THE PLATONIC RHETOR IN THE SECOND SOPHISTIC

by

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This dissertation looks at four authors (all "unqualified Second Sophists") whose literary activity covers the same period in the latter half of the second century: Lucian of Samosata, Maximus of Tyre, Publius Aelius Aristides of Mysia, and Lucius Apuleius of Madaura. Though born and in general operating at the geographic periphery of the Greco-Roman world, these second-century authors wrote with profoundly acculturated voices. At the same time, there was great concern in their work to emulate the themes and language of Classical Greece, and thereby add their names to the long tradition of Greek thought. The friction between various cultural trends such as the centripetal force of Rome, the movement of the Sophists around the East, and the importance of the tradition of fifth- and fourth-century Greek letters adds a particular force to their treatment of Plato. For these authors hailing from Asia and Africa, one strategy of appealing to past Hellenic literary glory was to invoke Plato and the tradition of Platonism. This dissertation aims to describe the backbone of the Middle Platonic tradition in order to identify the significant influence Plato had on nearly all the literature from the Second Sophistic.
Dedication and Acknowledgements

This dissertation is dedicated to Laura L. Relovsky.

I would like to thank Laura for reading, editing, correcting, and discussing this work with me from its start to its completion. Laura provided boundless support, assistance, and patience during this project. This study exists in large part because of her.

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1. General Introduction

It has long been assumed that Plato had a particular hold and impact on authors during the second century of our era, but this impression has rarely been given any specific treatment. Studies of the so-called Second Sophistic tend to avoid isolating the philosophical, particularly Platonic, underpinnings of the literary texts of the first three centuries of the Common Era.¹ In addition, studies of Platonism leapt from the decline of the Academic tradition, identified (at the latest) with Plutarch, to the Neoplatonism of Plotinus in the mid-third century, overlooking the literary continuity that connects them.²

In this study, I aim to show that Plato's dialogues had not just a strong philosophical impact, but also a fundamental literary, thematic, and ideological influence on some of the most important prose writers in this period.

This dissertation looks at four authors whose literary activity covers the same period in the latter half of the second century: Lucianus (Lucian) of Samosata, Maximus of Tyre, Publius Aelius Aristides of Mysia, and Lucius Apuleius of Madaura. Though born and in general operating at the geographic periphery of the Greco-Roman world, these second-century authors wrote with profoundly acculturated voices. At the same time, there was great concern in their work to emulate the themes and language of Classical Greece, and thereby add their names to the long tradition of Greek thought. The

¹ Exceptions include de Lacy 1974, Whittaker 1987, and Bowersock 2002.
² This trend has changed since Dillon 1977. Of note is the second series of volumes of the *ANRW* (1987-1994, 2.36.1-7) that focus on philosophy in the Roman Empire: e.g., Brisson and Patillon 1994 on "Longinus Platonicus," and Whittaker 1987, which focuses on Platonic philosophy in the early centuries of the Empire.
friction between various cultural trends such as the centripetal force of Rome, the movement of the Sophists around the East, and the importance of the tradition of fifth- and fourth-century Greek letters adds a particular force to their treatment of Plato. For these authors hailing from Asia and Africa, one strategy of appealing to past Hellenic literary glory was to invoke Plato and the tradition of Platonism.

Of importance to this work is the relationship philosophical concerns had with the extant examples of literature from the Second Sophistic. Equally important is the correlation between the work of these authors and scholastic Platonism in the first three centuries CE. For example, the two approaches to Platonism found in Maximus and Apuleius, one exegetical and one descriptive, both reflect the Platonic scholasticism of the time, and have an ideological influence on Neoplatonism in the third century. These approaches are exemplary of the disparate status of Platonism in the Second Sophistic, a development that invited systematizing. In addition, the rhetorical techniques we find in these three authors, coupled as they are with Platonic and generally philosophical themes, have an important influence on the emerging Christian polemics in these centuries.3 Both the Neoplatonism and the Christian apologetics of the third century CE would find a home in the Byzantine church in the next century and long afterward.

The literary and social impact of the literature of the Second Sophistic has gained much attention in the last four decades, while the philosophical influences, particularly those of Plato's dialogues, in relation to the literary and rhetorical output of the era have

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remained neglected. This dissertation only aims to describe the backbone of the latter Platonic tradition, whereas individual studies are still wanting to identify the significant influence Plato had on nearly all the literature from the Second Sophistic.

2. Rationale for the Present Work

Each of the authors discussed in this work has been chosen for his different approach to Plato and his dialogues. Lucian, the razor-witted satirist, is our authority for stereotypes and criticisms about contemporary philosophical schools, including Platonism and the Academy. His use of Plato's dialogues has been the subject of recent study, and shows a connection that has long been assumed. Lucian's idiosyncratic interpretations of Plato's dialogues, which are often at variance with conventional interpretations, certainly demand closer consideration.

Maximus of Tyre, referred to in the best manuscript of his work as "Πλατωνικός," is often considered either an "eclectic" (an epithet routinely leveled against many Middle Platonists), or a "sophist," a label that only refers to his oratorical techniques and does not account for the philosophical discussions contained in his work.

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4 E.g., see Clay 1992.
5 E.g., Wälchli 2003. Wälchli's project was to assess the (possible) dependence of Lucian's dialogue Lovers of Lies on Plutarch's Socrates' Sign, as well as their shared debt to Plato's Phaedo. For more on Wälchli, see Lamberton's 2004 review.
6 E.g., see Anderson 1976:184 for Plato in Lucian.
His forty-one Διαλέξεις are exemplary representatives of the popular Platonism prevalent in literary circles in the second century.8

Aristides is a key figure for understanding how Plato's name and ideas could serve as themes for rhetorical orations during the Second Sophistic, a development that might well have greatly discomfited the fourth-century philosopher. The Πρὸς Πλάτωνα περὶ ῥητορικῆς of Aristides is included as an example of a unique type of Platonic work that directly confronts Plato and his original arguments against rhetoric while at the same time considering contemporary Platonism. In his Πρὸς Καπίτωνα (To Capito), Aristides responds to a member of the Platonist school of Gaius at Pergamum in his own defense against the charge of slandering Plato.

Finally, in the Epilogue, I sketch some of the relevant work that has been done on Apuleius of Madaura. Along with Albinus, Apuleius was for a time considered a pillar of the "school of Gaius."9 His De Platone et eius dogmate continued to be a sourcebook for Platonism in the second century, as well as for the state of the "Plato myth" at that time.10 Apuleius has received more attention as a sophist than as an author fundamentally influenced by Plato.11

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8 By "popular Platonism," I mean any open lecture or performance that focuses mainly on Platonic themes given outside the Academy. See, for example, Taylor 1924.
9 For such approaches to the school of Gaius, see Sinko 1905 and Witt 1936.
10 Interest in the legend and mythology of Socrates in the second century CE was ubiquitous. Also of interest was the life of Plato, reflecting the doxographical tradition in which Plutarch was an important participant. Diogenes Laertius, Olympiodorus, and Porphyry all have alternative versions of this mythology. For discussion of the Plato legend and myth, see Boas 1948 and Riginos 1976.
11 See especially Harrison 2000.
As it so happens, alongside their role in the resurgence of interest in Plato in the second century, all of these authors influenced the philosophical and pseudo-philosophical discourse of their day. In addition, they set the stage not only for Plotinus and his reorganized Neoplatonism, but also for the emerging Christian sophists who were developing their craft by the early third century.

3. Principle Questions

In the era between Plutarch and Plotinus, our evidence for the existence of Academic work diminishes drastically. Identifying the particular Platonic elements these authors inherited and then either concretized or reacted against is an essential component of understanding the state of Platonism in the second century. Such an exploration will also help to understand how Plato was viewed by those not directly associated with the Academy, such as it was at the time. A further task is to understand why these authors, who are not Academic Platonists in the formal sense, began writing and declaiming in Atticized Greek about Plato and Platonism in the mid-Roman Empire. A final question is why, between Plutarch's pseudo-orthodox Platonism and Plotinus' revitalized Neoplatonism, neither of which focuses extensively on the debate between rhetoric and philosophy, Plato's battle on this ground is waged with such vehemence at this historical moment.12

12 Though not a point of focus, the issue of Plato's judgment of rhetoric was apparently of some interest in Neoplatonism. The lost περὶ ρητορικῆς of Porphyry was, according to the 11th c. Suda, apparently a response to Aristides' Πρὸς Πλάτωνα περὶ ρητορικῆς. See Behr 1968b for the exchange between Porphyry and Aristides.
In a broader context, then, I am interested in understanding how authors in the second century understood and made use of Platonic doctrine. The authors I shall be discussing, at least some of the time, seem interested in understanding what Plato meant, and were not just posing vis-à-vis the topical issues that preoccupied them. Yet, just as often they wanted to tap into the popular Platonic themes of the day. Some of the orators in the Second Sophistic began to see philosophy as a way to distinguish themselves from their competitors. Trying to distinguish between posturing and sincerity, then, quickly becomes a knotty problem in the task of understanding the use of philosophy in the second century.

One theme connecting these three authors is a moral one: the general disgust at the state of philosophy in their time. This criticism focuses both on the lack of consistency between words and deeds of the purported philosophers around them, and on how the purely theoretical interests of philosophy worked to the detriment of any practical applications to life. Further, the same or similar criticisms are often leveled at practicing sophists. It is important that the targets of these authors' criticisms are particular individuals as well as the states of philosophy and sophistry themselves. None of the authors I discuss pronounces on these subjects simpliciter, a fact that points toward an alternative explanation of the ubiquitous use of Plato as a stalking horse by some of the most eloquent orators in the Second Sophistic.

4. The Second Sophistic

In this work, ἡ δεύτερα σοφιστική, "the Second Sophistic," so named by Philostratus in his Vitae Sophistrarum (VS), refers to a historical time-period ranging from
50-250 CE. This use is a conscious misapplication of the term (though in fact common). In the VS, the Second Sophistic "sketched the types of poor men and rich, of princes and tyrants, and handled in speeches arguments for which history leads the way." Philostratus applies the term ἡ δεύτερα σοφιστική, which, he writes, was invented by the fourth-century Athenian orator Aeschines, specifically to a style of rhetorical performance. Although his focus is the first three centuries CE of the Greco-Roman world, the term is actually not used by Philostratus to denote a historical period. Modern studies of the subject treat the Second Sophistic, occasionally without specification, as a historical period, a cultural phenomenon, a social movement, or indeed a style of oratory. All three of the authors I treat in this work are, in various places in modern scholarship, referred to as "sophists"--often because of assumptions about their primary interest in the rhetorical style as defined by Philostratus--and are therefore considered part of the Second Sophistic as described in the VS.

Problems of classification, however, become immediately apparent even in Philostratus. According to him, sophistic rhetoric was in fact originally philosophical

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13 For the over-use of Philostratus' definition of "second sophistic," see Brunt 1994.
14 τούς πένητας ὑπετυπώσατο καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους καὶ τοὺς ἀριστέας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους καὶ τὰς ἐς ὅνομα ὑποθέσεις, ἐφ᾽ ᾗς ἡ ἱστορία ἀγει, VS 481. Philostratus is specifically referring to "exercises" (meletai).
15 The term σοφιστική (sc. τέχνη) seems to have been coined by Plato in the Gorgias (465c), where it is the inferior correlate to legislation (νομοθετικήν); the term is used in the Sophist (223b) to refer to "the part of the appropriative (οἰκειωτικής), coercive, hunting art which hunts animals, land animals, tame animals, man, privately, for pay, is paid in cash, claims to give education, and is a hunt after rich and promising youths."
rhetoric (φιλοσοφούσαν [sc. ῥήτορικήν]). In his dedication of the work to (Antony) Gordian I, Philostratus states in the first words that he has written "in two books, an account of certain men who, though they pursue philosophy, ranked as sophists (τοὺς φιλοσοφήσαντας ἐν δόξῃ τοὺς σοφιστεύσαι), and also of the sophists properly so-called." He writes of the same ambiguity as existing in previous authors, those who used the title "sophist" not only of orators (ῥήτορες) whose surpassing eloquence won them a brilliant reputation, but also "of philosophers who expounded their theories with ease and fluency" (ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς ξύν εὐροίας ἔρμηνεύοντας, 484). He begins his work with the second category: philosophers who were especially fluent. These two types of intellectuals are conflated by Philostratus into the title σοφισταί, a label showing a similar ambiguity or range that we find in Plato's time. For example, Philostratus begins the biographical list of sophists with the fourth-century BCE mathematician Eudoxus of Cnidus, who studied, at least for a short time, at Plato's Academy. Because of these ambiguities, it is tempting to leave the distinction between the two types of intellectual blurred.

Stanton 1973 has explored some of the problems of classifying sophists and philosophers. Philostratus mentions Dio of Prusa (c. 40-c. 120 CE) in the VS as if a sophist but confesses his doubts about the label, "such was his excellence in all departments" (VS 486). Dio's style "had an echo of Demosthenes and Plato" (βλέπων δὲ

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17 Τὴν ἀρχαίαν σοφιστικὴν ῥήτορικὴν ἤγειόθαι χρὴ φιλοσοφοῦσαν, VS 480.
18 VS 479; Philostratus ends this section of the VS with Favorinus, who was also well versed in Plato (according to Gellius Noctes Atticae (NA) 2.5), writing, "This is all I have to say about the men who, though the pursued philosophy, had the reputation of sophists," VS 492.
πρὸς τὴν Δημοσθένους ἡχῶ καὶ Πλάτωνος), that is, those classical authors who had by this point become the very archetypes of their respective genres, because he straddled successfully both the oratorical and philosophical styles. The eleventh-century Suda calls him both a "philosopher" and "sophist,"19 though Dio himself ostensibly wished to distance himself from contemporary sophists (e.g., *Orationes* 33.4).20 Similarly, Plutarch, though he had written epideictic works during what has been referred to as his "rhetorical period" (Stanton 1973:353), is left out of the VS entirely. Plutarch's use of "sophist" and related terms varies from neutral to deeply critical.21 He does not make a clear distinction between *rhetores* and sophists, but the former are also criticized, as are οἱ ῥητορικοὶ σοφισταί (Ibid. 352).

Bowersock 2002 discusses the development in the Second Sophistic of the philosopher as performative artist. Philosophers for the first time had begun to take the stage. This observation strives for a more distinct delineation between sophist and philosopher than had been previously supposed.22 He notes that philosophers (like

19 Δίων, ὁ Πασικράτους, Προυσαεύς, σοφιστής καὶ φιλόσοφος, ὃν Χρυσόστομον ἐκάλεσαν.
20 A great many of the negative comments about sophists by authors in the Second Sophistic, as well as instances of self-promotion as a philosopher, are treated as posturing in a very competitive field; for example, see Bowersock 2002. However, it is not impossible to deny that an author is a sophist while he, at the same time, writes and performs sophistic speeches.
21 Plutarch wrote a treatise criticizing sophists (no. 219 in the Lamprias catalogue: Πρὸς τοὺς διὰ τὸ ῥητορεύειν μὴ φιλοσοφούντας).
22 Bowersock 1969 seems to take a cue from Philostratus, and conflates the two designations "philosopher" and "sophist" for this era. He calls Aristides a "sophist" in his numerous discussions of him, though the author attempted to distance himself from the label; Dio and Plutarch are "philosophers" and "men of letters." Bowersock notes that
Maximus and Apuleius) are no longer unkempt and private as they once were, but are now impressive in appearance and quite public. Platonists, in fact, were more drawn to the stage than other schools at the time: the Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics seemed "allergic" to public spectacle (Bowersock 2002:169), and this fact is one reason for the present study. During the first three centuries of the Common Era, we see for the first time a type of Platonic rhetor.

In the Second Sophistic, "the two activities [of philosophy and sophistic display] were inextricably meshed because public performance was integral to both" (Bowersock 2002:164). However, it is not clear that the "movement from sophistic practice to philosophy was movement in the wrong direction" (Ibid.). It is true that "cross-over" sophists did not pull away from public view for the sake of philosophy, but not every sophist who worked to gain the name "philosopher" was a mere dilettante. A foray into the new development of philosophical performance took, in many cases, a good deal of

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23 "Philosophers belonged to a closed confraternity, it seems, whereas sophists belonged to the public," Bowersock 2002:162.
24 There is still a difference between the types in that, despite the conspicuous appearance of philosophers at this time, scholastic philosophers must still leave society to be able to comment upon it; see Hahn 1989 for more discussion. The lack of charging fees by less qualified "philosophers" is another difference.
25 The first use of "Platonic rhetor" is in Pépin 1981:9, where the term is used exclusively to describe Maximus of Tyre. In Deer 1994:25, the term is used of the Platonic rhetor, i.e., the orator described in Plato's dialogues, as opposed to the Aristotelian rhetor. An addition to the scholarship of the Second Sophistic is to extend this term to include other authors in the era who confront Plato or Platonic themes in their work.
26 This statement is applied to the once prevalent view that Dio, for example, had distinct sophistic and philosophical phases in his career. Bowersock does seem to imply that to practice philosophy as a sophist in the second century does take more than merely changing one's appearance.
work. Certainly, there is a range of ingenuity in the work produced. Apuleius' *De Platone et eius dogmate* is focused on the presentation of information rather than on persuasion or creative exegesis, while Maximus' forty-one *Διαλέχεις* are varied and original studies engaging in Platonic thought that leave any technical parsing to professionals.\(^\text{27}\) Clearly, a reputation as a philosopher was desirable in the Second Century, and is likely to have been the reason for many of "philosophical turns" we hear about during this time.\(^\text{28}\)

Though he is a major source for the lives and careers of the second sophists, it may be argued that I am allowing Philostratus a level of subtlety regarding labels that his work does not warrant. There is other evidence for the importance of such distinctions besides the *VS*, both epigraphical and legal.\(^\text{29}\) For example, it is clear that while a philosopher may achieve the title of "sophist," the reverse does not seem to happen (Bowersock 2002:161).

The terms ῥήτωρ/rhetor, σοφιστής/sophistes, and φιλόσοφος/philosophus are all coexistent in the second century. It seems that any attempt to disentangle their definitions has so far not yielded great reward, and the attempt for some absolute and distinct denotations would not solve any particular problem (if it is possible at all). It is advantageous, however, to acknowledge the range of meanings employed by each author. As a result, the specific designation and importance of the moniker "philosopher"

\(^{27}\) As stated, for example, in *Dialexis* 1.8.

\(^{28}\) Some of the most famous "philosophical conversions" we hear about are those of Lucian, Dio, and Favorinus.

\(^{29}\) For example, the privilege of μὴ κρίνειν, not serving on a jury, was extended to ῥήτορες, γραμματικοί, ἰατροί, and φιλόσοφοι, *Digest* 27.1.8; see especially Bowersock 1969: 30-42 and Swain 1996:268.
eloquent or not) as well as "philosophical rhetoric" (as perhaps taken from Plato's *Phaedrus*), has not yet garnered the emphasis it should in modern scholarship about the Second Sophistic. Without such an emphasis, the philosophical ideas and influences contained in the work of the second century are then ignored or overlooked in scholarship.

The challenge remains to show the philosophical interests of these authors in relation to their sophistic and rhetorical tendencies. The category of "philosophers who came to be called sophists" or "fluent philosophers" quickly becomes awkward and unhelpful for literature of this period. As observed above, authors such as Maximus, Lucian, and Aristides are often referred to as "sophists," though they consistently criticize the group. In modern accounts, these authors are sometimes called "sophist-philosophers," "philosopher-sophists," "philosophical sophists," or some similar combination. Given his exceptional literary range, into which category does Apuleius ultimately fit? Even if a sophist early on, what does one ultimately do with Lucian? What about Maximus, and Dio before him, both of whom are sophistic in their delivery, yet seemingly philosophic in their thought? Each of the authors I treat poses a unique

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30 As does the epigram for a man from Athens who was "a rhetor in his speaking, and a philosopher in his thinking" (ῥήτωρ μὲν εἰπεῖν, φιλόσοφος δ' ἄχρη νοεῖν, Kaibel 1878:no. 106, quoted in Bowersock 1969:12).
31 E.g., "Apuleius' attempt can be connected with the Second Sophistic movement, which produced a lot of sophist-philosophers or philosophical sophists," Schenkeveld 2001:201.
32 Apuleius' literary works are his best known (*Metamorphoses, Apologia*), and he is perhaps less known for his philosophical work (see my Epilogue). Recently, the case has been made for his being a sophist: see Harrison 2000 and Harrison et al. 2001.
33 Plutarch's answer in *On Listening to Lectures* is that one does not expect pure, flowery Attic when listening to a philosopher, but this is a limited qualifier with someone like Maximus of Tyre.
challenge to the label "Second Sophist." None of these authors is a philosopher in any traditional sense, and they should not be considered completely separate from the epideictic tradition of the time. Yet, they should not be limited by the sophistic traits they occasionally employ.

Therefore, if we see the literature at this time as stemming from a specific cultural context instead of a rhetorical style, we can avoid some of the problems of classification that develop whenever these categories arise. In that case, we will strengthen the impetus to determine and consider their use of philosophical themes, especially their inherited notions of Plato and Platonism. Philosophical ideology will then become as important as style in assessing these authors of the second century, and will be particularly emphasized throughout this study.

"Orator," "sophist," and "philosopher" are often used now in a way contrary to their usage by authors in the Second Sophistic. We tend to ignore the fact that "There is a tendency for Greek-speaking men of letters who produced works worthy of the Second Sophistic to want to be regarded as philosophers and not as sophists" (Stanton 1973:364). If one applied the term "Second Sophist" to all of those working in the first three centuries CE, the extant evidence would quickly rebut this misuse. Since our three authors were not sophists without qualification, either on the basis of their criticism of the group or by their own admission, in this work I shall use the historical sense of "Second Sophistic" as the period between 50 CE–250 CE. Since no universal definition for these terms will suffice for all authors in this period, it remains important to determine in what way each author thought about and used each of these labels.
4.1. "Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic"\(^{34}\)

The invocation of the Greek past in the literature of the Second Sophistic, in particular of the events and literature of the fifth and fourth centuries, is sometimes seen as a strong reaction against first- and second-century CE Roman occupation.\(^{35}\) Discussions of the literature of this period as a Greek reaction against the cultural and legal hegemony of the Roman Empire, however, do not tell the whole story. Often modern scholars find themselves describing two complementary but opposed cultures at this time.\(^{36}\) For Roman provincial government was superimposed upon local Greek administration, overseeing and containing it, two complementary rather than opposing authorities (Whitmarsh 2005:11). While tensions existed between the two cultures in the second century, Greek sophists and orators, the very ones who were supposedly hostile to Rome, held positions of influence in the Roman court, counted emperors among their admirers, and enjoyed far-reaching international acclaim.\(^{37}\) For example, of the sophist

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\(^{34}\) Bowie 1974, title
\(^{37}\) Hahn 1989 writes that when wealthy philosophers acted on behalf of their city they did so as leading citizens, not philosophers; see his chapter 14. This seems a difficult distinction to maintain. It is, however, irrelevant for our purposes, as we are addressing Greek attitudes toward Roman rule. See Millar 1964; Bowersock 1965 and 1969; Bowie 1982; Schmitz 1997.
Scopelian of Smyrna was honored by Domitian for accompanying him on an embassy promoting the "vine edict."\(^{38}\)

Nor was it the case that Romans were completely reconciled to Greek culture, resulting in a seamless οἰκουμένη between the two cultures. As Woolf 1994 argues, the Romans never stopped being Roman, and the Romans, to a great extent, let the Greeks remain Greek. The cultural and ethnographic delineations between Rome and Greece remained relatively stable, if permeable. The Roman interest in curbing Greek "decadence" was never realized and Roman culture itself never posed a threat to Greek identity (Woolf 1994:135). Alternatively, the Romans were never so attracted to Hellenism that their cultural mores, making up their own self-identity, became irrelevant (Ibid.). Rome was the central political and cultural hub of the Empire, but day-to-day life in the East was socially and culturally Greek.

While it is not the purpose of this work to offer a definitive interpretation of the relationship between Rome and Greece during the Second Sophistic, it will perhaps be helpful at least to show that the relationship was immensely complicated, at times hostile,\(^{39}\) envious, guarded, and (ostensibly) disregarded.\(^{40}\) What does seem to be the case

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\(^{38}\) Suetonius *Domitian* 7.2, 14.2. Domitian's edict forbade the planting of more vines in Italy and ordered the destruction of half the vineyards in the provinces--it was never implemented.

\(^{39}\) One would not want to imagine a situation of simple acquiescence; cf. Plutarch, *Praecepts gerendae reipublicae* 813e: εὑσταλεστέραν δει την χλαμύδα ποιεῖν, καὶ βλέπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατηγίου πρὸς τὸ βῆμα, καὶ τὸ στεφάνῳ μὴ πολὺ φρονεῖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν, ὁρῶντα τοὺς καλτίους ἐπάνω τῆς κεφαλῆς "It is necessary to make your (military) cloak readier for action, and to look towards the orator's platform from the office of the general; and your crown is not worthy of much pride or confidence since you see the shoes (of Roman soldiers) above your head."
is neither a pure cultural counteraction nor a cultural fusion, but the emergence of a
dynamic tension that structured both cultures, and outlasted the move of the capital to
Byzantium/Constantinople, continuing until the barbarian invasions in the fifth century.
The Hellenic obsession found in the literature of the Second Sophistic, therefore, is not a
Greek "reaction" to Rome. Instead, it is an instantiation of the long tradition of
Hellenism, encouraged to some extent by because of the material and economic
prosperity, especially in Asia Minor, that resulted from the Pax Augusta.

After Alexander's conquests, identification with Greek culture did not occur
through conscious choice: it was one's heritage. This is not to ignore the fact that, while
the tyrannical Domitian had dispelled philosophers from Rome in the first century CE,
the philhellenes Trajan and Hadrian accepted and promoted them in the first and second.
Rome was indeed the dominant power in the Mediterranean, but it was not just for the
education of children that Romans still looked to Athens in the second century CE.
Greece was still responsible for much of the culture as well as the amenities of life that
Romans enjoyed, sometimes with reluctant admission.

Generally speaking, the interest of those writing in the second century in the great

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40 For example, Maximus does not mention Rome or anything Roman in his Dialexeis,
though they were given in the imperial capital sometime in the 180s CE.
41 Aristides' To Rome is just one exception from an otherwise fiercely Hellenic orator.
42 Fein 1994 and Whitmarsh 2001:16
43 As shown by a letter from Pliny to a colleague (a "Maximus") reminding him that he
was sent "to superintend the affairs of free states" (Ad ordinandum statum liberarum
civitatum), and that it was thence that literature itself had come, not to mention Rome's
own laws (Epistula 8.24). Simultaneously, this letter seems to show feelings of reverence
and condescension. This is the case as well in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations (1.3) in his
discussion of doctrina Graecis.
Greek past was not the result of a nostalgia for the "old times," nor was it an affirmation of the independent greatness of the Greeks as opposed to the Romans. Jones (2003:14) suggests that the supposed Hellenic patriotism so often discussed in modern literature, sometimes assumed to be equivalent to Hellenism, is a "chimera." Greeks at the time bore no great grudge for belonging to the Roman Empire; they did not object to being Ῥωμαῖοι, a collective and non-prejudicial term. The second-century predilection for antiquity and archaism attracted Greeks to Athens of the classical period and Romans to the Rome of the Punic wars: "The mood was shared in common; its expression was appropriately diverse" (Bowersock 1969:16). To view the cultures in direct conflict would be to simplify something perhaps unique in ancient history: "a great baroque age and hitherto unparalleled οἰκουμένη" (Ibid.), though we may want to add "incomplete" to "οἰκουμένη."

This archaism was not an attempt to recreate fourth-century Athens exactly, but features conflations and alterations of historical conditions that emerge from the speeches and writings of this time. Homer and Plato could seem near contemporaries, and events that surrounded each of them seem simultaneous. Russell 1983 represents one attempt to describe the laws, population, and concerns of this synthetic Greece, one built out of words, that is found in the texts of the Second Sophistic. Certainly, this "shadow Greece" could be considered an alternative to, even an escape from, the political circumstances of the Roman Empire. Works of the Second Sophistic consistently dwelled

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44 Palm 1959 and Bowersock 1969:15. However, when not capitalized, as was usually the case, ῥεῖμα also means "might" and "confidence."
45 Russell 1983:21-40
on events surrounding the Persian war, the invasion of Greece by Philip II of Macedon, and the conquests of Alexander the Great. None of the themes of the sophists known from Philostratus, in fact, postdates 326 BCE.46

Complementing this taste for archaism was the importance of the Greek past to the educational system. In the Eastern Mediterranean after Alexander, it is clear that settlers acquired and natives maintained a Greek identity by an education centered upon a canon of texts headed by Homer, Euripides, Plato, and Demosthenes. For centuries, Greek education had emphasized oration in the Demosthenian style, as well as the almost interchangeable use of Homeric and fifth-century themes. As Kennedy (2001:15) explains, interest in epideictic oratory as it had developed in fifth-century BCE Greece resurged in Rome. It was taught as a major technique for transmitting traditional values and easily expanded into encomia of rulers and the revisions of unpleasant historical realities. According to Quintilian, imitative judicial and deliberative oratory for fictional cases began in the time of Demetrius of Phaleron in the fourth century BCE (Institutio Oratoria 2.4.41). Attic writers had first been studied and commented upon by Alexandrian scholars in the second and first century BCE, and then by the first century CE were adopted as stylistic models to match the increased interest in using a pure Attic Greek. After the second century BCE, every author of any repute would have had some training in rhetoric and philosophy. Plato is one of the ten authors read in the grammar schools in the second century CE, along with Homer and Demosthenes. These authors figure prominently in the rhetorical schools with the addition of nineteen others, including

Aristotle and Aeschines Socraticus. As this interest in the literature of the past was embedded in the long-established Greek educational system, alongside an interest in archaism and literary traditions, school exercises centered on the alternative endings to wars, long-past political discussions, epics, and tragedies. The interest in "ancient" orators and philosophers, coupled with an emphasis on epideictic exercises, developed into an extremely influential and lucrative profession in the Second Sophistic.

Soon enough in the Common Era, the taste for archaism was no longer confined to written literature or school syllabi. As Bowie (1970:5) notes, it is not clear when rhetorical displays "became more than simply a part of rhetorical training and joined panegyric and commemorative speeches in the role of public entertainment: certainly by the second half of the first century C.E. declamation seems to have moved into the first rank of cultural activities and acquired an unprecedented and almost unintelligible popularity." At the same time, the desire to be regarded as an autokhthon was great. For example, there were authors who consciously avoided the schools in order to find the "purest" Greek. Famously, Agathion lived in the Attic countryside where "the interior is untouched by barbarians, and so its speech and dialect is healthy, and rings with the most supreme Atthis" (VS 553). Further, in Athens the dress, architecture, and institutions

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47 For the full list, Householder 1941:62-63. For discussion of education in late antiquity, see Marrou 1948.
48 For a discussion of the importance of autokhthonia (αὐτόχθων) and the Athenians, see Rosivach 1987.
remained mostly unaffected by Hellenistic or even Roman influence.\(^{49}\) Imitating such traditions would forge a connection between Asia Minor and mainland Greece. Given the prevalence of Greek language and culture after Alexander, such a connection would give one an avenue into the predominant culture of the known world.

In Second Sophistic scholarship, some authors have suggested, contrary to the view of a laissez-faire relationship between the two cultures, that the increase of Rome's culture and power may still have challenged Greeks to assert their independent identity. Oratorical declamation was, naturally, one way in which Greek identity could be reinforced against the cultural and political challenges of Rome (Swain 1996:88-89). The tension, that emerges from this dynamic contrasts desired collective membership with separate cultural identity. There are two pieces of evidence that indicate this tension. First, Plutarch's *Vitae Parallelae* seems to be an example of the interconnection and separation between cultures (Swain 1996:86-90). Second, Aristides writes that the world is no longer made up of Greeks and barbarians (βάρβαροι): "now, it is Romans and non-Romans."\(^{50}\) In many ways, the process of negotiating a relationship between the Athenian past and the Roman present was the central means of constructing a literary identity and

\(^{49}\) Certainly there were some changes and developments, especially in the area of architecture and related technology, but material identity was less central to the Greeks of the time than Romans (Woolf 1994:128-130).

\(^{50}\) It is not his classification, however: he attributes the division to the audience: "you divide," 63. The moral barrier of Aristides continues to be the "Ἑλληνες-βάρβαροι shift rather than the borders of the Roman Empire (Swain 1996:279). *To Rome* was delivered before the imperial family, and so we should not accept its praises at face value (Ibid. 208).
cultural authority. Greek philosophy then was a method of "self-preservation" as well as a way to discuss issues of power and identity (Whitmarsh 2001). The familiarity and foreignness of the classical past--including its philosophy--became a tool of conciliation.

What is important to the present work is that conceptions of identity and culture are both problematic and complicated during the Second Sophistic. From the perspective of Rome, Athens maintained its status as a cultural and educational center, in that the "imperialist" division of labor "apportioned culture to the Greeks and power to the Romans" (Whitmarsh 2005:14). From the perspective of Athens, philosophy flourished at this time, but "in a more dispersed way since Athens had declined as a cultural center, and other centers grew, especially in Alexandria, Rome, and cities in the eastern Mediterranean" (Annas 2001:xxi).

Each author's particular treatment of the Greek past should be examined separately to reconstruct his rhetorical intent. There are at least as many reasons for the use of the past in the literature of the Second Sophistic as there were authors in the period. I hope to show, then, in this collection of studies that sketches the backbone of the Platonic tradition in the Second Sophistic, how three particular authors invoked the Hellenic past in the middle of the Roman Empire. In particular, I am interested in how each looked to Plato as a key figure for membership and entrance into the great Hellenic literary tradition.

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51 For more on this idea of cultural negotiation as the appropriation and transcendence of the paradigms of the past in the Second Sophistic, see Whitmarsh 2001.
52 For this specific sense of hellenizein, see Whitmarsh 2001.
4.2. Asianism/Atticism in the Second Sophistic

Ever since Erwin Rohde's 1886 "Die asianische Rhetorik und die zweite Sophistik," scholars have generally accepted the distinction between the rhythmical, bombastic "Asian rhetoric" and the straightforward but powerful Attic style of oratory. There is evidence of this division in Cicero, Caecilius, Strabo, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The Second Sophistic is often marked by a pure Attic revival that is a response to the decadent "Asiatic" excess of the time as well as to the developing, simplistically archaising Koine. We hear of such "Atticism" first in Latin: Cicero's Brutus (283-291) and Orator (1-36). Noting Atticism in Greek begins with Dionysus of Halicarnassus among surviving authorities and is perhaps more an imposed polarization than a reflection of the times. Such polarization nonetheless represented an opposition that dominated the literary schools for centuries (Whitmarsh 2005:51-52). Sophists in

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53 This distinction was diminished by Wilamowitz(-Möllendorff) 1900, which pointed out the slim evidence for Asianism as a wide-spread aesthetic movement in the second century. There are no words *ἀσιανίζειν or *ἀσιανίσμος to counter the commonly found ἀττικίζειν or ἀττικασμός. Though the terms were not used, a distinction remains. In the third century, for example, Philostratus mentions that Athenodorus "both Atticized and spoke in an ornate style" (2.14). Study of the Second Sophistic slowed considerably after Wilamowitz declared the era a "useless invention" (Bowersock 1969:421).

54 Brutus 45.325.

55 Quoted in the Suda s. v. Κεκίλιος, K1165, in Bekker 1854:555.

56 Who was himself an "Asiatic Greek."

57 Whitmarsh 2005:49-52. On all these authors, see Stemplinger 1894; Wilamowitz 1925; and Bowersock 1965.

58 Moeris' Lexicon Atticum often shows a particular word in "Attic" (Ἀττικοί), and then "Greek" ("Ελληνες), the latter being the Koine version. Such "general usage" Greek (συνήθεια) spoken and written during the second century, it is thought, is closer to modern than to classical Greek (Horrocks 1997). For the commonly accepted view of Koine, see Hatzidakis 1892; for a general overview of language and identity at this time, see Swain 1996:17-42.
general sought to Atticize "rigorously," and Attic is always seen as the vehicle for cultural purity (Whitmarsh 2005:43).

If one believes Lucian, the worst style seems to be a mixture of the Asiatic and Attic styles, and the best Attic is "purified" (ἀποκεκαθάρθαι). A number of lexica allow us to understand to some degree what that term might mean. A verbal slip was castigated as a "barbarism," syntactic errors were "solecisms," named after the "uncultured" Greek spoken in Soloi, a one-time Greek outpost in Cilicia. Lucian's entire Pseudologista, for example, is a response to a criticism aimed at a passing remark.

Neither the Attic nor the "Asiatic" style alone should be thought wholly to characterize the rhetoric of the second century. Threads of both styles intersect, which becomes a source of some subsequent confusion, and the friction through late antiquity between Attic classicism and the legacy of Asianism was never fully assuaged. A careful analysis of each author is required to understand under what influences he operated.

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59 "He is an out-and-out Atticist and has purified his speech down to the last syllable" (ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ κομιδῆ Ἀττικὸς εἶναι καὶ ἀποκαθάρθη τὴν φωνήν ἐς τὸ ἀκριβέστατον, Verae historiae 21).
60 Harpocratio Λέξεις τῶν δέκα ρητόρων, Aelius Dionysius Αττικὰ ὁνόματα; Phrynichus Ἐκλογὴ Αττικῶν ρημάτων καὶ ὁνομάτων and epitome and fragments of Σοφιστικὴ προπαρασκευή; Julius Polydeuces (an abridged version of?) Onomasticum; Moeris' Λέξεις Αττικαί; Pausanias of Syria found in Erbse 1950. The "opposition" is represented by the anonymous Antiatticista.
61 Lesky 1957-1958, following Norden 1915.
62 For discussions of the unresolved conflict between these styles, see Lesky 1957-1958 and Bowie 2004:65-66.
63 As proposed by Norden 1915.
"barbarism," and is therefore associated with the East.\textsuperscript{64} Those operating in Asia Minor and Syria, as were our authors, took pains to avoid anything less than pure Attic.\textsuperscript{65}

Lucian's Attic style is agreed to be masterly (Deferrari 1916). Maximus of Tyre favors, in general, the classicizing Attic grammatical norms of construction and vocabulary. In his avoidance of periodic sentences for shorter clauses and his interest in Gorgianic figures and rhythms (except when the subject calls for a higher tone), his style is markedly Asiatic.\textsuperscript{66} Aristides is considered to have pure, if conservative, Attic Greek (even as compared to fourth-century authors).\textsuperscript{67} As I will discuss in the Epilogue, Apuleius's style is "Asiatic" Latin, often heavily permeated with poetic elements, although less so in his philosophical writings.\textsuperscript{68}

The general revival of Atticism, however, reflects more than just a reinvigorated rhetorical or oratorical style.\textsuperscript{69} In the case of second-century historians, for example, archaism was likely not the product of stylistic considerations determined by the choice of Attic or Ionic dialects (Bowie 1970:10). Furthermore, a strict avoidance of Attic on the

\textsuperscript{64} Notable exceptions are Epictetus and Galen.

\textsuperscript{65} This concern would seem especially intense for Lucian: Samosata was considerably eastern (modern Samsat, Turkey). It is still unknown whether Aramaic was Lucian's first language; see Millar 1993:454-456.


\textsuperscript{67} See Behr 1973. Some of his reputation for being a rigorous Atticist was the result of purging his language of many post-classical words and expressions, and, according to Boulanger 1923, his syntax is distinctly Hellenistic. Usher, in his review of Behr, notes his penchant for metaphoric expression, sensitivity for emphatic word order, and liberal use of emphatic particles and the articular infinitive, all of which suggest Demosthenic influence.

\textsuperscript{68} For more on Apuleius' style, see Von Albrecht 1989 and Harrison 2000.

\textsuperscript{69} Bowie 1970:27. The rise of Latin might have created a barrier around educated contemporary Greek; for discussion, see Swain 1996:43-64: "The Practice of Purism."
part of some philosophers--Galen, Epictetus, Plutarch--perhaps owes to their self-conception as thinkers rather than rhetoricians.\textsuperscript{70} I do not imagine that this distinction holds true for all those who worried about their dialect at the time.

In conjunction with an "Atticism of themes," literature in the Second Sophistic generally invokes the whole of a celebrated Greek past, in language, rhetoric, and events. The orators and sophists of the time worked on the maintenance of the Greek tradition, as well as their membership within it, by consistently centering their discussions squarely on the fifth and fourth centuries BCE.

\textbf{5. Plato in the Second Century}

The importance of Plato to the literature of the Second Sophistic has been assumed for some time. The first and only sustained discussion of this connection is by Phillip de Lacy 1974 in a paper, "Plato and the Intellectual Life of the Second Century A.D.," was given at a panel on the Second Sophistic at the 105\textsuperscript{th} APA meeting in Missouri. In the paper, Plato is acknowledged as "second only to Homer in the frequency of allusions and variety of contexts in which the allusions occur."\textsuperscript{71} Since the pursuits of the "Second Sophists" seem to be particularly unplatonic, de Lacy looks to lessen the confusion that occurs if one associates the common view of "sophistry" with Plato by examining the sophistic and rhetorical activities of the period.

De Lacy reminds us that Platonism was still very strong among all the philosophers in the first two centuries of the Common Era, and "Plato himself even

\textsuperscript{71} De Lacy 4. This frequency holds true in the work of Lucian, Maximus, Aristides, and Apuleius.
stronger" (4). Plutarch must be given some credit for the continuing importance of Platonism in the second century as it appears in the work of both the sophists and the Platonists active at the time. The Middle Platonists de Lacy names are Albinus (fl. 149-157), Galen (circa 129-circa 200), Apuleius (circa 123/5-circa 180), and the philosopher Taurus (circa 105-circa 165), who was head of the Academy under both Hadrian (reigned 117-138) and Antoninus Pius (reigned 138-161). Taurus was the teacher of both the great sophist Herodes Atticus (circa 101-177) as well as Aulus Gellius (circa 125-after 180)(1974:4-5).

Beyond the Platonists, the influence of Plato generally remained strong in second-century philosophical circles. Stoicism and Platonism continued their mutual influence, as they had for some time. Respect for Plato was high among the Peripatetics: the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), for example, are replete with references to Plato. In his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aspasius (c.100-150 CE) references no fewer than six dialogues. The generally hostile Sextus Empiricus (fl. end of second century CE), our main source for Pyrrhonic Skepticism, shows a good knowledge of Platonism and names Plato, along with Thucydides and Demosthenes, as one of the masters of the Greek language (*Adversus mathematicos* 1.98).

As for the dialogues themselves, of the nine tetralogies, or thirty-six titles, nearly

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72 That is, since at least Antiochus in the first century BCE. This influence of Stoicism on Academic Platonism is a fundamental development for Middle Platonism.
73 *Apology, Laches, Laws, Meno, Republic*, and *Theaetetus*.
74 E.g., *Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes* 1.220-235; *Adversus mathematicos* (Προς Φυσικούς) 1.105-107, 2.305-309.
all can be found in the authors of the first and second century.\textsuperscript{75} Plutarch referenced twenty-eight of the standard dialogues,\textsuperscript{76} Apuleius, at least twenty-two.\textsuperscript{77} To complete the authors discussed in the current work, Lucian seems to reference twenty-one dialogues;\textsuperscript{78} Maximus, eighteen;\textsuperscript{79} and Aristides, at least twenty.\textsuperscript{80}

Plato was read for literary technique no less than for philosophical doctrine. Aulus Gellius (\textit{NA} 1.9), in fact, distinguishes the two methods. He writes that his teacher Taurus complained of a student who wanted to read Plato only to improve his style.\textsuperscript{81} As mentioned above, Philostratus complements the prose of Dio of Prusa for echoing that of Demosthenes and Plato (\textit{VS} 1.7). Aristides paid tribute to Plato's eloquence, transferring to him the line of Cratinus about Pericles: that he was the "greatest tongue of the Greeks."\textsuperscript{82} Passages from the Platonic dialogues are used as illustrations of virtues of style throughout rhetorical treatises of the time, as for example in that of Hermogenes. Lucian's \textit{Philopseudes} contains some questions about correct Attic usage that are settled with

\textsuperscript{75} Excluding the Middle Platonists, there is reference to 24 dialogues; to include them would complete the list (though the Ion seems to have only one possible reference in "Albinus \textit{Epitome 4}" [i.e., Alcinous' \textit{Didaskalikos 4}], de Lacy 1974:7.
\textsuperscript{76} Jones 1916.
\textsuperscript{77} Based on the edition of Thomas 1822.
\textsuperscript{78} Including the \textit{Epistulae} as one work, and removing the \textit{Theages} from the list, Gaeckler 1913.
\textsuperscript{79} Based on Trapp's 1997 edition.
\textsuperscript{80} Behr 1986: 526-528.
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{NA} 1.9-10: Alius ait "hoc me primum doce," item alius "hoc volo" inquit "discere, istud nolo"; hic a symposio Platonis incipere gestit propter Alcibiadae comissionem, ille a \textit{Phaedro} propter Lysiae orationem. Est etiam," inquit "pro Iuppiter! qui Platonem legere postulet non vitae ornandae, sed linguae orationisque comendae gratia, nec ut modestior fiat, sed ut lepidior.
\textsuperscript{82} Πρὸς Πλάτωνα περὶ ρητορικῆς (Περὶ ρητορικῆς) 72.
precedents from Plato. Plato clearly had some considerable standing in the Second Sophistic as an authority on style.\(^{83}\)

We must only look to Περὶ ὑψους (De sublimitate) to provide evidence of Plato's importance in rhetoric in the first three centuries CE.\(^ {84}\) Plato is quoted nine times on matters of style, and is defended without reserve against the criticisms of Caecilius of Calacte (first century BCE). A prolific critic, Caecilius had written his own work on the sublime, where the claim that Lysias was "in every respect a superior writer to Plato" (32.8) seems to have prompted [Longinus'] critique of that work.

Plato, however, is not above criticism for [Longinus].\(^{85}\) Two sections of the Laws are guilty of "frigidity" (ψυχρός) in expressing exotic ideas (5.741c, 6.778d). Menexenus 245d is criticized for repeated change of number for a less than appropriate subject matter. The section ends with a particularly sharp jab against Plato: "Only a sophist would have bells on wherever he goes."\(^{86}\) For two of the criticisms of Plato, there are conjoining parallel compliments concerning appropriate use of the same figures: metaphor\(^ {87}\) and periphrasis.\(^ {88}\)

\(^{83}\) De Lacy (1974:8) includes reference also to Lucian Rhetorum praeceptor 9, which includes imitations of Demosthenes and Plato.

\(^{84}\) I refer to Roberts 1899 edition.

\(^{85}\) The result of the first real discussion of the authorship of this work by Roberts (1899:2) was that the ascription to Longinus was dubitable and the date of composition was more likely the first century CE than the third century CE, as had been previously thought.

\(^{86}\) ἐπεὶ τοι τὸ πανταχοῦ κόδωνας ἔξηρθαι λίαν σοφιτικόν, 24.1. Clearly, "sophist" in the Second Sophistic has different connotations than in the fourth century BCE.

\(^{87}\) Laws 6.773c is criticized for the excessive use of metaphor (De Sublimitate 32.7); Timaeus 65c-85e is praised for it (32.5).
There is much praise for Plato's style in *De sublimitate.* "There is much praise for Plato's style in *De sublimitate.*" 89 *Republic* 9.586a is complimented for its ἀψοφητὶ ρέον, "soundless flow," which is itself an echo from the *Theaetetus.* 90 Plato's use and emulation of great writers of the past is mentioned as "yet another road to sublimity," especially his use of Homer. Plato could not have put "so fine a bloom of perfection" (ἐπακμάσατε...τηλικαύτα τίνα) on his philosophical doctrines if it had not been for his use and imitation of Homer (13.4).

[Longinus] additionally uses Plato as a model for his approach to literary criticism. In a later section about the "causes for the decline of literature" he imitates *Republic* 9.573e, writing that when the need for wealth develops, extravagance soon follows, becomes chronic in people's lives, and both, "as the philosophers say," nest and breed. 91 Greed, pride, and luxury are their offspring. As Russell (1964:191) notes, [Longinus'] "genealogical fantasy" owes its conception to the descriptions of democracy and tyranny in *Republic* 8.560c-d and 9.575a-b. Though *De sublimitate* mentions that Plato is ridiculed by many about his "literary madness into crude, harsh metaphors or allegorical bombast" (32.7), as a writer he is "firmly set in his importance and magnificent solemnity" (καθεστώς ἐν ὅγκῳ μεγαλοπρεπῇ σεμινώτητι, 12.3).

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88 The criticism of the *Laws* (7.801b) ends with a critic's joke about Plato's use of periphrasis (περίφρασις) and his somewhat "unseasonable" (ἀκαίρως) use of it (29.1); *Menexenus* 236d is praised for impressiveness of thought, the lyricism of the bare prose, and harmony of the "beautiful periphrasis" (28.2).
89 Cf. 12.3, 13.1, 13.3, 32.5-7, and 35.1.
90 Cf. οἴον ἐλαίου ἐρείμα ἀφοφητὶ ρέοντος, 144b.
91 Cf. *Republic* 9.573e: ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὲν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας βοᾶν πυκνάς τε καὶ σφοδράς ἐννενεστευμένας. ("And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings of desire hatched in his soul...?")
Even those who seemed to read Plato only as a literary model, like Fronto (100-170 CE) and Hermogenes of Tarsus (fl. c.161-180 CE), were not actually limited to this utilization. De Lacy takes the example of Hermogenes, who, in his Περὶ ἰδεῶν, names the very best prose panegyric (ὁ πανηγυρικὸς λόγος) to be Platonic.92 This is high praise since "panegyric" for Hermogenes is a general word for literature: this includes almost all poetry, where Homer is obviously the master, and all prose other than judicial and deliberative oratory, where Demosthenes excels (2.12).93

In the Περὶ ἰδεῶν there are at least eight uses of "as Plato said"94 to exemplify certain qualities of style: e.g., σεμνότης (solemnity), κάλλος (beauty), γλυκύτης (sweetness), and ἐπιέκεια (moderation)(De Lacy 8). But what is more, as de Lacy notices, Hermogenes writes that there are two ways to improve one's style: by imitation through "mere experience" (ἐμπειρίας ψηλῆς) and "unreasoning practice" (ἀλόγου τριβῆς, 1.1.12) or by approaching the ancients with knowledge (ἐπιστήμης, 1.1.17) of the forms of style. These epistemological levels--information through experience (as in Gorgias 463b, 501b) and accurate knowledge (as throughout the Phaedrus)---show a basic Platonic framework to Hermogenes' method much as it was originally used by Plato, that is, as

92 For Rutherford (1998:51), Demosthenes clearly holds a greater importance than Plato, indeed the highest of any author in Περὶ ἰδεῶν; the latter uses many ἰδέαι improperly, but the former "uses every ἱδέα as it ought to be used, which means he is the κανών for all styles and all techniques" (Ibid. 52).
93 This wide sense of "panegyric," which includes "Plato, the 'Socratics', history, and poetry," is not found before Hermogenes; Rutherford (1998:46) suspects it is a Hermogenean invention.
94 E.g., ὡσπερ ὁ Πλάτων ὅταν λέγη; ὡς ἔφη Πλάτων.
applied to rhetoric. Hermogenes writes one must learn what "each quality of style is in itself" (αὐτὸ ἕκαστον καθ' αὐτὸ, 1.1.40), echoing a common Platonic formulation.\textsuperscript{95}

As Rutherford (1998:16) notes, Hermogenes mentions that every λόγος should have a beginning, a middle, and an end, giving a clear reference to the Phaedrus (264c), except that he focuses on distribution of stylistic elements rather than the organization of a speech. In addition, Hermogenes' use of ἰδέαι, i.e. a system of stylistic qualities as abstract entities, seems to echo Plato's sketch of the Forms.\textsuperscript{96} For Rutherford, this increased interest in Plato is less a response to revived Platonism than an answer to the charge that rhetoric lacks any systematic methodology.\textsuperscript{97} This defensive stance against Plato's criticisms of rhetoric necessarily dominates any discussion of philosophy and rhetoric in the first three centuries CE.

This Hermogenes is generally considered to be the Hermogenes whom Philostratus includes in his list of Sophists (\textit{VS} 2.7).\textsuperscript{98} If this connection is viable, what emerges from de Lacy's example is an excellent illustration of a canonical "Second Sophist's" use of Plato in a rhetorical treatise (8).

As de Lacy notes, authors in the Second Sophistic were keenly aware of the conflict between their own purposes and Plato's teachings, and often sought to diminish these differences. At issue, then, is the fact that Plato's concern for the emptiness of rhetoric was geared not only to issues of persuasion without knowledge, but the very

\textsuperscript{95} Cf. Plato \textit{Theaetetus} 201e2: αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον.  
\textsuperscript{96} For example at 231.18, with which Rutherford compares the \textit{Sophist} 235b and 259a6.  
\textsuperscript{97} Such as that leveled by Sextus Empiricus in Πρὸς γραμματικούς (\textit{Adversus mathematicos}).  
\textsuperscript{98} E.g., Rutherford 1998:22-23.
nature of display or epideictic oratory (e.g., in the *Gorgias*). Yet, as we see, ἐπιδείξεις constitute an extremely prominent place in the literature of the Second Sophistic. Justification, defense, and reconciliation regarding Plato's past attack on rhetoric continued until the "last stages of the ancient world." 99 How our authors dealt with this tension will be explored in the following chapters. Beyond de Lacy's paper, I refer throughout this work to specific connections made between Plato and authors in the Second Sophistic. 100

5.1. Plato and Platonism

Between Plato and our authors are six continuous centuries of Academic Platonism--the scholastic interpretation of Plato's doctrines--starting in the fourth century in his Academy down to at least Plutarch and Gaius in the first part of the second century CE. The Platonic writings of Maximus and Apuleius should be included in this interpretive strain, which exemplifies the general background concerning Plato, albeit sometimes remotely, for all Second Sophistic authors.

5.1.1. Platonism Introduced

Interpretation of Plato's dialogues began not long after his death in 347 BCE with his immediate successors in the Academy, Speusippus (c. 407-339 BCE) and Xenocrates

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Platonists of no era considered themselves to be expounding new philosophies, despite what may seem implied with the later "Neo-" prefix in the third century CE. These scholarly followers generally thought that they were faithfully explaining ideas and notions already inherent in Plato's writings. There were, however, substantial disagreements about what constituted authentic Platonism. Proclus (412-485 CE) and Simplicius (circa 490-560 CE) provide extensive doxographies of disputed positions among Platonists over many centuries. Since this interpretive process and tradition began to some degree with Aristotle, who spent nearly twenty years with Plato, there is clearly something justified in all this work to settle the, if not a, Platonic stance.

In its various phases and differing levels of insight, the exegetical tradition of Platonism continues well past the time discussed in this dissertation, i.e., officially to the date of the closing of the Academy by Justinian in 529 CE. The second century CE is situated in the middle of what is referred to as "Middle Platonism," which itself spans from approximately 80 BCE-250 CE.

5.1.2. The Platonism/Academic Distinction

Philosophers only began to call themselves and each other "Platonists" (Πλατωνικοί/Platonici) around the time that interests us in this thesis. For example, in the second century BCE Antiochus of Ascalon (circa 130-68 BCE) was consistently referred to as an "Academic" in accordance with the exclusive denotation used for members of Plato's school from Speusippus to the age of Antiochus.\textsuperscript{101} It was perhaps only during or

\textsuperscript{101} Glucker 1978:213.
after the demise of the Academy that "Platonist" became a necessary appellation.  
"Platonism" as we use the term is a modern expansion referring to the varied notions of 
the philosophers who associated themselves with Plato and the Academy, as well as 
those who were writing in this tradition as the Academy began to fade into extinction.  
The typical approach, then, is simply to call Platonism whatever anyone during the 
relevant period identified as Platonism. This is not a foolproof methodology, but it does 
allow us to discuss positions thought to be at least internally cohesive if not also, 
however vaguely, a nearly continuous exegetical process. It would be problematic, for 
example, to exclude those philosophers who did not consider themselves Platonists but 
who obviously thought of themselves as followers of Plato and some version of his 
philosophy, for example the Pythagoreanism-influenced Eudorus in the first century 
BCE.

5.1.3. Middle Platonism Defined

"Middle Platonism" is a relatively new designation, having been created almost 
solely to fill the void between Plato and Neoplatonism. The first German equivalent 
_Vorneuplatonismus_ eventually gave way to the more common _Mittelplatonismus_. Since 
Schleiermacher, the general trend in Platonist studies had been to move very quickly from 

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102 For a full discussion of the uses of _Academici_ and _Platonici_, see Glucker 1978:206-225. 
103 Based on the evidence, Plato's Academy was not in operation from about 86 BCE to 
the second century CE, when at that time there was a Platonic resurgence. Further, the 
idea that Platonism at the Academy was eradicated by the Justinian edict may be 
incorrect. It seems that Damascius was Head of the Academy in 529 AD and he left 
Athens at this time with Simplicius and other members of the school. Simplicius returned 
to Athens, however, where he certainly wrote, undertook research, and was head of a 
very restricted Academy until his death in 560 CE; see Lynch 1972 and Glucker 1978 for 
full discussion.
Plato to Plotinus. Only since Dillon 1977 has Middle Platonism received attention as anything beyond a milestone on the way from the early Academy to Neoplatonism. Since Dillon, the tendency has been to move from Plutarch to Plotinus with some speed, thereby skipping most of the second century, except cursorily.

Of the labels for the phases of Academic Platonism as we use them, only the term "New Academy" is ancient, going back to Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.220). Sextus distinguishes five schools of "Academic philosophy": Plato and his school; the "Second" or "Middle Academy" of Arcesilaus (316/5-241/0 BCE) and his school; the "Third" or "New Academy" of Carneades (214-129/8 BCE); the School of Philo (20 BCE-ca. 40 CE) and Charmidas; and lastly the School of Antiochus (second century-69/8 BCE). Sextus refers to Plato as a member of the "Old Academy," which for us ends with Polemon (350-267 BCE). Modern usage of "New Academy" begins with Arcesilaus; "Middle Platonism," with Antiochus.

5.1.3.1. Antiochus

Around 80 BCE, Antiochus brought the Academy back to its positivistic methodological roots while at the same time adding much Stoic doctrine. The previous century had seen a remarkably skeptical turn in Platonism with Arcesilaus (316/5-241/0 BCE) and Carneades (214-129/8 BCE), with some modification in between by Philo of

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104 For examples of some early studies, Praechter 1953 and Theiler 1964.
105 See Whittaker 1987 for a notable exception.
106 In modern nomenclature, "Old Academy" is considered to be from 347-267 BCE; "New Academy," 265-80 BCE, "Middle Platonism," 80 BCE–250 CE, and Neoplatonism, 250-sixth century.
Larissa (350-267 BCE), so much so, in fact, that it is now difficult to see the Academy of that time as Platonic.\footnote{For discussion, see Dillon 1970; Tarrant 1985; Allen 1994; and Hankenson 1995.}

Antiochus re-established the dogmatic tradition of the Old Academy by rejecting outright the extreme skeptical methodology of the immediately previous scholarchs in favor of the assimilation of Stoicism to certain features of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. In the first century BCE, philosophers begin to argue about the complete harmony of Academic and Peripatetic thought. Antiochus is held to be primarily responsible for this trend.\footnote{For a report that Antiochus found little to distinguish Academic and Peripatetic doctrine, Cicero's \textit{De oratore} 3.67, where Calpurnius, a student of Antiochus', sets out his teacher's philosophy as Peripatetic teaching, yet as identified with the Academy.}

As all later Platonists, he considered the Academy and the Peripatos one ideological movement. Moreover, "early in the first century BC there was a deliberate attempt to read Stoicism bodily into Plato, just as eminent Stoics of the same period, Panaetius and Posidonius, were trying to read Plato into Stoicism" (Taylor 1924:9).

Antiochus' emphasis on Stoicism should not be de-emphasized. He is reported by Cicero to have thought that "Stoic theory should be considered a correction of the Old Academy rather than actually a new system" (\textit{Academica} 1.43). For example, Antiochos preferred the Stoic idea of happiness as "concordance with nature" (κατὰ φύσιν\footnote{Or, \textit{secundum naturam} in Cicero's Latin, \textit{De finibus} 2.34.}), a formulation that actually begins with Polemon in the Old Academy,\footnote{Polemon seems to have anticipated much Stoic doctrine. He is considered to have an emphasis on the notion of a life both "consistent with nature" (Clement of Alexandria \textit{Stromateis} 7.32), an idea quite this-worldly for a Platonist, and "self- sufficient"} over Plato's own...
"likeness to god" (ὁµοίωσις θεῷ) found in the *Theaetetus* and *Phaedo*. After Antiochus, it became the standard approach to turn to Aristotle and the Stoics instead of back to the preceding Academics, especially the earlier scholarchs Speusippus and Xenocrates. It does not seem unfair to attribute to Platonists of the time the notion that Peripatetics and Stoics seemed in some ways to have expressed better than Plato what Plato was trying to say (pace Dillon 1977:14).

We know about Antiochus from Cicero, who studied under him in Athens in 79/78 BCE. After having started out a Skeptic, he soon rebelled against the school, and so was in an excellent position to criticize it. He succeeded in turning the Academy back to positivist philosophy, but it is not clear he was ever the "head of the Platonic Academy." He gave lectures, though not in the Academy, which Cicero reports was deserted at the time.\(^\text{111}\) It is generally thought that Antiochus did not bring out what was best in Plato or Stoicism, and his thoughts seem to lack a certain carefulness (Dillon 1977:105-6). Antiochus surely prepared much of the ground for the revival of Platonism, but it is perhaps best not to consider him a necessary figure for the renewal (*Ibid.* 113).

Antiochus had started a trend, then, that was to be continued by Eudorus around 25 BCE. The Platonist body of doctrine continued to be expanded to include Peripatetic

\(^{\text{111}}\) Cicero *De finibus* 5.1; Cicero was in fact the only authority at the time on Platonism; see also 5.6.
formulations, Stoicism, and now, with Eudorus, Neopythagoreanism. This revival of Pythagorean doctrine is one of the major advances in the first century BCE, and fills in a major characteristic of what is given the name Middle Platonism. Eudorus re-established the Pythagorean principle "One of extant things" (τὸ ἐν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων) and "the Dyad and the principle of all opposites" (κατὰ δῶο ἀρχὰς τῶν ἀποτελομένων). Placing these below the ("Supreme") One (τὸ ἐν), he was perhaps reading the metaphysical scheme of Plato's *Philebus* back into this formulation of old Pythagoreanism (Dillon 1977:127).

It is around this time that Diogenes Laertius reports that Thrasyllus (d. 36 BCE) divided the works of Plato into nine tetralogies. This claim is still controversial. It seems clear, though, that the division, or one like it, predates Thrasyllus, and seems to have been known to Varro (116-27 BCE). Regardless of the exact dating or agency, Thrasyllus' order is the organization the Platonic corpus would take on henceforth.

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112 Dillon 1977:115-135 for more on Eudorus' contributions to major themes of Middle Platonism, especially the re-introduction of mathematics and numerology; see also Dörrie 1944.  
113 For more about this trend of Pythagoreanism in Hellenistic philosophy, see Thesleff 1961 and Burkert 1962.  
114 Diogenes 3.56. For both sides of the debate, Tarrant 1993 and Mansfeld 1994. Thrasyllus was the first person we know to be called *Platonicus* (Glucker 1978:206).  
115 *De Lingua Latina* 7.37. The Dercyllidian division of Plato's dialogues known by Varro probably preceded that of Thrasyllus, Glucker 1978:123. Evidence to the contrary is Diogenes Laertius' attribution of the division to Thrasyllus.  
5.1.3.2. Philo

The next phase of Platonism is brought about by Philo of Alexandria, who has been called "one of the most remarkable literary phenomena in the Hellenistic world."\(^{117}\) The only secure date we have for Philo is his unsuccessful embassy on behalf of the Jews of Alexandria to Caligula in 39 CE.\(^{118}\) His birth is often placed around 20-25 BCE.

Greek philosophy, for Philo, was a result of the teachings of Moses. Moses, as the author of the Torah, "had reached the very summit of philosophy" (Μωυσῆς δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν φθάσας ἀκρότητα) and "had learnt from the oracles of God the most numerous and important of the principles of nature" (χρησμοῖς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ συνεκτικώτατα τῶν τῆς φύσεως ἀναδιδαχθεὶς ἐγνω δῆ, *De opifici o mundi* 8). Philo's guiding principle that Moses was a great Platonist stemmed from the idea that Plato had followed Pythagoras, and Pythagoras, Moses.\(^{119}\) His synthesis of Alexandrian Platonism (already fused with Stoicism and Peripateticism) with Jewish thought did have some influence on contemporary Platonism in the first century, but later Platonists seem, in truth, very little acquainted with Philo of Alexandria (Dillon 1977:144). Philo's distinctive streak of Jewish piety, for example, influenced Middle Platonism much less than the Christian Platonists of Alexandria, Clement and Origen (*Ibid.* 144, 396). That said, the type of Platonism that Eudorus and Philo represented, heavily infused with numerology

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\(^{117}\) Dillon 1977:139. For a summary of the recent interest in Philo's rhetorical practices, see Conley 1997.

\(^{118}\) Josephus *Antiquitates Judaicae* 18.257-260.

\(^{119}\) Dillon 1977:141. There is enough Pythagoreanism in "Philo Judaeus," however, that Clement called him "the Pythagorean."
and transcendentalism, is more emblematic of Middle Platonism than the worldly concerns of Antiochus.

After Philo, Platonism appears again (as attested) with Plutarch of Chaeronea, and returns to Athens. Through Plutarch we encounter Platonism at the end of the first and beginning of the second century CE, the type of Platonism with which our authors were to varying degrees acquainted.

5.1.3.3. Plutarch

Our first firm date for Platonism after Eudorus and Philo is 66/7 CE, when we find Plutarch being taught by Ammonius (Moralia 385b); after this date, he writes, he soon became a member of the Academy (387f).\(^{120}\) He is thought by some modern scholars to have been the scholarch of the Platonic Academy at the time, but this point is not universally conceded.\(^{121}\) Since Ammonius was Egyptian, he might have been responsible for bringing Platonism from Alexandria back to Athens.\(^{122}\) Ammonius' brand of Platonism descends to a certain extent from the dogmatic synthesis established 150 years prior in Athens and Alexandria, which, for the most part, rejects the skepticism of the New Academy.

\(^{120}\) Generally speaking, most scholars place Plutarch's birth around 45 CE and his death after 119 when he is reported to be appointed Procurator of Achaea by Hadrian.

\(^{121}\) Since Zumpt 1844 it has been assumed from Plutarch, our sole source, that Ammonius was a scholarch of the Academy, and even died as head of it (as in von Arnim's entry in the Realencyclopdie). For an assessment of the evidence, see Glucker 1978:124-134, which concludes that Ammonius was a "Master" of his own private "College," and not the head of the Athenian Academy of Plato.

\(^{122}\) Dillon 1977:184; Jones 1966 for a full view of the literary evidence.
The interest in Plutarch for this work is solely to establish the Platonist tenets and themes about which our authors may have been familiar. Plutarch is not considered a great philosopher, but he dealt with some points of Platonic doctrine with originality. Certainly, he is an essential link in the chain of development of Middle Platonism. His philosophy has only recently become a subject of scholarship.

Plutarch's skeptical tendency, or rather his preparedness to use skeptical strategies in the manner of the New Academy, causes some difficulties in fully understanding his position. Plutarch does seem, however, to discuss some interpretations that differ from previous Platonists.

Plutarch’s discussion of the world-soul in *De animae procreatione in Timaeo (De an. procr.)* is alluded to in his *Platonic Questions*. His interpretation is not found in previous commentators. He begins by discussing the previous theories on the world-soul, those of Xenocrates, Crantor, and Posidonius. Xenocrates was wrong to believe that Plato thought the soul was number: rather it is *ordered* by number (1013cd). Crantor does not adequately distinguish between the intelligible essence of the soul and everything else, which is made up of the compound of the intelligible and sensible essences (1012f-1013a). Lastly, Posidonius made a mistake to think the soul is an Idea, since the former is moved

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123 For a full study of the biographer and historian, see Russell 1972; for his rhetorical works and talents, see Martin 1997.
125 See Opsomer 1998.
126 It is to Plutarch that later Platonic commentators attribute this interpretation; see Jones 1980:69-86.
and mixed with the sensible, the latter is, as ever, unmoved and never combines with matter (1023cd).\textsuperscript{127}

For Plutarch, Plato thinks god created the world-soul and the world in time, as opposed to Xenocrates and Crantor\textsuperscript{128} who wrote that the world was ungenerated and eternal.\textsuperscript{129} Just as the material universe was not created out of the immaterial, the world-soul was not created out of what was not soul, but reduced to order a pre-existent soul. This is the soul Plato calls \textit{ἀγένητος} in the \textit{Phaedrus} (245c). There is also the disordered element in the universe, which is called the "evil soul" in the \textit{Laws}, the \textit{ἀπειρία} in the \textit{Philebus}, the \textit{ἀνάγκη} and \textit{γένεσις} in the \textit{Timaeus}, and the \textit{εἰμαρμένη} and \textit{ξύμφυτος \ ἐπιθυμία} in the \textit{Politicus} (\textit{De an. procr.} 1014c-1024b).\textsuperscript{130}

As opposed to later Neoplatonist doctrine, Plutarch thinks that matter should not be held responsible for this irregularity since it is formless. In addition, god is absolutely good, and cannot be responsible for evil. This original soul, then, is the cause of evil in the world, as it is the cause of motion in matter; it is possessed in the sensible faculty and is responsible for judgments for forming opinions.\textsuperscript{131} This pre-existent soul is the "divisible essence" in the \textit{Timaeus} (35a). The rational element of order, from the \textit{δημιουργός}

\textsuperscript{127} It is not clear, however, that Posidonius is actually using \textit{iδέα} as Platonic Idea instead of an organizing of space after harmonizing numbers (Jones 1980:76 after Zeller 1922:784).
\textsuperscript{128} And the author, perhaps Albinus, of the second-century CE \textit{Εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τοὺς Πλάτωνος διαλόγους}.
\textsuperscript{129} For Xenocrates and Crantor, see Plutarch \textit{De an. procr.} 1013a and Proclus \textit{In Timaeo} 1.277.
\textsuperscript{130} See Jones 1980:81 for further discussion on this topic.
\textsuperscript{131} 1023d-1024c; although these opinions are not well defined: \textit{οὔτε δόξας ἐνάρθρους} 1024b, see Jones 1980:82.
himself, is mixed with it (1016cd). The indivisible νοῦς is combined with the divisible essence and causes the resulting world-soul to apprehend true being (1024c). In Plutarch's formulation, the element of reason cannot take away all the irregularity, and the result is the cause of evil (1015a). This theory of the world-soul, found first in Plutarch, is also discussed and attributed to Plutarch in commentaries by Proclus and Atticus. Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus found it important enough to refute.¹³²

Plutarch was a Platonist in the vein that had grown out of the previous century. He was influenced by Stoic and Peripatetic doctrine, while simultaneously criticizing the former. The evidence for his being influenced by Pythagorianism stems from youthful objection to meat-eating, early interest in number syllogism, as well as the championing of the rationality of animals.¹³³ He had not entirely shaken the skeptical approach of the New Academy, it is less apparent in his extant work than in the many titles that have been lost.¹³⁴ We have a good portion of his seriously philosophical work,¹³⁵ which reveals a relatively "orthodox" Platonist view, inasmuch as that expression can have real meaning, especially in the first and second centuries CE.

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¹³² For discussion of Plutarch as Platonic interpreter, see Jones 1980:68-106, esp. 86.
¹³³ On the Eating of Flesh; On the E at Delphi; On the Cleverness of Animals, respectively.
¹³⁴ E.g., Whether He Who Reserves Judgment on Everything is Involved in Inaction.
Field (1925) points out that there was great discontinuity in the existence of the Academy by the time Plutarch wrote. In *Moralia* 549E Plutarch writes as if he is in the tradition of the Academy. Elsewhere in the *Moralia* he acts as if the Academy were very much alive and in use. Field proposes that perhaps Plutarch is presenting a fiction in order to continue a moribund tradition. It is difficult to answer the charge of any sort of invention or deception, given that Plutarch is our sole witness for the time period.

