NOTES

ON

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

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BOOK VI.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

We have said that we must choose the mean, and that the mean is that which the ‘right reason’ points out. But how is the ‘right reason’ determined? What makes it ‘the right reason’? What is it that ‘the right reason’ has in view in fixing on this point rather than on that as ‘the mean’? The musician, for example, in tuning his instrument, must have some standard of tension before his mind. It is true that the strings must not be too tight or too loose, but just the right tightness. Again, it is true that the patient must get just what a skilful physician would prescribe—neither more nor less:—all this is true, but it is not definite enough. So in morals it is true that we must choose the mean as the right reason directs: but not definite enough. We must know definitely what the right reason is, that is, why, or in relation to what, it is ‘right.’

We have distinguished the virtues of the soul as virtues of the moral character and virtues of the intellect. We have discussed the moral virtues: let us now discuss the intellectual—but first a few words about the soul generally. We have seen that there are two parts of the soul, the part which has reason, and the irrational part. Now let us divide the part which has reason into (1) that part by which we perceive necessary truth, and (2) that by which we perceive contingent truth: for, as the objects are generically distinct, there must be generically distinct faculties of the soul naturally corresponding to each class of objects, knowledge implying a certain similarity and kinship between faculty and object. Let us call (1) the Scientific Faculty, and (2) the Calculative faculty, for to deliberate and to calculate is the same thing, and no one deliberates about necessary truths. The best state of each of these faculties will be the ‘virtue’ of each. We have to discover, then, what is the virtue of each, or the state which enables it to perform its proper function.

§§ 1-4.] Rassow (Forsch. pp. 19, 20) points out that this book has 1188 b. 18. two introductions, (1) ἐνειδ . . . ὅπος, §§ 1, 2, 3, and (2) τὰς δὲ . . . οὕτως, § 4. The motives of these two introductions seem, on first inspection at least, to differ. In §§ 1-3 we are told that the ideal or law of the perfect exercise of reason must now be examined,
1138 b. 18. because reason (as distinguished from feeling) is the faculty which perceives the exact point where, in a given case, the moral mean lies. The moral function of reason cannot, it would appear, be rightly understood apart from the ideal or law which regulates its speculative function. The completion of the doctrine of the moral mean thus seems to be presented by the writer of §§ 1-3 as the justification of a formal discussion of the ἀρετή of the rational part of the soul, leading up to a definition of the ideal, or law, of the perfect exercise of reason. But in § 4 the discussion of the intellectual ἀρετή is not introduced as for the sake of the right understanding of the moral ἀρετή; the writer, having finished what he has to say about the moral ἀρετή, simply passes on to the second coordinate part of his treatise—the discussion of the intellectual ἀρετή. It is to be noted that the writer of the M. M. does not seem to have had § 4 before him. He follows the writer of §§ 1-3 in introducing the discussion of the intellectual ἀρετή as necessary to complete the doctrine of moral virtue; see M. M. i. 34. 1196 b. 4 ἐπειδὴ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰρηται, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν καὶ ἐν τίσιν καὶ περὶ ποια, καὶ περὶ ἕκαστης αὐτῶν, ὅτι εἶ πράσσωμεν κατὰ τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων τὸ βέλτιστον, τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰπεῖν, τὸ κατὰ τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων πρᾶττειν, διόμεν ἡμῖν ὑστερ ἂν εἴ τις εἶποι ὅτι ἔγειρα ἄριστ' ἄν γένοιτο, ἐἰ τίς τὰ ὑμεῖν προσφέρετο. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀσαφές· ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ μου, τὰ ποια διασάφησον ἐστίν ὑμεῖν. οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου, τι ἐστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ τίς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος; ἀναγκαῖον ίσως ἐστίν πρῶτον μὲν, ἐν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐγγίνεται, ὑπὲρ τούτου διελέσθαι. διωρίσθη μὲν ὧν ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς ὡς τύπῳ καὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἐστὶ λόγον ἔχου, τὸ δὲ ἄλλων μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς· ἔστω δ' ἐις δύο τὴν διαίρεσιν ἔχον τὸ λόγου ἔχον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, δόν ἐστι τὸ μὲν βουλευτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἐπιστημονικὸν κ.τ.λ. Further on, (M. M. i. 34. 1197 b. 28–35), we find him stating distinctly that his treatise is ὑπὲρ ἢθων, and defending, though not without some confusion of thought, or perhaps of language, the discussion of σοφία in such a treatise—ἀπαρχότα καὶ ἀρέται καὶ πολιτικά καὶ πραγματείας ὑπὲρ σοφίας λέγεται. οὕτως γε πρῶτον μὲν οὐδ' ἀλλοτρία δόξειν ἂν ἐννηματίκης ἂν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, εἰπέρ ἐστιν ἄρετής, ὡσ φαιμέν. ἐτε δ' ἵσως ἐστὶν φιλοσόφου καὶ περὶ τούτων παρεπισκοπεῖν ὅσα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τυγχάνουσιν ὁμιλεῖ. καὶ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν ὑπέρ ψυχῆς λέγειν, περὶ ἀπαντῶν λέγειν· ἐστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σοφία ἐν ψυχῇ· ὅστε οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ὑπέρ... ψυχῆς πολύμεθα τοὺς λόγους.

It is not a profitable line of enquiry to ask which 'introduction' is 'Aristotelian,' and which 'Eudemian.' Thus much may be said, however, by way of bringing out the implication of each:—§ 4
seems to assume that the Statesman’s Manual ought to cover the whole ground of human nature, the intellectual ἀπέρατος being as indispensable as the moral ἀπέρατος to the noble life. The unity of the ἀπέρατος in the στροφαῖος having been assumed once for all, no explanation is offered of the special connexion of one ἀπέρατος with another, or of one set of ἀπέρατος with another set: it is thought to be enough to arrange them according to the popularly received psychological divisions, and to describe them in order as they occur on the list: §§ 1–3, on the other hand, instead of passing, like § 4, without comment from the description of the moral ἀπέρατος to that of the intellectual ἀπέρατος, come forward with a reason why the intellectual ἀπέρατος should be discussed at all:—they are to be discussed because the discussion of them is necessary to complete the doctrine of the moral mean. Whereas § 4 seems to present the moral and intellectual ἀπέρατος as holding coordinate places in the treatise, §§ 1–3 give us a logical bridge by which we seem to pass from the main subject of the treatise—the moral ἀπέρατος—to a subordinate part—the discussion of the intellectual ἀπέρατος—appended as necessary to the comprehension of the main subject. But if the true position of the writer of §§ 1–3 is to be estimated from E. E. Θ. 3. (H. 15) 1249 a. 21–b. 25 (and it is safe, I think, from the striking similarity of language, to suppose that it is), he misrepresents himself, when he thus—apparently from a desire for logical connexion between the parts of his treatise—introduces reason as if it were merely ancillary to moral virtue. It cannot be his real intention to put reason on any such footing. The σκοπός or ὁρὸς of the present passage, if identical with that of E. E. Θ. 3. (H. 15), will, after all, be the law of the moral mean, only because it is the law or ideal of man’s life, not as human and moral, but as godlike. Reason does not exist (as becomes afterwards clear) to accommodate itself to the exigencies of the moral life, and to perform the function of blind-man’s leader to passion; rather the moral life is for the sake of the life of divine speculation, as matter is for the sake of form. Reason must regulate passion, that man’s life may become δεκτικὸν τοῦ ἐλέους—receptive of its true form, capable of the contemplation and service of God. I transcribe the whole passage E. E. Θ. 3. (H. 15) 1249 a. 21–b. 25, as being essential to the right understanding of E. N. vi. 1. §§ 1–3.—ἔτει δ’ ἔστι τὸ ὁρὸς καὶ τῷ ἱερῷ, πρὸς ὧν ἀναφέρεται κρίνει τὸ ὕμνιον σώματι καὶ μή, καὶ πρὸς ὧν μέχρι ποιηθῆν ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἑν ὕμνιον, εἰ δὲ ἐλαττῶν ἡ πλέον, υἱκέτει. οὔτω καὶ τῷ στροφαῖῳ περὶ

§ 1. ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες] cf. E. E. ii. 5. 1222 a. 6–10, E. N. ii. 2. 2. Grant translates ὁ δριθὸς λόγος by ‘the right law.’ It is important to remember that λόγος is at once the objective order, and the faculty in man which perceives it. When a man’s passions are regulated, his nature is a λόγος, or organism, of the balance of...
which in all its parts he is delicately perceptive by means of his λόγος, or reason. Such a man will know at once where the mean point lies in a given case, because his 'moral consciousness'—his consciousness of the 'right law,' or 'just proportion,' of his nature will tell him, as healthy feeling tells a man when he has eaten enough. But what makes the λόγος, or proportion, itself ὤρθος, or right? It is safe to answer—its end. What then is its end, or, as the writer here expresses it, its σκοπός or ὤρος? For the sake of what does human nature exist as an organism? Till we know this we cannot attach definite meaning to the phrase ὤρος λόγος.

ἐστι τις σκοπός] Grant says—'Ἐπιτελεῖ καὶ ἀνίσον is a metaphor b. 22. from tuning the strings of a lyre. Cf. Plato, Lysis, p. 209 B καὶ ἐπειδῶν, ὡς ἐγγύς, τὴν λύραν λάβῃς, οὐ διακωλύσῃ σε οὕτω πατήρ οἴθ' ἡ μήτρη ἐπιτείνα τε καὶ ἀνίσον ἢν ἐν βούλῃ τῶν χορδῶν . . . This metaphor is not quite in accordance with the other metaphor of 'looking to the mark,' but in fact the term σκοπός seems to have become so regular a formula with Eudemus as to have lost its metaphorical association. By Aristotle, σκοπός was used as a pure metaphor . . . But in the writing of Eudemus it seems used as a scientific term equivalent to τέλος: cf. Eth. Eud. ii. 10. 20 [i.e. ii. 10. 1227 a. 6] ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλεύεται ἄει ὁ βουλευόμενος ἐνεκά τινος, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπός τις ἄει τῷ βουλευόμενῳ πρὸς ὅσκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐδὲς βουλεύεται . . . The similar use of ὤρος by Eudemus is not found in Eth. Nic., but appears borrowed from the mode of writing in the Politics of Aristotle.' Grant's remark that 'by Aristotle σκοπός was used as a pure metaphor' is true, I think, only of two passages in the so-called Aristotelian books of the E. N.—viz. ii. 6. 14 βάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτελεῖ τοῦ σκοποῦ, and i. 2. 2 καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες. In the one other place in which the word σκοπός occurs in these books—iii. 12. 9 διὸ δὲ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν συμφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ σκοπῶν γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλὸν, it seems to be used in much the same way as in E. E. ii. 10. 1227 a. 7 quoted by Grant. The same may be said of its use in Rhet. i. 6. 1362 a. 17 ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον, βουλεύονται δὲ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος κ.τ.λ., and of its use in Pol. Δ. (H.) 13. 1331 b. 26 ἐπεὶ δὲ δῦο ἔστιν ἐν οἷς γίνεται τὸ εὖ πάσιν, τούτων δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τῶν σκοπῶν κείσομαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὄρθος, ἐν δὲ τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φεροῦσας πράξεις εὐρίσκειν. Here surely we may borrow Grant's words about the Eudemian σκοπός, and say that by Aristotele 'σκοπός is used as a scientific term equivalent to τέλος'—although, when two
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1138 b. 22. lines below he uses it again, he seems to remember its metaphorical character—εἰπότε γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἐκκειταί καλὸς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρᾶτευ τοῦ τυχεῖν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνωσιν. But in E. E. i. 2. 1214 b. 7 is it not also used metaphorically?—ἅπατα τῶν δυνάμεων ζην κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν βέβαια τινά σκοπὸν τοῦ καλὸς ζην, ἢτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παθεῖαν πρὸς ἐν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις. There seems therefore to be nothing in Grant’s view that ‘By Aristotle σκοπὸς was used as a pure metaphor . . . but in the writing of Eudemus it seems used as a scientific term equivalent to τέλος.’ Both ‘Aristotle’ and ‘Eudemus’ use it as a metaphor, and both use it as a scientific term equivalent to τέλος. As for ‘the similar use of ὅρος by Eudemus’ it is true that it ‘is not found in the Eth. Nic.’ But Grant admits that it occurs in the Politics. The non-metaphorical use of σκοπὸς and ὅρος as ‘scientific terms’ in the Sixth Book of the Ethics seems to me to contribute nothing to the solution of the question of authorship.

b. 25. § 2. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶπεν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐδὲν δὲ σαφές] Fritzschte finds in these words a strong confirmation of his view that Eudemus is the author of this Book. He says—‘eadem sunt verba de re eadem Eud. p. 1249 b. 6: nusquam in E. N. est haec formula. An Aristotelem se ipsum tam graviter reprehendisse veri simile est? Contra eum, qui reprehendendi et conformandi emendandique locum sibi reperisse videretur, in repetenda hac formula sibi placuisse et credibile est et similibus recentiorum philosophorum, qui, scholae philosophi certi addicti, quum quaedam principis scholae melius sibi intelligere videntur, haec ut nauseam paene moveant identidem repetunt, exemplis possit illustrari, nisi odiosa sint exempla.’ Grant also sees in the words the protest of the disciple against his master. He says—‘This same expression, with the same illustration of the medical art, is repeated Eth. Eud. viii. 3. 13 [Θ. 3 (H. 15). 1249 b. 6] ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρῶτερον εἰλέχθη τὸ ὁς ὁ λόγος. τούτῳ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὄσπερ ἂν εἰ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν εἶπεν ὡς ἡ ἱερακὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης, τούτῳ δ᾽ ἀληθές μὲν, οὐ σαφές δὲ . . . In the present place there is an apparent protest against the indefiniteness and relativity of Aristotle’s moral theory of ‘the mean” and “the law.” Eudemus does not seem (according to the statement here) content to give greater explicitness to the idea of the ‘law’ by the development of the idea of the wise man who is its impersonation. But he asks (separating σκοπὸς and ὅρος from the λόγος), “What is the
mark to which one possessing the law must look?" "What is the standard of the law?" In reality these questions get no answer. They only cloud the subject by introducing a confusion of formulae. But are the words ἄλλης μὲν οὐδὲν δὲ σαφές too strong to be used by a writer speaking of himself? Surely not, if we may judge from An. Post. ii. 19. 100 a. 14 (quoted by Ramsauer) δὲ ἐλέγεθη μὲν πάλιν, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ ἐλέχθη, πάλιν εἰπώμεν, or from E. N. i. 7. 9 ἄλλη ἰσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἀριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενον τι φαίνεται, ποθέται δὲ ἐναργέστερον τι ἐστιν τι εἰς λεξηβιν. Indeed in E. E. Θ. 3 (Η. 15) 1249 b. 3–6 (quoted by Fritzsche and Grant!) we find Eudemus correcting himself in words identical with those in which Fritzsche and Grant here see the protest of the disciple against his master.

Again, is Grant right when he says that the questions—"What is the mark to which one possessing the law must look?"—"What is the standard of the law?" get no answer? Surely they do at the end of the E. E., where the ὄρος τῆς καλοκαγαθίας is determined, and in the Tenth Book of the E. N. where the βίος θεωρητικός is discussed. It is true however that in the Sixth Book itself we get no answer to them. The Sixth Book merely prepares us for the answer by completing the detailed account of the ἀρεταὶ of the σπουδαῖος. When the σπουδαῖος has been once placed concretely before us in the fulness of his attributes, we shall then be in a position to appreciate the definition of his ὄρος or σκοπός—of the ideal for which he lives. It may be that in the undisputed Nicomachean Books more value is attached to the living example of the σπουδαῖος than to a formal definition of his σκοπός—as we have it at the end of the E. E. (see note on E. N. ii. 6. 15), but so far as a formal account of the ideal is given in the undisputed Nicomachean Books, it does not seem to differ from that given at the end of the E. E. In E. N. x the ideal is ἔφε δοσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιέων πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (E. N. x. 7. 8), and the man who acts up to it is θεοφυλέστατος (x. 8. 13); in E. E. Θ. (Η.) the ideal is τῶν θεῶν θεραπευέων καὶ θεωρεῖν. This latter formula is quite 'Aristotelian' in substance; and it matters little whether it owes its phraseology to the master himself or to a disciple of the school.

§ 3. διὰ δὲι... τίς ὄρος.] A moral rule—e.g. 'Be moderate in your pleasures'—cannot be interpreted aright apart from a correct

1 If he wrote E. N. vi, as Fritzsche and Grant hold.
view of the ideal or chief end of life. As interpreted by an Epicurean this rule would mean—‘Enjoy yourself as much as you can consistently with your own health and peace of mind.’ But this would be excess from the Aristotelian point of view; such enjoyment would hinder τὸ ζήν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ. What the writer of Ἕ. Ἕ. vii. 13. 4 says of ἐνυπάρχεια is here virtually said of μεσοῦσ, viz. πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὄρος αὐτῆς—the mean point in every case is fixed, where it is fixed, because the Chief Good is what it is. What then is it? The answer finally given is—the exercise of the Speculative Reason. But before this answer can be given, the rational part of the soul, as a whole, must be examined, and especially the Practical Reason—φρόνησις—both because it is that manifestation of Reason which is γνωριμότερον ἡμῖν, and because it must have performed its function of rationalising the feelings and desires, before the Speculative Reason can engage, without impediment, in that activity of θεωρία which is the highest expression of man’s nature—that is, the final cause of his being. We have seen that the object of this speculative activity is ‘God,’ and that the man who engages in it is θεοφιλέστατος. It may be said then that, in their answer to the question τοῦτον τὶς ὁρος, the Aristotelians maintain that the ultimate moral standard is given by the religious consciousness. The ὁρος τῶν μεσοτίτων given by φρόνησις, or the Practical Reason (cf. ὃ ἀν ὁ φρόνησις ὀρίσει Ἕ. Ἕ. ii. 6. 15, and ἔτι ἡ κατὰ τῶν ἀρθῶν λόγον, ὁρθός ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν vi. 13. 4) is not the ultimate standard, because the position of φρόνησις in the hierarchy of faculties is that described in Ἕ. Ἕ. vi. 13. 8—ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ’ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίστου μορίου, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑστερίας ἡ λατρίκη οὐ γὰρ χρήσαι αὐτῇ, ἀλλ’ ὁρᾶ ὅποι γενήται ἐκείνης οὐν ἔνεκα ἐπιστάτης, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκείνη. ἦτε ὅμοιον κἂν ἐκ τῆς τῆς πολιτικῆς φαίνῃ ἀρχεῖν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιστάτην περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει: cf. Ἕ. x. 8. 1 δευτέρος ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἄρετὴν κ.τ.λ.

This note may be brought to a close with a reference to a note of Fritzsche on Ἕ. Ἕ. ii. 5. 1222 b. 7–8, in which he maintains the view against which I have been arguing—that the ὤς ἀν ὁ φρόνησις ὀρίσει of the Ἕ. Ἕ. was put forward as an ultimate standard ‘by Aristotle,’ and that it was left to Eudemus ‘to correct Aristotle,’ by showing that it is not ultimate, but dependent on the ὁρος τῆς καλοκαγαθίας: my contention being that ‘Aristotle’ (as we must conclude from the subordinate place which he assigns to the θεικαὶ ἁρεταὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν in Ἕ. Ἕ. x. 8) does not regard the
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ως ἄν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειν as an ultimate standard, but as dependent on a standard which is identical with the ‘Eudeman’ ὁρὸς τῆς καλοκαγαθίας—that, in short, there is no difference between the positions of ‘Aristotle’ and of ‘Eudemus’ with regard to the ultimate standard. Fritzsché’s note, which thus raises a very important question respecting the difference between Aristotle and Eudemus, will be found on p. 40 of his edition of the E. E.


§ 5. πρότερον] E. E. ii. 4. 1221 b. 27, E. N. i. 13. 9.

ἀλογον] After this word Spengel (Arist. Stud. p. 211) supposes that δὲ ἡδή διώρισμα τὸ ἁλογον, or words to such effect have fallen out; but the supposition is unnecessary. Ὑδ οὐκ οὐκ ὁ τρόπον διαρετέσαν relates to δῷ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, and the writer means that, as the ψυχή has two parts—τὸ λόγον ζχον and τὸ ἁλογον, so τὸ λόγον ζχον has also two parts.

καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ζχοντα] This division is not to be καὶ confused with that indicated in E. E. ii. i. 1219 b. 28 ὑποκείσθω δύο μέρη ψυχῆς τὰ λόγον μετέχοντα, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον μετέχειν ἀμφότερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τὸ ἐπιτάττειν, τὸ δὲ τὸ πείθειν καὶ ἀκούειν περιφέρειαι, and in E. N. i. 13. 19 διὰ τὸν ἐσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ διαπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκονιστικῶν προ. In these passages we have really the main division of the ψυχή into ἁλογον and λόγον ζχον, and only apparently a subdivision of τὸ λόγον ζχον. But in the passage before us (vi. i. 5) the λόγον ζχον κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ is itself subdivided into the faculty which apprehends things which are necessarily what they are—τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, and that which apprehends things which are contingently what they are—τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. For the distinction between τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν (ἐν τὰ ἄλλα, τὰ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης ἀπλῶς) and τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν (here ὡς ἐνὶ τῷ πολύ), see notes on iii. 3. §§ 3–5, and i. 3. 4. This distinction, regarded by Aristotle as in things, is really in our way of looking at things. There is no contingency in things, but there is often failure on the part of organic beings to cope with the complexity of the necessary laws which things obey. A ‘necessary truth’ so-called is one of which we become conscious by the way of intuition. Thus, the truth that the three angles of a triangle

1 Cf. Spinoza’s theory of Scientia intuitiva, Eth. ii. 40; Schol. 2.
are equal to two right angles is apprehended by us as ‘necessary,’ because we see that, in the diagram before us (which represents all that is essential to a triangle), they are plainly equal to two right angles: we assist at the operation of superposing them upon two adjacent angles, and see that they cover them. Again, the truth that a thing cannot be at once this and not this is apprehended by us as ‘necessary’ as soon as we look at an object and see plainly that it has a definite attribute—that a rose, e.g. is red, and not also not-red. When, however, we pass from this region of direct intuition to that of forces so complicated in their interaction that it is impossible to calculate more than roughly what events will result, we are in the region of the so-called ‘contingent.’ The events which do result are indeed necessarily what they are—there is no ‘contingency’ in them, as we should see if we could comprehend all their causes; but this we either cannot do, or cannot wait to do; for in most cases we are called upon for present action in relation to these imperfectly understood future events, and are compelled to forecast them as we best can. Our attitude towards them is thus not ‘speculative,’ but essentially ‘practical.’ The apprehension of ‘contingent truth’ is, in short, ‘correspondence with environment.’ In apprehending this kind of truth, we prepare, as we best can, for a future condition of the environment, which must always be more or less difficult to forecast; in apprehending ‘necessary truth’ we see plainly something which is immediately present. ‘Contingent truth’ may then be described as that body of beliefs and expectations upon which a being, whose life is ‘a correspondence extending in time’ acts on the whole successfully. The Aristotelian God, whose life is a timeless intuitive function, perceives all things as ‘necessary.’ In so far as man perceives ‘necessary truth,’ he too is a ‘spectator’ of the universe, and lives a divine life; but, as concrete human being, he, is no longer a ‘spectator,’ but an ‘actor’ engaged in a struggle—ἀδὲ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ ζητεῖν—and in this struggle his human life is guided by his perception of ‘contingent,’ or, as it may be called, ‘practical’ truth.

In the foregoing remarks I have treated τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀλλως ἔχειν as being here equivalent to τὰ ὡς ἔπι τὸ πολὺ. Technically τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, as well as τὰ ὡς ἔπι τὸ πολὺ, fall under the head of τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀλλως ἔχειν, but are obviously not to be thought of here in a passage

1 See Spencer, *Psychol.*, vol. i. p. 320.
which distinguishes faculties of knowledge in relation to objects of knowledge. Tά ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν are not objects of knowledge.

πρὸς γὰρ ... ὑπάρχει αὐτῶν] The doctrine that to generically different objects of knowledge must correspond generically distinct faculties is here based by the writer on the hypothesis that knowledge implies a ‘similarity,’ or ‘kinship’ between object and faculty. This hypothesis meets us in various forms in the history of Psychology. Sometimes it is the analogy of the reflection in a mirror (perhaps suggested by the fact that we see by images reflected in the eye), which seems to determine the form which the hypothesis takes. Knowledge in the mind is something in having which the mind becomes like the object which it knows, just as the mirror, in reflecting, becomes like the object which it reflects. Under this head may be brought those ancient theories identified with the names of Empedocles, Democritus, and Epicurus, according to which certain ἐδώλα, ἀπόρρωμα, ἰδίωμα, images of themselves are thrown off by objects, and passing into the soul, become its knowledge of the objects: and also the various modern theories of Representative Perception, which explain knowledge by means of ‘ideas.’ To a closely related class belong the theories, both ancient and modern, of ‘impressions,’ ‘traces,’ and the like, in which the mirror analogy has been replaced by the allied wax and seal analogy. Sometimes again the hypothesis γνώσακερται τῷ ὁμοίῳ τῷ ὁμοίῳ appears in a form determined by a desire actually to identify the faculties of the knowing mind with the objects known. Under this head come those theories which assert that the mind is itself made of the elements (στοιχεῖα), material or formal, which it perceives in objects: see de An. i. 2. 404 b. 10 λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχὰς, οἱ μὲν πλείους πουόντες ταῦτα, οἱ δὲ μίαν ταύτην, ὅσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγοντι ὑπότις

γαῖη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὑπόπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,
αιθερί δ' αἰθερία διαν, ἀτρό πυρὶ πῦρ αἴδηλον,
στοργῇ δὲ στοργῤῆν, νείκος δὲ τε νείκει λυγρῷ.

tὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ γνώσακερα γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένους διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ἄθροι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μίκου καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὁμοστρόπως. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, νοῦν
1139 a. 8. μὲν τὸ ἐν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἐν’ τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἐπισέδου ἀρετῶν δόξαν, ἀσθενῶν δὲ τῶν τοῦ στερεοῦ. All such attempts to explain how mind and external objects can be brought into the contact of knowledge are idle. The gulf, which they would bridge by ‘images’ and the like does not exist. Knowing faculty and object known are not two separate entities. Each exists only as the correlate of the other in the organic whole of knowledge. We cannot go behind knowledge to find there something γνωριμώτερον by means of which to explain it. What seems to be an explanation is invariably a metaphor, fitted only to conceal from us our true problem—the faithful description of the organic whole as it is actually given.

The view καθ’ ὑμαμετατά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνώσις, adopted here without demur, is submitted to lengthy criticism in the de An., and finally accepted only in a modified form. In de An. i. 5 the point first insisted upon is that it is not enough to make the ψυχή contain merely the four material στοιχεῖα which it perceives in external objects; it must also, if the view is to be consistently held, contain the manifold λόγοι, or συνθέσεις, in which these στοιχεῖα are combined in the objects: and this is regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of the view in the crude form in which it is held by Empedocles: see de An. i. 5. 410 a. 7 οὐδὲν οὐν ὅφελος ἐνίαι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, εἰ μὴ καὶ οἱ λόγοι ἐνέσχονται καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις γνωριεί γὰρ ἐκαστὸν τὸ ὁμοῖον, τὸ δ’ οἷον τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐθὲν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ταὐτ’ ἐνέσται, τούτο δ’ ὅτι ἄρρενος, οὐθὲν δὲ λέγειν τίς γὰρ ἄν ἀπορήσει εἰ ἐνέσται εἰ τῇ ψυχῇ λίθος ἢ ἄνθρωπος; οὐσίας δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄγαθὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἄγαθόν τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. The more refined form of the view, according to which the mind contains not the material, but the formal στοιχεῖα—i.e. the categories which it perceives in things, is next examined, and dismissed—for the mind cannot perceive these στοιχεῖα in things either in virtue of containing that which is common to them all (the categories having nothing in common, being ultimate γίνη); nor yet in virtue of containing οὐσία, ὁπων, ποσόν, and the rest, separately, inasmuch as it is itself οὐσία, and οὐσία cannot be built up out of elements which are not substantial. If, e.g. the mind ‘contains’ ποσόν, or is composed of ποσά, it must be ποσόν. Again the view is inconsistent with the fundamental truth that ‘like cannot be affected by like’—a truth which is referred to in de An. ii. 4. 10. 416 a. 29 in connexion with nutrition (the parallel between nutrition and knowing is an interesting point in
the Aristotelian psychology), and insisted on generally in *de Gen. et de An.*

In *de An.* ii. 5 the view is subjected to a second criticism, through which Aristotle passes to the statement of his own position. If a sense (τὸ αἰσθητικὸν) is like that which it perceives, why does it not then perceive itself? It does not, which shows that it is a potentiality of perceiving (which only becomes actual under the influence of the stimulus supplied by an external object), not, as the ὁμοιὸν ὁμοῖος theory makes it, the thing perceived—the actual 'earth,' the actual 'posidon.' It may be compared to something combustible which does not actually burn till fire is applied to it. As the combustible is not fire, but becomes fiery, so the mind, unlike the object which affects or impresses it (for otherwise it could not be affected or impressed), when once affected or impressed, is like it: see *de An.* ii. 5. 417 a. 17 πάντα δὲ πάσχει καὶ κυνεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ ἐνεργεία ὄντος. διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὅσ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχει, ἔστι δὲ ὅσ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνομίου, καθάπερ ἐπομεν' πάσχει μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀνόμιον, πεπονθὸς δὲ ὁμοίοις ἔστιν... 418 a. 4 πάσχει μὲν οὐν οὐχ ὁμοίον ὑπ' ἐπομονθὸς β' ὁμοιότατα καὶ ἔστιν οἴον ἑκένω. This then is the modified form in which the ὁμοιὸν ὁμοῖος hypothesis is accepted in the *de An.*—a form in which the influence of metaphor is as plain as in the cruder forms of the hypothesis, upon the criticism of which it is built. The Aristotelian theory of sensation, in fact, starts from the wax and seal metaphor: see *de An.* ii. 12. 424 a. 18 οἷς μὲν αἰσθησις ἔστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἀνέν τῆς υλῆς, οἶον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἀνέν τοῦ σηκώμος καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον. As wax cannot be impressed by a soft substance like itself, but, being impressed by that which is unlike itself, takes on the likeness of that which impresses it; so the mind takes on the likeness of the objects which it knows. Yet the metaphor, assuming, as it does, the separate existence of two entities brought into mechanical relation to each other, does not bind Aristotle's speculation, as similar metaphors seem to have bound the psychologists whom he criticises. The powerful instrument of thought which he wields in his philosophical language, enables him to pass beyond his metaphor. The employment of the distinction between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια enables him to see that, after all, the two entities of the metaphor are really two correlates—an aperçu which he formulates
Now to return to E. N. vi. 1. 5. In what sense is the faculty which apprehends ὧντα which are necessarily what they are 'like these ὧντα, and the faculty which apprehends ὧντα which are contingently what they are' like these ὧντα? The answer is that, on Aristotelian principles, the faculties in exercise are not merely like, but identical with the objects as perceived. The ὧντα, their objects, are in both cases relations, i.e. ἔννεπλα, whose 'entity consists in their intelligibility.' That θεωρία, or the scientific faculty in exercise, is identical with the θέωρημα is a doctrine of the widest reach in the Aristotelian philosophy, and is often insisted upon: e.g. de An. iii. 7. 431 a. 1 τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμην τῷ πράγματι: cf. de An. iii. 4. 430 a. 4, iii. 7. 431 b. 16. But what is thus said of the scientific faculty is true of all faculties. In active exercise they are all identical with their objects—for their true objects are ἐνδο,—constructions of their own activity, 'relations which the mind sets up,' whether it be in sensation, in practical deliberation, or in θεωρία: see de An. iii. 8. 431 b. 21 ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὧντα πῶς ἐστὶν πάντα γὰρ ἡ ἀληθής τὰ ὧντα ἃ νοητά, ἐστι δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστήμη πῶς, ἢ δὲ άληθῆς τὰ ἀληθή πῶς βεγγὺς βούτο, δειεις. τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ ἀληθής εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἡ μὲν δυνάμεις εἰς δυνάμεις, ἡ δὲ ἐνεργεία εἰς ἐνεργείας τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικῶν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστημονικῶν δυνάμεις ταῦτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμην τὸ δὲ αἰσθήτων. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἡ αὐτὰ ἡ τὰ εἴδη ἐνεργείε. αὐτὰ μὲν δὴ οὖ οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἴδος ὡστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὡσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν ὡστε γὰρ ἡ χείρ ὄργανον ἐστιν ὄργανοι, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἴδος εἴδων καὶ ἡ αἰσθήσεις εἴδων αἰσθήτων. With the οὖ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἴδος of this passage may be compared Green's remark (Proleg. pp. 36, 37) that 'as we pursue the analysis of the operations involved in the simplest perception of fact, we are unable to detect any residuary phenomenon amounting to a fact at all, that can be held to be given independently of a combining and relating activity, which if the antithesis between the work of the mind and the work of things be accepted must be ascribed to the former.' Cf. also Green's Works, vol. ii. p. 179, § 18.

1 Green, Prolegom., p. 36.
The forecasting or calculating faculty in exercise will then be identical with its object—the probability of the occurrence of the event about which the forecast is made. The probability is not a quality belonging to the event; it is a quality attaching to the thought of a mind ready to venture upon a certain line of action. Just as the theorem is what the thinker plainly sees it to be, i.e. his thought, so the probability of the occurrence of a certain event is the readiness to act in view of it displayed by the man whose interest it is to make as correct a forecast as possible.

We thus have two distinct faculties of the ‘rational part’—that of plainly seeing the truth of the theorems (τὸ ἐκ ἀνάγκης vi. 3. 2), and that of wisely forecasting future occurrences (τὸ ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν vi. 2. 6), each naturally related to its object in the way described.

The writer of the M. M. gives a good commentary on the distinction between the two rational faculties. It will be observed that he does not trouble himself with the καθ ὁμοιότητα η γνώσις explanation of the distinction—M. M. i. 34, 1196 b. 15 ἐστὶν δ’ εἰς δύο τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐχὸν τὸ λόγον ἐχὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, δι’ ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν βουλευτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμημονικὸν. ὅτι δὲ ἔτερα ἄλληλοι ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν ὑποκείμενων ἃ γένοιτο φανερόν, δόσῃ γὰρ δὴ ἔτερα ἐστιν ἄλληλων χρώμα τε καὶ χιμών καὶ ψόφος καὶ ὄσμη, ὡσαυτὸς καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐτέρας αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἀπέδωκεν (ψόφοι μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῆ, χιμῶν ἃ γενέσθαι γνωρίζομεν, χρώμα δὲ ὀψεῖ), ὁμολογεῖ δὲ καὶ τάλλα τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων δεὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν. ἐπεὶ δὴ ἔτερα τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐστίν, ἔτερα καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι μέρη ὅς ταῦτα γνωρίζομεν. ἔτερον δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῇ γνωρίζομεν’ ἔτερον δ’ ἐν εἴῃ τὸ μόριον τὸ περί τὰ αἰσθήτα καὶ τὰ νοητά. τὸ δὲ βουλευτικὸν καὶ προαρετικὸν περὶ τὰ αἰσθήτα καὶ εἰν κυνήσει καὶ ἀπλῶς δῦσα ἐν γενέσθαι τε καὶ φθορᾷ ἐστὶν. βουλευτικόν γὰρ ὑπὲρ τούτων δὲ ἐφ’ ἑκὼν ἐστὶν καὶ πράξεως καὶ μὴ πράξεως προκειμένως, περὶ δ’ ἐστὶν [καὶ] βουλή καὶ προαίρεσις τοῦ πράξεως ἢ μὴ πράξεως ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ καὶ εἰν κυνήσει τοῦ μεταβάλλειν’ ὅστε τὸ προαρετικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τῶν λόγων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστίν.

§ 6. τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικὸν] the ‘scientific’ faculty and the ‘calculative’ faculty. I think that Grant is right when he says that the terms ἐπιθυμημονικὸν and λογιστικὸν as they occur in de An. iii. 11 are not opposed to each other, as they are here. In de An. iii. 11 Aristotle is discussing the psychology of animal motion, with

1 Cf. Lotze, Logic, p. 267 (English translation).
1139 a. 12. which the ‘scientific’ faculty has nothing to do, and he naturally confines himself to the ‘calculative’ faculty, which, like the writer of *E. N*. vi, he identifies with the faculty of practical deliberation. The operation of this faculty, in pursuance of his ball and socket explanation of action (see *de An*. iii. 10) he resolves into the perception of a fixed principle (described as όκινητον 433 b. 16) and the perception of a particular fact as falling under the principle. The perception of the fixed principle, ἡ καθόλου ὑποθήκης (answering to the socket), is due to an element in the calculative or deliberative faculty which he calls τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν (434 a. 16). But the ἐπιστημονικὸν of *E. N*. vi is not a principle of action.

a. 13. οὐδὲς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν] We deliberate only where we have to do with things which we can modify by our action. Power of modifying the course of events by action may indeed be accepted as a definition of πράξις, or βουλευτικὴ δρέξις. An irrational animal, being without βουλευτικὴ δρέξις—being dominated by the impulse or fancy of the moment, and unable to weigh alternatives before acting, is not the real cause of those modifications in the course of events which it seems to bring about by what it does. It is merely a link in the chain of necessary consequence formed by act, impulse, and antecedents of impulse. This is what the writer means by denying πράξις to the lower animals, as he does below in ch. 2, § 2. It is only a rational being that can initiate a modification in the course of events. For the irrational animal there exist οὐ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, in the sense of τὰ ὧς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, any more than in the sense of τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης: see *Phys*. ii. 6. 197 b. 3 ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ ἐστὶν τὴν τύχην . . . ὅσθ᾽ ὁπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πράξει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι παύσαι. καὶ διὰ τούτο οὔτε ἁψυχον οὔτε ὅτε θηριῶν οὔτε παιδίων οὔτε τοιεὶ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει πρακτὰς ἀρνεῖ οὔτε ἐντυχεῖ ἀνδρία ἢ ἀνήρ ἢ ἄνηρ ἢ τύχης τούτοις, εἰ μὴ καθ' ὅμοιότητα, ὅσπερ ἐφ' Ἡρακλῆς εὐτυχεῖ εἶναι τοῖς λίθοις ἐκ δὲ οἱ βωμοὶ, ὁτι τιμῶνται, οἱ δὲ ὁρμοῦσιν αὐτῶν καταπάτονται. This, I think, is a fair statement of what the distinction between man and the lower animals in respect of the ‘contingent’ meant for the Aristotelian School in its earlier period:—man, as deliberating and choosing, is an ἀρχῆ πράξεων: the lower animals are mere vehicles (ἐκοινωνία—pleased and consenting vehicles, it is true) of an

1 The use of ἐπιστημονικῶν and ἐπιστήμη in *E. N*. vii. 3. 13, 14 may be compared with the use of ἐπιστημονικῶν in *de An*. iii. 11.
impelling force: ‘man is not a necessary, because not a natural agent.’ It is plain that we have here a germ capable of growing, in a suitable soil, into the ‘Free Will Theory’ as we find it in modern philosophy. It may therefore be worth while to call attention to the approach which later Aristotelianism made towards such a theory. In his treatise περὶ ψυχῆς B. 159 b. 160 a. we find Alexander Aphrod. denying that φύσις and διδασκαλία are in any real sense the causes of our προαιρέσεις. If they were, our actions would be necessary. Only contingent actions are in our power, and contingent actions imply προαιρέσεις ἀναίτιος. His words are (περὶ ψυχῆς B. p. 160, ed. Ald.) μόνον ψυχήν λογικὴν ἔχει (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) καθ’ ἑαυτὸν βουλεύονται τε καὶ ζητεῖν δύναται περὶ τῶν πρακτέων αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ παραπλήσσεται ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ζωίσις, ἀ τῷ μὴ κοιμάτω τῆς τοιάσθεν δυνάμεως ἠλογα καλοῦμεν, ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις ἐπόμενα τε καὶ συγκαταστηθέννα, καὶ ἀνεξετάστως ἐκαστὸν, διὸ πράττει, πουώντα. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἐξων μετὰ τὴν προσεσούμαν αὐτῷ φαντασίαι περὶ τινος ὡς πρακτέων, οἷον τε ζητεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ βουλεύονται, εἶτε χρῆ συγκαταστηθέννα τῷ φανέντι, εἶτε καὶ μή. βουλευόμενος δὲ καὶ κρίνας, αὐτὸς ἄρμα καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν ὑπότερον καὶ ὑπότερον προέκρυμεν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, ἀρχεται. διὰ τούτο καὶ μόνον τῶν ζωίσις ἀπαίτων ἐφ’ αὐτῷ τὸ πράττειν ἔχει, διὶ καὶ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν τὸ αὐτὸ τούτο τὴν ἔξοναιν ἔχει . . . . δ’ οὐν ἀναίτιος καὶ μὴ προοπαρχόντως αἰτία προαιρεῖται, ταύτα ἔστι τὰ λεγόμενα ἐφ’ ἥμιν. διὰ καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἐστὶ δυνατὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν μὴ προκαταβεβλήθασιν ὑπὲρ προοπάρχονσα, πάντως ἐν τούτῳ γενέσθαι τούτο τὴν ἀνάγκην παρέχε. διὰ ταύτα πολλάκις τυχεῖ καὶ περισσότεροι ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἠθεῖν ἤγερον, διαφέρουσα ἀλλήλων γίνονται παρὰ τὰς ἀναίτιους προαιρέσεις.

In this theory of προαιρέσεις ἀναίτιος we have perhaps the nearest approach in ancient philosophy to the modern doctrine of ‘Free Will.’ I will only add here that the germ of the opposite theory of ‘Necessitarianism’ is also contained in the Aristotelian view. The Aristotelian view, as presented in the Εθική, however, seems to combine the truth of the ‘Free Will Theory,’ with that of ‘Necessitarianism,’ without abstracting or exaggerating either. Man is ‘a creature, yet a cause.’ *Ἀνθρώπος ἀρχὴ πράξεων, and ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἠλέος are both true. 

§ 7.] Cf. E. N. ii. 6. 3 ἡ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ἀρετὴ ἐν ἡ ἡ ἔξω ἀφ’ ἦς a. 15.

1 See Green’s Proleg., pp. 112, 113.
2 I have transposed these two passages to bring out the argument more clearly.
BOOK VI: CHAP. 2: § 1.

There are three principles in the soul which go to determine moral action and truth—sense, reason, appetite.

As for reason or understanding, and appetite—it is to be noted that pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of appetite answer to affirmation and negation in the sphere of the understanding. Accordingly, since moral virtue is a habit which involves choice, and since choice is deliberate appetite, the process of deliberation must be true, and the appetite must be right, if the choice is to be good, i.e. the understanding must affirm, and the appetite must pursue the same things. Here we have the practical understanding and practical truth. The function of the understanding in science (as distinguished from its function in conduct and its function in art) is well performed when truth is obtained, badly performed when falsity results. To attain truth is indeed the function of the understanding generally, but the special function of the understanding in relation to conduct—i.e. of the practical understanding, is to attain truth which is in harmony with appetite rightly directed.

Choice is the efficient, but not the final cause, of moral action; while the efficient cause of choice itself is appetite and reasoning directed to a certain end; thus choice involves reason and understanding, and a definite condition of the moral nature. Understanding by itself supplies no motive; it is only when understanding has a practical end before it that it moves to action, the end of the understanding as employed in art being included under the practical end, for when we produce or make, anything, we do so, not for the mere sake of making the thing, but with a practical end in view. Wherefore choice is reason moved by appetite, or appetite directed by understanding, and such a principle is man.

The past is not an object of choice; no man 'chooses' to have sacked Troy, for no man deliberates about the past, but only about the future and contingent.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

These words introduce a singularly confused passage, in which the Aristotelian doctrine of animal motion, as we find it in de An. iii. chapters 9, 10, 11, and de Motu Anim., is applied to the explanation of πράξεις in particular. It will be well then to begin with a sketch of that doctrine.
The question asked in de An. iii. 9. 432 b. 13 is—What makes an animal move its limbs?—τί τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ξύον τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν; Ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις is always accompanied by the idea of an object (παντασία), or by an appetite (ὄρεξις) urging the animal to seek or shun an object. Hence ἡ ὑπερτερή δύναμις cannot be the cause of this κίνησις, for plants have ἡ ὑπερτερ. δύν. but not παντασία or ὄρεξις. Nor can τὸ αἰσθητικὲν be the cause of it; for many sentient animals do not move κατὰ τόπον. As for νόοι being the cause of it—the ὑπερτερικὸς νοῦς cannot be the cause of it, for this does not contemplate ‘conduct’; it has nothing to say about ‘things that are sought or things that are shunned—the objects which the man who moves κατὰ τόπον has before his mind: while the other kind of νοῦς, which does contemplate ‘conduct,’ and issues commands about shunning this or seeking that—the πρακτικὸς νοῦς cannot insure κίνησις in accordance with its commands; επιθυμία steps in, as in the case of the ἄκρατης, and produces a κίνησις contrary to that commanded by νοῦς. And yet, on the other hand, we cannot say that ὄρεξις or επιθυμία is the sole determining cause (κυρία) of ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, for the ἐγκράτης, although his ὄρεξις is strong, follows the dictates of his νοῦς. Thus it would appear that both νοῦς (including παντασία) and ὄρεξις are causes of ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις. But as νοῦς, in this connexion, is ὡς ἐνεκὰ τῶν λογιζόμενων καὶ ὁ πρακτικὸς, and as the ἀρχὴ of the πρακτικὸς νοῦς, i. e. that which starts its deliberation, is τὸ ὄρεκτον, we get ultimately one cause of ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, viz. τὸ ὄρεκτον which is τὸ κινοῦν πρῶτος, and uses νοῦς (i. e. προϊστασεις, or βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις) and ὄρεξις (i. e. επιθυμία roused by αὐθομος or παντασία) as its instrumenis. That τὸ ὄρεκτον is the prime movent is seen from the fact that νόησις (the mere contemplation of truth) without ὄρεξις does not produce κίνησις, whereas ὄρεξις (appetite) often produces κίνησις in spite of λογισμὸς. The ὄρεκτον, as prime movent of ἡ κατὰ τόπ. κίν. is ‘the good ’—either that which is really good, or that which a man thinks good—the good, however, in the sphere of conduct (τὸ πρακτικὸν ἀγαθὸν), not the good in the sphere of speculation1—the good which is realised in the contingent sphere, not that which is realised in the necessary sphere: see de An. iii. 10. 433 a. 27 ἀπὶ καὶ μὲν τὸ ὄρεκτον, ἀλλὰ τούτ’ εὖν ἡ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡ τῷ φανόμενον ἀγαθὸν’ οὐ πῶς δέ,
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1139 a. 17. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν. πρακτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλος ἔχειν: and de Moti Anim. 6. 700 b. 15 πάντα τὰ ξόα καὶ κυνὲ καὶ κυνήται ἐνεκά των, ὡστε τοῦτ’ ἔστων αὐτῶν πάσης τῆς κυνήτως πέρας, τὸ ὁδ ἔνεκα. ὁρώθην δὲ τὰ κυνοῦντα τὸ ξόον διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαιρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. ταύτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς οὐν καὶ ὁρέξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ ἀυτής τὴς αὐτήν τῷ ὅμοι ἔχουσιν· κριτικὰ γὰρ πάντα... βούλησιν δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὁρέξις, ἡ δὲ προαιρέσις καὶ τὸ ὁρετικὸν κυνοῦμενον κυνὲ. The ὁρετὶκὸν, ὡς κυνὸς πρῶτον moves, but is not moved (κυνὲ ὁδ κυνοῦμενον): the ὁρετικὸν, or appetitive faculty, is moved, and moves (κυνοὺμενον κυνὲ): the animal is moved (κυνὲται): or, to put it otherwise, the animal is moved by a movement which has two parts or elements—an unmoved part (ἄκινητον de An. iii. 10. 433 b. 15) νίζ. τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν, and a part which is moved, and moves (ὁ κυνὸς καὶ κυνοῦμενον), νίζ. τὸ ὁρετικὸν or appetitive faculty. Thus ἡ κύνης ἡ κατὰ τόπουν depends on a mechanism which may be compared to a ball and socket joint (de An. iii. 10. 433 b. 21, cf. de Motu Anim. 1. 698 a. 14). Like the ball, ὁρέξις moves in the fixed socket of τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν, as νόης (which is always ὅρθης, see de An. iii. 10. 433 a. 26) presents the ἀγαθὸν truly, or as φαντασία (which is καὶ ὅρθη καὶ οὐκ ὅρθη, see de An. i.e.) presents it truly or falsely. Or, we may compare the Practical Syllogism (see note on vii. 3. 9, a. 28) to the ball and socket joint: ἡ καθολὸν ἐποίησις καὶ λόγος is a fixed centre of control determining the sweep of the μερικὴ δόξα: the μερικὴ δόξα is the efficient, but not the final, cause of the πράξεις—the occasion, but not the principle, of the act: ἡ δὴ αὐτὴ κυνὲ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθολὸν, ἡ ἀμφῳ, ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν ἡμεροῦσα μᾶλλον, ἡ δ’ οὖ de An. iii. 11. 434 a. 19. There can be no κύνης without a fixed point d’ αρῥμι—πρὸς τὸ ἡμεροῦν δεὶ ἀπερείδεσθαι τὸ κυνὸν (de Moti Anim. 8. 702 a. 26); no πράξεις (ἥ γὰρ πράξεις κύνης) without a fixed principle of conduct—ἣ καθολὸν δόξα ἡ ἡμεροῦσα. In other words, animal motion (including moral action) implies a definitely constituted organism (or character) and a stimulus received by that organism (or character) from its environment.

To return now to E. N. vi. 2. 1.—The difficulty is in τρία. In the de An. and de Moti Anim. τὰ κυνὸντα are ττω—νοῦς or διάνοια (including αἴσθησις and φαντασία) and ὁρέξις. But even these two are κυνὸντα only in the sense of being instruments of motion. The
ultimate cause—τὸ κύριον—is τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἢ τὸ πρακτόν ἀγαθόν. 1139 a. 17. According to the doctrine of de An. iii. 9, ἀσθεσις, νοῦς and ὁρέες are certainly not to be described as κύρια τῆς κατὰ τόπον κυήσεως—under which, of course, πράξεις is included, ἢ γὰρ πράξεις κύησις (E. E. ii. 6. 1222 b. 29). But does the addition καὶ ἀληθείας in E. N. vi. 2. 1 make any difference? It indicates that the πράξεις which we have here to do with is right—that νοῦς, which is πάς ὁρέες (de An. iii. 10. 433 a. 26) is operative, and has presented τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, instead of τὸ ᾑδὴ ᾑδό (see de An. iii. 10. 433 b. 7), to the agent as his end; and that the appetitive part of his nature has accepted this νοητὸν as ὀρέκτων; further that διάνοια, the discursive faculty (see Bonitz, Met. p. 214), which attains ἀλήθεια in joining and separating thoughts as the corresponding things are actually joined and separated (see Met. Θ. io. 1051 b. 3 ἀληθεύει μὲν ὅ τὸ δηρημεύον ὁδόμενον δηρηθεῖαι καὶ τὸ συγκεκρεμένον συγκείσθαι, ἠφειστεῖ δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα: Met. E. 4. 1027 b. 20 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖς τὴν κατάφασιν ἐπὶ τῷ συγκεκρέμενῳ ἔχει, τὴν δ᾽ ἀπόφασιν ἐπὶ τῷ δηρημένῳ, τὸ δὲ ψεύδος τούτου τοῦ μερισμοῦ τὴν ἀντίφασιν . . . οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ψεύδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθεῖς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι . . . ἀλλ᾽ ἐν διάνοιᾳ . . . ἡ συμπλοκή ἕστι καὶ ἡ διάφρασις ἐν διάνοιᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι), and in selecting the suitable means to an end, has performed its work well—ἰ.ε. ἀληθῶς, in exact correspondence with the conditions of the virtuous life, and that τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν has consented to adopt the means suggested. Thus δὲ τὸ λόγος ἀληθῆς ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὁρέες ὁρθή (§ 2), and the result of this harmonious co-operation of reason and appetite is πρακτική ἀλήθεια—right action. The addition καὶ ἀληθείας then indicates that we are concerned here with the harmonious action of νοῦς or διάνοια (including ἀσθεσις) and ὁρέες. Although each separately may be described as κυνὸν (just as engine-driver and steam may both be said to 'set the train in motion'), neither can be described as κύριον, for νοῦς needs ὁρέες, and often thwarts it, and both are themselves moved by τὸ ὀρεκτόν. But acting harmoniously together, they constitute a single cause of πράξεις καὶ ἀλήθεια (= πρακτικὴ ἀλήθεια § 2), or right action; and may well be described as κύρια, being coextensive with the whole nature of the agent (καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ καθότατος § 5). In their harmonious action, manifesting itself in προαίρεσις (defined in § 5 as νοῦς ὀρεκτικὸς or ὁρέες διανοητική), they are a single principle of motion, like the ball and the socket in the organic unity of the joint.

But still the difficulty remains that a coordinate place is assigned
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1139 a. 17. to aisthēs, as one of three elements jointly kūma prάξεως kai ἀληθείας. The position here assigned to aisthēs is certainly not that assigned to it in the de An. and de Mot. An., where only two κυμώντα are recognised—νοῦς and ὑπέξιον—αἰσθησις being included in νοῦς; but it is not necessarily inconsistent with the doctrine of these treatises. It ought, I think, to be explained in connexion with the theory of the Practical Syllogism, the minor premmiss of which is described in E. N. vii. 3 as δόξα αἰσθητοῦ, and as αἰσθητική ἔποιησις. A right action is the conclusion of a syllogism in which the minor premmiss—a stimulus of sense—is followed by that action which the moral rule, defined by the major premmiss, requires in the circumstances. Indeed all πράξεως, wrong as well as right, involves such a ‘syllogism’ with major and minor premmissions. Αἰσθησις or αἰσθητική φαντασία (for the latter see de An. iii. ii. 434 a. 5) alone, as the lower animals have it, cannot initiate πράξεως, right or wrong:—E. N. vi. 2. 2 τούτων ὡς ἡ αἰσθησις αὐθεμίας ὑπό ὑπέξιος‘· δύναται τῷ τοῦ θερίου αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔξων, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κυνωνίου: E. N. vii. 3. 11 τῷ θερίῳ οὐκ ἀκρατή, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου ὑπόληψιν ἄλλων τῶν καθ' ἐκκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην: cf. M. M. i. ii. 1187 b. 7, and E. E. ii. 6. 1222 b. 15. The lower animals, in Aristotle’s view, act on no definite plan, of which they are themselves conscious, but as αἰσθησις, αἰσθητική φαντασία, and ὑπέξιον momentarily determine; whereas man’s αἴσθησις, with the ἐπιθυμία attending it (see de An. ii. 2. 413 b. 23 ὅπως μὲν αἰσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐπὶ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία), moves, or ought to move, in a definite manner within the ‘fixed socket’ of rational principle.

