NOTES
ON
THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

J. A. STEWART

VOL. I.
NOTES
ON THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
OF
ARISTOTLE

BY

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VOLUME I

Oxford
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1892
PREFACE

In the following Notes I quote the text of the Nicomachean Ethics as it is given in Mr. Bywater's Edition (Clarendon Press, 1890); and it is to be understood that I approve Mr. Bywater's readings and punctuation throughout, except in the (comparatively few) places where I express doubt or dissent.

Mr. Bywater's Contributions to the Textual Criticism of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Clarendon Press, 1892) unfortunately did not appear till the first four Books of my Notes were already in print; but in preparing the subsequent Books for the press I have taken account of the explanations and valuable suggestions contained in this brochure.

To Prof. Susemihl's critical edition of the Nicomachean Ethics, not to mention his edition of the Eudemian Ethics and his edition of the Moralia Magna, I am deeply indebted. On almost every page of these Notes I have to acknowledge something which I owe to Prof. Susemihl's industry and suggestive treatment of the text.

Before leaving the subject of the text, I ought perhaps to apologize for pretty often referring to the readings of certain inferior manuscripts—Cambr., CCC, NC, B¹, B², B³—which I happen to have examined. I quote these readings, not as being valuable in themselves, but—sometimes as enabling me to illustrate from my own observation the operation of causes which we have to take account of in
estimating the readings of the important manuscripts—sometimes simply as not having been hitherto published. So far as the problem of establishing the text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is directly concerned, Mr. Bywater is undoubtedly right in leaving as our recognised sources K^b_ and L^b_ with r and Aspasius.

These volumes contain only 'Notes.' I have not written 'Introductory Essays,' partly because the brilliant and instructive 'Essays' contained in the First Volume of Grant's *Ethics* hold the field—partly, and chiefly, because I think that junior students—to whom I hope these *Notes* may be useful—can master the *Ethics* only by fighting their way through the problems and difficulties of the Treatise, as these start up—sometimes for the first time, sometimes again under altered forms—in the Greek text itself.

Having, for these reasons, dispensed with 'Introductory Essays,' I have been obliged to make a good many of the 'notes' somewhat long; and being anxious that every important passage, as it occurred, should there and then impress the student with its full weight—its weight being often the weight of Aristotle's whole Philosophy brought to bear through some technical term—I have not been very careful to avoid repetitions.

The quotations from other works of Aristotle, and from Plato, have been printed in full, in order that the junior student may be able to read conveniently, within the limits of these volumes, what he certainly must read, if he is to understand the *Ethics* in a concrete way as part of Aristotle's entire Philosophy.

In writing the 'arguments' I have allowed myself considerable liberty. In some cases it seemed that the student would be best introduced to the particular context by an epitome, in some cases by a paraphrase and explanation, in other cases again by a more or less free translation.

In composing the 'notes' I have of course had a great
mass of material to draw upon in the works of the many scholars, ancient and modern, who have commented on the *Ethics*. The Greek Scholiasts—Aspasius (*Heylbut*, 1889), the Paraphrast Heliodorus¹ (*Heinsius* and *Heylbut*), Eustratius, Michael Ephesius, and the other Scholiasts printed in the Aldine Collection² (1536)—I have used carefully throughout; and among the modern commentators I owe much, in different ways, to Zell (1820), Coraes³ (1822), Michelet (1848), Fritzsche (for v, vi, vii—1851, and viii, ix—1847), Grant (last edition, 1885), Ramsauer (1878), and Jackson (for v—1879).

My largest debt is to Grant, whose *Ethics* I wish to mention here with the greatest respect, as an edition the value of which has steadily grown on me. For help, indeed, in certain classes of detail difficulties, I have had most often to turn to other authorities; but no other edition have I found so fertile in philosophical suggestions. These suggestions, I would remark, are to be found in unobtrusive notes, as well as in the Introductory Essays.

I must not omit to acknowledge my indebtedness to the modern translators—Stahr, Williams, and Peters—especially to the last. Here and there I have felt bound to say that I do not agree with a rendering given by Mr. Peters; but his Translation, taken as a whole, I have found an able and trustworthy assistant.

¹ We seem to have no good reason for believing that this was his name: see L. Cohen in the *Berl. philolog. Wochensch.* Nov. 9, 1889, p. 1419, and cf. Val. Rose in *Hermes*, vol. ii. p. 212.


³ For the circumstances attending the publication of this interesting edition see ΑΛΑΜΑΝΤΙΟΣ ΚΟΡΗΣ ὑπὸ Δ. ΘΕΡΕΙΑΝΟΥ (Trieste, 1890), vol. iii. pp. 47 sqq.
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My separate debts to predecessors I have tried to acknowledge in all cases as they were contracted; but it may well be that, in annotating a Treatise on which there are so many Commentators, I have sometimes put down, from ignorance or forgetfulness, as my own, what ought to have been credited to another.

There is one writer, not yet mentioned, to whom I wish to express special indebtedness. Dr. Rassow’s *Forschungen über die Nicomachische Ethik* (1874) have been always before me in writing these Notes. I suppose all who know Dr. Rassow’s little work will agree entirely with me when I say that very few works of the kind contain so much valuable matter in such small space. It would be a great gain if the *Forschungen*—a model of critical method—were made more accessible by means of an English translation.

It is not necessary to refer here, except generally, to the assistance—acknowledged in detail—which I have derived from the editors of other works of Aristotle, and from the editors of other authors, quoted in these Notes.

In conclusion—a few lines about ‘interpolations,’ ‘dislocations,’ and ‘duplicate passages.’ The subject is an interesting one, and I have touched it in some of my notes on Book v and Book vii, in connexion with the views of Dr. Jackson and Prof. Cook Wilson—also in other notes referring to the views of Dr. Rassow; but it properly lies beyond the scope of these volumes, which aim chiefly at helping readers of the *Ethics* to get hold of the philosophical doctrine of the Treatise. I feel sure that the scholars just mentioned agree with me in thinking that the philosophical doctrine, in its broad outlines and more important details, stands out with such evidence and actuality, that it is impossible to conceive our view of it as having to be appreciably altered in consequence of discoveries which may hereafter be made as to the condition of the text before the age of Andronicus. To take up the subject of ‘interpolations,
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dislocations, and duplicate passages’—even if I had been competent to do so—would therefore have been beside the aim of these Notes as concerned with the philosophical doctrine of the Ethics. Of course it would be a matter of extraordinary philological interest, if an Egyptian papyrus were found, old enough to decide for, or against, the ingenious speculations of the modern χαριτωρίς.

The Index added to these Notes does not profess to be complete. It is designed mainly to help the student by bringing together selected notes on some of the more important topics. To find his way in the Greek text, the student must turn to Mr. Bywater’s Index.

J. A. STEWART.

July, 1892.
Manuscripts

K\textsuperscript{b} = cod. Laurent. 81. 11 (10th cent.).
L\textsuperscript{b} = cod. Par. 1854 (12th cent.).
M\textsuperscript{b} = cod. Marc. 213 (15th cent.).
N\textsuperscript{b} = cod. Marc. append. iv. 53 (14th cent.).
O\textsuperscript{b} = cod. Riccard. 46 (14th cent.).
H\textsuperscript{a} = cod. Marc. 214 (14th cent.).
P\textsuperscript{b} = cod. Vat. 1342 (14th or 13th cent.).
\Gamma = Vetusta translatio (13th cent.).
Cambr. = University Library 1879 I i. v. 44: the Eliensis of Wilkinson, Zell, and Michelet, the O\textsuperscript{b} of Susemihl (13th cent.).
CCC = Library of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 112: the O\textsuperscript{a} of Susemihl (15th cent.).
NC = Library of New College, Oxford 227: the O\textsuperscript{a} of Susemihl (15th cent.).
B\textsuperscript{a} = Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 14080 (15th cent.).
B\textsuperscript{b} = Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 6790 (15th cent.).
B\textsuperscript{c} = Brit. Mus. Royal MS. 16 C. xxi (16th cent.).
Par. 1853 = Bibl. Nat. Paris: (part containing E. N. 15th cent.).

[For Bekker's MSS. of the E. N. see Susemihl, Die Bekkerschen Hss. der N. E. Neue Jahrbücher für Philol. 1878, p. 625 sqq.; and Bywater's Contributions to the Textual Criticism of Aristotle's Nic. Eth. For the English MSS. of the E. N. see Anecdota Oxon., Classical series, vol. i. part 1. For \Gamma, the Vet. tr., see Newman's Politics, vol. ii. pp. xli sqq.]
CORRIGENDA


" " 81, thirteenth line from top, for ‘is used’ read ‘is is used.’

" " 169, heading of note on § 2, read ἀπεταφων.

" " 329, tenth line of note on § 2, read ἄρχομος.

" " 496, ninth line from top, for ‘whole section’ read ‘clause.’

" " 309, tenth line from top, for ὁδὸν φύσεων read μήτε τού πᾶν.

II, p. 133, heading of note on 1146 a. 22 read παράδοξα ἔλεγχαν.

" " 148, top line, for ‘acts also against his consciously realised knowledge of the including universal’ read ‘at the same time consciously realises the including universal.’

" " 178, sixth line from top, for ‘in’ read ‘is’.

" " 181, fourth line of note on a. 3, read ἄκρατὴς.

" " 264, sixth line from top, for ‘imply’ read ‘implies.’

" " 295, seventh and eighth lines of note on a. 26, for ἐτι καὶ αὐτοῖς read καὶ ἐτι αὐτοῖς.
BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

Every art, every science, every action, every act of choice, aims at some good. Hence they have well defined The Good as 'the end which all things aim at.' But ends differ. Sometimes our end is the mere performance of a function; sometimes, something substantive beyond the performance of the function—in which case the something substantive is 'better than,' i.e. is the raison d'être of the function by which it is produced.

There are as many ends as there are arts, sciences, and forms of action. There are certain leading arts, sciences, and forms of action, under which certain other arts, sciences, and forms of action group themselves in various grades of subordination. The end of a leading art, science, or form of action always is more choiceworthy than the ends of the subordinate arts, sciences, or forms of action belonging to the group. Thus Generalship is an art, whose end, 'victory,' is more choiceworthy than 'riding,' the end of the subordinate art of horsemanship; as 'riding,' in its turn, is more choiceworthy than 'the bridle,' the end of the still more subordinate art of bridle-making. This example shows that an art whose end is, and an art whose end is not, a substantive product may belong to the same group of subordinate arts. A bridle is a substantive product, riding is the mere performance of a function; but the art of bridle-making and the art of horsemanship both fall under the same leading art.

§ 1. πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.] Eustratius, and other commentators after him, have noted that many of Aristotle's great philosophical treatises begin with a universal proposition. In the universal the cause is contained (An. Post. i. 24. 85 b. 26 τὸ δὲ καθόλου πρῶτον ἄινον ἀρα τὸ καθόλου): science explains things by their causes (An. Post. i. 2. 71 b. 9 ἐπιστάμεθα δὲ οἷομεθα ἐκαστον ἀπλώς. . . . ὅταν τὴν τ' αἰτίαν οἷομεθα γινώσκειν δὲ ἄτι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκαίνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλος ἔχει); hence the propriety of beginning a scientific treatise with a universal proposition, rather than with a particular statement. The opening words of the Politics are ἐπιστήμη
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2, BOOK I: CHAP. 1: § 1.

1094 a. 1. πᾶσαν πῶλην ὅρμων κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν, καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἁγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐνεκέν συνεστηκών (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἁγαθὸν χάριν πάντα πράττοντι πάντες), δὴ τῶν ἀπὸ πᾶσαν μὲν ἁγαθὸν τινὸς στοχάζοντα: the Metaphysics begin—πάντες ἀνθρώποι τοῦ εὐδηνοῦ ὁργάνων φύσεως: the Post. Anal. begin—πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχόντως γίνεται γνώσεως: similarly, the treatise de Partibus Anim. and the Physics begin with universal propositions. On the other hand the later Eudemian Ethics begin as Grant says (Ethics: essay i. vol. i. p. 23) ‘without any scientific preface, but rather in the form of a literary essay, with the sentence: “In the temple of the God at Delos some one . . . has inscribed the following verses on the vestibule of the shrine of Latona.”’

The exordium of the E. N. (taken in connexion with the similar exordia of the Politics, Metaphysics, Posterior Analytics, and other treatises mentioned) thus indicates, by its form, the logical method which Aristotle regarded as proper to ‘a scientific treatise.’ Demonstrative science in the strict sense (ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη—ἡ ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσως καὶ γνωριμοτέρων καὶ προτέρως καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπερισταμένος An. Post. i. 2. 71 b. 20) is possible, indeed, only in the regions of metaphysics and mathematics, where the mind confronts truths which are abstract (ἀνευ ἀληθος), eternal (ἀιτια), and necessary (μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀλλος ἐξεύ). In these regions principles are apprehended by the eye in diagrams, or by the mind’s eye in speculation, with perfect clearness and distinctness, and consequences are evidently seen to flow necessarily from principles. In the concrete enquiries, on the other hand, of the natural and moral sciences, there is no such clearness of principles, or evident consequence of conclusions. Health, Liberty, Temperance, Utility, and all other ‘mixed modes,’ as Locke would call them, in themselves as principles, and in their relations to their consequences, stand on a very different footing from an intuition like that of circle, and a law of thought like that of contradiction. Yet, in his concrete enquiries, Aristotle is so far influenced by the analogy of ἐπιστήμη, in the strict sense, that he constantly refers his most particular observations to general principles of a highly abstract and formal character, and often symbolises the primary importance of these principles by the position which he assigns to them at the beginning of an enquiry, as if to show that the conclusions

1 On space intuition as the ground of apodeictic science, see Lange, Logische Studien, p. 9 sqq.
reached in the enquiry flow from these principles, as the geometer’s conclusions flow from the visualised definitions, or diagrams, which he posits as his starting-points. This penchant for the ‘geometrical method’ in concrete enquiry sometimes leads Aristotle far astray, where ‘verification’ does not force itself upon him, as it does in Ethics and Politics.

So much for the general logical significance of the exordium of the Ethics, as one of a class. Its special logical significance in relation to the Treatise which it introduces may now be indicated.

The cause assumed in this section is the Final Cause; and the leading doctrines of the Treatise may be shown to follow as conclusions from the universal proposition in which this cause is assumed.

The good which every being, consciously or unconsciously, strives to realise is not something external to itself (χωριστόν i. 6. 13), but its own good (cf. i. 5. 4 τάγαθων δ’ οικεῖον τι καὶ δυσαφικῶτερον εἶναι μαντεύόμεθα), the perfection of its own nature, whatever that may be. The oak, which, springing from the acorn, grows according to the law of its nature, and becomes a perfect tree, realises the end of its existence, and attains ‘its own good.’ The final cause of an organism cannot be distinguished from the organism itself at its best. The final cause, or good, of the tree is the tree itself. Hence, for the term good, we may substitute the term existence. All beings, Aristotle might have said, struggle for existence according to their kinds. Φύσις, which in its strict sense is biological law—the law determining the growth of organised beings, is antagonistic to the ἀπειρον, or that which is indefinite and shapeless: see peri ζωον γενέσεως i. 1. 715 b. 14 ἢ δὲ φύσις φεύγει τῷ ἀπειρον τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀπειρον ἀτέλεις, ἢ δὲ φύσις ἀεὶ ζητεῖ τέλος. The φύσις of the acorn produces the oak, and only the oak, an organism realising a definite shape, or πέρας, in which no one part, or function, is developed out of due proportion. Such an

1 Cf. de Part. Anim. i. 1. 641 b. 25 ὅσ' εἶναι φανερῶν ὅτι ἐστι τι τουθέν ὤ δὴ καὶ καλοίμενοι, φώσι' ὦ γὰρ δὴ δ' ἐκ τυχόν ἐξ ἑκάστου γίνεται σπέρματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐκ τοῦδε, οὐδὲ σπέρμα τοῦ τυχόν ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος σπέρματος’ ἀρχὴ ἀρα καὶ ποιητικὸν τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ το σπέρματος’ φώσι’ γὰρ πεπατεί φύσι’ γάρ εἰ τοῦτον. Cf. Met. Δ. 16. 1021 b. 21 ἑκατόν τότε τέλεων, καὶ οὐδ’ ὅτι πάσα τότε τελεία, ἦταν κατὰ τό εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρτείης μηδὲν ἐκλείπῃ μόρον τοῦ κατὰ φύσις μεγάλου. Cf. Themistius on the Physics, vol. i. pp. 170, 171 (ed. Spengel)—τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τούτῳ ὑλός τοῦ τὶ ἦν εἰναι. παράδειγμα δὲ εἶπον οὐχ ὡς οἱ τὰς ἰδέας λέγομεν αὐτὸ τι καθ’ αὐτό ύπερτῶς καὶ χωριστῶν εἶδος, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἐστιν τὸ εἶδος ἑκάστου τῶν ὑπὸ φύσεως γνωμένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ὑποπο ὑποπο
organism is essentially itself, containing in itself its own ἀρχή and τέλος, i.e. growing in its own way, and for its own sake. In these respects natural organisms differ from the products of workmanship (τέχνη), which have an external ἀρχή—are shaped by another, and for some end towards which they are merely means. A house exists for the sake of those who inhabit it, but a plant or animal exists for its own sake. Τέχνη is accordingly related to the good in a very different manner from that in which φύσις is related to the good. Τέχνη is a means towards the attainment of the good, whereas φύσις is the realisation of the good. Now, since the subject of the Ethics is the Life of Man at its best (τὸ ἐπ ζήν), it is easy to understand that the relation of φύσις, rather than that of τέχνη, to the Good will be present to Aristotle's mind throughout the Treatise. Human life at its best is no mere device, or means, adopted by man for the sake of something beyond itself and better. The εὐδαιμονία lives, and there is nothing better than his life. His nature is a λόγος, or organism, ἀρθός, balanced in all its parts, and containing, like the nature of a tree, its own ἀρχή and τέλος within itself—freely initiating functions, in the performance of which it treats itself 'always as an end and never merely as a means.' So far, there seems to be no essential difference between the Tree and the Man: the λόγος, or organism, of each affirms itself. Whether the fact that in the man the self-affirmation takes the form of consciousness of self makes an essential difference, is a question which need not be discussed here. As it is, the εὐδαιμονία, in affirming himself, knows himself—takes a survey of human nature as an ἔδος, or organic whole, consisting of mutually related parts and tendencies.

But why related as they are, and not otherwise? Because 'it is best' that they should be so related—because ' Deus sive Natura' requires them to be so related. Hence the complete knowledge of human nature, as an ἔδος, requires a knowledge of God, and demands θεωρία strictly so called, or the contemplation of that which ψυχή συνήσι πλατάνω, καὶ ἡ τοῦτα δημιουργοῦσα ἀρχή μέχρι τοσοκατοι θρίσ τὴν ἱλλη μέχρι ὦ τὸ ἔδοσ τούτο καὶ τὴν μορφήν τελείως ἐναρμόσαι τῇ ἠλή.

For its own sake as representative of an immortal type. As individual, it sacrifices itself to the perpetuation of this type: see Aspasius on this §—ἐκαστῶν τάρῳ ἀγεταὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδιας φύσεως συνοδή ἐπὶ τῆς ἱλλαν τελειώτητα ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτην ἀγεταὶ διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἐκείνο μενεκέναι, ὁ πάνω ἐστὶ τελειωτατον (i.e. τὸ θεῖον).
is eternal. Accordingly, we find Aristotle defining εἴδαιμονία as 1094 a. 1. θεωρία τίς (x. 8. 8). And this is the formal definition, not only of the εἴδαιμονία of the Thinker (the subject of the context in which this definition occurs), but also of that of the moral agent—"η κατὰ τὰς ἀλας ἀρετᾶς": for the latter exists for the sake of the former, and must be defined in accordance with it. The city exists for the sake of its thinkers. A materially prosperous city without thinkers would be ἀρετής, like the body without the life. Political institutions and moral rules are what they are, because the end of the city is to be the home of a few thinkers. The moral life, which bulks so largely in the city, is τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως in relation to the μορφή which the life of the thinkers—τὸ δύναμις μικρὸν—realises. Σοφίας ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει ἡ φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκεῖνη (E.N. vi. 13. 8). Hence it is in the θεωρητικός βίος that the ultimate standard of all conduct is found. The ultimate ὁρος or σκοπός, according to which the moral μεσοτής is fixed, is given not by the practical, but by the speculative reason. Without the speculative ideal of τὸν θεῖον θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν (E.E. 1249 b. 20), or τὸ ἄθανατεῖν (E.N. x. 7. 8), man's moral life would be meaningless. Why should he restrain his desires for the mere sake of restraining them? Εἴδαιμονία, then, even when realised in the performance of moral actions, is θεωρία, or contemplation of the eternal: for the εἶδος of human nature, which must be known, if moral conduct is to be achieved, cannot be known except in view of its end—τὸ ἄθανατεῖν, τὸ τὸν θεῖον θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν 1.

The ultimate good, then, which man seeks after is the consciousness of his own εἶδος as θεῖον. It is only the 'Thinker,' as such, in the θεωρητικός βίος, who has this consciousness clearly (see E.N. x. 8. 8). The morally excellent man, however, acts in a manner which would be inexplicable unless the εἶδος of Human Nature were such as the 'Thinker' is conscious of it. The morally excellent man may be said to have a practical, as dis-

1 It is interesting to note that Plotinus (quite as much a Neo-Aristotelian as a Neo-Platonist: see Hegel, Vorles. über die Gesch. d. Philos. vol. 3, p. 9) actually describes as θεωρία τὸν εἴδος the effort of plants and animals to preserve and perpetuate their various types (Enn. iii. 8, vol. i. 333 sqq. ed. Kirchhoff), just as Aristotle often describes it as a striving after τὸ ἄλει καὶ τὸ θεῖον. So also the Scientia intuitiva of Spinoza's wise man is a θεωρία of Human Nature sub specie aeternitatis, or as related to God. With scientia intuitiva, a man forms clear and distinct ideas of his passions, and so regulates them, just as the καλοκαγάθος of Eudemus (E. E. H. 15) finds in his θεωρία of the Divine Nature, and of Human Nature as divine, the ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων.
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1094 a. 1. tinguished from a speculative knowledge of it. He knows it as an ἄρθρος λόγος, or organism maintaining itself with difficulty in an environment—liable to be disturbed by sensations and passions; and his 'unconscious metaphysic' consists in his strong interest in its maintenance, which causes him to reject the solicitations of the senses and passions, and 'choose the mean,' as the Practical Reason (acting in the service of the Speculative Reason) directs.

The morally inferior man, on the other hand, allows external influences to interfere with the steady operation of the internal organising principle of Reason. He allows himself to grow in this direction or that, out of due proportion (παρὰ τῶν ἄρθρων λόγων), in the interest of ends foreign to his nature, as an harmonious organism. He devotes himself to pleasure (ἀπολαυστικός βίος), or wealth (χρηματιστής βίος), or social success (τιμή—see E. N. i. 5), objects which a turn of fortune may remove from his grasp, leaving him without any 'good of his own.' He fails in life, because he 'makes himself a means and not an end.'

Thus from the Principle laid down in the first section of the Ethics the whole teaching of the Treatise may be deduced: that the Practical Life consists in the maintenance of the Mean, or organic balance, in action and feeling, for the sake of the Speculative Life, which is supreme, and furnishes the Practical Life with a σκοπός.

tέχνη] The habit or faculty of making (ἐξεις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική E. N. vi. 4. 3). It is external to the thing made, and, as such, is distinguished from φύσις, which is an immanent formative principle (Μετ. Α. 3. 1070 a. 7 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχή ἐν ἄλλω, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχή ἐν αὐτῷ: and cf. E. N. vi. 4. 4). Although τέχνη aims at the good in a very intelligible sense, its relation to it, as has been pointed out above, is not that in which Aristotle is concerned to show that the rational agent stands to his good. The rational life is not a process, producing beyond itself something which may perhaps in turn be employed for some further purpose; it is good and beautiful in itself, like an organism, and not useful as a means.

μέθοδος]: see the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant, and Index Arist. s. v. Literally it means 'way to knowledge': here it stands for 'knowledge' or 'science' itself (ἐπιστήμη).

πρᾶξις] as used in the Ethics properly means 'moral action': cf. vi. 2. 2 ἡ αἰσθησις οἰδεμαῖς ἀρχῇ πράξεως' δὴ τὸ τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. Πρᾶξις expresses reason
(λόγος), or what the man is as an indivisible  ἑιδος or person, just as 1094 a. 1. the place of the hands on the dial at a given time expresses the whole mechanism of the clock. As such, πράξεως is distinguished from reactions in immediate response to isolated stimuli of sense.

προαιρέσεως] defined in E.N. iii. 3. 9 as βουλευτική ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' a. 2. ἕμν. It also is peculiar to man as possessing reason. It is the 'choice' of means to some end, the end being distinguished by reason from the pleasure of the moment—the object of ἐπιθυμία. It is good when it is the exponent of the whole man as perfectly apprehended by his reason; bad, when the end with which the agent 'identifies his good' falls short of being 'the whole man,' or is merely a phantastic image of him. Mere ἐπιθυμία, on the other hand, expresses only the reaction of the sensibility in relation to an isolated stimulus. It involves no conception of a good. Something is pleasant at the moment, and ἐπιθυμία rushes without reflection to the enjoyment of it. Προαιρέσεως therefore, as implying the conception of an end different from present pleasure, is placed here with technical correctness in a list of faculties and functions which aim at 'a good.' Even 'bad choice' involves the notion, however imperfect, of 'a good': as Aspasius says ad loc. καὶ γὰρ αἱ μοχθηραὶ πράξεις καὶ μοχθηραὶ προαιρέσεις ἐφέσει τῷ ἄγαθῳ γίνονται, ἀλλὰ πεπλανημένων τῶν πραττόντων ἢ προαιρομένων.

Did kalως ἀπεφήναυτο τάγαθόν σοι πάντι ἐφέσει] cf. E.N. x. 2. 4 οἶ δ' ἐναπάμενον ὡς ὁκ ἄγαθόν σοι πάντι ἐφέσει, μὴ ὀδενέ λέγων. Cf. Rhet. i. 6. 1362 a. 23 ἐστῳ δὴ ἄγαθον ὅ ἄν αὑτῷ ἐκατοῦ ἐνεκα ἄφετον καὶ ὡς ἐνεκα ἀλλο ἀρούμεθα καὶ ὡς ἐφέσει πάντα ἡ πάντα τὰ αἰσθήσεων ἔχουσα ἡ νοῦν ἡ ἐλάβη νοῦν καὶ ὡς ὁ νοῦς ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἀποδοῖ, καὶ ὡς τὴν ἐκατον νοῦς ἀποδύσωσιν ἐκάστῳ, τὸ τὸ ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ ἄγαθον. Cf. Themistius, Περὶ Ψευδῆς, fol. 92 (vol. ii. p. 208, ed. Spengel) ἄγαθον γὰρ ἡ αἰσθήσεως ἡ αἰσθήσεως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι οὐχ ὁμα τε οὐδὲ κακόν, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦ τέρποντος ἡ ἀιώνως, τὸ δὲ ἄγαθον καὶ τὸ κακόν τοῦ νοὶ μόνον κρίνειν ἐστὶ. But if αἰσθήσεως and ἐπιθυμία, as such, are not directed to 'the good,' how can the lower animals, which have only αἰσθήσεως and ἐπιθυμία, be said 'to strive after the good'? Because their αἰσθήσεως and ἐπιθυμία have, like their protective colours and other bodily adaptations, assumed a definitely fixed character in relation to an orderly (i.e. rational) environment. Their organisms, which their αἰσθήσεως and ἐπιθυμία subserve, are embodiments of reason adequate to the conditions of the
§§ 1, 2.

environment in which they survive: cf. E. N. vii. 13. 6 οὐδ' ἡδονήν διόκουσιν τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονήν μέτοι πάντες. ἵσος δὲ καὶ διόκουσιν οὐ̂ς ἢν οὖναν οὐδ' ἢν ἄν φαίνει, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θείων. Man's ὁρέξεις conflict with his 'good,' because by his θεώρια he has risen into a sphere in which his merely animal adaptations are inadequate.

§ 2. διαφορὰ . . .] There are two kinds of ends. Some are immanent, being identical with the ἐνέργεια, or functions, which constitute the essence, or perfect being, of the things of which they are said to be the ἐνέργειαι. A physical organism, and the noble life, are ends of this first kind. Some ends, however, are not immanent, but exist beyond the functions or operations which produce them. The products of τέχνη are ends of this second kind. They continue to exist after the processes which have produced them have ceased; whereas a physical organism ceases to exist, as such, when its vital functions cease. The end of τέχνη is an ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Hence the ἐνέργειαι, or operations as such, of τέχνη are said to be ἀτελεῖς, and are more properly called κινήσεις than ἐνέργειαι. Cf. Met. Θ. 6. 1048 b. 28, &c. πάσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἤσχοσια, μάθησις, βάδισις, οἰκοδόμησις· αὕτη δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε' οὐ̂ γὰρ ἄμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβαίδεικεν, οὐ̂ δ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ φύκοδομεῖ, οὐ̂ δὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν, ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηκεν· ἄλλ' ἔτερον καὶ κνεὶ καὶ κινεῖται' ἐώρακε δὲ καὶ ὅρα ἄμα τὸ αὐτὸ, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νεώκε. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγοι, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν. Cf. Met. K. 9. 1066 a. 20 ἡ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τις, ἀτελῆ δὲ. But Life, whether viewed as an organised system of various functions, or as mirrored in one high function such as sight or thought, is ἐνέργεια in the strict sense, i.e. contains its own end in itself. Such ἐνέργεια, as Aristotle puts it, 'resides in' that organism of which it is said to be the ἐνέργεια, being indeed identical with the οὐσία or εἶδος of the organism; whereas the so-called ἐνέργεια of the builder or weaver, quâ builder or weaver, passes out into the house or web, which is 'better than' the builder or weaver, quâ builder or weaver. See Met. Θ. 8. 1050 a. 23, &c. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἴσατον ἡ χρήσις, οἶον ὄψεως ἡ ὁράσις, καὶ οὖν ἔχεται παρὰ ταύτην ἔτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως ἐργὼν ἐπ' ἐνώπιον δὲ γίνεται τι, οἶον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομής οἰκία παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδομήσιν . . . οὕσω μὲν οὖν ἔτερον τι ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν χρήσιν τὸ γεγομένον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιομένῳ ἐστὶν, οἶον ἡ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομημένῳ καὶ ἡ ύπανσίς ἐν τῷ ὑπαινομένῳ ἐμοιὸς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
With the doctrine of this passage we may compare Aristotle's theory of the relation of the ψυχή to the σῶμα. The ψυχή is the function of the σῶμα, its form, or essence. A dead body is a body only in an equivocal sense, as a marble hand is a hand. It is life which constitutes the body; and the living body does not exist for the sake of any end external to itself. See De Anima, ii. 1. 412 a. 19 ἀναγκαῖον ἢ ἡ ψυχήν οὐσίαν ἔωι, ὅς εἶδος σώματος φυσικῶς ὁμοίει ψυχών ἔχοντες—and Met. H. 3. 1043 a. 35 ψυχή γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια σώματος τινος. As the whole body exists for the sake of, and is constituted by its life, so an organ like the eye, taken by itself, may be said to exist for the sake of, and be constituted by its special function—sight. The end, good, or being of the eye is sight. This end or good is not something which can exist apart from the eye; and an eye which does not see is not really an eye. Cf. De Anima, ii. 1. 412 b. 18 εἰ γὰρ ἢν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζώον, ψυχῆ δὲν αὐτῷ ἢν ἡ ψυκή αὐτὴ γὰρ οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἢ κατὰ λόγον· ἢ δὲ ὀφθαλμὸς ὅλη ὑπερεία, ἢ ἀποληπτόνης, οὐκ ἐστὶν ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὀμοιώμας, καθάπερ ὁ λίθος καὶ γεγραμμένος. The noble life (εὐδαιμονία—τὸ εὖ ζῆν) is the function or ἐνέργεια of Human Nature as sight is of the eye.

§§ 3, 4] Τὸ εὖ ζῆν, the noble life, is the chief end of man, and all a. 6. his actions and pursuits are for the sake of this. But every one of these actions and pursuits has its own immediate end, which, in its turn, is a means to the end of some more comprehensive pursuit.
We thus find in life many ἀρχιτεκτονικὰ δύναμεις, so called however in a relative sense only, because the ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ δύναμις par excellence is the art of living nobly. All other ends—Health, Wealth, Victory—are subordinate to, and good only in relation to the noble life. Although some of the special operations of man, such as walking, riding, dancing, differ from the τέχναι proper in not resulting in ἔργα or things made, still they resemble them in looking beyond themselves, as e.g. to health, business, or amusement. On the metaphor implied, in the use of the term ἀρχιτεκτονική here, the Paraphrast has the following remarks: ἡ δὲ στρατηγικὴ ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ πρὸς αὐτὰς [i.e. ἰστικὴν κ.τ.λ.] καλεῖται δύναμις γὰρ ὑπὲρ δ ἀρχιτέκτων ἐν τοῖς τέκτονις καθάπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἁποθέλετον εἰς τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας ἐκεῖνα κελεύει τοιεὶν τοὺς τέκτονας ἀ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο φέρει τὸ εἶδος, οὕτω καὶ ἡ στρατηγική, καὶ εἰτίς ἄλλῃ τουατη, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱδίου τέλους ταῖσαι ἄλλαις διδοσι τοὺς κανόνας.

§ 4. δύναμις] ‘faculty,’ in the sense in which we speak of the Faculty of Arts or Law at a University.

χαλινοποιικὴ] Accepted by Bekker and Bywater on the authority of pr. Kᵇ alone, for the χαλινοποιικὴ of rc. Kᵇ, and apparently all other MSS.

κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον] Bywater introduces κατὰ into the text from Kᵇ, Mᵇ, (and Cambr.). For δὴ read here by Bekker and Bywater, Susemihl gives δὲ. The best MSS. seem to have δὴ, while δὲ is given by CCC, B¹, B², and Ald. Where δὲ and δὴ are concerned, however, MS. authority is not of much account. I prefer δὲ.

ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ] δὲ is the reading of all MSS. apparently except Mᵇ and Ῥ, which have δὴ. Δὲ and δὴ are constantly interchanged in the MSS., and the best of them have not much authority in the matter. Zell, Grant, and Ramsauer read δὲ, and explain it as an instance of ‘δὲ in apodosi.’ The law of ‘δὲ in apodosi’ in Aristotle is thus formulated by Eucken (de Arist. dicendi ratione: pars prima: de particularum usu, p. 31)—‘δὲ in apodosi usurpatur aut ita ut repetatur apud demonstrativum cum antecesserit apud relativum, aut post demonstrativum, cum non antecesserit, sed enuntiatio demonstrativa quodam modo opponatur relativae, aut post particularum el, ubi apodosis opposita est protasi.’ It seems natural then to bring the ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ of the present passage under the first
clause of the law for ‘δὲ in apodosi’ as formulated by Eucken.\textsuperscript{1094 a.14.}
Michelet, however, reading δὲ, prefers to speak of an anacoluthon here. He follows Krische (\textit{Jenaische allg. Literaturzeitung}: December, 1835: no. 230, p. 403) in thinking that the δόα τὰ \varepsilonισίν with which the sentence begins is, after the parenthesis, changed \textit{per anacoluthiam} into \textit{ἐν ἀπάφως δὲ}, the δὲ being simply repeated. The words of Krische (quoted by Eucken, p. 25) are: ‘δόα τὰ \varepsilonισίν κύνδιγτ den Satz an, der durch die Vergleichung, welche aber von ihm nicht zu trennen ist, unterbrochen wird; mit \textit{ἐν ἀπάφως δὲ} wird der unterbrochene Gedanke, der nun auch die Vergleichung in sich schliesst, wieder aufgenommen, so dass δὲ nach \textit{ἐν ἀπ.} das wiederholte erste δὲ ist, und nimmermehr statt δὴ die Apodosis bildet;’ on which Eucken remarks—‘cujus sententiae assentirer, si Aristoteles scripsisset \textit{ἐν ταύτας δὲ}, sed cum \textit{ἐν ἀπάφως} legatur, quo verba omnia quae antecedunt comprehenduntur, nescio an cum codice M\textsuperscript{b} (cujus auctoritas in talibus rebus summa est) Korae, Bonitzio δὴ legendum sit.’ I am inclined to follow Eucken in preferring δὴ to δὲ here, on the principle which he lays down in substituting δὴ for δὲ in \textit{E. N. iii. 111 b. 24—‘post πάρα non particula δὲ, quae opponit, locum habet, sed δὴ, quae ea comprehendat quae antecedunt’—and quite independently of the authority of M\textsuperscript{b}. M\textsuperscript{b} notoriously abounds in unique readings, which have no genealogical significance, and can only be regarded as the conjectures of a scribe: see Susemihl’s Pref. to his edition of \textit{Eth. Nic.}, Teubner, 1880, p. viii.—‘Cum inter peculiares M\textsuperscript{b} codicis lectiones haud paucae sint sine dubio e mera conjectura modo falsa modo recta haustae, summa in eo adhibendo cautione opus neque Bekkerus\textsuperscript{1} ubique satis ea usus est.’ Eucken therefore seems to me to take up a peculiarly untenable position, when he maintains (p. 40) not only that we must go to the MSS. to decide between δὴ and δὲ, but that on this particular point M\textsuperscript{b} is to be preferred to all others: ‘in Ethicis Nicomacheis ubicunque agitur utrum δὴ an δὲ scribendum sit codex M\textsuperscript{b} ceteris omnibus praeferendus est.’

§ 5. \textit{διαφέρει δ’ οἶδὲν κ.τ.λ.}] It does not affect the subordination described in § 4, whether the subordinate ends are \textit{ἐγγα}, like a bridle, or \textit{ἐνέγβασι}, like riding. Both fall under the end

\textsuperscript{1} According to Rassow (\textit{Forsch. über die Nic. Eth.}, p. 8) Bekker has altered the text on the authority of M\textsuperscript{b} unique in about twenty places.
1094 a. 16. of generalship—victory. Again, an ἐνέργεια like walking may be
subordinated to an ἐνέργεια the end of which is an ἔργον, as when a
builder walks to his work; just as, on the other hand, an end
which is an ἔργον, like a bridle, may be subordinated to one which
is an ἐνέργεια, like riding. The ἔργον is indeed ‘better than’ the
ἐνέργεια which produced it, but not better than any ἐνέργεια. Thus
a substantive ἔργον may be subordinate to a πρᾶξις which results
in no ἔργον. So the Paraph. ad loc. ἐί δὲ καὶ μὴ πρᾶξις ἐινὲ τὰ
tέλη τῶν πρᾶξεων, ἀλλὰ ἔργα, οὐδὲν κωλύει βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ αἱρετῶτερον
καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων τὸ τῆς ἁρχιτεκτονικῆς τέλος καὶ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ διότερον
χαλκοποιητικῆς μὲν τέλος ἔργον χαλινὸς γάρ’ στρατηγικῆς δὲ τέλος
πρᾶξις’ νίκη γάρ’ καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν νίκην βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ αἱρετότερον
τοῦ χαλινοῦ’ τὸ γὰρ ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς πρᾶξεως, οὐ πάσης, ἀλλὰ μόνης
ἐκεῖνης ἂν ἀποτελέσαμεν ἔστι, διότι τέλος ἐκεῖνης ἔστι.

CHAPTER II.

Argument.

Now, if all forms of human endeavour have ultimately one and the same
end, this end being sought after for its own sake, while all other ends
are chosen as means towards its attainment—and this must be so, for, if all our
ends were but means to further ends, human endeavour would be an endless
and vain process—this one ultimate end will be the Chief Good.

The knowledge of the true nature of this ultimate end of all human en-
deavour must evidently have great influence on the conduct of life. If we
possess the knowledge of it, we shall be more likely always to do the right thing
in particular circumstances. We must therefore try to get at least a general
idea of its nature, and to determine the science or art of which it is the object.

It must surely be the object of the science which rules all the other sciences,
and supplies the plan which they all subserve. Such Statesmanship—the science
or art of social life—manifestly is. All other sciences and arts exist and are
cultivated subject to the provisions which this supreme science or art lays down
for them. It uses the other sciences and arts for its own practical end: it de-
determines authoritatively what we shall do, and what we shall not do. Its end
therefore, including as it does the ends of all the other sciences and arts, will be
man’s Chief Good. When we say ‘man’s Chief Good’ it is eminently the
citizen’s Chief Good that we have in view; for although ‘man’ and ‘citizen’
are essentially one, and their good therefore essentially the same, the accidents
of concrete life may partially isolate the individual from the society of his
fellow-citizens, and the good which he attains to in his partial isolation will differ in degree, though not in kind, from that which men in full rapport with the best social influences realize for themselves and their city. The former good is one which indeed we are often fain to acquiesce in, but the latter is far better—a more divinely beautiful thing to lay hold of and keep.

§ 1.] As Grant says, this is 'the argument upon which the whole system of the Ethics is based.' We cannot always desire means; there must be an end desired for its own sake alone; for human nature, like the physical organism of an animal or plant, must have a limit or definite form. This limit or definite form will be the sumnum bonum (τὰ γαθών καὶ τὸ ἄρσον) of man. As the functions of a physical organism do not build up an indefinitely increasing mass without constant shape, but result in a structure definite both in size and form, so man's desires do not follow one another endlessly, giving rise to conduct which has no plan, but conspire (with success proportioned to the rationality of the agent) towards the maintenance of a definite system of life. The irrational man, as such, loses sight of this end. He is dominated by the ἐπιθυμία which happens at the moment to engage him. This is succeeded by another ἐπιθυμία, perhaps in no way related to it. His life is thus not one, but many; it is a mere succession of episodes like a bad play. It has no object: αὐτό τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀμφότερον μετακόμην (Pol. ii. 4. 1267 b. 3). But the rational man has a definite object—the maintenance of the ἐδος of human nature. This ἐδος he apprehends as an organism which must 'correspond with a social environment,' because it cannot otherwise take its appointed place in the κόσμος, or realise itself as 'divine.' That harmonious play of all the functions of his nature, which enables man so to 'correspond with his social environment' that he may realise himself as 'divine,' is the End or Good of human nature. This 'correspondence' is the function of νοῦς, the synoptic faculty, which views everything in its relations to all other things, i.e. not as phaenomenon, but as noumenon, or sub specie aeternitatis. In the πρακτικὸς βίος, with which the main part of the Ethics is concerned, the synopsis is less perfect than in the θεωρητικὸς βίος; hence, as everything is defined in accordance with its perfection, we find man's chief end defined at the close of the Ethics as θεωρία. For the present, however, it will be enough to regard it as 'correspondence with the social environment.'

In connecting the ἀγαθῶν with the πέρας, Aristotle follows the
1094 a. 18. Pythagoreans and Plato.  
E. N. ii. 6. 14 τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἐκκατον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου. Plato, Philebus, 27 B Σω. πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἀπείροις ἀπερνῷ λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ πέρας, ἐπεί γὰρ τῶν τριῶν μικτὰς καὶ γεγενημένης ουσίας. τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγων ἄρα μὴ πλημμελεῖν ἂν τι; The good and beautiful are realised in the μίξεις. Cf. Phil. 64 D Σω. καὶ μὴν εὐμετάσχεις γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἵδειν τὴν αἰτίαν . . . . ὅτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς ἐνμετρίου φύσεως μὴ τυγχόνα ἤτοισον καὶ ὑποσχόμεν ἐνίγκρασι πάσας ἐὰν ἀνάγκης ἀπάλλυσι τα τε κεραυνώμενα καὶ πρόφτερς ἀπητὴν . . . . νῦν δὲ καταπέθενεν ἡμῶν ἡ τάγαθος δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσας, μετριώσας γὰρ καὶ ἐνμετρίων κάλλους ὑπὸν καὶ ἀρετῆ πισταείχος ἐξομαίης γένεσθαι. Aristotle's view of the relation of πέρας to the ἀγαθῶν is very clearly stated in Met. a. 2. 994 b. 9 ἐτε δὲ τὸν ἐνεκέ τελὸς τοιῶντι δὲ τις ἀλλὸν ἐνεκε, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἔκεινον. ὡστε εἰ μὲν ἐσται τοιῶντι τὸ ἐσχατον, οὐκ ἐσται ἀπείροιν. εἰ δὲ μηδέν τοιῶντον, οὐκ ἐσται τὸ ὑπ’ ἐνεκε. ἀλλ’ οἱ τὸ ἀπειρον ποιείτε λανθάνουσαι ἐξαιροῦστε τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσαν. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐν ἐκχειρίσεσαι οὐδεὶς πράττειν, μὴ μελλον ἐπὶ πέρας ἡξει’ οὐδ’ ἐν ἐνι ὕος ἐν τοῖς τοιῶντις ἐνεκε γὰρ τοὺς ἀεὶ πράττει δ’ γε νοῦν ἐχον τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ πέρας’ το γὰρ τέλος πέρας ἐστι. The relation of parts in a definite organism, is what Aristotle means by the ἀγαθοῦν, τὸ πεπερασμένον, τὸ καλὸν. This relation is the object and realization of νοῡς. It is the νοητὸν which exists only for νοῡς. Hence it is said, as in Met. a. 2. 1074 b. 35, to be identical with νοῡς. The object of νοῡς is νοῡς itself. Νοῡς is therefore dominated by nothing external to itself, and better than itself, as ἀυθενθεὶς is dominated by τὸ ἀυθενθεῖν. It is therefore absolutely good—κράτιστον:—αὐτὸν ἀρα νοεῖ, ἐπερ εστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἐστιν ἡ νόησις νοησεως νοησις· φαίνεται δ’ ἂ ν ἄλλον η ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ ἀυθενθεὶς καὶ ἡ ἀλήθη καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὐτῆς δ’ ἐν παρέργῳ. The true personality of the εἴδωμον is his εἴδωμον or rationally ordered life (E. N. ix. 7. 4. 1168 a. 6 ἀσεμίν δ’ ἐνεργεία), or perfect correspondence with his environment. It is the law of his own nature to correspond perfectly. We must not abstract him from his environment, as if he were one thing, and the environment another thing, and thus
represent him as dominated by something alien to, or external to himself. In the life of reason he is a 'law unto himself.' He understands and desires everything as it stands related to the great whole of which it is a part. His knowledge is 'adequate,' and his desires are according to his knowledge—i.e. his knowledge is equal to what can be known in his sphere, leaving no residuum of the unknown, and his desires give rise to no conduct which can ever become matter for regret. In the life of sense, on the other hand, a man perceives only the superficies of things, and fails to grasp them in their essence as parts of the whole. His desires too, following the superficial information supplied to them by sense, lead him to perform acts which he afterwards wishes undone. The world is wider and more complex than himself, and has many surprises and retributions in store for him. The life of sense is thus one of subjection, or passivity; while the life of reason is one of freedom, and supremacy (cf. the term κράτος applied to νος). This life of reason, in which there is no ignorance or error is, it will be easily understood, an ideal, like Spinoza's cognitio aadequata, which no man ever actually reaches. Yet some men approximate to it more nearly than others; and in the beautiful structures of plants and animals we have a physical rendering of it which, save for the death of the individual, is perfect.

τῶν πρακτῶν) i.e. 'rerum agendarum,' Michelet rightly, who finds fault with Muretus for supplying τελῶν with πρακτῶν, and distinguishing between τελη which are πρακτά or attainable by man, and those which are οὐ πρακτά—ideal ends. But Aristotle cannot admit such a distinction; see Χ. 7. 8 χρή δὲ οὐ κατὰ τοὺς παρανοούμενα ἀνθρώπων φυσικῶν ἀνθρώπου δυτα, οὐδὲ θυμητὰ τῶν θυμητῶν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' οὗν ἐνδιέχεται ἀδιαμετέχειν. Τὸ πρακτῶν is the result or object of πρᾶξις (as τὸ ἐπιστήμην is of ἐπιστήμη, τὸ αἰσθητῶν of αἴσθησις) and as such may signify 'something done' as a means to an end, or the end itself: see Ε.Ε. 1. 7. 1217 a. 35 διχώς λέγεται τὸ πρακτῶν. καὶ γὰρ δὲν ἐνεκα πράττωμεν, καὶ τὰ τούτων προστήομεν χάρων, which Grant refers to as 'a sort of scholium' upon the term πρακτῶν.

βουλόμεθα] employed here with technical correctness, βουλήσις a. 19. or wish being directed to ends. See Ε. N. iii. 2. 9 ἐπὶ δ' ἡ μὲν βουλήσις τῶν τελῶν ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρῶς τὸ τέλος. Similarly αἱρούμεθα implies προαίρεσις or choice of means.

πρόεισι] impersonal. For examples see Ind. Arist. a. 20.
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1094 a. 21. *ματαιάν*] Cf. *Phys.* ii. 6. 197 b. 25 ὡς τοῦτο διν τὸ μάτην, τὸ σφικτὸς ἀλλος ἑνεκα διὰ τὴν θεοὺς ἑκεῖνον ὡς ἑνεκα ἑσεφύκειν—*i.e.* where a means misses its end, *i.e.* is no means at all, we have τὸ μάτην. But no part or function of a physical organism is thus useless. All parts conspire to the life or good of the organism. See *De Coelo* i. 4. 271 a. 32 μάτην γὰρ ἑπόδημα τοῦτο λέγομεν ὡς μὴ ἐστιν ἑπόδημα ὡς θεοῦ καὶ ἢ φύσις οὐδὲν ἀλόγος οὐδὲ μάτην ποιεῖ, where ἀλόγος means without λόγος, or definite structure and ratio of parts. Cf. *De Partibus Anim.* iii. 1. 661 b. 24 μηδεν μάτην ποιεῖ τὴν φύσιν μηδὲ περιφέργου, and other places noted in the *Ind. Arist.*

a. 22. § 2. ἀρ' οὖν] Zell and Michelet quote Muretus—' Mos hic est Aristotelis, ut saepe, quae affirmare instituit, ea interrogando esserat.' Cf. the common use of ἦ in Aristotle introducing as a question the writer's own opinion, *e.g.* *Ε.Ν.* v. 9. 9 ἦ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλούν;

a. 23. ῥοπήν . . . σκοπῶν] There is a mixture of metaphors here, ῥοπή suggesting a balance, σκοπόν being a target. On ῥοπήν Eustratius says—ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν ζυγῶν οἷς ἐν τοῖς βάρεσι χρύμεθα. The metaphor of the σκοπός occurs, as Zell and Grant notice, in Plato *Rep.* 519 B, C, where it is said of the ἀπαίδευτοι καὶ ἀληθείας ἀπειροι that σκοπόν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οἷς ἔχουσιν ἑνα, οὐ στοχαζομένους δει ἀπαντά πράττειν ἄν πράττομαι ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

a. 24. τοῦ δέοντος] Grant says:—'not “our duty” in the modern sense, this conception not having been as yet developed,' but more generally “what we ought to do” from any motive. The word δέον was a received term with reference to moral subjects. Cf. Plato *Rep.* p. 336 D, where Thrasymachus, calling upon Socrates to define Justice, says "Mind you don't tell me that it is the δέον or the ὁφέλιμον, or the λαυτελοῦν or the κερδαλέον, or the ἴομφερον." Cf. also *Charmides* p. 164 B; Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 22. But the exact import of the term was not fixed. Aristotle in the *Topics* ii. 3. 4 mentions among the πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα, οἷον εἰ τὸ δέον ἔστι τὸ ἴομφερον ἢ τὸ καλὸν.'

The fundamental meaning of δέον, or ὡς δεῖ, seems to be indicated by the conjunction which occurs in *Ε.Ν.* iii. 7. 2. 1115 b. 12 ως δεῖ δι, καὶ ως ὁ λόγος, ὑπομενεί (ὁ ἀνθρώπος τὰ φοβερὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἑνεκα. That is δέον, which is necessary as a means to the main-

1 I cannot assent to the view (apparently held by Grant) that the Greeks had not developed the conception of 'Duty,' as we find it—to take a typical modern instance—in Kant.
tenance of the organism of man's moral nature—an organism which realises an ἀρθὸς λόγος, or just proportion of parts, and is therefore καλὸν and ἀγαθὸν in the eye of νοῦς which contemplates it. The same reference to a just proportion may be noticed in the use of τὸ δέον in E. N. iv. 2. 13 διὸ πένθος μὲν οὐκ ἀν ἐν ἐν μεγαλοσπερῆς οὐ γὰρ ὡστὶν ἀφ’ ἃν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως ὁ δ’ ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ’ ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. Cf. E. N. iv. 2. 20 ὁ δ’ ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλύσεις ὑπερβάλλει. Similarly, the passage before us (E. N. i. 2) means that, if a man knows the ἀγαθόν of man, i.e. the εἴδος or organisation of man's nature as a system of harmoniously balanced parts, and if he keeps the thought or perception of it always before him in all that he does, he will not fail to do, at the proper time, what is necessary (δέον) to its maintenance.

§ 3. τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν.] A frequently recurring metaphor, derived from the practice of the sculptor, who makes a τύπος or rough clay model before he begins the statue in stone. Before we begin our elaborate treatment of the chief good, we will try to form a rough general idea of what it is, and of the conditions under which it can be realised. See Zell and Michelet ad loc., and Schwegler Met. vol. iv. p. 42, and Index Arist. s. v. τύπος, for such phrases as παχυλός καὶ τύπῳ, καθάλου λευθέν καὶ τύπῳ, τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγειν, τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἄκριβῶς λέγεσθαι, τύπῳ διελθεῖν, τύπῳ διοριστεῖν. The ὑπογραφὴ in painting answers to the τύπος in sculpture. In de An. ii. 1. 413 a. 9, we find the metaphor from painting mixed with that from sculpture—τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ταύτη διωρίσθω καὶ ὑπογραφάθω περὶ ψυχῆς. In E. N. i. 7. 17 there is the same mixture of metaphors. We must suppose that the sources of the metaphors have at last ceased to suggest themselves distinctly. Both metaphors occur in Plato, e.g. Rep. 414 A τοιαύτῃ τις δοκεῖς ἡ ἐκλογὴ εἴναι καὶ κατάστασις τῶν ἄρχοντων τε καὶ φυλάκων, ὡς εν τύπῳ μὴ δὲ ἀκριβείας εἰρήσθαι, and Rep. 548 D ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτεία ὑπογράφως αὐτα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι.

ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δινάμεων] δύναμις is the generic term, and includes, as species, ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη: but here δυνάμεως seems to stand for τεχνῶν.

§ 4. κυριωτάτης] Grant remarks that here 'κυριωτάτης seems partly to mean "most authoritative" or "absolute," partly "that which is most absolutely a science."' Κύριος is (1) 'sovereign over' c
1094a.26. (2) ‘in the strict sense’ i.e. in the sense which has the authority of usage in its favour, and consequently ‘prevails over’ other senses of a term: cf. *E. N.* i. 7. 13 κυρίωτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι = ‘for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term’: cf. also κυρία ἀρετή vi. 13. 1, where κυρία has probably both the meanings mentioned above—‘virtue, in the strict sense of the term—sovereign virtue.’ The present section may be rendered thus: ‘It would seem to be the object of the science *par excellence*, the science which is mistress and directs (ἀρχιτεκτονική) all the other sciences.’

a. 27. §§ 5—7. τοιαύτη δ’ ἢ πολιτικῆ φαίνεται, κ.τ.λ. It is man’s nature to be a citizen—φύσει ἀνθρώπων πολιτικῶν ζήσον. Severed, if that were possible, from the body politic, the individual would be like an amputated hand, which is no longer a hand except in name, for it is the performance of its function in the economy of the living body which constitutes it a hand. The ἀπόλις would be either a beast or a god; not a man, for he would have no distinctively human function: see *Pol.* i. i. 1253 a. 19 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλει ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἔστιν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναρμομένων γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποῦν καὶ χέιρ, εἰ μὴ ὀμοίωσις, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λαθίνην διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὄρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὡστε μηκέτι τοιαύτα ὑπάρχον ὡς λειτέων τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἄλλ’ ὀμοίωμα. ἢτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος δὴ λέγουσι εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀυτάρκης ἕκαστος ἔκμαμεθείς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσι ζεῖει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὥς δὲ μὴ δυνάμεις κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δέδομεν δὲ ἀυτάρκειαν οὐδέν μέρος πόλεως, ὡστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεύς. Cf. *Met.* Z. 11. 1036 b. 30 οὐ γὰρ πάντως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος ἡ χεῖρ, ἀλλ’ ἡ δυναμινῇ τὸ ἔργῳ ἀποτελεῖν, ὡστε ἐμψυχος αὐτὰ μὴ ἐμψυχος δὲ οὐ μέρος.

Man realises his true personality as man, when he becomes conscious of the manifold relations in which he stands to his fellows in that final social system which is distinguished as the πόλις from the κόμη and οἰκία; and when, in consequence of having become conscious of these relations, he acts, not to please or profit himself, but to show himself worthy of the civilization permanently embodied in his πόλις. Then his life is the chief good of man as man. Hence πολιτική, the science of the plan (ἀρχιτεκτονική) according to which the πόλις is constituted, will be the science of the chief good of man as man, *i.e.* of man as a ‘social being.’

1 And as a ‘thinker’: for it is only in the πόλις that thinkers are found.
Accordingly all man's special pursuits, such as warfare, household management, and public speaking, so far as they may promote or prevent the realisation of this 'plan,' are regulated by πολιτική.

The subordination of στρατηγική to πολιτική does not need much explanation. The true function of the στρατηγός is to conduct successfully the wars which are necessary to the maintenance of the πόλις, as a home of the peaceful virtues and arts: πολεμοῦμεν ὑπ' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν E. N. x. 7. 6. It is for πολιτική therefore to see that the military spirit is kept within just limits. The main point in Aristotle's criticism of the Spartan constitution is that, by the exclusive attention it paid to military excellence, it produced a state of society which could not last, no place being left for the peaceful virtues. See Pol. ii. 6. 1271 b. 2 πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύν- ταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, τὴν πολεμικὴν' αὐτή γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τοιούτων ἐσώφροντα μὲν πολεμοῦσιν, ἀπάλλυστο δὲ ἄριστῳ, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν, μηδὲ ἐπικείμεναι μηδεμίαν ἀσκήσεων ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς.

The subordination of οἰκονομική to πολιτική is a point of great importance in Aristotle's system. The πόλις is composed of οἰκία which, though chronologically prior, are logically posterior to the πόλις, i. e. they exist for the sake of the πόλις, as the members for the sake of the body. Hence πολιτική, which sees to the good of the πόλις, or whole, will regulate οἰκονομική, which sees to the good of the οἰκία, or part. The true function of the οἰκονόμος is so to rule his household consisting of wife, children, and slaves, and so to provide for their material wants, as to make his 'home life' such that he, and his sons when they grow up, can, without encumbrance or distraction, devote themselves to 'political life,'—that is, to the leisureed life of culture which the society of the πόλις offers. In providing, in this 'political' spirit, for the material wants of his family, the οἰκονόμος is engaged in ή κτητική ή κατά φύσιν, and the capital which he accumulates and administers is ὁ ἀληθῶς πλοῦτος, an amount definitely limited in relation to the end which it, as ἄργανον, subserves. But the οἰκονόμος may forget that 'political life' is the end, and 'home life' or 'private life' only the means. He may
1094 a. 27. make 'home life' or a 'private career' his end. He may make it his end to have a luxurious establishment, or to accumulate wealth for its own sake by trade (χρηματιστική)—an unnatural thing to do, for wealth is naturally a means, and the man who makes its accumulation his end is engaged in an endless undertaking.

It is for πολιτική, therefore, as the science of the social organism, to see that the spirit of self-aggrandisement in oikonomou, or private persons, does not make the parts useless or even dangerous to the whole. See Pol. i. 3. 1256 b. 27 ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν, οὗ δὲ ἦτοι ὑπάρχειν ἡ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ, διὸ ἐστὶ θησαυρίζομεν χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἐσοφεῖ δ' ἀληθῶς πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀναγκὴν ζωῆς οὐκ ἀπειρὸς ἐστιν, ὅπερ Ὀλίμποι φησὶ ποιήσας.

πλοῦτον δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσει κεῖται. κεῖται γὰρ ὅπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἀπειρὸν οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστι τέχνης οὗτε πλῆθει οὗτε μεγεθεὶ, δ' ἐκ πλούτου ὄργανον πλῆθος ἐστίν οἰκονομικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν. ὅτι μὲν τοῖσιν ἐστὶ τῆς κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δ' ἦν αἰτίαν δὴλον ἐστὶ δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἡν μάλιστα καλουσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικῆς, δ' ἦν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως.

The 'political' raison d'etre of 'home life' is nowhere seen more plainly than in Aristotle's theory of slavery (Pol. i. 2). The institution of slavery is supported on the ground that the slave is necessary to 'political life.' He exists not to contribute to the personal comfort or luxury of the master, but to give him that σχολή without which 'political life' is impossible. A free-man, who is obliged to be, as it were, his own slave, or, like the βάναυσος, to do slave's work, is naturally excluded from 'political life.' This defence of slavery, as necessary to 'political life,' becomes intelligible when we recognise the 'gentlemanly' and even 'academic' character of Aristotle's 'political life.' In supporting the institution of slavery as he does, and in excluding the βάναυσος and χρηματιστική from 'political life,' Aristotle merely gives expression to the truth, or truism, that refined culture and social brilliance are found only within the circle of the leisureed class. A 'good man,' according to the modern view, is a man who leads an upright and useful life in his sphere, whatever that may be. Aristotle's 'good man' (σπουδαιός) is, above all, a connoisseur of life, a man of the world, educated, magnificent, fortunate. Slavery or
some analogous institution is obviously necessary to the existence of a caste of men of this sort. See Pol. 1. 3. 1277 b. 35 ἢ καὶ τοὺς βασιλεύουσας πόλεις βασίλευον; ... 1278 a. 8 ἢ δὲ βασιλεύει τοὺς πόλεις οὐ ποιήσει βάσιν πόλιν ... a. 20 οὐ γὰρ οἶκον τῇ ἐπιθυμεῖσα τὰ τῆς ἄρετης ξώματα διὸν βάσιν ἀριστεύον ἥ δητικοίν: Z. 2. 1319 a. 26 δὲ γὰρ βίος ψαλòς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔργον μετέρετο ἄρετής, διὸν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τῷ τῶν βασιλείων καὶ τῷ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῷ δητικοῖν. Aristotle’s ἄρετη is essentially the quality of the gentleman.

The subordination of ῥητορική to πολιτική is an interesting point. In Plato’s Gorgias 452 sqq. we find the sophist Gorgias attempting to identify them, maintaining that ῥητορική is the true art of government, and is concerned with the greatest good of man—with that which gives men freedom in their own persons, and to rulers the power of ruling over others in their several states,' viz. 'the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly or at any other political meeting' (Jowett). Socrates maintains against this view that 'rhetoric is the shadow of a part of politics:' Gorg. 463 D ἢ ῥητορική κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικής μορίον εἰπωλον. It is the art of flattery, and the simulation of justice. Similarly in the Politicus 304 πολιτική and ῥητορική are carefully distinguished, and the subordination of the latter to the former insisted upon. Public speaking was so essential to the exercise of political influence in a democratic state that the temptation to regard rhetoric as the highest art was very strong. Aristotle follows the example of Plato in strenuously opposing this view, and we cannot be wrong in supposing that it is his sympathy with Plato’s opposition to the professional teachers of public speaking which makes him select ῥητορική here as one of his instances of an art subordinate to πολιτική. See E. N. x. 9. 20.

An orator is too apt to speak so as to obtain applause or benefit for himself, whereas his speaking ought to be a means to the good of the state. This it is for the state to see to. Aristotle obviously considered the art of public speaking as one requiring considerable regulation, for in Rhet. i. 1. 1354 a. 11-26 he says that in the best ordered states speakers are not allowed to make appeals to the emotions of the judges, but are confined to the facts of the case—a restriction, he dryly adds, which would reduce many speakers to silence. To appeal to the emotions of a judge is to bend the rule you are about to use. In the interest of the community at large it would seem that oratory ought to be regulated even in private cases...
between citizens; but where the speech is addressed to a sovereign people to determine their policy, the responsibility of the speaker is much greater. It is very little however that statute can do, in the absence of good sense and good feeling, to curtail the licence of public speaking. The institution of the γραφὴ παρανύμων at Athens was an attempt in this direction, but does not seem to have been very successful. Its effect was evaded by the passing of ψηφίσματα (as distinguished from νόμοι), in force for one year, and annually renewable.

The relation of πολιτικὴ to public speaking suggests, through the sophists the great teachers of rhetoric, the general subject of the relation of πολιτικὴ to education. We are told in § 6 that πολιτικὴ determines what sciences and arts shall be taught in the city, and to what extent, and to whom, and in the Politics (Π. 13—Θ. 7) a sketch of the education which it is desirable that the state should provide is given. Again, in the last chapter of the E. N. (χ. 9), the question whether education ought to be private or public is discussed (to a certain extent dialectically), and the conclusion reached that it ought to be public. The private point of view, even if it were backed by sufficient authority to enforce its particular system (which it is not), is too narrow.

It has been pointed out above that the difference of opinion between Plato and the sophists seems to have caused the selection here of ῥητορικὴ as an instance of an art subordinate to πολιτικὴ. The selection of στρατηγικὴ seems also to be due to the influence of Plato, who, in Politicus 304, 305—a passage from which the present may very well have been borrowed—describes πολιτικὴ as the sovereign (βασιλικὴ) science which regulates ῥητορικὴ, στρατηγικὴ, δικαστικὴ, as well as μουσικὴ and ὀλως αἱ περὶ χειροτεχνίας ἐπιστήμαι. The selection of οἰκονομικὴ is not accidental either, but is determined by Aristotle's peculiar view of the evil of χρηματιστική (see Pol. i. 3. 1256 b. 41), as well as by his theory of the origin of the πόλις (see Pol. i. 2. 1253 b. 2 ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἶπεν· πάσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκίων).

b. 4. § 7. χρωμένης] i. e. using as means to its own supreme end; cf. the use of χρῆσιμον = 'the means,' as e.g. E. N. i. 5. 8 καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ἀλλοῦ ὅτι τὸ δηλοῦν ἄγαθον· χρῆσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἀλλον χάριν. Pol. ii. 6. 1271 b. 3 χρησίμῃ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. E. N. viii. 6. 5 χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά. χρωμένης . . νομοθετοῦσης] Cf. the division of ἦ περὶ πόλιν φρονήσεως
BOOK I: CHAP. 2: §§ 7, 8.

(Ε. Ν. vi. 8. 2) into (1)  νομοθετική, (2) πολιτική, i.e. into that which lays down general rules of life, and that which deals, in the assembly and the law courts, as well as in the various executive departments, with the details of public business.


§ 8.] The words ἀγαπητῶν μὲν γὰρ καὶ εἰς μόνος are a little startling, b. 7. but must not be understood to mean that the individual is in any sense self-subsisting, and able to realise his good independently of the state. We have seen that Aristotle’s doctrine is that the individual has no existence apart from the body politic. No man who is not a πολίτης can attain to the ἀνθρώπων ἄγαθον. Indeed this doctrine is implied in the words ταῦτα ἡ ἀρετή καὶ πόλει. Accordingly when Aristotle goes on to distinguish the good of the πόλις from that of the εἰς μόνος, as κάλλιον καὶ διενέχεια, he must be understood merely to distinguish between πολιτικὴ in different social circumstances—between the πολιτικὴ who, like Solon or Pericles, is surrounded by all that is best in civil life, and the πολιτικὴ who lives in exile, with a memory or a hope instead of a city, or is placed in social circumstances which are mean and unworthy of him, like ‘the great soul in a small city’ spoken of by Plato (Rep. 496). Plato indeed regards exile and a small city as distinctly favourable (in existing circumstances) to philosophy—man’s highest occupation; but Aristotle takes the more concrete view, that with mean social surroundings, a man cannot perform his highest function well, although he may perform it in a way. It would be a misapprehension of Aristotle’s teaching to suppose that the distinction drawn in this section is that between the good of the community at large—‘the greatest good of the greatest number,’ and the private good of a single member of the community. No such distinction could be made by Aristotle. The good of the εἰς μόνος, in which we must sometimes ‘acquiesce,’ is still his good as a ‘social being;’ it is not a κτήμα of which he may be the solitary possessor, but an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς which can only be manifested in a social environment, unsatisfactory though that environment may be in a given case. A man’s social environment may be fitted to call forth his noblest energies, or it may be such as to impede them without entirely destroying them: this is the distinction which Aristotle draws. His social energies impeded, a
man is apt to fall back upon the abstraction of the individual per se—to live for himself, and forget that he is a member of the body politic; when his noblest energies are constantly called forth by brilliant social circumstances, he identifies himself with the body politic, which is no longer for him an abstraction, but his own concrete life. The true self is a noble life in a great city. The terms κάλλων and θείωτερον are applied with technical correctness to this life, which is, in the highest degree, one of definite order and form. The term καλόν, as we have seen, is applied where there is μέγεθος καὶ τάξις (Poet. 7. 1450 b. 3); and the term θείον marks the ἔδος which φύσις, whether in the natural or in the moral world, strives to perfect, by purifying from the influence of ὁλη. Θεός is pure form without matter (see Μετ. 1. 7, and, for the expression ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως De Interp. 13. 23 a. 23); φύσις is a principle which, by producing ever more and more definite forms (.Relative), strives to approach the ideal of the divine immaterial form. Plants and animals, which perpetuate their species (Relative) in young individuals unaffected by the decay of age, are thus said to strive after τὸ θείον in so doing: De Anima, ii. 4. 415 a. 24 φυσικοτάτων γὰρ τῶν ἐργῶν τῶν ζώων . . . τὸ ποιήσαι ἔτερον οἷον αὐτό, ἔτων μὲν ἔτων, φυτῶν δὲ φυτῶν, ἕνα τῶν ἀεί καὶ τῶν θείων μετάκιςσαι ὑπὸ δύνασαι. Οἰκονομ. i. 3. 1343 b. 23 ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀναπληρῶ ταύτη τῇ περίοδῳ τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀριθμῶν οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἔδος· οὕτω προφορομύνηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου ἐκατέρω ἡ φύσις τοῦ τε ἀνθρώπος καὶ τῆς γυμνικῆς πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν. Similarly, in following pleasure, which is the symbol of functions tending towards the good of the organism, all animals follow a divine instinct: Ἑ. Ἅ. vii. 13. 6. 1153 b. 30 οὖν ἡδονὴ διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντας, ηδονὴν μὲντοι πάντες· ἵνα δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ὕποι οὐδὲ ἢν οὐκοι οὖν ᾧν ἢν φαίνει, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τὶ θείον. Τὸ θείον, then, being the principle of form, or organisation, in plants and animals, it is easy to understand how, apart from any special motive to use an ornate epithet, νος should be described as θείος, as in Ἑ. Ἅ. x. 7. 8, and many other places. Νος is the principle of form and order in man, quæ human; the faculty whereby he abstracts his attention from the separate presentations, as such, of sense and feeling, and regards the relations in which the presentations stand to one another in an orderly system of science or life. To be able to identify oneself with such an orderly system may well be characterised as καλόν and θείον. The identification of νος and τὸ νοστὸν is a doctrine of the
greatest importance in Aristotle's philosophy, enabling him to reconcile the opposition (which Grant finds so conspicuous in his system: see Grant's *Ethics*, vol. i. pp. 412-413) between 'the end for the state' and 'the absolute worth of the individual consciousness.' Only that 'individual (sc. human) consciousness' has 'absolute worth' which has for its object, and identifies itself with, 'the end for the state.' The true self is the consciousness of social duty. 'Ἡμιν μὲν τὸ ἔδ καθ ἐτερον, ἐκεῖνο δὲ (sc. θεό) αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ ἔδ ἐστίν (E. E. H. 12. 1245 b. 18.).

The Paraphrast shows little appreciation of the philosophical import of the passage: he says ἔστι μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν ἀνθρώπω τὸ ἁγάθων διασώσαι ἁγαπητῶν (ἀν τε ἐν ἐτερῳ τις, ἀν τε ἐν ἀντῳ δυνηθῇ φυλάσσαι) κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θείουτερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν, ὥσον ἡ τῶν πολλῶν εὐδαμομοίᾳ τῆς ἐνὸς ἁμείνων ἐστίν.

ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν] The Hellenic race with its various states as distinguished from non-Hellenic races is doubtless foremost in Aristotle's mind here.

ἡ μέθοδος] 'This enquiry.'

πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα] Michelet says, 'τις nihil aliud indicat, nisi quod praeter moralem sint adhuc alienae scientiae quae politicœ subjiciantur, ut ὑκομομυκή. Inferiores scientiae autem a nobiliori cui subjectae sunt denominantur.' Perhaps it is better to avoid committing Aristotle to the view that 'moral philosophy' falls under 'political philosophy' as species under genus. He can hardly be said to distinguish the two.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

Our Subject then is the Chief Good, our Science a kind of Statesmanship.

Exactness of scientific treatment, it must be premised, depends on subject-matter. Some subjects do not admit of being treated very exactly, just as some materials do not lend themselves to very fine workmanship. Now, the science of society is not an exact science, because its subject-matter, Conduct, is a very complex one—indeed so full of inconsistencies and perplexities, that to some people it seems an arbitrary system, without foundation in the nature of things. On such a subject, then, we shall be satisfied with rough indications of the truth; with probable conclusions from probable premisses: with which the 'educated' reader will also be satisfied; for the educated man looks always in a science for that degree of exactness of which its subject-matter admits: he does not allow a mathematician to give him merely probable conclusions, or demand strict demonstration from an orator.
A man may be 'educated' in some particular branch, or in the general sense of the term. In either case, he is a 'good judge,' as far as his education extends. Hence a youth is not a fit student of the science of society. He is not a 'good judge' of doctrines belonging to a subject—the conduct of life—of which he has no real experience: moreover, he is so prone to be led away by his feelings, that doctrines have no influence over his conduct: and it is influence over conduct, not inculcation of doctrines, that is the raison d'être of our Science. What has been said regarding the youthful in years is true also of the youthful in character. There are men who at mature age still live under the rule of their passions. Their knowledge does such men no good. But if a man rule his desires aright, and act according to the dictates of his reason, knowledge of the truths of our Science will be of great use to him.

This chapter is devoted to the logical method of Ethics,—a subject which is taken up again in ch. iv. §§ 5–7, and in ch. vii. §§ 17–23.

b. 12. § 1. ὑποκειμένη ὑλή] The ὑποκειμένη ὑλή is the matter, as distinguished from the form. See Met. Z. 3. 1029 a. 3 λέγω δὲ τὴν μὲν ὑλήν, οἷον τὸν χαλκὸν, τὴν δὲ μορφὴν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ὑδάς τὸ δ' ἐκ τοῦτων τὸν ἀνδριαμένα τὸ σῶμαν. This ὑλή (sometimes called τὸ ὑποκειμένου) is, in itself, formless, and therefore not an object of knowledge; see De Coelo, iii. 8. 306 b. 17 αἰδέσ καὶ ἀμορφον δεῖ τὸ ὑποκειμένου εἶναι, and Met. Z. 10. 1036 a. 8 ἡ δ' ὑλή ἀγνωστός καθ' αἰτήν.

It is, however, receptive, in various degrees, of form, and, together with a given form, constitutes a concrete thing (τὸ σῶμαν): see Met. Δ. 4. 1015 b. 13 ἡ πρῶτη φύσις καὶ κυρίως λεγομένη ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία (i. e. τὸ ἔνθαλον εἴδος, Alex.) ή τῶν ἔχωντων ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ αὐτἠ ἡ γὰρ ὑλή τὸ ταῖτης δεκτή ἐκεῖνα λέγεται φύσις. Qua receptive of the forms which φύσις or τέχνη may impose upon it, ὑλή is τὸ δύναμεν ἐκαστὸν (Met. N. 4. 1092 a. 4), i.e. the potentiality of a definite form. Cf. Met. Z. 7. 1032 a. 20 ἀπαίτα δὲ τὰ γνώμονα ἡ φύσις ἡ τέχνη ἔχει ὑλήν δυνατὸν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν τοῦτο δ' εστὶν ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὑλή. Cf. Met. Η. 2. 1043 a. 24 τί ἐστι γαλήνη; ὁμολογηθεὶς ναλάτης τὸ μὲν ὑποκειμένου ὡς ὑλή ή γαλαταται ἢ δὲ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ μορφή ἡ ᾳμαλότητις. Cf. Pol. i. 3. 1256 a. 8 λέγω δὲ ὑλήν τὸ ὑποκειμένου εἷς οὐ τί ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον οἰον ὕφαινῃ μὲν ξια ἀνδριαμέτωπος δὲ χαλκῶν.

b. 13. τὸ ἀκριβές] ὑλή being the rough material which has to be brought into shape, the finish or perfection (τὸ ἀκριβές) of the shape will largely depend upon the nature of the material operated on; e.g. a figure carved in wood will differ in artistic character from one cut in marble. The facts dealt with by a science constitute its ὑλή, the science being the εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις (Eustratius) of the ὑλή.
As various materials, wood and stone, lend themselves differently to the efforts of the artist who gives them shape, so various subjects of enquiry admit of different degrees of definiteness in their scientific treatment: οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἀπαιτοῖς λόγοις ἐπικεφαλῶν τὸ ἀκριβές, ὡσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις: e.g. in medical and sociological enquiries the facts which science has to reduce to order, or λόγος, are so numerous, and their relations to one another so complicated, that probable conclusions, i.e. expectations which are more or less likely to be realised, are all that we can hope to reach. We can never be sure that we have taken into consideration everything affecting a social question or a medical diagnosis. In geometry, on the other hand, the influence of ὅλη is reduced to a minimum. All other qualities of bodies except their spatial, diagrammatically-representable qualities are ignored by geometry; and of the diagrams, as drawn, all actual irregularities are ignored. In nature there is no such thing as a circle with all its radii absolutely equal; but geometry assumes such a circle, and its deductions are true on the assumption. The first principles of geometry are so clear to the eye in the diagrams which represent them, and the reasoning, guided at every step by the eye, is so obviously affected by nothing save these principles, that we feel sure that our conclusions cannot be otherwise. Geometry is thus the type of ἀποδεῖξις, or necessary reasoning, because it has to do with ἔιθη as such, i.e. with abstractions, τὰ ἔξ ἀφανίσεως—τὰ ἀνεύ ὅλης; cf. An. Post. i. 13. 79 a. 7 τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα περὶ ἔιθη ἐστί, κ.τ.λ. Abstractions, or pure ἔιθη as such, from their very nature are incapable of change, change being incident to concrete things which grow and perish. The plan of a house, as such, i.e. the conception of certain architectural relations, is unaffected by the γένεσις and φθορά which alter a structure of bricks and mortar. Where λόγος is σίν τῇ ὅλῃ συνείδημένος, there γένεσις and φθορά obtain: τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἐστιν οὗτος ὡστε φθείρεσθαι, οὐδὲ γὰρ γένεσις· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ οἰκία εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τῇ ὅλῃ (Met. Z. 15. 1039 b. 21). Cf. Met. Z. 8. 1033 b. 16. φανερον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὡς εἴδος ἢ ὡς σύνεσιν λεγόμενον οὐ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν ἀπαιτί τῷ γενομένῳ ὅλῃ ἐνεστε, τὸ μὲν τόδε τὸ δὲ τόδε. The εἴδος, as such, is indivisible (Met. Z. 8. 1034 a. 8 ἀτομον τὸ εἴδος): κίνησις and γένεσις belong only to τὰ μεριστὰ καὶ μῆ δῶ (É.N. X. 4. 1174 b. 11), i.e. to material things, or the formations of matter; their 'matter' being the element of divisibility, confusion, and change in them. Cf. de Gen. et Corr. i. 4. 320 a. 2 ἐστι δὲ ὅλῃ μάλιστα μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσεως καὶ φθοράς δεκτικῶν. Form,
BOOK I: CHAP. 3: § 1.

1094 b. 13. or ἐιδός, then, as such, being ἀκίνητος, ἀδίβος, and μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, constitutes the object of ἀποδεικτική ἐπιστήμη. Geometry is the type of ἀποδεικτική ἐπιστήμη; for, although it is impossible for man to apprehend form without a certain admixture of matter (cf. de Memor. i. 449 b. 31 νοεῖν ὤκ ἐστίν ἄνευ φαντάσματος), still, in geometry, the matter, i.e. the irregularity due to the actual presentation of the form, is so slight, and so easily eliminated by an effort of imagination, that Aristotle is practically justified in speaking of the objects of the science as being ἄνευ υλῆς. See Met. a. 3. 995 a. 14 τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐν ἀπασία ἀπάτητον, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχοσιν υλῆν. διότερ oὐ φυσικὸς ὁ τρόπος ἀπάσα γὰρ ἵσος ἡ φύσις ἔχει υλῆν: and Met. Z. 15. 1039 b. 27 τοῖς ὦσιν τῶν ἀκαθήτων τὰ καθ' ἐκάστα ὀστὲ ὀρίσμον ὀστὲ ἀπόδειξις ἄστιν, ὅτι ἔχουσιν υλῆν, ἥς ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη ὡστ' ἐνδεχεσθαι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ. διὸ φθορὰ πάντα τὰ καθ' ἐκάστα αὐτῶν, εἰ ὀνὰ ἦ τε ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀναγκαίων, καὶ ὁ ὀρίσμος ἐπιστημονικὸς, καὶ ὦστε ἐνδεχεται, ὡστε οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη ὅτε μὴ ἐπιστήμη ὅτε οὐ' ἀγροῦ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δόξα τὸ τουτών ἄστιν, ὑστώς οὐδ' ἀπόδειξις οὐδ' ὀρίσμον, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν, δήλον ὅτι ὦστε αὐτῶν ὀστὲ ὀρίσμον ὀστὲ ἀπόδειξις. Cf. Met. K. 3. 1061 a. 28 οἱ μαθηματικοὶ περὶ τὰ εἷς ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται περιελθὲν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ οἷον θάρσος καὶ κοινότητα, κ.π.λ. ... μόνον δὲ καταλεῖπε τὸ ποιοῦ καὶ συνεχής. Simple spatial forms, always the same, and spatial laws or conditions, never counteracted by unforeseen influences, explain for Aristotle, as they do for Dugald Stewart (Elements of the Phil. of the Human Mind, Part II. ch. i and ch. ii. § 3), and J. S. Mill (Logic, Book II. chs. v and vi) the necessity and universality of the truths of geometry.

On κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην υλὴν Eustratius has the following note: ἡν δὲ ἐφ' ἐκάστην μεθόδον καὶ τέχνης λέγεται τὸ ὑποκειμένου αὐτῆς περὶ τὸ καταγίνεται, ὑποκείμενον δὲ τῇ ἡθικῇ καὶ πολιτικῇ τὰ ἐν ἔθνῃ εἶστι πράγματα καὶ αἱ περὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράξεις τε καὶ ἑνέργειαι, ἄστιν τῶν ὄστε ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐνδεχόμενον εἰσὶ καὶ ὦστε ἄσωστος ἔχομενα, ἀλλ' έστων οὐ κατὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἀποστάτησε. [Cf. Phys. iv. 9. 217 a. 22 ὡρὰ μιὰ τῶν ἐναντίων.] καὶ ἐπὶ τουτῶν τὸ ὑποκειμένων τῶν ὄστε ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ οἱ λόγοι οἱ παραδιδόντες περὶ αὐτῶν. διὰ οὐδ' χρὴ ἀναγκαίας τινὰς ἀπόδειξις περὶ τῶν οὔτως ἐνδεχόμενον ἀπατεῖν ὀστὲρ γὰρ μέτρον οἱ λόγοι τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσὶ περὶ ἄν ἑλονται, καὶ διὰ τὸ μέτρον ἐφαρμόζον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ μετρώμενον, οὐ δύναται δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ ἔχων ὄσωστος τὸ ὄστε ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὔτως ἔχομεν ἐφαρμόζον. The Paraphrast says: οὖ γὰρ δυνάτον ἐπὶ πάσης ἡλίθῃς ὑμῖν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἀλήθειαν εἰρεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς, ἀτε ἀναγκαίαν
§ 2. τὰ δὲ καλά, κ.τ.λ.] The subject-matter of moral or political b. 14. science is right conduct,—that which men, being such as they are, ought to do, in the various circumstances in which they are placed. But the notions comprised within this sphere—Justice, Temperance, Courage, &c.—are constituted by relations which vary (within limits) or are ‘contingent,’ not ‘necessary’ or immutable, as are those perceived in mathematics. It would, therefore, be absurd to demand ‘demonstration’ in such a subject. When Locke (Essay, iii. ii. 16) maintained that morality might be made ‘capable of demonstration as well as mathematics,’ if ethical terms, such as Justice, were carefully defined once for all, and the definitions used as first principles, he failed to see the full import of the circumstance that there are no diagrams in morals, and to appreciate the difference between a ‘mixed mode,’ however carefully defined in words, and a spatial form clearly represented to the eye in a diagram. But, even were it granted that, with definitions of its ‘mixed modes’ as principles of deduction, moral science, notwithstanding the absence of diagrams, might be made as ‘accurate’ as geometry, it would still be true that such an abstract system would be practically useless, being inapplicable to the varying contingencies of life; and indeed might become positively injurious, by stereotyping the conclusions of imperfect enlightenment, and handing them down in an authoritative form to times which might be profited by a change of conduct. Moral rules must suit themselves to the varying exigencies of life (so far as they do vary), and ethics cannot be made an ‘exact science’ without ceasing to be a practical system. According to Aristotle, however, ethics is essentially a practical system: E. N. i. 3. 6 τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γρῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις: and πρᾶξις is concerned with the contingent and variable; see E. N. vi. 5. 3. Demonstration can be looked for only where the subject-matter is abstract, i.e. where it is possible, and convenient, to ignore all actual irregularities and contingencies. But in ethics it would be as absurd to ignore the irregularities and contingencies in circumstances and
1094b.14. conduct, as in the art of navigation to ignore the variations of the weather. A science which is concerned with things as they present themselves concretely in nature can never attain to exactness, ἀπασὰ γὰρ ἤσως ἡ φύσις ἐχει ἔλεγον *Met.* a. 3. 995 b. 17.

Yet, although *Right* and *Wrong* are not abstract and immutable ἐδὸν like the principles of geometry, they are not the arbitrary creations of mere convention (νόμος), but have a definite nature of their own (φύσις). There are certain actions which, except under the most extraordinary circumstances, must be performed, as there are certain which must be avoided by all men, if human society is to maintain itself. We must not be misled by conceivable exceptions, or by the numerous cases of actions which do not involve the very existence of human society, and therefore would be indifferent but for fashion or some local and temporary utility, into supposing that *all* actions are indifferent. Man’s nature is of a certain kind on the whole, and his circumstances are of a certain kind on the whole; and if he does not act in a certain way on the whole he will perish. This is the φύσις in the distinction between right and wrong. There is a ‘natural’ distinction between right and wrong as there is between food and poison.

The question as to whether the δίκαιον exists φύσις or νόμος is a prominent one in the history of Greek ethical speculation. It is fully discussed by the writer of the fifth book of the *Ethics* (ch. vii), and the *Theaetetus* of Plato is chiefly devoted to it. Protagoras, we are told in the *Theaetetus*, maintained that ‘man is the measure of all things,—that is, that things are what they seem to him. By ‘man’ Protagoras did not understand ‘the human faculties as such,’ but ‘every individual man for himself.’ *Theaet.* 152 Α δηνγεί γὰρ ποτ [ὁ Προταγόρας] πάντων χρησάτων μέτρων ἀνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν: ἀνέγνωκας γὰρ ποι; "Εσεί. ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις. Σω. οὐκόν ὅτι ποτὸς λέγει, ὡς οὐδὲ ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοῦτα μὲν ἔστω ἐμοὶ, οὐ δὲ σοὶ, τοῦτα δὲ αὐτὸν ἀνθρωπὸς δὲ σοῦ τε κάγω; "Εσεί. λέγει γὰρ ὅτι ὅντως. Hence nothing has a nature or essence of its own, but exists only in relation to the mind which happens to perceive it: *Theaet.* 157 Α οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τινι ἄει γίνεσθαι, τὸ δ' ἐὰν πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον. Hence (*Theaet.* 1. 1. 1355 a. 20 ἰχθύσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορική διὰ τὸ τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττων τάληθη καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἔναντίων, ὡστε έκν ἡ κατὰ τὸ προσήκον αὐτή ἰχθύσει γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐκτὸς τῶν ηττάτων . . . 37 ἀεὶ τάληθη καὶ τὰ δελτία τῇ φύσει εὐόσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανότερα ἀσ ἀπλῶς εἶπαν.

1 Cf. *Rhet.* i. 1. 1355 a. 20 χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορική διὰ τὸ τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττων τάληθη καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἔναντίων, ὡστε έκν ἡ κατὰ τὸ προσήκον αὐτή ἰχθύσει γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐκτὸς τῶν ηττάτων . . . 37 ἀεὶ τάληθη καὶ τὰ δελτία τῇ φύσει εὐόσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανότερα ἀσ ἀπλῶς εἶπαν.
BOOK I: CHAP 3: §§ 2, 3.

§ 2. ** dikaios.** 'Good things' also, as well as ** kalas** and ** taux.** 167 C) or de an ekasai poiLe dikaiow kalas dokeu, tauta kalai eina auty 1094 b. 14. tosw an auta nomi/s: and (Theod. 172 A) ointov kai peri politikon, kalas mev kai aichra kai dikaiow kai ada kai doxa kai mu, oia an ekasai polis oibhso oteretai nyma eanu, tauta kai eina t upheia ekasai, kal ev touvoi mev oideu sophoterov ouste idios ouste ouste paiLov poleov eina . . .

(B) en tois dikaiow kai adikaiow kai oinos kai aniosia eboleuov isxu- rizei swv an oik 'strai fuysei au'tow oideu oidosi eantw' 'xov, allla tis kovh doxan touto geinetai upheies tote otevan doxh kai doxan an doxh xrovon. This view, which was obviously fitted to recommend itself to professional teachers of rhetoric or the art of 'getting on,' seems to have been held by many of the sophists, as also by the Cyrenaics (e.g. Theodorus; see Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil. Theodorus), and, after Aristotle's time, by the Epicureans. For a criticism of the view nofo mouon eina, fuysei de mu, see Cudworth's Eternal and Immutable Morality, Books II and III.

§ 3. kal tauxa. 'Good things' also, as well as **tut kalas** kal **ta b. 17. dikaios,** are of a mutable nature, and cause many perplexities. The Paraph. has—od mouon de, allla kai auta ta aytba eiz an dokes ennastasa ei ekdisamiai (andrefiain lego h ploutov h touitov ti) kai auta 'xai eilapan polhnu, k.t.l. Although this section is thus primarily a statement about tauxa, it may perhaps be regarded also as conveying, by its position, a refutation of the immediately preceding nofo mouon eina fuysei de mu. 'The argument from variability proves too much, viz. that good things also, such as wealth, have no quality of goodness in themselves independently of opinion and fashion. If right and wrong are indifferent, then riches and poverty are also.' Rassow conjectures filian for andreian (Forsch. p. 88). He says, 'Dass die Tapferkeit unter die dyad gerechnet wird, und nicht unter die kalas dikaiow, steht in auffalligstem Widerspruch mit den Grundanschauungen und dem Sprachgebrauche der Ethik. Der Scholiast [Eusistratus] nimmt andreia in der Bedeutung von ischus, aber diese Aushilfe ist unzulassig [the Index Arist. gives no instance of andreia=ischus]. Ich vermuthe daher: di filian Vgl. 9. p. 1099 a. 31 faixetui 8' ' الرو kai taw ekto aytba prosothoemien, kathater eitomow adounov ycor h ou ro'dion taw kalaw prattew axhrygen oventa. polhov mev yar prattew, kathaper di organon, di filow kai ploutov kai politikes dunamow.'

The assumption which underlies Rassow's objection to andreian seems to be that tauhaxa here, as distinguished from taw kalas kai taw dikaiow, must be taw ekto aytba. I confess that I cannot see why Aristotle
1094 b. 17. should not be allowed, even immediately after the mention of τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, to take τὰ γάρδια in its generic sense, and, having given πλοῦτος as an instance of τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῆ, to add ἀνδρεία as an instance of τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ (see Rhet. i. 5. 1360 b. 26); cf. Eustratius, εἰ δὲ τὴν καρδίαν ἀνδρείαν (as distinguished from ἴσχυς: Eustratius is here offering an alternative explanation for the ἀνδρεία = ἴσχυς explanation which he seems to favour), ἐρείς ὅτι ἐν πρὸς ἐν ἀντιθηκῇ, πρὸς τὶ τῶν θυραίων καὶ ἐξωθεῖν, ἐν τῶν ἐντὸς καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν.

b. 19. § 4. περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων] A common Aristotelian expression, περὶ τοιούτων referring to the matter of the enquiry, and ἐκ τοιούτων to the principles available for the establishment of scientific conclusions relating to this matter. See Rhet. ii. 1. 1377 b. 16, quoted by Zell—ἐκ τῶν μὲν οὖν δεὶ καὶ προτρέψειν καὶ ἀποτρέψειν καὶ ἐπανεῖν καὶ ἁγγείων καὶ αἰτιολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποιεῖν δόξα καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πλάσεις ταῦτα ἔτυχον περὶ γὰρ τούτων (i. e. τὸ προτρέπειν κ.τ.λ.) καὶ ἐκ τούτων (i. e. αἱ δόξαι καὶ αἱ προτάσεις) τὰ ἐνυπημῆμα. Cf. Th. i. 8. 103 b. 39 περὶ δὲ μὲν οἷς λόγοι καὶ ἐξ ὕπατα καὶ τοσοῦτα ἐστὶν: de Part. Anim. i. 5. 644 b. 23, sqq. συμβολής δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐκείνας (i. e. τὰς ἁγιασίας καὶ ἀφθαρσίας) τιμίας οὕσας καὶ θείας ἁλάτους ἥμιν υπάρχειν θεωρεῖ (καὶ γὰρ χ' ὑπὸ τις σκέψατο περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ δὲ εἰδέναι πονοῦμεν, παντελῶς ἑστὶν ὁλὴ ἡ φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀναβησθήνων κ.τ.λ. Cf. Hist. Anim. i. 6. 491 a. 13 περὶ δὲ τὸ γὰρ καὶ ἐξ δὲ εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἀποδείξιν, ἐκ τούτων γίνεται φανερῶν. Add to these examples given by Zell, E. N. i. 3. 5 οἱ λόγοι ὁ δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. E. N. vi. 11. 6 ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων.

In Anal. Post. i. 7. 75 a. 39, sqq. Aristotle says—τρία γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν εἶναι τὸ ἀποδεικνύομεν συμπέρασμα τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον γενέσθι τω μὴ καθ' αὐτόν· ἐν δὲ τὰ ἀξιόματα· ἀξιόματα δὲ ἐστιν, εὖ δὲ τρίτον τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὗ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ συμβεβηκτός δηλοὶ ἡ ἀποδείξεις: and An. Post. i. 10. 76 b. 11 πᾶσα γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τρία ἐστὶν, ὅσα τε εἶναι τίθεται ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ γένος οὗ τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ παθημάτων ἐστὶ τεθερμηκῆ καὶ τὰ κοῦμα καὶ λέγομεν ἡ ἀξιόματα, εὖ δὲ πρῶτον ἀποδεικνύομεν· καὶ τρίτον τὰ πάθη δὲ τὶ σημαίνει ἐκάστων λαμβάνει:—and in the same chapter, 76 b. 22 τρία ταῦτα ἐστὶν, περὶ δ' τε δεικνύαται, καὶ δ' ἐστὶ. On the passage 75 a. 39, sqq. Themistius (vol. i. p. 28, ed. Spengel) writes—τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν, εἶναι δ' δεικνύσιν ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τούτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατηγοροῦμεν ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι, ἐν δὲ τὰ ἀξιόματα εὖ δὲν δεικνύται,
to be noted that the analysis given in these passages (An. Post. 75 a. 39—76 b. 22) is introduced in order to expose the illogical procedure of applying the principles and method of one subject (γένος) to the explanation of another subject—75 a. 38 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἔξ ἄλλον γένος μεταβάντα δείξας, οἷον τὸ γεωμετρικὸν ἀριθμητική τριά γάρ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. The conclusions (ἀ δείκνυσι) of a given science are proved within the sphere of its own subject matter (περὶ ὁ δείκνυσι, γένος), by means of certain formal principles (ἐξ δεν), available within that sphere. The expression περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων evidently contains a reference to this analysis, περὶ τοιούτων relating to the γένος or ὑποκειμένη ὧν of moral science, viz. τὰ πρακτικά, and ἐκ τοιούτων to the principles available in such an enquiry. We must remember that these principles do not resemble either the axioms or the definitions of geometry, which are 'eternal and immutable,' but rather embody 'tendencies.'

Ἐνδείκνυσθαι] Eustratius has—ἀποδείξεις μὲν καθορῶς καὶ βεβαίως τὸ b. 20. ζητούμενον παριστά, ἐνδείξεις δὲ διὰ τινῶν ἐκτυπώσεων καὶ μιμήσεων καὶ ἐμφάσεων. According to the Ind. Arist. Aristotle does not use the verb elsewhere, and nowhere uses the noun (ἐνδείξεις). In Athenian law ἐνδείκνυσθαι means 'to inform against, lay an ἐνδείξεις against' anyone for illegal conduct. Cf. Plato, Apol. 32 B καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδείκνυσθαι μὲ καὶ ἀπάγει τῶν ῥήτωρων. The 'probable' nature of the evidence upon which an ἐνδείξεις relied may have suggested to Aristotle the employment of ἐνδείκνυσθαι in the present connexion. The author of the ῥήτορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον 38. 1445 b. 8, speaking of the ἐκταστικῶν εἰδος, uses the verb with what certainly seems to be a reference to its legal use—ἐφεξῆς ἔκαστον προσθέμενοι τῶν ῥήτωτων ἢ πραχθέντων ἢ διανοηθέντων ἐκτάσεων, ἐνδεικνύτες αὐτὰ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ τοῖς νομίμοις καὶ τοῖς ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ συμφέρουσιν ἐναπτικώμενα. At any rate, in the present passage ἐνδείκνυσθαι may be rendered by 'indicate' (as distinguished from 'demonstrate'—ἀποδείκνυμαι).

Τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] That which generally takes place. It is b. 21. distinguished from τὸ δεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης on the one hand, and τὸ

1094 b. 21. συμβεβηκός καὶ τὸ τυχόν on the other hand, see Met. K. 8. 1064 b. 32, sqq. Ἡῶν δὴ φάμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄλι καὶ εἶ ἀνάγκης [e.g. the angles of a triangle are = 2 right angles], τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ [e.g. perseverance is rewarded by success], τὸ δ' οὐθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁμ' ἄλι καὶ εἶ ἀνάγκης, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ [e.g. when a man digging his vineyard, finds a treasure]... ἔτη δὴ τὸ συμβεβηκός ὁ γίγνεται μὲν οὐκ ἄλι ὡς ἔπι τὸ πολὺ. Cf. also Topics ii. 6. 112 b. 1 τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν εἶ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τὰ δὲ ὑπότερ' ἔτυχεν. Hence Deliberation is concerned with τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, for τὰ εἶ ἀνάγκης and τὰ ὑπό τύχης are equally removed from the sphere of man's influence: E. N. iii. 10 τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἀνάλοια δὲ τὰ πῶς ἀποβέβηκα, καὶ ἐν ὡς ἀδιάφροσιν: and cf. §§ 1-9 of the same chapter. In E. N. v. 10. 4 τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον is used in the same sense as τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. On the distinction between ἐπὶ πολὺ (= far) and ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (both ὡς and the article with πολὺ are essential to the expression) see Eucken, über den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles (1868), p. 55, sqq. Thuc. (ii. 13) has θαρσεῖν τε ἐκέλευς προσώπων μὲν ἐξακοσίων ταλάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρον κατ' ἐναντίων: and Isocrates peri εἰρήνης 166. b καὶ ταῦτ' 'ει μή κατὰ πάντων ὡς εἴθεται συμβαίνει, ἀλλὰ τὸ γ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τούτων γίγνεται τὸν τρόπον. A fragment apud Meineke Fragm. Com. vol. iii. 469 has ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ πολλὰ τοῦτο ποιῶ.  

b. 22. τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι] From probable premisses only probable conclusions (συμπεράσκεται) can be drawn; cf. E. N. vi. 5. 3 εἶπα ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, ὡς δ' 'ει ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλος ἐκεῖν τούτων μή ἔστω ἀπόδειξις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλος ἐκεῖν) κ.τ.λ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδεχόμεθα χρεῶν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων] The Paraphrast gives the right sense,—ἀδερ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴς τοῦ πολιτικῆς λέγουν οὐ δύναται ἀκριβεστέραν ἀλλήλων εὑρεῖν ἡ δόσην ἡ ύπη δίδωσιν, οὔτω καὶ ἡ κρίνων τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους καλός ἢ κρίνει ἢ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον μή ἀκριβεστέραν ἀλλήλων ἀπατεῖ ἢ δόσην ἢ ύπη δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἀποδέχεται. For ἀποδεχόμεθα in its present meaning of 'accipere cum assensu, probare,' see Index Arist. Peters brings out the point of the remark well—'The reader, on his part, should take each of my statements in the same spirit.'  

b. 23. πεπαθεμένου] The πεπαθεμένος is the man whose culture (παθεία), whether special or general, enables him to criticise and estimate fairly scientific methods and results. His familiarity with the general principles of the 'logic of the sciences' leads him to
expect differences of treatment, as the ὑποκειμένη θλη differs in 1094 b.23.

various departments; and his acquaintance with the precise char-
acter of the θλη of a given department, aided by his knowledge
of logic, enables him to judge whether a certain method of dealing
with that θλη is appropriate or inappropriate. See E. E. 1. 6.
1217 a. 8 ἀπαίδευσια γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ ἕκαστον πράγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι
κρίνειν τούς τ' ὀικείους λόγους τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλοτροις: Μελ.
Γ. 4. 1006 a. 6 ἦστι γὰρ ἀπαίδευσι τὸ μὴ γνώσκειν τὸν κρίνειν
ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τίνας οὐδὲ ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν
ἐίναι. Cf. Μελ. Γ. 3. 1005 b. 3 ἦστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτης διὰ τὸ ἐγχέρισμα τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὅν
τρόπον δὲ απόδειξθαι, δι' ἀπαίδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο ὄρων
δεὶ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἦκεν προσπαθήσαντος, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούσαντας ζητεῖν.

With this last passage cf. Aristoxenus, Harmonica p. 30 (ed. Mar-
quard.)—βέλτινον ἦσιν ἐστὶ τὸ προδιελθὲν τὸν τρόπον τῆς πραγματείας τῆς
ποτ' ἐστίν, ἵνα προγνώσκοντες ὀσπερ ὅðων ἡ βαδιστέων κῆπιον πορευόμεθα
εἰδότες τε καὶ τὸ μέρος ἡμῖν αὐτής καὶ μὴ λάθωμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ παρυπο-
λαμβάνοντες τὸ πράγμα' καθάπερ 'Αριστοτέλης ἢ ἢ διαγείτο τοὺς πλείστους
tῶν ἀκούσαντας πάρα Πλάτωνος τῆν περὶ τάγμαθες ἀκρόασι παθεῖν προσ-
ιέναι μὲν γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ὑπολαμβάνατα λύφεσθαι τι τῶν νομιζόμενων τούτων
ἀνθρώπων ἀγάθων οἷον πλούστων ὑγίειν ἦσον τὸ ἀλον εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν
θαυμαστήν' ὅτε δὲ φανεῖσαν οἱ λόγοι περὶ μαθημάτων καὶ αἰρεθῶν
καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας, καὶ τὸ πέρος ὅτι ἄγαθῶν ἔστιν ἐν,
παντεῖς οἷοι παράδοξον τι ἔφανεν αὐτοῖς' εἴθ' οἱ μὲν ὑποκατεφρόνουν
tοῦ πράγματος, οἱ δὲ κατεμέφροντο. τί οὐν τὸ αὖτων; οὐ προσῆθαν,
ἀλλ' ὀσπερ οἱ ἐρατικοὶ πρὸς τούνομα αὐτὸ ὑποκεχορύτες προσῆθαν
εἰ δὲ γέ τις οἷα προεξέτειθε τὸ ἄλων, ἐπεγνώσχεν ἃν τὸ μέλλον ἀκούσαν
καὶ ἐπέρ ὅρησθεν αὐτῷ διέμεναν ἃν ἐν τῇ εἰλημμένῃ ὑπολήψει. Προέλεγε
μὲν ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς 'Αριστοτέλης δ' αὐτάς τάς τὰς αὐτίς, ὡς ἐγὼ,
tοῖς μελλοντοι ἀκρόασθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, περὶ τῶν τ' ἐστίν' ἡ πραγματεία
tοις. Cf. Μελ. a. 3. 995 a. 6 οἱ μὲν οὐν ἐὰν μὴ μαθηματικὸς λέγῃ
tις οὐκ ἀποδέχοντα τῶν λεγόντων' οἱ δ' ἢ μὴ παραδεχόμενοι' οἱ δὲ
μάρτυρα δείχνουσιν ἐπάγαθες τοιηθήν' καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα αἰρεθῶν, τοὺς δὲ
λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκρίβεις ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνείρειν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν [φ.ε.
the minuteness of such enquiries, which seems to them tedious],
ἐχει γὰρ τὸ ἀκρίβεις τοιοῦτον διὸτα καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων, καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνέλειθον εἶναι τοις δοκεῖ διὸ δὲ πεπαθευόμενο πῶς ἐκατα
ἀποδεκτών. Cf. de Part. Anim. i. 1. 639 a. 1 περὶ πάσας ῥεωνίας,
tε καὶ πέθεδον ὄρας τεπενύστεραν τε καὶ τιμωτέραν, δοὺ φαίνεται τρόποι
tῆς ἐξείων εἶναι, ότι τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος ζῶνος ἐχει προσαγο-
1094 b.23. *πέπαιδευμένον γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρῖναι εὐστόχος τὸ καλὸς ἤ μὴ καλὸς ἀποδίδοντον ὁ λέγων. τοιοῦτον γὰρ τῆς τινα καὶ τὸν ὅλον πεπαιδευμένον οἰόμεθα εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδευμένος τὸ δυνάσθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον. πλὴν τούτοις μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπέων κριτικὸν τινα νομίζομεν εἶναι ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὅστα, τὸν δὲ περὶ τινος φύσεως ἀφορισμένης ἐν γὰρ ἂν τις ἔτερος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπὸν τῷ εἰρημένῳ διακελεύομεν περὶ μόριον ὅστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας δεῖ τινὰς ὑπάρχειν ὅρους τοιούτους πρὸς ὅσε ἀναφέρον ἀποδέξεται τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων, χωρὶς τοῦτο πῶς ἔχει τάλιθεσι εἶτε οὕτως εἶτε ἄλλως. In the last passage ὁ ὅλως πεπαιδευμένος (cf. ὃ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος of the *Ethics*) is one who is remarkable for his grasp of the general principles of logical method, and for his delicate appreciation of the applicability to various subjects of the notions defined in a work like the *Metaphysics*; while ὃ περὶ τινος φύσεως ἀφορισμένης (cf. ὃ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν πεπαιδευμένος of the *Ethics*) is one who is distinguished for his appreciation of the method proper to a particular department, of the details of which he happens to have special knowledge, although his knowledge may be that of the *amateur*, as distinguished from the expert—a point made plain in *Pol.* ii. 1282 a. i ὃσπερ οὐν ἰατρὸν δεῖ διδάσκει τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἰατροῖς οὔτω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἰατρός ὃ ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτόνος καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην εἰσὶ γὰρ τινὲς τοιούτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὑπὸ εἰπέων τὰς τέχνας’ ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἐξτὸς πεπαιδευμένον ἢ τοῖς εὐθύναι. But, after all, the περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος and the καθ’ ἐκαστὸν πεπ. are not so much separate persons as personifications of two elements in παιδεία. A man cannot show special παιδεία in a particular department with the details of which he has at least an amateur’s acquaintance, without possessing a certain amount of the general παιδεία which consists in knowledge of the principles of logic as they apply in other departments; nor, on the other hand, can a man be said to realise the true meaning of these principles unless he has applied them for himself in a particular enquiry. Naturally, however, critics of science differ according as they present the one or the other of these two elements of the critical habit with the greater prominence. The difficulty raised by Eustratius regarding the possibility of ὃ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος, ‘the man who knows everything,’ is thus irrelevant. Aristotle does not imagine the existence of a man who knows the details of all the sciences, as well as each specialist knows the details of his own department. The περὶ πᾶν
πεπ. is, as has been just said, the man who is familiar with the logic of the sciences, and the notions more or less applicable in all departments; who brings, in short, to his criticism of the method of a given enquiry familiarity with the doctrines of the Organon and the Metaphysics; his habit realising the requirements of παιδεία specified by Alexander on Met. 995 a. 6 (p. 126 ed. Bonitz) δει πρώτον ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς ἐγγυμαζέσθαι καὶ τοῖς λογικοῖς ὀλως, καὶ εἴδεσται τοὺς τρόπους τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων συναγωγὰς. In many respects the distinction between the πεπ πεπ. and the καθ ἐκαστὸν πεπ. is the same as that marked by the terms λογικὸς and φυσικὸς respectively, on which see Phys. iii. 5. 204 b. 4–10 λογικὸς [κοινῶς τε καὶ ὁ φυσικὸς, Themistius ad loc.] μὲν οὐν σκοπον-μένος . . . φυσικὸς δὲ μᾶλλον θεωροῦσιν κ.τ.λ., i.e. looking at the subject (1) in the light of the general formal conceptions which dominate all science, and (2) more concretely, in connexion with its own special proximate principles; cf. Phys. viii. 8. 264 a. 7 οἷς μὲν οὐν ἐν τις ὁ οἰκείοις λόγοι πιστεύεοιν οὐδα καὶ τωῷ ταῖς ἐξων λογικὸς δὲ ἐπισκοποῦσι κ.τ.λ. It will evidently be one of the most important functions of παιδεία to see that each of the two points of view—the formal (λογικὸς) and the concrete (φυσικὸς) —has its proper place assigned to it in a given enquiry, according as that place is determined by the nature of the ὑποκειμένη ὑλή. On the παραδειγμάτωσι see the excellent notes of Michelet and Grant, to which I am largely indebted.

γένος] ‘is with Aristotle the object of a single science: μία b. 25. ἐπιστήμη ἑστὶν ἡ ἐνὸς γένους (An. Post. i. 28 [87 a. 38]). Cf. the whole of Met. ii. 3.’ Grant. See also Met. Δ. 6. 1016 a. 26 for the identification of the γένος with the ὑλή.

μαθηματικοῦ τε πειθαλογούντος ἀποδέχεσθαι] Taken from Plato, b. 26. Theaet. 162 E, as Zell and Grant point out—ἀποδείξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ’ ἑντυγών λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ὅ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεὸς ἀλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδ’ ἐνὸς μόνον ἢν εἰπ. οἰκεῖτε οὖν οὐ τε καὶ Θεὸς ἀλλ’ ἀποδέξεται πειθαλογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τηλικούτων λεγομένων λόγων. Ἀποδέχεσθαι takes the gen. of the person, like ἰδίως, generally, however, with a participle such as λέγοντος, εἰπόντος. See Liddell and Scott, s. v.

ρητορικῶν ἀποδείξεως ἀπαίτετι] The orator uses ἐνθυμήματα (Rhet. b. 27. i. 1. 1355 a. 6) which are arguments ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων (Rhet. i. 2. 1357 a. 32).
§ 5. καθ’ ἐκαστὸν μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος] καθ’ ἐκαστὸν must be supplied after ἄρα, and κρίνει καλῶς understood from the preceding sentence. Coraes reads in his text ἄγαθὸς κριτὴς. "Εκαστὸν ἄρα ὁ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν πεπαιδευμένος" ἀπλῶς δὶ ὁ περὶ πάν πεπαιδευμένος, a reading supported by the version of Aretinus, singula igitur is qui in singulis. The μὲν inserted after καθ’ ἐκαστὸν by Bywater, is given by Mᵇ, rc Ḥᵃ and pr ᴊᵇ.

ἀπλῶς] means ‘simply,’ ‘without qualification’ (distinguished from κατὰ πρόσθεσιν E. N. vii. 4. 3), ‘universally.’

a. 2. διὸ . . . περὶ τούτων] Whatever his proficiency in logic, as such, may be, the youth is deficient in the other element of πνευματικόν, viz. special acquaintance with the material details of moral science, should he pose as a critic or connoisseur of it. The matter of moral science is life, with its circumstances and actions, of which he has as yet no sufficient experience. On account of his ignorance of life he will be likely to regard ethical problems as being more simple than they really are. His ignorance of the moral νοημα will be practically tantamount to a denial of its existence. He will treat Ethics as if it were an abstract science like geometry. He will apply a few hastily assumed and arbitrarily defined principles to circumstances of all kinds. The author of the Sixth Book of the Nic. Ethics (ch. 8, §§ 5, 6) remarks that boys may succeed in mathematics, because the abstractions of that science (τὰ δὲ ἀφαιρέσεως) do not need much experience for their acquirement; but that they do not show prudence, and are unfit students of natural science, because experience produces prudence, and the principles of natural science are not easily apprehended spatial relations, but generalisations, the results of long and careful inductive enquiries. E. N. vi. 8. 1142 a. 12 γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοί τὰ τοιαῦτα, νόμιμοι δ’ οὗ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αὐτῶν δ’ ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὰ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα εἴς ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ’ ἐμπειρός οὐκ ἐστὶν πλήθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν’ ἐπει καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀν τις σκέψαι, διὰ τὰ δὴ μαθηματικὰ μὲν παῖς γένοιτ’ ἄν, σοφὸς δ’ ἡ φυσικὰς οὖ. ἡ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δὲ ἀφαιρέσεως ἐστὶν, τῶν δ’ αἱ ἀρχαὶ εἰς ἐμπειρίας’ καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύονται αἱ νεοὶ ἀλλὰ λέγονται, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄφθον; As a critic of moral science, then, the youth will demand more elegance and exactness than the νοημα (of which he is ignorant) admits. Geometry will supply him with his conception of what moral science ought to be. Not realising the endless
complexity of every moral and social question, he will admire a \textbf{1005} a. 2. system in proportion to the \textquoteleft lucidity\textquoteright{} with which it pushes a few \textquoteleft clear ideas\textquoteright{} to their logical issues. Cf. in this connexion Mill's \textit{Logic}, book vi. ch. 8, on the \textquoteleft geometrical method\textquoteright{} of reasoning in morals and politics.

\textbf{Δκροατής} Michelet says \textquoteleft Cum auditore, non cum lectore rem habet Aristoteles. Illa igitur vox luce clarius facit hoc opus Aristotelis, ut pleraque, ex praelectionibus in Lycaeo habitis ortum, ab ipso Aristotele vel etiam a proximis ejus discipulis hunc in ordinem redactum atque editum esse quem hodie servat.' It seems better to suppose that the \textbf{critical function} of the \textit{πεπαιδευμένος} has suggested the word \textbf{Δκροατής}, it being customary for Aristotle to think of \textit{κρίσις} as the function of listeners (in the law courts or elsewhere) who follow a speech intelligently; see \textit{E. N.} vi. 10. 2 ἢ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον, and vi. 10. 3 ἐν τῷ χρησθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τοῦτων περὶ δὲν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καθὼς [ἐστιν ἡ σύνεσις]. Cf. \textit{Philemon} apud Meineke \textit{Fragm. Com.} iv. 46 χολεπόν ἃ \textbf{Δκροατής} ἀσύνετος καθῆμενος, | ἕπο γὰρ ἀνοιας ὅχι ἑαυτὸν μέρκεται.

\textbf{§ 6. ἕτο ... πρᾶξις} Not only is the youth too inexperienced in \textbf{a. 4.} the difficulties of life to appreciate a science attempting to deal with them, but even such knowledge of the principles and rules of conduct as may reach his understanding will be practically useless to him, because he allows his passions rather than his knowledge to determine his actions. This circumstance— that his knowledge will be practically useless to him, is conclusive against the attempt to impart it, the end of the science of life (\textit{πολιτικὴ}) being conduct and not mere knowledge. It is one of the most distinctive points in Aristotle's ethical teaching—that it is useless to address the understanding (\textit{λόγος}) until the passions (\textit{πάθη}) have been brought into order. So long as a youth is passionately fond of a certain course of conduct, it is vain to tell him that it is \textit{wrong}. He will not understand what you mean; he will only feel that the course of conduct styled wrong is \textit{pleasant}. \textit{Right} and \textit{wrong} have definite meaning only for one who is detached from the sway of his passing passions, and can regard them, and their objects, coolly in relation to life conceived as an organic whole. 'Affectus, qui passio est, desinit esse passio, simulatque ejus claram et distinctam formamus ideam.' (Spinoza, \textit{Eth.} v. 3.) When the passions
and desires have been organised, as it were, by the moral training which the state supplies, i.e. when λόγος, or proportion, has been thus effected among them, then the time has come to appeal to the consciousness of this λόγος which has now dawned in the man's mind, and to instruct him in the rationale of that conduct to which he has been imperceptibly habituated by influences operating from without upon his sensibility to pleasure and pain. Cf. *E. N.* ii. 3. 2 διῶ δὲi ἧχθαι πως εἰδός ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὡςτε καὶ ἡ νοῦς ποτέ δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὅρθη παιδεία αὕτη ἐστὶν. When he has come to like, and habitually do what his moral instructors think right, then, but not till then, it will be useful to explain to him how and why it is right. The λόγος, or moral understanding, appealed to by a theory of Ethics, does not come into existence till the desires have been reduced by moral training to λόγος, or order. The youth who acts κατὰ πάθος—on the stimulus of present feeling, cannot realise the truths of ethical science, which are recognised as such only by the calm survey of the man in whom the λόγος or moral order is assured. The youth, like the ἀκρατής, may possess a precarious λόγος—a fine system of generous aspirations and good intentions, in relation to which moral truths may have some sort of vague meaning for him in his calmer moments; but this λόγος, and the vague γνώσις which it renders possible, cannot withstand the assault of πάθος: τοῖς γὰρ ταυτότοις ἀνάδοτοι ἡ γνώσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσις (§ 7)—'their knowledge, such as it is, turns out profitless for them.' The ἀκρατής or 'incontinent man' knows (after a fashion) that it is wrong to yield to πάθος, but nevertheless yields. He possesses a λόγος which opposes itself unsuccessfully to ἐπιθυμία (see *E. N.* i. 13, §§ 15, 16, and vii. 3)—not the λόγος which amounts to φρόνησις (for that resists ἐπιθυμία successfully), but merely the faculty of posing dramatically, as a temperate man, in his intervals of reflection: see *E. N.* vii. 3. 8 τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖων' καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν τούτοις ὡς τὴν ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἐπὶ λέγοντι ἑμποδισθέομεν, καὶ οἱ πρώτοι μαθόντες συναίνειν μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἵσαι δὲ αὐτῶν· δεί γὰρ συμφέρειν, τοῦτο δὲ χρῆναι δεῖσαι· ὡς καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποκλητεῖν λέγειν καὶ τοῖς ἀκρατευομένους.

To sum up—The νέος is an incapable student and critic of moral philosophy, because he is unacquainted with the facts, a knowledge of which it presupposes. His ignorance is due (1) to the short time he has lived, (2) to the strength of his passions,
which do not allow him to see even the facts, which he has had opportunities of observing, in their true light—i.e. as involving the distinction of right and wrong, rather than that of pleasant and unpleasant. He has not yet acquired the faculty by which the truths of moral philosophy can be apprehended, viz. the λόγος
which neglects the pleasure or pain of the present, and regards the relation in which the pleasant or painful action stands to the whole life. Such knowledge of moral philosophy as the νέος acquires is but ear and lip knowledge, of no influence upon his conduct. The moral faculty (λόγος) must be evolved as the result of the right ordering of his ὀπεγείς by moral training, before it becomes profitable for him to study the theory of morals. If the end were merely to construct a speculative system, perhaps a youth might be able to appreciate such a system, as he appreciates the elements of geometry; but conduct is the end; and conduct requires knowledge of the perplexities of life, and a settled character directed towards a high ideal.

§ 7. τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιομένους καὶ πράττουσιν. To the man of settled moral character a knowledge of the principles of moral philosophy will be very useful, just as a clear and methodical statement of the principles hitherto unconsciously followed is always useful to the artist or enquirer of practical experience. The Logic of a science is of very little use to one beginning the science; but may prove an invaluable guide to the experienced enquirer. A 'critique' may be meaningless to one who has not studied the picture or statue carefully for himself: but may become instructive after he has done so. Moral philosophy is useless to one who has no experience of life, and no faculty to discriminate between right and wrong, only a feeling for what is immediately pleasant or painful. Some of the Sophists, Aristotle says, (Ε. Ν. x. 9. 20), thought that it would be easy to legislate by making a collection of the most approved laws in existence, and selecting the best of them—as if the selection of the best required no judgment—as if the whole difficulty did not lie in judging correctly, as in music all depends upon the musical ear. Similarly (Ε. Ν. x. 9. 21), medical reports are useless to non-professional readers, but useful to men of professional experience.

The description of the πεπαιδευμένος given by Isocrates (Pana-
1095 a. 10. \( \text{ithenaeos 239} \), although differing from that given by Aristotle in not involving a technical specialisation of the term, is interesting as bringing into clear light the combination of experience and ethical moderation which Aristotle regards as essential to \( \pi\nu\delta\varepsilon\alpha\iota \) in relation to the science of \( \pi\o\lambda\iota\iota\kappa\iota \). 

This is thus described by Isocrates as the man of experience and moderation, who knows how to deal with the circumstances of life as they occur. In the \( \kappa\epsilon\iota\iota\kappa\iota\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\kappa\iota \) the \( \text{ithenaeos} \) is the critic of the science of life. But it is only the man of the world described by Isocrates, who fulfils the conditions, moral and intellectual, which Aristotle regards as essential to \( \pi\varepsilon\alpha\iota\nu \) (in his technical sense of the term), when it is engaged in the critical estimation of \( \text{ithenaeos} \). It is only the man of experience and moderation who can know what is meant by right and wrong. As the man of experience and moderation knows how to live, he is also the only competent critic of the science of life. His critical faculty, like his practical judgment, has become an instinct in him. See \( \text{E. N. vi. II. 6} \).
CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

What then is the Chief Good which is the object of our Science? Most people, cultivated and uncultivated, agree as to its name and call it Happiness: but here the agreement ends; for some make Happiness consist in Pleasure, others in Wealth, others in Social Recognition; and often a man's view of it changes with his circumstances, e.g. when he falls sick, he thinks that it is Health, and when he is poor, that it is Wealth. Others again, conscious of their own ignorance, identify it with the Wisdom and Learning which they admire from afar: lastly, it has been held to be Something by Itself, apart from all particular good things, but the cause of their being good. It would take too long to examine all these views: it will be enough to notice those which have the greatest vogue, or most to say for themselves as theories of Life.

But before we begin an examination of these views, and thereafter attempt to set forth a view of our own, it is important that we should be clear about the method proper to the Science of the Chief Good. Where ought the enquiry to begin? With general principles? or with particular facts? Evidently with something known: but when we say 'known', we may mean either known in the strict acceptation of the term, known for what it is, i.e. known scientifically as a general principle is known; or known from our point of view, i.e. known as a particular fact presented to the senses. It is with the 'known' in the latter acceptation that our present enquiry must begin. This is why it is so important that the student of the science of conduct should bring to his study of the subject a good moral character. Without this, he cannot 'know' the elementary facts with which his study must begin, i.e. cannot understand a teacher who begins by pointing to certain concrete examples of Virtue or Vice, or by quoting certain popular sayings, or by taking for granted that this thing is wrong and that thing right. Indeed this elementary 'knowledge' is so important in itself that it does not matter much if the average man never proceed from it to the knowledge of principles, or of the reason why.

§ 1. πᾶσα γνώσις καὶ προαίρεσις] 'The original four terms τέχνη, 1095 a.14. μέθοδος, πράξις, προαίρεσις are here reduced to two.' Grant.

Γνώσις has for its object, or 'good,' the reduction of the data of experience to form, law, or theory; προαίρεσις aims at the preservation of the moral organism amid the dangers to which it is exposed in its environment.
It is Aristotle's object, in the Ethics, to give a new meaning to this accepted term. The popular view regarded 'Happiness' as consisting in the favour of Heaven and Fortune, and in the multitude of a man's possessions. Aristotle shows that it consists, not in what a man has or receives, but in what he is and does. It is an active function (ἐνεργία ψυχῆς), not a condition of passivity. It is 'noble living'—τὸ εὖ ζήν in the active sense. Cf. the remarkable fragment of Aristotle preserved by Stobaeus, Flor. G. 54. vol. i. p. 78, ed. Meineke (assigned by Rose, Frag. Arist. 89 to the dialogue περὶ πλοῦτου),—νόμιζε τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἐν τῷ πολλῷ κεκτηθεῖσα γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τῇ ψυχῇ εὖ διακείσθαι καὶ γὰρ οὖδὲ τὸ σῶμα αὐτὸ τὸ λαμπρὸν ἐσθίτη κεκοσμημένον φαίνεται εἰς μακάρων ἀλλὰ τὸ τὴν ἀνάγειν ἔχων καὶ σπουδαίως διακείμενον, κἂν μὴν ἔχων τῶν προειρήμονῶν αὐτῷ παρῆν τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ψυχὴ εὖν ἐπιπαθεμένη, τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ τὸν τοιαύτου ἀνθρωπον εὐδαιμονία προσαγαρευόμενον εἰσίν, ὅπι ἢ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἡ λαμπρῶς κεκοσμημένος, αὐτὸς μηθεῖν δίοικος δὲν οὖν οὔδε γὰρ ἵππον, κἂν ὕπνοι χρυσά καὶ σκεῦην ἐξομολογήσομεν ἵνα τὸν τοιαύτου ἄξιον τούτου νομίζομεν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄν διακείμενος ἢ σπουδαῖος, τούτοις μάλλον ἑπανοοῦμεν. ὅσπερ γὰρ ἐὰν τῶν οὐκετῶν αὐτοῦ χεῖρων εἴη, καταγέλαστος δὲν γένοιτο, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷς πλεῖστοι ἀξιῶν τὴν κτῆσιν εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὴν ἕνας φύσεως, ἀδίκους τούτους εἶναι δὲ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτο κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ἔχει· τίκτει γὰρ, ὅσπερ φησίν ἡ παροιμία, κύρος μὲν ἐξιρμ. ἀπαθευσία δὲ μετ' ἐξουσίας ἀνοιαν' τοὺς γὰρ διακείμενοι τὰ περὶ τὸν ψυχὴν κακῶς, οὕτω πλοῦτος οὕτω ἱσχύς οὕτω κάλλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ὅσον περὶ ἀν αὐτὰ μᾶλλον αἱ διάθεσις καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὑπάρξω ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ πλεῖος καὶ μείζω τὸν κεκτηθέντων βλάπτουσι, χαρὶς φρονήσεως παραγενόμεναι.

χαρίειτες] 'Cultivated'—synonymous with τοῖς σοφοῖς three lines below. Cf. E. N. i. 1. 13. 7 τῶν ἱστρῶν οἱ χαρίειτες, an expression regarded by Zell as equivalent to τῶν ἱστρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτῖρος τῇ τέχνῃ μετιότετες, de Sensu, 1. 436 a. 21. Cf. de Divinat. 1. 463 a. 4 λέγωσι γοῦν καὶ τῶν ἱστρῶν οἱ χαρίειτες ὅτι δὲι σφόδρα προσέχειν τοῖς ἐνυπνίοις εἴλογον δὲ οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ τοῖς μὴ τεχνίταις μὲν, σκοτουμένοις δὲ τὶ καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσι. For other references to the use of χαρίεις see Index Arist.

a. 19. τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν] 'εὖ πράττειν is an ambiguous phrase. In its usual acceptation it would rather mean "fairing-well" than "acting-well."' Grant. It is Aristotle's object to give
an active instead of a passive sense to these commonly accepted expressions for the Chief End.

τί ἐστιν] Τίς ἐστιν is the reading of Ob, CCC, NC, adopted by a. 20. Zell, Coraes, Michelet, and Ramsauer. The Paraph. and Aspasius seem to have read τί ἐστιν. Eustratius distinguishes between the two readings: δὲ τὸ μὲν (i.e. τίς) τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ (i.e. τί) τοῦ οὐσιώδους λόγου δηλωτικῶν: i.e. τίς ἐστιν relates to a thing looked at in the concrete with all its material qualities, while τί ἐστιν (as = τί ἦν εἶναι) is the technical expression for the essence (οὐσία ἄνευ ὕλης) or form (εἶδος), declared in definition (ὅρισμός, ὅρος, or λόγος). Michelet argues that τίς is the better reading here, since Aristotle is about to state, not the definition of εὑρισκομένων, but popular opinions regarding it. See the notes of Zell and Michelet. The weight of MS. authority is in favour of τί, and τί seems to be required to bring out with sufficient sharpness the antithesis between the clauses beginning οὐκόματι μὲν ὁδὸν καὶ μὲν τὰς εὐδαιμονίας.

§ 3. ἴδιον ή πλοῦτον ή τιμήν] Eudemus (Ε. Ε. i. 2. 1214 b. 24) a. 23. explains the identification of εὐδαιμονία with τιμή, δόξα, πλοῦτος, or παιδεία, by the fact that these are conditions of Happiness, and there is a natural tendency to identify the conditions of the existence of a thing with the thing itself: ἐστι γὰρ ταύτ' αὐτὰ τῆς ἀμφισβήτησος περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἐστι, καὶ γίνεται διὰ τῶν ἄνω ὅπως εἰδόν τέ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἕνοι μὲρι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζοισιν.

συνειδῶτες ή ἀνατοῖς ἀγνοοιν] ‘Conscious of their own ignorance.’ a. 25. They answer to those who make παιδεία, ‘superior attainments,’ the σκοπὸς τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, in the list given by Eudemus, i. 2. 1214 b. 8.

ένιοι] The Platonists, whose view is examined in chapter 6. a. 26. Aristotle formulates the doctrine of ideas in the expression ἐν τῷ παρὰ τὰ πολλά (i.e. a single ‘universal substance,’ καθόλου οὐσία, in which the particulars, τὰ πολλά, τὰ αἰσθητά, ‘participate’ —μετέχει, but which is nevertheless separate from them—χωριστῶν). His own view opposed to this doctrine he formulates in the expression ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν (i.e. that in which the particulars are seen to resemble one another, which is predicater of—κατηγορεῖται κατά—any one of them, as a quality—ποιῶν τι—possessed by it. See An. Post. i. 11. 77 a. 5 εἰδή μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ἢ ἐν τῷ παρά τὰ πολλά οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ ἀπόδειξις ἐσταὶ εἶναι μέντοι ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν ἀλήθες εἰπτεῖν ἀνάγκη, οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τὸ καθόλου, ἂν μὴ τοῦτ’ ἤ ἐὰν μὲν τὸ καθόλου μὴ ἤ, τὸ μέσον οὐκ ἐστι, ὡστ’ οὖν’ ἀπόδειξις. Met. Z. 13. 1038 b. 35 φανερῶν ὑπὸ οὐδὲν
BOOK I: CHAP. 4: §§ 3-5.

Spengel (Aristotelische Studien I. Nic. Eth. p. 203) conjectures γάρ for δ' after ἐννοι: ‘Es folgen nämlich die Philosophen, welche etwas von den gewöhnlichen Ansichten weit abgehendes sagen, und dadurch dem Volke imponirten, das waren aber jedenfalls die Idealisten. Aristoteles ist damit in den Gegensatz von den πολλοῖς zu den σοφοῖς übergegangen, und hat zugleich den Platonikern einen Schlag gegeben; ihre Lehre werde von der Masse nur angestaunt, weil sie gar zu frappant und eigenthümlich scheine. Ich halte γάρ für nothwendig.’ Spengel’s γάρ would certainly convey a very pretty ‘hit’ at the Platonists; but I think that δε is needed to answer to μέν, line 22.

a. 29. § 4. τάς μαλαστὰ ἐπιπολαζοῦσας ἢ δοκοῦσας ἐχειν τινὰ λόγον] Views which ‘lie on the surface’ and are therefore popularly accepted, or views which, as ‘involving a theory of some kind,’ are more recondite, and are therefore confined to philosophers. Cf. Rhei. iii. 10. 1410 b. 22 ἐπιπόλαια γάρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δόλα καὶ δὲ ἑπὶ δεῖ δεῖ ζητῆσαι, quoted by Zell and Grant. Cf. Aristotle's Fragm. 470. 1555 b. 12 sqq. διὸ καὶ τὰς κόπας αὐτῶν ἐλεφαντίνας ἐποιήσαντο καὶ τῷ μεγάλῃ περιτάς ὁδὲν ἡ ὄρκυνα ἐπεπόλασε μάστιξ καὶ εἰς παραμίαν ἥθε. The Paraphrast’s note is ἵκανον δὲ ἐστὶν ἐὰς ἐξετάσομεν τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πλειόνων νομιζομένας ἡ δοκοῦσας ἐχειν τινὰ λόγον. The principle of selection laid down here is that of Top. i. 12. 105 a. 34, referred to by Zell after Muretus: τὰς μὲν δὲν προτάσεις ἐκλεκτῶς, ὑσαχῶς διωρίσθη περὶ προτάσεως, ἡ τῶν πάσων δόξας προχειρζόμενη ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἡ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ τούτω ἡ πάντω ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἡ τῶν γνωριμωτάτων.

a. 30. § 5.] ‘From hence, to the end of the chapter, follows the second digression on the method of Ethics.’ Grant.

Before beginning the examination, promised in § 4, of the popular views (examined in chap. 5), and of the philosophical views (examined in chap. 6), Aristotle enters upon a παρέκβασις concerning the method of moral science and the previous training which the student of the science must have received. The παρέκβασις seems to suggest itself suddenly in connexion with the mention of τὰς μαλαξία ἐπιπολαζοῦσας δόξας, as distinguished from τὰς δοκοῦσας ἐχειν τινὰ λόγον. The former δόξαι are of inductive origin, based on observation, however onesided, of the circumstances of life; whereas
the latter recommend themselves on *a priori* and abstract grounds. Hence the words "μὴ λαφθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς.

In every enquiry a beginning must be made from what the enquirer 'knows.' Cf. An. Post. i. 1. 71 a. i πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικῇ ἐκ προϊσταρχοῦση γίνεται γνώσεως. The enquirer's 'previous knowledge' may be either of abstract formulae generally applicable to the explanation of particular cases, or of particular concrete phenomena requiring explanation. Thus in Geometry he starts from the axioms and definitions,—certain abstract principles which are 'known,' and proceeds from them to the various more particular truths of the science. In the science of Medicine, on the other hand, the knowledge with which he begins is of symptoms,—certain particular concrete phenomena of health and disease, from the observation and comparison of which he proceeds to the discovery of the hitherto unknown general laws of life, on which they depend. Where a few abstract forms of great simplicity, and therefore easily 'known,' can be applied to the resolution of particular problems, the enquiry is deductive. Geometry, which makes complex spatial relations plain to the eye by breaking them up into simple spatial relations already 'known,' (Met. θ. 9. 1051 a. 21, &c. εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργεῖται διαφοροῖτε γὰρ εὑρίσκοντα εἰ δὴ ὃν διηρημένα φανερὰ δὲν ἦν νῦν δὴ ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει διὰ τὶ δύο ὁρθὰ τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στεγμὴν γωνία, ἵσαν δύο ὁρθάς εἰ οὖν ἀνήκοτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευρὰν, ἵδαντε δὲν ἦν εἰς δῆλον) is the perfect type of deductive reasoning. But where the enquiry is concerned not with abstract spatial relations, or with the development of mere notions, but with the behaviour of real phenomena in nature, no such simple formulae capable of explaining the phenomena are 'known' to the enquirer from the first. The concrete phenomena themselves are 'known,' and the formulae have to be abstracted from them. The falling of bodies to the earth, the swinging of the pendulum, the tides, the orbit of the moon, and the orbits of the planets, had all been separately 'known' before Newton evolved the great generalisation which explains them. An enquiry concerned with the behaviour of real phenomena in nature is (in its earlier stages at least) inductive.

Having alluded to the distinction between Deduction and Induction, and indicated, by the expressions γνώριμα ὀπλῶς and γνώριμα ἦμῶν (of which more hereafter), the ground on which the
one or the other of these two methods is adopted in a given enquiry, Aristotle asserts that moral science must be prosecuted on the inductive method, because particular cases of conduct are at first 'better known' to the enquirer than the general principles of conduct which give them significance. These particular cases, however, which must be known to begin with by the student of morals, will be entirely beyond the experience of one who has not been habituated to perform right actions and avoid wrong actions, and therefore has no stable moral character. Moral science assumes that the student has learnt practically to discriminate in his conduct between right and wrong actions, or, to use the technical language of the present passage, that he 'knows' that such and such actions are right, and such and such others are wrong; it then proceeds to show him how and why they are right and wrong—i.e. to discover their law. But the man of unstable moral character does not 'know' that such and such actions are right or wrong, because these terms have no meaning except in relation to a definite system of life, and his life is conducted on no system, but is obnoxious to the temptation of the passing moment. The present παρέκβασις, then, in which it is thus stated that the method of Ethics is observational and inductive, prepares us for the use which Aristotle afterwards (E. N. i. 8) makes of the popular views, which embody at least a certain amount of true observation, and explains the contempt with which he treats the a priori system of the Platonists.

a. 31. οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρχων λόγων] Deduction, συνλογισμός, E. N. vi. 3. 3 ὥς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου.

οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἄρχας] Induction, ἐπαγωγή, Top. i. 10. 105 a. 13 ἐπαγωγὴ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθέκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἐφοδος.

a. 32. ὁ Πλάτων] Bekker and Sus., following Lb, omit ὁ. Bywater, following Kb, Mb, Cambr., restores it to the text. Grant, omitting ὁ, remarks that 'the use of the word Πλάτων here, without the article, shows that a personal reference to the philosopher is intended': see also Grant's note on vi. 13. 3, where it is remarked that Aristotle uses the article when he speaks of characters in books (e.g. of the Socrates of Plato's Dialogues), but gives the names of real persons without the article, except in cases of renewed mention. But, as Plato is not a character in a book, like ὁ Σωκράτης, but always a real person, it is difficult to see what we gain by being told here 'that a personal reference to the philo-
sopher is intended.’ Grant continues, ‘The use of the imperfect ἤπορει shows that the reference is general; when Aristotle quotes from a particular passage in the Laws (653 A) of Plato (Eth. ii. 3. 2) he says ὅσ ὁ Πλάτων φησίν.’ It will be observed that in ii. 3. 2 the article appears in apparently all MSS., and yet the reference to Plato as the writer of a particular passage is as much ‘a personal reference to the philosopher’ as the ‘general reference’ to him in the present section. It seems to me to be unsafe to attach importance to the presence or absence of the article before Πλάτων here or elsewhere, more especially where, as here, the MSS. are divided. Σωκράτης, of course, is in an entirely different position. As regards the reference in ἤπορει being ‘general,’ not (as Michelet and Heylbut, Asp. p. 9, suppose) to the passage on the dialectical method at the end of Rep. vi. 510 sqq., I think that this may very well be so. Muretus, failing to find any discussion of the ἀξορία in the writings of Plato, suggests that the reference is to his ἄγγαρα δόγματα.

ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων] Cf. An. Post. i. i. 71 a. 1 b. 2. πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως: Τόπ. vi. 4. 141 a. 28 γνωρίζομεν δ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων... οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ μάθησις ἔχει.

ταύτα δὲ διττῶς τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς] Ἀπλῶς attached to a term indicates that the term is to be taken in its strict sense: cf. the ἀπλῶς ἀκρατῆς of E. N. vii. 4. Γνώριμα ἀπλῶς, then, are objects which are known (noia not scibilia: see the notes of Zell and Michelet), in the strict sense of the term known. According to Aristotle the pure form (εἰδὸς, οὐσία ἄνευ ὠλης) is known in the strict sense of ‘known.’ Where the form is with difficulty recognised, or not at all, on account of its implication with ὠλη in a σύναλον, or concrete material object, there is knowledge only in a secondary and qualified acceptation of the term. This inferior kind of knowledge, however, is given in experience before ‘knowledge’ strictly so called. Concrete objects of sense are πρότερα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, or γνωριμότερα ἡμῖν, while the εἶδη are πρότερα φύσει or γνωριμῶτερα φύσει, i. e. although not first known by us in the order of time, the εἶδη are logically first, inasmuch as the knowledge of them is necessary to the right understanding of the material objects in which they are embodied; and they are ‘naturally better known,'
because knowledge realises its true ‘nature,’ or reaches its goal, when it apprehends the  ἐνδος without admixture of matter. Cf. the use of φῶς in the statement, Pol. i. 1. 1253 a. 19 πρῶτερον δὴ τῇ φῶσει πόλις ἢ οὐκια καὶ ἑκαστος ἡμῶν· τὸ γὰρ ὄλον πρῶτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους——i.e. although the family existed before the πόλις was evolved by the συνοικισμός of κόμαι, yet the πόλις is the goal towards which the φῶς of man tends from the very first; he is φῶςει πολιτικὸν ζῶν, and we cannot properly understand him in his earlier phases, unless we keep in view the final goal of his φῶς. Man moves towards the πόλις, in which individualism gives place to the consciousness of social relations, as the whole natural world moves towards the perfect form of the πρῶτον κινοῦν, attracted, as it were, by its beauty. See Met. A. 7. 1072 a. 24 ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ κινοῦμενον καὶ κινοῦν μέσον [see Bonitz Met. ad loc. on the text], ἐστὶ τοῖνυν τι δ' ὦ κινοῦμενον καὶ ὕππει ὡς καὶ ἐνέργεια ὄννα. καὶ δὲ ἐδεί τὸ ὀρικτόν καὶ τὸ νοητόν καὶ τὸ κινοῦμενον... 1072 b. 3 καὶ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον. Similarly, knowledge advances from the confused data of the senses to the clear perception of relation or form. Form is the goal of knowledge, and is therefore φῶςει γνώριμον. It is the ἀπλῶς γνώριμον, that which is known in the true sense of ‘known.’ See An. Post. i. 2. 71 b. 33 πρῶτερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμότερα δισχώς. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα πρῶτερον τῇ φῶσει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρῶτερον οὐδὲ γνωριμότερον, καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμότερον λέγω δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρῶτερα καὶ γνωριμότερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἀπλῶς δὲ πρῶτα καὶ γνωριμότερα τὰ πορρῶτερον ἐστὶ δὲ πορρωτάτῳ μὲν τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα ἐγγύτατο δὲ τὰ καθ' ἑκαστα, καὶ ἀντίκειται ταῖς ἀλληλοις. ‘Quamvis,’ says Michelet, p. 21, ‘cognitio rerum sensibilium sit facillior nobis et primi ad eam feramur, vulgusque ipsum ea non careat (Met. i. 2): tamen minus scientiae et veritatis in rebus sensibilibus inest, et tum demum scire putamus, si universalia, difficilima cognitit et a sensibus remotissima, perceperimus; quo fit, ut principiorum, quippe quae non ἡμῖν γνωριμότατα sint, etsi ἀπλῶς ἡ φῶσει γνωριμότατα, admodum pauci, ii nempe, qui divinam quaerunt beatitudinem, i.e. sapientes participes fiant. Principia vero ideo γνωριμότερα sunt, quod ipsius animi naturam efficiunt, singularium autem rerum cognitio ex fortuitis uniuscujusque perceptionibus pendet... p. 22, Attamen si semper singularia nobis essent notiora, semper in scientiis ab singularibus ad principia ascendere deberemus; et Aristoteles prorsus, ut putant, esset empiricus qui analytica sola utatur methodo (i.e. induction). Sed
hoc loco Paraphrastes et Eustratius recte scientias distinguunt. 

Sunt enim scientiae in quibus, naturali rerum ordine servato (i.e. the order of our knowledge is, as it were, that of φύσις), ἀπλῶς γνώριμα et nobis sunt γνωριμοστέρα, ita ut ex causis (αἴτίων) utpote plus perspicuitatis habentibus ad effectus (αἰτιατά) digrediamur; ex gr. in mathematica et metaphysica, in quibus hanc ob causam a principiis et universalibus ad reliqua descendendum est. In quibusdam vero aliis scientiis effectus manifestiores nobis quam ipsae causae apparent, ubi, naturali rerum ordine mutato, nobis notiora non simpliciter sunt notiora. Quamobrem hisce in scientiis viam alteram ingredi oportet, non ex principiis, sed ad principia.' The difficulty of this ascent from the particular to the universal, from the effect to the cause, from the concrete to the abstract, from the matter to the form, is noticed in an interesting passage in Met. Z. 4. 1029 b. 4, sqq., where it is said that, as in moral education, the problem is to make that which is really or 'naturally' good also good for the individual, so in science, the problem is to make that which is really or 'naturally' known or true, also known or true for the individual student: ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίνεται πάσα διά τῶν κατὰ γνώριμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον καὶ τούτο μέρος οὕτω, ὡσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεως τὸ ποιήσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστω ἀγαθῶν, τὰ δὲ ἄγαθα ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθῷ, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γνωριμοστέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριµα.

The 'ordinary way of knowledge' from the concrete effects to the general law is described in Top. vi. 4. 141 b. 5, sqq., and illustrated by the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the στιγμῆ, or mathematical point. The solid is more evident to the senses than the plane, the plane than the line, and the line than the point. This is the order of our knowledge, but the order of natural production is in the opposite direction. The motion of the point generates the line, of the line the plane, of the plane the solid. The point is φύσει πρῶτερον to the line, plane, and solid; but the solid is πρῶς ἦμας πρῶτερον, i.e. more obvious to our senses. Τὰ φύσει πρῶτερον is the source from which the sensible particulars flow, as it were, and, though last to be known by us, is the first principle of natural generation. We can gather from Aristotle's theory of Definition διὰ πρῶτερων καὶ γνωριμοστέρων, or ἀ πρίοι, which is stated in Top. vi. 4, as well as from his theory of ἀπάδεκτα, that he found it more difficult than we do now to distinguish between a principle of actual generation, and a principle of clear explanation. He concludes the passage in the Topics (vi. 4) with the words
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1095 b. 2. (141 b. 15) ἀπλῶς μὲν ὧν βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῶν προτέρων (ι.ε. φύσει πρ.) τὰ ὑστερα πειράσαθα γνωρίζειν ἐπιστημονικῶτερον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐστιν, ἢ ὧν ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς ἀδυνατουτάς γνωρίζειν διὰ τῶν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαίων ἵσως διὰ τῶν ἑκένων γνωρίμων ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον ... 142 a. 9 ἵσως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς γνώριμον οὗ τὸ πᾶν γνώριμον ἐστιν ἄλλα τὸ τοῖς εὖ διακεϊμένοις τὴν διάνοιαν. Cf. E. N. vii. 3. 13, 14, where the καθόλου is distinguished as ἐπιστημονικὸν from the ἐσχατος ἔρος of sensation.

Our knowledge of concrete objects, then, coming before our knowledge of the forms or general laws which they realise, the method of all the concrete or natural sciences will be (at least in the earlier stages) observational and inductive: see Phys. i. i. 184 a. 16 πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμιστέρων ἡμῶν ἡ ὀδός καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα' οὐ γὰρ ταύτα ἡμῖν τὰ γνώριμα καὶ ἀπλῶς: διὰπερ ἀνάγκη τῶν τρόπων τοϊκῶν προάγει ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει, ἡμῶν δὲ σαφεστέρων, ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. ἔσται δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μάλλον ὑστερον δὲ ἐκ τοϊκῶν γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαρροῦσι τάῦτα. But in mathematics the case is different. Here there are no concrete objects, in which the ἔδος is obscured by the ἔλα, and has to be abstracted from it by a toilsome process of comparison and generalisation. The objects are ἔδη pure and simple, or abstractions—τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ἀβ ἱνίτιν; and among these abstractions the simplest and most easily 'known' are those of the widest application. The axioms and definitions are more easily 'known,' than the particular properties of the various figures which are shown to involve these axioms and definitions; hence the method of mathematics will be deductive. This does not, of course, affect the truth of the position (on which Aristotle is quite explicit: see An. Post. i. 18) that our knowledge of mathematical, as of all other ἀρχαὶ, is derived from the materials presented in sense-experience. The experience, however, required for the acquisition of mathematical principles is much slenderer than that necessary for the attainment of the principles of a concrete science like medicine or politics. In other words—where we deal with diagrammatically representable relations of space we can begin the deductive method almost at once; where we deal with concrete phenomena, the deductive stage, if reached at all, must be preceded by a long period of inductive enquiry. Νοῦς—the faculty of specially attending to that which is common in a multitude of sense-presentations, and of abstracting it as a point of view—perceives the form in the
matter supplied by induction, easily, or with difficulty, according to the nature of the matter. Spatial forms are easily abstracted, but 'kinds' or 'metaphysical notions' with difficulty; and when abstracted 'kinds' and 'notions' are not the lucid principles of deduction that spatial forms are, because their application is not diagrammatic, but to concrete phenomena. On ἡμῖν γνωρίσθαι and ἡμῖν γν. see Michelet's note ad loc., Trendelenburg's Elementa Logices Aristoteleae, § 19, and his De Anima ii. 2, § 1, note.

Ἰσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέων ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίσων] 'Perhaps then b. 3. we at all events must commence with what we know? Aristotle was probably unconscious of the sort of pun in this sentence. He merely asserts that we (i.e. ethical philosophers) must start from a basis of personal experience.' (Grant.) The gist of the present παρέξβασις may be given as follows. Ἐπιδαμονία is the ἀρχή, or first principle of human life. Are we in possession of the knowledge of this ἀρχή ab initio, as we are in possession of the principles of geometry, and will moral science consist merely in the deductive application of it to explain the details of conduct; or will the science not rather consist mainly in the attempt to abstract this ἀρχή from the ἐλη of our particular experience, i.e. to find it? Aristotle, as Eustratius and the Paraphrast (the latter with a certain qualification) interpret the present passage, decides here in favour of the second alternative. How far he is true to his decision we shall see. The Paraphrast's words are—ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος (ἀρχή γὰρ καὶ αὐτίκα ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων δὲ ἐκείνο γὰρ τὶ πράττωμεν) ἐξητέων, πῶς δεῖ ποιῆσαι τὸν περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον ἐχει γὰρ διαφορὰν καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν μεκρίν διαλεγόμενα τῶν γὰρ αὐτίων τὸ μὲν τελείων ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν τὸ δὲ υλικὸν τὸ δὲ ποιητικὸν καὶ ποιητικὸν μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ τεχνίτου υλικὸν δὲ τὸ ἔδα καί οἱ λίθοι εὐ δὴν ἡ ὁικία. εἰδικὸν δὲ τὸ εἴδος τῆς ὁικίας τελικὸν δὲ δὲ οῇ ὁ ὁικία γέγονεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὐτα αἷτι εἰσὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τοῦ εἶναι, αἷτι εἰσὶ καὶ τῆς γνώσεως αὐτῶν καὶ δὲ αὐτῶν δύναται ἐκείνα γνώσκεσθαι. ἦν γὰρ τις εἰδὴ τὴν τέχνην τοῦ τεχνίτου καθ' ἥν την ὁικίαν ἐνδημοรงγησεν, εἰσέται τὴν ὁικίαν ἡ ἀγαθὴν ἡ φαύλην, ὅσον τῇ τέχνῃ προσήκε. καὶ ὁ τῇ ὠλὴν εἰδως καὶ ὁ τὸ εἴδος ὁμοίως. πῶς δὲ γνώσκεσθαι τί τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς εἰσώμεθα ἡ ἀγαθὴν ἡ φαύλην. Συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀνίπατων ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδου ἄποτελέσσα τὰς αἰτίας γνώσεως ὁ γὰρ εἰδως τῆς ὁικίας, [v.1. αἰτίαν] τὴν τέχνην εἴσεται τοῦ τεχνίτου, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως. ὅπτε τοὺς λόγους διόχος ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποδεικνύμαι, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰ ἀποτελεσματα.
BOOK I: CHAP. 4: §§ 5-7.

1095 b. 3. χρήσμεθα δὲ ἐκατέρα τῶν μεθόδων κατὰ καρπά. [This is the qualification, alluded to above, with which the Paraphrat seems to accept the present passage as pledging Aristotle to an inductive method in Ethics.] καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀποδείξομεν ὅταν αὐτὰ δήλαι δοσὶ τὸ δ' ἀνάπαλι, ὅταν τὰ ἀποτελέσματα φανερώτερα ἦ. διὰ τούτῳ καὶ Πλάτων καλὸς ἐξῆτε τούτῳ καὶ ἡπόρει, ὅσ οὐκ ἀδιάφορον ὅν ἐπὶ παντὸς, πάτερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ προσήκουσα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὁδὸς, ἡ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς' ὅπερ ἐν στάδιῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδιαφοτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. διετής οὖν οὕσης τῆς ὁδοῦ, πάθεν ἡμῖν ἀρκτέον; ἡ δὴ, ἐπὶ οτι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων δηλοῦσι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων, ὅν ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον τὸ πολιτικὸν τέλος ἐστὶ; δει γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἀρξασθαι, οὐ τῇ φύσει, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν. Φύσει μὲν γὰρ γνώριμα λέγωσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια' ἐκεῖνα γὰρ ἡ φύσις πρὸτερα παρὰτητη, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πρῶτος ὅρα' ἡμῖν δὲ τὰ ἀποτελέσματα γνώριμα' ἔβεν ἀρκτέον οὕτω γὰρ σαφῆς ἔσται ὁ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῶν γνωρίμων γνώμενος. Εὐστρατίους ἔξερεν as follows—ἐπεὶ τούτων ἀρχὴ μὲν τέλει ἡ εὐδαμονία, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὕτην ὡς τέλος ἀγουσι αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰσὶ πράξεις, αὕται δὲ ὑπερέχει μὲν τῇ φύσει ὅσ τῆς εὐδαμονίας αἴτιατα, ἡμῖν δὲ σαφέστερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα, ἐκ τούτων ἡμῖν ἀρκτέων καὶ αὐτῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ αἴτιον—we. e. εὐδαμονία is the Final Cause of Life. The various ἀρεταί are naturally subsequent to it, as being its effects—i. e. as being what they are in virtue of it, just as the hand is a hand in virtue of the body; but they are more evident to us than it is—i. e. we learn (under the influence of moral training) to discriminate practically, or in our habitual conduct, between good and bad actions, before we can form a notion of life as a great whole, and understand why and how they are good and bad; accordingly, we must begin our study of moral science with this merely empirical 'knowledge of the ἀρεταί,' and rise from it to the knowledge of their cause, εὐδαμονία.

b. 4. §§ 6, 7. διὰ δει τοῖς έθεσιν ἥχθαι καλῶς... τοῦ διῶτι.] The connexion here may be exhibited as follows. Moral science must begin with moral facts—with particular moral actions. The student of moral science must be able to see for himself that a particular act is good or bad. (Ἀρχὴ τὸ ὅτι... ἀρκτέων ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῶν γνωρίμων). It will be useless to tell him that such and such an act is good or bad; he must have a tendency to think it good or bad. He cannot manifest this tendency unless he has often performed, or abstained from performing, the act in question—i. e. unless he has acquired a habit in relation to it. When he has once acquired good habits,
he may derive profit from the study of moral science; for then he knows what it is about—he then realises what is meant by calling such and such actions good or bad. Habit makes him think a certain act good: moral science explains to him why it is so. Thus άρχη here means 'what we start with'—the particular in this case: whereas άρχαί in the next sentence (§ 7) is to be understood in the technical sense of 'universal principles' (see Grant _ad loc._). At the same time we cannot help seeing that in using άρχη popularly, Aristotle is not uninfluenced by the associations connected with its technical meaning. The perception that a particular act is good or bad, which is an άρχη, in the sense of being simply the beginning of the study of moral science, itself involves a universal principle. The universal principle is the tendency to regard the act as good or bad, derived from the habit of performing it or avoiding it. The habits are thus ethical άρχαί, or first principles, or, at least, _media axiomata_ under the supreme άρχη—ἐκδαμονία. Without the habits, the moral perceptions have no existence. Accordingly we cannot be said to start from the moral perception in the popular sense of 'starting' (άρχετον, άρχη), unless we have already a habit which is a 'starting-point' in the technical sense as being a general principle. This seems to be the implication of the passage before us; and our interpretation of it is borne out by passages elsewhere in which habit is actually described as a sort of universal, viz. _E. N._ vi. 11. 4 άρχαί γὰρ τοῦ οὐ ἐνεκα (i. e. the habitual motive or aim), αὐταί (i. e. particular acts): ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου—where _καθόλου_ describes the habit which has been acquired by repetition of particular acts: and again _E. N._ i. 7. 20 τῶν άρχῶν δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῆθοι θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ’ αἰσθήται, αἱ δ’ ἐθισμός τω, καὶ ἄλλαι δ’ ἄλλως—'we perceive our starting-point, sometimes by induction, sometimes by simple sensation, sometimes by habituation...'.—where ἐθισμός is presented as a sort of 'moral induction,' which puts us in possession of 'moral principles,' just as scientific induction gives us the principles of deduction.

There is no moral ὅτι, then, unless there are good habits. We begin our ethical studies with the ὅτι (άρχη τὸ ὅτι); but we should not perceive the ὅτι at all, unless we possessed the άρχη of habit. Our perception of the ὅτι is thus a sort of deduction from the principle of habit. So far as the conduct of ordinary men is concerned, the perception of the ὅτι supersedes the necessity of the knowledge
of the διότι—i.e. the fact that they perceive a certain act to be good (it being really good: this the νομοθέτης has seen to), implies that they are so habitually disposed towards it, that, from a practical point of view, speculative reasons, proving that it is good, may be dispensed with. Ordinary men, who act virtuously from habit, do not need to know, and perhaps could not understand, why they ought so to act. Their Habit, with the accompanying Opinion that the things habitually done are good, is a sufficient substitute for the why, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὗ γνώσις ἄλλα πράξεως. The νομοθέτης, however, who is the author of the habit, must possess the why—he must know why certain acts are good. In his case, at least, it cannot be said, that the ὅτι is enough without the διότι. He must be able to show how the law of the habit (which is merely 'empirical' to the ordinary citizen) can be 'derived from' the Supreme Law (τὸ διότι) of Human Nature—εὐδαιμονία.

So much for the meaning which the immediate context undoubtedly gives to the present passage. But we must remember that ὅτι (as distinguished from διότι) has a special application, which could not fail to make itself felt to Aristotle's mind here. Τὸ ὅτι is that which is accepted without ἀπόδειξις: it is τὸ ἀναπόδεικτον. Hence it is a term specially applicable to the ἀρχαί or universal principles of ἀπόδειξις, which of course would not be ἀρχαί if they admitted of deductive proof—i.e. if they could be explained by means of a διότι. Thus we find E. N. i. 7. 20. 1098 a. 33 οὐκ ἀπαρνητέον ὅτι ὅτι ἐν ἀπαινόν ὁμορραγία, ἀλλ' ἰκανὸν ἐν τούτῳ τὸ ὅτι δεικνύσαι καλὸς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχαί τὸ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. Accordingly, the words before us—ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνετο ἀρχοῦσα, οὐδὲν προσδείησε τοῦ διότι—if abstracted for a moment from their context, mean that ἀπόδειξις must start from an ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτον; and that, if this ἀρχὴ is self-evident, it is unnecessary to attempt to make it more evident by trying to find some higher ἀρχὴ (διότι), which may explain it. The Paraphrast actually speaks of the ὅτι of the present passage as ἀρχὴ ἀποδείξεως. He says—εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀπεδείκνυμεν τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις ἄγαθας εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μητροποιουμένων ἐν τοῖς τοιαύταῖς πράξεωι ἐπείδη οἱ λόγοι ἀνάγκης ἔφασαν οἳ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰστέρων τὴν ἀρχὴν βουλομένη ἀποδείκνυσαν τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων δηλοῦσι, καὶ δεὶ ὑποκειθαί περὶ αὐτῶν καθάπερ ἀρχὴν ἀποδείξεως ὅτι ἀγαθαί,

1 The passage would run very well with the clause ἀρχὴ...διότι omitted.
BOOK I: CHAP. 4: §§ 6, 7.

Such a one is in possession of moral facts, which either stand already in the light of principles, or can be at once recognised as such on the suggestion of the Philosophers.' Grant. The Paraphrast's comment is—

μηδέτερον] neither ἔχει, nor λάβοι ἀν ἀρχάς.

οὗτος μὲν κ.τ.λ.] Hesiod, ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι 291–295. The sentiment expressed in these verses became proverbial, and reappears frequently in literature: see the notes of Magirus, Zell, Coraes, Michelet and Grant, who refer to Herod. vi. 16, Soph. Antig. 720, Livy xxii. 29, Cic. Pro Cluentio 31. The words of Sophocles are—

and Livy's words are—'Saepe ego (i.e. Minutius addressing the soldiers) audivi, milites, eum primum esse virum qui ipse consulat, quid in rem sit, secundum eum qui bene monenti obediat: qui vero nec ipse consulere nec alteri parere sciat, eum extremi ingenii esse.'
It is quite natural that men's views about the Chief Good, or Happiness, should be determined by the manner of their lives. There are three prominent lives, and, corresponding to them, three leading views about Happiness.

1. The life of sensual enjoyment. The votaries of this life make Happiness Pleasure. This view has received more attention than it deserves, because the life of which it is the theory—the life of a brute beast—is that led by many persons of high station.

2. The life of the man of affairs. He makes Social Success the Chief Good. But Social Success is too superficial a thing to be the Chief Good. It has its being rather in the applause of others than in the nature of the man himself; whereas the Chief Good must surely be something in a man—something which is his own, and not easily to be taken away from him. Moreover, those who seek the applause of their fellow citizens, seek it that they may have the satisfaction of believing in their own Goodness. Thus they put Goodness above applause. But even Goodness falls short of being the Chief End, for a man may 'have Goodness' and yet spend his whole life without doing anything worth doing—nay, may be involved in the greatest misfortunes, notwithstanding his Goodness: and it would be paradoxical to call such a man 'Happy.'

3. The life of the thinker. This we shall examine afterwards.

As for the life of money-making, it is contrary to nature. Its end, money, is obviously but a means, unnaturally converted into an end. Although the same is true of the other ends examined above, it is not so obviously true.

Let us return from this digression and examine men's notions of the good or happiness, for (γάρ) these notions are worth examination, being derived, as is only natural, from their own experience of life (οὐκ ἀλάγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βιων ὑπολαμβάνειν). Incorrect as these notions are, they are not without a certain foundation in experience, and will embody part of the truth which we are in search of. They place happiness in the satisfaction of one side of human nature; a review of them will bring to light how many sides human nature has, and will enable us to fill in the details of our own theory of life, which, stated in outline, is that all the sides of human nature ought to be duly satisfied under the synoptic eye of νοῦς. The subject of ἐοίκασιν is οἱ μὲν πολλοί in § 2, and οἱ δὲ χαριέτες in § 4, the words διό § 2. . . Σορδανάπαλλω § 3, being parenthetical. Peters does not bring out the force of οὐκ ἀλάγως correctly; he translates—'As to men's notions of the good or happiness, it seems (to judge, as we reasonably may from their lives) that the masses, who are the least
refined, hold it to be pleasure.’ Oίκ διόγος relates not to our 1095 b. 14.
inference, but to the derivation of ὑπολήψεις from βίοι by those who
live the βίοι; the ὑπολήψεις so derived are pronounced ‘natural’ or
‘not unreasonable.’ Williams falls into the same error as Peters;
he translates—‘the many and baser sort give by their lives a fair
presumption that their conception of the chief good and of happi-
ness is that it consists in material pleasure.’ Stahr is right—‘Wir
kehren jetzt zu dem Gegenstande zurück, wovon wir abgeschweift
sind. Es scheint mir nämlich, dass die Menschen nicht ohne eine
gewisse Berechtigung ihre Ansichten über das was gut und was
Glückseligkeit sei, nach ihren verschiedenen Lebensarten bilden.’
So Lambinus—‘Sane vero summum bonum et beatitudinem non
sine ratione ex variis vitae generibus existimare videntur.’ The
Paraphrast takes too narrow a view of the scope of the clause τὸ
γάρ ἀγάθων . . . ὑπολαμβανεῖν, when he understands it merely to give
a reason why men’s views of the chief good vary so much—viz.
because their lines of life (βίου) vary—ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγουμεν δὲν παρεξέ-
βημεν. ἂν δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος περὶ τοῦ διὰ τινὸς οἱ ἀνθρώποι περὶ τῶν ἐι-
δαμονίας ἔχουσι δόξαν. ἐκατόσος τοῖς ἀκολούθοις τῷ ὥσπερ βίῳ τὴν
ἐιδαμονίαν ὁρίζοντι. This takes no account of oίκ διόγος, which
prepares us for the importance which is attached below in chapter
8 to the ὑπολήψεις of the various classes of men.

§ 2. διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσιν ἀγαπῶσι means that they acquiesce b. 17.
in, or look no higher than; καὶ means that their life is in accordance
with their theory, or ὑπολήψεις.

τρεῖς γάρ εἰσιν κ.τ.λ.] In the ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος a man sacrifices
the λόγος, or harmony of his nature as a whole, to the ἐπιθυμητικὸν
μέρος—to his desire for pleasure; in the πολιτικὸς βίος (as the term
πολιτικὸς is used here) he sacrifices it to the βουλευτικὸς μέρος—to
ambition, or love of social success, and the applause of others; but
in the θεωρητικὸς βίος human nature is not treated as a means, but
reverenced as an end. To be revered as an end it must be
seen sub specie aeternitatis as divine, and this involves θεωρία.
Hence human nature cannot be maintained as a λόγος in the
πρακτικὸς βίος, except by one who has the σκοπός (see vi. 1. §§ 1, 2,
3, notes) which θεωρία gives. To have this σκοπός, it is not indeed
necessary to be oneself a ‘philosopher’ or ‘thinker,’ or actually to
lead the separate θεωρητικὸς βίος strictly so called; but it is necessary
to live in a city which has ‘thinkers,’ and is regulated for the sake
In such a city theoria, which appears in the professed ‘philosophers’ or ‘thinkers’ as the clear consciousness of speculative truth, manifests itself in the men of affairs as a spirit whereby they are enabled to detach themselves somewhat from the influence of merely personal pleasures and ambitions—‘material grounds of action,’ and take a ‘formal,’ ‘theoretic’ view of life, comprehending it in its μέγεθος καὶ τάξις as a system of καλαὶ πράξεις. This is the spirit of the ‘true politician,’ as described by Eudemus—E. E. i. 5. 1216 a. 23 οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας: οὐ γὰρ εἰσὶ πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ο ἐν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἵστη πράξεως προωριτικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν: ο δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἐνεκεν ἀπονταὶ τοῦ ζῆν οὖτος. The ‘true’ πολιτικὸς βίος is thus, in a sense, a θεωρητικὸς βίος, even in the case of the man of affairs who is not a professed philosopher or thinker. More literally, of course, it is a θεωρητικὸς βίος in the case of the man of affairs who not only lives in a city which exists for the sake of ‘philosophers’ or ‘thinkers,’ but is himself also a ‘thinker’ in the strict sense, and enjoys moments of inward philosophical σχολὴ in the course of his ‘political’ career. It is not necessary to be a professed ‘philosopher’ or ‘thinker,’ and to abstain from active participation in affairs in order to lead the θεωρητικὸς βίος. Perhaps the θεωρητικὸς βίος is most successfully realised, not as a separate life, but as the form of the πολιτικὸς βίος.

The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (Rep. 581)—τὸ φιλοκρατεῖς γένος, τὸ φιλόνεικον καὶ φιλότιμον, and τὸ φιλόσοφον, in the first of which ἐπιθυμία has the mastery, in the second θυμός, in the third λόγος. These three types of individual character are exemplified on a large scale in πολιτείαι (Rep. 544, sqq.). In ἀριστοκρατία there is ὄμοιον, ‘one mind’ extending throughout the whole body politic: all classes cheerfully conspire to maintain the good of the state, each performing its own function under λόγος or ‘the constitution.’ In τιμοκρατία order and discipline are confined to one class—the military class, representing θυμός, or the pushing self-asserting principle in human nature. In δημοκρατία the principle of ἐπιθυμία, represented by a wealthy clique, takes the place of θυμός, and for a time, by adopting the maxim of ‘cool self-regard,’ manages to ward off anarchy. Finally, in δημοκρατία anarchy prevails, every individual doing what pleases him best at the time—till the τύραννος, representing the supremacy of some one ἐπιθυμία in
the individual character, puts an end to the licence of the many, 1095 b. 17. that the licence of one—the worst anarchy—may reign. So, in
the ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος some tyrant ἐπιθυμία may determine conduct,
or many ἐπιθυμίαι may have their turns; in the πολιτικὸς βίος ambition is the master-passion, and keeps order to a certain extent,
but not in the interest of the whole man, only in its own interest;
while in the θεωρητικὸς βίος all the functions of man’s nature are
exercised duly.

Michelet and Grant point out that this three-fold division occurs
in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heraclides Ponticus
(apud Cic. Tusc. v. 3), in which life is compared to the concourse
at Olympia—some come to contend for prizes, some to buy and
sell, some—the noblest sort—to look on as spectators: ‘[Pytha-
goran] ut scribit auditor Platonis Ponticus Heraclides vir doctus
in primis, Phliuntem ferunt venisse; cumque Leonte principe
Phliasiorum, docte et copiose disseruisse quaedam; cujus ingenium
et eloquentiam cum admiratus esset Leon, quaesivisse ex eo, qua
maxume arte confideret: at illum, artem quidem se scire nullam,
sed esse Philosophum; admiratum Leontem novitatem nominis
quaesivisse quinam essent Philosophi, et quid inter eos et reliquos
interesse: Pythagoran autem respondisse—Similem sibi videri
vitam hominum et mercatum eum qui haberetur maxumo ludorum
apparatu totius Graeciae celebritate: nam ut illic alii corporibus
exercitatis gloriam et nobilitatem coronae peterent, alii emendi aut
vendendi quaesu et lucro ducerentur: esset autem quoddam genus
eorum, idque vel maxune ingenuum, qui nec plausum nec lucrum
quaererent; sed visendi causa venirent, studioseque perspicerent
quid ageretur et quo modo: ita nos quasi in mercatus quandam
celebritatem ex urbe aliquia sic in hanc vita ex alia vita et natura
profectos, alios gloriae servire, alios pecuniae; raros esse quosdam
qui, ceteris omnibus pro nihil habitis, rerum naturam studiose
intuerentur: hos se appellare sapientiae studiosos: id est enim
philosophos: et ut illic liberalissumum esset spectare nihil sibi
adquirentem, sic in vita longe omnibus studiis contemplationem
rerum cognitionemque praestare.’ Iamblichus (vita Pythag. § 58)
preserves the story in the following words—(see Cic. Tusc. v. 3,
ed. Davisii, note) ἔοικέναι γὰρ ἐφή (Πυθαγόρας) τὴν εἰς τῶν βίων τῶν
ἀνθρώπων πάροδον τῷ ἐπὶ τῶν πανηγύρεως άπαντῶν ῥήμας· ὣς γὰρ ἔκεισεν
παραδόσατοι φοιτώντες ἀνθρώπωι ἄλλοις κατ’ ἄλλου χρείαν ἀφικνεῖται, ό γεν
χρηματισμῷ τε καὶ θέρσους χάριν ἀπεμπολῆσαι τόν φόρτον ἐπεγόμενος· ὁ
The Neoplatonic rendering of the θεωρητικός βίος, which makes it an ecstatic life of entire freedom from bodily influences, is quite foreign to the concrete view of human nature taken by Aristotle. Aristotle's θεωρητικός βίος is the raison d'être of the πολίτης, in the same sense that the ψυχή is the raison d'être of the σώμα. We know of no ψυχή except as correlated with a σώμα; so we know of no θεωρία except as manifested by a civilized man, or πολίτης. It is true that in the Tenth Book of the Ethics he uses language which may seem to lend itself to a Neoplatonic rendering; but his object there is to abstract, and present clearly, the formal principle or theoretic element in actual life, and we must be careful not to make 'a material use' of this merely 'formal principle,' and suppose that he asserts the possibility or desirability of an actual life of pure θεωρία for man, in which the ζωὴ πολιτικὴν should be transformed into the θεία. The σοφία, as distinguished in the Tenth Book from the πολίτης, is as much an abstraction as θεία considered apart from the κόσμος. Hence we must not accept as a correct account of Aristotle's view the mystical comment of Eustratius on the θεωρητικός βίος of this passage—διακόπτων τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὸ σαρκικὸν τούτο νέφος καὶ προκάλυμμα θείο καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ ἀπάθειαν συγγίνεται. Aristotle himself was no believer in such a Nirvana, whatever influence he may have had on the evolution of the mystical doctrines of which this note of Eustratius is a reminiscence.

§ 3. άνθρωποδώδες] Zell and Michelet compare E. N. iii. 10. 8 περὶ τᾶς τοιαῦτας δ' ἡδονᾶς ἡ σοφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐκεῖν ἢν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, θεῖον άνθρωποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται αὕτη δ' εἰσὶν ἁφῆ καὶ γεώσις. Magirus connects the contemptuous character of Aristotle's criticism of the ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος in this section with the remark made in Τόμ. i. 9. 105 a. 3 ού δει δὲ πάν πράξειμα, οὔθε πάσαν θέσιν ἐπικοινωνεῖν ἀλλ' ἢν ἀπορήσειν ἢν τοῖς τῶν λόγων βοημένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αὐτόθησεως. The 'castigation,' as distinguished
from 'argument,' is contained here in the terms φορτικώτατοι and 1095 b. 19.

τυχάνοις δὲ λόγου] 'Obtain consideration,' Grant compares x. 6. 3. b. 21.

tὸν ἐν ταῖς εξουσίαις] Zell compares viii. 6. 5 o1 δ’ ἐν ταῖς εξουσίαις.

Σαρδανάπαλλος] Cf. E. E. i. 5. 1215 b. 36 ὁ γοῦν ἐν Λυσίππῳ θεώς b. 22.

do ὁς Ἀπίν τιμῶσιν ἐν πλεονὶ τῶν τοιούτων (i. e. τῶν σωματικῶν ἑδονῶν)
εξουσίας τοιούτων μονορχῶν . . . 1216 a. 16 ὁ δ’ Ἡρακλείας μακριότερος ἡ Ἐμερήδιον οὐκ ἔτη τῶν ἀκρατειῶν 

τοῦ ἡμῶν ἐποίησεν τῷ πᾶσιν τῶν ἱπποτῶν τὸ ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οὕτω δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαῖρειν φαίνονται τάττων τὴν 

eὐδαμωνίαν. See Cic. Tusc. v. 35 (among Rose's Fragments of Aristotle, No. 77) 'Quo modo igitur jucunda vita potest esse a qua 

absit prudentia, absit moderatio? Ex quo Sardanapalli opulentissimi Syriae regis error agnoscitur qui incidi jussit in busto,

Haec habeo quae ed. quaeque exsaturata libido

Hausit: at illa jacent inulta et praeclara relictar.

Quid aliud, inquit Aristoteles, in bovis non in regis sepulchro 

inscriberes? Haec habere se mortuum dicit, quae ne vivus 

quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur.' Cf. also Cic. de Fin. 

ii. 32. 106 quoted by Rose Fr. No. 77. Had Eudemus, when 

he wrote ὁ γοῦν ἐν Λυσίππῳ θεώς κ.τ.λ., the work (Dialogue περὶ 

dικαιοσύνης according to Rose) to which this fragment belongs 

before him? The verses translated by Cicero are given by 

Athenaeus viii. 14. 335 τί γὰρ τῶν ἑπτάριφαι δυναμένων ἐπελύουσι 

ὁ καλὸς οὖτος ἐποίησε (i. e. Archestratus, author of 

γαστρονομία) καὶ μόνος ἔφησαν τὸν Σαρδανάπαλον τοῦ Ἀνακυκλαύσας 

βίον, ὥν ἐδιανοηώτουρ εἶναι κατὰ τὴν προσηγορίαν τοῦ πατρὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐφή. ἐφ' 

οὗ τοῦ τάφου ἐπεγεγραφαίη ψήλι Χρυσίππος τάδε:

eβ εἰδὼς ὅτι θητός ἔφη τοῦ τιμῶν ἄξει, 

τερπόμενος θαλίστας· θανόντι τοι οὕτως ὑψήθης.

καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σπαρόμενος εἶμι, Νίκων μεγάλης βασιλείας.

κεῖν ἔχω σο' ἔφαγον καὶ ἑφύβρισα καὶ συν ἔρωτι 

τέρπ' ἔπαινον τά δὲ πολλά καὶ ἀλβα πάντα λέιπεσται.

ηδὲ σοφή βυτων παραίνεσις, οὐδὲ ποί' αὐτῆς

λήσομαι, ἀκτίσσο δ' ὁ βλέπων τῶν ἀπείρων χρυσῶν.

