components of newsmaking that reporters take are universal. Therefore, it is believed that the analysis of newsmaking components distinguishes a similarity and a difference in journalism practices performed in one political system from another.

C. Significance of the Study

This research is significant in three aspects. First, the role of the news media is examined across different political and media systems that contribute to a broader understanding of the media-government relation. The three nations are different from

each other in the media and political systems. First of all, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States are distinguished by two different political systems: a communist state and a liberal democratic state. Secondly, in regard to the media system, South Korea and the United States are characterized by the polarized pluralistic model and the liberal model respectively, whereas North Korea takes the Soviet model. Furthermore, the diplomatic interlink among the three nations between 2000 and 2001 was advantageous for this research to observe any possible effect of the changing international relations on the media-government relation. Therefore, this empirical comparative analysis will be a valuable case study for the re-evaluation of the media-government relation.

Second, the role of the news media in this research is evaluated not just through the sourcing pattern but the total newsmaking process: theme, news source, opinion direction, and media representation. In terms of subjectivity, for government, a government itself is an information provider and the media are the efficient channel for advocating and promoting its policy. However, for the media, a government is not only a news source but is also a topic of news itself. For this reason, saying that a government as an accredited source has the privilege of access to the media could not account the nature of the news media, particularly, when the media claim its legitimacy on the basis of professional journalism that is inscribed in a reporter's newsmaking process. Therefore, the relationship between the two entities should be evaluated from various aspects of newsmaking process.

Third, this research focuses on the news media's relationship with a government that specifically refers to the Executive branch. It is based on the assumption that the Executive branch is different in its nature and relationship with the news media from

other branches in the state (Cohen, 1963; Entman, 2004). Particularly in the field of foreign policy, the range of voices appearing in the news is much narrower than the one in domestic news, which is nevertheless rationalized in an elite pluralistic perspective (Brown et al, 1987). For this reason, taking all three branches as one unit (the state) diminishes the dynamics of interaction and results in reductionism (e.g., passive press) in the media-state relation, which justifies the analytic framework of this research.

D. Theoretical Assumptions

The study begins with the following assumptions. First, the role of the news media in relation to government is changing. According to Hallin (1986), the journalist's world is divided into three regions: the sphere of consensus, the sphere of legitimate controversy, and the sphere of deviance, and each of which is governed by different journalist standards. The sphere of legitimate controversy is the region of province of objectivity. However, within the sphere of legitimate controversy, the practice of objective journalism varies considerably. Near the border of the sphere of consensus, journalists practice the kind of objective journalism that involves a straight recitation of official statements. As the news deals with issues on which consensus is weaker, the principle of balance is increasingly emphasized (pp. 116-118). Hallin and Mancini (2004) also argued that, although the journalism practice in the sphere of consensus (celebrating consensus values) is one of important functions of the news media, the function is often obscured by emphasizing the normative ideal of the neutral and independent watchdog in the liberal model. The gap between ideal and reality is far greater in countries where journalists express allegiance to the liberal model of neutrality and objectivity, while the actual practice of journalism is deeply rooted in partisan advocacy traditions (p. 13).

The shift in the role of the news media from the sphere of consensus to the sphere of legitimate controversy occurs in the moment of crisis. Crisis is the moment when hegemony occurs as a contingent intervention. Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) called hegemony the response to a crisis (p. 7). Habermas (1973) argues that political crisis is the moment that the originally constructed consensus becomes contested through a discursive justification process through which a justified consensus emerged (p. xvi). As an example of crisis suggested in empirical researches, Berry (1990), in analyzing the *New York Times*' coverage of U.S. foreign policy, says that the press becomes critical when a president's foreign policy is at the stage when its outcome is known and it has become a failure. Failure is the sunlight that illuminates foreign policy performance and unleashes a critical press (p. xiii).

The second assumption is that reporters use narratives in making a news story and the narratives as texts are elements of social events that entail ideological effects. There are two causal 'powers' which shape texts: on the one hand, social structures (languages) and social practices (orders of discourse, articulation, frame); on the other hand, social agents, the people involved in social events (Archer, 1995; Sayer, 2000; Fairclough, 2003). The causality here is not simple mechanical causality or implying predictable regularities. The language as part of social structures becomes filter through which we make sense of the political world. Social practices (orders of discourse, articulation, and frame) that journalists adopt are in part a function of the lenses through which reporters view the world and their conception of their roles in the political process at a given moment (Jamieson & Waldman, 2003). Here we can see that, in the newsmaking process, reporters work as social agents, while narratives are regarded as social practices. The

important point about social practices is that reporters as social agents shape social events through narratives as social practices. It is what Fairclough (2003) argues that social events are causally shaped by social practices – social practices defined as particular ways of acting and although actual events may more or less diverge from these definitions and expectations, they are still partly shaped by them. One of the causal effects of texts is ideological effects, which are entailed through dialectical relations of identification and representation that are part of texts and can be seen through whole texts (pp. 25-27).

F. Research Questions and Hypotheses

Questions

- Q1: If reporting of a nation's foreign policy is constrained by a government, how can a government and its policy be contested by different forces? That is, how can opposite forces' opinions or ideas become a dominant discourse to influence a direction of policy? South Korea's *Sunshine* policy turned out to be a failure in 2001, although President Kim received the Nobel peace prize at the end of 2000 for his effort to bring reconciliation to the Korean peninsula. President Clinton's engagement policy toward North Korea was portrayed in the media as a U.S. diplomatic triumph in 2000; nevertheless, this was not picked up by the Bush administration.
- Q2: If the role of the news media is differently conceptualized by different political systems, how can we compare and discriminate the role of the media developed in different national contexts? Is there a common factor that influences the role of the media in relation to government?

Hypotheses

- H1: The degree of salience (attention and valence) in a policy issue correlates to the reporter's use of a news source.
- H2: A nation's foreign policy reflects various aspects of national interests. Different thematic issues of foreign policy affect the reporter's use of a news source differently.
- H3: The ratio of positive to negative sources quoted in a thematic issue can be an index to discriminate the role of the news media in relation to government.
- H4: International relations impose different effects on the news media coverage of foreign policy between two nations.
- H5: The media representation of each others nation and leader changes as a nation's foreign policy changes.
- H6: When political challenge becomes a critical media discourse, it becomes a hegemonic challenge to the leadership.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Section one reviews how each nation's press system has developed in different political, economic, and cultural contexts. Section two provides a literature review on the media-government relation from two perspectives: structural and ideological. Section three reviews the concept of hegemony. Section four is a literature review on news sources. Section five reviews the concept of media representation.

A. Comparison of Press Systems

Each nation's press system has developed in different political, economic, and cultural contexts. That is, each nation's journalism practice reflects its unique mode of media system that has developed in different historical context. The comparison of press systems will help us understand how the media-government relation is similar and different among each others.

1. South Korean Press System

The press system in South Korea could be characterized by the authoritarian model from the 1960s to the 1980s and by the polarized pluralist model from the mid 1980s. The South Korean press is difficult to fit in any single press model because the nation has gone through colonialism, the Cold War, and democratization process throughout the 20th century. Newspapers likewise suffered from ideological repression and partisanship. Therefore, the polarized pluralism of the current South Korean press is not the one rooted in history, but the one resulting in a historical specificity.

The South Korean media began to acquire the features of an industry during the 1960s, when the military regime began to mobilize the media for the purpose of nation-

building. The authoritarian governance in media policy was not strongly resisted due to two conditions: Confucian culture and national security. Although Western models and theories about media had long been accepted as the ideal by media industry, confronting the communist North, the South Korean government's intervention in the press system was not very different from the one in wartime reporting. In general, although democracy was accepted as a new political system and a national ideology, it took time for democracy to become a practical living ideology by experiencing the democratization process.

Setting economic reconstruction and national security as top priorities, the Third Republic repressed the news media by forcing a reorganization of media companies in 1961. In 1974 the Park regime forced journalists who were critical of its rule to resign, 134 journalists had to leave *Donga Ilbo* and 33 did the *Chosun Ilbo*, both of which were leading newspapers at the time. A total of 933 journalists were forced to quit in 1980 (Park, Kim, & Sohn, 2000, p. 113). The Fifth Republic Chun Doo Hwan government passed the Basic Press Act in 1980. Guidelines for reporting existed from 1980 through 1987. Governmental repression continued until the civil society was practically formed to confront the authoritarian governance.

The democratization movement of the 1970s and the 80s finally changed the South Korean political landscape from a military to a civilian system. President Chun promised a peaceful ceding of government power to civilians through changes in election laws. The democratization movement freed the press from government intervention, but put it in another pressure from market economy. Concerning the change of the press system from an authoritarian to a pure market system, Yang (1995) argued that there are

three factors influencing the social role of media: the state, the capital, and the pressure from civil society. While the state intervention and the capital tend to interrupt the freedom of press, the internal pressure of civil society pushes the press to be autonomous (p. 103). Whereas the news media received financial protection at the expense of its freedom, the media confronted market competition by following the rules of capitalism. Newspaper companies liberalized subscription fees and began to compete with each other to attract advertisers. Market competition, however, did not contribute to the diversification of editorials and the market place of ideas, but to sensationalism and partisanship.

In the wake of the democratization process, the news media appeared as a powerful social institution and began to play an important role in shaping a new South Korean political landscape. In a transitional mode of political system from the military-oriented conservatives to the nationalist progressives (for example, when confrontations ruptured between power groups), the news media played a powerful role in politics by forming a partnership with various interest groups. It implied that the newly achieved freedom of the press brought unprecedented power to the news media. Their role was not limited to the role of messenger or watchdog. Yoon (2000) contends that as various interest groups were emerging, the media became a site of struggle by representing all these contending forces; the rising media power over a government during the 1990s attributed to the changing political structure (Korea Press Foundation, 2001, p. 31).

There are ten dailies published in Seoul, thirty two dailies in other provinces; seven economics dailies; two English newspapers and various weeklies in each province. Among these, five national newspapers dominate the entire national market: *Chosun Ilbo*,

Joongang Ilbo, *Donga Ilbo*, *Hankuk Ilbo*, and *Hankyoreh Sinmun*. Among these five mainstream newspapers, *Hankyoreh Sinmun* is the only mainstream newspaper that developed from alternative media. *Hankyoreh Sinmun* was founded in 1988 by journalists dismissed from several established newspapers for political reasons in the 1970s and the 80s. The newspaper shared ideological common ground with the progressives. In both the 1992 and the 1997 presidential elections, *Hankyoreh Sinmun* supported Kim Dae Jung, who became President in 1997.

The tie between politics and the press was salient in South Korea. In the 1990s, *Chosun Ilbo*, supporting President Kim Young Sam in the 1992 presidential election, maintained a relatively favorable relationship with his government. However, in the 1997 election, by supporting Lee Heo Chang of the Grand National Party, which became the major opposition party, *Chosun Ilbo* built tension with the Kim Dae Jung government. This time, *Hankyoreh Sinmun* took the place of *Chosun Ilbo* and functioned as a spokesman for the Kim Dae Jung government in various policy-making processes. Mainstream newspapers in the 1990s tended to have their own political preferences that resulted in the polarized pluralist model.

Polarized pluralism tends to be associated with a high degree of political parallelism. Satori (1976) argues that polarized pluralist systems tend to have political cultures that emphasize ideology understood as a way of perceiving and conceiving politics, and defined, therefore, as a distinctly doctrinaire, principled and high-flown way of focusing on political issues (p. 137). Polarized pluralist societies are also characterized historically by sharp political conflicts often involving changes of regime. The media

typically have been used as instruments of struggle in these conflicts by the contending parties in periods of democratic politics (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 61).

In South Korean society, ideological conflict between the conservatives (*posu*) and the progressives (*chinbo*) could be found everywhere in political and economic reform, anti-communism, the National Security Law, and anti-Americanism. All these problems were the topics of media (mainstream and alternative) discourses as the news media tied with political parties. It implied that, on one hand, society became deeply divided and, on the other hand, an emerging civilian government was not recognized as a powerful governing institution (ruling bloc) yet. In the mean time, the press enjoyed unprecedented power over politics.

2. North Korean Press System

The North Korean media system is generally understood in the framework of the Soviet communist theory of the press as Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1963) discussed. In this political system, political leadership is defined as the ability to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party's policy. Accordingly, mass media are used instrumentally: as an instrument for unity. The media are designed not only to inform the people, but also to serve agitators (leaders) of all groups and, therefore, are characterized by a strictly enforced responsibility.

Differences in the political system between North Korea and the Soviet Union could be found in their philosophical variation. Armstrong (2001) contends that the North Korean state represents the most successful example of the indigenization of Stalinism in the communist world. Established under a Soviet occupation during the period of high Stalinism in the USSR, North Korea reflects the Stalinist model in its

political, economic, and social structures: a centralized party-state, a state-directed economy (rapid industrialization through a centralized state planning system) and a wide range of large-scale social organizations linked and subservient to the ruling party (p. 44). Later, by merging with *Juche* (self-reliance) ideology as North Korea's guiding political principle based on Confucianism from the 1960s onward, the macro-family unit shifted almost exclusively to the North Korean nation, with Kim Il Sung represented quite explicitly as the father of the people. That is to say, familism became established as a kind of political religion in North Korea, which, according to Armstrong (2005), might help to explain the longevity and stability of the North Korean regime (pp. 383-384).

The infrastructure of the North Korean media system was established during the cultural revolution that followed the socialist revolution in 1947. Social reforms began with the land reform through which millions of North Korean received land as free in 1946 and joined in a political party in 1946. Park (1996) claimed that through this land reform, the Korean Workers' Party, comprising some 15 percent of the population, was made up of true believers in the system and its leadership, and that overall, perhaps 20-30 percent of the population support the regime in their beliefs (p. 17). Social reforms made a cultural reform necessary. Cultural reform was necessary for nation-building since the liberation from Japanese colonial rule. The basic idea of cultural revolution was that all literature had to promote Party policy.

During the cultural revolution, various specialized press was bloomed. A specialized press serves different kinds of affiliations and occupations. As seen in the Soviet Union media system, newspapers formed into a huge pyramid, at the top of which is *Rodong Sinmun*. The party paper '*ChongRo*' (It was renamed in September 1946 to its

current *Rodong Sinmun*.) was published in 1945, followed by various papers such as political theory magazine '*KunRoJa*' (Workers) in 1946, North Korean central daily newspaper '*PyongYang Minbo*' (Pyongyang People's Daily) in 1945, the state-sponsored '*MinJuChosun*' (Democratic Chosun) in 1946, '*Rongmin Sinmun*' (Farmer's Daily), '*MinjuChongryun*' (Democratic Youngman) and more of provincial papers. Various newspapers were published by a myriad of labor groups, demographic division, military sector, college, and religious group. On top of these provincial papers, the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) was established in 1946 to provide an efficient centralized ideological education against imperialists (Lee, 1993, pp. 207-217). KCNA currently releases news articles in English, Russian, and Spanish and regularly reports news for all North Korean news organizations within the country. It serves a similar purpose as the Soviet-era TASS.

In regard to the reporting system, it is estimated that there are about 4,000 reporters in North Korea, Many of whom have graduated from Kim Il Sung University. Each newspaper is served by fifty to one hundred reporters. Forty to fifty foreign correspondents stay in mostly foreign communist states. There is also a domestic correspondent system. Correspondents take an assistant role to convey the news from their working spots to the main newspaper company (Ryu, 1995).

A reporter is characterized as an agent to inspire the people's revolutionary spirit and, therefore, is regarded as an important political actor. A reporter himself realizes his role as an honorable duty and a holy mission. Reporters work for creative reporting that is not to fictionalize the event but to compose a critical piece of writing based on national policy and ideology. Accordingly, reporting means not only the process of informing, but

also analyzing the meaning of events and sublimating it into an ideology (Kim & Lee, 1999, pp. 232-233).

A reporting format is divided into two categories: event-based reporting and document-based reporting. Event-based reporting is when a reporter makes news by observing events in real life situations such as politics, economics, and cultural events. Document-based reporting is when a reporter makes news by analyzing the published documents such as international news, including South Korean news, due to its difficulty of access. There are four different types of news: straight news (*Bodo*), news for enhancing virtue and moral (*DukSung* news), news for giving an answer to current affairs (*JyongRon*), and editorial (*RonPyong*) (Kim & Lee, 1999, p. 255).

3. *The United States Press System*

The U.S. press system was characterized by the libertarian model as well as a social responsibility model according to Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1963), emphasizing its philosophical origin and historical variation. It was also characterized by the liberal model by emphasizing a relative dominance of market mechanisms and of a commercial media according to Hallin and Mancini (2004). It was a widespread belief in the libertarian model that the power of the press should be protected from government intervention. Nevertheless, the model was replaced by the social responsibility model due to the change of emphasis in the way to protect the function of mass media that seemed to be tainted by the technological and industrial revolution and social changes.

The most distinctive characteristic of the U.S. media history is the early and strong development of commercial newspapers: an early example is the penny press of the 1830s. Along with industrial capitalism, a large scale newspaper industry was

developed roughly between the 1870s and the 1890s. The commercial revolution expanded circulations and transformed the political role of the press. Commercialization freed the newspaper from dependence on subsidies from political power. The press became independent political players.

As the press became big business, it became an object of criticism. The criticism increased in intensity in the twentieth century for its abuse of power, invasion of privacy, tendency to be subservient to advertisers, and for being controlled by one socioeconomic class (Siebert et al. 1963, p. 78). Dependence on a market economy made the press industry less democratic by following the rule of capitalism. Most of the populist and socialist press was wiped out, but not because of declining subscriptions. These newspapers were unable to compete for the advertising dollars that were necessary to keep the publications affordable. Therefore, revisionist scholars claimed the commercialization of the press as undermining the role of the press in democratic life, first, by concentrating media power in the hands of particular social interests and second, by shifting the purpose of the press from the expression of political viewpoints to the promotion of consumerism (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 203).

The concept of professional journalism was strongly developed by the 1880s. Publishers spoke more and more often of the duties which accompanied the privileged position of the press under the constitution. The first Canons of Journalism was adopted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1923. The basic idea of the code of ethics is that the press is responsible to the general welfare (Siebert et al. 1963, pp. 85-86). It also reflects the wish of the media industry to protect itself from criticism, and especially from the threat of external intervention and reduced autonomy. During this

period, the convention of objectivity developed and led to a sharp decline in party-press parallelism. The political orientation of editorial pages was rarely carried over to news reporting. On the other side of such effort, it was also claimed that professionalization constrained the journalistic ambition and made the reporting as a routine discipline³.

In fact, professional journalism developed as an apparatus to protect the press from the criticism of commercialization and its lack of political independence (MaQuail, 2000, pp. 150-151).

The media relationship to government was a bit ambiguous for the mixture of a structural independence and a practical cooperation. In the United States, although the First Amendment became a significant limitation on a government's role in the media system, the news media had a special working relationship with government officials which dominated the day-to-day production of news and became 'routinized' over the period (Hallin, 1987, p. 11). The area where the government plays an important role is in the regulation of media concentration. Media ownership concentration in the 1980s resulted in the structural ties between the media, the state, and the corporate community, which came to have a significant effect on the flow of information. As the notion of 'national security state' was promoted, the news media's relationship with the state was assumed to have institutionalized relations of trust and mutual dependence by representing a common public interest (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 234).

Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm's (1963) contention of the libertarian and the

³ McChesney, R. W. (2004). During professional journalism's embryonic phase in the 1930s, prominent journalists such as George Seldes and Heywood Broun struggled for a vision of professional journalism. In leading the fight for the establishment of the Newspaper Guild, the union for journalists, Seldes advocated a journalism that would aggressively ferret out the truth on behalf of democratic values and the dispossessed: "The difference between the Guild and the publishers is this: the former displays a social conscience while the latter still live in the golden but dying age of the socially irresponsible profit motive." (p. 65)

social responsibility models as an idealistic form of the press system was contrasted to the Hallin & Mancini's (2004) arguments that it is not at all clear that the media and a government are more separate in liberal countries than in other systems and that a government's formal role as regulator does not necessarily mean a government has less influence on the newsmaking process (p. 233).

The review of the three nations' media systems indicates, on the one hand, that there are complex and powerful link between the media and the national political system (a body of law, regulation, and policy). It supports Graber's (1980) contention that governmental attempts to control and manipulate the media are universal because governments throughout the world believe media effects are important political forces (p. 16). Hallin and Mancini (2004) also claimed that newspaper emerged as a force in political life in history. On the other hand, since each nation's press system has developed in its unique historical context, the links between political and media systems, particularly the distance between the two entities, show intercultural differences. With all these differences, it is dangerous to evaluate a nation's journalism practice with the model developed in other nation's journalism practice. The review raised questions of how to compare journalism practices performed in different media and political contexts and how to compare the role of the news media in relation to government.

B. Media-Government Relations

Literature review in this section covers various theoretic approaches to the media-state relations, mostly done in the western world, which would be a ground work (criterion) for this comparative analysis.

One of the most significant early researches on the press and foreign policy would

be Cohen's (1963) *The Press and Foreign Policy*. The contribution of Cohen's study is to recognize that the press represents itself as a link between foreign policy officials in the government and those people on the outside who is interested in international affairs. It implies that the media and the state influence each other, although it is not known which institution is stronger. After this work, media-state relations have been investigated from various aspects such as structural and ideological perspectives.

Cohen (1963) interviewed both correspondents and policy officials who are responsible for gathering and interpreting foreign policy news. In terms of the foreign policy-making process, he found that foreign policy originates in the Executive branch of government, somewhere in the White House, the Department of State, or the Department of Defense. The Executive is the initiator of policy proposals, and the Congress reacts to them, taking into consideration public feelings as they may have been shaped by press coverage.

He found that reporters see themselves as having two roles in connection with foreign policy. First, as neutral reporters, reporters inform, interpret, and explain foreign policy as a neutral transmission belt. However, the interpretive role has been more forced by the growing complexity of foreign policy and the leading role of the U.S. in international affairs (p. 27). Second, as participants in foreign policy, reporters question officials and criticize the government, acting as representatives of the public. The notion of participants implies two seemingly contradictory roles: watchdog and advocator. Policy advocacy generally takes place in the news columns of the press. He contends that these roles add up to substantial freedom of press in the political sphere and are legitimized by practice (pp. 37-38).

The press serves foreign policy makers in both the Executive and the Legislative branches as a basic standard source of factual information about foreign affairs. However, there are fundamental differences in relationship with the two branches. The relationship between policy-making officials and the press is characterized as the love-hate relationship because the press as a whole is both good and bad in its impact on the policy-making process. The press contributes significantly to members of Congress as a source of foreign policy information. (The role is substituted by think-tanks nowadays.) Congress frequently initiates investigations and directly affects foreign policy through committee actions, authorization, and appropriations.

Concerning the media influence on the state, the study found two things. First, the influence of the press on the foreign policy-making process is primarily exerted through Congress rather than through policy-making officials and the public. Second, continuous and meaningful discourse among foreign policy-making officials in all parts of the government is possible within the bounds set by this independent source of information and intellectual structuring of policy (p. 246). These findings stimulate further studies over the media-state relations that are divided into two divisions: a structural perspective and an ideological perspective.

1. Structural Perspective

A structural approach investigates the media-state relations from a political economy perspective and an organizational perspective. Scholars of political economy of communication argue that institutional and technological constraints shape markets to the advantage of those corporations and government with the power to control them (Mosco, 1996, pp. 17-18). An organizational perspective brings two aspects of newsmaking into

focus; first, newsmaking is a routine behavior and second, the division of labor within news organizations does more than reflect organizational processes. Bureaucratic politics can have important consequences for news content (Sigal, 1973, p. 4).

Herman and Chomsky (1988) proposed the 'propaganda model' to explain the performance of the U.S. media in terms of the basic institutional structures and relationships within which they operate. They contended that five filters as structural factors narrow the range of news by making it responsive to the needs of the government and major power groups. Filters are a) ownership and control, b) major funding source such as advertising, c) mutual interest between the media and those who have the power to define it, d) flak, and e) anticommunism as an ideological mechanism. Based on their accounts on five filters, they argue that propaganda campaigns prevent the news media from performing responsible journalism and, consequently, contribute to elite interests. The system permits dissenting voices and inconvenient information but within the boundary that their presence should not interfere the domination of the ruling bloc. The following is how the five filters work as constraints on journalism practice:

First, U.S. government's deregulation of media ownership in the 1980s accelerated media concentration. The structure of large media companies was not limited to the media field but interlocked with non-media companies. The dominant media firms were subject to sharp constraints by owners and other market-oriented forces such as major corporations and government.

Second, advertising serves as a powerful mechanism that weakens the concept of free market place of ideas in commercial media for its nature to appeal to large audience

with low costs. It becomes serious constraints particularly on working-class and radical papers.

Third, news sourcing became a significant governmental constraint on the news media. The news media in capitalist state maintains a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest. Government as a powerful accredited source fits to the journalistic claim of objective reporting. Besides authoritative figures of government, the magnitude amount of public information constitutes the primary news sources. Furthermore, powerful sources can deny critics access to the media and actively shape the supply of experts to elaborate the favorable public opinion for elite interests.

Fourth, flak refers to negative responses to a media program. The elites in the political and business worlds do not directly participate in cultural production. Therefore, flak is one way to fix the media criticism. Flak has increased in close parallel with business's growing resentment of media criticism and the corporate offensive of the 1970s and 1980s (p. 26).

The fifth filter is the ideology of anticommunism, which could be replaced with antiterrorism in current world politics. The ideological frame has a profound influence on the mass media to dichotomize the world. "A propaganda approach to media coverage suggests a systematic and highly political dichotomization in news coverage based on serviceability to important domestic power interests" (p. 35).

Concerning the ownership concentration, Bagdikian (2000) contends that, for the first time in U.S. history, the country's most widespread news, commentary, and daily entertainment are controlled by six firms that are among the world's largest corporations,

two of them foreign. News reporting and commentary controlled by mainstream media companies are the most politically narrow in the democratic world. Political variety among the mainstream media has disappeared because this top tier of corporate media, along with the government and wire services, defines the news agenda and supplies much of the national and international news to the general public.

The giant media system is only partially competitive. Bagdikian said, “Under the folklore of capitalism, even giant firms would compete forcefully against each other. But through mutual cooperation, interlocked directors, and shared partnerships in media operations, contemporary capitalist competition has become more like a cooperative cartel” (pp. viii-xvii). Merger and acquisition of cross-media is a typical symptom for companies to reduce competition and risk and increase the chance of profitability in the global market.

The media-state relation was not always compelled solely by structural apparatuses. Journalism practice was often influenced by political atmosphere as well as journalistic conventions. Concerning the influence of politics on journalism practice, Schudson (1995) argued that news as a form of culture was influenced by a political atmosphere and in return shaped the politics. In this process a certain norm was elaborated, within which the media-state relation was established. He argued that the modern conventions of news reporting emerged when politics was coming to be thought of as administration. The transformation of the news story was related to the idea of politics promoted by the Progressive movement, which sought more direct public participation in government. Journalistic professionalism emerged during this period and transformed the reporter’s status and a reporting pattern in the twentieth century. The

community of journalists trusted the very forms of discourse which was a critical process of consensus-formation within the community (pp. 66-71).

Analyzing the news coverage of the State of the Union messages, Schudson (1995) also found that the role of journalists began to move from being stenographers, or recorders, to interpreters. It took for granted the journalist's right and obligation to mediate and simplify, to crystallize and identify the key political elements in the news event. He argued that the changing narrative form of reporting reflected a new political reality which emphasized the preeminence of the President, not Congress. That is to say, when a changed political reality becomes part of the very structure of news writing, then the story does not reflect the new politics but becomes part of the new politics of narrative form (pp. 56- 65).

Concerning the changing media-state relations, however, he pointed out that the changing political economy of media during the last 30 years affected American journalism practices. He said that we should not overestimate the independence of the media and should not underplay the power of media routine, stressing the news media's overwhelming reliance on official government sources, the consistent absence of left-wing critics, and the homogenization of the op-ed page of newspapers from the 1960s through the 1990s (pp. 175-176, p. 185).

Media conformity to the government was aggressively cultivated by the state in the U.S. during the 1980s. Thompson (1987) contended that the Reagan administration's public relations apparatus developed new media policy based on their experience of the press during the Vietnam War and following the Watergate crisis. The concept of pool (type of government censorship) was conceived and tested in the 1983 U.S. invasion of

Grenada where ten reporters constituted the first Pentagon press pool to cover a real military operation. The system requires on-the-scene government review of all dispatches prior to their release, and mandates that, if copy is not redrafted to overcome valid security objections, disputed copy will be sent to the Pentagon for review, resolution, and ultimate release. It sparked intense anger among news organization (p. 40).

King and Schudson (1987) revealed that the press coverage in *Time*, *Newsweek*, the *New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Washington Post* during the first two years of the Reagan administration showed that the press consistently assumed a degree of popularity which was contrary to the polls. They said, “The buzz of Washington about the skills of the Great Communicator, powerfully amplified by the news media, helped to establish a myth as truth” (p. 39).

Concerning organizational constraints, journalistic conventions such as objective reporting and authoritative sources justify what reporters do in processing information. Schudson (1995) argues that the function of conventions is less to increase or decrease the truth value of the messages than to shape and narrow the range of what kinds of truths can be told (p. 55).

Sigal (1973) contends that the journalistic conventions and routines developed in the notion of professional journalism became organizational constraints that made reporters vulnerable to manipulation by the government. Examples are ‘objective reporting’ and ‘authoritative sources’. These conventions are rooted in earlier Progressive era for the purpose of prohibiting a partisanship in journalism. However, the way such conventions are used is often unrelated to the original purpose (p. 67). Hall et al. (1978) stated, “Ironically, the very rules (objective reporting) which aim to preserve the

impartiality of the media, and which grew out of desires for greater professional neutrality, also serve powerfully to orientate the media in the ‘definition of social reality’ which their ‘accredited sources’ – the institutional spokesmen – provide” (p. 58).

Concerning the relative nature of objective journalism, Hallin (1986) argued that the sphere of legitimate controversy is assumed to be located between the sphere of consensus and the sphere of deviance. The sphere of legitimate controversy is called the province of objectivity. However, the practice of objective journalism varies considerably within this sphere of controversy. Near the border of the ‘sphere of consensus’, journalists practice the kind of objective journalism that involves a straight recitation of official statements. Farther out, as the news deals with issues on which consensus is weaker, the principle of balance is increasingly emphasized. Still farther out, the ‘adversary’ ideal of the journalist as an independent investigator who serves to check the abuse of power is emphasized (pp. 116-118).

The sphere of consensus encompasses the objects that journalists do not regard as controversial. Journalists serve as advocates about consensus values. The sphere of deviance is the realm that journalists and the political mainstream reject as unworthy of being heard. Therefore, journalism becomes a boundary-maintaining mechanism by playing the role of exposing, condemning, or excluding from the public agenda those violate or challenge the political consensus (pp. 116-117).

Bennett (1990) criticized the limit of professional journalism practice based on findings that opinions voiced in news stories came overwhelmingly from government officials, both before and after the collapse of congressional opposition. Among the institutional sources of opposition, Congress was the primary voice which became a base

line for the implicit journalistic index operation (pp. 112-119). He assessed the degree to which the news media achieved a reasonable balance of voices in the news with four years of *NYT* coverage of U.S. funding for the Nicaraguan contras. The assessment was needed to theorize the media-government relations in comparison with a guideline (norm) for press-government relations drawn from two traditions in U.S. political culture. The proposed norm is that it is generally reasonable for journalists to grant government officials a privileged voice in the news, unless the range of official debate on a given topic 'marginalizes' stable majority opinion in society, and unless official actions raise doubts about political propriety (p. 104)

Based on research findings, Bennett contended that the presence of indexing norm (indexing model) helped to account for how routine journalistic decisions were made, which was justified in the version of responsible journalism. It was mainly because indexing minimizes risks to the corporate community as a whole that might result if a genuine, un-indexed 'marketplace of ideas' received serious attention in the press (p. 123). The implication is that indexing norms are constituted in collective action, residing in social structures and in the minds of agents within these structures. Therefore, the news is the coherent normative product of complex interaction among individuals who are transcending their separate realities to create a coherent social performance or product.

The media-government relations were becoming complicated with the collapse of ideological consensus formed during the Cold War era. Journalists have increasingly resisted presidential views. The changing relationship between the media and a government attracted academic attention on their interactive relation.

Robinson (2002) developed a theoretical two-way understanding of the direction of influence between the news media and the state (the 'policy-media interaction model') by analyzing the situational combination of the level of elite consensus and the policy certainty within executive. It emphasizes policy certainty within the administration as the key variable that produces more or less media criticism and media impact on policy. Policy uncertainty inside an administration opens the way for mediated dissent to influence its actions. But, if the administration reaches a policy decision, the power of dissenting voices diminished (pp. 30-32).

His situational analysis was an attempt to resolve the contradiction between CNN effect theory and the manufacturing consent paradigm. The term 'manufacturing consent' is understood as referring to the complete range of arguments that emphasize the power of government to set news media agenda. It is divided into two implicit versions; an executive version standing for the propaganda model and an elite version standing for the indexing model. He insists that these two seem-to-be contradictory models equally capture the essence of all elite models of media-state relations (pp. 12-13). The phrase CNN effect referred to the ubiquity of the channel and originated during the 1991 Gulf War. But, it indicated the role and impact of news media in general upon both foreign policy formulation and world politics (p. 2). The model presumes that the greater the level of uncertainty over policy within the executive, the more vulnerable the policy process is to the influence of negative media coverage. One thing particular in his research is a finding that the power of news media could be amplified when the policy uncertainty combines with elite dissensus and critical media coverage.

2. Ideological Perspective

The connection between a structural approach and an ideological approach to the media-state relation is well described by Hall et al. (1978) contending that, in a critical sense, the media are frequently not the ‘primary definers’ of news events at all; but their structured relationship to power has the effect of making them play a crucial but secondary role in reproducing the definitions of those who have privileged access, as of right, to the media as ‘accredited sources’. From this point of view, in the moment of news production, the media stand in a position of structured subordination to the primary definers. The structured relationship between the media and its powerful sources makes the media effectively but objectively play a key role in reproducing the dominant field of the ruling ideologies (p. 58).

Molotch and Lester (1974) argued that news as purposive behavior is generated by news promoters who identify an occurrence as special, and that the work of journalists helps to accomplish this task for various publics by making available to citizens a range of events. Through their interaction, the secondary meaning is created, which is a constructed reality, and it produces the social and political knowledge of publics.

The administrative officials’ habitual access to media can easily establish or change the public opinion in a way they intended. Powerful promoters attempt to increase the correspondence between their event needs and those of assemblers by pressuring media into altering their work routines. Another type of routine events is the feature stories generated by news assemblers who dig up stories. In this case, news assemblers become active and positive news effectors who create the occurrence. However, these are all regarded as appropriate newsmaking (pp. 124-129).

It implies that since the political and economic elites are separated from the means of culture, the state's ideological work cannot be accomplished without news assembler's voluntary cooperation in producing the meaning out of events. Therefore, a controversial issue has to be whether or not media assemblers can legitimately engage in transparent news promotion, because mostly they checked a story out for newsworthiness and not the things that 'really happened'.

Concerning the reporter's ideological work, Hall (1985) argues that those people who work in the media are producing, reproducing, and transforming the field of ideological representation itself (p. 23). However, the media's ideological work is not a process that is intentionally directed by the ruling class. Rather, the individuals who work in the media are already imbued with the political messages and translate them into independent political statements. Therefore, unwittingly, unconsciously, the reporter has served as a support for the reproduction of a dominant ideological discursive field (Hall, 1982, p. 88).

Concerning how Cold War ideology worked in U.S. politics and in various media reporting, Herman and Chomsky (1988) contended that during the Cold War era, American policy makers and politicians functioned within a Cold War consensus that was reinforced by the news media. In normal times as well as periods of 'Red Scares', issues tended to be framed in terms of a dichotomized world of communist and anticommunist powers, with gains and losses allocated to contesting sides, and rooting for 'our side' considered an entirely legitimate news practice. The compared case studies of the news coverage of pairs of similar events such as the shooting down by the Soviets of the Korean airliner KAL 007 in early September 1983 and the shooting down by Israel of a

Libyan civilian airliner in February 1973 showed the selective use of criteria and attention in line with 'useful purpose' which served a massive propaganda campaign (pp. 29-32).

Examining the U.S. media coverage of foreign policy from Vietnam to El Salvador, Hallin (1987) found that several prominent features occurred in the media coverage of foreign policy: the fragmentation of the Cold War consensus, reporting of the history of U.S. intervention, and the substantial change in the reporter's attitude toward political authority. Nevertheless, journalistic routines persisted. It implies that the ideological vacuum caused by the fragmentation of Cold War consensus brought another kind of ideological limit on journalism: distrust of political partisanship. He therefore claimed that the way hegemony worked in the media was that even in periods when the media were not supportive of foreign policy elites, they tended to be at least equally unsupportive of any attempt to challenge established authorities. That is to say, conservatism was rooted in a preference for order, which was reflected in journalistic routine.

In the vacuum of bipartisan consensus of Cold War ideology, the Reagan administration had a great deal of trouble managing public opinion on Central America without having a coherent oppositional ideology to take the place of the old one. The study, however, found that whereas a direct political pressure or control by ruling elites was a relatively small part of the hegemonic process, limits on ideological change was far more significant through those embedded in organization routines and those embedded in deeper ideological structure. Consequently, the news media are contributing to a passive form of domestic consent with the relative exclusion of alternatives (pp. 19-23).

In this study Hallin (1987) emphasized that the concept of hegemony should be understood as the one working in the process of political conflict rather than solely in the spectrum of functionalism. The conceptual application is useful in evaluating the media-government relation particularly in the post-Cold War era during which the political conflict frequently came out of the absence of bipartisan consensus on the state's foreign policy.

The absence of ideological consensus cast doubts on the application of traditional conceptual models of the media-state relations such as the propaganda model and the indexing model. This was mainly because the end of the Cold War allowed journalists themselves greater leeway to challenge the state's habits of Cold War thinking which, therefore, led to the growth of ambiguity in foreign policy events, issues, and actors.

Entman (2004) proposed the 'cascade activation model' in examining the role of media in the complicate process of framing foreign affairs. The model explains how and why some views activate and spread from the president to other elites, to the media, and to the public, while other views not. The model is designed based on the analysis of framing interacted with cultural congruence, motivations, power, and strategy.

The model originated in the idea that two major approaches to understanding the government (*hegemony* and *indexing*) do not fully account for changes in international politics and media behavior since the Soviet Union began withering away. Among various aspects of framing, he focused on two framing functions: problem definition and remedy.

Five propositions were explored in this model. First, Presidential control over framing of foreign affairs will be highest when dealing with the culturally congruent or

incongruent. In response to these situations, elites outside the administration tend to remain silent and their quiescence allows the administration's claims to flow unimpeded, directly through to the media.

Second, journalists have strong professional motivations to include oppositional readings of foreign policy in their stories, and enjoy the greatest opportunity to satisfy these motives when the event or issue is ambiguous.

Third, elites have strong motivations of their own for political survival. This leads them to heed indicators of lopsided or intense public opinion.

Fourth, in the post-Cold War period, if the White House mismanages its relationships with other elites and journalists, especially if it cannot find compelling schemas that support its line, a president may lose control of the frame.

Fifth, the decline and disappearance of the Cold War paradigm has made the public's response to foreign affairs less predictable, and this heightens the media's role in representation.

In his analysis of framing Entman (2004) argues that cultural congruence is the important starting point, because people's thinking networks (schema) have certain templates for interpreting foreign affairs. When events appear congruent with habitual mental associations, people more likely respond similarly. Motivations, power, and strategy have less impact on culturally congruent events. When the event appears dissonant with habitual schemas, people usually react by channeling their thoughts away from the troubling implications and responding in ways that are more comfortable both cognitively and emotionally. Culturally ambiguous development in foreign affairs can increase the efficacy of frame challenges originating in the media (pp. 147-148).

Based on empirical findings, however, he found that there were limitations on the media's abilities to fulfill the ideals of a free press, if a free press is defined as one that balances official views with a more impartial perspective that allows the public to deliberate independently on the government's decisions. He contends that the news media in political communication process cannot be the sole source to adjust the president's stance in foreign policy. However, when there are powerful forces inside and outside the administration, the degree of influence is conditioned in part by how fully the media cooperate with them.

C. Hegemony

1. Definition

The concept of hegemony was never defined by Gramsci himself. It was rather conceptualized by other scholars on the basis of his usage of the term in his vision of a liberal democratic political system. Therefore, rather than define it in one word, it is necessary to clarify the common misunderstanding of hegemony.