I would therefore explain the words πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῶς ὑπέξιον in the present passage as the formula of the Practical Syllogism read upwards thus—πράξεις (conclusion), δόξα αἰσθητοῦ (minor premmiss), ὑπόληψις τοῦ νοητοῦ ὑπέξιον ὄντος (major premmiss). Jointly the premmissions determine the conclusion. The minor alone could not determine it, for the minor alone would have no point d’approi, nor could the major alone, ἰρμεῖν γὰρ.

a. 21. § 2. ἔστι δ' ὑπερ . . . φυγῇ] τῷ ὄν τὸ ὄς ἀληθές (and it is with ἀληθεία the ἐργον διανοιῶν) that we here concerned), i.e. ‘is = is true’ (for the various senses of τὸ ὄν, see Met. Δ. 7, and Θ. 10) consists in affirmation (κατάφασις) and negation (ἀπόφασις) in correspondence with fact:—Met. Δ. 1017 a. 31 ἐτι τῷ εὑρετεῖν καὶ τῷ ἔστιν ὃτι ἀληθές, τῷ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ὃτι οὐκ ἀληθές ἄλλα ψεῦδος, ὁμοιῶς ἐπὶ
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καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως, οἷον ὅτι ἦτοι Σωκράτης μουνικός, ὅτι ἀλήθεις 1139 a. 21. 

καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως, οἰον ὅτι ἦτοι Σωκράτης μουνικός, ὅτι ἀλήθεις τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἦτοι η ὁμάδρεσσα σύμμετρος, ὅτι ψεύδος: Θ. 10. 1051 b. 1 ἐπει... τὸ κυρίωτα ἐν ἀλήθεις ἡ ψεύδος, τούτῳ δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ συγκείσας ἡ διηρήσα, ὅστ’ ἀληθεύει μὲν ὅ τὸ διηρήθην ὁμόμερον διηρήθησα, καὶ τὸ συγκείσαν συγκείσα, ἥψευται δ’ ο ἐναντίος ἔχων ἡ τὰ πράγματα, ποτ’ ἦτοι η ὦκ ἦτοι τὸ ἀλήθεις λεγόμενον ἡ ψεύδος; τούτῳ γὰρ σκέπτον τί λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς ὁμοίως ἀλήθεις σε λευκόν εἶναι οὐ σε λευκό, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σε εἶναι λευκόν ἠμείς οἱ φάντας τούτο ἁληθεύεμεν: De Interp. i. 16 a. 12 περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαρέσειν ἐστὶ τὸ ψεύδος τε καὶ τὸ ἀλήθεις: Mel. i. 7. 1012 a. 2 πᾶν τὸ διανοητὸν καὶ νοητὸν ἡ διάνοια ἡ καταφάσεως ἡ ἀποφάσεως τούτῳ δ’ ἐξ ὁμορρομοῦ δήλου ὅταν ἁληθεύῃ ἡ ψεύδονται. ὅταν μὲν ὥλθε συνθή φάσα ἡ ἀποφάσα, ἁληθεύει, ὅταν δὲ ὥλθε, ψεύδεται: De An. iii. 6. 430 a. 26 ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαφρέτων νόσις ἐν τούτως, περὶ ὅ οὐκ ἦτοι τὸ ψεύδος: ἐν οἴς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεύδος καὶ τὸ ἀλήθεις, σύνθεσις τις ὕπον νοημάτων διάσπερ ἐν δυναῖς—i.e. united not as the successive ideas in a reverie, but because certain attributes really belong to certain things. Now, the faculty which thinks together those things which exist or occur together in the external world, and thinks apart those things which exist or occur apart—which, in other words, affirms and denies in accordance with objective conditions, and realises truth where it is possible to fall into falsity (sc. ‘truth’ as that is given in propositions) is διάνοια: see Mel. E. 4. 1027 b. 25 οὐ γὰρ ἦτοι τὸ ψεύδος καὶ τὸ ἀλήθεις ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, οἰον τὸ μὲν ἄγαθόν ἁληθές, τὸ δὲ κακόν εἰθὸς ψεύδος, ἀλλ’ ἐν διάνοια’ περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀπλὰ καὶ τὰ τί ἔστιν οὖθ’ ἐν τῇ διάνοιᾳ. Διάνοια is the Understanding, or discursive intellect, as distinguished from νοῦς—Reason, or the intuitive intellect. The latter is concerned with εἴθη or notions per se, which are indivisible in the unity of their οὐσία—περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀπλὰ καὶ τὰ τί ἔστιν οὖθ’ ἐν τῇ διάνοιᾳ sc. ἐστὶ τὸ ἁληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεύδος (see Alex. quoted at end of this note)—their ἁληθές consists simply in their ‘clear intelligibility’ (τὸ δὲ ἁληθές τὸ νοεῖν αὐτά υπὲρ Mel. Θ. 10. 1052 a. 1), and has no ψεύδος opposed to it: see Mel. Θ. 10. 1051 b. 24 τὸ μὲν θυγαῖ καὶ φάσαν ἁληθές (οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα κατάφασι καὶ φάσαι), τὸ δ’ ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θυγανάνει· ἀπαθεῖναι γὰρ περὶ τὸ τί ἔστι οὖθ’ ἦτοι... τὸ δὲ ψεύδος οὐκ ἦτοι, οὐδ’ ἀπάθη, ἀλλ’ ἄγνωσ (ον which see Alexander, p. 571, ed. Bonitz—ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀπλῶν ἦ θυγάναι ο νοῦς αὐτῶν καὶ καθάπερ εἶχον ἀπέτευχα τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπλῆ ἐπιθαλὸν διάσπερ καὶ ἡ δύσις τῶν χρωμάτων... ἦ οὐ θυγάναι, οὐδ’ οὖν ὑπὸ αὐτά: cf. also Themistius, peri ψυχῆς A. fol. 71 b τὸ νοεῖν μὲν ὅταν τῶν ἀπλῶν δροὺς καταλαμβάνῃ, τὸ διανοηθεῖν δὲ ἐν τῷ συντεθείσι τούτοις καὶ διαμεῖν... τὸ ψεύδος ἐν τῷ
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1139 a. 21. συνηθέναι ταύτους καὶ διαφέω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς· καὶ νοεῖν μὲν ὡς ὄν ὅν τε ψευδὸς, διανοοῖσθαι δὲ ὡς τε: see also Alex. on Met. Η. 1012 a. 1 (Alex. ed. Bonitz, p. 289, line 15). This is undoubtedly the distinction (recognised by Schweger, Met. vol. iii. p. 183, Trendelenburg, de An. p. 272, Bonitz, Met. p. 214, Waitz, Organon, vol. ii. p. 298), which the Aristotelians make between νοεῖν and διάνοια, when they do make any distinction; but they often use the terms interchangeably. Thus in the chapter before us (E. N. vi. 2), διάνοια in § 2 is obviously equivalent to νοεῖν in § 1; and in § 5 προαρτητικῶς is defined as ὁ ὑπερτυχικὸς νοεῖν ὁ ὑπερτυχικὴ διανοητική. Again, in de An. iii. 4. 429 a. 23, we find νοεῖν given as the faculty of διανοιάσθαι, and in An. Post. ii. 19. 100 b. 5 διάνοια given as the genus under which νοεῖν falls as a species. Again, in de An. ii. 2. 413 b. 12, the parts of the ψυχὴ are distinguished as βρεπτικῶν, αἰσθητικῶν and διανοητικῶν; in iii. 4. 429 a. 30 as νοητικῶν, αἰσθητικῶν and βρεπτικῶν: in de An. iii. 10. 433 a. 9 we read φαίνεται δὲ γε δύο ταύτα κατοπίντα ὁ ὑπερτυχικὸς νοεῖν, and a few lines below 433 a. 17 δύο ταύτα φαίνεται τὰ κατοπίντα ὑπερτυχικὸς καὶ διάνοια πρακτικὴ. Lastly, Alexander in his commentary on Met. E. 4, where the technical meaning of διάνοια as discursus seems clear, writes as if intellect in the general sense were intended (Alex. ed. Bonitz, p. 424. 4)—οὐ μόνον ὡς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν οὐκ ἐστι τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεύδος ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς τοῖς ἐν τῇ διανοιᾷ.

For φυγὴ and διάζεις as elements οὗ κατὰ τόπων κίνησις οὗ τῶν ζῶν, see de An. iii. 9. 432 b. 28 ὡς κινήσεις ὁ φεύγωντος τῷ διώκοντος τι ἔστι.

a. 22. ἔις προαρτητικὴ] E. E. ii. 10. 1227 b. 8, E. N. ii. 6. 15.

a. 23. ὑπερτυχική] E. E. ii. 10. 1226 b. 17, E. N. iii. 3. 19.

a. 24. τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ ἕλαι καὶ τὴν ὑπερτυχικὴν ὁ ὑπερτυχικὸς ὁ ὑπερτυχικὸς λόγος when it seeks (διώξει) what λόγος or διάνοια affirm (κατάφασις) to be good, and shrugs (φυγῇ) what it denies (ἀπόφασις) to be good:—when, to use the expression of E. N. i. 13. 17, it ὀμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ: cf. E. N. i. 13. 18 ὡς τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ καὶ ὁ λόγος ὑπερτυχικὸς μετέχει πῶς [λόγον] ἐκατη-

1 Cook Wilson (Trans. Oxf. Philol. Soc. 1887-88, p. 6) remarks that 'the doctrine that single or simple notions are neither true nor false is clearly stated in treatises whose genuineness is doubted, viz. De Int. c. 1, Cat. 4, and Met. E. 1027 b. 18.' I understand Cat. 4. 2 a. 8 to state that τὰ κατὰ μηδείμαν ἀμφιλοχίας λεγόμενα are 'neither true nor false' in the sense in which 'true' and 'false' are applied to propositions; but I do not think that this statement is inconsistent with the doctrine that there is an ἀληθῆς = τὸ νοεῖν.
The motive power in man, τὸ ὀρέκτικον, left to itself, simply seeks present pleasure, and shuns present pain: but this is wrong. The motive power is used rightly, only when it is used to further that welfare of the whole life which reason comprehends: see de An. iii. 10. 433 b. 5 ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρέκτικον γίνονται ἐναντία ἄλληλαις, τούτῳ δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία ὑπαρχοῦσιν (ὅ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κειλεῖται, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἢδην φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἢδην ἢδον καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢδον καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὀραν τὸ μέλλον), εἰδεὶ μὲν ἐν ἂν εἰπτὶ τὸ κυνών τὸ ὀρέκτικον, ἡ ὀρέκτικον, πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρέκτικον (τούτῳ γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κυνώμενον τῷ νοσθήματι ἢ ἐρμῆσθήματι), ἀρίθμη δὲ πλείον τὰ κυνώματα. By λόγος in E. N. vi. 2. 2 we are to understand the συλλογισμὸς or chain of deliberative reasoning leading up to the act of προσέρχεσθαι. This λόγος is ἄληθής when the thoughts of which it consists are connected as facts require—when the means which will actually ensure the end are duly thought of in the proper order.

§ 3. θεωρητικῆς . . πρακτικῆς . . ποιητικῆς] See Met. E. i. 1025 b. a. 27. 

Διάνοια in the technical sense—the understanding, or faculty by which the steps to an end are reviewed in their true order, i.e. in correspondence with the actual conditions of the problem, operates in three fields, according as the end is the solution of a scientific problem, the attainment of a practical good, or the construction of a work of art. Take the last—the field of τέχνη. The architect apprehends by νοῦς the plan of his temple—an indivisible form (ἀδιάφρητον, ἀπλῶν). This plan is with him in all the steps of his work. It is a fixed principle (ἀκοὶμην) from which his διάνοια may be said to deduce these steps. The plan being assumed to be a realisable one, διάνοια ποιητικῆ or 'the faculty of thinking of the means by which a thing may be made,' performs its function well when it devises a method of finding and employing materials which is true—i.e. one in which the steps really suitable are duly thought of. In Geometry again the thinker starts with a definite problem to be solved, and his διάνοια θεωρητικῆ reviews the steps which lead to a solution in the order determined by the conditions of the problem: see E. N. iii. 3. 11 ὁ γὰρ βουλεύομενος ἐοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον διάγραμμα. But in the field of πράξεις we cannot, as in the fields of τέχνη and θεωρητικῆ ἐπιστήμη, start with
1139 a. 27. a definite plan or problem. We have no clear-cut notion of Life (τὸ εὖ ζῆν) before we begin to deal dianoetically with the emergencies of life. It is only after we have spent much time in dealing with them, that we see τὸ εὖ ζῆν as νοητὸν and καλὸν. We do not know what the problem of Life is till we have in part solved it. This is perhaps a reason for not insisting much on the technical distinction between νοῦς and διάνοια in this field.


τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ] = τῆς δὲ πρακτικῆς διανοιας. Its function is the attainment of ἀλήθεια ὁμολογοῦ ἔχουσα τῇ ὁρείς τῇ ἀρβη. That ὁρείς is ἀρβη which obeys the dictates of the πρακτικῆ διάνοια, and the dictates of the πρακτικῆ διάνοια are such as ὁρείς can obey—i. e. they are concerning τὸ φευκτὸν καὶ διωκτὸν.

a. 31. § 4. This section, § 5, and § 6 down to πεπραγμένα Ramsauer marks as probably aliunde hic translata. At any rate, whether a digression due to the writer himself, or an interpolated fragment, the passage seems to him to be out of place here. I cannot share this view. The passage, culminating as it does in διὸ ἡ πρακτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προϊσίεσις ἡ ὁρείς διανοητική (§ 5), seems to me to be fully justified by the contribution which it makes to the writer’s object—the explanation of διάνοια πρακτικὴ as κυρία πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας. Much less can I follow Susemihl who brackets § 4, § 5 from διὰ, and § 6 down to πεπραγμένα, and thus brings διάνοια δ’ αὕτη οὐθὲν καίει at the beginning of § 5 into immediate connexion with the end of § 3. It seems to me that § 4, dealing as it does with πρακτικῆ διάνοια as a source of κίνησις, is naturally followed by διάνοια δ’ αὕτη οὐθὲν καίει.

πράξεως μὲν οὖρ ... ἐνεκά τυνος] προϊσίεσις is the efficient cause (ἀρχή ὁπον ἡ κίνησις), but not the final cause (ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὖθ’ ἐνεκά) of πράξεως: cf. de Ἀπ. iii. 10. 433 a. 13 ἀρχῷ ἄρα ταύτα χωμητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοὺς καὶ ὁρείς, νοὺς δὲ δ’ ἐνεκά του λογιζόμενοι καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸς διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὁρείς ἐνεκά του πάσα’ οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὁρείς, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ τὸ δ’ ἐσχατὸν ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. ὡστε εἰλόγος ταύτα δύο φαίνεται τὰ κινοῦντα, ὁρείς καὶ διάνοια πρακτικὴ τὸ ὁρεκτὸν γὰρ καίει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια καίει, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὕτης ἐστὶ τὸ ὁρεκτόν. The final cause of πράξεως is τὸ ὁρεκτῶν which is τὸ πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν (de Ἀπ. iii. 10. 433 a. 29) or εἰπραξία (Ε. Ὁ. vi. 2. 5). Its efficient cause is the ‘last appetite’ in the deliberation started by the final cause—i. e. its efficient cause is the ὁρείς which translates
into act the idea of something now to be done to which ἰοβαλευσες 1139 a. 31. has conducted the agent: see de An. iii. 10. 433 a. 16 τὸ δ’ ἐσχάτου ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, and E. N. iii. 3. 12 καὶ τὸ ἐσχάτου ἐν τῇ ἀνάλυσι κ.τ.λ. The προαιρεσις or deliberate ὁρεξις of an act then is the efficient cause of the act; while the efficient cause of the deliberate ὁρεξις itself is the deliberation started by that final ὀρκετίων for the sake of which the act is performed—προαιρετέως δὲ ὁρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἐνεκά τινος. Briefly, the good moves the ὁρεξις διανοητική, and the ὁρεξις διανοητική moves the agent: see de An. iii. 10. 433 b. 14 τὸ δὲ κινοῦν διετέστων, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον ἐστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτόν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὀρκετικόν (καὶ εἰται γὰρ τὸ ὁρεγόμενον ἡ ὁρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὁρεξις κίνησις τῆς ἐστίν ἡ ἐνέργεια), τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷων.

The caveat conveyed by the words ἀλλ’ ὁδὸν ὃδε ἐνεκά is not to be overlooked. Προαιρεσις is only the instrument, not the raison d’être of πράξεις. An act is good, not because it gives a certain faculty assumed to be ‘authoritative,’ or a certain motive classed as ‘high,’ an opportunity of manifesting itself, but because it contributes to the realisation of an objective good. Right and wrong do not depend on an ‘arbitrary make of faculties,’ but are qualities ‘in things.’ Προαιρεσις is distinguished from the ἐπιθυμία which is contrary to it, not by its ‘good intentions’ or any other such subjective quality, but by its rationality; and its rationality means its correspondence with objective law. But the acts of the ἀκρατίας (who is μὴ προαιρόμενος E. N. vii. 4. 4) are produced by an ἀρχή—the ἐπιθυμία of the moment—which is at once their efficient and their final cause. They are done not for the sake of objective good, but for the sake of the gratification of the subjective feeling which immediately excites them. It is only in man, however, that such a violation of nature is possible. In the irrational animals (which are incapable of ἀκρατία, E. N. vii. 3. 11) ὁρεξις is always primarily for the sake of objects and only incidentally for the sake of its own gratification. When the irrational animals seem to follow present pleasure they are really striving after τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ θεῖον. Thus προαιρεσις or ὁρεξις διανοητική only conforms to the law of all healthy ὁρεξις in producing acts which look beyond the gratification of subjective feeling to correspondence with environment. Butler’s contention against Hobbes—that, as food, not self (i.e. pleasure), is the object of the appetite of hunger, so our neighbour, not self, is the object of benevolence, is based on the recognition of this law
of life often strangely ignored by moralists—antihedonistic as well as hedonistic, perhaps more often and more thoroughly by the former than by the latter.

In his note on προαιρέσεως δὲ ὁρεῖς καὶ λόγος ὁ ἑνεκα τινος, Eustratius is puzzled by Aristotle's inconsistency in first making ὁρεῖς the γένος of προαιρέσεις, defined as Βουλευτική (differentia) ὁρεῖς (genus)—i.e. its material cause, and then here its efficient cause.

a. 33. διὸ οὖτ’ ἀνευ νοο καὶ διανοίας οὖτ’ ἀνευ ἡθικῆς ἐστίν ἐξεως ἡ προαιρέσεις] Here νοο καὶ διανοίας take up λόγος in the immediately preceding clause, and ἡθικῆς ἐξεως takes up ὁρεῖς. The ὁρεῖς involved in προαιρέσεις, as distinguished from that involved in mere ἐπιθυμία, is a steadily operating appetite, proceeding from and declaring the ἡθικὴ ἐξεως or ἡθος of its subject:—see E. N. iii. 2. οἰκείωτατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ ὁ προαιρεῖς τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. According as the ἡθικὴ ἐξεως or ἡθος is good or bad, so is the end ὃν ὁ ὁρεῖς—E. N. iii. 5. 2ο τῷ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιοῦτο τιθέμεθα: vi. 12. 6 ή μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς τον σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὁρθῶν: cf. vi. 12. 10, vi. 13. 7.

It may be asked whether νοὸς and διάνοια are distinguished in E. N. vi. 2. 4. It is certainly plain that elsewhere in this chapter they are not distinguished; but here we are tempted to think that the two names would not have been brought so close together unless the writer had wished to distinguish two faculties. In de An. iii. 9. 433 a. 1, which resembles the present passage in bringing the two terms closely together, a distinction seems to be intended—ἐτι καὶ ἐπιστάτωντος τοῦ νοο καὶ λεγοῦσης τῆς διανοίας φείγειν τι ή διώκειν οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οἷον ο ἀκράτης. In de An. iii. 9 Aristotle seems to distinguish νοὸς as authoritative principle or ἀρχὴ (ἐπιστάτων) from διάνοια as merely indicating (λεγούσης) what particular things are to be sought or shunned. If we are to distinguish between νοὸς and διάνοια in E. N. vi. 2. 4, we may say that νοὸς grasps the end immediately, and διάνοια reviews the means: ἡθικὴ ἀρετῆ gives the moral interest in the end declared by νοὸς, and προαιρέσεις is the rational choice of the means discovered by διάνοια. It may be mentioned that Eustratius, in his note here, treats νοὸς and διάνοια as distinct. He says—ὁ κυρίως νοο ἀπλαῖς ἐπιστολάει γινώσκειν πέφυκε, τούτῳ μέσῳ ἡ λεγομένη ἡ διάνοια οἰκεῖο τοῦ πράγματος ἀνειλημένου καταλαμβάνει.

a. 34. εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἀνευ διανοίας καὶ ἡθος οὐκ ἐστιν] i.e. τὰ θηρία πράξεως οὐ κοινωνεῖ—τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ.
§ 5. διάνοια δ' αὐτή οὖδὲν κινεῖ] αὐτή—by itself, without ἄρεις τοῦ 1139 a. 35. πρακτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ—i.e. διάνοια θεωρητική. Eustratius has—ἡ διάνοια ἀπλῶς αὐτή καθ' αὐτήν οὖν ἔχει τι τέλος τῆς ἀληθείας σκοπιμότερον ἵνα τι πρὸς ἑκείνον κινή... ἥ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὴ διάνοια τέλος ἔχει τῷ εἰρέτῳ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, καὶ περαιτέρῳ οὖν προστίθησιν, ἢ δὲ πρακτικὴ εὐρίσκεται μὲν καὶ αὐτῇ τάληθες, οὐ μέχρι δὲ τούτῳ ἰσταται, ἀλλὰ δὲι καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ πράξεως ἐν' ἐφίκτησι τοῦ ὀρέκτου περὶ οὗ καὶ συνελογίσατο: cf. de Motu Anim. 6. 700 b. 24 οὗ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητὸν προαιρετῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος. διὸ τὸ τοιούτων ἐστὶ τῶν ἄγαθων τὸ κυνων' ἀλλ' οὗ πᾶν τὸ καλὸν κ.τ.λ.—on which Mich. Eph. (de Motu An. fol. 152) has τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα διανοητὰ μὲν, οὗ προαιρετὰ δὲ... ἀλλ' οὗ πᾶν τὸ καλὸν' ή γὰρ γνώσις τῶν οὗτων ή ὄντα καλῶν οὖσα ἡρεμίας μᾶλλον ἀλλ' οὗ κυνηγώς ἐστὶν αὐτὰ.

Although it is convenient to distinguish διάνοια αὐτή from ἡ μετ' ὀρέξεωσ (i.e. ὀρέξεως τοῦ πρακτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ), it must be remembered that all διάνοια is μετ' ὀρέξεωσ. Pure speculation is sustained by the ardour of a mind striving to make itself more and more perfect—a truth recognised by Plato when he makes ἔρως the impulse to dialectic, and by Spinoza when he identifies intellectus and voluntas, and by Aristotle himself in the opening words of the Metaphysics—πάντες ἀνθρώποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει.

αὐτή γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἀρχῆς] I. e. we have not τῶν dianoetic b. 1. ἀρχὴ κυνήσεως, νεώτ. πρακτικὴ and ποιητικὴ διάνοια, for πρακτικὴ διάνοια is the ἀρχὴ of ποιητικὴ διάνοια. A life of noble action (ἐντραξία) is the end for the sake of which all ποιηταί, from the cobbler to Phidias, work.

καὶ οὗ τέλος ἀπλῶς (ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ τινὸς) τὸ ποιητῶν] Cf. E. N. b. 2. vi. 5. 4 τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἔτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὖν ἄν εἰ ἦς ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος.

ἀλλά τὸ πρακτὸν] sc. τέλος ἀπλῶς. The reading ἀλλ' οὗ τὸ πρακτῶν, b. 3. given by Ald., Eustr., rc. Kb, rc. CCC, NC, Cambr., requires us to understand πρὸς τι καὶ τινός.

ἡ δ' ὀρέξεις τούτου. διδ κ.τ.λ.] τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν, the object of διάνοια b. 4. πρακτικὴ (and ultimately of διάνοια ποιητική), is ὀρέκτου: therefore man, as ἀρχὴ πράξεως, is ἡ ὀρεκτικὴ νοῦς ἡ ὀρέξεις διανοητική.

§ 6.] This section down to πεπραγμένα, might have been dispensed b. 5. with: but this is no reason for bracketing it.

οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἔσομένου καὶ b. 7. ἐνδεχομένου] See the remarkable passage, de Interp. 9. 18 a. 28

1139 b. 7. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀπτων καὶ γενομένων ἁνάγκη τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀληθῆ ἢ πευκὴ εἶναι... a. 33 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα καὶ μελλόντων οὐχ ὀμοίως: εἰ γὰρ πάσα κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις ἀληθῆ ἢ πευκὴ, καὶ ἂπον ἁνάγκη ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οὐτε ἐὰν ἦν πάντα ἁνάγκη· τὸ δὲ μὴ φῆσαι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἁνάγκη ἀληθεύειν τὸν ἐπτροπὸν αὐτῶν, εἰ πάσα κατάφασις ἀληθῆ ἢ πευκὴ... b. 5 οὐδὲν ἢρα οὔτε ἔστων οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ’ ὀπότερ’ ἔστηκεν, οὐδὲ ἔσται η ὁκ ἔσται, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἁνάγκη ἀπαντᾶ ταῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὀπότερ’ ἔστηκεν· ἡ γὰρ ὁ πάσα ἀληθεύει· ὁ ὀπόφας... εἰ ἔστι λεύκων νῦν, ἄληθες ἢν εἰπέν τρόπον ὅτι ἔσται λευκόν, οὐτε ἀεὶ ἄληθες ἢν εἰπέν ὅτι τῶν γενομένων ὅτι ἔσται· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ἄληθες ἢν εἰπέν ὅτι ότι ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται, οὐχ οἷον τε τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲ μὴ ἔστηκεν· ὁ δὲ μὴ οἷον τε μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀδύνατον μὴ γενέσθαι· ὁ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ γενέσθαι, ἁνάγκη γενέσθαι· ἀπαντᾶ οὖν τὰ ἐσόμενα ἀναγκαῖον γενέσθαι· οὐδὲν ἢρα ὀπότερ’ ἔστηκεν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τύχης ἔστηκεν· εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης, οὐχ εἰς ἁνάγκης· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖν ὀπότερ’ ἄν ὀπότερ’ γένεσθαι εἴη γενέσθαι, οἷον ὅτι οὔτε ἔσται οὔτε οὔτε ἔσται... b. 22 εἰ δὲ μὴν ἔσται μήτε μὴν ἔσται ἀδύνατον, οὐχ ἄν εἴη τὸ ὀπότερ’ ἔστηκεν, οἷον ναυμαχία· διότι ὅρα τὸν ἁπέκορον γενέσθαι ναυμαχίαν. μὴ μὴ γενέσθαι... b. 31 διότι οὔτε βουλεύεσθαι δεῖ· οὖν ἔσται πραγματεύεσθαι, ὥστε μὲν τοῖς ποίσιμοις, ἔσται τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ τοῖς ποίσιμοις, ἔσται τοῦτο. οὕτων γὰρ καλῶς καὶ εἰς μυριστάν ἔστος τὸν μὲν φάναι τοῦτο ἔστηκαν τὸν δὲ μὴ φάναι, ὅτι εἰς ἁνάγκης ἐςεθαντε ὀπότερον αὐτῶν ἄληθες ἢν εἰπέν τότε... 19 a. I διότι εἰ ἐν ἄπαντι χρόνῳ οὕτως εἶχεν ἄπει τὸ ἔπτερον ἁλληθεύεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν γενομένων ἢν ὀὕτως εἶχεν διότι εἰς ἁνάγκης γενέσθαι· ἢ τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὸς εἰπέ τις· ὅτι ἔσται, οὐχ οὐν τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι· καὶ τὸ γνώμονα ἄληθες ἢν εἰπέν· ἓν ἐστιν· ἀεὶ τῶν μὴν διδομένων ἄληθες· ἢν εἰπέν· ἵντα ἄπνοια—ὅρωμεν γὰρ νῦν ἔσται ἁρχή τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράξαι τί, καὶ ἔπει τὸς ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ ἑνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνάτον εἶναι καὶ μὴν χρόνῳ· εἰναὶ δὲ μὴν εἰσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ μὴν εἶναι, διότι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι· τ. ᾨ. future events are not settled beforehand. They have yet to be produced by φύσις or by human agency. If we maintain therefore that of two contradictory propositions about a future event, the one must be true, and the other false, in the sense that the one is already true, and the other already false, we make the occurrence of the 'contingent' necessary: we banish the 'contingent' from the world, and leave no place for deliberation. It is, of course, logically necessary that a battle should either take place to-morrow in a certain spot, or not take place: but if it takes place, it does not take place 'necessarily,' and if it does not take place, it does not not-take place 'necessarily.'—de Int. 9. 19 a. 28 εἰναὶ μὲν ἢ μὴ εἶναί ἄπαν ἁνάγκη, καὶ ἔστηκαν γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ. οὐ μέντοι

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

The modes in which the soul reaches truth in affirmation or negation are five—art, science, prudence, wisdom, reason.

The object of science strictly so called is necessary truth, or that which cannot be otherwise, and is therefore eternally true; for things that are necessary in the strict sense are all eternal, and things which are eternal are without generation and corruption. Moreover science can always be taught, and its object learnt. Now, all teaching starts from previous knowledge, as we say in Logic, and proceeds sometimes by induction, sometimes by syllogism. Induction is the source of the universal; syllogistic reasoning starts from universals. It is by induction therefore that syllogistic principles are obtained. The scientific faculty accordingly is the faculty of demonstrating conclusions from principles which are ‘better known’ than the conclusions derived from them. So much for science.

§ 1. ἀφθαρμέναι οὖν ἀνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγομεν.] ‘This chapter, Grant says, ‘proposes to consider the two parts of the reason (scientific and calculative) from a fresh point of view.’ In chap. 1. § 5 Reason was divided into two parts, because its objects are of two kinds; here it is the consideration of ἰδέα, the faculty of affirming and denying truly, which suggests a list of five rational states—ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει τῇ ψυχῇ τῷ καταφανί οὐ αποφανεῖ πέντε τῶν ἀριθμῶν. In this list τέχνη answers to ἰδέα ποιητική, ἐπιστήμη to ἰδέα θεωρητική, and φρόνησις to ἰδέα πρακτική, while νοῦς supplies τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, and φρόνησις with their respective ἀρχαί (see chap. 6), and σοφία is the possession of both νοῦς and ἰδέα—especially θεωρητική ἰδέα (see chap. 7. § 3). If this is plainly the rationale of the present list, it is even more plainly that of the list in Anal. Post. i. 33. 89 b. 7, by which Grant thinks it highly probable that the present list was suggested. In An. Post. i. 33 we have the rational states given in the following order—ἰδέα, νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, σοφία—i.e. first, the main division of the rational part into the discursive reason (ἰδέα) and the reason which grasps principles immediately (νοῦς); then, the three kinds of discursive
reason: and lastly, the possession of discursive ability together with the power of grasping principles. The list as we find it in E. N. vi. 3. i bears its rationale less clearly on its face. Διάνοια is not mentioned, although we must assume from οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἡ ἀποφάναι that the writer has it in his mind: and the logical order is reversed when σοφία is placed before νοῦς, although it is to be noted that in the subsequent discussion of these two states σοφία is taken last. Grant thinks that 'Eudemus' does not distinguish διάνοια from νοῶς here. It is certainly in favour of this view that νοῦς appears in a list οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἡ ἀποφάναι, for, as we have seen in Mel. Θ. 10. 1051 b. 24, quoted in note on vi. 2. 2. a. 21, the ἀληθεία which is perceived by νοῶς, as intuitive reason, is that of τὸ θεγγάνειν, or of φάσις, not that of κατὰφαινεῖ ἡ ἀπόφανης which is the ἔργον διάνοιας. On the other hand the identification of νοῶς in the present list with διάνοια is inconsistent with the special function assigned to νοῶς as distinguished from ἐπιστήμη in chap. 6. The statement with which chap. 6 ends—λείπεται νοῶς ἐν τῶν ἀρχῶν makes it, I think, impossible to regard the νοῶς of the list as anything but the intuitive reason. The words οἷς ἀληθεύει τῷ καταφάναι ἡ ἀποφάναι must therefore be taken to apply directly to τέχνη ἐπιστήμη and φρόνησις, and to be loosely extended to νοῶς on account of its position as κεφαλὴ τῆς ἐπιστήμης (chap. 7. § 3).

Prantl, in his work über die dianoetischen Tugenden in der Nicomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles 1852, maintains the thesis that to regard this as a list of five intellectual ἀρεταί is to involve oneself in a confusion of Logic and Ethics. There are only two intellectual ἀρεταί—σοφία and φρόνησις. Σοφία is the ἀρετή of the λόγον ἔχου μέρος, quid concerned with τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, and φρόνησις (including εύθυλλα, σύνεσις, γνώμη and δεινότητα) the ἀρετή of the λόγον ἔχου μέρος, quid concerned with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. Νοῦς is not an ἀρετή, but das Unmittelbare, i.e. the mind itself. Ἐπιστήμη is not an ἀρετή, for there is an ἀρετή ἐπιστήμης, viz. σοφία. Τέχνη is not an ἀρετή, for there is an ἀρετή τέχνης, which in its highest form is also called σοφία:—see p. 10 of Prantl’s work for a summary statement of these results. On p. 14, he calls attention to E. N. vi. 11. 1143 b. 15, as strongly supporting his view that σοφία and φρόνησις are the only intellectual ἀρεταί—τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐκατέρα τυγχάνει οἶδα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα εἶναι. Zeller examines Prantl’s view in his Phil. d. Gr. ii. 2, p. 649 note 2, and rejects it on two grounds—(1) because the subject
of Book vi, as stated in ch. 1. § 4, is the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί, and no 1139 b. 14.
hint is thrown out that these are not the five states enumerated in
ch. 3. § 1: (2) because the Aristotelian conception of ἀρετὴ as ἐπαινετὴ ἔξις (E. N. i. 13. 19) applies to all five. Ἐπίστημη and
tέχνη are certainly ἐπαινεταὶ ἔξις (ἐπιστήμη is adduced as an example of a ἔξις in Cat. 8. 8 a. 29, i1 a. 24); and νοῦς (not as part of the soul, but as state of the soul) is expressly described as a ἔξις in E. N. vi. i1. 2. If it is a ἔξις, it is an ἐπαινετὴ ἔξις—
i.e. an ἀρετή. I think that Zeller's general position is unassailable.
Ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν could undoubtedly be said of the ἐπιστήμων,
and also of the τεχνίτης, without violence to Aristotelian usage.
But it must at the same time be conceded to Prantl that a certain
difficulty is felt by the writer of the Sixth Book about the place of
ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη—see vi. 5. 7 ἄλλα μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἑστὶν ἀρετή, 
φρονήσεως δ’ οὐκ ἑστίν... δὴλαν ὅτι ἀρετὴ τις ἑστίν [ἡ φρονήσις] καὶ οὐ τέχνη—(this is perhaps why τέχνη is omitted from the list given in ch.
6. § 2): see also M. M. i. 34. 1197 a. 16 ἑστὶ δ’ ἡ φρονήσις ἀρετῆ, ὥς
dόξεων ἂν, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη (ἐπιστήμη seems to do duty for both ἐπιστήμη
and τέχνη here, as in the list 1196 b. 36), ἐπαινεταὶ γὰρ εἰσὶν οἱ φρόνι-
μοι, ο δ’ ἐπαινεῖ ἀρετὴς: ἔτι δ’ ἐπιστήμης μὲν πάσης ἀρετῆ ἑστιν, φρονήσεως 
δὲ ἀρετῆ οὐκ ἑστίν, ἄλλ’ ὡς ἑσκεν, αὐτὸ τι ἑστίν ἀρετῆ. I ought to add
that Rassow (Forsch. p. 124 note) gives his opinion very strongly in
favour of Prantl's view that σοφία and φρονήσις are the only intel-
lectual ἀρεταί, properly so called, recognised in the Sixth Book.

ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψευδομαθίᾳ] What is here b.17.
implied is expressed fully in ch. 6. § 2—ἐὶ δὴ ὁις ἀληθεύομεν καὶ
μηδέποτε διαψευδομέθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως
ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρονήσις ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. In what
sense, then, are all these ἔξις said to be infallible? Νοῦς is infallible
as the immediate perception of ἀδιαρετα or ἀπλά: see Met. θ. 10.
1051 b. 24, and other passages quoted in note on vi. 2. 2, a. 21. Ἐπι-
στήμη is infallible inasmuch as the truths which it apprehends, or of
which it is the apprehension, are such as, if seen at all, are clearly
seen for what they are, and leave no room for the supposition that
they might be seen otherwise—see § 2 below, πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβά-
nομεν, δ’ ἐπιστάμεθα, μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν. Σοφία is infallible,
because it is νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη (ch. 7. § 3). But in what sense
can the ἔξις which have to do with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν be said
to be infallible? We are saved the trouble of trying to answer
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BOOK VI: CHAP. 3: § 1.

1139 b. 17. this question as regards τέχνη, for τέχνη does not appear in the corrected list of infallible έξεις given in ch. 6. § 2, and it is stated in ch. 5. § 7 that there are degrees of excellence in it—τέχνης μὲν έστιν ἀρετή, and implied that involuntary, as well as voluntary ἀμαρτία is possible in it—ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκών ἀμαρτάνων ἀρετώτερον (ἐκ τοῦ ἄκοινως ἀμαρτάνοντος). We have therefore only to explain how φρόνησις, concerned as it is with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἐξειν, is infallible. The explanation seems to be that φρόνησις is correlated with the perfect organisation of the whole moral nature—Ε. Ν. vi. 12. Το ἀδύνατον φρόνημα εἶναι μὴ ἄντα ἀγαθόν. Φρόνησις is the consciousness of what goodness requires for its preservation. This consciousness is always present with the good man, and authoritative in him. An artist may forget his art, because it is only a part of himself—like a limb which may be cut off, leaving the body alive; but φρόνησις is the good man himself—a second nature, which, having once put on, he cannot put off—Ε. Ν. vi. 5. 8 ἄλλα μὴν οὖν ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου μονον' σημείων δὲ ὅτι λάβῃ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐξείς ἐστι, φρόνησεως δὲ οὐκ ἐστιν. It directs him unerringly in the interest of the noble life, as instinct directs an animal in the interest of the physical life. There is indeed nothing exceptional in 'the infallibility of the good man' (see Ε. Ν. iii. 4. 4, 5—ὁ ἀποδαί τὰ ἐκαστα κρίνει ὅρθως, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται . . . ὡσπερ καινῶν καὶ μέτρων αὐτῶν ὄν); every organism knows infallibly how to be itself.

ὑπολήψεις is a view or assumption, whether true or false: see Bonitz, Μετ. p. 41—Significat ὑπολαμβάνειν sumere et statuere aliquid pro vero, sive illud est verum sive secus.' It is sometimes reached mediately as the conclusion of a syllogism—ὅταν διὰ συνθετικοῦ λάβῃ τὴν ὑπολήψιν, sometimes is taken up immediately—ὅταν ἄπλῶς ὑπολάβῃ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν (see An. Post. i. 16. 79 b. 27): in the latter case it may amount either to ἐπιστήμη ἀναπόδεικτος—defined in An. Post. i. 33. 88 b. 7 as ὑπολήψις τῆς ἀμέσου προτάσεως (ἐκ καὶ ἀναγκαίας), or to δόξα as defined in the same passage (89 a. 2—4)—λεύτεται δόξαν εἶναι περὶ τὸ ἄλλος μὲν ἢ ψεύδος, ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἐξεῖν τοῦτο δὲ ἐστίν ὑπολήψις τῆς ἀμέσου προτάσεως καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαίας. It would thus appear that ὑπολήψις is a term of very wide application: cf. de An. iii. 3. 427 b. 24 εἰπὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφορικι, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τάνασσα τούτων: and Ε. Ν. vi. 9. 7 ἢ εὐιδουλία ἢ ἂν ὄρθωτη ἢ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὐ ἢ
In the section before us (vi. 3. i), 1139 b. 17. however, ἐπίστημη is evidently used in a specific sense as equivalent to δόξα, the standing opposite of ἔπιστήμη: see An. Post. i. 33. 89 a. 5 ἢ τε γὰρ δόξα ἄδεξαν καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ τουαίτη πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ ὀδείς ἂνται δοξάζειν ὅταν ἂνται ἀδύνατον ἄλλος ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐπίστασαν ἂν ὅταν εἶναι μὲν ὀντὸς, ὡς ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλος ὀδείς καλλίευ, τούτο δοξάζειν, ὥς τοῦ μὲν τοιοῦτον δόξαν ὀδειν, τοῦ δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐπίστημην.

§ 2. ἐπίστημή μὲν ὁδὲν κ.τ.λ.] See An. Post. i. 2. 71 b. 9 ἐπίστασαν b. 18. δὲ ὅμοιο ἐκαστὸν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τὴν τ' αἰτίαν οἰωμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἢν τὸ πράγμα ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνον αἰτία ἐστὶν, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τούτ' ἄλλος ἔχειν. Ἀδήλων τοινῦν ὅτι τοιούτων τί τὸ ἐπίστασας ἦστ' καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι οἱ μὲν οὖσαν αἰτίοι οὖσαν ἔχειν, οἱ δ' ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ ἔχουσιν, ὡστε οὗ ἀπλῶς ἐστὶν ἐπίστημή, τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλος ἔχειν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπέρεσ' ἦστ' τοῦ ἐπίστασαν τρόπος, ὡστερον ἐρώμεν, φορέμ δι' καὶ δι' ἀποδείξεως εἰδέναι. 'Ἀποδείξειν δὲ λέγον συλλογισμοῖς ἐπιστημονικῶν. Ἐπιστημονικῶν δὲ λέγω καθ' ἄν τὸ ἔχειν αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμηθα. Εἰ τοινῦν ἦστι τὸ ἐπίστασαθα ὅλον ἐθερμεν. ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ ἀληθῶς τ' εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ἁμέσως καὶ γνωριμοστέρως καὶ προτέρως καὶ αἰτίως τοῦ συμπεράσματος' οὖν γὰρ ἠσοντα καὶ αἳ ἀρχαὶ οἰκείαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου. Συλλογισμός μὲν γὰρ ἦσται καὶ ἀνευ τοιούτων, ἀποδείξεις δ' οὖν ἦσται οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει ἐπιστήμην.

ταῖς ὁμολόγησεν] 'the various analogical and inaccurate uses of b. 19. the word "knowledge"' (Grant). In the strict sense ἐπίστημή is ἀποδεικτική, as described in An. Post. i. 2 quoted in last note: but politics, and many other πραγματεία dealing with τὸ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλος ἔχειν (where there can be no ἀποδείξεις—see E. N. vi. 5. 3), are called ἐπιστήμαι in a loose sense. They are 'branches of knowledge.'

ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται] He means that a concrete thing is b. 21. known for certain to exist, or be of a certain kind, only when it is actually present to our observation; whereas a necessary truth is apprehended as being always what it is now apprehended to be: cf. Top. v. 3. 131 b. 21 ἄπαν γὰρ τὸ αἴσθητον ἔξω γινόμενον τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἂδηλων γίνεται' ἄφαντας γὰρ ἔστιν εἰ ἦτι ὑπάρχειν, διὰ τὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν μόνον γνωρίζεσθαι.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης] In Met. A. 5, τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης as (1) μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλος b. 22. ἔχειν is distinguished from (2) τὸ ἀνευ oὐ oὐκ ἐνδέχεται, (3) τὸ βίαν, and (4) ἡ ἀποδέιξεις, or syllogistic consequentia: cf. Met. A. 7. 1072 b.
BOOK VI: CHAP. 3: § 2.

1139 b. 22. II (where no. 4 is omitted) τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ... τὸ μὲν βία ὅτι παρά τὴν ὀρμὴν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἀνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἄλλ' ἀπλὸς.—i.e. τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἄξεων (e.g. a mathematical truth) is ἀναγκαῖον in itself: the other kinds distinguished are ἀναγκαία ἐξ ὑποθέσεως—see Phys. ii. 9. 199 b. 34.

b. 23. ἀδίδον ἄρα] If ἐξ ἀνάγκης in the sense of μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἄξεων, then ἀεί: see Phys. ii. 5. 196 b. 10 ἐπειδὴ ὤρωμεν τὰ μὲν ἀεί ὡσαίτως γινόμενα τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ, φανερὸν ὃ ὅτι οὐκετέρω τοῦτων ἀκίνητη τὴν fossils οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης, οὔτε τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεί οὔτε τοῦ ἀς ἐπὶ πολὺ: cf. Met. E. 2. 1026 b. 27 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὐδὲν τὰ μὲν ἀεί ὡσαίτως ἐχοντα καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐ τὸς κατὰ τὸ βίαιον λεγομένην, ἄλλ' ἡν λόγομεν τῷ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως, κ.τ.λ. The Divine Power which moves the πρῶτος οὐρανός, and with it all things, is οὐσία ἀδίδον ἀκίνητος—see Met. L. 6. 1071 b. 5, and 7. 1072 a. 23. So also pure form, as it is studied in the mathematical sciences, is ἀδίδον: see E. N. iii. 3. 3 περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀδίδων, οίδεις βουλεύεται, διὸν περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἡ τῆς διάμετρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι: Phys. iv. 12. 222 a. 6 τὸ ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι τὴν διάμετρον ἀεὶ ἐστὶν.

tὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτω ἀπλῶς] as distinguished from τὰ ἀναγκαία τὰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως: see Phys. ii. 9. 199 b. 34 τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποτέρον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἂν καὶ ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ. If a saw is to cut, 'it is necessary that' it should be made of iron (Phys. ii. 9. 200 a. 12)—ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὴ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Here the 'necessity' is extrinsic—'if we are to have cutting, it is necessary to have iron.' But the truths of mathematics are ἀναγκαία ἀπλῶς—necessary without qualification, in themselves, i.e. their necessity is intrinsic: see Met. D. 5. 1015 b. 9 τῶν μὲν δὴ ἕτερον αἰτίων τοῦ ἀναγκαίων εἶναι, τῶν δὲ οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταύτα ἑτέρα ἐστὶν εξ ἀνάγκης. ὅπερ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κυρίως ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἀπλῶν ἐστὶν.

§ 3. ἔτι διδακτή . . . συλλογισμῷ] See An. Post. i. 1. 71 a. 1 Πάσα 1139 b. 25.

διδασκαλία καὶ πάσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων γίνεται γνώσεως.

Φανερὸν δὲ τούτῳ θεωροῦσιν ἐπὶ πασῶν οἷς τὸ γάρ μαθηματικὸν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου παραγόνται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τεχνῶν. Ἡμοῖος δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτοις λόγοις οἷς τὲ διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δὲ ἐπαγωγῆς ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προφητευκόμενον ποιοῦται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ἐξωεντόν, οἱ δὲ δεικνύεις τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δήλου εἶναι τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτόν. Ἡμαρτός καὶ οἱ ρητορικοὶ συμπελθοῦσιν ὡς γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων, ὑ ἐστιν ἐπαγωγή, ἡ δὲ εὐθυμμάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συλλογισμός.

Grant, after quoting the above passage, says—what Aristotle had said of dialectical arguments (τῶν λόγων) Eudemus applies to science, which he accordingly asserts to be sometimes inductive. His further assertion that the principles of deductive science are obtained by induction is inconsistent with the conclusion of chapter vi [i.e. λειτουργεῖ νοῦς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν], though it agrees with Arist. An. Post. ii. 19 [100 b. 12 νοῦς ἐν εἴῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν]. Whether the two statements ἡ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου καὶ νοῦς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν are really 'inconsistent' will be examined under chap. 6. § 2.

ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν] 'This is a general mode of ex. b. 27. pression, not a particular reference' (Grant). For the 'Analytics' of Eudemus see Fritzschel, Éth. Eud. Prolegom. p. xvi, and Grant's Ethics, vol. i. Essay i. p. 32 (4th edition).

δι' ἐπαγωγῆς] Aristotle's treatment of ἐπαγωγῆ may be brought under three distinct heads:—(1) In An. Post. ii. 19 he treats it psychologically, giving a sketch of the process by which general notions are gradually formed in the mind out of the data of sense: (2) in An. Prior. ii. 23 he treats it formally, supplying a syllogistic formula for the inductive process, to correspond with that already found for the deductive process: and (3) in Top. i. 12, 13, ii. 10, 11 certain ὀργάνα δι' ἐν εὐπορήτησιν συλλογισμῶν, and certain τόπου, are explained which remind us of the Inductive Methods of Modern Logic. It is in these chapters of the Topics (in which the word ἐπαγωγῆ seldom occurs), and in the chapter on παράδειγμα, An. Prior. ii. 24, rather than in An. Prior. ii. 23 (on the inductive syllogism) that we must look for Aristotle's real contribution to the 'Logic of Induction.' The so-called inductive syllogism of An. Prior. ii. 23, being ἐξ ἀπάντων, misrepresents a process which results,

1 Bacon seems to take no account of this contribution.
1139 b. 27. not in demonstrated truth, as the deductive syllogism does, but in moral, or practical certainty.

b. 28. συλλογισμῷ] defined An. Prior. i. 1. 24 b. 18 as λόγος ἐν φ' τεθέντων τιων ἔτερον τι των κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταύτα εἶναι.

ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου] L. b and Ald. read ἀρχῆς, and I seems to omit καὶ. Καὶ may have been introduced, to make the clause coherent, by a scribe who read ἀρχῆς. If the genitive τοῦ καθόλου depends on ἀρχῆς, it is difficult to explain καὶ: if καὶ be retained, it seems necessary to render—'Induction is the beginning, and is concerned with the universal'—not a very satisfactory rendering, I think.

b. 29. εἰςιν ἄρα ἄρχαί εἴς ὑν...ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα] See An. Post. i. 3. 72 b. 18 Ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμεν οὕτε πάσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἀμέσων ἀπαντήκεικτον. Καὶ τοῦτο; ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, φανερὸν ἐὰν γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἔπιστασθαι τὰ πρῶτα καὶ εἴς δὴ ἡ ἀποδείξεις, ἵσταται δὲ ποτε τὰ ἀμέσα, ταύτ' ἀπαντήκεικτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι. Ταύτα τ' ὑπέρ ὅτι λέγομεν, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τινά φαμεν, ἣ τοὺς ἄρους γνωρίζωμεν. The words ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα are regarded by Trendelenburg (Hist. Beltr. zur Phil. vol. ii. 367) as a gloss. In the parallel passage M. M. i. 34. 1197 a. 21 ἐπαγωγὴ is not mentioned—ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ' ἀποδείξεως ἄνωτον ἐστίν, αἱ δ' ἀρχαῖ ἀναπαντῆκεικτοί: nor in the passage just quoted from An. Post. i. 3. 72 b. 18. But surely we must retain ἐπαγωγή ἄρα, unless we are prepared to reject ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ ἐστί καὶ τοῦ καθόλου. It seems to be impossible to distinguish between 'Eudemus' and 'Aristotle' here. Both ascribe the principles of syllogism, sometimes to ἐπαγωγῆ, sometimes to νοὺς. Aristotle, at any rate, saw so little inconsistency in this, that he even gives us the two explanations within the limits of the same immediate context—An. Post. ii. 19. 100 b. 3 Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῶν τὰ πρώτα ἐπαγωγῆς γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐξήσεις οὕτω τὸ καθόλον ἔμποιεί. ἐπεί δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξω, αἷς ἀληθεύεσμεν, αἱ μὲν αἱ ἀλήθεις εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδεύκουσαι τὸ πνεύμα, οἷς δὲ καὶ λογισμὸς, ἀληθή δ' αἰ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοὺς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἡ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαῖ τῶν ἀποδείξεως γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμης δ' ἀπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἄν εἶπ, ἐπεί δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθεύεσμεν ἐνδεχόμεθα εἶναι ἐπιστήμης η νοῦς, νοῦς ἄν εἰς τῶν ἄρχων, ἐκ τινὸς σκοποῦσαι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀποδείξεις, ἀποθ' οὖν ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμης. εἰ οὖν μὴ δέν ἄλλο παρ' ἐπιστήμης γένος ἔχουμεν ἀληθεύεσ, νοῦς ἄν εἰς ἐπιστήμης ἀρχὴ. No explanation of νοῦς ἄν εἰς τῶν ἄρχων can be
right which fails to take account of a passage like the following—

An. Post. i. 18. 81 a. 38 φανερών δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ τις αἰσθήσεις ἐκλέλοιπεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τών ἐκλελοίπεν· ἂν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν, εἰπέρ μαθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγὴ ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἦστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δὲ ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος· ἂδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δὲ ἐπαγωγής, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαίρεσις λεγόμενα ἦσται δι’ ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν, ὅτι ὑπάρχει ἐκάστῳ γένει ἕνα, καὶ εἰ μὴ χωριστά ἐστιν, ἢ τοιοῦτο ἐκαστον. ἐπαγωγήν δὲ μὴ ἠχοῦτας αἰσθήσεων ἂδύνατον. τῶν γὰρ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἡ ἀισθήσεις· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἄνευ ἐπαγωγῆς, οὔτε δὲ ἐπαγωγής ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. See below, note on ch. 6. § 2, a. 7.