### 5.1.4. Second-Century Platonist Commentary

The second century is considered a productive age for Platonic commentary, with evidence of works by Gaius, Albinus, Alcinous, Harpocration, and Numenius. The evidence for most of these figures, beyond names and titles, is scant. We know little about the dates or place of teaching for Gaius, though it is generally agreed that he was teaching at the beginning of the second century. The situation is similar for Albinus. Since Galen attended his lectures on Platonism between 149-157 CE, his floruit is given around that time. Harpocration, the Greek tutor of Lucius Verus, is also an obscure figure. We know Numenius was connected with Apamea in northern Syria, and his floruit is thought

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136 "Beginning with our ancestral hearth with the scrupulous reverence of the philosophers of the Academy" (τῶν ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ φιλοσόφων), *Moralia* 549 19-20.
137 *Moralia* 467e, 526f, 741c, 1059b.
138 Regarding the general interest in the second century about Plato, Taylor (1924:8): "We see this [strong current of popular Platonism in the first and second centuries C.E.] from the so-called *Timaeus locrus*, the recently discovered fragmentary commentary on the *Theaetetus*, the long passages preserved by Eusebius from the second-century Platonist Atticus, the *Introduction to Platonism* by Albinus, the essays of Plutarch and the discourses of Maximus of Tyre, all works from that period." To this we would now want to add Apuleius' philosophical works and Aristides' rhetorical speeches.
139 For a discussion of the evidence, as well as difficulties, see Dillon 1977:266-267.
140 For the problems with Harpocration's dates, Dillon 1977:258-259.
to be 150-176 CE. The evidence for these commentators, as well as the commentaries on the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus*, is owed primarily to Proclus' own *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*.

There were some attempts at further interpretive development of Plato's doctrine at this time, but from the evidence most of the innovations answer smaller points of contention. The majority of the remains of "scholastic" Platonism from the second century reveal a trend in the summarization and concretization of Platonic thought rather than major ideological modification.

The incorporated and inherited philosophy of the exact time of our authors can be seen in the *Epitome doctrinae Platonicae* (Διδασκαλικός τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων, for consistency, hereafter *Didaskalikos*), which is perhaps by Alcinous. The short *Introductio in Platonem* (Εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τοὺς Πλάτωνος διαλόγους), which may be by Albinus, is consistent in doctrine with the *Didaskalikos*. These works are both dated within the second century CE.

Scholars have tried to use Apuleius' *De Platone* in conjunction with the *Didaskalikos* of Alcinous to try to retrieve the original thought of Gaius, a Platonist active in Asia Minor in the early decades of the first century. Since Freudenthal 1897, the author of the *Didaskalikos* was identified as Albinus because of confusion between beta and kappa. It is now accepted that the work, perhaps written by Alcinous, was surely

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141 Which is perhaps why, beyond the beta/kappa mistake, both of these works were for a long time thought to be the work of the same author. Furthermore, this work is similar in form to the handbook approach of Apuleius' *De Platone*, and ideologically similar in parts to Maximus' *Διαλέξεις*. 
not the work of Albinus. This correction is established in the work of Whittaker in a series of articles and reviews beginning in 1974. With this separation dies a significant piece of evidence for a "school of Gaius," since Alcinous had no known contact with Gaius (unlike Albinus who is tied to Gaius by Proclus, e.g., in his In Platonis rem publicam commentarii 2.96). The aim of reconstructing Gaius' thought, introduced by Sinko in 1904, is now considered problematic, and in any case it is more likely to be an indication of a "common stock of data" dating back to the first century BCE, perhaps to Arius Didymus.

While the author of the Didaskalikos is not considered an extraordinarily inventive Platonist, the work is thought to be a fairly concise statement of Platonism as understood during the second century. Throughout the handbook the author treats the interpretation of Plato as melded with Stoicism or Peripatetic doctrine to be perfectly natural. The work is similar to Apuleius' De Platone in that it offers a summary of Platonist philosophy instead of a commentary on any particular dialogue, which was more often the case after Middle Platonism.

It is from the Didaskalikos (9.2), for example, that we learn Xenocrates said that the Form is "the paradigmatic cause of regular natural phenomena" (fr. 30). He excludes from this the "Form of Bed" or "Forms for perversions" (τὰ παρὰ φύσιν) such as fever or

\[142\] We have almost no dates for Alcinous. Perhaps all we can know with some certainty is that he is "bounded by the writings of Plutarch on one hand, and Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias on the other, with Apuleius, Albinus, Atticus, Numenius, the Peripatetic Aspasius, and the Platonizing sophist Maximus of Tyre as approximate contemporaries" (i.e., the second century CE), Dillon 1993:xiii.

ugliness. The Ideas, then, are the formal cause of the universe, echoing *Timaeus* 28a (Witt 1971:16). This conception of the Forms is standard for Middle Platonism. The *Didaskalikos* will be important for comparison in further chapters, especially Chapter 3 where I look at the Platonism of Maximus.

Much of the Platonic ideology inherited in the second century had been thought to come from the so-called "school of Gaius" and, to some extent, the "Athenian school" influenced by Plutarch. These claims about Platonism in the second century have thus come into doubt. Writes Dillon (1977:265): "That there was in any sense an Academy [at that time] is, as we have seen, doubtful, and there is no real unity of doctrine between such men as Taurus and Atticus. The School of Athens must, then, be accounted an empty name. The same … must be said of the School of Gaius." From the evidence we ought to place little weight on the influence of these two schools at this time, if indeed they existed as had previously been assumed.

It may be that the majority of the influence Middle Platonism exercised over the third-century Neoplatonism of Plotinus came from the Platonist schools during the first and second centuries CE, but, as stated, we know very little about any existing Academy, in Athens or elsewhere.\(^{144}\) Dillon (1977:232) admits that there are a number of individuals, who, while not philosophers themselves, offer good evidence for the Platonism of the time, and includes Apuleius and Maximus in that list.

\(^{144}\) While this matter is still a point of contention, it seems that Plato's Academy ceased to be a physical presence after the fall of Athens in 88 BCE. Lynch (1972:177-189) for further discussion.
5.2. The Creation of a "Popular Platonism"

Maximus and Apuleius are not situated within any official school of thought, and yet they were still called Platonists within their lifetimes.\footnote{ILA 2115 [ph]ilosopho [Pl]atonico / [Ma]daurenses cives / ornament[o] suo. D(ecreto) d(ecurionum), p(ecunia) [p(ublica)] // D(omo) n(ostro) divi C[ons]/tanti[ni] / Maxim[i fil(io)].} It is clear from its prominence that the expression of even a cursory knowledge of Plato's doctrines provided a lucrative image for an author in the second century.\footnote{The general judgment is that there is not exceptional originality to be found at this time: "Original Roman contributions to Platonism could be detailed on the back of a medium-sized postage stamp," Dillon (1988:71). We ought not, however, completely discount the work of such \textit{rhetores} and orators during this period if we wish to give as full an account as is possible of the condition of Platonic thought at that time.} Since our knowledge of second-century scholastic Platonism is at best piecemeal, these authors have more than literary relevance. In the current work, interest in them is primarily historical, for they constitute some of our most interesting and systematic uses of Platonism and Platonic thought at the time. This Second Sophistic "popular Platonism" is particularly strong evidence of the dominating influence of Plato in the second century.\footnote{The "popular philosophy" in Manning 1994 is primarily concerned with the Stoics and Cynics.}

Bowersock writes that the full story of the Second Sophistic, "this Greek renaissance…will lead directly and inevitably into the Byzantine Empire" (1974:1). Attempting a far more humble endeavor, I hope to show in the current work that in the time after our Second Sophistic authors, the preliminaries were set for two later groups of thinkers. On the one hand, there was the complete reorganization of Platonism into the Neoplatonism that starts with Ammonius Saccas at the end of the second century and
would be completed by Plotinus in the third. On the other, the rise of the Christian sophists and the impact of the philosophical-\textit{cum}-religious sermon on contemporary discourse. This movement begins seriously with the Gnosticism of Justin Martyr in the middle of the second century and comes to an ironic culmination with Tertullian's (c. 155-230) denunciation of philosophy as "the mother of heresy." Both of these developments will in fact find some common ground in the Byzantine Empire, and are heavily affected by the literature and techniques created in the Second Sophistic, especially as seen in second-century literature that shows direct influence from Plato's dialogues.

The methods, priorities, and theatricality of the authors outside the official Platonist schools in the second century, including the work of these three authors, provide us with information about both the "popular" and, less directly, the scholastic Platonism of the time. In an important sense, these \textit{rhetores} continued the tradition of working in various ways with Platonic doctrine, thereby connecting the Platonism of Plutarch and those before him with the Neoplatonism of Plotinus.\footnote{The satires of Lucian would not be greatly benefited by our looking at them directly in the tradition of Middle Platonism: these works should be seen as influenced by Plato and the dialogues within a larger framework. For a look at philosophy in Lucian, see Clay 1992.} They also resurrect the arguments regarding rhetoric and philosophy that seemed resolved by the Romans before the start of the Common Era, but do so in a way that reflects the new fame and success of Philostratus' "Second Sophists" in the first centuries CE.

In the second century we find a whole new type of performer and author: men of letters, not involved in any official school, who begin to stray from home and produce
extremely literate works of Greek (or, in Apuleius’ case, Latin). Commonly, these works grappled with Plato and Platonism, and were at times publicly performed or declared. The three authors I discuss—Lucian, Maximus, and Aristides—are all exceptional in their creative handling and manipulation of Platonic themes during this era. The second century CE, then, is marked by the rise and perfection of a new type of littérature: the Platonic rhetor. In the following chapters, I aim to describe how these authors used and manipulated their own conceptions of Plato and Platonism in various and important ways.
Chapter 2 – Lucian

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I pair three of Lucian's texts each with a dialogue of Plato. My purpose is to show that the influence of Plato on Lucian was more than just formal or nominal (e.g., Lucian's use of the dialogue form, and a character "Plato" within them) and that the philosopher provided Lucian more than just an occasional target of criticism. Beyond a list of echoed words or simple references, I aim to provide through specific examples an understanding of how Plato acted as a fundamental literary model for Lucian.

Tackaberry's 1930 study is the first sustained analysis of Plato and Lucian together. According to Tackaberry, "Lucian everywhere shows the influence of Plato" (62). His comments about Plato are "typically of the highest regard"; Lucian writes that Plato is "wise, inspired, excellent, noblest, and the best of philosophers." Along with Thucydides (in the Lexiphanes) and elsewhere with Demosthenes (Rhetorum), Plato is recommended as a literary model, a judgment not surprising during the Second Sophistic. In the Piscator, for example, Lucian gives a summary of Plato's characteristics spoken by Chrysippus: "high thoughts, perfect Attic style, grace, persuasion, insight, subtlety, and cogency of well-ordered demonstration" (62). Lucian read Plato, Tackaberry writes,

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149 I owe many thanks to Christian Kaesser, without whose guidance and input this chapter would not exist.

150 Pro lapsu inter salutandum 4; De parasito or Artem esse parasiticam (De parasito) 34; Pro imaginibus 28.

151 Piscator 22: ἢ τε γάρ μεγαλόνοια θαυμαστή καὶ ἡ καλλιφωνία δεινῶς Ἀττικὴ καὶ τὸ κεχαρισμένον καὶ πεπόθους μεστὸν ἢ τε σύνεσις καὶ τὸ ἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἐπαγγελφόν ἐν καρφῇ τῶν ἀποδείξεων, πάντα ταύτα σοι ἀθρόα πρόσεστιν.
first for the sake of his style, and, secondly, to gather some practical thoughts and simple reflections on life" (62).

In twenty-eight pages, Tackaberry works through all of Lucian's traceable references to Plato's dialogues, focusing on specific echoes and aspects of Plato's thought. For example, he examines Lucian in consideration of Platonic metaphysics (63), the use of dialogue in writing (63), and the theory of the ideal state (63-64). Discussing what he sees as Lucian's lack of admiration for the "superstitious streak of Neo-Platonism" in the second century (64-65), Tackaberry treats as historical fact the Syrian's famous references to his turn to philosophy (65-67), for which the only evidence is Lucian himself. He discusses Lucian's success at writing Platonic dialogue, as well as his satire of it, and includes a list of reminiscences or echoes of various Platonic dialogues (67-80). There is a list of references in Lucian to "other Platonic ideas" (80-81), proverbs and quotations common to both authors (83-84), and, at the end of the work, "Platonic reminiscences in Lucian's use" of certain words (84).

A complete list of the many quotations, allusions, and references in Lucian to specific Platonic dialogues is found in Householder 1941. In his first introductory chart, he lists Lucian's passages with their Platonic counterparts. They are broken up by "quotation," which includes also close paraphrase and parody; "allusion," which includes all recognizable references to passages or works of an author; and "reminiscence," "by which is meant the use of statements, opinions, words, phrases, or other matter which may be confidently supposed to be derived from a particular writer" (36). Householder records nine quotations in Lucian from six Platonic dialogues, fifty-two allusions directly
from dialogues and about Plato's works in general (e.g., a reference to the tradition of the Platonic dialogue), and twenty-four "reminiscences." We are told to see Tackaberry "for less definite reminiscences."

According to Householder's tables, Platonic allusions and reminiscences account for 7% of Lucian's use of authors in prose works while quotations make up 5%, making Plato third in frequency behind Homer and "Comicus Incertus." This type of frequency is consistent in the majority of the literature from the Second Sophistic (cf. de Lacy 1974:4). As a point of comparison, Householder gives a quotation and allusion list by frequency of "14 Authors of Imperial Date" (one of whom is Maximus of Tyre), which shows Plato second only to Homer in all of Lucian's opera.

Perhaps the most straightforward way to look at Plato and Lucian together is by strict allusion and linguistic echoes, but we also have Chapman's 1931 study of the two authors. R.W. Livingstone's 1932 review of his work has it consisting "of selections from the Loeb and Oxford Press translations of Lucian accompanied by gossipy comments and by two essays on Lucian and Plato, such as might be written by a clever and paradoxical schoolboy." And although it shows "the record of the impressions made by Lucian and Plato on a clever, vivacious and interested man," "his book exemplifies the dangers that beset a critic who writes on an unfamiliar subject without the discipline of scholarship or any doubt of his own competence."

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152 The list is based on existing indices to: Aelian, Marcus Aurelius, Scholia on Aristophanes, Athenaeus, Demetrius, Dio Chrysostom, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Longinus, Lucian, "Maximum" (sic) [Maximus of Tyre], Pausanias, Plutarch, Julius Pollux, and Rhetores Graeci.
As Livingstone somewhat reluctantly acknowledges, one benefit of this work is that it records the common judgment of Lucian at the time. For example, regarding the article on Lucian in Sandy's *History of Classical Scholarship*, Chapman writes, "the Doctor not only scores Lucian for the impurities of his idiom, but goes on to hint that Lucian's knowledge of the Greek poets was superficial and that he is incompetent as a judge of the classics" (8). This judgment of Lucian is no longer widely held.

Chapman's innovation was his attempt to combine Lucian and Plato beyond the mere list of reference and allusion. Yet, Plato's name does not appear in the book until page 114 in his chapter "Lucian Attacks Pederasty," and the two are not truly compared until the fifth chapter ("Plato and Lucian Contrasted"). His judgment is that Plato's dialogues convey more than anything else the literary genius of Plato, just as Lucian's do for his own talent. Both of these authors are interested in entertainment through irony and exchange--neither author has a "philosophy." In addition, since background definitions and assumptions shift (not to mention purposes), each dialogue should be accepted for its own merits and ideological terrain. For Chapman, one of the only differences between the authors is that Lucian trained his irony on the actual world, and Plato, "the heavens."

In Chapman's final judgment, the greatest misunderstanding of these two authors is that "Plato, the writer of fairy tales, has been accepted as the greatest philosopher of all time; while Lucian, the serious thinker, has been thought a trifler" (172). Chapman's main oversimplification, one that I would like to rebut, was that Lucian thought of Plato as merely another head of a philosophical school, and simply "disliked the caste" (176). The relationship between the work of Lucian and Plato is more complex than this.
While his approach is chatty and perhaps slim on textual analysis, it must be said that this was exactly Chapman's purpose: "The Nineteenth Century has left a hedge of critical literature about every great writer of antiquity. [...] Let us never read the learning of these investigators. Let us be ignorant, nimble, and enthusiastic" (2-3). In his chapter "Illustrations," he writes of his method: "my aim is to call attention to an author who has amused and instructed me, and may possibly do the same for others" (23). Although Chapman concedes that "[a]ccurate scholarship, when it prevails, is the epilogue to literature" (4), the fault of the lukewarm reception of the book lies as much with the expectations of the critic of The Classical Review, as it does with the author himself.

An approach similar to the one I take in this chapter can be found in Branham 1989, specifically the second chapter: "Agonistic Humors: Lucian and Plato." The fundamental connection between Plato and Lucian for Branham is humor. Plato developed a type of performance between sophists that shows a novel type of entertainment in the form of a combative sport. The difference between the common sense and common language of an interlocutor and sophist(s) in the Platonic dialogues leads to the general devaluing of the sophistic practice. In Lucian, however, the difference is linguistic as well as cultural. His focus is the tension between incompatible traditions: philosophical sects, language barriers, and intellectual hierarchy. One example of the difference between Plato and Lucian is that in the latter, humor and revelation are revealed through shift of perspective that is not in the control of the characters (102); in the former, Socrates never loses control over the conversation (81).
Branham also acknowledges the formal similarities between Lucian and Plato, for example, the *Anacharsis* is, generally speaking, modeled on Plato: in that dialogue, Lucian takes advantage of the tripartite division of the *Gorgias* (91). Lucian's use of Plato is therefore an example of the type of reception of Plato in the "Greek renaissance," as well as a chance to comment on philosophers both socially and as teachers (120-121). In Lucian's Platonic dialogues, then, the Platonic ideal of discourse is recalled, but never fully achieved (122). In short, Lucian echoes Plato formally, in presentation, in setting, and in his florid Attic style, and then deviates significantly from him (123).

Beyond these works, other points of contact between Plato and Lucian will be noted. For example, Whitmarsh 2005:46 compares the *Lexiphanes* with the *Symposium*; Anderson 1976:184 and Nesselrath 1985:82-84 make a connection, as I do below, between the *De parasito* and the *Gorgias*. Anderson 1976:7 connects aspects of the *Symposium* and *Nigrinus*, and, as I do, the *Rhetorum praeceptor* and the *Phaedrus* (184n.10). Helm 1906:35 and Marsh 1998:64 see portions of the *Piscator* modeled on the *Phaedo*. Marsh 1998:153, as well, connects *De parasito* with both the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium*.

2. *Rhetorum praeceptor* and *Phaedrus*: Idle Handbooks

As is the case for many of Lucian's works, the *Rhetorum Praeceptor* provides reasons to think of Plato and his dialogues. Notable is the mention of one of Socrates'
central interlocutors and a member of his inner circle, Cebes of Thebes from the *Phaedo*, along with three references to the *Pinax* or *Tabula* that had been erroneously attributed to him in antiquity (6). Another is the reference to Chaerephon's famous question to Apollo about Socrates that is so central to Plato's *Apology* (13). A last example is the suggestion that one method of learning rhetoric is the imitation of Plato, along with Demosthenes (9, 17).

There are perhaps only a few reasons to think specifically of Plato's *Phaedrus* when reading the *Rhetorum*. The idea of a speaker swathing his head in his mantle and "reviewing what has been said" (*Rhetorum* 21) is reminiscent of Socrates "keeping his head wrapped up while he speaks" during his first speech in the *Phaedrus* (237a). Another common theme is the combination of eroticism and rhetoric found in both works, which has at times posed a problem for commentators. Lastly, and perhaps most obviously, there is the citation from *Phaedrus* 246e at the very end of Lucian's *Rhetorum*:

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154 See Joly 1963 for this discussion, as well as support for a first century CE composition date (but no later than 70 CE since Dio Chrysostom 10.31-32 is taken as a quotation).
155 "Well, he once went to Delphi and made so bold a as to ask the oracle this question…for he asked if there was anyone wiser than I," 21a.
156 A natural pairing, also mentioned by Julius Pollux (second century CE) *Onomasticon* 2.120, 128, 129, 200, 3.89, 8.137; [Longinus] (first century CE) *De sublimitate* 14.1; Aelius Aristides 'ἐρωτ χορδί' 325.22; Hermogenes (second to third century CE) Περὶ ἰδεῶν 2.10; Libanius (4 c. CE) *Epistula* 1508.5.
158 "What is the subject of the *Phaedrus*? Are there two independent subjects, Love and Rhetoric, or is there some real bond of union between the two halves of the dialogue?" Hackforth 1928. Finding the unity of the dialogue has been approached in different ways. Nussbaum 1986 puts forth that the *Phaedrus* ultimately rejects the view of eros in the
...ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἠγεμόν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς, ἐλαύνων πτηνὸν ἅρμα, πρῶτος πορεύεται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος. (246e)

Now the great leader in heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes first, arranging all things and caring for all things.

There should be no great surprise at finding a reference to Plato's πτηνὸν ἅρμα, given the central position of the Phaedrus in Greek literature, especially in the Second Sophistic.\textsuperscript{159} There are direct references to the winged chariot in Philo,\textsuperscript{160} Plutarch,\textsuperscript{161} rhetorical handbooks,\textsuperscript{162} and elsewhere in Lucian.\textsuperscript{163} This direct reference just a few sentences before the end of Rhetorum, however, invites the reader to look back on the entire work and re-read it in light of the Phaedrus.

\textit{Republic} (see also her paper in Nussbaum and Sihvola 2002). Ferrari 1988:86-89 interprets the two themes as contrasting oratorical speech-making and philosophical speech. White 1993:176-179 looks at eros as a pull toward philosophical truth and an attempt to define that sort of life. The Introduction of Nehamas and Woodruff 1995, though it ultimately decided upon a rift between the themes of love and rhetoric in the dialogue, argues for an overlying theme of rhetoric for the work.

\textsuperscript{159} For a list of the uses of the Phaedrus in second-century Greek literature, see Trapp 1990.

\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Quis rerum divinarum heres sit} 301.

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum} 1102e, \textit{Quaestiones convivales} 740b.

\textsuperscript{162} Dionysius Halicarnassus \textit{De Demosthenis dictione} 7; Hermogenes Περὶ ἰδεῶν 1.6.

\textsuperscript{163} For example, \textit{Revivescentes} or \textit{Piscator} 22 and \textit{Bis accusatus} or \textit{Tribunalia} 33.
2.1. Rhetorical Instruction

The basic plan of both the *Phaedrus* and the *Rhetorum* is similar. In the beginning of the *Rhetorum* we are told that an adolescent youth (μειράκιον) has asked an older instructor how one can become a σοφιστής (1). As in the *Phaedrus*, the instructor also refers to the addressee as "boy" (παῖς, 1.24) and "young man" (νέος, 1.10, 8.8). Lucian immediately establishes the dynamic between the two characters in the monologue.164

This type of dynamic is more complicated with Plato. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates calls his interlocutor: "dear," "companion," "love," "dearest," "young man," "beautiful boy," and "boy." As we get farther into the dialogue, Phaedrus' youth is made more emphatic.166

In Plato's dialogue, Lysias' speech (230e-234c) is addressed to a young man by the "non-lover." The addressee is never referred to by any epithet, but, besides the context itself, there are references that make his age clearer, for example:

άλλ' ἱσως προσήκει...οὐδὲ ὅσος τῆς σῆς ὠρας ἀπολαύσονται, ἀλλ' οὔτινες πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν μεταδόσον. (233e-234a)

164 "The junior partner in a sexual relationship is called παῖς (or, of course, παῖδικα), even when he has reached adult height and hair has begun to grow on his face, so that he might be more appropriately called νεανίσκος, μειράκιον or ἐφήβος," (Dover 1978:85).

165 φίλος (227a, 229e, 230c, 275b); ἐταίρος (227b, 242c, 262c, 334d); φιλότης (228d); φίλτατος (235e); νεανίας (257d, 270e); καλλίπαιδα (261a); παῖς (267c). Socrates also uses: "divine" (δαίμονιος, 235c, 268a), "blessed" (μακάριος, 236d, 241e: also "of the upper class" in Attic), "best" (φέριστος, 238d), "most excellent" (ἀριστος, 239d, 269e), "noble" (ἄγαθος, 242b), "high-born" (γενναῖος, 277c, 243c).

166 This is not to say that Plato's characterization of Socrates is, generally speaking, representative of the more widespread views regarding such relationships in the fourth century, as Dover's 1964 article points out; also Dover 1989:153-170.
Perhaps you ought to grant favors...not to those who will enjoy your youthful beauty, but to those who will share their good things with you when you are older.

Socrates addresses both of his speeches in the *Phaedrus* to a "beautiful boy."\(^{167}\) The eroticism of Phaedrus' left hand and the scroll under his cloak\(^{168}\) is reinforced at 236cd when Phaedrus coerces Socrates to speak since they are alone, and the boy is "stronger (ισχυρότερος) and younger (νεώτερος)" than he.

There should be no surprise to see Socrates conversing with παιδες or νεοι. For examples we only need to look at the *Charmides, Lysis, Protagoras, Euthydemus, Republic* (cf. Polemarchus' idea at the start of the dialogue to go converse with οἱ νεοί, 1.328a), *Theaetetus, Sophist*, and the *Philebus*.

The middle and late Platonic dialogues, notably in the *Protagoras* and *Laws*, show consistent worry about the education of young men.\(^{169}\) The problem of the correct teacher for young men (οἱ παιδες) is of central importance in the *Laches*, where Lysimachus' son identifies the son of Sophroniscus for his father. In that dialogue, Socrates is mentioned as "always spending time wherever there is any such excellent study or pursuit for young men as you [Lysimachus] are seeking" (*Laches* 180c).\(^{170}\) Famously, one of the charges leveled against Socrates was that his discussions with the youth of Athens were a corrupting force (Φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα, *Apology* 24c).

\(^{167}\) παις καλός: 237c, 238d, 243e.
\(^{168}\) Cf. *Phaedrus* 228de and 236b.
\(^{169}\) *Protagoras* 326a: ὁ παις; *Laws* 6.766a, 7.809e: ἡ παιδον τροφή.
\(^{170}\) ἔπειτα ἐνταῦθα ἂεὶ τὰς διατριβὰς ποιούμενον ὅπου τί ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων ὃν σὺ ζητεῖς περὶ τοὺς νέους ἢ μάθημα ἢ ἐπιτήδευμα καλόν.
Plato uses νεανίσκος relatively few times in the dialogues. In the *Phaedo*, Phaedo is amazed at the way Socrates was so respectful to the criticisms τῶν νεανίσκων, that is, of his young followers, at his deathbed (89a). In the *Symposium*, Agathon is described by Aristodemos to Apollodorus as ὁ νεανίσκος (198a), and οἱ καλοὶ παῖδες and νεανίσκοι are used in conjunction in Diotima's speech to Socrates (211d). In the *Lysis*, the adolescent Lysis is called both a παῖς and νεανίσκος (205bc). Charmides is an object of mesmerized admiration in the dialogue of the same name: "Τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος, ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατε; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος; (Well, Socrates, what do you think of the young man? Hasn't he a splendid face?)" "Ὑπερφυῶς (extraordinary)," Socrates says.\(^{171}\)

Less often do we have Socrates speaking with μειράκια. Of notable example is the *Charmides*, where Socrates ventures that the lad, "at that age (τηλικοῦτος ὄν), wants to have a discussion (ἡδή ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι)" (154b). In the eponymous dialogue, Euthydemus is referred to repeatedly as a μειράκιον, as well as νεανίσκος (there is also a reference to Ktesippos' παιδικά at 274c). Socrates' first view of Agathon is as a μειράκιον in the *Protagoras* (315e). We note that in Lucian's *Rhetorum*, three of these epithets, παῖς, νέος, and μειράκιον, are all used for the young man.\(^{172}\) However, this evidence only shows a general connection between these themes in Plato's dialogues and Lucian's *Rhetorum*, not necessarily a direct connection with the *Phaedrus*.

\(^{171}\) The spurious *Hipparchus* and *Theages* also have uses at 229d and 122d, respectively.

\(^{172}\) In general, Lucian uses νεανίσκος about 52 times in his works, and not in the *Rhetorum*.
The erotic dynamic established in both of the works is consistent with the common Platonic connection of eroticism and education.\textsuperscript{173} This type of beginning--that of an older man speaking to a young (or younger) boy--also directly references the long-standing tradition of didactic handbooks. West (1978:3-25), in his commentary on Hesiod's *W&D*, discusses the Indo-European tradition of this model, starting around 2500 BCE. The full span is not as relevant to our discussion of Lucian, but his shorter discussion of Greek examples (*Ibid.* 22-25) is important. *The Precepts of Chiron*, attributed to Hesiod, has the Centaur teaching moral lessons to the boy Achilles. In Hippias' prose work of moral instruction, he chose to speak of Nestor and the young son of Neoptolemus, who "asks by what means a young man such as himself should strive for fame" (*Ibid.*). It is with this type of question in Hippias' work that we should look again to the *Rhetorum*. So far, we have discovered that the connection between the two dialogues is one that involves a long-standing tradition, and it remains to show that the connection runs deeper.

2.2. Rhetoric and Desire

Both the *Phaedrus* and the *Rhetorum* immediately introduce the topic of speechmaking. The *Rhetorum* begins with a reiteration of the question to the instructor: the boy has asked how to become a public speaker (ῥήτωρ), personify the name of σοφιστής (perhaps not the boy's words), and when speaking "clothe himself in eloquence"

\textsuperscript{173} "Indeed, the philosophical paiderastia which is fundamental to Plato's expositions in *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* is essentially an exaltation, however starved of bodily pleasure, of a consistent Greek tendency to regard homosexual eros as a compound of an educational with a genital relationship," (Dover 1989:202).
In the first dozen lines of the *Phaedrus*, Lysias, "the cleverest writer of our day" (228a), and his speeches are mentioned, as well as οἱ λόγοι generally. A main question throughout Plato's dialogue is how and from whom one might acquire "the truly rhetorical and persuasive art" (τὴν τε ὑπὸ ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην, 269d). In both works, this initial set-up of the instructor-student dynamic and the introduction of rhetorical analysis suggest to the reader a rhetorical handbook. Though rhetorical handbooks are never in dialogue form, the promise of such instruction is pervasive here. This promise is unfulfilled in both works, but the disappointment occurs in unexpected ways.

In the *Rhetorum*, the goal of the instruction will be such eloquence that, we are told, it provides a certain "invincibility and irresistibility" (ἀμαχον...καὶ ἀνυπόστατον), and allows one to be "admired and stared at by everyone." Without such powers, we are told the boy has said, "life is not worth living" (1). Rhetoric is established as a practical and effective goal perhaps primarily, but its acquisition also provides one with a level of fame and success that is no less valuable in the second century.\(^{174}\) This desire will be cast in more erotic terms as Lucian's dialogue continues.

The epithets ῥήτωρ and σοφιστής in the Second Sophistic coexist and seem to mean very close to the same thing. As Bowersock writes, they certainly seemed to have had differences that meant something to the men at this time (14), and there were some

\(^{174}\) For the idea of rhetoric in Aristides as an "amulet" that safeguards justice, see Walker 2000:111-112.
legal differences. Nevertheless, similarities are prevalent, e.g., either *rhetores* or *sophists* might or might not be teachers. His conclusion is that the term "σοφιστής," denoting a certain professionalism, represents a category within the general group of ῥήτωρ (13), but they are basically the same (14). Other scholars have added that the aspect of large public performances is the purview of the sophist (e.g., Whitmarsh 2001). Therefore, along with the increase of competition as well as a difference in audience (and thus success), there does seem to be a certain tension between the terms.

The two terms are found paired in Lucian, and their uses are consistent with Bowersock's conclusion. The *Macrobius*, perhaps by Lucian, mentions "Gorgias of the orators, whom some call sophist" (Ῥητόρων δὲ Γοργίας, ὃν τινες σοφιστήν καλοῦσιν, 23). In the *Pseudologista*, after the target of the tirade had overcome his low beginnings and reached some success, he became "now a public speaker and sophist" (νῦν ῥήτωρ καὶ σοφιστής). The first sentence in the *Rhetorum* is the only time Lucian uses σοφιστής in the work; the rest of the time the speaker promises the boy will be a *rhetor*, which is what he has apparently asked to become (cf. 1, 14). The second "instructor," the narrator of the work imitates, is also a *rhetor* and in the imitation he calls himself the best of all public speakers (Ῥητόρων τὸν ἄριστον, 13).

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175 For example, the privilege of µὴ κρίνειν, not serving on a jury, was extended to ῥήτορες, γραμματικοὶ, ἰατροὶ, and ϕιλόσοφοι, *Digest* 27.1.8; Bowersock 1969:33; Swain 1996:268.
176 This seems consistent with Plato's view in the fourth century: "Sophist and orator, my estimable friend, are the same thing, or very nearly such-like" (ταυτόν, ὃ μακάρι, ἐστίν σοφιστής καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγὺς τι καὶ παραπλῆσιον, *Gorgias* 520a).
177 Sections 4, 6, 7, 11, 15, and 24.
178 Sections 12, 13, and 25.
In response to the request, the boy is promised advice, which is "a sacred matter." He has asked which are the roads that lead to his goal (τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἁγιόσας ὀδοὺς αἰτινές ποτὲ εἰσιν, 1). As much as it is in the instructor's power, the boy will be an able hand at discerning what is to be said and then expressing it in words.\(^{179}\) In order to accomplish this, the boy must abide by the advice, practice it industriously, and follow the road resolutely (προθύμως ἀνύειν τὴν ὁδὸν, 1.19). The object of his quest calls for great effort and hard work: he must diminish his sleep, and put up with anything.

After mentioning all the numerous "nobodies" (μηδὲν ὄντες ἐνδοξοι) that have become wealthy because of their eloquence, the instructor tells our student he must not become dismayed by thinking that he must undergo untold labors before he achieves his goals (2.4-3.3). In fact, he will not be sending the boy on the "rough, steep, or sweaty road"\(^{180}\) so that he turns back out of frustration (ἐκ μέσης αὐτῆς ἀναστρέψαι καμόντα, 3). If he were to do that, he would be no better than the other guides who use the customary route (τὴν συνήθη ἐκείνην), "long, steep, toilsome, and, as a rule, hopeless" (μακρὰν καὶ ἀνάντη καὶ καματηρὰν καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀπεγνωσμένην, 8-9). His advice will send the boy to rhetoric as if "a leisurely stroll through flowery fields and perfect shade in great comfort and luxury by a sloping path that is very pleasant,"\(^{181}\) and will provide the goal without sweat, as well as "every blessing there is from rhetoric, in an instant, as if

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\(^{179}\) *Rhetorum* 1.15-6: ἔση γνῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι αὐτά; Cf. Thucydides 2.60: εἶναι γνῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσας ταῦτα. As we will see, the echo of Pericles in Thucydides will be frustrated, and the boy will learn neither what needs to be said under circumstances nor how to express anything in words.

\(^{180}\) οὐ γὰρ σε τραχεῖαν τινα ὀυδὲ ὀρθὸν καὶ ἱδρώτος μεστήν ἡμείς ἄξομεν, 3.

\(^{181}\) ἡδίστην τε ἁμα καὶ ἐπιτομοτάτην καὶ ὑπηλατὸν καὶ κατάντη σὺν πολλῇ τῇ θυμηδίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ διὰ λειμώνων εὐσανθῶν καὶ σκιαὶ ἀκριβοὺς σχολῆ, 3.
sleeping" (ἅπαντα ἐν βραχεὶ ὁσα ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ παρὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς μονονουχὶ καθεύδων λαβὼν, 3).

By the end of Rhetorum 3, we have established the two roads to eloquence that will make up the rest of the dialogue: one hard, toilsome, and frustrating, the one that our speaker took; the other easy, simple, and quick. The instructor begins by promoting the more difficult path (1-2) and then switches to discussing the easier (starting at 3). Clearly, the simple, lazier path will be the most desirable, especially to the mind of the simpler, lazier student. This first advertisement seems odd when we find out that our instructor seems to push the potential student toward another teacher, a representative of the easier path to rhetoric (whom he imitates)(8). The possibility of both paths being taught by the same teacher is not given as an option, but given the competition at the time few instructors at this time would seriously push away a potential student unless the instructor has something else in mind.182

The images of two diverging roads are long-allegorized images, as in Xenophon183 and in the Pinax of Cebes. Without denying Lucian's appreciation of this tradition, I propose that Plato is the source for the image of the roads to rhetoric for Lucian.

For the relevance of the two roads regarding virtue and vice, at Republic 364cd Plato quotes Hesiod from the Works & Days. The Hesiod text runs:

τὴν μὲν τοις κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
ῥηθισος· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μᾶλα δ᾽ ἐγγύθη ναίειν·
tῆς δ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἐθηκαν
ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὀρθοὶς οἴμοις ἐς αὐτὴν

182 For competition in the Second Sophistic, see Whitmarsh 2005:37-40.
183 Memorabilia 2.1.21: "The Choice of Herakles."
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶν δ’ εἰς ἄκρον ἰκηταί,
ῥηιδίη δὴ ἐπείτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ ἐνοῦσα. (287-292)

Vice in abundance is easy to get;
The road is smooth and begins beside you,
But the gods have put sweat between us and virtue,
Long and steep is the path that leads to her
And it is rough at first; but when a man has reached the top,
Then she is easy to reach though before she was hard.

Adeimantus quotes these lines, with some minor changes, to illustrate the ease of
the vicious path in stark contrast with the steep road of virtue:

τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
ῥηιδίως λείη μὲν ὁδὸς, μᾶλα δ’ ἐγγύθη ναίεν
τῆς δ’ ἄρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
καὶ τινα ὁδὸν μακρὰν τε καὶ τραχεὰν καὶ ἀνάντη. (Republic 364cd)

Vice in abundance is easy to get;
The road is smooth and begins beside you,
But the gods have put sweat between us and virtue,
and a road that is long, rough, and steep.

The last line of the text from the Republic is no longer a quote from W&D, but a
partial summary of Hesiod's lines 290-291. Plato has altered the lines from Hesiod to
disallow for the eventual ease of virtuous toil that runs through the poem. For Plato the
important work against vice never grows easier, and it is the same situation for Lucian's
difficult road to rhetoric. Adeimantus' identification of the long, steep path in direct
opposition to the ease of the vicious provides an important model for Lucian's two paths
to rhetoric.
Specific to the art of speech and writing, however, the *Phaedrus* also provides an image of the roads to rhetoric.\(^{184}\) At the end of the dialogue, after the long discussion of the proper type of rhetoric that has lasted forty-five of the fifty-two OCT pages,\(^{185}\) there is the following exchange:

\[
\{\Sigma\Omega.\} \quad \ldots \quad "\text{Tī dī hūn; fīśeī ïsōs ō sūnggraφeūs, ō Phaïdrē te kai Sóκrateīs, dōkeī oūtōs; µī ἄλλως πως ἀποδεκτέων λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης;}"
\]

\[
\{ΦΑI.\} \quad Aδύνατόν που, ὦ Σόκρατες, ἄλλως· καίτοι οὐ σμικρόν ὑ ε φαίνεται ἔργον.
\]

\[
\{\SigmaΩ.\} \quad \text{Αληθῆ λέγεις, τούτου τοῦ ἕνεκα χρῆ πάντας τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταστρέφοντα ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰ τίς πη ρήμων καὶ βραχυτέρα φαίνεται ἐπὶ αὐτὴν ὁδὸς, ἵνα µὴ µάτην πολλῆν ἀπὶ καὶ τραχεῖαν, ἐξὸν ὀλίγην τε καὶ λείαν. (272b)}
\]

Socrates:  "Now then," perhaps the writer [of our rhetorical handbook] will say, "Phaedrus and Socrates, do you agree to all this? Or must the art of speech be described in some other way?"

Phaedrus:  No other way is possible, Socrates. But it seems no small task.

Socrates:  Very true. Therefore you must examine all that has been said from every point of view, to see if no shorter and easier road to the art appears, that one may not take a long and rough road, when there is a short and smooth one.

We find that Socrates’ version of rhetorical instruction (if possible to achieve at all) will not be gained without diligent toil: "If the path is long, do not be amazed; for it must be trodden for great ends" (εἰ µακρὰ ἡ περίοδος, µὴ θαυµάσῃς· µεγάλων γὰρ ἕνεκα περιτέον, 274a).

\(^{184}\) It should not be a surprise if the images in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus* were somehow related. Given the possible order of composition, one would perhaps call the *Phaedrus* the first use of the image of the paths, though the *Republic* perhaps names the original impetus for the contrast, namely Hesiod’s text.

\(^{185}\) As in Burnet 1967.
After some of the preliminary references to the two roads to rhetoric, and before the proper descriptions of the roads at section 9, we have a type of rhetorical display. This exhibition emphasizes the references to the *Phaedrus*, and the preference for the shorter, easier path. It features a quotation of Demosthenes *Philippics* (1.44.15) that the teacher should be believed to be acting out of friendship (4)—friendship also being an important theme in the *Phaedrus*. Then comes the common reference to Hesiod (*Theogony* 30-34) and the inspiration of the muses on Helicon to show that one can quickly and pleasantly become the inferior *rhetor*, an easy task when compared to the work of becoming a great poet (5). Next is the story of Alexander (Pliny *NH* 6.145) and the trade route the Sidonian merchant took him on to get him to Egypt, that is, the path from Persepolis into the mountains, over the head of the Persian Gulf, picking up the trade route from Alexandria to Petra (5). Notably, while this would have been much shorter than the normal route (Susa, Babylon, Damascus), this route may not have been any quicker (Harmon 1992:140-141). Alexander did not believe his guide, says the instructor, and regretted it; so should the student not pass up a chance to "become a public speaker in a single day" (6).

The instructor mentions that he will "paint you a picture in words, like Cebes of old," to illustrate both roads to the student (6). As mentioned above, the *Pinax* or *Tabula* was attributed to the Socratic Cebes in antiquity. In that text, a wanderer in the temple of Saturn stands before a painting, perplexed by its imagery. It is only because an old wise

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186 At sections 1-2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
187 E.g., Price 1989.
man (γῆρος) takes him through the symbolism of the painting that he gains any understanding of it at all. This reference further emphasizes the significance of an instructor regarding rhetorical training. For Lucian, if there are no real instructors or guides, then the number of those who are deluded also increases, no matter how successful they seem.

The instructor begins by describing Rhetoric, who sits at the ends of the two roads:

καὶ δῆτα ἡ μὲν ἑφ' ὑψηλοῦ καθήσθω πάνυ καλὴ καὶ εὐπρόσωπος, τὸ τῆς Ἀμαλθείας κέρας ἔχουσα ἐν τῇ δεξίᾳ παντοῖος καρποῖς ὑπερβρύον· ἐπὶ δεύτερά δὲ μοι τὸν πλοῦτον δόκει παρεστώτα ὁρᾶν, χρυσοῦν ὅλον καὶ ἐπέραστον. καὶ ἡ δόξα δὲ καὶ ἡ ἰσχὺς παρέστωσαν, καὶ οἱ ἔπαινοι περὶ πᾶσαν αὐτήν Ἐρωτα μικροίς ἐοικότες πολλοὶ ἀπανταχῶθεν περιπλεκέσθωσαν ἐκπετόμενοι. (6)

So let her be sitting upon a high place, very fair of face and form, holding in her right hand the cornucopia, which runs over in all manner of fruits. Beside her imagine that you see Wealth standing, all golden and lovely. Let fame and power stand by, and let compliments, resembling tiny Cupids, swarm all around her on the wing in great numbers from every side.

The "compliments" (οἱ ἔπαινοι) resemble another painting, that of representations of the Nile. In the start of this extemporaneous "painting in words," the instructor works to sexualize the boy's love for rhetoric. He adds that the "compliments" (ἔπαινοι) are little Ἐρωτα, and it may be that "winged" (ἐκπετόμενοι) eroticism is meant to lead us back to the image of the winged chariot in Phaedrus (246a). Rhetoric is seen here with every advantage and symbol of success a rhetor could achieve: wealth, fame, power, and love, nothing left out that would impress an ambitious boy.

This preliminary section includes text from Demosthenes, events in the lives of Hesiod and Alexander, descriptions of the Pinax and Lucian's two paths to rhetoric, and a
graphic representation of the Nile. We move, therefore, from words alone, to descriptions of events that are properly called *ekphrastic*, to pictures "painted only in words," eventually ending on a description of a real painting.

The connection between writing and pictures should also remind us of Socrates' words in the *Phaedrus*:

> Δεινὸν γὰρ ποι, ὦ Φαίδρε, τούτ' ἔχει γραφὴ, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁμοιον ζωγραφία. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἔστηκε μὲν ὡς ζώντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σημ. ταυτὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· δόξαις μὲν ἄν ὡς τι φρονούντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δὲ τι ἔρη τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταυτὸν ἀδεί. (275de)

Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing.

This text has direct relevance to the *Pinax* of Cebes, as well as the type of description the professor of rhetoric will be providing the student. Further, Plato's placement of illusive writing, which "one might think spoke as if with intelligence," alongside solemn, silent painting in the *Phaedrus* illustrates that neither of these arts alone can instruct a student, since both are naturally deceptive. As I hope to show, the instructor of the easier path to rhetoric is much like Plato's characterization of writing and painting. That is, he will deceive the student into thinking he has something to say and that he speaks with intelligence, when in fact he merely says "one and the same thing," in this case superficial tricks of rhetoric that have no relationship to knowledge.

These references to authors and events are all consistent with the typical time-frame and set of themes in sophistic displays (5th-3rd century BCE): our instructor of
rhetoric could be one of Philostratus' sophists. This display sets up Lucian's description of the two roads to rhetoric as a type of ekphrastic discourse that is found among good generic company. The lessons learned from these references—trusting an instructor, the ease of instruction, taking advice when it is given, and the benefit of exegetical instruction to a student—are all given alongside references with high pedigree. The substance of the instruction in this case, however, is extremely limited.

In the *Rhetorum*, the instructor calls the boy the would-be lover of rhetoric, "of whom he seems especially enamored" (6), and further underscores his desire:

Πρόσει δὴ σὺ ὁ ἑραστής ἐπιθυμῶν δηλαδὴ ὃτι τάχιστα γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς ἄκρας, ὡς γαμήσεις τε αὐτὴν ἀνελθὼν καὶ πάντα ἐκεῖνα ἔχοις, τὸν πλοῦτον τὴν δόξαν τοὺς ἐπαίνους· νόμωρ γὰρ ἄπαντα γίνεται τοῦ γεγαμηκότος. (6-7)

Now you, her lover, approach, desiring, of course, to get upon the summit with all speed in order to marry her when you get there, and to possess all that she has—the wealth, the fame, the compliments; for by law everything accrues to the husband.

The sexual desire for the personified "Lady Rhetoric" pushes the discussion toward the immediacy and need of the easier and quicker path. To this is added further emphasis on the difficulty of gaining rhetorical skill. Our speaker again describes the mountain as a desperate climb and precipitous from every side, the type of climb that calls for a Dionysius or a Heracles (7). But the frustration of not yet reaching his goal would only be immediate, since the boy "in a short time will see the two roads" (ἐῖτα μετ' ὄλιγον ὁρᾶς δύο τινὰς ὀδοὺς), one precipitous and rough, the other simple and easy, "like taking a stroll" (7). Whereas erotic desire and rhetoric are immediately coupled by the dynamic between the speakers and the themes of the speeches in the *Phaedrus*, a
quarter of the way through the *Rhetorum* this theme is fully established beyond the teacher/student relationship.

### 2.3. The Roads to Rhetoric

In his constant reference to the two roads of rhetoric, the instructor acknowledges his own repetitiveness: the easy path is "just as I described it a moment ago, not to detain you by saying the same things over and over when you might even now be a speaker" (7-8). He then goes on to describe the difficult path once again, adding information about the relatively few tracks of those who have chosen it.

The issue of repetition is also found in the *Phaedrus*. Just after Socrates hears Lysias' speech, he comments by "looking at the speech rhetorically":

καὶ οὖν μοι ἐδοξέν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, δίς καὶ τρίς τὰ αὐτά εἰρηκέναι, ὡς οὖ πάνυ εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἦ ἵσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου· καὶ ἐφαίνετο δὴ μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικτὸς ὡς οἶός τε ὡν ταῦτα ἐτέρως τε καὶ ἐτέρως λέγων ἄμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα. (235a)

It seemed to me, Phaedrus, unless you disagree, that he said the same thing two or three times, as if he did not find it easy to say many things about one subject, or perhaps he did not care about such a detail; and he appeared to me in youthful fashion to be exhibiting his ability to say the same thing in two different ways and in both ways excellently.

Socrates, with a touch of irony, repeats himself in his analysis. Repetition is acknowledged in both the *Phaedrus* and *Rhetorum* as indicating little organizational sophistication, a deficiency of arrangement (διάθεσις or *dispositio*), which is a conventional section of any ancient rhetorical handbook. This lack of organization reaches the level of farce in Lucian, when the imitated teacher of rhetoric shows an impressively
underdeveloped sense of composition in his speech. Again, he seems to say a tremendous amount, but clearly says nothing of substance.

It was the rough and steep path the speaker in the *Rhetorum* had taken, being too young to know better: he had believed with Hesiod that "blessings are engendered of toil." The reference to difficulty and reward echoes the description of honest work by Socrates in the *Phaedrus*. In answer to the charge that is does not seem possible to follow the path to rhetoric as described, Socrates says "it is always noble to strive after what is noble, no matter what happens to us" (ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑπιχειροῦντι τοι τοῖς καλοῖς καλὸν καὶ πάσχειν ὃτι ἂν τῷ σωμῆ παθεῖν, 274ab). But this road was not worth all the work for the instructor, since most people all around him seem to be given greater returns without as much labor (8). The instructor then advises him in the easiest way of reaching the end of the path, so that the boy is not duped in the same way and does not spend his time in excessive toil (8). It is then we meet the personifications of the two types of paths.

The description of the guide of the difficult path seems erotically charged: vigorous (καρτερός), muscular (ὑπόσκληρος), with a manly stride (ἀνδρώδης τὸ βάδισμα), heavily tanned (πολὺ τὸν ἥλιον ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι), bold-eyed (ἀρρενωπός¹⁸⁹ τὸ βλέμμα) and alert (ἐγρηγορῶς). The "nonsense" of his instructor's advice, which our speaker accepted, will be to follow in the footprints of Demosthenes, Plato, "and one or

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¹⁸⁸ An allusion to *Works & Days* 289-291: "The immortal gods have put sweat before virtue" (τῆς δ' ἄρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν/ἀθάνατοι). The immediately preceding lines 287-288--"Vice in abundance is easy to get; the road is smooth and begins beside you"--are also relevant; all of these lines from Hesiod are quoted by Adeimantus in *Republic* 364cd.

¹⁸⁹ LSJ s.v. ἀρρενωπός: cum εὐμορφία ("beautiful in form"), Lucian *Scytha* 11.
two more" who have left "great prints, too great for men nowadays, but for the most part
dim and indistinct from lapse of time" (μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ὑπὲρ τούς νῦν, ἀμαυρὰ δὲ ἤδη καὶ ἀσωφὴ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου, 9). This type of imitation is the proper, licit path: the
boy "will find happiness by obtaining a lawful marriage with Rhetoric" (εὐδαιμονά σε ἐσεσθαι καὶ νόμῳ γαμήσειν τὴν Ῥητορικήν, 9). Early in the work, then, there is a
judgment by Lucian of orators who have taken the quicker, easier path, and, as a result,
have reached some of the greatest success.

By the Hellenistic period, imitation of classic literary models was regarded as the
basis for attaining excellence in style. In Dionysius' De imitatione, imitation is an
actualization (ἐνέργεια) modeled on the example by means of inspection. Alternatively,
emulation (ζῆλος) is "an actualization of the soul (of a writer) set in motion at admiration
of what seems to be beautiful" (Kennedy 1997:29). In the Phaedrus, Socrates would
follow and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a god" the man who can see how many
things can be collected into one and divided into many (266b). It may also be that the
source of Lucian's echo of footprints in Plato is a common one, since Socrates is quoting
here a formulaic line from Homer.

The instructor emphasizes the precariousness of such instruction. This type of
imitation is like the path of a ropedancer--one misstep and one falls from the path. If
Lucian's Pro lapsu inter salutandum is any indication, the slightest obscure or
inappropriate word in the second century would incur invective. For example, the

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190 This practice has a Classical foundation: cf. Isocrates' Against the Sophists 13.16-17
(where students pattern themselves after instructors).
191 ὁ δὲ ἐπείτα μετ' Ίχνια βαΐνε θεόιο, Odyssey 2.405, 3.30, 5.193, 7.38.
Pseudologista is a defense of the speaker, perhaps Lucian himself, who misused the feminine ἀποφράς.

The slightest misstep out of their footprints, then, and the boy will fall from the lawful path (9). The boy must imitate these ancient worthies, which is a task "far from easy" (9). Such a journey will necessitate little sleep, no wine, untidiness, and, what is worse, it will take years, an idea that hearkens back to the admonition the instructor gave in section 2. It is no help that the instruction would also cost a huge sum in advance: he demands "no small fee for all these hardships."^192 We see that little has changed since Plato's Phaedrus:

> But tell me now, what name to give to those who are taught by you and Lysias, or is this that art of speech by means of which Thrasymachus and the rest have become able speakers themselves, and make others so, if they are willing to pay them royal tribute (ὡς βασιλεύσιν)? (266C)

Everything about the advice in the Rhetorum is meant to discourage the type of student who desires simplicity, immediate fame, and unbridled admiration.

In the end, this instructor is an "imposter, old man, and truly out-of-date" (ἀλαζών¹⁹³ καὶ ἄρχαῖος ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ Κρονικὸς ἄνθρωπος) who displays long-buried

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¹⁹² Money is oddly treated in these dialogues. The instant wealth of the sophist is thematic in the Lucian piece (e.g., Wealth stands beside Rhetoric in the image at 6). At the end of the Phaedrus (279bc), Socrates prays that all his external possessions be in harmony with his inner man (τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναι μοι φίλω) and that he only have as much wealth as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure.

¹⁹³ Usually meaning "vagabond," ἀλαζών becomes a common term for sophistic pretender in Plato (LSJ s.v. ἀλαζών: "a false pretender, impostor, quack, of Sophists, Ar. Plat., etc."). The word is often applied to sophistic speeches, cf., Phaedo 92d: "I am conscious that those arguments which base their demonstrations on mere probability are deceptive, and if we are not on our guard against them they deceive us greatly (ὅδε τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις σύνοιδα οὐσὶν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτοὺς μή
speeches as if they are helpful (10). A good number of the exercises in the Second Sophistic use long-resolved themes and events, involving for example Troy\textsuperscript{194} or the Persian war.\textsuperscript{195} As a direct criticism against many of the declamatory sophists of the second century, our speaker complains that the instructor of the difficult path discusses these ancient speeches even when there is no more Philip or Alexander, long after these speeches could be helpful or practical (10). The rough guide of the difficult path does not know what a short easy road has recently been opened, says the speaker (10), a path that had been taken by many in the second century. The boy should therefore say goodbye to the "hairy, unduly masculine" fellow early on, and, if he is truly in love with rhetoric, let him lead others to toil away, "sweating" (10). There is every reason to identify this now insulted creature with the speaker himself, if not in person, then in spirit.

We are next introduced to the other guide, our other teacher of rhetoric. The original speaker, after warning that he should not talk on behalf of such an accomplished orator for fear of putting the hero out of countenance, provides an interpretation of the guide of the easy path. He does this under the pretense of providing what lessons the boy will learn under this other teacher of rhetoric: how to speak well and eloquently. It is at this point in Lucian's work that we expect to get our rules concerning the rhetorical art.

\textsuperscript{194} Dio Chrysostom's \textit{Troica} attempts to prove to the inhabitants of Ilium that Homer was a liar and that Troy was never taken.

\textsuperscript{195} In Philostratus' \textit{Imagines}, we find Themistocles speaking Persian at the royal court, trying to persuade the Persians to renounce their oriental luxury for the joys of the simple Greek life, 2.31.1.
The delicate fellow of the more recent, easier path is "wholly clever and wholly handsome" but physically the opposite of the other guide--with "a mincing gait and a thin neck, a feminine eye, and a honeyed voice; he distils perfume, scratches his head with the tip of his finger, and carefully dresses his hair, which is scanty" (11). It seems that the beautiful ideal from the fourth century has been altered to seem affected and less than appealing.

We have accounts of the fame of such effete orators, and indications about the level of attention they paid to appearance.\textsuperscript{196} Favorinus, the historian, philosopher, and sophist, was described as a (congenital) eunuch but was extremely popular and unbelievably successful in the second century (\textit{Polemo Physiognomics} 1.160-4). He also may very well be the target of Lucian's \textit{Eunuch} (Gleason 1995:3).

At the same time, a charge of effeminacy was undesired. Herodes Atticus, having been praised for a speech, replied: "Read Polemo's declamation and then you will know a man" (\textit{VS} 539).\textsuperscript{197} Euodianus' speeches were praised for having "nothing female or ignoble about them" (\textit{VS} 596). Aristides compares a peer's oratory to a hermaphrodite or eunuch (\textit{κατὰ τῶν ἕξορχουμένων 48}).\textsuperscript{198} Lucian writes that the inspired poet, if he wants to, can

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{196} Cf. Gleason 1994.
\item \textsuperscript{197} "τὴν Πολέμουος" ἔφη "μελέτην ἀνάγνωτε καὶ ἔσσεσθε ἄνδρα."
\item \textsuperscript{198} See Gleason 1995 for the susceptibility of sophists regarding the charge of effeminate behavior; also Gunderson 2000, Connolly 2003, and Whitmarsh 2005.
\end{itemize}
harness winged horses to a chariot\textsuperscript{199} and no one cares--but adding poetry to history is like dressing a rugged athlete in the purple dress and the make-up "of a prostitute."\textsuperscript{200}

In the \textit{Phaedrus}, this type of boy is going to be desired by the non-lover above the many "manly" lads around him. The description of him in Socrates' first speech matches the description of the guide of the easy path to rhetoric, and is the direct opposite of our rougher instructor:

\begin{quote}
\textquote{όφθησετα δή μαλθακόν τινα καὶ οὔ στερεόν διώκων, οὔδ' ἐν ἡλίῳ καθαρῷ τεθραμμένον ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ συμμυγεί σκιᾶ, πόνοιν μὲν ἀνδρείων καὶ ἱδρώτων ξηρῶν ἄπειρον, ἐμπειρον δὲ ἀπαλῆς καὶ ἁνάνδρου διαίτης, ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι καὶ κόσμοις χήτειν οἰκείοιν κοσμούμενον, ὅσι τε ἄλλα τούτως ἔπεται πάντα ἐπιτηδεύοντα, ὧ δῆλα καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον περαιτέρω προβαίνειν, ἀλλὰ ἐν κεφάλαιον ὀρισσαμένους ἐπ᾽ ἄλλο ἴνει. (239cd)}
\end{quote}

He will plainly court a beloved who is effeminate, not virile, not brought up in the pure sunshine, but in mingled shade, unused to manly toils and the sweat of exertion, but accustomed to a delicate and unmanly mode of life, adorned with a bright complexion of artificial origin, since he has none by nature, and in general living a life such as all this indicates, which it is certainly not worthwhile to describe further.

Such a boy gives courage to his enemies and fills his friends and lovers with fear in all wars and important crises (239d).\textsuperscript{201} The impression of the instructor in the \textit{Rhetorum}, then, when read alongside this section of the \textit{Phaedrus}, is less than inspiring.

Given the descriptions of the two guides, we observe another example of the common trope that one's words match one's heart and outward appearance. The reference to Herakles in \textit{Rhetorum} 7 along with the conceit of the two roads to rhetoric can be seen

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\textsuperscript{199} κὰν ἵππων ὑποπτέρων ἄρμα ζεύξασθαι ἐθάλη, another reference in Lucian to the chariot in the \textit{Phaedrus}.
\textsuperscript{200} ἐταρικώ, \textit{Quomodo historia conscribenda sit} 8.
\textsuperscript{201} Compare the descriptions of the philosopher and rhetorician on the battlefield in the \textit{De parasito} (40-41).
\end{flushright}
as based on the story Virtue and Vice in Prodicus' famous parable, as reported in Xenophon.\textsuperscript{202} Formally, there are great similarities between the descriptions of the \textit{rhetores} and Virtue and Vice. Compare for example the descriptions of the men above with the \textit{Memorabilia} (2.21):

\begin{quote}
\begin{small}
tήν μὲν ἐτέραν ἐνυπρεπῆ τε ἱδεῖν καὶ ἐλευθέριον φύσει, κεκοσμημένην τὸ μὲν σώμα καθαρότερτι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα αἰδοῖ, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα σωφροσύνη, ἐσθήτα δὲ λευκῇ, τήν δ' ἐτέραν τεθραμμένην μὲν εἰς πολυσαρκίαν τε καὶ ἀπαλότητα, κεκαλλωπισμένην δὲ τὸ μὲν χρώμα ὡστε λευκοτέραν τε καὶ ἐρυθροτέραν τοῦ ὄντος δοκεῖν φαίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα ὡστε δοκεῖν ὀρθοτέραν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, ἐσθήτα δὲ ἐξ ἦς ἄν μᾶλλον ὁρα διαλάμποι: κατασκοπεῖσθαι δὲ θαμὰ ἑαυτὴν, ἐπισκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ τὰς ἄλλος αὐτὴν θεᾶται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς σκίαν ἀποβλέπειν.
\end{small}
\end{quote}

The one was fair to see and of high bearing; and her limbs were adorned with purity, her eyes with modesty; sober was her figure, and her robe was white. The other was plump and soft, with high feeding. Her face was made up to heighten its natural white and pink, her figure to exaggerate her height. She was open-eyed, and dressed so as to disclose all her charms. Now she eyed herself, looked whether anyone noticed her, and often stole a glance at her own shadow.

There is great interest in both descriptions in the eyes. One has her eyes adorned "with modesty" (αἰδοί) and the other is "open-eyed" (τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα) in Xenophon; one has a "feminine" (γυναίκειον) eye and the other is "bold-eyed" (ἄρρενωπὸς) in Lucian. A certain vanity also characterizes one member of each pair. But it is also helpful to look at the description of the two horses in the \textit{Phaedrus}:

\begin{quote}
\begin{small}
tῶν δὲ ἐδὴ ἵππων ὁ μὲν, φαμέν, ἀγαθός, ὁ δ' οὖ- ἀρετή δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διείσμενον, νῦν δὲ λεκτέον. ὁ μὲν τοιών αὐτοῖν ἐν τῇ καλλίον στάσει ζῶν τὸ τε εἶδος ὀρθός καὶ διηρθρωμένος, ὑψαύχη, ἐπίγρυπος, λευκός ἱδεῖν, μελανόμματος, τιμῆς ἑραστῆς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοὺς, καὶ ἀληθινῆς
\end{small}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{202} As a neos, the student in the \textit{Rhetorum} is the same age as Heracles when he had his encounter with Virtue and Vice, when "the young became independent and show whether they are going to approach life by the path of goodness or by the path of wickedness," (Xenophon, \textit{Memorabilia} 2.1.21).
δόξης ἑταῖρος, ἄπληκτος, κελεύσματι μόνον καὶ λόγῳ ἵνισχείται· ὁ δὲ αὐθεντικός, πολύς, εἰκῇ συμπεριφορημένος, κρατεραύχηλος, συμπρόσωπος, μελάγχος, γλαυκόμματος, ὑφαιμος, ὑβρεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος, περί ὡτα λάσιος, κωφός, μᾶστιγι μετὰ κέντρον μόης ὑπείκων. (253de)

Now of the horses we say one is good and the other bad; but we did not define what the goodness of the one and the badness of the other was. That we must now do. The horse that stands at the right hand is upright and has clean limbs; he carries his neck high, has an aquiline nose, is white in color, and has dark eyes; he is a friend of honor joined with temperance and modesty, and a follower of true glory; he needs no whip, but is guided only by the word of command and by reason. The other, however, is crooked, heavy, ill put together, his neck is short and thick, his nose flat, his color dark, his eyes grey and bloodshot; he is the friend of insolence and pride, is shaggy-eared and deaf, hardly obedient to whip and spurs.

The descriptions of the instructors in the Rhetorum, when we add their words to their physical description, strikingly match the descriptions of the horses in the Phaedrus, more so, it seems to me, than the Heraclean Ladies of Xenophon. In the Rhetorum, the first guide is not explicitly described as temperate and modest. There is nothing to connect him directly with the "good" horse in the Phaedrus, in fact, unless we recall the virtues of hard, honest work as mentioned by Socrates and quoted above. The "skills" the instructor of the easy path will ask of the boy in the Rhetorum, however, directly relate:

Κόμιζε τοίνυν τὸ μέγιστον μὲν τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἕστα θάρσος, ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ τόλμαν καὶ ἀναισχυντίαν. αἰδώ δὲ ἢ ἐπείκειαι ἢ μετριότητα ἢ ἔρυθημα οἵκιοι ἀπόλιπες· ἀχρεία γὰρ καὶ ὑπεναντία τῷ πράγματι. [...] τοῦτα δὲ ἀναγκαῖα πάνυ καὶ μόνα ἔστιν ὅτε ἰκανά. (15)

Bring with you, then, as the principal thing, ignorance; secondly, recklessness, and thereto effrontery and shamelessness. Modesty, respectability, self-restraint, and blushes may be left at home, for they are useless and somewhat of a hindrance to

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203 I would not want to discount an influence of Prodicus' allegory on Plato; see for example Depréel 1992.
the matter at hand. [...] These things are necessary, and sometimes sufficient in
themselves.

Issues of instructional content aside, the list of "equipment" the instructor asks
the boy to bring clearly describes the passionate horse, and among those things he wants
left behind, the temperate one. The good horse is "constrained always by modesty," and
"always willing to obey"; the bad horse "springs wildly forward," is "unwilling to obey," and
pulls "without shame" (μετ’ ἀναιδείας). It seems, in fact, that "[t]he one is a friend of
honor joined with temperance and modesty, and a follower of true glory" (253d), and
"…the other is the friend of insolence and pride" (253e) could be descriptions of the two
instructors in the *Rhetorum* as much as the two horses in the *Phaedrus*.

The speech that makes up the rest of the *Rhetorum* is put in the mouth of a
follower and perhaps teacher of the difficult path, as he imitates the superficial instructor
of the easy path to rhetoric. This speech promises the rules of rhetoric, and so should
fulfill the original indication of a rhetorical handbook. As a point of comparison, it may be
helpful to look at what rhetorical handbooks looked like in the immediate centuries leading
up to the Second Sophistic.

2.4. Ἡ τέχνη ῥητορικῆ

Handbooks during and after the Hellenistic period bore the name that spoke to an
important issue for Plato: ἡ τέχνη ῥητορικῆ, *ars rhetorica*. After Aristotle's Ῥητορική,
some of the extant or attested handbooks are: Anaximenes' (fourth century BCE) Τέχνη
ῥητορικῆ (*Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*); Rufus' (second century CE) Τέχνη ῥητορικῆ; the
Τέχνη ῥητορικῆ of "Anonymous Seguerianus" (ca. third century CE); Valerius Apsines'
(third century CE) Τέχνη ῥητορική; Cassius Longinus' (third century CE) Τέχνη ῥητορική; the Τέχνη ῥητορική περὶ ἰδέων of the "Anonymi in Hermogenem"; and the last surviving traditional rhetorical treatise from antiquity, Valerius Apsines' (third century CE) Τέχνη ῥητορική.

As Kennedy notes, by the second century rhetoric:

...had developed a traditional set of precepts grounded in five 'parts' that recapitulate the act of planning and delivering a speech: invention (planning the content and argument), arrangement (of the contents into a logical sequence and unity), style (the choice and combination of words into clauses, periods, and figures), memory (the use of mnemonic system to retain the contents in mind), and delivery (oral expression and gesture) (1997:5).

A typical rhetorical handbook, then, would include some or all of the following sections: first, often, would be εὑρεσις, or inventio, which is "invention" as "discovery" of the resources for discursive persuasion for a particular rhetorical problem. Then would come "arrangement," διάθεσις/dispositio, οἰκονομία/compositio, or τάξις/ordo, which encompasses the activity of ordering; the use of each term depended on the author. After the first century BCE, σύνθεσις was also used for compositio, for example in Dionysius' De compositione verborum. In addition, τάξις was sometimes divided into ύπόθεσις, "subject" or "theme," and λέξις, "style," the latter having "had an especially pervasive and lasting influence" (Rowe 2001:122). "Delivery," or ύπόκρισις/actio, had been added by Aristotle in his Rhetorica. The anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium is also concerned with delivery, but adds μνήμη, memoria (3.28-40), which also becomes part of the traditional list, as for example in Quintilian's (first century CE) Institutio oratoria.
Contemporary with *Ad Herennium* was Cicero's *De inventione*, which also discusses the importance of *memoria*.\(^{204}\)

In the first three centuries CE, we have the famous five principles from *De sublimitate*: "power of expression," "strong and inspired emotion," which are both "innate dispositions." The rest of the principles are benefited by training, which includes "fashioning of figures," learning "nobility of diction," which itself includes "choice of words" and the "use of figurative and artistic language," and lastly "dignified and distinguished word-arrangement" (8).

Most likely, these handbooks were not immensely theoretical treatises, though we have some that lean in that direction, such as the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. Generally speaking, the Second Sophistic is not considered to have produced any major rhetorical treatises (Murphy 1983:180). Rather, the rhetorical books became collections of examples of what might be said (Kennedy 1997:10). In the fifth century BCE and after, students were likely taught by example: discursive epideictic speeches on hypothetical issues were given for students to imitate (i.e., *progymnasmata*).\(^{205}\) For example, the Σχήματα λέξεως ("Figures of Speech") of Gorgias Atheniensis (first century BCE), which has survived in a Latin translation by Rutilius Lupus, defines and gives examples of twenty different rhetorical figures.

### 2.5. Plato's Handbook

In the *Gorgias* Plato shows that rhetoric is not an art and is instead a process and

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\(^{204}\) The standard view of the rhetorical handbook is Fuhrmann 1960.

\(^{205}\) Later examples include the *Progymnasmata* of Hermogenes in the second century, and one from Aphonius in the fourth.
type of flattery.\textsuperscript{206} There was, for Plato's Socrates, no concession of any validity for rhetoric as it stood (481b). There is an indication at the end of the \textit{Gorgias}, however, that rhetoric could be used another way: "and rhetoric is to be used for this one purpose always, of pointing always to what is just, and so is every other activity" (καὶ τῇ ρητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πρᾶξει, 527C). He does not expand on this possibility. In the \textit{Phaedrus}, however, there is a type of τέχνη ρητορική consistent with this principle in the \textit{Gorgias} that is further outlined; it is, however, Plato's version of a handbook and does not make room for the usual type of rhetorical instruction. Plato criticizes two things in contemporary rhetoric: unreflective routines, and formalistic techniques (Fuhrmann 1960:135-37). These were the mainstays also of the Second Sophistic orator, and we see Lucian satirizing both in the \textit{Rhetorum}.

Socrates seems to be on the traditional track in the \textit{Phaedrus} when he initially looks at Lysias' speech "rhetorically" (τῷ γὰρ ρητορικῷ αὐτοῦ μόνῳ τὸν νοῦν προσείχον, 235a). Regarding his "inevitable arguments," he comments that the "arrangement" (διάθεσις), not the "invention" (εὑρεσις), should be praised; regarding arguments that are not inevitable, the invention as well as the arrangement deserves praise (236a). When we learn more about Socrates notion of philosophical rhetoric, however, things quickly change.