In comparison with the concept of ideology, Eagleton (1991) contends that hegemony is a broader category than ideology: it includes ideology, but it is not reducible to it. The concept of hegemony extends and enriches the notion of ideology by lending material body and political cutting edge. For example, a ruling group may secure consent to its power by ideological means; but it may also do so by altering the tax system and a political form. Therefore, hegemony is not just some successful kind of ideology, but is discriminated into its various ideological, cultural, political, and economic aspects. With Gramsci, the crucial transition is effected from ideology as 'systems of ideas' to ideology as lived, habitual social practice – which must then presumably encompass the

unconscious, inarticulate dimensions of social experience as well as the workings of formal institutions (pp. 112-115).

Williams (1978) acknowledges the dynamic character of hegemony, as against the potentially static connotations of ideology: hegemony is never a once-and-for-all achievement, but has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. Therefore, he argues that any governing power is thus forced to engage with counter-hegemonic forces in ways which prove partly constitutive of its own rule. Therefore, as a concept, hegemony is inseparable from overtones of struggle (p. 112).

Assuming that the question of hegemony arises from the struggle between human agents that try to preserve existing structures and the one that try to transform such structures, Joseph (2002) argued that there are dual conception of hegemony: structural and political (or agential). Hegemony in its structural role is related to the need to secure social cohesion and structural reproduction. Hegemony in its political usage is related to the role of agents to win consent to a set of ideas and interests. These two aspects are not mutually exclusive, but interrelated. The struggle between agents (hegemonic project) is an articulated attempt to preserve or transform such structures and relations. (pp. 38-39). As an example, the growth of fascism as a specific hegemonic project may be linked to a deeper hegemonic crisis in the basic structure of bourgeois society. The growth of nationalism in South Korea as a specific hegemonic project is linked to the crisis in the political economic structure during the 1970s and 80s.

Based on this review, first, hegemony cannot be reducible to an ideology but a process of ideological domination through contestation. A ruling bloc (agent) struggles for holding its power and status quo by maintaining the existing social, political, and

economic structure, while other contending social forces (agents) struggle for gaining the power to change the structure.

Second, ideological work appeared as a critical factor in hegemony. Gramsci normally uses the term hegemony to mean the ways in which a governing power wins consent to its rule from those it subjugates. Therefore, on the one hand, hegemony is constituted through a ruling bloc's ideological work that projects its own way of seeing the world as a 'common sense'. On the other hand, a contending force's struggle is regarded as an attempt to transfer the existing structure not through revolutionary action but through the war of position (ideological work) which is called a passive revolution – as a revolution without a revolution (Gramsci, 1971, p. 59).

Third, hegemony is a contestation process involving a continuous war of position. Gramsci believes that the ruling intellectual and cultural forces of the era constitute a form of hegemony by inducing popular consent to the rule of the leading groups in a society (Rojek, 2003, pp. 108-116). For Gramsci, the popular consent is the legitimate consensus that is constructed through a legitimate discursive process. It is distinguished from a 'false consensus'⁴ (Habermas, 1973, p. xv). When the consensus is not constructed through a contestation process, the leadership becomes vulnerable when the policy is challenged by a critical political discourse, because the news media that are separated from the ruling group in liberal democratic society can shift the role from a site of ideological reproduction to a site of ideological struggle.

⁴ Upon questions "How can a discursively realized agreement be distinguished from the mere appearance of discursively founded agreement? Which are the criteria of a 'true' as opposed to a 'false' consensus?" he asserts that truth claims can be justified only discursively, through argumentation. A claim founded on experience is by no means a justified claim.

2. State and Civil Society

The relationship between the state and civil society is important to understand how hegemony is constituted. The central role of state is to reproduce normative order through its influence over institutions such as the educational system, the police, the judiciary, the health care system, and the media, through which the state imprints its values on the public sphere (Althusser, 1971; Rojek, 2003, p. 116). Whereas the state functions as a politico-juridical organization in the narrow sense, civil society has developed on the basis of its economic power in history. The whole range of institutions in civil society plays a critical role in a liberal democratic society by having a close connection with the parliamentary system. In this sense, civil society is not subject to the direct authority of the state. Nevertheless, the relationship between the state and civil society could be problematic when the ruling bloc seeks to orchestrate (influence) institutions of civil society to achieve hegemony (Rojek, 2003, p. 118). Through the parliamentary system, the relationship of civil society to the state is regarded as interdependent.

3. Relation of Forces

In regard to social formation, Gramsci rejects the vulgar Marxist notion of the privileged class subject and the binary social classification. He conceptualizes power in terms of a 'ruling bloc' or 'historic bloc' of interest that consists of contradictory ensembles that hegemonic leadership must cement. The struggle for domination is conspicuous at multiple levels in the social formation, the most significant of which are the economic, political, and cultural (Eagleton, 1991, p. 115). Therefore, based on the Gramscian concept of social formation, the struggle in the field of foreign policy could

occur not among different classes such as a government, intellectuals, parties, bourgeois class, and working class, but among different ruling blocs such as the conservatives and progressives who encompass various and contradictory social groups and whose identity can be found with ideology. That is, various forces struggling in this field are different ideological groups.

According to Gramsci (1971), the relation of forces is formulated in various levels. It is closely linked to the structure. First, the various social classes emerge in the level of development of the material forces of production. Second, the relation of political forces emerges by the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness, and organization attained by the various social classes. Third, the relation of political forces become transformed into 'parties' that come into confrontation until a single combination of them gain the upper hand and thus create the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 180-181).

In the same logic, the relation of forces in international relations is formulated in various levels: development of material production (productive force), the relation of political forces (parties), and immediate political relations (potentially military forces). The idea is supported by various labels given to groups of nations: the Third World, developing countries, G8, super power, European Union, ally, the East and the West, the North and the South. As seen here, international relations intertwine with internal relations of nation-states as well as the relation of military forces.

Concerning hegemony in international relations, Gramsci (1971) argued that the more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party will come to represent this situation and to exploit it, with the

aim of preventing rival parties gaining the upper hand. Therefore, international reality often shows the irony between national interests and nationalism, because the most nationalist party, in reality, represents not so much the vital forces of its own country as that country's subordination and economic enslavement to the hegemonic nations (pp. 176-177, p. 182).

4. National Interests

Joseph (2002) argues that since the modernity, hegemony has been connected to the national project. Nationalist ideologies must be seen as attempts to mobilize support around a national project, although in reality this national project represents the hegemonic interests of the few. Nationalism, therefore, can act as the national interest by constructing belief in a shared community that cuts across notions of class and other forms of social stratification (p. 136).

A difference in the concept of nationalism between different forces (e.g., the conservatives and the progressives) becomes a war of position. Hall (2000) argues that ideologies do not consist of isolated and separate concepts, but in the articulation of different elements into a distinctive set or chain of meanings. In liberal ideology, 'freedom' is connected (articulated) with individualism and the free market; in socialist ideology, 'freedom' is a collective condition, dependent on, not counterposed to, 'equality of condition', as it is in liberal ideology. As seen here, the same concept is differently positioned within the logic of different ideological discourses (p. 271). Therefore, the goal of the ruling bloc's conceptualization of national interests is claimed to secure the unity of social formation and structural reproduction, although it is not always consented by other groups.

D. News Sources

Reporters play a key role in the newsmaking process. However, reporters do not make a news story only with their narratives. They use news sources to legitimize the narratives in accordance with thematic issues. The selection of a news source is in the boundary of the reporter's journalistic discretion. Among many factors, selecting news sources is one of the most significant methods for reporters to enhance the objective value of their stories. For this very reason, it could be the most strategically contrived way of naturalizing the public perception of world events.

Regarding the relationship between news and news sources, Schudson (1995) contends that the news is organized by conventions of sourcing – who is a legitimate source of information to a journalist. A news story is supposed to answer the questions who, what, when, where and why, but understanding news as culture requires asking of news writing what categories of people count as “who,” what kinds of things pass for facts or what,” what geography and sense of time are inscribed as “where” and “when,” and what counts as explanation of “why” (p. 14).

Who become news sources is a crucial question because it contributes to figuring out how diverse political actors may articulate their ideas in pursuit of their interests. Schlesinger and Tumber (1994) argue that, although it is essential to bear in mind the political and economic constraints that undoubtedly limit access to the news media, there is increasing awareness amongst radical critics of the media that the holders of power do not constitute a dominant ideologically cohesive bloc. Therefore, there is a need to pay more attention to resistances to domination and ideological competition from outside the centres of political and economic power (pp. 15-16).

In the media-state relations, it is argued that the routine procedures of news gathering allow reporters to rely more on official sources than any other. Many researchers suggest that the use of credible sources is to enhance the value of newsworthiness. Sigal (1973) found that well over half of the sources for political reporting in the *New York Times* came from routine contact with government officials. Especially in the field of foreign policy, news reporters relied on routine channels – handouts and press conferences, background briefings which are mostly government sources. Inside the government, the standard operating procedures for authorizing disclosures put these channels under the control of the senior officials in any department (p. 115). Therefore, in reporting of North Korea, Sigal (1998) noted:

That was a problem in news about nuclear diplomacy with North Korea. The unintended result is that newsmaking can create a closed circle of Americans talking to themselves. In so doing, the news mutes and distorts information from abroad, in this case, what China, South, and especially North Korea itself were saying and doing. The problem was compounded by the episodic attention that news makers gave to North Korea and the way they framed news about it. (p. 208)

Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that the mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest. The media need a steady, reliable flow of the raw material of news (p. 18). For the economic reason it is claimed that powerful sources regularly take advantage of media routines and dependency to manage the media, to manipulate them into following a special agenda and framework. The byproduct would be to marginalize dissent and to maintain dominant private interests. But it occurs in such a way that the media become unaware of the self-screening (p. 23).

About a news source who has a privileged access to the media, Hall et al. (1978)

argues that the media give access to those who enjoy ‘accreditation’. This is a resource limited to certain social groups which enjoy a special status as sources in virtue of their institutional power, representative standing, or claims to expert knowledge. “The result of the structured preference given by the media to the opinions of the powerful is that these ‘spokesmen’ become what we call the primary definers of topics” (p. 58).

Schlesinger and Tumber (1994) argued that the powerful source’s privileged access to the media originated in the notion of impartiality, balance, and objectivity. In Britain it was formally enforced in television (a near-monopoly situation) but there were similar professional ideological rules in journalism. In the U.S. the conventions of objective reporting is a historical product in reaction to the excessive partisan press. However, the convention of objective reporting accelerated the consequences of news routine.

In the study of the *New York Times* coverage of U.S. funding of the Nicaraguan contras, Bennett (1990) found that opinions voiced in news stories came overwhelmingly from government officials, both before and after the collapse of congressional opposition. Of the 889 voiced opinions in the news, 604 came from officers, offices, or committees of U.S. governmental institutions. Only 139 opinions came from non-governmental domestic voices (pp. 116-117). Measuring oppositional voices, he found the indexing norm where journalists implicitly answer questions about what, how much, and whose opinion to cover by looking to ‘official’ conflict or opposition levels within the government. Journalists tend to support liberal or opposition views in the news, but they give voice to those views only when parallel voices are being raised in circles of government power. Official opposition came primarily from Congress. He also found that

opinion on the op-ed pages was indexed tightly to levels of congressional opposition (p. 119). Therefore, he argued that the indexing hypothesis supports an emerging general theory of the press and the state: liberal news messages rise with liberal tides in government and fall again with ebbing liberal voices. In other words, mass media news is indexed implicitly to the dynamics of governmental debate. He also argued that indexing norms reside both in social structures and in the minds of agent, which are constituted in collective action. Therefore, the news is the coherent normative product of this complex interaction between individuals (p. 110).

Congress is not the sole entity of elite sources that influence the media reporting of foreign policy. The use of experts in reporting receives a growing attention. Newsom (1996) explained that public policy institutes have grown significantly in the last half of the twentieth century due to the expansion of U.S. responsibilities around the world after World War II and the congressional reforms of the early 1970s which makes Congress become more involved in foreign policy. The think tanks became ‘research brokers,’⁵ putting academic research into readable forms for policymakers. The staffs were recruited largely from academia, journalism, non-governmental organizations and retirees from government, both civilian and military. The exact influence on foreign policy is difficult to assess. However, there is no doubt that the process creates and refines perceptions of international events and the American responses to those events with influence on publics well beyond the Beltway. The rapid growth of the think tanks was a manifestation of an intensified ideological division in national politics (p. 169).

The work of experts is, on the other hand, criticized for its sophisticated

⁵ David M. Ricci (1993). *Transformation of American politics: The new Washington and the rise of think tanks*. New Haven: Yale University Press (p. 163).

propaganda effort, being funded and disseminated to the media. Shaping the supply of experts is an extended relation between power and sourcing. In this way bias may be structured, and the supply of experts may be skewed in the direction desired by the government and the market (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p. 23).

Concerning the reporter's dependence on anonymous attribution, Brown et al. (1987) in a content analysis of during 1979 and 1980 of front-page news stories appearing in the *NYT*, *Washington Post*, and four North Carolina newspapers found that more than half the sources cited in national and wire stories were veiled in comparison with the one in local newspaper stories. They called these unidentified sources 'invisible power' (p.54). Culbertson also found that 54% of all stories in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* used at least one unnamed source. The two words most frequently used to veil source identity were 'officials' and 'spokesman'. (Brown et al, 1987 p. 46)

Bagdikian (2005) argues that unnamed sources serve many purposes for both the news media and officialdom. First, the range of information journalist can use could be wider from background briefing to top officials in their field. Second, the anonymity often made sources free from a possible retaliation such as demoted or fired. Therefore, the sources may leak information to a trusted journalist because they believe it is in the public interest to shed light on misguided policies and actions. These are the fundamental reason why a ban on unnamed sources is impractical (p. 33).

About the reporter's dependence on foreign sources, Entman (2004) found that in covering the events in Grenada, Libya, and Panama, foreign sources contributed far more to the policy critique than members of Congress, although did not have a significant effect on the result, – in the most extreme case, that of the Libya action, by a ratio of

about 28:1 (television) and 22:0 (Times). He argued that these findings suggested journalists' significant independence of debate among U.S. elite because the high degree of policy opposition in the news appeared despite the near-absence of the congressional disputation that is so crucial to indexing models (p. 50, p. 55). As another example, the media used foreign critiques to provide some balance in covering the debate over the president's (George W. Bush) 'war soon' posture and helped build pressure on Bush to obtain U.N. approval. At this time overseas opposition stimulated more independent counterframing by journalists. The implication of these findings is that the significance of foreign dissent to U.S. policy decisions may be greater in the twenty-first century than in the past (p. 153).

In many studies of the media-state relations, there was no clear distinction between the Executive branch and the Legislative branch, although the two branches played different roles in the field of foreign policy. When Bennett (1990) says 'opposition levels within the government' or 'official conflict', it implies that Congress was part of a government. It is also found in Mermin (1999) criticizing that the press does not offer critical analysis of White House policy decisions unless actors inside the government (most often in Congress) have done so first (p. 143). Robinson (2002) used terms an executive version and an elite version of manufacturing consent paradigm in order to make a distinction between political elites and government officials. However, the political elites in elite version consisted of all members in the executive, legislative or any other politically powerful position in society (p. 13). Entman (2004) made a distinction between the Executive branch and the Legislative branch as systems that played different roles in the flow of ideas. In this research the administration (a

government) and Congress (parliament) are treated as separate sourcing groups due to their different role in the policy-making process.

E. Representation

Political image-building is not a new phenomenon. The purpose of image-building is to achieve and maintain political power. The media representation analyzed in this research encompasses two aspects of ideological work: relationship and identity. The word ‘representation’ brings out the concept of relationship between two entities. However, the two entities are not only limited to two nations but also the relationship between one nation and itself. The relationship between one and self is defined as identity. However, since the relation with others in turn always entails the relation with oneself, and vice versa (Foucault, 1994, p. 318), the media representation in this study evaluates how each nation’s news media describe each others nation and leader as well as a self-image.

Representation is a meaning-making process that is intertwined with the concept of ideology. Althusser (1969) contends that ideology is a system of representations (images, myths, ideas or concepts, depending on the case) endowed with a historical existence and role within a given society. Systems of representation are the systems of meaning through which we represent the world to ourselves and one another (p. 231). For Althusser, knowledge is the production of a particular practice. It is not the reflection of the real in discourse, in language but the result of discursive work. Through this discursive work, social relations are represented in speech and language and acquired meaning. Therefore, it should be understood in the level of ideological practice and its principal mediator – language (Hall, 1979; Hall, 1985).

The media representation has the following characteristics. First, despite realistic of plausible, media images never simply present the world direct. They are always a construction, not a transparent window on to the real. Second, the media representation of other nations has broadly political implications – indicating a nation that stands in for us. Third, in return, the media representation makes the media re-present certain events and stories, and tend to marginalize or even exclude others (Branston & Stafford, 2003, p. 90)

Since the concept of representation emphasizes the relationships between people, events, ideals, values, and beliefs, it raises the following questions. Whose interests does the text serve? Has its meaning changed over the years and in what ways? What conclusions can we draw from it? What issues does it raise? What values are offered, either directly or indirectly, by the text?

Nations generally seek to create and maintain a favorable stature in the community of nations. For this reason, national consciousness (self-image) as the primary determinant of national identity is different from international images featured by other nations. Ebo (1997) argues that while every nation has some power to construct its national identity internally by exerting control over domestic forces, nations with dominant global media advantage will have a better chance of shaping their international image and placement in the global political hierarchy (p. 54).

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. Summary

Gramsci (1971) raised a question about organic relations between domestic and foreign policies of a state: “Is it domestic policies which determine foreign policy, or vice versa?” He suggested that it would be necessary to distinguish: between great powers, with relative international autonomy, and other powers; also between different forms of government (p. 264). It implies that the flow of influence between a domestic policy and a foreign policy is affected by international relations. It, therefore, suggests that the news media coverage of foreign policy can be appropriately evaluated on the basis of a contextual understanding. This section provides historical background of international relations among the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea.

The relationship between the United States and North Korea stood out in the Cold War framework, which was a typical political and cultural representation during the last half century. The ideological framework ‘communism’ has been overlapped by the concept of ‘state-sponsored terrorism’ in U.S. political discourse since the 1970s. According to Neumann (2004), the predominant view amongst Washington hawks in the 1970s and 80s was that none of the various terrorist groups that operated in Western Europe and the Middle East was truly independent. They were all connected through a vast terrorist network, which was created and supported by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. It was believed that the communists’ aim was to destabilize the Western societies without being directly linked to violence (p. A15). The U.S. representation of North Korea has also been constructed in this political framework.

However, the relationship between the U.S. and North Korea was significantly, although temporarily, changed as the U.S. shifted its diplomatic strategy from a negative and punitive approach to a positive economic inducement approach in 2000. The shift was made under the belief that the new strategy would be effective in reducing regional conflicts and stemming weapons of mass destruction proliferation (Lasensky, 2001). The ground work for this turn-around had been prepared since 1999 by South Korean President Kim's active diplomacy with the Clinton administration. President Kim Dae Jung argued that U.S economic sanctions were not effective for North Korea to open its door, but increased the tension on the Korean peninsula. President Clinton assigned former defense secretary William Perry to review North Korea policy. Based on Perry's report, Clinton adopted the 'Engagement and Enlargement' policy⁶ over North Korea (Harrison, 2002, p. 86). President Clinton planned to visit Pyongyang to make a missile accord, which was mired at the end of his presidency.

In 2001, the Bush administration declared that the government should take a comprehensive approach to North Korea since the U.S. North Korean policy was fragmented and lacked verification. The Armitage report⁷, made in the middle of 1999 and revolving around the ideas of strict 'Reciprocity' and 'Verification,'⁸ had a strong

⁶ According to Harrison Selig (2002), President Kim Dae Jung visited to call for an end to U.S. sanctions in a series of media statements. "Lifting sanctions is imperative in order to let North Korea open its doors to the outside." Later, when President Clinton named former defense secretary William Perry to review North Korea policy, Kim pushed the sanctions issue hard in his meetings with Perry. This was largely responsible for Perry's recommendation that sanctions be relaxed and for the White House pledge in September 1999 to move in this direction. See "Statement by Press Secretary on Sanctions Against North Korea" at <http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/091799-statement-by-press-secretary-on-sanctions-against-north-korea.htm> See "A National Security Strategy" at <http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/010500-report-on-national-security-strategy.htm>

⁷ A comprehensive approach to North Korea by Richard L. Armitage
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/1999/forum159.html>

⁸ President Bush stressed that he would deal with North Korea in the context of a comprehensive approach, which will test North Korea's true intentions and the seriousness of its desire for improved relations, that is,

influence on the new Bush administration's hard-line policy over North Korea (Suh, 2003). The administration's hard-line policy imposed a negative impact on the ongoing unification talks between North and South Korea, even though the Bush administration officially announced its support for South Korean President Kim's effort for reconciliation with North Korea. In fact, the Bush administration's new defense policy (USNMD) made South Korean government's diplomatic negotiation with North Korea more ambiguous than ever before, because the U.S. plan for NMD has been vigorously assailed by North Korea and its allies China and Russia. Although South Korea has been a long time ally of the United States, it was too close to North Korea to be protected by the U.S. missile shield that was predicated on the threat of nuclear and missile attacks from unpredictable nations like North Korea.

The Bush administration cited the North Korean missile threat as a large part of the reason for its determination to push ahead with building a missile shield that was originally initiated during the Reagan administration (Kirk, 2001, A4). The administration brought the concept of rogue state back to its ideological campaign of terrorism. The changing U.S. foreign policy from the Clinton administration's engagement policy to the Bush administration's hard-line policy actually influenced the media representation of North Korea. The dominant image of North Korea has been shifted from World's Last Communist State to Rogue State that was defined as a state imposing possible threats such as nuclear and bio-chemical weapons of mass destruction to world peace.

When the news is produced through an interpretive framework, it appears to offer

whether North Korea responds affirmatively and takes the appropriate action. See also "Statement by the President" at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-4.html>

naturalized explanation for the event by resonating in American political culture (Hall, 1982; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Bennett, 1990). The news coverage of a missile or nuclear ambitions in states like North Korea often has its value of sensationalism and propaganda campaigns, which in general have been closely attuned to elite interests (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Therefore, whenever the news was related to missile or nuclear, it was framed in a way that North Korea was a threat for its violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty and should be subject to U.S. punishment. The weapons in North Korea could not be described as deterrence against the U.S. nuclear and missile threats which was, however, true to the North.

The U.S. media portrayal of North Korea is not a unique example of the media representation. The North Korean newspaper *Rodong Sinmun* is fundamentally a government agency advocating socialism and *Juche* ideology (self-reliance). North Korea has never accepted the U.S. role as the world's police and peacekeeper, since the North has been confronting U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula since 1950. North Koreans believe that the U.S. is culpable for the Korean War and the division of the Korean peninsula. North Korean media denounce the U.S. intervention in the Indo-China war, Bosnia, and Somalia as a violation of human rights. In 2001, North Korea blamed the Bush administration's hostile policy toward the North for suspending its effort to continue unification talks with the South. North Korea interpreted U.S. hostility as an imperialist maneuver of expansionism to the North.

Given that North Korean media persistently delivered news about U.S. aggression (reporting how frequently U.S. reconnaissance patrols near North Korean coast every month, how U.S. military forces have joint military exercises with South Korean forces,

and how the U.S. proceeds NMD despite Russia's reluctance), it is hardly surprising that North Koreans tolerate their own government's political suppression and economic failure. They rather have a dream of emancipating South Koreans from U.S. oppression.

Confronted by the Bush administration's (unintended) interruption to both Koreas' unification movement, South Koreans began to perceive the U.S. presence and influence on the Korean peninsula as a foreign intervention and an infringement on a state's sovereignty. Public frustration translated into lower approval rating for Kim's leadership which had been triggered anti-Americanism which emerged during the 1980s as the new Left's ideology. In South Korea, there are two distinct groups, the conservatives and the progressives, who view the history of the division of the Korean peninsula from different perspectives. The conservatives support the military alliance with the U.S. for the purpose of national security, whereas the progressives regard it as the main obstacle in unification talks with the North.

As seen here, there was an inter-relationship among a nation's foreign policy, domestic policy, international relations, and the media reporting. However, the direction of influence among these factors was different from nation to nation. The U.S. foreign policy was changed by the Bush administration's priority on defense policy. The change of U.S. foreign policy had a negative impact on North Korea's diplomatic negotiation with the U.S. as well as South Korea and, consequently, affected South Korea's *Sunshine* policy.

B. U.S. foreign Policy over the Korean Peninsula

In 1993, President Clinton laid out an integrated strategy – a New Pacific Community – which linked security requirements with economic realities and the U.S.

concern for democracy and human rights. It was part of Clinton's engagement policy toward the East Asian region. The strategy was established on the assumption that security, open markets, and democracy go hand in hand. The U.S. military presence is essential for maintaining the peace and security that enable most nations in the region to build thriving economies. Currently U.S. security is enforced by its bilateral treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines.⁹

Since 1953 the U.S. relationship with South Korea has been characterized by a military alliance in which South Korean forces came under the command of a U.S. general in times of war as well as peace. The relationship was structured in a historical context. On July 7, 1950, United Nations Security Council (Resolution 84) determined that the North Korean armed attack upon the Republic of Korea (ROK) constituted a breach of the peace and recommended UN member states make military forces and other assistance available to a "unified command" – the UNC (the United Nations Command) – under the United States, to repel the North Korean armed aggression and restore international security in the region. The Commander-in-Chief, UNC (CINCUNC) signed the July 27, 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement to stop the Korean conflict, on behalf of 16 UNC member states and the ROK. The role of CFC (Combined Forces Command) is to deter war during the armistice and to defeat external aggression during wartime. The CFC is commanded by a US general officer. Some of key elements of CFC are combined defense planning, intelligence integration and sharing, a sophisticated logistical interface, educational exchanges, and defense industry cooperation. Following the existing mutual defense pact, 37,000 U.S. troops remain in South Korea at this time. Other U.S. ground,

⁹ The White House (1996). The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Retrieved from [http:// fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm](http://fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm)

naval, and air forces are stationed in Japan and afloat throughout Northeast Asia.¹⁰ In 2005 the Roh Moo-Hyun government in South Korea suggested that command be shifted to South Korea in wartime as well as in time of peace, which was not agreed by the U.S. for reason that there should be no uncertainty about the security of the peninsula (US, South Korea to examine military command shift, 2005).

The military alliance between the U.S. and South Korea became an issue in South Korea when South Korea's diplomatic talks with North Korea seemed to be deterred by the Bush administration's hard-line policy toward North Korea. The shift in U.S. foreign policy from engagement to hard-line was conceived as an obstacle to a peaceful transformation of the world's last spot of the Cold War and was perceived as U.S. intervention which assured its dominant power over the peninsula. Concerning the change of U.S. policy over the peninsula, Oh (2002) contends that "this situation not only limits the two Koreas' ability to take a leading role in resolving Korean peninsula issues, but has also damaged the improved relations between the U.S. and North Korea at the end of the Clinton administration" (p.5). The military alliance between the two nations continued to be a discourse especially among the progressives and South Korean alternative media.

U.S. military presence in this region was justified even after the end of the Cold War era. During the Cold-War period, the U.S. role was framed as 'world policeman'. However, whereas the U.S. bipartisan consensus became fragmented in the post-Cold War, its defense capability did not decrease. The U.S. government justified the need of a strong defense in the absence of visible imminent threats by changing its role from 'world

¹⁰ 2000 Report to Congress about military situation on the Korean peninsula

policeman' to 'global leader' who has the world premier economic and military power and the strength of democratic values.

Since 'global leadership' was framed as the new ideological groundwork for U.S. foreign policy, the role of U.S. defense was interpreted and illuminated from a new perspective. The U.S. military presence in Asia was rationalized by stating,

"In thinking about Asia, we must remember that security is the first pillar of our new Pacific community. The United States is a Pacific nation. We have fought three wars there in this century. To deter regional aggression and secure our own interests, we will maintain an active presence, and we will continue to lead"¹¹

Although the preeminent threat has gone, it was presumed that the U.S. military presence would serve as the foundation for American security in the region. The military is not a U.S. resource for containment, but a necessary tool to resolve problems, reduce tensions, and defuse conflicts before they become crises. Therefore, Clinton's engagement policy is evaluated as a 'preventive diplomacy' which is indispensable to maintain stable political and economic relations and to serve the U.S. and allies' interests. But an interesting point is the description of the method of engagement in terms of security.

"Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most important our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference. We must also use the right tools -- being willing to act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake; in alliance and partnership when our interests are shared by others; and multilaterally when our interests are more general and the problems are best addressed by the international community"¹²

¹¹ The White House (1996). The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Retrieved from [http:// fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm](http://fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm)

¹² The White House (1996). The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Retrieved from <http:// fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm>

Therefore, the engagement toward the Korean peninsula could be paralleled by either a unilateral or partnership of military resources, if necessary.

This preventive security is called for as a necessary strategy to prevent the dark side of globalization. Globalization, on one hand, is the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural, and political integration and can bring us great promise. On the other hand, it can bring risks; weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, drug trafficking, and other international crimes are global concerns; a number of states have the capability and the desire to threaten U.S. national interests through coercion or aggression. Therefore, while Clinton's engagement policy set diplomacy as a vital tool for countering threats to U.S. national security, it was also backed up by an alternative path that was a punitive physical containment.

The Bush administration's foreign policy also emphasized U.S. global leadership and national interests. A difference from the Clinton administration was in the policy strategy stressing the 'peace through strength'. The Bush administration's realistic foreign policy was based on the Republican Party's traditional diplomatic and security policy ideology that was pushed by the Reagan administration (Bhang, 2001). The Bush administration perceived North Korea as an aggressive expansionist state that seeks to develop weapons of mass destruction and threatens world peace. President Bush was skeptical of South Korea's *Sunshine* policy and emphasized a pragmatic and realistic approach in dealing with North Korea. Therefore, it is concluded that the major difference between the Bush and the Clinton administrations can be attributed to each president's perception of foreign threats, strategy, tactics, and a specific historical

situation rather than the general frame of national interests which is categorized as security, economic interest, and democratic value.

C. The U.S.-North Korea: Nuclear Diplomacy

The relationship between the U.S. and North Korea began at the end of Korean War in 1953. The story was mainly about the nuclear and missile diplomacy: the process of crisis resolution. Blechman (1978) noted that no country has been the target of more American nuclear threats than North Korea – at least seven since 1945 (p. 2). To North Korea, the United States is not an enemy far away. The U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula has posed existential nuclear threats.

In 1957 the U.S. deployed nuclear arms in South Korea and conducted numerous military exercises with nuclear-capable artillery and aircraft on the Korean peninsula. The American nuclear threats spurred North Korea to develop nuclear arms in the early 1960s. With the help of the Soviet Union and China, North Korea stepped into the nuclear arms program in the 1970s. The nuclear reactor became operational in 1986. In 1990, U.S. intelligence realized that the development of the North Korean nuclear program has been faster and larger than they expected with their ample natural resource ‘uranium’. Then it became an international and national issue (Sigal, 1998, p. 20).

The end of the Cold War in the beginning of the 1990s led to a series of structural changes in the international system. The Soviet Union established relations with South Korea in 1990, and China, already embracing capitalism by the late 1980s, recognized Seoul in early 1992. The world in which North Korea had lived for four decades was quickly being dismantled. During this period North Korea saw economic stagnation. The North had loosened its military confrontation to reduce its defense burden and tried to

open its economy. North Korea signaled that it would move forward on nuclear issues if the U.S. first removed its nuclear weapons from South Korea. In September 1991, the U.S. announced it would unilaterally remove all U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea. In December 1991 President Roh pushed through the North-South denuclearization agreement despite resistance from the pro-nuclear hawks (Harrison, 2002, p. 250). In addition to the withdrawal, both the U.S. and the ROK announced on 7 January, 1992 that they would suspend the annual 'Team Spirit' military exercise. Then, North Korea finally signed its safeguards accord with the IAEA, bringing its facilities under full-scope international oversight.

Despite the measure of progress, senior officials within the senior Bush administration were deeply divided over the extent to which the U.S. should engage North Korea (Sigal, 1998, pp. 32-33). In 1992 during Hans Blix's visit, North Korean officials asked him for help in acquiring new light-water reactors (LWRs) and supplying them with nuclear fuel in return for abandoning reprocessing (Glain, 1993). However, according to Charles Kartman, director of Korean affairs at the State Department, it was inconceivable to officials that the North Koreans would substitute the LWRs for peaceful purposes for a nuclear program that had military purpose. The Bush administration dismissed the idea and determined to pursue the 'crime-and-punishment' approach, assuming that North Korea was pursuing a strategy of 'cheat and retreat' (Sigal, 1998, pp. 38-40).

The Clinton administration had been in office for only three days when North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. The crisis over North Korea's nuclear program became an issue in the U.S. media, reporting that a North Korea nuclear

reprocessing center at Yongbyon had gone “hot” – had begun to process plutonium (Risen, 2000). Former President Jimmy Carter went to Pyongyang and won a pledge from Kim Il-Sung to freeze the North’s nuclear program. Then, President Bill Clinton took initiatives to ratify the Agreed Framework in 1994, promising inducements on the condition that potential proliferations accept nuclear restraints. His decision was assailed by the political opponents, because his diplomatic strategy (engagement) was totally different from the traditional U.S. style of diplomacy: ‘crime and punishment’ or ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach.

The Clinton administration’s lifting of economic sanctions in 1999 suddenly created a whole new set of questions for the United States. Would the U.S. be willing to withdraw some of the 37,000 American troops based in South Korea? Is it ready to resume diplomatic relations with the North, as it did five years ago with Vietnam? And how could the United States justify spending \$60 billion on a missile defense system predicated partly on the threat of a nuclear attack from North Korea, if it believed the North was changing course? (Sanger, 2000, June 15).

However, normalization between the U.S. and North Korea was the start of a fundamental transformation on the Korean peninsula. The two Koreas finally showed progress in new unification talks. In October 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright talked with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-Il, in Pyongyang about restraining missile development and testing as well as missile exports. One of her goals in visiting North Korea was to assess the North Korean leader who has remained virtually unknown as a personality or a policy maker. She found Kim a very good listener and a good interlocutor with nothing obviously odd about him. President Clinton planned to visit

North Korea to make a missile pact, which clashed with the incoming Bush administration's goal. Clinton's effort to reach an agreement has clearly been a source of tension and an obstacle for a national missile defense program. Although staying publicly neutral, Bush's foreign policy advisers were saying privately that Clinton's visit would amount to unnecessary grandstanding (Perlez, 2000, A20).

By mid-March 2001, there were fierce power struggles in Bush's White House. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that U.S. policy would "pick up where President Clinton left off" on talks with North Korea, while President Bush stated flatly that he had no intention of negotiations with Pyongyang (Kellner, 2001, p. 188). The Bush administration justified its position by accusing Clinton of failing to a missile accord with North Korea in his final days in office (Gordon, 2001, pp. A1, A8).

There were two main reasons for the Bush administration's hard-line policy. First, under the name of 'thorough review' of American policy toward North Korea, the Bush administration explored a way to stop delivery of two conventional nuclear power plants to the North – the *quid pro quo* for halting its operations to process nuclear waste – and maybe replace them with conventional coal-fired plants. As an example of the conservatives' arguments, Paul D. Wolfowitz, nominated as Deputy Secretary of Defense, told Congress years ago that the 1994 deal that froze North Korea's one known nuclear weapons production facility was deeply flawed (Sanger, 2001, March 7).

Second, the Bush administration cited a threat from North Korea as a large part of the reason for its determination to push ahead with building a missile defense system. National missile defense (NMD) systems have been under consideration for a long time under different names. The current system is a scaled-down version of the Strategic

Defense Initiative (SDI or “Star Wars”) that was a central component of the Reagan administration’s military policy in the mid 1980s. It envisioned the construction of a network of anti-ballistic missile systems that would be capable of destroying incoming enemy attacks. The proposal suffered much criticism inside and outside the Reagan administration. Senator William Proxmire (D-WI) argued that the development of SDI violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which forbids the U.S. and the Soviet Union from deploying antimissile systems. Congress approved minor funding for SDI research in the short term, but the system was never built. At the end of the Cold War, Reagan rejected the idea in support of new arms-reduction agreements (Crothers & Lind, 2002, p. 84).

Ten years later, despite the end of the Cold War and U.S. dominance in the world, SDI ironically reemerged as an issue in the 2000 presidential campaign. Proponents of SDI encouraged its development on the grounds that it might stop a ‘rogue’ attack on the United States and its allies. Discussion of NMD program has become a defining point separating Democrats and Republicans: most Republicans favor testing and deploying a version of SDI, while most Democrats do not.

As seen here, the relationship between the U.S. and North Korea has been reflecting U.S. foreign policy that was closely related to the U.S. defense policy. Regarding U.S. defense policy, Halperin and Lomasney (1999) argued that despite the end of the Cold War a defense budget has been remarkably resilient by being constrained by politics. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 created budget committees responsible for debating and setting the parameters of an overall budget as an aftermath of the Vietnam War. Department of Defense has to meet the necessary

conditions in order to maintain the system as well as the military industrial complex alive (p. 102).

D. The Sunshine Policy

The *Sunshine policy* is part of South Korea's foreign policy towards North Korea, which was introduced by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in order to underline the peaceful management of the division of the Korean peninsula. It was an extension of South Korea's *Northern* policy that was activated at the end of the 1980s, focusing on having diplomatic relations with Eastern European socialist countries, the Soviet Union and China in pursuit of reunification with North Korea. In contrast to past policies that focused on containment, Kim's *Sunshine* policy explicitly rejected "unification by absorption" and emphasized economic cooperation (Choe, Lee, & de Bary, 2000, p. 450). President Kim actually put words into actions by approving large shipments of food aid to the North and lifting restrictions on business deals between North Korea and southern firms. Furthermore, during his visit to Washington in June 1998, Kim called for an end to U.S. sanctions in a series of media statements, saying "Lifting sanctions is imperative in order to let North Korea open its doors to the outside" (Harrison, 2002, p. 86). In September 1999, the Clinton administration partially lifted economic sanctions, and Pyongyang was surprised and impressed by Kim Dae Jung's stand on the sanctions issue. Therefore, during the years 2000 and 2001, South Korea expedited talks with North Korea by showing significant progress under the policy.

The *Sunshine* policy was constructed under two assumptions: engagement and collective defense. First, engagement primarily focuses on political and cultural reconciliation and economic cooperation with North Korea. The policy is established

under the pervasive belief that the regime under Kim Jong-Il would not collapse or disintegrate in the near future. From the mid 1990s onward, although North Korea faced extraordinary disasters, continuing famine, and the disappearance of its economic supporter the Soviet Union, they persevered. In case of its collapse, North Korea's sudden landing would definitely not be a desirable situation for South Korea's social and economic stability. Therefore, rather than pursuing reunification, managing the peace on the Korean peninsula seemed to be a practical task for both sides. Therefore, several guidelines were set up to implement peaceful diplomacy: inter-Korean dialogue would be upheld; politics and business would be separated; humanitarian aid in the form of food and agricultural aid would be provided to North Korea; family reunions would be encouraged; South Korea agreed to provide US\$ 3.2 billion to KEDO for the construction of a light water reactor nuclear power plant in North Korea required by the 1994 Agreed Framework (Choe, Lee, & de Bary, 2000).

Second, collective defense is one of the structural apparatuses in managing peace on the peninsula. It is a security strategy adopted by South Korea and the United States, emphasizing deterrence and defense against North Korea. Therefore, the ROK-US military alliance is a key component. Based on the concept of collective defense in the *Sunshine* policy, it was assumed that if there were a political and economic normalization among North Korea, the U.S. and Japan, North Korea would not oppose a continuing U.S. troop's presence in Korea. However, Kim's assurance on this sensitive matter of defense turned out to be too idealistic to be implemented in the talks between two nations whose international relations has been complicated for ideological and geopolitical reasons since World War II. For this reason, it was evaluated that the South Korean engagement policy

was constructed from a perspective of “defensive realism” that did not assume that states were inherently aggressive because they merely aimed to survive (Hwang, 2004). From this point of view, North Korea’s threatening posture arose because of its security fears. Abandoned by its Cold War patrons, economically bankrupt and internationally isolated, North Korea was believed to consider the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as its only path to survive and to secure their regime.

Collective defense was assumed to be a practical defense strategy in the *Sunshine* policy in order to secure the economic cooperation between North and South Korea. However, it was Kim’s optimistic view of its effect on unification talks. The possible negative effect had never been discussed in political arena. Even when collective defense became an issue in 2001, it was not actively discoursed in the mainstream media but in alternative media.