§ 4. ἔξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀνα- b. 31. λυτικοῖς.] See An. Post. i. 2. 71 b. 9—a passage quoted above, § 2 note ἐπιστήμη, b. 18.

δεν γὰρ... ἔξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην.] Scientific knowledge is realising b. 33. a truth as the necessary consequence of premisses which are clearly known, i.e. more clearly known than the conclusion established by means of them: for if they were not more clearly known, how could the conclusion be established by means of them? It would be independent of them. It would be knowledge without proof—‘accidental knowledge.’ The language here resembles closely that of An. Post. i. 2. 72 a. 25—ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ πιστεύειν τε καὶ εἰδέναι τὸ πράγμα τῷ τουτοῦτῳ ἔχειν συνλογισμὸν δὲ καλοῦμεν ἀπόδειξιν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ- τος τῷ ταῦτῃ εἶναι εἰς δὲ τὸ συνλογισμόν, ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον προγνώσκειν τὰ πρῶτα, ἡ πάντα ἡ ἔνα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄλλο γὰρ δὲ οὐ πάρχει ἐκαστόν, ἑκεῖνο μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει, ἐκεῖνο φιλοῦμεν, ἑκεῖστο γινομεν, ἐκεῖνα γενομεν, κακεῖα γενομεν τε καὶ πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον, ὅτι δὲ ἑκεῖνα καὶ τὰ ύστερον. οὐχ οὐδὲ τὸ δὲ πιστεύειν μᾶλλον δὲ αἰδέω, ἡ μὴ τυγχάνει μήτε εἰδώς μήτε βέλτως διακεῖμενος ἡ εἰ ἐπώγχανεν εἰδώς. συμβάλλεται δὲ τούτῳ, εἰ μὴ τὰς προγνώ- σκεται τὸν δὲ ἀπόδειξις πιστεύωντων μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀνάγκη πιστεύειν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἡ πάσας ἡ τούτῳ τοῦ συμπεράσματος. τὸν δὲ μᾶλλοτα ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν δὲ ἀπόδειξις εἰς μόνοι δὲ τὰς ἀρχαῖς μᾶλλον γνωρίζουμε καὶ μᾶλλον αὐτῶν πιστεύειν ἡ τῷ δεικτικῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ δὲ ἀλλὸ πιστότερον εἶναι μὴδὲ γνωριμοτέρον τῶν ἀντικειμένων ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, εἴ δὲ ἐσται συνλο- γισμὸς ἡ τῆς ἐναντίας ἀπάτης, εἰπέρ δὲ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον ἀπλῶς ἀμετάπειστον εἶναι.
CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

In the sphere of the contingent, or that which can be otherwise, making and doing are to be distinguished. The habit of reasoning truly, where the making of something is concerned, is Art. The artist sees how something, which may or may not be, shall be produced, the principle residing in himself, the maker, and not in the thing that is being made; for art is not concerned with things that exist or come into existence of necessity; nor is it concerned with the products of nature, for they have their principle in themselves. There is a sense in which chance and art are concerned with the same things. ‘Art loves chance and chance loves art.’ Art, then, is a habit of reasoning truly where something is being made (while the man who is without art reasons falsely), and operates in the sphere of the contingent.

1140 a. 2. § 2. ἐτερον[ποίησις] is an ἐνέργεια ἀτελής—it has an ἔργον παρ’ αὐτήν: πρᾶξις is an ἐνέργεια which is its own τέλος: see notes on i. 1. 1, 2: cf. M. M. i. 34. 1197 a. 3 ό ταυτό τὸ ποιητικόν καὶ πρακτικόν. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἔστι τι παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἄλλο τέλος, ὁδὸν παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶν ποιητικὴ οἰκίας, οἰκία αὐτῆς τὸ τέλος παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν, ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τεκτονικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ποιητικῶν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄλλο οὐθὲν τέλος παρ’ αὐτῆν τὴν πράξιν, ὁδὸν παρὰ τὸ κιβάριζειν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄλλο τέλος οὐθέν, ἄλλ’ αὐτὸ τούτῳ τέλος, ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις.

a. 3. ἐξωτερικοὶς λόγοις] See note on i. 13. 9. Eustrat. has—ἐξωτερικοῦς δ’ ὑομάζει λόγους ὃς ἐξῆς τῆς λογικῆς παραδόσεως κοινῶς τὰ πλῆθυ φαίνει.

ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἐξεις] μετὰ λόγου is opposed to ἄλογος in Met. Θ. 2. 1046 b. 2, and is really = λογικός, as that adjective is used by the later Aristotelians in the sense of ‘rational.’

a. 5. διὸ οὔθε περιέχεται ὑπὲρ ἄλληλων] Ramsauer remarks that this is inconsistent with vi. 2. 6—αὐτὴ (ἡ πρακτικὴ) γάρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει, and thinks that the writer of the present chapter cannot have had ch. 2. § 5 before him.

a. 7. § 3. ὅπερ] ‘A logical formula implying identity or convertibility of terms’ (Grant). Eustrat. ad loc. has—τὸ δὲ ὅπερ δηλοῦν κεῖται τὸ συνωδόσις κατηγορεῖσθαι τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς τὴν τέχνην, καὶ τὸν ὄραμον αὐτῆς· ὡς εἰ τις λέγει τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν τι ξύον εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ οὐσία τις ἐμψυχος...
BOOK VI: CHAP. 4: §§ 3-5.

aiσθητική' διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τοῦ ξόνου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς εἰδος εἰς γένος 1140 a. 7. τὸ ξόνον ἀναφέρομεν' ἐκαστὸν γὰρ τῶν εἰδῶν ὅπερ τί ἐστὶ τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ· τοῦ ὅπερ δηλούντος τὴν οὐσίαν κατηγορίαν τοῦ γένους κατὰ τὸν εἴδος' καὶ ὡς ταῦτα ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅπερ τί ξόνον εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὅπερ τινα οὐσίαν ἐμφανείς αἰσθητική, οὕτω καὶ τὴν οἰκοδομὴν ταῦτα εἰπεῖν εἶναι τέχνην τυπά, καὶ ὅπερ ἔστων τωλὶ μετὰ λόγον ποιητικήν, ὡς τοῦ δρού τούτου εξεσάντος πρὸς τὴν τέχνην καὶ ἀντιστρέφοντος. See note on vii. 13. 1 ὅπερ, b. 6.

μετὰ λόγον Ἀλήθους] Where we have τέχνη, as distinguished from a. 10. ἀλήθεια (see below, § 6), the calculation, or λόγος, which διάσω ποιητική goes through, consists of ideas following one another in the true order—i.e. in the order of the steps which actually constitute the making of the thing.

§ 4. περὶ γένεσιν] See An. Post. ii. 19. 100 a. 8 (τὸ καθόλου) τέχνης a. 11. ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ δὲν, ἐπιστήμη. But φύσις is also περὶ γένεσιν: accordingly, to define the province of τέχνη, it is necessary to add—as the writer does here—ὅν ἡ ἀρχὴ εἰ καθὸ ποιῶν ἂν μὴ εἰ τῷ ποιομένῳ: cf. Med. l. 3. 1170 a. 7 ἢ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλα, ἢ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ: Phys. ii. 8. 199 b. 28 εἰ ἐνὶ εἰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔννομῷ ἡ ναντικη, ὅμως ἢν φύσει ἐποίει. Eustratius has the following note here—ἐστὶ γὰρ ἢ περὶ ἢ ἐν τῷ φύσιν περὶ γένεσιν ἐνέργος, ἂν ἢ μὲν φύσις ἐντός οὐσία καὶ διὰ τῶν σωμάτων χαράωσιν οὖτως ἐν ἄντιοις ἐνεργεῖ, δὲ τέχνη οὐκ ἐντός οὐσία ἄλλοι ἐκτὸς τῶν σωμάτων περὶ ἢ καταγίζεται, οὖτως ἐν ἄντιοις ἐνεργεί, καὶ οὗτοι ἄντιοι τὰ τεχνητά ἐνδὴ ἐπείδησιν ἐκτὸς γὰρ ἢ ἀνθρωποποιητική τοῦ χαλκοῦ, ἢ τις ἐνεργεί τοῦ ἥξιον ἢ τοῖς τεχνητάς ἢ οὖσία καὶ ἁμφα, οὔτω κινοῦσι τὰ ὑποκείμενα, διὰ καὶ ἐκτός ἄντιοι κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τὰ ἐνδὴ περιτίθεσαι.

καὶ τὸ τεχναῖεν καὶ θεωρεῖν] Bek. 2, Fritzche, Rams., and Susem., following Muretus, bracket the second καὶ. Muretus says: 'deleo καὶ, ubi enim docuit quid sit τέχνη, statim addit quid sit τεχναίεν.'

§ 5. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποιήσας . . . πράξεως εἶναι] Rassow (Forsch. p. 43) a. 16. brackets this sentence as an interpolation.

καὶ τρόπων τινὰ περὶ τὰ ἄντι ἢ τῆς καὶ ἢ τῆς τέχνης] τέχνη and a. 17. πράξεις (ποιήσις or τέχνη being included under πράξεις, see E. N. vi. 2. 5) operate in the same sphere, viz. in that of τὰ κατὰ προαίρεσιν γεννώμενα ἐνεκά του (see Phys. ii. 5. 196 b. 18). Where a man uses his intelligence to do or make something, he generally succeeds—i.e., the result which follows is caused by him. But sometimes a result (good or bad) which he did not contemplate makes its appearance.
1140 a. 17. Of this Chance is the cause. He ploughs in order to raise a crop, and he turns up a treasure—*by chance*; see *Phys.* ii. 5. 197 a. 5 ἤθλων ἄρα ὅτι τῆς τυχῆς αὐτίνα κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκα τοῦ. διὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διάνοια καὶ τυχῆς ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις οὐκ ἄνευ διανοίας: ii. 6. 197 b. 1 ἣ μὲν γὰρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης ἐστὶν ὅσοι καὶ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ἂν ὑπάρξει καὶ ὅλως πράξεις. διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι δοκεῖ ὅτι ταῦτα εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ή εὐτυχίᾳ ἡ ἐγχώς, ἡ δ’ εὐδαιμονίᾳ πράξεις τις εὐπραξίᾳ γάρ. ὁσθ’ ὑπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πράξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιήσας, καὶ διὰ τούτο οὐτὲ ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὐτὲ θηρόν οὐτὲ παιδίων οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαιρέσειν οὔθ’ εὐτυχία οὔθ’ ἀντισφαίρει τούτοις, εἰ μή καθ’ ἔμοισθενα. Τύχη and πράξεις (the latter including ποίησις) are thus περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ, τύχη operating irregularly to produce or frustrate results which πράξεις produces regularly. There is a special sense, however, in which τύχη and τέχνη (τέχνη being distinguished from πράξεις) may be said to be περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ. Τύχη seems to cooperate with and favour (ἐστερεῖ) τέχνη, as it does not favour πράξεις. This is because πράξεις is a more perfect expression of reason, or the organising principle, than τέχνη. Πράξεις is the realisation of the rational personality itself. But τέχνη realises its good in an external ἔργον, and the ἔδος which it imposes on ἤλη is only a surface form—very different from the forms, penetrating to the very heart of the ἤλη, which φύσις and ἄρση produce (cf. *E.N.* ii. 6. 9 ἡ δ’ ἀρσῆ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμελῶν ἐστὶν ὡσπέρ καὶ ἡ φύσις: *Met.* Δ. 3. 1070 a. 7 ἢ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἄρχῃ ἐν ὀλλῷ, ἢ δὲ φύσις ἄρχῃ ἐν αὐτῷ). Τέχνη is a weak principle which cannot succeed unless the underlying ἤλη—the element of irrationality and accident—be favourable. Thus its greatest triumphs are often unexpected. The exigency of a rhyme suggests a beautiful turn of thought; ‘a mere accident’ gives the world a great mechanical invention. But though, for this reason, τέχνη owes more to τέχνη than πράξεις does, we must not forget that the highest πράξεις—εὐδαιμονία, needs εὐτυχία, and that the fundamental πράξεις—the physical life of plant and animal—is often most vigorous when some ‘accidental’ variation has given a new direction to inherited tendency.

a. 21. § 6. ἡ δ’ ἀτεχνία τοῦτων μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικῆς ἔξις] When the unskilful man tries to make something, he realises the steps of the operation 'falsely.' He goes to work 'in the wrong way.'
CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

Prudence comes next: in order to understand what it is, let us look at the characteristics of the people who are deemed prudent. It would appear to be characteristic of the prudent man to be able to deliberate well about the things that are good and expedient for himself, not in the narrow sense of good for health or strength, but in the general sense of good for the life of the noble citizen. Now no man deliberates about things which are necessarily what they are, nor about things which it is not in his own power to do. Accordingly prudence will not be science, or art—not science, because its object—that which is done—is contingent; not art, because making and doing are generically distinct. It remains, then, that prudence is the faculty of reasoning truly where something is being done, its sphere being that of man's good and evil. The end of doing is not something different from the doing; it is well-doing; whereas the end of making is something different from the process of making. Pericles may be taken as an example of the prudent man, as popularly understood—the man who has the faculty of seeing what is good for himself and for others in the State and the family. Hence too σωφροσύνη gets its name ἀπὸ τοῦ σώζειν τὴν φρόνησιν, because it 'preserves' a man's conception of what is good—a conception, or principle, which differs from a scientific conception, or principle, in being distorted and vitiated by pleasure and pain—for in conduct the end aimed at is the principle, and the man who has been vitiated by pleasure or pain is, because so vitiated, blind to the good end. Prudence, then, is a rational habit, which forms true conceptions about what is good for man, and issues in moral action. It is a virtue or excellence, not an art; for we speak of excellence in art, but not of excellence in prudence; and in art voluntary error is better than involuntary, whereas in the sphere of prudence and of the moral virtues voluntary error is worse. It is the excellence of that division of the rational part of the soul, which forms opinions, or deals with probabilities. But it is not merely a rational habit: for a merely rational habit may be lost; but prudence is never lost.

§ 1.] From hence onwards the Sixth Book may be thought to justify better its place in an Ethical Treatise. It will now be concerned mainly with Reason as 'the Moral Faculty': but see note on ch. i. §§ 1–4.

περὶ δὲ φρόνησιος] Grant has an important note here, in which he traces the history of the doctrine of φρόνησις down to the form which it takes in this Book:—'Plato (Phaedo 79 D) identified the
moral consciousness with philosophy — *i.e.* he made φρόνησις identical with σοφία — With Aristotle φρόνησις was gradually coming to assume its distinctive meaning, as practical wisdom, ‘being described in the Politics r. 2. 1277 b. 25 as ‘the only virtue properly belonging to a ruler’— i.e. as ‘practical wisdom, but in a broad general sense with reference to state affairs rather than to individual life’: while ‘in the present Book we have the Eudemian exposition and development of Aristotle’s theory, which entirely contrasts φρόνησις with σοφία, and limits the former to the regulation of individual life.’ See also Grant’s *Ethics*, Essay iii. vol. i. p. 194. I cannot agree with Grant that in this Book φρόνησις is limited to the regulation of individual life; nor do I think that in the Politics it is denied to the individual as managing for himself his own private affairs— (if this is the import of Grant’s remark, quoted above, on its place in the Politics), but only to the individual, quid áρχόμενος. We shall have opportunities, however, of returning to these points in subsequent notes.

θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους] For this method of enquiry Fritzsche compares *E. N.* iv. 3. διαφέρει δ’ οίδειν τὴν ἐξίν ἡ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐξίν σκοπείν.

a. 28. πρὸς τὸ εὖ [ἡν ἄλως] *Cf.* *E. N.* vi. 9. 7 πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἄπλως. Bekker omits ἄλως with K^b^. All other MSS. read it (or ἄλων). As I have had occasion to remark before, the *omissions* of K^b^ count for little; and Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 62) is undoubtedly right when he says— ἄλως, das kaum entbehrlich ist, hätte Bekker meiner Ansicht nach aufnehmen sollen. Vgl. p. 1141 a. 12 εἰναὶ δὲ τινας σοφοὺς ολομεθα ἄλως, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οὐδ’ ἄλλο τι σοφοῖς.’

a. 30. § 2. δὲ μὴ ἔστι τέχνη,] because τέχνη is concerned with ποίησις, not with πράξις.

a. 31. § 3. Βουλεύεται δ’ οίδεις κ.τ.λ.] See *E. N.* iii. 3.

a. 33. μετ’ ἀποδείξεως] See note on ch. 3. § 2 ἐπιστήμη, b. 18.

δὲ δ’ αἶ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλως ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις] See *An. Post.* i. 4. 73 a. 21 ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀδύνατον ἄλως ἔχειν οὐ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἄπλως, ἀναγκαίον δὲ εἰ οὐ τὸ οἰστητῆν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην. ἀποδεικτικὴ δ’ ἐστὶν ἢν ἔχομεν τῷ ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν εἰς ἀναγκαίων ἀρὰ συλλογισμός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

πάντα γὰρ εἰνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν] i.e. all conclusions from con-
tingent premisses are contingent; see Eustrat.—πάντα τὰ ἐξ ἐνδεχο-
μένων ἀρχῶν συναγόμενα συμπεράσματα εἰνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν τοῦτο δ’
oük ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις τὰ γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὸς συμπερασμὸμεν ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται.

The parenthesis beginning with πάντα, which Fritzsche, Michelet, Susemihl, and Bywater close with ἔχειν, ought, as in Bekker’s text, to include καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, for, as Ramsauer points out, if these words belonged to the protasis, we should have μὴ, not οὐ.

§§ 4–8.] In these §§ the order is very confused. The following b. 4. rearrangement is offered, not as a reconstruction of the text as it may have originally stood, but as an attempt to make the meaning of the passage, as we now have it, clearer. It will be seen that I am indebted to Rassow (see Forsch. pp. 43–45, and 30–31), and to Susemihl (app. crit. ad loc.), although I have ventured to take a line of my own:—1140 b. 3…ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἔτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἰς ἑστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετῆς, φρονήσεως δ’ οὐκ ἐστιν καὶ εἰν μὲν τέχνη ὁ ἐκών ἀμαρτάνων αἰρετῶτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἕτοιν, ὑστέρα παρ’ ἄρτι καὶ οὐ τέχνη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀμαρτάνοντος ἀρετήτωτερος, ὅτι ὅταν τὸν ἀμαρτήσαντον τετράγων τὸν λόγον ἐχῖντον, βατέρου ἂν εἰς ἀρετὴν τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἢ τὸ γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. δοστ’ ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἔξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ (ἀληθοῦς;) περὶ τὰ ανθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικῆν. διὰ τούτο Περικλέα καὶ τόσον τούτους φρονοῦσιν ὀλοκληρωθεὶν ὑπακοὴν Ἥν ἂν διακρίναται θεωρεῖν εἶναι δὲ τούτοις ἡγομένη τόσον οἰκονομικῶς καὶ τούτοις πολιτικῶς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧδ’ ἔξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον αὐτοίνοι δ’ ὅτι λῆθη τῆς μὲν ταυτῆς ἔξεσις ἐστὶ, φρονήσεως δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθε καὶ τῇ συνίσκυσιν τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τὸν ὅρματι, ὅσ πάροικοι τῆς φρόνησιν σφηξέι δ’ τὴν τουτην ὑπάληψιν. ὦ γὰρ ἀπαίσιν ὑπάληψιν διασβεῖται οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, ὅσ οὐκ τὸ τρίγωνον δυο ὀρθά ἔχει οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτικόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν τὸ οὖν ἔνεκα τὰ πρακτικά. τῷ δ’ διεσβαρμένῳ δ’ ἡδονῆς η λύπη εἴδθης οὖ φαίνεται ἀρχὴ, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτοις ἐκείνην οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ’ αἰρέσασθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν’ ἐστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτική ἀρχὴς. The points in the foregoing rearrangement which I would call attention to are—(1) one of the two clauses in which φρόνησις is defined is omitted—viz. that in § 4, which differs from that in § 6 in adding καὶ κακά, and in having ἀληθῆ in a position in which it would be difficult to read ἀληθοῦς: (2) τέχνη and φρόνησις
1140 b. 4. are contrasted in a continuous passage; and (3) the statement ἄλλα μὴν οὐδὲ ἔσις μετὰ λόγου μόνων, with the σημεῖον—ὅτι λήθη φρονήσεως οὐκ ἔστι, is brought into close connexion with the passage which explains the function of the moral ἔσις, σωφροσύνη, in 'preserving' the ἀληθης ὑπόληψις of the intellect περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθά. This rearrangement professes merely to make §§ 4–8 read more evenly. About the causes of their present unevenness—omissions, interpolations, transpositions, or double versions—I forbear to speculate.

b. 5. § 4. ἔσις ἀληθῆι] Rassow (Forsch. pp. 44, 45) calls attention to this strange conjunction. The definition of τέχνη at the end of ch. 4 is ἔσις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοὺς ποιητικῆς: so we ought to have here ἔσις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοὺς πρακτικῆς. In § 6, however, ἀληθοῦς is supported by good authority (τ) and ought, I believe, to be read. The definition given here in § 4, with its καὶ κακά (an addition supported neither by § 1, nor by § 5), and its ἀληθῆ placed where ἀληθοῦς would be unnatural, seems to be a late interpolation due to some one who thought proper to show that φρόνησις is an ἔσις μετὰ λόγου ἣν οὐκ ἐστι λήθη, by defining it as a ἔσις ἀ—ληθῆς μετὰ λόγου.

b. 6. ἔτερον τὸ τέλος] See M. M. i. 34. 1197 a. 4, quoted above in note on vi. 4. 2. 1140 a. 2.

b. 7. οὐκ ἄν εἶν] The corruption οὐκ ἄν is given by Mb and accepted by Eustratius and Michelet, who explain that there are some πρέξεις of πρακτικῆς τέχναι with ends which, though not ἔργα like the ends of the ποιητικῆς τέχναι, are still subservient to higher ends—as, e.g. the immediate end of riding is subordinate to victory.

b. 8. § 5. Περικλέα] Surely this is against Grant’s view (note on vi. 5. 1 quoted above ad loc.) that the developed theory of the Sixth Book ‘limits φρόνησις to the regulation of individual life.’ Indeed, in his note on the present §, Grant refers us to his note on ch. 8. § 1, which treats of ‘the connection established by Eudemus between thought, (i.e. φρόνησις) for the individual, for the family, and for the state.’

b. 10. οἰκονομικοὺς] CCC has the strange blunder οἰκουμενικοῦς.

1 In Rhet. i. 9. 1366 b. 20 however we have—φρόνησις δ’ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοιας, καθ’ ἄν ἐν βουλευκαθαι δίνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημέων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.
BOOK VI: CHAP. 5: §§ 5, 6.

The editors quote 1140 b. 11. Plato, Cratylus 411 E σωφροσύνη δὲ σωτηρία οὐ νῦν δὴ ἐσκέμμεθα, φρονήσως.

§ 6. τὴν τοιαύτην ὀπόληψιν τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπω ὁγαθὰ καταγιν. b. 12. μένην ἡ τὰ κακά (Eustratius). Pleasure and pain are the influences which interfere with the maintenance of that moral balance of which φρόνησις is the consciousness. Σωφροσύνη, then, being the maintenance of the balance, quid endangering by the most pressing pleasures and pains, will 'preserve' φρόνησις in a special manner. The wide Platonic conception of σωφροσύνη, however, as the όμοιον of all the parts of the soul, seems also to be present to the writer's mind here, as well as the narrower Aristotelian conception of it as μεσότης περὶ σωματικής ήδονᾶς καὶ λύπας. Cf. with the doctrine of this passage that of E. N. i. 3—that the man whose πάθη are not under moral control does not 'know' what is right and what is wrong, and that therefore (since πάσα διδασκαλία καὶ πάσα μάθησις διανοητική ἐκ προϋπαρχόντως γίνεται γνώσεως) we must not begin to train him by the way of the intellect—τῆς πολετικῆς οὐκ ἕστων οἰκείου ἀκρατῆς ὁ νέος ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων . . . ἐτὶ δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικῶς ὃς ματαιῶς ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς . . . τοῖς τοιούτοις (i. e. τοῖς κατὰ πάθος ἑξετάσις ἀνόητος ἡ γνώσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὁρέξεις ποιομένους καὶ πράττουσαν πολυωφελές ἄν εἰ τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι—E. N. i. 3. §§ 5–7. It is only the 'good man' who is φρόνιμος, because the 'knowledge' in virtue of which a man is called φρόνιμος is knowledge conducive to right action—knowledge up on which a man is prepared to act. The 'knowledge' with which the ἀκρατὴς is credited is only formally 'knowledge':—οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμοι ἄλλα καὶ τῷ πρακτικῷ ὁ δὲ ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός (E. N. vii. 10. 2). But knowledge which does not call for action—οὐν ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον κ.τ.λ.—is accessible to good and bad men indifferently. In short, knowledge of an environment we ascribe only to the being which corresponds with that environment:—ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐκαστὰ κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται (E. N. iii. 4. 4).

Σύν ὀρθᾶς] sc. γονίας.

b. 15.

αἷ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαί κ.τ.λ.] cf. E. N. vi. 12. 10 οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν b. 16. πρακτικῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσέν εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιοῦτο τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὑπάρχοντες δὲ δῦν (ἔστω γὰρ λογον χαρίν τὸ τυχόν): τούτῳ δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ


1140 b. 16. φαίνεται διαστρέφει γάρ ἡ μοιχεία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἁρξάς. ὡστε φανέρων ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ διὸντα ἁγαθῶν.

b. 22. § 7. τέχνης μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρετῆ, φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἐστὶν] The Paraph. Heliodorus has—τῆς μὲν τέχνης ἐστὶ καὶ κακία καὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ γὰρ δυσκόλου καὶ ἁγαθῶν εἶναι τεχνιτὴν καὶ πονηρῶν φρονήσεως δὲ οὐτε κακία ἐστιν (ἀδύνατον γὰρ φρόνιμον τινα διαφοροῦ εἶναι) οὕτε ἀρετῆ. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρετῆς ἀρετῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἐστὶν, οὗ γὰρ μειονής μεγίστης: cf. M. M. i. 34. 1197 a. 16 ἐστιν δ᾽ ἡ φρονήσις ἀρετῆς, ὡς δόξεις ἄν, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη (τέχνη here). ἐπαινετοὶ γὰρ εἶσιν οἱ φρόνιμοι, δ᾽ ἐπαινοῦσιν ἀρετῆς. τι δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης μὲν πάσης ἀρετῆ ἐστιν, φρονήσεως δὲ ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐσείει, αὐτὸ τί ἐστιν ἀρετῆ.

καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ οἱ ἑκὼν... περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς] The editors refer to Met. Δ. 29. 1025 a. 6, where the paradox τὸν ἑκόντα φαίνον βελτίω, maintained in Hipp. Min. 373 C, is criticised. The Aristotelians seem to miss Plato’s point when he says that it is better to do injustice voluntarily than to do it involuntarily. They tell him that the analogy of the arts does not apply to the virtues. The man who voluntarily spells incorrectly is indeed a better speller than the man who involuntarily spells incorrectly (see Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 20 πότερον δὲ γραμματικότερον κρίνεις δὲ ἂν ἑκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ καὶ ἀναγγείλῃ, ἢ ἂν ἑκὼν; ἢς ἂν ἑκὼν); but voluntarily to keep back money one owes is worse than to do so unwittingly. Surely Plato did not wish to dispute this truth. Voluntarily to keep back money, he would say, is worse, because it indicates ‘ignorance in the soul’ (Rep. 382 B) in the sense of a bad character, just as involuntarily to spell incorrectly is worse, because it indicates ‘ignorance in the soul’ in the sense of defective education or stupidity. But Plato put this paradoxically; he said that to do wrong voluntarily is better than to do so involuntarily. The Aristotelians, it would appear, either could not, or would not see that by ‘involuntarily’ he meant, not ‘in consequence of an accidental oversight,’ but ‘in consequence of moral blindness, or ignorance in the soul.’ His language is of course rather misleading; but he could not have really misled Aristotle. Aristotle must have seen that Plato was only making the distinction marked by the ἄνωθεν ἢ καθ’ ἐκκατά καὶ τὴν ἄνωθεν ἢ καθὸλον of E. N. iii. 1. 15.

b. 26. § 8. δοξαστικὸν] = λογιστικὸν of E. N. vi. 1. 6. Rassow (Forsch. pp. 43, 44) finds the employment of δοξαστικῶν for λογιστικῶν inco-
sistent with the manner in which δόξα is conceived, not only in Β.Ν. but in this Book. In this Book it is 
βουλεύεται, and not δοξίζων, which is characteristic of the φρόνησις: 
and the wide difference between δόξα and βουλή is seen in the 
chapter on εὐδοκία (vi. 9), where—1142 b. 13. § 3—it is said καὶ γὰρ 
ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἄλλα φῶς τις ἡ δή, ὅ δὲ βουλευόμενος, εὰν τε εὖ εὰν τε καὶ 
κακῶς βουλεύεται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται. Further, to prove that φρόνησις 
is the ἀφετής of the δοξαστικῶν μέρος, the writer of vi. 5. 8 adds— η τε 
γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ εὐδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἐχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις: but this is 
inconsistent (Rassow thinks) with Β.Ν. iii. 2. 10. 1111 b. 31 ἦ μὲν 
γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον περὶ τὰ ἀδια καὶ τὰ ἁρμαμα 
ἡ τὰ ἐφ’ ὑμῖν. The term δοξαστικῶν for λογιστικῶν occurs again in 
this Book 1144 b. 14. vi. 13. 2, in a context, however, which Rassow 
suspects to be of later origin. I cannot attach much weight to 
Rassow’s difficulties. It is true that the Index Arist. gives the 
term δοξαστικῶν = λογιστικῶν as occurring only in these two places 
in the Aristotelian Corpus; but it must be remembered that in 
vi. 10. 3 we find ἑνενεις defined as consisting ἐν τῷ χρήσαι τῇ δόξῃ 
ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ διὸν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστιν, and that τὸ δοξαστῶν 
—'the probable'—is the regular Aristotelian opposite of τὸ ἐπιστήτων: 
nor must we forget that the premisses of the Practical Syllogism 
are generally described as δόξα (e.g. vii. 3. 9). All this makes me 
think that Rassow goes too far when he accepts the occurrence of 
δοξαστικῶν = λογιστικῶν here and in vi. 13. 2 as evidence for the in 
terpolation of the respective contexts. It seems to me quite natural 
that the writer of vi. 1. 6 should happen to substitute δοξαστικῶν 
here and in vi. 13. 2 for λογιστικῶν. With regard to Rassow’s 
difficulty about the consistency of δοξαστικῶν = λογιστικῶν with Β.Ν. 
iii. 2. 10—surely that passage does not mean that τὸ δοξαστῶν as 
such is ever τὸ ἀδιαφόρον: it surely means only that, although 'probable 
matter' is the proper object of δόξα as distinguished from ἐπιστήμη, 
yet people are ready enough to trespass into the region of 'necessary 
truth' with their 'unscientific opinions'—to offer 'opinions' about 
what ought not to be matter of opinion at all, but of 'scientific 
knowledge.' Lastly, as regards Rassow’s difficulty in connexion 
with Β.Ν. vi. 9. 3. 1142 b. 13—it is true that δόξα (i.e. an opinion) 
is φῶς τις, and βουλεύεται is ζήτησις: but this does not imply that τὸ 
δοξαστικῶν μέρος χρίωμεν ταῖς δόξαις is not a faculty of ζήτησις.
CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

Since scientific knowledge is knowledge derived by a discursive process from necessary principles, the derivation of these principles themselves cannot be discursive: they cannot be scientifically demonstrated: nor can they be produced in the mind by the operation of the making faculty, nor yet by that of the faculty of prudence—for they are necessary principles, and art and prudence have to do with contingencies: nor again can we say that Wisdom or Philosophy gives us the principles of demonstrated or scientific knowledge: this would be too general a statement, for the philosopher does not merely apprehend principles. but draws conclusions from principles. Accordingly, in our list of the faculties by which, or ways in which, certain truth is always attained—Science, Prudence, Wisdom, and Reason—Reason only remains as the faculty by which we obtain first principles.

The argument of this chapter, as the editors note, is borrowed from An. Post. ii. 19. 100 b. 5, quoted in note on vi. 3. 3 b. 29.

1140 b. 31. § 1. πειρὶ τῶν καθολῶν ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη, with which, as distinguished from νοῦς, the present argument has to do, is ὑπόληψις πειρὶ τῶν ἐκ τῶν καθολῶν—see E. N. vi. 3. 3 ὁ δὲ συνλογισμός ἐκ τῶν καθολῶν. These demonstrated truths are of course themselves καθολοὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖο, but it is awkward to begin a chapter, intended to present the distinction between ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς, with words ascribing to the former a characteristic (τὸ πειρὶ τῶν καθολῶν ὑπόληψιν ἐστὶ) which it shares with the latter. The ὑπόληψις of the present passage is ἡ δὲ συνλογισμοῦ of An. Post. i. 16. 79 b. 29: see note on vi. 3. 1. 1139 b. 17 ὑπολήψει.

b. 33. μετὰ λόγου] Cf. An. Post. ii. 19. 100 a. 10 ἐπιστήμη β' ἀπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστὶ. Λόγος is here = συνλογισμός, as again in E. N. vi. 8. 9 ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄρων, ὅπως οὐκ ἐστι λόγος, and vi. 11. 4 τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος.

τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ' ἀν ἐπιστήμη εἶτι] i.e. ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη (with which alone the present argument is concerned—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητῶν ἀποδεικτῶν), for there is an ἀναποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη which gives ἀρχὴ: see An. Post. i. 3. 72 b. 18 ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμέν οὔτ' πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἁμέσων ἀναποδεικτον.
§ 2. Why is τέχνη omitted from this list, after having been included in that given in chapter 3, § 1? Is it because τέχνη has been shown in chapter 5 to be a ἐχειν ἢ ἔστι λόθη? Or does ἐπιστήμη here include τέχνη? Or have we the lists of two different writers?

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CHAPTER VII.

Argument.

When we speak of the Wisdom (σοφία) of a great artist like Phidias, we mean by Wisdom nothing but excellence in the particular art. * * *

Wisdom is, in short, the most perfect of the sciences or arts: accordingly, if a man is wise, i.e. knows perfectly, he will know not only scientific results but principles: Wisdom is therefore Science crowned, as it were, with Reason—knowledge of results, and grasp of principles, in the highest sphere.
It would be absurd to make practical knowledge higher than speculative knowledge, unless Man were the highest object of knowledge in the universe.

The objects of practical knowledge or Prudence, like the conditions of health, vary: but the absolute truth, which 'Wisdom' or philosophy apprehends, may be compared to 'White' or 'Straight,' which is always the same. There are as many different kinds of Prudence, as there are classes of men (perhaps we ought to say, of animals) capable of seeing to their own different interests. It is plain, then, that we cannot identify Prudence and Wisdom without falling into the contradiction of 'many kinds of Wisdom—many kinds of Absolute Truth.' But perhaps it may be argued—Man is so far exalted above other creatures, that we may regard his peculiar human good as a thing sui generis and unique—as the best thing in the universe, an absolute to be apprehended by the highest faculty, the faculty of 'Wisdom.' To this it must be replied, that man is not highest in the universe; the nature of the Heavenly Spheres is more divine than human nature. If the knowledge of man's peculiar human good be 'Wisdom,' there will be 'another kind of Wisdom,' concerned with the good which is more divine than man's: but 'another kind of Wisdom—another kind of Absolute Truth' is a contradiction in terms. There is only one 'Wisdom' —the exercise of the understanding and the reason in relation to the ultimate Truth. Indeed, popular opinion recognises clearly enough the distinction between the spheres of 'Wisdom' and 'Prudence.' Anaxagoras and Thales are held to be 'wise men'—'philosophers' with the knowledge of things high and wonderful, but ignorant of the useful truths of daily life which Prudence perceives.

Prudence is concerned with man's peculiar human good in so far as that good can be made object of deliberation. Indeed, deliberating well is the distinguishing function of the prudent man. No man deliberates about things which are necessarily what they are, and cannot be changed, or about things which have no reference to a practical end. The man who 'delivers well,' in the strict sense of the expression, is he whose calculation enables him to hit the highest and best mark which man can aim at—to realise as perfectly as may be the ideal of the life of noble action. But Prudence has to do, not merely with the ideal, or universal, but also with particulars. Prudence is a habit which results in action, and action is concerned with particular things to be done: these particular things to be done, therefore, the prudent man must know as well as the ideal. The analogy of an art like that of the physician shows us how important the knowledge of particulars is: an empiric knowledge is more useful than mere theory, without experience—it is better to know that 'chickens flesh is digestible,' than to know generally that 'all light flesh is digestible,' and nothing more.

Since Prudence, then, is not mere theoretical knowledge, but knowledge for the sake of moral action, and since moral action involves an end or ideal for the sake of which particular things are done, to be prudent a man must know both the universal and the particulars: at any rate the particulars. But when we say—'at any rate the particulars,' let us remember that even in what seems to be knowledge of mere particulars there must always be present some consciousness of the 'plan' which the particulars subserve.
With §§ 1–5 of this chapter cf. Mel. A. 2. 982 a. 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς τήν ἐπιστήμην τις ὑπολόγισε, ταύτ’ ἄν εἴπῃ σκεπτόν, ἡ περὶ ποιας αἰτίας καὶ περὶ ποιας ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην σοφία ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ λάβω τις τὰς ὑπολόγισεις ἄς ἔχομεν περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ, τάχ’ ἄν εἰκόνα φανεροῦ γένους μᾶλλον, ὑπολαμβάνεις δὴ πρώτων μὲν ἐπιστήμην πάντα τὸν σοφὸν ὡς ἐνδεχεται, μὴ καθ’ ἔκκαιρην ἐχοῦσα ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν ἐτὰ τὸ τὰ χαλεπά γνώσει δυναμον καὶ μὴ μᾶρδα ἀνθρώπων γεγυμνόσειν, τούτων σοφῶν (τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πᾶσιν κοινὸν, δεδομένα καὶ οὐδὲν σοφὸν) ἐτὶ τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ τὸν διδασκαλικῶτερον τῶν αἰτίων σοφότερον ἐνει περὶ πάσαν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν δὲ τὴν ἐαυτῆς ἐνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν αἱρετὴν οὔσαν μᾶλλον εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀποβαλλόντων ἐνεκεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχικότεραν τὴς ὑποτευτοῦσας μᾶλλον εἶναι σοφίαν οὐ γὰρ δεῖ ἐπισταθείν τοῦ σοφῶν ἀλλ’ ἐπισταθείν, καὶ οὐ τούτων ἐπιθετόν, ἀλλὰ τούτων τῶν ἁπτομάτων. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὑπολογίσεις τοιαύτας καὶ τοιαύτας ἔχομεν περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῶν σοφῶν. τοὐτῶν δὲ τὸ μὲν πάντα ἐπισταθεὶ τῷ μᾶλλῳ ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν οὕτως γὰρ οἷον παντὸς πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶτατα ταύτα γνωρίζεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου πορροωτατῷ γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶν. ἀκριβέστερα δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρῶτων εἰσὶν αἱ γὰρ εἰς ἐλαστῶν ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσωπείας λαμβανομένων, οἷον ἀριθμητική γεωμετρία, ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ διδασκαλική γ’ ἢ τῶν αἰτίων θεωρητικῆς μᾶλλον οὕτως γὰρ διάδοσκον τις τὰς αἰτίας λέγωντες περὶ ἑκάστου. τὸ δ’ εἴδει καὶ τὸ ἐπισταθεὶν αὐτῶν ἐνεκα μᾶλλον’ ὑπάρχει τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμην’ δ’ ἔγινεν αἰφνιδίως τῆς μᾶλιστα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλιστα αἰρήσεται, τοιαύτῃ δ’ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον’ ἐπιστήμην μᾶλιστα δ’ ἐπιστήμην τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ αἰτία πρῶτα τούτα καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ πρῶτα γνωρίζεται, ἀλλ’ ὡς ταύτῃ διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ἀρχικότατῃ δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικῇ τῆς ὑποτευτοῦσης, ἡ γνωρίζοντα τίνος ὑποκεῖται συν πρακτέον ἑκαστον’ τούτο δ’ ἐστὶν τὰ γνωρίζει τοὺς αἰτίας, διὸς δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσης. εὖ ἀπάντην οὖν τῶν ἐχομένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πιστέε τὸ ἐμπίστευν διὰ οὗ δεῖ ταύτην τῶν πρῶτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτίων εἶναι θεωρητικῆς καὶ γὰρ τὰ γνωρίζει τὸ ἐν τῶν πρῶτων ἐστὶν. Αὐτὸ τούτῳ σοφία τοῦτον ἀρχαῖον ἐδίδει, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλληθοῦσιν (vi. 7. 3).

§ 1. ἐν τῇ Lb Mb have ἐν γε, and Cambr. and Ald. have ἐν 1141 a. 9. alone. Ramsauer, reading τῇ, and failing to find any conjunction answering to it (εἰκάστη δὲ τοὺς in § 2, 1. 12 he regards as answering
BOOK VI: CHAP. 7: §§ 1, 2.

1141 a. 9. to ἐπιστήμα μέν in § 1, l. 11, conjectures that the quotation from the Margites was followed by a clause containing illustrations of the ascription of ἰσοφία to ὁ ἀκριβεστάτως τὰς ἐπιστήμας, as distinguished from ὁ ἀκριβ. τὰς τέχνες. As the text now stands, the argument conducting to ὅστε δῆλον l. 16 is, he thinks, defective. It is possible that something has fallen out before ὅστε δῆλον, but the anacoluthia noted by Ramsauer need not be regarded as pointing to such a supposition: δὲ often answers to τε in Aristotle and the best writers (see Eucken de Arist. dicendi ratione: pars prima, de particularum usu, pp. 16, 17, and Fritzsche on E. N. viii. 14. 1 and ix. 11. 1), and ἐναι δὲ τινας, though answering, so far as regular form is concerned, to the nearer ἐπιστήμα μέν, may well answer also, per anacoluthiam, to ἐν τε τοῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνες (to which indeed ἐπιστήμα μέν relates). The two facts—that ἰσοφία is ascribed both (τε) to those who are perfect in some art, and (δὲ) to those who are capable in the general sense (ὁλως), seem to me to be sufficient to warrant the conclusion ὅστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἐν τοῖς ἐπιστήμοις εἶναι ἰσοφία.

An examination of the articles ἰσοφία and ἰσοφός in Liddell and Scott shows (1) that any one who excelled his fellows as a carpenter, charioteer, pilot, soothsayer, sculptor, and especially as a poet or musician, was called ἰσοφός: (2) that a man with natural abilities was distinguished as ἰσοφός from ὁ μαθὸς who owes all to teaching: (3) that ἰσοφός was applied like φρόνιμος to the man who was wise in matters of common life—e.g. the seven sages were called ἰσοφοῖ: and (4) that the application of the term was restricted by the philosophers to those who were skilled in the sciences, learned, profound, wise.

ἀκριβεστάτως] On ἀκριβεστία, see note on i. 7. 18; also Grant's note on that §.

a. 10. ὁδὸν Φειδίαν] 'sc. λέγοντες : quod e verbo ἀποδίδομεν elici potest.' Rams.

a. 13. § 2. ἰσοφώς ὁδέμεθα ὁλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος] Of course, if these are (as is generally assumed) ἰσοφοὶ par excellence—philosophers like Thales and Anaxagoras, and not merely men of brilliant general ability and culture, the conclusion ὅστε δῆλον κ.τ.λ. follows easily enough.

a. 14. ὅσπερ ὁμηρὸς φησιν] The quotation merely gives illustrations
BOOK VI: CHAP. 7: §§ 2, 3.

of ἢ κατὰ μέρος σοφία, and throws no light on the conception of the 1141 a. 14. σοφὸς ὁ λος.

ἐν τῷ Μαργίτηι] In Poet. 4. 1448 b. 30 and 38 Aristotle ascribes the Margites to Homer, and says that it bears the same relation to comedy that the Iliad and Odyssey do to tragedy.

οὔτε ἄλλως τι σοφὸν] The editors refer to Clem. Alex. Strom. i. a. 16. 281 (221), who completes the line with πάσης δ᾿ ἡμᾶς τέχνης.

ὡσεὶ δὴ λον κ.τ.λ.] The argument is (1) that, because σοφία is ascribed τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις, it is itself ἀκριβεστάτη, and (2) that it is ἀκριβεστάτη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν—because, as ἀκριβεστάτη, concerned, not only with τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν, but with ἀρχαί, and, in its highest form, with the ultimate ἀρχαί of all ἐπιστήματα, with τὰ τιμωτάτα τῇ φύσει: see An. Post. i. 27. 87 a. 31, where a science which has in itself both the ὅτι and the διὸς is said to be ἀκριβεστέρα than one which has to borrow its διόν.

§ 3.] Cf. M. M. i. 34. 1197 a. 20 ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν a. 17. νοητῶν καὶ τῶν ὄστων ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ᾿ ἀποδείξεως ὄστων ἐστίν, αἱ δὲ ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι, ὅστ᾽ ὃν ἂν εἰπὲ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ νοῦς, ἢ δὲ σοφία ἑστὶν ἐς ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ συγκεμένη. ἦστιν γὰρ ἡ σοφία καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ δεικνύμενα, περὶ ἢ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἢ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, τοῦ νοῦ αὐτὴ μετέχει, ἢ δὲ περὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς μετ᾽ ἀποδείξεως ὄστα, τῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει: ὡστε δήλων ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἑστὶν ἐκ τοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης συγκεμένη, ὅστ᾽ εἰς ἂν περὶ ταύτα, περὶ ἢ καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη.

ὁσπερ κεφαλὴν ἐξουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμωτάτων] The σοφία, a. 19. so called, of a creative artist like Phidias is ὡσπερ κεφαλὴν ἐξουσα ἐπιστήμη—technical skill guided by artistic ideals which the artist's own genius supplies—οὗτος μὲν πανάριος δε αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ: the σοφία of the metaphysician—and this is the σοφία strictly so called—is ὡσπερ κεφαλὴν ἐξουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμωτάτων, ι. ι. τῶν χωριστῶν καὶ ἑκχειριτ. the explanation of the universe by reference to its ultimate principle, God, τὸ πρῶτον κυοῦς —, hence distinguished from μαθηματικὴ and φυσικῆ, the other θεωρητικαί ἐπιστήμαι, as θεολογική: see Mel. Κ. 7. 1064 a. 28 ὡτεὶ δ᾽ ἐστι τῆς ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὁν καὶ χωριστῶν, σκεπτόν πότερον ποτε τῇ φυσικῇ την αὐτὴν θετιν ταύτην εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἔτεραν, ἢ μὲν οὖν φυσικῆ περὶ τὰ κινήσεως ἔχουσα ἀρχὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἑστὶν, ἡ δὲ μαθηματικὴ θεωρητικὴ μὲν καὶ περὶ μέγιστα τις αὐτὴ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χωριστά. περὶ τὸ χωριστόν ἄρα δι καὶ τὸ ἀκινητόν ἐτέρα τούτων ἀμφο—
BOOK VI: CHAP. 7: § 3.

1141 a. 19. Τέρων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔστι τις, εἰπὲν ὑπάρχει τις οὐσία τοιαύτη, λέγω δὲ χωριστῇ καὶ ἀκίντος, ὅπερ πειρασόμεθα δεικνύω. καὶ εἰπὲν ἐστὶ τις τοιαύτη φύσις ἐν τοῖς ὄσοις, ἑνταῦθι ἀν εἰς τὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ αὕτη ἂν εἶπῃ πρῶτῃ καὶ κυριωτάτη ἄρχῃ. δὴλον τοιοῦτοι ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστὶ, φυσικὴ, μαθηματικὴ, θεολογικὴ. ἑξελεστῶ μὲν οὖν τὸ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν γένος, τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ τελευταία λεχθεῖσα περὶ τὸ τιμωτάτων γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, βεβλίων δὲ καὶ χείρων ἐκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστημῶν. ἀπορήσεις δὲ ἂν τις πιστῶν ποτὲ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ή ὅτι ἐπιστήμην καθόλου δεῖ θεῖαν ἡ οὐ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ μαθηματικῶν ἐκάστη περὶ ἐν τὶ γένος ἀφωρισμένον ἐστὶν, ἡ δὲ καθόλου κοινῇ περὶ πάντων. εἰ μὲν οὖν αἱ φυσικαὶ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶ, κἂν ἡ φυσικὴ πρῶτη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἰς· εἰ δὲ ἠστιν ἐτέρα φύσις καὶ οὐσίᾳ χωριστῇ καὶ ἀκίντος, ἔτεραν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῆς εἶναι καὶ προτέραν τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ καθόλου τῷ προτέραν. Φοροὶ τὴν μήτης νομοί see notes on Ε.Ν. i. 12.

1141 a. 20. ἀτοπον γὰρ] Ramsauer and Susemihl suspect a lacuna between τιμωτάτων and ἀτοπον—on insufficient grounds, I think: see their notes ad loc. The connexion seems to me very plain in the text as we have it—Σοφία is ἀκερβεστάτη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, i.e. σπουδαστάτη, because concerned with τὰ τιμώτατα (cf. Mel. K. 7 quoted above); for (Μβ has δὲ) it would be absurd to say that φρόνησις is σπουδαστάτη, inasmuch as its object is χεῖρον—cf. M. M. i. 34. 1197 b. 6 ἦστιν δὲ χείρων ἡ φρόνησις τῆς σοφίας (περὶ χείρω γὰρ ἐστιν) ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία περὶ τὸ ἀίδιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἀνθρώπῳ.

Lb, Ob, B1, B3, NC, CCC, r, and Ald. read τὴν ἐπιστήμην πολιτικήν, introducing confusion into the passage by making ἐπιστήμη the subject of a passage which is concerned with σοφία. Coraes, reading ἐπιστήμην, proposes to meet the difficulty by inserting τὴν before πολιτικήν, while Cambr. does so by reading τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐπιστήμην.

1141 a. 21. εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀριστον κ.τ.λ.] Cf. below § 4. 1141 a. 34 καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολλαὶ θείστερα τῆς φύσιν, κ.τ.λ. Cf. an interesting passage in Grant’s Ethics, Essay v. vol. i. pp. 286, 287, in which Aristotle’s ‘idea of the slightness of man and of his actions in comparison with nature, and what he would call the “diviner parts” of the universe,’ is dwelt on: ‘Aristotle might, indeed, seem to coincide with the utterance of the Psalmist, “What is man in comparison with the Heavens?” But with him the heavens were not a mere
physical creation; rather the eternal sphere of Reason, the abode of pure Intelligences, the source of all emanations of Reason and Intelligence throughout the world. Compared with this higher sphere individual man, with his practical and moral life, appeared insignificant. On the πρῶτος οὐρανός and other σφαῖρας, see note on iii. 3. 3.

§ 4. εἰ δὴ ὑγιεῖνον κ.τ.λ.] I prefer δὴ (Mb) to δὴ here: another a. 22.

reason is being given for not identifying φρόνησις with σοφία. The argument of the § is—As ‘healthy’ or ‘good’ has a different meaning, according as it is applied to the condition of men, or of fishes, while ‘white’ or ‘straight’ has the same meaning in all connexions; so ‘wise’ has always the same meaning, whereas ‘prudent’ has not. ‘Prudence’ in one case is not necessarily ‘prudence’ in another, any more than what is a ‘healthy’ condition in one case is necessarily a ‘healthy’ condition in another case—utilities, the objects of Prudence or Statesmanship, vary, and there are consequently many kinds of Prudence or Statesmanship; but philosophic truth, the object of Wisdom, is one, and there is only one kind of Wisdom: accordingly, if we identify Prudence or Statesmanship with Wisdom, by making Wisdom the knowledge of utilities, we shall land ourselves in the contradiction of ‘many kinds of Wisdom’—‘many kinds of philosophic truth.’ But it may be asked—Is not man so highly exalted above the other animals, that we may place his utility in a category by itself, as the utility par excellence—one in contradistinction to the many varying utilities of the other animals? If so, may we not then identify Statesmanship, the science of man’s utility, with Wisdom, without thus making ‘many Wisdoms’? No, because there are existences higher than man. With these Wisdom must concern itself; and if it concerns itself also with man’s utility, we shall still have ‘many Wisdoms.’ I follow Michelet in making the apodosis begin at καὶ τὸ σοφὸν l. 24. Zell would make it begin at φανερὸν δὲ καὶ l. 28.