Athenaeus (xii. 38. 528, 9, apparently quoting Ctesias) and 

Nicolaus Damascenus (ed. Tauchn. p. 251) describe fully the 

luxurious habits of Sardanapalus. The latter writer says ὃ ἐκεῖνον 

ἔχων ἐν Νίνη, ἐδιοδό τῷ σύμμαχον ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις διατρίβων, ὠβλών μὲν 

οὐχ ἀπότομοι, οὐδ' ἐπὶ δήραις ἔξω, διὸ περὶ τὸ πάλαι βασιλεῖς, ἐγχριμένοισ

1095 b.22. δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον, καὶ τοῦς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὑπογραφῆμενος, πρὸς τὸ τᾶς παλλακίδας ἀμιλλώμενος περὶ κάλλους καὶ ἔμπλοκής, τὸ τε σύμπαν γυναικεῖον ἔθει χρώμεσι. Cf. Athenaeus xii. 39. 530 Αὐριστόβουλος (served under Alexander, and wrote a history of his wars, which was Arrian's chief authority) ὧν Ἀγχυλῆ ἂν ἐδείματο (φησὶ) Σαρδανάπαλος, Ἀλέξανδρος ἀναβαίνων εἰς Πέρσας κατεστρατευθεύεσατο, καὶ ἦν οὐ πόρρω τὸ τοῦ Σαρδανάπαλον μυμεῖον, ἐφ᾽ οὐ ἐστάναι τόπον λίθων συμβεβληκότα τῆς δεξιᾶς χειρὸς τοὺς δικτύλους, ὡς ἄν ἐπικροτοῦσα. ἐπηγεγράφατο δὲ αὐτῷ Ἀσσυρίων γράμμασι: Ἐν Σαρδανάπαλος, Ἀνακυκλαμένου παις, Ἀγχυλῆν καὶ Ταρσοῦ ἐδειμὲν ἡμέρῃ μη. ἔσθει, πῶς, παιζεῖ ὡς τᾶλα τοῦτον οὐκ ἄξια—τού ἀποκροτήματος τοικε λέγειν." Sardanapalus (Assur-bani-pal), son of Esarhaddon, reigned from about 667 till about 647. His reign marks the culmination of Assyrian power and civilization.

b. 23. § 4. τιμὴν] On τιμὴ as the end of ‘political’ life, see E. N. v. 6. 7 μουσός δρα τις δοτοίοι (i. e. to the ἄρχον), τούτο δὲ τιμῇ καὶ γέραις. Cf. Pol. ii. 4. 1266 b. 38, where the πολλοὶ are said to be satisfied with κτήσεις, but the χαριστεῖς to strive after τιμαὶ, ὑποτελεῖται—ἐπὶ στασιάζοντος οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνάδοτην τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν τοῦνατον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον” οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον, οἱ δὲ χαριστεῖς περὶ τῶν τιμῶν ἔναν ἵσται.

b. 24. ἐπιπολαιότερον] ‘Too superficial for that which we are in search of.’ Grant. Honour is not the nature and life of the person honoured, but a merely superficial and transitory reflection on him of the opinion of other people.

δοκεῖ . . . μαντευόμεθα] Honour depends on those who give it, not on him who receives it. It therefore cannot be the chief good, which is ‘one’s own’ and depends on oneself; cf. Met. Θ. 8. 1050 a. 34 sqq., from which we can understand how ἐνυδαμοία, being an ἐνέργεια which contains its own end in itself, must be οἰκειόν τι—i. e. something which resides wholly in the man who realises it—ὅτι δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν αὐτοὶς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια: οὐν ἡ ὁράσις ἐν τῷ ὁρώντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ἦλθ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ιδίᾳ καὶ ἡ ἐνυδαμοία ζωῆς γὰρ ποιεῖ τις ἐστὶν. On the other hand, where a result different from the ἐνέργεια is produced by its operation, i. e. where the ἐνέργεια is not its own end, but has an external end, the ἐνέργεια (consummation) is in the result—1050 a. 30 ὅσον μὲν οὖν ἔτερον τι ἐστὶν παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γνωρίμονον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιομένῳ ἐστὶν, οὐν ἡ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομομένῳ καὶ ἡ ἴδιασις ἐν τῷ ἴδιοφαινόμενῳ ὡμολογεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἄλως ἡ κίνησις
BOOK I: CHAP. 5: §§ 4-6.

ἐν τῷ κανονίμῳ. As ὑφαντὸς then is ἐν τῷ ὑφαντομένῳ, so τιμή is ἐν 1095 b. 24. τοῖς τιμῶσι: it does not reside ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ as θεωρία resides ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι. The good opinion of others is an ἔργον, as it were, which a man produces, like a web or a house; it is not his own life.

The notion of inherence, which is doubtless the one primarily attaching to ἐν in the present case, does not of course exclude that of being in the power of, into which indeed it easily passes.

μαντευόμεθα] Zell quotes Schol. Par. μαντευόμεθα εἰρήται διὰ τὸ b. 26. μήπω τι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀποδείχθηναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν εἰκασμῷ οὕτω λαμβάνεσθαι, στοχαστικὴ γὰρ τέχνη ἡ μαντική. Cf. De Gen. Anim. iv. 1. 765 a. 27 μαντευόμενοι τὸ συμβησάμενον ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων καὶ προλαμβάνοντες ὡς οὕτως ἔχον πρὶν γνώμενον οὕτως ιδεῖν. May not the term have a special appropriateness in connexion with τάγαθον, or the true Form of human life—τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, which man 'divines,' just as all plants and animals after their kinds instinctively, by a kind of natural divination, find their good—succeed in maintaining and perpetuating their various types, and so realise τὸ ἄει καὶ τὸ θεῖον? See note on i. 2. 8 b. 7. All life—moral and physical—is a striving after Form, a divination of τὸ θεῖον.

§ 5. ἐπὶ . . . κρείττων] The editors refer to viii. 8. 2, where τιμή is said to be sought κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

πιστεύσωσιν] Kb, Mb, Ob, Ha have πιστεύσωσιν, which ought to b. 27. be restored to the text for Bekker's πιστεύσωσιν. See Rassow, Forsch. p. 53: 'der Aorist hat inchoative Bedeutung.'

καὶ ἐπὶ ἀρετῆ] Epexegetical—'i.e. for their virtue.' b. 29.

§ 6. ἀτελεστέρα] ἀρετή is a mere ἔδος, or possession of the power b. 32. of acting well, not an ἑνέργεια or act; see ii. 5. This ἔδος may subsist without going forth in action. It is therefore ἀτελεστέρα—'falls short of being the τέλος' (Grant)—which is τὸ εἴς ζήν in actuality, not in mere potentiality. Εὐδαιμονία is the manifestation of ἀρετή, and is defined in i. 7. 15 as ψυχῆς ἑνέργεια κατ᾽ ἀρετήν. Thus ἀρετή is to εὐδαιμονία as δύναμις to ἑνέργεια.

καθεύδειν] is opposed to ἑνέργεις x. 8. 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν ζήν γε πάντες ὑπελήφασιν αὐτοὺς [τοὺς θεοὺς] καὶ ἑνέργειαι ἄρα' οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὡσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωσα.

ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετῆν] i.e. with the mere ἔδος of ἀρετή. 'Past merits,' b. 33.
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**BOOK I: CHAP. 5: § 6.**

1095b. 33. says Grant, 'or the passive possession of qualities whose existence depends on the attestation of fame, cannot be thought to constitute the chief good. Very different from this is ένέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν an actual life of virtue in the present.'

1096 a. 1. **κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἄρετεῖν**] cf. i. 9. II. The good things of body and estate are the ἠλη in which the εὐδαιμονία realises the form of his nature. Without this matter the form cannot be realised; but the form is not to be confounded with the matter. Εὐδαιμονία is a certain manner of life. This manner of life requires certain conditions, as the art of Phidias required marble or ivory. As Eudemus puts it (E. E. i. 2. 1214 b. 16), we must be careful to distinguish between τὸ ζῆν καλῶς and δὸν ἀνευ οὐ δυνατῶν ζῆν καλῶς. Cf. Didymus, Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἥδεικῶν δόγματα ἀρετεῖν [cf. Mullach, *Fragm. Phil.* vol. ii. p. 90 τοὺς δὲ νομίζοντας τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ ἐξωθεν ἀγαθὰ συμπληροῦν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄργεον ὅτι ἡ μὲν εὐδαιμονία βίος ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ βίος εἰ πράξεως συμπελλήφθη εἰς τὸν δὲ σωματικῶς καὶ τὸν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν οὕτε πράξεως ἐναι καθ’ ἑαυτό, οὔθ’ ἀλος ένέργειαν... τὰ δὲ ἀνευ πράττειν ὑπούν ἀδύνατον μέρη τῆς ἐνεργείας λέγειν οὐκ ἄρθρον.

a. 2. **εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων**] For the meaning of θέσις as an ἀρχή ἀποδείξεως see *An. Post.* i. 2. 72 a. 14 sqq. where it is distinguished as ἀρχὴ ἂν μὴ ἔστι δείξα, μὴ ἂν ἄναγκῃ ἔχειν τῶν μαθησάμενων τι from ἐξίσωμα, which is an ἀρχὴ ἂν ἄναγκῃ ἔχειν τῶν ὑπούν μαθησάμενον. Here (E. N. i. 5. 6) however we are concerned with the dialectical (as distinguished from the apodeictic) θέσις, which is described in Τοπ. i. 9. 104 b. 19 (quoted by Eustratius and the commentators after him) θέσις δὲ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοσις τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ὅν τι ὑπὸ ἐστιν ἀντιλέγειν καθάπερ ἐφη 'Ἀντιθέτις ή ὅτι πάντα κινεῖτα καθ’ Ἱππακλείτον' ἢ ὅτι ἐν τῷ δὲ καθάπερ Μέλισσος φησί τῷ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐκαντία ταῖς δόξαι ἀποφηματίσας φοροίζεις εὐθεῖα ἐστὶ. A θέσις, then, is a paradox maintained on the authority of some great philosopher. An exception is made in its favour in the application of that rule of Dialectic by which only ἑνδοξά are admitted as premisses, and παράδοσις as such excluded.

In Aristotle’s time the Cynics maintained the paradox indicated in the present passage, and after his time the Stoics, contending ὅτι αὐτός ἄρκεις ἡ ἀρετή πρὸς εὐδαιμονία—that the mere consciousness of virtue, even though its manifestation ‘in works’ be prevented by external circumstances, constitutes Happiness. (See Zeller’s *Stoics,*

Epicureans, and Sceptics, pp. 224, 225, Engl. transl.) Cicero (Para-
doxon, 2) defends the δίκεις—ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν,
‘arguing,’ as Grant remarks, ‘the greatness of Regulus in his
misfortunes, as though that were identical with his happiness’; or
perhaps rather identifying his ‘idea of happiness’ with ‘the con-
sciousness of happiness,’ to borrow a delicate distinction drawn by
Prof. Jowett (Plato, Introduction to the Gorgias). ‘Nec vero,’ says
Cicero, ‘M. Regulum aerumnosum nec infelicem nec miserum
unquam putavi. Non enim magnitudo animi ejus cruciabatur a
Poenis, non gravitas, non fides, non constantia, non ulla virtus,
non denique animus ipse: qui tot virtutum praesidio tantoque
comitatu, quum corpus ejus caperetur, capi certe ipse non potuit
. . . bonus vir et fortis et sapiens miser esse non potest. Nec vero,
cujus virtus moresque laudandi sunt, ejus non laudanda vita est,
neque porro fugienda vita est quae laudanda est. Esset autem
fugienda, si esset misera. Quamobrem quicquid est laudabile idem
et beatum et florens et expetendum videri debet.’ ‘Plato,’ says
Prof. Jowett (l. c.), ‘does not mean to say that Archelaus is tor-
mented by the stings of conscience, or that the sensations of the
impaled criminal are more agreeable than of the tyrant drowned in
luxurious enjoyment. . . . What then is his meaning? . . . He is
speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of
happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier
falls in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without
pain, or that physical suffering is always compensated by a mental
satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy. . . . We are not con-
cerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility or by the
rules of logic, but merely to point out the existence of such a
sentiment in the better part of human nature.’

Aristotle was not deficient in appreciation of the part which the
idea of happiness plays in life; but his idealism was not of the kind
to express itself rhetorically, and seem to have always in view some
heroic figure of the tragic stage. His idealism consisted in his
profound recognition of the fact that man has aspirations which
can never be satisfied; which, nevertheless, must be fostered,
because they give élan to those functions which are capable of actual
fulfilment. The αἰθέρωτας βίος is indeed unattainable by man;
but if he ceased to aspire to it, the good life, which is actually
within his reach, would become, in its turn, an impossible ideal.
See E. N. x. 7. 1177 b. 31 ó θερά δι' θανόντων τούς παρανοϊκῶν anθρώπων. F 2
The account given of the spirit of the ἀνθρώπου in E.N. iii. 9. §§ 3–5 shows us how well Aristotle understood the place of 'the idea of happiness' in life—not as a 'constitutive principle,' and equivalent to an actual 'consciousness of happiness,' but as a 'regulative principle.'

a. 3. ἰκανώς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἶρηται περὶ αὐτῶν] It is often assumed that τὰ ἐγκύκλια are the same as εἰσωτερικοὶ λόγοι. One of the reasons for holding that the reference of the latter expression is to commonly accepted views, not necessarily embodied in any written work, is that the present tense is invariably (or almost invariably) used with it. But here, the perfect seems to indicate a special reference to a definite class of written works, or it may be to a definite course of lectures. See note on εἰσωτερικοὶ λόγοι i. 13. 9.

a. 4. §§ 7. ὑπέρ οὗ] περὶ is Bekker's reading against the MSS., which all apparently give ὑπέρ. Sussemihl and Bywater accordingly read ὑπέρ. ὑπέρ with the genitive is so characteristic of the M. M., and the Aristotelian commentators, that its reception into the text here (justified by the MS. authority) raises the question, whether the clause in which it occurs should not be bracketed as an interpolation. See notes on iii. 3. 2, and iv. 2. 4.

a. 5. ἐπομένων] x. 7.

§ 8. ὅ δὲ χρηματιστής (sc. βίος) βιαίος τις ἔστιν] The money-getting life is contrary to nature, for nature has always a definite τέλος, whereas money-getting goes on εἰς ἄπειρον, see Pol. i. 3. 1256 b. 41 χρηματιστικῶν, δὲ ἣν ἀδέδωκεν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούσιον καὶ κτίσιν . . . 1257 b. 19 ἐστι γὰρ ἐπέμειναι χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλούτος ὁ κατὰ φύσιν. The term βιαίος is to be taken in its technical sense =παρὰ φύσιν: see de Coelo 300 a. 23 τὸ δὲ βία καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ταῦτον: Met. Δ. 5. 1015 b. 14 εἶ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἄντα ἀδιά καὶ ἀκίνητα, οὐδὲν ἐκείνου ἐστὶ βιαίον οὐδὲ παρὰ φύσιν: Met. Ι. 1. 1052 a. 23 φύσει . . . καὶ μὴ βία: Phys. iii. 5. 205 b. 5 εἰ δὲ γὰρ ἐν τί ζων βία καὶ οἷς οὐ δέο πέφυκεν: Phys. iv. 8. 215 a. 1 πάσα κύριος ἡ βία ἡ κατὰ φύσιν . . . ὡς μὲν γὰρ βιαίος παρὰ φύσιν ἔστιν: Phys. viii. 4. 255 b. 31 πάντα τὰ κυ νώμενα ἡ φύσει κυνήγαται ἡ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βία. Newman (note on Pol. i. 3. 1253 b. 18) remarks that the connexion which Aristotle traces between τὸ βιαίον and τὸ παρὰ φύσιν is inherited by him from Plato (Tim. 64 D), and from still earlier inquirers (cf. Protag. 337 D, for the words of the
Sophist Hippias). Eustratius interprets the passage incorrectly. He says that the \( \chi \rho \mu \mu \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \iota \eta \) \( \beta \iota \iota \sigma \) employs violent means to make money. Dante (Inf. xi. 109–111, quoted by Michelet) had this interpretation in view when he placed usurers among the ‘violent’ in Hell: although it is to be observed that the ‘violence’ consists in ‘setting Nature, in herself, and in her follower (Art), at nought.’ Grant translates—‘But the life of gain is in a way compulsory,’ and remarks that \( \beta \iota \iota \sigma \) ‘is to be taken in a passive, not in an active sense. It is the opposite of \( \epsilon \kappa \omega \delta \iota \sigma \iota \)\), meaning “forced,” as in Eth. iii. 1. 3. It implies that no one would devote himself, at the outset, to money-making, except of necessity, “parce qu’il faut vivre” . . . It is true that in several places \( \beta \iota \iota \sigma \) is opposed to \( \kappa \alpha \alpha \) (\( \pi \iota \nu \nu \), and in such contexts means “unnatural” ; . . . But without such a context, it cannot simply stand for \( \pi \alpha \rho \alpha \ \phi \iota \sigma \iota \)’ To this it may be answered that the term \( \chi \rho \mu \mu \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \iota \eta \) of itself supplies the context required. That \( \chi \rho \mu \mu \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \iota \eta \) is \( \alpha \pi \iota \rho \iota \sigma \) and \( \pi \alpha \rho \alpha \ \phi \iota \sigma \iota \) is a common-place in the Aristotelian system.

For \( \beta \iota \iota \sigma \) we have the conjectures \( \beta \iota \iota \sigma \) \( \alpha \beta \iota \iota \sigma \) (Muretus), and \( \alpha \beta \iota \iota \sigma \) (Coraes); but no correction is necessary. Aspasius has \( \tau \iota \nu \ \delta \chi \rho \mu \mu \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \iota \eta \) \( \beta \iota \iota \sigma \) \( \lambda \iota \gamma \o\omega \iota \), \( \tau \iota \nu \tau \iota \nu \iota \) \( \mu \iota \kappa \iota \iota \), \( \dot \omega \ \pi \rho \\circ \iota \varepsilon \iota \mu \alpha \iota \) \( \beta \iota \iota \sigma \) \( \lambda \iota \gamma \o\omega \iota \) \( \tau \iota \nu \iota \) —as if he read \( \beta \iota \iota \sigma \).

\( \chi \rho \sigma \iota \mu \omicron \) useful as means to end: see Index Arist. s. v. The a. 7. term is technically employed (alone or with \( \epsilon \iota \sigma \tau \iota \) and \( \pi \rho \\circ \iota \tau \iota \)) to denote the means. The life of money-making is concerned only with means, and has no limiting conception of the end of human endeavour. This the life of \( \theta \iota \omega \rho \iota \alpha \iota \) has, and with this end identifies itself. The \( \theta \iota \omega \rho \iota \alpha \iota \) \( \beta \iota \iota \sigma \) is Life, and exists for its own sake (see x. 7. 5) ; whereas the \( \chi \rho \mu \mu \alpha \iota \sigma \tau \iota \eta \) \( \beta \iota \iota \sigma \) is not Life, but undue care for one of the material conditions of Life.

\( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \beta \varepsilon \beta \lambda \eta \lambda \eta \tau \alpha \)\] The editors quote Pol. Θ. 2. 1337 b. 22 ai a. 10. \( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \beta \varepsilon \beta \lambda \eta \lambda \eta \mu \iota \iota \iota \alpha \) \( \mu \alpha \theta \iota \sigma \iota \) \( \tau \iota \nu \omega \) \( \tau \iota \nu \sigma \) \( \tau \iota \nu \sigma \) —where the notion of the fundamental character of these branches is conveyed. Here we may render—‘and yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them,’ thus bringing out the idea of a foundation laid for the claims of \( \h \delta \iota \nu \iota \) and \( \tau \iota \mu \iota \) and at the same time indicating that labour has been wasted on the attempt to lay such a foundation. I think that \( \pi \rho \\circ \iota \sigma \) \( \alpha \iota \tau \alpha \) obliges us to take account of this latter point by suggesting \( \kappa \tau \eta \nu \alpha \lambda \omega \nu \tau \alpha \) \( \pi \rho \\circ \iota \sigma \).
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CHAPTER VI.

Argument.

Now let us examine the opinion of those who make the Chief Good a Universal Essence, or Idea, existing apart from all particular good things. It is an unpleasant duty to have to criticise this opinion, which is that of men who are our personal friends; but the philosopher is bound to prefer truth to friendship.

(1) Objects conceived as members of a sequence (e.g. numbers), where the subsequent depends upon the prior, they do not bring under a common Idea. But good is a conception which appears in the Category of Substance, and also in the Categories of Quality and Relation, which are subsequent to the Category of Substance, i.e. presuppose it as their ground. How then, on their own principles, can they bring these various appearances of Good under one common Idea?

(2) If all good things fall under one common Idea, i.e. have all one and the same Essence, or Form of Being, how comes it that, there being ten Categories, or Forms of Being, we find good things in all the ten, and not in one Category only? Thus, in the Category of Substance we find God and Reason, in that of Quality, the various Virtues; in that of Quantity, the Moderate; in that of Relation, the Useful—and these are all 'good things,' although the 'Form of their Being,' or 'their Essence' is not the same.

(3) Since things that have the same essential nature, or fall under one Idea, are all objects of one Science, good things ought all to be objects of the same science. But this is not so. Even good things in the same Category are objects of different sciences—under the Category of Time, the science of the favourable opportunity in sickness is Medical Science; that of the favourable opportunity in warfare is Generalship.

(4) What do they gain by the prefix real by which they mark their Ideas? Real-man, and man, have the same essential nature, viz. that of 'man,' which is common to both. Similarly the real-good, and a good thing, are both 'good.'

(5) If they reply that real means everlasting, we ask, How can mere duration enhance Essence, and put the real-good in a higher position, qua good, than a good thing? If the Idea of the Good is good, it is so independently of time, and if a particular thing is good, it also is good independently of time, just as a thing is white, whether it be white for a day, or a thousand years.

A more plausible position than that before us is the position of the Pythagoreans, who give us a column of good things, within which, not outside of which, they place the Principle of Unity. Even Speusippus, it would appear, follows the Pythagoreans rather than the Platonists here.

But it may be objected to the foregoing criticism—'you have ignored the distinction between things good in themselves, and things good as means to these. It is only things good in themselves which the theory professes to bring under one Idea.'

Let us then confine our attention to things good in themselves.

If it be asked What things may be so described?—there are two alternative answers possible, viz. They are things such as seeing, or thinking, or as certain
pleasures and honours—or The Idea of the Good is the only thing good in itself.
If the latter alternative be accepted, the class of things good in themselves will
be left empty, for the Idea is not in the class. If the former alternative be
accepted—i.e. if it be admitted that seeing, thinking, &c., are also good in
themselves, as well as the Idea, then the same essential nature of Goodness must
be apparent in them all, as the same quality of whiteness is apparent in snow
and white paint. But as a matter of fact the 'goodness' of thinking differs
essentially from that of seeing, and has its own definition. For the same reason
the goodness of each of the pleasures and honours referred to has its own separate
definition.

When we call a thing 'good,' then, we do not mean that it participates in
common with all other good things in one Idea of the Good. What then do we
mean? We mean something: for the same epithet is surely not applied by
mere accident to all these things, without there being some common characteristic
in them all justifying its application. What is this common characteristic?
Perhaps the fact that they 'belong to the same department,' or 'contribute to the
same end'—i.e. they are perhaps called 'good,' as a knife and a bandage are
both called 'surgical,' because they belong to the same department—surgery, or
as cleanliness and exercise are both called 'healthy,' because they contribute to
the same end—health: or perhaps it is safer to say that things are called 'good'
'on the ground of identical relations'—e.g. the relation of the eye to the body is
the same as that of reason to the soul; if we call the eye 'good' in its relation,
we must call reason 'good' in its also. But the discussion of these matters
belongs properly to another part of our system, and need not detain us further,
especially as the Universal Good, apart by itself, even if it exist, is evidently a
thing which man cannot make the end of his action, and lay hold of: and it is
an end which he can lay hold of that we are now looking for.

But it may perhaps be said that a knowledge of the Idea of the Good helps us
to perform those good actions which we can perform, and to lay hold of those
good things which are within our reach, by giving us an 'example or standard
of goodness' to serve as a test of the goodness of our conduct. This is a plausible
view; but it is not supported by what, as a matter of fact, is the procedure of the
sciences and arts. They all try to realise a good, and to supplement what is
lacking to them, but it is never the knowledge of the Idea of the Good that they
make their desideratum. If this knowledge were really useful, is it likely that
all men of science and artists would thus neglect it? But the chief argument
against this view that a knowledge of the Idea is useful, is that derived from
the difficulty of explaining to oneself how it can be useful—how it can be useful
to a weaver or carpenter in his trade—how it can make a man a better general
or a better doctor. So far, indeed, is a doctor from troubling himself with such
wide 'knowledge,' that he does not take a wide view even of 'health,' the final
end of his own profession. It is not Universal Health which he considers, but
man's health, or rather his patient's health.

*Introductory Note.* The 'Ideas' of Plato answer, in part, to 1096 a 11.
what we now call 'Laws of Nature.' As distinguished from part-
icular phenomena which come and go, the 'Ideas are fixed;'
hence are the objects of *scientific* knowledge, as distinguished from
BOOK I: CHAP. 6.

1096 a. 11. mere sensation. Particular men are men, because they ‘participate in,’ or are ‘copies of’ the ‘Idea of Man’; as we should say—because they are common results of that fixed Law of Nature which brings forth such beings as men. Particular things are beautiful, because they are ‘copies of the Eternal Beauty’—as we should say—because there is that in the fixed constitution of the universe which determines the production of things so characterised. To give force to his assertion that the ‘Ideas’ are fixed, Plato was accustomed to speak of sensible things as fluctuating, and even unreal. Such reality, at any rate, as they possess they derive from the ‘Ideas’ in which they ‘participate.’ We must not, however, take Plato too literally. He speaks of the unreality of particulars, in much the same way as we speak of the impossibility of an uncaused phenomenon,—a phenomenon which is not part of the universe of Natural Laws. The language at his disposal for expressing the ‘reality’ of the Ideas was not adequate to the task. He was obliged to say that the Ideas have more oôôia than the particulars, or that the particulars derive such oôôia as they possess from the oôôia of the Ideas; thus seeming to make the Ideas separate things. But how can the particulars ‘participate in’ the oôôia of a thing separate from them? This was the question which Aristotle put to Plato, or the Platonists. The oôôia of a thing must belong to itself; a thing cannot have its oôôia outside itself in another thing. This difficulty, raised by the inadequacy of the word oôôia for the task assigned to it, was felt by Plato himself (see the Parmenides), and was probably brought home to him, as to Aristotle, by the literal interpretation which pupils of the Academy gave to the doctrine of the Ideas, not only speaking of them as separate things (that was almost unavoidable), but thinking of them as such.

The ‘Ideas’ then answer, in part, to our ‘Laws of Nature,’ the objects of scientific knowledge. But these ‘Ideas’ are members of a system, in virtue of belonging to which they are what they are. This system is the Universe—the One, or the Good. If the ‘Ideas,’ are oôôia, or ‘fixed Laws of Nature,’ the Universe of which they are the fixed Laws, is ἐπίκενω τῆς οὐσίας—is not itself

1 Modern Biology seems to enforce Plato’s doctrine of the unreality of the particular. We see the life of the individual shortened by natural selection for the sake of the Race. See Weismann, Essays upon Heredity (Clarendon Press), Essays i and iii.

2 In part they answer to the ‘Categories of the Understanding’ in modern philosophy. The ἰδέα τῇγαθοῦ answers to the ‘Ideas of the Reason.’
a Law of Nature, but higher. How this doctrine of the Idea of the Good was misunderstood—by the Platonists, we may suppose, rather than by Aristotle—is best shown in the chapter now before us. There is nothing, I venture to think, in the Dialogues of Plato to justify the interpretation which Aristotle's criticism assumes: we shall accordingly follow the line of least difficulty, if we suppose that the Platonists are mainly responsible for the misunderstanding. In all likelihood too they are responsible for the popular ridicule which seems to have been bestowed on the doctrine—see Diog. Laert. iii. 26 and 27 quoted by Meineke, Fragm. Com. vol. iii. 302 τοιούτος δ' ὅν (Πλάτων), ὅμως ἐνκόφθη καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν καμίκῶν—*Ἀμφίς Ἀμφικράτει—

τὸ δ' ἄγαθον δ' τι ποι' ἔστιν, οὕτω σὺ τυγχάνει
μέλλεις διὰ ταύτην, ἠπτον οἷα τοῦτ' ἔγω,
ὅ δὲποτ', ἢ τὸ Πλάτωνος ἄγαθόν' πρόσεχε δή.

It will now be convenient to place by the side of Aristotle's criticism, analysed above in the Argument, Plato's own account of the Idea of the Good as given in Rep. 506 sqq. The Guardians of the State must know the nature of the Good, for if they have not this knowledge, they cannot know the real nature of the Just or the Beautiful. What then is the Good? Socrates can answer only by a simile. The Sun, the Eye, and Visible objects, are in the sensible world, what the Good, Reason (νοῦς), and the Ideas (τὰ νοώμενα), are in the intelligible world. The ἰδέα τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ is that which gives their truth (ἀλήθεια) to the objects of real knowledge, as the sun gives visible colour to the objects of sight. It is the ἰδέα τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ which also gives the power of apprehending this truth (ἐπιστήμη), as the sun gives the eye the power of seeing. As light and sight are not identical with the sun, so ἀλήθεια and ἐπιστήμη are not identical with the ἰδέα τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ, but only like it; moreover as the sun causes the γένεσις of all things but is not itself γένεσις, so the ἰδέα τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ imparts οὐσία to the objects of real knowledge, but is itself something higher than οὐσία—οὐκ οὐσίας ὅποιο τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείαι καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος (509 B).

"Good," says Plato, "is the cause of existence and knowledge." This opens a sublime conception, on the one hand, of a world in which all things are very good; on the other hand, of a philosophy whose method of the deepest knowledge consists in no mere abstract investigations, nor any mere accumulation of
experience, but in apprehending with enthusiasm and joy the all-pervading idea of good, as it manifests itself under the three forms of beauty, symmetry, and truth [Philebus 65 A].’ Grant, Ethics, Essay iii. vol. i. p. 205.

It is difficult to understand a man of Aristotle's calibre attacking, as he does, a theory like this; especially as his own philosophy of human life, with its ideal of the θεορητικός βίος, and its doctrine of ειδαιμονία as something not to be counted among particular good things (E. N. i. 7. 8.), is in entire sympathy with it. ‘Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben,’ is the ideal for Aristotle's ειδαιμον, no less than for Plato's φιλόσοφος. We are tempted to believe that it is not Plato's theory which Aristotle attacks here, but the formalism of the Platonic school; at any rate, the criticisms contained in this chapter are entirely beside the mark, as directed against the theory which is exhibited in the Republic. Ο τὴν ἴδιαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένοι is the man who, after a long education, has risen to the speculative height from which he can see, like Spinoza's wise man, all things as belonging to a single system, in relation to which they 'have existence,' 'are good,' and 'are known.' The ἴδεα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is not a separate thing—χωριστόν τι; it is the system to which 'things' belong, and by belonging to which (or 'participating in' which) are 'things'—it is the One, Deus sive Natura 1. If the Platonic school had confined itself to presenting, as Plato does in the Republic, the conception of τὸ εὖ, or τὸ ἄγαθον, as a great 'regulative principle,' probably no objections would have been raised by Aristotle. But the Theory of Ideas tended always to become more and more a Theory of Ideal Numbers, lending itself to obscurantism; it also stood in the way of the acceptance of that critique of the forms of speech (as epoch-making as Kant's deduction of the forms of thought) which it was Aristotle's greatest service to European culture to have begun and carried so far. It is therefore not entirely surprising to find the ἴδεα τοῦ ἄγαθον, notwithstanding Plato's presentation of it (an unexceptionable presentation of it, one might have supposed, from Aristotle's point of view), coming in for a share of the opposition which the εἰδητικοί ἄρθροι, and χωριστὰ ἔδη of the school naturally roused in the author of the doctrine of Categories.

1 There is a very interesting passage in Teichmüller's Literarische Fehden, pp. 232, 233 (to all the views contained in which I do not however wish to pledge myself) which may be consulted in this connexion.
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It is in the distinction drawn between \( \text{πρώτη} \) and \( \text{δεύτερα οὐσία} \) in 109a. 11. Cat. 5 that the doctrine of the \( \text{χωριστὸν εἶδος} \) or 'universal thing,' as held by the Platonists, is most effectively met. That doctrine, like the paradox of Antisthenes (see Plato, \textit{Soph.} 251 A, and Arist. \textit{Met.} \( \Delta. \ 29 \); cf. also Mullach, \textit{Fragm. Phil.} vol. ii. 270 and 281, 2) and Stilpo (see Plutarch, \textit{adv. Colotem} 23), practically assumed that all words stand \textit{for} things. Antisthenes consistently denied the possibility of predication, because each thing, marked by its own name, is itself. The thing marked by the word \textit{Kallias} is itself, and the thing marked by the word \textit{man} is itself. You cannot predicate \textit{man} of \textit{Kallias}, for that would be to change \textit{Kallias} into man, and \textit{make him another individual}. The Platonists, on the other hand, affirmed the possibility of predication; but it was only by the \textit{tour de force} of their dogma of \( \text{μίθεος} \) that they were able to do so. \textit{Man} was indeed the name of a thing separate from the thing of which \textit{Kallias} was the name; but somehow the thing called \textit{Kallias} 'participated in' the 'Substance' of the other thing called \textit{man}.

In opposition to Antisthenes and the Platonic \( \text{χωριστωτες} \), it is pointed out in Cat. 5 that, although the term \textit{man} looks like the name of a separate thing, it is really indicative of an aspect or attribute of a thing: see 3 b. 10 \( \text{ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν} \) \( \text{τῶν πρῶτων οὐσίων} \) \( \text{ἀναμφισβήτησον καὶ ἀληθὲς} \) \( \text{εἰσιν} \) \( \text{ὅτι} \) \( \text{τάδε} \) \( \text{τι} \) \( \text{σημαίνει} \ldots \) \( \text{τῶν} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) \( \text{δευτέρων} \) \( \text{οὐσιῶν} \) \( \text{φαίνεται} \) \( \text{μὲν} \) \( \text{ὀμοίως} \) \( \text{τῷ} \) \( \text{σχήματι} \) \( \text{τῆς} \) \( \text{προσηγορίας} \) \( \text{τάδε} \) \( \text{τι} \) \( \text{σημαίνειν}, \) \( \text{ὅταν} \) \( \text{ἐὰν} \) \( \text{ἀνθρώπω} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{ζών} \), \( \text{oū} \) \( \text{μὴν} \) \( \text{ἀληθὲς} \) \( \text{γε}, \) \( \text{ἀλλὰ} \) \( \text{μᾶλλον} \) \( \text{ποιῶ} \) \( \text{τι} \) \( \text{σημαίνει}, \) \( \text{oū} \) \( \gammaὰρ \) \( \text{ἐν} \) \( \text{ἐστὶ} \) \( \text{τῷ} \) \( \text{ὑποκείμενον} \) \( \text{θωσπερ} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{πρῶτη} \) \( \text{οὐσία}, \) \( \text{ἀλλὰ} \) \( \text{kατὰ} \) \( \text{πολλῷ} \) \[as distinguished from the \( \text{ἐν παρά} \) \( \text{πολλά} \) \( \text{of the Platonists} \) \] \( \text{ὁ} \) \( \text{ἀνθρώπω} \) \( \text{λέγεται} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{τὸ} \) \( \text{ζῶν} \). The distinction drawn here is, in grammatical language, that between the proper name and the common term, practically amounting to that between the 'reality of existence' and 'the reality of validity' noted by Lotze, \textit{Logic} p. 441 Eng. Tr.

'Among all the reasons,' says Zeller (\textit{Ph. d. Gr.} ii. 2. 302) 'with which Aristotle opposes the theory of Ideas, there are two which rise into prominence, and to them all the others may be mediate or immediately reduced, (1) That the universal notions ... posited in the Ideas are not substances, but mark only certain properties and relations—at most, genera and species, not things themselves. (2) That the Ideas lack moving force, and that they not only do not explain, but render impossible, the change of
phenomena, creation and destruction, alteration and movement, and the natural properties of things thereon dependent.'

The position taken up by Aristotle against the Platonic χωριαί in objection (1) is that of the critic of the forms of speech, or thought (the two are inextricably connected in Aristotle's mind), who distinguishes τὰ γένη τῶν ἔντων—the various senses in which Kallias is something, is a man, is good, is a father. Unless these distinctions were kept steadily in view (and the 'realism' of the Platonists was the great obstacle to their recognition) it was vain, Aristotle rightly thought, to hope for advance in the sciences. As for objection (2), it comes from the man of science, who is not satisfied unless he has efficient causes. But, as Lotze says (Logic p. 447), 'The fact that they supply no beginning of motion proves little against the doctrine of the Ideas... As concerns Aristotle's criticism let us turn to the sciences of our own day. What shall we say to our Laws of Nature? Do they contain in themselves a beginning of motion? On the contrary, they all presuppose a series of data which they cannot themselves establish, but from which once given, the necessary connexion one with another of the phenomena which ensue is deducible. No natural law ordains that the different bodies in our planetary system should move, or that their course should be directed towards one and not another quarter of the heavens, or that the acceleration which they impose on each other by the force of attraction should have the particular amount which it has and not a different one. But is the whole system of mechanical truths useless and mere empty babble (κενολογείω) because it leaves these first beginnings of motion to be explained from some other source, and starting from the fact of motion as it actually finds it, is satisfied with explaining its different phases in their necessary connexion with each other?... To see in the world of Ideas the patterns to which all that is, if anything is, must conform, was a thought of which the importance is unfairly ignored by Aristotle.'

The doctrine of Ideas, as Plato himself sets it forth in his Dialogues, was, it must be admitted by the reader of Aristotle's criticisms in the Metaphysics1, misunderstood—but probably more by the Platonists than by Aristotle. Be that however as it may, Aristotle's criticisms have done much to give currency to false

1 It is in Cat. 5, as it seems to me, that we have the really valuable results of the Aristotelian opposition to the doctrine of Ideas.
views regarding the doctrine, as held by Plato himself. For the doctrine, as held by Plato himself, we must go to Plato's own writings: and if we sometimes find statements there which seem to imply the χωριστὸν ἔδος, we must remember that Plato could hardly help using language which might be interpreted as implying it. He wished to describe the relation of Laws of Nature to particular things, and the Greek language almost obliged him to speak of these Laws as 'things.'

On the Platonic ' Ideas' generally see Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. (Plato), Grant's Ethics, Essay iii. vol. i. p. 200 sqq., Jowett's Introduction to the Parmenides, Lotze's Logic Book iii. ch. 2—the world of Ideas; for Aristotle's general criticisms see Met. A. 6, Z. 13, 14, 15, M. 4, 5, 9, 10, and Cat. 5, Zeller's Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. 293 sqq. (3rd German ed.), Zeller's Plat. Studien, pp. 232, 3, Grote's Aristotle, appendix i and appendix iii.

Keeping in view the account of the ἑδικὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν given in Rep. 506 sqq. and remembering that Plato himself, as distinguished from weak disciples, did not regard—could not have regarded—' The Good' as a ' Thing' separate from 'particular good things,' we may go on to examine Aristotle's criticism in detail.


§ 2. ἐν οἷς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἰστερον]. Things related to one another as the terms of a series were not brought by the Platonists under one Idea. Where one thing grows out of another thing, the two things cannot be regarded as coordinate impressions of a single type. Aristotle recognises this in Pol. iii. 1. 1275 a. 34 (see Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. p. 295 n. and Jowett, Pol. ad loc.) where he notes the impossibility of finding a common definition for the πολλαί of the various states, which he distinguishes as ὀρθαὶ and παρεκβεβηκοῦσαι, the latter being subsequent to, or degenerations of, the former.

I understand Aristotle in the present § to refer, not to the εἰδητικοὶ ἀρίθμοι of the Platonists, but to the μαθηματικοὶ ἀρίθμοι. The distinction between these two is given in Met. M. 6–8. The
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1096 a. 18. μαθηματικοί ἀριθμοί are the 1, 2, 3 of ordinary numeration; the μονάδες of which these ἀριθμοί are composed are all συμβαται, being homogeneous. The μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμός 3 arises out of 2 by the addition of 1, and is thus subsequent to 2 (ὐστερον), or implies 2. The εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, on the other hand, are ἀσύμβατοι: ἡ δύνας αυτῇ, and ἡ τριάς αυτῇ. (Duality and Trinity as notions), cannot be added together: the μονάδες of which ἡ δύνας αυτῇ is composed are not homogeneous with those of which ἡ τριάς αυτῇ is composed: the τριάς αυτῇ is not the δύνας αυτῆς + 1: it is independent of the δύνας αυτῆς. Thus the εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, with which the Platonists identified the ἰδέα, are distinguished from one another not as the term ἀριθμοί naturally implies—quantitatively, but qualitatively. They are ἀσύμβατοι, which means that they are not quantitatively comparable. Accordingly, when they, equally with the μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί, are described as involving πρῶτον καὶ ύστερον (see Met. m. 6. 1080 b. 12, and Bonitz’s note, p. 542 sqq., on τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ύστερον τὰς ἰδέας—Trendelenburg’s conjecture, μὴ before ἔχοντα, accepted by Zeller, Platon. Stud. p. 243, rejected Ph. d. Gr. ii. 1. p. 433, is wrong), the description is to be taken as one awkwardly transferred from the ἀριθμητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, which are not independent entities, to entities which, though called ἀριθμοί, are yet regarded as independent of one another. The phrase ἀσύμβατοι ἀριθμοί really involves a contradiction. As Bonitz says, Met. p. 540: ‘Plato enim licet ex Aristotelis testimonio dixisse videatur τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι ἀριθμοὺς, tamen hos numeros, qui idearum exprimenter naturam, a mathematicis ea distinxit ratione, quae revera ipsam numerorum naturam penitus tolleret. Hos enim numeros dixit esse ἀσύμβατοι, consociari non posse nec computari alterum cum altero. Sed quum numeris abstractis, utpote magnitudinibus ejusdem speciei, id necessario tribuendum sit, ut incrementa ac decrementa inter se et efficient et patiantur, hoc qui negat, is numeros manifesto non quantitates definitas esse dicit, sed qualitates definitas, quas quum ipsas describere non possit, ad numerorum imaginem confugit.’ The πρῶτον καὶ ύστερον of the εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, in short, is their being qualitatively distinct. Alexander on Met. M. 6. 1080 b. 12 accommodates himself so entirely to this strained use of πρῶτον καὶ ύστερον as to say (Alex. in Met. p. 722 ed. Bonitz) τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντα τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ύστερον ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας τῶν εἰδητικῶν ἀριθμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ύστερον ἔχοντα μηδὲ κατ’ εἶδος διαφέροντα τὸν μαθηματικὸν εἶναι εὔθετο.
We may safely assume, I think, that for Plato himself the $\text{εἴδητικοί} \, \text{ἄρθρῳ}$ were rather symbols of the fixity, separateness, and, as it were, impenetrability of the qualitatively distinct $\text{idēa}$, than the $\text{idēa}$ themselves: but it is evident from Aristotle's criticism in Met. M. 6–8 that Pythagorizing followers confounded the symbols and the things symbolised.

I take it, then, that the reference in the present § is to the $\muαθηματικοί \, \text{ἄρθρῳ}$ and not to the $\epsilonϊδητικοί \, \text{ἄρθρῳ}$: and I understand Aristotle to remind his Platonic opponents that, according to their own view, the $\muαθηματικοί \, \text{ἄρθρῳ}$ do not involve a common $\text{idēa}$, because they are not mutually exclusive $\epsilonϊδη$ independent of one another, (like the various species under the genus animal), but are so related to one another that the prior is included, as condition, in the subsequent. That the $\text{idēa}$ themselves are $\text{ἄρθρῳ}$ is another entirely different opinion of the Platonists, not, as I think, alluded to here. It would not be true to say οὐδὲ τῶν (εϊδητικῶν) ἄρθρων idēav katekéseizontov, for the Platonists certainly posited τὸ ἐν as the supreme idēa or formal principle which produces the other idēa (called εϊδητικοί ἄρθρῳ,) in the matter of the ἐν, τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν: see Met. A. 6. 988 a. 10.

The parallel passage in the E. E. runs as follows, i. 8. 1218 a. 1 ἐν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὑστερον, ούκ ἔστι κωνον τι παρὰ ταύτα, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστὸν. Ἐτη γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρῶτον πρῶτον' πρῶτον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀναιρομένον τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναρείσθαι τὸ πρῶτον. Ὁδόν ει τὸ διπλάσιον πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλασιών, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλασίον τὸ κωνή κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστῶν ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου πρῶτον, εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ἴδεαν, οὐδὲ χωριστὸν ποισειε τῆς τοῦ κοινοῦ. Fritzsche (followed by Grant) makes the ἐν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὑστερον of this passage the εϊδητικοί ἄρθρῳ, and compares Met. B. 3. 999 a. 6 ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὑστερον ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷς τοῦ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναι τὰ παρὰ ταύτα. οἶον εἰ πρώτῃ τῶν ἄρθρων ἢ ἐν, οὐκ ἔσται τις ἄρθρῳ παρὰ τὰ ἐδη τῶν ἄρθρῳν ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ σχῆμα παρὰ τὰ εἶδη τῶν σχημάτων. I agree with Bonitz (Met. pp. 153 and 154) against Zeller (Ph. d. Gr. ii. 1. p. 434), and Schwegler (on Met. A. 11. 1019 a. 3) that the μαθηματικοί ἄρθρῳ are intended in Met. B. 3. 999 a. 6. If so, the presumption is strong that they are intended in E. E. i. 8. 1218 a. 1, and if in the latter passage, then in E. N. i. 6. 2. It ought to be mentioned that Zeller's opinion in the Platonische Studien (p 239 sqq.) was that the reference in E. N. i. 6. 2 is to the μαθηματικοί, not to the
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1096 a. 18. εἰδουκαί ἄρθρως: but that in his Ph. d. Gr. (ii. 1. p. 433 second edition) he reverses this opinion.

a. 19. τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται κ.τ.λ.] The category of substance—τὸ τί ἐστιν', τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, ἡ οὕσια, is naturally prior to the other categories: i.e. the various relations and qualities recognised under the other categories presuppose Things to be related and qualified. 'Being white,' and 'being small,' are kinds of 'being' (γένη τῶν ὄντων), dependent on 'being a thing.' 'Being a thing' is the strict and primary sense of 'being.' If, then, the subsequent or dependent kinds of 'being,' on the one hand, and 'being' in the primary and fundamental sense, on the other hand, are equally described as 'good,' it is plain that the term 'good' cannot represent a generic notion. Substance and its accidents or offshoots are not independent εἶδος, to be brought under 'good' as their γένος.

Two points are to be noted in this argument, (1) It seems to assume that the Aristotelian doctrine of the Categories had come to be so far accepted by the Platonists that the inconsistency of their theory of Ideas with it was worth pointing out to them. (2) In laying stress upon the dependence of the other categories on the first category it certainly makes a point against οἱ μὴ κατακεκατομμυρισμένοι τῶν ἄρθρων ἔδωκα, but at the expense of somewhat staggering the reader when he comes to § 3, where the independence or separateness of the categories is assumed, and it is contended that, since θέος as substance, and ἄρτη as quality, fall under different κατηγορίαι τῶν ὄντων, or differ τῷ ἔναι (see Mêl. Δ. 7. 1017 α. 23 διαγωγεῖ γὰρ λέγεται [εἰς κατὰ τὰ σχῆματα τῆς κατηγορίας] τοσανταχώς τὸ ἔναι σημαίνει: and cf. note on E. N. v. 1. 20), they cannot both be called 'good' ὑπὸ having one common nature. In § 2, line 22, τῶν ὄντων is the 'being;' or τῷ ἔναι, of the first Category, and the other Categories are presented as related to it as accidents, συμβεβηκότα; whereas in § 3, line 24, τῷ ὄντει is used generally for the 'being;' or τῷ ἔναι, which is found in ten distinct kinds corresponding to the ten Categories.

1 ἐστιν is omitted by K b M b O b and CCC in l. 20, and apparently by all MSS. in l. 24. See Bonitz's note on Met. E. 2. 1026 a. 36. In enumerating the Categories it would appear that Aristotle sometimes writes τῷ τί for τὸ τί ἐστιν. Spengel (Arist. Stud. p. 203) argues that the writer of M. M. must have found no ἐστιν here in line 20, for he has l. 1. 1183 a. 10 καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιητ. In E. E. i. 8. 1217 b. 27, however, we have τὶ ἐστιν. Rassow (Forsch. p. 53) would omit ἐστιν both in line 20 and in line 24.
§ 3. ἡ δ’ ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.] The argument in § 2 was that ‘good,’ 1096 a. 23.
when applied to a substance, and to a relation respectively, is not
applied to two things belonging to mutually exclusive classes,
capable of being brought under a higher class notion: the
argument in § 3 is that substances and relations belong to mutually
exclusive classes—these classes, however, are not ἐδή, but ultimate
γένη incapable of being brought under one common γένος or ἴδεα.
The categories are τὰ γένη τῶν ὄντων, and τὸ εἶναι ὄντα συνήκει οὖν
γὰρ γένος τὸ ἐν Ἀν. Ποι. ii. 7. 92 b. 13. Cf. de An. i. 5. 410 a. 16
οὐ δοκεῖ κοινὰ πάντων [sc. τῶν γενῶν τῶν κατηγοριῶν] εἶναι στοιχεία.

τάξιαν ἵσαχὼς λέγεται τῷ ὑπντὶ] ‘The use of the term good
is coextensive with that of the word is.’ The categories, as ἀἱ κατη-
γορίαι τοῦ ὄντος, are the various senses in which the word is used:
see Met. Δ. 7. 1017 a. 22 καθ’ αὐτὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται ὅσα περὶ σημαίνει τὰ
σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας’ ὅσαχως γὰρ λέγεται, τοσαυτάχως τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει,
ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν τι ἐστὶ σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ
ποιόν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι, τὰ δὲ ποιόν ἡ πάσχειν, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ πότε,
ἐκάστω τοιτὸν τὸ εἶναι ταὐτό σημαίνει. Οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἄνθρωπος
ὑμάνιν ἑστὶν ἢ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑμάνιν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζειν ἑστὶν ἢ
τέμνων τοῦ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζειν ἡ τέμνει.

ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἁρται] see notes on ii. 5.


a. 31 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἑπιστήμη περὶ ἐν γένος ἢ μία. ‘This argument,’ says
Grant, ‘is certainly unsatisfactory if applied to Plato’s point of
view. Plato would say dialectic is the science of the Idea of good,
and in this all other sciences have their meeting-point. Even of
the πρακτῶν ἄγαθον it might be said that according to Aristotle’s own
account it falls (in all its manifestations, whether as means or ends)
under the one supreme science—Politics.’

§ 5] Susemihl brackets this § and § 6 as ‘inserta ab editore a. 34.
antiquissimo.’ I do not think that bracketing is safe or helpful in
a chapter like the present.

ἀπορήσεις δ’ ἐν τις τό ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτόκαστον] Grant
compares Met. A. 9. 990 a. 34 οἱ δὲ τὰς ἴδεας αὐτίας τυφέμνον πρώτον
μὲν ξηνιότες τοιαύτα τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς αὐτίας ἐπερ τοιαύτα ἴσα τῶν
ἄρηντον ἐκόμισαν, ἀστερεὶ εἰ τις ἀρμῆσαι βουλήμενος ἐλαττών μὲν ὄντων
οὐκ ἡ δυνήσεσθαι, πλεῖον δὲ ποίοσας ἄρθροις. The ἴδεα are merely
the doubles of the particulars, and do not help us to explain them.
This criticism is valid against those Platonists who regarded the ἴδεα, or laws which explain particular things, as themselves also things; but does not affect Plato who, in the Parmenides 132 A–E, anticipates it in its most telling form—in the form of the τρίτος ἀνθρωπος refutation. (For this refutation see Bonitz. Mel. pp. 111, 112 on A. 9. 990 b. 17.)

οὗτός λόγος] The same definition, expressing the same essence or nature.

οὐδὲν διοίκουσιν] sc. αὐτο ἀνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος.

οὗτ' ἡ ἄγαθὼν] sc. διοίκητι ἄγαθὼν τι καὶ αὐτοαγαθὸν.

The connexion between this and the preceding section is well brought out in the parallel passage E. E. i. 8. 1218 a. το ἐστὶ τοῖνυν, φασιν, αὐτό τι ἄγαθών τὸ οὗν αὐτὸ πρῶτον τῶν λόγων τῶν κοινῶν τούτο δὲ τί ἀν ἐπὶ πλὴν ὅτι ἄδιδον καὶ χωριστῶν. 'This prefix αὐτό-,' the Platonists are supposed to answer, 'is not mere surplusage: αὐτό = ἄδιδον.' Aristotle replies—'mere duration does not enhance essence. The nature of whiteness is as perfect in a snowflake, which falls into the river, as in a block of Parian marble.' I cannot agree with Grant (Ethics, Essay iii. p. 210), who sees in Aristotle's argument merely a 'confusion between length of duration (πολυχρόνων) and eternity (ἄδιδον)'. According to Aristotle's doctrine the οὐσία, or τί ἐν εἴναι, immanent in particulars is ἄδιδον, in the sense of being independent of the accidents of γένεσις and φθορά, which take place in time—ἐν χρόνῳ. It is the Platonists who confuse πολυχρόνων and ἄδιδον, by making their ἴδεα things separate from the particulars—χωριστὰ ἐνδη, thus placing them in space and time—in space as τρίτοι ἀνθρωποι somewhere, in time as πολυχρόνα. I therefore understand the 'confusion between ἄδιδον and πολυχρόνων' to be due to the Platonists, not to Aristotle. Aristotle says to them—'You make the ἴδεα, or notion, which is ἄδιδον, or independent of the accident of time, a thing among things in space and time. Your ἄδιδον is, after all, only πολυχρόνων. You have not grasped the distinction between a law which is eternally valid, and a thing which comes into existence and perishes.'

The statement ἐπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνον τοῦ ἐφημέρου I take to mean that the accident of time does not affect the τί ἐν

1 Grant here follows Eustratius.
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eïnai of λευκότης. Cf. Themistius peri ψυχής, fol. 69 a (vol. ii. pp. 1096 b. 3. 38, 39, ed. Spengel), where λευκότης, as such, is said to be independent of μέγεθος or space, and in this respect is compared with νοῦς—ὁ γὰρ οὐδὲν συντελεῖ τὸ μέγεθος εἰς τὴν φύσιν, τούτῳ ἀμέγεθε καθ’ αὑτό, εἰ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός διαμοίρητο’ οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ πηχυαίον λευκὸν μᾶλλον τοῦ ποδαίου . . . διὸ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ταῖς ποιότησιν οὐ συντελεῖ, ἀλλὰ ἀδιαίρετος ἡ λευκότης ὡς λευκότης καὶ ἐν τῷ μεγεθεί. ὥσαυτος δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως εἰς τοῦ κύκλου καὶ τοῦ μεγεθοῦς τό τε μεῖζον, ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ σμικρότερον μόριον νοήσει, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ νοὸ τὸ μέγεθος, εἰτέρ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια. οὕτω γὰρ τινα καὶ ἄχρωνος γίνεσθαι λέγομεν, οὔτε οὐδὲν ὁ χρόνος πρὸς τὴν τελειωσιν συνεισφέρει, ἀλλ’ εἰθὲ τέλεια καὶ ὅλοκληρα γίνεται ἐν ὁτροφῶν μορίᾳ τοῦ χρόνου.

I conclude this note with an extract from Michelet ad loc., to whom, it will be seen, I am much indebted—'Hoc loco pugnat Aristoteles adversus eos, qui ideas separat a singulis. It, qui ideas vel formas rerum ut ipsarum substantias ipsis rebus insitas esse putant, jam, etsi pereant singulae res, aetermitatem formarum adseverant, sive in hac extent sive in illa re caduca: est enim aeternum immutabile aliud, in quolibet temporis momento totum existens; singulae igitur res ipsae aeternae, quaevis caducae. Qui vero ideas separat a rebus singulis, illis aeternitas nihil aliud est atque infinitum temporis spatium, quod, cum percurri reque existere nunquam possit, idem est ac diuturnitas. Itaque non ex vera Philosophi sententia, sed ex falsa istorum opinione αἴδων et πολυχρόνων idem est.'

§ 7. This brief and obscure jotting, which is not reproduced b. 5. either in the E. E. or in the M. M., may be taken as a sort of argumentum ad homines addressed to the Platonists—'Your doctrine of the αὐτόσωμαί is not held even by Speusippus, the head of your own school: he agrees with the more plausible view of the Pythagoreans.' The ἄρχαὶ αἱ κατὰ συστοιχίαν λεγόμεναι τοῦ Pythagoreans, or rather of a section of the Pythagoreans, are given in Met. A. 5. 986 a. 23 as—πέρας ἀπειροῦ, περιττῶν ἄρτων, ἐν πλῆθος, δεξίων ἀριστερῶν, ἄρρεν ὠψι, ἡμεῖς κατοικοῦμεν, εἴθυ καμπύλον, φῶς σκότος, ἀγαθὸν κακίν, τετράγωνον ἑτερώμεθα. Here τὸ ἐν appears in the column of good things—i.e. in the στοιχος in which τὸ ἀγαθὸν occurs. Taking this circumstance in connexion with the fact mentioned in Met. A. 6. 987 b. 27 that, while Plato regarded τὸ ἐν καὶ τοὺς ἀρμόδιοις as παρὰ τὰ αἰσθήματα, the Pythagoreans regarded them as immanent in

1096 b. 5. particulars—οἱ δ' ἀρκετοὶ εἶναι φῶςν αὕτα τὰ πράγματα, we may perhaps venture to explain the section before us as praising the Pythagoreans at the expense of the Platonists, because they—the Pythagoreans—'make the One good, instead of making the Good one': i.e. they do not make the Good an abstract unity separate from things; they find it immanent in things in various forms which they enumerate; unity is only one of the forms of its immanence—being a united whole is one of the ways in which a thing is good. The Pythagoreans, in fact, are praised for drawing up a list of good things. Ὑδὲ, ὅταν, &c., may each be called good. There is no good separate from the things enumerated in the column; see Plut. Is. et Osir. (quoted by Zell) ch. 48 (ed. Parthey)—οἱ μὲν Πυθαγορικοὶ διὰ πλεύσων ὁμόματος καθηγοροῦσι τοῦ μὲν ἰγαθοῦ τὸ ἐν τῷ πεπερασμένῳ τῷ μένῳ τὸ εἴθε τὸ περασαῖον τὸ τετράγωνον τὸ ἵσον τὸ δεξίον τὸ λαμπρόν, τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ τὴν δύναμα τὸ ἀπερῶν τὸ φερόμενον τὸ καμπύλου τὸ ἀρτον τὸ ἐπερῆμηκε τὸ ἄνυσον τὸ ἀριστερῶν τὸ σκοτεινόν.

As regards the precise nature of the agreement of Speusippus with the Pythagoreans we are left pretty much to conjecture. It is not unlikely, however, that Aristotle is contrasting with the one ἀρχή of the Platonists the πολλαὶ ἀρχαί of Speusippus: see Mel. Z. 2. 1028 b. 21 Σπεύσισσος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὕσιας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀρχάμενοι, καὶ ἀρχάς ἐκάστης οὕσιας ἀλλήν μὲν ἀρκίμα, ἀλλήν δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχήν καὶ τοῦτον δή τοῦ τρόπου ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας. These ἀρχαί or οὕσια derived from τὸ ἐν, Speusippus held to be better than τὸ ἐν, because (as may be seen from a comparison of the seed with the adult form) τὸ καλλίστον καὶ ἄριστον is not in the Beginning but in the End. Τὸ ἐν, then, although the first beginning of things (cf. ἀρχάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς), is not, for this reason, in an exceptional position as regards goodness. Qua good, it is only one among many good ἀρχαί, and indeed the least good among them, as being the most remote. It is to this doctrine, then, that Aristotle probably refers when he says here that Speusippus is one of όἱ τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἰγαθῶν ὑστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἐν: see Mel. A. 7. 1072 b. 30 ὅποι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνασθαι, ὄσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσισσος, τὸ καλλίστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τοῦ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ἔφων τὰς ἀρχὰς αὕτε μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ἀρκεῖς ὑστοῖ. The reason which Aristotle gives for this judgment is τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελεῖον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τελεῖον. The First Cause is the Best—God, who is ζέον ἀδίον ἄριστον (Mel. A. 7. 1072 b. 29). It is plain then that, in
the section before us (E. N. i. 6. 7), Aristotle must not be under-stood to approve the doctrine of Speusippus when he describes it as πιθανῶτέρον than that of the Platonists criticised. He merely uses the name of Speusippus as a controversial weapon against the Platonists. On the doctrine of Speusippus see Grant, Eth. ad loc. and Essay iii. pp. 217–218.


§ 8. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος] I agree with Grant that 'we need not confine the reference of περὶ τούτων to the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, or refer it, with some commentators, to the books mentioned in the list of Diogenes (v. 25) περὶ τῶν Πυθαγόρειων α' περὶ Σπευσίππου καὶ Ζευκράτους α'. The reference is rather to 'the whole subject of the good in its relation to unity—to existence—to the world '; i.e. to 'the scope of Aristotle's entire Metaphysics.'

diὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρήθαι] τοὺς b. 9. λόγους is the theory of the Platonists. Coreses gives the sense of the clause well—ἀντεπεῖν τις ἄν ἔχωι μοι τοῦτο, ὅτι Πλάτων ὦ περὶ παντὸς ἁγαθοῦ ἄλλα περὶ τοῦ κυρίως καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἁγαθοῦ πεποίηται τῶν λόγων. The Platonic theory does not bring all good things (things relatively good included) under one Idea, but only things absolutely good. The omission of μὴ in CCC and Ob seems to be a mere blunder.

καθ' ἐν εἰδοῖ] 'Assigned to one species.' εἰδοὶ is here, as Grant b. 10. remarks, the Aristotelian species, not the Platonic idea.

§ 10. ἡ δέα ... ἡ οὖθ' ἄλλα] These are alternative questions. b. 16. The latter is disposed of first by δοτε μάταιων ἔσται τὸ εἰδὸς, and the former is dealt with in § 11. If the ἰδέα τάγαθον is the only thing absolutely good, the class (εἰδοὶ) of things absolutely good, which the Platonists ask us to distinguish, will be void of contents, for the ἰδέα is not in the class; as Michelet says—'Distinixerat Noster in genere duas bonorum species (εἰδη): bona per se et propter alium. Iam si omnia vere bona, tanquam non existentia per se, ab idea excluderimus, et alteram speciem tantum ideam esse voluerimus, haec bonorum species erit vana, omnique carebit argumento; nec essent due species, generi coordinatae (id, quod tamen supposui-mus), sed idea vana et multitudo existentium bonorum.'
§ 11. **If, on the other hand,** the things enumerated also (καὶ, *i.e.* as well as the Idea) are absolutely good, and, as such, are λεγόμενα καὶ μίαν ἰδέαν, how are we to account for the fact that they do not all exhibit a common nature or essence of goodness capable of identical definition like the whiteness of white things?

b. 25. **οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἄγαθὸν κοινὸν τὶ λατά μίαν ἰδέαν**] ‘The application, then, of the term “good” (cf. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; in the next sentence) to things does not imply that they all participate in a common “idea.”’

§ 12. **όμοιόμενοι**] ομόνυμα are things which have the same name without having the same nature (*e.g.* κλεῖσ, a key, and the collar-bone), as distinguished from συνώνυμα, things which have the same name and the same nature (*e.g.* ox and horse, which both not only are called animals, but are animals): see *Cat.* i. 1 a. 1. When such very different things as *e.g.* a knife, a dinner, a field, and a horse are all called ‘good,’ they surely cannot get this common name by accident (οὐ γὰρ οἷς τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τῶχος ὁμοιόμοιος). There must be some reason why they are called ‘good.’ That reason, we have seen, does not lie in their participation in one Idea, or universal substance; nor does it lie in their having a common inherited nature, like the members of a biological class, which are συνώνυμα. What, then, is the reason of their being called ‘good?’

ἄλλ’ ἄρα γε ... ἀναλογίαν] τὰ ἄφ’ ἐνὸς λεγόμενα and τὰ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα (the two phrases are practically equivalent) are technically distinguished by Aristotle from τὰ ὁμοιόμοιοι λεγόμενα on the one hand, and τὰ συνώνυμα or καὶ ἐν λεγόμενα on the other hand. Τὰ ὁμοιόμοιοι λεγόμενα have their common name ἀπὸ τῶχος: τὰ συνώνυμα or καὶ ἐν λεγόμενα have it because they belong to the same εἴδος or γένος, whereas τὰ ἄφ’ ἐνὸς, or πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα, are things which do not necessarily belong to the same εἴδος or γένος, but agree in contributing to one end, in relation to which they are regarded as belonging to one department—as, *e.g.* a knife and a lecture may both be called ‘surgical.’ They are both called ‘surgical,’ not as an ox and a horse are both called ‘animals,’ nor yet as a key and the collar-bone are both called κλεῖσ. See *Met.* K. 3. 1060 b. 37 τὸ τε ἱατρικὸν καὶ γένειον ... πολλαχῶς λέγομεν ... ἱατρικὸς γὰρ λόγος καὶ μαχαλίριον λέγεται τὸ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἱατρικῆς ἑπιστήμης εἶναι, τὸ δὲ
BOOK I: CHAP. 6: § 12.

f. Cf. Met. Z. 4. 1030 b. 2 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἵπτρικόν σῶμα καὶ 1096 b. 27. ἔργον καὶ σκεῦος λέγεται οὔτε ὁμοιώμως οὔτε καθ’ ἐν ἅλλα πρὸς ἐν—on which Alex. (in Met. p. 441, l. 13, ed. Bonitz) has οὖτε καθ’ ἐν καὶ συνοινώμως, ἅλλα πρὸς ἐν, ἤγους ὡς τὰ αὖ ἐνὸς τε καὶ πρὸς ἐν. Cf. also Met. Γ. 2. 1003 a. 33 τὸ δὲ ἐν λέγεται μέν πολλαχῶς, ἅλλα πρὸς ἐν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὁμοιώμως ἅλλ’ ὅσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγείαν ἄπαν πρὸς ὑγείαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ τῷ σημεῖῳ εἶναι τῆς ὑγείας, τὸ δ’ ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς. Καὶ τὸ ἵπτρικόν πρὸς ἵπτρικήν τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἐχειν τὴν ἵπτρικήν λέγεται ἵπτρικόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ εὐφρεῖν εἶναι πρὸς αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ εἶναι τῆς ἵπτρικῆς. Ὁμοιοτρόπος δὲ καὶ ἀλλὰ ληψόμεθα λεγόμενα τούτωσιν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μέν, ἅλλ’ ἄπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐσίαν, ὄρθα λέγεται, τὰ δ’ οὐ πάθη οὐσίαι, τὰ δ’ οὐ πάθη ἐλήμενοι, ἥ θεορεῖ καὶ στερεύεσθαι ή ποιήσθαι, ή ποιητικὴ ἡ γεννητικὴ οὐσία, ή τῶν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγόμενον, ή τούτων τινὸς ἀπόφασες ή οὐσίας; διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ δὲν εἶναι μὴ δὲν φαρμένων. Καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ὑγείων ἀπάντων μία ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ὡσαυτὸ οὐκ ἄπειρον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸν καθ’ ἐν λεγόμενον ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ θεωρηθαι μᾶς, ἅλλα καὶ τῶν πρὸς μίαν λεγόμενον φύσιν καὶ γὰρ ταύτα κόσμον τῶν λέγεται καθ’ ἐν. Δῆλον οὖν οὐτὶ καὶ τὰ ὅρια μίας θεωρηθαι ὑπὸ ὡς on which Alex. (p. 199, l. 20) has—καθ’ ἐν μὲν λεγόμενα λέγεται τὰ συνώμωμα καὶ ὤψ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τεταγμένα γένος. οὐ μόνον δὲ, ἡφαῖ, τῶν οὐσίων ἑχόντων πρὸς ἅλληλα μία ἐπιστήμη, ἅλλα καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ πρὸς ἐν . . . ἐν πάσι πως αὐτοῖς ὀρᾶται ἡ φύσις αὐτή ἀρχής καὶ τό ποιητικὸ καὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑγείᾳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιητικῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑγείᾳ ἐστὶν ἡ θεωρομένη. There is μία ἐπιστήμης of all όστα ἡ όστα, just as there is μία ἐπιστήμη τῶν ὑγείων ἀπάντων: for not only τὰ καθ’ ἐν λέγομενα (τὰ συνώμωμα), but τὰ πρὸς μίαν λεγόμενα φύσιν fall under ‘one science.’ The term τὸ ἐν is used in many senses, but in all πρὸς ἐν, just as ὑγείαν is always used πρὸς ὑγείαν, whether it be used to qualify something which produces, preserves, declares, or is receptive of health; thus food, exercise, and a good complexion are all called ὑγεία. Similarly τὸ ἐν is always used in reference to (πρὸς) one object, viz. οὐσία, sometimes marking οὐσία itself, sometimes its πάθη, sometimes όδος εἰς οὐσίαν, sometimes φόρα οὐσίας. Cf. also M. M. ii. 11. 1209 a. 23 ὁ δὲ φαρμὲν ἵπτρικόν τὸ μαχαίριον, ἵπτρικόν τὸν ἄθροιν, καὶ ἵπτρικόν τῆν ἐπιστήμην’ ταύτῃ ὥσιν χρήσιμον λέγωνται, ἅλλα τὸ μὲν μαχαίριν τῷ χρῆσιμον εἶναι πρὸς ἵπτρικόν ἵπτρικον λέγονται, τὸ δ’ ἀνθρώποι τῷ ποιητικῷ εἶναι ὑγείας, τὰ δ’ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ αἰτία εἶναι καὶ ἀρχής: E. E. Η. 2. 1236 a. 16 ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φύλας εἰδή εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ’ ἐν ἀπάσαι μήθ’ ὡς εἴδη ἐνὸς γένους μήτε πάσης λέγονται μιᾷ φύσιν. Prὸς μίαν γὰρ τινὰ λέγονται
We can now see that the distinction made above in § 8 between τὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ δυνάμενα, as καθ’ ἐν εἰδῶς λεγόμενα, and τὰ ποιμητικὰ τοῦτων καὶ φυλακτικὰ ἡ τῶν ἑναντίων καλυτικὰ, as διὰ ταῦτα λεγόμενα is really that between the συνώνυμα, or τὰ καθ’ ἐν λεγόμενα, and the τὰ πρὸς ἐν καὶ ἀφ’ ἐνὸς of § 12, and the other passages quoted. The Platonists assert that there are ἄγαθα so called συνώνυμος, i. e. ἄγαθα which are members of a true εἰδος (or γένος), their membership being explained as their μέθεξις in one ἰδέα; Aristotle’s refutation consists in showing that no ἄγαθα are συνώνυμα, but are πρὸς ἄλλων λεγόμενα.

b. 28. ἡ μᾶλλον κατ’ ἀναλογίαν;] This is Aristotle’s final answer: Different things are called ἄγαθα on the ground of identical relations (ἀναλογία is defined in Ε. Ν. v. 3. 8, as ἰδιότης λόγων). Thus the relation in which sight stands to the body is the same as that in which reason stands to the soul. If sight is ‘good’ in its relation—i. e. contributes to its particular end, the welfare of the body, reason is ‘good’ in its like relation to the welfare of the soul: see Alexander in Μετ. p. 550, l. 17 (ed. Bonitz) τὰ ἀναλογικὰ λεγόμενα . . . ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ, οἷον ὡς δῆς ἐν διὰδομῷ νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ, and p. 329, l. 13 τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ἐν ὁρίστατο ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο. Different things are called ‘good,’ not because they all contribute well to one end, but because they all contribute well to their respective ends. Τὰ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν λεγόμενα may be represented by parallel, τὰ πρὸς ἐν by converging, lines.

b. 31. § 13. ἅλλης δὲν εἰὴ φιλοσοφίας] πρώτη φιλοσοφία, as distinguished from the present enquiry which is πολιτικὴ τις. Ἡπέρ γιὰ περὶ, however, makes me suspect the whole clause from ἐξακριβῶν to τῆς ἰδέας as an interpolation. On this late use of ὑπέρ see notes on i. 5. 7, iii. 3. 2, and iv. 2. 4.

b. 32. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστω ἐν τὶ τὸ κοινῆ κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (Forsch. pp. 53, 54) defends καὶ, the reading of Κ, Μ, and Camb. against τὸ.

b. 35. §§ 14, 15, 16.] The χωριστὸν ἄγαθὸν is not only an unrealisable good, but it is also useless as an ἰδεῖ—παράδειγμα. Grant has a good note on these sections: ‘It has been objected that Aristotle
fixes on too mean specimens of the arts, and that he might have spoken differently if he had adduced the fine arts. But the question is whether, for practical life, the Idea, that is, a knowledge of the absolute, could be made available? This forms a great point of divergence between Plato and Aristotle. The latter seems to regard the Idea as an object of the speculative reason alone, something metaphysical and standing apart; and between the speculative and practical powers of man he sets a gulf. Plato, on the other hand, speaking without this analytical clearness, seems to think of the Idea as an object for the imagination, as well as the reason, as being an ideal as well as an idea. In this its many-sided character he would make it affect life as well as knowledge; for by contemplation of it the mind would become conformed to it.

§ 16. ὑφάντης ἡ τέκτων . . . εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἁγαθὸν] This is not a fair criticism of Plato. He does not represent the knowledge of the ἰδέα τάγαθον as attainable by artisans, but only by those exceptional natures who, having gone successfully through a long course of scientific training, are found capable of διαλεκτική, and, as philosopher-kings, are to be entrusted with the management of the State. See Rep. vii. In the E. E. i. 8. 1218 b. 7–24 the uselessness of the knowledge of the ἰδέα τάγαθον is demonstrated from the fact that this ἰδέα is not an αἰτίων ὡς κυήσαν; it does not produce motion, either as the efficient cause at the disposal of an artificer produces it, or as the τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν, which calls forth the energies of the πολιτικός, produces it. Aristotle and Eudemus, when they criticise Plato, seem to forget their own great philosophical principle—that the τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν is not ultimate, but sought for the sake of the θεωρητικὸς βίος, in the σκοπός of which—θεών θεωρέων καὶ θεραπεύων, τὸ ἐφ᾽ ὅσου εὐδόκηται άθανάτεοι—the ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων is to be ultimately found. Aristotle with his ὁ τῶν σκοπῶν ἔχων ὅρθων, and Plato with his ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος, are at one in making amor intellectualis Dei the ultimate spring and coordinating principle of all man's varied activities, scientific, moral, and artistic.

τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἁγαθὸν] (the reading of Kb restored to the text by a. 9. Bywater for the αὐτὸ τάγαθον of Lb and Ῥ preferred by Bekker) is equivalent to τοῦτο τὸ αὐτομαχαλί. Instances of the separation of the prefix αὐτο- from its word, are given in the Index Arist., e. g. Met. M. 8. 1084 a. 21 αὐτὸ ἐκατός ἄνθρωπος.
But to return now from the Good of the Platonists, which, to say the least, is unattainable, to the attainable good, the object of the present enquiry—we see that this attainable good is something which differs in different actions and arts. But can we find no general term to characterise it in every case? Surely in every case the good is that for the sake of which is done what is done—health in medical practice, victory in warfare, the house in building—in short the End, whatever its special nature, in every case. So, if we have always ultimately one end in all our actions, this one end will be the good attained by man in action; if more than one end, then these will be the forms in which good is attained in action. Thus we are led again to our old conclusion, which it is now time to explain more fully.

There are many so-called ends which are not really ends, but only means to something else. Money, e.g., and tools are ends which are not really ends. But the Chief Good must be really an end. Now that which is sought for its own sake is more really an end than that which is sought for the sake of something else; and that which is never sought for the sake of something else is more really an end than that which is sought both for its own sake and for the sake of something else; while that which is always sought for its own sake and never for the sake of something else is most really an end, i.e. is an end without qualification. Now Happiness is such an end without qualification. Honour, pleasure, understanding, and the virtues, we seek both for their own sakes and for the sake of the Happiness which we suppose they will bring. But Happiness no man seeks as a means to these, or to anything.

That Happiness is the Chief Good may be inferred also from the fact that Happiness is self-sufficient. The Chief Good is self-sufficient: its possessor lacks nothing; and with Happiness a man lacks nothing—when we say 'a man' we mean not 'the solitary individual,' for he is an abstraction, but the real man—the citizen, whose concrete personality is constituted by the manifold relations in which he stands to kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens, within a definite circle. Such a man, then, with Happiness, lacks nothing: he has that which is the best of all good things—not best, however, in the sense of being one of them, for if it were one of them, it could be made better by the addition of the least one of them.

But 'Happiness is the Chief Good' is, after all, a truism which throws little light on the real nature of Happiness or the Chief Good. Perhaps we may reach something more definite by determining 'the function of man.'

Every artist has his peculiar work or function. Surely man, as man, has his peculiar function also. What is it then? Let us review the vital functions in order. It cannot be taking in nourishment, and growing, for plants and animals, as well as man, live this kind of life, and we are looking for his peculiar function. Nor can it be perceiving with the senses, and feeling, for
this kind of life he shares with all animals. We are left then with the conclusion that man's peculiar function is the rational life—that is, rational conduct. The good man will perform this function well, i.e. so as to realise the end of his being in the manifestation of his own peculiar excellence. The end or Chief Good of man may then be defined as 'vital function manifesting the excellence which is highest and most perfect in human nature.' But it is only 'in a perfect life' that this end can be realised; 'for one swallow does not make spring.'

Let this serve as a 'rough sketch' of the Chief Good. If the outline is right, it will be easy to fill in the details afterwards. But our former warning must not be forgotten—the same exactness must not be looked for in all enquiries; for exactness varies with subject-matter, and with the nature of the particular enquiry or art. Nor must we always demand syllogistic antecedents. First principles have no such antecedents, but are data of sense perception, induction, or habit. We must try then to look for our principles in the place natural to each kind, and be careful to define them well when we have got them: for good definitions, to begin with, have great influence on what follows: 'the beginning is more than half the whole.'

§ 1. ἐπανελθομένος ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν] See i. 5. 8, where the 1097 a. 15. expression τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν occurs, immediately before the digression of chapter vi.

φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ] This result has been a. 16. reached in ch. vi. § 12—καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. The γὰρ introduces a clause which gives direction, as it were, to the question τί ποιήσῃ ἐν εἴδου τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν; What is good, we have just seen, differs in different arts and pursuits, but is always the end of the art or pursuit in question; τέλος is the most general description which can be given of ἀγαθόν. Hence the ἀγαθόν, i.e. τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν must be τελειώτατον—the end par excellence. Accordingly, if all πράκτων have ultimately one τέλος, or certain assignable τέλη, this, or these, will be τὸ πράκτων ἀγαθόν.

§ 2. μεταβαίνων δὴ κ.τ.λ.] Michelet has 'haec aberratio ipsa a. 24. Philosophum jam ad ea quae sibi proposuerat reduxit'; Stahr translates 'So ist denn auf ihrem Umwege unsere Untersuchung doch zu demselben Resultate gelangt'; Williams, 'Our argument has now returned to the question from which it originally digressed'; and Peters, 'Our argument has thus come round by a different path to the same point as before.' I do not think that μεταβαίνων here implies digression, but rather advance step by step, through the particular cases of ἱστορική, στρατηγική, εἰκοδομική, &c., to the generalisation ἐν ἀπάσῃ πράξει τὸ τέλος: cf. Met. Z. 4. 1029 b. 1-12, where
BOOK I: CHAP. 7: §§ 2-4.

1097 a. 24. τὸ μεταβαίνειν expresses the inductive process by which τὰ φύσει γνώριμα are reached through τὰ αὐτῷ γνώριμα: πρὸ έργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμότερον. ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὐτῶ γίνεται πάσι διὰ τῶν ζητον γνωρίμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦτο έργον ἐστὶν, ὡσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεις τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὀλὼς ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθῇ, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα. τὰ δ' ἐκάστους γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἥρεμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἡ οὐθέν ἔξει τοῦ άτομον. ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐκ τῶν φύσεως τῶν γνωστῶν, αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν, τὰ ὀλοκλήρως γνωστὰ πειρατέον, μεταβαίνοντας, ὡσπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τοῦτον αὐτὸν. Εὐστράτιος εὔπραξαν μεταβαίνων εἰς ταῦτάν] i. e. to the same result as that reached in i. 2. 1.

a. 27. § 3. αὐλόως] Zell ejects αὐλόως as due to the following ἀλώς. Ἄργον, φίλους, and δούλους have been conjectured by Coraes, Bonitz, and Bywater (Journ. of Philol. vol. xvii. p. 68) respectively. I confess that I do not see any objection to retaining αὐλόως.

a. 28. τελεια] 'Ends in themselves.'

a. 30. § 4.] 'The conception of ends was not fully developed in Plato; at the beginning of the second book of the Republic, those are said to be the highest goods which are desired both for themselves and for their results.' Grant. It is misleading, I think, thus to compare directly what Plato says about δικασχύνη, at the beginning of Rep. ii, with what Aristotle says here about τὸ ἀριστόν. Plato merely says of δικασχύνη what Aristotle himself says of ἀριστή in § 5,—that from one point of view it is an end, from another point of view a means; and Aristotle would certainly not dispute the statement that its being a means, as well as an end, makes it more valuable than it would be if it were merely an end. On the other hand Plato would agree with Aristotle in regarding the eιδαιμονία, or noble life, of the indivisible organism of the πόλις, as an end which is never a means. It must be carefully noted that when Plato says, in the passage referred to by Grant, that δικασχύνη, as both end and means, is better than things which are merely ends, the ends which he has in his mind are τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ ἡδωνας διὰ φυλαξεῖς. He is not thinking of τὸ ἀριστόν—the noble life, which the δακτικός alone grasps in its unity. Perhaps we may say that
§ 5. **νοῦν**] Not 'Reason' in the highest sense, but 'intelligence' or 'prudence' as in vi. 11. 6 καὶ ἢδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην. Those who systematically make τιμή or ἡδονή their end, i.e. choose it δι' αὐτῷ, are those who identify it with ἑιδαιμονία, as they are described in ch. v. The truly good man chooses τιμή, ἡδονή, νοῦς, and ἀρετή, for the sake of ἑιδαιμονία: i.e. in all his special pursuits he is regulated by the ideal of the noble life.

§ 6. **συμβαίνειν**] 'The same conclusion (viz. that ἑιδαιμονία is the *summum bonum*) follows also from the consideration of its self-sufficiency.'

**τὸ δ' αὐτάρκεις κ.τ.λ.**] 'The term "self-sufficient," however, b. 8. we do not apply to the life of the *mere* Self—the solitary Self, but to that of the Self realised in association with others—with parents, children, and wife—with friends and fellow-citizens.'

In this rendering I have tried to bring out the *logical* construction of the sentence, according to which αὐτό, the *logical* subject of αὐτάρκεια, is qualified (1) by μόνον, and (2) by γονεῖσι . . . πολίταις: i.e. the Self may be regarded either (1) in isolation, or (2) as constituted by social relations. In the first case it is a mere abstraction, and its self-sufficiency is only nominal; in the second case it is concrete and real, and self-sufficient in virtue of the presence of those relations which constitute its concrete reality.

According to the *grammatical* construction, however, γονεῖσι and the following datives are *coordinate* with αὐτό. The dative αὐτό depends on the verbal notion in αὐτάρκεις, as Ramsauer points out: 'Egregia brevitate,' he says, 'per solam dativi casus vim tota enunciatio confecta est. Nobis magis perspicuum esset, si in eandem sententiam legeremus: αὐτάρκεις σὲ γονέων ὃδε αὐτό μόνον ἀρκεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῖσιν ἀρκεῖν δεὶ κ.τ.λ.' Cook Wilson (Transactions of Oxf. Philological Society, Feb. 3, 1888) calls attention to the words of the Paraphrast as giving 'the right explanation of the dative'—αὐτάρκεις σὲ δ ἄρκει οὐ μόνον τινὶ ζωτί βιον μονότην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῖσι κ.τ.λ. Of course properly αὐτάρκεις (neut.) cannot govern αὐτό (masc.), much less γονεῖς: the only proper construction is αὐτάρκης αὐτῷ (cf. M. M. ii. 15. 1212 b. 26 αὐτός ἐαυτῷ αὐτάρκης ἐσται): αὐτάρκης ἄλλοις (γονεῖσι . . . πολίταις) is a contradiction in
1097 b. 8. terms. The grammar therefore of the sentence is loose: we ought to have had something like this—τῶν ὅ' αυτάρκη λέγομεν οἷς αὐτῷ, ἥ μονότης, αὐτάρκη, ἄλλ' αὐτῷ, ἥ οἰκονόμος καὶ πολίτης. The singular γυναῖκι (Kb and Mb however have γυναῖξι), among the plurals, points to αὐτῷ as the logical subject of the clause ἄλλα . . . πολίταις.

b. 11. ἕσει Πολιτικῶν ο ἄθρωπος] Rassow (Forsch. p. 54) defends the reading πολιτικῶν given by Kb against the πολιτικὸς of Lb Mb, and compares ix. 9. 3 πολιτικῶν γὰρ ὁ ἄθρωπος καὶ συζητεῖ περικός.

Man realises his true nature or personality in the πόλις. The true 'self,' to which 'self-sufficiency' is ascribed, is that which consists in the clear consciousness of manifold social relations, and of the duties which they entail, as distinguished from the 'self' which is made up of the sensations and feelings, as such, of the individual: see Pol. i. 1. 1253 a. 1 φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσεων η ἡ πόλις ἐστι καὶ ὅτι ο ἄθρωπος φύσει πολιτικῶν σώματι, καὶ ο ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τέχνην ήτοι φαινότα εἶστιν η κρείττων η ἄθρωπος.

§ 7. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος δρόσος τις] Social life, the realisation of which by the individual constitutes his true personality, is, so to speak, a natural organism (τῶν φύσεων η πόλις ἐστι Pol. i. 1. 1253 a. 2), and must be definite—φωμένων: cf. ix. 10. 3, 4, a passage which seems to redeem the promise ἄλλα τούτο μὲν εἰσόδους ἐπισκεπτέων.

b. 12. γονεῖς] = προγόνους. Rassow (Forsch. p. 111) suggests that after γονεῖς a genitive, τῶν γονεῶν, may have fallen out, but does not press the suggestion.

The true self, described as 'self-sufficient,' is constituted by the consciousness of relations to others—ancestors, contemporaries, and descendants, within a definite, and comparatively narrow, circle. The self, like the state, must be εὐστάτος. The σπουδαῖος—the man who is earnest about the performance of duty, will not allow himself to be influenced in his daily life by the supposed wishes of very distant ancestors, or by the supposed wants of very remote posterity: nor will he try to adapt himself to a very wide and miscellaneous body of contemporaries.

b. 16. § 8.] All the editors have long notes on this section, which, after all, is not very difficult. 'Moreover we take (supply οἰδομέθα) Happiness to be the most choiceworthy of all good things—not "most choiceworthy" in the sense of being itself one of them, for (ὅτι as introducing this apagogic proof is practically equivalent to γάρ,
which Susemihl, following Aretinus, indeed reads) plainly, if it were counted together with the addition of the least of them—the addition would cause an overbalance of good, and the greater good is always the more choiceworthy.’ Cf. the Paraphrast’s very clear note—ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ λέγομεν συναρμομεθαίνα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄγαθοις τῶν γὰρ αἵρεσιν ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τὸ ἄκρον καὶ εἰ σύντοιχον αὐτήν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήσομεν ἄγαθος, φανερὸν δὴ, εἰ προσθήσωμεν τι τῶν ἄλλων αὐτῇ, αἵρετωτέραν ποιήσομεν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἂν ἦν αὐτῇ τὸ ἄκρον τῶν αἵρετῶν. Eustratius, on the other hand, absurdly interprets the passage as meaning that εὐδαιμονία is made αἵρετωτέρα ἐν οἴνοι̃ the addition of them—οἷον τὸ ἐπτριῶν ἱσως, ἢ τὸ ἑπίδεξιον βαδίζειν, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον, ἡ προστιθέμενον τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ μεθενὸς λειπομένῳ τῶν κυριωτέρων πρὸς σύντοιχον αἵρετωτέραν αὐτὴν ἑπερφελῆ. I will not trouble the student with the other views of the interpretation of this passage. A statement and criticism of them will be found in Rassow’s Forsch. pp. 112-115. Rassow interprets as I have done above, following the Paraphrast. So also do Coraes, Michelet, and Grant; Zeller, however (Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. pp. 610, 611, third ed.), at the end of a somewhat puzzling note, suggests that the words συναρμομεθαίνα δὲ . . . ἅπα, or at least ὑπεροχῆ . . . ἅπα are an interpolation. But it is difficult to suppose that the writer of the M. M. i. 2. 1184 a. 15–25 had not the words suspected by Zeller before him when he wrote—μετὰ ταῦτα ταῖν πῶς τὸ ἀριστον δὲι σκοπεῖ; Πάτερον οὕτως ὡς καὶ αὐτοῦ συναρμομένου; ἂλλα ἄποσαν. Τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον ἐπείδη ἐστι τέλος τέλειον, τὸ δὲ τέλειον τέλος ὡς ἀπλαῖς εἰπεῖν οὐθέν ἄν ἄλλο δάξειν εἴη η εὐδαιμονία τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἑκ πολλῶν ἄγαθον συντίθεμεν; ἐὰν δὴ τὸ βελτίστου σκοπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ συναρμομεθαίνα, αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἐσται βελτίστον αὐτὸ γὰρ βελτίστου ἐσται. Οἶον τὰ ὑγιεινὰ θεῖε καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν, σκότει τὸ τοιοῦτον πάντων βελτίστου. Βελτίστον δ’ ἐστιν ὑγίεια. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο πάντων βελτίστου, καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ βελτίστου’ ἄποσαν δὴ συμβαίνει. Οὐ δὴ ἵσως οὕτω γε σκέπτειν τὸ βελτίστον.

The doctrine of the present section may be explained as follows—Etherdaimonia is Life, and, as such, cannot be classed among the ‘good things’ of life. It is the Form and organisation of man’s powers and opportunities. To suppose it possible to add one of these powers or opportunities to the already perfect Form, would be to suppose that the power or opportunity in question
has not been already organised in the Form\(^1\), and that consequently the Form is imperfect. The absurdity of such a supposition would equal that of representing a perfectly healthy man as made more healthy by the addition of a heart. As the various organs of the body have no function, and therefore no real existence, apart from the living body, so particular good things (virtue, health, beauty, wealth) have no existence, except as elements of the noble life.

In this section Aristotle virtually maintains all that Plato contended for in his doctrine of the Idea of the Good. As the Idea of the Good is the unity of good things, and that by reason of which they are good—in other words, as it is that definite system, or order, by belonging to, and subserving which, particular things are said to be *good*, rather than pleasant, or otherwise attractive to mere sense; so *εὐδαιμονία* is that orderly and beautiful life in relation to which, and only to which, man's powers and opportunities have any significance. The man who has no rational conception of the greatness and beauty of Life, as a system, will cherish, instead of that conception, an image borrowed from sense; he will identify Happiness, or Life, with pleasure, or honour. Having made this identification, he will easily persuade himself that 'Happiness' may be enhanced by the addition of particular good things; for *his* 'Happiness' is itself only a particular good thing. But Happiness, as the rational man conceives it, is not a *thing*—not something that a man receives passively and possesses (*κτήμα*), but the *use* (*χρήσις*) which he makes of the things he has received and possesses. So, a tree is not the inorganic elements into which it may be analysed, but the use, as it were, to which the organising principle puts these elements. *Νοῦς* in man, like *φύσις* in the plant and animal worlds, recognises and imposes definite limits. Particular details are valued by it, not for themselves (if they were, no limit could be assigned to their desirable multiplication), but for the sake of the beautiful Life which transforms them. But the man who lives by 'sense and imagination' is immersed in these details. Life, or 'Happiness,' is for him a mere succession of particular experiences—an indefinite sum of good things which never satisfies him. To the external view

\(^1\) Cf. *Met.* Z. 17, 1041 b. 11 sqq., where it is shown in the case of *σώφρος* that the *οὐσία*, or organic whole, is not co-ordinate with its *στροχεία* or elements, and cannot be added to them.
he may seem to be εὐδαιμὼν, because the material conditions or 1097 b.18. elements of εὐδαιμονία are separately present; but the transforming spirit is inwardly wanting—

’Er hat die Theile in seiner Hand,
Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.’

He is receptive of isolated impressions; he lives κατὰ πάθος; he does not assert a personality in active function. Cf. Poët. 6. 1450 a. 18 ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἑστι, καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξει τις ἑστίν, οὖν ποιώς.

§ 9. ἂλλ’ ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογοῦμεν b. 23. τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δὲ κ.τ.λ. ] According to Ramsauer τὸ ἄριστον is the subject and τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν the predicate, and τὸ ἄριστον must be understood after τὶ ἑστὶν. The accepted name εὐδαιμονία and the desiderated definition are thus contrasted by μὲν and δὲ. But, if this were the construction, should we not have ἂλλ’ ἴσως τὸ μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογοῦμεν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δὲ κ.τ.λ.?  

§ 10. ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τάγαθιν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὗ] whether the ἔργον b. 28. be a substantive result παρὰ τὴν ἑνεργειαν, or simply the ἑνεργεια itself (see E. N. i. 1. 2 and Μελ. Θ. 8. 1050 a. 22–b. 3). In the former case the ἔργον is better than the ἑνεργεια, in the latter case than the ἐξει. Cf. E. E. ii. 1. 1219 a. 13 τὸ ἔργον λέγεται διαχώς τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἑστὶν ἔστερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρήσιν, οἷον οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκία ἂλλ’ οὐκ οἰκοδομίης καὶ λατρεικὴς ὑγίας ἂλλ’ οὐχ ὑγίαις ὑπὸ ἱστρεισι, τῶν δ’ ἡ χρήσις ἔργον, οἷον ὄψιν δρασίς καὶ μαθηματικής ἐπιστήμης θεωρία. "Ωστ’ ἀνάγκη, διὸ ἔργον ἡ χρήσις, τὴν χρήσιν βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἐξει. Of this latter kind is the ἔργον ἀνθρώπου of the present passage: cf. Μελ. Θ. 8. 1050 a. 34 διότι δὲ μὴ ἑστὶν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἑνεργειαν, εἰν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἑνεργεια, οἷον ἡ δρασίς εἰς τῷ ἀριστεί καὶ ἡ θεωρία εἰς τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωή εἰς τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆ γὰρ ποιά τις ἑστιν. Cf. also Μ. Μ. i. 3. 1184 b. 9 τὸ δὲ τέλος ἑστὶν οὖ ἄπλοιν ἄλλα διστῶν εἰς μὲν γὰρ ἑστὶ τὸ τέλος αὐτή ἡ ἑνεργεια καὶ ἡ χρήσις, οἷον τῆς ὄψεως καὶ ἑστὶ γε ἡ χρήσις αἰρετωτέρα τῆς ἐξει. Τέλος δὲ ἡ χρήσις οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐν βοιλιοῦ ἐχειν τὴν ὄψιν μὴ μελλόν ὄριν ἄλλα μὲν, ὡς οἰκεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐπ’ ἀκόις καὶ τῶν τουκατων. ἢν ἄρα καὶ χρήσις καὶ ἐξει ἑστὶν, ἢ ἄριστον καὶ αἰρετωτέραν ἡ χρήσις τῆς ἐξεις ’ ἡ γὰρ χρήσις καὶ ἡ ἑνεργεια τέλος, ἡ δ’ ἐξει τῆς χρήσεως ἐνεκεν.

§ 11. ποτέρου πο ὁ κ.τ.λ.] The editors point out that this passage b. 28. is taken from Ῥηπ. i. 352 E δοκεῖ τι σοι εἶναι ἵσπου ἔργου; ἔρωτε. ἅρα
b. 33. [§§ 12, 13.] The following extracts give in outline the psychology of these sections—viz. that living beings (τὰ ἐμψυχα), possessing the power of nutrition and growth, are either sentient (Ἴσα) or non-sentient (φυτὰ). Sentient beings either combine their separate sensations into a rational experience (αὐθροπος), or they do not (τὰ λοιπὰ ἔφοι). De An. ii. 2. 413 a. 20 Λέγομεν αὖν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴς ἱκέτευσιν, διωρίσαμε τὸ ἐμψυχον τοῦ ἁγίου τῷ Δίῳ. Πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ξίρου λεγομένου, καὶ τὸ τὸυτὸν ἐνυπάρχῃ μοῦνον, ξίρον αὐτό φαιμεν, οἷς νοῦ, αἰσθησις, κίνησις καὶ θάνατος ἐκ τῶν τῶν ὀμοιωτέρων τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἐξουθενόμενον τόσον. ἥ�νε τῇ κίνησις τῷ τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ καὶ φύσει τῇ καὶ αἰσθησις. Διώ καὶ τὰ φύσιμαι πάντα δοκεῖ ξίρον φαινεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμεν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτῃ, δι᾽ ἄυ τὴν ἀσθεσίαν τὰ τὰ φύσιμα, ἐκαθορισμένοι τὰ τὰ ἀναρρήτα τῶν ἐγγελικῶν τοῦ ἀνακόμισθος ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώπινοις. Φανερῶν δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν φυσιμένων οὐδεμιὰ γὰρ αὐτοὶς ὑπάρχει δύναμις ἄλλῃ ψυχῆς. Τὸ μὲν αὖν ἕν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς ξίροις, τὸ δὲ ξίρον διὰ τὴν ἁσθεσίαν πρῶτος καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κωδύματα μὲν ἀλλάζοντα τῶν, ἔχοντα δὲ αἰσθησιν ξίρα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ξίρον μοῦνον. Ἀλεθής τε ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπαρκός πάσιν ἄφη. Ὡσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικῶν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἁθῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἡ ἁθὴ τῶν ἀλλων αἰσθήσεων. Θρεπτικῶν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιούτον μόρον τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ καὶ τὰ φύσιμα μετέχει τὰ δὲ ξίρα πάντα φαίνεται τῆς ἀπτικῆς αἰσθησίας ἔχοντα. 3. 414 a. 29 Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτὴ λεγεῖται τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πάσαι, καθάπερ ἐπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινάς αὐτῶν, ἐνοίς δὲ μία μόνῃ. Δυνάμεις δὲ ἑσθομεν θρεπτικῶν, ὀρεκτικῶν, αἰσθητικῶν, κινητικῶν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικῶν. Ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικῶν μοῖρον τῆς ψυχῆς οὔ καὶ τὰ φύσιμα μετέχει τὰ δὲ ξίρα πάντα φαίνεται τῆς ἀπτικῆς αἰσθησίας ἔχοντα. 98 BOOK I: CHAP. 7: §§ 11-13.
§ 12. **praktike τις τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσι**] Grant translates, 'a moral 1098 a. 3. life of the rational part,' and compares vi. 2. 2 τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. This translation is somewhat misleading. Man's highest function is not πρᾶξις in the sense of moral, as distinguished from speculative 'action'—θεωρία: nor do the words πρακτικὴ τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσι really limit us to the 'moral life.' See Pol. H. 3. 1325 b. 14 'Ἄλλα εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐθαμονίαν εὑρεσίαν θετεύων, καὶ κοινὴ πάσης πόλεως ὅπως εἴη καὶ καθ᾽ ἐκαστὸν ἀρίστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. Ἀλλὰ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἔτερους, καθάπερ οὐσιώδεις τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διαινοίας εἶναι μόνας ταῦτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποθανόντων χάριν γιγαντεύοντας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἑνεκὼν θεωρίας καὶ διαινοήσεις: ἡ γὰρ εὑρεσία τέλος, ὡς καὶ πρᾶξις τις, κοινοτεταμένοι δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς τὰς διαινοίας ἀρχιτέκτονας. It is better then to translate the words πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσι, 'a life consisting in the action of the rational part.'

§ 13. \[τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὴς λόγος, τὸ δὲ ἔχον καὶ διαινοούμενον\] a. 4.

'With regard to the present passage,' Grant says, 'Bekker exhibits no variation in the MSS., and the Paraphrast evidently had it in his text. All that can be said therefore is that the present sentence interrupts the sense and grammar of the context, and that it is conspicuously awkward in a book which for the most part reads smoothly.' Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 72) brackets the sentence, pointing out that ἐπιπειθής does not occur elsewhere in the Aristotelian canon, and appears only in very late Greek. While the sentence itself, then, is doubtless an interpolation, its doctrine is strictly Aristotelian, being, in fact, that laid down afterwards in ch. 13, § 19 of this book. 'The rational part' is (1) Reason proper, τὸ λόγον ἔχον κυρίως—that which 'has reason' in the strict and proper sense of 'having,' i.e. 'has it in itself'; (2) the appetites quæ obedient to reason, τὸ μετέχον λόγον—that which 'has reason,' not in the strict and proper sense of 'having,' but in the sense of 'participating in, or benefiting by, what another has.'

**διττῶς κ.τ.λ.**] 'But, as this "rational life" may be understood in a. 5.'
either of two senses—either as a state, or as a function, we must take it in the latter, which seems to be the more proper sense.' I am inclined to agree with Rassow (Forsch. p. 72) that καὶ before ταύτης ought to be omitted. He supposes it to have been inserted after the clause τοῦτον δὲ . . . διανοούμενον had been interpolated. After λεγομένης Rassow conjectures that such words as τῆς μὲν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν τῆς δὲ καθ’ ἑξίν have been omitted (Forsch. p. 73).

The apodosis begins with τὸ ἀνθρώπινου ἀγάθου § 15, where γίνεται, as Grant remarks, 'is used as denoting a deduction from premisses' [cf. i. 8. 3 for a similar use of γίνεται], and may be rendered 'it results that the good for man, &c.' Eustratius, however, gives a different force to γίνεται: ο Datagram δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια ἦστιν ἀλλὰ γίνεται, διὰ τὸ μεθύπτετο ἵστασθαι ὑφείλειν τὸν τελεῖον ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ διὰ παντὸς ἐμμένειν αὐτῶν ἀντέχόμενον . . . ἦστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως εἰπεῖν τὸ γίνεται: ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τινά ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι ἀγαπεῖ τὸ ἔσται, ὅσ ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἁγάθων καὶ ἡμέρα καὶ ὁ ἐσυναυτὸς τοῦτον γὰρ ἐκατον ἁλων μὲν ὡς ἄλοις ὅπερ ἀπορρισμένον ὕψισταται, κατὰ μέρος δὲ γίνεσθαι ἀποστείλεται παρερχόμενον τῶν μερῶν ὁμών καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ γὰρ αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν γέγονός ἦδη παρόμμεθα, τὸ δ’ ἐπιγίγνεται μετ’ ἐκείνῳ, καὶ ἐβεβηκός οὕτως, καὶ οὐδέποτε ὀδόκληρος ἴσταται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μικρῶν ἀπαρτίζεται διὸ καὶ πρὶν αὐτῆς ὁμ έστιν οἰκεῖον εἰσεῖν ἀλλὰ γίνεται. Is Eustratius thinking of Ε. Ν. ix. 9. 5 ἐν ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐϊρηται ὅτι ἡ εἰδαμονία ἐνέργεια τῆς ἦστιν, ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια δήλω ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οἷον ἐπάρχει ὄσπερ κτήμα τι; Grant's explanation of γίνεται is of course correct.

The term ψυχῆς has not been actually used above, but is naturally suggested by the divisions enumerated in §§ 12 and 13, which are those of the ψυχή.

The Paraphrast explains rightly, I think, the distinction intended here: κατὰ λόγον, ὅταν διανοοῖται, ὃς ἄνευ λόγου, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος κυθήται μετὰ λόγου. The expression κατὰ λόγον at the beginning of this section is followed, it will be observed, by the expression μετὰ λόγου at the end of the section; but the technical opposition between κατὰ λόγον (where λόγος is a principle governing life mechanically from without), and μετὰ λόγου (where λόγος regulates life from within: see notes on vi. 13. 5) does not seem to me to be raised in the present passage,

1 So also Eustratius—τὸ μὲν κατὰ λόγον περὶ τῆς οἰκείας ἐξουσίας λόγον καὶ διανοοομένης ψυχῆς θέμενος τὸ δὲ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου περὶ τῆς λόγου ἐπιπείθοις.
although the two expressions occur in it. The expression μετὰ 1098 a. 7. λόγον often stands merely for ‘rational,’ instead of λογικός, which Aristotle does not use in this sense—or hardly ever: cf. Met. Θ. 5. 1048 a. 3, where δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγον are opposed to ἀλογον δυνάμεις. Here, then (Ε. Ν. i. 7. 14), I think, the phrase πράξεις μετὰ λόγον = πράξεις λογικάς (as a later writer might employ the adjective); and expresses shortly what has been set forth more fully in the words ἐνίργεια κατὰ λόγον ἣ μὴ ἀνευ λόγου, understood as by the Paraphrast 1. Perhaps, however, it may be thought that ἢ μὴ ἀνευ λόγου is=μετὰ λόγον in the technical sense of the latter expression (i.e. where λόγος is an immanent principle regulating life), and that ἢ thus introduces a correction of the inadequate formula κατὰ λόγον, which accordingly is not repeated, the more correct μετὰ λόγου being used. But it does not seem likely that Aristotle would introduce such an important distinction by means of the merely negative expression μὴ ἀνευ λόγου. On the other hand, such a negative expression is well fitted to designate the obedience of the passions to reason, as distinguished from the spontaneous activity of reason itself in the sphere of thought.

τῷ γένει] qualifies τῷ δ’ αὐτό.


κατὰ τὴν ἀριστην καὶ τελειοτάτην] i.e. κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἀρετήν, a. 17. Reason is the Form of man which is impressed on the matter of the lower nature which he shares with the brutes. This Form (identical with the τέλος or ἐργον, cf. E. Ν. iii. 7. 6 ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει: Met. Θ. 8. 1050 a. 21 τῷ γὰρ ἐργον τέλος) is the ἔδωκ (§ 12) which is the object of the present enquiry. In seeking to discover the definition of a thing (and Aristotle is here really seeking to discover the definition of man), we always look for the characteristic Form irrespective of the matter in which it is realised. Hence here, when Aristotle identifies Happiness with the ἐνίργεια of Reason, he is considering it formally—as something which admits of definition (see note on vii. 13. 2 b. 10). But

1 This was written before I became acquainted with Bywater’s view that ἀνθρώπων 1098 a. 12 ... ὀντο 16 is a repetition of what has gone before. This view explains the conclusion which I had reached that μετὰ λόγου and κατὰ λόγον are not distinguished here, as they are in vi. 13. 5.
1098 a. 17. it must not be forgotten (and Aristotle, unlike the Neoplatonist exponents of his system, never forgets this) that Reason, or the Form of Happiness, is only realised by man in a given matter, vegetative and sensitive. Accordingly, when Happiness is said to be an ἔνεργεια κατὰ τὴν ἄριστην καὶ τελευτάτην ἄρετήν, i.e. κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ, it is understood that all the functions, vegetative and sensitive, of man as a composite being are exercised in a harmony characteristic (ὁμοιότητα) of man alone. This harmonious exercise of all his natural faculties is the ‘exercise of Reason’ in which man’s chief good consists. The exercise of Reason is best in the sense of being the co-ordination of all other functions, not in the sense of being itself a function abstracted from the others, capable (in man as distinguished from God) of operating without a material basis laid in the ψυχή qua θεραπευτική and αἰσθητική. See Laas (εὐθαμονία, Aristotelis in Ethicis Princípiúm quid velit et valeat, Berlin, 1859), pp. 10 and 11: 'In hac definitione non omnia plana sunt: mirum est quod hominis munus in sola ratione versatur, quia ejus propria sit; quasi non sentire et vivere, quamvis non proprium, tamen hominis munus sit. . . . Ut igitur cur rationi humana omnia tribuantur noscas, memineris quaeo Aristotelem hominis proprium quaevisisse; est igitur hoc potius anquirendum cur alicuius rei vis in ejus proprio solo sit non in toto. . . Cum Platoni omnis essentia vertatur in universalí, illi (i.e. Aristoteli) generalis definitionis pars nihil est nisi materia in qua vera essentia specificae differentialé exprimatur. . . . Ac si omne genus materia est, quo mersa differentialé forma, ut ita dícam, sola vim totius exprimit, etiam in rerum natura omne eatenus existit quatenus materiae forma est impressa: conditiones igitur necessariae ut forma possit comparere pro materia habentur; ut, cum primum illud forma definitum prodit, eae ad rei vim perspicieandam nullius sint momenti. Itaque si ex Aristotelis sensu omnis plantarum vita animalium propríam existentiam tempore praeceedit tanquam conditio sine qua non, est ea in ipso animali materia, vera autem essentia in proprio est quod in ea exprimitur. Quare verum munus hominis non in vivendo, non in sentiendo seseque movendo—sed hae sunt conditiones in quibus rationalis hominis vita efflorescat.'

a. 18. § 16. ἐπὶ δὲ ἐν βίω τελείω] Rassow (Forsch. pp. 116, &c.) discusses the question whether these words mean, as generally supposed, 'das volle menschliche Leben bis zum Tode'—i.e. a complete life spent prosperously up to the day of death. He begins by
admitting that there is much in favour of the view that such is their meaning: first the passage E.N. i. 9. §§ 10 and 11 oôde paîs eîdâimovn estîn ouâva yâr praktikos toû touîtoûn dià tîn hîkian' ol de leugmenvo dià tîn dêsipîda makarizotai. deî yâr, dastep éîpomev, kai ârmeti teîleîas kai bîn teîleîov. polllai yâr meteîbolai gîwovvai kai pantoîa tûxai kátâ toû bîov, kai èndechetâ tîn málîovn êîdôrînta megâlais symborâias periopesîn epî yîrôs, kathâper en tîois Tînouçois peri Priâmov muhêvetai' tôn de toioûtâs xhrasâmenvov tûxais kai teîlevsînta aîthiâs oîdêis eîdâmôvizei: secondly, the circumstance that the later Peripatetics undoubtedly took the words in this sense—E. E. ii. 1. 1219 b. 6 dîw kai to Sûlanov efêî kâlîos to mi jwvî eîdâmôvizeiv, all' otan lâbê tôlos' oîdêv yâr âtelîe eîdâmovv ou yâr bîov: M. M. i. 4. 1185 a. 4 ou'dî en xrouô ge âtelîe, all' en teîleîov teîleîos b' an eîn xrouôs osûn anwvpopos bîav. There is nothing, however, in the expression bîos teîleîos taken by itself, Rassow thinks, to warrant us in assuming that Aristotle—as distinguished from his followers—makes a long continuously prosperous life a necessary condition of Happiness. The phrase bîos teîleîos taken by itself means simply a life that reaches its end or aim. Of course to reach its end or aim a life must have a reasonable duration, and a reasonable amount of prosperity; but the question still remains, Did Aristotle, like his successors of the Peripatetic school, identify this reasonable duration and prosperity, necessary for the attainment of the end, with a long life continuously prosperous up to the day of death? To answer this question, Rassow appeals to E.N. i. 10. 14 ou'dî de pûkîlîos ge kai eîmetâbolov' ou'te yâr ek tîs eîdâmôvias kuvhsîsgeta radîos, ou'dî upô toû tuvûtovn âtuîmêtovn all' upô megalovn kai pollovn, eî te tîw toioûtovn ouk ânv genoîtu pâlîn eîdâmovv en âlîgô xrouô, all' efêî, en polłôv tîw kai teîleîov, megalovn kai kâlîov en avîô gevômenvn eîpêsbolov. Thus, while Solon will allow the title of 'happy' only to the man who possesses Happiness without interruption to the end of his natural life, Aristotle does not regard it as impossible to regain a Happiness which one has lost. If then it is conceivable that a man may possess, lose, and then regain Happiness, how can the bîos teîleîos, in the sense of 'das volle menschliche Leben bis zum Tode,' be the necessary condition of Happiness? We shall have to return to this subject in ch. 10.

§ 17. peirgegrâphw . . . ânagrávai] The editors compare de a. 20. gen. anim. ii. 6. 743 b. 20 ãpanta de tâs peirgrâfais dôrîzetai
1098 a. 20. πρότερον, ὑστερον δὲ λαμβάνει τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰς μωλακότητας καὶ τὰς σκληρότητας, ἀτεχνῶς ὁσπερ ἐν ὑπὸ ζωγράφου τῆς φύσεως δημιουργοῦμενα καὶ γὰρ οἱ γράφεις ύπογράψαντες τὰς γραμμὰς ὀνόματος ἐναλείφονσι τοὺς χρώμας τὸ ζώον. The meaning of ἐποτυπώσαν is to "mould slightly or roughly," then to "outline" = περιγράψαν, which is opposed to ἀναγράψαν, to "fill in in detail."

In this (the third) digression on the logical method of Ethics (§§ 17–23), Grant remarks (Ethics vol. i. p. 394) that 'Aristotle points out his definition of the chief good as a "sketch to be filled up"'; and also, it would appear, as an ἀρχή or leading principle, which in importance amounts to "more than half the whole" science. In filling up the sketch, he again cautions us that too much ἀρχέων is not to be expected. But it is plain that he has deserted his former view of the science as inductive [i.e. in i. 4. 5]; he now makes it depend on a general conception of the chief good which is to be applied and developed.' See generally Grant's Appendix A on the Ethical method of Aristotle. Grant seems to me to go too far when he says that, in the passage before us, Aristotle 'has deserted his former view of the science as inductive.' The opposition between induction and deduction is not an absolute one. In a concrete enquiry, of the complexity of that pursued in the Ethics, the phenomena could not be grouped and handled, as 'induction' requires, without the aid of 'deduction.' 'A general conception of the chief good,' framed in anticipation of the evidence to be afterwards fully adduced in support of it, is essential at the outset, as 'throwing the light of science' (to use Mill's expression) upon phenomena which would otherwise baffle knowledge by their complexity and apparent inconsistency. Aristotle's method in Ethics is thus 'inductive,' or 'deductive,' according to the point of view from which we choose to regard it. He starts with a 'general conception,' framed in advance of the facts, which he applies to their interpretation; so far his method is 'deductive.' But the results of the application of this 'general conception' are so carefully verified by appeals to experience at every step, and so often modified, to bring them into agreement with experience, that the so-called 'deductive' enquiry seems not to differ from the 'inductive' process of establishing generalisations by the observation of particular phenomena. In short Aristotle's method in Ethics answers pretty exactly to what Mill (Logic Book vi. ch. 9) calls the 'Physical or Concrete Deductive
method, the method of astronomy, natural philosophy, physiology, and especially of social science, 'that most complex of all studies.' The author of the *Ethics* is 'aware' (to borrow Mill's words) 'that the same superior complexity [of social phenomena] which renders the instrument of deduction more necessary, renders it also more precarious'; and he meets this difficulty by the systematic use of verification, characterised by Mill as 'the third essential constituent part of the Deductive method,' and described as the process 'of collating the conclusions of the ratiocination either with the concrete phenomena themselves, or when such are obtainable, with their empirical laws.' Aristotle's appeals to 'the concrete phenomena themselves'—to his own observations in Ethics and Politics, occur on every page; while to 'their empirical laws,' as popularly recognised in ἔνδοξα and λεγόμενα, he attaches the greatest weight. The spirit in which Aristotle employs the concrete deductive method in the *Ethics* could not be better characterised than in the following passage (Mill's *Logic* vi. 9): 'The ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the à priori reasoning itself, but the accordance between its results and those of observation à posteriori. Either of these processes, apart from the other, diminishes in value as the subject increases in complication, and this in so rapid a ratio as soon to become entirely worthless; but the reliance to be placed in the concurrence of the two sorts of evidence, not only does not diminish in anything like the same proportion, but is not necessarily much diminished at all. Nothing more results than a disturbance in the order of precedence of the two processes, sometimes amounting to its actual inversion; inso-much that instead of deducing our conclusions by reasoning, and verifying them by observation, we in some cases begin by obtaining them conjecturally from specific experience, and afterwards connect them with the principles of human nature by à priori reasonings, which reasonings are thus a real verification.'

In the *Ethics* 'the order of precedence' is frequently 'disturbed,' and even 'inverted,' in correspondence with the exigencies of a difficult enquiry. Hence the hesitation which Aristotle's commentators have shown in deciding the question, whether the method of the *Ethics* is 'deductive,' or 'inductive.' The truth however is, as we have seen, that the abstract distinction between Deduction and Induction is not à propos in relation to a concrete enquiry like the present.
1098 a.20. With regard to Aristotle's attitude, in other concrete enquiries than those of the moral sciences, to the three operations noted by Mill (Logic iii. 11) as essential to the Deductive method, viz. the processes (1) of direct induction, (2) of ratiocination, and (3) of verification, it may be said that while he is fully aware of the importance of the third, and carries out the second with marvellous acuteness, he is not sufficiently careful about the first. His natural science is largely vitiated by the influence of notiones temere a rebus abstractae. But in ethical and political science the case is different. Here the ratiocinations, the results of which are carefully verified, proceed from principles which, from the nature of the subject to which they belong, are based on a solid foundation of experience. Human life is always present to our observation, and rouses our liveliest interest; and we frame true generalisations about it before we are well aware that we are generalising at all; at any rate, our unconscious generalisations are so nearly true, that subsequent conscious verification easily corrects them. But in the field of natural science, Aristotle had no such foundation already laid for his ἄρχαί. He had to depend, in an age in which observers were few and inexperienced, scientific collaboration unknown, and instruments of observation non-existent, almost entirely upon himself. Little wonder then that his principles in this field did not answer to the 'subtlety of nature,' and gave results often so vague, and wide of the mark, that they seemed to be verified by observations which were really quite irrelevant to the subject of enquiry.

a. 22. δόξειε... ἔλειπτον] Victorius, followed by most of the editors, quotes Soph. El. 34. 183 b. 17 τῶν γὰρ εὐρισκομένων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ' ἑτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεποιημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδεδωκέντο ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὑπερετέρον τὰ δ' ἐξ ὑπάρχῳ εὐρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν ἐπώθη, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῷ τῆς ὑπερετέρου ἐκ τούτων αὔξησεος. Μέγιστον γὰρ ἵππος ἀρχὴ παντός, δόστερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον· διὸ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσοῦτο μικρότατον δὲ τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατον ἐστὶν ὑφήρημι. Ταύτης δ' εὐρημενής ῥῆμα τὸ προστιθέναι καὶ συναίσθεν τὸ λοιπόν ἐστιν· διὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν ῥητορικῶν λόγων συμβέβηκε, σχέδων δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας τέχνας.

διαρθρώσατ] 'to articulate,' 'to work out in detail.'

a. 23. καὶ δ' χρόνος κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Plut. Conviv. vii Sap. 9 τί σοφώτατον; χρόνος (ἐφ' οὐδὲν) τὰ μὲν γὰρ εὐρήκεν οὕτως ἢ δὲ εὐρήσει.

a. 26. § 18.] See Grant's useful note on the various meanings of ἀκρίβεια.
Here, according to Grant, ἀκριβεία combines three meanings: 'It seems to say that mathematical exactness is not suited to Ethics—that too much subtly is not to be expected (καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμετρὸς κ.τ.λ.)—that too much detail is to be avoided (ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα κ.τ.λ.).'

The definition of the Chief Good is not like a definition in Geometry, the consequences of which can be demonstrated to the eye plainly in a diagram. It only enables us to trace tendencies—τὰ ὅσα ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, which may be counteracted in particular cases. It is a principle, after all, not so much of science as of conduct; it leads us not to scientifically demonstrated conclusions, but to good and useful acts: cf. i. 3. 6 τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις.

Like the carpenter’s right angle, it is a principle χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον sufficiently correct for the practical purpose in view—a purpose which would be defeated if greater elaboration were attempted: cf. i. 13. 8 θεωρήσων δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρήσων δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσον ικανὸς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα. Cf. Mill’s Logic vi. 9: ‘It is evident ... that Sociology considered as a system of deductions à priori cannot be a science of positive predictions but only of tendencies. We may be able to conclude from the laws of human nature applied to the circumstances of a given state of society that a particular cause will operate in a certain manner, unless counteracted; but we can never be assured of what extent or amount it will so operate, or affirm with certainty that it will not be counteracted; because we can seldom know, even approximately, all the agencies which may coexist with it and still less calculate the collective result of so many combined elements. [E.g. the collective result in a given case of the elements of εὐδαιμονία. One man’s εὐδαιμονία may be seriously affected by external circumstances, which do not so seriously affect that of another.] The remark, however, must here be once more repeated, that knowledge insufficient for prediction may be most valuable for guidance. It is not necessary for the wise conduct of the affairs of society, no more than of any one’s private concerns, that we should be able to foresee infallibly the results of what we do. We must seek our objects by means which may perhaps be defeated, and take precautions against dangers which possibly may never be realized. The aim of practical politics is to surround any given society with the greatest possible number of circumstances of which the tendencies are beneficial, and to remove
or counteract as far as practicable those of which the tendencies are injurious. A knowledge of the tendencies only, though without the power of accurately predicting their conjoint result, gives us to a certain extent this power.'

a. 28. κατὰ τὴν ὑποκείμενην ὠλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἑφ’ ἄσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθὸδῳ] Eustratius explains the distinction made here—οὐ μόνον φησίν, κατὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐπίσησεν δεῖ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὰς μεθόδους τὰς καταγωγομένας περὶ αὐτὰ... εὑρίσκομεν γὰρ πολλάκις διαφόρων μεθόδων καταγωγομένως ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπὸν ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν... παράδειγμα τοῦ λόγου τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης περὶ ζῆτησιν ἀμφῶς τῆς ὀρθῆς γονίας καταγωγομένων κ.τ.λ.

a. 29. § 19. καὶ γὰρ] The connexion here is explained by Eustratius, as quoted in the last note. The comparison of the γεωμέτρης and τέκτων occurs also in Aristoxenus 33. 15 (p. 48, ed. Marquard)—ὁ μὲν γεωμέτρης οὐδὲν χρῆται τῇ τῆς αἰσθήσεως δυνάμει, οὗ γὰρ ἐθέσει τὴν ὀνημ. οὔτε τὸ εὐθὺ οὔτε τὸ περιπέτεια οὔτε ἀλλὰ οὔδεν τῶν τοιούτων οὔσει φαίλοι συνε τῷ κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁ τέκτων καὶ ὁ τορνεύτης... τῇ δὲ μονωτῷ σχεδὸν ἐστὶν ἀρχής ἔχουσα τάξεων ἤ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀκρίβειαν, οὗ γὰρ εὐθείαται φαίλοις αἰσθανόμενον εἰ λέγειν περὶ τούτων δὲ μηδένα τρόπον αἰσθάνεται.

a. 30. τὴν ὀρθήν] sc. γονίαν.

a. 31. τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιῶν τι.] 'Its essence, or essential attributes.' Technically τί ἐστι stands for the γένος, and ποιῶν τι for the διαφορὰ εἴδοποις which, impressed upon the matter of the γένος, makes the οὐσία or τὸ τῇ ὡς εἶναι declared by the ἀξιωματικῷ. See Τὸν ἅ. 2. 122 b. 15 οὐδὲν... ἢ διαφορὰ γένος ἐστὶν... ὅτι δὲ τούτω... τῇ δὲ τούτω... ὀνημ. γὰρ διαφορὰ σημαίνει τί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιῶν τι, καθάπερ τὸ πεζώ καὶ τὸ δίπον... ἢ μὲν διαφορά τὴν ποιήτη τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ σημαίνει... ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν πεζόν, ποιῶν τι λέγει γένος; Mel. Δ. 14. 1020 a. 33 τὸ ποιῶν λέγειται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἢ διαφορὰ τῆς οὐσίας... τοῦ ποιῶν τι ἀνθρώπους ἢ γένος... τῶν δὲ τούτων... τοῦ διπον... τοῦ διπον... τοῦ διπον... καὶ εἰς σχήμα ποιῶν τι σχήμα... ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιῆται τῆς οὐσίας. Diese Unterscheidungsmerkmal der Arten (i. e. διαφορά)... sind nicht,' says Zeller (Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. 206, ed. 3) 'accidentelle, sondern Wesensbestimmungen (Mel. vii. 4. 1029 b. 14, 1030 a. 14, Τον. vi. 6. 144 a. 24 οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορὰ τῶν κατὰ συμβαθικοῦ ὑπάρχοντον ἐστὶ, καθάπερ οὐδέ τὸ γένος... τοῦ δὲ τοῦ... καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν... τοῦ διαφορᾶν ὑπάρχειν τοι καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν'), sie gehören zum.
Begriff des Subjekts, von dem sie ausgesagt werden, alles daher, 1088 a. 31. was in ihnen enthalten ist, gilt von den Arten und den Einzelwesen, denen sie zukommen (Kat. c. 5. 3 a. 21 ff., b. 5). Es kann deshalb von ihnen gesagt werden, dass sie (zusammen mit der Gattung) die Substanz bilden (Met. vii. 12. 1038 b. 19), dass sie etwas substantielles aussagen (Top. vii. 2); sie selbst jedoch, für sich genommen, sind nicht Substanzen, sondern Qualitäten, drücken nicht ein τι, sondern ein ποιών τι aus (Top. iv. 2. 122 b. 16, ch. 6, 128 a. 26, vi. 6. 144 a. 18—21, Phys. v. 2. 226 a. 27).'

The words before us are τι ἐστιν ἡ ποιών τι, not τι ἐστι καὶ ποιών τι. With καὶ, we could translate—'the genus and difference,' or 'the generic and specific attributes,' giving τι ἐστι its strict meaning, according to which it is distinguished from τὸ τι ἢν εἶναι. In de part. anim. i. 1. 64 a. 16 the phrase καὶ τι καὶ ποιών τι actually occurs, where τι and ποιών τι are equivalent to γένος and διαφορά respectively, and the whole amounts to οὐσία, or τὸ τι ἢν εἶναι. But here ἡ obliges us to give τι ἐστιν by itself the meaning of τὸ τι ἢν εἶναι, οὐσία, or 'essence'; while the alternative (ἡ) ποιών τι, which may be rendered by 'essential attributes,' expresses the same 'essence' looked at from a slightly different point of view, as constituted by the τελευταία διαφορά: see Met. z. 12. 1038 a. 19 φανερῶν ὅτι ἡ τελευταία διαφορά [μετά τοῦ γένους δηλαδή, Alex. ad loc.] η οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος ἔσται: on which Alexander (p. 488, Bonitz's edition of Alex.) has ἡ τελευταία διαφορά ἐστι τὸ εἴδος, τὰ δὲ πρὸ αὐτῆς ἔνα ... τὸ μὲν ἐξὸν πεισῶν ὕλη ἐστὶ ... τὸ δὲ δίστον εἴδος: and Zeller (Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. 207, ed. 3) explains that the τελευταία διαφορά is not simply the last specific character as such, but the specific notion determined by it. On the technical distinction between τι ἐστι and τὸ τι ἢν εἶναι see Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. 207-9, ed. 3; Schwegler, Met. Excursus i; Trendelenburg, Rhein. Mus. 1828, vol. ii. 457-483; Trendelenburg, De Anima note on i. 1. 2 (cf. his note de An. iii. 4. 7 on τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι); Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre 34 ff.; Biese, Ph. d. Arist. i. 243, 366, 427, ii. 35; Waitz, Organ. 67. b. 12, 94 a. 11. 'Zu dem einfachen τι ἐστι,' says Zeller (Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. 209, ed. 3), 'verhält sich das τι ἢν εἶναι wie das Besondere und Bestimmte zum Allgemeinen und Unbestimmten ... Das τι ἢν εἶναι ist mithin eine bestimmte Art des τι ἐστι (daher De Anima, iii. 6. 430 b. 28 τοῦ τι ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ τι ἢν εἶναι, das Sein nach der Seite des Wesens), und es kann deshalb dieses, wie dies bei Arist. sehr häufig ist, in der engeren Bedeutung des τι ἢν εἶναι gebraucht werden, wogegen das letztere niemals
in der umfassenderen des τί ἐστι steht, so dass es auch den Stoff
oder die blosse Eigenschaft oder das Allgemeine der Gattung,
abgesehen von den artbildenden Unterschieden, bezeichnete.
Eustratius' note on the words before us is—ὁ δὲ γεωμέτρης τὴν τε
οικείαν καὶ ποιοτήτα τῆς ἀρχής ἐπιτίθετι τί τέ ἐστιν ἢεταῖον, καὶ τίνα
ἐχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν ὁξείαν καὶ ἀμβλείαν. This would be its τελευταία
diaforά.

§ 20. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον . . . ὁμοίως] Sections 17–19 have insisted
on the importance of a περγραφή, or ἀρχή, to the subsequent
development of a science. Section 20 suggests that, while every
science must accept its particular ἀρχή or ἄρχαι as ultimate (i.e.
without foregoing demonstration), some sciences push their ἀρχή or
ἄρχαι farther back than others. The theoretical sciences are con-
cerned to have principles as ultimate and irreducible as possible1,
whereas the practical science of Ethics, the end of which is not
knowledge but conduct, does well to acquiesce in a principle or
principles leading to useful applications, without troubling itself to
go back very far upon the theoretical reasons which might be
added (were it worth while) in support of the principle or
principles in which it acquiesces. What the Paraphrast says of
ἄρχαι generally is especially true of the ἀρχή of morals—εἰ γὰρ
ζυγίσομεν τῶν ἄρχων αὐτίναν οὐδέποτε ἄρξαμεθα ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἀπειρω βαδισ-
μεθα.

1098 a. 31. as distinguished from the διάοι: see An. Post. i. 13. 78
a. 22, sqq. Cf. E. N. i. 4. 7. 1095 b. 6. Το δει may signify, either a
particular fact accepted immediately on the authority of sense, or
a general principle accepted, without syllogistic proof, on the
authority of induction. In either case there is an ἀρχή or Beginning—
a stimulus which initiates, in the one case, a movement in corre-
spondence, or a process of continued observation; in the other

1 Cf. Top. i. 1. 100 a. 27 ἀπόδειξες μὲν ὅμως ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρῶτων οἱ
συλλογισμοὺς, ἢ ἐκ τοιούτων η διά τινων πρῶτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ
γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχήν ἔληφε . . . ὅτι δὲ ἀληθή μὲν καὶ πρῶτα τὰ μὲν δὲ ἔτεραν, ἀλλὰ
δὲ αὐτῶν ἐχούσα τὴν πιστῶν οὐ δεὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαίς ἄρχαις ἐπιτίθεται
An. ii. 6. 742 b. 32 τῆς γὰρ ἄρχης ἄλλη γνώσις καὶ οὐκ ἀπόδειξες.
case, a ratiocinative train of thought. A sudden noise which makes me turn round to look, and a general point of view which enables me to explain the particulars of a science, are both ἀρχαὶ.

οἶνον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὸ δ’ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχὴ[ Rassow b. 2 (Forsch. p. 16), following Zeller and Münscber (Quaest. crit. p. 18), regards the words οἶνον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς as an interpolation, at the same time holding that the whole passage § 18 μεμъηθαία a. 26 ... § 23 ζητουμένων, b. 8, consisting mainly as it does of repetitions of i. 3. i and i. 4. 5-7, is not by Aristotle. Sussemihl brackets § 17 δὲξει a. 22 ... § 23 ζητουμένων b. 8. Ramsauer proposes the omission of δ’ before τὸ, and takes the clause τὸ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχὴ closely with οἶνον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς—velut in iis quae principia sunt causas quaerere absurdum; esse enim illa, omnium primum est.’ I think that οἶνον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς may be an interpolation, but that we have no substantial grounds for condemning it as such.

§ 21. τῶν ἀρχῶν ... ἀλλως[ ‘And these starting-points, or principles, are arrived at, some in one way, some in another; some by induction, others by perception, others again by some kind of training.’ Peters.

ἐπαγωγὴ[ Cf. E.N. vi. 3. 1139 b. 28 ή μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὅ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ εἰ δὲν ὁ συλλογισμός, δὲν οὐκ ἦστιν συλλογισμὸς’ ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. See An. Post. ii. 19, where the part played by the repetition of particular experiences in producing principles is graphically described. Cf. An. Post. i. 18. 81 a. 38 φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ τις αἴσθησις ἐκλεισθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμη τω ἐκλεισθείη, ἤν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν, ἐπεὶ μανθάνωμεν ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ ἢ ἀποδεῖξις. ἦστι δ’ ή μὲν ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ὡς ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, κατὰ μέρος’ ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι εἰ μὴ δὲ ἐπαγωγὴ: ... ἐπαθήσθαι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν ἀδύνατον τῶν γὰρ καθέστων ἢ αἴσθησις. This last passage, dealing as it does with the origin of τὰ καθόλου or general principles, does not contradict the statement before us, αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ θεωρῶνται αἱ δ’ αἰθήσει κ.τ.λ. dealing with the origin of ἀρχαὶ or principles which are not regarded as necessarily general principles in all cases. Where an ἀρχὴ is the result of ἐπαγωγή, it is of course a general principle; but sense-perception (αἴσθησις) can also give an ἀρχὴ which, though merely a particular impression, is a Beginning (ἀρχή), or stimulus, capable of inducing a train of φαντάσματα, or of rousing an ἐπιθυμία, or of immediately calling forth a movement in response. The
produced by ἐπαγωγή is the cumulative result of a great many sense impressions, and action or thought suggested by such an ἀρχή is more likely to be in correspondence with the environment than that suggested by a single impression which may be of an exceptional character. But such a single impression obviously differs in degree rather than in kind from the deeper impression produced by induction. Sometimes we think and act on the strength of deep impressions produced by long and uniform experience, sometimes on the strength of the impressions which we receive at the moment. It is to be remembered, however, that the channels of these latter impressions—the organs of special sense—are themselves the results of long and uniform experience in the race, and that the impressions received through them are consequently not so particular as they seem to be when contrasted with 'generalisations from experience,' the formation of which we can trace in the life of the individual. Indeed Aristotle himself recognises the universal element in αἴσθησις in such passages as An. Post. ii. 19. 100 a. 16 καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἐκαστὸν, ἢ δ' αἴσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν, οἶνον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὐ Καλλίου ἀνθρώπου: and An. Post. i. 31. 87 b. 28 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ τοσοῦτος, καὶ μὴ τοῦτο τινὸς, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαι γε ἀναγκαῖον τάδε τι, καὶ τού, καὶ νῦν.

The latter part of the passage quoted above (note on § 19 a. 29) from Aristoxenus illustrates how αἴσθησις may be an ἀρχή: τῷ δὲ μονακίῳ σχεδὸν ἐστὶν ἀρχή ἥχουσα τάξιν ἢ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀκριβεῖα, οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φαύλως αἰσθανόμενον εὖ λέγειν περὶ τούτων διὸ μηδένα τρόπον αἰσθάνεται.

The ἀρχή obtained by ἐθισμός are (1) the moral habits or tendencies to act in certain ways. These habits are produced by the repetition of particular acts, just as scientific generalisations result from repeated perceptions. After many observations we acquire a certain point of view which dominates our scientific procedure in the department to which the observations belong. After performing many similar acts we acquire a bent which disposes us to go on performing the acts in question. Farther, as belief goes with action, a tendency to act in a particular way is attended by a belief that it is good (i.e. right or desirable) to act in that particular way. Hence ἐθισμός not only produces the ἀρχή of Habit, or tendency to act in a particular way, but also, as a kind of ἐπαγωγή, produces (2) a point of view from which conduct is re-
garded—the ἄρχη of belief or opinion on moral matters. Cf. E. N. 1098 b. 3.

§§ 5, 6.

καὶ ἀλλαὶ δ’ ἄλλωσιν] This does not mean that there are other ways in which ἄρχαι are obtained besides the three mentioned. Transl. 'some in one, some in another of these three ways.'

Eustratius has a note which brings out well the connexion between the clause τῶν ἄρχων δ’ ἂν μὲν κ.τ.λ. and what immediately precedes: ἐπεὶ τὰς ἄρχας τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεις εἰπε γνώσκεσθαι, μηδὲ τὸ διὸτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀποδίδοσθαι, δοσπερ τυχὸς ἐρωτῶντος—καὶ τῶν ταύτας γνωρίσομεν καὶ ἐπιστημονεῖα ἀρχώστωσιν οὖσα καὶ μὴ ὑποβαλλομέναι ἐπιστήμη; συμβῆσαι γὰρ διὰ τῶν ἄδηλων δῆλα τὰ ἄδηλα γίνεσθαι—παραβιδώσω τοὺς τρόπους δὲ ὅπῃ ἢ γνώσις τῶν ἄρχων περιγίνεται ἄλλωσιν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὁταν. ἐπαγωγῇ μὲν διεφοροῦται ὡς αὐτῶ· τὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἢσα κ.τ.λ. . . . αἰσθησεὶ δὲ ὅσ τὰς ἐκάστους τῶν πρῶτων στοιχείων οἰκείας γνωρίσωμεν ποιώτητα· αὐτὸν πυρὸς μὲν τὴν θερμότητα, ἀέρος δὲ τὴν ὄγρατητα, ὦδας τὴν ψυχρότητα, γῆς τὴν ἕροτητα. ἐθύμῳ δέ, ὅσ αἱ ἄρχαι πῶς γὰρ ἄλλῳ καλὰ εἶναι γνωρίσομεν τὰ σωφρονικά ἢ ἐκ τῶν πρῶτων ταῦτα;

§ 22. μετέβαλαν κ.τ.λ.] 'We must endeavour to attain each in the natural way'—Grant. E.g. we must remember that moral principles naturally result from ἐθικῶς. We must not try to reach them by a purely intellectual process, as if they were theoretical principles, or by the short-cut of the intuition or feeling of the moment. Cf. Eustratius—ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ διαφόρους τρόπους ή τῶν ἄρχων γνώσις ἢμῖν περιγίνεται, διὰ τὸ τοῦτο φθορὰν ὅτι περιτέων ἐκάστας κατὰ τὸν τρόπον ἐκείνου μετέρχεσθαι καθ’ ὅν πεφύκασαν εἰς γνώσις ἢμῖν ἔρχεσθαι.

διορισθοῦσι Cf. An. Post. ii. 3. 90 b. 24 αἱ ἄρχαι τῶν ἀποδειξεων b. 6. ὄρισμαι· ὅτι οὐκ ἔστωται ἀποδειξεῖς, δέδεικται πρότερον, ἢ ἐστώται αἱ ἄρχαι ἀποδεικταί, καὶ τῶν ἄρχων ἄρχαι, καὶ τούτ’ εἰς ἀπειρον βαδιέται, ἢ τὰ πρώτα ὄρισμα ἐστϊ ἀπανδεικτα. Bywater has restored διορισθοῦσι of all other MSS.

§ 23. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἡμισὶν τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἢ ἄρχη] Cf. Pol. E. b. 7. 4. 1303 b. 29 ἢ δ’ ἄρχη λέγεται ἡμισιν εἶναι παντὸς, which seems to be the ordinary form of the proverb. Did Aristotle borrow the modification πλεῖον ἢ ἡμισαν from Plato, Legg. 753 E—ἄρχη γὰρ λέγεται μὲν ἡμισιν παντὸς εν ταῖς παρομίωσις ἔργοι, καὶ τὸ γε καλὸς ἄρξασθαι πάντες ἐγκομιζόμεν ἐκάστοτε· τὸ δ’ εἴστε τε, ὃς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, πλεῖον ἢ τὸ ἡμισίν καὶ ὀδοῖς αὐτὸ καλὸς γενόμενον ἐγκομιζάκει ἵκανος? If we are to believe Teichmüller, however (Literarische Fehden, p. 188), the
CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Let us now see if our Definition agrees with popular opinions about Happiness, for if it does not, it cannot be true in fact, however correct in logic.

Good things are popularly distinguished as (1) external good things, (2) good things of the soul, (3) good things of the body; and good things of the soul are placed highest. Our Definition agrees, making the Chief Good consist in certain vital functions or actions of the soul, and in conduct. Indeed the expressions 'functions,' 'actions,' and 'conduct,' by themselves, are sufficient to show that our end is a good thing of the soul, not an external good thing. Again, the Happy man is popularly said to 'live well' and 'to do and fare well': now, we practically define Happiness as 'a good life' or as 'well-doing.' Further, everything that has ever been viewed as an essential requirement of Happiness, and has consequently been identified with it, is included in our Definition—Goodness, Prudence, Wisdom, Pleasure, External Prosperity. We must believe that these, as elements, are really contained in Happiness, unless we are prepared to deny all weight to consensus and authority.

In the first place, then, we have the support of those who say that Happiness is Goodness, for we make it a function manifesting excellence, or goodness—our advance being that we thus make it consist, not in possession, but in use, not in having something, but in doing something: for a man may have a good thing, and yet it may result in no good for him. As at Olympia the crown is for one of the competitors, not for the strongest man in Greece if he hold aloof, so in life, success is won not by being good, but by well-doing.

Again, our Definition gives due place to Pleasure, for the 'life of well-doing' has its own pleasure—an inherent pleasure, not a merely ornamental pleasure, which may be put on, as it were, and taken off. Whatever a man does habitually he likes, i.e., takes pleasure in; and the good man takes pleasure in the good actions which constitute his Happiness—indeed he would not be a good man if he did not take pleasure in them. Moreover, taking pleasure in the things which he ought to take pleasure in, he enjoys real pleasures, i.e., pleasures which
combine together harmoniously in his life; whereas the pleasures of ordinary
men are unreal, as judged by this test, i.e. they conflict with one another.
And not only are the actions in which Happiness consists pleasant in the eyes
of the good man—they are also truly good and truly fair in his eyes: and he is
the best judge.
Happiness, then, is in itself ' fairest, sweetest, best'—all three: it is not
righteousness which is fairest, and possession sweetest, and health best, as the
Delian Inscription hath it: yet, ' the functions of the highest excellence,' in
which Happiness consists, cannot be performed in the absence of external good
things. It is impossible, or difficult, to play a brilliant part on the stage of life
without equipment. Friends, wealth, influence, are the instruments; high birth,
fair children, beauty, the ornaments of the Happy Life. This is why some
have even identified Happiness with external prosperity, i.e. with good fortune.

§ 1. σκέπτεων ἃς περὶ αὐτῆς] αὐτῆς grammatically refers to ἀρχή in 1098 b. 9.
7. § 23, but the sense requires us to understand εὐθυμονίας. I read
ἀς for δῆ, with Susemihl and Bywater.

ἐκ τοῦ συμπέρασματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος] These words are to be
taken as a periphrasis for 'logically,' 'syllogistically,' or 'formally.'
But we must examine our principle—the notion of the Chief Good,
not only from the formal point of view—from the point of view of
"Conclusion and Premisses," but also in the light of the popular
opinions about it.' This rendering takes λόγος—συλλογισμὸς by a
common usage, and contrasts τὰ ἐξ ὧν, the premisses, with the
ii. 4. 57 a. 36 (quoted by Ramsauer) φανερῶν ὃν ἄν μὲν ἢ τὰ
συμπέρασμα ψευδές, ἀνάγκη ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος ψευδὴ εἶναι ἡ πάντα ἡ ἔνα.
This passage seems decisive as to the meaning of the phrase ἐξ ὧν
ὁ λόγος, and deprives of plausibility an objection which might be
urged against our rendering, viz. that λόγος must here mean
ἀριστότικα, and not συλλογισμῶς, because in the subsequent sections it
means ἀριστότικα. Coraes is therefore wrong with ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος τὰ
μέρη ἐξ ὧν ὁ ὀρθότικα σύγκειται τῆς εὐθυμονίας. The definition of the
Chief Good has been reached as a συμπέρασμα by a process of
reasoning from premisses (ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος) involving such abstract
notions as τέλος, ἀγάθον, ἐνέργεια. The result of this abstract process
—the Definition of the Chief Good in i. 7. 15—must, Aristotle now
says, be verified by being collated with concrete experience as
embodied in the common opinions and sayings of men. While
this seems to be the plain meaning of the passage before us, the
awkwardness of its phraseology must be admitted. Συμπέρασμα,
the technical term for the conclusion of the συλλογισμῶς, is im-
properly applied to an ἀρχή ἦς οὐκ ἐστι συλλογισμός, especially in a context like the present (unless Rassow and Susemihl are right in bracketing ch. vii. §§ 17 or 18–23), where the non-syllogistic origin of ἀρχai is carefully insisted upon. Eustratius, who sees the difficulty just noticed, has a good note, in which he gives what I take to be the correct interpretation—ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ὀρισμοῦ μεταβὰς εἰς τὸ κοινὸς εἴπειν περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, κάτεισιν εἰς τὴν ἄρχην ἦν αὐτὸς έδει τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὀρισμένον. ἐπεὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦς διὰ πολλῶν συνήξειν αἵτινες, τὸ δὲ οὐ τὸ διότι ἀποδίδοις [Eustr. has said above in his note on 7. § 20 τὰ μέρη τοῦ ἀρου τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐκλεγόμενοι οὐδαμὴ αἵτινες εἶληφε δὲ ἦν ὅπερχει ἑκείνων ἑκατὸν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ οὐδὲ διὰτε μέρος τῆς οὐσίας αἵτις ἐστίν... ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη δεῖξε τοῦ ὅτι οὐ τοῦ διότι ἐστί, φησὶν νῦν ὅτι σκέπτειν περὶ αἵτις εἰ ἀρμίδιος ὅρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀποδοθεὶς, οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ μεταφέρεσθαι δ' αὕτη ἡ ἄρχη καὶ ὁ ὅρος ἐστὶ, καὶ ἦν ὁ λόγος τούτων ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων ἢ δὲν ἡ περὶ αὕτου δεῖξις συνθέτεται, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

The doctrine, justly insisted upon by Aristotle in the present passage—that the principle of moral science must be brought to the test of substantial agreement with popular opinion—does not admit of analogical extension to the principles of the physical sciences. Popular opinion cannot afford to be far wrong in matters of conduct, but has little reason for being right as to the remote truths of the physical sciences. Aristotle, however, submits the principles of the physical sciences, equally with the principle of moral science, to dialectical tests, i.e. examines them in connexion with τὰ ἐνδοξά: see Top. i. 2. 101 a. 36 ἐμὲ δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν [χρήσιμος ἡ πραγματεια, i. e. the Topics, which supply premisses for the dialektikos συλλογισμός, and rules for its employment]· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθεῖσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον εἴπειν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἑπειδὴ πρῶτα αἱ ἀρχαί ἐπιστών εἰσι, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἑκάστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν διελθεῖν τοῦτο ὁ ἰδιὸς ἡ μάλιστα οἰκείον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἑστίν ἐξεταστικῆ γὰρ ὁ σά, πρὸς τὰς ἀπατῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχαὶ δόθην ἤ χεί. In his note on the above passage, Alexander (Berlin Schol. 254 b. 36) illustrates the relation of Dialectic to first principles, by showing how ἐνδοξά may be used in support and elucidation of the Definitions of Geometry. See Zeller (Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. pp. 243–4 ed. 3) 'Sie (i. e. die Dialektik) dient insofern namenlich zur Feststellung der wissenschaftlichen Prinzipien, denn da sich diese als ein erstes nicht durch Beweisführung aus etwas gewisserem ableiten lassen, bleibt nur übrig, sie vom
That Aristotle failed to draw consciously any very marked distinction between the principle, or principles, of moral science, and the principles of the physical sciences, as related to ἐνδοεια, shows how defective his conception of the method of the physical sciences really was. The dialectical sifting of ἐνδοεια, or men's opinions about facts, in order to find the residuum of truth contained in these opinions, can never take the place, in the physical sciences, of direct observation and arrangement of the facts themselves. The dialectical method of physical enquiry is on a par with the attempt to sift historical truth directly out of myths by a rationalising process (on which see Grote's Greece, Part i. ch. 16)¹.

The importance, however, of a dialectical treatment of the principle, or principles, of moral science cannot be too much insisted on. The value of these principles is that they lead 'not to knowledge but to conduct.' Unless conduct is to be revolutionised rather than regulated, these principles must, on the whole, agree with the moral sentiments and opinions which, by their prevalence, prove themselves to be such as the welfare of man requires.

The moralist's function, then, according to Aristotle's view (the justice of which is indisputable), is to introduce form, clearness, consistency, into the body of opinions, on practical matters, commonly held by men. These opinions are, on the whole,

¹ We must not, however, underrate the indirect service rendered by Aristotle to these very physical sciences. His 'dialectical' treatment of their principles put Europe in possession of the subtle calculus of philosophical language, without which later brains could not have thought out the discoveries suggested to them by wider and more careful observations.
sound (otherwise they would not prevail on matters of such vital importance to the human race), but are wanting in clearness and consistency viewed as a body. The moralist, viewing them as a body, detects and removes the inconsistencies, and produces a system in which his contemporaries recognise the clear expression of their own obscurely entertained sentiments. So, to take a parallel case, the policy of Pericles was recognised by the Athenian δῆμος as the perfect form of its own political views and aspirations, which, without his genius, would never have found expression as a system. See *E. E.* i. 6. 1216 b. 26 πειρατέον δὲ τούτων πάντων ζητεῖν τὴν πιστὶν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίων καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φανομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντως ἀνθρώπων φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντα τοῖς ἤθησαν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας, ἰστερματικῶς ποιήσοντον ἔχει γὰρ ἑκάστου φιλεῖν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἷς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πάντοτε πρὶν πρέπει αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγόμενων, οὐ σφάλας δὲ προϊσόντων ἦσαν καὶ τὸ σφάλας, μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰσαχθέντος λέγεσθαι συγκεκριμένον (cf. *de Anima* ii. 2. 413 a. 11): *E. N.* vii. 1. 5 δεὶ δὲ διαπέπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντως τὰ φανομένα, καὶ πρῶτων διαπροσώπωσιν, οὕτω δεικνύσαι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἐνδοξα πρὶν πρὸς τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυρίωτα· εὖν γὰρ λύγηται τα τα δυσχέρη καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἐνδοξα, δεδειγμένοι ὑπὸ ἑαυτῶν. — *E. N.* x. 8. 12 κοπεῖν δὲ τὰ προειρημένα χρῆ ἐπὶ τὰ ἑργα καὶ τῶν βιῶν φέροντας, καὶ συναντών μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποθέτον, διαβαῤῥούντων δὲ λόγους ὑπολειπτέων (cf. *E. N.* x. i. §§ 3, 4).

b. 11 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεὶς . . . τάληθες] The passage *E. N.* x. 8. 12, just quoted, helps us to understand this clause. Τὰ ἐπάχρονα are ‘the natural attributes of the thing, the facts of its nature’ (Grant), which, it is here tacitly assumed, are adequately represented in the opinions or λεγόμενα appealed to. If the Definition be true (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθείς), these commonly recognised facts will agree with it; but if it be false (τὸ δὲ ψευδεὶς), they will soon show themselves at variance with it. Grant notices the confusion caused ‘by the word τάληθες in the second part of the sentence answering to τὰ ἐπάχρονα in the first,’ and consequently having to be taken in a different sense from τὸ ἀληθείς immediately above. Rassow, however (*Forsch.* p. 73), conjectures, with great plausibility, that τάληθες is the blundering interpolation of a reader, who did not observe that τὰ ἐπάχρονα is the subject of διαφορεῖ, as well as of συνῆθει. His words are ‘Vergegenwärtigt man sich den Zweck
§ 2. νευμημένων δή...]
‘To apply our principle (δή), goods b. 12. have been divided into three kinds’ (Grant)—i.e. to apply the principle of appealing to λεγόμενα.

As Ramsauer observes, this threefold division of goods is indicated by Plato in *Philebus* 48 E and *Euthyd.* 279 B. Cf. also *Legg.* 743 E. It is a very natural division, and doubtless was made long before Plato and Aristotle; but the Peripatetics seem to have given it philosophical importance, by taking it in connexion with their discussions of εὐδαιμονία. Cf. Plut. *de Vita et Poesi Homerī,* ch. 137 οί δ' ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου προτείειν μὲν τά τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθὰ νομίζονσιν οἷον φρόνησιν ἀνθρείας συμφρονίσῃς δικαιοσύνης. δεύτερα δ' εἶναι τά τοῦ σώματος οἷον ἤγειει κ.π.λ. . . τρίτα δὲ τά ἐκτὸς οἷον εἰδοξίαν κ.π.λ. . . ἐπαινεῖν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὸν τό ἐν ἀληθίδαι καὶ νόμῳ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ συμφοραί αἴδουλῳς χρῆσαι τῇ ἄρετῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀντεχούσης τοῖς κακοῖς, οὐ μέντοι ἄρετον, οὐδὲ μακάριον τὸ δ' ἐν ἀγαθοῖς νοῦν ἔχειν τῷ ὑπερετή τοῦ εὐδαιμονοῦ οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν κτῆσιν μόνην τῆς ἄρετης ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καλῶν. Didymus—'Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἥβηκῶν δόγματα (Mullach, *Fr. Phil.* ii. pp. 89, 90)—after making out a parallelism between the ἀγαθὰ of body, mind, and estate thus—

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<tr>
<td>ἀλλὸς</td>
<td>δικαιοσύνη</td>
<td>φιλία</td>
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<tr>
<td>εὔαισθησία</td>
<td>φρόνησις</td>
<td>εὐτυχία</td>
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... goes on to say—τοὺς δὲ νομίζοντας τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ ἐξωθείν ἀγαθὰ συμπληρῶν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγεις ὅτι ἡ μὲν εὐδαιμονία βίος ἦστιν, ὁ δὲ βίος ἐκ πράξεως συμπεπληρωματικὸς τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πράξαν εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτό, οὔθ' οἷος ἐνέργειαν.

The passages in which Aristotle refers to this threefold division are *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 25 οὖν γὰρ αὐταρκεστάτου εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχουσι αὐτῷ τά τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τά ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά. ἔστι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τά περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ τά ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δ' εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμῆ.
b. 12. Pol. H. i. 1323 a. 22 νομίσαντας οὖν ικανὸς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστησις ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς ὡς ἀληθὸς γὰρ πρὸς ἐμαυείους οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσειν οὐ, ὡς οὖ, τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίσον, τῶν τε ἐκτός καὶ τῶν ἐν σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχουσιν τοῖς μακροίοις χρή. Cf. E. E. ii. 1. 1121 b. 32 πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἦ ἐκτὸς ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τούτων αἱρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαμορφώθηκα τὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις: Μ. Μ. i. 3. 1184 b. 2 ἐστὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ σώματι οἷον ιδέα, κάλλος, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός, πλοῦτος ἀρχὴ τιμῆς ἐτεί μᾶλλον τοιοῦτων, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βέλτιστα. The following passage, attributed by Mullach (Fr. i. p. 554 b.) to the Pythagorean Archytas, is so evidently from a late Peripatetic summary done into the Doric dialect, that it is added here merely as another proof of the importance given by Peripateticism to the threefold division of ἀγαθά, not as being a possible source from which Aristotle may have borrowed that division: ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπος οὖν ἐν ψυχᾷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τὸ γὰρ εἶ ἀμφοτέρων ἐς καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοιοῦτων ἀνθρώπος· καὶ γὰρ αἱ τὰς ψυχὰς ὀργίων τὸ σῶμα πέρφυκε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπος μέρος, καὶ τούτο καὶ ἡ ψυχὰ, διὰ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ μὲν ἐνὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, δὲ τῶν μερῶν. καὶ ἀνθρώπος μὲν ἀγαθὸν εὐδαιμοσύνα, τῶν δὲ μερῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ψυχὰς μὲν, φρόνισις, ἀνθρεία, δικαιοσύνα, σωφροσύνα, σώματος δὲ κάλλος, ἱδέα, εὐκτίς, εὐδαιμονία. τὰ δὲ ἐκτός, πλοῦτος καὶ δόξα καὶ τιμὰ καὶ εὐγένεια ἐπιγένεμα ἦμεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀκόλουθα τοῖς φύσει προϊστασκάτοις ἀγαθοῖς. δορυφορεῖ δὲ τὰ μῆκον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέζονα, φιλία μὲν καὶ δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος σῶμα καὶ ψυχὰν, ἱδέα δὲ καὶ ἰσχὺς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῶν, φρόνισις δὲ καὶ ἀνθρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῶν νόσον τὰς ψυχὰς, ὁ δὲ νόος τῶν θεῶν. οὕτος γὰρ ὁ κράτιστος ἐντέλειος ἡ καὶ ὁ ἀγεμονεύοντα· καὶ τούτω ἐνεκα καὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν δεὶ παράμενοι, στρατεύματος μὲν γὰρ ἐγείτησα στραταγών, πλοτωρίων δὲ κυβερνητά, τὸ δ' κύριον θεός, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς νόσος, τὰς δὲ περὶ τῶν βιῶν εὐδαιμοσύνας πρόμνουσι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτερον ἐντεῖ φρόνισις, αἱ μὲ ἐπιστήμα πάντων περὶ τῶν βιῶν εὐδαιμοσύνας ἡ ἐπιστήμα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθῶν.

b. 14. λέγομεν] 'are commonly said to be.' Peters.

b. 16. τίθεμεν] 'may be said to be.' Peters.

ὡστε καλῶς ἐν λέγοντοι] 'so our Definition (λόγος) is right.' Tὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχῶν is of the present passage is equivalent to the ψυχής ἐνεργεία of the Definition, as given in ch. 7. § 15. In making the highest good an ἐνεργεία ψυχῆς, the Definition agrees with the commonly accepted view that the goods of the ψυχῆ are the highest.
§ 3. ὅρθως δὲ καὶ δὴ . . . τέλος] ‘But indeed we secure the support of this opinion by the mere statement that certain actions and exercises are the end’—Peters: i. e. ‘our Definition is also seen to be right, in that it makes certain actions and functions the end.’ ‘Qui enim dicunt, actionibus humanis felicitatem contineri, in animo sitam felicitatem volunt, cum solus animus in homine agendi sit principium’—Michelet. As ψυχικάς was the emphatic word in the previous §, ἐνέργεια is emphatic here: see Eusthr., διαφέρει δὲ τοῦτο (i. e. the point made in § 3) τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ (i. e. that made in § 2), ὅτι ἐν ἑκείνη μὲν τὸ καλὸς εἰρήσαθαι ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν τὴν εἰσαμομοίαν αὐξάσθησαι ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ὅρθως λέγεσθαι πράξεις εἶναι καὶ ἐνέργειας τὸ τέλος. τὸ δὴ τινὲς προσεῖδον ὅτι οὐ χάπλος πράξεις καὶ ἐνέργεια τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ ποιαί· ἄντων καί ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀγαθὴν.

γίνεται] ‘is shown to be.’ Cf. i. 7. 15 for this use of γίνεται. b. 20.

§ 4. τὸ λόγῳ] ‘our Definition.’

τὸ εὖ ἃν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τῶν εἰσαίμων] ‘the popular saying that the εἰσαίμων lives and fares well.’

ἐιρήται] i. e. in our Definition. b. 22.

§ 5.] ‘Farther, the various things which are looked for in Happiness seem all to belong to it as we have defined it.’


τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις] The commentators generally identify this with b. 24. the view of Socrates, comparing E. N. vi. 13. 3; cf. E. E. i. 5. 1216 b. 3 Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης φίλτε εἴναι τέλος τὸ γνώσεις τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ἐπέζητες τί ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς· ἐποίει γὰρ ταῦτα εὐλόγως. ἐπιστήμης γὰρ φίλτε εἶναι πᾶσας τῶν ἀρετάς, ὡσ′ ἀρμα συμβαίνει εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. ἀμα μὲν γὰρ μεμάθηκαιν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμὲν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι. Of course this is an absurd travesty of the doctrine of Socrates.

ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις] Anaxagoras probably for one: cf. E. E. i. 5. 1216 a. 11 τῶν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξιγόραν φασίν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς των δια- διορούντα τοιαῦτα ἄττα, καὶ διερατώτατο τίνος ἕνεκ’ ἄν τίς ἐλεύθερος γενέσθαι
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1098 b.24. μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι τοῦ "τοῦ" φάναι "θεαρήσαι τὸν οὐφανὴν καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν ὁλον κόσμον τάξεων." Οὔτε μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἔνεκεν τὴν αἴρεσιν ἑκεῖν τούτῳ τιμίῳ εἰναι τοῦ ζην. Cf. E.E. i. 4. 1215 b. 6 Ἀναψαγόρας μὲν ὁ Κλαξιφίμνος ἔρωτιθείς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονιστάτος, "οὐδεὶς" εἶπεν "δὲ σὺ νομίζεις, ἀλλὰ ἀτόπος ἂν τίς σου φανεῖν." Τούτω δ᾿ ἀπεκρίνη τοιὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος ὀρθῶν τὸν ἔρωμεν ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν οὖτα καὶ καλὰν ἡ πλοῦσιν ταύτης τυγχάνεις τῆς προσφηνορίας. Αὐτὸς δ᾿ Ἰσως φείτο τὸν ἐξωτα ἀλώπος καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τίνος θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τούτων ὁς ἀνθρωπον εἰπεὶς μακάρων εἶναι. Cf. E.N. x. 8. 11.

b. 25. τοὺς δὲ ταύτα ἢ τοὺς μὲν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς] cf. Plato Philebus 27 D ἢ λὰ ἐκὼντα μὲν ἐθεμέν ποιν τὸν μετὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως: cf. Phileb. 60 D, E.

μεθ’ ἡδονῆς] seems to mean 'with pleasure added,' as distinguished from οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς, 'with pleasure essentially involved'; so, apparently, the Paraphrast—τοὺς δὲ τούτων τι μεθ’ ἡρασί, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀπὸ αὐτῶν τοῦτον τικτομένης. Cf. below, § 12 οὔδεν δὴ προσδείχαι τής ἡδονής ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὄσπερ περιάτου τινὸς, ἀλλὰ ἔχει τήν ἡδονήν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. When Plato praises τὸν μετὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως, he, like Aristotle, regards the relation of pleasure to virtuous action as an essential one: this is plain from Philebus 63 E ἄλας δὲ ἡδονάς ἀθλήσεις καὶ καθαράς ἢ ἐπές, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῶν νόμιξες, καὶ πρὸς ταύτας τὰς μεθ’ ἤγκειαι καὶ τοῦ σαφοφευνείς καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐξυπέπασθε ἀρετῆς ὑπόκαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὑπάθει γεγονόμει αὐτῇ ἐνυκακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μίγνων κ.τ.λ. Aspasius explains differently: μεθ’ ἡδονῆς μὲν οἱ λέγοντες μέρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ποιοῦσι τήν ἡδονή, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς, οἱ μέρος ἀλλ’ ὕπ’ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡ εὐδαιμονία λέγοντι τήν ἡδονή.

b. 26. έτεροι] The commentators identify this with the opinion of Xenocrates, Plato’s disciple: see Clem, Alex. Strom. ii. p. 419 a, quoted by Ritter and Preller, Hist. Ph. § 301 ξενοκράτης . . . τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι κτῆσιν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως. εἰτά ὡς μὲν ἐν θ’ γῆρεσιν φαίνεται λέγον τὴν ψυχήν, ὅσ δ’ οὐθ’ ἄν τὰς ἀρετάς, ὅσ δὲ εὖ δὲν ὡς μερῶν τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας ἔξεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ κυνήσεις καὶ σχέσεις, ὅσ τούτων οὐκ ἄνευ τὰ σωματικά καὶ τὰ ἐκτός. This does not seem to differ essentially from Aristotle’s own view of the nature and conditions of εὐδαιμονία.

συμπαραλλαμβάνων] M b, O b, Ald., C C C, and N C give συμπεριλαμβάνονων. MS. authority does not count for much where παρά and περί are concerned. Συμπαραλλαμβάνων ('take in as an
adjunct,' *Liddell and Scott* expresses a view of the relation of *eudaimonia* such as Aristotle himself holds; *συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν* ('include along with') expresses a view which Aristotle would object to as putting *eudaimonia*—a mere condition, *οὗ ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν ἦν, οἵ αὐγακόιον εἶ ὑποθέσεως*, too much on a par with the formal elements, or *μέρη* strictly so called, of *eudaimonia*. On τὰ μέρη τῆς *eudaimonias* see below note on § 16.

*eudaimonian* literally, 'goodness of season (*eidos*),' and then, generally, 'prosperity.'

§ 7.] Cf. vii. 1. 5, and note there. 

§ 8.] 'Aristotle now proceeds to show his own coincidence with these preexistent theories. It is to be observed that he says nothing here in reference to those who made happiness to consist in "thought" [*φρύσης*] or "a sort of philosophy" [*σοφία τις*]. This is one of the marks of systematic method in the *Ethics.* He will not anticipate the relation of *φρόνησις* and *σοφία* to *eudaimonia.*' Grant.

Although it is true that Aristotle makes no explicit reference in this chapter to those who made happiness to consist in *φρόνησις* or *σοφία τις*, he seems to me not entirely to overlook their opinion; for in § 13 he passes from the consideration of the pleasure involved in *ai kata' árētēn prōžēs* to the assertion that they are not only pleasant, but also *ἀγαθαί καὶ καλαί*, as judged by the *σπουδαίος*, the standard of excellence. This appeal to the *κρίσις* τοῦ *σπουδαίου* involved in defining the Chief Good as *ψυχής ενέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἄριστην ἄρετήν* seems to me to give full weight in the Definition to the opinion of those who make Happiness consist in *φρόνησις* or *σοφία* τις, and I think that § 13 is intended to bring this out.

*συνφόδος*] Susemihl now wishes to read (*E. E. Appendix, p. 163*) *σύνφορος* ('conterminous with') after K*. He thinks that *συνφόδος*, given by NC (not by Z=CCC) and Camb., supplies the intermediate form between the correct *σύνφορος* and the plausible *συνφόδος*: see his reply to Adolf Busse (*zur Textkritik der Nic. Eth.: Hermes, vol. xviii. p. 137, sqq., 1883*) in *N. Jahrb.* 1883.

*ταῦτας γᾶρ ἔστιν ἢ κατὰ αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια*] 'For "exercise of faculties b. 31. in accordance with excellence" belongs to excellence.' Peters. 'Zur Tugend gehört die ihr gemässe Wirksamkeit.' Stahr.

§ 9.] With this § cf. *M. M.* i. 4. 1184 b. 28 *τὸ ἄρα ἑὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ*
1098 b. 31. ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῷ εὗρείν, τὸ δὲ εὗρείν ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἦν. Τῶν' άρ' ἐστὶ ἀλὸς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὸ ἀριστον. 'Εν χρήσει τοιῶν τοι τῶν εἶναι καὶ ἐνεργεῖαι ἡ εὐδαιμονία. Ὄμω γὰρ ἦν ἐξεις καὶ χρήσεις, χρήσεις καὶ ἡ ἐνεργεία τέλος. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἡ ἀρετὴ ἔξεις ἦν. Ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ χρήσις αὐτῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅπερ τέλος ἄν εἴη ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ χρήσις αὐτῆς. 'Ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἄρ' ἀν εἴη ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἦν. Ἐπειδήπερ οὖν τὸ ἀριστον ἀγαθὸν ἦστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ αὐτὴ τέλος ἐνεργεία, ζωτείς ἁν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς εὐδαιμονεῖς ἄν εἴης καὶ ἐξομεῖς τὸ ἀριστον ἁγαθὸν. 'Εσπεὶ δ' οὖν ἠτῶν ἐνεργεία τέλεος ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλος, οὕτω τούτῳ δει λαμβάνειν ὅτι καὶ ἐν τελείῳ ἦσται. Οὐ γὰρ ἦσται εἰς παιδί (οὗ γὰρ ἦσται παῦσει εὐδαιμονίαν) ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνδρι' οὕτως γὰρ τέλεος. οὕτω ἐν χρόνῳ γε ἀτελεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν τελείῳ. Τέλειος δ' ἀν εἴη χρῆσις, ὅστοι άνθρωπος ὑπο. Καὶ γὰρ λέγεται ἄρθος παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ὅτι δεῖ τὸν εὐδαιμονέα ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ βίου κρίνειν, ὅς δέον τὸ τέλεον εἶναι καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ τέλεος καὶ ἐν ἀιὼν τέλεος. Ὕπετ δὲ ἐνεργείας ἦστιν, ἢδον ἀν τίς καὶ ἐνεπελθείς. 'Εν γὰρ τοῖς ὑποισίως, οὖν ἐξ τῆς καθόδου διὰ βίου, τῶν τοιοῦτον ὧν πάνω θεωρομένα λέγειν εὐδαιμονέα ἦνι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ χρόνον ἀντὶς ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ χρόνον αὐτὸν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς υἱὸς ὑπάρχει, δὴ ἂν κατὰ τὴν ἐνεργείαν: cf. E. N. ix. 9, 5, and x. 6. 2.

b. 32. ἐν κτῆσις ἡ χρήσις ... ἐν ἐξείς ἡ ἐνεργεία.] Eustr. has ἡ μὲν χρῆσις καὶ κτήσις, ἐπὶ τῶν ὄργανον λέγεται καὶ εἰ τῷ τούτῳ ἀνάλογον, ἡ δὲ ἐξείς καὶ ἐνεργεία ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ θεωρομένῳ ποιητῶν καὶ τελειούσων αὐτό. οὖν πλούσιος μὲν καὶ σκέψι καὶ τὰ τής τέχνης ὑπογέγραμμα ἑγένεσθαι τοῦ κτῆσιν εἶναι τοῖς ἐχούσι λέγονται, καὶ δεῖ χρῆσαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ δέουσα ώς μή μάτην ἡ τούτων εἷς κτήσις. τέχνη δε καὶ ἐπιτήτημα καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐξείς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν αἰτή μὲν ὡς ἐν ύποκειμένῳ ὡς, τελειοτάτω καὶ τοῦ ἐν ὧν ἐστι, καὶ δεῖ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνεργεῖν ὑπὲρ μή μάτην τὰς ἐξείς ἔχομεν ὡς γὰρ θεατοῦρῳ μή θεατοῦρῳ ματὴν τὴν κτήσις, οὕτω καὶ ἐξείς ἀγάθη μὴ ἐνεργοῦσα εἴη ἂν τὸ ὑπάρχεια διάκενον.

b. 33. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐξέν ... ὑπάρξον] 'for the Habit (of Virtue) may be present, and yet bring forth no good result.'

1099 a. 2. ἐξηγηγηκότι] ἐξηγηκὼν means 'to lie quite idle,' like a field 'lying fallow.'

a. 3. πράξει] The subject is ἐνεργεία, but Eustrat. has πράξαι γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργῶν καὶ εἰ πράξεις ἐκ γὰρ ἀγαθῆς ἐξείς ἀγαθῶς προβαίνοντων ἐνεργείαι. So the Par. πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄ τὴν ἐνεργείαν ἔχων, καὶ ἐν τὴν ἀγαθήν ἐνεργείαν ἔχει, εὗ πράξει.

δοσπερ ὧν Ὑλομπίασιν κ.τ.λ.] Cf. E. E. ii. 1. 1219 b. 9 στε-φανοῦσται οἱ νικῶστες, ἀλλ' οἱ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικῶν, μὴ νικῶστες δε. 
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τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀκαθόθων...ἐπήθολοι γίνονται] 'win the great 1099 a. 5. prizes of life.' Cf. i. 10. 14 μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν...γενόμενος ἐπήθολος.

§ 10. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ’ αὐτὸν ἡδος. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἱδεόθαι a. 7. τῶν ψυχικῶν] The connexion is explained by the Paraphrast—ἐστι δὲ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ’ εαυτὸν ἡδος, οὐκ ἔξωθεν ἐξων τὴν ἡδονήν' ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἱδεόθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστίν (cf. E. N. x. 3. 6 ei δὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ κατά φύσιν ἀναπληρώσεις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν φ’ ἡ ἀναπληρώσεις, τούτ’ ἂν καὶ ἱδοτο’ τὸ σῶμα ἁρα’ οὖ δοκεῖ δὲ ὀὐδ’ ἐστὶν ἄρα ἡ ἀναπληρώσεις ἡδονή), οὐδὲν καλέει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς εἰναι. Cf. E. N. x. 4. 10, 11, and x. 5. 6: also E. E. ii. 1. 1218 b. 32 πάντα δὴ τὰ ἄγαθα ἢ ἐκτὸς ε’ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἰρετότερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ τὸν ἐξωτερικοῦ λόγους φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἡδονή ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ: and M. M. i. 3. 1184 b. 5 τὰ δ’ ἐν ψυχῇ διώρισται ἄγαθα εἰς τριά, εἰς φρόνησιν εἰς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἡδονήν.

ἐκάστῳ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡδο πρὸς δ’ λέγεται φιλοτουχώτατος] If a man is a. 8. φιλοτουχώτατος, he will, unless hindered, perform the πράξεις which his disposition prompts. These πράξεις, being his own, i.e. proceeding from his own disposition, will be pleasant (see E. N. viii. 3. 6 ἐκάστῳ γὰρ καθ’ ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις); their being pleasant and their being performed are two inseparably connected characteristics of such πράξεις.

§ 11. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ’ a. 11. εἰναι] The φαῖλος is not an organic whole. His desires do not represent the good of a permanent personality, but are merely the cravings of this or that part as separately affected. The whole does not live in every part, but every part is served by its own separate gratification. What pleases one part displease another part. The rational man—the φρόνιμος or σπουδαῖος—perceives and loves the beautiful Form of Human Nature (τὸ καλὸν), and is regulated by his consciousness and love of it in all his desires. Nothing is pleasant to him which harms, or even does not benefit, his nature as a whole—τοῖς δὲ φιλοκαλοῖς ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα. Τὰ φύσει ἡδέα—‘things naturally pleasant’ are thus things which call forth the functions, and preserve the health, of a man’s true φύσις—his rational personality; τὰ μὴ φύσει ἡδέα are things which stimulate desires ‘not obedient to reason,’ i.e. not organised as parts of a consistent and permanent system. Cf. the description in E. N. ix. 4 of the σπουδαῖος and of the φαιλος respectively—§ 3 ὁμογενοὶ ἐαυτῷ (ὁ σπουδαῖος) καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὥργεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν καὶ
BOOK I: CHAP. 8: §§ 11, 12.

1099 a. 11. Βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τάγαθα καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἄγαθον τάγαθον διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἑνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἔκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ) καὶ ζην δὴ Βούλεται ἑαυτῷ καὶ σφέξεθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τούτου ὁ φρονεῖ. ἄγαθον γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εὑρεῖ. On the other hand (§ 9) απασιάζει (τῶν φαίλων) ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μέν διά μοχθηρῶν ἀλλεὶ ἀπεχάρευν τινῶν, τὸ δὲ ἰδεῖται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δείο τὸ δὲ ἐκείνο ἐλκεῖ ὑποστει διασπόντα. It may be noted that the term φύσει has the same reference, in the phrase τὰ φύσει ἡδέα, as the term natural has in Butler's expression, 'the natural supremacy of Conscience' (Sermon 2), viz. to Human Nature as a system.

a. 14. οὕτε καὶ τούτους εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ' αὐτάς] 'accordingly they are pleasant, both to those who perform them, and in themselves,' i.e. the desires of the φιλόκαλου are in perfect correspondence with 'the Nature of Things,' or 'moral environment'—τὰ φύσει ἡδέα, the things in which a man ought to take pleasure, are αὐτῶς ἡδέα, things in which they do, as a matter of fact, take pleasure. Cf E. N. iii. 4. 5 καθ' ἐκάστῳ γὰρ ἔξω ἵνα ἐστὶ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλέοντον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τὰ τάληθες ἐν ἐκάστοις ὀράμα, ὑπερ κανόν καὶ μέτρου αὐτῶν ὄν.

a. 15. § 12. οἴδεν δὴ προσδεῖται κ.τ.λ.] Ramsauer contrasts the relation of εὐδαίμονι τὸ τὸ ἔκτος ἄγαθα—§ 15 φαίνεται δ' ἔμοι καὶ τῶν ἔκτος ἄγαθον προσδεομένη. In short, ἡδονή, being τῶν ψυχικῶν, cannot be a περίαπτον. On the whole § 12 see Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. 620 (third edition): 'Die Lust soll nicht der Zweck und Beweggrund unseres Thuns sein, sondern nur eine nothwendige Folge der naturgemässen Thatigkeit; könnten beide getrennt werden, so würde ein tüchtiger Mensch die Thatigkeit ohne Lust der Lust ohne Thatigkeit unbedingt vorziehen (E. N. x. 3. 12 οἴδεις τ' ἂν ἔλοκτο ζην παιδίων διάνοιαν ἔχον διά θεῖον, ἡδομείος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἶνον τὰ μάλιστα, οἴδε χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδεπετε μέλλον λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλά τε σποουδήν ποιησάμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονή, οἷον ὀράμα, μημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τάς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' εἴ ἀνάγκη ἐπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οἴδεν διαφέρει: ἐλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἂν αὐτῶν ἡδονή); in Wahrheit jedoch besteht die Tugend eben darin, dass man die Lust von der Tugend gar nicht zu trennen weiss, dass man sich in der tugendhaften Thatigkeit unmittelbar befriedigt fühlt, und keines weiteren, äusserlichen Zusatzes von Vergnügen bedarf.' Zeller then quotes E. N. i. 8. 12. Cf. also ii. 3. 1.

a. 18. περίαπτον] 'τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν φυλακτήριον, καὶ συνηθέστερον, φυλακτόν (Γαλλ.
BOOK I: CHAP. 8: §§ 12–14.

amulette)’—Coraes. Grant quotes Plut. Pericles 38 Θεόφραστος ... 1099 a.16. '


καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἐκαστον] i.e. ἀρισταὶ καὶ κάλλιστα.

eἰπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαίος' κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν] See a. 23. note on § 8 b. 30 above. Cf. Eustrat. καὶ τοῦτο (i.e. καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἐκαστον) ἔδωκαν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος σπουδαῖος γὰρ ὅν ὁ κρίνων περὶ αὐτῶν, ὁρθῶν ἐξεῖ τὸν λογισμὸν τὸ κριτήριον, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡδιστὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀριστῶν καὶ κάλλιστον αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεις κρίνονται, ὡς καὶ πρότερον ἐηρηνα, εἰς ἄν ἔξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοιαύτα: εἰ δὲ μὴ, φαίνεις τὸ σπουδαῖος, καὶ διάστροφος ὁ ὁρθὸς' ὧπερ ἄτομον. On the σπουδαῖος as the standard cf. E. N. iii. 4. 5; ix. 4. 2, 3.

κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν] viz. καὶ ἀγαθὰς καὶ καλὰς εἶναι τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἐκαστον.

§ 14. καὶ οὖ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα] ' and a. 25. these are not separated as they are in the Delian Inscription.' The Eudemian Ethics open with the quotation of these lines. Zell, Coraes, Fritzsche (Eth. Eud.), Michelet, and Grant collect various renderings of the sentiment, e.g. Plato, Gorgias 451 E ὁ δέμα μὴν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἄδοτοι ἄνθρωπος τοῦτο τὸ σκολῖον, οὗ δ' καταρκηθοῦσαν ἄδοτε, ὡς ἔγνωσεν, μὲν ἀριστον ἔστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενότατοι, τρίτον δὲ, ὡς φησίν, ὃ ποιήθη τοῦ σκολίου, τὸ πλεῖστον ἄδοὺς κ.τ.λ.: Theognis (Poel. Gn. p. 11, Tauchnitz) κάλλιστον τὸ δικαίωτατον ἀριστὸν δ' ἔγνωσεν | πρήγμα δὲ τερπνότατον τοῦ τις ἔρφο τυχεῖν: Simonides (or Epicharmus)

γνωσεν μὲν ἀριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ
deeúteron δὲ καλὸν φυλὰν γενόσθαι,
to tritoq δὲ πλείστον ἄδολως, kai to teptartoq ἡμᾶν μετὰ τῶν ψιλῶν:

1 Brit. Mus. 16. C. xxi (B') and the Aldine Edition give—ἡδιστὸν δὲ τυχεῖν οὐ τις ἐκαστος ἔρφ.
BOOK I: CHAP. 8: §§ 14, 15.