Calling for North Korea’s cooperation to the South’s proposal for economic reconstruction on the Korean peninsula, President Kim encouraged Hyundai, a South Korean conglomerate, to develop a tourist resort on North Korea’s Mount Kumgang. This was an attractive offer for Pyongyang which was in need of hard currency. Chung Ju Young, founder of Hyundai, was literally at the forefront of North-South economic relations for years. In August 2000, Chung again went to Pyongyang for talks with Kim Jong-Il and returned with a signed agreement to open hundreds of factories employing up to 200,000 North Korean workers in and around the ancient Koryo capital of Kaesong. These facilities are now beginning to open, in spite of much U.S. obstruction (Cumings, 2005, p. 239). James Rooney, at the time chief executive of Templeton Investments in

Seoul, said, “Hyundai has become a *de facto* ambassador to North Korea, and everyone is watching with bated breath to see what they can achieve” (Sims, March 7, 2000).

The shift of *Northern* policy from containment to engagement was contingent on the changing South Korean political economy. President Kim Dae-Jung took office in the midst of a South Korean economic crisis (IMF) that hit South Korea in the final year of President Kim Young Sam’s term. The economic crisis presented Kim with a huge problem at the beginning of his presidency. The government had spent about \$140 billion trying to clear up the bad debts of the *chaebol*, the traditional Korean conglomerates. Kim pushed economic reforms to revitalize its international competency. As a result, South Korea’s economic growth bounded back in 1999 to 10.2 percent from 5.8 percent in 1998. Kim has been largely credited with the economic turnaround although his promised economic reforms have yet to materialize.¹³ President Kim tried to boost economic reforms by opening trade between North and South, which was the so-called economic cooperation with North Korea and a new diplomatic strategy in the post-Cold War era. Kim believed that economic cooperation was practically a shortcut to approaching the North. He calculated that Hyundai’s business project would be a psychological breakthrough that would give impetus to broader economic linkages. In fact, by April 2000, more than 190,000 South Koreans had gone on the Hyundai tours (Harrison, 2002, p. 86). In his March 2000 interview, Kim envisioned a summit meeting between the South and North and said, “After this election there would be a huge scale of procurement from the Northern policy, which will open the path for investment

¹³ CNN reported that when South Korean President Kim Dae Jung was presented with the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway, in December 2000, he pledged to dedicate the rest of his life to the reconciliation and cooperation of Korean people. <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/12/bio.kim.daejung>

especially from small business group” (Interview with President Kim Dae Jung, March 31, 2000).

Economic cooperation was part of President Kim’s diplomatic strategy to manage peace on the peninsula, originally declared in his inauguration speech in February 1998. “Diplomacy in the age of globalization will require a change in ways of thinking. The new ways of thinking must be different from those prevailing during the Cold War. Diplomacy in the twenty first century will center on the economy and culture” (Choe, Lee, & de Bary, 2000, p. 449). Economic cooperation between the two Koreas was activated by adopting a flexible reciprocity under the circumstances that North Korea could not withstand the contingency and equivalence in trade due to its economic downfall. Although a flexible reciprocity is adopted on the principle that politics and business are separated, the line is blurred because the scale of trade is not limited to the civilian business trade but expanded to establish an economic bloc between two nations.

Based on this analysis, it is evaluated that the assumption and strategy of the *Sunshine* policy were established on President Kim’s conservative stance, emphasizing a free market economy and a strong collective defense. From the beginning of implication of policy, North Korea was portrayed as a new economic interest, while U.S. military presence in South Korea was a tacit agreement between the North and South as long as the U.S. was favorable to the North. Therefore, after the June summit meeting North Korea was perceived as a brother, not an enemy. The June summit meeting between the two Koreas actually inspired nationalism that had been oppressed under Cold War ideology for several decades. Therefore, the *Sunshine* policy was perceived as a unification approach rather than a systematic economic approach to bring peace and

prosperity to the Korean peninsula. A nationalist movement was not the one that the U.S. anticipated through its support of unification talks on the Korean peninsula because of its adverse effect on capitalism, which consequently caused a wider gap between the conservatives and the progressives in South Korea.

Controversy between the conservatives and the progressives originated from South Koreans' struggle between the twin goals of industrialization and democratization. Among controversial issues, the most contentious is to redefine South Korea's relationship with North Korea on the one hand and the United States on the other. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the conservative coalition wanted to delay democracy until the country was strong militarily and economically. South Korea's democratization process, initiated by the progressives experiencing the economic inequality, has been most active in the 1980s during which the military regime was taken over to the civilian government. However, in relationship with the U.S., the two civilian governments led by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung continued to place a high importance on South Korea's alliance with the United States as the conservatives did (Hahm, 2005, p. 62). The economic crisis in the late 1990s, emerging nationalist movement, and the tension with the Bush administration made Kim's leadership vulnerable to opponents; the conservatives challenged South Korean government's position in relation with North Korea, while the progressives challenged it in relation with the United States.

E. The U.S.-South Korea Economic Relations

South Korea has the [tenth largest](#) economy in the world, and the third largest in Asia, behind Japan and China. As one of the [East Asian Tigers](#), it achieved rapid economic growth through its export-led economic reconstruction. The South Korean

economic reconstruction from ground zero in the Korean War was often described as the ‘miracle of the Han river’. However, growth was conditioned by a number of international, social, political, and cultural factors. The process and impact of economic growth has also posed some fundamental problems and challenges for South Korean society, culture, politics, and international relations.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Korean economy has been under the influence of Japan and the United States that, especially, intervened in Korea to establish a capitalist economy as well as a collective defense system. The emergence of a nascent industrial capitalist class was closely related to Japanese colonial economic interests. Some of the top *chaebol* were founded by men who began their business careers during the colonial period: Samsung, Lucky Gold Star, and Hyundai. *Chaebol* is a family-owned and managed group of companies that exercises monopolistic or oligopolistic control in product lines and industries (Woo, 1991, p. 149). Since 1961, the process of capitalist growth has greatly accelerated in South Korea. By the mid 1980s, the combined sales of South Korea’s top five *chaebol* accounted for nearly 66% of GNP.

By the early 1960s, having a state structure (the Third Republic), South Korean government (the Third Republic) was capable of galvanizing all its valuable international and social resources toward economic growth. Most economic planning was intervened (controlled) by the government. President Park’s economics was, in significant part, tutored by American experts for its efficient use of U.S. aid reaped from its role as America’s chief ally in the Vietnam War by dispatching a total of about 300,000 troops between 1965 and 1973 (Cumings, 1997, p. 321). The U.S. supplied a total of \$12.6 billion in economic and military assistance to South Korea between 1946 and 1976.

Nearly all American aid to South Korea before 1964 was provided on a grant basis, thus making it possible for the country to begin its export-led growth in the 1960s without a backlog of debt. However, the U.S. interest in Korea has from the beginning been political and strategic rather than economic: support for South Korea since 1945 was part of a global containment of international communism centered on the Soviet Union (Eckert et al., 1990, pp. 395-396).

President Park and his officials devised a series of five-year economic development plans beginning in 1962. State intervention in the economy has proceeded without much constraint and conflict with civil society. The state-made businessmen adhere to its official development programs, while the state dominated the financial system; the government has been able to direct capital into industries targeted for development. In this sense, Park's economic plan cannot be regarded as a genuine social revolution, but as a nation-building through his own manner of control. Nevertheless, his leadership, although a subject of criticism from a Western liberal perspective, has been in general supported in Confucian culture where people accept the state as an active, moral agent in the development of society (pp. 405-407).

South Korea's nation-building is well explained in Hall's argument on the state's role in capitalism. Hall et al. (1978) contends that since different tasks arise from different moments in the development of capital, it is possible for ruling-class alliances to establish and organize through the mediation of the state. The state intervention in the economy is characteristic of the earlier stages of capitalist development. The state performs its work on behalf of the capitalist system, not necessarily by assuring jobs within its bureaucracies, but by other means: first, by destroying those structures,

relations, customs and traditions; second, it performs the work of actively tutoring, forming, shaping, cultivating, soliciting and educating the emergent classes to the new social relations (pp. 208-209).

South Korea became U.S. trading partner. The special U.S.-ROK (Republic of Korea) relationship gave South Korea privileged access to U.S. markets. Comparing the trade record between the two nations, South Korea is far more dependent economically on the United States than the United States is on South Korea. For over a decade, South Korea has been one of America's largest trading partners. South Korea sends about 40% of its exports to the U.S., having a \$10 billion trade surplus in 1987, \$13.53 billion in 2000, and \$14.41 billion in 2003. From 1990 to 2003, the annual U.S.-South Korea merchandise trade has increased from \$33 billion to \$60 billion. Even in the year 2000, total trade was over \$66 billion. In 2003, the United States was Korea's number one trading partner, its second-largest export market, source of imports, and supplier of foreign direct investment. On the other hand, South Korea is the U.S.'s seventh-largest trading partner and its sixth-largest export market. South Korea has also become a significant investment site for American companies, which have poured nearly \$20 billion into the country over the past seven years. But, in 2003, China for the first time displaced the United States from its perennial place as South Korea's number one export market¹⁴

South Korean economic development was attributed to not only the state's involvement but also a strong labor. While success through the late 1980s was achieved

¹⁴ RL30566. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (2004). South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and Future Prospects. Retrieved from <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30566.pdf#search=%22US-South%20Korea%20trade%22>

by a system of close ties between government and business, another important factor contributing to the rapid economic progress was a strong labor effect. For the past twenty-five years low labor costs (low pay relative to business profits, poor working conditions, the longest average work week in the world, workers' forbearance in the face of such hardships, and no worker's union) have consistently been South Korea's chief comparative advantage in the international export market ((Eckert et al., 1990, pp. 402-403). The working class grew and gained steam all during the 1970s, moving strongly to affect politics in 1979-80, and finally maturing after the 1987 crisis (declaration of abdication of military regime to civilian) into a central player as the progressives.

Growing as multinational enterprises, major groups competed with each other by mirroring what the others were doing, which consequently brought the economic crisis in 1997. Following the collapse of Hanbo Steel in January 1997, six of the country's top 30 *chaebol* went bankrupt. The 'export-dependent' Korean economy was running merchandise trade deficits and, by 1996, the current account deficit had ballooned to more than US\$ 23 billion, or 4.5 percent of GDP. The exchange value of Korean currencies (won) collapsed from W804/US\$ in 1996 to averaging W1, 400/US\$ in 1998. In December 1997, Seoul turned to the IMF for economic assistance. It was then that South Koreans elected longtime democracy activist Kim Dae Jung to the presidency.¹⁵

President Kim enacted a set of market-oriented reforms as a *quid pro quo* for receiving a \$58 billion package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following the near collapse of the South Korean economy in 1997. In return, Seoul agreed to tighten its fiscal and monetary policies and engage in far-reaching, market-oriented reforms of its

¹⁵ 'South Korea' retrieved August 18, 2006, from countrywatch.com
http://www.countrywatch.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/cw_topic.aspx?ty

financial and corporate sectors, and of its labor market policies. In the years following the crisis, the government spent approximately \$140 billion to bail out ailing banks and mutual funds. As a result of reforms, South Korea has opened its doors to foreign investors, ushering in billions of dollars of foreign portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI). Since the 1997 crisis, FDI commitments by U.S. companies have totaled nearly \$20 billion. General Motors purchased Daewoo Motors in 2002. Citigroup purchased KorAm for \$1.7 billion in March 2004. These were the largest foreign direct investments in Korean history. The result is that foreign companies, including U.S. firms, are now significant shareholders in many prominent industrial conglomerates, own an estimated 40% of the value of the shares traded on South Korea's stock exchange, and own about one-third of the Korean banking industry.¹⁶ The South Korean government plans to privatize several large state-owned enterprises, including the power generation assets of the state electricity utility, Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), and the natural gas monopoly Korea Gas Company (KOGAS). However, the privatization program has moved at a slower pace than originally planned, due in part to strong opposition from labor unions and delays in implementing legislation. Following the financial crisis, South Korea entered a severe recession. Gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 6.7% and unemployment nearly quadrupled, rising to 7.6% in 1998. The slowdown generated substantial anti-IMF and anti-American sentiment among many South Koreans.

The economic crisis was not the only problem. The impact of rapid economic growth during the previous several decades produced the question of economic justice in the distribution of wealth. In promoting export-led growth, the state has cultivated a

¹⁶ CRS report for Congress RL30566. South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and Future Prospects. July 1, 2004.

partnership with corporate owners while simultaneously keeping workers' wages down to maintain comparative advantage in the international market. Currently national wealth is distributed strikingly in the hands of the business elite. Confucian culture has been much less tolerant of such income disparity. Furthermore, the contradiction between nationalism and foreign dependency has also made potential political instability a structural problem for the state, the class, and even for South Korean capitalism itself (Eckert et al., 1990, pp. 414-415).

The capital accumulation made through external linkages put the state and the private sector relatively vulnerable to the outside world, especially vis-à-vis the United States. South Korea's economic dependency and military alliance put the nation under U.S. influence in the east-Asian region. In the Congressional Report of 2004, "Economic growth also has helped transform the ROK into a mid-level regional power that can influence U.S. policy in Northeast Asia, particularly the United States' approaches toward North Korea and China" (p. 1). About U.S. hegemony in the east-Asian region, Cumings (2005) argued that, while the division of Cold War hindered horizontal relations and communications among the East Asian countries, it accelerated the vertical relationship with the United States. A vertical regime has been solidified by bilateral defense treaties. Therefore, all (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines) became semi-sovereign states, deeply penetrated by American military structures, and all were incapable of anything resembling independent foreign policy or defense initiatives. The dominant tendency until the 1970s was a unilateral American regime heavily biased toward military forms of communication, and correspondingly biased against the multilateral mechanisms that emerged in Europe (pp. 233-234).

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

This chapter will describe the methodology of the study. Included within the discussion will be descriptions of flow of data analysis, analytic procedures, sample data, sampling procedure, unit of analysis, variables and operationalization, and reliability test.

The primary goal of this research is to explore a pattern of relationship between the news media and a government: how reporting of foreign policy supports or challenges a government, what determines the role of the news media, and if there is a difference and/or a similarity in the role of the news media developed in different political contexts. For this purpose, I use a content analysis of three nations' news media coverage of foreign policy and international affairs during the years 2000 and 2001. Berelson (1952) defined content analysis as a "research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (p. 18). This definition is useful because it highlights the method's origin and concerns. The words 'objectivity' and 'manifest' reveal the scientific ambition in study of social science. Although it is questionable to be value-free, the content analysis has an advantage of procedural rigor compared to the qualitative research method.

Procedures to ensure rigor include the quantification of a large volume of texts and the statistics that are used to make broader inferences about the influence of interaction between variables. Statistics reduces the uncertainty which might harm to the internal validity (linking power). Operationalization of concepts also reduces possible misunderstanding between researcher and reader.

A. Flow of Data Analysis

1. Pilot study with approximately 15% to 20% of random sample of total data
2. Develop lists of themes, news sources, and the media representation of each nation and leader.
3. Develop two different units of analysis: 1) individual news story and 2) 48 bi-weekly intervals
4. Test intercoder reliability with 20% of sample data. Sections tested are theme, news source, opinion direction, and media representation.
5. Analyze the relationship between total number of themes (TNT), total sources (TS), total positive sources (TPS), total negative sources (TNS), and total opinion direction (OPD).
6. Analyze the influence of thematic issues on the reporter's selection of a news source.
7. Analyze the sourcing pattern and opinion direction for each thematic issue.
8. Analyze the influence of international factor on thematic construction.
9. Analyze the media representation of each others nation and its leader.
10. Compare each nation's primary cause of political challenge and its impact on politics.

B. Analysis Procedure

News articles and editorials are selected from the *New York Times*, *Donga Ilbo*, and *Rodong Sinmun*. Among total 1,733 populations found in ProQuest Historical Newspaper database, *Donga Ilbo* database, and *Rodong Sinmun* published between 2000 and 2001, total 780 sample data are selected by using systematic sampling: *The New York*

Times (251), *Donga Ilbo* (352), and *Rodong Sinmun* (177). For analyzing these sample data, 103 variables are identified regarding 1) general information, 2) thematic issues, 3) news source and its opinion direction, 4) primary cause of political challenge and its impact on politics, and 5) media representation of nations and leaders. To judge if each news source's opinion is consistent or inconsistent with a nation's foreign policy, lists of each nation's foreign policy is provided along with a coding protocol. (Appendix B).

Sample data are divided into two units of analysis: 1) individual news story and 2) 48 bi-weekly intervals. Bi-weekly tallies for two years will show if trends emerge in each newspaper's coverage over time, where the unit of analysis becomes the number of stories in each newspaper.

Data are analyzed to assess 1) the associations among themes, news sources, and opinion direction, 2) the mean differences between two U.S. administrations, and 3) the comparison of each newspaper's source distribution in accordance with each critically discoursed thematic issue, media representation, primary cause of challenge and its impact on politics which will be done by using descriptive and inferential statistics: correlation, multiple linear regression, and t-test.

1. Sample

The sample data used for the analysis consists of the *New York Times* from the United States, *Donga Ilbo* from South Korea, and *Rodong Sinmun* from North Korea. *The New York Times* and *Donga Ilbo* are mainstream newspapers of each nation. *Rodong Sinmun* is the most widely-read newspaper in North Korea.

The New York Times has a reputation as a literate, comprehensive and authoritative U.S. newspaper. The paper regards itself as "the world's greatest news-

gathering organization,” one that is characteristically “balanced, thorough, authoritative, a colossus astride the globe” (Diamond, 1993, p. 4). In international affairs, the *New York Times* is “a premier member of the elite press and plays an influential role in informing American leaders and interested members of the citizenry on international affairs” (Malek, 1997, p. 228).

Donga Ilbo was established in 1920 as a channel for expressing the national spirit of Korea, and became a pillar of the South Korean news industry along with *Chosun Ilbo*. In 2000, its circulation reached over 1.9 million with a market penetration rate about 22%. Compared to *Chosun Ilbo*, *Donga Ilbo* was historically characterized as slightly Center-Left. In 1974, journalists at *Donga Ilbo* adopted a ‘Declaration on Practicing Freedom of the Press’ in which they rejected outside intervention in press organizations and protested the illegal arrests of journalists by the authorities (Park, Kim, & Sohn, 2000, p. 113).

RoDong Sinmun (“newspaper of the workers”) is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, published by the *Rodong News Agency*. It is the most widely read newspaper in the country, first published on November 1, 1945 and serving as a communication channel for the North Korea Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea. It is regarded as a source of official viewpoints on many issues (Lee, 1993, p. 208).

2. Sampling Procedure

Sample data consist of news articles and editorials published during the years 2000 and 2001 in three nations’ newspapers. I selected sample data through a systematic sampling. In systematic sampling, every k th number is the total list chosen for inclusion in the sample. The first element is selected at random. Systematic sampling is the most

time and cost efficient sampling method for content analysis of newspaper text, ensuring the degree of representativeness (Babbie, 2001, pp. 197-201).

The sample data are collected from the following areas: U.S. foreign policy over the Korean peninsula, South Korean government's *Sunshine* policy, and North Korean positions toward South Korea and the United States. Among total 1,733 populations, 780 sample data are selected.

There are total 357 the *New York Times* documents found in ProQuest Historical Newspapers from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2001, which contain keywords 'South Korea, North Korea' in citation and document text. Among these a total of 197 documents were selected from the population of all documents, which excludes every 3rd number of document as well as articles oddly related to sports and directory. There are also 54 documents found in the database, having keywords 'South Korea' and 'North Korea' in editorials and columns. Therefore, total 251 sample data in the *New York Times* consist of 197 news articles and 54 editorials.

There are a total of 646 *Donga Ilbo* documents found in the donga.com database from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2001, which contain a key word '*Sunshine* policy' in general news articles and editorials. Among these populations I select every 2nd number of news articles and all editorials, which produces 276 news articles and 76 editorials as sample data.

Rodong Sinmun sample data was selected from every 3rd number of newspapers published during the years 2000 and 2001. Among the selected newspapers, the selection of sample news story follows the rules: 1) events related story, 2) size of headline, and 3) articles having a picture. Therefore, a total of 177 sample data are collected based on

systematic random sampling. *Rodong Sinmun* follows its own news-making technique that is different from the U.S. and South Korean newspapers. For example, there is no clear distinction between news and editorial. The newspaper designates pages 5 and 6 to denounce South Korea, the U.S. and Japan.

3. Unit of Analysis

This research use two types of unit of analysis: 1) individual news story and 2) 48 bi-weekly intervals. First, a news story is coded into thematic issue categories and source categories which become a unit of measurement. Second, each news story is divided into 48 bi-weekly intervals to assess trends in each newspaper's coverage of foreign policy over time. Through this process, the second set of unit of analysis is the number of stories published in each newspaper per bi-weekly interval. When it is divided by each thematic issue, it will also show when each theme becomes an issue in 48 bi-weekly intervals.

C. Variables and Operationalization

Variables are divided into five sections: 1) general information, 2) thematic issue categories, 3) news source categories and opinion direction, 4) primary causes of political challenge and its impact on politics, and 5) media representation of nations and leaders.

(Appendix C)

1. Themes.

A thematic structure is defined as a preoccupying conception or proposition which runs throughout a media text, usually around an initiating topic. Its function is to provide a sense of the overall organization, hierarchy, and relations between different aspects of properties of the text. Theme is viewed as an instrument of media salience enhancing attention and prominence (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 169). In this research,

themes are divided into six areas: 1) internal political relations, 2) defense, 3) economic relations, 4) diplomatic strategy, 5) ideology, and 6) leadership. The following themes are examined in each area.

a. Thematic variables

1. International Political Relations

- 1) South Korea – North Korea relations (unification talks, summit meeting, high-level talks)
- 2) The U.S. – North Korea relations (diplomatic relationship, political normalization)
- 3) North Korea's diplomatic relations with other states except the U.S. and South Korea (e.g., China, Russia, and Japan)
- 4) The U.S. – South Korea relations

2. Defense

- 5) US defense (USNMD, US Presence on the Korean peninsula, military exercise in the east-Asian region, US Concern over nuclear missile proliferation, 1972 ABM treaty)
- 6) North Korean Defense (North Korea's self-defense, NK nuclear and missile threats, the 1994 Agreed Framework)
- 7) South Korean Defense (collective defense, military alliance with the U.S., clash between South and North Korea)

3. Economic Relations

- 8) Economic cooperation between South and North Korea (economic reconstruction, business opportunity for South Korea, humanitarian aid)

9) Economic relations between the U.S. and North Korea (economic normalization, economic sanction)

10) Economic Situation (social, cultural and economic situation)

4. Diplomatic Strategy

11) Strategy (engagement policy, reciprocity, verification)

12) Human rights (POW, Political refugee, US war crime)

13) Family reunion

14) NK Strategy (a theme of confusion)

5. Ideology

15) *Juche* ideology (North Korean philosophy of self-reliance)

16) Type of nation (confederation, one nation and two states)

17) Unification as an extension of *Juche* ideology

18) Ideological conflicts (the conservatives vs. the progressives, political consensus, National Security Law, anti-Americanism)

19) Crisis of capitalism

20) US global leadership

6. Leadership

21) Kim Dae Jung's governance

22) Kim Jong-Il's governance

23) Bill Clinton's governance

24) George W. Bush's governance

b. Operational definition of thematic variables

International Political Relations. It refers to state interactions, particularly in areas such as diplomatic talks, summit meetings, high-level talks, and other political normalization related activities.

US National Missile Defense (NMD). It is a defense strategy known for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or “Star Wars” during the Reagan administration envisioning the construction of a network of anti-ballistic missile systems that would be capable of destroying incoming enemy attacks (Crothers & Lind, 2002).

ABM Treaty. It refers to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on the limitation of ABM systems used in defending areas against missile-delivered nuclear weapons.

North Korean Nuclear and Missile Threat. It refers to the North Korean effort to produce ballistic missiles¹⁷ and its nuclear ambition. The North Korean ballistic missile inventory now includes over 500 SCUDs of various types. North Korea continues to work on the long-range missile *Taepo Dong 2*. Nuclear threat refers to an identifiable concrete provocation or verbal threat. However, only explicit threats to use nuclear weapons are considered illegal under international law (Kauzlarich, 1994, p. 6).

The 1994 Agreed Framework. It is also called the Geneva Convention. North Korea signed the Agreed Framework with the United States on October 21, 1994, committing itself to giving up nuclear-arming in return for replacement of its nuclear

¹⁷ 2000 Report to Congress, Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula on September 12, 2000. In late 1999 North Korea agreed to a moratorium on future missile test firings for the duration of discussions with the US to improve bilateral relations. North Korea publicly reaffirmed that moratorium in June 2000. <http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/Korea2000.htm>

reactors, a supply of fuel oil, security guarantees, an end to the American economic embargo, and gradual diplomatic normalization – a deal which will take years to fulfill.

Collective Defense. It refers to a security strategy adopted by South Korea and the United States, emphasizing deterrence and defense against North Korea. The ROK (Republic of Korea)-US military alliance remains central to the defense of the ROK.¹⁸

Economic Sanctions. It refers to economic penalties applied by one country on another for a variety of reasons. Economic sanctions include tariffs, trade barriers, import duties and import or export quotas. Since 1950, North Korea has been excluded from US government programs to effectively subsidize trade and outbound foreign investment because of its status as a Marxist-Leninist state. North Korea has also been affected by US policy toward international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

US Engagement Policy to North Korea. It refers to the policy that attempts to establish normal diplomatic relations, relax economic sanctions, and take positive steps that would provide opportunities for North Korea, if North Korea moved to eliminate its nuclear and long-range missile threats.

South Korea's Engagement Policy (The Sunshine Policy). It is the policy that encourages inter-Korean dialogue, a separation of business from politics, family reunions, and humanitarian aid in the form of food and agricultural aid.

Reciprocity. There are two kinds of reciprocity: strict (specific) reciprocity and flexible (diffuse) reciprocity. While strict reciprocity is exemplified by international trade

¹⁸ In the 1954 US-ROK (Republic of Korea: South Korea) Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States agreed to help the ROK defend itself against external aggression. In support of this commitment, the US currently maintains approximately 37,000 service personnel. In 1978 a Combined Forces Command (CFC) was established. The head of the CFC serves as commander in chief of the United Nations Command (UNC) and the US Forces in Korea (USFK).

negotiations, flexible reciprocity points to a wider institutionalization of trust. Thus, in a system of flexible reciprocity, states need not seek the immediate benefit guaranteed by strict reciprocity, but can act in the confidence that their cooperative actions will be repaid in the long run (Keohane, 1986).

Juche Ideology. It refers to the North Korean philosophy of self-reliance. *Juche* is an ideology centered on man as the master of his universe, and a continuous struggle of the working classes against capitalism. The imperative of the nation is to attain independence and to preserve national sovereignty (Saccone, 2002, pp. 28-29).

Confederation. It is the form of government suggested by the North, which involves establishing regional governments depending on the existing ideologies and systems and forming a federal government above them as a superstructure. From the beginning, North Korea has insisted that an inter-Korean political formula should be based on parity or coequality, rather than population because South Korea has more than twice the population of North Korea. It is claimed that President Kim Il-Sung launched the formula of a *Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo* for Korea's reunification in October *Juche* 69 (1980), in his report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on the work of its central committee.¹⁹

One Nation Two States. It is the commonwealth form of government, envisaging the equal representation of the North and South in the proposed confederal structure. President Kim Dae-Jung wrote that the government's proposed commonwealth stage, comparable to a confederation, "is entered into after a prior phase of reconciliation and cooperation. In our case the confederal stage is itself one of reconciliation and

¹⁹ *The Pyongyang Times*, April 15, 2000. p. 6

cooperation, thus requiring no special preparatory period, and can be commenced forthwith” (Harrison, 2002, p. 84).

National Security Law of 1961. It is the South Korean law that defines communist North Korea as an illegal state, and is the symbol of South Korea’s anticommunism. To encourage or praise North Korea is punishable by imprisonment of up to seven years. Historically, the National Security Law has been rigorously applied, often with draconian ferocity. In the early days following the Korean War, many people were jailed for pro-North sentiments. The ambiguity of the National Security Law has led to much abuse and has been a major barrier to improved relations in the divided Korea.

2. *News Sources*

Reporters frame the thematic structure in headlines and lead paragraphs, and elaborate the structured representation of the cases for and against the theme through their choice of sources in the pyramid structure of news narrative. That is, a reporter’s discourse practice of news story strategically utilizes various voices from communicative events in order to legitimate the story presentation (Deacon et al., 1999).

In this research, each news source is assigned with valence (opinion direction) representing affective attributes of news source in a news discourse. Valence is assigned in accordance with the source’s supportiveness (consistency) of an administration’s foreign policy constructed based on a president’s frame of reference. Therefore, more positive stories would indicate higher salience in some instances, whereas more negative stories would indicate higher salience in other cases. The valence is assigned under the rationale that the reporter’s narrative is the characteristic rhetoric of news journalism where it creates the appearance of a factual account.

a. The New York Times

- 1) President William J. Clinton
- 2) President George W. Bush
- 3) State Department
- 4) Defense Department
- 5) Other Government Officials
- 6) Member of Congress or Senate (Republican)
- 7) Member of Congress or Senate (Democratic)
- 8) Think-Tanks, Experts
- 9) Non-Government Groups
- 10) General Public
- 11) South Korean Government
- 12) South Korean Non-Government Sources (Experts, Institutions)
- 13) North Korean Government
- 14) Other Foreign Government
- 15) Other Foreign Non-Government (e.g. UN., WHO, EU)
- 16) *NYT* Reporters
- 17) News Agencies
- 18) South Korean Media
- 19) North Korean Media
- 20) Other Foreign Media
- 21) Public Opinion Survey
- 22) Anonymous Attribution (government related)

23) Anonymous Attribution (non-government related)

b. Donga Ilbo

- 1) President Kim Dae Jung
- 2) Government Officials
- 3) Member of Parliament (Millennium Democratic Party)
- 4) Member of Parliament (Jamin Party)
- 5) Member of Parliament (Grand National Party)
- 6) Intellectuals, Experts
- 7) Non-Government Institutions and Activist Groups
- 8) General Public
- 9) North Korean Government
- 10) US Government
- 11) US Non-Government (think-tanks, experts)
- 12) Other Foreign Government
- 13) Foreign Non-Government Sources (U.N., experts, institutions)
- 14) *Donga Ilbo* Reporters
- 15) News Agencies
- 16) North Korean Media
- 17) US Media
- 18) Other Foreign Media
- 19) Public Opinion Survey
- 20) Anonymous Attribution (government related)
- 21) Anonymous Attribution (non-government related)

c. Rodong Sinmun

- 1) Kim Il Sung
- 2) Kim Jong-Il
- 3) Government Officials
- 4) Non-Government Groups
- 5) Korean Central News Agency (KNCA)
- 6) *RoDong Sinmun* Reporters
- 7) General Public
- 8) South Korean Government
- 9) South Korean Non-Government
- 10) US Government
- 11) US Non-Government
- 12) Foreign Government
- 13) Foreign Non-Government
- 14) South Korean Media
- 15) US Media
- 16) Other Foreign Media
- 17) Anonymous attribution (government related)
- 18) Anonymous attribution (non-government related)

3. Media Representation

a. Media Representation of Nations

- 1) Failed State (economic catastrophe)
- 2) World's Last Communist (Stalinist) State

- 3) Isolated and Reclusive State
- 4) Trading Partner
- 5) Terrorist
- 6) Rogue State (producing and selling nuclear and missile technology)(강패국가)
- 7) Unpredictable State
- 8) One Nation (ethnic community, 민족)
- 9) Brotherhood (동포)
- 10) Puppet Regime (괴뢰정권)
- 11) Imperialist (미제)
- 12) World's Super Power (초강대국)
- 13) Global Leader
- 14) Interventionist (간섭)
- 15) Peace-Maker
- 16) World Policeman (세계경찰)
- 17) Ally (우방)
- 18) Capitalist
- 19) Totalitarian State
- 20) State of Ideological War
- 21) Aggressor (침략자)
- 22) Corrupted State
- 23) Jingoist (전쟁광)
- 24) Chosun People's Enemy (민족의 원수)

25) Strong Independent State (강성대국)

b. Media Representation of Leaders

- 1) Suspicious man
- 2) Terrorist
- 3) Negotiable Partner
- 4) Pragmatist (실용주의자)
- 5) Reclusive and Secretive Leader
- 6) Military Commander in Chief (국방위원장)
- 7) Evil
- 8) Nationalist (애국자)
- 9) Faction (도당)
- 10) Traitor (매국노)
- 11) Great Leader (영도자)
- 12) Leader of democracy
- 13) Idealist (이상주의자)
- 14) Reformist (개혁가)
- 15) Lame-Duck President
- 16) US Puppet (Stooges of reactionary) (괴뢰정권, 반동)
- 17) Mediator
- 18) Peace-Maker
- 19) Interventionist
- 20) Policeman (Cop)
- 21) Bully

22) Dictator

23) Novice (신참, 초보)

24) Failed Reformer

25) Political Philosopher (정치 철학자)

c. Operational definitions of media representation of nations

Failed State. It refers to a state that is unable to provide basic governance, safety and security, and opportunities for their populations, potentially generating internal conflict, mass migration, famine, epidemic diseases, environmental disasters, mass killings and aggression against neighboring states or ethnic groups, which can threaten regional security.²⁰

Terrorism/Terrorist. Terrorism is characterized as the systematic use of coercive intimidation against civilians to further political goals (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003).

Rogue State. It refers to a state that threatens the world's peace, sponsoring terrorism and seeking proliferation of weapon of mass destruction.

Unpredictable State. It refers to a state that is untrustworthy of keeping an international agreement and has a tendency of aggression.

Puppet Regime. It refers to a state whose government depends on a foreign power for its existence and therefore follows the will of foreign power in key policy issues.

Imperialism/ Imperialist. Imperialism is defined as the policy and practice of forming and maintaining an empire by the conquest of other countries and the establishment of colonies or another type of sphere of influence. Imperialism refers to a country's policy of expanding a geopolitical influence.

²⁰ The White House (2000, January 5). *Report on National Security Strategy*. Retrieved from <http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/Korea2000.htm>

Interventionist. It refers to a state that has a military commitment to other state's governing system or crisis. The activity can either be justified or unjustified.

Peace-Maker. It refers to a state that attempts to seek and negotiate peace and reconciliation.

World Police. It refers to a state that is taking a role of police in world affairs. The state is assumed to be empowered to use force and other forms of coercion and legal means to affect world order.

Ally. It refers to a state of being allied or united with another state by treaty.

Capitalist. It refers to a state that support a socio-economic system based on private property rights, including the private ownership of capital, with economic decisions made largely though the operation of free market rather than by state control.

Totalitarian State. It refers to a state that wields absolute control, leaving people having virtually no authority.

State of Ideological War. It refers to a state where various sectors fight for their own ideological authenticity that is usually related to national interests and/or nationalism.

Aggressor. It refers to a state that commits provocation or warlike act in violation of international obligations.

Corrupted State. It refers to a state that has a lack of integrity in its governing system, showing low moral standard.

Jingoist. It refers to a state that vociferously supports a nation's military aims, advocating aggressive nationalism.

Chosun People's Enemy. It refers to a state that is hostile to Chosun (old label of Korea) ethnic group that, therefore, Chosun has to fight against.

Strong Independent Nation. It refers a state that has sound political, economic and defense system.

d. Operational definition of media representation of leaders

Lame Duck. It refers to an elected official who has lost political power

Mediator. It refers to a person who assists in negotiations and conflict resolution.

Bully. It refers to a person who tends to torment others, either through verbal harassment, physical assaults, or more subtle method of coercion.

Faction. It refers to a group of people who act together within and against a larger body. A group is connected by a shared belief, but does not represent the whole body.

Traitor. It refers to a person who betrays the nation of his citizenship and willfully cooperates with an enemy.

Reformer. It refers to a person who wishes to change a system to improve it.

Novice. It refers to a person who is new to any field or activity. In this study it refers to a president who does not have enough experience in foreign policy and international diplomatic relations.

Idealist. In this study, it refers to a person who is subjective, dogmatic and extremely optimistic in processing of foreign policy.

D. President's Frame of Reference

1. President William J. Clinton's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula²¹

National Interests. National Interests fall into three categories. The first category is security interests which include U.S. territory and allies, the safety of citizens, the economic well-being of society, and the protection of critical infrastructures. The second

²¹ See Report on National Security Strategy for a New Century released by The White House on January 5, 2000. <http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/010500-report-on-national-security-strategy.htm>

category is economic interests which include regions where the U.S. has sizable economic stake or commitments to allies. The third category is humanitarian interests which include responding to natural and manmade disasters and supporting democratization.

Perception of North Korea. North Korea's threatening posture arose because of its security fears. North Koreans consider the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as their only path to survive and to secure their regime. Therefore, the engagement policy would be a good way to build a sense of trust with North Korea, reducing its insecurity, and therefore, ending its nuclear threat (Hwang, 2004).

Threats. Tensions on the Korean peninsula remain the leading threat to peace and stability in East Asia. North Korea continues to dedicate a large portion of its resources to its huge military: development and export of long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Goals. (1) To bring a peaceful resolution to the Korean conflict with a democratic, non-nuclear, and reunified peninsula, (2) to support South Korea's effort of seeking new channels of dialogue and developing areas of cooperation with North Korea, (3) to deter aggression and secure the U.S. interests, the U.S. enhances a security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Strategies. (1) Political and economic normalization with North Korea; to induce peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict, the United States will improve bilateral diplomatic ties with North Korea, which is consistent with the objectives of South Korea. However, this strategy will only be implemented as long as the North cooperates in efforts to reduce tension on the peninsula. (2) To engage the North in a productive

dialogue with the South, the U.S. urges the North to participate constructively in the Four Party Talks among the United States, China, South Korea, and North Korea to negotiate a peace agreement. (3) Working closely with the ROK and Japanese allies, the U.S. will improve relations with North Korea on the basis of their moving forward on the missile and WMD agendas. (4) If the North chooses to go down a different path, the U.S. will take necessary measures in the other direction.

*2. President George W. Bush's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula*²²

National Interests. Security interests will include U.S. territory and allies such as Japan and South Korea. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, national security priority has been shifted to the prevention of terrorism that applied more pressure to North Korea by assigning it as a regime constituting an axis of evil.²³

Perception of North Korea. North Korea is regarded as an aggressive expansionist state that seeks to develop weapons of mass destruction and threatens world peace. The leader Kim Jong-Il of North Korea was described as suspicious and secretive. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the administration assigned North Korea as a regime sponsoring terrorists.

Threats. (1) North Korea's nuclear and missile program, its provocative actions and belligerent posture (e.g. the discovery of a suspect North Korean nuclear site and the launch of a *Taepodong* missile) pose a threat to the security of the U.S. allies: Japan and South Korea. (2) The 1994 Agreed Framework would allow North Korea to buy time to

²² Armitage, R. (1999). A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea. INSS Strategic Forum 159, March 1999. Retrieved from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/1999/forum159.html>

²³ Office of the Press Secretary. (2002, Jan.). *President delivers State of the Union Address*. News release, January 29, 2002. Retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html>

consolidate the regime and continue its nuclear weapons program.

Goals. (1) To regain the diplomatic initiative, the U.S. will maintain and strengthen deterrence, (2) to eliminate the military threat posed by North Korean nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons and missiles, the U.S. tests North Korea with clear choices: on the one hand, economic benefits, security assurances, political legitimization (affirmative response), on the other hand, the certainty of enhanced military deterrence. That is, if diplomacy fails, North Korea should be faced with the consequences of its choice: isolation or containment, allowing the U.S, South Korea, and Japan to act together. (4) The United States seeks to facilitate the South-North reconciliation and the peace on the Korean peninsula.

Strategies. (1) New comprehensive approach combines diplomacy and deterrence. Deterrence is central to this approach to protect U.S. and allied interests and to regain diplomatic initiative. (2) To test Pyongyang's intention, the U.S. adopts the policy of strict reciprocity vis-à-vis North Korea: expecting an agreement or monitoring and verification from the North Korean regime. (3) The U.S. should call for a trilateral defense ministers' consultative meeting to address a range of peninsula contingencies. (4) U.S. diplomacy must be closely coordinated with Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing. Diplomacy should seek to align South Korean and Japanese policies to influence positively North Korean behavior as well as to reinforce military deterrence. However, after the September 11 attacks, the administration adopted a harder line toward North Korea than ever before.²⁴

²⁴ The administration considered the prospective use of nuclear weapons in a major Korean contingency (from Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review" January 9, 2002, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>). The National Security Strategy of the

3. President Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy²⁵

National Interests. Security and economic prosperity are inevitably interconnected on the Korean peninsula. Through the inter-Korea dialogue and active cooperation, South and North Korea can build an 'economic community' which will contribute to regional peace and prosperity.