'Ὑγιεῖνον καὶ ἄγαθὸν are the objects of φρόνησις, in the wide sense of the term in which it includes the ‘intelligence’ of the lower animals; but τὸ λευκὸν καὶ εἴδυ are not the objects of σοφία; they merely resemble its objects in being always the same. So the Paraph.—τὸ αὐτὸ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἐπιστητὸν (=σοφὸν) εἶναι, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ εἴδυ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λευκὸν παρὰ πᾶσιν. The Paraph., it will be
1141 a. 22. observed, takes τὸ σοφίαν as the object of σοφία. It is better to take it as the subject of σοφία—the wise being or faculty. He or it is of only one type: whereas τὸ φρόνιμον, the prudent being or faculty, is of many types.

a. 25. τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὸ ἐκαστὰ τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν φησιν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἑπιτρέψει αὐτά] This is Bywater’s reading for Bekker’s τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὸ ἐκαστὰ εὖ θεωροῦν φαίνειν ἐν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἑπιτρέψ-ειαν αὐτά. For τὰ all MSS. read τὸ: τὸ before εὖ is omitted by r and M b: φησιν is given by K b alone: and ἑπιτρέψει by K b alone. Susemihl, otherwise following Bekker, reads αὐτὸς for αὐτά, after M b. Rassow advocates αὐτὸς, Forsch. p. 63. If K b is right with φησιν and ἑπιτρέψει, the change to the singular number, after the emphatic πάντες ἐν ἐποιεῖν, is so awkward, that one is tempted to suspect that something has dropped out; but see Byw. Contrib. p. 50. Αὐτά are the ἐκάστα, its own peculiar ἀφελίμα. We trust a being which is φρόνιμον to see to its own interests.

a. 27. τῶν θηρίων ἐνα φρόνιμα] See Met. A. i. 980 b. 22 φρόνιμα . . . οἷον μέλισσα καὶ εἰ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζωῶν ἐστίν.

a. 33. τῶν δυντῶν] ἱστρήκη is περὶ ζώων, animate beings, not περὶ δυντῶν, existences as such. Hence the editors have suspected the genuineness of the words. Perhaps they have arisen out of a dittograph of πάντων: but cf. E. E. 1217 a. 26 quoted by Byw. Cont. 51.

a. 34. οὔδεν διαφέρει] ‘that makes no difference’—still there will be ‘many wisdoms.’ Eustr. has—οὔδεν διαφέρει τούτοι τουτεστιν οὐκ οἰκεῖον ἐστιν πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι μὴ ἑτέρας οὑσας πρὸς ἀλλήλας σοφίαν καὶ φρόνησιν.

b. 1. οἷον φανερώτατα γε εἷς ἃν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν] ‘As—to take the most obvious instance—the heavenly bodies’ (Peters). So the Schol. Paris. quoted by Zell—τὰ οὐράνια σώματα, ἵνα μὴ λέγωμεν ἤρως καὶ δαίμονας. Cf. Met. A. 8. 1074 a. 30, quoted by the editors, τέλος ἐσται πάσης φορᾶς τῶν φερομένων τιθείων σωμάτων κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν: Phys. B. 4. 196 a. 33 τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν καὶ τὰ θεία ταῦτα τῶν φανερῶν: cf. Met. E. 1. 1026 a. 18 τῶν φανερῶν τῶν θείων. These phrases—τὰ θεία ταῦτα τῶν φανερῶν—τὰ φανερὰ τῶν θείων—show that ‘to take the most obvious instance’ does not fully render the force of οἷον φανερώτατα γε. For some account of τὰ εἷς ἃν συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος see passages quoted in note on iii. 3. 3.
§ 5. εκ δή... τῇ φύσει] Ramsauer and Susemihl bracket these 1141 b. 2. words. They are unnecessary, and interrupt the obviously close connexion between the closing lines of § 4 and διὸ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ’ οὖθ’ φιλοῖν εἶναι. Ramsauer also notes the unusual nature of the construction νοῦς τῶν τιμωτάτων.

διὸ κ.τ.λ.] Grant quotes Plato Theaet. 174 A—διὸπερ καὶ Θαλῆν b. 3. ἀστρονομία, ὧ Θέοδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θραττά τις ἐμελὴς καὶ χαρίσσα θεραπείει ἀποσκόψαι λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δ’ ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λαμβάνει αὐτόν. Ταῦταν δὲ ἁρκεῖ σκόμμα ἐπὶ πάντας δοσι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγνουσι.

§ 6. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις... b. 12 πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν] Rassow (Forsch. b. 8. p. 20) prints this sentence and the beginning of chapter 5 as duplicate passages. Grant notes that the remark βουλεύεται δ’ οὖθες κ.τ.λ. is here repeated for the third time: cf. ch. 1. § 6, and ch. 5. § 3.

οὖθ’ ὁσὸν μὴ τέλος τι ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν] No man b. 11. deliberates about what is invariable, nor, in the region of the variable, about things which have no practical bearing upon life—i.e. about things ‘which involve no end realisable in action.’ As Ramsauer remarks, οὖθ’ ὁσὸν limits the sphere of φρόνησις to a certain class of ἑνδεχόμενα, whereas in ch. 1. §§ 5, 6 it is simply said that τὸ λογιστικὸν is concerned with τὰ ἑνδεχόμενα.

ὁ δ’ ἀπλῶς εὐβουλοὺς] i.e. εὐβουλοὺς in the strict sense of the word: b. 12. cf. ch. 9. § 7 ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς εὐβουλεύεσθαι καὶ πρῶς τι τέλος: cf. ch. 5. § 1.

τοῦ ἀρίστου] τοῦ εὐ ζην. Eustr. has the following note here: b. 13. ἀριστὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ διὸπερ διαφορὰ κείμενον ἐν τῷ ὄρμῳ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τέχνην ἀποτελομένων διάτησι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἄγαθα γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τεχνῶν ὑπάρχει ἀποτελέσματα, ἀλλ’ ὁδὶν εἰς ἑκείνων ὑπάρχῃ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἀριστὸν. οἰκεία γὰρ καὶ θρόνος καὶ τράπεζα, καὶ ἱμάτιον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγαθα μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὡς χρήσια καὶ ἀφίλεμα, οὖθέν δὲ αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἀριστὸν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ὑποθέσθαι τῷ λογισμῷ τὰ πάθη, καὶ κύριον αὐτοῦ καὶ δεσπότην τῆς ἀλόγου ποίησασθαι. πρακτά δὲ λέγονται ἄγαθα τὰ διὰ πράξεως καταρθοῦμενα. οὐκ οὖν τὸ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀνθρι- σασθαι, τὸ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας πολεμοῦμεν εὐγκατεύσασθαι καὶ ὁσα τοιαῦτα.
§ 6, 7.  

This remark seems to suggest itself here as a qualification of what has just been said. The general conception of τὸ ἀριστον ἀνθρώπῳ is not enough: acquaintance with particulars is also necessary.

It is of the essence of the ‘knowledge,’ which the φρόνημα as such possesses, to issue in action. In the sphere of conduct, ‘knowledge’ without works is dead.

The writer of E. N. vi. 7. 7 may have had this passage in his mind. His introduction of the term ἀρχιτεκτονική 1. 14. 22 may have been suggested by διό καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτεκτονικὰ k.t.l.

The argument is—‘All light flesh is wholesome: the flesh of fowls is light: therefore it is wholesome.’ The man who knows the conclusion, ‘the flesh of fowls is wholesome,’ is more likely to prescribe successfully than the man who knows the major ‘all light flesh is wholesome,’ without knowing the minor, ‘the flesh of fowls is
light.' Hence Trendelenburg (\textit{Histor. Beiträge zur Ph.} vol. ii. 1141 b. 18. p. 371) would seem to be right in bracketing κώφα καὶ l. 20. Whether Rassow is right (\textit{Forsch.} pp. 96, 97) in substituting κρέα καὶ for the rejected words is more doubtful. But κρέα καὶ may have come in here (l. 20) as a ditograph of κρέα καὶ in the line above (19).

\[ \text{ή δὲ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ} \] Rassow (\textit{Forsch.} p. 45) regards the whole b. 21. passage beginning with these words and ending with σκεπτέων ch. 8. § 4, 1142 a. 11 as an interpolation. The σημείων in ch. 8. § 5 can be properly understood, he thinks, only in close connexion with the remarks in ch. 7. § 7 ending with ποιήσει μάλλον 1141 b. 21. I shall try to show that the σημείων follows naturally what has been said in the immediately preceding section—vi. 8. 4.

\[ \text{άμφων] καὶ τὴν καθολικὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν καθ' ἐκαστα.} \]

\[ \text{ταυτὴν μᾶλλον] τὴν καθ' ἐκαστα φρόνησιν.} \]

\[ \text{b. 22.} \]

\[ \text{εἴη Петербург} \] But even to the most intimate knowledge of τὰ καθ' ἐκαστα the direction of a master faculty is necessary. The man who knows details cannot deal with them without a plan of life. This plan he finds, for the most part, embodied in the institutions which have grown up under the νομοθεσία of his State. The master prudence, ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις, under which his prudence of detail works as a χειροτέχνη, is the direction afforded by πολιτικὴ ὑπὸ νομοθετικῇ—referred to a few lines below in ch. 8. § 2. It is only as conforming to general rules laid down for the common good that the individual finds his own private good. For ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις see \textit{M. M.} i. 34. 1198 a. 32 πότερον οὗ ἑστὶν ἡ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ ἡ οὗ, ίδιον ἄν τις ἐντέθη, ἐπὶ τάς ἐπιστήμας ἐπιβλέψεις, οἷον ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκοδομήν. ἔστω γὰρ, ὡς φαίην, ἐν οἰκοδομή σὲ μὲν ἀρχιτέκτων τις καλοῦμεν, δὲ ὑπηρετῶν τούτων οἰκοδόμωσ' ὡστὸς δὲ ἑστὶν ποιητικὸς οἰκίας. ἔστω δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων, καθὸ οὖσι ἐποίησι οἰκίαι, ποιητικὸς οἰκίας. ὦμαίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ποιητικῶν ἔχει, ἐν αἷς ἑστὶν ἀρχιτέκτων καὶ ὑπηρέτης τούτων. ποιητικὸς ἅρα τῶν καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων ἐσται, καὶ τοῦ αὐτῶν τούτων (οὗ) ποιητικὸς καὶ ὁ ὑπηρετικὸς. εἰ τοῖνυν ὦμοιος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄρτων ἔχει, ὑπερ εἰκὸς καὶ εὐθοὺς, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἄν ἐν ἐπὶ πρακτική. αἱ γὰρ ἀρεται πάσαι πρακτικαὶ εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις διαπέρ ἀρχιτέκτων τις αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ὡστὸς γὰρ αὐτὴ προστάξει, οὕτως αἱ ἀρεται καὶ αἱ κατ' αὐτὰς πρώτουσι: ἐπὶ οὖν αἱ ἀρεται πρακτικαί, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ ἄν ἐν ἐπὶ. In this passage we must understand that is
CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Statistics and Prudence are the same faculty regarded from different points of view.

Under Statesmanship, or Prudence as concerned with the welfare of the State, are included—(1) the faculty of legislating in accordance with a comprehensive plan of social life; (2) the faculty of dealing with the details of social life: this latter species (which has taken to itself the generic term, Statesmanship) is (a) deliberative and (b) judicial; and dealing, as it does in the assembly and law-courts, with particular cases—issuing in particular decrees and verdicts, is thought by many to be the only form of statesmanship; for it is that in the practice of which alone people are seen to be 'doing something,' like workmen.

Similarly, many think that Prudence as concerned with one's own private affairs is Prudence par excellence. It has, indeed, the generic name, Prudence; but knowing the good of others in the family and in the State is equally Prudence. Knowing what is good for oneself is only one species of knowing what is good for man; but it is a species distinguished from the other species—knowing what is good for other people—by a large differentia: it therefore seems to many to be sui generis: the man who can see well to his own interests is thought to be 'prudent,' and those who devote themselves to the interests of others are considered 'busy-bodies; not 'prudent.' But surely a man's 'own' interest cannot thus be abstracted from the interests of 'other people.' A man cannot be prudent in 'his own' interest without considering the interests of other people in the family and the State.

If 'one's own' interest could be abstracted from the social tissue, and made the object by itself of 'Prudence,' then boys would be 'prudent': they deal successfully with the abstractions of mathematics; why not, then, also with the abstraction of 'their own' interests? But they are no more 'prudent' in 'their own' interests than they are well versed in philosophy and the natural sciences. This may be taken as a sign that 'one's own' interest cannot be abstracted; that Prudence, like proficiency in the concrete sciences, requires long and wide experience for its acquirement—experience of 'one's own' interest as that inheres in the tissue of the interests of the community.

Prudence, then, being the immediate knowledge of particulars, is not scientific knowledge, for scientific knowledge is mediate, or proved, knowledge; it is therefore the antithesis of Reason, for Reason apprehends universals immediately. Its particulars, then, being apprehended, not mediatly as conclusions
are apprehended by science, but immediately, Prudence will be a sort of sense—
not indeed like sight, which perceives colour immediately as its special object, or
hearing, which perceives sound, but rather like the sense by which we perceive a
geometrical figure—a triangle or a circle—immediately for what it is.

§ 1. ἡ πολιτική] Grant has an important remark here—that, 1141 b. 23.
according to Aristotle, 'φρονησις was a psychological term ex-
pressing a faculty of the mind, but πολιτική was merely one of the
divisions of the sciences. In order to make them commensurate,
Eudemus alters the signification of πολιτική. He treats it as a state
of the mind (ἐξις), as a mode of φρονησις, dealing with the State
either universally or in details. From the same later point of view
he adds also οἰκονομική.'

ἡ αὐτῇ μὲν ἐξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταῦτων αὐταῖς] See note on
v. 1. 20. Πολιτική, the prudence of the citizen, and φρονησις, the
prudence of the man, are the same habit viewed from different
points, as the citizen and the man are the same person viewed
from different points. Take the case of one who 'gets on well
in the world.' He may be looked at either as a man who conducts
his own affairs prudently, or as a citizen who contributes by his
position and influence to the welfare of the State of which he is
the product. His career is a line in which the private can only
logically be distinguished from the public side. Except as con-
forming to the conditions of the community to which he belongs,
and as promoting its good, no man can be said to manage his own
affairs prudently—οὐκ ἂστι τὸ αὐτὸν εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ πολιτείας
§ 5. Even the narrowest φρονησις περὶ αὐτῶν is πολιτική—although
the latter name is technically given only to the faculty of the
'public man'—the legislator, ecclesiast, dicast, or executive officer.
We may say then that the ἐξις προνοιακή περὶ τὰ πρακτικὰ ἄγαθα is
φρόνησις quæ περὶ αὐτῶν, and πολιτική quæ περὶ ἔτερον. These are
two aspects logically distinguishable: but there is no such thing
as caring only for oneself, or caring only for others.

Fritzsche and Grant make much of this § and the three following
§§ as fulfilling a promise 'made before in the E. E.'—viz. i. 8.
1218 b. 9 τὸ δ᾽ οὖν ἐνεκα ὡς τέλος ἀμιστόν καὶ αἰτίων τῶν ὑφ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ
πρῶτον πάντων. ἄστε τούτῳ ἐν εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἄγαθον τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων
πρακτικῶν. τούτῳ δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν. αὕτη δ᾽ ἔστι πολιτική
cαι οἰκονομική καὶ φρόνησις. διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὐταὶ ἀλλ᾽ ἐξις πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας
τῷ τοιαύτῃ εἶναι' πρὸς δ᾽ ἀλλήλας εἰ τι διαφέρουσιν, ὑστερον κεκτέου.
The divisions made in this § and in § 3 may be tabulated thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th align="left">Φρόνησις (Α)</th>
<th align="left">Οικονομική</th>
<th align="left">Πολιτική (Α)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="left">(ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτική)</td>
<td align="left">(ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν)</td>
<td align="left">(ἡ περὶ τόλμων Φρόνησις)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">Φρόνησις (a)</td>
<td align="left">Οικονομική</td>
<td align="left">Πολιτική (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">(ἡ ὁς τὰ καθ ἑκάστα περὶ τόλμων Φ.)</td>
<td align="left">(ἡ ὁς ἀρχιτεκτονική)</td>
<td align="left">(ἡ ὁς περὶ τόλμων Φ.)</td>
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<tr>
<td align="left">Πολιτική (a)</td>
<td align="left">Νομοθετική</td>
<td align="left">Βουλευτική</td>
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<tr>
<td align="left">(ἡ ὁς τὰ καθ ἑκάστα περὶ τόλμων Φ.)</td>
<td align="left">Πολιτική (a)</td>
<td align="left">Dikastikē</td>
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</table>

Here Φρόνησις is used in a generic sense (A), and a specific sense (a)—δοκεὶ δὲ καὶ Φρόνησις μὴλίστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἵνα καὶ ἔχει αὑτὴ (a) τὸ κοινὸν ἀνωμα (Α), Φρόνησις § 3. Πολιτική is also used in a generic (A), and a specific (a) sense.

b. 25. Νομοθετική] The architectonic relation of Νομοθετική to ἡ Πολιτική ἡ περὶ τὰ καθ ἑκάστα, as well as to Οικονομική and ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν Φρόνησις, is not exhibited to the eye in the above table, in which Νομοθετική appears as coordinate with Πολιτική (a), and as having no bearing at all upon Οικονομική or Φρόνησις (a). In the well-ordered State, however, it dominates all three—Φρόνησις (a), Οικονομική, and Πολιτική (a)—ὁ γὰρ νῦν ἀγορεύει περὶ ἀπάνων. Its architectonic relation, to Πολιτική (a) at least, is better brought out in Pol. Δ. 11. 1297 b. 37, where three μόρια τῶν πολιτείων πασῶν are distinguished—(1) τὸ βουλευτικὸν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν—the deliberative body: (2) τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀρχαὶ—the executive: and (3) τὸ δικαίου—the judicial body; and Νομοθετική is said to be concerned ‘theoretically,’ i.e. architectonically, with all three: ἐστι δὴ τρία μόρια τῶν πολιτείων πασῶν περὶ δὲν δεῖ θεωρεῖν τὸν σπουδαῖον νομοθέτην ἐκάστη τὸ συμφέρον.

ἡ δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ ἑκάστα] The Vet. tr. has—haec autem ut circa singularia commune habet nomen politica, as if he read ἡ δὲ ὡς περὶ τὰ καθ ἑκάστα. Ramsauer conjectures ἡ δὲ ὡς χειροτεχνική (or ὡς πράττουσα) περὶ τὰ καθ ἑκάστα. Would it not be simpler to read ἡ δὲ ὡς καθ ἑκάστα? Cf. iii. 1. 15 ἡ ἔγνωσ... ἡ καθ ἑκάστα.
This is not the formal division of \(1141\) b. 27. \(\text{πολιτικὴ (a) .}\) That is given in the next section as \(\text{βουλευτικὴ} \) and \(\text{δικαστικὴ} \). Here the writer wishes merely to characterise \(\text{πολιτικὴ (a) as πρακτική, i.e. as concerned with τὸ καθ' ἐκαστα}, \) in contradistinction to \(\text{κομμωτικὴ which involves ἡ τῶν καθόλου θεωρία.} \) He adds καὶ \(\text{βουλευτικὴ in order to explain πρακτικὴ—τὸ γὰρ ψφύσμα πρακτῶν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον.} \) He might have written—ἀὕτη δὲ πρακτική, ἦτοι βουλευτικὴ καὶ δικαστικὴ—τὸ γὰρ ψφύσμα πρακτῶν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον (sc. ἐν τῇ βουλευτεί), καὶ ἥ κρίσις.

\[\text{ὁς τὸ ἔσχατον} \] Eustr. has—τὸ ψφύσμα ἐστὶν ὁ τελευταῖον ὁ κρίνας b. 28. ἡ βουλευτεύμενος ἀπεφήνατο τί δει γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ προτεθέντι ζητήματι, οἷς ὡς καθόλου φαινόμενον ἀλλ' ὡς ἔσχατον καὶ καθίκαστον τὸ γὰρ καθόλου οὕτω πράξει ὑπογίζεται. Αἱ ψφύσματα is the first step in the execution of a policy. It carries with it consequences which result in the realisation of a certain τέλος. Deliberation, starting from the conception of this τέλος, reviews the steps by which it may be realised till \(\text{at last the first step actually to be taken is reached in thought.} \) This is the ψφύσμα, which is thus τὸ ἔσχατον: cf. \(\text{E. N. iii. 3, 11, 12 ὁ γὰρ βουλευτεύμενος ἄκου ἤμεν καὶ ἀναλύων ... ὥσπερ διάγραμμα ... καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσθαι.} \) The term ἔσχατον often stands simply for the ‘particular’ as such—e.g. \(\text{E. N. vi. 11. 3 ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπαντα τὰ πράκτα: Met. k. i. 1059 b. 26 πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἔσχάτων: cf. E. N. vii. 3. 13 ἔσχατος ὄρος.} \) Particulars as such are called ἔσχατα, doubtless because they are individuals, or ultimate units found by breaking up genus and species.

\[\text{διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι κ.τ.λ.] πολιτικὴ (a)—ἡ χειροτεχνική, has appropriated to itself the generic name which it ought to share with ἡ ἄρχιτεχνική. Only ‘party men,’ ‘active politicians’—those who ‘have a hand in carrying on the current business of the State,’ are popularly regarded as ‘our statesmen.’ Political thinkers are not regarded as ‘statesmen.’\]

\[\text{§ 3. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις κ.τ.λ.] Similarly, φρόνησις (a) has ap-} b. 29. propriated to itself the generic name which it ought to share with ὀικονομική and πολιτική. 'To be able to manage 'one's own' affairs well is Prudence—and the only real Prudence, it is thought (δοκεῖ; for to attend as a 'politician' to 'other people's affairs is the mark, not of a prudent man, but of a busybody. The truth, however,}

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1141 b. 29. is that, as the State which is ruled by ψηφίσματα instead of νόμος sinks into the social chaos of ἡ ἐσχάτη δημοκρατία (Pol. E. 8. 1312 b. 36), so the man who tries to manage 'his own affairs,' without regard for the common good, courts his own ruin. 'One's own good' cannot be abstracted from the common good, and treated as a thing by itself.

b. 33. § 4. εἰδος . . . πολυπράγμονες] 'Knowing one's own good (φρόνησις a)' and 'knowing what is good for other people (πολιτικήγε)' are the two species (εἰδὴ) of 'knowing what is good (φρόνησις А).’ But these two species are distinguished from each other by such a large ‘difference’ (διαφορά), that they often do not seem to be coordinate species at all under the same genus. ‘My own good’ is such a very different thing to me from 'my neighbour's good,' and seems so superior, that the tendency is to make the knowledge of the former coextensive with Prudence, and to cast the knowledge of the latter out of the genus altogether as πολυπράγμονη.

This interpretation assumes that διαφορά is here used in its logical sense as διαφορά εἴδοσων or differentia specifica, and is suggested by the foregoing εἰδος = species: see (e.g.) Met. I. 7. 1057 b. 7 ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ γένους καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν τὰ εἴδη. It is the interpretation adopted by Eustratius, who writes:—τὴν διαφορὰν διδάσκει διὰ τῶν τούτων τοῦ γάρ ἐαυτὸν φρονίμου πρὸς οἰκονομικοί καὶ πολιτικοί καὶ φησίν ὅτι ἐκάστῳ μὲν τούτων καὶ γνώσει ἐστὶ καὶ φρόνησις, πλὴρ ἔχουσι διαφοράς πρὸς ἄλληλους, τῷ γένει μὲν ἵσως ἄντας τοὺς αὐτοὺς (ταύτας Eustr.) διαφέρονται δὲ πολὺ τούτων πρὸς τὸ λοιπὰ, καὶ τοσοῦτον ὡστε καὶ δοκεῖν τὸν εἰδότα τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ διατριβόντα, φρόνιμον ἐναντίον οὐ φρόνιμου διὰ πολυπράγμονα ὡς τὰ ἔξω ἐαυτοῦ ἥγεσιν, καὶ ἐξετάζων. It is difficult to suppose that in a context in which the species of a genus are distinguished, διαφορά can be used in any but in this, its logical, sense. Zell, Coraes, Grant, and Ramsauer, however, follow Lamminus in understanding ἀλλ’ ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλὴν to mean—'verum de hoc ipso magna est controversia.'

b. 34. ὑνώσεως] Eustr. had a v. l. φρονήσεως before him.

τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι] Eustr. says that the phrase is elliptical, and that we must understand ὀφελίμων, συμφέρων, or ἀριστον. Αὐτοῦ, the

1 Οἰκονομικὴ is not mentioned, perhaps because, as Eustr. says, ἡ γὰρ οἰκονομικὴ ἐγγίζει τῇ γνώσει τῇ τοῦ ολίκειον συμφέροντος ἐνός τινος.
BOOK VI: CHAP. 8: § 4.

reading of M\textsuperscript{b}, is tempting, but is probably only one of the con-
jectures of which M\textsuperscript{b} is full.

καὶ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.] Eustr. brings out correctly the force of these 1142 a. 1.
words—διαφέροντας (i.e. τὸν καθ’ ἐαυτὸν φρόνιμον καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν)
τοσοῦτον ὡστε καὶ δοκεῖν τὸν εἰδότα τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν φρόνιμον εἶναι, τὸν
dὲ πολιτικὸν οὐ φρόνιμον ἀλλὰ πολυπράγμων. So much is made of the
specific difference between φρόνησις περὶ αὐτῶν and πολιτική, that the
latter is cast out of the genus, which the former is allowed to
monopolise.\footnote{For examples of the general tendency illustrated by the extrusion of πολιτική
from its genus, see Mill's Logic, iv. 5, especially § 4.}

But the truth is, as the writer is about to show,
that φρ. περὶ αὐτῶν and πολιτική are closely connected. A man
cannot secure ‘his own’ interests ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδὲ ἄνευ πολιτείας
(§ 4). If (§ 5) ‘one’s own’ interests could be abstracted from
the concrete tissue of social well-being, and treated simply by themselves,
boys, who can deal with simple abstractions, might be expected to
be φρόνιμοι. As a matter of fact they are not φρόνιμοι, because the
‘good’ with which even the most self-regarding
φρόνησις is concerned, is concretely implicated with the
‘common good,’ which
only a man of ripe experience can estimate.

οὐ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμωνες] Zell and Grant quote Plato a. 2.
Ref. 433 A τὸ τὰ αὐτὸν πρᾶτευν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν, and Gorg.
526 C φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτὸν πράξατο καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος: cf.
Isoc. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως 319 τοὺς μὲν διὰ πολυπραγμοσύνην ἐμπείρους
τῶν ἀγῶνων γεγενημένους.

Εὖριπίδης] From the Philoctetes of Euripides: see Dindorf, Poel.
Scen. p. 352. The third line of the present quotation seems to
have been in full—

Ἰσον μεταιχεῖν τῷ συφωτάτῳ τύχῃ;

After this line there seems to have followed a passage (paraphrased by Dio Chr. Or. 59. p. 575) which ended with the lines—

οἴδεν γὰρ οὕτω γαῖρον ἡ ἄνηρ ἔφυ·

τοὺς γὰρ περισσοῦς καὶ τοῖς πράσσοντας πλέον

τιμῶμεν ἄνδρας τ᾽ ἐν πολέμει νομίζομεν.

After πλέον in our text 1142 a. 6 the Paraph. Heliodorus seems
to have read Ζεῦς μυσεῖ, and CCC adds οὐκ ἔστω φρονίμους.

§ητοῦσα] sc. those oie δοκεῖ ὅ περὶ αὐτῶν εἰδάτε καὶ διατρίβουν φρόνιμος εἶναι, a. 7.

\footnote{γαῖρος = αὐθάδης, σεμώνς, μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἢ μετέωρος—Hesych.}
BOOK VI: CHAP. 8: §§ 4, 5.

1142 a. 9. кαίτοι ἰσως οὐκ έστι το αὐτοῦ εὖ εἶναι οἰκονομίας οὔδε ἄνευ πολιτείας)

It is impossible to secure one's own good, without taking account of the good of the household and even of the State. The Paraph. has a good note here in which he shows how the next sentence ἐτεί δὲ κ.τ.λ. and the σημείων § 5 are connected with this remark—καίτοι οὐ δινατον ἰσως την ἔθικην εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς, οὔτε την οἰκονομικῆ ἄνευ τῆς πολιτικῆς; οὐ γάρ δινατῶν εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὰ καθ’ ἕαυτόν τινα διαθείναι, τῆς οἰκίας αὐτοῦ, ἡ τῆς πόλεως οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν. 

χαλεπῶν γὰρ μὴ διαφεράμενα τινά μετὰ πολλῶν φαίλων διατίρμητα έτεί δὲ μετὰ μηδενός διατίρμης, ἀλλὰ βίου έχει μονώτη, πῶς εἴστει το ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθόν; ἄδηλον γὰρ, καὶ χρεία διδασκάλια πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ σκέψεως. ταῦτα δὲ αὐτῶν ἀνευ ἐμπειρίας γενέσθαι ή δὲ ἐμπειρία τῶν ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ὅτι έστι, καὶ οἰκίας καὶ πόλεως, καὶ ἀνευ τούτων οὐκ έτει ἐμπειρίον οὔδε φρόνιμον εἶναι.

Similarly Eustrat., who formally distinguishes two reasons why οὐκ έστι το αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὔδε ἄνευ πολιτείας—(1) Μαν is a social being. Family and public life is part of the concrete life of the individual: (2) the deliberation necessary to secure το αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν cannot be carried on without κοινωνίᾳ. This is how he explains 1142 a. 10 έτεί δὲ τα αὐτοῦ πώς δει διοικεῖ, ἄδηλον καὶ σκέπτεσθαι. He says—τη δὲ σκέψει δει κοινωνίᾳ, έτει κοινωνίᾳ ή οἰκονομικὴ ή πολιτική.

This interpretation of σκέπτεσθαι 1142 a. 10, by which it is made to refer to the σκέψεις of the φρόνιμος, is, I daresay, possible; but it would be more in accordance with Aristotelian usage to make it refer to the σκέψεις of the writer and his reader. The sentence έτεί δὲ . . . σκέπτεσθαι is one which it is indeed difficult to explain satisfactorily in its context. At any rate, however, we may suppose that the οὐκ ἄδηλον of § 6, 1142 a. 20 is intended to contrast with the ἄδηλον of § 4, 1142 a. 10.

a. 11. § 5. σημείων κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (Forsch. p. 45), as was pointed out in note on ch. 7. § 7, b. 21, regards the passage beginning ch. 7. § 7. 1141 b. 21 ή δε φρόνησις πρακτική, and ending here 1142 a. 11 with σκέπτεσθαι, as an interpolation, and takes the σημείων closely with the remarks in ch. 7. § 7 which end with ποιήσει μᾶλλον 1141 b. 21. It is true that the σημείων would follow these remarks very appositely. But does it not follow καίτοι ίσως οὐκ έστι το αὐτοῦ εὖ άνευ οἰκονομίας οὔδε άνευ πολιτείας appositely enough? Το εἰρήμενον is οὐκ έστι το αὐτοῦ εὖ άνευ οἰκονομίας οὔδε άνευ πολιτείας—φρόνησις περί αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑνα

1 Cambr. seems to be the only MS. which agrees with Kb in reading εὖ.

2 Moral science conceived as the science of the individual's good.
requires that wide experience which can be obtained only in 

The fact that boys are not φρόνησις, although μαθηματικοὶ, points to the truth of this statement; for if we enquire why they are not φρόνησις, we find that it is because φρόνησις needs long experience of life, and if we enquire why they are μαθηματικοὶ, we find that it is because the abstract truths of mathematics do not need 'long experience of life' for their apprehension, but are plain at first sight. If τὸ αὐτὸν ἁγαθὸν were something which could subsist by itself in abstraction from τὸ κοινὸν ἁγαθὸν (as the δόξα stated and examined in § 4 would have us believe), boys might be equal to its comprehension, as they are equal to the comprehension of the abstract truths of mathematics: but they are not equal to the comprehension of τὸ αὐτὸν ἁγαθὸν: so it would seem to follow that this ἁγαθὸν does not subsist by itself in abstraction from τὸ κοινὸν ἁγαθὸν, but that to comprehend it one must be able (which boys are not) to take account of the good of the household and of the State.

διότι = δὴ: see Index Arist. s. v. διότι: but perhaps we ought a. 12. to read δὴ here, treating δὲ as a dittograph of the preceding αὐ: see Index Arist.—'interdum literas δὲ in v. διότι inde videri ortas esse, quod praecedit vocabulum terminans in αὐ, praecipue καὶ, Vahlen monet Rhet. p. 58—' then follow several references to places where διότι = δὴ is preceded by καὶ.


§ 6. ἔτει] In § 5 the question was—'Why is a boy μαθηματικὸς a. 18. but not φρόνησις?' and the answer was—'because φρόνησις needs experience, and he has no experience.' Section 6 proceeds—'and this is the true answer, because (ἔτει) it assigns his lack of φρόνησις to a cause which accounts also for his not having a grasp of the principles of philosophy or of natural science.' Render—'For if we go on to ask why a boy may be a mathematician, but cannot understand philosophy or natural science, we find that it is because the truths of mathematics are abstract, whereas the principles of philosophy and natural science are reached through long experience. A boy does not realise the meaning of the principles of
philosophy and natural science, but merely repeats by rote the formulae used to express them; the truths of mathematics, on the other hand, he comprehends fully, for they are plain at first sight.'

a. 17. σοφός] i.e. σοφός ἀπλῶς as distinguished from σοφὸς τὰ τοιούτα above, line a. 13.

a. 18. δι' ἀφαιρέσεως] τὰ δὲ or εἴτε ἀφαιρέσεως, 'results or products of abstraction,' are regularly used as = 'the truths of mathematics': see notes on i. 3. 1 and i. 3. 5: cf. Trendelenburg's note on de An. iii. 4. 8 (cf. also his Elem. Log. § 36, note), where it is pointed out that the first meaning of ἀφαιρέσεως is material—e.g. it is the process of chipping away the block of stone till the perfect form of the statue is reached in Phys. i. 7. 190 b. 7 τὰ δὲ ἀφαιρέσει οἴνων ἐκ τοῦ λίθου ὦ Ἐρμής. It is then applied to the process of reaching εἴθη or concepts by leaving out of account the particularities of individuals, and fixing attention upon essential characteristics: and especially to the process of reaching those εἴθη with which mathematical science (see An. Post. i. 13. 79 a. 7) is concerned. Eustratius has the following note on τὰ δὲ ἀφαιρέσεως here —χωρὶς τῶν ὑποκειμένων κατ' ἐνέργειαν ύφιστασθαι μὴ δυνάμενα, ἀφαιροῦνται δὲ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐν ὅσι ύφεστήκασι, καὶ ὡς ἐν φαντασίᾳ ύφεστηκότα περὶ τῆς διανοίας τὴν εξήγησιν δέχονται περὶ τῶν ἐπιστημόνων αὐτῶν.

Opposed to εἴτε ἀφαιρέσεως 'abstract' is εἰκ προσβέσεως 'concrete': see Mel. A. 2. 982 a. 27 and An. Post. i. 27. 87 a. 31, where geometry is said to be 'more concrete' than arithmetic, and therefore less exact—καὶ εἴτε διαπαθών ἀκριβεστέρα τῆς εἰκ προσβέσεως, οἷον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητικής λέγω δὲ εἰκ προσβέσεως, οἷον μονάς οὐσία ἰδέως στεγή δὲ οὐσία θετῶν ταύτην εἰκ προσβέσεως. Geometry is εἰκ προσβέσεως as compared with arithmetic, because it adds position: it adds also the three dimensions as generated by the motion of the point, line, and plane respectively: see Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 83, 84.

It is not to be understood from the words τὰ μὲν δὲ ἀφαιρέσεως ἐστὶν, τῶν δὲ αὐτὶ ἀρχαὶ εἴτε ἐμπειρίας that ἀφαιρέσεις and ἐμπειρία are mutually exclusive. The ἀρχαὶ of natural science are εἰκ ἐμπειρίας, inasmuch as they are general points of view, not particular observations; see An. Post. ii. 19. 100 a. 6 ἐκ δὲ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἁρμηνευτός τῶν καθόλου ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ τῳ ἔνδο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἐν ἀπασίᾳ ἐν ἕνῃ ἐκείνῃ τὸ αὐτὸ τέχνης ἀρχή καὶ ἐπιστήμης: and it is by induction
that even εάν αφαιρέσεως par excellence—the truths of mathematics, are said to become known in An. Post. i. 18. 81 b. 2 ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δὲ ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ εάν αφαιρέσεως λέγομεν ἦσται δὲ ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν—on which see Waitz’s note.

καὶ τὰ μέν] The ἀρχαί of philosophy or natural science, τῶν δὲ α. 19. being τὰ διὰ ἀφαιρέσεως.

οὐ πιστεύοντων] ‘do not realise’: see Index Arist.—πιστεύεις omnino firmitatem persuasionis significat, sive ea δόξης sive ἐπιστήμης vim ac naturam habet sive ad cognitionem principiorum pertinent—see de An. iii. 3. 428 b. 4, 428 a. 21, E. N. vii. 3. 4, An. Prior. ii. 23. 68 b. 13 ἀπάντα πιστεύομεν ἣ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἥ εάν ἐπαγωγῆς.

ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν] Grant compares E. N. vii. 3. 8 οἱ πρῶτοι μαθώντες α. 20. συνειρρυθοῦσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἵστασι δ’ οὖσα.

τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον] i. e. the definitions, ὅρμοι (θέσεις οὐκ ἐστίν τί An. Post. ii. 10. 94 a. 10), from which the mathematician starts, are plain and easily understood at first sight: as Eustratius says—τί ἐστι στημή, τί ἐστι γραμμή, τί ἐστιν ἐπιφάνεια, τί σώμα, τί κύκλος, τί τρίγωνον, καὶ τῶν σχημάτων ἐκατόν, καὶ ὃσα ἔτερα ὀριστικῶς λαμβάνει ὁ γεωμέτρης . . . οὐδαί διὰ τὸ μὴ πωλοῦ δεῖσθαι χρόνον πρὸς τὸ καὶ τῶν ὁρῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιστασθαι. Ὡν ὀρμοίς καὶ τὴν relation to ἁπάντες see e. g. An. Post. ii. 3. 90 b. 30 ὅρμος μὲν γὰρ τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ οὐσίας· αἱ δ’ ἀποδείξεις φαίνονται πάσαι ὑποτεθέντες καὶ λαμβάνονται τὸ τί ἐστιν οἷον ἅμα μαθηματικὰ τί μοῦσα καὶ τί τὸ περιττῶν, καὶ αἱ ἀλλὰ ὁμοιῶς.

§ 7. ἢτι κ.τ.λ.] This seems to be another argument (after the digression in §§ 5, 6) to prove that οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτόν εἴ οὐκ ὁμοιότητι. So Eustr.—τούτῳ πρὸς τὰ ἀνωτέρα ἐστίν ὅτι δεῖ τῇ εἰδήσει τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γνώσεως . . . ὁ γὰρ βουλευσάμενος ἡ ἡμαρτ. . . ἡ ἡμαρτ. . . ἣν τῷ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τῷ καθέκαστα. ὡστε ἀμφοῦ δεῖ τῶν φρόνιμον ἐχεῖν . . . καθόλου δὲ ἀγαθοῦ λέγει καὶ καθέκαστον, τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἴδικὸν· ἢστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἴδικὸν τοῦ ἴδιον φρόνιμου, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν τοῦ ὁικονομικοῦ, ὡστε δεῖ τὸ ἴδιος φρονίμωρ τοῦ ὁικονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ. Cf. the Paraph.—Ἐκ, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀμαρτία ἡ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀπὸ ἁγνοίας συμβαίνει, ἡ τῆς καθόλου, ἡ τῆς μερικῆς (καὶ γὰρ ὃ ἁγνοῦν καθόλου, ὃν τὰ ἀλήσθημα ὑδάτα φαιλα, καὶ ὁ τούτω μὲν ἴδιος, ἁγνοῦν δὲ μερικῶς, ὃν τὰ τὰ ὑδάτα βαρύσταθμα, ὁμοίως ἀμαρτήσεται· χρήσεται
BOOK VI: CHAP. 8: §§ 7–9.

1142 a. 20. γὰρ ἐκάτερος τοῖς φαίλοις ὑδατι, φανερὸν ὅτι πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἁμαρτεῖν, ἀναγκαῖον μὴ μόνων εἴδειν, ὅτι τάδε τὰ ὑδατα βαρύσταθμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι τὰ βαρύσταθμα φαύλα: δεῖται ἄρα ἡ μερική φρόνησις τῆς καθόλου φρονήσεως τῆς πολιτικῆς, καὶ ἀδύνατον τὴν ἥδικὴν ἀνευ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνήθη, ὀσπερ καὶ τὴν μερικήν γράσαι ἀνεύ τῆς καθόλου μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν ἀδύνατον. It would thus appear that in the present § we have a parallel adduced from medical science to illustrate the interdependence of a knowledge of what is good for others and a knowledge of what is good for oneself. The universal πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὑδατα φαύλα is parallel to the knowledge of the social good; the particular, τὸ βαρύσταθμον, to the knowledge of one’s own good. As the conclusions of ιατρική demand the knowledge of both a major and a minor, so do those of φρόνησις—even when it seems to be concerned merely with ‘one’s own’ good.

Zell refers to Probl. 933 b. 28, where it is stated that τὸ μὲν ἀλμυρὸν βαρύ, τὸ δὲ γλυκὸ κούφων. The adjective βαρύσταθμον appears to occur only here in the Aristotelian Corpus. Susemihl brackets this §.

a. 23. § 8. οὕτως ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη. φανερὸν τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὡσπερ εἴρηται] Cf. Met. K. 1. 1059 b. 26 πάντα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων. For this sense of ἐσχάτος (= ultimate individual) see above, note on vi. 8. 2 b. 28. The expression τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν ἡ φρόνησις has not actually occurred before, but, as Ramsauer notes, the equivalence of τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν καὶ τὸ ἐσχάτον is assumed.

a. 25. § 9. μά] ἦ γὰρ τὸ θεωρητικὸν νῷ as distinguished below in vi. 11. 4 from the πρακτικὸν νῶς, which is τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως.


a. 27. ἐπιστήμη] ἦ γὰρ τὸν ιδίων, ἀλλ’ οἶκα ἀισθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ [ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς] ἐσχάτον τρίγωνον] We have here the Aristotelian distinction between the ἴδια άισθήτα (propria sensibilia of the Schoolmen) and the κοινά άισθήτα (communia sensibilia), as explained in de An. ii. 6. 418 a. 7 Δεκτέων δὲ καθ’ ἐκάστην αἰσθήσεως περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρώτων. Λέγεται δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τριχώς, ὥν δύο μὲν καθ’ αὐτά φαμεν αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἐν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τῶν δὲ δύο τὸ μὲν ἴδιον ἐστίν ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πασῶν. Λέγω δ’ ἴδιον μὲν ὁ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρα αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὁ μὴ ἐνδέχεται
BOOK VI: CHAP. 8: § 9.

We must note the admission, made at the end of the passage quoted from de An. ii. 6 that the κατὰ αἰσθητὰ are after all not ἀναρματικά in the strict sense (κυρίως). In de An. iii. 1. 425 b. 5 they are called the common concomitants (tà ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ κατὰ) of the ἰδα αἰσθητά, and must be regarded as really intelligibilia formally present in the propria sensibilia. As such, they differ from the κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητὰ of de An. ii. 6. 418 a. 20, which are merely empirically inferred proper sensibles: e.g. when one infers the bitterness of the yellow bile which one sees, the bitterness is κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητῶν (de An. iii. 1. 425 b. 1). The eye, as such, is not affected by it. The κατὰ αἰσθητὰ are described by Hamilton (Reid, p. 830) as 'concomitant cognitions to which the impression on the organ of the proper sensible only affords the occasion'; —and Grant says — 'We see in the apprehension of number, figure, and the like, not an operation of sense, but the mind putting its own forms and categories, i.e. itself, on the external object.' In de An. iii. 1. 425 a. 13 the five common sensibles enumerated in de An. ii. 6 are reduced to one—κίνησις:—ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κατὰ ὁμοίως ὁμοίως τὶ ἕνει κινήσεως τὶ ἕνει, ἐκ ἀκάτω κινήσεως κινήσεως (οὐ) κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, οὐ τῆς κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήματος, μέγεθος, ἀρμοδίως ἕνος: ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα κινήσεις κινήσεως, οἷον μέγεθος κινήσεως, ὅστε καὶ σχήμα μέγεθος γὰρ τῷ τὸ σχήματι τῷ δὲ ἥμερων τῷ μὴ κι-

1 The οὐ is Torstrik's conjecture. The κατὰ αἰσθητὰ are not to be confounded with τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητὰ of de An. ii. 6. 418 a. 20. The κατὰ αἰσθητὰ are not empirically inferred from the ιδα αἰσθητὰ, but are formally present in them: see de An. iii. 1. 424 a. 27 τῶν δὲ κατὰ ἔνει ἔχων αἰσθητῶν κωπήν οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς.

2 We have not really a sixth common sensible added here to the five given in ii. 6, for ἔνει is included in ἀρμοδίῳ.
1142 a. 27. νείσθαι· ὅ δ’ ἀριθμὸς τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς, καὶ τοῖς ἱδίοις· ἐκάστῃ γὰρ ἐν αἰσθήματι αἰσθήσει. ἦστε δὴ δὴ ὅτι ἀδύνατον ὅτου οὖν ἱδίαν αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τούτων, διὸν κυνήσεως· οὕτω γὰρ ἦστα τὰ ὅψει τὸ γλυκὸν αἰσθη-νόμεθα. τούτο δ’ ὅτι ἄρχον ἔχοντες τυχάνομεν αἰσθήσεων, ἥ καὶ οὕτω συμ-πέσωσιν ἀμα γνωρίζομεν. On this reduction of the κοινὰ αἰσθήτα το κίνησις Hamilton (Reid, p. 829 note *) has the following remarks—

Many modern philosophers when they attempted to explain the origin of our notion of extension from motion, and, in particular, the motion of the hand, were not aware that they had the Stagirite at their head. It is to be remembered, however, that Aristotle does not attempt, like them, to explain by motion our necessary concept of space, but merely our contingent perception of the relative extension of this or that particular object. This, however, takes it for granted, that by motion (κίνησις) Aristotle intends local motion. But motion is with him a generic term, comprising under it four, or six, species; and in point of fact, by motion Aristotle may here (de An. iii. i), as in many, if not most, other places of his psychological writings, mean a subjective mutation (ἀλλοίωσις) or modification of the percipient. This too is the interpretation given to the passage by the great majority, if not the whole, of the ancient expositors . . . . It is therefore remarkable that Dr. Trendelenburg, in his late valuable edition of the De Anima, should have apparently contemplated the interpretation by local motion, as the only one proposed, or possible. See also Trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen, vol. i. chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, in which the intuition of motion is described as fundamental in sensation and thought—


The κοινὰ αἰσθήτα, as distinguished from the ἱδία αἰσθήτα, are to be assigned directly to the so-called κοινὰ or κύριον αἰσθητήριον or κοινῇ αἰσθήσεως, as faculty: (see de Mem. i. 450 a. 9). But ultimately the ἱδία αἰσθήτα also are to be referred to it. ‘Common sense—κοινῇ αἰσθήσεως,’ says Hamilton (Reid, p. 756), ‘was employed by Aristotle to denote the faculty in which the various reports of the several senses are reduced to the unity of a common apperception’: see περὶ ὑπνου καὶ ἐγκρανόρσεως 2. 455 a. 12 ἐπεὶ δ’ ὑπάρχει καθ’ ἐκάστην αἰσθήσειν τὸ μὲν τι ἱδίον τὸ δὲ τι κοινόν, ἱδίον μὲν οὖν τῇ ὑψεῖ τὸ ὀρᾶν, τῇ δ’ ἀκοῆ τὸ ἀκοής, ταῖς δ’ ἀλλαξ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον’ ἐστι δὲ τις καὶ

1 Kant would say—intuition, not concept.
 kube νύμμες ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, ὅ καὶ οἱ ὄρα καὶ ἀκούει καὶ αἰσθάνεται. 1142 a. 27.

οὐ γὰρ ὃς τῇ γε δῆς ὄρα ὃς ὄρα. καὶ κρίνει δῆ καὶ δύνασαι κρίνειν ὅτι ἄτερα τὰ γλυκεῖα τῶν λευκῶν, ὥστε γεύσει ὅστε δῆς ὁυί ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλὰ τινὶ κωβφ μορίῳ τῶν αἰσθητήριων ἄπαντων. ἐστὶν μὲν γὰρ μία αἰσθήσει, καὶ τὸ κύριον αἰσθήτηριον ἐν τῇ δ’ εἶναι αἰσθῆσθαι τοῦ γένους ἐκάστου ἄτερον, ὅπων ψάφων καὶ χρώματος. τούτῳ δ’ ἀμα τῷ ἀπτικῷ μάλιστ’ ὑπάρχει τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ χωρίζεται τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητήριων, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα τούτῳ ἀχώριστα.

Kouv αἰσθήσεις is thus the ‘consciousness’ of sensations—the reference of them to a self-conscious subject, this subject being embodied in a actually sensitive organism governed, in the case of τὰ ἐναίμα, by a heart—de Somno, ch. 3. 456 a. 4 πάντα τὰ ἐναίμα καρδίαν ἔχει, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κυρίας ἐνείβεν ἐστιν. Κουβ αἰσθήσεις is the ultimate ‘faculty’ of all sensation—i.e. τὰ κοινα αἰσθητά (magnitude, figure, &c.) are indeed to be referred to it, but so are ultimately the ἱδα αἰσθήτα also. It is the living being, one and indivisible, conscious of the various ἱδα αἰσθητά in the forms or categories of μέγεθος, σχῆμα, στάσις, ἀρθρόσ, κίνησις. But the living being is essentially ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ αἰσθήσεως (de Somno 4. 456 a. 5), and the categories in which it is conscious of αἰσθητά may be reduced to one—viz. κίνησις. Since, however, ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστι καὶ μία (de An. iii. 2. 425 b. 25)—since in actual experience subject and object are one, this ultimate category of the mind is also ultimate in things: ‘die Bewegung ist die erste Thatigkeit des Denkens und des Seins.’

On the general subject of the ἱδα and κοινα αἰσθήτα, see Hamilton’s Reid, note D on Primary and Secondary Qualities of Body, especially pp. 828–830 (Hamilton regards the Aristotelian distinction as analogous to that between Primary and Secondary Qualities): see also Trendelenburg, de Anima, notes on passages quoted above, and Edwin Wallace, Psychology of Aristotle, Introduction § ix, and notes on passages quoted above: see also Grant’s useful note ad loc.

οἷα] ‘like that by which we perceive.’ The nature of the per- a. 28. ception involved in φθόνος is merely illustrated by means of the mathematician’s perception of the common sensible σχῆμα. The ἐχθατον, or particular, which the mathematician, as such, perceives is the particular shape (triangular, quadrilateral, circular) of the figure before him; and shape is not the datum of a single sense
as colour, e.g., is, but is given in the perceptions of more than one sense. I thus take τριγώνων to be merely an example of the common sensible σχήμα (κύκλος would have done equally well), and dismiss as untenable the view of Michelet and other commentators, that what the mathematician is here said to perceive is that 'what is ultimate or simplest in geometry is the triangle'—i.e. that all figures may be broken up into triangles. But surely, if the writer had been thinking of 'that which is ultimate in geometry,' he would not have mentioned a figure at all, but στιγμή.

Φρόνησις then is concerned with ἔσχάτα—particulars, which it perceives, as αἰσθησις perceives its ἔσχατα, immediately: but the ἔσχάτα of φρόνησις are not like the ἰδα αἰσθητα perceived by the special senses,—'this is red, this is sweet,'—but rather, they are like the perceptions of the geometer—'this shape before me is triangular, or circular.' As a coloured object seen, or a resisting object touched, is the occasion for the geometry of the perception of σχήμα by his κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον, so in the φρόνησις the various feelings and circumstances which make up τὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεισ are responded to by an activity of the moral reason which imposes on the ὑπη presented to it its own form of Duty. As the geometer solves his problem by perceiving shapes in the data of eye (or touch), and recognising this construction, or manipulation of shapes, as better fitted for the solution of a given problem than that other construction, so the φρόνησις solves the problem of τὸ ἐν ζῷ ἀναπληρվει, not as things pleasant or painful to sense here and now, but as things which are good or bad—i.e. fitted, or not fitted, to have a permanent place in the general plan of life: ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἢ αἰσθησις, ἢ αἰσθησις, ἀντιλαμβάνοντα ὁχι οὐ τε οὐδὲ κακὸν, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦ τέρπους ἢ ἀνιώκτος. τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν τὸ νῦν μόνον κρίνειν ἔστι: Themistius, vol. ii. p. 211, ed. Spengel.

Although I believe that the first meaning of τὸ [ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς] ἔσχατον in the writer's mind was the geometer's particular—this particular shape, e.g. triangle, he could not fail to be conscious of the other meaning of ἔσχατον, as the last step in ζήτησις: see E. N.

1 ἐν τοῖς μαθ. bracketed by Bywater. The words may very well have been inserted by a scribe in the interest of the interpretation adopted by Michelet referred to above: in his Contributions (p. 51), however, Bywater remarks that 'it is quite possible that ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς is only out of place, and that it came in originally after αἰσθανόμεθα.'
Indeed the words with which vi. 9 begins—τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ κ.τ.λ. (I see no reason for assuming, with Rassow, Forsch, p. 46, and Susemihl, that there is a lacuna between ch. 8 and ch. 9) make it pretty certain that, as a matter of fact, the term ἔσχατον did suggest ζήτησις to his mind. We may then follow up this suggestion, and say that the φρόνιμος, like the γεωμέτρης, ζητεῖ—follows out a train of thought (φαντασία λογιστική in his case, φαντ. αἰσθητική in the case of the γεωμέτρης: see Trendelenburg, Historische Beiträge zur Phil. vol. ii. pp. 381, 382, de An. iii. 10. 433 b. 29) till he reaches an ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύει—something which he finds will serve his purpose, and beyond which he does not care to go. This ἔσχατον is a particular reached at last, and recognised as a means now to be taken for the attainment of the end in view. Thus the γεωμέτρης reaches a point at which the further διάρεισις of his διάγραμμα (see Met. Θ. 9. 1051 a. 21. sqq. and note on E. N. iii. 3. 11 b. 20 ἀναλύειν . . . διάγραμμα for the difference between ἀνάλυσις and διάρεισις) may cease, when, as in Eucl. El. i. 47, he has got certain τρίγωνα, by means of which he can show that the square described upon the side subtending the right angle is equal to the squares described upon the sides which contain the right angle. The φρόνιμος likewise reaches a point at which he must say—Here at last I must stop thinking, and begin to act. This is the right thing to do: it is unpleasant, perhaps; but it is right. I must do it.’

κάκει] ‘for on that side too we shall reach a point beyond which a. 29. we cannot go.’ We cannot go beyond the πρῶτον ὄροι on the one side, or the καθ’ ἐκαστα or ἔσχατα on the other side.

ἀλλ’ αὐτὴ μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἡ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ’ ἀλλο εἴδος] ‘But this latter sense (i.e. the καθ’ αἴσθησις operative in mathematics) is sense rather than prudence, though specifically different from the other sense (i.e. ἡ τῶν ἱδίων): so Coraes—αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ διάλειψις τῶν μερικῶν, οἰν ἐφρήκε συμβαίνειν ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς, αἴσθησις ἀν μᾶλλον λέγοιτο ἡ φρόνησις. In other words, the sense operative in mathematical ζήτησις, though specifically distinct from the special senses, is not to be identified with prudence or the deliberating faculty. It is only analogous to prudence. For ἡ some MSS. and editors read ἡ—in which case the distinction is between ἡ φρόνησις ἡ καθ’ ἐκαστα (which is then said to resemble the mathematician’s
BOOK VI: CHAP. 9.