\textsuperscript{206} "Then will you prove that the orators have intelligence, and that rhetoric is an art, not a flattery, and so refute me?" (Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ρήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην τὴν ρητορικὴν ἄλλα μὴ κολακεῖαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; εἰ δὲ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, 467a). Socrates is nowhere refuted by Polus.
Phaedrus and Socrates review what is contained in the books on rhetoric: handbook principles, or τέχναι (sc. λόγων). The type of speech being discussed does not directly relate to the epideictic handbooks we have, but rather the rules for forensic speaking. Throughout the Phaedrus they have been discussing the fact that courtroom speeches seem to rely not on what actually happened, but rather on assertions characterized by probability (272e). But Socrates acknowledges the entire nature of the art that ostensibly leads souls by words "not only in law courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as well" (261a). When a speech deals with persuasion, for Plato's Socrates everything is "forensic." Socrates also adds thinly disguised references to Gorgias' and Thrasy-machus' (or perhaps Theodorus') ἐπιδείξεις,

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207 Cf. 266d-267e. Socrates also calls them the "niceties of the art" (ὁ κοιμψά τῆς τέχνης, 266d). For the "art of words," compare: "Then, my friend, he who knows not the truth, but pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all" (Λόγων ἃρα τέχνην, ὦ ἑταίρε, ὃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδὼς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκός, γελόιαν τινά, ὦς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται, Phaedrus 262c); "You have stated just what those say who pretend to possess the art of speech, Socrates. I remember that we touched upon this matter briefly before, but the professional rhetoricians think it is of great importance" (Ἀυτὰ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, διελήλυθας ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι, Phaedrus 273a).

208 Included is "introduction" (προοίμιον) first, "narrative" (διήγεσις) second with a place for "testimony" (μαρτυρίας), then "proof" (τεκμήρια), then "probabilities" (εἰκότα), "confirmation" (πίστωσιν), and "refutation" (ἐλεγχόν) both "in accusation and defense" (ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ ἄπολογίᾳ, 266e-267a). Socrates also offers the inventions of "allusion" (ὑποδήλωσιν), "indirect praises" (παρεπαίνους), and "indirect censures in verse to aid memory" (παρασφάλους φασίν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν μνήμης χάριν); as well as "duplication" (διπλασιολογίαν), "sententiousness" (γνωμολογίαν), "figurativeness" (εἰκονολογίαν), and "correctness of diction" (ἀρθοέπεια). All of this leads up to the "summary" (ἐπίλογος) of the speech.
which are all examples of speeches that were models for those in the Second Sophistic. Socrates wants to include all possible moments of persuasion in his discussion of rhetoric.

Socrates and Phaedrus decide that instructors who have previously believed they were teaching the art of rhetoric to students have only been providing these "necessary preliminaries" (τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα, 269b). The application of these sketches and the composition of the whole, however, have been left to the students. Instructors as conceived in the Phaedrus do what we find them doing in the Rhetorum: providing the students either preliminaries or inessentials, and forcing them to learn what to say and how to compose the whole speech on their own, i.e., by knack or experience.

Phaedrus 271c-272b represents the rhetorical "handbook" of Socrates: "I will describe how one should write, if one is to do it, as far as possible, in an artistic way" (ὡς δὲ δει γράφειν, εἰ μέλλει τεχνικῶς ἔχειν καθ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, λέγειν ἐθέλω). In this second introduction of the method, Socrates leaves out the importance of "speaking" he had added previously (λεχθῆσεται ἦ γράφοντες 271b). In short, the student of rhetoric must know the different forms of the soul and the different classes of speeches, then apply the latter to the former in the right way (271de). The Greek is just that vague, and with that little context:

οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοίδε υπὸ τῶν τοιῶν λόγων διὰ τὴν τὴν αἰτίαν ἐς τὰ τοιάδε

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209 E.g., Socrates had just missed Gorgias' ἐπίδειξις at the start of the Gorgias (447c).
210 Rhetoric is a "habitue or knack" (τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία, Phaedrus 270b) or a "craft devoid of art" (ἀτέχνος τριβή, Phaedrus 260e); in the Gorgias 463b and 462c: ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή.
211 Οὕτωι μὲν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλως ἐνδεικνύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον τέχνη ποτὲ λεχθῆσεται ἢ γράφησεται οὔτε τί ἄλλο οὔτε τοῦτο. […] πρὶν ἀν οὖν τὸν τρόπον τούτον λέγωσί τε καὶ γράφωσί, μὴ πειθώμεθα αὐτοῖς τέχνη γράφειν, 271c.
So men of a certain sort are easily persuaded by speeches of a certain sort for a certain reason to actions or beliefs of a certain sort, and men of another sort cannot be so persuaded.

That is, Socrates provides only the outline of a rhetorical handbook. We are not provided anything more in the way of instruction or application. Similarly, our rhetorical instructor in Lucian is full of "instruction," which consists of tricks and shortcuts but provides nothing along the lines of real guidance.

Add to this vague sketch from Socrates knowledge of the right time (καιρός) to speak and to be silent (272a). None of these instructions could possibly be written down, for they require knowledge and specifics that are only realized in context: "the student of rhetoric must, accordingly, acquire a proper knowledge of these classes and then be able to follow them accurately with his senses when he sees them in the practical affairs of life, 212 otherwise he can never have any profit from the lectures he may have heard" (272a). All of this knowledge will come into play only when our speaker meets an audience, that is, in real time and under certain circumstances. Before such a meeting, preparation of a speech is a waste of time. In effect, Socrates has now taken the burden of truth and "persuasion" away from the speech and put it onto the speaker. In the same way, the second instructor in Lucian places the burden on the speaker's appearance and his ability to deceive, and so away from the speech, whether prepared or extemporaneous.

\[212\] θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὅντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα ὀξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν.
When pretending to speak to Tisias, the legendary fifth century BCE inventor of rhetoric, about learning the art of speaking, Socrates says that without the necessary skills one could never be a perfect orator. These skills include having full definitions and division, knowing fully the accounts for different souls, knowing the class of speech for each soul, and properly arranging and adorning them so that they match the nature of the audience.\textsuperscript{213} In other words, as was stated much earlier in the dialogue, there is no art if there is no hold on the truth (260d). It is never clear, however, that such knowledge is in fact possible.

Philostratus has dozens of anecdotes about second sophists asking for subjects and then speaking \textit{ex tempore}.\textsuperscript{214} The success of an orator in the Second Sophistic did not rely on his knowing the minds of his audience or the truth about a subject: these moments were about invention, entertainment, and, tellingly, instantaneous persuasion. Since the type of lessons Socrates discusses cannot be written down in any handbook, the student must learn on his own how to recognize the mind of the person to whom he is speaking, and then apply the correct type of speech to him in the moment (271de). Socrates' list emphasizes the presence of the speaker and his being truly involved in a conversation with his audience, as well as his level of knowledge, e.g., the ability to grasp universals. Mere tricks of the trade, as we find in Lucian, are exactly those things not required for philosophical rhetoric. What is not important is the preparation of epideictic speeches

\textsuperscript{213} 277bc; lists such as this one are repeated a few times, e.g., in the mouth of "Tisias" at 273d.
\textsuperscript{214} Aristides is a famous counterexample to this, explaining to Marcus Aurelius that he is a "perfecter of speeches, not a vomiter," \textit{VS} 583.
out of context that are then displayed to some audience. Nor is there any concern to work extemporaneously in order to surprise and entertain an audience with rhetorical fireworks when there is no grasp of the truth of the subject. Teaching the art of rhetoric is shown to be a lesson about the soul: what it is, how it acts, and how it is appropriately classified (271a-e). Outside of the basics Plato's Socrates gives in the *Phaedrus*, the fully expanded rules could not possibly be satisfactory for any rhetorical handbook (nor in fact a "handbook" of philosophy). Even if it could be, Socrates warns about trusting someone who has "stumbled across something in a book" (268c). None of these requirements for rhetoric can be taught, except perhaps in the Academy.

The themes in the *Phaedrus* involve arrangement (διάθεσις), invention (εὕρεσις), and the famous discussion of writing and memory (μνήμη, 274c-275b). In the dialogue, issues of memory and recollection are introduced early on in the middle of Socrates' second speech about the philosophical mind (249c). But even in the beginning of the dialogue memory is an issue, when Phaedrus is unable to give Lysias' speech to Socrates from memory and must instead read it (228d). And later, nearer to the end of the dialogue, the relationship between memory and writing is introduced as a way in which one can appear knowledgeable and not be so: "Some will read many things without instruction, and seem to know them; they will not be wise, but only appear it" (274b). This is an important criticism of sophists for Plato (as well as *rhapsodes*, as in the *Ion*): they seem to have knowledge but, when pressed, obviously do not. The same holds true for Lucian's rhetorical instructor, who has succeeded in the dialogue by this exact deception. Both the *Rhetorum* and the *Phaedrus* discuss the dangers of the appearance of knowing why
something should be said a particular way, while in fact a speaker is often able to employ tricks and deceptions and accomplish the same goal. Through Lucian's *Rhetorum* we have a glimpse that in the second century CE this is in fact how things have developed.

The first, oblique, definition for rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* is Phaedrus' suggestion that the one who is to be an orator (τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι) seems to need to understand only what appears just, instead of what really is so, i.e., he persuades an audience by likelihood (260a). Socrates, however, sees rhetoric as a ψυχαγωγία, a "leading the soul" with words (261a), and does not mention persuasion except in order to connect it much later with truth. Rhetoric is so defined by Socrates at 261a, but is not picked up at that point by Phaedrus. The definition re-emerges in 271c in the introduction of the Socratic rhetorical handbook. Since rhetoric is the "function of speech to lead souls" (λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὕσα), the man who is to be a rhetorician must know all the

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215 And later: "For in the courts, they say, nobody cares about truth in these matters, but for that which is convincing; and that is probability, so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention to probability." (τὸ παράσαν γάρ οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις τούτων ἀληθείας μέλειν οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ· τούτο δ' εἶναι τὸ εἰκός, ὥ δεῖν προσέχειν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνη ἔρειν, 272de). The account of rhetoric as "persuasion" is specifically avoided in the *Phaedrus* in a way that it is not in the *Gorgias*. The first of many definitions of rhetoric as a "producer of persuasion" (πειθοῦς δημοσιογρός ἢ ρήτορική) in the *Gorgias* is found at 452e.

216 "So what I claim is this, that without my help [i.e., "the art of speaking": ἡ τῶν λόγων τέχνη] the knowledge of the truth does not give the art of persuasion," 260d: i.e., both knowledge and the art of speaking are necessary for the philosophical orator.

217 Generally, ψυχαγωγία means "amusement," and Lucian is quite aware of the range of definitions between "persuasion" and "amusement": Hermes "leads down the souls of the dead" *Dialogi deorum* 4, and Pluto is found, "this time, acting as guide of souls (ψυχαγωγεῖν) and usher of the dead" in 11; Nigrinis converses with Plato, philosophy, and truth which lead to "ψυχαγωγία and laughter (γέλωτα)," *Nigrinis* 18, and there is the same coupling in 21; in *Verae Historiae* 1, the word again means "amusement"; in *Bis accusatus* 10, it is "pleasure" (this text is an entry in LSJ s.v. idem, A.2).
various types of soul. Rhetoric and dialectic (the method of dividing and uniting things naturally, 266b), then, are determined to be synonymous (266c). By this time in the Phaedrus, Plato has sketched out the basics of philosophical rhetoric, and then recapped them at 278d. Again, this particular handbook cannot ever be written down. If anyone were to attempt it, this text, like anything written, does not deserve to be treated very seriously (277e-278a). Knowledge about Socratic rhetorical knowledge, the sort desired by Phaedrus, can only be gained with "much diligent toil" (274e)--as we saw also in the Rhetorum. Again, as in the Rhetorum, the real rhetorical and persuasive art must be written on the soul (τὸ ὄντι γραφομένος ἐν ψυχῇ, Phaedrus 278a).

In light of the types of instruction prevalent among sophists in the fourth century BCE, the impossibility of gaining this level of knowledge should suggest that the Phaedrus is a parody of the rhetorical instruction of Plato's time. Still, Plato is able to be as interested in the pursuit of philosophical rhetoric as he is to provide for one's enjoyment a sketch of rhetorical handbooks that turns prevalent sophistic instruction on its head. We will see that Lucian's "handbook" is similarly a satire of the undeserved success of the imitators in the Second Sophistic of Plato's sophists.

2.6. The Speech of the Second Path

The list given by the "instructor" of the easy path that was quoted above, "ignorance," "recklessness," "effrontery," "shamelessness" (ἀμαθία, θράσος, τόλμα, ἀναισχυντία), represents everything the student must contribute: the rest the boy will learn as he goes. He will need "a very loud voice, a shameless signing delivery," and gait like the effete instructor's (15). We could look at these items as relating to the issues of
delivery, certainly a legitimate concern in oratory, but they are clearly meant to reflect behavior that is both superficial and overly distracting. Beyond these traits, according to Lucian's *rhetor*, the orator's appearance is extremely important.

The boy is told that he must deck himself out with "gaily-colored clothing, or else white, a fabric of Tarentine manufacture, so that your body will show through; and wear either high Attic sandals (the kind women wear, with many slits), or else Sicyonian boots, trimmed with strips of white felt" (15). He must have many attendants, and always have a book in hand (15).

One of the ironical aspects of this section is the contrast between the concern in the Second Sophistic for outward appearance and the view of an ancient, austere forerunner. This sophist has a number of superficial priorities, but there was some concern about dazzling dress in the second century: "It is impossible to overestimate the significance of the performance to sophistry: the naked words that we can read today represent only a fragment of the entire communicative package" (Whitmarsh 2005:24). A good part of this performance was visual. We have a certain number of comments about sophist's attire and dress in the course of declaiming: "When fully embodied in performance, the sophist's declamation would have been dynamized by clothing, props, gesture, intonation, vocal texture, complemented by the surroundings, and framed by an ongoing dialogue with the audience" (*Ibid.*). The proper Second Sophistic rhetorical handbook, then, might very well have a section on appearance, although Phrynichus'
Sophistic Preparations (Praeparatio sophistica) does not seem to. Particularly applicable to our vain instructor, as Whitmarsh (2005:30) notes: "These flamboyantly dressed, limelight-hoggers inevitably posed serious questions about the behavior proper to real Greek men."

The student in the Rhetorum is told he will be told the rules (οἱ νόμοι) that he must follow so that Rhetoric will recognize and welcome him (16). But instead of a set of rhetorical guidelines, the first rule involves appearance: "First of all, you must pay special attention to outward appearance, and to the graceful set of your cloak" (16). Just after this, however, we finally get a section in the Rhetorum describing what must be said, regarding both thematic and linguistic choices (16-21).

Famously, in order to feign Atticism in his speech, the speaker says that the student must cull from somewhere fifteen to twenty Attic words, practice them, and have them ready to sprinkle "as a relish" into his speech (16). He must gather obscure, unfamiliar words, rarely used by the ancients, and have them ready. As a result, the whole mob (ὁ λεὴς ὁ πολύς) will think him amazing and beyond them in education. Even if there is no need for these precious words, they are still ornamental when uttered at

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218 Phrynichus' Sophistic Preparations (Praeparatio sophistica) might be a point of comparison with Lucian's "handbook." However, the epitome we have begins with word choice (λέξεις) for both the ancients (οἱ ἄρχοι) and for the more recent speakers (οἱ νέοι). Those speaking loosely (οἱ δὲ ἀπολελυμένοις λέγοντες) when using a particular word (ἀφηλλεῖ) show themselves to be the "most unlearned men" (ἀμαθέστατοι, a1). There are also references to word arrangement (διάθεσις λόγου, 64; σύνθεσις, 26.12; and σύνταξις 71.19, 122.6), and "delivery" (ὑπόκρισις, 71.19, 71.22). In other words, this instruction book better conforms to a traditional rhetorical handbook.

219 Such as ἄττα, Attic for Homeric ἀσσα ("some" or "sundry"). Use of the word significantly diminishes after Aristotle until Plutarch and the Second Sophistic.
random (18). On occasion, one may even need to make them up (16). Importantly, then, in opposition to the *Phaedrus*, context is here completely irrelevant: "never mind if the rest (of the words) are inconsistent, unrelated, and discordant." If anyone questions the boy on his usage, he should blame someone who never lived (17). Failing that, as the speech of the imitated instructor makes clear, concerns over appearance are thrown in the middle of these instructions as if to distract one's accusers (as much as it might the student listening to the speech). 220 When word choice and diction are mentioned, they are discussed in the most superficial ways.

In direct opposition to the first instructor, the last thing the pupil should do is read the classics (τὰ παλαιά), including that "tiresome Plato" (17). Better to read the μελέται ("exercises") of contemporary speakers in order to create a stock provision to use when the need arises. When he "really must speak," and the audience has selected from among the easier topics he had suggested, 221 the boy is to say "whatever comes to the tip of [his] unlucky tongue" (18). 222 He is to say whatever comes to him first, and, as opposed to the *Phaedrus*, not to worry at all if it is the right time (ἐν καιρῷ): "just keep

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220 "Only let your purple stripe be handsome and bright, even if your cloak is but a blanket of the thickest sort," 16-17.
221 Famously, a Second Sophist would ask the audience for a topic (ὑπόθεσις), and then pick from those offered (usually a standard repertoire), and began to declaim. This was a tense, high-pressured situation, demanding great control over themes and language, as well as a talent for improvisation (ἀυτοσχεδίαζεν, as in *Cratylus* 413d). For an overview of sophistic performance, see Whitmarsh 2005:23-40.
222 ὅτι κεν ἐπ' ἄκαιρίμαν γλῶτταν ἐλθαί became a proverb: Athenaeus (second or third century CE) *Deipnosophistae* 5.57, and epitome of same 2.1.81; *Lyrica Adespota* fr. 102.1.1.
talking, and do not stop" (18). Issues of arrangement or organization are the least of his worries in this case.

The topics to choose from according to the instructor are typical themes of the Second Sophists (India, Ecbatana, Marathon; Medes, Xerxes, Leonidas). The uses of these places and events will be haphazard, and the themes one chooses will clearly be irrelevant to any particular context. To carry the whole thing with a high hand will be to ensure that his audience (οἱ πολλοί) will be struck dumb with admiration of his appearance, his diction, his gait, his pacing, his intonation, his sandals, and his obscure vocabulary (as well as his sweat and laboring breath)(20). Surely a poor excuse for amplification", the consistent return to appearance throughout the speech (at 15, 16, 17, 18, and 20) emphasizes the apology we were given in the beginning of the monologue regarding the speaker's repetition. In addition, the focus on appearance underscores the consistent avoidance by the imitated instructor of anything approaching real rhetorical content.

In other words, the student is to take no pains at all for correctness, context, organization, or arrangement. Thus, we are confronted with a set of rhetorical rules in Lucian that are only concerned with seeming an orator. The importance on organization

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223 We might note that the locations and themes Lucian's rhetor promotes are in line with those that Plutarch suggests for this type of speaker: "By emulating acts like these it is even now possible to resemble our ancestors, but Marathon, Eurymedon, Plataea, and all the other examples which make the common folk vainly to swell with pride should be left to the sophists" (ἀπολιπόντας ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς τῶν σοφιστῶν, Praecepta gerendae reipublicae 814c).
found in the *Phaedrus*, that of the head, body and tail of a speech "composed in fitting relation to one another and to the whole" (264c), is purposely disregarded.

The *Rhetorum* makes it clear that a scrupulous onstage appearance must be complimented by a notorious offstage conduct. The instructions include: brag if anyone accosts you (21), laugh at all other speakers, show up late and yell when it is silent, lie, and abuse your fellow speakers: all this will make you famous and distinguished in an instant (22). In your private life, gamble, drink, boast of it, be shameless and insolent, remove all your hair, and be as sexual as possible (23). In other words, be as infamous a person as possible. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates is also concerned about the life of the speaker off the stage, but his interest is that men love wisdom (278e) and that their souls become noble (279b).224 The off-stage antics discussed in both works are ostensibly in moral opposition, and it is important that they are brought up at all.

Our speaker emerges again as himself at the end of the *Rhetorum*, and emphasizes that if one follows the professor of the easy path, the pupil will not marry "an old woman out of a comedy," but instead his lawgiver and tutor--Rhetoric--will be the fairest of brides. Consequently, Plato's phrase about the winged chariot will be applied to him with better grace than to Zeus: he will be the student-cum-rhetor who "arranges all things and cares for all things" (διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελοῦμενος, 246e). This description of Zeus in the *Phaedrus* is located some way into the second speech of Socrates, on the cusp of the long description of the heavens, recollection, lust, wisdom, and, importantly, love and rhetoric (243e-257b).

224 Socrates thinks that the teacher of rhetoric must be just and good; cf. *Gorgias* 460b-d.
The goal of the imitated instructor's lesson is to seem an orator, not to become one in any true sense. For example, our imitated instructor "enjoys the name of rhetor," even though he is generally unsuccessful in the courts (25). Here we have exactly the opposite sort of (unwritten) rhetorical handbook as is found in the Phaedrus. In the Phaedrus, the typical handbook sections have been changed into their philosophical equivalent, so that, theoretically, the philosophical orator would be exactly what he claims to be. Plato's orator is marked by a certain frankness: a harmony of words and actions. This is, however, an idealized goal.

In the Rhetorum, alternatively, any of the sections of a "normal" handbook have either been left out or terribly perverted: the emphasis is on tricks and deception. The sophistic orator is marked by the sort of deception sophistic rhetoric demands, here taken to its extreme. Frankness and sincerity are the direct enemies of this type of rhetoric. The Rhetorum is, of course, a satirical look at sophistic teaching, but also continues from an opposite approach the tradition of the Phaedrus, but from the opposite approach. While I would not want to diminish the significance of the myths and "doctrines" in the Phaedrus for later Platonists, the Rhetorum is perhaps the type of monologue Plato would have written if he had wanted to write a satirical Phaedrus from the perspective of the sophist.

All of these "rules" in the Rhetorum seem very toilsome and would not benefit our student; the instructions seem to demand more work than the initial "difficult" path to rhetoric. Alternatively, the rules in the Phaedrus are likely impossible to achieve, and so also provide no help to a student. There is no instruction in either of these rhetorical
handbooks—merely sketches and suggestions. It is important that in the _Rhetorum_ everything relies on the illusion of style and delivery, while in the _Phaedrus_ one's grasp of the subject matter is essential. While I grant that the slide between sincerity and parody in both these authors may be enormous, one way to read both of these works is as critiques of teaching of the "art" of sophistry— one during the "First Sophistic," the other during the Second. Plato's _Phaedrus_ reads as a parody of normative rhetorical instruction in the fourth century while Lucian's _Rhetorum_ is a satire of those sophists, among whose ranks he once found himself, and who had risen to such great fame in the second century CE.

Why, then, does Lucian use Plato's _Phaedrus_ as a model for his _Rhetorum_? Plato's _Gorgias_ takes great pains to show that rhetoric is flattery, but briefly mentions the possibility of a philosophical use of rhetoric. The _Phaedrus_, alternatively, promises a handbook explaining the possibility of philosophical rhetoric, and fails to deliver any instruction. In the _Rhetorum_, this impossibility is picked up by Lucian who shows that rhetoric in the Second Sophistic has become Plato's nightmare: success in the second century seems practically ensured by the application of rhetorical knack and experience. Oratory has developed so that knowledge of any kind is unnecessary, and the sophists, in a sense, have won. Orators' ability to _seem_ to know something, as well to flatter and entertain, gave them unparalleled preeminence in this era. In the fifth century, then, Plato fails in the instruction of philosophical rhetoric by discussing a book that cannot be written. In the second century, Lucian satirizes the type of rhetorical handbook many successful orators in the Second Sophistic seem to be following, a handbook that in fact does not exist.
The well-trained rhetorical instructor in the *Rhetorum* is quickly pushed into the background and eventually disappears from the text. The eroticized desire for fame and success in oratory takes precedence in the second century, a possible danger of which Plato seems all too aware in the *Phaedrus*. The love of knowledge and the true study of the classics are gone and have been replaced by love of reputation. What better way to indicate this fact than to continue Plato's parodic tradition?

The theme that will run through the rest of this chapter is the desire for frankness, a certain philosophical openness, as seen by the epistemological requirements of the philosophical rhetoric of the *Phaedrus*. From the *Rhetorum*, thus far we have seen rhetoric as the direct opposite of frankness, an emphasis on its use of verbal deception in order to persuade.

### 3. *De parasito* or *Artem esse parasiticam* and *Gorgias*: Artistic Flattery

In this section I compare Lucian's *De parasito* with Plato's *Gorgias*. This is a natural comparison in the literature, but one that generally seems more to have been assumed than developed. As a dialogue, as opposed to the monologue format of the *Rhetorum*, Lucian strives to parody Socratic forms of argumentation, levels of "proof," and vocabulary, as well as what are taken to be Platonic perspectives about rhetoric and philosophy in the *Gorgias*, a this later middle dialogue. The end result is a commentary

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225 The author of the *De parasito* has now generally been accepted to be Lucian; see Hall 1967:262-265, Nesselrath 1985; Anderson 1978:65 for a discussion of the *De parasito* in the Lucianic corpus, as well as its possible connection to Plato's dialogues as well as the *Gorgias* in particular. Unfortunately, the textual condition of this text remains uncertain in many parts.

226 E.g., the very complete Nesselrath 1985: esp. 82-85.
by Lucian on the low quality of those individuals who pursue both rhetoric and philosophy in the second century.

The place to begin with Lucian's dialogue is with the title: Περὶ παρασίτου ὁτι τέχνη ἢ παρασιτική. The second phrase immediately brings to mind the rhetorical handbook tradition, discussed in the previous section of this chapter, nearly all of which were titled ἡ τέχνη ῥητορική. This subject in turn refers to Socrates' central question in the Gorgias: whether rhetoric is an art. Lucian's work is not just a mere reversal of Plato, where the superior rhetoric is pitted against philosophy and is in fact the greatest art. Lucian takes the idea in Plato of rhetoric as a form of flattery (κολακεία), and turns the embarrassment of the label into a skill and benefit, one superior to both philosophy and, doing Plato one better, rhetoric as well. Parasitism in Lucian is shown to be not merely an art, but the art of flattery. In the background of any discussion of this dialogue, then, is the connection between Plato's idea of rhetoric as flattery as opposed to philosophy, and Lucian's conception of parasitism as opposed to both philosophy and rhetoric.

3.1. Themes

The themes of the De parasito are stated right away:

Τί ποτε ἡρα, ὦ Σίμων, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ δοῦλοι τέχνην ἐκαστὸς τινα ἐπίστανται δι' ᾗς αὐτοῖς τέ εἰσιν καὶ ἄλλω χρήσιμοι, σὺ δέ, ὡς ἐσικεν, ἔργον οὐδὲν ἔχεις δι' οὗ ἂν τῇ ἡ αὐτοῖς ἀπόναιῃ ἡ ἄλλῳ μεταδοθῇς; (1)

Why on earth, Simon, is it, that while other men, both slave and free, each know some art by which they are of use to themselves and to someone else, you apparently have no work which would enable you to make any product yourself or give away anything to anybody else?
Immediately we see that the concerns in the dialogue are with art (téchnē), production (ἔργον), benefit to others (ἄλλως μεταδοιήσ), and benefit to oneself (αὐτὸς ἀπόνωο). These concerns remain consistent throughout the dialogue. In the Gorgias, Socrates slowly leads his discussion to his topic by hypothetically asking a series of professionals: "And who are you, sir? What is your work?" (σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, καὶ τί τὸ σῶν ἔργον; 452a-c) He asks Gorgias, however, a slightly different question, while teasing him about the previous aggrandizement of his art as dealing with "the greatest and best human affairs" (451d):

ἵθι οὖν νομίσας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτάσθαι καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ’ ἔμοι, ἀπόκριναι τί ἐστιν τούτῳ ὁ φής σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ. (452d)

Now come, Gorgias; imagine yourself being questioned by those persons and by me, and tell us what is this thing that you say is the greatest good for men, and that you claim to produce.

The answer, "persuasion" (τὸ πείθειν), is touted by Gorgias as an incredible profit to the speaker: in fact, all the other professionals previously used as examples by Socrates from a drinking song (451e) will in fact work for the benefit of the speaker of rhetoric (452e). Once Socrates establishes that persuasion is the ἔργον of ῥητορική, he asks the question that will affect the rest of the lengthy dialogue in one way or another:

ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργαζέται τούτῳ τὸ ἔργον, ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ γράφου μετὰ τούτῳ ἔπανεριμέθ' ἀν τὸν λέγοντα: ποίας δὴ παιθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τι πειθοῦς ἢ ῥητορικῆ ἐστιν τέχνη; (454a)

Since then it is not the only one that achieves this effect, but others can also, we should be justified in putting this further question to the speaker, as we did concerning the painter: Then of what kind of persuasion, and of persuasion dealing with what, is rhetoric the art?
By this moment in the Gorgias, all of the dialogues' concerns are established: art (τέχνη), production (ἔργον), benefit to others (μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις), and the benefit to oneself (e.g., "the doctor will be your slave," 452e). The start of Lucian's invention in the De parasito was to cull these slightly scattered themes from the Gorgias and place all of them together in the first sentence of his dialogue.

In order to understand and gather all this information sought by the interlocutors, what is needed in both dialogues is to define what constitutes an art (Gorgias 501a; De parasito 3-4), apply the profession to that definition (Gorgias 502c; De parasito 4), discover what the profession deals with (Gorgias 454a; De parasito 9), and discuss the proper use of it (Gorgias 480e-481b; De parasito 11).

The humor of being seen as a parasite "in deed" (ἔργῳ) but perhaps not "in word" (λόγῳ) in the first section of Lucian's text should not be lost on us. The opposition is known from Thucydides, but we should keep in mind Plato's view of rhetoric (and sophistry) as the use of empty words that hide the character of a speaker. This clever remark about "theory versus practice" is followed by a comment about both the theoretical nature of rhetoric and philosophy in the second century, and the importance of rhetorical handbooks at the time. Simon does not yet want to name his profession, since he has not yet "thoroughly mastered the literature on the subject" (οὐπω μοι δοκῶ τοῦς περὶ ταύτην ἐκμεμελετηκέναι λόγους, 1).

227 έργῳ μὲν οὖν κατορθοῦν ψημί ζῆν, εἰ δὲ σοι καὶ λόγῳ, οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν. (σοὶ, σὺ, σὺν MSS. Editors, except Jacobitz, omit σοι.)
3.2. Determination of the Profession

The reluctance of Simon to name his profession may be a reference to the length of time it takes for Socrates to get an answer out of Gorgias. After questioning Callicles, Gorgias, and Polus, and even though we immediately know about his "having displayed" (ἐπεδείξατο) just before the dialogue opens, it is only after a significant number of exchanges that we learn that Gorgias is skilled in ἡ τέχνη τῆς ῥητορικῆς (449a). Similarly, it is also a good number of lines into De parasito before we hear Simon's response: he is involved in the ἡ παρασιτική [τέχνη], "the parasitic art" (end of 1). The use of –ική by Lucian as a play on the professional terminology of the Gorgias has long been noticed. The parallels for parasitism Tychiades gives are of γραμματική and ἱατρική (3), just as Socrates gives ὑφαντική and μουσική as parallels for ῥητορική (449d).

3.3. Crime and Blame

Immediately after learning Simon's profession, we find out that insanity (μανία) secures for those whom she inhabits remissions of their sins "like a schoolmaster or tutor" (ὡς περ διδάσκαλος ἢ παιδαγωγός), by taking the blame for them upon herself (2). Lucian seems here to acknowledge Gorgias' "blame the students not the teachers" argument in the Gorgias (456c-457b): "And, in my opinion, if a man becomes a rhetorician and then uses his power and this art unfairly, we ought not to hate his teacher and cast him out of our cities" (457b). So speaks the teacher of rhetoric. Simon has altered the equation, so that Inspiration itself, acting as a teacher, takes any blame away from the professional. Do not

\[228 \text{ See, e.g., Nesselrath 1985:83-84.}\]
blame the practitioner of parasitism, says the speaker in Lucian, when you can blame the mania that inhabits and causes him to act viciously.

3.4. Ὅστις ἐστίν;

The opening of the De parasito is, generally speaking, a parody of the start of the Gorgias. Simon finally concedes his profession, and then states that he is a "craftsman in it" (δημιουργός ταύτης). This terminology clearly invokes Plato's definition of rhetoric as a "craftsman of persuasion" (πειθοῦς δημιουργός), a description only found in Plato in the Gorgias (453a-455a). After this concession in the De parasito, we find this exchange about names:

{TYSIADHS} Ὅστις ἐστίν;
{SIMON} ἔστιν Σίμων, ὁ παρασιτική τέχνη ἐστί;
{TYSIADHS} Τέχνη γάρ, κἀγώ ταύτῃς δημιουργός.
{SIMON} Καὶ σὺ ἄρα παράσιτος;
{TYSIADHS} Πάνω ὄνειδίσας, ὦ Τυχιάδη.
{SIMON} Ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἐρυθρῆς παράσιτον σαυτὸν καλῶν;
{TYSIADHS} Ὅστις ἐστίν; ἀισχυνοίμην γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ λέγομι. (2)

Tychiades Well then, Simon, "parasitic" is an art?
Simon Indeed it is, and I am craftsman in it.
Tychiades Then you are a parasite?
Simon That was a cruel insult, Tychiades!
Tychiades But do you not blush to call yourself a parasite?
Simon Not at all. I should be ashamed not to speak it.

This section, Simon's admission of his art to Tychiades' "insult," echoes of the exchange between Socrates and Gorgias at the beginning of that dialogue:

{ΣΩ.} Ὅστις ἐστίν;
{ΓΟΡ.} Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
{ΣΩ.} Ὅστις ἐστίν;
{ΓΟΡ.} Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι. (2)
Socrates …or rather, Gorgias, do you tell us yourself in what art it is you are skilled, and hence, what we ought to call you?

Gorgias Rhetoric, Socrates.

Socrates So we are to call you a rhetorician?

Gorgias Yes, and a good one, if you are pleased to call me what--to use Homer's phrase--"I want to be called."

Socrates Well, I am pleased to do so.

Gorgias Then call me such.

For Plato's Socrates what we should call a craftsman is important: it is, in one sense, "what he is" (ὅστις ἐστίν, 447cd). Both Simon and Gorgias show the same sort of bravado in their answers. In addition, under most circumstances "rhetorician" is for Socrates as insulting a word as "parasite" jokingly is in Lucian, especially once we finish through both of the dialogues and see how each profession fares. The exchange is emphasized again in Lucian by Tychiades:

Καὶ νῇ Δίᾳ ὁπόταν σε βουλώμεθα γνωρίζειν τῶν οὐκ ἐπισταμένων τῶν, ὅτε χρήζωι μαθεῖν, ὁ παράσιτος δῆλον ὅτι φήσωμεν εὖ λέγοντες; (2)

Then, by Zeus, when we wish to speak about you to someone who does not know you, when he wants to find out about you, of course we shall be correct in referring to you as "the parasite?"

Again we hear of the importance of one's professional name when answering the question ὅστις ἐστίν; Further, the connection to Plato is emphasized in Lucian by connecting Simon with Plato's friend, Dion of Syracuse: "Why, you would do me greater pleasure than you would Dion by addressing him as 'the philosopher'."229 Tychiades soon tires of this entire problem: he says that it matters little to nothing to him what Simon

229 Καὶ μήν ἂν ἔμοι μᾶλλον χαρίζοι ἢ Δίωνι ἐπιγράφων φιλοσόφῳ, 2. The failure of that endeavor is treated more fully in Chapter 4--Aristides.
wishes to be called. What takes precedence is the absurdity of the idea of "the parasitic art" itself, which leads to the definition of art in general.

3.5. Is "X" an Art?

The definition of art had undergone modification between Plato and Lucian. A τέχνη for Socrates in the *Gorgias* has an account to give of its nature, which shows the means by which it provides the things it provides, so that its own cause can be described (465a). Rhetoric is called an art by Socrates' interlocutors in the *Gorgias*, though Socrates is the first to call it so in the dialogue (447c). Importantly, rhetoric is not an art for Socrates—it is a "habitude or knack" (ἐµπειρία καὶ τριβή) for the purpose of gratification (462bc), and he cannot call "art" anything that is irrational in this way (465b). It is Socrates in fact who sets himself up for this significant moment with Polus:

{ΠΩΛ} ... ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἄρποεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ρητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῆς εἶναι;
{ΣΩ} Ἄρα ἐρωτᾶς ἣντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι;
{ΠΩΛ} Ἐγογε.
{ΣΩ} Οὐδεμία ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡς Πῶλε, ὡς γε πρός σὲ τάληθή εἰρήσθαι.
(462b)

Polus Since you think that Gorgias is at a loss about rhetoric, what is your account of it?
Socrates Are you asking what art I call it?
Polus Yes, I am.
Socrates None at all, it seems to me, Polus, if you would have the honest truth.

Lucian's *De parasito* continues this concern about the nature of art. Simon argues that parasitism is an art according to one Hellenistic definition. What is more, it is

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230 Ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν ὡς χαίρεις καλοῦμενος, οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν μοι μέλει σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀτοπίαν, 2.
231 βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, τίς ἢ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός.
superior to both rhetoric and philosophy, much as Plato argues that philosophy with the pursuit of virtue is superior to rhetoric (Gorgias 480e-481b). Simon gives "his" definition of art:

Τέχνη ἑστίν, ὡς ἐγὼ διαμνημονέων σοφοῦ τινος ἀκούσας, σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τι τέλος εὐχρηστὸν τῷ βίῳ. (4)

An art, I remember having heard a learned man say, is a system composed of apprehensions exercised together to some end useful to life.

The introduction of an observation or idea from an outside source is typical of Socratic method. This quote from Lucian, however, is found in two more variations, once applied generally (4) and again describing specifically parasitism (8). It is attributed to Zeno in the scholarship, and often this text of Lucian is used as justification for doing so. Yet, there being no attribution in the text nor an indication of the learned man's identity, it is unclear we should take Lucian as proof of anything. Nearly contemporary with Lucian, however, Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes) repeatedly quotes the definition of all art as "a system of precepts exercised together toward some end useful in life":

Πάλιν οἱ Στοικοὶ περὶ ψυχῆν ἄγαθά φασιν εἶναι τέχνας τινάς, τὰς ἀρετὰς: τέχνην δὲ εἶναι φασι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων, τὰς δὲ καταλήψεις γίνεσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. (3.188)

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232 E.g., Gorgias 524b: "This, Callicles, is what I have heard and believe to be true; and from these stories, on my reckoning, we must draw some moral such as this…"

233 Gibbs, L.W. 1972. "William Ames's Technometry," Journal of the History of Ideas 33:615-624: "This definition is attributed to Zeno and is to be found in Lucian's Parasite, ch. 4; see Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, collegit Ioannes Ab Arnim, I (Stuttgart, 1964), 21." I agree with the author sending the reader to the Stoicorum. I do not deny this should be taken as supporting evidence for attributing the quote to Zeno, but it ought not stand alone.
Again the Stoics say that the goods of the soul are certain arts, namely the virtues; and an art, they say, is "a system composed of apprehensions exercised together," and the perceptions arise in the ruling principle.\textsuperscript{234}

There is reason to think that the source of the requirement that an art is a type of knowledge that provides benefit, as found in the beginning of the \textit{De parasito}, is Stoic. However, as we saw above, the knowledge involved in an art and its benefit are not solely a Stoic concern. Indeed, Plato, in the \textit{Gorgias}, is quite aware of these goals.\textsuperscript{235}

You have only to look, for example, at the painters, the builders, the shipwrights, or any of the other craftsmen, whichever you like, to see how each of them arranges everything according to a certain order, and forces one part to suit and fit with another, until he has combined the whole into a regular and well-ordered production.

It seems natural to imagine that this idea of craftsmen (δημιουργούς) who combines (συστήσηται\textsuperscript{236}) these arrangements into a well-ordered production (κεκοσμημένον πράγμα) is the source for the idea of the parasitic σύστημα exercised

\textsuperscript{234} A similar the definition is found in Philo \textit{De congressu eruditionis gratia} 141: τέχνης μὲν γάρ ὁρος οὐτος· σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τι τέλος εὐχρήστου, τοῦ εὐχρήστου διὰ τὰς κακοτεχνιας ύψιως προσπιθημένου ("For this is the definition of art: a system of apprehensions exercised together toward some desirable end, the word "desirable" being very properly added by reason of the abundance of evil arts.") The notion of κακοτεχνίας is not Stoic. As we see with the Sextus quote, the idea of an evil art would move against the very nature of τέχνη.

\textsuperscript{235} As quoted above: "Now come, Gorgias; imagine yourself being questioned by those persons and by me, and tell us what is this thing that you say is the greatest good for men, and that you claim to produce" (452d).

\textsuperscript{236} συστήσηται is applicable to the form as a whole, because it is only by the harmony of its several parts (τὸ ἔτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἄρμότειν) that it exists, Lodge 1896 \textit{op. cit.}
toward useful benefit. The same concerns about benefit toward life in general (both to the practitioner and others) appear in the beginning of the Gorgias (452d, quoted above). In both cases, art has a production (beyond its simple application, it seems\textsuperscript{237}), and that production must be used for the benefit of those involved. Of Socrates' most prevalent examples in the Gorgias, i.e., medicine, physical training, judging, and legislating, the first pair is concerned with benefit to the body and the latter with the soul (464b). These crafts provide care always for the best of their own target, either of the body or of the soul (464c). A τέχνη is different from knack (τριβή), then, not only in that it gives an account of its activity, but also because it must used for some specific benefit, as in both the Platonic and Stoic accounts.

As indicated in the Introduction and the chapter on Maximus, Middle Platonism already had a strong admixture of Stoicism, generally construed. It is perhaps best to look at the issue of what constitutes an art as important in the Greek tradition generally; however, I think the connection here gives further justification to read the De parasito alongside the Gorgias.

3.6. With What is the Art Involved?

\begin{quote}
πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δοκιμάζειν καὶ διακρίνειν ὅστις ἢν ἐπιτήδειος γένοιτο τρέφειν αὐτόν, καὶ ὅτε οἱ παρασιτεῖν ἁρξάμενος οὐκ ἢν μεταγνοῖθ. (De parasito 4)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{237} Even though he seems to suggest that the production of a craft or art is not separable from its result, Socrates argues at one point that calculation produces as its ἔργον persuasion about the amount of the odd and the even, which is a result separate from the simple activity of calculation (453c-454a).
In the case of the parasite,\textsuperscript{238} first of all there is testing and deciding who would be suitable to support him, and whom he could begin to cultivate without being sorry for it later.

The source of the first type of knowledge that parasitism requires is not found in the \textit{Gorgias}, but in the \textit{Phaedrus}. The philosophical art of rhetoric as described in the \textit{Phaedrus} requires the identification of the audience's soul and an understanding of the nature of "soul" in general (258d-274b). Parasitism is similar in this way, and requires the same sort of understanding, just as "the assayers possess an art because they know how to distinguish between coins that are counterfeit and those that are not" (4). This ability is necessary since "men are not discernable at once, like coins" (4). Part of the greatness of parasitism, and what makes it superior to even divination, is that it "distinguishes and recognizes things so obscure and hidden" (4).\textsuperscript{239} As a result, like philosophical rhetoric, the parasite will "know how to say the right words and to act in such a way" (λόγους λέγειν ἐπιτηδείους καὶ πράγματα πράττειν, 5) that makes him successful. This shows, according to Simon, intelligence and highly developed knowledge (συνέσεως καὶ καταλήψεως ἐρρωμένης, 5).\textsuperscript{240} Parasites also show "some degree of theory and wisdom" (τινὸς λόγου καὶ σοφίας) since they enjoy greater favor than those who do not possess the art (5). As described in the \textit{De parasito}, the skills of the parasite have tangible benefits over philosophy and rhetoric, especially given their relatively unavailing state in

\textsuperscript{238} A.M.H. adds εἶναι ὃν τῷ παρασίτῳ after the lacuna.
\textsuperscript{239} ὥς δὴ καὶ μεῖζων ἢ τοῦ παρασίτου τέχνη, ἢ γε καὶ τὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ἀδηλα καὶ ἀφανῆ μᾶλλον τῆς μαντικῆς γνωρίζει τε καὶ οἴδεν. [μεῖζον vulg.: μεῖζον MSS].
\textsuperscript{240} Cf. \textit{Gorgias} 450a, where Gorgias claims that, since speech is the expression of thought or intelligence, the skill in speaking of the art's possessor makes him intelligent (δυνατοῦς φρονεῖν) about something.
the second century. Furthermore, the ability to discern and recognize the soul of another will ensure the ability to know whether words and deeds are consistent. According to Simon, parasitism provides protection against deception that other arts cannot.

In his "proof" of the parasitic art, Simon provides us with a quote from Plato's *Theaetetus*: "When a man is about to partake of a banquet, if he be not versed in the art of cookery, his opinion of the feast in preparation is something deficient in weight" (Τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσεσθαι μὴ μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης ἀκυρότερα ἡ κρίσις, 5). The quote from Plato:

οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσεσθαι μὴ μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἡ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὄψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς.  
(Theaetetus 178d)

Then, too, when a banquet is in preparation the opinion of him who is to be a guest, unless he has training in cookery, is of less value concerning the pleasure that will be derived from the food than that of the cook.

By omitting the authority of the cook, Lucian manipulates the Platonic line as to avoid diminishing the parasite's level of wisdom. Simon must establish that the parasite relies on exercised knowledge: his livelihood and life depend on it (6).

Once we establish that it is a benefit to the practitioner, the fact that parasitism is "directed toward some end useful to the world" is the next requirement of proof by Simon. Of course, it is not immediately obvious how the parasite's eating and drinking is particularly useful to everyone else--wherein lies the joke. Simon states that nothing is
better for the world than eating and drinking (7), its relation to the subject of parasitism is another logical jump.

Simon asserts that parasitism, despite its immense apparent power, ought not be considered a δύναμις—like strength and beauty—rather than an art. Part of what Socrates is arguing against in the Gorgias is this very idea of rhetoric: that it is a power or capability (Αλλ' ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, ὡς Σώκρατες, σαρκὸς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἄπασαν, 455d). His point is that it is no δύναμις at all, and he asks at 460a what the power (δύναμις) of rhetoric is, even after Gorgias' lengthy "explanation" answering this exact point (456a-457d). This section in the De parasito is sometimes considered a further dig at rhetoric (Harmon 1947:251n.2).

In the Phaedrus, at very end of the discussion of rhetoric and before the discussion of the proper ways of writing, Socrates announces that he has had "enough of the art of speaking and that which is no art" (Ὁὔκοιν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι ἰκανῶς ἔχετο, 274b). For the parasite, parasitic skill is not something that is wanting of art, for such a thing never achieves anything for its possessor. In support of this, he supplies a list of professions, which, like parasitism, would save their practitioner if need be.

The idea that "it is art that saves [the parasite], and not want of art" (8) is another

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241 Τό γε μὴν "πρὸς τι τέλος εὐχρηστον τῷ βίῳ" μὴ καὶ μανίας ἢ ἦπειν. ἐγὼ γὰρ τού φαγεῖν καὶ τοῦ πιεῖν οὐδὲν εὐχρηστότερον εὑρίσκω ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ὃν οὐδὲ ζήν γε ἀνενέκτην ("And to its being "directed to some end useful to the world," it would be crazy, don't you think, to investigate that point. I, for my part, cannot discover that anything in the world is more useful than eating and drinking, and in fact without them it is impossible to live at all!" 7)
example of false logic in the *De parasito* in the form of a false dichotomy. Whether well reasoned or not, such a conclusion would fulfill the second requirement of the definition of art, that it must provide some benefit to the possessor. Therefore, since Simon thinks he has proven that parasitism is a benefit to the world--because his eating and drinking is useful to others--and that it is a benefit to the possessor--because, like the knowledgeable captain in a storm, it saves his life--he can finally say he has shown that "parasitism is an art" (τέχνη ἡ παρασιτική, 8). Parasitism is a "complex of knowledges exercised in combination" (8) as required by the definition of art originally introduced.

Simon is able to accomplish what Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles are not in the *Gorgias*: prove the art of their profession. He did so, of course, at the expense of rigorous argumentation. This type of disputation and reasoning, as stated, is meant to parody the "anti-rhetoric" of Socrates, as on display especially in the *Gorgias*.

What parasitism "is concerned with," the same question asked about rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, is "food and drink and what must be said and done to obtain them;" its end is pleasure (9). It is noted in *De parasito* 9 that the definition of the τέλος of parasitism as defined as pleasure is asking for trouble from "the philosophers," i.e., the Epicureans and the Stoics (Harmon 1992:255n.1). It is the same situation regarding the next point: that it is not virtue but parasitism that is the consummation of happiness.

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242 "Then if parasitic is not want of art, and not a gift (δύναμις), but a complex of knowledges exercised in combination, evidently we have reached an agreement today that it is an art."

243 ἢ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τὶ τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει ὡσπερ ἢ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἰματίων ἐργασίαν ("Tell me with what particular thing rhetoric is concerned: as, for example, weaving is concerned with the manufacture of clothes, is it not?" 449d)
Plato's dialogues are one source of the tension between pleasure and reason in the pursuit of human flourishing for the later Hellenistic schools. In the *Gorgias*, for example, Socrates shows by parable that true happiness involves temperance or self-control, and that the unbridled pursuit of pleasure is opposed to the good (ἐτερον γίγεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, 497). Socrates' idea of human happiness for the agent in that dialogue seems to involve virtuous activity as well as a certain harmony within parts of the soul. Further, Socrates seems to assume here that, as in earlier Socratic dialogues, knowledge is sufficient for virtue, and virtue, as a means, is sufficient for happiness. Simon's clever answer, which is somewhat similar in form, is to show that parasitism and happiness "have the same end" (τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος, 10), thereby sidestepping confrontation with any philosophical schools by virtue of a simple identity. The definition of pleasure Simon ends up embracing is Epicurean, in which, typically, the greatest evil is pain and the greatest good is absence of both pain and turbulence in the soul (Cicero *De finibus* 1.38). Lucian plays throughout this argument on the already prevalent misinterpretation of Epicureanism as the pursuit of pure, unadulterated sensual pleasure (e.g., Odysseus had entered into the Epicurean life on Calypso's island, 10).

Acquiring the parasitic art is remarkably like the process of acquiring the second type of rhetoric in the *Rhetorum*. The other arts attain their τέλος late, for "the road to

244 As the exercise of the virtues (which are still described as like crafts, e.g., 460b, 5033), much as Simon exercises his knowledge of parasitism for his own survival.

245 This harmony is not as forcefully described as it is in the *Republic*. The idea of happiness in the *Gorgias* therefore takes on a less idealized form than it does in the later dialogues. For this "adaptive" conception of happiness found in the *Gorgias*, see Irwin 1979 and 1995.

246 The so-called "Socratic instrumentalist" view of happiness.
them leads uphill" (14). Like rhetoric in the *Rhetorum*, parasitism derives profit from the art right away, even during the apprenticeship itself: "no sooner does it begin than it is at an end" (14). The difference, however, is that this art has no teacher (not that the second instructor in the *Rhetorum* is essential for anything important); parasitism, as Socrates says about poetry, "comes by some divine dispensation" (14; cf. *Ion* 534bc). We see from the *Gorgias* that, to be art, something must be teachable, and this is the major criterion not met by Gorgias. This requirement is not an issue for the Stoic definition of art—it is Platonic in origin; however, we will see that this requisite is ostensibly fulfilled by the end of the *De parasito*.

The first comparison with rhetoric and philosophy in the *De parasito* shows that they are not singular and unified (27) in the way parasitism is (30). The philosophical and rhetorical landscape of the second century was extremely disparate, divergent, and diverse. This fact is illustrated by the creation circa 176 CE by Marcus Aurelius of the four chairs of philosophy in Athens—representing Platonic, Stoic, Peripatetic and Epicurean philosophy—as well as the chairs of rhetoric in both Athens (one "sophistic" and one "political") and Rome around this time. Lucian's view of the intellectual terrain mirrors other contemporary descriptions, such as Maximus' descriptions of the era (cf. Chapter 3). The philosophical application of the idea that unity, self-sufficiency, and

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247 καὶ ὅρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτάς, Hesiod *W&D* 290.
248 Though it is claimed be to be true: Socrates: "Aren't we to say that you're capable of making others orators too?" Gorgias: "That's exactly the claim I make. Not only here, but elsewhere, too," (449b). Plato attempts to address this problem in the *Phaedrus* (e.g., 271ab).
wholeness are preferred to division and reliance begins with Plato (primarily from the characteristics of the Forms in the *Theaetetus* and *Republic*), continues through Aristotle (as in the *NE*) and later Platonists and Peripatetics, and is incorporated into both Stoicism and Epicureanism.

Therefore, if it is true that there is no art if there is no objective reality, and there is no objective reality if there is diversity (again, from the characterization of Plato's ἰδέαι), then only parasitism is a true art. And since that art is one and universal, it is actually wisdom, while neither philosophy nor rhetoric can be (30). This entire argument can be seen as a parody of the steps Plato makes to show that the Good (τὸ ἀγαθὸν) is the One (τὸ ἕν). 250 As support of all this, we are further told that parasites fall in love with neither philosophy nor rhetoric, since they do not need it, while many orators and philosophers have become parasites (30). If we review the type of knowledge the parasite has, however, we see that it is much like Socrates' discussion of philosophical rhetoric in the *Phaedrus*. The parasite is a dark second-century image of an idealized fifth-century Platonic philosopher.

Rhetoric and Philosophy do not emerge quite as scathed in this dialogue as is commonly thought. It is a dig against rhetoric in the *De parasito* that the rhetorician can ply his art even though a fool (25). The "critique" of philosophy does not cut quite so

250 From the *Republic* (506A) and the *Theaetetus* (176e), we gather that the Good is the One (ὁτι ἄγαθὸν ἐστιν ἕν), an idea further attested in Aristoxenus' *Elements of Harmony* as the culmination of Plato's the "Lecture on the Good." *Pace* Krämer 1959:511, the One is then established as "the highest objective norm of value"--it is πρὸς τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ τὰκριβὲς ἀπόδειξιν at *Politicus* 284d, i.e., what is needed for the demonstration of absolute truth.
deeply: all that is really shown is that it can be used for witless purposes and that the philosopher often commits adultery (56). These points emphasize not only the possible misuse of both, but also that neither requires men to be good.

3.7. \textit{Tεχνὴ καὶ ἔργον}

During a long interlude taking the reader through the famous parasites of history,\textsuperscript{251} we find out that the greatest examples of parasites are those attached to kings (44-5), though royal affiliation is not listed as a requirement for the art. Were this anachronistic stipulation a necessity, the absence of second-century kings in Athens, Rome, or anywhere in the Greco-Roman world, would guarantee the absence of parasites and parasitism.

Even though it has been obliquely asserted, Tychiades finally asks to be given real proof of one requirement set out in the beginning of the dialogue: that of the benefit of parasitism to others (58). The answer Simon gives him is that the practitioner of the art is a benefit to rich men (\textit{πλούσιος ἀνήρ}) as an ornament, food taster, and bodyguard all rolled into one (58-59). The loyalty of the parasite is truly an inspiring thing, if in fact it seems predicated on the idea that the parasite and the wealthy gentleman mate for life.

Both the \textit{Gorgias} and \textit{De parasito} show themselves to be dialogues about the nature of art and its production. The Platonic/Stoic definition of an art requires production of benefit to one's self and to others. The benefit to one's self is proven, in a manner of speaking, in both works: with rhetoric, all other professions will work for the

\textsuperscript{251} Parasitism began, along with oratory and philosophy, with Homer, \textit{Rhetorum} 44-49. The use of Homer here may mirror the use of Homer by Plato at the very end of the \textit{Gorgias} (523a).
benefit of the speaker; with parasitic, the practitioner survives and flourishes. The benefit to the world from these two arts is at no point established, though promised. Nor is there an explicit qualifier for these professions that they are not to harm or take anything away from others. In both cases the art (explicit in both the Stoic definition of art as well as Plato's definition) requires that one acts for the benefit of others, but in fact both of these professions depend on dispossessing others of goods, in the form of monetary payment, reliance, trust, or patronage. And this is one of the points of Lucian's satire of Plato: the types of goods change, but all of these supposed arts, including philosophy in the second century, are different in name only.

It is clear by the end of the dialogue that our interlocutor should not be convinced of anything by Simon, especially regarding the conclusions from this last series of arguments. The ending parody of Socrates' use of etymology is meant to seem the final straw:

{ΣΙΜΩΝ} Ὡρὰ δὴ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἐάν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι δοκῇ, καὶ πειρῶ πάλιν αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἢ ἄριστα οἷεὶ. φέρε γάρ, τὸν σῖτον οἱ παλαιοὶ τί καλοῦσι;
{ΤΥΧΙΑΔΗΣ} Τροφήν.
{ΣΙΜΩΝ} Τί δὲ τὸ σιτεῖσθαι, οὐχὶ τὸ ἐσθίειν;
{ΤΥΧΙΑΔΗΣ} Ναί.
{ΣΙΜΩΝ} Ὦκοὐν καθωμολογηται τὸ παρασιτεῖν ὧτι οὐκ ἄλλο ἐστίν;
{ΤΥΧΙΑΔΗΣ} Τοῦτο γάρ, ὦ Σίμων, ἐστίν ὁ αἰσχρὸν φαίνεται. (60)

Simon Note my answer and see if you think it is satisfactory, and try on your part to answer my question as you think best. Come now, what about the noun from which it is derived? To what did the ancients apply it?
Tychiades To food.
Simon And what about the simple verb, does it not mean "to eat"?
Tychiades Yes.
Simon: Then we have admitted, have we not, that to be a parasite is nothing but to eat with someone else?

Tychiades: Why, Simon, that is the very thing that seems discreditable!

This derivation is justified by Platonic use, though the scene is a parody of etymological "proofs" performed by Socrates (e.g., μανική/μαντική, Phaedrus 244b-d). The exchange is also an imitation of the Socratic process of arguing by selective leading and interpretation, as well as the general method of clarity and definition (διαίρεσις, e.g., Phaedrus 266b). Tychiades' incredulousness, which comes mere lines before the end of the dialogue, makes his unqualified agreement with the conclusion at the end of the work all the more ridiculous:

καὶ σοὶ λοιπὸν ὠσπερ οἱ παιδεὺς ἀφίξομαι καὶ ἔξως καὶ μετ' ἀριστον μαθησόμενος τὴν τέχνην. σὺ δὲ μὲ αὐτήν δίκαιος διδάσκειν ἀφθόνως, ἐπεί καὶ πρῶτος μαθητής σοι γίνομαι. φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς μητέρας μᾶλλον τὰ πρῶτα φιλεῖν τῶν τέκνων. (61)

Hereafter I shall go to you like a schoolboy both in the morning and after lunch to learn your art. You, for your part, ought to teach me ungrudgingly, for I shall be your first student. They say that mothers love their first children more.

Well before this moment in the text, we anticipated Tychiades' blind admiration for parasitism in section 25. Even at that point, Simon had apparently proven parasitism "to be such a fine thing!" (οἶνον χρῆμα ἀποφαίνῃ).

Simon had no teacher, and so invented, if not parasitism itself (Homeric characters did that, cf. 10), then the art of parasitism: Simon's art was self-taught. By the end of the dialogue, however, the discussion turns into the teacher-parasite talking to the student-

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252 "To eat together," a meaning Plato uses: "My friend Melesias and I take our meals together" (Μελησίας ὀδε, καὶ ἡμῖν τὰ μειράκια παρασιτεῖ, Laches 179bc).
parasite.\textsuperscript{253} It is the final fulfillment of this implicit Platonic requirement from the *Gorgias*,\textsuperscript{254} in addition to the essentials explicitly stated in the dialogue, which might finally make parasitism an art. We see, as in the *Laches*, that Socrates also converts interlocutors to become, if not students, fellow lovers of inquiry. Socrates, while having teachers in a way (Diotima, Anaxagoras), also invented his particular profession, and like Simon had no instructor in the traditional sense: Socrates' mission was the result of his revelation and interpretation of the oracle. By his own consistent admission, Socrates did not teach philosophical content. He did, however, teach by example a type of methodology and approach to life, perhaps as Simon would have to do for Tychiades. At the very least, in order to teach his art Simon will have to allow another parasite to see through his tricks, just as an effective teacher of rhetoric must.

The *De parasito* specifically mocks the type of argumentation, and notion of "proof," found so commonly in the early Platonic dialogues. In light of the *Gorgias*, the *De parasito* should be viewed as making light of the types of discussions Plato wrote for Socrates, but now applied to the battle between rhetoric and philosophy that has reemerged in the second century. In Plato's dialogue, Socrates ignores options, bullies and leads the interlocutor, and overuses both the reductive method to garner the assent of the

\textsuperscript{253} Though the actual process of teaching this art is not indicated; that dialogue may turn out much like the *Gorgias*.  
\textsuperscript{254} Gorgias must have something teachable to profess in order to justify his teaching at all; he must have an account of his art to be able to do this, and his ability to make speeches may simply be natural talent (449b-d). An art, generally speaking in Plato, is defined by a body of knowledge that can be taught: "Then let us repeat our question with reference to the same arts that we spoke of just now (ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν): does not numeration, or the person skilled in numeration, teach us all that pertains to number?" 453e.
interlocutor and false modesty. Generally speaking, Socrates maintains that he is involved in refutation, not persuasion, but we know from the *Gorgias* that he looks to convince his interlocutors throughout. We need only look to *Gorgias* 519d for a good idea of the disingenuousness of Socrates' claim about only conversing by means of the *elenchus*. After giving his own long display of argument (517b-519d), Socrates stops speaking for a moment, and, between breaths, Callicles is able to slip in:

{ΚΑΛ.} Σὺ δ’ οὐκ ἂν οἶδός τ’ εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο;
{ΣΩ.} Ἐοικά γε (519d)

Callicles And you are the man who is not able to speak unless somebody answers you?
Socrates Apparently, I can.

Simon is meant to be seen as another Socrates: occasionally modest, occasionally confrontational, always clever and ever deceptive. This is a version of the Socrates who is capable of "speaking with great satirical fun" (διακωμωδείν, *Gorgias* 462e).

In the *De parasito*, Simon uses many of the same methods. There is little use of anything like real logic in the dialogue, which is replaced by displays worthy of a sophist: paradoxes, avoidance of confrontation, quotations from authority, and questionably relevant examples. There is an example at section 22 of the *De parasito*, when at last our otherwise ineffectual interlocutor asks a real question of Simon, and finally presses his

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255 E.g., Socrates: "Now is it also what he wishes, supposing it to be really bad? Why do you not answer?" 468d. Also: "Well, I said rather a branch of flattery. Why, at your age, Polus, have you no memory? What will you do later on?" 466a. That is not to say Polus does not give as good as he gets in this dialogue, see, for example, Michelini 1998.
specific interpretation of parasitism. The parasite answers "I can't say," and immediately changes the subject.\textsuperscript{256}

Near the end of the \textit{De parasito}, Tychiades finds that Simon is not as deficient in preparation as he had asserted in the beginning of the work, and reinforced at 3.\textsuperscript{257}

\begin{quote}
Πάντα μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σίμων, διεξέλθειν ύποτρήσας οὐδὲν τῆς σεαυτοῦ τέχνης, οὐχ ὡσπερ αὐτὸς ἔφασκες, ἁμελέτητος ὦν, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἄν τις ὑπὸ τῶν μεγίστων γεγυμνασμένος. λοιπόν, εἰ μὴ αἵσχον αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα ἐστὶ τῆς παρασιτικῆς, θέλω μαθεῖν. (60)
\end{quote}

It seems to me, Simon, that you have gone over everything without being in any degree inadequate in your art. You are not deficient in preparation, as you said you were; on the contrary, you are as thoroughly trained as one could be by the greatest masters. And now I want to know whether the very name of parasitic is not discreditable.

Tychiades' low level of observation is apparent by this point since the entire dialogue has passed and yet he asks this basic question, merely lines away from the end of the conversation--and his total assent to the art of the profession. More importantly, Simon’s ken does not actually include, according to this dialogue, parasitism.

The style and rhetoric of Simon’s defense is that of a sophist, even though his methodological framework is that of a philosopher. In essence, to philosophize about philosophy, as we see generally in Plato, is to philosophize. As we see in the \textit{Gorgias}, to rhetorize about rhetoric is to philosophize. As Lucian shows in this dialogue, to rhetorize about parasitism is also to philosophize (even if not very well). The entirety of Lucian's

\textsuperscript{256} Fritzsche (1860-1882) rewrites the manuscript in his edition (1860-1882) to give two questions to Simon, and two answers (including "I can't say") to Tychiades. This rewriting of the text may be right, but the tenor of the exchange in the dialogue follows an avoidance at real argumentation.

\textsuperscript{257} "If you care to listen, I think I can tell you why, although, as I just said, I am not entirely prepared for it," \textit{De parasito} 3.
dialogue should be seen as a parody of the Socratic method as characterized in the early and middle dialogues.\textsuperscript{258}

To discuss parasitism, then, is not to perform the actions of a parasite, but rather to rhetorize, to philosophize, or both, depending on the speaker's intent. At section 60, Simon is shown to know, rather than the art of parasitism, the tricks of argumentation (or the ability to parody them). Simon is, after all, a craftsman of the art (ταύτης δημιουργός), as rhetoric is a producer of persuasion in the \textit{Gorgias} (πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἢ ρητορική, 453a). His epideictic model is the rhetorician and his logical model the philosopher, neither of which is any different from all the parasites throughout history.\textsuperscript{259} Parasitism relies on the ability to persuade and entertain, and so rhetoric is its greatest weapon; in the case of the \textit{De parasito}, since we are discussing the definition of the art itself, philosophy is the tool of this parasite.

For Lucian, the dialogue is partially about how parasitism relates to the intellectual's self-sufficiency and the need for others. Ideally, the philosopher requires no one else: he may question or help those who are lost or excessively arrogant, but ideally, he is able to live "philosophically" and flourish without any dependence on others. Like the Platonic Socrates who requires an audience, the second-century philosophical \textit{rhetor}

\textsuperscript{258} For the view of Socrates' method as a type of "anti-rhetoric," Rossetti 1984, 1988, 1989, and 1993.
\textsuperscript{259} It is a pleasure to learn that Plato was an inept parasite when he went to Sicily. We know from his letters that the trip was not exactly successful (cf. \textit{Epistula} 3 and \textit{Epistula} 7), but Lucian's reasoning as to why the excursion did not work out is a smart alteration of perspective. In his interpretation Plato was quite the failure, and at the ugly art of parasitism no less (34).
needs an audience and pupils to absorb his brilliance, as well as pay his tuition. The
teacher of rhetoric, the sophist, and the demagogue: all of these artists require other
individuals to charge, teach, persuade, defend, or display for. Lucian's point about the
sophist and the philosopher being "drawn" to parasitism is exactly the point: these
professionals, while insisting they are increasing their αὐτάρκεια, in fact always demand
the attention of others. And, even if there is something perhaps like "pure" philosophy in
the Second Sophistic, there is certainly no such thing as pure parasitism. Simon's
speeches, as if from a Socratic sophist, are the very proof of this, contrary to his own
insistence.

4. Revivescentes or Piscator and Laches: Frankness

4.1. Piscator

The Piscator is an agonistic and forensic dialogue, similar to many in Lucian's
corpus (e.g., Bis accusatus or Tribunalia). The character of Socrates speaks first in this
work, enjoining all the philosophers to kill "Frankness" or "Free-speaker" (παρρησιάδης),
who has insulted them all terribly. The accused in the dialogue could actually be anyone
until the character is introduced 27 lines into the dialogue.²⁶⁰ Homer, Euripides, and other
tragedies (since lost to us) are bandied between Socrates, Plato, the other philosophers,
and Frankness himself in his own defense.²⁶¹ The confrontation between Plato and
Frankness becomes a fight of erudition, and Plato's quotation of Bacchae 386-388 forces

²⁶⁰ In the OCT, Macleod, ed. 1974.
²⁶¹ With many of the lines changed to fit the context of the dialogue: "Show yourselves
men, wise ones, and call up the fury of battle" (ἀνέρες ἔστε, σοφοί, µνήσασθε δὲ
θούριδος ὀργῆς, Piscator 1); "show yourselves men, friends, and call up furious valor"
(ἀνέρες ἔστε φίλοι, µνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς, Iliad 6.112)
Frankness to switch tactics and, in the spirit of honesty, openly ask what "irreparable thing" (ἀνήκεστον) has made the philosopher "irreconcilably angry" (ἀμεϊλικτα ὀργαὶ ἐξεσθε) and ready to execute him.

"Frankness" is no stranger to Lucianic dialogue.262 In the Phalaris, the character speaks "freely" (μετὰ παρρησίας) about a Socratic choice: whether to inflict unjust punishment or be put to death himself (1.9). Nigrinus thought that Athens was right for the man who "has not tasted liberty, has not tried free speech, has not contemplated truth."263 Demonax, in the work of the same name, aimed his life toward philosophy, committing himself wholly "to liberty and free speech" (ἐλευθερία καὶ παρρησία, 3). He also incurred from the masses "quite as much hatred as his prototype,"264 by his "freedom of speech and action" (τῇ παρρησίᾳ καὶ ἑλευθερίᾳ, 11). The "typical Cynic way" of speaking, according to Demonax, is "frankly" (50). In the Calumniae non temere credendum, the slanderous man "does not cultivate free speech" (ἀπαρρησίας, 9), and-as applicable to the Piscator--if the potential slanderer is "noble, gentlemanly, and outspoken" (γενναῖον καὶ ἑλεύθερον καὶ παρρησιαστικόν), he immediately vents his wrath and allows his friend to give a defense (τὴν ἀπολογίαν, 23). In Juppiter confutatus, the Cynic interviews Zeus "frankly" (μετὰ παρρησίας) about free will and predestination and begs that the god not become exasperated as a result (5). Herakles asks Zeus to hear him "frankly"--that he is who he is and cannot change his ways (Juppiter tragoedus 32).

262 παρρησία was originally coined in the fifth century where it referred to the right to speak in the democratic assembly; for more, see Peterson 1929; Scarpat 1964; Momigliano 1971 and 1973-4; Konstan 1996.
263 ἀγευστος μὲν ἑλευθερίας, ἀπειρατος δὲ παρρησίας, ἀθέατος δὲ ἀληθείας, Nigrinus 15.
264 μύσος οὐ μείον τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, i.e., Socrates.
Timon the misanthrope declines wealth from Hermes, since poverty has trained his body, and spoke with him "truthfully and frankly" (μετ’ ἀληθείας καὶ παρρησίας, 36). Along the same lines, Croesus is always amazed when a poor man does not cringe but "speaks frankly and truthfully" to him (τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν λόγων, 13). The Cynic wishes to liberate men, to be their "interpreter of the whole of truth and free speech" (τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἀληθείας καὶ παρρησίας προφήτης, Vitarum auctio 8). Lastly, and importantly, in Juppiter tragoedus, Zeus welcomes Momus' "frankness," since it is clear that it is intended for the common good (δῆλος γὰρ εἰ ἐπὶ τῷ σωμφέροντι παρρησιασόμενος, 19).

All of these uses are found in Lucian's so-called "Platonic" dialogues. As indicated, applications of the word are given as parallels to both truth and freedom of both words and actions. This idea of frankness is the opposite of ἀπάτη. For Lucian, παρρησία invokes a type of sincere openness, and so constitutes the opposite of both hypocrisy and deception. That is, "frankness" implies a consistency between one's words and actions. What I want to suggest is that παρρησία is an essential term in Lucian's philosophical vocabulary. This consistency between words and actions is precisely what Lucian thinks philosophy (and more obviously sophistry) in the second century is missing.