Perception of North Korea. The regime under Kim Jong-Il in North Korea will not collapse or disintegrate in the near future. The current economic crisis will not undermine the regime. Deterrence and containment were not effective in changing the nature of totalitarian regime. Thus, inter-Korean relations should be handled by establishing peace on the basis of reconciliation and cooperation.

Threats. (1) North Korean nuclear and missile threats, (2) The possibility of North Korea's hard-landing (a sudden collapse accompanied by aggression)

Goals. (1) To promote peaceful management of tension on the Korean peninsula; that is, no armed provocation by the North will be tolerated, (2) not to attempt to absorb the North in any way, (3) to revitalize both states' economic conditions.

Strategies. (1) Inter-Korean dialogue will be upheld by the exchange of high-level envoys. (2) Politics and business are separated; that is, the legal procedures are simplified and the limits of South Korean investment in North Korea are waived. (3) Humanitarian aid in the form of food and agricultural aid will be provided to North Korea to relieve the North's food crisis. (4) Family reunions are encouraged. (5) South Korea provides \$ 3.2

United States of America described North Korea as one of the United States' defining national security threats (White House, September 2002, 13-16, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>)

²⁵ President Kim Dae Jung's Inaugural Speech of 1998 is retrieved from Choi, Y. Lee, P. H., & de Bary, W. T. (2000). *Sources of Korean tradition*. Columbia University Press; Department of Unification (2005). *Unification white paper*. Seoul: Yangdong publishing; Comparison of the *Sunshine* policy and Armitage report, Retrieved from <http://www.pyung.co.kr/news1.htm>.

billion to KEDO for the construction of a light water reactor nuclear power plant in North Korea required by the 1994 Agreed Framework. This amounts to 75 percent of the final cost. (This work was later suspended in 2003.) (6) South Korea will take the role of mediator to bring political and economic normalization between the U.S and North Korea.

4. Kim Jong-Il's policy toward South Korea and the United States

National Interests. (1) Unification between North and South Korea remains a constant goal since the Korean War. To ease tensions and foster mutual trust, North Korea proposed the establishment of the “*Democratic Confederation Republic of Koryo*” (the confederation form of state) as the most realistic way of national reunification. (2) Based on *Juche* ideology, North Korea insists that the problem between the North and South should be solved without foreign interference. (3) The U.S. imposition of military threat toward the North and its intervention on the Korean peninsula should be avoided.

Perception of the U.S. and South Korea. The U.S. is regarded as the strongest imperialist force in the world and the successor to Japanese imperialism. The U.S. imposed an existential threat with tactical nuclear weapons and a military exercise called “Team Spirit.” A recent target of criticism is the U.S. plan to assign South Korea as one of the U.S. NMD bases. The South Korean government is a U.S. puppet regime. South Korea’s National Security Law is a symbol of South Korean hostility towards North Korea. Emancipation of South Korean from U.S. imperialism is regarded as the North’s calling.

Threats. (1) The U.S. national missile defense (NMD) program and its joint military exercises with South Korea (Team Sprit) and Japan are substantial military threats. (2) The country’s economic stagnation, (3) The Bush administration’s hostility

toward Kim's regime aggravates the North's military reinforcement, which is its last line of defense.

Goals. (1) To revitalize its economy and to ease tension on the Korean peninsula, North Korea pursues the ideological, technical and cultural revolutions (*Rodong*, 2000, March 18). (2) Based on pragmatism, the North normalizes political and economic relations with the U.S. and develops diplomatic relationships with Western countries, and (3) pursues unification between North and South Korea, but within the frame of nationalism.

Strategies. (1) North Korea proposes bilateral negotiations to Washington to establish a peace agreement. (2) North Korea abides by the 1994 Agreed Framework (Geneva Convention). (3) North Korea responds positively on the inter-Korean dialogue and economic cooperation. (4) The North blames the South Korea's *Sunshine* policy for its ironic combination of engagement policy with its reinforced collective defense with the United States. (5) North Korea proposes confederation as the practical and fair method of reunification. (6) North Korea accuses the U.S. of its culpability in the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

D. Reliability

Intercoder reliability was performed with 20 percent of the total sample news articles of three newspapers (126 samples out of 650 news articles). The principal coder judged which theme and news sources were used in each news story. The total sources' opinion direction (OPD) came out of the mean value of total valence assigned to each news source's opinion direction: consistent, neutral, or inconsistent with each nation's foreign policy. Principle coder also judged how each others nation and leader were

represented in each newspaper, if any. The second coder conducted a coder reliability check to validate the judgments made by the principal coder.

Holsti's (1969) formula was used to check intercoder reliability:

$$2M (N1 + N2)$$

where:

M = number of coding decisions on which the two judges agreed.

N1 = number of coding decisions made by judge 1.

N2 = number of coding decisions made by judge 2.

Coder reliability for agreement was 82% in average: thematic issues (87%), news source (78%), opinion direction (77%), and media representation (82%). The following table shows the reliability test by each newspaper.

Reliability Test

	<i>Donga Ilbo</i>	<i>The NYT</i>	<i>Rodong Sinmun</i>	<i>Total</i>
Theme	82%	90%	89%	87%
News Source	80%	73%	82%	78%
Opinion Direction	75%	80%	77%	77%
Representation	90%	86%	79%	85%
Total	82%	82%	82%	82%

Coder disagreement was mostly found on whether a source in news stories should be counted as a news source or as a background reference, and whether a reporter should be counted as a news source or not. (A reporter is counted as a news source only when

there is a clear sign of a reporter's opinion.) Opinion direction ranged from 10 to -10. A difference in the two coder's selection of a news source resulted in a lower score in opinion direction. Therefore, in the intercoder reliability test, more than a two point discrepancy of opinion direction between two coders was counted as a disagreement between coders. Coder disagreement was also found on the media representation of nations and leaders. The reliability test in media representation was conducted only with the images selected by the two coders together. That is, the case that only one coder selected an image was discarded.

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

This chapter reports the findings of statistical analyses related to testing the hypotheses. Sections are divided into five different areas: 1) comparison of three newspapers' reporting pattern, 2) comparison of thematic construction, 3) reporter's selection of a news source, 4) impact of international relations on reporting of foreign policy, 5) the media representation of nations and leaders, and 6) impact of challenges on politics.

A. Comparison of Three Newspapers' Reporting Pattern

The study indicates that media attention is significantly correlated with the amount of news source used in a media discourse. As an event becomes an issue, reporters use more news sources to construct a theme out of the event. When this relationship is analyzed in connection with a source's opinion direction, this study found that reporters depend on positive sources for two reasons: to advocate an issue and to defend the issue when it is challenged. Additionally, it was discovered that reporters depend on negative sources more likely to challenge the issue.

Hypothesis 1 posits that the degree of media salience correlates to the reporter's selection of a news source. This study found some patterns between the media attention and the reporter's selection of news source by applying a variable 'opinion direction' (OPD) into the relationship between total number of theme (TNT) and total sources (TS).

Table 1 and Figure 1 show the mean values of total number of themes (TNT), total sources (TS), total positive sources (TPS), total negative sources (TNS) and total sources' opinion direction (OPD) in three newspapers: *Donga Ilbo*, the *New York Times*, and


Rodong Sinmun. It indicates that the mean value of positive sources is similar in three newspapers, whereas the mean value of negative sources is different among each of these. The negative sources in *Rodong Sinmun* is far below that of the other two newspapers, indicating that the news media in a communist state might function as an agent of the state in a different manner from newspapers in a liberal democratic state.

Table 1

Mean Value of Total Number of Themes (TNT), Total Sources (TS), Total Positive Sources (TPS), Total Negative Sources (TNS), and Opinion Direction (OPD) among Three Newspapers (N = 650)

Newspaper	Mean TNT	Mean TS	Mean TPS	Mean TNS	Mean OPD	Total Intervals	Total Number
<i>Donga Ilbo</i>	5.8	16.6	6.5	6.9	1.5	48	276
<i>The NYT</i>	4.1	14.3	5.5	3.8	1.8	48	197
<i>Rodong Sinmun</i>	3.7	9.8	6.6	0.4	6.1	48	177

Figure 1. Differences in average newspaper scores for positive and negative sources and opinion direction



As hypothesized, correlation tests in Table 2, 3, and 4 show that total sources increase as total number of themes increases in three newspapers: *Donga Ilbo* ($r = .88$, $p < .01$), the *NYT* ($r = .87$, $p < .01$), and *Rodong Sinmun* ($r = .32$, $p < .05$). That is, the media attention, operationalized as total number of themes (TNT) issued in 48 bi-weekly intervals, is significantly correlated with total sources (TS) quoted in thematic issues. These findings imply that as a theme becomes an issue, a reporter uses more news sources. In terms of effect size r square (coefficient of determination), more than 75% variability in TS of *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT* is explained by TNT, whereas only 10% variability in TS of *Rodong Sinmun* is explained by TNT.

When total sources (TS) is divided into its subsets total positive sources (TPS) and total negative sources (TNS), TNT has a significant correlation with TPS ($r = .79$, $p < .01$) and TNS ($r = .77$, $p < .01$) in *Donga Ilbo*, and TPS ($r = .75$, $p < .01$) and TNS ($r = .69$, $p < .01$) in the *NYT*, but only TPS ($r = .92$, $p < .01$) in *Rodong Sinmun*. The relationship between TNT and TPS in *Rodong Sinmun* was not only significant but also dramatically high in its effect size by showing that 85% variability in TPS is explained by TNT. These findings affirm the premise that, whereas newspapers in a liberal democratic state provide to various news sources the opportunity of advocating, challenging, and defending their ideas, the one in a communist state more likely limits the media function to advocate and promote a government's policy.

When total sources' opinion direction (OPD) is applied into this matrix, OPD is significantly and inversely correlated only with TNS in both *Donga Ilbo* ($r = -.41$, $p < .01$) and the *NYT* ($r = -.55$, $p < .01$). The findings imply that, considering the range of OPD from 1 to -1 (from 10 to -10 in actual graph), TPS cannot be significantly correlated

with OPD if TPS increases in promoting as well as defending a policy. That is to say, when an issue is advocated and promoted, TPS will increase, which would result in high score of OPD. However, when an issue is defended, TPS will increase along with TNS, where the actual OPD would be diminished in response to the increasing negative opinion. On contrary to the relation between OPD and TPS, TNS is significantly correlated with OPD because the higher TNS is, the lower the OPD is. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that total number of negative sources (TNS) is more likely cited when a policy becomes problematic, while positive sources are quoted not only to advocate an issue but also to defend the issue when it is challenged.

In North Korean *Rodong Sinmun*, however, OPD has a significant correlation with TNS ($r = -.68, p < .01$) as well as TPS ($r = .44, p < .01$), which implies that the effect of negative sources on OPD is not great enough to diminish the effect of positive sources on OPD. Although there were some negative sources no matter where these came from, the challenge was definitely not strong enough to be a critical discourse against a dominant power. According to sample data, this study found that whenever a theme became an issue, the total number of positive sources (TPS) increased. Negative sources were quoted not for challenging a government's policy but for reinforcing the state's ideological position and its adherence to security issues.

B. Comparison of Thematic Issue Construction

Hypothesis 2 posits that a nation's foreign policy reflects various aspects of national interests. Different thematic issues of foreign policy affect the reporter's use of a news source differently. This study found that different aspects of foreign policy became issues in the three nations' newspapers and that, in comparison of news with editorial, the

NYT editorial was in general more separated from the news production than *Donga Ilbo* editorial was.

Table 5, 6, and 7 are the lists of themes issued in the three nations' newspapers. The lists are divided into two categories: news and editorial. Table 5 shows that dominant themes in *Donga Ilbo* news articles consisted of internal affairs (33%) that included DJ Governance (23%) and Ideological Conflict (10%). It was followed by SK-NK Relations (22%), Diplomatic Strategy (14%), and international relations (13%) that included US-SK Relations (9%) and US-NK Relations (4%). A thematic composition in *Donga Ilbo* editorials showed a similar pattern to the one in news articles, covering DJ governance (25%), SK-NK Relations (17%), US-SK Relations (16%), Diplomatic Strategy (7%), and Ideological Conflict (5%).

Table 6 shows that dominant themes in the *NYT* consisted of international relations (40%) that included SK-NK Relations (20%), US-NK Relations (11%), and NK with other Nations (9%). It was followed by US Defense (9%) and other various themes. A thematic composition of the *NYT* editorials showed a different pattern from the one in news articles with US Defense (60%) that included USNMD (40%), ABM treaty (8%), WMD (8%), and US Presence (4%). It was followed by Diplomatic Strategy (15%), SK-NK Relations (10%), and US-NK Relations (6%).

Table 7 shows that the agenda of *Rodong Sinmun* mainly consisted of the peril of war (24%) that included US Presence (11%), USNMD (8%), and US threat (5%). It was equivalent with state's ideological work (24%) that included Ideological Conflict in South Korea (8%), Unification as an extension of *Juche* ideology (8%), and Anti-

Americanism (8%). *Rodong Sinmun* coverage of the peril of war and the state's ideological work linked with the survival of its political system and national security.

This study supports hypothesis 2 positing that various aspects of foreign policy were individually constructed by receiving a different degree of media attention. The media attention seems to be different depending on the proximity to national interests and the goal of nation's foreign policy. Therefore, whereas inter-Korean relations and internal affairs were the major coverage in *Donga Ilbo*, the *NYT* coverage of foreign policy focused on international political relations and U.S defense, and *Rodong Sinmun* emphasized the foreign threats through which national security and ideological solidarity was reinforced.

Concerning the difference in opinion direction and thematic construction between news and editorials, this study found that, the *NYT* showed a clear division between the principle of news production and editorials in comparison with other two newspapers. The OPD of the *NYT* editorial was inversely correlated with the one of news ($r = -.25$), whereas the OPD of *Donga Ilbo* editorial was positively correlated with the one of news ($r = .28$). In regard to the selection of a theme, *Donga Ilbo* showed more similarity between editorial and news that the *NYT* did, whereas *Rodong Sinmun* showed no difference between editorial and news.

In regard to a thematic composition of editorials, almost 60% of total themes in the *NYT* were about US Defense, particularly US national missile defense (USNMD) that was one of the most controversial issues during a transition from the Clinton to the Bush administration. The *NYT* editorial acted as a political advisor as well as a critique in the political decision-making process, while news reporting more likely focused on what's

happening in the administration by following the conventions. In contrast, a difference in a thematic composition between news and editorials in *Donga Ilbo* was thinner than the one in the *NYT*, showing the preoccupying conception in an initiating topic. It implied that the connection between news and editorials represented the nature of South Korean newspaper practicing in a polarized pluralist model where the media system tended to be associated with politics. *Rodong Sinmun* did not have a clear distinction between news and opinion although there was an official editorial in the news section page one. Every single event was transformed into an educational material that was, however, regarded as an authentic journalism practice in a communist state.

Therefore, implications are first that the role of editorials is far more political than other type of reporting. In this respect, the role of media is regarded as a participant in the foreign policy decision-making process (Cohen, 1963). Second, in connection with USNMD, the Korean peninsula as a significant geopolitical region raises the newsworthiness (Grosswiler, 1997, p. 208).

The reporting pattern found from the test of hypothesis 1 becomes an important clue to discriminate the role of the news media in relation to government, indicating that reporters depend on positive news sources to advocate as well as to defend an issue and that they depend more likely on negative sources to challenge the issue. This reporting pattern leads us to the following proposition: the comparison of two multiple linear regression models could evaluate the level of prediction of thematic variables (independent variables) on the reporter's selection of positive or negative sources (dependent variables). Based on these comparison, we can discriminate which theme was more likely contested, promoted, or challenged.

The advantage of using a multiple linear regression is to raise the percent of criterion (DV) variance accounted for by the linear combination of the predictors (IVs). A multiple regression model is particularly useful when evaluating a nation's foreign policy since it can be used to integrate various dimensions such as political relations, economic relations, policy strategies, ideological dimensions, and leadership, which, therefore, can be separated to determine their contribution to explaining the predominance of positive or negative stories.

As seen in Table 8 and 9, a multiple linear regression for prediction level of thematic variables on total positive sources (TPS) in *Donga Ilbo* suggests four models. The first linear combination of DJ Governance is significantly related to TPS, $F(1, 46) = 38.29, p < .01$. Forty five percent of variability in total positive sources (TPS) is accounted by DJ Governance. As variables such as Diplomatic Strategy, SK-NK Relations, and US Defense are added as predictors, the TPS variance (R^2) increases by 8%, 7%, and 5% respectively. The fourth linear combination of these variables is significantly related to TPS, $F(4, 43) = 20.32, p < .01$, which explains 65% variability in TPS. This effect size represents a substantive and non-trivial explanation to further the understanding of how total positive sources (TPS) are influenced by reporters' construction of thematic issues.

Table 10 and 11 showed that a multiple linear regression for the relation between thematic variables and total negative sources (TNS) in *Donga Ilbo* suggests three models. The first linear combination of Diplomatic Strategy is significantly related to TNS, $F(1, 46) = 55.88, p < .01$. Fifty five percent of variability in TNS is accounted. As Ideological Conflict and DJ Governance are added, the TNS variance increases 11% and 9%

respectively. Therefore, the third linear combination is significantly related to TNS, $F = 43.91, p < .01$, which explains 75% variability in TNS. These two final multiple linear regression models are transformed into the following two functions:

Donga Ilbo

$$[\text{TPS} = .37 + 2.11 (\text{DJ Governance}) + 1.13 (\text{Diplomatic Strategy}) + 1.47 (\text{SK-NK Relations}) + 4.14 (\text{US Defense})]$$

$$[\text{TNS} = .64 + 2.57 (\text{Diplomatic Strategy}) + 3.19 (\text{Ideological Conflict}) + 1.67 (\text{DJ Governance})]$$

The implication of these two multiple linear regression models is that among nine most frequently issued themes in *Donga Ilbo*, DJ Governance and Diplomatic Strategy were the themes more likely contested between challengers and defenders by showing the relevance in both models. These issues influenced reporters to depend on negative sources to bring out the controversial points and at the same time allowed significant space to positive sources to defend President Kim's frame of reference in the *Sunshine* policy. SK-NK Relations and US Defense were the themes more likely advocated and promoted by positive sources by showing the relevance with the reporter's use of positive sources. Ideological Conflict was the theme mostly contested by dominant number of negative sources no matter where they came from.

As seen in Table 12 and 13, a multiple linear regression for evaluation of prediction level of thematic variables on total positive sources (TPS) in the *NYT* suggests five models. The first linear combination of SK-NK Relations is significantly related to TPS, $F(1, 46) = 21.06, p < .01$, where 31% of the variability in TPS is accounted for by the specified independent variables. As US Defense, US Leadership, US-NK Relations, and Family Reunion are added as predictors, TPS variances (R^2) increases 10%, 9%, 5%

and another 5% respectively. Therefore, the fifth linear combination accounts 59% of the effect size or variability in TPS, which is statistically significant, $F(5, 42) = 12.23$, $p < .01$. Again, this regression result represents a substantive amount of effect size explained by this model.

In Table 14 and 15, a multiple linear regression for the relation between thematic variables and total negative sources (TNS) in the *NYT* suggests four models. The first linear combination of US-NK Relations is significantly related to TNS, $F(1, 46) = 10.49$, $p < .01$. It explains 19% variability in TNS. As SK-NK Relations, Diplomatic Strategy and US Defense are added as predictors, TNS variance (R^2) increases 12%, 9%, and 7% respectively. The fourth linear combination model accounts 47% variability in TNS, which is significant, $F(4, 43) = 9.45$, $p < .01$. These two final multiple linear regression models are transformed into the following two functions:

The New York Times

$$[\text{TPS} = .25 + 2.38 (\text{SK-NK Relations}) + 2.71 (\text{US Defense}) + 4.89 (\text{US Leadership}) + 1.71 (\text{US-NK Relations}) + 3.41 (\text{Family Reunions})]$$

$$[\text{TNS} = .79 + 2.07 (\text{US-NK Relations}) + 1.17 (\text{SK-NK Relations}) + 2.76 (\text{Diplomatic Strategy}) + 1.81 (\text{US defense})]$$

The implication of these two functions is that among 10 most frequently issued themes in the *NYT*, US-NK Relations, SK-NK Relations and US Defense are the themes more likely contested between challengers and defenders by showing its relevance in both models. US Leadership and Family Reunion are the themes more likely promoted by positive sources. US Diplomatic Strategy is the theme mostly challenged.

In contrast to these two cases, Table 16 and 17 shows that a multiple linear regression model is applied only to the relationship between thematic variables and total

negative sources (TNS) in *Rodong Sinmun*. The first linear combination of US Threat is significantly related to TNS, $F(1, 46) = 7.27, p < .01$. 14% of variability in TNS is accounted by US threat. As US Presence is added, the percent of TNS variance (R^2) increases 13%. Therefore, 27% variability in TNS is explained by US Threat and US Presence, which is significant, $F(2, 45) = 8.29, p < .01$, which produced the following function:

Rodong Sinmun

$$[TNS = .15 + .61 (\text{US Threat}) + .40 (\text{US Presence})]$$

The implication is that among 10 most frequently issued themes in *Rodong Sinmun*, US Threat and US Presence were the themes having most negative sources. Inability of relationship between thematic issues and total positive sources (TPS) is due to the overwhelming number of positive sources spread into all thematic issues that cannot discriminate the influence of thematic issues on TPS.

Research findings supported Hypothesis 2 that a nation's foreign policy reflects various aspects of national interests. This study indicates that each thematic issue receives different degree of media attention based on its proximity to national interests and the goal of a nation's foreign policy, and that different thematic issues of foreign policy affect the reporter's use of a news source differently. In relation with government, the news media support and/or challenge a government by constructing various thematic issues. This study indicated that whereas internal affairs were the major coverage in *Donga Ilbo*, the *NYT* coverage of foreign policy more likely focused on international political relations and U.S. defense. Compared to *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*, *Rodong Sinmun* contributed to the survival of its political system by focusing on the peril of

foreign threats. The news media act as political participant through its editorial function. This study indicated that the *NYT* editorial acted as a political advisor as well as a critique in the political decision-making process by focusing on a nation's one of the most controversial issues such as USNMD. In regard to the connection between news and editorials, this study showed that *Donga Ilbo* was thinner than the *NYT*, representing the nature of South Korean journalism practice as a polarized pluralistic model.

C. Comparison of News Sources

Hypothesis 3 posits that the ratio of positive and negative sources can be an index to discriminate the relative nature of the news media in relation to government. The hypothesis is an attempt to examine the following assumptions. If journalism practice is conducted within journalistic conventions such as objective reporting, authoritative source, and fair and balanced representation, the ratio between positive and negative sources should be converged to near 1 without a large variance. Additionally, if reporting of a nation's foreign policy is constrained by the state, the opinion direction would be within a positive range of scale. For this reason, the ratio between positive and negative sources is a convenient index to indicate how the media interact with a government through the selection of a news source that is what reporters take for granted as premises of their works.

Donga Ilbo. In Table 18, total 805 voices were detected in total 276 news articles in *Donga Ilbo*. Table 18 shows the frequency distribution of total sources (TS), total positive sources (TPS), total negative sources (TNS), and opinion direction (OPD) by each group of news sources. Each individual news source was coded by its identity and a direction of opinion tuned to President Kim's frame of reference. Each news source was

categorized into seven different groups for its type: government sources, political parties, experts and non-government sources, foreign governments, foreign non-government sources, foreign media, and reporter. Among these various news sources, more than one third of total voices came from members of political parties.

Table 19 compared the frequency distribution of total news sources referring each thematic issue between 2000 and 2001. It indicated that total number of news sources in 2001 was twice higher than the one in 2000. Among seven different groups of news sources, government sources and political parties appeared three times more frequently in 2001 than in 2000. In terms of thematic issues, DJ Governance (237) had the highest number of news sources, which was followed by Diplomatic Strategy (143) and SK-NK Relations (135).

Table 20 shows the ratio of positive to negative sources in each group of news source referring seven most frequently issued themes: DJ Governance, SK-NK Relations, Diplomatic Strategy, Ideological Conflict, US-SK Relations, US-NK Relations, and US Defense. It indicated that for the ratio of positive to negative sources, SK-NK Relations (5.3: 1) was the theme mostly advocated and promoted particularly by South Korean government sources (24: 1) and total foreign sources (41:4) except U.S. media. Ideological Conflict (1: 4.6) was the theme mostly challenged by negative sources. DJ Governance (1: 1.7) and Diplomatic Strategy (1: 1.4) were the themes mostly contested by challengers and defenders. Challenges came mostly from political parties, political experts and non-government groups, and foreign media.

Table 21 shows the opinion direction of each group of news sources referring seven most frequently issued themes. It indicated that in regard to opinion direction,

South Korean government, the first ruling party (Millennium Democratic Party), and foreign governments were highly consistent with Kim's frame of reference, whereas the first opposition party (Grand National Party), intellectuals, non-government sources, U.S. media, and U.S. non-government sources were relatively inconsistent.

These findings imply that *Donga Ilbo* supported Kim Dae Jung government's effort for reconciliation with North Korea by promoting a theme SK-NK Relations on the one hand, and challenged Kim's leadership by constructing critical media discourses in DJ Governance, Diplomatic Strategy, and Ideological Conflict particularly in 2001 on the other hand.

This study also indicates that there seemed to be a certain pattern between the type of a thematic issue and the reporter's selection of a news source. A government had a strong voice in international political relations (SK-NK Relations, US-SK Relations) than in any other themes. President and government sources were strong advocates and promoters of SK-NK Relations and US-SK Relations where political parties were near absent. In international political relations, foreign governments tended to be consistent to a President's frame of reference, but not always the same case in foreign non-government and foreign media. For example, whereas U.S. government sources were highly consistent to President Kim's vision in US-SK Relations, U.S. non-government sources and U.S. media interpreted the same subject from different perspectives. It implies that whereas foreign governments tended to affirm the authority of a government's foreign policy, foreign non-government sources and foreign media tended to have more comprehensive sights on what's going on the nation's foreign policy based on broader information.

Contrast to a government's power over international political relations, political parties tended to have powerful voices on procedural aspects of foreign policy such as diplomatic strategy and a President's governance. The fact that a huge proportion of news sources came from the members of political parties (33.7%) indicates that the *Sunshine* policy has been quite controversial during 2000 and 2001, but more in 2001 than in 2000. It implies that *Donga* reporting of international political relations seems to be more likely constrained or shaped by a government, while other themes such as strategy are vulnerable to a contestation. It supports Entman's (2004) contention about the power of elite dissenting voices, "If open dissent does not spread along the American elite network, challenges to the White House's frame will probably not affect policy very much" (p. 151).

Intellectuals and political experts were invited whenever the evaluation was needed over foreign policy and international relations. That is, reporters depended on intellectuals not only to criticize but also to speculate the prospect of the policy in the context of changing international relations. Compared to the role of intellectuals, South Korean non-government sources were more likely limited to challenge a government.

Voices of general public were narrow in foreign affairs by sharing 4% of total sources which clustered in themes such as SK-NK Relations and Ideological Conflict. The narrow opening of gate for social voices is a limit of journalism practice constrained by the routine in foreign affairs (Bennett, 1990, p. 107). However, it is noticeable that the appearance of social voices in SK-NK Relations in 2000 and Ideological Conflict in 2001 reflected the change of positioning of news media toward Kim's government. Except the reporter's use of government-related anonymous source in DJ Governance,

the reporter's dependence on anonymous source was more for challenging a government than supporting or defending it. Government-related anonymous sources were the only voices that came from inside-circle challenging as well as defending a government. Reporter's voice was coded only when it contained opinion. This study indicated that the reporter's position was following two main actors: government and parliament. That is, when the policy was promoted, reporters' position was consistent with a president's. When the policy was contested, their position was more likely consistent with dominant voices in parliament.

The New York Times. The *NYT* reporting of U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula covers in general the process of unification talks between South and North Korea (SK-NK Relations), the process of political normalization between the U.S. and North Korea (US-NK Relations), and economic situation of the peninsula. Since South Korea continued to grow as a major trading partner and was just recovered from the IMF crisis, the South Korean economic situation and the Kim Dae Jung government's effort for reconciliation and economic cooperation with North Korea became a routine news story about South Korea. In contrast, the U.S. political relation with North Korea experienced a restless diplomatic phase due to a changing policy in a transition between the Clinton to the Bush administration.

Total 691 news sources were found in total 197 news articles of the *NYT*. Each news source was divided into seven general categories for its type: government sources, political parties, experts and non-government sources, foreign governments, foreign non-government sources, foreign media, and reporter. Table 22 shows the frequency distribution of total sources (TS), total positive sources (TPS), total negative sources

(TNS), and opinion direction (OPD) by each group of news sources. It indicated that more than half of total sources came from foreign sources that included foreign governments (27%), foreign non-government sources (22%), and foreign media (6%). Only 17% of total sources were government sources.

Table 23 shows the frequency distribution of news sources referring each theme issued between 2000 and 2001. It indicated that, among seven most frequently issued themes, SK-NK Relations contained the most news sources (117) that was divided into 72 sources in 2000 and 45 sources in 2001, which implied that the theme was more actively discoursed in 2000 than in 2001. Diplomatic Strategy and Bush Governance became issues in 2001.

Table 24 shows the ratio of positive to negative sources referring seven most frequently issued themes: US-NK Relations, SK-NK Relations, NK with Others, US Defense, Diplomatic Strategy, US Leadership, and Bush Governance. It indicated that SK-NK Relations (4.3: 1) and US Leadership (2.2: 1) were the themes more likely promoted and advocated, whereas Bush Governance (1: 2.5) was the most challenging issue in the beginning of 2001. Diplomatic Strategy became an issue in 2001, which was equally contested between challengers (mostly think-tanks and reporters) and defenders (mostly government sources). Other thematic issues in the NYT were more likely discoursed within the convention of objective reporting by showing the ratio of positive to negative sources converging to 1.

Table 25 shows the opinion direction of each group of news sources referring seven most frequently issued themes. It indicated that government sources were mostly consistent with each President's frame of reference. Themes dominantly shaped by a

government were US Defense and US-NK Relations. Among government sources, government-related anonymous sources were occasional dissenters that were, however, limited to US-NK Relations and Bush Governance.

The role of government-related anonymous sources in reporting of foreign policy needs more attention, considering that there was a clear difference in the degree of reporter's dependence between the *NYT* and *Donga Ilbo* and in the opinion direction between 2000 and 2001. As seen in Table 26 and 27, first, the *NYT* (9.4% of total sources) depended on government-related anonymous sources significantly more than *Donga Ilbo* (4.5% of total sources) did. Second, the group's opinion direction was highly consistent with each President's frame of reference in 2000 and it dropped significantly in 2001 (A difference in opinion direction between the two years was significant particularly in the *NYT*, $t = 2.75$, $df = 30$, $p < .05$). Government-related anonymous sources' opposition were, nevertheless, very selective, which means that while they challenged one aspect of foreign policy, they defended strongly another aspect.

Congressional voice was near absent in the *NYT* contrary to *Donga Ilbo* reporting of the *Sunshine* policy. It did not mean that there was no significant oppositional voice. As seen in Table 22, oppositional voices came mostly from foreign sources: foreign government, foreign non-government sources, and foreign media. In a domestic boundary, think-tanks and government-related anonymous sources were significant challengers to a government's policy.

The role of foreign sources in the *NYT* was different from the case of *Donga Ilbo*. The high degree of policy opposition appeared despite the near-absence of the congressional disputation on U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula, which challenged

Bennett's indexing norm (1990). It implies two things. First, U.S. journalism practice was more independent from elite debates than the one concerned in the school of passive journalism. Entman (2004) argues that when journalists have motivation to resist in the absence of congressional response, they tend to depend on foreign sources (p. 153). Second, considering that although the two administrations' rationales in the policy toward North Korea were different, both were not seriously disputed in Congress, foreign criticism was not powerful enough to alter the politics unless it was channelized into domestic opposition. In this context, the role of foreign sources could be regarded to substitute the congressional opposition and constitute an oppositional point of view in reporting of a government's policy.

Rodong Sinmun. Total 467 news sources were found in total 177 news articles in *Rodong Sinmun*. Table 28 shows the frequency distribution of total sources (TS), total positive sources (TPS), total negative sources (TNS), and opinion direction (OPD) of each group of news source in *Rodong Sinmun*. Table 29 shows the frequency distribution of total sources referring each theme issued between 2000 and 2001. Tables indicated that KCNA and *Rodong* reporters were the main news providers, sharing 35% of total news sources. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) as the state agency of North Korea is a major news provider in *Rodong Sinmun*. KCNA is in charge of delivering news to domestic mass media as well as foreign countries; daily press releases are issued in English, Russian, French, and Spanish. *Rodong* reporters play the role as reporter, instructor, and editor. Reporters are not only delivering news but also giving a correct answer on current events in the world.

Next two dominant groups of news source were foreign non-government sources and foreign media, covering 34% of total sources. Foreign non-government sources consisted of Institutions of *Juche* Ideology located in various socialist, underdeveloped and developing countries. South Korean non-government sources (various anti-government activist groups) and South Korean media were also cited as major information providers. Non-government sources consisted of various organizations that were mostly subdivisions of Worker's Party. The role of non-government sources was critical for building its ideological unity through reporting how they educated people in issues such as anti-Americanism and unification.

Foreign governments and foreign media except South Korean media were cited to rebuke the U.S. plan for NMD. Foreign governments such as Russia, China, India, Ghana, and all socialist allies criticized that the U.S. as a world's superpower became isolated from international community for its unilateralism and caused an arms race with its disputable NMD. In this sense, foreign sources played a critical role to support Kim Jong-Il regime.

North Koreans have Kim Il Sung 'Kyosi' that is a collection of words about the principle of nation-building and international relations. These words are the foundation upon which reporters should interpret current events. Surprisingly, government sources were only up to about 10.5% of total sources in *Rodong Sinmun*. It implies that although *Rodong Sinmun* was operated as the state agency, its sourcing pattern was not visibly subordinated to the state. Rather, reporters were ideologically imbued with a government's policy and a national ideology.

As seen in Table 29, a reporter depended on news sources 1.7 times more in 2001 than in 2000. In terms of thematic issues, U.S. threats, USNMD, US presence on the Korean peninsula, and anti-Americanism were prominent than any other issues. Reporting of anti-Americanism was particularly based on South Korean media (main stream media, alternative media, and other publications). It implies that *Donga Ilbo* reporting of the U.S. could be biased toward the conservative's perspective.

Table 30 shows the ratio of positive to negative sources in each group of news source referring six most frequently issued themes: US Presence and Threat, USNMD, Unification, South Korean Ideological Conflict, Anti-Americanism, and Human Rights. Table 31 shows opinion direction of each group of news sources referring 6 most frequently issued themes. It indicated that the ratio of TPS to TNS for each thematic issue in *Rodong Sinmun* was significantly different from the one in *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*, typifying the function of newspaper as a site of ideological reproduction with the all time high score of positive sources. The opinion direction seemed to be not meaningful to discriminate if North Korean government regards a theme as a political challenge or not. It suggests that the political challenge is better to be estimated by measuring the changing number of total sources (TS) and total number of themes (TNT), assuming that the more challenge they have, the more positive news sources they use to rationalize their position on the issue.

Rodong Sinmun attacks the U.S. for its violation of Human Rights especially in 2000. The conceptualization of human rights in North Korea like China was different from the one in Western world. Whereas human rights refers to the concept of human beings as having universal natural rights in Western world, in communist and socialist

state where collectivism supersedes individualism, it is believed that a truly independent sovereign state can guarantee human rights. Based on this perspective, a nation-state that intervenes or invades other country is judged as the one that violates human rights. Human Rights became an issue in 2000 when China and North Korea were part of subject in the U.S. media discourses where U.S. government attempted forcible humanitarian intervention in Somalia (1992-1995) and Bosnia (1995: NATO bombing of Bosnian Serbs).

Juche Ideology as a national political philosophy became a premise of Unification and Type of Nation that North Korean government envisioned. The newsmaking under these topics is known as a fundamental tactic for the nation-building phase because these topics inspired patriotism and remained no room for opposite forces. It was a critical difference in the media discourses of Unification between North Korea and South Korea; whereas North Korea emphasized ideological aspect of unification, South Korea was divided into two discourses: the conservative focused on the technical side of unification process and the progressives focused on spirit of nationalism.

This study supports hypothesis 3 that the ratio of positive to negative sources quoted in a thematic issue could be an index to discriminate the role of the news media in relation to government. Based on the ratio of positive to negative sources, this study indicated that whereas *Rodong Sinmun* functioned dominantly as a site of ideological reproduction by showing that reporters depended on positive sources in absolute number (e.g., 35: 0 in anti-Americanism, 31: 1 in South Korea's Ideological Conflict), *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT* functioned in the range between a site of ideological reproduction and a site of ideological struggle. However, the ratio in *Donga Ilbo* fluctuated in a wider range

than the one in the *NYT* did. The ratio in *Donga Ilbo* varied from 5.3: 1 (SK-NK Relations) to 1: 4.6 (Ideological Conflict), whereas the one in the *NYT* varied from 4.3: 1 (SK-NK Relations) to 1: 2.5 (Bush Governance). The range was wider when the ratio was compared between 2000 and 2001. The ratio in *Donga Ilbo* varied from 28: 1 (SK-NK Relations in 2000) to 1: 7 (Ideological Conflict in 2001), whereas the one in the *NYT* varied from 8.8: 1 (SK-NK Relations) to 1: 2.5 (Bush Governance). Among 7 most controversial issues in *Donga Ilbo*, 4 thematic issues were more or less consistent to a government's policy and other 3 issues were inconsistent to. Among 7 issues in the *NYT*, 4 thematic issues were more or less consistent to a government's policy, 2 issues were inconsistent to, and 1 issue was in neutral.

The analysis of a news source also indicates that there is a pattern in the reporter's selection of a news source that is different in accordance with a thematic issue through which the news media support or challenge a government. This study indicated that various aspects of foreign policy became a media agenda through different groups of news sources. International political relations and defense related issues were normally the substance of a nation's foreign policy where government sources rightly had an upper hand as an accredited and authoritative source and, therefore, the issues were easily advocated and promoted unless otherwise. However, a procedural aspect of foreign policy such as a diplomatic strategy was vulnerable to contending forces that had different perspectives on the scope of national interests from a government's. A theme advocated by government was, however, not always promoted by the media. It could be challenged by other contending forces when it was triggered by some reasons (moment of crisis). Contending forces mostly consisted of all news sources except government

sources. However, among government sources, government-related anonymous sources took various roles: supporter, defender, and challenger. The appearance of contending forces in a thematic discourse was a sign of struggle even if it was not powerful enough to change the course of political action.

D. Impact of International Relations

Hypothesis 4 posits that international relations impose a different effect on the media coverage of foreign policy between two nations. It is established based on the assumption that a hegemony perspective is not only applied to the relationship between the news media and the state but also international relations when there is a conflict between/among nations' interests (Gramsci, 1971). The media-government relation in the field of foreign policy cannot be properly understood without analyzing political context between nations. Even if source's opinion is measured in accordance with a President's frame of reference, the measured opinion is not only influenced by the interaction between the media and government but also the relationship between nations. Therefore, in this section I attempt to observe how international relations affected the media discourse of various aspects of a nation's foreign policy.

A brief summary of political crisis that occurred in the beginning of 2001 was as follows. Since 1954, the U.S. foreign policy has been interrelated with South Korea's Northern policy in the name of military alliance that took a form of collective defense. A collective defense refers a security strategy emphasizing deterrence and defense against North Korea. Under this condition, other issues such as US-NK normalization and economic cooperation between the South and the North were pursued by Kim Dae Jung government. Since the goal of collective defense was set for the peace on the peninsula

and for U.S. power in the East-Asian region, it could not be affected by any change in a government's policy strategy. For the Clinton administration's engagement policy, diplomacy was a vital tool for countering threats to the U.S. national security, but was backed up by alternative path that was a punitive physical containment. That is, Clinton's engagement policy was a combination of diplomacy and defense strategy that would be implemented if it was necessary. In contrast, emphasizing 'peace through strength', 'strict reciprocity' and 'verification', the Bush administration's comprehensive approach did not honor the 1994 Agreed Framework. Given that the two administrations pursued different diplomatic strategies toward North Korea, it cannot be overlooked that the change of U.S. policy toward North Korea from the Clinton to the Bush administration might have influenced the media-government relation in all three nations involved.