1142 a. 29. ἅρπτετον ἕτοιμαι (which cannot be classed as a kind of ἁρπτετον). I prefer the ἐ reading; but anyhow the clause is awkward and unnecessary.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

Deliberating, or taking counsel, is a species of seeking.

What is good counsel? Is it scientific knowledge, or opinion, or happy guessing?¹

It cannot be scientific knowledge, for he who knows does not seek, and taking good counsel, or deliberating well, is a form of deliberation, i.e. of seeking.

It cannot be happy guessing, for one makes a happy guess all at once without thinking, whereas deliberation takes time. Nor is it sagacity, which is a kind of happy guessing.

Again, it cannot be opinion of any kind.

Since deliberating well is deliberating 'correctly,' it will be 'correctness' of some kind—not correctness of scientific knowledge, however, for 'correct' is used only where 'incorrect' is possible, and scientific knowledge is never 'incorrect'; nor of opinion, for correctness of opinion is truth—something definite and settled (indeed, an opinion as such, whether true or false, is always something definite and settled), whereas the man who deliberates (whether correctly or incorrectly) has not yet reached anything definite and settled, but is still seeking and thinking. It remains, then, that deliberating well is a correct process of thinking conceived as still going on, not a correct result of thinking conceived as definitely affirmed.

But when we speak of deliberation as 'correct,' we must be careful to note that it is not enough that it should be 'correct' as regards any single one of the three elements—end, means, and length of time taken—which are distinguished in deliberation: it must be 'correct' as regards all three, e.g. he does not deliberate well, or 'correctly,' who attains to a good end by bad means; or who even attains to a good end by good means, but takes an unusually long time in his deliberation, and so runs the risk of missing the opportunity of action.

There are of course many ends in relation to which we say of a man, 'he deliberates well,' specifying in each case the end; but when a man 'deliberates well or correctly' in relation to the end par excellence—the chief end of man—we say without any qualification, 'he deliberates well or correctly,'—'he is a man of good counsel.' Good counsel then, in the strict sense, will be the characteristic quality of the prudent man—the man who has a true conception of the chief end and employs the means which subserve it.

This chapter, as Grant explains, commences the examination of a set of faculties (ἐξουσία, ἐστοχία, ἀγιόνω, σύνεσις, and γνώμη) cognate to φρόνημα, or forming part of it.

¹ I owe this rendering of ἐστοχία to Peters.
§ 1. *peri eubouliaias.*] 'It is an abrupt, awkward commencement 1142 a. 32. of the chapter to say, "enquiring and deliberating are different, for deliberating is a species of enquiring." But what is meant apparently is, to bring "good counsel" under the head of enquiring, which separates it at once from both science and opinion.'—Grant. This seems to me to be the correct view of the place of the clause; and I cannot agree with Rassow (Forsch. p. 46), who says—'das Capitel das über die euboulia handelt, beginnt mit einem Satz der völlig zusammenhanglos dasteht: τὸ ξητέων δὲ καὶ τὸ θολεύοντα διαφέρει τὸ γὰρ θελεύοντα ξητέων τι ἔστιν.' The Paraphrast brings out the connexion, recognised by Grant, as follows—καὶ πρώτον περὶ eubouliaiae οἶκειος γὰρ ἔχει μάλατα τῇ φρονήσει, ἵνα τὸν λόγον ἀρτίως ἀπηλλάξαμεν ὡστε τὸν περὶ eubouliaia λόγον τῷ περὶ τῆς φρονήσεως συναπτόν. πρῶτον μὲν οὐν οὐκ ἔστι ξητήσεις· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ ἐστὶν η ξητήσεις τῆς eubouliaias· οὐ μόνον γὰρ οἱ θολεύοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς βουλεύομενοι ξητεῖ· καὶ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαία ξητοῦνται· περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ ἐπιστήμῃς οὖν, εἰ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔχει δύο ὀρθά, ξητεῖται πρὸς τῆς ἐπιστήμης, καὶ εἰ ἡ σειρὴ σφαιροειδῆς ἐστὶ· διὰ τούτο ἡ euboulia oὐκ ἔστων ταύτων τῇ ξητήσεις· ἐτι δὲ, οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμῃς ἔστιν ἡ euboulia· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμων oὐξ ἔπειτα, οὐ δὲ euboulia ξητεῖ· ἡ γὰρ euboulia βουλή τις ἐστίν· ή δὲ βουλή ξητήσεις ἐστὶν τοῖς τι δεὶ πράτεσιν· καὶ οἱ βουλεύομενοι ξητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται περὶ τῶν πράξεων, ὡστε εὗ καὶ καλῶς γένονται· ὡστε η μὲν euboulia ξητήσεις, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμῃς οὐ τοιαύτῃ ἡ euboulia ἀρὰ oὐκ ἔστων ἐπιστήμῃς. The writer of the *M. M.* thus describes the relation of euboulia to φρόνησις ii. 3. 1199 a. 4—ἡ δὲ γε euboulia ἐστι μὲν περὶ ταύτα τῇ φρονήσει (περὶ γὰρ τὰ πρακτὰ ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγῆν ὄντα), ἐστιν δὲ οὐκ ἀνευ φρόνησεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ τούτων ἐστὶ, ἡ δὲ euboulia ἐξει δὶς ἔδαρεσι· τι τοιοῦτον ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς βελτίστων καὶ συμφορωτάτων.

§ 2. *ἀνευ τε γάρ λόγου*] does not involve a process of reasoning. b. 2.

§ 3. *ἀγχίνεια.* The editors refer to An. Post. i. 34. 89 b. 10 for b. 5. the definition of ἀγχίνεια as εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέτηρ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου. It is the faculty of guessing at once the 'middle term,' or cause, which explains a phenomenon; and thus answers to Locke's sagacity (Essay, iv. 2. 3 'a quickness of the mind to find out these intermediate ideas that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other, and to apply them right'), or to what is now called the 'Scientific Imagination.'
After this assertion we expect a clause giving the reason for it; but instead we have a clause which goes off with ἀλλὰ. It is not till we come to the words 1142 b. 13 καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα . . . λογίζεται that we get the reason for the assertion οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα . . . οὐδεμία. The run of the passage would be greatly improved if we could adopt Zwinger’s rearrangement (for which see Zell’s note and Suseniolh’s Appar. Crit., ad loc.) so far as to insert 1142 b. 13 καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα . . . λογίζεται after οὐδεμία 1142 b. 7. The sentence 1142 b. 7 ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακός . . . b. 12 πᾶν οὐ δόξα ἐστὶν would then come in without awkwardness. As for the words 1142 b. 12 ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . ὁπω ἕνως, they are rejected by several critics. Their inconsistency with 1142 b. 16 ἀλλ’ ὁρθότης τὸς ἐστὶν ἡ εὐθυλία βοωλῆς is insisted on by Rassow (Forsch. p. 46)—‘Aeltere Erklärer, wie Giphanius und Zwinger, nehmen Anstoss an den von mir eingeklammerten Worten (i.e. 1142 b. 12 ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . ὁπω ἕνως), die neueren halten es für hinreichend, zu διανοια ἁρα λειτεται die Worte ὁρθότης αὐτῆν εἶναι zu ergänzen. Allerdings handelt es sich um die Frage: τίνος ὁρθότης ἡ εὐθυλία; aber wenn auf diese bereits mit λειτεται κ.τ.λ. die letzte Antwort gegeben wird, wie passen dann die Worte ἀλλ’ ὁρθότης τὸς ἐστὶν ἡ εὐθυλία βοωλῆς, in denen doch ersichtlich erst das Endresultat der Untersuchung angegeben werden soll? Durch Umstellung ist, wie ich glaube, hier nicht zu helfen.’

b. 8. ὁ δὲ εὖ ὁρθὸς βουλεύεται] i.e. εὖ ὁρθός, therefore εὐθυλία is ὁρθότης τις.

b. 10. ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία) as Eustrat. explains—ἐπιστήμη is itself ὁρθότης, and there is no ὁρθότης ὁρθότητος. The infallibility of ἐπιστήμη, as such, has already been asserted in ch. 3. § 1 and ch. 6. § 2.

b. 11. δόξης δὲ ὁρθότης ἀλήθεια] Of course ἐπιστήμη, although it has properly no ὁρθότης, has its ἀλήθεια. It is one of the faculties οὐ ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδομέθα, ch. 6. § 2.

ἀμα δὲ καὶ ὁρισται ἢ ἂν πᾶν οὐ δόξα ἐστὶν] ‘the object of opinion is, as such, always something definite’: δόξα has already adopted a definite view: βουλή is a process which has not yet led to the adoption of anything definite. As the Paraph. puts it—ἢ μὲν εὐθυλία ζητεῖν ἐστὶν, ἢ δὲ δόξα εὐρηκεῖαι.

b. 12. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖθ’ . . . οὖπω φάσις] If this sentence be retained (and
I think that Rassow and Susemihl go too far when they bracket it, 1142 b. 12. after Giphanius), we ought to take the first clause very closely with what immediately precedes—'The object of δέκα is always a definite result already reached; but εἶβομαι is only a process (λόγος) which has not yet reached a result.' Then follow the words διανοια ἃμα λείπεται, to which we must supply ὀρθότητα αὐτὴν εἶναι. Since εἶβομαι cannot be the ὀρθότης of either ἐπιστήμη or δέκα, for the reasons given, it remains that it is the ὀρθότης of the discursive faculty—the faculty which carries on the process of reviewing the steps which lead to results, but is not itself the ὑπάλληλος of these results—ἀυτὴ γὰρ (sc. διανοια) οὕτω φαίνει.

§ 4. ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τὶς ἐστὶν ἡ εἶβομαι βουλής] Rassow (Forsch. b. 16. p. 46), as we have seen, regards these words as inconsistent with διανοια ὃμα λείπεται. I think that something might be said for bracketing them, and retaining the sentence ἀλλ' μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εἰβομαι. διανοια ὃμα λείπεται αὐτὴ γὰρ οὕτω φαίνει, bracketed by Rassow. As for the words 1142 b. 16 διὸ ἡ βουλή ζητήτα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί—they are bracketed by Rassow, because (Forsch. p. 46) 'das Wesen der βουλή ist ja schon viele Male erörtert und im Folgenden ist davon nicht die Rede, vielmehr wird der Begriff der ὀρθότης, auf den es hier ganz allein ankommt, näher bestimmt.'

ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον δὲ οὐ πάσα] ὀρθὸς βεβουλευτάθα. b. 17. is an expression which lends itself to several inaccurate senses. It is inaccurate to describe (1) the man who has taken the right means to the attainment of a bad end as ὀρθὸς βεβουλευμένος: or (2) the man who has reached a good end by improper means: or (3) the man who has reached a good end by right means, but only after spending an unreasonably long time in deliberation. Thus πάσα must be taken distributively: 'when we say ὀρθὸς βεβουλευμένος, we do not wish the expression to be understood in any one of its various senses, but only in the one strict sense in which it is applied to the man who reaches a good end, by right means discovered within a reasonable time.'

ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής κ.τ.λ.] The description of the ἀκρατής here, as b. 18. employing λογισμὸς for the attainment of a bad end, is not consistent with the account of him given in E. N. vii, and answers rather to the ἀκλαστός. See Grant ad loc.

ὁ προτίμηται ἰδεῖν] ἰδεῖν is the reading of K b, L b, M b, Ob, CCC, vol. ii.
Cambr., B.³. Instead of ίδειν NC and Par. 1853 have καὶ σκέψασθαι ίδειν—σκέψασθαι being probably a gloss on ίδειν: cf. Eustrat. ὦ γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἀπλός ὁ φαύλος προτίθεται ὡς τέλος ίδειν ἤτοι σκέψασθαι ὅτως αὐτοῦ ἐπιτείχεται, καθὸ ἀκρατὴς καὶ φαύλος, οὐκ ἔσται ὑφελίμων. Madvig (Adv. Crit. 462) suggests ίδειν (so r), which is adopted by Grant (3rd ed.) and Jackson, who compare Plato, Soph. 221 Λ ὁπερ ἄρη προθέμεθα δεῖν ἑξετείνιν. Rassow (Forsch. p. 97) suggests οὗ προτίθεται τυχεῖν, which is adopted by Bek.², Susemmihl, and Grant in his last edition. I would suggest λαβέιν: cf. the following εἰληφῶς.

b. 20. δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche quotes, among other aphorisms, Soph. Antig. 1050 κράτιστοι κτημάτων εὐβοιλία.

b. 22. § 5. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ κ.τ.λ.] Eustrat. has ὃς γὰρ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλης εἶναι συμπέρασμα, τοῦ μέσου λαμβανομένου ψευδώς . . . , οὕτως ἐνδέχεται καὶ διὰ φαύλον τρόπον τέλος ἀποκάλημα χρηστῶν, οἷον εἰ τις πένης μουχείσαι ἐκ τούτου ὑπότροχες. It is inaccurate, as Grant notes, to speak of 'a false middle term' (ψευδὴ τῶν μέσων ὅρων εἶναι), falsehood or truth belonging to propositions, not to terms. What the writer means is that either or both of the premisses containing the middle term may be false, and yet the conclusion be true: see An. Prior. ii. 2. 53 b. 4 ἔστι μὲν οὖν αὐτῶς ἔχειν, ὡστε ἄλλης εἶναι τὰς προτάσεις, οὗ ἦν ὁ συλλογισμός· ἔστι δὲ ὡστε ψευδώς· ἔστι δ' ὡστε τὴν μὲν ἄλληθι, τὴν δὲ ψευδὴ τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἄλληθις ἡ ψευδὸς εἶ ἀνάγκης. ἐξ ἄλληθιν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι ψευδός συλλογισμός, ἐκ ψευδῶν δ' ἔστιν ἄλληθις, πλῆν οὐ διώτι, ἀλλ' οὗ τὸ γὰρ διώτι οὐκ ἔστων ἐκ ψευδῶν συλλογισμός.

b. 27. § 6. ἐκεῖνη] i.e. the θοῦλη which, having a good end and employing good means, yet takes too long time. The man who comes to a 'right' decision only when the time for action is past, cannot be called εὐθυλος.

ἀλλ' ὀρθότης ἢ κατὰ τὸ ωφελίμων, καὶ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς καὶ ὅτε] 'but rightness where the advantageous is concerned—end, means, and length of time, being all what they ought to be.' I scarcely think that Eustr. is right in making καὶ οὐ δεῖ epecegetical of τὸ ωφελίμων. He says—ἐκεῖνη ἡ ὀρθότης τῆς εὐθυλίας ἐστὶν εὐθυλία, ἢ καὶ τὸ ωφελίμων ἐχεῖ τοῦ τέλους, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου τὸ ἐπαινετόν, ὁ δηλοὶ τὸ δὲ, καὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ ἀρκεῖν, ὁπερ δηλοὶ τὸ ὅτε, τὸ δὲ ωφελίμων καὶ οὐ δεῖ ἐκ παραλλήλου ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτό.

b. 28. § 7.] The Paraph. Heliodorus has the following note: Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ τέλος ἡ καθόλου ἐστὶ καὶ ἐσχατὸν, ὡς μερικῶν, ἐσχατὸν μὲν, πρὸς δὲ πᾶσα πρά-

Thus the telos to áplos is the telos téleon—επισκοπεία: cf. E. N. vi. 5. ἴδοκεί δὲ φρονίμων εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς θεωρεῖνα τῷ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς υγίειαν, πρὸς ἴσχυν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὄντος.

Thus τὸ τελεόν τὸ ἀπλὸν ὁπρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὁ ὅ φρονήσες ἄληθῆς ὑπόληψις b. 32.

The clause beginning οἷο is necessary to define the reference of τὸ (οτ τῶ) τέλος. Nor is there any difficulty in making φρονήσις the ὑπόληψις τοῦ τέλους. Φρονήσις ἐστὶ ἀρχιτεκτονική, as well as περὶ τὰ καθ' ἐκκαστα (see E. N. vi. 7. 7). We may say that φρονήσις indeed apprehends the end, but could not do so in the way required by morality—i. e. with a 'single eye,' unless ἤθικα ἄρετὴ invested that end with a moral interest. The Paraph. is quite distinct in referring οἷο to τέλος. He says that the words πρὸς τὶ τέλος, ὁ ὅ φρονήσες ἄληθῆς ὑπόληψις ἐστὶ are put διὰ τὴν πωνρὰν βουλὴν, ἦτε ὅ τὰ μὲν τέλει προσηκοῦντα καὶ ἀκόλουθα ζητεῖ, πρὸς τέλος δὲ φέρεται πωνρὸν οὐ οἶκ ἐστὶν ὃ φρονήσες ἄληθῆς ὑπόληψις.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT.

Intelligence is not the same as knowledge generally, or opinion (then all men would be 'intelligent'), nor is it a special branch of knowledge, like medical science or geometry; for it is not concerned with the 'eternal and immutable,' and among things 'that come into being' only with those which, being difficult to understand, are subjects of deliberation. Its field therefore is the same as that of Prudence; but it is not Prudence; for Prudence issues commands or recommendations, whereas Intelligence merely sits, as it were, and judges. The
intelligent man, using his experience, comes to a right decision about matters within the province of Prudence laid before him by another in a speech: as he listens he does not add to his experience, but makes use of his experience, just as a man who knows Greek does not learn Greek, when he listens to another speaking Greek, but uses the Greek which he has, in order to understand what is said. The intelligent man is he who understands, or appreciates correctly, the value of recommendations made to him within the province of Prudence.

1142 b. 34. § 1. σύνεσις intelligence, is another element in φρόνησις, or a state cognate to it. It is the faculty of understanding and appreciating good advice laid before one by another person. The συνετός, qua συνετός, does not initiate policies, or schemes of conduct, but has the intelligence to recognise good ones when they are presented to him. Σύνεσις is thus the excellence of the κριτής who listens to a speech (ἄλλων λέγωντος § 3), and judges rightly as to the merits of the plan of action which it recommends (ενπίπτεις § 2). Σύνεσις may be regarded as a stage in the development of φρόνησις. A man must have listened intelligently to what his elders advise on practical matters, before he can take rank himself as an authoritative adviser. Of course the majority of men—so far as large political questions are concerned—never become φρόνιμοι and ἐπιτακτικοὶ, but are, at best, only intelligent followers or critics—συνετοὶ.

eὐσύνεσις All MSS. seem to give ἀνενεσία, and, in the next line, ἀνενετός. Εὐσύνεσις and εὐσυνετός is the certain emendation of H. Stephanus—made, independently it would appear, by Spengel also (see Arist. Studien i. p. 212).

1143 a. 2. πάντες γὰρ ἄν ήσαν συνετοὶ] He seems to mean that all men would then be 'intelligent,' for all men have either ἐπιστήμη or δόξα: but the Paraph. understands the words rather differently: he says—ἡ γὰρ ἄν πάντες οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ἢ οἱ δοξάζοντες συνετοὶ ἦσαν. ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσίν: i. e. either all ἐπιστήμονες or all δοξάζοντες would be συνετοὶ.

a. 8. § 2. ἢ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστιν... ἢ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον] Grant points out that 'the opposition of these terms is taken from Plato, Politicus 259 E—260 C,' where it is said that 'all science may be divided under the two heads of critical and mandatory'—ἀρ' οὖν συμπάθης τῆς γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικῶν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικῶν διαιροῦμεν προσέποιμεν, ἐμμελέως ἄν φαίμεν δηρηθῶμεν;

a. 10. ταῦτα γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσύνεσις καὶ συνετοὶ καὶ εὐσυνετοὶ] added to
meet the possible objection that, although σύνεσις is κριτική μόνον, ΙΙΙ: Α. 1.10. ευσυνεσία may be something more.

§ 3. ἄλλ᾽ ὀπερ τὸ μανθάνειν κ.τ.λ.] Grant quotes Soph. El. iv. 1. 2 a. 12. (i. e. Toph. ix. 3. 165 b. 32) for the double meaning of μανθάνειν—(1) to learn, (2) to understand—τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὀμάνυμην, τὸ τε ξυνέιαν χρόμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην.

Σύνεσις is not the possession or acquisition of φρόνησις—the power of giving good advice—but the employment of one’s intelligence in estimating advice given. Συνείναι is thus like μανθάνειν, where μανθάνειν means, not ‘learning something new,’ but ‘understanding’ what is said to one in conversation, by means of knowledge (e.g. knowledge of the language in which the conversation is carried on) which one already possesses.

οὕτως κ.τ.λ.] As, in conversation, one ‘understands’ (μανθάνει) a. 13. what is said in a language, and on a subject, with which one is already familiar, so, in the ἐκκλησία, the ordinary citizen employs his general experience and intelligence (δόξα—cf. τὸ δοξαστικόν=τὸ λογιστικόν E. N. vi. 5. 8, vi. 13. 2) in apprehending (συνείναι) the advice given in a statesman’s speech.

ἄλλου λέγοντος[ For σύνεσις, regarded specially as the excellence a. 15. of the listener in the assembly or court, cf. Philemon (Meineke, Fragm. Comic. vol. iv. 46)—

χαλεπῶν γ’ ἀκρογής δόγματος καθήμενος,
ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀνοίας οὐχ ἕτος μέμφεται.

καὶ κρῖνειν καλῶς] sc. ἓτων η σύνεσις, καὶ η εὐσυνεσία: then follows τὸ γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς τῷ αὑτῷ.

§ 4. ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν] ‘from the intelligence shown in a. 17. “understanding”’—sc. the meaning of a person with whom one is talking. Coraes has the following note here—‘χρόμεθα πολλάκις τῷ μανθάνειν ἐπὶ τοῦ συνείναι’ οὖν, ημικά ὅ μη συνείς τὰ λεγόμενα φησι πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα (’Αριστοφ. Βάτρ. 1444)

... πῶς; οὐ μανθάνω
ἀμαθεστερὸν πως εἰπέ καὶ σαφέστερον.

ὥσπερ ἄν Γάλλος ἀνὴρ ἐρμηνεύετειν οὕτως, comment? je ne te comprends point; parle-moi un peu moins savamment et plus intelligiblement.’
CHAPTER XI.

Argument.

Judgment is the faculty of deciding correctly what is equitable: this definition is in accordance with the view commonly held about the equitable man—that his chief characteristic is to be ready to pass favourable judgment.

The faculties mentioned—judgment, intelligence, prudence, and reason—have all, it is easy to see, the same reference, and may be ascribed to the same character: they all have to do with ultimate particulars, intelligence and judgment being faculties which come to right decisions as regards matters within the province of prudence, i.e. as regards things which men do, which are always ultimate particulars, never universals. Reason, indeed, is concerned with 'ultimates' at both ends of the series; it is both beginning and end— as speculative, it is concerned with the ultimate universals which cannot be demonstrated by syllogistic reasoning, but are the immutable first principles of scientific demonstration—as practical, it is concerned with the ultimate particulars, which are contingent, and find their place in the minor premiss of the practical syllogism: these particulars the practical reason, as regulating conduct, must perceive immediately, for it is from often perceiving them thus that a man acquires the universal principle of conduct—the prevailing bent of character.

Since reason, and the cognate faculties, intelligence and judgment, are concerned with particulars, they will require time and experience for their development: and, as a matter of fact, we see these faculties (as distinguished from the speculative faculty) growing naturally up in men, as they become older: so much so that we feel that undemonstrated assertions and opinions, coming from men of years and experience, have all the weight of demonstrations. Such men have the eye of experience and see correctly.

So much for Prudence and Wisdom. Each has its own nature, and its own sphere, and is the excellence of its own separate part of the soul.

1143 a. 19. § 1. γνώμη rendered by Grant 'considerateness.' It is perhaps impossible to bring out in any single English word the whole meaning of this term. It may be sufficient to think of ὅ γνώμην ἔχων as 'the man of good sense and good feeling'—especially in so far as he exhibits these qualities in his judicial decisions (ἢ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὧδη). The dicasts swore γνώμη τῇ ἀριστῇ (ἢ δικαιοτάτῃ) κρίνειν—'to decide according to the best of their judgment'—cf. Pol. iii. 16. 1287 a. 25 ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδε παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστηται τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἀρχαίς: Rhet. i. 15. 1375 a. 27 φανερῶν γὰρ ὦτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἕναντις ὃ ἐγγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ κοινῷ ὦνῳ χρηστάνειν καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ὡς δικαιότεροι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ γνώμη τῇ
The original meaning of γνώμη is ‘knowledge’ or ‘understanding.’ Thus in Democritus, quoted by Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. vii. 138, we have γνώμης δε δυο είσιν ἰδέα, η μὲν γνησία, η δε σκοτή—‘genuine knowledge’ and ‘dark knowledge’: and in Herodotus iii. 4, γνώμην ἰκανός means ‘a man of good understanding.’ Secondly, γνώμη came to stand for ‘a thought’—especially for ‘a thought’ or ‘opinion’ relating to the conduct of life. And this is the sense in which we find γνώμη technically used by Aristotle in the Rhetoric: see Rhet. ii. 21. 1394 a. 22 ἐστι δ’ ἡ γνώμη ἀπόφασις, οὐ μὲντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστον, οἷον ποιός τις ἱστικήτης, ἀλλὰ καθολου’ καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐνάντιον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν οἱ πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ αἵρετα ἡ δεικτὰ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ πράκτες. A γνώμη is thus a generalisation relating to the conduct of life: and Aristotle takes special pains to make it clear that it is a generalisation which has merely an empirical basis—i.e. has not been verified by syllogistic derivation from higher principles; for he goes on to say 1394 a. 26 ὅσ’ ἐπεὶ τὰ εὐθυμίματα δ’ περὶ τοιοῦτον συνλογισμὸν ἔστων, σχεδὸν τὰ συμπεράσματα τῶν εὐθυμίματος καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρεθέντων τοῦ συνλογισμοῦ γνώμαι εἰσιν, οἷον

χρή δ’ οὖ ποθ’ ὅς τις ἀρτιφρων πέφυκ’ ἀνήρ, παιδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφῶς.

τοῦτο μὲν οὖν γνώμης προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τι εὐθύμῃμα ἔστιν τὸ ἀπαν, οἷον

χρῆσις γὰρ ἀλλης ἦσ ἔχουσιν ἀργίας, φθόνου παρ’ ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενή.

καὶ τὸ

οὐκ ἔστων δὲ τις πάντ’ ἄνηρ ἐνδαιμονεῖ

καὶ τὸ

οὐκ ἔστων ἄνδρῶν δὲ τις ἔστ’ ἐλεύθερος

γνώμη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἔχομενῳ εὐθύμῃμα,

ἡ χρημάτων γὰρ δουλὸς ἔστιν ἦ τίχης.

A maxim which may be used, by way of σημείων or εἰκῶς, as the premiss of an ἐνθύμημα or ‘rhetorical syllogism’ (see Rhet. i. 2), or may, as conclusion of an ἐνθύμημα, be deduced from suitable premisses, is, if taken by itself (ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ συνλογισμοῦ), a γνώμη. A γνώμη, then, is a moral maxim, a piece of proverbial wisdom (cf. the expression ποιηταὶ γνωμικοί), advanced and accepted without
proof, but recommending itself by its obvious agreement with the sentiments and feelings of the society in which it appears.

Here, in the *Ethics*, the meaning of γνώμη seems to waver between 'the act of deciding sensibly and kindly,' and 'the disposition which results in sensible and kind decisions.'

συγγνώμονας] This is the reading of K\(^b\) and M\(^b\) restored by Bywater, instead of Bekker's εἰγνώμονας the reading of L\(^b\), r, Cambr., NC, B\(^a\), CCC, Eustr., Heliod. The *Index Arist.* does not give εἰγνώμονας except in this chapter, and in *M. M.* ii. 2, where συγγνώμονας does not occur, and εἰγνωμοσύνη is used instead of γνώμη. It is not unlikely therefore that εἰγνώμονας got into the text of the *Ethics* at a date subsequent to the compilation of the *M. M.*\(^1\) Apart, however, from this suspicion, there is nothing against the word in the context here. Indeed it may be thought that the words a. 21 σημείων δὲ τὸν γὰρ ἐπιείκη μᾶλιστα φαινὲν εἰναί συγγνώμονακὸν follow εἰγνώμονας more naturally than συγγνώμονας: that the connexion between ἐπιείκεια and συγγνώμη is assumed to be better known than that between ἐπιείκεια and γνώμη, καθ ἴνα εἰγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φαινὲν γνώμην, and is therefore adduced as a σημείων: cf. *Rhet.* i. 13. 1374 b. 4 ἐφ' ὅς γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμονη ἔχειν ταύτα ἐπιείκη, and b. 10 τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώπων συγγνώμονες ἐπιείκεις.

Συγγνώμη means properly 'thinking and feeling with others,' and answers to the *sensus communis* of the Roman writers: cf. Quintil. *Inst.* i. 2—Sensum ipsum, qui communis dicitur, ubi discet, cum se a congressu, qui non hominibus solum, sed multis quoque animalibus naturalis est, segregât?—Hor. *Sat.* i. 3. 66 Simplicior quis et est . . . ut forte legentem Aut tacitum impellat quovis sermonem molestus, Communi sensu plane caret, inquam:—on which Orelli quotes Seneca, *de Benefic.* i. 12 Sit in beneficiis sensus communis: tempus locum personas observet, qua momentis quaedam grata et ingrata sunt. The συγγνώμων is the man of social sympathy, who enters into the thoughts and feelings of others, and especially is ready to make allowance for their difficulties in his formal or informal verdicts—who, in short, gives judgment (γνώμη) in their favour (συν) when a rigid interpretation of the law would warrant an unfavourable judgment.

1 I find, since writing the above, that this is Bywater's opinion; see *Contributions*, p. 52.
BOOK VI: CHAP. 11: § 1.

τοῦ ἀληθοῦς] Trendelenburg brackets συγγρώμη: the sentence is 1143 a. 23. then a mere repetition of what has just been said three lines above—ἡ γνώμη . . . ἡ τοῦ ἑπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὅρθη: on the other hand, with συγγρώμη retained, the definition of συγγρώμη is in the same terms as that of γνώμη. I think that the words ἡ δὲ συγγρώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἑπιεικοῦς ὅρθη ought to be bracketed. The clause ὅρθη δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς follows the ὅρθη of line 20 very naturally, σημεῖον δὲ . . . συγγρώμην being parenthetical. I agree with Rams. that τοῦ ἑπιεικοῦς in line 20, as in line 23, is neuter—the genitive of the object. Grant makes it masc. in both places.

ὅρθη δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς] sc. κριτική, if line 23 be retained: if not, a. 24. κρίσις—'that is a right decision which gives a true verdict.'

The whole § may be paraphrased thus—What is called 'good sense'—the quality of people whom we describe as 'fair and sensible,' and as 'taking a sensible and proper view,' may be defined as 'the habit of coming to right decisions in matters of equity.' That this is a correct definition of 'good sense' is seen, if we refer to the usage of the term 'common sense' as equivalent to 'fellow feeling' or 'tendency to give favourable judgment.' It is generally admitted that 'the equitable man' is distinguished for his 'common sense,' or 'fellow feeling,' and that to give effect to this sense or feeling in certain cases is 'equitable.' 'Common sense' is, in fact, 'good sense,' which enables a man to come to a right decision in a matter of equity: a 'right' decision being one which gives a true verdict.

Instead of γνώμη, the writer of Μ. Μ. uses εὐγνωμοσύνη, as we have seen—ii. 2. 1198 b. 34 ἡ δὲ εὐγνωμοσύνη καὶ ὁ εὐγνώμων ἐστὶν περὶ ταῦτα περὶ δ καὶ ἡ ἑπιείκεια, περὶ τὰ δίκαια [καὶ] τὰ ἑλλελειμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου τῷ μή ἀκριβῶς διωρίσθαι, κριτικὸς ὑπὸ τῶν ἑλλελειμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου, καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ νομοθέτου ἑλλελειμέναι, ἔστι μέντοι δίκαια, ὁ τοιοῦτος εὐγνώμων. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂνευ εὐπρεπείας ἡ εὐγνωμοσύνη τῷ μὲν γὰρ κρίνει τοῦ εὐγνώμων, τὸ δὲ δὴ πράττειν [καὶ] κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἑπιεικοῦς. It ought to be remembered that the writer of the Μ. Μ. discusses ἑπιείκεια in a context parallel, not to E. N. v. 10, but to E. N. vi. 11.

I said that σύνεσις may be regarded as a stage in the development of φρόνησις. But the power of intelligently following a speech, and estimating its recommendations at what they are worth, presupposes something more than mere intellectual sharpness and nimbleness.
The successful critic of a policy must be in sympathy with the traditional thought and feeling of the community for which the policy is recommended. ἰγνώμη, or communis sensus, underlies σύνεσις. And, as there are many who are συνετοὶ but never (at least in great matters) become φρόνιμοι, so there are many who have γνώμη and συγγραφή without rising to the clear intellectual consciousness of reasons possessed by the συνετοὶ. The συνετοὶ appreciate the force of the ἐνθυμήματα (βητορικοῖ συλλογισμοῖ) which the speaker employs: but γνώμαι are points of view which recommend themselves without syllogistic proof (ἀφαιρεθέντο τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ)—are felt to be true by ὁ γνώμην ἔχων.

In the foregoing remarks I have purposely allowed the Aristotelian associations connected (a) with the term γνώμη, as (1) moral maxim, (2) judge’s decision, (3) disposition which results in γνώμαι (1) or (2), and (b) with the term συγγραφή, as communis sensus, and especially the manifestation of communis sensus in equitable judgments, to have free play, and influence one another. I believe that the writer of this § could not use the term γνώμη without being affected by these various associations. At the same time, it is proper to say, in conclusion, that I think that the sense of γνώμη as judge’s decision is most prominent in his mind. If σύνεσις is especially the κρίσις in the ἐκκλησία, γνώμη is especially that in the δικαστήριον.

This infinitive is grammatically the object of ἐπισφέροντες, and we should have expected the article before it; but the writer omits the article, because he still has λέγομεν in his mind. That he has λέγομεν in his mind is shown clearly by the following accusatives καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετοὺς. Michelet makes the construction—γνώμην γὰρ καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπισφέροντες, λέγομεν καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετοὺς γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἡδί: but, if this is the construction, why have we not the article before φρονίμους and συνετοὺς?

I think that Grant’s suggestion is right—that this expression refers ‘to what is said in § 6 ἦδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει’ and is ‘nearly equivalent to our saying of a person that he had “attained to years of discretion.”’

‘for equity enters into all good relations between man and man’—
i. e. equity is coextensive with justice. This is given as a reason 1143 a. 31. for the statement év τῷ κριτικὸς ἐστὶν περὶ δόν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ ἐγνώμονον ἢ συγγράμων —the φρόνιμος has to do with ‘all good relations between man and man’; and the συγγράμων is κριτικός τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, which is coextensive with these ‘good relations.’

§ 3. Having proved at the end of § 2 that σύνεσις and γνώμη a. 33. have the same sphere as φρόνησις or νοῦς, because τὰ ἐπιεικῆ are coextensive with τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον, the writer now proves the same point again, by reference to the fact that τὰ πρακτά (which are ἔσχατα) are the objects of σύνεσις and γνώμη, as well as of φρόνησις or νοῦς. Ramsauer brackets τὰ πρακτά in line 33, and Kb Mb τ, Cambr. pr., and NC read ἀπάντων for ἀπαντα.

§ 4. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα] γνώμη, σύνεσις, φρόνησις a. 35. and νοῦς have been exhibited as πάσας εἰς ταῦτα τείνουσα, because all concerned with moral ἔσχατα (ἐπιεικῆ, ἀγαθὰ, πρακτά). The writer now goes on to say that νοῦς is concerned, not only with moral ἔσχατα—the particulars of action—but, in science as distinguished from conduct, with another kind of ἔσχατα—ultimate principles—the highest universals: so that, if we use νοῦς in its generic sense, we can say that it is concerned with ‘ultimates at both ends of the series’ (Grant)—i. e. with universals at the top, and particulars at the bottom.

νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὗ λόγος] The highest universals and the ultimate b. 1. particulars are apprehended intuitively, not reached by discursive reasoning.

καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις] sc. νοῦς. The construction is ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις νοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων. This is the νοῦς θεωρητικός, as distinguished from the νοῦς πρακτικὸς—ὁ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς (sc. δόξαι cf. E. N. vii. 3. 9, or προτάσει, or perhaps ἀποδείξεισι understood in a loose sense).

τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρῶτων] sc. ἐστὶ, ‘is concerned with.’ These b. 2. are the First Principles of θεολογικῆ and μαθηματικῆ.

ἐνδεχομένων] The full expression requires the addition of καὶ b. 3.

1 ἔγνωμῶν ἢ fort. secludendum Byw.; see above § 1, note on συγγράμων 1143 a. 19.
BOOK VI: CHAP. 11: §§ 4, 5.

1143 b. 3. ἄλλως ἔχειν, which Rassow (Forsch. p. 77) accordingly proposes to insert.

τῆς ἐπέρας προτάσεως] the minor premise, called in E. N. vii. 3. 13 ἡ τελευταία πρότασις. The phrase ἐπέρα πρότασις does not appear from the Index Arisli. to occur except here.

b. 4. ἄρχαι γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἐνεκα αὐταὶ] αὐταὶ (attracted to the gender of ἄρχαι) are the particulars (ἐσχατα) which constitute the ‘minor premise’ apprehended by νοὺς πρακτικός. These particulars are said to be the ἄρχαι τοῦ οὗ ἐνεκα—to supply the materials out of which the moral end, or the character, is built up by ἔθισμός, as by a sort of induction—ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου. For a similar use of ἄρχη (as the material source) Grant compares E. N. vi. 3. 3 ἐπαγωγή ἄρχη ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου.

b. 5. § 5. τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεὶ αἰσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς] The πρακτικός νοὺς is here represented as a sensibility to certain particular impressions. The cumulative effect of such particular impressions is a certain bent of character, or settled way of looking at, and feeling with regard to, the objects from which the impressions are received. But when νοὺς πρακτικός is thus described as a sensibility to certain particular impressions, it is evident that, from the very first, it must find, in the things which impress it, the common attribute to which the character eventually formed is the adaptation. Νοῖς πρακτικός is indeed the sensibility to certain particular impressions, in so far as it is on the occasion of the presence of particular αἰσθητά (ἡδεία καὶ λυπή) that it receives its impressions; but these αἰσθητά impress it from the first in a moral way. It is therefore not merely passive in relation to them; it perceives this among them to be good, and that bad, irrespectively of the present pleasure or pain which attends either: i.e. it criticises them in view of the requirements of its own permanent nature. It is as true, in short, of the αἰσθησις with which the νοῦς πρακτικός is here identified, as of the αἰσθησις of the bodily senses, that it involves a perception of the καθόλου: see An. Post. ii. 19. 100 a. 16 καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἐκαστὸν, ἢ δ' αἰσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν.

1 If τὸ καθόλου (Kb Mb Bywater) is right (as against Bekker's τὸ καθόλου), Trendelenburg's, I think, mistaken view (Hist. Beitr. ii. 384) that τέλος is to be supplied after καθόλου is finally disposed of.
The sharp contrast drawn between the νοῦς θεωρητικός and the νοῦς πρακτικός in Ε.Ν. vi. 11. §§ 4, 5 is indeed very misleading. A καθόλου is at first dimly seen by each in the material setting of the καθ’ έκαστα belonging to its sphere; and each, using its own peculiar method—νοῦς θεωρητικός using ἐπαγωγή, and νοῦς πρακτικός, ἐθικός—comes to apprehend its καθόλου more clearly. The only ground (apart, of course, from the difference of spheres, or object-matter) for contrasting the νοῦς θεωρητικός and the νοῦς πρακτικός is that of the clearness with which each ultimately apprehends its καθόλου. The generalisations of the νοῦς θεωρητικός, clear-cut forms embodied in ὀρισμοί, seem, at last, to stand out independent of the particulars; whereas the generalisations of the νοῦς πρακτικός are never clear-cut, but always inhere in particulars. They are the ways in which Kallias, and people who have received the same training as Kallias, generally act, in certain (approximately described) circumstances, when they act in the manner generally assumed to be right. But the generalisations of the νοῦς θεωρητικός are abstract formulae, which distinguish themselves by their necessity from the particulars (as such, contingent) falling under them. To arrive at such formulae being the goal of the νοῦς θεωρητικός, that faculty is represented as being 'concerned with' them; whereas the νοῦς πρακτικός is said to be 'concerned with particulars,' because it never can, with any appearance of perfection, detach its generalisations from them.

and γνώμη, as Eustratius notes. These habits are all concerned with τά καθ’ έκαστα, and therefore (διό) require time and experience for their formation. They grow up in us naturally (φυσικά δοκεῖ εἶναι), as we gain experience of life. But we do not naturally grow up to be philosophers (φύσει σοφός μὲν ὑδεῖς): philosophy requires special teaching: see Eustrat. ad loc.—διότι φησίν ἐκ τῶν καθ’ έκαστα ὁ πρακτικός νοῦς καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡμῶν παραγίνεται καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ φυσικά δοκεῖ εἶναι ταύτα. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία τῶν καθόλου, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ φύσει ἡμῖν πρόσεστον ἀλλ’ ἐκ μαθήσεως περιγίνεται, ἡς εἶναι καὶ νέων δυνατόν ὑπάρχαι σοφόν ἐν γνώσει τῶν καθόλου γενόμενον καθά καὶ προκλαβὼν ὁ φιλόσοφος εἶρηκεν. αἱ δὲ εἰρημέναι ἔξεις, ἐπεὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πολυπτερίας συνάγονται τῶν καθέκαστα χρόνου δει αὐτῶς μακρὸν, καὶ ἡλικίας τελευτέρας, δὲ ἴν αὐτὰ ἀνθρώπος προσγίνονται. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐκ φύσεως ἡ ἡλικία, καὶ ὁ μακρὸς τῆς ζωῆς χρόνος δὲ ὅσον ἡ κτήσις τῶν ἔξεων

[Translation begins here]

δεικνύει τούτων αὐτός, οὔθε φύεται
ἀυτόματον ἀνθρώπουσιν, ὥς βελτιστε, νοῦς
δώσερ ἐν ἀγρῷ θύμοις ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν τε καὶ
ἐτέρων ἄκουσιν καὶ θεωρήσαι . . .
κατὰ μικρὰν ἄεί, φασι, φύνονται φρένες.

b. 9. § 6. διὸ καὶ ἀρχή καὶ τέλος νοοῦ ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδεῖξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 31) places these words after αὕτη θ᾽ ἐστὶ νοοῦ § 5, 1143 b. 5. A scribe, he suggests, transposed the two sentences both beginning with διὰ. This is very likely. Moreover, it is only after τούτων οὖν ἐξειν δεὶ ἀνθρώπους, αὕτη θ᾽ ἐστὶ νοοῦ that the grammatical reference of the words ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδεῖξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων is intelligible.

As for the meaning of the statement ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοοῦ— it is doubtless given correctly by the Paraph.—ἀρχὴ μὲν, καθ᾽ ὄσον τῶν πρῶτων ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν γνώσεις, καὶ θεωρητικὸς λέγεται· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀποδεῖξεις· τέλος δὲ, καθ᾽ ὄσον γνώσεις ἐστὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἐκκατὰ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ πρακτικὸς λέγεται. For the expression ἐκ τούτων . . . καὶ περὶ τούτων, cf. i. 3. 4 ἀγαπητοῦ οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγονται κ.τ.λ. He means that ‘reasoning’ in morals is ἐκ τῶν καθ᾽ ἐκκατα, and περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἐκκατα. The term ἀποδεῖξεις is, of course, used here in a loose sense, for ‘morality is not capable of demonstration.’

b. 14. ὁρθῶν ὁρθῶς] This is the reading of L b (and apparently O b) only: ἀρχὰς or τὸς ἀρχᾶς is given instead of ὁρθῶς by K b, M b, r, CCC, NC, Cambr., and B 1, 2, 3, Ald., Hel., Eustr.

b. 16. § 7. ἄλλου τῆς σοφίας μορίου] i.e. σοφία is the highest excellence of the ἐπιστημονικῶν μέρους, and φράσεως of the λογιστικῶν: see note on ch. 3. § 1. 1139 b. 14, for Prantl’s view of the διανοητικά ἄρετα.
CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT.

Let us now discuss the question—What is the practical use of Wisdom and Prudence?

Wisdom, it may be urged, is useless: it is concerned with that which eternally is, not with that which comes to pass or is produced, and consequently does not regard the means which produce Human Happiness.

Prudence indeed regards these means; but must we have Prudence in order to secure them practically? The good man in virtue of his good habits employs these means, i.e. performs good acts. Surely knowing that these acts are good does not help to make him perform them, any more than knowing that a regular pulse is a healthy symptom (as distinguished from knowing the proper treatment of an irregular pulse) makes a man’s pulse regular. And if it be said that we must have Prudence, not indeed to tell us that such and such acts are good, but to tell us how to secure their performance, what, it may still be asked, is the practical use of Prudence? It is superfluous in the case of those who are already good, and perform the acts in question from habit; and why should those who are not already good, but wish to become good, trouble themselves to have Prudence of their own? Why should they not consult a professional expert in Prudence, as we do a doctor in the matter of health? Lastly, there is the awkward point—if Prudence is practically useful, if it really does something—especially something so great as the production of Human Happiness—it will take the lead over Wisdom, for the practical faculty which uses materials always directs as a mistress the scientific or artistic faculty which supplies the materials. But how can Wisdom be thus ancillary to Prudence? Prudence is surely inferior to Wisdom.

So much for the statement of the difficulties: now let us attempt to answer them.

Let us begin by saying that Wisdom and Prudence, even if they result in nothing ‘practical,’ must be choice-worthy in themselves, inasmuch as each of them is the excellence of its own part of the soul.

Secondly, they do produce results. Wisdom produces Happiness, not indeed as efficient cause of it, but as formal cause: it is one of the formal elements in that totality of the virtuous character, which realises itself in the function called Happiness. The other formal elements are Prudence and Moral Virtue, Virtue making the end aimed at good, and Prudence the means. Wisdom is the excellence of the scientific part, Prudence of the deliberative, Moral Virtue of the appetitive: the excellence of the fourth part of the soul, the nutritive, is not one of the formal elements in the totality of the virtuous character: for it does not rest with it to do, or not to do.

As regards the objection that Prudence does not help us to perform good acts, let us meet it by analysing ‘a good act’ a little deeper. What looks like ‘a
good act¹ may be performed under external pressure, or from ignorance, or for some end which has nothing to do with goodness, by a man who is not good: but an act is really 'good' only when it is done by a good man, being deliberately chosen by him because it is a good act—i.e. contributes to the chief end. This chief end, for the sake of which acts are deliberately chosen as means, is set up by Virtue—i.e. it is the same thing to say 'This man is virtuous or good' and 'his end is good'—but the steps which must be taken in order to realise this end are discovered, not by virtue but by another faculty. Let us stop to explain this point. Cleverness is the power of hitting upon the means conducive to a given end. If, then, the end be good, we praise the faculty which discovers the means, and call it Prudence: but we call it Kogery if the end be bad. Cleverness is the potentiality of Prudence (as it is of Kogery); but Prudence, as confirmed habit, does not supervene without Virtue: for, without Virtue, the syllogisms in which Prudence reasons would have no major premiss: it is only the good man who sees the good end which constitutes the major premiss. Vice distorts and falsifies a man's view of the principles of conduct. It is plain, then, that a man cannot be Prudent without being good.

1143 b. 19. § 1. thewropēi] Byw. after Kᵇ, Mᵇ, Cambr. All other MSS., apparently, give thewropēi, which I prefer.

b. 20. oδδημιάς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως] on the contrary, it is the contemplation of being (τὸ δὲ, as distinguished from τὸ γενόμενον).

b. 22. ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια] Lᵇ seems to be right in omitting ἡ: see Rassow (Forsch. p. 63).

b. 25. ἀσπέρ οὐδὲ τὰ ύγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ ἐφεκτικὰ] Ramsauer suggests the insertion of τῷ before τὰ ύγιεινά. The construction is—ἀσπέρ οὐδὲ τῷ τὰ ύγιεινὰ καὶ ἐφεκτικὰ εἶδέναι πρακτικότεραι ἐγιμὲν τῶν ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ἐφεκτικῶν. This usage of πρακτικότεραι is well illustrated by Rassow (Forsch. p. 124) from E.N. v. 1. 4. οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ύγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ύγιεινὰ μόνον λέγομεν γὰρ ύγιεινὸς βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίζῃ ὁς ἢ ὁ χαίρων.

b. 26. δόσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξως εἶναι λέγεται] 'I mean ύγιεινά and ἐφεκτικά in the sense, not of the efficient causes, but of the manifestations of ύγιεία and εἰεδία.' Cf. Met. 1. 1003 a. 34 τὸ ύγιεινὸν ἀπὸ πρὸς ύγιεινον, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ύγιείας, τὸ δὲ ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς: cf. Top. ii. 2. 110 a. 19, Met. k. 3. 1061 a. 6. He means that the mere knowledge of 'what concerns health' does not make a man perform healthy functions. 'Healthy functions' (τὰ ύγιεινὰ τὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξως εἶναι λεγόμενα) are not like 'the means to health' (τὰ ύγιεινὰ τὰ τῷ ποιεῖν τὴν ἔξων λεγόμενα) which are suggested by medical know-
ledge. Medical knowledge—knowledge of 'the means to health'—makes a man indeed
praktikōteros τῶν ύγιεινῶν τῶν τῷ ποιεῖν τὴν ύγίειαν
λεγομένων—i. e. praktikōteros κατὰ τὸ ἱατρεῖν, but not κατὰ τὸ ύγιεῖνος ἐνεργεῖν, οἱ τῶν ύγιεινῶν τῶν τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξως εἶναι λεγομένων.

οὐδὲν γὰρ πρακτικότεροι κ.τ.λ.] After πρακτικότεροι we may under-
stand, then, κατὰ τὸ ύγιεῖνος καὶ εὐεκτικῶς ἐνεργεῖν, or some such words.
Knowledge of the means to health or good training, as they are set
forth in the sciences of ἱατρική and γυμναστική, will not make a man
who has not the ἐξις of ύγεία or εὐεξία, a healthy man or a powerful
athlete. The Paraphrast Heliodorus has the following comment
here—οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδενα τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια πρακτικοὶ αὐτῶν
γίνανταi διὸπερ οὐδὲ ύγιεινοὶ ἢ εὐεκτικοὶ γνώμεθα ἀπὸ τοῦ καλῶς εἶδενα
tὰ ύγιεινὰ καὶ εὐεκτικά, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐξεν ἐξιν ύγιείας καὶ εὐεξίας τῷ γὰρ
ὁ πύκτης πρακτικότερος γίνεται διὰ τοῦ εἶδενα τί ἐστι τὸ εἶ καὶ καλῶς
πυκτεύειν οὐ γὰρ τῷ εἶδενα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐξιν πυκτικῆς, πυκτεύει' ὄρμιος
δὲ καὶ ὁ παλαιστής καὶ ὁ δρομικὸς καὶ γὰρ τοῦ καὶ ὁ γυμνικὸς διὰ τῆς ἐξιν
γυμνικὸς ἐστιν, οὐ διὰ τὸ εἶδενα τὰ εὐεκτικά καὶ γυμνικά λέγω δὲ εὐεκτικά
καὶ γυμνικὰ ἢ ύγιεινά, οὐ τὰ ποιητικα εὐεξίας ἢ ύγιείας, ἀλλ' οἱ ποιεῖ ὁ
ύγιαινων, ὁ ὁ εὐεκτικοί, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐξιν ύγιείας ἢ εὐεξίας ἐξεν.

§ 2. τούτων χάριν] τοῦ ταῦτα εἶδεναι χάριν.

τοῦ γίνεθαι] sc. σπουδαίους.

τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν] sc. ἀρετήν: i. e. 'those who have not the ἐξις b. 30.
(of ἀρετή')': οὖσιν has been unnecessarily suggested for ἔχουσιν.

αὐτοῦς ἔχειν] sc. τὴν φρόνησιν: the writing is very careless.

§ 3. ποιοῦσα] used here in the sense of χρωμένη (see E. N. i. b. 35.
2. 7): hence not to be compared with ἡ ποιήσουσα, but with
ἡ χρωσμενή of Rep. 601 D. The Paraphrast seems to suggest
the line of thought which led the writer to describe φρόνησις as
ἡ ποιοῦσα: he says—δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ φρόνησις βελτίων τῆς σοφίας, καθὸς
ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ πράξεως, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κυριωτέρα τῆς σοφίας, ὡς καὶ
ἐποίησις τῆς κατοικίας, καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἐκάστου—i. e.
φρόνησις, as πρακτική or ἀρχή πράξεως, is the efficient cause 
τοῦ ποιητικῶν αὐτῶν (see de Gen. et Corrup. i. 7. 324 b. 13 ἐστι δὲ τὸ 
ποιητικῶν αὐτῶν ὡς ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχῆ τῆς κατοικίας) of εὑρίσκειν, and (it may 
be maintained) uses materials supplied by σοφία, which it therefore 
directs, as the weaver directs the tailor.

περὶ δη τούτων λεκτέων] μὲν γὰρ ἡπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον]
1143 b. 35. Zell compares Pol. Θ. 6. 1340 b. 20 πότερον δὲ δὲι μανθάνειν αὐτοῦ διόντας τε καὶ χειροτροφοῦντας ἡ μη, καθάπερ ἤπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέων.