1099 a.25. Soph. Creusa (apud Stob.)

The unity of ευδαιμονία—the άριστη ένεργεία in which the other ένέργειαι are not lost, but co-ordinated and used for the good of the whole—is well brought out by Eustr. in his note, here—έστι δὲ ή ευδαιμονία ή ὁμοί πάσα ιἱ ήνα τὰς άρετὰς ένέργειας, ή εἰ μίας τῶν άρετῶν έρει, ή άριστη πασῶν . . . άυτῇ δ’ ἄν εἶη ή κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθη φιλοσοφίαν καὶ φρόνησιν, ή καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς συντηροῦσα καὶ συνέχουσα.

a. 20. ταύτας δὲ, ή μιᾶς τούτων τῆς άριστης, φαμέν εἶναι τὴν ευδαιμονίαν]

The unity of ευδαιμονία—the άριστη ένεργεία in which the other ένέργειαι are not lost, but co-ordinated and used for the good of the whole—is well brought out by Eustr. in his note, here—έστι δὲ ή ευδαιμονία ή ὁμοί πάσα ιἱ κατὰ τὰς άρετὰς ένέργειας, ή εἰ μίας τῶν άρετῶν έρει, ή άριστη πασῶν . . . άυτῇ δ’ ἄν εἶη ή κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθη φιλοσοφίαν καὶ φρόνησιν, ή καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς συντηροῦσα καὶ συνέχουσα.

a. 31. § 15.] External goods are necessary as conditions of ευδαιμονία, but are no parts of it, just as air and light are necessary to the life of a plant, but are no parts of that life. Even pleasure, although it must not be accounted a part of ευδαιμονία, is more intimately connected with it than external goods. Cf. Pol. H. 7. 1328 a. 21 ἐπεὶ δ’, ὅσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτων οὐ ταύτα ἐστὶ μόρια τῆς ἄλης συστάσεως, ὥσ τιν οὖν οὐκ ἀν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μίρη θετέων ὡς ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχει . . . διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ’ ἐστὶν ή κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως . . . ή δὲ πόλεως κοινωνίας τῆς ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ενδεχομένης άριστης’ ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν ευδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον, αὐτῇ δὲ άριστης ένεργεία καὶ θρησίς τῆς τέλειος κτ.λ.: Ε. Ε. i. 2. 1214 b. 11 μάλιστα δὲ δεὶ πρῶτον . . . διορίσασθαι . . . ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ ξην εὖ, καὶ τίνων ἀνέω τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὖκ ἐνδεχέσθαι τοῦθ’ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ταῦταν, διότι οὐκ ἀνέω τοῖς ἐγναίνει, καὶ τὸ ἐγναίνειν. ὁμοίως δ’ ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ’ ἐτέρων πολλῶν’ ὅστε οὔδε τὸ ξην καλῶς, καὶ διότι οὐκ ἀνέω δυνάτων ξην καλῶς: Ε. Ν. vii. 13. 2 οὐδεμία γὰρ ένεργεία τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ή δ’ ευδαιμονία τῶν τέλειων’ διὰ προσθέτεται ο εὐδαιμόνιον τῶν ἐν σώματι ἁγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτός καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδιζότατα ταῦτα, οἱ δὲ τὸν προχάζομεν καὶ τὸν δυστυχίας μεγάλαις περιπάτηστα εὐδαιμονία φύσκοντες εἶναι, ἔναν ή ἁγαθόν, ἡ ἐκοῦντες ή ἀκοὐντες οὔδεν λέγουσιν. See Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. 620, 621 (ed. 3) μετ’ ἀπορίας λέγει ταῦτα, η δὲ τῶν ἀριστήρων τιμήτωρ τιμήτωρ διὰ προσθέτεται ο εὐδαιμόνιον τῶν ἐν σώματι ἁγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτός καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδιζότατα ταῦτα, οἱ δὲ τὸν προχάζομεν καὶ τὸν δυστυχίας μεγάλαις περιπάτηστα εὐδαιμονία φύσκοντες εἶναι, ἔναν ή ἁγαθόν, ἡ ἐκοῦντες ή ἀκοὐντες οὔδεν λέγουσιν. See Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. 620, 621 (ed. 3) μετ’ ἀπορίας λέγει ταῦτα, η δὲ τῶν ἀριστήρων τιμήτωρ τιμήτωρ διὰ προσθέτεται ο εὐδαιμόνιον τῶν ἐν σώματι ἁγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτός καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδιζότατα ταῦτα, οἱ δὲ τὸν προχάζομεν καὶ τὸν δυστυχίας μεγάλαις περιπάτηστα εὐδαιμονία φύσκοντες εἶναι, ἔναν ή ἁγαθόν, ἡ ἐκοῦντες ή ἀκοὐντες οὔδεν λέγουσιν. See Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. 620, 621 (ed. 3) μετ’ ἀπορίας λέγει ταῦτα, η δὲ τῶν ἀριστήρων τιμήτωρ τιμήτωρ διὰ προσθέτεται ο εὐδαιμόνιον τῶν ἐν σώματι ἁγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτός καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδιζότατα ταῦτα, οἱ δὲ τὸν προχάζομεν καὶ τὸν δυστυχίας μεγάλαις περιπάτηστα εὐδαιμονία φύσκοντες εἶναι, ἔναν ή ἁγαθόν, ἡ ἐκοῦντες ή ἀκοevice image conversion successful
sprünglich in der vernunftgemässen Thätigkeit, in der Ausübung einer vollendeten Tugend; alles übrige kommt nur als eine Bedingung derselben in Betracht und ist nur insofern für ein Gut zu halten, wiefern es mit jener zusammenhängt, als ihre natürliche Folge, wie die Lust, oder als ihr Hülftmittel, wie die leiblichen und äusseren Güter; muss aber vorkommenden Falls zwischen diesen verschiedenen Gütern gewählt werden, so müssen alle andern den geistigen und sittlichen, weil sie allein unbedingte Güter sind, nachstehen.'

§ 16. enion de . . .] Things, the absence of which mars ευδαιμονία, 1099 b. 2. are distinguished, as Ramsauer notes, from things which are necessary to it as ὑγια. The de after enion thus answers to the μὲν after πάλλα. Grant quotes Ῥήτ. i. 5. 1360 b. 18 ed. ἡ ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν, πολυφυλίαν, χρηστοφυλίαν, πλούτον, εὐτεκίαν, πολυτεκίαν, εὐγηρίαν, ἄτι τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἄρετάς, οἱ ὧν ὑγείαν κάλλος ἑσυχάς μένεις δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικῆν, δόξαν, τιμήν, εὐνυχίαν, ἀρετῆν ὡστο γὰρ ἐν αὐταρκεστατος εὖ, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τὰ τέ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἄγαθα ὁ γὰρ ἐστιν ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα. He adds, 'The expression in the Ῥήτ. "parts of happiness" is equivalent to "instruments" of happiness, the more accurate designation in the present passage.' This is scarcely correct;—the present passage, as we have just seen, distinguishes the instruments (ὑγια) of happiness, such as πλούτος, and its ornaments, such as κάλλος; whereas in the Ῥῆτ. both are called 'parts'—μέρη. In Ἕ. Ἐ. i. 2. 1214 b. 26 (ὅποι ἄνευ ὑπὸ ὅλον τε ἐγκαταστάσεις ἔνοικο μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσι), on the other hand, we find μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας contrasted with ὅποι ἄνευ ὑπὸ ὅλον τε, this latter expression being, in fact, equivalent to the μέρη of the Ῥῆτ. The Ῥῆτ., concerned as it is to supply points to speakers addressing popular audiences, naturally differs from the more philosophical Εθικα (Nic. and Ευδ.) in its presentation of εὐδαιμονία. It includes conditions, instruments, and ornaments among the μέρη. For μέρη as 'formal elements of the notion' see Μει. z. io and 11.
130 BOOK I: CHAP. 8: §§ 16, 17.

1099 b. 3. εὐγενείας] See Pseudo-Plut. de Nobilitate 7 'Αριστοτέλην ὁράμεν ἐν τῷ ἐκδηδομένῳ περὶ εὐγενείας βιβλίῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑπανευοίς διακεκοσμηκότα καὶ ἐν τῶν ἀγαθῶν λόγω διηρήμηκότα. The fragments from this Dialogue περὶ εὐγενείας, preserved in Stob. Flor. 86. 24, 25, and 88. 13 (see Berlin Aristotle, 1490), seem to suggest for εὐγενεία a more intimate relation to εὐδαιμονία than that occupied by the other ἀγαθά mentioned with it; for it is defined as ἀρετή γένους—'hereditary virtue' (so also in Pol. Γ. 7. 1283 a. 37); and, as such, must contribute to the content of that τελεία ἀρετή which manifests itself in the ἐνέργεια of εὐδαιμονία. Εὐγένεια is thus on a higher level than the 'instruments' or 'ornaments' of εὐδαιμονία.

οὐ πάνυ εὐδαιμονικὸς] 'is not very likely to be happy.' Peters.

b. 5. ή ϕιλοι] omitted by Ha, NC, P², Par. 1417, Par. 1853, Eustratius, Heliodorus. Accordingly Susemihl brackets the words. The reference to ϕιλοι is certainly not quite in place here, where the writer is speaking of the ornaments rather than of the instruments of εὐδαιμονία.

b. 8. § 17. ἐτεροὶ δὲ τὴν ἀρετῆν] These words are regarded as spurious by Giphanius, Ramsauer, and Susemihl. But are they not necessary to account for the ὅθεν which follows in Ch. 9. § 1? I think that they are: see Grant, ad loc.—'The word ὅθεν expresses the thread of connexion by which this new subject of discussion (i.e. πότερον ἐστὶ μαθητῶν κ.τ.λ.) is introduced. Since happiness seems to be a balance of two principles, an internal one, virtue, and an external one, circumstances, the question arises whether it is attainable by the individual through any prescribed means, or whether it is beyond his control. It seems chiefly, however, to be upon the word ἀρετῆν that Aristotle goes off. The question of the day, πότερον μαθητῶν ἡ ἀρετή, comes before him in mentioning that some identify happiness with virtue. . . . The question forms an important point at issue in the ethical systems of Aristotle and Plato. The conclusion of Aristotle is directly opposed to that which is tentatively stated at the end of the Meno (99 E)—ἀρετὴ ἄν εἶν ὀφεῖ φύσει ὀφεῖ διδακτῷ, ἀλλὰ βειά μορὰ παραγγελμένη ἄνευ νου οἷς ἰν παραγήγηται.' It

1 The text of the passages quoted from Aristotle in the editions of the de Nob. (ch. 14) has no authority. The passages were inserted by J. C. Wolf, the first editor of the work. See Newman's Politics, vol. ii. p. 68.
must be remembered, however, that, in the *Meno*, it is the political genius of a Pericles or Themistocles which is ascribed to *theta* *muora*; whereas in *E. N.* i. 9 Aristotle is speaking of the *topraxia* of average citizens—οι μη πεπηρωμένοι πρὸς ἀρετήν.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

The view that Happiness is Good Fortune—a gift bestowed by an external Power, Heaven or Fortune, upon certain favoured persons, is the very antithesis of our view that it is a function which the strenuous man, by his own efforts, learns to perform, and it may be useful here to compare the degrees in which two such opposite views of the origin of Happiness succeed in accounting for the facts of life.

We may begin by admitting that if Heaven has any gift for man, Happiness may well be that gift: it is indeed a 'Divine thing'; but this it surely may be in virtue of being the crown of man's endeavour.

Again, if Happiness were a gift of Fortune, it would be something exceptional, not widely distributed as it is. Its being widely distributed corroborates our view that it is attained through exertions of which most men are capable. And again, it is surely more in keeping with the 'beauty' of Happiness—that is, with the exquisite Harmony of the Happy Life, to ascribe it to the operation of a steady principle of causation, such as human agency, rather than to an aimless principle like Fortune or Chance. The organisms of the physical world are too beautiful, we think, and too definite, to be the results of Chance; but the life of the good man is far more beautiful and definite. Indeed this beauty and definiteness of the Happy Life are implied in our Definition, which thus throws much light on the question of the origin of Happiness now before us. We define it as a vital function manifesting excellence—implies thus that it is of a definite kind; and here we find ourselves in agreement with the doctrine laid down at the beginning of this Treatise—that the Chief Good is the end of Statesmanship; for the statesman's principal care is to produce a certain definite character in his citizens, i.e. to make them good, and capable of well doing. With good reason, then, we do not speak of an ox as 'happy'—for he cannot perform the functions in which Happiness consists; or a child (unless by anticipation)—for he cannot yet perform them. The performance of them needs, as we have said, perfect excellence and a perfect life: and often enough life is imperfect: many are the changes of fortune; the man who flourishes most may happen upon great misfortunes in his old age, like Priam; and no one would call a Priam 'happy.'
§ 1.] Cf. E. E. i. 1. 1214 a. 14 πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτόν ἐν τῷ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τῶν κατηχόν, πάτερον φύσει γίγνονται πάντες εὐδαιμόνες οἱ τυχαίοις ταύτῃς τῆς προσφοραῖς, ὡσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τῆν χροήν διαφέροντες, ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὕσως ἐπιστῆμης τοῦ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ διὰ τῶν ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ ὄστε κατὰ φύσιν ὄστε μαθοῦσιν ἄλλῳ εὐθείᾳ ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, θυατεία μὲν τοῖς φαύλως εὐθείᾳ, χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς), ἢ τούτων μὲν καὶ οὐδένα τῶν τρίτων, δυνάς δὲ θετούν ὅτι καθάπερ οἱ νυμφαλητοὶ καὶ θειληπτοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπινοοῦν δαιμονίον τῶν ὀστερ εὐθυσαίζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην (πολλοὶ γὰρ ταῦτα φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν).

b. 11. §§ 2, 3.] Aristotle, while declining to regard Happiness as a special gift bestowed on a favoured few by anthropomorphic gods, is willing to allow the term θείον to be applied to it as an ornate epithet—as indeed the term may be applied to any beautiful result of the formative agency of Nature: cf. E. N. vii. 13. 6 πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θείον: de An. ii. 4. 415 a. 26 φυσικοτάτων γὰρ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῷων ἑργῶν, ὅτα τελεῖα καὶ μη πῆρῳματα ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτῃ ἔχει, τὸ νοησάν ἐτερον ὅν ἄν, ἔφοι μὲν ἔφοι, φυτῶν δὲ φυτῶν ἐν τοῦ ἄει καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσι, ἢ δύναται: πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖνον ὄργεται, κακεῖνον ἐνεκα πράττει ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν πράττει: E. E. H. 14. 1248 a. 26 κυνί γὰρ ποι τὰ πάντα τὸ ἦμα τῶν θείων.

b. 14. ἄλλης ἢ εἰς σκέψεως οἰκειότερον] Eustr. says τῶν περὶ προνοιας εἰς ἄλλοις οἰκειότερον καὶ θεολογικῆς θεωρίας ἐχάμενοι ἵθελε δὲ ἡ προκειμένη πραγματεία, καὶ δοσον καὶ αὐτὴν ίκανον τὸ εἰρμενον. The question, however, is not one which Aristotle cares to discuss even where, as in the Metaphysics, it might seem more in place than here. The passage, E. N. x. 8. 13, in which he comes nearest to seriously entertaining the question of a personal relation between the gods and men, on close examination, is seen to commit him to nothing more than an ornate use of the epithet θεοφιλέστατος.

b. 18. § 4. εἰ θ' ἢ καὶ πολύκαιρον . . . ἐπιμελείας] There is a certain looseness in the reasoning here; indeed Grant describes the last clause, as it stands, as a petitio principii. The argument seems to be this:—If we suppose that Happiness is acquired δὲ ἀρστεὶ καὶ τῶν μαθήσεων ἢ ἀσκήσεων, τ. ἑ by our own personal exertions, we not only are still at liberty to describe it as ἀρστεῖον, θείον, and μακάρων, but we are able to explain the admitted fact that it is ‘common to many’ (πολύκαιροι)—a fact which is irreconcilable with its being
or the special gift of the gods. ’But it would seem also to be common to many—a characteristic which can be explained (γὰρ) only if we suppose that it may be acquired through study and diligence, by all who are not incapacitated for virtue.’ The importance of τὸ πολύκοινον, as enabling us to discriminate between the claims of an exceptional agency like θεὸς, εὐφυΐα, or τίχη on the one hand, and of man’s own personal exertion (ἐπιμέλεια, &c.) on the other hand, to be the source of Happiness, is well brought out in E. E. i. 3. 1215 a. 12 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τίχην γινομένους ἡ τοίς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλὸς ζῦν ἔστιν, ἀνελπιστὸν ἣν εἰ ἐνή πολλοίς (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπιμελείας ἡ κτήσις οὐδὲ ἐπ’ αὐτοὶς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας) εἰ δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῶν ποιῶν τινα εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατ’ αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἦν εἰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ θεϊότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλεῖσιν ἐνδεχόμενον μετασχεῖν, θειότερον δὲ τῷ κείσατα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς αὐτοῖς παρασκευάζουσι ποιῶς τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

§ 5.] On this section Ramsauer remarks, ‘jam enim missa est b. 20. omnis cogitatio de deorum beneficio. Nec deesset forsan necessario τὸ πολύκοινον, si res ad deum referenda esse videretur; quod vero fortunae attribuitur spreta omni lege ne ós εἰπὶ τὸ πολὺ quidem potest accidere.’ The fact that Happiness is ‘common to many’ certainly excludes the hypothesis of mere chance being its cause; but I cannot agree with Ramsauer in thinking that the same fact does not, in Aristotle’s mind, necessarily exclude the hypothesis of its being the gift of personal gods. We must remember that the popular conception of εὐδαιμονία which Aristotle has to correct is that embodied in the etymology of the word, and associated with such examples as Polycrates and Croesus, who, because specially favoured by Heaven, were also specially exposed to its φθόνος.

Michelet’s note on § 4 makes εἰ ὅδ’ ἐν καὶ πολύκοινον disprove the intervention of the gods. ‘εἰ ὅδ’ ἐν καὶ πολύκοινον’ nempe si exercitazionee virtus comparatur. Jam autem concludit: Cum a multis possit acquiri, revera exercitatione comparatur. Sin vero a Diis mitteretur, paucis Deorum amicis continget, ut admodum paucis Homeri heroibus, ex. gr. Menelao campi Elysii.’ I think that τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πολύκοινον is intended to disprove the agency of any exceptional cause, whether God or Chance.

In illustration of the conception of φύσις contained in § 5 Zell and Michelet quote Phys. viii. 6. 259 a. 10 εἰ γὰρ τοῖς φύσις δεί τὸ
The implication in the argument is that civilization, the perfect form of man’s life, is too beautiful and definite an organism to be the result of chance; so in Phys. ii. 8 it is argued that the beautiful structures of plants and animals cannot be due to the working of the haphazard principle of nature, with which the survival of the fittest is mistakenly identified in the chapter—as in the following passage 198 b. 23: *τό μὲν έξειν τίνι φύσις, οίον τοῖς ὁλίγοις καὶ άθετεις, οίον τοῖς Διόνυσοις καὶ χρησίμους πρός τό διακρίνειν, τούτος δὲ γομφόν πλανέως καί ἄριστος πρός τό λείαντος τήν τρόφιν, επειδή οὐκ έστι κατά τόν άγνωστον γενετόν, άλλα συμπεπείνων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν άλλων μερῶν, εν οἷς δικεῖ ὑπάρχει τό ἐνεκά του, διότι μὲν οὖν ἀναπτύσσεται ωσποδέν καὶ εἴ ἐνεκά τοῦ ἐγκέφαλον, ταῦτα μὲν εὐώθη ἀπὸ τόν αὐτόματον συστάτον έπιτηδειώς οὖσα δὲ μὴ οὖτως, ἀπόλλυτο καὶ ἀπολύτως, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τά βουγενηθέργη.

Darwin quotes this passage at the beginning of the 'Historical Sketch' prefixed to his 'Origin of Species,' and adds—'We here see the principle of natural selection shadowed forth, but how little Aristotle fully comprehended the principle is shown by his remarks on the formation of the teeth.' Aristotle's doctrine of φύσεις, however, is not inconsistent with Darwinism—indeed, if teleology is to find a place at all in Darwinism, it must, I feel sure, be in that form in which it is conspicuous in Aristotle's doctrine of φύσεις. Aristotle's mistake in the passage quoted by Darwin is to see chance, and not natural law, in τὰ συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως.

πέφυκεν.] Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater rightly place a b. 22. comma instead of a full stop after πέφυκεν.

§ 6. τὰ κατὰ τέχνην] τέχνης, like φύσεις, is τοῦ μέσου στοχαστική—strives to realise that which is definite: cf. E. N. ii. 6. 9. It is directly opposed to τύχη, which is its στέρησις: cf. Met. Λ. 3. 1070 a. 6 ἢ γὰρ τέχνη ἡ φύσεις γένεται ἡ τύχη ἡ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ ἢ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχή ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἢ δὲ φύσις ἀρχή ἐν αὐτῷ . . . αὐτὲς λοιπαί αὐτίκα στερήσεις τοῦτων.


§ 7. συμβαίνεις . . . ζητούμενον] 'Light is thrown on the b. 25, question before us (i.e. how we attain Happiness) by our definition (of Happiness) also.'

ποιά τίς] 'of a certain definite kind,'—i.e. realised under b. 26. definite conditions internal and external. Cf. Aristoxenus 18. 20 (Marquard p. 24) τὰ ἡμοσιμένων μέλος . . . προσδίδεται συνθεισῶς τινος ποιᾶς καὶ οὗ τῆς τυχούσης. Cf. Plotinus, Ἔπαι. ii. 4. 167 οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ στέρησις ποιότης οὐδὲ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐφημία ποιότητος. So here, εὐδαιμονία, being an ἐνεργεία ποιά τίς, cannot be the result of τύχη, for τύχη is the στέρησις οὐ ἐφημία ποιότητος.

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν . . . ὄργανικῶς] i.e. Happiness is essentially ψυχῆς b 27. ἐνεργεία, but requires the other goods as the conditions of its realisation. (1) It requires τὰ τῶν σώματος ἁγαθά as its ὅλη, matter,
or necessary substratum—(τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαίον. Cf. Phys. ii. 9. 200 a. 7 ἐν τοῖς ἅλλοις πάτοις, ἐν ὦσις τὸ ἐνεκά τοῦ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀνευ μέν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐγχώρτων τὴν φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταύτα ἅλλα ἄλλα ἄλλα ἐνεκά τοῦ αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ δὲ πρώτον τουσδένὶ; ὅπως τοῦτο, καὶ ἐνεκά τοῦτο. τούτῳ μέντοι τὸ ὁδὲ ἐνεκα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ἢ ἢν σιδηροῦσιν ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀρα σιδηροῦν εἴη, ἦ πρῶτον ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐγὼ ὑποθέσομεν οὖν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἅλλα οὐχ ὡς τέλεος· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἀλήθείᾳ τὸ ἀναγκάζον τὸ δὲ οὖν ἐνεκά ἐν τῷ λόγῳ

—health, vigour and longevity, goods of the body, are necessary to the Form of Happiness, as in the matter in which it is realised. So, cutting the form of a saw is realised in the matter of iron, not of wood. This relation of Happiness or ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια to bodily excellence is indeed merely an extension of Aristotle's general doctrine of the relation of the ψυχῆ to the body: see de An. ii. 1. 412 a. 20, where ψυχῆ is defined as εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμεις ἐνέργειας—the ψυχή is the form of the σώμα, which is the δύναμις or matter. (2) Happiness requires τὰ ἐκτὸς ἅγαθᾶ as instruments (τὰ δὲ συνεργά καὶ χρήσιμα πέρικεν ὄργανωσιν. Cf. Ε. N. i. 8. 15. 1099 a. 33 πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτεται καθότερ δι' ὄργανων, διὰ φιλῶν καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως).

b. 31. § 8. ποιοῦσιν τις καὶ ἁγαθοῦς] καὶ ἀγαθοῦς is here epexegetical—‘of a certain definite character, i.e. good.’ Cf. Eustratius: ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐργον ἔχει ἐπιμελεστατὸν ποιεῖν τοὺς πολιτας ποιοῦσιν ἡγοῦν ἁγαθοῦς καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. By the agencies of μάθησις, ἀσκησις, and ἐθικμός, πολιτικὴ affects the Happiness of the citizens—a definite result.

b. 32. §§ 9, 10.] These sections are intended to strengthen the position, that personal exertion is the cause of εὐδαιμονία, by pointing to the absence of ability to make the exertion on the part of children and brutes, διὸν οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον σήμερον. 1100 a. 4. §§ 10, 11. διὸ γὰρ ... πολλαὶ γὰρ ...] The first γὰρ introduces a clause explaining why children cannot yet be called εὐδαιμονεῖς: the πράξεις in which εὐδαιμονία consists require τελεία ἄρετῆ and a τέλειος βίος. The second γὰρ introduces (somewhat irrelevantly) a clause which explains why even those old and virtuous enough to be πράκτικοι may still fail to satisfy the requirement of the τέλειος βίος, regarded as a life free to the end from great misfortune. Thus the transition is made to the subject of the next chapter. See Ramsauer on §§ 10 and 11.
BOOK I: CHAP. 10.

CHAPTER X.

Argument.

Are we then 'to call no man happy while he lives,' following Solon's maxim 'wait for the end'? If this means that 'a man may be happy after his death,' we who define Happiness as 'a vital function' can admit no such doctrine; but we need not suppose that Solon meant anything so absurd. He meant that when a man is dead he is beyond all chance of misfortune, and that we may then, if his life has been happy, safely say so. But can we really feel sure that even when he is dead a man is beyond the reach of good and evil fortune? A living man may be touched by good and evil fortune without being conscious of it; so perhaps the unconscious dead may be touched by the good and bad fortune of their children and remoter descendants. It would indeed be absurd to suppose that a dead man is so touched by posthumous fortune as to become now 'happy,' now 'wretched'; but it would be equally absurd to maintain that he cannot be touched by it at all. Perhaps however the further examination of Solon's maxim may throw some light on this question of posthumous fortune—Must we then 'wait for the end' before we venture to felicitate a man on his Happiness? Surely it is absurd to wait till Happiness is a thing of the past, before we venture to admit its existence—because, forsooth, it is a stable thing, whereas the fortune of man's life is unstable to the end. So, let our answer to Solon be—

This continual observance of the changes of fortune is a great error. Happiness does not consist in good fortune, although it requires its material assistance: nor does Wretchedness consist in bad fortune: it is in actions, good and bad, that Happiness and Wretchedness consist. And here we may note that our Definition of Happiness is corroborated by Solon himself. It is the stability of Happiness which strikes him most. How the stability which he regards as essential to Happiness can be predicated of a life which is still obnoxious to fortune, is his difficulty. Now the functions in which our Definition makes Happiness consist have more stability than aught else in human life. They are the man's throughout life, even more than his knowledge and skill of hand. In the performance of the highest of them he lives continuously, identifying himself with them. Himself he still is both in prosperity and in adversity—a personality maintaining its identity through all changes. Slight changes do not influence him much; greater changes enhance his Happiness or mar it; but even where they do most to mar it by laying sorrow upon him and impeding him in the performance of his functions, his noble personality shines out: we see him bearing his misfortunes cheerfully, not because he does not feel them, but because he 'has a heart aboon them a.' Such a man, whatever happened, could never become 'wretched,' for he could never perform the base actions in which Wretchedness consists; on the other hand it would be absurd to extol 'the felicity of his life,' if he ended his days like Priam.

From what has been said it is evident that the happy life is essentially uniform. The happy man is not easily moved from his Happiness by ordinary misfortunes: and if once moved somewhat from it by great misfortunes, is not
restored to it in a short time, but, if at all, only after many years full of glorious achievements.

And now we may present our Definition in this final form—* The happy man is he who, being perfectly good, manifests his goodness in action, who has been sufficiently furnished with external good things, whose life embraces a definite, i.e. a perfect period—and (perhaps we should add), whose death is according to his life.*

1100 a. 10. *Introductory Note.* In this chapter Aristotle shows how his conception of ψυχής ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν may, as ἀρχή, be applied to solve (cf. i. 7. 23 δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἡ ἡμισί παντὸς ἐναι ἡ ἀρχὴ, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανή γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ἡπτομένων) what is undoubtedly the most pressing question which the moralist has to deal with. The question is—How can there really be such a thing as Happiness for living men, who are always exposed to terrible vicissitudes of fortune? Aristotle's answer is—Happiness does not depend essentially, as is popularly supposed, on the outer moment of Fortune, but is within a man, and is as abiding as his personality, of which it is the function. It is indeed affected by Fortune, but it is not the sport of Fortune. If, then, the Definition is correct with its ψυχής ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, Happiness is possible. But further, the very circumstance that pessimism, or disbelief in the possibility of Happiness, prevails, is evidence in favour of the conception embodied in the Definition. Men are agreed that Happiness, if it exists at all, must be something stable and lasting; this is why, considering too exclusively the mutability of Fortune, they despair of Happiness. Their agreement that Happiness (did it actually exist) would be something stable, is a δόξα in favour of the correctness of ψυχής ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, for such an ἐνέργεια is preeminently stable.

Having shown that Happiness is possible, because essentially ψυχής ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, Aristotle is willing to concede to popular opinion a very important influence exercised by Fortune; and in making this concession even entertains the question, whether the influence of Fortune ceases for the individual at his death, or does not rather (as another popular belief will have it) affect even the dead through their descendants. His discussion of this question (resumed on ch. 11) is remarkable as leading to no definite statement of his own view. The discussion is conducted in the spirit of the dialectic which animates the Platonic 'Dialogues of Search.' Indeed, the disproportionate space occupied by the subject or sub-
jects of chapters 10 and 11 suggests the thought that in these chapters we have part of an early Aristotelian Dialogue worked into the later and more dogmatic Ethics. Aristotle is reputed to be the author of a Dialogue Εὐδήμος ἣ περὶ Ψυχῆς treating of the immortality of the soul, fragments of which have come down to us (see Berlin Aristotle, p. 1479 sqq.). Cf. the conjecture of Blass (Rhein. Mus. vol. xxx. p. 481 sqq. 1875) that the Dialogue περὶ φιλοσοφίας was made use of in the composition of certain parts of the Metaphysics and de Coelo. Be this as it may, the point of interest for us here is that in the Ethics Aristotle thinks it worth while to discuss, at considerable length, without arriving at any positive expression of opinion, a question on which we know, from his other writings, that he had formed a positive opinion. The Ψυχῆ he defines in the de An. ii. 1. 412 b. 10 as τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοὐδεὶ σώματι. Personal consciousness—all that is included in the designation παθητικὸς νοῦς, perishes with the body. The παθητικὸς νοῦς is eternal, but it is cosmic not personal:—de An. iii. 5. 430 a. 17 καὶ οὗτος δ νοῦς χαριστῶς καὶ ἀμμύης καὶ ἀπαθῆς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὑπὸ ἐνεργεία... χαρισθείς δε ἐστι μόνον ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῆς, καὶ τούτῳ μόνον ἀδιάφορον καὶ ἀφέων’ οὗ μνημονεύωμεν δε, ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν ἀπαθῆς... δ’ δε παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός’ καὶ ἀνευ τούτου οὐδέν νοεῖ—on which see Trendelenburg, de An. p. 491, who finds in οὗ μνημονεύωμεν a denial of Plato’s doctrine of ἀνάμνησις. Even in the chapter before us (E. N. i. 10) ‘one phrase occurs,’ as Grant points out (Eth. Essay v. p. 302), ‘in which the real feeling of Aristotle, for the moment at least, seems to be let out. He asks (Eth. i. 10. 2), “Can Solon have meant that a man is happy when he has died?” and replies, “This would be an absurdity, especially since we consider happiness to be ἐνεργεία...”... it is clear that we have here a brief indication that death destroys those potentialities that result in happiness. It would seem then that the only immortality which is left possible by his belief is a Buddhist nirvāṇa’ (see generally Grant’s Eth. Essay v. pp. 295–303, where he discusses Aristotle’s opinions as to the nature of a soul). Why, then, does Aristotle discuss the question of personal immortality as he does here? The form in which the question is raised seems to help us to an answer. ‘How is the happiness of the dead affected,’ he asks, ‘by the fortunes and conduct of their descendants?’ We immediately think of the importance attached in ancient societies to the performance by descendants of the ceremonial rites due to ancestors, the proper performance of which may almost be said to
have been the *raison d’être* of the family as a corporation to be perpetuated. The large place which the cult of ancestors held in the imagination and traditional practice of the ordinary Greek seems to explain the prominence here given by Aristotle to the discussion of a subject in which he had no scientific interest, and his unwillingness to commit himself to a conclusion which he knew would be *λίαν ἄφιλον...* vài ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίων (i. 11. 1). It is to be noted, however, that he rationalises the issue put—It is the effect on dead ancestors, not of the ceremonial conduct, but of the fortunes of their descendants which he discusses. On ancient beliefs regarding the soul and death, and on the cult of the dead, see Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique* Livre i, chapters 1 and 2.

It is perhaps worth noticing in conclusion that in the Dialogue Εὐδόμος ἦ περὶ ψυχῆς, an argument for the immortality of the Soul seems to have been drawn from the religious homage paid to the dead. Fr. 33, Berlin Arist. 1480 a. 11 ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοφωνὸς πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώποι καὶ σπένδομεν χοῦς τοῖς κατοικοῦμενοι καὶ ὄμνυμεν καὶ ἀυτῶν, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῷ μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς ὅστε σπένδει ποτὲ ἡ ὄμνυσι καὶ αὐτοῦ.

§ 1. κατὰ Σόλωνα] See Herod. i. 30–33 for the conversation between Solon and Croesus—οὕτω δὲ, ὁ Κροῖς, says Solon (ch. 32. § 6) πάν ἐστὶ ἀνθρωπὸς συμφορή, ἐμὲ δὲ σὺ καὶ πλούτεσι μὲν μέγα φαίνει καὶ βασιλεὺς εἶναι πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὸ εἰρεῖ μὲ, οὕκω σε ἑγῷ λέγω (i. e. εὐδαίμονα), πρὶν ἂν τελευτήσατα καλῶς τῶν ιῶνα πῦθομαι... Αποκριθής ζῷο τί ἤποδέξασι δή λέον μοι ποιομαίνειν οὐδενὸς ἀποτέλεσμα; καρτά δόξας ἀμαθία εἶναι, ὅ τα παρεῖναι ἀγαθὰ μετέι, τὴν τελευτήν παντὸς χρήματος ὀρῶν ἐκέλευς. Plut. *Vita Solonis* ch. 27 Ἐλλησιν, εἶτε, δὲ βασιλεὺς Λιδίων πρὸς τὰ τάλλα μετρίως ἔχειν ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκε καὶ σοφίας τῶν ἀδαρσοὺς, ὃς ἔσκε, καὶ δημοτικῆς, ὡς βασιλικῆς οὐδὲ λαρμάρας, ὅπω μετρίωτος ἡμῖν μέτεσθι, ἡ τύχαις ῥώσας παντοδείκσας χρώμμενον ἀεὶ τῶν βίων ὅπω ἐά τοῖς παραχώς ἀγαθῶς μέγα φρονεῖν οὐδὲ θαμάζειν ἀνθρός εὐτυχίαν μεταβολῆς χρόνον ἔχουσαν. Ἐπίσης γὰρ ἐκάστω ποικίλον εἶς ἀδήμου τὸ μέλλον ὅ δ’ ἐστε τέλος ὁ δαίμων ἔθετο τὴν εὐπραξίαν, τούτων εὐδαίμονα νομίζομεν. ὁ δὲ ζωτὸς ἔτι καὶ κυδωνύσοτος ἐν τῷ βίῳ μακαρισμός, διότερ ἀγανδόμενον κήρυγμα καὶ στέφανος, ἐστὶν ἀδέσποτος καὶ ἄκυρος. The com-
mentators quote for the sentiment of this dictum attributed to Solon—

**Soph. O. T. 1528**

δοσε ὤντων ὡν τὴν τελευταίαν χρεών ἡμέραν ἐπισκοποῦντα μηδὲν ὀλβίζειν, πρὶν ἂν τέρμα τοῦ βίου περάσῃ μηδὲν ὀλγεύον παθόν.

**Trach. 1**

λόγος μὲν ἐστὶ ἀρχαῖος ἀνθρώπων φανείς, ὡς οὐκ ἂν αὐτῶν ἐκμάθησι βροτῶν, πρὶν ἂν θάνη τίς, οὕτ' εἶ ἥρετος οὕτ' εἴ τι τρόκας.

**Eurip. Androm. 100**

χρῆ δ' οὖν οὖν εἰσεῖν οὐδὲν ὀλβίον βροτῶν, πρὶν ἂν βανός τῆς τελευταίαν ὑής ὑπὸς περάσας ἡμέραν ἥξει κἀκε.

**Troad. 509**

τῶν δ' εὐθυμίων μηδένα τομίζετ εὐτυχείς πρὶν ἂν θάνη.

To these passages may be added Διονυσίου τυράννου ἐκ Λήδας (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. iv. 18, ed. Meineke)—

θυετῶν δὲ μηδεὶς μηδὲν ὀλβίοιν ποτὲ κρύψῃ, πρὶν ἂν αὐτῶν εὐ τελευτήσαν ὑδη' ἐν ἄσφαλεί γὰρ τὸν βανότ' ἔπαινέσται.

§ 2. ἀτοπων] See Grant's *Eth.* Essay v. p. 302, quoted in Introductory Note to this chapter.

§ 3. μηδὲ Σάλων τοῦτο βούλεται] 'Solon's meaning' was evidently the opposition generally expressed by means of two clauses being implied in the single clause έκει μὲν καὶ τοὺρ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα—'ut si explicares "haec quamquam vera sunt tamen aliam admittunt controversiam."' δέ at the beginning of § 4, ἀπορίαν δέ, has no relation to this μὲν.

άσφαλῶς[ Cf. Dionysius quoted at the end of note on § 1.

§ 3. μηδὲ Σάλων τοῦτο βούλεται] Ramsauer points out that μὲν here is not followed by δέ, the opposition generally expressed by means of two clauses being implied in the single clause έκει μὲν καὶ τοὺρ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα—'ut si explicares "haec quamquam vera sunt tamen aliam admittunt controversiam."' δέ at the beginning of § 4, ἀπορίαν δέ, has no relation to this μὲν.

δοκεῖ] not to be taken as necessarily an expression of Aristotle's own opinion.

1100 a. 19. εἰπερ καὶ τῷ ζώντει μῆ αἰσθανομένῳ δὲ[143] ἕσπερ κἂν εἰ τίς χόριον μὲν ἀγαθὸν τοὺς κατὰ τῶν βίων ἀγαθὸν ὑπερ, τῶν δὲ οἰκείων αὐτοῦ εἴ τίχωσιν, καὶ αὐτῶν εἰς γρώσιν οὐκ ἔρχονται καὶ δὲ ο(LED)ημιαίσιν ὑποσί ἡ διὰ χρόνον καὶ σφοδρῶς ἄλχολαι πρὸς ἔτερα, οὔτω καὶ τῷ τεθνεότι συμβαίνει πολλάκις γίνεσθαι μηδεμίαν αἰσθήσεων ἔχοντι τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ τοῖς οἰκείοις αὐτοῦ συμβαίκευν[143]—Ευστ. Ρασού (Forsch. p. 120) would place a comma after ζώντει, on the ground that the words μῆ αἰσθανομένῳ δὲ cannot go with the conditional clause: the construction is δοκεῖ γὰρ εἰπεῖ τῷ τεθνεότι καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, μῆ αἰσθανομένῳ δὲ, εἰπερ καὶ τῷ ζώντει καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ μῆ αἰσθανομένῳ.

A dead man, it may be argued, is like a living man absent on a long journey, to whom, without his knowing it, good and evil may happen, in the matter of his estate, or in the persons of his relatives left at home. A dead man may thus perhaps be said ‘to participate unconsciously’ in the happiness or misery of his descendants. Aristotle says nothing here to lead us to suppose that he appropriates this view; indeed, he could not appropriate it, for it still assumes personal immortality, although in a highly attenuated form. Aristotle's own doctrine is that 'immortality' belongs to the family or race, as distinguished from the individual: see de An. ii. 4. 415 a. 26 φυσικῶτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῴσιν, ὡς τελεία καὶ μῆ πρώματα, ἡ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ πούσιν ἔτερον οἷον αὐτῷ, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ αἱ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ἥ δύναται ... ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνίαν ἄδυνατε τοῦ αἱ καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἑκάστῳ τῶν φθάρτων ταύτῃ καὶ ἐν ἀρμισμένῳ διαμένει, ἥ δύναται μετέχειν ἑκάστῳ, κοινωνία ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δ’ ἵστον καὶ διαμένει οὖκ αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ οἷον αὐτῷ, ἀρμισμένῳ μὲν οἷος ἔν, εἴδει δ’ ἐν. Οἰκ. i. 3. 1343 b. 23 ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀναπληροῖ ταύτῃ τῇ περίαδρῳ τὸ αἱ εἶναι ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀρμισμένῳ οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος’ οὕτω προφοροῦμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου ἐκατέρου ἡ φύσις τοῦ τε ἀνδρῶς καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν.

a. 20. τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμαίας] i.e. to himself.

a. 21. § 4. αἰτοῦν δε[143] This is Bekker's reading, followed by Bywater. I am inclined to follow Susemihl in reading δῆ: nothing new is going to be added: what has been said is going to be repeated in different words.

a. 23. κατὰ λόγον] ‘in accordance with his life’: Ευστρ. has κατὰ λόγον ἦτοι κατὰ ἀκολουθίαν καὶ ἀναλογίαν τῆς αὐτοῦ μακροζήτησος.

§ 5. μη δ’ επί τινα χρόνον] ‘not even for a time’—i.e. for a short 1100 a. 29, time after the death of the γονεῖς.

On § 5 Grant remarks—'The second part of this sentence, pronounced so strongly as it is, seems to contradict what one would have supposed to be Aristotle's philosophical creed. But he is here speaking from the popular point of view, and states strongly the two sides of the difficulty that presents itself. For the nonce he accepts a common belief on the subject (cf. i. 11. 1, i. 11. 6), but modifies it so as to leave it unimportant.'

§ 6. τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν] viz. πότερον οὐδ’ ἄλλοι οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων a. 31. εἰδαμονιστέον ἦσσ’ ἀν ζη; § 1. The solution of this ἀπορία will help us to the answer of τὸ νῦν ἐπεξηγομένον, viz. πότερον αὐσκεῖται τὰ τῶν ἐγκόνων τῶν γονείων; the discussion of which is resumed in the next chapter.


§ 8. Grant notes that the words χαμαλεόντα καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον b. 6. form an iambic line, probably quoted from some play.

§ 9. ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ἀρθόν;] This is b. 7. Solon's error. He attaches too much weight to fortune. Happiness is essentially the virtuous life, which can maintain itself even in the midst of misfortunes.

With ἐπακολουθεῖν ταῖς τύχαις cf. Menander (Stob. Ecl. Phys. ii. 8, Meineke, Fr. iv. 215)

διαπαρακολούθητον τι πράγμα ἐστὶν τύχη.

§ 10. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ νῦν διαπορηθέν] To be taken b. 11. closely with what immediately precedes—'Happiness does not consist in good fortune. Good fortune is only an external condition, not part of the essence, of Happiness. Happiness consists essentially in the performance of function: and (§ 10) this theory (τῷ λόγῳ) of Happiness is confirmed by the very difficulties themselves which we have reviewed.' Τὸ διαπορεῖν is διέρχεσθαι τὰς ἀπορίας (see Index Arist. s. v. διαπορεῖν); consequently here τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν means 'the result of the review of ἀπορίαι which we have concluded.' The result of this review has been to bring out τὸ μόνον τι εἶναι τὴν εἰδαμονίαν as the thought underlying the ἀπορίαι—'How can εἰδα-
which is obnoxious to fickle fortune (§ 7)? Our Definition, which makes Happiness consist, not in good fortune, but in those functions which are the most stable elements in human nature, is thus confirmed by 'the review of ἀποριας.' The Paraph. Heliodorus explains this excellently—λέγομεν τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῶν ἐπικολουθείν, οὐδαμός ὅρθον’ οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνιστάται, ἡ τούταις ἄλλα προσδείται μὲν τούτων πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν: ἡ δὲ οὐσία τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὐκ ἐν αὐταῖς, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ κατ’ ἄρετην ἐνεργείαν συνιστάται, καθὼς εἴρηται. Μόνον γὰρ δεῖ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ διὰ τούτο οὐ δυνατὸν αὐτὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν τυχεῖσθαι καὶ τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ ἡ προκειμένη ξήσεις. ἀπὸ τούτου γὰρ ἐλαβεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ἐποκείσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν μόνον εἶναι.

b. 14. μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτὰς δοκοῦσιν εἶναι] The contrast here is between deeply organised functions, whether intellectual or moral, involving the coordination of all parts of a man's nature—i.e. between the display of intelligence and moral goodness, on the one hand, and special knowledge, involving the perhaps exclusive cultivation of one small part of human nature, on the other hand. An intelligent man will show intelligence on all occasions, a just man will always act justly; but an examinee may quite forget a branch of knowledge, after the reason for which he 'got it up' has ceased to exist.

b. 15. τούτων δ’ αὐτῶν] i.e. τῶν ἐνεργείων τῶν κατ’ ἄρετήν.

ai τιμώτατα] The exact force of this expression may be gathered from i. 12, which asks whether εὐδαιμονία is ἐπανετῶν or τίμων. Things which are means are ἐπανετά, but an end-in-itself, such as εὐδαιμονία, is τίμων. Hence here ai τιμώτατα may be rendered—'the highest,' i.e. the most final. The μακάριοι—those who realise most perfectly that 'humanity is an end-in-itself,' not a means to something beyond itself, spend their lives in—identify themselves with the performance of functions which are 'highest' in this sense. We may take it, then, that ai θεωρητικὴν ἐνέργειαν were in Aristotle's mind when he wrote τούτων δ’ αὐτῶν ai τιμώταται.

b. 16. κατὰ[ἡν] Coraes suggests ζῆν: cf. the Paraph. ἅν τὸ ζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τῶν μακάριον μάλαστα καὶ συνεχόστατα. The compounded form κατα-ζῆν is rare, but it is, I think, appropriate here: perhaps, however, the κατα- represents a dittograph of the preceding -τατα.

Susemihl and Bywater instead of aura.

λίθην] Similarly in E. N. vi. 5. 8 τέχνη and φρόνησις are contrasted—λίθη μὲν τῆς τουαίτις ἔξεως (ἐ.γ. τέχνης) ἔστιν, φρόνησις δ’ οὖν ἔστιν. Tέχνη implies the cultivation of a small part of a man’s nature; whereas φρόνησις involves the organisation of the whole man, and he cannot ‘forget’ or lose his φρόνησις without becoming another being. Cf. Grant on the present § (i. 10. 10)—‘The ἐνέργεια . . . is our life and being, and it would be absurd to speak of forgetting this. It “is more abiding than the sciences,” i. e. than the separate parts of knowledge, which do not constitute the mind itself.’

§ 11. τὸ ζητούμενον] τὸ ζητούμενον ἦν εἰ δύναται μένειν ὁ εὐδαίμων b. 18. μακάριος ἐν ταῖς τῶν τυχῶν μεταπτώσεσιν. Eustr. So the Paraph.—

ὑπάρξει τὸ ζητούμενον τὸ εὐδαίμων, τὸ μόνιμον δηλονότι αὐτῷ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν.

μάλιστα πάντων] ‘mostly’—Grant; πάντων is neut. b. 19.

πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν] Grant (note on § 10) points out that these words show that the opposition between αἱ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειας and αἱ ἐμπιστήμαι in § 10 is not the opposition ‘between the moral and intellectual ἐνέργειαι.’

ὁ γ’ ὅς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου] Zell, Coraes, b. 21.

Michelet, and Grant refer to Plato, Protagoras 339 λέγει γάρ ποιν Σιμωνίδης . . . ὅτι

ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθείας γενέσθαι χαλεπῶν

χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ

tetragōnon aneu ψόγου te-
tetragōnon.

Cf. Rhet. iii. I. 1411 b. 25 λέγω δὴ πρό ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὡς ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει: οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον, μεταφορὰ: ἄμφω γάρ τέλεια, ἀλλ’ οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν. Sophater, apud Stob. Flor. vol. ii. 222 (ed. Meineke), quoted by Zell, indicates the precise metaphor conveyed by τετράγωνος—τίς οὖν οὕτως κατὰ τῶν Σιμωνίδου λόγον τετράγωνος, δὲ κατὰ πάσαν τίχην καὶ πραγμάτων μετάστασιν ἀσφαλῶς έστηξεται. So Eustr. τετράγωνος, ἢνοι βεθηκὼς καὶ στάσιμος· ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν τοιούτων σχημάτων, δ’ ὅπως ἂν ὑφίσταται πεσότα ὀρθα ἢσταντα. Cf. Suidas sub voc. Δαμασκος—σεμίσος δὲ ἢ καὶ εὐσχή-

L
1100 b. 21. \( \mu \nu \nu t \alpha \pi \alpha n t a k a i t e t r \alpha \gamma a w o n o s \) \( \alpha n e u \) \( \psi \omicron \gamma o u \) tetrugmei\( \nu o s \) \( \phi \dot{a} n a i \) \( k a t a t o u \) Symwni\( \delta \eta n \).

b. 26. § 12. kai \( \gamma a r a \) a\( \nu t a \) suneupikosmei\( \nu n \) pe\( \mu f u k e n \), kai \( \eta \) \( \chi r h e i s \) a\( \nu t o u \) k. t. l. a\( \nu t a \) kai \( \eta \) \( \chi r h e i s \) a\( \nu t o u \) are distinguished. \( \text{‘In themselves they naturally help to lend a charm to life, and the use of them is noble and good.’} \)

b. 30. \( \delta i a l a m p e i t o \) kal\( \delta o n \) Both Michelet and Grant remark on the Stoical tone of this passage. Grant compares \( E. N. \) iii. 9. 4, where the self-sacrifice of the brave man is described.

1101 a. 2. § 13. \( \epsilon k \) tw\( \omicron \) uparx\( \omicron \)nt\( \omicron \)n k. t. l. t\( \alpha s t h \) \( \tau \alpha s t h k a \) \( \omicron \) \( \delta r g h a n a \) \( \kappa r h \) \( \eta \) \( \omicron \) \( \delta r h a s \) upokeim\( \epsilon n i s \) logi\( \xi \) es\( \theta a i \). Eustr.

a. 6. § 14. \( \epsilon d h l o s \) \( m e n \) ou\( \delta e p o t e \) g\( \acute{e} n o u t \) \( \delta n \) \( \epsilon i \) e\( \mathrm{id} \alpha i m o n \), \( \omicron \) \( \mu \nu \) \( \mu \alpha k\acute{a} \rho i o s \) \( g e \) k. t. l.] The distinction between e\( \mathrm{id} \alpha i m o n \) and \( \mu \alpha k\acute{a} \rho i o s \) is not carefully observed by Aristotle. We may perhaps say that the latter term is strictly applied to the man whose happiness is not marred in any way by circumstances: cf. the derivation given in \( E. N. \) vii. ii. 2 t\( \delta n \) \( \mu \alpha k\acute{a} \rho i o n \) \( d\nu o r a k a s i n \) \( \alpha p \) \( t o u \) \( \chi a r e i n \).

a. 14. § 15.] In this § the words \( \eta \) \( \pi r o s d e t e i o n \) a. 16 . . . \( \pi a n t o s \) a. 19 are bracketed by Susemihl. Rassow had pointed out (\( \text{Forsch.} \) pp. 118, 119) that they (and also the words \( \epsilon i \) \( \delta \) \( \omicron \) \( o \omicron \mu o \) a. 19 . . . \( \alpha n h r o p \omicron o s \) a. 21 in § 16) are inconsistent with the result gained by Aristotle from the discussion of Solon's dictum, although quite in harmony with the later peripatetic view of the \( \beta l o s \) \( t \alpha \ell e i o s \). Rassow's words are—‘Was hindert uns also, fahrt Aristoteles fort (§ 15), den gl\( \ddot{u} \)ckselig zu nennen, der der vollkommenen Tugend gem\( \ddot{a} \)ss an \( \mu \) \( \epsilon h n G l \ddot{u} ck g u \ddot{e} t e r \) hinl\( \ddot{a} n g l \ddot{a} n g \) ist, mit \( \epsilon \omicron \) \( \mu \alpha k\acute{a} \rho i o s \) \( \alpha l l a \) \( t \alpha \ell e i o n \) \( \beta l o s \)? Schl\( \ddot{o} s s e \) hier die Untersuchung, so \( \ddot{a} \) \( r \ddot{a} \) \( n \ddot{u} \) \( \ddot{a} \) \( b l o s \) \( t \alpha \ell e i o s \) zu verstehen habe, keineswegs im Zweifel sein kon\( \ddot{a} n \). Denn wenn es denkbar ist, dass jemand die Eud\( \ddot{a} m o n i e \) besitzt, verliert und wiedergewinnt, wie kann der Besitz derselben an das volle Menschenleben gebunden sein? (cf. note on i. 7. 16). Aber wider Erwarten erfolgt ein Zusatz, der zwar in der Form einer Frage auftritt, aber doch einer Frage, die eher zu Bejahung als Verneinung hinneigt. Es heis\( \ddot{s} s t : \ \eta \) \( \pi r o s d e t e i o n \) . . . \( \pi a n t o s \); \( \epsilon i \) \( \delta \) \( \omicron \) \( o \omicron \mu o \) . . . \( \delta \) \( \alpha n h r o p \omicron o s \). Wer so definit
kann nichts einzuwenden haben gegen das Solonische Wort; denn mag er auch auf die äussern Glücksfälle ein minderes Gewicht legen als Solon, so stimmt er ihm doch darin bei, dass es zur Glückseligkeit nicht eines gewissen Abschnittes des Lebens, sondern des ganzen Lebens bedürfe, und wer dies meint, wird Solons Vorsicht im Urtheil nur billigern können. (Oben ch. 10 § 7, war es als ein ἄτοπον bezeichnet, εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν εἰδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύ- σεται καὶ αὐτὸῦ τὸ ὑπάρχειν. Auch dies wird durch die Worte, ἕσεσθαι τὸ μελλὼν ἄφαντος ἡμῖν zurückgenommen). Die letztere Definition, die, wenn man auf die Fassung Gewicht legen darf, noch als fraglich hingestellt wird, scheint in der Schule des Aristoteles die herrschende geworden zu sein. Denn während er selbst noch Grunde gegen die Solonische Ansicht anführt, wird diese in der Eudemischen Ethik kurzweg als richtig bezeichnet und demgemäss der βίος τέλειος als das volle Menschenleben gefasst.'

Susemihl apparently differs from Rassow in regarding the words εἰ δὲ σοῦτο . . . μακαρίους δὲ ἀνθρώπους § 16 as genuine. But surely, if the words ἔπειτά τοι πάντως, with their references to the future (βιωσόμενοι καὶ τελευτήσοντα) are inconsistent with Aristoteles's criticism of the Solonian dictum, the words οὐχ ὑπάρξει καὶ ὑπάρξει are equally so. Nor is the sentence εἰ δὲ σοῦτο . . . μακαρίους δὲ ἀνθρώπους even consistent with itself. The writer of it evidently lays emphasis on τῶν ζωτῶν, and intends to make a statement which shall embody what he conceives to be Aristotle's correction of Solon's τὸ μὴ ζωντ' εἴδαμωνίζεις: but he does not see that the words καὶ ὑπάρξει deprive the correction of meaning, Aristotle's objection to Solon being that Solon will not acquiesce in the present, but must needs wait for the future. Aristotle's view of Life is like his view of Pleasure. Both Life and Pleasure are perfect (τέλειος) εἰ τῷ ἀτόμῳ νῦν. We have not to wait for a future τέλος: if we had, Life would be a γένεσις, not an ἐνέργεια.

§ 16. μακαρίους δὲ ἀνθρώπους] Before ἀνθρώπους Τ, C C C, Eustr., a. 20. Paraph., corr. P1 (i. e. Par. 2023), and perhaps Asp. (see Bywater) read ὡς, which Michelet ascribes to Christian influences—as if the distinction intended were that between the imperfect happiness competent to man's fallen nature and the perfect felicity of God: whereas according to the true Aristotelian teaching, man, although
1101 a. 20. partially subject to the vicissitudes of fortune, has a region—that of thought—exempt from their influence. As exercising thought he enjoys a felicity which does not differ in kind from the divine; while, as a composite being, he enjoys a human happiness. Be this as it may, I cannot see how the so-called Christian distinction may not be got out of the words before us as well without as with ως. The meaning (with or without ως) seems however to be simple enough—we may call men μακάριοι, but we must remember that they are men. The difference between the happiness of man and of God is not in the kind of function which constitutes the happiness in each case, but in the continuity of that function: see Met. A. y. 1072 b. 13 ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρθη τα ὀυρανός καὶ ἡ φύσις διαγωγῆ ἔτως ὀλὰ ἡ ἀριστή μικρὸν χρόνον ἦμων ὑπὲρ ἕνω ἐκείνῳ ἔστω ἦμιν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον . . . ὥστε ἥν καὶ αὐτὸν συνεχῆς καὶ ἄδειας ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ τούτῳ γὰρ ὁ θεός.

Eustratius, although he perhaps writes under the influence, to some extent, of the Christian distinction, does not really misrepresent the Aristotelian teaching in his commentary on the words before us—μακάριοι δὲ φησιν ὃς ἀνθρώπων ἦτοι κατὰ τὸ ἀρμάζων ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις, οἷς ἐν βιώ διαγωγῇ ἐν διωμείρε ρύσει καὶ μεταβολῆ ὑπάρχει, ἐπεὶ τῆς νοερᾶς καὶ θείας φύσεως ἄλλο εἶδος μακαρίτητος, ἐν οὐσία τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντος καὶ μνημείων ὑπομενοῦσης μεταβολῆν. I have great doubts, however, of the genuineness of the words εἰ δ' ὀδύν . . . δ' ἀνθρώπων.

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

To return now to the question whether the dead are touched by the fortunes of living descendants and friends—That they are not touched at all is a cold doctrine opposed to most men's way of thinking, and therefore not one which we should be justified in maintaining dogmatically: but to make a critical examination of the particular cases, in order to estimate the probability of the dead being or not being touched in each, would take too long: a general statement on the subject must suffice: and let it be this—Different things whether happening to ourselves or to our friends affect us differently. Some things affect us deeply, other things lightly. This during our lives. But when we compare the way in which the dead are ‘affected’ with that in which the living are ‘affected,’ we must be prepared for a vast difference—much vaster than that in
the theatre between the effect of a messenger’s tale of horror and crime and the effect of the crime itself in all its horror enacted on the stage before our eyes. Taking account then of this vast difference in the way in which the dead as compared with the living are ‘affected’—if they are ‘affected’ at all (a doubt which we must not lose sight of either)—we may say that if aught of good or evil reaches the dead from the living world and touches them, it is so trifling, or they are so insensible to its influence, that it does not affect their Happiness if they are happy, or Wretchedness if they are wretched.

§ 1.] On the subject of this ch. see introductory note to ch. 10. 1101 a. 22. He now returns to the ἐπιζητούμενον of i. 10. 6.

Λάν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἑναντίον] Remembering that a. 23.

the treatment of the subject in this and the preceding chapter is dialectical, we may recognise in these words two marks of the legitimate dialectical πρότασις or πρόβλημα, as it is described in the Topics. (1) No πρότασις may be employed which deeply offends the religious and moral sentiments of men, Τόπ. 1. 11. 105 a. 3 οὖ δεῖ δὲ τὸν πρόβλημα σωτὰς βέσιν ἑπισκοπεῖν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀποφέρεσιν ἀν τίς τῶν λόγων δεομένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αλεθήσεως, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορώντες πότερον δεῖ τοὺς βεοὺς τιμᾶν, καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπᾶν ὡς κολάσεως δέονται, οἱ δὲ πότερον ἡ χείρ λεική ὡς, αλεθήσεως. So, to call in question the consciousness of the Dead is a heartless proceeding (λάν ἄφιλον) and not suited to Dialectic. (2) Another mark of a legitimate dialectical πρότασις seems to be indicated by the words καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἑναντίον, viz. that, except where it is supported by very exceptional evidence, it must not conflict with popular opinion. See Τόπ. 1. 10. 104 a. 8 ἔστι δὲ πρότασις μὲν διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἠδοξος ἢ πάσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μαλίστα γνωρίμοις, μὴ παράδοξος· θείη γὰρ ἂν τις τὸ δοκέων τοῖς σοφοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ ἑναντίον ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν δόξαις ἦν; and Τόπ. ι. 11. 104 b. 19 βήσεις δὲ ἐστὶν ἐπιδηλυσις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινῶς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν οἰον ὅτι οὐκ ἐστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἢπῃ Ἀντισέβησις . . . τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἑναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφημα-μένου φροτίζειν εὐθεῖα ἐστιν. In a dialectical discussion, then, like the present, we must not call in question the widely entertained belief, that the dead are conscious, the denial of which moreover wounds the tenderest feelings of mankind. But while, for these reasons, unwilling here entirely to deny this popular belief, Aristotle does not scruple to minimize it—his dialectical conclusion being § 5 ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διίκειται πρὸς αὐτῶν ὑπὸν, ἐτ’ ἀγάθον ἔτε τοῦναντίον, ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἡ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἐκεῖνος εἶναι,
BOOK I: CHAP. 11: §§ 1-5.

1101 a. 23. εἰ δὲ μῆ, τοσοῦτον γε καὶ τοιοῦτον διότι μὴ τοιεύν εἰδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ δύτας μηδὲ τοὺς δύτας αδφερείσθαι τὸ μακάριον.

a. 28. §§ 3, 4, 5.] We have here a double protasis εἰ δὲ a. 28 . . . . διαφέρει δὲ a. 31, the apodosis beginning—συλλογιστέον δὴ a. 34.

a. 32. § 4. τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι] ‘It makes a much greater difference whether a calamity happen to the living or to the dead, than it does whether a terrible crime be presupposed in the plot of a tragedy or enacted on the stage.’ Michelet appositely quotes Hor. A. P. 181

‘Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus.’

There can be very little doubt that this is the meaning of the passage; but most of the commentators, beginning with Eustrat., miss the point, e.g. Coraes, with οἶνον ἐπὶ παραδείγματος, οἰδίπους, τὴν μυτέρα γαμῶν, τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς ἐκκεντέμενος, τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἐκπίπτων, ὑδ᾽ ἔδη, διαφέρει τοῦ ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ ταῦτα ταῦτα πάσχειν ὑποκρισιν ὑποκρισίμου οἰδίποδος.

a. 34. § 5. συλλογιστέον] ‘we must take into account.’

μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἵσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.] ‘or rather perhaps (we must take into account, συλλογιστέον understood) the fact that a question is raised about the dead etc.’ Grant. Lambinus suggested μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἵσως τὸ δεῖ διαπορεῖσθαι : but as Grant argues ¹ ‘The alteration would really alter and spoil the context. Aristotle does not say “Perhaps after all we had better start the question anew, whether the dead are conscious of events.” This would contradict § 6. He only says, “While granting the hypothesis that they do feel, we must take into account the element of doubt which still continues to attach to the subject.”’ Rassow, however— (Forsch. p. 74), is of opinion that μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἵσως τὸ δεῖ διαπορεῖσθαι is the correct reading. I cannot help thinking that the considerations urged by Grant against the conjecture of Lambinus tell equally against that of Rassow.

1101 b. 1. ἐκ τοῦτων] ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων—Aspasion: so Stahr, Peters, and Williams: but the Paraph. has—φαίνεσαι τοινῦτε ὅτι, εἰ καὶ ἔρχεται τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦτων.

¹ After noting the rendering of the Paraph. as supporting Lambinus—σκεπτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς βέλτιον δὲ ἐκτι σκέφθοντε οἰ κοινωνοῦν κ.τ.λ.
§ 6.] Victorius thinks that this § is an ancient scholium which has got into the text—‘nihil enim novi tot verbis exponitur: nec solum sententia sed ne verba quidem variantur . . . sunt etiam libri nonnulli (which?) a quibus haec verba absunt.’ Stahr follows Victorius in regarding the § as an interpolation.

CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT.

Let our next question be this—Is Happiness a thing which we praise, or is it not rather a thing which we revere? It must be either praised or revered; for it is actually good, not a mere possibility of good.

A thing is praised because it is a good means to some end; e.g. a virtuous character is praised because it produces virtuous actions. Where there is no reference to an end beyond, praise is misapplied; e.g. it is misapplied, and ridiculously so, to the Gods who exist for themselves not for man. It is plain then that the Chief Good is above praise: ‘that a good thing which is above praise must be the Chief Good’ was indeed the argument which Eudoxus used to prove that ‘Pleasure is the Chief Good’—and a very fine line of advocacy it was, in the opinion of many.

As for encomia—they are for performances such as feats of bodily strength or masterpieces of art: but the works of those who have made encomia their special subject may be consulted for details; our present subject is Happiness, and it is plain that Happiness is revered as an End. As a Beginning also or First Principle it is revered. All that is done by men is done for its sake: it is the Prime Mover or First Cause of all their actions. Such a Principle and Cause of Good we revere as divine.

Introductory Note.] Except that this chapter contains a further attempt to show the agreement of the Definition with popular opinion and forms of speech, its connexion with the immediate context is not evident. The following passage in E.E. ii. 1. 1219 a. 40—b. 16, which gives an imperfect conspectus of the contents of several chapters of the E.N., seems however to bring out the solidarity of the enquiry before us with the preceding discussions, especially with the question ei de to telos dran:—oti de to genos kai tov dron authe legeom kados, martura ta dokouta poisin hemi. to te gar ev prattew kai to ev zhe to auto to ekdaimoiven, ev ekastou
1101 b. 10. The term ἐπανετῶν does not indeed occur in this passage; but its contrary ψεκτῶν occurs in the immediate context, 126 a. 30 ὅραν δὲ καὶ ἐλ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἡ φεντών εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατόν ἐθηκεν... then follows 126 b. 4 καὶ ἐλ τῶν δ' αὐτὸ τιμῶν ἡ αἰρέτων εἰς δύναμιν... ἐθηκεν.
BOOK I: CHAP. 12: §§ 1, 2.

§ 2. φαίνεται δὴ πῶς τὸ ἔπαιντὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τι b. 12.

When the possession of a good quality places a thing in a definite relation to something else we praise it on account of its relation to that something else (γίνονται οἱ ἔπαινοι b. 10. δὲ ἀναφοράς § 3). Cf. Cat. 7. 6 b. 2 ἐστὶ δὲ . . . τῶν πρὸς τι . . . έξεις διάθεσις ἐπιστήμη αὐθεντικής θεσίς. πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα αὐτὰ ἀπερ ἐστὶν ἐπέρων εἶναι λέγεται . . . ἡ γὰρ έξεις τινῶς έξεις λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμης κ.τ.λ. Cf. the last words of the present book of the E. N.: τῶν έξεων δὲ τὰς ἔπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν. A good quality to be ἔπαινετων, however, must be one which places its possessor in a definite relation. There are certain good qualities—various ἐπιστήμης or τέχναι (the δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγου of Met. Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1) such as ῥητορικὴ, διαλεκτικὴ, λατρικὴ, which may be used for good or evil indifferently, and therefore are not ἔπαινετα or, at least, not so without qualification. But moral έξεις (e. g. δικαιοσύνη) differ from such δυνάμεις in being the sources of good actions only, in this respect resembling the ἀλογοι δυνάμεις or natural properties of Met. Θ. 2, which always produce the same effects—the peculiar property of fire, e. g. always producing heat, that of snow, cold: cf. also E. N. v. 1. 4. These moral έξεις are ἔπαινεται without qualification, as they tend definitely to good; whereas many intellectual έξεις (and it will be observed that no intellectual έξεις are instanced by Aristotle in the section before us—i. 12. 2) belong rather to the class of δυνάμεις which are distinguished from τὰ ἔπαινετα in § 1. Eustratius seems to see this—τὰ μὲν θεία τίμα λέγομεν ὡς ὑπάρχουσα ὑπὲρ ἔπαινον . . . ἔπαινετα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὡς τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι μὲν λειτύρωμα, ἐπαινών δὲ μόνον τυγχάνοντα, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπερ ἀνθρώπινα μὲν καὶ ταῦτα, ἐπαφετεριζόντα δὲ, ὡς καὶ καταρθοῖν δύνασθαι καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυνάμεις λεγόμενα, δὲ τιμά τῶν τεχνῶν ὑπάρχει εὐρεία, οὗν λατρικὴν ἡ ῥητορικὴ κ.τ.λ. These instances, it will be observed, differ from those given by the author of M. M. i. 2, who has τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις οἷον ἀρχὴ πλούσιος λόγος κάλλος ι. 183 b. 28.

Besides the moral έξεις, there is another class of ποιότητες,
sufficiently definite in the direction of good to be 'praised' without qualification—viz. those described in Cat. 8. 9 a. 15 as tā kāta dūnāmīn phusikēn—οὐ γὰρ τῷ διακρίσσαι πως ἔκαστον τούτων λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ δūnāmīn ἔχειν ψυκῆν... τοῦ πούσσα τὶ μᾶκς... ὁ δὲ πυκτικὸν ἰδρομικὰ (cf. the passage before us, § 2) λέγουσι οὐ τῷ διακρίσσαι πως ἀλλὰ τῷ δūnāmīn ἔχειν ψυκῆν τοῦ πούσσα τὶ μᾶκς. To prevent misunderstanding it is proper to add that, although in the view of the passage before us (Eth. i. 12. 2) the qualities or ποιότητες regarded as ἐπαινετά par excellence are the moral ἔξεις and tā kāta dūnāmīn ψυκῆν λεγόμενα, still it is not implied that all intellectual ἔξεις are mere potentialities for good or evil, like ῥητορική, and therefore not properly ἐπαινετά. Those ἐπιστήμαι which are concerned with necessary truth cannot be turned to evil account, and, τὰ ἔξεις, are accordingly ἐπαινετά: similarly the intellectual ἔξεις of φρόνησις, although concerned with contingencies, is ἐπιστήμη, being one of those οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαφευγόμεθα (E. N. vi. 6. 2). That Aristotle extended ἐπαινοῦ to intellectual as well as to moral ἔξεις is indeed plain from the last section of this book, where ἀρετὴ is described as ἐπαινετή ἔξεις, and the ἀρεταί are then distinguished as ἠθικά and διανοητικά. The tendency, however, which we have noticed in the passage before us (i. 12. 2) to regard the moral ἔξεις as preeminently ἐπαινετά is developed by the writer of the M. M. into the doctrine that the intellectual ἔξεις are not ἐπαινετά: see M. M. i. 5. 1185 b. 3 ἔστιν δ’ η ὕψις, ὡς φαμέν, εἷς δύο μέρη δημιουμένη, εἷς τὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον, ἐν μὲν δὴ τῷ λόγῳ ἔχουσι ἐγγίνειν φρόνησις ἀγχώνον σοφία εὑρίσκειν μήκη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἄλογῳ αὖτις αἱ ἀρεται λεγόμεναι, σωφροσύνη διακρίσσαι ἀνθρεῖα ὅσαι ἄλλα τοῦ ἰδίου δοκοῦν ἐπαινετά εἰναι. κατὰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαινοῦντοι λεγόμενα κατὰ δὲ τὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχοντος οὔδείς ἐπαινεῖται: οὐτὲ γὰρ ὅτι σοφός, οὔδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται, οὔτε ὅτι φράσμοι, οὔτ' ἄλογα κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδέν. This is not in itself Aristotelian, but Aristotle suggested it.

With the words which head this note—φαινεται δ' κ.τ.λ. cf. Met. Δ. 14. 1026 b. 23 μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἄδαθόν καὶ τὸ κακόν σημαίνει τὸ ποιόν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶν ἔχουσι προάρισειν: cf. also E. N. ii. 5, which turns on goodness (ἀρετή) being regarded as the ποιότης par excellence: hence an examination of the admitted forms of ποιότητας—ἔξεις, δύναμις, πάθος (οτ παθητική ποιότης), with the conclusion § 6. 1106 a. 11 λείπεται ἔξεις τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰναι.
δὲ serves to bring out clearly that there are two distinct classes of ἔπαινα—
the ἀρέται, and τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν: hence also the word πεφυκέναι here.

§ 3. γελοῖοι] sc. οἱ θεοὶ. b. 19.

τούτῳ δὲ συμβαίνει] i.e. τοὺς θεούς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφέρεσθαι. Cf. b. 20.

E. N. x. 8. 7 for Aristotle's view of the life of the Gods, which is θεορητικὴ ἐνέργεια, holding itself entirely apart from admixture with the concrete, and consequently from interference in human affairs.

§ 4. ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄγαθῶν] sc. τὰ θεώτατα. b. 25.

§ 5. Εὐδοκός] Said to have been one of Plato's pupils; chiefly celebrated as an astronomer (Met. A. 8); made ἴδιαν the summum bonum (E. N. x. 2). For references to the literature about him see Schweger, Met. vol. iv. p. 310. Opposite the section before us there is a scholium on the margin of Par. 1854 (L b)—not however, so far as I could judge, one of those by the hand which wrote the text—throwing considerable light on this doctrine of Eudoxus: it is (see Cramer, Anecdota Graeca vol. i. Schol. Cod. Par. 1854, p. 110 b. 27)—τί λέγει γὰρ τὴν ἴδιαν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἄγαθῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπένεμεν αὐτῇ ὁ Εὐδοκός τὰ ἀριστεία. This expression ἐπέκεινα πάντων τῶν ἄγαθῶν suggests the view that the doctrine of Eudoxus was only a modification of Plato's theory of the ἴδια τάγαθον, and consequently by no means a 'hedonistic' doctrine, as Aristotle insinuates E. N. x. 2. 1 ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἴδιαν ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δὲ αὐτούς διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σῶφρων εἶναι οὐ δὴ ὁς φιλός τῆς ἴδιας ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἤξελ καὶ ἀλήθειαν. Here Aristotle speaks as if Eudoxus was better than his doctrine: but it is quite in Aristotle's manner to misrepresent the doctrines of the Platonists. See note on E. N. x. 1. 2. In the present § (i. 12. 5) it will be understood that Aristotle does not imply his approval of the conclusion drawn by Eudoxus.

§ 6.] ἐγκομία are given to good acts or products as such; ἐπαινοὶ b. 33.

to the qualities in men necessarily resulting in such acts or products; while a Life spent in the systematic performance of all good acts is, taken as a whole, τίμιον and τέλειον. The editors refer to Rhet. i. 9. 1367 b. 26 ἢ τίνας ἐπαινοὶ λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγαθος ἀρετῆς ... τὸ δ' ἐγκόμιον τῶν ἔργων ἢ τί ... ὥσε καὶ ἐγκομιά-
CHAPTER XIII.

ARGUMENT.

Since Happiness is 'a vital function manifesting perfect excellence,' let us now, in order to get a clearer view of Happiness, examine the nature of 'excellence.' In doing so we shall only be following out the line of enquiry contemplated at the beginning of this Treatise, when we described our Science as a kind of Statesmanship; for the 'excellence' or 'goodness' of their citizens is what all true Statesmen (e.g. the great lawgivers of Crete, Sparta, and other states) have been most anxious about.

Of course it is man's excellence that we examine; and the excellence not of his body but of his soul; for we define Happiness as a vital function, i.e. a function of the soul. The Statesman then must know something about the soul as a whole, just as the physician must know the body as a whole: in each case no part can be known or treated aright except as part of the whole. But the Statesman's study of Psychology need not go into wearisome details, for its end is practical not scientific.

It will be enough then if we here borrow the main outlines of Psychology from other works in which the subject is treated—and first, let us borrow the division of the soul into (1) the irrational part and (2) the part which has reason—it does not concern us here whether these parts are really separate as hand and foot are in the body, or only separated in thought as convex and concave in the mathematical circumference. Then the irrational part is subdivided. First we have the vegetative part, the principle of nutrition and growth, which we see perhaps most plainly at work in the embryo; but it continues to
operate in the adult also. This principle is common to all living creatures and not peculiar to man. Thus it operates most in sleep when the difference between men as men, i.e. between good men and bad men, is least apparent: ‘during half their lives’ according to the saying ‘the happy are no better off than the miserable.’ And this is easily explained, for sleep is the non-activity of the soul qua principle of conduct—although the principle of conduct may sometimes be so far active in sleep as to make the dreams of the good man better than those of the bad man. But enough of this: let us pass on from the nutritive part whose excellence is not that of man as man, to the other subdivision of the irrational part—to the principle which though irrational yet participates somehow in reason. In the continent man and in the incontinent man we see two principles, one that of reason which we praise, and another which opposes reason. This latter principle in the continent man at least obeys reason or participates in it. Thus the irrational part of the soul contains two principles—the vegetative principle which does not participate in reason at all, and the appetitive which does in the sense of listening to reason and obeying it. Admonition, reproof and exhortation all witness to its participation in reason; and if we wish on the strength of its ‘participation’ to say that it ‘has reason,’ there can be no objection to our saying so, and subdividing the part of the soul which has reason into two parts—the part which has reason in the strict sense, i.e. in itself, like the father who directs; and the part which has it in a secondary sense, i.e. by derivation from another or participation, like the child who follows his father’s directions.

This subdivision underlies the classification of the ‘excellences.’ We distinguish them as those of the intellect (i.e. the part which has reason in itself) and those of the moral character (i.e. the appetitive part which follows reason). Wisdom, intelligence and prudence are excellences of the intellect; liberality and temperance of the moral character. When we are describing a man’s moral character we do not speak of him as wise or intelligent but as good tempered or temperate; whereas the wise man comes in for the praise appropriate to his habit, which belongs to the other division, that of the intellect. In both divisions an ‘excellence’ may be described as a ‘habit which we praise.’

§ 1. peri árētōs épousēpetevōn ànv eîn[ K b, Camb., and Asp., are 1102 a. 6. the authorities for ànv eîn, accepted by Bywater. The words ànv eîn, are not found in other authorities.

A new division of the Ethics begins here. After indicating, in this chapter, the psychological ground of the distinction between the diavōtikai and the ἥδικαι ἀρεται, Aristotle goes on in Book ii, and Book iii chapters 1–5, to discuss the common characteristics of the ἥδικαι ἀρεται. This discussion is summed up in iii. 5. 21 kouï μὲν οὖν peri tōn ἀρετῶν εἶρηται: then follows a detailed account of the separate ἥδικαι ἀρεται up to the end of Book v: while Book vi is devoted to a discussion of the diavōtikai ἀρεται.

§ 2. ὕστορειν ψυχικός] Michelet compares Pol. iii. 5. a. 8.
Grant remarks that 'Aristotle seems to have inherited the preference felt by Plato and Socrates for the Spartan constitution; not so much as a historical fact, but rather as a philosophical idea. It presented the scheme of an entire education for the citizens, though Aristotle confesses that this became degraded into a school for gymnastic.' The fault which Aristotle finds with the Spartan legislation is that it is based on a one-sided psychology—that it recognises only the virtues of the φυσικὴ μέρος. Cf. Pol. ii. 6. 1271 a. 41 καὶ οὕτι δὲ τῇ ἰποθέτει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιμελήσεις ἀν τις ... πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πάσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, τὴν πολεμικὴν αὐτὴ δὲ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τουραρίων ἐσφέροντο μὲν πολεμοῦσις, ἀπόλλυτο δὲ ἄρεστος, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζεις, μηδὲ ἰσχυρεῖται μηδὲμιᾶς ἀσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. Cf. Pol. Θ. 3. 1338 b. 9 νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσα τῶν πολεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν παιδῶν αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν ἐμπώοσε, λαβάθεμαι τὰ τε εἴδη καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν τῶν σωμάτων, αἱ δὲ Δάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὖχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θεριῶθεν εὖ ἀπεργάζοντα τοὺς πόνους, ὡς τούτο πρὸς ἀνδρίων μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὐτε πρὸς μίαν ... οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην, βλέποντα ποιητέων τὴν ἐπιμελείαν.

εἴ τινες ἔτεροι] Michelet suggests the Carthaginians, whose constitution is described, and on the whole favourably criticised in Pol. ii. 8. Eustr. has οὐ δὲ Σάλων Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐτέρων ἔτεροι.

The Par. has δειτὶ δὴν διποτὶ ἡ ἐξής αὐτὴ ἀκόλουθος ἀν εἶν τῇ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου σκοπός· ἢ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος περὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς πολιτικῆς.

I transcribe Eustratius’ note on this §, not as throwing much light on Aristotle’s doctrine of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἅγαθον, but as an interesting example of how Aristotelian doctrines fared under the combined influences of Neoplatonism and Christian asceticism: πολλὰ γένη ἄρετων εἰσήγουν οἱ παλαιοὶ, πολιτικῶν καθαρτικῶν

νοεράν καὶ τὴν παραδειγματικὴν καὶ τὴν θεωρηκὴν τούτων δ' ἐκάστην 1102 a. 14. διήρουν εἰς τέττιρα τὰ πρῶτα φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην, ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἐκάστων ἀποδιδόστε αὐτῶν, οἶκείως δηλούσι τῶν γενῶν ἐκάστου. ἀλλὰ τῶν ἦμιν τὰ δύο ταῦτα συνείροστα γένει μάλιστα, ἣ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ καθαρτική, ἢ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς συμπρακτικής τῶν σώματι, ἢ δὲ χαρακτηρικὴς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκφώνησις ἀνυπομένῳ πρὸς αὐτό, ὥσ ἦν τῶν μὲν μετριοπάθειαν μόνον κολάζουσα τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν παθῶν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον συνηθοῦσαν τὴν κατὰ ταῦτα ἐνέργειαν, τὴν δὲ ἢ ἐς ἀπαθεῖαν ἄγουσαν ἐν τῷ ὁτι καθαίρεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, ἢ καὶ ὡς ἀπαγογοῦσαν ὅτι ἦδη καὶ κεκάθαρται, καὶ ἀπροσπαθής πρὸς τὸ σῶμα γεγέντοι. ἀνθρωπίνῃ τοῖν τριῶν ἀρετὴν φησί τὴν πολιτικήν, ὡς οὖσα τῆς καθαρτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπον ὡς ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ συμαμφότερον ἐπέι καὶ φύου ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἔμερος καὶ συναγελαστικόν καὶ κοινωνικόν· δεὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον σῶμα κοινωνίαν ἀρίστησαν, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπον τὸτε καθέστηκε σύνθεσιν τάσσαν ἐλικὴν ἀπηρυμένος ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ἀνεπιστρόφω τῶν χειρῶν ψυχῆς καὶ νῦ καθαρφ πρὸς τὰ κρεῖττα ἀναφέρομεν καὶ πρὸς τὴν θείαν ἀναπλούμενος ἄλλαμψιν.

§ 6. καὶ τὴν εἰδαμονίαν δε[.] This clause introduced by καὶ ... a. 17. δε (on which see Eucken, de Arist. dicendi rat. Pars Prima: de particularium usu p. 32) stands to that immediately preceding it in the same relation in which the words καὶ γὰρ τῶν ὁλῶν κ.τ.λ. in § 5 stand to those immediately preceding them: accordingly, the Paraphrast's rendering is simply—ἐπει τοίνυν ἡ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἀρετῇ οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς (καὶ τὴν εἰδαμονίαν γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν), κ.τ.λ.

§ 7. ὡσπερ καὶ τὸν ὄφθαλμον θεραπεύοντα καὶ πᾶν (τὸ) σῶμα[.] a. 19. It seems best (with the Par., Victorius., Zell, Coraes, Grant, Stahr, Williams and Ramsauer) to govern καὶ πᾶν (τὸ) σῶμα by εἰδέναι, not by θεραπεύοντα (with Eustr., Argyrop., Lamb., Michelet and Peters). 'The statesman must know something about the nature of the soul, just as the practical oculist must have a general knowledge of the body': δῆλον ὅτι δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν εἰδέναι πῶς ἐχει τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν μελαντὰ ὀφθαλμῶν θεραπεύειν, τοῦ σώματος παντὸς τῆς γνώσιν ἔχειν ἀνώγηκα' Paraph. This interpretation is strongly supported by Plato, Charm. 156 B, quoted by Coraes and Grant—ἡθ καὶ συν ἀκήροια τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅτρον, ἐπειδὰν τις αὐτὸς προσελθή τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἄλγων, λέγουσιν πως ὁ οὐχ οἶδαν τοις αὐτοῖς μόνοις ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ιάσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνυγκαίον εἰ ἄμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν εἰ μέλλοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ὄμματων εἶ ἔχειν καὶ αὐ τὸ τήν κεφαλὴν εἰςβαι ἂν
1102 a. 19. ὅτε ἐρεπενείται αὐτήν ἐφ’ ἑαυτής, ἄνευ διόλου τοῦ σώματος, πολλὴν ἄνων εἶναι· ἄν δὲ τούτῳ τοῦ λόγου διαίταις ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα [cf. Ramsauer’s conj. (adopted by Bywater) πᾶν τὸ σῶμα for πᾶν σῶμα in E. N. i. 13. 7] τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δὲλου τοῦ μέρους ἑπιχειροῦντες ἐρεπενείται. This wide view of the relation of the special organ to the whole body, or of local symptoms to the general condition of the body, recalls the teaching of Hippocrates, to physicians of whose school we may suppose Aristotle to refer in the expression τῶν ἱατρῶν οἱ χαριέντες § 7. In the Treatise περὶ ἀρχαῖας ἱητρυκής 20, Hippocrates lays down, and in the Prognostics (see Littré, Hipp. ii. 96) and Treatise περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων (see Littré, Hipp. ii. 198) applies, the great principle—that we must study ὁ ἄνθρωπος, the concrete human organism, in all its rapport with external things, and ascertain the effects, healthy and morbid, which they produce upon it, instead of taking (as unscientific practitioners do) each symptom by itself, and pronouncing it to be a case of ψυχρόν, which must be met by the application of θερμών, or of θυρόν, by the application of ἐγρόν—a method which he derides in περὶ ἄρχ. ἱητ. 13, as ὁ τρόπος ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. See περὶ ἄρχ. ἱητ. 20 (Littré vol. i. p. 622) ἐπεὶ τοὶ γε μοι δοκεῖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὶ ἱητρῷ περὶ φύσις εἶδέναι, καὶ πάνω σπουδάσαν ὡς εἰσεῖσαι, ὡς ἐπεὶ τί μελεῖ τῶν δεόντων ποιῆσαι, ὁ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ ἐσθήμενα καὶ πικρόμενα, καὶ ὁ τί πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ ὁ τί ἀφ’ ἐκάστοτε ἐκάστῳ ἡμεῖς ἐξυμβῆσθαι. Littré (vol. i. pp. 295, 296 Introd.) is of opinion that Plato has this passage (or one to similar effect at the beginning of the First Book περὶ διαίτης, see Littré vol. i. p. 300) in view in Phaedrus 270 C Σω. ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ὀξέως λόγον κατανοοῦσα οἵεις δυνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ διόλου φύσεως; Φαι., εἰ μὲν Ἰπποκράτει τι τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πείδευσαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταῦτης. Although Aristotle only once mentions Hippocrates by name (and that without any reference to his doctrines—Pol. H. 4. 1326 a. 15), traces of the influence of his teaching are, according to Littré (vol. i. p. 72), numerous in the Aristotelian writings. To the passages mentioned by Littré may be added de Sensu i. 436 a. 20 (quoted by Grant and Ramsauer to illustrate τῶν ἱατρῶν οἱ χαριέντες), a passage which describes the method of physicians who observed a rule identical

1 Cf. Aristocles peripateticus (Suidas. s. 'Αριστοκλῆς), apud Euseb. Praepar. Evang. xi. ch. 3 καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ ἱατροὶ μέρη τινὰ θεραπεύοντες, ἐπιμελοῦσι τῶν διόλου σωμάτων πρῶτον, οὗτοι κ.τ.λ.: see Mullach, Fragm. Phil. iii. 206, 299.
with that (ἀναγκαίον παντὶ ἱερῷ περὶ φύσεως εἰδεναι) laid down by 1102 a. 19. Hippocrates—σχεδόν τῶν τε περὶ φύσεως οἱ πλείστοι καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν οἱ φιλοσοφοφότεροι τὴν τέχνην μετίκεισι ὁ μὲν τελευτᾷ εἰς τὰ περὶ ἱερικῆς, οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἁρχονται περὶ ἱερικῆς. Medical specialists, (see Herod. ii. 84, for the length to which specialisation was carried in Egypt), must control their treatment of particular organs by a competent knowledge of the structure and functions of the whole organism; similarly, the statesman who has to educate a people must do so with a knowledge of human nature as an organic whole, otherwise he will fall into error like that of the Spartan Legislator who cultivated the warlike virtues of his people at the expense of the peaceful. Cf. Pol. H. 13. 1334 a. 6 αἱ γὰρ πλείσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμώσαν μὲν σώζονται, κατακολούθησαν δὲ τὴν ἄρχην ἀπολύσαν ... αὖτις δ' οὐ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάξειν.

The interpretation offered by Eustr., Argyrop., Lamb., Mich. and Peters cannot, I think, be easily maintained against the evidence afforded by the parallels quoted above. Argyropylus referring καὶ πᾶν σῶμα τῷ θεραπεύσειν, gives the following rendering—'Quemadmodum et eum qui curaturus est oculos totumque corpus, de ipsis scire oportet'; which is thus explained by Michelet—‘ut politicum qui animo medetur animi naturam perspectam habere oportet, ita medicus qui oculum totumve corpus curat, id, quod semper curat, sive oculum sive corpus nosse debet. Virtus enim se habet ad animum ut sanitas ad oculum corpusse.’ The other interpretation, according to Michelet, ‘leaves us without a simile’; —’nee dicere vult Aristoteles, animi virtutem spectanti majus quiddam animo investigandum esse, quemadmodum qui oculus mederetur totum corpus nosse deberet: istud enim de medico quidem et ipsum verum est, de politico autem nihil simile proferre possit.’ This objection we may answer by remarking that what Aristotle insists upon is that the statesman must have a knowledge of human nature as a whole, if he is to deal successfully with the education of any of its particular tendencies or capacities: i. e. that whenever he is engaged with one part of human nature he must think of the other parts: e. g. when he is dealing with a particular ὑπέρις, say the love of money, he must take it in connexion with other ὑπέρις, such as that for pleasurable indulgence; and further, must consider the relation of the ὑπερτυχόν μέρος generally to the rational element: and the connexion of both ὑπέρις and λόγος with the ὑπερτυχόν μέρος.
a. 26. § 9. ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις] I think that it is best to render this expression quite generally—‘in other accounts,’ or ‘elsewhere,’ leaving it to be gathered from the context whether the reference, in this or that particular case, is to written or to unwritten opinions, to the opinions of Aristotle himself, or to those of others. That the reference is always to a definite class of popular treatises (as distinguished from the abstruse treatises—ἄκρωτικοί λόγοι, see Strabo xiii. 609, Plut. Alex. 7, adv. Colot. 14, Aul. Gell. xx. 5) written by Aristotle himself was held by many of the older interpreters (e.g. by Victorius and Lambinus), but has been given up by most modern scholars. The literature of the subject is very extensive. The student may consult (in addition to the notes of Michelet, pp. 28–31 and p. 72, Zell, p. 56, and Ramsauer, p. 71), the following authorities—Ind. Ar. s. v. ἔξωτερικος λόγος.; Grant, Ethics (appendix B on ἔξωτερικοι λόγοι), Grote, Aristoteile i. 63 sqq.—Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, Susemihl, Neue Jahrbücher vol. 129 (‘ἔξωτερικοί λόγοι bei Arist. u. Eud.’; his conclusion is that ἔξωτερικοί λόγοι = ‘ausserphilosophischen Erörterungen mit verschiedener Färbung in verschiedenen Stellen’), Thurot, Études sur Aristote, 1860, p. 223, Brandis, Die Schicksale der Aristotelischen Bücher, Rhein. Mus. i. 254, Stahr, Aristotelia vol. ii. 3 (über den Unterschied exot. u. esot. Schriften des Arist.), and Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. vol. ii. 2. p. 114 sqq. Zeller’s conclusion (p. 118 sqq.) is expressed thus—‘Wenn auch im allgemeinen jede Erörterung eine exoterische genannt werden kann, welche nicht zu der eben vorliegenden Untersuchung gehört, oder welche nicht tiefer in ihren Gegenstand eindringt, wenn ferner die “exoterischen Reden” nicht immer und nicht nothwendig eine bestimmte Klasse von Schriften bezeichnen, so finden sich doch Stellen, in denen wir allen Grund haben, sie auf solche zu beziehen.’ The present reference (E. N. i. 13. 9) Zeller thinks (p. 122), is most probably to the Dialogue Eudemus.

It is to be observed that the Paraphrat, in his note on the present passage, is careful to say that the reference is not to written works—περὶ ψυχῆς τοίνυν οὐ μόνον ἐν συγγράμμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ στόματος πρὸς τοὺς ἐνυγχάνοντας ἀρκοῦτως εἴπομεν ἐναὶ καὶ χρηστίον αὐτῶι.

a. 27. ὅτων] = scilicet, videlicet. See Ind. Arist. and Ramsauer’s note.

§ 10. τῷ λόγῳ] As we might say—‘logically two, but really a. 30. (περιφορά, i.e. as really existing) indivisible.’ Cf. Met. M. 2. 1077 b. 13. The distinction marked by λόγῳ and περιφορά here is that elsewhere marked by λογικός and φυσικός (see note on vii. 3. 9). To explain a thing λογικὸς is to explain it by means of a formula more or less abstract and general: to explain it φυσικός is to explain it more concretely, taking account of its natural properties. It is evident that while only one exhaustive concrete view of an object can be taken, more than one abstract view may. Thus a σύνδεσμος may be λόγῳ δύο. Ψυχή, which is the totality of the functions of the body, exists (περιφορές) only as a totality. Reason does not exist without sense, or sense without the vegetative functions; but we can look at the ψυχή from various points of view—as rational, sensitive, vegetative; just as in mathematics we can look at a real line, which has a certain breadth as well as length, from the point of view of its length only.

ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ] Here the circumference formed by a line ‘without breadth’ is looked at from two points of view—as concave and convex.

§§ 11–19.] The ‘psychology’ contained in these §§ is, with slight a. 32. differences of terminology, that already given in i. 7. 12–13, where see notes.

§ 11. κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ] The meaning of κοινῷ here is explained below, § 12—ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινῆ τις ἀρετή καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται. In De An. ii. 4. 415 a. 23 nutrition and reproduction are mentioned as the two functions of this ‘part of the soul’—ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχή καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις υπάρχει, καὶ πρώτῃ καὶ κοινότατη δύναμις ἐστὶ ψυχής, καθ’ ἣν υπάρχει τὸ ξύν ἀπασιν. ἦς ἄστιν ἔργα γεννήσαι καὶ τροφὴ χρήσαι.

§ 12. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς ἐνεργεῖν μᾶλλον] The commentators 1102 b. 3. quote περὶ ὑπνοῦ καὶ ἐγγραφέως I. 454 b. 32 τὸ ἔργον τῷ αὐτῷ ποιεῖ τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόριον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐγγραφοῦνται τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ αὐξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον, ὡς οὐδὲν προσδεόμενα πρὰς ταῦτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως. The natural connexion between sleep and nutrition is brought out in full detail in περὶ ὑπνοῦ 3. ‘Der Zweck des Schlafs,’ says Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. ii. 2. p. 550 (referring to De Somno 3), ‘ist die
Erhaltung des Lebens, die Erholung welche ihrerseits wieder dem höheren Zwecke der wachen Thatigkeit dient. Seine natürliche Ursache liegt in dem Ernährungsprocesse."

b. 7. § 13.] In the treatise peri ενυπνίων Aristotle explains dreams as caused by κινήσεις, similar to those made by the αισθητά, occurring in the organs of sensation in the absence of the αισθητά. He points to the phenomenon of 'after-images,' 2. 459 b, as illustrating the principle of the persistence of sense κινήσεις, and accounts for the dreamer's belief in the truth of his dream, while it lasts, by the fact that the κίνησις which constitutes the dream is not exposed to the lively criticism of other experiences, but has the ἀρχή (or conscious principle) of the dreamer all to itself, δι' ἀρχὴν τῶν κατὰ μόριον αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἀδύναμιν τοῦ ἐνεργείου. The ἀρχή pronounces for the truth of any experience purporting to come from sense, unless a more authoritative experience be present to contradict the judgment —peri ενυπνίων 3. 461 b. 3 διὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' ἐκάστης αἰσθησιῶν φησιν ἡ ἀρχή, εἰν μὴ ἑτέρα κυριοτέρα ἀντιφέ. φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' εἰν τὸ ἐπικρίνων κατέχεται ἢ μη κινήται τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν.

b. 9. πλήν εἰ μη?] Mb, Asp.—adopted, in place of the πλήν εἰ πη of other sources, by Bywater, who makes the words ἄθεν φασίν ... φαύλη parenthetical.


b. 13. § 15. ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς] φύσις here is equivalent to δύναμις οἵ μόριον.

b. 14. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατούς καὶ ἀκρατούς τὸν λόγον] In the ἐγκρατής or 'continent man,' and ἀκρατής or 'incontinent man,' there is a struggle between ἐπιθυμία and λόγον, with the result that, in the case of the ἐγκρατής, λόγος generally prevails, and, in the case of the ἀκρατής, ἐπιθυμία: i.e. both know that it is wrong to follow pleasure, but feel inclined to follow it; the ἀκρατής, however, yields to his inclination, whereas the ἐγκρατής does not. Distinguished from the ἀκρατής and ἐγκρατής, in whom a struggle takes place between λόγος and ἐπιθυμία, are the ἄκολαστος or 'incorrigible,' and the σώφρων or 'temperate man,' in neither of whom there is a struggle—because, in the ἄκολαστος, ἐπιθυμία has gained complete supremacy, and λόγος, in the σώφρων, The desires of the σώφρων cheerfully obey reason: the reason (or
conscience) of the ἀκόλαστος is either silenced or transformed into a 1102 b. 14. 
ψευδής λόγος—a Flatterer of Desire.

ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ ἂν ὅρμαι τῶν ἄκρατῶν] Cf. iii. 2. 4, 5 καὶ ὁ ἄκρατης b. 21. 
ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαμφίβλητος δ’ σοὶ: ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ’ ἀνάπαλως προαι-
ρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ’ σοὶ καὶ προαιρέσθι μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, 
ἐπιθυμία δ’ ἐπιθυμία σοὶ: cf. also note ad loc. with reference to Rep. 
440, where Plato proves that the ἐπιθυμητικῶν and λογιστικῶν are 
distinct ‘parts,’ by pointing, just as Aristotle does here, to the 
‘opposition’ between them.

§ 16. πῶς δ’ ἔτερον, οὔδὲν διαφέρει ι. ε. πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ b. 25. 
τὰ τοῦ ἀόρατος μόρια . . . ἢ τῷ λόγῳ διὸ ἢ σῶς ἄχριστα πεφυκότα . . . 
οὔδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν—§ 10 above.

Aristotle seems here to offer a sort of apology for describing τό τοῦ 
ἀκρατοῦσ as μετέχων λόγου. See note on i. 3. 6 for an estimate of the 
λόγος τοῦ ἄκρατος.

σῶφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου] The σῶφρον and ἀνδρείος are given as b. 27. 
eamples of confirmed virtue. ἐγκράτεια is not properly ἔξις.

πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ] Cf. ix. 4. 3 ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἐαυτῷ (ὁ b. 28. 
σπουδαίος) καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν. On the other 
hand, στασίαξε (τῶν μυθηρίων) ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μυθηρίων ἀλγεῖ 
ἀπεχώμενον τινων τὸ δ’ ἤδειται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δείρο τὸ δ’ ἐκείσε ἐλκεῖ ὀσπερ 
διασπώντα—ix. 4. 9.

§ 18. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀλογον διίττων] i. e. as well as the ψυχῆ 
itself, which has already (§ 9) been divided into two parts—τὸ ἀλογον 
and τὸ λόγον ἔχου.

tὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου] It is true that λόγος, as b. 29. 
conscientia—i. e. as a regulating principle within the individual of 
which he himself is conscious, does not interfere with his vegetative 
(or merely physiological) functions, as it interferes with his appetites 
and desires. At the same time we must remember that these vegetative 
functions are there because they are materially necessary, in the 
economy of the ψυχῆ, for the realisation of its end—the consciousness 
of λόγος. In this sense then they ‘participate in λόγος’: they 
must be defined in reference to it (ἀριστεῖται γὰρ ἐκαστῷ τῷ τέλει iii. 7. 6): 
except as ‘necessary in the economy of the ψυχῆ, for the conscious
1102 b.29. realisation of λόγος, ’they are meaningless—as the αἰκία is meaningless except as ‘materially necessary for the πόλις.’ We may say, then, that, although the φυτικῶν μέρος ‘has nothing in common with λόγος’—if λόγος be taken to mean (as it certainly means in this context) the individual’s conscious regulation of irrational tendencies, yet it ‘has all in common with λόγος,’ in so far as it is δεκτικόν, i.e. so constituted as to serve as material basis for the individual’s consciously realised λόγος. Again, although the conscious λόγος of the individual cannot step in suddenly to modify his own vegetative, or merely physiological functions, as it can to modify his appetites and desires, the conscious λόγος of the ‘legislator’ does, in the long run, modify the vegetative, or merely physiological functions of the individuals belonging to the race over whose development he presides. In the interest of the particular form of culture which it is his ‘end’ to realise in his citizens, ‘the legislator’ will see that the suitable physique is at last produced in them. But, after all, we need not look so high as ‘the legislator’ to find conscious modification of vegetative functions. The results of ‘sexual selection’ are evidence for the reaction of ‘consciousness,’ even among the lower animals, on the vegetative part. However, to limit the reference to the human race—we can say τὸ μὲν φυτικῶν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγον only if we take λόγον in the restricted sense of the reason of the individual, and forget that νόμος which is λόγος ἀπὸ τινος φιλόσοφων καὶ νοῦ (E. N. x. 9. 12) takes measures which, in the history of the race, profoundly affect the vegetative part.’

b. 30. τὸ εἰποθυμητικὸν καὶ ὄλος ὁρεκτικόν] i.e. τὸ ὁρεκτικὸν is the generic term: see De An. iii. 3, 414 b. 2 (quoted by Ramsauer) ὁρεσίς μὲν γάρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βουλήσις.

b. 31. οὖτω δὴ . . . μαθηματικῶν] The Paraph. has—λέγομεν γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων λόγον ἔχειν τὸ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ οἷς κελεύουσιν ἐξακολουθεῖν. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν λόγον ἔχειν τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ καὶ γνῶσιν τινα καὶ ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν ἔχειν. The phrase ἔχειν λόγον has a double meaning: ἔχειν λόγον τῶν μαθηματικῶν is ‘to have the theory or demonstration of mathematical propositions’ in one’s own mind—i.e. to understand it for oneself: to take it on authority would not be to ‘have it,’ in this sense of ‘having;’ ἔχειν λόγον τοῦ πατρὸς is, idiomatically, to ‘have regard to one’s father’—to pay attention to his advice; but here the reader is asked to lose sight, for a moment, of the idiomatic sense of the phrase, and contrast
'having the λόγος of one's father' with 'having the λόγος of mathematical propositions.' 'Having the λόγος of one's father' is having it as borrowed from him; 'having the λόγος of mathematical propositions' is having it in the strict sense of 'having'—having it in one's own right, for the λόγος of the μαθηματικά is the λόγος of the μαθηματικός himself—έπι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὀλης τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον: De An. iii. 4. 430 a. 2.

It is difficult to express in English the double entendre of the Greek; but the meaning is that one is 'rational'—ζήτει λόγον—in two senses—as yielding to the good advice of another, and as grasping scientific truth by one's own effort.

§ 19. εἰ δὲ χρή καί τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ζήτει, διηττόν ἐσταί καί τὸ 1103 a. 1. λόγον ζήτει, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ἀπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικῶν τι] The διηττόν has been shown to be διηττόν—viz. τὸ φυσικόν and τὸ δρεκτικόν. Τὸ δρεκτικόν has, ὡς κατήκου λόγον, been described as μετέχων λόγον. Aristotle now goes on—'If we are to say that the δρεκτικόν also (καί τοῦτο), as well as the λόγον ζήτει proper, ζήτει λόγον in virtue of its being μετέχων λόγον, then the λόγον ζήτει also will be διηττόν as well as τὸ διηττόν. We shall have the λόγον ζήτει subdivided into (1) τὸ λόγον ζήτει κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ—that which 'has reason,' in the strict sense of 'having,' i.e. 'has it in itself,' and (2) τὸ λόγον ζήτει, where ζήτει = μετέχων—that which 'has reason,' not in its own right, but by derivation or participation. An illustration may make this clearer: Animals are divided into (1) rational—man, and (2) irrational—the lower animals. Of the lower animals some (a) e.g. bats, do not allow themselves to be directed by man's reason: others (b) e.g. dogs, do: and if we may call (b) 'rational,' then (1) will have its two divisions, as well as (2), (b) being counted under both (1) and (2).

ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καί τῶν σοφῶν κατὰ τὴν ζήτει] See note on i. 12. 2. a. 8.
BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

Excellence being of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral, the former owes its origin and development, for the most part, to teaching, and therefore needs time and experience, the latter comes from habit («00s—hence its name in Greek ἡθος). This being so, it is plain that the various forms of Moral Excellence, i.e. the various Moral Virtues, are not naturally implanted qualities in us; for habit cannot alter any natural quality: e.g. it is the nature of a stone to fall, and you cannot habituate it to rise by throwing it up into the air ever so often. The Virtues, then, are not naturally implanted qualities; but this does not mean that their presence in us is 'contrary to nature.' It is our nature to be capable of acquiring them; but it is by habit that we do actually acquire them.

Further, where a natural endowment is concerned, the order in time is (1) faculty, or organ, e.g. eyes, and (2) employment of faculty, or organ, e.g. seeing: we did not acquire our eyes by often seeing, but first had eyes, and then saw with them; whereas in the case of the Virtues the order is reversed: we acquire them by acting, even as we acquire the Arts—we become builders by building, just men by doing just acts. To understand how true this is, we have only to look at the procedure of law-givers. Wishing to make their citizens good, they provide laws under which their citizens are habituated to perform good actions. A good constitution differs from a bad one in the success with which it habituates the citizens to perform good actions.

Again, the analogy of the Arts, referred to above, will help us to understand another point, viz.—that it is in the same, not in different circumstances, with the same, not with different opportunities, that one man, by repeatedly acting well, acquires a Virtue, and another man, by repeatedly acting badly, falls away into the opposite Vice. In the same circumstances one man becomes a good builder, or musician, and another man a bad builder or musician, according as the one repeatedly builds, or plays, well, and the other badly: so, it is in the same business that one trader becomes just, and another unjust, in the same service that one soldier acquires the Virtue of courage, and another falls away into the Vice of cowardice. To sum up—: it is from the repeated performance of similar acts that a Habit is formed. Hence the importance of seeing that the acts are of the right kind; for according as they are good or bad, so will the Habit be good or bad. It thus makes all the difference to a man's character, whether the acts, which he has been habituated from youth upwards to perform, are good or bad.
§ 1. τὸ πλέον] The Paraphrast has—καὶ ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ ἔχει μὲν 1103 a. 15. καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἀρχῆς (δεκτικῶν γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐπιστήμης) καὶ ἀπὸ θεοῦ αὐξάσαν λαμβάνει τινά· τὸ δὲ πλέον ἀπὸ τῆς διδασκαλίας καὶ τῆς γένεσιν καὶ τῆς αὔξησιν ἔχει. For an account of the relation of ἐμπείρια to the ἀρχαὶ of ἐπιστήμη see An. Post. ii. 19.

§ 2. ἡ ἥθικὴ ἔξ ἔθους] Grant quotes Plato, Legg. 792 E πᾶν ἔθος a. 17. γὰρ ἔθος. Cf. also E. E. ii. 1. 1220 a. 9, and M. M. i. 6. 1186 a. 1, and Plutarch De Virt. Mor. ch. 4 (quoted by Zell)—ἂν κακὸς ὁ ἄλογον τὸ ἔθος· ἀναφέραται δέ, ὅτι τὴν ποιότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει λαμβάνει τὸ ἄλογον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πλαστόμενον, οὗ βουλευόμενον τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντόσαρι (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατόν οὔτε ἄμεσον) ἀλλὰ δρον τινά καὶ τέλει ἐπιτιθέντος αὐτῷ, καὶ τὰ ἥθικα ἀρετά, οὐκ ἀπαθεῖς οὕσας, ἀλλὰ συμμετρία πάθων καὶ μεσοτήτας, ἐμποιοῦντος· ἐμποιεί δὲ τῇ φρονήσει τῆς τοῦ παθητικοῦ δύναμιν οἷς ἔχει αὐτείς καθιστάς.

'Ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, as such, comes ἔξ ἔθους: but ἔθος requires a certain ἐφύνω to work upon (see Grant ad loc.). The children of a civilized community inherit tendencies to virtue which make habituation easy.

§ 2. οὐδεμία τῶν ἥθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται] i.e. only a. 19. those ἀρεταί are called ἥθικα which result from training under νόμος; for there are φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί (see E. N. vi. 13). The difference, however, between φυσικὴ ἀρετή and ἥθικὴ ἀρετή is that the former does not, like the latter, involve the whole man. A man may have 'natural,' or constitutional, courage without possessing other good qualities; whereas, if he possess ἥθικὴ ἀρετή, his nature has become a unity and a system in perfect adjustment to the complex external system represented by νόμος, or the law and fashion of the society in which he lives. When man is said to be φύσει πολιτικῶν ἔθων, it is not meant that he is produced by Nature in ready-made correspondence with a complex social environment. His correspondence is only the final result of prolonged contact with society; but he has a natural tendency to correspond. In other words, the uncivilized man is not civilized already, but has it in him to become civilized—οὖτ' ἐρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ περικόμενοι μὲν ἡμῖν δεξαμένα αὐτάς, τελειομένοι δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους (§ 3).

Φύσις, like many other leading terms, has both a generic and a specific sense in Aristotle—a circumstance which often involves the philosopher himself, as well as his interpreters, in considerable
1103 a. 19. confusion. In its generic sense it = 'laws of nature'; in its specific sense, 'laws of organic nature,' or 'biological laws'—i.e. laws of nature which result in the production and maintenance of definite living structures. It is in connexion with this narrower sense of the term that we must take all Aristotle's most characteristic statements about φύσις (as in Phys. ii)—οὐδὲν μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ—τόλος καὶ οὐ ένεκα ἡ φύσις—ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ—ἄεὶ τὸ βαθὺς, &c. In the present section, however, φύσις is used in the wider sense, which includes all 'laws of nature,' organic and inorganic. Of course, it is true only of the laws of inorganic matter that they are not changed by habituation (οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσεως διάλογος ἐξῆκεται); for in the sphere of biology τὰ φύσει ὀντα change in relation to, adapt themselves to, or 'habituate' themselves to, changes in the environment.

The distinction therefore drawn in Mæt. Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1—αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις πᾶσα τῶν ἐναρτίων αἱ αὐταί· αἱ δὲ ἀλογοὶ μία ἐνίσ—does not properly discriminate between man's conscious life on the one side, and nature, whether organised or unorganised, on the other; but rather between organised nature (including man's conscious life) on the one side, and inorganic nature on the other. The expression μετὰ λόγου by itself is wide enough to include all organisms. Only organisms exhibit λόγος or ratio. Inorganic nature is essentially ἀλογος.

a. 28. § 4. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δήλον] Grant observes (Ethics Essay iv. vol. i. p. 240, note 34) that 'this doctrine is opposed to some of the modern discoveries of psychology, as, for instance, Berkeley's "Theory of Vision."' Taking his stand on οὐδὲν τῶν φύσεως διάλογος ἐξῆκεται, Aristotle fails to see that the senses are really 'habits' organised in the race, and that the difference between the senses and the moral virtues—both being viewed as adaptations to environment—is that the former are adaptations of very long standing, deeply organised in the race, whereas the latter are, so to speak, adaptations of yesterday's date, and not yet perfect in the race—i.e. not inherited except in the vague form of ἐφυέων.

'Ve need only compare,' says Grant (note on § 2 of this chapter), 'the theory of Virtue in this book with the discussions in the Mæno of Plato, to see how immensely Moral Philosophy had gained in definiteness in the mean time.' Virtue and knowledge are, indeed, no longer confused together. Virtue is no longer said to be pro-
duced by 'teaching,' like knowledge, but to result from 'acting in correspondence with νόμος, or the social environment.' This was certainly a great advance in definiteness of theory. But yet, the 'social environment,' as Aristotle understands it, lacks continuity in time; every man has to begin his adaptation almost at the beginning. The peripatetic doctrine of catastrophes, or φθορά (see Pol. ii. 5. 1269 a. 5, 6, and Newman's notes), whereby all except a few human beings were periodically destroyed, civilization having to begin afresh on each occasion (see Bernays, Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit p. 39), finds its parallel in Aristotle's theory of the growth of moral virtue, in which Heredity is not recognised sufficiently by the side of Habituation, or individual adaptation.

§ 5. νομοθετα] Aristotle, in common with his contemporaries, b. 3. had not adequately grasped the truth that 'constitutions are not made but grow.' He shows a tendency to personify social influences, and make them emanate from a definite legislator in the past. The foundation of colonies, under ready-made laws, doubtless gave plausibility to this view, which in itself however is quite in keeping with the peripatetic doctrine of discontinuous civilization alluded to in the last note.

§ 6. ἐπὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.] i.e. 'The circumstances and acts b. 6. are generically the same, only differing as to well and ill.' Grant. Repeated προαρέσεις, good or bad (bad προαρέσεις not being easily distinguishable from mere ὀρέξεις) transform an original δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων into a fixed εἴσις, good or bad, which resembles the ἄλογος δύναμις of Met. Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1 in being μιὰ ἐνός. See Met. Θ. 5. 1048 a. 8 ἑκείνῳ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων [ποιητικαί], ὥστε ἀμα ποίησε τύπαντα: τούτῳ δὲ ἀδύνατον ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔτερῷ τι εἶναι τού κύριου λέγω δὲ τούτῳ ὀρέξῳ ἡ προαρέσεις: and E. N. v. 1. 4 δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτῇ εἶναι, εἴσις δ' ἡ ἐναρτία τῶν ἐναντίων χ.α.

§ 7. καὶ ἐπὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργεῖσθαι αἱ ἐξεῖς γίνονται] 'It b. 21. will be observed that why an act tends to reproduce itself Aristotle does not inquire'—is Grant's remark here. But it need not sur-

1 Not that Aristotle did not make valuable first contributions to a just view of the importance of Heredity in morals and politics—in his doctrine of φυσική ἁρετή and εὑρίσκε, and of εὑρέσεως defined as ἁρετὴ γένους in a fragment of the Dialogue De Nobilitate (preserved by Pseudo-Plut. de Nob. 14 [but cf. Newman's Politics vol. ii. p. 68] and Stob. Fl. vol. iii. p. 166 ed. Meineke: see note on i. 8. 16. b. 3), and in Pol. iii. 7. 1283 a. 37.
prize that Aristotle does not stop to put this question, for if it is a legitimate question at all, it is, at any rate, a very wide and vague one. To ask why acts tend to reproduce themselves—why they become easier instead of more difficult—why, in short, habits are formed, is tantamount to asking why there is such a thing as life, or the continuous correspondence of organism with environment. For further considerations relating to this subject see note on ii. 6. 17.

§ 8. ποιάς ἀποδίδοναι] ‘tales reddere’—Michelet. ‘Wherefore we must see that the acts are of a certain kind.’ For the Aristotelian use of ἀποδίδοναι see Index Arist. and Cope, Rhet. i. 1. 7. 1354 b. 3, note. Cope quotes the δεὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιᾶς ἀποδίδοναι of the present § and says—‘τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδοναι is not simply “to produce” but to produce energies that are due to the system, energies corresponding to the faculties from which they spring.’ Instead of ‘corresponding to the faculties from which they spring’ he ought to have said—‘corresponding to the faculties which it is desired to produce’—i.e. fitted to produce certain faculties or habits.

For the technical meaning of this term see E. N. vii. 12. 1 b. 26, note.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

The way then in which the acts are performed being so important, we must now enquire what is the right way, for this Treatise is intended to be practically useful. The right way is the way which the Right Reason prescribes—let this be taken as the most general answer which can be given, and let us start from it: we will examine afterwards the nature of the Right Reason and its relation to the Virtues.

But before proceeding, let us remind the reader again that we agreed that a theory of conduct ought to be an outline, not an exact system; theories being always conditioned by subject matter, and the subject matter of our present inquiry—‘all that relates to Conduct’—being one which presents no absolutely fixed conditions, in this respect resembling the subject matter of medical science—‘all that relates to Health.’ With such a subject matter, our Theory, as a
whole, must be a tentative outline; still more tentative must be any narrower
generalizations which we may make within its compass; for the particular
cases which such generalizations attempt to explain are cases which fall under
no art, and are provided for by no set of traditional rules, but must be dealt
with, as the special occasions require, by the agents themselves, just as the
exigencies of a particular case of illness must be dealt with by the doctor, or
those of a particular storm, by the pilot, as he judges best at the time.

But we must not despair. We must do what we can to help our 'theory of
conduct' in its evil plight. Let us then venture upon the generalization, that,
as in eating and drinking, so in conduct, excess and defect are injurious, and
the mean salutary—that e.g. it is by fearing dangers too much and too little,
that men become cowardly and rash; by avoiding these extremes, that they
become courageous. It is in the same circumstances, then, and with the same
opportunities, that one man, by repeatedly acting well, acquires a virtue, and
another, by repeatedly acting badly, falls away into the opposite vice. To this
we must now add, that the virtue or vice, once fully formed, will manifest itself
in the continued performance of the acts, good or bad, in which it originated—
herein following a law observable in the case of acquired bodily qualities also:
men become strong by taking much food and exercise; and strong men show
their strength in taking much food and exercise. So, men become temperate by
denying themselves pleasures; and temperate men show their temperance in
denying themselves pleasures.

§ 1. οὐτέρον ἀλλαί] The θεωρητική φιλοσοφία are three—1103 b. 27.
μαθηματική, φυσική and θεολογική. See Met. E. 1. 1026 a. 18.

ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψεωθα] Rassow (Forsch. p. 55), followed by b. 29.
Bywater and Sus., reads ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψεωθα for Bekker's ἀναγκαῖον
ἔστι σκέψεωθα, on the ground that ἀναγκαῖον does not, except
very rarely, occur with ἔστι in the Aristotelian writings. Rassow is
supported by Lb, CCC, B1, B2.

§ 2. κατὰ τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων] In the present passage it seems best b. 32.
to avoid translating κατὰ τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων “according to right
reason,” as is usually done, (1) because of the article which seems
to show that λόγος is used in a general sense here, and not to
denote a particular faculty of the mind; (2) in reference to the
train of associations which must have been in Aristotle’s mind of
“standard,” “proportion,” “law,” &c.—Grant ad loc. Organic
potentialities—aι μετὰ λόγων δυνάμεις—may result in structures, or
habits, variously fitted to correspond with the environment.
Where the correspondence is an exact one, the organisation, or
λόγος, is said to be ὀρθὸς. In ἥπερ ὀρθὴ human nature realises
itself as a system or organism (ὁρθὸς λόγος), capable of withstanding
the disintegrating influences of pleasure and pain. The process
1103 b. 32. which results in ἥδεις ἀρετή is the εἰδοποιήσις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων (Eustr. ad vi. 13. 1). If a faculty of ὁρθὸς λόγος is to be distinguished from the proportion, or orderly arrangement, which is its object, it can be distinguished only logically; for the two are really one. The ὁρθὸς λόγος is the personality, or orderly nature, of the virtuous man, of which he is necessarily conscious. ‘According to the right ratio’ renders κατὰ τῶν ὁρθῶν λόγων adequately in most places.

b. 33. ὅστος] Book vi, or what may have corresponded to it in the original Nicomachean Treatise.

b. 34. τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος is not coordinate with the ἀρεται, any more than the whole body is coordinate with the hand or head. The hand is a hand only because it belongs to a body which has a head and all other necessary parts. The ἀρεται are ἀρεται only because they coexist in a definite system or λόγος. Courage without all the other virtues is a mere abstraction, like a hand belonging to no body: οὗ χαρίζονται ἄλληλον αἱ ἀρεται E. N. vi. 13. 6.

1104 a. 4. § 3. οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει] Not being ἐξ ἀνάγκης, they vary; but they vary within the limits fixed by the conditions of human existence. Τὰ δίκαια are not νόμοι, but φύσει: i.e. they are suitable to human nature, which is regulated by certain uniform biological laws, not to be confounded, however, with the necessities of mathematics or metaphysics. After all, however, the expression οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει is too strong, and is apt to mislead. Perhaps ‘nothing absolutely fixed’ would express what we ought to understand.

a. 5. § 4. τοιοῦτον δ’ ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου κ.τ.λ] The most general statement that can be made in morals (the definition of εἰδαμονία) is, even as a general statement, lacking in definiteness. It is only a περιγραφή (i. 7. 17) or rough sketch, of that which is essentially contingent: something very different from the absolutely definite ὁμοιαὶ of ‘things which cannot be otherwise,’ which stand as the ἀρχαὶ of mathematics. But indefinite as the highest generalisation of morals is, it is more definite than the lower generalisations, which relate to special duties. When we descend from the περιγραφή of Life as a whole, to the details of Life—to the duties of Kallias in his particular circumstances, we are indeed ‘immersed
in matter— we no longer look for ἀκρίβεια—not of course for 1104 a. 5.
mathematical ἀκρίβεια—for that did not belong to our περιγραφή—
but not even for the ἀκρίβεια of the skilled workman. Rules of
conduct for Kallias cannot be turned out like shoes.

§ 5. βοηθέων] Still, something may be done in the way of a. 11.
supplying a rule applicable to all cases—‘Do not run into
extremes.’

§ 6.] The parenthesis δεὶ γὰρ . . . χρήσθαι, follows ὄρωμεν in
Coraes’ text, and the same order appears in two MSS. noticed by
that editor, and in Argyropylus, and the Paraphrast. At any rate
the parenthesis contains the reason for adding the illustration
ὁστερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱσχύος κ.τ.λ. Ethical phenomena are ἀφαιρή and must
be illustrated by physical phenomena which are φανέρα. Zell,
however, ad loc., refers to instances in which the clause containing
the reason stands before that containing the statement for which
the reason is given.

τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα κ.τ.λ.] Grant remarks that this is perhaps a. 15.
taken from Plato Erastae 134. Cf. M. M. i. 5. The doctrine that
medical treatment ought to aim at the mean had been laid down by
Hippocrates Peri ἀρχαίας ἱστραφῆς, ch. 9 (Littre’, i. 588). Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν
ἀπλῶς, ὀστερ ὑφογέταια, ὅσα μὲν ἦν ἱσχυρότερα ἔδει, ὅσα δὲ ἦν ἀσθενε-
στερα ὅφελε τε καὶ ἐτέρεμον τῶν κάμυοντα καὶ τῶν ὑγιαίνοντα, ἐνπετές ἂν ἦν τὸ
πρῆγμα πολλῶν γὰρ τοῦ ἁσφαλέος ἢ ἐδεὶ περιλαμβάνοντας ἁγεν ἐπὶ τὸ
ἀσθενεστάτου. νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἄμαρτημα, οὔτε ἣσσου λυμαίνεται ἐκν ἄν-
θρωπον, ἢν ἐλάσσονα καὶ ἐνδεέστερα τῶν ἱκανῶν προσφέρεται τὸ γὰρ τοῦ
λιμοῦ μέρος ἑυμαι ἱσχυρῶς ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ γυναῖκα (lame or
weaken) καὶ ἀσθενεία ποιήσαν καὶ ἀποκτείναι. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἐτέρονα
μὲν τῶν ἀπὸ πληρόσιος, οὐχ ἣσσου δὲ ἀμα δεινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ κευστός δ’ ὧν
πολλῶν ποικιλώτερα τε καὶ διὰ πλέον ἀκρίβεια ἐστὶ (‘ainsi la médecine
a bien plus d’une face, et exige une précision de plus d’un genre.’
Littre’). δεὶ γὰρ μέτρον τῶν στοχασαθαθ’ μέτρον δὲ, οὔτε σταθμόν,
οὔτε ἄριθμον οὔτεν ἀξιον, πρὸς δ’ ἀναφέρων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκρίβεια, οὐκ ἄν
εὑρίσῃ ἄλλη ἢ τοῦ σύμματος τῶν ἁσθενῶν’ διὸ ἔργον οὐκο τομαμαθεῖν
ἀκρίβεως, ὡστε σιμφρά ἀμαρτανεῖν ἔνθα ἢ ἐνθα καν ἠγὸ τοῦτο τοῦ ἤτρων
ἱσχυρῶς ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν σιμφρά ἀμαρτανόντας τὸ δ’ ἀκρίβεια διλαμάκις ἐστὶ
kατειδίων ἐπεὶ οἱ πολλοὶ γε τῶν ἤτρων ταύτα μοι δικοῦσι τοῖς κακοῖς
κυβερνήσαν πάσχειν’ καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν ἐν γαλήνη κυβερνώσαν ἀμαρτά-
νωσιν, οὐ καταφανές εἰσιν ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς κατασχῇ χειμῶν τε μέγας καὶ
CHAPTER III.

Argument.

According as the performance of certain acts is attended by pleasure or by pain, we may infer that the habit of performing them has or has not been acquired. Thus he who faces danger and feels pleasure, or at least no pain, in so doing, is habitually courageous; while he who feels pain in so doing, is cowardly. Indeed we may go so far as to describe the field of moral virtue as 'Pleasures and Pains'—for

(1) It is Pleasure that tempts us to do wrong, and Pain that makes us hold aloof from noble deeds. True education is being trained from childhood to like and dislike aright, as Plato says.

(2) Pleasure or Pain attends every action and every feeling, and it is with actions and feelings that moral virtue has to do.

(3) Moral correction is effected by the remedial influence of Pain.

(4) Every thing is naturally related to, and concerned with, that which naturally affects it for good or evil. Now, we are affected for evil, i.e. made worse, by Pleasures and Pains unduly pursued and avoided. And this is so true, that some have been induced to go the length of defining Virtue, as insensibility to the influence of Pleasure or Pain. But this is too unqualified a statement; for it ignores the distinction between due and undue influence.

(5) Again, there are three objects of choice, the honourable, the useful, and the pleasant, and three of aversion, the dishonourable, the injurious, and the painful: now, the good man tends to act rightly in relation to all these objects, and the bad man tends to err, but chiefly in relation to Pleasure—for Pleasure enters most largely into the composition of human nature; it belongs not only
to man's merely sentient nature which he shares with the lower animals, but
attends the pursuit and attainment even of the distinctively human objects of
choice, the honourable, and the useful.

(6) Again, the liking for Pleasure has grown up with us all from our child-
hood. It has sunk like a dye into the fibre of our lives, and is not to be easily
rubbed out.

(7) And not only do we estimate our feelings according to the Pleasure or
Pain attending them: even to our actions we all, more or less consistently,
apply the same standard. To bring this personal standard into harmony with
what is objectively right—to make the individual 'like and dislike aright,' is
the all-important object to which the Moralist must exclusively devote himself.

(8) Lastly, it is the glory of Art and Virtue to conquer difficulties. What
more difficult conquest than that of Pleasure could be set before Moral Virtue
and the Art of Virtuous Living?

We have now established the following points—that Virtue is concerned with
pleasures and pains: that, according as the same opportunities are repeatedly
used for the performance of good actions, or repeatedly used for the performance
of bad actions, a man acquires a virtue, or falls away into the opposite vice:
and that the formed virtue or vice manifests itself in the continued performance
of the good or bad actions in which it originated.

§ 1. σημείον δὲ δὲι ποιεῖται τῶν έξεων τὴν ἐπιγνωμονήν ἡδονήν ἠ 1104β. 3.
λύπην τοῖς έργοις] If certain acts are attended by pleasure, we may
generally take it that the habit of performing them has been con-
tracted; as long as they remain painful, we can infer that the
habit has not been contracted.

It is to be noted that the term ἐπιγνωμονή occurring here is
employed in E. N. x. 4. 8 to express the relation of pleasure to
action: τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν ένέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή οὐχ ὡς ἢ ἔζεις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ’
ὡς ἐπιγνωμονεῖν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἄκμαίοις ἡ ἁρα. Transferring the simile
to the present passage, we may say that pleasure is the sign of the
perfect habit, as the bloom of beauty is the sign of youthful prime.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχώρεινο τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὑτῷ τούτῳ χαίρειν b. 5.
σώφρων] Aristotle here lays it down that the good man does good
actions easily and with pleasure. But it may be urged—'The
greater the difficulty, the greater the merit. There is no merit in
doing good actions mechanically.' Surely this is a narrow view to
take of a good action. A good action is not a tour de force. We
must not allow the sense of pride and victory felt when a difficulty
has been overcome, to influence our judgment. The important
point is that a good action has been done, not that something has
occurred to stimulate amour propre. A difficult action is not so
likely to be repeated as one which is done easily, and it is of im-
portance, in estimating the value of a good action, to know whether
it is likely to be repeated, or is merely an isolated ἐπίδειξις.

b. 8. περὶ ἡδονᾶς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἡθικὴ ἀρετή] The rest of this
chapter contains eight Considerations in support of the statement
that moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains.

b. 9. Consideration (1) is—διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαύλα πράττομεν,
διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα] A distinction seems to be
drawn here between the ways in which we are influenced by
pleasure and by pain respectively. Under the influence of pleasure
we directly seek what is bad, not recognising it as bad (see the
analysis of ἀκρασία in E. N. vii. 3), whereas pain makes us desist
from doing what we clearly see to be right.

Particular pleasures and pains are the influences which tempt
men to perform acts involving excess or defect—i.e. to sacrifice
their permanent welfare to something unenduring. The μεσότης, or
ὀρθὸς λόγος (right ratio), is that definite organisation of the moral
nature, which has grown up in response to νόμος, and withstands the
disintegrating influence of particular pleasures and pains. But the
life κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον has its own pleasure. All acts which sub-
serve the maintenance of the ὀρθὸς λόγος are pleasant to the good
man, and habitually performed; while acts which tend to destroy
that λόγος, however 'pleasant' they may once have been, have
ceased to be pleasant to the good man, and are no longer per-
formed. We are thus brought to the old distinction between 'good
and bad pleasures,' i.e. between pleasures attending acts which
conduce to the maintenance of the μεσότης, or ὀρθὸς λόγος (right
ratio), and those attending acts which, on account of their kind
or degree, hinder the establishment and maintenance of the λόγος.
Ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ is the final result of that education, or adaptation,
which enables a man to distinguish between 'good and bad
pleasures,' and choose the good.

b. 11. § 2.] Zell, Michelet, and Grant quote Plato, Legg. 653.

b. 13. § 3.] Consideration (2). The virtues have to do with πάθη and
πράξεις, which are all attended by pleasure and pain: cf. E. N. x.
4. §§ 6–9, referred to by Michelet. ai, omitted by Bek., should be
read before ἀπεραι (see Rassow, Forsch. p. 55); Kb, CCC, and
Cambr. have ai.

b. 16. § 4.] Consideration (3). Punishment, one of the great agencies
of moral improvement, consists in the infliction of pain applied as a contrary to vice which is pleasant. The Paraphrast has—καθάπερ ἐκεῖναι (i.e. ταῖς λατρείαις) ἐναντία αἱ νόσοι αἱ θεραπεύουσι, καὶ έν ἰδίωμεν λατρῶν ψυχῶν προσάγοντα θεραπεύεις γυνώσκομεν εὖ διό τινα νόσον από θέμης συντήρα, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κολάσεων ὅδυνηρον οὐσίων γυνώσκομεν ὅτι θεραπεύομεν κακίας από ἡδονῆς γίνονται. Zell, Michelet, and Grant refer to Hippocrates, Ἀρθ. xxii. § 2, for the doctrine αἱ δ' λατρείαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων. There is a passage however in his work περὶ ἀρχάς ἱπποκρ. (13. Littre i. 598), in which Hippocrates ridicules the application, at least, which the doctrine receives from ordinary practitioners, who follow what he calls ὁ τρόπος ὃ εἰς ὑποθέσεις. This τρόπος or Method juggles with certain notiones temere a rebus abstractae, simply directing the practitioner βοηθεῖν τῷ μὲν θερμῷ ἐπί τῷ ψυχρῷ, and so on with the other ἐναντίαι. But let us test this Method in a concrete case: A patient has a complicated illness occasioned by eating unwholesome food. Is his condition ἄρχων, or ψυχρῶν, or ἐξρόνι, or ἔγρον? Hippocrates asks derisively: And where shall we find the remedy likely to cure him under the contrary category? See also note on E. N. i. 13. 7.

§ 5.] Consideration (4). Pleasures and pains make us worse; b. 18. hence some have gone the length of defining virtue as insensibility to their influence. But this is going too far; for virtue is not λόγος in the abstract, but an ἐννοιος λόγος—the result of an εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων. It is the order of the πάθη, not ἀπάθεια. So Plato (Philebus 60 D, E) says that the Best Life must have both ἡδονή and φρόνησις. The peripatetic view is well expressed by Plutarch in the following passage (De Virtute morali. 12)—διό καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἡδονά, τὴν άγαν ἀφαιρετέον ἐπιθυμιά, καὶ περὶ τὰς άμύνας, τὴν ἄγαν μυστοπηρίαν. ὄντω γὰρ δὲ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάλγητος, ἀλλὰ σώφρον, δὲ δὲ δίκαιος, οὐκ άμάς οὖθε πικρὸς ἔσται. τῶν δὲ παθῶν παντάσων ἀναιρεθέντων, εἰ καὶ δυνατὸν ἐστιν, ἐν πολλοῖς ἀργότερος ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀμβλύτερος, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης πνεύματος ἐπιλιπόντος. ταῦτα δ' ἀμέλει καὶ οἱ νομοθέται συνυότας, ἐμβάλλουσι εἰς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ ζήλον πρὸς ἄλλος. πρὸς δὲ τούτων πολείμαι καὶ σαλπίζει καὶ αὐλοίς ἐπενείρους καὶ ἀδίαντο τὸ θυμοειδῆς καὶ μάχημαι. Cf. ch. 4 of the same treatise quoted above in note to ii. 1. 1, α. 17.

πρόφητα Bywater, following Kb, for the πρόφητον of all other authorities. I confess that I do not like πρόφητα. It does not appear in the Ind. Arist. In a course of oral lectures its occurrence
BOOK II: CHAP. 3: §§ 5-7.

1104 b. 18. would not surprise us, as its ordinary meaning (especially in the phrase χθες καὶ πρόφεν) seems to be 'the day before yesterday.'

b. 21. φαίλει] The reading of K^b L^b M^b, Camb., NC, is obviously right (see Rassow, Forsch. p. 55). Bekker reads φαίλα.

b. 23. ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου] 'by,' or 'in the definition,' or 'formula.'

b. 24. ἀπαθείας κ.τ.λ.] See the notes of Zell and Michelet. The Cynics seem to be specially referred to here: Socrates may also be intended, for he is elsewhere (Ε.Ν. vi. 13) accused of making the ἀρεται, φρονήσεις, or λόγοι: and Speusippus held στοιχάζοντα τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀσχέσιας (see Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil.: Speusippus); Democritus also is stated to have held a similar view (see Ritter and Preller: Democritus).

b. 27. § 6. ὑπόκειται . . . πρακτική] The Paraph. has—ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετή ἐναι ἡ ἔξω ἡ ὑπόσ. ἔξοικα περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας καθὼς προοδο-μισάμεθα—i.e. ὁ δὲ, ὁς δὲ, κ.τ.λ., thus taking ἡ τοιαῦτα closely with περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας. Grant has—'we may begin by assuming then . . . that this kind of excellence (i.e. moral) is concerned with pleasures and pains.' So Williams and Peters. I think that the Par. is right.

b. 29. § 7.] Consideration (5). There being three generally recognised objects of ἀιρέσεις—viz. τὸ καλὸν, τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ ἥδυ, the last is involved in the first two. The καλὸν is τὸ εἴδε ἥδυ— the Noble Life, the conception of which serves as a regulative principle. The συμφέρων is (in the strict sense of the term) that which is recognised as a means to the attainment of some end, whether that end be the realisation of the Noble Life, or some subordinate end. The ἥδυ is something desired irrespectively of its goodness or utility. In seeking the καλὸν and the συμφέρων a man is conscious of a system of things; whereas in following the ἥδυ, as such, he has to do with merely isolated particulars. The pursuit of the καλὸν and of the συμφέρων is, however, pleasant, because it is a pursuit; to pursue successfully and to feel pleasure being practically identical.

γενοίτο δ' ἄν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τοῦτων φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὑτῶν] Here Bywater restores ὅτι from K^b, in place of the ἄτι of all other authorities. I think that ἄτι is right, and that καὶ ἐκ τοῦτων . . .
BOOK II: CHAP. 3: §§ 7-10. 181

The subjects of choice’—i.e. the three b. 35. subdivisions mentioned under the head of aipersis.

§ 8.] Consideration (6). The love of pleasure is innate, ingrained in our nature, and hard to rub out. ‘χαλεστόν ἀποτρίψαθαι . . . εγκεχωρισμένον’ the metaphor, says Grant (following Gifarius and Zell), ‘though not its precise application, seems taken from Plato, Rep. iv. p. 429 D, where the effects of right education are compared to a dye with which the mind is imbued, so as to resist the detersive effects of pleasure and pain.’

Consideration (7). Pleasure and pain are the tests which we apply to actions also (as well as to feelings). Michelet appositely quotes Diog. Laert. x. § 129, speaking of Epicurus—

§ 10.] Consideration (8). It is very difficult to contend against a. 7. pleasure and pain; the contest therefore is worthy of the great Art of Life.

Jos. Ηράκλειτος] See the notes of Zell, Coraes, Michelet and Grant: a. 8. cf. also Bywater’s Heracliti Eph. Reliquiae, cv. p. 41. Heraclitus spoke only of the difficulty of contending with δυμός, as is recognised in Pol. Θ. 9, 1315 a. 30, and in Eth. Eud. ii. 7. 1223 b. 23. His words, according to Bywater, were δυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεστόν ὅ τι γὰρ ἐν χρησίς γίνεσθαι ψυχῆς ὄνεαται.

ἠδηκῇ read by M, rc. L, NC, Paris 1853, B and some a. 11. other inferior MSS.
CHAPTER IV.

Argument.

But here a difficulty may be raised—A man becomes just by performing just acts: but surely, if he performs just acts, he is already just: if a man writes correctly, he surely can write. To this we may answer, that the inference is not certain in the case of the man who writes correctly, any more than in the case of the man who performs just acts. A man may write something correctly by chance, or at the suggestion of another person. We do not know that he can write, till we know that he has written something as only a person who can write could—i.e. from his own knowledge of the art of writing. So much for the analogy between an art and a virtue, appealed to by the promoters of the difficulty before us. The analogy, even so far as it holds, is evidently not in favour of their suggestion, but against it. It is, however, where the analogy breaks down entirely, that we see the best opening for a decisive refutation—and it breaks down here: a work of art has its artistic merit in itself: it is enough in the realm of art if a work, with certain good qualities in it, has been produced—we say ' What a beautiful work!' But in the realm of conduct we do not say ' Well done!' as soon as we see an action, with certain good qualities in it, performed. Before we pronounce, we look at the agent also, and ask—'How did he perform it?' (1) Did he know that he was performing it? (2) Did he choose deliberately to perform it, and that, because he thought it right, not because he thought it would lead to some ulterior pleasure or profit? and (3) Did he perform it as the result of a fixed and unchangeable habit in him? Unless these conditions in the agent be fulfilled, we do not speak of the moral value of actions: but works of art have their artistic merit independently of any such conditions in the artist, except of course that of his having knowledge. With the acquirement of the virtues knowledge, such as is required in the artist, has little or nothing to do; but the other conditions mentioned are all-important, realised as they are in consequence of the frequent performance of good actions.

Actions, then, are said to be just or temperate, when they are such as the just or temperate man would perform; but it does not necessarily follow that if a man performs these actions he is just or temperate. More is needed: to be just or temperate he must perform them as just or temperate men perform them.

We have good reason for saying, then, that it is by performing just or temperate acts that a man becomes just or temperate. Nay, how could it be otherwise? Who, if he omits to perform such acts, has the least chance of ever becoming good? And yet the majority of men omit to perform them, and take refuge in talk, and think that they have a philosophy of life which will make them good. They are like patients who listen attentively to their physician, but do not follow his prescriptions. Foolish patients! foolish moralists!
§§ 1-3.] This ἀπορία we may resolve by pointing out (which Aristotle does not do explicitly) that τὰ δίκαα before the formation of the Habit are, so far as the agent is concerned, only ὑμωνύμως δίκαα. They are only apparently his just acts; really, qua just, they are expressions of the wise intention of the law-giver, or ruler, who enjoins and enforces them. The moral agent himself has to begin by acting under the compulsion of the law, until by repetition a habit is formed, and he performs the acts in question proprio motu, the habit bringing with it an insight, more or less clear, into the significance of the acts, and a belief that they are good. Then they are really the agent’s own just acts—i.e. they are ‘just’ in the strict, and not in an equivocal sense. Thus the analogy between ἄρετή and τέχνη, appealed to by the promoters of the ἀπορία (which, it may be observed, is an ignava ratio in morals—or excuse for inactivity—see § 6 of this chapter—similar to that in science refuted in the Μένο νο 8ο E.—οὐκ ἀρα ἐστι ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπων οὔτε οὔτε οὔτε μὴ οἶδεν οὔτε γὰρ ἃν ὅ γε οἶδε ζητοῦ οἶδε γάρ, καὶ οἴδεν δεῖ τὸ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως. οὔτε ὁ μὴ οἶδεν οἴδε γὰρ οἶδεν ὁ τι (ζητήσει) does not help them. A just act may be just in an equivocal sense, as a word correctly written (γραμματικῶν τι) may be ‘correctly written’ merely in an equivocal sense, and is no sure sign that a man can write. The analogy only makes it clearer that the difficulty about ‘becoming just by doing just acts’ is to be met by pointing out that the acts are not really ‘just’ at first, but ‘must and can’ be made just by the strenuous practice of the agent himself. It is this ‘must and can’ which oi ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων καταφέυγοντες (§ 6)—the promoters of this ἀπορία—ignore.

But, after all, there is no real analogy (for the purpose of the present discussion) between the ἄρεται and the τέχναι—ἔτι οὐδ' ὑμωνύμως ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄρετῶν (§ 3, a. 26). The goodness of a work of art is something quite different from that of a moral action. The goodness of the work of art is a quality which we see at once in the work itself—Hermes is dug up at Olympia, and we find him beautiful as soon as we see him. But the goodness of a moral action is not a quality in the action itself, which we can appreciate apart from the goodness of the agent. The reason of this is that the real object of the moral judgment is not the isolated action, but the system of conduct to which it belongs; and this we can get at only through a knowledge of the way in which the agent performed the given action. If we find that an
1105 a. 17. action, belonging *prima facie* to a noble system of conduct, has, as a matter of fact, been performed by the agent deliberately in the interest of that system, and performed also easily and with pleasure, as being an action with which he identifies his own good, then we venture to speak of 'the goodness of the action.' We know that it is a good action which we can count on the agent to repeat. It is only actions which will be repeated that are morally significant. An action, however useful and even well-intentioned, which is not likely to be repeated, because the agent finds it difficult and unpleasant, is not an important factor in that correspondence with the environment which is the ultimate object of the moral judgment. Of course it is true that there are actions which from their very nature are exceptional, because intended to meet exceptional circumstances—actions involving heroic self-sacrifice, which take a position analogous to that of great works of art, and demand unhesitating and immediate applause, although performed by a man of whose disposition we otherwise know nothing; but in the vast majority of cases it is unsafe to estimate an action thus from the outside, judging of its moral value from its splendour or immediate utility; before we come to a decision, we ought to know the state of the agent—whether he is aware that he performs the act, whether he chooses it because it is right, and that, of fixed habit, having often performed it before, and therefore being likely to perform it often again.

a. 28. § 3. ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταύτα πως ἔχωντα γενέσθαι] I prefer αὐτά given by Lb and NC.

a. 31. πρῶτον μὲν ἦν εἰδώς κ.τ.λ.] *i.e.* (1) it must not be done δι' ἦγου-αυ, otherwise it would be involuntary, *i.e.* not his act at all, but a mere accident without moral significance (see E. N. iii. 1. 3); (2) it must not be the result of unregulated θυμός or ἐπιθυμία, but of διέκεισθαι ὁρείς, *i.e.* προαιρετικά (see E. N. iii. 3. 19), and the βουλευτική ὁρείς must be directed to the good end, τὸ καλὸν, τὸ ἐὰν καὶ, for it is possible to employ apparently good actions as means to an unworthy end. This seems to be the sense of προαιρετικά δι' αὐτά—viz. ‘choosing means for the sake of the good end which one appears to choose them for’: ‘choosing them as being what they are—good: *i.e.* good means to a good end’: *e.g.* a man must choose to perform a charitable act for the sake of the public good which such acts promote, not for the sake of personal popularity.
In the latter case his ‘charitable act’ would be such only in appearance. *προαίρεσις* δὲ αὐτὰ cannot signify ‘choosing them, i.e. the particular acts, for their own sakes, as ends-in-themselves,’ for *προαίρεσις* is the choice of means (see *E. N.* iii. 2. 9). Good choice treats particular acts as means to the realisation of *εἰδωμονία*, the chief end. (3) Not only must an act, to be morally good, be chosen in the way described above, but the choice of it must be habitual and practically inevitable. The *προαίρεσις* of means, to be good, must be guided by the *βούλησις* (*E. N.* iii. 2. 9) of an End, or Life, to which the whole nature of the moral agent has been perfectly adapted.

The statement, however, τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἡ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ.] ‘This,’ Grant remarks, ‘is b. 2. a reaction against the Socratico-Platonic doctrine that virtue consists in knowledge.’ Aristotle uses *εἰδέναι* in two senses in the present context, in one of which he affirms, and in the other seems to deny, its necessity in morals. A man must *know that he is doing* an act, if the act is to have any moral significance at all. This is an indispensable condition (πρῶτον μὲν εὰν εἰδὼς), as we have seen above. But, this condition fulfilled, a man may act well without a theory of action (τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι), if his moral habits are good; whereas correct theory without good habits would avail nothing. Without a theory, conduct could not long maintain itself as a system. Aristotle concedes this in his doctrine of the *πρακτικὸς νοῦς*, and in his view that the moral agent ought to become *νομοθετικός* (*E. N.* x. 9. 14). After all, if allowance be made for difference of philosophical language, Plato and Aristotle hold essentially the same view about the place of knowledge in morality. It may be pointed out in passing that the distinction drawn in § 3 between a work of art which has its good in itself, and an action which must be interpreted in the light of the agent’s character, is the distinction of *Met.* Θ. 8, between *ἐνέργεια* which have an *ἔργον* παρ’ αὐτῶς, and those which have not—1050 α. 30 ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἐπορεύον τί ἦστι παρὰ τὴν χρήσιν τὸ γεγομένων, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια εἰ τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστὶν, ὅσων ἡ τε οἰκοδόμησις εἰ τῷ οἰκοδομομομένῳ κ.τ.λ. ... ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἦστιν ἄλλο τί ἔργον παρὰ τῷ ἐνέργειαν, εἰ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια· οἷον ἡ ὁράσεις εἰ τῷ ὄρωντι, καὶ ἡ θεωρία εἰ τῷ θεωροῦντι. The excellence of Homer is embodied in his *ἔργον*, and remains there for all time;
1105 b. 2. but a good action is only a glimpse which we get of a good life. On the one hand, it is the Iliad, and not its author that is important; on the other hand, it is the orderly beautiful life, of which the action is a symptom, that is precious.

b. 3. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ... ἀπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν ... περιγίνεται]
The ἄλλα are τὸ προαιρέσσια δὲ αὐτὰ and the ἔξος, both of which come from acting, not from philosophising.

b. 5. § 4.] Good actions are only then morally good, i.e. really what they appear to be, when they are done by a good man: and a good man is a man who performs good actions easily and in the interest of a noble system of conduct.

b. 9. §§ 5, 6.] show that the remark πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῶς ἀρετὰς [sc. ἔχειν] τὸ μὲν εἶδεν αὐτὴν ὡς ἡ μετὰ τὸν λόγον (§ 3) is directed, not so much against Plato, as against Sophists like Isocrates, who professed (or were accused, by those who did not themselves take fees, of professing) to teach conduct by a course of lectures—cf. E. N. x. 9. 20.

CHAPTER V.

Argument.

We have assumed the concrete existence of Virtue, and tried to show how it is practically acquired: let us now try to find its formal definition; and first let us ask—What is its Genus?
The qualities which manifest themselves in the Soul are three—Feelings, Capacities, Habits; and Virtue will be one of the three.

(1) Feelings: e.g. desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, emulation, pity—these, and all other feelings, being accompanied by pleasure or pain.

(2) Capacities: being capable of experiencing these feelings—e.g. being capable of feeling anger or pity.

(3) Habits: the relations, good or bad, in which we stand to our various feelings, e.g. if we are disposed too much or too little to anger, it is a bad habit; if moderately, a good habit.

The Virtues and Vices then are not feelings, because we are not said to be good or bad for our mere feelings, or praised or blamed for them, whereas we are praised for our Virtues, and blamed for our Vices. Again, we experience a feeling, e.g. anger or fear, without choosing to experience it, but the virtues involve Choice. Moreover we are said to be 'moved' by our feelings, but 'disposed,' not 'moved,' by our Virtues and Vices.
Nor are the Virtues and Vices capacities, for we are not said to be good or bad, and we are not praised or blamed, because we are capable of experiencing certain feelings. Further, we are endowed by nature with these capacities; but it is not nature which makes us good or bad, as was pointed out before.

If then the Virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, it remains that they are habits.

§ 1. τί ἐστιν ἢ ἀρετή] What is its γένος. It seems to be a 1105 b. 19. reversal of the natural order to enquire first (as Aristotle has done in the previous chapters of this Book) — How Virtue is acquired; and then (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα) to ask — What Virtue is. This is surely the order which Socrates finds fault with Meno for wishing to adopt (Meno 86 C, D). Perhaps we may answer for Aristotle that it is only the man who has acquired ἀρετή for himself who can understand its τί ἐστι. The present enquiry therefore follows a natural course, when starting from ἀρετή, as something concretely known, it first tries to show how it is practically acquired, and then tries to find its formal definition.

τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστὶ κ.π.λ.] As Michelet and other b. 20. commentators point out, the phenomena in the Soul are here said to be three, because ἀρετή, or goodness, the quality (ποιότης) par excellence (cf. Ε. Ν. i. 9. 8 αὐτὴ δὲ [τη ἡ πολιτικὴ] πλείουσιν ἐπιμελειαν ρυόμενοι τοῦ ποιοῦσιν τινα καὶ ἀγαθόν τοῦς ποιήσαι: and Met. Δ. 14. 1020 b. 23 μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἄγαθον καὶ τὸ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποιῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψυχῶν, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχονσι προαιρεσιν), suggests the accepted threefold division (so far as the ψυχή is concerned) of ποιότης into ἔξις, δύναμις, and πάθος. See Cat. 8. 8 b. 25 sqq., and Grant's note. Zell quotes Plutarch, De Virt. Mor. 4 τρία γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα φασὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν, δύναμιν, πάθος, ἔξιν ἢ μὲν ὁδὸν δύναμις ἀρχή καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οἷον ὀργιλογία, αἰσχυντικία, βαρβαλεῖντες τὸ δὲ πάθος κινήσις τις ὑπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον ὀργὴ, αἰδώς, βίαιτος, ή δὲ ἔξις ἰσχύς καὶ κατασκευὴ τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄλογον δυνάμεως ἐξ ἐθεοῦ ἐγγενεμείη, κακία μὲν ἀν φαιλοῖς, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀν καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παιδαγωγηθῇ τὸ πάθος.

§§ 2–6.] A πάθος is an isolated feeling or affection, and a δύναμις b. 21. is the capacity for experiencing such a feeling. A capacity of this kind, with the resulting feeling, is natural, i.e. independent of education, and, in itself, is neither praised as good, nor blamed as bad. Moreover, a feeling is a motion (κατὰ τὰ πάθη κυνῆσθαι λεγόμεθα) which arises out of a capacity independently of choice (ἀπορείτως).
These characteristics of πάθος and δύναμις exclude the possibility of ἀρετή being a πάθος or δύναμις: for ἀρετή is a disposition (κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς διακόσμησα πῶς λεγόμεθα) not a motion; it implies choice: and it is praised as good; besides, it is acquired by education. But these are the characteristics of ἔξις. Accordingly λείπεται ἔξις αὐτὶς εἶναι.

In other words, the ‘Qualities’ of the ψυχή are either affections (πάθη) or capacities (δύναμεις and ἔξιςς). Virtue is not an isolated affection. It is therefore a capacity. But it is not a natural capacity. Therefore, it is an acquired capacity, i.e. a ἔξις: and a ἔξις for which we are praised.

§ 2. πάθη] It is to be observed that the doctrine of this section is considerably simpler than that of the corresponding passage in Cat. 8. In this latter passage παθητικά ποιότητες and πάθη are distinguished (9 a. 28). Παθητικά ποιότητες are permanent qualities, such as a pale complexion, or madness, whether congenital or caused by disease; whereas πάθη are transient qualities (if the term qualities be admissible), such as paleness suddenly produced by fear, or excitement by pain—9 b. 19 ὅσα μὲν οὐ γὰρ τῶν ποιότων συμπτωμάτων (μελανία, ὀξυρίας: and the same remarks are afterwards applied to psychical conditions, such as μυελή ἔκστασις) ἀπὸ τῶν παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παραμοιών τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶληφε, παθητικὰ ποιότητες λέγονται: ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτα λεγόμεθα . . . ὅσα ἀ' ἀπὸ μαθίω διαλυόμενών καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθασταμένων γίνεται, πάθη λέγεται, ποιότητες δέ οὐ. οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοὶ τινες κατὰ ταύτας· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐμφάνισιν διὰ τὸ αὐθαυστήρᾳ ἐρυθρίας λέγεται· οὔτε ὁ ὀξυρίας διὰ τὸ φοβηθητικὴν ὀξυρίας· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθείναι τ' ὡστε πάθη μὲν τά ποιότα λέγεται, ποιότητες δ' οὐ. Here the writer says that πάθη are not ποιότητες: but above (9 a. 28) he has said—τρίτων δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικά ποιότητες καὶ πάθη. The difference between a παθητική ποιότης and a δύναμις according to Cat. 8 is that, while the former is the permanent manifestation or induration, as it were, of a πάθος, the latter is a natural capacity of doing or resisting something: see Cat. 9 a. 18 δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἡ δύναμιας τοῦ ποιήσαι τ' ῥᾳδίως ἡ μὴ δεν πάσχειν. The δύναμις of the Categories thus differs from that of the Ethics, which is καθ' ἴδιο παθητικὸ τούτων (i.e. τῶν παθῶν) λεγόμεθα. Indeed the δύναμις of the Ethics stands very close to the παθητική ποιότης of the Categories. The manner in which the notion of παθητική ποιότης, or permanent manifestation of a πάθος, naturally passes into
that of δύναμις καθ' ἵνα παθητικοί (τοῦ πάθους) λεγόμεθα is easily seen in 1105 b. 21. the case of psychical παθητικά ποινίτες, where the manifestations generally admit of degrees; thus the παθητική ποινίτες of μανική ἔκκαστος, or insanity, is not always violently manifested; and the violent outbursts, when they occur, appear as πάθη, or κινήσεις, arising out of the normal ἔκκαστος, which thus comes to be regarded as a capacity, rather than as a manifestation. If we compare the parallel passage in the Eudem. Ethics (ii. 2) with Cat. 8 we can see how close παθητική ποινίτες and δύναμις stand to each other, where τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν at least are concerned. In the Categories the ὄργιλος is said to have a παθητική ποινίτης (Cat. 8. io a. 2 ποινὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας [sc. τὰς παθητικὰς ποινίτις] λέγονται, ὄργιλοι κ.τ.λ.); in the Eith. Eud., to have a δύναμις (Eith. Eud. ii. 2. 1220 b. 12 λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τωματὰ, θυμόν φύσαν κ.τ.λ. . . . καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταύτα οὐκ ἔστι ποινίτης, ἀλλὰ πάσχει κατὰ δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις, ποινίτης· λέγω δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις καθ’ ὦς λέγονται κατὰ πάθη οἱ ἑνεργοῦστες· οἶον ὄργιλος κ.τ.λ.).

In the foregoing remarks I have purposely omitted, as irrelevant, reference to such παθητικά ποινίτες as ἔλευθερα, so called because they are qualities which produce πάθη in us—Cat. 8. 9 b. 5 τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστην τῶν εἰρήμικῶν ποινιτῶν πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικὴν ποινίτης λέγονται.


έξεις δὲ καθ’ ὄς τῶς τὰ πάθη ἐχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς] Cf. E. E. ii. 2. 1220 b. 18 έξεις δὲ εἰσιν, δόοι αὐτοὶ εἰς τοῦ ταύτα (τ.ε. τὰ πάθη) ἢ κατὰ λόγον ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐναιτίως. The έξεις of virtue is the result of the
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**BOOK II: CHAP. 5: §§ 2-4.**

1105 b. 25. εἰδοποίησεις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων (Eustratius) effected by moral training.

b. 29. § 3. οὖ περὶ λεγόμενα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαίοι ἦ φαύλουι] Because, as is explained in Cat. 8, the πάθη are not properly ποιότητες: we are not ποιοὶ τινες in consequence of them. It is thus evident that it is only on account of their close connexion with παθηματικαὶ ποιότητες, of which they seem to be at once the causes and the results, that πάθη are considered under the head of ποιότης at all. In themselves they are κινήσεις (see § 4 of this chapter), or ἐνέργειαι—not ποιότητες (see E. N. x. 3. 1). This is recognised in E. E. ii. i. 1218 b. 35 τῶν δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ μὲν ἔξεις ἡ δυνάμεις εἰσὶ, τὰ δ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ κινήσεις.

1106 a. 3. § 4. προαιρέσεις] As Grant points out, there has been no proof of this yet. Aristotle, however, has probably in his mind the doctrine of Met. θ. 2 and 5, according to which δρέξις or προαιρέσεις determines (as τὸ κύριον) which of the two contraries open to a δύναμις μετὰ λόγου shall be manifested. He therefore assumes here as a settled point, that the ἀρεταῖ, having been acquired in circumstances in which the development of the contrary κακία was possible, are μετὰ προαιρέσεως. It is true that the δύναμεις μετὰ λόγου of Met. θ. 2 and 5 are identified with the properly intellectual potentialities, or abilities, i.e. with the τέχναι and ἐπιστήμαι: but the doctrine of Eth. Nic. iii. 5—that, if the performance of good acts is ἐφ' ἴμων, then the performance of bad acts is equally ἐφ' ἴμων—enables us, or rather obliges us, to extend the notion of ἡ μετὰ λόγου δύναμις ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων οὖσα so as to include moral potentiality also—i.e. the power of acting well or ill in given circumstances, which man, in virtue of his λόγος, possesses. Indeed, the notion may be even farther generalised, so as to include all Life (physical as well as moral), i.e. all cases in which an organism may, or may not, succeed in doing what is for its advantage in given circumstances: and this generalisation of the notion would be in strict conformity with the meaning of λόγος= orderly arrangement of parts, or organisation. All organisms, in that they can so behave as to survive or perish, possess δυνάμεις τῶν ἐναντίων: whereas in the inorganic world there is no ‘adaptation to an environment, or failure in adaptation’: there are only ὁλογον δυνάμεις, operating in one direction.

a. 6. διακείσθαι πως] Except, apparently, for the alliteration, this might have been ἔχειν πως. The ἀρεταί are διαβίοσις which have
So much for the genus of Virtue—it is a Habit. But what is its differentia? What sort of Habit is it?

Let us begin with the statement, that a virtue or excellence gives perfection both to the condition and to the function of that of which it is the virtue or excellence. Thus the excellence of the eye makes the eye itself and its sight good. So man's excellence or virtue will be a habit which makes him good, and causes him to perform his peculiar function well. The differentia then which we are looking for is contained in the words—'which makes him good and causes him to perform his peculiar function well.' We have already said, in passing, that Goodness is preserved by the Mean, and that 'performing well' consists in avoiding extremes and choosing the Mean. Accordingly, if we now explain fully what 'choosing the Mean' is, we shall explain the true differentia of Virtue.

Wherever a measurable whole can be divided into two parts, we can subtract a part which is 'greater than,' or a part which is 'less than,' or a part which is 'equal to,' the part which we leave. Here 'equal to' is the arithmetical mean between any two unequal parts into which the whole may be divided; it is the absolute mean, or 'half of the thing,' which is the same for all men. From this absolute mean, however, we must distinguish the relative mean, or 'mean for me,' which is not the half of the thing and the same for all men, but that amount which is neither too much nor too little for me—that amount which exactly suits me in my particular circumstances: e.g. let two pounds of meat a day be too little, and ten too much for me during my training: it does not follow that the arithmetical mean between two and ten—the half of their sum, i.e. six pounds, will suit me. Whatever quantity between the extremes two and ten suits me is the mean for me, and will be prescribed by my trainer. And the rule which the trainer here observes is that which all artists follow. They all look to this, not to the arithmetical mean; i.e. they all aim at what is simply enough in the circumstances, avoiding excess and defect. Thus we say of a master-piece of art—'you could not take from it, or add to it, without spoiling it.' And if Art achieves her triumphs by observing this golden rule, much more carefully will Virtue observe it, inasmuch as her
triumphs are greater: for the Virtuous Character is like one of the organisms which Nature brings forth—it is more fitly contrived and more beautiful than any work of art. When we say that Virtue observes the mean, we refer only to Moral Virtue, for it is acquired in a region—that of feelings and actions—where excess and defect are possible. Thus, take the feeling of anger: if we are too angry, or not angry enough, we err and are blamed; but if we are angry at the proper time, and at the proper things, and with the proper persons, and with the proper effect, and in the proper way, we hit off 'the happy mean,' and do what we are praised for, and what is right. But where 'we are praised,' and 'do what is right,' Virtue is concerned. It is Virtue therefore which makes us 'hit off the mean': indeed we may perhaps even say that 'Virtue is itself a kind of mean.' Again, there are many wrong ways (evil is something indefinite as the Pythagoreans opined, good something definite), but only one right way. Hence it is easy to miss the mark, difficult to hit it—another reason why we assign the mean—for it is difficult—to Virtue, and the extremes to Vice—for they are easy.

Moral Virtue may then be defined, as 'A Habit involving Choice, lying in a Relative Mean fixed by Reason, that is, as the Prudent Man would fix it.'

But it is only as formally defined, that Virtue 'is a mean,' or 'lies in a mean,' between two vices, choosing the middle course between their extremes. This 'middle course,' we must remember, is likewise the Best Course: and as choosing what is Best virtue is 'supreme excellence.' It is not to every action, however, and every feeling that the formula of the mean applies. Some feelings, e.g. envy, some actions, e.g. theft, are seen, as soon as named, to imply evil. It is never possible to have such feelings, or perform such actions, 'in the right way.' To suppose it possible would indeed be as absurd as to suppose that acting unjustly or acting intemperately could have its excess, defect and mean, or that the exact mean point of justice or temperance could be resolved into excess and defect. In short there is no mean in excess and defect, and no excess and defect in the mean.

1106 a. 15. § 1. ποια τις] Having in the last chapter shown ὅ τι ἐστι τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, viz. that it is a ἐξει, Aristotle now proceeds to declare its differentia—ποια τις.

§§ 2, 3.] Taken, as Grant points out, from Plato, Rep. 353 B.

a. 25. § 4. ποια τις ἐστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς] Its differentia is that it is ἐν μεσότητι.

a. 28. συνεχεῖ καὶ διαμετρεῖ] Continuous and discrete quantity—i.e. magnitude (μέγεθος) and number (πλῆθος), according to Grant, who quotes Cat. 6. 4 b. 20 τοῦ ἐν ἐξει καὶ μέν ἐστι διαμετρέουσα τὸ δὲ συνεχεῖ . . . ἐστι δὲ διαμετρήσειν, οίνον ἀριθμὸ καὶ λόγος, συνεχεῖς δὲ οίνον γραμμὴ ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἐτὶ δὲ παρὰ ταύτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος. It will be observed, however, that in this passage from the Categories the
term used is διωρισμένον not διαιρέτων. Is διαιρέτων in the Ethics 
1108 a. 26. equivalent to διωρισμένον in the Categories? Against an affirmative answer we have De Coelo i. 1. 268 a. 6 συνεχες μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ διαιρέτων εἰς ἀεὶ διαίρεται: and Mel. Δ. 13. 1020 a. 10 λέγεται δὲ πλῆθος μὲν τὸ διαιρέτων δυνάμει εἰς μὴ συνεχῆ, μέγεθος δὲ τὸ εἰς συνεχῆ, from which passages it would appear that both μέγεθος and πλῆθος, i.e. both the συνεχες and the μὴ συνεχες are διαιρέτα. If διαιρέτων then is to be distinguished from τὸ διωρισμένον, which undoubtedly stands for πλῆθος, we must translate συνεχει καὶ διαιρέτῳ by 'continuous and at the same time capable of division'—the rendering rejected by Grant, but supported by the Paraphrast, who has—ἐν παντὶ συνεχεί, οὖν γραμμῆ ἐπιφανεία, σώματι, ἦ λόγῳ ἡ χρόνος, καὶ ὅλως ἐν παντὶ δυναμένῳ διαιρεῖναι. The writer of the parallel passage in E. E. ii. 3 certainly understood the reference to be to the συνεχες alone, and not to the συνεχες and διωρισμένον. His words are, 1220 b. 21 ἐν ἀπαντὶ συνεχεί καὶ διαιρετῷ ἐστὶν ὑπεροχή καὶ ἐλλειψις καὶ μέσον καὶ ταῦτα ἡ πρὸς ἀληθη ἡ πρὸς ἡμᾶς' οὖν ἐν γνωματικῇ ἐν ἱερικῇ ἐν οἰκο- 
δομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν ὅπως εἰρήνει καὶ ἐπιστημονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστη-
小微, καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀνάξιῳ ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχῆς' ἢ δὲ πράξεις κίνησις. The Ald. Sch. follows the lead of Eudemus. He says— 
πρόδηλον ὅτι πάση πράξει παρακολουθεῖ χρόνος, οὐκ ἑλάσσων δὲ περὶ 
πράξεως ἡ πάθη ἡ ἀρετή' καθ' ὃ οὖν ἐν χρόνῳ, δὲ χρόνος ἐν συνεχεῖ καὶ 
διαιρετῷ, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ διάφεσιν λήψεται.

§§ 4–8.] It is unfortunate that Aristotle, in introducing the subject of the ethical mean, gave such prominence to the 
συνεχες καὶ διαιρέτων i.e., to Quantity simply as Quantity. He thereby 
invited scholastic explanations like that by which Eudemus attempts to 
show how moral action falls under the head of the συνεχες— 
E. E. ii. 3. 1220 b. 26 ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχῆς' ἢ δὲ πράξεις κίνησις: 
and laid his Theory open to the (really false) charge of recognising 
only a quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice. As a 
matter of fact, however, he is careful to distinguish between the 
μέσου τοῦ πράγματος and the μέσου πρὸς ἡμᾶς. The μέσου τοῦ πράγ-
ματος, as such, has no place in morals, being confined to depart-
ments in which the 'middle,' or 'half,' of something can be ex-
actly measured, or counted. The μέσου πρὸς ἡμᾶς, with which

1 It is fair to add, however, that the Paraphrast passes, a few lines below, 
from the 'continuous' to the 'discrete'—but uses the term διωρισμένον, not 
διαιρέτων. Aspasius is defective here.
alone we have to do in morals, is that δ μητε πλεονάζει μητε ἐλλείπει, i.e., that which enables a particular person to correspond successfully with his social environment. Here account must be taken of complicated organic conditions, of complicated external circumstances, and of intricate actions and reactions between these organic and external factors: and the division of a συνεχές throws little light upon the problem. This Aristotle sees clearly. It seems probable that, having arrived at a satisfactory result in the preceding chapter by looking at ἀρετή in connexion with the Category of ποιῶν, he next turned to that of ποσῶν for help, and so stumbled upon τὸ συνεχές, of which his commentators have unfortunately made so much.

When we have found τὸ μέσον τὸ τού πράγματος, we have found a quantity simply. But in τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς we have a quantity, as it is related to a quality. From σχῆμα, the fourth kind of ποιῶν (see Cat. 8. 10 a. 11), we may obtain an illustration of the way in which quantity is related to quality. Let us suppose that a disc is 'of no use' with a diameter of 10 inches, and that it must be enlarged till it becomes a disc 'of a useful size.' In adding matter (e.g. copper) to it, it is true that we must not add 'too much or too little'; but, more than this, 'the due amount' which we add must have the quality of shape suitable to a disc; the same 'amount' with another quality of shape would not help us. This due amount thus circularly qualified might be called τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς τῶν κύκλων. It is clear then that τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, although it has its quantitative aspect, is essentially that which is qualitatively suitable to the moral character in the circumstances in which it is placed.

The analogy between the moral character and the definite well-balanced forms of organic nature, and of art, was always present to Aristotle's mind; indeed we have to look no farther than the 9th section of this chapter to find it mentioned. Living organisms, and works of art, are σχῆματα, definite after their kinds, which Nature and Man respectively form by qualifying matter. The

1 Cf. Trendelenburg Logische Untersuch., i. 358 sqq.: he remarks that Aristotle's virtuous μεσόνς is not a mere quantum, but keeps in view the qualitative peculiarity of virtue: and that when Plato extols measure in the moral, natural, and artistic worlds, he understands not measure per se, but measure in relation to a qualitative end. It is in the end which it subserves that measure has its ethical value.
quantity of matter used in any case is determined by the form of the whole organism, or work. Thus animals and plants grow to sizes determined by their particular structures, habitats, and conditions of life, and each separate organ observes the proportion of the whole to which it belongs. The painter or sculptor considers the symmetry of the whole composition in every detail of his work. The conductor of a choir is forced to exclude a voice which surpasses all the others conspicuously in beauty—

§ 7. 

In all cases Form dominates matter, quality quantity. Similarly, the moral character is a definite Form which maintains itself as such, the *méson*, so-called, which it observes in various circumstances being that course of action which is best fitted in the circumstances to secure its continued maintenance. The less we think of the 'middle,' or 'half' of a *symbexis* and *diasperein*, in such a connexion, the better. When an insect escapes capture by resembling the colour of the leaves or bark on which it lives, its development of that particular shade of colour and no other, has as much right to be described as an observance of the *méson*, as the temperance which protects the citizen from extremes disastrous to himself and others.

§ 7. τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν] otherwise ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης— a. 35.

The *ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης* answers to the average as found by

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\(^1\) Cf. Spencer's *Biology*, part ii. ch. 1 on Growth.
1106 a. 35. statistics. Statistics give us the average amount of beer, e.g., consumed per head in a city: but it is only by accident that this amount happens to be that good for a particular person.

b. 7. § 8. μέσον δὲ οὖ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς] Morality and art have nothing to do with the μέσον τοῦ πράγματος as such. When we say that they seek the μέσον, we mean by that term τὸ μέτριον (as used by Plato in the Politicus)—the qualitatively suitable quantity, which may of course, in some cases, happen to be τὸ μέσον τὸ τοῦ πράγματος. Thus corrective justice seeks to effect τὸ ἴσον (or μέσον) τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν (see v. 4. 3)—but only because that ἴσον or μέσον is qualitatively suitable: the end of justice is best served, if the parties are treated as equals who have been made unequal by the βλάβως, and the arithmetical mean is struck between them.

b. 8. § 9.] τέχνη, ἀρετὴ, and φύσις are principles which produce definite forms. The forms which τέχνη produces in matter do not, however, penetrate the matter, as do those produced by ἀρετὴ and φύσις. The sculptor shapes only the outside of the marble. But a living being is organised throughout its matter, as deep down as the microscope can reach¹. Similarly, a virtuous character is no mere external accomplishment, but the personality of the man. For this reason ἀρετὴ is said to be πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείων. It is a beautiful organism in which nothing is ματηρ, as distinguished from a product of workmanship, necessarily rough and imperfect.

What Aristotle somewhat unfortunately calls the μέσον in nature, art, and morals, Plato called more happily the μέτριον. In three passages in the Politicus he anticipates all that is valuable in Aristotle’s doctrine, and even stumbles in one place upon the use of the term μέσον, only however to drop it. In the first passage (Politicus 283 E–284 A) he says that good and bad men are chiefly distinguished by their different relations to the φύσις τοῦ μετρίου, and that all the arts produce their good and beautiful results by observing τὸ μέτριον. In the second passage (Politicus 284 D) he distinguishes between the sciences which have to do with number and magnitude as such, and those which regard τὸ μέτριον, τὸ πρότερον, τὸν καρπόν, τὸ δεόν, thus dividing ἡ μετρητικὴ into

¹ As Leibnitz says—'Machinae naturae h. e. corpora viventia sunt abduc machinae in minimis partibus usque in infinitum. Atque in eo consistit discrïmen inter naturam et artem, hoc est inter artem divinam et nostram.'
two parts. Aristotle's distinction between the μέσον τοῦ πράγματος 1106 b. 8. and the μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς involves the same division. It is in this passage that Plato happens to use the term μέσον. In the third passage (Politicus 310) Plato makes a practical suggestion with regard to the realisation of τὸ μέτρων in the character of the community, which shows us how deeply he has penetrated into the meaning of this great principle of Life. The μέτρων, he suggests, may be realised by the intermarriage of opposite natures. Naturally, from ῥᾳδιῶν, like seek like; ἄνδρεῖοι do not mix with σῶφρονες. The result is that after many generations the former become savage, and the latter unable to hold their own. It is for wise legislation to weave together opposite tendencies, and produce a race which may be compared to a web, λέον καί, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐνήμιρον (with a fine warp). Again, μετρότης or ἔξωμετρία is the principle of good, beauty, and survival in an interesting passage in the Philebus 64 D, E.

§ 10. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἦθικήν ἄρετήν ἐν μεσότητι, because it is b.16. a form concretely realised in the ἠλη of the pleasures and pains which attend actions and feelings. It is an ἐνοικὸς λόγος effected in this ἠλη with difficulty. It is said to be ἐν μεσότητι in relation to the tendencies to disorder which it withstands. But διανοητική ἄρετή is the Principle of Form or λόγος viewed per se as incompatible with the irregularity of excess or defect. Thus φρόνησις is the Principle of Form in relation to the ἠλη of τὰ πρακτά. This Principle itself is not said to be ἐν μεσότητι, but the concrele form, or moral order, which it produces in our passions (i. e. the ἐνοικὸς λόγος of ἦθική ἄρετή) is, because that concrete form may fail (by reason of ὑπερβολή and ἐλεйψις) to be produced. Where, however, failure is impossible—in the region of the ἄλοι λόγοι, or rationes, of science and speculation, truths in the pursuit of which there is no πλάνη and no temptation from the side of pleasure or pain— it would be unmeaning to use the expression ἐν μεσότητι, which connotes success in circumstances in which failure is possible.

Thus the faculties by which we apprehend such truths—the purely intellectual ζέεις—σοφία and ἐπιστήμη—are not described as ἐν μεσότητι ὀδηγοί—for two reasons: first because they are phases of

1 E. N. vi. 5. 6 οὐ χαὶ ὀπασάν ὑπάληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἥδυ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὑπὶ τὸ πράγματον διὸ ὅροις ἔχει ἡ ὁμιλεῖ ἐχεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν.
the Principle of Form, which *in itself* is incompatible with ἑπερβολὴ and ἔλλειψις: secondly because they are concerned with objects which offer no obstacles to the reception of the form of reason. Hence the broad distinction which must be kept in view for the right understanding of the present section:—That in its practical exercise—in dealing with matter, or, as we should say, with 'an environment,' λόγος, or the Organising Principle (though *in itself* incompatible with ἑπερβολὴ and ἔλλειψις), is surrounded by difficulties and dangers, which it surmounts and avoids by 'doing the best in the circumstances'—by 'adaptation'—τὸ τοῦ μέσου στοχαστικαί: whereas in its scientific exercise (as Aristotle understood its scientific exercise), the Principle of Reason has not to impress its form upon an alien and rebellious matter, but finds itself face to face with itself in its object, and, being dominated by nothing beyond itself, cannot fall into error: cf. *Met.* A. 10. 