Donga Ilbo. Table 32 shows differences in the mean value of total number of themes (TNT), total sources (TS), total positive sources (TPS), total negative sources (TNS), and total sources' opinion direction (OPD) in *Donga Ilbo* reporting of foreign policy between the Clinton and the Bush administration.

The followings were significant in t-test. The mean value of TNT increased from 4.04 to 7.46 between the two administrations ($t = -2.93$, $df = 46$, $p < .01$). The mean value of TS increased from 11.42 to 21.75 ($t = -2.09$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$). The mean value of TNS increased from 3.38 to 10.38 ($t = -2.75$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$). Accordingly, total sources' OPD dropped from 3.20 to -.25 between the two administrations ($t = 2.80$, $df = 46$, $p < .01$).

Table 32

Differences in the Mean Value of Total Number of Themes (TNT), Total Sources (TS), Total Positive Sources (TPS), Total Negative Sources (TNS), and Total Opinion Direction (OPD) in Donga Ilbo between the Clinton and the Bush Administration (N = 48)

Measure and Variables	<u>Mean</u>		<u>Standard Deviation</u>		<u>N of Intervals</u>	
	Clinton	Bush	Clinton	Bush	Clinton	Bush
TNT**	4.04	7.46	2.27	5.23	24	24
TS*	11.42	21.75	8.82	22.58	24	24
TPS	5.71	7.38	6.34	8.08	24	24
TNS*	3.38	10.38	2.99	12.09	24	24
OPD**	3.20	-.25	4.18	4.37	24	24

Significance for t-test results reported in text; significant differences between means indicated by ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Figure 2. Comparison of total number of themes (TNT) and total sources' opinion direction (OPD) in 48 bi-weekly intervals in Donga Ilbo




Figure 2 shows the trend of TNT and OPD changing in 48 bi-weekly intervals between 2000 and 2001. Findings imply that the *Sunshine* policy became more frequently a media discourse as the Bush administration began responsible for the government in 2001. As seen in Table 32 and Figure 2, the *Donga Ilbo* attention on Kim Dae Jung government's policy significantly increased as U.S. policy collided with the South Korean *Sunshine* policy. In the moment of crisis, reporters depended more news sources to clarify the issues and integrated opinions than they promoted the policy, which was supported by the fact that the reporter's dependence on negative sources was more prominent than the one on positive sources. The sharp drop in opinion direction indicated that the policy became a subject of controversy in 2001.

Table 33

Differences in the Mean Value of TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD for 6 most frequently issued Themes in Donga Ilbo between the Clinton and the Bush Administration (N=48)

Variable	TNT		TS		TPS		TNS		OPD	
	C	B	C	B	C	B	C	B	C	B
DJ Gov	1.0	1.7	3.5	6.6	1.3	1.6	1.5	3.7	1.6	-3.4
SK-NK	1.1	1.5	2.9	2.8	2.4	1.5	0.1*	0.7*	7.4*	3.5*
Strategy	0.2*	1.5*	0.9*	5.0*	0.2*	1.8*	0.5*	2.4*	-5.0	-2.9
Ideology	0.5	0.6	1.2	2.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	1.8	-1.5	-5.6
US-SK	0.2*	0.9*	0.3*	2.2*	0.1*	1.0*	0.1	0.7	-0.8	3.6
US-NK	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	4.9	0.8
US Defense	0.1	0.1	2.5	1.0	2.0	0.3	0.0	0.7	7.5	-3.3

Significance for t-test results reported in text; significant differences between means indicated by ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table 33 shows differences in the mean value of TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD for seven most frequently issued themes: DJ Governance, SK-NK Relations, Diplomatic Strategy, Ideological Conflict, US-SK Relations, US-NK Relations, and US Defense. It indicates that the frequency of all themes except US Defense increased more or less during the Bush administration. Among these themes, significant difference in the mean value of TNT was found in Diplomatic Strategy ($t = -2.73$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$) and US-SK Relations ($t = -2.22$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$).

Concerning a news source, this study indicates that a reporter's dependence on a news source increased in all themes except US Defense. A difference in the mean value of TS between the two administrations was significant in Diplomatic Strategy ($t = -2.18$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$) and US-SK Relations ($t = -2.31$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$).

When total sources (TS) was divided into TPS and TNS, the study shows that a reporter's use of a negative source for all thematic issues increased in the Bush administration, while the use of a positive source varied by thematic issues. It implies that when issues were challenged, some issues (e.g., Diplomatic Strategy, and US-SK Relations) were more seriously defended than other issues were. Therefore, for example, Diplomatic Strategy shows a significant difference in the mean value of TPS ($t = -2.21$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$) and TNS ($t = -2.43$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$) between the two administrations. A difference in the mean value of TPS was also significant in US-SK Relations ($t = -2.24$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$). A difference in the mean value of TNS was significant in SK-NK Relations ($t = -2.42$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$).

The opinion direction of all themes except Diplomatic Strategy and US-SK Relations decreased in the Bush administration. Although OPD of Diplomatic Strategy

increased from -4.98 to -2.92 between the two administrations, it could not be regarded as an improvement in OPD, because OPD of Diplomatic Strategy in 2001 was still in the negative range and the theme was 4.5 times more frequently issued during the Bush administration. Accordingly, it is plausible to say that Diplomatic Strategy was more seriously contested during the Bush administration than the Clinton administration. This study indicated that OPD in SK-NK Relations significantly dropped during the Bush administration ($t = 2.18$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$).

Among seven most frequently issued themes, US-SK Relations was the only theme where OPD moved toward a positive direction during the Bush administration. The theme received media attention 5.4 times more in 2001 than in 2000. In the sourcing pattern, US-SK Relations dominantly shaped by US sources (US government, US non-government, and US media) and South Korean government sources (Table 19). The implication is that US-SK Relations was reinforced in a constructive direction when the South Korean government realized its relationship with the Bush administration problematic. Kim Dae Jung government was steering toward the conservatives from the progressives. In the backdrop of changing international relations, the impact of international relations was examined by comparing which thematic issues were particularly brought up after US-SK Relations became a critical media discourse. It was compared by measuring the total sources used by reporters for each thematic issue, based on the assumption that as the media attention increased the reporter's dependence on a news source increased.

The following figures 3, 4, and 5 reveal that US-SK Relations became a controversial issue around March, 2001, which led to the following media discourses of

Diplomatic Strategy, DJ Governance, and Ideological Conflict. These three themes were the most critical issues that challenged Kim's leadership (Table 10 and 11).

Figure 3. Comparison of *Donga Ilbo* news sources referring US-SK relations and Diplomatic Strategy




Figure 4. Comparison of *Donga Ilbo* news sources referring US-SK Relations and DJ Governance





Figure 5. Comparison of *Donga Ilbo* news sources referring US-SK Relations and Ideological Conflict



These figures indicate that US-SK Relations activated other potentially challenging variables such as Diplomatic Strategy, DJ Governance, and Ideological Conflict. The effect of international relations on the media reporting of a nation's foreign policy was subtle to be detected when it became an intervening variable that occurred intermittently. Further task is that although we knew that although there was a clear difference in the media coverage of thematic issues between the two U.S. administrations, we could not exactly figure out what transformed the power of foreign sources into domestic oppositional voices.

When the Bush administration took over the government, *Donga* reporters assiduously delivered the changing mood of Washington and speculated the possible impact of U.S. policy on the *Sunshine* policy and the Korean peninsula. What they found was that the *Sunshine* policy might lose its direction for the conflict between the Bush administration's demand for a stronger tie in connection with USNMD and the goal of *Sunshine* policy 'economic cooperation and reconciliation' with North Korea. Ironically, what reporters contributed to, although unconsciously, was that the reporter's dependence on U.S. sources in reporting of US-SK Relations actually brought the power to domestic conservatives by affirming their ideology realistic.

Considering the impact of US-SK Relations on other thematic issues, the media discourse of US-SK Relations constituted itself as U.S. hegemony in this region by conferring the power to the South Korean conservatives to influence the policy in line with the U.S. policy. The conservatives used to be the ruling coalition whose interest was intertwined with South Korean political economy that was also interlocked with U.S. interests on the Korean peninsula. In this structural tie between two nations, President

Kim's *Sunshine* policy could be practically executed within the boundary of substantiating U.S. interests in this region, unless Kim took a risk of political and economic stability. Therefore, the media discourse of US-SK Relations became a hegemonic turning point between the progressives and the conservatives in South Korea.

The New York Times. Table 34 shows differences in the mean values of total number of themes (TNT), total sources (TS), total positive sources (TPS), total negative sources (TNS), and total sources' opinion direction (OPD) in the *NYT* reporting of foreign policy between the Clinton and the Bush administration.

Table 34

Differences in Mean Values of Total Number of Themes (TNT), Total Sources (TS), Total Positive Sources (TPS), Total Negative Sources (TNS), and Total Opinion Direction (OPD) between the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration in the NYT (N = 48)

Measure and Variables	<u>Mean</u>		<u>Standard Deviation</u>		<u>N of Intervals</u>	
	Clinton	Bush	Clinton	Bush	Clinton	Bush
TNT	4.04	4.17	3.01	2.37	24	24
TS	15.29	13.25	13.99	9.60	24	24
TPS	7.13	3.83	7.16	3.96	24	24
TNS	3.13	4.46	3.66	4.63	24	24
OPD**	3.61	-.02	4.18	4.37	22	23

Significance for t-test results reported in text; significant differences between means indicated by ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

It indicates that the mean value of OPD was significantly different between the Clinton and the Bush administrations ($t = 3.59$, $df = 43$, $p < .01$), which was mainly caused by TPS decreased from 7.13 to 3.83 and TNS increased from 3.13 to 4.46. The effect size

(ω^2) of 23% accountability is comparatively high in consideration of the premise that the news media are assumed to balance sources with conflicting perspectives. This study implies that the Bush administration's policy was less supported in the media discourse than the one in the Clinton administration's engagement policy was.

Figure 6 shows the trend of TNT and OPD in 48 bi-weekly intervals during 2000 and 2001. It indicates that the U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula has been more constantly contested in the media during the Bush administration by showing a large gap between the media attention (TNT) and opinion direction (OPD), whereas the policy in the Clinton administration was more likely promoted.

Figure 6. Comparison of total number of themes (TNT) and total sources' opinion direction (OPD) in 48 bi-weekly intervals in the *NYT*




Table 35 shows differences in the mean value of TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD for six most frequently issued themes: US-NK Relations, SK-NK Relations, NK with Others, US Defense, Diplomatic Strategy, and US Leadership. It indicates that there is a significant difference in OPD between the two administrations, particularly, in international relations: US-NK Relations ($t = 1.77$, $df = 13$, $p < .05$) and SK-NK Relations ($t = 2.67$, $df = 20$, $p < .05$). A significant difference in OPD of these two themes

was more likely due to a significant drop of positive sources during the Bush administration, not the significant growth of dissenting voices. It implies that, although opinion direction was significantly dropped in the Bush administration, the opinion change was not regarded as a critical challenge for a government to reconsider a direction of foreign policy if it was perceived as less supportiveness. If political challenge was perceived as critical, total positive sources would increase to defend the policy as total negative sources increased.

Table 35

Differences in the mean value of TNT, TS, TPS, TNS and OPD for 6 most frequently issued themes in the NYT between the Clinton and the Bush administrations(N=48)

Variable	TNT		TS		TPS		TNS		OPD	
	C	B	C	B	C	B	C	B	C	B
US-NK	0.4	0.5	1.9	1.7	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.3*	-2.4*
SK-NK	0.9	0.7	3.1	1.8	2.2	0.7	0.3	0.4	6.3*	1.3*
NKOthers	0.3	0.4	1.7	1.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.4	1.9	-1.7
US Defense	0.3	0.4	1.6	1.6	0.8	0.7	0.3	0.8	2.8	-0.01
Strategy	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.7
US leadership	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.1	5.3	2.4


Significance for t-test results reported in text; significant differences between means indicated by ** p < .01, * p < .05

In terms of international relations, unlike the case of South Korea, U.S. hegemony has been rarely affected by US-SK relations. In fact, US-SK Relations took only 2.5% of total *NYT* coverage of South and North Korea. Since a significant part of U.S. military stayed on the Korean peninsula since 1954 to deter North Korea as well as to maintain

the U.S. influence in the East-Asian region, the U.S. hegemonic concern focused more on US-NK Relations and US Defense than any other issues. US-NK Relations has been a controversial issue during the Clinton administration, indicating the ratio of positive to negative sources (17: 13) and opinion direction (1.3) in 2000. However, it became less supported and more challenged during the Bush administration with the ratio (9: 16) and opinion direction (-2.4).

Since US-NK Relations became a critical media discourse for its ironic dual relevance to SK-NK Relations (unification talks) and U.S. defense, the effect of international relations was examined in the relationship between US-NK Relations and SK-NK Relations by measuring the reporter's use of a news source. As seen in Figure 7, after SK-NK Relations became a media discourse by announcing the summit meeting between the North and the South, President Clinton's engagement policy toward North Korea (US-NK Relations) was successfully articulated to U.S. national interests first time in history.

Figure 7. Comparison of total sources referring SK-NK Relations and US-NK Relations in the *NYT*



However, for the Bush administration the very media discourse of US-NK Relations was a subject of struggle through which the administration should justify USNMD as a primary defense strategy in the post-Cold War era. That is to say, the Bush administration's winning strategy depended on how to articulate USNMD to U.S. national interests. US-NK Relations has been skillfully constructed by the Bush administration by claiming that 'strict reciprocity and verification' was to test the North Korea's true intentions and the seriousness of its desire for improved relation. The administration could avoid a further domestic debate by offering a diplomatic talk in condition of North Korea's significant reduction of traditional defense artillery. The ball was on the other side. The Bush administration's strategy transferred the burden of changing policy into South Korea and alleviated a further media discourse by channeling the media attention to SK-NK Relations that was the second highest peak of SK-KK Relations in Figure 7.

International relations were critical to understand the process of ruling bloc's ideological domination. Concerning international relations, Gramsci (1971) claimed, "International relations also deal with a balance of forces and intertwine with internal relations of nation-states as well as the relation of military force. He argued that the more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party will come to represent this situation and to exploit it. It was what exactly happened in South Korea in relation with the United States. *Donga Ilbo* supported President Kim Dae Jung to constitute hegemony with the *Sunshine* policy in domestic and international community in 2000. Although there were dissent voices against his strategy and governance, his leadership was supported with 79% approval rate. However,

when national interests framed in the *Sunshine* policy (the economic cooperation between North and South Korea through political reconciliation) was collided with U.S. interests framed in the Bush administration's hard-line policy (peace through strength), his leadership was challenged by the conservatives whose interests were linked with the U.S. interests.

Rodong Sinmun. Table 36 shows differences in the mean value of TNT, TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD in six most frequently issued themes in *Rodong Sinmun* between the Clinton administration and the Bush administration. It indicates that when a theme became an issue, a reporter relied on more news sources to bring out the issue.

Table 36

Difference in mean value of TNT, TS, TPS, TNS and OPD for 6 most frequently issued Themes in Rodong Sinmun between the Clinton and the Bush administrations (N=48)

	TNT		TS		TPS		TNS		OPD	
Variable	C	B	C	B	C	B	C	B	C	B
US presence	0.3	0.5	0.6	1.2	0.3	0.7	0.2	0.2	1.3	4.4
Ideology	0.1*	0.5*	0.2*	1.5*	0.2*	1.2*	0.0	0.0	8.9	7.9
Unification	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.0	0.0	9.7	8.5
Anti-A	0.1*	0.5*	0.4*	1.9*	0.1*	1.4*	0.0	0.0	3.0*	7.1*
USNMD	0.3	0.3	1.3	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.0	0.0	3.9	5.9
US threats	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.1	6.7	1.5

Significance for t-test results reported in text; significant differences between means indicated by ** p < .01, * p < .05

Among these 6 thematic issues, a significant difference in the mean value of TNT was found in Ideological Conflict ($t = -2.30$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$) and Anti-Americanism


($t = -2.16$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$). The mean value of TS increased in all themes except USNMD in the Bush administration. A significant difference in the mean value of TS was found in Ideological Conflict ($t = -2.48$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$) and Anti-Americanism ($t = -2.16$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$). A difference of the mean value of TPS was also significant in Ideological Conflict ($t = -2.42$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$) and Anti-Americanism ($t = -2.55$, $df = 46$, $p < .05$). The mean value of OPD was significant in Anti-Americanism ($t = -2.58$, $df = 10$, $p < .05$) by showing 3.0 in the Clinton administration and 7.1 in the Bush administration.

This study indicates that the impact of changing international relations on the reporting of foreign policy was clear in thematic issues such as Anti-Americanism and South Korea's Ideological Conflict. Anti-Americanism was taken more seriously in the Bush administration than in the Clinton administration in response to the change of U.S. policy from an engagement to a hard-line policy. South Korea's ideological conflict between the conservatives and the progressives reflected the by-then South Korea's social and political atmosphere. Although international relations did not challenge Kim's regime that was due to the absence of organic inter-relation, the impact of international relations were clear in the media coverage of foreign policy: more denouncement, more negative media representation, and more ideological. *Rodong Sinmun* claimed that the U.S. was a super rogue state if the term 'rogue' named after the state that threaten world peace by producing nuclear, missile, and weapon of mass destruction. The theme was salient particularly when the U.S. designated North Korea as a nation that supported terrorism. Reacting to the Bush administration's suspension of diplomatic talks with North Korea, North Korea went back to the strict principle of *Juche* (self-reliance)

ideology. It was different attitude from the one North Korea had in 2000 when Kim Jong-Il regime declared to negotiate with nations having different ideology.

Figure 8 shows the comparison of *Rodong Sinmun*'s total number of themes (TNT) and total sources' opinion direction (OPD). It indicates that, unlike *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*, *Rodong Sinmun* completely lacked the function of media as a site of ideological contestation among different social forces, but fulfilled the function of ideological production and reproduction.

Figure 8. Comparison of Total Number of Theme (TNT) and Total Sources' Opinion Direction (OPD) in *Rodong Sinmun* (N=48)



Nevertheless, *Rodong Sinmun* agenda was not arbitrarily selected by reporters, but closely linked with current affairs. US Threat was salient when the U.S. asserted that North Korea was an unpredictable rogue state to justify its USNMD. Anti-Americanism was salient when the on-going diplomatic talks in 2000 was abolished by the incoming Bush government in 2001. Ideological Conflict was salient when the South Korean conservatives' discourse of national security became dominant in 2001.

However, OPD in *Rodong Sinmun* was moving mostly in the positive range no matter how a thematic issue changed. It means that the newspaper in a communist state did not provide a space for political opponents to compete their ideas. Therefore, political challenges in the newspaper did not challenge the policy but announced what a current issue was. The issue became a subject of a reporter's argument through which reporters clarified and interpreted the issue based on political ideology. Therefore, the role of newspaper in North Korea was limited to let people have a unified perspective and to make a collective society. A reporter is regarded as one of the most active political actors whose role is to inspire people of revolutionary spirit for a nation-building (Kim & Lee, 1999, p. 232).

This study implies that North Korea did not take initiatives in diplomatic talks with the United States and that the reporting of international news was extremely defensive. The impact of international relations was detected in the reporting of foreign policy but not on Kim's political power and leadership. The failure in diplomatic talks with the U.S. was not critical to social and political stability.

E. Media Representation of Nations and Leaders

Hypothesis 5 posits that the media representation of each others nation changes as a nation's foreign policy changes. It is based on the assumption that media representation is an ideological work influenced by a dominant political bloc's world view. Therefore, the null hypothesis is that the media representation of each others nation does not change between 2000 and 2001. Two-way contingency table analysis was conducted by using crosstabs.

Donga Ilbo. Table 37 shows that *Donga Ilbo* representation of North Korea was found in 67 articles out of 277 sample data, which was 24% of total news coverage of the *Sunshine* policy. The representation of North Korea was changed between 2000 and 2001. Dominant images of North Korea in 2000 were Failed State (36%), One Nation (19%), and World's Last Communist State (16%). The image of North Korea was diversified with Failed State (19%), Totalitarian State (19%), Unpredictable State (17%), Rogue State (14%), and World's Last Communist State (14%).

North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il (Table 38) was addressed as Military Commander in Chief (60%) in both years, which indicated that there was a significant change in addressing him in comparison with what media used to label him before. A difference between 2000 and 2001 was that he was often represented as Pragmatist (30%) first time in history in 2000, whereas he was described as Suspicious Man (9%) and Dictator (6%) in 2001.

Implication is that the *Sunshine* policy might have been reconsidered under the influence of U.S. policy in 2001. The change in media representation in 2001 consisted of the newly added images such as Rogue State and Suspicious Man, which were the Bush administration's rhetoric and perceptions of North Korea and its leader. However, the change between 2000 and 2001 was not significant in statistical test.

Table 39 shows that there was a significant change in *Donga* representation of the U.S. between 2000 and 2001, Pearson χ^2 (6, $N=29$) = 19.30, $p < .01$, Cramer's $V = .816$. Total 29 articles out of 277 sample data included media representation of the U.S., among which 26 articles belonged to 2001. The U.S. was represented as Peacemaker, Ally, and State of Ideological Conflict in 2000, whereas it was represented as Ally (35%), World's

Superpower (30%), Interventionist (15%), and Global Leader (12%) in 2001. The implication is that *Donga* representation of the U.S. reflected that Kim Dae Jung government more realized the U.S. as an influential factor in the inter-Korean relation in 2001 than in 2000, and at the same time that the U.S. intervened in the inter-Korean dialogue.

Table 40 indicated that *Donga Ilbo* representation of South Korea in 2001 was different from the one in 2000 that was significant in Pearson $\chi^2 (4, N = 51) = 28.83$, $p = .000$, Cramer's $V = .75$. Total 51 news articles (18%) out of 277 sample data included media representation, among which 19 articles pertained to 2000 and 32 articles to 2001. South Korea was dominantly represented as Capitalist State (47%) and One Nation (37%) in 2000, whereas it was represented as State of Ideological Conflict (47%) and US Ally (41%) in 2001.

Table 41 indicated that *Donga Ilbo* representation of Kim Dae Jung was also significantly changed from 2000 to 2001 in Pearson $\chi^2 (9, N = 59) = 33.89$, $p = .000$, Cramer's $V = .76$. His dominant images were Leader of Democracy (40%), Reformist (24%), and Peacemaker (12%) in 2000, whereas Lame-Duck (27%), Failed Reformer (24%), Idealist (15%), and Peacemaker (15%) were dominant in 2001. The implication is that President Kim lost a political ground to execute the *Sunshine* policy after the failure of political and economic reform, which resulted in a lower presidential approval rate.

The analysis supports that the change of *Donga Ilbo* representation of North Korea and the U.S. between 2000 and 2001 was influenced by a nation's foreign policy. When the goal of policy was declared as 'reconciliation and economic cooperation', it was transformed into a patriotic expression such as 'One Nation' for North Korea and

South Korea. However, when a government changed the policy strategy in the wake of changing international relations and political contestation, the media reflected the change in their representation of nations and leaders. An interesting finding in *Donga Ilbo* was that a drastic change actually occurred in the self-image in the same period, considering that the national identity (self-image) is normally more stable and constructive than the images of others.

The New York Times. Table 42 indicates that the media representation of North Korea was changed significantly between 2000 and 2001, $\chi^2 (9, N = 97) = 22.46$, $p = .008$, Cramer's $V = .48$. North Korea was dominantly represented as World's Last Communist State (42%), Failed State (15%), and Rogue State (15%) in 2000, whereas the ranking of dominant images was changed into Failed State (29%), Rogue State (24%), Terrorist (11%), and Isolated and Reclusive State (11%) in 2001. Total 97 articles out of total 197 sample data, which was 49% of total news coverage, included various symbols and representation. Table 43 indicated that, compared to the change of media representation of North Korea, the image of Kim Jong-Il was not significantly changed between the two years, being represented as Dictator (32%) and Reclusive and Secretive Leader (25%) in both years, which covered 8% of total sample data.

This study indicates that the *NYT* emphasized the moment of North Korea's stepping into capitalism in 2000, whereas the representation of North Korea in 2001 more likely reminded of the image of Cold-War era. The implication is that the *NYT* representation of North Korea was influenced by the two administrations' foreign policy stances: the Clinton administration's engagement policy vs. the Bush administration's hardline policy. In contrast to the positive images of North Korea in 2000, the media

representation of North Korea in 2001 was part of Bush administration's ideological struggle to articulate North Korea to a rogue state and a terrorist state, which was based on a government report²⁶, not of actual events.

In Table 44 South Korea was represented as Capitalist state (50%) and US Ally (29%), which covered 14% of total sample data in both administrations. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung (Table 45) was represented as Peacemaker (40%), Lame-Duck (25%), Reformist (10%), and Failed-Reformist (10%), which covered 10% of total sample data. The *NYT* representation of South Korea and President Kim Dae Jung was more frequently found in 2001, although the representation was not significantly different between the two years.

Table 46 indicates that The *NYT* represented the U.S. as World Policeman (32%), World's Superpower (28%), and Peacemaker (18%), which covered 11% of total news coverage. Table 47 indicates that President Bush was represented as Policeman (31%) and Novice (31%) which symbolized his conservative tenet and unsophisticated diplomatic skill, which implied President Bush's leadership in question in the beginning of his official time.

Rodong Sinmun. *Rodong Sinmun* representation of the U.S. was found in total 80 articles out of 177 sample data during 2000 and 2001, which took 45% of total news coverage of foreign policy. Table 48 indicates that the image of the U.S. was more intensified in 2001 than in 2000, showing that 56% of total representation belonged to

²⁶ Karl & Judith (2001). Star wars boosters. *Nations*, 272(4), pp. 6-7. Rumsfeld's commission reversed a 1995 finding of the nation's intelligence agencies that the country was not in imminent danger from ballistic missiles acquired by new powers in 1998. Sciolino & Myers (2000, July 5) reported in the *New York Times* that the rules of classic intelligence analysis were altered, the officials said, to measure not whether countries were likely to threaten the United States, but whether they "could" do so. The change skewed the results toward the most alarming assessment. "There's a lot of pressure from the Hill driving this process."

2001 and 44% to 2000. The U.S. was represented as Imperialist (43%), Interventionist (20%), and Rogue state (11%) in 2000. The image was changed to Interventionist (24%), Rogue state (16%), Jingoist (16%), Imperialist (11%), and Chosun people's enemy (11%) in 2001.

Table 49 indicates that President Bush was portrayed as an interventionist (33%), a bully (33%), a policeman (17%), a dictator (8%) and a king of rogue state (8%) for 12 times. Findings indicate that the frequency of *Rodong Sinmun* representation of the U.S. increased from 35 to 45 in 2001 and that the type of symbol became various toward a negative direction in 2001.

Table 50 shows that South Korea was predominantly represented as One Nation (41%) in 2000 and 2001. While a typical North Korean portrayal of South Korean government was Puppet Regime (16%) and a Corrupted State (14%) in 2000, the image of State of Ideological Conflict was conspicuous in 2001.

The representation of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung (Table 51) was unusually rare with only 8 times out of 177 sample data, which seemed to be the effect of the June summit meeting in 2000. Kim Dae Jung was represented as Faction (38%), Traitor (38%), Reformist (13%), and Dictator (13%).

This study indicates that after the June summit meeting between leaders of two Koreas, the image of 'One Nation' was frequently found particularly in thematic issues such as Unification and Type of Nation. It was known that the concept of 'One Nation' emerged when Kim Il Sung suggested confederation as an ideal form of unified government during the 1980s. Nevertheless, *Rodong Sinmun* representation of South Korea and its leader have shown little progress. Furthermore, the newspaper represented

the struggle between the progressives and the conservatives in South Korea as the inevitable on-going process of workers' revolution in South Korea.

Table 52 shows that *Rodong Sinmun* represented North Korea as One Nation (49%), Strong Independent State (35%), and Peacemaker (14%) during 2000 and 2001. Kim Jong-Il (Table 53) was mostly represented as Great Leader (46%) and Nationalist (46%). The national identity of North Korea was constructed as One Nation and Strong Independent Nation (KangSungDaeKuk) and Kim Jong-Il as Nationalist and Great Leader. Based on historical analysis, Kim Jong-Il in North Korea, although known as dictator, became really a hero on behalf of changing international relations. Between 2000 and 2001 he brought the historic turn-over with the June summit meeting in 2000, various international treaties, Chinese Prime Minister Chang and Russian President Putin's visit to North Korea, and a reclusive and secretive leader Kim Jong-Il's trip to Shanghai and Moscow. The historic turnover between North and South Korea brought a dimming hope to all Koreans. All these progresses in international relations were counted as Kim's ability to handle the situation.

Comparing three newspapers' representation of each others nation, the amount of media representation used in *Donga Ilbo* was 24% for North Korea, 11% for the U.S., and 18% for South Korea. The amount of *NYT* representation was 49% for North Korea, 14% for South Korea, and 14% for the United States. The amount of *Rodong Sinmun* representation was 45% for the U.S, 43% for South Korea, and 37% for North Korea. Therefore, the ranking in frequent user of media representation was *Rodong Sinmun*, the *NYT*, and *Donga Ilbo* in order. But, analyzing a section by section, the most frequent use of representation was found in the *NYT* coverage of North Korea (49%). Second highest

was the *Rodong* representation of the U.S. (45%). The least use of representation was the *Donga* representation of the U.S. (11%).

For media representation of leaders, the most frequent use of representation was found in *Donga Ilbo* coverage of Kim Dae Jung (21%), *Rodong Sinmun* reporting of Kim Jong-Il (18%), and the *NYT* reporting of Kim Dae Jung (10%) in order. For self-portrayal (national identity), the most frequent use of representation was found in *Rodong Sinmun* (37%), *Donga Ilbo* (20%), the *NYT* (14%) in order.

F. Impact of Challenges on Politics

Hypothesis 6 posits that when political challenge becomes a critical media discourse, it can become a hegemonic challenge to the leadership. This section analyzes the primary cause of political challenge and its impact on politics in three newspapers.

Table 54 indicates that 7 different reasons were detected as political challenges in *Donga Ilbo*: 1) ideological conflict, 2) DJ governance, 3) U.S. foreign policy, 4) DJ's radical movement toward North Korea, 5) diplomatic strategy, 6) North Korea's unfaithful response, and 7) low threshold of national security. Among these 7 issues, as seen in the analytic section of thematic construction, only three issues became critical discourses: Ideological Conflict, DJ Governance, and Diplomatic Strategy. These three issues did not identically match with top three causes of political challenges. Furthermore, although U.S. foreign policy was picked as one of major causes of political challenges, US-SK Relations was constructed in a slightly positive direction (The ratio of positive to negative sources was 1.5: 1). Therefore, it suggests that if the issue did not become a critical discourse pertaining more negative than positive sources, it could hardly become a hegemonic challenge to the existing leadership.

The impact of various political challenges on politics was found in such areas: 1) the replace of cabinet members, 2) review of foreign policy, 3) tension between North and South Korea, and 4) review of domestic policy. Findings indicate that Kim Dae Jung government attempted to adjust its policy in accordance with domestic political challenges as well as U.S. foreign policy although it was not known that the attempt has been done in right time.

Table 55 shows that a primary cause of political challenge found in the *NYT* during 2000 was linked with the following issues: 1) diplomatic strategy, 2) North Korea's suspicious missile production, and 3) arms race. However, the challenge in 2001 was related to the following issues: 1) inconsistency of U.S. policy, 2) interruption of détente mood, 3) overestimation of North Korean threat, 4) building tension in the East-Asian region, and 5) negative effect on U.S. foreign policy.

This study indicates that the primary cause of political challenges was different between the Clinton and the Bush administration. The Clinton administration faced an opposition for its attempt to make a missile accord, which came from the incoming Bush administration's cabinet members at the end of his office hour. (The ratio of positive to negative sources in US-NK Relations in 2000 was 17: 13.) The impact of challenge resulted in the cancellation of Clinton's visit to North Korea. In contrast, the Bush administration faced an opposition for its attempt to abolish the 1994 Agreed Framework established between the U.S. and North Korea during the Clinton administration. (The ratio of positive to negative sources in US-NK Relations in 2001 was 9: 16.) The political challenge resulted in the U.S. offer of diplomatic talks with North Korea.

Table 56 shows that political challenge in North Korea was found in issues such as U.S. military threat, the U.S. assertion of North Korean threat, the South Korean assertion of North Korean threat, and the U.S. intervention in inter-Korean affairs. In contrast to the *NYT* and *Donga Ilbo*, there was no such thing as the impact on politics found in *Rodong Sinmun*.

This study supports hypothesis 5 by finding that not every political opposition found in the media became a challenge to a President's leadership, but the one that became a critical media discourse. When the issue became a critical media discourse, the news media function as a site of ideological contestation no matter where the opposition came from. A political challenge could be originated in foreign sources as well as domestic sources. As seen in this study, a foreign source was not a direct challenger. The influence of foreign sources might be activated when their voices were transformed into a domestic opposition. To make this link possible, these two groups had to share a common interest. Reporter played the role as a catalyst in this docking process with its power to construct a theme and to select a news source.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Discussions

This section presents a number of general conclusions on the results of the analyses and implications that these findings might contribute to understanding of the media-government relations. Discussion will be based on the comparison of statistical results and theoretical review on media-government relations.

The purpose of this study is to explore how reporting of foreign policy supports or challenges a government, what determines the role of the news media in relation to government, and how the news media developed in different political contexts are different and similar in reporting of a nation's foreign policy.

Content analysis was conducted to compare the three nation's news coverage of foreign policy and international affairs. The variables compared were themes, news sources, the opinion direction, and media representation. These are universal components of the reporter's newsmaking process, which justify the comparison of the role of the news media developed in different political contexts.

Findings in content analysis suggest five implications in regard to the role of the news media in relation to government. First, the role of the news media in a liberal democratic state is shifting in the range between a site of ideological struggle and a site of ideological reproduction, whereas the role of the media in a communist state is more likely limited to ideological reproduction. A critical difference in the newsmaking process lies in the existence of forces that challenge a government.

Second, the role of the news media is determined by how reporters construct a critical discourse out of thematic issues. Even in a liberal democratic state, not every individual theme of foreign policy is contested by contending forces. Only when the policy is confronted with an opposition, the news media become a site of struggle where different forces compete with their ideas to achieve public consent.

Third, the role of news media is influenced by a reporter's selection of a news source. Reporters tend to interact with different types of news sources, depending on the nature of thematic issues.

Fourth, a hegemonic turning-point emerges when a contending force's perspective becomes a dominant media discourse.

Fifth, the media representation of each others nation and leader is constrained by a government's foreign policy that reflects a ruling bloc's word-view.

The next section discusses conclusions in connection with research questions: RQ1) if reporting of a nation's foreign policy is constrained by a government, how the policy be contested by different forces? How can opposite forces' opinions or ideas become a dominant discourse to influence a direction of policy? RQ2) if the role of the news media is differently conceptualized by different political systems, how can we discriminate the role of media functioning in relation to government? Is there a common factor that influences the role of the media?

1. Role of News Media

The first implication of this research is that the role of the news media in a liberal democratic state is shifting in the range between a site of ideological struggle and a site of

ideological reproduction²⁷, whereas the role of the media in a communist state is more likely limited to ideological reproduction. The basic difference in the newsmaking process lies in the existence of forces that challenge a government.

This study indicates that a reporter's selection of a news source has two patterns. First, reporters depend on positive sources to promote an issue as well as to defend it when the issue is challenged by contending forces. Second, reporters depend on negative sources more likely to challenge the issue. These two patterns become a clue in determining how different role the news media play in accordance with various thematic issues in the following section.

The test of correlation among themes, news sources, and opinion direction (Table 2, 3, 4, and Figure 1) indicates several things. First, in *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*, total number of themes (TNT) is significantly correlated with total sources (TS), total positive sources (TPS), and total negative sources (TNS), whereas in *Rodong Sinmun* total number of themes (TNT) is significantly correlated only with total sources (TS), but not with total positive sources (TPS) and total negative sources (TNS). Second, in *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*, total sources (TS) is significantly correlated with total positive sources (TPS) and total negative sources (TNS), whereas in *Rodong Sinmun* total sources (TS) is significantly correlated only with total positive sources (TPS). Third, in *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*, opinion direction (OPD) is significantly correlated only with total negative

²⁷ For Althusser (1971), the function of ideology is to reproduce the social relations of production. The ideology is produced and reproduced in the domain of the superstructures: institutions like the family, churches, cultural institutions like the media, trade unions, political parties, etc. (These institutions in civil society are therefore called Ideological State Apparatuses.) Despite its diversity, such institutions function in unity beneath the ruling ideology which is the ideology of the ruling class. However, he claims that no class can hold State power (power of governance) over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the Ideological State Apparatuses (pp. 153-155)

sources (TNS), whereas in *Rodong Sinmun* it is significantly correlated with total positive sources (TPS) as well as total negative sources (TNS).

These statistical results indicate that a reporter's dependence on a news source increases as a theme becomes an issue regardless of media and political systems. However, a difference in media and political systems can be found in the way reporters use a news source for. For the media in a liberal democratic state, whereas reporters depend on positive sources when they promote an issue, they relied on positive and negative sources when they challenge the issue. When an issue is challenged, the function of positive sources is more likely to defend the issue being challenged. For this reason, the total source's opinion direction (OPD) is significantly and inversely correlated with total negative sources (TNS), but not with total positive sources (TPS).

In contrast, for the media in a communist state, the function of negative sources is limited to the announcement of a threat to the system, not the indication of political challenge to a government and its authority. Therefore, the increase in total sources (TS) is more likely ascribed to the increase of total positive sources (TPS), not the one of total negative sources (TNS). Accordingly, the existence of negative sources does not significantly reduce the positive source's defense mechanism. For this reason, the total source's opinion direction (OPD) is significantly correlated with both total positive sources (TPS) and total negative sources (TNS).

This study implies that the role of the news media as a site of struggle is dominantly exercised in a liberal democratic state. The media in a liberal democratic state provide a space for open discussion among various contenders. In this sense, the concept of media as a site of struggle is in line with Norris's (2004) claim that the mass media

have a positive impact on democratization and human development if they function effectively as a watchdog holding the powerful to account and as a civic forum facilitating a diversity of voices in public debate (p. 116).

However, concerning the media relationship to government, an issue raised here is that the watchdog function was so strongly believed as an idealistic journalism practice that the other side of media function was often neglected or underestimated. Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue that the normative ideal of the neutral, independent watchdog leads to blind spots in journalists' understanding of what they do, obscuring many functions – that, for example of celebrating consensus values (Hallin, 1986, pp.116-8) – which fall outside the normative model (p. 13). Therefore, the normative concept of journalism in a liberal democratic state did not accurately describe the complexity of newsmaking (Schudson, 2000).

This research supports their arguments on the disparity between the normative role of journalism and the real journalism practice in a liberal democratic state by showing that the role of the news media in liberal democratic state is actually shifted in the range between a site of ideological struggle and a site of ideological reproduction, whereas the one in a communist state is more likely limited to a site of ideological reproduction. A critical difference is in the existence of forces that challenge the government's power. Therefore, our next concern is where dissenting voices are coming from and how a critical theme is constructed in the news media.

2. Construction of Critical Media Discourse

The second implication is that the role of the news media is determined by how reporters construct a critical discourse out of thematic issues. In *Rodong Sinmun*, themes

related to foreign threats and ideological consolidation received in general more attention than any other thematic issues did. Without any specific dissenting voices, reporters creatively discoursed a theme in the form of question and answer. In *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*, not every individual theme of foreign policy was contested by contending forces. Only for certain themes, the news media became a site of struggle where different forces competed with their ideas to achieve public consent.

This study indicated that different aspects of foreign policy were individually constructed by receiving a different degree of media attention (Table 5, 6, and 7), depending on the proximity to national interests and the goal of a nation's foreign policy. Whereas internal affairs were the major coverage in *Donga Ilbo*, the *NYT* coverage of foreign policy focused on international political relations and U.S. defense. It implies that the South Korean government has been suffered from internal struggles that might be intensified in the polarized pluralistic political culture, whereas the U.S. foreign policy emphasized matters of security in various parts of the world. It supports Mowlana's (1997) contention that the appearance of the Cold War made U.S. foreign policy analysts and the media focus on such areas as arms race and conflict (p. 35).