In the Piscator, Frankness (i.e., "Lucian"), in "his noble dialogues" (οἱ καλοὶ...\footnote{265 For the label, e.g., Branham 1985:240.}
\footnote{266 Notice especially the "frank hearing" in the Herakles example (Juppiter tragoedus 32).}
\footnote{267 LSJ s.v. idem: A. trick, fraud, deceit, in pl., wiles 2. guile, treachery. For discussions of ἀπάτη, see Rosenmeyer 1955 and especially Mazur 2006.}
ἐκεῖνοι σοὶ λόγοι), has spoken abusively about philosophers and philosophy by advertising their wares for sale (i.e., in *Vitarum auctio*). As an apology for *Vitarum auctio*, we have another version of a revived form of writing that was used many times on Socrates' behalf.\(^\text{268}\) The genre of apology is also used for other topics, both in the author's defense (e.g., Apuleius' *Apologia*) and in the case of smaller matters, like a slip of the tongue (Lucian's *Pseudologista*). Conventional in this tradition is the reversal of the charge--not only is the defendant not harming the plaintiff, but is in fact his greatest benefactor.\(^\text{269}\)

The Philosophers, those whom Frankness has vilified in his dialogues, have requested a leave of absence from Hades in order to bring about a confrontation. Frankness believes the entire affair is a misunderstanding, telling Plato to keep his stones for those who deserve such treatment instead of throwing them at him. This point has confused some commentators: "It is curious that this suggestion, though emphasized by being repeated (§11), is not worked out" (Harmon 1921:9). Those who deserve this punishment are not the master philosophers, Plato, Epicurus, Diogenes, Pythagoras, etc., but their followers, whom we meet at the end of the dialogue. It is the later members of the philosophical schools that have corrupted and twisted the original teachings, whether Platonist, Epicurean, Cynic, Pythagorean, or Peripatetic. The pupils of these schools are the real targets of Frankness' satirical and scornful dialogues, and are those who deserve to

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\(^{268}\) Plato's and Xenophon's *apologiai* are merely our earliest examples. Lysias, Theodectes, and Demetrius of Phalerum were also credited with apologies for Socrates. See Chroust 1957 for discussion.

\(^{269}\) A defense perhaps invented by Plato's Socrates, *Apology* 28a-34b.
be stoned.

4.2. Laches

While the Laches is generally considered to be a dialogue about courage, it is no more about it than the Phaedrus is "about" love or the Gorgias is "about" the art of rhetoric. Certainly these dialogues are about these subjects in one sense, but they are certainly not circumscribed by them. Lucian takes advantage of the range of topics that a Platonic dialogue concerns itself with, develops his own idiosyncratic interpretations for particular dialogues, and uses them as models for his own. For example, we have already met the unlikely rhetorical handbook in the Phaedrus and the rhetoric of flattery in the Gorgias. The Laches, for Lucian, is about frankness.

Any discussion of rhetoric and philosophy must confront notions of transparency and open expression. Rhetoric simpliciter for Plato can be defined as the attempt to persuade by displaying the expressions and ideas that are most successful in attaining one's goal, implicitly by masking one's own feelings or thoughts. Platonic philosophy, in its ideal form, considers knowledge as the perfect method of persuasion; it does not need artistry to support it (as in the Gorgias), but such artistry is not incompatible with it (as in the Phaedrus). Knowledge, as was shown in the Phaedrus, includes

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270 See, for example, Schmid's 1992 book on the dialogue.
271 After Plato, Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is not quite so judgmental: "the ability in each case to see the available means of persuasion" (Rhetorica 1.2), but from Quintilian's later survey we see that "to secure the assent of the audience" is extremely important, Ad Herennium 1.2. Under Plato's original influence, such assent is to be secured by any possible means.
272 "In the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse accordingly,
understanding one's own mind and the mind of one's interlocutor: frankness is essential for philosophy so conceived.

In the Piscator, Frankness is complimented repeatedly on his clever, manipulative speaking. How, then, is frankness related to truth while at the same time it utilizes rhetoric? It seems that the oppositions between truth and artistry and between truth and rhetoric (not the same thing) are essential to Plato's ideological landscape. Yet, when we look at the artfully constructed and complicated syntax of Socrates' Apology, which comes exactly at those moments when the speaker is admitting his own rhetorical inability, we see that the difference between rhetoric and philosophy is more complicated than mere opposition.

In the beginning of the Laches, Lysimachus admits that he and Melesias requested the presence of Nicias and Laches at a mock battle under false pretenses. Now, however, they will be forthcoming: "We will tell you now; for we think we should speak our minds freely to friends like you" (ἡγούμεθα γὰρ χρῆναι πρὸς γε ὑμᾶς παρρησιάζεσθαι, 178a). He explains what he means further:

εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες οἳ τῶν τοιούτων καταγελῶσι, καὶ ἕαν τις αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσῃται, οὐκ ἂν εἶποιεν ἃ νοοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ συμβουλευομένου ἀλλὰ λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δόξαν· (178a)

offering to the complex soul elaborate and harmonious discourses, and simple talks to the simple soul," Phaedrus 277bc.

273 E.g., at sections 8, 9, and 18: "That speech of your is good rhetoric (κατὰ τούς ρήτορας), my fine fellow; but it is directly against your case…" 8; "At any rate, they say you are an orator (ῥήτορα) and an advocate (δικαστὶκόν) and a knave (πανούργον) at making speeches," 9 (cf. the effect speaking to Socrates has on an interlocutor, Laches 187e-188c); "[Frankness] is terribly un-scrupled and smooth-tongued (δεινῶς πανούργος ἐστιν καὶ κολακικός) and so may seduce Truth," 18.
Some people, of course, ridicule such appeals, and when consulted for their advice will not say what they think, but something different, making the wishes of the inquirer their aim, and speaking against their own judgment.

Frankness is both an object of ridicule and the opposite of rhetoric, which involves using words contrary to one's beliefs in order that some goal might be achieved (here the goal of the inquirer). Lysimachus' guests have the discernment (ἰκανούς γνῶναι) needed for frankness, of course a first step, but will moreover give their own thoughts openly (ἀπλῶς ἐν εἰπεῖν ἀ δοκεῖ ύμῖν, 278b). These are the reasons why he will trust these men enough to discuss the education of their children. He even reiterates the importance of frankness (παρρησιασόμεθα πρὸς ύμᾶς) when beginning his story (179c). Frankness, then, has been a theme in the Laches ever since Lysimachus admitted that his guests were brought there under false pretenses.

The problem is that words are so easily counterfeited:

Ἔγωγε, ὃ Λάχης ὤε γε σὺ ὅκ ἃν ἔθελοις πιστεύσαι, εἰ φαῖν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι δήμουργοι, εἰ μὴ τί σοι τῆς αὐτῶν τέχνης ἔργον ἔχοιεν ἐπιδείξαι εὑ εἰργασμένον, καὶ ἐν καὶ πλεῖω. (185e)

I have, Laches, (noticed) people in fact whom you would not care to trust on the mere statement that they were good practitioners, unless they could put forward some example of their personal skill--some work well carried out--not in one only, but several cases.

In order to judge the truth of someone's words, a number of examples of past actions are required.274 Perhaps this problem echoes Socrates' criticism that the sophists were the only men who professed (ἐπηγγέλλοντο) to be able to make him a complete gentleman (186c); where are the stories of their successes to back up their claims? This

274 Cf. the comment about assayers in the De parasito (4), discussed above.
problem of trust and consistency relates to the experience of speaking with Socrates when he tests his interlocutor: he does not stop until someone gives an account of himself "in comparison to his past and present misdoings" (188ab). In a true account, words will necessarily match the deeds of the speaker.

Laches discusses the "harmony" between a man and his speech.275 If his words and deeds match, such a man is "musical." The man who shows the character opposite to his description pains Laches, whereas the man of true concord gives him joy (188de). Socrates is an example of such a harmonious individual, which is a point that appears midway through the Laches:

Σωκράτους δ’ ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν λόγων οὐκ ἐμπειρός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ πρότερον, ὡς ἐσί, τῶν ἔργων ἐπειράθην, καὶ ἐκεῖ αὐτὸν ἐστὶν ὃς ὁ γνώμην ὄντα λόγων καλῶν καὶ πάσης παρρησίας. (188e-189a)

I myself have no experience with the words of Socrates, but previously, it seems, I have made trial of his deeds, and there I found him worthy of fine and entirely frank words.

As introduced in the beginning of this chapter, words and deeds must be in concord when one practices παρρησία. This attribution of frankness to Socrates emphasizes that in the Piscator it is not the heads of the schools, but rather the later pupils who have altered and misdirected the original teachings. Thus, the dialogue of the Laches is written about the relationship between rhetoric on one hand and openness, communication, and frankness on the other.

275 "Seeing the speaker and his words together, how they sort and harmonize with each other" (θεώμενος ἄμα τὸν τε λέγοντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὤτι πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀμιστοτά ἔστι, 188d).
Further, the only way to give one's opinion and judgment faithfully implies some knowledge set. In this dialogue, it is to know the relevant part of virtue--in this case, courage (190b). It does not hurt his case that Socrates had exhibited bravery at Delium in front of one of the interlocutors. But this makes the connection between words and deeds in this dialogue that much more interesting: this group cannot come to an adequate definition of courage, even though Socrates (and others) have exhibited it admirably. It is true that Socrates is shown in the *Laches* as a harmonious individual, but in an interesting way, words and deeds in the *Laches* cannot be shown, generally speaking, to harmonize.

The result of the discussion midway through the dialogue is a positive statement about virtue: Socrates' old saying that "every man is good in that he is wise, and bad in so far as he is unlearned" (194d). In the end, however, the group cannot come to any agreement about what courage is. Though they cannot define it, the least they are able to do is come to the frank realization that they do not know how to give an account of it (199e).

Similarly, as we see in the *Piscator*, as soon as Frankness (or Lucian) saw how many disagreeable attributes a public speaker ("those who rhetorize," οἱ ῥητορεύοντες) had to take on--chicanery (ἀπάτη), lying (ψεῦδος), impudence (θρασύτητα), a loud mouth (βοή), contentiousness (ἀδόκιμοι: lit. "jostlings") and "other gifts" (καὶ μυρία ἄλλα)--he had to flee (29). The first three of these traits are in direct opposition to frankness. After his move away from sophistry, he found instead that the deeds of those around him did not

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276 That is, not of a personal description but as an account or definition.
not match their words (31): there was no harmony in these men. As described in the
*Piscator*, it was as though some effete actor were playing the part of Achilles, or Theseus,
or Herakles himself "without walking or speaking as a hero should." This would be a
perfect example of the "unmusical man" in the *Laches*. Real frankness necessitates that
anyone watching the pupils from philosophical schools would initially lay blame on
Philosophy, as Frankness or Lucian did, just as they would blame the tragedy rather than
the actor in the example above. Frankness' frankness was developed in his satirical
dialogues, which exposed these fakes for what they were--simply hypocritical (33).
These philosophers are the same types Laches and Socrates worry about in the *Laches*:
men whose words do not match their deeds, either because they aim to flatter, to deceive,
or both. Lucian's second-century philosophers seemed to read and study philosophy
simply in order to practice the reverse (34). This situation is upsetting, since "these
cheats are often more convincing than the genuine philosophers" (42), and so are all the
more influential and therefore damaging.

At the end of Lucian's dialogue, how does Frankness bring the "philosophers" to
the Acropolis? By promising them gifts and riches (41), when in fact they will get a "fox-
brand" or "ape-brand" (ἀλωπεκίας ἢ πιθηκοφόρους, 47). Frankness' deception here seems
justified when we see the superficial and embarrassing behavior of the pupils of
philosophy. In this apology for performing acts of forthrightness, Lucian is still working,
at times with deception, to expose these disingenuous men for what they are, right up to
the end of the dialogue.
For modern critics, a judgment about the harmony of words and deeds for Lucian himself must remain unknown; that is, unless Lucian's words are his deeds, in that he exposes cheats and pretenders (*Piscator* 29) and extols his "true" respect for the master philosophers (cf. *Nigrinus*, *Demonax*). But, what exactly "frankness" means in the genre of satiric dialogue is not exactly clear. Lucian, even if his "true thoughts" can be expressed in the dialogues, is always masked and is in complete control of every expression as well as his own level of forthrightness. As a result, if Lucian were ever being frank with us we would not know it. We cannot properly accuse of outright frankness the writer who never names himself in his dialogues.

"Tychiades," "Frankness," "Lycinus" are all names, perhaps, Lucian uses for himself or some version of himself. But is there a difference between these names and "Socrates," "Timaeus," "Athenian Stranger," for Plato? Both of these authors promote their own idea of truth, liberality, and forthrightness while being deceptive, if that is the right word, in the process.

While this satirical deception is a point of connection between Plato and Lucian, the importance of sincerity and openness as displayed in their dialogues is not diminished. This remains true in all their work, but especially obtains in the dialogues I have looked at in this chapter. Knowledge, knowing one's own as well as another's mind, and frankness are of the greatest importance throughout all these works. Yet, neither of these authors ever speaks in his own voice. We are able to take Plato and Lucian only at the same face value, and both philosophical satirists retain the upper hand at every step regarding wisdom, frankness, and truth.
Rhetoric traditionally defined necessarily involves deception for the sake of persuasion; ideal philosophy, as for example Plato's, involves pure forthrightness and frankness. In practice both of these authors use pseudonyms, myths, and various tales heard at one time from some source. Philosophy, as in Plato and Lucian, then, has its own brand of deception, which ranges from false humility (e.g., *Apology* 17a-18a) to true myths (*Gorgias* 523a) and noble lies. But, if that is true, then there are two levels of deception at work. Sophistic/rhetorical insincerity aims to persuade mainly for the benefit of the speaker, and any benefit to the audience would be for the most part coincidental. The lack of moral goals in rhetoric is what was most antagonizing to Plato (*Gorgias* 462b). Philosophical satire and philosophical deception for both Plato and Lucian can lead to knowledge and wisdom as self-realization and as an understanding of others. Philosophical rhetoric can be deceptive for the purpose of acquiring true virtue.

**5. Conclusion**

By pairing these dialogues together, I hope to demonstrate that Lucian has Plato in mind as a strong literary and ideological model. The literal descriptions of Plato and Platonists in Lucian are interesting, but most likely have nothing to do with his "true feelings" about these authors, and so can only take us so far. More significantly, Chapman's idea that Lucian was the first "modern" reader of Plato is important, and unduly dismissed. Lucian was in some ways perhaps the most interesting Platonic scholar of anyone in the second century. It seems to me that he had a very specific idea of what Plato's works were about, which involved conclusions that could only be discovered with

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277 For the noble lie, see *Republic* 345e-346a, 414b-415d, 517c-519c, and 519b-520a.
close readings and great understanding. Lucian was not blinded by smaller details or traditional doctrines or, for that matter, tradition at all. As a master at the dialogue, he saw clearly what was being expressed by his teacher's words: if not the meaning of the text, one that was diminished by those who were apparently "experts" at interpreting Plato. By the second century, except for Maximus of Tyre and perhaps Dio or Favorinus, in the larger part of the tradition of Middle Platonism comprise handbooks, which are likely themselves based on handbooks from previous authors. Lucian provides us with a very different Plato from the one we might otherwise have.

There are more than a few of dialogues of Lucian and Plato that could have been paired here, and many other connections than the ones I have attempted to show. This chapter has been about reading Lucian through Plato, and of course vice-versa. In this way, one can find connections between the authors, but also a new appreciation for their subtlety and brilliance. Lucian read and understood Plato in a unique way, and then built upon the issues he found that were to him at once universal and timeless. In the end, this modeling accentuated both of their talents for satire and parody. Perhaps Chapman, quite against the judgment of his own time, was on to something significant by calling Lucian one of the greatest Greek thinkers. In any case, this appraisal may very well hold true in the context of the Second Sophistic.
Chapter 3 – Maximus of Tyre

1. Biography

Except for three short biographical notes, we know very little about Maximus of Tyre. The two surviving external sources do not offer much information: an entry in Eusebius of Caesarea's fourth-century *Chronicle*, and a brief note in the tenth-century Byzantine Greek historical encyclopedia the *Suda*. As for many of the biographical entries in the *Suda*, the entry on Maximus derives from an epitome of the *Onomatologos* or *Pinax* of Hesychius:

Μάξιμος Τύριος φιλόσοφος· διέτριψε δὲ ἐν Ρώμῃ ἐπὶ Κομόδου. Περὶ Ὀμήρου καὶ τίς ἢ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀρχαία φιλοσοφία· Εἰ καλῶς Σωκράτης οὐκ ἀπελογήσατο· καὶ ἄλλα τινά φιλόσοφα ζητήματα.

Maximus of Tyre, philosopher. Lectured in Rome in the time of Commodus. [He wrote] "On Homer and the identity of the ancient philosophy to be found in his work," "Whether Socrates did well not to speak in his own defense," and other philosophical questions.

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279 The titles given here of *Dialexeis* 26 and 3 seem summarized. The title of *Dialexis* 26 in the manuscript is Εἰ ἔστιν καθ᾽ Ὀμήρου αἴρεσις; *Dialexis* 3 is titled Εἰ καλῶς ἐποίησεν Σωκράτης μὴ ἀπελογηθάμενος. It is not known whether the titles are editorial additions, but their lack of accuracy may lead one toward this idea.
280 In *Dialexis* 3, Maximus purports that Socrates did not in fact provide a defense for himself before a jury. Maximus' invention is that, alongside the idea that Socrates made no defense, he provides specific information that is taken directly from Plato's and Xenophon's *Apologiae*. Maximus is able to show an intimate knowledge of Socrates' life (and the traditions that surround it) while hiding his own sources of information. The idea that Socrates did not make a defense may have been taken from Xenophon. The *Memorabilia* states that Socrates thought himself to have been preparing his whole life for such a defense (1.7) and so disallowed by his daemon to prepare for it (1.8-9). For more discussion, see my Appendix 1.
281 Hobein also gives an entry from Ps. Eudocia: Μάξιμος Τύριος φιλόσοφος· διέτριψε δὲ ἐν Ρώμῃ ἐπὶ Κομόδου. ἔγραψε πολλὰς φιλοσοφικοὺς λόγους ὃν πρῶτος τις ὁ θεὸς κατὰ Πλάτωνα, περὶ Ὀμήρου καὶ τίς ἢ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀρχαία φιλοσοφία· Εἱ καλῶς
We learn from these sources that Maximus becomes prominent \((agnoscitur)\) in Olympiad 232 (149-152 CE),\(^{282}\) he "lectured in Rome at the time of Lucius Aurelius Commodus" (sole \textit{imperator} from 180-192 CE), and his \textit{Dialexeis} were given upon his first visit to the imperial capital.\(^{283}\) All other biographical information must come from the \textit{Dialexeis} themselves.

All three sources agree in calling him a Tyrian, but it is unknown whether he was born, educated, or rose to prominence there. It is unknown whether he visited Rome more than once, but, with the mention of his "first" visit, more than one visit can be assumed. There have been attempts to identify the Maximus of the \textit{Dialexeis} with Cassius Maximus, to whom Books 1-3 of Artemidorus' \textit{Onirocritica} is dedicated,\(^{284}\) as well as the Sidonian philosopher in Lucian's \textit{Demonax} 14.\(^{285}\) Neither seems likely.\(^{286}\) Maximus' life and career, then, can be sketched only in the most general terms. I would put his birth somewhat later than 120-125, as Trapp does (1997:xi), perhaps in the early 130s; then

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\(^{282}\) Eusebius' \textit{Chronicle}: \textit{Arrianus Philosophus Nicomediensis agnoscitur, et Maximus Tyrius} (Jerome’s translation, Merton MS. Coxe 315, fol. 136r).

\(^{283}\) \textit{διέτριψε δὲ ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἐπὶ Κοιμόδου, Suda/Hesychius; τῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ διαλέξεων τῆς πρώτης ἐπιθημίας, Parisinus Graecus 1962, fol. Γ’}.

\(^{284}\) Pack 1963:xxv-vi and \textit{PIR} ii.120C 509.

\(^{285}\) Dürr 1900:4; Funk 1907:180, 686; \textit{PIR} ii. 120C 509.

\(^{286}\) Trapp 1997:xii for problems with identification.
early recognition around 150 CE; with the *Dialexeis* perhaps given before, but at least during, his first visit to Rome in the 180s.\textsuperscript{287}

The earliest information for Maximus' status as a Platonic philosopher comes from the most authoritative manuscript of the *Dialexeis*. In addition, the orations are subscribed "the philosophical (discourses) of Maximus of Tyre."\textsuperscript{288}

The 41 *Dialexeis* comprise approximately 336 pages in Trapp's 1994 Teubner edition, just under 70,000 words. The subject matter of the orations is varied, and includes discussions of pleasure, prayer, revenge, Socratic eroticism, the identity of Plato's god, virtue and science, and the goal of philosophy. The *Dialexeis* average around 197 lines: the shortest has 99 lines (*Dialexis* 28), the longest has 317 (*Dialexis* 1).\textsuperscript{289}

2. Maximus on Plato and the Contemplative Life

In the first *dialexis*, Maximus immediately expresses his concern for the practical relevance of philosophy to life. The introductory lecture sets out to prove that philosophical instruction is necessary for the pursuit of virtue, that such a pursuit is important to human life, and attainable by almost everyone, and that he is fully capable of providing it.

Maximus is careful to show the applicability of philosophical teaching to any type of life and in any context. If life were stable and unchanging and consisted of one

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\textsuperscript{287} Since the Eusebius information is based on sources that contain disagreements and errors, even this much is not secure. For more on Maximus and his dates, see Trapp 1997, especially the Introduction.

\textsuperscript{288} Μαξίμου τυρίου Πλατωνικοῦ φιλοσόφου; Μαξίμου Τυρίου φιλοσοφούμενα, Parisinus Graecus 1962, fol. Γ'.

\textsuperscript{289} For more on Maximus, Dillon 1977:399-400, and especially Trapp 1997.
form, then a single type of teaching would be sufficient (1.3). But the changeable nature of
human fortune and the uneven tenor of human affairs deceive and "baffle our powers of
reason" (καὶ ἐξαπατᾶται ὁ λογισμός). "Set over (life) is teaching" (ἐπιτέτακται δὲ αὐτῶ ὁ
λόγος), which alters itself to the circumstances of the moment (1.2). Like the tragic actor,
"the teaching of philosophers" (ὁ τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγος) adopts its tone to suit the
emotions of the moment in order to offer consolation to those in pain and enhance the joy
of those who are happy (1.2).

It is important to his argument that Maximus shows the message of his teaching
will not change. The expression his account takes may change, however, depending on
what form will be most effective. Even though the arrangement or style may be reshaped,
"the virtue of philosophical teaching is not diverse or multiple, but single and in itself
coherent." The aim, if not the style of presentation, of philosophy's message is unified,
steady, and constant.

Philosophy is concerned with the business of human life (1.1), and is inseparable
from it, as light from the eye (1.3)--both act as the same sort of guide for men. The
summit of philosophy's purpose is to "rouse men's souls and guide their ambitions," and
to "temper their desires" (1.8); philosophy should "teach and control men's souls" (1.8).

Alternatively, if one thinks that philosophy is merely a matter of "skill with
words, or refutation, argument, and sophistry" (τέχνας λόγων, ἢ ἐλέγχους καὶ ἔριδας καὶ
σοφίσματα), there is no problem finding a teacher. The world is full of that kind of

290 τοῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγοις, τὸ μὲν καλὸν οὐκ εἶναι παντοδαπὸν οὐδὲ
dιαπεφορημένον, ἀλλ' ἐν καὶ αὐτῷ αὐτῷ παραπλήσιον, 1.10.
"sophist," and this matter (τὸ χρημα) is not hard to acquire. In fact, there seems to be more teachers than students. So while "these (skills) are only a small part of philosophy, ignorance of them may be disgraceful." At the same time, "knowledge of them is no source of pride" (1.8). Though these arts are less valuable than philosophical inquiry per se, they are still necessary, again, depending on context.

Maximus is careful to show that he is no less able to speak to the philosopher, who is used to a more sober form of expression (1.7), than he is to address νέοι. He declares twice that νέοι make up his audience, whom he is able to entertain while at the same time educating.\(^{291}\) He provides a "treasury of eloquence" such as "to appeal to all ears and all characters."\(^{292}\) If faced with someone who despises such entertainment and sophistry in his pursuit of truth, Maximus "is no longer the same man," implying he can speak to that man just as effectively (1.7). He attempts to straddle the line between those who need to be entertained while instructed, on the one hand, and strictly professional philosophers on the other.

Koniaris (1983) takes the discussion of the tragic actor and the theater at the start of *Dialexis* \(^{293}\) to indicate what will effectively be a switch in Maximus' philosophical stance. It makes more sense, it seems, to look at this discussion as a justification for his

\(^{291}\) As Plutarch explains in *De audiendo* (37c-f), this is the transitional period between childhood and one's own rationality.

\(^{292}\) These claims seem to be requisite oratorical boasting in the Second Sophistic. See Winter 1976:chs. 8-10 for Paul's accusation that the Corinthians are addicted to the "grand style," their idolatry, and the boasting of sophistry.

\(^{293}\) I.e., "When actors are playing in Dionysius' theater, speaking one moment with the voice of Agamemnon, the next with that of Achilles, or again impersonating a Telephus or a Palamedes, or whatever else the drama may call for, no one finds it at all odd or disturbing that the same man should appear now in one guise and now in another."
presentation of philosophical arguments—which emerges as fairly standard Middle Platonism—in a less Academic, more rhetorical fashion. Maximus thus shows how the form he uses, which resembles epideictic oratory in the second century, is justified for the cause of philosophy as long as it is effective. By emulating the types of displays a second-century audience was anxious to hear, he at once gains access to vulnerable youth and is able to continue the Platonic tradition in his own way after the acme of the Academy has passed.

This introduction will help the audience account for the fact that Maximus switches tones throughout the *Dialexeis*, depending on the point being made and the level of sophistication of the subject. Further, Maximus is able to justify his own sophistic presentation of philosophical points, since Platonic oratory was a genre that had begun to develop in the century before. Last, he sets the stage to argue for the unity of philosophy beginning from the very start of Classical Greek thought, irrespective of the form it takes.

Maximus acknowledges the formal and technical skills necessary for the endeavor of philosophy while at the same time warning that theory and technicalities alone will not suffice. The rhetorical skills he mentions are all in vain without a corresponding move toward the practical acquisition of virtue. Worry over arrangement and argumentation should exist only for practical purposes, and such a concern about the elevation of theory over practical virtue runs throughout the *Dialexeis*.²⁹⁴ Maximus exhorts his audience throughout the lectures to gain whatever skills are needed in the honest pursuit of virtue and human flourishing.

²⁹⁴ In particular, *Dialexeis* 21.4, 27.8, 30.1, and 37.2.
Such an application of education is not without Platonic precedent, particularly in the *Laws* (631e-632a and 653ab).\(^{295}\) Taking the educational precepts in the *Republic*, alongside an "inclusive" reading of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* back into Platonism, one can provide justification for the practical applicability of education to life, rather than the pursuit of the purely philosophical or contemplative existence.

Practical ethics in the first and second century CE were still solely the concern of philosophers. Studies of ethics are found in the Platonists of the time, e.g., Plutarch,\(^{296}\) Calvenus Taurus,\(^{297}\) Atticus,\(^{298}\) and Alcinous.\(^{299}\) Such concerns are also voiced by the so-called "Neopythagoreans" in the second century, such as, Nicomachus\(^ {300}\) and Numenius.\(^ {301}\) There are ethical passages in the Poemandres of the *Corpus Hermeticum* that accord with Numenius, as well as with the common contemporary "Stoicizing" Platonism that had prevailed since Antiochus. The same trend is seen in the Chaldaean Oracles of [Julian].

Perhaps one could glean moral lessons from the epideictic speeches of the sophists of the Second Sophistic, but this was clearly not their primary concern.

\(^{295}\) E.g., "Moreover, in the matter of anger and of fear, and of all the disturbances which befall souls owing to misfortune, and of all the avoidances thereof which occur in good-fortune, and of all the experiences which confront men through disease or war or penury or their opposites--in regard to all these definite instruction must be given as to what is the right and what the wrong disposition in each case," *Laws* 632ab.
\(^{296}\) E.g., *De sera numinis vindicta, De virtute morali, De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos*.
\(^{297}\) Cf. Aulus Gellius *Noctes Atticae* I, IX, XII.
\(^{298}\) Fr. 2, Baudry 1931:1-33.
\(^{299}\) *Didaskalikos* 27-34.
\(^{300}\) *Introductio arithmetica* 1.14.2 and *Theologoumena arithmeticae*.
\(^{301}\) E.g., περὶ τὰ γαθοῦ, fr. 2, des Places 1974.
Entertainment and innovation, merged with hypothetical or historical quandaries, were much more the order of the day. Take for example the following titles of Polemo quoted by Philostratus (VS 542-543): *Xenophon Wishes to Die at the Same Time as Socrates* and *Solon Asks for his Laws to be Repealed when Pisistratus Receives a Bodyguard*. Many of the "exercises" (meletai) prominent in the Second Sophistic were about events long past, the moral or practical applicability of which one would be hard pressed to find. Sophists were known to be involved in court cases and to perform civil duties at this time, but what we have about theoretical and practical ethics seems contained exclusively within the work of those who considered themselves philosophers.

Maximus is not alone in his desire to ground philosophy in more practical concerns. It was a trope in the Hellenistic and Imperial periods that philosophy is the *ars vivendi* and not merely an intellectual pursuit. Yet, in the Second Sophistic, Maximus clearly sees himself as surrounded by vanity and sophistry of two sorts. As we will see, on the one hand are the pedantic, technical, handbook-producing Middle Platonists, and on the other the shining stars of the Imperial cultural sky, the ambitious, vainglorious, epideictic sophists.

The concerns in the *Dielexeis* for practical ethics, coupled with the events in Plato's life, provide an effective illustration of the applicability of philosophy to life.

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302 E.g., Dio served his city through embassies to Rome (cf. *Orations* 40.15, 45.2-3), and had won from Trajan the right for Prusa to increase its Council by 100 and to mint its own coins, Whitmarsh 2005:60.
303 The Stoics described philosophy at this time as a τέχνη τοῦ βίου, Arnim 1903 (=SVF) 2.117=*Academica* 2.23 (Antiochus); SVF 3.516 (Sextus, *Adversus mathematicos* 11.200, 207). Socrates is clearly a starting point for this conception of philosophy; see Inwood 1986.
Dialexeis 15 and 16 are set up as forensic scenes (controversiae was the name for such fictitious legal speeches in Seneca\(^{304}\)) in which the two lives of action and contemplation are opposed. The battle over the two lives was a common trope since the second half of the fifth century,\(^{305}\) but Maximus writes that the philosophers of his time still have yet to end the quarrels and debates of what sort of life to live (15.2). These men have all the preparations, all the equipment, and "the security of their science," only to have no sure course to steer (15.2). The sequence and two sides of the debate, as well as the process of discovery Maximus wants to effect, are shown by two consecutive lecture titles in the manuscript: "What Kind of Life is Better, that of Action or that of Contemplation? That the Life of Action is (Better),"\(^{306}\) and "That is the Life of Contemplation is better than the Life of Action."\(^{307}\)

In Dialexis 15 the prosecution speaks first in the form of a speech by an unnamed advocate of the life of action. The speech is made up of charges against someone (later identified in the text as Anaxagoras\(^{308}\)) who is living the life of contemplation. In following solely the contemplative life, this representative has ignored the important models of the

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\(^{304}\) See the edition of Winterbottom 1974. Suasoriae, alternatively, was Seneca's name for speeches of persuasion or dissuasion.

\(^{305}\) Euripides Antiope; Plato Gorgias, Theaetetus, and Republic; Aristotle Protrepticus and Nicomachean Ethics; also the discussion of Theophrastus in Cicero Ad Atticus 2.16.3. For discussion, see Jaeger 1948:App.II and Carter 1986.

\(^{306}\) Τίς ἀµείβων βίος, ὁ πρακτικὸς ἢ ὁ θεωρητικὸς; ὃτι ὁ πρακτικὸς, 15.

\(^{307}\) "Ὅτι ὁ θεωρητικὸς βίος ἀµείβων τοῦ πρακτικοῦ, 16.

\(^{308}\) Anaxagoras had for some time been the representative of the contemplative or philosophical life, see for example Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics 1215b6. It would seem that the emphasis he placed on νοῦς in his philosophy, as well as the tradition of his trial circa 450 contributed to this association. When he died the citizens of Lampsacus erected an altar to Mind and Truth in his memory; see, for example, Copleston (1976:66).
past from history, myth, and philosophy. One of the examples used at length is Plato and his Sicilian voyages: "For a friend's sake, an exile and pauper, Plato confronted a mighty tyranny, traveling great distances by land, crossing seas, incurring the tyrant's enmity, suffering exile and danger, all so as not to betray the character of philosophy" (ἵνα μὴ προδῷ τῷ φιλοσοφίας ἠθος)(15.9). Plato is so far described as the very epitome of the man of action who has faced great obstacles in his endeavors.

In *Dialexis 16*, the defense of the life of contemplation is expressed in the persona of Anaxagoras, and is modeled at least partly on the apology of Plato's Socrates. The defense follows directly in response to the formal accusations. Citing personal reasons for withdrawing from political life in Clazomenae, "Anaxagoras" argues that civic life in fact depends on the principles that the contemplative life examines. Maximus then gives his own solution for the debate based on this dependence: when discussing

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309 "I am convinced that I never intentionally harmed anyone..." (πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδίκειν ἀνθρώπων, *Apology* 37a); the first line of "Anaxagoras" speech: "I know very well, men of Clazomenae, that I am very far from doing you any wrong" (Ὅτι μὲν πολλοῦ δέω ἀδίκειν ύμίς, ὃς ἀνδρεὶς Κλαζομένοι, ἐν τούτῳ οἶδα, *Dialexis* 16).

310 The charges are written by Maximus to emulate the common Attic practice of reading charges or laws under discussion. In the speeches of the Attic orators, the passages do not show up and in their place is the word "Law."

311 "Anaxagoras" speech should be considered a declamatory exercise, along the lines of Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon* (6.5), where Clitophon is accused of adultery; see also the false confession of the murder of Leucippe, where Clinias and Thersandros have opposing speeches. Trial scenes in the Second Sophistic are quite common, Russell 1983:38n.100. These speeches continue the forensic applications of speechmaking in the new sophistic style that had developed in the first century CE, as well as the use of the dialogue format in general. Apuleius' *Apology* as an example of this style. Lucian provides us many of these speeches, and most are within a dialogue format, although some are written as monologues. Maximus actually has three sets of opposing speeches, 15-16 (between active and contemplative lives), 23-34 (virtue or pleasure as the end of life), and 39-40 (on degrees of good).
immediate practical utility, the life of action is to be preferred; for the sake of the best outcomes, the life of contemplation is preferred (16.5). The most productive type of life for each particular person should be chosen on the basis of one's capabilities. This idea reflects Plato's early separation of the different "classes" in the Republic.\textsuperscript{312}

This "inclusive" compromise is the line often adopted in the Middle Platonism of the time. Similar concessions occur in Alcinous Didaskalikos 2, Apuleius De Platone 2.23.253, and [Plutarch] Placita 874f-875a. When both age and capabilities are factored in, Maximus writes, "let the philosopher live the life of action when he is young,"\textsuperscript{313} and "let him grow old in the pursuit of reason" (16.5).\textsuperscript{314} This allows for a type of "mixed life" that is based on effectiveness and talent both: "Plato's laborious excursions to Sicily and his efforts with Dion belonged in the prime of his life; when he grew old he found refuge in the untroubled calm and noble debates and uninterrupted contemplation of the Academy" (16.5).\textsuperscript{315} As is required by basic Platonic psychology (as well as Aristotelian) the contemplative life takes precedence over the active life. It is the philosopher who at the end of Dialexis 16 travels the whole earth in a "truthful dream": i.e., "he sees all things while his body remains still" (16.6). This "flight of the soul," so prevalent throughout Maximus, is taken from the Phaedrus, where the mind of the philosopher alone has wings (249c) and takes flight (246a-249d).

\textsuperscript{312} Cf., Book 8, regarding the practical education of the young.
\textsuperscript{313} Νέος μὲν γὰρ ὄν ὁ φιλόσοφος πραττέτω.
\textsuperscript{314} γηράσκοντα δὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.
\textsuperscript{315} Καὶ γὰρ οἱ Πλάτωνος ἐπὶ Σικελίαν δρόμοι καὶ πόνοι, καὶ περὶ Δίωνα σπουδῆ, κατὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν ἐγγύνοντο τῆς ἡλικίας· γηράσαντα δ᾽ αὐτὸν ὑπεδέξατο Ακαδημία, καὶ βαθεῖα σχολῆ, καὶ λόγοι καλοί, καὶ θεωρίᾳ ἀπταστός.
Plato's career, then, is seen as an exemplary combination of the practical and philosophical life. In contrast to Epicurus and his "craven, idle, cringing life of worms," Maximus encourages comparison, "Greek with Greek": Plato from the Academy, Xenophon from the army, and Diogenes from Pontus. Though Maximus is influenced by the importance of the contemplative life in Plato and the subsequent support by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (especially Book 10), the discussion is clearly also a direct reaction against the pedantic, showy sophistry that surrounds him. Accordingly, Maximus insists that action follows rhetoric whenever possible and appropriate. He does not seem very impressed with the embassies and other civic duties of the sophists we hear about from the Second Sophistic.

As diverse as the second century intellectual terrain was, it is clear that Maximus has sophists and the more pedantic philosophers\(^3\)\(^1\)\(^6\) in mind when discussing the importance of action in addition to contemplation or thought. Perhaps Maximus' view was influenced by Plato's concern about philosophers being apt to retire from the world.\(^3\)\(^1\)\(^7\)

It is noteworthy that the argument is written in the long tradition of Δισσοὶ λόγοι, which emphasizes the ability to argue a case from opposing sides.\(^3\)\(^1\)\(^8\) Maximus alters the rules of the game, however, in that he finds both sides partially right, and therefore reconciles the importance of both lives. In context, then, Maximus uses the style of

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316 See especially *Dialectis* 21.4.
rhetoric so popular at the time in his version of the protreptic speech in order to petition his audience to reconsider the applications of philosophy to the practical life of virtue.

If the *Dialexeis* were in fact given in succession, it might be surprising to hear after the previous argument that "Plato's foundation and his republic are established in purely theoretical terms; he aims for the greatest possible perfection rather than what might be most practicable" (17.3).319 His city is like an idealized statue (17.3). Plato notoriously wavers on the point of the actualization of his *polis*.320 Maximus does not specifically address whether Plato meant the *Republic* to be used as a political treatise, as is sometimes argued (especially in light of the Sicilian trips). In *Dialexis* 17, at least, he seems to find the two discrete.

Maximus is often dismissed as more of a sophist than either a philosopher or a Platonist. My hope in this chapter is to suggest that a more fruitful way to think of him is as a proponent of a new type of popular Platonism—a philosopher who has taken on the method of the extremely public and successful Sophists of the time. Philostratus discusses a category of the authors who "seem the sophist but are actually philosophers" (*VS* 479). Maximus' work is perhaps not impressive or famous enough to warrant a mention. This division between philosopher and sophist, however, shows the limitation of viewing sophistry as merely a type of rhetoric in the second century. It seems Philostratus himself strives to some degree to acknowledge a third type of thinker in the

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319 ἀλλ' ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἄνοιξις καὶ ἡ πολιτεία γιγαντίαν λόγω, κατὰ τὸ ἀκριβέστατον μᾶλλον ἢ χρειωδέστατον...
320 *Republic* 471c, 540d, and 592ab.
Second Sophistic, a new type of public figure that I refer to in this work as the Platonic 
rhetor.

3. Plato's Style in Maximus' Writing

3.1. Vocabulary

The vocabulary and syntax in the *Dialexeis* are modeled on Plato's Attic style more than that of any other author. Dürr's *Sprachliche* examines the influences on vocabulary and syntax of Maximus' most prominent models, specifically Plato, Xenophon, and Plutarch. According to Dürr (1900: 79-83), of the 200 particularly Attic words in Maximus, 115 of these are from Plato. As he writes, "Moreover, for Maximus as for Philo, Plutarch and other philosophical authors, that Plato is their linguistic model is expressed by the fact that of the generally Attic vocabulary, only a small fraction is not found in Plato" (116, my translation).³²¹ Maximus is deliberate in his "Atticizing," and, according to Dürr, he does so with Plato constantly in mind.

Maximus refers to Plato as justification for his liberality regarding technical vocabulary. Begging the pardon of "the experts in the pursuit of terminology" (τούς σοφοὺς τῆς τῶν ὄνομάτων θήρας), he calls love at one time "appetition" (ὄρεξιν), and at another "desire" (ἐπιθυμίαν). He is able to interchange the two because, as he writes, "I trust Plato in these other respects in his freedom over terminology" (ἐγὼ γὰρ τοι τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὄνομάτων ἐλευθερία πείθομαι Πλάτωνι, 21.4). A possible source of this idea is found at *Protagoras* 358a, where Socrates entreats Prodicus to answer "in

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³²¹ "Dass des weiteren für Maximus wie für Philo, Plutarch und andere philosophische Autoren Plato das sprachliche Vorbild ist, ist dadurch ausgesprochen, dass von den allgemein attischen Prosavocabelen nur ein kleiner Bruchteil sich nicht bei Plato findet..."
response to the intent of his question" (τοῦτο μοι πρὸς ὁ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι) and to spare him the "distinction of terms" (διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων). The phrasing of Maximus' τά τε ἀλλα does not necessarily show particular doctrinal preoccupation or a Platonic sectarianism in other respects, as has been assumed,322 "these other things" refers to Plato's general influence on Maximus, since the section as a whole indicates a general Platonic focus.

The nod to Plato in 21.4 answers questions or criticisms of imprecision the listener may level against Maximus. Then, by deferring to the terminological "experts" in the passage, the imagined criticism becomes the impetus for a short analysis of the seemingly relative nature of love. The response to such criticism, then, is an excuse for further exegesis and suspends doctrinal responsibility that was in fact caused by the pedanticism ascribed to another party.323 The statement about terminology is also an oblique reference to Plato's looser, more "poetic" style that emerges when the philosopher is discussed alongside Homer. Maximus promotes this style over that of the more pedantic second-century Academic Platonists, which is solely doctrinal and without tremendous inspiration.

3.2. Platonic Methodology in Maximus

3.2.1. Analogy and Image

Use of image or allegory (εἰκόνες), and specifically analogy that has Platonic

322 This quote from 21.4 is in fact printed as the epigraph for the entire work in Davies' 1740 edition.
323 "But if they insist, let us call love 'appetition' and not 'desire'… What then if our sophist turns stubborn and exploits the qualification…?" 21.
precedent, is ubiquitous in Maximus. To build on one example listed in Trapp (1997:xxxix): god is like the sun (ἥλιος, 19.3, 37.5), a spring (πηγή, 11.11), a steward (ταιμίας, 41.2), a craftsman (τεχνίτης, 13.3, 13.4), a king (βασιλεύς, 11.5, 11.12), a legislator (ὁ νομοθέτης; 6.5, 11.12), a farmer (καρπών τροφέα, 41.2), a steersman (κυβερνήτης, 8.7, 13.4), a doctor (ιατρός; 8.7, 13.4), a general (στρατηγόν, 13.4), a chorus-master (κορυφαία ἁρμονία, 13.3), a guide (χειραγωγός, 8.7), and a playwright (δραματουργεῖ ὁ θεός, 1.1). They are largely concentrated in the same three Dialexeis, and all of these images and epithets have Platonic sources.

The image of the sun as linked to the Good (τάγαθόν) is used by Maximus to refer to the "light" that makes things intelligible (cf. Republic 6.508a-e). For god as the source of only good, see Plato's Timaeus, 29d-30a. For god as the "steward" of good and evil to mortals, see Republic 2.379e. Famously, in Plato's Timaeus (28c), god is the "maker of everything" (ὁ ποιητὴς...τοῦ τοῦ παντός) and the "architect." God as (the Great) King is subsequent to Plato. God as "king of all," however, is ascribed to Plato in the second Epistula (312e). The idea of god as the law and lawgiver, see Plato's Politicus 294a and 297a. For Zeus as a "steersman" of men and gods, see Symposium 197b. For gods considered as the benevolent charioteers, steersmen, generals, doctors, and

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324 Dialexeis 11 ("Plato on God"), 13 ("Prophecy and Human Foresight"), and 41 ("God and the Sources of Evil").
325 Plato attributes the line to Homer, although it is not found in the received text: ἄγαθον τε κακῶν τε τέτικται; yet, for Zeus as "dispenser" of war, Iliad 4.84.
326 For the switch to τεχνίτης in Platonism, not found in Plato as an epithet for god, see perhaps Philo Legum allegoriae 1.18.9.
327 [Aristotle] De mundo 6; Philo De opificio mundi 71; De specialibus legibus 1.18; De decalogo 61.
328 As well as to [Aristotle] De mundo 400b12.
farmers, see the *Laws* 905e-906a and 961a-d.

One formulation that is indicative of Maximus' rhetorical style is found near the end of the *Dialexeis*:

"Ἡ τούτων μὲν πέρι οὐθέν δεῖ τὸν θεόν ἐνοχλεῖν, αἰσθανομένους τῆς χορηγίας, καὶ ὑφόντας τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ συνιέντας τὴν πηγήν, καὶ τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν εἴδότας, τὸν οὖρανοῦ ἀρμοστήν, τὸν ἥλιον καὶ σελήνης ἁγωγά, τὸν κορυφαῖον τῆς τῶν ἀστρων περιφοράς καὶ δινήσεως καὶ χορείας καὶ δρόμου, τὸν ἐρῶν ταμίαν, τὸν πνευμάτων οἰκονόμον, τὸν ποιητὴν θαλάττης, τὸν δήμουργόν γῆς, τὸν ποταμῶν χορηγόν, τὸν καρπῶν τροφέα, τὸν ἐκάστῳ γεννητήν, τὸν γενέθλιον, τὸν ὑπόπτον, τὸν ἐπικάρπιον, τὸν πατρῶν, τὸν φυτάλμον· οὗ ὁ νοῦς ἀρραγής ὡς τὸν πατρῶν, τὸν φυτάλμον… (41.2, "Good Being the Work of God, Whence Comes Evil?")

We need not bother the god over this matter [of oracles], since we are well aware of this provision, and see its origins, and understand its source, and know the Father and Creator for ourselves, the governor of the heavens, the director of the sun and moon, the leader of the swiftly whirling orbits of the dance of the stars, the steward of the seasons, the regulator of the winds, the creator of the sea, the maker of the earth, the provider of rivers, the nurturer of crops, the begetter of living things, the god of the family, the god of rain, the god of fruitfulness, the paternal god, the fostering god…

This text is exemplary of Maximus' affinity for epithets and images (and length of cola--the sentence continues from this point). In the *Timaeus* (28c), Plato gives "maker of all" (ὁ ποιητής...τοῦ παντός), but here Maximus looks to descend figuratively from heaven (οὐρανός) to earth (γῆ) in steps, bringing the divine down to his audience through words. In the second century, Stoics were discussing the immanent divinity, and Platonists the transcendent god. Maximus attempts to express a vision of god that is less abstract and more comforting than what is found in the Platonism with which he seems to be familiar.
As a last example, in one sentence Maximus is also able to distribute a single image throughout nearly every aspect of life:

Εἰ δὲ σοι καὶ σαφεστέρας εἰκόνος δεῖ, νόει μοι στρατηγὸν μὲν τὸν θεόν, στρατείαν δὲ τὴν ζωὴν, ὑπόκλητα δὲ τὸν ἄθροισμον, συνόδευμα δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην, ὅπλα δὲ τὰς εὔπορίας, πολεμίους δὲ τὰς συμφοράς, σύμμαχον δὲ τὸν λογισμὸν, ἀριστείαν δὲ τὴν ἄρετήν, ἣταν δὲ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, μαντικὴν δὲ τὴν τέχνην αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἐπισταμένην τὸ μέλλον. (13.4, "Whether, Given the Reality of Prophecy, There is Free Will")

Or if you need a still clearer image, you could imagine god as a general, life as a campaign, man as hoplite, fate as the watchword, resources as weapons, misfortunes as enemies, reason as an ally, virtue as victory, wickedness as defeat, and prophecy as the skill that can predict future contingencies on the strength of present resources.

The image of the "campaign of life" is used often in Maximus,329 and is found in Middle Platonism in general.330 The rhetorical charge and vividness of an image like this one are quite useful for Maximus' ethical and practical concerns, serving him well in his attempt to rouse his audience for the personal battle between virtue and vice that each of them must wage.

Such imagery is constantly used throughout the Dialexeis, even resorted to when Maximus is at pains to illustrate a particular point. At the beginning of 1.6, he writes that to show his point another way, he "needs the image of the athletes again." Such moments of "desperation," by implying necessity of such techniques, might be used to stave off accusations of frivolous rhetorical displaying.

329 Dialexeis 5.3, 15.8, 10, 33.3, 34.4, and 40.5.
330 Plutarch Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus 77c, Philo De ebrietate 99-100.
3.2.2. Myth

Following the lines of Plato's frequent use of mythological elaboration, Maximus uses myth to instruct. In *Dialects* 10.1, which Trapp (1997:85) sees as an echo of *Gorgias* 523a, Maximus writes, "That of Epimenides was the same message, whether a myth or a true account" (Ταύτῃ τοι ἔτεινεν καὶ ὁ Ἐπιμενίδου εἶτε μῦθος εἶτε καὶ ἀληθῆς λόγος).331 Moving from *mythos* to *logos* has frequent Platonic precedent, for example, *Protagoras* 324d.332 Maximus performs a heavier-handed version when he ends a section with: "Thus ends the myth. Let reasoned argument now take its turn and consider" (14.3).

Maximus maintains the Aristotelian distinction between what is "known better to us" and "things that are better known in themselves."333 He maintained that we should begin the study of a topic with things better known to us and arrive ultimately at an understanding of things better known in themselves (11.7). As a result, however, we often admire what is obscure: "given the boldness of its nature, the human soul tends to think little of what is close at hand, while it admires what is distant" (4.5). As we will see, this admiration of the obscure supports both the need for him to interpret Plato (11.1), and his use of myth and allegory in education. For Maximus, myth entertains while it instructs, and can sometimes say better what bare doctrine would merely mar:

331 "Listen then, as they say, to a very fine story, which you will regard as a fable, I think, but I as an actual account; for what I am about to tell you I mean to offer as the truth" (ἀκούει δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἠγήσῃ μῦθον, ὃς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον: ὃς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὑπάρχει σοι λέξῳ ἀ μέλλω λέγειν, Gorgias 523a).
332 Trapp sees an echo of the famous "great myth" of Protagoras in *Dialects* 36.1, which begins: Βούλομαι σοι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Λυδοῦ σοφίαν ποιήσαι μῦθον…
333 Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b, 2.3.72b; Topics 142a; Physics 1.1.184a; Nicomachean Ethics 1095b; Metaphysics 1029b. For discussion of Aristotle's first principles and idea of dialectic, Irwin 1988.
Ἐγὼ δὲ εἰ μὲν τι πλέον ἐθέσαντο τῶν προτέρων οἱ ἔπειτα, μακαρίω τοὺς ἀνδρὰς τῆς θέας· εἰ δὲ μηδενὶ πλεονεκτοῦντες κατὰ τὴν γνώσιν, μετέλαβον αὐτῶν τὰ αἰνίγματα εἰς μύθους σαφεῖς, δέδοι τις αὐτῶν ἐπιλάβηται ὡς ἔξαγορευόντων ἀπορρήτους λόγους. (4.5, "Which Produced the Better Account of the Gods, Poets or Philosophers?"

For my part, if those of the present generation have seen more deeply than our forebearers, I congratulate them on their sight; but if instead with no gain in understanding, they have merely converted allegory into explicit doctrine, I am afraid that someone may arrest them for profaning mysteries that ought not to be revealed.

Without initiation or proper instruction, bare doctrine does injustice to the ideas involved. This notion may originate in the end of the *Phaedrus*, where Socrates insists that writing without instruction is, more likely than not, unclear (275c). Since Maximus does not believe his contemporaries have gained any more understanding by stripping away artistry, their destruction of the ancient poetic form has brought only harm. Myth respects the message of philosophy, makes it more impressive to us, and stirs our curiosity to discover the real meaning behind it.

In contrast to this view of Plato as a user of myth and poetry in his dialogues, Aristotle and Plato are characterized as plain-spoken thinkers at the end of the *Dialexeis*:

Βούλει τοίνυν Ἀριστέαν μὲν καὶ Μελησαγόραν καὶ Ἐπιμενίδην καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν αἰνίγματα τοῖς μύθοις ἐζωμεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τὴν γνώμην τρέψομεν, τουτούς τοὺς ἐκ Λυκίου καὶ Ἀκαδημίας τῆς καλῆς; οὐ γὰρ μυθολόγοι, οὐδὲ αἰνιγματώδεις, οὐδὲ τερατείαν ἀσπαζόμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐν δημοτικῇ λέξει τὲ καὶ ἐν διανοίᾳ εἰθισμένα. (38.4, "Whether One Might become Good by Divine

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334 *Phaedrus* 257cd: "He who thinks, then, that he has left behind him any art in writing, and he who receives it in the belief that anything in writing will be clear and certain, would be an utterly simple person, and in truth ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon, if he thinks written words are of any use except to remind him who knows the matter about which they are written."

335 Reading εἰθισμένα (in manuscript R) with Koniaris, not εἰθισμένη (add. Markland) with Trapp; ἐν omitted by manuscript U.
Dispensation")

Shall we now dismiss Aristeas and Melesagoras and Epimenides and the allegories of the poets and pure myth, and turn our thoughts towards the philosophers, those inhabitants of the Lyceum and the noble Academy? They are no spinners of myths, or speakers in riddles, or lovers of marvels, but communicate in everyday language and familiar patterns of thought.

Typically in Maximus, Plato is a representative of the "ancient," poetic group of thinkers, as opposed to the more recent, plain-spoken sort. Here Maximus has moved the line between ancient and contemporary thinkers back so that Plato is now a representative of the latter. As this should indicate, since Plato seems to bridge the gap between the ancient allegorists and the more modern creators of bare doctrine, it is best to imagine him on this cusp between ancient and new thinkers. Before Plato were the Presocratics, mentioned throughout the *Dialexeis,* and after him Aristotle, who used the new form of "bare" philosophical treatise. For Maximus, Plato used both doctrine and myth most efficaciously. There will be times, then, where Plato will be on the "ancient" side of the line and sometimes the contemporary side, especially when practical concerns

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336 E.g., *dialexis* 4.4-5: "Allegory is ubiquitous, among both poets and philosophers; I admire these older authors' [Plato, Pherecydes] reverence before the truth more than I do the outspokenness of the moderns" (Πάντα μεστὰ αἰνιγμάτων, καὶ παρὰ ποιηταῖς, καὶ παρὰ φιλοσόφοις· ὃν ἐγὼ τὴν πρός τὸ ἀληθὲς αἰδῶ ἀγαπῶ μᾶλλον, ἢ τὴν παρρησίαν τῶν νεωτέρων); also cf. 5.8.

337 E.g., mention of "ideas from Thrace and Cilicia [whence Democritus and Chrysippus], Epicurus' atoms, Heraclitus' fire, Thales' water, Anaximenes' air, Empedocles' strife, and Diogenes' jar," *Dialexis* 26.2.

338 For this idea of "coating" teachings with entertainment, cf. Plato *Leges* 659e-660a, though most famously this notion is found in Lucretius *De rerum natura* 1.936-50. For the educative purpose of myth in Middle Platonism and after, cf. Strabo 1.2.3 and 8; [Plutarch] *De vita et poesi Homeri* 92; Plutarch *De E* 385d; Sallustius 3.4; Julian *Orations* 5.170a; and Clemens *Stromata* 5.4.24.1-2 and 6.15.126.1. The idea is also found in Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 1.2.9-10.982b).
become an issue. The dismissive view of myth found at 38.4 (quoted above) is not consistently endorsed throughout his work: more often, we see the benefit of myth for education. There is basis for criticism in Plato, however, since he is himself occasionally critical of allegory. As we will see, Maximus must also confront Plato's dismissal of Homer to counter the educative influences of myth and epic in the ideal state of the Republic.

3.3. Platonic Quotation

Allusion to Plato in Maximus can come like a flood or a trickle. In 38.4, after a reference to Aspasia from Aeschines Socraticus, Maximus writes, "You collect together expertise in love from Diotima, in music from Connus, in poetry from Evenus, in farming from Ischomachus, and in geometry from Theodorus." As Trapp (1997:301n.14) notes, Maximus references in one sentence the Symposium 210d, Euthydemus 272c, Apology 20bc, Phaedo 60d, (Xenophon's) Oeconomicus 6.17, and Theaetetus 143d.

Maximus uses Homer in his Dial exeis much as Plato does, i.e., for direct quotation and with very few paraphrases: only 27 of the 187 quotations of Homer in Maximus are indirect or paraphrased. Alternatively, Plato's dialogues are referenced or quoted 115 times in Maximus, second only to Homer, and only twelve of these are direct. Rather than mere adornment, Maximus' Platonic allusions and paraphrases thoroughly permeate the text by constituting, with qualification in view of the Stoicized Platonism of the time, the entire philosophic approach to each of his questions and themes. The result is a Middle-

339 Notably Republic 378e, Phaedrus 229c, and at Gorgias 492, where allegory seems to be used with irony.
Platonic lens through which Maximus strives to see Platonism in a pure sense, outside of the pedantic, theory-driven philosophy in the second century.

Homer is by far the most quoted author in the second century, and this trend holds true in the Dialexeis. And as Plato holds the second position in the Second Sophistic, so does he in Maximus. The relationship between Plato and Homer is a discussion point for many in the Second Sophistic, especially grammarians (for example, De Sublimitate 13.3). In such discussions, though Homer is a source of poetic style for Plato, the epic poet is most often discussed as the father of sophistry or at least as standing in their tradition of rhetoric. In his Second Discourse on Kingship, Dio has Alexander most admire Homer's heroes for their rhetoric ex tempore (VS 460). Hippodromus of Larissa, who held the Athenian chair of rhetoric (perhaps the imperial chair) from 209 to 213 called Homer the "father of the sophists," and "their voice" (VS 620).

After Plato removed epic poetry from of his ideal state in Books 2 and 3 of the Republic, this view of Homerus sophista is a common characterization. Once the criticism of Homer had been initiated by the philosopher (arguably found coupled with a show of just as much respect), the expulsion of the poet from the republic opened the path for

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342 160 lines of Homer found in 184 quotes and allusions: 109 from the Iliad, 75 from the Odyssey; Kindstrand 1973 for analysis. Hesiod, "though no less distinguished than Homer" (Dialexis 24.1), has few lone references (Dialexis 11.12, 15.7, 18.9, 36.1, 37.5, 38.2, and 38.2), and is usually mentioned along with Homer (Dialexis 4.3, 17.3, 17.4, 22.7, 26.2, 32.8, and 37.4). For the differences of style between the two poets, Dialexis 26.4.
343 Aristides' version of Homer the sophist is discussed briefly in the next chapter.
sophists to think of Homer as one of their own. Given the importance of rhetoric and persuasion in the *Iliad*, for example, a scene such as the embassy to Achilles is a natural point of connection between Homer and the sophistic movement of any era. Add to this the traditional importance of Homer in the Greek educational system generally speaking, and it is not surprising that themes on Homeric topics abound in the epideictic literature in the Second Sophistic.\(^{344}\)

Maximus is unique in the second century for placing Homer so concretely in the tradition of philosophy as the first of its line.\(^{345}\) This is an essential point for looking at Platonic thought in Maximus, since Homer will be an inspiration not only for Plato's style but also for his themes and doctrine. Maximus aims to reconsider and reconcile poetry and philosophy in a way that is uncommon in the literature of the Second Sophistic. A further repercussion of this argument is the removal of Homer from the sophistics' camp, diminishing their lineage and a major source of themes. In the end, Maximus shows that the sophistic use of Homer is superficial and negligent, and is opposed to Plato's understanding, and by extension to his own, which is indicative of a deeper and more meaningful relationship with both the poet and the philosopher.

\(^{344}\) E.g., Heliodorus' *Aethiopica* which discusses the Egyptian birth of Homer; Dio's *Troicus* lists many alterative endings to Homer, in one of which Hector kills Achilles; Philostratus centers his *Heroicus* on the minor character Protesilaus.

\(^{345}\) Philodemus had already shown that the first philosophers are found in Homer, (2 fr. xxi). To know the points of connection between Maximus' *Dialexis* 26, 'Whether there is a Homeric School' (Εἰ ἦστεν καθ’ Ὀμήρου αἵρεσις), and Favorinus' lost *On Homer's Philosophy* would be interesting; see Barigazzi 1966:169-170 and Trapp 1997:214.
3.4. Homerus philosophus

A great many of the Homeric quotes in Maximus are used merely to introduce or adorn a particular point:

In the heat of battle a Homeric hero may cry, "Take me alive, son of Atreus, and take appropriate ransom!" [Il. 6.46] "But what ransom can we offer to destiny (τῇ εἰμαρμένη), to free ourselves from the chains of its compulsion?" (5.5, "Whether One Ought to Pray").

Even if a quote or allusion adds nothing particularly substantive to an argument, the poet's name clearly lends weight to any discussion and reflects to some extent the level of education of the speaker. The more obscure the quote or allusion, the more subtle his learning. Maximus shows that Homer is important for more than the beauty of his verse, however, by reading his poetry allegorically.346 Plato's Socrates discusses Homer in much the same way in the dialogues:

παρακάλως ἂρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἑπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ ἀίσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταύτων συμπέπτωκεν, κατὰ μὲν Ὀμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον οἷον ῥέματα κινεῖσθαι τά πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρώπων μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαϊτητον τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἀίσθησιν ἑπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. (Theaetetus 160d)

Therefore you were entirely right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity (εἰς ταύτων συμπέπτωκεν) between the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all their followers that all things are in motion like streams, that, according to the great philosopher Protagoras, man is the measure of all things, and that, according to Theaetetus, since these things are true, perception is knowledge.

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346 For the advantage of "allegory" (αἴνιγμα) in education over bare doctrine: Dialexis 4.5; the momentary departure of allegory for the more recent "Lyceum and noble Academy": Dialexis 38.4; and the difficulty for the badly trained to understand allegory as a justification for Plato's banishing poetry from his republic: Dialexis 17.4.
Setting aside the ironic inclusion of Theaetetus, who is standing beside Socrates, we see this same sort of reconciliation in Maximus that Socrates shows here between two "ancient" and two contemporary thinkers.

Starting in the fifth century, there is a long tradition of reading Homer allegorically, and Platonism is included. This tradition gains renewed support in the Common Era. Heraclitus in the first century CE adopts an allegorical reading of ancient poetry, especially Homer's, in his Ὅµηρικὰ προβλήµατα, and specifically attacks Plato's accusations against the epic poet (Allegoriae [= Quaestiones Homericae] 4). Alternatively, in the Ps-Plutarch De vita et poesi Homeri (19-40), the allegorical reading of Homer is used to reject, much like Maximus, Plato's expulsion of Homer from the Republic. This is done even though violent misrepresentations of text are possible in the name of "allegory" (31c). A passage from the Neopythagorean Nicomachus (first century CE) quotes Homer Iliad 8.69-74, which he proceeds to read allegorically, in his discussion of the problem of evil.

347 Xenocrates quotes Homer Iliad 15.189 in support of his triadic division of the universe (fr. 5). The allegorical interpretation of Homer (Iliad 11.38-40) preserved in the scholia of fr. 55 (Heinze) is attributed to either Xenocrates or Crates of Mallos. Philo's allegorical reading of the Septuagint was "learned from the Stoic (and perhaps Pythagorean) exegesis of Homer what philosophic truths could be concealed..." Dillon 1977:141. The Stoics had most notably developed the tradition of reading Homer allegorically into a philosophical tradition. Dialexis 4.8 of Maximus quoted below shows influence of this aspect of Stoicism. For allegory in Stoicism: Tate 1927, 1934; Buffière 1956 and 1962; Daniélou 1973:40-68; Pépin 1976; Lamberton 1986; Most 1989; Lamberton and Keaney 1992; and Dawson 1992.

348 For more on this argument in Plutarch, see Russell 1989:303 and Whitmarsh 2005:52-54.

349 Cf. Theologoumena arithmeticae 42.
With this type of reading Homer can be effectively used by Maximus as material support for philosophical arguments:

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\tau \mu \nu \ materially \ Greek \ \nu \mu \ \lambda y \\ \\gamma l \\ \ \chi r \\ \ \alpha \\ \\tau \\ \ \kappa \ld\n\]

Homer reproaches Lycian Glaucus for giving gold and accepting bronze in return, and exchanging the worth of a hundred oxen for the worth of nine; but if they had set the value of these things to one side and measured the exchange by the intentions of the participants, the deal would I take it have been a fair one (τό χρήμα ισόρροπον).

Such a reading extends the connection between the two forms of writing, since for Maximus allegory is ubiquitous in both poetry and the best forms of philosophy (4.5).

The style is best shown in epic since the doctrines contained therein are concealed in poetic adornments. Sustained exegetical discussions of a just few lines of poetry illustrate an understanding of Homer's deeper worth as a thinker. Maximus, then, recasts Homer:

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\text{This is how I should like you to think of Homer's poetry, as a twofold phenomenon, set in the form of myth \textit{qua} poetry, but \textit{qua} philosophy composed to promote the pursuit of virtue and apprehension of the truth.}
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Homer is not only the most inspired and varied of poets, but also the first and most wide-ranging of the philosophers.

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350 On this famous "bad bargain" from Iliad 6.232-6, see Aristotle NE 5.9, 1136b9-12. Cf. Dialexis 26, 32.5, 39.1, 35, 38, and 39.

351 "I understand the pleasure that Homer's poetry can give, but I praise him for his more serious qualities" (…καὶ τῆς Ὁμήρου ὀβιδῆς συνῆμι μὲν τῆς ἠδονῆς, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν σεμνοτέρων αὐτήν ἑπισινῶ, Dialexis 25.7). For an example of Homer exhorting men toward deeper, more meaningful (philosophical) pleasures, see Dialexis 4, 17, 22, and 26.
For Maximus the entire Greek philosophical tradition, then, begins with Homer. His poetry is representative of a time when philosophy was whole and complete, before the squabbling and sectarianism of more recent philosophers. In Homer's time, uncomplicated souls fed with pleasure and satisfaction on epic. Since then recent philosophers, contentious men showing little more than shrewdness and suspicion, have "banished" Homer, the first philosopher, to mere myth. Philosophical camps now fight amongst themselves spouting only partial truths. In Maximus' time, "now only many colonies of philosophy" exist, pulling and pushing in every direction. "Sophist clashes with sophist" to no advantage or gain. Instead of action, the world is full of "refutation, argument, and sophistry" as well as of "that sort of sophist" (πάντα ύμιν μεστά τοιούτων σοφιστῶν) (26.2, 1.8).

352 Although the fragmentary state of philosophy in the second century is the focus of the Dialexeis, it is noteworthy, given Maximus' reliance on Plato (429-347 BCE), that this degradation of philosophy started when Protagoras (490-420 BCE), Democritus (b. 460-457 BCE), Chrysippus (c. 280-207 BCE), Epicurus (341-270 BCE), Heraclitus (fl. circa 500 BCE), Thales (fl. circa 585 BCE), Anaximenes (546-525 BCE), Empedocles (492-432 BCE), and Diogenes (circa 412-c.321 BCE) arrived in Hellas, all of whom save one is a predecessor or close contemporary of Plato. All of these thinkers are found listed in Dialexis 26.2.

353 Καὶ Ὄμηρος μὲν ἀποκηρύττεται φιλοσοφίας, ὁ ἤγειν ϑων τοῦ γένους, Dialexis 26.2; this is another allusion to Plato's banishment of Homer from the state. See also Dialexis 17.

354 For the common disappointment in the diversity of Greek philosophical doctrines and the desire for unity, see Diodorus Siculus (c. 90-21 BCE), who, in his Bibliotheca historica (2.28.3-6), discusses the diversity of doctrines as well as the virtuous unity of the Chaldaean teaching. For superiority of the philosophy of the distant past over the decadent thought of the present (comparing Maximus and Plutarch), see Andersen 1955:252-256.
men tend to admire what is distant and think little of what is close at hand (cf. 4.4-5), the destruction of any adornment at all for the more recent "bare doctrines" has destroyed the interest in and efficacy of such philosophy.

Second to Homer, who is the first of the philosophers, Plato remains the last of the great thinkers and is for Maximus, as for all authors in the second century, a poet and philosopher in his own right. To support the legitimacy of Homer as the first of the line, Maximus takes great care to prove the great affinity between Homer and Plato. He first establishes his own philosophical authority by tapping into the universal philosophical dominance of Plato, and then works backwards to the epic poet.356

4.1. Homer and Plato in Maximus

According to Maximus, Plato was legitimized as one of the "true, noble, genuine philosophical offspring" of Homer, back when his poetry still had power over people; Plato was a "nursling" (θρέμμα) of Homer's poetry (26.3). Even though Plato is called the greatest Greek writer, unsurpassed even by Homer (11.1), we are told that "their language flows from the same source and derives from Homer's harmony" (26.3). In Dialexis 26.3 we are promised an unfulfilled analysis of the similarities in the two authors' language; instead, Maximus spends time showing ideological likenesses. The similarities between the two authors, not just in vocabulary and phrasing but also in thought, provide

355 οἱ δ' εἰσὶν οὐδὲν ἄλλοιότεροι τῶν προτέρων οἱ ἔπειτα, which picks up the immediately preceding γνωμονίς τοῖς λόγοις, Dialexis 4.3.
356 We may compare a very similar process with Moses and Plato in Philo (see Introduction, above).
357 For this sort of affinity between Plato and Homer (and the idea of Plato Homericus), see Heraclitus Allegoricae 18, [Longinus] De sublimitate 13.3, and Dio Orationes 36.27.
358 In particular, Dialexeis 17 and 26.
Maximus enough evidence to claim boldly that "Plato is more similar to Homer than he is to Socrates" (26.3).

Maximus' comparisons between Homer and Plato vary considerably in style. Often it is merely a matter of terminology. Maximus discusses the universal range of subject matter in Homer, which allows him to account for "a lucid theology, an account of political forms, and an account of human virtues and vices and experiences and disasters and successes" in the stories of Odysseus and Troy (26.4). Like Plato, Homer covers not only all of philosophy as defined by Maximus in the second century (that is to say, he omits logic) but also all of human experience (Trapp 1994:218). By the end of the poem Homer portrays Odysseus as "godly and like the immortals, just as Plato makes the happy man to be" (διογενῆ καὶ θεοῖς εἰκέλον, οἶον ἄξιοὶ Πλάτων εἶναι τὸν εὐδαίμονα, Dialexis 26.9). Middle Platonism used Plato's conception of man's happiness as "likeness unto god" (ὁμοίωσις θεῶ, Theaetetus 176ab) ever since Eudorus in the second century BCE.

What seems to be a difference in subject matter in poetry and philosophy, then, is merely a difference only in vocabulary; the themes are actually identical, if their forms of expression are not. Every poetic name is matched by a "full stock of reasoned concepts" on the side of the philosophers:

Κάλει τὸν μὲν Δία νοὺν πρεσβύτατον καὶ ἄρχικώτατον, ό δὲ πάντα ἔπεται καὶ πειθαρχεῖ· τὴν δὲ Ἀθηνᾶν, φρόνησιν· τὸν δὲ Ἀπόλλων, ἡμῖν· τὸν δὲ Ποσειδῶ, πνεῦμα διὰ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἰόν, οἰκονομοῦν αὐτῶν τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν ἀρμονίαν. (4.8, "Which Produced the Better Account of the Gods, Poets or Philosophers?")
Call Zeus the supreme and venerable Mind that all things follow and obey. Call Athena Intelligence, Apollo the Sun, and Poseidon the cosmic Breath that pervades land and sea, preserving their stability and harmony.

Simply by shifting terminology, one can recognize the identity of subjects that make up all poetry and philosophy (for all but the atheistic Epicureans). Therefore, Maximus insists that "poet" and "philosopher" are basically equivalent terms (καὶ γὰρ ποιητὴν καλῆς, φιλόσοφον λέγεις, καὶ ἄν φιλόσοφον καλῆς, ποιητὴν λέγεις, Dialexis 4.7). Still, there is a difference: by the end of the Dialexeis, Maximus writes, "up to this point I believe (πείθοµαι) Homer, and I trust (πιστεύω) Plato" (41.2).