1144 a. 1. § 4.] Human nature, as a system of ἀρετῶν, is an end in itself: see Met. A. 2. 982 b. 24 δῆλον οὖν ὡς δὲι οἰδεμέν αὐτήν (sc. σοφίαν) ζητούμεν χρείαν ἐτέραν ἀλλ' ἄστερ οὐδεμᾶς φαμέν ἀλειθερός ὁ ἐαυτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μη ἀλλον ὄν, οὗτω καὶ αὐτῇ, μόηα ἐλευθέρα οὕσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν' μόη γὰρ αὐτῇ ἔαυτής ἕνεκέν ἔστω.

a. 3. § 5.] After ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια understand τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. Σοφία 'pro-ductes' ἐνδομονία—not, however, as the doctor (efficient cause), but as the principle of health (formal cause), produces a healthy state. Eustratius reads τὰ εἰνεκτικά after ὑγίεια, but explains the sentence as if he read ἐνδομονία: Σοφία and φρόνησις, he explains, produce ἐνδομονία, not as merely external causes, like ἰατρική when it produces health; but as constituent parts (μέρη) of ἐνδομονία, like ὑγίεια, which is also a constituent part of ἐνδομονία. Ἡ δῆλη ἀρετή (the character of which ἐνδομονία is the function) is made up of the ἀρετῶν of the mind and of the body, aided by external means, such as wealth. Σοφία is the highest ἀρετή of the mental, as ὑγίεια is of the bodily part. Ἐνδομονία is a ὁλον constituted by the union of these two μόρια. Σοφία accordingly produces ἐνδομονία, just as ὑγίεια also produces it, in the sense of being one of the factors which constitute it. ἰατρικὴ is not one of the factors or constituent elements of that which it 'produces', but is external to the product. Such is the explanation offered by Eustratius. It is not inconsistent with the view of ἐνδομονία presented in Rhet. i. 5. 1360 b. 18 εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ ἐνδομονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειας, πολυβλάσιαν, χρηστοφλιὰν, πλόοτον, εὐτεκνίαν, πολυτεκτίαν, εὐγηρίαν, ἐτί τάς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετᾶς, οὖν ὑγίειαν κάλλος ἰσχυὸν μέγεθος δύναμιν ἀγανωστικήν, δόξαν, τιμήν, εὐτεκιάν, ἀρετήν. But surely it is inconsistent with the words which follow in § 6, 1144 a. 9 τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετῆ τοιαῦτη, τοῦ θρητικοῦ. These words make it impossible to regard ὑγίεια, the excellence of τὸ θρητικὸν, as a μέρος τῆς δῆλης ἀρετῆς: see also Ε. Ε. ii. 1. 1219 b. 20 δῶ καὶ ἄλλο εἰ τι μορίων ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, οὖν τὸ θρητικὸν, ἡ τούτου ἀρετή οὐκ ἐστὶ μόριον τῆς δῆλης ἀρετῆς, ὅσπερ οὐδ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος. We must therefore understand τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, not ἐνδομονίαν, after ὑγίεια 1144 a. 4, and explain—σοφία (he has dropped φρόνησις for the moment) 'produces' ἐνδομονία, as formal, not as efficient cause:—i.e. it is a
méros, or formal element, in the ἀλοι, or εἴδος, of the virtuous 1144 a. 3. character whose function is εὐδαιμονία. For the technical use of μέρος, as the πολαὶ συνεργεία, see Bonitz on Met. Δ. 25. 1023 b. 19 ἐπὶ εἰς ἢ διαφέρει τα ἡ ἡ ἡ διάνυσε τὸ ἀλοι, ἢ τὸ εἴδος, ἢ τὸ ἔχει τὸ εἴδος. The phrase δὴ ἀρετὴ does not occur in the ‘Nicomachean’ Books of the E. N., but is well known to Eudemus. Grant remarks that Eudemus came to identify ἡ δὴ ἀρετὴ with καλοκαγαθία—for which see E. E. Η. 15. 1248 b. 8 sqq. The Paraphrast explains the present § correctly—"Επειτὰ καὶ χρήσιμοι εἰσὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, οὖχ ὧστε ἡνερκῇ πρὸς ἡνερκῇ ἄλλ’, ὧστε ἡ ἡνερκῇ πρὸς ἡνερκῇ ἦνερκῇ ἦνερκῇ, ὃτα ἢ γαρ καθὼς εὐδαιμονία ἢ παντελῆς ἢστών ἀρετῆς, σοφία δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μέρος εἰσὶ τῆς ἀληθ. ἀρετῆς; ὡστε μέρος εἰσὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης εὐδαιμονίας σοφία καὶ φρόνησις, καὶ τὸ ταύτα ἔχειν μετὰ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀρετῶν εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶ τὴν ἀληθ. εὐδαιμονίαν.

§ 6. ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κ.τ.λ. ‘Further, the function of the a. 6. εὐδαιμονία (τὸ ἔργον takes up ἑνερκῇ (? immediately preceding) requires for its complete fulfilment Προφθεία καὶ Μορφή Βιοτία—Βιοτία making the end aimed at (sc. in the sphere of conduct) right, and Προφθεία making the means right.’ Man’s is a σύνθετος φύσις. ἡ δὴ ἀρετὴ includes, as its μέρος, the ἡνερκῇ, as well as the διενερκήτης ἀρετή. The ἀνθρωπίνων ἁγαθῶν, or man’s function, as man, is an ἑνερκὴς ψυχῆς, which involves not only θεωρία, but πράξεις. For the doctrine of this passage cf. E. E. ii. Η. 1. 1227 b. 19 ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν μὲν σκοπῶν ἀρθῶν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαφανοῦς ἐς ταῖς δὲ τῶν μὲν σκοπῶν ἡμαρτήσας, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἑκεῖνον περαιόντα ὄρθως ἔχειν, καὶ μηδετέραν, πότερον δ’ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὧτα τὸν σκοπὸν, διὰτ’ ὅταν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδ’ ὄρος, ἀλλὰ δὴ ὅσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω. οὕτω γὰρ ἑαυτὸς σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν μ’ ὑπ’, ἀλλ’ εἰ περιπατεῖν ὃ μ’, οὕτω δὲ γιγαντιάς εἰ δεῖ εἰ ἔχειν ἢ μ’, ἀλλ’ εἰ παλαιάται μ’ ὑπ’. ὄροις δ’ οὐδ’ ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὄροις περὶ τοῦ τέλους ὅσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ υπόθεσις ἀρχαῖ, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς παρακείσι τῷ τέλος ἀρχὴ ἦνερκῇ ὑπόθεσις. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνῃ, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο ὑπάρχῃ, εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνον, ὅσπερ ἔκει, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὄρθω, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν νοῦς ἀρχῆ τῶν τελῶν, τῇ δὲ πρᾶξεως τῇ τῆς νοησεως τελευτῃ, εἰ οὖν πᾶσι θρόπητος ὁ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μ’ ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ὁ ὁ ὁ λόγον εἰς τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ’ οὖ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος . . . τὸ τέλος μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τοῦτον ἀλλῆς δυνάμεως, ὥσα ἐνεκα τοῦ τελούς δεὶ πράξεις. ἀρετὴ is the moral structure or organisation, which, like all living
structures, strives to maintain itself: in suo esse perseverare con-
natur (Spinoza, Eth. iii. 6). Asked to define the ‘rightness’ of the
virtuous end, we can only answer—that it is being the end which
human nature, as a well-known type, is seen to propose to itself.
It is the life which this particular organism, as a matter of fact,
strives to lead. Our answer is thus given in the same way as it
would have to be given, if the question were—How do you define
the ‘rightness’ of (say) a sparrow’s σκοπός?

Φύσις ή καθ’ έκαστα, as here described in relation to ηθική ἀρετή,
is the consciousness of the moral structure or organisation, in so
far as this consciousness manifests itself in the delicate perception
of the particular things which are advantageous or hurtful to the
structure.

The four parts are (1) τὸ εὐπρεπομονικόν, with its ἀρετή—
σοφία, (2) τὸ λογιστικόν, with its ἀρετή—φρόνησις, (3) τὸ ἰσχυρικόν, with
its ἀρετή—θεωρητική ἀρετή, and (4) τὸ θρησκευτικόν, with its ἀρετή—γρίες.

a. 10. ἀρετή τοιαύτη] is ἀρετή which can be regarded as a μέρος of ἡ ἐλή
ἀρετή (see note on § 5 above), and more especially (as is shown by
the explanatory clause οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν) ηθική
ἀρετή.

§ 7. ἀνωθεν] Ramsauer compares E. N. viii. i. 6 καὶ περί αὐτῶν
τοιῶν ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητούσιν καὶ φυσικότερον—where see note.

a. 18. ἢ δὲ ἐπερόν τι καὶ μὴ δὲ αὐτά] ἢ δὲ ἄλλο τι, ἢ χρήματα ἢ ἡδονή, τὸ
δίκαιον τοιούτα, καὶ μὴ δὲ ἐαντό (Paraph.).

a. 19. οὗν] here = ‘i.e.—see Waitz, Organon vol. i. p. 280—‘Aris-
toteles saepo voce οὗν ita utitur, ut explicit (scilicet, nempe), non ut
exempla afferat.’

For the doctrine of this §, see E. N. ii. 4.

a. 20. § 8. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαιρέσειν ἄρθην ποιεῖ ἢ ἄρετή, τὸ δὲ δεικτὶ ἐκείνης
ἔνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄλλο ἐτέρας δυνάμεως]
Grant says—‘There is some confusion here in speaking of the
means to a purpose, προαιρέσεις itself being in the Aristotelian
psychology a faculty of means; but cf. Eth. Eud. ii. i. 5–6 [1227
b. 36], where προαιρέσεις is said to imply both end and means, and
whence the present passage is repeated almost verbatim, ἐστὶ γὰρ
πᾶσα προαιρέσεις τινὸς καὶ ἕνεκα τινὸς. οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστιν, οὐ
αἰτία ἢ ἀρετή τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα. ἐστὶ μένυν ἡ προαιρέσεις οὐ τούτον,

I think that Grant is mistaken in supposing (as he seems to do) that there is any deviation marked here from Aristotle's doctrine of προαίρεσις as 'faculty of means.' The writer says distinctly ἕτει μέτιν η ἱπροάρεσις οὐ τοῦτον (i.e. of the end), ἀλλὰ τῶν τοῦτον ἔνεκα (the means); and if he gives us to understand that προαίρεσις 'implies both end and means,' he only expresses what is involved in Aristotle's and his own view of προαίρεσις as faculty of means—sc. of means to a certain end. There is no more awkwardness, I think, in saying τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὁρθῶν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἔκκινη (sc. τῆς προαίρεσεως) ἐνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἐστι τῆς ἀρετῆς, than in saying, as both Aristotle (Ἑ.Ν. iii. 2. 1) and Eudemus (Ἑ.Ε. ii. 11. 1228 a. 2) say, that we judge of a man's character (i.e. his end) from his προαίρεσις—i.e. we think less of what his acts are in themselves, than of the end for which he chooses them as means. It must be remembered also that the popular meaning of προαίρεσις (to which 'Eudemus' may be allowed to revert here, without being thought guilty of much 'confusion') is that of 'general policy'—as in Demosth. 257. η ἱπροαίρεσις ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ πολιτεία. By ἐτέρας δυνάμεος we are to understand φρονήσεως. It points out to the man whose interest is in the good end, the things naturally fitted to serve as means to this end. These things he accordingly chooses and does.

ἐπιστήσασι] sc. τὴν διάνοιαν.

§ 9. τῶν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπῶν] 'a given end'—i.e. δεινότης, or a. 24. 'cleverness,' is the power of discovering and employing the means which lead to any end which happens to be in view—no account being taken, so far as the notion of δεινότης is concerned, of the morality of the end. θευτότης, of course, operates largely in non-moral fields, where it undergoes no transformation: but in the moral field, when it is habitually enlisted in the cause of a good end, it becomes the ἐξις of φρόνησις; when habitually enlisted in the cause of a bad end, the ἐξις of πανωργία. In Ἑ.Ε. ii. 3. 1221 a. 12 (in the ὑπογραφή of doubtful authenticity), φρόνησις is given as the μεσότης between πανωργία and εὐθεία.

τυγχάνειν αυτῷ] αὐτῷ (i.e. τού οἰκοποῦ) is Bywater's reading for a. 25. the αὐτῷ of the MSS. I think that Ἑ.Ε. ii. 11. 1227 b. 40 is
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BOOK VI: CHAP. 12: §§ 9, 10.

1144 a. 25. against Bywater’s reading—το μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, διὰ ἕνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεί πράττειν.

a. 27. διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμέν εἶναι] These words are to be construed (as by Eustr. and the Paraph.) in the obvious way—τοὺς φρονίμους being the subject, and δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους the predicate. It is adduced as a proof of the close connexion which the writer wishes to establish, between δεινότης and πανουργία on the one hand, and δεινότης and φρόνησις on the other, that ‘even the φρόνιμοι are often popularly described as δεινοὶ and πανούργοι’—i. e. that the terms φρόνιμος, δεινός, and πανούργος are used (inaccurately, of course, but still used) interchangeably.

Michelet construes—διὸ καὶ φαμεν τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ πανούργους εἶναι δεινοὺς, but does not satisfactorily explain the omission of the article before πανούργους in the existing text. Ramsauer (followed by Susemihl) inserts the article before πανούργους. It may perhaps be thought that οὗ, which CCC reads before πανούργους, is a fragment of an original τοῦ. Fritzsche quotes Plato, Theaet. 177 A δεινοὶ καὶ πανούργοι, and Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9 πανούργος δὲ καὶ δεινὸς ἀνθρώπος πράγματι χρήσασθαι.

a. 28. § 10. οὖχ ἡ δύναμις] Bekker’s οὖχ ἡ δεινότης is the reading of Mb alone. Not only do the great MSS.—Kb and Lb—read δύναμις, but the inferior ones—Cambr., CCC, NC, B1, B2, and B3—also. Accordingly Susemihl and Bywater revert to δύναμις. I agree with Ramsauer (against Rassow, Forsch. p. 63) when he says—‘οὖχ ἡ δύναμις nullo modo ferri potest, nisi addatur (ἡ δύναμις) αὐτῇ. Optime, ut sexcenties, Bekkerus de Nic. meruit corrigens δεινότης.’ It is to be noted that the Paraph. Heliodorus has—ἐστι δὲ ἡ φρόνησις οὖχ αὐτή ἡ δύναμις, ἡ δεινότης, ἀλλ’ κ.τ.λ.

a. 29. ἡ δ’ εἴει τῷ ὁματὶ τούτῳ κ.τ.λ.] Eustratius (followed by Zell, Fritzsche, and Grant) is plainly wrong in regarding the ὁματι here as νοῦς πρακτικός. The passages quoted by these editors (e.g. Ε.Ν. vi. 11. 6 διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐξείν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὁματα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς, ἣ 6. 12 ὡς γὰρ ἐν σῶματι ὁματι, ἐν ψυχῇ νοὺς) certainly show that νοῦς is described as ὁματα or ὁματι: but the question here is—What does τῷ ὁματὶ τούτῳ mean? and it surely can only mean the δύναμις of δεινότης, which becomes the εἴει of φρόνησις (or νοῦς πρακτικός), when ὑμετέρα has taken it into its service. Grant compares Plato, Rep. 518. It will be seen that the δύναμις or ὁματα of Plato answers to the δεινότης or
innate capacity of E. N. vi. 12. 10, not to φρόνησις—518 B Δεί δή, 1144 a. 29.

[Ramsauer makes a difficulty about the statement thus a. 30. referred to, and comes to the conclusion that it is not to be found, and must have occurred in a lost passage—most likely in the present Book. But what is the statement? Virtually, that ἄρετή makes the σκοπός of the δόμα τῆς ψυχῆς good, and so makes the ὄψις of this δόμα an ἐπανετή ἔξεις. This has been said several times in §§ 6–9. I cannot understand why Ramsauer declines to recognise the remarks in these §§ as referred to by ὅς ἐίρηται.

οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἄρχην ἔχοντες εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ.] a. 31. ἔχοντες εἰσίν (if the reading is sound) must be taken as equivalent to ἔχουσιν: so the Paraph.—οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν, οὓς δηλοῦσι συλλογιζόμενοι πράττομεν, ἄρχας ἔχουσι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων. For the Practical Syllogism, see notes on vii. 3. 9. Ramsauer suspects τὸ τυχόν, which he regards as inappropriate where τὸ ἄριστον is concerned. This objection seems a little hypercritical.
CHAPTER XIII.

Argument.

As Prudence is related to Cleverness, so is Virtue strictly so called related to natural virtue. That there is such a thing as natural virtue is plain: people are born with tendencies to acquire this or that virtuous disposition—temperance, or courage, or justice: such tendencies are constitutional or natural. Unless directed by reason they are obviously harmful; but under the direction of Reason, i.e. of Prudence, they settle down into habits and become virtues strictly so called. Thus, as we find Cleverness and Prudence under the opining part of the soul, so we find natural virtue and virtue strictly so called under the moral part: and virtue strictly so called does not come into existence without Prudence. Hence Socrates held that the virtues are so many forms of Prudence. He was wrong in simply identifying the virtues with Prudence, right in so far as he recognised that Prudence is necessary to them. And this is what all now recognise in their definition of Virtue as 'a habit in relation to certain objects—determined,' they add, 'as the right ratio requires,' meaning by 'right' that determined by Prudence. A slight alteration, however, is necessary in this definition. Virtue is not only 'a habit determined as the right ratio requires,' for the right ratio might be a law external to the 'virtuous disposition—rather, Virtue is 'a habit which has the right ratio in itself.'

It is plain then from what has been said that a man cannot be good in the strict sense without Prudence, or prudent without moral virtue: and it is by means of the distinction which we have drawn between Virtue strictly so called and natural virtue that we meet the dialectical argument which tries to show that the virtues may exist separately in a man—that he may have this virtue, and not yet have acquired that. The 'virtues' which this argument manipulates are only the 'natural virtues,' which indeed may exist separately; but as for the virtues which constitute the character of the good man strictly so called, they cannot exist separately. If a man have Prudence, he will at the same time have all the virtues. Even if Prudence did not help conduct, we should need it as being the excellence of a part of the soul; as it is, however, it does help conduct; without it and Virtue choice would not be right; for Virtue gives the good end and makes it attractive, Prudence discovers means such as virtuous choice can adopt.

As for the difficulty about Prudence being mistress of Wisdom—It is no
more so than medical science is mistress of health. Prudence does not use
Wisdom as a means, but provides that Wisdom shall abound. It is for, not to
Wisdom that Prudence issues commands. Prudence stands to Wisdom, as the
State stands to the gods whose worship it regulates.

§ 1. καὶ γὰρ . . . πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν] The reading of L, O, NC is 1144 b. 1.
tempting—παραπλησίως γὰρ ἔξει ὡς κ.τ.λ. for the καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παρα-
πλησίως ἔξει ὡς κ.τ.λ. of the other MSS.: in any case, however, the
ἀναλογία is given incorrectly: it ought to be—ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν
dεινότητα, οὔτω καὶ ἡ κυρία ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν φυσικὴν. One is also tempted
to think that οὐ ταῦτα λέγει, ὃμοιον δὲ is an interpolation. If we retain
it, we must understand ἡ δεινότης τῆς φρονήσεως: and might then be
ready to agree with Rassow (Forsch. p. 126) that the terms of the other
ratio are given in the correct order—οὔτω ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς
tὴν κυρίαν.

πάντας γὰρ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.] The doctrine of φυσικὴ ἀρετή, or a constitu-
tional tendency to goodness, which lends itself kindly to moral train-
ing, is, Fritzsche (E. E., note here pp. 146–7, and note on E. E.
iii. 7. 1233 b. 16) takes pains to show, a Eudemian development of
hints supplied by Aristotle—e.g. in E. N. ii. 1. 3, ii. 5. 5, x. 8. 2,
x. 9. 8. It is true that the doctrine of φυσικὴ ἀρετή is very definitely
presented in the E. E., as will be seen from the passage quoted
below; but I think that justice is scarcely done to Aristotle's state-
ments on the subject, when they are summarily described as
'hints:'—'Confidentius ut de rebus exploratis loquitur Eudemus
quam facit Aristoteles, ex cujus quasi adumbrationibus . . . haec
doctrina petita est' (Fritzsche ad E. E. 1233 b. 16). The state-
ment of Aristotle (referred to by Fritzsche) in E. N. ii. 1. 3 ὄν' ἡρα
φύσει ὀΰτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἄρεται, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν
δεξαμενα ἀνάδεικται, τελειομέναις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους, seems to go far beyond
a hint. Nor must we forget, in estimating Aristotle's position in
relation to this doctrine, to take into account the prominence which
he gives to εὐγένεια (defined as ἀρετὴ γένους: see note on i. 8. 16
euγενείαι 1099 b. 3), and to national character (see Pol. H. 6. 1327 b.
18 sqq.), and to the continuity of mental, as well as of corporeal forms,
in the ascending scale of organic life generally: see Hist. Anim. Θ.
1. 588 a. 16 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ἀλλὰν φύσιν τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὴν γένεσιν
tοῦτον ἔχει τῶν τρόπων: αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ οἱ βίοι κατὰ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰς
τροφὰς διαφέρουσιν. *Ενεπτι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων
ἐχθιν τῶν περὶ τήν ψυχήν τρόπων, ἀπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει φανερότερα
τὰς διαφόρας: καὶ γὰρ ἡμερότης καὶ ἀγριότης, καὶ πράξεις καὶ χαλεπότης, καὶ
1144 b. 4. ἀνδρία καὶ δείλια, καὶ φόβοι καὶ θάρρη, καὶ θυμοὶ καὶ πανουργία καὶ τῆς περὶ
tῆς διάνοιας συνήθεσις ένεισεν ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότηται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν
μερῶν ἐλέγομεν. Τά μὲν γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἠττὸν διαφέρει πρὸς τῶν
ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν γόνων (ἐνα γὰρ τῶν τουτῶν
ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐνά δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴους μᾶλλον), τὰ δὲ τῶν
ἀνόλογων διαφέρει οhower, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τέχνη καὶ σοφία καὶ σύνεσις, οὕτως
ἐνίας τῶν γόνων ἕστι τις ἐξέρχεται ταχύτερος φυσικὴ δύναμις. Φανερώτατον δ’
ἐστι τὸ τουτόν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν παιδῶν ἥλικίαν βλέψασιν ἐν τούτωι γὰρ τῶν
μεν ὑστερον ἔχουν ἐστομένων ἐστιν ἰδεῖν οἷον ἔρχεται καὶ σπέρματι, διαφέρει δ’
οὐθεὶν ὡς εἵπειν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς τῶν θηρίων ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν θυρίων τούτων, ὡστ’
οὕδεν ἄλογον εἰ τὰ μὲν ταῦτα τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια τὰ δ’ ἀνόλογον ὑπάρχει τοῖς
ἄλλοις ζῴους. Οὕτω δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἄνυψων εἰς τὰ ζώα μεταβαίνει κατὰ μικρὸν ἡ
φύσει, ὡστε τῇ συνεχείᾳ λανθάνεις τὸ μεθόριον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ μέσον ποτέρων
ἔστιν.

The most definite statement of the doctrine of φυσικὴ ἀρετῆ in the
E. E. is that in iii. 7. 1234 a. 24 sqq. The writer is speaking of the
παθητικα μεσότητες (αἰδώς, νέμεσις, φιλία, σεμρότης, εὐτραπελία) and their
respective extremes, and he says—πάσαι δ’ ἄνται αἱ μεσότηται ἐπεισεῖν
μὲν, οἷκ εἰσὶ δ’ ἀρεταί, οὐδ’ αἱ ἀνεία τίθην: ἀνείαν προαιρέσεως γὰρ. ταῦτα
δὲ πάντ’ ἐστίν ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθημάτων διαφέρεσις· ἔκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος
ti ἐστίν. διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ ἐνεῖα εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἀρετὰς’ ἐστὶ
γὰρ, ὡσπερ λεχθῆσαι ἐν τοῖς υστερον, ἐκάστη ποι ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ
ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως. ὁ μὲν οὖν φώνη ς εἰς αἰδείας συμβάλλεται (πρὸς
γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἄντ’ αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ἡ αἰδώς εἰς
σοφροσύνην, διὸ καὶ ὁρίζεται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τῷ σωφρόσυνῃ. Here
an attempt is made to distinguish separate natural or constitutional
bases in the πάθη, not only for separate virtues, but for separate
vices: and it may be at once admitted that Aristotle supplies only
hints for such detail, as when he says of the courage διὰ τῶν θυμῶν
E. N. iii. 8. 12—φυσικοτάτη δ’ ἑοικεν ἡ διὰ τῶν θυμῶν εἰναι, καὶ προσλα-
βοῦσα προαιρέσει καὶ τὸ ὑν ἐνεκα ἀνδρεία εἰναι, and when he recognises
the value of αἰδώς as a quality in the young, E. N. iv. 9. 3. The
passage in the M. M., parallel to E. N. vi. 13. §§ 1–5 is as follows
—i. 34. 1197 b. 36 ὡσπερ δ’ ἔχει ἡ διεύθυνσις πρὸς φρονήσιν, οὕτως δόξειν
ἄν ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀπασοῦ̂ν. λέγω δὲ οὖν εἰςιν ἀρεταὶ καὶ φύσει ἐν
ἐκάστοις ἑγγνώμεναι, οἷον ὁρμαὶ τινες ἐν ἐκατότροτο ἄνειν λόγον πρὸς τὰ ἀνδρεῖα
καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καθ’ ἐκαστήν πρὸς τὰ τωιταί’ εἰςι δὲ δὴ καὶ εὖς καὶ
προαιρέσει. αἱ δὲ δὴ μετὰ λόγου οὖσα τελεῖς ἀρεταὶ ἐσων ἐπαναλαμβάνει
ἐπεγνώμεναι. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ φυσική ἀρετῆ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀνει λόγον χωριζόμεν μὲν
τοῦ λόγου μικρὰ καὶ ἀπολυπτομένη τοῦ ἐπανειδήθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν
σωφρονικοί] capable of becoming σώφρονες.

καὶ τάλλα ἔχομεν] i. e. are capable of acquiring the other ἔξεις, b. 6. or have the other ἔξεις potentially.

§ 2. εἰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει] The highest b. 12. moral life consists in the greatest possible αὐτάρκεια of the inner, or rational, as distinguished from the outer, or sensitive, man. But reason and sense are not to be regarded as two entities having no part in each other, the one being the principle of morality, and the other of immorality. If this were the distinction, it would be difficult to understand Aristotle’s view of a voluntary act, as one springing from any ἀρχὴ within the man, whether it be ἐπιθυμία, θυμὸς, or λόγος (E. N. iii. 1. 20), and his definition of προαίρεσις as βουλευτικῆ ὁρεῖς (E. N. iii. 3. 19). The moral reason is no mere abstraction out of contact with the passions, but it is the Form (εἶδος) and they are the Matter (τὸ δεκτικὸν)—not antagonistic, but really complementary forces which morality seeks to harmonise. Choice, or προαίρεσις, wherein man appears so clearly as an ἀρχὴ—without which there would be no such thing as morality, belongs as much to the sensitive and emotional, as to the rational side of human nature, and presupposes the power of performing voluntary (ἐκοῦσια) acts, which irrational beings have no less than man. As the objects of the scientific νοῦς are always presented in a particular ὅλη, so the ὀρθὸς λόγος, or moral organism, of which νοῦς
πρακτικός is the consciousness, is an ἐνυλος λόγος, an equilibrium of real passions. The inner, or rational, is the Form of the outer, or sensitive man. The moral reason is the εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων. Aristotle thus avoids the extreme Socratic position—that virtue is knowledge, and vice consequently involuntary, without surrendering the truth that reason is essential to morality. Morality is the perfection of the form of a given matter. In plants, their manner of growth—is the form. Animals are conscious of their organisms in the schemata of pleasure and pain; and mere ὑπότις is the exponent of their form, so that whatever thwarts mere ὑπότις is not themselves. Acts done from mere ὑπότις by man are his own acts, and voluntary, because in him the sensible nature is the material vehicle of the rational moral nature, and if he is to have credit for achieving the perfect form, he must be responsible for acts which hinder its reception—if virtue is in his power, vice must also be in his power. This is the practical consideration which makes Aristotle, in treating of τὸ ἐκούων, represent man as coextensive with his ὑπότις of all kinds. There is therefore no contradiction between the statements that Reason is the Man (e.g. E. N. ix. 8. 6), and that acts done from ἐπιθυμία and θυμὸς, as well as those done from λόγος, are voluntary, i.e. the man’s own acts (E. N. iii. 1. 21). Reason is the Form taken by the whole sensitive nature. The more clearly a man sees that Reason is himself, the more readily will he hold himself responsible for all acts of the sensibility which stand in the way of the final victory of Reason. A central government becomes strong and succeeds in crushing lawlessness in the provinces, only by holding itself—its own weakness—responsible for the lawlessness.

The education of the young citizen under νόμος consists in the process of centralising the ἀρχή of his nature. At first he acts κατὰ λόγον—in accordance with an external standard, supplied by the νομοθέτης, which he could not see unless it were pointed out to him, and would not conform to unless he were constrained. As time goes on, he begins to see for himself what is right, and to desire, independently of external constraint, to do it, till at last he acts μετὰ λόγον—in accordance with a standard which he has now appropriated to himself and assimilated: see E. N. vi. 13. 5 ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ’ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὁρθοῦ λόγου ἔξις ἀρετή ἔστω. By habituation the natural tendencies to proper conduct (αἱ φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί) become fixed in relation to one another; and as
they become fixed, the consciousness of their relation to one another becomes clearer, and more capable of serving as a principle of guidance, when circumstances arise in which the due relation is likely to be disturbed. Φυσικὴ ἀρετή becomes κυρία ἀρετή, by habituation, under the eye of φρόνημα, which itself becomes clearer as the passions are reduced to order (E. N. vi. 13. 6). Αἰδώς, for example, is the natural basis of σωφροσύνη (E. E. iii. 7. 1234 a. 32). This natural tendency to refrain from acts of intemperance is strengthened by education till it begins to attract its possessor's attention, and he makes 'intemperance' and 'temperance' objects of moral reflection in relation to other objects of moral experience. This is the beginning of φρόνημα, which reacts upon the incipient habit of temperance—ensures its fixture by keeping it steadily in consciousness, and determines its place in relation to other habits similarly made objects of reflection: cf. Shaftesbury's reflected sense, by the operation of which a creature rises from 'mere goodness' to 'virtue' I.

κυρίως ἀρετή] It is not till a man becomes fully conscious for b. 14. himself of the order of his moral nature, and delicately sensitive to all that makes for or against it—that he is virtuous in the strict sense of the term—i.e. virtuous in his own right, and a law to himself.

δομαστικοῦ] See note on vi. 5. 8.

ἡ κυρία ὁδ γίνεται ἀνευ φρονήματος] He has told us in ch. 12. b. 16. § 10 that ἀδύνατον φρονήματος εἶναι μὴ ὑπάρχῃ. Trendelenburg (Hist. Beiträge zur Philos. ii. 385-6) discusses this apparent circle, remarking that 'Dialectic can easily exhibit a relation of mutuality

1 Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, Book i. Pt. 2. § 2—'When in general, all the Affections or Passions are suited to the publick good, or good of the species . . . then is the natural temper entirely good . . . § 3 But to proceed from what is esteemed mere Goodness, and lies within the reach and capacity of all sensible creatures, to that which is called Virtue or Merit, and is allowed to man only—In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are objects of the affection, but the very actions themselves, and the affections of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects; so that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike.'
1144 b.16. as a vicious circle. We must look out of the dialectical circle, as it were, beyond the \textit{relata} themselves, and enquire after the cause which has brought them into this relation of mutuality. We shall then see that \textit{ἀρετή} and \textit{φρόνησις} grow up \textit{together} in the citizen, because the \textit{νοῦς}, or \textit{φρόνησις} \textit{ἄρχιτεκτονικὴ} of the \textit{νομοθετής}, which produces both, cannot, as a matter of fact, produce the one without producing the other. The fully formed \textit{ἐξίσιν} of \textit{κυρία ἀρετή} is the assured order of the passions, and the order is not assured till the subject is clearly conscious for himself of its essential lines. This clear consciousness of the moral order is the fully formed \textit{ἐξίσιν} of \textit{φρόνησις}:

\textit{Σωκράτης} See Grant's note \textit{ad loc.}, in which it is concluded from the absence of the article that 'the actual and historical Socrates is designated' here. It is scarcely necessary to say that the bald doctrine—\textit{πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας εἶναι} attributed by Eudemus in i. 5. 1216 b. 2 sqq. to \textit{Σωκράτης} \textit{ὁ πρεσβύτης}, and by the writer of the \textit{M.M.} in i. i. 1182 a. 16 to \textit{Σωκράτης}, and in 1183 b. 8 sq. to \textit{ὁ Σωκράτης}, is not the doctrine either of the historical or of the Platonic Socrates. \textit{Συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτῷ (συ. \textit{Σωκράτει}) ἐπιστήμας ποιοῦντι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀναρέων τὸ ἀλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, τούτο δὲ ποιῶν ἀναρέει καὶ πάθος καὶ ἥδος} (\textit{M.M.} i. i. 1182 a. 20) is a captious inference from isolated statements of Socrates or Plato, not a fair account of the theory of either, which did not differ essentially from that of the Aristotelian school.

b. 19. \textit{ἐξῆσεν} Eustr. connects \textit{ἐξῆσεν} with the circumstance that Socrates philosophised \textit{dialecticōs καὶ ζητητικῶς}.

b. 21. \textit{§ 4. καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες} Fritzsche has an important note here (\textit{E. E. p. 147})—'Ego interpreter \textit{nunc, quum valeat doctrina Peri-}
§ 5. μικρὸν μεταβῆναι

Socrates made the ἀρετὴν λόγον, the writer says: they are not λόγοι, but ἔξεις, περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, κατὰ λόγον—οὔτε λόγον, for the λόγος which the πάθη of the κυρίωσ ἀγαθὸς obey is not an external one,—not that of law which a man conforms to, but of principle which he reveres. The κυρίωσ ἀγαθὸς performs his virtuous acts proprio moit, according to a standard which he has assimilated—with which he identifies himself: see Eustratius—οὐ γὰρ μοῦν ὅσ μέτρον δεῖ τάξα τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων τῆς κατ’ ἀρετῆν ἐνεργείας ἡ πείσεως, ἵνα εἰπῃ πάντα τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς κατ᾽ αὐτῶν τὸ γὰρ μέτρον ἐνδείξεται ποτὲ τοῦ μετρουμένου χωρίζονται: οὐκ δεῖ δὲ ποτὲ πράττειν ἡ πάσχεων κατ’ ἀρετῆν, χωρίζομεν ἡ προσνομεσις, ἀλλὰ δεῖ παρεῖναι καὶ τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων ἄει, καὶ μετ’ αὐτῶν τὰ πράξεις γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς πεύκες ἓνα κατ’ ἀρετῆν γίνοντο, καὶ η μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἔξεις ἀρετῆς ἐστί. Cf. also the Paraphrast, who has τὸ γὰρ κατὰ λόγον διαφέρει τοῦ μετὰ λόγου κατὰ λόγον γὰρ τις ποιεῖ τι, καὶ ἔτερον κυνούντος, καὶ τὸ τέλος σκοποῦντος, ὥσπερ ἡ φύσις κατὰ λόγον ποιεῖ· μετὰ λόγον δὲ, ὅταν αὐτὸς εἴδος πράττῃ, καὶ τὸ τέλος σκοποῦν κατὰ λόγον ποιη. The introduction of consciousness (ὅτως αὐτὸς εἴδος πράττῃ) by the Paraphrast, as discriminating τὸ μετὰ λόγου from τὸ κατὰ λόγον, is unfortunate. It is true that in man the rule of an internal principle is the rule of consciousness, or conscience; but surely plant life, from which consciousness is absent, is also ruled by an internal principle (ἡ γὰρ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ), and if the term λόγος is used to express the law of that life, it ought to be used in the formula μετὰ λόγου, not, as by the Paraphrast, in the formula κατὰ λόγον. We shall avoid confusion if we take μετὰ λόγου to mark an inward principle (whether its inwardness appear as self-con-

1144 b. 26. Sciousness, or merely as the organic unity of the physical individual), and κατὰ λόγον an external rule. Thus, a temple is built κατὰ λόγον: a tree grows μετὰ λόγον.

b. 32. § 6. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος . . . . . . . πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν] The writer of the M. M. helps us to understand the real nature and object of the dialectical argument (ὁ λόγος . . . ὁ διαλεξιθεί τις τῶν) referred to here, which tries to prove that the ἄρεται are independent of one another. Its real object is to make a casuistical interpretation of duty possible, by showing that there may be 'a conflict of duties' in any given case—that man is nothing but a bundle of separate virtuous tendencies, any one of which may be indulged at the expense of the others. His words are—M. M. ii. 3. 1199 b. 36 ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ τουτόν ἀπορίαν, ὃν ἐπεδίωκαν μὴ ἣ ἀμα πράξας ταῦτα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, πώτερ' ἂν τις πράξειν; ἐν μὲν δὲ ταῦτα φυσικάς ἄρετας ἐφαμέν τὴν ὀρχὴν μὸνον [δεῖν] τὴν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ λόγου ὃ ὦ ἐστὶν ἀρέσις, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ ἔχοντι ἐστὶν. ὡστε ἀμα τὸ ἐλέσθαι [καὶ] παρέσται καὶ ἡ τελεία ἄρετή ὑπάρχει, ἢ ἐφαμέν μετὰ φρονήσεως εἶναι, ὥν ἄνευ δὲ τῆς φυσικῆς ὀρχῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν. οὐδ' ἐναντιώστεται ἄρετὴ ἄρετῇ. πέφυκεν γὰρ ὑπείκειν τῷ λόγῳ, [ἡ] ὅσ οὕτως προστάτητε, ὡστ' ἐφ' ὃ ὄν οὕτως ἄγη, ἐπὶ τούτο ἀποκλίνει. τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον οὔτος ἐστὶν ὁ ἀροῦμενος. οὐτε γὰρ ἄνευ τῆς φρονήσεως αὐτὸ ἄρεται γίνονται, οὐθ' ἡ φρονήσεις τελεία ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρετῶν, ἄλλα συνεργοῦσι πως μετ' ἀλλήλων ἑπακολουθοῦσα τῇ φρονήσει.

b. 35. τούτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἄρετας ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ.] The λόγισμ of the casuistical argument is that man is not a bundle of separate natural tendencies, but a moral organism: and that, as a matter of fact, the best men are conscious of this organism, and make the consciousness of it, and not feeling or natural inclination (however amiable), their guide in life.

1145 a. 1. ἀμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μεὶς ὑπαρχούση πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν] ὑπαρχούσῃ (Byw.) is the reading of Κ, Μ, Cambr.: ὁση is the reading of Λ, and other authorities, accepted by Bekker and Susemihl. I think that ὑπαρχούσῃ is better than ὁση, if we read the future ὑπάρξουσιν—'if φρόνησις is present, all the virtues will be present': but Λ, which reads ὁση, reads ὑπάρξουσιν. As for μεϊ—'it accords with ὁσῃ, but scarcely with ὑπαρχούσῃ. We seem to require—ἀμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει, μεϊ ὁσῃ, ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. As regards the doctrine of the sentence—ἐι δὲ ἄρετὴ, of which φρόνησις is the con-
consciousness, is the resultant of all the special ἀρεταὶ ὕψις, just as 1145 a. 1. εὐεξία is of the normal condition of all the bodily organs:—see E. E. ii. I. 1220 a. 2 ὥσπερ ἡ εὐεξία σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μόριον ἀρετῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ὑψίς ἀρετῆ § τέλος. Were it not for the resultant, the special ἀρεταὶ would be ἀρεταὶ only in an equivocal sense. If we can be sure that a man has really one virtue—e. g. σωφροσύνη, we may be sure that he has all the other virtues which make up the organism of ἡ ἱλί ἀρετῆ: but a man may have αἴδως, and not νέμεις, in his natural constitution. Grant remarks that the theory of this § approaches nearly to the Stoical idea of the wise man: cf. Diog. Laert. vii. § 125 (quoted by Michelet) τὰς δὲ ἀρετᾶς λέγουσιν (sc. οἱ Ἀριστοκρατοι) ἀντακολουθεῖν ἄλληλαις, καὶ τῶν μίαν ἐχοντα πάνων ἔχειν. On the general subject of the relation of φρόνησις to ἀρετῆ see note on ii. 6. 15.

§ 7.] This § recapitulates what has been said in ch. 12. § 4 and a. 2. §§ 7, 8.

§ 8.] Cf. M. M. i. 34. 1198 b. 9 πότερον δὲ αὕτη πάντων ἄρχει τῶν a. 6. ἐν τῇ ὑψίς, ὥσπερ διόκει καὶ ἀπορεῖται; ἡ οὖ; τῶν γὰρ βελτίων οὐκ ἀν δόξειν, οἷον τῆς σοφίας οὐκ ἄρχει. ἀλλα, φησίν, αὕτη ἑπιμελεῖται πάντων, καὶ κυρίω ἐστὶ προστάτουσα. ἀλλ ἵσως ἔχει ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ ὁ ἐπίτροπος, οὕτω γὰρ πάντων κύριος καὶ πάντα διοικεῖ· ἀλλ' οὕτω οὕτως ἄρχει πάντων, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζει τὸ δεσπότη χολήν, ὅπως ἄν ἐκείνος μὴ κωλυόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκκεῖται τοῦ τῶν καλῶν τι καὶ προσηκούντων πράττειν. οὕτω καὶ διόμοι τούτων ἡ φρόνησις ὥσπερ ἐπίτροπος τίς ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας, καὶ παρασκευάζει ταύτη χολήν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ αὕτης ἔργον, κατέχουσα τὰ πάθη καὶ ταύτα σωφρονίζουσα. Cf. Met. A. 2. 982 a. 14 καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν δὲ τὴν ἐαυτῆς ἔκειν καὶ τοῦ εἴδεναι χάραν αἱρετῆν οὕτως μᾶλλον εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀποβαίνοντων ἔκειν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχικωτέραν τὴς ὑπηρετούσης μᾶλλον εἶναι σοφίαν οὐ γὰρ δεῖν ἐπιστατεῖαι τῶν σοφῶν ἀλλ' ἑπιστάτην, καὶ οὐ τούτων ἐτέρῳ πείδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τῶν ἤτοι τοσοφόν. As was pointed out in note on vi. i. 1—4. 1138 b. 18, φρόνησις does not apprehend the ultimate standard. That is given by σοφία. The moral life is what it is in order to subserve the ideal of the speculative reason.
BOOK VII.

Introductory Note.—‘These chapters [vii. 1–10],’ says Grant, ‘form a necessary complement to the Aristotelian ethical system, taking a more practical point of view (ἄλλην ἀρχήν) than that which would divide mankind simply into the virtuous and the vicious. Moral systems in general have perhaps too much neglected this field of the intermediate states; and general language has not definitely adopted the distinction between the “Intemperate” [ἀκόλαστος], and the “Incontinent” [ἀκρατής], as the use of the English words at once testifies, for we are evidently obliged to give a certain special and technical meaning to the word “Intemperate,” in order to make it stand as the representative of ἀκόλαστος.’ Cf. the Aldine Scholiast on vii (not Aspasius, but ‘Anonymus rec.’—see Rose: Commentaire zur Ethik des Arist., Hermes, vol. v) fol. 117v—ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐκ ἐστι κυρίως ἀρετή ἀλλ' ἐγκρίθη τῇ ἀρετῇ . . . ἦ μὲν γὰρ ἐστιν η ἐγκράτεια ἐκ προσφέρεσις γυμνοῦ καὶ περὶ πρακτά καταγωγομένη, ἐσεκεν ἀρετῆς; ἦ δὲ πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἰσονομία ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλά μάχη τις καὶ στασιασμός, ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁ γὰρ ἐγκράτης ἐχει μὲν τῶν λόγων προστάσσοντα δεῖν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἱδονῶν τῶν αἰσχρῶν, τὴν δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχει μὴ ἀκολουθοῦσαν τῷ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἀντιτίθεμαι καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἱδονῶν ἀντέχεσθαι σπεύδοντας· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄρετῶν ἰσονομία τίς ἐστιν καὶ οὐ μάχη τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ ὁ σώφρων ἔχει μὲν τῶν λόγων προστάσσοντα δεῖν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἱδονῶν καὶ εὔθυς ἔχει τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπακολουθοῦσαν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ μὴ ἀντιτίθεμαιν ἀντικείμενη τῇ ἀρετῇ ήτοι τῇ ἐγκρατείᾳ ἐτέρα τίς ἐστι κακία παρὰ τὰς ἀλλὰς τὰς ἀντικείμενας ταῖς ἡθικῶς ἄρεταις ήγουν τὴν ἀκόλουθίαν τὴν δειλίαν καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς· ὁ γὰρ ἐγκράτης ἔχει μὲν τῶν λόγων ἐρρομένοιν ὅτι κακῶν

1 ‘Incorrigible’ is perhaps the closest rendering of ἀκόλαστος. He is the man who has no principle, and is an ‘incorrigible offender.’ ‘Intemperate,’ however, is amply justified by the fact that ἀκόλασις is the regular contrary of σωφροσύνη.
BOOK VII.

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The paradoxical character (τὸ ἀτόπον) of ἀκρασία, to which Socrates first called attention, made the state a favourite subject of discussion. Thus the chief difficulties in the notion of voluntary action present themselves to the writer of the Eudemian Ethics (Ε. Ε. ii. 7 and 8) in connexion with ἐγκράτεια and ἀκρασία: the writer of Ε. Ν. v discusses the puzzle of self-injury with immediate reference to the ἀκρασία (Ε. Ν. v. 9. 5); the interest of the writer of Ε. Ν. vii. chapters 1–10 in his subject is, to a considerable extent, a dialectical one; and the same remark applies to the writer of the Μ. Μ. ii. chapters 4, 5, and 6, who follows Ε. Ν. vii. 1–10 very closely, and probably (see Ramsauer Ε. Ν. p. 425) had no other treatment of the subject before him, when he wrote. It is the circumstance, as it seems to me, that ἀκρασία lends itself to dialectical discussion, rather than the intrinsic importance of the subject—great as that is1—which accounts for its remarkable prominence in the Aristotelian system, and more especially (as was to be expected) in the later versions of that system.

1 The necessity of assuming the existence of intermediate states between the confirmed ἐξεις, ἀρετὴ and κακία, is set forth by Alexander Aphrod. in his ἄπορία καὶ λόγος, iv. 3. p. xxx. Ald. ὅτι δυσκοιλίας τε καὶ ἀδυνας, καὶ δύο ἄρετης τε καὶ κακίας, ὅτι τις ἔξεις μεταφῆ. If there were no intermediate states, how, he asks, would it be possible to become virtuous? Everything comes either ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ορ ἐκ τοῦ μεταφῆ. If ἀρετὴ came ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, then κακία would be φῶς, and ἀρετὴ consequently παρὰ φῶς. Therefore ἀρετὴ and κακία are differentiated ἐκ τοῦ μεταφῆ.
CHAPTER I.

Argument.

Let us now pass to another division of our subject. Dispositions to be avoided are three, (1) Vice, (2) Incontinence, (3) Brutality. Virtue and Continence are plainly the contraries of Vice and Incontinence: the contrary of Brutality is not so plain; but may be taken to be superhuman virtue, such as we ascribe to heroes and to the gods. As this godlike virtue is rare among men, so is its opposite brutality—oftenest found among barbarians, and sometimes even caused by disease and mutilation. We shall return to it afterwards—at present we are concerned with those properly human dispositions which lie between the god and the brute. Of these dispositions, Vice and Virtue have been already discussed: there remain Incontinence and Softness, Continence and Endurance, the latter two belonging to the same genus as Virtue, but differing from it specifically; the former two belonging to the same genus as Vice, but differing from it specifically.

Let us conduct this enquiry in our usual way,—first stating the views held regarding these dispositions; then going through the difficulties in the views; then proceeding to establish, if possible, all the views backed by sufficient opinion, or, at least, the most of them, and the weightiest: for the purpose of this treatise will have been sufficiently served if, having removed certain confusions, we leave men's opinions to speak for themselves.

The following views, then, are held—

(1) Continence and endurance are good, incontinence and softness bad.

(2) The continent man is he who abides by the result of his reflection; the incontinent, he who falls away from it.

(3) The incontinent man acts under the influence of feeling, knowing that what he does is bad; the continent man, knowing that his desires are bad, obeys his reason and does not follow them.

(4) The temperate man is continent and enduring; while the converse of this statement some regard as universally true, and others do not.

(5) Some use the terms ' incorrigible' and ' incontinent' interchangeably; others distinguish between them.

(6) Some say that the prudent man cannot be incontinent; others say that prudent and clever people are sometimes incontinent.

(7) There is ' incontinence' in anger, and in the pursuit of honour and of material advantages.

1145 a 15. § 1.] In this section we have six states—(1) θεία ἀρετή, ἡ ἐπὶ ἄνθρωπον, (2) ἀρετή, ἡ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, (3) ἐγκράτεια, (4) ἀκρασία, (5) κακία, ἡ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, (6) θηριότης. Although the ἀρετή above ἐγκράτεια ἐν pari materia is σωφροσύνη (i.e. περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς
think that Grant is right in assuming, as he seems to do in his note on this section, that the terms ἀρετή and κακία, as here employed, are simply equivalent to σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία respectively. 'Ἀρετή here marks the character, as a whole, of the virtuous man, as distinguished from the god, whose attribute is τιμωτέρων ἀρετῆς, and κακία the character, as a whole, of the vicious man, as distinguished from the beast. This seems to be the view of the Ald. Schol. ad loc.—ἡ γὰρ κακία ἀντίκειται πάσαις ταῖς ἡθικαῖς ἁρεταίς; ἡ γὰρ δειλία καὶ ἡ βραζόντης καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἡ κακία ἀντίκειται ταῖς ἡθικαῖς ἁρεταίς. Similarly the Paraphrast Heliodorus describes the ἁρετὴ of this section as ἡ ἑρετή ἡ ἡθικὴ.

μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δὲ αὐτάρκειαν οὔθεν μέρος πόλεως. ὥστε ἡ θηρίων ἡ θεώς. Cf. Plut. de Vita et Poesi Homeri, 133 μένος θεοῦ καὶ θηρίου γέγονεν άνθρωπος . . . τὴν μὲν ἄκραν ἁρετήν θείαν ἴγνεται ὁμηρος], τὴν δὲ ἄκραν κακίαν θηριωδίαν, ὅς ἀστερον Ἀριστοτέλης ἐνόμισε. The brutes have neither ἁρετὴ nor κακία, because ἁρετὴ and κακία are states acquired by habituation (ἐξείσι); whereas the dispositions of brutes are what they are and φύσει. The Ald. Schol. and Heliod. explain this difference between man and the brutes by the presence of λόγος in man. The Ald. Schol. says—τοῖς μὲν θηρίους ἁρετή ὡς ἔστι διότι ἡ ἁρετή προαιρετὴ ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν λογικῶν ἐστὶν: and Heliod. has—οὔ γὰρ ἐστιν θηρίου κακία ἡ ἁρετή διὰ τὸ μὴ μετὰ λόγου ποιεῖν ἡ παρὰ τῶν λόγων: i. e. man lives in, and is conscious of (λόγως), a moral environment (πόλις), with the conditions of which he either may (ἁρετή), or may not (κακία) correspond. But the brutes are born into a merely physical environment, with which they are, from the first, in perfect correspondence. God, on the other hand, has no ἁρετή for ἁρετή is a ἔξει, or acquired capacity of correspondence with an environment, and represents the painful victory of organising form (λόγος) over matter (ὁμηρος)—ἐνέργεια ἄνεν δυνάμεως—νόμος νοῆσεως—the formative principle in him is not confronted by an alien matter, but regards itself alone. This conclusion, arrived at by an a priori method in Met. Λ. 7 and 9, is confirmed by considerations of a somewhat popular kind in Ἐ.Ν. x. 8. 7.

The expression τιμωτέρων ἁρετῆς 1145 a. 26 indicates that the
divine good is not a ἔξος, which is merely ἐπανεῖς, but an ἐνέργεια, which is τίμιον: see E. N. i. 12.

The genitive κακίας depends on ἔτερον: see Coraes ad loc.—διάφορων τι γένους παρὰ τὴν κακίαν, ὡς ἐξηγεῖται ἦ Ἀργυροπούλου—diversum quid est a vitio genus.

Bywater adds oâ. I like better Susemihl’s way of meeting the difficulty, by making σεῖος ἄνὴρ φασώ parenthetical. Coraes (with the approval of Rassow, Forsch. p. 126, and Susemihl ad loc.) reads οὗτος between φασών and οὗτος, on the strength of Plato, Meno. 99 D, which the writer of the present passage seems to have had in his mind—καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες δὴ τοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσιν καὶ οἱ Δάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκομιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θείος ἄνὴρ, φασίν, οὗτος. Argyropulus, as Coraes notes, favours ἦντος: his version is—Dicunt enim vir divus hic est. The Ald. Schol. also may have read οὗτος: his version is—οἱ Δάκωνες . . . ἔλεγον οὗτος ὁ ἄνηρ θεὸς ἐστιν ὃν θεῖος.


‘(1) Some men are born brutal; (2) others are made so; (3) others make themselves so’—Peters’ note ad loc. Τοὺς διὰ κακίαν ὑπερβάλλοντας, introduced by καὶ—δὲ, are distinguished as a third variety from (1) οἱ φύσει, i. e. βάρβαροι, and (2) οἱ δὲ νόσους.

We are to think of bodily mutilations and defects, not, with the Ald. Schol., of a defective moral nature—εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες, he says, πεπρωμένοι ἠτοι βεβαιμένοι ἐχουστε τὸ λογιστικόν καὶ τῶν συκίων φρενῶν ἐκκατάνεστε. Coraes, noting that Argyropulus has laesiones principii, suggests the reading περίφοιτος τῆς ἀρχῆς, and compares the πεπρωμένοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν of E. N. i. 9. 4: but the association of περίφοιτος with νόσου (frequent, as Fritzsche ad loc. notes, in the E. E. and in E. N. vii) seems conclusive in favour of understanding the former term of bodily injuries or defects.

§ 4. Ἰστερον] vii. 5.

perὶ δὲ κακίας εἰρηται πρῶτερον] E. E. iii. 2 (cf. E. N. iii. 10), if κακία be taken here rather in its special sense, as ἀκολουθία, than in the general sense of the contrary of ἱθικὴ ἀρετὴ. The Paraph.
probably takes it in the general sense: he says περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται 1145 α. 34. πρώτον, οὔτε περὶ ἀρετῶν ἐλέγομεν ἢδικῶν.

ουτε γὰρ ὃς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ α. 38. ἐκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑπολιπτέον, οὐθ’ ὃς ἔτερον γένος] Rassow (Forsch. p. 126) remarks on the extraordinary carelessness of the writing here, and supposes that the author, when he wrote περὶ, intended to use λεκτέον, as in the previous clause, but wrote ὑπολιπτέων instead. Coraes adopts the reading ὄσπερει for ὃς περὶ. Ramsauer notes the carelessness with which ἐκατέραν is used in the singular number, although, on the one side, three dispositions (ἀκρασία, μαλακία, and τρυφή) are enumerated, and, on the other side, two (ἐγκράτεια and καρτερία). ὄσπερ ὄντων, for ὃς περὶ, might be suggested, if it were not easier to accept the careless writing of the text as it stands.