The news media act as political participant through its editorial function. This study indicated that the *NYT* editorial acted as a political advisor as well as a critique in the political decision-making process by focusing on a nation's one of the most controversial issues such as USNMD. *Donga Ilbo* editorial was not separated from the news production as much as the *NYT* was in terms of its thematic selection and opinion direction, showing a positive correlation with the opinion direction of *Donga* news. Therefore, in regard to the connection between news and editorials, this study showed

that *Donga Ilbo* was thinner than the *NYT*, representing the nature of South Korean journalism practice as a polarized pluralistic model.

Concerning a government's power over reporting of foreign policy, although there was a certain degree of influence from a government, reporters more likely selected a theme and a news source and constructed critical media discourses. When a government constituted ideological domination, the media were more likely promoting its policy. However, when a government was challenged by powerful opponents such as political parties, the reporter's construction of theme was not always influenced by a government's discourse that defended the policy. It supported Gitlin (1979) arguing that the newspaper's claim to legitimacy that is embodied in the professional ideology of objectivity rests on the substantial autonomy of its reporters. Reporters feel that they have professional prerogative power to make a news story for readers by selecting an event and a news source. It is the way hegemony works in journalism practice no matter how the media supports or challenge a government (p. 20).

Themes became issues for different reasons: promoting, contesting, and challenging a government's policy (Table 8 through 17). The issue contested was more likely the procedural aspect of policy such as diplomatic strategy. The conflict came from the difference in contending forces' perspectives on national interests. As seen in this research, contending forces' different perceptions of national interests were articulated in their political lines. For example, in the *NYT*, the Bush administration articulated 'U.S. national missile defense' to national interest by emphasizing that the U.S. soil should be protected from an attack of unpredictable nations such as North Korea, whereas the Clinton administration articulated 'engagement and enlargement' to national interest for

its effect on reducing tension in critical geopolitical regions. In *Donga Ilbo*, Kim Dae Jung government (the progressive government) articulated ‘reconciliation and cooperation’ to national interest for its effect on reducing tension on the Korean peninsula and accelerating an economic growth, whereas the conservatives articulated ‘containment and strict reciprocity in economic cooperation’ to national interest for its effect on preventing the unpredictable North Korean aggression.

The contending force’s different perception of national interests became a political challenge to an existing government’s policy when it was triggered for some reason (e.g. a perceived policy failure, conflict between nation-states). In the moment of crisis²⁸, a reporter developed news discourses by selecting a theme and a news source in accordance with the nature of an issue. Through the process of contestation, a hegemonic crisis was resolved and a new ideological unity was reconstituted. Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argued that any form of consensus is the result of hegemonic articulation²⁹ that is a legitimation process in the moment of crisis. The political articulation is possible under the assumption that a particular social force is the representation of totality: a form of hegemonic universality (p. x, p. xviii). The followings are the examples of how contending forces’ different perceptions of national interest became a media discourse in *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*.

²⁸ Habermas (1973) argues that political crisis is the moment that the originally constructed consensus becomes contested through a discursive justification process through which a justified consensus emerged (p. xvi). Hall (1984) argues that a crisis is a break in the social relations and institutions which bind society together, or which enable it to maintain and reproduce itself on the same basis as before (p. 12). In a moment of crisis in the existing social order, competing strategies on the part of different groups of social agents emerge to resolve it.

²⁹ Articulation is neo-Althusserian concept used by Hall. It refers to a combination of distinct determinations that contribute to the reproduction of social and economic relations. The combination is not fixed or eternal but instead is best conceptualized as a process geared to establishing ‘difference within unity’ (Rojek, 2003, p. 123). For example, in liberal ideology, freedom is connected (articulated) with individualism and the free market; in socialist ideology, freedom is a collective condition, dependent on ‘equality of condition’, as it is in liberal ideology (Hall, 2000, p. 271).

In *Donga Ilbo* (Table 8, 9, 10, 11, and 33), two trajectories of the *Sunshine* policy were drawn in media discourses between 2000 and 2001. While the policy was actively advocated by the South Korean government in 2000, themes such as Ideological Conflict, Diplomatic Strategy, and DJ Governance were seriously contested in 2001. The conflict between contenders originated in a diplomatic strategy, particularly the concept of reciprocity. Kim Dae Jung government's approach to North Korea was characterized by the concept of *flexible reciprocity*, while the conservatives insisted *strict reciprocity*. Originally the *Sunshine* policy was introduced as an extension of the Northern policy starting in the 1980s. However, a critical difference from the previous policy was that the *Sunshine* policy explicitly rejected the 'unification by absorption' and emphasized economic cooperation. The shift of policy from containment to engagement was contingent to the changing South Korean political economy (part of Kim's economic reform in the IMF crisis). In this historical context, the economic cooperation with North Korea was rationalized as a new diplomatic strategy that was also supported by the Clinton administration, but not by the South Korean conservatives. The conservatives' disagreement with Kim's strategy became a legitimate controversy in 2001 when the Bush administration launched a hardline policy toward North Korea, which consequently brought a political crisis to President Kim.

As seen in the *NYT* (Table 12, 13, 14, 15, and 35), during the Clinton administration SK-NK Relations were strongly supported by the media (OPD = 6.3). Accordingly, US-NK Relations, despite dissenting voices, showed more positive tone in its media discourse (OPD = 1.3). However, as the Bush administration took responsibility in government, a struggle for ideological domination actually occurred between ruling

blocs: the one favoring Clinton's engagement policy and the other favoring President Bush's hardline policy. Accordingly, a critical media discourse was constructed around US-NK Relations (OPD = -2.4). These themes became issues basically due to the different perception of national interests between the two ruling blocs. Based on the engagement policy, the Clinton administration put its priority on diplomatic relations along with a military action as an alternative. In contrast, the Bush administration put its priority on building USNMD as a new U.S. defense strategy, claiming 'peace through strength'. As seen here, although the ultimate goal of U.S. foreign policy 'U.S. hegemony' was not different between the two administrations made Diplomatic Strategy an issue in 2001.

Compared to *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT* where different forces articulated their ideas in the form of thematic discourse, *Rodong Sinmun* plays the role dominantly as a site of ideological reproduction by focusing on foreign threats and lacking dissenting domestic voices against a government's policy strategy. Therefore, themes became issues generally through criticizing outer forces and supporting a government's position (e.g. sovereignty, self-defense, self-reliance). The media agenda in foreign news was mostly set by reporters in accordance with a perceived threat to national interests. Therefore, the more challenges they perceived, the more news they produced to rationalize their ideological position. For this reason, the level of challenge in *Rodong Sinmun* was measured not by the source's opinion, but by the frequency of thematic issues.

Based on these findings and historical analysis, it is plausible to say that the news media coverage of foreign policy tends to support a government's position unless any specific political challenge is perceived and/or becomes a subject of media discourse.

When a challenging theme becomes a media discourse is the moment of media's entering into a sphere of legitimate controversy (Hallin, 1986; Bennett, 1990; Robinson, 2002; Entman, 2004). Therefore, whether a reporter constructs a challenging theme as a media agenda is a critical variable to influence the role of news media in relation with a government.

3. Selection of News Source

The third implication is that the role of the news media is determined by the reporter's selection of a news source. Research findings indicate that reporters interact with different types of news sources (president, government officials, non-government officials, political party, intellectuals, foreign governments, foreign non-government sources, foreign media, and anonymous sources) in accordance with the nature of a thematic issue.

The followings are research findings from this investigation. First, themes least opposed by congressional voices turned out to be international political relations (e.g., SK-NK Relations, US-SK Relations, US-NK Relations). International political relations were the themes advocated and promoted mostly by a government with most use of media representation. The finding supports Entman's (2004) contention that the president and top advisors enjoy the most independent ability to decide which mental associations to activate and the highest probability of having their thoughts become part of the general circulation of ideas; few of the reported criticisms challenge the administration's problem definition and goal (p. 9, p. 89). Findings on the excessive use of media representation in international political relations also associates with Entman's findings – how word choice, information distribution and withholding, and timing are all important elements of

strategy that help lend a government great control over framing than congressional or other elites (p. 91). Concerning a government's power over the media coverage of foreign policy, Berry (1990) argues that reporters accept the assumptions and consensus of the foreign policy establishment in a formulation stage and an execution stage of foreign policy; the assumptions define the nature of the foreign threats and opportunities the nation faces (p. xiii).

Second, a theme most vulnerable to an elite opposition (political parties, intellectuals, and reporters) was a procedural³⁰ aspect of foreign policy such as a diplomatic strategy, and a president's governance (leadership). When these themes became issues, a government (President, government officials, and government-related anonymous source) became a strong defender. For example, in *Donga Ilbo*, challenges that came from political parties, intellectuals, political experts, and other non-government sources were concentrated on themes such as Diplomatic Strategy, DJ Governance, and Ideological Conflict. The same thematic issues were strongly defended by government sources.

In the *NYT*, US-NK Relations, Diplomatic Strategy, and Bush Governance were mostly challenged by think-tanks and political experts. The opinion direction in US-NK Relations was -10.0 (think-tanks). The one in Diplomatic Strategy was -3.3 (think-tanks), and the *NYT* reporters (-2.5). The opinion direction in Bush Governance was -8.0 (reporters), -10.0 (think-tanks), and -10.0 (Democratic Party). The challenge was conspicuous particularly from March 2001 to June 2001 during which the U.S. diplomatic talk with North Korea was officially suspended for a comprehensive review.

³⁰ A procedural aspect of foreign policy engages in political deliberation such as consensus procedure and legitimization process. In contrast, substantive aspect encompasses problem definition, causal analysis, and justification of the policy objective.

However, the opposition mostly came in the near absence of a congressional voice, which might be due to the Republican control of the Congress³¹. (Republicans challenged the Clinton administration's engagement policy toward North Korea from the beginning.)³² Among government sources, a government-related anonymous source seems to play more various and interesting roles than any government sources do, which will be explained more in later.

Third, intellectuals, think-tanks, and non-government experts were prominent in the evaluation stage of any problematic issue of foreign policy. The evaluation stage was not limited to the period after the failure of a foreign policy³³. Their criticism on a policy often supersedes the place of congressional opposition when it falls silent. (e.g. US-SK Relations in *Donga Ilbo*, US-NK Relations in the *NYT*)

Fourth, concerning the range of the news media's dependence on government sources (President, government officials, and government-related anonymous sources), this study revealed that the media's dependence on government sources in all three newspapers was not heavy in comparison with other sources. The most frequently quoted news sources in the three newspapers are political parties (34%) in *Donga Ilbo*, foreign sources (49%) in the *NYT*, and KCNA and reporters (35%) in *Rodong Sinmun*. The media's dependence on government sources was ranged from 11% to 17% of total sources: the *NYT* (17%), *Donga Ilbo* (15.5%), and *Rodong Sinmun* (10.5%).

³¹ The composition of the House of Representative in 2000 was 221 (Republican Party) to 212 (Democratic Party). (223: 211 in 1998) The 2000 U.S. Senate was 34 (Republican Party) to 33 (Democratic Party).

³² When North Korea signed the Agreed Framework with the United States on October 21, 1994, Republican hawks denounced inducements as appeasement by assuming that it the U.S. bribed North Korea to refrain from nuclear-arming, it would set a dangerous precedent (Sigal, 1998, pp. 6-7)

³³ Berry (1990) contends that the news media becomes critical only when a president's foreign is at the stage when its outcome is known and it has become a failure (p. xiii). He argues that at the outcome stage, reporters rely less on what U.S. officials say and do and more on what foreigners say and do (pp. 139-140).

The findings indicate that the way reporters interact with government sources is not as close as the one claimed in the literature that shows a wide spread agreement that government sources play a crucial role in defining and shaping the news agenda ‘through their interaction with reporters’ (Sigal, 1973; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Bennett, 1990; Schudson, 1995, 2000). The difference in findings between this research and previous studies is believed mainly due to the difference in coding. Whereas previous studies counted all types of sources coming from a government as a government source, this research counted a government source that was directly quoted by a reporter as a source. Government sources that appeared in the middle of a reporter’s analysis of past event or historical context were all omitted from a source counting. The reporter’s interaction with a government source took a same manner as his interaction with other news sources.

When government sources were divided into sectors, first, the media dependence on a President as a primary source ranged from 2% to 7% of total sources: the *NYT* (1.6%), *Donga Ilbo* (5.5%), and *Rodong Sinmun*³⁴ (7%) of total sources. It indicated that South Korean *Sunshine* policy has been actively shaped by President Kim, whereas U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula has been discoursed by other government officials (State Department, Defense Department, other government officials, and government-related anonymous sources). In contrast, the way North Korean leader was cited in a news story was unique in its own system. The leader’s word was treated like political philosophy or a god’s word that, therefore, could not be a subject of public dispute.

³⁴ Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-Il in *Rodong Sinmun* are not primary sources. The way *Rodong Sinmun* takes their words are different from the one in any other newspapers do. Kim Il Sung passed away. Nevertheless, his word is frequently cited as a god’s word. So is Kim Jong-Il’s.

Second, the media dependence on government-related anonymous sources ranged from 2% to 9% of total sources: the *NYT* (9.4%), *Donga Ilbo* (4.5%), and *Rodong Sinmun* (1.7%). It indicates that the *NYT* relied heavily on a government-related anonymous attribution in comparison with the other two newspapers did. Concerning the U.S. media's use of an anonymous attribution, Bagdikian (2005) argues that, although disputable, unnamed sources serve too many purposes for both the news media and officialdom. It actually helps officials (relatively high in the hierarchy who are in a position to know crucial information) leak significant information. The officials may leak information to a trusted journalist because they believe it is in the public interest to shed light on misguided policies and actions. The information revealed by officials who protected themselves with anonymity constituted too large a portion of daily front-page news for the policy to survive. They turned out to be right (p. 33). However, his argument cannot be the answer for the question why there is a significant difference in the degree of each nation's media dependence on government-related anonymous sources in reporting of foreign policy. The difference, therefore, seemed to be more associated with each nation's different political and media culture; while the U.S. put more emphasis on political consensus especially over a government's foreign policy, South Korea is overtly divided into an ideological polarization especially on a government's foreign policy.

Comparing how government-related anonymous attribution was used in the *NYT* and *Donga Ilbo*, this study indicated that the role of government-related anonymous sources was characterized as an invisible advocator and a defender of a policy on the one hand (e.g. DJ Governance in *Donga Ilbo*, US-NK Relations and Diplomatic Strategy in the *NYT*). On the other hand, the appearance of negative opinion in this source indicated

the emergence of internal division in a government (a break in ideological unity of a ruling bloc). The followings are research findings about the use of government-related anonymous attribution in each newspaper.

The opinion direction of government-related anonymous sources is significantly different between 2000 and 2001 both in *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*. In *Donga Ilbo*, while the number of government-related anonymous source increased significantly in 2001 (ten times higher than in 2000), the source's opinion direction decreased significantly (7.5 in 2000 and -.9 in 2001). The opinion direction in each critical issue was all in a negative range except DJ Governance. It implies that while government-related anonymous sources were advocates and defenders of DJ Governance, they became inside challengers to all other critical issues such as SK-NK Relations, Diplomatic Strategy, Ideological Conflict, and US-SK Relations. (In fact, Jamin Party, the second ruling party, was separated from the ruling coalition against President Kim's radical approach to North Korea. Kim Dae Jung government started having a division in its ideological coalition.)

In the *NYT*, the total number of government-related anonymous sources was relatively high in both administrations in comparison with the other two newspapers that supported Bagdikian's (2005) argument on the U.S. media. However, the opinion direction of these sources was significantly different between 2000 and 2001 ($t = 2.75$, $df = 30$, $p < .05$). The opinion direction of total government-related anonymous sources for the Clinton's engagement policy was 5.9. In detail, whereas the source's position was highly consistent with the Clinton's frame of reference in regard to SK-NK Relations, their position for US-NK Relations in 2000 turned out to be quite controversial. In contrast, the opinion direction of total government-related anonymous sources for the

Bush administration's foreign policy was -.06. It indicated that insiders did not agree with the Bush administration's new foreign policy. In detail, government-related anonymous sources were more challenging than supporting Bush Governance (leadership), while they were, nevertheless, defending the Bush administration's Diplomatic Strategy from other elite's opposition.

In comparison of the role of government-related anonymous sources in the two newspapers, government-related anonymous sources in *Rodong Sinmun* acted as unknown government-messengers of foreign threats. The research findings suggest the need for future studies on the function and value of this specific group of news sources. Realizing the power of unnamed sources, Brown et al. (1987) said that continued condoned anonymity of sources in all but a few cases perpetuates the invisibility of the truly powerful.

Fifth, The reporter's dependence on foreign sources (foreign governments, foreign non-government sources, and foreign media) was different in its degree and purpose from each others newspaper. The study shows that a reporter's dependence on foreign sources ranged from 23% to 55%: *Donga Ilbo* (23%), *Rodong Sinmun* (46%), and the *NYT* (55%). However, the dependence on foreign media ranged from 6% to 17%: the *NYT* (6%), *Donga Ilbo* (9%), and *Rodong Sinmun* (17%). These findings indicate that the *NYT* relied on primary foreign sources more than the other two newspapers did, which implies the American media's tendency in objective reporting. These findings support Donsbach and Patterson's (2004) findings that the U.S. journalists relied far more heavily on personal initiative (e.g., obtaining interviews with newsmakers and people in the street) in covering stories than did their internal colleagues, who relied more heavily on

other-initiated material (e.g., wire service copy). Furthermore, U.S. journalists primarily want to affect politics and the public through information and not through advocating their subjective ideas, values, and beliefs in news writing (pp. 262-264).

This research also found that the foreign source in the *NYT* takes the role to criticize a government's policy. It supports Entman's (2004) findings that in the aftermath of September 11 terrorist attacks when the Bush administration planned to launch the war on terrorism, although congressional opposition on Iraq was not very energetic, the news media used foreign critiques to provide some balance in covering the debate over the president's "war soon" posture and helped build pressure on Bush to obtain U.N. approval. He also contended the foreign critique did not always have impact on politics because foreign sources were generally regarded as less powerful and less credible than American officials were. Therefore, although substantive dissent appeared, the political impact was often diminished without domestic elite group's support (p. 55, pp. 150-153).

Contrary to the case of U.S. media coverage, foreign sources in *Donga Ilbo* played two dominant roles: to promote a government foreign policy (particularly SK-NK Relations) and to resolve the conflict between two nations. Foreign sources' presence was dominant in promoting SK-NK Relations particularly in 2000. However, when US-SK Relations became an issue, *Donga* reporters relied on various U.S. news sources whose opinion directions were U.S. government (10.0), U.S. non-government sources (2.7), and U.S. media (-5.0). The heavy reliance on U.S. sources that showed large discrepancy between U.S. government and other U.S. sources did not bring a positive

effect on Kim Dae Jung government's *Sunshine* policy, which raised doubt in public toward the government's policy.

In *Rodong Sinmun*, a reporter relied on foreign sources to promote a government's policy and ideological position and to propagandize foreign threats and intervention. Due to a difficulty in access to foreign sources except Russia and China, a reporter heavily relied on wire services and collected information from other nation's newspapers and magazines. Therefore, a reporter's role was more likely characterized as a situation analyst.

Sixth, comparing the tone between editorial and news, there is a difference from each others media system. Editorial is assumed to represent a newspaper's official positions on the issues (current events or public controversies) that is, therefore, different from news in its format and tone. Although this conceptualization is commonly applied to *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*, the distance between editorial and news varies in these two newspapers.

In terms of the opinion direction of editorial, this study showed that the *NYT* editorial was in general more separated from the news production than *Donga Ilbo* editorial was. The opinion direction of the *NYT* editorial was inversely correlated (-.25) with the one of news, whereas the opinion direction of *Donga Ilbo* editorial was positively correlated (.28) with the one of news.

In regard to the selection of a theme, *Donga Ilbo* showed more similarity between editorial and news than the *NYT* did. Themes frequently found in *Donga Ilbo* were DJ Governance, Diplomatic Strategy, US-SK Relations, and Ideological Conflict. A difference was found in US-SK Relations between editorial and news; US-SK Relations

were more frequently issued and more critical in editorial than in news. In the NYT editorials, themes most frequently found were US Defense and Diplomatic Strategy which were not the most popular issues in news. The editorial was more critical on these issues than news was. However, the criticism was not on a goal (substance) of a new defense policy (USNMD) but on the procedure to achieve the goal. In this particular issue, the *NYT* editorial played more likely an advisory role in a government's policy decision-making process. Accordingly, the opinion in editorial did not only come after the event but before the events also.

Compared to these two newspapers, *Rodong Sinmun* shows no difference between opinion and news. Since a reporter is conceptualized as a political actor, different types of news were developed: news as information, news as an instrument to enhance virtue and moral (more like an essay), news as an analysis of a current issue, and news as an answer to a current issue. Therefore, news takes various modes in the continuum between news and editorial, which, therefore, hardly have any difference in tone between news and editorial. As seen in these three cases, it is plausible to say that the *NYT* shows higher degree of role segregation between news and editorial than the other two newspapers do. *Donga Ilbo*, although it is practiced with the similar normative standard taken in the U.S. media system, reflects the nature of polarized pluralism in its real practice by showing the association between the media system and political system. *Rodong Sinmun* reflects the nature of soviet communist system as working as a state instrument of propaganda.

4. Impact of International Relations

The fourth implication is that a hegemonic turning point (the moment that counter-hegemony becomes hegemony) emerges when a contending force's perspective

on national interests becomes a dominant media discourse. The media becoming a site of struggle does not always bring a hegemonic turning-point. This study found that a hegemonic turning-point occurred when the media constructed a critical discourse out of a thematic issue and, at the same time, the contender's articulation become a dominant media discourse. The followings are examples of how a contending force's perspective becomes a dominant media discourse in the moment of crisis.

US-SK Relations in *Donga Ilbo* became an issue when Kim Dae Jung government realized that the *Sunshine* policy was not compatible with the Bush administration's 'comprehensive approach' to North Korea. Claiming that the policy was fragmented and incomplete, the Bush administration suspended a diplomatic talk with North Korea. In this backdrop of changing relation between the U.S. and North Korea, the South Korean government's diplomacy toward the Bush administration became active in an effort to take a continuous support from U.S. government for the *Sunshine* policy. US-SK Relations became one of the most frequently discoursed themes in early 2001. *Donga Ilbo* reporters relied on U.S. sources to read the mood in Washington. Nevertheless, the media reporting of US-SK Relations actually brought the critical power to South Korean conservatives to challenge Kim's policy. The actual counter-hegemonic challenge occurred as a contender's perspective became a dominant discourse, not in US-SK Relations, but in Diplomatic Strategy, Ideological Conflict, and DJ Governance. It implies that a foreign source hardly became a direct challenge to a government unless it was transformed into a domestic opposition. The link between these two was supported in Figure 3, 4, and 5 and historical analysis, which suggested the following premise that if

there was a common interest between foreign sources and domestic dissenters, the power of foreign sources was transformed into a domestic opposition to challenge the leadership.

A critical discourse in the *NYT* was constructed around themes such as US-NK Relations and Bush Governance. Since the Clinton administration's engagement policy was evaluated 'in the media' as the one that induced the détente on the Korean peninsula, a struggle for the Bush administration depended on how to articulate its hardline policy to national interests. Accordingly, the Bush administration's contestation was particularly against patrons of the engagement policy, which was the moment of crisis in terms of the U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea. In relation with the news media, the dissonance between the Bush administration and the *NYT* remained in the legitimacy of the Bush administration's new foreign policy because the new policy was ambivalent, depending on its interpretation. Emphasizing the unpredictable North Korean missile attack, the new policy was not only legitimate but also culturally congruent. However, if the government picked up a punishment principle to a bad guy, the policy could interrupt the South Korea's effort in reconciliation with North Korea, which was strongly supported by the Clinton administration as well as international community. The contradiction led reporters to depend on think-tanks, non-government elite sources, and, particularly, foreign sources who were the main source of opposition.

Upon this political challenge, the Bush administration revived the concept of rogue state out of habitual schema and requested the principle of 'strict reciprocity and verification' between North and South Korea as well as between the North and the United States.³⁵ The administration's offer of the re-opening of diplomatic talk was conditional:

³⁵ US-NK diplomatic talks cannot be continued in situation that the production and sales of the North Korea's weapons of mass destruction such as missiles was against the principle of compliance with all

North Korea's significant reduction of conventional defense artillery from the border. The Bush administration's claim and offer were challenged by ex-officials and political experts in the near absence of congressional opposition. The absence of a congressional voice was not least linked with the following political situations; there was no deep consensus concerning American objectives and means³⁶ in the policy toward North Korea on the one hand and the Bush administration started working his official term with the Republican dominated Congress³⁷ on the other hand. Without a strong congressional opposition, the Bush administration's articulation became a dominant discourse even though there was a clear gap in policy strategy between the Clinton and the Bush administration.

From the two case studies the following questions are raised. Why did South Korean government suddenly lose its control in its foreign policy although the policy was supported from an international circle? Why was the Bush administration's foreign policy supported in the U.S. in spite of international disagreement? What makes a difference in the media discourse of contending forces' struggles in the moment of crisis? What should be a theoretical basis to account the difference?

Based on data analysis and historical review, it was assumed that the power of foreign sources and international relations were interrelated. This study cross-examined how foreign sources were used in *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*. First, concerning a similarity and a difference in US-NK Relations of *Donga Ilbo* and US-NK Relations of the *NYT*,

agreements. James Baker said that the United States would maintain the principle that compliance with all agreements should be verified without fail. (from interview with *Donga Ilbo* on Jan 23, 2001)

³⁶ The collapse of the Soviet Union cut away the basis of American foreign policy for the preceding fifty years. The Bush administration revived the concept of rogue state as a rationale for US national missile defense program.

³⁷ The composition of the House of Representative in 2000 was 221 (Republican Party) to 212 (Democratic Party) (223: 211 in 1998). The 2000 U.S. Senate was 34 (Republican Party) to 33 (Democratic Party).

this research found that a similarity in both discourses was that the high degree of policy opposition appeared in the near absence of the congressional disputation. A difference was in the impact of foreign voices; foreign voices in *Donga Ilbo* reporting of US-SK Relations brought a critical power to opponents to challenge Kim's leadership, whereas the one in the *NYT* reporting of US-NK Relations were ended up as fulfilling the goal of objective journalism when it was defined as a fair presentation of contending groups' debate on the issue.

The *NYT* reporter's dependence on foreign sources and its effects on politics in this research actually supported what Entman (2004) criticized foreign sources in the study of Grenada, Libya, and Panama. He argued that the media's dependence on foreign sources indicated that journalist's significant independence of debate among U.S. elites. However, although reporters have motivations to contest the White House's frame, they were frequently hampered by their inability to sustain substantive critiques on their own and, therefore, the effect of foreign dissenting voices on policy decision-making process was not great (p. 153).

In contrary to the limited impact of foreign sources on U.S. politics, the impact on South Korean foreign policy was substantial first by reinforcing Kim's leadership in 2000 and second by pressing his leadership in 2001. The influence of foreign sources on the South Korean foreign policy raised question about notions such as consensus and policy certainty. Hallin (1986) contended that, as news deals with issues on which 'consensus' is weaker, the principle of balance (in news reporting) is increasingly emphasized. Through this way, the news media operated within the sphere of legitimate controversy. The coverage, overall, became critical of government policy (pp. 117-118). Robinson (2002)

argued that, although media coverage pressured government to change policy, if the policy is certain within the executive branch, the ‘certainty’ made the media influence resisted (p. 31). However, these arguments did not properly fit to the media-government phenomenon in South Korea in several points. First, although President Kim’s *Sunshine policy* was not formulated in bipartisan consensus, it was significantly supported in 2000. Second, although Kim’s government was certain about the substance of the *Sunshine* policy, the strategy was adjusted in accordance with the Bush administration’s policy.

Second, concerning the influence of international relations, this study takes historical analysis into consideration based on the assumption that the more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party will come to represent this situation and to exploit it, with the aim of preventing rival parties gaining the upper hand (Gramsci, 1971, p. 176). Reviewing the underlying assumption of the *Sunshine* policy (based on President Kim’s inauguration speech), it was found that the success of policy depended on two conditions: the political and economic normalization between the U.S. and North Korea and the collective defense between the U.S. and South Korea. The U.S. as a critical variable was at stake in the South Korean government’s effort for reconciliation with North Korea. That is to say, the U.S. intervention could facilitate the unification talks between South and North Korea or interrupt it. Nevertheless, the unification talk between two Korea was soon framed in the South Korean media as a nationalist movement³⁸ as soon as the historic June summit meeting between the North and the South was announced, which was not at all

³⁸ President Kim Dae Jung was supported by the progressives who were more likely slanted into nationalist. As the policy was affirmed by international community soon after the announcement of the June summit meeting in 2000, the nature of policy was framed as a nationalist movement in domestic arena, although it was planned as an economic policy from Kim’s perspective.

intended by the U.S (both administrations) and was against the expressed goal of the *Sunshine* policy ‘reconciliation and economic cooperation’. It was part of reasons why the Bush administration showed objection on Kim’s *Sunshine* policy, which was not seriously contested in Congress at all. It implied that the conflict between South Korea and the U.S. fundamentally lied in the difference in the perception of national interests between the two governments, which eventually caused a political crisis to Kim Dae Jung government.

Considering how foreign sources could challenge a government’s policy, this study indicated that foreign sources could hardly be a direct challenge to a government unless these were transformed into a domestic opposition. The link between foreign sources and domestic dissenting groups was established upon common interests shared by these groups. The historical analysis and the empirical test support this claim. As seen in figure 3, 4, and 5, foreign source actually stimulated the contestation between the progressives and the conservatives; Kim’s ruling bloc supported mostly by the progressives (nationalist) who were the main actors in the democratization process in the 1980s, whereas the conservatives were another ruling bloc whose interest was closely linked with the U.S. interest on the Korean peninsula. In this ideologically polarized political situation, the hegemony constituted by President Kim in 2000 could not be safe in the conflict between the two nations’ interests. It was because the disparity between the two nations’ interest could cause damage not to the leadership of superior state, but to the one of inferior state. The *NYT* reported President Kim’s political crisis in 2001 under the headline “South Korea sees prospects of its leader steadily ebb,” A reporter quoted, “Critics and admirers alike say, though, that what has happened in the last year is an

object lesson for future leaders of this nation of 46 million about the limits of influence in a region where far larger and more powerful nations have always called the tunes” (French, 2001, p. A8). Therefore, this study suggests that international relations are not just the relationship between nation-states, but a balance of force that is interrelated with internal relations of nation-states. Gramsci (1971) argued that international reality often shows the irony between national interests and nationalism, because the most nationalist party, in reality, represents not so much the vital forces of its own country as that country’s subordination and economic enslavement to the hegemonic nations (pp. 176-177).

Then, why was there no such impact on leader Kim Jong-Il upon the change in the U.S. policy over North Korea? In fact, the change in U.S. policy could have imposed a negative impact more on North Korea than South Korea, since North Korea was on the verge of economic catastrophe. However, according to Gramsci’s argument on international relations, North Korea was no need to adapt the direction of its policy in accordance with U.S. interests in the region because the nation took a totally different form of government and no structural interlink with the U.S. Therefore, the conflict between the two nations’ interests was not transformed into a political crisis, but interpreted as another foreign threat.

These findings have significant implications in the media behavior in relation to government. First, upon foreign pressure, a government became treated as a one ruling bloc; contentions were no longer between actors such as a government, members of Congress, elites, non-government sources, and foreign sources, but between one ruling bloc who supports an existing policy (structure) and another ruling bloc who supports a

change. Second, unless the relation of force is united as one ruling bloc (ideological unity), each subgroup's contention, remained as a fragmented idea or a position of a small sector, cannot be easily penetrated into the media. It explains why the South Korean elite opposition to the *Sunshine* policy was not effective in 2000, but in 2001. Third, among competing contentions, reporters already knew how to handle a thematic issue and who became a proper and powerful actor. The news media, whether consciously or not, recognized that real predicting power lied in international relations in reporting a nation's foreign policy and international affairs. Therefore, understanding international hegemonic relations is crucial in analyzing different aspects of the media-government relation as seen in the case of the *NYT* and *Donga Ilbo*, which show similar statistical results but have totally different media impact on leadership.

5. Media Representation and Ideological Struggle

The fifth implication is that the media representation of each others nation and leader is constrained by a government's foreign policy that reflects a ruling bloc's world-view. Findings in this research indicated several things. First, a dominant image of each nation has been changed between 2000 and 2001, being influenced by the change of a nation's foreign policy and the change of international relations.

Second, the media representation of other nation increased when it reflected a nation's foreign policy interests. This study indicated that the most frequent use of representation was found in the *NYT* coverage of North Korea (49%) and the second highest was found in *Rodong Sinmun*'s representation of the U.S. (45%).

Third, the media representation of leader increased when a president's leadership was challenged. This study indicated that the most frequent use of representation was

found in the *Donga Ilbo* representation of Kim Dae Jung (21%). The *NYT* representation of President Bush outweighed the one of President Clinton.

Fourth, there was a difference between international images and self-images (national identity). The self-image tended to be more stable and inspirational for the purpose of creating and maintaining a favorable stature in the community of nations, whereas international images were the ones pictured through the lens of each nation's interest. However, this study also indicated that even the self-image was contestable when a nation was deeply divided into ideological sectors. The followings are the findings related to this issue.

North Korea's self-image in *Rodong Sinmun* was portrayed as One Nation (한민족) and Strong Independent State (강성대국) in both years, which was contrasted to other newspapers' representation of North Korea. The U.S. self-image in the *NYT* was portrayed as World's Policeman/ World's Superpower/ Peacemaker in both years. It supports Cohen's (1989) assertion that, in foreign coverage, the key signature of centrist propaganda is the portrayal of the U.S. as mediator or peacemaker. Another hall mark of centrist propaganda is to affirm, no matter what the evidence, that U.S. foreign policy is geared toward promoting democracy (pp. 13-14). Whereas the self-image of North Korea and the U.S. tended to be steady and positive, the self-image of South Korea was deeply changed from Capitalist/ One Nation in 2000 to State of Ideological Conflict/ US Ally in 2001. It was not just limited to the image of nation but to the image of President Kim Dae Jung; his image was changed from Leader of Democracy/Reformist in 2000 to Lame-Duck/ Failed Reformer in 2001. It implies that South Korea has gone through

economic and ideological instability that brought a political crisis and a crisis in national identity.

Questions raised here is what will happen in the media representation when a government's policy is seriously contested by other ruling bloc. This study suggested that the media representation of each others nation was influenced by a nation's foreign policy. However, when the policy was changed by contending groups' ideological struggle, any change shown in the media representation reflected the product of ideological struggle between contending forces. It supported Hallin (1986) arguing that the media's coverage is closely related to the unity and clarity of the government as well as the degree of consensus in society. Concerning the degree of consensus, he contended that a government's policy could be influenced by opposition when the opposition grew in the media as a result of political divisions within a nation and within the government itself (p. 214). The followings are the summary of research findings related to this issue.

A dominant image of North Korea in the *NYT* was changed from World's Last Communist State in 2000 to Rogue State/Failed State in 2001. The change in the image of North Korea between the two years reflected the two administrations' efforts to rationalize their positions; the image of North Korea as World's Last Communist State was associated with the victory of democracy and capitalism over communism which was consistent to the Clinton administration's engagement policy. By the same token, the image of Rogue State reflected the Bush administration's effort to justify the plan of USNMD.

In *Donga Ilbo*, a dominant image of North Korea was changed from Failed State/ One Nation in 2000 to Failed State/ Unpredictable State/Totalitarian State in 2001. The

image of North Korea as One Nation reflected Kim's engagement policy in 2000, while the image of Unpredictable State/Totalitarian State reflected the conservatives' perspective on North Korea, which was lined with the Bush administration's perception of North Korean regime.³⁹

The media representation of the U.S. was different from each others newspaper and was also changed as each nation's political context was changing. In *Rodong Sinmun*, a dominant image of the U.S. was changed, although negative in both years, from Imperialist in 2000 to the mixture of Interventionist/ Jingoist/ Rogue state/ Imperialist/ Chosun People's Enemy in 2001 by reflecting Kim Jong-Il regime's attitude toward the Bush administration's hostile policy (what they called) toward North Korea.

The image of the U.S. in *Donga Ilbo* was hardly found in 2000, whereas the image of Ally/ World's Superpower was dominant in 2001. It implies that the South Korean government was more conscious of the U.S. in 2001 when the US-SK Relations became an issue. Although minor in comparison with other South Korean alternative media, the U.S. represented occasionally as Interventionist during this period, which reflects the character of *Donga Ilbo*: mainstream and conservative.

The media representation of South Korea was also different in the three newspapers. A dominant image of South Korea in *Rodong Sinmun* was One Nation in both years, while State of Ideological War was added in 2001. *Rodong* representation of

³⁹ The Bush administration appears to consider North Korea as a reckless and aggressive expansionist state with which the United States will be unable to negotiate and achieve a satisfactory result. As a result, the Bush administration believes that the United States should adopt a hawkish policy and should punish North Korea's rogue behavior. In contrast, the Clinton administration did not seem to view North Korea as an irrational revisionist state, despite its rogue behavior, but felt that North Korea could be understood through the security dilemma. Thus, engagement with negotiation often was the best policy for the North Korean threat. (Hwang, J. 2004)

South Korea was to legitimize Kim Jong-Il regime as an authentic government that was established on the basis of true nationalism (*Juche* ideology). It was why a technical side of peace process and economic cooperation between the North and the South was nearly absent in *Rodong* reporting of SK-NK Relations and Unification. In the *NYT*, South Korea was portrayed as Capitalist/ Ally in both years.

6. Government Constraints?

The findings indicated that the way reporters interacted with government sources was not as close as the one claimed in the literature review that showed a wide spread agreement that government sources played a crucial role in defining and shaping the news agenda ‘through their interaction with reporters’ (Sigal, 1973; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Bennett, 1990; Schudson, 1995, 2000). Although this study did not support the claim of news agenda that was shaped through the interaction between government officials and reporters, it supported that the impact of government sources on the newsmaking process was significant in advocating the policy (e.g., SK-NK Relations in *Donga Ilbo*, US-NK Relations, and US Defense in the *NYT*) and in defending it upon a challenge (e.g., DJ Governance, Diplomatic Strategy in *Donga Ilbo*, Diplomatic Strategy in the *NYT*). When the policy was advocated by a government, the policy was also actively promoted by the news media as Molotch and Lester (1974) contended that without a reporter’s voluntary cooperation, a government’s policy could not be successfully promoted as was advocated. The role of the news media in advocating and promoting a government policy was found in no matter how different political systems the media worked.

A difference in the role of the news media was found in the moment of a policy being challenged. If the reporting of foreign policy was constrained by a government, a reporter's selection of a theme and a source would be limited to the one favorable to a government's position. However, as seen in Table 8 through 15 (multiple linear regression models), the findings indicated that a government did not automatically ensure its credibility in terms of a reporter's selection of a theme and a news source. Therefore, implication is that although there is a certain degree of influence from a government depending on a thematic issue (e.g., defense related issues), a reporter more likely selects a thematic issue and a news source by focusing on the conflict between contenders.

Then, what could be a theoretical basis to explain how a reporter selects a theme and a source against a government's intention? The theoretical base has to support that a government was not a sole powerful source that influenced the newsmaking process. How should we perceive a government as a news source?

Hall et al. (1978) coined the term 'primary definer', arguing that the media stand in a position of structured subordination to the primary definers (powerful sources); in the relationship between the media and a government, a government is often regarded as a primary definer. The issue in this argument is then who is a primary definer when a dispute occurs among members of the same government over a key question of policy.

Concerning the concept of primary definer, Schlesinger and Tumber (1994) argue that Hall et al. (1978) tend to overstate the passivity of the media as recipients of information from news sources: the flow of definitions is seen as moving uniformly from the centres of power to the media. Within this conceptual logic, there is no space to account for occasions on which media may themselves take the initiative in the

definitional process by challenging the so-called primary definers and forcing them to respond (e.g., investigative journalism) (p. 18). They also argue that the main pitfall in this model is that because the conception of 'primary definition' resolves the question of source power on the basis of structuralist assumptions, it closes off any engagement with the dynamic processes of contestation in a given field of discourse (p. 21).

Curran (1996) also argues that sources with privileged access to the media should not be conceived as one bloc who advances a single definition of events, but rather as a shoal of sources which have different degrees of access and different degrees of news status. Entman (2004), dividing the role of the state into two different groups of actors, contends that the president and top advisors enjoy the most independent ability to promote the spread of frames. But, congressional leaders also enjoy more autonomy and the network of journalists influences through its power of inquiry (p. 9).