Admitting fully the importance in Metaphysics and Ethics of this doctrine of the infallibility and autonomy of Reason, I think that it causes Aristotle to overlook the fact that there are properly scientific operations which closely resemble moral actions in the dangers and difficulties by which they are surrounded. The scientific operation of ἐπαγωγή, for example, consists in the slow and difficult formation of a conception out of the manifold of confused sensations. At every step of this process the intellect is liable to be deceived by present appearances, while memory often plays it false: above all, the feelings affect its point of view—Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est. To form a true conception, or καθῆλον, out of many αἰσθητά is as closely connected with adaptation to the environment, as the formation of a good habit of acting is, and attended by difficulties perhaps as great, though not of the same kind. The καθῆλον therefore which embraces just the most important points in the αἰσθητά, omitting those which are not important, might with truth be described as apprehended or 'held' by a ἔκς lying ἐν μεσότητι. But Aristotle, although he gives a very good account of ἐπαγωγή, and the formation of universals, prefers, in contrasting moral virtue and science, to look at the latter as engaged with the abstract truths of mathematics and metaphysics, which the Greek mind pursued with so much success. If the difficulties of concrete
scientific investigation had been more fully appreciated by him, he would not have drawn the line so sharply as he seems to do in this section, between ἰδική ἀρετή and διανοητική ἀρετή. It is to be noticed however that τέχνη, which he has correctly described as τοῦ μέσου στοχαστική, is the ἀρετή of the ποιητική διάνοια: see E. N. vi. ch. 2 and ch. 4. Indeed it is implied in the definition of ἰδική ἀρετή (§ 15) that φρόνησις also is στοχαστική τοῦ μέσου. The same is, as I have tried to show, true of other intellectual ἔξεις, in so far as they also are modes of our adaptation to a difficult environment. There is therefore little value in the limitation apparently implied in the words λέγω δὲ τὴν ἰδικήν, except in so far as attention is called to the much greater influence of pleasure and pain in the moral than in the scientific sphere of human activity. All thinking, even the most abstract, is ‘a mode of adaptation’—i.e. is ‘practical.’ Aristotle admits this in the opening words of the Metaphysics—πάντες ἀνθρώποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ἥργον ται φύσει. A belief is honest which we are prepared to act upon; and a belief which leads to hurtful action is not true. The avenues of knowledge, the special senses, do not give the whole truth about the universe, but only so much as enables us to live. Their truth is relative to conduct. The practical curiosity of the eye of sense, which sustains the intelligence of the lower animals, becomes in man the theoretical curiosity of the ‘mind’s eye’—Met. A. 2. 982 b. 12 διὰ τὸ βασιλέας οἱ ἀνθρώποι καὶ τῶν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἡρακτικὶ φιλοσοφεῖν.

§ 11. μέσον τε καὶ ἀριστον] The via media which ἀρετή takes is b. 22. also the best way—i.e. the only right way in the circumstances. Cf. below, § 17.

§ 12. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν πράξεως] as well as περὶ τὰ πάθη, e.g. b. 23. φοβηθήναι, mentioned in § 10.

ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται] ] Rassow b. 25. (Forsch. 33) suggests ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται καὶ ἀμαρτάνεται—on the ground that both predicates (ἀμαρτάνεται and ψέγεται) belong to each of the extremes. Bywater brackets ψέγεται.

§ 13. στοχαστικὴ γε] Ramsauer has—‘Particulā γε adjectā ex- b. 28. cusatur quasi audacia loquendi qua nova vox μεσοτής ἡ ἀρετή modo proposita est; neque enim prorsus certum virtutem ideo quod sit τοῦ μέσου vel στοχαστική τοῦ μέσου, necessario ipsam esse μεσοτήτα.’
§ 14. ἕτερο τὸ μὲν κ.τ.λ.] There are many wrong ways of doing a thing, but only one right way. Therefore (καὶ διὰ ταύτ’ ὁδὸν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, involving as they do many ways of doing a thing, are characteristic of vice, and μεσότης is characteristic of virtue. The Paraphrast has—φαίνεται ἄρα καὶ διὰ τούτο τὴν μὲν ὑπερβολήν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῆς κακίας εἶναι (ἀόριστα γὰρ ἐκάτερον) τὴν δὲ μεσότητα τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὑσιμενὴν καὶ μιᾶν υόσαν.


b. 35. ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἄπλως κ.τ.λ.] Spengel (Aristotelische Studien I. Nic. Eth. p. 205) would place this line after ἐπικυρεψε, b. 33.

b. 36. § 15.] This is the final definition of ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ. The parts of it which have not been already explained are—ὀρισμένη (dat.) λόγῳ, and ὡς [Bywater reads ὧς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειν.

The μεσότης is ‘rationally determined,’ or ‘determined according to the proper ratio or proportion.’ This ratio is, of course, that of the organisation which meets most successfully the conditions of human life. The man who realises this ratio most perfectly, and is most clearly conscious of it, is termed the φρόνιμος. In the Sixth Book which treats largely of φρόνιμος, we are told (ch. 13. 6) that it is φρόνησις which raises φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ into κυρία ἀρετῆ. There exist, independently of education, in the children of a civilised community, certain natural tendencies to feel pleasure and pain in connexion with the right objects. Without these natural tendencies to work upon, νόμος would have difficulty in making a beginning of moral education. Thus θυμὸς is the natural source of ἀνδρεία, αἰδώς of σωφροσύνη, and νέμεις of δικαιοσύνη (see especially E. E. iii. 7. 1234 a. 24 sqq.). These natural tendencies νόμος limits in relation to one another, producing a συμμετρία of the whole man. The

1 No apology is needed for sometimes rendering λόγος, or ὁ ἄφθος λόγος, by ratio or proportion, rather than by Reason; for the object of Reason is ratio or system, and the faculty of Reason and its object are identical, according to a far-reaching tenet of Aristotle, upon which he often insists. Ὁ ἄφθος λόγος is the moral constitution of man, of which he is conscious in his λόγος, φρόνησις, or νόμος πρακτικὸς.
difference between ὑμός and ἄνδρεια, for instance, is that ὑμός is 1106b.36. a fitful principle, depending upon accident for its manifestation, incapable of originating a consistent course of behaviour in the presence of danger, and not necessarily bound up with any other good tendency, but often existing alone—as in the case of the Spartans and other purely warlike nations: whereas ἄνδρεια implies all the other virtues, being a member of the indivisible organism of the moral character; not a fitful principle of action, but mediating acts ultimately determined by the man's whole moral nature, and not by the accident of the moment which might arouse his ὑμός.

A man's ἄνδρεια is not a feeling which is born on the battle-field, but the spirit shown on the field by one who, not only has had experience of danger, but has cultivated the peaceful virtues of σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἕλενθρωπός, μεγαλοπρέπεια; and similarly, the spirit of ἄνδρεια is necessary to these peaceful virtues. Νόμος (which is νός ἄνευ ὀρέξεως Pol. iii. 11 1287 a. 32) perceiving the relation which ought to subsist between the tendencies of human nature, endeavours to effect it in the young, by encouraging some tendencies, and discouraging others. At first the subjects of this educational process are not aware of what is being really done; but in course of time they begin to see for themselves the relation which has been gradually effected. Φρόνησις, or the consciousness of the proper relation (ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος), dawns in them, and aids νόμος, and gradually supersedes it in the function of preserving and perfecting the συμμετρία. Unless, on the one hand, the wayward tendencies were first regulated in relation to one another by the constraining force of νόμος, we should never become conscious for ourselves of the proper relation in which they ought to stand to one another, as members of a whole; but, on the other hand, unless this consciousness supervened in us, our virtue would remain at the level of the mere good behaviour of children, who do what is right without knowing why, simply because they are told to do it: οὐχ οὗν τε ἐγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρόνησεως (vi. 13. 6). With φρόνησις, a man is κύριοι—his own master; and conscious of the systematic unity of his nature in all its parts—ἄμα γὰρ τῇ φρόνησις μᾶ ὑπαρχοῦσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν αἱ ἀρεται. With Aristotle's theory of the relation of φρόνησις to κυρία ἀρετή may be compared Shaftesbury's view, that Virtue, as distinguished from mere Goodness, is impossible without Reflection (Inquiry concerning Virtue, Book i. Part ii. Section iii), and Kant's doctrine, that kind actions prompted by a good-natured temperament have no moral value.
1106 b. 36. The virtuous habits produced by the external agency of ἴμος, and maintained and perfected by the φρονήσεις at last awakened in the subject himself, are severally termed μεσότητες. In this Book, and the two following Books, each of these μεσότητες is treated separately in connexion with its own special extremes, and little care is taken to remove the very natural impression that its relation is only to these specified extremes—that, for instance, the nature of ἅνευθερήσεως is exhausted when we have defined it as the mean between ἀσωτία and ἅνευθερήσεια. Moral virtue thus seems to be presented as a σμήνος ἁρετῶν. But closer attention shows that this is not the impression which Aristotle intends to convey—that the separate treatment of the virtues, in relation to special extremes, is intended only to bring out into clear light, one after another, a number of important aspects of the same moral agent, as he is placed in different circumstances: that we have to do, not with so many individuals—the ἄνδρεῖς, σώφρους, &c.—but with points of view obtained by analysis, the intention of the analysis being to enable us at last to clothe the concrete agent more fully with his attributes. Against the separate or analytical treatment of the various μεσότητες in succession, we must set the statement οὐ χωρίζονται ἀλλήλοις αἱ ἁρεταὶ (vi. 13. 6). The various virtues, although for greater clearness they may be treated separately, are not separately existent, but each exists only as all the others exist, and form an ἄρθρος λόγος, or system, which is different (within limits) for each man. Each man has, as it were, his own moral centre of gravity, and all the virtues, related to one another in a particular way, are necessary to his stability; but his moral stability may be assailed in different ways, in different circumstances. On the field of battle the emotions of fear and over-confidence are its special assailants, and its main maintenance against them is courage. Other circumstances have other special temptations, and the maintenance of stability receives other names. But the centre of gravity remains the same in all, being that particular λόγος, or organisation, of his whole nature which is best for the particular man. The one vice of cowardice, or of rashness, would amount to the demoralisation of the whole nature. We cannot conceive of the magnificence of the rash man, or of the temperance of the coward.

These considerations show how mistaken the objection is to Aristotle's theory of the virtuous mean, that it makes merely a quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice. This objection
can be felt only by one who thinks of courage, for instance, merely in connexion with its specified extremes—cowardice and rashness. But courage is only a particular manifestation of ἡ ὀλη ἀρετή: and cowardice, or rashness, is only a particular symptom of total demoralisation. Cowardice, or rashness, therefore differs from courage as the confusion differs from the order of the whole nature. If this is not a qualitative difference, it will be difficult to point to any that is.

The various Virtues described in this Book and in the two following Books may be taken, then, to be illustrations, more or less striking, of the function of φραύνης, or the consciousness of the ‘right ratio,’ in preserving that ratio against the various assaults to which it is exposed through the sensibility. As ἀνδρεία is the preservation of the right ratio in the presence of danger to life in battle, so σωφροσύνη is its preservation amid the temptations of bodily pleasure; μεγαλοπρέπεια its preservation in the midst of great wealth and state; ἐλευθερία, in the midst of the daily calls upon one’s purse; πραΰτης, amid the irritations of social intercourse; εὐτυπελία, amid its gaieties. In these and all other circumstances of temptation there is no occult quality, no separate faculty, which deals with each kind of temptation—the man indivisible deals with each, preserving in the particular circumstances of each temptation a moral balance, which has been preserved so long, under such various assaults, that its preservation in any circumstances whatsoever is no longer doubtful.

But is not this all too vague? How shall a man know that he is really preserving his ‘moral balance,’ or character? The E. N. refer us to the φραύνης or στουδαίοις, and the E. E. end by referring us to the σκόπος τῆς καλόκοιμίας, explained (E. E. H. 15. 1249 b. 20) as τῶν θεῶν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν—all that hinders this is evil; all that promotes it, good. This may be taken to mean that we must regulate our lives in accordance with νοῦς—τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θείον, that we must not allow ‘the sensibility’ to dominate our conduct. But ‘regulate our lives in accordance with Reason’ is a formula which conveys no information as to the real requirements of Reason; for, although it is plain that we are to restrain the sensibility, how far we are to do so we are left without means of judging. How is a man to know when a particular πάθος, admitted, disturbs the poise of his whole moral nature, and when not? If he be καλὸς κάραβος, Eudemus seems to answer, he will know. Still, it would be
desirable that those who have not yet attained to the height of καλοκαγαθία should know, at least approximately, the proportions of the moral κράτους, which, when fully achieved, is doubtless very hard to disturb. But Eudemus gives us no further information on this point. Aristotle tells us to observe the proportions of the φρόνιμος or σπουδαῖος: but still we are not told what these proportions are. We are told that his nature is ‘intelligible,’ not a mere bundle of sensations: that it is ὀφθαλμών ὁ λόγος—but we are not told more. Evidently, then, Aristotle will have us look for ourselves at the σπουδαῖος in the concrete, and watch how he actually tempers his nature. This is undoubtedly to refer us to a standard of great practical value, albeit to one which, being merely empirical, is apt to be misinterpreted. It must be admitted, however, that even those moral systems, which profess to give an ultimate standard, are obliged to acknowledge that the σπουδαῖος, or man who acts up to the requirements of the ultimate standard, is indispensable as a representative standard, which the bulk of mankind can easily see, and will, from a natural tendency to imitate social types, probably conform to. So far, then, Aristotle’s σπουδαῖος—the good man whom we admire and wish to imitate—is an excellent moral agency, not only representing the standard of right actions, but supplying a strong motive to perform them. On the other hand, the Eudemian σκοπὸς τῆς καλοκαγαθίας—τῶν θεῶν θεραπεύων καὶ θεωρεῖν is a mere formula—‘Live according to Reason’—not a concrete example of the rational life successfully achieved, which may serve at least as an empirical rule of conduct likely to be followed.

But how shall we know the σπουδαῖος, or φρόνιμος, when we see him? Aristotle’s answer to this really vital question is nowhere given in so many words, but is not difficult to gather from the general drift of his Ethics and Politics. We recognise the φρόνιμος when we see him, because we have ourselves received an education similar in kind to that which he has received and perfected. This education is that of correspondence with the νόμος—the law, custom, fashions, and social conditions generally—of the State into which we have been born, and in which we live. The φρόνιμος corresponds with these conditions in an eminent manner. In all his actions he shows himself at home in his own city, and worthy of it. The maintenance, then, of a beautiful everyday life, according to Hellenic traditions—a life in whose varied activities one takes a personal, but not a self-aggrandising part—is Aristotle’s
standard of Virtue. It has the advantage of being a standard which it is not very difficult to keep in view. It is easier to see whether a particular action is in harmony with the tone of the society in which one has been brought up, than to see whether it promotes the 'greatest good of the greatest number.' But it will be said—'The tone of the society in which one has been brought up may be bad: this is not an ultimate standard which Aristotle gives us.'

Perhaps not: but we must answer on behalf of Aristotle, that he knew nothing better than the limited society of the Hellenic city. The culture of the few, according to the Hellenic pattern, was his standard. He was a stranger to political and economic considerations, which, in modern times, have made 'society' co-extensive with 'the greatest number'; he was a stranger also to that philanthropy which gives up 'culture' with its πᾶσα αἰ ἀρετή, and leads what he must have considered a μονόκολος βίος in order to help the miserable.

The ἐρήμος λόγος, then, which the virtuous man preserves in all circumstances is 'correspondence with his social environment.' It is a 'correspondence' which 'extends in space and time'—i.e. it is an adaptation to the environment as one whole. The man whose habits have been determined by the conditions of peace, but not by those of war, or vice versa, is a man who does not correspond with his environment as one whole, and his correspondence even with one set of conditions is more apparent than real, because peace and war cannot be sharply separated; in war he must look forward to peace; and when he has obtained the blessings of peace, he must be ready to defend them. Thus the warlike and the peaceful virtues of the good man do not refer simply to war and peace respectively. The rule which his φρόνησις or social and moral tact lays down for him is—'So act in any particular case, that you heighten your power of acting well in any other case.' This rule implies a highly developed adaptation. Every stimulus is received as being what it is, because the whole environment is what it is. The moral nature of such a man is like a highly organised animal, which acts in response to a particular stimulus in a manner which promotes the good of the whole organism as exposed in the present and future to a whole system of stimuli.

Φρόνησις, or the 'Practical Reason,' does not appear fully in a
man till 'good habits' have been formed—till the manifold of his sensible nature has been reduced to the ὁρθὸς λόγος. Reason grows with its object. It is evolved as the moral agent takes increased pleasure in good actions—called 'good' at first only by anticipation, in relation to a future ὁρθὸς λόγος in him, or still latent Reason. Reason is thus the Habit of Habits. It may be that this supreme Habit of the moral life reveals its existence, in the experience of some men, suddenly, like the light-bringing idea which flashes all at once in the mind of a man of science, after years of patient study. This is the moral experience which Kant prefers to dwell on, maintaining that the recognition of Duty 'is not to be effected by gradual reform, as long as the Principle of a man's actions remains impure, but requires a revolution in the mind, and he can only become a new man by a kind of new birth, as it were, by a new creation and a change of heart.' And again—'Virtue is described by some as a long practice (in observing the law) by which a man has passed from the propensity to vice, by gradual reform of his conduct and strengthening of his maxims, into an opposite propensity. This does not require a change of heart, but only a change of morals.' We must not suppose, however, that passages like the foregoing are intended to condemn habituation, which no moralist could refuse to regard as the great practical agency in the formation of Virtue. The difference between Kant and Aristotle is not really one of principle, but of detail. Kant confines himself almost entirely to the description of the pure Form of Virtue, and leaves nearly untouched the practical question of its actual superinduction upon sensible beings; while Aristotle applies himself largely to this latter question. But Aristotle's Habituation (which Kant doubtless refers to in the passages quoted above) is misrepresented, when it is implied that it is a process which can go on while all the time the 'Principle of action remains impure.' 'The long practice in observing the Law' is possible, Aristotle would tell us, only because there is, in the subject of it, a principle of rational personality (τὸ προαρετικόν) which, aided doubtless by 'the Law,' can and does set aside mere ἐπιθυμία. Virtue is a ἔγεις προαρετική. Προαρέσεις is an 'autonomous' principle. It is absurdly wrong to class Aristotle among those 'who recognise only 'heteronomy'—'Will ruled by appetites'—in morals. Προαρέσεις is βουλευτική ὁρείς (iii. 3. 19)—a Principle which reaches forth to take, or refrains from taking, after deliberation,
as distinguished from ἐπιθυμία which rushes blindly at its object. 1106 b. 36. The στροφαία προαιρεσις which, as organising principle, builds up the virtuous character, reaches forth or refrains in the interest of the whole moral organism or Personality, and sets aside the solicitations of the separate parts as such. Aristotle's insistence on the unity of the virtues in φρόνησις disposes at once of the suggestion that he founds morality on 'heteronomy.' He would have no difficulty in agreeing with Kant in distinguishing between 'true and merely habitual morality.' Good natural tendencies (φυσικαὶ ἀπεραὶ) may be confirmed into habits, apparently good, but yet forming no parts of a moral organism. A collection of such independent habits would be 'habitual virtue,' as distinguished from a 'virtuous character.' The man who has merely 'habitual virtue' is virtuous because, being a man of naturally good disposition, he happens also to have lived all his life in contact with certain good influences: but his nature has no system. He is perhaps honest enough, but illiberal; temperate enough, but not courageous. This would be a case of 'heteronomy.' But where a habit—e.g. σοφροσύνη—exists in a man, just as the ὁρθὸς λόγος of his whole moral nature requires it to exist—so that all the other virtuous habits coexist with it in perfection—we have the 'autonomy of the Will.' The actions which proceed from such a habit are determined 'formally'—i.e. by the consciousness of the whole moral organism, or ὁρθὸς λόγος. They are 'formally,' not 'materially,' determined because they proceed from, or are the expression of, the man as an ἔδως or Form—a system of related parts grasped by Reason; and are not merely due to the susceptibility of a single part placing itself in material isolation. As man is concretely constituted, all his moral actions must be occasioned by stimuli conveyed through the parts—i.e. by particular feelings, pleasant, or painful. But in some cases, in the moral, as in the physical organism, the external stimulus acts merely as a local irritation, provoking, as it were, a reflex movement of merely local significance; while in other cases, it is answered by a deliberate movement, resulting from the reaction of the whole organism, and subserving its highest interest.

There seems, therefore, to be no real antagonism between Aristotle's doctrine of Habituation, and Kant's doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will 1.

1 According to Kant, man has two characters—an 'intelligible' and a 'phe-
The close connexion which Aristotle’s philosophical definition of ἡ ἁρτή establishes between the μεσότης and φρόνησις recalls the kinship popularly recognised between τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν and τὸ γνώθι σεαυτόν—as, for example, in the following passage in Plutarch’s Consolatio ad Apollonium, 28—δ’ ἐστὶ τῶν Δελφικῶν γραμμάτων τὰ μάλιστ’ ἀναγκαίατα πρὸς τὸν βίον, τὸ γνώθι σεαυτόν, καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἠρτηται καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα. ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ ἕνων σύμφωνα καὶ συνφιλία, καὶ διὰ θατέρων θατέρων ἑοκε δηλούσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν. ἐν τέ γὰρ τῷ γνῶσκειν ἑαυτὸν περιέχεται τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ γνῶσκειν ἑαυτόν. Τι καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων φησιν ὁ Ἱον οὗτος τὸ γνώθι σεαυτόν, τοῦτ’ ἐπος μὲν οὐ μέγα, ἔργον δ’, ὥσπερ Ζεὺς μόνος ἐπιστήμων θεόν. ὁ δὲ Πίνδαρος,

Σοφοὶ δὲ, φησὶ, καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν ἐπος αἰνησαν περισσῶς.

Suppletur notio jam satis adumbrata (καὶ ἐτί) Dativo enim infinitivi circumscribitur qua ratione vel quibus in rebus sit virtus id quod modo explicatum est: ἐστὶν ἡ ἁρτή... μεσότης τὸ. Quo in supplemento summum est ut referatur virtus et vitia illi opposita ad τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις. Of course it is no new point which is thus introduced by καὶ ἐτί. It has already been brought forward in § 10 αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις and in § 12.

See Grant’s excellent note ad loc. and his Essay iv. p. 260. ‘This passage,’ he says (in his note), ‘implies that the term μεσότης is an abstract and metaphysical expression for the law of virtue, estimated by the understanding (though doubtless the deepest view attainable); but that viewed in relation to the good, or (as we should say) from a moral point of view—virtue is no mean state lying between vices (as if virtue were a little less vice, and vice a little more virtue), but an extreme, that is, utterly removed from, and opposed to vice.’ In other words—nomenal.’ In virtue of the former he is free: in respect of the latter, he is part of nature, and subject to its necessary laws. This distinction seems to me to be, at bottom, that between the individual organism, on the one hand, and its genealogical antecedents and its environment, on the other hand. When the organism ‘corresponds with its environment,’ the functions which it performs are its own functions—they are performed in accordance with its own constitution, and we may call them free: and yet they are necessary, because its constitution and the external stimuli which act on its constitution are products of the necessary laws of the Universe. Cf. note on E. N. iii. 1. 2.
BOOK II: CHAP. 6: § 17. 209

μεσότης δύο κακίων is a scientific formula, which describes the virtuous character in relation to the difficulties which surround it in its ‘struggle for existence.’ It describes Virtue, as the Darwinian theory describes the forms of vegetable and animal life—with special reference to the πολλαὶ ιδέαι βιωτίου which they manage, in various ways, just to evade. But Virtue, like these other forms, is something more than the negative ‘that which just manages to avoid fatal error.’ It must contain some positive reason for its existence. It does not exist simply because it does not happen to perish. The scientific formula, however, takes no account of this positive reason, but confines itself to τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ εἰς ἱποθέτεσθαι (see Phys. ii. 9.199 b. 34 sqq.).—If virtue is to be realised, such and such extremes must be avoided: so Darwinism—If the butterfly is to live, it must have such and such spots. But why Virtue (or the butterfly) should take the trouble to struggle for existence, is a question to which the formula contains no answer. Indeed no scientific answer can be given to such a question. We can only say with Aristotle that Virtue exists because it is a beautiful and excellent thing (see iii. 7. 6), just as plants and animals exist because it is ‘better’ that they should live than not live—see De Gen. Anim. ii. 1. 731 b. 24 ἐπὶ γὰρ ἄτι τὰ μὲν ἄδικα καὶ θέλει τῶν ἄνωτων, τὰ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον αἰτιον ἄνελ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν του βελτίωνος ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχόμενοις, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἴδιον ἐνδεχόμενον ἑστὶ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μεταλαμβάνει καὶ τοῦ χείρων καὶ τοῦ βελτίωνος, βελτίων δὲ ψυχῆς σώματος τὸ δὲ ἔμψυχον του ἀγάν καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῷ τοῦ μὴ ζων, διὰ ταῦτα τὰ αἰτίας γένεσις ψωφίων ἑστὶν.

Regarded scientifically, then, as a form constituted in a certain way out of certain elements, Virtue is a Mean suggesting Extremes. The Extremes represent the prevalence of that matter which Virtue reduces to form; and a scientific account of Virtue must describe the manner in which it accomplishes this achievement. But the achievement itself is not the manner of its accomplishment. So, Phidias, in executing his work, must be alive to all the various treacheries of his material and subject; but when the work is finished, it stands a god.

Plutarch (De Virt. Mor. 5) glosses this passage in a manner which shows that he did not allow the doctrine of μεσότης to suggest ‘a merely quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice’—ἀρετὴ ... οὐκ οὔσα φθορὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδὲ ἀναίρεσις, ἀλλὰ τάξις καὶ διακόσμησις, ἀκρότης μὲν ἐστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι, τῷ ποσῷ δὲ μεσό-
BOOK II: CHAP. 6: §§ 17, 18.

1107 a. 6. τῆς γίνεται, τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐξαιροῦσα καὶ τὸ ἀλλείπου. Cf. also with this §, iv. 3. 8 ἐστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόφυσος τῷ μὲν μεγίθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεὶ μέσον.


The τί ἦν ἐλειφαί, defined in Met. Z. 7. 1032 b. 14 λέγω δ' ὅσιαν ἀνευ δλης τὸ τί ἦν ἐλειφαί, is the law, or principle, in accordance with which a thing is constituted, and is what it is. It thus answers nearly to Bacon's Forma. A doctor's prescription is a formula which states the τί ἦν ἐλειφαί of the dose which is made up in accordance with it: the architect's plan, realised in bricks and wood by the builder, is the τί ἦν ἐλειφαί of the house: the structural type which an animal conforms to is its τί ἦν ἐλειφαί.

a. 8. § 18. οὖ πάντα κ.τ.λ.] i.e. there are πράξεις and πάθη which cannot be so modified as to form parts of an orderly character and life, but must be eradicated by education. Thus ἄνανθευτικά, being a natural tendency towards vice in relation to bodily pleasures, must be eradicated, as its contrary αἰθός, which is a natural tendency towards virtue in relation to these pleasures, and the source of σωφροσύνη (see E. E. iii. 7. 1234 a. 32), must be fostered in the young. Again, φθόνος contributes to ἀδίκια (see E. E. iii. 7. 1234 a. 30)—i.e. it is a natural tendency to grudge our neighbour his due share. This natural tendency cannot be organised into a virtuous character, or turned to good use, but must be eradicated, if possible, by education. For the relation of φθόνος to ἀδίκια cf. Chares (apud Stob. Flor. vol. ii. 47. ed. Meineke),

ἀδικώτατον πράγμα εἰσὶ τῶν πάντων φθόνος,

and Hippothoon (apud Stob. Flor. vol. ii. 48),

φθόνος κάκιστος κακωτάτατος θεὸς

κακοῖς τε χαίρει κάγαθοι ἀλαόντεαι.

a. 12. λέγεται] Bekker and Susemihl read ψέγεται on the suspicious authority of Mb alone.

§§ 18–20.] These sections show clearly that Aristotle does not make 'a merely quantitative difference between virtue and vice'—

1 It would not be necessary to notice this view of Aristotle's doctrine, had it not been advanced by Kant. There are other indications pointing to the conclusion that Kant's study of Aristotle was not very careful.
BOOK II: CHAP. 7: § I.

οὐκ ἔστι σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἀλλείψις—ἐκαλολοια 1107 a. 12.

and ἀνασθομαί do not differ from σωφροσύνη in a merely quantitative manner, nor ἁρπαγὴς and δελία from ἀνδρεία: ἁρπαγὴς e.g. is not the ὑπερβολὴ of ἀνδρεία—the two are qualitatively different. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of the μεσοτής of an ἄκρων—and the μέσον is in a sense an ἄκρων, an indivisible point which cannot be resolved into mean and extremes. We cannot speak of 'moderation in moderation.' Or otherwise—an ἄκρων is a quality not a quantity: cf. Plutarch's expression quoted in note on § 17 ἄκρωτις μὲν ἐστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι.

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

Now let us draw up a Diagram to show in detail that our formula 'Excess—Mean—Defect' applies to particular cases. We shall thus give reality to a theory which, left in its general form, would be too vague.

[For the 'Diagram' of ἄκρως (§§ 2-13) see text.]

In the foregoing Diagram (§§ 2-13) it is in the Habits of the Characters in the middle column, i.e. in the ways in which they are disposed towards actions or feelings, that the mean is realised. But (§§ 14, 15) it is sometimes realised also in feelings themselves and their immediate accompaniments. Thus, although Shame is not a virtuous habit, 'the man who has a sense of Shame' is praised. He occupies the mean; while one extreme is occupied by 'the Bashful Man,' who is always covered with Shame, and the other by 'the man who is without any sense of Shame.' Again the feeling of Indignation is the mean between Envy and Malignant Joy. But we shall have an opportunity afterwards of discussing these matters.

[Monro (Journ. of Philol. vi. pp. 185 sqq., 1876) brings forward what seem to be strong reasons for regarding this Chapter as an interpolation. Its terminology agrees rather with that of the E. E. and M. M. than with that of E. N. iv. The discrepancies will be pointed out in the notes on Book iv.]

The reading of the majority of MSS. is κοινότεροι. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus ad loc. and E. E. appendix p. 164. Manuscript authority, however, is nearly useless in the cases of κοινός, κενός, and καινός, and Bekker, I think, was right in neglecting it here, and
going on internal evidence, which seems to be in favour of κενώτεροι.

See the passages adduced by Zell, Michelet, and Grant, and by Zeller Ph. d. Gr. (Arist.), p. 171 n. 2 (3rd German Edition), especially de Gen. Anim. 748, a. 7 οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος καθόλου λίαν καὶ κενός ὁ γὰρ μὴ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν λόγοι κενοί. The reading κενώτεροι, as the antithesis of ἄληθινώτεροι, is supported by a line of Menander preserved in the Florentine MS. (Laurent. 22. 8) of Johannes Damascenus (see Meineke's Stobaeus: Flor. iv. p. 242)—

ἀληθείς εἶναι δεὶ τὸ σεμνόν, οὐ κενόν.

§ 32. See Michelet's important note, the gist of which is as follows—we have here four extremes round ἄνδρεία thus—

Defect of Fear—ἀφοβία. ἄνδρεία. Excess of Fear

Excess of Confidence—ἐρασύτης. Defect of Confidence

There is this difference between the two sides, as the Ald. Schol. notes, that excess of fear and defect of confidence are never disjoined, but always make together a single vice, of which they are, as it were, the moments; whereas the 'moments' on the other side—viz. defect of fear and excess of confidence, may exist apart, and give rise to two distinct vices, the defect of fear constituting what Michelet calls Intrepidity—a passive vice; the excess of confidence constituting θριασύτης, rashness—an active vice. Hence it results that two vices are opposed to ἄνδρεία on one side—'intrepidity' and rashness; and only one vice on the other side—cowardice. Further, as cowardice is a vice of defect, the writer of this chapter is led to speak of both the vices on the other side as vices of excess: hence the expression ὅ τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ὑπερβάλλων, instead of ὅ τῷ φόβῳ ἀλλείτων. The Ald. Schol. explains how Intrepidity is distinguished from θριασύτης—πρὸς τῷ τῇ θριασύτητι πρὸς τῷ ἄφοβῳ καὶ τῷ ἀλογίῳ ἱπτηκὸν πρὸς τὰ δεινά καὶ γὰρ ὃ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ἐν τῷ βίρρῳ ἄφοβος, οὐκ εἴτε δὲ καὶ ὃ ἄφοβος θριασύτης. See also Grant's note ad loc. Grant acutely recognises this complicated treatment of ἄνδρεία as 'a sign that Aristotle is here only working his way to the theory of the mean.' He probably thought out his theory first in connexion with ἄνδρεία. It is to be noted, however, that in § 4 of this chapter a similarly complicated account of ἐλευθερότης is given, and appears also in iv. 1, just as the refinement with regard to ἄνδρεία appears also in iii. 7. 7.
§§ 2–18.] The virtues, with their extremes, enumerated in this chapter, are all described in detail in Books iii and iv—where see notes.

§ 4. δ' ἐν αὐτάς] Bywater, for Bekker’s δ' ἐν αὐτάς Lb. κατ' αὐτάς b.11. is the reading of CCC, αὐτάς pr. Camb., δ' ἐν αὐτάς NC. Perhaps δ' ἐν αὐτάς: see note on viii. 4. 2. 1157 a. 19.

§ 8. (τῷ) περὶ μικρᾶ διαφέρουσαν] Bywater adopts the τῷ from b. 25. Ramsauer. I should like to read τῷ ἔλευθερωτάτα, περὶ μικρᾶ ὀδόσαν.

§ 9. κατὰ τῶν ὑφηγημένων τρόπων] Either τῷῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου (§ 5), 1108 a. 3. or (as the Paraphrast takes it) ἐγείρεις ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῷ μεσότητα καὶ τὰ ἀκρα: see the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant. ‘According to the method which has hitherto guided us’—Grant.

§ 11. πειρατέων . . . αὐτοῦς ὄνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἔνεκα κ.τ.λ.] a. 17. ‘Aristotle’s method,’ says Grant, ‘consists partly in accepting experience as shown in common language, &c., partly in rectifying it, or re-stating it from his own point of view; partly in finding new expressions for it, so as to discover men’s thoughts to themselves. He usually rather fixes the meaning of words, than creates new ones. For instance, he here assigns a peculiar and limited meaning to ἀλῆθες and φιλία. His influence upon the forms of language of civilised Europe can hardly be overrated. It is far greater than has ever been exercised by any one man beside.’


§ 14. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητας] a. 30. αἴδως and νέμεσις, being πάθη, are not μεσότητας in the strict sense; but are here called μεσότητας, as it were by anticipation, because they represent tendencies which can be easily cultivated into ἀρεταί. They are the natural sources, or the physical basis, of σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη respectively according to Eudemus (Eth. Eud. iii. 7), who describes them, together with φιλία, σεμώνης, ἀλῆθες, and εἰκρατεία, as παθητικαὶ μεσότητας—praiseworthy, but not ἀρεταί (nor are their contraries κυκλιαῖ), for they are without προαιρεσίς. These praiseworthy πάθη, being φυσικά (i.e. natural in the sense of being independent of education), contribute to the φυσικὰ ἀρεταί. Now, each perfectly developed virtue has its natural counterpart, out of which it has been evolved by φρονήσις—Eth. Eud. iii. 7. 1234 a. 29 ἐκάστη πῶς ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως. Thus, αἴδως
contributes to πάθη and νέμεσις to δικαιοσύνη, and each may be called a μεσότης by anticipation. In Plutarch, *De vita et poesi Homeri* 132, the peripatetic doctrine of the relation of these πάθη to Virtue is touched upon as follows—τῶν περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην διστεία πάθη ἴσως καὶ τῶν ἔλεος (τὸ γὰρ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς δικαιοσαί ἐπὶ τῶν πληρῶν, εἰ παρ' ἀξίαν εὐχοῦσι, νέμεσις καλεῖται τὸ δὲ λυπησθαί εἰ παρ' ἀξίαν δυστυχοῦσιν, ἔλεος λέγεσαι). Perhaps we may say that αἰδώς is a παθητική μεσότης, or a φυσικὴ ἀρετή, when (in the young) it takes the fixed form of a παθητικὴ ποιότης, as distinguished from a mere πάθος (see Cat. 8. 9 b. 33 sqq.).

Νέμεσις is not again discussed. The Fourth Book ends with αἰδώς (the last section seems to be a later addition), and is probably defective.

Νέμεσις (νέμω) properly means the distribution of what is due. Personified, it becomes the Goddess of Justice (see the περὶ κόσμων 401 b. 12 Νέμεσιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάστῳ διανεμήσεως), especially of just retribution, who humbles the overweening. Without personification, it is the feeling of righteous indignation. We can thus easily understand why Eudemus regards νέμεσις, the feeling of indignation naturally aroused by the sight of undeserved success, as 'contributing to' justice, which is essentially διανεμητικὴ κατ’ ἄξιαν. Although νέμεσις is not discussed in the Fourth Book of the *Nic. Ethics* as we have it, it is fully treated in *Rhet. ii. 9*, and its relation to δικαιοσύνη made very plain.

### a. 33.

δ' ὑπερβᾶλλων, δ' καταπλήξης] Rassow (*Forsch. 74*), following Coraes, and followed by Susemihl, inserts δ' ἀλλιτῶν καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβᾶλλων before ὡς. For Bekker's ὁ μηδὲ in the following line he reads μηδὲν with Kb (*Forsch. 55*): and compares 1104 a. 20, where μηδὲν occurs in a clause of similar structure. Bywater reads μηδὲν for ὁ μηδὲ.

### a. 35.

§ 15. νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκαίας] According to Grant φθόνος and ἐπιχαιρεκαία are 'only different forms of the same state of mind,' and cannot be opposed as two extremes. The true contrary of φθόνος is ἄνωθεσια τις. This is recognised, he thinks, by Eudemus, who has 'φθόνος—ἀνώνυμον—νέμεσις' in his ἱπτομαχή (*E. E. ii. 3. 1221 a. 3*), and by Aristotle himself in *Rhet. ii. 9. 1386 b. 34* ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρεκάκος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφ'

1 The end of iv may have disappeared along with the Nicomachean v, vi, and vii.
BOOK II: CHAP. 7: § 15.

The passage quoted from the Rhetoric is certainly in favour of Grant's view that φθόνος and ἐπιχαίρεικαία cannot properly be opposed as contraries; but if we turn from the ὑπογραφή of Eudemus to the detailed description, we find that it is only the ἔξις which he leaves nameless: the ἔχον is plainly the man called ἐπιχαίρεικασ, he tells us: and then he proceeds to contrast the ἐπιχαίρεικασ with the φθονέρο, just as the writer of E. N. ii. 7. 15 does. Grant is wrong, then, in supposing that the 'mistake (in ii. 7. 15) is set right by Eudemus.' The following are the words of Eudemus (E. E. iii. 7. 1233 b. 18) οἷον δ ὁ φθονέρο καὶ ἐπιχαίρεικασ καθ' ἃ γάρ ἔξεις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ' ἄξιον ἐπὶ πράττουσιν ἐστὶν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαίρεικακου πάθος [ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ] ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ' ὃ ἔχον δηλοῦσθαι, ἐπὶ τὸ (?) χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἄξιαν κακοπαραγίαι μέσον δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσθήκος καὶ ὁ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἄξιαν κακοπαραγίαις καὶ εὐπαραγίαις, χαίρειν δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἄξιαις.

The writer of the M. M. follows E. N. iii. 7. 15 and Eudemus in thus making φθόνος and ἐπιχαίρεικαία contraries, although he differs from Eudemus in making the pain and joy of the φθονέρο, and ἐπιχαίρεικασ respectively, independent of the good or ill fortune being deserved or not, and in making νέμεσις exclusively λύπη τις. His words are (M. M. i. 27. 1192 b. 18) νέμεσις δὲ ἐστὶν μετόνομης φθονέρος καὶ ἐπιχαίρεικαίας ... ἐστὶ δ' ἡ νέμεσις περὶ ἀγάθῳ ἀ τυγχάνει ὑπάρχοντα ἀναξίου ὡστὶ, λύπη τις. νεμεσθηκός οὖν ὃ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτως λυπητικός, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς γε πάλιν οὖτος λυπητικός, καὶ των ἀδικίων πράττουσιν ἀναξίων ὡστα ... ὁ δὲ γε φθονερὸς ἐναχτίος τούτῳ. ἀπλῶς γάρ, ἐὰν τε ἄξιον τις ἢ ἐὰν τε μή τοῦ εὐ πράττειν, λυπητικός. ὡμοίως τούτῳ ὁ ἐπιχαίρεικασ ἔστησε κακός πράττοντι καὶ τῷ ἄξιον καὶ τῷ ἄναξίῳ. ὁ δὲ γε νεμεσθηκός οὐ, ἀλλὰ μέσος τις ἐστὶ τούτων. The writer of the M. M. is certainly right in not ascribing to characters like the φθονέρος καὶ ἐπιχαίρεικασ the power of discriminating between deserved and undeserved fortune. He is also certainly right in making νέμεσις exclusively λύπη.

ἐπὶ πάσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ ἐπιχαίρεικασ] Rassow (Forsch. 74) b. 4. adopts, with much approbation, the suggestion of Sauppe (Dionysius und Aristoteles p. 22)—to insert after λυπεῖται (1108 b. 5) the words καὶ ὃ μὲν νεμεσθηκός ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακῶς πράττουσι λυπεῖται. Of
course it is possible that a clause ending with λυπείται may have fallen out; but I cannot help thinking that it is awkward to characterise the νεμεστικός in two closely adjacent clauses, instead of once for all; and I do not see why we should not be allowed to give its natural weight to the word ἐπιχαρέκακος, and mentally supply ἐν πάσι τοῖς κακῶς πράττοναι after χαίρειν. A Greek, I feel sure, could not think of the ἐπιχαρέκακος ' rejoicing at the success' of any one, good or bad : hence Grant's objection falls to the ground—'Again, the ἐπιχαρέκακος cannot be said τοσοῦτον ἀλλάζειν ὡστε κ.τ.λ., for he does not rejoice at the success of the good,' &c. I therefore think that Sauppe's clause is unnecessary. Of course the confusion, pointed out by Grant, of contrasting φθόνος and ἐπιχαρέκακος as two extremes is not denied, but is perhaps not so great as Grant supposes. The φθονερός is pained by the good fortune of other people: the ἐπιχαρέκακος rejoices at the ill fortune of other people: the νεμεστικός is pained by undeserved good or ill fortune. The φθονερός and ἐπιχαρέκακος may indeed be ὁ αἷτος (Rhet.), but there is a logical distinction.

b. 7. § 16. οὐχ ἀπλῶς] i. e. πλεοναχῶς v. 1. 7.

b. 8. ἐκατέρας] i. e. universal and particular justice v. 1. 8.

b. 9. δομιῶς δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν] Grant (followed by Ramsauer) brackets this clause, 'because of the term λογικά, which never occurs elsewhere in Aristotle or Eudemus, as applied to the διανοητικά ἀρεταί—secondly, because of the sense, since Aristotle could not possibly say that he meant to show how the intellectual excellences were μετοχής—thirdly, because of the extreme likelihood of an interpolation here.'

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

The two vices, that of Excess and that of Defect, and the virtuous Mean, are all three opposed in a certain way to one another—i. e. the two extremes are opposed as contraries, both to the mean, and to each other. Now the mean, standing in contrary opposition to each of the extremes, may be quantitatively expressed as an 'equal' which is 'greater' than the less of the defective extreme, and
'less' than 'the greater' of the excessive extreme. But here the man who actually lives in an extreme becomes the victim of a moral illusion. In 'greater than' or 'less than,' as applied to the mean in its relation to the extreme in which he lives, he sees 'too great,' or 'too little.' The coward calls the courageous man rash, and the rash man calls him a coward—each as it were pushes the man in the virtuous mean away from the middle place towards the other extreme. The contrariety is greater between the two extremes than between each and the mean, for each is more distant from the other than from the mean. But the mean is not always equally distant from each of the extremes, for one extreme sometimes resembles the mean after a fashion; e.g., Rashness bears a certain resemblance to Courage. Hence it is the defect, Cowardice, and not the excess, Rashness, which is regarded as the proper opposite of the mean, Courage, or as more distant from it: but in other cases it is the excess, e.g., Intemperance, which is so regarded, and not the defect, e.g., Insensibility.

When one of the extremes is thus the opposite par excellence of the mean, we have to explain the circumstance in either of two ways: (1) We may have to refer to the nature of the particular extremes themselves: thus ordinary observation makes it plain that Rashness, as a formed Habit, stands closer to Courage, and resembles it more nearly, than Cowardice does. This is the reason why we make Cowardice the opposite par excellence of Courage. It is a reason connected with a difference in the formed habits themselves. Or (2) we may have to refer to a difference, not in the formed habits themselves, but in our own tendencies, making it easier for us to acquire the one habit than the other. Thus our natural tendency to seek pleasure makes it easier for us to acquire the extreme habit of Intemperance than its opposite, the extreme habit of Total Abstinence. This is why Intemperance is the opposite par excellence of Temperance.

§ 1. ai mên gar àkrapai kai tê mésoi kai allhlais énastiai elsin, h 1108 b. 13. de mésoi taîs àkrapais] Cf. Cat. 11. 13 b. 36 sqq. énastion dé èstiv èx ánâgyes ágathî mên kakkôn too to dé dèllov tê kath' ékastou étaygôgh, ònon úgyieia nósoi kai ándreia délia, ómouios dé kai èpti tôn allon. kakkô dé èpti mên ágathôn énastion, òtê èk kakkôn tê gar ènúdeia kakkô èpti h' òperbdôle énastion kakkôn ùn. ómouios dé kai h' mesôtis énastia ékaterph, ousta ágathôn. èpti dèlloyon è stis tà tois tois èpti tàs plèistos aîi tà kakkô tà kakkôn énastion èstiv. In Cat. 6. 6 a. 17 tà plèiston allhlon diosthêkota tòv èn tà autôv géniv eis èstiv as a definition of énastia: but that the writer regards it as too narrow is plain from a subsequent passage (Cat. 11. 14 a. 19) ánâgye diè papta tà énastia h èn tà autôv géniv èstiv hè èn tois énastis égénis, hè autâ génis èstiv. àleukôn mên gar kai melan èn tà autôv géniv (chrôma gar autôn tà génos), diakosúnhe diè kai àdikia èn tàs énastis égénis (tà mèn gar àrêtê, tà dè kakkia tà génos) àghathôn dé kai kakkôn ouk èstiv èn géniv, allà autâ tughánei génh twn ònta. Cf. also Men. A. 10. 1018 a. 25 sqq.

§ 2.] ò mésoi, i.e. ò frómous or spoudaios, alone is in a position to b. 15.
1108b.15. judge correctly. See iii. 4. 5 διαφέρει πλείστων ἵσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὑθεὶς, ὅπερ κανῶς καὶ μέτρου αὐτῶν ἄν. The άκροι do not possess, as it were, the αἰσθητικὴ μεσότης. Ramsauer appositely compares de An. ii. 11. 11. 424 a. 4 ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητος τῶν οὖσι τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητικῶς ἐναντιώσεως· καὶ διὰ τούτου κρίνει τα αἰσθήματα το γὰρ μέσον κριτικῶν γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων—ἐ. ὑ. Sense is affected because it is a mean between contraries—because e. g. it is not so cold as τὸ ψυχρόν and colder than τὸ θερμόν. If it were as cold as τὸ ψυχρόν, it could not be affected by it: and, not affected by τὸ ψυχρόν, it could not be affected by the contrary θερμόν. Similarly, if it were as hot as τὸ θερμόν, it could not be affected by τὸ θερμόν—or by the contrary ψυχρόν. The difficult words γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων (which may be compared with ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρείας πρὸς μὲν τῶν δειλῶν θρασεῖς φαίνεται κ.τ.λ. here) are thus explained by Philoponus (quoted by Trendelenburg)—πῶς τὸ μέσον γίνεται τῶν ἐπερθολῶν κριτικῶν ζειείς. τὸ γὰρ ἐν μεσότητι τιμῶν ὑπὸ πρὸς ἐκάτερον τῶν ἄκρων θάτερον πῶς ἐστὶν. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τὴν ἀλκείαν αὐτοῦ θερμότητα ψυχρόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὴν ψυχρότητα ὑπερβαλλόν θερμόν.

b. 27. § 4.] πλείστη ἐναντιώτης] Bywater restores πλείστη in place of Bekker's πλεῖον. The MSS. are practically unanimous in favour of πλείστη. Was the original reading πλεῖον ἦ?

b. 31. § 5. ὑμοιώτης] Both the θρασύς and the ἀνδρείας face the foe; but the δειλὸς runs away; both the ἀσωτὸς and the ἐλευθέρως spend money; but the ἀνελευθέρως does not. Further, θρασύτης and ἀσωτία represent the prevalence of tendencies which, if properly directed, would have become ἀνδρεία and ἐλευθερώτης respectively; whereas δειλία and ἀνελευθερία represent tendencies which could not be made to lend themselves to the formation of these virtues. Cf. iv. i. 31, where it is said of the ἀσωτὸς that he is εὐιάτος, and ἔπι τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλευθέρως.

b. 35. §§ 6–8.] For the two grounds on either of which one of the extremes rather than the other may be opposed to the mean as its contrary par excellence, see Argument of this chapter.

1109a.18. § 8. κοσμώτης] ἀνασωθησίας—the vice opposed to ἀκολογία is what we should have expected (the Paraph. has ἀνασωθησία), but Aristotle perhaps wished to avoid the unusual word. At any rate κοσμώτης here does not stand for ἀνασωθησία, but rather for σωφρο-
CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

That Moral Virtue then is a mean state of a certain kind between two vices, that of excess and that of defect; and that it is a mean state because it can hit off the mean in feeling and action—all this we have explained sufficiently. Now let us draw a practical conclusion from the Theory which we have set forth.

Our practical conclusion is shortly this—It is a difficult thing to be good. Hitting off the mean in conduct is like finding the centre of the circle—to do it, a man must know how. It is easy to open one’s purse and give away money; but to give to the right man, the right amount, at the right time, for the right object, in the right manner—that is indeed difficult, and few can do it. All praise and honour therefore to those who can. Since then it is so difficult to hit off the mean exactly at first, we must begin by avoiding the extreme which is the more contrary to the mean, i.e. the more dangerous extreme, 'steering far from foam and breakers' like Odysseus, adopting the proverbial 'second best course' and choosing the lesser evil. In order to do this, we must ascertain what things tempt us as individuals most—individuals are differently constituted—and, measuring the strength of the temptation by the pleasure which the thing gives us, draw ourselves away from that course to which we are constitutionally most inclined; for, by thus drawing ourselves far away from our evil bent, like people who straighten timber, we shall reach the mean. But on all occasions it is Pleasure which we must guard against most carefully. We ought to feel towards Pleasure as the elders felt towards Helen, and echo their saying; for if we 'send the enchantress away,' we shall be the less tempted to sin. These are the general rules for hitting the mean; but it is a difficult matter at best to hit it, especially where a multitude of details are concerned: thus, it is a difficult matter to lay down any rule about anger, which shall determine the way in which, the persons with whom, the class of things at which, and length of time during which, one ought to be angry: indeed, so far is there from being a rule, that we sometimes praise the man who is deficient in the feeling of anger, and call him good-tempered, and sometimes the man who waxes wroth, and say that he has a manly spirit. In short, the man who deflects only a little from the right course, whether towards the side of excess, or towards that of defect, is
not blamed; only the man who deflects far, for he attracts notice: but how far he must deflect, to attract notice, and incur blame, it is not easy to determine theoretically: indeed the question is not really a general one at all, but relates to this, that, and the other particular case, and such particular cases elude theory; only sense can pass judgment upon them as they arise.

Thus much then is plain, that the middle state is praiseworthy, but that it is sometimes by leaning to the side of excess, and sometimes by leaning to that of defect, that we shall more easily reach the mean, or that which is right.

1109 a. 29. § 2. διότερ πτω εὖ] This is the reading of Kᵇ, Ald., B¹, B², B³, and CCC (all except Kᵇ insert ἐστι after διότερ), and must be accepted as right, because M. M. i. 9. 1187 a. 4 has τὸ δὲ μέσον χαλεπῶς, καθ᾽ ὃ ἐπαινοῦμενα διὸ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ σπουδαῖον. All other authorities (including NC, Cambr., and Par. 1853) have ἐπερ ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ. Michelet, reading ἐπερ ἐστι τὸ εὖ, takes the words as parenthetical, and connects καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινιτόν καὶ καλὸν, as predicates, with τὸ δ’ . . . καὶ ὁς.

a. 31. § 3. Ἡ Καλυφω] The editors point out that Aristotle is wrong here. It was Circe not Calypso who gave the advice to Odyssey (Od. xii. 109); but the line quoted is uttered by Odysseus himself afterwards (Od. xii. 219), when he gives directions to his pilot. CCC has Ἡ Κηρή Καλυψώ: B¹ and B² have Ἡ Κηρή.

a. 33. τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον κ.τ.λ.]—for the reason given in § 8 of last chapter.

a. 34. § 4. κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασὶ, πλοῦν] The meaning of this proverb seems to be placed beyond doubt by a fragment of Menander preserved by Siobaeus (Flor. vol. ii. p. 349, ed. Meineke) Μενάνδρου ἐκ Θρασυλέωτος,

οὶ δεύτεροι πλοῦς ἐστὶ δῆμον λεγόμενος,
ἀν ἀποτέλῃ τις οἱρίον κόμαι πλείω.

Thus the Scholiast on Plato, Phaedo 99 D, is wrong with παρομία δεύτερον πλοῦς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσφίλως τι πραπτόντων, παρ’ ὄσον οἱ διαμαρτόντες κατὰ τῶν πρότερον πλοῶν ἀσφαλῶς παρακενάζοντα τῶν δεύτερον. The proverb occurs in Pol. Γ. 8. 1284 b. 19, in the Phaedo 99 D, and elsewhere.

§§ 4, 5, 6.] The doctrine of the μεσότης here suggests to Aristotle a valuable practical rule. ‘Find out the things you have a weakness for, and avoid them as much as you can.’

b. 8. § 6. ἀδέκαστοι] ‘unbribed.’ δεκάζεων means ‘to bribe’ (ety-
mology apparently unknown). Λύκον δεκάς was the name for 1109 b. 8. bribed jurymen at Athens. See Liddell and Scott s.v. δεκάζεν. Cf. Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία ch. 27 ἡρξατο δὲ μετὰ ταύτα καὶ τὸ δεκάζεν, πρώτον καταδείξαντος Ἀνύτου... κρινόμενος γὰρ... δεκάσας τὸ δικαστήριον ἀπέφυγεν.

Ἐλένην I. iii. 156 sqq. b. 9.

§7. οὖ γὰρ ρα'δίων διορίσαι κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (Forsch. 16) points b. 14. out that the passage beginning here, and extending to the end of the Book, occurs again almost verbatim in iv. 5. 13, 14. He regards the Second Book as the original locus of the passage.

§ 8. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὖ ρα'δίων τῷ λόγῳ b. 20. ἀφορίσαι] The twin clause in iv. 5. 13 shows that παρεκβαίνων must be understood here after πόσον.

ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις] αἰσθήσει is a κριτικὴ δύναμις (An. Post. ii. b. 23. 19. 99 b. 35), because a μεσότης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως (de An. ii. ii. 424 a. 4). Here it stands for the faculty by which the good man, as μέσος, discriminates, with the accuracy required by the particular occasion, between the good and the evils contrary to it in the extremes. Cf. τὸ δομα τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας of vi. i. 6. See note on ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις iv. 5. 13, for the force of ἐν in the phrase.
BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

It is only for what is voluntary that men are praised or blamed; for that which is involuntary they are pardoned and sometimes even pitied. The distinction between the Voluntary and the Involuntary is therefore a vital one for the theory of conduct; it is one also about which the practical legislator, who has to assign rewards and punishments, would do well to be clear.

Acts which are either (1) forced upon us, or (2) caused by ignorance, are involuntary.

Where the moving principle is external, i.e. of such a kind that the man contributes nothing to the result by his action or feeling, the result is forced upon him; e.g. the motion of a man who is carried off by brigands is forced upon him.

But is an act 'forced upon him' which a man performs when a painful alternative is offered to him, such as the alternative of his own dishonour, or the death of those dear to him, and he brings himself to accept one of the two evils? Is it voluntarily or involuntarily that he accepts his own dishonour? Is it voluntarily or involuntarily that he consents to the death of those dear to him? The parallel case of the man who throws his goods overboard in a storm will help us to an answer. In ordinary circumstances a man does not throw his goods overboard voluntarily; but, to save his own life, and the lives of the crew, a man of sense will always do so. Let us then call acts of this kind mixed acts, i.e. they are both voluntary and involuntary; but more voluntary than involuntary; for an act is what it is to the agent, at the time when, and in the circumstances in which, he performs it; and these mixed acts, at the time when they are performed, are chosen as being the best in the circumstances, by an agent who has in himself the power of setting his limbs in motion to perform them, and who uses that power, although he could have refrained from doing so. But although a mixed act is thus voluntary as actually performed in given circumstances, it is not in itself the kind of act which a man would choose to perform apart from the given circumstances; and in this sense may perhaps be described as 'except in given circumstances involuntary,' or 'in itself involuntary'—this, however, by a stretch of language, for voluntary and involuntary properly describe acts as
they are to the agent when performed. That mixed acts are voluntary as actually performed is shown by the fact that we even sometimes praise a man for such acts; e.g. when a man submits to disgrace or pain in a noble cause we praise him, whereas if he submit without good reason we blame him. Sometimes however the disgrace which he submits to, and the acts which he brings himself to perform, may be of such a kind that we cannot indeed praise him, but pardon him in consideration of pressure too great for human nature to withstand: although, again, there are things which nothing—not even the prospect of the most terrible death—should compel a man to do; thus the Alcmaeon of Euripides 'compelled to kill his mother' is a ridiculous figure. It is hard sometimes to decide which is the alternative one ought to prefer; but harder far to abide by one's decision once made; for generally the choice is between pain to be endured, and bringing oneself to do or submit to something disgraceful. This is why blame or praise is given according as one does, or does not, bring oneself to accept the disgraceful course.

How then shall we describe an act which is forced upon a man? In the strict sense of the expression, that is forced upon a man which results from a cause lying outside himself, and is entirely independent of his own cooperation: whereas that which in given circumstances is chosen as the lesser evil, and carried out by an agent who has the principle of its initiation in himself, is not forced upon him (however 'involuntary in itself,' i.e. generally undesirable it may be), but is his voluntary act.

So much for painful alternatives: we cannot properly speak of a man being forced to act where they are concerned.

As for the contention that pleasant things, and things which are honourable and good, force us to act, exerting external pressure upon us—it is obviously absurd, for it implies that all our actions are forced upon us—all that we do being for the sake of pleasant things, or of things which are honourable and good. Moreover, when we are forced to do something, we do it with pain, whereas, when we pursue something pleasant or good, we feel pleasure. It is ridiculous then to blame pleasant things, and not our own susceptibility to their influence—to take credit indeed to ourselves for our good actions, but to throw the blame for our discreditable actions upon pleasant things.

That then is 'forced upon a man' which results, without his cooperation, from a cause external to him.

An act which is 'caused by ignorance' is always 'non-voluntary'; but it cannot be called 'involuntary' unless the man is sorry for it when he finds out the harm which it has done. If he is not sorry, it is best to describe his act simply as 'non-voluntary.'

But there is a difference between acts 'caused by ignorance,' and acts 'performed in ignorance.' The man who is drunk or in a rage acts indeed 'in ignorance'—he does not know what he is doing; but we do not say that ignorance is the cause of his misdemeanours or crimes: we ascribe them to intoxication or anger as the case may be. Indeed whenever a man commits an offence, he may be said to act 'in ignorance' of what he ought or ought not to do; and the effect of repeating such offences is that he becomes an unjust or bad man—he acquires a character. Now we blame character, thus showing that we consider the man a voluntary agent in its formation, i.e.
the performance of acts done 'in ignorance' of what he ought or ought not to do: or to put it otherwise—blindness of choice, or not knowing what one ought to do, does not make one's acts involuntary; on the contrary, it makes them bad, and, becoming chronic, amounts to a character for which one is blamed. It is only when a man's 'ignorance,' instead of being due to his own passions and character, is a mere accident of the circumstances of a particular case, that the acts arising from it are involuntary. Thus a man, without any fault of his own, may not know what he does, e.g. that he is revealing a secret, or whom his act affects, e.g. he may mistake a friend for an enemy in the dark, or he may not know how his act will take effect, e.g. sparring he may hurt. Here it is not the man's disposition, temporary or chronic, but the mere accident of his not knowing a particular circumstance, which is the true cause of his act. His act then is involuntary—that is to say, if he is sorry for it afterwards.

Acts forced upon a man and acts caused by ignorance being involuntary, voluntary acts will be those which have their origin in the man himself, he being fully aware of all the material circumstances surrounding their performance. This being so, it follows that acts caused by passion or desire are not to be described as involuntary. If such acts are involuntary, the lower animals, and even children, are incapable of voluntary action. And further—what about good actions caused by passion and desire? Are they involuntary? Or is it only bad actions thus caused that are involuntary, the good ones being voluntary? It would be ridiculous surely to draw such a distinction between the effects of a single agency. And then the absurdity of having to say that we are involuntary agents when we are moved to action by feelings which ought to move us! for we ought to feel angry sometimes; we ought to feel a desire for health and knowledge. Moreover, what we do or suffer involuntarily is painful, whereas that which accords with our desire is pleasant. Again, what is gained by saying that a fault proceeding from desire, as distinguished from one proceeding from deliberate calculation, is involuntary? The important point is that they are both wrong and to be avoided. Indeed the irrational feelings are as much part of the man's nature as his calculating faculty; it is absurd therefore to talk of acts prompted by these feelings being involuntary.

1109 b. 30. § 1. The discussion of the ἐκοίνωνν and ἀκοίνων connects itself with the subject of ἀρετή, because ἀρετή is—(1) ἔσεις ἐπανετή (i. 13. 19, cf. ii. 9. 9), and—(2) ἔσεις προαρετη (ii. 6. 15). We praise what is voluntary; and choice (προαιρέσις, iii. 2) is the special form under which the voluntary principle appears in man, as a rational being, and therefore as capable of acquiring ἀρετή. Ἀρετή is a 'praiseworthy habit' produced by the repetition of acts of which a man himself is the cause, i.e. of voluntary acts. Ἡν a man is an ἀρχή τῶν πράξεων Aristotle does not say in the Ethics. He contents himself with pointing to the fact that he is. The author of the Eud. Eth. (ii. 6) and the author of the M. M. (i. 10. 11) discuss the subject of man's voluntary agency with an evident wish to fathom its metaphysical import, but, after all, leave us where Aristotle leaves us—
with the unexplained fact that man is a cause. They point out 1108 b. 30.
that all ὀψίαι or φύσεις are ἀρχεῖα, i.e. generative of other ὀψίαι or φύσεις like themselves: e.g. ἀνθρωπος γεννᾶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷον ζῶα καὶ φυτῶ φυτά. But man is distinguished from other generative principles, animate or inanimate, by being the author of another class of effects, viz. πράξεις:—see E. E. ii. 6. 1222 b. 15 sqq. The ἀρχή, properly so called (κύρια), is that ὅθον πρώτον ἡ κίνησις. Such is God. Mathematical ἀρχαὶ are not properly ἀρχαὶ (ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς ἀρχαῖς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κύριον), because they are not causes of motion; ὡς ἄνθρω-
πος ἀρχή κυήσεως τινος ἡ γὰρ πράξεις κίνησις. Where the effects are contingent (ἐνδιέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ—such as may either happen or not), the ἀρχαὶ must be contingent also. Human actions are contingent; therefore man is a contingent cause—E. E. ii. 6. 1222 b. 41 ἐπεί ἐστὶν ἐνα τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναντίον ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἀρχαὶ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν τουτατας ... ὡς πράξεων ὃ ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν ἀρχή καὶ κύριος, ἐφεξῆς ὃτι ἐνδεχέται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ.

The view thus set forth by the author of the E. E. and the author of the M. M. is based on the doctrine of Met. θ. 2 and 5—that ai μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεως, being τῶν ἐναντίων, must be dominated by something external to themselves, which shall determine in which of the two contrary ways they shall actualise themselves; ἀνάγκη ἀρα ἐτερόν τι ἐστιν τὸ κύριον λέγω δὲ τούτο δρέξιν ἡ προαιρέσις (Met. θ. 5. 1048 a. 10). That which is κύριον παρ excellence in man, making him a moral agent—ἀτίνος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεως, is βουλευτικὴ δρέξι, or προαι-
ρέσις. It is by choosing certain acts, and performing them, that we acquire a certain Habit. Προαιρέσις converts the δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων into a definite ἔξος, which results in acts of one kind only: cf. E. N. v. i. 4. Ἀρετή is a ἔξος προαιρετική (ii. 6. 15), i.e. a habit which was produced by, and is productive of, certain deliberately chosen acts.

[ίσως] See Zell ad loc. and on i. i. 1. Δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἴσως, σχεδόν, b. 33. are often employed, 'quanquam in re certa . . . partim ex communi Atticorum consuetudine, partim ex Aristotelis philosophandi ratione, praeertim in his libris de vita et moribus hominum quae res accu-
ratam subtilitatem non admittunt.'

§ 2. χρήσιμον δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'It must not be supposed,' says Grant b. 34. (Plan of Book iii), 'that the present disquisition on the Voluntary is a disquisition on Free Will. The latter question Aristotle would certainly have assigned to πρώτη φιλοσοφία, or Metaphysics, and
1109 b. 34. would have thought out of place in a system of Ethics. . . . The ensuing chapters assume that a man is an ἀρχή of his own actions, and, with this assumption, treat of the Voluntary under its various aspects in relation to virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment. From this practical point of view these chapters furnish to some extent a psychology though not a metaphysic of the Will. Again (note on iii. i. 1—2): 'It is plain that the discussions on the Will are never metaphysical. An appeal to language and common opinions sums up nearly the whole. The scope of the argument is limited to a political, as distinguished from a theological, point of view—ἀναγκαῖον τῶν περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσιν, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τῶν νομοθετοῦσιν.' And: 'In asking what is the Voluntary, Aristotle does not pursue a speculative method of enquiry. Such a method might have commenced with the deep-lying ideas of personality and consciousness, of the individuality of the subject, &c. But he is content with defining the Voluntary by a contrast to the common notions (§ 3) of what constitutes an Involuntary act. It might be said that this is giving a merely negative conception of freedom. But in fact the conception given is positive, only the analysis of it is not pushed very far. The voluntariness of an act Aristotle represents to be constituted in this—that the actor is in every case the ἀρχή of his actions, except in cases of compulsion, where there is really a superior ἀρχή. . . or of ignorance, where he does not know what his action is, and can only be held to be the cause of what he meant to do. In what sense, and how, the individual is an ἀρχή is the point where Aristotle stops short in the enquiry.'

On this I would remark—that if Aristotle 'stops short in the enquiry,' perhaps his theory of 'in what sense, and how' is thereby conveyed. I think it is. This enquiry is about Responsibility; and 'Responsibility,' he gives us to understand by 'stopping short' where he does, is meaningless except as resting with the immediate cause of an act—i. e. with the concrete individual, whose function the act is. The individual is 'responsible' for acts which can be assigned to his character as immediate cause. 'Free,' applied to an act, means, 'caused immediately by a character'—the character, of course, performing its functions, like every other organism, in a definite environment, not in vacuo. In short, it is only the individual, as affected by particular circumstances, who can put forth acts, and be 'responsible' for them, i. e. come in for their conse-
quences. This is Aristotle’s theory of ‘freedom’; and I believe 1109 b. 34. that, by thus taking its stand upon ‘the concrete individual putting forth acts in his environment,’ it suggests the best possible solution of the famous difficulty—How to reconcile ‘freedom’ and ‘necessity,’ which modern speculation has—to some extent, needlessly—raised for itself. The solution which Aristotle’s theory suggests may be put thus—The ancestral, or other, antecedents of the concrete individual cannot be saddled with ‘responsibility’: ἀτίμως ἑλκυόνων θεῶν αὐτῶν. The individual is ‘responsible’ for acts which can be assigned to his character, as immediate cause. His character is itself, as we now believe, the necessary product of the universe, and the circumstances which stimulate his character to put forth acts are likewise necessary products of the universe: but this does not relieve him of ‘responsibility’ and make his acts not ‘free,’ for ‘free,’ applied to an act, means ‘caused immediately by a character performing its functions in its environment.’ Only ‘the individual character in its environment’ can put forth acts, and be ‘responsible’ for them—i. e. come in for their consequences. The universe, which brings forth individuals, is not itself an individual to be held responsible: ‘Natur lebt in lauter Kindern; und die Mutter—wo ist sie?’ The question of the efficiency, freedom, or responsibility of the individual must not be mixed up with the question of the origin of the individual.

It will thus be seen that man as ἀρχή τῶν πράξεων is merely a particular aspect of man as living being; for, to be a living being is to be ‘responsible’ (whether in a physical or in a political environment) for ‘free’ acts, i. e. for ‘acts put forth by an organism.’ But the organism must not be abstracted from the universe, and made a ‘free agent’ in the sense of initiating acts with the production of which the laws of the universe have nothing, or not everything, to do. That would be to set up more universes than one. It is as subject of a libera necessitas—to employ Spinoza’s powerful phrase—that we must conceive the ‘free agent.’

When we say, then, that Man is an ἀρχη τῶν πράξεων we are face to face with the (for morals) ultimate fact that he is a living being. All living beings, plants as well as animals, the irrational animals as well as man, perform certain functions by which they maintain their own existence. To perform these functions is to be a living being. Man’s moral πράξεις, by which he corresponds with his distinctively human, i. e. his ‘political,’ environment, proceed from habits of his
1100 b. 34. nature, just as his bodily functions proceed from organs of his nature. Moral πράξεις and bodily functions are necessary for the maintenance of his nature as a whole; and are, on exactly the same grounds, said to be his πράξεις and his bodily functions respectively. Biologically considered, bodily functions differ from moral πράξεις in depending upon structural adaptations of older standing. The performance of moral πράξεις being thus more precarious than the performance of bodily functions, and, moreover, affecting others, praise is accorded when the πράξεις are rightly performed. The praise is accorded not because they are more truly the agent's own acts than are the unerring perceptions of his eye or ear, or the regular movements of his heart, for which he is not 'praised' at all; but because they are apt not to be performed rightly. A man's virtue is praised and rewarded, but not his health, because, as a matter of fact, his virtue grows up in correspondence with an environment which makes itself felt by means of praise and blame, reward and punishment. Those vital functions which we distinguish as voluntary acts are those which proceed from sources within a man, which are capable of being modified, during the lifetime of the individual, in relation to his environment, especially to that very complex part of it of which praise and blame, reward and punishment, are the chief exponents. Such 'sources within a man' are the πάθη, belonging as they do to that part of human nature which is characterised as μετέχον λόγον, κατήχον λόγον καὶ πειθώρικόν—i.e. still capable of being organised in relation to νόμος, or the rational environment. From the πάθη proceed (1) actions neither more nor less the man's own actions than are the movements of his heart or lungs, but distinguished from these latter movements by the circumstance that they affect other people's interests directly or indirectly, and accordingly elicit praise or blame, or otherwise call forth social influences, in relation to which they suffer modification—are encouraged or repressed. From the πάθη proceed also (2) actions which do not affect other people's interests, and therefore do not elicit praise or blame, but are called voluntary because they do not proceed from their sources in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of their not proceeding from them under certain conditions. Whenever, in short, an act proceeds not inevitably from an inherited organ, but with some degree of hesitation from a state of feeling which, in the history of the individual, can be (or could have been) affected
(even to the extent of being sometimes rendered entirely inoperative) 1109 b. 34.
by other feelings, whether self-regarding or altruistic, we call the act voluntary. As, however, man's true personality consists in his consciousness of social relations, and his readiness to be modified in correspondence with social requirements, acts which meet these requirements and acts which disregard them are 'voluntary' in the truest sense. Acts which affect the agent alone, although proceeding *contingently* from their sources, and therefore voluntary, are so in the lower sense in which we speak of the actions of children and brutes as voluntary. From the way in which Aristotle connects 'the voluntary' with 'praise and blame' here, and in other passages, we can see that he practically identifies man's 'efficiency' with his correspondence, or failure, by reason of the prevalence of selfish feelings, to correspond with the social environment. As it is only the *politeia* who is truly *αυτάρκης* (see *E. N.* i. 7. 6), so it is only the *politeia* who is truly an *άρχη* *πράξεων*. The term 'voluntary' however in its general sense is applicable to any act which results from a feeling or desire contingently, *i.e.* so results that it may be prevented by the operation of another feeling or desire. In carrying back the explanation of voluntary action to the possession by man of a *δύναμις τῶν ἐναρίων*—*i.e.* of tendencies still capable of modification, and in connecting it so closely with the sanctions of a social system, the high complexity of which he fully recognised, Aristotle gives prominence to the same considerations as have led a modern evolutionist, like Spencer, to speak of 'Will as coming into existence through the increasing complexity, and imperfect coherence of automatic actions'—(*Psych.* i. 498–499; cf. whole chapter on *The Will*, Special Synth. ch. ix).

§ 3. τὰ βιχά ἢ δι’ ἀγνοιαν] 'Cum spontaneum id sit, cujus b. 35. principium in eo sit qui agat, non ignorantе singulas circumstantias, invite factum exstat simulatque una ex ambabus conditionibus, quas requirit spontaneum, abst.' Michelet *ad loc.* A voluntary act in one of which the *άρχη* is in the agent himself, he being at the same time aware of the several circumstances of his act. These are the two conditions of a voluntary act. An act is involuntary when either of these two conditions is absent: *i.e.* if the agent, while knowing all the circumstances of his act, is forced to act by an external constraining *power*, ὁ̄ν εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσας ποι ἡ ἀνθρωποί κύρων ὄντες (*§ 3*); or if, while he is under no external constraint, he is ignorant
1109 b. 35. of the circumstances—e. g. one who administers poison, thinking it to be medicine, because it has been put, through no fault of his own, into a bottle labelled ‘medicine,’ is not held to be the ‘cause’ of the consequent poisoning, or to have poisoned ‘voluntarily.’ His act is one δι' ἀγνοομένον.

The remarks of Eudemus (E. E. ii. 8) on the βλαστον are very instructive. Τὸ βλαστὸν καὶ ἀνώγη, he says, are terms employed to mark a force which interferes with the law governing the behaviour of an object inanimate or animate; a stone is moved upwards βια, fire downwards βια. When these inanimate objects move in their own natural direction—κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν καθ’ αὐτὰ ὀρμὴν (1224 a. 18), they are not said to move βια, nor yet are they ἐκούσια. There is no name to characterise their movement. Similarly, in the case of animals, we see many motions or acts which are βια—viz. those done ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὀρμὴν ἐξωθέν τι κινήν (1224 a. 22). In the case of inanimate objects it is easy to see the external ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως which interferes with the law of their nature. It is also easy in the case of irrational animals. They live τῇ ὑπέξει. Everything which thwart their ὑπέξει is βλαστον. But in the case of man a difficulty arises. He has τῶν equally internal principles—λόγος and ὑπέξει which thwart each other. Does ἐν τῶν ὑπέξει, or ὑπέξει in the case of the ἀκρατῆς? No. Both λόγος and ὑπέξει are internal, and βια is exerted only by external agencies. An act done from prudence, and on rational grounds, is neither more nor less ‘voluntary’ than one done from the mere appetite of the moment,—ἡ δ' ἡ ἐκούσια ψυχή καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐκρατοῦ πράττει, βια δ' οὐδέτερος (1224 b. 26). We must not abstract a man’s motives (whether high or low, whether due to tendencies acquired during his own lifetime, or to those inherited from his ancestors) from himself, and say that they are external to him and force him (βίαια). If later controversialists had seen this as clearly as Aristotle and the peripatetics did, we should have been spared many profitless discussions about the ‘Freedom of the Will’ and ‘Moral Responsibility.’

1110 a. 4. § 4. ἄσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἡ διὰ καλῶν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννοι] A tyrant with power over the lives of a man’s family commands him to do something base. He may do it from fear of greater evils—διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν, i. e. the death of his family; or he may refuse to do it because honour forbids (διὰ καλῶν τι).
In either case he does something most painful to himself; and the question is: Does he act voluntarily or involuntarily?

§§ 5, 6.] The answer is given in these sections. Such actions are μυκταί. Except under very exceptional circumstances no one performs them voluntarily—ἐκουσίων δὲ τὰ σωφτά, ἀπλῶς δ' ἵσως ἀκούστικεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τῶν τουφότων οὐδέν. But there are exceptional circumstances in which men perform them. In these exceptional circumstances, at the time at which they are performed, they are voluntary—they proceed from an internal ἀρχή, from a desire to perform them in the agent; but in any other circumstances, as a matter of fact, no one would perform them. In discussing therefore the voluntariness of a given action we must look at it strictly in connexion with the circumstances in which it takes place, for 'the end or motive of an act is that which is in view at the time' (Peters)—τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καρόν ἐστιν—e.g. the τέλος or object which a man has in view when he throws his goods overboard is not the infliction of loss on himself, but the lightening of the ship. The question is whether such an act is voluntary or involuntary; not whether it is wise or unwise in the particular circumstances, or likely to be matter of regret when the danger has passed. I see no reason for holding with Grant that 'the phrase τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως is general, not referring only to the cases under dispute, but to action universally'—or that 'τέλος is used here in a peculiar sense to denote the moral character of an action.' It seems better to take τέλος in the passage before us in the sense in which it is afterwards employed in chap. 5. § 17 of this Book, as 'the object specially contemplated by a particular action'—e.g. the lightening of the ship. In discussing the question of the voluntariness of a disagreeable action, let us not lose sight of 'the object specially contemplated by the given action,' and wander into the irrelevancy of considering the feelings with which such actions are regarded in the abstract.

It may be remarked in passing with regard to the instance of a μυκτή πράξεις given in § 5—that cases arising out of αἰ ἐν τοῖς χειμώνιοις ἔχολοι were probably well known in the law courts: cf., for the Lex Rhodia de iactura, Digest. xiv. 2, 1—'lege Rhodia cavetur ut si levandae navis gratia jactus mercium factus est, omnium contributione sarciatur quod pro omnibus datum est';—i.e. the principle of the 'general average' is to be applied.
1110 a. 17. § 6. ὅτι ἄρχη, ἐπὶ ψυχὸ καὶ τὸ πρᾶττειν καὶ μὴ] This statement, taken as an aphorism by itself, would be too general. The functions of the heart proceed from an ἄρχη which is strictly ἐν αὐτῷ, i. e. is involved in the φύσις of the individual (cf. ἂν ἐστι φύσις ἄρχη ἐν αὐτῷ Met. Α. 3. 1070 a. 7) and yet cannot be described as ἐπὶ αὐτῷ.

a. 19. § 7. ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεωι δὲ ταῖς πταιώταις ἄνδρε καὶ ἐπικαυνώται] 'which shows that the acts are regarded as voluntary'—Peters, note ad loc.

a. 28. § 8. Ἀλκμαῖων] The anonymous scholiast on this Book (Ald. ed.) has the following note here—καὶ γὰρ τὸν Ἐφριμιδῆν Ἀλκμαιών τὸν Ἀμφιράδο πάλαι, τοῦτον ἦν ὁ πατὴρ ἀνελῖχο τὴν μητέρα (Εφριμίς) ἐπέσκηψεν, ἐὰν ἤμι, ἦταν τὸν πατέρα λυπῶν· δὲ χαὶ ἄξια αἰτία ποίων τοῦτο ἵστορεῖται. ἀλλοις· παρατίθεται τὸν παρ' Ἐφριμίδη Ἀλκμαίων ὅτι ἂν εὑρέτη τινὰ ὑπομεινόντα μητροκοινωνίαν· λέγει γὰρ παρ' αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀλκμαῖον μόνοτα μὲν μ' ἐπήρεσεν ἐπικεφαλής πατρὴν ἀδικμά(τ') εἰσέβαλεν εἰς Θηβαία ἀν,

a. 32. § 9. Ἀναγκαίον] We have here the influence of an internal ἄρχη—of motives, not of external force, and the term ἀναγκαίον is perhaps improperly used. But it may be that Aristotle draws a distinction between ἀνάγκη and βία (cf. § 8 ἔνα δ' ἰσως ώς ἐκτὸς ἀναγκασθῆναι—where βιασθῆναι would have been absurd); motives of painful cogency being ἀναγκαία, though, as internal principles, not βιαία. The writer of the Μ. Μ. discusses τὸ βίαιον and τὸ ἀναγκαῖον in separate chapters (i. 14 and 15); and, although he says τὸ ἀναγκαῖον όν ἐν πάντι, ἀλλ' ἡ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἑκτός, his example shows that he is thinking of the effect produced on the mind of the agent by an external occurrence, not of physical compulsion—Μ. Μ. i. 15. 1188 b. 21 ὡς ἡ ἀναγκαία συντομώτερον βαδίσαι εἰς ἄγρῳ εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀπολωλότ' ἄν εὐρὼ τὰ ἐν ἄγρῳ. In short, very painfully cogent motives may be called ἀναγκαία, as distinguished from pleasures, which cannot be called ἀναγκαία, however pressing—Μ. Μ. i. 15. 1188 b. 15 τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον όν πάντως οὖδ' ἐν πάντι λεκτόν ἐστίν, ὡς ἄκα ἡδονής ἐνκεκριμένον, εἰ γὰρ τις λέγει ὃτι ἡ ἀναγκαία τὴν τοῦ φίλου γυναῖκα διαφέρει ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἄτοπος ἄν εἰ.
§ 10. τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βία;] This question, following immediate-1110 b. 1. dately upon the words προῖ τοῖς ἀναγκασθέντας ἦ μὴ, and the terms in which it is answered, support the view that Aristotle, like the writer of the Μ. Μ., distinguished technically between ἀναγκαία and βίαια. In the case of the ἀναγκαία it is true that ἦ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἔτιν, but not true that ὁ πρᾶττων μηδὲν συμβαλλεται. The external occurrence operates through the medium of the painful feeling which it produces. On the other hand, τὸ βίαιον is distinguished from τὸ ἀναγκαίον by the differentia ὡς ἄν ὁ πρᾶττων μηδὲν συμβαλλεται. The external agency determines a man's act without the effective intervention of his feelings.

ἀἳ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἐκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια] 'For acts b. 6. fall within the sphere of particulars; and here the particular thing that is done is voluntary'—Peters: i. e. in discussing the voluntariness of an act done under painful circumstances, we must take the act by itself as 'a particular'—in connexion merely with the temporary state of mind out of which it immediately springs; we must not raise the general question of its wisdom or goodness.

ἀποδοῦναι] syn. ὅριζειν: see Ind. Arist. s. v. ἀποδιδόναι—'it is not b. 8. easy to say.'

§ 11. εἰ δὲ τις τὰ ἡδεὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κ.τ.λ.] The Aldine Scholiast b. 9. seems to have read λυπηρά for καλά. He says—τοῦτων γὰρ χ贸易战 τοιτέστι τῶν ὑδέων καὶ λυπηρῶν, τὰ μὲν φεύγοντες τὰ δὲ διώκοντες. τὸ δὲ πάντες, δηλαδὴ χώρις τῶν ἁγαθῶν λέγει καὶ σπουδαῖον. But καλά (bona, honesta, formosa) are regularly coupled with ἡδεά, as e.g. in E. N. ii. 3. 7, τὸ συμφέρων (not mentioned here) being the means to either. See Grant's note here. Having shown that acts done from feelings produced by painful circumstances are voluntary, and are praised and blamed in various degrees, Aristotle goes on in the present section to show that acts proceeding from states of mind produced by pleasant objects, or by the contemplation of what is good and honourable, are also voluntary. The parenthetical words ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα are to be understood as describing the position of those (εἰ δὲ τις . . . φαίη) whose view he is arguing against. Cf. Μ. Μ. i. 15. 1188 b. 17 εἰ γὰρ τις λέγει ὅτι ἡραγκάσθην τὴν τοῦ φιλοῦ γνώικα διαφθείρα ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἀτομος ἄν εἰη. Pleasant things, and things that are good and honourable, cannot be said to force us, or to be the causes of involuntary actions; for (1) if they
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1110 b. 9. were so, then *all* actions would be compulsory and involuntary; since it is for the sake of pleasant things, or of things that are good and honourable, that we do all that we do: (2) those who act under compulsion, and involuntarily, act with pain; those who act for the sake of the pleasant, or the good and honourable, act with pleasure: (3) this doctrine that pleasant things force us ‘leaves out of account,’ as Grant expresses it, ‘the internal susceptibility of the agent (*αὐτῶν εἰδήρατον δύνα*)’ and, in fact, is merely an excuse for bad actions, which are generally done for the sake of pleasant things. We take credit to ourselves for good actions, and blame pleasant things for our bad actions.

The sum of Aristotle’s teaching here is that we must not abstract a man’s motives, whether good or bad, from himself, and say that they are external to him, and force him. The later doctrines of Necessitarianism and Free Will, both apparently now defunct, equally erred in making the abstraction deprecated by Aristotle.

b. 10. τὰντα ἀν εἴη αὐτῶ βία] Bekker reads οὕτω for αὐτῷ: but the authority for οὐτῶ—K^b, L^b, M^b, NC, Cambr.—(accepted by Bywater) is stronger.

b. 18. § 13. οὐχ ἐκοῦσιον] ‘Non-voluntary.’

b. 22. τοῦ δὴ δι’ ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ] τοῦ is apparently masc. —cf. iv. 6. 9 τοῦ δὲ συνηνίσκων ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ. There is an apparent inconsistency between the doctrine of this §, according to which the *μὴ μεταμελέμενος* is not to be called ἄκων, and the doctrine of § 6 above,—καὶ τὸ ἐκοῦσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄκοουσιν ὅτε πράττει λεκτέων.

b. 24. § 14. ἐτερον δ’ ἐξικε καὶ τὸ δι’ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἄγνοουντα] ‘Through ignorance’ . . . ‘in ignorance.’ After ἄγνοουντα Bekker has ποτείν, given by I and NC. The distinction is that between acting from unavoidable (τὸ δὲ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν), and acting in avoidable ignorance (τὸ ἄγνοουντα πράττειν). The unavoidable ignorance which can be pleaded in excuse of an action, by an agent who regrets what he has done (μεταμελέμενος § 13), and which constitutes (equally with βία) the action in question ἄκοουσιον, is that of mere particulars (η καθ’ ἐκσαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἡ πράξεις); e.g. (to take the example of ἄτυχημα given by the Paraphrast in his note on v. 8. 7)—a sportsman, shooting at a distance from the haunts of
men, kills a man who lies concealed in a thicket. He kills the man merely from ignorance of the particular fact that someone is there concealed. He possesses no general principle from which he could possibly have inferred this fact. The fact stands entirely by itself, being of so exceptional a kind that he could not have foreseen it. His ignorance therefore is described (§ 15) as ἡ καθ’ ἐκαστα, and counts as an external cause co-ordinate with βία, the preposition διὰ in the phrase δι’ ἀγνωσίας πράττειν expressing, as Michelet remarks, an agency distinct from himself, i.e. ignorance not due to his own carelessness or other bad habits. But if, (to take the Paraphrast’s example of a ἀμάρτημα v. 8. 7), the sportsman shoots too near a frequented highway and unwittingly kills a passer-by, we do not acquiesce in his ignorance of the fact that someone was passing by; we go back to the cause of this ignorance—his own carelessness. We hold him responsible for his ignorance of a fact which he might have, and ought to have, inferred as probable from the general principle in his possession—that highways are frequented by travellers. His ignorance is not due to the exceptional nature of the fact, as in the first case, but to his own disposition. It is not really ignorance of a particular fact which we have here to deal with, but rather a state of ignorance—a general tendency not to notice a certain class of facts. Hence this state of ignorance, whether it consists in the non-application, or in the non-possession, in the temporary obscuration, or in the entire absence, of principles of good conduct, is described as ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει, or ἡ καθόλου ἀγνωσία (§ 15). It is not an accident external to the man. It is part of himself and whatever it causes he causes. Being a quality in the agent, it is, as Michelet remarks, well expressed by the participle ἀγνώσσεται agreeing with the subject of πράττειν. But not only is it his ignorance, just as his health is his health. This would not make him socially responsible for its results. He is responsible because it supervenes although it need not necessarily supervene, or is not removed, when it might be removed. Thus a man is responsible for mistakes committed in temporary states of ignorance induced by drunkenness or passion, because to pass into these states is contingent not necessary: cf. E. N. iii. 5. 8 καὶ γὰρ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνώστῳ κολάζοιται, ἐὰν αἶτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνωσίας, δόν τοὺς μεθόνυμοι διεκλά τὰ ἐπιτίμια ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθήματι, τούτο δ’ αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνωσίας. For the same reason, he is responsible for acts proceeding from an established vicious cha-
racter—from total blindness to the true end of human endeavour—what Plato calls 'the lie in the soul.' Similarly, ignorance of a law which has been published and is easy to understand is ignorance for which a man is responsible. Hence the principle of Jurisprudence Ignorantia juris nocet; ignorantia facti non nocet. Cf. E.N. iii. 5. 8 καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦτας τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἀ δὲ ἐπισταθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἀστι, κολάζοναι, ἀμοίωσι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δὲ ἀμέλειαι ἄγνωσι δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐν αὐτοῖς δυ τοῦ μῆ ἄγνωσι τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθήναι κύριοι.

There is of course some confusion in calling the acts themselves which are done δὲ ἄγνωσι non-voluntary or involuntary. Strictly, the acts themselves are voluntary, but their results are such as the agent could not possibly have foreseen, and he is not held responsible for results which he did not contemplate and now regrets. It would be more correct to say that a man is not held responsible for such results, than that the acts are involuntary. The sportsman shoots voluntarily into the thicket, being ignorant of the fact that, contrary to all probability, a man lies concealed there. He kills the man; but is not held responsible for this unforeseen result of his voluntary act.

b. 27. διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων] διὰ μεθήν καὶ ὑργῆν.

b. 28. ἄγνωσι . . . § 15 περὶ ἡ πράξεις] If we follow Michelet in sharply distinguishing ἡ ἐν τῇ προαίρεσι ἄγνωσι and ἡ καθόλου ἄγνωσι, we may explain this passage thus—τὸ συμφέρον is that which is useful as a means: ἡ ἐν τῇ προαίρεσι ἄγνωσι is ignorance in the choice of means to the attainment of an end, and hence is equivalent to ignorance of the συμφέρον—cf. iii. 2. 9 ἡ δὲ προαίρεσι τῶν πρῶς τὸ τέλος. Now this ignorance in the choice of means is not an external accident, but a condition of the agent, which he has brought upon himself by yielding to his πάθη. Hence it is not the cause of involuntary but of voluntary actions—indeed it is the cause of those reprehensible actions the repetition of which eventually establishes an evil character—μοιχηρία: οὐ γάρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαίρεσι ἄγνωσι αἰτία τοῦ ἄκουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοιχηρίας.

Μοιχηρία is thus the same as ἡ καθόλου ἄγνωσι—ignorance of the true end itself—for it is the moral character which gives the end: iii. 5. 20 τῷ ποιεῖ τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τούτῳ τιθέμεθα. Thus, as Giphanius observes, ἡ ἐν τῇ προαίρεσι ἄγνωσι is characteristic of the

1 Bywater reads τὰ συμφέροντα given by Kb, Asp., and NC.
BOOK III: CHAP. 1: § 14.

ακρατής, who knows the end, but is tempted by his passions to stray from the path of duty leading to it: while ἡ καθόλου ἄγνωστα is characteristic of the ἀκόλουθος, who has become permanently blind to the end. A man is responsible for both kinds of ἄγνωστα—for the ἄγνωστα of temporary passion, and for that of an established vicious character.

But, although Aristotle undoubtedly distinguishes in this Book προαίρεσις, as concerned with the means, from βούλησις the wish for the end, and although it is reasonable to suppose that, in here using the term προαίρεσις, he has in view the technical meaning which he is about to give it; it does not therefore follow that in using the expression ἡ καθόλου ἄγνωστα he has in view something as distinct from ἡ εν τῇ προαίρεσις ἄγνωστα as προαίρεσις itself is distinct from βούλησις: for in iii. 3. 16 he tells us that the objects of βούλησις, and therefore of προαίρεσις, are not mere particulars, thus implying that they are particulars in which the general law or rule of conduct is seen. Hence ἡ εν τῇ προαίρεσις ἄγνωστα, which is equivalent to ἄγνωστα τὰ συμφέροντα, or ἄγνωστα τὰ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἐν ἀφετέρους, is essentially 'an ignorance of the end,' or 'a general ignorance;' ἡ καθόλου ἄγνωστα, and, as such, is distinguished from the excusable ἡ καθ ἐκαστα ἄγνωστα— the thought of this latter expression, as about to be used, having determined Aristotle to translate ἡ εν τῇ προαίρεσις ἄγνωστα into the equivalent ἡ καθόλου ἄγνωστα for the sake of the antithesis. Ἡ εν τῇ προαίρεσις ἄγνωστα is thus distinguished from ἡ καθ ἐκαστα ἄγνωστα as being a state, inchoate, or established, of the agent, producing acts which are so far from being involuntary that they are morally evil, and confirm the evil tendency—μοῖχηρία, from which they spring: i.e. ἡ εν τῇ προαίρεσις ἄγνωστα may stand either for the state of the ἀκρατής who is said to act from ἐπιθυμία and not with προαίρεσις (iii. 2. 4)—his ἄγνωστος being, in fact, the prevalence of ἐπιθυμία where προαίρεσις ought to prevail; or for that of the ἀκόλουθος, or ὁ λος κακός, who is said to act προαιροῦμενον (vii. 7. 2), i.e. calmly and without passion choosing means to the bad end which his character sets up—the ἄγνωστα being, in this case, that confirmed moral blindness to the good end which makes it possible for him 'to choose means ' to the bad end.

Ἡ εν τῇ προαίρεσις ἄγνωστα, accordingly, meaning ignorance which is a state or tendency inchoate or established of the agent, may, in relation to the numerous ἀμαρτίαι which flow, or are likely to flow, from it, be described as a general ignorance. Hence follow the
1110 b. 28. words oiv' $' $' kath' $' ekosta—‘that is, it is not general ignorance, but particular ignorance, which makes an act involuntary.' Here all turns on the point whether oiv' necessarily distinguishes $' kath' $' from the $' previously mentioned, or admits of being rendered as above—‘that is, it is not general ignorance,' &c. The Paraphrast, Grant, Ramsauer, and Peters do not distinguish $' ev $' proairesei $' and $' kath' $' $'. and, with some hesitation, I agree with them, against Michelet, for the reasons I have given, and because I believe that oiv' can be legitimately rendered as above. The Paraphrast's comment is—$' yap $' ev $' proairesei $', $' estin aitia $' taw kaioun, ouk $' estin aitia $' taw akousiau, alla $' tis mochosias'. ou $' yap tis katholou peri $' tis meidh $' anvyoiv $' oti povrion otiin gignetai taw akousiau, allaw tis anvosaia merikos tirde tis meidh, oion, ferei eipein, ouk eidoita mekri oros piyntas peri mebein.

One further point however—Does the writer of E. E. ii. 9 throw any light on the present passage? Has he it in view at all? and if so, is the distinction which he draws the same as that which Michelet finds here in § 15? His words are—1125 b. 11 etpei de to epistisasa kao to eidoia diiston, ev men to ekhein, ev de to krisina tis episthmis, el ekxw mou chrwmenos de esti men $' os dikaios ou anwyos legein, esti de ouk $' diakiaoion, own ei de ameleian mu ekrhito. omoiw dei kai mu ekxw tis sygouito en, ei de rados $' anakaios en, mu ekhei dei ameleian $' hodosi $' h upon. Is el ekxw mou chrwmenos dei $' tas sygouito $' $' of the man whose ignorance is $' ev $' proairesei—Michelet's 'ignorance in the choice of means,' and de $' ekxw the man whose ignorance is $' katholou—‘universal,' i.e. ‘of the end'? cf. the oiv' $' katholou (sygountai gar dia ge taptn) of the E. N. with the omoiw de kai mu ekxw tis sygouito en of the E. E.

1111 a. 1. § 15. ev ois kai peri a] ‘Ignorance of the particular occasion and circumstances of the act’—Peters. Better—‘the persons and things affected by the act’: see below, notes on § 18.

a. 4. § 16. peri t $' ev tiv] ‘On what object or person.'

a. 9. § 17. sygountes fason ekpesein autous] Liddell-and-Scott has ‘ekpesei me—it escaped me unawares, Arist. Eth. N. 3. 1. 17,' but quotes no other instance of the usage. Ramsauer defends the usage—‘Ekpistei me alienum a Graecae linguae indole non dixerit qui meminerit legi ekbainos, ekilein xorain.' The Paraphrast, how-
ever (perhaps reading λέγοντας), seems to make the subject of 1111 a. 9. ἐκπεσεῖν the persons—λέγοντας γάρ περὶ ἄλλων συνχυθήναι φασι, καὶ τι καὶ περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων παραφθέγξασθαι, μή συνορώντος ὁ λέγοντας, ἣ καὶ ἀγνοοῦντας ὅπι ἀπόρρητα ἢ—i. e. ἐκπεσεῖν (= συνχυθήναι) means ‘to be confused,’ ‘put out,’ as we might say. The Ald. Schol., again, has—ὅδε λέγοντος μοι ἐξέπεσεν μοι τοιούτων ῥῆμα—as though he read λέγοντας, and understood the clause to mean, ‘they say that, in the course of their talk, the word escaped them.’ Aspasius has—τὸ δὲ τί ἦστιν τὸ πραττόμενον, ὅπερ ἐκπεπτωκέναι (λέγοντας, Heylbut) αὐτοῖς, ὡς ὁ Δισχύλος τὰ μυστικά.


ἐπὶ σωτηρία πίσως] This is the certain emendation of Bernays a. 13. (accepted by Susem. and Bywater) for the παίσις of the codd. Πιπίσκεως is ‘to give to drink.’ The illustrations in the parallel passages—E. E. ii. 9, and M. M. i. 16—bear out the emendation.

θέξαι] restored by Susem. and Bywater in place of the δεῖξαι of a. 14. most MSS.

ἀκροχειρίζομενοι] explained by the Ald. Schol.—ἐστι τὸ πυκτεύειν a. 15. ἡ παγκρατιάζειν πρὸς ἔτερον ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς ἡ δλως ἀκραὶς τοῖς χεροῖς μετ’ ἄλληλον. ‘It is what we call “sparring”’,—Grant.

The various forms that ἡ ἁγνοία ἡ καθ’ ἐκαστα may take are thus illustrated in the present section in the order in which they are
BOOK III: CHAP. 1: §§ 17-23.

111 a. 15. enumerated in section 16. Ignorance (1) of the thing done (τι)—Aeschylus and the Mysteries, the catapult accident: (2) of the object of the act (περί τι ἢ ἐν τίνι)—Merope's mistake: (3) of the instrument (τίνι)—the pointed spear, the stone mistaken for pumice-stone: (4) of the result of the act (τὸ ὦ ἔνεκα)—killing by a potion intended to cure: (5) of the manner (πῶς)—when in sparring a man hits harder than he supposes or wishes.

a. 16. § 18. ἐν οἷς ἢ πρᾶξις] bracketed by Ramsauer, l. 16. In line 18 the same expression occurs in a specific sense, = the persons affected by the act.

a. 18. κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἢ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα] 'The most important circumstances are the objects of the action and its result'—as the Paraphrast explains, τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ τὸ ἔργον. The οὗ ἔνεκα here is not, as usual, the intention of the doer, for he cannot be ignorant of what he intends to do; but the outcome or result of what he actually does, which is the opposite of his intention. See Grant ad loc.

a. 24. §§ 20, 21.] In the words ἵστος γὰρ καλὸς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμόν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν it is implied that the position ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμόν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν is inconsistent with the definition of τὸ ἐκούσιον just laid down. This position must be examined, for if it is correct, the definition will require modification, θυμός and ἐπιθυμία being ἀρχαὶ ἐν αὐτῷ.

a. 27. § 23.] Here, as elsewhere in this Book, Aristotle maintains the necessity of keeping the question of the voluntariness of actions distinct from that of their goodness or badness. Popular thought tended to merge these two questions. All actions, Aristotle argues, proceeding from modifiable feelings and states of the agent, are voluntary; it matters not, so far as the voluntariness of the actions is concerned, whether the feelings and states are morally good or bad, i.e. are the causes of morally good, or of morally bad actions. Further, in this section, Aristotle makes it clear that he regards θυμός and ἐπιθυμία as the sources of τὰ καλά. In his system, the passions are not abolished, but regulated. 'Ἀρετή is the result of the εἰσοδοθηρίας καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων (Eustrat.). The passions supply the motive power in action; διάνοια δ' αὐτῇ οὐδὲν κατε (vi. 2. 5).
§ 24. ὃν δὲ ὁ ὀρέγεσθαι] θημὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία are two species of the a. 30.
genus ὀρέξις, the third species being βουλήσις (see E. E. ii. 7. 1223 a. 26), not as yet mentioned. θημὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία elicited by proper objects (ἁν ὃν δὲ ὁ ὀρέγεσθαι) are surely not causes of involuntary actions. To hold that they are would be to maintain the position, which nobody apparently wishes to maintain, that τὰ καλὰ are involuntary.

§ 26.] The Paraph, has—ἐὰν ἀκούσια ἃν τὰ κατὰ θημὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα, a. 33.
dιέφερεν ἃν τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀμαρτομένων, κατὰ τὴν ἐκουσίαν καὶ ἀκούσιαν διαφοράν· διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ὁμοίως ἐκεῖνοι φεύγατα, δ’ τοῦ ἐκουσίου ἐστὶ, καὶ ψυχόν άξια οὐδὲν ἤττων· ὅπερ οὔκ ἂν ἦν, εἴ διέφερεν ὄς ἐκουσίων ἀκούσιον. The force of the section may be brought out thus—‘Further, do the faults of anger differ from those of calculation in being involuntary? Surely not. Faults of both kinds should be avoided, and the irrational passions seem to be no less part of human nature than the reason.’

§ 27.] ὡστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (αἱ) ἀπὸ θημοῦ καὶ b. 1.
ἐπιθυμίας] K b and Γ give ὡστε καὶ αἱ, and the αἱ before ἀπὸ is a conjecture adopted by Byw. from Susemihl. Τοῦ ἀνθρώπου thus becomes the predicate in correspondence with ἀνθρωπικά in the line above. The other authorities (followed by Bekker) instead of ὡστε καὶ αἱ give αἱ δὲ. This latter was evidently the reading which the Paraph, had: his words are—ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἀλογα πάθη καὶ ἀνθρωπικαὶ εἰσίν ὡσπερ ὁ λογισμός· ἀπὸ τοῦτον δὲ τῶν παθῶν, θημὸν δηλο
νότι καὶ ἐπιθυμίας, πᾶσαι αἱ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται πράξεις.

The writer of the E. E. discusses the relation of τὸ ἐκουσίων καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον to ἐπιθυμία and θημὸς in ii. 7. His first position is 1223 a. 33 τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρὸν (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἢδέος): ὡστε βλασφειν καὶ ἀκούσιον τὸ ἄρα καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκουσίων. His second position takes the form of an ἀπορία, through which he eventually passes to the solution of the problem of the nature of τὸ ἐκουσίων. 1223 b. 3 ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτων διὰειν ἃν τὸ κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκουσίων εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν δυνατῶν, ἄπαν γὰρ ὁ ἐκῶν τὰ πράττει, βουλόμενος πράττει, καὶ ὁ βουλεύει, ἐκόν. βουλεύεις τ’ οὐδεὶς δ’ ὑπέσται εἰσιν κακῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκατεύθυνος οὐ εἰ δ’ ὑπέσται ποιεῖ τ’ τὸ γὰρ παρ’ ὁ οὖσαι βλέπεσθον εἶναι πράττειν δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκατεύθυνθαι εὐτίκως. ὡστε ἄμα συμβῆσται τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκόντα καὶ ἀκούστα πράττειν’ τούτο δ’ ἀδύνατον.
111 b. 1. Wish (βουλήσις) is voluntary; but the ἀκρατής, who acts κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν, acts contrary to his wish; therefore to act κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν is to act involuntarily. But, as the writer points out in the next chapter (E. E. ii. 8), this ἀδορία owes its existence to an unwarranted abstraction. We are not entitled to look at ἐπιθυμία by itself as constituting the man, and to say that in the ἡγκρατής it is forced by λογισμός, or at λογισμός by itself, and say that in the ἀκρατής it is forced by ἐπιθυμία—1224 b. 26 ἦ δ’ άλη έκοψα ψυχή καὶ τοῦ ἡγκρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἡγκρατοῦ πράττει, βία δ’ οὐδέτερος. Ἐπιθυμία, in short, is as much the man as λογισμός, and action consequent upon either is voluntary. The same remarks apply to θυμός.

In the Rhetoric i. 10. 1368 b. 32 seven causes of action are enumerated—τύχη, φύσις, and βία of involuntary, and ἔθος, λογισμός, θυμός, and ἐπιθυμία of voluntary actions:—πάντες δὴ πάντα πράττονται τὰ μὲν οὐ δὲ αὐτοὺς τὰ δὲ δὲ αὐτοὺς. τῶν μὲν οὖν μὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττονται τὰ δ’ εἷς ἀνάγκης, τῶν δ’ εἷς ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν βία τὰ δὲ φύσει, ὅστε πάντα διὰ μὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς πράττονται, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δὲ βία. ὅσα δὲ δὲ αὐτοῖς, καὶ δὲν αὐτοῖς αὐτοῖς, τὰ μὲν δὲ ἔθος τὰ δὲ δὲ ὀρέξειν τὰ μὲν διὰ λογισμικὴν ὀρέξιν ὑπὸ δὲ ἀλογού ἐστιν δ’ ἦ μὲν βουλήσις ἀγαθῆς ὀρέξεις οὐδέσι γὰρ βουλέται ἄλλ’ ἦ ὅταν ὁπὴὴ ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλογοῖ δ’ ὀρέξεις ὀργή καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ὅστε πάντα ὅσα πράττονται ἀνάγκη πράττειν δὲ αὐτίκ’ ἐπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δὲ ἔθος, διὰ λογισμόν, διὰ θυμόν, δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

Let us now discuss Choice: for its connexion with moral virtue is intimate, and it is a better criterion of character than overt action is.

Choice falls as a species under 'the voluntary,' i.e. 'the voluntary' is of wider extent, for (1) while children and brutes are as capable of voluntary action as adult men are, they are incapable of choice: and (2) the sudden acts of adult men are voluntary acts, but not acts of choice.

Some have identified choice with desire or passion: but (1) the lower animals have desire and passion, without having the power of choice: and (2) the acts of the incontinent man result from desire, not from choice, those of the continent man from choice, not from desire: (3) there is a contrariety between desire and choice: for desire is related to things simply qua pleasant and painful, but choice is not related to its objects qua pleasant and painful, but qua good and bad.
The difference between choice and passion is even more marked than that between it and desire—acts which we perform in a passion we are very far from waiting to choose.

Others again have identified choice with wish. The two are closely connected, but there is a difference: for we never choose an impossibility, although we may wish it, e.g. we may wish never to die. Again, we often wish for results which we have no power to bring about, e.g. that a certain competitor may get the prize; whereas we only choose what we can ourselves bring about. Further, wish is properly of the end, e.g. we wish health; choice of the means, e.g. we choose to do this, that, and the other thing conducive to health, in all cases the objects of choice being things which lie within our power.

Nor is choice opinion, for we may have opinions about all things in heaven and earth, not merely about things which lie within our power; and opinions are distinguished as true or false, whereas choice is good or bad. But if we may not for these reasons identify choice with opinion generally, perhaps we may identify it with opinion about right and wrong in conduct. No: for choosing rightly or wrongly makes us good or bad men; but having opinions about right and wrong does not. And it is correct to say 'we choose to do something,' but not to say 'we have an opinion to do something.' It is 'about something' that we have an opinion. Again choice is praised for having a good object; opinion, for being true; and what we choose is that which we consider good; but we form an opinion about a thing independently of any such consideration. Nor do we always find good choice and true opinion going together. There are some people with excellent opinions who have bad characters, and choose as they ought not. It is another question, which does not concern us, whether an opinion precedes or attends, an act of choice: at any rate we have shown that the two are not to be identified.

What then remains after all these exclusions? In choosing, as we have seen, we always act voluntarily; but in acting voluntarily we do not always wait to choose—we sometimes act on the spur of the moment, from mere desire. It remains therefore that, in acting from choice, we act voluntarily, not on the spur of the moment, but deliberately; consequently the object of choice is a voluntary act, about which a man has deliberated. After going through a process of reasoning he prefers that which he 'chooses.'

§§ 1—14. peri προαιρεσις This chapter treats of προαιρεσις or deliberative choice (late Latin electio: see Victorius ad loc.). Προαιρεσις is a species of τα ἐκούσια—§ 2 ἕν προαιρεσὶς δὲ ἐκούσιον μὲν φανεται, οὐ ταύτων δὲ, διὰ ἐπὶ πλέον τα ἐκούσια—i.e. τὰ ἐκούσια is of wider extent, for (1) children and brutes have τα ἐκούσια, but not προαιρεσις: (2) sudden acts are ἐκούσια but not κατὰ προαιρεσιν. Again προαιρεσις is not ἐπιθυμία or θυμὸς, for (1) irrational animals have ἐπιθυμία and θυμὸς, but not προαιρεσις: (2) ἐπιθυμία and προαιρεσις must be distinct principles, for the supremacy of the one or the other constitutes the different character of the ἀκρατία or of the ἐγκρατία respectively: (3) the opposition between προαιρεσις
111 b. 5. and ἐπιθυμία is something very different from that between one ἐπιθυμία and another: (4) the relation of ἐπιθυμία to pleasure and pain is very different from that of προαίρεσις to pleasure and pain: (5) the difference between θυμός and προαίρεσις is even more striking than that between ἐπιθυμία and προαίρεσις. Acts done from θυμός are the very opposite of acts from deliberate choice. Again προαίρεσις is not the same as βουλήσις, wish, for (1) προαίρεσις is of things in our power, βουλήσις often for impossibilities: (2) βουλήσις has properly to do with the end, προαίρεσις with the means. Again προαίρεσις is not the same as δόξα, for (1) δόξα is about all things—impossibilities as well as things in our power: (2) δόξα are distinguished as true or false, not as good or evil. Nor is προαίρεσις the same as δόξα τις, i.e. an opinion on matters of conduct (cf. Ε.Ε. ii. 10. 1226 a. 4 οὐδέ δὴ ἢ τῶν ἐφ’ αὐτῷ διότων πρακτῶν δόξα, ἢ τυγχάνομεν αὐλίμων δεῖν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν)—for such opinions, however sound, do not affect the character as a series of προαίρεσεις does: (3) we ‘choose to take or avoid’; but we do not ‘opine to take or avoid’: (4) προαίρεσις is praised for its goodness, δόξα for its truth: (5) we choose what we have reason to consider good, but form opinions about things quite irrespectively of this consideration—ἀ ν πάντα Ἰςμεν ἄγαθα δοτα (but see note ad loc. § 13): (6) it is not always the same men who choose best and who have the best views or opinions on matters of conduct, for some choose through wickedness what they speculatively disapprove.

The point that δόξα precedes, or attends, προαίρεσις is not controverted in the foregoing arguments, which are directed merely against the view that προαίρεσις, and δόξα, or δόξα τις, are identical.

In iii. 3. 19 Aristotle defines προαίρεσις as βουλευτικὴ δρεῖς τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. It is the choice of things in our power, after deliberation; as he says in § 17 of the present Chapter—it is μετὰ λόγου καὶ διδασκίας, i.e. it implies the exercise of the reasoning faculty. It is not an irrational impulse, like ἐπιθυμία or θυμός, and, at the same time, it is not purely intellectual, like δόξα, but belongs to the appetitive side of our nature (δρεῖς). For the Eudemian account of προαίρεσις see note on vi. 12. 8.

b. 5. § 1. οἰκειότατον κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Ε.Ε. ii. 11. 1228 a. 2 ἐκ τῆς προα- 
ρέσεως κρίνομεν τις τούτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ἕνεκα πράττει, ἄλλ’ οὗ τι 
πράττει ... ἐτὶ πάντας ἐπιωνοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τῇ προαιρεσίν ὑπε-
ποτες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἐργα καίτοι αἴρετωτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς ...
BOOK III: CHAP. 2: §§ 1-5.

§ 2. τα ἐξαιρέσεις] Ramsauer compares what is said in iii. 8. 15—b. 9. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειότερον δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς φόβοις ἀφοβοῦν καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἦ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ζέεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἤττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς. τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προελαυτο, τὰ δὲ ἐξαιρέσεις κατὰ τὴν ἔξω.

According to both passages, apparently, τα ἐξαιρέσεις are not κατὰ προοίμιον; but according to the later passage the ἔξις of ἀνδρεία is specially shown in them. How is this to be reconciled with the definition of ἀρετή as ἔξις προοίμικη; By pointing out that the virtuous ἔξις is the organic result, as it were, of many acts of rational choice, which, at first hesitating and difficult, have at last become ‘secondarily automatic.’ In the first passage Aristotle contrasts sudden acts in general with those chosen after deliberation; in the second passage he has specially in view the sudden emergencies which call for prompt action on the part of the courageous man; and he says, in effect, that the truly courageous man, having organised his deliberation, will be ready for these emergencies; that, in relation to them, he will show how well organised his προοίμικη ἔξις of courage is; whereas τὰ προφανή may be faced, after deliberation, by one whose deliberation is not yet organised—has not yet become ‘secondarily automatic.’

§ 4.] Peters’ translation here is—‘The continent man; on the b. 13. other hand, deliberately chooses what he does, but does not desire it.’ Better—‘the continent man acts from deliberate choice, not from mere desire,’ for we must remember that προοίμιον is βουλευτική ὁρεξία (E. N. iii. 3. 19), and involves appetite and desire.

§ 5. καὶ προοίμεσε μὲν ἑπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἑπιθυμία δὲ ἑπιθυμίᾳ b. 15. οὗ] This does not mean that one desire is never opposed to another (cf. Ald. Schol. ad loc. δοκεῖ καὶ ἑπιθυμία ἑπιθυμία ἑναντία, ὡν εἰ τις δόξη ἑπιθυμεῖ καὶ χρηματισμῷ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δεῖται δαπάνης, ὁ χρηματισμὸς δὲ φειδοὶ περιγίνεται χρημάτων), but that the opposition is not of the nature of contrary opposition; whereas deliberate choice and desire are opposed as contraries (ἐναντία), if opposed at all. Two desires
1111 b. 15. relating to two different objects may indeed clash and wrangle; but deliberate choice and desire, relating to the same object, are opposed in a much more definite manner. Desire seeks to possess it, because it is pleasant; deliberate choice, keeping in view the permanent welfare of the whole man, declines it. The opposition between desire and deliberate choice is, in fact, that between desire and reason—between the tendency to disorder and the principle of order—a definite and standing opposition, very different from the accidental, and often temporary, opposition which obtains between two desires. An illustration may help to make this great difference clear. Two disorderly and self-seeking factions in a state may oppose each other bitterly, or may join hands against the orderly government which strives to repress them both. Their opposition to each other is accidental, not necessary. But the opposition of orderly government to faction is a necessary one, as long as the state, in the proper acceptance of the term, lasts. In the Republic, Plato has sketched the décadence of a state, in which order, or λόγος, has ceased to assert itself, and various ἐπιθυμίαι assume in turn the functions of government. A strong passion, such as that for honour, or wealth, may, for a time, preserve order in its own interest, and maintain the semblance of a state, but is soon overpowered by a coalition of other passions, which, having obtained mastery over it, begin to wrangle among themselves, till a passion stronger than the rest—personified as the demagogue-tyrant—vaults into supremacy. (Rep. 545 sqq.) No one ἐπιθυμία is necessarily and always opposed to another. Each has its own object, which may, or may not, at a given time, be compatible with that of another. But so far as all ἐπιθυμίαι, as such, seek objects which stand out of relation to an orderly system, they are essentially opposed to reason, the principle of order, and therefore to its exponent, deliberate choice. Reason is the permanent personality of the man, which distinguishes itself from every passing desire. It coexists with the desire, and distinguishes itself from it. But one desire does not really coexist with another: i.e. two desires do not quarrel about the possession of the same thing. Each merely seeks its own object, and is unconscious of, and careless of, the object of the other. The technical meaning of the word ἐναρτιότητα thus gives the key to the interpretation of the passage before us, as the Ald. Schol. seems to have seen. His words are—ἀδύνατον τὸν αὐτὸν ἁμα ἐπιθυμεῖν τὸν τε τραφήναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ
Contrariety (ἐναντιότης) is between things in relation to the same quality, or circumstance, not in relation to different qualities, or circumstances; e.g. ἑπιθυμία urges a man to drink, and προαιρέσεις restrains him from drinking: ἑπιθυμία and προαιρέσεις are here opposed (as contraries, ἑναντία) on the common ground of drinking. But there is no such common ground on which two ἑπιθυμίαι can be opposed. One ἑπιθυμία does not urge the man to drink, and another restrain him. He does not ‘desire’ at the same moment to drink and not to drink. The ‘opposition’ between ἑπιθυμίαι is of a less definite kind than this: e.g. the desire of drink may be ‘opposed’ to that of money; but this is not ‘contrary’ opposition (οὐκ ἑναντιοῦται), because ἑναντία are properly the most distant extremes within the same class, and the desire of drink and the desire of money fall under different classes. But to desire to drink, and to choose not to drink are ‘contraries,’ both falling under the class of attitudes towards drinking.

The special explanation of the term ἑναντία given in E. N. ii. 8. 8 also throws light on the passage before us. The extreme which represents a naturally strong desire is there said to be ‘more contrary’ to the mean, or good choice, than the extreme which represents a naturally weaker desire; i.e. it is more difficult, and more painful, to avoid the extreme which represents a naturally strong desire; for, as desire is of pleasure, the opposition to desire must involve pain. Hence προαιρέσει μὲν ἑπιθυμία ἑναντιοῦται. But if one ἑπιθυμία conquers another, it is because we like it better—no pain is involved—ἑπιθυμία ἐν ἑπιθυμίᾳ οὐ.

The contrariety of λογισμός and ἑπιθυμία is discussed in Rep. 440, q. v.

καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑπιθυμία . . . οὖθεν ἢδέος] The Paraph. has—ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν b. 10. ἑπιθυμία λυπηρά ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἢδύν αἰτὶ αὐτικείμενον ἔχει (πρὸς αὐτὸ γὰρ αἰτὶ φέρεται), ἡ δὲ προαιρέσεις οὕτω λυπηρά ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ ἢδύν αὐτικείμενον ἔχει. He seems to have had before him the reading ἐπιθυμος (Cod. Victor.), ἡ προαιρέσεις δ’ οὕτω λυπηρὰ (N b) οὖθεν ἢδέος. Adopting the reading of Bekker’s and Bywater’s texts, we may explain the state-
ment thus—ἐπιθυμία is concerned directly and exclusively with pleasure, which it seeks, and pain, which it avoids—the two being very intimately connected, since the pain which it avoids is that of the emptiness which it seeks to fill with pleasure (cf. *E. N.* vii. 12. 2). The Paraphrast’s reading ἐπίλυσις was evidently intended to bring out this meaning, which, however, is sufficiently plain in the better supported reading ἐπιλύστων.

But λυπηρά for λυπηροῦ involves a blunder in Aristotelian doctrine. Προαιρέσεις, when, in the ἐγκρατία, it declines an importunate pleasure, or, in the ἄνδρεῖος, chooses wounds and death in a noble cause, of course involves pain: see *E. N.* iii. 9, §§ 2–5 διὸ καὶ ἐπιλύσιμον ἢ ἄνδρείον κ.τ.λ. So, we cannot read ἡ προαιρέσεις δ’ οὕτω λυπηρὰ οὖθ’ ἤδεος. But it is true to say that ‘deliberate choice is not concerned with the painful or the pleasant.’ Its object is the καλὸν, συμφέρον, or ἁγαθὸν generally. It does not seek merely to get present pleasure, and avoid present pain, as ἐπιθυμία does, but it looks at πράξεις and πάθη in their relations to an end. It has to do with the selection of means, irrespectively of the immediate pleasure obtained, or pain avoided, in the course of the selection. The end, of course, whether high or low, is regarded by the agent as good and pleasant. The text followed by the Paraphrast, though obviously corrupt in the form in which he had it, may, however, represent the source from which the writer of the parallel passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* (ii. 10. 1225 b. 30), derived his—ἐτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμὸς ἀεὶ μετὰ λύπης· προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης—a statement which is true.

b. 18. § 6.] Cf. the comparison of θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία in vii. 6. 1–5.

b. 19. § 7. βουλήσεις] not will, but wish.

b. 23. ἀθανασίας] merely ‘exemption from death.’ The question of the ‘immortality of the soul’ is not raised here: see Zell and Grant.

b. 28. § 9. τέλος ἐστὶ μᾶλλον] ‘Again we are more properly said “to wish the end,” “to choose the means.”’—Peters. This brings out correctly the force of μᾶλλον. The words in iii. ch. 3, § 20–ch. 4, § 1 seem to imply that the proper use of both terms is perfectly definite—that as προαιρέσεις is only of means so βουλήσεις is only of the end,—ἡ μὲν οὖν προαιρέσεις τίποτε εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποιά ἐστι καὶ διὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τελη. ἡ δὲ βουλήσεις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἰρηγαί. *Eude-
mus is equally explicit with regard to \( \text{προαίρεσις} \)—\( E. E. \) ii. 10. 1226 1111 b. 26.

a. 7 οὐδεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲν προαίρεται, ἄλλα τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. But with regard to \( \text{βουλήσεως} \) he says \( \text{δὲ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος (1226 a. 13)} \), and \( \text{βουλεύσαν} \) μὲν καὶ \( \text{δόξα} \) \( \text{μάλιστα} \) τοῦ τέλους, \( \text{προαίρεσις} \) \( \delta \) \( \text{oὐκ} \) \( \text{ἐστιν} \) (1226 a. 16)—which may be thought to suggest the propriety of limiting the reference of \( \text{μᾶλλον} \) in the passage before us (\( E. N. \) iii. 2. 9) to \( \text{βουλήσεως} \), notwithstanding the absolute statement in \( E. N. \) iii. 4. 1 \( \nu \) \( \text{δὲ βουλήσεως οἵτινς} \) \( \text{μὲν} \) \( \text{τοῦ τέλους} \) \( \text{ἐστιν} \) \( \text{εἰρητα} \). The Paraphrast however has—\( \nu \) \( \text{μὲν} \) \( \text{βουλήσεως} \) \( \text{τοῦ τέλους} \) \( \text{ἐστιν} \) \( \text{ἄει} \), \( \nu \) \( \text{δὲ προαίρεσις} \) \( \text{τῶν} \) \( \text{πρὸς} \) \( \text{τὸ τέλος} \) \( \text{φεροῦντων} \).

\[ \text{βουλόμεθα} \text{ μὲν καὶ} \text{ φαμέν} \] \( \text{sc. ὅτι} \text{ βουλόμεθα} \text{ εἰδαμώνειν} \). Ramsauer. b. 28.

\( \text{§ 10. περὶ} \text{ τὰ} \text{ ἁίδια} \] We are to understand that \( \text{δόξα} \) may \( \text{προ-} \) b. 32. pronounce upon \( \text{διδοῦν} \), as upon anything in heaven or earth (\( \text{cf. vii. 3. 4} \) \( \text{δῆλοι} \) \( \text{δ} \) \( \text{Ἡράκλειτος} \)); but only \( \text{ἐπιστήμη} \) has them as its \text{true objects} : see vi. 3. 2.

\( \text{§ 11. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ} \text{ τίνι} \] An opinion on moral matters—as is made 1112 a. 1. clear by the parallel passage \( E. E. \) ii. 10. 1226 a. 4 \( \text{οὐδὲ} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{τῶν} \) \( \text{ἐφ'} \) \( \text{αὐτῶν} \) \( \text{πρακτῶν} \) \( \text{δόξα} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{τυχχάνομεν} \) \( \text{οἰδήμεν} \) \( \text{διὰ} \) \( \text{τι} \) \( \text{πράττειν} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{πράττειν} \). The Ald. Schol. has—\( \text{οὐδὲ} \text{ τίνι} \) \( \text{οἶν} \) \( \text{τὴ} \) \( \text{περὶ} \) \( \text{τούτων} \) \( \text{περὶ} \) \( \text{ἄ} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{προαίρεσις} \) \( \text{κατὰ} \) \( \text{γὰρ} \) \( \text{τὴ} \) \( \text{προαίρεσιν} \) \( \text{τῶν} \) \( \text{ἀγαθῶν} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{κακῶν} \) \( \text{ποιῶν} \) \( \text{ἐσμεν} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{γὰρ} \) \( \text{ἀγαθώ} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{κακώ} \) \( \text{κατὰ} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) \( \text{τὴ} \) \( \text{περὶ} \) \( \text{τῶν} \) \( \text{ἀυτῶν} \) \( \text{τούτων} \) \( \text{δόξαν} \) \( \text{οὐκ} \) \( \text{κατὶ} \) \( \text{ἀγαθῶ} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{κακώ} \) \( \text{oὐ} \) \( \text{γὰρ} \) \( \text{ὁ} \) \( \text{δοξάζω} \) \( \text{ὅτι} \) \( \text{ὁ} \) \( \text{ἀνδρὶ} \) \( \text{ἀγαθῶ} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{δικαιοσύνη} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{ἀν-} \) \( \text{δρίω} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{ἀγαθῶς} \) \( \text{ὁ} \) \( \text{προαιρόμενος} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) \( \text{τοῦ} \) \( \text{γὰρ} \) \( \text{άκρατος} \) \( \text{δόξα} \) \( \text{μὲν} \) \( \text{ὀρθῆ}, \text{προαιρε-} \) \( \text{sις} \) \( \delta \) \( \text{οὗ} \). We can gather from this section what Aristotle would have thought of the tendency to estimate a man's character by his speculative belief.

\( \text{§ 12. φυγεῖν} \) \( \text{[ἡ] τι} \]) Bywater brackets \( \text{ἡ} \). It is omitted by \( \text{Κb} \). a. 3.

\( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{πάνι} \) \( \text{δοξάζομεν} \) \( \text{We never opine.'} \) \( \text{πάνι} \) intensifies the nega- a. 5. tive, as in the next section—\( \text{ἄ} \) \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{πάνι} \) \( \text{ἴσμεν} \) \( \text{sc. ἀγαθὰ} \) \( \text{ἀντα} \).

\( \text{§ 13. ἡ τῷ ὀρθῶς} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) is here equivalent to \( \text{ἡγο} \), and introduces a. 6. words explanatory of \( \text{oὐ} \) \( \text{δὲι} \). A comma between \( \text{μᾶλλον} \) and \( \text{ἡ} \), as in Coraes' text, would prevent a natural misunderstanding of the con-struction.

\( \text{ἄ} \) \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{πάνι} \) \( \text{ἴσμεν} \) \( \text{sc. ἀγαθὰ} \) \( \text{ἀντα} \). It is necessary to supply these a. 8. words in order to give the argument force. Ramsauer, who fails to supply them, is aware that the argument, as he conceives it, is a weak one; for he says—' \( \text{parum in sexto hoc argumento ponderis} : \) \( \text{ἐνυι} \) \( \text{γὰρ} \) \( \text{τῶν} \) \( \text{δοξαζότων} \) \( \text{οὐ} \) \( \text{διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴσονται} \) \( \text{ἀκριβῶς} \) \( \text{εἰδέναι} \) (vii. 3. 3). \( \text{Poterit igitur nihilominus} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{προαιρεσις} \) \( \text{esse} \) \( \text{δόξα τις} \).' Aristotle
1112 a. 8. means to say here that we choose what we have reason to consider good, but form opinions about things quite irrespectively of this consideration. Here an important difference is noted between choice and opinion: the former relates to the good, the latter does not. The Paraphrast's note I accordingly regard as wrong—ἐπὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἂ σφόδρα γνώσκομεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἂ οὖ πάνυ γνώσκομεν ἀληθὴ εἶναι.

a. 10. § 14. ένοι] οἱ ἀκρατεῖς, see vii. 3 on the relation of ἀκρασία to δόξα.

a. 11. § 15. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως κ.τ.λ.] That opinion precedes (and accompanies) choice is undoubtedly Aristotle's opinion, see iii. 3. 17 τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκαθ' ἐπι προαιρετόν ἐστι. Cf. Ἑ. Ἑ. ii. 10. 1226 b. 9 ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικὴς ἐστὶν ἡ προαιρέσεις: cf. also Ἑ. Ν. vii. 3. 9 where the premisses of the Practical Syllogism are described as δόξα: and ἰ. Α. i. 10. 433 b. 27 ἡ ὀρκετικὸς τὸ ζῷον, ταύτην αὐτοῦ κυητικόν ὀρκετικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας' φαντασία δὲ πάσα ἡ λογιστικὴ ἡ αἰσθητική.

For the use of the term παρακολουθεῖ Ramsauer quotes Ἑ. Ἑ. ii. 10. 1225 b. 21 μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρὰ τινων, καὶ ζητοῦσι δόξει 8' ἀν δυνών εἶναι βάτερον ἡ προαιρέσεις, ἢτοι δόξα ἡ ὁρεῖς' ἀμφότερα γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολουθοῦντα. Προαιρέσεις is not identical with either ὁρεῖς or δόξα, but 'involves' both.

a. 16. § 17. μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας] Both terms mark an intellectual process, as distinguished from an intellectual act—they mark an association of ideas, a train of thought, a review of the circumstances of the case in their relation to the possibility and advisableness of taking action. 'Choice implies reasoning, and a process of thought.' That 'association of ideas,' 'train of thought,' 'intellectual process' is one of the prominent meanings of λόγος is shown by the fact that it is frequently used for συλλογισμὸς: while, in its dominant sense, διάνοια is the faculty of joining and separating νοήματα—see passages quoted in notes on vi. 2. 2; cf. also vi. 9. 3 where διάνοια is said not to be an assertion, or finished intellectual result—διανοίας ἄρα λέιπεται (ὁρθότητα εἶναι τὴν εὐβουλίαν) αὐτὴ γὰρ (i.e. διάνοια) ὑπὲρ φαίς.

a. 17. ἀπὸ ἕτερων αἱρετῶν] ἡ προαιρέσεις, lit. "choosing before." Our "preference" exactly corresponds here, but unfortunately cannot always be employed.' Peters.
CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

What then is Deliberation? And what are the things about which we deliberate?—for plainly we do not deliberate about everything. In the first place, not about things which a fool or madman might think fit to 'deliberate about'—nor about the eternal and immutable verities of the Universe and of Mathematics—nor yet about those changes, whether produced by necessity, or nature, or however produced, which take place uniformly, like the changes of the seasons—nor about those events which occur without uniformity, like rains and droughts—nor about chance events, such as the discovery of a buried treasure—nor yet about all which concerns the conduct of human life, for example no Lacedaemonian thinks of deliberating how the blessings of good government may be conferred upon the Scythians.

It remains then that we deliberate about things which lie within our own power. We have nothing to do with things which are accomplished by other causes than Man's efficiency, i.e. nothing to do with things produced by Nature, Necessity, and Chance, the other causes commonly enumerated.

Every man deliberates about those things which he has it in his power to accomplish—but not where he has the guidance of an exact Science or Art. He does not deliberate, for example, how to shape letters, and spell words—for there can be no doubt about that—but where the things, which it is in his power to accomplish, or affect, are not uniformly the same, but vary according to circumstances, as, for example, the things which a doctor or merchant has to deal with vary according to circumstances. Thus, there is more room for deliberation in navigation than in gymnastic, navigation being a less exact system than gymnastic. For the same reason there is wider scope for deliberation in matters of opinion than in matters of scientific knowledge. We deliberate, in short, where results can be predicted with more or less probability, but not with certainty; and where great issues are involved, we try to get other people to join with us in our deliberations, because we fear that by ourselves we shall not be able to come to a right decision.

It is not about the end that we deliberate, but about the means. We set an end before ourselves, and then enquire how, and by what means, we can reach it: if there are more ways than one of reaching it, we enquire which is the best and easiest way; if there is only one way, we review its steps in the backward direction, till we come to the first step, which is the last to be thought of, but the first to be actually taken.

Here the man who deliberates may be compared with the man who solves a
geometrical problem by analysing an assumption into simpler and simpler elements, till he comes to something sufficiently evident to serve as the starting-point of the synthetic process by which he is conducted to the solution. If, in the course of his deliberative analysis of the successive steps, a man comes upon a step which he sees cannot be taken—e.g. a step impossible without money which cannot be procured—he gives up the idea of trying to reach the end; but if all the steps seem possible, he takes the matter in hand. By 'possible' we mean able to be effected by himself, for that which is effected for him through the instrumentality of his friends may be said to be effected by himself, inasmuch as he is the cause of the actions of his friends. His friends are his instruments, and an important part of deliberation is always about instruments—what instruments are at my disposal, and how shall I use them?

Man is a Principle or Cause of Actions. Deliberation is about Actions, i.e. about means (for actions are means), not about the end. But, although thus concerned with particulars, deliberation is not concerned with them as sense is, which takes each by itself, and merely says—'this is white,' 'that is sweet.' Deliberation reviews certain particulars as members of a definite system—as conspiring to the end, and is thus a process with clear limits, although concerned with particulars.

What deliberation considers, and choice selects, is the same step viewed at different times. Before anything is settled the step is simply 'under deliberation'; but when, as the result of deliberation, it is once for all preferred to other steps, it is 'chosen.' A man comes to the end of his review of practical steps when he reaches the point at which his own efficiency begins, i.e. when he brings the matter to where he, with his leading principle, or power of choice, can do something. Thus in the Homeric constitution the deliberation of the chiefs ended with the practical decision announced by them to the people.

Choice then may be defined as the deliberate reaching forth towards things which lie within our power.

1112 a. 18. § 1. λογίας, or λογία, Deliberation, is not about (1) things a madman or fool would deliberate about, nor (2) about eternal and immutable laws, such as those of the Universe and of Mathematics, nor (3) about uniform changes whether due to Necessity or Nature or any other principle of causation, e.g. the rising of the sun, nor (4) about variable events, e.g. drought and rain, nor (5) about chance events, e.g. the finding of a treasure, nor (6) about all human affairs, e.g. not about the government of Scythia (which a Greek could not influence). After all these exclusions, there remain as the objects of deliberation, τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτὰ, and these are not ends but means. Assuming an end as good, we look about for means, till we arrive at one which it is immediately in our power to produce or supply—τὸ πρῶτον αὕτων of § 11. Having used this means, we are then in a position to use a further means, and so on.
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2. ὑπὲρ οὗ] for peri oü—an infrequent use of ὑπὲρ in Aristotle, 1112 a. 20 but more frequent in the Ethics, Topics, and Rhetoric than elsewhere, according to Eucken (Sprachgebrauch des Arist. p. 47). In the Nic. Eth. it occurs five times—i. 5. 7, i. 6. 13, here iii. 3. 2, viii. 1. 7, and x. 1. 2 (see notes on these passages). Nor is this use of ὑπὲρ frequent in the majority of those books in the Aristotelian Corpus which are plainly not by Aristotle himself. In the M. M. however it is very frequent, occurring between 80 and 90 times, and is even more frequent in the Rhet. ad Alex.

§ 3. peri δή τῶν ἀιδίων . . . οὖν peri τοῦ κόσμου] Cf. de Coelo a. 21. ii. 14. 296 a. 33 ἢ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου τάξις ἀιδίως ἐστὶν. This order of the Universe which is said to be αἰδίως depends upon, or is the expression of, an eternal immaterial principle, described in various parts of the de Coelo and Metaphysics as—οὐσία αἰδίως ἀκίνητος—ἐνέργεια ἀνευ δυνάμεως—τὸ πρῶτον κυών οὐ κυνούμενον—θεὸς: e.g. Mel. Λ. 6. 1071 b. 4 ἀνάγκη εἶναι τια ἀιδίων οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον—and Λ. 7. 1072 a. 21 ἐστι τι αἰεὶ κυνούμενον κύριον ἀπαυστόν, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ κύκλῳ καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ' ἐργῇ δήλον. ὡς' ἀιδίως ἄν ἐπὶ ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός. ἐστὶ τούτων τε καὶ δ' κυβεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κυνούμενον καὶ κυών καὶ μέσον, ἐστὶ τούτων τι δ' οὐ κυνούμενον κυβεῖ, ἀιδίων καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα, κυβεῖν δὲ δὲ τὸ ὑπὲρτον καὶ τὸ νοητόν [κυβεῖ οὐ κυνούμενα], τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλὸν, θεολητῶν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ δυν καλὸν. . . . ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστι τι κυών αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον δὲν, ἐνέργεια δὲν, τοῦτο οὖν ἐνδεχεται ἀλλως ἐξεῖν οὐδαμός. φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρῶτη τῶν μετα-βολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ ταύτης δὲ τοῦτο κυβεῖ. ἑξ' ἀνάγκης ἀρα ἐστὶν δυν' καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταγώς, τὸ μὲν βιά ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἀνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς: ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρα ἀρχής ἤρησεν οὐρανός καὶ φύσις, διαγωγή τ' ἐστὶν οὐ η ἀρίστη μικρὰ χρόνον ἤμι. οὕτως γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐκείνο (ἥμιν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ δοκή ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτων' καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγοροι αἰσθήσεις νόσησις θνητῶν, ἐπίπεδοι δὲ καὶ μικρὰς διὰ ταῦτα. ἡ δὲ νόσησις ἡ καθ' ἐαυτὴν τοῦ καθ' ἐαυτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. ἐαυτὸν ἐυνεί ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μεταληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ νοητὸς γὰρ γίνεται θεγαγόν καὶ νοῦς, διὸ ταύτῃ νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς. ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχουσι. ὡστ' ἐκείνο μᾶλλον τούτων ὁ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς δεόν ἐχεῖν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τῇ ἡδιστῶ καὶ ἀριστῶ. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εἰ ἔχει, ὥστε ἢ μείρι ποτὲ ὁ θεὸς αἰεἰ, θαυμαστῶν' εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἢτι θαυμασμῶτερον, ἔχει δὲ δέο. καὶ ζωή δὲ γ' ὑπάρχει ἡ γὰρ νοῦν ἐνέργεια ζωῆ, ἐκείνου δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δ' ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζωῆ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδίως. φοιμὲ.
As Alexander in his commentary on this chapter (Met. Λ. 7) puts it (p. 667, ed. Bonitz) ἡ τοῦ ἕλιου σφαῖρα, and the σφαῖρα of the other planets, are moved by ἡ ἀπλανής σφαῖρα, or πρῶτος οὐρανός, which is τὸ κυνούμενον-καὶ-κυνοῦν, and intermediate (μέσον) between τὸ πλανώμενον (τ. ε. ἡ τοῦ ἕλιου σφαῖρα and the other planetary σφαῖραι), which it moves, and τὸ πρῶτον κυνοῦν οὐ κυνούμενον, by which it is itself moved. Not only is the Prime Mover described as ἀνίμως, but the πρῶτος οὐρανός is similarly described (Met. Λ. 7), as are also the sun, and other bodies of the planetary spheres—Met. Θ. 8. 1050b. 20 sqq. and Met. Α. 8. 1073 a. 26–39. From the last passage referred to we learn that the eternal motions proper to the sun and other planets are caused by an equal number of ἀκίνητοι καὶ ἀδιόν οὐσίαι, which we must regard, not as independent principles, but as special manifestations of the πρῶτος κυνοῦν, which primarily manifests itself in the circular motion of the πρῶτος οὐρανός. (See Alex. Met. p. 682; each planetary sphere, he says, has its ψυχῇ in subordination to the πρῶτος νοῦς, as the spheres themselves are subordinate to the ἀπλανής σφαῖρα.) The circumstance that the path of each planet is the resultant of its own proper motion and the motion of the containing sphere next above it explains the phenomena of natural growth and decay. The sun and other planets, by variously approaching and receding from different parts of the earth at different seasons, cause the alternations of γένεσις and φθορά which take place in our sublunary region (cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. p. 469, sqq., 3rd ed.)—See de General. et Corrupt. ii. 10. 336 a. 26 sqq.—φανερῶν ὅτι μᾶς μὲν οὐσίς τῆς φορᾶς οὐκ ἐνδεχεται γίνεσθαι ἢμαρ διὰ τὸ ἐναντία εἶναι τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁσαντός ἥξιον ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πέρυκε ποιεῖν. ὡστε ἤσοι γένεσις ἀεὶ ἐσται ἡ φθορά. ἔτι δὲ πλείους εἶναι τὰς κυμήσεις καὶ ἐναντίας, ἡ τῇ φορᾷ ἡ τῇ ἀνομαλίᾳ τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τάναντι αὐτία. ὅτι καὶ οὖν ἡ πρῶτη φορὰ αὐτία ἐστὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ τὸν λοξὸν κύκλου ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεχές ἐστι καὶ τὸ κυμαίαν δὸ κυμήσεις· ἀνάγκη γὰρ, εἴ γε ἀεὶ ἐσται συνεχῆς γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀεὶ μὲν τι κυμέοιμαι, ὥστε μὴ ἐπιλεῖπωσιν αὐτίας αἱ μεταβολῶν, δοῦ δ', ὅπως μὴ δέσπονε συμβαίνῃ μόνον. τῆς μὲν οὖν συνεχείς ἡ τοῦ ἄλοχος φορᾶ αὐτία, τοῦ δὲ προσείναι καὶ ἀπείναι ἡ ἐγκλεισθεὶς· συμβαίνει γὰρ ὅτε μὲν τὸ τόπον γίνεσθαι ὅτε δ' ἐγγύς. ἀνίσου δὲ τοῦ διαστήματος ἄνωθεν ἀνάμικρος ἐσται ἡ κύμησις· ἵστ' εἰ τῷ προσείναι καὶ ἐγγύς εἶναι γεννητός, τῷ ἀπείναι ταῦτα τοῦτο καὶ πόρρῳ γίνεσθαι φθείρει, καὶ εἰ τῷ πολ-
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Now to return to the passage before us, *E. N.* iii. 3. 3—we do not deliberate about the eternal constitution of the κόσμος, because we cannot alter it—it is the expression an οὐσία ἀδιδός ἀκίνητος, 'an Eternal not ourselves.' Nor about the eternal relations of mathematics, e.g. the incommensurability of the diagonal and side of a square. From the words with which § 4 begins—ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κυκλίται, it is plain that Aristotle thinks of the ἀίδια here, in § 3, as ἀκίνητα (Ramsauer suggests that he has forgotten to add the words καὶ ἀκίνητων l. 21). Now, it is strictly true that the objects of pure mathematics are ἀκίνητα (see *Met.* E. i. 1026 a. 13 ἢ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ ἀκόμητα μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἐνα [i.e. pure mathematics, as distinguished from optics and astronomy: Alex. ad loc.] περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ’ ἵνα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν ἔλη’ ἢ δὲ πρώτῃ καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα): but, as we have seen, in the κόσμος, οὐσία ἀδιδός ἀκίνητος manifests itself in ἀδιδός κυκλίται. We must suppose then that, in using the words περὶ τῶν ἀίδιων οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου, he is thinking only of the πρῶτον κινοῦν οὐσία ἀκίνητος, which is the cause of eternal motion, but is not itself motion; this cause alone is the true object of τελεολογική οτ̄ ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, the motions in their various spheres produced by it falling under the provinces of ἀστρολογία and φυσική. This is obviously the conception of the province of τελεολογική which he entertains in *Met.* E. i partly quoted above; for the passage continues—1026 a. 15 ἢ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα μὲν τὰ ἀττία ἀίδια εἰσίν, μάλιστα δὲ ταύτα· ταύτα γὰρ ἀττία τοῖς φανεροῖς τῶν θείων—i.e. πρώτη φιλοσοφία is concerned with τὰ ἀττία,
the causes of the visible motions of the heavenly spheres. The motions themselves fall under ἀστρολογία and that part of φυσική which may be entitled περί κυβήσεως par excellence: see Phys. ii. 7. 198 a. 27 [ἐστι τοῦ φυσικοῦ εἰδεῖν], οἷς ὁσα κυμάτια κυμαίνεται δακτίλες διὰ μη ὀδηγεῖται φυσικής: οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἐναυσί ἐχοντα κυνῆσιν οὐδ' ἀρχὴν κυβήσεως κυμαίνει, ἀλλ' ἀκίνητα ὄντα.

§ 4. ἄλλ' οὖθε περί τῶν ἐν κυνήσει . . . ἀνατολών] These, as distinguished from the οὐσία καὶ ἀκίνητα (objects of ἀστρολογία and μαθηματική), are the objects partly of ἀστρολογία—a branch of applied mathematics dealing with the οὐσίαι κυβήσεως of the various heavenly spheres, which present such phenomena as those of τροπαι καὶ ἀνατολαι, here described as εἰς ἀνάγκης (i.e. εἰς ἀνάγκης . . ἤν λέγομεν τῷ μὴ ἐνδεχεσθαι ὅλως Met. E. 2. 1026 b. 29: cf. Δ. 5. 1015 a. 34); partly of φυσική—a science which deals with uniformities of sublunary motion manifesting themselves in the phenomena of (a) inorganic and (b) organic nature—for this is what the distinction made in de gen. anim. i. 4. 717 a. 15—παῦν ἡ φύσις ή διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖ διὰ τὸ βελτιων practically amounts to. The motions of inorganic nature (manifesting themselves in such phenomena as those of gravitation, heat, light, electricity, chemical combination) are said to proceed εἰς ἀνάγκης, because, although they differ from the eternal motions of the heavenly spheres in being capable of suspension (as when a stone is not allowed to move downwards), still, when they do take place, they always take place in one way (see Met. Θ. 2. 1046 b. 4 αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγον [δυνάμεις] πᾶσι τῶν ἐναυσιῶν αἱ αὐταῖ· αἱ δ' ἁλογοι μένα ἔνοδοι· οἶον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μῶν, ή δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας).

The other class of natural motions comprises those that proceed ἐνεκά τοῦ. These are organic processes, or biological laws, resulting in the production and maintenance of the various definite forms of vegetable and animal life, in which all separate parts and functions conspire in the interest of the whole. It is these organic processes, and the resulting organisms, rather than the phenomena of inorganic nature, which Aristotle has in view in describing φύσις as he does in the following passages which are typical of many others—Phys. ii. 8. 199 b. 15 φύσει γὰρ, ὥσα ἀπὸ των ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχῆς συνεχῶς κυμάτια ἀφικνεῖται εἰς τὰ τέλη· ἀφ' ἐκάστης δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτό ἐκάστας οὐδὲ τὸ τυχόν, αἰτὶ μάντω τοι ἀὐτό, ἀν μὴ τι ἐμποδίζῃ . . . ὅταν δὲ τὸ μὴ ὑεσθαι ἐνεκά τοῦ γίνεσθαι, ἐνα μὴ ἐδοξοῖ τὸ κινοῦν βουλευ-
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σάμενον. καὶ τοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βοηθεῖται καὶ γὰρ εἶ ἐννὴ ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ 1112 a. 23. ναυπηγημε, ὁμοίως ἄν φύσει ἐποιεῖ διότι εἰ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ἐνεστὶ τὸ ἐνεκά του, καὶ ἐν φύσει. μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις λατρείη ἀντίς ἐστὶν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔσκεν ἡ φύσις. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἰτία ἡ φύσις, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἐνεκά του, φανερών. Phys. ii. 1. 193 a. 28 ἐνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἐκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὑλή τῶν ἔχοντων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχῆς κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ ἐίδος τὸ κατὰ τῶν λόγων . . . καὶ μᾶλλον αὐτὴ φύσις τῆς ὅλης . . . ἡ μορφὴ φύσις. Phys. ii. 2. 194 a. 28 ἢ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἐνεκά—and the frequently recurring οἴδεν μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ. This is Aristotle’s dominant conception of φύσις. It is evidently taken from the phenomena of organic nature, being in fact that noted in Met. Δ. 4. 1014 b. 16 φύσις λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἣ τῶν φυσικών γένεως, οἷον ἐπὶ τὶς ἐπικείμενος λέγοι τὸν. At the same time, as has been pointed out above, he distinguishes τὰ φυσικὰ as inorganic (τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης) and organic (τὰ ἐν ὦς τὸ ἐνεκά του)—viz. in de Gen. An. 717 a. 15 quoted above, and in An. Post. ii. 11. 94 b. 36 ἢ μὲν ἐνεκά του ποιεὶ φύσις, ἢ δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης’ ἢ δ’ ἀνάγκη διατήρη’ ἢ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὀρμήν, ἢ δὲ βία ἢ παρὰ τὴν ὀρμήν, ὁπερ ἄλοθος ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται, ἄλλ’ οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀνάγκην. It will be remembered that this same downward motion of the stone, which is here described as ἐξ ἀνάγκης, is said to be φύσει in E. N. ii. 1. 2. Cf. Grote’s Aristotle, i. 355: ‘Nature produces effects of finality, or with a view to some given end, and also effects of necessity, the necessity being either inherent in the substance itself, or imposed by extraneous force. Thus a stone falls to the ground by necessity of the first kind, but ascends by necessity of the second kind.’

The whole field of φυσικὴ is mapped out in the following passage, Phys. ii. 1. 192 b. 8 τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φύσει, τὰ δὲ δὲ ἀλλασ αἰτίας, φύσει δὲ φαμεν εἶναι τὰ τε ἔφει καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλὰ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα [ταύτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν]. πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥηθέντα φαίνεται διαφόροιτα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα· τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἐκατὸν ἐν ἐαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχει κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀδέσποτον καὶ φύσει, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν.

Ἡ φύσις ἡ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιοῦσα—law of inorganic nature, and ἡ φύσις ἡ ἐνεκά του ποιοῦσα—biological law, may then be distinguished as the two coordinate species of the genus φύσις. But biological laws realise their ends—certain vegetable and animal organisms, by conforming to certain definite conditions imposed, as we say, by the
If organisms are to come into being and exist at all, it is necessary for them to conform to certain conditions. Hence we must distinguish from \( \varphi \) (which is coordinate with \( \alpha \)) and \( \gamma \) (which is coordinate with \( \beta \)), as explained above), which is the necessary condition of the successful operation of the laws of organic nature—\( \varphi \) is \( \alpha \) for \( \gamma \) for inorganic nature—\( \varphi \) as explained above), which is the necessary condition of the successful operation of the laws of organic nature. Looking at an organism \textit{per se}, we see that its vital functions are conditioned by mechanical and chemical laws; looking at it in relation to its external environment, we see that its life is maintained in correspondence with laws regulating the inorganic phenomena of gravitation, heat, light, electricity, &c. \( \alpha \) for \( \gamma \) for inorganic nature; while \( \alpha \) for \( \gamma \) for inorganic nature
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υποθέσεως expresses the relation in which 'biological law' stands to an environment constituted for the most part by phenomena of 'inorganic nature.' Organisms, and works of human intelligence, are produced only under definite conditions or limitations imposed by this environment.

Thus the ἐξ ἀνάγκης—'according to the laws of inorganic nature,' and the φύσει of the present section (E. N. iii. 3. 4) cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive expressions. A stone is said to fall both ἐξ ἀνάγκης, and φύσει. On the other hand, if we give φύσει its dominant sense of 'according to biological laws,' we can distinguish it from ἐξ ἀνάγκης—'according to the laws of inorganic nature.' We must remember, however, that 'biological laws' operate only as the ἐξ ἀνάγκης of the environment permits.

§ 5. οὖδὲ peri τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως] From the examples given here a. 26. —οἷον αὐχμών καὶ ὁμβρών—we may perhaps identify these with τὰ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος of Phys. ii. 8. 198 b. 35 πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ ἀλή οὐτω γίνεται ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτόματος οἴδεν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δικαί ἦν πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἢτ' ἐπὶ κύνα ὁ οὖδὲ κάμπτα ἢπὶ κύνα, ἀλλ' ἰν χειμῶνος.

οὖδὲ peri τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης] τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης are distinguished as a. 27. occurrences directly affecting man, not to be foreseen by him, because exceptional, from τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτόματος—occurrences, or phenomena, not conceived as affecting man, which contradict the ordinary laws of nature: see Met. A. 3. 1070 a. 6 ἢ γὰρ τέχνη ἢ φύσει γίνεται ἢ τύχη ἢ τῷ αὐτόματῳ. ἢ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἄρχῃ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἢ δὲ φύσις ἄρχῃ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀνθρώπος γὰρ ἀνθρώπον γεννᾷ, αὐτὲ δὲ λοιπὰ αἰτία στερήσεις τίττων : i. e. τύχη is the στερήσεις of τέχνη (or, more generally, of νοῦς καὶ πάν τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπου § 7). Its sphere is τὸ ἄδηλον in human affairs: τὸ αὐτόματον, in its specific sense, is the στερήσεις of φύσις—it is the spontaneous, or that which contradicts uniform law in the domain of nature—especially of organic nature: see Met. K. 8. 1065 a. 26 τὸ δὲ ἐνεκά τοῦ ἐν τοῖς φύσει γεγομένοις ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐστίν, τύχη δὲ ἐστίν ὅταν τι τούτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός' ὧσπερ γὰρ καὶ διὰ ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, οὐτό καὶ αἰτίων, ἢ τύχη δὲ αἰτίων κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἐνεκά τοῦ γεγομένοις. διὸ περὶ ταύτῳ τύχη καὶ διάνοια προαίρεσις γὰρ οὐ χωρίς διανοίας: τὰ δὲ αἰτίων ἀφοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης διὸ ἰδίᾳ ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ καὶ αἰτίων κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐδενὸς. In Phys. ii. 6. 197 a. 36, however, τὸ αὐτόματον is presented as the
Human intelligence, and natural organisms, attain to their various ends on condition of utilising and adapting themselves to the necessary laws of ‘matter’ or ‘the environment.’ As a rule (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ) they succeed in doing so—ὡς ὁ τὰν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ έξ ἤποθέτειος appears as τὸ συναίτιον. But not always. Sometimes the formative principle is unequal to the task of comprehending the complexity of the material environment, and results follow which, as it were, take the designer or the organism by surprise. These are τὰ ἀπὸ τόχης in the region of human deliberation, τέρατα in the animal and vegetable worlds. Τόχη and τὸ αὐτόματον thus represent the mistakes and failures of intelligence and of the organising principle in nature, in their relations to the material environment. This seems to be the fair inference from Aristotle’s statement that they are στερηθέεσις of διάνως and φύσις, as well as from his adoption of the description of τόχη as ἀδήλος αἰτία ἀνθρώπινω φαινομέν. Material conditions, once ascertained, are found to remain always the same (αἱ δ’ ἄλογοι δυνάμεις μία ἕνος), but organising principles may fail to ascertain them, or use them, and so may miscarry: cf. Phys. ii. 6. 197 b. 29 οὕτω δὲ τὸ αὐτόματον κατὰ τὸ δύναμα ὅταν αὐτὸ μᾶτ’ γίνηται. Τὰ ἀπὸ τόχης, and τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτόματου represent then the mistakes and failures of organising principles. These mistakes and failures are their own mistakes and failures (as a man’s bad acts are his own acts), not freaks of a positive ‘principle of mistake or irregularity’ in the ὁλη, or external world, which is otherwise regulated by necessary laws—Phys. ii. 8. 199 b. Π εἰ δὴ ἔστιν ἐνα κατὰ τέχνην ἐν οἷς τὸ ὁρθοὶ ἐνεκὰ του, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀμαρτημένοις ἐνεκὰ μὲν τοὺς ἐπιχειρεῖται ἄλλ’ ἀποτυχημάτω, ὡμοίως ἐν ἑξοὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, καὶ τὰ τέρατα ἀμαρτήματα ἐκείου τοῦ ἐνεκά του. I cannot think that Grote (Arist. i. 165) is right when he speaks of ‘the independent agency’ of Chance and Spontaneity. These are not positive agents, but στερηθέεσις,
§ 8. Σκύδαι] In E. E. ii. 10. 1226 a. 29, and M. M. i. 17. 1189 a. 20, 1112 a. 28. 'Ινδοι (brought within the Greek horizon by Alexander's conquest) are substituted for Σκύδαι.

§ 7. ἄνευ δὲ νοῦ καὶ πᾶν τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπου] See Rhet. i. 4. 1359 a. 32. 30 πρῶτον μὲν ὁδοτέον περὶ ποία ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ὁ συμβολευόμενον συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἀπαντῆς ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενίσθαι καὶ μή. ὅσα δὲ ἢ ἀνάγκης ἢ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐσται ἢ ἀδικωτοῦ ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, περὶ δὲ τούτων ὁδὸν ἢ συμβολήν. οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχόμενων ἀπάντων ἢ ἐστὶν γάρ καὶ φύσει ἐνα καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς γεννήμενα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐνδεχόμενων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή, περὶ δὲν οὐδὲν πρὸ ἐργοῦ τὸ συμβολευόμενον ἀλλὰ δῆλον διὰ περὶ δοσιν ἐστὶν τὸ συμβουλεύειν. τουαύτα δὲ ἐστὶν σοντά πέρυκεν ἀνάγκης εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ δὲν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἢ μὲν ἐστὶν, ἢ μέχρι γάρ τούτων σκοποῦμεν, ἢς δὲν εὐρόμενεν εἰ ἡμῖν δινατὰ ἢ ἀδίκως πράξατο. Below, in the same Chapter (Rhet. i. 4), Aristotle enumerates five objects of deliberation—(1) revenue, (2) peace and war, (3) defence, (4) imports and exports, (5) legislation. These are all δ' ἀνθρώπων.

tῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκαστὸς βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δ' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν] a. 33. Added lest the reader should misinterpret the words πᾶν τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπου. The object of deliberation generally is πᾶν τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπου: but the individual can deliberate only about that part of τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπου which is δ' αὐτοῦ.

§ 8. ἀκρίβεις] As Grant remarks, not 'exact' in the sense in b. 1. which we speak of the 'exact Sciences,' but rather 'fixed'—as may be gathered from the example, the art of writing.

καὶ αὐτάρκεις explains ἀκρίβεις. The ἀκρίβεια of a science which has its own principles within itself (which is αὐτάρκης) is greater than that of one which has to borrow them from another science: see An. Post. i. 27. 87 a. 31.

§ 9. μάλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας] τέχνη, as b. 6. Grant notes, is here distinguished from ἐπιστήμη, although in § 8 ἐπιστήμη has just been used as equivalent to τέχνη.

§ 10. ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πόλυ] See note on i. 3. 4. b. 21. b. 8. Ramusauer suggests καὶ ἐν ὡς ἄδοξον: b. 9. Rassow (Forsch. p. 75), following the ἄλλα ἐν ὡς ἢ ἄδοξον ἐστὶ τὸ ὡς δέν of M. M. i. 17. 1189 b. 24, suggests καὶ ἐν ὡς ἢ τὸ ὡς δὲν ἄδοξον. It is pretty plain that the writer of the M. M. had before him both the E. N. and the E. E. (ii. 10. 1226 a. 33 sqq.) when he wrote 1189 b. 18–26; he reproduces the διχά γνωμένης τῆς
1112 b. 9. ἀμπρίας which is peculiar to the E. E., and the ἀδιάριστον which is peculiar to the E. N. But he uses the word ἀδιάριστον, which is less appropriate in the context than ἀδιάριστον, for ἀδιάριστον is that which has no limits (and therefore would elude intelligence, and could not be the subject of any forecast whatsoever) whereas ἀδιάριστον is that which has no very definite limits: see Waitz on Anal. Pr. i. 4. 26 b. i.4. It may be conjectured that the writer of the M. M. found in his copy of the E. N. καὶ εἰν οἷς ἄ δει (sc. πράττειν) ἀδιάριστον, a reading which might easily spring from an original καὶ εἰν οἷς ἄ δει (sc. πράττειν) ἀδιάριστον.¹

b. 11. § 11. βουλευόμεθα δ' οὖ περὶ τῶν τελῶν] It sometimes happens, however, that deliberation about the means to a contemplated end results in our seeing that the end is not worth the means, and that another end is preferable. We sometimes cannot be sure that an end is desirable, i.e. is really an end for us, till we have ascertained what means it necessitates. But the ends instanced by Aristotle in this section are those more obvious ends which may be accepted as ends before deliberation.

b. 18. κάκειν] 'refers to εἰνός and δὲν τούτον'—Grant.

b. 19. τὸ πρῶτον αἰτίου] i.e. the step which must be first taken (πρῶτον εἴν τῇ γενέσει), which, however, is the last to be thought of in the review of the steps (ἐξάκισαν εἴν τῇ εἰρέσει). A wishes to obtain an appointment: he can obtain it through the influence of B: he must get an introduction to B: C can give him an introduction: he must write to C: what is C’s address? He must look it out in the directory: there is a directory in the club: he must go there: he must call a cab. Here ‘calling a cab’ is the πρῶτον αἰτίου.

b. 20. ἀναλύειν . . . ὅπερ διάγραμμα] Cf. Top. i. 16. 175 a. 27 ἄναλύεται δε ποτε, καθάπερ εἰν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν καὶ γὰρ ἐκεί ἀναλύομεν ἐν τοῖς συνθέτουσι πάλιν ἀναλύομεν.

We must suppose that the reference is to what is known as the Analytical Method of proof in Geometry—a Method which Plato is said by Proclus (ed. Friedl. p. 211) and Diogenes Laertius (iii. 24) to have invented, although there are traces of its employment before his time (see Gow, History of Gk. Mathematics p. 176).

¹ As regards the admissibility of ἄ δει = τι δεί, I am indebted to Prof. Cook Wilson for references to Ind. Arist. 532 b. 14, and Kühner’s Gk. Gr. § 562. 4, 2nd ed.
It consists in assuming as true the proposition to be proved, and deducing from it, as principle, the necessary consequences to which it leads (see D. Stewart, *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, Part ii. chap. 4, § 3. i. Preliminary observations on the Analysis and Synthesis of the Greek Geometricians)—

‘If in this deduction,’ says D. Stewart, ‘I arrive at a consequence which I already know to be true, I conclude with confidence that the principle from which it was deduced is likewise true. But if on the other hand I arrive at a consequence which I know to be false, I conclude that the principle or assumption on which my reasoning has proceeded is false also. Such a demonstration of the truth or falsity of a Proposition is called an Analytical Demonstration. According to these definitions of Analysis and Synthesis those demonstrations in Euclid which prove a proposition to be true by showing that the contrary supposition leads to some absurd inference, are properly speaking Analytical Processes of Reasoning. In every case the conclusiveness of an Analytical Proof rests on this general maxim—that truth is always consistent with itself; that a supposition which leads by a concatenation of mathematical deductions to a consequence which is true must itself be true; and that which necessarily involves a consequence which is absurd or impossible must itself be false. It is evident that when we are demonstrating a Proposition with a view to convince another of its truth the synthetic form of reasoning is the more natural and pleasing of the two, as it leads the understanding directly from known truths to such as are unknown. When a Proposition, however, is doubtful and we wish to satisfy our own minds with respect to it, or when we wish to discover a new method of demonstrating a theorem previously ascertained to be true, it would be found far more convenient to conduct the investigation analytically.’

Themistius in his commentary on *An. Post.* i. 12 (vol. i. pp. 41–43, ed. Spengel) has remarks on ἀνάλυσις which are worth careful attention in the present connexion. They bring to light an important difference between βούλευσις and γεωμετρικὴ ἀνάλυσις, here roughly compared by Aristotle. He begins by defining ἀνάλυσις—p. 42 (fol. 6 b) ἀναλύειν δὲ λέγω νῦν τὸ τεθεῖσα τὸν ἀληθοῦς συμπεράσματος τῶν προτάσεων ἐξευρίσκειν δὲ δων συνήχθῃ. But

1 'The *reductio ad absurdum* is a kind of theoretic analysis. This is the only analysis that Euclid admits.' Gow, *Hist. of Gk. Mathematics* p. 177, note 2.
1112 b. 20. true προτάσεις may be inferred, as consequences, from a false assumption. Is not this a circumstance which must seriously affect the value of the Geometer’s ἀνάλυσις? Themistius meets this difficulty by simply pointing out (after Aristotle: see An. Post. i. 12, 78 a. 10) that, as a matter of fact, the Geometer does not infer his true consequences from false assumptions; and that he can be sure that he does not, because the objects of intuition with which he deals in his ἀνάλυσις are so simple and so limited in number—p. 41 (fol. 6 b) ἐν δὲ τοῖς μαθήμασιν . . . οὐκ ἔστων ὁ παραλογισμὸς . . . δρισται γάρ ἢκαστον, καὶ τὸ ὤνομα ἢκάστου σχεδὸν δειξὶς ἐστὶν τῶν γὰρ κύκλων ἀκούσας εἰθὺς ὑπὸ γεγραμμένον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ φέρεται ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ τι σημανόμενον. In non-mathematical reasoning, on the other hand, ἴ. ε. in διάλογοι, the προτάσεις are indefinite in number and lend themselves to various ambiguities—p. 42 εἰ δ’ οὐκ ἦν δυνατὸν ἐκ προτάσεως ἀληθὸς δειξῆς, βάδιον ἄν ἦν τὸ ἀνάλυσις . . . χαλεπῶ τὸ ἀνάλυσις ἐν ἀπειρος γὰρ ἡ ζήτησις τῶν προτάσεων. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτῃ διαφέρει τὰ μαθήματα τῶν διαλόγων, ὅτι μὴν ἐν ἐκείνως ἡ ἀνάλυσις, ἀλλοι δὲ οὔθέν γὰρ προτάσεως λαμβάνομεν εἰς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. The non-mathematical reasoner can never be sure that his προτάσεις are not false. But the mathematician sees that his are true; and, as true premisses can give only a true conclusion, he thus demonstrates the supposition with which he began his analysis by the reverse process of synthesis. According to this view, the plainness to the eye of the προτάσεις obtained by the ἀνάλυσις of διαγράμματα has evidently much to do with the conviction that the conclusions synthetically built upon them ‘cannot be otherwise.’ An assumption is resolved into its elements. These elements are necessarily few, and their nature, and their connexion with the whole, plain to the eye. They are evidently true premisses, hence the conclusion (i. e. the original assumption) must be true. But in concrete enquiries, as in that about the cause of τὸ φιλλορ-ποιεῖ (see An. Post. ii. 16), there is no such visible evidence; we can never be sure that we have analysed rightly; hence the conviction of their necessity is wanting to our synthetic reasonings on such matters. The writer of the Μ.Μ. has also a passage in which he dwells on the difference between γεωμετρικὴ ζήτησις and βουλευσις—Μ. Μ. i. 17. 1189 b. 6–19.

The ἀνάλυσις of the present section is not to be confounded with the διαφέρεις of Met. θ. 9. 1051 a. 21, where Aristotle says that theorems and problems are solved by ‘division,’ i.e. by
drawing lines. Thus the Theorem ‘τρίγωνον = two right angles’ is proved by so ‘dividing’ τρίγωνον—by so drawing the lines which may be drawn in relation to τρίγωνον (or, otherwise, the lines which are ‘potentially in τρίγωνον’) that at last angles = τρίγωνον are obtained which are plainly seen to be also = two right angles. The three angles of τρίγωνον are at last made into angles which can easily be pieced together so as to make two right angles—1051 a. 21 εὐρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα (here = demonstrations: see Bonitz ad loc.) ἐνεργεῖα διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὐρίσκουσιν. οἴδ' ἦν δημιουργεῖν, φανερὰ ἄν ἦν' νῦν δ' ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τὴν δὲ ὀρθά τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι ἀλλ' περὶ μὲν στιγμὴν γωνίαν ἵστα τῶν ὀρθῶν. οἴδ' εἰ ἦν ἀνάκτος ἐπὶ τὴν πλευρὰν, ἰδόντες ἄν ἦν εὐθὺς δήλον. διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἡμικύκλῳ ὀρθὴ καθιλοῦν; διὰ τὴν εἰ ἔπειτα τριεσίς, ἵνα βασίς δύο καὶ ἴππα μέσον ἐπισταθείσα ὀρθῆ, ἰδόντες δήλον τῷ ἐκείνῳ εἰδότης. ὅστε φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ δύναμεν ὡστα εἰς εὐφρένειαν ἀναγώμενα εὐρίσκεται. The two proofs given here are of course ‘synthetic,’ and in An. Post. ii. 11 Aristotle selects the latter of them for reduction to syllogistic form. The angle in the semicircle is ‘divided’ and so proved to be = one right angle; it is not assumed to be = one right angle, which would be the case if the proof were ‘analytical.’ For a criticism of Euclid’s Synthetic Method see Schopenhauer die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung i. 82–87. Schopenhauer’s contention is that Euclid’s Synthetic Method involves the substitution of logical for intuitive evidence. It is intuitive evidence, I take it, which Euclid always offers (the evidence of superposition in the last resort): but often not in the most direct way. The issue is not, as Schopenhauer will have it, between intuitive evidence on the one side, and the Synthetic Method on the other; but between the Analytic Method and the Synthetic Method. Schopenhauer may or may not be right in holding (against Euclid) that the Analytic Method is better than the Synthetic for the purpose of teaching Geometry. This is a practical question in Paedeutik upon which I am not competent to give an opinion; but I think that he is certainly wrong in supposing that Euclid’s evidence is ‘logical, not intuitive.’ Euclid marshals intuitive evidence according to the Synthetic Method. The passage quoted from Met. θ. 9 shows that the Synthetic Method of διαίρεσις is fully consistent with the appeal to intuition at every step. As an instance of the confusion into which Schopenhauer falls, the fact may be mentioned that, while blaming Euclid for his neglect of the Analytic Method and of the appeal to intuition,
(the two seem to be identified by Schopenhauer), he singles out the apagogic proofs for special condemnation, as relying on Logical as distinguished from Intuitional evidence. But competent authorities tell us that these apagogic proofs are the only examples of the Analytic Method in Euclid!

b. 23. § 12. καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ... γενότευκα] The Paraphrast has—τρόπον των ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος καὶ ὁ μαθηματικὸς ἀναλύει· καὶ ὁ ἔσχατον εὑρίσκεται ἀναλύοντι, τούτῳ ἔργον πρῶτον γίνεται τῷ βουλευόμενῳ· καθάπερ ὁ μαθηματικὸς, προῦ δὲ ἔσχατον ἀφιέται ἀναλύον, τούτῳ ὑποτείνει, καὶ ἀπὸ τεύτου διὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὁδειὼν, ἀποδείκνυσι τὸ προκείμενον. Καὶ ἄμφω δὲ, εἰ ἀναλύοντες ἀδινατοὺς ἐπίχοιν, ἀφιέται τοῦ ζητήματος.

b. 24. § 13. καὶ μὲν ἀδινατό ἐπίχωσιν, ἀφιέται] The parallel in μαθηματικὴ ζήτησις to such a case in βουλευομενος would be the ἀδινατον to which the ἀναλυεις conducts in apagogic demonstration: cf. καὶ ἄμφω δὲ in the passage quoted from the Paraphrast in last note.

b. 30. § 14. ὃμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς . . . διὰ τίνος] This clause comes in awkwardly. What are the λοιπά? How does the δὲ οὖ—whether masc. (Michelet) or neut. (Grant)—differ from the ἄργανα just mentioned, and the πῶς from ἡ χρεία αὑτῶν? The πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων of § 11 seems to make it necessary to take ἡ διὰ τίνος here as exephegetic of πῶς, and therefore to regard τίνος as neut. If τίνος is neuter, it will be reasonable to suppose that οὖ is masculine.

b. 31. § 15. καθάπερ εἰρήται] Ramsauer notes that the exact phrase ἀνθρώπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων has not been used before, although οὖς καὶ πᾶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων has been given (§ 7) as one of the αὕτα. Καθάπερ εἰρήται, he thinks, would be strictly in place only if some such words had been used as we find in Ε. Ε. ii. 6. 1222 b. 18 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώποι καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ἑών. Perhaps, however, ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἡ ἡμῖν, § 13, may be considered sufficient to justify καθάπερ εἰρήται.

Ramsauer has another difficulty. He thinks that the words ἀνθρώπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων are unnecessary to the argument which follows. The ‘conclusion’ βουλευτόν τὸ πρὸς τὸ τέλος is derived from the premisses ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρακτῶν, and αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἑνεκα: but these premisses, he thinks, do not need ἀνθρώπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων to rest upon. Strictly not: but surely these latter words have this bearing on what follows, that they
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serve to introduce (or reintroduce) the τῶν αὐτῶν πρακτῶν and the 1113 b. 31. πράξεις, which are, in Ramsauer’s view, necessary to the ‘conclusion.’ If, however, we follow Bywater in adopting the οὐ γὰρ ἄν εἰπῃ Βουλευτῶν of K b in place of the old οὐκ ἄν οὐν εἰπῃ β., Ramsauer’s difficulty will not arise.

ai δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἐνεκα] Πράξεις here are τὰ αὐτῶν πρακτά, τὰ καθ’ b. 33. ἐκαστα (iii. 1. 10 ai γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἐκαστα), or λοιπά, which are done for some end (iii. 5. 18 τὸ τέλος . . . φασίναι καὶ κείται, τὰ δὲ λοιπά πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες πράττοντοι). Ramsauer finds the statement αὐτὲς πράξεις ἄλλων ἐνεκα too general, and inconsistent with the doctrine of i. 1, that some ἐνέργειαι or πράξεις are their own τέλη. But it must be remembered that properly it is only εἰσπραξία, or a systematic life of καλαὶ πράξεις, which is its own τέλος. Each individual πράξεις in the system is correctly described as ἄλλων ἐνεκα, cf. iii. 7. 6 καλὸν δὴ ἐνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

§ 16. οὐ γὰρ ἄν εἰπῃ] This, the reading of K b alone, seems to be right: οὐ βουλευτῶν τὸ τέλος ἄλλα τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη has already been laid down in § 11: whereas the old reading οὐκ ἄν οὐν would make it a ‘conclusion’ now independently reached. It must be remembered, however, that in these writings a conclusion is sometimes proved, in the most formal manner, more than once in adjacent passages. Grant quotes Rhet. i. 6. 1362 a. 17, for the doctrine—βουλευτῶν τὸ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

οὔδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστα] These words are added to prevent b. 34. a possible misunderstanding. Τὰ αὐτῶν πρακτά, with which βουλή is concerned, are indeed καθ’ ἐκαστα: but βουλή is concerned with τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστα in a different way from αἰσθήσεως. Αἰσθήσεως is concerned with καθ’ ἐκαστα as such, i.e. separately—with ‘this is red,’ ‘this is sweet,’ ‘this is heavy’; but καθ’ ἐκαστα as such are not the objects of βουλή: only καθ’ ἐκαστα in so far as they may turn out to be means to some end: e.g. αἰσθήσεως says this piece of cloth is scarlet: βουλή decides that it is a bad colour for a uniform.

It follows (δὴ) from τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη being the objects of βουλή, that τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστα περὶ σὲ, as well as τὸ τέλος (this is the force of οὔδὲ) are beyond its scope.

eἰ δὲ αὐτῷ Βουλεύσεται (sc. τίς), εἰς ἄπειρον ᾧξει] Grant says that 1113 a. 2. ᾧξει is impersonal: but the analogy of E. E. ii. 10. 1226 b. 2 εἰς ἄπειρον ᾧξον suggests that τίς should be supplied.

I do not think that this clause ought to be taken very closely
with the immediately preceding words: it rather refers to τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη, and says that in tracing back the series of means (τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τῶν) we must stop somewhere, and begin to act. Ὅτιν εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἡ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ are, as Ramsauer observes, questions of fact. With such questions deliberation has indeed nothing to do; but it is not suggested, I think, by the words εἰς ἀπειρον ἦσει that deliberation would never reach its goal if it tried to deal with them. It simply cannot deal with them; but, within its own sphere of τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος it may prolong the review unduly. It must be noted, however, that the writer of the parallel passage in the E. E. (ii. 10. 1226 b. 1) understands by the regression εἰς ἀπειρον an examination of the data of αἰσθήσεως themselves. So also the Paraphrast—οὗτε τοινῦ τὸ τέλος ἐςτὶ βουλευτόν, οὗτε τὸν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, διὸ καθ' ἐκαστ' οἷον, εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο, εἰ πέπεπται, εἰ πεποίηται ὡς δεῖ· ταῦτα γὰρ αἰσθήσεις γνῶσκομεν, οὐ βουλή καὶ κρίσει εἰ δὲ περὶ τοῦτον ἄρτος βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἀπειρον ἦσει.

Except that the thing chosen is, as such, set apart,' i. e. it is the same step, which is first 'under deliberation,' and then 'chosen,' set apart, or fixed upon. We cannot review steps εἰς ἀπειρον: we must eventually choose one of them.

Class a. § 17. πλὴν ἄφωρισμένον ἦδη τὸ προαιρέτων] 'Except that the thing chosen is, as such, set apart,' i. e. it is the same step, which is first 'under deliberation,' and then 'chosen,' set apart, or fixed upon. We cannot review steps εἰς ἀπειρον: we must eventually choose one of them.

Class a. § 18. οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς & προεῖλοντο ἀνὴγγελλον τῷ δῆμῳ] The Paraphrast's note is—'Ομηρος . . . εἰσάγει τοὺς βασιλείς μετὰ τὴν βουλήν τὸ προκριθεὶν ἀπαγγέλλοντας τῷ δῆμῳ, ὡσπερ τῇ προαιρέσει, ὡστε πραξῆναι. Here ὄρεξι might be substituted for προαιρέσει to the advantage of the Paraphrast's interpretation, according to which then the βασιλεῖς would represent βουλευσις, the δῆμος would represent ὄρεξι, and the result would be the adoption of a line of public action—a προαιρεσις. But if we turn to Aristotle's text we see that this can hardly be the true interpretation. If the δῆμος supplies the active element of ὄρεξι, while the βασιλεῖς supply the βουλευσις, how are we to explain ἀ προεῖλοντο οἱ βασιλεῖς? It does not seem likely that we can have a careless proleptic use of this
word, in a passage which contains the definition of προαίρεσις. We must believe, I think, that of βασιλεῖς, representing, as they do, τὸ ἡγούμενον, also represent τὸ προαρμόμενον, and are therefore the sources of βουλευτικὴ δρέπις. What place then has the δῆμος in the comparison? Merely, I think, that of ὀργανικὰ μέρη, which can be set in motion by the προαίρεσις.

§ 19. βουλευτοῦ δρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν] Here τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν is a partitive genitive—'the object of choice is that among things in our power which we seek to take after deliberation': whereas in the next line it is a genitive depending on δρεπίς. It is a very careless style of writing which permits δρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν to stand so close to δρεπίς τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

ἐκ τοῦ . . . βουλευτοῦ] Mb has βούλησον: but βουλευτοῦ is certainly right: cf. vi. 2. 2. The λόγος of vi. 2. 2 is the βουλευτοῦ of the present passage.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

Choice then is of means, wish of the end. But is the end wished the really good, as some suppose, or, as others suppose, only that which the wisher thinks good? Each view has its difficulties. If we say that the really good is the object of wish, we must draw the conclusion that the man who makes a wrong selection, and 'wishes something bad,' does not 'wish' at all; while if we say that whatever a man thinks good is the object of wish, we must be prepared to maintain that there is no such thing as a natural or absolute object of wish, but that all is relative to the feeling of the individual.