A subtler example of the connection between Homer and Plato is of the image of unbridled passion. As Trapp (1997:176n.9) notes, when discussing "Socratic love," Maximus begins with a Homeric simile, only to finish the picture with an echo of Plato's Phaedrus:

Phaedrus:

"Εστώ δὴ ὁ ἔρως ὀρεξίς τις ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὀρέξει ταύτη χαλινοῦ δεῖ, καθάπερ ἱππον θυμῷ· ἐὰν δὲ ἐπιτρέψῃς τῇ ψυχῇ φέρεσθαι, αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο, κατὰ τὴν Ὀμηρικὴν εἰκόνα, ἱππον ἀνήκας ἀδηραγόν διὰ πεδίου κραοάνειν καὶ ύβρίζειν, οὐκ ἔπι λουτρὰ νόµιμα, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ δρόμους τεχνικοὺς θεόντα, ἀχάλινον, ἀδέσποτον. Ἀλλὰ αἰσχρὸν μὲν θέαμα ἱππος ἄφετος, αἰσχρὸν δὲ ἄκουσμα ύβριστῆς ἔρως. Οὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ἔρως ὁ… ἐπὶ σαρκῶν ἥδονᾶς συντεταγμένος, καὶ φλεγμαίνων σῶμα σώματι ἄναμιγνύει, καὶ προσφυόμενος οὔτε τινα εὐσχήμονα οὔτε νόµιμον οὔτε ἐρωτικὴν τῷ ὄντι ἄνυσφήν. Ἐπισπάται δὲ αὐτὸν κάλλους

359 The characterization is originally Stoic, but by now found within Middle Platonism, De vita et poesi Homeri 114.
360 Cf. Heraclitus Allegoricae 17-20, Chrysippus in Philodemus De pietate 15 (= Diog Bab. fr. 33, SVF 3); Cornutus Theologiae Graecae compendium 20, 35.7; Justin Apologia 1.64; (see Buffière 1956:280). In Dialexis 8, Athena is identified with Virtue; Dialexis 8.5, with a helpful daemon.
361 Heraclitus Allegoricae 6; De vita et poesi Homeri 102.
362 Poseidon seems here to be the immanent World Soul, while Zeus is removed to the intelligible realm (Trapp 1997:39n.35). In Stoicism, Poseidon is often found as the πνεῦμα of the sea alone, e.g., Cicero De natura deorum 1.40.
φήμη οἰστροῦμενος, ύπο δὲ τῆς ἀγνοίας πλανώμενον. (20.5 "On Socrates' Erotic Science")

Granted that love is a desire of the soul, this desire still needs a bridle, just like a mettlesome horse. If you give the soul its head, exactly as in the Homeric simile, you will have released a greedy horse to gallop its wanton way over the plains, bridleless and riderless as it speeds to other destinations than its normal bathing-place or a man-made racecourse. A horse running out of control is a shameful sight to see, just as violently excessive love is a shameful thing to hear about. This is the kind of love that...strains after physical pleasure and burns to mingle body with body, clinging in an embrace that is neither seemly nor lawful nor even truly loving. It is drawn onwards in a frenzy by rumors of beauty, but is lost in a maze of ignorance.

The allusion to Paris' leaving his bedchamber for the battlefield from the *Iliad* (6.505-515) quickly turns to the Platonic dark horse of passion (cf. *Phaedrus* 253e-254e). The image has been changed: there is now only one horse (instead of two) and no driver. Unlike the image in the *Phaedrus*, the horse is loose and uncontrolled. At the end of the quoted text, ἀγνοία results from this type of love; for Plato the mad, desirous horse is controlled by σοφία, the wisdom of the charioteer.363 What we seem to have from Maximus is the scene that results when the Platonic charioteer has completely lost control.

More importantly than a changed image, however, is that in this combined allusion Maximus is illustrating his point about Homer and Plato, about poetry and philosophy. There is every reason to imagine that Maximus's impression is that this section of the *Iliad* was the impetus for Plato's chariot analogy as it emerges in the *Phaedrus*. Plato took

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363 This is a natural application of the Platonic passage at this time; Cf. Galen *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 3.3.13-24, where, in his discussion of emotion, it is applied to Medea: "But then again anger, like a disobedient horse that has got the better of the charioteer, dragged her by force toward the children." The dark horse is anger and pride, no longer desire, as Plato conceived the image.
on the image of Paris' horse from Homer and developed it a new direction and more fully, but the idea remains fundamentally the same: both images illustrate the same basic philosophical truth about irrational passion. Maximus' own changes to the Platonic image, so that it more closely resembles the Homeric simile, seems an invitation to read this new image as an instance of the continuity of philosophical literature he is at pains to make in his Dialexeis.

As one might expect, Plato's removal of Homer from his republic proves to be a difficult problem for Maximus. In Dialexeis 4 and 26, Maximus uses allegorical readings of Homer to vindicate poetry's role in every good community. Maximus acknowledges, however, that not every community needs Homer. Dialexis 17 reads as a guide to how one is able to appreciate Homer and Plato without contradiction: if every state has different needs, and Plato's republic is set up specifically not to require (Homeric) poetry, then for all such places Homer is justifiably unnecessary. The two authors are not essentially separated or divided one from the other: it is simply a matter of necessity.

Although in 18.5, Maximus blames Socrates. As mentioned above, Plato's relationship with Homer was a major topic among ancient grammarians: we have extant Heraclitus Allegoriae Homericae, [Plutarch] De Vita et Poesi Homer, Dionysius of Halicarnassus De Demosthene 5-7, Athenaeus 11.504c-509e, [Longinus] De Sublimitate 13.3; we also hear of Dio Defense of Homer against Plato, Aelius Sarapion Whether Plato was Right to Banish Homer from his State, Aristocles of Messana Whether Plato or Homer is the More Valuable, and Telephus of Pergamum On the Accord of Homer and Plato; for full discussion, see Weinstock 1926.

Maximus adds Sparta and Crete as two other states where Homer would be expelled "where hard work and virtue are respected" (Dialexis 17.5). As Trapp 1997 notes, this argument must necessarily run contrary to the remarkable versatility and universal appeal of Homer that Maximus praises elsewhere; see e.g., dialexis 26. For Homer's universality, Plato Ion 531d, Dio Dialexis 12.68, [Plutarch] De vita et poesi Homeri 63 and 74, Quintilian Institutio oratoria 10.1.46-51.
Maximus tries, then, to respect Homer as teacher and educator,\textsuperscript{366} while at the same time not contradicting Plato's decision to banish Homeric poetry from his ideal state. Finally, in the matter of style, we are not to forget in the \textit{Dialexis} that Plato took his grandeur from Homer (32.8), even though ideologically Maximus always ultimately defers to Plato.

\subsection*{4.2. Poetry and Philosophy Reconsidered}

Plato's famous banishment of poetry from his republic (\textit{Republic} 3.377a-389a) stems from the conflict between pleasure and reason, cast in the forms of Homeric poetry and (Platonic) philosophy. In his first discourse, Maximus immediately reconstructs epic poetry and philosophy as two voices of the same muse (1.2). Maximus' restructured Platonic dichotomy, then, is also between pleasure and reason; the former is represented especially by Epicureanism, the latter by the single, continuous tradition of philosophy, beginning with Homer's epic. Poetry and philosophy, as essentially one thing, differ only in age and form:

\begin{quote}
Καὶ γὰρ ποιητικὴ τί ἄλλο ἢ φιλοσοφία, τῶ μὲν χρόνῳ παλαιὰ, τῇ δὲ ἀρμονίᾳ ἐμμετρος, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ μυθολογικῇ; καὶ φιλοσοφία τί ἄλλο ἢ ποιητικὴ, τῶ μὲν χρόνῳ νεωτέρα, τῇ δὲ ἀρμονίᾳ εὐζωνοτέρα, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ σαφεστέρα; (4.1, "Which Produced the Better Account of the Gods, Poets or Philosophers?"
\end{quote}

What is poetry if not a more venerable form of philosophy, composed in meter and mythological in expression? What is philosophy, if not a younger form of poetry, less formal in composition and more lucid in expression?

Even though second century philosophy as Maximus sees it is decadent and vain,\footnote{See especially \textit{Dialexis} 26.4-5. However, professional \textit{rhapsodes} are "utter fools" (17.5), as perhaps in the \textit{Ion} and Xenophon's \textit{Symposium} (3.6).} the modern "bare doctrines" are in essence no different from the myths of the past "except in style of composition" (πλὴν τῶ σχῆματι τῆς ἀρμονίας) (4.3). The doctrines
about the gods, for example, have their origin in a far more distant era and descend via the whole philosophical tradition.\footnote{αἱ περὶ θεῶν δόξαι ἄρξιμεναι ἀνοουθὲν διὰ πάσης φιλοσοφίας ἔλθον (4.3).}

Acknowledging and altering Plato's conflict between reason and pleasure in order to fit the needs of the epideictic-hungry second century, Maximus in this single move combines the entire Hellenic tradition from Homer to Plato for the purpose of his philosophical education.\footnote{Maximus, like many of his contemporaries, places the center of gravity of his 41 \textit{Dialexeis} in the fifth and fourth century BCE. Except for perhaps two oblique references to Rome, he does not refer to an individual later than 110/9 BCE--Clitomachus (187-109 BCE), \textit{Dialexis} 4.3 (see Trapp 1997:34n.4), and an event later than the end of the fourth century--the split of Alexander's Empire at this death, \textit{Dialexis} 28.1 (Ibid. 1997:xxxviii). These events are late as compared to the themes of the sophists in Philostratus' \textit{VS}, where no subject after 364 BCE is mentioned. \textit{Pace} Trapp 1997.} Maximus expresses this connection carefully so as not to mar the image of the great Greek past with the ineffective, discordant present. And, in the process of explaining this process and adding to it, Maximus works to insert himself into the long tradition of allegoric philosophers.

Plato's dialogues stand as the point of connection between the unified thought of epic and the frayed edges of philosophy in the second century. The best of the more recent figures since Homer and Hesiod, Plato was able to preserve both the doctrines and style of presentation of the early poets.\footnote{\textit{Dialexeis} 1.8 and 25.6-7; Maximus' allegorical readings of Homer, his exegesis of Platonic doctrine, and his unification of the two speak to his versatility.} Maximus obliquely purports to have a similar range.\footnote{Pace Trapp 1997.} In the devolution of philosophy after Homer and Hesiod down to the "bare doctrines" of philosophy in the Second Sophistic, Plato emerges for Maximus as the most imitable model in regard to thought, vocabulary, and expression. By imitating Plato's
vocabulary and style so as to indicate that Plato often imitated Homer's vocabulary and style, Maximus connects himself to the entire tradition of Greek philosophical literature through the best example of that long literary and philosophical tradition.

5. Maximus in the Platonist Tradition

For Maximus, Plato is the source of enlightenment. Plato represents the sun (11.1), is an oracular spokesman (11.6),371 and is the gods' interpreter (41.4). Maximus also presents Plato, in what seems to be feigned naïveté regarding the tradition of Platonism, quite explicitly as a "gold-mine" of wisdom. After lamenting the inadequate terminology and diction that would match his topic (i.e., daemones), Maximus writes,

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Ὁ πότε γὰρ οὐδὲ ὁ εὐφωνότατος τῶν ὀντῶν Πλάτων, εἰ καὶ πρὸς Ὄμηρον παραβάλλειν ἔθελοις, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀξίωρεως πιστεύεσθαι περὶ θεοῦ λέγων, ἀλλ' ἐτέρωθεν τι πυθέσθαι ποθεῖς τὴν Πλάτωνος δόξαν, σχολὴ γ' ἄν τις ἐπιτολμήσαι τῷ λόγῳ, νοῦν καὶ βραχὺν ἔχων (11.1, "Plato on the Identity of God")
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When even Plato, unsurpassed in eloquence, even when you would like to compare (him) to Homer, is still unable to convince regarding his account of god, and you long to learn of the opinion of Plato from somewhere else, then if someone were to hazard an account, he would be a fool.

This relationship between the ability to "convince" (πιστεύεσθαι) and the quality of "the greatest melodiousness" (εὐφωνότατος) seems forced, especially when applied to a Platonic dialogue. Yet the point helps Maximus' argument regarding the causal connection between eloquence and philosophical ability, as found especially in Plato.

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371 Where the spokesman of god "from the Academy and Attica" with "the gift of divination" answers Maximus' question about god's location and identity.
Maximus' reluctance to seem a fool (νοῦν καὶ βραχίν) is not long-lived: "For example, if confronted with a thirsty man, wouldn't the bare minimum of water do?" If someone who had read Plato's own words still needed further exposition, because either blinded by their intensity or thinking they actually lack luminosity, the result is the same. Ideally, all one should need are the dialogues themselves. However, as long as unguided or misguided readers remain, who for differing reasons cannot see the true brilliance of Plato's words, further explication is required.

Therefore, in 11.2 Maximus offers an image of what reading Plato requires, where he suggests that the process is akin to mining for precious metals. When miners cut into the earth and retrieve metal from the ground, others test it for them to determine whether it is in fact gold. After the first engagement (ἡ πρώτη ὠμολία) with Plato's dialogues (οἱ Πλατώνοι λόγοι), one needs the assistance of some further technique, which will "try and purify what has been mined" (τὸ ληφθὲν δοκιμάζοντα, καὶ ἐκκαθαρίζονσα). This is done, as using gold with fire, with reason (λόγῳ). Maximus writes that this process is essential since "[o]nly then can constructive use be made of the gold" (χρῆσθαι ἢδὲ δύναται ἀκηράτῳ καὶ βεβασανισμένῳ τῷ χρυσῷ). This idea underscores Maximus' practical attitude toward philosophy in the whole of the Dialexeis: what Plato said must be applied. In the rest of dialexis 11, then, Maximus works to find the proper Platonic technique to interpret Plato, and then utilizes that process to understand Plato's understanding of god. His technique is cross-examination (11.3-4) and imagery (11.5-11).

372 For the image of "drawing from the springs of Plato's wisdom," the anonymous Prolegomena ad Platonem 1.
The mining (and metallurgic) image is used in Maximus also at 18.3 regarding the use of the word "love" both to the god and to μανία ("madness," *Phaedrus* 256bd, 265a-266a). There, Maximus discusses everyone's desire for the good as a ceaseless chaotic groping, just like people searching for gold and silver in the dark (29.5). All the substances they find are tested by comparison with similar substances that differ only in degree, a process that shows exactly how odd it is to test the good by setting it against evil (40.4). There is Platonic precedence for the image of purifying gold as applied to philosophical study, as in *Politicus* 303de and *Epistula* 2.314a.

Elsewhere in Maximus, philosophy is likened to oracular pronouncements as in the case of "Socrates' discussion held in the Piraeus" (37.1), i.e., at the start of the *Republic*. It was constructed with arguments as "in a play": he made laws and appointed leaders properly trained to be the "leaders of the herd" (ἀγέλης ἡγεμόνας), for whom his name was "Guardians" (φύλακας ὄνομα τοῦ ἡγεμόνας, cf. *Republic* 327a and 369a-427c). This was not, "as some of our less cultivated friends might think it" (ὡς δόξαι ἄν τινι τῶν ἀγροικοτέρων), a "waking dream" (ὄναρ ὑπαρ) but a "theoretical exercise" (ξυνιστὰς πόλεις). This was the form philosophy used to take long ago, like oracles" (Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῆς παλαιᾶς φιλοσοφίας ὁ τρόπος οὗτος ἦν ἑοικός τοῖς χρησμοῖς). As Trapp (1997:291n.4) notes, such discussions therefore require an intelligent interpreter, as also

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373 This is the Plato of *Phaedrus* 242d rather than *Symposium* 201e.
374 Generally, in Stoicism the good is not appreciated by contrast with other items of lesser goodness, Cicero *De finibus* 3.34; see Trapp 1997:ad locum.
375 "But another group remains, which is still more difficult to separate, because it is more closely akin to the kingly class and is also harder to recognize. I think we are in somewhat the same position as refiners of gold," *Politicus* 303d.
376 Cf. *Dialexis* 17.3, where Plato's concern is what is perfect, not practicable.
in the case of ancient poetry.

The statement about those "less cultivated" is important. That Maximus has decided to explain the need for an exegetical process regarding Plato's dialogues is telling, however disingenuous one finds it. It may be that his audience, supposedly made up of νέοι (e.g., 1.7), do not know or are less familiar with the seven-century-long Platonist tradition, and he is taking advantage of that fact to promote some sense of originality. This is not very likely: if the Academy and Platonism is known anywhere in the second century, one would believe that it would be post-Ciceronian Rome. At this time, however, no Platonist texts would have constituted a part of the educational system, since Plato's dialogues are still standard. More likely, Maximus finds himself so far removed from whatever remnants there are of the Academy at the time that he is determining his own clear version of Platonic interpretation, even if in a more popular sense and setting.

Maximus strives to engage the dialogues directly in his interpretations, and thus avoids many of the more standard Platonist themes--most obviously with respect to logic. However, Maximus does not quite succeed in pulling completely away from the tradition, as some of his references (whether direct or indirect) indicate. For example, Maximus makes reference to ideas attributed to Posidonius, who was a first-century Stoic figure entangled in the Platonist tradition.\textsuperscript{377} Trapp (1997:xxvi) rightly attributes these uses to Maximus drawing on second century CE Platonist education, when Stoic and Peripatetic matters are regularly incorporated into Platonic interpretation. As I have tried

\textsuperscript{377} See Dillon 1977:106-113 for discussion on this figure.
to show, Maximus places himself outside the Academy, even if his thoughts occasionally reflect the Platonist work that had been done before the Second Sophistic.

It does seem that the Plato of certain Second Sophistic writers, like Maximus, connects Platonic thought in Plutarch to that of Plotinus, in particular the idea of the material world characterized as chaotic disorder, the interest and treatment of daemones, and the compatibility of Peripatetic and Platonic lines of thought. Further, the varied, disparate nature of these uses at that time provided an impetus for Plotinus' attempt to organize such "Middle Platonism" into a newly systematized Neoplatonism in the third century.

"Platonic rhetor," rather than "Platonist," speaks more to the fact that Maximus does not associate himself with, and actually seems to dislike, any sort of school or sect (although he does show signs that he respects Plato's original school; e.g., 27.5). Maximus is clearly not affiliated with any version of the Academy such as it existed in the Second Sophistic, though he was clearly influenced by and places himself directly with Plato and the dialogues, as well as many of the subjects that only became important after Plato's death (e.g., demonology). This is not to ignore the fact that Maximus' Platonic philosophy is colored by the changes from the first century BCE, namely the addition of compatible Peripatetic and Stoic doctrines. Plato and Platonic ideology run throughout Maximus in an essential and fundamental way.
6. Sophists, Rhetores, and Maximus

6.1. Sophists

As is the case for Aristides, Plutarch, Dio, and other philosophic or Platonic rhetores like them, Maximus' uses of the term "sophist" (σοφιστής) are sometimes ambiguous, but most often are cast in a negative sense.

First, the more ambiguous uses of "σοφιστής." The Syracusan sophist from Sparta, Mithaecus the cook, is used in a basically political lecture to illustrate the differences between Greek states, here focusing on Spartan tastes (17.1). Love is described as a "sophist," since it is a predator and an enchanter, which is "so like Socrates' own condition" (18.4 and 18.9). The reference is to the Symposium 203c-e, where the comparison of love with Socrates is implicit in the dialogue itself. Anacreon (b. circa 570 BCE) is referred to neutrally as "the sophist from Teos" (18.9). There are no contemporary examples of sophists given in the Dialexeis; for Maximus all the representatives of the class are taken from Plato. Socrates' rival, sophistic professionals were "Prodicus, Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Protagoras" (18.9). Their particular talents are also distributed as needed: Mithaecus was a sophist, but was not "an expert in Protean elegance of language, genealogy from Hippias, or Gorganic rhetoric, or Thrasymachean immoralism." As previously mentioned, no one after the first century BCE, philosopher or sophist, is named in the Dialexeis.

378 See Bury 1932:lxii and Trapp 162:n.19.
379 Prodicus: Hippias Major 282c, Cratylus 384b; Hippias: Hippias Major 285d; Gorgias: Gorgias passim; Thrasymachus: Republic 336b.
As differentiated from this use of "sophist" as a professional term or neutral description are the more abusive instances in Maximus. Sophists "have an ease of acquiring art and their skills are easy to acquire"; "there are more teachers than pupils" (1.8); "their arguments are relative, reinforcing Protagoras' dictum of the subjectivity of truth" (21.4). Maximus has internalized Plato's notion of the sophist, and has not adjusted, or refuses to alter, this interpretation in the Second Sophistic. It would make sense that Maximus would continue Plato's conception of the type if he wishes to distinguish himself from the constellation of orators in the second century.

Maximus also uses the term obliquely to refer to the inadequacies of the thinkers of his time. After what Maximus sees as the decline of philosophy, bare doctrines become common property, easy for the world to associate with, and the noble pursuit of philosophy has been released to "wander amidst wretched sophistries" (26.2). He discusses the currently warring camps of philosophers, where "sophist clashes with sophist" (26.2). Since sophists privilege theory over the practical acquisition of virtue, "[i]f all it took to gain virtue was theoretical knowledge and a handful of doctrines, then sophists would be a valuable class of person now" (27.8). Maximus is entirely dismissive of both empty theorists and pedantic philosophers, and refers to both as sophists.

Naturally, the sophist is often compared with the philosopher, as in *Dialexis* 20.3: "The philosopher is different from the sophist: sophists are less than philosophers." The

\[380\] E.g., *Dialexeis* 21.4, 27.8, 30.1, and 37.2.
\[381\] E.g., 27.2, 1.8, and 30.1.
\[382\] E.g., 1.8 21.4, 27.8, 37.2, and 30.1.
language in this section is taken from Gorgias 464b-466a, where professions are listed in contrast to their shadow art: "as self-adornment is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to legislation; and as cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice" (464c). Similarly in Maximus, the informer imitates the orator, as the sophist imitates the philosopher (14.8). And all the knowledge these sophists say they know (regardless of their label), Socrates disavowed (18.4).

The rhetor fares slightly better with Maximus. Orators involve themselves with strife, contentiousness, and artifices; their battles are in the law courts (22.3). The true orator allies himself with philosophical argument (25.6), which is a reference to the possibility of a philosophical rhetoric in the Phaedrus (277bc). As quoted above, rhetores are compared with the profession that mimics them: just as the sophist imitates the philosopher, professional prosecutors mimic the more substantial orators (Μμεϊται που και φαρμακοπόλης ιατρόν, και συκοφάντης ρήτορα, και σοφιστής φιλόσοφον, 20.3). It seems that Maximus wants at times to view the sophists in his time as orators, but only when they are working in a civic capacity.

6.2. Maximus' Use of Plato and the Sophists

Maximus is as critical of those who go to see sophists as he is of the teachers

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383 "Drug-sellers mimic (μμεϊται) doctors, professional prosecutors mimic orators, sophists mimic philosophers," 20.3. The first differ in objectives, the second in policy, the third in virtue (ἀρετή); see Trapp 1997.
384 At Gorgias 465c, orators and sophists are thought to be so similar that they tend to be mistaken for one another: "But although, as I say, there is this natural distinction between them, they are so nearly related that sophists (σοφισταί) and orators (ῥήτορες) are jumbled up as having the same field and dealing with the same subjects, and neither can they tell what to make of each other, nor the world at large what to make of them."
themselves. He suggests that his audience leaves the colors and shapes and the pleasure and displeasures they bring to the eyes and uses the ears in order to "hunt down the character of the soul" (25.3) Maximus' audience should avoid such "reasoning of the masses" (οι τῶν πολλῶν λογισμοί) "for whom sufficient grounds to praise an utterance are furnished by a fluent tongue, a rush of words, Attic diction, well-constructed periods, and elegant composition." This is an exemplary description of the most coveted and successful traits in the Second Sophistic (cf. Rhetorum praecptor in Lucian—Chapter 2). Maximus himself must be careful to show that his own Attic emulation and elegance differs from this impression: everything for him is done in the name of philosophical discovery. As Philostratus was all too aware, since the Hellenistic period the lines between philosophers and sophists had been blurred, so purported intention and perceptible emphasis is often all that separates these types of men. Maximus will not tolerate the praises for anyone until he learns "the usefulness of the words" (25.4). It is easy to be carried away silently and gradually by pleasure into ignorance and then hedonism, when one is likely to fail to recognize the deceptiveness of the utterances (25.5).

385 The image seems to be inspired by Socrates' discussion in the Phaedrus that the man who knows philosophical rhetoric must know the types of souls and how to recognize them, e.g. Phaedrus 271a-272b. The fact that is it not merely pleasures, but also displeasures in the eyes emphasizes that Maximus is discussing the physical, changing world, not the intelligible realm.

386 ἀπόχρη πρὸς ἔπαινον λόγου γλῶττα εὐστοχος, ἢ όνομάτων δρόμος, ἢ ρήματα Ἀττικά, ἢ περιόδοι εὐκαμμείς, ἢ ἀρμονία ύγρά.

387 Cf., the second instructor in Lucian's Rhetorum, Chapter 2.
As Trapp (1997:211n.17) notes, Maximus uses the discussion of τέχναι and κολακείαι in the Gorgias (462b-463c and 521d-522a) to his advantage, i.e., of rhetoric and cookery as types of flattery: "Wayward words are no more worthy of respect than foods that pander to the stomach--these are the words of caterers" (25.5). Aimless sophistic is, as it is for Plato, no better than flattery for the soul. Maximus also rejects declamations about bygone events or non-existent heroes or past courtroom trials (25.6)--again the staple themes of the Second Sophist.\textsuperscript{388} He differentiates between epic themes for the sake of entertainment as opposed to his own use, i.e., exemplary or prescriptive models of behavior culled from history.

Maximus requires, then, "real oratory that speaks to the soul" (25.7), in which there is added nothing shameful, and where the focus is on virtue and the pursuit of the good. This sort of speech will have a different sort of pleasure. The idea of the deeper, more intense sort of pleasure for the philosopher had long been established, e.g., both Republic 580d-583a, and Aristotle NE 10.1-8, 1155a-1181b. This philosophical oratory for Maximus is free of flattery, heavily trained, and commanding of all who come within range because of its persuasiveness and inspirational force (27.5). This type of persuasion, as in the Phaedrus, springs from a grasp of the truth and an understanding of souls.

All of these descriptions we learn in the middle of the lectures (25-27), but we learn of these overarching themes in the first Dialesis. It is clear even then that everyone praises orators and philosophy, but no one imitates them (1.6). Maximus shows that his

\textsuperscript{388} For which, see Russell 1983:chs. 2 and 6.
philosophical diatribe is sweetened when he advertises himself as capable at rhetoric. In
Maximus a listener will find nearly everything listening to him: a poet imitating him
would only need to add meter, but otherwise one will find political skills, skill with the
assemblies, and skill in the council chamber. As we read the speech however, it is
increasingly clear that while he can speak to every type of person, his interest lies in
inspiring them to follow philosophy, although not a pedantic, purely theoretical sort. His
goal is showing his audience what εὐδαιμονία truly is: the exercise of wisdom in the
pursuit of virtue.  

Maximus is also keen on not being lumped in with the philosophical sects who
are, according to him, pedantic and ineffectual. Modern sectarianism and the hostility
between factions are also to blame for the fact that "the much vaunted good has been
completely lost to sight by the Greek world" (26.2). Such men are interested in over-
theorizing and protracted geometric drawing for no purpose, rather than in becoming good
men. As the Athenian Stranger puts forth (as taken from the Laws), just as an
unobserved law is an empty formula, the large and impulsive "population" of the human
soul must give way and accept its own law (26.3). When this law (of reason) is accepted
and followed where it commands, the result is "the best of all constitutions (πολιτεία) for

389 For Maximus, Socrates is the example of such a life: he was a lover of true happiness
(Σωκράτης μὲν ὡς εὐδαιμονίας ἐραστής) and a lover of virtue (Σωκράτης μὲν ὡς ἀρετῆς
ἐραστής, 19.3).
390 Says the orator from Tyre, in Rome.
391 Cf. 37.2; also 1.8, 21.4, 27.8, and 30.1.
the soul, which some men call philosophy."\textsuperscript{392} Here reason is no trivial benefit to our lives. All the arts that provide any advantage join philosophy, "the law maker," in making men better in every way (37.3).

What becomes clear in Maximus' discussions of sophists is that he is criticizing epideictic orators as well as certain philosophers of his time. The notion of empty theorists could apply to those who mindlessly apply rhetorical tricks as much as those who pursue the abstract doctrines of philosophy, e.g., purely theoretical Platonism in the second century. He challenges the idea that the pursuit of virtue can only be undertaken by professional scholarchs:

Is the goal for us human beings so specialized and complicated a matter and so hard to grasp, so obscure and so implicated with lengthy study, that we could not achieve it except by humming and strumming and protracting geometrical lines this way and that, and exhausting ourselves in such pursuits, as if our aim were quite other than that of becoming good men--an attainment which, when put into practice, is something high and noble, close to divine virtue, and not difficult to achieve for anyone who is once willing to yield to the promptings of what is fine, and set his face against what is shameful? (37.2, "Whether the Liberal Arts have a Contribution to Make to the Cultivation of Virtue")

This question defines Maximus' use of Plato in his entire philosophical enterprise.\textsuperscript{393} Since Maximus "introduces" the exegetical tradition of Plato to his audience, he is attempting to distance himself from a now empty Academic tradition as well as to indicate the proper use of the philosophical project. Not only is Maximus interested to

\textsuperscript{392} The reference to the Athenian Stranger of the \textit{Laws} points us to that dialogue, but these comments about population of a city following the law to insure the best constitution brings to mind the \textit{Republic}.

\textsuperscript{393} The quote also indicates more of Maximus' labored, circuitous use of cola.
investigate what Plato meant in his dialogues, but he wants to discuss the applications such thoughts have to life.

In spite of everyone's desire for the Good, in Maximus' eyes no one is anywhere near it. Men are searching for gold and silver in the dark, snapping, quarrelling, exhorting, and looking askance at their neighbor to see if he has it (29.5). Inner peace as found through philosophy is more important than the avoidance of external calamity, but this last is a subject for poets.\textsuperscript{394} Platonic philosophy so conceived shows its Stoic influence unabashedly.

Can we then rule out the possibility that Maximus, as a sophist, is using invective against other sophists? This interpretation has been put forth in reference to Dio's lectures, as in Whitmarsh (2005:60-64), but is, at least, arguable in Maximus' case. Dio's use of "sophist" is nearly always derogatory.\textsuperscript{395} By presenting himself as a philosophical instructor to Trajan, Dio assumes the role of saving the emperor from some "ignorant and charlatan sophist" (Whitmarsh 2005:17).

Given Maximus' consistency regarding virtue and the exercise of wisdom, his preaching seems earnest. He uses as much technical terminology as he needs, it seems, certainly to appear the philosopher (\textit{pace} Trapp 1997:xxii-xxx). We should ask: would the result be different for Maximus' audience if he were merely paying lip service to philosophy? The answer seems that it would not be, since his return to virtue and

\textsuperscript{394} 22.7; see also 29.7.
\textsuperscript{395} \textit{Orationes} 12.5, 22.5, 24.3, 34.3, and 71.8.
practical ethics runs consistently throughout his work, and is not used as merely introductory or transitional.

We have seen that Maximus at least claims to abhor the current sophists that have gained so much interest and fame in his time. In addition, his feelings toward *rhetores* were seen as less reticent, since that profession clearly has a practical value that purely epideictic orations in the Second Sophistic do not. He elaborates his popular Platonism in the interest of keeping impressionable youth from falling in with either the vain philosophers or vainglorious sophists of the second century. In his own self-promoting fashion, he wants to incite these νεοί toward the pursuit of a type of life that combines action and contemplation in the sincere pursuit of virtue. It might very well be that Maximus has the last laugh, since he may not be sincere in the least and only desires money and fame by doing something unique. But again, it seems that the effect on his audience would be the same no matter his true motivations--in either case his warning would be fruitful for at least some of his audience. We are dealing, after all, with his authorial intent, not his sincerity or authenticity: qualities we cannot hope to gauge in the current state of our knowledge.

Maximus's orations are philosophical in content, and are sophistic in delivery. They represent a natural development from the reconciliation of form and theme in the second century; however, Maximus is unique in his application. The tradition of the Academy with its commentaries was dying out, only to be reborn later on in Neoplatonism. An accessible, entertaining, but above all elegant form was essential in order to be noticed and to gain recognition among all the Second Sophistic background
noise. A form less austere than the school lecture (e.g., the contemporaneous Didaskalikos), Maximus' style manipulated what he saw as a depraved empty form in order to apply it to a nobler cause.

7. Maximus and Christianity

There are two very conspicuous absences in the Dialexeis, one more common than the other. That Rome is not obviously mentioned in the Dialexeis is not implausible. While we find encomia for Rome in the second century, it is clear that constant reference to the imperial capital was not required when invoking the long tradition of Hellenism. Indeed, that would often defeat the purpose.

Yet the Dialexeis were produced some time in the 180s, at a time when Christianity was clearly shifting from a peripheral Jewish sect to an international faith. In addition, the Apologia of Aristides and Justin Martyr had been in circulation since perhaps the mid-140s. The previous decade had seen the first philosophical rebuttal of Christian philosophy, the Ἀληθὴς λόγος of Celsus. Maximus does not discuss the "new philosophy" even once throughout the entire Dialexeis. This silence may be evidence for the distance Christianity still had to travel, for all its recent successes (Trapp 1997:xlix).

396 This is not to mention the Old Testament and, further, Philo's connection of Plato with Moses.
397 Contrast Maximus' contemporary, Lucian. In his De morte Peregrini, Peregrinus, a Cynic philosopher who became a Christian, rose in prominence in the Christian community and subsequently returned to Cynicism. Lucian's invective in the work may be an attack on the gullibility of the Christians at the time rather than Christianity per se. See, e.g., Allinson 1930.
Surely, the new philosophy played no discernable part in the Hellenism of Maximus, and bore no obvious relation to his project. There are doctrinal similarities (the flight of the soul through the heavens [8-10], man's relationship with god [5, 13, 41], and the use of images in religious worship [2]), which were points of contention for the Christian Sophists as well as within the Eastern tradition not long after the *Dialexeis'* supposed delivery. While Maximus' possible application to Christianity is apparent at every turn, to a contemporary thinker, the reverse may not have been obvious. The move to date himself with any reference to the new philosophy must have seemed contrary to Maximus' clear desire to connect himself with the pure Hellenic tradition.

Maximus is still considered more of a sophist than a philosopher: "In antiquity he was called 'a Platonic philosopher' but to us he is more a rhetorician who handles philosophical subjects for an audience of πεπαιδευμένοι, *cognoscenti*" (Schenkeveld 1997:245). However, at least according to Maximus himself, his target audience was not made up of πεπαιδευμένοι, but rather νέοι. His argumentation is not especially impressive, nor is it as sophisticated as the most learned would require at that time. But it is not clear that he should be seen as more a rhetorician than a philosopher.

Clearly, Maximus' approach to philosophy involved the use of the techniques of the sophists that surrounded him in the employment of a more philosophical message. While his success is varied in our appreciation, he deserves to be seen as genuinely

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398 It seems that a better translation for πεπαιδευμένοι would be something like "humanists." The authors I treat would all be excellent examples of what seems to be a new form of what we could call humanism.

399 *Pace* Trapp 1997; see especially his Introduction.
committed to rhetorical and sophistic techniques in the service of a popular Platonic philosophy in the best tradition of the protreptic display; "φιλόσοφος" is not mutually exclusive of "φιλόλογος," especially in the Second Sophistic. Even if we choose not to see him as a Platonic rhetor, he should be considered a philosopher who deploys epideictic modes of thought and expression in a way that allots him a unique place in the literature from the Second Sophistic.

What is both frustrating and interesting about Maximus is that his exposition feels so sporadic in its treatment of particular questions and themes. We do not find in Maximus the type of systematic layout of doctrine that we find in Alcinous or Apuleius. His thematic treatment, however, adds to his variety and the rather sweeping gesture of his connections. This Platonism wrapped in Peripatetic and Stoic ornamentation is given with some of the flourishes that were so popular and successful in the Second Sophistic. Maximus' Platonism is meant to be set outside the Academy or any school, and is a response to the sophistry of the time.

In what remains of this chapter, I look briefly at aspects of Maximus' particular brand of popular Platonic thought.

8. The Platonism of Maximus

The typical tripartite division and order of a philosophical treatise, Ethics-Physics-Logic, is found first in Aristotle's Topica (1.14, 105b19), and is a common

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400 Plutarch seems to use them, at times, interchangeably: Quaestiones convivales 612C, for example, discusses whether one should philosophize at a symposium (Schenkeveld 1997:247n.187).

401 More along the lines of Plutarch's Πλατονικὰ ζητήματα, Trapp 1997:xvi.
Middle Platonist ordering.\footnote{The Academic Xenocrates is originally credited with the three branches of philosophy, as well as this order, Dillon 1977:23.} The typical Stoic ordering is Logic-Physics-Ethics, but is found also in Philo and Alcinous' \textit{Didaskalikos}. As indicated above, Maximus has no intention of providing a typical or complete philosophical exposition. For the purposes of order, I separate out his main ideas into a tripartite division (such as it is), and then further into sub-categories.

\section*{9. Logic}

Maximus has nothing to say of the subject of logic.\footnote{Maximus' view of Plato's method of \textit{diairesis} is discussed below.} His primary interest, as a practically-minded Platonist, is primarily in ethics, and secondarily in physics. His interest in physics will only be explored as it relates to issues of epistemology and man's relationship to the divine.

\section*{10. Ethics}

\subsection*{10.1. Soul: Bipartite Division}

The human soul, "the most mobile of all things," is itself a compound of the mortal and immortal (κεκραμένη ἐκ θνητῆς καὶ ἀθανάτου φύσεως, 6.4).\footnote{This division will be strained later when Maximus defines man as mortal and emotional, \textit{daemones} as immortal and emotional, and god as immortal and unemotional. The opposition of emotional and unemotional and mortal and immortal reveals Aristotelian influence on it as a method of classification, and will be further discussed below in the section on \textit{daemones} (cf. Dialexis 9.1). For now it is important to see that, once we have focused on a different dialectical argument in Maximus, definitions must necessarily change.} The mortal component falls into the same category as animals, and involves the faculties of...
nourishment, growth, movement, and perception. The immortal part of the soul unites (ζυνάπτει) it with the divine (τῷ θείῳ), and involves thought, reasoning, learning, and knowledge (νοεῖ, καὶ λογίζεται, καὶ μανθάνει, καὶ ἐπίσταται, 6.4). In one sense, this is the first, more basic separation of beast (mortal), man (compound of both), and god (immortal). More importantly it shows the intermediary place man has between animals and god; man has important faculties in common with both.

The bipartite division is found also in 11.7-8. The soul is divided into "intellect" (νοῦς) and "perception." These are two cognitive (πρὸς σύνεσιν) faculties. The intellect is simple; perception is "diverse, various, and manifold." These two faculties each correspond to the Platonic metaphysical division found in the Republic and Phaedo:

...κατὰ μὲν τὸ θνητὸν αὐτῆς ζυνάπτεται τῇ θηριώδει φύσι, καὶ γὰρ τρέφει, καὶ αὔξει, καὶ κινεῖ, καὶ συστάται (6.4). This list of faculties has a particularly Aristotelian sound to it. Cf. Protrepticus fr. 6 (Ross) and NE 1.13; Trapp 1997:55 for this connection.

The distinction between man and beast is found in Plato (Protagoras 320d), as well as Neoplatonism (Philo De opificio mundi 134-47).

Literally: "perceptions," αἰσθήσεως.

τοῦ δὲ ποικίλου καὶ πολυμεροῦς καὶ πολυτρόπου, 11.7.

Here also is an Aristotelian opposition, between what is known to us by experience and what is known better per se, is by this time also common Middle Platonic doctrine: Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b, 2.3.72b; Topics 142a; Physics 1.1.184a; NE 1095b;
That is, the intellect apprehends the Forms and the Good, while perception regards the everyday, material world. Though Maximus does not at this point directly connect the intellect with the immortal part of the soul and the perceptive with the irrational and physical, such a connection is made in the next section. The intelligible is free from everyday experience, and is apprehended by the intellect, but, since it has been engrafted on the whole soul (ὅ δὲ τῇ πᾶσῃ ψυχῇ ἐμπεφυτευμένος), it is torn apart (διασπάται) by perception (11.8). Therefore the goal of man is to steady himself, chasten himself, and divert his senses, just as in a loud symposium, so that he can stay sober and disciplined; in this way he can keep his intellect on its own proper objects.\footnote{410} We "locate" god, then, in the firmer, more stable realm (ἄρα οὐκ ἐν τῇ στασιμωτέρᾳ καὶ ἐδραιοτέρᾳ, καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένῃ τοῦ ῥεύματος τοῦτου καὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς; 11.8). More will be said about perceptible and intelligible objects below, but for now we see that this type of language—on the one hand the manifold, perceptible world, and on the other the steady, unchanging intelligible world—is fundamentally Platonic, as found in Republic 507a-509b and Phaedo 65b-67b.

Much later in the Dialetheis (27.5), the soul is divided "in the first division" (κατὰ πρώτην νομήν) into two aspects: "reason and emotion."\footnote{411} They work together (as does perception and intellect, above, though they too play differing roles). Any defect in either of these faculties results in disharmony, and thus in vice (ἀἰσχίστος). In the typical scene, Metaphysics 1029b. For discussion of Aristotle's first principles and his idea of dialectic, see Irwin 1988.

\footnote{410} There is a clear parallel here with Socrates in the Symposium.

\footnote{411} καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἐστὶν λόγος, τὸ δὲ πάθος.
the emotions boil over and wash over the soul, confusing the "growths and shoots" of reason. This is equivalent to mob rule in the state, and we will see that the soul-state analogy from the Republic is central to Maximus' ethical system. The defect of reason, then, is an inability to control emotion properly. This division of reason and emotion, primarily stemming from Phaedrus 246a (cf. Protagoras 321c), is followed elsewhere in Maximus (e.g., 20.4). The theory, he acknowledges, is not his own: "It comes from the Academy, and is a product of Plato's inspiration and a native of his hearth" (27).

Maximus writes that the bipartite division of the soul was accepted by Aristotle, but its source was "certain Pythagoreans." The idea that Plato took his psychology from Pythagoras is found also in Cicero's Tusculan disputations 4.5.10 and Apuleius Florida 15.26. Diogenes Laertius names Plato's immediate teachers to be Philolaus and Eurytus (3.6), and the tradition that Plato was Pythagoras' student is common in Middle Platonism and Neopythagoreanism.

This argument is well expressed by Maximus. While he gives no proof of the necessity of this division, there is an assumption that, because of the argument's persistence, the idea does not need to be reinvented. Maximus at once marks the importance of Plato and his Academy, establishes a deeper, older source for the doctrine, and shows its acceptance by Aristotle, who is the more recent, established student. The

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412 For "boiling passions" in Plato, cf. Timaeus 70b.
413 Cf., Philo's connection running Moses-Pythagoras-Plato.
414 For example, note an early forerunner of Neopythagoreanism, Moderatus of Gades (first century CE). Plato and the Platonists are only followers of Pythagoras who in fact cover up their debt to the master, cf. Porphyry's Vita Pythagorae 53. For discussion, Dillon 1977:344-351.
pedigree, and so validity, of the bipartite account of the soul is beyond criticism. It is unlikely that Maximus would be seen as a Peripatetic by discussing such a bipartite soul in the second century, as the Peripatetic characteristics of Middle Platonism after Antiochus and Plutarch, while needing constant mediation, had by this point become well established.\footnote{See Rees 1957, Dillon 1977:102 and 174-175.}

Though Maximus does not do so explicitly, all three of these bipartite divisions (intellect/perception, reason/emotion, immortal/mortal) can be conflated into one coherent system. The more typical Platonist account of the human soul is one that divides it into irrational and rational aspects. For example, Plutarch discusses the human soul, just as he does the world-soul, as a twofold division into rational and irrational.\footnote{Placita philosophorum 898e. For more on this Ps-Plutarchean work, see Daiber 1980.} According to Plutarch, this division is fathered by Pythagoras, and fully developed in Plato. Assuming Plato's basic division to be bipartite, as do all later Platonists, he accounts for Plato's tripartite division of the soul found in the \textit{Republic} (e.g., 442a) by taking the two lower divisions described in that text as two parts of the irrational soul. Similarly, like the Middle Platonist tradition generally, Maximus identifies the two "lower" parts of the soul, appetite and passion, as the two parts of the irrational soul, leaving the intellect/reason/immortal aspect to its own higher capability. He conflates these parts of the soul in the interest of harmony between Platonic texts, but there is precedent in Plato.
for the division of the soul into the subject of knowledge\textsuperscript{417} and the principle of movement or life.\textsuperscript{418}

Maximus makes his own attempt to account for the rational/irrational distinction:

\[ \text{ἄφες τῷ λόγῳ ὁ δὲ ἐρήσεται, διαφορούμενος τὰς γνωριμιώτατας φύσεις δίχα, καὶ τὴν ἐτέραν τὴν τιμιοτέραν τέμνων ἀεὶ, ἦστ' ἂν ἐφίκηται τοῦ νῦν ζητουμένου. Τῶν δὲν τοίνυν τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα, τὰ δὲ ἐμψυχα; καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα, λίθοι καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὀσία τοιαύτα τὰ δὲ ἐμψυχα, φυτά καὶ ζώα· κρεῖττον δ' ἐμψυχον, ἄψυχον. Τοῦ δ' ἐμψυχον τὸ μὲν φυτικὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν τοῦ φυτικοῦ κρεῖττον. Τοῦ δὲ αἰσθητικοῦ τὸ μὲν λογικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον· κρεῖττον δὲ τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ ἄλογου. (11.8, "Plato on the Identity of God")

Follow reason's lead: it will lead you by means of a series of divisions on familiar kinds of entity, dividing each in half, then each successive time further dividing the more valued of the resulting segments, until it arrives at the object of our present inquiry. Well then, everything that exists can be divided into the inanimate and the animate. "Inanimate" comprises sticks and stones and so on, "animate" comprises animals and plants. The animate is superior to the inanimate. The animate can be divided into the vegetative and the perceptive, of which the perceptive is superior. The perceptive can be divided into the rational and irrational, of which the rational is superior.

This text begins with Maximus' idea of Plato's technique of dialectic as division (\textit{διαίρεσις}), which is taken from \textit{Phaedrus} 265d-266b and the \textit{Sophist}. The division of the soul into faculties (nutritive, vegetative, etc.) is Aristotelian and had long been common philosophical property.\textsuperscript{419} The model for the division here of rational and irrational is the distinction between beast and man, not within the human soul. But that the "rational soul is the conglomerate of the nutritive, vegetative, motive, affective, and intellective faculties" could be misleading if we did not see that Maximus is dividing all types of

\textsuperscript{417} A commonly Platonic stance, as in the \textit{Meno}, \textit{Phaedo}, and \textit{Theaetetus}.

\textsuperscript{418} The "lower division" so conceived can be found in the \textit{Phaedrus} 245, \textit{Republic} 611, and the \textit{Laws}. See Roberts 1905 and Rees 1957 for discussion.

\textsuperscript{419} See for example \textit{De Anima} 2.4-5 and 3.
creatures with this process, and is not concerned with humans alone. This account is not parallel with the notion of rational and irrational parts of the soul found in Middle Platonism.

Thus, Maximus is able to say that the same relationship found between the inanimate and animate holds for the intellective element and the (rational) soul as a whole (i.e., one of superiority). Yet he finds one last division of the intellectual faculty: one that has a natural capacity to think, and one that is the perfect intellect. The most perfect form of intellect thinks all things eternally at the same time. Inspired by Aristotle, this concept of god had also become common in Middle Platonism (cf. Alcinous Didaskalikos 10.164.18-20) and will become so in Neoplatonism (Plotinus Enneads 5.9.4.2-3 and 5.9.5.1-4).

Therefore, all the different oppositions in the soul in Maximus are a result of the differing circumstances under which he is discussing them. The immortal/mortal distinction is made in a lecture about knowledge, and specifically what distinguishes man from both beast and god (i.e., participation in both immortal and mortal natures). The division of intellect and perception emerges in a lecture about Plato's conception of god. Maximus needs to provide the basic division between the intelligible, where god is surely located, and the perceptible, which seems to us all there is. Correspondingly, the human mind is theoretically able to appreciate both realms, which is assumed also by our participation in the mortal and immortal. This distinction is essential if we are to know

420 ὡστε εἶ ἂν ἐν ἐντελέστατος, ὁ νοών ἄει, καὶ πάντα, καὶ ἅµα, 11.8.
421 For example, De Animus 3.4-5, 429a10-430a25, Metaphysics 7.6, 1045b.
god in any way. Last is the division of reason and emotion, which is found in a lecture about the "science of virtue." There, virtue is a harmony of the higher and lower aspects of the soul, while reason controls and guides the emotions; vice is therefore the disharmony of the same. Like Plato and any thoughtful Platonist, Maximus works to remain consistent, while using definitions that fit the topic under discussion. Platonism may well be unique in that its system, once certain precepts are accepted, can be seen as, by and large, a consistent system.

That is not to say that there are no problems to be worked out with Maximus' organization. Besides a compound of, essentially, the irrational and rational in which the latter rules the former, "man is a compound of soul and body, the former ruling and the latter is subordinate, like ruler and ruled in a state of which both are equally parts, in spite of their differing roles" (7.2). The difficulties that arise with the ruled/ruler scheme when applied to the two parts of the soul, as alongside a similar relationship regarding the soul/body compound, will be discussed below.

10.2. Soul: Tripartite Division

Though he recognizes the "primacy" of the bipartite division of the soul found in the *Phaedrus*, Maximus also discusses the common tripartite conception found in the *Republic*, which is developed further in the *Timaeus*. This secondary division of the soul into the three-fold appetite, spirit, and reason also invokes Plato's soul-state analogy, the conception of virtue as the harmony of these faculties, and philosophy's role in developing and maintaining a virtuous soul.
In *Dialexis* 6.4, Maximus puts forth the three processes that constitute his epistemological system, which are discussed more fully below. For now, it is important to see that in this section, Maximus anticipates his use of the soul-state analogy with the epistemological correlate to the tripartite soul. "Perception" (αἰσθήσις) accumulates "experience" (πείρα), and is connected with the everyday needs of life, i.e., material things. This process involves the mortal part of the soul and thus the emotions. "Prudence" (φρόνησις) takes control of the passions and subjects them to rational control, the role of the spirited part of the soul in the *Republic*. As Trapp (1997:58) notes, this mirrors both the idea of φρόνησις in Aristotle and the unruly nature of the passions in *Republic* 588b-590a. The intellect is most like law in the state and is the most authoritative and precious of the soul's capabilities. This is the only true law, and is subject to no vote, is unwritten, and thus is directly connected with the immortal part of the soul and therefore to god. Prudence "lies between" knowledge and perception (this framework anticipates the use of the soul-state analogy in 16.4), and is the "overlap," the connective tissue and go-between, of perception and the mortal part of the soul on one hand and intellection and the immortal part on the other.

In Plutarch's *Platonicae quaestiones* (9, 1007e), the division of the soul into three parts situated in different parts of the body, as developed in the *Timaeus*, is rejected in

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422 This aspect of the soul also "represents a science compared to experience" and "falls short of the surety of the intellect"—it takes the place of mathematics in some accounts of Plato's epistemology (*Dialexis* 6.4).

423 Maximus' dislike of democratic law is especially pronounced here: under these human laws, Socrates was put to death; they are fallible, false, and misguided, whereas divine law produces only freedom and virtue (6.5).
favor of non-spatial distinction of powers of the soul (1008e). At this point, Plutarch is clearly discussing a tripartite soul, not the basic division of rational and irrational as he often does. In [Plutarch] *Placita* 898e and Maximus, both Plato and Pythagoras are said to identify the soul as bipartite primarily, and tripartite secondarily.

The division of the soul in the "first instance" discussed above allows for a secondary, tripartite division as in the *Republic*, which we find in *Dialexis* 16.4, the main discussion of the state and soul analogy. The tripartite soul is used throughout Maximus as often as the basic bipartite division. The use depends on need: as mentioned, harmony and virtue will require the tripartite analogy (e.g., *Dialexeis* 37-8); the flight away from pleasure toward reason will only require the more basic bipartite division (33.7). In a lecture setting, the soul-state analogy from the *Republic* provides Maximus not only immediate recognition as a Platonist, but also a vivid analogy that he can use to discuss various problems easily, for example, the problems that occur in a democracy, the importance of temperance regarding emotions and passions, and the internal harmony that only philosophy can provide.

### 10.3. Soul and State Analogy

The notion of the tripartite soul naturally leads to a connection between the soul and state as envisioned in the *Republic*. In *Discourse* 16.4, Maximus answers the charge made by the advocate of the practical life. He writes as someone speaking to equals, trying to "persuade by (philosophical) dialectic" (πείθων καὶ διαλέγομενος). Such a speaker would say, on behalf of the contemplative life, "that god assigned the human soul three faculties with their own locations and characters as if assembling groups of people
around the city." The philosophical connection of the soul and state owes its existence to Plato's *Republic*, especially 369a-449a and 543a-592b. The individual functions of the parts of the soul as discussed by Maximus deserve quotation in turn:

\[\text{ἡς τὸ μὲν ἄρχον καὶ προβουλεύομενον εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἀναγαγών, ἱδρύσας αὐτοῦ, πλέον οὐδὲν αὐτῶ προσέταξεν λογισμοῦ.} (16.4, "That the Life of Contemplation is Better than the Life of Action")

Taking the ruling and deliberative faculty up to the acropolis and establishing it there, he assigned it in the function of reasoning and reasoning alone.

We also find reference to god "in the acropolis in our argument and establishing him in the citadel of the supreme commander" (11.8). In the *Republic*, certain appetites that are nurtured in the democratic soul seize the acropolis, finding it empty of studies and honorable pursuits, which are the best Guardians (φύλακες) in the minds of men (560c). To this we should compare Philo Judaeus, where the prophet does not utter anything on his own, but is only an interpreter, "while he is speaking under inspiration, being in ignorance that his own reasoning powers are departed, and have quitted the citadel of his soul" (προφέρεται, καθ' ὁν χρόνον ἐνθουσιὰ γεγονὼς ἐν ἂγνοια, μετανισταμένου μὲν τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ παρακεχωρηκότος τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν, *De specialibus legibus* 4.49.4). Instead of the appetitive passions taking hold of the "citadel" as in Plato, in Philo it is "the divine spirit" (τὸν θεῖον πνεῦμα) in control.

Next in Maximus comes the second part of the soul, the θυμός, the spirited part, akin to the auxiliary Guardians in the city:

\[\text{τὸ δ' ἀκμάζον, καὶ πράττειν δεινόν, καὶ τελεσιουργεῖν ἰκανὸν τὰ βουλευθέντα, συνηψεν τε καὶ ξυνεκέρασεν δι' ύπηρεσίας προσταγμάτων τῶ βουλευτικῷ.} (16.4)\]
[The second faculty], whose vigor gave it skill in action and the ability to put its wishes into operation, he connected and merged with the rational faculty as a subordinate to carry out its commands.

This account of the second principle moves away from Plato's ἐπιθυμητικόν (desire) and toward Aristotle's idea of a rational faculty between vegetative and fully rational. In addition, Maximus here connects characteristics associated with passion with reason, and not with the other "lower" faculty as he sometimes does (a mistake Plato anticipates at Republic 439e). The important "ability to put plans into action," as found in a lecture on the preeminence of the contemplative life no less, shows Maximus' desire to connect the practicable life with a part of the tripartite soul. This is a later interpolation of Plato's scheme in the Republic.

And last:

τρίτον δ' αὖ, τὸ ἄργον τοῦτο πλήθος καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ βάναυσον, καὶ μεστὸν μὲν ἐπιθημιώτων, μεστὸν δὲ ἔρωτων, μεστὸν δὲ ὑβρεώς, μεστὸν δὲ ἱδιονὶ παντοδαπῶν, τρίτην ἔχουσιν μοῦραν, οἶον δὴμον τινα ἄργον, καὶ πολύφωνον, καὶ πολυπαθῆ, καὶ ἐμπληκτον. (16.4)

To the third, an idle, ill-disciplined, low-grade mass awash with desires and passions and violent arrogance and pleasures of all kinds, he assigned the third place, like an idle, cacophonous, impressionable, and unstable populace.

This type of soul resembles that of the tyrant, being of a nature filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites (7.7); and, as is clear from the quote, it is also like the democratic soul (16.5). As rulers, tyrants have no friends and monarchs have no flatterers, so monarchy is a more divine thing than a tyranny. Democracy, of

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424 As at Republic 475b.
425 As at NE 1.13, 1102a26. This influence is more evidence for the conflation of Platonic and Peripatetic ideology in the second century, Trapp 1997:146n.11.
426 E.g., 7.2, discussed below.
course, is "crammed" with flattery, whereas Aristocracy is crammed with friendships (14.7). The result is sickness in the state whether the demos or the tyrant has control (7.1). The equation of this type of deficient soul with both the tyrant and the democratic man has Platonic precedent: for the tyrant, Republic 579b5-580b; for the democratic man, Republic 558a-c. By showing the worst rule as both tyrannical and democratic, so to speak, Maximus can switch back and forth between the two worst types of men and states when it is appropriate.\(^{427}\)

The ἐπιθυμητικόν part of the soul as correlative with the practical life is a particularly interesting conflation of Plato and Aristotle, but not out of line with Platonism.\(^{428}\) This hierarchy follows the Plato of the Politicus (301-2), not the Republic where there is a five-tiered sequence: monarchy or aristocracy, timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny.\(^{429}\) Maximus has separated the monarchy (ruling the soul by reason), aristocracy (ruling by spirit, or, in Maximus, prudence), then democracy and tyranny interchangeably as the worst states (the rule of desire). In this way, Maximus has, then, conflated the discussion in the Politicus and the five-tiered system so that each of the three parts of the soul corresponds to one particular type of constitution and ruler, taking on a particularly idiosyncratically Peripatetic-laced Platonism as a model.

The people, just as the passions of the body, are more numerous than the ruler, impetuous, many-voiced, dissimilar in composition, swift to anger, vehemently desirous,

\(^{427}\) For the direct devolution between the two types of soul (and constitutions), Republic 571a-576d.

\(^{428}\) Pace Trapp 1997:146n.11.

\(^{429}\) Pace Ibid. n.12.
dissipated in pleasures, spineless in grief, harsh in their rage (7.2).\textsuperscript{430} The appetitive and passionate (spirited) parts of the soul, then, when negatively defined, are conflated, and often make up the "lower order" of the bipartite soul.

When looked at constitutionally, democracy, equated with the appetitive part of the soul, is out of the running for best system. The spirited and intellectual constitutions, aristocracy and monarchy respectively, both "have a stake in the good" (16.5).\textsuperscript{431} The rule of reason, when the spirited part of the soul acts deferentially toward it, is associated with a monarchy, in as much as the spirit works harmoniously with divine law. The second, lesser constitution of aristocracy, connected with the rule of the "middle" part, corresponds with the "strong and vigorous" practical cast of soul. These represent, then, the contemplative and active lives, respectively. Last of all is "fair-seeming" democracy, which is like the rule of the mob, and which is seen all too often in the individual (16.5). This is the rule of the appetitive in the individual.

So, the analogy is made even cleaner, if less subtle, than Plato's original version. There are three parts of the soul, and each has its characteristics. Virtue, in both sides of the analogy, is the harmonious working of all three parts, just as in Plato. The increase of any part of the soul changes the description of the type of soul (e.g., the increase of the reign of the passions is a sign of the democratic ruler), and thus, except in the case of an increase of reason, becomes vice. There are, with some blurring of the distinction, three

\textsuperscript{430} I am curious about the reception of these notions if these lectures were indeed given in second-century Rome.

\textsuperscript{431} Maximus, then, while separating and associating these two systems with different parts of the soul (unlike Plato who uses them interchangeably), still finds, as Plato, that both constitute the rule of the best.
corresponding types of constitutions that match the types of ruler and types of soul: monarchy/monarch and reason; aristocracy/spirit leader and passion; democracy/the demos (or tyranny/the tyrant) and desires (as in Dialexeis 14, 7, and 16).

When the top two types of constitutions are compared for preference of rule, we find Maximus falling in with Plato and Aristotle in choosing the life of contemplation, and monarchy in the state. If we look only for "good outcomes," the life of contemplation is to be preferred. When one looks for the practical utility of the political life, it also has an important place of distinction. This choice is made between knowledge per se and moral virtue, and, as mentioned, both have a stake in the good (16.5). If someone picks knowledge, as in the life of contemplation, he has moral virtue; the latter, however, does not insure the former.

Harm can come to the healthy state, then, only when the ruler falls sick. This is not an issue in a democracy, where there is no health to begin with. If Dionysius in Syracuse were to become ill, his citizen's health would be insufficient to protect them. There may be more people than rulers, just as passions in the soul, but the ruler and the soul affect each of their subordinates much more fundamentally and directly than the opposite direction (7.2). The use of Dionysius is chosen as the antitype to Pericles presumably because of his inclusion in Plato's biography.432

Vice, then, is simply the disruption of harmony. It is what happens when the good element in a city is forced into subjection and the "mindless rabble" assumes control,

emboldened by the exercise of power without fear of retribution (27.6). Although this process seems involuntary, in line with the Socratic approach to vice,\textsuperscript{433} we will see below that Maximus will be sure to indicate explicitly that it is voluntary.

\textbf{10.4. Immortality}

Since the soul is what staves off destruction of the body "during its stay," then it is itself imperishable (9.5). The thought is from the argument for the immortality of the soul from \textit{Phaedo} 105c-107a. Pythagoras is purported to be the first to maintain the immortality of the soul, which had become Platonist tradition by now.\textsuperscript{434}

In addition, Maximus argues that if the soul needed something else to hold it to the body, e.g., another soul (another body would make little sense), this would lead to a \textit{reductio}\textsuperscript{435} (as in Aristotle \textit{De Animus} 1.5.411b6-14). Maximus' analogy of a ship moored to a steady rock by cables, then, can be pressed only so far:

\begin{verbatim}
οἷον εἰ ἥνεκ' τις ὅλκάδα ἐν κλόδωνι ἐκ πέτρας ποθὲν καθωρισμένην διὰ πολλῶν κάλων, ὡσ τε ἐτέρον ἵνα τῷ ἐξεπεσόμενῳ τῇ ζυγόδεσα τελευτᾷ ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν, χρῆμα ἐστὸς καὶ ἐδραῖον (9, "What was Socrates' Divine Sign?")
\end{verbatim}

You might compare the case of a ship in a heavy sea, moored to a distant rock by means of a whole series of cables; each cable is held steady by the next, but the whole interconnected sequence ends with the rock, which is firm and steady in itself.

When our sinews, the "cables" connecting the soul to the body, grow weary and break, that is death. The ship (the body) sinks away, and the rock (the soul), "firm and steady in itself," "swims free" (9.5-6, emphasized again in 33.7). There seem to be three

\textsuperscript{433} "No man does evil willingly," e.g., \textit{Protagoras} 345d and \textit{Timaeus} 86d.
\textsuperscript{434} For example, Porphyry \textit{Vita Pythagorae} 19, Apuleius \textit{Florida} 18.26, and Hippolytus \textit{Philosophumena}.
\textsuperscript{435} εἰ δὲ μῆ, ποὶ στήσεται ὁ λογισμὸς προϊὸν εἰς ἀπειρον;
elements here, and perhaps the cables are the "breath" which Maximus briefly mentions, or it is the mortal part of the soul. No specifics are offered, but one would presume that the author was looking to avoid our interpreting the cables as something soul-like, to avoid the *reductio*. As an analogy, then, this image has limited logical sense, given the previous insistence that there is only soul and body. As oddly as this is expressed, the metaphor of the embodied soul as a stormy sea, and as swimming free, is not otherwise without Platonic precedent.\(^{436}\) This expressive—if perhaps limited--use of analogy is not uncommon in Maximus, but in an oratorical setting such uses of imagery are helpful and seem warranted.

### 10.5. Man as Composite

A result of the argument for the immortality of the soul, along with the identification of the mortal and immortal parts of the soul from *Dialexis* 6, requires that Maximus discuss his understanding of man as a composite.\(^{437}\) Maximus writes, "the soul is enmeshed in two levels of existence" (διττῷ βίῳ ἡ ψυχὴ συνεχομένη): one immune to disturbance, the other a turbid and disorderly confusion (11.9).\(^{438}\) No part of the soul is in fact "mortal," but one part deals with the mortal aspects of the man-as-composite. These levels of existence are both epistemological, in that they deal with the perceptible and

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\(^{436}\) *Phaedo* 90c and 19 and *Republic* 611e; Plutarch *De genio Socratis* 591e, *De exile* 607de; Philo *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 24, *De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini* 13; Numenius fr. 13; Porphyry *Vita Plotini* 22.

\(^{437}\) As he does also in *Dialexis* 33.7

\(^{438}\) For the impetus of the two souls, see *Timaeus* 69c: "And they, imitating Him, on receiving the immortal principle of soul, framed around it a mortal body, and gave it all the body to be its vehicle, and housed therein besides another form of soul, even the mortal form… they thus compounded in necessary fashion the mortal kind of soul."
intelligible, but they also relate to the two aspects of the individual as a combination of the immortal soul and mortal body. For example, at 27.7 the lower part of the soul is the intermediary between the body and (higher aspects of) the soul. So, just as the soul rules the body, the (higher) intellect rules the lower half of the soul. The composite man is a connection of higher and lower orders, which relate to one another in a hierarchical system.

The embodied soul, then, is "buried" in the body and overwhelmed with stupor and repletion; it perceives reality like one dreaming (the experience is also like one who is drunk, 10.1, 27.5). The imagery is common in Platonism and Neoplatonism, found in Philo De Abrahamo 70, Plutarch Isis et Osiris 362b, Alcinous Didaskalikos 14, Plotinus 4.8.1, Proculus In Platonis rem publicam commentarii 2.351 (Kroll). The Platonic precedents of the buried or enmeshed soul are Republic 533c, Theaetetus 201d-202c, and Phaedo 79c.

The idea of the soul as distributed throughout the body (28.2) is of Stoic origination, and sounds much like the Epicureanism of Lucretius (De rerum natura 3.94-416). Platonism, following Timaeus 69c-72d, in a redeveloped tripartite outlook, typically ties the three parts of the soul to particular bodily organs.

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439 Instead of relegating apprehension of the perceptible to the sense organs, for example.
440 ἡ ψυχὴ κατορωρυγμένη ἐν σώματι, 10.1. The "wretched soul" is also buried or earthed in the soul (ἡ δὲ δειλὴ ψυχὴ κατορωρυγμένη ἐν σώματι, 7.5).
441 Timaeus 69e for the role of the thorax, lungs, liver, heart, and other parts of the body.
Maximus compliments the human form for its structure (e.g., 9.4, 36.1), as Plato does at *Timaeus* 69a. True to Platonism, however, the body is described by Maximus as unstable and naturally perishable (9.5), as well as a hindrance to reason and intellect.

Both the body and the soul are capable of sickness (7.1). This idea has Platonic precedent (but not exclusively Platonic: cf. Democritus b31 and 187d-k and Chrysippus *SVF* 3.421-30). For Plato's notion of sickness, see *Republic* 444c-e, *Gorgias* 464a-c, and 475c. For sickness in Neoplatonism, see Philo *De virtutibus* 162, Plutarch *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* 81f-82a. The body's sickness is construed as misfortune; the soul's is considered moral turpitude. Maximus shows no direct connection between the sicknesses, thereby further emphasizing the separateness of the body and soul.

10.6. Virtue and Vice

As a composite, man is equally capable of vice (μοχθηρία) and virtue (ἀρετή): the former requires something to chastise it, and the latter requires something to preserve it (38.5). Reason (λόγος) fulfills the requirement in both cases, which allows the health of the soul to be eternal, secure, and immortal, and that of the body ephemeral, unstable, and mortal. Maximus does not limit this role only to man's reason. The best dispositions in man need god's help to tether them and bring down the scales on the "better side" (τῆς ἐπὶ θάτερα τὰ κρείττω ῥοπῆς) since they exist in the ambiguity between supreme virtue

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442 Πέφυκεν τὸ ἀνθρώπων πᾶν εξ ἄρχης δίχα, τὸ μὲν εἰς ἄρετῆς ἐπιτηδειότητα, τὸ δὲ εἰς μοχθηρίας...

443 The manuscript title of this *Dialexis* is Εἰ γένοιτό τις θεία μοίρα ἀγαθός ("Whether one might become good by divine dispensation").
and extreme vice (38.6). However, if Maximus' Platonist god is pure reason, this is a logical continuation of the designated role for reason.

Against what is taken as a Socratic formulation, Maximus holds that moral turpitude in the soul is voluntary, and misfortune of the body involuntary; involuntary evils are to be pitied, and voluntary evils are a matter for hatred (7.2). As a result of the discussion of man's composite nature, the sickness of the soul is the worse situation, since the soul is clearly more valuable than the body. The sick soul tends to ignore laws (7.3), and the soul sick with the disease of pleasure wastes and withers away (7.7), much like the tyrant in Republic 571a-580b. While bodily health is the product of science, the health of the soul is a tempering of the passions, and the harmony of the soul caused by philosophy is virtue. This will provide an undercurrent of support for the idea of free will when fate and providence are discussed below. This is not to say that Maximus remains consistent regarding his acceptance of the possibility of ἀκρασία throughout the rest of the Dialexeis: at 27.9 we see again that "vice is involuntary," in particular when a result from lust (which seems perhaps an empirical fact): vice is a product of the pull of pleasure (μοχθηρία δὲ χρήμα ἀκούσιον, ύφ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἐλκόμενον). Given the protreptic nature of the Dialexeis, this view of vice seems little more than a reference to the Socratic notion that no one makes a mistake willingly (as in Protagoras 345d: οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει).

444 αἱ δὲ ἄρισται ψυχῆς φύσεις ἀμφισβητήσιμοι, ἐν μεθορίᾳ τῆς ἀκρας ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὴν ἐσχάτην μοχθηρίαν καθορμισμένοι, δέονται ξυναγωνιστοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ξυλήπτορος τῆς ἐπὶ θάτερα τὰ κρείττω ροπῆς καὶ χειραγωγίας.
When he begins *Dialexis 27*, virtue for Maximus is the product of a science (τέχνη) -- it has elements of both theory and practice (ἀρετῆ μετέχουσα θεωρίας καὶ πρᾶξεως). Philosophers learn virtue like a science -- as potters, cobbler, and carpenters learn their arts. (27.1). But this process is not just theoretical or for the sake of learning: virtue is the health and comeliness of the soul (27.3). Against the Socratic/Platonic formulation found in the middle dialogues, virtue for Maximus is not a form of knowledge, even though knowledge is a virtue (ἀρετή) it is a product of the combination of the practical and theoretical sciences (27.4). When there is harmony in the soul, reason offers security and the emotions accept it; reason imposes due measure and the emotions have due measure imposed -- the joint achievement is happiness. Virtue is the proper organization of the soul: it is the harmony of the *Republic* (e.g., 443d).

Since virtue, therefore, is not the expiration of the passions, but the temperance of them, this vein shows more peripatetic influence in Maximus’ Platonism. Moderation as applied to happiness and the harmony of the soul in this way specifically indicates the peripatetizing rather than stocizing side of middle Platonism.446 For the alternative to this vein of Platonism, contrast Apuleius *De Platone* 2.20.247:

Plato likewise says that no one can be completely wise, unless he excels others in his natural disposition, is perfect in disciplines and the aspects of prudence, and

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445 τοιούτον τι ἄριστον, ὡς ἔνοικεν, ἢ δικαιοσύνη...καὶ ἄρεταν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἐαυτῷ καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὡσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς ἀρμονίας ἀτεχνώς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης... ("Justice is indeed something of this kind [...] having first attained to self-mastery and beautiful order within himself, and having harmonized these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean...").