'Ἐγκράτεια and ἀρετή (here = σωφροσύνη, apparently) belong to the same γένος, inasmuch as both result in good acts, where certain bodily pleasures are concerned; but differ κατ' εἶδος, in that the good acts proceeding from ἀρετή are done without, and those proceeding from ἐγκράτεια with, a struggle. Similarly, ἀκρασία and μοχθηρία (= ἀκολασία) belong to the same γένος, inasmuch as both result in bad acts; but they differ κατ' εἶδος, in that the bad acts proceeding from μοχθηρία are done without, and those proceeding from ἀκρασία with, a struggle. So also καρτερία produces good acts, where certain bodily pains are concerned, but after a struggle; and thus belongs to the same γένος as ἀρετή, but differs from it κατ' εἶδος: and μαλακία produces bad acts, where certain bodily pains are concerned, but after a struggle, thus belonging to the same γένος as μοχθηρία, but differing from it κατ' εἶδος. For the difference between the ἀκρατής and ἀκόλαστος see Ε. Ν. vii. 3. 2 ὁ μὲν γὰρ (sc. ἀκόλαστος) ἄγεται προαιρομένος, νομίζον ἄει δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἢδυ διώκειν ὁ δ’ (sc. ἀκρατής) οὐκ ἄκειται μέν, διώκει δέ. The Ald. Schol. marks the difference by saying that in the ἐγκράτης and ἀκρατής there is a μάχη τις, in the σωφρόνως and ἀκόλαστος αν ποιομαί τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς: cf. Plutarch, de Virt. Morali ch. 6 νῦν δὲ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐστιν, οὗ τὰ παθητῖκα ὄσπερ εὐθὺς θρέμα καὶ πρόν ὁ λογισμὸς ἱμαχεῖ καὶ μεταχειρίζεται, περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας χρώμενος ὑπείκοντι καὶ δεχομένῳ τῶν χαλινῶν καὶ κρατοῦτι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας· ἐγκράτειαν δὲ οὐκ ἄλλ᾽ ἀνέχει, οὐδὲ πειθομένη, ἀλλὰ πλαγίαν καὶ ἀντεσίσουσαν, οἷον ὑπὸ πληγῆς καὶ χαλινοῦ καταβιαζόμενοι καὶ ἀνακρονόμενοι, ἄγιος ὁ ἐν ἐαυτῷ καὶ θρόμβων μεστὸς· οἷον ὁ Μάτων ἐξεικνύει περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποξύγια, τοῦ χείρων πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἰγνομαχοῦσα ἀμα καὶ τὸν ἱνίχον διαιταράττοντος, ἀντέχειν
On the method of the present enquiry. First, we must state what men think on the subject (τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα): then, review the difficulties in the various opinions (διασφαλιστάς); but not in such a way as to overthrow any, or, at least, many of them (οὕτω δεικνύον μᾶλλον μὲν πάντα τὰ ἐνδοξά τε πεπάθη τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰ πλείστα καὶ κυριώτατα); for men’s opinions about matters of conduct, if certain confusions be cleared up (ἐὰν λύση τὰ δυσχέρη), will generally be found to be right. Cf. E. E. i. 6. 1216 b. 28 κράτιστον μὲν πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησαμένοις, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τρόπον γέ τις πάντας, ὅπερ μεταβιβάζομεν ποιήσωμεν: ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖον τε πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ δὲ ἀναγκαίων δεικνύοι πῶς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶν μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δὲ, προϊόσκεται ἐστι καὶ τὸ σαφῆς, μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν ἔωςτων λέγεσθαι συγκεχυμένοις. According to this view, the function of the moral philosopher is to introduce form into the matter already supplied by the common opinions of men. These opinions, often representing imperfect knowledge and states of feeling, and generally couched in misleading language, cannot, as they stand, combine to form a consistent theory of conduct. They necessarily conflict with one another at many points, if not in their substance, at least in their expression. The moralist has to note the points at which they conflict, and to present the exact nature of the conflict in every case as sharply as possible in a striking ἀπορία. When two conflicting opinions have been sharply defined side by side, the grounds on which each has been adopted will generally appear. Each is seen to embody part of the truth; each regards the same thing from a somewhat different point of view; or even perhaps it is not the same thing at all that is regarded, but two things which a word confounds. The detection of the equivocation, or other cause of misunderstanding, which has opposed two nearly correct
opinions as the *éuvaria* of an *áporia*, immediately removes the dead-lock, and enables the moralist to use the opinions as materials in the construction of his ethical system. Thus, ἡ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὐφρεσίς ἐστιν (*E. N.* vii. 2. 12), the λύσις being effected, not by the eristic method of championing the one ἐναντίον and discrediting the other, but by the method of examining the truth in each—by discovering ‘the grounds on which each has naturally approved itself,’ as Eudemus puts it in a passage (*E. E.* vii. 2. 1235 b. 13) which Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies* § 65) compares with the passage before us—ληπτέως δὴ τρόπος ὡστε ἡμῖν ἢμα τὰ τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων μᾶλλα ἀποδώσει, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντίωσεις. τούτο δ’ ἔσται, ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνηται τὰ ἐναντία δοκοῦντα· μᾶλλον γὰρ ὑμολογοῦμενον τοῦ τούτον ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φανομένοις. Cf. *E. N.* vii. 14. 3 ἐπεὶ δ’ οὖ μόνον δεῖ τάληθες εἰπέντε ἄλλα καὶ τὸ αἵτιον τοῦ ψεύδους· τούτο γὰρ συμβαλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν· ὅταν γὰρ εὐλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαινεται ἄληθες οἵ ἐν ἄληθες, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τὸ ἄληθεν μᾶλλον· ὅστε λεκτέον διὰ τί φαίνεται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἥδαιμοι αἰρετότεραι. A good example of the method of dealing with ἀπορίας recommended in *E. E.* vii. 2, is given in *E. N.* ix. 8. One λόγος, or view, condemns the φίλαυτος, another maintains that a man ought to love himself most. The *ἐναντίωσεις* here is caused by the ambiguity of the term αὐτός. The former view regards the lower and merely sensitive self, the latter the higher and rational self. Instead of being contrary views about the same thing, they turn out to be views about entirely different things.

Moral science then being, as it were, the *formation* of common opinions into a system, the moralist must begin by stating these opinions. He must next arrange them so as to bring out clearly the inconsistencies which they involve in relation to one another. He is then in a position to see more or less easily why they present themselves as inconsistent, and it suggests itself to him to reconcile the inconsistencies by drawing needful distinctions—as when in *E. E.* vii. 2 the discussion of the *ἀπορία* whether τὸ φιλοίμενον ἐστι τῷ ἴδῳ or τῷ ἄγαθῳ results in the establishment of three εἶδη of φιλία: or by applying an ‘appropriate idea’ instead of the inappropriate one which caused the *ἀπορία*—as in *E. N.* viii. 8. 1, where the appropriate idea of τὸ μεταμελητικὸν ἐλθαί is introduced, and enables us to see the ἀκόλουθος and ἀκρατής in their true relation to each other, which we could not do so long as the misleading idea of τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἂν (*E. N.* vii. 2. 10) was retained. Thus, by the method
the moralist hits upon the distinctions and ideas (together with the terminology to express them) which bring light and order into the rough material of popular opinion. These distinctions and ideas are not likely to be fanciful and arbitrary, for they have been forced upon the moralist by a careful study of the intricacies of his subject-matter. They will be οἰκείοι λόγοι τοῦ πράγματος (see Δ. Ε. i. 6. 1217 a. 9). In other words—ή λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὑρεσὶς ἐστιν. As most ἀπορίας are largely due to the ambiguities of common language, an important part of the method of τὸ διαπορθάαι is to distinguish τὰ πλεονάξως λεγόμενα. Thus, in Τορ. i. 13. 105 a. 21 this is given as the second of the four parts into which the method of dialectical enquiry is divided—τὰ δὲ ὀργάνω δὲ ἐν εὑρορήσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐστὶν τέταρτα: ἐν μὲν τῷ πρωτάσει λαθεὶς δεύτερον δὲ τῷ ποσαχῶς ἔκαστον λέγεται δύνασθαι διελεῖν τρίτον δὲ τῷ τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν, τέταρτον δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέφθη. The method sketched in the above passage, and fully explained in Τορ. i. chapters 14–18, is indicated in the section before us (Ε. Ν. vii. 1. 5), and followed, though not very systematically, in the enquiry prosecuted in Ε. Ν. vii. chapters 1–10. In the section before us, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα answers to τὸ πρωτάσει λαθεὶς: and τὸ δεικτικά τὰ ἕνδοξα (resulting from τὸ διαπορθάαι) corresponds to the εὑρορία effected by the detection of ambiguities (τὸ ποσαχῶς ἔκαστον λέγεται δύνασθαι διελεῖν), by the observation of distinctions which had been overlooked (τὸ τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν), and by the survey of the subject as a connected whole (ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέφθη), which the detection of ambiguities and the observation of distinctions render possible.

The value attached by Aristotle to τὸ διαπορθάαι καλῶς is well set forth in the following passage, Μελ. Β. i. 995 a. 24 sqq.—Ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζήτησιν ἐπιστήμην ἐπειδὴν ἦμας πρώτων, περὶ δὲ ἀπορήσασιν δεὶ πρῶτων ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ὡσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ἐπειλήψασι τινες, κἂν εἱ τι χωρὶς τῶν τυχόνων παρευραμένων. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῖς εὑρορήσασι βουλομένους προάγον τὸ διαπορθάεται καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὑστερον εὑρορία λύσις τῶν πρῶτων ἀπορομμένων ἐστὶν, λύσις δὲ ὡς ἐστὶν ἀγνοοῦντας τῶν δεισμῶν. ἀλλ᾿ ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλαὶ τούτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος· ἡ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ, ταῦτα παραπλησιὸν πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένους· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρῶτον. διὸ δὲ τὰς διαχερείας τεθεωρήκειν πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε τὰ ἱαρὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ τούτων ζητοῦντας ἀδυνατον τὸ διαπορθάει πρῶτων ὁμοίως ἐνεάτος τοῖς ποῖς δὲ βαθίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτως ὁδῷ εἰ ποτε τὸ ἡξτούμενον εὑρέθηκεν ἡ μὴ γινώσκειν τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν ὦ
BOOK VII: CHAP. 1: § 5.

The conditions of moral and political welfare (as distinguished from the recondite laws of the physical world) are represented with substantial accuracy in the common opinions of men; for if common opinions had misrepresented conditions so essential to its survival, the human race must have long ago perished. These common opinions, arbitrary and accidental though they may often seem, are really, like the colours of flowers and the markings of insects, parts of the rational or 'noumenal' world, not mere opaque 'phenomena' which hide it from our sight. Hence the moralist fulfils a function of the first philosophical importance, when he detects and removes certain obscurities and confusions which prevent a connected view of the whole body of experience represented by ἐνδοξά.

ἐὰν γὰρ . . . ἵκανῶς] The Ald. Schol. and the Par. take τὰ b. 6. δυσχερῆ to mean false ideas—τοῦς λόγους τοῦς μὴ συμβαίνοντας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ (Par.)—ὅσα μὲν τῶν δοξῶν ἔχονται ἀληθείας ταύτας λαβεῖν, ὅσα δὲ εἰς πεπλανημέναι καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἕξω ταύτας ἐᾶσαι (Ald. Schol.); but λόγην τὰ δυσχερῆ cannot mean the rejection of false views, the reference plainly being to the λόγις τῆς ἀπορίας which is εὕρεσις, or εὐπορία. The δυσχερῆ here are evidently the δυσχέρεια or δεσμῶς of the passage quoted above, Met. b. i. 995 a. 24 sqq., i.e. the causes of the various ἀπορίαι, such e.g. as the reason why two ἐνδοξά, each of which is apparently well-founded in itself, seem to contradict and discredit each other. When this reason has been detected, then καταλείπεται τὰ ἐνδοξά—each of the two ἐνδοξά is seen to be true from its own somewhat different point of view, and the moralist fulfils his function sufficiently if he states in unambiguous terms the precise sense in which each is true. I therefore agree with Grant and Ramsauer, who explain ἐὰν γὰρ λύνται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἐνδοξά in connexion with
E. N. vii. 2. 12 I understand to mean that these questions must be dealt with on the method of removing difficulties, and so leaving the truth (embodied in the ἐνδοξα) plain.

ἀποδεικτικὸς and ἀποδειγμένον seem to be used here rather than the compound with ἀπο-, because the διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμὸς is distinguished from the ἀποδεικτικὸς συλλογισμὸς by being εἰς ἐνδόξας, the ἀποδεικτικὸς συλλογισμὸς being εἰς ἀλήθων καὶ πράτων. See Top. i. 1.

b. 8. §§ 6, 7] enumerate the φαινόμενα, ἐνδοξα, or λεγόμενα about ἐγκράτεια, ἀκρασία, &c. These ἐνδοξα are generally reduced to six (as by the Paraph.), though a more minute division is possible. The Paraph. has ἀνείκ αἱ τὰς ἐγκράτειας ἄγαθον, καὶ ἡ καρτερία τῶν στουδαίων καὶ τῶν ἑπανετῶν εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ἀκρασία τοὔτων. φασὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐγκράτειας καὶ ταύτα πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι ὁ ἐγκρατὴς ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ τῷ ἐρμηνευτικῷ ἔτνων λογισμῷ καὶ ἀκινήτῳ, καὶ ἐγκράτεια τὸ ἐμμένων τῷ λογισμῷ· ἀκρασία δὲ καὶ ἀκρατῆς τούτων· διότερον, ὅτι εἰδὼς ὁ ἐγκρατὴς ὅτι φαῦλα αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, ἀφίσταται τούτων καὶ ἀκολούθει τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ δὲ ἀκρατής, εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράτει, ἔδει τὴν ἥδην τὰ πείδεται τῷ λόγῳ· τρίτων, ὅτι καὶ ὁ σῶφρον ἐγκρατής ἐστὶ καὶ καρτερικός, καὶ ὁ ἀκόλογος τούτων· τέταρτων, ὅτι καὶ πᾶς ἐγκρατὴς σώφρον· ἐνοὶ δὲ όμοιοι καὶ τὸν ἀκρατὴν πάντα ἀκολούθωσι, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλουθον ἀκρατῆς εἶναι φασίν· ἄλλοι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· πέμπτων, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται φρόνῳ καὶ δείνῳ ὅταν καὶ ἀκρατῆς εἶναι· ἐκτον, ὅτι λέγονται ἀκρατεῖς οἱ πρὸς θυμὸν ἐπιρρηπεῖς, καὶ οἱ σφόδρα τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους ὄργῳ· ταῦτα μὲν οὐν εἰσὶ πάντα σχέδων τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ ἐγκράτειας καὶ ἀκρασίας· ἐν περὶ ἐκάστου σκεφτόμεθα· πρᾶτον περὶ τοῦ πρῶτον.

For the various views see the passages quoted by Fritzsche and Grant from Xen. Mem. i. 5. §§ 4, 5, 6; iv. 5. §§ 3–7; ii. i. § 1: Plato, Gorg. 491 D; Rep. iv. 430 E; Legg. ix. 869 A: and Isoc. Demon. p. 6 c ύβον κρατείσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῆς· τούτων ἐγκράτειαν ἀσκεῖ πάντων, κέρδους, ὄργης, ἄδους, ἀπίστης.

b. 15. § 6. οἱ οὗ οὔ] i.e. they regard ἐγκράτεια as a term of wider extent than σφιθροσύνη.

b. 18. § 7. φρονίμους ἄντας καὶ δεινούς] τό καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἅτοι (Ald.
BOOK VII: CHAP. 2.

Schol.). It is because they confound φρονήσις and δεινότης (see E. N. 1145 b. 18. vi. 12. 9 for the difference), that they can, with any plausibility, speak of the φρονήσις as sometimes ἀκάρης. In the words καὶ δεινοὺς we have thus a good example of the λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

Having stated the views commonly held, let us next go through the difficulties in them.

The first difficulty is—How can a man have a 'right conception,' and yet act incontinently against it? His 'conception,' some maintain, cannot be 'true knowledge'; 'true knowledge' cannot be dragged about like a slave by passion: it was on this ground that Socrates absolutely denied the existence of 'incontinence' or 'acting against knowledge of right,' holding that ignorance is the cause of men's doing what is wrong. This view is plainly at variance with experience; the man who acts incontinently is certainly not 'ignorant' before he is overtaken by passion. Granted that he becomes ignorant; but how does he become ignorant? By whose fault?

Others, again, admitting that 'true knowledge' cannot be overcome by passion, tell us that 'opinion' may; and that accordingly 'opinion about what is right' is the 'conception' which opposes itself (unsuccessfully) to passion in the incontinent man. The objection to this view is that by substituting 'opinion' for 'knowledge' it sets up a weak principle against passion; and if the incontinent man have only a weak principle with which to combat strong desires, he ought to be excused if they prevail, whereas we do not excuse him.

Then, it may be replied, after the rejection of knowledge and opinion, prudence remains as the opposing 'conception'; it is surely a very strong principle. To this we have to say that 'prudence' and 'incontinence' are incompatible qualities in the same character. How absurd to make the 'prudent' man, who not only has all the virtues, but exercises them, voluntarily perform the worst actions!

Another point is—Continence necessarily implies the presence of strong and bad desires (hence 'temperate' and 'continent' are not convertible terms—the temperate man has not excessive or bad desires); for 'continence' opposing 'good desires' would not be good, and opposing weak desires, it would not be the great and noble quality that it is.

Again, if continence is abiding by any opinion—false as well as true—it will sometimes be a bad thing; and if incontinence is falling away from any opinion, there will be a good kind of incontinence, like that of Neoptolemus, when he did not abide by his intention of telling a lie, because it gave him pain to have to tell it.
Other difficulties—and hard ones to solve—are set forth in the following sophistical arguments—

1. If a weak incontinent man is only stupid and ignorant enough, he is a virtuous character, for his opinions are wrong and he has not strength of will to act on them, but incontinently does what is right.

2. The man who pursues pleasure deliberately, convinced that it is right to do so, is a better character than the man who does so from incontinence, and not because he is convinced that it is right. The former may change his erroneous conviction for a true one—come to believe that it is wrong to make pleasure his end—and then he will be a reformed character; whereas the latter—the incontinent man—cannot change his conviction for a better: he already believes that his actions are wrong, but he nevertheless goes on performing them; he is as full of sound knowledge as a drowning man is of water; and it does him no good. His case is hopeless.

Lastly, what is the strict sense of the term 'incontinent'?

These, then, are the difficulties; we must now try so to remove them as to leave the truth bare; for it is in the resolution of difficulties that discovery consists.

1145 b. 21. § 1.] This § introduces the discussion of the ἄπορία involved in the view ὅ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος κ.τ.λ. ch. 1. § 6. 1145 b. 12. Zell, Fritzsche, and Grant quote Plato, Protag. 352 B, a passage which the present writer evidently had in his mind—δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τουοῦτον τι' οὐκ ἱσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι, οἷδὲ ὡς περὶ τούοτον αὐτοῦ ἄντος διανοοῦται, ἀλλ' ἐνοῦσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης, οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχεν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτέ μὲν θυμόν, τοτέ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτέ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἐρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβου, ἀτεχνῶς διανοοῦμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὀσπερ περὶ ἀνθρωπόδου, περείκομενός ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων.

τῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὅρθως ἀκρατεύεται τις] 'how it is possible to have an ὀρθὴ ὑπόληψις and yet act incontinently,' or 'what is meant by the ὀρθὴ ὑπόληψις of the ἀκρατής.' 'Ὑπόληψις is the generic term, including both ἐπιστήμη and δόξα (see note on vi. 3. 1 b. 17). Hence the writer goes on—ἐπιστάμενον μὲν ὄν ὑμ. κ.τ.λ. and (§ 4) ἀλλά μὴν εἶγε δόξα κ.τ.λ.

b. 24. αὐτήν] This is the reading of K b and NC accepted by Rassow, Susemihl, and Bywater, instead of αὐτὸν given by Bekker and Ramsauer. Rassow advocates αὐτήν as follows (Forsch. p. 63)—'Für αὐτὸν giebt K αὐτήν. Diese Lesart verdient den Vorzug, theils wegen der platonischen Stelle, die Aristoteles im Sinne hat, Protag. p. 352 B (i. e. διανοοῦμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὀσπερ περὶ ἀνθρωπόδου, περείκομενης), theils weil es am Schluss des vierten Capitels (vii. 3. 14) heist: οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης
BOOK VII: CHAP. 2: § 1. 127

παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὔτε αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς 1145 b. 24. αἰσθητικῆς.’ Ramsauer, reading αὐτῷ, explains—‘quem scientia liberum et quasi dominum reddidit.’ I think that this is a very strong defence of αὐτῷ: cf. Xen. Mem. i. 5. § 3 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε μηδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῆς δεξαμεν’ ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε φιλοξενεῖν τοιούτοις γενέσθαι.

Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ἰδὼς ... ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνωσιν] Socrates indeed b. 25. was entirely opposed to the view (sc. that a man may know the right and do the wrong), maintaining that there is no such thing as incontinence (sc. defined as—knowing the right and doing the wrong).’ See Xen. Mem. iii. 9. §§ 4 and 5 Σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σοφροσύνην οὐ διώριξεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὰ μὲν καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ γεγρῶσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰσόδα ειλαβεῖσθαι, σοφοὺς τε καὶ σοφρόνα ἔχωσιν. Προσωρινῶς δὲ, εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν, ἀ δὲ πράττεν, ποιοῦσα δὲ τὰναντία, σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἐγκρατείς εἶναι νομίζοις; Οὔδεν γε μᾶλλον, ἐφή, ἢ ἀσύφος τε καὶ ἀκρατείς. πάντας γὰρ οίμαι πραισμαγείονους ἐκ τῶν ἑνθεοχωμένων, ἢ ἢν οἴσχθηνε συμφορωτάτα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, τοῦτα πράττεν. νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὅρθως πράττονται, οὔτε σοφοὺς οὔτε σοφρόνας εἶναι. "Εφῄ δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πάσην ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι, τὰ γὰρ δικαία καὶ πάντα, ὡσ ἀρετὴ πράττεται, καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ οὔτ' ἢν τοὺς ταύτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντί τούτων οὔδεν προελέβασιν, οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττεν. ἀλλὰ καί, ἢν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν. οὕτω καὶ τὰ καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς πράττεν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφοὺς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ, ἢν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ τε δικαια καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἀρετὴ πράττεται, δήλον εἶναι. ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πάσα ἀρετὴν σοφία ἐστὶ. Cf. Plato, Prolag. 352 C ἀρ' οὖν καὶ σοι τοιούτων τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλῶν τε εἰναι ἢ ἐπιστήμην καὶ οἷον ἄρχεσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου; καὶ έαν περ γεγυμνέσθη τις τάγαθα καὶ τά κακά, μὴ ἢν κρατήσθηναι ἢν μηδενός, ὡστε ἄλλ' ἀτὰ πράττεν ἢ ἢ ἢν ἐπιστήμην κελεύττω. ἄλλῳ διαφέρει εἰναι τὴν φρονήσιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ γιαρνοῖ τε καὶ ἀκατάλληλοι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ἀσπερ σὺ λέγεις, δὲ Ἔκρατεῖς καὶ ἄμα, εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμὸ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν πραγμάτων. Καλῶς γε, ἐφην ἐγὼ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀλήθη. οἰσκα οὖν ὃτι οἱ πολλοί τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοὶ τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ πείθοσι πολλοῖς φασιν γεγρῶσκοντα τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ θέλεις πράττεν, εὖ οὖν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα πράττεν. Cf. M. M. ii. 6. 1200 b. 25 Ὀσκράτης μὲν ὁ πρεσβύτης ἐντέρει ἰδὼς καὶ οὐκ ἐφῆ ἀκρασίαν εἶναι,

1 Cf. E.E. i. 5. 1216 b. 2 and Fritzsche’s note. Πρεσβύτης is a term of honour, and does not distinguish a senior from a junior Socrates.
1145 b. 25. λέγων ὅτι οὐδεὶς εἶδος τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ εἰσίν ἔλοιπ' ἄν' ὁ δὲ ἀκρατής δοκεῖ, εἶδὼς ὅτι φαίνεται εἰσίν, αἰρέτασθαι ὡμος, ἀγάμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. διὰ δὴ τὸν τουτοῦν λόγον οὐκ ἀπ' εἶναι ἀκρασίαν οὐ δὴ ὦρθώς. ἀκρατεῖ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ πείθεται ἀναμειῶ τὸ πιθανὸν γνώμενον ἀκρατεῖς γὰρ εἰσίν ἀνθρώποι, καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰδότες ὅτι φαίνεται ὡμος ταύτα πράττοντων.

b. 28. ὑπολαμβάνοντα] Spengel (Arist. Studien p. 45) would insert ὦρθώς before ὑπολαμβάνοντα. Rassow (Forsch. p. 126) thinks that there is nothing to prevent ὑπολαμβάνοντα standing alone, as εἶδος so often does. I agree with Rassow.

b. 27. § 2. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος κ.τ.λ.] The view of Socrates (οὗτος ὁ λόγος) conflicts with τὰ ἐνδοξά, but, as Socrates is a great man, we must treat his θέσεις, or παράδοξους, respectfully, and enquire how the ἁγνεία, by which he explains away ἀκρασία, ‘comes on’ (γίνεται b. 29—see Grant ad loc.). It is evidently not a chronic state of ignorance, but an ignorance which ‘comes on’ like sleep or drunkenness (see E. N. vii. 3. 7), for the ἀκρατής is not ‘ignorant’ before he is tempted.

b. 28. καὶ δὲν ἦστεν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δὲν ἀγονιαν, τῆς ὅ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἁγνείας] Bywater suggests in his note ad loc. (cf. Contributions p. 53) that perhaps γίνεται should be inserted after δέν, and omitted after τρόπος. There seems to be some doubt about the use of δέν (i.e. δέν ἦστι, as distinguished from δέν the acc. abs., which is common) = δὲ: see Index Arist. s. v. δέν: in E. N. ii. 7. 1. 1107 a. 32—περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἐκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέν δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. Ληπτεῖν οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς.—K ὀμίς οὖν. If the doubt is sufficient to recommend a change of the text here (vii. 2. 2. 1145 b. 28), I think that it would be simpler to read δέν for δέν, than to suppose that γίνεται has been displaced.

b. 30. οὐκ οἴτει γε] After γε NC and Ald. insert δέν πράττειν ἀ πράττει. These words must, at any rate, be understood: cf. E. N. vii. 9. 6 ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδὲ διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ οἰδάμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ' οὐκ οἰδάμενος: E. E. ii. 7. 1223 b. 8 τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὁ οἴτει βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δ' ἐπιθυμῖαν ἀκρατεύωσθαι ἑστὶν: E. N. v. 9. 6 βούλεσται οὐδεὶς ὁ μὴ οἴτει εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὁ τε ἀκρατής οὐχ ὁ οἴτει δεῖ πράττειν πράττει. Their argument falls back on the ‘uncertainty of δόξα’—a commonplace of Greek philosophy. They argue that, because δόξα is not

so ‘certain,’ it is not so ‘strong’ as ἐπιστήμη—a piece of reasoning 1145 b. 33. disposed of below E.N. vii. 3. 4 ἔνως γὰρ πιστεύουσα οὐδὲν ἤττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἐὰν ἔτεροι οἰς ἐπιστάνται· δηλοῖ δ’ Ἡράκλειτος.

Δόξα is not so ‘certain’ as ἐπιστήμη, because the ὑπολήψεις of the δοξάζων are not about things taken in connexion with their causes, as the ὑπολήψεις of the ἐπιστάμενοι are. The truest ὑπολήψεις of the δοξάζων are apt to run away like slaves, and leave him, because they are not bound by chains of reasoning to their causes. 'Ο ὀρθὸς δοξάζων has, in short, ‘empirical,’ as distinguished from ‘scientific’ knowledge. This is how the ‘uncertainty’ of δόξα is represented in the Meno 97 D. Elsewhere Plato describes the ‘empirical’ character of the knowledge of the δοξάζων by making τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος the object of δόξα: see Bonitz, Mel. p. 411—‘opinationem, δόξα, a scientia Plato, fortasse secutus Parmenidem, ita distinctit, ut quomodo generatio medium inter ens et non-ens locum habet, ita δόξα medium quidpiam sit inter scientiam rei et ignorantiam, cf. Conviv. 202 a ἢστι δὲ δήσου τοιοῦτον ἢ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξὺ ἀμαθίας καὶ φρονήσεως: de Rep. v. 477 a οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ ὄντι γνώσις ἢ, ἀγνώσια δ’ ἢ ἄναγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ἄντι, ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ὄντος μεταξὺ τι καὶ ζητήσεως ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τι τυγχάνει ὑπὸ τοιοῦτον: πάντως μὲν ὄν. 'Αρ’ ὄνη λέγομεν τι δόξαν εἶναι; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Theaet. 190 a, Soph. 263, Phileb. 37 a. Idem discrimen Ar. exponit An. post. i. 33. 89 a. 2 λείπεται δόξαν εἶναι περὶ τὸ ἄλλης μὲν καὶ ψείδος, ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ καὶ ἄλλος ἔχειν—ἡ τε γὰρ δόξα ἄβδαιον, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ τοιαῦτα—ός τοῦ μὲν τοιοῦτον δόξαν οὖσαν, τοῦ δ’ ἀναγκαίου ἐπιστήμης: cf. also Bonitz, Mel. p. 142 'vocabulo δόξα... opinandi naturam incertam et inconstantem notat [Arist.], quae fere est vis hujus vocabuli ubi ἐπιστήμη opportunn.'

§ 4.] Cf. M. M. ii. 6. 1200 b. 38 ἀλλ’ ἄρα γε ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐ, b. 38. δόξα δὲ; ἀλλ’ εἰ δόξαν ἔχει ὁ ἀκρατής, οὐκ ἄν εἰπῃ ψεκτός. εἰ γὰρ φαιλὸν τι πράττει μη ἀκριβῶς εἰδός ἀλλὰ δοξάζων, συγγνώμην ἄν τις ἀποδοθέσθαι τῇ ἡδωνικεῖ καὶ πράξῃ τὰ φαιλα, μη ἀκριβῶς εἰδότα ὅτι [οὐ] φαιλα εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντα οὐς δὲ γε γε συγγνώμην ἔχεμεν, τοῦτος οὖν ψεγόμεν ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατής, εἰπερ δόξαν ἔχει, οὐκ ἔσται ψεκτός. ἀλλ’ ἄστιν ψεκτός.

§ 5. φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντίτειμότητας; αὕτη γὰρ ἴσχυρότατον] If an 1146 a. 4. ἴσχυρία ὑπολήψεις cannot, consistently with the circumstance that he is ψεκτός, be ascribed to the ἀκρατῆς, it follows then that an ἴσχυρα ὑπολήψεις must be ascribed to him. Such is φρονήσεις—αὕτη γὰρ ἴσχυρότατον: cf. E. E. H. 13. 1246 b. 34 τῶν Σωκρατικῶν ὅτι οὖν εἶδον vol. ii.
BOOK VII: CHAP. 2: § 5.

1146 a. 4. ἵσχυρότερον φρονήσεως. It is to be remarked, however, that, for those who take their stand on the Socratic οἷδεν ἵσχυρότερον φρονή-
σεως, the position φρονήσεως ἀντίτεινουσίς is really identical with the position ἐπιστήμης ἐναίσθησις (§ 1). Those who take their stand on the Socratic οἷδεν ἵσχυρότερον φρονήσεως evidently do not distinguish between ἐπιστήμη and φρόνησις. Aristotle and his school, however, distinguish between them; and the reasoning by which the present writer refutes the position φρονήσεως ἀρα ἀντίτεινουσίς involves the special connotation which he attaches to φρόνησις as something different from ἐπιστήμη. The words αὕτη γὰρ ἵσχυρότατον (§ 5), therefore, representing as they do the extreme Socratic position, are somewhat startling, as put in the mouths of persons who depart from that position (τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ δ’ οὐ § 3), and try to explain ἀκρασία by distinguishing φρόνησις from ἐπιστήμη, and that too in a list which corresponds exactly with the Aristotelian division of τὰ νοεῖν, or ὑπολήψις, into ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, φρόνησις, as given in de An. iii. 3. 427 b. 9 τὸ νοεῖν ἐὰν ν’ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθόν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν ὀρθῶς φρόνησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα ἀλήθης τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς τὰ αὐτὰ τῶν τούτων: and 427 b. 24 ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτὴς ὑπὸ ὑπολήψεως (cf. the πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς of E. N. vii. 2. 1) ἀπαρατεί ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τὰ ἑναρχία τῶν. The Paraphrast sees that the writer is conducting his opponents through a formal list: he says ἐστὶ δὲ οὕτω δόξα ἐστὶν ἡ γράφεις τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ ὀὕτω ἐπιστήμη, δοκεῖ φρόνησις εἶναι αὕτη γὰρ λείπεται, καὶ ἐστὶν ἵσχυρα γνώσις.

a. 5. ἀλλ’ ἀτοπον’ ἐσται γὰρ ὁ ἀτόπος ἀμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἄκρατής] After all, the position which the writer takes up here—that the φρόνιμος cannot be ἄκρατης—does not differ essentially from that of Socrates—οὔθενα ὑπολαμβάνωνα πράττειν παρά τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἄγνωσι— for φρόνησις is an ἀλήθης ὑπολήψις (E. N. vi. 9. 7) involving the possession (and exercise) of all the virtues—ἀμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μὴ ὑπαρχοῦσα πάσα ὑπάρχουσιν αἱ ἁρεταί. The ἀλλὰ δὲ ἄγνωσι of the Socratic position means that the ἀλήθης ὑπολήψις, which Aristotle equally with Socrates regarded as incompatible with ἀκρασία, is absent.

a. 8. πρῶτερον] i.e. E. N. vi. 7. 7 (πρακτικός = ‘one who tends to perform good actions’)—vi. 8. 8 (τῶν ἵσχατων τις = ‘one concerned with particulars’) —vi. 13. 6 (τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἁρεταίς = ‘one who has all the virtues ’). Rassow (Forsch. p. 127) points out that the words καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἁρετάς do not belong to the causal clause

τῶν γὰρ ἑσχάτων τις, which he accordingly (followed by Susemihl 1146 a. 8. and Bywater) makes parenthetical. It is inserted to explain πρακτικός: cf. E. N. vi. 8. 8 τὸν γὰρ ἑσχάτου ἑστίν, ὥσπερ ἔρημα τὸ γὰρ πρακτών τοιοῦτον.

Perhaps we ought to read ἑστὶ for τις 1146 a. 9.


τὸ ἄγαν] The Ald. Schol. seems to have read τὸ ἀγαθάν. His a. 12. version is—ὁ γὰρ σώφρων οὐδ’ ὅλως ἐξει αἰσχρὰ ἢδονὰς ἑπερεάζουσας αὐτὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγου προστάσαντος δεῖν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἢδονῶν, εὑρὸς ἐξει τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπακολουθοῦσαν αὐτῷ, καὶ μείνῃ ἠμεμφῖν οὐ γὰρ τοῦ σώφρονος ἑστὶ τὸ ἀγαθάν, ὅ τὸ πολεμεῖσθαι ὑπὸ αἰσχρῶν ἢδονῶν καὶ λασχυρῶν. The Paraphrast Heliodorus may also have read ἀγαθάν: he says—εἰ δὲ ὁ σώφρων ἦσται ἐγκρατὴς ἐξει φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λασχυράς ὅπερ ἐναντίων ἑστὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῆς σωφροσύνης ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπεσθαὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῷ λόγῳ ἡ σωφροσύνη οὐ συνισταται. Cf. E. N. vii. 9. 6 ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδεὶς παρὰ τῶν λόγων διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἢδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ σώφρων, ἀλλ’ δ’ μὲν ἔχουν δ’ ὅλως ἔχουν φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ δ’ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἰος μὴ ἔδεσθαι παρὰ τῶν λόγων, δ’ ὅ τοις ἔδεσθαι ἄλλα μὴ ἀγαθάν. The blunder of the Ald. Schol. may perhaps be due to a confused recollection of this use of τὸ ἀγαθάν. Ἀγαθάν is certainly right here, although this is the only place in the Aristotelian corpus given by the Index Arist. for its use, with the article, as a substantive.

ἄλλα μὴν δει γε] i.e. the ἐγκρατῆς must have strong and evil desires: cf. M. M. ii. 6. 1201 a. 12 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσται ἐγκρατῆς, σφοδρὰς δείησε ἑκεῖν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμίας. The ἐγκρατῆς differs from the σώφρων in having strong and evil desires—in being strongly tempted by τὰ μὴ φύσει ἴδεα: and that the desires of the ἐγκρατῆς must necessarily (ἄλλα μὴν δει γε) be strong and evil is plain; for otherwise it would follow that ἐγκρατεία is not always the good and admirable quality which it is supposed to be.

§ 7.] This ἀπορία is solved at the beginning of chap. 9, where it a. 16. is pointed out that it is not 'any opinion'—πᾶσα δόξα—which the ἐγκρατῆς sticks to and the ἀκρατῆς abandons, but 'the true opinion'—ἡ ἀριθμὸς δόξα.

The Paraphrast Heliodorus, following the order in which the λεγόμενα are enumerated in E. N. vii. 1. §§ 6 and 7, gives his version
BOOK VII: CHAP. 2: §§ 7, 8.

1146 a. 18. of vii. 2. §§ 7–10 ἄλλα πρῶτευτι 1146 b. 1 (answering to vii. 1. 6 καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατής . . . ἐκστασικὸς τοῦ λόγου) first, then proceeds to give his version of vii. 2. §§ 1–6, and ends with vii. 2. 11 ἐτὶ εἰ περὶ πάντα . . . ἀπλῶς.


a. 21. § 8. ἐτὶ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος [ψευδόμενος] ἀπορία] ψευδόμενος has given much trouble to the commentators. I agree, however, with Rassow (Forsch. p. 127) and others that it is merely a ditto graph of ψευδόμενος in the line above, and ought to be expunged from the text. There are insuperable objections to supposing, with Fritzsche, a reference to the logical fallacy, ὁ ψευδόμενος, mentiens, associated with the name of Eubulides the Megarian, the formula of which is given by Aul. Gell. xviii. 2 Cum mentior et me mentiri dico, mentior an verum dico? As Rassow remarks (p. 127), the article is indispensable before ψευδόμενος if the mentiens is to be understood; also, instead of συμβαινει ἐκ τινος λόγου § 9. 1146 a. 27, we should require ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου: and lastly, the argument which proves that ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετὰ ἀκρασίας ἁρτη is not the mentiens.

If retained, ψευδόμενος must be taken, as by Zell, to be a predicate qualifying ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος—‘Again, there is the sophistical argument which causes difficulty by conducting people to a false conclusion’; and Grant’s very ingenious comparison with Soph. El. 3. 165 b. 12 may be accepted—‘Supposing,’ says Grant, ‘that ψευδόμενος be allowed to stand, we must interpret it in a logical sense, not as if it had anything to do with the fallacy of Eubulides. The explanation of it is to be found in the Soph. Elench. of Aristotle iii. 1–2, where it is said that the aims of the Sophists and Eristics are five in number, ἔλεγχος καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ παράδοξον καὶ συλλογισμὸς (making one talk bad grammar) καὶ πέμπτον τὸ ποιήσαι ἀδολεσχήσαι (making one repeat the same thing over and over) . . . μάλιστα γὰρ προαρχόντα φαίνεσθαι ἔλεγχοι, δεύτερον δὲ ψευδόμενον τι δεικνύει, τρίτον εἰς παράδοξον ἄγει κ.τ.λ. In the above passage we see that the writer has brought together two of these separate terms, speaking of παράδοξα ἔλεγχα. It is possible that he may also have

1 For this fallacy see also Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil. § 233 Eubulides, and Ueberweg’s Logic, Engl. Trans. pp. 244–247.
qualified the "sophistical reasoning" with another of these logical formulae."

παράδοξος...αδελγχειν] 'to refute by means of paradoxical conclusions.' 'The Elenchus,' says Grote (Arist. ii. 69), 'is a syllogism with a conclusion contradictory to, or refutative of, some enunciated thesis or proposition (πληγχος δὲ συνλογισμὸς μετ' αντιφάσεως τοῦ συμ- περάσματος Soph. El. i. 165 a. 2)... the Sophistical Elenchus or Refutation being a delusive semblance of refutation, which imposes on ordinary men, and induces them to accept it as real.'

deëetai γὰρ ἡ διάνοια:] The editors compare Mel. B. i. 995 a. 24 sqq. quoted above in note on vii. 1. 5. 1145 b. 2.

§ 9. ἕκ τινος λόγον] i.e. ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος mentioned above a. 27. in § 8.

Sections 8 and 9, in their connexion, may be paraphrased thus—'Again, there is the sophistical argument which gets some people into a difficulty, by starting from πάσης δόξης ἑκατοτικῶν ἡ ἀκρατία (§ 7), and conducting them to a false conclusion, which they see plainly to be false, and yet cannot refute—I mean the sophistical argument which proves that 'folly with incontinence is virtue.'

This paraphrase, it will be observed, retains ψευδομένος a. 22 (= 'by conducting them to a false conclusion'); but the sense of the whole passage paraphrased would not be affected if the word were omitted (and I think it ought to be omitted, as a dittograph); for the words διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξος κ.τ.λ. down to the end of § 8 explain the particular ἀπορία produced by the σοφιστικὸς λόγος in question, as that of one who has been entrapped into a conclusion which he sees to be false, but cannot refute.

§ 10.] This § contains another σοφιστικὸς λόγος, similar to that a. 31. given in § 9, and, like it, starting from the assumption πάσης δόξης ἑκατοτικῶν ἡ ἀκρατία. 'Ο τῷ πεπείσθαι πράττων...καὶ προαροῦμενος is the ἀκόλαστος, as distinguished from the ἀκρατής. The ἀκρατής is elsewhere in this Book carefully described as οὐ προαροῦμενος, οὐκ οἰόμενος, οὐ πεπεισμένος: see E. N. vii. 7. 3 τῶν δὲ μὴ προαρουμένων κ.τ.λ.: vii. 8. 4 ἐπεὶ δ' ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπείσθαι διώκειν...δὲ δὲ πεπείσται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν κ.τ.λ.: vii. 3. 2 ὃ δὲ γὰρ ἀγεται προαροῦμενος, νομίζων ἄει δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἥδι διώκειν...δ' δ' οὐκ οἶσται μὲν, διώκει δὲ: vii. 9. 6 ὃμιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἔτεροι μὲν διότες, ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ συμμακά ἢδεα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν καὶ
1146 a. 31. oǐδμενος δεῖν, δ' οὐκ οǐδμενος. Hence Rassow, Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater, following Kbd, Mbd, r, omit μή (read by Bekker) before ἐπέπειστο 1146 b. 1, the meaning being—'if the ἀκρατῆς acted διὰ τὸ πεπείσθαι οἵτως, instead of acting, as he does, παρὰ προαίρεσιν or οὑκ οǐδμενος δεῖν, then τὸ μεταπειθῆναι would be possible in his case.' The omission of μή before ἐπέπειστο, however, necessitates the insertion of οὐ (or ἄλλα Ramsauer and Bywater) before πεπεισμένος 1146 b. 2, against all MS. authority, except that followed by the Vet. Interp. (r'), which gives nunc autem non suasus. See Rassow (Forsch. p. 64)—Es scheint mir keinem Zweifel zu unterliegen, dass mit den besseren Handschriften dieses Buches (MK), die Negation μή vor ἐπέπειστο zu streichen ist. Freilich ist es dann nöthig, in den folgenden Worten mit Lambin. νῦν δ' οὐ πεπεισμένος zu schreiben. . . . Die alte Uebersetzung hat die Negation an erster Stelle nicht, wohl aber an zweiter: si quidem enim persuasus esset qui agit, dissusus utique quiesceret; nunc autem non suasus nihil minus talia agit.' The difficulties which the omission of μή and the insertion of οὐ remove are (1) that of having to apply the term πεπεισμένος to the ἀκρατῆς, in opposition to the usage of vii attested by such passages as ch. 8. § 4 quoted above: and (2) that of having to understand ἐπέπειστο and πεπεισμένος to imply a right conviction, whereas πεπείσθαι at the beginning of the § must be understood to imply a wrong conviction. Ramsauer's conjecture (adopted by Bywater) νῦν δ' ἄλλα πεπεισμένος οὐδέν ἤττον ἄλλα πράττει (Byw. brackets ἄλλα before πράττει) seems to me to labour under the objection that it does not remove difficulty (1): it still applies to the ἀκρατῆς the epithet πεπεισμένος, which seems in this Book to be retained in a technical sense for the ἀκόλαστος alone. But the 'nunc autem non suasus nihil minus talia agit' of the Vet. Interp. suggests a reading which, I think, meets the requirements of the case. The Vet. Interp. had doubtless before him νῦν δ' οὐ πεπεισμένος οὐδέν ἤττον τοιαῦτα πράττει. For τοιαῦτα read τὰ αὐτά, and retain οὐ before πεπεισμένος: the meaning being that the ἀκρατῆς, without τὸ πεπείσθαι, commits the same acts as the ἀκόλαστος does with τὸ πεπείσθαι: cf. E. N. vii. 8. 3 οὐ μὴν ἄλλα ὁμοίων γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις κ.π.λ. It seems to be impossible to decide whether the writer of the M. M. had the text as given by Bekker (i.e. μή before ἐπέπειστο, and no negative before πεπεισμένος) or as rendered by the Vet. Interp.: see M. M. ii. 6. 1203 a. 6 πότερος δ' εὐικότερος, ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἢ ὁ ἀκρατῆς; οὔτω μὲν οὖν δοξεῖν δὲ ἱσως οὖχ ὁ ἀκρατῆς· ὁ γὰρ

As regards the proverb—ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεὶ ἐπιπίνειν;—the ἀκόλαστος, it is argued, acts from a wrong conviction, which he may exchange for a right one, and so become a reformed character: but the ἀκρατής does not act from conviction, but from passion. It is true that he has a right opinion, but it is not capable of influencing his conduct: his case is therefore hopeless: the proverb applies to him—'when water sticks in a man's throat, what can he drink to wash it down?' The true opinion of the ἀκρατής is ineffectual; and no truer and more effectual one can be found. This represents the interpretation of the proverb given by the Ald. Schol., Stahr, Grant, Peters, and others. Rassow, however (Forsch. p. 65), interprets differently. 'Das tertium comparationis,' he says, 'ist die Fülle. An richtiger Erkenntniss (und diese ist es doch die mit dem Wasser verglichen wird) fehltes dem Zügellosen nicht, er hat davon die Hülle und Fülle, man braucht sie ihm nicht erst beizubringen.' If we accept this interpretation, we may perhaps render the proverb—'A drowning man doesn't need more water to drink.' The Paraphrast's explanation leaves the sense in which he understood the proverb doubtful—'Ὅταν δὲ ὁ δυνάμενος ἐκτήτην τῆς δόξης βελτίων τοῦ μῆ δυναμέουν, δήλων' ὁ γὰρ τῷ ἡπατήσαθα τὰ φαῦλα διόκων, ὅτι νομίζει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, βελτίων ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ὅτι φαῦλα, καὶ διώκωντος' ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡπατήμενος μεταπειθθεῖς δύναται ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι, ὁ δὲ δὲ ἀκρασίαν διώκων, καὶ εἰδὸς ὅτι φαῦλα, οὐ δύναται ἐκτήτην τῶν κακῶν· πῶς γὰρ ἢν ἐκαταίη, ἐπεὶ οὐ δύναται μεταπειθθῆναι; ὁ γὰρ ἐδεὶ γυνώσκειν, οἶδε, καὶ εἰδὸς ἀκρατεύεται, καὶ ἐνοχὸς ἐστὶ τῇ παρομοίᾳ.

*Ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεὶ ἐπιπίνειν;

As regards the general significance of the §, and its connexion with what precedes—It is another σοφιστικὸς λόγος, starting, like that given in § 9, from the assumption—πᾶσης δόξης ἢ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικῶν. In § 9 it was proved paradoxically that, if the ἀκρατής be ἄφρων, and his δόξαι false, his actions will be good: in § 10 it is proved paradoxically that, if he have true δόξαι, he is in a hopeless state—he has the best possible δόξαι, but he is too weak to act up to them: whereas the ἀκόλαστος, who is not ἐκστατικός τῆς δόξης, may, if sup-

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1 Bywater (Contrib. p. 54) thinks that the καὶ δόμως πράττει of the above passage is an echo of οὕδεν ἦττον πράττει, without the ἄλλα of our MSS.
plied with true δόξα, act on them as steadfastly as he now acts on his false δόξα. The paradox thus established by means of the in-appropriate use of the idea μεταπεισθήναι in the context is left here by the writer unfutated, as an example of those difficulties by grappling with which ethical theory advances. His answer to it is deferred to E. N. vii. 8. i: but it may be useful just now to point out the solution naturally suggested by the terms to which the difficulty has been reduced.

The point which decides us in favour of the ἄκρατης against the ἀκόλαστος is that the end which the former ignores in his acts is good, whereas that which the latter acts up to is bad. The argument insists on the point that the ἀκόλαστος follows the recommendations of his λόγος, while the ἄκρατης does not. But we ask, Why does the ἀκόλαστος follow the recommendations of his λόγος? and the answer is—because it recommends that which is bad. This the sophistical argument in E. N. vii. 2. 10 keeps in the background, proceeding to infer that, as the ἀκόλαστος follows reason when it recommends the bad, he would follow it with the same steadfastness if it could be made to recommend the good. But the truth is that we have not to do here with the reason or understanding, but with the moral character and habits. A false issue is raised by assuming that the ἀκόλαστος will yield to arguments addressed to his understanding; and when it is argued that it is useless to try to reform the ἄκρατης, because he already knows what is right, the possibility of strengthening his moral nature is ignored. But this is really the important point. What is represented as ‘false opinion,’ or ‘wrong conviction,’ in the ἀκόλαστος, is really an inveterate moral blindness and depravity brought on by the repeated neglect of that ‘true opinion,’ the possession of which is represented as putting the ἄκρατης in such a hopeless position. The ἀκόλαστος was once ἄκρατης. His so-called ‘false opinion’ or ‘wrong conviction’ is merely an intensified form of the weakness of the ἄκρατης. The fallacy of the argument lies in its transformation of moral depravity into intellectual error. The intellectual error so-called of the ἀκόλαστος is contrasted with the weakness of the ἄκρατης: intellectual error, it is argued, may be corrected, but weakness such as that of the ἄκρατης cannot be cured. The truth, however, is that the so-called intellectual error of the ἀκόλαστος, being really inveterate weakness or utter depravity, is incurable, whereas the not yet inveterate weakness of the ἄκρατης may be cured:
see E. N. vii. 8. 1, where ἀκολασία is compared to a chronic disease, 1148 a. 31. and ἀκρασία to a sudden passing seizure; see also E. N. vii. 8. 4 ὅ 
δὲ (sc. ἀκολασίας) τέτεινται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο εἶναι αὐτὸς διόκειν αὐτὰς—where the 'conviction' or 'opinion' of the ἀκολασία is said to be the 
effect of his depraved moral character. Thus the σοφιστικὸς λόγος of 
vii. 2. 10 is guilty of a ὑπερο πρότερον; it assumes that his 'conviction' or 'opinion' is the cause of his bad character—that if we 
could change his 'opinion' we should change his character. There 
is nothing more striking in the Aristotelian teaching than its oppo-
sition to this vulgar assumption. Opinion or Belief, according to 
Aristotle, follows conduct—as a man becomes better or worse his 
belief becomes better or worse. The 'true opinion' of the ἀκρατής 
is a favourable symptom so far as it goes, indicating that his 
character is not yet utterly ruined: the 'false opinion' of the ἀκό-
λαστος means that his character is utterly ruined; it is a 'false 
opinion' which he will always stick to.

§ 11. ἦν εἰ περὶ πάντα . . . τινας ἄπλως] If ἀκρασία be mani-
fested in anything (περὶ πάντα), i. e. in θυμός, or in relation to κέρδος, 
or to τυμὴ, what do we mean when we use the term ἀκρασία simply 
(ἄπλως), without adding any such qualification as θυμοῦ or κέρδος? 
We must mean that there is a man who is ἀκρατὴς in some one 
special respect not explicitly stated, for we cannot mean that any 
one is ἀκρατὴς in all respects together: cf. the Ald. Schol.—ei περὶ 
pάντα, ἦτοι τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν τυμήν καὶ τὸ κέρδος καὶ ἄπλως περὶ πάντα ἡ 
ἐγκέφαλια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία καταγίζεται, ὁ ἄπλως ἦτοι ὁ κυρίος ἀκρατῆς τῆς 
ἐστὶ; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔχει πάσας τὰς ἀκρασίας, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀκρατῆς θυμοῦ, 
ὁ δὲ ἀκρατῆς τυμῆς, ὁ δὲ ἀκρατῆς φιλοχρηστείας. ἦν ὁ μὲν ἔχει τῇ 
δὲ τὴν ἀκρασίαν ἦτοι τοῦ θυμοῦ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τυμῆς, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔχει πάσας, λοιπὸν ὁ 
κυρίος ἀκρατῆς τῆς ἐστὶν' λέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι εἰς τινες ἄπλως ἦτοι κυρίως 
ἀκρατεῖς.