Perhaps we may avoid this dilemma by saying that the really good is the object of wish in the strict and true sense of the expression 'object of wish,' but that what each of us thinks good is the object of wish for each of us, i.e. object of wish in a relative sense; so that, if a man is really good, that which is really good will be his object of wish, and, if he is bad, that which is bad—just as the healthy man finds an ordinary 'healthy diet' good for his health, while an invalid finds the diet of the sick room good for his.

In all matters the good man judges rightly, and what things really are he thinks them to be. Every man looks at things in his own way, according to his disposition; but the good man is the normal man, with whose measure the divergencies of other men must be compared. His distinguishing characteristic is that he sees things as they truly are: other men are deceived by pleasure. They think that it is good, although it is not. They seek after it as good, and shun pain as evil.
3 70
BOOK III: CHAP. 4: § 1.

1113 a. 15. § 1. ἡ δὲ βουλήσεις... τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν[ Cf. Plato, Gorgias 467 D εἶναι τι τοῦ πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τούτο βούλεται δ' πράττει, ἀλλ' ἑκεῖνο ὧν ἕνεκά πράττει.

δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τάγαθοι εἶναι[ τάγαθοι is the reading of Ρ, Ασπ., CCC, NC, Cambr., Ald., and is accepted by Bywater and Susem. The other authorities have ἄγαθοι. Grant has a good note here in which he quotes Plato, Gorgias 466 sqq., where the doctrine τάγαθοι ἡ βουλήσεις is maintained: see also passages collected by Bonitz (note, p. 497, on Mel. Λ. 7. 1072 a) in which Aristotle describes the general tendency of Nature as towards the good—
de Gen. et corr. ii. 10. 336 b. 27 ἐν ἀπασίω δέ τοῦ βελτίων ὀρέγεσθαι φαμέν τῇ φύσι—de Part. Anim. iv. 10. 687 a. 15 εἰ ὧν οὖν ὦτῳ βελτιοι, ἡ δὲ φύσις εἰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖ τὸ βελτίστοτε, οὐ διὰ τὰς χειρὰς ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος φρονομαστάς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ φρονομαστάν εἶναι τῶν ψών ἔχει χεῖρας. Cf. also de Inces. Anim. 2. 704 b. 15, and passages quoted in note on E. N. i. 9. 5.

In all creatures there is a θεῖον τι which directs their efforts towards that which is naturally good. This instinctive tendency to conform to the objective law of the environment is often thwarted by influences of subjective origin; but the continuance of life proves it to be the strongest principle—τὸ κράτιστον. 'It rules the world,' because, after all, it 'has might as it has right.'

a. 16. τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἄγαθοῖ[ Grant refers to Mel. Κ. 6. 1062 b. 13 καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος (Protagoras) ἐσεὶ πάντων χρημάτων εἶμαι μέτρων ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν ἐτερον λέγων ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτ' εἶμαι παγίως... μέτρον δ' εἶμαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἐκάστῳ. Cf. Mel. Γ. 5. 1009 a. 6, where Aristotle says that the doctrine of Protagoras amounts to a denial of the Principle of Contradiction—ἐπὶ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ δ' Προσαγόρου λόγου, καὶ ἀνάγκη όμοιως αὐτοῦ ἀμφότερον ἡ εἶναι εἰ μή εἶναι. εἶναι γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦτα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀνάγκη πάντα ἀμα ἀληθή καὶ ψευδή εἶναι. πολλοὶ γὰρ τάναυτα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλήλως, καὶ τούτου μὴ ταύτα δοξάζωται ἐν αὐτοὶς διεψευδοντας νομίζουσιν· δοτ' ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τε καὶ μή εἶναι. καὶ εἰ τοῦτο 'ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη τὰ δοκοῦτα εἶναι πάντ' ἀληθῆ· τὰ ψευδείματα γὰρ δοξάζωσιν ἀλλήλως οἱ διεψευδομένοι καὶ ἀληθεύοντες· εἰ δὲ εἶχε τὰ ἄνατα οὕτως, ἀληθεύουσιν πάντες. The denial of this Principle (πιστῶν βεβαιωτάτη ἀρχὴ Mel. Γ. 3. 1005 b. 18) amounts to the denial of Life. Life is not a succession of unrelated φαινόμενα, but a principle acting in conformity with definite objective laws—the physical life acting in conformity with definite physical laws, the moral life with
the law of Duty. Right and wrong are 'in things,' not in our feelings. See Cudworth's *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, book ii. chap. i for an excellent discussion of the individualistic morality of Protagoras.

§ 2. συμβαίνει . . . μή είναι βουλητῶν δ' βουλεταί δ' μὴ ὀρθῶς a. 17. αἱρούμενος] This verbal difficulty (for Aristotle is really at one with Plato against Protagoras and all who set up the subjective standard of feeling) the writer of the *M.M.* (ii. ii. 1208 b. 39) evades by means of a verbal distinction—βουλητῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, βουλητέου δὲ τὸ ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθόν.

§ 3. μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητῶν] i. e. they deny the existence of an objective moral standard.

tὸ δοκαῦν . . . φαίνεται] Zell quotes passages which show that these terms are properly distinguished: but here there does not seem to be any distinction suggested—*E. E.* H. 2. 1235 b. 25 τὸ γὰρ ὄρικτὼν καὶ βουλητῶν ἡ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλω ὄρικτὼν φαινόμενον γὰρ τι ἀγαθόν τοιε μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κἂν μὴ δοκῇ: οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα—cf. *De An.* iii. 3. 428 a. 18 sqq.

§ 4. ὁ σπουδαῖος κ.τ.λ.] There is an objective good, a φύσει a. 29. βουλητῶν, or ἀγαθόν, which ἀρετή, man's true φύσις, or perfection discloses: cf. vi. 12. 6 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεὶ ὀρθῶν. What is said here of the σπουδαῖος, or perfect man, must be said of every perfect organism. Its actions are adapted to its environment. If we were to ask 'what is best for a butterfly?' the answer would be—to do as the nature and instincts of a butterfly dictate.' The example introduced by ὃστερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων a. 26 shows how far it was from Aristotle's thought to draw a sharp line between ἀρετή and other phases of life. His biological studies made it impossible for him to do so.

§ 5. μέτρον] For the μέτρον ἀνθρώπος of Protagoras Aristotle a. 33. substitutes μέτρον ὁ σπουδαῖος: cf. *E. N.* ix. 4. 2, and x. 5. 10.

τὴν ἡδονήν] i. e. the pleasure of ἀπόλαυσις is their chief good. a. 34. They do not know that the performance of duty—τὰ καλὰ πράττεν—is the chief good, and is attended by 'its own' pleasure: cf. *E. N.* i. 8. §§ 11 and 12.
CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

The particular acts deliberately chosen as means to a wished for end being voluntarily performed, and virtue manifesting itself in the performance of such acts, it follows that being virtuous is ‘in our power’—and being vicious also: for, if to do this or that is right, and is in our power, then not to do it, being wrong, will also be in our power; and if not to do it is right, and in our power, then to do it, being wrong, will also be in our power. Indeed, if we deny that being good or bad is in our power, we must deny that man is the parent of his actions. But this we cannot deny, for actions cannot be referred to any other origin than to the man who performs them. Originating in him they are in his power, or voluntary. If they originated elsewhere, what would be the use of trying to influence him by rewards and punishments? If they were not voluntary, we should no more try to persuade him to do them, than we try to persuade a man to feel warm, or experience any other sensation over which he has no power. On the other hand, where the efficiency of the man is obviously excluded, that is, in the case of acts forced upon him, and of acts caused by ignorance, we do not think of punishing him—unless, indeed, the ignorance be caused by himself. Thus the drunken man is ignorant of what he does; but he is himself the cause of the ignorance; and in some cities is doubly punished—both for the ignorance, and for what he does in it: so also men are punished for what they do in ignorance of a plain law, because the ignorance is due to their own carelessness. If it be urged in extenuation—that it is their nature to be careless—we answer that it is a second nature, which they have acquired by repeating acts which it was in their power not to perform: that they knew quite well what the repetition of these acts was leading to; and that consequently their final state—their carelessness or injustice generally—has been voluntarily chosen by them: not voluntarily chosen, however, in the sense that they can, if they wish, lay it aside and become just, any more than a man can, if he wish, lay aside the bad health which has resulted from a voluntarily chosen course of dissipation. It originally rested with themselves not to become unjust; but they have made themselves so with their eyes open. In this sense they are ‘voluntarily unjust’ although it is now beyond the power of ‘wishing’ to change their injustice into justice. And, lest it should be thought strange that a moral state which we cannot alter if we wish, should yet be described as ‘voluntary,’ and be blamed, it may be pointed out that there is nothing exceptional in this: what we say of a moral state is true of many bodily states also: no one would blame a man for natural unsightliness; but for unsightliness produced by dissipation or carelessness a man is blamed; blamed, because his unsightliness was ‘voluntarily’ produced, although now beyond the power of ‘wishing’ to change. In short, where blame lies, the vice is ‘in our power.’ We cannot shelter ourselves from this blame behind the pretext that the vice is now fixed and no longer ‘in our power’; it originally was ‘in our power’ not to contract it.
But some one may say—'Perhaps it is not true that it originally was in our power not to contract it. Perhaps the vicious disposition which you hold a man responsible for because he himself, as you say, has fixed it with his eyes open, was fixed for him from the beginning. A man always seeks what he thinks good. But is he master of his thoughts? Does not his view of the Chief End of Life depend upon his disposition? You say that he himself contributes to the making of his disposition, in which case, of course, he would be in a sense the cause of the view which he takes of the Chief End, and he responsible for the conduct determined by that view—but what if he himself has nothing to do with the making of his disposition—if it is fixed by nature from the beginning? Then surely no blame attaches to the man who does evil. He does evil because nature has not endowed him with an eye for the true end of life.'

To this we answer—You prove more than you wish. You prove virtue to be as involuntary as vice. If vice is natural blindness, virtue is natural endowment. The virtuous man, equally with the vicious man, is dominated in his actions by a conception of the end which has been fixed for him from the beginning. But if, in order to make the good man a voluntary agent, you admit either that he has something to do with the formation of his conception of the good end, or that, though dominated by an end fixed for him by nature, he nevertheless selects means voluntarily—surely you are bound to make the same admissions in the case of the bad man? If the good man is a voluntary agent so is the bad man. Both are efficient in the performance of acts, if not in the formation of the conception of the end. Nay rather, we cannot regard acts and end as separate. By acts good or bad we contribute to the making of character good or bad; and according as is the character so is the end.

If then the virtues are 'voluntary,' the vices are also 'voluntary.' It is not to be supposed, however, that these habits are voluntary as actions are voluntary. A voluntary action is one over which an agent, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, has control from beginning to end. But a voluntary habit is one over the beginning only of which the agent had control—which has imperceptibly, like bodily weakness, taken hold of him and become at last independent of his control. It is called voluntary because the acts which produced it were in his power to perform or not.

§ 1. peri tau'ta] Apparently τά πρός τό τέλος: see iii. 3. 15, αι 1113 b. 4. πράξεις ἄλλων ἑνεκα.

§ 2. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κ.τ.λ.] The Paraphrast exhibits the b. 6. connexion between this clause (introduced by δὴ) and the previous clause thus—ἐφ' ἡμῖν δρα ἐστίν ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ἡ κακία' αἰ γὰρ πράξεις δὲ ἐν ἐβδομέν ἐκανόνες εἰς τὴν ἁρετὴν προσαρταί καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσίν. The writer of the M. M. (i. 9. 1187 a. 7) makes 'Socrates' deny the doctrine of this section—Σωκράτης ἐφη, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι θεῖλον. εἶ γάρ τις, ἕρωτε, ἐρωτήσειν ὡστινοὶ πότερον ἀν δισαγωγὸν δίκαιον εἶναι ἡ ἀδίκος, οὐθὲν τῷ διὸ τὴν ἁδίκιαν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐπ' ἀνδρείας καὶ δειλίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν δὲ ὤστεν. δῆλον δ' ὡς εἰ φαύλοι.
b. 7. έν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ.] Grant refers to Met. Θ. 2 where αἱ μετὰ λόγου διφάσεις are said to be τῶν ἐναντίων. Cf. Met. Θ. 5 where ὅμοιος οἱ πρωταίτες is said to be τὸ κύριον, and to determine which of the two possible ἐναντία shall be selected.

b. 13. § 3. τοῦτο δ’ ἢν τὸ ἄγαθος καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι] ‘And this (i.e. τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰτιχρὰ) is, according to our view, being good and bad.’ ἢν refers back (as e.g. in iii. 8. 14), not perhaps, as Grant thinks, ‘to the preceding section,’ but more generally to the doctrine already established that the deliberate choice of τὰ καλὰ or τὰ αἰτιχρὰ indicates a good or bad character: cf. iii. 4. 2. At any rate Trendelenburg, in his paper on τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι (Rheinisches Museum, 1828, vol. ii. pp. 457 sqq.), referred to by Grant, is right in telling us that ἄγαθος here is simply by attraction to ἡμῖν, and that the formula τὸ ἄγαθὸν εἶναι = ‘the essential idea of goodness,’ or ‘of a good man,’ is not in the writer’s mind. He seems to be thinking of the way in which a man’s deliberate actions indicate his character to the ordinary observer; not of the scientific formula (τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι) of Virtue or Vice. For the use of the dat. with εἶναι to express the essential notion see De Anima ii. 1. 412 b. 12 ἢν μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελεκεῖ εἰναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ—An. Post. ii. 4. 91 b. 4 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ζωῆς εἰναι κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπον εἰναι—Phys. iii. 5. 204 a. 23 τὸ γὰρ ἀπείρος εἰναι καὶ ἀπειρον τὸ αὐτό, ἐπερ οὐσία τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ μη καθ’ ὑποκείμενον—Met. Z. 6. 1031 b. 11 ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἢν εἰναι τὸ ἄγαθον καὶ ἄγαθῳ εἰναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἰναι, δεικτ’ ἢν τ’ ἀλλ’ λέγεται, ἀλλά
§ 3. &pother kai proôta—i.e. the words ἀπειρον, ἀγαθον, καλὸν mark 1113 b. 13. notions, not concrete things. That τὸ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι in the present passage (Ε. Ν. iii. 5. 3) cannot mean ‘the essential notion’ of the virtuous man becomes very plain if we turn to ii. 6. 17, where the essential notion of ἀρετή is distinguished from its excellence—κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὁυσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸ τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι λέγωντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ᾠριστὸν καὶ τὸ εἶ ἀκρότητα.—Τὸ ᾠριστὸν καὶ τὸ εἶ answers to the τὰ καλὰ πρᾶττειν of the present passage.

§ 4. οὐδεὶς ἡκὼν ποιηρὸς οὐδ’ ἄκων μακάριος] μακάριος seems to be b. 14. the reading of all MSS., and is accordingly restored by Bywater. Bekker and Susemihl adopt μάκαρ, the suggestion of Victorius. Bergk (Poet. Lyr. p. 1076, referred to by Ramsauer) thinks that this line may be by Solon. The Schol. (quoted by Zell and Michelet) says—παρομιλα τοῦτο ἢ καὶ Ἐπίσημος οἱ Συρακοσίοι κέχρηται ἐν οἷς φησίν ἄλλα μάς ἐγὼ ’ναγκαίος ταύτα πάντα ποιεῖ, οὕτως δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡκὼν ποιηρός, οὐδ’ ἄταν ἑκὼν. ἐν Ἕρακλεῖ δὲ ταύτα τῷ παραδόρῳ. The line is quoted in the spurious dialogue περὶ δικαίων (Plato Dial. p. 374 a.) referred to by Zell, Coraes, and Grant. There can be no doubt that the writer of the line used ποιηρός in the sense of ‘wretched,’ to contrast with μάκαρ meaning ‘happy.’ But Aristotle here, and the writer of the dialogue περὶ δικαίων, quote the line in order to give the word its other sense of ‘wicked,’ although that other sense is obviously not intended by the poet. The liberty which they thus take with the poet’s meaning is not so great however as it seems. A Greek would not distinguish the two senses of ποιηρός so sharply as we do when we are compelled to translate the word by ‘wicked’ in one context, and by ‘wretched’ in another.

§ 5. τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις] Above, iii. 3. 15—τοικε δὴ . . . ἄν—b. 17. θραπεὺς εἶναι ἀρχή τῶν πράξεων. As for the parallel ὅσπερ καὶ τέκνων, it has not, Ramsauer notes, been mentioned before in the Ε. Ν.; but in Ε. Ε. ii. 6. 1222 b. 15 we have—εἰσὶ δὴ πάσαι μὲν αἱ οὗσία κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἄρχαι, διό καὶ ἐκάστη πολλὰ δύνατα τουαίτα γεννᾶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωποι. . . πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὡ γ’ ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν ἄρχη μόνον τῶν ζῶν.

§ 6. εἰ δὲ ταύτα] i.e. τὰ εἰρημένα. b. 19. παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, δὲν καὶ αἱ ἄρχαι ἐν ἡμῖν] Bekker reads ἐφ’ in b. 20. place of the first ἐν. The text as given above is that restored by
1113 b. 20. Rassow (Forsch. p. 56) who quotes in support of ἐν in both places the account of τὸ ἀκούστων as ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔσωθεν 1110a. 1, and 1110 b. 2 where τὸ ἀκούστων is said to occur ἀπὸ ὧν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἑκτὸς ὧν, in contrast to τὸ ἀκούστων which is that ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, 1110 b. 4. He also quotes 1110 a. 16 ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τουατάσις πράξεως ἐν αὐτῷ ἑστίν δυν ὑ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή: also 1111 a. 23, 1112 b. 28, 1113 b. 32, 1135 b. 19, 1140 a. 13. 'Ἐπ' οὖτ᾽ ἐφ' and ἐν are often confused by scribes, and MS. authority does not help us much in coming to a decision; but here there seem to be good internal grounds for preferring ἐν in both places. As for the inference that where the ἀρχαὶ are ἐν ἡμῖν the acts are ἐφ' ἡμῖν, it is not, as thus stated, conclusive. The movements of the heart and lungs proceed from ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, but are not therefore ἐπὶ ἡμῖν. There are plainly two kinds of ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν. What is the special nature of those ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν which produce movements that are ἐφ' ἡμῖν?

b. 24. § 7. ὧν δὲ ἄναγκα ἦσσον μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴττοι. This is a full statement of what is implied in the ὧν ἄγκαν of iii. 1. 14. Grant has some excellent remarks on the value of the argument of this section. 'This fact [of rewards and punishments] is not sufficient to disprove a metaphysical system which would represent legislature, judge, criminal, and the whole world, as forced to do what they do by an irresistible succession of cause and effect. But ethically and politically it is sufficient to justify a practical assumption of freedom. And in any system it must at all events be taken account of.'

b. 31. § 8. διπλὰ τὰ ἐπιτίμια] The reference is, as the editors point out, to the law of Pittacus, see Pol. ii. 12. 1274 b. 19, and Rhet. ii. 25. 1402 b. 9.

1114 a. 4. § 10. τοιοῦτος] Kb Nb and NC have τοιοῦτον. Ramsauer conjectures τοιοῦτον, and in the next line ἄδικον and ἄκολαστον.

a. 11. § 13.] Rassow (Forsch. p. 28) would transpose the sentences ἄτι δ᾽... ἄκολαστον, and εἰ δὲ μὴ... ἀν ἐν. That which he puts first brings the foregoing remarks to an end; while that which he puts second introduces a new point—the Platonic τὸ τὸν ἄδικοντα μὴ βοῦλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι (see Gorg. 509 E. ἰδιολογήσαμεν μηδένα βου- λόμενον ἄδικεν ἀλ' ἄκουστα τοὺς ἄδικοντας πάντας ἄδικεν, cf. Protag. 345 D, E). I think that the run of the passage is much improved by the transposition.
§ 14. οὐ μὴν ἐὰν γε κ.τ.λ.] ‘No man wishes to be unjust’ would be true if wish (βουλήσεις) were only of τὸ ἄγαθον, as distinguished from τὸ φανερωμένον ἄγαθον. But the ἄδικαν voluntarily with his eyes open performs the acts ἐξ διὰ ἐσταί ἄδικας, and he is responsible for the habit of ἄδικα which is formed. He must be treated practically as if he wished to form it. It is irrelevant, then, to urge ‘no man wishes to be unjust’ as an excuse of injustice. ‘Not wishing,’ in the sense of ‘not making injustice his ideal,’ has evidently nothing to do with the matter. He did not ‘wish’ in this sense to be unjust, and yet he became unjust by his own voluntary acts; and, being unjust, he may wish to be just, but that will not make him just.

καὶ εἰ οὐτός ἔτυχεν] καίτοι is Rassow’s certain conjecture (as it seems to me) for καί, see Forsch. p. 28.

προεμένω] τῇ ἰδιεισα. Par. a. 17.

βαλεῖν] Kb, Lb, Mb, Ob, r, Ald., Cambr., have βαλεῖν: but a. 18. λαβεῖν is the reading of CCC, NC, B, B2. Syllables written backwards are not very uncommon in MSS. Bywater brackets καὶ ρίψαι, reading βαλεῖν. If βαλεῖν accidentally became λαβεῖν, the words καὶ ρίψαι would be naturally added; or perhaps ρίψαι was originally a marginal gloss on βαλεῖν, and crept into the text, and suggested the change (not however universally made) of βαλεῖν into λαβεῖν. Susemihl reads λαβεῖν καὶ ρίψαι.

§ 15.] We are held responsible for states of body sometimes; a. 21. a fortiori for states of mind, even though it may be beyond the power of ‘wishing’ to change them.

§ 17.] This involved section, into which the movement of a whole Dialogue seems to be compressed, consists of two sentences, in the first of which—εἰ δὲ τὸς ἑπὶ τὸς ἐρρήν 1114 a. 31 . . . εὖφειά 1114 b. 12—the protasis states the position of Aristotle’s opponent, and the apodosis, beginning νυθεῖς 1114 b. 3, develops the consequences of that position in such a way as to lead up to the second sentence—1114 b. 12 εἰ δὴ τὰ ἐστὶν ἄληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἐσταί ἐκούσιον;—in which Aristotle refutes his opponent by showing him that he ‘proves too much.’ The clause 1114 b. 1 εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . b. 3 αὖτος αὕτως is best regarded as a parenthesis stating Aristotle’s own view, thrown in at the beginning of the ‘Dialogue,’ by the side
a. 32. τῆς δὲ φαντασίας] φαντασία is described in de An. iii. 3. 428 b. 10 as a κίνησις started by αἴσθησιν, and resembling it; φαντάσματα are images derived from sense—ideas, Vorstellungen, 'relics of motions made in the sense'—to quote an expression of Hobbes (Lev. iii), whose account of Imagination (Lev. ii and iii) resembles Aristotle's account of φαντασία very closely. See de An. iii. 3, where, after having shown that φαντασία is not αἴσθησις, ἑπιστήμη, νοῦς, or δόξα, Aristotle says (428 b. 9) οὖν ἂν ἐν τοῖς τούτοις ἐστὶν ὁ όρατός ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία. ἀλλ' ἐπειδή ἐστιν κυριεύοντος τοὺς κυνηγούσαν ἔτερον ἐπὶ τούτον, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησις τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀνεύ αἰσθήσεως γίγνεται ἀλλ' αἰσθανομένως καὶ δὲν αἰσθήσις ἐστιν, ἓστι δὲ γίγνεται κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνέργειας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἰδὴ ἀνύητη ἡ κίνησις οὕτω ἀνεύ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχόμενη οὕτω μὴ αἰσθανομένως ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάγχειν τὸ ἔχων, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλη φαντασία καὶ ἴδειν. Cf. also 429 a. 1 ἡ φαντασία ἐνε γάρ κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γεγομένην. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὅψις μάλιστα αἰσθήσις ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ύπομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φαύνου εὑρίσκειν, ὥστ' ἂν φωτὸς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλων ἑδέν. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ βία, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μή ἔχειν νοῦν, οἶνον τὰ χρήμα, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐννοεῖ τὸ πάθη καὶ νέοις καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν. Φαντασία is thus a motion caused by sensation, distinct from sensation, but resembling it. As such, it mediates between sensation and thought—de Mem. 1. 449 b. 31 νοεῖν οὐκ ἂν ἀνεύ φαντάσματος—and gives appetite objects, see de An. iii. 10. 433 b. 27 ἀπὸ δρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον ταὐτή ἑαυτοῦ κυνηγικὸν δρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἂν φαντασίαι· φαντασία δὲ πάσα ἡ λογιστικὴ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ταυτίς μὲν οὐκ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει. Αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία converts the sensation of an object into an idea of it which attracts or repels: λογιστική (called βουλευτική in de An. iii. 11. 434 a. 7) φαντασία enables the calculative faculty to marshal reasons which will appeal to ὅρεξις. Hobbes' 'Trayn of Imaginations' (Lev. iii)—the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows—is an excellent example of what λογιστικὴ φαντασία does. The close connexion which thus subsists between φαντασία and ὅρεξις enables us to appreciate the force of the former term in the present section. It is used here simply for 'the idea that this or that is good.' Hence it is almost equivalent to 'a desire for this or that.'
Aristotle's own view here parenthetically stated in conditional form involves a difficulty. A man is *tēs egeis pws aitros* because he has voluntarily performed the acts which have resulted in the *egeis*; but each of these acts implies *phantasia*—*dpektikōn de oik δ' anēv phantasia*:

what if *phantasia ἦς οὖ κύροι ἑσμέν* dominates the whole process by which a *egeis* is formed? Aristotle cannot be said to face this difficulty. It is enough for his present purpose to refute his opponent by making him prove more than he wishes, *viz.* that we cannot take credit to ourselves for our *virtues*. Broader ground, however, might have been taken.

It might have been argued that the *φύσις*, or natural bent which determines the *telos*, is after all *the man's own φύσις*—*his own character*—in short *himself*—the concrete man, made up of elements inherited from ancestors, and of elements taken on in the lifetime of the individual; and that consequently to say that the end is fixed *φύσις* is to say that the man himself fixes it, not that it is fixed for him, in spite of himself, by an external power. The biological antecedents of the individual are not external to him. They are summed up *in* him. Aristotle's opponent in the present passage, like many disputants in our own day, commits the mistake of externalising biological antecedents. He does not see that an inherited character is still *the man's own character*.

*el mēn oūn . . . aitōς aitros*] *el mēn oūn* is the reading of Mb, Lb, Nb, Γ, b. 3. Ald., B1, B2, NC, CCC, adopted by Rassow (*Forsch.* 121) and Susemihl. Kb, Ob, Camb., read *el μή, outheis*, adopted by Bekker, Ramsauer, and Bywater. If *el μή, outheis* be adopted, the whole section is one sentence, in which the protasis makes three starts:

1. *el μή, outheis*  
2. *el μή, outheis*  
3. *el ταῦτα εστιν ἀληθή*—the apodosis beginning at τί μᾶλλον b. 12.

*αλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει*] Ramsauer notes that b. 4. this view resembles Aristotle's *άγνοια μὲν οὖν ὁ μοχθηρός ἄ τοι πράττειν καὶ δὲν ἄφεσιν, καὶ διὰ τὴν τουατύν ἀμαρτίαν ἄδικον καὶ ὀλος κακοὶ γίνονται Ε. Ν. iii. 1. 14. Aristotle differs from his present opponent in regarding the *μοχθηρός* as *aitos τῆς ἄγνοιας*, in recognising in the *φύσις* which causes the *ἀγνοια* the man's own character.

*η δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἐφεσις*] *τὸ ἐτέλος οὗ ἐφιέται*. b. 5.

*εὐφυής*] That *εὐφυία* is highly prized by Aristotle is shown by b. 8.
the place which φυσικὴ ἄρετη (E. N. vi. 13. 1) and ἐυγένεια (see note on i. 8. 16) occupy in his system.

b. 9. τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . τοιοοῦτον ἐξει[ ] There is a Platonic ring about these words, and the doctrine reminds one of that maintained at the end of the Meno—that ἄρετη is a divine gift, which its possessor cannot communicate to others. We can imagine a Platonising opponent encouraged by Aristotle to enlarge on ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ εὐφυΐα, and so lay himself open to the awkward question—τι μᾶλλον ἡ ἄρετη τῆς κακίας ἐσται ἔκόσμων ;

Rassow (Forsch. p. 121) finds the construction of the sentence τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . ἂν εἰη εὐφυΐα irregular: the words τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . ἐξει have no suitable predicate, the predicate τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ εὐφυΐα being a superlative which answers rather to the clause καὶ τὸ εὖ . . . περικέναι. He accordingly translates, as if εὐφυΐα ἂν εἰη were read after ἐξει, thus—'das Grösste und Schönste, was man von einem andern nicht empfangen und lernen kann, sondern was man so besitzen wird, wie es von Natur geworden ist, (ist die εὐφυΐα), und ist es gut und schön von Natur geworden, so ist es die vollkommene und wahre εὐφυΐα.' I cannot help thinking that this is a little too subtle. The superlatives μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον in the first clause of the sentence surely deserve the superlative predicate as much as τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλὸς τοῦτο περικέναι. But is Rassow right in making τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . ἐξει a subject with εὐφυΐα (whether τελεία or not) as predicate? Is it not better to make τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον the object of ἐξει and to regard the clause τὸ γὰρ . . . ἐξει as explanatory of εὐφυΐς l. 8, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον developing εὖ- and καὶ δ . . . ἐφι developing -φিς? We should then translate—'for he will have that which is greatest and fairest, and that which one cannot receive or learn from another, but has entirely from nature.' Then follows the clause καὶ τὸ εὖ . . . εὐφυΐα not as 'Ein steigernder Zusatz zum Subject (Rassow, Forsch. 121),’ but added to distinguish this moral εὐφυΐα, as τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ, from the lower kind of εὐφυΐα which a man of ‘good natural ability’ possesses. The τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ εὐφυΐα of this passage may be compared, as Ramsauer notes, with the θεία εἰροχία (E. E. H. 14. 1248 b. 3), or εὐφυΐα ὄρεξεως καὶ ἐπιθυμίας (E. E. H. 14. 1247 b. 39) of the E. E. and M. M. The writers of these treatises found the doctrine of φυσικὴ ἄρετη in Aristotle; but they certainly developed it in a way which suggests Platonic influence.
The Platonic tone and phraseology of the following passage 1114 b. 9. (M. M. ii. 8. 1207 a. 35) is remarkable:—έστιν οὖν ἡ εὐτυχία ἄλογος φύσις: ὅ γάρ εἰς χθόνιον ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνευ λόγον ἔχων ὅρμην πρὸς τάγαθα, καὶ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνων, τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ φύσιν: ἐν γὰρ τῇ συνήκει ἐνεστὶν τῇ φύσει τούτων ὁ ὅρμων ἄλογος πρὸς ἀν εὖ ἔχωμεν, καὶ εἴ τις ἔρωτίσθη τῶν οὕτως ἔχοντα, διὰ τί τούτῳ ἀρέσκει σοι οὕτω δρᾶσει; οὐκ οἶδα, φησίν, ἀλλ’ ἀρέσκει μοι, ὅμοιον πᾶσχον τοῖς ἑνθουσιάζοντοι καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἑνθουσιαζόντες ἀνευ λόγον ὅρμην ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ πρᾶττει τι. Cf. Plato, Meno, 99 D καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἐκεῖτα τούτων φαίμεν ἄν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἑνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους δυνασ καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθώσει λέγοντες πολλά καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὄνομαν.

§ 18. τά δὲ λοιπά] τά πρῶτο τό τέλος. b. 15.

§ 19.] At the end of § 17 the opponent had to admit that if the b. 16. τέλος being φυσικῶν makes vice involuntary, it also makes virtue involuntary. But he wishes to believe that virtue is voluntary (ἡ ἀρετῆ ἑκούσιων ἐστὶν 1114 b. 19); accordingly he must admit either that the end is not fixed φύσις (εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἑκάστοι φαίνεται ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ’ αὐτὸν ἐστιν—it is partly due to himself) or that the end is indeed φυσικῶν, but the means are voluntarily chosen by the good man (εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικὸν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκούσιον τῶν σπουδαῖων . . .). But either admission, made in the interest of the voluntariness of virtue, entails the voluntariness of vice.

§ 20. ὅσπερ λέγεται] i.e. it is maintained by our opponent that b. 22. νιτίς is voluntary.

§§ 21, 22.] The order accepted by Bekker from the MSS. viz. b. 26. (1) κοινὴ προστάξη, (2) αὐχ ὤμοιος . . . ἑκούσιοι ought to be reversed: see Rassow, Forsch. p. 28. Spengel (Arist. Stud. pp. 205-6) inclines to the view that the section αὐχ ὤμοιοι . . . ἑκούσιοι is a marginale, and not, as Scaliger supposed, a part of the original text detached from its immediate antecedent § 20 by the intrusion of the words κοινῇ προστάξῃ. He thinks that the words αὐχ ὤμοιοι . . . ἑκούσιοι are out of place after § 20, which merely proves that ἀρετὴ and κακία are equally voluntary. But are they out of place as referring back to the remark made at the end of § 14?

§ 21. πρακτικάι (καὶ) καθ’ αὐτάσ] i.e. not τούτων πρακτικάι κατὰ b. 28. συμβεβηκόσ: e.g. the ἔξεις of temperance produces temperate acts, because it is its own nature to do so, not because they happen to
conduce to health or respectability. Susemihl and Bywater insert καὶ before καθ', with Γ, Asp., Ob, CCC, NC, Cambri. Of course MSS. do not help us to a decision. I do not like the καὶ.


§ 23. πόσαι] See Grant's excellent notes here and on ii. 7. i. Aristotle can hardly have regarded his list of virtues as theoretically exhaustive. He only means that it is not limited to the four 'cardinal virtues' σωφία, ἀλήθεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, but involves a more minute analysis of the conditions of human life than that enumeration presupposes. We may suspect that, having written τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ πόσα καὶ πῶς, he naturally went on to write καὶ πόσαι.

CHAPTER VI.

Argument.

Here ends our general description of moral virtue. Let us now proceed to describe in detail the various forms of moral virtue—the virtues in the plural: their number our list, when finished, will show.

Courage. It is a mediocrity in relation to the feelings of fear and confidence. Νῦν, we fear evils—to use the most general expression. Hence fear is defined as the expectation of evil. But although we fear all evils—disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death, it is not with all of them that courage has to do; for there are some evils which a man ought to fear. Thus if a man does not fear disgrace he is shameless, not courageous, although the latter epithet is sometimes wrongly applied to him, because he resembles the courageous man in not fearing. On the other hand, poverty and disease perhaps ought not to be feared: they do not come by one's own fault; but yet, being without fear of them does not constitute a man courageous, except in a metaphorical sense. A man may be a coward in war, and yet look the loss of his fortune boldly in the face. Or again, he may fear the outrage of wife and children or the jealousy of Heaven, and yet be no coward; may look forward to a flogging with a stout heart, and yet not be courageous. What then is the object of fear with which courage is concerned? Surely that which is the object of the greatest fear—for the courageous man is the man to face it—death, which puts an end to life. But not death, as such, however coming—thus, not death by shipwreck or disease—but death coming gloriously in battle. He is courageous, in the strict sense, who is without dread of a glorious death, and of the risks which bring it to close
quarters with him in sudden onslaught—and such above all are the risks of war: not that the courageous man is not also without dread of death by shipwreck or disease; but the prospect of such a death does not call forth his peculiar excellence, for he revolts against it, as miserable and inglorious, often, in his inexperience, regarding it as inevitable, when it is not; nor can he take up arms and defend himself against it. It is only where a man can take up arms and defend himself, or where death is glorious, that he can 'show courage.'

§ 1. ἐν ἀνδρείᾳ] See Grant’s excellent notes on §§ 1–8 of this chapter, in which he refers to the Protagoras (349–51, 359–61), and to the Laches to show that ‘Aristotle’s admirable account of courage is to some extent indebted to the observations of Plato, while in some points it is a protest against the Platonic theory.’ Aristotle’s relation to the Platonic theory may be briefly stated thus—Aristotle is at one with Plato in recognising the moral elevation of the virtue, but he limits its sphere to war, whereas Plato extends it so as to include all dangers—even those of temptation.

§§ 1, 2. ἐν φόβῳ . . . προσδοκίαν κακοῦ] Grant quotes Protag. 358 D προσδοκίαν τινα λέγω κακοῦ τούτο, εἴτε φόβοι εἴτε δέοι καλέσαι, and Laches, 198 B ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι δ' ἔρως παρέχει, παραπλῆθα δ' ἡ δέος παρέχει δὲν δὲν παρέχει ὡς τὰ γεγονότα, οὔτε τὰ παράντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκόμενα δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μελλόντος κακοῦ. But, it is argued by Socrates,—ἀνδρεία cannot be an ἐπιστήμη, for science has nothing to do with time. Agriculture, or strategy, μία οὕσα εἴρημα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γεγονότα (198 Ε) . . . καὶ δ' ὁμοὶ οὗτος τάττει μὴ τῶν μάτων τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν ἄλλα τῶν στρατηγῶν τοῦ μάτων. If courage is a science, it cannot be confined to the future (δεινῶν καὶ παραπλῆθων) but must be concerned with good and evil universally.—ἡ ἐν πάντων ἁμαρτῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἔχοντων (199 Κ). Then, asks Socrates, can he be wanting in the highest virtue, who knows all that is good and all that is evil; and can he fail in temperance or justice or holiness, who alone can guard against evil and compass good, whether in the service of the gods or in the society of men? οὐκ ἀρεταὶ, concludes Socrates (199 Ε), μόριον ἀρετῆς ὁ εἴη τὸ νῦν λέγομεν ἄλλα σύμπασα ἀρετῆ. What we call ‘moral courage’ is, in fact, made the foundation of all virtue. Such is the suggestion put forward in the Laches. It is particularly to be noted that it is only a suggestion. In § 3 Aristotle protests against this wide and vague use of the term.
BOOK III: CHAP. 6: §§ 2, 3.

1115 a. 6. ἀνθρώπος suggested in the Laches. The term is properly used, he thinks, only in connexion with the dangers of war (§ 10), and καθ’ ὄμοιότητα (§ 4) in connexion with all other evils.

a. 7. ἡδὴ φανερῶν γεγένηται] This is the reading Kb, Ob, Cambr., accepted by Susemihl and Bywater, instead of the καὶ πρὸς τερέων εἰρήταυ of other MSS. (some of which, e.g. CCC, B¹, B², however add φανερῶν γὰρ γεγένηται) accepted by Bekker. I prefer Bekker’s reading: cf. below iii. 10. I ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσοτής ἐστὶ περὶ ἢδονᾶς ἢ σωφροσύνη εἰρήταυ ἡμῖν. Whatever may be thought of the genuineness of the διαγραφή in ii. 7, there can be no doubt that there was a διαγραφή of some kind there to which Aristotle is entitled to refer back here.

a. 10. § 3. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἄδοξιαν] Eudemus (E. E. iii. i. 1229 a. 33) limits the application of the term φόβος. He distinguishes φόβος, properly so called (fear of death), from dread of disgrace, &c. ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιμνικὰ φόβοι. τοιαῦτα ὃ ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιμνικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς τοὺς γὰρ ἄλλην τινὰ προσδεχομένως λύπην ἑτέρα μὲν ἀν τις ἴσως λύπη γένοισαι καὶ πάθος ἑτέρον, φόβος δ’ οὖν ἔσται, οἷον εἰ τις προσφέρῃ ὅτι λυπηται λύπην ἢν οἱ φθονοῦσες λυτοῦται, ἢ τοιαύτην ὅπου οἱ χλοοῦσιν ἢ οἱ αἰσχροῦμενοι. ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μόνας ταῖς τοιαύτας φανομένας ἔσεσθαι λύπαι φόβος γίνεται, ὅτινες ἢ φόβοις ἀναρετικῆ τοῦ ζῆν. Thus φόβος is not the proper name for the anticipation of the pain of envy or shame; it is applied only to the anticipation of such pains as are destructive of life—ὁς ἡ φόβος ἀναρετικῆ τοῦ ζῆν. This refinement in the use of the term φόβος was doubtless suggested primarily to Eudemus by Aristotle’s limitation of the sphere of ἀνθρώπων to war; but a passage in Rhet. ii. 5. 1382 a. 21 may also have had its influence—ἐστο δὴ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ τοραχῆ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ ἢ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ’ ὅσα λύπαις μεγάλαις ἢ φθοράς δύναται, καὶ ταὐτ’ ἐὰν μὴ πάρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνεται ὡστε μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πάρω ἐνδόρα ὄφαλον φοβοῦνται ἵσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔγγος, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. εἰ δὲ ὁ φόβος τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τοιαῦτα φοβερὰ εἶναι ὅσα φαίνεται δύναμιν ἐχειν μεγάλην τοῦ πθείρειν ἢ βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην συνεποῦσας.

a. 12. ἐνια γὰρ καὶ δει φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλὸν] Eudemus would have avoided the word φοβεῖσθαι here; nor is it quite consistent with the usage of Rhet. ii. 5: εὐλαβεῖται τὸ ἀσχρόν expresses better than φοβεῖται the relation of the ἐπεικῆς to moral evil.

λέγεται] The subject is ὁ ἀναίσχυντος.

§ 4. οὐδ’ ἥλως ἄση μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι’ αὐτὸν] In limiting the a. 17. sphere of ἄνδρεία to war, without narrowing the application of the term φοβεῖσθα (as it is narrowed by Eudemus), Aristotle shows that he fully recognises the virtue which we call ‘moral courage’—the σύμπασα ἀρετή of Laches 199 E, which Plato (adopting the Socratic doctrine of ἐγκράτεια) very rightly regards as the foundation of πολεμικὴ ἀρετῆ and all the other virtues.

§ 5. φθόνον] Does he mean the envy of a rival (or of Heaven), a. 23. or the pain of being oneself envious? The writer of the E. E. iii. 1. 1229 a. 37 adopts the latter alternative—φόβος δ’ οὐκ ἦσσαι, οὖν εἰ τις προορότο ὅτι λυπῆται λύπην ἢν οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται.

§ 6. φοβερώτατον . . . κακὸν εἶναι] Here δοκεῖ does not necessarily a. 26. express Aristotle’s own view, any more than it does in i. 10. 3 δοκεῖ γάρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθεωτί καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἁγαθὸν. E. N. i. 10. §§ 3–5, and E. N. i. 11, should be read in connexion with the present remark.

§ 7. ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις] Grant quotes Laches, 191 D, E, for a. 29. the extended use of the term ἄνδρεία, to which objection is made here and in the following sections—βουλόμενος γάρ σου πυθεῖσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὀπλιτικῷ ἄνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἰσπικῷ καὶ ἐν ἔξυπνοι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖσ πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κυκλόνως ἄνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ οὗτοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσιοι πρὸς πινιας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἄνδρεῖοι εἰσί, καὶ ἐν ἀδείᾳ μὴ μόνον ὅσιοι πρὸς λύπας ἄνδρεῖοι εἰσίν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἥδαιμα δεινοὶ μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες ἢ ἀναστρέφοντες—εἰσὶ γὰρ πού τινες, ἢ Δάρκης, καὶ ἐν τοῖσ τοιοῦτοις ἄνδρεῖοι.

§ 8. καλλιστῷ] Cf. Thuc. ii. 42. 5 καὶ δὲ ἐλαχίστων καιροῦ τόχης a. 31. ἀμα ἀκμῆ τῆς δίδξης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δεῖος ἀπηλλάγησαι.

§ 10. ὑπόγυια] αἱφριδίου ἐπερχόμενα Paraph.—the sense given to a. 34. the word here by Liddell and Scott; cf. iii. 8. 15 δὸ καὶ ἄνθρωπο-τέρον δοκεῖ εἶναι τό ἐν τοῖσ αἵφριδίους φόβους ἀφοβίσκον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἰσίν ἢ ἐν τοῖσ προδήλουσ’ ἀπὸ ἐξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢν, ὅτι ἦτον ἐκ παρασκευῆς τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγον τις προκλητό, τά δ’ ἐξαίφθης κατὰ τὴν ἐξιν. The word υπόγυια means literally ‘nigh at hand,’ and Hippocrates 1225 C. E. F. is quoted by Liddell and Scott for an absolute use of υπόγυια='near the end, at the approach of
CHAPTER VII.

Argument.

Men differ in the things which they fear; but there are things so fearful that no man in his senses will regard them without terror, or think of facing them. These may be dismissed, for we have to do only with things which, although they are fearful, it is possible for men to face. These latter are, in themselves, and for different men, fearful in different degrees. Similarly, things inspire confidence in different degrees. It is with objects of fear, then, which are not too fearful for man to face, and with the grounds of confidence which may be set off against them, that the courageous man is concerned. His fear and his confidence he will govern aright, facing the danger of battle, as he ought, and as reason dictates, for the sake of glorious achievement; for glorious achievement is the end of virtue. A courageous act, like every other virtuous act, realises its own end when it shows forth the end for the sake of which its parent habit exists. The habit of courage is a glory to human nature: it exists for the sake of being a glory to human nature—to be this that it is is its end. To show forth then the peculiar glory of courage is the end for the sake of which the courageous man faces danger and does deeds of courage.

On the side of excess we have:—

(1) The man whose fearlessness is excessive. He has no name, but may be described as a sort of madman, or insensate person, for whom (as they say for the Celts) earthquakes or waves have no terrors.
(2) The man whose confidence is excessive—the rash man, who is also a
swaggerer and a pretender to courage, but fails in the hour of real danger.

(3) The man whose fear is excessive—the coward. He appears also on the
side of defect, for his confidence is defective; excessive fear, however, is what is
most noticeable in him, and hopelessness; whereas the courageous man is full of
good hope. Rash men again are eager for the fray before the danger is at hand,
but in the hour of danger they hang back; whereas courageous men are keen
when the time for action comes, but keep quiet before it.

Courage then is a mediocrity in relation to the feelings of confidence and fear,
as these are raised in war; and the courageous man deliberately takes his stand
where he does because it is glorious to do so, or would be disgraceful not to
do so.

But to commit suicide in order to avoid poverty, or the pangs of love, or any
other pain or sorrow, is not courageous, but cowardly: for to shrink from hard-
ships is effeminacy; and the suicide braves death, not because death is glorious,
but because life is evil.

§ 1. τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν . . . ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων] There are two classes 1115 b. 7.
of φοβερὰ, (1) φοβερὰ which men can face; each one of these is
differently φοβερῶν to different men: (2) φοβερά so appalling that no
man in his senses will face them—lightnings, earthquakes, inun-
dations (Paraph.).

§ 2. ὡς ἀνθρώπως] i.e. so far as τὰ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων are concerned. b. 11.

φοβηστατὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα] i.e. as well as τὰ ὑπὲρ
ἀνθρώπων.

ὦς δεὶ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ] προστάτει is to be understood b. 12.
after λόγος, and ὁ ἀνδρείας is the subject of ὑπομενεῖ. He will indeed
fear them, but yet, in obedience to the dictates of reason, will face
them. Ramsauer refers to a passage in Ῥο. iv. 5. 125 b. 20, in
which Aristotle makes the ἀνδρείας ἀπαθῆς, instead of, as here,
ἐγκρατὴς φόβου. (See § 5, below καὶ ἀδικίαν . . . πᾶσχει καὶ πράττει
ὁ ἁγίας). The passage in the Ῥοτικά is as follows—diafράσσουσι
δὲ καὶ οἱ τὴν ἐξίν εἰς τὴν ἀκολουθίαν δύναμιν πάντοτε, οὐν τὴν πράσχειν
ἐγκρατείαν ὑπῆρξαν καὶ τὴν ἁγίαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φόβου καὶ κερδών·
ἀνδρείας μὲν γὰρ καὶ πράσχει ὁ ἀπαθῆς λέγεται, ἐγκρατὴς δὲ ὁ πάσχον καὶ μὴ
ἀγίαν. Ἡγομένος μὲν οὖν ἀκολουθέει δύναμις ἐκατέρω τοιαῦτα, ὡστ' εἰ πάθει,
μὴ ἄγεοθαι ἄλλα κρατεῖν' οὐ μὴν τοῦτο γ' ἔστι τῷ μὲν ἁγίας τῷ δὲ πάρο
ἐίναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλος μὴ πᾶσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τωιοῦτων μηδέν. We may explain
this difference between the Ῥοτικά and Ἐθικά by pointing out that
in the Ῥοτικά Aristotle is speaking of the abstract notion of ἁγ-
ίας—τοῦτο γ' ἔστι τῷ μὲν ἁγίας ἐίναι, as discussed by dialectical
1115 b. 12. disputants; whereas in the *Ethics* he is describing the ἄνδρεῖος in the concrete.

τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα· τούτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς] Ramsauer observes that it is here for the first time that the chief end is described as τὸ καλὸν: henceforward it is often so described, as in *E.N.* 1116 a. 11, 12, 1117 a. 8, 1178 b. 13, 1120 a. 23, 24, 1122 b. 6: in *E.E.* 1229 a. 8, 1230 a. 27: and in *M.M.* 1190 a. 28 and 33.

b. 15. § 4. (δ) οὐ δεῖ] Susem. and Bywater restore δ from ρ.

b. 17. § 5. οἱ μὲν ... ὀπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος ... ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν] 'The man who governs his fear and also his confidence aright, and faces the dangers that he ought to face.'

οὐ ἔνεκα] sc. δεῖ, i.e. καλοῦ ἔνεκα—in a glorious cause.

b. 19. κατ' ἀξίαν] There ought to be the same ratio between the magnitudes of two φόβου as there is between the magnitudes of their respective φοβερά.

ὁ λόγος] The faculty which perceives, or the consciousness of, that right ratio (ὁ ὑπόθεσις λόγος ... τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν) which education has established among the ἀλογα πάθη of human nature.

b. 20. πάρχει] Cf. note on § 2, b. 12, above.

§ 6. τέλος δὲ ... τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἄνδρεῖαν] See paraphrase at the beginning of this chapter. Rassow’s ἐξώ καὶ τὸ ἄνδρεῖο δὲ· ἡ δ' ἄνδρεία καλὸν· for the received ἐξώ καὶ τὸ ἄνδρεῖο δὲ· ἡ ἄνδρεία καλὸν· is probably right (*Forsch.* p. 90). We see from this passage what a ‘positive’ conception of Nature underlies Aristotle’s ‘Teleology.’ Human Nature is a beautiful organism, and to be beautiful is its raison d’être. So a plant or animal is its own raison d’être; it performs the functions of its nature for the sake of maintaining that nature in perfection—a doctrine which was afterwards eagerly taken up by Plotinus: see *Enn.* v. 8. (vol. 2. p. 12, ed. Kirchhoff) Διὸ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ποθεῖνον ἔστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα τῷ καλῷ, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑράσιμον, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι. πότερον δὲ ποιήσαντι αὐτὸν τῷ χρῆ ζητεῖν, οὕτως τῆς φύσεως μᾶς;

b. 22. ὄριζεται γὰρ ἐκαστὸν τῷ τέλει] These words are placed by Imelmann (*Obs. Crit. in Arist. Eth. Nic.* p. 6) after τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἄνδρεῖαν with the approval of Rassow. I think they are better in
their old place, immediately after τοῦ ὀλίκου (i.e. καλόν) δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος, 1115 b. 22.

which they explain. The meaning is—'If ἀνθρεία ἢ καλόν, we may infer that its end is τὸ καλόν, for a thing is (i.e. is essentially as defined—ὁ ἐφήσται) what it is in relation to its τέλος.'

§§ 7-12.] Cf. ii. 7. 2, where the same complicated system of b. 24. extremes is exhibited, viz. :

1. excess of fear } constituting the δελός.
2. defect of confidence } 3. excess of confidence constituting the θρασύς.
4. defect of fear (or excess of fearlessness) constituting an ἀνόμομος.

The writer of E. E. iii. 1. 1228 a. 33 sqq., instead of distinguishing the ὑπερβάλλων τῇ ἀφοβῇ as ἀνόμομος from the θρασύς, simply says ὃ θρασύς . . . οἷος φοβείσθαι μὲν ἦττον ἢ δεῖ ταρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.


§ 10. ἐν ταῖς λύπαις] i.e. ἐν φόβοις. Excessive fear (generally 1116 a. 1. producing physical symptoms, see iv. 9. 2) is more manifest than defective confidence.

§ 13. ἐν οἷς εἴρηται] i.e. ἐν πολέμῳ. a. 11.

τὸ δ’ ἀποθεμένων φεύγοντες πενίαν κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle, Grant a. 12. remarks, 'does not sympathise with or discuss the sentimental deaths of the Cynic philosophers. Suicide was afterwards dignified by the
Such is Courage strictly so called; but five other kinds less strictly so called may be distinguished; and first, as resembling true courage most closely—

(1) The courage of the ordinary citizen. He faces danger because his city punishes and disgraces him if he does not, and honours him if he does. Hence 'courageous men' are most common in those cities in which cowardice is held in dishonour and courage in honour. This is the sort of courage which Homer portrays in Hector with his—'What will Polydamas think of me!' and in Diomedes with his—'What will Hector say!' It is like the true courage in so far as its motive is virtuous, i.e. shame and a wish to avoid disgrace and a desire for honour and glory. Under this head we may also bring the courage of those who are compelled by their commanding officers to face danger—a much inferior form, being actuated not by shame, but by bodily fear, by desire to avoid not disgrace but physical pain. This kind of courage to which a man is compelled is very far removed from that of the truly courageous man, who faces death under the inspiration of a glorious cause.

(2) The courage of experience: that of trained professional soldiers who know the risks of war (often more imaginary than real), and how to meet them with the greatest safety to themselves and loss to their adversaries. They go into battle knowing that they are likely to come out of it unhurt. If they are confronted by superior numbers, and see that there is real danger, they are the first to flee; whereas non-professional citizen troops prefer death to the disgrace of flight. Socrates, when he said that 'courage is knowledge,' seemed to identify true courage with this courage of experience; but the two are widely different.

(3) The courage of passion and spirit. This is the courage of wild beasts when they rush upon those who have wounded them, and of Homer's heroes when their 'blood boils,' and they 'breathe forth wrath through their nostrils.' The truly courageous man is indeed helped on by his passion and spirit, but the consciousness of the glorious significance of his achievement is his real motive, and guides him throughout, whereas passion and spirit are blind guides, and cannot supply a moral motive: their influence is that of mere feeling—of painful feeling, when one is angry, of pleasurable feeling, when one wreaks one's vengeance. If pleasure and pain were moral motives, then the ass, emboldened by the pain of hunger to graze on, in spite of blows, and the lover, risking all to enjoy his mistress, would be examples of true courage. True courage is not a thing of feeling, but of reason; nevertheless the courage of
of courage are distinguished, as spurious, from true courage is
concisely stated in E. E. iii. i. 1229 a. 12 ἔστι δὲ έδή ἄνθρεια πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ἀμοιοστασία τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά. The spring of action is different. In the case of true courage it is
the obligation which the perception of τὸ καλὸν lays upon the agent:
The source of each truly courageous act is the whole man, i. e. the
agent as a rational whole; whereas the seeming courageous acts
done κατὰ τοὺς πέντε τρόπους spring not from the whole man, but
from isolated feelings. It is the same difference as Kant marks
by the distinction between a formal principle and material grounds
of action.

These spurious forms are given in three different orders by
Aristotle, Eudemus, and the writer of the M. M. Eudemus (E. E.
i. 1229 a. 12 sqq.) has ἡ πολιτική—ἡ στρατιωτική (δὲ ἐμπείρια)—ἡ δὲ ἀπειρία καὶ ἄγνοια—ἡ κατ' ἐλπίδα—ἡ διὰ πάθος ἀλόγωτον οἰον δὲ ἔρωτα καὶ θυμὸν. The writer of the M. M. (i. 20. 1110 b. 21 sqq.) has
ἡ κατ' ἐμπείρια—ἡ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρία—ἡ διὰ τὰ πάθη, οἰον οἱ ἐρώτες οἱ οἱ ἐνθυσιάζοντες—ἡ δὲ αἰσχύνη τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ψυχῆς—ἡ δὲ ἐλπίδα.

πρώτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική, μάλιστα γὰρ ἔσοχεν] 'ideoque (γὰρ) a. 17.
obtainet primum locum.' Rams. 'This phrase (πολιτικὴ ἀνθρεία'),
says Grant, 'is to be found in Plato's Republic p. 430 C, where it
probably originates, but it is there used in a different sense from the present. Plato meant by the term "civil courage" to distinguish the true courage of a civilized man from all merely brutal instincts. Διόκησ χάρ μοι την άρθη δόξαν περι των αιτών τούτων δένεν παιδείας γεγονόν, την τε θηριώδη και άνθραποποιόδη, ουτε πάντα νόμμων ἠγείσθαι, ἄλλο τε τι ἡ άνδρείαν καλεῖν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, λέγεις. Ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τούτο ἀνδρείαν εἴναι. Καὶ χάρ ἀποδέχοντες, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, πολιτικὴ γε, καὶ ὀρθῶν ἀποδέξει. Aristotle meant by "civil courage" that daring which is prompted, not by an independent desire for the beautiful, but by a regard to reputation, and to the fame or disgrace and even punishment awarded by society to brave or cowardly actions respectively. It is scarcely necessary to add that the difference here between Plato and Aristotle is only about the use of a phrase. Aristotle is at one with Plato in regarding true ἀνδρεία as a habit acquired by the πολιτεία under the influence of νόμως. We can only say that he thinks fit to use the adjective πολιτικὴ in an inferior sense here, just as he does in E. N. i. 5. 4, where he makes the πολιτικὸς βίος one of the inferior lives, although man is φύσει πολιτικὸν ἔσον. The contrast between πολιτικὸς (ordinary citizens), and hired στρατιώται (§ 6 below), going out to battle, was doubtless in his mind when he wrote § 1, and probably induced him to give πολιτικὴ the sense which it bears here: cf. E. E. iii. i. 1229 a. 13, where πολιτικὴ and στρατιωτικὴ occur close together—Μία μὲν πολιτικὴ, αὕτη δ' εστίν, ἥ δ' αἰθῶ οὖσα. δεύτερα ἡ στρατιωτικῆ αὕτη δὲ δὲ ἐμπερίαν καὶ τὸ εἰθέναι. That the influence of νόμως, so carefully allowed for in Plato's definition of ἀνδρεία (Rep. 430) as δύναμις καὶ σωτηρία διὰ παινὸς δόξης ἀρθῆς τε καὶ νόμον δεινῶν πέρι καὶ μι, is fully taken account of in Aristotle's theory of ἡ ἀνδρεία ἡ διὰ τὸ καλὸν is proved, if it is necessary to quote special passages in support of what is involved in Aristotle's whole conception of the relation between the individual and the state—by Rhet. i. 9. 1366 b. 11 ἀνδρία δὲ δὲ ἢν πρακτικὸς εἶναι τῶν καλῶν σεμνῶν ἐν τοῖς κυνέουσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁ νόμος κελεύει καὶ ὑπηρετικὸ τῷ νόμῳ.

a. 23. § 2. Πουλυδάμας] Iliad xxii. 100.


a. 28. § 3.] Ramsauer, rightly I think, makes δὲ αἰθῶ γάρ parenthetical. This kind of courage resembles true courage more closely than the other forms do, because it is actuated by αἰθῶς, which, though not
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ἀρετή is akin to it, and contributes to it (see ii. 7. 14 ἡ γὰρ αἰσθᾶς 1116 a. 28. ἀρετή μὲν οὐκ ἐστι, ἐπανείπται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰθήμων: cf. iv. 9), and by a desire for τιμή, which though not τὸ καλόν, or the chief end (see i. 5. §§ 4. 5), is yet its 'guinea stamp,' and an object the moderate pursuit of which constitutes an ἀρετή (see iv. 4) which contributes to the attainment of the chief end.

§ 4. ἀναγκαζομένους] There are thus two kinds of πολιτική a. 30. ἀνδρεία: (1) ἡ δὲ αἰδᾶ, (2) ἡ δὲ ἀνάγκη καὶ φόβον. Grant refers to Phaedo 68 D, 'where Plato speaks of most men being courageous from a sort of cowardice'—τὸ δεδείναι καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσὶ πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι καίτω ἄτοπον γε δέει τυά καὶ δειλία ἀνδρείων εἰσι.

ὁ Ἑκτωρ] II. ii. 391. It is Agamemnon not Hector who a. 33. speaks. The lines are quoted again in Pol. iii. 9. 1285 a. 10 and attributed correctly to Agamemnon. See Zell's note.

§ 5. προστάτωντες] The reading apparently of all MSS., except a. 36. a 'Codex Pontificius,' which has the reading προστάτωντες accepted by Lamb., Vict., Coraes, and Susemihl. Προστάτωντες would mean 'posting in front;’ προστάτωντες, simply 'posting,' generally with dat. or adverb of place.

τύπτοντες] The commentators refer to Herod. vii. 223, where the Persian commanders at Thermopylae are said to have used whips. See Rawlinson's note (7) on the chapter, and note (8) on Herod. vii. 22 for the practice among the Persians and other Oriental nations.

§ 6. ἡ ἐμπειρία] See Laches 195, and Protag. 360, where b. 3. ἀνδρεία is defined as ἐπιστήμη or σοφία τῶν δεινῶν τε καὶ μή, and Protag. 350, where those who know the art of warfare are said to be bolder than those who do not (if the latter are bold they are not ἀνδρείοι but μαυρόμενοι)—in short οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μη ἐπισταμένων τοπαλέωτεροι εἰσι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπιδιόν μάθοσιν, ἡ πρὶν μαθεῖν. But as we have seen (note on iii. 6, §§ 1, 2), objections are raised in the Laches 199, to the definition ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μή, and 'the knowledge of good and evil,' with which ἀνδρεία is identified at the end of the dialogue, is something differing toto coelo from the ἐμπειρία of the professional (i.e. mercenary) soldier with which Aristotle very unfairly wishes to confound the Socratic ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν. Aristotle's unfair statement of the Socratic position, ' is
1116 b. 3. corrected,' Grant tells us, 'by Eudemus in his Ethics'—(E. E. iii. i. 1229 a. 15) ή στρατιωτική... δε εμπειριαν και το ειδεναι, ουχ δοστερ Σωκράτης ξηθα τα δεινα, αλλα δτι τας βοσβειας των δεινων. I fear that this 'correction' does not really amount to a fair treatment of the Socratic doctrine. Eudemus still wishes his readers to think that Socrates identified courage with στρατιωτικη εμπειρια, and therefore ought to have made it knowledge, not of τα δεινα, but of τας βοσβειαις των δεινων, for he says, E. E. iii. i. 1230 a. 4 παραπλησιω σε τοιους και ου τε εμπειριαν υπομενουντα τους κυνυνους, δουπετροπον σχεδον οι πλειονοι των στρατιωτικων ανθρωπων υπομενουν. αυτο γαρ τοινατιον ξει η δε οικο Σωκράτης, επιστήμην οιδομον ειναι την ανδρειαν. ουτε γαρ δια το ειδεναι τα φοβηρα βαρονουν οι επι τους ιστους αναβαινεσ επισταμενοι, αλλα δτι ισαι τας βοσβειας των δεινων ουτε δ' ο βαρβαλεστερον αγωνιζονται, τοιτο ανδρεια. και γαρ αν η ισχυς και ο πλοιος κατα Θεαγνου ανδρεια ειναι.

"πας γαρ ανηρ πενιη δεμημενος."

In this "correction," Grant tells us, 'by Eudemus in his Ethics'—(E. E. iii. i. 1229 a. 15) ή στρατιωτική... δε εμπειριαν και το ειδεναι, ουχ δοστερ Σωκράτης ξηθα τα δεινα, αλλα δτι τας βοσβειαις των δεινων. I fear that this 'correction' does not really amount to a fair treatment of the Socratic doctrine. Eudemus still wishes his readers to think that Socrates identified courage with στρατιωτικη εμπειρια, and therefore ought to have made it knowledge, not of τα δεινα, but of τας βοσβειαις των δεινων, for he says, E. E. iii. i. 1230 a. 4 παραπλησιω σε τοιους και ου τε εμπειριαν υπομενουντα τους κυνυνους, δουπετροπον σχεδον οι πλειονοι των στρατιωτικων ανθρωπων υπομενουν. αυτο γαρ τοινατιον ξει η δε οικο Σωκράτης, επιστήμην οιδομον ειναι την ανδρειαν. ουτε γαρ δια το ειδεναι τα φοβηρα βαρονουν οι επι τους ιστους αναβαινεσ επισταμενοι, αλλα δτι ισαι τας βοσβειας των δεινων ουτε δ' ο βαρβαλεστερον αγωνιζονται, τοιτο ανδρεια. και γαρ αν η ισχυς και ο πλοιος κατα Θεαγνου ανδρεια ειναι.

"πας γαρ ανηρ πενιη δεμημενος."

in use. See also Göller's note on Thucydides, iii. 30, where τὸ ιννη b. 7. καὶ τὸ πολέμου is proved to be the correct reading. The MSS. here (E. N. iii. 8. 6) vary hopelessly between κενά and καινά, and need not be considered. I think that καινά is to be preferred; it seems to be a more natural object for συνεφάκασιν than καινά.

§ 7. εἰτὰ] Their ἐμπείρια gives them confidence (1) as making b. 9. them aware of τὰ κενά τοῦ πολέμου, and (2) εἰτά, as making them skilful in the use of weapons, &c. See Grant's note on § 6.

§ 9. τὰ δὲ πολιτικά] the citizen troops.

τῷ Ἐρμαίῳ] The Ald. Schol. has the following—'Ερμαίοι εὖ b. 19. Κορωνεία τῆς Βωσίας τόπος οὕτω καλούμενος ἐστὶ πεδινὸς ἐν αὐτῇ, τῶν ἀλλῶν αναμάλων ὄντων· ἐν χ ὑποταγματίζων ποτὲ Κορωνεῖς τὸν τοὺς βοηθήσασιν αὐτοῖς στρατιώτατος ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχείου, μετὰ τῶν Βουιστρῶν ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατελάβον· καὶ τὴν Ἀκρόπολιν ἔχειν ύφι ἐντῷ ὏νομαρχος ὁ Φωκέως προδοθείμαν αὐτῷ ἀυτοὶ μὲν μείναντες ἀπεθάνων ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφί τοῦ ὕνομαρχον ἀποκλείσαντες τὰς πόλεις, ἦν αὐτοῖς μηδὲ βουλομένους ἐξεῖν φυγεῖν καὶ καταλείπειν τὴν πατρίδα. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν βοηθήσαντες αὐτοῖς στρατιώτατον ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχείου ἐφύγων εἴθες ἐν ἄρχῃ τῆς μάχης, αἰσθάμενοι ἦν τεθνάναι τῶν Βουιστρῶν Χίημα. Ἰστοροῦσι περὶ τῆς μάχης ταύτης Κεφισσόδωρος (Κηφισσόδωρ;?) ἐν τῇ δωδεκάτῃ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ἱέρου πολέμου, καὶ Ἀπαχμένης ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ τῶν περὶ Φιλίππων καὶ Ἐφορος ἐν τῇ τριάκοστῃ. 1 Cf. Zell's note on this scholium.

See Grote, Hist. of Greece pt. II, chap. 87, for the career of Onomarchus the Phocian. The date of the capture of Koroneia by him was B.C. 353 or 352.

§ 10. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν] θυμός in Plato is the Wille zum Leben—b. 23. that principle that manifests itself, not only in anger, but in tenacity of purpose, rivalry, pluck, push, and other forms of 'spirit.' Without its aid, λόγος would succumb. The λόγος of the state—its constitution, and institutions, must be maintained by 'public spirit' and 'patriotism,' against the selfishness of citizens, and the attacks of foreigners; the λόγος of the individual must be 'preserved and succoured' against the attacks of pleasure and pain, by 'strength of will'—succoured by θυμός against the insidious attacks of ἐπειθεία (see Rep. 441 A ἐν ψυχῇ . . . ἐστὶ τὸ θυμωδείς ἐπι-

1 I find this scholium (with a few verbal differences, and the words ιστοροῦσι . . . τριάκοστῇ omitted) on the margin of CCC. ad loc.
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1116 b. 23. καὶ τὸν λογιστικὸν φύσιν, and 440 A πολλαχοὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιαζοῦμεν τινὰ παρὰ τῶν λογισμῶν ἐπιθυμία, λοιποὺ οὗτος τε αὐτὸν καὶ δυμοῦμεν τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὅσπερ δυὸν στασιαζόντων εὐμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγαντίων τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιοῦτον), and preserved by it against the disturbing influence of fear (see Ῥεπ. 430 B δύναμι καὶ σωτηρία δίκης ὀρθῆς κ.τ.λ.). In Aristotle θυμός has the same fundamental meaning—spirit of independence, enterprise, patriotism, loyalty in national and individual character. Here indeed, as in the parallel passage Ῥ. E. iii. 1 (1229 a. 24 δѣ ὅργῃ καὶ θυμὸν ὠσαίτως, and 1229 b. 29 καὶ ὅλως ἡ ἐμπειρία ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμὸν ἐστίν, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ δὲ ἀλλὰ ἡ ἄνδρα ὑπομένουσιν καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονῆ ἔχει τινὰ μετ’ ἐλπίδος γὰρ ἐστὶ τιμωρίας), and in Ῥ. N. vii. 6, §§ 1–5, it is regarded chiefly in the light of its special manifestation—anger: but in Ἀστ. H. 6. 1327 b. 23 sqq. its fundamental meaning—spirit of enterprise, independence, patriotism, loyalty in national and individual character, is brought out very strongly—τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχρὸις τόποις ἐνθά καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐνθυπνή θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶν πλήρη, διανοιαὶ δὲ εὐθείατρα καὶ τέγνη, διόπερ εἰλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀπολιτεύεται δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἀρχεῖν οὐ δυνάμενα τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἀθανάτε δὲ, διόπερ ἀρχεῖν καὶ δουλεύεται διατέλει τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὀσπέρ μεσεύει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνθυμοῦ καὶ διανοητικὸν ἐστίν: ὀσπέρ εἰλεύθερον τὸ διατελεῖ καὶ δῦναμις πολιτεύμονον καὶ δυνάμενον ἀρχεῖν πάντως, μᾶς τυγχανόν πολιτείας. τὴν αὕτη δὲ ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐνθή [καὶ] πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τὴν ψυχὴν μονόκολον, τὰ δὲ ἐν [τε] κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν τούτων ὃτι δὲι διανοητικὸς τε εἶναι καὶ δυνομείδεις τὴν ψυχὴν τους μέλλοντας ἐναγώγους ἑσσάθη τὸ νομοθέτη πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν. ὀσπέρ γὰρ φασὶ τινὲς δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοὺς φύλαξίν, τὸ φιλητικὸν μὲν εἶνα τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτους ἄγριας, ὁ θυμὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν. αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ἀρχουμεν. σημείωσι δὲ πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀγνώτους, ἀλαγορεύθη τοιμίας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος προσηκότως τοῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλὸν διαλέγεται πρὸς τῶν θυμῶν

"εὐ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλον ἀπαγχεῖαν."

καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πάσων ἀρχικῶν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνότητον ὁ θυμὸς.

BOOK III: CHAP. 8: §§ 10–12. 297

"Ομηρος] Zell and the other editors note that the first quotation is from II. iv. 151, or xvi. 529; the second from II. v. 470; and the third from Od. xxiv. 318. The fourth does not occur in Homer at all. Theocritus 20. 15 (later than Aristotle) has ἔμωι δ' ἰδφαρ ἐξεσεν αἴμα, and in Probl. ii. 26. 869 a. 5 we find ὁ θυμός ἔσεσ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐστὶν τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν. Coraes compares Soph. O. C. 434 ὅπερικ' ἔξει θυμός, κ.τ.λ.

§ 11. ὁ δ' θυμῶς συνεργεῖ αὐτῶς] cf. below § 12 φυσικωτάτη δ' θυμός. There is a natural alliance between θυμός and λόγος: see Plato, Rep. 441. θυμός is an active principle which sides with λόγος, the principle of order, against the mere passions of the sensibility—the pleasures and pains: Cf. E. N. vii. 6, §§ 1–5, where it is argued that ἀκρασία θυμοῦ is not so bad as ἀκρασία ἐπιθυμιῶν, because θυμός is, at least, loyal to λόγος, whereas ἐπιθυμία is ἐπίζουλος. There is thus a special reason for confining the remark συνεργεῖ αὐτῶς to θυμός: but Eudemus, looking at the matter from a slightly different point of view, is also right in recognising the material value to true courage of all the feelings—shame, anger, hope, &c. which inspire the various forms of spurious courage—E. E. iii. 1. 1229

BOOK III: CHAP. 8: § 12.

1117 a. 4. τοῦ θυμοῦ: δῆττεν γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἀριστα μάχονται: E. N. vii. 6. 2 ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικότερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμίων κ.τ.λ. θυμὸς in short represents the natural man—those inherited qualities of constitution which supply the rough material to be shaped by education into the form of virtue. Cf. Rep. 410 D καὶ μήν, ἢν 8' εἴγω, τὸ γε ἀγριον τὸ θυμοεῖδες ἀν τῆς ψύσεως παρέχωτο, καὶ ὀρθὸς μὲν τραφέν ἀνδρεῖον ἄν εἴη.

προσλαβόσα προαιρέσει] θυμὸς is one of the forms of ὀρέξει. This ὀρέξει must become βουλευτική.

a. 5. καὶ τὸ οὖ ἐνεκα] i. e. τὸ καλὸν, cf. E. E. iii. i. 1230 a. 27 ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γε ἄρετή προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἰρήται πρότερον, ὅτι ἐκα τίνος πάντα αἱρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὖ ἐνεκα, τὸ καλὸν), δήλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἄρετή τις οὖσα ἐνεκα τίνος ποιήσει τὸ φιλότητα ἐπιμενεῖ, δοσ' οὔτε δὲ ἀγριαν (ὁρθὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κράτει) οὔτε δὲ ἢδονήν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλὸν. θυμὸς then is a principle which naturally lends itself, if cultivated rightly, to the performance of daily. It is an active principle which makes a man scorn the passive life of submission to pleasures and pains.

a. 6. ὄργινόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δὲ ἢδοναι] But, if uncultivated, θυμὸς manifests itself chiefly as anger—a pain hungering for the pleasure of personal revenge. It thus ceases to be the ally of λόγος, and becomes an ἐπιθυμία opposed to it. Cf. E. E. iii. i. 1229 b. 31 καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἢδονὴν ἔχει των μὲν ἐλπίδος γὰρ ἐστι τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὁμοὶς οὐκ' εἰ δια ταύτην οὐτ' εἰ δὲ ἀλλην ἢδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τῶν θάνατων ἡ φυσὴ μεζίωνον λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δύκαςιν (ἀν) ἀνδρείος λέγοτο τούτων. Cf. Rhet. ii. 2. 1378 b. 1 (referred to by Fritzsche in his note on the above passage) καὶ πάση ὁργῇ ἐπεσθαί τινα ἢδονὴν τήν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι ἢδονὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οίκεσθαι τεύχεσθαι ὃν ἐφιέστα, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεστα αὐτῷ, ὃ δὲ ὁργιζόμενος ἐφίεσται δυνατῶν αὐτῷ. διὸ καλὸς εἰρήται περὶ θυμοῦ ὃς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μελίτος καταλεξημένοι ἀνдрῶν ἐν στίβεσθαι αἴέτει.

a. 7. διὰ ταύτα] i. e. λύπην (ἀλγοῦσι) and ἢδονὴν (ἡδοναί). Pain and pleasure are subjective springs of action (πάθη). Moral action must be actuated by reverence for the objective law of duty (τὸ καλὸν) apprehended by reason.

a. 8. οὖ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν ὁδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος] sc. κελεύει, cf. E. E. iii. i.
BOOK III: CHAP. 8: §§ 12–16.

1229 a. 1 ἠ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἄκολουθος τῷ λόγῳ ἔστιν, ὅ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν 1117 a. 8. αἱρέωθην κελεύει.

Rassow (Forsch. pp. 29, 30) omits (with Kb, Ob, and CCC) the sentence οὗ δὴ ἐστιν ἀνδρεία . . . κἀκεῖνον at the beginning of § 12 (it is probably a ditto graph of the similar clause in § 11. 1116 b. 33, 35); places the sentence φυσικοτάτη . . . ἀνδρεία εἶναι after τι at the end of § 12, 1117 a. 9; and reads δὲ (with Mb, Ob) instead of δὴ after καὶ οἱ ἀνθρώποι 1117 a. 6. He adds that the words καὶ οἱ μοιχαὶ . . . δρᾶσιν § 11 ought perhaps to be struck out. They are out of place in a context relating to τὰ θηρία, and anticipate the transition made by the words καὶ οἱ ἀνθρώποι δὲ.

§ 13. μηθεὶν ἄν ποιεῖν] Perhaps we should read μηθεὶν ἄν ἀντιπαθεῖν. a. 14. The MSS. have μηθεὶν ἀντιπαθεῖν.

§ 14. μεθυσκόμενοι] Zell quotes Prob. A. I. 955 a. 1 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίσω εἰς μέθυν πάντες ἔχουσιν προβιβάμος, ὅτι πάντας ὃ οἶνος ὃ πολὺς ἐγελπίδαις ποιεῖ, καθὰπερ ἢ νεότης τοὺς παιδας· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γύρας δύσελπι ἐστιν, ὡ δὲ νεότης ἐγελπίδος πλῆρης.

§ 15. διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] The courage of the sanguine man is the result of temporary feeling; he is elated by a perhaps groundless hope of victory. But the truly courageous man is actuated by steady principle. His nature is such that the law of duty is always before his eyes. Hence (διὸ) you may take him on a sudden without discomposing him. His courage will be ready on the shortest notice, because it is himself, not a passing mood.

ἀπὸ ἐξεις γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢν, ὅτι ἤττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς] This is a. 19. Bywater’s reading for the ἀπὸ ἐξεις γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. of Lb Mb accepted by Bekker. Kb, Ob, CCC, and Cambr. have μᾶλλον ἢ διὶ ἤττων. I am not sure that the imp. ἢν is in place here. I would suggest ἀπὸ ἐκς ἐξεις γὰρ μᾶλλον εἶναι, ὅτι ἤττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς.

§ 16. εἰσίν οὗ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων] Because their hope blinds a. 23. the sanguine to the real nature of the danger which they encounter.

ἀξίωμα] Those who do not know (οἰ ἄγνοοιντες) are, however, a. 24. inferior to the sanguine in not having that opinion of their own superiority which the latter have. Ἀξίωμα is here the superior value which the sanguine attach to themselves, as persons likely to prevail: cf. E. N. iv. 3. 12, where τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψίχον ἀξίωμα is the
superior value which the \( \mu \gamma \varepsilon \alpha \lambda \omega \psi \nu \chi \omicron \sigma \) assigns to himself—\( \mu \gamma \alpha \lambda \omega \nu \) \( \alpha \omicron \tau \omicron \nu \ \alpha \xi \iota \omicron \ \alpha \gamma \omicron \omicron \sigma \)  

The editors refer to Xen. Hell. iv. 4. 10 for this incident, which occurred in the battle (B.C. 392) at the Long Walls of Corinth, between the Argians, Corinthians, and Athenian mercenaries who held Corinth, and the Corinthian exiles aided by Lacedaemonians and Sikyonians. 'The Argians,' says Grote (Hist. of Greece pt. II, chap. 75), 'bold from superior numbers attacked and broke the Sikyonians, tearing up the palisade, and pursuing them down to the sea with much slaughter: upon which Pasimachus the Lacedaemonian commander of cavalry, coming to their aid, caused his small body of horsemen to dismount and tie their horses to trees, and then armed them with shields taken from the Sikyonians inscribed on the outside with the letter \( \sigma \gamma \alpha \) (\( \Sigma \)). With these he approached on foot to attack the Argians, who, mistaking them for Sikyonians, rushed to the charge with alacrity.'

Eudemus (E.E. iii. i. 1230 a. 16 sqq.) thus sums up his discussion of the spurious forms of courage—

\[ \gamma \alpha \tau \omicron \nu \\]
CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

We have said that Courage is concerned with feelings of confidence, and with feelings of fear: but it is with the latter more than with the former that it is concerned: for fear is painful, and it is harder and more praiseworthy to bear pain than to abstain from pleasure. But though the exercise of courage is surrounded by circumstances of pain, yet the end is sweet, as the garland is sweet for the athlete, though the contest be painful. The courageous man endures death and wounds for the sake of glorious achievement in war. It would be absurd however to say that he rejoices in death and wounds: he endures them as pains, and the more complete his excellence, and the happier his life, the greater pains are they to him: life is so well worth living, and he has to look forward to the loss of so much. But he is all the more courageous that he gives up so much for glory in war: his courage realises in the most perfect way the type of those strenuous virtues which taste pleasure only in laying hold of the end. But, although he is thus the bravest of men, perhaps a less brave man, with nothing to lose, might make a more useful soldier, being ready to risk his life for a small remuneration.

§ 1. μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβηρά] So, as Ramsauer notes, σωφρονῶν 1117 a. 30. is ἤγγοι περὶ τὰς λύπας (iii. 10. 1), and ἀλευθερωτής ἴσ μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ δόσει (iv. 1. 1).

§ 2.] δικαίως ἐπανεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Cf. ii. 3. 10 περὶ a. 34. δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βελτιον ἐν τούτῳ.

§ 3. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειν ἐν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, a. 35. ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλων δὲ ἀρανίζεθαι] The ἡδονὴ which the courageous man experiences in realising his end is not a pleasurable feeling, but an ideal satisfaction. Pleasurable feeling cannot coexist with painful feeling; but ideal satisfaction may. As Professor Jowett says in his Introduction to the Gorgias—Plato does not ‘mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the Protagoras, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the Phaedo. What then is his meaning? And what is the value of his method? His
meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few. He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only because we believe that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their enemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found in a few instances to do what is right, without reference to public opinion or to consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground only, much as Socrates' friends are described as regarding him in the opening of the Phaedo; or as was said of another, "they looked upon his face as upon the face of an angel." We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility, or by the rules of logic, but merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better part of human nature.'

b. 4. *εἴπερ σάρκινοι*] Grant translates (rightly I think) 'the blows . . . are painful and grievous to flesh and blood,' following Lambinus, who has *cum ex carne content*. Michelet rejects this rendering for *praesertim si multa praediti sint carne*, referring to *de Anima* ii. ii. 423 b. 22 where flesh is said to be the medium of touch—*δήλων ἃτι ἐντὸς τὸ τῶν ἄπτου αἰσθητικών. οὔτω γὰρ ἄν συμβαίνοι ἐπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτυθέμενοι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητήριοις οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτυθεμένων αἰσθάνεται· ὡστε τὸ μεταζύ τοῦ ἀπτικοῦ ή σάρξ.*

b. 5. *διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ . . . φαίνεται ἐχειν*] The ideal satisfaction—'the Idea of Happiness,' is apt to be lost in the crowd of painful feelings.

b. 7. *§§ 4, 5.*] In these sections self-sacrifice is praised in a manner which we shall do well to keep in mind when we examine Aristotle's account of *μεγαλοψυχία*. *Quid μεγαλόψυχος the εὐδαίμων seems to be devoted to his own εὐδαιμονία: but quid ἀνδρεῖος he is ready joyfully to surrender it. See Grant's interesting note, in
which Aristotle's ἀνδρεία, ἦ μᾶλλον ζήν ἄξιον is compared with 1117 b. 7. Wordsworth's 'Happy Warrior'—' more brave for this, that he hath much to love.'

§ 5. οὖ δὴ . . . ἐφάπτεται] sc. τις. 'The deep moral pleasure,' b. 15. says Grant (Ethics, Essay IV, vol. i. p. 226), 'which attaches to noble acts, Aristotle describes as triumphing even over the physical pain and outward horror which may attend the exercise of courage. And he acknowledges that in many cases this may be the only pleasure attending upon virtuous actions.'

Of course τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν stand in a somewhat exceptional position, as compared with τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. They are painful in a sense in which other virtuous actions are not. Other virtuous actions indeed imply a restraint put upon inclination; but when once the moral character has been formed, they are no longer painful: and some of them are even in themselves (i.e. as distinguished from their ends) pleasant, e.g. τὰ κατὰ τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν are themselves pleasant to the connoisseur (ἔπιστήμων) who performs them. Τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν however are not thus in themselves pleasant. They are so painful that it is only the man who has the strongest interest in the chief end, who will bring himself to perform them. Aristotle thus gives due prominence in his account of ἀνδρεία to the struggle which some have represented as essential to morality. But we must not allow ourselves to be misled by his remarks here. He is not one of those who make a struggle essential to morality. On the contrary, morality with him is perfect adaptation to environment: accordingly, we find him in his accounts of the other virtues dwelling on the ease and pleasure with which the good man acts. But the other virtues are concerned with life, and may well result in pleasant actions; whereas ἀνδρεία shows itself in the presence of death. It necessarily involves acts which are painful, as breaking with life. Its grandeur is enhanced, in proportion as the life or adaptation which it calls a man away from, is the more perfect. It is perhaps a defect in Aristotle's system that it does not recognise any other virtues, except ἀνδρεία, which call a man away from the brilliant everyday life of which the μεγαλόψυχος is the ideal ornament: e.g. Aristotle's good man is never required to give up his brilliant career, in order to help the outcasts of society. As it is, it is only here in this passage, in reference to the ἀνδρεία of the man ἦ μᾶλλον ζήν ἄξιον,
that we find Aristotle deeply touched by the sublimity and pathos of that struggle between inclination and duty, which impressed Kant so powerfully, and is celebrated by him in so many passages full of lyrical fervour.

§ 6. οπρατιώτας] i.e. mercenaries: μή goes with the subject τούς τουίτους, and κρατίστους οπρατιώτας is predicate.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

Next in order comes Temperance, the excellence of the other subdivision of the irrational part of the soul. It is, as we have said, a mediocrity in relation to pleasures, and (though to a less extent) to pains; and profligacy is related to the same pleasures and pains.

To what special pleasures then is Temperance related? Pleasures may be distinguished as bodily and mental. Mental pleasures are those which affect the mind without affecting the body, such as the pleasure of being esteemed, of acquiring knowledge, of listening to wonderful tales, of hearing oneself talk, and of gossip. It is not in relation to any of these pleasures that we speak of men being temperate or profligate. The man, e.g., who likes to hear himself talk is a bore, but not a profligate. Accordingly, it is with bodily pleasures that Temperance will be concerned; but not with all of them—not with the pleasures of the eye, as such: e.g. a man is not temperate or profligate by reason of the pleasure he takes in painting, although there is undoubtedly a right way of liking pictures, as there are wrong ways—nor with the pleasures of the ear: we do not speak of those who are too much addicted to music and the theatre as profligate, or of those who like them in moderation as temperate—nor with the pleasures of smell, except by association: thus there is no profligacy or intemperance in being very fond of the scent of flowers, but there is in being very fond of the odours of the perfume bottle and the dinner table. Profligate, gluttonous persons like these odours because they remind them of the things they lust after. Even people who are not gluttonous like the smell of food when they are hungry; but gluttonous persons like it without being hungry. This associated pleasure is the only pleasure which the lower animals derive from the senses of sight, hearing, and smell. The dog likes the smell, because it suggests the taste, of the hare which he tracks; the lion rejoices when he hears the lowing of the ox and knows that it is near and may soon be eaten; the roe deer, or wild goat, pleases his eye with the prospect of food. Temperance and profligacy then are concerned with those pleasures which the lower animals share with man—servile and brutish pleasures, it would thus appear. These are the pleasures of touch and taste—although taste, properly so called, i.e. the
The discrimination of flavours, as exemplified by the wine-taster, or the chef, is not what the gluttonous person takes much, or any, pleasure in. His pleasure is in the purely tactual enjoyment which is common to swallowing meat and drink. Thus a certain gourmand wished that his throat were as long as a crane's, showing thereby that his pleasure was tactual. Profligacy then being related to touch, which is the most general or elementary of all the senses, and belongs to man, not as man, but as animal, is justly held to be a disgraceful and brutish vice. Certain finer tactual pleasures must however be distinguished from those to which profligacy, or intemperance, is related. Profligacy, or intemperance, has to do only with the tactual pleasures of certain definite organs: not e.g. with the pleasure of a skin glowing under the hand of the rubber in the gymnasium.

§ 1. perì σωφροσύνης] See E. E. iii. 2 and M. M. i. 21. 'Σω- 1117 b. 23. φροσύνη,' says Grant, 'which in spite of the false etymology given in Plato's Cratylus 411 E [σωτηρία φρονήσεως] and Eth. vi. 5. 5 [ός σφόξουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν] meant originally "sound mindedness" (in German, Besonnenheit), soon came to mean temperance with regard to pleasures. In this sense it is often popularly defined by Plato, cf. Rep. 430 E κόσμος πού τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμίων ἑγκρατεία. Symposium. p. 196 C εἶναι γὰρ ὀμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν, &c.' See also Charm.

The same tendency which appeared in Aristotle's treatment of ἀνδρεία appears in his treatment of σωφροσύνη—the tendency to narrow the reference of a term which Plato, in accordance with popular usage, employed with a wider meaning. Σωφροσύνη in the Republic is good sense and good feeling, resulting in moderation in all things; and is especially viewed as a communis sensus, or ὀμόσωσι unifying the various classes of the state in peace and contentment under an established system of government (Rep. 432). But Aristotle limits the meaning of the term to moderation in respect of certain bodily pleasures. Σωφροσύνη, from being, in the Republic, a virtue with as distinct a social reference as δικαιοσύνη itself, thus becomes, in the Ethics, the most strictly personal of all the virtues.

Ramsauer suspects these words. As they stand, they seem to indicate a plan upon which Aristotle arranges the ἄρεται in order. He begins with the two ἄρεται specially associated with the two subdivisions of the ἄλογος φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς, μετέχουσα μέτωπο τῆς λόγου—viz. :—θυμός and ἐπιθυμία. It is true that the other ἔθικαι ἄρεται, as well as ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, consist in the regulation of ἄλογα πάθη having their
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117 b. 23. origin in θυμός or ἐπιθυμία: but ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη are specially associated with these parts, being the regulation of their most characteristic manifestations—those manifestations, namely, which are common to man and brutes, and may, as owing nothing to social influences, be deemed ἀλογα in a more thorough sense than such passions as a desire for other people's money, or a desire for honour, which are called into existence by social influences. On the other hand, if the divisions of the ἀρετικῶν μέρος were in Aristotle's mind, 'Why,' as Grant asks, 'does he not begin with σωφροσύνη, since θυμός is higher than ἐπιθυμία (Eth. vii. 6) ? ' I am inclined, after all, to think with Grant that 'Aristotle probably began his list of the virtues with courage and temperance, because they were two of the Greek cardinal virtues'; and to follow Susemihl in attaching great weight to Ramsauer's suggestion that the words δοκοῦσι γὰρ . . . αἱ ἀρεταὶ are interpolated.

b. 25. εἶρηται] ii. 7. 3.

b. 26. ἤττου γὰρ καὶ οὖχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας] The article before λύπας (cf. ii. 7. 3 περὶ ἡδωνάς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὖ πάσας, ἤττου δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας) limits the reference to the pains caused by the absence of the pleasures: cf. below iii. 11. 5.

b. 28. διηρήθωσαν] cf. x. 5, where ἡδωναί are distinguished according to the ἐνέγρεια which they attend.

b. 29. ἐκάτεροι] i. e. ὁ φιλότιμος and ὁ φιλομαθής.

b. 30. τούτων χαίρει] Scaliger's conjecture τούτῳ is probably correct.

1118 a. 1. § 3.] See Theoph. Char. xxii. (iii) περὶ ἀδολεσχίας, and xxiii. (vii) περὶ λαλίας, and xxiv. (viii) περὶ λογοποίους.

a. 9. § 5. κατὰ συμβεβηκός] i. e. 'by association.'

a. 13. §§ 6, 7, 8.] Cf. de Sensu 5, where two kinds of ὀσμαί are distinguished, (1) those which are correlated with the various χυμαί, and have therefore τὸ ἦδο καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, or by association. (These are the ὀσμαί with which the ἀκόλαστος is said in E. N. iii. 10. 6 to be concerned κατὰ συμβεβηκός.) They are associated with τροφή and τὸ βρεττικὸν μέρος, and so become indirectly objects of ἐπιθυμία. When the desire for food has been satisfied, these ὀσμαί no longer give pleasure. (2) Those ὀσμαί which are pleasant καθ' αὐτός, e.g. the scent of flowers. They do not invite us to eat, nor do they stimulate any desire. The pleasure
derived from such ὀςμαί is peculiar to man, whereas that of ὀςμαί 1118 a. 13. associated with tastes is common to him with the brutes; see de Sensu 5. 443 b. 16 ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ δύο ἐστιν' οὐ γὰρ ὀσφερ τινὲς φασιν, οὐκ ἐστιν εἰδὴ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἐστιν. διαφορεῖν δὲ πῶς ἐστι καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἐστιν τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς χυμοὺς τεταγμένον αὐτῶν, ὀσφερ ἐστομεν, καὶ τὸ ἥδυ καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχουσιν διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ πάθη εἶναι, ἐπιθυμοῦσιν μὲν ἡδείαν αἱ ὀςμαί τούτων εἰσί, πεπληρομένοις δὲ καὶ μηδὲν δεομένοις οὐχ ἡδείαν, οὐδὲ τούτως, ὡστε αὐτὰ μὲν, καθάπερ ἐστομεν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχουσι τὸ ἥδυ καὶ λυπηρόν, διὸ καὶ πάντων εἰσί καὶ τῶν φῶν 

We may say that σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία are concerned with those ἡδοναὶ which Plato distinguishes as πληρῶσεις τῆς ἐνδειας, or ἀπαθαγαλαί λύπης, from the καθαραί ἡδοναί: see note on x. 3. 7, for quotations from Ῥεπ. 584 B, and Philebus 51 B, where Plato distinguishes these two kinds of ἡδοναί. The οἶνον χρώματι καὶ σχήμασι of Ῥ. ὀ. iii. 10. 3 may be an echo of the τὰς περὶ τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα of Philebus 51 B. The τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείωτας of Philebus 51 B shows that the distinction marked by Aristotle's κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ καθ' ἀυτὰς was present to Plato's mind. The following passage in Μ.Μ. ii. 7. 1205 b. 20–28 may be compared as giving very clearly this distinction between ἡδοναί, which is the psychological ground upon which Aristotle proceeds in determining the proper sphere of σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία—ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ καθυπατήματι τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκώς, οἶνον καθυπατήματι μὲν αἱ ἐξ ἐνδειαῖς ἀναπληρῶσει, καθεστηκώς δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τῆς ακοῆς καὶ τῶν τουτών οὕτως, βελτίως ἄν ἔπησαν αἱ καθεστηκώς τῆς φύσεως ἐνέργειας αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ κατ' ἀμφοτέρους λεγόμεναι τῶν τρόπων ἐνέργειαι εἰσὶν· διὸ τὸ μὲν ὅτι αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδοναὶ καὶ τῆς ακοῆς καὶ τοῦ διανοιαίθαι βελτίστατα ἄν ἔπησαν, ἐπεὶ αἱ γε σωματικὰ ἐξ ἀναπληρώσεως.
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1118 a. 18.  § 7. oúk ξετί δὲ οὐδ' . . . συμβεβηκός] Zell refers to Problematum KH. 7, 950 a. 9 oúdōn δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πέντε, τά τε ἄλλα ξορά ἀπὸ δύο μοῖχων τῶν προερχόμενων ἤδη, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἄλλας ἡ ὁλος οὐχ ἤδεται κατὰ συμβεβηκός τούτο πάσχει. ὦρων μὲν γὰρ ὁ ὅρων, ἡ καὶ ὀσφραυώμενος, χαίρει ὅτι ἀπολαίει καὶ ὅταν πληροθῇ, οὔδε τὰ τοιαῦτα ἥδεα αὐτῷ, ὀσπερ οὔδε ἡμῶν ἢ τοῦ ταρίχου ἄδημη, ὅταν ἄδημ ἐχωμεν τοῦ φυγείν. ὅταν δὲ ἐνδειξ ὄμεν, ἡδεία, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ρόδου ἄεὶ ἡδεία.  Cf. E. E. iii. 2.1230 b. 36 ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα, περὶ ἄπερ καὶ τὰλλα ἐνέργεια μοῖχον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικός ἔχοντα, καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυποῦμενα, περὶ τὰ γενετὰ καὶ ἀπάτα. περὶ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἥδεα σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἀπαντα φαίνεται ανακαθήτοι διακείμενα, οὖν περὶ εὐαρµοστίαν ἡ ἀκόλ. οὔθεν γὰρ, ὡς καὶ δέξιων λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἡ τῇ ἀκοπαίει τῶν εὐαρµοστίων, εἰ μὴ τί που συμβεβηκέρει περιτώδες. ἀλλ' οὔθεν πρὸς τὰ εὐώδη ἡ διοικότη· καίτοι τάς γε αἰσθήσεις ἀξιωτέρας ἔχουσι πάσας. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὀρμῶν ταύτας χαίροντων ὅσα κατὰ συμβεβηκός εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς.

I agree with Grant in thinking that this view according to which 'brutes have no pleasure of hearing or smell or sight except accidental ones, namely when sounds or scents indicate to them their prey or their food' is questionable. Some animals seem to derive pleasure from music.¹ A dog will sit for an hour at a time at a window looking with evident pleasure and interest at people and vehicles passing in the street. As for his pleasures of smell, which engross so much of his attention, they are obviously so different from any with which our less developed sense makes us acquainted, that it would be rash to say that they are all κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Indeed the presumption is in favour of many of them being καθ' αὐτάς. That a dog experiences ψυχικά ἡδονάι, such as those of friendship, performance of duty, and vanity, is pretty obvious.

a. 18.  αἱ κόνες] Giphanius notes that κόνων and canis are feminine when hunting is concerned. Aristotle tells us that the female Laconian hounds were better than the males; see Hist. Anim. ix. i. 608 a. 27 αἱ Δάκαναι κόνες αἱ δήλεται εὐφραίνουσι τῶν ὀρέπον εἰσὶν.

a. 22.  ὁμώος δ' οὖδ' ἔδω ἢ [ἐφῶν] ἕλαφον] οὐδ' ἔδων = οὔδε τῇ ὑφῆι (cf. οὔδε ταῖς ὁμώοις, and οὐδὲ τῇ φωνῇ above); and ἡ εὐρών is added

¹ Coraes calls attention to Pol. Θ. 6, where Aristotle himself admits that brutes have some appreciation of music: 1341 a. 13.
because he (or an interpolator, according to Sus. and Byw.) is 1118 a. 22. thinking of Iliad iii. 23

§ 8. ὁδ**εν ἀνδραποδῶδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται] Zell quotes a. 25. Prob. KH. 2. 949 b. 6 διὰ τί κατὰ δύο μόνος αἰσθήσεις ἀκρατεῖς λέγομεν, οἶον ἄφην καὶ γεύσιν; ἢ διὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τοὺς ἄνθρωπος γνωμένας ἡδονὰς ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴους; ἢ τίνα κανεὶς ἀπηγοτάται εἰσὶν, διὸ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ μόνα ἐπονείδστοι εἰσίν, ὡσεὶ τὸν ὑπὸ τούτων ἔτομον ἄληθεν καὶ ἀκρατῇ καὶ ἀκόλουθον εἶναι φαινεῖ, διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν χειρίστων ἡδονῶν ἔτησαίς.

ἄφη] Touch is the fundamental sense in all animals; see de a. 26. Anima ii. 2. 413 b. 4 αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πάσας ἄφη. δόσσερ δὲ τὸ θρησκευτικὸν δύναται χορηγῆσαι τῆς ἄφης καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἢ ἄφη τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. θρησκευτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μάριν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ καὶ τὰ φυσίμενα μετέχειν τὰ δὲ ζώα πάντα φαίνεται τὰν ἀντικήν αἰσθήσιαν ἐγκοστα.

Touch is necessary to the preservation of the animal. Sounds and colours and smells do not feed the animal. That which feeds it must touch it immediately. The touch of food is taste. Taste accordingly is correlated with τὸ θρησκευτικὸν μέρος, see de Anima iii. 12. 434 b. 11 ἔπει γὰρ τὸ ζῷον σώμα ἔμψυχον ἐστι, σώμα δὲ ἄπαν ἄπτον, ἄπτων δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἄφη, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τοῦ ζῷου σώμα ἄπτικον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει σῴζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον. αἱ γὰρ ἀλλαὶ αἰσθήσεις δὲ ἐτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἶον ἄσφρεσεις ὅψις ἀκοῆς ἀπόκεινες νεοῖ, εἰ μὴ ἐξεῖ αἰσθήσιον, οὖ δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν φεύγειν τὰ δὲ λαβεῖν. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ, ἀδύνατον ἔσται σῴζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον. διὸ καὶ ἡ γεύσις ἐστὶν δόσσερ τῇ τροφῆς γὰρ ἐστιν, ἢ δὲ τροφῆ τὸ σώμα τὸ ἄπτων. ψυφὸς δὲ καὶ χρώμα καὶ ώσμή ὡς τρέψει, οὔδὲ ποιεῖ ὡς ἄλλη ἄλλη ἄλλη. ὡσεὶ καὶ τήρ γεύσις ἀνάγκη ἄφην εἶναι τιμη, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἄπτου καὶ θρησκευτικοῦ αἰσθήσιον εἶναι αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαίαν τῷ ζῷῳ, καὶ φανερῶν ὅτι οἷον ὁ ἄνευ ἄφην εἶναι ζῷον. αἱ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ τοῦ εὖ ἑκαῖν καὶ γείων ἥδη οὐ τῷ τυχόντι, ἀλλὰ τισίν, οἶον τῷ πορευτικῷ ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν εἰ γὰρ μέλλει σῴζεσθαι, οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἀπόκεινες αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποθεῖν. Cf. de Sensu i. 436 b. 10 Τοῖς δὲ ζῴοις, ἢ μὲν ζῷον ἐκαστὸν, ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχει αἰσθήσιαν τούτων γὰρ τὸ ζῷον εἶναι καὶ μὴ ζῷον διαφέρειν. ἢ ἀδίκα ο ἡδη καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἢ μὲν ἄφη καὶ γεύσις ἀκολούθη τὰς εἰς ἀνάγκης, οὐ μὲν ἄφη διὰ τὴν εἰρήμενην αὐτὰν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, οὐ δὲ γεύσις διὰ τὴν τροφὴν τὸ γὰρ ἢδυ διακρίνει καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν αὐτῇ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, ὡστε τὸ μὲν φεύγειν τὸ δὲ διώκει, καὶ ὅπως ὁ χυμός ἐστι τοῦ θρησκευτικοῦ μορίου πάθος. Αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐξωθεὶν αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῖς πορευτικοῖς αὐτῶν, οἶον ἄσφρεσες καὶ ἀκοῆ καὶ
§ 9 τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὖθεν χρῆσθαι] With the pleasures derived from the various flavours which γεύσει perceives as distinct (and it is with these that γεύσει in the strict sense is concerned—
tῆς γὰρ γεύσεως ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν) the ἀκόλαστος has not directly
to do. Γεύσει, the perception of flavours, stands to the mere sensa-
tion of throat-touch, with which the ἀκόλαστος has directly to do,
in much the same relation in which the smell of food stands to its
taste; and, although certain χυμοὶ may, like certain ὀσμαὶ, be desired
cατὰ συμβεβηκός by the ἀκόλαστος, yet roughly the remark of Eu-
demus is true that ἀκολούθια is not concerned with the pleasures of the
tip of the tongue, but with those of the throat: E. E. iii. 2. 1231 a. 12 ἐπὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν ὕπερ πάσαν ἰδιωμὴ ἐπτόηται τὰ θηρία,
οὐδὲ ὅσον τῷ ἀκρῷ τῆς γλώσσης ἡ αἰσθήσις, ἀλλὰ ὅσον τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ
ἀυτὸν ἀφῆν μᾶλλον ἢ γεύσει τὸ πάθος. διὸ οἱ ψυχοφάγοι οὐκ εὔχονται τὴν
gλώσσαν ἐχειν μικρῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν φάρυγγα γεράνων, ὅσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ
Ἐρύξιδος. ὡστε περὶ τὰ ἀπόμενα, ἀν ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, θετέων τὴν ἀκο-
λοασία.

With τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν may be compared
de An. ii. 10. 422 b. 10 τὰ δ’ εἰδὴ τῶν χυμῶν, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χρω-
μάτων, ἀπλὰ μὲν τάνατσα, τὸ γλυκὸ καὶ τὸ πικρὸν, ἐχομένα δὲ τοῦ μὲν τὸ
λιπαρὸν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἄλμηρον μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων τὸ τε δριμύ καὶ τὸ αὐstinηρὸν
cαι στρυφφῶν καὶ δεξι’ σχέδων γὰρ αὐτὰ δοκοῦν εἶναι διαφορά χυμῶν.
ὡστε τὸ γευστικόν ἐστὶ τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, γευστὸν δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐπε-
λεξεῖα αὐτοῦ.

a. 32. § 10. ψυχοφάγος] His name, Philoxenus, is given in the passage
E. E. iii. 2. 1231 a. 16 quoted above, and in the present passage is
supplied by Nlb, Ob, Ald, Kb, CCC, NC, Cambr., and other MSS.: also in
Prob. KH. 7. 950 a. 2 we read τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν τροφὴν ἀπ’
ἐνιῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ γλώσσῃ τὴν ἱδώ, ἀπ’ ἐνιῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ λάρυγγι, διὸ καὶ Φιλό-
ξενος γεράνων φαράγγα εὐχέτε ἔχειν. There are several references to
him (or them, for there were more than one of the name) in
later writers—Plutarch, Aelian, Athenaeus: thus, Plut. de Amore
1 has χυμῶν ἱδών δεδουλώσατο Φιλόξενον τῶν ψυχοφάγων: Plut. de
occulte vívendo 1 τοὺς μὲν γὰρ περὶ Φιλόξενον τὸν Ἐρύξιδος... ἐπτοη-
μένους περὶ τὰ ὄψα: Athenaeus Deipn. viii. 26 καὶ ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει φησὶ 1118 a. 32.

[Μάχων]

Φιλόξενος θυ', ὡς λέγουσ', ὁ Κυθήριος

ηδικτμό τριών ἕχειν λάρυγγα πήχεων,

ὅπως, καταπίνων, φησίν, ὅτι πλείστον χρόνων,

καὶ πάνθ' ἄμα μοι τὰ βρώμαθ' ἤδονήν ποιή.


Φάρνγξ is properly the wind-pipe, but is here used loosely for the οἰσοφάγος or gullet. Ramsauer refers to de Part. An. iv. 11. 690 b. 29 to show 'quo sensu Aristoteli probabile fuerit votum Philoxeni': ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα τῶν χυμῶν ποιεῖ τὴν αἰσθήσιν, τῶν ἑσεχθῶν ἐν τῇ καθόδε ἡ ἤδονῃ . . . καὶ σχεδόν τῶν πλείστων ὄψων καὶ ἑσεχθῶν ἐν τῇ καταπόσει τῇ τίσει (v. l. θίξει) τοῦ οἰσοφάγου γίνεται ἡ χάρις.

κοινοτάτη] i.e. it belongs to all animals: see de Anima ii. 2. b. 1. 413 b. 4 αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἄφη. ὀπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δίνεται χαρίζεσθαι τῆς ἄφης καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἡ ἄφη τῶν ἀλλων αἰσθήσεων. Θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγουμε τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ὁδ' καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει τὰ δὲ ζώα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἀστικὴν αἰσθήσιν ἔχουτα. The Paraphrast's explanation is wrong—κοινοτάτη ἐστίν ἡ ἄφη ἐν πᾶσις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄφη τῶν πάσαις αἰσθήσεως αἰσθάνονται, for Aristotle in the de Sensu 3. 442 a. 29 finds fault with Democritus for reducing all the senses to touch: Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων, ὅσοι λέγουσι περὶ αἰσθήσεως, ἀποστάτοι τί ποιοῦσι πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητά ἀπ᾽ ἀποικώσων, καὶ οἱ εἰς ποιεῖν την ἔχει, δηλον ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἐκάστη ἄφη τίς ἔστιν τούτο δ᾽ ὅτι ἠδύνατον, οὗ καλεσμένοι συνιδέων. Cf. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii. pp. 152 sqq. for a defence of the view of Democritus assailed by Aristotle.

§ 11. ἐλευθερωτάται] Opposed to ἀνδραποδίῶν in § 8. b. 4.

γυμνασίους] In the Gymnasia there were baths, apparently b. 6. similar to our Turkish baths, which were used by the gymnasts after exercise. For the advantages derived from τρίψεως and the consequent θερμασία see Prob. ΛZ. 2. 965 b-966 a, b.
CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

Desires are (1) common to all men and natural, and (2) peculiar to individuals and acquired. Thus the desire for food and drink and the sexual desire are (1) natural, while individuals show (2) preferences for this or that kind of food, etc. But even in these individual preferences there is an element of natural desire, in that there are some things which all men agree in preferring to certain other things. So far as a desire is simply natural, i.e. so far as individual preference has not refined upon it, it does not hold out much temptation to error, and when error takes place, it is always in the way of excess. Thus those people are few who, simply because they are hungry or thirsty, will overfill their bellies with whatever comes to hand. It is only the lowest sort of people who tend to become gussling-bellies as they are called.

But when individual preference comes in as to the particular kind of food, etc., with which the natural desire is to be satisfied, there are many who err, and many are the ways of error. For when we say that a man has a great liking for something, we mean either that he likes something which he ought not to like at all, or likes it more than the average man does, or in the wrong way. Now in all these respects the profligate, or intemperate man, goes to excess. He delights in things which he ought not to delight in at all—abominations; and where it is permitted to take delight, he does so more than he ought, and more than the average man does.

So much for the relation of temperance and intemperance to pleasures: as for the pains to which they are related, they are those caused by the absence of the excessive pleasures. Such pains the temperate man does not feel, while the profligate, or intemperate man, is tortured by them. These absurd pains (pains produced by pleasures) are to be distinguished from the more real pains which the courageous man endures and the coward shrinks from.

Those who are deficient in their love of pleasure are very rare—so rare that they are not even distinguished by a name; indeed such insensibility as theirs is scarcely human.

As for the temperate man, he observes the mean in these things. He takes no pleasure in what the intemperate man takes most pleasure, but rather hates it; and the pleasures which he does allow himself are never excessive or ill-timed—whether they be those proper to a healthy constitution, or other pleasures in so far as they do not interfere with health and vigour, and are not inconsistent with the ideal of a noble life, or beyond his means.

1118 b. 8. §§ 1, 2, 3, 4.] The κουιαί, or φυσικά ἐπιθυμίαι are those which all men experience. But few men habitually gratify them in an improper way, simply quid κουιαὶ or φυσικαὶ, i.e. promiscuously
without caring for the manner in which they are gratified, so long as they are gratified somehow. The few who do so are the λιων ἀνθρώπων, who e.g. overfill their bellies with any sort of food. The ήδη καὶ ἐπίθεται ἐπιθυμίαι are partly (1) the particular directions which the κοινὰ ἐπιθυμίαι legitimately take in different men, e.g. preference for this kind of food or drink rather than that, where the things specially desired are good, if taken in moderation; partly (2) perversions of the κοινὰ ἐπιθυμίαι, by which they are directed to objects which are μυστα. It is where the κοινὰ ἐπιθυμίαι take particular directions, that we find ἀκολούθια for the most part. This particular (and in itself legitimate) way of gratifying a natural human desire attracts one man, that particular way another man, and they go to excess in these particular ways. Here we have to do with what is distinguished in Ε.Ν. vii. 5. 8 as ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἀκολούθια from ἡ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ἡ θηριώδης ἡ νοσηματώδης, under which latter head it may be noted the desire of τὰ μυστα mentioned in § 4 properly falls.

§ 1. Scaliger, with the approval of Susemihl and Rassow, (Forsch. p. 58) inserts καὶ φυσικαὶ after κοινὰ, b. 8.

τροφῆς . . . καὶ ἐδών] These are the two objects of τὸ θρεπτικὸν b. 9. distinguished in de Anima ii. 4. 415 a. 23—nutrition and reproduction—ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑπάρχει καὶ πρῶτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς καθ' ἑν ἑπάρχει τὸ ζῦν ἀπασω' ἤ ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννήσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσασθαι.

ἐξής ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς] We have here the ordinary distinction b. 10. between solid and liquid nourishment. For Aristotle's scientific account of the physiology of nutrition and taste see de Sensu 4. 441 b. 15 sqq. where he tells us that τὸ ἔξορυ καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν must both be present in every experience of taste and process of nutrition—"Ωσπερ οὖν οἱ ἐναπολύόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τοῦ χυμοῦ τοιούτων ἔχειν ποιοῦσι τὸ ὑδωρ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φύσις τὸ ἔξορυ καὶ τὸ γεώδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἔξορυ καὶ γεώδους διαφούσα καὶ κυνύσα τῷ θερμῷ ποιοῦ τί τι τὸ ὑγρὸν παρασκευάζει. Καὶ ἐστὶ τούτῳ χυμὸς τὸ γιγομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰρημένου ἔξορου πάθος ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τῆς γεώσεως τῆς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀλλοιωτικῶν εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ αἰσθητικὸν εἰς τούτῳ δυνάμει προσπάρχον' οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ μαυθάνει ἄλλα κατὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. "Ὅτι δ' οὐ παντὸς ἔξορον ἄλλα τοῦ τροφίμου οἱ χυμοὶ τῇ πάθος ἐστὶν ἡ στέρησις, δεὶ λαβέων ἐνενεῖθεν, ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἔξορον ἀνευ τοῦ ὑγροῦ οὔτε τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀνευ τοῦ ἔξορου' τροφῇ γὰρ οὔτεν αὐτῶν τοῖς ζύοις, ἄλλα τὸ μεσμέριον.
The editors quote *Iliad* xxiv. 129.

Ομηρος [As Achilles, whom Thetis is addressing in the lines referred to above.]

b. 12. τοιῶσθε τροφής καὶ εἴσης. Ramsauer conjectures παντός for πᾶς in this clause, construing τὸ δὲ τοιῶσθε ἢ τοιῶσθε ἑπιθυμεῖν οὐκέτι παντός ἐστιν οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν (masc.). But it is better to accept the anacolouthon, and to suppose that Aristotle wrote τὸ δὲ with the infinitive in his mind, and then carelessly wrote πᾶς instead of παντός because he had written πᾶς γὰρ ἑπιθυμεῖ above. Reading πᾶς we must of course make τῶν αὐτῶν neuter, and explain — οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεὶ ἑπιθυμεῖ ὁ αὐτός. Bywater's suggestion, τῆς δὲ τοιῶσθε, is very tempting however.

b. 13. § 2. ἡμέτερον] 'Et fere ἐφ' ἡμῖν,' Ramsauer. 'Επίθετος, ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἑπιγνωσία, Par. 'Merely capricious,' Grant.

b. 14. ἕτερα γὰρ . . . τυχόντων] Here two reasons are given for the assertion that there is something 'natural' even in the most factitious tastes: (i) they are 'natural,' in the sense of being the expressions of the nature of the particular individuals, it being 'natural' that the tastes of individuals should vary within certain limits; and (2) they are 'natural,' because they are confined within these limits—because, though varying, they agree in not giving the preference in any case to certain things distinguished as τὰ τυχόντα.

πᾶσιν] τισίν Οᵇ, a mere blunder.

b. 20. § 3. αὖτήν] sc. τὴν γαστέρα.

b. 22. § 4. τῶν γὰρ φιλοσοφοῦτων . . . πολλοῖ χαίρουσιν] Rassow (*Forsch.* 58, 59) reads τὸ for τὰ before χαίρειν (with Μᵇ and Οᵇ) and before μᾶλλον (Νᵇ and Οᵇ) in line 23, and treats the words τῶν γὰρ (l. 22) . . . δὲ (l. 24) as an independent sentence, which he closes with a full stop. If τῶν γὰρ φιλοσοφοῦτων λεγομένων is to be treated as a genitive absolute, τὸ being retained before χαίρειν and μᾶλλον, and a comma placed after δὲ, l. 24, then we must follow Eucken (*De Arist. dic. rat.* p. 31) in reading δὴ (Μᵇ) after κατὰ πάντα.

Grant thinks that ὡς in the phrase ἢ τῶ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ is an interpolation, because he supposes that, if it is retained, we must place a comma after μᾶλλον, and treat ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ as a separate clause, rendering 'or because they like them as people
in general do;’ whereas (he argues) μᾶλλον ἦ ought to be taken together so as to give the rendering ‘or because they like them more than people in general’ (πλέον ἦ κατὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς, Par.). This is undoubtedly the right rendering (it is remarkable however that Grant does not notice its inconsistency with the natural meaning of the reading καί ὃς οἱ πολλοί χαϊροῦσιν which he accepts in l. 27); but it is not necessary to omit the ὃς in order to obtain it. Μᾶλλον ἦ ὃς οἱ πολλοί is as good Greek as μᾶλλον ἦ οἱ πολλοί, and has the same meaning. Thus in vii. 8. 2 (referred to by Ramsauer) we have ὅμως γὰρ ἂν ἀκρατής ἔστω τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπὸ ἀλήγου αὐτῶν καὶ ἐλάσσουν ἦ ὃς οἱ πολλοί, although in iv. 4. 4 (quoted by Grant) we have ἐπαινοῦστε μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἦ οἱ πολλοί. The above being the meaning of ἦ μᾶλλον ἦ ὃς οἱ πολλοί, it is absolutely necessary to accept in l. 27 the reading of Kᵇ, CCC, and Camb. καὶ ἦ ὃς οἱ πολλοί, rendering ‘and more than people in general.’

§ 5.] The pains with which the σῶφρον and ἀκελαστὸς are concerned are not independent pains like those which the ἀνδρεία faces, but pains caused by pleasures (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεὶ αὐτῷ ἦ ἥδων) i.e. caused by the absence of pleasures.

§ 6. ἀτόπῳ] This is what Grant calls ‘the disgraceful paradox’ of ἀκολογία. The Paraphrast has ὡστε καὶ ἄτοπον τι δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ ἥδων λυπεῖσθαι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν ἥδων τοῦ ἐναντίου.

§ 7. οὗ πάνυ γίνονται] The ascetic spirit (unless we regard ἀ. 6. Cynicism as a manifestation of it) was conspicuously absent from the Greek national character.

οὗ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἔστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ἡ ἀκελαστικὸς ὥστε κ.τ.λ.] Such insensibility would be inconsistent with being a man; for man is after all an animal: cf. E. N. iii. 1. 27 δοκεῖ δ’ ὁ μόνον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τά ἀλογα πάθη.

οὗ τέτευχε δ’ κ.τ.λ.] In E. N. ii. 7. 3 we have ἐλλειπτοντες δὲ περὶ a. 10. τὰς ἥδονας οὗ πάνυ γίνονται· διότι δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐναίσθησιν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰς ἥδονας οἷς κατὰ οὐκ ἀναίσθησιν. Eudemus (E. E. iii. 2. 1230 b. 13) has τοὺς δὲ ἀνίκητος ἐχοῦσας δὲ ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἥδονας οἷς κατὰ οὐκ ἀναίσθησιν, οἱ δὲ ἀλλοι ὑπομητοῖς τοιούτοις προσαγορεύοντος. ἢστι δ’ οὗ πάνυ γνώμονα τὸ πάθος οὐδ’ ἐπιτόλως διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ βάτερον ἀμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον καὶ πάνω εἶναι σύμφωνον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἥδεον ἤταν καὶ αἰσθησίων. μᾶλιστα δ’ εἰσὶ τοιούτοι, οίων οἱ κομφοδοξάσκαλοι παρά-
1119 a. 10. γονόν ἀγροκος, οἱ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρα καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πλησίονα τοῖς ἤδεις. Cf. E. N. ii. 2. 7 ὁ μὲν πάσης ἢδοις ἀπολαῦσαι καὶ μηδεμίας ἀπεχώμενος ἀκύλαστος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσιν φεύγων, ὄστερ ὁ ἀγροκός, ἀναισθησις τις: and E. N. ii. 7. 13 περὶ δὲ τὸ ἢδον τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδί ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ τῇ διάθεσι εὐτραπελία, ἡ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ βομβολοχία καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς αὐτὴν βομβολόχους, ὁ δὲ ἐλεέστων ἀγροκός τις καὶ ἡ ἐξε ἀγροκία: cf. also E. N. vii. 9. 3 εἰσὶ δὲ ἵσχυρον ὄμοιοίς οἱ ἑδοιονομοῦντες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἀγροκοὶ, οἱ μὲν ἑδοιονομοῦντες δὲ ἢδονὴν καὶ λόπην χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες εὰν μὴ μετατίθουσι, καὶ λυπούσι εὰν ἀκριμα τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ὑστερ ψυχής σματε ὅπερ μᾶλλον τῷ ἄκρατε ἐοῦκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεὶ. From these passages we may gather that, if any name belongs to the ἐλεέστων περὶ τὰς ἢδονὰς, it is ἀναισθησις, and that the ἀγροκοὶ or rustic (as distinguished from the ἀστεῖος or town-man) is merely adduced in E. E. iii. 2 and E. N. ii. 2. 7 as an example of ἀναισθησια, as he is introduced elsewhere as an example of other peculiarities—in E. N. ii. 7. 13, of dullness, and in vii. 9. 3, of opinionativeness. Theophrastus, Char. x. (iv), gives an amusing sketch of the ἀγροκοὺ. Ἀγροκός ἐστὶ σμαθίαν ἀγροκοῦ. The ἀγροκοὶ is the man who maintains that myrrh smells no sweeter than thyme: his shoes are too large for him: he talks loudly: he mistrusts his own friends, and makes confidants of his servants. He will stand on the road and look at a cow or a goat, but will look at nothing worth looking at. He runs himself to answer a knock at his door. The ἀναισθησία of Theophrastus does not seem to have much in common with Aristotle's ἀναισθησία—insensibility to the pleasures περὶ ὧς ὁ ἀκύλαστος. Ἀναισθησία is defined in Char. xxv. (xiv) as ἐραδύσις ψυχῆς ἐν λόγοι καὶ πράξειν. The ἀναισθησις is the only man who goes to sleep in the whole theatre. He loses things and cannot find them. He fatigues his children by obliging them to wrestle.

With regard to the ἀγροκοὶ of the κωμῳδῳδιδάσκαλοι referred to by Eudemus—plays entitled ἈΡΓΟΙΚΟΣ, ἈΡΙΟΙ, ἈΡΙΩΤΗΣ, are known to have been written by Antiphanes, Menander, Pherecrates, and Sophron: see Fabric. Bib. ii. pp. 414, 460, 474, 494 referred to by Zell. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Theophrastus sometimes borrowed from the comedians in writing his Characters.

a. 13. § 8. οὐδ' ἄλως οἷς μὴ δὲ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιοῦτο οὐδὲν] Rassow (Forsch. p. 91) reads οὐδ'...οὐδὲ for the οὐδ'...οὐτε of the codd. here. The clause occupies the same position in the first (οὐτε γὰρ ὡςτε ... ...) of the two main divisions of the sentence, as the clause οὐδ'

\[\text{ἐπιθυμεῖ κ.τ.λ. does in the second (οὖν ἀπότομον . . .); and if οὖν is 1119 a. 13.}
\[\text{right in the second division it must be in the first also. Susem.}
\[\text{and Bywater follow Rassow.}
\]

\[οὖν' ἀλώς τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν] Rassow (Forsch. p. 91) favours a. 15.

\[οὐθενός, making it depend upon ἐπιθυμεῖ. Although all MSS.}
\[apparently exhibit οὐθενός, three—Κβ, Οβ, and CCC—read im-
\[mediately after it, not σολα but ἅ, and so are as good evidence for}
\[an original οὐθεν' σολα, as for an original οὐθενός' ἅ. It seems}
\[certain that the letters σολ are original, and that Susemihl’s οὐθεν' ἅ}
\[is wrong. I think, however, that οὐθεν is right. I take the phrase}
\[οὖν' ἀλώς τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν as a blank adverbial formula, or et}
\[cetera, added to οὐθὲ μὴ λέγω ή δεῖ and οὖν' ἄρε μή δεῖ, and, with them,}
\[epexegetic of μετρῖος by which οὖν' ἄπότομον λυπεῖται οὖν' ἐπιθυμεῖ is}
\[qualified. This blank formula is to be filled in ὑσιχῆς ἀλώς ὑπὸ}
\[τοῦ λόγου διορίστηκα τὰ τοιάῦτα (Ε. Ν. ii. 3. 5)—e.g. οὖν' ὡς μή δεῖ}
\[would be included in it.
\[The reading οὐθενός' σολα would easily arise by dittographia of}
\[σολ, and would be retained by scribes, for Rassow’s reason—that}
\[οὐθενός depends on ἐπιθυμεῖ
\]

\[οὖτως ἔχων] i. e. ο ὑπεράγων τῶν ἢδονῶν τῶν τοιτου ἐμποδίων οὔτων, a. 19.

\[ἡ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἡ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.

CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT.

Profligacy, or intemperance, is more voluntary than cowardice, for it pur-

sues pleasure, which men naturally seek after, whereas cowardice consists in not}

facing pain, which men naturally avoid. Moreover, pain disturbs and destroys}

the nature of its subject, but pleasure has no such effect. Being more voluntary,

profligacy is therefore more disgraceful. It is easier to habituate oneself to resist}

bodily pleasures, than to habituate oneself to endure the pains of fear; for}

one has many more opportunities in life of habituating oneself to resist bodily}

pleasures, and the process of habituation is without danger. But the habit of}

cowardice is more voluntary than the particular acts of cowardice ; for the}

habit is not in itself painful, whereas the acts are caused by a pain which}

disturbs the man’s nature and makes him throw away his arms and otherwise}

disgrace himself. Hence the opinion that these acts are even forced upon him.

On the other hand, acts of profligacy are more voluntary than the habit is ; for}

they are actuated by desire and appetite, whereas no one desires the habit.
The term ἀκόλαστος—which means literally, 'unchastised'—is also applied to children when they are naughty; for there is a certain similarity between the 'profligate' and the naughty child. It does not matter where which is the original application of the term; at any rate, its transference is warranted by the real analogy between desire and a child—both try to do what is unseemly, and both grow apace, and need chastisement. If desire be not chastened and brought under subjection to reason, it will go great lengths, being an insatiable principle, which is strengthened by indulgence, till it at last casts reason out. As the child must live in obedience to his master, so must the principle of desire be subjected to reason. Hence in the temperate man desire will be in harmony with reason; both will aim at that which is noble and good; desire will seek the right objects, in the right way, and at the right time, in conformity with the dictates of reason.

1119 a. 21. §§ 1, 2. In these sections Aristotle is speaking about τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις. Acts of intemperance are more voluntary than acts of cowardice, because the former are prompted by the desire of pleasure, and express the natural bent of the agent, while the latter are done under the constraint of pain, and seem to represent, not the agent, but his necessity.

a. 24. § 2. φύσιν] The normal state, as Grant points out.

µᾶλλον δὴ ἐκούσιον] sc. ἀκόλασία τῆς δείλιας. The MSS. seem all to have δ', but δ' is certainly right: see Rassow, Forsch. p. 92.


a. 27. §§ 3, 4.] In these sections he passes on to speak about the ἔξεις themselves.

The habit of cowardice is more voluntary (οὗχ δυοιόως = µᾶλλον) than acts of cowardice; the habit of profligacy less voluntary than acts of profligacy. The reasons given for these differences are that the habit of cowardice is not painful, as compared with acts of cowardice, which seem to be forced upon a man at the time by the pains of fear; while the habit of profligacy is not desired or sought after, although profligate acts are. There is a good deal of confusion here. The habit δείλια is acquired by the repetition of particular acts caused by λυπη. It is misleading therefore to describe it as αὐτῆς ἀληθῶς, in order to prove it to be 'more voluntary' than the particular acts. When Aristotle calls a habit 'voluntary' he means, as we have seen (iii. 5. 14), that we are responsible for it. If then the acts which produce the habit of δείλια are in a sense involuntary (as caused by λυπη ἣ ἐξιστησι καὶ φθειρει τὴν τοῦ
BOOK III: CHAP. 12: §§ 3, 4. 319

(ἔχοντος φύσω), the habit will be equally involuntary, i.e. the δείλος 1119 a. 27. will be relieved of responsibility for it, in proportion as the acts which produced it were "involuntary." So much for the relation between the acts which made the habit and the habit itself. If, on the other hand, the τὰ καθ' ἐκαστα here are not the acts which made the habit of δείλια, but the acts which flow from the habit when made—what is meant by distinguishing the habit itself, as ἄλυτος, from its acts, as forced upon us by λύτη? Are they not forced upon us by a λύτη of which the "habit itself" has made us at least more susceptible? Again, how does the fact that οὐθεὶς ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος ἐβαί make the habit of ἀκόλασια less "voluntary," in the sense of making it a habit for which we are less responsible? The habit is just as "voluntary" as the acts which produced it; i.e. if they are entirely voluntary, we are fully responsible for it. Nor can the acts which flow from the formed habit of ἀκόλασια be distinguished, as "desired and fully voluntary," from the habit, as "not desired and less fully voluntary." Surely if these acts are desired, it is because the habit makes us desire them. By ἀκόλασια we mean only that such acts are desired. We seem then to have nothing but scholastic trifling in the sections before us, if we render them quite literally thus:—"acts of cowardice are forced upon us by the pains of fear; but we do not fear cowardice itself, and it is not painful to be a coward. Therefore cowardice itself is more voluntary than acts of cowardice. On the other hand, acts of profligacy are pleasant and are objects of desire; but we do not desire to be profligate. Therefore profligacy itself is less voluntary than acts of profligacy." An important psychological truth, however, may be got out of these sections, if we interpret them a little more freely, and suppose Aristotle to mean by the ἔξεις αὐτῇ acts performed after a certain date, and by the τὰ καθ' ἐκαστα acts performed before that date; the psychological truth being that the pleasures or pains, as the case may be, which originally prompt acts, tend to disappear from consciousness, and leave the acts to go on automatically. The pains which prompt early acts of cowardice are very keenly felt; but, as time goes on, cowardly acts are performed on the occasion of less and less painful experiences, till at last we may suppose the perfect δείλος cultivating his δείλια at home in security, studiously avoiding all occasions for its active display in the presence of danger. In such a case the δείλια might be described as αὐτῇ μὲν ἄλυτος. Again, a pleasure like that of
1119 a. 27. drinking brandy, keenly felt at the beginning of the drunkard's progress, disappears almost entirely at last and leaves him the victim of a physical craving—of pain, not of pleasure.

It is to be noted that ἐκόσιον, after ὁμοίως in § 3, is the reading of Ῥ, Νᵇ, Ald, mg, Ὄᵇ, pr. Ρᵇ, NC, B¹, (B¹ has ἐκόσιον ἔ καὶ κρείττων in the text; Ὄᵇ has on the margin καὶ ἐκόσιον ἔ καὶ κρείττων); while φευκτόν is the reading of Bekker's four MSS., Κᵇ, Λᵇ, Μᵇ, Ὄᵇ and also of CCC and B³.

a. 33. § 5.] Eudemus (E. E. iii. 2. 1230 a. 38—1230. b. 8) has the following account of the derivation and uses of the word ἀκόλαστος—λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς. τ' τ' γὰρ μὴ κεκόλασμένος πως μηδεὶς ἰατρευόμειν, διόπερ ἀτμηστο τὸ μὴ τετμημένον, καὶ τούτων ὁ μὲν δυνάτος, ὁ δ' ἀδύνατος ἀτμηστο γὰρ τὸ τὸ μὲ δυνάμενον τιμηθήναι καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι κόλασιν, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκόλασμένον δὲ περὶ ἀμαρτίας, περὶ δὲ ὁρθομαχεῖ ὁ σώφρων, διόπερ οἱ παιδεῖς. κατὰ ταῦταν γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκόλασιαν. ἦτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κόλασεως.

b. 2. δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὑστερόν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου] I agree with Grant that 'there can be no doubt that the punishment and unrestrainedness of children is the more concrete and primary idea.' Aristotle seems to make it plain in § 8 which he regards as πρώτον and which ὑστερόν—διόπερ δὲ τὸν παιδα... οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.


τὸ συγγενεῖς] That which is born with one—connate. He means that the gratification of desire strengthens the natural principle of desire in us. Function reacts on organ. Coraes has—προβιβάζει τὴν συγγενή καὶ ἐμφυτον τῇ παιδικῇ ἥλικιῃ ἐπιθυμίαν αὐτὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἀν μὴ κολάζηται.

b. 13. § 8. δώστερ δὲ] Κᵇ, Ὄᵇ, and Camb. have ὁστερ δὲ, CCC has ὀστερ δή. Bekker's ὁστερ γὰρ is given by Λᵇ, Μᵇ, Ῥ.

b. 16. § 9. ἀμφοῖν] i.e. The ἐπιθυμητικόν and λόγος. Cf. vi. 2 2 δέι τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὅρεξιν ἀρθῆν... καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι, τὴν δὲ διώκειν.
BOOK IV.

Introductory Note. The E. E. and M. M. agree in the following order—ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, πραΰτης, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια: then follow, though not in exactly the same order in each treatise, the παθητικαὶ μεσοῦτησ—νόησις, αἰδώς, φιλία, σεμνότης, ἀλήθεια, and εὐτραπελία. The Nicomachean order is—ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, φιλοτιμία, πραΰτης, φιλία, ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία,—and lastly, αἰδώς, distinguished from all the foregoing as a πάθος.

In E. N. iii. 10. 1 Aristotle seems to give a reason (but see note ad loc.) why he begins with ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη—viz. δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἄλογων μερῶν αὕτα αἰ ἄρεταί. It is true that all the moral virtues consist in the regulation of τὸ ἄλογον or the element of disorder in man; but νομός and ἐπίθυμία represent this element in certain purely animal forms, without the regulation of which, to begin with, the more distinctively human and social virtues could not be acquired. The reasons which make it proper to begin the list with ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη are in favour of giving the third place to πράΰτης, which consists in the regulation of ὀργή, a feeling which man shares with the brutes. As ὀργή, however, is most often roused by causes which depend for their existence on society, the virtue of πράΰτης, if placed third, makes an easy transition to ἐλευθεριότης, and the other virtues which consist no longer in the regulation of purely animal instincts, but of feelings which are of distinctively human origin—i.e. do not come into existence except in society—the desire of wealth, the love of display, the desire of honour, the wish to please, and so forth.

Book IV may be said to discuss the virtues which consist in the
regulation of feelings and desires, which, however evolved from animal instincts, owe their present form and force to society. "Liberality (ἐλευθερία) is the observance of the Mean in spending and acquiring 'wealth' (χρηστια)—its more characteristic side however being that which relates to spending, i.e., to the use of 'wealth'—of moderate wealth, it must be understood, not of great wealth. Being the habit of using such wealth properly, its extremes, ἀσωτία and ἄγελευθερία, are the habits of abusing such wealth. The term ἀσωτία, however, is often employed with an implication (συμπλήκτων, § 3) of ἀκρασία and ἀκολοχία, and thus appears in a very bad light. In the strict sense (οἰκείος, § 4), however, the ἀσωτός is one who wastes his substance (§ 5), and so ruins himself—as the etymology of the word shows (ἀ and σώτειον).

The ἐλευθέριος, then, is concerned with the χρήσις χρηστιάς, and is better characterised as one who spends well than as one who acquires well; for to acquire is κτῖσις, not χρήσις—i.e., 'to acquire well' is, at best, the mere refusal to receive except from proper sources, it is not active function. "Ελευθερίας will thus realise the characteristic of all ἀρετή—to issue in positive well-doing, rather than to merit the merely negative praise of refraining from evil (§ 7). The ἐλευθερίος will give τῷ καλῷ ἐνεχά καὶ ὑσθόν (§ 12), i.e., with

1 See, however, Zeller's Ph. d. Gr. 3rd German Ed. p. 634 (Aristotle), note 1, for a criticism of Häcker (das Eintheilungs- und Anordnungsprinzip der moralischen Tugendreihe in der Nikomachischen Ethik, Berlin, 1863), who adopts a view similar to that advanced above. Zeller's chief point is that if the view were correct, ἀρετή must come after ἀνθρεῖα. To this it may be answered—that it could hardly come in between the two Cardinal Virtues ἀνθρεῖα and ὁμοφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after ὁμοφροσύνη in the E. E. and M. M.—a point which Zeller does not mention. Aristotle indeed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discussion of ἀνθρεῖα and ὁμοφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after ὁμοφροσύνη in the E. E. and M. M.—a point which Zeller does not mention. Aristotle indeed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discussion of ἀνθρεῖα and ὁμοφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after ὁμοφροσύνη in the E. E. and M. M.—a point which Zeller does not mention. Aristotle indeed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discussion of ἀνθρεῖα and ὁμοφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after ὁμοφροσύνη in the E. E. and M. M.—a point which Zeller does not mention. Aristotle indeed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discussion of ἀνθρεῖα and ὁμοφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after ὁμοφροσύνη in the E. E. and M. M.—a point which Zeller does not mention. Aristotle indeed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discussion of ἀνθρεῖα and ὁμοφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after ὁμοφροσύνη in the E. E. and M. M.—a point which Zeller does not mention. Aristotle indeed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discussion of ἀνθρεῖα and ὁμοφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after ὁμοφροσύνη in the E. E. and M. M.—a point which Zeller does not mention. Aristotle indeed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discussion of ἀνθρεῖα and ὁμοφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after ὁμοφροσύνη in the E. E. and M. M.—a point which Zeller does not mention. Aristotle indeed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discussion of ἀνθρεῖα and ὁμοφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after ὁμοφροσύνη in the E. E. and M. M.—a point which Zeller does not mention. Aristotle indeed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discussion of ἀνθρεῖα and ὁμοφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after ὁμοφροσύνη in the E. E. and M. M.—a point which Zeller does not mention.
due regard to the fitness of things, of which his φιλόνησις makes him a correct judge. Consequently his liberality must not be estimated from the amount that he gives, but from the relation which the gift bears to his means (§ 19). Hence Tyrants with practically unlimited means are not δάσωτοι. They cannot 'ruin themselves' by their extravagance (§ 23). The ἐλευθέρος does not value wealth for its own sake, but only ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως. Those who have made fortunes have done so by setting a high value on wealth and devoting themselves to its acquisition. They are less likely to be liberal with their money than those who have inherited fortunes (§ 20).

Of the extremes, δασωτική is much better than ἀνελεφθερία. It runs short of means (§ 30) and, being a generous impulse, may be chastened by age and experience into ἐλευθεροτυπία (§§ 30, 31). It also benefits many, by making 'money circulate.' Ἀνελεφθερία, however, is incurable, being the vice of old age and helplessness, and of narrow and timid natures, of which nothing can be made (§§ 37-40).

We may note in this account of ἐλευθεροτυπία and its extremes—

(1) the stress laid on the point that ἐλευθεροτυπία results in a χρήσις χρημάτων. It thus takes its place with the other virtues in a life of doing. The χρηματοτυπίς βίος, which may be contrasted with the life of the ἐλευθεροτύπος, is concerned merely with indefinite κτήσεις, and is a life of reception, that is, not properly a Life at all.

(2) The importance attached to force of character. It is better to do what is noble, than to refrain from what is base; and the bold spendthrift is a more hopeful character than the timid niggard.

(3) The remark that the spendthrift 'benefits many,' may be noticed as untrue. Money does more work and 'benefits' more people as 'capital' than it does if scattered about broadcast: cf. Grant's good notes on §§ 31-32 and § 44.

As I observed in note on ii. 7. 2, Aristotle's treatment of ἀνελεφθερία is as complicated as his treatment of ἀνδρεία: see ii. 7. 4 and iv. i. 29. The δασωτος is in excess as regards spending and in defect as regards acquiring; the ἀνελεφθερος is in excess as regards acquiring, and in defect as regards spending. Nor are the two moments of ἀνελεφθερία always united in one character. Some exceed in acquisition; others are in defect as regards spending: see iv. i. 38, 39.

§ 1.] The method of exhaustion, by which its object is assigned 1119 b. 22. to ἐλευθεροτυπία may be compared with that by which the object of Particular Justice is found—v. 2. 5.

§ 2.] Cf. v. 5. 15.  

b. 2.
§ 3. συμπλέκοντες 'with an implication'—implying intemperance. Grant compares 'the Prodigal Son.' The historian Theopompus, Aristotle's contemporary, in a passage preserved by Athenaeus (iv. 62), gives a vivid picture of the ἄσωτία of Philip and his friends, which may serve as an illustration of ἄσωτία 'with an implication'—Φίλιππος, ἔπει ἐγκατῆσαν πολλῶν ἐγένετο χρημάτων, οὐκ ἀνέλισαν αὐτὰ ταχέως, ἀλλ' ἐξεβάλε καὶ ἔρριψε, πάνων ἀνθρώπων κακοτες ὑπ' οἰκονόμους, οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν. ἀπλῶς γὰρ οὔτε αὐτῶν ἥπιατο ζήν όρθως, οὐδὲ σωφρόνως οἰκεῖν οἰκίαν. τοῦ δ' αὐτὸς αὐτὸς ἦν, ἀπληστος καὶ πολυτελῆς ὁν, προχεῖρος ἀπάντα ποιῶν, καὶ κτάμενος καὶ δίδωσι' στρατεύσῃ γὰρ ὁν, λογίζεσθαι τὰ προσώπα, καὶ τάναλισκόμενα δὲ ἀσχολίαν οὐκ ἥξινατο. ἦσσα τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἑκατονταῖς ῥηματικοὶ οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς χόρας, οἱ δ' ἐκ Θεσσαλίας, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἅλλης Ἐλλάδος, οὐκ ἀραπατόν ἐξειλεγμένω, ἀλλ' εἰ τις ἦν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησπόντεσι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς χόρας, οἱ δ' ἐκ Θεσσαλίας, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἅλλης Ἐλλάδος, οὐκ ἀραπατόν ἐξειλεγμένω, ἀλλ' εἰ τις ἦν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησπόντεσι· ἦτοι βαρσάρως λάσταυρος ἢ βοδώρος ἢ θρασύς τὸν τρόπον, οὗτοι σχεδόν ἀπαντεῖ εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἄθροισθενες ἑταῖροι Φίλιππον προσηγορεύοντο. εἰ δὲ μὴ καὶ τουτοῦτο τις ἐνθάλθη, ὕπο τοῦ βιοῦ καὶ τῆς διαίτης τῆς Μακεδονικῆς ταχέως ἐκεῖνος ὄμοιος ἐγένετο. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οἱ πόλεμοι καὶ αἱ στρατεύσαι, καὶ αἱ πολυτελεῖαι θρασεῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι προκρίνεται, καὶ ζήν μὴ κοσμίως ἀλλ' ἄσωτος καὶ τοῖς λησταῖς παραπλησίως.

b. 33. § 4. οἰκείως] 'they are not properly called ἄσωτοι.'

§§ 6–8.] See Argument at the beginning of this chapter.

a. 14. § 8. ἐπεται] For the technical use of this term = ἐπάρχειν τινι, or καταγροφεῖσθαι τινος, see An. Pr. i. 27 and 28 passim.

a. 17. § 9. ἄττον προίθεται μᾶλλον ἡ οὐ λαμβάνοντι] 'For men are less inclined to give away (ἡττον προίθεται) what is their own, than (μᾶλλον ἡ = ἡ) to abstain from taking what belongs to others.' As Grant and other editors point out μᾶλλον is redundant.


a. 33. § 16.] Grant has an interesting note on this section in which he calls attention to 'the spirit of manliness and nobility (ἀνθρώπη καὶ φιλοκαλεῖς cf. Eth. iv. 4. 3.) which runs through the virtuous characters of Aristotle.' 'The principle of individuality,' he says 'a sense of life and free action (ἐνέργεια), are with Aristotle the basis of morality, and the first requisite to nobleness seems to be self-respect . . . Christianity says "It is more blessed to give than
to receive"... In the Christian sentiment there is so great a harmony between the object and subject, that the subjective side appears to be lost; but in reality it is only lost to be found again, it is diminished to be enhanced. Aristotle's statement would be, "It is better to give than to receive, because it is more noble." This has a slight tendency to give too much weight to the subjective side.' I think not—

§ 17. ἀναγκαῖον] i.e. ἀναγκαῖον εἰς ὑποθέσεως—materially necessarily, b. 1.

if the beautiful form (τὸ καλὸν) is to be realised (see Met. Δ. 5. 1015 a. 20).

§ 18. βλέπειν] Bekker reads ἔπιβλέπειν with Lb. Dassow b. 6. (Forsch. 59) prefers βλέπειν, the reading of Kp and Mbp. CCC, which in this part of the Ethics is practically a transcript of the text of Kbp (see Anecd. Oxon. Classical Series, vol. i. part i. p. 45), omits not only the prefix ἐπι- but also the μή immediately preceding.


§ 20.] Zell, Coraes, Michelet, and Grant compare Plato, Rep. b. 11. 330 B, C, where Socrates (in his conversation with Cephalus) says οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἡ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά (sc. τὰ χρῆματα) δισπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ... καὶ οἱ πατέρες κ.τ.λ. Cf. also E. N. ix. 7. 3.

§ 22. οὖδ' ὡσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα] Cf. note on iii. 11. 8, a. 15 οὖδ' ὅλως b. 21. τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.

§ 24. ἔπεται... b. 34. αἱ ἐπόμεναι] See above, note on § 8 b. 32. of this chapter.


1121 a. 7. (Plut. an seni sit gerenda resp. 5). Cf. also Stobaeus (Flor. i. 240 ed. Meineke) quoted by Coraes—Σιμωνίδης ἐρωτηθεὶς διὰ τὸ ἐπτάτου γῆρος ὅν ψιλάργυρος ἐή κ.τ.λ. Grant quotes Rhet. ii. 16. 1391 a. 8 ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναίκα τὴν Ἰέρανων ἐρωτήθην πόσερον γενέσθαι κρείττον πλούσιων ἢ σοφῶν πλούσιοι εἰπεῖν τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἐφή, ὅραν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων χώραις διατριβήσωτας. See also the amusing reference to his love of money in Rhet. iii. 2. 1405 b. 24 καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδον μισθὸν δλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ ἰκήσας τοῖς ὀρέωσιν, οὐκ ἤθελε ποιεῖν ὡς δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν ἐπεὶ δὲ ἱκανόν ἔδωκεν ἐποίησε ἑαυτὸν ἀνελευθεροῖς βύγματι ἐπιών. καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἔσταν.

a. 15. § 29. πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς] See below §§ 41, 42.

a. 16. §§ 30, 31. τὰ μὲν ὅν τῆς ἄσωτίας . . . βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου] 'The two sides of ἄσωτία (mentioned in § 29) are very seldom found united in the same person, for it is not easy for one who has no receipts to give to everybody (if he tries, his means soon come to an end)—that is, if he is a private individual; and it is only the private individual who can be termed ἄσωτος): where they are united however—that is, in the ἄσωτος proper, we have a character not a little better than that of the ἀνελευθέρος.' The words ταχίως . . . ἄσωτοι εἶναι are parenthetical; and ὁ γε τοιοῦτος is ὁ μισθόμενον λαμβάνων καὶ πἀσι διδοὺς = the ἄσωτος proper = ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος τῶν τρόπων ἄσωτος of § 32 below. Where (as is generally the case) extravagance goes with indiscriminate acquisition (§§ 33, 34), we have really a bad form of ἀνελευθερία, not something better than ἀνελευθερία. See Rassow Forsch. p. 121.

a. 24. § 31. δῶσει γὰρ οὗς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται οὗς ὅθεν οὗ δεῖ] K̄b, CCC, Ῥ, and Cambr. omit both negatives, with the approval of Rassow (Forsch. 59), who is followed by Susemihl. The fault of the ἄσωτος, as Rassow points out, is to give too much and take too little. If he is reformed and becomes like the ἐλευθέρος, he will give the right amount to the right people, and also take the right amount from the right sources—λήψεται οὗς δεῖ.

b. 4. § 35. οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἑνεκα] τοῦ καλοῦ ἑνεκα. All MSS. except K̄b Ōb and CCC, seem to read τοῦτον αὐτοῦ—which I prefer to τοῦτον accepted by Sus. and Byw.

b. 16. §§ 38–40.] ἀνελευθερία has two moments: but they do not always coexist in the same character; hence we have two classes
of ἀνελευθέρων, (1) Those who are conscientious enough—or at least externally irreproachable—in the matter of acquisition, but will not part with what they acquire. (2) Those who are bent upon acquisition, and unscrupulous in the methods which they employ.

§ 39. κύμβικες] Coraes, in his note on this section, explains the use of κύμβικες = 'niggard,' by pointing to its connexion through the diminutive κυμβίκου with the modern Greek τοκίκικι which means a dog-tick or flea = the old Greek κροτών. "Εστι τοίνυν, he says, κύμβικες ὁ δίκην κροτώνος οἰονικες κεντόν καὶ ἐκμυζόν τὰ ἐλάχιστα, ὁ μηδὲ τὰ λεπτότατα τῶν κερμάτων (small change) παρορῶν, δὲ οἱ Γάλλοι τὴν αὐτήν μεταφορὰν σώζοντες πίνετε-ταίλε καλοῦσιν.

κυμμυστρίας] a cummin-splitter. Cummin, a relish eaten with food.

§ 40. τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ] Zell (reading τοκισταὶ b. 34. καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῷ) supplies δανείζοντες out of τοκισταῖ—'who lend small sums at a high rate of interest.' Michelet prefers to take τὰ μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῷ with ἐργαζόμενοι—'who perform small services for a large return'—agreeing with Coraes apparently, who (also reading καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῷ) says—τοῦτο μὲν σημαίνει, τὰ εὐτελὴ ἐπὶ πολλῇ τιμῇ διδόμετε ἡ ὑπουργοῦστε. I prefer Zell's interpretation, which applies as well to the reading κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ (Byw.) as to Zell's. For Aristotle's general objection to τόκος see Pol. i. 3. 1258 b. 6 ὃ ὁ δὲ τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα νομίσματος. ὡστε καὶ μίλιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὕτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν.

§ 44.] The grounds upon which ἀνελευθέρων rather than ἀσωτία is to be regarded as the proper contrary of ἀλευθερώτης are the two specified in ii. 8. 7, 8.

It is only as a character that ἀνελευθέρων can be truly described as μείζον κακῶν τῆς ἀσωτίας. The economic effects of ἀσωτία are unquestionably worse than those of ἀνελευθέρων.

With the account of ἀλευθερώτης and its extremes given in this chapter, cf. E. E. iii. 4 (a very meagre treatment of the subject), and M. M. i. 23, 24. The various forms of ἀνελευθέρων are described by Theophrastus (Char.) not only in his chapter περὶ ἀνελευθερίας, but also in the chapters περὶ ἀπονοίας, περὶ αἰσχροερθίας and περὶ μικρολογίας. The following is his description of the αἰσχροερθία, as translated by Jebb:—

'The avaricious man is one who when he entertains will not set
enough bread on the table. He will borrow from a guest staying in the house . . . When he sells wine he will sell it watered to his own friend. He will seize the opportunity of taking his boys to the play when the lessees of the theatre grant free admission . . . He is apt to claim his part of the halfpence found by his servants in the streets and to cry—"Shares in the luck" (κοινὰ εἰναὶ φήμας τῶν Ἑρμὺν) . . . It is just like him too when he is paying a debt of thirty minas to withhold four drachmas (about 3s. out of £120). Then if his sons, through ill health, do not attend the school throughout the month, he will make a proportionate deduction from the payment; and all through Anthesterion he will not send them to their lessons because there are so many festivals, and he does not wish to pay the fees. It is just like him too when a club-dinner is held at his house to secrete some of the fire-wood, lentils, vinegar, salt and lamp-oil placed at his disposal. If a friend or a friend’s daughter is to be married he will go abroad a little time before in order to avoid giving a wedding present.’

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

Μεγαλοπρέπεια—magnificence—differs from ἐλευθερότης in being concerned only with expenditure, and that on a grand scale (§ 1). The μεγαλοπρέπης is ἐλευθέρος, but the ἐλευθέρος is not therefore μεγαλοπρέπης (§ 3). Both expend with equal propriety, but the scale on which they do so is different; and the expenditure of the μεγαλοπρέπης results in performances, and works, which are beautiful and striking in the public eye, rather than merely useful to individuals, as are the gifts of the ἐλευθέρος. Ἐλευθερότης results in a κτήμα useful to the person benefited; whereas μεγαλοπρέπεια results in an ἔργον which is the glory and admiration of the city (§ 10). Hence the μεγαλοπρέπης must be a rich man, and even a man whose riches have been inherited (§§ 13, 14), otherwise expenditure on a great scale (whether for public objects, or on great family occasions, §§ 11—17) would be out of keeping with his condition; but the ἐλευθέρος need not be a rich man. The habit of spending money on a great scale with propriety will direct the μεγαλοπρέπης even in cases where the expenditure is necessarily small. He is an artist—ἐκποντήμον ἐστιν (§ 5), and will display his superior taste, even in cases in which the ἐλευθέρος, strictly so called, can compete with him—καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπείαν (§ 10).

1 What we understand by ‘public spirit’ enters largely into the notion of μεγαλοπρέπεια.
The extremes are ἐπανοία or ἀπειροκαλία and μικροπρέπεια. The former results in vulgar display of wealth; the latter falls short of the requirements of great occasion (e.g. a marriage or a θεωρία) by anxiety to do the thing as cheaply as possible.

§ 1. περὶ τᾶς δαπανηρὰς μονον] Aspasiaus has ἤ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερώθης 1122 a. 21. περὶ δόσιν καὶ λήψιν, ὡ δὲ μεγαλοπρέπεια περὶ τὴν δόσιν.

§ 2.] The τριπαρχία was one of the extraordinary λειτουργίαι at a. 24. Athens. The τριμάρχοι got the ship, fairly equipped, from the State. The State also paid the crew, and bore the expense of their provisions. The τριμάρχοι had to maintain the efficiency of the ship for one year, hire the crew, and often pay large bounties in order to induce men to serve; he had also often to advance the money required for pay and provisions. The cost of a trierarchy amounted to about fifty minae. See Smith’s Dictionary of Antiquities: article Trierarchia, and Jebb’s Theophrastus, p. 253. The ἀρχιθεωρία was the leader of a θεωρία, or embassy sent by the state to the Great Games, or to consult the oracle at Delphi, or to assist at the celebration of the Delia—the solemn festival of the Ionian confederacy. The ἀρχιθεωρία was one of the ordinary, or ἐγκύκλιοι λειτουργίαι, which devolved upon the wealthy Athenian citizen. See Smith’s Dict. of Antiquities, articles—Delia, Theor, Leiturgia. Zell assumes that the τριπαρχία would cost more than an ἀρχιθεωρία: Grant reverses this opinion. The Delian ἀρχιθεωρία probably cost more than a τριπαρχία: some other ἀρχιθεωρίαι probably less.

§ 3. πολλάκι κ.τ.λ.] from Od. xvii. 419, a. 27.

§ 4. οὖχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι ... λαμπρυνόμεναι] Asp. has—βανω- a. 32.

1 In the E. E. (iii. 6) δ ἐπὶ τὸ μείκων is said to be ὠνόματος, but to resemble the ἀπειρόκολος and σαλάκων: in the ὑπογραφή, however, the habit is called δαπανηρία (E. E. ii. 3). In the Μ. Μ. (i. 26) the habit is called σαλακωνία (1192 a. 37—Kb however reads ἀλαζονέας here, and ἀλαζών for σαλάκων in 1192 b. 2 and 3). The σαλάκων, or swaggerer, is coupled with the σόλωκος, or vulgar person, in Rhet. ii. 16. 1391 a. 4.
weight to the joint authority of Kβ and Oβ here, that he accepts υπέρ from them. He may be quite right in doing so: but I think he ought to do more, and bracket the clause (suspicious in itself) in which υπέρ appears. See note on iii. 3.

b. 4. § 6.] Rassow (Forsch. 75) inserts ei πρέπον between πρέπον and τῷ ἔργῳ (1122 b. 4), believing that no sense can be got out of the clause οὖτω γὰρ ... ἔργῳ as it stands. Is this so? Aristotle says that the δαπάναι (answering to the ἐνέργεια mentioned in the line above) of the μεγαλοπρεπῆς are (as his name implies) μεγάλα and πρέπουσαι. The ἔργα or objects (answering to the δω ἐστὶν above) of his δαπάναι will therefore be μεγάλα, for unless they are μεγάλα, we cannot speak of a μέγα δαπάνημα in the sense in which we wish μέγα to be here understood—i. e. in the sense of μέγα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ—not only great materially (for the δαπάναι of the βάνωσις are great materially), but having its material greatness plainly justified by the greatness of its object.

Münscher and Rassow (Forsch. p. 75) omit καί (b. 1) before δω ἐστὶν: wrongly I think. A εξις (like an organ) is to be understood in relation to its functions, and to its objects, or the environment for which it is suited.

Ἐν ἄρχῃ may be taken as a reference to the account of the nature and formation of the ἥδικαι εξεις with which Aristotle began this division (Books ii—iv) of his Treatise.

b. 12. § 10. ἐν τούτοις δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Ἔν τούτοις i. e. ἄ δεί καὶ ὡς δεί. Peters translates—'So the magnificent man must be liberal also; for the liberal man too will spend the right amount in the right manner; only, both the amount and the manner being right, magnificence is distinguished from liberality (which has the same sphere of action) by greatness—I mean by actual magnitude of amount spent: and secondly, where the amount spent is the same, the result of the magnificent man's expenditure will be more magnificent.' This seems to be the only rendering which the words as they stand admit of: οὖν μέγεθος is epexegetic of τῶ μέγα, and τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὐσίας is a genitive absolute. The rendering of Lambinus—sed in his quidquid magni est magnifici proprium est, veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa haec versantis,

1 Here Peters translates Bekker's ταυτά.
which makes the gen. ἑλευθερώτητος depend on μέγεθος, can hardly be right. I am inclined, however, to suspect the text, and to think that Coraes is right in trying to restore a verb to govern μέγεθος. He suggests σχούσης for οὖσης and has the following note: Σχούσης ἀντὶ τοῦ οὖσης οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἔξηγοςάοτο κοινὰ πολλὰ τοῖς κριτικοῖς παρασχόν πράγματα χωρίον τοῦτο. ὦ νοῦς, ἐπεὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖος καὶ ἑλευθέριος, κατ' οὔδὲν τε ἐκείνου διαφέρει ἔτερον, πλὴν ὅτι εὖ μεγάλου καὶ μεγάλων ἕνεκα δαπάνη, εἰτὶ ἂν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἑλευθερώτητος σχούσα μέγεθος τοστέστων ἡ διατάξιν ἐν οἷς ἰσὶ δεῖ καὶ ὠς δεὶ μετρίᾳ μὲν οὖσα ἑλευθερώτησιν κεκλησται, προσδιούσα δὲ μέγεθος καλεῖσθω μεγαλοπρέπεια. Rassow (Forsch. 92) adopts the method of emendation indicated by Coraes, and conjectures λαμβούσης for οὖσης, comparing such uses as λαμβάνειν αἴξην, τελείωσιν, τέλος, τοῦ μεγάλου τέλος, ὕψος. Susemihl accepts Rassow's λαμβούσης into his text. Thus μεγαλοπρέπεια 'ist gewissermassen eine ἑλευθερώτης in grossem Stil.' The reading ταύτα (accepted by Rassow, Susemihl and Bywater) has the support of all MSS. apparently, except Ha, CCC, and rec. K b, which have ταύτα adopted by Bekker.

Whether we leave the text as it stands with οὖσης, or read λαμβούσης, we have to remember that the μέγα, or μέγεθος, characteristic of μεγαλοπρέπεια, is not material bulk, as such, but the grandeur which belongs to material bulk subserving a worthy end. 'Magnificence,' says Grant, 'differs from Liberality not in degree, but in kind, being a display of more genius and imagination on the same objects, and thus with the same expense producing a more striking result.' Grant reads περὶ ταύτα— but even this ought not to be rendered 'on the same objects.' The ἑλευθέριος and the μεγαλοπρεπής do not spend 'on the same objects,' but 'both spend the right amount in the right manner,' on their different objects.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀντὶ ᾧ κ.τ.λ.] This explains how it is that ἀπὸ τῆς ἅποθε 1122 b.12. διάτάξης the magnificent man produces a finer result than the liberal man. The result produced by the liberal man is merely a κτήμα—something that is materially useful to the recipient, and has its market value, whereas the result produced by the magnificent man is of the nature of a work of art. It is θαυμαστῶν— 'displays genius and imagination.'

The words with which this section ends are variously given by the MSS—K b, Ob, r, CCC, and Cambr. give καὶ ἔστιν ἔργον ἄρετή,

b. 19. § 11. **τὰ τίμια**] as distinguished from τῶν δὲ ἰδίων § 15. See viii. 14. 3, where τίμη is said to be the return which Society makes to its benefactors. There ought to be a comma (Bekker has none) after θεοῦ,—ἀναθήματα, κατασκευαὶ (constructiones templorum Lamb., arae aedificatae Victor.), and θυσίαι being the three subdivisions of τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς.

b. 22. **χορηγεῖν**] See Smith’s *Dict. of Antiq.* article Choregus. The χορηγία was one of the most expensive λειτουργίας. The duty of the χορηγός, who was appointed by his Tribe, was to provide choruses for tragedies, and comedies, and other public functions. He had to pay the χοροδιδάσκαλος and the choreutae, supplying the latter with proper food, and with the necessary dresses and masks. Even the prize which the most successful χορηγός received, (a tripod) he had to pay for himself. For the expenses of the χορηγία, see Haigh, *Attic Theatre*, p. 82 sqq.

b. 23. ἐστὶν τὴν πόλιν] It would seem that Aristotle uses this expression to distinguish the λειτουργία referred to, from the less splendid ἐστὶν τὴν φυλήν, one of the regular λειτουργίας, which consisted in giving a feast to one’s tribesmen. See Smith’s *Dict. of Antiq.* article *Hestiasis*.

b. 24. § 12. **ἀναφέρεται**] The subject of this verb is τὰ διαπανήματα, and τὸ τὶς κ.τ.λ. is in apposition to τῶν πράττων.

b. 29. § 14. **πρέπει δὲ [καὶ] οἷς**] Bywater brackets καὶ. I think that its omission is a great improvement.


§ 15. ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς μετεστίν \( \delta i \) διὰ τῶν ἕως ζῴων ἄνοιξις οἷκεῖον καὶ \( b. 31. \) συγγεγορέων, Coraes. ‘Their connections’—Peters.

§ 17. καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν διαπανημάτων] I follow Susemihl and Bywater in reading ἐπεὶ for ἐπί, and make the apodosis begin at διὰ τοῦτο § 19. I find that CCC has γρ. ἐπεὶ on the margin for insertion before \( \kappaα \) καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν διαπανημάτων: but all MSS. seem to read ἐπί. Peters (reading ἐπί) translates—’And in his expenditure every detail will be great after its kind, great expenditure on a great occasion being the most magnificent, and then in a less degree that which is great for the occasion, whatever it be.’

§ 20. ἐρανιστῶς γαμικῶς ἐστιόν] ‘Eranos being a club where each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each guest contributed, it was of course bad taste to eclipse the rest in splendour.’ Grant.

Possibly instead of ἐπί: but the three dots referring to the γρ. are under the καὶ.

1123 a. 23. defined in Poet. 12. 1452 b. 22 πάροδος μὲν ἡ πρώτη λέξει δεῦρον χοροῦ. Zell and Coraes, however, are of opinion that here πάροδος means the part of the theatre at which the chorus entered, and that the ‘purple’ is not the dress of the choreutae, but the hangings of this part, which, in the case of comic representations, were usually skins. That hangings are here intended seems to be the view both of the Ald. Schol. and of the Par. The former has—σύνθες ἐν κωμοθείᾳ παραπετάσματα δέρρεις ποιεῖν οὐ πορφυρίδας: and the Par. has—ἐν ταῖς κωμοθείαις ἀντὶ κοδίου (sheep skins), ἀ παραπετάσματα ἡν ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, πορφυρίδας ἔχει, καθάπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. Zell quotes Lysias (699) for the cost of a comic choregia—κωμοθείαις χορηγὸν Κρητικὸν ἐνίκον καὶ ἀμφότερον σιν τῇ τῆς σκηνῆς ἀναθέτει ἐκκαλέσκα μνᾶ—i.e. about £64. The cost of a tragic choregia would be much greater.

Bywater restores Μεγαρεῖς from K, in place of the Μεγαρεῖς of other MSS. Pr. CCC has Μεγαροὶ.

a. 31. § 22.] Μεγαλόπρεπεία and its extremes are discussed in E. E. iii. 6, and in M. M. i. 26 shortly, and in an inferior manner.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

The μεγαλόψυχος, or great-souled man, deems himself worthy of that which is highest, being worthy of it, as distinguished from the χαύνος, or vain man, on the one side, who thinks too highly of himself, and the μικρόψυχος, or small-souled man, on the other side, who thinks too little of himself.

That which is highest—among external good things—is honour. It is this which the μεγαλόψυχος rightly deems himself worthy of. Μεγαλοψυχία, then, may be defined as a mediocrity where honour and dishonour are concerned.

Rightly deeming himself worthy of that which is highest, the μεγαλόψυχος must be a truly virtuous man; and his μεγαλοψυχία will lend distinction to the virtues, without which it cannot itself exist.

But, although he deems himself worthy of the highest honour, the μεγαλόψυχος does not make honour his all-in-all. Since, then, even honour is not all-in-all to him, he will not be likely to think too highly of inferior good things. The consciousness of his own commanding personality will be enough for him. This consciousness will reveal itself externally in the independence of his demeanour,
and the distinction of his bearing. He will accept the honour which he receives from good men, not as adequate to his desert, but as the best thing which they can offer. The opinion of ordinary men—favourable or unfavourable—he will look down upon. (Here he is apt to be imitated by those who are not really μεγαλόψυχοι. But he has a right to look down on other men.) He will rather do good offices than have them done to him. He will remember those whom he has benefited, but those who have benefited him he will easily forget. He will be haughty and reserved with the great, and easy with those of middle-estate. He will not enter into competition with others for honour. He will reserve himself for great occasions of acting, and great danger; but when the great danger comes he will not grudge his life. He will love and hate openly. He will speak and act the truth—except in so far as he keeps ordinary people at a distance by his irony. He will never be found looking up to people or things with awe and wonder. Remembering evil, personal talk, praise, blame, complaint, will all be far from his nature.

His walk will be slow, his voice deep, his manner of speaking calm and measured.

The extremes—the vain man, and the small-souled man, are not exactly vicious characters—they are not evil-doers: but they are in error. The small-souled man deprives himself of what is his due, from not knowing himself. He is not silly; but he is backward. His poor opinion of himself, however, makes him a worse man in time. The vain man, on the other hand, is silly. His lack of self-knowledge is conspicuous. He is always being shown-up, as he strives, by dress, and all kinds of ostentation, to make people think highly of him.

Μικρόψυχοι, however, is the real opposite of μεγαλόψυχοι, for μικρόψυχοι is more common than χαλονότης, and worse.

Introductory Note.] The picture of the μεγαλόψυχος given in this chapter is a creation of art, intended to present a great philosophical truth with concrete evidence to the imagination. We must therefore be careful not to look at it as if it were a portrait-sketch after the manner of Theophrastus, or stood on the same plane with the other character-pictures given in the Fourth Book.

The μεγαλόψυχος accepts the highest honour, though falling short of his deserts, because men have nothing better to give him. He remembers those whom he has benefited, but not those from whom he has received benefits. To the many he is ironical. He does not give way to admiration, for in his eyes nothing is great. This spirit in a real man would be intolerable. But Aristotle’s μεγαλόψυχος is not a real man. He is an ideal creation in philosophy, as Philoctetes or Antigone is in tragedy. He is Aristotle’s concrete presentation of that θεωρία which is essential to human excellence. He ‘contemplates’ the κόσμος or beautiful harmony of his own nature, and allows nothing external to it
to dominate his thought or conduct. He thus realises ἀυτόρρεια or autonomy, and 'possesses all the virtues' in a fuller sense than other virtuous men, who are conscious of the moral law merely through their φρόνησις, or practical insight and self-knowledge. The μεγαλόψυχος is a man of the highest speculative power. Like Spinoza's ideal, he has the scientia intuitiva, and sees in every virtuous act the whole world of human nature clearly, which good men of less speculative power see only dimly. The ever-present spectacle of 'the moral law within,' by its sublimity, exalts his mind; while the exaltation of mind, or μεγαλοψυχία, reveals itself outwardly in the dignity and distinction of his bearing. High speculative power being thus essential to μεγαλοψυχία, it is not every virtuous man who can be μεγαλόψυχος.

It is impossible to determine how far Aristotle was guided in his delineation of the μεγαλόψυχος by reference to particular individuals known to him. There certainly seem to be touches in the work suggested by such a reference; but it may be said, I think, that the work loses, rather than gains, by these attempts at realism, and that the impression which they convey, that we have before us a real and possible man, who, as described, would be intolerable, is unfortunate, and has contributed to the misunderstanding of the significance of μεγαλοψυχία in Aristotle's Ethical System. The measured movements, and the deep voice, make us think of a real man: but, after all, they are only the buskins and mask of an ideal character. Aristotle, we may be sure, was as fully aware of the ideality of his μεγαλόψυχος, or man who is a law to himself, as Kant was of the ideality of his Good Will: but Aristotle, unlike Kant, had undertaken to picture the ideal of moral autonomy, for the eye, as it were, and could not withstand the temptation of putting in touches more suitable to a psychological and physiological description, than to the representation of an ethical ideal.

Hegel's view, that Alexander the Great was Aristotle's model, is a particularly unfortunate one. The impetuous genius, and the vices, of Alexander distinguish him, in the most marked manner, from the harmoniously developed μεγαλόψυχος. Nor must too much be made of the examples of μεγαλοψυχία—Alcibiades, Achilles, Ajax, Lysander, and Socrates—given, in a purely

1 For other objections to Hegel's view see Teichmüller Literarische Fehden, p. 192.
logical context, in An. Post. ii. 13. 97 b. 18; for no one of these characters answers to the description here given. The description of the μεγαλόψυχος in the Ethics is rather the mise en scène of Aristotle's doctrine of the ἀνθρώπεια of the εὐδαίμων in the Life of Reason, than a portrait-sketch after the manner of Theophrastus.

§ 4. σωφρων] here means 'modest,' 'knowing his place'—1123 b. 5. as each of the classes in Plato's State, in virtue of its σωφροσύνη, 'knows its own place.'

§ 5. τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι] The editors refer to Poet. 7. b. 7. 1450 b. 36 τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἑστι.

§ 6. οὐ πᾶς χαῖνος] i. e. a man may think too much of himself, b. 9. without going the stupid length of vanity.

§ 8. τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἅκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεὶ μέσος] Cf. ii. 6. 17. b. 13. As 'a great man' he stands on a pinnacle; as 'a virtuous character' he occupies the mean. His position, as he himself is conscious of it, and as it strikes the imagination of the admiring beholder, is one of incomparable preeminence; but to the moral analyst it suggests difficulties of detail in which the χαῖνος and the μικρόψυχος fail—and in which the 'virtuous character' himself might have failed.

§ 10. ἦ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἄγαθά] 'Worth' is a b. 17. relative term—i. e. it cannot be understood except as entitling its possessor to 'something'; and this 'something' has to be specified. Being something which the person 'worthy of it' gets, it cannot be a good thing of the soul, or of the body; it must, therefore, be one of τὰ ἐκτὸς ἄγαθά.

τιμή] When μεγαλόψυχα is said to be περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ στήμασ, we b. 20. must remember that τιμή is after all only a symbol of the reward to which the worth of the μεγαλόψυχος is entitled. Τιμή regarded at an end in itself in the πολιτικὸς βίος turns out to be something precarious, ἐν τοῖς τιμώσας μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ (i. 5. 4). The true reward is εὐδαιμονία or the ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς καὶ ἀρετῆ ἑστί. This is indeed τίμην (i. 12) and an end in itself, as the gods, to whom we do not give ἔπαινος, but assign τιμή, are ends in themselves, not means to our advantage. The τιμή which is assigned to the μεγαλόψυχος must therefore be understood in connexion with the
technical use of the term τίμην as explained in E.N. i. 12. The
self-sufficing personality of the μεγαλόψυχος inspires reverence.
The outward expressions of this reverence are in themselves
nothing to the μεγαλόψυχος, but he receives them, as the gods
receive our homage, not because they need it, but because we
offer it, as the best thing we have to offer. But if the world is
unappreciative and withholds the homage due to his character, the
μεγαλόψυχος is not troubled. He goes on his way like Plato’s
embodiment of the ‘autonomy of the Will’—ο ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν
(Rep. 362 and 366), who walks through life with the inward
consciousness of justice, and the reputation of injustice.

b. 23. § 11. τιμήσ γὰρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἄξιοστοι ἐαυτοὺς] Bywater
brackets οἱ μεγάλοι—rightly. It probably represents an interpolated
οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι.

b. 25. § 12. ἄξιωμα] ‘non est sui aestimatio, sed ipsa dignitas’—Michelet,
rightly.

b. 26. § 13. οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον] πρὸς ought perhaps to be
restored to the text before τὸν. K b omits γε.

b. 30. § 14. τὸ ἐκάστῃ ἅρμα μέγα] The virtues of the μεγαλόψυχος
are exalted by his clear consciousness of their systematic unity.
An error, which might escape the notice of the ordinarily virtuous
man, cannot escape his notice, but is instantly seen in its bearing
upon the whole of life. He has always the ‘Representation of
Law Universal’ before his eyes. It must be admitted that the
μεγαλόψυχος is not easily understood by us, and does not
command our modern sympathy. The whole man is ideal;
whereas we prefer to idealise one trait, leaving the rest of the
character still human, and prone to error. We are tempted to
apply to the faultless μεγαλόψυχος our saying—‘Pride goes before
a fall,’ forgetting that ex hypothesi he cannot fall, as a god cannot
die.

We, in modern times, are dominated by two great conceptions,
to which Aristotle is a stranger—the conception of Social Progress,
and that of Human Brotherhood. The μεγαλόψυχος, with ‘all
the virtues,’ answers to the conception of a stationary social order.
He lives in a glorious present which has no need of a future.
But in the mind of the modern social reformer, new ideas appear,
as disturbing elements, among the old ideas which reflect actually present conditions. These new ideas he must cherish, and give himself up to. He must be willing to correspond badly with the present, to incur odium, to make himself ridiculous—all for the sake of a future, which he may not, perhaps cannot, live to see. Here, evidently, there is no room for 'all the virtues.'

The other great conception of modern times—that of the Brotherhood of men, especially as it gives reality in our eyes to the misery that we see around us, is equally opposed to the Aristotelian ideal of 'all the virtues.' If these miserable are to be succoured, it must be by men who devote themselves to the work entirely, without thought of 'culture.'

§ 15. παρασείσαντι] here used absolutely as in Probl. v. 8. b. 31. 881 b. 6 ὃ δὲ βάτων θεί παρασείων ἡ μὴ παρασείων: but the full construction has χεῖρας, cf. περὶ πορείας ζωὸν 3. 705 a. 17 καὶ οἱ βίωνες βάτων θέου ισανικά παρασείνοντες τὰς χεῖρας. The editors compare Theophr. Char. περὶ ἀδόλεσχίας—παρασείσαντα δὲ χρῇ τῶν τοιούτων τῶν ἄνθρωπων καὶ διαράμενον (sc. τὰ σκέλη—' with long steps,') ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, ὡς τις ἀπήρετος βουλεύει εἰναι.

ϕ' γ' οὐδὲν μέγα] The reading of Ob, CCC and Kb man. alt.; b. 32. Bekker omits the γ' wrongly: see Rassow, Forsch. 60.

§ 16. κόσμος] The beauty and order of the virtues which is the object and work of Reason.

καλοκαγαθίας] This term does not seem to have the technical meaning for Aristotle, which it afterwards bears in the E.E. (H. 15. 1248 b. 8 ff.) In the E.E. it is that ἐξίς which enables a man to see the ultimate σκοπός or δρός—the Divine Nature. It is a kind of amor intellectualis Dei. Here, however, and in E.N. x. 9. 3 (the only other place where the word occurs in the E.N.) 'no special import is given to the word. It seems to imply a sort of elevated virtue.' (Grant.) To Aristotle as to Plato the καλὸς τὸ καγαθὸς is 'very much what we mean by a "gentleman."' (Grant.) The writer of the M.M. (ii. 9) describes the καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς as the man for whom all things really good in life are good—'ἔστιν οὖν ὁ καλὸς καγαθὸς ϕ τὰ ἄπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἔστων ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἄπλῶς καλὰ καλὰ ἔστιν' ὁ τοιοῦτος γὰρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς. ϕ δὲ τὰ ἄπλῶς ἀγαθὰ μὴ ἔστων ἀγαθὰ, οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς, διότι οὐδὲ ἵγαινεν ἂν δοξείν ϕ τὰ ἄπλῶς ἰγαθεία μὴ ἰγαθεία ἔστων. εἰ γὰρ ὁ πλοῦτος

1124 a. 4. καὶ ἡ ἄρχη παραγαμοῦμενα τινα βλάπτονες, οὐκ ἄν αἱρετὰ εἰη, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα αὐτὸν μὴ βλάψει, βοηθεῖται αὐτῷ εἰναι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἄν οἶδος ὑποστελλόμενος τι τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἄν δόξει καλὸς κἀγαθός εἶναι ἀλλ’ ὃς τάγαθα πάντα ὅστα ἄγαθά ἐστιν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μὴ διασβείεται, οἶον ὑπὸ πλοῦτον καὶ ἄρχης, ὁ τοιοῦτος καλὸς κἀγαθός (Μ.Μ. 1207 b. 31—1208 a. 4). This description of the καλὸς κἀγαθός as the man in perfect correspondence with the most brilliant social circumstances—not obliged to 'furl his sails'—to deny himself good because it hurts him, comes very near what was Aristotle's thought when he wrote χαλεπόν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ οἶνω τε ἀνέν καλοκαγαθίας.

a. 7. § 17. ἄρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦσ] equivalent to καλοκαγαθία as understood in the present context.

a. 17. § 18. ὡς μέγιστον δὴν] These words have caused difficulty to the editors; and Ramsauer proposes the omission of ὡς. Peters following the Par. translates—'Seeing that not even honour affects him as if it were a very important thing.' This interpretation is supported by the following φὶ δὴ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρῶν ἐστίν. Coraes, however, following Lambinus, interprets differently, taking ὡς not in the sense of 'as if,' but closely with the superlative μέγιστον—οὐδὲ περὶ τὴν τιμήν, καίπερ δὲν ὡς μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οὕτω εξει ὡστε πέρα τοῦ μέτρου χαίρειν, τυγχάνων, ἡ λυπεῖσθαι, στεροῦμενος. I have no hesitation in accepting the Paraphra's interpretation—οὐ γὰρ μέγιστον ὑγίηται τὴν τιμὴν καὶ οὕτω περὶ αὐτὴν ἐξει ὡς μέγιστον δὴν. It is true that τιμὴ is μέγιστον τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν (§ 10): but ἄρετῆς παντελοῦσ οὐκ ἄν γένοιτο ἄξια τιμὴ (§ 17).

a. 20. § 19. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχῆματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν] The force of δοκεῖ must be observed here. Μεγαλοψυχία as popularly conceived is enhanced by prosperity: but true μεγαλοψυχία with its παντελῆς ἄρετῆ is independent of fortuitous aid.