These arguments suggest two things. First, the definition of primary definer is not always fixed to a government because the official status does not automatically ensure credibility. The credibility is changing over time; the state is not safe from oppositional and alternative views. When the power of government is displaced by 'new forces', it becomes essential to explain their emergence. Accordingly, the role of news media to a government cannot be static but shifting as the 'balance of power' is shifting.

Second, government and congress should not be considered and analyzed as one unit in evaluating the role of news media in relation to government. The two branches differently interact with the news media particularly in the field of foreign policy. Only in a communist state the two systems may function in similar mode, but not in a liberal democratic state. Therefore, if government and congress was examined as one unit, the

analysis could miss how the vital aspect of political communication ‘contestation’ occurred in the news media.

Based on these arguments, it is plausible to say that for reporters, a government is not only an important source of news but also a topic of news. When a topic is chosen by reporters, powerful sources subsequently become primary definers ‘only in their relevant areas’. Accordingly, the role of the news media in relation to government is not as passive as relaying a government’s policy, but actively promote and/or challenge it through a reporter’s selection of a theme and a news source. In the process of contestation, the media function as a catalyst by providing the space to various contenders.

B. Conclusions

The research was conducted based on the following questions. First, if reporting of a nation’s foreign policy is constrained by a government, how can the policy be contested by different forces? Second, if the role of the news media is differently conceptualized by different political systems, how can we compare and discriminate the role of media functioning in relation to government? What factors determine or influence the role of the news media?


The results of the statistical test suggest that there are three key areas to differentiate the role of the news media in relation to government: political challenge, thematic construction, and news source. The role of the news media in relation to government is distinguished by two issues: 1) whether there are challenges to a government’s policy or not, and 2) whether the issue challenged is critically discoursed in the news media.

This study found that, no matter what political systems the media belonged to, the news media advocated and promoted a government's policy if there was no substantial political challenge and, therefore, functioned more likely as a site of ideological reproduction. A difference in the role of the news media stood out when a government was challenged no matter where the challenge came from. Upon political challenges, reporters developed a thematic issue with various news sources. The way they developed a critical media discourse determined the role of the news media as a site of struggle or a site of ideological reproduction and the media's impact on the policymaking process. These findings suggest the following political communication model that encompasses these three key areas and the flow of communication that influence the role of the news media in relation to government.

1. Political Challenge.

Political challenges were detected by listing various sources' reasoning to resent a government's policy and by measuring the number of dissenting voices. Findings implied that not every political opposition found in news stories was a substantial challenge to leadership, but the one that became a critical media discourse. The existence of a significant number of dissenting voices in media discourses was a key factor to determine its impact on politics. It is because ideological domination can be constituted with or without opposition. With opposition, contending groups were going through the contestation process in order to legitimize their ideas. Without opposition, the power group maintained its status through a constant ideological reinforcement. These two processes happened to produce the same consequence 'ideological domination'. However,

Figure 9. Diagram featuring the Role of the News Media in Relation with Government



the one was based on consensus and the other was not. For this reason, the existence of dissenting voices in media discourses is a key factor to decide the role of media.

In connection with political challenges, the findings of the three nations' news reporting pattern indicated that, whereas the news media in a communist state were dominantly advocating and promoting a government's policy, the one in a liberal democratic state was actively promoting and/or challenging a policy through a reporter's selection of a theme and a news source. That is to say, whereas the role of the media in a communist state mostly is limited to a site of ideological reproduction, the one in a liberal democratic state is shifting in the range from a site of ideological reproduction to a site of struggle. Implication is that a government in a liberal democratic state does not automatically ensure credibility; the credibility is changing over time; a government is not safe from oppositional and alternative views. Therefore, upon political challenges, a government and contending forces compete with their perspectives in the media where a government struggles for sustaining the power and the existing system and other contending forces struggle for contesting their particular visions and changing the existing system.

Therefore, this study suggests two things. First, a similarity in the role of the news media of different political systems is that the news media promote a government's policy when there is no substantial political challenge. A difference is that the role of the news media as a site of struggle is dominantly exercised in a liberal democratic state. Second, the opposition came from various sources. However, some opposition is seriously perceived as a challenge, while others remain having no significant impact.

Therefore, when a political challenge becomes a critical media discourse, it can be a hegemonic challenge to a government.

2. Construction of Thematic Issue.

How thematic issues are constructed is another key factor to affect the role of the news media in relation to government. This study found that different aspects of foreign policy were individually constructed as a theme by receiving a different degree of media attention. The media attention varied in response to two main factors: the proximity to national interests and the conflicts between contending forces' perception of national interests.

The proximity to national interests made each nation's news media emphasize different aspects of foreign policy. *Rodong Sinmun* emphasized foreign threats and sovereignty in order to sustain Kim Jong-Il regime in the midst of economic catastrophe. U.S. interests were not separated from U.S. defense and international relations, which resulted in the prominence of themes such as US-NK Relations and US Defense. South Korea focused on inter-Korean relations that resulted in the prominence of SK-NK Relations.

The media attention also varied for the conflict between contending forces' perception of national interests. A theme became a critical issue in the moment of crisis that is defined as the moment that the originally constructed consensus becomes contested through a discursive justification process through which a justified consensus emerged (Habermas, 1973, p. xvi). The moment of crisis was situated in various ways by many scholars. For Berry (1990), failure is the sunlight that illuminates foreign policy performance and unleashes a critical press (p. xiii). Hallin (1986) argued that when

consensus is weaker, the principle of balance in journalism is increasingly emphasized (p. 116). Robinson (2002) argues that during periods of elite dissensus, critical coverage might come to influence executive policy processes (p. 31). In the moment of variously situated crisis, competing strategies on the part of different groups of political agents emerge to resolve it, which constitutes a critical media discourse.

However, constructing a critical issue in the moment of crisis is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for constituting a hegemonic turning point. This study indicated that a real hegemonic turning point emerged as a powerful opponent's articulation (a counter-hegemony bloc's perspective) became a dominant media discourse. It provides the theoretical linking power between the media coverage and actual policy outcomes by explaining why some challenges have impact on a government's policy and others not. Concerning how hegemony works in journalism, Gitlin (1979) argued that when political crises erupt in the real world, reporters call into question whether the dominant routines can go on contributing to social stability. Then, reporters may change with images of the world and their instincts about what is news worthy, interesting or important. These changes are more or less conscious (p. 32). Robinson (2002) contended that in the moment of crisis, the media construction of a critical discourse provides bargaining power for those seeking a change in policy. As seen here, two things were prominent in the media reporting in the moment crisis. First, the media reporting in the moment of crisis could have impact on policymaking process. Second, the position shift in media practices was based on substantial autonomy of reporters.

This study also indicated that the media coverage of foreign policy was significantly associated with international relations, showing that there were a number of

foreign sources voiced for and against the policymaking process. However, problematic was that, although international relations were detected (listed) as one of primary causes of political challenges in each nation's newspaper, foreign sources did not in general become powerful direct dissenters to a government's policy but stimulated domestic forces to take into action. For this issue, this study revealed that the transformation of foreign pressure into domestic opposition was particularly effective when there were common interests shared by foreign sources and domestic dissenting groups. In other words, when nations were interlinked with organic relations⁴⁰ such as economic and/or military relations, the international relations became one of key factors to influence the media-government relation along with other key factors such as a thematic construction and a news source.

The influence of international relations on the media coverage of foreign policy was different in nation to nation, which reflected the Gramsci's (1971) concern over the balance of power in international relations. Asking if it is domestic policies which determine foreign policy or vice versa, Gramsci contended that a particular ideology born in a highly developed country is disseminated in less developed countries, impinging on the local interplay of combinations (p. 182). In connection with this issue, this study revealed that despite liberal democracy taken as a fundamental political philosophy, there was a significant difference in the political contestation process that occurred in *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*. In *Donga Ilbo* coverage of foreign policy, a foreign policy issue (US-SK Relations) had its significant impact on domestic issues and Kim's leadership. On the

⁴⁰ Cumings (2005) called this relation a vertical regime that has been solidified by bilateral defense treaties. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines became semi-sovereign states, deeply penetrated by American military structures, and all were incapable of anything resembling independent foreign policy or defense initiatives (pp. 233-234).

contrary, in the *NYT* coverage, the key issue of domestic policy (US Defense) had its significant impact on U.S. foreign policy. In this sense, international relations could not be regarded merely as the relationship between nation-states, but international hegemonic relations that influenced the media-government relations.

3. *News Sources.*

A reporter's selection of a news source is another key factor to influence the role of the news media in relation to government. Among three newspapers' coverage of foreign policy, similarities in the sourcing pattern are as follows. First, reporters interacted with different types of news source in accordance with the nature of a thematic issue. In *Donga Ilbo* and the *NYT*, news sources were influential in their relevant areas. Regarding the sourcing pattern, government sources were influential, particularly, in international political relations and defense related issues. Elite voices were powerful at a procedural aspect of foreign policy such as a diplomatic strategy and a president's governance. Intellectuals, think-tanks, and non-government experts were prominent in the evaluation stage of any problematic issue of foreign policy, which was not specifically limited to the result of foreign policy. A government-related anonymous source, which is called invisible power, played various roles in advocating, promoting, and defending a government's policy. It occasionally played a critical role as an inside political challenger that indicated an emerging internal division.

Second, in regard to the diversity of voices in a plural society, the media coverage of foreign policy was more likely constructed from an 'elite pluralistic perspective' that focuses on diversity of debate, critiques, and contest within set parameters based on the assumption that it is possible to have a great deal of variety within a relatively narrow

range of sources through the presentation of trivial differences among them. It is the notion compared to a 'classical democratic perspective' that implies a diverse representation of political and social elites and non-elites, of organized and unorganized individuals, and government as well as non-government figures (Brown et al. 1987, p. 45). This study supported that the plurality in a classical democratic perspective has practically not been expected especially in the field of foreign policy.

Third, contrary to the expectation, government and its officials were not the most frequently cited news sources in all three newspapers, compared to other sources. The difference in findings between this research and previous empirical tests might be mainly due to a difference in coding; this research counted a government source that was directly quoted by a reporter as a source, whereas previous studies counted all types of sources coming from a government such as briefings and news releases (Sigal, 1973; Brown et al., 1987; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Bennett, 1990). The sourcing pattern in *Rodong Sinmun* was not skewed toward government sources either. Major news sources were government and non-government sources, foreign government and non-government sources, foreign media, and reporters. Domestic non-government groups were mostly consisted of subdivisions of the Worker's Party. Foreign non-government sources were mostly consisted of institutions of *Juche* ideology located in various nations. Therefore, despite the appearance of diversity in sourcing pattern, the role of each sourcing group was limited to advocating and praising *Juche* ideology and Kim Jong-Il's political line.

Differences in sourcing pattern were clear in the role of political elites (particularly congressional members) and foreign sources. First, the elite's dissensus on a government's policy was in general more prevalent in South Korea than in the United

States, which was partially characteristic in a polarized pluralistic model. In the *NYT* coverage of foreign policy, the absence of congressional dissenting voices implied a passive form of consensus on a government's policy.

Second, the media dependence on foreign sources was different in three newspapers' coverage of foreign policy. In *Donga Ilbo*, this study found that the degree of elite's dissensus was inversely associated with the opinion direction of foreign sources (foreign government, foreign non-government, and foreign media). In contrast, the appearance of foreign dissenting voices filled the vacuum of oppositional view on a government's policy. Accordingly, foreign dissenting voices hardly had impact on politics. In *Rodong Sinmun*, a reporter relied on foreign sources to promote a government's policy and ideological position and to propagandize foreign threats and intervention. Findings indicated that a different pattern of the media dependence on foreign sources was associated with international hegemonic relations, showing that the power of foreign voices was activated under two conditions. First, there was a conflict between two nations' interests (e.g., South Korean engagement policy toward North Korea vs. USNMD). Second, there should be common interests shared by foreign forces and domestic contending forces. The power of foreign voices diminished unless these two conditions were satisfied (e.g., the U.S. influence on North Korea).

Therefore, implication is that when a nation's foreign policy is articulated to national interests, it is easily supported by the public. However, there is no guarantee that it will be equally supported by other nations if there is a conflict between two nations' interests. In other words, constituting hegemony within a national boundary is not tantamount to constituting the same hegemony in the international community. The

disparity between two nations' interests can cause damage to the leadership when it becomes a critical media discourse.

Third, in relation to government, the concept of journalism was differently practiced in different media and political systems. The *NYT* reporting of foreign policy shows the tenet of objective journalism practice than other two newspapers by showing the least variance in the ratio of positive to negative sources in various thematic issues and the most frequent use of primary foreign sources in three newspapers. The concept of objectivity was defined as the practice that in matters of controversy, reporters attempt to balance sources with conflicting perspectives, if not within a single story, then from one story to the next as coverage continues over time (Sigal, 1986, p. 16). Compared to two other newspapers coverage of foreign policy, *Donga Ilbo* reporting of foreign policy was more prominent in a watchdog function in relation to government which seemed to be affected by South Korean media and political system⁴¹ as well as international relations.

In conclusion, this study suggests that the role of the news media in relation to government cannot be evaluated in linear relationship. For reporters, a government is not only an important source of news but also a topic of news. Therefore, although a government as an accredited source has its privilege to access media, the same government as a topic becomes a subject of contending forces' contestation which makes a government vulnerable to the news media. It is a fundamental difference in the role of media in relation to government between a communist state and a liberal democratic state.

⁴¹ The South Korean media system has been transformed from the authoritarian model into the polarized pluralistic model where the media are integrated into party politics. The newly launched civilian progressive government confronted economic instability as well as the pressure from the old political coalition 'the conservatives'.

In a liberal democratic state, the role of news media in relation to government was also differentiated for their journalism practices. In this case, crucial influencing factors were a reporter's construction of a thematic issue and selection of a news source. The way how a media discourse was constructed through a reporter's selection of a news source determined the impact of news discourse on politics and characterized the role of news media in relation to government.

C. Limitations and Recommendations

Like any other research, this study has its limitations. The followings are some suggestions for further research based on these limitations. The first limitation of the present research has to do with research methods. Although I attempted to find the relations between the media and government through content analysis to measure the relationship among theme, news source, opinion direction, and media representation by emphasizing the value of objective evaluation, it is recommendable to use of a combination of interviews with journalists who work in reporting foreign policy related issues and with government officials for a future research. This would help researchers to explore why reporters select a certain group of news sources to construct a critical discourse in accordance with a thematic issue; how they choose a news source when they have motivations to resist but there is no dissenting voice in elite groups; how they justify their selection of a news source in professional journalism in terms of democratic value and ethical value.

Second, this research observes how international relations work in the relationship between the media and government by analyzing the media coverage of foreign policies in three nations that are interlinked each other. It is based on the Gramsci's (1971)

question on the direction of influence between domestic policies and foreign policies. He also argued how a particular ideology born in one nation is disseminated in other nations (p. 182). The questions Gramsci raised in whether domestic policies determine foreign policies or vice versa actually in different national settings suggested significant implications on the value of foreign sources that a reporter depended on reporting of foreign policy. Although this research had an opportunity to examine the issue by comparing the media coverage of foreign policy in different political media systems, it is recommendable to increase a sample size (number of nations) or, if possible, to select the cases already disputed in previous researches in order to enhance its generalizing power.

Third, the sample data of this research was limited to the three nations' mainstream newspapers for its merit of less ideological bias as Bennett (1990) asserted. However, these data are disadvantageous in terms of the fair representation of each nation's dissent voices, which used to be stronger in alternative media than in mainstream media. William (2001) contends that human practice is not always happening inside the dominant mode, although there is a central system of practices, meanings, and values in society. He distinguished culture as a dominant, residual, and emergent formation. It reminds of the importance of analyzing alternative and oppositional media practices.

Fourth, it is recommendable to expand the coverage of analysis to an extensive area of framing, which is an effective method to analyze the media's ideological work: why and how a certain frame in foreign policy is more appealed than others was not. Although there was a difficulty in comparing the media content written in two different languages, it is recommendable for future researches to do in-depth analysis of ideological aspect of news reporting.

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TABLES

Table 2

Correlations among Total Number of Themes (TNT), Total Sources (TS), Total Positive Sources (TPS), Total Negative Sources (TNS), and Total Opinion Direction (OPD) in Donga Ilbo (N=48)

Variable	TNT	TS	TPS	TNS	OPD
TS	.88***				
TPS	.79***	.78***			
TNS	.77***	.90***	.47**		
OPD	-.24	-.19	.16	-.41**	

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 3

Correlations among Total Number of Themes (TNT), Total Sources (TS), Total Positive Sources (TPS), Total Negative Sources (TNS), and Total Opinion Direction (OPD) in the NYT (N=48)

Variable	TNT	TS	TPS	TNS	OPD
TS	.87***				
TPS	.74***	.87***			
TNS	.69***	.78***	.47**		
OPD	-.13	-.11	.25	-.55***	

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 4

Correlations among Total Number of Themes (TNT), Total Sources (TS), Total Positive Sources (TPS), Total Negative Sources (TNS), and Total Opinion Direction (OPD) in Rodong Sinmun (N=48)

Variable	TNT	TS	TPS	TNS	OPD
TS	.32*				
TPS	.27	.92***			
TNS	-.08	-.01	-.22		
OPD	.11	.10	.44**	-.68***	

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 5

Lists of Themes Issued in Donga Ilbo News and Editorials during 2000 and 2001
(N = 352)

News (n = 276)	Editorials (n = 76)
DJ Governance (23%)	DJ Governance (25%)
SK-NK Relations (22%)	SK-NK Relations (17%)
Diplomatic Strategy (14%)	US-SK Relations (16%)
Ideological Conflict (10%)	Diplomatic Strategy (9%)
US-SK Relations (9%)	Ideological Conflict (7%)
US-NK Relations (4%)	NK Diplomatic Strategy (7%)
US Defense (2%)	SK-NK Clash (7%)
Human-Rights (2%)	Human Rights (4%)
NK Strategy (2%)	US-NK Relations (4%)
NK Threats (1%)	SK-NK Economic Relations (3%)
US Leadership(1%)	US-SK Military Alliance (1%)
SK-NK Economic Relations (1%)	US Presence (1%)
Family Reunion (1%)	
NK Economic Situation (1%)	
SK-NK Clash (1%)	

Table 6

Lists of Themes Issued in the NYT News and Editorials during 2000 and 2001 (N = 245)

News (<i>n</i> = 197)	Editorials (<i>n</i> = 48)
SK-NK relationship (20%)	USNMD (40%)
US-NK relationship (11%)	Diplomatic Strategy (15%)
NK with others (9%)	SK-NK Relations (10%)
US defense (9%)	ABM Treaty (8%)
SK-NK eco coop (6%)	WMD (8%)
Family reunion (5%)	US-NK Relations (6%)
US leadership (5%)	US Presence (4%)
KDJ governance (5%)	Bush Governance (2%)
Diplomatic strategy (5%)	Clinton Governance (2%)
SK eco situation (5%)	DJ Governance (2%)
Human-rights (3%)	US-SK Relations (2%)
Bush governance (3%)	
NK threats (3%)	
US-SK relationship (3%)	

Note. US Defense (60%) in editorials is divided into USNMD (40%), ABM (8%), WMD (8%), and US Presence in the Korean peninsula (4%).

Table 7

List of Themes Issued in Rodong Sinmun during 2000 and 2001(N = 177)

<i>Rodong (N=177)</i>
US Presence (11%)
Ideological Conflict (8%)
Unification (8%)
Anti-Americanism (8%)
USNMD (8%)
US Threats (5%)
Human Rights (5%)
Juche Ideology (4%)
Type of Nation (4%)
Bush Governance (4%)
DJ Governance (3%)
US-NK Relations (3%)
SK-NK Relations (3%)
Crisis of Capitalism (3%)
NK with Others (3%)

Table 8

Summary of Regression Analysis for Thematic Issues Predicting the Reporter's Selection of Positive Sources in Donga Ilbo (N = 48)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Step 1			
DJ Governance	2.72	.44	.67**
Step 2			
DJ Governance	2.36	.43	.59**
Diplomatic Strategy	1.27	.46	.30**
Step 3			
DJ Governance	2.02	.42	.50**
Diplomatic Strategy	1.21	.43	.28**
SK-NK Relations	1.31	.47	.28**
Step 4			
DJ Governance	2.11	.40	.52**
Diplomatic Strategy	1.13	.40	.27**
SK-NK Relations	1.47	.45	.31**
US Defense	4.14	1.69	.23*

Note. $R^2 = .45$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .08$ for Step 2; $\Delta R^2 = .07$ for Step 3; $\Delta R^2 = .05$ for Step 4
 * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 9

The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors (Thematic Variables) with TPS in Donga Ilbo (N = 48)

Thematic Variable	Correlation between Predictor and TPS	Correlation between predictor and TPS controlling all other predictors
DJ Governance	.674**	.628
SK-NK Relations	.479**	.446
Diplomatic Strategy	.473**	.394
US Defense	.118	.351

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 10

Summary of Regression Analysis for Thematic Issues Predicting the Reporter's Selection of Negative Sources in Donga Ilbo (N = 48)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Step 1			
Diplomatic Strategy	4.11	.55	.74**
Step 2			
Diplomatic Strategy	3.08	.56	.55**
Ideological Conflict	3.27	.87	.38**
Step 3			
Diplomatic Strategy	2.57	.50	.46**
Ideological Conflict	3.19	.75	.37**
DJ Governance	1.67	.42	.32**

Note. $R^2 = .55$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .11$ for Step 2; $\Delta R^2 = .09$ for Step 3

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 11

The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors (Thematic Variables) with TNS in Donga Ilbo (N = 48)

Thematic Variable	Correlation between each Predictor and TNS	Correlation between each predictor and TNS controlling all other predictors
Diplomatic Strategy	.741**	.651
Ideological Conflict	.652**	.540
DJ Governance	.521**	.519

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 12

Summary of Regression Analysis for Thematic Issues Predicting the Reporter's Selection of Positive Sources in the NYT (N = 48)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Step 1			
SK-NK Relations	3.08	.67	.56**
Step 2			
SK-NK Relations	3.07	.63	.56**
US Defense	2.91	1.07	.31**
Step 3			
SK-NK Relations	2.93	.59	.53**
US Defense	2.96	1.01	.32**
US Leadership	4.42	1.63	.29**
Step 4			
SK-NK Relations	3.06	.57	.56**
US Defense	2.49	.99	.27*
US Leadership	4.41	1.56	.29**
US-NK Relations	1.70	.79	.23*
Step 5			
SK-NK Relations	2.38	.62	.43**
US Defense	2.71	.95	.29**
US Leadership	4.89	1.51	.32**
US-NK Relations	1.71	.76	.23*
Family Reunion	3.41	1.52	.25*

Note. $R^2 = .31$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .10$ for Step 2; $\Delta R^2 = .09$ for Step 3; $\Delta R^2 = .05$ for Step 4; $\Delta R^2 = .05$ for Step 5.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 13

The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors (Thematic Variables) with TPS in the NYT (N = 48)

Thematic Variable	Correlation between each Predictor and TPS	Correlation between each predictor and TPS controlling all other predictors
SK-NK Relations	.560**	.508
US Defense	.314*	.402
US Leadership	.332*	.447
US-NK Relations	.230	.328
Family Reunion	.390**	.327

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 14

Summary of Regression Analysis for Thematic Issues Predicting the Reporter's Selection of Negative Sources in the NYT (N = 48)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Step 1			
US-NK Relations	2.26	.70	.43**
Step 2			
US-NK Relations	2.43	.66	.46**
SK-NK Relations	1.33	.48	.35**
Step 3			
US-NK Relations	2.38	.62	.45**
SK-NK Relations	1.19	.46	.31*
Diplomatic Strategy	2.99	1.15	.31*
Step 4			
US-NK Relations	2.07	.60	.39**
SK-NK Relations	1.17	.43	.30**
Diplomatic Strategy	2.76	1.10	.28*
US Defense	1.81	.75	.28*

Note. $R^2 = .19$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .12$ for Step 2; $\Delta R^2 = .09$ for Step 3; $\Delta R^2 = .07$ for Step 4

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 15

The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors (Thematic Variables) with TNS in the NYT (N = 48)

Thematic Variable	Correlation between each Predictor and TNS	Correlation between each predictor and TNS controlling all other predictors
US-NK Relations	.431**	.464
SK-NK Relations	.301*	.381
Diplomatic Strategy	.352**	.359
US Defense	.389**	.344

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 16

Summary of Regression Analysis for Thematic Issues Predicting the Reporter's Selection of Negative Sources in Rodong Sinmun (N = 48)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β
Step 1			
US Threats	.54	.20	.37*
Step 2			
US Threats	.61	.19	.42**
US Presence	.40	.14	.37**

Note. $R^2 = .14$ for Step 1; $\Delta R^2 = .13$ for Step 2

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 17

The Bivariate and Partial Correlations of the Predictors (Thematic Variables) with TNS in Rodong Sinmun (N = 48)

Thematic Variable	Correlation between each Predictor and TNS	Correlation between each predictor and TNS controlling all other predictors
US Threat	.369**	.435
US Presence	.314*	.392

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 18

Frequency Distribution of Total Sources (TS), Total Positive Sources (TPS), Total Negative Sources (TNS), and Opinion Direction (OPD) of each Group of News Sources in Donga Ilbo (N=276)

Variable	TS	TPS	TNS	OPD
<i>Government</i>	125 (15.5%)	82	16	
KDJ	44	38	0	8.2
Gov Official	45	30	2	6.2
Anonymous gov-related	36	14	14	0.5
<i>Political Party</i>	271(33.7%)	66	159	
MDP	127	59	33	2.3
JP	37	3	30	-7.2
GNP	107	4	96	-8.9
<i>SK Experts</i>	129 (16%)	36	67	
Intellectual	48	12	29	-4.5
SK non-gov	30	5	18	-6.1
General Public	30	12	8	-0.2
Public Opinion	4	3	1	3.3
Anonymous non-gov-related	17	4	11	-4.9
<i>Foreign Government</i>	42(5.2%)	38	3	
US Government	17	17	0	10.0
Foreign Government	21	20	1	9.4
NK Government	4	1	2	-5.0
<i>Foreign non-gov</i>	71(8.8%)	37	27	
US non-gov	40	14	22	-2.5
Foreign non-gov	31	23	5	6.3
<i>Foreign media</i>	75(9.3%)	31	32	
NK Media	1	0	1	-10.0
US Media	29	9	15	-2.6
Foreign Media	45	22	16	0.0
<i>Donga Reporter</i>	84 (10.4%)	19	34	-0.7
Total	805(100%)	309	338	

Table 19

Frequency Distribution of News Sources Referring each Theme Issued in Donga Ilbo between 2000 and 2001(N=48)

Variable	DJGov	SK-NK	Strategy	Ideology	US-SK	US-NK	USDef	Total
<u>Government TS 125 (15.5%)</u>								
KDJ	3/7	9/13	0/3	0/0	1/4	0/1	1/0	42 (14/28)
Gov Official	7/3	2/4	0/13	2/3	1/4	0/1	-	40 (12/28)
Anonymous gov-related	2/10	0/1	0/7	0/4	0/8	1/1	-	34 (3/31)
<u>Political party TS 271(33.7%)</u>								
MDP	10/64	0/2	6/29	2/6	0/1	-	-	120(18/102)
JP	8/7	1/0	1/11	4/2	0/1	-	-	35 (14/21)
GNP	15/26	0/2	7/32	7/12	-	-	-	101 (29/72)
<u>SK experts and non-gov TS 129 (16%)</u>								
Intellectual	2/5	10/7	3/2	1/7	2/2	0/1	-	42 (18/24)
SK non-Gov	3/7	5/3	1/4	2/1	1/0	-	-	27 (12/15)
General Public	1/1	7/0	0/1	1/9	-	-	-	20 (9/11)
Public Opinion	1/1	0/0	1/0	0/0	-	-	-	3 (2/1)
Anonymous Non-gov-related	2/2	0/2	0/4	2/2	-	-	-	14 (4/10)
<u>Foreign G TS 42(5.2%)</u>								
US Gov	0/1	2/3	-	-	1/3	3/1	2/1	17 (8/9)
Foreign Gov	1/0	8/10	-	-	-	-	-	19 (9/10)
NK Gov	0/0	0/2	-	-	-	-	-	2 (0/2)
<u>Foreign non-gov TS 71(8.8%)</u>								
US Non-Gov	0/5	1/0	3/2	-	0/12	0/8	0/2	33 (4/29)
Foreign non-Gov	6/0	11/2	-	-	-	-	-	19(17/2)
<u>Foreign media TS 75(9.3%)</u>								
NK media	0/0	0/0	-	-	-	-	-	0 (0/0)
US media	2/3	2/6	-	1/1	0/7	1/2	-	25 (6/19)
Foreign media	6/3	5/1	0/4	0/1	0/1	2/0	1/0	24 (14/10)
<u>Reporter TS 84 (10.4%)</u>								
Donga Reporter	10/13	8/6	1/8	5/5	1/17	2/0	-	76 (27/49)
Sub Total	79/158	71/64	23/120	27/53	7/60	9/15	5/3	(221/473)
Total	237	135	143	80	67	24	8	694

Table 20

Ratio of Positive to Negative Sources Referring each Theme Issued in Donga Ilbo (N=276)

Theme	DJ Gov P : N	SK-NK P : N	Strategy P : N	Ideology P : N	US-SK P : N	US-NK P : N	US Def P : N	Total P: N
<i>Government</i>	25:3	24:1	11:4	2:4	12:3	3:0	1:0	78: 15
KDJ	10/0	18/0	2/0	-	5/0	1/0	1/0	37: 0
Gov Official	7/1	5/0	7/1	2/0	5/0	1/0	-	27: 2
Anonymous gov-related	8/2	1/1	2/3	0/4	2/3	1/0	-	14: 13
<i>Political Party</i>	29:73	0:2	29:49	3:26	1:0	0:0	0:0	62: 150
MDP	26/26	-	27/2	3/3	-	-	-	56: 31
JP	2/10	0/1	0/12	0/5	1/0	-	-	3: 28
GNP	1/37	0/1	2/35	0/18	0/0	-	-	3: 91
<i>SK Experts</i>	2:20	19:8	4:9	6:18	2:4	0:1	0:0	33: 60
Intellectual	0/7	7/5	1/3	1/7	0/4	0/1	-	9: 27
SK non-gov	0/8	4/3	0/3	1/2	-	-	-	5: 16
Public Opinion	1/1	0/0	1/0	0/0	2/0	-	-	4: 1
General Public	0/1	7/0	0/1	4/5	-	-	-	11: 7
Anonymous non-gov-related	1/3	1/0	2/2	0/4	-	-	-	4: 9
<i>Foreign Gov</i>	2:0	24:0	0:0	0:0	4:0	4:0	3:0	37: 0
US Gov	1/0	5/0	-	-	4/0	4/0	3/0	17: 0
Foreign Gov	1/0	18/0	-	-	-	-	-	19: 0
NK Gov	-	1/0	-	-	-	-	-	1: 0
<i>Foreign Non-Gov</i>	7:4	12:0	1:4	0:0	4:5	4:4	0:2	28: 19
US Non-Gov	1/4	1/0	1/4	-	4/5	4/4	0/2	11: 19
Foreign non-Gov	6/0	11/0	-	-	-	-	-	17: 0
<i>Foreign Media</i>	3:10	5:4	2:2	1:2	2:6	0:4	1:0	14: 28
NK media	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0: 0
US media	0/5	3/3	-	1/1	2/5	0/1	-	6: 15
Foreign media	3/5	2/1	2/2	0/1	0/1	0/3	1/0	8: 13
Donga Reporter	5/11	11/3	3/2	0/5	2/0	1/0	0/0	22: 21
Total	73:121	95:18	50:70	12:55	27:18	12/9	5:2	274: 293
Ratio Conversion	1: 1.7	5.3: 1	1: 1.4	1: 4.6	1.5: 1	1.3: 1	2.5: 1	

Table 21

Opinion Direction of News Sources Referring each Theme Issued in Donga Ilbo (N=48)

Variable	DJ Gov	SK-NK	Strategy	Ideology	US-SK	US-NK	US Def	TS OPD
<u>Government</u>								
KDJ	10.0	8.3	7.5	-	10.0	-	10.0	8.2
Gov Official	5.6	8.0	5.9	5.0	10.0	-	-	6.2
Anonymous gov-related	7.2	-4.5	-1.9	-10.0	-1.3	5.0	-	0.5
<u>Political Party</u>								
MDP	0.4	0.0	6.3	-0.7	0.0	-	-	2.3
JP	-5.4	-10.0	-10.0	-7.5	10.0	-	-	-7.2
GNP	-8.5	-5.0	-9.6	-9.3	-	-	-	-8.9
<u>SK Experts and Non-Gov</u>								
Intellectual	-10	-1.4	-5.0	-3.3	-10.0	-10.0	-	-4.5
SK non-gov	-7.8	-3.0	-6.3	-10.0	0.0	-	-	-6.1
Public Opinion	0.0	10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-0.2
General Public	-5.0	10.0	-10.0	3.9	-	-	-	3.3
Anonymous non-gov-related	-3.3	10.0	-1.7	-10.0	-	-	-	-4.9
<u>Foreign Gov</u>								
US Gov	10.0	10.0	-	-	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
Foreign Gov	10.0	10.0	-	-	-	-	-	9.4
NK Gov	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-5.0
<u>Foreign Non-Gov</u>								
US Non-Gov	-5.0	10.0	-7.8	-	2.5	-	-10.0	-2.5
Foreign non-Gov	10.0	9.7	-	-	-	-	-	6.3
<u>Foreign Media</u>								
NK media	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-10.0
US media	-10.0	-1.4	-	-	-5.0	-3.0	-	-2.6
Foreign media	-2.3	0.0	0.0	-10.0	-10.0	-7.5	-10.0	0.0
Donga Reporter	-3.4	5.5	1.4	-4.3	3.3	5.0	-	-0.7

Table 22

Frequency Distribution of Total Sources (TS), Total Positive Sources (TPS), Total Negative Sources (TNS) and Opinion Direction (OPD) of each Group of News Sources in the NYT
(N = 197)

Variable	TS	TPS	TNS	OPD
<i>Government</i>	117 (17%)	67	15	
Clinton	4	4	0	10.0
Bush	7	7	0	10.0
State Dept	18	13	1	7.1
Defense Dept	7	3	1	2.5
Government Official	16	8	3	2.5
Anonymous gov-related	65	32	10	2.9
<i>Political Party</i>	2 (0.3%)	0	1	
Republican Party	0	0	0	-
Democratic Party	2	0	1	-5.0
<i>US Experts and Non-Gov</i>	87 (12.6%)	36	22	
Think-Tanks	28	6	12	-2.8
Non-Gov Sources	12	3	5	-0.5
Public Opinion	3	3	0	10.0
General Public	29	18	1	5.1
Anonymous Non-Gov-related	15	6	4	0.1
<i>Foreign Government</i>	187 (27%)	61	65	
SK Government	86	34	21	2.0
Foreign Government	61	19	25	-1.0
NK Government	40	8	19	-3.2
<i>Foreign Non-Gov</i>	149 (21.6%)	58	43	
SK non-Gov Sources	108	47	34	1.3
Foreign non-Gov	41	11	9	1.0
<i>Foreign Media</i>	43 (6.2%)	6	22	
SK Media	15	6	4	1.3
NK Media	18	0	12	-6.6
Foreign Media	10	0	6	-5.6
<i>The NYT Reporter</i>	106 (15.3%)	34	20	1.4
Total	691	262	188	

Table 23

Frequency Distribution of News Sources Referring each Theme Issued in the NYT between 2000 and 2001 (N=48)

Variable	US-NK	SK-NK	NKOther	USDef	Strategy	USlead	BushGov	Total
<u>Government</u> TS 117 (17%)								
Clinton	2/0	-	-	1/0	-	-	-	3 (3/0)
Bush	0/2	0/1	-	0/1	0/2	-	-	6 (0/6)
State Dept	4/3	-	2/2	1/1	0/1	-	-	14 (7/7)
Defense Dept	-	-	-	3/2	-	-	-	5 (3/2)
Gov Official	-	-	1/0	2/5	-	0/1	0/3	12 (3/9)
Anonymous	18/5	9/1	0/1	6/1	0/4	-	0/7	52(33/19)
Gov-related								
<u>Political Party</u> TS 2 (0.3%)								
Republican P	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0 (0/0)
Democratic P	-	-	-	-	0/1	-	-	1 (0/1)
<u>US Experts and Non-Gov</u> TS 87 (12.6%)								
Think-Tanks	0/3	4/0	1/0	2/1	0/4	1/2	0/1	19 (8/11)
US non-Gov	0/2	1/0	-	1/0	-	-	-	4 (2/2)
Public Opinion	-	3/0	-	-	-	-	-	3 (3/0)
General Public	-	7/2	-	-	-	6/0	-	15 (13/2)
Anonymous	-	2/0	1/0	-	-	-	-	3 (3/0)
Non-Gov-related								
<u>Foreign Government</u> TS 187 (27%)								
SK Gov	4/10	10/13	3/2	5/6	-	-	-	53 (22/31)
NK Gov	3/5	4/3	2/0	0/1	0/2	0/2	-	22 (9/13)
Foreign Gov	6/0	0/3	16/8	11/3	-	0/4	0/4	55(33/22)
<u>Foreign Non-Government</u> TS 149 (21.6%)								
SK non-Gov	0/3	17/8	-	2/5	1/0	-	-	36 (20/16)
Foreign non-Gov	0/1	0/2	1/9	1/2	-	-	0/4	20 (2/18)
<u>Foreign Media</u> TS 43 (6.2%)								
SK Media	1/2	4/1	0/2	0/2	-	0/1	-	13 (5/8)
NK Media	1/2	1/1	2/3	0/3	-	-	-	13 (4/9)
Foreign Media	-	-	4/3	0/1	-	-	0/1	9 (4/5)
<u>Reporter</u> TS 106 (15.3%)								
NYT Reporter	5/3	10/10	4/5	4/5	1/3	5/2	0/5	52 (29/33)
Sub Total	44/41	72/45	37/35	39/39	2/17	12/12	0/25	206/214
Total	85	117	72	78	19	24	25	420

Table 24

Ratio of Positive to Negative Sources Referring each Theme Issued in the NYT (N = 197)

Variable	US-NK P : N	SK-NK P : N	NKother P : N	US Def P : N	Strategy P : N	USLead P : N	BushGov P : N	Total P : N
<i>Government</i>	17:6	8:1	2:0	16:0	5:0	0:0	3:2	51: 9
Clinton	2/0	-	-	1/0	-	-	-	3: 0
Bush	2/0	1/0	-	1/0	2/0	-	-	6: 0
State Dept	5/0	-	2/0	2/0	1/0	-	-	10: 0
Defense Dept	-	-	-	2/0	-	-	-	2: 0
Gov Official	-	-	-	5/0	-	-	2/1	7: 1
Anonymous	8/6	7/1	-	5/0	2/0	-	1/1	23: 8
Gov-related								
<i>Political Party</i>	0:0	0:0	0:0	0:0	0:1	0:0	0:0	0: 1
Republican P	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0: 0
Democratic P	-	-	-	-	0/1	-	-	0: 1
<i>US Experts</i>	0:3	13:1	0:1	2:1	1:2	5:2	0:1	21: 11
Think-Tanks	0/3	2/0	0/1	2/0	1/2	0/2	0/1	5: 9
US non-Gov	-	1/0	-	0/1	-	-	-	1: 1
Public Opinion	-	3/0	-	-	-	-	-	3: 0
General Public	-	6/1	-	-	-	5/0	-	11: 1
Anonymous	-	1/0	-	-	-	-	-	1: 0
Non-Gov-related								
<i>Foreign Gov</i>	9:13	17:6	13:7	7:13	0:2	2:2	1:3	49: 46
SK Gov	7/3	13/2	1/1	4/4	-	-	-	25: 10
NK Gov	2/6	2/4	1/0	0/1	0/2	2/0	-	7: 23
Foreign Gov	0/4	2/0	11/6	3/8	-	0/2	1/3	17:23
<i>Foreign Non-Gov</i>	0:1	17:6	2:0	3:6	0:0	0:0	0:0	22: 13
SK non-Gov	0/1	17/4	-	1/5	0/0	-	-	18: 10
Foreign non-Gov	-	0/2	2/0	2/1	-	-	-	4: 3
<i>Foreign Media</i>	0:4	4:2	0:6	0:4	0:0	1:0	0:1	5: 17
SK Media	0/1	4/1	-	0/1	-	1/0	-	5: 3
NK Media	0/3	0/1	0/3	0/2	-	-	-	0: 9
Foreign Media	-	-	0/3	0/1	-	-	0/1	0: 5
<i>Reporter</i>								
NYT Reporter	0:3	9:0	2:2	6:1	0:1	5:0	0:4	22: 11
Total	26: 30	68: 16	19:16	34: 25	6: 6	13: 4	4: 11	170: 108
Ratio Conversion	1: 1.2	4.3: 1	1.1: 1	1.4: 1	1: 1	2.2:1	1: 2.5	