446 Cf. Diogenes Laertius 5.31; Alcinous *Didaskalikos* 30.184.14; Philo *Legum allegoriarum* 3.132; Clemens (Alexandrinus) *Stromata* 2.39.4.
has been imbued with them from his childhood, being accustomed to appropriate deeds and words, and pleasure of the mind being purified and expunged, having thrown these things out from the mind from this point. * * * ...prudence and temperance and all the doctrines coming from scientific knowledge of things and eloquence.\footnote{447}

In Maximus, philosophical discourses are the way to sooth the soul: they train the emotions, calm its violent and impulsive element, and rouse what is too weak and relaxed. One human form of this process is, as for Plato,\footnote{448} music (16, "Whether the Liberal Arts Have a Contribution to Make to the Cultivation of Virtue").

Later in \textit{Dialexis} 27, however, Maximus changes from talking about virtue as a product of a τέχνη to the idea that it is the product of a knowledge (ἐπιστήμη)(\textit{pace} Trapp 1997:228-9n.16). Everything in the theoretical science is in the category of reason, and whatever theoretical reason makes orderly is in the category of emotion.\footnote{449} The former is "wisdom" (σοφίαν), which is knowledge (ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν), the latter, a product of knowledge (ὑπὸ ἐπιστήμης γινόμενον), is "virtue" (ἀρετή, 27.7). His insistence that virtue is a product of two kinds of science has at this point been left behind for the idea that it is the product of an ἐπιστήμη. This switch is not a major

\footnote{448} For Platonic precedent of this idea of music \textit{Republic} 398c; \textit{Laws} 652a. In Platonism, [Plutarch] \textit{Placita} 1140b and 1145e.
\footnote{449} Τάττε δή μοι πάν, ὅσον θεωρητικὸν τέχνης εἶδος, κατὰ τὸν λόγον· τὸ δὲ ύπ’ αὐτοῦ κοσμοῦμενον κατὰ τὰ πάθη;
problem for Maximus' Platonic stance, certainly, and, what is more, this slide has been noticed in Plato himself.\textsuperscript{450}

The virtues of the soul are not innate: they require natural endowment, which in the end only needs to play a small role (1.5). Since the 4\textsuperscript{th} century BCE, the development of virtue required practice (ἐθος, ἄσκησις) and instruction (μάθησις, διδασκαλία) in addition to natural endowment (φύσις)(Trapp 1997:9n.22). As Trapp 1997 gives it, this continues into Middle Platonism after Aristotle (NE 10.1179b20): for example, Philo Vitae Abrahamo 52-4; [Plutarch] De liberis educandis 2a; Alcinous Didaskalikos 28; and Diogenes Laertius 5.18. From the Pythagorean side, we find this notion in Plato's acquaintance, Archytas.\textsuperscript{451}

Early in the Dialexeis, alongside our powers of reasoning, god gave men love and hope. Love is a "pair of wings" that lift the soul and allows it to run towards its objects of desire (which seem to be the intelligible Forms). These wings are also called by philosophers "human impulses" (1.5). This imagery from the Phaedrus (246a) is fused with the Stoic idea of ὀρμή (SVF 3.171), which had moved from the more frequent "attack" or "onslaught" to "impulse" (though this last meaning is already found in Homer and Herodotus) and had become common philosophical terminology (Plato Timaeus 27c, Republic 511b; Aristotle Rhetorica 1393a3, Metaphysics 364b5; Cicero De officiis 1.101).

\textsuperscript{450} E.g., referring to Protagoras 345de, Gorgias 509d, Timaeus 86-87, Laws 9: "In all these passages there is the implication, which is made explicit in many of Plato's works, that political and moral virtue is a skill or science, a τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη whose practitioners are the unchallengeable authorities on questions of right and wrong," Brambough 1960:294.

\textsuperscript{451} Fr. 3, p. 41.20 in Thesleff.
Hope encourages the individual's appetitive urges, and pushes us on to our various endeavors: money-grubbing, campaigning, traveling, banditry, and adulterous liaisons. All these desires are without rational limit, and thus only lead to more desire (an Aristotelian influence from the *Politics* 1.9). Alternatively, when the soul leads one to "an object that is stable, unified, bounded, and defined--naturally beautiful, accessible to effort, apprehensible to reason, pursuable with love, and attainable with hope--then its exhortations are blessed with good fortune, victory, and success" (1.5). This is the reason, as Maximus argues in the beginning of the *Dialeexis*, for philosophical spectacles, as opposed to those visual events that only provide momentary pleasure (1.4). Philosophic love tempers our hopes and directs us toward virtue.

In *Dialeexis* 16, the speech of the representative of the life of the mind ("Anaxagoras") also takes this Platonic stance, and ends with two important rhetorical climaxes. The first is that virtue is the product of the exercise of reason. The exercise of reason is secured by practice, practice is secured by truth, and truth is secured by the leisure necessary to pursue it. In this way, we get a justification for the contemplative life. The second climax: true reason is the only path to virtue, what it does not know it learns, what it learns it retains, what it retains it puts into practice, and, putting it into practice, reason is unerring. This is how Maximus says he spends his leisure: the pursuit of truth, the art of living, the power of argument, the equipping of the soul, and the training in virtue. This training takes the form of philosophic orations and teaching, geometry, the liberal arts, and music (37.7); as well, it clears the mind and allows for contemplation of man's universal nature (as for Plato at *Republic* 526c). The pull and
importance of the practical life as the application of virtue does not disappear after we
discover the slight edge of the contemplative life.

Maximus also follows what is taken to be the Socratic notion that to do wrong is
worse than to suffer it, as found in both the *Crito* 49b and *Gorgias* 469b (12.7). But as
mentioned above, Maximus thinks vice is often voluntary, and wrongdoing is done by
choice: the worse man chooses to do it, the good man chooses not to (12.4). Revenge,
then, is worse than the original offence, just as in Plato's *Gorgias*. Of course, as stated
above, Maximus changes his mind in that "vice is involuntary" (28.9).

For Maximus, wrongdoing and evil together are the removal of the good, and the
Good is virtue. That virtue is inalienable is a Stoic tenet, but it is found within the
Platonist tradition as well. The question as to whether virtue is the sole good is
contested throughout Platonism; Plato seems to waver on this idea. One can justify that a
good man cannot be harmed as in the *Apology* (44ab), whereas philosophical dialectic is
able to improve the vicious man in the *Phaedrus* (e.g., 276e). Platonists could also claim
this tenet in *Apology* 30c, which is paraphrased by Maximus in 12.8. According to a
more Stoicizing/Platonic, *Apology*-influenced vein of Maximus, then, the good man cannot
be harmed. The question as to whether virtue is the sole good is contested throughout
Platonism: Plato seems to waver. One can justify that a good man cannot be harmed as in
the *Apology*. But clearly the notion of philosophical dialectic improving the vicious man is

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452 E.g., *SVF* 1.568-69, 3.238-84, 3.578-80; Seneca *De constantia sapientis* 3-5, 7.
453 cf. Apuleius 2.20.248; for discussion of virtue as the good in Platonism, see Dillon
454 Socrates is ever the example of not being able to wrong a good man, cf. Apuleius *De
Platone* 2.20.248.
possible, as in the *Phaedrus*. That virtue is inalienable is a Stoic tenet, \(^{455}\) but it is found within the Platonist tradition as well.\(^ {456}\) According to a more Stoicizing/Platonic *Apology*-influenced vein of Maximus, then, the good man cannot be harmed. Again, Platonists could claim this tenet in *Apology* 30c, which is paraphrased by Maximus in 12.8.\(^ {457}\)

In direct opposition to Stoicism, Maximus takes the Platonic/Aristotelian stance that other things besides virtue are good, e.g., physical attributes, external fortunes, and surroundings. This inclusive idea of goods is found in Plato *Laws* 697b, and Aristotle *NE* 1.8 1098b12.\(^ {458}\)

Importantly in Maximus, there is a middling type of person who does not have a firm grasp on virtue, but who has not degenerated into the most vicious type. He lives by right opinion (βιοτεῦον δὲ ἐν δοξαῖς ὀρθαῖς), and is nurtured and educated in a stable community of sound laws (24.3).\(^ {459}\) A construction of Hellenistic philosophy and Middle Platonism, this idea counters the Stoic claim that anything less than virtue is vice. While not an issue for Plato, in the second century this was a widely held Platonist view: for example, Philo *De praemiis et poenis* 62.5, Alcinous *Didaskalikos* 30.183.31, and

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\(^{455}\) E.g., SVF 1.568-69, 3.238-84, 3.578-80; Seneca *De constantia sapientis* 3-5, 7.

\(^{456}\) cf. Apuleius 2.20.248; for discussion of virtue as the good in Platonism, see Dillon 1977:44, 73-74, 123-125, and 299.

\(^{457}\) Socrates is ever the example of not being able to wrong a good man, cf. Apuleius *De Platone* 2.20.248.

\(^{458}\) On the Good and the right type of life as portrayed by Neoplatonism, see Plotinus *Enneads* 1.4.

\(^{459}\) Maximus' introduction of the idea seems affected: "How might we decide the issue [of the superiority of farmers or soldiers]? Shall I tell you? I will. My soul divines that, as Plato opines, there is a certain category of men…" (Τῷ ἄν οὖν τις κρίναι τὸ λεγόμενον; βούλει σοι φράσω; καὶ δὴ λέγω. Μαντεύεται μοι ἡ ψυχή, κατὰ τοὺς Πλάτωνος λόγους, εἶναι τι ἀνθρώπων γένος, 24.3)
Apuleius *De Platone* 2.3.224 and 2.19.246.

In the end, then, health is harmony, disease disharmony. Harmony is single and in unison, disharmony plurality and in discord; these formulations reiterate the connection between intellect or monarchy and the passions or democracy at the end of the *Dialexeis* 39.3. With respect to vice, the greatest human evil is desire. God has given us our abilities (41.5) and freed us to act, but he himself is not a source of evil (on which, more below). The fault is with him who chooses. In support, Maximus quotes Plato: "Free of vices, God is blameless" (ἐλομένου αἰτία, θεὸς ἄναίτιος, 41.5; *Republic* 617e). It is because of the soul's own freedom that vice exists. Therefore, it is pure blunder to look for an "evil soul" (cf. *Laws* 896e4). There are, however, many subordinate, inferior souls, and these are the source of evil. There is much Platonic and Neoplatonic precedent for this discussion.\(^{461}\)

We find out very early on in the *Dialexeis* (1.4), that virtue is closer kin to the soul than pleasure. Virtue and pleasure, as stated above, are immediately established as the main opposing themes of Maximus' moralizing in his *Dialexeis*. There is a Platonic anti-pleasure, anti-appetitive skew to Maximus' notion of virtue that he maintains throughout his work.

\(^{460}\) This line is echoed in the Second Sophistic and beyond: Lucian *De mercede conductis potentium familiaribus* 42-43; Justin Martyr *Apologia* 44.8; Clemens *Paedagogus* 1.8, *Stromata* 4.23, 5.14; Plotinus *Enneades* 3.2.

\(^{461}\) Plato *Republic*, 617e; Lucian *De mercede conductis potentium familiaribus* 42; Chalcidius *Commentary in Timaeus* 164; Hippolytus *Refutatio omnium haeresium* 1.19.19; Clemens *Paedagogus* 1.8.69.1; Justin *Apologia* 1.44 and 2.81; and Plotinus *Enneades* 3.2.7.20. For discussion, see Dillon 1977:266-304, and 1993; and Whittaker 1990.
Both theoretical learning and practical habituation of the character are required and both must have a favorable natural endowment on which one must build (cf. 27.9). This requirement was established by Aristotle (NE 10.9, 1163b32-1171a1) and absorbed into Middle Platonism (cf. Alcinous Didaskalikos 28, Apuleius De Platone 2.10.234). The application of learning to the control of the passions is an essential element for Maximus in the pursuit of virtue: theoretical learning is simply not enough.

**10.7. Love**

Discussions of love and desire in Maximus are connected with Plato's theory of recollection (as in the *Meno* and *Phaedrus*). The images of love come by and large from the *Phaedrus*: the form of one's beloved is the sweetest sight, as is anything that stirs recollections of the beloved (*Dialexis* 2.10). These statements are consistent with the *Phaedo* 73d-74a and Aristotle's *De memoria et reminiscientia* 451b12, and are echoed in the case of Odysseus at *Dialexis* 10.7. His talk of love as recollection relates to the way Maximus handles the excessively amorous speech and action of Socrates (discussed further in Appendix 1). What is important here is Maximus' reliance on the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* to invoke the transcendental beauty that sets Socrates' pursuits in their metaphysical context and thus in Maximus' eyes vindicates him completely. This is the primary difference between pleasure as lust for physical beauty and pleasure as the desire for true, philosophical beauty *per se*.462

462 Another "vulgarized version" (Hunink) of the "two Venuses" can be found in Apuleius' *Apologia* (12). There is reference there to *anamnesis* and recollection, as well.
Maximus' use of the *Meno* and *Phaedrus* act as a magnet in his work that attracts many types of support, not only from other Platonic dialogues but also Socratic writings from Xenophon and Aeschines. In the end, Maximus' four lectures on Socratic love resemble other types of ἔρωτικοι λόγοι found throughout this century and before. With this topic, Maximus is able to deepen his justification and use of Platonic metaphysics and epistemology, but also invokes a survey of the history of erotic literature as a *topos*.

Beauty as it descends from the intelligible realm loses its original character, but as we go up the cosmological strata of the universe, it becomes purer and less contaminated (21.8), just as in the *Phaedrus* (see especially Socrates' long speech, 246-253). This type of thought will be immensely influential in Neoplatonism. Plotinus will end up describing the universe as a series of levels reaching from the ultimate simplicity of the infinite One to the more complex structures of the material universe. As the first level of reality emerges from the One, it turns its vision back toward the One in a movement of contemplative desire.

For Maximus as the forms for Middle Platonism do not take on their qualities, but "are" their qualities, "god is not beautiful, he is the source of all beauty, like the source of a spring" (11.11).

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464 E.g., Plutarch's *Amatorius* and the pseudo-Lucianic *Amores*. Favonius' lost *On Socrates and his Erotic Science* would be a nice comparison piece.
465 For Plotinus' vision of the world-soul and the One, see *Enneads* Books 3-6 *passim*. See Deck 1967 for discussion.
10.8. Human Good, Happiness, Virtue

As in the beginning of Plato's *Philebus*, pleasure and virtue are both brought up as ostensible candidates for the Good. Given Maximus' Platonism, virtue as perfected reason\(^\text{466}\) will take a position of preeminence. The structure of the argument is very reminiscent of the *Phaedo*, in that, as Trapp 1997 points out, the "Epicurean" case is represented twice (*Dialexeis* 30.3-4 and 32) and rejected twice (30.4-31 and 33). The reason Trapp says that the two works are similar "if only at a distance" is that the structure of the *Phaedo* is more complicated than simple four speeches. In the *Phaedo*, there is an argument with Cebes (generation from contraries, 69e-72e), one with Simmias (recollection, 72e-77a), and it is agreed that these should be combined into one (77a-78b). Then there is a "second" speech with Cebes (that philosophy leads the soul from visible to invisible 78b-84b). After a transition of objections from both interlocutors, and an interruption by Echecrates (84b-92a), there is an answer to Simmias (refutation of theory of soul-harmony, 92a-95a) and one to Cebes (from physicists to "second course", 95a-107a). The similarity, however, still remains.

The discussion of the two lives, which is indicative of Maximus' style and use of logic, culminates with:

\(\text{‘Ιδιον δὲ σαρκῶν μὲν ἢδοναί, νοῦ δὲ λόγος· καὶ κοινὸν μὲν αὐτῷ αἱ σάρκες πρὸς τὰ θηρία, ἱδιὸν δὲ νοῦς. Ἐνταῦθα τοῖνυν λέγει τὸ ἀνθρώποις ἄγαθὸν, ὅποιο τὸ ἔργον· <ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἔργον, ὅποιο τὸ ἔργανον> ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἔργανον, ὅπου τὸ σῶζον. Ἀπὸ τοῦ σῶζοντος ἄρξαι. Πότερον ποιέσθω διασωστικόν, σῶμα ψυχῆς, ἢ ψυχή σώματος· εὑρέτης τὸ σῶζον. Τί ψυχῆς ὀργανόν· νοῦς. Ζήτει τὸ ἔργον. Τί νοῦ ἐργόν; φρόνησις· εὑρέτης τὸ ἀγαθὸν. (33.7, "What is the End of Philosophy?")}\)

\(^\text{466}\) See Trapp 1997:236 for discussion.
The function particular to the flesh is Pleasure, that particular to the intelligence is reason; mankind shares flesh with beasts, but intelligence is its own distinctive possession. You should therefore seek the human good where the distinctive function of man is to be found, and the distinctive instrument where the factor that ensures its survival resides. Begin with the preserving factor. Which preserves which, body soul or soul body? You have your preserver. What is the soul's instrument? Intelligence. Now look for the distinctive function. What is the proper function of intelligence? The exercise of wisdom. You have your Good.

Maximus' discussion of the survival aids of animals (man's advantage is reason) is much like the one found from Protagoras (320d-322d). In outline, the discussion echoes Aristotle's argument about human function (ἐργον), as in Aristotle's NE 1.7.1097b24. Maximus uses both sources to show his audience how easily these conclusions fall out from the truth, when one follows Platonic methodology conceived of generally.

At the end of the Dialexeis (39-40), the unity of the Good--and of the divine--is once again stressed. The Good is firm, steady, motionless, balanced, open to all, unrationed, generous, and lacking nothing; it offers no scope for increase and tolerates no deficiency. This shows Stoic influence of the unmitigated Good (i.e., as virtue), but stems from the long Platonic concern for self-sufficiency and unity, which falls into Hellenistic thought by means of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Maximus, though, stops short of calling the Good virtue. He is consistent in conceiving the Good as the exercise of wisdom, as found in the life of contemplation, and his formulation is in line generally with the Middle Platonic conception of happiness that results--that is, happiness as likeness to god (26.9).467

Near the very end of the *Dialexeis*, there is stress on the possibility, even the need, to understand higher and lower degrees of Good (40.5). The discussion of the relative ranking of degrees has Platonic precedent: *Gorgias* 451e and 467e, *Meno* 87e, [Plato] *Epistula* 7.355b. The issue regarding what is necessary for virtue, whether it is solely human good or some combination of goods (of soul, body, or external goods), is a Stoic and Peripatetic battle, and continues to be an issue within Middle Platonism, with each author taking one side.468 The inclusion of the good of the soul, the body, and external goods is decidedly Platonic (cum Peripateticism): the standard threefold classification of soul, body, and external goods is from Plato, e.g., *Gorgias* 467e, *Euthydemus* 279ac, *Philebus* 48e, and *Laws* 743e.

10.9. Death and the Flight of the Soul

Since embodied soul is hindered by the body, at death it breaks free and can turn outward and re-encounter pure truth (10.3-4). The general idea of the impairment of the soul is found in Plato at *Phaedo* 66a and 79c. The image Maximus uses of the eye being blocked and impaired in *Dialexis* 10.3 is taken from *Republic* 518d, and the idea of recollection as a slow awakening, from *Meno* 85d.469

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468 For the contemporary conception of goods (but with the further division of "divine" and "human" goods), Alcinous *Didaskalikos* 27; Apuleius *De Platone* 2.1.219-2.222. The issue comes down through Aristotle *NE* 1.8.1098b9-1.10.1101a21, Antiochus in Cicero's *De finibus* 5.26-7, 68. Philo is ambiguous on this point: see *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 285-286 or the Peripatetic-influenced, *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 7. For discussion of these issues, Dillon 1977:44, 70-75, 146-8, and 328.

469 Socrates: "And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man?"
For Maximus, such a release from the prison of the body is not disadvantageous for the virtuous soul: "I am inclined to say that noble souls do not feel regret to see the body perish" (7.5). The imagery of the cave and the soul's release in Maximus (e.g., 7.5, 36.4) invokes *Republic* 514a-517d, and *Gorgias* 493e and *Phaedo* 82e are both sources for the idea of the body as a prison. Our bodies are "nothing but short-lived cloaks" (7.5); the good soul, in fact, looks to strip its covering as soon as possible. The soul is, after all, confused and imprisoned in a life of turmoil and darkness, overwhelmed in chaos and disharmony (as in *Phaedo* 79c and 109a; and *passim* the *Phaedrus*). The lover of god gladly welcomes this release as it approaches (11.11). Maximus is providing his audience with an example of consolation literature, as well as with the Platonic notion (as throughout the *Phaedo*) that the philosopher readies himself for death.

Learning and recollection, then, simulate on a smaller scale the release of death. But more than the release of death, reason also lifts the blocking and provides for clarity, at least as much as is possible while one is alive and under the misfortune of physical embodiment. The notion of philosophy as a turning away from the body as in death, as well as a preparation for death, gets its start in the *Phaedo*. Thus, the philosopher practices the disengagement from the soul during life, in order to attain the virtue that will provide him with eternal reward, while he is not allowed to hasten the release with suicide (as *Phaedo* 80). In Maximus, then, while alive the soul learns and obtains a type of temporary release, though death is the full, permanent release--and in both we reconnect

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470 For this idea in Neoplatonism, see Philo *Legum allegoriarum* 3.21, *De ebrietate* 101, *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 85.
with pure truth. This freedom from the lower realm of both the body and the world helps the soul recollect true beauty. Maximus says more on this "flight of soul" and its turning away from the world as it related specifically to practical philosophy and epistemology (37.7 and 38.3 are two examples). The fundamental difference between Platonism and Peripateticism as Middle Platonism develops is that the former believed man was in exile in the world, the latter that he is at home (pace Taylor 1924).

11. Epistemology

11.1. Objects of Apprehension: Perceptible and Intelligible

Perception and the intellect are associated with objects that differ as much as they themselves do (11.7). Perceptibles are more familiar to us, and are manifold in constant congeries and processes of change, while the realm of the intelligible is firm and stable (11.7). Intelligible objects are unknown to everyday experience, are more knowable in their real nature, and are apprehended by the intellect.\textsuperscript{471} This is an example of the Peripatetic influence of science as applied to the Platonic separation of the two realms of being. This tension between the Peripatetic and Platonic process of obtaining knowledge remains throughout Maximus' work.

This separation of perceptible and intelligible, however, is essential Plato and essential Platonism, as is the correspondence of perception and the intellect in apprehension. The imagery Maximus uses is from \textit{Phaedrus} 247c-248e.

\textsuperscript{471} For the division: Aristotle's \textit{Posterior Analytics} 1.2.71b, 2.3.72b; \textit{Topics} 142a; \textit{Physics} 1.1.184a; \textit{NE} 1095b; \textit{Metaphysics} 1029b. For discussion of Aristotle's first principles and idea of dialectic, Irwin 1988.
As mentioned above, this type of apprehension is accomplished (while living) by the *apostrophe* and the flight of the mind, both of Platonic origin (*Phaedo* 82d-84b); both are common in Middle Platonism.\(^{472}\)

Maximus' epistemological system is as deep as is required for any issues of contemplative life and the importance of philosophy for virtue. An over-emphasis of the topic would likely be seen as a promotion to turn away wholly from this world and an example of over-theorizing, and would thus diminish any practical ethicist's position.

### 11.2. Tripartite Epistemology: Belief, Prudence, and Knowledge

The primary discussion of knowledge arises from a desire to know how man differs from beast, and then further what it is that distinguishes man from god (6.1, τί ἐπιστήμη). Obviously Maximus avoids any discussion of vegetal nature when the trio "beast, man, god" must be emphasized. This notion of man between beast and god is prevalent in Middle Platonism, and is highly conventional at the time. In this type of approach, all things are connected and any connection between extremes is always performed by intermediaries or middle terms. The term is often found in its simplest form as an object that participates in the characteristics of both extremes. True to Platonic form, Maximus works to divide his discussion and define his terms, and looks to discover "for man, what is understanding (τῷ ἄνθρωπῷ τῷ ἐπιστασθαί), knowing (εἰδέναι), and learning (μαθάναι)" (6.1).

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All good intentions aside, perhaps, Maximus is at times not extraordinarily careful regarding vocabulary. In *Dialexis* 6.4:

καθό δὲ ξυμβάλλουσιν αὐτῆς αἱ θνηταὶ φύσεις τῷ ἀθανάτῳ, τούτῳ πᾶν καλεῖται φρόνησις, διὰ μέσου οὐσα ἐπιστήμην πρὸς αἴσθησιν. Καὶ ἐστὶν ἔργον ψυχῆς, ὡς μὲν ἀλόγου, αἴσθησις· ὡς δὲ θείας, νοοῦς· ὡς δὲ ἀνθρωπίνης, φρόνησις.

And in so far as its mortal and immortal characteristics meet, the overlap of experience and reason is given the name "prudence," which is the intermediate between perception and knowledge. The function of the soul, then, *qua* irrational entity is perception, *qua* divine entity intellect, *qua* human entity, as a composite of the two, prudence.

As should be clear, man has within him knowledge, experience, and prudence (as the overlap of the two); at the same time these processes and states are represented by three types of being: animal, god, and man (as the composite of these). Maximus observes a Platonist parallel between perception as experience, knowledge as reason, and prudence as their cognitive overlap. Yet immediately after this quote, we find that the different epistemological processes consist of perception accumulating (ἀθροίζει) experience, prudence accumulating reasoned reflection, and intellect accumulating surety (βεβαιότητα): the harmony of all three of these together is called by him "knowledge."

Knowledge, then, exists in man via his connection with divine reason, and yet also as the

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473 The relationship between experience and prudence in Maximus reflects a Peripatetic strain of Platonism: "The reason is that prudence includes a knowledge of particular facts, and this is derived from experience, which a young man does not a possess for experience is the fruit of years" (αὕτην δ' ὢτι καὶ τῶον καθ' ἐκαστά ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα εἰς ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἐμπειρός οὐκ ἐστὶν πλήθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν, Nicomachean Ethics 1142a14).

474 Καὶ ἐστὶν ἔργον ψυχῆς, ὡς μὲν ἀλόγου, αἴσθησις· ὡς δὲ θείας, νοοῦς· ὡς δὲ ἀνθρωπίνης, φρόνησις· ἀθροίζει δὲ αἴσθησις μὲν ἐμπειρίαν, φρόνησις δὲ λόγον, νοοὺς δὲ βεβαιότητα, 6.4.
harmonious relationship of the three types of understanding: through experience, prudence, and the intellect.

Thus Maximus does not first nod when he writes: "knowledge, prudence, and experience each have their control human capabilities" (διείληχε δὴ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄνθρωπων δυνάμεις ἐπιστήμη, καὶ φρόνησις, καὶ ἐμπειρία, 6.4). Trapp 1997 writes that Maximus' previous definition of knowledge as the harmonious relationship of intellect, prudence, and perception is misleading. It would be better to have said "intellect, prudence, and experience..." This is true. However, this slip is anticipated by his previously saying that prudence is "the intermediate between knowledge and perception" (6.4). Perhaps it would have been clearer to have said that prudence is the intermediate between intellect (or intellectual surety) and perception, and that the three working together are knowledge, therefore, remaining more consistent. This notion is later maintained in the same Dialexis, and is more clearly purported at 11.7. Yet, this is an oration, and we get the point: reason and intellectual surety allow for knowledge, especially when experience/perception and prudence are harmonious, i.e., they are ruled by reason. The divine part of man involves everything involved in "thought, reasoning, learning, and knowledge."

What is more, this looseness of terminology actually reflects the two types of knowledge Maximus has Platonic justification to discuss. The allowance for perceptible

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475 Trapp 1997:56 notes this point as well.
476 The human soul has two cognitive faculties: the one simple, called "intellect" (νοῦς), the other diverse, various and manifold, called "perception" (αἰσθήσεως), further discussed under Epistemology, below.
experience to become knowledge is decidedly not Platonic, but rather Platonist via Peripatetic influence. Plato did not generally speaking think we could have knowledge about the perceptible world (if at times perceptibles seem to be integrated into a larger network of knowledge), and thus the objects of perception or our experience with them cannot constitute the objects of knowledge or even instances of it. Knowledge in Plato (after the *Meno*) is solely about the Forms or the intelligible world.

This tension is one within Middle Platonism at the time. There is a temptation to combine Aristotle's notion that men (through their own divine reason) are able to have scientific knowledge about the world through research and experience, with the Platonic idea of harmony from the *Republic* (where this harmony is virtue) as an apprehension of the Forms or intelligible world by the philosopher.

For Maximus each part of the soul has its particular role in man's comprehension of his experience with the world. Arts, crafts, and the everyday needs of life are the purview of perception; prudence takes control and subdues the passions; intellect, the most divine part of the soul, can provide assurance for these experiences. The idea that the mind stamps experience with the mark of surety is Platonist and shows signs of influence by Aristotle. Plato's dialogues regularly indicate that reason comprehends the intelligible world, and perception the perceptible, and these realms are separate except for some sort of participation or modeling, a connection that remains as vague in the *Dialexeis* as it does in Plato. Maximus, then, at different times in his work admits to both models of knowledge. There is an elision in Maximus between two epistemological models--one Platonic, one quite Platonist.
Dialexis 6 has been thought to be somewhat incoherent, in that after this decisive description, the inclusive definition of knowledge is lost and the exposition adheres more to the "laws" of intellect. That is, the description of knowledge relies on the definition of knowledge as purview solely of the intellect (Trapp 1997:50-51). However, this arc seems justified by the Platonic stance, and moves away from Peripatetic influence based on the inclusive reading of the Nicomachean Ethics. This notion of the harmony of all three of these faculties, if not in the name of knowledge necessarily, is required and desired in the Republic. However, as in the Republic, the lower portions of these fall away as the dialogue continues; they are necessary, but much less important than reason and (the Guardians). In the end, Plato discusses aspects of justice as the proper administration and care of human reason/the Guardians, while the other two classes remain in the background (and remain necessary parts of the whole). The intellect is the focal point in Maximus with the same intensity as in the Republic.

For Maximus, then, the harmony of the parts of the soul (and the faculties of perception/knowledge) is by extension required to ensure virtue. The focus, then, on administrative points of the intellect is required to keep such harmony intact: strong, trained reason should ensure harmony for both knowledge and, then in turn, virtue. The tension emerges in the Republic as the Guardians' reliance on the rest of the population, as well as the level of responsibility they have for the polis. Even though "the rulers need someone to rule, and the citizens need someone to rule them," harmony is important only in that other citizens should either stay out of the way of the rulers or work toward their
goals when needed. We cannot be sure if this is the motivation of Maximus, but the move remains consistent with a shift in the Republic.

Regarding the "other type of knowledge," reason stamps a seal on perceptions and experience, along the lines of justifying true beliefs (6.2). From the Phaedo:

And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking only of Equality, but of Beauty, Goodness, Justice, Holiness, and all which we stamp with the seal of "what it is" in the dialectical process, when we ask and answer questions (περὶ ἀπάντων οίς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τὸ "αὐτὸ ὁ ἐστὶ" καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτώντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι). Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth? (Phaedo 75)

The image of the stamped seal in this dialogue is given as proof of the Platonic notion of recollection. The image of the seal itself invokes both Theaetetus 191cd as well as the Stoic definition of φαντασία. The idea of the "seal of reason" had become standard in Platonism by this time (Dillon 1977).478

Lastly, I add Maximus' description of διαίρεσις for the sake of completeness:

οὐδεύοντος κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἐκθηρωμένου τὰ συγγενῆ τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ διακρινοντος τὰ ἀνόμια, καὶ τὰ ὁμοία συγκρίνοντος, καὶ τὰ οἷκεα συντιθέντος, καὶ τὰ συγκεχυμένα διαφοροῦντος, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια χωρίζοντος, καὶ τὰ ἄτακτα συντάττοντος, καὶ τὰ ἀνάρμοστα ἁρμοζομένου. (6.4, "What is Knowledge?")

477 Ἀρα πάν ὅπερ ἤ αἴσθησις ἀθροίσασα τῇ κατὰ βραχὺ θεωρίᾳ, ἐμπειρίαν τούτο ὁνομάζουσα, προσαγάγῃ τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ μετὰ τούτῳ ἐπισφραγίσηται ὁ λογισμὸς τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ, τούτῳ φῶς ἔπειστήμην εἶναι; ("Are we perhaps to give the name 'knowledge' to anything that is gradually assembled by the operations of sense-perception and given the name of 'experience,' then presented to the soul and stamped with the seal of reasoned thought?" 6.2).

478 The image of the seal on wax is found in Arius Didymus (Compendium of Platonic Doctrine [Eusebius Praeparatio evangelica 9.23.3-6]) and the image is ubiquitous in Philo (e.g., De ebrietate 133, De migratione Abrahimi 102).
If reason were the only thing distinctive of man, then knowledge would be nothing other than the secure operation of reason, following a consistent path as it searches out related phenomena, separating dissimilars and assembling similars, placing together what belongs together and moving apart what does not, dividing up what is jumbled, bringing order to confusion and harmony to discord.

The description is of Plato's the technique of division, separation, and assembling (διαίρεσις), and is discussed by name at *Phaedrus* 265de and in the *Sophist* (beginning in 229d and then passim). In the *Phaedrus*, this process is comprised of two basic processes: the process of generalization from divers particulars, and division according to natural joints. Writes Plato (Socrates speaking): "I am myself a great lover of these processes of division and generalization; they help me to speak and to think," (οὕτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὸς τε ἔραστής, ὥ Φαίδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵνα οἷός τε ὧ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· *Phaedrus* 266b).

For other treatments, διαίρεσις is discussed in Seneca *Epistula* 58.8-15 and Philo *De agricultura* 139. It is not only a Platonic word (fragments of Empedocles and Parmenides both seem to include it). For Maximus, this process just leads to organization and more harmony in the soul, and is discussed in 11.8.

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479 *Phaedrus* 265d: "First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea; as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse, the speaker should define his several notions and so make his meaning clear."

480 *Phaedrus* 265e: "The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might."
11.3. Memory, Recollection, and Learning

11.3.1. Memory

Much as in the *Phaedrus* (274d-275b), spoken utterances about god are compared with written characters in the *Dialexeis*; however, in Maximus these characters are the symbols human nature has discovered to help it lay aside its own obtuseness and print a permanent record for the future. Teachers sketch faint letters for students over which they can guide the movement of pupils' hands, much as men need symbols to allow for recollection of the divine (2.2). Yet there are some whose memories are strong, and who can reach straight out for the heavens with their souls and encounter the divine, and need no images to apprehend the divinity. From the argument in the *Phaedrus*, in which writing is seen as an inferior, silent permanent record, Maximus shifts to the idea of writing as a pathway to recollection (e.g., *Theaetetus* 206a). As would be natural for Plato, in the *Theaetetus* and the *Meno*, dialogue or dialectic is the path to recollection. By the second century, it is clear that writing had long been established as a necessary and important tool. The primacy of speech no longer plays as much a role as in the *Phaedrus*. This reworking by Maximus is a clever turn from the idea of writing as an inferior crutch to writing as a path to knowledge.

11.3.2. Recollection, Learning

The Peripatetic idea of knowledge as represented by Maximus, one dependent upon the idea of scientific experimentation, emerges from discovery or by learning, both of which are useless without some basis of internal knowledge to support them. This is similar to the possible connection between midwifery and recollection as in the *Theaetetus*
Maximus takes his argument from the *Meno*. In that dialogue, if someone discovers some $x$, then he can recognize it only in one of two ways: he already knows $x$ in some way (through recollection) or at that moment learns $x$ from an instructor. If the latter is the case, then someone else clearly previously "discovered" $x$, and our inquiry must travel up the ladder of instructors to find the source (*Dialexis* 10.4-5, cf. *Meno* 80d). Forgetfulness, then, is simply a lack of recollection, while recollection is the process of rousing, guarding, and preservation of what has been set in order by reason; this, then, is "memory" (*Dialexis* 10.6). "Discovery," then, is really the realization of innate natural opinions, and the awakening and organizing of them—recollection is knowledge.

Maximus, then, attempts to combine two types of knowledge: Peripatetic scientific discovery and Platonic apprehension of the intelligible world. Learning looked at from an Aristotelian point of view, i.e., knowledge resulting from the accumulation of information through experience and perception, can be seen as an impetus for recollection (as the *Meno*). The problem is that for Plato the objects about which one can have knowledge are not these perceptibles. But as Maximus formulates it, study of the world can lead to knowledge of a sort ("intellectual surety") while at the same time allowing for knowledge as an apprehension of the forms through a process of recollection, a process begun by perception. The organization of such perceptions can therefore involve knowledge of things of this world through experience (a Peripatetic conception), as well

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481 As in Burnyeat 1977:9-10.
482 With opinions all lined up like Homer's soldiers, *Iliad* 10.3-4.
as the idea of perceptibles allowing for recollection of the Forms (the Platonic formulation). True knowledge, however, emerges in Maximus as the acquisition one gains from the flight of the soul from the lower to higher realms, leading to the recollection of true reality (10.9, as in the *Phaedrus*).

Reason plays its role in Maximus as the midwife to the soul, where intellection is the soul's "conception," perception is the "labor pains," and recollection is the "delivery" (10.4). All of these are consistent with the Platonic view of knowledge by means of recollection, especially as in the *Theaetetus*.

The way Maximus works to combine these notions is an example of the process at this time of further solidifying the compatibility of the Academic and Peripatetic ideas of knowledge that seems unique. It is not clear whether knowledge for Maximus a recollection of the Forms via the material world, or a flight from the perceptible world in order to understand the Forms qua the intelligible realm. In the end, perhaps Maximus is simply not completely consistent about his idea of knowledge, or that he even has a preferred definition.

Based on his treatment as analyzed quantitatively, then, Maximus' epistemology is drawn, in descending order: from the Peripatetic-Platonist strain of knowledge as justified, ordered experience; from the idea of recollection and study of the Forms from the *Phaedrus* and *Republic*; and from knowledge as intellection requiring a midwife as in the *Theaetetus*. These conceptions are not absolutely incompatible, but there seems to be an avoidance of absolute systemization in Maximus. They all seem to work reasonably well through his popularized, Middle Platonic lens.
12. Physics

12.1. Cosmos

By means of the *apostrophe*, the world is left below as the soul "turns upon itself"; it flies up through and beyond the heavens and heavenly bodies into the region of true reality (*Dialexis* 10.3, *cf.* the *Phaedrus*). The philosopher's soul--passing from earth, through every region of air, the accompanying sun and moon, and their orbits--takes its fixed place in the choir of other stars, and "all but joins Zeus in the disposition of reality" (16.6).\(^{483}\) This path of the soul is the process through which we are able to find god (11.12), the choirmaster of the harmony and order of the heavens.\(^{484}\)

God is as well the mechanic for the machinery of the heavens.\(^{485}\) The images using the causation of machinery creates problems of fate and destiny, as does the idea of the "helmsman who knows what will result" (13.3). There is little room in these moments in Maximus for man's free will.

In his note at 41.4, Trapp 1997 is unsure whether we have the Platonic or the Stoic conception of the cosmos. There, the heavens have no contact with evil or imperfections, the source of which are modifications of physical matter or the license of the human soul (41.4). The idea that matter or free will are the only two sources of evil, as found in *Didaskalikos* 10.4, is a major invention of Platonism. This phase of

\(^{483}\) The full implication of Maximus' Platonist cosmology is that the superiority of the Good--and of each realm of reality to another--is a matter of kind, not of degree or quantity, cf. 39.4; see Trapp 1997:312n.21.

\(^{484}\) Harmony of the heavens: 13.3; their order: 13.6--the imagery is from Aristotle's *De Mundo* 399b15 and 400b8.

\(^{485}\) 13.3; for which see also the *De Mundo* 398b11-17, Trapp 1997:119n.8.
Platonism, that matter is a possible cause of evil in the world is, by most accounts, absent from Plato. Plutarch and Atticus find this formless matter in the *Timaeus*, in defiance of older academic exegesis of the dialogue (Taylor 1924:11). That the heavens have no contact with evil is a Stoic formulation, but the idea, also found in Homer (*Odyssey* 1.33-4), is introduced easily into Middle Platonism.

### 12.2. Forms

Maximus is clear about the separation of the intelligible and the material world. The heavens and earth are immortal hearths or vehicles for two types of being, the gods and men, respectively (13.5). Since Maximus remains consistent on this point, even with the inclusion of Peripatetic influences (which were in the second century merely considered an aspect of Platonism), he is more or less an "orthodox" Middle Platonist in this regard.

Trapp 1997 finds no discussion of the Forms in the *Dialeixeis*. In 1.5, however, "if the soul leads us to an object that is stable, unified, bounded, and defined, naturally beautiful, accessible to effect, apprehensible by reason, pursuable with love, attainable with hope, then its exertions are blessed with good fortune, victory, and success." Whether this is the Good *per se*, or a part of the organization of the Forms, this description matches what we have from Plato. The *Phaedo* is one place to find some descriptions of the Ideas, which are: unchangeable (78c10-d9), eternal (79d2), intelligible,

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486 "They say that their ills come from us; but it is by their own/misdeeds they bring pains beyond their lot upon themselves" (ἐξ ἡμέρων γάρ φασίν κάκας ἐμεμεναί οί δὲ καὶ αὐτοῖ/ σφησὶν ἄπασθαλίησιν ύπερ μόρον ἀλγε’ ἐχουσιν).
487 "[Maximus] does not discuss, or even so much as mention, the theory of Forms," Trapp 1997:xxvii.
not perceptible (79a1-5), divine (80a3, b1), and incorporeal (passim). At Phaedo 80b there is a short list: an Idea is "divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself." Though not named, the Forms seem to be what Maximus has in mind at 1.5. If this is true, our author immediately exhibits his Platonic framework to his audience.

As an object of philosophical desire as described by Maximus (21.7), true beauty is "beyond" the physical cosmos. This conception is a common Middle Platonist description of transcendental "true being," as found at Republic 6, 509 b.8-10.

12.3. Fate and Providence

Issues of fate (σύνθεμα) are developed in the Dialexis 5, "On Prayer." Philosophical discussions of destiny should be thought of as emerging post-Plato (though the notion is treated in mythical form in the Republic and Phaedrus), and are formulated in various ways by Platonists.488 The first account we encounter to do so is Philo, since Cicero is unclear about Antiochus' conception of fate, and Eudorus' is lost to us. Philo gives the Platonic and Platonist position, positing both freedom of the will and the existence of providence. In Maximus, we find the same approach, with a move against more typical Platonist conceptions of free will and responsibility toward the position of a rather dogmatic Stoicism.

"Fate drags men by force and compels them to follow its lead" (5.5): this is an undeniably Stoic formulation (SVF ii 975, and Seneca Epistula 107.11). In order to understand fate, one should "compare the man in chains who follows his captors of his

own free choice" (13.8, cf. SVF i 527, ii 975; Seneca Epistula 107.11). Everything succumbs to fate, including Zeus (Dialexis 5.5). In Maximus, since the gods (and other factors under their control) produce events (13.4), god knows what will result; therefore, every outcome is preordained.

Maximus' orthodox Stoic imagery is incompatible with the notion that vice is voluntary. His discussions of free will, then, ignore an important point in Middle Platonism: man's role in the organization of fate and the cosmos. His line seems to be that free will is an autonomous factor that exists "somehow" within the cosmos, but his wording seems to subject human will to a rationally harmonious, rigid, all-encompassing fate. This is a difficult position to maintain in Middle Platonism, which often assumes Plato's primacy of free will over providence. The trick is to describe how man's will can be found compatible with the possibility of absolute divine control. Maximus does write that divine prophecy and human intellect are wound in a perfect harmony (13.5), but this is applied specifically to the issue of prophecy and prayer, and does not answer how human will can coexist with and have an effect on a world conceived of this way.

Plato still slips into this system. In Dialexis 13, Maximus calls fate a "watchword" (ἐἰμαρμένη). Images of the benevolence of fate are common in Plato, for example, Protagoras 344d and Laws 905e-906a, 961de. This characterization is not incompatible with the Stoic notion of an immanent god, but the idea has Platonic precedent (pace Trapp 1986:119n.11).

489 In which Iliad 16.433-4 and 18.54 are quoted; it is also the case in Seneca's Prometheus.
"Destiny" (πεπρωμένη), for Maximus, is the name men have given evil; destiny is an excuse for misfortune. Yet only the license of men and alterations to matter (41.4) are responsible for evil—fate and the gods are shown to be innocent. It is the joint responsibility of divine prophesy and human intelligence to foresee the results that will come from the misuse of human autonomy (13.9), a conception that sidesteps the problem of an all-encompassing fate. In addition, god cannot wish for evil to be part of his divine plan, since it is absent from him (25.4). So human will, as responsible for evil, clearly has some causal effect in some way for Maximus.

It seems that the flaw in the perfect harmony of god's providence seems to be chance (40.5-6). Chance sets itself up "as a rival to virtue," often confounding its operations. Chance, as the possibility of man to commit evil, is obscure and can cloud virtue. These are the situations in which men need god to aid them, fight for them, and stand by them so they stay on the path to virtue (8.7). How chance fits exactly into the mechanical conception of the universe is not explicitly stated.

How all of these issues are connected in Maximus is a bit of a mystery. He was not alone in his concern: in Hippolytus Philosophumena 37: "And if he affirms this part in destiny [that god is blameless], he knew also that something was in our choice." Clearly, as an ethicist, free will must play an essential role in his approach. For the insistence of the freedom of the will in Middle Platonism, see Plutarch De fato 569de, De vita et poesi Homeri 120, Alcinous Didaskalikos 26, Apuleius De Platone 1.206 (with Dillon 1977:294-298 and 320-326). The precedence of freedom of the will would better exemplify the typical Platonic and Middle Platonist view.
13. Theology

13.1. Daemones

In the tradition of Plutarch, and of the later Platonists, the account of *daemones* in Maximus stems from Socrates' personal *daemonion*, as is shown by the manuscript title of *Dialysis* 8 (τί το δαμόνιον Σωκράτους). Here we are concerned with demonology in Maximus in relation to Middle Platonism. Although there is Platonic precedent for the existence and behavior of *daemones*, specifically in the *Symposium* (e.g., 202), extensive discussion of demonology begins only after Plato.\(^{490}\)

Homer is a natural connection with Socrates and Plato, since he discusses the role of the *daemonia* "Athena," *et alii* in the *Iliad*. Homer's daemonic power (8.5) is not a single entity, nor specifically for one individual alone, nor for one set of purposes (unlike Socrates', for example); it takes many forms and work on many levels in many voices and under many names. Maximus does not ask that we take the specific representations literally, but rather that we believe in the general power that assists mortals both in waking and dreaming. As Kindstrand 1970 also notes, Maximus attributed the theory of *daemones* to Homer and not to Plato: "If you do not believe there is any such power, then take issue with Homer, deny the efficacy of oracles, and leave Socrates alone" (8.6).

*Daemones*, Maximus writes, are involved in the contest between vice and virtue within men's souls. God, alone and immobile, administers the heavens and maintains their

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\(^{490}\) There is also a discussion of the young *daemones* who help the demiurge in the *Timaeus* (41ad).

\(^{491}\) Plutarch gives us evidence of Xenocrates' daemonology in *On the Obsolescence of Oracles* 416cd.
hierarchy. Part of this hierarchy, and a race secondary to him, are the immortal beings, the *daemones*, which have their station between heaven and earth (the realms of god and man, respectively, 8.8). This is their standard, middling location. Daemones are more closely concerned with gods than men: they are the servants of gods and overseers of men (9.2). They fill the gap between heaven and earth, and provide a harmonizing affect by binding man with god (9.1). Such a binding is a connection as in the case of a middle term, but is also a provision against the two halves of the cosmos dividing ("not cutting Nature in two," 9.1), an idea that also has Platonic and Platonist precedent: *Symposium* 202d, Plutarch *De defectu oraculorum* 415a, Apuleius *De deo Socratis* 4-6. Platonic also is the role of the *daemones* as interpreters between men and gods (8.8): *Symposium* 202e; [Plato] *Epistula* 984e; Plutarch *De defectu* 416f. and *De Iside et Osiride* 361c.

The help the *daemones* provide is varied: some heal, dispense advice, reveal the hidden, and assist the builder in his work. As well, different *daemones* are dispersed in different bodies: Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras, Zeno, and Diogenes. The idea of the "advisor daemon" is common in Platonic thought: Plato *Phaedo* 107d, *Republic* 617e. The sturdy soul that has attracted a good daemon as its protector helps against the tumult of the lower realm (perceptible reality) and, freeing itself from the body, stirs recollections of the higher sights and sounds of the intelligible realm (10.9).

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492 As in Plato *Symposium* 202d, Plutarch *De defectu oraculorum* 416c, Apuleius *De deo Socrates* 6, and Ocellus Lucanus *De universi natura* 3.3.
493 For discussions of intermediaries in relation to geometry, *Dialexis* 6, and in relation to issues of morality, 38.
494 The implication is that they inhabit the bodies of famous individuals, Trapp 1997:76n.41.
As to what exactly daemones are, in true sophistic form, Maximus answers "on their behalf" in *Dialexis* 9. In line with nature's systematic descent from greater to lesser, as god is immortal and emotionless, daemones are immortal and emotional and man mortal and emotional, a system much like scales on a musical chart (9.1-4). They are a "middle term" between man and god, and are like the elements in Aristotle (*De generatione et corruptione* 330a30-b13 & 331a7-332a2).

Since they are immortal, daemones do not change or degenerate in any way. They are souls that have shed their bodies (this fact is never completely decided, and is contained within a question). This is a contested issue in Middle Platonism. In Apuleius there are embodied souls, disembodied souls, and souls that have never been housed in a body (*De deo Socratis* 15-16). Plutarch seems to have them not only as permanently disembodied (*De Iside et Osiride* 361b), but also as disembodied humans (*De genio* 593d-594a).

Daemones act as proper souls by keeping the body together when alive, as solidly moored in the stormy tumult of life (9.5); both of these ideas are in line with their helpful nature. Daemones patrol the earth helping the good, avenging the victims of injustice, and punishing wrongdoers (8.8). There is an indication, as in Xenophon, that there exist

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495 Instances of *prosopopoeia* are found in Plato, see, e.g., Plato's well known imitation of Dion in *Epistle* 8.
496 9.5: Πώς δ’ ἄν καὶ πάθοι, ἐξέπερ ἐστιν τὸ δαιμόνιον αὐτὸ ψυχή ἀποδυσαμένη τὸ σῶμα; "And in any case, how could they suffer any such thing, if they are really souls which have shed their bodies?"
malevolent *daemones* in only one place in Maximus (8,8498). There is indication in the third century CE for this idea in Plato in Hippolytus' *Refutatio omnium haeresium* (=*Philosophumena*) 34: "Plato accepts the nature of *daemon*es, and says some are good and some bad."

### 13.2. God

#### 13.2.1. The Image of God

Mankind's various images of the gods and Zeus help remind them (i.e., recollect) what they are striving for, while those mindful of god and whose souls are strong enough to encounter the divine need no such reminders (2.2–4). For the former: "the art of Phidias that arouses recollections of god for the Greeks" (2.10).

For the Platonic Maximus, however, no image could properly capture god:

'Ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεός, ὁ τῶν ὄντων πατήρ καὶ δημιουργός, ὁ πρεσβύτερος μὲν ἡλίου, πρεσβύτερος δὲ οὐρανοῦ, κρείττων δὲ χρόνου καὶ αἰώνος καὶ πάσης φύσεως, ἀνώνυμος νομοθέτη, καὶ ἄρρητος φωνῇ, καὶ ἀόρατος θαλαμοῖς· (2.10, "Whether Images Should be Set up in Honor of the Gods")

For god, father, and creator of all that exists,499 is greater than the Sun and the heavens. Mightier than time and eternity and the whole flux of nature; legislators cannot name him, tongues cannot speak of him, and eyes cannot see him.

This ineffability of god was a common trope in second-century thought: cf. Alcinous *Didaskalikos* 10 and Apuleius *De Platone* 1.5 (with Whittaker 1990:100n.169 and 106n.197). Unable to understand god, we use perceptible objects to get closer to his essence. We would do anything to stimulate the memory of our "desired one," who

498 9.8: μὲν φοβερός, ὁ δὲ φιλάνθρωπος, ὁ δὲ πολιτικός, ὁ δὲ τακτικός"Some are terrifying, some benevolent; some concern themselves with politics, others with war."

499 An echo of *Timaeus* 41a: Ἡθοὶ θεῶν, ὃν ἐγὼ δημιουργός πατήρ τε ἔργων, δὴ ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος.
wavers in Maximus between our beloved (as in the *Phaedrus*) and god himself (as in the *Phaedo* 73d). Clearly, early on in the *Dialektes*, god and not our mortal beloved is meant: "Let them only know god, love him, and recollect him!" (2.10).

Since the incorporeal god has no lower aspects of the soul, he is a unified One, pure organization, without division, lacking in nothing, and self-sufficient (38.5-6). Therefore, the idea of happiness as "likeness to god" (ὁμοίωσις θεῶ, 26.9, and an echo at 35.2) corresponds with the idea of virtue as perfect organization as well as knowledge conceived of as connection to god (35.8, and 26.9, respectively). These points of contact become standard in Middle Platonism. For a similar conception of god, see, for example, Plato *Theaetetus* 176b1-2, Alcinous *Didaskalikos* 28.181.19, and Diogenes Laertius 3.78.

In *Dialektes* 2.2, just as in the *Phaedrus* (274d-275b), spoken utterances about god are compared with written characters, which are merely the symbols human nature has discovered to help it lay aside its own obtuseness and print a permanent record for the future. Yet, there are some whose memories are strong, and who can reach straight out for the heavens with their souls and encounter the divine, and may perhaps need no images for the divinity. As mentioned above, teachers help their pupils by sketching faint letters for them, over which they can guide the movement of their hands, we need writing to remind us of the gods. In this way, therefore, we have created symbols for the honor paid as a pathway to the recollection of the divine (cf. *Protagoras* 326d). The weaker members of mankind, then, invented such crutches as the process of writing to preserve the names and reputations of the gods (2.2), as statues are used by some for the same purpose.
13.2.2. Plato's God

*Dialexis* 11 (τίς ὁ θεὸς κατὰ Πλάτωνα) provides an interpretation of Plato's god. Here we find the justification for the exegetical process regarding Plato's dialogues (cf. the mining analogy, discussed above (found at 11.2 and 18.3)). After nearly giving up his search for "more information" about god, the start of the discussion of Plato's god is preceded by the division of the cosmos into the intelligible and the perceptible. Even with all the different understandings of god throughout the world, there is one account that all nations can believe: there is one god, who is father and king of all, along with him many children (*daemones*), who share in his sovereign power. The problem of one divine ruler as opposed to the Greek Pantheon is also discussed in *Dialexis* 39, where we see men assign to external goods the type of variety they assign to the gods: Zeus rules, Hephaestus works bronze, etc. The nature of the Good, however, is as unified as god's nature.

The idea of the unity of god becomes more characteristic of Stoicism than Platonism. The discussion of the characteristics of unity, including "self-sufficiency,"\(^{500}\) begins with Plato's *Republic*,\(^{501}\) is continued by Aristotle,\(^{502}\) and becomes an essential ethical characteristic of Stoic texts.\(^{503}\) Maximus works to imitate discussions of Platonic and Aristotelian self-sufficiency and the final end regarding both the divine and the Good:

\[ Τὸ \ θεῖον \ πάντως \ ποι \ τίθεσαι \ τελεώτατον \ καὶ \ αὐταρκέστατον \ καὶ \ ἵσχυρότατον (38.6). \]

\(^{500}\) αὐτάρκεια, of the city, then of the Good, and thus of god.

\(^{501}\) E.g., 369b and 387d.

\(^{502}\) *NE* 1.7, *Politics* 1.5, 1095b-196a and 7.1, 1145ab.

\(^{503}\) E.g., Diogenes Laertius 7.127: αὐτάρκη τε εἶναι αὐτήν (sc. τὴν ἄρετήν) πρὸς εὐδαμονίαν, καθά φησι Ζήνων.
occasion, he specifically imitates Aristotelian formulations: 

Εἰ γὰρ μὴ τέλεον, οὐκ αὐτάρκης (cf. NE 1097b8-9: τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἁγαθὸν αὐτάρκης εἶναι δοκεῖ).

Divine intellect, as "our messenger from the Academy reports to us," is the father and begetter of all. Plato does not tell "his name, complexion, or size," for he does not know them, and in any case--these are physical properties, grasped only by the flesh. Human intellect is what is used to understand, to "see" and "hear" the intelligible, grasping it in a single act of comprehension (11.9).

The ascension to god is guided for Maximus by reason and love, begun by blocking the ears to the world below, only to move past the heavenly bodies into the region of true reality. The first and essential step is to avoid harassment by the mob of uncouth thoughts and desires, which are within the very person who wishes to make such a journey (11.10). The two paths are through death or to turn away from the senses, by means of the exercise of reason, which unobstructs one's gaze and allows one to see the true object of one's desire (11.11).

As stated above, god is the source only of the Good. For Platonic, and non-Platonic precedent of this conception of god: Timaeus 29d-30a, Seneca De providentia 1.1.2-4, [Plutarch] De fato 572f-573d. Maximus' notion that evil can be interpretive is an idea stemming from a Stoic orientation and use of Heraclitus504 (Dialexis 41.4).

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504 Μεταβολὴν ὁρᾶς σωμάτων καὶ γενέσεως, ἀλλαγὴν ὀδὸν ἄνου καὶ κάτω, κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον. Heraclitus B80: τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰρήνην, καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ὀδὸν ἄνου κάτω, τὸν τὸ κόσμον γίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτὴν. This Heraclitus is also inspiration for Plato (e.g., Phaedo, Parmenides, Philebus, Timaeus), as well as many others (Philo De somnios 1.56, De aeternitate mundi 109.5; Diogenes Laertius 9.8, 9.16; Plotinus Enneads 4.1 and 4.8).
Alternatively, evil is able to come from the freedom of the soul. We are given the reins to the chariot of our own soul by the god and what we do with them is up to us. If an individual fails to control himself, it is because of his habit and practice and education, as in *Phaedrus* 254b and 256c. For the Platonic precedent for god and the personal responsibility for ill deeds, cf. Plato *Timaeus* 41e-42b and *Phaedrus* 246a and 253d.

13.2.3. God's Actions

God administers the heavens, is settled and immobile. He is always "in action" though, for if he were to stop his work, "the heavens would stop revolving, earth would no longer give nourishment, rivers would not flow, seas would stop spreading their waters, seasons would no longer change, fates assigning destinies, and muses singing" (15.6). God governs the whole universe with beauty, artistry, and knowledge. His knowledge is virtue, he is of single nature; he is pure intelligence, pure knowledge, and pure reason.

A complication is the attribution to god of certain lack of attention (41.4). This is a alternative to the Stoic idea that man is not able to see the whole for the parts, which, as a result, seem evil (the precedent is found *SVF* ii. 1170, Philo *De Providentia* 2.79, 100, 102, and 104) or being disappointed by expectations (e.g., god did not promise the Athenians immortality, 41.4). This is an attribution of a deficiency in god--to assign any lack of attention or interest or detail to god is to make him less than perfect. While this idea is only briefly raised in the text, this is not the only example in Maximus, and is dangerous ground for a Platonist of any ilk.
The divine intellect does not "hit its target every time" (13.2). The idea that there is nothing closer to human intellect than divine intellect is not a new idea by this time. The idea that this similarity implies that the divine intellect is not perfect is an interesting product of this comparison. Maximus' justifications for this idea do not mirror the standard notion of god as perfection: "You imagine god to know every little thing? […] He is too busy for that" and "hardly as meddlesome as that." For Maximus, god takes his time with the truth, as a doctor with his patient, at times by deception; many men have been harmed by the truth and many have been helped by lies. For Platonic precedent of such helpful lies, Republic 382c and 389bc. An important byproduct of the selectiveness of god's truth-telling is perhaps the allowance in Maximus' universe for human powers of judgment (cf. 13.3).

13.2.4. Divine Mind

The notion that the divine mind thinks all things forever at the same time is Aristotelian (Metaphysics 11.7, 1063b36-1064b15), but had by that time made its way into Middle Platonism, e.g., Alcinous Didaskalikos 10.164.18. God is conceived in Maximus, as in Alcinous, as the Supreme Intelligible and then so the Supreme Intelligence (Dialexeis 11.8). Divine intellect is like the embracing circuit of the Sun, and sees the whole surface at once, while the human intellect is like the Sun's progression over different parts of the whole at different times.

505 Cf. also Philo De cherubim 14-15 and Clemens of Alexandria Stromateis 7.53.1-2.
But in the end of the *Dialexeis*, the divine mind is responsible for everything, bringing order and beauty to everything it touches or sees (41.2). This image will find its way into Neoplatonism as the idea that god's vision organizes everything (e.g., Philo *De fuga et inventione* 103.4).

While nothing is obviously lost, Trapp 1997 speculates that the 41st lecture is incomplete. It seems that the 41st could very well be the end of the *Dialexeis* (though I have not reviewed the Paris manuscript). The subject matter, that of god and the source of evil, would be a natural ending to a practically-minded, philosophical course of lectures. The source of evil has been discovered, as has the solution to vicious behavior. The end of the work seems a natural place to discuss the glory of god and his blamelessness in the face of evil—an essential point in both Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. Maximus last words make reference to, perhaps appropriately, Plato's *Phaedrus* and the divine chariot. It is telling however, that just before the extant part of the last lecture breaks off, the two horses of the *Phaedrus* have become four, and all of them are problematic: two represent excess, two represent deficiency. It may be that Maximus is ending on a warning and admonition of the consequences of ignoring the pursuit of the virtuous life.

**14. Conclusion**

Maximus' brand of popular Platonism looks to step outside the norm of Platonism in the Second Sophistic. He constructs his lectures so as to reach his youthful audience in

507 Lucian's *Rhetorum* also ends with a "chariot quote" from the *Phaedrus*, cf. Chapter 2.
508 One horse is licentious, gluttonous, and lustful and the other spirited, manic, and impulsive.
509 One is lazy and sluggish, the other mean, humble, and pusillanimous.
a way that the second-century Platonic handbooks in order of Albinus and Apuleius could not (and perhaps were not meant to). As we see, Maximus also wants no part of the earlier Platonist interpretive tradition, since it had clearly not been successful in making men either virtuous or happy. Far from answering any knotty questions of interpretation, Maximus' Platonic position is exemplary of the difficulties that had developed in later Platonism. For example, with the addition of Aristotelian materialism (so to speak), it had become difficult to understand Platonic idealism alongside knowledge as scientific discovery. The looseness of Maximus' vocabulary, for which he in fact apologizes and still uses Plato as justification, is owed to his own rough understanding of Plato and Platonism as they stand in the second century. As a popular lecturer, he takes what he knows of the basic and fundamental Platonic perspectives--the tripartite division of the soul, ideas of the intelligible and perceptible, happiness as likeness to god--and shakily incorporates these ideas with the consistent purpose of helping young men toward the noble pursuit of virtue.
Chapter 4 – Aristides

Scholars often consider Publius Aelius Aristides one of the most prominent and important of the sophists in the second century. His 16 extant orations show great breadth of learning and a gift for variety and range of emotion. These speeches show a fluidity and style that put orators like Maximus of Tyre in a lesser light.

Aristides is the only one of our authors who is discussed in Philostratus' VS (582-585). According to Philostratus, Aristides has "erudition, force and power of characterization […] Moreover, Aristides was of all the sophists most deeply versed in his art, and his strength lay in the elaborate cognition of a theme…” (585). In the Περὶ ἰδεῶν λόγου, Hermogenes considers Aristides and Nicostratus the only contemporary writers worthy of mention. Aristides' work, however, has come under harsh criticism by some modern readers who find it bland and wordy.\(^{510}\)

As an "undoubted sophist,”\(^{511}\) however, Aristides has few positive things to say about the type, much like Maximus.\(^{512}\) His comments about sophists are almost all negative, alongside a few non-pejorative and negative uses aimed specifically toward rivals or bad orators. It has been remarked that the author had a similar disdain for

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\(^{510}\) "To the modern reader, these and other works of Aristides are likely to seem bland, wordy, and superficial, lacking even the historical interest of somewhat similar works in Isocrates. That Aristides came to be regarded as the greatest of the later sophists is indicative of what counted as high rhetorical art in his time and of the intellectual exhaustion of the period," Kennedy 1994:241.


\(^{512}\) Mensching 1965:65n.3; Behr 1968:106n.39. For the idea that not every occurrence of "sophist" is negative: Festugière 1969:148.
philosophers. As we will see, what Aristides disdained were those who used the name of "philosophy" to hide their true nature. His respect for the real thing, whether thinking of a sophist or philosopher, was quite strong. This does not mean that Aristides wanted to be referred to as a sophist, nor, for that matter, a philosopher. His concern for both types of intellectual was not categorical, but rather morally driven, and he is as pleased with his attacks on bad sophists as he is on bad philosophers. As will emerge from this chapter, seeing Aristides as an orator with a wide variation of talents makes more sense than to categorize him as a sophist.

There is a deep tradition of scholarship on many of the speeches of Aristides, especially his masterful Παναθηναϊκός (Panathanaicus), as well as his Ῥωμης ἐγκώιον (Encomium to Rome), which is important for our conception of "Greco-Roman" relationships in the second century CE. Also of importance is his Sacred Tales, which in nearly six speeches narrates 130 dreams sent to him by the god Asclepius.

Scholars have long acknowledged that Plato plays a prominent role in the work of Aristides, but there are no sustained discussions of this influence. This seems odd,
however, given Aristides' prominence in the Second Sophistic, as well as his direct contact with the important conflict between rhetoric and philosophy that had been taken up again by those in the second century. It may be that our rather recent interest in Aristides is a significant change in perspective from decades past. Just as so many scholars leveled the charge of unoriginality or banality against the Second Sophistic in general, many have found Aristides long-winded and trite. For example, see the review of Boulanger 1923 by Wright, in which the reviewer deems Aristides' three discourses against Plato to be "violent and foolish."^520

Aristides' use of Plato is most obviously introduced by the title of his longest oration Πρὸς Πλάτωνα περὶ ρητορικῆς, *Against Plato: In Defense of Rhetoric*. The ρητορική of the title is sometimes translated "oratory," and for good reason. Aristides is not defending epideictic or display speeches, but rather forensic or judicial speechmaking and then applying this defense to other types of rhetoric. This does not mean that he does not elsewhere consider panegyric or epideictic discourse as a genre that can achieve high eloquence. In this work conceived "against Plato," in order to distinguish it from the use of rhetoric specifically as epideictic as Plato often does in the *Gorgias*, "oratory" is sometimes used instead of the English cognate "rhetoric." Use of both in this work will be made with this overlap of definitions in mind.

^520 A 1925 *JHS* review begins by praising Boulanger for writing "a readable volume of 500 pages about a man who never had a single original idea and who, apart from his diverting personal characteristics, is interesting only as a *virtuoso.*"^521 See, for example, Behr 1986.
His second speech in defense of oratory, and on behalf of orators, is Πρὸς Πλάτωνα ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, Against Plato: In Defense of the Four. "The Four" are: Pericles (c. 495--429 BC), Cimon (510--450 BCE), Miltiades (c.555--489), and Themistocles (c. 524--459 BC). We should note two things immediately: first, the conspicuous absence of either sophists or epideictic orators (these men are all justifiably thought of as statesmen), and second that the closest date of these four to Aristides is the last half part of the fifth century. These dates are consistent with, if perhaps even older than, many of Philostratus' examples of Second Sophistic literature in the VS.

The third speech is, as Behr 1986 gives it, a short forerunner to the Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, entitled Πρὸς Καπίτωνα, Against Capito. It was written soon after the Περὶ ρητορικῆς, around August of 147 CE, and nearly 20 years before the Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων. The speech is addressed to a prominent Pergamene who was a member of the Platonist school of Gaius. Members of the school had made an attack on Aristides' first speech on rhetoric, based partly on his personal criticisms of Plato.

While other authors in the Second Sophistic had waged their own idiomatic battles between rhetoric and philosophy, Aristides thought it important at least ostensibly to directly engage Plato, and does so using the philosopher's own words. What emerge are forensic, rhetorical exercises in which Plato and Aristides tangle in a series of pseudo-dialogues, with Aristides in complete control of the tenor of the arguments. In this chapter, my intent is to sketch the uses of Plato by a prominent rhetorician in these three speeches that directly confront the philosopher and his "slanderous treatment" of rhetoric.
and oratory. For purposes of organization, I shall continually summarize this first long oration in order to provide context.

1. Πρὸς Πλάτωνα περὶ ῥητορικῆς

*Against Plato: In Defense of Rhetoric* was written in Pergamum between 145 and 147 CE at the height of Aristides' illness and involvement in the practice of incubation at the Asclepeion.\(^522\) Pergamum was the site of revival of Platonism though the efforts of Gaius, though Aristides' defense seems prompted more by the Cynic philosophers who utilized the arguments from the *Gorgias* for their own attacks on oratory (Behr 1982). Gaius seems to have been interested in the cosmology of Plato's philosophy, primarily as given in the *Timaeus*.

The speech is a prolonged confrontation between Aristides and Plato--or rather the latter's pronouncements in the *Gorgias* that pertain to rhetoric. There, Plato famously argues that ῥητορική is not a τέχνη, but a form of flattery (κολακεία) that is obtained by knack (ἐµπειρία) or experience (τριβή)(463ab). Aristides' method of refutation, a source of great pride throughout the speech, is to use Plato's own words against him. This is often accomplished (though not always) by quotations taken from other dialogues. The quotes taken elsewhere from Plato that are used against those from the *Gorgias* (which provide the charges and some of the confutations) are taken mainly from the *Phaedrus, Republic*, and *Laws*, with a smattering of quotes from other works.\(^523\)

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\(^{522}\) This summary of the context and impetus is taken primarily from Behr 1986:449. For a complete biography of Aristides, see Behr 1968a.

\(^{523}\) The *Republic* is the most-quoted work of Plato by Aristides, except the *Gorgias* (because of this series of speeches against Plato), C.P. Jones 1972:136n15. The main list
The structure of the speech is the following: Aristides provides a defense of oratory (1-20), confronts the charge (21-31), discusses the ramifications if rhetoric is not an art (32-134), refutes the charge that rhetoric is not an art (135-177), refutes the charge that rhetoric flatters the masses (178-203), argues that rhetoric represents all the virtues (204-318), provides examples of the virtues of the Four orators (319--343), provides Plato's argument of the two oratories (real and apparent)(344-361), promotes the power of the true orator (362-437), shows that Plato does in fact praise oratory (438-445), shows the fallacy of the idea of two oratories (446-461), and, in a peroration, gives an attack against the Cynics (462-466). This speech is often considered more "logical" than the other two speeches against Plato. A look at the type of reasoning Aristides uses against Plato in the first speech makes up the bulk of this chapter. I conclude with a short synopsis of the forerunner to Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, and an immediate response to the first speech, Πρὸς Καπίτωνα.

1.1. The Speech: The Defense of Oratory (1-20)

In order to justify his authority to confront a figure such as Plato, Aristides must first confront the primacy of the ancients over modern attempts at literature. As the first contestant does not walk away with the prize in any contest, he writes, when applicable
it is the ideas or actions themselves that must be analyzed to determine the winner. Therefore, he continues, "If we must yield to time and take our values from it, the current respect which all men have toward those ancients is out of place" (6). Homer, Hesiod, Plato, and Demosthenes threw all those who came before them "into the shade," but this fact does not necessitate that those who come after do not warrant any recognition. Therefore, one should respect the ancients, but not fear them, especially Plato. This oration, then, is Aristides' attempt to take on one of the most respected and imposing figures for authors in the Second Sophistic. Since men at this time are in danger of honoring his fame more than his ideas, Plato is a natural target (11). Two specific reasons ensure his status as a foil for Aristides: Plato's claims and exhortations "everywhere" (ἅπανταχοû) that he "places nothing above the truth," and his treatment of Homer. If Plato could censure his predecessor Homer and denied him the right to speak, then, in imitation of Plato, we can dare to listen to Aristides at least until we see his arguments as deficient (12).

Aristides is careful to show both reverence for the great thinkers before him, and, in addition, the confidence to challenge them directly. His respect, then, is tempered by a certain envy and resentment for their place in history (if a slight hint of fear). Their preeminence should not prevent others, perhaps especially him, from gaining reputation. Aristides will be questioning Plato's notions about rhetoric in the same way Plato challenged the preeminence of Homer before him and ultimately censured the poet (12).