The force of the passive verbs ἤξιονται and τιμῶνται in this section and in § 20, as explained by Ramsauer, is also to be observed—'a. 21 ἤξιονται τιμῆ . . . a. 24 τιμῶνται . . . a. 25 τιμητέος . . . a. 26 ἤξιονται τιμῆς: observandum genus passivum verborum. Prius igitur iste quidem de honoribus cogitare videtur qui sibi ab aliis offeritur, ut deinde (vs. 27 ἐκατοντος ἢξιοντων) et ipse audeat eosdem sibi vindicare. Id quod secus erat in vera virtute, quippe

qua ab initio ὁ ἄξιος δὲν αὐτὸς ἄξιοὶ εἰκών μεγάλων (1123 b. 2), non 1124 a. 20. egens ille testimonio aliorum.'

ἡ πλούτωντες] Rassow (Forsch. 60) rightly omits the article a. 22. before πλούτωντες, with Kb, Mb, Camb., and CCC. of δυναστεύοντες ἡ πλούτωντες are together distinguished from όι εὐγενεῖς. The article before πλούτωντες would have been right, if καὶ instead of ἡ had been used.

τιμητὸς] Bekker reads τιμητός. τιμητός is given by pr. Kb, Mb, a. 25. Asp. NC, B3.

§ 20. ἀμφοὶ] ὥς ἰδίῳ πράσεις καὶ ἡ ἁρετή καὶ τὰ ἐξωθεν ἀγαθὰ μᾶλλον ἀξίουσι τιμήσει τὴν ἁρετὴν μόνον ἔχουσος. Par.

§ 21. ὑπερόπται] Jebb (Theophrastus p. 186) compares the a. 29. ὑπερφιλία, or arrogance, of Theophrastus with the parody of μεγαλογυνία described in this section. 'Ο δὲ ὑπερφιλαῖος says Theophrastus τοῦδε τις ὅπως... εἴ τοίχας μεμνήσθαι φάσκειν—′ he will profess to recollect benefits which he has conferred—i.e.,' says Jebb (p. 187), 'he will remind others in a patronizing manner that he has placed them under obligations; which may or may not be true, for the ambiguous φάσκειν, "to allege," leaves it doubtful. This trait illustrates the difference between arrogance and Lofty-mindedness. It is characteristic of the Lofty-minded man, as Aristotle observes, to remember whom he has benefited. The arrogant man (who is a bad imitator of the Lofty-minded) does not only remember;—he proclaims that he remembers.'

καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχουσε ἀγαθὰ γίνονται] οἱ has been received into the text by Bekker, Susemihl and Bywater, on the authority of Kb. It is given also by Camb.; but all other MSS., apparently, read καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα. I feel considerable doubt about the reception of οἱ. Michelet's defence of καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχουσε ἀγαθὰ seems to me to be a strong one. 'Kb οἱ ante τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχουσε ἀγαθὰ addit, quam lectionem Cardwellus et Bekkerus in textum reperunt. Male. Καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχουσε ἀγαθὰ est causa, cur ii, qui virtute orbati sunt, contemptores et contumeliosi sint: utpote habentes etiam externa bona; ad γίγνονται igitur supplices subjectum e praecedentibus (οἱ δὲν ἁρετῆς). Addentibus οἱ, alterum καὶ rejeciendum esset.' This καὶ is marked for omission by a later hand in CCC. If we suppose the original text to have been—ὑπερόπται

1124 a. 29. δὲ καὶ ἡμισταὶ τὰ τουαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται (sc. οἱ ἄνευ ἀδετῆς), we may explain the words καὶ οἱ as fragments of an ancient blunder ἡμιστικαί with the final at corrected οἱ above the line. But there is no strong objection, I think, to the retention of the καὶ. If it belonged to the original text, the blunder ἡμιστικαί would be almost inevitable: and the correction of the final at into οἱ would follow as a matter of course.

The readings ἰπερόσταται δὲ καὶ ἡμισταὶ καὶ τὰ τουαῦτα ἔχοντες κακὰ (Par. 1417, Ald., Coraes) γίνονται are worth noticing only as κακοὶ (Γ, Ζελλ) showing that the clause is one which puzzled scribes.

b. 5. § 22. ὥ μὲν γὰρ] Susseihl and Bywater read ὥ μὲν γὰρ on the authority of Κᵇ. The first hand in CCC likewise gives ὥ μὲν γὰρ. So far as sense is concerned, I do not think that there is much to choose between this and Bekker’s ὥ δὲ.

b. 7. § 23. μικροκίνδυνος] This is the reading of Κᵇ, Camb., CCC, and B¹. The other MSS. seem to agree in giving πυκνοκίνδυνος. The Par. and Asp. also read πυκνοκίνδυνος. It is difficult to decide between the two readings.

b. 9. πάντως] ‘at all costs,’ Peters.

§ 24.] Grant remarks that ‘the principle of independence appears here in an extreme form.’ But we must remember that Aristotle is putting on the stage for us his doctrine that the chief end of man is ἑνόγγεια not πάθος: we must not criticise the ‘character’ in which this doctrine has been embodied, as if he were a person whom we might meet in real life. At the same time, it must be admitted that it is more difficult not to criticise the μεγαλόψυχος in this way, than it is to appreciate correctly an abstractly presented ideal like that of Spinoza or Kant.

b. 11. οὖν γὰρ οἱ προσοφλήσει] Bywater introduces οἱ, given by Κᵇ, CCC, and Camb. I feel very doubtful about it in Aristotle.

b. 13. § 25. ὅν δὲ ὅν πάθωσιν οὗ] This is true in tendency of us all—as Menander says (Meineke iv. 345)—

Μünscher’s insertion of ἵφ’ before ὅν is a tempting but perhaps not strictly necessary emendation. Bywater reads ὅν for the οὗ of the codd. after μημονεύειν: and άκούειν for άκούει.

Θείν καὶ λέγειν τὰς ἐυεργεσίας τῷ Διὶ] In general terms she does not.

(Π. i. 503—4 εἴποτε δὴ σε μετ' ἀδιανόησιν ὅπηγα, ἡ ἔπει ἡ ἔργῳ), as Coraes points out: λείπεται οὖν, he adds, μνημονικὸν ἀμάρτημα ὑπολαμβάνειν τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦ τοῦ προκείμενον.

Ἄκωνε[ν] This again, Coraes remarks, is perhaps a μνημονικὸν b. 16. ἀμάρτημα—that is, if the reference is to the circumstance narrated by Xenophon (Hellen. vi. 5. 33, 34) of Spartan envoys (together with envoys from Corinth and Phlius) coming to Athens to ask for aid against the Thebans, b.c. 369; for, in Xenophon’s summary of the Spartan speeches, the services rendered to Athens by Sparta are very prominent (see Grote’s Greece part ii. ch. 78. vol. vii. 205). As for the historian Callisthenes, referred to by the Ald. Schol. ad loc., we cannot be sure that the Schol. reports him correctly. At any rate the close verbal agreement with Aristotle’s present statement is suspicious. The words of the Schol. are—τὸ δὲ περὶ Δακεδαμώνων τοιοῦτον ἱστορεῖ Καλλισθένης ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, ὧν Ἡθικῶν εἰς τὴν Λακωνίκην εἰσβάλλοντον, ἐπεμψαν Δακεδαμώνων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους συμμαχία δεόμενοι, λέγοντες ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὡς μὲν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Δακεδαμώνοι πεποίηκασιν εἰς τούτως ἐπελάθοντο ἐκόντες, ὡς δὲ αὐτοὶ χρηστὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίων ἐπεπώθησαν τούτων ἔμεμπτο, ἡ δὲ τούτων αὐτούς ἐπαξόμενοι πρὸς τὴν συμμαχίαν μᾶλλον.

§ 26. ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνοις] Susemihl and Bywater accept ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνοι b. 21. the reading of Kb, Ob, CCC, and Camb. In the next line the MSS. seem all to agree in reading ἐν. I much prefer ἐν ἐκεῖνοις.

§ 28. καὶ ἀμελεῖν] restored by Bywater from Kb. I prefer the b. 27. μελεῖν of the other MSS., and would close the parenthesis with φοβουμένων.

παρρησιασθῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικός εἶναι, καὶ ἀληθευτικός] b. 29. This is Bywater’s reading for παρ. γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν· διὸ καὶ ἀλ., which Bekker, and originally Susemihl, accepted on the sole authority of γ. Par. 1856. There is no passage in the E.N. where the MSS. exhibit such variety (see Susemihl’s E. N. app. crit. and especially his E. E. Appendix ii, where he abandons Bekker’s reading). As the meaning given is in all cases practically the same, I think that we cannot do better than accept Bywater’s
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1124 b. 29. choice—without assuming that it is exactly what Aristotle wrote.

b. 30. ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δὲ εἰρωνείαν] See below chapter 7. Bywater brackets εἰρωνεία δὲ which all MSS. give after εἰρωνείαν, except N, which gives εἰρωνα δὲ, accepted by Bekker. Sussemlhl's suggestion—εἰρων δὲ is worth consideration I think. Perhaps εἰρων γὰρ.

b. 31. § 29. πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζὴν ἄλλ' ἢ φίλον] 'He cannot fashion his life to suit another, except he be a friend' (Peters), i.e. he cannot make himself relative to (πρὸς τι) any one who is less than his ἐτερος αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν.

1125 a. 8. § 31. εἰ μὴ δὲ ἰδίων] Coraes is undoubtedly wrong with εἰ μὴ ἐπ' ἐκείνων ἰδίων. Peters has 'except with the express purpose of giving offence.' I much prefer Jebb's 'unless it be to show his scorn' (Theophr. p. 35).

a. 15. § 34. σύντονοσ] 'excited,' Peters. Zell refers to the Physiognomonica, where the bodily characteristics attending the various virtues and vices are described. Although the characteristics of the μεγαλόψυχος are not described, those of the μικρόψυχος are in ch. 3. 808 a. 29 μικροψυχου σημεια μικρομελής, μικρογλαύφωροι ('small and round,' Liddell and Scott) ἵππος, μικροματος καὶ μικροπρόσωπος, οἶδαν εἰ ἐνὶ Κορίνθιοι ἢ Δευκάδιοι. The characteristics of the κόσμιος, however, answer partly to those assigned here to the μεγαλόψυχος—κοσμίον σημεια ἐν ταῖς κυψεῖς βραδύσ, καὶ διάλεκτος βραδεία καὶ φωνή θυματώδης καὶ ἀσμενής κ.τ.λ. 807 b. 33. Zell and Coraes refer also to de Gen. An. v. 7. 786 b. 35 δοκεῖ γενναιότερον εἶναι φύσεως ἡ βαρντωπυν καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέλει τὸ βαρύ τὸν συντόνων βέλτιον τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον ἐν ὑπεροχῇ, ἢ δὲ βαρύτης ὑπεροχῇ τις.

a. 18. § 35. ὁδῷ ὁτιοι] no more than the ἐξεις of μικροπρόσωπος and βαρντωπυν are κακιὰ in the strict sense. See above ch. 2, § 22.

a. 21. καὶ ἀγροεῖν δέ ἐστιν] Coraes in defending this infinitive against the v.l. ἀγροεῖ, makes it depend on ἐστι. Grant and Peters however make its construction the same as that of ἀξιόν. In any case, the particles καὶ—δὲ (see Eucken de partic. usu p. 32) introduce
words—ἀγνοεῖν εαυτόν—which explain wherein the inferiority of the 1125 a. 21. μικρόψυχος really consists.

§ 36. χαίνοις] Jebb (Theoph. p. 198) compares the μικροφιλότητος a. 27. of Theophrastus with the χαίνοις, remarking that 'the μικροφιλότητος does not necessarily, like the χαίνοις, overrate himself; he only overlrates those things on which he founds his claim to honour.' 'The man of Petty ambition (μικροφιλότητος),' says Theophrastus (Jebb's translation, p. 99), 'is one who when asked to dinner will be anxious to be placed near the host at table... In the Market Place he will frequent the bankers' tables; in the gymasia he will haunt those places where the young men take exercise; in the theatre when there is a representation he will sit near the Generals... Also he is very much the person to keep a monkey; to get a Satyr ape, Sicilian doves, deer-horn dice, Thurian vases of the approved rotundity, walking-sticks with the true Laconian curve, and a curtain with Persians embroidered on it... When he has sacrificed an ox he will nail up the skin of the forehead wreathed with large garlands opposite the entrance, in order that those who come in may see that he has sacrificed an ox. When he has been taking part in a procession of the knights, he will give the rest of his accoutrements to his slave to carry home; but after putting on his cloak, will walk about the market-place in his spurs.' The χαίνοις as such does not occur among the portraits of Theophrastus.

οὗ γὰρ ἀξίων ὄντες] Bywater follows Kb (and CCC) in reading οὗ. a. 28. Bekker, following all other MSS., reads ὅς. Cf. ὅς ἀνάξιων ὄντες two lines above, I suspect that an original ὅς fell out after ἐπιφανῆς, and a corrector, seeing something amiss, inserted οὗ in the archetype of Kb.


περὶ αὐτῶν] περὶ αὐτῶν is Bekker's reading: but περὶ αὐτῶν (sc. a. 32. περὶ τῶν εἰναρχήματον) gives much better sense, and is defended by Rassow, Forsch. p. 60. Cf. the Par. περὶ ἀναντιάς πανερὰ ποιεῖν ἀεὶ τα εἰναρχήματα ἑαυτοῖς καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀεὶ λέγει.

§ 37.] Μικροψυχία is worse than χαμαράθης, and more common: it is accordingly the real contrary of μεγαλοψυχία. 'Want of
1125 a. 2. elevated aims,’ says Grant ad loc., ‘want of effort of will, of individuality, these are indeed fatal deficiencies as regards the attainment of what is fine and noble in character.’ Μικροψυχία, like ἀνελευθερία, is the characteristic of a weak and narrow nature, of which nothing can be made. Χαυτότης, like ἀσωτία, may perhaps disappear as age and experience indicate to a man his true level. Not that the χαύνος will thus become μεγαλόψυχος. Μεγαλόψυχία requires such high and singular endowments that a man cannot become μεγαλόψυχος by the simple process of moderating youthful χαυτότης, as it is suggested (iv. 1. 31) he may become ἐλευθέριος by the decay of his ἀσωτία. Μεγαλόψυχος nascitur non fit. A man with the speculative endowment of the μεγαλόψυχος can never have been really vain, even in the years of youthful inexperience. But if we descend to a lower intellectual and moral level, we may see the vain youth becoming a man who thinks well of himself, but not too well, and is able and ready to play his part in life with spirit. The μικρόψυχος, however, has not the amour propre, and personal force, necessary for the struggle which results in fine social types: he becomes worse, as time goes on, and he falls further and further out of the running. It must be observed, however, that μικροψυχία may imply either a general feebleness of character—in which sense it is indeed a hopeless state; or mere backwardness (ἀκηροὶ § 35) in the social struggle, which is not inconsistent with latent strength. It is also to be observed that μικροψυχία of this latter kind, i.e. mere social backwardness, would be a greater hindrance to the attainment of ‘excellence,’ as Aristotle understood ‘excellence,’ i.e. the possession of ‘all the virtues’ which put a man en évidence in a brilliant society, than it is to that self-denying devotion to the public good which is now recognised as the chief element in Virtue.

Μεγαλόψυχία is discussed in Ε.Ε. iii. 5 (in an inferior manner) and in Μ.Μ. i. 25.
CHAPTER IV.

Argument.

There is an ἀνώνυμος ἀρετὴ (we may perhaps call it Proper Ambition), the mean between φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία, which stands to μεγαλοφυσία in respect of τιμή as ἐλευθερία stands to μεγαλοπρεπεία in respect of δαπάνη. Ἐλευθερία is concerned with comparatively small δαπάναια, the anonymous mean between φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία, with the honours which are within the reach of the ordinary citizen—honours which a man cannot take his proper share in social life without aspiring to.

Introductory Note.[1] The comparison of the ἐλευθερίας and the μεγαλοπρεπής brought out more than a quantitative difference, or difference in the amounts expended. The μεγαλοπρεπής, we saw, is an artist, and his performances differ qualitatively from those of the ἐλευθερίας. Much more striking is the qualitative difference between the respective objects of the μεγαλόφυσιας and the ἀνώνυμος of this chapter. The statement that the μεγαλόφυσιας is concerned with μεγάλη τιμή and the ἀνώνυμος with μικρὰ τιμῆ (ii. 7-8) takes us only a short way. It is a different kind of τιμή with which each is concerned. The τιμή which the μεγαλόφυσιας accepts is but ‘the guinea stamp,’ which symbolises his intrinsic worth. His object is, not this τιμή, but the personality—the εἰδαιμονία to which it is rendered. But the ἀνώνυμος of this chapter seeks another kind of τιμή—ordinary social recognition; not, indeed, that he may enjoy it selfishly, but that he may be better able to influence society for good, just as the ἐλευθερίας seeks to have money that he may be liberal with it. Neither he, nor the ἐλευθερίας, as such, has that sense of Form, which enables the μεγαλοπρεπής to make an artistic use of wealth, and in the μεγαλόφυσιας appears as scientia intuitiva—the intuition of Life as a Whole. It is therefore somewhat misleading to coordinate μεγαλοφυσία and the virtue of this chapter, as Aristotle does here, and the writer of ii. 7-8 does, describing the former simply as περὶ τιμῆν ὁδὸν μεγάλην, and the latter as περὶ μικρῶν ὁδῶν. The virtue of this chapter is the quality of the ‘successful man,’ who makes a career for himself,
but in a public-spirited way: μεγαλοψυχία is Goethe's Im Ganzen Guten Wahren resolut zu leben; or Spinoza's Amor intellectualis Dei, or the καλοκάγαθία of Eudemus.

1125 b. 1. § 1. καὶ περὶ ταύτην] Ramsauer reads τιμὴν for ταύτην, because ταύτην relates not to τιμὴν but to τιμὴν μεγάλην, and brackets the clause ἦ μὲν οὖν . . . εἴρηται, (ch. 3, § 38), because μεγαλοψυχία has not been described in this Book as περὶ μεγάλην τιμὴν, although in ii. 7 it is so described. If ii. 7 is genuine—and Ramsauer seems to accept it as such—I cannot see why Aristotle should not be allowed to refer to it here in δοσολ εἴρηται, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη. Of course if we accept the view of Monro (Journal of Philology vi. 185 sqq.), and reject ii. 7 as an interpolation, the case is different. If we could read μικράν for ταύτην Ramsauer's grammatical difficulty would be removed, and the presence of the clause containing μεγάλην perhaps made more acceptable. It is to be noted that this chapter adds scarcely anything new to the sketch (itself comparatively full) in ii. 7. 8, 9: it is also to be noted that its subject is not treated of, either in the E. E. or in the M. M. It is perhaps allowable to suspect that this chapter was inserted here after the whole Book was written: and that there is some connexion between its late insertion, and the comparative fulness of the summary in ii. 7. 8, with which, moreover, it stands in close verbal relationship. I have no theory to put forward: but my suspicions make me inclined to accept as genuine the clause (a. 34, 35) bracketed by Ramsauer, as well as the clauses καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη (§ 1) and δοσολ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἰσομεν (§ 4) bracketed by Monro (l.c.). Grant's note on καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις points, I believe, in the right direction. 'Cf. Eth. ii. 7. 8. This expression might seem to suggest that the present passage was written after an interval; it is repeated in § 4.'

b. 9. § 3. καὶ δεδεν οὐ δεῖ] Ramsauer refers to the μικροφιλοσοφία of Theophrastus defined (Char. μικρόφ.) as δρεξίς τιμῆς ἀνελεύθερος.

b. 14. § 4. πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλότοιοτου λεγομένου] When we say that a man is 'fond of,' we may mean that he is 'too fond of,' or 'laudably fond of.' In some connexions the prefix φιλό- is unambiguously meant in a good sense—e.g. in the term φιλομαθής—
or in a bad sense—e.g. in the term φιλόσως: but in other con. 1125 b. 14. nexions it is doubtful in which sense it is meant—e.g. in the term φιλότιμος. Bywater’s τὸ φιλότιμον for the τὸν φ. of the codd. in line 15 is a distinct improvement.

ἔπαινοντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ] The many are b. 15. regarded as being deficient in ambition and its kindred public-spirit. They are devoted too much to κέρδος or material interests: see Pol. ii. 4. 1266 b. 38 ἐστιν στασιάζοντι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀμοιβατη τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τούτωνλον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον, οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀμοιβα, οἱ δὲ χαρίνετες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, εἶναι ἰσαί.

ἐρήμης] The allusion is doubtless to the ἐρήμη δίκη or action b. 17. in which one party does not appear and judgment goes against him by default. Its own special name ‘does not appear’ to defend the mean against the claims of the extremes.

§ 5. ἐστὶ δὴ καὶ ὡς δεὶ] restored by Sus. and Byw. for Bekker’s b. 20. ἐστὶ δὴ δὲ καὶ ὡς δεὶ. The inference marked by δὴ is required. ἐστὶ δὴ καὶ ὡς δεὶ is given by NC, B², and CCC: and Cambr. has ἐστὶ δὴ ἡ καὶ ὡς δεὶ.

§ 6. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτ’ κ.τ.λ.] even in the ordinary case of the virtue b. 23. having a name: thus ὁ ἄνδρειος πρὸς τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, ii. 8. 2.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

The adjective πρῶς, which we apply to the good-tempered man, who occupies the mean position between the man who shows excessive or ill-directed anger; and the man who cannot be provoked to anger; is not strictly appropriate, connoting, as it does, a reprehensible ‘mildness’ or ‘insensibility’; however it may be taken, in the absence of a better term, to describe the man who occupies the mean, for after all he bears more resemblance to the ‘mild’ than to the ‘ill-tempered’ man. Of ‘ill-tempered’ men there are several varieties—the ὑψιλος, ἄρρηξιπος, πωρος, and χαλέπιος. On the other side, the ‘mild character’ may go the length of being ἄνδραποδώδης (§ 6), or may shade into the mean state. The abstract noun πρῶς, it would seem, is available for the μήκη ἡς, but the adjective πρῶς has associations which make it somewhat inapplicable to the man who is μήκος.
Introductory Note.] The close connexion between ἀνδρεία and θυμός or ὀργή (see iii. 8. 12) naturally suggests a different place on the list for πραΰτης. The writers of the E.E. and M.Μ., as we have seen, place it after σωφροσύνη: but perhaps Aristotle is after all justified in placing it where he does, inasmuch as it 'inclines towards the defect' (§ 1) and so involves συγγρώμη (§ 4)—sympathy or fellow-feeling—a principle of conduct which exists only for the πολιτικών ζήσον.

1125 b. 28. § 1. ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν] The ἐλλειψις has no name: it is however described below in § 5 as ἀφορησία τις. The writer of ii. 7. 10 (whether Aristotle, or another) is scarcely more definite. The ἐξεις he finds without names; but he gives them names σαφηνείας ἕνεκα. Thus he says τὴν μεσότητα πραΰτητα καλέσωμεν, and ἢ δ' ἐλλειψις ἀφορησία ἔστω.

b. 30. § 2. τὰ δ' ἐμποιεῖται πολλά] and so various kinds of ὀργιλότης may be distinguished.

b. 33. § 3. βουλεῖται κ.τ.λ.] 'being πρᾶσος means being ἀτάραχος etc.'

1126 a. 2. § 4. οὗ γὰρ τιμωρητικός] i.e. where the τιμωρία would be justified.

a. 7. § 6. οὗ εἶναι ἀμωντικός] Here Aristotle seems to touch upon the 'final cause of anger,' which Grant tells us is not included in the present enquiry.

a. 8. § 7. ἥ δ' ὑπερβολή κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται . . . οὗ μὴν ἁπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει] This distinction will not apply in the case of the ἐλλειψις, which shows itself κατὰ πάντα, and in the same man.

a. 13. § 8. οἷ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίλονται] The ὀργίλος here is 'the quick-tempered man,' the term being used in a specific sense, whereas in § 2 the ὑπερβολή as a genus is called ὀργιλότης τις, and in ii. 7. 10 the terms ὀργίλος and ὀργιλότης are used in the generic sense.

a. 17. ἀνταποδιδόσαυν ἢ φανεροὶ εἰσὶ διὰ τὴν δεξύτητα] Coraes describes ἢ φανεροὶ εἰσὶ as χαρίων ὑποττον. A later hand in CCC inserts καὶ after ἢ. If the text is sound, we must suppose ἢ φανεροὶ εἰσὶ to qualify ἀνταποδιδόσαυν adverbially and to stand for φανερῶς.

a. 23. § 10. τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν] see de Part. An. iii. 11. 673 b. 7, where
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to koyfou is opposed to tov pouwvttai bapors, that which is indigestible. 1128 a. 23.
The pikros has as it were a load of indigestible anger in him—
ev autp de pepsi tv orphvn xronon de.

Both keep up their angry feelings: but it does not appear that
the xalepos, like the pikros, conceals his displeasure. The writing
however is very careless; for in the next § the whole genus of oi
uperbaldontes peri orphas seems to be covered by oi xalepos. In
E.E. iii. 3. 1231 b. 25 we find—o praras mesos tout xalepou kai tout
andrapodwous.

§ 13. ou yap brdoi k.t.l.] The passage beginning here and a. 32.
extending to the end of § 14—anvkeceou, occurs almost in the same
words in ii. 9. §§ 7, 8 and 9. See Rassow’s Forsch. p. 16.
Rassow thinks that the proper locus of the passage is in the Second
Book.

andrapodeis os dvnaumewn arxein] as opposed to andrapodwous § 6, b. 1.
Ramsauer notes.

o de tvso kai pos parakeiaivn vsektos, ou brdoi tv lagw apodow- b. 2.
vai] The same construction occurs in the twin-passage ii. 9. 8
o de mekri tvos kai eti tvson vsektos ou brdoi tv lagw aforisesai. For
the usage of apodoimai (here = aforisai) see note on ii. 1. 8.
Grant translates here—‘to lay down in the abstract.’

en yap tois kath ekasta kan tv aiosthisei kai krisis] see note on b. 3.
ii. 9. 8. The codd. seem all to have kai tv aiosth., but I believe
that Ramsauer (followed by Byw.) is right in inserting en before
tv aiosthisei. I would suggest further that a comma be placed
after ekasta, so as to give the meaning which we have in ii. 9. 8
ta de touaiva en tois kath ekasta, kai en tv aiosthisei h krisis where the
en before tv aiosthisei means ‘rests with,’ ‘depends on’; while that
before tois kath ekasta means simply ‘in’ or ‘among.’ This is
plainly the meaning required in iv. 5. 13 also. The krisis is not en
tois kath ekasta in the sense of ‘resting with them,’ as it is en
tv aiosthisei: but if we follow the codd., we are, I think, obliged
to give the preposition, as expressed before tois kath ekasta, the
sense which it is about to bear as understood before tv aiosthisei—
viz. the sense of ‘rests with.’
§ 14.] By the frequently employed terms ἐπαινετῶν and ἰεκτῶν, Aristotle indicates, with sufficient clearness, the moral standard which he recognises. The praise or blame of social equals is given, according as we conform to, or transgress, the prevailing νόμος of the society in which we live. The prevailing νόμος of a society which flourishes cannot be bad: it must embody much of the φυσικῶν δίκαιων. Actions are good or bad, according as they fall in with, or conflict with, an existing system of Greek Life, assumed to be good as a system, and final as a system, although capable of improvement in details. Any radical improvement of the existing system was inconceivable to Aristotle.

Πραΐόντος is described (third on the list) in E. E. iii. 3 and M. M. i. 22.

CHAPTER VI.

Argument and Introductory Note.] The ἀρεταί described in this chapter, and in the two following chapters, concern 'one's deportment in society' (Grant). That they do not stand on the same level of moral importance as the ἀρεταί hitherto discussed is recognised by the writer of the E. E. when he styles them παθητικὰ μεσοτήτες—ἐπαινεταί, but not ἀρεταί· ἀνεν προαρίστεος γάρ (E. E. iii. 7. 1234 a. 24), and by the writer of the M. M. when he says (i. 32. 1293 a. 35) εἰ μὲν οὖν εἶσιν αὕται ἀρεταί ἣ μὴ ἀρεταί, ἄλλος δὲν εἶναι λόγος.

This chapter is concerned with the general subject of 'agreeable manners.' The man with agreeable manners has a certain sympathy (to be distinguished from the affection of Friendship) with those whom he meets in society, which causes him to 'get on well' with them. This, however, he does without sacrificing his personal dignity. He makes himself pleasant in society, without over-complaisancy or flattery. Nor is it only by a sense of his own personal dignity that he is guided in the manifestation of his sympathy: but also by the desire of keeping up a high standard of manners and conduct in other people; for he will not make himself pleasant, when by doing so, he would encourage something decidedly objectionable. He occupies the mean position between
the over complaisant man, and the man with disagreeable manners, who does not 'get on well' with people.

Chapter 7 treats of another element in 'one's deportment in society'—the straightforward unaffected presentation of oneself as one really is—opposed to swagger and self-exaltation on the one side, and self-depreciation on the other.

Chapter 8 treats of the third element in 'one's deportment in society'—conversational brilliancy.

In ii. 7. 11 the three ἀρεταὶ of social deportment are given in a different order (ἀλήθεια, εὐστραπελία, φιλία) determined by a division of τὸ περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεως κοινωνίαν into τὸ περὶ τὰ λόγια τῆς κοινωνίας and τὸ περὶ τὸ ἱδρυμα, and a subdivision of the latter into τὸ ἐν παιδϊα καὶ τὸ ἐν πάσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον.

It is to be observed, however, that the same order as that of ii. 7. 11 is suggested in iv. 8. 12, where Aristotle sums up his account of the ἀρεταὶ of social deportment—τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρήμεναι εἰ ὑμῖν μεσοτήτες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεως κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δὲ ἢ ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειών ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἱδρυμα. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν ἱδρυμαν ἢ μὲν εἰ τοῖς παιδιαῖς, ἢ δὲ εἰ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμολογεῖ.

Aristotle's scheme in iv. 6 is—

δόσκολος οὐ δύσερς—ἀνώνυμος—ἀρεσκὸς καὶ κολάξ.

In ii. 7. 13 the ἀνώνυμος is called φίλος, and his ἐξίς, φιλία.

In the Ε.Ε., however, we have a distinction drawn between φιλία and σεμώνης thus—

ἐχθρα—φιλία—κολακεία

αὐθαίδεια—σεμώνης—ἀρέσκεια.

See Ε.Ε. iii. 7. 1233 b. 29 φιλία δὲ μεσότης ἐχθρας καὶ κολακείας ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐχερός ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν κολάξ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἀπάσας ἀντικρούσαις ἀπεχθημάτως, ὁ δὲ μὴ πρὸς ἀπαντάν ἱδονήν μὴ ἀκολουθόν, μὴ ἀντιτείναν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον βελτιστόν, φίλος. σεμώνης δὲ μεσότης αὐθαίδειας καὶ ἀρεσκείας ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἑτέρον ἓν ἀλλὰ καταφρονητικός αὐθαίδης, ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ πάντων ἕλαττον ἀρεσκός, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μῆ, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄξιους οὕτως ἕχων σεμώνος.

The writer of the Μ.Μ. (i. 28 and 31), making the same distinction, explains it thus—σεμώνης is the μεσότης περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας: φιλία, περὶ πράξεως καὶ λόγως. The αὐθαίδης is described (Μ.Μ. i. 28. 1192 b. 31) as οἶος μηθεὶς ἐπιθυμίως μὴ διαλεγόμενος: ὁ ἀρεσκός as οἶος πάσιν ὁμιλεῖν καὶ πάντως καὶ πανταχῆ: the σεμώνος as οὐκ εἰς

πάντας ἀλλ' εἰς τοὺς ἄξιους. Under the name of σεμνός, then, the ἀνώνυμος of Aristotle’s scheme is regarded as one who knows how to maintain his personal dignity. Under the name of φίλος (M. M. i. 31) the same man is regarded as one who gets on well with people. The ἀπεχθητικός, however, and the αὐθάδης are different men, the former being aggressively rude, the latter only surly when approached; so also the κόλαξ and ἄρεσκος are different men, the former having an object to gain by his flattery, the latter being overcomplaisant without ulterior object.

1120 b. 19. § 4.] In ii. 7. 13, as noted above, the μέσος is simply called φίλος, and his virtue φίλα (so also in E. E. and M. M.). Here, however, ‘the man with agreeable manners’ is said to resemble the ἐπιευκής φίλος, but to differ in being ἀνευ τοῦ στέργειν οἰς ὁμιλεῖ.

b. 23. § 5. οὔ γάρ τῷ φίλειν ἢ ἔχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἐκαστα ὡς δει, ἀλλά τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι] ‘for it is not from any feeling of friendship or of enmity that he permits this [or objects to that]—always with perfect propriety—but because he is the well-mannered man we are describing (τοιοῦτος).’ The logical balance of the sentence requires ἢ δουχεράινει after δει, b. 24, answering to ἔχθαίρειν as ἀποδέχεται does to φίλειν. The Paraphrast sees this: his words are—οὔ γάρ διὰ τὸ στέργειν ἢ ἔχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα, ἢ ψέχει κ.τ.λ.

1127 a. 7. § 9. τοῦ δὲ συνηδόνοντος δὲ μὲν . . . δὲ[ Cf. iii. 1. 13 τοῦ ὅη δη' ἄγνωαν δὲ μὲν . . . δὲ.

a. 8. ἄρεσκος] See Theophrastus (Char. peri ἄρεσκεια), who defines ἄρεσκεια as ἑυσεθιώς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτιστῷ ἠθοις παρασκευαστική. ‘Complaisance,’ he says (Jebb’s Transl. p. 85), ‘may be defined as a mode of address calculated to give pleasure, but not with the best tendency. The complaisant man is very much the kind of person who will hail one afar off with “my dear fellow”; and after a large display of respect, seize and hold one by both hands. He will attend you a little way, and ask when he is to see you, and will take his leave with a compliment on his lips. Also when he is called in to an arbitration he will seek to please not only his principal, but the adversary as well, in order that he may be deemed impartial. He will say too that foreigners speak more justly than his fellow-citizens.’

In a note on the character of ἄρεσκεια Jebb remarks (p. 181)—

‘The Flatterer, according to Aristotle, flatters for money or what money buys; the Complaisant man “aims at being pleasant with no further object” (μὴ δὲ ἀλλο τι). This is a fault (1) because to combat the wishes of others is sometimes a duty to them and to oneself: thus Aristotle’s Perfectly-behaved man is one who will occasionally “make difficulties” (δυσχεραίνει) for either reason or both. (2) Because the primary object of the Complaisant man is, not that others may be pleased, but that he may be pleasant. He desires popularity, either from mere vanity or for the sake of influence. When, therefore, he is said to aim at being pleasant “without further object” this does not exclude a selfish object. To be thought pleasant is itself the object which he most covets. He is unmercenary, as contrasted with the Flatterer; but he is not disinterested.’ Jebb goes on to notice two salient points of difference between the κόλαξ and the ἀπεσκος as portrayed by Theophrastus: (1) The κόλαξ treats his patron as a superior; the ἀπεσκος treats his associate as an equal for whom he has a warm regard. (2) The κόλαξ attaches himself to one patron; the ἀπεσκος desires to be on cordial terms with as many persons as possible.

κόλαξ] Κολακεία is defined by Theophrastus as ὀμιλίαν αἰσχρῶν a. 10. συμφέρονταν δὲ τῷ κολακεύοντι. ‘The Flatterer,’ he says (Jebb’s Translation p. 81), ‘is a person who will say as he walks with another, “Do you observe how people are looking at you? This happens to no man in Athens but you. A compliment was paid to you yesterday in the Porch. More than thirty persons were sitting there: the question was started, who is our foremost man? Every one mentioned you first, and ended by coming back to your name.” With these and like words, he will remove a morsel of wool from his patron’s coat; or if a speck of chaff has been laid on the other’s hair by the wind, he will pick it off: adding with a laugh, “Do you see? because I have not met you for two days, you have had your beard full of white hairs; although no one has darker hair for his years than you.” Then he will request the company to be silent while the great man is speaking, and will praise him too in his hearing, and mark his approbation at a pause with “True”; or he will laugh at a frigid joke, and stuff his cloak into his mouth as if he could not repress his amusement.’ In his note on this character, Jebb remarks (p. 178)—‘The notion conveyed by the term κολακεία is not precisely what we usually mean by

1127 a. 10. 'flattery,' but something coarser. It meant a sort of extravagant toadyism practised not as a fine art, but simply as an industry—as a recognised method of obtaining a livelihood. This tone is unconsciously illustrated by Athenæus, when in his reminiscences of eminent Flatterers (vi. pp. 248–260) he speaks of "Cheirisophus the Flatterer of Dionysius," "Callicrates the Flatterer of Ptolemy," "Anaxarchus one of the flatterers of Alexander." These men had, as it were, been preferred to permanent posts.'

Athenæus (vi. 80, 261) quotes lines of the comic poet Anaxandrides in which κολακεία is presented as a sort of τέχνη or trade—

τῇ δ’ ἀλαζονεία μετὰ τὴν κολακείαν χώραν δίδωσι 'Αναξανδρίδης ὁ κομφο- 

dιωπων ἐν Φαρμακομάντει, λέγων ὁπως·

ὁτι εἰμὶ ἀλαζῶν, ταῦτ' ἐπιτιμᾶς; ἀλλὰ τι;

υκά γὰρ αὐτή τὰς τέχνας πάσας πολύ,

μετὰ τὴν κολακείαν ἦδε μὲν γὰρ διαφέρει.

Again (vi. 73, 258) Athenæus quotes Antiphanes to the same effect—"Ἀντιφάνης δ’ ἐν Λημνίαις τέχνην τινὰ ὑποτίθεται τὴν κολακείαν εἶναι, ἐν οἷς λέγει·

ἐστὶν ἡ γένους ἢ ἢδιον τέχνη,

ἡ πρόοδος ἄλλη, τοῦ κολακείου εὐφύως,

ὁ γραφάς πονεῖ τι καὶ πικραίνεται,

ὁ γεωργὸς ἐν ὅσης ἐστὶ κυνόνιος πάλιν’

πρόεστε πάσην ἐπιμέλεια καὶ πόνος’

ἡμῶν δὲ μετὰ γέλωτος ὁ βίος καὶ τρυφῆς’

ὁ γὰρ τὸ μέγιστον ἐργον ἐστὶ παιδία,

ἀδρῶν γελάσαι, σκώψαι τι’ ἐκπειν πολὺ,

οὐκ ἤδ’; ἐμοὶ μὲν μετὰ τὸ πλούσιον δεύτερον.

Plutarch (de adulatore et amico ch. 7) describes the κόλας in the following terms—ὁ δὲ κόλας ἄρ’ ἔν δή μίαν ἐστιαν ἡθοὺς οὐκ ἔχων μόνον,

οὐδὲ ἐσπεύδει ὄνων ἐχρυταῖς ἀφετέρου, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρῳ καὶ πρὸς ἐτέρον πλαττόν καὶ

προμαρμάζων ἐαυτόν, οὐκ ἀπλοὺς οὐδὲ εἰς, ἀλλὰ παυκοδάπός ἐστι καὶ

ποικίλος, εἰς ἄλον ἐκ ἄλθος τῶον, ὀσπερ τὸ μεταρόμενον ὀδορ, περιμ-

ρεόν ἄει καὶ μετασχηματιζόμενον τοῖς υποδεχόμενοι. Alciabides is adduced as the great κόλας, who changed his manners with his place, living elegantly at Athens, and austerely at Sparta; fighting and drinking in Thrace, and giving himself up to oriental luxury in Asia. In his treatise de Amicorum Multitudine ch. 9, Plutarch again employs the expression ἡθοὺς ἐστιαν οὐκ ἔχων, applying it to the man who is μετάβολος καὶ παυκοδάπος, without the special
implication of κολακεία. The treatise de adulatore et amico contains 1127 a. 10. the philosophy of κολακεία (which it presents as a phase of ‘heteronomy’), and throws considerable light on the peripatetic theory of αὐτάρκεια.¹

δύσκολος] Eudemus and the writer of the M. M., as we have seen, oppose the αὐθάδης to the ἀρεσκός and the ἀπεχθητικός to the κόλαξ.

The αὐθάδης is the man who ‘pleases himself.’ As Jebb (Theoph. p. 184) remarks, he ‘acts chiefly from a desire to be left alone . . . he repels advances, but he does not take liberties.’ He is described by Theophrastus (αὐθάδεια) in the following terms—‘The surly man is one who when asked where so-and-so is, will say, “Don’t bother me”; or when spoken to will not reply . . . He cannot forgive a person who has besmirched him by accident, or pushed him, or trodden upon his foot . . . when he stumbles in the street he is apt to swear at the stone. He will not endure to wait long for anyone; nor will he consent to sing, or to recite, or to dance. He is apt also not to pray to the gods.’ (Jebb’s Transl. p. 87.)

In illustration of the Eudemian terminology, according to which αὐθάδεια is one of the extremes where σεμνότης is the mean, see the lines of Eubulus preserved by Athenaeus (vi. 76, 260)—

άλλ’ ἔστι τοῖς σεμνοῖς μὲν αὐθάδεστερος,
καὶ τοῖς κόλαξι πάσι τοῖς σκώπτουσι τε ἐκατόν εὐφράγητος.

The dangerous proximity of δρέσκεια to κολακεία is implied in the following line of Anaxandrides (apud Ath. vi. 66, 255)—

tὸ γὰρ κολακεύειν νῦν δρέσκειν ὄνομ’ ἔχει.

¹ Clearchus of Soli (Aristotle’s pupil) is quoted by Athen. vi. 66, 255 as follows:—κολαξ μὲν οἶδεις διαρκεὶ πρὸς φιλίαν καταναλίσκει γὰρ ὁ χρύνος τὸ τοῦ προστοίματος αὐτῶν ψεύδος ὁ δ’ ἐραστής κόλαξ ἔστι φιλίας ὃν ὃραν ἐκάλλος. In another fragment, preserved by Athenaeus (vi. 67, 255), Clearchus says—τὴν κολακείαν ταπεινὰ ποιεῖν τὸ ήθη τῶν κολάκων, καταφρονητικῶν ἄντων τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν. ομοίους δὲ τὸ πᾶν ὑπομένειν εἰδότας οὐ πολύμοι. τὰ δὲ τῶν κολακευμένων ἐμφροφομένων τῇ κολακείᾳ, χαύνου και κενούς ποιοῦντα, πάντων ἐν ὑπορεχύν παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι κατασκευάζεσθαι. On Clearchus see Bernays, Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 110.
CHAPTER VII.

Argument and Introductory Note.] The ἄληθευτικός, who realises the mean between ἀλαζωνεία and εἰρωνεία, is straightforward in conversation and demeanour, where no important interests are involved. Of course he will be truthful where they are; but this kind of truthfulness belongs properly to the virtue of justice (§§ 7, 8). Here we are concerned merely with the habit of presenting oneself in society as one really is, neither better nor worse.

The ἀλαζῶν— the Boaster or 'Swaggerer' (see Jebb’s Theop. p. 193) is of three kinds, according to this chapter—(1) ὃ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος μηδενός ἐνεκα: (§ 10); (2) ὁ δόξης ἐνεκα ἀλαζωνεύμενος, (3) ὁ κέρδους ἐνεκα ἀλαζωνεύμενος. In all three cases the ἀλαζῶν pretends to the possession of ἐνδοξα, or qualities held in repute, which he either does not possess at all, or possesses to a smaller extent than he would have it believed (§ 2). Ὡ δόξης ἐνεκα pretends to those qualities which are admired and praised; ὁ κέρδους ἐνεκα, to qualities agreeable and useful to others, the absence of which can be concealed—such as prophetic or medical skill (§ 13).

The ἀλαζῶν described by Theophrastus belongs to the second kind. ‘When he is living in a hired house he will say (to anyone who does not know better) that it is the family mansion; but that he means to sell it, as he finds it too small for his entertainments.’ (Jebb’s Translation p. 97.)

The εἰρων, as here described by Aristotle, depreciates himself by denying the possession of qualities held in repute, or making them out less than they are. He is better than the ἀλαζῶν, being more refined; he does not seek profit by his irony, nor even repute, for qualities held in repute are what he especially disclaims (§ 14). Excessive irony or self-depreciation, however, passes easily into swagger (§ 15). ‘The general characteristic of [Aristotle’s] Ironical man,’ says Jebb (Theop. p. 190), ‘is that he holds in reserve, for whatever purpose, something of his available power. This purpose may be an earnest dialectical one, like that of Socrates. Or it may be to avoid ostentation and check impertinence; as Aristotle’s lofty-minded man is ‘ironical’ to the common crowd.
Or the purpose may be merely playful; as Anacharsis in Lucian says that the Athenians were reputed 'ironical' in conversation (Anach. c. 15). Jebb finds the picture of the εἰφών drawn by Theophrastus strikingly inadequate as judged by Aristotle's standard. Theophrastus 'describes merely a person who takes a cynical pleasure in misleading or inconveniencing others by the concealment of his real feelings and intentions.' According to O. Ribbeck (Rheinisches Museum 1876, vol. xxxi. pp. 381 sqq., über den Begriff des εἰφών) the εἰφών is mentioned for the first time in Greek literature in Aristoph. Nub. 449. The scholiast on this passage has—εἰφών ὁ πάντα παις καὶ διαχλευάζων, εἰφωνεύσανεν ἀπατεών, ὑποκρίτης. The Fox is the type of the εἰφών: cf. Philemon, Fragm. ovi ἣν ἀλώνης ἥ μὲν εἰφών τῇ φύσει, ἡ δὲ αὐθεντικάτος. Neither Plato nor Xenophon, according to Ribbeck, makes Socrates call himself εἰφών. The term was really one of reproach applied by his contemporaries who thought that he outwitted them. Plato uses εἰρωνεία, εἰρωνικός, or εἰρωνεύσαθι in a bad sense in Soph. 268 A, Legg. 908 D, Rep. 337 A (the passage in which Thrasygnachus says to Socrates ὃ Ηράκλεις, ἔφη, αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ιδιωτία εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταὐτ ἐγὼ ἔδο τε καὶ τούτως προβλέγων, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἔθελόνοις, εἰρωνεύσαοι δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσως ἢ ἀποκρίνοι, εἰ τις τί σε ἑρωτάτ), Sympos. 216 E. Cf. Aristoph. Aves 1211, Plato, Apol. 38 A. The notion of εἰρωνεία was, however, ennobled by the character of Socrates, and by the representation which Plato gave of him. In the Eth. Nic. εἰρωνεία has the old meaning in so far as it involves a divergence from truth; but when the εἰφών is said to be χαρακτήρος, as φεύγων τὸ ὄγκορπον, his character is taken in a better and finer sense. Aristotle is the first to make Socrates the type of true refined Irony. But Theoph. understands 'irony' 'in a sense almost wholly bad,' as Jebb remarks (Theoph. p. 191).

§ 1.] Imelmann (obs. crit. p. 12), followed by Rassow (Forsch. 1127 a. 13. p. 17), distinguishes two introductory passages in this section, (1) περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ . . . συναντέστε, and (2) ἐν δὲ τῷ συζύγῳ . . . προσποιήματι. Imelmann (l.c.) inserts καὶ τῆς εἰρωνείας after διαφοράς in line 1127 a. 13; and Rassow, Susemihl, and Bywater (the last omitting τῆς) accept the emendation.

καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι] προσποιήμα is something unduly assumed, a. 20. something pretended to: hence here it refers properly only to the
1127 a. 20. ἡευδομένων, and strictly only to the ἀλαζών, for ἀρνείσθαι not προσ-
ποιεῖσθαι is characteristic of the εἰρων (§ 3). The words τῷ προσ-
ποιήματι limit the scope of ηευδομένων εν λόγοι καὶ πράξει—'those
who are untruthful in what they say and do, I mean in the matter
of personal pretensions.' The καί however (which Imelmann obs.
crit. p. 12 wishes to omit) seems to me to be necessary before τῷ
προσποιήματι.

a. 21. § 2. ἐνδόξων] 'things held in esteem.' The commoner meaning
of τὰ ἐνδόξα in Aristotle is of course that of 'probable opinions.'

a. 23. § 4. αἰθέκαστος] In the good sense here intended, the αἰθέκαστος
is 'the man who appears in his own character.' The term was
also used in a bad sense as equivalent sometimes to βιαιος, some-
times to ᾑδογνώμων, sometimes to αἰθάδης—see uses collected by
Zell and Coraes. It is contrasted with εἰρων in the fragment of
Philemon quoted above.

a. 24. καὶ τῷ βίω] Bywater's note is 'fort. καὶ τῷ βίω.'

a. 25. ὀμολογῶν] Ramsauer notes the care with which the three verbs
are used—ὀμολογεῖ of the ἀληθευτικός, ἀρνεῖται of the εἰρων, and προσ-
pοιεῖται of the ἀλαζών.

a. 28. § 6.] It is not necessary to point to a base ulterior object, for the
sake of which the ἡευδομενοι choose τῷ ἡευδῷ, in order to establish
the position that they are ψεκτοι: for τῷ ἡευδῷ in itsel is φαύλον
καὶ ψεκτόν: and those who choose it μηθενός ἔτικα (and there are
such), are φαύλοι τὴν ἔξιν and ψεκτολ. Similarly, the man who is
ἀληθευτικός, where no great interests are involved, simply because
it is his habit to stick to the truth as such, is ἐπαινετός.

a. 33. § 7. ἐν ταῖς ὀμολογίαις] The Par. has ἔστι τοῖς ἀληθευτικός, οἷς
ὁ ἀληθεὺς ἐν ταῖς συμφωνίαις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ταυτίτοις ὅσα εἰς δικαιοσύνην
ἡ ἀδικίαν συντείνει . . . ἀλλ' ὅστις ἄνευ ἀνάγκης ἡ νομίμου ἡ δικαίου ἡ
ἄλλου τινός πολιτικοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει διὰ μόνον τὸ
ἔχειν ἔξιν τῆς τοιαῦτης ἀρετῆς.

b. 5. § 8. ὡς γὰρ ἀισχρόν κ.τ.λ.] The man who shrinks from τῷ ἡευδῶς
as such, in circumstances in which it cannot be called ἀισχρόν,
as not involving serious social consequences, will à fortiori shrink
from it in those circumstances in which the verdict of society
is severely against it: see the Par. οἱ γὰρ φιλαλήθεις καὶ ἐν οἷς οὐκ
§ 9. ἀποκλίνει] I have no hesitation in accepting Coraes' ἀπο- b. 8. κλίνει, which is moreover supported by the Par., ὅς, εἰ δὲ καὶ παρεκκλίναι τοῦ μέσου, πρὸς τὴν ἐλλειψιν, οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἐπερβολὴν νεόσει.

§ 10. μηθενός ἑνεκα] It is difficult to suppose the case of a man b. 10. who magnifies his ὑπάρχοντα, without thinking of his own δόξα or τιμή as thereby enhanced. Perhaps we may say that ὁ δόξης ἡ τιμῆ ἑνεκα ἀλάζονευόμενος is the man, who, with a definite scheme of social success before his eyes, is always 'advertising' himself by a consistent course of swagger—e.g. the rich parvenu carefully affecting country tastes in order to get into county society: whereas ὁ μηθενός ἑνεκα ἀλάζονευόμενος is the man who boasts, not indeed without some idea of enhancing his reputation, but without a definite scheme of social success before his eyes.

§ 11. ὅς ὁ ἀλαζῶν] The text would be much better without these b. 12. words: but if we retain them, we must understand them to refer to 'the Boaster proper,' i.e. the man who boasts without any definite end to be served, as distinguished from the man who boasts for reputation, and the man who boasts for gain. 'The man who boasts for reputation is not very blameworthy, any more than the simple boaster (ὁ ἀλαζῶν) is; the man who boasts for gain, however, is more reprehensible. But, whether a man boast from simple love of untruth (ὁ μὲν τὸν ψεύδεις αὐτῷ χαίρων ὁ ἀλαζῶν) or with the ulterior object of reputation or gain (ὁ δὲ δόξης κ.τ.λ.), we must remember that his boasting is the expression of a character, not the practice of an art, and therefore comes in for blame.'

§ 12.] The clause οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ᾽ κ.τ.λ. is added, lest too b. 14. much should be made of the admission—οὐ λίαν ψεύτος: see Top. iv. 5. 126 ἀ. 30 ὡν δὲ καὶ εἰ τῶν ψεύτων ἡ φθειράς εἰς δύναμιν ἡ δυνατῶν ἐθηκεν, ὅν τοῖς σοφιστήν ἡ διάβολον ἡ κλέπτην τῶν δυνάμενον τά ἀλλότρια ψφάρείσθαι, κ.τ.λ. . . . πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαύλοι κατὰ προ- αἵρεσιν λέγονται.

'Ἀλαζονεία is after all a fixed moral habit, not, as might perhaps be supposed from its less offensive forms, a mere faculty like that
of the disputant (διαλεκτική), which can be employed without raising a moral issue. Συμβατική, not διαλεκτική, is its true parallel.

For the doctrine that προαίρεσις, not δυνάμεις, are the objects of moral judgments, Zell, Michelet, Grant, and Ramsauer refer to Top. iv. 5. 126 a. 30 (quoted above) and Rhet. i. 1. 1355 b. 20. σοφιστής μὲν κατά τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν—'the Sophist is distinguished,' as Grant puts it, 'from the Dialectician not intellectually but morally.'

Bywater makes the words οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει . . . ἀλαχών ἐστιν parenthetical; Bekker places a comma after ἐστιν b. 15, and, like Bywater, takes ὡσπέρ καὶ ψεύστης with what follows. I prefer to take the words ὡσπέρ καὶ ψεύστης, as = ὡσπέρ καὶ ψεύστης ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐξίαν καὶ τῷ τοῦτῳ ἔτια, and refer ὁ μὲν and ὁ δὲ to ὁ ἀλαχών l. 14, not to the ψεύστης. I would therefore punctuate thus—οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαχών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαίρεσι (κατὰ τὴν ἐξίαν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοῦτῳ ἔτια ἀλαχών ἐστιν, ὡσπέρ καὶ ψεύστης), ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρον, ὁ δὲ δόξης ὁρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδος. If we refer ὁ μὲν and ὁ δὲ to the ψεύστης, we distinguish the person described as τῷ ψεύδει ἀντὶ χαίρον from the ἀλαχών proper of § 10, and make ὁ δόξης ὁρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδος, not an ἀλαχών, but a person fraudulent in another way. But is it likely that when he wrote ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρον, Aristotle was thinking of another ψεύστης, distinct from the one whom he had just described in almost identical terms (οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἔχαμε τῷ ψεύδει b. 10) in § 10; and, although the methods employed by ψεύστης and by ἀλαχών respectively, where κέρδος is concerned, may be distinguished, how is the ψεύστης, quα ὁ δόξης ὁρεγόμενος, to be distinguished from ὁ δόξης χαίρων ἀλαχών ὁρεγόμενος? It is perhaps worth noticing also that the definition of the ἄνθρωπος ψευδής in Met. Δ. 29 seems to be against the identification of the δόξης ὁρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδος here (b. 16) with the ψεύστης as distinguished from the ἀλαχών—see Met. Δ. 29. 1025 a. 2 ἄνθρωπος δὲ ψευδής, ὁ εὐχέρης καὶ προαίρετος τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, μὴ δ' ἔτερον τι ἄλλα δ' αὐτό—on which Alexander (ed. Bonitz p. 402) has the following comment—λέγεται ἄνθρωπος

1 Stahr interprets the words ὡς ὁ ἀλαχών in § 11 as if they implied that the term ἀλαχών is not properly applied to the μηθεύον ἔνεκα προσομολόγειν, but only to the δόξης ἔνεκα. This is surely wrong. 'Thut er es aber aus einer bestimmten Absicht, so ist wieder ein Unterschied, will er sich nämlich damit blass Ansehen und Ehre geben, wie der eigentliche Prahler, so ist er nicht allzuhalt zu beurtheilen.'
§§ 12, 13. The Paraph. Heliodorus avoids the error of making δὲ δόξης ὄργιμον ἡ κέρδος a species of ὁ ψεύδης (as distinguished from ὁ ἀλαξὼν), by referring δὲ ὁ τῷ ψεύδη αὐτῷ χαίρων to the ψεύδης and δὲ δόξης ὄργιμον ἡ κέρδος to the ἀλαξὼν: he says καὶ κατά τινα ἐξιν ὁ ἀλαξὼν γίνεται, ὀσπερ καὶ ὁ ψεύδης, ὃς οὐ δόξης ἔνεκα ἡ χρημάτων προσπαθεῖται, ἀλλὰ αὐτῷ τοῦ ψεύδους ἔνεκα μόνον.

§ 13. οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὃν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ διαλαβεῖν b. 19. έστι μὴ ὡντα, οἶον μάντιν σοφὸν ἱατρὸν] So Bywater, following Kb, which (with CCC) omits ἂν before διαλαβεῖν, and ἂν before ἱατρὸν. Bekker follows the other MSS in reading ἂν and ἂν. Sussemihl reads ἂν, but not ἂν. It is to be noted that pr. Kb has ὃν ἦδη ἀπόλαυσις, CCC ὃν ἂν ἦδη ἀπόλαυσις, and Cambr. ὃν ἦδη ἀπόλαυσις, and that NC, B1, B2, r, Ha, N1, Ald., Hel., have ὃν ἰατρὸν ἃ μάντιν σοφὸν, and O1 has ὃν μάντιν ἢ ἱατρὸν σοφὸν.

As regards the omission of ἂν (which seems to rest on three authorities, Kb, CCC, and Aspasius—he has τοιοῦτον δὲ ματική, ἱατρή, σοφία)—a point is certainly made by the inclusion of the list of impostors of a third variety—the learned impostor—σοφός or σοφιστής: but, on the other hand, it might be argued that it is necessary to qualify at least ἱατρὸν by an adjective expressing the skill which is pretended to; that it is not being a doctor, but being a good doctor, which is the pretence that escapes detection. The ἂν might very easily drop out, and, once out, would be likely to remain out, because it seemed so natural to include the Sophist among notable impostors. Kb’s omission of ἂν ought not to weigh too much with us. It may be only one of the numerous blundering omissions for which the MS is remarkable: and perhaps the omission of ἂν may belong to the same class. On the other hand, what Kb adds or substitutes is entitled to great attention; and so, I think that Ramsauer’s conjecture—ὃν ἦδη ἀπόλαυσις—is not to be overlooked.

It seems to be generally assumed (e.g. by Stahr and Peters) that ὡντα is neut. pl. In that case the words ὃν μάντιν κ.τ.λ. follow awkwardly. On the other hand, if we take ὡντα as masc. sing., there is some difficulty in connecting the clause—καὶ
§ 13. They pretend to have qualities from which other people derive advantage, and to be what one may not-be, and yet never be found out, e.g. a good doctor.'

§ 14. (or καὶ ἄ) διαλαβεῖν κ.τ.λ. with what goes before, so as to allow us to translate—'They claim to have qualities from which other people derive advantage, and to be what one may not be, and yet never be found out, e.g. a good doctor.'

§ 15. oi δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ [προσποιούμενοι] ] See the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant. The difficulty is that ἀπαρνήσθαι not προσποιοῦσθαι is the term regularly used by Aristotle in connexion with the εἶρων. On the other hand, however, Theophrastus defines εἰρωνεία as προσποίησις ἐπὶ χειρὸν πράξεων καὶ λόγων, and in the present section Aristotle is showing how εἰρωνεία passes into ἀλαζονεία. Those εἰρωνεῖς who not only deny the possession of great qualities, but, in order to lend plausibility to their denial, seriously affect small merits or accomplishments, which might be allowed 'to go without saying' (τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ), as if these were their only good qualities, are humbugs. Ramsauer throws out the suggestion that the words oi δὲ τὰ μικρὰ . . . εὐκαταφρώσκοι εἰσιν have accidentally been removed from their proper place after εἰρημένα § 13; but he does not press the suggestion. It seems, however, worth consideration: φανερὰ would make a good antithesis to διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄστα. Bywater (following Vahlen) cuts the knot by bracketing προσποιούμενοι.

1 In ii. 7. 12, however, εἰρωνεία is defined as προσποίησις ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν.
§§ 15-17. 365

**BOOKE IV: CHAP. 7:**

**§§ 15-17.** The derivation of this word is obscure. The 1127 b. 27. Ald. Schol. has βαυκοπανούργοις . . . τοις σεμυσαπανούργοις βαυκόν γάρ ἠλεγγον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸν τρυφερόν. See also Liddell and Scott, s.v. βαυκός ‘prudish,’ ‘affected.’ The general idea seems to be that of silly affected humbugs, contemptible for their little transparent artifices.

η τῶν λακώνων ἐσθῆς] not as worn by the Spartans themselves, b. 28. but as imitated by certain Athenians. See Coraes, ad loc. τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λακωνικῶς βιοῦσας Ἀθηναίους αἰνίττειται, δὲν καὶ Δημοσθένης (1267. 21) καθάπεταται, ἵσσαιν ὑμῶν, ὥς ἐγὼ νομίζω, πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν Διότιμων, καὶ τῶν Ἀρχεβιάδην, καὶ τῶν Χαιρετίμων, τῶν ἐπιστολῶν τουτοῦ, οἱ μὲν ἡμέραν μὲν ἑκατοντάκασι, καὶ λακωνίζουν φασί, καὶ τρίβωνας ἔχουσι, καὶ ἄπλως ὑποδέδενται ἐπειδὴ δὲν συλλέγωσι, καὶ μεθ' ἄλληλων γένουσι, κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν οὐδέν ἐκλείπουσι.’

§ 17. χείρων γάρ] sc. τοῦ εἰρωνοῦ.

**CHAPTER VIII.**

**Argument and Introductory Note.**] The εὐτράπελος, or ἐπιδέξιος, is the man whose conversation in society is easy, bright and playful, contributing to the pleasure and amusement of the company, without offending against good taste, or hurting susceptibilities. Especially in the sallies of pleasantry of which persons present (himself included) are the objects, will he show graceful tact—never saying anything that his victim, being a man of taste, does not enjoy: and tacitly imposing his own rule of good taste upon those who attack him in turn. The βομολόχος is the buffoon, or ’funny man,’ whose pleasantry is coarse and offensive, and practised in and out of season. The ἄργος or ἄγροικος (ἄγροικος in E. E., M. M., and E. N. ii. 7. 13), presumably so called as being contrasted with the ἀστείος, is the dull man, who, like a rustic in polite society, sits silent, unable to follow, or contribute to easy conversation, and ‘incapable,’ as Grant puts it, ‘of either making or appreciating a joke.’ The βδέλυρια and ἄγροικία of Theophrastus do not present many points of likeness to Aristotle’s extremes.

Looking back over the list which ends with εὐτραπελία, we seem to see in the ἀπεταί of the Fourth Book, not virtues in our sense,
but qualities forming the dignified and brilliant member of polite society. 'The Gentleman,' always conscious of what is due to himself, seems to be presented as the ideal of 'the good man.' But we must not let this ideal of 'the Gentleman' mislead us in our interpretation of Aristotle. We must not overlook the way in which all 'the qualities of the Gentleman' (even the most superficial of them) are made to subserve earnest aims.

'Ἐλευθεριότης is essentially the habit of doing good with one's money, and implies fellow-feeling regulated by discrimination of desert, and a large perception of the public issues involved in the smallest act of giving. Μεγαλοπρέπεια is essentially the virtue of the man of public spirit, who undertakes a λειτουργία, on the proper performance of which the credit and advantage of his city depend. The φιλότιμος shows how personal ambition may be reconciled with enthusiasm for the common good. The πράσος is, above all, συγγραμμικός—a man who has sympathies which enable him to understand others, and bear with them. The φίλος and the ἀληθευτικός set the example of dignified, and at the same time kindly and straightforward, manners, and so perform a moral work of the highest importance, making men understand one another better, and respect one another more. Finally the εὐτράπελος performs an important function, by lightening the incubus of ennui which tends to oppress life. He contributes to that ἀνάπαυσις which is sought not for its own sake, but because it makes us more capable of the performance of the earnest duties of life: παίζειν ὡς ὤπως σπουδάζῃ, καὶ Ἀνάχαριν, ὁρᾶσας ἔχειν δοκεῖ ἀναπαύει γὰρ τοικεν ἡ παιδί, ἀδυνατώτετε δὲ συνεχῶς ποιεῖν ἀναπαύεις δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος ἢ ἀνάπαυσις γίνεται γὰρ ἐνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας (E. N. x. 6. 6).

Thus, in all cases, we are brought back to the standard of the Noble Life, or Hellenic Culture. Those who participate in this culture know when it is realised in the habits of a member of their society, and praise his habits accordingly—τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαυέταις ἀρετὰς λέγομεν (i. 13. 20).

1128 a. 1. § 1. οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ δος, ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν] In the E. E. (iii. 7. 1234 a. 14) two kinds of εὐτραπελία are distinguished—that of the man who knows how to receive pleasantry—and that of the man who knows how to originate it. The former consists in being able to enjoy a polite and delicate σκόμμα—even when it
BOOK IV: CHAP. 8: §§ 1-6.

raises a laugh against oneself; the latter consists in being able to originate a skêma which its victim, being a man of good taste, will enjoy. oôs òi dè dîptôs tís evtraspelias (h mév yâp ev tò wârên èstì tò géloiv kai tò eîs autón, vàn ò toûndî, òn èn tò skêma èstìn, h 8' èn tò dînasthai toûnta porizesthai), èterai mév eîsiv allêlou, ámfôterai méntai mesôsthes. kai èpò tòn dînâmèn toûnta porizesthai èp' ôsow hêôthêse ó ev kripôs, vàn èis autón ò tò géloiv, mésoû èstai toû Pôrtiiou kai toû yvixroph. ò 8' òròs ouûtos beîtîw h tà xî luþîròn èinav tà lexhîn tà skôntomènô anûtì òpôròfouâuâ màllòn èpò òdè tò èn mesôsthe òntì ârésekîw ouûtos èpò èpò òtè wênti. The same distinction is made in M. M. i. 30. 1193 a. 17 èstai ò di ó evtraspelos dîptôs pou legrâmënòs kai èpò ò dînâmèn skôpèse égorîwos, kai òs èn òpômèiun skôntomènous evtraspelos.

èp toûntaion . . . toûntov] Masc. The kind of company will make a difference.

§ 3. wùmòlôkoi] The wùmòlôkoi is literally one who hangs about the altars to steal or beg what is offered on them: then, metaphorically, a low-fellow who will do anything to get a meal—a 'loafer': and, still more metaphorically, a person who will say anything to raise a laugh—a low jester. See Liddell and Scott, s. v.

ðyôkaioi] The reading of Kb and CCC, restored to the text by Bywater, in place of Bekker's ðyôka, given by all other MSS. See on the use of the term ðyôkaio in Aristotle, note on iii. 11. 7.

ôlòn evtraspòi] Grant gives us a neat rendering here—'they are called witty, by a name that implies their happy turns.'

§ 4. kai òi wùmòlòkoi evtraspeloi prósigmauroûntai òs xâìrentes] a. 14. And also evtraspelìa is sometimes used in a bad sense—as in N. T. Eph. 5. 4 (quoted by Giphanius), where it is coupled with wùmòlôgia, and means low jesting.

§ 5. âleuðerioì] Kâb (followed by CCC) has âleuðerou. In either case 'gentleman' is the meaning.

§ 6. tòn kómmôdôn tòn palaivòn kai tòn kaiwòn] Ramsauer quotes a. 22. Rep. 395 E, where kómmôdôn is used as synonymous with âleuðerogêîn.
BOOK IV: CHAP. 8: §§ 6-9.

1128 a. 22. and κατηγορεῖν—κατηγοροῦντας τε καὶ κωμῳδοῖντας ἄλληλους καὶ αἰσχρο-λογοῦντας. Cf. Hor. A. P. 281

'Successit vetus his comoedia, non sine multa
Laude; sed in vitium libertas excidit et vim
Dignam lege regi; lex est accepta chorusque
Turpiter obticuit sublato jure nocendi.'

On which Orelli quotes Cic. de Rep. 4. 10. 33 'apud quos (Graecos antiquiores) fuit etiam lege concessum, ut quod vellet comoedia de quo vellet (præterquam de archonite: Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 31) nominatim diceret. Quem illa non attigit, vel potius, quem non vexavit? cui pepercit?'—and Suidas, 'Ἀντίμαχος' (v.c. 417-404?) ἐδόκει ὧδε πρὸς ἀρχιτέκτων 

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a. 25. § 7. τὸν εὗρ[κάτοπτοντα] Is the conversation of εὐτράπελοι merely a game of polite personal banter? We can hardly suppose that Aristotle means this. 'ὤ εὗρ[κάτοπτον] rather is one whose conversation plays gracefully round things and people—sometimes round even serious things and people—presenting them in new and amusing—but not therefore ridiculous—lights; he is a sort of Dialectician, too, in the world of fancy; for he shapes no course for his conversation beforehand, but goes as the winds waft him. He is in short the charming talker, whom we like to listen to, for other reasons, and because he is always willing to listen to us. The meagre accounts of the εὐτράπελοι in the E. E. (iii. 7) and M. M. (i. 30) present him merely as one who can give and take polite personal banter.

The definition of εὐτράπελοι in Rhet. ii. 12. 1389 b. 11 as πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις must be taken in its context; the εὐτράπελοι whom Aristotle has immediately in view there are impulsive but gentle manly youths. The εὐτράπελοι of the Fourth Book is an ἀριστή of the man of the world, and 'πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις' describes only one aspect of his conversational 'versatility.'

a. 27. ἢ καὶ τέρπειν] Eudemus (as quoted in note on § 1) lays stress on the pleasure which the εὐτράπελοι gives τῷ εὗρ κρώνοι.]

a. 29. § 9. οὗ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει] Following the Paraphrast's οὐ γὰρ πᾶν πάντα ἔρει, Coraes reads οὗ δὴ πᾶν λέξει. Others have proposed ἀκούστειν for ποιήσει. Ποιήσει seems to me to be the right word in this place, after the preceding ποιεῖν.
BOOK IV: CHAP. 8: §§ 10–12.

§ 10. ἐνια δ' οὗ δ' ἐν ἄκοιναι.] The rule in respect of ἔκονευ is, 1128 b. 1. it would appear, not so strict as that in respect of ἔκ δέγευ.

ἄγροικος] Bywater: ἄγρος (Bekker) is the reading of ᾰ and ᾰ b. 2. CCC (as of all other MSS.), although in § 3 both ᾰ and CCC read ἄγροικοι. Is this ἄγροικος in § 3 a corruption of ἄγροι καὶ?

§ 12.] See Introductory Note to iv. 6. The ἄρεται of social b. 4. deportment are given here in the same order as in ii. 7. 11—viz. ἀλήθεια, εὑρετέλεια, φιλία.

CHAPTER IX.

Argument and Introductory Note.] The passage ii. 7. 15, in which the discussion of νέμεσις follows that of αἰδώς in § 14, prepares us for a discussion of νέμεσις in the present context also. But the Fourth Book, as we have it, ends without even mentioning νέμεσις. It seems probable that the accident which deprived us of the Nicomachean books answering to v, vi, vii, deprived us of the last part of iv, treating of νέμεσις: (iv. 9. 8 is perhaps an editor's interpolation). Perhaps, indeed, part of the discussion of αἰδώς is lost; for it is to be noted that there is no mention of the ἀναισχυντος and καταπληξία as extremes, where the αἴδημον is μέσος. At the same time, we cannot feel sure that it was Aristotle's intention here to represent the αἴδημον definitely as μέσος. So far as the discussion goes, αἰδώς appears merely as a provisionally good feeling, admirable only in the young: whereas in the E. E. and M. M. the αἴδημον is evidently regarded as a mature man, no less than the φίλος, ἀληθής, and εὑρετέλεια,—as the man who has just the right amount of self-assurance, who is not either regardless of what people think of him, or too shy and sensitive to put himself forward at all. See M. M. i. 29. 1193 a. i sqq. αἰδώς δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης ἀναισχυντικος καὶ καταπλήξιος, ἦστιν δὲ περὶ πρᾶξεως καὶ λόγους [i.e. it is definitely one of the ἄρεται, so-called, of 'one's deportment in society']. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀναισχυντός ἦστιν ὁ ἐν παντὶ καὶ πρὸς πάντας λέγων καὶ πράττων ἐτέχει, δὲ καταπεπληγμένος ὁ ἐναντίος τούτων, ὁ πάντα καὶ πρὸς πάντα εὐλαβεύμενος καὶ πρᾶξει καὶ εἰπεῖν (ἀπρακτὸς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁ πάντα καταπληγμένον) ἢ δὲ αἰδώς καὶ ὁ αἴδημον μεσότης τις τούτων. οὔτε γὰρ ἀπαντᾷ καὶ πάντως, ὅσ ὁ ἀναισχυντός, καὶ ἐρεί καὶ b
BOOK IV: CHAP. 9.

πράζει, οὔτε ὣς ὃ καταστάξει, εἰν παντί καὶ πάντως εὐλαβηθήσεται, ἀλλὰ πράζει καὶ ἐρεί ἐν ὁι ἁτε καὶ ἀ ἁτε καὶ ὦ ἁτε δει. So also E. E. iii. 7. 1233 b. 26 sqq. αἰσθὸς δὲ μεσότης ἀνασχυντικὰ καὶ καταστάξεως· ὃ μὲν γὰρ μηδε-

μᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀνασχυντος, ὃ δὲ πάσης ὑμῶς καταστάξεως, ὃ δὲ τῆς τῶν φανομένων ἐπεικῶν αἰθήμων. (This is all that we have about αἰσθός in the E. E.) The same extremes are given in ii. 7. 14, where presumably the view of the αἰθήμων is the same—viz. that he is a mature man on the same level with the εὐτράπελος, &c. All that we can say, then, is that in the Fourth Book, at least so far as we have it, αἰσθός is looked at from a different point of view: and that the discussion of it, so far as it goes, cannot be regarded as paralleled by the discussion in the later treatises. In the E. E. and M.M. both αἰσθός and νέμεσις appear among the so-called παθητικὰ μεσότηται—ἄληθεια, εὐτραπελία, φιλία, and σεμιότης: whereas the subject of the 9th chapter of the Fourth Book is carefully distinguished from the foregoing ἀπεραία, its discussion forming a sort of appendix to the Book. Αἰσθός, as presented in this chapter, is a natural shrinking from incurring the bad opinion of other people, which is useful in those whose morality is not yet assured, as preventing them from doing things which would bring them into disgrace: but it is only thus provisionally useful. The time ought to come when one, as a matter of fact, does not do, or think of doing, such things. This is the strong position which Aristotle takes up. But it suits most men to look at αἰσθός differently, and to argue thus—

‘I have done wrong, but I am ashamed. I have done a bad thing, but I am not such a bad man after all, because I am ashamed. This bad thing done by me is not so bad as the same thing done by my neighbour, who does not seem to be ashamed of having done it.’ Aristotle in this chapter declares himself—as we might expect—against this substitution of the subject’s feeling in the place of an objective moral standard. He sees that the man who thus palliates a bad action, and gives himself, as it were, absolution for it, will be prepared, with a light heart, to repeat it; and that αἰσθός, though at first a protection, may become a snare. We can understand therefore the anxiety which he shows throughout the chapter to make it quite plain that αἰσθός is not a virtue. He feels that the point is one of great practical importance, because it suits human weakness so well to make it out a virtue.

For ποία αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀνασχυντοῦσιν καὶ πρὸς τινὰ καὶ πῶς ἔχουντες see the interesting chapter Rhet. ii. 6. 1383 b. 12 sqq.

φόβος τις αδοξίας] Ramsauer refers to Plato, Legg. i. 646 E. φοβοῦμεθα δέ γε πολλάκις δόξαν, ἡγούμενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοὶ πράττοντες ἢ λέγοντες τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν· δι' ὑ' καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε, ὁμαί δὲ καὶ πάντες, αἰσχύνην. In Rhet. ii. 6, referred to above, the definition (1383 b. 13) does not include the term φόβος—ἐστι δὴ αἰσχύνη λύση τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἄδοξαν φανόμενα φέρει τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παράνοια ἢ γνωστόν ἢ μελλόντων. In Top. iv. 5. 126 a. 6 (referred to by Ramsauer) doubt seems to be thrown on the propriety of including the term φόβος in the definition—ἐὰν οὖν τις τὴν αἰσχύνην φόβον ἐπὶ ἢ τὴν ὀργὴν λύσην οὐ συμβήσεται εῦν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ εἴδος καὶ τὸ γένος ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχύνη ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεί, καὶ ἢ μὲν λύση ἐν τῷ ἑπιθυμητικῷ (ἐν τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἤδονή), ἢ ὀργὴ ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεί, διότι οὔ γενε τὰ ἀποδοθέντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοῖς εἴδεσι πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. In strict conformity with this view that αἰσχύνη is εἰς τῶν λογιστικῶν we have a second definition in Rhet. ii. 6. 1384 a. 23 ἐπεὶ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, καὶ ταύτης αὐτὴς κάπων ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀποδοθέντων κ.τ.λ. It is to be noted, however, that the definition with which Rhet. ii. 6 opens (1383 b. 13, quoted above) contains the word φανόμενα.

§ 2. ὅπερ δοκεί πάθος μᾶλλον ἢ εἶσεις εἶναι] Ramsauer compares b. 15. de An. i. 1. 403 a. 16 ἔσωκε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἐλεος, βάρσος, ἦτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μοιεῖν ἀμα γὰρ τούτων πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. It is of course only a εἶσιν of the ψυχῆ which is contrasted here, in this way, with a πάθος, for there are bodily ἐξεῖς.

§ 3. διὰ τὸ πάθει ξύνας πολλά ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς ἀιδοῦς δὲ b. 17. κωλύεσθαι] This regulation of πάθος by πάθος is the only regulation possible at first, but must not be acquiesced in as a permanent form of moral government. The φυσική ὀργή which is constituted by the de facto prevalence of good over bad feelings, does not make a man good in his own right. Ὁχι οὖν την ἀγάθων εἶναι κυρίως ἄνων φρον ἡτεως vi. 13. 6).

§ 5. οὐδὲτερα γὰρ πρακτεῖν] This seems to bind down the ἐπιεικῆς b. 24. to a very strict observance of conventional propriety; but probably Aristotle only means that the ἐπιεικῆς will avoid vulgarity as well as immorality—e.g. as the Ald. Schol. says, he will not eat in the market-place—like the βδέλυγος of Theophrastus, who, πληθούσης τῆς ἄγορᾶς, προσελήφων πρὸς τὰ κάρυα ἢ τὰ μῆλα ἢ τὰ ἀκρόδρυα, ἔστηκὼς.

1128 b. 24. ῥαγηματίζεται, ἀμα τῷ πολοῦτι προσλαλῶν. Rassow (Forsch. 93) is probably correct in reading ὁδ' for ὁδ' before ἀλοχυνίειν.

b. 25. § 8. φανερὸς δὲ καὶ] Rassow (Forsch. 93) conjectures διὰ for καὶ here, and supplies with φανερὸν not simply ἐστὶ but ἀλοχυνίειν ἐστὶ. Susemihl adopts Rassow's διὰ, and makes the words οὐ γὰρ πράκτειν § 4 . . . ἀλοχυνίειν § 5 parenthetical. I think that Rassow's διὰ, though a legitimate and tempting conjecture, is not strictly necessary. The same may be said of Bywater's suggestion—καὶ τῷ.

b. 28. ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδῶς] In Rhet. ii. 6. 1384 a. 16–22, as Ramsauer notes, ἐκουσία are mentioned which cause ἀλοχυνίη. Κb CCC, Paris 1853, and NC read ἐκουσίοις.

b. 29. § 7. ἐς ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές] 'good if': but the ἀρεταί are good without an if.

b. 32. τὰν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα] Bywater (with Κb and Cambr.). I much prefer Bekker's τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα.

b. 33. § 8.] I think that this § is an editor's interpolation. A case, however, might conceivably be made out for the retention of οὗτοι ἐστὶ δ' οὖθ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετῆ, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή: the argument being—'even ἐγκράτεια is not an ἀρετή, so a fortiori αἰδῶς is not. The ἐγκράτης has bad desires which he resists stoutly and successfully; the αἰδοῦμενος who makes a virtue of his αἰδῶς has bad desires which he seeks to palliate.'
CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

Concerning Justice and Injustice. Let us, according to the method hitherto adopted, start from the commonly given descriptions of the states in question. Justice then is commonly described as 'a state which makes us able to perform just acts; which makes us act justly and wish what is just.' A corresponding description is given of injustice. Here the words 'and wish what is just' are important, serving to mark the distinction between a state or habit on the one hand and a science or faculty on the other. A science or faculty (e.g. larpuch) can produce either of two contraries, but a state or habit (whether physical like
BOOK V: CHAP. 1: § 1.

If we, or moral like ἀγαθονή, is a bent towards the production of one class of effects only. We may gather then from the commonly given description of justice that it is not a faculty which enables us to perform just or unjust acts indifferently.

So much for the ethical import of the description. But from the merely logical point of view it is to be noted that since, as we have just observed, science is of contraries, the science or knowledge of a state or habit will be that of its contrary also. It is also to be noted that the knowledge of a state or habit throws light upon its material conditions, and a knowledge of these upon the state or habit: if e.g. we know that being in good training is having firm flesh, we know that being in bad training is having soft flesh; and we also know that things good for training are things which produce firmness of flesh. It is generally the case that if one of two contraries has various meanings the other has correspondingly various meanings.

Now injustice has two meanings, for the unjust man is (1) the man who transgresses the law and (2) the man who takes too much or is unfair. Consequently the just man is (1) the man who observes the law and (2) the man who is fair. Qua 'disposed to take too much' the unjust man will have to do with external good things. But since the unjust man is also disposed to take too little of that which is evil, the wider designation 'unfair' is more accurately applied to him, including as it does both 'disposed to take too much of that which is good' and 'disposed to take too little of that which is evil.'

Concerning justice in the first sense of the term. Since the just man is the man who observes the law, all that is in accordance with the law is 'just' in one sense of the term. Since then the laws cover the whole field of conduct, inculcating all the virtues and forbidding all the vices, justice in this sense is complete virtue—complete virtue, however, viewed not as a simple possession, but as putting its possessor in a certain relation to other people. In short, the just man in this first sense is the man who 'can use his virtue towards other people.' This is why 'ruling over other people tests a man's justice'; and why justice is sometimes thought to differ from all the other virtues in being 'the good of other people.' This first kind of justice then is not a part of virtue (i.e. a virtue) but virtue (i.e. the virtuous character) as a whole; and the contrary, injustice, is not a part of vice but vice as a whole. The difference between virtue (i.e. the virtuous character as a whole) and this kind of justice is constituted by a difference in the point of view from which each is regarded. Regarded simply as the possession of the good man his moral character as a whole is called virtuous; regarded as placing him in certain relations to other people it is called just.

1129 a. 3. § 1. περὶ δὲ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ. Ἡ δίκαιον is the principle of justice, or justice in the abstract; δίκαιον is the habit of acting in accordance with the principle.

Grant and Ramsauer refer to Ε. Ἀ. ii. 16 περὶ δὲ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ.
§§ 1, 2.

Grant remarks that πῶς μεσότητις εἰσιν; is a slightly different question from ποία μεσότης; and Ramsauer says 'caute dictum ποία μεσότης,' because it will be shown v. 5. 17 that ἡ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τις ἐστὶν, οὗ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσων ἔστι—i.e. τού ἰσου between τὸ πλέον and τὸ ἐλαττὸν. The doctrine of v. 5. 17, however, relates only to particular justice, no attempt being made, according to Ramsauer, in the Fifth Book, to show that universal justice is a μεσότης, whereas in ii. 7. 16 both kinds of justice are contemplated as μεσότητες. Hence Ramsauer thinks that the words πῶς μεσότητις εἰσιν (ii. 7. 16) are spurious. Surely this is a very unsafe line of criticism. If the Fifth Book was not written by the author of the Second Book, the inconsistency noticed by Ramsauer, if inconsistency it be, need not surprise us. If, as Ramsauer is inclined to believe (p. 281), the Fifth Book was written by the author of the Second Book, are the two passages really so inconsistent that to remove the inconsistency we must alter the text? Particular Justice may perhaps be a μεσότης in a sense somewhat different from that in which the other ἀρεταί coordinate with it are μεσότητες: but universal justice, at any rate, being the manifestation in society of all the ἀρεταί, is a μεσότης just as its constituent elements—ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, &c., are severally μεσότητες—i.e. it is a μεσότης περὶ πράξεως καὶ πάθη. When we call a man ἀνδρείας we think of him specially as one who observes moderation in relation to certain particular πράξεως καὶ πάθη: when we call him δίκαιος in the wide sense we think of him as one who observes moderation in relation to all πράξεως καὶ πάθη generally. This is so obvious that the writer of the Fifth Book does not think it necessary to make any definite statement on the subject: although he comes very near to doing so when he says ch. 2. § 6 ἡ δὲ (i.e. Universal Justice) περὶ ἁπάντα περὶ ἄσα ὁ σπουδαῖος—i.e. the δίκαιος is related to all his circumstances ὡς δὲ, καί ὅς ὁ λόγος. I am therefore disinclined to follow Grant and Ramsauer in attaching any special significance to ποία here. It seems to follow very naturally the ποῖας of the preceding line, to which no one thinks of attaching any special significance.

§ 2. κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲθοδον] i.e. the method of taking the a. θ. ἐνδοξα or λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῆς (cf. § 3 below ὡς ἡ πάντας . . . βουλομένους λέγειν), and testing them by their conformity with
philosophical ideas, which, in their turn, are often modified in accordance with the ἐνδοφα or λεγόμενα: cf. E. N. i. 8. i σκεπτέων δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεία πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ἴσχυοι ταχύ διαφωνεῖ τὰλησιές. Cf. note on vii. 1. 5.

§ 3. καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια . . . τὰ ἀδίκα] This is added, Mich. Eph. says, to distinguish the ξίς—δικαιοσύνη—from a δύναμις (or ἐπιστήμη):—οὐκ ἐν τῷ βούλεσθαι πράττειν ἐστὶν τὸ εἶναι ἐκεῖνος (i. e. τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ ἐπιστήματι) ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι· ὁ γὰρ τὴν ἁτρικὴν ἔχων, καὶ μὴ βούληται ἐγνάζειν, ἁτρῶς ἐστὶ καὶ λέγεται, ὁμοιῶς καὶ ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύναμιν ἔχων, καὶ μὴ ὑπὲρ τῶν βικαίων λέγῃ ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδίκων, ρήτωρ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀλλος κἀκεῖνος ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τε βικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ρήτωρ ἐστι. δίκαιος δὲ ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν δυνάμενος (which is all that the expression πρακτικὸν τῶν δικαίων by itself without the addition καὶ βούλονται κ.λ. implies); δύναται γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀδίκος ταύτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ δίκαιος ἐστὶν ὁ βούλεμος· βούλεται δὲ ὁ τὴν ἔχων ἔχων τὴν εἰρημένην. The Paraph. Heliodorus has remarks to the same effect.

This view of the force of καὶ βούλονται seems to me to explain the connexion οὐδὲ γὰρ § 4 naturally and adequately, and to make it unnecessary, with Jackson (Book V. introd. pp. xv, xvi), to interpolate v. 9. §§ 14–16, 1137 a. 4–26 between § 3 and § 4 here. It may be true that 'the doctrine of ch. i. § 4, is necessary to complete the argument of ch. 9. § 16,' and it is interesting to note that this was the opinion of Mich. Eph. 'who, though he does not suspect any displacement, is nevertheless careful in commenting on the latter passage to quote the former.' But it is necessary to remember in connexion with this quotation that he has already explained to his own satisfaction the immediate sequence of § 4 upon § 3 in ch. i.

For the popular view here appealed to, that Justice implies βούλησις, i. e. a definite moral bent, and is therefore not a δύναμις or ἐπιστήμη cf. Philemon (quoted by Stobaeus, Flor. vol. i. p. 189, ed. Meineke) ἀνὴρ δικαίος ἐστιν οὐχ ὁ μὴ ἀδικῶν | ἀλλ' ὅστις ἀδικεῖν δυνάμενος μὴ βούλεται, and Menander (Meineke iv. 344) δικαίος ἀδικεῖν οὐκ ἐπισταται τρόπος. The term προσηρεῖται would probably have been preferred by the writer here as more technically correct than βούλεται, had he wished to give an accurate definition of justice: as it is, he merely quotes popular language: cf. v. 8. 11 δικαίος ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοσύνη, and v. 5. 17 καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἥν ὁ
BOOK V: CHAP. 1: § 3.

At the same time it is to be noted that in v. 11, 6, the impossibility of τὸ ἐαυτῶν ἄδικεῖν is proved by reference to the fact (stated in v. 9, 5 and 6) that no man wishes (βούλεται) to be injured; the absence of βούλησις shows that there is no ἀδίκεια πρὸς ἑαυτὸν. Προαίρεσις, however, seems to be the accepted term in the two Aristotelian passages which state most explicitly the distinction now before us between a moral habit and a faculty—viz. *E. N.* iv. 7. 12 οὐκ εῶν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστιν ὁ ἄλλος, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαίρεσιν κατὰ τὴν ἔξω γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι ἄλλων ἐστιν, and *Top.* iv. 5. 126 a. 30 ὅραν δὲ καὶ εἰ τὶ τῶν ψευτῶν ἡ φευκτὰν εἰς δύναμιν ἡ εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐθηκεν (sc. one’s opponent in a dialectical encounter), οἷον τὸν σοφιστήν ἢ διάβολον ἢ κλέπτην τῶν δυνάμεων λάθρα τὰ ἀλλόφρα κλέπτειν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων τῷ δυνατῷ εἶναι τί τοιτῶν τοιούτων λέγειν: δύναται μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεός καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος τὰ φαύλα δρᾶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσί τοιοῦτοι πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαιλοὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγονται.

The distinction between moral character on the one hand and intellectual ability or professional skill on the other, which is formulated by Aristotle in the above passages, was one which the Greek mind found it difficult or inconvenient to keep in view, if we may judge from Plato’s evidently strong desire to bring it home to his readers: see *Rep.* 332 D τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἅρα εἰ ποιεῖ καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει; Δοκεῖ μοι. Τίς οὖν δυνατότερος κάμινοντας φίλους εὗ ποιεῖ καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει; ʿΙατρὸς . . . 335 D οὗ θερμοτήτως, αἶμα, ἔργον ψυχεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑαυτίου. Ναὶ. Οὔδε ἔργον ὑγραίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑαυτίου. Πάνω γε. Οὔδε δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑαυτίου. Φαίνεται. 'Ο δὲ γε δίκαιος ἄγαθός; Πάνω γε. Οὔκ ἢρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὃ Πολέμαρχε, οὗτε φίλον οὐκ ἄλλων οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑαυτίου. *Gorgias* 460 C Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τῶν ῥητορικῶν δίκαιων εἶναι, τῶν δὲ δίκαιων βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν; Γορ. Φαινεῖται γε. Σω. οὐδέποτε ἢρα βουλήσεται δὲ γε δίκαιος ἄδικεῖν. Γορ. Ἀνάγκη. Σω. τῶν δὲ ῥητορικῶν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι. Γορ. Ναὶ. Σω. οὐδέποτε ἢρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἄδικεῖν. Gorgias then contradicts himself by saying that the ῥητορικὸς may use his art ἄδικας—the intention of the whole passage being to bring vividly before us ‘the old confusion of the Arts and the Virtues’ (Jowett iii. 12). Cf. also *Meno* 90 B, where it is argued that virtue is not an accomplishment which can be taught, else good men would surely teach their sons to be virtuous. So far from being an accomplishment which can be acquired, it is rather a divine gift or inspiration. At any rate, it is not something which the sophists can teach, as riding-masters
1129 a. 9. teach the art of riding: see also E. N. v. 9. 16 τοῦ δικαίου οὗτοι εἶναι οὐδὲν ἤττον τὸ ἁπάντι. ὅτι οὐδὲν ἤττον ὁ δίκαιος ἄλλα καὶ μᾶλλον δύναι ἐν ἑκατὸν πράξει τούτων, and Grant's note ad loc.—'The opinion that justice implies its contrary as if it were an art (ἐνώμας) would be a consequence of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to and drew out the paradoxical conclusion, Rep. p. 334 a, Hipp. Min. pp. 375, 6. The Aristotelian theory that justice is a moral state (ἐξίς) set the difficulty at rest.' To this last remark it is necessary to add that Plato, although he has no technical terms in which to express his view, sees as clearly as Aristotle that justice is a state involving the harmony of the whole man, and resulting from life-long intelligent obedience to νόμος. If justice were the dexterity of a single faculty, easily imparted in a few lessons by the Professors of ἡττορική, then ἡττορική would be the sovereign science, as these Professors maintain. But πολιτική is the sovereign science, and ἡττορική is ancillary: see Politicus 304 C D E, and note on E. N. i. 2. 6.

a. 11. § 4.] See Met. Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1 δήλων ὅτι καὶ τῶν δύναμεων αἰ μὲν ἕσονται ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. διὸ πάσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσίν ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαί εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄλλῳ. καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πάσας τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὕται, αἱ δ' ἄλογοι μία ἐνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνετος μόνου, ἢ δὲ ιατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ἑργείας. αὕτων δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πράγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν, πλὴν οὐχ ὡσανώς, καὶ ἔστων ὡς ἀμφότερος, ἔστι δ' ὡς τοῦ ὑπάρχουσα μᾶλλον. διάλογος καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιστήμας εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων. εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτῷ τὸ δὲ μὴ καθ' αὐτῷ καὶ γὰρ τὸ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ τρόπον τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀποφαίνει γὰρ καὶ ἀποφορὰ δηλοῖ τὸ ἐναντίον. ἡ γὰρ στέρησις ἡ πρῶτη τὸ ἐναντίον, αὕτη δ' ἀποφορὰ εἰσαρέσθη. ἐπει δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη δύναμις τῶν λόγων ἑκείνη, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κυνήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν τοῦ μὲν ὑγιείου ὑγίεις μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμώτητα καὶ τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων ἀμφότερος. From this passage it is plain that the δύναμεις of the present section are αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις, and it is probable that the ἐπιστήμαι which the writer has more prominently in view are αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι, such as ἱατρική, i.e. those which are ἀρχαὶ μεταβλητικαί ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄλλῳ—although, of course, the remark τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὕτη is true of science generally. Thus the ἐπιστήμη of δύναμις μετὰ λόγου—ἱατρική, apprehending the ἄλογος δύναμις—τὸ θερμαντικὸν, apprehends also its contrary τὸ ψυκτικὸν, and according
as it employs the one or the other will produce θερμότης or ψυχρότης 1129 a. in the patient—always a definite result from the means taken, since αἱ ἄλογοι δύναμεις μῖα ἐνῷ. In Met. Θ. 2 the contrast is that between an ἄλογος δύναμις such as τὸ ἱγνείου (i.e. τὸ ποιητικὸν ἱγνείαν) and a δύναμις μετὰ λόγου, such as ιατρική: in the passage before us (Eth. v. i. 4) the contrast is between a ἔξις, such as ἱγνεία, and a δύναμις μετὰ λόγου, such as ιατρική. As the ἄλογος δύναμις—τὸ ἱγνείου produces only ἱγνεία (Met.), so the ἔξις—ἵγνεια (Eth.) produces only ἱγνεία (i.e. τὰ σημαντικὰ ἱγνεία—see Top. i. 15. 106 b. 35 τὸ ἱγνεῖν τὸ μὲν ἱγνεία ποιητικῶν, τὸ δὲ φυλακτικῶν, τὸ δὲ σημαντικῶν. Cf. Met. Γ. 2. 1003 a. 35, Met. Κ. 3. 1061 a. 6). For the doctrine τῶν ἐναντίων μὲν ἐπιστήμη the editors refer to An. Pr. 24 a. 21, 48 b. 5, 50 a. 19, Phys. viii. 1. 251 a. 30, de An. 427 b. 5; and Jackson refers also to Plato, Phaedo 97 D, and Charmides 166 E. The reason why τῶν ἐναντίων μὲν ἐπιστήμη is stated in the passage Met. Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1–20 quoted above—viz. λόγος ἑστίν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πράγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν. For στέρησις see Met. Δ. 22, and cf. Top. vi. 9, where rules are given for the definition of τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενα.

ἔξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ὦ] Rassow (Forsch. p. 95, note) α. 14. supports the conjecture of Muretus—ἔξις δ' ἡ αὐτή τῶν ἐναντίων ὦ. On the margin of his copy Muretus found the note of a scribe to the effect that some MSS. have αὐτή instead of ἐναντία. This suggested to Muretus that an original αὐτή became αὐτή, which in its turn became ἐναντία. Η in fact actually reads ἡ αὐτή.

ἵγνειῶς βαδίζειν] Cf. Top. i. 15. 106 b. 34 τὸ ἱγνεῖν ὡς ποιητικὸς α. 18. ἡ φυλακτικῶς ἡ σημαντικῶς ῥηθόταται.

§ 5. πολλάκις μὲν ὦν γνωρίζεται . . .] The transition here, α. 17. though suggested by the ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτή ἔιναι of § 4, is very abrupt, and even inconsequent. After telling us in §§ 3 and 4 that 'the ἔξις Justice does not result in both δίκαια and ἄδικα, but only in the former, herein differing from a δύναμις μετὰ λόγου like ιατρική, which can produce either health or sickness, and, generally, from an ἐπιστήμη which, if it knows the ἔξις, also knows the στέρησις of the ἔξις,' the writer seems to be suddenly struck by the logical importance of this last point (that the knowledge of the ἔξις is the knowledge of its στέρησις) for his present purpose (the joint investigation of δικαιοσύνη and ἄδικα), and enlarges on it
throughout §§ 5, 6, and 7, dismissing entirely the really important ethical doctrine (the difference between ἐξις and δύναμις or ἑπιστήμη) which he has only just raised in §§ 3 and 4. Inconsequent, however, though the transition marked by μὲν οὖν certainly is, we can understand how it might seem a perfectly natural one to a writer whose critical faculty was overweighed by his knowledge of peripatetic doctrine. According to that doctrine ἔξις or 'possession' is related not only to certain definite ἐκτὰ (i.e. τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν) which may be safely inferred from it (as in turn it may be inferred from them as symptoms), but also to the στέρησις or 'privation' of that of which as ἔξις it is the 'possession.' True, the relation between ἔξις and ἐκτὰ is something very different from that between ἔξις and στέρησις: but the writer of the Fifth Book is not the man to discriminate in such a case. He sees no inconsequence in the remark that 'a ἔξις does not produce contraries—but the knowledge of a ἔξις is the knowledge of its ἐναντία ἔξις or of its στέρησις.'

The writer's implication, however, in §§ 5, 6, 7, and 8—that the knowledge of δικαιοσύνη is the knowledge of ἄδικα, and vice versa—must be accepted with a reservation. It has only a logical value. Definitions of the two ἔξις, embodying and rationalising popular opinion, may indeed be arrived at by one enquiry. We may save ourselves the trouble of making two enquiries. But it is only the just man, as such, who really knows what Justice is. The dialectical outsider, as such, can only rationalise the popular ὑπολήψεις ἄς ἔχομεν περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, as he may equally well rationalise the ὑπολήψεις περὶ τοῦ ἄδικου. As the just man, however, is not ideally just, but has to struggle with the forces of evil, he will also know ἄδικα, and he will know it in its essence, because the essence of ἄδικα is that it opposes itself to δικαιοσύνη. The just man knows ἄδικα essentially because he knows it for what it really is—as the enemy of δικαιοσύνη. But it is not conversely true that the knowledge of ἄδικα which the ἄδικος possesses is also the knowledge of δικαιοσύνη. He sees in δικαιοσύνη only the enemy of ἄδικα: but this is to see only an accident of δικαιοσύνη, which is essentially καλλιστή—a beautiful organising principle—καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἔφος οὔτω δυναμο-στός. The ἄδικος in short knows the sanction of the just law—the punishment which it inflicts, but not the just law itself, as such: see Plato, Rep. iii. 409 D, ἐπωρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τε καὶ αὐτὴν ὀφνοί, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευμένης χρόνῳ ἀμα αὐτῆς τε καὶ ἐπωρίας ἑπιστήμην λήψεται.
BOOK V: CHAP. 1: § 5.

Fritzsche quotes Met. A. 2. 982 a. 23 ὑπόκειμέναν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχων οἵτινες πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα, where τὰ ὑποκείμενα are the particular cases or facts which fall under the general rule or principle. In his note on the passage, Bonitz, while showing how the term naturally lends itself to this sense (the extension of the logical subject—τὸ ὑποκείμενον is narrower than that of the predicate), remarks that it is a sense which it does not bear elsewhere (ἰ. ἐ. than in Met. A. 2), so far as he knows, in Aristotle’s writings. Nor is it easy to see how here (E. N. v. 1. 5) it can mean merely particular cases or symptoms—τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξωσ, for ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεικτικῶν plainly takes up ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκείμενων, and τὸ ἐνδεικτικόν is immediately afterwards explained as τὸ ποιητικόν. Peters translates—'A habit is often known by the opposite habit, and often by its causes and results'; and Jackson says: 'τὰ ὑποκείμενα include not merely manifestations and symptoms of the ἔξωσ in question, but also its causes and conditions. In fact the ὑποκείμενα of ὑγίεια (to take a particular example) are τὰ ὑγιεινά in the various kindred senses of φιλακτικά, παινικά, σημαντικά, and δεικτικά ὑγίεια. For these senses of ὑγιεινά cf. Met. iii. 2. p. 1003 a. 34, x. 3. p. 1061 a. 5, Top. i. 15. p. 106, b. 35.' I am inclined to think that if the writer had intended to use ὑποκείμενα here for ἐνδεικτικά in this very wide sense of the latter term, he would not immediately have added καὶ τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν τὸ ποιητικόν κ.τ.λ. I prefer to understand τὰ ὑποκείμενα as the material conditions of ἐνεξία (τὸ ἀναγκαῖόν τὸ ἔξωφθεσιν) of Phys. ii. 9. 199 b. 34—200 b. 8, τὸ ὁς οὖν ἕνεκ τοῦ ἐε of Met. A. 7. 1072 b. 12, τὸ ὦς ἔλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ κυνήσεις αἱ ταύτης of Phys. ii. 9. 200 a. 31)—the necessary food, &c., used as means or material (τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐνεξίας) by the γυμναστής or trainer who is the efficient cause of ἐνεξία: cf. Pol. A. 1. 1238 b. 25 τὴν κρατίστην τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκείμενων ἀρίστην οὐ δει λειταθεῖν τὸν ἄγαθον νομοθέτη καὶ τῶν ὄν ἀληθῶς πολιτικῶν. Fritzsche (whom Grant follows) is supported in his (I think, erroneous) view of the meaning of ὑποκείμενα here by Mich. Eph. who has—γνωρίζεται ἡ ἔξως . . . ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν υπ’ αὐτὴν ἔκτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκτὰ ἐκ τῆς ἔξωσ. The Paraph. Heliodorus, however, is right—γυμνασκούστω δὲ αἱ ἔξως καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτῶν ἔξως μὲν γὰρ φέρει εἶπεν ἡ ὑγίεια, ἐκτῶν δὲ τὸ ἐνεξεινόν δ’ πρὸς ὑγίειαν φέρει· εἶ γὰρ γυμνασκούσιν ὑγιεῖνον εἶναι τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί γυμνασκούσιν ἐνεξειν ἐναι τὴν ἐν σαρκὶ πυκνότητα. The Paraph., it will be observed, is guilty of a little confusion here in his use of the terms ὑγίεια and ἐνεξία: see Top. v. 7. 137 a. 3, quoted by Zell, ἐπεὶ ὅμως
1129 a. 19. ἢ χει λατρεύς τὸ πρὸς τὸ λατρευτὸν ὑγιείας εἶναι καὶ γνωμαστής πρὸς τὸ λατρευτὸν ἑυεξίας, ἵπτο δὲ ἰδιὸν γνωμαστὸν τὸ λατρευτὸν εἶναι ἑυεξίας, εἰ τὸν ἰδιὸν λατρεύς τὸ λατρευτὸν εἶναι ὑγιείας.

a. 21. πυκνότης] Ζέλλ引用《Physiognomonica》806 b. 22，where σκληρόν is coupled with ὑπερκτική as applied to σάρξ.

a. 22. § 6. ἀκολουθεῖ κ.τ.λ.] Τὸπ. υ. 15. 106 b. 21 ἐπὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἐξίους λεγομένων ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰ γιὰ τὸ δύστερον πλεονάσχος λέγεται, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν, ὅπον ἐς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πλεονάσχος λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πυρηνήν καὶ τῷ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ ἀνασθηθὸν εἶναι πλεονάσχος ῥηθήσεται κατὰ τῇ πυρηνήν καὶ τῷ σῶμα.

a. 24. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] because there are exceptions to the above rule:
see Τὸπ. i. 15. 106 b. 2 τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τὸ μισεῖν ἑναιντίν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν οὐδὲν—ἰ. ὀ. φιλεῖν is used πλεονάσχος (=‘to love’ and ‘to kiss’), but μισεῖν the δύστερον is not.

a. 25. οὗτος ἐς τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἁδίκον] This is the reading of Ηα Μβ Nb Qβ B1 adopted by Bekker and Bywater. But Κβ, Πβ, Camb. read οὗτος ἐς τὸ ἁδίκον καὶ ἡ ἁδίκια, and Λβ (followed by Jackson) reads οὗτος ἐς τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἁδίκον καὶ ἡ ἁδίκια: i. e. we have τὸ ἁδίκον and ἡ ἁδίκια, but their contraries τὸ δίκαιον and ἡ δικαιοσύνη are absent from Κβ Πβ Camb., and ἡ δικαιοσύνη is absent from Λβ. I would suggest that the archetype of Κβ Πβ Camb., which was throughout distinguished for the unusual frequency with which it omitted words and clauses, omitted τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ, the original reading being οὗτος ἐς τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ ἁδίκον καὶ ἡ ἁδίκια. The plural δάσεα (given by all MSS. apparently, except Ηα and Ρ, which have δάσεα—adopted by Bywater—in both places) would perhaps be thus accounted for: cf. for similar plurals Ε.Ν. ν. 2. 9. 1130 b. 14 καὶ τὸ ἁδίκον καὶ ἡ ἁδίκια οὔ ταῦτα ἄλλα ἔστερα ἕκεινων, τὰ μὲν ὧς μέρη τὰ δ’ ὧς ὀλ. 1130 b. 14 καὶ τὸ ἁδίκον καὶ ἡ ἁδίκια οὔ ταῦτα ἄλλα ἔστερα ἕκεινων, τὰ μὲν ὧς μέρη τὰ δ’ ὧς ὀλ.

a. 27. § 7. διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὄμωνυμαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει] sc. ἡ ὄμωνυμα—‘the equivocation,’ τὴν ὄμωνυμαν being = τὰ ὄμωνυμα; ‘because the things called by the same name (τὰ ὄμωνυμα) stand very close to each other, the equivocal use of the name escapes notice.’ Ὅμωνυμα are things which have nothing but the name in common, as Man and Picture, each of which is called ζῷον. Συνώνυμα are things which have a common name and a common nature, as Man and Ox: each not only is called, but is ζῷον: see Cat. 1.
BOOK V: CHAP. 1: § 7.

I. 3. 1 ομώνυμα λέγεται διόν άνυμα μόνον κοινών, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τούνομα λόγος 1129 a. 27. ετερος . . . συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται διόν τε άνυμα κοινών καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς.

In Top. i. 15. 107 a. 3 Aristotle illustrates the equivocal uses of the term ἄγαθον under various Categories, and remarks that a term which is applied to several objects, each of which belongs to a different Category, is employed equivocally, i.e. with a different meaning in each Category—σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν κατὰ τούνομα κατηγορίων, εἰ ταῦτα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ πάντων' εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταῦτα, δήλον δὴν ὁμώνυ- μον τὸ λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ ἄγαθὸν ἐν ἑδοματί μὲν τὸ ποιητικὸν ἠδονής, ἐν ἰστρικῇ δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἠγείας, εἶπ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ποιάν εἶναι, οἷον σώφρονα ἡ ἄνδρεια ἡ δικαιαν' ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων. ἐναχθεὶ δὲ τὸ ποτὲ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ ἄγαθὸν ἄγαθον γὰρ λέγεται τὸ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ πολλάκις δὲ τὸ ποσόν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ μετρίου λέγεται γὰρ τὸ μέτριον ἄγαθον, ὡστε ὁμώνυμον δὲ τὸ ἄγαθον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἐπὶ σώματος μὲν χρώμα, ἐπὶ δὲ φωνῆς τὸ εὐήκους· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀξύ· οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεται· φωνῆ μὲν γὰρ ὀξεία ἡ ταχεία, καθάπερ φασίν οἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἀρμονίους ἀρμονικοί, γνωσία δὲ δεξία ἡ έκλασμων ῥηθεὶς, μάχαιρα δὲ ἡ δεξιόγωνος. The Categories are thus an important instrument in the hands of the Dialectician when engaged with the second of the four processes mentioned in Top. i. 13. 105 a. 21 as constituting the dialectical method—τὰ δὲ ἄργανα δὲ 〉δὲν εὐπορήσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐστὶ τέταρτα, ἐν μὲν τὸ προτάσει λαβεῖν, δεύτερον δὲ ποραχῶς ἐκαστὸν λέγεται δύνασθαι διελένει, τρίτον τὰς διαφοράς εὑρεῖν, τέταρτον δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις. In connexion with this practical employment in dialectic of the Categories as means of distinguishing τὰ πλεοκαχῶς λεγόμενα, it may be noted as not without significance that the Treatise on the Categories itself (whether written by Aristotle or not matters little) begins with the words ομώνυμα λέγεται.

With διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμονυμίαν Jackson compares Phys. vii. 4. 249 a. 23 εἰς τὲ τῶν ὁμονυμίων αἱ μὲν πολὺ ἀπέχουσα, αἱ δὲ ἐχοσαί των ὁμοιότητα, αἱ δ' ἐγγὺς ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογία, διὸ οὐ δικαίως ὁμονυμία εἶναι οὔσα.

καὶ οὖχ ὀσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δὴλη μᾶλλον (ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλῇ a. 28. ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν]) It is not where the ὁμώνυμα are particulars plainly distinguished by their 'outward appearance' (Peters), e.g. Collarbone and Key, that ὁμονυμία is dangerous. It is when we are dealing with abstractions or general notions that it is likely to escape our notice and lead us into error: see An. Post. ii. 13.
Undetected ὀμωνυμία prevents the discovery of truth by causing us to connect together notions or facts which have nothing or little in common. From the comparison of such notions or facts no scientific results can be obtained, since scientific discovery requires the comparison of things which are similar (ἡ τοῦ ὀμοίου σκέψις), their similarity, as science understands similarity, being that which strikes us after we have carefully noted their differences (τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν): while it is impossible to note their differences till we have cleared the ground by dissolving any false associations due to ὀμωνυμία which may exist in our minds (ποσακὸς ἐκαστὸς λέγεται διελέυν): see Τοπ. i. 13. 105 a. 21 quoted above. ὀμωνυμία, in short, as such, are not comparable for scientific purposes: but τὸ συνώνυμον πᾶν συμβλητόν Τοπ. i. 15. 107 b. 17.

'Das letzte Wort (μᾶλλον) gehört nicht zu δήλη, sondern zu πόρρω, so viel als πορροστέρω. Seine jetzige Stellung ist kaum zu recht fertigen, vielleicht genügt es επὶ τῶν πόρρω μᾶλλον δήλη zu setzen.'

a. 30. κλεῖς] Zell and others quote Plutarch, Reg. et imp. apophthegmata 9 τὸς δὲ κλείδος αὐτῷ (Philip) καταγείσθης εἰ τολέμῳ, καὶ τοῦ θεραπεύοντος ἵπτρον πάντος τι καθ' ἡμέραν αὐτοῦντος, Δάμβαμε, ἔφη, ὅσα βούλει τὴν γὰρ κλεῖν ἐχεις.

When ἡ καθόλου δικαιοσύνη and ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη are here said to be ὀμωνυμα, it is obvious that the term is not to be taken in the strict sense of ὅπι τὸ ὄνομα μόνον κοινῶν (Cat. i. 1 a. 1), i. e. of τὰ κυρίως ὀμωνυμα λεγόμενα ἅ ἐστι τὰ ἀπὸ τόχης (Alexander Aph. Met. p. 197, line 12, ed. Bonitz); for, as Mich. Eph. says in his note on the present passage—τῶν δικαιοσύνων... ἡ μὲν ἑτόν ὡσπερ γένος δικαιοσύνη κατὰ πάσης ἀρετῆς, ἡ δὲ ὡσπερ ταυτῆς εἴδους. ὡστε ὡς μὲν γένος καὶ εἴδος συνώνυμα ἐστοιτ' ἐπιδέχομαι γὰρ τὰ εἴδη τῶν γενῶν ὄμοιων. Below (v. 2. 6, on which see note) they are actually called συνώνυμα. In fact, the two kinds of δικαιοσύνη (or of ἀδικία) are said to be ὀμωνυμά with as much or as little right as the things called ἀγαθά are said in Τοπ. i. 15. 107 a. 3–17 to be ὀμωνυμα λεγόμενα. The statement made 107 a. 11 ὡστε ὀμωνυμον τὸ ἀγαθὸν certainly cannot be reconciled with E. N. i. 6. 12. 1096 b. 27 οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε (ὅ. το
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όγαθόν) τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τούχης ὁμώνυμος, unless we allow a latitude in 1129 a. 30. the use of the term ὁμώνυμος which the definition in Cat. 1. 1 a. 1 does not prepare us for. The ὁμώνυμος of that definition are merely τὰ ἀπὸ τούχης, whereas the kinds of justice (like the various ὁγάθον) are only called ὁμώνυμος by an exaggeration, perhaps justified by the circumstance that the points in which they differ are very apt to be overlooked. In strict Aristotelian language they are neither ὁμώνυμος nor yet συνώνυμα, but τὰ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα—see Mel. Z. 4. 1030 b. 2 oμδὲ γὰρ λατρείων σῶμα καὶ ἔργον καὶ σκέφτος λέγεται οὔτε ὁμώνυμος οὔτε καθ’ ἐν ἄλλα πρὸς ἐν—on which Alexander (p. 441. 13. ed. Bonitz) has oμδὲ γὰρ λατρείων σῶμα καὶ σκέφτος οὔτε ὁμώνυμος λέγεται οὔτε καθ’ ἐν καὶ συνώνυμος [cf. Alex. Mel. p. 199. 20 καθ’ ἐν μὲν λεγόμενα λέγει τὰ συνώνυμα καὶ ἄφ’ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ τεταγμένα γένος], ἄλλα πρὸς ἐν, ἔργον ὡς τὰ ἄφ’ ἐνὸς τε καὶ πρὸς ἐν—e. g. a drug, a bandage, and a lancet are all called λατρεία because they are ἀπὸ τῆς λατρείας, depend upon, are prescribed by, or used by medical science: exercise, fresh air, and food are all called ὑγείαν because they are πρὸς τὴν ὑγείαν, have Health in view as their end: see Alex. Mel. 197. 2 τὰ δὲ ἄφ’ ἐνὸς τε καὶ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα οὔτε τὴν τῶν συνώνυμων ἰσογεία πρὸς τὸ κατηγορούμενον σώζει πρῶς ἄλληλα, οὔτε πάλιν ἔχει τὴν τῶν ὁμώνυμων ἀκρατὸν τε καὶ ἄμικτον ἑπεράστη, ἄλλ’ ἐστι τις αὐτοῖς κοινωνία κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ταῦτα ἃ λέγεται τῷ εἶναι τίνα φύσιν ἐκείνον τοῦ πρᾶγματος, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς πως ἐνορίσθαι πάλιν, ἄφ’ οὗ ὡς ἡ πρὸς δ’ ἐνὸς ἐκκοιτά τινα διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος κεκοινωνήκεν αὐτοῦ . . . οὔ μόνον ὁμόμαστος κεκοινωνήκε τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὖτος ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα ὡς τὰ κυρίως ὁμώνυμα λεγόμενα ἃ ἐστι τὰ ἀπὸ τίχης, ἄλλα καὶ αὐτικὸν τω λέον ἔχει τοῦ ὀμίως ἄλληλος ὄνομασθαι.

Thus ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰχένα τῶν ζῴων and η τὰς θύρας κλείσων are both called κλεῖες and are ὁμώνυμα: horse and ox are both called ζῷων and are συνώνυμα or καθ’ ἐν λεγόμενα: a bandage and a drug are both called λατρεία, and are ἄφ’ ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα. It is under this third head, then, that the two kinds of justice really fall. ὁ ἰσός, the fair man, and ὁ νόμιμος, the man who has all the social ἀρετής, are both called δίκαιος, because the moral quality or complex of qualities characterised in each case is ἄφ’ ἐνὸς, i. e. ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας—is produced by the chief science; and is an instrument in its hands πρὸς ἐν, i. e. πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Similarly Eudemus and the writer of M. M. describe the kinds of φιλία as πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα—E. E. H. 2. 1236 a. 16 ἀνάγκη ἀρα τρία φιλίας εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ’ ἐν ἀπάσας μηδ’ ὡς εἰδὴ ἐνὸς γένους, μήτε πάρτι παρέχεται ὁμώνυμος πρὸς c c
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1129 a. 30. μίαν γὰρ τινα λέγοντα καὶ πρώτην, ὀστερὸ τὸ ἑιστρικόν. Cf. Μ.Μ. ii. 11.

1209 a. 19-31. Similarly Alex. (Met. p. 197) places τὸ ἄγαθον, τὸ σχῆμα, and ὁ ἀριθμὸς under τὸ πρὸς ἐν λεγάμενα. For the sense, however, in which Particular and Universal Justice may be called συνώνυμα see note on v. 2. 6.

a. 31. § 8. ποσακχῶς] τὸ ποσακχῶς ἐκαστὸν λέγεται διελεῖν is the second of the four ἀργανα δὲ ἐν εἰςπορῆσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν enumerated in ῾Ορ. i. 13. 105 a. 23. The first—τὸ προτάσεις λαβῆν—has been employed in § 3.

a. 32. καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος] NC, Par. 1853, Bywater: other MSS., however, have the article before ἄνισος: and K b and CCC for καὶ ὁ ἄνισος read καὶ ἄδικος, a circumstance which may be thought to favour the view of Trendelenburg, Ramsauer, and Jackson, who reject καὶ ὁ ἄνισος. ‘These words (καὶ ὁ ἄνισος),’ says Jackson, ‘which after Trendelenburg I have bracketed, but which Bekker retains, cannot be said to destroy the sense, as they might be taken as an explanation of ὁ πλεονέκτης [this apparently is the view of the scribe of NC and Bywater, who omit the article before ἄνισος]. But they are certainly awkward, especially as the same idea is introduced with a justificatory explanation in § 11. See Trendelenburg’s Ἱστορικαί Βειτράγες zur Φιλοσοφία ii. 354. I conceive that the scribe, not seeing that the word πλεονέκτης suggested ἔσος as its correlative, bridged the apparent gap by anticipating § 11.’ On the other hand, Hampke, with the approval of Spengel (Aristotelische Studien i. 207), brackets the words καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης. Their omission would, of course, make the clause more symmetrical: but the opening words of § 9 seem to show that they must be retained. On the whole, the omission of the article before ἄνισος seems to be the easiest way out of the difficulty. For a remarkable criticism of τὸ ἄδικεν = τὸ πλεονέκτειν see Plato, Gorgias 483 B–484 B: the gist of it is contained in the following words—νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχρῶν λέγεται τὸ πλέον ᾣτεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἄδικεν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν ἢ δὲ γε, οἴμαι, φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δικαίων ἐστὶ τῶν ἀμείωτοι τοῦ χείρων πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τῶν δυσνάτωτον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ᾣτεῖν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ἄλλαις ταῖς πόλεις καὶ τοῖς γένεσις, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέρτηται, τῶν κρείττω τοῦ ἔττανος ἀρχεῖον καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. Cf. Menander (Meineke iv. 359) ἰσότητα δὲ ἀὑροῦ καὶ πλεονέξιαν φύγε.

b. 1. § 9. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος] Τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἄδικον is τὸ ἄνισον. But τὸ ἄνισον, which is the generic term (τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινὸν
§ 9), has two species, τὸ πλέον and τὸ μείον. As, however, the man 1129 b. i.
who habitually disregards ἴσοτης almost invariably does so for his
own advantage, τὸ πλέον is practically identical with τὸ ἄνυσον. The
ἀνυσος with whom we are practically concerned is the πλεονέκτης.
The μειωκτής—the man who will not stand up for his rights when
he knows that he is being unfairly treated—is not often met with,
and may be neglected. Not to be confounded with the μειωξια
properly so-called of the man who (reluctantly, of course—see V.
9 and 11) allows himself to be unfairly treated is the merely
apparent μειωξια of the man who chooses τὸ μείον κακῶν, for this
is really πλεονεξία. Lb and Bb read καί (adopted by Bekker) before
πλεονέκτης: this καί might be defended as accentuating the term
πλεονέκτης, and calling attention to the fact that the ἄνυσος with whom
we have practically to do is the πλεονέκτης not the μειωκτής—
'Since the unjust man is not merely unfair (ἀνυσος) but unfair
to his own advantage (καί πλεονέκτης).'

περὶ τάγαθὰ ἔσται] Cf. Ῥεπ. 359 C τὴν πλεονεξίαν πᾶσα φύσις b. 2.
διώκειν πέρικεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν, νόμω δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἱσον τιμὴν.

οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσα ...] The πλεονέκτης seeks to have more
than his fair share of τὰ ἔκτοι ἄγαθα. To seek to have τὰ περὶ
ψυχῆς (see Ῥ. N. i. 8. 2) in as large measure as possible is not
πλεονεξία: see Ῥ. N. ix. 8. 11. 1169 a. 34 ἐν πάσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς
ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἐντός τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νόμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φιλαντον
εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ ἐφηταῖ’ ὡς δ’ οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή. Ταῦτα ἐκτὸς ἄγαθα
are ἀπλῶς ἐὰν ἄγαθα, τινὶ δ’ οὐκ ἐὰν—i. e. they are in themselves good
things, although in certain relations (which must be specified in
each case) they may be evils. Thus it would be absurd to call
‘money’ a bad thing. The term ‘money,’ taken by itself without
qualification (ἀπλῶς), suggests the idea of something good; although
when we qualify it, and speak of ‘ the profligate’s money’ (τυφλ.),
it suggests the idea of something bad: cf. Τοῦρ. ii. 115 b. 33 ὥσ’ ὁ
μηδὲν οIBActionεῖμεν δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ ἀισχρόν ἢ ἄλλα τε τῶν τιμώτων,
ἀπλῶς ῥηθήσεται.

Πλεονεξία puts into practice the false theory of life which is
criticised in Ῥ. N. i. 10. That theory placed εὐθυμωνία in external
eυτεχία—in the mere presence of (as distinguished from the proper
use of) those things διὸ τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον τὰ δὲ συνεργά καὶ
χρήσιμα πέρικεν ὀργανικὸς (netinet. i. 9. 7. 1099 b. 27—cf. the ἀναγκαία
ἐξ ὑποθέσεως of Phys. ii. 9, and τὸ οὗ οὔκ ἄνει τὸ οὗ Ἑ of Μετ. Δ. 7.

C C 2
This false theory of life, then, the πλεονέκτης puts into practice, making the accumulation of these external good things, which are only means to the noble life, his end. He pursues τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά without considering whether they are or are not, as possessed by him, conducive to his own true welfare (ἀυτῷ ἀγαθά)—i.e. conducive to the ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ’ ἄρετὴν. Of all the forms of vice, his is the most unprincipled—involves the most systematic neglect of the ideal, and is the most degrading to the moral character, inasmuch as it is the abuse of those external good things which are materially necessary to the practice not only of justice but of all the other social virtues. Mich. Eph. has the following note here—εἰπὼν τὸν πλεονέκτην ἄδικον εἶναι περὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ, λέγει μὴ περὶ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεονέκτην εἶναι’ οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἱστροῦ ἢ τοῦ ῥήτορος ἱστρικώτερος ἢ ῥητορικώτερος σπεύδει γενέσθαι, οὔτε τοῦ μουσικοῦ μουσικότερος καὶ τὸ πλέον τούτων ἐν τούτως ἔχειν ἄλλα περὶ ἐκείνα τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεονεκτεῖ ἀπερ ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς καὶ τῇ ἐαυτῶν φύσει ἀγαθὰ, τοῖς φαίλοις δὲ καὶ μοχθηροῖς ὡς ἀγαθὰ. εἰσὶ δὲ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ὑγεία πλουτὸς κάλλος εὐγένεια ἀρχὴ ἔξωσια, ἢ τῇ ἐαυτῶν φύσει ἀγαθὰ διὰ τοῖς φαίλοις κακὰ ἐστὶν μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν αἰσχὺς νόσος πενία.

A man, while choosing poverty and obscurity if these conduce to his true welfare,—the performance of duty,—ought to aspire to a life in which that welfare is more brilliantly realised through the proper use of wealth and social advantages.

Πλεονεξία then is related only to τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά. There is no room for it, according to the Aristotelian doctrine, where the ἄρεται are concerned. The μεγαλόψυχος in asserting a victorious personality before his contemporaries is not a πλεονέκτης, although ἐαυτῷ τοῦ καλῶν τὸ πλέον νέμων. We are tempted to ask, if not Aristotle, at least ourselves, the question—Is this self-centred culture which must have wealth and leisure, and must, on pain of losing its beautiful balance, shut its eyes to the surrounding misery and squalor, not a refined form of πλεονεξία after all? Or perhaps the more pressing question is that concerning ‘the modern man,’ in the notion of whose personality we include industrial and commercial success—distinguished by Aristotle as merely ἀναγκαῖον (or even βλαιον) from the καλῶν, or life of culture, which constitutes the true personality of his citizen—If culture is perhaps πλεονεξία, what shall we say of the personality which
is constituted by the consciousness of success in commercial and industrial competition, and by the influence which attends such success? But the question is a far wider one than at first sight appears. It is the law not only of human society, but of the natural world, that the strong take to themselves the lion’s share, and have become strong by doing so. Are we or are we not to have Types distinguished from their fellows by strength and beauty? It is practically to this final issue that the question is pushed in the remarkable passage quoted from the Gorgias—483 B, C, D—end of note on v. 1. 8.

§ 10.] Cf. E. N. v. 3. 15, 16.

§ 11.] After κοινῶν all MSS. apparently except K b and CCC b. 11. insert (with certain variations) the words καὶ παράνομος· τοῦτο γὰρ [ἡ παρανομία ἢ ἡ ἀναρχία] περιέχει πάσαν ἀδικίαν καὶ κοινῶν ἐστι πάσης ἀδικίας. CCC, however, has these words on the margin, in the hand apparently of the original scribe.

§ 12. πῶς δίκαια] πῶς is added because all enactments are not just in the sense of aiming at the maintenance of ἴσοτης. Many of them have no reference to the requirements of Particular Justice: they are just in a certain sense—i. e. they are just in the wide and loose sense, not in the narrow and technical sense. See Mich. Eph.—πρὸςκειται δὲ τὸ πῶς δίκαιον, ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἴδιως λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην πάντα τὰ νόμιμα δίκαια, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς. Πῶς = κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην is further explained by the words which follow in § 13, b. 17 δοῦτε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον κ. τ. λ., where the μὲν is answered by ζυγοῦμεν δὲ γε τῷ ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην in chapter 2, § 1: but see below, note on § 13, b. 17.

§ 13. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἄπαντων] ‘The view given here of law,’ says Grant, ‘which is expressed still more strongly below, ch. 11, § 1, is quite different from modern views. Law is here represented as a positive system (though the instances quoted of its formulæ are all negative, μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν, &c.), aiming at the regulation of the whole of life, sometimes, however, with a bias of class-interests, and sometimes only roughly executed (ἀπεσχεδιασμένοι). This educational and dogmatic character of the law was clearly exemplified to the greatest extent in the Spartan institutions. Athens rather prided herself (according to the wise remarks which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles) on leaving
greater liberty to the individual. But Plato and Aristotle both made the mistake of wishing for an entire state-control over individual life.' Cf. E. N. x. 9 oix ikanov 6' 6sos vevov vntas trophi6s kai etpmeleias tuxeln orqth6s, 8L' epeidh' kai anqroptntas dek eptneieun auth kai etheteivai, kai per tauta deoim6v 6n vnov, kai elos de per1 panta t6n bion. It must be remembered, however, in connexion with the statement oiv vnov tov dyorevntai peri apntov, that vnov has a much wider meaning than law, and includes also all that we understand by custom as sanctioned by public opinion. However desirable Aristotle may have considered the extension of the sphere of law in the strict sense of the term, he could not have affirmed with any show of truth that 'the laws, as a matter of fact, have something to say about all that we do'—although it would be true to affirm that 'custom (whether sanctioned by law or by public opinion) has.' How largely the idea of custom enters into the connotation of vnov may be seen from the statement E. N. v. ii. i d6 m' klevete o vnov, apagorevei, which is not true if vnov be translated by law, but strictly true if it be understood generally as custom: e. g. custom or fashion does not tell Oxford undergraduates to go down to the River in academical dress; it therefore forbids them to do so. Nor do the Statutes of the University tell them; but the Statutes do not therefore forbid them. The Statutes are neutral in this matter, as in many other matters in which fashion takes a side. But see note on v. ii. i, discussing Jackson's opinion.

b. 15. στοχαζόμενοι . . . τρόπων τουοτουν] As Rassow points out (Forsch. p. 76) the reference here is to the distinction between σεται πολιτεία in which the rulers rule for the good of all (το συμφέρων πάσι) and παρεκβάσεις in which they rule for their own advantage (το συμφέρων τοίς κυρίοις); see Pol. iii. 6. 1276 a. 17 φανερόν τούνν ὡς ὅσι μὲν πολιτεία τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρων σκοποῦσιν αὕτη μὲν ἀρχαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὕτως κατὰ τὸ ἄπλος ὄκαυν . . . iii. 7. 1279 a. 28 ὅταν μὲν ὃ ἕν ἦ οἱ ὄλγοι ἥ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρων ἀρχοι, ταῦτα μὲν ἄρδες ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἔδων ἡ τοῦ ἐνός ἡ τῶν ὄλγων ἡ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις: and cf. E. N. viii. 10.

Spengel (p. 207), supposing that the reference is to Democracy (πάσι), Aristocracy (τοῖς ἁρίστοις οί τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἁρέτην), and Oligarchy or Monarchy (τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἅλλον τρόπον τουοτουν), proposes to omit ἥ τοῖς ἁρίστοις οί κατ' ἁρέτην ἥ, on the ground that
tois ἀρίστοις = τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετήν. Rassow prefers the omission 1129 b. 15. of the words ἦ τοῖς ἀρίστοις, and Jackson and Susemihl bracket them. Bywater, on the other hand, brackets the words κατ' ἀρετήν, which are omitted by Kᵇ and CCC. I venture to think that their omission by Kᵇ is a blunder. Bekker, followed by Susemihl, places a comma after κυρίοις, and Rassow says 'κυρίοις mit κατ' ἀρετήν zu verbinden verbietet der Sprachgebrauch, und Bekker ist vollkommen in seinem Rechte, wenn er vor κατ' ἀρετήν ein Komma setzt.' But why should κατ' ἀρετήν not relate to τοῖς κυρίοις, or even to τοῖς ἀρίστοις? See Pol. Δ. 5. 1293 b. 3 τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἁπλῶς κατ' ἀρετήν πολιτείαι καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν των ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεῖτεν ἀριστοκρατίαν. It seems to me to be the safer course to leave the text as it stands (either with κατ' ἀρετήν or with ἦ κατ' ἀρετήν) in all MSS. except Kᵇ and CCC, taking τὸ κατηγορημένον πάσιν to refer to the end of the ὄρθαι πολιτείαι, and τὸ συμφέρον τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἦ τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετήν ἥ κατ' ἀλλοι τρόποις τοιούτων to refer to the ends of the παρεκβάσεις: τοῖς ἀρίστοις, of course, not being the ἀρίστοι ἁπλῶς κατ' ἀρετήν of Pol. Δ. 5, but the ἀριστοκρατία μὲν ὑπόθεσιν των ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν = τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετήν ἥ κατ' ἀλλοι τινὰ τρόπον τοιούτων, where the words κατ' ἀρετήν must be understood to refer to the standard of high birth and military excellence, and the words κατ' ἀλλοι τινὰ τρόπον τοιούτων to the other grounds—especially wealth—on the strength of which men claim to rule. The word τοιούτων seems to show that the writer thought of πολιτικὴ δύναμις and πλοῦτος rather than of ἐλευθερία (see Pol. Δ. 6. 1294 a. 10 ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν ὄρος ἀρετῆς, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμου δὲ ἐλευθερία: cf. Ε. Ν. ν. 3. 7)—i.e. of tyranny and of better and worse oligarchies, rather than of democracy, in which last the κατηγορημένον appears at least to be more regarded. I cannot, however, agree with those (e.g. Michelet and Spengel) who make the writer refer in the words τὸ κατηγορημένον πάσιν to the end of democracy. The antithesis between πάσιν and τοῖς κυρίοις κατὰ κ.τ.λ. is so sharply pointed that we must believe the writer to have in his mind the distinction between ὄρθαι πολιτείαι and παρεκβάσεις.

Ωστε ἐνα μὲν τρόπον κ.τ.λ.] As I have said, these words explain b. 17. the πῶς δίκαια = κατὰ τὴν κυρίως λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην δίκαια of the last §, μὲν being answered by δὲ in ch. 2, § 1, 1130 a. 14. Jackson, however, opposes ἐνα μὲν τρόπον and προστάτει δὲ (§ 14, 1129 b. 15).
and compares ch. 2, §§ 10, 11. II 130 b. 22 σχεδὸν ... 26 κοινῶν—where νόμμα, which promote virtue through education, are distinguished from νόμμα which enforce the different virtues.' I think that the broad distinction in v. 2. 10, 11 is rather between τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὁλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενα, and τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὁλης ἀρετῆς—between the acts which produce, and the agencies which produce, virtue. These agencies are chiefly educational: but it is not, I take it, the writer's object to make a point of distinguishing between 'the indirect encouragement of the particular virtues by means of educational enactments' and their 'direct encouragement' (Jackson, p. 74) by means of commands and prohibitions, however important the distinction in itself may be; he merely wishes to show that both τὰ πραττόμενα (whether performed in consequence of the agent's possession of ὁλη ἀρετῆς, or merely in external conformity with its requirements—for ἀπὸ τῆς ὁλης ἀρετῆς admits of both meanings: cf. τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἱστοικῆς as a description of τὰ ἱστοικὰ ὀργάνα) and τὰ ποιητικὰ (which are chiefly educational enactments) are called νόμμα, and thus to exhibit the extent of the denotation of the term νόμμα. Similarly in the passage before us (v. 1. 13, 14), I think that the words προστάτευε δὲ κ.τ.λ., instead of containing a statement contrasted with that introduced by the words ἦν μὲν τρόπον, merely go into the details suggested by the words καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. The μόρια τῆς εὐδαιμονίας (in Eudemian phraseology nearly = τὰ μόρια τῆς ὁλης ἀρετῆς, see E. N. vi. 12. 5) are the separate ἀρεταί enumerated in § 14, which are implanted by education (lasting throughout the whole lifetime of the citizen, see E. N. x. 9. 9) and enforced by law. In its educational, as well as in its strictly legal capacity, νόμος may be said προστάτευε τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν . . . καὶ τὰ τοῦ σάφρονος κ.τ.λ. Cf. E. N. ii. 6. 7 οὗ γὰρ ἐὰν τῷ δέκα μναὶ φαγεῖν πολὺ δῶ νἐ δέλιον, ὥ ἀλείπτης ἥ μᾶς προστάξει—where the ἀλείπτης stands to the physique in the same relation in which νόμος in its educational capacity stands to the

1 Instead of πραττόμενα corr. Kb, Pb, Ald., NC, CCC, B1,3 and Γ read προστάτευεν, adopted by Bywater, and apparently preferred by Susemihl (see Susem. E. N. addend. et corr. p. 246), who would substitute ἵπο (the reading of CCC) for ἀπὸ 1130 b. 22. Although the MS. authority seems on the whole to be against προστάτευεν, that would not settle the matter between two such easily confounded words as πραττόμενα and προστάτευεν. But internal evidence seems to me to be strongly in favour of τὰ πραττόμενα ἄπο τῆς ἀρετῆς as contrasted with τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς.
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moral character: cf. also E. N. iii. 12. 8 ἀστερ ἔθν τῶν παιδῶν δεῖ 1129 b.17. κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἵκμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζην κ.τ.λ.—where προστάγματα are evidently contemplated as τὰ ποιητικὰ τὰς ἁρετὰς. The writer of the M. M. i. 33. 1193 b. 2 evidently treats προστάττει δε κ.τ.λ. as explanatory of, not as in any way contrasted with, ἐνά μὲν τρόπον κ.τ.λ. He writes—ἐστὶ δὲ διὰ τὸν δίκαιον, διὸ τὸ μὲν ἐστι κατὰ νόμον. δίκαια γὰρ φασίν εἶναι ἢ ὁ νόμος προστάττει: ὃ δὲ νόμος κελεύει ταυτεία πράττειν καὶ τὰ σώφρονα καὶ ἀπλῶς διπλασία ὅσα κατὰ τὰς ἁρετὰς λέγεται, διὸ καὶ, φασίν, δοκεὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἁρετή εἶναι: εἰ γὰρ δίκαια μὲν ἐστὶν ὃ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ποιεῖν, ὃ δὲ νόμος τὰ κατὰ πάσας ἁρετὰς διὰ προστάττει, ὃ ἅρ τοὺς κατὰ νόμον ἐμμένων δικαιοὶς τελείως σπουδαίοις ἐστί, ὅπερ ὃ δίκαιος καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἁρετή ἐστιν: ἐν μὲν δὲ τῷ δίκαιῳ ἐν τῷ τούτοις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ ταύτα: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν περὶ ταύτα δικαιοσύνην ζητοῦμεν. Here plainly ἐν μὲν δὴ ὡς ἐνα μὲν τρόπον of the passage before us (Ε. N. v. i. 13) and ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ κ.τ.λ. = ζητοῦμεν δὲ γε κ.τ.λ. of E. N. v. 2. i. 1130 a. 14.

τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς] Cf. Rhet. i. 5. 1360 b. 18 sqq. b.18.

§ 14.] See Fritzsche's note here for references to enactments b.19. against the offences mentioned, and Muretus ad loc. Before κατὰ 1129 b. 23 Rassow (Forsch. p. 60) advocates the insertion of τά read by Ι.κ.

§ 15. ἀλλ' οὖχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἔτερον] The writer of the M. M., b. 26. in the passage parallel to this, goes out of his way to distinguish ἡ δὴ δικαιοσύνη from ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη in a somewhat misleading manner. His words are (i. 33. 1193 b. 12)—κατὰ μὲν γὰρ ταύτα τὰ δίκαια (i.e. τὰ νόμματα generally) ἐστὶν καθ' ἐαυτὸν διὰ τὰ δίκαια εἶναι (ὁ γὰρ σῷφρον καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείως καὶ ὁ ἐγκατής καὶ αὐτὸς καθ' ἐαυτὸν ἐστὶν τοὐτοῖς) ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ πρὸς ἔτερον ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰρημένον κατὰ νόμον δίκαιον ἐστὶν οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν εἰ τοῖς πρὸς ἔτερον δικαιοὶς οὕτως καθ' αὐτὸν εἶναι δικαιοῦν τούτῳ ὃ δ' ἐστιν ὁ ζητοῦμεν δίκαιον καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν περὶ ταύτα. Here he says that the temperate man may, quod temperate man, be virtuous καθ' ἐαυτὸν as well as πρὸς ἔτερον, whereas the fair man cannot, quod fair, be virtuous καθ' ἐαυτῶν, but is necessarily conceived as standing in a relation πρὸς ἔτερον. It is true, perhaps, that a man's temperance or intemperance concerns himself, at least immediately, more than it concerns other people; whereas his fairness or unfairness refers immediately and essentially to the interests of other people, i.e. cannot be conceived without reference to these interests: this,
however, is not what the writer of the present passage (E. N. v. i. 15) is thinking of; but of ἰὴ δικαίωσύνη as distinguished from the co-extensive ἰὴ ἀρετῆ by being πρὸς ἑτερον (see § 20 of this chapter, and note). ‘This Justice, then,’ he says, ‘is perfect excellence—perfect excellence, however, viewed not as a simple possession, but as putting its possessor in a certain relation to others.’ I think that this statement (as well as that in § 20) is best explained by reference to the fact that the Aristotelian logic assigns ἰεῖς not only to the category of ποιότης (Cat. 8), but also to that of πρὸς τι (Cat. 7). As ἐπιστήμη is at once a quality of the ἐπιστήμααν and a relation in which he stands to the ἐπιστήμαν, so τελεία ἀρετῆ is at once a quality of the νόμος and a relation in which he stands to the social environment which requires that quality. So, the colour of a flower is at once that which is simply red or blue, and that which attracts the bees.

The distinction, however, here drawn between τελεία ἀρετῆ ἄπλως and τελεία ἀρετῆ πρὸς ἑτερον = δικαίωσύνη, is merely a logical one, and we must not think of the man who has δικαίωσύνη as distinguished from the man who has τελεία ἀρετῆ. Τελεία ἀρετῆ, because τελεία, i.e. because it is the perfect organisation of all the special ἄρεται, will maintain its possessor in active relations with the social environment in correspondence with which its development has been perfected: there cannot, in short, be τελεία ἀρετῆ without ἡ τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρήσις. But the man whose ἀρετῆ is ἄτελης, i.e. the man in whom certain ‘virtues’ exist separately without having been organised in correspondence with the social environment as one great whole, will make a merely private and personal use of his ‘virtues’—e.g. he will perform acts of ‘courage’ only when his own personal interests are concerned—when his amour propre is wounded—when he is angry—when he is afraid; he will be ‘fair’ to his friends, but unfair to strangers: ‘temperate’ so long as he is among his neighbours and acquaintances,—in short, he is one of those who ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύναται χρησθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἑτερον ἀδυνατουσίν—‘he can use his virtue, such as it is, in a narrow domestic way, but not as a citizen widely related to fellow citizens.’

With the τελεία ἀρετῆ of the present section compare the καλοκαιρινὴ of E. E. Θ. 3. 1248 b. 8—1249 a. 16, which is described as ἀρετῆ τέλειος, and distinguished from the ἰεῖς πολιτεία of the Laconians and others who choose the ἄρεται and the ἔργα ἀνδ τῆς ἀρετῆς not
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καλοῦ ἄρετα, but for the sake of τὸ φύτευε ἄγαθα—τιμή, πλοῦτος, σώματος 1129 b. 26. ἄρετα, οὖν νυκτὸς, δυνάμεις. Such are ἄγαθοι μὲν ἄνδρες . . . καλοκαγαθίαν δέ οὐκ ἔχουσιν.

καὶ οὖθ' ἐσπερὸς κ.τ.λ.] Zell and Fritzsche quote Iliad xxii. 317 b. 28.

ὁίος δ' ἄστυρ ἔσται μετ' ἄστρασι νυκτὸς ἄμολγος
"Εσπερός, δὲ κάλλιστος ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστάται ἄστυρ.

The comparison is assigned to Euripides by the New College Oxon. Scholiast Cod. 240 (see Bywater, Hermes v. 356) καὶ οὖθ' ἐσπερός' τούτῳ ἐξ Εὐφρίσδου σοφός (sic) Μελανίππης' λέγει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ δικαιοσύνας δὲ χρύσος πρῶτον. Cf. Plotinus, Ἑνν. i. 6 (vol. i. p. 5. ed. Kirchhoff) δὲ καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης πρῶτον καὶ οὔτε ἐσπερός οὔτε ἔρος οὔτω καλὰ: cf. Ἑνν. vi. 6 (vol. ii. p. 67, Kirchhoff) δικαιοσύνη . . . ἦς ὡς ἀλήθειας καλὸν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ οὔτε ἐσπερός . . .

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνης συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἐνι] ἀρετή ἑτὼν is the reading b. 29. of r Mb Ald. Heliod. adopted by Bergk (Poet. Lyr. p. 360, 390). The authorship of the line is very doubtful: see New College Oxon. Schol. (Bywater, Hermes v. 356) καὶ παροιμίαμοινες ψαμ (originally ψαμεν) τοῦτῳ Θεόγνιδος' εἰρηται δὲ οὕτως' βούλευ 3' εὐσεβεῖος ὀλίγοις σὺν χρήσιν οἰκεῖν ἢ πλοῦτεν ἀδίκους χρήσιμα πασάμενος ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνης συλλήβδην πάσα ἀρετή. χώραν μέντοι παροιμίαν ἐπέχει καὶ μέμνηται αὐτῇ ὡς παροιμίας Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ περὶ θῆδων (originally θεῶν), ἐν δὲ τῷ πρῶτῳ τῶν θησικῶν ὡς Φωκίλιδης αὐτῶν μεμνημέν, καὶ ιδιος καὶ Φωκίλιδης αὐτῷ ἔχρησαν. Iamblichus (apud Stob. Flor. vol. i. pp. 193, 4, ed. Meineke) refers to it as 'an old saying'—"Ἰαμβιλίχου έκ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τῆς πρὸς 'Ἀικατόλιον περὶ δικαιοσύνης' ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ τὸ τῶν θὸς ἀρετῶν τέλος καὶ τὴν συναγωγὴν αὐτῶν συμπετάσων, ἐν δὴ πᾶσα ἐνεστὶ συλλήβδην κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον, γένοιτο ἀν τοῖς εἰς τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀγόμενον.

καὶ τελεία μάλιστα . . . ἀδυνατούσις] These words have given the b. 30. critics much trouble. The difficulty is thus stated by Jackson (pp. 69, 70)—‘From the opening words of this §, as well as from the argument generally, it is clear that the phrase πρὸς ἑσπερον does not explain τελεία, but differentiates δικαιοσύνη from τελεία ἀρετή. This being so, it follows that the words ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρήσις ἐστὶν do not justify the statement καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετῆ, and that the words ὅτι οὶ ἔχων αὐτὴν κ.τ.λ. do not justify the statement τελεία δ' ἐστιν.’ Jackson proposes to remove the difficulty by transposing
the words καὶ τελεία μᾶλλοντα and τελεία ἐστίν. Other critics make other suggestions (see Susemihl, *app. crit.* ad loc. for an exhaustive list of their views). I believe that Ueberweg’s simple suggestion—the insertion of τελεία after χρῆσις ἐστιν—which had occurred to me independently, is the best solution of the difficulty. If we make this insertion the meaning of the passage will be—Justice is perfect excellence in the highest sense of the word “perfect” (τελεία μᾶλλοντα), because it is the perfect employment (χρῆσις τελεία) of perfect excellence, i.e. its employment not merely in one’s own affairs but towards one’s neighbour.’ The clause διὶ ὅ ἐξών κ.τ.λ. explains τελεία ἐστί (sc. χρῆσις).

b. 31. χρῆσις] ‘The phrase ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστιν [sc. ἡ δικαιοσύνη],’ says Jackson (p. 70), ‘is strange, since χρῆσις is almost equivalent to ἐνέργεια (Berlin Index, s. v.), and a ἔξεις can scarcely be identified with an ἐνέργεια; but cf. § 20 quoted above. Apparently in this place δικαιοσύνη is the practice of the virtue, not the virtue itself. Aristotle would not have expressed himself so loosely.’ The expression is certainly loose; but we ought not to go the length of supposing that ‘in this place δικαιοσύνη is the practice of the virtue, not the virtue itself,—for the writer immediately adds words which show that he is thinking of δικαιοσύνη as a ἔξεις—ὅ ἐξών αὐτῆν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον δύναται τῇ ἄρετῇ χρῆσθαι.

1129 b. 30. § 16. ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δεῖξει] This—the reading of Kb—may be accepted as most probably correct. Susemihl prefers ἀρχὰ τὸν ἄνδρα δεῖξει. Zell quotes after Muretus e proverbibus Graecis—ἀρχὴ τὸν ἄνδρα δείκνυσι, ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιεικῶν, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ ἀρχῇ βιαίων γεγομένων.

a. 2. ἡδὴ] ‘because the officer is ex hypothesi in relation to others and a member of a community,’ Jackson.


‘Ἀλλότριον ἄγαθὸν ἡ δικαιοσύνη expresses, in the portable form of an epigram or proverb, that view of life which is worked out on a larger scale in the various systems of ‘ethical atomism’ with which the student of the History of Philosophy is familiar. That view
of life—however expressed—assumes that self-love is the ultimate spring of action. Another proverbial expression of the same view is ‘Honesty is the Best Policy.’ It is assumed that honesty or justice is something which a man gives away to his neighbour, for which he must be careful to get an adequate return; and the proverb asserts that, as a matter of fact, he does get such a return. The saying ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, on the other hand, suggests that he does not get an adequate return. It expresses the abstract point of view from which the poor man regards the capitalist, and generally the socially weaker the socially stronger; while the proverb ‘Honesty is the Best Policy’ expresses the desire (associated with an equally abstract or selfish point of view) of the man, whose position is already assured, that the political and economical régime under which he knows that he personally will continue to flourish may be maintained. Both proverbs represent the just man as an isolated individual who thinks only of himself—who knows that he is making a good bargain, or regrets that he is forced to make a bad one. The final cause of just action—τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον (see Pol. iii. 6. 1279 a. 17) is entirely ignored by these proverbs. The hope of gain or the fear of superior strength, by itself, could not make men act ‘justly’; they would cheat, or perish in the attempt to resist, rather than act ‘justly’, if hope of gain or fear of force were their only motive. If men act ‘justly’ it is because they really believe that καλλιστὸν τὸ δικαίωμα, and are drawn, κατὰ τὸ ἐν αὑτοῖς θείου, to act in harmony with the law of that beautiful system in which they live and have their being; cf. Green’s Works vol. ii. pp. 427 (Principles of Political Obligation: G. Will, not Force, is the basis of the State).

ἁλῳ γὰρ . . . κοινῷ] κοινῷ is the reading of ῥ, Ald., Heliod., a. 4. B1, NC, accepted by Michelet. The weight of external authority is thus strongly in favour of κοινῷ, but such authority cannot be regarded as decisive here. The best MS. might easily omit the second of the two identical syllables in κοινῷ, or make κοινῷ into κοινῶνι by dittograph. Accordingly we must allow internal considerations to decide between κοινῷ and κοινῳ. Michelet in support of κοινῷ says—ἡ ἀρχοντὶ κοινῷ referendum est ad duplex civitatum genus quod Aristoteles Pol. iii. 7 exponit . . . κοινῳ non esset diversum ab ἀρχοντὶ cum ii, penes quos summa imperii est, participes sint civitatis (κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πόλεως).

Jackson reading
KOIVUVKI says—' The alteration (Michelet's) is unnecessary. The words ἡ ἄρχοντι ἡ κοινωνία may be paraphrased: "either that of the governing class in the case of a παρεκβεβηκτἀ πολιτεία, or that of his fellow citizens in the case of a πολιτεία ὅρθη." ' Thus both Michelet and Jackson agree in recognising a reference to the distinction between those states in which the governors rule for the public good, and those in which they rule for their own private advantage. But is it likely that this Aristotelian distinction is referred to in a clause which states the ground on which (γάρ) some have maintained the very unaristotelian doctrine that justice is ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν? It seems better to take the words to mean simply that the just man does what is to the advantage of another, that other being either his ruler (ἄρχοντι) or his neighbour (κοινωνία). In obeying the definite commands of his ruler he benefits his ruler; in dealing honestly with his neighbour he benefits his neighbour: but in neither case benefits himself. Further, the distinction between the παρεκβεβηκτἀ πολιτεία and the ὅρθη πολιτεία turns on a difference in the conduct of the ἄρχοντες: but the subject of πράττει is the ἄρχομενος, or the justice of the ἄρχομενος.

Reference to the distinction between the παρεκβεβηκτἀ πολιτεία and the ὅρθη πολιτεία being thus excluded, we may decide in favour of the reading κοινωνία. The reading κοινφ, originally due to a clerical slip, would maintain itself because it seemed to refer more pointedly than κοινωνία to this distinction which was not seen to be out of place in the context.

a. 6. § 18. ὁ καὶ πρῶς αὐτῶν καὶ πρῶς τῶν φίλων] Jackson says, 'The first καὶ means "even," i.e. "not merely towards his neighbour but"; not "both," because friends are looked upon as part of the man himself (ix. 4. 5) and therefore cannot be identified with the ἄτρος.' Rassow also (Forsch. p. 61), in answer to Nötel who would (with NC) omit the first καὶ and (with MΓ) the second πρῶς, says—' was hindert, das erste καὶ in der Bedeutung von vel zu fassen?' I cannot help thinking that Rassow and Jackson are wrong here, and that we must take the first καὶ in the sense of 'both,' and τῶν φίλων in the sense of 'his neighbours.' The writer is speaking about the κάκιστος, and it would be out of place in connexion with him to think of the doctrine of the identity of the αὐτός and the φίλος, which is formulated—as in the passage quoted here by Jackson (ix. 4. 5 ἃτρι γάρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός)—to
describe the relation between good men. The Paraph. Heliodorus 1130 a. 6. seems to me to be right with—ο μὲν οὖν ἔαυτὸν τε βλάπτων τῇ μοι-
θηρία καὶ τοὺς φίλους κάκιστος· ο δὲ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς οὐ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον κεχρη-
mένος συμφέρων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀριστοῖς ἐστί.

[éteron] Rassow (Forsch. p. 61) seems to be right in a. 7.
preferring ἀλλ' ἀρ δὲ πρὸς ἐτέρον, the reading of Ῥ, ἦ, ἃ, Ὁ. He
remarks that Bekker's ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐτέρον could stand only if the
foregoing words were ὦ μὴ πρὸς αὐτῶν. NC has ἀλλὰ καὶ ὦ πρὸς
ἐτέρον.

γὰρ οὖσα (sc. ἡ σοφία) τῆς ἄλης ἀρετῆς κ.τ.λ., where it would appear
that ἦ ἄλη ἀρετῆ is the possession of all the ἀρεταί—ἐπιστήμη and ἢθικαί.
The ἀρετῆ of τὸ δημοτικὸν μέρος (ιγύεια), however, is not an
element in ἦ ἄλη ἀρετῆ: cf. E. E. ii. i. 1219 b. 20 εἰ τι μέροι ἐστὶ
ψυχῆς, οὖν τὸ δημοτικὸν, ἡ τούτου ἀρετῆ οὐκ ἦστι μόριον τῆς ἄλης ἀρετῆς,
ἀλλ' ὦ ἦ τοῦ σώματος. Here (v. 1. 19) δικαιοσύνη in the wide
sense of the term is identified with ἦ ἄλη ἀρετῆ; and if we are to
bind the writer to the meaning given to ἦ ἄλη ἀρετῆ in E. N. vi and
in E. E. ii quoted above, we must suppose that the χρήσις πρὸς
ἐτέρον of intellectual as well as of moral excellence is included in
the conception of universal δικαιοσύνη.

§ 20. ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ἦ ἀυτῆ, τὸ δ' ἐστὶ οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἦ μὲν πρὸς a. 12.
ἐτέρον, δικαιοσύνη, ἦ δὲ τοιάδε ἐξίς ἄπλως, ἀρετῆ] Grant brings out
the meaning of this sentence with sufficient clearness—' But what
the difference is between virtue and this kind of justice is clear
from what we have said already. They are the same, only con-
ceived differently; viewed as a relation to others, the state is
justice; viewed as a state of the mind simply, it is virtue.' Here
the comma is rightly placed after, not (as by Bekker) before,
ἀπλῶς. Cf. Met. A. 10. 1075 b. 2 τὴν γὰρ φιλιαν ποιεῖ (ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς)
tὸ ἀγαθόν ἀυτῆ δ' ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κυνοῦσα (συνάγει γὰρ) καὶ ὡς ἄλη· μόριον
γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος· εἰ δὴ καὶ τὸ αὐτό συμβέβηκε καὶ ὡς ἄλη ἀρχὴ ἐστι καὶ
ὡς κυνοῦσι, ἀλλὰ τὸ γε εἶναι οὐ ταῦτο—on which Bonitz says—' His
verbis (τὸ γε εἶναι οὐ ταῦτο) notionis significari diversitatem, quasi
dicat: οὐ ταῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ἄλη καὶ τὸ εἶναι κυνοῦντι, apparent coll.
Top. v. 4. 133 b. 33 ἀλλ' ἄλλο λέγεται τὸ ἐτέρον αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ εἶναι:
οὐ ταῦτο γὰρ ἦστιν ἀνθρώπῳ τε τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ
1130 a. 12. *εἰναι* λεικῶν ἀνθρώπων: *Phys.* iii. 3. 202 a. 20, b. 9, 12, 16, ubi promiscue usurpantur τὸ εἰναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς sive εἰς: i. 3. 186 a. 31. al.’ Cf. also the following passages quoted by the various editors—*De An.* ii. 12. 424 a. 25, iii. 2. 425 b. 25 (ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μία, τὸ δ’ εἰναι οὐ ταῦταν αὐταῖς): *E. N.* vi. 8: 1: *De Mem.* i. 450 b. 21 (τὸ εἰς τῷ πίνακι γεγραμμένον ζῷον καὶ ζῴον ἐστι καὶ εἰκὼν τὸ αὐτό, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἄμφοτ’ τὸ μέντοι εἰναι οὐ ταῦταν ἐστὶν ἄμφοτ’, καὶ ἐστὶ θεωρεῖν ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς εἰκών): *De Inv.* et *Sen.* i. 467 b. 25 (where it is pointed out that τὸ ἀριθμὸν ἐν may be τὸ εἰναι πλείω καὶ ἄτρια).

That notion or conception is meant by τὸ εἰναι in the present section (v. i. 20) is evident, I think, from the above parallels. Michelet, however, makes τὸ εἰναι here the ‘sensible substance’ as distinguished from the notion or λόγος, and quotes *Met.* M. 3. 1077 b. 12 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε ὁ οὐσία μᾶλλον τῶν σωμάτων εἰσίν, οὔτε πρότερα τὸ εἰναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ λόγον μόνον, οὔτε κεχαριμένα που εἶναι δύνατον, εἰρηνικαίκως—adding, ‘hoc loco τὸ εἰναι de sensibili substantia praedicatur quae per se existere queat: magnitudines autem mathematicae per se existere non posse dicuntur, sed a sensibilibum substantia sustentantur.’ Similarly he explains the passage *De An.* iii. 2. 425 b. 25—αἰσθῆσεις and αἰσθητῶν exist separately—τὸ εἰναι οὐ ταῦταν αὐταῖς, but each quid separately existing is only a δύναμις. In actuality or ἐνέργεια, i.e. in real essence they are one. After all, this differs only verbally from Trendelenburg’s explanation (*De An.* p. 435, first ed.)—‘ubi res in sensum agit, sensus vero rem suscipit, ibi res et sensus in unum quasi concurrunt, ut utriusque actio quasi unam efficiat (ἡ αὐτή ἐστι καὶ μία), utrique vero natura per se diversa sit (τὸ δ’ εἰναι οὐ ταῦταν αὐταῖς).’ Then turning to the passage *E. N.* v. i. 20 Michelet says—‘Notione et substantia virtus et justicia universalis sunt idem, modo et ratione existendi (τὸ εἰναι) tantum differunt. Firmatur hic sensus τοῦ εἰναι ipsa explicatione quae sequitur, cum verba ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐτερον existendi rationem alteram, alteram vocabula ἡ δὲ τοιαῦτε εἰς ἄπλος declarent. Sed non abnuerim his diversis existendi modis etiam diversam essentiam contineri.’ This last sentence seems to bear out the remark made above that the difference between Michelet’s explanation of τὸ εἰναι in *De An.* iii. 2, and that of Trendelenburg and others, who take it as = notion, is really only verbal. The truth is that εἰναι is a term which takes its colour from its context, as a technical term of such common extraction might be expected to do. Sometimes
it means what a thing is to the senses, sometimes, what it is to the scientific understanding. However, in the majority of cases in which it is used carefully (as in the formula το δ' ἐστιν ἐτερπον αὐτοῖς) it must be understood to mean what the thing is to the scientific understanding—i.e., as = τὸ τί ἐστιν, or λόγος. See Trendelenburg, Rhein. Mus. 1828, vol. ii. pp. 480, 481.

Turning now to E.N. v. i. 20, we may say that virtue and universal justice are the same state conceived from different points of view, just as the same road is regarded differently by the man who stands at the top of the hill and by the man who stands at the bottom: see Met. K. 10. 1066 a. 33 and Phys. iii. 3. 202 a. 20 καὶ τὸ ἄνατες καὶ τὸ κάτατες: ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν μὲν ἑστιν, ὁ μὲν τοῦ λόγου οἶχ ἐσ (Phys.), or ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐστιν οἶχ ἐν (Met.). To the one man the road is downhill; to the other it is uphill. What the road is is different for each.

Virtue and universal justice, then, being the same state conceived from different points of view, virtue is the state conceived simply as a state; justice is the state conceived as putting its possessor in a certain relation to society. Here the difference τὸ ἐστι between virtue and justice is evidently that between things assigned to different ψένη τῶν ὄντων (see Met. Δ. 28. 1028 b. 13), to the category of quality and to the category of relation respectively. Now, as was pointed out in note on v. i. 15, ἓσις is assigned not only to the category of ποιήσις (Cat. 8), but also to that of πρός τι (Cat. 7). The moral ἓσις, then, considered under the category of ποιήσις, is simply the quality, ἀρετή, and nothing more (ὑπόλοιπος); considered under the category of πρός τι, it is this quality viewed as putting its subject in a certain relation to others—δικαιοσύνη: and, being in different categories, ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη differ τὸ ἐστίν, for the categories are the κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος (Met. Θ. 1. 1045 b. 28) 'h. e. modi quibus esse aliquid dicimus' (Bonitz, ad loc.). Cf. Met. Δ. 7. 1017 a. 22 καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ἐστιν λέγεται διασπερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα ἡς κατηγορίας: ὁσαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τοσαταχῶς τὸ ἐστι σημαίνει· ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν κατηγορομένων τὰ μὲν τι ἐστὶ σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποιον, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ ποτεί, ἐκάστῳ τούτων τὸ ἐστι ταὐτό σημαίνει: on which Alexander (331 Ι. 27) has—τὴν γὰρ οὐκείαν ὑπαρξίν ἐκάστου σημαίνει τὸ δι' ὁμοφύμονον . . . δεκαχώς καὶ τὸ δι' καὶ τὸ ἐστιν ῥήθησαται τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῇ οὐσίᾳ συντασσόμενον ἑστιν τὴν οὐσίωδη ὑπαρξίν σημαίνει, τῷ δὲ ποιῷ τὴν ὑπὸ ποσοῦ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Met. Γ. 2. 1003 b. 5 καὶ τὸ δι' ἐστι πολλαχῶς μὲν, ἀλλ' ἀπαν...
CHAPTER II.

Argument.

Concerning the second kind of justice, i.e. the justice which is a particular virtue, not the virtuous character as a whole: and concerning the corresponding injustice.

There is such a kind of injustice, for ‘taking too much’ is a distinct kind of wrong doing, which has as much right to be assigned to its own vice as running away in battle, and using abusive language, have to be assigned to their respective vices. In these latter cases it is true that we have special names cowardice and bad temper for the vices; whereas for the vice which disposes a man to take too much we have no special name, only the general name of all vice—injustice. But the absence of a special name must not be allowed to make us overlook the existence of the vice, which not only has its own acts which cannot be mistaken, but even displays itself sometimes in acts commonly assigned to other vices, as e.g. when adultery is committed for gain, not from lust. In short, when a man has taken more than his share of gain we say that he is unjust, as we say that he is cowardly when he runs away in battle, or profligate when he has committed adultery. Thus we must distinguish injustice in the specific sense, and injustice in the generic sense—two states which have the same name and involve the same notion of ‘relation towards other people,’ but differ in that injustice in the specific sense is concerned with social position, money, and other external good things, which men take pleasure in acquiring too much of at the expense of their neighbours, whereas injustice in the generic sense is concerned with the whole sphere of man’s activity as a moral agent.

‘Contrary to law’ being the whole under which ‘unfair’ falls as a part, particular injustice, which is relative to the unfair, will be a ‘part’ of universal injustice, which is relative to that which is contrary to law. Similarly, particular justice is a part of universal justice. With universal injustice, then, which is coextensive with that vice against which all legislation and state educa-
tion are directed, and with universal justice, which is coextensive with that virtue which all legislation and state education strive to produce, we have now no more to do: nor shall we at present discuss the question whether there is or is not another kind of virtue—that of the good man, as such,—produced by other agencies than those of legislation and state education:—our present subject is particular justice.

Particular justice is of two kinds, (1) distributive, and (2) corrective: and corrective justice finds a place both in (a) voluntary transactions (e.g. buying, lending), and in (b) involuntary transactions, whether these latter imply stealth and deception, as theft, or violence, as murder.

§ 1. τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην] Spengel (p. 207) rejects as an explanatory addition. The passages collected by Waitz (Organon i. 375) and Eucken (über den Sprachgebrauch des Ar. p. 24 sq.), to whom Jackson (ad loc.) refers, for the equivalence of ἐν μέρει and κατὰ μέρος, give no instance of ἐν μέρει with a genitive; but below § 3. 1130 a. 23 we have καὶ ἄδικον τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ διόν ἄδικον = ὡς μέρος τοῦ διόν ἄδικον.

§§ 2-5.] Nötel (Quaest. Arist. Specimen p. 11) would omit § 5, a. 16. because it merely repeats the argument of § 2. But we must not press the writer too hard in a passage like this, remembering that we have here merely to do with σημεία, and that grounds which might easily be shown to be logically identical, may present themselves superficially in popular thought and language as different, and hence may be used as distinct σημεία by a method which appeals to such thought and language. The writer wishes to show that there is such a vice as 'particular injustice.' In § 2 he enumerates the various acts which are considered wrong (i.e. unjust in the general sense), and assigns them to the special vices from which they spring, in order to show that the act of 'taking too much' (ὅταν πλεονεκτᾷ) exists as a wrong act distinct from the others, and is left without an explaining vice, unless we admit the existence of 'particular injustice' (ὅ ἐν μέρει ἄδικία). In § 4 he shows further that this vice of particular injustice must sometimes be assumed to account for acts which seem at first sight to proceed from other vices—as when an act of adultery does not proceed from ἀκολασία but from the desire of gain—τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα: and in § 5 he finally clinches the matter by means of this term κερδαίνειν, which has turned up in § 4, pointing out that, as we always refer other wrong actions (ἀδικήματα) to their definite vices—adultery to ἀκολασία, flight to δελία, so, as a matter of fact, we always refer an
1130 a. 16. act from which a man derives gain unfairly (εἰ ἐκδηλῶν) to ἀδικία.
The reference here is evidently to as definite a vice as it is in the case of adultery or flight; but this definite vice has only the general name 'injustice'—ἀδικία. The name therefore is to be understood here in a specific sense. He has, in short, found that ἐκδηλῶν has a well-recognised coordinate place in popular language by the side of μοιχεύων, &c., and gives as definite a sense to the ἀδικία from which it proceeds as is possessed by ἀκολοχία, &c. At the same time it must be conceded to those who, with Nötel, would omit § 5, that its omission would not materially weaken the argument. Its retention, however, is to be defended on the ground that, occurring in a passage which appeals to popular language, it makes use of the term ἐκδηλῶν, whereas the term employed in § 2 is πλεονεκτεῖν. The difference between πλεονεκτεῖν and ἐκδηλῶν may not be great; but we must remember that ἐκδηλῶς is a term which is to hold a prominent place in the subsequent discussion of particular justice, and is worth dwelling on in an introductory passage like the present. Before leaving this question of the relation of § 5 to the preceding sections, we must notice Susemihl's attempt to meet Nötel's difficulty by placing a comma after ἐκδηλῶν 1130 a. 28, and reading ὅτι for ἦτι in the same line. I do not think the change necessary, and Susemihl is mistaken in saying that Kb has ὅτι here. It is in line 24, not in line 28, that Kb has ὅτι for ἦτι.

a. 22. § 2. καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν] καὶ = ἦτοι.
a. 27. § 4. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν] sc. ἀδικός λέγεται. Fritzsche.
a. 33. § 6. συνώνυμος . . . δύναμιν] Cf. E. N. v. i. 7, where universal and particular injustice were said to be ὄμωνυμα, and see note ad loc., in which it was pointed out that, as there regarded, they are more properly τὰ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα ὀμώνυμα. Here, however, they are regarded from a somewhat different logical point of view, and can, with technical correctness, be called συνώνυμα. They are regarded, in short, as belonging to the same Category (ὁ ὀρθὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει)—that of Relation (ἀμφω ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἐπερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν);

1 Rassow (Forsch. p. 17) says '1130 a. 28-32 (§ 5) ist wohl mit Unrecht von Nötel als Wiederholung von 1130 a. 16-22 (§ 2) verdächtigt. So verwandt nämlich die beiden Abschnitte dem Inhalte nach sind, so ist doch noch ein Unterschied der Gedanken zu erkennen.' Unfortunately Rassow does not explain his view of the nature of this difference.
and thus having the same τι ἐστιν or οὐσία (viz. the τι ἐστιν or οὐσία 1130 a. 33. characteristic of the σχῆμα, γένος, or Category of πρὸς τι), they are properly συνώνυµα: for (Cal. 1. 1 a. 6) συνώνυµα λέγεται ὅν τέ τε ἀναµα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός. For the doctrine that the τι ἐστιν which the ὀρισµὸς declares has a different character in each category see Met. Z. 4. 1030 a. 17 καὶ ὁ ὀρισµὸς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τι ἐστίν πλεονάξων λέγεται καὶ γὰρ τὸ τι ἐστίν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον σηµαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐκατὸν τῶν κατηγοροµένων, ποιόν, ποιόν, καὶ ὁ σὰ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐστίν ὑπάρχει πάσιν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁµόος ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρῶτος τοῖς δ’ ἐποµένοις, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τι ἐστιν ἀπλῶς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιόν ἐρωµεθ’ ἄν τι ἐστιν, ὡστε καὶ τὸ ποιόν τῶν τι ἐστίν μὲν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἀπλῶς.

On the passage before us (v. 2. 6) Mich. Eph. has the following— ἔθος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλεις συνώνυµα λέγειν, καὶ τὰ ἀφ’ ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἐν λέγοµενα, ἢ ὅσ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ, μεταξύ ἐστὶ τῶν τε συνωνύµων καὶ τῶν κυρίως ὁµωνύµων, δει τὸ ὀρισµὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λέγεται. ἀµφοὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρῶτον ἐτέρων, ἀπὶ ἀρχῆς τοῦ παρόντος βιβλίου μέχρι καὶ τοῦτο τὴν ἐν μέρει κακίαν συνώνυµον λέγει τῇ ὁλῇ κακίᾳ, ἢ ὅτι τὴν ἐν μέρει αὐθεντικῇ τῇ ὁλῇ ἀδικίᾳ. εἰς δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ συνώνυµοι, ἀλλὰ μέσα τῶν συνωνύµων καὶ ὁµωνύµων, δι᾽ ὃν παρατίθεται ἐµφαίνει ὡς οὐχ ἀπλῶς συνωνύµως τὰς ἀδικίας ἐκάλει, ἀλλὰ πῇ, οὐ χάρις αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς ἐν, ἢ τρόπον μὲν τινα συνώνυµα ἐστιν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ δεδεικτα, τρόπον δὲ τινα ὁµωνύµα. καθ’ ὅσον μὲν γάρ ὁ ὀρισµὸς αὐτῶν, ὡς αὐτὸς φησιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ, κατὰ τοῦτο συνώνυµον ἐστί. πῶς δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ ἐν τῶν γένει ἐδήλωσεν εἰπόν—ἀµφοὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρῶτον ἐτέρων, ἢ τῇ κοινῇ ἀδικίᾳ καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἢν ἐπὶ μέρος λέγοµεν. ἀµφότεραι γὰρ αἱ αὐθεντικαὶ ἐν τῷ πρῶτον ἐτέρων ἀµαρτάνειν τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσι. κατὰ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο συνώνυµαι εἰσὶ. καθ’ ὅσον δὲ ἐν τῇ μὲν μέρει ἀδικίᾳ ἢ κατὰ πλεονεξίαν περὶ τιµὴν ἐστὶ καὶ χρίµατα—λέγουσι δ’ ἀν τιµὴν καὶ χρίµατα τὰ τυχήµατα τῶν ἀγαθῶν—ἐν ὃς δὲ ἡδονὴ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέδους ἢ πλεονεξία, ἢ δὲ καθόλου ἀδικία περὶ πάντα περὶ δῶς ὁ νόµος καὶ σπουδαῖος, κατὰ δὴ τοῦτο πάλιν ὁµωνύµαι εἰσὶν αἱ αὐθεντικαὶ. It will be observed that Mich. Eph. here describes the common γένος or category of the two kinds of justice as a common εἰσὶ.
or personal security (e.g. he tries to avoid risks which he should share equally with his fellow-citizens); the ἄδικος in the wide sense of the term is he who fails in all, or some, of those various social relations in which the good man succeeds.

b. 6. §§ 7-11.] Rassow (Forsch. p. 17) suspects the whole passage, 1130 b. 6 ὅτι ... 1130 b. 29 παρεί. After refusing to accept Nötel's view that 1130 a. 28-32 is a repetition of 1130 a. 16-22, he says 'Eher hat man Grund, an der ersten Hälfte des folgenden Capitels (bis 1130 b. 29) Anstoss zu nehmen, die den Charakter grosser Breite und Weitschweifigkeit trägt und die sich ohne alle Beeinträchtigung des Gedankenganges aus dem Texte ausscheiden lässt. So sind die Worte (Z. 16) ὅστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἄδικαι λεκτέων κ.τ.λ. ganz leer, da schon das vorhergehende Capitel von der justitia particularis gehandelt hat. Vor allem befremdend aber ist das Zurückkommen auf das νόμιμον ἄδικον, über das schon, p. 1129 b. 11 ff. des längeren gesprochen ist.' The passage is certainly chargeable with the faults here brought against it by Rassow; but to bracket it, with Susemihl, is to pledge oneself to a more definite theory of the authorship and composition of this Book than I am prepared to do.

b. 7. παρά τὴν ἄλην ἀρετήν] Spengel (pp. 207, 8) rejects ἀρετήν as a blundering insertion: it is δικαιοσύνην which must be understood after ἄλην.

τὸ δὲ καὶ ποία τις] For this phrase see note on E.N. i. 7. 19, a. 31.

b. 8. § 8. διώρισται κ.τ.λ.] 'now, two senses of "the unjust" have been distinguished, viz. "the illegal" and "the unfair."

b. 10. § 9. ἐπει... b. 14. ἥλα] Bekker's text here is ἐπει δὲ τὸ ἄνωσον καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταὐτόν ἀλλ' ἐστερων ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὀλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἄνων ἄνωσον, τὸ δὲ ἄνωσον οὐ πάν πλέον), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἄδικαι οὐ ταὐτά, ἀλλ' ἐστερων ἑκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη, τὰ δ' ὡς ἥλα. This text seems to be given, without admixture, only by Lb and Nb. All other MSS. mix it up more or less with readings belonging to the text adopted by Bywater. The only possible explanation of the text given by Lb and Nb is that offered by Mich. Eph. and accepted by Michelet and Grant—viz. that as the ἄνωσον is a genus under which the πλέον falls as a species (the Ἐλαττος being the other
species), so universal justice is a genus under which particular justice falls as a species (courage, temperance, &c. being the other species)—'what is said about “more” and “unequal” having nothing to do with πλεονεξία, but being simply an illustration of a part included by a whole'—Grant: or, as Mich. Eph. puts it—ἐξ ἀναλόγου τινός δείκνυσι τὴν διαφοράν τῆς τε μερικῆς ἀδικίας καὶ τῆς μερικῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἀδικίας, διὸνέμει λέγων, ὡς τὸ πλέων πρὸς τὸ ἀνίσον οὕτως ἡ μερικὴ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνην. Now, putting aside for the moment the question of the MS. authority for the text which calls for this interpretation, we may note the following difficulties connected with the interpretation itself in its context. In § 8 τὸ ἀνίσον marks the sphere of particular injustice: here, in the very next section, we are asked to believe that it 'has nothing to do with πλεονεξία,' but is introduced (with τὸ πλέων) simply as 'an illustration.' And of what? Of the relation of part to whole: as if that required illustration. Further, ἐπεὶ is a conjunction which introduces a reason, not a mere illustration or parallel. Again,—although this may perhaps seem a small point—if τὸ ἄνισον is the genus or whole, and τὸ πλέων the species or part, the order being (1) ἄνισον and (2) πλέων, why have we this order reversed in the explaining clause ὅς μέρος πρὸς ἄλλου? (cf. Jackson, p. 74, who notices this last point).