Table 25

Opinion Direction of News Sources Referring each Theme Issued in the NYT (N=48)

Variable	US-NK	SK-NK	NKOther	USDef	Strategy	USLead	BushGov	TS OPD
<u>Government</u>								
Clinton	10.0	-	-	10.0	-	-	-	10.0
Bush	10.0	10.0	-	10.0	10.0	-	-	10.0
State Dept	6.7	-	6.7	10.0	10.0	-	-	7.1
Defense Dept	-	-	-	3.8	-	-	-	2.5
Gov Official	-	-	0.0	6.0	-	0.0	5.0	2.5
Anonymous	0.5	4.3	0.0	7.5	5.0	-	-2.7	2.9
Gov-related								
<u>Political Party</u>								
Republican P	-	-	-	-	0.0	-	-	-
Democratic P	-	-	-	-	-10.0	-	-	-5.0
<u>US Experts and Non-Gov</u>								
Think-Tanks	-10.0	5.0	-10.0	6.7	-3.3	-7.5	-10.0	-2.8
US non-Gov	0.0	10.0	-	-10.0	-	-	-	-0.5
Public Opinion	-	10.0	-	-	-	-	-	10.0
General Public	-	3.9	-	-	-	8.3	-	5.1
Anonymous	-	5.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	0.1
Non-Gov-related								
<u>Foreign Government</u>								
SK Gov	4.7	5.8	-1.3	0.0	-	-	-	2.0
NK Gov	-5.0	-3.3	5.0	-10.0	0.0	10.0	-	-3.2
Foreign Gov	-4.0	5.0	3.4	-5.7	-	-5.0	-6.7	-1.0
<u>Foreign Non-Government</u>								
SK non-Gov	-3.3	5.8	-	-7.5	0.0	-	-	1.3
Foreign non-Gov	0.0	-10.0	3.0	3.3	-	-	-8.3	1.0
<u>Foreign Media</u>								
SK Media	-3.3	6.0	0.0	-5.0	-	10.0	-	1.3
NK Media	-10.0	-5.0	-5.0	-7.5	-	-	-	-6.6
Foreign Media	-	-	-3.3	-10.0	-	-	-10.0	-5.6
NYT Reporter	-3.9	3.5	0.0	5.0	-2.5	7.1	-	1.4

Table 26

Distribution of TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD in Government-related Anonymous Attribution in Donga Ilbo (n = 36)

Year	TS	TPS	TNS	OPD
2000	4	3	0	7.5
2001	32	11	14	-.88
Total	36	14	14	

Table 27

Distribution of TS, TPS, TNS, and OPD in Government-related Anonymous Attribution in the NYT (n = 65)

Year	TS	TPS	TNS	OPD
2000	37	21	5	5.94
2001*	28	11	5	-.06
Total	65	32	10	

* $p < .05$

Table 28

Frequency Distribution of Total Sources (TS), Total Positive Sources (TPS), Total Negative Sources (TNS,) and Opinion Direction (OPD) of each Group of News Sources in Rodong Sinmun (N = 177)

Variable	TS	TPS	TNS	OPD
<i>Government</i>	49 (10.5%)	41	6	
Kim Il Sung	9	24	0	10.0
Kim Jung Il	24	24	0	10.0
Gov Official	8	7	0	8.8
Anonymous gov-related	8	2	6	-5.0
<i>NK Non-Government</i>	38 (9.1%)	26	4	
NK non-Gov	12	12	0	10.0
Anonymous Non-gov-related	26	14	4	4
<i>Foreign Government</i>	57(12.2%)	50	4	
SK Gov Official	1	1	0	10.0
US Gov Official	7	1	4	-3.3
Foreign Gov	49	48	0	9.5
<i>Foreign Non-Gov</i>	80 (17.1%)	77	2	
SK non-Gov	42	40	1	8.8
US non-Gov	4	3	1	5.0
Foreign non-Gov	34	34	0	10.0
<i>Foreign media</i>	80 (17.1%)	51	3	
SK Media	33	18	2	4.2
US Media	10	6	1	3.8
Foreign Media	37	27	0	6.7
<i>NK Media</i>	163 (34.9%)	70	1	
KCNA	106	17	1	1.5
Rodong Reporter	57	53	0	9.3
Total	467 (100%)	315	20	6.0

Table 29

Frequency Distribution of News Sources Referring Each Theme Issued in Rodong Sinmun between 2000 and 2001(N = 48)

Variable	US P T	Ideology	Unification	A-Am	USNMD	H.R	Bush	Total
<u><i>Government</i> TS 49 (10.5%)</u>								
Kim Il Sung	0/1	-	0/1	0/1	0/1	1/0	-	5 (1/4)
Kim Jung Il	0/2	0/5	6/1	0/1	0/1	-	-	16 (6/10)
NK Gov Official	2/0	-	1/0	-	-	-	-	3 (3/0)
Anonymous	1/5	-	-	-	-	1/0	-	7 (2/5)
gov-related								
<u><i>NK Non-Government</i> TS 38 (9.1%)</u>								
NK non-Gov	0/2	-	0/2	0/1	-	1/0	-	6 (1/5)
Anonymous	2/0	-	1/2	2/1	-	-	0/1	9 (5/4)
Non-gov-related								
<u><i>Foreign Government</i> TS 57(12.2%)</u>								
SK-Gov	-	-	-	0/1	-	-	-	1 (0/1)
US Gov	1/0	-	-	-	3/0	-	-	4 (4/0)
Foreign Gov	1/0	-	-	-	13/2	2/0	0/1	19 (16/3)
<u><i>Foreign Non-Government</i> TS 80 (17.1%)</u>								
SK non-Gov	0/3	0/10	-	0/18	-	1/0	-	14 (1/31)
US non-Gov	-	-	-	-	-	-	0/1	1 (0/1)
Foreign non-Gov	0/5	0/1	0/3	0/3	3/1	3/0	0/2	21 (6/15)
<u><i>Foreign Media</i> TS 80 (17.1%)</u>								
SK Media	1/3	2/7	-	2/7	-	-	-	22 (5/17)
US Media	1/1	-	-	1/0	1/1	-	0/3	8 (3/5)
Foreign Media	1/2	-	0/3	1/3	5/2	4/0	0/3	24(11/13)
<u><i>NK Media</i> TS 163 (34.9%)</u>								
KCNA	8/11	2/5	1/3	3/8	6/4	6/0	0/7	64 (26/38)
Reporter	3/7	1/6	6/4	0/2	1/3	2/0	0/0	35 (13/22)
<hr/>								
Sub Total	21/42	5/34	15/19	9/46	32/15	21/0	0/18	103/174
Total	63	39	34	55	47	21	18	277

Table 30

Ratio of Positive to Negative Sources Referring each Theme Issued in Rodong Sinmun (N = 48)

Variable	US Presence	US NMD	Unification	Ideological Conflict	Anti- Americanism	Human Rights	Total
<i>Government</i>	4:4	1:0	9:0	5:0	2:0	1:0	22:4
Kim Il Sung	-	-	1/0	-	1/0	0/0	2:0
Kim Jung Il	1/0	1/0	7/0	5/0	1/0	-	15:0
NK Gov Official	2/0	-	1/0	-	-	-	3:0
Anonymous gov-related	1/4	-	-	-	-	1/0	2:4
<i>NK Non-Government</i>	2:1	0:0	4:0	0:0	1:0	1:0	8:1
NK non-gov	2/0	-	1/0	-	-	1/0	4:0
Anonymous Non-gov-related	0/1	-	3/0	-	1/0	-	4:1
<i>Foreign Government</i>	0:1	15:1	0:0	1:0	0:0	2:0	18:2
SK-Gov	-	-	-	-	-	-	0:0
US Gov	0/1	0/1	-	-	-	-	0:2
Foreign Gov	-	15/0	-	1/0	-	2/0	18:0
<i>Foreign Non-Gov</i>	6:0	4:0	3:0	10:0	21:0	4:0	48:0
SK non-Gov	1/0	-	-	10/0	18/0	1/0	30:0
US non-Gov	-	-	-	-	-	-	0:0
Foreign non-Gov	5/0	4/0	3/0	-	3/0	3/0	18:0
<i>Foreign Media</i>	3:0	2:1	3:0	7:1	10:0	3:0	28:2
SK Media	0/0	-	-	7/1	5/0	-	12:1
US Media	-	0/1	-	-	1/0	-	1:1
Foreign Media	3/0	2/0	3/0	-	4/0	3/0	15:0
<i>NK Media</i>	7:1	5:0	10:0	8:0	1:0	4:0	35:1
KCNA	1/1	1/0	0/0	1/0	0/0	2/0	5:1
R Reporter	6/0	4/0	10/0	7/0	1/0	2/0	30:0
Total	22: 7	27: 2	29: 0	31: 1	35: 0	15: 0	159:10
Ratio Conversion	3.1: 1	13.5: 1	29: 0	31: 1	35: 0	15: 0	

Table 31

Opinion Direction of News Source Referring Each Theme Issued in Rodong Sinmun (N = 48)

Variable	US Threat	US NMD	Unification	SK Ideological Conflict	Anti- Americanism	Human Rights
<i><u>Government</u></i>						
Kim Il Sung	-	-	10.0	-	10.0	0.0
Kim Jung Il	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	-
NK Gov Official	10.0	-	10.0	-	-	-
Anonymous gov-related	-5.0	-	-	-	-	10.0
<i><u>NK Non-Government</u></i>						
NK non-Gov	10.0	-	10.0	-	10.0	10.0
Anonymous Non-gov-related	-5.0	-	10.0	-	-	-
<i><u>Foreign Government</u></i>						
SK-Gov	-	-	-	-	-	-
US Gov	-10.0	-3.3	-	-	-	-
Foreign Gov	-	10.0	-	10.0	-	10.0
<i><u>Foreign Non-Government</u></i>						
SK non-Gov	10.0	-	-	10.0	8.6	10.0
US non-Gov	-	-	-	-	-	-
Foreign non-Gov	10.0	10.0	10.0	-	10.0	10.0
<i><u>Foreign Media</u></i>						
SK Media	0.0	-	-	6.3	4.7	-
US Media	-	-5.0	-	-	10.0	-
Foreign Media	10.0	1.3	10.0	-	10.0	6.7
<i><u>NK Media</u></i>						
KCNA	0.0	1.1	1.0	1.7	0.0	3.0
R Reporter	8.6	10.0	10.0	10.0	5.0	10.0

Table 37

Comparison of Donga Ilbo Representation of North Korea between 2000 and 2001
(n = 67)

North Korea			
<u>represented as</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2001</u>	<u>Total</u>
Failed State	11 (36%)	7 (19%)	18 (27%)
World' Last Communist State	5 (16%)	5 (14%)	10 (15%)
Isolated and Reclusive State	2 (7%)	4 (11%)	6 (9%)
Rogue State	2 (7%)	5 (14%)	7 (10%)
Unpredictable State	2 (7%)	6 (17%)	8 (12%)
One Nation (Minjok)	6 (19%)	1 (14%)	7 (10%)
Totalitarian State	2 (7%)	7 (19%)	9 (13%)
Aggressor	1 (3%)	1 (3%)	2 (3%)
Total frequency	31 (100%)	36 (100%)	67 (100%)
Percent of total representation	46%	54%	100%

Table 38

Comparison of Donga Ilbo Representation of North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Il between 2000 and 2001 (n = 63)

Kim Jong-Il represented as	2000	2001	Total
Suspicious Man	1 (6%)	4 (9%)	5 (8%)
Negotiable Partner	1 (6%)	2 (4%)	3 (5%)
Pragmatist	5 (31%)	2 (4%)	7 (11%)
Reclusive and Secretive Leader	0	2 (4%)	2 (3%)
Military Commander In Chief	8 (50%)	29 (62%)	37 (59%)
Nationalist	0	1 (2%)	1 (2%)
Great Leader	0	1 (2%)	1 (2%)
Reformist	0	2 (4%)	2 (3%)
Peacemaker	1 (6%)	0	1 (2%)
Dictator	0	3 (6%)	3 (5%)
Failed Reformer	0	1 (2%)	1 (2%)
Total frequency	16 (100%)	47 (100%)	63 (100%)
Percent of total representation	25%	75%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 39

Comparison of Donga Ilbo Representation of the U. S. between 2000 and 2001 (n = 29)

The United States			
represented as	2000	2001	Total
World's Superpower	0	8 (31%)	8 (28%)
Global Leader	0	3 (12%)	3 (10%)
Interventionist	0	4 (15%)	4 (14%)
Peacemaker	1 (33%)	0	1 (3%)
World's Policeman	0	2 (8%)	2 (7%)
Ally	1 (33%)	9 (35%)	10 (35%)
State of Ideological Conflict	1 (33%)	0	1 (3%)
Total frequency	3 (100%)	26 (100%)	29 (100%)
Percent of total representation	10%	90%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 40

*Comparison of Donga Ilbo Representation of South Korea between 2000 and 2001**(n = 51)*

South Korea represented as	2000	2001	Total
One Nation	7 (37%)	1 (3%)	8 (16%)
Peacemaker	0	1 (3%)	1 (2%)
US Ally	2 (11%)	13 (41%)	15 (29%)
Capitalist	9 (47%)	2 (6%)	10 (22%)
State of Ideological Conflict	1 (5%)	15 (47%)	16 (31%)
Total frequency	19 (100%)	32 (100%)	51 (100%)
Percent of total Representation	37%	63%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text.			

Table 41

Comparison of Donga Ilbo Representation of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung between 2000 and 2001 (n = 59)

Kim Dae Jung			
Represented as	2000	2001	Total
Nationalist	1 (4%)	0	1 (2%)
Great Leader	2 (8%)	0	2 (3%)
Leader of Democracy	10 (40%)	2 (6%)	12 (20%)
Idealist	1 (4%)	5 (15%)	6 (10%)
Reformist	6 (24%)	1 (3%)	7 (12%)
Lame-Duck	1 (4%)	9 (27%)	10 (17%)
Mediator	1 (4%)	0	1 (2%)
Peacemaker	3 (12%)	5 (15%)	8 (14%)
Dictator	0	4 (12%)	4 (7%)
Failed Reformer	0	8 (24%)	8 (14%)
Total frequency	25 (100%)	34 (100%)	59 (100%)
Percent of total Representation	42%	58%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 42

Comparison of the NYT Representation of North Korea between 2000 and 2001 (n = 97)

North Korea			
represented as	2000	2001	Total
Failed State	8 (15%)	13 (29%)	21 (22%)
World' Last Communist State	22 (42%)	4 (9%)	26 (27%)
Isolated and Reclusive State	4 (8%)	5 (11%)	9 (9%)
Trading Partner	1 (2%)	0	1 (1%)
Terrorist	1 (2%)	5 (11%)	6 (6%)
Rogue State	8 (15%)	11 (24%)	19 (20%)
Unpredictable State	1 (2%)	4 (9%)	5 (5%)
One Nation	2 (4%)	0	2 (2%)
Brotherhood	1 (2%)	0	1 (1%)
Totalitarian State	4 (8%)	3 (7%)	7 (7%)
Total frequency	52 (100%)	45 (100%)	97 (100%)
Percent of total Representation	54%	46%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 43

Comparison of the NYT representation of Kim Jong-Il between 2000 and 2001 (n = 28)

Kim Jong-Il			
Represented as	2000	2001	Total
Suspicious Man	1 (6%)	1 (8%)	2 (7%)
Terrorist	0	1 (8%)	1 (4%)
Negotiable Partner	0	3 (25%)	3 (11%)
Pragmatist	3 (19%)	1 (8%)	4 (14%)
Reclusive Leader	5 (31%)	2 (17%)	7 (25%)
Military Commander	1 (6%)	1 (8%)	2 (7%)
Dictator	6 (38%)	3 (25%)	9 (32%)
Total frequency	16 (100%)	12 (100%)	28 (100%)
Percent of total Representation	57%	43%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 44

Comparison of the NYT Representation of South Korea between 2000 and 2001 (n = 28)

South Korea			
represented as	2000	2001	Total
One Nation	2 (10%)	0	2 (7%)
Peacemaker	1 (5%)	1 (5%)	2 (7%)
US Ally	4 (20%)	4 (50%)	8 (29%)
Capitalist	11 (55%)	3 (38%)	14 (50%)
Corrupted State	2 (10%)	0	2 (7%)
Total frequency	20 (100%)	8 (100%)	28 (100%)
Percent of total Representation	71%	29%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 45

Comparison of the NYT Representation of Kim Dae Jung between 2000 and 2001
(n = 20)

Kim Dae Jung represented as	2000	2001	Total
Leader of Democracy	1 (17%)	0	1 (5%)
Idealist	0	1 (7%)	1 (5%)
Reformist	1 (17%)	1 (7%)	2 (10%)
Lame-Duck	0	5 (36%)	5 (25%)
Mediator	1 (17%)	0	1 (5%)
Peacemaker	2 (33%)	6 (43%)	8 (40%)
Failed Reformer	1 (17%)	1 (7%)	2 (10%)
Total frequency	6 (100%)	14 (100%)	20 (100%)
Percent of Representation	30%	70%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 46

Comparison of the NYT Representation of the U.S. between 2000 and 2001 (n = 28)

The United States			
represented as	2000	2001	Total
World's Superpower	4 (27%)	4 (31%)	8 (29%)
Interventionist	1 (7%)	0	1 (4%)
Peacemaker	4 (27%)	0	4 (14%)
World's Policeman	4 (27%)	6 (46%)	10 (36%)
SK Ally	2 (13%)	1 (8%)	3 (11%)
State of Ideological Conflict	0	1 (8%)	1 (4%)
Aggressor	0	1 (8%)	1 (4%)
Total frequency	15 (100%)	13 (100%)	28 (100%)
Percent of Representation	54%	46%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 47

The NYT Representation of President G. W. Bush (n = 13)

President Bush		
Represented as	2001	Percent
Pragmatist	1	8%
Interventionist	1	8%
Policeman	4	31%
Bully	2	15%
Dictator	1	8%
Novice	4	31%
Total frequency	13	100%

Table 48

*Comparison of Rodong Sinmun Representation of the U.S. between 2000 and 2001**(n = 80)*

The U.S. represented as	2000	2001	Total
Isolated and Reclusive State	0	1 (2%)	1 (1%)
Rogue State	4 (11%)	7 (16%)	11 (14%)
Imperialist	15 (43%)	6 (13%)	20 (25%)
World's Superpower	2 (6%)	2 (4 %)	4 (5%)
Interventionist	7 (20%)	11 (24%)	18 (23%)
World's Policeman	1 (3%)	1 (2%)	2 (3%)
State of Ideological Conflict	1 (3%)	0	1 (1%)
Aggressor	1 (3%)	3 (7%)	4 (5%)
Corrupted State	1 (3%)	2 (4%)	3 (4%)
Jingoist	2 (6%)	7 (16%)	9 (11%)
Chosun People's Enemy	1 (3%)	5 (11%)	6 (8%)
Total frequency	35 (100%)	45 (100%)	80 (100%)
Percent of Representation	44%	56%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 49

Rodong Sinmun Representation of President Bush in Rodong Sinmun (n =12)

President Bush		
represented as	Frequency	Percent
Interventionist	4	33%
Policeman	2	17%
Bully	4	33%
Dictator	1	8%
King of Rogue State	1	8%
Total	12	100%

Table 50

Comparison of Rodong Sinmun Representation of South Korea between 2000 and 2001
(*n* = 75)

South Korea			
Represented as	2000	2001	Total
One Nation (Minjok)	16 (43%)	15 (40%)	31 (41%)
Puppet Regime	6 (16%)	3 (8%)	9 (12%)
State of Ideological War	6 (16%)	15 (40%)	21 (28%)
Aggressor	2 (5%)	0	2 (3%)
Corrupted State	5 (14%)	2 (5%)	7 (9%)
Jingoist	2 (5%)	3 (8%)	5 (7%)
Total frequency	37 (100%)	38 (100%)	75 (100%)
Percent of total Representation	49%	51%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 51

Comparison of Rodong Sinmun Representation of President Kim Dae Jung between the Clinton and the Bush Administrations (n = 8)

Kim Dae Jung			
Represented as	2000	2001	Total
Faction (DoDang)	3 (60%)	0	3 (38%)
Traitor (YukJeok, MaeKukRo)	1 (20%)	2 (67%)	3 (38%)
Reformist	1 (20%)	0	1 (13%)
Dictator	0	1 (33%)	1 (13%)
Total frequency	5 (100%)	3 (100%)	8 (100%)
Percent of total Representation	63%	37%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 52

Comparison of Rodong Sinmun Representation of North Korea between the Clinton and the Bush Administration (n = 65)

North Korea			
Represented as	2000	2001	Total
One Nation (MinJok)	14 (42%)	18 (56%)	32 (49%)
Brotherhood (DongPo)	0	1 (3%)	1 (2%)
Peacemaker	6 (18%)	3 (9%)	9 (14%)
Strong Independent State	13 (39%)	10 (31%)	23 (35%)
Total frequency	33 (100%)	32 (100%)	65 (100%)
Percent of total Representation	51%	49%	100%
Significance for relation reported in text			

Table 53

Rodong Sinmun Representation of Kim Jong-Il during 2000 and 2001 (n = 33)

Kim Jong-Il represented as	Frequency	Percent
Military Commander in Chief	1	3%
Nationalist	15	46%
Great Leader	15	46%
Peacemaker	2	6%
Total	33	100%

Table 54

Primary Cause of Political Challenge to Kim Dae Jung Government and its Impact on Politics Reflected in Donga Ilbo between 2000 and 2001 (N = 276)

Cause of Challenge	Frequency	Impact on Politics	Frequency
Ideological conflicts	26	Replacement of cabinet Members	13
KDJ governance	25	Review of foreign policy	10
US foreign policy	19	Tension between North And South Korea	9
DJ's radical movement toward North Korea	17	Review of domestic policy	1
Diplomatic strategy	16		
North Korea's unfaithful response	15		
Low threshold of national Security	12		
Total	130	Total	33

Table 55

Primary Cause of Political Challenge to the U.S. Policy over the Korean Peninsula and its Impact on Politics Reflected in the NYT during the years 2000 and 2001

<u>Cause of Challenge</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Impact on Politics</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
<u>Year 2000</u>			
Diplomatic strategy	6	Cancellation of visit to North Korea	1
North Korea's suspicious missile production	3		
Arms race	2		
<u>Year 2001</u>			
Inconsistency of US policy	10	Resume of diplomatic talk with North Korea	2
Interruption of Détente mood	6	Tension between the U.S. and South Korea	1
Overestimation of North Korean threat	4		
Building tension in East-Asian region	8		
Negative effect on US Foreign policy power	1		

Table 56

*Primary Cause of Political Challenge to North Korea and its Impact on Politics
Reflected in Rodong Sinmun during the years 2000 and 2001*

Cause of Challenge	Frequency	Impact on Politics	Frequency
US military threat	18		
US assertion of North Korean threat	7		
South Korean assertion of North Korean threat	2		
US intervention in inter-Korean affairs	2		
Total	29	Total	0

Appendix A: Coding Protocol for the Media Coverage of Foreign Policy and International Relations

This news story protocol is aimed at assessing balance in the news media coverage of foreign policies and international relations. It examines 1) thematic issues of a nation's foreign policy between 2000 and 2001, 2) news sources, 3) news sources' opinion direction in accordance with a nation's foreign policy, 4) media representation of nations and leaders, and 5) primary cause of political challenge and its impact on politics. The following definitions are important in proper coding.

1. *Thematic issue*: It is a topic of news covered and /or critically analyzed by reporters and/or editors. It also accounts for a key issue in news content. A theme, as a preoccupying conception, usually runs throughout texts around an initiating topic.
2. *Opinion direction*: It is assigned by the degree of consistency of a news source's opinion toward a nation's foreign policy. A nation's foreign policy toward each others nation is established based on a President's frame of reference, **upon which coders judge the direction of a news source's opinion about a thematic issue.**
3. *Media representation of nations and leaders*: Representation is highly crystallized version of schemata which links to prescriptive readings. It is a collected image of news sources' attitude toward nations and leaders. In order to confirm that coders make an appropriate choice, the study requests coders to write a cue word found in a news story if different from examples.
4. *Primary cause of political challenge and its impact on politics*: In often cases the primary cause of political challenge is identified with the theme that is inconsistent with a nation's foreign policy. However, the study requires coders to identify the challenge particularly with news sources' quotes and/or editor's comments. The impact of political challenge consists of 1) the congressional hearing or debate on a certain aspect of foreign policy, 2) the administration's effort to reduce its responsibility in its failure of foreign policy, and/or 3) the lower public approval rate of presidency.

Appendix B: President's Frame of Reference in a Nation's Foreign Policy

President William Clinton's policy toward the Korean peninsula

1. *The U.S. perception of North Korea:* North Korea's threatening position is due to its security fear. (*defensive realism*)
2. *Engagement policy* is effective to build a sense of trust with North Korea.
3. North Korea's development and export of missile and WMD would be prevented through *political and economic normalization*.
4. The U.S. improves *bilateral diplomatic ties* with North Korea.
5. The U.S. promotes the *Four Party Talks* among the U.S., China, South Korea, and North Korea to negotiate peace talks.
6. The U.S. supports the South Korean government's *Sunshine* policy.
7. The U.S. abides by *the Agreed Framework of 1994* by providing the *quid pro quo*.
8. The U.S. enhances *collective defense* with South Korea and Japan for the purpose of deterrence.
9. The U.S. will take a *punitive action* in conjunction with the North Korea's aggression.
10. On July 23, 1999, President Clinton signed into law H.R. 4, the "National Missile Defense Act of 1999," stating that it is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective NMD system.
11. The U.S. has ratified the START II Treaty (ABM treaty).

President George W. Bush's policy toward the Korean peninsula

1. *The U.S. perception of North Korea*: North Korea is an aggressive expansionist state that seeks to develop WMDs and threatens world peace. Kim Jong-Il of North is suspicious and secretive. (*offensive realism*)
2. *The Agreed Framework of 1994* should be reviewed for its validity. The U.S. needs a comprehensive review of its North Korean policy because the policy is fragmented.
3. The *strong U.S. military presence* is central to regain the diplomatic initiative and to protect allied interests.
4. *Strict reciprocity and verification* are necessary to test Pyongyang's intention.
5. The U.S. enhances *collective defense* with South Korea and Japan.
6. The U.S. diplomatic effort toward North Korea will be held within the form of *Four Party talks*.

President Kim Dae Jung's *Sunshine* policy

1. *South Korea's perception of North Korea*: North Korea will not be collapsed in the near future. Deterrence and containment was not effective to change the nature of totalitarian regime. The inter-Korean relations should be handled with engagement policy.
2. South Korea will not attempt to absorb North Korea. (*no unification by absorption*)
3. South Korea enhances the *inter-Korean dialogue* through summit meetings and the exchange of high-level envoys in order to manage the peace on the Korean peninsula.
4. Politics and business will be separated.
5. South Korea encourages the *economic cooperation* with North Korea. *Flexible reciprocity* is applied to the economic cooperation.
6. *Humanitarian aid* and *agricultural aid* are provided to relieve the North's food crisis.
7. *Family reunions* are encouraged.
8. South Korea will maintain the *collective defense* with the U.S.
9. South Korea will take the role as a mediator in the process of political and economic normalization between the U.S. and North Korea.

Kim Jong-Il's policy toward the U.S. and South Korea

1. *Perception of the U.S. and South Korea*: The U.S. is the strongest imperialist force, imposing immanent threat to North Korea. South Korea is the U.S. puppet regime.
2. North Korea pursues a peace agreement through *bilateral negotiations* with the U.S. (political and economic normalization)
3. North Korea disagrees *Four (Six) Party Talks* because the participating nations will take their interests on the peninsula into consideration rather than the Korea's interests. The concept of *Four (Six) Party Talks* is itself foreign intervention and the infringement of sovereignty.
4. Juche ideology claims that each nation has right to decide its future. Therefore, the problem on the Korean peninsula should be solved without foreign interference.
5. The U.S. should be off the Korean peninsula.
6. North Korea will make a diplomatic relationship with Western countries as well as South Korea and Japan on the basis of pragmatism. (*post-Cold War policy*).
7. USNMD is a symbol of imperialism and belligerent ambition because the U.S. attempts to develop NMD despite Russian and Chinese opposition.
8. *Confederation* is the most ideal form of government for a future unified Korea. It is based on Unification Magna Carta, founded by Kim Il Sung.
9. North Korea accepts the *inter-Korean dialogue* and *economic cooperation* in the frame of *familism*. (*flexible reciprocity*)
10. North Korea should *emancipate* South Koreans from U.S. oppression through the international worker's revolution.
11. The U.S. mobilization of multinational army to invade other nation (e.g., US preemptive attack and insurgence) is regarded as *international terrorism*.
12. Human rights refers to the basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled. It is believed that *human rights can be protected by a nation's sovereignty*. Therefore, Western interventionism is understood as a broader hegemonic project.
13. *Globalization* is an economic trend against national interests.

Appendix C: Coding Sheet

The Media-Government Relations: Comparative Analysis of the United States,
South Korea and North Korea's Media Coverage of Foreign Policy

I. General Information

Name of Coder _____

Date Coded _____

Story Number _____

v1. Story Identification

1. *The New York Times*
2. *DongA Ilbo*
3. *RoDong Sinmun*

v2. Story Publication Date: (e.g., May 3, 2001 = 050301)

v3. Type of News

1. News Story (straight news, features, analytical news)
2. Editorial

II. Thematic Issue Categories

Political Relationship

v4. SK-NK Relations (unification talks, summit meeting, high-level talks)

v5. US-NK Relations (diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and North Korea)

v6. North Korea's diplomatic relations with other countries except the U.S. and South Korea (e.g., China, Russia and Japan)

v7. US-SK Relations

Defense

v8. US Defense

- 8-1. US NMD
- 8-2. US presence and military exercise in east-Asian region
- 8-3. US concerns over nuclear and missile proliferation
- 8-4. 1972 ABM treaty

v9. North Korean Defense

- 9-1. North Korea's self-defense
- 9-2. NK nuclear and missile threats
- 9-3. The 1994 Agreed Framework

v10. South Korean Defense

- 10-1. SK military alliance with the U.S.
- 10-2. Clash between South and North Korea

Economic Relationship

v11. Economic cooperation between South and North Korea

- 11-1. Economic reconstruction
- 11-2. Business opportunity for South Korea
- 11-3. Humanitarian aid

v12. Economic normalization between North Korea and the U.S.

- 12-1. Economic sanctions
- 12-2. Business opportunity for the United States

v13. Economic situation

- 13-1. South Korean social, cultural and economic situation
- 13-2. North Korean social, cultural and economic situation
- 13-3. US social, cultural and economic situation

Diplomatic Strategy

v14. Strategy (engagement policy, appeasement, reciprocity, verification)

v15. Human Rights Issue (POW, political refugee, US war crime)

v16. Family Reunion

v17. NK Strategy (a theme of confusion, tit-for-tat approach)

Ideologyv18. *Juche* Ideology (criticism of capitalism and imperialism)

v19. Type of Nation (confederation, one nation and two states)

v20. Unification as an extension of *Juche* ideology

v21. Ideological Conflicts (the conservatives vs. the progressives, National Security Law, anti-Americanism)

v22. Crisis of Capitalism

v23. US Global Leadership (anti-communism, anti-terrorism)

Leadership

v24. Kim Dae Jung's governance

v25. Kim Jong-Il's governance

v26. Bill Clinton's governance

v27. George W. Bush's governance

III. News Source Categories and Opinion Direction

Which news source do you find in this news story? Is a news source's opinion consistent with a nation's foreign policy? (e.g., Consistent = 1, Neutral = 0, Inconsistent = -1)

The New York Times News Sources

Number of consistent, neutral, inconsistent and total

v28. President Bill Clinton _____

v29. President George W. Bush _____

v30. State Department _____

v31. Defense Department _____

v32. Other Government Officials _____

v33. Member of Congress or Senate (Republican) _____

v34. Member of Congress or Senate (Democrats) _____

v35. Think-Tanks _____

v36. Non-government Activist Groups _____

v37. General Public _____

v38. South Korean Government _____

v39. South Korean Non-government Sources (experts, institutions) _____

v40. North Korean Government _____

v41. Other Foreign Government _____

v42. Other Foreign Non-government Sources (e.g., U.N.) _____

v43. NYT Reporters and Foreign Correspondents _____

- v44. News Agencies _____
- v45. South Korean Media _____
- v46. North Korean Media _____
- v47. Other Foreign Media _____
- v48. Public Opinion Survey _____
- v49. Anonymous Attribution (government related) _____
- v50. Anonymous Attribution (non-government related) _____

Total number of source whose opinion is consistent _____

Total number of source whose opinion is inconsistent _____

Total number of source whose opinion is neutral _____

Total number of source _____

Total opinion direction [(sum of opinion/total number of source) x 10] = _____

DongA Ilbo News Sources

Number of consistent, neutral, inconsistent and total

- v51. President Kim Dae-Jung _____
- v52. Government Officials _____
- v53. Member of Parliament (Millennium Democratic Party) _____
- v54. Member of Parliament (Jamin Party) _____
- v55. Member of Parliament (Grand National Party) _____
- v56. Intellectuals _____
- v57. Non-government Institutions and Activist Groups _____
- v58. General Public _____
- v59. North Korean Government Officials _____
- v60. US Government Sources (administration) _____
- v61. US Non-government Sources (think-tanks, intellectuals) _____
- v62. Foreign Government Sources _____
- v63. Foreign non-government Sources (experts, institutions) _____
- v64. *DongA Ilbo* Reporters and Foreign Correspondents _____

- v65. News Agencies _____
- v66. North Korean Media _____
- v67. US Media _____
- v68. Other Foreign Media _____
- v69. Public Opinion Survey _____
- v70. Anonymous Attribution (government related) _____
- v71. Anonymous Attribution (non-government related) _____

Total number of source whose opinion is consistent _____

Total number of source whose opinion is inconsistent _____

Total number of source whose opinion is neutral _____

Total number of source _____

Total opinion direction [(sum of opinion/total number of source) x 10] = _____

RoDong Sinmun News Sources

Number of consistent, neutral, inconsistent and total

- v72. Kim Il Sung _____
- v73. Kim Jong-Il _____
- v74. Government Officials _____
- v75. Korean Central News Agency (KNCA) _____
- v76. *Rodong Sinmun* Reporters _____
- v77. NK non-government sources _____
- v78. General Public _____
- v79. South Korean Government Officials _____
- v80. South Korean Non-government Sources _____
- v81. US Government Officials _____
- v82. US Non-government Sources _____
- v83. Foreign Government Sources _____
- v84. Foreign Non-government Sources _____
- v85. South Korean Media _____

v86. US Media _____

v87. Other Foreign Media and News agencies _____

v88. Anonymous attribution (government related) _____

v89. Anonymous attribution (non-government related) _____

Total number of source whose opinion is consistent _____

Total number of source whose opinion is inconsistent _____

Total number of source whose opinion is neutral _____

Total number of source _____

Total opinion direction [(sum of opinion/total number of source) x 10] = _____

IV. Primary Cause of Political Challenge and its Impact on Foreign Policy

Choose an appropriate number from following examples, if any.

v90. Primary cause of *DongA Ilbo* news sources' opposition (political challenge) to the *Sunshine* policy, if any

1. Diplomatic strategy (appeasement, flexible reciprocity, lost of diplomatic initiative)
2. President Kim's radical movement toward North Korea (ill-preparation of *Sunshine* policy, lack of consideration on US policy over North Korea)
3. North Korea's unfaithful response to the *Sunshine* policy
4. President Kim's governance (transparency, domestic reforms)
5. Internal ideological conflict (absence of bipartisan consensus, regionalism)
6. Low threshold of national security

v91. Impact of political challenge over South Korea's *Sunshine* policy, if any.

1. Replacement of cabinet members
2. Review of the *Sunshine* policy
3. Review of domestic policy
4. Lower approval rate on Kim's presidency
5. Tension between South Korea and the U.S.

v92. Primary cause of *NYT* News Sources' opposition (political challenge) to the Clinton administration's engagement policy toward the Korean peninsula, if any

1. No verification of North Korea's abiding in the Agreed Framework 1994
 2. North Korea's suspicious missile production
 3. Humanitarian issues in North Korea
 4. Appeasement diplomatic strategy toward North Korea
 5. Unrealistic strategy
 6. Arouse arms race
- v93. Impact of political challenge over the Clinton's engagement policy toward the Korean peninsula, if any
1. Allocation of defense budget to NMD program
 2. Review of ABM agreement (summit meeting with Russia)
 3. Defer the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea
 4. Cancellation of Clinton's visit to North Korea
 5. Lower approval rate of Clinton's presidency
 6. Tension between the U.S. and South Korea
- v94. Primary cause of *NYT* News Sources' opposition (political challenge) to the Bush administration's hard-line policy toward the Korean peninsula, if any
1. Interruption of détente mood in the Korean peninsula
 2. No proof of North Korea's breaking of the Agreed Framework 1994
 3. Overestimation of North Korean missile threats
 4. Inconsistency of U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea
 5. Building a tension between the U.S. and South Korea
 6. Building a tension in east-Asian region
 7. weaken US power over international affairs
 8. Arouse arms race
 9. Unrealistic
- v95. Impact of political challenge over the Bush administration's hard-line policy toward the Korean peninsula, if any
1. Review of hard-line policy
 2. Lower approval rate of Bush's presidency
 3. Resume of diplomatic talks with North Korea
- v96. Primary cause of *Rodong Sinmun* news source's opposition to Kim Jong-Il's foreign policy, if any.
1. US intervention in inter-Korean affairs
 2. US military threats

3. Inconsistency of US policy over NK
4. US assertion of NK threat
5. SK assertion of NK threat

V. Media Representation of Nations and Leaders

Choose an appropriate number from following examples and write an associated cue word that you can find from a news story, if any.

v97. How is North Korea portrayed in this story? _____ , _____

v98. How is the U.S. portrayed in this story? _____ , _____

v99. How is South Korea portrayed in this story? _____ , _____

Media Representation of Nations

1. Failed state (economic catastrophe)
2. World's last communist (Stalinist) country
3. Isolated and reclusive state
4. Trading partner
5. Terrorist
6. Rogue state (producing and selling nuclear and missile technology)(강패국가)
7. Unpredictable state
8. One nation (ethnic community, 민족)
9. Brotherhood (동포)
10. Puppet regime (광대)
11. Imperialist (미제)
12. World's super power
13. Global leader
14. Interventionist (간섭)
15. Peace-maker
16. World policeman (세계경찰)
17. Ally (우방)
18. Capitalist
19. Totalitarian state
20. State of ideological war
21. Aggressor (침략자)
22. Corrupted state
23. Jingoist (전쟁광)
24. Chosun people's Enemy (민족의 원수)
25. Strong independent state (강성대국)

- v100. How is Kim Jong-Il portrayed in this story? _____ , _____
- v101. How is President Kim Dae-Jung portrayed in this story? _____ , _____
- v102. How is President Clinton portrayed in this story? _____ , _____
- v103. How is President Bush portrayed in this story? _____ , _____

Media Representation of Leaders

1. Suspicious man
2. Terrorist
3. Negotiable partner
4. Pragmatist
5. Reclusive and secretive leader
6. Military commander in chief
7. Evil
8. Nationalist
9. Faction (DoDang)
10. Traitor (YukJeok, MaeKukRo)
11. Great Leader
12. Leader of democracy
13. Idealist
14. Reformist
15. Lame-Duck president
16. US puppet (Stooges of reactionary)
17. Mediator
18. Peace-maker
19. Interventionist
20. Policeman (cop)
21. Bully
22. Dictator
23. Novice
24. failed reformer
25. philosopher

CURRICULUM VITA

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EDUCATION

- Ph.D. 2007 Rutgers University, School of Communication, Information, and Library Studies, New Brunswick, NJ
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- 1978-1980 Producer, Christian Broadcasting Station, Seoul, Korea