525 Ὅμηρου δὲ καὶ Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῶν εἰς ἡμᾶς νενικηκῶν, Πλάτωνος, εἰ βούλει, καὶ Δημοσθένους καὶ τῶν ὀλίγων πρὸ τούτων, οὐδὲ εἰς πολλοστὸν χρόνον ἐλπὶς ὄμοιαν ἐγγενέσθαι δόξαν, συμπροϊόντος ἵσυον τοῦ πρὸ αὐτῶν ἐκείνοις ἄει.
Phaedo 91c provides one example of Plato's "many exhortations" that he places nothing above the truth.\(^{526}\) It is unclear where the ubiquitous claims are found, however, and Aristides does not provide a list.

This section introduces the four principle predecessors for Aristides (whom he quotes throughout the speech), and narrows his focus to the most pervasive, if most slanderous, of them. His attempt to imitate Plato in his approach and prose style places Aristides, like Maximus, in the direct literary lineage of Homer via his own target. The difficult balance will be to bring up justified and important criticisms alongside his reverence for the author (which does not seem simply for effect).

There seems to be a problem with Aristides' argument: by conflating Homer and Plato as having both "thrust into the shade those before them," he has ignored his own premise of chronological hierarchy. His conflation of the 8th (presumably) and 5th centuries belies his own insistence that those who come later should not be barred from respect or fame, though they so often are (10). To ignore the centuries between these two authors (as well as his two other examples, Hesiod and Demosthenes) is to ignore that fact that the later prose authors did in fact succeed in spite of the preeminence of the early poets. Yet Aristides does recognize the separation of the two authors: "For if [Plato] on many counts censured Homer who was far older and if he was not deprived of the right to speak, then…" (12). This slip, it seems to me, is more evidence for the Second Century trend of conflating Homer, Plato, and their respective compatriots together as

\(^{526}\) Spoken by Socrates: "But you, if you do as I ask, will give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth" (ὓμεῖς μέντοι, ἃν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρόν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μάλλον).
"the ancients" (οἱ παλαιοί). We find the same sort of aggregation in Maximus and his discussion of philosophical poetry (e.g., Dialexis 4 and 26).

Aristides begins to introduce the charges in 13: "Let us consider and evaluate his over-contentious comments (φιλονεικότερον) about rhetoric, when he used the literary contrivance of a meeting between Gorgias and Socrates in Athens (τοῦ δέοντος Γοργίου καὶ Σωκράτους ύποθέμενος συνουσίαν)." In openly undertaking his accusation, Plato did not deprive oratory completely of its defense, but granted two or three people (i.e., Gorgias, Polus, Callicles) the chance to take the opposite side that he did in the pretense of the dialogue. Aristides, then, must not lack the courage to act on behalf of oratory, so that it otherwise seems that the arguments against Plato are only those that he wished to make against himself. It is senseless to our author (ἄλογον δὲ μοι φαίνεται) that Plato felt no shame in criticizing oratory, in which he himself had some part, but also that anyone could feel embarrassment speaking in defense of oratory. Further, it would be problematic if oratory were tried in absentia and offered no arguments since it is the art of words (λόγον τέχνην οὖσαν, 16). Aristides must use its techniques in its own defense and show exactly what is just in his own practice. If there were no defense provided, then Plato's judgment stands unchallenged. Aristides, then, must defend oratory's honor, so that men might not be deprived of what is fairest in the world (18). For "this bold act" (ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τολμήματι), he must invoke Hermes, god of oratory, Apollo, leader of the Muses, and the Muses themselves to be guides. If Aristides engages this defense on behalf of oratory, he knows that he would neither be arguing with the lowest of the Greeks, nor on behalf of

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527 Translation from Behr 1986:79.
the lowest of subjects (19).

It is here at the beginning of the speech, and we will see at the very end (465), that Aristides writes that Plato holds a place among the great rhetoricians. This frame is constructed as subtly as possible, since he is writing within one of the last geographical areas in which the philosophy of Middle Platonism still holds any sway.

The magnitude of Aristides' task is set up in this section: he defends rhetoric so that other men do not unnecessarily "deprive themselves of what is fairest in the world" (αὐτοὺς τῶν καλλίστων ἀποστερήσανεν ἐκόντες, 18). Currently, men revile rhetoric, which in fact ought to be sanctified from silly slander (19). Surely, then, the impetus for this work is not the unprecedented fame of the sophists of Aristides' time, but rather the Middle Platonists (and Cynics) who continue to demean rhetoric by taking Plato's words from the *Gorgias* on the subject as truth.

To leave Plato's word against rhetoric as the last and final is to allow his slanderous conclusions to stand unopposed. In accordance with the trends in the Second Sophistic, we see that for Aristides, there has not been any worthy discussion of oratory or rhetoric since Plato, even by Aristotle.\textsuperscript{528} This direct connection closes the gap between the two authors, giving Aristides' emulation of Plato's Greek an even stronger illusion of contemporaneousness in this confrontation.\textsuperscript{529}

\textsuperscript{528} There is mention at section 71 of a similar question posed by Aristotle in his *De divinatione* 463b14; see Behr 1968:173n9. There seems to be a quote from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1411a5 in the speech *On Making Peace with the Athenians* 21.

\textsuperscript{529} Aristides is "rather old-fashioned even by early fourth-century Greek standards," Usher 1974:201-202. Listed is Aristides' use of "alliteration, polyptoton [repeating a word
The invocation of Hermes as the god of oratory will emerge again as support for the divine source of oratory, and hence its transcendence of art, in the first set of arguments.

1.2. The Charge (21-31)

Aristides further establishes the importance of his defense by writing, "of all of Plato's words which are remembered, some most admire those in which he treated this subject" (20). Aristides justifies his topic further by proposing that Plato's comments about rhetoric are more respected and discussed than anything else in the Platonic corpus. This observation is not likely true in the tradition of Middle Platonism, in which the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus* reign supreme. Certainly, the *Gorgias* is well known (see Lucian, above), but, in terms of justification, it is important to establish that one is arguing a vital point that has important, sweeping consequences.

He begins the defense by reading the charge aloud "as if an illegal proposal" (21). Aristides quotes the entirety of the text from *Gorgias* 463a-465c as background (21), from which most of the targets from emerge in the oration. This long quote provides, not the specific actual charge (yet), but the type of reasoning for which Aristides will take Plato to task. In this section of the *Gorgias*, Socrates is transitioning his focus from Gorgias to Polus, while setting up the comparison between beautification/gymnastics, sophistry/legislation, cookery/medicine, and oration/justice. Throughout this oration, Aristides will look at the points introduced in this long section of quoted text: the charge using a different form], *paranomasia* [using words that sound alike but that differ in meaning], and etymological figure."
that rhetoric is flattery,\textsuperscript{530} that it is shameful, it lacks art, and it has an inferior association in this four-part analogy.

According to Aristides, Plato does not use any sort of reasoning in this section of the \textit{Gorgias}--the philosopher is being solely presumptive. Since there is no chain of reasoning in the charge, many unexpressed assumptions--charitable concessions allowed by his interlocutors--must be made to reach Plato's conclusion. For example, the connection between oratory and cookery, for Aristides, is settled without any question or investigation (24). This defense of rhetoric, alternatively, will be made solely of proofs; our orator will turn the requirements of substantiation and logic against the philosopher.

The reversal Aristides attempts is important: rather than slander the other side with charges of "frigidity and boorishness," his argument will not be made from lack of taste, but instead from proof, which he insists is lacking in Plato's arguments (26). The \textit{rhetor} charges the philosopher, not with lack of taste or style, but with a typical slander often used against rhetoric: the absence of clear, complete argumentation from verifiable evidence.

The initial charge, which is the first ten lines of the long verbatim quote given from the \textit{Gorgias}, follows (Socrates is speaking):

\begin{quote}
dοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναι τι ἐπιτηδεῦμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ἴσως δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομολεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: καλὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{530} Dodds 1990:225 is helpful with \textit{κολακεία} in the \textit{Gorgias}. "Flattery" is the traditional translation, but it is important to realize that there is a greater implication of moral baseness to the Greek term. "In its political application, which will be developed later in the dialogue, \textit{κολακεία} stands for the time-serving opportunism which panders to public taste instead of trying to educate it."
μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἢ ὕφοποική; ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη ἄλλη ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ρητορικὴν ἔγω καλῶ καὶ τὴν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικὴν, τέταρτα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέταρτην πράγμασιν. (28)

It seems to me, Gorgias, not to be an artistic practice, but that of a soul taking aim, courageous, and naturally clever, in associating with men. Its total effect I call flattery. It seems to me that there are many other parts of this activity. One is cookery which seems to be an art, but in my reasoning is no art, but a matter of experience and practice. A part of this I also call oratory, beautification, and sophistry, these being four parts concerned with four actions.

To switch "oratory" to "philosophy" in this argument would prove nothing, according to Aristides. The nature of philosophy is in no way like that of cookery, therefore the argument cannot touch philosophy. But, in the same way, the arguments that vilify cookery in no way malign oratory, as long as such a relationship remains unproven (30). Aristides has already said that if it is in fact silly to settle an investigation right at the outset, then it is no less silly to hypothesize at the outset about an investigation that is itself silly to investigate (24). The examination of the relationship between oratory and cookery is farcical in itself, but further is a matter already settled for Plato. How, Aristides asks, is this not the act of a slanderer (31)?

The charge as quoted will set up a few of the major points that will echo throughout the rest of the oration: rhetoric as conjecture (or "aim"); the difficulty of something that seems to be an art, but is in actuality a knack; and rhetoric as connected with cookery (as well as the issue of the other two forms of the four illegitimate arts: beautification and sophistry).
1.3. The Ramifications if Rhetoric is Not an Art (32-134)

Though Aristides is, as he says, reluctant to say so (31), this kind of slander must not go unanswered. It is worse for one to feel more shame by not showing rhetoric's lack of shame than to feel the shame of the one who first considered it so (32).

As he begins this counterfactual argument, here again Aristides makes a swipe at Plato's method of argumentation. Aristides is under the impression that what we read in the *Gorgias* is not Socrates, nor an attempt to show Socrates' style of discussion. The dialogues are Plato's alone, and contain ideas for which he alone should be held responsible. Plato's assumption that rhetoric is not an art, therefore, is something "that, like some lucky find, he makes twist through the whole argument" (ὅπερ ὡς ἔρμαιον στρέφει παρ' ὁλον τὸν λόγον, 33). Aristides makes a point to indicate that the spontaneity and serendipity of philosophical conversation that Plato is able to feign is, in fact, neither. Plato's points do not fall naturally from the text as fully formed logical truths--they deserve to be carefully scrutinized at every turn.

If we grant that rhetoric is without art, as the *Gorgias* argues, then for Plato's argument to make sense everything without art must be shameful, evil, or worthless. It is universally accepted that man's greatest possessions are from the gods, and these gifts are apart from art and beyond art. Our greatest arts--medicine, human justice, and legislation--are nothing compared to "the cures from Delphi." Men go to the oracles on

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531 Cf., *Phaedrus* 244a: "For the prophetess in Delphi and the priestess at Dodona in their madness have done much good for Greece publicly and privately, but when sane, little or nothing" (ἠ τε γὰρ δὴ ἐν Δελφοῖς προφήτης αἱ' τ' ἐν Δωδώνῃ ἱερεῖαι μανείσα μὴν πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ ιδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἠγάσαντο, σωφρονοῦσα δὲ βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν·); quoted in Aristides at 52.
behalf of the most important affairs: constitutions, instruction, and military distribution (especially Lycurgus and Sparta\textsuperscript{532}) (38-41). The priestesses from Dodona, however, know only as much as the god approves, for as long as he approves. They have no knowledge before or after each "episode," and are often ignorant that they have spoken at all.\textsuperscript{533} The priestesses, therefore, have no art, and we cannot demand a reasoning principle from them (35). Yet nonetheless, even Plato recognizes that the priestess must be consulted whenever he draws up constitutions or legislates:\textsuperscript{534} as he says, he must not act until before the Pythian priestess assents.\textsuperscript{535} The evidence for this argument is from the oracle (42) and Zeus himself (43). Aristides' conclusion is that any argument that belittles or even seeks art is worthless (45).

Then if poets ask for the benefit of the muses, one can speak in meter without art about the most important things and have it still be divine (since meter itself is innocent). How then is it impossible to speak without the most important things, i.e., without art, as an orator? The answer is that the divine is beyond art: Apollo is responsible for prediction, the Muses for poetry, and Hermes for oratory. Plato is thus refuted "by the general argument itself" (50).

\textsuperscript{532} Still, not because of Lycurgus ("the best of the Greeks") proposed legislation was the god said to have legislated the laws (39); see \textit{Laws} 632d. Lycurgus attested to the superiority of the Pythian priestess, who had no special knowledge.

\textsuperscript{533} Even though everyone, including Plato (\textit{Apology} 21a; \textit{Republic} 461e, 540c; \textit{Laws} 923a), say that the Pythian is the one who pronounced.

\textsuperscript{534} As famously in the \textit{Republic} and \textit{Laws: Republic} 427bc; \textit{Laws} 686a, 738c, 759c, 828a, 856e, 865b, 914a.

\textsuperscript{535} As at \textit{Republic} 540c and \textit{Laws} 947d.
Aristides begins with the point that rhetoric has no art, and works to argue its worth (even having conceded this point to Plato). Plato's self-proclaimed reverence for the divine is an essential portion of Aristides' argument. That men's greatest possessions are from the gods and are apart from art is from the *Phaedrus*, as is Plato's reverence for the Pythian oracle and its works. The consulting of oracles, however, is later Plato, especially the *Laws* (a fact that Aristides acknowledges at 50, referring to his own sections 34-41). Men as well go to the oracles on behalf of the legislation of laws, as Lycurgus did, "the best of the Greeks," in Plato's *Laws* 632d. The Pythian priestess must be consulted whenever anyone, under Plato's aegis, draws up laws or legislates, and Plato says that he must act, "if the priestess assents," but before that, he does not dare. Plato reveres the oracles (i.e., for Aristides, "the divine"), and finds their speech beyond art (since they have no knowledge) and still they provide tremendous benefit to...

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536 Socrates, about one sort of love: "but in reality the greatest of blessings come to us through madness, when it is sent as a gift of the gods" (νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῶν γίγνεται διὰ μανιάς, θείας μέντοι δόσει διδόμενης, 244a).
537 "For the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when they have been mad have conferred many splendid benefits upon Greece both in private and in public affairs, but few or none when they have been in their right minds," *Phaedrus* 244a. Cf. also *Apology* 21a; *Republic* 461e, 540c; *Laws* 923a, 947d for further evidence.
538 "Moreover, when diseases and the greatest troubles have been visited upon certain families through some ancient guilt, madness has entered in and by oracular power has found a way of release for those in need, taking refuge in prayers and the service of the gods," *Phaedrus* 244d.
539 "In this manner, Strangers, I could have wished (and I wish it still) that you had fully explained how all these regulations are inherent in the reputed laws of Zeus and in those of the Pythian Apollo which were ordained by Minos and Lycurgus, and how their systematic arrangement is quite evident to him who, whether by art or practice, is an expert in law, although it is by no means obvious to the rest of us."
540 *Republic* 427bc; *Laws* 686a, 738c, 759c, 828a, 856e, 865b, 914a.
541 *Republic* 540c, 461e; *Laws* 947d.
man. Plato's understanding of divine illumination could be thought to begin early with Socrates' daemon and evolve from there. For Aristides, if Hermes the "bountiful" is the god of oratory, as Apollo is the god of prediction and poetry (by way of the Muses), then his gift of words is divine and even greater than art (Aristides' evidence is from Phaedrus 244a, as above).

Some of the oracles to which Aristides refers are mentioned by Plato (Zeus' at Dodona in Epirus at section 42, from Phaedrus 244b, 275b; and Laws 738c) and at least one is not (Apollo's at Ionia at 44, but presumably that at Brankhaidai). Aristides, being a highly religious person, would have knowledge of oracles beyond those mentioned by Plato, though it would make sense that these examples would take precedent.

While he seems to have been refuted by this argument, for Aristides it would be even better if Plato were refuted by his own statements; he believes that Plato refutes his own argument point by point. Plato's admitting to taking refuge in the Pythian princess in many places in the Laws is just the beginning. Aristides provides the refutation as an imitation of the citation of law as inserted in the speeches of the Attic orators. The

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542 Apology 31d; the form of Socrates' "voice" is unknown: was it solely moral, was it propositional, perhaps some form of conscience? (For discussion, see Taylor 1911, Cornford 1912, Woodhead 1940, and McPherran 1996.) In whatever way we imagine it, this divine connection will find a later instantiation regarding one's connection to the Forms (as knowledge) in the Phaedo, perhaps after the more rational explanation of recollection in the Meno (though see the divine inspiration invoked at the end of that dialogue, at 99e and 100b).

543 This insertion continues the forensic frame set up by Aristides from the start of the oration with the introduction of the one "who will rightly cast his vote" after deciding on which side the truth is to be found (1). First, this frame will set up the criticism that Plato "places nothing over the truth" (11). Second, it emphasizes the sense of agon between
quoted text from *Phaedrus* (244a-245b) proves for Aristides that the mantic art is the fairest of arts from its madness and art need not be sought in the greatest things. Such divine madness provides release from disease, makes sound its possessor for the present and future by finding freedom from evils, and awakens poetry in the soul by adorning in writing and educating all in the countless deeds of the ancients (52).

According to Plato in the *Phaedrus*, then, there is a type of madness "better than sanity" that comes from gods to men. Aristides has shown, from Plato's words, that we cannot justifiably censure everything that does not have art, nor simply believe without proof that oratory is shameful. Thus, if prophecy comes from Apollo or Zeus, and other rituals from other gods, and poetry from the Muses, then Hermes "will not be mute about his gift, but claiming oratory for himself and his father, he will speak truthfully and justly" (56). This reference to these gods is sufficient proof, "if we have any share in oratory, and even if we should take refuge in no art" (57).

Instead of the slightly more circuitous route that was taken above to show an inconsistency, Aristides now launches his direct attack, using Plato's own words against him. This aspect of the argument gives our author the most pleasure. As Euripides wrote, "You hear this from your lips, not mine"; and, as taken from Aeschylus, Aristides finds Plato is convicted "in this not by another, but with your own plumage" (55).\(^{544}\)

Aristides imitates the short exchange between Phaedrus and Socrates before giving his quote from that dialogue: "'Where please,' he says, 'is my boy'? Indeed, where please

\(^{544}\) *Hippolytus* 352 and *Myrmidons* fr. 135 (Radt 1985), respectively.
is the speech to the boy? Here it is at hand." The quoted text is from the *Phaedrus* (244a-245b), which dialogue Aristides continually mentions as evidence of Plato's recourse to the divine. This textual invocation includes a typical creative Socratic/Platonic etymology about the derivation of οἰωνιστική (haruspicy) from οἶησις (notion). This section establishes for Aristides that Plato understood art need not be sought in the greatest things. Therefore, the assumption that oratory is no art does not in itself damage oratory.

Aristides picks back up at the end of the quoted text (at *Phaedrus* 245b) and discusses the next section from the *Phaedrus* where Socrates lists the various gifts from the gods to man. There, Plato suggests that love is set from the gods to benefit the smitten and the beloved, and that such madness is given to man for the greatest good fortune. For Aristides, he must still show that from the start the power of oratory came to men from the gods for the greatest good fortune, and is bestowed as constituting now the highest order of beauty and will be bestowed in the future. In the meantime, "if Plato is to be believed, it is he who does not grant the highest honors to art" (60). How is it then that he proves oratory to be shameful? In fact, if Plato does not grant honors to art, then he sides with Aristides' argument that the gifts of the muses and gods are the greatest things. Aristides, then, finds his own argument to be consistent. If Plato is inconsistent and does not agree with Aristides, and thinks that the highest honors go to art, then there is no further dispute, and we know at that point Plato does not always speak the truth (61).

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545 Socrates: "Where is the youth to whom I was speaking? He must hear this also, lest if he does not hear it, he accept a non-lover before we can stop him." Phaedrus: "Here he is, always close at hand whenever you want him," *Phaedrus* 243e.
This echo from the *Phaedrus* becomes call and answer, and directly emulates (or mocks) Plato's style:

εἰεν. τίνα δὴ τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἢν; "Ὡστε τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ μὴ φοβώμεθα; μηδὲ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβεῖτο δεδιττόμενος, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ κεκινημένου τὸν σώφρονα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον." ὡς δὴ καὶ τάδε. Ὡστε τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ μὴ φοβώμεθα, μηδὲ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβεῖτο δεδιττόμενος, ὡς οὐ τὸν φύσει καὶ θεία μοίρα κατορθοῦντα δεῖ νικᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅστις τεχνικὸς μικρῶς μοίρα κατορθοῦντα δεὶ νικᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅστις τεχνικὸς μικρῶς ἐστίν. (Section 58; from *Phaedrus* 245b)

Well! What comes next: "Therefore let us not fear this, nor let any argument frighten and terrify us, that the sane man must be preferred as a friend before the ecstatic." Consider this too: therefore let us not fear this, nor let any argument frighten and terrify us, that he who succeeds by his nature and divine portion must not prevail, but whoever is trivially artistic.

This reversal is cleverly accomplished: art has become the trivial talent, whereas nature and divine portion (here explicitly paired) is where true success lies. Such quotation and imitation continues in the rest of this section, and this type of Platonic echoing is used throughout Aristides' speech. The start of this section sounds like a man who is confident in his position and is prepared for whatever confutation comes his way.

As a contemporary of Plato, Aeschines Socraticus, Plato's "fellow pilgrim," can legitimately testify on behalf of Plato's ideas, according to Aristides, since the two are from "the same school." The quote from Aeschines supports Plato's words (even "attests to Plato" [μαρτυρεῖ Πλάτωνι]) about the importance and high place of the divine and the fact that benefit can be found where art is not (61-65). As a result, no more

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546 Αἰσχίνης ὁ τοῦ Πλάτωνος συμφοίτητης; συμφοίτητης: a technical term used of incubants at the temple of Asclepius, Behr 1986:451n.51.
547 The text is found in *Aeschines von Sphettos*, Dittmar 1912: fr. 11a and 11b. It would seem that Plato and Aeschines would have been rivals in the tradition of *Socratikoi Logoi*; for the genre, see Vander Waerdt 1994.
evidence from Plato will be used on the subject of religion since so many people have been actually saved by divine portion (66). This section of the argument (66-73) is based on religious experience. The source of his evidence is from Aristides' stay as an incumbent at the temple of Asclepius. As a result, the level of logical reasoning here is limited, and Plato does not make an appearance again until Aristides returns to literary evidence. Aristides asks forgiveness of the reader for no longer arguing against Plato while "experiencing this feeling when 'divine portion' (θεία μοῖρα) and 'salvation' (σωτηρία) enter into the discussion" (73). Such topics do not need textual proof—they reside in the experiential. Aristides has such knowledge from the gods themselves (67).

Aristides continues with evidence from Aeschines, and at one point does touch on the relationship between student and master. There are some, in fact, who have "assumed that these are the writings of Socrates himself" (77). Obviously, this attribution is incorrect, but Aristides does not think the idea completely without sense since they suited Socrates' character so well.

After the religious testimony (66-77), Aristides again begins to use Platonic evidence. In fact, the support for this portion of the speech is provided by "Socrates himself," no less than "the proud Plato" or "the clever Aeschines" (78). It is agreed by all accounts that Socrates knew nothing, and the Pythian princess called him the wisest of all Greeks. How can this be if he himself said he knows nothing? The answer is that he was

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548 ...καὶ ταύτι μὲν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου κινηθεῖς καὶ τοῦ τοῖς θεοῖς ὡσπερεί τετελεσμένου ἐπὶ πλείον ἵσως ἔξηγαγόν. Literally, the argument is "consecrated to the gods," Behr 1986:451n.160.
549 Fr. 11c Dittmar.
550 E.g., Diogenes Laertius 2.60 and 62; see Dittmar 1976:248, 263 for discussion.
trained in no art (78). Failure to possess an art, then, is not shameful in Socrates' eyes (even if it is in Plato's). Further, since he was guided by a divine sign, he was not ignorant of all-important matters, even though he knew nothing (79). If the god said he was the wisest of Greeks, then Socrates did not lie about any of this (80). Therefore, Socrates was indeed the wisest of the Greeks, and was ashamed neither of his lack of art, nor of his own ignorance (81). Socrates' life then confirms Aristides' testimony twofold: Socrates was consistent, and the god agreed with his life and aims (82). Plato and Aeschines both agree with these facts.

While we do not have the writings of Socrates, for Aristides the agreement between Plato and Aeschines is enough to determine his thoughts on the subject. The argument here is Aristides' own version of the disavowal of knowledge by Socrates. His answer is to discuss knowledge that has art in opposition with the type Socrates possessed, which was without art (and, moreover, divinely inspired). There was no shame in his lacking any art. Socrates, unlike Plato, emerges from the argument consistent in word and deed.

While his connection with the Delphic god is mentioned (83), it is interesting that the divine reverence that Socrates often displays in Plato is not as emphasized as it might

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551 Xenophon is not mentioned as a source for Socrates anywhere in the speech. He is, however, considered "of the same stock" as Plato much later in the text, and so further support (301). Xenophon is a source of other types of information--specifically for Cyrus (Section 301, for example, is taken from Anabasis 1.7.1).

552 On which, see most famously Vlastos 1985.
Plato must remain the main target and source of evidence throughout the speech, and Aristides separates teacher and student as deftly as he is able throughout.

Poets as a class also provide real evidence for this argument, since they are in fact poets through a reason that surpasses art (85). Superior men invented the arts based on their natures; so nature, preeminent in order and power, is itself responsible. In actuality, the gods led and guided men in this, so art is simply an appendage to something far greater. Naturally, the examples are Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar himself, who is according to Plato worthy of use "in the most important matters" (109). Pindar writes that everything that is natural is best (Olympian 9.107-110); thus, everything that arises naturally in an orator is superior to that which is learned or copied from another. Plato acknowledges that poets educate by divine inspiration, and that art is worthless in the face of nature and such inspiration. Plato, and the gods through him (an essential point regarding inspiration), bears witness to this (113). Even if not from art, oratory is from a bold nature: it is a fine and divine thing. It is slander and not refutation or proof that resides in Plato's insults (114).

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553 In particular, Socrates' "mission," for which see Brickhouse and Smith 1983.
554 For Aristides and Homer, see Boulanger 1923; Behr 1968, 1986; and Kindstrand 1973.
555 See Oliver 1953 and Behr 1986:451-452
556 The quote is from Thucydides (2.15.5, Behr 1986:452n.92), and Aristides gives no examples from Plato. Pindar is quoted as a source three times in the Republic: 1.330, 2.365, and 3.408; for discussion, see Behr 1968, 1986:451-452. The poets are used in sections 86-109 in Aristides. The texts from these authors are often directly addressed to Plato by name (e.g., 100: "Then, Plato, [Hesiod] says that the conception of an idea is superior to learning one…").
557 This distinction and relationship is essential in this speech, and is discussed in its own section below.
In the section using examples from Homer, Maximus discusses that Telemachus was worried about what to say to Nestor for lack of what Plato calls "experience," since he was far from knowing any art of speaking. This is another reference to Plato's criticism of oratory as "knack" learned by experience (ἐμπειρία) or "routine" (τριβή) at Gorgias 463b, 501a. In that dialogue, since the orator has no account to give of the real nature of the things he discusses, he cannot communicate their causes and cannot convey knowledge to his audience (454e-455a). For Plato, the typical practitioner of rhetoric needs no knowledge of his subject, and this is exactly the line of thinking that Aristides avoids in his refutation of Plato.

In the end of this section of Aristides' argument, Plato admits that the poets do not write through art but divine inspiration (113). Art, then, is worthless against the force of nature and the divine (referring back to the opposition of art and nature/the divine set up in 58). Plato understands from the poets that oratory is a fair and divine thing in both word and deed. Poetry does not come to men through art, but is in fact the work of a bold nature. Again, slander and not refutation lie in Plato's insults (114).

As will be discussed further concerning Plato below, Aristides writes that Art, then, is "the servant or maid" to (prior and superior) Nature's mistress (115). The greatest figures did not make art great by keeping with tradition, but by surpassing it. It is nature, not art, which is the leader of men. Nor can art be the discovery and possession of art (medicine, for example, did not invent medicine); nature made art through discovery

558 Telemachus is able to succeed through natural endowment (Odyssey 4.611) and the god's approval (3.26-28).
559 From sections 100-108.
and so discovered all the arts. Nature is then superior to art and rules it, while art serves and learns. A result of Aristides' combination of nature and the divine (with both opposed to art) is that in fact the gods invented art and man employs it for his own benefit. It is not shameful to think either that discovery is part of the ruler, since the gods have discovered all things, or to refer the act of discovery to the gods. If revelation is the part of the discoverer, then the discoverer is always the superior (115-130). Again, though Plato specifically is not invoked in this section, this conclusion is essential for Aristides' later refutations.

Yet, the opposite argument also works (131). According to Plato, not all arts have pure benefit; it is odd to think that because something has art it has no share in anything worthwhile, but that those who do not pursue something with art are wanting. This is not Aristides' account, "but Plato's and his shop's," and indicates no regard for the art of the common people, and at the same time belittles what does not take place through art. The pun is a reference to Plato's seeming lack of respect for craftsmen, referring to Plato's school as a workshop (ἐργαστηρίον). The idea that Plato thinks little of craftsmen in general is taken from Gorgias 512c. Plato cannot have it both ways, however: he must either honor those professions that have art, here represented as craftsmen, or not

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560 ἀλλ᾿ ύμετρος, ὅ Πλάτων, καὶ τοῦ σοῦ νῆ Δί′ ἐργαστηρίου; literally: "[the tale is] yours, Plato, and your workshop's, by god," 132.
561 We should note as well one of the few references in this speech to the "Academy," such as it is in the second century CE.
562 Socrates: "But you none the less despise him and his special art, and you would call him 'engineer' in a taunting sense, and would refuse either to bestow your daughter on his son or let your own son marry his daughter," 512c. With all of Socrates' examples using crafts and craftsmen, Aristides separates Plato and Socrates in this argument.
criticize orators "because they lack artistic competence in the subject of their discourse" (μὴ τέχνην κέκτηναι περὶ ζων λέγουσιν, 134).563

Again, we should note that Aristides does not try to argue that orators have knowledge of everything they discuss, or, necessarily, of anything at all—that was Gorgias' mistake in the first place. Rather, he takes the tack (so far in the argument) that orators are divinely inspired and bestow direct benefit on their fellow men. Rhetoric is, essentially, beyond knowledge, and is therefore beyond any art.

1.4. The Refutation of the Charge that Rhetoric is Not an Art (135-177)

The argument that oratory is still valuable to man, even if not an art, is concluded at 135. Aristides changes direction and works to prove the "worse side" of the case: oratory is in fact an art. Without giving any ground, and not conceding that oratory has no share in art, Aristides wants to show "the extant of oratory's art," in Plato's words.564 Plato himself asserts that oratory shares in art in the very dialogue in which he denies it. The refutation of Plato's position will again consist of his own statements, but now both the charge and the counter-argument are found within the Gorgias (137).

Plato says of oratory, "in his own slander no less," that it aims at things, and guides its words according to its aim.565 If oratory has an aim, then it must use reason.

563 Cf. Gorgias 465e, where rhetoric "has no account to give of the real nature of the things it applies, and so cannot tell the cause of any of them."
564 Phaedrus 269d: ἀλλὰ δὴ τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὑποτιμήσαι τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην πῶς καὶ πόθεν ἐν τις δύναιτο πορίσασθαι;
565 Gorgias 465a: "Flattery, however, is what I call it, and I say that this sort of thing is a disgrace, Polus—for here I address you—because it aims at the pleasant and ignores the best" (κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημὶ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ Πωλε--τούτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω--ὅτι τοῦ ἡδεὸς στοχάζεται ἀνευ τοῦ βελτίστου).
Reason does not err, since, if one errs, one has either not used reason or has not
maintained it.\textsuperscript{566} Then, if taking aim (στοχασμένη) is an attribute of oratory, oratory
preserves reason to the fullest (133-140). Plato's own statements shatter his slanders.
Aristides wonders how Plato could not have known\textsuperscript{567} that if he were to allow the idea
that taking aim is part of oratory, that both his contradictory arguments and his use of
what is not art as evidence of what is art would offer his opponent a hold.

In the Second Sophistic tradition of δισσοί λόγοι,\textsuperscript{568} Aristides switches sides, and
after perhaps successfully arguing that rhetoric does not partake in art, now argues, as
Plato writes,\textsuperscript{569} "the extent of its art." His method will consist once again of using Plato's
own words against him. He is sure to say before he begins, however, that he "does not
concede to Plato that rhetoric has no art" (137).

"In his slander," Aristides writes, Plato says that oratory "aims at things and
guides its words according to its aim" (138). From the \textit{Gorgias}:

\begin{quote}
\textit{τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἂν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευόν τῶν
μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἢ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθημένη--οὐ γνώσα λέγω}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{566} Cf. 139: "For to take aim is to hit the mark."
\textsuperscript{567} Or "taken aim" (ἐστοχάσατο), another reference to the role this verb plays in this
argument.
\textsuperscript{568} A method that had recently gained much use, but one that had been around since
before Plato, perhaps starting around the fifth century BCE. For the fragments of the
speech 6, "The Opposite Argument" in Behr 1986:301-312. For the Protagorean influence
\textsuperscript{569} \textit{Phaedrus} 269d: "But so far as the art is concerned, I do not think the quest of it lies
along the path of Lysias and Thrasymachus," \textit{Phaedrus} 269d. Though he will use this
section of the \textit{Phaedrus} near the end of his speech, it is curious to me that Aristides does
not make more of it earlier; cf. "If you are naturally rhetorical, you will become a notable
orator, when to your natural endowments you have added knowledge and practice; at
whatever point you are deficient in these, you will be incomplete" (269d).
Now these four, which always bestow their care for the best advantage respectively of the body and the soul, are noticed by the art of flattery which, I do not say with knowledge, but by speculation, divides herself into four parts, and then, insinuating herself into each of those branches, pretends to be that into which she has crept, and cares nothing for what is the best, but dangles what is most pleasant for the moment as a bait for folly, and deceives it into thinking that she is of the highest value.

This is the "shadow" argument from the *Gorgias*, in which we learn that flattery instantiates itself in all four of the legitimate arts and thereby deceives everyone involved. The word στοχασμένη (<στοχάσασθαι), which I translate as "by speculation,"\(^{570}\) is primarily a Platonic word\(^{571}\) that is then picked up by Aristotle.\(^{572}\) Its meanings can range from "to aim" or "shoot at" to "aim at" or "endeavor after" to "endeavor to make out" or "guess at a thing."\(^{573}\) Aristides' argument relies on a switch from Plato's use of the verb as meaning "speculation as an uninformed or unreasoned guess" (specifically as opposed to knowledge) to the meaning of "aiming as endeavoring after," an idea that has no direct opposite.\(^{574}\)

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\(^{570}\) Opposed in the Platonic passage above with "by knowledge" (γνώσα <γιγνώσκω).

\(^{571}\) Uses include Aesopus et Aesopica (sixth century BCE) *Fabulae* 77, 276; Euripides *Bacchae* 1205; Hippus (5 B.C.?) fr. 1; those contemporaneous with Plato: Isocrates *Ad Demonicum* 50, *Ad filios Jasonis* 10; Hippocrates *De articulis* 4, *De prisca medicina* 9. Plato has five uses of the word, all implying "speculation."

\(^{572}\) E.g., *Nicomachean Ethics* 1128a6.

\(^{573}\) LSJ s.v. στοχάζομαι.

\(^{574}\) *Pace* Behr 1986:452n.109. Though Aristides gives a vague indication of the opposite of "endeavor" at 139: "So those who miss the mark, do not at all take aim, but they do the opposite of taking aim."
For Aristides, oratory guides its words according to its aim; to aim at something is to use reason. Those who hit a distant mark take aim by referring to nature, and by employing this kind of reason obtain a target. Here again, Aristides connects rhetoric to nature, and so then obliquely to the divine (138). To take aim for Aristides is to hit the mark; those who miss the mark do so "for good reason," since they do not take aim. No one errs when reason is used, and so only failure only comes when it is either not used or not maintained. The use of reason in rhetoric's aiming, then, implies its connection with art. Aristides' conclusion, that "if taking aim is an attribute of oratory, oratory preserves reason to the fullest extent" (εἰ τὸ στόχασθαι τῇ ῥήτορικῇ ἐστιν, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἢ ῥήτορικὴ σκέψει λόγον, 140), in Plato's terminology would read as a nonsensical hypothetical: "If speculation is an attribute of rhetoric, rhetoric preserves reason to the fullest extent." By taking advantage of this range of definitions, Aristides is able to use in his refutation all of Plato's passages that refer to the speculative nature of rhetoric. By switching the intended meaning of the word to something with a much more positive and active connotation, Aristides is free to cull as much support as he desires from the Gorgias.

Aristides uses Plato's own examples against him: archery (143), navigation (144), and medicine (149-156). Even Plato would have to admit that archery is "the art of taking aim." Just as the purpose of archery is to hit the mark, the goal of navigation is to save men from the sea by aiming at a particular target--it is to aim at a target, e.g., Aegina (cf. Gorgias 511d). When the helmsmen have Aegina in sight, they take aim at what they see. This process first necessitates that one "conjecture" through the exercise of reason, and
here Aristides begins to connect his physical examples with the more abstract rhetoric. If being a helmsman is an art, then what indeed prevents oratory from being one as well, especially if both conjecture through reason about their goal? Throughout these examples, Plato is used against his own overarching conclusion about rhetoric in the *Gorgias*.

According to Aristides, medicine, which is according to Plato "the counterpart of justice," also conjectures about the body according to context and necessity. The doctor must employ reason to determine illness, diagnosis, and cure, no matter who the patient is or what the problem. This process must be above all else (reasoned) conjecture, and sounds along the lines of the idea of philosophical rhetoric as found in the *Phaedrus* (minus the particular emphasis we find there on knowledge of souls, however). All of this is proven by Plato's "adamantine necessities" (ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις). The idea that "at any rate the accurate" (οἵ γε ἀκριβεῖς) navigators ask those they meet about where they are (145) is a reference to what will be an important distinction for Aristides, and is taken from the *Republic*:

575 *Gorgias* 464b: "There are two different affairs to which I assign two different arts: the one, which has to do with the soul, I call politics; the other, which concerns the body, though I cannot give you a single name for it offhand, is all one business, the tendance of the body, which I can designate in two branches as gymnastic and medicine. Under politics I set legislation in the place of gymnastic, and justice to match medicine."

576 "All this, which has been made evident in the form I have stated some way back in our foregoing discussion, is held firm and fastened--if I may put it rather bluntly--with reasons of steel and adamant (so it would seem, at least, on the face of it) which you or somebody more gallant than yourself must undo, or else accept this present statement of mine as the only possible one," *Gorgias* 508e--509a. Aristides continues to throw Plato's words back at him, even if they do not directly affect the argument. See also the "bronze statue" comment at 157 with *Phaedrus* 236b.
"Can we deny, then," said I, "that neither does any physician in so far as he is a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, 'precisely' speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a moneymaker."

We will see that the precise definition of a professional will be an essential part of Aristides' argument about who is and who is not an orator. Here in the Republic, the passage comes just before Socrates' reversal of Thrasymachus' original claim, namely that the ruler is always self-interested. Socrates has turned that definition around. He shows that the true ruler, "insofar as he is a ruler," does not consider and enjoin his own advantage, but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft. The true ruler keeps his eyes fixed on this goal and on what is advantageous and suitable in all that he says and does (342e). This will allow Socrates to say that the name used for the professional who does not have the advantage of the ruled in mind is done so only out of laziness or imprecision. The bad or evil so-called "orator" in Aristides, then, will be shown not to be an orator at all. If the one concerned with accuracy and details is not an artist, then no one is (147).

Painting forms a picture ("conjectures," στοχάζεσθαι) by reasoning about nature, as the pictures of painters have caused "to form a picture" (αἱ γὰρ τῶν γραφέων εἰκόνες εἰκάζων ἐποίησαν, 159) to be used of other things. Aristides must therefore tackle the
famous μίμησις argument about words (and painting) made in the *Phaedrus*.\(^{577}\) Oratory also aims as imitation, like painting (or the mantic art)---these activities form a picture by reasoning. The mixture of colors is the most perfect part of the art, since it brings the picture closer to truth (ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἀγει τὸ εἰκασθὲν τῆς ἀληθείας, 157-162).

Plato himself considers painting an art at *Gorgias* 480a, or, according to Aristides: ἐν αὐτοῖς γε τούτοις τοῖς Γοργεῖοις λόγοις ("in this Gorgian discourse indeed"). Painting is the art of forming a picture by taking aim at a subject by reasoning about nature. Plato's position on painting as imitation of an imitation of truth,\(^{578}\) then, is nicely reversed. Aristides makes a clever turn to include accuracy, conceived of as nearness to truth, in an argument against Plato, even though the latter would deny its applicability to painting or anything material or plastic whatsoever. In this way the more accurate the painting, the closer to truth it is for Aristides (162), a perfectly intuitive way to think about painting and imitation. For Aristides to leave out painting's ability to form a picture (i.e., conjecture) is to deprive it of its greatest feature.\(^{579}\)

Likewise, the mantic art is the science of forming a picture for the seer (163-164). For Plato, haruspicy is done by thinking men (164), and the mantic art has regards to

\(^{577}\) He must treat painting also because painting is called an art in the *Gorgias* (450c), which is the point of this section of Aristides' argument (i.e., the nature of art, and oratory as art).

\(^{578}\) Cf. *Republic* 10.597e-589a: "'The producer of the product three removes from nature you call the imitator?' [...] 'Consider, then, this very point. To which is painting directed in every case, to the imitation of reality as it is or of appearance as it appears? Is it an imitation of a phantasm or of the truth?' 'Of a phantasm.'" This is in fact the danger of painting and all of imitation, the more "accurate" it is, the greater the ability to deceive those who cannot differentiate between knowledge, ignorance, and imitation, 598d.

\(^{579}\) οὐκοῦν ὃ μεγίστῳ προέχει, τοὺς ἀφαιρεῖς, ἐὰν μὴ λίπης τὸ εἰκάζειν, 162.
reason, since it needs context and questions. (167). The seer also takes aim at the future (168). All of these arts take aim, and, furthermore, use reason to do so.

The mantic art is in the same way the science of forming a picture "which has regard to reason" and based on signs (168). Plato understood this connection, writes Aristides, which provides the most satisfying kind of testimony. Evidence from the *Phaedrus* (244d) provides the point that haruspicy is the investigation of the future on the part of the thinking man. This is enough for Aristides to show that haruspicy is the act of men who form a picture, and, as part of the mantic art, is at least in part concerned with the forming of a picture of nature by means of reason.

Aristides asks, then, why Plato worries that oratory uses conjecture (171), when it is so similar to the mantic art. The difference is that after having made its conjectures the mantic art is finished, while oratory conjectures about matters, and in addition continues to "accomplish through its servants whatever it finds best" (171). Since the role of oratory continues after the conjecture is done, it does the mantic art one better, which is quickly finished. Oratory maintains the underlying theory of mantic art as well as that of strategy, which Plato cannot deny is connected with the "art of politics" (τῇ πολιτικῇ, cf. *Politicalis* 304e). Therefore, oratory is not a "shadow of the part of politics," as Plato says: rhetoric is in fact not a shadow of anything. Oratory is essential to politics, since

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580 That military command is a true political art, *Politicus* 304e: "The power of determining how war shall be waged against those upon whom we have declared war, whether we are to call this a science or not a science? Younger Socrates: 'How could we think it is not a science, when generalship and all military activity practice it?'"

581 *Gorgias* 463d: ἐστιν γὰρ ἣ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδωλον; and *Gorgias* 463e (Gorgias is speaking): Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ᾿ εἶπε πῶς λέγεις
it is the conjecture required before action. Like the art of strategy, oratory is not lacking art if it uses conjecture; it is because it uses conjecture, in fact, that oratory has a share in art (if Plato's own statement is true, as from section 175). Plato asserts that firm assertion about the future is impossible for any mortal, but each of us is still able to form a picture about the highest matters (176). Zeus himself has the only complete, perfect science about such affairs, while men remain only able to form pictures through speculation. Plato himself, in fact, asserts that he forms a picture about the highest matters when a "firm assertion" is impossible, and remits such precision to god, "in a truly proper and philosophic way," says Aristides (176).

1.5. The Refutation of the Charge that Rhetoric Flatters the Masses (178-203)

Aristides must confront the charge that rhetoric "flatters the masses" (as from Gorgias 501d-503d). Not only does an orator not aim at the desires of the multitude,
he writes, but in fact the situation is the very the opposite of this: the rhetor is the one true leader of the people.

For Aristides, this is an easy charge to answer ("even if a child would not prove this," cf. *Gorgias* 470c). The nature of oratory is exactly *not* to allow what the masses want, but rather to consider only what is best (178). In addition, people understand that orators are their superiors in respect to both the state and their own fortune. The accolades for the rhetores are deserved, as are the requests for help both by embassies as well as those in dire need; men in the most trouble ask the orator for advice and guidance (179). The orator is singled out not because he aims at what is most popular, but because he speaks as the situation demands, conjecturing the nature of the situation. This conjecture, at times, includes the method of the best treatment of the audience not to flatter but in order to achieve the reception for what is best (as the knowledge of souls would achieve in the *Phaedrus*). His interest is not to guess the opinion of the audience, but to say all that needs to be said order to persuade. Clearly, no one would ask anything of an orator if all they received back is the desire of the masses (180-185).

Just as a doctor does not act to gratify the body, but rather to cure it, so does the orator always aim for what is best (to "cure" the populace, as it were). The orator does in fact conjecture about his audience, not in order to serve the multitudes nor observe their

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584 "So hard to refute you, Socrates! No, a mere child could do it, could he not, and prove your words are untrue?"

585 Though these concerns can be compatible, unless we assume that the masses never want what is best, which is not unreasonable when discussing Plato.

586 "Not even Plato would speak such absurdities," i.e., those about to go to trial would ever think to disregard *rhetores*, 184.
natures to gratify them, but to say what is best at the right time (186).\textsuperscript{587} Persuasion, then, is nothing else than the act of convincing an audience of the best course, which is determined beforehand by (reasoned) conjecture.\textsuperscript{588}

Further, to think \textit{rhetores} do not command is to mistake the servant for the mistress (187). They are called "demagogues" (δημαγόγοι) because they lead, not because they follow (189). Gratification, then, is not bad in and of itself: rhetores use gratification along with what is best, as the chorus provides the keynote to the leader, who then works to achieve their harmony (191).\textsuperscript{589}

If someone in power uses gratification for preserving his rank by persuading and not compelling, while also conjecturing the desires of those beneath him, he is a political man and a true orator (193). The orator is in fact a ruler, a patron, and a teacher (190). The question for Aristides is: if these men are not admired by the people, do not have fame, do not transact business, nor have any influence, then how can we accept Plato's charge, through which all this could occur (195)?

It is a consistent point of pride for orators that they do not say what the people approve, but rather what they themselves think is best (195). In point of fact, there is no one single desire of the masses (196); they have many desires, and this is why they need a guide. Any orator risks insulting one group while flattering another whenever there are natural factions (197).

\textsuperscript{587} As Demosthenes, but also as Socrates, cf. \textit{Phaedrus} 272a: the true orator must have "grasped the right occasions for speaking and for holding back….."

\textsuperscript{588} This separation of conjecture on behalf of "best moment," persuasion, and gratification is easily blurred.

\textsuperscript{589} It is the same with the helmsman and his sailors, 191.
As an orator does not speak more to please than to pain (198)—he is simply concerned with what is best. Here we see again the difference between epideictic oratory for the purpose of entertainment and Demosthenic oratory for the purpose of strategy or lawmaking. This is perhaps more evidence to consider Aristides a *rhetor* than a sophist.

Aristides invokes the Platonic description of the orator: as a "maker of persuasion."\(^{590}\) While he sidesteps the moral difficulties involved with persuasion itself,\(^{591}\) he acknowledges that the problem is that to flatter and to persuade are opposing goals. He argues: "If [rhetores] say what is approved [by the masses], then they do not persuade" (εἰ γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν, οὐ πείθεται, 200). If these speakers do aim for the desire of the masses,\(^{592}\) then it is they who have first been persuaded by the people, not the reverse (201). If oratory is persuasion, then they do not fawn (since fawning is not persuading); if oratory is flattery, oratory is not the maker of persuasion (since orators themselves are persuaded)(202). Therefore, if an orator persuades, then he does not flatter; if he flatters, he does not persuade. Either oratory is flattery, or it is the maker

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\(^{590}\) Or, given its importance, the "Maker of persuasion" (see Usher's 1974 review of Behr); *Gorgias* 455a: "Thus rhetoric, it seems, is a producer of persuasion for belief, not for instruction in the matter of right and wrong" (ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἀρτα, ὡς ἐοικεν, πειθοὺς δήμιουργός ἐστιν πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιον τε καὶ ἀδίκον). To quote the end of the formulation about instruction would dampen Aristides' refutation (which he acknowledges, see the next note).

\(^{591}\) In that Gorgias problematically agrees that the rhetorician has no knowledge of that which he speaks, but is only concerned with belief: "Thus rhetoric, it seems, is a producer of persuasion for belief, not for instruction in the matter of right and wrong," *Gorgias* 455a. This is why Aristides writes at this point in the argument: "For the moment (199) I do not care if it is persuasive or instructive persuasion." He sidesteps one of Gorgias' rather fatal endorsements.

\(^{592}\) This clearly flies in the face of his pervious argument about the singularity of the desire of the masses.
of persuasion, but not both. Plato refutes Plato, in either case, on the same subject, in the same argument and in the same text.

Charges of redundancy aside, this is the high point of Aristides' refutation: it turns neither on a slip of definition, nor on the import of another text. Here, Plato does indeed seem to contradict himself in the same argument on some level by writing that the maker of persuasion flatters the masses; in the very least, Aristides has a point that the orator cannot persuade and be persuaded at the same time. Of course, the point rests on the idea that the rhetor is not Gorgianic but rather intrinsically Demosthenic in his pursuits and purpose.

1.6. The Argument that Rhetoric Represents All the Virtues (204-318)

In order to refute Aristides' refutation, then, someone must prove that: 1. Oratory does not use reason; 2. It only uses conjecture; 3. It is not a great discovery; 4. It has no share of art; and 5. It does not belong with the many arts that Aristides has enumerated. Oratory will in fact be shown by Aristides to have the greatest share of reason--or at least entirely involved in the action of reason--and that of all human things, it is the first, most perfect, and the greatest thing to be prayed for (204).

Aristides launches into a section of his speech in which he speculates on the invention and original purpose of rhetoric (205-233). This very standard etiology--that rhetoric was invented so that the inferior could have some defense against the stronger--has no need for support or evidence from Plato. It is important that Aristides feels he has shown that oratory maintains the peace as well as guides citizens in war by persuasion of the right course; that legislation (a fully "legitimate art" for Plato) is part of rhetoric; and
that laws are in effect merely examples of concrete rhetoric. Aristides will move forward in his speech believing that he has shown that oratory is the greatest and most effective political art. All these sub-conclusions will be needed for the following rather long argument that all the virtues are found in rhetoric.

But Aristides goes further to prove that justice and all the virtues are found within rhetoric (234-243). The art of justice seeks out and punishes the transgressors of the laws, while it creates and follows the laws (222). That which is just is found by oratory: it examines what has occurred and the art of justice renders a decision after examination (223). Oratory, then, combines both laws/legislation and the art of justice (which are both political arts according to Plato, e.g., 463d)(233). Justice is in Aristides' mind not the harmony of the virtues, as it is for Plato—it is the punishment of the vicious and the benefit of the decent (231). The necessity of oratory after the work of the laws, justice, and jurors is the source of its preeminence (233).

Aristides here "is close to saying" that oratory is better than the art of justice, inasmuch as the juror is better than the public executioner, as the juror is between the orator and the public servant (225). When the court case is finished, the job of justice has been completed; when the laws are made, the role of legislation is over; after the verdict has been stated, the jurors are through. Oratory is never finished: it assuages angry jurors, gets them to accept the laws, and causes them to vote (226). Oratory's utility is universal.

Neither oratory nor the orator will ever allow that there is justification for the utmost violence (231). There is no place for words when force or violence defines justice: where is persuasion then, if this is allowed? Plato himself cannot show that that oratory
approves any such thing. Whatever Plato's censuring of oratory might be, Aristides can say with assurance that it does not approve violence and force. Laws, justice, and speeches are of one nature, and oratory is involved with them all. In fact, rhetoric is the very bond between these parts of politics (233). Oratory precedes legislation when it is needed, and precedes then the art of justice--rhetoric comes first, middle, and last. Whether Plato would allow that it helps one "obtain justice and honor law," even Aristides concedes, is another thing (232).

We ask again, then, how Plato can prove that oratory is a "shadow of a part of politics." Aristides has shown that the different parts of politics as Plato describes them are held together by oratory. In addition, we have anticipated the argument that even according to Plato's approach, the worse type of "rhetoric" is not even properly called rhetoric (234). Plato is not abusing oratory in these arguments, nor proving it is a shadow of politics; rather he himself has caught a shadow of oratory, and does not ever touch the real thing (234). The reversal of Plato's shadow argument from the Gorgias is complete.

The address and quote of Pindar by Callicles from the Gorgias (as one who speaks contrary to the nature of oratory) is noteworthy. As Behr notes, Plato changes the verse to fit his text, while Aristides, who was thoroughly familiar with Pindar,

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593 Gorgias 463d: ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ ρητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδωλον.
594 "Our language is imprecise when we say that the doctor or helmsman erred" (251); as we will see, strictly speaking, they are neither doctors nor helmsmen when they err, cf. the argument at Republic 340d. In short, art does not err.
595 Pindar fr. 187 Turyn.
evidently would not have wanted to reproduce Plato's distorted version, "[y]et the context shows that Aristides wished to keep the distorted sense."^597

Aristides works to show that, far from being without virtue, all the virtues are found within rhetoric, as comprised of the canonical four parts: intelligence, moderation, justice, and courage (235-238).^598 Justice in the *Gorgias* is never defined, but rather discussed thematically: issues of power, temperance, and justice do not answer such a list as Aristides gives. At this point in Plato's career (the early part of his "middle period"), human happiness is still inextricable from virtuous actions.^599

Aristides will focus on showing that Plato is ridiculous to attribute problems to oratory that are not relevant to its work, and that not every terrible deed in the world can be attributed to it. He purports, then, that oratory was invented for the sake of justice: all the crimes one brings against it only add to its defense. Oratory was invented specifically to prevent all these misfortunes (236-238).

Thus, the four virtues are shown to be in rhetoric, and oratory was discovered by intelligence for the sake of justice. The temperance of orators preserves cities, since moderation promotes a life of decency. Orators have courage in that they do not yield to enemies. If any do in fact yield, these will not be keeping up the tenets of oratory. Of the four parts of flattery, oratory is not to justice as cookery is to medicine. What gymnastics

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^597 See Behr 1986:453n.146. See Wilamowitz 1929 for the Plato, as well as Libanius *Apologia Socratis* 87, vol. 5.62 (Foerster).

^598 237: διαφέροι δ’ ἂν τοσούτῳ, ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁμοιὸν τῇ ῥητορικῇ τὸ εἴδωλον. ἄλλα μὴν τῆς γε ἀρετῆς τέτταρα δὴ ποὺ φασιν εἶναι μόρια, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν.

^599 For more, see Irwin 1979.
and medicine are for the body, oratory appears to be for the soul and in the conduct of city life (236).

So in fact, the four parts of virtue are not only in rhetoric—they are all realized by oratory. When the orator speaks in public, he employs foresight as to things that will doubtfully come to pass. When he legislates, he employs foresight so that other things shall not come to pass, and in other matters it preserves what it can. When he hands criminals to the jurors, he rectifies deeds already done. Even before the crimes were committed, oratory might have been able to persuade the criminals from being vicious (237). Throughout history, there are examples of those (e.g., Archelaus600) who should have used oratory rather than force: oratory would have been more persuasive and more effective (238).

Such an attribution of the four virtues to oratory may have originated with Diogenes of Babylon.601 This fourfold division, while not that of Plato, matches Plato’s fourfold division of the legitimate and illegitimate arts.602 Each of the virtues is shown by Aristides to be either responsible for oratory (e.g., φρόνησις) or used by it (e.g., σωφροσύνη).

The example illustrating the lack of necessity of force, i.e., Archelaus and Cleopatra, is taken from Plato Gorgias 471bc. At this point, though the fourfold

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600 23BCE-18CE: the ethnarch of Samaria, Judaea and Idumea from 4 BCE-6 CE.
601 Circa 150 BCE. For Diogenes and Aristides, see Sohlberg 1972:177-200, 256-283. Behr believes that Aristides may have acquired it from teachers of rhetoric, who also accepted the attribution, Behr 1986:454n.154.
divisions match up, Aristides' use of Plato has otherwise dropped off, replaced by diverse historical evidence of the uselessness of force in the face of persuasion.

Aristides does in fact acknowledge that some use oratory to slander others; but, of course, no one considers medicine evil for its having killed men (248). If oratory's nature is to create criminals, then it is evil indeed, but it was invented to preserve mankind and justice through argument. What medicine is to the body, then, oratory is to the soul. One cannot be a doctor at the moment he is a murderer, nor can one be an orator while one slanders (249). If someone loses the qualities of the orator by becoming a slanderer or flatterer, they abandon oratory. To stray from oratory is to be no longer a part of it, so these men do not in fact harm oratory. As Plato would acknowledge, every art wants to employ what is useful in accord with its nature (250). Even if he errs unwillingly, according to Plato, our language is imprecise when we say, "the doctor erred." When art is present, erring is impossible--error is not in art. If someone purposely acts contrary to his art, then he wrongs his art by participating in it and therefore disgraces it "twice over."

Here we resume the argument (obliquely referenced previously by Aristides) from the Republic. At 340de, Thrasymachus summarizes Socrates' "trivializing" argument:

Yet that is what we say literally--we say that the physician erred and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these in so
far as he is that which we entitle him never errs; so that, speaking precisely, since
you are such a stickler for precision, no craftsman errs. For it is when his
knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong--when he is not a
craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when
he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician
made a mistake and the ruler erred.

The use of this argument allows Aristides to say that, in effect, a mistaken or
wayward orator is no orator at all. In addition, any evil use of a profession does not affect
that profession, but rather is a judgment on the practitioner only. If Plato judged oratory
based on its worst examples (a point that will soon come up), then really he is not even
discussing oratory, but something that resembles it (i.e., its own shadow or a shadow of a
part of it). The "disgrace twice over" refers to the fact that the bad artist has used his art
immorally.⁶⁰³

According to Plato, laws are for the safety of the cities and justice for all:
legislation is justice (253); according to Aristides, legislation is ranked by Plato as higher
than justice. As we see from the Laws, only the rule of law can ensure a just social
system.⁶⁰⁴ How many people, though, have passed bad or illegal laws (254)? Legislation
then is not entirely good. True legislation and laws are just, and as such try to prevent
any problems. Immoral proposals are not laws in the proper sense of the term: they are,
more precisely, "illegal writings" (255). As long as medicine saves the sick, and navigation
those who sail, and the laws those who use them, the words of oratory saves the
deserving and preserves justice (257). In fact, one could use the same argument against

⁶⁰³ pace Behr 1986:454n.168.
⁶⁰⁴ See, famously, Laws 713c-714a and 875ad. For Plato and the rule of law, see the
standard Morrow 1941 and 1960.
philosophy, as in the case of Anaxagoras and Diagoras, who were both contemporaries of Socrates and tried for impiety (258). Of the philosophers from the past, some were corrupters, some blasphemed, some made statements that they should not have, and some showed more pride than intelligence (259). There is no doubt that men have failed in oratory (as well as philosophy), but this fact does not make the art itself worse. Since men have been evil under the guise of both oratory and philosophy, we should not judge an art by its misapplications, but by its accomplishments (260).

Aristides continues throughout this section to argue by means of Platonic echoes. He writes that if we show that legislation is not a wholly good thing because bad laws have been passed, must we say that Plato's "questions are inescapable (ἀφυκτα) and shall we hide our heads?" Socrates finds the questions from Euthydemos constant and inescapable.605 Famously, the shame Socrates feels for his first speech in the Phaedrus causes him to hide his head (συγκαλυψόμεθα).606

Aristides tries to incorporate Plato's argument that it is better to be wronged than to do wrong (261). If oratory has prevented wrong and done none, then it is as good as it has succeeded in this goal. As long as evil exists, however, someone will be wronged, and thus oratory will necessary exist as well.

The counterintuitive argument that one should desire to be wronged than do wrong is from Gorgias 469bc, and is paraphrased rather than quoted (as is common with

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605 Euthydemos 276e: "All our questions, Socrates, he said, are like that; they leave no escape."
606 Phaedrus 237a: "I'm going to keep my head wrapped up while I talk (ἐγκαλυψόμενος ἐρῶ), that I may get through my discourse as quickly as possible and that I may not look at you and become embarrassed."
Aristides' use of Plato). Of note is the separation and then agreement between Plato and Socrates that Aristides makes: "If Plato would answer us, it would be most valuable for the argument. And the answer is at hand. How? He has described Socrates' answer" (262). If Plato asserts that oratory is of no use because it not as great an evil to be wronged than to do wrong, then why does he not erase all the laws as a result? Laws have this purpose only--principally, that no one be mistreated by anyone. Oratory will not leave on its own: it will have to be sent out along with the laws, which are in sympathy with it.

The best situation, really, is neither to be wronged nor to do wrong, and this is the purpose and aim of rhetoric for Aristides. Oratory, then, by agreeing with the laws, prevents both being wronged and doing wrong, which is ranked by Plato as the best situation of all.\textsuperscript{607} Then if to be wronged is stopped by oratory, and doing wrong by both philosophy and oratory, then oratory is better than philosophy by that amount. The man who compels others to be just, will be the first to be so. The orator makes others good and watches out for them. As a result, the good man will not necessarily be an orator, but an orator you can be sure is a good man, and will lead others to this state.\textsuperscript{608}

If to do wrong is worse, however, then why would Plato work so hard to defend his republic? Why, asks Aristides, did Plato separate and pay the highest honor in his "bookish" republic (ἡ ἐν τῇ βιβλίῳ πόλις) to a fighting force (τὸ μάχημα) so that the city

\textsuperscript{607} \textit{Gorgias} 469c: Socrates: "For my part, I wouldn't want either, but if I had to choose, I would choose suffering over doing what it unjust."

\textsuperscript{608} By definition, since we would not call a bad man by the name "orator."
will be protected?  Why so many precautions if to be wronged is not the greatest evil? Either being wronged is to be avoided, or such precautions are unnecessary. Why would he make so many laws for those who do wrong? Aristides cheekily asks Plato why he "has orated" (ῥητορεύεις) over such concerns, showed an importance for preambles, and provided "twin examples of them" (275). Either doing wrong is the worse of the two, or punishments for those who do wrong are as necessary as Plato seems to think (as in Gorgias 480a). Plato, according to Aristides, is caught again in a logical paradox (276).

There are two notes concerning this argument. First, the work of Plato's second class of auxiliaries consists primarily of dividing the classes into three and enforcing the laws of the Guardians, and secondarily of watching for invasion from without (a point that is of great importance for Aristides). Second, there is no mention by Aristides here

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609 The Guardians of the city: "But let us arm these sons of earth and conduct them under the leadership of their rulers. And when they have arrived they must look out for the fairest site in the city for their encampment, a position from which they could best hold down rebellion against the laws from within and repel aggression from without as of a wolf against the fold," Republic 415d.

610 "...it is worse for those who do wrong whenever they are not punished and it is fitting according to you for one to denounce himself whenever he does wrong," 273; Gorgias 480a: "But if he is guilty of wrongdoing, either himself or anyone else he may care for, he must go of his own free will where he may soonest pay the penalty."

611 "Why do you orate over each of these so seriously if suffering punishment and not permitting wrongdoing were not matters of importance," 275.

612 For the idea of "twin examples," see Laws 721a-723d: "When one hears and compares this law with the former one, it is possible to judge in each particular case whether the laws ought to be at least double in length, through combining threats with persuasion, or only single in length, through employing threats alone."

613 Those who help the true, ruling guardians; at Republic 4.434c the three classes are listed as χρηματιστικός, ἐπικουρικός, φυλακικός, "the money-makers, the helpers, and the guardians."
(or anywhere) that different concerns in different dialogues may be responsible for certain discrepancies in precepts.

For Aristides, all these arguments are in accordance with other authors, but, even better, he can add that actual testimony is added by Plato's own words and especially his deeds. He asks why Plato sailed three times to Sicily (280). The answer is for the sake of Dion and the profession of philosophy, but also to work against harm and wrongdoing by using argumentation (or rhetoric) (281). Clearly, any one can more effectively defend himself against his enemy than by permitting him to do wrong and by considering how no one will punish him (283). These riddles were solved and refuted by Plato himself by truly making clear "where their rottenness lies" (284).

It is the introduction of Plato's actions that will incur the wrath of the Middle Platonists at Pergamum. So far having focused on his words, this addition will add a new dimension to Aristides' speech. The reason for Aristides' interest in this approach is to show that Plato agrees with him in both word and deed, "since he shows a high regard for the approval of the individual with whom the argument takes place" (119). The reference is to the Gorgias:

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\text{άλλα ἐγὼ σοι ἔχω ὅν υἱὸν ὁμολογῶ· οὐ χάρι νευδομαρτυρας πολλοῦς κατ᾽ ἐμού παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν μὲ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἄν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἐνα ὁντα μάρτυρα παρασχοματι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὅν λέγω, οὐδέν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὅν ἂν ἣμῖν ὁ λόγος ἦ; οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγὼ σοι μάρτυρι μίας ἔχω ὅνομος, τοὺς δ′}
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614 Cf. Gorgias 471e-472d: "My wonderful man, you're trying to refute me in oratorical style [ῥητορικῶς γὰρ ἐπιχειρεὶς ἐλέγχειν], the way people in law courts do when they think they're refuting some claim. [...] This refutation is worthless, as far as truth is concerned, for it might happen sometimes that an individual is brought down by the false testimony of many reputable people."
Nevertheless, though I am only one person, I don't agree with you. You don't compel me; instead you produce many false witnesses against me and try to banish me from my property, the truth. But if on my part I fail to produce you as my one witness to confirm what I say, I consider I have achieved nothing of any account towards the matter of our discussion, whatever it may be; nor have you either, I conceive, unless I act alone as your one witness, and you have nothing to do with all these other people.

Taking this cue, Aristides wants to obtain Plato's endorsement more than anyone else's (and by means of his own testimony), since it is solely with him that this speech is engaged.

The evidence for the trips of Plato to Sicily is taken from Plato's 7th and 8th letters. The genuineness of the Epistulae has gone through tremendous flux. By the end of the 19th century, all had become spurious. Since then, the important Epistulae 7 and 8 have perhaps the most defenders of any of the 13. These two letters were used as attacks against Plato in antiquity, with which tradition Aristides was familiar. What is important for us is that all the letters were considered genuine in antiquity. Aristides directly quotes from Epistula 7 328c-329a, and indirectly from Epistula 7 350b and following. Part of Aristides' argument here is that the letters themselves, as well as the trips, were opportunities to persuade. Here he has support for Plato's unrecognized respect for oratory (as persuasion and argumentation). Epistulae 7 and 8 are usually

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615 For scholarly opinion on the genuineness of Plato's letters, see Post 1925, Souilhé 1926, Morrow 1935; for the argument against the 7th letter, Shorey 1933, Cherniss 1945, Ryle 1966, Edelstein 1966.
616 Behr 1986:455n187; see also Behr 1968:193-196.
One of the rather outstanding events in Plato's later life was his intervention in the politics of Syracuse. The fact that the trips were failures is not controversial. The first trip, made in order to implement his philosophical theories into the governance of the state, was, in the least, unsuccessful. Dion, who had invited Plato to Syracuse a second time, was then banished at the beginning of the reign of Dionysius II. In 357 BCE, Dionysius II invited Plato out to promote a reconciliation with Dion, which also failed. Dion was murdered in 354 BCE. The letters, if genuine, were written by Plato just after his murder. That these events would be a sensitive issue for Platonists is not exactly a shocking revelation.

The upshot of Aristides' use of the trips is to show that Plato had gone to Sicily with the idea that argumentation and rhetoric, political and philosophical—"whether or not it must be called an art"—would solve the problems that had developed there and persuade those in power there to stop doing wrong, (282). That he went back after the first unsuccessful trip was his testament to his faith in Dion, his own profession, and in the possibilities of oratory (281-282). Plato's actions are in agreement with Aristides' arguments in defense of oratory.

Aristides' insistence that his pointing out the failures of Plato's trips in fact honors the philosopher of course has a false ring. These arguments are in the least slanderous, no
matter how much the author worries that anyone "at all may think that in these arguments I am using this occasion to accuse or slander Plato" (295). The true targets of the work as a whole, however, are the local Platonists, who knew Plato almost solely from the Timaeus, as well as the Cynics and Skeptics who were in the habit of using the Gorgias to attack oratory.

In his use of Socrates' deeds, Aristides has occasion to refer to "what he said or did not say." Aristides doubts the accuracy of Plato's remarks about the defense and the many problems that had accumulated from the Apology (e.g., 19a). The use of Xenophon's deeds, as "one of the same stock" as Plato, is parallel with the previous literary support of Aeschines in section 69.

We are at "the very summit" of Plato's argument: we must show Plato is in fact refuted and refuted by his own words (304). The Laws provides the perfect evidence for Aristides' argument: in order to live a happy life, one must not do wrong nor be wronged by others (305). If oratory prevents wronging or being wronged, then it is a kind of philosophy. If philosophy is only used to disallow someone to be wronged, then oratory is a better kind of philosophy. How, then, can something be the perfect good and the

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619 Though given their famous distaste for oratory, the Cynics can still be seen as employing a type of rhetoric that reflects their particular ethos, namely one of confrontation and frankness; see K. Kennedy 1999.
620 E.g., Sextus Empiricus (Adversus Mathematicos 2) that oratory is not an art.
621 A reference to Delium, as in Symposium 220e-221b.
622 Pace Behr 1986:455n196. We also see Maximus purporting no defense from Socrates at all, contrary to the Platonic (and Xenophonic) tradition.
623 As Xenophon recorded them: Anabasis 1.7.1.
perfect evil (306)? If the good man is happy and one cannot possess oratory unless one is good, orators are truly happy; oratory is indeed the very finest thing for Aristides.

This idea of this point being "the very summit" (ἐπ᾽αὐτὸν ἡδῆ τὸν κολοφῶνα) of Plato's argument is from Laws 673d. Aristides wants Plato not only to testify on the points where he is refuted, but also, as if present, to bear witness in his own voice (304). The text he quotes is from Laws 829a, and concerns the requirements that those who live a happy life neither wrong others nor allow oneself to be wronged. Aristides is quite "pleased" with this testimony from Plato (ἰοῦ ἱοῦ τῆς μαρτυρίας!), since it provides him such ammunition. Oratory, having been proven to provide these things in the best manner, is "good and even the greatest of goods." But then, of course, if this is the case than oratory cannot be simultaneously so perfect and so perfectly evil, as Plato writes.