From this review of the ἀπορίας suggested by the interpretation of it we see that Bekker's text cannot possibly be right. The protasis introduced by ἐπεὶ must give the reason for the apodosis καὶ τὸ ἀδικὸν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὕτως ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνον, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὤν: but the relation of the ἄνισον to the πλέων as Mich. Eph., Michelet, and Grant explain it (and their explanation is the only one consistent with the parenthesis of Bekker's text), is not a reason. Accordingly Bekker's text must be altered so as to make ἐπεὶ introduce a reason. Now, the reason why particular justice is a 'part' of universal justice can only be that it is (as notion—τὸ ἀδικὸν, and state—ἡ ἀδικία) related to a definite part of that field of conduct with the entire extent of which universal justice is concerned. The text adopted by Jackson, Susemihl, Ramsauer, and Bywater, with ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον κ.τ.λ., supplies this reason. Another internal ground for reading παράνομον, though a small one in com-

1 I shall give my reason below for beginning the apodosis here, with most editors, not at ὅτε (line 16) with Jackson and Susemihl, who substitute a comma for Bekker's full stop after δικαιοσύνης (line 16).
parison with that just mentioned, is that the words ὅς μέρος πρόσ (or καὶ) ὅλων given by all MSS. no longer seem to reverse the proper order of the two terms. So much for the internal grounds in favour of the παράνομον text.

For the external grounds in its favour see Bywater’s app. crit. ad loc., and Jackson’s note, pp. 73, 74. It may be added that CCC agrees with Kb Pb and Camb. in reading παράνομον πλέον, and with Kb in reading καὶ πρόσ.

It remains to notice Spengel’s view of this passage (pp. 208, 9) —a view which, I think, cannot be summarily rejected as wrong, although the MS. evidence seems to me to be rather against it than for it. At any rate it is a view which, whether right or wrong, is most instructive as a specimen of textual criticism. It is simply that the parenthesis (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἀπαν ἀνισον, τὸ δὲ ἀνισον οὐ πάν πλέον) is a later interpolation introduced to explain the foregoing words, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀνισον καὶ τὸ πλέον, by a scribe who understood them as Mich. Eph. does. The parenthesis omitted, the sentence runs clearly, and may be paraphrased thus—ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀνισον—τούτῳ τὸ πλέον—οὐ ταὐτῶν τῷ παρανόμῳ ἀλλ’ ἔτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλων, καὶ τὸ ἀδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτά κ.τ.λ. Spengel’s words are—’Man streiche den Erklärungssatz τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἀπαν ἀνισον, τὸ δὲ ἀνισον οὐ πάν πλέον und alles ist richtig . . . Nicht den Unterschied von ἀνισον und πλέον will Aristoteles geben, sondern den von παράνομον und ἀνισον; er sagt, dieses ἀνισον oder πλέον (dieses hebt er hervor, weil die Ungerechtigkeit zumeist in der πλεονεξία besteht) ist nur ein Theil von dem παράνομον, folglich das Fehlen in diesem nur ὅς μέρος von dem gesammten παράνομον, d. h. die specielle ἀδικία von der gesammten ἀδικία.’ The reading ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον Spengel regards as due merely to the attempt to mend a text already put out of joint by the interpolated parenthesis, which itself, instead of being struck out, was altered into τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνισον ἀπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἀπαν ἀνισον. There is perhaps no place in the E. N. where the MSS. show so much confusion as they do here¹, and I am far from feeling sure that the παράνομον text which I have adopted is verbally correct, although there can

¹ Of this confusion the Paraphrast’s hopelessly unmeaning note is a fair measure—ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταὐτῶν ἐστι τῷ ἀνισον, ἀλλ’ ἐστι τῷ μὲν ἀνισον ὅπερ ὅλων, τὸ δὲ πλέον ὡς μέρος—(τὸ γὰρ πλέον καὶ ἀνισον, οὐ πάν δὲ τὸ ἀνισον πλέον) ἐστι τοῖς ἀδικίαι καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀνισον ἀλλη’ αἱ οὐν ἂν εἶναι αὐτὰ ἀδικίαι· ἀλλ’ ἢ μὲν περὶ τὸ πλέον μερικὴ ἐσται ἀδικία, ἢ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀνισον ἀδικία, καθόλου.
be no doubt that the meaning which it gives is that which the writer wished to convey. Spengel’s text, however, gives this meaning equally well; but, as I have said, I think that the MS. evidence (such as it is) is rather against than for it. It is only this scruple which retains me from going even further than Spengel—viz. from striking out, not only the parenthesis, but the words καὶ τὸ πλέον, which he supposes to have suggested the parenthesis. KB and CCC with καὶ πρῶς might then be explained as giving a reading in which καὶ, necessitated by the insertion of either καὶ τὸ πλέον or καὶ τὸ παράνομον, had established itself without extruding πρῶς, which would alone be admissible if neither καὶ τὸ πλέον nor καὶ τὸ παράνομον were allowed a place in the text.

[quoted in Greek]

ωστε . . . b. 18. ὠσαύτως] Rassow (p. 17) says ‘Diese Worte sind b. 18. ganz leer, da schon das vorhergehende Capitel von der justicia particularis gehandelt hat’; and Ramsauer brackets them saying—‘Quae deinceps, l. 16, adjungitur sententia (ὡστε . . . ὠσαύτως) hoc quidem loco post reliqua interposita, imprimit postquam bis dictum est ζητούμεν δὲ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ὀρετῆς δικαιοσύνης (a. 14) et τίς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τις λιπτέων (b. 7) ita est inanis ut ne excusari quidem possit.’ If this judgment is correct (and it may well be), the question of making the apodosis begin with ὡστε does not arise. As, however, ‘bracketing’ is a somewhat gratuitous act in the case of a sentence belonging to such a loosely organised passage as the present (§§ 7-11), it is perhaps better to leave the words ὡστε . . . ὠσαύτως in the text—not as introducing an apodosis (Jackson and Susemihl), but as a statement made in consequence of the conclusion καὶ τὸ ἀδικὸν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία b. 13 . . . δικαιοσύνης b. 16, which is the real apodosis to the protasis introduced, b. 10, by ἐπεῖ. That apodosis stated that particular justice is a μέρος of universal justice; then follows the clause before us which runs—‘So (ὡστε), since this ἐν μέρει justice exists, as distinguished above, we must discuss it.’

§ 10. διοριστέων] Rassow (Forsch. p. 93) conjectures ἀφοριστέων, b. 22. referring to ἀφεισθω in b. 20 above, and comparing E. N. i. 7. 12. 1098 a. 1. I think that διοριστέων is right, and that the clause means—‘And how the justice and injustice corresponding to these states are to be determined is easily explained’: then follows the explanatory clause with γάρ. The διορισμός here is easy, and is given on the spot; not so in the case mentioned in the next section, where it has to be postponed—ὡστερον διοριστέων 1130 b. 28.
BOOK V: CHAP. 2: §§ 10, 11.

1130 b. 22. σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων] 'the great majority of the acts which are "according to law."' Mich. Eph. explains σχεδὸν here by pointing out that there are νόμιμα which refer, not to the moral conduct of the citizens, but to the practice of the various arts and trades: he says—ἔστι δ’ οὖν τινά τῶν νομίμων ἃ ὄντως δὲν ζῇν διωρίζεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πῶς ἄν ἄγαθον καὶ σπουδαῖον καὶ ἐκεῖτοι γένοιτο οἱ πολίται, εἰσηγοῦνται. ὁ γὰρ ἐμφρον νομοθέτης οὐ μόνον περὶ τῶν νομοθετεῖ καθ’ ἀδικουμενοῖς, ἀλλὰ περὶ οἰκοδόμων, περὶ ὑφαντῶν, περὶ ἀπλῶς πάντων τεχνιτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ γεωργίων καὶ στρατηγῶν καὶ ἐμπορίων, καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν δι’ ὧν οἱ πολίται συνίστανται, οὐ μόνον δὴ περὶ τῶν νομοθετεῖ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ δὴ πρῶτον περὶ τῆς παιδείας τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι ἄγαθον τε καὶ νομίμων πολιτῶν προαγορεύει. For τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας πραττόμενα (οἵ προστατόμενα) in this §, and τὰ ποιτικὰ τῆς ἀληθείας in § 11, see note on v. i. 13, b. 17. For καθ’ ἐκάστην . . . καλῶς ο λόμος see same note.

b. 26. §§ 11. παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν] 'The education of a man as a citizen'—Peters: i.e. his education for (πρός) the life which he must lead as a member of the state, or πολιτική κοινωνία.

τῆς καθ’ ἐκαστόν παιδείας] 'the education of the individual as such'—Peters.

b. 27. ἀπλῶς ἀἀρ ἄγαθος ἐστὶ] 'simply a good man'—i.e. 'good' in the sense in which we use the term when we apply it to a man without the πρόσθεσις of such qualifying circumstances as we specify when, e.g. we call him 'good, as the citizen of an oligarchical state': for 'good' means one thing when applied to the citizen of an oligarchical state, and another thing when applied to the citizen of a democratical state—i.e. 'a good citizen' is a man who helps to maintain a particular social system, whether that system be good or bad: see Pol. i. 2. 1276 b. 28 τῶν πολιτῶν . . . ἡ σωφροσύνη τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστὶ, κοινωνία δ’ ἐστιν ἡ πολιτεία δύστερη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀνεγκαίον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐπερ οὖν ἐστὶ πλέον πολιτείας εἶδος, δόλων ὡς οὐκ ἔνδεχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετήν εἶναι τῇ τελείᾳ. τοῦ δ’ ἄγαθον ἄνδρα φιλόμεν κατὰ μᾶλν ἀρετήν εἰρικῇ τῇ τελείᾳ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδεχεται πολιτείαν ὑπ’ σπουδαίον μὴ κεκτηθεῖαι τῇ ἀρετῇ καθ’ ἦν σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ, φανερῶν. What then is this ἀρετῆς καθ’ ἦν σπουδαῖος ἄνὴρ—this goodness without qualification καθ’ ἦν ἀπλῶς ἀἀρ ἄγαθος ἐστὶ? In the Politics Aristotle certainly identifies it with the goodness of a certain citizen, viz. the citizen of the Best, i.e. the Aristocratical State: Pol. Δ. 5. 1293 b. 3 τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν
BOOK V: CHAP. 2: § II.

This identification of the good citizen and the good man in the aristocratical state depends on Aristotle's doctrine that in that state the rulers are not a privileged caste distinct from the ruled, but the elders of a homogeneous people (i.e. a people consisting of citizens who are all good, Pol. H. 12. 1332 a. 32 ἀλλὰ μὲν σπουδαίοι γε πάλις ἄρτι τοῦ πολίτου τούτου μετέχονται τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίοι" ἦμεν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολίται μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας) —the natural, not the arbitrarily constituted rulers. This result, however, he reaches through a dialectical process of considerable complexity: see Pol. Γ. 2. 1276 b. ἐπειδὴ ἀδύνατον ὅμοιον εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἄν ἐὰν ἄρτι μιὰ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἁγαθοῦ: but perhaps, he continues, we may identify the goodness of the good man and the goodness of a particular citizen—viz. the citizen who is a 'good ruler'—1277 a. 13 ἄλλα ἴσον ἄρα ἡ ἄρτι ἄρτι πολίτου τε σπουδαίοι καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίοι; φαμέν δὴ τὸν ἀρχάρχων σπουδαίον εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον: then 1277 a. 20 ἐὰν ἴσον ἄρτι ἄρτι ἀρχαῖοι τε ἁγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἁγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἄρτι καὶ ἂρχομένος, οὐχ ἄρτι ἄν ἴσον ἄρτι πολίτου καὶ ἁγαθοῦ, τυχὸς μέντοι πολίτου οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι ἀρχαῖοι καὶ πολίτου. In the aristocratical state, however, the rulers are men who have learnt to rule well by being well ruled. The education in the ἄρτη τοῦ ἀρχαῖου is begun and carried on in the person of the ἀρχόμενος. The distinction between ἀρχαῖον and ἀρχόμενος is not an absolute one — the ἀρχόμενος is δυνάμει the ἀρχαῖον. If we regard especially the continuity of the citizen's life in the Best State (and in the Best State—ἡ κατὰ φύσιν πόλις—the citizen's life is a continuous natural development), we shall say that the ἄρτη of the citizen and the ἄρτη of the good man, are identical; if we give prominence to the fact that there are always two generations—the younger and the older—the former of which is educated and ruled by the latter, we shall say that the ἄρτη of the good man (= good ruler), and the ἄρτη of the citizen, are different. See Pol. Γ. 2. 1277 b. 7 ἄλλα ἴσον τιν ἁρχή καὶ ἂρχα ἁρχόμενον τῷ ἁγαθοῖς τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ. ταύτῃ γὰρ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἁρχήν, ἣν δὲ τὸν ἁρχαίον ἁρχόμενον μαθεῖν . . . διὸ
1130 b. 27. λέγεται καὶ τούτο καλῶς ὡς οὐκ ἦστω εὖ ἄρξαι μὴ ἀρξῆται. τούτων δὲ ἀρετή μὲν ἐτέρα, δεὶ δὲ τῶν πολίτων τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετή πολίτου τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐκείνων ἄρχην ἐπιστασθαι ἐπὶ ἀρμόστερα. καὶ ἄνδρας δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω: then 1277 b. 25 ἢ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχοντος οὕτω ἀρετὴ μόνη, τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἐσοκεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχοντῶν, ἀρχομένου δὲ γε οὐκ ἦστω ἀρετή φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθῆς ὡσπέρ γὰρ αὐλοποιὸς ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δὲ ἀρχον αὐληθῆς ὁ χρώμενος. πάστερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἦ ἐτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἐτέρα, φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων. Cf. also Pol. H. 13. 1332 b. 32 ἀλλὰ μὴν διὶ γε δεὶ τοὺς ἀρχονταίς διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀναμφισβήτητον . . . ἡ γὰρ φύσις διδάσκει τὴν διαφέρειν, ποιήσασα τῷ γένει ταύτῳ τὸ μὲν νέοτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, δι' ὑπό τις μὲν ἀρχεσθαὶ πρέπει τοὺς δ' ἄρχειν . . . ἐστὶ μὲν δρὰ οὖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατεόν, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς ἐτέρους. ὡστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ἦστω ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαίαν, ἐστι δ' ὡς ἐτέρους εἶναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἄρχηθηναι φασὶ δεῖν πρῶτον . . . 1333 a. 11 ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ ἀρχοντος τήν ἀρετήν εἶναι φαιμὲν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἄνδρας, τῶν δ' αὐτῶν ἀρχόμενῶν τε δεῖν γίνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἀρχοντα ἐστερον, τούτῳ ἄν εἰν τῷ νομοθετή ρηματευτέον, ὡπος ἄνδρες ἄγαθοι γίνονται, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐπιστηθεμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ τέλος τής ἀρίστης ζωῆς. The outcome of all is that the legislator should strive to make his fellow-citizens good men. The answer given by the Politics to the question before us is—that it is πολιτική, and no other agency, which conducts the παιδεία καθ' ἂν ἄπλος ἂγαθός ἐστι. The virtue of the perfectly good man is determined πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν—Pol. Γ. 12. 1288 a. 39 φανερῶν ὅτι τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἂν ἄμφω τὸ γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πῶς συστήσεις ἐν τὶς ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευομένην, ὡστε ἦστα καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἤθη ταύτα σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαίον ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικῶν. But the writer of the Fifth Book of the Ethics, in the alternative ἦ ἐτέρας (v. 2. 11), seems to suggest a point of view which is foreign to the Politics—viz. that the good man may possibly spring up under influences, and manifest his goodness under conditions with which the legislator has nothing to do. This seems to be the suggestion thrown out in the present passage; and it may be thought that this suggestion appears as a definite doctrine at the end of the E. E. where the place of καλοκαγαθία is determined. But we must not make too much of the difference between the καλοκαγαθία of Eudemus and the ἀρετῆ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἄνδρας of the Politics. In both conceptions we have an ideal excellence which man approaches along the line traced for
him by πολιτική. Aristotle indeed describes the Chief End of man 1130 b. 27. as θεωρία τις (E. N. x. 8. 8), and Eudemus as τὸ τῶν θεῶν θεραπεύων καὶ θεωρεῖν (E. E. Θ. 3. 1249 b. 20); but these descriptions must not be allowed to mislead us. If the systems of Aristotle and of Eudemus, as wholes, have any weight, it is to impress the conviction that the Chief End, however described, is not something which we must pass through and out of social life to reach; but that, on the contrary, it is social life itself at its best. It is true that Aristotle’s theory of the Best Life, as a theory, is defective. He is forced to pronounce the life ‘impossible,’ because theoretically he regards it as a fixed type of excellence. But his practice carries him beyond his theory. He urges us to strive after the ideal although it is ‘impossible of attainment’ (E. N. x. 7. 8). He thus divines that the ideal is, after all, not something unrealisable; that, on the contrary, it is being always realised in the amelioration of the life itself which we have inherited and transmit: just as the type Horse is not something χωριστών which all horses fail of attaining to, but rather that which they perfect in their generations.

We may take it then that there can be no doubt about the view of Aristotle and Eudemus. In so far as a man is σπουδάων or καλὸς καὶ ἄγαθος it is πολιτική which makes him such.

If the writer of v. 2. 11 is neither Aristotle nor Eudemus, it is impossible of course to determine his view, as he does not return to the subject. He seems to suggest a view different from that of Aristotle and Eudemus: but, as he belongs at least to their school, the presumption is that he really shared their view, and that, after all, ἡ ἐτέρας is surplusage. Grant seems to make too much of the present passage when he founds on it the statement ‘Eudemus [with whom he identifies the Writer of the Fifth Book] would seem to have wished to take up the question where Aristotle left it, and —with the view of giving a separate existence to Morals as a science—to ask whether there is not a kind of education, not falling within the province of Politics, which aims at producing the virtues of the individual man, as distinct from those of the citizen.’

οὐ γὰρ ἵσως . . . πάντι!] This is Aristotle’s view as expressed b. 28. e.g. in Pol. Γ. 2. 1276 b. 34 (quoted in last note) ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέξεται πολιτικὴν δοτα σπουδάων μὴ κεκτήσατε τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ’ ἣν σπουδάως ἀνήρ, φανερῶ —a view which we have seen is not inconsistent with the doctrine that the ἀρετὴ καθ’ ἣν σπουδάως ἀνήρ is the work of πολιτική; but the writer of the passage before us (v. 2. 11) adduces it as if
1130 b. 28. It raised a presumption in favour of the supposition that an agency different from πολιτική may be instrumental in producing such ἄρετη. There is indeed much confusion of thought in the passage, and to found on it any conclusion so important as that regarding the writer’s doctrine of the relation between ‘Politics’ and ‘Morals’ seems to be a very hazardous proceeding. The confusion is increased by the Paraph. Heliod., who seems to think that the reference is to a distinction between the good man and the good citizen similar to that drawn already (v. i. 20) between ἄρετη and δικαιοσύνη.

The phrase τὸ ἄνδρι ἀγαθῷ εἶναι is equivalent to ‘the notion “good man”’,—‘the being a good man’: see de An. ii. 1. 412 b. 12 ἢν μὲν γὰρ ἄν τὸ πελίκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο. An. Post. ii. 4. 91 b. 4 τὸ ζῷον εἰναι κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐναί ἀλλήλαις γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἄνθρωπον ἐναί ζῷον εἰναι, ὡσπερ καὶ πάντα ἄνθρωπον ζῷον, ἀλλὰ οὐχ οὕτως ὡστε ἐν εἰναι. Met. Γ. 4. 1006 b. 22 εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει ἔτερον τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μὴ ἄνθρωπος δήλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον τὸ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον· ὡστέ ἐσται τὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι μὴ ἄνθρωπον ἐν γὰρ ἐσται:—and further on 1007 a. 20 ὅλως δὲ ἀναφέροις οἱ τούτῳ λέγοντες οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι πάντα γὰρ ἀνάγκη συμβεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ ὅπερ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἡ ζῷον εἶναι τι ἢν εἶναι μὴ εἶναι. Met. Z. 15. 1039 b. 20 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ οὐσία ἐτέρα τὸ τε σύνολον καὶ δο λόγος (λέγω δὲ ὅτι ἢ μὲν οὕτως ἐστιν οὐσία σὺν τῇ ὑλῇ συνελεμένων δό λόγος, ἢ δὲ δό λόγος ὅλως), ὅσα μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγονται, τούτων μὲν ἐστὶ φθορά· καὶ γὰρ γένεσις τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἐστιν οὕτως ὡστε φθείρεσθαι· οὖθε γὰρ γένεσις (οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκία εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ όικίᾳ) ἀλλὰ ἀνεύ γενεσίως καὶ φθοράς εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσίν δέδεσται γὰρ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ταύτη γενεα ὁδῷ ποιεῖ. Phys. iii. 5. 204 a. 23 τὸ γὰρ ἀπειρῷ εἶναι καὶ ἀπειρον τὸ αὐτό, εἰσὶν οὐσία τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ μὴ καθ’ ὅποιομένου—i.e. the notion of infinity and infinity are identical, for infinity is nothing but a notion—can never be concretely realised as an actual thing: see Met. Θ. 6. 1048 b. 14 τὸ δ’ ἀπειρον οὐχ οὕτω δινώμει ἐστὶν ὡς ἑνεργεία ἑσόμενων χωριστῶν, ἀλλὰ γνώσει: cf. Met. Z. 6. 1031 b. 11 ἀνάγκη ἢρα ἐν εἰναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν εἶναι καὶ καλῶν καὶ καλῶ εἶναι, ὅσα μὴ καθ’ ἀλλο λέγεται ἀλλὰ καθ’ αὐτά καὶ πρώτα. On the formula generally see Trendelenburg, de An. iii. 4. 7. [429 b. 10.] p. 472, first ed.

b. 30. § 12.] Particular Justice, concerned, as we have seen (v. i. 9), with τάγαθα περὶ ὅσα εὐπρεπί καὶ ἀνυπόκτω οὕτω μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰὲ ἀγαθά, τινὰ δ’ οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, is now divided into two species: (1) Distributive Justice manifested in the fair apportionment of these good things (social
position, property, and all other material advantages) among the members of the Community, according to their deserts: (2) Corrective Justice concerned with the rectification of results at variance with the principle of fair apportionment which arise out of acts performed by members of the Community in the various circumstances in which, as individuals, they 'have to do with one another.' The term συναλλάγμα = contractus of Roman Law. The relation between these two species of Particular Justice is well stated by Trendelenburg, Hist. Beiträge zur Phil., vol. iii. p. 412: to διανέμων κατ' ἄξιαν is the primary form of Particular Justice: the διανομή may take place in the exchanges of trade (ἀλλακτικῆ δικαίωσις), or in the allotment of common goods (διαιωμητικῆ τῶν κοινῶν): the secondary form of Particular Justice is ἡ διαρθωτικῆ: it comes into operation when the just relations according to the primary form are disturbed, and equalises the unequal.

§ 13. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο] The members of the social κοινωνία, as individuals, 'have to do with one another' (συναλλαττωνται) in circumstances which may be assigned to one or other of two main heads, according as the will of both parties (ἐκώσια συναλλάγματα), or of one party only—the other party being unwilling—(ἐκώσια συναλλάγματα) is concerned in what is done. As results at variance with the principle of fair apportionment arise in each of these two sets of circumstances, and must be rectified, there will also be two kinds of Corrective Justice.

It is easy to see how the results of ἐκώσια συναλλάγματα (assault, theft, &c.) are such as need rectification, and that it is in the criminal court that they are rectified. Ἐκώσια συναλλάγματα (buying and selling, letting, &c.), on the other hand, being those in which both parties enter voluntarily into certain arrangements in view of results agreeable to both, might seem from their very nature to give results needing no rectification. It sometimes happens, however, without the fault of either contracting party, that a result other than that originally in view, and not agreeable to one of the parties, follows from an arrangement; and it may be right that a civil court should consider whether the result (unfortunate for one of the parties) should be rectified, and, if so, to what extent: e.g. A takes the lease of a farm from B for a number of years at a rent suitable to good times: if times become bad beyond all reasonable calculation, it may be right that A should be able to have the
question of the reduction of his rent judicially decided. It may perhaps be thought that a better instance of τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐκουσίως συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικῶν might have been selected than this which suggests 'interference with the freedom of contract.' It is, however, the 'rectification' in the civil court which corresponds most logically with the 'rectification' made in the criminal court—it is the rectification of the original συναλλάγμα itself. But I suspect that the writer of the present passage had not such a case of rectification by the civil court in his mind when he drew up his list of ἐκουσία συναλλάγμασα here, but that he thought rather of the enforcement of the terms of such συναλλάγματα, and the settlement of disputes regarding their meaning, in the civil court (cf. v. 4. 7. 

However, the line may be dividing ἐκουσία συναλλάγμασα, which require enforcement, from ἄρχων ἀνάρχων, for the man who has to be sued for the payment of a debt is sometimes not easily distinguishable from the man who intended from the beginning to cheat his creditor.

The judicial enforcement, then, of the terms of an ἐκουσίου συναλλαγμα, and their judicial interpretation, must be distinguished from the judicial rectification of the terms themselves. But we must understand the phrase 'rectification of the terms themselves' to denote not only the judicial alteration of unfair terms already arranged (e.g. refusal of law courts to enforce agreements to pay interest above a certain rate; judicial revision of rents which have become too high—after all a comparatively rare and somewhat questionable kind of 'rectification'), but also the prevention, by other than judicial means, of unfair arrangements which would inevitably be made if certain checks and methods of procedure did not exist. And here we can see that it is in the institution of νόμισμα that the principle of Corrective Justice is most largely and effectively embodied. On a system of barter almost every exchange involves a result at variance with the principle of fair apportionment. It is impossible, on such a system, to make really fair exchanges, there being objectively no common measure of the things exchanged, the accidents of temporary need and passing whim dominating all transactions. But the institution of νόμισμα
compels men to exchange on a uniform system, and therefore fairly. It may be regarded as an omnipresent court of 'diorthotic justice'—'diorthotic' in the sense of keeping straight what would otherwise inevitably go wrong. It does not enforce or interpret the terms of arrangements already made, but provides ab initio that the terms shall be of a certain kind—i.e. reasonably fair, thus interfering, not indeed with 'free,' but with haphazard contract. And that the writer of the Fifth Book regarded the institution of νόμσμα in this light is probable from the similarity of the terms in which he describes its function with those in which he describes the function of the δικαστής, Ε. Ν. v. 4. 6. 1132 a. 18 ὧστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἀν εἰ ὁ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ οὖν ἀμφοτέρως, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστήν ἴκναι ἴκναι ἴκνι τὸ δίκαιον ὁ γὰρ δικαστής βούλεται ἴκναι οἷν δίκαιον ἐμφυκοῖν καὶ ἵπτοις δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσι ἱκον δικαίοις, ὡς εἰ σον τοῦ μέσου τύχων, τοῦ δίκαιου τευχόμενον μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἰπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής ὁ δὲ δικαστής ἐπαινοῦσι κ.τ.λ.—and Ε. Ν. v. 5. 10. 1133 a. 19 διὸ πάντα συμβαλλατεῖ δεὶ πῶς εἶναι, διὸ ἴκνι ἄλλαγήν. εἰ ὣς τὸ νόμσμα ἐφελθῆκε, καὶ γίνεται πῶς μέσον· πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὡστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, πόσα ἕτη ἄγον ἕποδήματι ἱδον οἰκία ἐροτήματι: cf. v. 5. 14, 15. 1133 b. 14 ff. What has been said of νόμσμα—the 'medium of exchange' par excellence—as 'diorthotic' applies to other contrivances—of which the railroad and the advertisement may be taken as two typical examples—whereby exchange is made easier, and the producer is consequently enabled to count on getting a fairer return for his commodity than he otherwise would get—i.e. on getting more nearly the share properly due to his ἀξία, or economic worth, in the industrial community.

In connexion with what has been said it may be convenient here merely to mention a point to which we shall have to return afterwards—viz. that, while the assignment of shares of booty to those who have taken part in a successful expedition, and the distribution of social distinctions among citizens, are very obvious cases of διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν (the agency of the central public authority being clearly seen in the definite order that such and such a distribution of booty shall be made, and in the constitutional law which provides that such and such gradations of social rank shall be recognised), yet there is another and more important case of διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν—the distribution of wages and profits among the members of the industrial community ac-
according to 'economic laws'—which is apt to escape observation as a case of διανομή ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, because the existence of common property to be divided, and the agency of the state in dividing it, are not so immediately obvious as they are in the other cases. It is important, therefore, to call attention here to the fact that the exchange of products between individuals is by far the most important state agency at work in the distribution of the rewards of labour. The farmer receives the reward of his labour in the form of the coat which a settled social system allows him to get in exchange for his corn from the tailor. Νόμοσμα and the other 'media of exchange' alluded to above are thus 'dianemetic' as well as 'diorthotic' agencies. As promoting exchange νόμοσμα is a 'dianemetic' agency; but as keeping the exchange or distribution fair in circumstances in which unfair assignments would, but for its intervention, inevitably occur, it is a 'diorthotic' agency. Its 'dianemetic' and 'diorthotic' functions are after all only logically separate; its concrete work is to promote the fair distribution of the national wealth by means of the exchange of commodities.

a. 3. δανεισμός] 'lending at interest.' Jackson, Peters.

a. 4. χρήσεις] 'lending without interest.' Jackson, Peters. χρήσεις is the commodatum of Roman law, distinguished from mutuum by not being concerned, as mutuum is, with things quae pondere numero mensurato constant—e.g., wine and corn. The actual bushel of corn received by the person who benefits by the mutuum is not returned by him, but another bushel equivalent to it: the person, however, who benefits by a commodatum must restore the very thing which he has borrowed—e.g., the book. Commodatum differs from locatio in being gratuitous. See Smith's Dict. of Cl. Antiquities: Article COMMODATUM.

a. 5. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων] Mich. Eph. has πῶς συναλλάγματα ταῦτα λέγεται; ἣ ὡς ὁ κλέφας ἀντὶ τῶν κλεμμάτων ὅ τε μὲν δίδωσιν ἄλλω τινα ὅ τε δὲ μαστεγοῦσα, καὶ γέγονε τρόπον τινὰ δόσιν καὶ λήψις . . . λαβών γὰρ χρήσεις ἢ ἄλλο τι ὁ κλέφας δίδωκεν ἀντὶ ἑκείνων εὐθύνας.
CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

Concerning Distributive Justice. Injustice being inequality, or too much to A and too little to B, justice will be equality, or the mean between too much to A and too little to B; i.e. it will involve four terms at least—two persons and two shares. If the persons are of equal merit, they will, in a just distribution, receive equal shares; if of unequal merit, they will receive proportionally unequal shares—in other words, in a just distribution the ratio between the persons and that between the shares will be equal. Although all men admit that distribution ought to be 'in proportion to merit (σαν' δικαιο),' they are not agreed as to what constitutes merit. Democrats, oligarchs, and aristocrats adopt different standards of merit in their distributions of the good things of life.

The just then is that which is 'in a proportion'; for concrete things (such as persons and their shares) stand in relations of proportion to one another no less than abstract numbers do.

The 'proportion' to which distributive justice conforms is that which mathematicians call geometrical proportion—discrete, with four terms, not continuous, for although continuous proportion has really four terms, it obtains that number by employing one term twice, whereas in the formula of distributive justice the four terms are separately present from the beginning—A and B the persons, and γ and δ their respective shares. Starting then from

\[ A : B :: \gamma : \delta \]

we get alternando

\[ A : \gamma :: B : \delta \]

and componendo

\[ A + \gamma : B + \delta :: A : B \]

where the conjunction of A and γ and of B and δ (i.e. the assignment of γ to A and of δ to B) represents just distribution, i.e. distribution 'according to merit.'

Unjust distribution violates this proportion, i.e. gives the one party too much good (or too little evil) in proportion to his merit, and the other too little good (or too much evil).

Grant introduces this chapter with an excellent note, in which he refers to Plato, Gorgias 507 E, and Laws 757 B, as foreshadowing the Aristotelian doctrine of Distributive Justice: also to Pol. τ. 5. 1280 a. 6 sqq., where 'though the name of distributive justice does not occur, yet the idea of it is fully developed.'

The argument is — τὸ δίκαιον is ἴσον: but τὸ ἱσον is μέσον: therefore τὸ δίκαιον is μέσον as well as ἴσον. When, however, we speak of 'equal' (ἰσον), or 'a mean between' (μέσον), we imply at least two things. But τὸ δίκαιον is more than an ἴσον or μέσον implying at least two things. As has been pointed out before (v. 1. 20, v. 2. 6), it has its εἴναι, or δύναμις, ἐν τῷ πρῶς ἐτερον: i. e. it implies a relation between persons. In other words, τὸ δίκαιον must be regarded under the two categories of Quantity and of Relation: it is an equality of things which involves a fair relation between persons. Hence it implies four terms — two things and two persons, at least.

§ 3. ἀνευ λόγου] 'without proof.'

§ 4. καὶ πρῶς τι καὶ τισίν] Ἐκὶ and CCC seem to stand alone in omitting καὶ πρῶς τι, and Ἐκὶ in omitting καὶ τισίν. Bekker, following Ἐκὶ, brackets καὶ πρῶς τι, Jackson follows Ἐκὶ in omitting καὶ τισίν, while Ramsauer and Susemihl omit the whole clause καὶ πρῶς τι καὶ τισίν. This last omission is, I think, unjustifiable. The argument of §§ 1-5 seems to require an explicit statement of the point that τὸ δίκαιον is to be regarded not only under the category of Quantity as ἴσον, but also under that of Relation — πρῶς τι. Moreover, the writer of the M. M. (i. 33. i193 b. 31, quoted here by Jackson in his important note) lays great stress upon this point in the argument — τὸ δὲ γε ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν ἐγγίνεται τὸ ἄρα πρῶς ἐτερον ἴσον εἶναι δίκαιον ἴστι, καὶ δίκαιος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄν ἐν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐν δικαίῳ καὶ ἴσῳ καὶ ἐν μεσότητι (καὶ Susem.) τὸ μὲν δίκαιον [ἐν om. Susem.] τισὶ λέγεται δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἐν τισίν ἴσον, τὸ δὲ μέσον τισὶ μέσον: ὅστε ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἴσται καὶ πρῶς τινας καὶ εἰ τισίν. Jackson therefore retains καὶ πρῶς τι as the equivalent of the πρῶς ἐτερον of the M. M. This is unquestionably right: but it may be doubted whether he is right in omitting καὶ τισίν 'as a gloss anticipatory of ἤ ἐδὲ δίκαιον, τισίν.' The equivalent expression καὶ τισίν is certainly unnecessary after καὶ πρῶς τι: but it is in the manner of the writer to add such unnecessary explanations. As for the omission of καὶ πρῶς τι by Ἐκὶ — very little weight indeed should be attached to the omissions of Ἐκὶ. They are generally

1 See Met, Δ. 15. 1021 a. 11 ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ δὲν μιᾶ ἡ ποίησις, ἐμφίλα γ' ἄν ἡ ποίησις μιᾶ, ἴτα δὲ δὲν τὸ ποιόν ἐν.
2 CCC in Book V has not independent authority. It is probably a transcript of a transcript of Ἐκὶ; see English MSS. of Nic. Eth. Anecd. Οx. p. 45.
as insignificant as its actual readings are significant. What is 1131 a. 16.
really important is that the argument absolutely requires καὶ πρός τι (whatever may be thought of the origin of the gloss καὶ τιτιν),
and that the writer of the M. M. seems to have read πρός τι (or πρός τικα; ?).

§ 5. καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα] ἐν οἷς = τὰ πράγματα. Jackson (fol-
lowed by Susemihl) brackets the words τὰ πράγματα as a gloss on ἐν οἷς.

§ 6. καὶ ἡ αὐτῇ ἔσται ἴσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς] 'There will be the
same "equality" between the persons and between the things': i. e.
if the persons, as comparable κοινωνοὶ of the same social system, are
absolutely equal, their shares will be also (ἡ αὐτῇ) absolutely equal:
if they are not absolutely equal, but stand in a certain definite ratio
of superiority and inferiority, their shares will also stand in the
same (ἡ αὐτῇ) ratio. Μάχαι καὶ ἐγκλήματα arise when the ratio, whatever
it be, subsisting between the persons is not observed exactly
(ἡ αὐτῇ) in the apportionment of the shares. Ramsauer's note on
ἡ αὐτῇ ἴσότης is good—'Intelliges vocem ἡ αὐτῇ additum ad ἴσότης
tollere quasi notionem ipsius paritatis: "eodem modo quo haec
paria vel erunt vel non erunt, et illa vel erunt vel non erunt." "Inta
enim revera neque homines nec res, sed hinc ratio inter homines,
illinc inter res ratio; et est ἡ ἀνάλογα ἴσότης λόγων, vs. 31. '}

ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κάκεινα ἔχει] 'I omit,' says a. 21.
Jackson, 'the words τὰ ἐν οἷς which appear in all the MSS. except
Kb [and CCC], and in Bekker's text, in order that here, as in the
sentences before and after, the persons may take precedence of the
things distributed.' Susemihl and Ramsauer also omit the words.
Certainly 'the persons should take precedence of the things' here;
but even with the omission of τὰ ἐν οἷς the clause is not satisfactory.
'Ἕκεινα referring to the more remote οἷς is then indeed correct: but
instead of κάκεινα we ought to have καὶ ταῦτα referring to the nearer
ἐν οἷς.

τὰ ἴσον ζητεῖται σταθμάζουσιν.

§ 7. ἦτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δήλου] τοῦτο is the fact stated a. 24.
above in § 5, that τὸ δίκαιον involves at least two persons and two
things so related that there is ἡ αὐτῇ ἴσότης between the persons and
between the things. This fact becomes more significant if we realise clearly that it implies that τὸ δίκαιον is ἀναλογὸν τι—να ἀναλογία we already know as mathematicians is ἴσοτης λόγων καὶ ἐν τέταρτων ἐλαχίστους. Now, that τὸ δίκαιον, with its two persons and two things, is ἀναλογὸν τι is obvious from our use of the expression καὶ ἄξιαν, ‘according to merit.’ When we say that Α and Β are rewarded each ‘according to his merit’ (whatever that may be), we mean that each receives his ‘just’ reward. But when Α and Β are rewarded each ‘according to his merit,’ reward a (i. e. Α’s reward) stands to reward β (i. e. Β’s reward) in the same ratio (λόγος) as Α’s merit stands to Β’s. Hence, just distribution of rewards being distribution ‘according to merit’ involves the ἀναλογία, or ἴσοτης λόγων—Α : Β :: a : β. By means of the expression καὶ ἄξιαν, then, the writer is enabled to substitute for the ἴσοτη ἴσοτης of § 6 the more appropriate ὁ ἄντως λόγος of § 10.

For the expression καὶ ἄξιαν, as used in the E.Ν., see the following passages quoted by Ramsauer in his note on v. 3. 7—viz. 1115 b. 19, where the ἄνθρειος is said καὶ ἄξιαν, καὶ ὢν ἀν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττειν, i. e. in the manner indicated and required by λόγος, which grasps life as a whole, and gives each feeling and action its due place in the ensemble:—1119 a. 19, where the σώφρων is said μή μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἰδιότητας τῆς ἄξιας, i. e. than they deserve:—1122 a. 26, where we have the expression καὶ ἄξιαν διαπανών: and 1100 a. 25 βίων τοῦ καὶ ἄξιαν: cf. also E. E. iii. 6. 1233 b. 6 ὃ δὲ καὶ ἄξιαν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπής τὸ γὰρ πρέπον καὶ ἄξιαν ἐστίν' οὐδὲν γὰρ πρέπει τὸν παρὰ τὴν ἄξιαν: also E. E. iii. 7. 1233 b. 19 ὃ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεύσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς καὶ ἄξιαν εἰ πράττοντον ἐστίν: also E. E. viii. 3. 1249 a. 7 τὸ καθαρὸς καθαρὸς καθὰ ἐστὶ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὸς· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον· τούτῳ δὲ τὸ καὶ ἄξιαν· ἄξιος δὲ οὕτως τούτῳ καὶ τὸ πρέπον καλὸν· πρέπει δὲ ταύτα τούτα, πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, δύναμις. In all these passages καὶ ἄξιαν means ‘according to merit,’ or ‘suitably to desert’—whether the ‘merit’ or ‘desert’ be the ground on which recognition is due to a person in the social κοινωνία, or the reason why a feeling, an action, or a circumstance should have a certain place assigned to it in the ensemble of ὁ ἀνθρώπων βίος. The expression καὶ ἄξιαν thus necessarily connotes the idea of ‘proportion’; hence we find the phrase τὸ καὶ ἄξιαν ἴσον = ‘the equality which characterises proportion,’ i. e. ἴσοτης λόγων: see Pol. E. I. 1301 b. 29 ἐστι δὲ διὰ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τὸ δὲ καὶ ἄξιαν ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῷ μὲν τὸ πληθεῖ ἢ μεγέθει ταῦτα καὶ ἴσον, καὶ
Equality is either (1) numerical equality (τὸ ἀριθμὸν ἴσον), or (2) equality of ratios (τὸ καὶ ἀξίων ἴσον).

That 'the recognition of a merit' is the principle on which all just distribution must proceed is universally admitted; but men are not agreed as to 'what constitutes merit'—as to what is the underlying condition (ὑπάρχειν—bracketed, however, by Bywater: it is omitted by Ob, Pb, Kb, and CCC, the two last having καὶ ἀξίων των δειν εἶναι per dittographiam 1 in its place) of preferential recognition. Those who think that the masses should rule hold that the being a free man (ἐλευθερία) is by itself a 'merit' overshadowing all other 'merits,' and entitling its possessor to share equally with all other 'free' members of the state: oligarchs think that the rich are entitled to more recognition than other members of the state; some, again, think that high birth constitutes a superior claim; and those who favour the rule of the Best and most Virtuous identify the highest 'merit' with goodness and culture: see Pol. 1. 5. 1280 a. 7–1281 a. 8, where it is pointed out that οἱ δικαιορισταὶ make the mistake of supposing that if a man is 'superior' in a certain respect (i.e. in respect of wealth) he is superior in all respects; and οἱ δημοκράται the mistake of supposing that if men are equal in one respect (i.e. in respect of being free men) they are equal in all respects. Both ignore the vital point (τὸ κυριώτατον, 1280 a. 25), that the State is an institution for the furtherance of human perfection, not an insurance or joint-stock company. Cf. also Pol. 1. 7. 1282 b. 23 sqq., where the various claims to social recognition are examined. Does any superiority, he asks, give a man a right to a higher position in the State? Surely not. We cannot give a man a higher position on account of his finer complexion or superior stature. We do not give a better flute, among equal players, to the high-born player. In short, only those superiorities must be taken into account which have a distinct connexion with the well-being of the State. Noble birth, Freedom, and Wealth are superiorities which have a distinct connexion with the existence and well-being of the State, and their claims to recognition are accordingly pronounced

1 This dittograph may have accidentally extruded ὑπάρχειν. Ob and Pb are scarcely independent evidence.
1131 a. 26. reasonable. There cannot be a city consisting entirely of poor men, or of slaves; and without ἀρετή, hereditary and acquired, there can be no good administration of the resources and energy supplied by wealth and freedom. Freedom, wealth, and high birth are all factors in the well-being of the State, if ἀρετή—enlightened moral interest in the κοινὴ συμφέρον—be present to coordinate them. The class which possesses this ἀρετή 'merits' the highest place in the State, just because it is its supremacy alone which ensures that other classes shall also receive what they severally 'merit' in the διανομὴ τῶν κοινῶν. The rule of ἀρετή is ἡ ὀρθή πολιτεία. But where the coordinating principle of ἀρετή is absent, freedom, wealth, and high birth struggle each for mastery: and, through various processes of στάσεις, various παρεκβεβλημέναι πολιτείαι are consolidated, according as this, that, or the other ἀξία has succeeded, for the time, in securing exclusive recognition to itself.

In connexion with the use made of mathematical formulæ by the writer of the Fifth Book it is interesting to note the elaboration with which his example is followed by a later writer on Justice, the Pseudo-Archytas, quoted by Stobaeus (Flor. vol. ii. p. 137, ed. Meineke, Mullach, Fragm. Phil. i. 560)—'Ἀρχύτα Πυθαγορείου ἐκ τού περὶ νῦμον καὶ δικαιούμης' διὸ τὸ δίκαιον τοῖς μὲν ἀριστοκρατικῶν, τοῖς δὲ δαμοκρατικῶν, τοῖς δὲ ἀλγαρχικῶν συνούντι. καὶ τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν κατὰν ἐπεναντίαν μεσότατα' τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μέξοι μέξοντας τῶν λόγων, τοῖς δὲ μήσοι μέξοντες διανείμει ἀνάλογα αὕτα τὸ δὲ δαμοκρατικὸν κατὰν γεωμετρικὰν' ἐν γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς λόγοις ἵσον τῶν μεζόνων καὶ μηδόνων μεγεθέων τὸ δὲ ἀλγαρχικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν κατὰν ἀριθμητικὰν' ἀντιστάσεις γὰρ αὕτα τῷ ἐπεναντίῳ τοῦ γὰρ μήσοι μέξοντας τῶν λόγων, τοῖς δὲ μέξοι μέξοντες, ταῖς μὲν δὲ ἑξαίη τὰς διανομὰς τοσαύτας ταῖς δὲ ἑξάκοντας ταῖς πολιτείαις καὶ τοῖς ὀκοῖς θεωρήσεται.

τιμά τοῖς γὰρ καὶ κολάσεις καὶ ἄρχαί ἢ ἐξ ἴσον τοῖς μέξοι καὶ μήσοι πολλοίς, ἢ ἐξ ἴσον ἢ τῷ ἀρεταὶ ὑπερέχειν ἢ τῷ πλούτῳ ἢ καὶ δυνάμει, ταῖς μὲν δὲ ἑξαίη ἵσον δαμοκρατικῶν, τὸ δὲ ἑξαίη ἀριστοκρατικῶν ἢ ἀλγαρχικῶν. See Mullach, Fragm. Ph. ii. 119, for an account of these three μεσότητες or ἀνάλογα (in music)—(1) ἀριθμητικά, in which as the first term exceeds the second, so the second exceeds the third—e.g. 6, 4, 2. Here, as Nicomachus Gerasenus (ἀριθμητικῆ εἰσαγωγή p. 132, ed. Hoche) says, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσιν ὁρῶς μείζων ἢ λόγοι, ἐλάττωσιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς μείζονα, ἢ ἐν τοῖς μείζονοις ἐν τοῖς μείζονα, i.e. the ratio 6:4 is smaller than the ratio 4:2; or as Archytas (?) quoted by Mullach (ii. 119) says, τὸ τῶν μείζων ὁρῶν διάστημα μεῖον, τὸ δὲ τῶν μείζων μείζον: (2) γεωμετρικά, where we μείζων ἢ λόγοι ποιοῦται τὸ διάστημα καὶ οἱ μεῖοι: e.g. 8, 4, 2, ratio 8:4.
§ 8. Μοναδικοῦ ἀρίθμου ... διὸς ἃριθμοῦ] 'Proportion' is not a. 30. peculiar to 'number' in pure arithmetic where μονάδες, or abstract 'ones,' indivisible and always equal to one another, are counted; but belongs to all 'number'—i. e. also to 'number' as realised in concrete and unequally-sized things. This statement (introduced by γιὰ) is added to meet a possible objection—that the schema of Proportion, applicable to numbers formed by the addition of abstract units (μονάδες), is not applicable to the concrete oǐ and ἐν oǐ with which ῥ to ὑκαίνον is concerned. Mich. Eph. has the following commentary here—μοναδικον ἀριθμων λέγω ἃ ἀριθµοµένων, οἶν τὴν δηκάδα, ὁ ἀριθµοµένος τοὺς δέκα ἵππους ἄ τοὺς δέκα ἀνθρώπους, ὁ καὶ κυρίως ἀριθµὸς ἠγεταὶ ... διὼς δὲ ἀριθµὸν λέγονται τὰ ἀριθµηµατα, οἶν τοὺς δέκα βίοις ἢ ἀνθρώπους. Ἀναλογία γὰρ φησιν οὗ μόνον ἔστι τῶν ἐκ μονάδων συγκειµένων καὶ ὧς μέτρων λαµβανοµένων ἀριθµῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀριθµητῶν ἢ καὶ ἄριθµητῶν. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ὡς μέτρων ἀριθµῶν ἐστὶ τίς ἀναλογία, ὡς ὁ γ' (8) πρὸς τὸν δ' (4), ὡς οὐ' (6) πρὸς τὸν γ' (3), ο黡τως ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθµητῶν ἵππων, κυρίων, γραµµῶν ἐπιπέδων, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὃν ἐστὶν ἀριθµός καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτω ἀναλογίᾳ ἐστὶν ἐξουσίᾳ γὰρ ἀριθµῶν. δεὶ γὰρ ἵνα ἀναλογία τις ἦν. Cf. Bonitz on Met. M. 6. 1080 b. 19. p. 545, "Εξοισωνοι numeri [i. e. the "extended units" of the Pythagoreans—τῶν γὰρ ὄλων οὐρανῶν κατακεκάζουσιν εἰς ἀρίθµων, πλὴν ὡς μονάδως, ἀλλὰ τὰς μονάδας ὑπολαµβάνουσιν ἐκεῖν μέγεθος, 1080 b. 17] Ar. opponit τοὺς μοναδικοὺς ἀρίθµους, i. e. eos numeros, quibus non certae quaedam res (cf. N. 5. 1092 b. 19: ἀεὶ ὁ ἀρίθµος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκείν ἡ πάρος ἡ γῆς ἡ μοναδική), sed ipsae unitates, abstractae ab omni rerum qualitate et varietate, individuae (cf. 8. 1083 b. 17) neque inter se distinctae (cf. 7. 1082 b. 16) numerentur. Ac talem quidem numerum quum investiget scientia arithmetica, eundem numerum ἀριθµητικὸν et μοναδικὸν appellat, cf. 8. 1083 b. 17." Cf. Zell, 'ἀριθµοὶ μοναδικοὶ sunt quos nostrates dicit unbenannte Zahlen; numeri nude positi sine rebus numerandis.' Jackson (p. 81) refers to Plato, Phileb. 56 D, 'where arithmeticians who deal with μονάδας ἀνίσους
such as two armies, two oxen, &c., are distinguished from arithmeticians who deal with μονάδες which are all alike.'

a. 31. ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων] See Euclid, v. Def. 3 λόγος ἐστὶ δυο μεγεθῶν ὁμογενῶν ἡ κατὰ πηλακότητα πρῶς ἄλληλα ποιὰ σχέσις: and v. Def. 8 ἀναλογία δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν λόγων ταυτότης (v. I. ὁμοιότης). In his note here Mich. Eph. says—τὸ ἰσότης ἀστὶ τοῦ ὁμοιότης ἀναλογία γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν λόγων ὁμοίότης—the reason for preferring ὁμοίότης to ἰσότης apparently being that in γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία we have to do not with ἥ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰσότης, i.e. not with two equal quantities or ἀριθμοί, e.g. 4 = 4, but with two qualitatively identical ratios each of which yet involves different arithmetical conditions: e.g. the ratio 2 : 4 is qualitatively identical with the ratio 5 : 10; but each ratio is realised in quantitatively different terms. Now, if 2 and 4 be taken to represent the sides of one (say, right-angled) parallelogram, and 5 and 10 the sides of another, the two parallelograms (which thus represent diagrammatically the ἀναλογία 2 : 4 : : 5 : 10) are, in mathematical language, similar (ὁμοια), though of course not equal (ἴσα): see Euclid, vi. Def. 1. It is probable then that Mich. Eph. had ‘similar’ geometrical figures in view when he chose ὁμοίοτης instead of ἰσότης to express the qualitative sameness of the λόγοι in γεωμετρική ἀναλογία: and in this usage he is supported by the authority of Met. Δ. 15. 1021 a. 11 ταύτα μὲν γὰρ ἢν μία ἤ οὐσία, ὁμοία δ' ᾃν ἡ ποιότης μία, ἦσα δὲ ἢν τὸ ποσόν ἐν: cf. Mich. Eph. on v. 2. 12 ὅταν τοίνυν τῇ μὲν ποιότητι διαφέρωσι τῇ αὐτῇ, τῇ δὲ ποιότητι μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναλογία γεωμετρικὴ καλεῖται . . . ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία ἐστὶν ἡ ποσοῦ μὲν ἢν ἐν ταῖς διαφοραῖς, ποσοῦ δὲ μὴ ἢν ἄδοκο τῇ ἤ ὁμοίον μετέχουσα.

a. 32. § 9. ἢ μὲν οὖν διηρημένη . . . συνεχῆς] See Nicomachus Gerasenus ἀριθ. εἰσαγωγὴ ii. 21. §§ 5, 6, p. 121, ed. Hoche—συνημμένη ἀναλογία (= συνεχῆς of the present passage) ὅπως ἂ, β, δ (i.e. i, 2, 4) κατὰ ποιότητα . . . κατὰ ποιότητα δὲ α, β, γ (i.e. i, 2, 3). Διηγημένη (καὶ δηγημένη here) . . . οἷον κατὰ μὲν τὸ ποσὸν α, β, δ, η (i.e. i : 2 : : 4 : 8), κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν οὕτως α, β, γ, δ (i.e. i, 2, 3, 4). The statement τῷ ἐνί ὡς δυσὶ χρῆται καὶ διὸ λέγει, made by the writer of the Fifth Book here must, of course, be taken as made with exclusive reference to the συνεχῆς ἀναλογία at present before him—viz. ἡ συνεχῆς (οὐ συνημμένη) ἡ κατὰ ποιότητα.

b. 1. ὡς ἢ τοῦ α . . . τοῦ γ] Jackson has an important note here: 'Throughout §§ 9, 11, 12, where I have given ordinal numbers [he
reads ἡ τοῦ πρῶτον, &c., for ἡ τοῦ a, &c.,] most of the editors write 1131 b. 1. cardinals (α, β, γ, δ). In order to avoid the arithmetical absurdity (1 : 2 = 3 : 4) thus produced, I proposed in the *Journal of Philology* 1872. iv. 310, to write (with Fritzche) Α, Β, Γ, Δ: but on further consideration I am convinced that πρῶτον, δευτέρον κ.τ.λ. should be substituted. The otherwise strange phrases ὁ α δρος, τοῦ α δρον in §§ 11, 12 suggest this alteration, and it is confirmed by several MSS., Ηα and Κβ [and CCC] throughout §§ 9, 11, 12, and Ρβ and Νβ in §§ 9, 12, writing ordinals in full, whilst Ρβ pr. man. gives sometimes ordinals in full, sometimes α, β, γ, δ with superposed marks which may perhaps represent the terminations of ordinals, cf. Bast, *Comment. Palaeogr.* p. 850 [NC has ordinals in three places, and Β in two.] Michael Ephesius and Averroes seem to have had ordinals.’ I follow Jackson in preferring the ordinals. As to the phrases ἡ τοῦ α (i.e. πρῶτον, τὴν τοῦ β (i.e. δευτέρον)—Jackson asks, ‘can they mean “the line which we take for our first term,” “the line which we take for our second term”? Mich. Eph. comments as follows—τὸ δὲ τῆς λέξεως τῆς οίκου ὡς ἡ τοῦ πρῶτος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου τοιοῦτον ἐστιν, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πρῶτος ὧν σχέσις τοῦ ἐκτὸς πρὸς τὸν δευτέρου τὸν δ (ἢ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου τοῦ δ), αὐτῶς ἡ τοῦ δευτέρου τοῦ δ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τρίτου τοῦ β. But is this not a misuse of the word σχέσις? Cf. Eucl. *El.* v. Def. 3 quoted above. At any rate we may safely reject the alternative suggestion of Grant that στεγη’ is to be supplied, as well as his theory that the proportionals are algebraical quantities.’ I have little doubt that the reference here is to γραμμαί, and that the writer has in his mind the συνεχὴς ἀναλογία κατὰ ποιότης of the problem of τετραγωνισμός (Euclid, *El.* ii. 14, cf. vi. 13) in which the longer side of a rectangular parallelogram stands to a μέση γραμμή as the μέση γρ. stands to the shorter side: see de *An.* ii. 2. 413 a. 17 τί ἐστι τετραγωνισμός; τὸ ἱσον ἑτερομήκει ὅρθογώνιον εἶναι ἰσόπλευρον. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὦρος λόγος τοῦ συμπεράσματος: ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ τετραγωνισμός μέσης εὐρέσις, τοῦ πράγματος λέγει τὸ ἀτίων.

§ 10. διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ἕα] ‘for the same distinction b. 5. obtains between the persons and between the things.’ Here ὁμοίως marks the qualitative sameness of the λόγοι: see note on § 8, a. 31. Jackson quotes *Pol.* 5. 1280 a. 17 διήρηται τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς.

§§ 11, 12, 13.] To take the Paraphraet’s examples—α = Achilles

1131 b. 5. (100); $\beta =$ Ajax (50); $\gamma =$ reward of Achilles (10); $\delta =$ reward of Ajax (5):

(1) $a : \beta = \gamma : \delta$

(2) $\varepsilon\nu\nu\lambda\lambda\alpha\xi$—alternando (Euclid v. 16.)

$\alpha : \gamma = \beta : \delta$

(3) δοστε το $\delta\lambda\nu\nu$ προς το $\delta\lambda\nu\nu$ (sc. ἀπερ ἐκάτερου προς ἐκάτερου § 13)
—componendo (Eucl. v. Def. 16).

$a + \gamma : \beta + \delta = a : \beta$.

The just distribution consists in putting together $a$ and $\gamma$, $\beta$ and $\delta$: . . . ἕ τοι τοῦ $a$ ἄρων τῷ $\gamma$ σύζευξις τῷ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιῳ ἑστὶ (§ 12).

b. 7. § 11. το $\delta\lambda\nu\nu$ προς το $\delta\lambda\nu\nu]$ This phrase is elliptical: supply ἀπερ ἐκάτερου προς ἐκάτερου as in § 13.

b. 8. ἀπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδιάδει[ei] ‘this is the combination which the distribution effects.’ Bywater’s suggestion ἀπερ (i.e. the two terms united in the $\delta\lambda\nu\nu$: see his Contributions to the Text. Crit. of Nic. Eth. p. 44) is tempting.

b. 9. § 12. σύζευξις] This, Jackson points out, is Euclid’s σύνθεσις (v. Def. 16): cf. συντεθή here. In Nic. Ger. ii. 23. 5. p. 125, Hoche, σύνθεσις is multiplication, not addition.

b. 10. καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ, (τὸ $\delta'$ ἄδικον) τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον] so Bywater, following $\Gamma$, which gives the words τὸ $\delta'$ ἄδικον, and $K^b$, $L^b$, $\Gamma$, which read τὸ before παρά for the τοῦ of $M^b$ and other MSS.

b. 13. § 13. γεωμετρικὴ] ἡ ἀναλογία ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιῆν is called ‘geometrical’ on account of the large place which it occupies in geometry (see e.g. Eucl. Books v and vi), as compared with ἡ ἀναλογία ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιῆς, contrasted as ἀρμικτική. Ἀρμικτὸς is ποιῶν, whereas the ‘similar figures’ of geometrical proportion fall, as σχῆμα, under the category of ποιῆς (see Cat. 8. 10 a. 11). For γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία as ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιῆν see Nicom. Ger. ii. 24. pp. 126, 127, Hoche—ἔστι δὲ ἡ γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία ὅταν . . . ποιῶτες μη τῇ αὐτῇ διαφέρουσι οἱ ὀροι ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ λόγου ποιῶτες τῇ αὐτῇ, ἑκατὼν ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρμικτικῆς ἀφθῆ . . . οἷον $\beta$, $\delta$, $\eta$, δὴ γὰρ λόγον ἔχει ὁ ἡ πρὸς τῶν $\delta$, τοῦτον καὶ ὁ $\delta$ πρὸς τῶν $\beta$ καὶ ἀνάπαυσιν, οὐ μὴν ἦσθι ποιῶτες μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων ἔχουσιν.

The Aristotelian explanation of Distributive Justice as κατὰ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν is derived from Plato: see Gorgias 507 and
Laws 757 quoted by Fritzsche, and by Grant in his introductory note to this chapter. Cf. Plutarch, Sympos. viii. Quaest. 2, who asks why Plato represents God as a geometer. Among various explanations to the geometrician, the following (Sympos. viii. Q. 2. ch. 2, quoted by Fritzsche)—

§ 14. ἦσθi δ' οὗ συνεχῆς αὐτή ἡ ἀναλογία] Of course the geometrician, b. 15. ἀναλογία of distributive justice with its two persons and two things is not συνεχῆς: but there are cases in which geometrician ἀναλογία is συνεχῆς—see Nicom. Geras. quoted above in note on v. 3. 9, a. 32—

the μέση γραμμή of Eucl. vi. 13 is one term used twice.

γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ'/ Ἑλλην] Injustice in distribution b. 17. being the violation of proportion, 'it follows from this (ἄρα) that, in an unjust distribution, one term is made too large, and the other too small'—i.e. if the distribution is unjust the ὅλον a + γ will be made too large, and the ὅλον β + δ too small, or vice versa, in proportion to the relation subsisting between a and β (οὔτε ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον). The inference γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ'/ Ἑλλην becomes clearer if we supply in thought τὸ δ' ἀνάλογον μέσον (cf. line 11 above) immediately before γίνεται.

οὔτε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει]. 'And this is also what b. 18. actually takes place'—i.e. 'actually takes place' (ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει), as well as 'may be inferred from premisses' (λόγῳ
CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

The other kind of particular justice is that which 'corrects' inequalities arising out of transactions, voluntary and involuntary, between individuals. Justice in 'correction' is equality—not, however, that of ratios, as in geometrical διαλογία, but the equality which obtains in arithmetical διαλογία, where the mean is equally distant from each extreme. Thus the judge who 'corrects' an inequality arising out of a transaction neglects the possible inequality in 'merit' of the parties (which he could not do if 'distribution' had to be made), and takes account only of the difference produced by this particular transaction in the positions of parties whom he views simply as persons equally entitled to the undiminished possession of the κερδός διάβολο which happen to belong to them. The equality \( x = x \), which subsisted before the transaction made a difference in the positions of the parties, is the arithmetical mean between their positions \( x+1 \) and \( x-1 \) after the transaction. The judge tries to make their positions equal again by reducing them to the arithmetical mean \( x \), i.e. by taking from A's too-much \( x+1 \) that part of it \( i \), which was acquired at B's expense, and adding it to B's too-little \( x-1 \). If we call A the 'gainer' and B the 'loser' by the transaction, we may define 'corrective justice' as the mean between gain and loss. Accordingly when people think that they are 'losers' they appeal to the judge or 'middle-man' as to the embodiment of the just mean. We must remember, however, in defining corrective justice as the mean between gain and loss, that, on the one hand, it is only as something which has a value to be afterwards paid for in the criminal court, that a blow can be called the 'gain' of the assailant and the 'loss' of his victim; and, on the other hand, that 'gain' and 'loss' in the original sense of the terms, i.e. gain and loss incidental to trade, are not unjust, and therefore need no 'correction.'

131 b. 25. § 1. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τῷ διορθωτικῷ κ.τ.λ.] See note on v. 2. 13. When distribution has to be made it is 'just' to give to each recipient a share proportioned to his 'merit': this is τὸ διανεμητικόν δίκαιον, and its formula, as we have seen, is ἡ γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία. When a συμβαλλόμενα between A and B has resulted in
the transference of part of A's merited share of τὰ εἰκόνει ἀγαθὰ to B, it is 'just' to correct the anomaly by transferring back to A from B either the part in question, or its equivalent. This is τὸ διορθωτικὸν (or ἐπανορθωτικὸν, § 6) δίκαιον. Its mathematical formula is ἡ διμεσθητὴν ἀναλογία (or μεσότης); for A and B are no longer regarded as possibly unequally-meritorious recipients in a distribution to be made, but as persons equally entitled to enjoy the undiminished possession of the shares, large or small, which they have respectively received; accordingly when, as the result of a συνάλλαγμα, B's share is increased at the expense of A's, the reduced share of A and the increased share of B will appear as extremes between which the equality of A and B, as persons entitled to the undiminished possession of their shares, will fall as the 'arithmetical mean.' Let \( x = x \) represent the equality in the eye of the law of A and B, as persons entitled to the undiminished possession of their respective shares—an equality which is not affected by the differences in personal character, working power, rank, &c., which would have to be considered if A and B came up as recipients in a distribution: a συνάλλαγμα between them reduces A's \( x \) to \( x - i \) and increases B's \( x \) to \( x + i \). It is 'just' to 'correct' this inequality, and the correction is made by striking the 'arithmetical mean' \( x \) between \( x - i \) and \( x + i \), i.e. by restoring, in short, the parties to the positions which they each occupied before the συνάλλαγμα.

In his note on this § Jackson quotes the following passage from Grant ad loc.—'The term "corrective justice" is itself an unfortunate name, because it appears only to lay down principles for restitution, and therefore implies wrong. Thus it has a tendency to confine the view to "involuntary transactions," instead of stating what must be the principle of the just in all the dealings between man and man.' On this Jackson remarks—'Apparently Grant forgets that it is the original transaction which is said to be either voluntary or involuntary, and that it is the rectification of wrong arising out of the original transaction with which corrective justice is concerned.' The example which Jackson gives of the rectification of 'wrong arising out of' a voluntary transaction is 'A borrows money from B (who is here ἐκὸν) and does not fulfil his engagement to repay the loan at a certain time; corrective justice takes from A the proper amount and restores it to B.' Here I would submit that A's non-fulfilment of his engagement is not a 'wrong arising out of the original transaction' in the same sense in which e.g. the loss
1131 b. 25. of my purse is a wrong arising out of the 'original transaction' with the pickpocket. A's non-fulfilment of his engagement (his ability to repay being assumed) introduces a new relation, or συνάλλαγμα, between the parties, being a form of κλοπή, and belonging to the λαθραία division of ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα, not to the class of ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα. It is properly this new ἀκούσιον συνάλλαγμα out of which the wrong rectified in Jackson's example arises. At the same time I am ready to admit that Jackson's example of the διόρθωσις of 'wrong arising out of a voluntary transaction' is probably one which the writer of the Fifth Book would have accepted. As I remarked in my note on v. 2. 13, he probably thought rather of the enforcement against fraudulent or potentially fraudulent parties, of the original terms of ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα, and the settlement of disputes regarding the meaning of the original terms in the civil courts, than of the judicial rectification of unfortunate results, for which neither party is to blame, arising out of the συναλλάγματα—the terms of the συναλλάγματα not being in dispute—as e.g. when a Land Court 'rectifies' the result of a lease contracted in the open market. As it is, however, he gives no examples of τὸ διορθωτικὸν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐκούσιοις συναλλάγμασι. I limit myself to saying that he gives no examples, for I think that Grant goes too far when he asserts that 'all that is said [in this chapter] applies only to the "involuntary transactions."' I take it that the words in § 7—ὅτε ἐμφασβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστήρων καταφεύγοντες—may refer to 'voluntary' as well as to 'involuntary transactions.'

b. 26. § 2.] By ἤ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν διανομή we must understand much more than the distribution made by some obvious central authority, such as a general who distributes prize money, or a board of directors who apportion dividends: far the most important form of the διανομή ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν is the distribution of wealth which results from the operation of the 'economic laws' regulating wages and profits. The good workman contributes more (cf. the εἰσενέχθετα of this passage) than the indifferent workman to the development of that wealth of the nation which is, as it were, the material body to which the State, as ζωή, gives life and reality; and accordingly his reward is greater. Any attempt to interfere

1 It is worth noticing that the difficulty of bringing the recovery of debt within the scope of judicial διόρθωσις was felt; see E. N. ix. 1. 9.
with the wages or profits determined by free competition is an attempt to disturb a geometric ratio, and to violate the principle of justice. No such attempt can, in the nature of things, succeed permanently, its hope being, not to change a merely conventional principle of justice, but to defeat the law of the victory of the strongest.

It is interesting to compare in this connexion the remarkable passage, M. M. i. 33. 1193 b. 36-1194 a. 25, in which distributive justice is described as determining the returns of labour, and regulating the exchanges which in E. N. v are discussed in the chapter on antipesebios (ch. 5). The writer of the M. M. differs from the writer of E. N. v in confining the principle of antipesebios to criminal cases, M. M. i. 33. 1194 a. 29-1194 b. 2.


οδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.] When one man injures another man (the examples in this § and the next are exclusively), no account is taken of the possibly unequal ‘worth’ of the persons as recipients in a distribution, but only of ‘the difference produced by the hurt’ (τοῦ βλάσθουσ τῆν διαφοράν) in the positions of parties who are equally entitled to enjoy the possession of their own.

In his note on this §, Grant says: ‘Corrective justice is here said to regard each case impersonally as an affair of loss and gain, and between these it strikes the middle point. It is the moral worth of persons that is ignored (εἰ ἐπεικής φαίλον κ.τ.λ.), for we find afterwards, ch. 5. §§ 3-4, that a consideration of the position and circumstances of persons does come in to modify the estimate of the loss sustained from an indignity,’ &c. It must be remembered, however, that in the cases here alluded to by Grant (v. 5. 4 οἶον εἰ ἁρχὴν ἔχον ἐπάταξεν . . . καὶ εἰ ἁρχοντα ἐπάταξεν), ‘the loss sustained [sc. by the...
individual himself] from an indignity’ is not the most important thing to be estimated, but rather the public evil arising from acts which tend to diminish the authority and prestige of a magistrate. I do not think that it is fair to the writer to assume (as Grant seems to do) that he regards in v. 5. 4 merely the individual’s personal loss, and not also the public evil involved in the offence; but it must be admitted that he does not see at all clearly that the case ἐὶ ἄρχωντα ἐπάτηκεν is not sui generis. Even when one ordinary citizen injures another ordinary citizen, the true nature of the situation created is misrepresented by the term συνάλλαγμα applied to it. We are not concerned merely with a relation between two individuals in vacuo, but with a sore in the body politic, which must be healed by means which take account of the whole organism. Δὐρφωτις is much more than making the ᾑδικῶν give ‘compensation’ to the ᾑδικοῦμενος—indeed it is sometimes impossible to ‘compensate’ him at all. The words before us here (v. 4. 3)—οὐδὲν γὰρ διώφησεν κ.τ.λ.—are significant, as showing how abstract the writer’s notion of τοῦ διώφορων δίκαιον is. He is thinking here only of the ‘compensation’ given to the individual. The good moral character of the ᾑδικῶν does not indeed make the wrong which he inflicts one for which the ᾑδικοῦμενος should get less ‘compensation’ than for an equal wrong inflicted by a bad man; but the claims of the ᾑδικοῦμενος to compensation having been satisfied, it still remains to be considered by the ‘court of correction’ how far society has been endangered by the offence, and how much ought to be added to the penalty on that account; and here ‘previous good character’ is not irrelevant. The formula of the ἀμβίατης μεσότης seems to me to have stood in the way of the writer’s taking a complete view of the nature of ‘Corrective Justice.’

§ 4. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν κ.τ.λ.] ‘for even when one man is struck, and another strikes, or one man kills, and another is killed, it is a case of unequal division between patient and agent’—i. e. the situation created by a theft is only a more obvious, but not a more real, case of ‘unequal division’ than that created by an assault or a murder.

α. 9. ἀλλὰ πειράται τῇ ᾑμίᾳ ἵσαξεν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους] I am inclined (though with considerable hesitation) to agree with Münscher (Quaest. Crit. p. 70) and Jackson that ᾑμία is not (as Mich. Eph. and others suppose) the instrumental dative here = ‘by the penalty
which he (the judge) inflicts,' but the impaired position of the injured party, as opposed to the κέρδος, or augmented position of the injuring party. The fact that in the context ζήμια describes the position of the injured party seems to favour this view. Jackson’s rendering is—i.e. πειράται τῇ ζήμιᾷ ισόζειν τὸ κέρδος ἀφαιρῶν αὐτοῦ. “He endeavours to equalise the unjustly augmented advantages of the one (τὸ κέρδος) and the unjustly impaired advantages of the other (τὴν ζήμιαν) by taking from the former and giving to the latter.” The gen. ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους (not ἀφαιρῶν τὸ κέρδος) seems to show that κέρδος stands here for the whole position of the πλέον ἔχων, not for the unjustly obtained part of it.

§§ 5, 6. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἶπεῖν . . . καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζήμια a. 10. τὸ δὲ κέρδος] The terms ζήμια and κέρδος are applied strictly (οἰκείως) only where A has come out of an ἐκούσιον συνάλλαγμα poorer (in respect of ἀργύριον ἢ σὰρ αἰς ἀργύριον), while B has come out of it richer; still, metaphorically we speak of the ζήμια of the man who has been struck, and of the κέρδος of the man who has struck him: it is not, however, till the damage done comes to be estimated, that the terms are thus metaphorically applied: i.e. the infliction of a wound could not be described as κέρδος to the person inflicting it, except for the reason that it has a value in the criminal court and has there to be paid for: see Rassow (Forsch. p. 122)—Trendelenburg (Hist. Beiträge zur Ph. iii. p. 425) denkt bei μετρηθὴ an schätzbare Klagen, und interpretirt im übrigen wie Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire: mais quand le juge a pu mesurer le dommage éprouvé, le profit de l’un devient sa perte, et la perte de l’autre devient son profit. Aber diese Auffassung ist schon wegen γε un-möglich. Nach meiner Ansicht ist zu übersetzen: aber erst dann nennt man das eine ζήμια, das andere κέρδος, wenn das Erlittene gemessen ist.’ Another objection to the view of Trendelenburg and Saint-Hilaire is that although the judge’s rectification is certainly called (καλεῖται) ζήμια (i.e. = penalty) so far as the πατάζας is concerned, its result for the παθόν is never called κέρδος.

§ 6. ὡστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν . . . κέρδος] I do not think that a. 18. there is any significance in the substitution here of ἐπανορθωτικὸν for διορθωτικόν. A comparison of the words before us with § 14 below ὡστε κέρδος τινὸς καὶ ζήμιας μέσον τὸ δικαίον ἐστὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον is well fitted to exhibit the difficulty in which the writer is placed by his conception of τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐκούσιοις συναλ-
In the clause before us (§ 6) we naturally assume that, in accordance with the statement made at the beginning of this chapter, τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον is τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους, not only in άκούσια συναλλάγματα (from which the examples are exclusively taken), but also in έκούσια συναλλάγματα. In § 13, however, he tells us that ζημία and κέρδος originally and properly mean that loss and gain (having less and having more than one started with) which the law, so far from attempting to correct, permits in voluntary exchanges, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὑπενεσθαί καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν οἷσιν ἄλλοις ἄδειαις ἐδώκεν ὁ νόμος, and that, where an attempt is made by the law to correct ζημία and κέρδος, it is not ζημία and κέρδος in such voluntary transactions as buying and selling, but in involuntary transactions; his final summing-up being (§ 14) ὅστε κέρδους τυνὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιον ἐτέτοιαν παρὰ τὸ έκούσιον—'accordingly (corrective) justice is the mean between gain of a certain kind and loss of a certain kind, i.e., between gain and loss in involuntary transactions.' Here τῶν παρὰ τὸ έκούσιον, referring to and explaining κέρδους τυνὸς καὶ ζημίας τυνὸς, is an inexact abbreviation for τῶν ἐν τοῖς άκοντιοις συναλλάξασαι: so the Paraph.—ὅστε κέρδους τυνὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιον ἐτέτοια λέγω δὲ τῶν ἐν τοῖς άκοντιοίς συναλλάξασαι . . . τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς έκονοις συναλλάξασαι κέρδους οὕτως ἐστίν οὕτως εὐθύνεται τοῦτων γὰρ ἄδειαις ἐδώκεν ὁ νόμος. It is difficult to reconcile this summing-up with the position from which the writer starts, that corrective justice is the rectification of inequalities arising ἐν τοῖς συναλλάξασαι καὶ τοῖς έκονοις καὶ τοῖς άκοντιοίς: but see note on v. 4. 14, b. 18 where Jackson’s view is discussed.

§ 7. καὶ ξητοῦσι δικαστῇν μέσον'] Fritzsches quotes Thuc. iv. 83 ἑτούμοι ὄν βρασίδα μέσον δικαστὴν ἐπιτρέπειν.

μεσιδίους'] Zell quotes Pol. E. 5. 1306 a. 28 ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλους ἐγχειρεῖν τὴν φυλακὴν στρατιώταις καὶ ἀρχοῦσι μεσιδίῳ.

§ 8. δίχα διαίρεθα] 'to divide into two equal parts,' Jackson, who refers to Eucl. El. i. 10, i. 9, iii. 30: cf. also Nic. Ger. ἄρθ. εἰσαγ. i. 8. 4, p. 15, Hoche.

§ 9.] The sentence τὸ δ’ ἵσον . . . ἀναλογίαν Rassow (Forsch. p. 30) supposes to have changed places with διὰ τοῦτο . . . δικαστῆς—' Die richtige Gedankenfolge wird hergestellt, wenn der Satz διὰ τοῦτο—δικαστῆς vor den Satz τὸ δ’ ἵσον—ἀναλογίαν gestellt und an
die etymologische Bemerkung angeschlossen wird, zu der er ganz 1132 a. 29.
ersichtlich gehört. Erst dann gewinnt sowohl διὰ τοῦτο, als γάρ
seine richtige Beziehung.'

1. ed. Bonitz (on 1078 b. 21) δικαιωσίνη γάρ φασιν [οι Πυθαγόρειοι]
ἐστιν ἄριθμος ὧ διαμένων τὴν δεκάδα δίκα. Cf. also Theol. Arith. p. 12
(Ast's edition), quoted here by Jackson, Δίκη τε, οἰονεὶ δίκη καὶ ἴσις
κ.τ.λ. It is scarcely necessary to remind the student that the
original meaning of δίκη is custom or usage—cf. δίκη βρότων, 'the way
of mortals'; and that consequently δίκαιον = νόμμον is earlier than
δίκαιον = ἴσον.

§ 12. ἵσα αἱ ἐφ' ὄν α α . . . κ.τ.λ.] 'The lines (γραμμαί) over b. 6.
which we write a . . . a, β . . . β,' i.e. 'the lines a a, β β.' As Jack-
son remarks, 'the genitive and the dative appear to be used indiffer-
ently in such phrases'; hence, in b. 7, τὸ ἐφ' ὃ γ δ (O b and CCC—
though in CCC there are traces of erasure after ὅ) ought to be read
for Bekker's τὸ ἐφ' ὄν γ δ. 'It will be observed,' Jackson notes,
'that the whole lines are described as ἱ a a, κ.τ.λ., and the segments
of them as τὸ a ε, κ.τ.λ. Thus ἱ a a is what Euclid would call ἱ a a
γραμμή, τὸ a ε what he would call τὸ a ε τριήμα.'

ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν . . . b. 11. τοιούτον] All b. 9.
MSS. give these words, both here, and (without ὄν) in ch. 5. § 9.
1133 a. 14, where they are explicable in the context. Here they
are clearly out of place, and must have crept by some accident into
the archetype of all existing MSS. If we suppose that in the
MS. from which the archetype was copied, the text from 1132 b.
11 ἔληλυθε to 1133 a. 14 ἱσαεθῆναι exactly filled the reverse side of
one folio (A), and the obverse side of the next folio (B), we can
see that the copyist, reaching τὸ γ δ 1132 b. 9 at the bottom of the
obverse side of folio A, and accidentally turning over two leaves
(A and B), instead of one 1, would find the words ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.
1133 a. 14 at the top of the reverse side of folio B, and might
transcribe them after γ δ 1132 b. 9, before he found out his mistake.
If he marked them for omission, the next transcriber might easily
fail to notice his mark.

The words having thus established themselves in v. 4. 12, their

1 Rassow (Forsch. p. 38 note) gives an instance of this accident in the case
of N b.
occurrence again in v. 5. 9 would, of course, be a difficulty for later scribes; and I cannot help thinking that the omission of ἄν in the latter place was an awkward attempt on the part of a later, but very early scribe (for all the MSS\(^1\) and the Aldine edition omit ἄν 1133 a. 15) to minimise the difficulty by making the writer appear to refer back with the imperfect ἀνεμοῦντο to a statement already made. The result is, of course, an unjustifiable sentence. Aristotle alludes with the imperfect ἤν to a doctrine previously stated, but if he wishes to quote the exact words of a previous sentence he does so with ὡς ἔλεγομεν πρῶτον, or some such phrase. It is conceivable, however, that a copyist in difficulty might ignore this distinction. At any rate I feel sure that it was by no mere accident, but on a theory of some kind or other, that a succession of scribes down to the time of the Aldine edition steadily refused to admit the grammatically necessary ἄν in v. 5. 9, while they read it in v. 4. 12.

Whether the clause is genuine even in v. 5. 9 will be examined in the note on that §. The foregoing hypothesis to account for its presence in v. 4. 12 assumes only that it was present in v. 5. 9 before it appeared in v. 4. 12, but not that it is genuine, i.e. was always present, in v. 5. 9.

b. 11. §§ 13, 14.] See note on v. 4. 6, a. 18.

b. 15. § 13. ἐν δῶσιν ἄλλους ἄδειαν] Grant has a good note here—'In commerce of all kinds the law allows one to gain as much as one can. In involuntary transactions the law allows no gain to be made, but brings things always back to their level. This non-interference of the law with bargains becomes, if carried out, the principle of free-trade.'

b. 18. § 14. ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτε ἔλαιον ἄλλ' αὐτὰ (τὰ add. Rassow, Bywater) δὲ αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασίν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ἥμισυόθαι οὔτε κερδαίειν] Bekker's full stop before ὅταν b. 16 should be removed: see Rassow, Forsch. p. 94.

On the αὐτὰ δὲ αὐτῶν [or αὐτῶν] of the MSS., I quote Jackson's note, in which he gives the various interpretations which the editors have offered of the words, and adds an interpretation of his own—'αὐτὰ δὲ αὐτῶν γένηται.] The editors all read δὲ αὐτῶν, and most take these words in connection with αὐτά. "Nemo interpretum haec

\(^1\) Jackson states that all the ten MSS. (including K\(^b\)) examined by him omit ἄν here. I can add that CCC and B\(^{123}\) also omit it.
verba intellexit," says Michelet. "Felicianus vertit: sed sua cuique 1132 b.16. per se ipsa evaserint; Argyropylus: sed sua per se ipsa sunt facta; Lambinus: sed paria paribus respondent. Cum § 13 dixisset, nomina κέρδος et ζημία orat esse ex contractibus voluntariis, iam § 14 proponit, ea nomina translata esse ad obligationes ex delicto, ita ut in iis solis usurpentur. Verte: ubi vero neque plus neque minus habent, praeferquam quae per se ipsos facta sint, &c." Rassow (Forschungen, p. 94) proposes to insert τά before δ' αὐτών [Bywater adopts Rassow's τά], and to translate "das was man durch seine eigene Arbeit besass." Grant would construe "but result in being themselves by means of reciprocity, i.e. by mutual giving and taking, εναυσών being equivalent to ἄλληλων." Finally, as I learn from a note to Williams' translation, Professor Chandler reads δ' αὐτών, and translates "But when, by buying and selling (δ' αὐτών), men have got neither more nor less than they had at first, but exactly the same." Agreeing with Professor Chandler in his rendering of πλέον, ἔλαστον, and αὐτά (sc. τά ἐξ ἄρχης), I take δ' αὐτών γένηται to mean "comes into their possession." If we can say δ' αὐτών εἶναι "to be in their possession" Politi. vii. (vi.) 4. p. 182. 28, viii. (v.) 1. p. 194. 23. 6. p. 206. 2 (see Eucken, über den Sprachgebrauch des A. ii. 38), surely δ' αὐτών γίγνεσθαι must also be admissible. The sentence thus means, as it ought to do, "But when people get what is their own, they are said to have what is their own." Cf. Polit. viii. (v.) 7. p. 208. 26 μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἱσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τά αὐτών. It may be conceded that δ' αὐτών γένηται would in certain contexts be good Greek for 'comes into their possession,' although it is to be noted that the idea of 'management,' in addition to that of mere 'possession,' seems to be conveyed in the passages on which Jackson relies; the difficulty, however, of accepting Jackson's interpretation of the words in the present case is that of breaking up the phrase αὐτὰ δ' αὐτών [or αὐτῶν], which seems to be an organic whole. The passages quoted by Jackson, after Eucken, perhaps throw light on δ' αὐτών [or αὐτῶν] γένηται, but not on αὐτὰ δ' αὐτῶν [or αὐτῶν]—viz. Pol. 1306 a. 16 τής πολιτείας δ' ἄλλης οὖσας: 1301 b. 12 τήν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιρόωνται τήν αὐτήν δ' αὐτῶν δὲ εἶναι βούλονται: 1293 a. 28 το δ' αὐτών τάς ἀρχὰς ἔχειν. It seems to me that αὐτὰ δ' αὐτῶν cannot be broken up, and that αὐτῶν is necessarily neuter, referring to the same subject as αὐτά. The phrase does not, it would appear, occur elsewhere in the Aristotelian Corpus; but in Theophrastus, Met. i. 1 (Brandis, p. 309) we have, οὖτ' ἄγαν εὐσήμον

1132 b. 18. ἡ [sc. τῶν μαθηματικῶν] συναφῆ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς . . . οἷον γὰρ μεμηχανμένα δοκεῖ δι' ἡμῶν εἶναι σχῆματα τε καὶ μορφὰς καὶ λόγους περιτεθέντων, αὐτὰ δὲ δι' αὐτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει φύσις: i.e. geometrical truths are thought to be arbitrarily constructed by us, and to have in and of themselves no independent reality: cf. also Plutarch, Consol. ad Apollon. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ βιλλιστοὶ τῶν λατρῶν πρὸς τὰς ἀδρὰς τῶν μεματῶν ἔπεφραξαν εὐθὺς προσφέρουσι τὰς διὰ τῶν φαρμάκων βοηθείας, ἀλλ' ἐδοξεί τὸ βαρύνον τῆς φλεγμονῆς διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐξοθῆν ἐπιχρήσεως αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν πέψων.

I take αὐτὰ δὲ αὐτῶν [or αὐτῶν] then in the present passage as one expression in which δὲ αὐτῶν strengthens αὐτὰ, and explain: 'But when there has resulted neither more nor less [than what they started with], but simply the original amount itself'—i.e. the original amount not affected from without in any way, but remaining 'in and through itself' the same. Rassow's easy emendation gives good sense, but I prefer the αὐτὰ δὲ αὐτῶν of the codd. explained as above.

b. 18. ἀπὸ τῶν κέρδων . . . ἀμεροῦς] see note on v. 4. 6, a. 18. Jackson's view alluded to at the end of that note is as follows, p. 86 'τῶν παρὰ τῷ ἐκοῦσιν] This is not inconsistent with 2. § 13 and 4. § 1, because, whether the original transaction was ἀκούσιον or ἐκοῦσιον, the result must have been παρὰ τῷ ἐκοῦσιν in regard to the person injured, else there would be nothing to rectify': and he translates the clause—'Thus τὸ [διορθωτικόν] δίκαιον is a mean between a sort of profit and a sort of loss in matters which are not voluntary—the possession of exactly as much after the transaction as before it.' Jackson's point here then is that τῶν παρὰ τῷ ἐκοῦσιν is not, as the Paraph. assumes it to be, equivalent to τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συναλλάγμασι, but serves to mark that kind of ζημία (resulting, it may be, from an ἐκοφίσιον συναλλαγμα) which the losing party resents, and can have judicially rectified, as distinguished from that other kind of ζημία which he accepts as bad luck in business. I admit that this interpretation of τῶν παρὰ τῷ ἐκοῦσιν is ingenious, and would be plausible, if we could be sure that we were dealing here with the unbroken statement of a consistent doctrine of corrective justice. In the absence, however, of anything like certainty on this point, I think that it is safer to explain the two passages, §§ 5, 6, and §§ 13, 14 (whether written by the same author or not cannot be settled, and does not matter much) independently of each other. Sections 5 and 6 regard the κέρδος and ζημία, between which τὸ
CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

Some have thought that 'suffering or receiving in return,' meaning by this 'suffering or receiving the same in return,' is an adequate definition of justice. But this definition does not explain the nature either of distributive or of corrective justice. Corrective justice does not proceed on the principle of 'an eye for an eye'; it takes account of circumstances and motives, and also makes the offender suffer, not the same thing, but that which is equivalent; and it is a return equivalent to the product of his labour, but not the same in kind, which distributive justice assigns to each member of the community; in other words, the subsistence of the social community requires that each labourer shall receive from other labourers in exchange for his product, not the same product, but an equivalent amount of other products. Thus, if labourers A and B, and their respective products a and β, be arranged in a square

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
A & B \\
\hline
a & \beta
\end{array}
\]

we may say that exchange is 'cross-conjunction,' i.e. the conjunction of A and β and B and a. Since, however, the values of the unit products of different labourers differ, there could be no fair exchange unless it were possible to determine in each case what amount of one product is equivalent to what
amount of another product. This is possible by means of money, which is a 'medium of exchange' or 'common measure of things exchanged.' Of course 'need' or 'demand' is the real medium; and money is merely its conventional representative; but it is necessary to 'represent' or universalize need; since need in the concrete, i.e. the need of this particular product, varies too much to be a standard of value, whereas money enables a man to get anything he needs is something which he always needs equally—or nearly equally (for the value of money fluctuates slightly); i.e. money is something which he is always willing to take in exchange for his product.

From what has been said it is plain that 'doing justice' is striking the mean between the position of the party who injures and that of the party who is injured, and that the habit of justice is a mean state, not however in the same sense in which the other virtues are mean states, but because, in the apportionment of external good things, it produces a mean, i.e. always assigns an amount which is the mean between the too much and the too little which injustice assigns. The just man deliberately assigns to himself and to others that amount which is exactly proportioned to his and their 'merit' in each case, neither too much nor too little. The unjust man deliberately assigns too much of that which is good, and too little of that which is evil, to himself; and where he does not himself come in for a share, tends to give undue preference to one or other of the two parties between whom he makes distribution.

1132 b. 21. § 1. TO ἀντιποινόθος[1] The writer having explained the two εἴδη of Particular Justice, now proceeds in ch. 5 to discuss certain points, some connected with Distributive Justice, and some with Corrective Justice, which might have been discussed in chapters 3 and 4 under their own heads, but seem to come before the reader more naturally and suggestively when allowed to arise out of the criticism of a famous theory of justice with which he is already familiar.

Τὸ ἀντιποινόθος, literally 'that which has suffered or received in return,' is somewhat strangely used instead of τὸ ἀντιποινόθεν, ἀντιποινόθεν in mathematics is 'to be reciprocally proportional': ἀντιποινόθεσις is 'reciprocal proportion'; and τὰ ἀντιποινόθητα are 'magnitudes which are reciprocally proportional': see Euclid, El. vi. Def. 2.—'Two sides of one figure are said to be reciprocally proportional to two sides of another, when one of the sides of the first is to one of the sides of the second, as the remaining side of the second is to the remaining side of the first.' The enunciation of Euclid El. vi. 15 is τῶν ἵππων καὶ μιὰν μᾶ ἴππη τεῦχτον γονίαν πριγώνων ἀντιποινόθεσιν αἱ πλευραὶ αἱ περὶ τὰς ἴππας γονίας καὶ διὸ μιὰν μᾶ ἴππη τεῦχτον γονίαν πριγώνων ἀντιποινόθεσιν αἱ πλευραὶ αἱ περὶ τὰς ἴππας γονίας, ἵππα ἀπρόν ἐκείνα.

1 I wish to acknowledge indebtedness to Jackson's note, p. 93.
Let \((1)\) and \((2)\) be equal triangles having angles \(A\) and \(X\) equal.

Then \(AB : XY : : XZ : AC\).

Or let \(AB : XY : : XZ : AC\), and angle \(A = X\), then the triangles are equal.

Here the \(\alpha ντιτσεπόνδησις\), or 'reciprocal proportion,' consists in this, that if triangle \((1)\) is superior in respect of its side \(AB\) to \((2)\) in respect of its side \(XY\), on the other hand \((2)\) is equally superior in respect of its side \(XZ\) to \((1)\) in respect of its side \(AC\).

In mathematics the term \(\alpha ντιτσεπόνδησις\), \(\alpha ντιτσεπονέθαια\), or \(\alpha ντιτσεπόνδησις\), thus means unambiguously 'reciprocal proportion.' But when we apply this technical mathematical term to express the concrete case of the 'just reciprocation' which ought to subsist between two persons, it immediately becomes ambiguous. When we say that 'it is just that A should get or suffer in return what he has given to or inflicted upon B,' do we mean that he should get or suffer the same thing, or something different but 'equivalent'? And if something different, but 'equivalent,' what is to be the standard of equivalence? In the so-called \(\epsilon κόινα \sigma ναλλάγματα\) a natural instinct of the primitive man calls aloud for 'the same thing.' This instinct found formal expression in the law, 'an eye for an eye,' of ancient penal codes, and still asserts itself in those modern codes which retain the death-punishment for murder. It was only comparatively late reflection which suggested that the ends of criminal justice were, in most cases at least, best served by a retribution equivalent to the injury, but not the same in kind. In the case of the \(\epsilon κόινα \sigma ναλλάγματα\), however, men necessarily saw from the very first that \(\alpha ντιτσεπόνδησις\) could not be corn for corn, but must be corn for something else, and that the \(\alpha ντιτσεπόνδησις\) would be fair, only if the value of the corn given in return equalled the value of the thing received. Thus the notion of \textit{value}, \(\alpha γία\), proportion, forced itself upon them from the very first in the case of \(\epsilon κόινα\)
BOOK V: CHAP. 5: § 1.

1132 b. 21. συναλλάγματα, but was long absent from their reflection upon ἰκανία συναλλάγματα.

In the present passage the writer accuses the Pythagoreans, together with others, of confounding justice with ‘simple reciprocation’; ‘simple reciprocation’ being ‘retaliation,’ or that reciprocation which proceeds according to the principle of ‘an eye for an eye.’ ‘But there are some who think that simple reciprocation, or “suffering the same in return,” is all that is involved in the notion of justice. This was the opinion of the Pythagoreans, who defined justice simply (i.e. without any πρόθεσις or qualification) as “reciprocation,” or “suffering the same in return”—an opinion which in § 3 is identified with that of the line εἶ τε πάθων κ.τ.λ. Here then the charge brought against the Pythagoreans is that they confounded justice, as a whole, with the lex talionis which, as we have seen, recommends itself to a primitive instinct as the law of ἰκανία συναλλάγματα. The writer’s criticism (§§ 2–5), and consequent construction (§§ 6 &c.)—in which the famous conception of τὸ ἀντιπέπνονῦσ is not cast aside, but skilfully used—consist in turning the reader from these ἰκανία συναλλάγματα which are so misleading in this connexion, if attended to exclusively, and asking him to observe τὸ ἀντιπέπνονῦσ in ἰκανία συναλλάγματα as well, in order to obtain there a truer view of its nature, and return with this truer view to the explanation of it in the ἰκανία συναλλάγματα.

It seems to be very likely, however, that, in charging the Pythagoreans with the identification of ‘justice’ and ‘retaliation,’ the writer is mistaken. There can be no doubt, of course, that they spoke of justice as ἰκανεῖσι: but it is probable that, in doing so, they thought merely of the mathematical implication of the term, without pledging themselves to the doctrine of ‘an eye for an eye,’ or indeed to any doctrine which could be said to have much ethical significance. This would be entirely in keeping with their treatment of the other ‘virtues,’ which they explained fantastically, by mathematical formulae, without, apparently, paying much attention to their concrete content: see Alex, on Met. A. 5. 985 b. 26 (quoted by Jackson from Zeller i. 360) τῆς μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης ἢδον ἵππολαμβάνοντες εἶναι τὸ ἀντιπέπνονῦσ τε καὶ ἱμαν, ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τούτω εὐρίσκοντες δε, διὰ τούτο καὶ τῶν ἵππας ἤδον ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον ἔλεγον εἶναι δικαιοσύνην . . . τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν τῶν τέσσαρα ἔλεγον . . . οἱ δὲ τῶν ἑνών: see also Theol. Arith. p. 28 (Ast), quoted by Jackson, ‘where the Pythagorean definition of justice is said to be δύναμις
The other virtues were similarly formulated: see M. M. i. i. 1182 a. iI πρῶτος μέν οὖν ἐνεχείρησεν ὁ Πυθαγόρας περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπὼν, οὐκ ἄρθρος δὲ τάς γὰρ ἀρετάς εἰς τοὺς ἄρθρους ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκεῖαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἄρθρος ἴσως ἴσος. I think then that there is good reason for doubting whether the Pythagoreans with their mathematical expression τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεποθῶς, pledged themselves to the doctrine of simple retaliation with which the writer of the Fifth Book charges them. At any rate the pseudo-Archytas (apud Stob. Flor. ii. 138 ed. Meineke), who, I suppose, hoped to pass for a Pythagorean, gives a very different account of the expression from that ascribed to the Pythagoreans by the writer of the Fifth Book. Discoursing περὶ νόμων καὶ δικαιοσύνης, this 'Pythagorean' says ἵνα δὴ τῶν νόμων τὸν κάργον καὶ τῶν πολὺ ἡ παύσαν σύνθεσον εἶμεν τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας· καὶ ἔχειν τι βασιλῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας· ἀσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ δικαίουμών· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ βασιλείας τὰς μοναρχίας, τοῖς δὲ γέρων τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας, τοῖς δὲ ἐφοροῖς τὰς διακρίσεις, ἰσοπράτηται δὲ καὶ κόροι τὰς διακρίσεις· δει τοίνυν τῶν νόμων μὴ μόνον ἁγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἤμεν, ἄλλα καὶ ἀντιπεποθῶς τοις αὐτῶι μερέσσων [legem igitur oportet non solum bonam et honestam esse, sed etiam singulis suis reipublicae partibus oppositam—Mullach, Frag. Phil. i. 560]. οὗτος γὰρ ἱσχυρὸς καὶ βέβαιος· τὸ δ' ἀντιπεποθῶς λέγω αὐτῷ, καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρχαν [partibus singulis eam oppositam esse dico, ita ut idem magistratus alii imperet alii obediat], ἀσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ εὐνομοτάτῳ δικαίουμών· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ βασιλείασι τοῖς ἐφοροῖς ἀντικάθηται, τούτοις δ' οἱ γέρωντες, μέσοι δ' οἱ κόροι καὶ ἰσοπράτηται· ἐφ' δ' γὰρ ἄν μέγωτε τοῖς πλεονεκτοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶντων, οὕτω τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑποίσχεται.

ἀντιπεποθῶς ἄλλῳ] ἄλλῳ seems to be given only by Kb Pb and b. 23. CCC1; and Jackson omits it, 'because it is grammatically impossible to combine it with ἀντιπεποθῶς.' (The ἀντιπεποθῶς τοις αὐτῶι μερέσσων of the ps.-Archytas quoted above seems to show that it is not impossible.) He suspects 'that ἄλλῳ is a corruption of ἀλλως prefixed to one of the double readings which in the following sentence are preserved by Pb, and therefore may have occurred in the common progenitor of Pb and Kb.' The reading of Pb is ἀντιπεποθῶς ἄλλῳ, τὸ δ' ἀντιπεποθῶς οὐκ ἐφαρμότετε οὕτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νόμμον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολιτικόν, πολιτικόν δὲ λέγω τὸ κοινωνικόν, τὸ δ' ἀντιπεποθῶς,
§ 2. τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει] ‘receiving, or suffering, the same in return’ is a definition of justice which is inapplicable, whether we consider justice as distributive or corrective; and there is no third kind of justice. Mich. Eph. has an interesting note here—αὐτῶν δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τῶν Πυθαγορείων τὸ ἀπλός εἰσέν τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς δίκαιον, καὶ μὴ διωρίσα, μηδὲ προσβείναι τὸ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τὸ γὰρ ἀπλός ἀντιπάσχειν ἐκαστὸν ὁ πεποίηκεν οὐδὲμός δίκαιον. οὐ τὸ σημεῖον παρέβετο τὸ μὴ ἐφαρμόττειν αὐτὸ μὴν τῷ διαιρετικῷ δικαίῳ μὴν τῷ διορθωτικῷ εἰς ὅ τὸ δίκαιον διήρησεν ἀλλὰ πῶς οὐκ ἐφαρμόζει ἐκεῖνοι; ἢ ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι ἐκάτερον ἐν ἀναλογίᾳ ἑστὶ, τὸ μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρικῷ τὸ δ’ ἀρμοδιοτητῆς, τοῦτο δ’ ἐν ὑδάτερα τῶν ἀναλογιῶν ὑποτίθεται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ταὐτὸ τῷ διαιρετικῷ οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν ἅγιαν ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ ἵσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τό κατ’ ἀξίαν· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀντιπεπονθὸτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τοῦ γὰρ τό κατ’ ἀξίαν εἰ διδόσει εὐγένει καὶ σπουδαῖοι μιᾶς πληγήν πληξεῖ, καὶ αὐτὸν μιᾶν ἀντιπληγήσῃ, ἢ εἰ ἵσει λακτίσῃ ἀντιλακτισθῆναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖδέ τῷ διορθωτικῷ ταὐτὸ τῷ ἀντιπεπονθῶς τὸ μὲν γὰρ διορθωτικῷ οὗτοι αὐτὰ ἀξίων ἀντιπασχεῖν τοὺς ποιήσαντας οὐ γὰρ ὁδῶτα αὐτὶ ὁδώτως ἀξίων ἐξαρείν, ἀλλὰ τιμᾶσθαι πᾶσον καὶ οἶνον ἀξίας οὐ ὁδών ἢ ὁ ὀφθαλμός, ἢ εἰ ἢ τὸ μέλος, οἰῶν εἰ δέκα νομισμάτων, ταῦτα ἀπατεῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιήσαντος καὶ διδώσα τῷ πεπονθῶτι τῆν στέρησιν τοῦ ὁδώτου τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ. It will be noticed that Mich. Eph. in this passage thinks of a ‘Distribution of Punishments’ κατ’ ἀξίαν. He says that to punish, on the ἀντιπεπονθῶς principle, a slave who strikes a gentleman would be inconsistent with the διαιρετικῶν δίκαιων. The Paraphrast is, I think, more fortunate in his illustration. He says—Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθῶς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὐδὲν εἰδειν τοῦ δικαίων, ὅστε γὰρ τὸ διαιρετικῶν δίκαιων τοιοῦτοι ἑστίν, ὅστε τὸ διορθωτικὸν εἶπε μὲν γὰρ τῆς διαιρομῆς οὐ δυνατὸν ἀεὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἑκάστων πᾶσχεσθαι ὅποι τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀπερ ἐποίησαν ἐν γὰρ τῶν τύμων ἁπέκτενεν, πῶς τὸ αὐτὸ πεῖσαται; ‘Receiving the same in return’ is an erroneous account of distributive justice, because in it the dividend which a man receives ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ is not the same in kind as the contribution which he makes to the common capital: e.g. the musician is not paid in music, but in money according to his skill. It is also an erroneous account of corrective justice, because it makes punishment merely a matter of immediate personal revenge, ignoring the interests of society, which demand the establishment of an impartial court able
to take account of the position and circumstances of the parties as 1132 b. 28, members of the State, and to estimate carefully degrees of responsibility.

§ 3. καίτοι βουλοῦται γε τούτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ Ῥάδαμάνθιος δίκαιον] b. 25. i.e. the Pythagoreans appeal to the venerable authority of Rhadamantius.

τὰ τα'] the conjecture of Coraes and Jackson for the τὰ τα’ of the b. 27. MSS. is probably correct.

dική κ’ θεία'] Fritzsche quotes Hom. Hymn. in Cer. 152 ἰδεῖσι δίκης, and compares Latin rectus, Germ. Recht.

§ 4. πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ] i.e. in many cases just correction b. 28. and simple retaliation do not agree. The examples introduced by οἶνον seem to refer only to correction, unless we are to follow Mich. Eph. in thinking of a ‘distribution of punishments.’

οἶνον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων κ.τ.λ.] As was pointed out in note on v. 4. 3, the writer, in this remark, probably recognises the public aspect of punishment. Hitherto he has described punishment or ‘correction’ as affecting the ἀδικών and ἀδικοῦμενος only. We can in this instance see the advantage of the method in morals which builds upon foundations discovered by the examination of ἐνδοξά. Had the writer not found the so-called Pythagorean position imperfect, it would perhaps not have occurred to him to remove a vital imperfection in his own theory of ‘correction,’ even in the slight and insufficient way in which he does so in the present passage. The Paraph. Heliodorus has a discriminating note here—ὁ γὰρ τὸν ἄρχοντα τυπτήσας, τὴν τάξιν τῆς πολιτείας ἀνείλε, καὶ οὐ τυπτήσετοι, ἀλλ’ ἀποκτανθήσεται καὶ ὁ τῶν γάμων τοῦ πέλασ διαφθείρας, πείναται μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς κακῶς, οὗ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἄνολον. Cf. Probl. ΚΘ. 14. 952 b. 28 (referred to by Fritzsche) οἶνον καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τὶς ἄρχοντα κακῶς ἔσῃ, μεγάλα τὰ ἐπίστημα, ἐὰν δὲ τὶς ἰδιώτης, οὐδὲν καὶ καλῶς’ οἴεται γὰρ τότε οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν τὸν κατηγοροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ύπρίζειν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ λιμένι κλέπτοντα οὐ μόνον τὸν ἰδιώτην βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀσχύνειν.

1132 b. 30. εὑρήθη ἑκὼν δράσας εἰδύνεται μείζων ἠ τῇ ἄντιπεπονθέσθαι. So far as the impulse to retaliate in kind is an irrational one, it will not stop to enquire whether an injury is intended, or is merely due to accident; but perhaps the words before us imply something more than this, which the writer of the M. M. (i. 33. 1194 a. 37) has expressed—οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ἐὰν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐξέκοψεν τινὸς, ἀντικοπήσῃ μόνον, ἀλλὰ πλείον παθήσῃ, ἀκολουθήσωσι τῇ ἀνάλογῳ. So if justice is 'receiving the same in return,' the aggressor whose assault is voluntary, and perhaps entirely unprovoked, will suffer in return exactly what he has inflicted on his perhaps innocent victim: but he ought to suffer more.

b. 31. § 6. ἀλλ᾽ ... ἢ πόλις] The editors quote Pol. B. 2. 1261 a. 30

διότερ τὸ ἵσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθέσθαι σῶζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἥσυχοις εἴρηται πρότερον—where τὸ ἵσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός = τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός καὶ ἀναλογίαν of the present passage.

Τὴν πόλιν is probably to be supplied as the object of σωζεῖν.

Τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός καὶ ἀναλόγια is 'receiving the same in return'—a conception which does not explain either punishment, or the distribution of profits, wages, and rewards generally, according to the 'merit' of the recipient. Τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός καὶ ἀναλόγια is 'receiving that which is equivalent to what one has done.' Just punishment, notwithstanding the venerable authority of the natural man to the contrary, proceeds upon this latter principle: it is not a wound such as he has inflicted that the assailant receives in return, but a damage equivalent to the injury caused by the wound: the mere repetition of the wound itself is not equivalent to the injury caused, which includes not only the suffering of the individual assaulted, but something much greater—the violence done to public order. As for the 'distribution of wealth'—it obviously proceeds on the principle of 'receiving that which is equivalent to what one has done.' The carpenter e.g. contributes to the national well-being by his work, and receives in return for his contribution, not his own product back again, but its equivalent in the shape of the products of other workmen who are not carpenters. He apparently receives this equivalent from the individuals with whom he deals in the so-called ἀλλακτικοὶ κοινωνίαι into which he enters for the disposal of his product: but in truth these ἀλλαγαί are only the machinery, so to speak, of the vast διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν in which the members of
the State receive according to their εἰσενέχθεσα. It is only as members of the ‘social organism’ that individuals have anything to exchange. What they seem, as mere individuals, to do, they really do as expressing the State which sustains them. But ‘the State,’ like Nature, lebt in lauter Kindern—und die Mutter—wo ist sie? It is this intangibility of ‘the State’ which, it would seem, has led some editors (e.g. Jackson) to distinguish for the writer of the Fifth Book three kinds of particular justice—distributive, corrective, and commercial (i.e. τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς κοινωνίαις). This view errs in failing to recognise in ἡ ἐκουσία διάλογη the most important instance of ἡ διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν—that in which the ‘distribution of wealth’ is made according to ‘economic laws’ which express the ‘will of the State,’ or reveal its essence, more significantly than any legislative or executive measures dealing with ‘distribution’ can do. The law which sustains the State as an organism is ‘reaction equivalent to action’ (τὰ ἀντιποικίαν ἀνάλογον). A is benefited by B’s action in a certain way, and must benefit him in return equally, but not in the same way—that is to say, if the relation between them be a commercial one, or one of friendship καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν (E. N. viii. 7, §§ 1, 2), for in perfect friendship (and in the most genuine form of friendship διὰ τὸ ἥδυ) τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ’ ἀμφοῖν (E. N. viii. 6. 7). A benefits B by the product of his labour; B must benefit A equally by the product of his (different) labour. It may be that A’s unit product is the result of more labour or skill than B’s unit product; it is evident, then, that B must compensate for the inferior value of his units by their greater number, if there is to be any μετάδοσιν between him and A. Thus the qualitatively different products of A and B must be equalised (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἵσον § 8), the process of equalisation starting from an estimate of the labour and skill which A and B have put into their respective products—i.e. an estimate of the cost of production in each case, which gives what economists call the natural value of each product¹. About the natural value oscillates the market value, as the relation between supply and demand varies from time to time. When the market value of A’s unit product (e.g. house) has been compared

¹ Need, or Demand, is of course always assumed as the final cause of production. A thing which is ‘costly to produce,’ and is yet produced, is ‘needed’ much. Labour is what Aristotle would call τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δηαγματοί— the material cause of production, and must be paid for; but Need is the final cause.
with that of B's unit product (pair of shoes), as it can be easily and accurately compared in a society which employs νόμιμα, or 'a medium of exchange,' when, consequently, it has been determined πόσα ἐττα ὑποθήματα ἑσον ὀίκια (§ 10), then the μετάδοσις which follows will realise the law of τὸ ἀντιποιοῦν ἀνάλογον, or of 'equivalent effects produced by each upon each.'

The fundamental importance in the social organism of this law of τὸ ἀντιποιοῦν ἀνάλογον is indicated by Plato in his theory of the division of labour as characteristic of ἡ ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις: see Rep. 369 B γίνεται τοῖς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις . . . . 370 B ὅταν, ἢ δ' ὅσ, ἕις μιᾶν. Cf. Pol. B. 1. 1261 a. 22 ὰὐ μόνων δὲ ἐκ πλείονον ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕξ ἐδει διαφέροντων. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. ἑτερον γὰρ συμμαχία καὶ πόλις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ χρήσιμον, κἂν ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἴδει (βοιμεῖα γὰρ χάριν ἡ συμμαχία πέφυκεν), ὀςπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμός πλείων ἐκκύψει (διόιος εἰ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πόλει ἔθνοις . . . .) ἐξ ἑν δὲ δεὶ ἐν γενέσθαι, εἴδει διαφέρει. διόπερ τὸ ἑσον τὸ ἀντιποιηθῆν ἁλεί τᾶς πόλεις, ὀςπερ ἐν τοῖς ἕθεσις εἰρήνη πρότερον.

1133 a. 1. δουλεία] i. e. so far as a man is not in a position to assert himself against competitors in legitimate business, and to defend himself by invoking the assistance of the law against those who treat him unjustly, to that extent he is not really a 'member' of the πόλις, but outside it, as a δοῦλος is. To be really a κίτισσι, a man must be able to hold his own in the city—i. e. be in a position to perform his function in the body politic.

a. 3. § 7. διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδῶν πουούνται] Mich. Eph. explains ἐμποδῶν by ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, the Paraph. Heliod, by ἐν ἐκάστῃ τῶν πόλεων, and the Schol. Par. (according to Zell) by μεταξὺ τῶν πόλεων. Jackson, translating 'in some frequented place,' adds that 'the word does not seem very appropriate,' and suggests ἐν πόλεων. He refers to Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας (Gomperz Herkulansche Studien, ii. 81)—τῶν Δία νόμων φησιν ἐναί καὶ τὰς Χάριτας τὰς ἡμετέρας καταρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις τῶν εὐφρενῶν. Pausanias saw a representation of the Graces (attributed to Socrates) in the Propylaea of the Athenian Acropolis (ix. 35). The position of this group answered well to the description ἐμποδῶν given here. It may be noted also that certain Athenian coins bore representations of the Graces: see Miss Harrison's Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens, p. 376.
§ 8. The exchange of equivalent products

The exchange of equivalent products (the quantity and quality of the one product being reciprocally proportional to the quantity and quality of the other product) is effected by conjoining, or adding together, the diametrically opposite terms. Let οἰκοδόμος Α, σκυτοτόμος Β, οἰκία Γ, and ἰπόδημα Δ stand at the four corners of a square thus, so that his product is placed immediately beneath each workman. Exchange of products then is effected by conjoining, or adding together, Α and Δ, Β and Γ, the terms which stand at the diametrically opposite corners:—or more simply, λαμβάνει ο οἰκοδόμος παρά τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκείνῳ μεταδίδεται τὸ αὐτοῦ.

Jackson is certainly justified in taking exception to Grant's translation of ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις—'joining the diagonal of a square,' because the mathematical term for the junction of the diagonal is ἐπίζευξις, not σύζευξις. But Grant's explanatory note gives, I think, the writer's meaning (which indeed is obvious) more correctly than Jackson seems to admit. Grant, after drawing and lettering a diagram as I have done above, says 'The joining of the diagonal gives each producer some of the other's work, and thus an exchange is made; but the respective value of the commodities must be first adjusted, else there can be no fair exchange.' This note explanatory of the diagram which he has drawn, seems to me to clear Grant at least from the charge which Jackson brings against 'the editors' that 'they fail to show why "the junction of the diagonal" is mentioned.' Nor do I think that the Paraph. Heliodorus either lays himself open to Jackson's charge. His words are—Δεὶ τοίνυν ἐν ταῖς χάρεσι τηρεῖν τὴν ἴσοτητα πλὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἂν ποιεῖ ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις διάμετρος μὲν γὰρ ἔστω ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς γωνίας τοῦ παραλληλογράμμου ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναντίον γωνίαν ἐπίζευγμενή εὐθεία, ἦστω δὲ ὁσπερ τετράγωνον οἱ τέσσαρες ὅροι ο οἰκοδόμος, ο σκυτοτόμος, τὸ ἰπόδημα, ἡ οἰκία, ο οἰκοδόμος μὲν ἐφ' ὀδ το α, σκυτοτόμος δε ἐφ' οδ το γ, οἰκία ἐφ' ὀδ το β, ἰπόδημα ἐφ' οδ το δ' ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὡς ὁ σκυτοτόμος τὸ ἰπόδημα τίθεται, ὁσπερ τὸ δ' ὡς το το γ, καὶ ὡς τον οἰκοδόμον η οἰκία, ὁσπερ τὸ β ὡς το α, εὖ ταῖς πρὸς ἄλλους κοινωνίας συναφθήσεται μὲν ο οἰκοδόμος τοῖς ἱπόδημοις, ὁσπερ
Again, I cannot follow Jackson when he says ‘έφ’ ή Α κ.τ.λ. are lines, not, as in Grant’s figure, points: for if we take points as our proportionals, what is the use of introducing the notion of proportion at all?’ If lines had been intended, should we not have had έφ’ ή Α κ.τ.λ.? Moreover, Grant does not take ‘points’ (in the mathematical sense) for proportionals, but quantities (δροι) marked Α Β Γ Δ, and arranged for convenience round the corners of a square. The ‘joining the diagonal’ is indeed an unfortunate translation, because it suggests a geometrical construction as such—viz. the process of connecting the points Α and Δ, Β and Γ, considered merely as geometrical points, by the diagonals ΑΔ and ΒΓ—it is unfortunate, that is to say, because it suggests what is known by the technical name of ἐπίζευξις, whereas the writer (as Grant, in spite of his unfortunate translation, sees well enough) has before his mind not a geometrical square, as such, but only a square arrangement of terms or δροι, and means, not that geometrical point Α is joined to geometrical point Δ by the geometrical line ΑΔ, but that the term Δ, representing a certain quantity, is added to the term Α, which also represents a certain quantity: to express which meaning he uses the same word, σύζευξις, as he used before in v. 3. 12 ή ἀρα τοῦ α δρον τῷ γ καὶ ή τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν τῇ διαμορφω δικαίων ἐστιν. In the present passage he might have said—η τοῦ α δρον τῷ δ (sc. ἢσαμένος § 12) καὶ ή τοῦ β τῷ γ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν τῇ άλλαγῇ δικαίων ἐστιν. This latter σύζευξις, however, is, according to the square arrangement of the δροι adopted, distinguished as ή κατά διάμετρον σύζευξις. It must be understood

1 In his interesting note (p. 95) on ή κατά διάμετρον σύζευξις, Jackson refers to E. E. vii. 10. 1242 b. 6 ff.—‘where we are told that in an unequal friendship the ὕπερέχων conceives his claims to be represented by the formula ὡς αὐτός πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττων οὕτω τὸ παρά τὸν ἐλάττων γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ’ αὐτό, but that the ὑπερεχόμενος τοιούτων στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγωσιν. That is to say, if Α and Β are the persons, C and D their claims, Α, the superior in rank, thinking himself entitled to superior advantages, argues that Α + Ρ = Α , or Α = Ρ : on the other hand B, the inferior, holding that “noblesse oblige,” maintains that Ρ + Τ = Ρ , or Ρ = Τ . These opposing views are reconciled here in the same way as in the Nic. Eth.
that the remark ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν καὶ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατὰ διύ- 1133 a. 5. μετρον σύζευγες, assumes that Γ and Δ have been 'equalised': i.e.
that Δ = xδ = Γ, where δ stands for the shoemaker's unit product, one pair of shoes, and Γ for the builder's unit, one house. By multiplying his δ's by x, the shoemaker B makes himself as good a man, for the occasion of this particular αἰλοικικὴ κοινωνία, as the builder A; accordingly, A being = B, and xδ = Δ = Γ, we get the following ἀναλογίαι:—

(1) A : B :: Δ : Γ
(2) A : Δ :: B : Γ
(3) A + Δ : B + Γ :: A : B

i.e. two persons who are, for the occasion, exactly equal, get, in a distribution made according to γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία, exactly equal shares, A's share being paid in B's wares and B's share in A's wares.

Let A be a workman of exceptional skill whose day's work is worth B's week's work. A's economic ἥμαρτον will thus be six times as great as B's, if we consider A and B as contributing throughout a lifetime to the sum of the national well-being; and A's entire receipts will be six times as large as B's; but that part of his entire receipts which A gets in the form of B's product, and that part of his entire receipts which B gets in the form of A's product, must be earned by exactly equivalent labour on the part of A and of B respectively: what A receives (πᾶσχει) from B, and what he does (ποιεῖ), i.e. causes B to receive, must exactly balance each other, the superiority of A's quality being compensated for by the superiority of B's quantity; i.e. A's quantity and quality being reciprocally proportional to B's quantity and quality. A and B are thus, quid quoque exchanging equivalent products, i.e. for the occasion, ἵσων. Let the lines AA' and BB' represent by their lengths (AA' being the longer) the estimated total value of the labour performed in the working years of a man's life by these workmen A and B respectively: and let the equal parts A'x, taken from AA', and B'x, taken from BB', represent by their equal length the equal value of the products which A and B exchange. It is plain here i.e. the ἰσοπλῆκτον is held to be entitled to superior service, the ἱσοπλῆκτον to superior respect; and consequently κέρδος and τιμὴ must be bartered against one another, just as the house and the shoes are bartered in commerce.'
that although \( A'x \) is equal to \( B'x \), it bears a smaller proportion to \( AA' \) than \( B'x \) does to \( BB' \). This means that the exchange of equivalent products ‘takes more out of’ B than ‘out of’ A. A and B are indeed for the occasion ἰσος, else they could not be κοινωνοι (see § 12): but, regarded generally as shareholders receiving dividends in virtue of labour contributed to the common fund of the national well-being, they are not ἰσος: A is superior to B; and it may be a question for B, considering his economic inferiority to A, whether he can afford to equal himself for the occasion to A, i.e. whether he can afford to deal with A at all.

The double point of view from which (as I have tried to show) the κοινωνοι in an ἀλλαγῇ must be regarded—as (possibly) unequal workers in the economic field, and yet as equal for the purpose of the particular exchange—is excellently presented by the writer of the M.M. in a passage (i. 33. 1193 b. 38–1194 a. 25) which should be carefully compared with the passage now before us—

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\text{τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον ἐν τέταρτῳ . . . . . . ἦστιν δὲ ἡ ἀναλογία αὐτή ὡς γὰρ δὲ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ, οὕτως δὲ οἰκοδόμος τῇ γεωργῷ ἰσοῖος τῷ σκυτεὶ, τῷ υφάστῃ, τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀναλογία πρὸς ἄλληλους γίνεται καὶ συνέχει δὴ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀναλογία τῆς πολιτείας. ώστε τὸ δίκαιον ἐσχεῖν εἶναι τὸ ἀνάλογον. τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον συνέχει τὰς πολιτείας, τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀνάλογον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ πλείον ἢ ἔδωκαν τὸ αὐτὸν ἔργον ἢ τῷ σκυτεὶ, καὶ ἦν ἔργον ἀντικαταλάττεσθαι [καὶ] τῷ σκυτεὶ πρὸς τὸν οἰκοδόμον, ἀνθ’ ὑποδημάτων δ’ οὐκ ἦν οἰκίας λαβὼν, ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἔνομασαν, οὐ ταῦτα πάντα ὡς ἔτοι ἐστὶν, ἀργύριον προσαγορεύσαντες νόμασα, τούτῳ χρήσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστον ἐκάστου διόδοτας τὴν ἄλλαξιν ποιεῖσθαι παρ’ ἄλληλων, καὶ τούτῳ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν.
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a. 9. τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργου . . . τῷ αὐτοῦ] Bywater after MB. Bekker, following KB, LB, OB, reads του ἐκείνου ἔργου. Bekker’s τῳ αὐτοῦ adopted by Bywater does not seem to have any MS. authority, except, apparently, that of 1. All Bekker’s MSS. give τοῦ αὐτοῦ. See Bywater’s Contrib. to Text. Crit. of the Nic. Eth. p. 45.

a. 10. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἰσον] is the equality obtained by taking account of the relation which subsists between the unit products of A and B in respect of value (their value being determined by ‘the worth of the persons,’ or, in modern phraseology, by the cost of production and conditions of the market), and, if they are of unequal value, multiplying the less valuable product, so as to get
a resultant equivalent to the more valuable. This equality must exist (γένναι), before a just exchange can take place.

τὸ λεγόμενον] a fair exchange—ἡ ἀντίδοσις ἡ καὶ ἀναλογίαν.

§ 9. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο . . . καὶ τοιοῦτον] See note on 4, § 12, b. 9, a. 14, where it was said that the words, as they occur here, 'are explicable in the context.' More, I think, cannot be said for them. The passage would run better without them. The sentence, a. 16 ό γάρ ... ἵσασθηναι must be taken closely with the sentence οὐθὲν γὰρ κολύει ... ἵσασθηναι, a. 14 at the end of § 8, which it explains: 'there is nothing to prevent the product of one of the two contracting parties being better than that of the other (§ 8); for contracts are between those who, like physician and husbandman, differ, and are consequently often not equal' (§ 9). The sequence of thought traced in the above paraphrase suffers from the parenthesis of the words before us; and it may be that they are interpolated here, as well as in ch. 4, § 12. Here, however, they make a natural enough side remark or note, which could not be said for them in ch. 4, § 12: a scholastic note about the relation of τὸ τοιοῦτον and τὸ τοιοῦτον is not entirely out of place in a discussion of τὸ ἀντιπαράλληλον or τὸ ἀντιποίμενον. In view, then, of the fact that, to say the least, they are parenthetical here, it will be convenient to explain these words as they might be explained in accordance with Aristotelian doctrine, if they stood as an isolated aphorism without context.

Accepting the insertion of ὅ before ἐποίης (see Rassow, Forsch. p. 18), I would render the aphorism as follows—'The arts would perish, unless, as the active element put forth action in each case to such and such an extent and in such and such a mode, the passive element received the impression of this action (ἐπασχέ τοῦτο) conformably in each case to the extent and to the mode.' In other words—The existence of the arts depends upon the presence of two elements, an active and a passive, so related that, while the former exerts a force which in each case is definite in amount and mode, the latter receives an impression which corresponds exactly to the amount and mode of the force in each case exerted: e.g. there could be no art of sculpture, if marble yielded to the force of the chisel in a less or in a greater degree (ἐἰ μὴ ἐπασχέ τοῦτο τοιοῦτον)
than that measured by the ποιητικὴ αὐτία, or ἀρχή μεταβλητικῆ ἐν ἄλλῳ,—the will of the artist; or if it failed to assume a form representing his idea (ἐπάσχε τοῦτο τοιοῦτον).

This seems to me to be the natural interpretation of the words before us, considered, as I believe they ought to be considered, apart from their present context, as an Aristotelian aphorism, embodying the doctrine stated or illustrated in such passages as the following:—de An. iii. 5, 430 a. 10 ἐπεὶ δ’ ὤσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὑλῆ ἐκάστῳ γένει (τούτῳ δὲ τὸ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἐτέρῳ δὲ τὸ αἰτίου καὶ ποιητικῶν, τῷ ποιεῖ πάντα, οἷον ἦ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὑλὴν πέποθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχει ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ ἔστω ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει δυναμώματα ἐνεργεία χρώματα. καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ νοῦς ἀριστοτέος καὶ ἀμφίρρης, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὑπὸ ἐνεργεία, ἀνεὶ γὰρ τιμωστέρον τὸ ποιεῖν τοῦ πάσχον τοῦ καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὑλῆς (here the νοῦς παθητικὸς is said to be so called τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι under the plastic power of that other νοῦς—or aspect of νοῦς—which is what it is τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν: moreover we are warned against supposing the relation between the active and the passive Reason to be that of ἀντιποθετοῦντες, for we are expressly told that the active Reason is ἀπαθής): Met. θ. 5, 1048 a. 13 τὸ δυνατὸν κατὸ λόγον ἀπὰν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὄρεγηται, οὐ τ’ ἤχει τὸν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἤχει, τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἤχει δὲ παράνομον τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὡδὶ ἔχοντος ποιεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ποιεῖν οὐ δυνάσθαι (i.e. the δύναμις μετὰ λόγου of the τεχνής realises itself in a given ποίησις only if the material receptive of the influence of that particular ποίησις be present): Cat. 4. 2 a. 3 ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμεις, καὶ πάσχει δὲ οἷον τέμενεται, καίσται. With these Aristotelian passages may be compared a passage in Plato’s Gorgias 476 B–D (referred to by Ramsauer in his note on E. N. v. 4. 12), which recalls the phraseology of the Aristotelian passages, and more especially of E. N. v. 5. 9, so strongly that it seems certain that it served as a model. Ἐκ. Σκότει δὴ καὶ τόθε ἄρα εἰ τις τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τοῦτον τοῦ ποιουτόν; Ὀν. ἔρινη δοκεῖ. Ἐκ. ἄρα τοῦτο πάσχειν, οὗ τοῦ ποιεῖν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον, οἷον ποιεῖ τοῦ ποιεῖν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοῦτο ἐξ ἐς τὸ πάσχει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι; Ὀν. ἀνάγκη. Ἐκ. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει τῇ τοῦ ἐκ ὑπό τοῦ τύπτου, ὡς καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι; Ὀν. ναὶ. Ἐκ. τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἄν τὸ τυπτὸν ποιῆ; Ὀν. πάντω γε. Ἐκ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ καί τις, ἀνάγκη τῇ κάεσθαι; Ὀν. πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ἐκ. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε καί ἢ ἀλγειώς, οὗτο κάεσθαι τὸ κακείνου,
In these passages, which may be taken as fairly representing what Aristotle, following Plato, has to say about the relation between τὸ τεῦχον and τὸ πᾶσχον, we find nothing about the reaction of the latter upon the former: τὸ πᾶσχον is simply that which πάσχει: it is not represented as, in its turn, a ποιών which makes the original ποιών a πᾶσχον: and I cannot see how more can be fairly got out of the passage (v. 5. 9) before us, than out of these passages, or out of the Platonic passage which it resembles so closely in phraseology. But those who try to explain the passage before us in its context, find it necessary to believe that it implies the doctrine of the reaction of the πᾶσχον upon the ποιών. Thus Rassow (Forsch. p. 18) says—'Der Gedanke, den man nach dem Zusammenhange erwartet, ist dieser: die Künste würden nicht bestehen können, wenn sich nicht eine vollige Gleichheit der Leistungen und Gegenleistungen herstellen Hesse. Deutlicher würde dies ausgedrückt sein, wenn für ἔπασχε etwa ἀντεποίει oder ἀνταπεδίδοι gesetzt wäre; aber auch so, wie die Worte lauten, scheinen sie mir dem geforderten Gedanken zu entsprechen. Man muss nur bedenken, dass, wie es bei dem ἀντεποιεῖν nöthig ist, beide Theile geben und empfangen, dass also das ποιών auch ein πᾶσχον und das πάσχον auch ein ποιών ist.' Jackson, agreeing with Rassow that this is the meaning of the passage, is constrained however to admit that it is not one which 'the text naturally and properly bears.' He endeavours to extract the meaning by altering the punctuation: see his note pp. 97, 98. But, it may be asked, if ἔπασχε = ἀντεποίει, what does ἔπασχε τοιούτων mean? Κοινωνίς B may be said ἀντεποίει τοιούτων ὑπὸ ποιεῖ κοινωνίς Α, but not τοιούτων οἷον. The point is that the κοινωνίς exchange qualitatively different products.

While maintaining, then, that the present passage ought not to be forced to mean more than it expresses—viz. that, as τὸ ποιών (e.g. the seal) acts, so τὸ πᾶσχον (e.g. the wax), quid δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἴδους, is affected by its action; while deprecating, therefore, the attempt to reconcile the present passage with its context by making
1133 a. 14. ἐπαχύς = ἀντιποίες—against the evidence afforded by the representative passages quoted above, in which (in de An. iii. 5 expressly) τὸ ποιοῦν is presented as ἀπαθής: while maintaining, in short, that the passage before us has nothing to do with τὸ ἀντιποιοῦνθος or mutual action and passion, but only with the relation between the agent considered simply as agent, and the patient considered simply as patient, I do not forget that the distinction of agent and patient is merely a logical one (cf. Theaet. 157 A), and that, in the concrete worlds of nature and of art, the so-called patient, in receiving the impress of the so-called agent, becomes in turn the good of the agent—that which perfects the agent: thus, the artist gives form to the marble, and the formed marble in return is the glory of the artist: the root nourishes the leaf, and the leaf gives life to the root: each is for the sake of each; each is both maker and thing made.

In opening these remarks I said that 'a scholastic note about the relation between τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πᾶσχον is not entirely out of place in a discussion of τὸ ἀντιποιοῦνθος.' It is not entirely out of place, inasmuch as the simple relation of ποιοῦν to πᾶσχον is implied in the double relation of τὸ ἀντιποιοῦνθεναι: but it is so unnecessary that it seems probable that we have to do with an interpolation here as well as in v. 4. 12. Ramsauer, indeed (p. 319), regards the words with as much suspicion here as in v. 4. 12. On one ground only do I think that the genuineness of the words as they occur in v. 5. 9 may be plausibly maintained. It may be argued that the writer wishes to show that τὸ ἀντιποιοῦνθεναι must be between ἐπερώτ, and that to do so he refers parenthetically to the simple relation between ποιοῦν and πᾶσχον which according to de Gen. et Corr. i. 7. 323 b. 31 are τῷ γένει μὲν ὄρμοι καὶ ταῦτα, τῷ δὲ εἴδει ἀνόρμοι καὶ ἐναντίον: as if he said—the parties to an ἀλλαγή, each of whom is a ποιοῦν acting upon the other as a πᾶσχον, must indeed belong to the same social system of fellow-workers (τῷ γένει ὄρμοι), but must be of different trades (τῷ εἴδει ἀνόρμοι), otherwise they could not act and react. This is practically the line of interpretation followed by Mich. Eph.

This defence of the genuineness of the words before us is, as I have said, plausible; but I cannot attach much weight to it

1 Mich. Eph. does not comment on the words before us when he comes to v. 5. 9. His note on v. 4. 12 however deals with them in connexion both with τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον (the subject of their context in v. 4. 12), and with ἀλλακτικὰ καὶ κοινωνίαι (the subject of their context in v. 5. 9).
§§ 10–15.] Only things, or amounts of things, which are equal in value, are normally exchangeable. There must therefore be some means of comparing things, in order to ascertain, in each case, whether they are equal or unequal in value; and when they are found to be unequal, there must be some means of equalising them. In the first place, the unit product of A must be compared with the unit product of B in respect of ‘cost of production’—i.e. the labour (including ability, risk, time, &c.) involved in the production of each from beginning to end must be estimated, and the result of the estimate, in each case, must be numerically expressed. Let the cost of producing A’s unit product $a$ and B’s unit product $b$ be the same. If B needs $a$ as much as A needs $b$, $a$ and $b$ are of equal value (for the purpose of the particular exchange), and may accordingly be exchanged. But if A needs $b$, while B does not need $a$ at all, or so much, what can A do? He must (were special need the ‘medium of exchange’) either fail to obtain $b$, or obtain it at a ruinous cost; and, in conceivable circumstances, he might find himself compelled to obtain it even at such a cost. But the institution of money removes the difficulty by substituting general need for special need as ‘the medium of exchange’ or ‘bond.’ Although B may not need $a$ at all, or so much as A needs $b$, he always needs something equivalent to $a$ as much as A needs $b$. A can always obtain $b$ from him in exchange for that amount of money which is earned by labour equal to the labour required to produce $b$: for B, although he does not need $a$, is always willing to take A’s money made by selling $a$ to those who need it, because this money enables him to obtain $c$, which he needs, from its producer, who, again, may not need $b$, but is always willing to take B’s money, in order to obtain for himself $x$, which he needs. Thus all men may be said always to ‘need’ equal sums of money equally; but particular products, though representing the same labour, i.e. having the same ‘natural value,’ are often ‘needed unequally’: hence, if A needs $b$ very much, and B needs $a$ very little, and A can procure $b$ only by getting B to take a certain amount of $a$, it is evident that the result of exchange will be that A has too little in proportion to his labour, and B too much. Under a system of mere barter every transaction thus tends to result in inequality. But by means of a
system of \( \sigma \mu \beta \omega \lambda \alpha \) which entitle the bearer to anything he happens to need, the fluctuating standard, dependent on the varying relation between A's need of the particular product \( b \) and B's need of the particular product \( a \), is superseded by the fixed standard constituted by the circumstance that A's need of \( b \) is always equalled by B's need of something which he cannot obtain without the money obtained by selling \( b \) to A. Money is a system of \( \sigma \mu \beta \omega \lambda \alpha \), or tickets, enabling the bearer to get what he happens to need. These \( \sigma \mu \beta \omega \lambda \alpha \) being, in their higher denominations, of precious metal, their number cannot, in a short time, be largely increased, and therefore bears a tolerably constant relation to the sum-total of exchangeable products of industry existing at a given time. Thus the various unit products come, according to the labour expended upon them and the demand for them, to be associated with definite parts of the sum-total of money existing in the community at a given time. In this way the value of each unit product is expressed in money, and it becomes easy to compare as to value products which seemed incomparable:—πάντα συμβλητά δεί πως είναι ὅν ἐστίν ἄλλαγη (§ 10) . . . δεί ἄρα ἐνι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι . . . τούτο δ' ἐστι τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἡ χρεία ἡ πάντα συνέχει (§ 11) . . . τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενόσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἑνδέχεται ικανὸς (§ 14) . . . οἷον δ' ἅπαλαμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην (§ 11) . . . πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὡστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχήν καὶ τὴν ἄλληξιν (§ 10). Money, as a calculus, makes it easy to compare products; but without this calculus it would still have been possible to compare them roughly, by taking account of the labour expended upon them. It would, however, be impossible to exchange them fairly—indeed it would often be impossible to exchange them at all—without money as a system of \( \sigma \mu \beta \omega \lambda \alpha \). It is important to distinguish between these two functions of money—(1) as supplying a calculus (μετρεῖται πάντα νομίσματι § 15), and (2) as guaranteeing the satisfaction of any need (οἷον ἐγγυηθής ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς μελλούσης ἄλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὥστε ἐστὶ αὐτὶ δειβῇ § 14). In respect of both functions money is, as remarked above in note on v. 2. 13, a. 1, an ever-present diorthotic judge preventing the unfair distribution of the rewards of labour, which, on a system of barter, would be inevitable—i.e. without the aid of the calculus supplied by money, men would only be able to compare products so roughly that the exchange of them would, in most cases, result in one party getting too much and the other too little; and without a system of
σύμμετα, a producer would often be unable to dispose of his product, or be obliged to dispose of it to someone who did not need it much, and therefore made only an inadequate return for it. That the writer of the Fifth Book himself thought of νόμοςμα as a ‘dior-thotic’ agency seems, as was remarked in note on v. 2.13, to be a fair inference from the similarity of the terms in which he describes its functions, with those in which he describes the function of the δικαστής: see E. N. v. 4. 1132 a. 18 sqq., and v. 5. 10. 1133 a. 19 sqq.

Rassow (Forsch. pp. 18, 19) believes that in §§ 10-16 the same thought is repeated in three parallel passages, no one of which has greater claims to be considered genuine than the other two have. These passages, which he prints in parallel columns, are—

1. §§ 10. 1133 a. 19 διὸ . . . 25 ἔστω.
3. §§ 14-16. 1133 b. 14 διὸ δὲ . . . 28 κλίνω.

It is certainly true that §§ 10-16 are full of repetitions. But what is the character of these repetitions? They seem to me to be various expressions of the thought—‘there must be a fixed standard of comparison,’ and so far I agree with Rassow; but I differ from him in thinking that each repetition, by its slightly altered form, suggests a fresh point of view important in the doctrine of currency. Thus in the first of Rassow’s parallel passages the train of thought is—‘products must be σύμμετα: so there must be a μέτρον, i.e. one standard: this is νόμοςμα, which measures.’ In the second passage the train of thought is—‘But what do we mean by saying that νόμοςμα becomes the standard of measurement? The true standard is χρεῖα: νόμοςμα is its conventional representative: and the advantages of having this conventional representative of χρεῖα are great: χρεῖα itself is subject to great fluctuations, whereas its representative is not; and, when sometimes the absence of χρεῖα would put a stop to business, the presence of the representative guarantees its continuance—ὅσον ἐγγυητής ἐνθ’ ἡμῖν.’ Rassow’s third passage is distinguished by the introduction of the term σύμμετρα—‘since νόμοςμα is a μέτρον, the things which it measures must be σύμμετρα. But how can things so different as corn and shoes have a common measure? Are they not heterogeneous? Quōd useful, and ἐν χρεῖα, they are homogeneous: and νόμοςμα enables us to compare and measure them in respect of their common quality of usefulness.’ I do not pretend that the repetitions (especially in
the third passage) do not give reason for the suspicion that §§ 10–16 have come down to us in a somewhat altered form; but I maintain that new points arise in every passage in the midst of the repetitions. I cannot therefore follow Jackson when he says (p. 98) that 'the chapter would gain in perspicuity if §§ 11–16 were rejected.' Probably the Fifth Book itself would gain in perspicuity if half of it were rejected. But it is not a question of 'perspicuity.' If §§ 11–16 were rejected the discussion of currency would lack several highly important topics which are not touched in § 10, but are at least dealt with—whether perspicuously or not is another question—in §§ 11–16.

a. 20. § 10. γίνεται πως μέσον πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὡστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν] Mich. Eph. points the analogy between νόμισμα and the δικαστής thus: καὶ ὅρως ὅπως τὰ νομίσματα ἀνάλογον ἐστὶ τῷ δικαστῇ; ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπανορθωτικοῦ δικαίου τῇ τοῦ δικαστοῦ μεσότητι ἐγνώσκομεν πάσον δεὶ ἀφελείς ἀπὸ τοῦ πλεονέκτου καὶ προσβείναι τῷ ἀνικήτωτι μέσον γὰρ πάσων ὁ δικαστὴς τοῦ ἡδικητός καὶ ἡδικημένου, ἔστει ἀμφότερον τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλλείψιν δήλην, οὕτως καταλαβής τῇ παραβέβηκε τοῖς νομισμάτοις, εὑρομεν τὴν τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑπεροχήν καὶ ἡδικμένου, καὶ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐγίνεται πως μέσον τὸ νόμισμα, κανὼν γὰρ καὶ κριτήριον γίνεται τῆς ἀρετῆς τοῦ οἰκοδόματος καὶ τῶν ὑποδήματων, ὡς καὶ ὁ δικαστής τῆς πλεονεξίας καὶ μειονεξίας.

a. 22. δεὶ τοῖνυν . . . τροφὴν] i.e. (given normal conditions of the market) as the labour required for the production of the house (this is what the writer means by οἰκοδόμος) is to the labour required for the production of the pair of shoes, so must the number of pairs of shoes be to unity—i.e. to the one house. In other words—the sum obtained from the sale of this number of pairs of shoes will be equal to the value of the house: or, when the shoemaker comes forward with this sum, he is equal to the builder and can deal with him, the analogy being as given by the writer of Μ.Μ. (i. 33. 1194 a. 13) ὥσ ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ.

a. 27. § 11. εἰ γὰρ . . . ἢ αὐτῇ] Without need there would be no exchange at all; with unequal need (εἰ μὴ ὁμοίως δεόμενο), exchange would not be the same as it is—i.e. unequal instead of equal products would be exchanged. I doubt much whether ἢ οἷς ἢ αὐτῇ, as the alternative of ἢ οἷς ἢ ἰσταί, can have directly the meaning
which Ramsauer gives it—‘Si aut nulla χρεία fuerit, aut alterius 1133 a. 27. multo minor, cessaret commercium aut ad paritatem non perveniret (οὔ χα αὐτῆ ἄλλαγή).’

υπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας] That which represents need as medium a. 20. of exchange: what Plato (Resp. 371 B) calls ξύμβολον τῆς ἄλλαγῆς ἔνεκα—a ticket received in view of future χρεία, where there is no present χρεία.

κατὰ συνθήκην] ‘by agreement among men’—cf. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως § 15.

ὅτι ὁδ φύσει ἄλλα νόμῳ ἐστι... ἀξρηστον] cf. Pol. i. 3. 1257 b. a. 30.

8 καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νομίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τούτ’ εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λίθος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμασμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ’ οὐδὲν, ὅτι μεταβεμμένων τῶν χρωμένων οὐδὲν ἔξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμων πρὸς οἷδεν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ, καὶ νομίσματος πλοῦτον πολλάκις ἀπορρέει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς καίτοι ἄτοσκ πλοῦτων εἶναι πλοῦτος οὐ εἰσπορὸν λιμῷ ἀπολείπεται, καθὼς καὶ τῶν Μίδων ἑκέινων μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εἰκός πάντων αὐτῷ γενομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. It is only this or that particular monetary system which is νόμῳ and can be changed and disused; the institution of money itself is φύσει, just as speech is φύσει; i. e. like speech, it is essential to the realisation of that πολιτικῆ κοινωνία in which man attains his true φύσις. With a system of barter, as with a system of dumb signs, man could never have become a πολιτῆς, but would have remained an isolated savage. And it is easy to exaggerate the change which νόμος or agreement can produce even in a given monetary system. Speaking generally, we may say that agreement cannot supersede the precious metals. If they are to be superseded, it will be, not by agreement, but by the operation of a natural law. As things are, however, and have always hitherto been, it is as ‘natural,’ i. e. as necessary, that standard coins should be made of a precious metal, as that knives should be made of a hard metal. The statement ἐφ’ ἥμιν ποιήσας ἀξρηστῶν applies only to tokens made of a base metal, and to paper. Gold and silver have ‘an intrinsic value’ which cannot be taken from them—the value which belongs to them as practically the only materials of which standard coins can be made. They have, of course, a further intrinsic value as materials of which articles other than coins are made; but it is not going too far to
say that if coins ceased to be made of them, they would cease to be ‘precious’ metals. Since then a currency is necessary to that πολιτική κοινωνία in which man realises his φύσις, and since a currency must be based on the employment of the ‘precious metals,’ we may say that money made of these metals is ‘natural.’

As the labour required for the production of the more valuable unit stands to the labour required for the production of the less valuable, so must the number of the less valuable units stand to unity. This will be a case of ἀντίστοιχος, or reciprocal proportion, for the number of the less valuable units will compensate for their qualitative inferiority. The Paraph. Heliodorus has—κείσθω δὴ τῶν γεωργῶν πρὸς τῶν σκυτέα διπλάσιων λόγων ἔχειν, ἦσσαμ δὴ καὶ ὁ σῖτος διπλάσιος τῇ ἀξίᾳ τῶν ὑποδήματος εἰ τοῖςν ἦσσαμ ἦσσαμ γεωργοὺς πρὸς τῶν σκυτέα, τὰ ὑποδήματα πρὸς τὴν τροφῆν ἦ τῶν σίτων, διπλάσιον ἦσσαμ τὰ ὑποδήματα τῶν σίτων, καὶ σῖτος ἦσσαμ ἦσσαμ ἀξία τοῦ σίτου. As we have seen, the writer of the Μ. Μ. expresses the proportion thus—ὡς ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ σῖτος ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ (ι. 33. 1194 a. 13).

I believe that this puzzling sentence merely puts into other words what has already been said in § 8—viz. that it must be settled before the exchange how many of B’s qualitatively inferior units are equivalent to A’s unit, the ἀντίστοιχος κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, or ἰσόρροπος ἀλλαγή as the Paraph. Heliodorus calls it, depending on this equivalence. Let A = οἰκοδόμος, B = σκυτότομος, Γ = οἰκία, Δ = ὑπόδημα. Since A : B : : Γ : Δ, the simple σύζευξις of distributive justice will be expressed by Α + Γ : Β + Δ : : Α : Β, where Α and Β have the results of their industry (ἐξουσι τὰ αὐτῶν), and do not exchange (οἰκ ἀλλάττονται). An exchange is effected by σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον, but the σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον must not be made till Δ (the qualitatively inferior unit) has been multiplied to give a resultant equivalent to Γ: i.e. the σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον must not be made unless Α and Γ, Β and Δ, are reciprocally proportional magnitudes, thus—Α : Β : : Δ (ἰσασμένον) : Γ. This Α : Β : : Δ (ἰσασμ.): Γ is the σχῆμα τῆς ἁναλογίας to which the terms ‘must not be brought after the exchange (ὅταν ἀλλάξωται)’ i.e. to which they must be brought before the exchange, when Α has still his Γ, and Β his Δ’s. It is only then that it is possible (by the higgling of the market’) to make Δ equal to Γ, and so to make Α and Β ἴσοι. Α and Β having thus been made ἴσοι, are κοινωνιαὶ, οἱ
can exchange fairly. In other words, having first brought the terms to the $A : B :: \Delta (\text{isosmênon}) : \Gamma$, we may proceed, through $A : \Delta (\text{iso} : \text{i}.) : B : \Gamma$, to the $\sigma\xi\nu\varepsilon\varsigma \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha \delta\acute{\iota} \mu\acute{e}r\rho\alpha\nu \Delta (\text{isosmênon}) : B + \Gamma :: A : B$. But if exchange take place without a previous equalisation of $\Delta$ to $\Gamma$, and $A$ get simple $\Delta$ (one pair of shoes) and $B$ get $\Gamma$ (a house), $A$ and $B$ are placed in the position of extremes, or $\acute{a}k\rho\alpha$, in relation to the $\mu\acute{e}v\sigma\nu$ or $\iota\sigma\nu$ which the exchange has ignored; and of these $\acute{a}k\rho\alpha$ $B$ ‘will have both superiorities’—will have the advantage over $A$ in the transaction by the two parts mentioned in ch. 4, § 10; for, $A$ with his house and $B$ with his (say) 1000 pairs of shoes being $\iota\sigma\nu$, the house has been taken from $A$ and given to $B$, who still practically retains all his shoes—999. In fact, whenever an article is sold too cheap, the buyer $\xi\chi\epsilonì \acute{a}m\phi\varphi\dot{o}r\epsilon\varsigma \tau\alpha\varsigma \upnu\rho\rho\chi\varsigma\varsigma$—(1) that part of the article for which he has not paid, and (2) the money which he ought to have paid for that part. In this interpretation I have followed, in the main, the lines laid down by Jackson, who starts from the view of H. Richards (Journal of Philology, 1872, iv. 150) that $\acute{a}m\phi\varphi\dot{o}r\epsilon\varsigma \tau\alpha\varsigma \upnu\rho\rho\chi\varsigma\varsigma$ is to be explained by reference to the $\delta\upsilon\omega\iota\tau\nu\tau\omega\upsilon \acute{a}m\phi\varphi\dot{o}r\epsilon\varsigma \tau\alpha\varsigma \upnu\rho\rho\chi\varsigma\varsigma$ of v. 4. 10. 1132 a. 33.

The words before us, as thus explained, seem to state, in unnecessarily obscure language, the obvious truth that wares must be equalized before they are exchanged: and I should have less confidence than I have that they do not mean something more profound, were it not for the circumstance that in $E. N.$ ix. i. §§ 8, 9 a remark to nearly the same effect is made in plain language. The question there propounded is—When there is no previous $\delta\omega\mu\alpha\lambda\gamma\alpha\eta\alpha\gamma$, who is to fix the value of the return expected by the giver—the giver or the receiver? The receiver; but he must make the value of the return equal to what he valued the gift at before he got it—$\delta\epsilon i 8' \iota\sigma\nu \omega \tau\omicron\sigma\omicron\omicron\omicron \tau\nu\iota\alpha\nu\iota \delta\omicron\sigma\nu \xi\chi\omicron\tau\tau\tau \varphi\acute{a}v\iota\tau\alpha\mu\alpha \acute{a}x\iota\omega, \delta\alpha\lambda \delta\omicron\sigma\nu \pi\iota\nu \xi\chi\epsilon\epsilon i\nu \epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\mu$. He must put himself back in the position in which he would have been if he had had to ‘higgle in the market’ about the price of the article.

The explanations offered by Mich. Eph. and Michelet on the one hand, and by Grant and Peters on the other, both ignore the reference to ch. 4. § 10 in $\acute{a}m\phi\varphi\dot{o}r\epsilon\varsigma \tau\alpha\varsigma \upnu\rho\rho\chi\varsigma\varsigma$, and therefore, as it seems to me, miss the writer’s simple (though hidden) point. Mich. Eph. says that if no previous equalization has taken place, but the $\acute{a}i\kappa\omicron\delta\dot{a}m\acute{o}m\acute{o}m$ gets a pair of shoes, and the $\omicron\kappa\tau\tau\tau\iota\upsilon\sigma$ a house, each

h h
of the terms (as if he read ἐκάτερον), viz. ὀικοδόμος and ἰδίτευς, will exhibit both ἑπερβολή and ἐλλειψις (ἀμφοτέρος τὰς ὑπεροχὰς)—the ὀικοδόμος exhibiting ἑπερβολή ὑμῖν superior producer and ἐλλειψις ὑμῖν receiving only one pair of shoes; the ἰδίτευς exhibiting ἐλλειψις ὑμῖν inferior producer and ἑπερβολή ὑμῖν receiving a house. His words are: ἢ ἑπερβολὴ λέγεται καὶ εἶπ τῇ ἑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψεως· καὶ έδος έστι λέγει εἰς ὑπερβολῆν ἐδόθη αὐτῷ πολλά· καὶ ἐμπαλιν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ἐδόθη αὑτῷ ὀλίγα. καὶ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν δὲ πλοῦσιος ἠστή καὶ αὖ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν δὲν πένθης, ὥστε λέγωτε τῷ λιῶν ἔχει δὲ χρήματα πολλά, καὶ λίαν δὲν ὀλίγα. καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς λέξεως τοιοῦτον· ὃ δὲ λέγει τοιοῦτον ἄν εἰσὶ τάς ἀναλογίας τοῖς τεχνιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀν ἐργάζομαι δεῖ ποιεῖν πρὸ τοῦ ἀλλαξάσθαι κατὰ τὸν ὕψηγμενόν τρόπον. γνωμένης γὰρ τῆς ἀναλογίας πρὸ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τῆς ἀνταλλαγῆς, ἔσται ἡ ἀντίδοσις καὶ ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ὑπὲρ καὶ δικαιά. καὶ εἰς τὸ σχήμα τῆς ἀναλογίας ἀναχθήσεται ὡς εἴναι ὃς ὁ ὀικοδόμος πρὸς τὸν σκυτότομον, οὕτως ὁ ὀικοδόμος μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων. Ὕπὶ γὰρ ὑπέρεχε ὁ γεωργός τοῦ σκυτῶν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ γεωργὸς μετὰ τοῦ αἴτου, τοῦ σκυτῶς μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων, πρὸ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ὁδηγοῦν. καὶ δεῖ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀνασταλή τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ἰσασθῆναι. ἰσασθήσεται δὲ ὡστός. ἐπεί γὰρ διπλῇ ἐστὶν ἡ οἰκία τῶν ὑποδημάτων, ἄν διπλασιώσῃ τὰ ὑποδήματα, β' ὡστα καὶ γίνεται β', ἔσται δ' ὑποδήματα ἵστα τῇ οἰκίᾳ· καὶ οὕτως τῇ ἰσότητις γεγονοῦσα εἶ ὑπηρέτησε σὲ μὲν ὀικοδόμος τὰ δ' ὑποδήματα, καὶ ὁ σκυτεὺς τῆς οἰκίας, ἔσται ὁ ὀικοδόμος μετὰ τῶν β' ὑποδημάτων ἵστα τὸ σκυτεῖ μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας, ἐπεί γὰρ διὰ τὴν τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑπερεύξετο ἐλέγετο ὁ ὀικοδόμος ὑπέρεχει τοῦ σκυτεῖ, ἰσασθήνου τῶν ὑποδημάτων τῇ οἰκίᾳ, ἔσται ὁ ὀικοδόμος ἵστα τῷ σκυτεί τοῖς δὲ ὡστα ἵστα ἐάν προστέθη, τὰ δία ἵστα ἔσται· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ ὀικοδόμος μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἵστα τὸ σκυτεῖ μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας. δεὰς οὖν ὕστο τῇ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ποιείσθαι τῆς ἀναλογίας, καὶ ἰσάζει δ' ἀυτῆς τὰ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἔργα· εἶ δὲ μὴ ἀμφοτέρας ἑξεῖ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς· τοιαύτης· εἰ δὲ ἄπλος καὶ χαρις ἀναλογίας ἀλλάζωσι, ἐκάτερα τῶν ἄκρων, ἦτο ὁ ὀικοδόμος καὶ ὁ σκυτεὺς, ἀμφοτέρας ἑξεῖ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς· ἄν γὰρ λαβῇ ὁ ὀικοδόμος τὰ β' ὑποδήματα, ἔσται μὲν ὑπερέχειν ὡς ὀικοδόμος, ὑπερεχόμενος δὲ καὶ ἐλλειπῶν ὡς τὰ β' ὑποδήματα ἐχοῦν· καὶ ὁ σκυτεὺς ὁμοίως· ὡς μὲν σκυτεὺς ἐλλειπῶν καὶ ὑπερεχόμενος, ὡς δὲ ἐχοῦν τὴν οἰκίαν ὑπερέχον. ὅστε τούς οὕτως ἄπλος ὁδηγοῦται ἀλλασσομένους, μάταιων ἐστὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν πειράσασθαι εἰς σχῆμα ὧς ἔγενε ἀναλογίας, καὶ οὗ μόνον μάταιον ἄλλα καὶ ἀδύνατον· οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς τῆς δῆχα ἀναλογίας γεγονοῦσα εἶναι ὡς ὁ ὀικοδόμος πρὸς τὸν σκυτεύα, οὕτως ὁ ὀικοδόμος μετὰ τῶν β' ὑποδημάτων πρὸς τὸν σκυτεύα μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας, διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀλλασσομένων ἀνυότητα. ὅτι δὲ δύναται ἰσασθῆναι τὰ ὑποδήματα τῇ οἰκίᾳ, εἰρήνης. διὰ γὰρ τῶν νομομά-
BOOK V: CHAP. 5; § 12.

των, ἦ διλου τιμῶς. Michelet follows Mich. Eph. Grant's view is 1133 b. 1. different. He says—'After an exchange has been made, or, in short, after the price of an article has once been expressed in money, it is no longer the time to talk of "the quality of labour." or for either side to claim an advantage on this account. If he did he would have "both superiorities" reckoned to him, i.e. his own superiority over the other producer, and the superiority of his product over that of the other. . . . ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται can mean nothing else than "when they have exchanged", ὅταν with the aorist implying a completed act. It seems unnecessary to say that the value of a thing is not to be settled after it is sold. Rather it is after the goods have come to market, and had a market price put upon them, that considerations of their production must cease. The expression, therefore, is not clear, but the above interpretation seems the most natural that can be given of the passage. . . . "Both the superiorities" must be those named or implied in §§ 8-10, the superiority of the one product over the other, and the superiority of the one producer over the other.' Peters follows Grant in explaining ἀμφότερα ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροξᾶς τὸ ἔτερον ἄκρον to mean that 'one of the two parties would get both the advantages—i.e. have his superiority counted twice over. His (e.g. the husbandman’s) superiority over the other party (the shoemaker) has been already taken into account in fixing the price of a quarter of corn as equal to three pairs of shoes: this is one advantage which is fairly his; but it would be plainly unfair if, at the time of exchange, the husbandman were to demand 50s. worth of shoes for 25s. worth of corn, on the ground that he was twice as good a man: cf. Munro, Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, vol. ii.’

οὐ δεῖ . . . εἶ δὲ μὴ] for this construction cf. de Gen. et Corr. i. 4. 319 b. 23.

εἶ δὲ μὴ . . . ἄκρον] Grant, Jackson, Susemihl, and Bywater treat these words as parenthetical, remove Bekker's full stop after ἄκρον, and place a full stop after αὐτῶν b. 3 instead of Bekker's comma. I do not think that it makes much difference whether we accept this or Bekker's punctuation. In any case, ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται and ὅταν ἔχουσι are contrasted, and αὐτὴ ἦν ἱσότης is that of Δ made equal to (ἰσασμένων) Γ. While Δ and Β still retain their respective Ρ and Δ, they are in a position to determine how many
1133 b. 1. Δ’s shall be held equal to Γ, i.e. they can make themselves (ad hoc) ἵσοι, for as the Schol. puts it—ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑπεροχὴν ἔλεγετο ὁ οἰκοδόμος ὑπέρεχε τοῦ σκυτέως, ἵσασθέντων τῶν ὑποδήματος τῆς οἰκίας ἐσται ὁ οἰκοδόμος ἵσος τῷ σκυτεί. Having made themselves ἵσοι in this way, they can become κοινωνοῖ in a mutually satisfactory ἄλλαγη.

b. 8. § 13. ὥσπερ ... ἐξαγωγὴν] Bekker follows Κb in reading ἐξαγωγῆς.

With ἐξαγωγῆς the construction is—ὁσπερ (sc. ἀλλάττουται) ὅταν οὐ ἔχει αὐτὸς δεσμὴ τις οἷον οἷον, διδόντες (sc. οἷον) σῖτου ἐξαγωγῆς—'giving wine in return for the privilege of exporting corn.' Jackson, reading ἐξαγωγὴν, objects to ἐξαγωγῆς on two grounds, (1) because the separation of the words οἷον οἷον from διδόντες, which ἐξαγωγῆς involves, complicates the sentence unnecessarily, and (2) because 'the weight as well as the bulk of the MS. authority is against ἐξαγωγῆς. Ἐξαγωγὴν is certainly the easier reading: but a difficult reading given by Κb alone comes with great weight. An original ἐξαγωγῆς would inevitably be changed into ἐξαγωγῆν, as soon as a scribe, aware that ἐξαγωγῆς does not mean 'a cargo,' but 'the privilege of exporting,' and that therefore ἐξαγωγῆς could not be the partitive genitive, took οἷον οἷον with διδόντες instead of with οὐ ἔχει αὐτὸς δεσμὴ τις. On the whole, I am not willing to reject ἐξαγωγῆς without scruple, though, of course, the circumstance that διδόντες ἐξαγωγῆς is a regular phrase is in favour of reading ἐξαγωγῆν as the object of διδόντες. Ἐξαγωγὴν is 'the privilege of exporting': see Isocrates, Τράζεζ. 370 b. ἄξιον δὲ καὶ Σατύρων (Σατύρων I, king of Bosporus b.c. 407–393) καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἑυθυμήσθηναι, οὗ πάντα τῶν χρόνων περὶ πλείστου τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑμᾶς παύονται, καὶ πολλάκις ἡδί διὰ σπάνων σῖτου τὰς ἄλλους ἐμπόρους ναίς κενᾶς ἐκπέμποντες, υἱῶν ἐξαγωγὴν ἰδοὺν. It is doubtless this Black Sea trade which the writer of the Fifth Book has in his mind here.

The plural διδόντες, which 'belongs grammatically to both the parties concerned, whereas in sense it refers only to one of them' (Jackson), need not surprise us.2

b. 10. δεῖ ἄρα τότῳ ἑναπεθήναι] τότῳ is the inequality of the σῖτος and οἷος which must be equalised.

1 Pr. Κb seems to stand alone with ἐξαγωγῆς: CCC has ἐξαγωγὴν—one of the few cases in which it varies from Κb in the Fifth Book.
2 This note on 1133 b. 8 was written before the publication of Bywater's Contributions (see p. 46), and is printed without alteration. Bywater supposes that ἐξαγωγῆς represents a blunder—ἐξ ἄγωγῆς, and (to account for διδόντες) suspects a lacuna between the two halves of the passage.
§ 14. έγγυητής] The χρεία which νόμισμα represents is the 1133 b. 12. abiding need of something, as distinguished from the fluctuating need of this particular thing: see the Paraph. Heliodorus—έπει δὲ τολλακίς ὁ μὲν χειρός δείται τοῦ ἔργου τοῦ τέκτωνος, ὁ δὲ τέκτων οὐ δείται τοῦ χειρός, ἵνα τά ἀλλάξαται καὶ αἱ καυνώναι μηδὲ τοιε ἔληκονται, παρελήφθη τὸ νόμισμα καὶ τούτο διδόμεν ὁ χειρός τῷ τέκτωνι, λαμβάνει παρ' ἐκείνου τῷ ἐκείνου ἔργῳ· ὁ δὲ τὸ νόμισμα καθάπερ ἐγγυητής έστι πρὸς τὸν τέκτωνα, ὅτι ἐπείδαι τῶν τοῦ χειρός τοῦ τέκτωνος ένεστε, καὶ αὐτὸν λήφθαι παρὰ τοῦ χειρός ἐστὶν χρεία κατέστη. καὶ οὕτω κάντασθα διὰ τὴν μέλλουσαν τοῦ τέκτονος χρείαν ἡ ἀλλαγὴ καὶ ἡ καυνώνα γίνεται. Καὶ τὸ νόμισμα δυνάμει ἐστὶν πάντα σχεδὸν ὅν δεῖται ἕκαστος.

dei γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν] Rassow (Forsch. p. 94) suggests dei γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι ἐσται λαβεῖν.

πάσχει ... μένειν μᾶλλον] Money is affected in the same way b. 13. as other commodities are¹, but not to the same extent—i.e. it fluctuates in value as the demand for it, or need of it, is greater or less. Its natural tendency, however, is to fluctuate less in value than other commodities. Mich. Eph. has the following note—πότε δύναται πλεῖον τὸ νόμισμα ἲ πότε ἐλάττων ἢ οὔδεν; ἢ ἐν μὲν ταῖς εὐθυνείαις πολὺ δύναται, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄγαν συνοδείαις καὶ ἀφορίσεις πάνω τῶν καρπῶν οὐδὲν; οὔδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ἐχόντων σίτου μὴ ἀρκοῦσα ἐστὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐαυτοῦ ἀνταλλάσσειν τότε προθυμεῖται. In a passage very similar to the above the Paraph. Heliodorus expressly gives as the reason why νόμισμα is more stable in value than other commodities, the fact that it is δυνάμει πάντα σχεδὸν ὅν δεῖται ἕκαστος. It represents the ever-present need of something as distinguished from the passing need of this thing. Accordingly, so long as the relation between the quantity of exchangeable commodities and the quantity of νόμισμα in the community remains pretty constant, the value of a given piece of money does not fluctuate seriously. Mich. Eph. and the Paraph., it will be observed, allude only to variations in the quantity of exchangeable commodities, apparently assuming that variations in the quantity of νόμισμα may be neglected. These latter variations, however, are far more serious than might at first be supposed. Under the conditions of modern trade, sudden rises and falls in what is really the quantity of νόμισμα

¹ Bywater (Contributions p. 46) suspects τὸ αὐτὸ as an alternative reading for τὸ τότο, and suggests that πάσχει may be taken absolutely = 'is subject to modification or change.'
in the community take place to such an extent that, had they come within the observation of the sceptical Greek, they must have made the plausible λίπος τὸ νόμαμα seem more plausible than ever. Under the conditions of modern trade the tolerably constant quantity of visible tangible money (which the ancients regarded exclusively) is increased by a singularly fluctuating quantity of invisible intangible money—i.e. by Credit, which now swells to enormous proportions, and raises all prices, i.e. diminishes the value of a given standard coin, now contracts, and lowers all prices, leaving the holders of standard coins in possession of the field—i.e. with coins of augmented value. ‘In consequence of changes in credit alone,’ says Giffen (Essays in Finance, p. 294), ‘the service-ability of the same quantity of money varies indefinitely in comparatively short periods; the scale of prices is in constant oscillation; no conceivable changes in the quantity of money itself could at all have the effects which are constantly being produced by changes in credit alone.’ ‘When credit is good all prices rise, that is, the standard depreciates in value’ (p. 200).

b. 18. μὴ οὖσης συμμετρίας] Cf. Plato, Laws 918 B πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνεργέτης πᾶς ὁ ὁ σαρμὰτον ὄντων νομίσματα ἀνθρώπων οὕτως καὶ ἀνώμαλον ὑμᾶς τε καὶ σύμμετρον ἀπεργάζεται; τούτῳ ἦμιν χρῆ φάναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος ἀπεργάζεσθαι δύναμιν, καὶ τὸν ἐμπορόν ἐπὶ τοῦτο τετάχθαι δεὶ λέγειν καὶ μισθωτός καὶ παρθένος καὶ άλλα, τὰ μὲν εὐσχημονέστερα, τὰ δὲ ἀσχημονέστερα γεγόνα, τούτῳ γε πάντα δύναται, πάσιν ἐπικουρίαν ταῖς χρείαις ἐξευπορεῖν καὶ ὁμαλότητα ταῖς οὐσίαις.

τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ . . . ἰκανώς] Things so different as wine and corn are not commensurable in the strict sense of the term, for they are not homogeneous in the strict sense: practically, however (ἐνδέχεται ἰκανός), they are commensurable, because practically homogeneous—i.e. homogeneous as being both useful. Money is the measure of their common usefulness: see Mich. Eph. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ αὖτον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα, σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, εἰ κυρίος σύμμετρα τὰ ὄμοιον δύνανται γενέσθαι, οὖν ἀρίθμῳ ἀρίθμοις, καὶ μεγέθῳ μεγέθεις τὰ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλοις τοσοῦτον διεστῶτα, αὖτόν σύμμετρα γενέσθαι· τὰ γὰρ σύμμετρα κωνῖος μορφῆς καταμετροῦνται, ἀρίθμῳ ἀρίθμῳ, τὰ μεγέθῃ μεγέθεις τὸ δὲ νόμαμα οὖν ἐστὶ μόριον τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀλλαγῇ· οὕτε γὰρ τῶν υποδημάτων ἐστὶ μόριον, οὕτε τοῦ ὀίνου· ἦν γὰρ ἦν οἶνος ἢ υπόδημα. οὕτε ἄλλου οὖδενος· γίνεται δὲ μέτρου τῆς κατὰ τὴν χρείαν αὐτῶν συμμετρίας—i.e. money measures them both quā needed or useful: being needed
or useful is their common quality. Cf. also Acciaiolius ad loc.—§ 14-17. 471

Res quae sunt diversorum generum et rationum non videntur mensurari posse ex parte naturae (only ex instituto hominum), quia mensura debet esse de genere eorum quae mensurantur; ut quantitas continua mensuratur quantitate continua, non discreta. Nam si res per mensuram debent mensurari, habere debent illam mensuram quae fit pars illarum rerum. Quare nummus ipse medius cadit inter res mensurandas propter indigentiam: quia imponitur pretium alteri rei, et sic etiam alteri, et in nummo et pretio conveniunt, et hoc pacto ex instituto est nummus quodammodo mensura.'

§ 15. [εξ ὑποθέσεως] i.e. κατὰ συνθήκην, § 11.

ἡ ἵσον] 'that is, equal to.'

§ 16. For the history of exchange see Pol. i. 3. 1257, a. 6-41. b. 26.

The passage ends with—ἐνικοτέρας γὰρ γενουμένης τῆς βοοθείας...εξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρήσις: οὐ γὰρ εἰδώλισκεν ἐκαστὸν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς των τοιούτων τι συνέβηστο πρὸς σφαῖς αὐτοῖς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὁ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ δυν εἰχε τὴν χρείαν εἰμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ξύρ, οἰον σίδηρον καὶ ἄργυρον καὶ εἰ τι τοιούτων ἐτέροιν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ὅρισθεν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλόντων, ὥστ' ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως αὐτοῦ· ὁ γὰρ χαρακτῆρ χρηστῆ τοῦ ποσοῦ σημείων.


§ 17. ἡ δικαιοπράγματα] 'doing justice,' Peters. The man who b. 30. 'does justice,' as judge, strikes the mean between the position of the party who injures and the position of the party who is injured; and, in his private capacity, neither injures other people, nor allows himself to be injured by them—ἡ δικαιοπράγμα οὕτως ἐστι τοῦ ἄδικεων καὶ ἄδικεσθαι. At the end of next § 1134 a. 12, however, we have τοῦ δὲ ἄδικηματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαστον ἄδικεσθαι ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ μείζον τὸ ἄδικεων, from which it would seem that in the passage before us δικαιοπράγμα might have been used instead of δικαιοπράγμα.

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη...ἀκρων] Rassow (Forsch. 61) seems to be b. 32. right in preferring the reading adopted by Susemihl and Bywater to Bekker's ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστιν ὡς τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ταῖς πρότερον ἄρεταίς, κ.τ.λ.
The Paraph. Heliodorus explains the sentence as follows—καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστίν οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ταῖς προτέραις ἀρεταῖς τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐκάστη μέση ἐστὶ δύο κακῶν τὴν μὲν ἄπερβαλλοντα τῆς δὲ ἐλλείπουσα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ σωφροσύνη μεταξὺ τῆς ἡλιθίοτητος καὶ τῆς ἀκόλουθίας ἐστὶ η δὲ ἄνδρια μεταξὺ τῆς δειλίας καὶ τῆς βραβύτητος, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ὁμοίως· ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἔχει παρ' ἑκάτερα δύο κακίας αἰς ἀντίκειται, ἀλλὰ μόνη τῇ ἁδικίᾳ ἀντίκειται μέση δὲ ἐστὶν, ὅτι τῆς ἁδικίας ἀνισότητι εἰσαγομένη, τὸ ἴσον αὐτῇ ἑπτεὶ καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ποιητική. ὃ δὴ ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττωνος, καὶ διὰ τούτο αὐτῇ μὲν μεσότης ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ ἁδικία ἄκροτης, ὅτι τῶν ἁκρῶν ἐστὶν. Μιχ. Eph. has a note to the same effect—viz. that every one of the other virtues has two vices contrary to it, but justice has only one vice (ἁδικία), and this one vice, he explains, ἰσορροίπεται ἐν τῷ ἁδικοῦντι καὶ ἁδικουμένῳ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἁδικῶν ἐστίν τὸ πλέον ἑχον, ὅ δὲ ἁδικούμενος ὁ τὸ ἐλάττων. This is not correct, for the ἔξις of ἁδικία, of which he is speaking, is not seen in the ἁδικούμενος at all, but in the ἁδικῶν, who manifests himself in acts both of ὑπερβολή and of ἐλλειψις—in taking too much good and too little evil as his own share; and, where his own share is not involved, in assigning to other people too much or too little good or evil. Peters, who follows the Par. and Mich. Eph., translates—'We see also that the virtue justice is moderation [or a mode of observing the mean], but not quite in the same way as the other virtues hitherto spoken of. It does indeed observe a mean, but both the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice'—and in a note he adds the following explanation—'whereas in other fields the two extremes are chosen by different and opposite characters (e.g. the cowardly and the foolhardy), the unjust man chooses both, too much good to himself and too little to his neighbour, too much good to his partisan and too little to his opponent.' According to this view, then, of the passage before us, the point is in the words ἡ δὲ ἁδικία τῶν ἅκρων: 'justice is not a μεσότης in quite the same way as the other virtues are μεσότητες, because, although "it does indeed observe a mean," "both the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice."' Is it this alone that constitutes the difference? I think not. The chief point of difference, as it seems to me, is marked by the words ὅτι μέσον ἐστίν, and a difference of

1 'Too much good to himself' and 'too little to his neighbour' are only verbally two. The one thing which he does in all cases is to choose too much good to himself at the expense of other people.'
merely secondary importance is constituted by the fact that 'both
the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice.' That the
stress is upon ὅτι μέσον ἐστὶν is plain from the words ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἔλλειψις ἡ ἁδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολὴς καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐστὶν in § 18; i. e. δι-
καιοσύνη is a μεσότης because τοῦ μέσου ἐστὶ, just as ἁδικία is ὑπερβολὴ
and ἔλλειψις because ὑπερβολὴς καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐστὶ. That ἁδικία ὑπερ-
βολὴς καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐστὶ (i. e. ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἐστὶ) is another,
and, I think, subordinate point of difference.

In what sense, then, can δικαιοσύνη be said τοῦ μέσου εἶναι in
which ἄνθρωπος is not? The gloss τοὺς τούτους ἵνα which some MSS.
read after τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν, and Mich. Eph. recognises, seems to me
to answer this question. All the virtues, δικαιοσύνη included, are
indeed μεσότητες περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, i. e. they are μεσότητες in
the sense of being μεταμόρφουσα—phases of man's adaptation to a difficult
social environment; but δικαιοσύνη is a μεσότης also in a more
literal sense of the term, in as much as it realises itself in a
definitely measurable external μέσον, i. e. in the choice of that which
is objectively ἴσον. Justice (the writer confines himself here to
Particular Justice) is that one of the virtues which is concerned
with the ἴσον as distinguished from the other νόμμα. The just man
is μέσος in a sense in which the ἄνθρωπος e. g. is not μέσος—i. e. he is
μέσος καὶ ἴσος. There is nothing, in short, in the passage before
us, which is not implied in the division of τὸ δικαίον into τὸ νόμμαν
and τὸ ἴσον.

I take it then that the meaning which the writer wishes to convey
is that the μεσότης Particular Justice differs from the other virtuous
μεσότητες (1) in realising itself in the production of that to which,
as μέσον or ἴσον, a definite numerical value can be assigned; and
(2) in having (nominally) only one ἐναντία κακία—ἀδικία or 'un-
fairness,' productive of objective measurable inequality: but surely
this does not amount to a virtual admission, that 'the original
theory of ἀρετὴ as a μεσότης is a failure so far as justice is concerned'
(Jackson, p. 100). If there is any hesitation in the present passage
about applying the term μεσότης to δικαιοσύνη, the same hesitation exists
about applying it to ἀρετὴ generally; for in Ε. Ν. ii. 6. 13 we read
μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, στοιχαστικὴ γε ὀδὴ τοῦ μέσου. Justice,
equally with the other moral ἀρεταί, is a ἔξις προορισμῆς ἐν μεσότητι
ὦδης—a habit of regulating conduct by reason in the midst of
temptations held out by the sensibility. It is the regulation of
those feelings which, if unregulated, lead a man to act wrongly
in relation to property, as σωφροσύνη is the regulation of those which, if unregulated, lead him to act wrongly in relation to bodily pleasure. The σωφρον does what is objectively right in circumstances which are such that we cannot test the rightness of his acts by exact measurement (cf. iv. 5. 13 οὐ γὰρ βάδισαν διόρισα τὸ πῶς καὶ τίς κ.τ.λ. . . . ἐν γὰρ τοὺς καθ’ ἐκαστά κἀν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις); whereas the δίκαιος does what is objectively right in circumstances which allow us generally to test the rightness of his acts by figures. His action, in short, produces an ἴσον—a quantitative result—which may be calculated beforehand. Δικαιοσύνη is a μεσότης (or mode of adaptation to the social environment) manifesting itself externally in acts of measurably equal division; σωφροσύνη is a μεσότης (or mode of adaptation to social environment) manifesting itself in acts the rightness of which can be judged only by the qualitative test of αἰσθήσει (iv. 5. 13, ii. 9. 8). The recognition of this difference surely does not amount to a virtual admission that 'the original theory of ἀρετὴ as a μεσότης is a failure so far as justice is concerned.' If narrow technical ground be taken, and it be urged that δικαιοσύνη is not a μεσότης in the true sense because it has only one extreme, ἄκινη, it may be answered that, although the possibility of μειονεξία as the contrary of πλεονεξία is perhaps excluded by the result reached in chapters 9 and 11 of this Book, yet two kinds of unfairness to other people may be logically distinguished—that of giving strangers (from whom one has nothing to expect) too little, and that of giving friends (from whom one has expectations) too much, and that the one or the other of these kinds of unfairness may be specially characteristic of a given ἁπλοκ.  

It remains to notice Grant's view. He says—'Justice is a mean state or balance in a different sense from the other virtues. It is not a balance in the mind, but rather the will to comply with what society and circumstances pronounce to be fair (τού μέσου ἴστιν). Justice, according to this view, is compliance with an external standard. While in courage, temperance, and the like, there is a blooming of the individual character, each man being a law to himself, in justice there is an abnegation of individuality, in obedience to a standard which is one and the same for all. It must be remembered that the account of ἐπείκεια in this book supplements that of justice and takes off from its otherwise over-legal character.'
mind’ as the other virtuous habits are—i.e. it is one of the modes 1133 b. 32. in which the civilised man has learnt to control his sensibility, in the interest of the System of Life which Reason presents to him. Inasmuch as this System is an objective order of things, it is ‘an external standard,’ to which the σπουδαίος, not merely quid dikaios, but quid possessing the other virtues, conforms himself. In conforming himself, whether as σώφρων, or as ἀνδρείος, or as dikaios, to the objective standard of Reason, he ‘is a law to himself,’ because he realises his true self in so doing: and the only ‘abnegation of individuality’ to which he submits (and he submits to it quid σώφρων or ἀνδρείος as well as quid dikaios) is the abnegation of his merely sensitive nature. His true ‘individuality’—his rational nature, he cannot abnegate. Finally, it is very misleading to distinguish the standard of justice, as ‘one and the same for all,’ from that of temperance or courage. The standard of the Noble Life is an indivisible whole, one and the same for all men who have the eye of Reason to see it clearly. Each of two good men who are friends is a ἔτερος αὐτός to the other. Both live up to one and the same objective standard, and, in living up to it, are a law to themselves.


§ 18. ἴ ἐ δ’ ἄδικα τούναντίον τοῦ ἄδικου] i.e. ἴ δ’ ἄδικα τούναντίον a. 6. ἐστὶ καθ’ ἣν ὁ ἄδικος λέγεται πρακτικός κατὰ προαιρεσίν τοῦ ἄδικον.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ... ἔτυχεν] ‘Where other people are concerned a. 11. (i.e. where the unjust man himself as διανέμων does not take a share), although the result, as a whole, is the same (i.e. the violation of proportion), the way in which the proportion is violated (i.e. whether the unjust man gives A or B the unfair advantage) is a matter of chance.’ Here, in accordance with the doctrine of v. chapters 9 and 11, the writer assumes that μηνονεία—the habit of accepting less than one’s due—does not exist (see note on v. I. 9, b. i). I think that it has as much right to formal recognition as the equally obscure ἀνασθήσια of E. N. iii. 11. 7.

τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος ... μεῖζον τὸ ἄδικεῖν] The result of injustice a. 12. (τὸ ἀδίκημα) is an unequal division, wherein the part which is too small is ‘being injured,’ and the part which is too large is ‘injuring.’ There is no reference here, as some commentators seem to think, to the question, whether ἄδικεῖν or ἀδικεῖσθαι is the greater evil, dis-
CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

But a man may perform an act which is unjust without being unjust himself. By what mark, then, shall we know the acts which stamp the man who performs them as unjust? There is no distinguishing mark attaching to the acts. The acts are outwardly the same of the man who yields to a sudden passion, and of the man who deliberately chooses; and yet the latter is and the former is not 'an unjust man'.

But we must remember that hitherto we have described justice in the abstract only, and that we have to complete our account by saying something about justice as concretely realised in the state—civil justice.

Civil justice is the bond which unites, in a common life, persons who are free and equal. This common life is its own end, or self-sufficient. It is regulated not from without, but by the inner principle of its own nature—Law. Conformity with law, then, is civil justice. But where there is law and justice, we, as a matter of fact, find also injustice. We find that individuals tend to seek their own private good, and must be restrained by the law of their common life. Accordingly we do not allow the individual as such to rule, for he would become a tyrant; but we set the law or the constitution over the ruler, making him thus the guardian of justice and equality; giving him, however, a recompense in the form of honour and privilege, lest, being but human, he should say—'What am I profited if I am just and do not take advantage of my position to give myself more than my share of good things?' Indeed there are rulers who are not satisfied with all the honour and privilege that can be bestowed upon them, but, becoming tyrants, recompense themselves for their trouble by more solid advantages at the expense of their subjects.

Between those who are not free and equal persons associated in a commonwealth regulated by the law of its own constitution, the relations are 'just' only in a metaphorical sense. Thus it is only in a metaphorical sense that we can speak of 'justice' in the relation subsisting between (1) husband and wife, (2) father and child, (3) master and slave. These relations are characterised by the power of the paterfamilias over his own, not by the unanimity of independent persons. The relation between husband and wife, however, resembles that between fellow-citizens more nearly than do the relations between father and child and between master and slave.

I believe, with Rassow (p. 38), Jackson (p. xvii, &c.), and Ramsauer that these sections are foreign to the present
context; but I do not venture to designate any other context in the Fifth Book as their original locus. They certainly refer to a subject which is discussed in chapter 8; but this does not seem to me to warrant Jackson's insertion of them in § 8 of that chapter after διάθη: for why should it be assumed that, being interpolated where we now find them, they belong originally to the Fifth Book at all? It is often tolerably safe to say that a passage is an interpolation; but almost always unsafe to assign it to another locus. The student may refer to Rassow (Forsch. pp. 35 &c.) for an excellent examination of the various views which have been advanced concerning the locus of the sections before us. He regards the examination of these views as principally useful in showing 'wie wenig wir im Stande sind mit Sicherheit zu urteilen' —a valuable lesson, where 'dislocations in the text' are concerned.

The passage before us, then, is best regarded as a fragment. It may be paraphrased as follows—"Since one may perform an unjust act, and yet not be an unjust man, by what mark shall we know, under the various categories of crime, those unjust acts, the performance of which is, of itself, sufficient to stamp the agent as an unjust man in this or that respect—as a thief e.g., or an adulterer, or a robber? Surely the criterion is not to be found in the acts. Two men may perform, from different motives, acts which are externally indistinguishable. One man may steal under the influence of a pressing, but transitory, feeling; the other from deliberate choice. The former is not a thief; the latter is: but their acts are indistinguishable.'

On the words ἡ οὐτώ μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει which are equivalent to ἦ ἐκ τούτων πράξεις οὐδὲν διοίσει Mich. Eph. has the following note:—ἥν ἂν σαφεστέρα ἡ λέξεις ἐπὶ οὐτός εἶχεν ἐπὶ αὐτῇματα ἐστὶ τὸ κλέπτειν τὸ μοιχεύειν τὸ πορνεύειν τὸ ἱεροσυλλαβὴν καὶ ἀπλῶς πάντα τὰ παράνομα, ποία ἔκ τούτων πράσσει τις ἄδικει, καὶ ποία ὁμόως οὐκ ἄδικει: εἰς γὰρ τινα ἄδικα ἂ πράττει μὲν τις, ἄδικος δὲ οὐκ ἐστί. πῶς δὴ τούτο; ὅτι οὐκ εἰς τὴν πράξιν ἀποκαπνητεῖ τὰ πράγματα κρίνομεν, ἂλλ᾿ εἰς τὸ οὖν ἔνεκα, ὦ γὰρ τοῦ μαυσωλεοῦν τὴν μάχαιραν κλέψει μὲθ ἢς ἠμέλλει ἔατον ἄνελευ, ἔκλεψεν μὲν, κλέπτης δ᾿ οὐκ ἐστί, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον σωτήρ καὶ ἐνεργάτης, οὕτω μοιχὸς ὦ τὴν πλούσιαν διαψεύδομεν ἕπθυμὶα χρησάτων, ἀλλὰ φιλοχρήματος. ἑρωτήθαις δὴ ὡ ποία ἀδικήματα ἄδικως, ἄδικως ἐστίν, ἀποκρύνεται λέγων ἡ οὐτώ μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; ἢστι δὲ δ᾿ λέγειν. οὐτώ μὲν, δίχα προσ- διορισμὸν λεγόμενον, δόξειν ἂν μηδεμίαν ἔχειν διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὸν
BOOK V: CHAP. 6: §§ 1-3.

1134 a. 17. ἀδικῶν τι πράττοντα εἰδού καὶ ἀδικοῦ εἰναι. εἰ δὲ τις ἐπιθλέπτη εἰς τὸ τέλος καὶ οὐ ἐνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ ἀδικοῦ, εὐρήσει πολλοὺς ἄδικα μὲν πράττοντας, ἄδικον δὲ μὴ δοκεῖ.

Rassow (Forsch. p. 37) supposes, with Muretus, that some words have fallen out after διόσει, because 'In dem mit γάρ angefügten Beispielen wird nämlich nicht, wie man erwartet sollte, angegeben, worin der ἀδικὸς dem ἀδικός gleich, sondern worin er von ihm verschieden ist.' Muretus (p. 430) restores the clause thus—

โนικόν μὲν οὗδεν διόσει, ἐπιθλέπτη δὲ εἰς τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα διόσει, and suggests that the repeated διόσει occasioned the omission. I do not think that it is necessary to suppose an omission. The words καὶ γάρ ἀν συγγένειο γνωικὶ κ.τ.λ. are equivalent to καὶ γάρ τὸ αὐτὸ (i. e. τὸ συγγενέστατα γνωικῇ) πράττοντων ὅ τι διὰ πᾶδος ποιῶν καὶ ὁ προαιρούμενος, ὅν ὁ μὲν προαιρούμενος ἄδικος ἐστίν, ὃ δὲ διὰ πάδος οὖ, and explain ἓ νοικόν μὲν (i. e. κατὰ τὰς πράξεις) οὔδεν διόσει;

a. 20. οὔ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἄρχῃν] Cf. E. N. iii. 3. 17 παύεται γάρ ἑκατὸν ἡτῶν πῶς πράξει, ἵπταν εἰς αὐτῶν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἄρχην, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον τούτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρόμενον.

a. 22. § 2. οὔδὲ μοιχὸς, ἐμοίχευσε δὲ] Münscrher, Hampke, and Ramsauer bracket these words, because, the case of the μοιχὸς having been already selected in § 1 to illustrate the point under consideration, cannot again be used as an additional illustration. Rassow merely notes the remarkable carelessness revealed by the words: 'eine auffallende Nachlässigkeit ist es, wenn in den letzten Worten neben dem κλέπτης der μοιχὸς genannt wird, ungeachtet das μοιχεύων in Vorhergehenden als Beispiel benutzt ist'—(Forsch. p. 37). Those who bracket words like these in the Fifth Book take too little account, I think, of the carelessness of the writer, or writers. The substitution of οὐ (Kb, Pb, Camb., CCC Sus., Byw.) for Bekker's οὔδὲ before κλέπτης, however, makes the whole clause less awkward.

a. 23. § 3. πῶς μὲν οὖν . . . πρότερον] Here, again, we have a section which is bracketed as an interpolation by many editors. It differs, however, from §§ 1 and 2 in this important respect—it does not contain a piece of argument foreign to the context, but merely surprises the reader by reminding him rather irrelevantly of a previous discussion. It is therefore not so obviously an interpolation as §§ 1 and 2. At the same time, I would say that it is probably one of those rather numerous recapitulatory and connecting sentences which we may
attribute to the care of an early editor, who, finding δεί δε μη λαοθάντα, inserted words to facilitate the transition to το πολιτικόν δίκαιον from that aspect of το ἀπλῶς δίκαιον which had been discussed in the previous chapter under the head of το ἀντιπεποιθός. I therefore think that it is unnecessary to try, with Jackson, to find another locus for the words before us. Jackson places them at the beginning of ch. 10 (on έπειτείκεια), where they do very well—but, as the head of one statue may sometimes be made, by a clever restoration, to do very well on the body of another.

It is worth mentioning that the writer of the Μ.Μ. does not recognise §§ 1 and 2, but passes immediately from his criticism of the Pythagorean ἀντιπεποιθός to το πολιτικόν δίκαιον. His criticism of το ἀντιπεποιθός ends i. 33. 1194 b. 2; and at 1194 b. 3 we read—ἐπεὶ δε το δίκαιον πολλαχώς λέγεται, διαφορέων ἄν εἰς ἄντη ποιον δίκαιον ἦστιν ἢ σκέψις' ἐστι δή δίκαιον τι, ὡς φασίν, οἰκεῖ ἄντη διεσπάσθη καὶ ὕδω πρὸς πατέρα. το 6 ἐν τούτοις δίκαιων ὁμοιόμοιον ὃν δύο ἦκεν λέγεσθαι το πολιτικό δίκαιον (ἐστιν γάρ το) δίκαιον, ἦστι δὲ ἢ σκέψις, το πολιτικόν δίκαιον). We may suppose the writer of the Μ.Μ. with a text of the Fifth Book before him in which chapter 6 began with a reference to the subject of chapter 5—πώς μὲν οὖν ἔχει το ἀντιπεποιθός πρὸς το δίκαιον εἰρησται. Such a connecting clause might well be genuine. But, whatever its origin may be, I feel sure that it was written to stand here—that is, to make the transition from the subject of ch. 5 to that of ch. 6.

§ 4. δεί δέ μη ... πολιτικόν δίκαιον] 'It must be remembered, a. 24. however, that our subject is not only Justice in the abstract, but Justice as concretely realised in the State'—i. e. 'not only what is just in itself, but what is just as between citizens.' Hitherto the formal conditions of Particular Justice have been discussed—i. e. the ἀναλογία, geometrical, arithmetical, and reciprocal, which it involves have been explained; the writer now proceeds to indicate the mode of its concrete appearance—to sketch its natural history in the State. It was, of course, impossible to explain its formal conditions without frequent references to its concrete manifestation in the State; but as yet there has been no connected treatment of the latter. With the antithesis τό ἀπλῶς δίκαιον—τό πολιτικόν δίκαιον we may compare the antithesis ὁ ἄγαθος ἀνήρ ἀπλῶς—ὁ ἄγαθος πολίτης, as presented in v. 2. 11, and in the passages quoted
in the note thereon. The ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἄπλως is the ideally good man, the man who is conceived as realising perfectly (sc. ἐν τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ τῇ καὶ ἐν εἰσηγήσει) the formal notion of goodness; the ἀγαθὸς πολίτης is the man who corresponds accurately with the conditions of a given πολιτείᾳ, good or bad, but, except as citizen of ἡ ἀρίστῃ πόλις, realises the formal notion of goodness more or less imperfectly. The conditions of even the best existing πολιτείᾳ are such as always to prevent the actual coincidence of the ἀρετή of the πολίτης with that of the ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἄπλως. Similarly, it is only in ἡ πολιτείᾳ ἡ κατά φύσιν (see v. 7. 5) that τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον coincides with τὸ ἄπλως δίκαιον. That is, it is possible to conceive ideal circumstances in which the justice of citizens realises perfectly the formal notion of justice. The definition of this formal notion, carefully elaborated in chapters 1-5, is epitomised with sufficient accuracy in ch. 5, § 17 καὶ ἂν δικαιοσύνη... πρὸς ἄλλον.

What, then, are the conditions of the (doubtless imperfect) realisation of Justice in the State? Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the present chapter answer this question. Justice is realised in the common life, under νόμος, of individuals who are free and equal. The individual, left to himself, is not πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαιρεσίν τοῦ δίκαιον καὶ διανοητικὸς τοῦ ῥήτου τοῦ καὶ ἀναλογίαν, as the definition of τὸ ἄπλως δίκαιον requires. The constraint of νόμος is necessary to make him act justly—i.e. νόμος, or λόγος, representing the race, must supersede ὁ ἀνθρωπος, the individual: and since, after all, individuals must be entrusted, as ἀρχοντες, with the administration of this νόμος, a sop must be offered to their thwarted πλεονεξία in the shape of μισθὸς τις; though, even with this, they often become τύραννοι. It is only in the πολιτείᾳ καὶ ἐν εἰσηγήσει, where λόγος rules in the soul of every citizen, that a system of external restraints and inducements is unnecessary.

From the discussion of τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον the writer passes naturally to that of the relations between the various members of the ὅικεῖα, which is the unit κοινομεῖα out of which the πόλις has grown.

Distinguishing, then, τὸ ἄπλως δίκαιον and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον as the formal notion of justice, and its (necessarily imperfect) realisation in the State, I cannot agree—(1) with Michelet, who says (pp. 177, 178) 'Id justum quod quaecumque est et simpliciter justum et civile justum, ita ut materia hujus libri non sit duplex justum, ut partitur Acciajolus, simpliciter justum et justum civile; jus enim civile est ipsum simpliciter justum vel, ut dicit Paraphrastes, κυρίος δίκαιον. Sed justum civile est id simpliciter justum, quod non proposito
tantum et animis agentium continetur, sed etiam legibus sancitum est'; or (2) with Grant, who says, 'Τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον is opposed to τὸ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. It is not meant here to separate τὸ ἀν. δίκ. from τὸ πολ. δίκ.: rather it is implied that they are both the same. The only justice that can be called so without a figure of speech is that between fellow-citizens'; or (3) with Rassow, who says (Forsch. p. 123), 'Τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον und τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον sind verschiedene Ausdrücke für dieselbe Sache, was u. a. Hildenbrand und Tren- delenburg verkannt haben. Der Gegensatz, um den es sich hier handelt, ist der zwischen dem ἀπλῶς δίκαιον und dem δίκαιον καθ' ὁμοιότητα. Das erstere ist eben das politische Recht, das zweite das väterliche, das häusliche und das Herrenrecht. So richtig Zeller (Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 2. p. 500), und Grant'; or (4) with Peters, who says (p. 161, note), 'These are not two distinct kinds of justice; justice proper, he means to say, implies a state.'

In opposition to these views, then, I believe that τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον are here distinguished as the formal notion (τὶ ἦν εἶναι οὐδὲν ἄλλον ἔργον) and the concrete realisation (σύνεσιν). It is only in the ideal State that τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον coincide—that is, they never actually coincide. In actual States those individualistic tendencies which are specially dwelt on below in §§ 4—7, as characteristic of the persons between whom τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον (as distinguished from τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον) subsists, are never eliminated.

[ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίον] The ἐπὶ is a dittogr. of ἔστιν. Βίος is here a. 26. man's life as a πολιτικὸν ἔργον: cf. E.N. x. 6. 8 εὐδαμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώποδορ μεταβίβασθαι, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον.

[πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν] cf. Pol. Γ. 1. 1275 b. 17 τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερῶν φ' γὰρ ἔσοναι κοινωνίας ἀρχής βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἦδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἱκανόν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ἑορτή, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἶναι—and Pol. Α. 1. 1252 b. 28 ὡς ἐκ πλείονοις κοινοῖς κοινωνία τελειος πόλις ἦδη, πάροικον ἐχούσα πέρας τῆς αὐτάρκειας—and Pol. Γ. 5. 1280 b. 29 φανερῶν τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἐστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ διδύκειν σφάεις αὐτόν καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν, εἰπὲρ ἐστιν πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχότων τοιοῦτων ἀπάντων ἦδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ

1 Of course the formal notion of justice cannot be conceived independently of the formal notion of the State.

1134 a. 26. ζην κοινωνία καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. οὐκ ἐστιν μέντοι τούτο μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἕνα κατοικοῦστον τόπον καὶ χρωμένον ἐπιγαμίας. διὸ κηδεία τ᾽ ἐγένετο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φατνίας καὶ θυσίας καὶ διαγωγῆς τοῦ συζύγου. τὸ δὲ τουχύτων φιλίας ἔργον ἢ γὰρ τοῦ συζύγου προαιρέσεις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εῦ ζην, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν, πόλις δὴ ἡ γενών καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους χάριν. τοῦτο δὲ ἢ ἐστίν, ἢς φαμέν, τὸ ζην εὐδαιμόνιος καὶ καλὸς. τῶν καλῶν ἀρά πράξεων [χάριν] θετέων εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῶν συζυγίων—καὶ E. N. i. 7. 6 τὸ δ᾽ αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζωντι βιῶν μονώτητι, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεύσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γνωκτὶ καὶ ἔλθε τοῖς φιλοῖς καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. The state (ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία) is an organism (αὐτάρκες τι), and the law of its members is τὸ πολιτικῶν δίκαιον.

a. 27. ἐλευθερῶν καὶ ἦσον ἢ κατ᾽ ἀνάλογαν ἢ κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν] Each member of the social organism must, in order to be a member at all, have an initiative of his own (ἐλευθερία), which he exercises for the common good. This initiative cannot be exercised by an individual whose inferiority, in πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ or δύναμις, to the other individuals with whom he is associated, sinks beneath a certain level, fixed differently in different πολιτείαι. All individuals on, and above, this level are equally members of the social organism (ἴσοι), inasmuch as each one of them, quid biōν κοινωνίων or καλῶν πράξεων μετέχων, initiates, in his own sphere, a social function essential to the σωτηρία of the commonwealth, even as each member of a ship’s crew contributes his share to the prosperity of the voyage: see Pol. Γ. 2. 1276 b. 26 ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν πάντων (ἵ.ε. τῶν πλοτήρων, καὶ περ ἀνομοίων δωτῶν τὴν δύναμιν). . . . ἀριστοκράτων καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ περ ἀνομοίων δωτῶν, ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστὶν κοινωνία δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία. Mechanical pressure from without (τυράννης), taking the place of, or limiting, the constitutional action (βίως) of its members, is foreign to the conception of the State as αὐτάρκες τι, or an organism. The individual member is indeed limited—but by the immanent law of the organism to which he belongs (νόμος), and that, not in his ἐλευθερία, which is realised in obedience to the law of the organism, but in his tendency to πλειοτεία.

The δοῦλος has no initiative which can be exercised for the good of the State. He does not live for the State, but for his master; and the law which regulates his function is an external
one—the will of his master. To occupy a status which places life above the will of a master is, then, the first condition of citizenship. All who occupy this status are, of course, equally free; but it is only in a pure democracy that they are politically equal—Pol. E. 1. 1301 a. 29 δὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐγίνετο ἐκ τοῦ ἰσοῦ ὅτι οὖν ἰσονοῦ ὡς οὐσία ἰσοῦ εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ λεύκηροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀπάθ᾽ ἰσοῦ εἶναι νομίζουσιν). Such a democracy makes all its freemen absolutely equal citizens—ἰσοὺς καὶ ἄριστον. Other constitutions recognise grades among freemen constituted by differences of birth, culture, or wealth. Some of these constitutions draw such a sharp line between the highest grade and the grades beneath it, as to exclude from the functions of the citizen all except those who are ἰσοῖ within the limits of the highest grade. Here, again, οἱ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας may be said to be absolutely equal—ἰσοὶ καὶ ἄριστον, the freemen belonging to the lower grades not coming into comparison with them at all. But there are certain other constitutions—the so-called mixed constitutions (Pol. A. 6 and 7), which include within the pale of effective citizenship the members of several grades. Their citizens are ἰσοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογος, ἴ. ἐ. ἰσοὶ inasmuch as they all perform political functions, and are comparable on this common ground; ἰσοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογος, because comparison shows grades in the dignity and importance of their respective functions. Strictly then, it is incorrect to identify, as Mich. Eph. does, the ἰσοὶ καὶ ἄριστον of the present passage, with the citizens of a pure democracy, and the ἰσοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογος with those of an oligarchy or aristocracy. The citizens of a pure democracy are, of course, ἰσοὶ καὶ ἄριστον—‘on a footing of absolute equality’ (Peters), but so are the members of a close oligarchy, for they are themselves a homogeneous body of peers, and those whom they exclude from all share in the government of the city cannot be compared with them in an ἀνάλογος having for its basis political ἀξία. It is only in a mixed constitution that we can correctly speak of the citizens as being ἰσοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογος—‘on a footing of proportionate equality’ (Peters). As a matter of fact, however, most of the ‘aristocracies’ and ‘oligarchies’ noticed by Aristotle in the Politics are mixed constitutions, recognising grades within the body of effective citizens, and the description ἰσοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογος is therefore applicable to their citizens; while the description ἰσοὶ καὶ ἄριστον remains as specially applicable to the citizens of a pure democracy, as described in Pol. Z. 1. 1317 a. 40—1318 a. 10.
1134 a. 29. ἀλλὰ τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ’ ὅμοιότητα] Freemen, standing on a footing of equality either absolute or proportionate, are related by political ties (τοῦτοι ἐστὶ πολιτικῶν δίκαιον); i.e. they are persons whose unanimity (ὁμόνωμα, see Ε.Ν. ix. 6) can create and maintain a polis. What such persons do quid metέχουντες τῆς πολιτείας, and in accordance with its spirit and requirements, is just in the political sense of the term. And this is the proper sense of the term; for man’s true nature, or form, is realised in the performance of political function (φύσει πολιτικῶν ὁ ἀνθρωπός). But, that man may be able to realise his true form in the creation and maintenance of a polis, certain material conditions are necessary, the most important of which is that the oikia, or families, of which the polis is composed, shall be well regulated. In the oikia the citizen, as husband, father, and master, no longer ἀνθέων with free equals τοῦ ἐν ἕνεκα, but exercises authority, τῆς ἀναγκαίας ζωῆς χάρων, over inferiors, some of whom are not even free. It is in another, that is in a metaphorical sense (καθ’ ὅμοιότητα), then, that the term just must be applied to the relations subsisting between him and these inferiors.

a. 30. οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς] kaı’ indicates that δίκαιον and νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς are merely different expressions for the same relation. ‘Just relations’ are equivalent to ‘relations constituted by νόμος.’ Persons οἷς νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς are persons whose conduct is determined, not by individual impulse, or by the force of a master, but by the manifold influences (examples, customs, laws, ideals) exerted by a system of common life, which they have been born into, and are ‘of one mind’ (ὁμοιούσι) to maintain and adorn.

a. 31. νόμος ἰδίᾳ, ἐν οἷς ἀδικία] This is not to be understood, as by Michelet, to mean that νόμος presupposes ἀδικία—‘legem propter injustitiam institutam esse.’ The social order is not a mere police system for the suppression of injustice—Pol. γ. 5. 1280 b. 29 ἐφανερῶν τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόσον καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτούς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάρων’ ἄλλα ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν ὁδὴ ὑπαρχόντων τούτων ἀπάντων ἠδὴ πόλεις, ἄλλ’ ἑκ τοῦ ἐν ζωῆς κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς σκέψεως καὶ τοῖς γένεσις, ζωῆς τέλειάς χάρων καὶ αὐτάρκειος. Νόμος is essentially the law of man’s rational self-realisation, as πολιτικῶν κύρων: but since he is impeded in his rational self-realisation by the irrational part of his nature, this law of his self-realisation is forced
to assume, as δίκη, judicial functions, and, for this reason, is often wrongly regarded as nothing but a repressive agency operating ἐν οἷς ἀδίκια. The words before us seem to imply this opinion; and so do the remarks which follow in §§ 5, 6, and 7. Νόμος seems to be presented as an invention specially introduced to combat πλεονεξία, as Hobbes' commonwealth is introduced to put an end to the evils of the state of nature. But the Aristotelian conception of νόμος, as elsewhere presented (e.g. in Pol. 1. 11. 1287 a. 28 ὁ μὲν ὁ θεός τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἀρχεῖ κελεύειν ἀρχεῖ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δὲ ἀνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθηκα καὶ θωρίοι ἕ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀριστον ἀνήρας διαμφθείρει. διότι οὖν ἄριστος νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἔστιν) gives such prominence to its god-like, that is, creative and constitutive efficiency, that we must not find too much fault with the phraseology of the present passage, which, after all, is intended (as I believe) to point the distinction between τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, justice in the abstract, and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, justice in the concrete, and does so by insisting on the highly complex character of the conditions which determine the manifestation of the latter. The presence of ἀδίκια among those οἷς νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς is the ἔλη (or constitutes the greater part of the ἔλη) which prevents, even in the so-called ὀρθαὶ πολιτείαι, the perfect realisation of τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον in τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.

ἐν οἷς δ’. ἀδίκια . . . οὗ πᾶσιν ἀδίκια] This clause is rejected a. 32. by Zell, Jackson, and others from the present context. I am inclined to agree with Ramsauer, who brackets only the latter half of it (made parenthetical by Sus. and Bywater), viz. ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἄδικεν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδίκια. These words might very naturally have been added, for the sake of antithesis, by a scribe who remembered the ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστιν ἀδικοῦντα μὴν ἄδικον ἐδίκων οἷον of § 1. Without them, the passage runs smoothly, τοῦτο (which cannot in any case refer to ἀδίκια, for ἀδίκια is not the act of τὸ νέμειν) referring to the immediately preceding τὸ ἄδικεν.

tὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν] From these words it would appear that the a. 33. writer in this discussion of τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον has merely particular justice in view.

ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν] M. Eph. says—λέγει δὲ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τὰ τῇ a. 34. ἐστῶν φύσει τοιαῦτα, ἃ καὶ ὁς δυνάμεις λέγεται καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ· οἷον πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, πενια, δυσγένεια, καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ καὶ πάλιν κακὰ. συντελοῦσι

1134 a. 34. γὰρ τῷ μὲν σπουδαῖρο πρὸς τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖας, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ εἰς τὰς κατὰ κακίαν.

a. 35. § 5. διὸ . . . τύραννος] See Pol. γ. 10. 1286 a. 8, where the question is put—πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχεῖν ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀριστῶν νόμων; and Pol. γ. 11. 1287 a. 18, where the general conclusion is reached τῶν ἄρα νόμων ἀρχεῖν αἱρετῶτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνα τινά, the reason being that τῷ μὲν νόμῳ τὸ παθητικόν ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ’ ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγχει τοὺτ’ ἔχειν πάσαν (Γ. 10. 1286 a. 18)—a reason further insisted on in a passage (Γ. 11. 1287 a. 28) quoted above, note on a. 31. It must be remembered, however, that the conclusion τῶν νόμων ἀρχεῖν αἱρετῶτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνα τινα is true, not of all communities, but of those composed of ὁμοίως καὶ ἵσσον: see Pol. γ. 11. 1287 b. 41 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φανερῶν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἱσσοῖς ὑπὸ συμφέρουσαν ἐστὶν ὡστε δίκαιον ἐνα κάρον ἐναι πάντως, ὡστε μὴ δυτικόν νόμων, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ὡς δυτικόν νόμων, ὡστε νόμων δυτικόν, ὡστε ἀρχικόν ἀρχικόν ὡστε μὴ ἁγάθων μὴ ἁγάθων, οὐδ’ ἀν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἁμείναιν ἢ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ’ ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέαν. The exception here alluded to is explained as follows—Γ. 11. 1288 a. 15 ὅταν ἢ γένος ὅλων ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνα τινά συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ’ ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὡσγ’ ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τούτῳ βασιλικόν καὶ κύριον πάντων καὶ βασιλεία τῶν ἐνα τούτων. With Aristotle’s discussion of the question πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχεῖα ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀριστῶν νόμων, Jackson compares the discussions in Plato, Politicus 293 E sqq., and in Legg. 874 E sqq. The latter passage especially is worth careful study in connexion with Aristotle’s view. As to the point raised by Plato ποῦ δὴ νομοθετήσων τε καὶ ποῦ ἀποδώσων κρίνων τοῖς δικαστηρίοις (Legg. 876 A), Aristotle expresses the following opinion in Rhet. i. 1. 1354 a. 31 μιλίαστα μὲν οὖν προσῆκε τοῖς ὀρθοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις, δόσα ἐνδέχεται, πάντα διορίζειν αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι ἐλάχιστα καταλείπειν ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι. We shall return to this subject in the chapter on ἐπείκειαι (v. 10).

λόγον] MS. authority is strongly in favour of λόγον against νόμον: and cf. E. N. x. 9. 12 ὃ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὡς ἀν ἀπὸ τίνος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ.

ἐαυτῷ τούτῳ ποιεῖ] i. e. ἐαυτῷ τὸ πλέον νέμει.

b. 1. γίνεται τύραννος] τύραννος is the worst of those παρεκμεθηκόν πολιτείαι in which the governors rule for their own advantage, not
for the common good: see E. N. viii. 10. 2 ὃ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοτεί, ὃ δὲ βασιλεύς τὸ τῶν ἀρχέομενων—cf. Pol. 1. 5.

There exists a general opinion (δοκεῖ) that one gets no advantage from being just—that, in fact, one merely confers advantage on other people, justice being ‘the good of other people.’ Since rulers are apt to share this opinion, the State, in order to secure their services, must remunerate them with honour and privilege: as it is, there are rulers who are not satisfied with such intangible remuneration, but become tyrants and remunerate themselves by plundering the State. Here the clauses ὃ ἡμὲν κοιτᾶν, ἐὰν πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦσαν.

§§ 6, 7.] There exists a general opinion (δοκεῖ) that one gets no advantage from being just—that, in fact, one merely confers advantage on other people, justice being ‘the good of other people.’ Since rulers are apt to share this opinion, the State, in order to secure their services, must remunerate them with honour and privilege: as it is, there are rulers who are not satisfied with such intangible remuneration, but become tyrants and remunerate themselves by plundering the State. Here the clauses ὃς ἡμὲν κοιτᾶν, ἐὰν πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦσαν.

We shall then accept ποιεῖ, for which the MS. authority is unimpeachable? It is difficult to refuse to do so. At the same time, ποιεῖ and ποιεῖ are palaeographically very like. Were it not for the MS. consensus in favour of ποιεῖ, I should decide for ἐκέρασιν τοῦτο ποιεῖ = ἐκέρασιν τοῦ πλέον νέμει, because it answers to ἐκείνῳ τοῦτο ποιεῖ = ἐκείνῳ τοῦ πλέον νέμει in § 5, and because ποιεῖ seems to me to be an unsuitable word to express the action of τὸ νέμειν with which the work of the just ruler is here identified. Ramsauer thinks that it is self-evident that ἐκέρασιν ποιεῖ cannot = ἐκέρασιν τοῦ πλέον νέμει, although αὐτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ above is rightly, he admits, taken as = ἐκείνῳ τοῦ πλέον νέμει. I confess that I cannot see the ground on which this distinction is made. But even granting that ἐκέρασιν ποιεῖ could not mean ἐκέρασιν τοῦ πλέον νέμει, we might argue that the words in Rep. 343 C οἱ δ’ ἀρχιμένοι ποιοῦσιν τὸ ἐκείνον συμφέρον are in favour of reading ἐκέρασιν ποιεῖ here = ἐκέρασιν ποιεῖ το συμφέρον. However, for the reasons against ποιεῖ (which, after all,—whether from accident or not—has no MS. backing) see Jackson’s note ad loc.
BOOK V: CHAP. 6: §§ 6, 7.

1134 b. 5. ἀλλότριον ἄγαθον] See note on v. i. 17, a. 3.

b. 6. § 7. μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμῆ καὶ γέρας] ‘Here, as in the unequal friendships, the assistance rendered by the superior and the honour and respect which compensate it are equated by means of τὸ ἀντιπεποιηθὸς’ (Jackson). ‘The exchange of equivalent amounts of honour and just government’ describes the relation between ἄρχων and ἄρχόμενοι, as it is conceived by those who hold that justice is ἀλλότριον ἄγαθον—a good thing handed over to one’s neighbour, for which one must be careful to get from him an adequate return. Nor is the writer himself unwilling to regard the relation as an exchange; for the inference μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος is undoubtedly his. He believes that in society, as it is, the ruler must be remunerated with honour of a more or less material or external kind. But the more perfect society becomes—the more ‘constitutional’ government becomes, the less appropriate becomes the formula of ‘exchange’ to the relation between ἄρχων καὶ ἄρχόμενοι. The τιμῆ which the ruler who is nobly φιλότιμος, or, it may be, μεγαλόφυστος, seeks, is not an external reward, but the approbation of his own ‘conscience.’ He gives his services to the State, because he is ‘public-spirited’ or ‘patriotic.’ And, further, those whom he rules are not a passive caste of mere ἄρχόμενοι. They too are public-spirited, and patriotic, and help him to rule. Indeed, where the relation between ruler and ruled is not, to a considerable extent, one of mutual help in the work of carrying out a system of common life, τυπανίς, in some form or other, must inevitably supervene. If the ruled are those who do not help, but merely remunerate the ruler, the latter is sure to bid for ever higher ‘remuneration.’ ‘Remuneration’ is, indeed, materially necessary in the case of the ἄρχων, as in that of the ἵτρως. But, as οἱ χαρίειν τῶν ἱτρῶν do not follow their profession for the sake of the fees, so the true ἄρχων does not govern for the sake of ‘honour.’ The final cause of his government is the public good, not his own advantage. In a noble community the good ruler is the object of the highest τιμῆ—the loyal devotion of his people. But how absurd it would be to say that he rules for the sake of their devotion! His consciousness of it is only an ἐπιγνώμενον τί τέλος: his real τέλος is the ἐνίγμα καὶ ἀρετὴ which results in the welfare of his loyal and devoted people. Thus the relation between ruler and ruled is misrepresented in its essential character when it is simply described as an ‘exchange.’ As an exchange it certainly presents itself concretely to the interested
parties; and the wise legislator tries to make it appear to them 1134 b. 6. a tolerably fair exchange; but, even in the worst πολιτεία that still deserves the name, the fact that there is government at all implies a nīsus towards social organisation, which is no more accounted for by the self-seeking of the governors, than the existence of ἵππη is explained by the fact that it is practised as a μυσθαρμητική τέχνη.

§§ 8, 9.] Passing from the πόλις to its unit the οἴκια, we find three b. 8. kinds of δίκαιον, resembling that between πολίται and yet differing from it—viz one kind appearing in the relation between husband and wife (τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον), another in the relation between father and children (τὸ πατρικὸν δίκαιον), and another in the relation between master and slaves (τὸ δεσποτικὸν). These three kinds of δίκαιον resemble the δίκαιον between πολίται, in so far as they appear in relations involving the conduct of a πολίτης (the paterfamilias) towards those who, though not πολίται, are individuals ὃν ἄνευ οἰκία ἢς πόλις: they differ from it, because the relations in which they appear are not between ἀλεξέρεος καὶ ἴσος—not between independent persons standing on a footing of equality. The slave and the child, as such, are not independent persons, but are, as it were, parts of the paterfamilias: he cannot therefore injure them, any more than he can injure himself: if we speak of justice or injustice appearing in his conduct towards them, it must be in a metaphorical sense. It is only towards his fellow-citizens that a man can act justly or unjustly in the strict sense. Justice, strictly so called, appears in those relations which exist between men quæ rational beings, striving to attain εὐδαιμονία by united action; it does not, except in a metaphorical sense, appear in those domestic relations, which, after all, are common to the irrational animals with man. For the three μέρη τῆς οἰκίας cf. Pol. A. 2. 1253 b. 1–10, and Pol. A. 5. 1259 a. 37; in both passages οἰκονομική is divided into three parts—δεσποτική, πατρική, and γαμή: cf. also E. N. viii. 10. §§ 4–6 for the analogues of these three domestic relations in πολιτεία.


οὐ γὰρ ἔστων ἄδικα πρὸς τὰ αὐτὸν ἀπλῶς] Peters takes ἀπλῶς with ἄδικα—'We cannot speak (without qualification) of injustice towards what is part of one's self': but it perhaps ought to be taken with τὰ αὐτὸν (sc. μέρη), which would then be distinguished,
1134 b. 9. as 'parts strictly so called,' from slave or child which is ὀστερος μέρος αὑτοῦ: so, apparently, Μ. Μ. i. 33. 1194 b. 10–14.

b. 10. κτήμα] ‘slave.’ For the rationale of this use of the term see Pol. A. 4. 1253 b. 23 sqq., and cf. Oecon. i. 5. 1344 a. 23.

b. 11. ἐως ἄν ἣ τηλίκοιν καὶ χαιρισθῇ] Reading μὴ before χαιρισθῇ (Lb, Mb) is strongly supported by Μ. Μ. i. 33. 1194 b. 14, 15 ὀστερος γὰρ μέρος τί ἐστι τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ νῦν· πλὴν ὅταν ἦδη λάβῃ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάξιν καὶ χαιρισθῇ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τότε ἦδη ἐν ἰσότητι καὶ ὁμοιότητι ἐστὶ τῷ πατρὶ.

潟στερος μέρος αὑτοῦ] See Pol. A. 4. 1254 a. 9 τὸ δὲ κτήμα λέγεται ὀστερος καὶ τὸ μόριον. τὸ τε γὰρ μόριον οὒ μόνον ἄλλον ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλον ὀρύσος δὲ καὶ τὸ κτήμα· διὸ ὅ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δοῦλου δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκεῖνον δ’ οὔ ἔστω· ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότου δοῦλος ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλος ἐκεῖνον. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δοῦλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δήλον (ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἄλλ’ ἄλλοι διδοθεὶς δι’, ὁδὸς φύσει δοῦλος ἐστίν, ἄλλοι δ’ ἐστὶν διδοθεῖς, διὰ ἐν κτήμα τῇ [δοῦλος ἐστίν], κτήμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χαιριστῶν). In E.Ν. viii. 12. 2, 3 a physiological explanation of στεργή (the germ of all social feeling) is found in the fact that τὸ τέκνον εὖ αὐτοῦ, ἵ. ἓ. μέρος αὐτοῦ.

αὐτὸν δ’ οὔδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν] This anticipates the conclusion reached in chapters 9 and 11. Βλάπτειν (σε. παρὰ τῶν νόμων) μετὰ προαιρέσεως ἀδίκειν.

b. 12. § 9. διὰ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀδίκεια πρὸς αὐτῶν] Ramsauer’s conjecture αὐτά, adopted by Susemihl, is very tempting, the argument being—‘Since no man chooses to harm himself, and since his slaves and children are parts of himself, it follows (διὰ) that he cannot be unjust towards them (αὐτά)—i. e. civil justice and injustice do not appear in his relations to them—οὖν ὅ τι ἀδίκον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικὸν (σε. πρὸς αὐτά).’

b. 13. κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἣν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει ...] A reference to § 4. For a discussion of the question, How far Aristotle is right in holding that νόμος πρὸς αὐτὸς has nothing to do with the maintenance and regulation of the relation between master and slave, see note on E.Ν. viii. 11. 7. That faithful slaves have rights the recognition of which tends to place them in a quasi-political position, is admitted in Oecon. i. 5. 1344 b. 14 χρῆ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὁρίσθαι πᾶσιν. δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἄλλον.
That the State has a right—e.g. in the interest of humanity—to 1134 b. 13. interfere with a man’s treatment of his slaves is, of course, another matter, and does not imply that between him and his slaves there is νόμος: for the State may also interfere with his treatment of animals: cf. Ramsauer—‘ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος. Ἐν οἷς: ετενίμ περὶ αὐτῶν, velut perί τεκνοποιας, τροφῆς, παιδείας, leges esse, quibus parentes vel etiam heri quam maxime obligati sint, infuliari sane non est in animo.’

οὖτοι δ’ ἦσαν ... ἀρχεσθαι] This remark has not been made in b. 14.

the Ethics: but cf. Pol. Γ. 7. 1283 b. 42 πολίτης δὲ κούρη μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἐστὶ, καθ’ ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἑτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαρευόμενος ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ’ ἀρέτην.

διὸ μάλλον ... καὶ κτήματα] This is the doctrine of Pol. Λ. 5. b. 15.

1259 a. 39 καὶ γὰρ γυναῖκος ἀρχειν καὶ κέντον, ὡς ἐλευθερών μὲν ἀμφοῖ, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπων τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναῖκος μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκτων δὲ βασιλικῶς. Mich. Eph. has the following note here—ἔστω ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἰσότης, καθ’ ἄμφω ἐλευθερον, καὶ ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὸ αὖ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἰσότητι εἰσὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡς παρὰ μέρος ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι δεὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἁνδρὰ ἀρχειν, δεὶ μέντοι καὶ τὴν γυναίκα ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν των των θεραπαίνων δηλοῦσθαι καὶ τῆς τῶν εἰσκομιζομένων σωτηρίας καὶ φυλαχῆς.

τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον] According to Pol. Λ. 5 οἰκονομική is the b. 17.

genus, and δεσποτικῆ, πατρικῆ, and γαμικῆ the species.

The following is the version which the writer of the M. M. (i. 33.

1194 b. 5—29) gives of this chapter—ἔστω δὴ δίκαιον τι, ός φασιν, οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην καὶ υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα. τὸ δ’ ἐν τούτου δίκαιον ὁμοιώμας ἀν δόξειν λέγεσθαι τῷ πολιτικῷ δίκαιῳ (ἔστω γὰρ τῷ) δίκαιῳ, ἀπὸ οὗ ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, τό πολιτικῶν δίκαιων· τοῦτο γὰρ μαλακτὰ ἐστίν ἐν ἰσότητι (κοινονία γὰρ οἱ οἱ πολίται τινες, καὶ ὀμοίως βούλομαι εἶναι τῇ φύσει, τῷ δὲ τρόπῳ ἑτεροι), τῷ δὲ υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα καὶ οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην οὐκ ἂν δόξειν εἶναι δίκαιον οὖθεν. οὔτε γὰρ τῇ ποδί τῇ ἐμφ πρὸς ἐμὲ οὔτε τῇ χειρί, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ’ ἐκάστῳ τῶν μορίων· ὀσάκτως ἀν οὖν δόξειν ἔχειν καὶ ὃ νῦν πρὸς πατέρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος τι ἐστί τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ νῦν. πλὴρ ὅταν ἢ ἤδη λάβῃ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάξιν καὶ χωρισθῇ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, τότ’ ἢδη ἐν ἰσότητι καὶ ὀμοιότητι ἐστὶν τῷ πατρί· οἱ δὲ πολίται τοιούτῳ τινες ἐθέλουσιν εἶναι, ὡς δ’ αὐτῶς οὐδ’ οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην ἐστὶ δίκαιον διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτίαν τοῦ γὰρ δεσπότου τι ἐστίν ὁ οἰκέτης. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ εἰ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ δίκαιον, τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐστίν. οὐ τούτο δὲ γε ἡρεῖς ξηπούμεν, ἀλλὰ
CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

In civil justice there are two elements, a natural and a conventional. That which is naturally just is always and everywhere equally just, whether people deem it just or not; that which is only conventionally just was originally indifferent, and has been made just by law or fashion. Some maintain that there are no human institutions which are more than conventionally just, arguing that what is naturally of a certain kind is so invariably (e.g., fire is invariably hot), whereas the justice of human institutions varies — what is right at home is not necessarily right in Persia. To this it may be replied: The Divine nature is indeed invariable; but we are here concerned with human institutions: their justice certainly varies; but this does not prove that there is not a natural as well as a conventional element in them; for in the concrete world variations are natural. Which are natural and which merely conventional among human institutions, although both those which are natural and those which are conventional vary, is as plain as it is which hand is naturally the stronger, although either may be the stronger. In proportion as a given constitution falls short of the ideal constitution, its institutions will exhibit more of the conventional element.

A just rule is a universal which has just acts under it as particulars. 'Unjust act' and 'unjust rule' — 'act of justice' and 'just rule' differ. The 'unjust rule,' whether unjust naturally or conventionally, is prior to the 'unjust act.' Similarly, the 'just rule' is prior to the 'act of justice,' or rather to the 'just act,' for the expression 'act of justice' ought to be retained to mark the rectification of an unjust act.

b. 18. § 1.] That which is naturally right (τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον) is right in itself always and everywhere, whether it be deemed right or no; that which is conventionally right (τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον), in itself neither
right nor wrong, has been made right by the νόμος of a community, 1134 b. 18. and continues to be right only so long as the νόμος declares it to be right. It is perhaps scarcely necessary to point out that νομικά, as here distinguished from φυσικά, must not be confounded with νόμιμαν as distinguished from ἰσον in v. i. 8. Τὰ νόμιμα are all those things which are recognised as right by the law and fashion (νόμος) of a community; some of these are naturally, or in themselves, right (φύσει δίκαια), others are only conventionally right (νόμω δίκαια). It is also to be noticed that (here in § i) the writer, in describing τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον, seems to have in view only things which, being in themselves neither right nor wrong, are made right by νόμος. He apparently forgets that also things which are in themselves wrong often become conventionally right. But in § 5 he uses words which may be understood to imply that both things indifferent and things wrong may become νόμω δίκαια—ὁμιοί δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώπους δίκαια οὐ ταῦτα πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ αἱ πολιτείαι, ἄλλα μιὰ μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη. Here the reference must be to the παρεκβηθηκὼς πολιτείας in which much that is παρὰ φύσιν, or in itself wrong, is deemed right, i.e. is conventionally right—in which, in fact, the bad man is the good citizen. The more perfect a πολιτεία is—i.e. the nearer it approaches to the ideal of ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη, the more fully will its νόμιμα realise the requirements of τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον, the element of νομικῶν δικαιῶν in its institutions and customs being small and consisting of what was originally indifferent, rather than of what is in itself wrong.

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ] Kᵇ and CCC omit these words, and read γάρ before φυσικάν. The omission may be easily explained as a slip of the eye caused by the similarity of the last words of ch. 6 and the omitted first words of ch. 7. Kᵇ has frequent omissions of this kind. On the other hand, the interpolation of πολιτικοῦ here, per dittographiam, would be very natural. At any rate, it seems certain that the writer of the M. M. read here τοῦ δὲ δικαίου instead of τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου, for his version (i. 33. 1194 b. 30) not only begins—τῶν δὲ δικαίων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ νόμω, but ends (1195 a. 5) with words which, if they mean anything, mean that it is not τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον which is divisible into τὸ φυσικὸν and τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον.—βελτίων οὖν δικαιῶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ νόμων. ἄλλ’ ἀ ζητοῦμεν, δικαιῶν ἐστὶ πολιτικῶν’ τὸ δὲ πολιτικὸν ἐστὶ τὸ νόμῳ, οὐ τὸ φύσει.
The difference between the Fifth Book with τὸ δὲ πολιτικὸν δικαίων κ.τ.λ. and the M. M. with τὸ πολιτικόν ἐστὶ τὸ νόμων ὁ τὸ φύσει seems to be due to the fact that the writer of the M. M. does not keep clearly before his mind the distinction which the writer of the Fifth Book marks by the terms νόμων and νομικών.

b. 22. μνᾶς λυτροῦθαι] Jackson's note is—'the editors point out that this passage is inconsistent with Herod. vi. 79 ἀποκροῦ δὲ ἐστὶ Πελοποννησίως δύο μνᾶς τεταγμένα κατ' ἄνδρα αἰχμάλωτον ἐκτίνευσι, and ν. 77 χρόνῳ δὲ ἐλυσαν σφέας διμένως ἀποτιμησάμενοι. But, as Blakesley remarks, the prisoners in the latter case being the Chalcidian Hippopotae, two minae "may be considered as the ransom of a man-at-arms, not of an inferior soldier." One mina, then, may have been the ransom of men of the lowest rank.'

ἡ τὸ αἴγα . . . πρόβατα] Jackson's note here is—'On the strength of Herodot. ii. 42 ἄρος μὲν δὴ Δως Θηβαῖος ἰδρύνει ἱρὼν ἡ νομᾶς τοῦ Θηβαίου ἐστί, οὔτως μὲν νυν πάντες ὄνων ἀπεχώρησεν αἰγάς ὄνομα, Muretus proposed to read αἴγα Δὶθέν ἄλλα μὴ πρόβατα. Cf. N. E. ix. 2. § 6, de Mirabiliibus 844 a. 35. (In Athen. iv. 138 f. ὅθέναι δ' ἐν ταῖς κοπίσσας αἴγας ἄλλο δ' αὐθέντες ἑρείων Ζεὺς is not the divinity honoured.) But the addition of Δὶ does not explain the awkward antithesis of the singular αἴγα and the plural δύο πρόβατα. Is it possible that ἄλλα μὴ is a corruption of μιᾶν ἡ?' Τὸ αἴγας θέναι ἄλλα μὴ πρόβατα μὴ δὲς might be suggested; but Zell's conclusion is perhaps the safest—'Mureti conjectura admodum blanditur; sed cum Aristoteles aliam rem h. l. significare potuerit sibi et popularibus suis tam notam, quam nobis nunc ignotam, ab auctoritate codicum recedere nolui.'

b. 23. θείων Βρασίδα] See Thuc. v. 11.

b. 24. τὰ ψηφισματῶθη] The distinction between a νόμος which embodies the permanent necessities of the State and is presumably in accordance with 'the natural fitness of things,' and a ψήφισμα which meets an unexpected and presumably temporary condition of affairs, is a commonplace in Greek political thought. One of the characteristics which mark the declension from φύσις of ἡ ἑκαττον δημοκρατία is that government by ψηφίσματα, or special decrees of the people, has taken the place of the rule of νόμως, or the Constitution: see Pol. Δ. 4. 1292 a. 2 ἐτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι τῶν ἱρτῶν, εἰπόν μόνον ἡ πολιτική, ἱρτῶν δὲ τὸν νόμον.
BOOK V: CHAP. 7: §§ 1–3. 495

έτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τάλλα μὲν εἶναι ταῦτα, κύριον δὲ εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος 1134 b. 24. καὶ μὴ τῶν νόμων. τούτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἄλλα μὴ ὁ νόμος. συμβαίνει δὲ τούτο διὰ τούς δημαγγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμένοις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ’ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσὶν ἐν προεδρίᾳ. διόπω δὲ οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἰσί κύριοι, ἐναίσθηται δημαγωγοί. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δήμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ τολλών οἱ γὰρ τολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσίν ὡς ἐκαστὸς ἄλλα πάντες. ὁμηρὸς δὲ ποιεῖ λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι πολυκορασίαν, πότερον τὰ ὑπὸ τὸν πλείον ὅσων οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἐκαστὸς, ἄδηλον. δ’ οὐν τοιοῦτος δήμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ἄν, ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμων, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, διὸτι οἱ κόλακες ἄντιμοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ δήμος οὕτως ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυραννίᾳ. διὰ καὶ τὸ ἄθος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἀμφοῦ δεσποτικὰ τῶν βέλτιστον, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα διόπω εἰς τὰ ἐπιτίγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγγοῦς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. καὶ μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκάστου ἐκάστου ἐκάστου ἐσχήσεως, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τοῖς τυράννωσι, οἱ δὲ δημαγωγοὶ τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς τοιοῦτοις.

But, although government by ψηφίσματα is thus opposed to that by νόμος, as caprice is opposed to reason, it is none the less true that a single ψηφίσμα may be the vehicle of reason—may secure the realisation of that which is really or 'naturally' right, in an exceptional case which the general rule laid down by νόμος could not meet: see v. 10. 6.

§ 2. ἐνίοις] See note on E.N. i. 3. 2. Cf. Grant, Ethics, Essay ii. vol. i. p. 150 on the opposition between Law and Nature.

διεικ. κ.τ.λ.] The ἐνίοι referred to argue—Nature is invariable; the b. 25 institutions of men (τὰ δίκαια) vary; therefore they have no 'natural' foundation. The writer meets this argument in §§ 3 and 4, by pointing out that 'being variable' and 'having a natural foundation' are not incompatible characteristics. While all human institutions (as distinguished from the functions of the godhead) are 'variable,' some of them are 'natural' and some of them are 'conventional.' Which are 'natural' and which 'conventional' is as plain as it is which hand is 'naturally' the stronger.

καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις] The editors compare the Μίνως 315 E—316 A, b. 26. where these words occur in a similar context.

§ 3. τούτο δ’... b. 30 οὖ θεοῦ] This is a very awkward passage. b. 27. τούτο is apparently τὰ δίκαια κυνείσθαι. This statement is untrue, and yet true in a sense. ‘Among the gods’ κυνεῖται τὰ δίκαια οἰδαμός—i.e. justice in the abstract is ‘eternal and immutable’;
among men,' however, *κινητον πάν τὸ δίκαιον*—all human institutions are mutable; but not mutable in the sense of being entirely arbitrary: their mutability is not inconsistent with *τὸ εἶναι τί καὶ φύσει* in them. In the sphere of mathematics, and in the sphere of inorganic nature (*e.g.* τὸ πῦρ), there are no variations; but in the sphere of biological adaptation, to which *τὰ δίκαια*—man's actions—belong, *variations are natural*. Then follow the words ἀλλ' ὀμοσ... *οὐ φύσει*, which are unnecessary because they have been anticipated by the words ἐστι μὲν τί καὶ φύσει. Jackson makes the whole section τοῦτο δ... *οὐ φύσει* parenthetical; but this, after all, removes formally rather than practically the difficulty inherent in the sequence—παρ' ὧν ἐστι μὲν τί καὶ φύσει, κινητον μέντοι πάν, ἀλλ' ὀμοσ ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δὲ οὐ φύσει. However, we must not expect too much logical order from the present writer, who, moreover, expresses himself so awkwardly as to seem guilty of the inaccuracy of ascribing δίκαια (through ἀκίνητα δίκαια) to the gods, contrary to the express teaching of his school (see *E. N.* x. 1178 b. 10). It is to relieve him of responsibility for such an inaccuracy that Susemihl brackets the whole clause καίτων παρὰ γε 28... *οὐ φύσει* 30. But perhaps we need not understand κυνεῖται τὰ δίκαια after οὐδαμῶς 29, with Grant, Jackson, Susemihl, and Peters. It may be allowable to supply κυνεῖται τὸ φύσει.

b. 34. § 4. πάντος] Bekker reads τίνας, against all the MSS. apparently, and against *M. M.* i. 33. 1194 b. 33.

§ 5. ὄνοματι... πολούσιν] *sc.* οἱ ἐμποροι, Jackson. Dealers buying up corn or wine in large quantities compute by means of large units of measurement; but when they retail their stock they find it convenient to use smaller units—*e.g.* bottles instead of hogsheads. It may be useful to append here the passage in which the writer of the *M. M.* discusses the distinction between *τὸ φύσει δίκαιον* and *τὸ νόμος δίκαιον*—i. 33. 1194 b. 30 τῶν δὲ δικαίων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν φύσει τὰ δὲ νόμοι. ἐδεί δ' οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν μή ὦς μηδέποτε ἄν μεταπεσόντα καὶ γὰρ τὰ φύσει οὕτα μεταλαμβάνουσας μεταβολῆς. λέγω δ' οὖν εἰ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ μελετῶμεν πάντες ἀεὶ βάλλειν, γνωρίζομεν ἄν ἀμφιδέξιον ἀλλὰ φύσει γε ἀριστερὰ ἐστιν, καὶ τὰ δεξιὰ οὕτων ἦττον φύσει βελτίω ἐστὶ τῆς ἀριστερᾶς, κἂν πάντα ποιῶμεν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ καθώσπερ τῇ δεξιᾷ. οὐδ' ὅτι μεταπτήσουσι, διὰ τούτο οὐκ ἐστὶν φύσει' ἀλλ' εἰ ὦς εἶπ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τῶν πλείων χρόνων οὕτω διαμένει ἡ ἀριστερὰ οὕτα ἀριστερὰ καὶ ἡ δεξιὰ δεξιά, τούτο φύσει ἐστίν. ὡςποτε ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει δικαίως, μή, εἰ μεταβάλλει διὰ τῆν ἡμετέραν
§§ 6 and 7.] 'We have a transition of subject now,' says Grant, a. 5. 'a return from the digression on civil justice, to inquire into individual responsibility, &c. The transition is made by saying that the principles of justice and injustice (τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ ἁκόν) are universals, and differ from just and unjust acts.' See M. M. i. 33. 1195 a. 8 τὸ δ' ἁκόν καὶ τὸ ἁκοῖμα δόζειν ἢν εἶναι οὐτω ταῦταν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁκόλογον ἐστίν τὸ νόμω ώριμένων, οἷον τὸ τήν παρακαταβαθμὸν ἀποστερήσας ἁκόλογον ἐστί, τὸ δ' ἁκοῖμα ἐστιν τὸ ἢδη ἁκοῖς τι πράξαι. ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ δικαιοπράγμα σὺ ταῦταν τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον τὸ τὰ νομώ ώριμένων, τὸ δὲ δικαιοπράγμα τὸ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν.

§ 7. καθ' ἐκαστόν δὲ αὐτῶν . . . ἐπισκέπτετον] Ramsauer is perhaps a. 13. right in suspecting that these words are interpolated. The word ὑστερον can scarcely point to anything so near as the following chapter, to which Zell and Michelet make it refer. The Politics ('intended book or books πεπί νόμων' Jackson) or Rhét. (i. 13. 1373 b. 1 sqq.) could not be referred to in this way by the writer of the Fifth Book.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Just and unjust acts being what we have described, to act justly or unjustly a man must perform them voluntarily. If he perform them involuntarily, they are accidentally or nominally, not really, just or unjust acts; i.e. they are merely just or unjust acts, not his just or unjust acts. Thus, if a man restore a deposit involuntarily under compulsion, he 'acts justly' in a nominal, not in a real sense. Further, a voluntary act may be done either with or without deliberate choice, i.e. either after we have turned it over in our minds, or without previous thought. Now, to apply these distinctions to the classification of the ways in which one member of society may 'hurt' another—

(1) When one man hurts another without knowing that he is doing so, and in circumstances in which he could not be expected to know, we say that 'an accident' has happened.

k k
(2) But when he might have known, though acting without evil intent, we say that his act is 'culpable'—for an act which can be traced to something in the man (here to his not knowing when he might have known) is 'culpable,' an act which is due to something external to the man (e.g. to his not knowing when it was impossible for him to know) is a mere 'accident.'

(3) When a man hurts another knowingly, but without premeditation, e.g. in anger, his act is an 'act of injustice,' but he is not himself in virtue of it 'an unjust man.'

(4) If, however, he hurt, deliberately choosing to do so, i.e. with premeditation, he is 'an unjust man,' and his act is an 'act of injustice' in the strict sense, i.e. one for which strictly no excuse can be found. But where sudden anger causes a man to inflict hurt, premeditation is excluded, and an extenuating circumstance may be found in the provocation which roused his anger; for anger arises when a man thinks that he is unjustly treated; and in judging the act which springs from his anger, we have to ask—'Has he been unjustly treated?—How far has he received real provocation?' Here it is evident that both parties may dispute in good faith, each believing that he has justice on his side. Not so where the question is not about the justice of an admitted act, but whether (e.g. in a business transaction) something has been done or not, e.g. if A asserts that he has paid B, and B denies A's assertion, one of the parties must be deliberately trying to treat the other unjustly, unless the whole dispute be due to a slip of memory.

It is of course with the discrimination of the different degrees of guilt attaching to voluntary transgressions that a court of criminal justice has mainly to do. But there are certain involuntary actions which it cannot overlook—those involuntary actions which are not done accidentally in consequence of an excusable ignorance of mere particulars, but are blindly and ignorantly done under the influence of brutal and unnatural impulses.

1135 a. 15. § 1.] Rhet. i. 13 should be read carefully with this chapter. The following is the version of the subject of this chapter given by the writer of the M. M.—he does not seem to have had the chapter before him in the form in which we have it—M. M. i. 33. 1195 a. 14 πότε οὖν τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ πότε οὖ; ὃς ἀπλῶς μὲν εἰσίν, ὅταν πράττῃ κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ἐκουσίως (τὸ δὲ ἐκουσίως ὃ ἤν, ἔχοντα εἰς τοὺς ἐπάνω ὑπακούοντα), καὶ ὅταν εἰδός καὶ ὁ καὶ φιλότητα ἐστω καὶ ἐδοκεῖς καὶ φιλότητα ἐστω, ὁ ἀδικός εἰσται ὁ εἰδός καὶ ὁ καὶ φιλότητα ἐστω. ὅταν δὲ μηθεὶς τοῦτων εἰδός πράξῃ τι δίκαιον, δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἑστιν, ἐπαγγελθεὶς δὲ. εἰ γὰρ οἴμοις τῶν πολέμων ἀποκτείνειν τῶν πατέρας ἀπεκτείνειν, δίκαιον μὲν τι ἐπαρέχεται, ἄδικει μέσον αὐθεντικά, ἐπαγγελθεὶς δὲ. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ μῆν ἄδικες τὰ ἄδικα πράττοιται ἐν τῷ ἁγιοίς ἐστιν τοῦτο, ὁ καὶ μικρῶν ἐπάνω ἑλέγετο, ὅταν μή εἰδώς μήθει ὁ βλάπτει μηθ' ὃ μήθ' ὁ ἐνεκείς ἄλλα ἢ δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀγνοια ψυχικής ἐστίν, πῶς δὲ γνωμονής τῆς ἁγιοιας, ἢ βλάπτει, οὐκ ἄδικες, ἐστι δὲ ὁ ἀδικείς. ἐστι δ' οὖν τὸ διαφανές. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἁγιος αἰτία τοῦ πράξῃ τι, οὐδὲν τοῦτο πράττετε, ὅταν οὐκ ἄδικείς ὅταν δὲ τῆς ἁγιοιας αὐτὸς ἢ
BOOK V: CHAP. 8: §§ 1-3.

Ko T[a] τι κατά τήν ἰγνοιαν ἦς αὐτὸς αἰτίος ἐστὶν, οὗτος ἦδη 1135 b. 15. ἀδικεῖ, καί δικαιὸς ἄδικος οὗ τοιοῦτος ἐλήμθησε. οὗν ἐπὶ τῶν μεθύνων. οἱ γὰρ μεθύνοντες καὶ πράξαντες τι κακὸν ἄδικονσίν τῆς γὰρ ἰγνοιας αὐτοῦ εἰσιν ἀιτίοι' ἐξῆν γὰρ ἀιτίῳ μὴ πίνει τοιοῦτον, δι' ἀγνοῆσαντας τύπτων τῶν πατέρα. ὁμοίως [καὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν άλλων ἀγνοίων δεῖ μὲν γίνονται δι᾽ αὐτοῦς, οἱ κατὰ ταῦτα ἄδικοντες ἄδικοι δὲ μὴ ἀιτίῳ εἰσὶν ἀιτίοι, ἀλλ' ἡ ἰγνοια κάκεινος ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῖς πράξασι τοῦ πράξατι, οὐκ ἄδικοι. ἦστιν δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ἰγνοια ἡ φυσική, οὗν τὰ παιδία ἰγνοοῦντα τοὺς πατέρας τύπτουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν τούτω ἰγνοια φυσική οὖσα οὐκ οὔτε διὰ τὴν πράξιν ταύτην τὰ παιδία λέγεσθαι ἄδικα' ἡ γὰρ ἰγνοια αἰτία τοῦ πράττεν ταῦτα, τῆς δ' ἰγνοιας οὐκ αὐτὰ αἴτα, διὸ οὔν' ἄδικα λέγονται.

§ 1. έκόνοι] see Rhet. i. 13. 1373 b. 27 ἐστι δὴ τὸ ἄδικεσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ a. 17. ἐκόνοις τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν τὸ γὰρ ἄδικεσθαι ὁμοίως πρότερον ἐκούσοι εἰσὶν.

οἷς γὰρ συμβεβηκε...πράττουσιν] i. e. τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δίκαια η ἦς a. 18. ἄδικα πράττουσιν.

§ 2. ἐσται τι ἄδικον] i. e. ἄδικον κατὰ συμβεβηκός. a. 22.

§ 3. πρότερον] cf. E. E. ii. 9. 1225 b. 1. sq. and E. Ν. iii. 1. 20. a. 23.

όν (ζενέκα)...τόνος ζενέκα] the tendency or result of the act: see a. 25. Grant's note on iii. 1. 18.

κακείων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μηδὲ βία[...] 'mistake and a. 20. compulsion being excluded in each case.' Τύπτειν τῶν πατέρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός would be to beat him, mistaking him for some one else; τύπτειν τῶν πατέρα βία, to beat him in the circumstances described in line 27. Mich. Eph. is right in explaining μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός here as equivalent to μὴ βίᾳ ἰγνοια. His words are—τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι τὰ καθέκαστα κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ γνωρίζει ἄν τις ταῦτα δὲν ἡ ἰγνοια ἀκούσιον ἐποίη τὸ γνώμενον, οὗτος δὲν τοῦ δείκνυσιν' τὸ γὰρ τῶν πατέρα τύπτων ἐν νυκτομαχίᾳ, καὶ γνωρίζων μὲν ὅτι ἄνθρωπον τύπτει, ἰγνοῦν δὲ δι' ὅτι ὅ νῦπτει ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἄν ἐν περὶ τὸν πατέρα ἡ πράξεις, ὅσ πρὸς μὲν ἄνθρωπον καθ' αὐτό, ὅσ δὲ πρὸς πατέρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός' διότι καὶ ἀκούσιος ἢ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὠβρυ τοῦ ὑπο.

τὸ δὲ ἰγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἰγνοοόμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῶ δ' ὃν, ἢ βία, a. 31. ἀκούσιον] Have we a three-fold or a two-fold division of ἀκούσια here? Mich. Eph. tells us—a two-fold division. He says—δεὶ δὲ ἐν τῇ λέξει τῇ ἡ βία α.EVT τοῦ ἢ τὸ ἄλλα γράφειν...τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἄλλα βίᾳ ἀκούσιον. According to this view, then, ἦ is not disjunctive but explanatory, and we have the old division into τὰ δὲ ἰγνοοι and τὰ ἀκούσια.
I have little doubt that a three-fold division is really intended, the clause πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. explaining and giving illustrations of τὸ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ δὲ δυν., as distinguished from both τὸ ἀγνοούμενον and τὸ βιά. Τὰ φύσει ὑπάρχοντα are opposed to τὸ βιά (cf. for this opposition Μετ. I. 1. 1052 a. 23 εἴ τι φύσει τοιοῦτον καὶ μὴ βιά, Φυσ. Π. 5. 205 b. 5 εἴα γὰρ ἐν τί ποιεῖ βιά καὶ οὐχ οὐ δεισεῖν).

So far as τὰ βίαια are concerned, πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν εἰδότες: but these βίαια are not the only 'involuntary actions' which we perform εἰδότες: πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων (as well as τὰ βίαια) are involuntary, and yet εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν. The words δὲν οὐδὲν οὐθ᾽ ἐκώσιον οὔτ᾽ ἀκούσιον ἐστιν Rassow (Forsch. p. 95) has shown conclusively, I think, to be wrong. Γηρὰν and ἀποθνῄσκειν belong to the same class of φυσικά as βερμαίνεσθαι, ἀλγεῖν, and πεσέναι, which in Ε.Ν. iii. 5. 7 are said to be μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν μὴθ᾽ ἐκώσια, the implication being that they are ἀκούσια. Accordingly Rassow proposes to read δὲν οὐδὲν οὐθ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν οὐθ᾽ ἐκώσιαν ἐστιν instead of the δὲν οὐδὲν οὐθ᾽ ἐκώσιον οὔτ᾽ ἀκούσιον ἐστιν of the MSS. Spengel (Arist. Stud. p. 211) had proposed simply to read δὲν οὐδὲν ἐκώσιον ἐστιν, διὸ τὸ γηρὰν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν. οὔτ᾽ ἀκούσιον is, I think, plainly an interpolation; and the passage iii. 5. 7. 1113 b. 19 sqq., quoted by Rassow, is certainly in favour of his conjecture οὔτ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν οὐθ᾽ ἐκώσιον, for the collocation occurs twice in it. But looking simply at the palaeographical conditions of the present passage itself, should we not be safer in accepting Spengel's suggestion?¹

The force of καὶ (omitted however by Ha, Mb, Q, CCC) is explained by Mich. Eph.—καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός καὶ τὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ. CCC and Pb read καὶ after ὀμοίως.

For the distinction drawn here see Plato, Λέκκ. ix. 862 B σχεδὸν γὰρ, ὁ φίλος, οὔτ᾽ εἰ τίς τῷ διδωτί τι τῶν ὄντων οὔτ᾽ εἰ τοιούτων ἀφαιρεῖται, δίκαιον ὀπλός ἢ ἀδικον χρὴ τὸ τουιτοῦν οὕτω λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ήθει καὶ δικαίω τρόπος χρόμενός τις ἀδική τυα τι καὶ βλάπτῃ, τούτῳ ἐστι τῷ νομοθετ. θεατῶν, καὶ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλεπτέοιν, πρὸς τέ αὐτίκαι καὶ βλάβην.

If it be thought still safer to retain the reading of the MSS., we must remember that the clause πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. is introduced to explain a list of ἀκούσια, and therefore can only mean that these φύσει ὑπάρχοντα are not voluntary. Jackson's parenthesis a. 19 ἀδίκημα—α. 33 ἀκούσιον, separating this clause from what immediately precedes, cannot, I think, be right.

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§§ 6–9.] There are three forms of βλάβη—viz. ἀτύχημα, ἀμάρτημα, b. 11.
and ἀδίκημα. When the hurt is inflicted μετ' ἄγνοιας and the agent
is not the cause of the ἄγνοια—the circumstances being such that he
could not be expected to foresee what is going to happen—the hurt
is an ἀτύχημα, an accident, or misadventure. It belongs to the class
of τὰ δὴ ἄγνοια (E. N. iii. 1. 13). When the hurt is inflicted μετ'
ἀγνοιας, but the agent is the cause of the ἄγνοια (i.e. acts ἄγνοιῶν—
E. E. ii. 9, E. N. iii. 1. 14—as a drunken man does—but not with
the ἄγνοια of the μοχθήρος—E. N. iii. 1. 14—for the words ἄνων δὲ
κακίας exclude that kind of ignorance), and might be expected, but
for this voluntary ἄγνοια, to foresee what is going to happen, the
hurt is a ἀμάρτημα—culpable. When a man inflicts hurt εἰδὼς μὲν
μὴ προβοσκευόμενος δὲ, under the sudden influence of one of the natural
elementary passions of human nature—especially θυμός—the hurt
is an ἀδίκημα—an injury. But we cannot infer from an injury inflicted
under such circumstances that the agent is a bad or unjust man.
If, however, the injury is inflicted deliberately, with premeditation,
then we may infer that the agent is a bad or unjust man.
There are thus really four kinds of βλάβη which a court of justice
has to distinguish. A hurts B. It is for the court to find out
whether the hurt is an ἀτύχημα, or a ἀμάρτημα, or an ἀδίκημα ἄνων
προνοιας, or an ἀδίκημα ἐκ προνοιας.

§ 6. βλάβων] βλάβη is hurt or damage as such generically; while
willful hurt, i.e. injury, is ἀδίκημα: see Liddell and Scott s. v. βλάβη.

μετ' ἄγνοιας] not, as Rams. seems to think, equivalent to δὲ b. 12.
ἀγνοιαν. The writer uses μετ' ἄγνοιας as a neutral phrase to cover
τὰ δὲ ἄγνοια, i.e. ἀτυχήματα, and δὲ ἄγνοιῶν πράττει, i.e. ἀμαρτήματα
strictly so called.

ἀμαρτήματα] 'here includes ἀτυχήματα as well as ἀμαρτήματα in the
narrower sense in which the word is used in § 7.' Jackson.

ἡ οὖχ ψ] ψ as vulg. Rassow (Forsch. p. 61) restores ψ, the reading b. 16.
of Kb (and CCC), as being consistent with τοῦτο, line 14 above.
§ 7. ἀκακίας] added (as μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας is added in the passage quoted from the Rhet.) to exclude the chronic ἁγνοια of the μοχθηρός, as distinguished from the temporary ἁγνοια of the μεθύων. What is called in E. N. iii. 1.14 the ἁγνοια of ὀργή is also excluded: for the θυμὸν ποιῶν is said in § 8 of the present chapter to act εἰθῶς μὲν μὴ προβολεύοντας ἄγριος. In E. N. iii. 1.14 he is coupled with the μεθύων as ἁγνοῶν—see Jackson’s note on v. 8. 6, in which he calls attention to this difference between the ‘Aristotelian’ view and the ‘Eudemian.’ It is to be noted, however, that in § 12 of the present chapter the writer speaks of those who act διὰ πάθους (μὴ νυκτοίκην μὴν ἀνθρώπων, it is true) as ἁγνοῶντες.

We are to understand the ἀμαρτήματα, then, of this section as ἁλάβας inflicted by a drunken or careless (but not necessarily vicious) person. Such a person would be culpae reus, in the language of Roman law. ἁλάβας inflicted under the influence of anger belong to the class of ἀδίκήματα—injuriae dolo commissae—not to that of ἀμαρτήματα. Ἀτύχημα is the casus of Roman Law: cf. Gaius iii. § 211 (p. 227, ed. Gneist)—‘Is injuria autem occidere intelligitur cujus dolo (resulting in ἀτυχήμα) aut culpa (resulting in ἀμαρτήμα) id acciderit, nec ulla alia legem damnun (i. e. θλιβή) quod sine injuria datur reprehenditur: itaque inpunitus est qui sine culpa et dolo malo, casu (resulting in ἀτύχημα) quodam damnun committit.’

The following passage from Justinian iv. 3. §§ 3–8 (p. 227, ed. Gneist) may be compared to illustrate the nature of culpa (resulting in ἀμαρτημα), and its difference from casus (resulting in ἀγαττημα)—

'Ac ne is quidem hac lege tenetur qui casu occidit, si modo culpa ejus nulla inveniatur . . . . . Itaque si quis, dum jaculis ludit vel exercitatur, transeuntem servum tuum trajecerit, distinguatur. Nam si id a militie quidem in campo, eoque ubi solitum est exercitari, admissum est, nulla culpa ejus intelligitur; si alius tale quid admiserit, culpae reus est. Idem juris est et de militie, si is in alio loco quam qui exercitandis militibus destinatus est id admissit. Item si putator ex arboare dejecto ramo servum tuum transeuntem occiderit, si prope viam publicam aut vicinalem id factum est, neque proclamavit, ut casus evitari possit, culpae reus est; si proclamavit, neque ille curavit cavere, extra culpam est putator. Aeque extra culpam esse intelligitur, si seorsum a via forte vel in medio fundo caedebat, licet non proclamavit, quia eo loco nulli extraneo jus fuerat versandi. Praeterea si medicus qui servum tuum secuit dereliquerit curationem, atque ob id mortuus fuerit servus, culpae reus est. Imperitia quoque culpae anumeratur, veluti si medicus ideo servum tuum occiderit, quod eum male secuerit aut perperam ei medicamentum dederit. Impetu quoque mularum quas mulio propter imperitiam retinere non potuerit, si servus tuus oppressus fuerit, culpae reus est mulio. Sed et si propter infirmitatem retinere eas non potuerit, cum alius firmior retinere potuisset, aeque culpae tenetur. Eadem placuerunt de eo quoque qui cum equo veheretur impetu ejus aut propter imperitiam aut propter imperitiam suam retinere non potuerit.'

ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ τῆς αἰτίας] 'It is plain,' says b. 18. Jackson, 'that this sentence ought to restate the distinction already drawn between ἀγαττημα and ἀμαρτημα: but it is difficult to see how ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ τῆς αἰτίας—so the MSS., except Ὁ ἁ Ὅ ὁ [and B^2] (which have εκαίσας), and all the editors—can be equivalent to μὴ παραλόγως, and ὅταν ἐξωθεν τὸ παραλόγως. Moreover, ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας is a strange phrase. Hence I have supposed αἰτίας to be a corruption of ἀγαττίας, and I find the strongest possible confirmation of my conjecture both in the E. N. and in the M. M. Cf. E. N. iii. 5. § 8: also § 7: and M. M. i. 33. 1195 a. 27 . . . b. 4.' Susemihl
adopts Jackson’s ἀγνώιας. It is true that ἡ ἀρχή τῆς αἰτίας (= princi- 
podium causae) is a strange phrase; and I should feel tempted to 
mend it, either by substituting another word for αἰτίας, or by 
retaining αἰτίας in another sense, as equivalent to criminis instead 
of causae, were it not for the fact that I find Hippocrates (περὶ 
ἀρχαῖς ιτηρίκης 1. ed. Littre vol. i. p. 570) using the same expression 
ἡ ἀρχή τῆς αἰτίας = princiuitum causae—ὅκισον ἐπεχείρησαι περὶ ἰτηρίκης 
λέγειν ἡ γράφειν, ὑπόθεσαι σφίσιν αὐτέως οὐ ποθώμενοι τῷ λόγῳ, θερμών, 
ἡ ψυχρών, ἡ ψυρρών, ἡ ἔρημών, ἡ ἄλλη ὁ τι ἐν ἐθέλωσιν, ἐς βραχὺ ἀγωντες, τὴν 
ἀρχήν τῆς αἰτίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῶν νοοῦσιν τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, καὶ 
πάση τῆς αὐτῆς, ἐν ἡ δῶ προβήμενοι, εἰς πολλοῖς μὲν καὶ οἴσι λέγοισιν 
cαταφαινέει εἰσά ἀμαρτάνοντες. The fact that the phrase does else-
where occur (though not in the Aristotelian writings), to my mind 
turns the balance in favour of retaining it here.

Thus ὃ θυμὸν ποιῶν is accounted εἰδῶς. In N. E. iii. 
§ 8. εἰδῶς] ‘Thus ὃ θυμὸν ποιῶν is accounted εἰδῶς. In N. E. iii. 
1 § 14 he is classed with the μεθύων as an ἄγνωιαν: ἔτερου δ’ ἐνικε 
kai τὸ δ’ ἄγνωιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἄγνωοντα ποιεῖν ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἡ ἀργιζό-
μενος οὐ δοκεῖ δ’ ἄγνωιαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδῶς δὲ, 
ἀλλ’ ἄγνωια.’ Jackson, ad loc.

b. 21. ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] Jackson points 
out that this second ὅσα is the subject of συμβαίνει. He accordingly 
removes Bekker’s commas after πάθη and φυσικά. Mich. Eph. disting-
guishes between φυσικά and ἀναγκαῖα πάθη—εἰσὶ δ’ πάθη φυσικά, ἐρωτεῖς, 
λύσαι, φάζον ἀναγκαῖα δὲ πείνα δίψα: but I think it is doubtful whether 
any distinction is intended. The writer probably wishes merely to 
point out that certain normal appetites (called indifferently φυσικά 
or ἀναγκαῖα) common to all men, breaking out suddenly to seek 
satisfaction, may occasion injurious acts which must be treated 
differently in the criminal court from injurious acts deliberately 
planned for the satisfaction of these (natural) or other (factitious) 
appetites. It is true, however, that in vii. 4. 2 the ἀναγκαῖα with 
which the ἀκρατῆς ἀπλῶς is concerned are identified with τὰ περὶ 
tῆν τροφῆν καὶ τῆν τῶν ἀφροδισιῶν χρείαν, and that another sphere is

1 E. g. αἰκίας: this term (see v. 2. 13), well known to Athenian law, occurs 
in Plato, Legg. ix, to which the present chapter is so deeply indebted; and in 
Pol. ii. 4. 1262 a. 26 aἰκίας committed by persons who are ἀγγούωνες 
are distinctly contemplated. Ἡ, Μ, and B, with αἰκίας, might be supposed to 
exhibit a divergent form, which, when compared with the aἰτίας of other 
MSS., would point to an original aἰκίας.
assigned to the ἀκραγὰς θυμὸν. Accordingly, if it is necessary to suppose that the writer means to distinguish ἀναγκαία and φυσικὰ here, it would be true to say that (as Jackson explains ad loc. p. 112) φυσικὰ πάθη are those κοινὰ πάσι καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσον κοινὰ (E. N. vii. 6. 2), and ἀναγκαία πάθη a species of the φυσικα, including ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ περὶ τὸν τροφὴν κ.τ.λ.

οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταύτα οὐδὲ πονηρόι: οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἦ b. 23. βλάβη. 1 ὅταν δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός] i.e. the merely instinctive operation of these natural passions, resulting in injurious acts, does not argue a bad character. It is when these passions are made 'objects of reflection,' and when the means of gratifying them to the injury of other people are deliberately sought out, that we can infer a bad character. It is obvious that among these natural passions there are some which call in the aid of reflection more readily than others: cf. vii. 6. 3, where ἐπιθυμία generally, as distinguished from θυμὸς, is described as ἐπίθυμος. Hence the prominence given in the present passage to τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ as examples of τὰ μὴ ἐκ προνοιῶν.

For the distinction between injurious acts produced by the un-premeditated operation of ἀναγκαία ἔνοψ φυσικὰ πάθη, and injury inflicted deliberately—especially in the form of συνομοματία—in order to gratify spite or greed, see Probl. κ.θ. 13. 951 b. 27 (quoted by Zell and Ramsauer)—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικων καὶ δὲ ὀργῆν καὶ διὰ φόβουν καὶ δὲ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ δὲ ἀλλα πολλά γίνεται, καὶ οὐ μὸνον ἐκ προνοιῶν τὸ δὲ ἄδικος ἑγκαλεῖν ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἐκ προνοιῶν ἐστὶν.

§ 9. διὸ καλὸς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοιῶν κρίνεται] τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ, b. 25. acts done in the heat of sudden anger. In the Laws (ix. 866 D—867 B—a passage referred to by Bywater, Journal of Philology, 1874, v. 115, and, after him, by Jackson, for the explanation of οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖσσαι τὰ ἀγνοεῖς at the end of § 10 below), Plato distinguishes between two classes of οἱ θυμῶν ποιῶτες, viz. οἱ ἐξαιρέσι καὶ ἀπροβουλεύσι πράττοντες, and οἱ μετ’ ἐπιθυμεῖσσαι ὑπερτοῦν χρῶν τιμωρούμενον. His words are—Ἐὰν δὲ αἱ τις αὐτόχειρ μὲν κτείνῃ ἔλειδθον, θυμῶν δὲ δὲ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἐκπαιδεύειν, διὸ δὲ πρῶτον τὸ τοιοῦτον διαλαβεῖν. θυμῶν γὰρ δὲ πέπρακται καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸν ἐξαιρέσεις μὲν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύσι τοῦ ἀποκτείναι πληγάς ἤ των τοιοῦτον διαφθείρωσι τών παραχήμα τῆς ὀρμῆς γενομένης, μεταφελεί τε εὐθὺς τοῦ πεπραγμένον γίνεται, θυμῶν δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖσσαι προσήκοισθεῖτε λόγοις ἢ καὶ ἀτέμιτοι ἔργοι, μεταδιώκοντες

1 Jackson inserts ch. 6. §§ 1 and 2 here: see his Introduction, pp. xvii−xix.
§§ 9, 10. In trying a case of assault, the court, having first satisfied itself that the assault, alleged by the ὑβρισταὶ as διώκων, and admitted by the ὑβριστός ὁ ποιῶν as φεύγων, was committed in the heat of sudden anger, and therefore without premeditation, allows the ὑβριστός ὁ ποιῶν to plead in justification of his offence so committed, and in mitigation of its penalty, that the ὑβρισταὶ provoked it by what either really was unjust treatment, or might naturally in the circumstances be mistaken for unjust treatment. The question before the court is—Was there provocation, or apparent provocation, sufficient to justify the assault in any degree?—περὶ τοῦ δικαίου
The finding may be that the διώκων is μοχθηρός, but it cannot be that the φεύγων is μοχθηρός. It is only in cases where the fact of the offence alleged by the διώκων is denied by the φεύγων (ὅταν περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητῶσι), that one or other of the two parties (it is uncertain which) must be μοχθηρός, and guilty of deliberately wronging the other—either the διώκων in bringing an accusation which he knows to be false, or the φεύγων in having committed an offence which he does not attempt to justify, but denies; see Rhet. iii. 17. 1417 b. 27 (quoted by Jackson)—μὴ λαυθανέτω ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει (i.e. τῇ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι) μόνῃ τοῦ ἔτερου ἐίναι ποιητῶν οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄρνοις αἰτία, ἀλλὰ ἐν εἰς τινες περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῖν: cf. Pol. Δ. 13. 1300 b. 25 (quoted by Grant, Jackson and Ramsauer) περὶ τῶν ἐκ προφοίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκοοσιών, καὶ ὡς ὁμολογεῖται μὲν, ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου.

I said above that I do not agree with Bywater and Jackson in identifying the ἐπιβουλεύσας of § 10 either entirely or partly with the man who takes time to retaliate—ὁ τῶν θυμῶν φιλάττων καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχώρημα ἐξαίφνης, ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς ὑπερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενος of Legg. ix. 867 A. ‘The man who takes time to retaliate’—ὁ μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς τιμωρούμενος—does not lose sight of the φανομένη ἄδικα, because he ‘takes time’; and his act of retaliation is, as often as not, done openly, and its reason avowed afterwards. The issue before the court would then be περὶ τοῦ δικαίου and not περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι. But the ἐπιβουλεύσας of § 10, I take it, as contrasted with the θυμὸς ποιῶν (ὁ οἰόμενος άδικεῖσθαι) is a person whose conduct does not raise the issue περὶ τοῦ δικαίου. He cannot therefore be identified with the μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς τιμωρούμενος who avows his premeditated act, and pleads justification—with success, as we sometimes see in the French and Italian law-courts. Nor can it be right to identify him (as the Paraph. does) with the ὁργίσας, who may be entirely innocent of the ἄδικα attributed to him by the θυμὸς ποιῶν. It only remains that we identify him with the man who deliberately injures his neighbour not by way of revenge for real or imagined wrong. A good example of such an ἐπιβουλεύσας is ὁ ἄδικος ἐγκαλῶν, or ὁ συκοφαντῶν of Probil. ΚΘ. 13. 951 b. 29, and 952 a. 1, who, as διώκων, accuses the φεύγων of having done something, which the latter denies having done. In such an ἀμφισβητήσει περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι, if the jurors’ votes are divided equally for the διώκων and for the φεύγων, the verdict is, of course, given in favour of the
latter—but the writer is at pains to explain why—because the διώκων, if he has really brought a false accusation against the φεύγων, must be held to have done so knowingly and ἐκ προνοιας, whereas the φεύγων, if he committed the offence charged, may have committed it ἀνευ προνοιας. The passage runs as follows—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
dὲ ὀργῆν καὶ διὰ φόβου καὶ δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ δὲ ἀλλα πολλὰ γίνεται, καὶ οὐ
μόνον ἐκ προνοιας· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἐγκαλεῖν ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἐκ προνοιας ἐστίν.
ὡστε ἐπεὶ ἦσαν ἡ ἑγνώσαμεν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα ἐγκαλεῖν
cαὶ τὸν φεύγοντα ἀδικεῖν, φαινοντο κριθεῖν τοῦ ἀδικως ἐγκαλοῦντος τὸ νικάν
τῷ φεύγοντι ὃ νομοθέτης ἀπένειμεν... 952 α. ὃ ἔτι μείζω μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ ἐκ
προνοιας ἀδικως ὃ μὴ ἐκ προνοιας. ὃ μὲν δὴ συκοφαντών ἂν ἂν ἐκ προνοιας ἀδικεῖν, ὃ δὲ 
ἔτερον τι ἀδικών τὰ μὲν δὲ ἀνάγκην τὰ δὲ δὲ ἄγνωσθαι, τὰ δὲ ὅπως
ἐτυχεν ἀδικεῖν αὐτῷ συμπέπτει. ὡστε ἐπεὶ ἦσαν γένωσαι αἱ ψήφοι, ὃ μὲν διώκων
κέκριται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμίσεων ἐκ προνοιας ἀδικεῖν, ὃ δὲ φεύγων ὑπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν αὐτῷ
ἀδικεῖν μὲν οὐ μὲντοι γε ἐκ προνοιας, ὡστε ἐπεὶ ἀδικεῖν μείζω κέκριται ὃ διώκων
τοῦ φεύγοντος, εἰκότως ὃ νομοθέτης νικὰν ἐκρίνε τὸν τὰ διάτω ἀδικοῦντα.

The ἐπιβουλεύσας, then, being the man who deliberately injures
his neighbour (by bringing a false accusation against him, or
otherwise) without having received provocation, the δὲ μὲν b. 33 will
be the θυμόφω ποιών—the man who retaliates in the heat of anger—and
the δὲ δὲ will be the ἐπιβουλεύσας as just described. I think that
the whole passage from δῶ b. 25 to δ᾽ οὖ b. 1136 a. 1 is of the nature
of a parenthesis; and that the words εἰν δ᾽ ἐκ προωφείσεως Βλάψης,
ἀδικεὶ a. 1 resume the main thread of the discussion by repeating,
in a slightly altered form, what had been said before the parenthesis,
viz. ὃ ἔτιν δ᾽ ἐκ προωφείσεως, ἀδικος καὶ μοχθηρὸς b. 25. The sense of the
whole parenthesis from δῶ to δ᾽ οὖ may be brought out thus—An
act done in the heat of anger is not treated at law as an act pre-
meditated by the agent: for (1) it arises from provocation received
from another; and (2) the agent as φεύγων admits the act, and
pleads in justification the provocation which he has received. He
stands on an entirely different footing from that of the two
parties in an ἀρμοφῳθησις περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι who is proved guilty—
for one or other of them must be guilty of premeditated wrong—
either the φεύγων of committing an act which he knows cannot
be justified, and therefore denies, or the διώκων of bringing an ac-
cusation which he knows to be false. The party found guilty in
such a case differs from the θυμόφω ποιών in not being unaware of
having plotted an injury (ὁ δὲ ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγροεῖ), and in
not thinking that he has received an injury which justifies his act
(δ μὲν [i. e. ὁ θυμὼς ποιῶν] οἴηται ἄδικεισθαι, δ ὁ [i. e. ὁ ἐπιβουλέως 1135 b. 25. λέοντας] οὗ).

Mich. Eph., Coraes, Michelet, Nötel, and Peters, refer δ μὲν and δ δὲ to the ὀργίσας and the θυμὼς ποιῶν (they differ, however, as to which is which), thus treating the words δ ὁ ἐπιβουλέως οὐκ ἄγνοεί as parenthetical (Nötel rejects them from the text—Quaestitionum Aristotelearum specimen, p. 43). The objection to this interpretation is that the ὀργίσας may or may not be conscious of having done something to merit the retaliation of the θυμὼς ποιῶν, and accordingly the statement δ μὲν οἴηται ἄδικεισθαι would not always be true of him. But it is always true of the θυμὼς ποιῶν, whose sudden ὀργὴ is ἐπὶ φαινομένη ἄδικη. Nor could the words δ δ᾽ οὗ (sc. οἴηται ἄδικεισθαι) always apply to the ὀργίσας. If he is conscious of having done nothing to merit the attack of the θυμὼς ποιῶν, he will think that he has been unjustly treated. It seems plain, then, that the words δ μὲν οἴηται ἄδικεισθαι refer to the θυμὼς ποιῶν, and the words δ δ᾽ οὗ to the ἐπιβουλέως, who, as I have tried to show, is neither the man 'who takes time to retaliate’ (Jackson), nor the ὀργίσας, but that one of the two parties in an ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι who is proved to be μοχθηρός. The words δ δ᾽ ἐπιβουλέως οὐκ ἄγνοεί are thus not to be treated as parenthetical.

ἐπὶ φαινομένη κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche compares E. N. vii. 6. 1. b. 28.

ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν] The Paraph. Heliod. has—οὗ γὰρ, ὡσπερ b. 29. ἐν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις συναλλάγμασιν ἔχει, οὕτω κανταῦθα ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις γίνεται: ἐν ἐκείνως μὲν γὰρ ἡ πράξεις ἀμφισβητεῖται οἷον, εἰ θαλαθὶ τὴν παρακατάθηκην ἢ τὸ δάνειον, καὶ λαβὼν οὐκ ἀπέδωκε, καὶ τοῦτο δειχθῆ, ποιηταὶ εὐθὺς καὶ ἀδικός ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἐπιλαθόμενος ἀρνεῖται—i. e. the reference is to ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα—e. g. B sues A for an alleged debt; and A swears that he has already paid it: one of the two must be μοχθηρός, unless the one in error has simply forgotten the circumstance in dispute—B the circumstance of his having been paid, or A the circumstance of his not having paid.

ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν] 'I think,' says Jackson ad loc., b. 31. 'that the subject of δρῶσιν is δ τε ὀργίσας καὶ δ ὀργισθελε, who do not raise the issue of fact unless they do it through forgetfulness, i. e.

1 This seems to be the only legitimate way of completing the clause. Nötel (p. 43) supplies οἴηται ἔκεινον ἄδικεισθαι, in the interest of his interpretation of the passage.
the forgetfulness which results from anger. These words are commonly understood to refer to the two parties concerned in a συναλλάγμα, "ubi fieri non potest quin eorum alter qui ita controversant pravus sit, nisi forte oblivio intercessit" (Victorius on Rhet. iii. 17): but (1) why is αὐτὸ δρῶσιν in the plural? and (2) what precise idea do these words convey? According to my interpretation, they stand for περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητῶσιν. I confess that I do not see any difficulty in reconciling the plural with the common interpretation. The words ἄν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν are added to qualify the immediately preceding statement, ἄν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἑτέρον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, the subject of δρῶσιν being οἱ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, and αὐτὸ being τὸ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητεῖν. It is practically, if not exclusively, among ἀμφισβητήσεις arising out of ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα that these exceptional cases of τὸ διὰ λήθην δρῶν will occur. It is just possible, however, that in an action arising out of an ἑκούσιον συναλλάγμα, such as assault, the θυμῷ ποιῶν might διὰ λήθην maintain erroneously that he had not committed the assault.

These words, as Ramsauer and Jackson point out, are closely connected with the immediately preceding δικαίωσις, after which, accordingly, a comma, not a full stop (Bekker), should be placed.

when his act is inconsistent with the γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία of Distributive Justice, or the ἀριθμητικὴ ἴστις of Corrective Justice.

This answers to εἰ ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἄδικεὶ above.

as distinguished from προελήμενος δικαίωμα.

This section states the principle according to which συγγραφὴ is to be extended to actions or withheld from them, and, as Ramsauer points out, naturally follows sections in which the writer has laid down principles in accordance with which degrees of guilt may be discriminated in a court of justice: 'συγγραφὴ enim necessario ad τὸν κρίνωσα pertinet.' Jackson has an important note here—'These words ῶταν τοι̉ οὐκείους answer to τῶν δὲ ἑκούσιων in § 5: but it must be observed that the ἑκούσια of the present section include actions which do not appear at all in the foregoing classification. The ὅσα μὴ μόνον ἄγρυστοις ἀλλὰ καὶ δὲ ἄγρυσαν ἄμαρτάνουσιν
are the ἄτυχήματα of § 7: the δοσα μὴ δὲ ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ’ ἄγνοοντες μὲν 1136 a. 5. διὰ πάθος δὲ μὴν φυσικῶν μὴν ἀνθρώπικόν are neither the ἄμαρτήματα nor the ἄδικήματα of §§ 7, 8, but acts characteristic of the inhuman πάθη... compare vii. 5. The acts in question are ἀκούσια because the perpetrators of them are not responsible agents, but they are not συγγνωμονικά, because they are even more detestable than ordinary vicious acts.’ Cf. Grant ad loc.—’The police-courts afford frequent instances of the infliction of brutal injuries which are “not forgivable,” though the perpetrators seem hardly responsible beings.’ Mich. Eph. accordingly is wrong when he says—ἀκούσια νῦν ἵκως λέγειν πάντα τὰ παρὰ προαιρεσιων γινόμενα’ τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πάθος γνώμενα πρὸ ἀλλίων ἐκούσια μὲν εἶπεν ἀποαίρετα δὲ. νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσιοι ὑπάγει καὶ ταῦτα καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν εἰ ἐκούσια λέγων ταῦτα πάλιν ἀκούσια φησιν’ ἐκούσια μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι καθ’ ὅσον οὐ δὲ ἄγνοιαν γίνεται, ἀκούσια δὲ αὐτῶν καθ’ ὅσον οὐ κατὰ προαιρεσιων: wrong also, when he illustrates τὰ διὰ πάθος μὴν φυσικῶν μὴν ἀνθρώπων by τὸ τοιαῦτα προθήκης ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ τοιοῦτο τοὺς πάθος, οἷον σαρκός πέτρικος καὶ οἷον γλυκεῖος, adding that τὰ διὰ ταῦτα ἀμαρτήματα οὐκ ἐστὶ συγγνώμην ἄξιος. If the μὴν φυσικὰ μὴν ἀνθρώπων πάθη of the present section are thus, as Mich. Eph. explains, merely the ἰδιοὶ καὶ ἐπίθετοι ἐπιθυμίαι of iii. ΙΙ. Ι, and not τὰ θηριώδη πάθη of vii. 5, it would not perhaps be inconsistent with the terminology of Book iii to say that the man who acts under their influence does so ἄγνωστοι, and it is not inconceivable that even the writer of the present section might—carelessly perhaps—say so; but it would be in direct opposition to the doctrine common to the Fifth and Third Books to speak of the ἰδιοὶ καὶ ἐπίθετοι ἐπιθυμίαι as producing acts which are ἀκούσια. Since the acts are said to be ἀκούσια, we can only understand that the μὴν φυσικὰ μὴν ἀνθρώπων πάθη which cause them are θηριώδη πάθη.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

It may make our conception clearer of the relation between ‘treating unjustly’ and ‘being treated unjustly,’ if we try to answer, or at least to state, distinctly some difficult questions connected with the subject—

Can a man consent to be treated unjustly?

Or is it always against his will that a man is treated unjustly?
Or is it sometimes with his consent, and sometimes against his will, that a man is treated unjustly?

'Treating unjustly' is always a voluntary act: from which it might be inferred that 'being treated unjustly' is always against the sufferer's will. But on the other hand, although 'treating justly' is always a voluntary act, we find that just treatment is not always voluntarily accepted—for the criminal who is punished is treated justly against his will. What is true, then, of 'being treated justly' may be true also of 'being treated unjustly'—it may be true that sometimes a man receives unjust treatment voluntarily, and sometimes against his will. But when we are told that a man sometimes receives unjust treatment voluntarily, we must refer to a former distinction, and ask—Is the unjust treatment inflicted by an unjust agent, i.e. by one who deliberately intends to inflict unjust treatment? For if not, then it is only nominally and not really that the sufferer is 'treated unjustly,' and it may be true that he voluntarily accepts what is thus nominally unjust treatment, although he could not voluntarily accept what is really unjust treatment, viz. treatment intended to injure him—i.e. could not accept it as intended. Take the case of the incontinent man: with full knowledge of all the circumstances he voluntarily hurts himself, or allows another to hurt him: therefore, it may be argued, a man can voluntarily treat himself unjustly, or injure himself, and voluntarily accept injury from another. But does such a man wish to be treated unjustly? i.e. does he make his own loss or ruin his end? Surely not. He still wishes for his own good, i.e. makes his good his end. What he voluntarily inflicts upon himself, or allows another to inflict, is hurt, not injury. Our answer, then, to the question, Can a man consent to be unjustly treated or injured? is 'No,' for he cannot wish to be injured, i.e. he cannot make his own loss or ruin his end. In short, whenever a man is injured, there must be another person to injure him by acting against his wish, i.e. by ignoring his personality. Accordingly, when a man 'gives away gold for brass,' or, as the equitable man often does, assigns to himself in a distribution less than his legitimate share, he is not really injuring himself. He does not make his own loss or ruin his end; nay, he may have his own good in the form of popularity or honour distinctly in view.

In distribution the charge of injustice attaches to the distributor, not to the party to whom he has awarded too much: and it is never himself but always other people that the distributor injures. If he distribute unfairly, under compulsion or in unavoidable ignorance of essential circumstances, the distribution is of course in itself an unfair one, but the distributor is not held to be an unfair man. If, however, he distribute or decide unfairly with full knowledge of what he is doing, he has generally a personal interest in the form which his award takes—appropriating to himself, if not a bribe, its equivalent in the gratitude of the favoured party, or in the satisfaction of his spite against the unfairly treated party.

Neglect of the distinction on which we have insisted between the nominally and the really just or unjust act, has given rise to the opinion that it is an easy matter to perform just acts, and that the just man has the faculty of performing both just and unjust acts. But, to be really just, acts must be performed by a just man, and a just man is the result of long and difficult training, as a good
BOOK V: CHAP. 9: §§ I, 2. 513

doctor is the result of long study and experience. Moreover, the formed character of the just man is not a faculty capable of producing contraries, but manifests itself only in just acts.

Justice exists only for a being whose participation in the enjoyment of good things may be greater and less than his desert, i.e., it exists for the normal man, not for the gods whose desert is infinitely great—not for the incurably wicked who are harmed by the smallest share of such good things.

§ 1. Απορήσειε β' ἀυ τις, ει ἴκανως διάμοσταί] See Argument of this 1136 a. 10. chapter sub init. for the connexion with the subject of last chapter. In that chapter certain principles by which δικασταί must be guided in estimating the guilt of various offences were laid down. The present chapter pursues the same subject, discussing questions evidently important for δικασταί—viz. How far can a man consent to receive injury? If he consent, is he really injured, and does the offender really injure him, or only do him harm? Or, must we look more to the intention of the offender than to the consent (whatever that may mean) of the sufferer, in estimating the guilt of the offender? Ramsauer indicates the connexion between this chapter and the last by the words—‘Judicis vero quantum intersit, si verum sit volenti non fieri injuriam, nemo non videt.’

Εὐριπίδης εξήκε] Mich. Eph. has—παρατίθεται τὰ τού Ἐυριπίδου ἱσαβεία a. 11. ἐκ τοῦ Βελλέροφωντος εἰς πιστευσὶν τοῦ ἑστὶν ἐκώντα δικαίωσαι. Wagner (Eurip. Fr. p. 40), followed by Dindorf (Eur. Fragm. 'Αλκμέων Α et B) supposes that we have two lines of a στίχομβία from the 'Αλκμαίων ὁ διὰ Ψωφίδος (referred to in E. N. iii. 1. 8). The first line (in which he reads κατέκατα for the κατέκατα of the extant MSS.—the MS. from which the vet. trans. is derived seems to have had κατέκατα) he assigns to Alcmaeon (who has killed his mother), and the second line (after which he places a note of interrogation) he assigns to Phegeus. Fritzsche, adopting a conjecture of Grotius, inserts ὁ before βῆλουσαν (codd.), comparing Eurip. Ἡρώδ. 319 φιλος μ' ἀπελλαν' ὡς ἂνοισαι ὡς ἂν. Sussemihl also reads ἦ ὡς βῆλουσαν: Jackson and Bywater read ἦ ὡς ἂνοισαι.

§§ 1, 2. πότερον γάρ κ.τ.λ.] The reasoning may be exhibited as a. 15. follows:—

ἀδικεῖν is always ἐκώσιον: Is ἀδικεῖσθαι then always ἐκώσιον? Or, is it sometimes ἐκώσιον, sometimes ἐκώσιον?

Perhaps the analogy of δικαίοπραγεῖν and δικαίοςθαι may help us:—

δικαίοπραγεῖν is always ἐκώσιον: But, do we find that δικαίοςθαι is always ἐκώσιον?
BOOK V: CHAP. 9: §§ 1-3.

1136 a. 15. No: δικαιοσθαι is sometimes ἐκώσων, sometimes ἄκοισιον:

So, the analogy of δικαιοπραγεῖν and δικαιοσθαι does not favour the inference that, because ἀδίκως is always ἐκώσων, ἀδίκεισθαι is always ἄκοισιον. It rather favours the inference that ἀδίκεισθαι is sometimes ἄκοισιον, sometimes ἐκώσων.

a. 16. § 1. καὶ ἄρα κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (Forsch. p. 40) raises a difficulty here. If the question πότερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. be answered to the effect that ἀδίκεισθαι is πάν ἐκώσων, the question καὶ ἄρα πᾶν οὖτος ἢ ἐκεῖνος; is excluded: if, on the other hand, it be answered that ἀδίκεισθαι is not πάν ἐκώσων, what is the use of going on to ask whether it is τὸ μὲν ἐκώσων τὸ oriously ἄκοισιον? No one, surely, would suppose that it could be πάν ἐκεῖνος—i.e. πάν ἐκώσων.

The confusion indicated by Rassow doubtless exists. But it need not surprise us. It is caused by the writer's formalism. He makes a point of stating all the formally possible alternatives. There seems to be no suspicion about the substantial soundness of the text, although the words ἄστερ καὶ τὸ ἀδίκως πᾶν ἐκώσων l. 17 are probably a ditto graph of the identical words in the line above.

a. 17. ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκώσων τὸ oriously ἄκοισιον;] 'or is ἀδίκεισθαι sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary?'

a. 19. § 2. ἡστὲ εὐλογον ἄντικεισθαι ὀμοῖος καθ' ἐκάτερον, τὸ ȧ ἀδίκεισθαι καὶ δικαιοίσθαι ἡ ἐκώσων ἢ ἄκοισιον ἢ ἐλιναὶ] Bywater, following K b [and CCC], omits τὸ before δικαιοίσθαι. This seems to dispose of the difficulty which Rassow (Forsch. p. 96) finds in taking τὸ as coupling the whole clause τὸ ȧ ἀδίκεισθαι . . . ἐκώσων εἶναι with what goes immediately before, and to make it unnecessary to consider the conjecture—καὶ for καθ' before ἐκάτερον—with which he proposes to meet the difficulty.

a. 23. § 3. ἕπειτα κ.τ.λ.] I hardly think that Bywater's ἕπειτα (to correspond with πρῶτον μὲν a. 11), for the ἕπει of the codd., is a necessary change. See Argument of this chapter (§§ 3-6) for the further step taken in the discussion here. The writer's feeling when he wrote ἕπει may have been expressed thus—'ἀδίκεισθαι is really (ὡς ἄληθῶς) always ἐκώσων: and cases adduced to prove that it is not always ἐκώσων (just as δικαιοθαι is not always ἐκώσων) are deceptive: for (ἐπεὶ § 3), if we examine them, we shall find that they are only cases of ἀδικα πάσχειν, not of ἀδίκεισθαι. Now, ἀδικα πράττειν carries with it only ἀδικα πάσχειν, not ἀδίκεισθαι. To injure B, A must hurt him.
BOOK V: CHAP. 9: § 3.

wishing to hurt him. If A hurt B without wishing to hurt him \textbf{1136 a.23.}
then B is hurt (δλαντεται, ἄμισος τᾶς χει), but not injured (οὐκ ἄμισον)
by A. To apply this principle to the case of the ἀκρατῆς so com-
monly adduced to prove ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐκόντα ἄμισσοθα, or ὅτι ἐστὶν αὐτῶν
αὐτῶν ἄμισον— the ἀκρατής either hurts himself proprio motu (§ 4), or
allows another person to persuade him to hurt himself (§ 5). His
act is admittedly voluntary. But what is its real object, as that
object presents itself to him at the moment of action? His own
pleasure, not his hurt. He does not wish to hurt himself, or be
hurt by another person; he merely desires pleasure. When he is
hurt by himself, his passive side cannot complain of injury (τὸ
ἄμισσον), for his active side, not being able to wish what his
passive side is unwilling to suffer, cannot wish to hurt the latter.
Hence οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν αὐτῶν ἄμισον.

But where the ἀκρατής is not
agent and patient in one, but patient yielding to the solicitations of
another person, he may receive injury (ῥ ἄμισσόν) from that other
person in so far as he is seduced to do, because pleasant to his
feeling, what his tempter, even while he tempts him, knows to
be hurtful, perhaps ruinous to his person. He is injured (ἄμισον),
because his tempter injures him (ἄμισον). But he cannot be his
tempter's accomplice against himself. He is with his tempter as
holding out a pleasure to feeling, but not as ignoring his person:
οὐκ ἄμισσον ὁ ἀκρατής ὑπ' ἄλλον.

Jackson explains the present passage by distinguishing two
successive stages in τὰ κατ' ἀκρασίαν. 'According to Eudemus,' he
says, p. 117, 'we must distinguish in τὰ κατ' ἀκρασίαν two successive
stages: (1) that in which the βούλησις resists, and therefore the man
is ἐκῶν, and (2) that in which, the βούλησις having given way to the
ἐπιθυμία, the man is ἐκῶν, but οὐδὲν παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν πάσχει βούλησιν.

Thus the ἀκρατής is not simultaneously ἐκῶν and παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν
πάσχον, and therefore the phenomena of ἀκρασία do not countenance
the theory that a man may ἐκῶν ἄμισσοθα':—and again p. 118, 'in
the first stage A is not ἐκῶν, because βούλησις, being dominant,
resists: in the second stage A is ἐκῶν but not ἄμισσον, because
ἐπιθυμία, being dominant, assents to B's solicitations, βούλησις having
now given way.' Of course it is quite true that in the ἀκρατής
there is a struggle between ἐπιθυμία and λόγος, in which the former
eventually prevails. This struggle takes time, and two stages
may very properly be distinguished in it. But it is scarcely correct
to speak of the ἀκρατής being 'not ἐκῶν' in the first stage—i.e.
before he acts. A man is ἐκῶν, or not ἐκῶν, properly only at the moment of acting (see iii. 1. 6). Now, it is agreed that the ἀκρατίας at the moment of acting is ἐκῶν—whether he tempt himself, or be tempted by another. The question is—what is the real object of his voluntary action, as that object presents itself to him at the moment of acting? His real object, thus determined, is present pleasure, not his own hurt. He acts to satisfy an isolated ἐπιθυμία, not to do harm to his personality, as that is represented to him, more or less adequately, by his βούλησις—the principle of self-conservation within him. In yielding incontinently to pleasure he indeed violates the principle of self-conservation within him by a voluntary act, but without realising that he does so. Hence, in the language of the present passage, οὐκ ἀδικεῖι αὐτὸς αὑτὸν—when acting alone he does not plot his own hurt; and οὐκ ἀδικεῖται ἐκῶν—when yielding to the solicitations of another he does not conspire with that other to hurt himself.

a. 26. ἐπὶ ἀμφοτέρων] i.e. ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν. As Mich. Eph. explains—ἐνδέχεται τὸν δικαίουμενον κατὰ συμβεβηκός μεταλαμβάνει τὸν δικαίον, ὅταν ὁ δικαιοπραγῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός δικαιοπραγή—i.e. when the agent πράττει αἷς συμβεβηκε δικαίως εἶναι (v. 8. 1), the patient πάσχει αἷς συμβεβηκε δικαίως εἶναι.

a. 27. ἐπὶ τῶν ἄδικων] The omission of ἐπὶ has been suggested. The suggestion is plausible: but the MSS. are apparently all against it.

a. 29. ἄδικων γὰρ κ.t.l.] Fritzsche and Grant quote Rhet. i. 13. 1373 b. 27 ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἄδικεῖν τὰ ὦν ἐκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν.

a. 31. § 4. ἀπλῶς] explained by Mich. Eph. as ἀνεν προσθήκης, 'without qualification.' The qualification or addition necessary is supplied in § 5—παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν. Ἀδικεῖν is not simply hurting voluntarily, but hurting voluntarily for the sake of hurting. The victim cannot, without denying his own personality, be a party to this. He must always wish to be himself intact. That βούλησις, as distinguished from ἐπιθυμία, expresses—often inadequately enough—the personality or self is a doctrine which Aristotle shares with Plato: see notes on iii. 4. It plays a great part also in the philosophy of Plotinus—cf. especially a passage Ἐπι. vi. 8. p. 747 sqq., the key-note of which is—οἷς ὄπερ ἔτυχεν ἔστώ, ἄλλ' ὄπερ ἡβουλήθη αὐτὸς.

a. 34. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τούτῳ ἐν τοῖς ἀπορουμένων] Discussed afterwards in
BOOK V: CHAP. 9: §§ 4-8.

chapter 11. The words before us come in strangely here. They 1136 a. 34. seem to refer back to a list of ἀπορισμένα: but no list has been given.

§ 5. ὁ διορισμός = ἔμφασις: viz. that given at the beginning b. 3. of § 4.

§ 6. βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν . . . οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται] βλάπτεται may b. 5. be ἐκούσῃων, but ἄδικείσθαι cannot be: for no one can conspire against his own personality. The words οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, 'no man knowingly denies his own personality'—'no man makes his own hurt his end' (see iii. 4. i ἕπει τὸ τεῖλον έστ'ν), are equivalent to ἄδικείσθαι οὐδεὶς ἐκών—'no man submits voluntarily to hurt which he feels to be simply hurt, and knows that his assailant regards as simply hurt.'

οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται . . . πράττειν πράττει] cf. E. E. ii. 7. 1223 b. 7. b. 6 βούλεται ὁ οὐδεὶς ὁ οίεται εἶναι κακόν. ἄλλα μὴν ὁ ἀκρατεύομενος οὐχ ἄ βολεται ποιεί τὸ γὰρ παρ᾽ ὁ οίεται βελτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δι᾽ ἐπιθυμιάν ἀκρατεύομεθα ἐστίν.

οὐχ ἄ οίεται] This is the reading of Kb alone, preferred by b. 8. Bekker and Bywater. Other MSS. read ὁ οἶκ, preferred by Jackson and Susemihl. Jackson however calls attention to E. E. ii. 7. 1223 b. 7, where ὁ ἀκρατεύομενος οὐχ ἄ βολεται ποιεί seems to be in favour of Bekker's preference.

§ 7. ὁμηρός] Iliad vi. 236.

§ 8. ἦτι δ᾽ ὅν προειλήμβα δυὸ ἐστίν εἰπεῖν] The first of these two b. 15. questions (ποτέρον ποτ᾽ ἄδικεί ὁ νεῖμαι) has not been mentioned before as a question to be discussed; and the second (ei ἐστιν αὐτῶν αὐτῶν ἄδικεῖν) has already been partly discussed (§§ 4 sqq.) in connexion with the question ei ἐστιν ἐκῶν ἄδικείσθαι, from which, however, the writer evidently wishes to distinguish it, for he says περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἄδικείσθαι ὅτι οὐχ ἐκόησον δήλου. ἦτι δ᾽ ὅν κ.τ.λ.

The word προειλήμβα is certainly strange in the absence of a definite list of ἀπορίαι to which reference might be made—as Ramsauer says, 'Contra usum Aristotelis est ad προαίρεσιν των quam inter scribendum habuerit animo absconditam se verbis revocare'. Perhaps Zell is right in supposing the reference to be to § 1 of the present chapter—ἀπορήσῃε δ᾽ ἄν τις εἰ ἱκανῶς διώμεναι περὶ τοῦ ἄδικείσθαι καὶ ἄδικεῖν πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐστιν . . . ἐκώντα ἄδικείσθαι.
1130 b. 15. Having discussed this first question, and summed up the result with peri mèn oûv toû àðiκεύωταὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον δῆλον (§ 8), he goes on with ἕτερ δὲ oûv to discuss two other questions contemplated (but not announced) at the beginning of the chapter.

b. 17. § 9. ei γάρ ἐνδέχεται] 'These questions seem to be connected, for if . . .', Jackson.

tò πρῶτερον λεγθέν] the former alternative in the first question, viz. àðiκεί o νείμα—explained by the epexegetical clause καὶ ὁ διανέμων àðiκεί ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον.

b. 21. ἐλαττωτικός] see v. 10. 8.

tοῦτο] τὸ ἔλαστον αὐτῷ νῄειν. This statement must not be taken ἀπλῶς. We must qualify it with the ἀριθμής, e.g. τοῦ ὥφελμον—ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πλεονεκτεῖ, οὗν τοῦ καλοῦ.

b. 22. τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ] ἀπλῶς is perhaps used here to distinguish the καλὸν itself, truly so called, from δάξα the appearance of it.

b. 23. λύσει κατὰ] Bekker inserts καὶ before κατὰ without MS. authority Jackson's note is 'καὶ Οὐ?'

tὸν διορισμὸν] § 5 above.

b. 24. διὰ γε τοῦτο] i.e. in consequence of τὸ ἔλαστον αὐτῷ νῄειν.

b. 25. § 10. φανερῶν δὲ ὅτι καὶ . . .] He has hitherto treated the first of the two questions stated in § 8 in its bearing on the second. He now treats it on its own account.

b. 28. ἔχων ἄει] Rassow (Forsch. p. 61) expunges ἄει, conjecturing (with much plausibility, I think) that it is the corruption of an old ditto-graph àðiκεί which ᾱ now alone retains (in place of ἄει after ἔχων). If we retain ἄει we can hardly take it, with Zell, as in the idiom ὁ ἄει ἀρχηγὸν: the meaning must be that, although the πλέον ἔχων is often a πλεονεκτῆς in the ordinary sense of that term, he is not always so.

b. 27. ὑπάρχει] Grammatically ὑπάρχει goes with the second ὁ as well as with the first; but logically it goes with the first only, thus—οὐ γάρ ὁ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἄδικεί, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐκουσίως τοῦτο ποιῶν. It is not the material presence of τὸ ἄδικον in a man's circumstances (ὑπάρχουσα), but its formal presence in his disposition, and efficiency in his will, which makes the ἄδικῶν. I think that Jackson is wrong
with ὑπάρχει—note on § 11. The reading 1136 b. 27. ἀδικον ἔχω ὑπάρχει given by pr. K\textsuperscript{b} suggests ἀδικον ἐχειν ὑπάρχει, which would be a tolerably satisfactory reading, although the special force of ὑπάρχει as opposed to ποιειν would be lost.

τούτο δὲ θευ ἡ ἁρχὴ τῆς πράξεως] τούτο εστὶ τὸ ἐκόντα ποιεῖν—‘the b. 28. initiation of a voluntary agent (τὸ ἐκόντα ποιεῖν) is the efficient cause of the action; and this resides in the distributor, not in the receiver.’

§ 11. οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα] Zell and Michelet make b. 31. the λαμβάνον the subject of these verbs. As a slave, at the bidding of his master, may perform an unjust act, without being himself chargeable with injustice, so the λαμβάνον may participate in an unjust act (ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα), without being himself unjust in respect of it (ἀδικεῖν). Mich. Eph., Grant, and Ramsauer, on the other hand, make the διανέμων the subject. This latter is the more plausible construction of the two, because the διανέμων is the subject in § 10 and also in §§ 12 and 13, and because it does not require us to stretch the meaning of ποιεῖν so as to include what is after all πάσχειν. Jackson adopts a third course. He takes the § closely in connexion with § 10, omits έτι (as a dittograph of the first two letters of ἐπει), and makes ἡ χείρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης the subjects of the verbs ἀδικεῖ and ποιεῖ. ‘I suppose the sentence thus altered,’ he says, ‘to be a justification of the distinction just made between ὑ ποὶ ἀδικον [sc. ποιεῖν] ὑπάρχει and ὑ τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν. The Paraphr. seems to have understood the sentence as I do.’ The following are the Paraphrast’s words—Φαίνεται δέ, ὅτι ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ καθ’ αὐτό, ὃ δὲ λαμβάνων κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἀδικεῖ καθ’ αὐτό, ὃς ἐκὼν τοῦτο ποιεῖ. 'Εκὼν δὲ τις ποιεῖ, ὅταν ἡ παρ’ αὐτῷ τῆς πράξεως ἡ αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἁρχὴ τοῦ ποιεῖν τῆς δὲ διανομῆς ἡ ἁρχὴ παρὰ τῷ διανέμοντι: ὁ ἄρα διανέμων τὸ πλέον ἀδικεῖ καθ’ αὐτό, ἄλλ’ οὖν ὁ δεχόμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἡ ἁρχὴ, καθὼς εἰρηκαί. Οὐ γὰρ δὸ ποιῶν τὰ ἄδικα ἀδικεῖν λέγεται, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός διὸ περὶ λέγεται καὶ ἡ χείρ φονεύειν, ἡ μάχαιρα, ἡ λίθος, παρ’ οἷς οὐκ ἐστὶν ἁρχὴ τοῦ φόνου, οὐδὲ ἀφ’ ἕαντων πράττουσιν ἀδικα μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦσιν, ἀδικοῦσι δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

It seems to me that we cannot thus regard the λαμβάνον or ἔχων as a ποιῶν, and take ἡ χείρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης as parallel to him. But it would be possible to follow Jackson in omitting έτι, and making ἡ χείρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης the subjects of the verbs, and yet not regard these agents as parallel to the λαμβάνον. One might regard them
as examples of τὰ ποιοῦτα in the sense of ὄργανα, as distinguished from τὰ ποιοῦτα κυρίως, or ἄρχαί ὅθεν πρῶτος ἡ κίνησις, to which latter class the διανέμομεν, as ἵκων, has been assigned. Thus the words ὅθεν ἡ ἄρχη τῆς πράξεως in § 10 would suggest § 11, and the connexion between the two §§ might be exhibited thus—

' the ποιεῖν of the διανέμομεν, as voluntary initiator or ἄρχη τῆς πράξεως, is ποιεῖν in the primary sense, for (ἐπεῖ) ποιεῖν has a secondary sense in which ὄργανα are said ποιεῖν.' For ἐπεῖ introducing a similar parenthesis, see E. N. vii. 12, 2, b. 36. But is it necessary to omit ἐπεῖ, and refuse to regard the sentence as simply saying—'If the διανέμομεν be a mere instrument in the hands of another οὐκ ἄδικεῖ but ποιεῖ τὰ ἄδικα'? The case indeed seems hardly worth mentioning: but is it less worth mentioning than that—ἐι μὲν ἄγνωσίν, mentioned in § 12? Jackson's note on § 12 is—

' The argument is contained in the words εἰ γνῶσιν ἔκρινεν ἄδικος, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡ χάριτος ἡ τιμωρίας. The words εἰ μὲν ἄγνωσίν—

tὸ πρᾶτον merely set aside the case of ignorance as irrelevant to our present remarks.' Why then, it may be asked, may not § 11 merely set aside the case of compulsion as irrelevant to our present remarks? It is indeed quite in the writer's manner to give us a complete list of formally possible cases.

On the whole, then, I am inclined, with Mich. Eph., Grant, and Ramsauer, to make ὁ διανέμομεν (conceived as ποιῶν ἄλλον ἐπιτάξαντος) the subject of ἄδικεῖ and ποιεῖ—as if we read, ἐπεῖ, εἰ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται καὶ ἐπείν ὅσ τὰ ἄψυχα κτίσθη ὡσ ἡ χεῖρ καὶ ὁ οἶκης ἐπιτάξαντος—ἐπιτάξαντος μὲν οὖν εἰ ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἄδικεῖ ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα. The reading of Κb Nb Pb and New Coll.—

μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν instead of after ἄδικεῖ—is worth notice as pointing to a ' fault' in the juncture of the vulgate.

For τὰ ἄψυχα b. 30, cf. Méi. Α. i. 981 a. 30 δίω καὶ τόου ἄρχεται·

τοιοῦτοι περὶ ἐκατον πρώτων καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ συφωτέρως, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιημένων ἱσασθαί, τοὺς δ' ὀστὲρ καὶ τῶν ἄψυχων ἐνια, ποιεῖν μὲν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖν ἄ ποιεῖ, οἷον καὶ τὸ πῦρ. Fritzche refers to Plato Legg. ix. 873 E εἰ δὲ ἄψυχα τι ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπὸν στερήσῃ . . . δικαστήριον μὲν αὐτῷ καθίζω τῶν γετών τῶν ἑγγύτατον ὁ πρῶτος ὁ γένει. He refers also to Pausan. vi. 11 ἄριστον Ἀθηναίοις γράφον ὕπερορεῖ καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, ἐὰν γε ἐμπεσόν τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποκτείνειν ἀνθρωπον—also to Aeschines Contra Ctes. 244 καὶ ὕπερ ἃτι ἐν ἑπὶ δεινών, ὃς Ἀθηναῖος, εἰ τὰ μὲν ἔξι καὶ τοὺς λίθους καὶ τὸν σίδηρον, τὰ ἄφωνα καὶ ἄγνώμονα, ἐὰν τὸ ἐμπεσόντα.
§ 12. ἀγγοὺς ἤ ἀγγοῖα ἢ καθ' ἐκαστὰ, not ἢ καθολον, must be under-
b. 32. stood here. An unjust decision made in unavoidable ignorance of particulars is not unjust in the eye of the law of the State (τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον), but nevertheless it violates ‘the fitness of things’ (τὸ πρῶτον, i.e. τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον). The Paraph. seems to be wrong in supplying τοὺς νόμους after ἀγγοὺς. Of a judge who decided in ignorance of the νόμος of his State it could hardly be said οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον. In M. M. i. 33. 1196 b. 1 the distinction marked here by the words οὐδὲ ἄδικος ἢ κρίσις ἢ τίτι, ἢ τίτι ὅσος ἄδικος is explained thus—ἐστι μὲν ἢ ἄδικεῖ ἢ τίτι δὲ ὦ πρὸς ἢ ἄδικεῖς μὲν γὰρ τὸ τῇ ἀδησίᾳ καὶ τῇ φύσει ὅν δίκαιον μὴ ἔχειν ταύτῃ μὲν ἄδικεί, μὲν δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ δοκοῦν ἐκαὶ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ.

πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς] If the διανέμων, with full knowledge of the law under which he is acting, and of the circumstances of the particular case, make an unfair distribution between A and B, he must do so to serve some personal end. Not only will the favoured party ἐξεί τὸ πλέον (perhaps without being chargeable with ἀδικία), but more than that (καὶ), the διανέμων himself too will ἐξεί τὸ πλέον.

§ 13. τοῦ ἀδικήματος] the material result of τὸ ἀδικεῖν—the unfair share assigned to the favoured party.

dιὰ ταύτα] διὰ χάριν ἢ τιμωρίαν.

καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τῶν ἀγρόν κρίνωσ] This is the reading of ᾿Kn b. 3. adopted by Rassow (Forsch. p. 62) and Bywater, ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ meaning ἐπὶ τῷ μερίσματι τοῦ ἀδικήματος. The reading of other MSS. is ἐπ' ἐκείνων ὁ τῶν ἀγρόν κρίνωσ, where ἐκείνων are τοῦ μερισμένου τοῦ ἀδικήματος—the unfair distributor and the favoured receiver who share between them the profits of the transaction, the former getting a bribe, the latter too large a share in the distribution. Jackson paraphrases this § well—‘If the judge secures to himself χάρις or τιμωρία by giving an unjust award, he is just as much a πλεονεκτὴν as if he were to share the plunder with the receiver. For it is not essential that the unjust distributor should take a share
1137 a. 3. of the property distributed, since even if his share takes a more substantial form than χάρις and τιμωρία, he may receive it, not in land (land being the article distributed), but in money.

a. 4. §§ 14–16.] Jackson places these §§ after ch. 1. § 3, giving his reasons for doing so on pp. xiii–xvi of his Introduction. I am ready to admit that these §§ suit the context of the first chapter better than they suit that of the ninth; but I cannot admit that this proves, or even renders probable, the conclusion that the first chapter is their original locus. The Fifth Book, especially in its latter part, is, to my mind, a collection of materials waiting for arrangement, rather than a treatise which has fallen into disarrangement. Nothing that I have read (English or foreign) on the subject of 'Dislocations in the Text' has made me doubt the correctness of what, after all, is bound to be the prima facie view—that the order (or disorder) of the Fifth Book is substantially that in which the original compiler threw his materials. There are doubtless many omissions and interpolations in the text as we have it which add to the original confusion of the compilation: but the numerous transplantations (often of short passages to distant places), which we are asked by certain modern critics to assume, are quite a different thing. It may be admitted, however, that the place which the chapter on ἐπισκέψεια now occupies (cutting in two, as it does, the discussion of τὸ ἔκωντα ἄδικε κεισαὶ and τὸ αὐτὸν αὐτῶν ἄδικεῖν) is inconsistent even with the low standard of arrangement actually attained in the Book.

a. 7. § 14. καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον] I agree with Williams against Jackson that this means 'delivering a bribe'—a vicious action, like the other actions mentioned—perhaps suggested by the ἀργύριον of § 13.

a. 8. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅδι ἔχοντας ταύτα ποιεῖν οὐτὲ ρήξιν οὔτε ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς] The Paraph. Heliodorus has—τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρᾶξει τὰ δίκαια ἡ τὰ ἄδικα, καὶ ἡ δοῦναι ἀργύριον ἢ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον, ῥάδιον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ βουλομένου· τὸ δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνης ἔστω ἐσχὼν ἡ ἄδικια, δὲ χρόνον καὶ ἀσκήσεων δείται, δὲ ἂς ἔστω ἡ δικαίως τις ἡ ἄδικος λέγεται, τούτῳ δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὡστε ἢμα τῷ βουλευσθαι καὶ μᾶς ἔριν εἰς κτίσασθαι.

a. 9. § 15.] See E. N. ii. 4. §§ 3–6.

a. 11. ἀλλ' οὖ ταύτ' κ.τ.λ.] 'but it is only κατὰ συμβεβηκός that actions prescribed by law are identical with τὰ δίκαια' (Jackson). It is not
enough, in order to perform 'just actions,' to find out the actions which the law declares to be just, and perform them according to pattern. Actions are 'just' only when they spring from the habit of justice, which no mere study of the requirements of the law will give a man.

νεμόμενα] Perhaps suggested by the διανέμουν of §§ 8–13. Kb, a. 13. Mb, Ha have γενόμενα, which seems to be a mere blunder.

τούτο δὲ πλέον ἔργον κ.τ.λ.] Bywater (Contrib. p. 49) says—'in lieu of τούτο δὲ I restore τούτο δὲ, or if any one prefers it, τούτο [δὲ], in order to keep up the correspondence in construction and sense between this clause and that which comes just after, in l. 16: in the one case an act is said to be πλέον ἔργον κτि. and in the other τούτο δὲ ἔργον κτि.' This seems decisive against Bekker's συνίειαν. ἂν' οὖ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἂν' ἣ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἂν' πως πραττόμενα καὶ πως νεμόμενα δίκαια' τούτο δὲ κ.τ.λ. With either text, however, the meaning is—'To learn to 'know' δίκαια, as the φρόνημα (who must have the ἔξις of δικαίωσιν) knows them, is more difficult than to learn to know ἴγουα as the experienced ἴατρός 'knows' them.' The commentators compare M. M. ii. 3. 1 199 a. 27 οὖ γὰρ ακοπεί ὁ ἄδικος οὔδὲ δύναται κρίνειν τὸ ἁπλὸν ἁγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀιτῷ ἁγαθὸν, ἄλλα διαμαρτάνει. τῆς δὲ φρονήσεως τούτῳ ἐστὶ, τὸ ὀρθῶς δύνασθαι ταὐτὰ θεωρεῖν, ὅμοιοὶ δυσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν καὶ ἱατρικὴς τὸ μὲν ἁπλὸς ὑγιεῖνον καὶ τὸ ἱατρίας σωματικὸν οἴδαμεν ἀπατεῖς, ὅτι ἀλλήλοις καὶ τὸ ἱατρίμου καὶ αἱ τομαὶ καὶ αἱ καύψεις ἴσοι ἐστὶ ιφυλεῖ ἡ καὶ ἱματικά, ἂν' ὁμοίοι εἰκὸν ἔχομεν τὴν ἱατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὖ γὰρ ἔτι οἴδαμεν τὸ καθ' ἱατρό παρακαταινάν, δυσπερ ὁ ἴατρός οἴδει τίν' ἐστὶν τοῦ ἁγαθὸν καὶ πόσε καὶ πῶς διακειμένως· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἤδη ἡ ἱατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἁπλὸς ἱγιεία εἰδώτες ὁμοίοι εἰκὸν οἴδει παρακολουθεῖ ἡμῖν ἡ ἱατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη· ὅτι δ' αὐτῶς οὐ ἄδικος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἁπλὸς καὶ ἡ τυπανία ἁγαθῶν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ ἱεροσολυμία, οἴδειν ἂν' εἰ καὶ ἁγαθὸν ἡ μῆς, ἡ πότε, ἡ πόσα διακειμένως, οὐκέτι οἴδει. Jackson quotes Plato, Phaedr. 268 A–C, where the person who ἐκ βιβλίου ποιεῖ ἀκούσας ἥ αὐτοῖς φαρμακίοις ἰατρὸς οὕτως ἐλεύθερος κὰ τής τέχνης is described as μανόμενος.

§ 16. δ' αὖτ' ἄδικος] τὸ διεσθίει εἰ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν. The a. 17. opinion criticised in this § ignores the distinction between a δύναμις and a ἔξις stated in v. 1. 4—δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξις δ' ἡ ἐννοια τῶν ἐννοιῶν οὐ. 'This opinion that justice implies its contrary, as if it were an art (δύναμις), would be a consequence,' says Grant, 'of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to, and drew out

1137 a. 17. the paradoxical conclusion, Rep. 334 A (εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεῖνος φιλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτειν δεῖνος), Hipp. Min. 375-6 (ὑδφιδὴν ἡ δυσατότερα καὶ συμφωνεῖν αὐτῇ (sc. ψυχή) ἀμείωνος οὖσα ἐφάνη καὶ ἀμφότερα μᾶλλον δυσαμβεβηκεῖν ποιεῖν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ περὶ πᾶσαν ἐργασίαν 375 E). The Aristotelian theory that justice is a moral state (ἐξίς) set the difficulty at rest.

a. 26. § 17.] Jackson places this § in chapter 1, § 9 after τά αὐτότις ἀγαθά (see his Introd. p. xvi).

Mich. Eph. points out that τὰ ἁμάξα ἀγαθά or ‘things good in themselves’ are of two kinds—viz. (1) things good in themselves in the sense of being always and without qualification good—the ἀρεταὶ and the ἐνέργειαι κατ’ αὐτὰς: and (2) things good in themselves in the sense of being good in the abstract, but not necessarily good in all circumstances—money good in itself, or generally, but bad in the possession of the profligate. It is with τὰ ἀμάξα ἀγαθά in this second sense that δικαιοσύνη has to do: for in respect of τὰ ἁμάξα ἀγαθά in the first sense there can be no πλεονεξία. His note is interesting and may be transcribed—ὅπως ἐν συμφωνεῖ ἡ λέξις, εἰ οὖσα πως εἴχεν τῶν δικαίων τὸ μὲν ὡς εὑρίσκει νεμικόν, τὸ δ’ ἐπανορθωμάτων’ ταῦτα δὲ τὸ διανεμηθέν καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθωμάτων ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν τὸς μετέχουσι ὑπὸ ἁμάξα ἀγαθῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἡ ἐθικουμενική, ἁμάξα δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστὶ κυρίως τὰ τῆς αὐτῶν φύσει ἀγαθά, οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ κατ’ αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαις δεύτερον δὲ ἁμάξα ἀγαθά τὰ ὁμολογικά καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ἀγαθά ὡς τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν οὐ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν. τίνα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ὁμολογικὰ ἁμάξα καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, συμφωνίας, ἐπήγαγεν ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλεύψεις, πλοῦτος τιμαί, δυναστεία πολιτική, ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλεύψεις. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἁμάξα ἁμάξους ταῖς ἀρεταῖς εἰ γὰρ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὁμολογεῖαις οὖσας καὶ μεσοέσθεν, ὡς δεδεκτική, ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλεύψεις οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν οἷς δ’ ἐστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλεύψεις, ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ πλεονεκτένα καὶ μειονεκτένα. κατ’ ἀρετήν δ’ οὐ γίνεται πλεονεξία, οὐ γὰρ οἷον τὸ τυφλὸν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν βιασάμενον τῷ ἔχομα, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων γίνεται ἐπὶ γὰρ τούτοις καθ’ ὄρον ἀφαιρεῖται βία δὲ τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τὴν ἀμέλειαν τινα, τὸ λατα, τὴν ἀνθρείαν τοῦ ἀνθρείου ἀφελέσθαι, ἣ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ἐπιστήμων βία οἰκεῖς δύναται. διὸ οὖν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἀνθρείων ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλεύψεις, ἐν τούτῳ τὰ δίκαια, τὸ γὰρ δύναται τούτων τῶν ἁμάξαν καὶ πλέον τῷ ἔχειν καὶ ἔλασσον, περὶ τῶν τούτων νομίμως ὑπενώσασθαι τὰ δίκαια ἐστὶ. ἐπεὶ οὖς γα μὴν ἐστὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἁμάξων, τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὑπερβολὴ τῶν τοιούτων οὖν ἐξίς ἐλλεύψεις ἐστί, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀστικά, οἰδέ τὸ ἐπανορθωσίκα καὶ τὸ διανεμηγείκα δίκαιον. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς θεόις ἐν οἷς οὖ
CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

Concerning Equity. The relation of Equity to Justice has caused some difficulty. The two strike us as not being exactly the same; and yet, on the other hand, since 'equitable' is popularly used as a term of praise for 'good,' it seems illogical to distinguish it from 'just,' which, in its wide sense, is the same as 'good.' If 'equitable' and 'just' are to be distinguished, one of them, it would appear, is not 'good'; and if both are 'good,' why distinguish them? The solution of this difficulty is that the 'equitable' and the 'just' are generically the same, i.e. both 'good,' but the 'equitable' is the better. Equity is a higher form of justice; it is not the justice of the letter of the law, but that of the spirit which corrects the letter. The law, by reason of the complicated
nature of its subject-matter, is necessarily general in its terms, and sometimes fails to meet the just claims of an individual case. Here equity steps in and supplies the defect. Indeed there are some cases about which we cannot have a law at all, but must provide for them, as they arise, by special decree. Where the stones are irregularly shaped the builder must use a flexible rule.

The 'equitable' then is 'just,' being better not than the 'just' as such, but than its necessarily imperfect realization in law. It is the correction of law where it falls short by reason of its generality. The equitable man is the man who habitually makes such correction, and although he may have the letter of the law on his side, is unwilling to press his legal right harshly, preferring to take less than his due.

Introductory Note.—It seems to be generally agreed that this chapter is misplaced here in the MSS. Jackson puts it at the end of the Book; Ueberweg (Hist. Phil. vol. i. p. 147, English Transl.) inserts it (preceded by chapter 9, §§ 14-17, 1137 a. 4-30) after chapter 8, i.e. after συγγραμμονικά 1136 a. 9. The reasons for preferring Ueberweg's rearrangement are (1) that the constructive treatment of Justice becomes continuous, and the ἀπορία contained in chapters 9 and 11 of the vulgate form an appendix to the Book: (2) that the remarks on ἐπείκεια follow closely on the discussion contained in chapter 8. A comparison of Rhet. i. 13 makes it probable that they ought to follow even more closely than they do in Ueberweg's rearrangement—i.e. that chapter 9, §§ 14-17 ought not to intervene between the end of chapter 8 and the beginning of chapter 10, but be otherwise disposed of—I do not venture to suggest how. In Rhet. i. 13 the discussion of ἐπείκεια arises immediately out of a discussion, closely resembling that in E. N. v. 8, of the various degrees of guilt attaching to the διάβατα which come before the courts of justice. If, as seems probable, the writer of E. N. v. 8 had Rhet. i. 13 before him, or in his recollection, when he wrote, he would naturally go immediately on from συγγραμμονικά (1136 a. 9) to the discussion of ἐπείκεια.

Ueberweg accounts for the disorder in the text of the last three chapters of E. N. v by the misplacement of the leaves of an archetype MS.

It may be only an accidental coincidence—but it seems worth noticing in connexion with this hypothesis of misplaced leaves—that the mass of text from 1176 a. 11 to 1177 a. 30 (E. N. x. ch. 5, § 9—ch. 7, § 4) omitted by Kb is twice as large as that contained in the chapter on ἐπείκεια, v. 10; twice as large as that
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contained in v. n; and equal to that intervening between the end of chapter 8 (1136 a. 9) and the beginning of the chapter on ἐπιείκεια, chapter 10. There are 88 Bekker's lines in the passage (1176 a. 11–1177 a. 30) omitted by Kb; 43 in the chapter on ἐπιείκεια; 43 in the following chapter, v. n; and 87 from the end of v. 8 to the beginning of v. 10.

The lacuna in Kb was probably caused by the absence of two leaves (each containing about 43 Bekker's lines) from the ancient manuscript of which Kb is a transcript. Fol. 121v in Kb ends with τά γὰρ αὕτα τούς (1176 a. 11) and fol. 121v (the other side of the same leaf) begins with μὲν κεχωρηγμένων δὲ μὲν (1177 a. 30), the lacuna not being indicated in any way by the scribe, who, it would seem, was unconscious of its existence.

On the other hand it would be going too far if we were to say that the disorder in the text of v. 9–11 was probably caused by a misplacement of archetype leaves containing each about 43 Bekker's lines. The 'disorder' to be explained by the hypothesis is, after all, not a definite indisputable fact like the lacuna in Kb. At any rate it would be satisfactory, before attaching much importance to the quantitative relation subsisting between the lacuna in Kb and certain passages in v. 9–11, to be able to point to other cases of 'disorder' in the E. N., which could be explained by the hypothesis of an archetype leaf of 43 Bekker's lines. I confess that as yet I have not found any such cases. The space intervening between v. 4, 12 (1132 b. 9) and v. 5, 9 (1133 a. 14), to which I turned first, does not seem to have anything to do with an archetype leaf of 43 lines.

I append Rhet. i. 13. 1373 b. 25–1374 b. 23 for future reference, and to show how naturally the chapter on ἐπιείκεια takes its place between ch. 8 and ch. 9, after συγγραμμουκά 1136 a. 9: ἀπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικεμάτων δημηγρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄστων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλων καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, λέγωμεν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκόντος τὰ ἀδικα πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄδικεν ὀρίσται πρότερον ἐκούσιν εἰσαι. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη τῶν ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκούσας βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραί εἰσών· τὰ γὰρ ἄγαθα καὶ τὰ κακὰ εἰρηται καθ' αὐτὰ πρότερον, καὶ τὰ ἐκόνα, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὅσα ἐδότες, ὅτι' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἡ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἄθικον εἰσαί, καὶ ἡ ἀγνοοῦσος καὶ ἀκούσας ἡ ἐκόνας καὶ ἐιδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προεκλομένων τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος. περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποία δὲ προηρωῦνται καὶ πῶς ἱσχυντες, εἰρηται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ'
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ομολογουντες τολλάκιοι πεπαρχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ ὁ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οὐν λαβέων μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ πατάξαι πρὸτερον ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὑβίστασι, καὶ συγγενεσθαί ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μοιχεύσαι, ἢ κλέψαι μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι, οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τί, ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δημοσίαν, ἢ διελέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίως ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προδούναι, διὰ τούτα δέν ἂν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίζασθαί, τί κλοπῆ, τί ὑβίρεις, τί μοιχεία, ὅπως ἐὰν τε ὑπάρχειν ἐὰν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα δεικνύσαι, ἧχωμεν ἑρμαθίζειν τὸ δίκαιον. ἦστε δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι καὶ φαύλου μὴ ἄδικον ἢ ἀρκειοβήτησι΄ ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαρέσει ἡ μορφήρια καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσημαίνει τὴν προαρέσειν, οὐν πρὸς καὶ κλοπῆς οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἐπίταξεν πάντως ὑβίστασιν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἑνεκά του, οὐν τοῦ ἀτιμάσαιε κεύειν ἡ αὐτὸς ὑστῆρα, οὐδὲ πάντως, εἰ λάθρᾳ ἠλάβες, ἐκλεψεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς ἐπὶ βλάβη τούτου, ἀφ᾽ ὦ ἠλάβε καὶ σφέτερεσθαι οὖντος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἤχει, ὡσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἄδικων ἢν δύο εἶδος τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμένα τὰ δ᾽ ἐγράφα, περὶ δὲ ἄν μὲν οὶ νόμοι ἀγορεύονται εἴρηται, τῶν δ᾽ ἀγράφων δύο ἔστιν εἰδος ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολήν ἀρέτης καὶ κακίας, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ὑνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμία καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεά, οὐν τὸ χαίρειν ἣν ποίησατε εἰ καὶ ἀυστεροῦν τὸν εὐ πούμαντα καὶ βαιηθηκόν εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ὅσα ἀλλὰ τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἑδον τοῦ μοιχαμένον ἢλλημα, τὸ γὰρ ἐπείκες δοκεῖ δικαίον εἶναι, ἔστω δὲ ἐπείκες τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δικαίων, συμβαίνει δὲ τούτῳ τὰ μὲν ἐκόντων τὰ δὲ ἀκότων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκότων μὲν ὅταν λάθη, ἐκόντων δ᾽ ὅταν μὴ δύνηται διορίαται, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαίον μὲν ἡ καθόλου εἰπτευ, μὴ μὴ δὲ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ ὅσα μὴ ῥάδιον διορίασθαι δὲ ἀπερίαν, οὖν τὸ ἀρσῖν συδήμφος πηλίκοι καὶ ποιή οὐ εὐλογεῖτο γὰρ ἢν ὁ αὐτὸν διαμιμῆσαται. ἂν οὐν ή ἀόριστον, δὲν δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἀπλῶς εἰπτευ, ὡστε καὶ δακτύλιον ἐχὼν ἐπαρτῆσε τὴν χεῖρα ἡ πατάξα, κατὰ μὲν τῶν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἐνοχὸς ἔσται καὶ ἄδικες, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἅλθεις οὐκ ἄδικες, καὶ τὸ ἐπείκες τούτῳ ἔστων. ἐλ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐλεημένῳ τὸ ἐπείκες, φανερὸν ποιὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐπείκες καὶ οὐκ ἐπείκει, καὶ ροῖοι οὐκ ἐπείκες ἀνθρώπους εἰπερί οὖς τῷ γάρ δει συγγρόγγων ἔχων, ἐπείκει ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἀμαρτημάτα καὶ τὰ ἄδικημα μῆτο τοῦ ἂν ἄξον, μηδὲ τὰ ἀτυχήματα ἐστὶν ἀτυχήματα μὲν δόσα παράλογα καὶ μή ἀπὸ μορφήρια, ἀμαρτημάτα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μή ἀπὸ πυρριείας, ἀνίκηματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα ἀπὸ πυρριείας τε ἔστων τὰ γάρ δὲ ἐπιθυμών ἀπὸ πυρριείας, καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώπινοις συγγραφαίσκει ἐπείκεις. καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάμαθαν τὸ νομοθέτου σκοπεῖν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαρέσειν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ μέρος ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὄλον, μηδὲ ποὺς τις νῦν, ἀλλὰ ποὺς τις τὴν ἢ ἢ ἦν ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ τὸ μημονεύειν μᾶλλον δὲν ἐπεβεβλα ἂν ἀγαθῶν ἡ κακῶν, καὶ
BOOK V: CHAP. 10: § I.

In the M. M. (ii. 1. 1198 b. 24) ἐπιείκεια is discussed in connection with εὐγνωμονία—i.e. among the intellectual ἔξεις, in a context corresponding to Ἔ.Ν. vi. ii. 1.

§ 1. καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἑπανώντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντί τοῦ ἄγαθον] i.e. 1187 a. 35. ἑπανώντες μεταφέρομεν τὸ ἑπιείκες ἀντί τοῦ ἄγαθον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα—

from men (ἀνάθρα τῶν τοιούτων) we transfer the term ἑπιείκες to things also (μεταφέρομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα) as a term of praise instead of the term ἄγαθον—or ‘we use ἑπιείκες as a general term of praise instead of ἄγαθον.’ See Grant’s note on this §, and Fritzsch’s note on Ἔ.Ν. viii. ii. 5 for the history of the meanings of ἑπιείκες. Derived from εἰκός, it means originally (as in Homer) ‘meet’ or ‘suitable’—
i.e. in the particular circumstances of a case. Thus in v. 4. 3 the ἑπιείκες is the morally good man as distinguished from the φαίλος or bad man; in ix. 6. 2 οἱ ἑπιείκες, the honourable citizens, are opposed to ὁ δῆμος; while, in the present chapter (§ 8), the ἑπιείκες or equitable man is opposed to the ἀκριβοδίκαιος. In all cases the ‘goodness’ marked by the term ἑπιείκες would seem to be that which consists in correspondence, as exact as possible, with given conditions, as distinguished from absolute perfection—τὸ ἀκριβές. A man is ἑπιείκης ἀνὴρ πολίτης; but it would be a solecism to call him ἑπιείκης ἀνὴρ σοφός: and in Isocrates Helene 209 a. b τὸ ἑπιείκος δοξᾶσθαι, ‘to form probable opinions’ (Jebb, Attic Orat. vol. ii. p. 52), is opposed to τὸ ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι, ‘to have an exact knowledge’; τολὺ κρείττων ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἑπιείκος δοξᾶσθαι ἤ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι.

τὸ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι] i.e. if we follow out the logical implication b. 2.
of the conception ἑπιείκες.

ἡ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδάζων, ἢ τὸ ἑπιείκες οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο] b. 4.
The easiest way out of the difficulty involved in these words is to omit οὐ δίκαιον with Giphanius, Coraes, and more recent editors. Γ and N omit οὐ δίκαιον εἰ, the former having vel enim justum non studiosum, vel epices alid. Michelet (followed by Fritzsch), retaining the words οὐ δίκαιον εἰ ἄλλο, places the comma after οὐ.
7 b. 4. instead of after δικαίον. It is very unsafe, however, to accept as final any suggestion which may be offered for the emendation of a passage like this consisting of short clauses introduced by ἂν and οίκοι. Such clauses were often omitted by scribes, and often repeated. Bywater has perhaps shown proper caution in leaving the text as the majority of the MSS. give it.

b. 8. § 2. δικαίου τινὸς] explained below as τοῦ νομίμου δικαίου.

b. 11. §§ 3, 4.] Fritzsche and Jackson compare Plato, Politeicus 294 A–C; see especially the words—οὐκοίν ἄδυνατον εὖ ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ μηδέποτε ἀπλὰ τὸ δὶα παντὸς γεγονόμενον ἀπλοῖον. Cf. also Rhet. i. 13 quoted above in introductory note to this chapter.


τοιαύτη] ἀόριστος Paraph.—i. e. περὶ ἣς οὖν οἶνον τὲ ῥῆσις εἰπεν καθὸλου.

b. 21. § 5. τὸτε ὅρθος ἔχει κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche aptly compares here Rhet. i. 13. 1374 b. 11 ἐπικεκά τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἄλλα πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἄλλα πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθετοῦ.

b. 23. εἰπεν] This is the reading of Kβ alone. It is to be preferred to the εἰποί of all other MSS. 'because,' as Jackson says, 'it is distinctly assumed that the νομοθέτης is not present and therefore does not pronounce.'

b. 25. § 6. οὐ τοῦ ἄπλοσ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ δὶα τὸ ἄπλοσ ἀμαρτήματος] τὸ ἄπλοσ δικαίον is justice not qualified in relation to the requirements of this or that particular case—the justice of the general rule; τὸ δὶα τὸ ἄπλοσ ἀμάρτημα is the failure of the general rule, by reason of its generality (δὶα τὸ ἄπλος), to meet the requirements of a particular case: cf. with the ἄπλος of this passage the use of ἀπλὰ in the sentence quoted from the Politicus 294 C in note on §§ 3, 4, b. 11. A rule, in so far as it is general and unqualified, cannot fit individual cases, in so far as they are never unqualified, but always particularly qualified—ἄδυνατον εὖ ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ μηδέποτε ἀπλὰ τὸ δὶα παντὸς γεγονόμενον ἀπλοῖον.
I cannot agree with Jackson that διαδράματος is suspicious, or 1137 b. 25. that the Paraphrast's διαδράματος may possibly be the right reading. 'Αμάρτημα, I take it, has been carefully selected to mark the concrete result (cf. διώκματος v. 9. 13) of the application of the general rule.

διὰ τὸ καθόλου] exactly equivalent to διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς above. b. 27.

ψηφίσματος] See note on τὰ ψηφίσματα v. 7. 1, b. 24. b. 29.

§ 7. τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ μολύβδινος κανών] By Λεσβία oiko- b. 30. domia we are to understand 'Cyclopean building' in which large polygonal stones were employed, and fitted together, as at Tiryns; and the μολύβδινος κανών is to be explained as a flexible piece of lead which was first accommodated to the irregular surface of a stone already laid in position, and then applied to other stones with the view of selecting one of them with irregularities which would fit most closely into those of the stone already laid. Fritzsche, in his important note here, quotes an authority who mentions that a flexible rule is still used at Verona when a wall is being built of polygonal stones.

The parallel between the easy morals for which the Lesbians were noted and their μολύβδινος κανών was not likely to escape the notice of later littérateurs (see quotations in Zell and Coraes—especially from Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce, t. ii. ch. 3). Fritzsche cannot be right when he supposes that 'Cyclopean building' was called 'Lesbian' because its κανών was flexible like the Lesbian morality.

The form οἰκοδομής, which all other MSS. apparently give here for the οἰκοδομίας of Kᵇ and Pᵇ, came into use later for οἰκοδομησις or οἰκοδομία. If οἰκοδομής is right here, it is only here that it occurs in the Aristotelian corpus.

Before we pass on, it may be well to notice a fragment of Aeschylus which Grant quotes. He merely appends it to a note in which the 'Cyclopean' explanation of Λεσβία οἰκοδομία is accepted; but it might perhaps be taken to suggest another explanation. The fragment is given by Dindorf (Fr. 72), as from the Ωλαμο-pioi, in the following form—

ἀλλ' ὅ μὲν τις Λέσβιον φανόματι
κῦμ', ἐν τριγώνοις ἐκπερανέτω ρυθμοῖς.

The κῦμα or κυμάτιον is a moulding on an architrave or elsewhere. The Doric κῦμα is a simple hollow; the Lesbian an undulating
BOOK V: CHAP. 10: §§ 7, 8.

1137 b. 30. moulding, either concave above and convex below (cyma recta), or the reverse (cyma reversa). See Smith's Dict. of Ant. article cyma. Is it suggested that the μολιβδών κανών had anything to do with the Lesbian κύμα?

b. 33. § 8.] On the Equity of the Roman Law, see Maine's Ancient Law, ch. iii, 'Law of Nature and Equity.'

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

A man cannot act unjustly towards himself either in the general or in the special sense of 'acting unjustly.' Murder, e.g., committed in anger, is unjust in the same general sense in which all other vicious acts forbidden by law are unjust. The man who commits suicide, then, in anger acts unjustly. Towards himself? No. Towards the State; for it is the State that punishes him. Nor can a man act unjustly in the special sense towards himself; for that would mean that the same thing could at once be taken from and given to the same person. Unjust treatment implies at least two persons, one of whom deliberately makes an aggression on the rights of the other. The same person cannot be both aggressor and victim, agent and patient; and moreover, if the agent of injustice, who must be a voluntary agent, were also the patient, then the latter would be a voluntary patient of injustice, which, as we have shown, is impossible. Further, if we pass in review all the modes in which unjust treatment may be received (and it must be received in some particular mode), we find no case in which the agent is also recipient: a man does not commit adultery with his own wife, break into his own house, steal his own money—in short, injure himself in any one of the particular modes in which injury can be inflicted.

The general answer, however, to the question—Can a man inflict injury on himself? is No; for he cannot voluntarily receive injury.

To inflict injury and to receive it are both evil, for both involve a departure from the mean—the agent having too much and the patient too little; but to inflict injury is the worse, for it implies more or less evil in the agent, while receiving injury does not involve evil in the patient. Indirectly, of course, the reception of injury may lead to consequences which are worse for the patient than the infliction of injury is for the agent; but in itself the infliction is a greater evil than the reception of injury.

The view that a man can injure himself owes much of its plausibility to a confusion between the self as a whole and a part of the self. Because the irrational part may encroach upon the just prerogatives of the rational part of
BOOK V: CHAP. 11: § 1.

the self, it is thought that a man may act unjustly towards himself. But the supremacy of the rational part over the irrational part is at most only 'just' in the metaphorical sense in which we have seen that the rule of the father over his child or the master over his slave is 'just.'

§ 1. τὸτερον 8'] This chapter (with the exception of §§ 7 and 8) 1138 a. 4. is placed by Jackson after § 13 in chapter 9.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων] Jackson says 'i.e. from 9. §§ 1—13.' But does not the explanatory clause τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. oblige us to suppose rather that the reference is to the distinction made in ch. i. § 8 τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἢρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον?

οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτινώναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἢ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει.] a. 8.

Jackson's note here is—'οὐ κελεύει'] "Does not allow," i.e. forbids. Cf. the well-known use of οὐκ εἶνασ as the correlative of κελεύειν. The words ἢ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει are explanatory of the phrase οὐ κελεύει.

So Victorius, quoted by Cardwell. Eudemus wishes to say—"What the law bids is δίκαιον, what the law forbids is ἀδίκον." Cf. i. § 14 προστάτει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἄνδρεύον ἄργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τῷ τάξει . . . ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθερίας, τὰ μὲν κελεύον τὰ ἢ ἀπαγορεύον. Not appreciating this idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύει, Grant remarks "the extraordinary assertion is made that whatever the law does not command it forbids. We might well ask, Did the Athenian law command its citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, etc.?" This criticism [i.e. Grant's] is endorsed by Rassow (Forschungen, p. 42). I cannot believe that the writer's meaning here is correctly represented by the tautology 'What the law does not allow it forbids.' If we understand by νόμος, not merely statute law, but custom and fashion, it is absolutely correct to say 'What νόμος does not enjoin it forbids': see note on οἱ νόμοι ἀγορέωναι περὶ ἀπάντων, v. i. 13, b. 14. As for the 'idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύω'—οὐκ εἶ means 'forbids'; but does οὐ κελεύει? If exception is to be taken to Grant's remark quoted by Jackson, it is not, I think, on the ground of its non-appreciation of the 'idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύω,' but because it understands νόμος in too narrow a sense—as law, not as law and custom. The same error deprives Michelet's note of point—'Cum apud Graecos leges non juris tantum, sed virtutis causa ferrentur, legibus praecepta continebantur, quibus magistratus edicebant, quae fieri vellent. Apud nos autem, stricto jure inter Romanos jam orto, lex nihil jubet, sed quae fieri
1138 a. 6. nolit, edicit, ita ut contraria Aristotelii jam nunc obtineat regula: *Quae lex non jubet, permittit.* Nor is it necessary, with Acciaiolus, to suppose that *ά δέ μή κέλευες ἀπαγορεύει* applies only to things obviously wrong. *Custom* (fashion, public opinion) forbids the most innocent actions, if it does not enjoin them.

a. 12. § 3. *η πόλις [ημιοί] The commentators quote Aeschines, *Contra Cles.* 244 ἐάν τις αὐτῶν διαχρήστηται, τὴν χείρα τὴν τοῦτο πράξασαν χώρις τοῦ σώματος βάπτομεν, and Plato, *Legg.* ix. 873. The pollution of the city caused by the suicide was probably regarded as the chief part of the injury inflicted by his act: other effects would be those noted by Mich. Eph.—καθ’ ὃ ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν πόλιν στρατηγῶν ἢ στρατιώτην ἢ τεχνίτην ἢ τινά τοιοῦτον.

a. 14. § 4. *ἔτι* In §§ 1–3 the writer has shown that *οὐκ ἔστιν ἄδικοι πρὸς αὐτὸν, where ἄδικοι = παράνομοι.* He now proceeds to show that the same is true where ἄδικοι = ἁντικοι.

καθ’ ὃ ἄδικος μόνον ὃ ἄδικῶν] μόνον ὃ is the conjecture of Laminus for the ὁ μόνον of the codd., and is approved by Zell, Ramsauer and Bywater. The meaning is—'Further, if we take ὃ ἄδικῶν in the narrow sense of ἄδικος (ἄδικος μόνον = ἁντικός or πλεονέκτης), and not in the wide sense (ἄλως φαύλος = παράνομος), it is impossible ἄδικησαι ἑαυτόν.' No MS. apparently gives μόνον ὃ, and all, with two exceptions, ὁ μόνον. The two exceptions are CCC with ἄδικος ὃ μὲν ἄδικῶν, and ᾿H with ἄδικος ὃ ἄδικῶν. An omitted μόνον supplied above the line or on the margin might very easily get into the wrong place after ὃ; and would retain that place by suggesting to careless scribes and readers that the distinction with which the sentence is concerned is not that between the ἁντικός and the παράνομος, but that between ὃ τὰ ἄδικα πράττων and ὃ ἄδικῶν, as given e.g. in ch. 9. § 3.


a. 16. ἐστὶ γάρ τῶς . . . πονηρῶν] i.e. there is a sense in which the ἄδικος is an offender coordinate with the δειλός e.g., and not an offender generally. Ἀδικία in one sense is πλεονεξία—a specific form of πονηρία, just as δειλία, ἁσωτία, are specific forms. It has however a generic sense also, in which it is equivalent to ἄλη πονηρία.

οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην] κατὰ τὴν μερικὴν ἡτίς ἐστὶν ἢ πλεονεξία (Paraph.). 1138 a. 17.
I prefer Bekker's punctuation here to Susenmihl's and Bywater's. The words ἀμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. are to be taken closely with ὅστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἄδικει.

ἄδικεῖ] K has ἄδικεῖ ἄν. Can ἄν be a corruption of αὐτῶν, which a. 18. the sense requires?

ἀμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] see M. M. 1. 33. 1196 a. 9 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἄδικον, ἦ ἄδικεῖ, πλείων ἔχει, ὃ ἄδικομενος, ἦ ἄδικεῖται, ἐξαφνον. εἰ ἀρὰ αὐτὸς αὐτῶν ἄδικεῖ, ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ πλείων ἔχειν καὶ ἐξαφνον. ἀλλὰ τούτ' ἄδικαντον ὅθεν ἀρὰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν αὐτῶν ἄδικεῖν.

ἐν πλείοσιν] 'implies more than one person': cf. v. 3. 4. 5. a. 19.

§ 5. ἐπὶ δὲ . . . πρότερον] 'The words ἐκοῦσιν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως,' a. 20. says Jackson, 'are not necessary to the argument. Indeed τὸ ἄδικεῖν is not necessarily ἐκ προαιρέσεως: I have therefore translated the phrase "voluntary or deliberate, and aggressive."' But see below, note on ὅ γὰρ διότι ἔσπευδε a. 21.

πρότερον] sc. τὸ ἄδικεῖν τοῦ ἄδικεῖσθαι.

α. 21.

ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔσπευδε κ.τ.λ.] Jackson's note here is—'οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἄλλ' ὁ ὁργίασας 8. § 9.' Does this mean that ὁ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν of the present passage and ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν of 8, § 9 are identical? If they are, then the argument is—'ἄδικεῖν is deliberate and aggressive: for the θυμῷ ποιῶν, who does not act deliberately and is not an aggressor, οὐ δοκεῖ ἄδικεῖν.' This, however, is hardly consistent with v. 8. 9.

ἐπὶ εἰς ἄν ἐκόντα ἄδικεῖσθαι]—which has been shown to be a. 23. impossible ch. 9. §§ 1–6. Ramsauer asks—'quid hoc post verba ἄδικεῖται δ' ὀδηγέσω ἐκόν, vs. 12? ' Surely because it helps to prove the conclusion—that the ἄδικῶν quid ἀνωσ cannot injure himself. In § 3 it helped to prove another conclusion—that the ἄδικῶν quid παράνομος cannot injure himself.

§ 6. πρὸς δὲ τούτων] 'If, instead of arguing from our conception a. 24. of ἄδικα, we examine special cases of it, we come to the same conclusion' (Jackson). Τὸ ἀποκτείνων ἄμνον, already discussed in §§ 2 and 3, is, of course one of τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἄδικήματα, but it does not stand in the same position as the ἄδικήματα mentioned in this §. As soon as they are mentioned, we see that they are not cases of
1138 a. 24. \( \text{τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτὸν} \). But \( \text{τὸ ἀποκτεννῶναι ἑαυτὸν} \) looks, at first sight, like a case of \( \text{τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτὸν} \), and it is only the reflection—\( \text{ἡ πολὺς ζῆμοι} \)—which makes us aware that it is not. The difference between the \( \text{ἀδικήματα} \) of the present section and those of which \( \text{τὸ ἀποκτεννῶναι ἑαυτὸν} \) in §§ 2 and 3 is an example that is marked in \( \text{Rhet. i. 13. 1373 b. 18 \ πρὸς οὐς δὲ διώρισται [τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἁδικά]} \ διχῶς διώρισται* \( \text{ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν \ πρὸς ἕνα τῶν κοινωνόντων, \ αὐτὲς πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν. Διὸ καὶ τάδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἁδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν* \( \text{ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ἁρισμένον \ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν \ ἡ γὰρ κοινοῖς καὶ τύπτων ἁδικεῖ τινὰ τῶν ὀρισμένων, \ αὐτὲς μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινὸν. \) Thus \( \text{ὁ σφάττων ἑαυτὸν} \) injures τὸ κοινὸν by depriving it of a soldier. Similarly, the \( \text{ἀκόλαστος} \) or \( \text{ἀσώτως} \) who, at first sight, might seem to injure himself, really injures the State by depriving it of the services which health or wealth enables a citizen to render. The \( \text{μοιχεύων} \), on the other hand, is regarded rather as injuring an individual. I therefore understand the present § (6) to contain another argument to show that the \( \text{ἀδικὸν} \) \( \text{σιάλ ἄνωσος} \) cannot injure himself—cannot treat himself as another individual whose ‘fair share’ he encroaches upon. The arguments to show that he cannot injure himself \( \text{ζημία} \) παράνομοι were concluded in § 3.

The writer of the \( \text{M. M.} \) would seem to have these two classes of \( \text{ἀδικήματα} \)—\( \text{τὰ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν} \) and \( \text{τὰ πρὸς ἕνα} \)—in his mind. His words are (i. 33. 1195 b. 35)—\( \text{ἀλλὰ ἵνα ἐσταιδὰ πᾶλιν ἀπορήσειν ἃν τις, ἃρα γε ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτῶν ἁδικεῖν; ἐκ μὲν} \) τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς σκοπούμενος οὐκεὶν ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ πᾶλιν οὔτως. \( \text{εἰ γὰρ ἂ νόμος πράττειν τάττει, ταῦτα ἐστὶν δίκαια, ἡ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα ἁδικεῖ* καὶ εἰ πρὸς ὅν κελευει πράττειν, πρὸς τοῦτον εἰ μὴ πράττει, τοῦτον ἁδικεῖ, ἡ δὲ νόμος κελευὴ σώφρονα εἰναι, οὕτων κεκτηθήσα, σώματος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰλλα τὰ τοιοῦτα, ἢ ἃρα ταῦτα μὴ πράττων ἁδικεῖ αὐτῶν. \) εἰς οὕθενα γὰρ ἄλλον τῶν τοιούτων ἁδικημάτων ἡ ἀναφορὰ ἐστὶ—ἀλλὰ μὴ ποτὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἄληθή ἢν, οὕτω ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν ἁδικεῖν αὐτῶν, τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πλείον ἔχειν καὶ ἔπαθεν, οὕτω ἐκόπτα ἃμα καὶ ἄτομα. \( \text{ἀλλὰ} \) μὴ ὁ ἁδικοῦν, ἤ ἁδικεῖ, πλεῖον ἔχει, ὁ δὲ ἁδικούμενος, ἤ ἁδικεῖται, ἔπαθεν. \( \text{εἰ ἃρα αὐτὸς αὐτῶν ἁδικεῖ, ἐνδέχεται} \) τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἔπαθεν. \( \text{ἀλλὰ} \) τοῦτο ἁδύνατον οὐκ ἃρα ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν αὐτῶν ἁδικεῖν,—ἐτὶ ο μὲν ἁδικῶν ἐκὼν ἁδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἁδικούμενος ἐκὼν ἁδικεῖται, ὥστε εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτῶν ἁδικεῖν, ἐνδέχεται* τὸ ἃμα καὶ ἀκούσιον καὶ ἐκούσιοι πράττειν τῷ τούτῳ δὲ ἁδύνατον οὐκ ἃρα οὕτως ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν αὐτῶν ἁδικεῖν.—ἐτὶ εἰ τις λαμβάνοι ἐκ
BOOK V: CHAP. 11: §§ 6, 7.

τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων. ἀδικοῦσι γὰρ πάντες ἤτοι παρακαταθήκην 1138 a.24. ἀποστεροῦντες ἢ μοιχεύοντες ἢ κλέπτοντες ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων πουόντες: οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε αὐτὸς αὐτὸν παρακαταθήκην ἀπεστήρησεν, οὐδὲ ἔραξεν τὸν ἑαυτῷ γυναῖκα, οὐδὲ ἐκλεφθὲν αὐτὸς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ· ὅταν εἰ τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔστιν, τούτων δὲ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται πρὸς αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, οὔκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

ὅς κ.τ.λ.] 'But indeed the question of τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν as a a.26. whole (i.e. whether we understand ἀδικεῖν as παρανομεῖν or as πλεονεκτεῖν) is answered by reference to the definition of ἀδικεῖν (ch. 9. §§ 4, 5), which enabled us to answer the question of τὸ ἑκανοσία ἀδικεῖσθαι.

Fritzsche has the following note on the words ὅς δὲ . . . ἀδικεῖσθαι—'Eadem et sententia est et verba eadem quae p. 1136 b. 23 (coll. p. 1136 b. 3-4) leguntur. Quae si ab eodem scriptore posita esse credimus, magnum habent offensionem, eadem si ab alio Peripatetico (h. e. Eudemo) in simili disputatione adhibita esse sumimus, explicationem habent facilem.’ Fritzsche’s view is that the Fifth Book was written by Aristotle, with the exception of this eleventh chapter, which comes from the lost book of Eudemus ἐπὶ δικαίωσύνης (see Fritzsche, Prolegomena, p. xlvi),

§§ 7, 8.] Jackson places these sections, ‘which have obviously a. 28. nothing to do with the ἀπορία raised in ch. 9,’ after ch. 5, § 18. See his Introduction, p. xvi. Ramsauer suggests the same locus for them. The writer of the M. M. passes on (i. 33. 1196 a. 25) immediately from a discussion parallel to that in ch. 11, §§ 1-6, to the subject dealt with in § 9.

§ 7. καὶ ὅπερ . . . γυμναστική] These words are probably a note a. 30. from the margin. As they stand, they have no grammatical connexion with the context. A ‘codex perantiquus’ referred to by Lambinus seems to have patched up a connexion by ὅπερ ἔχει ὅπερ ὑγιεινὸν κ.τ.λ. Rassow (Forsch. p. 77) supplies after μέσον the words τὸ δὲ δικαιοπραγεῖν μέσον.

χείρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] The commentators refer to Plato, Gorgias a. 31. 443 A and 509 C.

κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς] The distinction is not, a. 33. as the Paraph. (in an alternative explanation) says, that between ἡ καθόλου ἀδίκια and ἡ μερική, but (as the parenthesis after ἐγγύς

1138 a. 33. shows clearly) that between the πάθη which give rise to the voluntary and reprehensible, but not deliberate, acts of the ἅμων ποιῶν, and the ἔξεις προαιρετικῆς of the μοιχήρας (see ch. 8, §§ 8-11). Michael Ephesus is right—λέγων κακίαν ἀπλῶς τὴν μετὰ προαιρέσεως ὅτι τὸ ἐκόσιον ἔχει, σύνεγγυς δὲ τὴν δίχα προαιρέσεως ... διάτι οὐδὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως πᾶν ἐκόσιον' οἱ γὰρ ἀρχιζόμενοι ὡς εἴπε πρῶτον ἐκόσιες πράττονσιν οὐ μὴν ἐκ προαιρέσεως. The expression τελεία κακία, = ἡ μετὰ προαιρέσεως, is, however, misleading, for it suggests (as Ramsauer points out) the ἀλή κακία which is opposed to ἡ τελεία ἀρετῆ at the end of the first chapter of this Book.

b. 2.  § 8. ἀλλ' οὖθεν μελετῇ τῇ τέχνῃ] Science takes no account of τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. It is concerned either with τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, or with τὰ ὡς ἐτο πολὺ.

b. 5.  § 9.] For 'justice and injustice as between the parts of the soul' the commentators refer to Plato, Rep. 432 A, 441 A, 443 C. The writer seems to warn his readers against what he conceives to be the misleading tendency of such a presentation of justice as we have it in the Republic. Metaphorically we can speak of justice and injustice between the parts of the soul. But this is no good reason for affirming that a man can be unjust in the strict sense to himself.

b. 7.  οὐ πάντα δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεισποτικὸν ἢ τὸ ὀικονομικόν] i.e. not τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον as well as τὸ δεισποτικὸν and the other forms distinguished in ch. 6, but the other forms exclusive of τὸ πολιτικὸν. Thus the writer of the M. M. begins his parallel passage (i. 33. 1196 a. 25) with the words—οὐ τὸ γε πολιτικὸν δίκημα ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀικονομικὸν. Stahr translates—'Doch gilt das nicht von der Gerechtigkeit in ihrem ganzen Umfange, sondern nur von derjenigen, wie sie der Herr gegen den Sklaven, der Hausvater gegen die Familie übt.'

b. 8.  εν τούτωι γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις] This must surely mean 'the theories in question'—i.e. the Platonic and other theories which speak of justice and injustice subsisting between the parts of the soul. But Mich. Eph. has ὅπερ λόγον ἔχει τὸ δυῖλος πρὸς δεισπότην τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ ἀλογὸν μέρος τῆς ἐρημίας πρὸς τὸ λογιζόμενον. τοιαύτη γὰρ διεστηκε τῷ ταῖτα διάστασιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὡς εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἐρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον—i.e. he apparently takes ἐν τούτωι τοῖς λόγοις as meaning 'in this ratio.'

b. 10.  βλέπουσι] dat.
They think that the man, as a whole, can injure himself, because one part of his soul can have its desire thwarted by the other part. They think that there subsists between these parts a sort of justice like that between ruler and subject. Justice, however, is between persons ὅσι καὶ ὀμοσ πρὸς αὐτούς (v. 6. 4), and 'parts are not persons,' as Peters (p. 179) well puts it. A theory of justice which forgets this is as misleading as a theory of voluntary action which fails to recognise ἡ δὴ ψυχή—the organic unity behind the struggle of the 'parts': see E. E. ii. 8. 1224 b. 21 (quoted by Jackson)—ὡς τὸ μὲν βία ἐκάτερον φάσαι ποιεῖν ξει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὤρεξιν καὶ διὰ τῶν λογισμῶν ἐκάτερον ἀκούσα ποτὲ πράσσειν' κεχωρισμένα γὰρ ἄντα ἑκάτερα ἐκπροέτει ὑπ’ ἀλλήλου. ὡδὲν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν βίαν μεταφέροναι ψυχήν, ἵνα τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τις τοιοῦτον ὀρῶσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τούτῳ λέγειν ἡ δ’ ἀλη ἐκοῦσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦ πράττει, βία δ’ οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφότερα ἤχομεν.

ὅτι ἐν τούτοις] Jackson brackets ἐν.

τῶν ἔαντων ὄρεξις] i. e. the ὄρεξις of the several μέρη. The ὄρεξις b. 11. of the λόγου ψυχῆς μέρος may be thwarted by the ἀλογου μέρος, and vice versa. 'An ὄρεξις is loosely and κατὰ μεταφορὰν attributed to the λόγον ψυχῆς' (Jackson).

ἄρχοντι καὶ ἄρχομεν] The editors quote Pol. A. 5. 1260 a. 5 ἐν b. 12. τάντα [i. e. τῇ ψυχῇ] γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ’ ἄρχομεν, διὸν ἐτέραν φαινεῖν εἶναι ἄρετήν, οἷον τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου.


END OF VOL. I.