If the definition of philosophy is the same, then oratory is a kind of philosophy (φιλοσοφία τις οὖσα ἢ ῥητορική φαίνεται, 305), as it is characterized perhaps in the Phaedrus (e.g., 269bc)(261-266). But if it is enough for philosophy to prevent wrongdoing only, then oratory is even more perfect. How then can orators hold the least power, as Plato says? Orators are happy, or at least not wretched, according to Plato's

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624 ἐπὶ τοῖνυν τῇ τῆς μέθης χρείας τόν κολοφῶνα πρώτον ἐπιθῶμεν εἰ καὶ σφῶν συνδοκεί.
625 In the Laws (829a), Plato requires that "one do not injury, nor allow any to be done to you by others." The difficulty does not lie so much in the first, but in being strong enough to be immune to injury.
626 Plato who "shares in that epigram and through whom the race of Ariston [Plato's father] is truly 'divine'," Republic 304; cf. also 368a: παίδες Αρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θείον γένος ἀνδρός.
627 "Then, to my thinking, the orators have the smallest power of all who are in their city," Gorgias 466b.
argument, if the completely good man is happy and it is "impossible to possess this power if one is not completely good" (306). Aristides believes he has shown, contrary to Plato, that orators are more effective than both philosophers and philosophy by preventing wrongdoing of any type, are happier since the true orator is completely good, and are the most powerful by using the greatest good for the greatest purposes.

Often Plato wants to assail oratory, but instead accuses tyrants and potentates, "combining the uncombinable" (τὰ ἄμυκτα μιγνύζ, 307). For Aristides, tyranny and oratory are opposed, just as he showed force and persuasion are opposed (308). Oratory, (or persuasion) is good, the tyrant (or force) is evil. As the slave is to the master, so is the flatterer to the tyrant. Orators are flatterers when among the potentates, tyrants, and common men, and tyrants are certainly not flatterers (309). Therefore, since they use force, if oratory is flattery, then the accusations regarding tyrants are not appropriate. If oratory is classed with tyranny, it has already by that time become flattery (309). One of these statements must be false, and Aristides has already shown that oratory is by definition not flattery.

The connection of oratory to tyrants and "potentates" (δυνάσται) is from Gorgias 523a-526b, where, at the very end of the dialogue, Socrates provides the myth of Zeus' laws for the judges of those dead who are bound for the Isles of the Blest. The dead were able to undeservedly make their way to the Isles because of witnesses and testimony that convinced the "awestruck" judges (523c). Those who are worst and do the most damage are from the ranks of the most powerful: "kings, tyrants, potentates, and those most
active in the affairs of cities" (525d). The majority of Greece's potentates has proven to be bad (526b) and are then a natural correlate to tyrants for Plato; not so for Aristides.

So there are two contradictions in which Plato finds himself, according to Aristides. First, oratory is proven to be both important and unimportant to Plato. The second is that Plato connects tyranny and oratory, but tyranny is mutually exclusive with oratory (it is at that point "flattery"), in the same way that force and persuasion are incompatible. Oratory ("if this must be said," 311) is as far from despotism as Plato is from Dionysius. And, as long as oratory is preserved, there is no tyranny: the tyrant fears someone who can stand and speak against his authority in persuasion and by argument.

Aristides asks why it is that all orators disagree with one another--why there is no unity among them. This argument (315-318) moves beyond anything Plato has said. That oratory is not unified cannot be support for an accusation against it, since the same criticism can be leveled against philosophy. Orators are no less orators for not agreeing--the original goal of justice is not impeded. Oratory, then, does not have a double or self-contradictory nature, as Plato wrote. The

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628 Philosophers, for Plato, would presumably be in agreement since the Good is one and unified. After the Hellenistic period, and by the second century, no such promise could possibly be made. Cf. Lucian's *De parasito* (30).

629 *Gorgias* 503ab: "For if this thing also is twofold, one part of it, I presume, will be flattery and a base mob-oratory, while the other is noble--the endeavor, that is, to make the citizens' souls as good as possible, and the persistent effort to say what is best, whether it prove more or less pleasant to one's hearers." Aristides has already shown that oratory is the noble endeavor, and that the ignoble is flattery and does not touch the art of oratory in its evil aim.
original goal of oratory is not impeded, nor is the reason for which oratory was first discovered: justice.

So Aristides ends the first book of the speech against Plato, and the end of the first defense of oratory.630

1.7. The Examples of the Virtues of the Four Orators (319-343)

Aristides criticizes Plato's use of his examples of orators in the *Gorgias*. The philosopher thought Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles did not govern the city to the best ends. The Four are taken from *Gorgias* 503c: (Callicles) "Why, do you hear no mention of Themistocles and what a good man he was, and Cimon and Miltiades and the great Pericles, who has died recently, and whom you have listened to yourself?"631 This division of the speech into this second part is often considered "unnatural" (cf. note 647) seems less so when thought of as the basis for the next long speech by Aristides: *Against Plato: On Behalf of the Four*. This second section anticipates many of the methods of argumentation in that later speech, which we will see is first developed in *To Capito*.

Had Plato justly accused these men of not governing the city for the best ends, then they would justly be believed to be bad. Yet, even with this concession, for Aristides the argument in defense of oratory is untouched (319). Aristides' initial response to

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630 According to Behr, the division of the second book, which begins here, is as old as Sopater of Apamea (300 CE), if he was the author of the *Hypothesis* to oration 3. It is possible that Porphyry knew nothing of the unnatural division.

631 Also *Gorgias* 515b: "Then if this is what the good man ought to accomplish for his country, recall now those men whom you mentioned a little while ago, and tell me if you still consider that they showed themselves good citizens--Pericles and Cimon and Miltiades and Themistocles."
Plato's charge is to provide a speech from the mouths of these resurrected statesmen "in the same way Dion is made by Plato to talk to the Syracusans" (321).^632

In Aristides' *prosopopoeia*, the Four would address Plato in the following way:

We did not know your science of virtue, but we were earnest (321).^633 We made it so that philosophers were able to exist, and that you were given certain freedoms. We did not concede to the barbarians, and we did not allow others to. We taught Greece, and we displayed our virtue as best we could. Why did you charge us with flattery and servitude? You should instead thank us for your freedom and safety (322).

The invented speech is followed in fact by Plato's words on behalf of the murdered Dion, from *Epistula* 8 (355c-356b), and concerns the invaluable service those from the past (including our Four) provided Greece as a whole (324). These statesmen enjoy benefit that was created by those who freed Greece from the Persians--the benefit or high esteem ought to be placed back on them (326). According to Plato (328), these men are to be praised, even though in the same breath he insults their worth.

The oddity for Aristides is that Plato uses the Four as proof that oratory is flattery, as if they were orators (329). This misdirection then frees them from the charge of flattery, for Plato himself denies that they use flattery when he speaks of their misfortunes. Only one argument can be true: if oratory is flattery, and they were in fact

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^632 *Epistula* 8.355cd: "Thus, I exhort Dion's friends to declare what I am advising to all the Syracusans, as being the joint advice both of Dion and myself; and I will be the interpreter of what he would have said to you now, were he alive and able to speak." Aristides uses this technique of *prosopopoeia* again in speech 3: *Against Plato: The Defense of the Four* starting at 367, Behr 1986:456n.217.

^633 The implication that knowledge of the science of virtue allows for its applicability and not vice-versa, is noteworthy.
orators, then they must be flatterers (330). But, if they are not flatterers, how can oratory be flattery because of them? Upon examination of their true professions, this whole argument is completely unfair. The Four did not become bad men because they were not successful in their plans. Rather, they would be bad if they had not advised what was best under the circumstances. The former is to accuse Fate, not the men; the latter is to accuse a policy, not a profession.

Aristides finishes this section with an attack on Plato's own actions: "Did you, Plato, or Socrates for that matter, Aristides asks, ever lead the Athenians toward what is best?" (331) While the Four led and worked to lead well, neither Plato nor Socrates conceded to steer the way (though Socrates certainly fulfilled his military duty). The orators, then, were more profitable for the people; while they did not yield, Plato shirked from his responsibility. They feared nothing--neither jurors, fate, nor fortune--when in fact it would have been easier to run. So, the Athenians were not made best of all by these men, but Aristides suggests we consider how terrible they would have been without them. As Plato writes, because of the pull of pleasure, next to a cook a doctor would starve before boys who did not understand the truth. One can only do so much when competing with pleasure and vice. If the Four sometimes stumbled in guiding civic affairs toward the best end, why is it a particular wonder? What is important is that they did not flatter

634 Aristides also asks Plato about the leadership of Speusippus (Plato's nephew and disciple) and Chaerephon (the intimate companion of Socrates)? "You would deny [that they helped]," 331.
635 "Thus cookery assumes the form of medicine, and pretends to know what foods are best for the body; so that if a cook and a doctor had to contend before boys, or before men as foolish as boys, as to which of the two, the doctor or the cook, understands the question of sound and noxious foods, the doctor would starve to death," Gorgias 464d.
Greece by charming it, but rather by arousing it, teaching it, being themselves examples of how to display virtue in the height of danger.636

While looking at further examples of those in civic power, Aristides denies that Alcibiades and Critias should be used against Socrates as proof that he corrupted the young.637 If that is the case, neither should we say that Pericles and Themistocles failed because they did not teach political virtue to everyone. In fact, one could provide the same argument about the gods: men are guided by gods, but say and do many things against them. Unlike the gods, who have been unable after all this time to tame men, as "when a charioteer acquired horses who kick, he calms and tames them, and finally rides them safely and comfortably wherever he wishes" (338).638 In the Second Sophistic, the image of the charioteer (ἡνίοχος) from the Phaedrus has become standard for both the recklessness of the untamed soul, as well as the model for rational living.639 Though the Phaedrus image is ubiquitous in the second century, it is not the only Platonic charioteer

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636 These characteristics sound much like Socrates' defense in Plato's Apology. The flattery and charm examples are from the Gorgias 502a: Flute players do not play with an eye to what is best, but to what has been invented for the sake of pleasure.

637 As Aristides writes, both of these students of Socrates have been so often criticized by both the "democrats" and the "moderates," it is impossible to believe at this point that Critias is not the worst of the Greeks. According to Xenophon, Socrates' alleged corruption of Alcibiades and Critias was a primary concern of Socrates' prosecutors, Memorabilia 1.2.12-48. See Wood & Wood 1978.

638 καὶ ὁ μὲν ἡνίοχος παραλαβὼν λακτίζοντας τοὺς ἱπποὺς προάνει καὶ τιθαισεῖς καὶ τελευτῶν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἄσφαλῶς καὶ κατάπληθα πολλὴν ῥήστον ἐπίθαν ὅποι βούλεται, 338. Reference to the Charioteer from the Phaedrus, who uses reason to tame the appetitive and spirited horses.

639 E.g., Phaedrus 247e: ἐλθοῦσι δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ ἡνίοχος πρὸς τὴν φάτνην τοὺς ἱπποὺς στήσας παρέβαλεν ἀμβροσίαν τε καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς νέκταρ ἐπότισεν. For more on the charioteer in a Second Sophistic author, see the section on Maximus, above. For a general overview, see Trapp 1990.
in the dialogues: e.g., Gorgias 516e: "Good drivers, at any rate, do not keep their seat in the chariot at their first race to be thrown out later on, when they have trained their teams and acquired more skill in driving!" On a wider scale, however, Aristides wants to question the helpfulness of the argument in the Gorgias that blames the shepherd for the unruly stock. Our author is referencing Gorgias' "blame the student, not the teacher" argument from the Gorgias (456c7-7c7). Plato, then, is just a simple slanderer: he asks Pericles and Themistocles to do what the gods cannot. This is unrealistic and unfair, given that these men tried to make men's faults as small as possible.

What is more, Plato praises those before him and their virtue in a funeral oration, and he includes Pericles and Themistocles among these. Aristides finds that Plato shows his agreement with this assessment of the Four, when the latter wrote his funeral oration that included the deeds of these men (340). The Platonic authorship of the Menexenus was unquestioned in antiquity (it is included in the Alexandrian divisions), even though the oration has more of the character of a rhetoric exercise than any other work of Plato. Aristotle quotes the work as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators praised "the Athenians among the Athenians." The existence of this rather rhetorical

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640 "Well, at any rate a herdsman in charge of asses or horses or oxen would be considered a bad one for being like that--if he took over animals that did not kick him or butt or bite, and in the result they were found to be doing all these things out of sheer wildness," Gorgias 516a.

641 Presumably, philosophy is not something that can be used against citizens in the way sophistry or rhetoric can, so this issue is not raised.

642 See Philip 1970.

643 "For it is true, as Socrates says in the Funeral Speech (ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ), that 'the difficulty is not to praise the Athenians at Athens but at Sparta'," Aristotle Rhetoric 3.14.11. See also Rhetoric 1.9.30.
oration gives natural support for those Second Sophistic authors who wish to emphasize Plato's sympathetic contribution to epideictic literature or, as here, oratory in general. The question is: Can Plato blame oratory, which follows the same impulse, when he undertook epideictic exercise as a demonstration of the power and grace of his prose style (as in the Periclean oration)?

Matching Thucydides with "the same literary skill," according to Aristides, the *Menexenus* praises the Four and all like them (340). In that work, Plato mentions that others make the deeds of the earlier Greek leaders the theme of lyric and other poetry. These events rank higher than those of Marathon and Salamis: Plato concludes that these actions "showed to the barbarians 'that all wealth and power yield to virtue'" (341). Themistocles and Miltiades provided advice at these events in history, so when he praises those who counseled and acted in this way, he praises those statesmen. Therefore, we see that Plato is merely a slanderer not only of oratory, but also of the Four. What is more, Plato still blames oratory and the Four even though he used them in his demonstration of the power and grace of oratory in his own prose style. He is a witness

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644 "These exploits, therefore, for these reasons I judge that we should pass over, seeing also that they have their due need of praise; but those exploits for which as yet no poet has received worthy renown for worthy cause, and which lie still buried in oblivion, I ought, as I think, to celebrate, not only praising them myself but providing material also for others to build up into odes and other forms of poetry in a manner worthy of the doers of those deeds," *Menexenus* 239c. This gives an example of the prose style and rhetorical device the author achieves.

645 "It is by realizing this position of affairs that we can appreciate what manner of men those were, in point of valor, who awaited the onset of the barbarians' power, chastised all Asia's insolent pride, and were the first to rear trophies of victory over the barbarians; whereby they pointed the way to the others and taught them to know that the Persian power was not invincible, since there is no multitude of men or money but courage conquers it," *Menexenus* 240d.
that these men did not guide their fellow citizens in what was worst, nor satisfied the
citizens' desires, but led them in such deeds which not even Plato would be ashamed to
praise and attribute virtue to their accomplishment. This, then, is a false accusation, so
Plato must not be allowed to blame the Four for their inability to educate fully all the
Athenians in political virtue.

1.8. Plato's Argument of the Two Oratories: Real and Apparent (344-361)

Aristides finally asks how Plato bears witness to the principle argument: he has
divided points about this argument in the *Gorgias*. There are two natures of oratory: one
is flattery, which disregards the public welfare and the sake of their private affairs, and
the other fair, which has concern for their fellow citizens. Therefore, even according to
Plato orators sometimes say what is best and sometimes they do not.

In the *Gorgias*, Plato poses both the question and the answer regarding his view
of rhetoric:

**Socrates:** Do the orators strike you as speaking always with a view to what
is best (πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν), with the single aim (τοῦτου στοχαζόµενοι) of making the citizens as good as possible by their
speeches, or are they, like the poets, set on gratifying the citizens, and do they, sacrificing the common weal to their own personal
interest, behave to these assemblies as to children, trying merely to
gratify them (χαρίζεσθαι), nor care at all whether they will be
better or worse in consequence?

**Callicles:** This question of yours is not quite so simpl
who have a regard for the citizens in the words that they utter, while there are also others of the sort that you mention.

**Socrates:** That is enough for me. For if this thing also is twofold, one part of
it, I presume, will be flattery and a base mob-oratory (κολακεία ἄν εἰη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δηµυγορία), while the other is noble—the
endeavor, that is, to make the citizens' souls as good as possible (ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται τὸ δ' ἔτερον καλὸν), and the persistent effort
to say what is best (ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἐσονται), whether it
prove more or less pleasant to one's hearers. (502e-503a)

This anaskeueê clearly goes some way to supporting Aristides' previous point that even Plato knows that good oratory is noble, and bad oratory is mere flattery. The distinction between the two oratories--one real, one apparent--is in fact one made by Plato himself. Aristides was clever to make the argument that a bad orator is not an orator at all (as a erring helmsman is in fact no helmsman) much earlier in the argument (circa 234), so that this real/apparent distinction in oratory seems to be an obvious ramification of his speech.

Plato's mistake, then, was to divide oratory in two parts and then criticize them as one (345). And regarding the "real" oratory, one rhetor was especially honorable in the eyes of his fellow citizens, i.e., Alcibiades. And, as long as there is one example, then not all rhetores can be considered ignoble. Alcibiades' mere existence disproves all of Plato's previous categorical arguments regarding this particular class of men.

Aristides provides text from the Gorgias that shows Alcibiades, as an honorable man, is an example of the "fair and good men" (καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ) who will exist in the future. 646 Such men have the power to do harm, but who have passed life justly (as Aristides has proven orators to do above). Such men are few, since, as mentioned previously, 647 the common run of potentates are bad (346).

The existence of a single example of an honorable orator is enough for Aristides to make his case. Further, this example is not even necessary: he says there will be more in

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646 Cf. Gorgias 525e-526b.
647 Sections 309-310, above.
the future. The existence of such men "who have existed here and elsewhere" is further support that Plato does not believe in the complete absence of good orators who are free from flattery (354).

The quotes were purposely placed "in the middle of the myth" in the *Gorgias*, according to Aristides—not by chance or clumsily, but so that these sentiments may be concealed as much as possible. The myth of the judgment of the gods concerning men's eligibility for the Isles of the Blest was used above to criticize the connection of potentates with tyrants (309-310). The argument is hidden and yet still can be found with some care, and so if someone should hit upon this argument and use it against him, Plato would not seem to have overlooked it completely (348)—in other words, it is implicitly argued that Plato was anticipating Aristides. Plato had thus found a middle ground at the end of the dialogue (where the myth is found). If he had put the section in the beginning of the dialogue, his more slanderous arguments could not have been made.

The treatment of the Four by the very people they were supposed to improve in an indication, for Plato, their poor leadership. Having "added chariots and such things" to this argument, Plato clearly set Alcibiades aside in this section of the *Gorgias*. Since Alcibiades was also ill-treated by the Athenians, like the Four, and ill-treatment is the basis of Plato's proof against their effectiveness, then Plato is again refuted in this series of his accusations.

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648 *Gorgias* 526a: ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθαδὶ καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν.
649 The judgment of the Isles of the Blest: *Gorgias* 523a-527a.
650 *Gorgias* 516e: "Good drivers, at any rate, do not keep their seat in the chariot at their first race to be thrown out later on, when they have trained their teams and acquired more skill in driving!"
1.9. Promotion of the Power of the True Orator (362-437)

Plato introduces the helmsman to make the orator humble by comparison (362).

The helmsman is compared with the orator in the Gorgias:

καὶ μὴν σώζει γε καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἰς τι τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν οὐ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ’ αὐτῇ σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἐγὼ σομείων ταύτης ἔρω, τὴν κυβερνητικήν, ἢ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύνων, ὡσπερ ἢ ῥητορική.

Yet, you know, [swimming] too saves men from death, when they have got into a plight of the kind in which that accomplishment is needed. But if this seems to you too small a thing, I will tell you of a more important one, the art of piloting, which saves not only our lives but also our bodies and our goods from extreme perils, as rhetoric does.

Nowhere does Aristides seem to use this concession by Plato that rhetoric also saves men, perhaps because Plato immediately launches into a criticism of its vainglorious, performative tendency.651

The helmsman only saves men,652 and only those on his ship. Aristides recognizes that the orator both saves and kills,653 so has twice the power, and further does so for

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651 "And at the same time [piloting] is plain-fashioned and orderly, not giving itself grand airs in a pretence of performing some transcendent feat; but in return for performing the same as the forensic art…the actual possessor of the art, after performing all this, goes ashore and strolls on the quay by his vessel's side, with an unobtrusive demeanor," Gorgias 511de.

652 "And so he reckons out how wrong it is that, whereas a victim of severe and incurable diseases of the body who has escaped drowning is miserable in not having died, and has got no benefit at his hands, yet, if a man has many incurable diseases in that part of him so much more precious than the body, his soul, that such a person is to live, and that he will be doing him the service of saving him either from the sea or from a law court or from any other peril whatsoever," Gorgias 511e. Pilots do not have the luxury of deciding who lives or dies, as the orator does; which provides more proof of the orator's use of reason.
cities, at war and at peace, on land or at sea (368); he persuades someone when to sail and when to stay at port. What is the power the helmsman uses when he wants to say anything about his art, or wants to "bury us with arguments?" (372) The reference in Plato is from the *Gorgias* (521bc): "And yet, if he chose to speak as you people [orators] do, Callicles, magnifying his business, he would bury you in a heap of words, pleading and urging the duty of becoming engineers, as the only thing; because nothing else amounts to anything." The faculty to convince to build is not the engineer's--his talent lies in the building. The engineer will not get a chance to use his skill if the orator does not prevail: ἵκανος γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος ("and his speech will be enough," *Gorgias* 512c)

This is the same argument Plato uses about expertise and philosophy. In the *Gorgias* (519a), the rhetorical politician provides citizens with what they need (dockyards, walls, triremes). The true politician, however, should be concerned only with the souls of the citizens, and Socrates is considered the only example of such a man (521d). Men think they know what they need, but do not; someone responsible is required to tell them what that is (467-8). What is important, again from the *Gorgias* (471e-472b), is reasoned argument, and not the will of the majority. That is, we need is an

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653 Polus: "Are they not like the despots, in putting to death anyone they please, and depriving anyone of his property and expelling him from their cities as they may think fit?" *Gorgias* 466c.
654 The exclamation in this section--ὦ Γοργεία κεφαλή--is a play on Gorgias' Gorgon-like name.
655 καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμινύων τὸ πράγμα, καταχώσειν ἄν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγον καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γῆνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὦς ουδὲν τᾶλλα ἔστιν.
656 As we know from the *Republic* (6.492), the general populace is the greatest sophist of them all.
expert, but the question remains what type of individual that might be. For Plato, the expert must not be the one who can argue the most effectively, but he who has experience with the Forms: the philosopher.\textsuperscript{657} For Gorgias (and our Aristides), for whom the Forms play no part in politics or morality, the expert is the one who uses rhetoric. We do not need the sophist, then, but the rhetor, i.e., the one who has the best interest of the citizens in mind and the talent to convince them to do what is right.

Related to the shadow argument from flattery, Plato holds gymnastic trainers in higher esteem than doctors (374).\textsuperscript{658} The superiority of the gymnastic trainers over the doctor is not as surprising as that of the helmsman over the orator (374).\textsuperscript{659} People survive without training, but everyone needs medicine (here we should recall Aristides' extremely poor health and reliance on Asclepius).

Quoted above is the argument that swimming also saves people's lives (376, cf. Gorgias 511c). Again, for Aristides, that skill saves only the one with that knowledge, while the orator can save cities. In the Gorgias, the swimmer is an example for Plato of someone who has no grandeur but still has power over life and death, unlike the orator who is full of pretense.

\textsuperscript{657} Though Plato tells us who should be responsible for men's souls, he begs the question of who should control the ship of state; for more on this argument, see Sharples 1994:51.
\textsuperscript{658} Gorgias 520b: "Yet in reality sophistic is a finer thing than rhetoric by so much as legislation is finer than judicature, and gymnastic than medicine: in fact, for my own part, I always regarded public speakers and sophists [δημηγόροι τε καὶ σοφισταὶ] as the only people who have no call to complain of the thing that they themselves educate, for its wickedness towards them; as otherwise they must in the same words be also charging themselves with having been of no use to those whom they say they benefit."

\textsuperscript{659} Gorgias 520b: "Yet in reality sophistic is a finer thing than rhetoric by so much as legislation is finer than judicature, and gymnastic than medicine."
Aristides sums up the argument so far and shows again that all the virtues are found in oratory (382). Oratory partakes in every aspect of virtue. It was discovered by intelligence on behalf of justice, and is preserved through moderation and courage. Orators discover what is necessary, arrange it and present it with adornment and force. Oratorical moderation is a harmony between theme and probability in speech. Oratorical propriety is essential in justice and is the maintenance of length and quality in a speech that is suited to the matter. Oratorical argumentation is the height of courage; nothing bans and scorns that which is meager and ignoble like it.

The virtues of the oratory do not stop there. The orator must know when to speak and when to keep silent (384). Contrary to Plato, then, the knowledge of the right time to be silent no more belongs to the philosopher than to the orator. The man who knows what is it proper to say, then, knows what it is proper to do. He who knows what should be done by another, knows what must be done by himself. Therefore, the same man is clearly able to say and do what is necessary; and the man who errs in one, most likely errs in both respects (385-6).

The knowledge of when to speak and when to keep silent seems an oblique reference to the practitioner of "philosophical rhetoric" at Phaedrus 276a—knowledge of the right time (καιρός). The use of reason and the virtues, according to Aristides,

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660 "The word which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner, which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak, and before whom to be silent."

661 For the right moment for the orator in Aristides, see 384-386; in Plato, see Phaedrus 272a.
allows the orator to say at every moment the best thing to say--and knowing the best thing to say is to know the best thing to do, reversing Plato's formulation.

In the style of Plato, Aristides looks to follow up his logical proof with a "true myth": "I shall tell a myth which does not purposely end in itself, but even here will be factual proof…" (383). The myth tells the story of oratory's invention and continued use between men in cities, both personally and in the pursuit of virtue.

Aristides takes from the Gorgias (527a) the notion that a myth need not merely entertain but can provide further factual support for an argument. Aristides' tale works to provide an etiological account of oratory, and is clearly set along the lines of Protagoras' creation myth in the first half of his "Great Speech" in the Protagoras (320c-328d). There, Protagoras shows that justice comes about through the sheer need of survival for men (Protagoras 322d), who cannot live alone (322c). Aristides has already linked oratory and justice (e.g., as early as 235), and so oratory is the reason for both man's survival and the existence and continuation of justice. Aristides ends with the observation, which he feels has been proven sufficiently, that as long as men live together and deal with one another in any way (i.e., publicly and privately), oratory will be necessary (401-402).

As we have seen, from the beginning oratory has a connection to Hermes (19), but ("if Plato is to be trusted") also to the race of daemones who send messages between gods.

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662 "Possibly, however, you regard this as an old wife's tale, and despise it; and there would be no wonder in our despising it if with all our searching we could somewhere find anything better and truer than this." Prosopopeia is a common trick of Socrates, often used to introduce a topic or premise without having to take responsibility for it.
to men. Oratory, then, unifies the universe. The reference to Plato's race of *daemons* is as close to mentioning any real interest of the Platonists as Aristides gets. The typical text for Platonic demonology is *Symposium* 202e-203a. In Middle Platonism, this race of *daemons* connect the upper and lower realms, and, as for Maximus (Chapter 3), prevent the universe from splitting in two. Aristides uses this idea of cosmic unification for his own purposes: "Therefore in this respect one could rightly call oratory the bond of the Universe" (424).663 Therefore a clearly Platonist position is used here to prove that *daemons*, representing oratory, are what keeps the universe together--not metaphysically, but rhetorically.

In sections 430-438, Aristides begins to buttress his arguments with his own deep commitment to oratory.664 Because of the section's personal nature, Plato momentarily leaves the discussion.

### 1.10. Plato Does in Fact Praise Oratory (438-445)

One final thing is left to Aristides: to prove that Plato himself issues the same views about oratory that he has. He will argue that oratory is a partner of the kingly art for the sake of justice as is found in Plato's *Politicus* and *Apology*.

The text Aristides uses from the *Politicus* is a qualified praise of oratory:

Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῖνυν λόγον ἔσοικε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν ἑτερα καὶ ὁπόσα ἀλλότρια καὶ τὰ μὴ φίλα πολιτικής ἐπιστήμης ἀποκεχορίσθαι, λείπεσθαι δὲ τὰ τίμια καὶ συγγενῆ. τούτων δὲ ἑστὶ ποιεῖ ηὐπερηγή καὶ δικαστικῆ καὶ ὅση βασιλικῆ κοινωνοῦσα ῥητορεία πείθουσα τὸ δίκαιον συνδιακυβερνήτευ τᾶς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράξεις. (303e-304a)

663 ὡστε καὶ σύνδεσμον τὴν ῥήτορικὴν τοῦ παντὸς ὀρθῶς ἀν καὶ <κατὰ> τοῦτο εἶποι τις. (<κατὰ> αΑ² Canter: om O.)
664 Behr 1986:449n.1; this section has been discussed in Sohlberg 1972:193-195.
By the same method, it now seems that the other matters, whatever is different and foreign, have now been separated by us from the science of statesmanship, and what is left is precious and related to it. Herein are included the arts of the general and of the juror and of oratory to the extent that it participates in the kingly art; by persuading what is just, it helps to steer the affairs in the cities.

The kingly art Plato discusses here matches Aristides' description of real oratory\textsuperscript{\textit{665}}--the apparent kind of speechmaking is shown by now to be flattery, not oratory at all. In the \textit{Apology}, Plato writes that justice is the purview of a juror, but the virtue of an orator is to speak the truth.\textsuperscript{\textit{666}} Clearly, to speak the truth is an unfamiliar skill to the flatterer. Aristides and Plato agree, then, but seem to hold opposite positions anyway (442). Even in the same arguments in this "very strange treatise," Plato agrees that it is possible for oratory to be most fair, and adds this strange and brief remark at the end: "rhetoric is to be used for this one purpose always, of pointing to what is just."\textsuperscript{\textit{667}} Aristides counters this clearly normative admonition in the \textit{Gorgias} with the fact that it is impossible to use flattery towards the ends of justice (443). As a result, Aristides feels, Plato is shown to deny that oratory is flattery or is part of the same nature (445). He

\textsuperscript{665} As well as being in agreement with Hesiod: "Again, Hesiod says that kings participated in the power of argument by a divine portion and gift" (391), cf. \textit{Theogony} 80-87.

\textsuperscript{666} \textit{Apology} 18a: "So now I make this request of you, a fair one, as it seems to me, that you disregard the manner of my speech--for perhaps it might be worse and perhaps better--and observe and pay attention merely to this, whether what I say is just or not; for that is the virtue of a judge, and an orator's (ῥήτορος) virtue is to speak the truth."

\textsuperscript{667} \textit{Gorgias} 527c: καὶ τῇ ῥήτορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.
leaves aside Plato's "fairest stream of all;" he chooses to pass over those words which "come from a temperate mouth"—all of his other statements from various texts in praise of oratory.

1.11. The Fallacy of the Idea of the Two Oratories (446-461)

Aristides can now resume at 446 the double oratory argument from section 345: i.e., that Plato did not in fact slander (the better) oratory, but, splitting the oratories in two, he demeans only the second and worse of them. The problem for Aristides is that Plato criticized oratory as if it were one—even after knowing and acknowledging it to be two (447). Plato was certainly able to keep the two separate types of love in his speeches about love in the Symposium. Two interpretations are possible: either Plato wholeheartedly acknowledges that there are two oratories and criticizes only the worse, or Plato in fact has slandered the dual oratories as if they were single. Aristides, in line with his argument, clearly feels that Plato has the weaker hold (449). The difference between oratory and flattery is the same as between philosophy and trickery, which

668 Timaeus 75e: "For all that enters in and supplies food to the body is necessary; while the stream of speech which flows out and ministers to intelligence is of all streams the fairest and most good."

669 "That is enough for me. For if this thing also is twofold, one part of it, I presume, will be flattery and a base mob-oratory, while the other is noble—the endeavor, that is, to make the citizens' souls as good as possible, and the persistent effort to say what is best, whether it prove more or less pleasant to one's hearers," Gorgias 503a.

670 "If Love were only one, it would be right; but, you see, he is not one, and this being the case, it would be more correct to have it previously announced what sort we ought to praise. Now this defect I will endeavor to amend, and will first decide on a Love who deserves our praise, and then will praise him in terms worthy of his godhead," Symposium 180c

671 See the quote above from the Politicus 303e-304a.

672 The former is held by Reiske, the latter by the scholiast, Behr 1986:459n329.
Plato would certainly also acknowledge--these are not two types of philosophy, but are two separate and unrelated things.

In his argument, therefore, Plato blamed flattery and slander, but not true oratory. It makes no different whether his target is the true or apparent sort, however, since he correctly praised oratory. He should have said that apparent oratory is not oratory at all, not that is shameful, "just as he argues somewhere" about the sons of gods--with this speech, Aristides has made such an argument.

Plato's argument, according to Aristides, then is similar to the one in the Republic (391c) where it is argued (again, "somewhere") that if they are the sons of the gods, they are not covetous, and if they are covetous, they are not the sons of the gods. (454) Instead of saying apparent oratory is not oratory, he said that oratory was shameful. In other words, both statements cannot be true at once.

But Plato exempted real oratory from criticism, Aristides understands (and quotes), at the end of the Euthydemus:

Socrates: Why, do you not hold athletics, and moneymaking, and rhetoric, and generalship, to be fine things?
Crito: Certainly I do, of course.
Socrates: Well then, in each of these, do you not see most men making a ridiculous show at their respective tasks (τοὺς πολλούς πρὸς ἕκαστον τὸ ἔργον οὐ καταγελάστους ὁρᾶς)?
Crito: Yes, I know: what you say is perfectly true. (307ab)

673 "But we must constrain the poets either to deny that these are their deeds or that they are the children of gods, but not to make both statements or attempt to persuade our youth that the gods are the begetters of evil, and that heroes are no better than men," 3.391d.
Aristides shows that Plato praises oratory and blames those who do not practice it properly. Again, he should judge oratory based on its successes, not its many failures.

A description of those who would succeed in oratory are provided by Plato in the *Phaedrus*, and is also quoted here at the end of Aristides' speech:

Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὃς Φαϊδρε, ὥστε ἁγονιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι εἰκός, ἵσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἔχειν ὀσπερ τὰ ἄλλα· εἰ μὲν σοι υπάρχει φύσιν ῥητορικῆ εἶναι, ἔσει ρήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος, προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην καὶ μελέτην· ὅτου δ’ ἃν ἐλλείπῃς τούτων, ταύτῃ ἀτελῆς ἐσει· ὅσον δ’ αὐτοῦ τέχνη...

Whether one can acquire it, so as to become a perfect orator, Phaedrus, is probably, and perhaps must be, dependent on conditions, like everything else. If you are naturally rhetorical, you will become a notable orator, when to your natural endowments you have added knowledge and practice; at whatever point you are deficient in these, you will be incomplete. But so far as the art is concerned...

Aristides trails off, "But I omit what follows," in fact leaving out Plato's final jab at oratory: "...I do not think the quest of it lies along the path of Lysias and Thrasyvachus" (269d). This text comes at the end of Plato's handbook of philosophical rhetoric. The argument is used to show that an orator, one better than any of those living, can exist under certain conditions. According to Plato, if you have the natural endowments for being an orator, you will be distinguished when you have added knowledge and practice—μελέτη, with its association with military drills as well as attention or care, is of a different type of approach to something than ἐμπειρία, which invokes a mere acquaintance. The mere possibility if this individual, whether Alcibiades or not, is enough to show that Plato does not think oratory hopeless.

674 τὰ ἄλλα is τᾶλλα in the text of the *Phaedrus* (Burnet); ἐσει: ἔση; καὶ: τε καὶ; ἔσει: ἔση; δ’: δὲ.
Aristides ends his long refutation of Plato by honoring the philosopher:

But in reply to Plato, the father and teacher of orators, it was necessary for me, as I had not received a toast from his hands, to fill the cup in return. May he receive it with noble grace, because he pledged it too; for it is not fitting for the man who strikes the first blow to run away. Others would justly pardon us if we value the gods of oratory above the good Plato. And Asclepius, the best in everything, exempts us from Plato's accusation, when he too honors us with his approval and we shall not cease to be grateful, in our verse as well as in our prose in the manner you see here (τὰ μὲν ἐν μέτροις, τὰ δὲ οὕτωσι πεζῇ). (465-466)

It seems likely that, given his pervasive Atticism, thanking Plato "in this very way in our prose" (τὰ δὲ οὕτωσι πεζῇ) at the end of the speech concerns as much Aristides' actual syntax, as the ideas discussed in his speech.

Of note is that Aristides refers to Plato as the "father and teacher of orators" (ὁ τῶν ῥητόρων πατὴρ καὶ διδάσκαλος),\(^\text{675}\) which is rather strongly put in comparison with the connection of Plato with rhetoric made at the beginning of the work.\(^\text{676}\) We would question Aristides' sincerity with this epithet if he didn't owe so much to Plato, as in fact he acknowledges throughout the work.

It may be that Aristides does not want to reject Plato outright, only Plato's rejection of the Greek heritage.\(^\text{677}\) More likely, it seems to me, neither Plato himself nor his ideas are his target at all--in fact, it is just the opposite. Rather, our author wants to reject the use of Plato in the second century, that is, his status in Middle Platonism, via Gaius and the Pergamum Platonists, and this is established by his choice of theme. In addition, and as stated on the outset, his targets also include the Cynic philosophers who

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\(^\text{675}\) The same phrase is used in To Capito 26.

\(^\text{676}\) In section 16, Plato "criticized rhetoric, in which perhaps he had some part."

have long mined the *Gorgias* for targets against oratory. The most important thing to come out of this discussion of *Against Plato* is that, with this speech, Aristides has effectively done for Plato's ideas of rhetoric what the Platonists have been doing for centuries for his metaphysics. That is, to have pulled apart disparate statements about certain topics from specific seminal works of Plato, and worked to make them consistent in order that the philosopher's thoughts could be seen clearly, distinctly, and, most importantly, in their true light.

2. Τέχνη and φύσις in Aristides

Art and nature are old correlates in Greek thought. Plato is not the first to use the opposition, but he does make frequent use of it. In the *Sophist*, for example, both nature and art are considered types of τέχνη:

678 Fragment 48 of Empedocles as found in Plato: "Fire and water and earth and air, they say, all exist by nature (φύσει) and chance (τύχῇ), and none of them by art (τέχνῃ),"

679 Early discussion of the Forms in the *Republic* show that "it is universally true, then, that that which is in the best state, by nature or art or both, admits least of alteration by something else" (Πάν ὅτι τὸ καλὸς ἐξὸν ἐφ᾽ ἔρει ὁ τέχνῃ ἐφ᾽ ἄμφοτέροις ἐλοξίστην μεταβολῆν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται, 2.381b).
images of nature) and mortals (paintings and other arts). In short, there are two kinds of production, each of them twofold (δῶ ὁ διχῇ ποιητικῆς εἴδει). This basic split between mortal and divine production, and then between real and apparent production, besides reflecting Plato's metaphysical division as sketched by the "divided line" in the Republic (509a-513e), can explain the basic organization of the whole of Aristides' Περὶ ῥητορικῆς.680

In the realm of image-making production, the maker can use himself as an instrument in imitation of someone or something real, as in the process of μίμησις. Since one can imitate with knowledge or without, we know that for Plato one who imitates with knowledge will be a philosopher. Those who imitate with no knowledge, who deal in opinion-imitation (δοξομιμητική), are further divided into those who are simple (and thus harmless) and those who are dissembling imitators (οἱ εἰρωνευκοὶ μιμηταί). Of the dissembling type of speaker, if he speaks in front of a crowd, he is a popular orator (δημολογικός). The other dissembling imitator from ignorance "who does it in private in short speeches and forces the person who converses with him to contradict himself" is the one who should "truly and absolutely be called a real and actual sophist" (ἄληθῶς αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν παντάπασιν ὃντως σοφιστήν)(267d-268c).681 The definition, then, of the "real and true" sophist in the Sophist is, "the imitative kind of the dissembling part of the art of opinion which is part of the art of contradiction and belongs to the fantastic class of the image-making art, and is not divine, but human, and has been defined in

680 For a request for more on this division, see Trapp's 1997 review of Karadimas1997.
681 This individual differs from Socrates in intention only.
arguments as the juggling part of productive activity" (268c-268d). The argument describes the difference between what men call nature and what it really is: the real projection of the divine art.

For Aristides, nature, seen as part of the divine, transcends all art, and this distinction is essential for Aristides' defense against Plato. The argument I have sketched here comes at the end of Plato's *Sophist*, and it is this scheme that Aristides' Περὶ ῥητορικῆς picks up and manipulates, though it is never mentioned.682

3. Πρὸς Καπίτωνα

Aristides wrote *To Capito* in response to the Pergamene Platonists of the school of Gaius. The school had responded, it seems, because Περὶ ῥητορικῆς had censured inconsistencies in Plato's personal behavior. This reply was apparently written in a single night to a prominent member of the school, and who was associated with the Temple of Asclepius, where Aristides had been staying for two years. The response was the forerunner to the *Defense of the Four*, which Aristides would write 20 years later.683

The work is divided into four parts: admiration for Plato (1-7), response to the criticism created by discussion of Plato's trip to Sicily (8-19), evidence that the argument was out of respect and ought to be judged in its entirety (20-27), and Plato's slanderous language compared with Aristides' true observations (28-51).

682 Karadamis' book on the battle between Sextus and Aristides about rhetoric has been criticized as having insufficiently discussed the importance of the division of art and nature in Aristides. See Trapp's 1997 review.

683 Behr 1986:479n1.
The main charge is that Aristides in his argument made mention of Plato's trips to Sicily, seemingly attacking Plato's life. These points ought to have been kept separate, and the refutation should have been of his argument only. The defense takes on a few different approaches.

Aristides actually believes that they both agree completely in position, and that he did not in actuality slander Plato. Even so, the arguments he used could have been stronger and more damaging, even though he only told the truth. And in any case, Plato was the one who was inconsistent. He asks why, if Plato slandered so many, we are not able to refute his arguments by his acts? Lastly, in defense of his defense he asks that his readers judge the whole not just the part, because, in the end, Aristides "honors Plato like his own life."

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684 7, 8, and 10; ideological agreement is less emphasized in this shorter response, since that fact does not explain the reason for Aristides mentioning Plato's trips.
685 10 and 28; "For I did not slander Plato, as if I were trying a case in court..." 10. That Aristides did not slander Plato is the entire reason for this response and so must be proven.
686 11, 13, 20, 33, and 34; a threat made also in the first speech against Plato, and a truly insulting defense.
687 14, 19, 35, 36, and 46; Aristides is continuously amazed that the mention of true, documented events can be called slander. At the end of the speech he will accuse Plato of lying (see below).
688 17-18; Plato's inconsistency between texts is not Aristides' fault, though perhaps pointing them out is. This point is off topic from the supposed point of the letter: i.e., Plato's trips.
689 37-41, 42-45, 47, and 48; there is more made of Plato's treatment of Homer, a common difficulty for authors in the Second Sophistic, in this speech than in the first.
690 20-22; he asks them to observe the entire speech, since the Platonists only refer to the inapplicability of the Sicilian trips.
691 1, 7, 23, 25, 26, 48, and 49; the sincerity of the "honorific poem" is diminished by the dominance of a story exemplifying the preeminence of Demosthenes that takes up 31 of the 53 lines of the Behr 1978 edition.
When Aristides compares Plato's writings and life to sacred rites or mysteries, this is likely in response to the Platonists ostensibly having a tight control on his doctrines (and interpretations of personal behavior). This seems a certain impetus for the *Defense*; Aristides is ostensibly taking oratory back from Plato so that he might take back Plato from the Platonists. Of note is what seems to be a focus on the gap in language and time between himself and Plato:

For to speak by the grace of the gods, our diction is no impediment to being able to understand any of his material (οὐχὶ κόλμα τὸ μηδὲν δὲν τὸν ἕκειν νοῦ

dεξαμεθαί δύνασθαι), nor does any proclamation, even if it is one of the mysteries, drive us away, and those who have known me say that my life is in no way dissonant with his views. But whether I spoke then like him, or he now like me, no one, I think, could have come between us, not in the eyes of the one have surpassed the other, as far as our goodwill and mutual agreement on general points are concerned. (7)

The invocation of the Eleusinian Mysteries of "pure hand and understanding in voice" reveals concerns regarding initiation and scholasticism in order to understand Plato as a rhetorician, rather than as a Platonist that might focus on rather abstract affairs. Understanding Plato can be a linguistic problem for an author in the second century, but one that can be overcome. For Aristides, no one could come between himself and Plato "whether I spoke like him, or he now like me," so great is their agreement. The difference in their Greek does not bar either mutual respect or ideological agreement. But,

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692 7, 14, and 19; "Then was it proper and necessary to bring these things to light, or are we wrong in this and meddlesome, is we do not bow down in worship, as if it were to a chest concealing secret rites?" 19.
693 See Foucart 1900:308-313; Wilamowitz 1931-32:vol.2 53; Behr 1986:479n.13.
694 Behr writes that this section is about the agreement of their basic position, commenting: "i.e., the basic position of the *Gorgias* and oration II [Defense of Rhetoric] were interchangeable," Behr 1986:479n.14. It seems to me that the point here is a linguistic one, especially since Aristides' Atticism and imitation of Plato is ubiquitous.
what is more, this lack of distance between them is ideological, temporal, and figurative:

Aristides and Plato are, to our author, peers and colleagues, And, with an eye toward the truth, which "Plato everywhere honors and believes is a starting point for true friendship," Aristides confronts those points that have offended the Platonists.

Once he feels that he has defended himself adequately (28), Aristides plays on the Platonic idea of "recollection" (ἀνάμνησις):

κάμοι μὲν ἀπολελόγηται μετρίως ὑπὲρ τῆς αἰτίας, ὡς ἐγὼ νομίζω· ὅτι δὲ ἐκεῖνος ἐστιν ὁ ὡς πάνω φροντίζων εἶ τοῦ δέοι καθάπεται, μάλιστα μὲν εἰκὸς άμεινὸν σε ταῦτα ἐπιστασθαὶ τε καὶ <μεμνήσθαι>⁶⁹⁵ τούτοις σχολάζοντα, ὡς δὲ οὖν κάγὼ μέμημαι φέρε ἀναμνήσθητι. καὶ ὅπως αὖ μή με φήσεις Πλάτωνος κατηγορεῖν.
(28)

I have reasonably defended myself on this charge, as I believe. But as to the fact that it is he who does not at all care whether someone should be attacked, it is very likely that you know and recollect this better than I, since you engage in the study of his works. But come now and recall what I recall. And take care you do not again say that I am accusing Plato.

This false concession to the Platonists is underscored by what should be seen in the first speech as Aristides' "easy citation, innumerable allusions, and stylistic borrowings" of Plato.⁶⁹⁶ Aristides knowledge and familiarity with a great portion of the Platonic corpus, beyond those texts upon which the Platonists concentrated their studies, should be apparent. Yet they remain his target: by using derivatives of ἀνάμνησις (recollection),⁶⁹⁷ Aristides is mocking the Platonists with their own language.

⁶⁹⁵ <μεμνήσθαι> Bodleianus Miscell. 57 (prob. Ddf.): om. O.
⁶⁹⁶ Behr 1986:449n.1.
⁶⁹⁷ The epistemological language used here is Platonic: ἐπιστασθαί (ἐπίσταμαι, "understanding" or "knowledge" e.g., Theaetetus 163cd); μέμημαι (μυνήσκω, "recollect"; e.g., Phaedo 73); ἀναμνήσθητι (ἀναμμήνησκω, "recollect"; e.g., Phaedo 72-73).
Aristides ends this letter with the charge that Plato was far from the truth by falsifying gatherings and contriving that "the dead are together with one another as if they were alive" (50). He gives names and dates, when Socrates had died many years before.\footnote{A reference to the \textit{Symposium}; set in the archonship of Dexitheus (385-384 BCE). Socrates died in 399 BCE.} Why then is anyone upset if Aristides brings to light some of the things Plato did, when Plato is permitted to contrive that things occur together which do not correspond? This charge of falsity in literature is given by the author responsible for a speech written in the second century in favor of sending reinforcements to Sicily in the fifth century BCE.\footnote{Oration 5, \textit{Περὶ τοῦ πέμπειν βοήθειαν τοῖς ἐν Σικελίᾳ}, "On Sending Reinforcements to Sicily" the setting of which (as for Oration 6) is the conquest of Sicily led by Alcibiades in 415 BCE; see Pernot 1981. I only mean to point out the charge of mendacity in light of the genre in which Aristides worked and the general themes of the Second Sophistic.} The only difference between them, it would seem, is that Aristides never made "ubiquitous claims and exhortations to place nothing above the truth."\footnote{"But you, if you do as I ask, will give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth; and if you think what I say is true, agree to it, and if not, oppose me with every argument you can muster, that I may not in my eagerness deceive myself and you alike and go away, like a bee, leaving my sting sticking in you," \textit{Phaedo} 91c. Aristides makes much of these claims, which neither seem interpreted fairly, nor are strictly speaking claims specifically applicable to Plato. The text quoted here from the \textit{Phaedo} is put in the mouth of Socrates.}

Aristides' arguments against Plato, echoed in the short \textit{To Capito}, are rigorous and successful to varying degrees. His initial speech on behalf of rhetoric is the most "logical" of these three, with the final, \textit{On the Four}, in large part supplying further examples that prove the basic points of the first \textit{Defense}. Besides the "slander" concerning Plato's trips to Sicily, Aristides' basic approaches are two. The first is to exploit every moment where Plato admits the possibility of the noble use of rhetoric. The second is his reinterpretation...
of "conjecture" without reason (στοχάζεσθαι) into "aim" as implicitly involving reason, i.e., in the process of finding the means to one's goal. This shift in meaning allows Aristides to recast every instance in which Plato insults rhetoric as mere belief as a compliment that rhetoric is able to accomplish any speaker's goal, and does so with the aid of reason (as any art must). This "petty and eristic display" by Aristides (Usher) is indeed more "philosophic criticism than an epideictic showpiece." The latter type of display piece, *On the Four*, is more along the lines of what we find in Aristides, not to mention a good many of the orators in the Second Sophistic. In this series of three speeches, Aristides is interested in seeming able to match Plato on his own territory as well as to appear the fourth-century philosopher's equal. He is more or less unsuccessful in both goals, but his attempt is in line with the increased interest in the second century to show off a certain philosophical veneer, and the authority or target to turn to in order to accomplish, as we find in many of these authors, this is Plato.

Again, it seems that the most important thing to come out of this discussion of Aristides' trio of Platonic speeches is that Aristides, to some extent, works to do for Plato's ideas of rhetoric what the Platonists have been doing for centuries for his metaphysics, whether a scholar was working from within the Academy or during its slow demise.
Epilogue

Some common themes emerge from this study of Lucian, Maximus, and Aristides. First, their three very different treatments of Plato should be apparent. Lucian's use is one of modeling and emulation. He adopts the dialogue form for himself, and redevelops the more humorous aspects and sarcastic tones of Plato into full-blown satire. This much seems to be common knowledge, gleaned straight from his dialogues. Furthermore, Lucian develops many of his works with the structure and method of a specific Plato dialogue constantly in mind, which then works alongside his own idiomatic interpretations. Maximus, alternatively, tries to grapple with Platonic thought on his own, parallel with the tradition that Plutarch had both continued and recast in the previous generation. He does so with a range and application of Platonic themes that permeate every aspect of his lectures. Aristides, finally, seems on the surface to confront Plato directly, his goal to take rhetoric back from the philosopher. Plato had already developed a type of philosophic rhetoric by the end of the Phaedrus, which is a point that Aristides notices but chooses to deemphasize. If he had not passed it over, much of the polemic atmosphere that he achieves by confronting the Gorgias would have been lost.

A point of connection in all these works is that each of these authors is taking Plato back from those who were misusing him in the second century. Lucian does so with his philosophic-satiric, "Platonic" dialogues, since he indicates that in practice both

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701 See for example, "the Syrian's" defense of his use of dialogue, Bis Accusatus 34. For the treatment of Cynic and Menippean influences and associations in light of his adaptation of Plato, see Bernays 1879 and Baldwin 1974.
philosophy and sophistry had begun to depreciate Plato's doctrines (in fact, philosophy in general). He further points to the fact that those who misapplied them had completely lost their way for the sake of material success and fame. Plato's works are starting points used to refocus philosophy toward a notion of consistency and frankness, and perhaps help conduct second-century sophistry down the same path.

Maximus attempts to create his own style of popularized Platonism and even goes as far as to renounce and ignore the validity of the seven-century tradition of Platonism. Sophists and philosophers around him, as parodied in Lucian, had become disingenuous or pedantic, and--what is worse--had made Plato's ideas inapplicable to life. His popular Platonism denies the importance of vainly haranguing about vocabulary or the parsing of philosophical minutiae that was apparent in the more typical second-century Platonism. He wanted to turn Platonist studies again toward the pursuit of virtue and human flourishing (εὐδαιμονία).

Finally, Aristides is not actually attacking Plato in his defense speeches. In his confrontation and emulation, he works to be Plato's equal while at the same time acknowledging the philosopher's rhetorical ability. Aristides' true target is the Platonist schools (including the Cynics), which had usurped the metaphysical Plato and developed a limited understanding of their master's ideas about oratory. As with the other two authors, Aristides uses Plato to invoke the entire Hellenic tradition by skipping over the previous seven centuries of technical literature--as much as was possible. Again, these authors set for themselves the moral task of rediscovering Plato and taking him back from those who make it their profession, at least in the eyes of Lucian, Maximus, and
Aristides, to appropriate him.\textsuperscript{702} At the same time, they open themselves up to a new type of humanism not found in literature since the 5th century BCE.

Another secondary theme that emerges is each author's treatment of Homer. Plato had not exactly harmed Homer's reputation with his famous expulsion of the poet from the \textit{Republic}, as we see from the continued preeminence of the poet down through the Second Sophistic.\textsuperscript{703} When one confronts Plato, however, one must also confront his treatment of the epic poet. Homer, then, becomes a sophist (as in Lucian), a rhetorician (as in Aristides), or the first true philosopher (as in Maximus). Dio writes that Socrates was Homer's pupil and resembled him much; Maximus writes that Plato was Homer's pupil and more like him than he was like Socrates (Kindstrand 1973). Confronting one's own notions of Homer was essential for all authors in the Second Sophistic. One reason this became unavoidable was the increased interest in Plato, who acknowledged the impact Homer had had on Greece while at the same time expelling him from the \textit{Republic}. Yet, in the Second Sophistic, as ever, the texts of Plato and Homer were primary ways to invoke the Hellenic tradition, and these two authors remained a natural pair.

All of the authors I treat consistently indicate their respect and admiration for the philosopher's ideas and his style by using Plato in varying ways. It is important to see that they all wished, despite this respect, at once to challenge his preeminence and to become his equal, or at times his superior, however unlikely. As in the fourth century BCE, Homer only rarely comes under criticism, and it takes a Plato, as in the \textit{Republic}, or

\textsuperscript{702} For the general attack at this time on "pseudo-philosophers," see Hahn 1989:ch. 10.
\textsuperscript{703} See Kindstrand 1973 and Zeitlin 2001.
an Aristotle, as in the *Poetics*, to do so. Plato, it seems, was not above occasional reproach in the second century CE while at the same time inspiring direct emulation and careful refashioning.

In a general sense, the lack of consistency or frankness in the intellectual terrain of the second century—among the philosophers, sophists, and *rhetores* in the Second Sophistic—has our authors fundamentally dissatisfied. A result of Plato's idealized version of philosophy and philosophical rhetoric, were they possible, is that one would know one's own mind: the first requirement of frankness, as well as philosophy. A further repercussion is that one then begins to know the intentions and thoughts of others. Philosophical rhetoric as conceived in the *Phaedrus* would no longer permit an uninformed sophist to allow his words to contradict his thoughts or intentions, which is such a worry in the *Gorgias*. Persuasion used by an ignorant speaker as flattery solely for the purpose of a particular aim would be a thing of the past. Sincere frankness would govern and clean up the marred, somewhat deprived intentions of these star performers of the classical world, the sophists of the Second Sophistic.

A good deal more remains to be said about Plato in the Second Sophistic. One would want to tease out additional broad generalizations as to why Plato specifically was

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704 *Gorgias* 487a (Socrates to Callicles): "For I conceive that whoever would sufficiently test a soul as to rectitude of life or the reverse should go to work with three things which are all in your possession—knowledge, goodwill, and frankness. I meet with many people who are unable to test me, because they are not wise as you are; while others, though wise, are unwilling to tell me the truth, because they do not care for me as you do." The irony in these lines does not alter the applicability of these traits to other people or circumstances.

705 "*Konzertredner*" as in Radermacher.
used at this time, as well as why the authors at the time use the particular themes and dialogues they did. Next, one might further emphasize how Plotinus and the Christian sophists were influenced by these uses of Platonic texts. Plotinus often mined the dialogues themselves, but surely one reason for his systematizing of Platonism was the varied treatment of Plato. In addition, as the Christian Sophists were learning their oratorical styles from authors in the Second Sophistic, so naturally some of their understanding of Plato and how to incorporate him into the "new philosophy" was taken, to some degree, from contemporary sources. By building on the discussion of these three authors, and tracing the influences not only into the next century, one would easily incorporate additional authorities, but also by including significant predecessors, two examples of which would be Dio Chrysostom (40-120) and Favorinus (fl. 120-150).

Trapp 2000 is the first and only sustained exposition on the relationship between Dio Chrysostom and Plato. While Dio does not often mention Plato by name, one could include him in such a discussion since appreciation of his work depends on an understanding of this influence (Trapp 2000:213). Ancient commentators did notice the

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706 Beyond the authors already discussed, see Sextus against Aristides' Defense, Karakimas 1996; for Porphyry against Aristides' Defense, see Behr 1968b.
707 See, for example, Edwards 2002 on Origen and Plato; also Timothy 1973 in general. And, for the influence of the Second Sophistic orators specifically on John Chrysostom, see Ameringer 1921, and on St. Basil, see Campbell 1922.
708 Both of these authors are included in Philostratus' VS as "not sophists" though "they seemed to be so" (discussed in the Introduction, above). For Dio Chrysostom in general Jones 1978 and Swain 1996:187-241; for his "philosophical turn," see Moles 1978 and Whitmarsh 2001:158-161; for his sophistic tendencies, Whitmarsh 2001:156-180; for his philosophical tendencies, see Berry 1983; for Dio and Plato, Trapp 2000 (on which, see Whitmarsh's 2002 review). On Favorinus as a sophist, see Gleason 1995:3-20; Holford-Strevens 1997; Whitmarsh 2001:118-121, 167-178, and 181-24; for volume one (this far) of the Budé, see Amato 2005.
stylistic imitation between the two authors, but Plato is also a model, as in Maximus, of philosophic action for Dio. Trapp (Ibid. 214-219) looks at the author's most overtly Platonic piece--the *Borystheniticus*. He follows with six other orations in which Plato's presence was felt (219-228), and discusses the even distribution of Plato in Dio's oeuvre (228-237). Trapp places Dio's use of Plato into a broader context and summarizes such use, writing that Dio used Plato extensively as a stylistic model and as a source for Socrates (a central ethical paradigm), but not for his philosophical content (237-239). His work is certainly a beginning in the enormous task of writing the longer and thorough work concerning Plato in the Second Sophistic. For example, since there were many Platons for second-century writers, a better understanding of the choices made and of the politics of those choices is still to be explored (cf. Whitmarsh's review of Swain 2000).

Not coincidentally, Dio "Chrysostom" is said by Philostratus (*VS* 490) to have taught Favorinus. Dio should be included in this larger work since he seemed to have placed himself within the tradition of an earlier, Academic form of skepticism (as opposed to Pyrrhonic). As a friend of Plutarch and Herodes Atticus, Favorinus should naturally show Platonic influence. We have fragments of his extensive *opera*709 (it seems 30 titles are attested), but some effort ought to be made to place him more fully into the context of Platonic studies in the Second Sophistic.

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709 Mainly as quoted by Aulus Gellius: see Holford-Strevens 1988:ch. 6; Bargazzi 1966 is the edition for Favorinus.
Lastly, a work such as this must include and emphasize the work of Apuleius, who was called *philosophus Platonicus* by himself and others after his death.\(^{710}\) Some significant work has already been done on Apuleius and his use of Plato.

Hijmans 1987 discusses Apuleius as a Platonist, or rather as a translator and adaptor of first- and second-century Platonism. He extensively discusses the *Corpus Apuleianum* including the sometimes-questioned authenticity of the *De mundo*, which is known effectively to be a Latin copy of a Greek work.\(^{711}\) The current scholarship on the *Apology, Florida, De deo Socratis, De Platone et eius dogmate* (1 and 2), and *Metamorphoses* indicates that they were in fact written by the same individual, presumably Apuleius. Discussion of *De mundo* also tends to verify its authenticity (408). Hijmans looks as well at Apuleius' audience and readers based on evidence from all the works (415-434). In his Section 4 (434-469), Apuleius' Platonism is laid out; Apuleius' work did not amount to rethinking the theoretical positions in a radical way, nor does it engage in criticism like a Sextus Empiricus (*Ibid.* 470). Apuleius' idea of philosophy was more along the lines of Maximus: it is the art of living. His works show a certain inconsistency and vagueness, but his most obvious target in his philosophical

\(^{710}\) *ILA* 2115 (on a statue base, from some point in the years 337-361, i.e. almost two centuries after Apuleius' floruit) *philosopho [Pl]atonico / [Ma]daurenses cives / ornament[o] suo. D(ecreto) d(ecurionum), p(ecunia) [p(ublica)] / D(omino) n(ostro) divi C[ons]/tanti[ni] / Maxim[i fil(io)]; Apuleius is called *philosophus Platonicus* or *Platonicus* by Augustine (*De civitate dei* 8.12, 8.14, 8.24, 9.3, 10.27), and once each by Sidonius (*Epistula* 9.13.8), Cassiodorus (*Institutiones* 2.5.10), and Charisius (*Ars grammatica* 2.16 = Keil, *GL* 1.240.27). See Harrison 2000:1-14.

\(^{711}\) The *De mundo* is discussed alongside the *Metamorphoses* to see how Apuleius treats Greek originals, in Hijmans 1987:399-406.
works is impiety (**Ibid.** 470).\(^{712}\) Hijmans had to leave out the poet Apuleius from the discussion, but that is where Harrison 2000 seems to begin.

Harrison's work examines Apuleius' philosophical works but from a rhetorical perspective. In his work, Apuleius again emerges as a compiler of existing materials more than as an original investigator. That said, he investigated everything: "there seems to have been almost no branch of learning in which Apuleius had no interest, almost no genre in which he did not write a book" (Harrison 2000:37). The depth and breadth of his learning, coupled with the fact that he offered an analogue to all of the Greek works in the Second Sophistic, makes him "an intellectual child of his time."

Though Apuleius engaged in Platonic themes and shows such influence throughout his work, Harrison strives to call him a "Latin sophist" based on the concern for being a star performer, his obvious self-promotion and cult of his own personality, and his prodigiously displayed literary and scientific polymathy. Harrison then proceeds to look at Apuleius' more philosophical works for signs of rhetorical training and development of sophistic style.

What remains to be done regarding Apuleius, then, is to connect these two aspects of the author into a single treatment. By this I mean to observe and acknowledge Apuleius' rhetorical interests and skills, and, in addition, take seriously his Platonic engagement as more than "fundamentally playful" (Harrison 2000:259). To chronicle the use of Plato in the Second Sophistic would require synthesizing both of these tendencies.

that emerge in Apuleius and locate him alongside the authors I have looked in this dissertation. That is, it remains to place him alongside other Platonic littérateurs who wish to take Plato as their own in their own particular way. These men wished at once to invoke the entire Hellenic tradition within the first few centuries of the Common Era, but also to carve their own spots in a crowded and extremely prolific literary spectrum. Plato is the common figure to so many in the Second Sophistic who know themselves to be creatures of their own time, but desire to be associated with the classical moments of Ancient Greece while making those moments in some sense modern.
Appendix: Socrates in Maximus

A. Socrates' Apologia

Mention of Socrates is often an excuse for Maximus to further various and disparate philosophical discussions, such as the relationship between daemones and god and the difference between beauty and pleasure, as in Dialexis 8-9\textsuperscript{713} and 18-21\textsuperscript{714} respectively. In Dialexis 3, however, Socrates' trial before the Athenians in 399 BCE is the theme throughout. If his art had been plastic, Maximus insists, Socrates' fame would have been secured and he would not have died as he did. Since his life was his art (3.1), he did not get a universal positive verdict from the jurors. For Maximus the trial belongs in a discussion of philosophy and the civic life, practically speaking. Compared to other accounts of the trial, Maximus' invention is that Socrates made no defense in court whatsoever. This is certainly contrary to Plato's defense, but as well Xenophon's claim (at Apology 1) that Socrates prepared no defense, but still made one (Apology 7-13). Maximus places himself in the long tradition of σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι by discussing Socrates' thought and life, but most importantly by discussing his trial.\textsuperscript{715}

Though he made no defense, the information we read in Maximus about Socrates' behavior in court (often brought up hypothetically) is taken primarily from Plato's

\textsuperscript{713} Dialexis 8 and 9: "Socrates' Daemonion."

\textsuperscript{714} Dialexis 18-21: "Socratic Love."

\textsuperscript{715} We have Socratic defenses from Plato, Xenophon, and Libanius, Declamation 1 and 2 (On the Silence of Socrates). There is mention of works by Crito (Suda s.v.), Lysias ([Plutarch] Lives of the Ten Orators 836b and Cicero De Oratore 1.231), Theodectes (Aristotle Rhetoric 2.23.13, 1399a7-11), Demetrius of Phalerum (Diogenes Laertius 9.15 and Plutarch Aristides 1 and 27), Zeno of Sidon (Suda, s.v.), and Theon of Smyrna (Suda s.v.); Trapp 1997:24.
This is true also of his behavior in his cell and before the Eleven, which are taken the *Phaedo*. Maximus asks his audience if they would rather have had Socrates follow all the standard precepts of narrative, proof, and peroration instead of avoiding a defense thereby incurring his release (3.3). The answer is meant of course to be "no," but the use of information taken from Plato's version of the defense, while still allowing Socrates the dignity of not giving one, is cleverly done.

The silence of Socrates at his trial reflects the fact that virtue and goodness are the only true test of a man's life for Maximus: a verbal defense is not needed. Socrates took the safe path, keeping silent where honorable speech was impossible. In fact, there was nothing he could have said: it would have been a lie, made things worse, or both (3.4). Just as Xerxes lost just as he thought he had won by defeating Leonides, the Athenian jury lost just as they were condemning Socrates (3.8). Turning the tables on the jury and condemning them to their own damnation for their verdict is taken from Plato's *Apology* (39cd), and is a common trope for *apologiae* after Plato. Maximus takes the line that Socrates knew he was to die, and virtue dictated silence in the face of false charges (3.7-8).

By taking his information readily from both Xenophon's and Plato's apologies, Maximus appears to know intimate details about Socrates, and still demonstrates a

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716 E.g., his contesting the juries' assessment after they had made it (*Apology* 35e-38b).
717 E.g., he gave his body to the 11 (*Phaedo* 59c), showed no anger toward his gaoler (116bd), and exhibited no reluctance to the poison (117c).
718 Which Socrates himself mentions in the *Apology*. The list of witnesses, advancing arguments, submitting to cross-examination, offering proof, and forcing witnesses in 3.6 follows the contrast between philosophical and legal procedure laid out in *Gorgias* 471e-472c and 473e-474b; Trapp 1997:29n.15.
719 See my discussion of Lucian's *Piscator*, above, where Frankness goes from the Philosophers' worst enemy to their greatest defender.
thorough knowledge of Socratic literature. Since he maintains his own version of the
defense (i.e., none at all), he claims that his position is stronger than any other account.
To imagine Socrates silent in court after Plato's *Apology* is to make a great omission of
Socratic literature, unless the author acknowledges the information within it obliquely.
Our author thus tries to outdo all other Socratic apologies. Maximus defends Socrates in
his own voice (since the latter was silent), and shows what could or should have been said
as an addition to such a virtuous life. Not acknowledging the jury or their power over his
life is more of a statement by Socrates than any defense could express.

**B. Socratic Eroticism**

Regarding Socrates and the charge of his having an excessive interest in physical
love, Maximus provides a vindication first on perceptible level, so to speak, with the
distinction between virtuous and vicious love (19-20), then a further defense on the
intelligible level with the idea of True Beauty (21).\(^\text{720}\)

The lack of consistency of Socrates' actions is a principle problem for Maximus.
Socrates, we are told, is a man of truth, so how can there be any correspondence between
Socrates the lover and Socrates the chaste? He is at once attracted to beautiful boys while
he makes men into fools, and even rivals Lysias in erotic skills (as in *Phaedrus* 234d and
*Phaedo* 60d). How can these habits be consistent alongside his honesty to the people of
Athens, independence against the tyrants, heroism at Delium, scorn for the jurors, path to

\(^{720}\) See Trapp 1997:156-159 for an introduction to these *Dialexeis*. 
prison, and readiness to face death (18-19, cf. *Apology* 32cd, *Laches* 181b)? As Maximus asks: how can all this be consistent with philosophy (18.5)?

Against all accounts—including the insistence of Plato—Maximus writes that Socrates took on students: "the conceited" Alcibiades, Critobolus, Agathon, Phaedrus, the "inspired" young Lysis, and handsome Charmides.  

Socrates is frank with us about how his heart pounded and began to sweat when Charmides was around; he was maddened to feverish pitch like the bacchants by Alcibiades; and his eyes turned to Autolycus as if light in a darkness.  

All of these interlocutors were clearly students for Maximus (fiscal payment was not necessary).

Maximus approaches this conflict as a *rhetor* as if in a court of law (18.6). He notes that the accusers in court Anytus, Meletus, and the absent Aristophanes, did not mention his love-life in their accusations against Socrates. Rather, the charge of wrongdoing and corruption of the young was based on Critias becoming a tyrant and Alcibiades being guilty of hubris, Socrates making the weaker case the stronger, and his swearing by the plane tree and the dog.  

The eroticism of Socrates gave no target to either prosecutors or comic poets (18.6).

While Socrates denied himself all other things on which the sophists prided themselves (including knowledge), love was Socrates' skill and sphere of activity. Physical

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721 Plato *Symposium* 215a ff.; Xenophon *Symposium* 1.3.3.7 and Plato *Euthydemus* 306d; Plato *Symposium* 198b; *Phaedrus* 234d; *Lysis*; and the *Charmides*, respectively. Notice there is no Plato in this list.

722 See Plato *Charmides* 155d; *Symposium* 215e; and Xenophon *Symposium* 1.9 (where Xenophon is the narrator).

723 *Apology* 19b, 24b; Xenophon *Memorabilia* 1.2.12; *Phaedrus* 236de; and *Gorgias* 461a.
beauty falls through the eyes into the soul: the eyes are beauty's highway (19.2), an idea that echoes *Phaedrus* 250b.\(^{724}\) By using the *Phaedrus*, Maximus understands that Socrates fell for beautiful boys because they are the means by which he can see the supreme idea of beauty. He picks his lover for the joint cultivation of virtue, as in *Symposium* 209a and *Phaedrus* 253-257b.\(^{725}\) While Socrates and Epicurus both pursue their ideas of virtue, the former goes after true happiness, the latter seeks pleasure (just as Socrates and Cleisthenes pursue beauty: Socrates in the name of virtue, Cleisthenes in the name of pleasure, 19.3). Moreover, such "vicious love" does not even deserve the name, just as the inferior helmsman does not deserve his.\(^{726}\)

The enjoyment of beauty through physical restraint is from Alcibiades' description of Socrates in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* (276e). This view of True Beauty, which is beyond physical vision, is based on the assumption that the soul is imprisoned in a life of turmoil, darkness, chaos, and disharmony; it is taken from Plato's *Phaedo* 79c and 109a, and *Phaedrus* 21.7. This higher-level beauty is the reason Socrates had eyes for the lower, physical type and why he sought after every manifestation with his keen gaze "like a skilled huntsman" (cf. *Symposium* 203d). That is, Socrates spent his

\(^{724}\) "Now in the earthly copies of justice and temperance and the other ideas which are precious to souls there is no light, but only a few, approaching the images through the darkling organs of sense, behold in them the nature of that which they imitate, and these few do this with difficulty. But at that former time they saw beauty shining in brightness…"

\(^{725}\) The notions of a higher and lower love are also from *Phaedrus* 237b-238c and *Symposium* 180d.

\(^{726}\) The argument is similar to the one used by Aristides to show that "vicious oratory" is not oratory at all (Πρὸς Πλάτωνα περὶ ῥητορικῆς).
life trying to recollect True Beauty (*Dialexis* 21.8), and discussion with beautiful boys was one means to do so.
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