Studies I. pp. 60, 61) thinks that συμβαίνει δὲ μὲν ἐν τὰ ἐναντίωσις, 
ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὁς ἀλλήλης ἡ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐστὶ δ’ ὡς οὖ E. E. vii. 2. 1. 
1235 b. 17, 18, was almost certainly written (by another writer) as 
an elucidation of τὰ δὲ καταληπτείν of E. N. vii. 2. 12, 'which seems 
to have been understood by the author of E. E. vii. 2. 1 as mean-
ning that some of the ἄπορίαι must be done away with, and some 
left. The latter expression (καταληπτείν) seemed paradoxical in 
connection with the sentence which follows—ἢ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἄπορίας
1146 b. 6. ευρετέος ἠστιν, because an aporia consists of opposing opinions whose opposition must be somehow overcome: the author of Ε. Ε. vii. 2. 1 accordingly wrote the passage συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ. to explain it—"The opposition (ἐναντίωσις) must be allowed to stand (μένειν), if what is said is true in one sense and not in another." I think that Cook Wilson's rendering—'the opposition must be allowed to stand'—of the words συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντίωσις places his view of their origin as an explanation of τὰ δὲ καταληπτένιν in Ε. Ν. vii. 2. 12 in rather too favourable a light. I take the words συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντίωσις, Ε. Ε. 1235 b. 17, to mean—'if the thing said be true in one sense, and not in another, the result is (συμβαίνει) that the opposition of opinion remains unresolved': i.e. one reason why the opinions opposed in an ἀπορία remain opposed—why, in short, an ἀπορία is not resolved—is that the subject about which the opposite opinions are held has really two sides (from one point of view it is true to say this about it, and from another point of view that, as e.g. about τὸ φιλοσόφειν), but we have not yet succeeded in showing that it has two sides—in showing that the two opposite views about it are both reasonably held (εὐλόγως δοκοῦτα Ε. Ε. 1235 b. 15)—that they do not really contradict each other: the whole passage (Ε. Ε. 1235 b. 13 sqq.) is—ληπτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν ἀμα τὰ τε δοκοῦτα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντίωσεις. τούτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία δοκοῦτα μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενον ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φανομένοις. συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντίωσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθεῖς ὅ το λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ. It will be observed that I attach importance to the antithesis marked by φαίνεται—ἡ. It would be true to say—συμβαίνει δὲ λύεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίωσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθεῖς φαίνεται τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ. The ἀπορία is resolved, when the reasonableness of a difference of opinion has been shown.

As I said in my note on vii. 1. 5. 1145 b. 6, I understand the words before us, τοῦτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεὶ τὰ δὲ καταλεῖν, to mean that these questions must be dealt with on the method of removing difficulties, and so leaving the truth (embodied in the ἐνδοξά) plain. The words before us are, in fact, equivalent to the ἐὰν γὰρ λύηται τὰ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλεῖπται τὰ ἐνδοξά of Ε. Ν. vii. 1. 5, and, thus understood, correspond exactly to the ληπτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν ἀμα τὰ τε δοκοῦτα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει (⇐ τὰ δὲ καταλεῖπτεν) καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντίωσεις (⇐ τὰ δὲ ἀνελεῖν) of Ε. Ε. vii.
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2. 1235 b. 13. It is perhaps worth adding that τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν 1146 b. 6.
ἀνελείν τὰ δὲ καταλείπειν does not mean that 'some of the ἀπορίαι
must be done away with and some left,' but that 'some things in
the ἀπορίαι must be done away with and some left'—i. e. the
confusions, causing ἐναρκίως, must be done away with, or cleared
up, in such a way that, as they are cleared up (ἀμα E. E. 1235 b.
13), views, hitherto merely ἐναρκία, are left no longer as merely
ἐναρκία, but as εὐλόγως δοκοῦντα.

CHAPTER III.

Argument.

We have to enquire—(1) Whether the incontinent man 'knows' or not, and if
he 'knows,' in what sense it is that he 'knows.' (2) In relation to what things
a man is to be described as 'continent' or 'incontinent'—i. e. whether in
relation to any pleasure or pain, or only in relation to certain definite pleasures
or pains. (3) Whether 'continence' is identical with 'endurance,' or is to be
distinguished from it. These and cognate questions we have to answer.

[Our enquiry begins with the question (1) Whether it is a difference between
their respective objects, or a difference between their attitudes to objects (with or
without a difference in the objects) which distinguishes between the continent
man and the incontinent man. Our next question (2) is whether continence
and incontinence are concerned with any objects—i. e. with any pleasures or
pains, or are limited (as they certainly are when strictly understood) to the
pleasures and pains with which incorrigible profligacy, or intemperance, has to
do—the difference between intemperance and incontinence strictly so called being
in the attitude, not in the objects—i. e. intemperance pursuing the pleasure of the
moment 'on principle,' incontinence pursuing it indeed, but not 'on principle."

To begin, then, with the question about the 'knowledge' involved in incon
tinence—The substitution of 'true opinion' for 'knowledge' does not make it
easier to explain the prevalence of passion in incontinence, for 'opinion' is often
as hard to move as 'knowledge.'

The distinction between 'merely having knowledge' and 'having it and
realising it,' is more likely than that between 'opinion' and 'knowledge' to help
us. It surely need cause no surprise if a man acts against knowledge, which
he has, but does not realise. Of the two premises of the Practical Syllogism,
the major—excess is evil—may be fully realised, quà universal proposition,
in consciousness, and the man may yet act incontinently, because he does not
realise the minor—'this is a case of excess.'

And not only have we the difference between the major and the minor—the
former realised by the incontinent man, the latter not realised—but in the major
itself we have to distinguish two sides—one relating to the agent and the other to things. The form of the major is, 'All agents who are such and such, ought to do such and such things.' To this two-sided major corresponds a two-sided minor—'I am such and such, and this thing is such and such.' The latter part of this minor a man is much more likely 'not to know,' or 'not to realise,' than the former part; but even this merely half ignorance of the minor is enough to account easily for incontinence, or acting against fully realised knowledge of the major as universal proposition.

So much for 'having knowledge,' and 'having it and realising it'; but there is a third kind of 'having'—having which does not amount to having—which may be considered in connexion with incontinence. It is in this third sense that a mad or drunken man 'has knowledge'; and the incontinent man, repeating moral phrases without 'knowing' what they mean, may be compared to a madman, or to a man who is drunk, or to an actor playing the part assigned to him.

Hitherto our explanation of incontinence has consisted in a general reference to 'non-realised knowledge.' Let us now try to find the immediate cause of incontinence—how it comes about that, in the peculiar condition of the incontinent man, knowledge is 'not realised,'

It is in the way that the machinery of the Practical Syllogism is worked by Desire that we shall find the immediate cause of an incontinent act. The major premiss, 'excess is evil,' which opposes itself to Desire is not allowed to reign without a rival. Desire sets up another major,—'sweet things are pleasant,' and is thus able to represent the incontinent act as a conclusion validly drawn from premisses. Desire marks its opposition to Moral Principle by putting forward a maxim—'sweet things are pleasant—which does not in itself (though it does in its consequences) conflict with 'excess is evil,' the maxim of Moral Principle.

As for the question—How the incontinent man, when the fit is over, recovers his knowledge, the explanation of this recovery will be the same as that given by the physiologists for 'recovery' from the unconsciousness of drunkenness or sleep.

We are now in a position to define our attitude to the view of Socrates. Socrates may be allowed to say—'knowledge cannot be overpowered by passion'—if by 'knowledge' be understood 'true knowledge'—'knowledge of the universal.' This, because it is universal, is not touched by passion. It is only 'the knowledge of the sense-particular'—and this after all is not 'knowledge'—which enters into conflict with passion, and may be conquered by it.

1146 b. 8. §§ 1, 2.] Rassow (Forsch. pp. 20, 21) points out that each of these sections contains a separate list of proposed enquiries. The list given in § 1 corresponds, in substance and in order, with the contents of the following chapters, whereas that given in § 2 mentions only one point actually discussed afterwards—viz. ἐπειράσθαι.

1 'Knowledge of the major, as universal proposition' must not be confounded with 'the application of this knowledge to particular cases.'
el peri panti' estin aer.ia kai egraptewa $ o$; 1146 b. 18. The two 1140 b. 8.
passages therefore appear to Rassow and Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, Paragraphs 25, 28, 29, 61) to be independent duplicates not belonging to the same version. Cook Wilson seems inclined to regard that in § 2 as the earlier, and as having introduced a version now lost. This opinion must be taken in connexion with his whole theory of the structure and authorship of the present chapter. He regards it as made up of passages from two very similar versions, either of which § 1 fits equally, while § 2 fits neither: and with respect to the authorship of the chapter he is of opinion that 'whether the two versions [of which it is composed] are by the same hand or not, there is a strong probability that (a) neither is by Aristotle, that (b) neither is by the author of the Eudemian Ethics—or at least of the second book of that treatise, and that (c) they are not by the same author as some of the most important parts of this book' (Arist. Studies, I. paragraph 60). He arranges the parallel versions thus—

\[
\begin{align*}
A^1 \ $ 2 & \quad A \ $ 1 \\
B_1 \ $ 3 & = B_2 \ $ 4 \\
C_1 \ $ 5 & = C_2 \ $ 7-8 \\
D_1 \ $ 6 & = D_2 \ $ 9-12 \\
?\ $ 13, 14 & \\
\end{align*}
\]

See Aristotelian Studies, I, Table I, and paragraphs 25-32, and 59-61.

That there is considerable confusion and repetition in this chapter no one can deny; but whether so much as to justify all the details of Cook Wilson's theory may, I think, be doubted. Sections 1 and 2 seem to me to be clearly, and sections 3 and 4 probably, parallel versions: but §§ 5, 6, 7, and 8 strike me as consecutive; and §§ 9, 10, and 11 can only be described as parallel to § 6 in the sense that, like it, they treat of the Practical Syllogism; for that Syllogism is analysed, and applied to the explanation of aer.ia, in the two passages from two different, though not inconsistent, points of view, in such a way that the two analyses and applications, taken together, seem only to present the subject exhaustively. The relation of §§ 9, 10, and 11 to § 6 seems to me to differ in an important point from that of § 4 to § 3; for whereas § 4 merely repeats the substance of § 3, §§ 9, 10, and 11 say something not said in § 6, and something well worth saying.
1146 b. 8. The circumstance that the treatment of the Practical Syllogism is not continuous, but broken by §§ 7 and 8, is evidence of confusion in the structure of the chapter; but, as the considerations added in §§ 9, 10, and 11 are so well worth adding, we ought perhaps not to have much difficulty in supposing that the writer of §§ 5, 6, 7, and 8—doubtless with some sacrifice of symmetry—added them. On the other hand, it must be noted that the writer of the *M. M.* (ii. 6), in his version of this chapter, treats of the Practical Syllogism in one place, not in two places; but his treatment of it is so jejune and slight as to make it unlikely that, even if his authority had treated of it in two places, he would have followed his example.

Although I cannot accept, in anything like its fulness, Cook Wilson’s theory of the structure of this chapter, I think that his view of its authorship (that it is probably not by Aristotle, not by Eudemus, not by the author of the principal parts of this Book) has much to say for itself; and the remarks which he makes in the course of paragraphs 59–61 in support of his view have also great value, independently of the immediate purpose to which he applies them, and I shall frequently have to refer to them in subsequent notes. According to Cook Wilson this chapter is probably not by Aristotle, not by Eudemus, not by the author of the principal parts of Book vii, because (1) these three writers describe the ἄκπαρτία as the subject of ‘an active struggle between reason (*λόγος*, sometimes *προαίρεσις* = “rational will”) and appetite (*ἐπιθυμία*), between the desire to do what is wrong and the conviction that it is wrong’ (*Arist. Stud.* paragraph 60, p. 49); whereas this chapter, by applying the distinction of actual and potential knowledge to explain ἄκπαρτία, makes a mental struggle impossible, there being no actual knowledge for appetite to struggle with; and because (2) ‘chapter 3 is an obvious concession to the Socratic principle, as the writer of the last section of it felt’ (p. 50), whereas Aristotle, Eudemus, and the writer of the other parts of Book vii, are strongly opposed to that principle.

The following (among other) passages are quoted by Cook Wilson (paragraphs 59–61) to show that Aristotle, Eudemus, and the writer of the other parts of Book vii regard the struggle in the ἄκπαρτία as an active and conscious one—*E. N.* i. 13. 15, 16. 1102 b. 14–25; ix. 4. 8. 1166 b. 7–10; *de An.* iii. 9. 8. 433 a. 1–3; *de An.* iii. 10. 6. 433 b. 5–10; *E. E.* ii. 7 and 8. 1224 a. 30–36 and
§ 2.] Ramsauer, who thinks that this section is out of place here, b. 14, and may have been the opening of an Aristotelian discussion which has not come down to us, remarks that the words ὅτε γὰρ περὶ ἀπαντὶ κ.τ.λ. b. 19 assume as settled what is elaborately established in subsequent chapters. Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, paragraph 61) remarks that 'according to § 1 the first subject for consideration is that which follows ... πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καί πῶς εἰδότες; § 2 not only puts a different subject first, but omits this, at least in any distinct shape, from the list. Perhaps therefore § 2 belongs to an earlier version which contained nothing about potential knowledge possessed by the ἀκρατής. The writer of § 2 may merely, as against Socrates, have maintained or presupposed what is implied in chapter 2, that in ἀκρασία there is a strong and active consciousness of wrong-doing (ισχυρὰ ὑπόληψις ... ἀντιτείχουσα), and have added that this conviction could be disobeyed, if not accompanied, as in φρόνησις (cf. ch. ii. § 5. 1146 a. 4 sqq.) by a strong desire to realise it, but opposed by ἐπιθυμία. He may have felt no more difficulty in this representation than the author of the passages quoted from the de An. and Nic. Ethics [see end of last note] seems to have done, and therefore not have dwelt on it further. . . . The above is somewhat countenanced by the conclusion of § 2. The first problem (ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως) being, whether the ἀκρατής and ἐγκρατής are differenced by their objects or by their relation to them; the fact that the ἀκρατής knows he should not adopt the pleasant motive (ὅτα ὁδὸς ἕτερα μὲν διώκει δὲ) is assumed as subsidiary to the solution of the problem, without any hint that the fact itself is a principal difficulty awaiting settlement.'

Peters expresses his view of this section in an interesting note (p. 215), which I quote to show how plausibly the obscure phenomena here presented to criticism may be accounted for on still another hypothesis.—'This section (§ 2) seems to me not an alternative to § 1, but a correction of it, or rather a remark to the effect that the whole passage (both § 1 and the discussion introduced by it) ought to be rewritten, and an indication of the way in which this should be done. Of considerable portions of the Nicomachean Ethics we may safely say that the author could not have regarded them as finished in the form in which we have them. I believe
that the author made a rough draft of the whole work, or of the several parts of it, which he kept by him and worked upon,—working some parts up to completion; sometimes rewriting a passage without striking out the original version, or even indicating which was to be retained (e.g. the theory of pleasure); more frequently adding an afterthought which required the rewriting of a whole passage, without rewriting it (e.g., to take one instance out of many in Book v, τὸ ἀντιπεποιθόδος is an afterthought which strictly requires that the whole book should be rewritten); sometimes (as here) making a note of the way in which a passage should be rewritten. Suppose, if need be, that the work, left in this incomplete state, was edited and perhaps further worked upon by a later hand, and we have enough, I think, to account for the facts.'

b. 19. ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς] The man strictly so called, or without further qualification—i.e. the man who is incontinent about certain bodily pleasures (see ch. 4), as distinguished from the man so called with an added qualification (μετὰ προσβάλεσισ)—ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ, κήρδους, or τιμῆς. Viewed as ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής, a man is viewed as related to the same bodily pleasures as the ἂνδραστός: but the relation is not the same in each case. The relation in which the ἂνδραστός ἀκρατής stands to these pleasures is not so simple as that in which the ἂνδραστός stands to them: the ἂνδραστός is conceived as 'simply related to them'—πρὸς ταύτα ἀπλῶς ἔχει: but the ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής is conceived as 'related to them in a certain manner'—ωδὴ ἔχει—in a certain manner which distinguishes him from the ἂνδραστός: i.e. the ἂνδραστός simply goes in for them: the ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής goes in for them—after a struggle.

b. 24. §§ 3, 4.] Imelmann (Obs. Crit. in Arist. Eth. Nic. p. 44), regarding §§ 3 and 4 as two independent versions, would strike out the words ἐπιστήμη δόξης in § 4, b. 29, on the ground that οὐδὲν διοίσει immediately preceding is equivalent to the οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον of § 3, b. 25. 'Quaestio est,' he says, 'utrum contra ipsam scientiam immodici peccent an contra opinionem: quam nihil facere ad rem Aristoteles indicat, quoniam opinionem interdum eadem pertinacia atque scientiam defendamus et obtineamus. Quem sententiarum nexum duo verba aperte perturbant. Etenim οὐδέν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης prorsus sunt aliena ab hoc loco, cum, si quidem οἱ δοξάζοντες facilius mollitiae indulgent, differre ἐπιστήμην δόξης
§§ 3, 4. 145 dicendum erat ... quam inepte autem illa illata sunt, manifesto, 1146 b. 24. he then prints §§ 3 and 4 in parallel columns, omitting the words ἐπιστήμη δόξης. But a comparison of the corresponding passage in the M. M. (ii. 6. 1201 b. i sqq.) shows that the whole clause, οὐδὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης, as it stands, is equivalent to οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον. The passage runs thus—τὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἁπαρίαν παρέχοντα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον δὲ λύσι τὰς ἁπαρίας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἄποσπον γὰρ εὖδοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ἔχουσα ταύτῃ ἀποβάλλειν ἡ μεταπίπτειν. ὃ δ' αὖτος λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει δόξαν εἰναι ἡ ἐπιστήμην εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ δόξα σφοδρὰ τῷ βέβαιον εἶναι καὶ ἀμετάπειτον, οὐδὲν διοίσει τῆς ἐπιστήμης, κ.τ.λ.: cf. the Paraphrast—ὑπεβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις τὴν δόξαν οὔτω βεβαιῶς ἐγκείσθαι ὡστε μὴ διαφέρειν ἐπιστήμης κατὰ τὸ ἀντιβαινεῖ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις. In the light of these commentaries § 4 may be paraphrased thus—'If you argue that δόξα is weak, and therefore more likely than ἐπιστήμη to be overpowered, we shall reply that there is no difference between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη in the matter of strength, for some people, like Heraclitus, are as firm in their δόξα as others are in their ἐπιστήμη.' Οὐδὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης is thus not to be understood, as it is apparently by Imelmann, as an inference from εἰ οὖν ... πράξεων, but as an answer to it: 'If you argue εἰ οὖν ... πράξεων, our answer will be οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἐπιστήμη δόξης.' Doubtless the expression οὐδὲν διοίσει δόξα ἐπιστήμης would have been more correct than the οὐδὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης of the text, δόξα, not ἐπιστήμη, being the proper subject of the argument; and it will be observed that the writer of the M. M. and the Paraphrast have adopted the more correct expression.

The exact scope of the argument οὐδὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης is well defined by Grant—'Of course neither Aristotle nor his school would wish to do away with the distinction which Plato had established between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. It is only as connected with the will, and as forming a ground for action, that opinion can be considered as strong as science.'

§ 4. δηλοὶ δ' Ἰράκλειτος] The Ald. Schol. (who also instances the b. 30. dogmatism of Democritus about his atoms) says—δηλοὶ δ' Ἰράκλειτος ὅτι ἔστι βεβαία καὶ λογικά δόξα, καὶ οὐ πάσα δόξα ἔστιν ἀσθενής, ἐκείνος γὰρ δοξάζων ὅτι κίνησις οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἄκριτας οἶδε, δεῖξαι ὅτι καῦν δόξαν VOL. II.
§ 4, 5.

Rassow's view (with which I agree) of the relation of these §§ to one another is as follows (Forsch. pp. 127–129). Against the Socratic doctrine that there is no such thing as ἀκρασία, because no one knowingly does wrong, four considerations, coupled together by οὖτις, are brought forward—(a) Knowledge is not always actual. A man may have knowledge, without using it: § 5. (b) The reflection which precedes action may be reduced to the form of a syllogism, in which the general rule is the major, the particular case the minor premiss. Now, the knowledge of the major premiss may be consciously present, while that of the minor may remain latent; and so a man may do wrong, notwithstanding the fact that his ἄγνωσις is only partial: § 6. (c) His passions may take such hold of a man that he may be said to have in a sense, and yet not have, the knowledge of right and wrong, his condition being like that of a madman, or of a man asleep or drunk: §§ 7, 8. The προπετίς ἀκρασία, or προπέτεια of E. N. vii. 7, 8, is the form of ἀκρασία which the writer has in view in §§ 7 and 8. (d) The fourth consideration (presented in §§ 9, 10, 11) takes up the other kind of ἀκρασία distinguished in E. N. vii. 7, 8, viz. ἀσθενεία. The passions occasion ignorance or moral blindness, not directly, but by means of sophistical representations; they place, by the side of the major premiss which contains the rule of conduct, another major premiss which is not in itself false, but in the circumstances is irrelevant. Hence, in acting from this true, but irrelevant, major premiss, the ἀκρατής acts ἐπὶ λόγον πως καὶ δέξια. These, according to Rassow, are the four separate considerations urged in this chapter against the view of Socrates.

§ 5.] 'The distinction between the possession and the application of knowledge' is made, as the editors note, by Plato, Theaet. 197,
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198 οὖκ οὖσιν ήμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστερῶν κτῆσει τε καὶ θῆρας ἔρωμεν 1146 b. 31. ὅτι διπλὴν ἡ ἡθραν σὲ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτήσαθαί τοῦ κεκτήσαταί ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ κεκτήμενον τοῦ λαβέων, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χεραίν ἄ πιλαι εἰκότητο.

διοίκει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα δὴ μὴ δεὶ b. 33. πράττειν [τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα] So Bywater. Bekker and Susemihl read διοίκει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ δὴ μὴ δεὶ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα, which expresses the sense intended more neatly. The words καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα are given by all authorities, apparently, except Mb and r. On the other hand, all authorities seem to give the words bracketed by Bywater—τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα. Of course we cannot retain both the words omitted by Mb and r, and those bracketed by Bywater.

For the antithesis ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ see de An. ii. 1. 412 a. 22 αὕτη δὲ (i. e. σώματος ἐνελέγεν) λέγεται διὰ χώσ, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. ἐφανερῶς οὖν ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπάρχειν τήν ψυχήν καὶ ὑπὸν καὶ ἐγρήγορος ἐστιν, ἀνάλογον δέ ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορος τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὡς ὑπὸν τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν κ. τ. λ. Cf. Mel. Θ. 6. 1048 a. 32 λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει οὖν ἐν τῷ εἴλος ἑρμήν καὶ ἐν τῇ δή τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθηκάναι, καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἐὰν δυνατόν ἐπιστήμην. Cf. Phys. viii. 4. 255 a. 33 ἐστὶ δὲ δυνάμει ἄλλος ὅ μαθόν ἐπιστήμων καὶ ὁ ἔχων ἢθη καὶ μὴ θεωρῶν ... ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμημα μὴ θεωρῶν δὲ δυνάμει ἐστίν ἐπιστήμημα πως, ἄλλ' οὖχ ὡς καὶ πρὶν μαθέων. See Bonitz, Mel. p. 394.

§ 6.] Section 5 called attention generally to the fact that knowlege may be possessed without being realised in consciousness, and argued that there is nothing paradoxical in supposing that the ἀκρατής acts `against knowledge,' if his knowledge is merely possessed, but not realised in consciousness. Section 6 points out further that there is nothing to prevent the ἀκρατής acting `against knowledge,' if, while his knowledge of the universal is realised in consciousness (χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου), his knowledge of the particular is not (ἄλλα μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος). There is nothing inconsistent in this supposition, for, although knowledge of the universal includes knowledge of the contained particular, it does not necessarily entail the consciousness knowledge of the particular; see Aid. Schol. ad loc. ἐὰς μὲν οὖν γνώσκειν τὴν καθόλου πρότασιν, καὶ τὴν μερικὴν ἐξ ἀνίκητος γνώσκει δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργεῖς ἢ γὰρ μερικὴ πρότασις ὑπὸ τῆς καθόλου προτάσεως περιέχεται. Nor is there any difficulty in supposing that the ἀκρατής, in acting against his non-realised, or latent, know-
ledge of the particular, acts also against his consciously realised knowledge of the including universal: for action does not lie in the sphere of the universal, but in that of the particular—πρακτά γάρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, it is ‘particular things,’ not ‘things in general,’ that are done—see the Paraph. ad loc. ἀμφότερον οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν προτάσεων, ἐπειδὰν ἐπιθυμία τις ἐπὶ τῇ κινή συναντᾶ; γὰρ γὰρ κὰ τὸ κακὸν οὐ δεῖ πράττειν, καὶ θεωρεῖν κατ' αὐτὴν τρυπαίτα, τὴν ἔν & μερικὴν, ὅτι τὸδε κακὸν, ἐξεχὶ μὲν, οὐ χρήσατο δὲ, οὐδὲ συνορέσαι ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ διὰ τούτο πρὸς τὴν μοχθηρίαν χωρεῖν, ὡσπερ ἀποτυφλώθειν, τότε δὲ οὐδὲν βαμπιστάν. εἶ γὰρ καὶ τρυπά τῇ καθόλου προτάσει, ἀλλὰ πράττει οὐ δύναται κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην μὴ χρώμενος καὶ τῇ μερικῇ, αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κυρία τῶν πράξεων. Here the last sentence explains very clearly the words of the text οὐδὲν καλῶς πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην... πρακτά γὰρ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα. A man may consciously realise a general rule of conduct without realising that this is a case in which it is applicable, and it is only by what he realises in particular cases that his actions, being particulars, can be influenced. The knowledge of the general rule is not an efficient cause. It ‘rests’ as a final cause. Where it does not inspire efficient causes to act in its interest, actions (produced by efficient causes hostile to its interest) may take place: see de An. iii. 11. 434 a. 16 ἐπεὶ δ’ ἢ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἢ δὲ τοῦ καθ’ ἕκαστα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιούτῳ πράττειν, ἢ δὲ ὅτι τὸδε τοιοῦν τοιῶθε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιῶθε), ἂν αὕτη κινεὶ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἢ καθόλου ἢ ἄμφω, ἀλλ’ ἢ μὲν ἡμεοῦσα μᾶλλον, ἢ δ’ οὐ. In short, ‘universal knowledge,’ being ‘at rest’—not entering into the arena of particular conflicts—is no more affected by the passions which affect ‘particular knowledge,’ and make it ‘latent,’ than the Race is affected by the particular incidents of disease and decay which affect Individuals.

The section then proceeds (from διαφέρει 1147 a. 4 onwards) to call attention to the circumstances in which consciously realised knowledge of the universal most frequently coexists with that merely latent knowledge of the particular, which makes the prevalence of ἐπιθυμία intelligible. I agree with Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, paragraph 31) in regarding as mistaken the view (maintained by Rassow, Forsch. p. 128) that §§ 5 and 6 ‘do not refer to ἀκρασία, and that the words δῆλον οὖν διὰ ἀμοίωσ ἐξεῖν λεκτέον τοῦ ἀκρατείς τούτοις § 7 show that the state of the ἀκρατίας is first discussed in §§ 7, 8.’ ‘This would be strange in itself,’ continues Cook Wilson, ‘and seems to be disproved by the sentence in § 5 διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦσα δὲ ἢ μὲ δεὶ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ
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διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου κ.τ.λ.] 'Aber auch bei dem Allge- 1147 b. 4. meinen macht es einen Unterschied, ob dasselbe etwas von ihm (dem Menschen) selbst oder von einer Sache aussagt.'—Stahr. Not only is there the important difference, just noticed, between the universal and the particular, but also in the universal itself (καὶ τὸ καθόλου) there is a difference, according as the reference is to 'oneself' or to 'things.' This difference is mentioned, because it has a bearing on the 'latency of the particular,' by which the phenomenon of ἀκρατία is being accounted for. See the Paraphrast's note—"Όταν γὰρ τὸ καθόλου οὐτως ἔχῃ, ὡστε περιέχειν αὐτὸν τὸν συνδειγμένον, ἦ τὸν ὑμεικόν, τῇ καθόλου συγγινώσκεται καὶ ἡ μερικὴ ἕον, πάσιν ἀνθρώποις βλαβερὸν ὁ ἔλλεβορος, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀνθρωπος, αὐτῷ ἐπὶ βλα- 

βερὸν ὁ ἔλλεβορος· ἐνταῦθα τῇ καθόλου καὶ ἡ μερικὴ συγκωσκέται· οὐ γὰρ ἐαυτὸν δύναται ἁγονεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπος· ὁμοιὸς δὲ κἀν τὸν ὑμεικὸν περιέχει, οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδε αὐτὸν ἁγονεῖν δυνατόν. ὅταν δὲ ἡ καθόλου πράγμα 

τὶ περιέχει, τότε οὐκ ἀνάγκη, τῆς καθόλου γυνωσκομένη, καὶ τὴν μερικὴν γυνώσκεσθαι· οἷον, πᾶς ἔλλεβορος βλαβερὸν, τόδε ἔλλεβορος, τόδε ἐπὶ βλαβερὸν· ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἀνάγκη γυνώσκεσθαι τὴν μερικὴν, τῆς καθόλου γυνω-

σκομένης.

In so far as the universal 'relates to oneself,' the included know-

ledge of the particular is not likely to remain latent; but in so far as the universal relates to 'things,' the knowledge of the particular is often latent, and τὸ ἀκρατεύεσθαι easily explained. As 'the difference in the universal' thus owes its importance to the difference which it involves between particulars, the Paraph. actually begins his note (part of which has been quoted above) ον 

diαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου, with the words— αἱ μερικαὶ δὲ διαφέρουσι· 

τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη πάσα εἰδέναι, τῶν καθόλου γυνωσκομένων' τὰς δὲ ὁβ—
The best explanation of the words διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου seems to be given by the passage de An. iii. 11. 434 a. 16, lately quoted—ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐπολήσεις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα (ἢ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὃτι δὲι τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιώντε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι τὸ τοὐν τοιώντε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσοδε), ἠδὴ αὐτῇ κινεῖ ὡς δάξ, αὐξ ὡς καθόλου ᾠ ἀμφότερον, ἄλλ' ἡ μὲν ἥρεμοισά μᾶλλον, ἡ δ' οὖ. The formula of the universal proposition is ‘all men in such and such circumstances ought to do acts of such and such a kind.’ To apply correctly a general rule drawn according to this formula, the agent must (1) recognise his own circumstances in the general description given—the general description of circumstances being the τὸ ἐπὶ ἐνατοῖ of the present §: it is assumed that he will not find much difficulty in doing so, and in supplying the αὐτὸς ἀνθρώπος or κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσοδε part of the minor. (2) He must recognise in the particular thing now before him the marks which the general rule gives as characteristic of the things which men in his circumstances ought to do. These characteristic marks given by the general rule are the τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος of the present §, where it is assumed that the agent may easily fail to notice in a particular thing the marks which characterise the things which men in his circumstances ought to do.

It will be observed that the one universal proposition of the de An., with its double reference—to persons and to things (δὲι τὸν τοιοῦτον—τὸ τοιώντε πράττειν), is resolved, in E. N. viii. 3. 6, into two universal propositions—(1) παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ἔρημα, ‘all men are benefited by dry nourishment’ (with its minor αὐτὸς ἀνθρώπος—‘I am a man’), and (2) ἔρημον τὸ τοιώντε, ‘all things with such and such qualities are dry’ (with its minor τὸ τοιώντε, ‘this thing now before me possesses these qualities’). The resolution, however, is more apparent than real, for the first universal proposition has already a reference to both persons and things, and the second universal proposition merely describes more fully the things referred to in the first proposition. Παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ἔρημον is really equivalent to τῷ τοιοῦτῳ συμφέρει τὸ τοιώντε—a general rule, expressing the relation of a class of persons to a class of things, which finds its application in the minor τὸ ὁ τοιώνε κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσοδε—
a proposition which has likewise a double reference—to a person and to a thing. It is in the application, then, of the thing-side of the universal proposition that, according to the present §, the agent’s chief difficulty lies (ἀλλά εἰ τάδε τοιώδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ 1147 a. 7). A man may know generally that acids are bad for bilious people: and he may know that he is bilious: but he may continue to drink sherry, not knowing that it contains a great deal of acid. His conduct might be described as μηδὲν ἄτοπον. It would have to be described as θαυμαστῶν, if he continued to drink sherry, after his doctor had told him its real nature. The distinction, then, drawn in this § seems to resolve itself into that between knowing and not knowing the particular—a distinction which has much more significance in the case of the ἀκατάστης than in that of the ‘bilious patient’ of our example, for there is that in the condition of the ἀκατάστης which makes it peculiarly difficult for him to interpret and apply the universal—that is, ‘to know the particular.’ The ἀκατάστης is likely to find as much difficulty with the καίγω δὲ τοιώδε, as with the τάδε τοιώδε.

αὐτὸς ἀνθρωπος] αὐτός is Rassow’s reading (see Forsch. pp. 65, a. 6. 66) for Bekker’s οὖσα. Kᵇ pr. and Mᵇ have ὁ αὐτός, and Cambr. has ὁ οὖσα. The Paraph. seems to have had αὐτός, and the reading is supported by the αὐτός δὲ ἀνθρωπος of the Practical Syllogism in de Motu Anim. 7. 701 a. 13.

κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διάσει τοὺς τρόπουσ] Ramsauer notes that a. 8. this te answers to ἦτα τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλων τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων § 7. 1147 a. 10, where another τρόπος is mentioned.

οὖτω μὲν ... ἄλλως δὲ] Coraes has—οὖτω μὲν ὁ νοῦς δ’ οὖν, a. 9. ὡστε δοκεῖν μηδὲν ἄτοπον τὸ οὖσα εἰδέναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὡστε τὴν μείζω πρότασιν ἐπίστασθαι μόνην καὶ τὴν καθόλου, τὴν δ’ ἑλάττω καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀγνοεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀμαρτάνειν ἄλλως δ’ ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ θαυμαστόν τὸ εἰδότα ἀμφότερα, τὸ τ’ ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ τὸ καθόλου, ἀμαρτάνειν.

§ 7. ἦτα τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλων τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων a. 10. ὑπάρχει τοὺς ἀνθρώπωσ] The connexion between this § and §§ 5 and 6 seems to me to be the following—§ 5 explained the phenomenon of Incontinence by a general reference to the distinction between potential and actual knowledge: § 6, going into detail, showed that knowledge of the particular is often potential, even when knowledge of the including universal is actual: § 7
proceeds to point out that incontinence may be explained, not only by reference to the distinction, just considered, between potential and actual knowledge, but also by reference to a distinction which must be drawn within the limits of potential knowledge—for knowledge may be ‘potential’ in the proper and positive sense of ‘likely to be actualised,’ and ‘potential’ in the merely negative sense of ‘not only not actualised, but unlikely, in the circumstances, to be actualised.’ There are cases in which the natural tendency of potential knowledge to rise into actuality (cf. E. N. ix. 9) is impeded to such a degree that, while the impeding influences continue to operate, the knowledge can scarcely be called even potential—i.e. it is potential in a merely negative sense. The Paraphrast expresses this view of the meaning and connexion of § 7 very well—*Eri, ov tovto mouo dvaferwousn oij evestamenevei, toj tvon xin 6xhen kai xhrosva, tovs dev 6xhein xin, ou xhrhsva de, alla kai ge aute to 6xen dvaferwousw' ou gar hrwios 6xhevei tovs evisthmas oij evistamenevei 6stei gar 6xovta tina evisthmer, m6 6xheiv oivn, tvn kathdovta, kai maivmenvn, kai oivmvenv kata tovto dev tov trpou 6xhevei tivn evisthmer kai oij ev tvn pakhswv ontes' mevovnv gar upo tiv evisthmiac, kai maivovtei upo tov xumov. Similarly Rassow (Forsch. p. 128)—‘Dort (i.e. in the cases contemplated in §§ 5 and 6) war das Wissen dem Menschen zwar nicht gegenwattig, aber es konnte durch Erinnerung und Zureden in ihm erweckt werden; in diesem Falle (i.e. the 6llos trpou of § 7) hat die Leidenschaft dem Menschen mit der Besinnung die Fhigkeit geerobert, sich zu sammeln und zum Wissen zurckzukehren. So lange daher die Raserei der Leidenschaft vorhalt, ist er gegen alle Mahnung taub und vollkommen ausser sich.’ Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, paragraphs 26, 27, 30), holding §§ 7 and 8 to be another version parallel to § 5, and placing them immediately after § 4, makes the words 6lloiv trpovn tvon vov rmvenv and dvaferwous in § 7 refer to what has preceded in § 4. ‘There (i.e. in § 4) the only kinds of “having” belief are having it doubtfully or having it certainly, in each of these the “having” being actual, §§ 7 and 8 add the case where the “having” is potential.’ He thus regards §§ 7 and 8 as explaining, for the first time in the version to which they belong (see above note on vii. 3. i—2. 1146 b. 8 for Cook Wilson’s resolution of this chapter), the difference of explicit or actual, and implicit or potential knowledge. ‘According to what seems the necessary meaning of the

words, §§ 7 and 8 explain the difference of explicit (or actual) and implicit (or potential) knowledge, premising that it has not been mentioned hitherto—εἰ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων κ.τ.λ. (paragr. 26 β). Now, as the difference has been mentioned in § 5, Cook Wilson argues that § 5 and § 7 cannot belong to the same version. Then, referring to the interpretation commonly given (as by the Paraphrast, quoted above, and by Rassow), he says (paragr. 26 β), 'some have thought . . . that the intention of § 7 is to describe, not the difference of implicit from explicit knowledge in general, but a new species of implicit knowledge, distinct from what has been given (ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων), and defined by the examples καθεύδων, μανωμένος, οἰωμένος. It may be doubted whether this explanation would ever have been thought of, had it not been for the supposed necessity of reconciling § 5 and § 7, for it does not seem to suit either passage'—for, he argues, 'if ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων referred to § 5, that § must also be the description of a particular kind of implicit knowledge; but it is a description of implicit knowledge in general, not of a particular species.' Nor, again, can 'the reference be to § 6, as that only uses the general notion of potentiality (οὐκ ἐνεργεί) given in § 5' (paragr. 26)—i.e. 'applies the distinction [of potential and actual knowledge expounded in § 5] to the action of the ἀκραθία through the Practical Syllogism' (paragr. 27 end).

Cook Wilson's statements—that § 5 is 'a description of implicit knowledge in general, not of a particular species,' and that § 6 'only uses the general notion of potentiality given in § 5,' do not seem to me to put the matter correctly. I take it that §§ 5 and 6 are concerned, not with 'implicit knowledge in general,' but with two particular species of 'having knowledge'—τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην. The notion of 'having knowledge'—ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην—is not convertible with the notion of 'implicit knowledge': 'the implicit having of knowledge' is one species of 'having knowledge' and the other species is 'the explicit having of knowledge.'

The εἰ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων of § 7, then, naturally refers to §§ 5 and 6, because in § 5 two species of 'having knowledge'—τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην—have been distinguished, viz. τὸ ἔχειν καὶ θεωρεῖν (where the 'having' is actual) and τὸ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ θεωρεῖν δὲ (where the 'having' is potential); and in § 6 these two species of 'having knowledge' have been considered in connexion with the two προτάσεις of the Practical
Syllogism, and the ἀκρατής has been distinctly said to 'have’ both προτάσεις, the ‘having’ of the major being actual, and that of the minor potential.—ἐχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας . . . χρώμενον μεντοι τῇ καθ-λον ἀλλὰ μῆ τῇ κατὰ μέρος.\(^1\)

To these two species of ἔχειν distinguished in §§ 5 and 6 (the ἔχειν of the οὐ χρώμενος and the ἔχειν of the χρώμενος), § 7 adds yet another species (cf. Ramsauer's note—‘κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους τῶν τρόποις 1147 a. 8: τε istud ad τὸ ἐτι 1147 a. 10. § 7 spectat, quo ἄλλος τρόπος additur’), viz. το ἐχειν πως καὶ μή ἐχειν, which differs from the normal ἔχειν μὲν μὴ θεωρεῖν δὲ in the manner explained at the beginning of the present note. If we keep it steadily in view that the object of § 7 is not ‘to explain the difference of explicit and implicit knowledge,’ but merely to call attention to another kind τοῦ ἔχειν τῇ επαστήμην, the fact that this third kind τοῦ ἔχειν resembles one of the two kinds distinguished in §§ 5 and 6 in being implicit need not trouble us. Indeed, without compromising the position taken up against Cook Wilson’s view, one might admit (though I do not think that it is necessary to do so) that this third kind of ἔχειν, being a variety of implicit ἔχειν, was perhaps not in the author’s mind when he wrote § 5, but that he there thought merely of the broad specific difference between implicit ἔχειν and explicit ἔχειν: cf. the opinion stated by Peters at the end of the following note, p. 217—‘Action in spite of knowledge presents no difficulty (1) if that knowledge be not present at the time of action § 5, or (2) if, though the major (or majors) be known and present, the minor (or one of the minors) be unknown or absent § 6. But (3) other cases remain which can only be explained by a further distinction introduced in § 7; i.e. a man who has knowledge may at times be in a state in which his knowledge, though present, has lost its reality—in which, though he may repeat the old maxims, they mean no more to him than to one who talks in his sleep. Section 7, I venture to think, is (like § 2) not a repetition or an alternative version, but an afterthought, which requires the rewriting of the whole passage.’

In referring the words ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων to § 4, Cook Wilson says (paragraph 30) ‘There (i.e. in § 4) the only kinds of “having” belief are having it doubtfully or having it

\(^1\) The words ἐχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας κ.τ.λ. in § 6 are sufficient to show that not only the ἔχειν μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ, but also the χρώμενος is thought of as ἔχειν—a point which Bywater’s reading and bracket in § 5. 1146 b. 34 conceal.
certainly, in each of these the “having” being actual, §§ 7 and 8 1147 a. 10. add the case where the “having” is potential. Surely this view requires § 4 to say ‘there are two kinds of “having knowledge”—

tοῦ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην—having it doubtfully and having it certainly, in each of these the “having” being actual’: but § 4 compares ἐπιστήμη and δόξα—does not mention two kinds τοῦ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην, indeed says nothing about ‘having’—ἔχειν—either δόξα or ἐπιστήμη: whereas the words with which § 7 begins—ἑτὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλων τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις—seem to imply that the technical expression ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην does not occur here for the first time in the context, and that other modes τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην have been mentioned before.

The ἔχειν καὶ θεωρεῖν—ἔχειν μὲν μὴ θεωρεῖν δὲ—and ἔχειν ποι καὶ μὴ ἔχειν of these §§ recall τὸ δυνατὸν ὅτι ἦδη ἔστι κατὰ ἐνέργειαν—τὸ δυνατὸν ὅτι ἐνεργήσθη δὲν—and τὸ οὐδὲποτε ἐνέργεια ἄλλα δύναμις μόνον of de Int. p. 13. 23 a. 8—25, on which see Grote’s Arist. vol. i. pp. 184, 185.

Before leaving the subject of the τρόποι τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, I would call attention to the expressions οὐ θεωρῶν and οὐ χρόμενος, used in §§ 5 and 6 to describe the state of the man whose ‘having’ is implicit. θεωρεῖν and χρήσθαι are terms applicable only to the man whose faculties are in normal working order, and the expressions οὐ θεωρῶν, οὐ χρόμενος are intended to show that one who easily could ‘think’ or ‘use’ simply does not happen to do so—as when an Englishman who ‘has’ a knowledge of German does not happen to be reading a German book; but the ἔχειν of § 7, which is practically equivalent to μὴ ἔχειν, and is defined, not by οὐ θεωρῶν, but by μανώμενος, is knowledge which cannot, in the circumstances, be produced at will—it is tied up, as it were, like money in some bad unrealisable security.


Εὔπη λέγουσι Εμπεδοκλέους] Besides the poem περὶ φύσεως, a. 20. Empedocles wrote a poem called καθαρμοί, in which the Agrigentines were exhorted to live piously and virtuously. See Mullach, Fr. Phil. vol. i. pp. 12 sqq., and Ritter and Preller, Hist. Ph. §§ 167 and 179.
συμφωνήματι]

Ald. Sch. οἱ νεκροὶ φύσιν γενέσθαι τὴν ἐξὶν ἐν αὐτῶι. The reading of K[b] συμφωνήματι, which Sus. and Bywater adopt in place of Bekker's συμφωνήματι, is supported by Ald., CCC, and B[3], which have συμφωνή εἶναι.

a. 24. § 9. φυσικῶς] 'Again, we may look at the more immediate causes of incontinence'—i.e. we may examine the precise mechanism by which an incontinent act is produced. Hitherto the enquiry has been conducted λογικῶς rather than φυσικῶς—the remote and abstract explanation afforded by the great Aristotelian distinction of ὕπόμας and ἐνέργεια has been adduced rather than the proximate cause of οἰκεῖος λόγος, which an examination of the concrete nature (φύσις) of the phenomenon will make known. (For the distinction λογικῶς—φυσικῶς see note on i. 3. 4 πεπαιδευμένων 1094 b. 23, and on viii. 1. 6. 1155 b. 2.) The proximate cause (οἰκεῖος λόγος) of an incontinent act, or the precise mechanism by which it is produced, is not, however, given in the premisses of the Practical Syllogism, as such. The premisses of the Practical Syllogism, as such, explain all acts generally (λογικῶς), not incontinent acts specially (φυσικῶς). The proximate cause of an incontinent act is to be sought in the special manner in which ἐπιθυμία uses the mechanism of the Practical Syllogism to attain its own object; and §§ 9, 10 and 11, in explaining the sophistical use which ἐπιθυμία makes of the Practical Syllogism, give the οἰκεῖος λόγος of one form, at least, of incontinence (ἀσθενεία; see vii. 7. 8, and note on vii. 3. 5–11. 1146 b. 31), thus differing from § 6, which merely mentions the premisses of the Practical Syllogism in connexion with the remark that the knowledge of the universal may be consciously realised, while that of the included particular may, on account of causes not specially stated, be latent. Section 7, with its οἴνομένως, μανόμενος, καθεύδων, prepares us for the οἰκεῖος λόγος stated in §§ 9–11.

a. 28. ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν] i.e. when the conclusion results from the premisses: ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς καθόλου καὶ τῆς μερικῆς δόξης ἄλλην τινὰ συναγάγωμεν δόξαν (Paraph.).

a. 27. ἔιθα μὲν] ei μὲν ἐστώ ἢ δόξα θεωρητική (Paraph.).

a. 28. ποιητικᾶς] =πρακτικᾶς: cf. de Motu Anim. 7. 701 a. 23 ai δὲ

1 According to Cook Wilson §§ 9–12 are parallel to § 6; see Arist. Studies, Table I.

The Aid. Schol. has—ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικάς, 1147 a. 28. ἢτοι δὲ δυσὶν αἱ δόξαι ποιητικά ἢτοι πράκτικαι, οὐ δεῖ τὸ συμπέρασμα φάναι, ἀλλὰ πράξαι.

For the Practical Syllogism, see note on vi. 1. 1139 a. 17, and Grant's excellent section on 'the doctrine of the Practical Syllogism,' Ethics, Essay iv. pp. 263–270.

The de Motu Animalium, in the 7th chapter of which (701 a. 7 sqq.) we find a detailed account of the Practical Syllogism, is a late Peripatetic work (see Val. Rose, de Arist. Lib. Ord. et Auct. pp. 162–174); but the account does not seem to be in any way inconsistent with what we find in E. N. vii, or in de Anima iii, or elsewhere, in works presumably earlier than the de Motu Anim. It is just what we might expect, however, that the doctrine of the Practical Syllogism, originating doubtless in Aristotle's own wish to find a neat logical formula for action corresponding to that found for ratiocination, would, because giving a neat logical formula, be put prominently forward by his followers. Accordingly it is to a late treatise like the de Motu Anim. that we have to go for a detailed account of the Practical Syllogism. In reading this account, it is important that we should look behind its scholastic phraseology, and remember that the 'major premiss' stands for the permanent organism of the animal (or the moral character of the man): the 'minor premiss' for a stimulus coming from the environment, and calling forth a movement (or action)—'the conclusion'—in accordance with the nature of the permanent organism of the animal (or moral character of the man). Thus the major premiss, compared to the fixed socket of the joint, is said ἴσωπος (de Anima iii. 10. 433 b. 21 sqq.), while the minor premiss is said κὺστὶν—to produce motions (or actions) with a sweep, as it were, controlled by the fixed socket of organic structure (or moral principle). Without the point d'appui of permanent organic structure (or fixed moral principle), and the particular stimuli of sense, animal motion (or moral action) is impossible. In short, the movements of an animal take place, in accordance with the structure of the animal, on the occasion of sense-stimuli. In the doctrine of the Practical Syllogism this physiological truth is put into scholastic form, and the formula applied more especially to the explanation of moral action.

The latter part of de Motu An. ch. 7 (from 701 a. 36) and ch. 8 may be read for the 'physiology' of the Practical Syllogism. As a small movement of the rudder produces a great movement at the
prow, so a slight physical change or movement in an internal part, caused by the heat or cold induced by a πάθος, is communicated through nerves and muscles, and results in the manifest movement of a limb: γι' το ̑ το ἔμφασις δύναται το αὐτὸ καὶ μείζων καὶ ἐλαττων γίνεσθαι καὶ τά σχέματα μεταβάλλειν, αὐξανομένων τῶν μορίων διὰ θερμότητα καὶ πάλιν συστελαμένων διὰ ψύξιν καὶ ἀλλοιώμενων. ἀλλοιοῦσί δὲ αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ αἰσθάνεις καὶ αἱ ἐννοιαι' αἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθάνεις εἰδύς ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλοιώσεις τινὲς οὔτε, ἡ δὲ φαντασία καὶ ἡ νόσησις τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξουσί δύναμιν τρόπον γάρ τινα τὸ εἴδος τὸ νοσοῦσαν τὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἡ ψυχροῦ ἡ ὑδέας ἡ φοβερᾶς τοιοῦτον τυγχάνει διὸ οἶνον περὶ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκαστόν, διὰ καὶ φρίττοντοι καὶ φοβοῦντοι νοσοῦσαν μᾶλλον τοιαύτα δὲ πάντα πάθη καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσίν. ἀλλοιούμενων δὲ τὸ σώματα τὰ μὲν μείζον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον γίνεται. ὡστ' ἐὰν μικρὰ μεταβολὴ γενομένη ἐν ἀρχῇ μεγάλας καὶ πολλὰς ποιεῖ διαφορὰς ἀποθεῖν, οὐκ ἄδηλον οἷον τοῦ θάνατος ἀκαραιῶν τι μεθυσμένου πολλῆ ἡ τῆς πρόφασιν γίνεται μετάστασις... ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα πάντα σχέδων μετα ψυξίων τυποὺ καὶ θερμάσης τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν παθημάτων' διέρρη γὰρ καὶ φόβοι καὶ ἀφοροσυσκοτή ρὰ καὶ τάλλα τὰ σωματικὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα τὰ μὲν κατὰ μόρια μετά θερμάσης ἡ ψυξίως ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ καθ' ὀλον τὸ σώμα' μνήμαι δὲ καὶ ἑλπίζει, οἷον εἰδὼλοις χρώμεναι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡστ' ὡν ἤτοι ὡστ' ἐὰν μᾶλλον αὐτία τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσίν. ὡστ' εἰδήμωσις ἠδή δημιουργεῖται τὰ εἴνοι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὀργανικῶν μορίων μεταβάλλοντα ἐκ πεπηγώτον ύγρὰ καὶ εἴ ύγρῶν πεπηγώτα καὶ μαλακὰ καὶ σκληρὰ εἴ ἀλλήλων τούτων δὲ συμβαίνοντων τὸ τρόπον τούτων, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν παθητικὸν καὶ πουνητικὸν τοιούτων ἐχόντων φύσιν οἷαν πολλαχώ ἐνικήκαμεν... ὡστ' ὡσταὶ μηδὲν ἀπολύπη αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, εὖθες τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ πᾶσχει. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἄμα ὡς εἰπεῖν νοεῖ ὦτι παρευστὸν καὶ περιέρεται, ἢ μὴ τι ἔμποδίζῃ ἔτερον, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρακεκναζὲ ἐπιτηδεῖον τὰ πάθη, ἡ δ' ὑδέας τὰ πάθη, τὴν δ' ὑδέας ἡ φαντασία' αὐτὴ δὲ γίνεται ἡ διὰ νοσοῦσα ἡ δὲ αἰσθάνεις.

§ 10. αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ] ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ μερικὴ δόξα ὅτι τῶδε γλυκὸν αὕτη δὲ ἡ μερικὴ δόξα ἐνεργεῖ (Ald. Schol.). So also Peters—'Now when you have on the one side the universal judgment forbidding you to taste, and on the other side the universal "all sweet things are pleasant" (ὅδε here corresponds to γευσθαι δέi above: nolē), and the particular judgment, "this thing before me is sweet," and this latter judgment is effectively present, or, in other words, appetite for the sweet is there...'. Grant's rendering, however, is grammatically preferable, as referring αὕτη to the second universal proposition (ἡ δὲ), not to the μερικὴ δόξα under it—'When therefore there is in the mind one
universal which forbids tasting, but another which says "all that is sweet is pleasant" (having a minor) "this thing is sweet," and thus the second universal is realised'—i.e. the second universal is applied in its minor.

κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων] Some (e.g. Ramsauer) have taken this to mean—'for each of the "Parts of the Soul"—i.e. λόγος and ἐπιθυμία—can move the man'; but I have no doubt that τῶν μορίων are the ὑπάρχουσα μέρη—'bodily parts,' of the passage quoted above from the de Motu Animi. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχουσα μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιθυμίας τὰ πάθη, ἢ δὲ ὑπάρχουσα μέρη πάθη, and that the Paraph. is right with—ἡ ἐπιθυμία μετὰ τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ γενετὸν ἁγεῖ: δύναται γὰρ κινεῖν ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, λέγω δὲ τὰς οἰκείας αἰσθήσεως τῷ ἐπιθυμητῷ, ὅρασιν εἰ ὑπάρχουσα ἐστὶ τὸ ἱδρύ πρὸς ἐαυτὸν ἔλκει καὶ γενετὸν τὸ γενετὸν.

Section 10, as I said, gives the proximate cause of an incontinent act, by exposing the sophistical use which ἐπιθυμία makes of the Practical Syllogism.

On the one side, we have the maxim of Reason—ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὡς κολύουσα γενέσθαι, and on the other side, the desire of sweet things. But the ἀκρατής, unwilling to apply the maxim of Reason, and yet anxious not to seem to act without Reason, presents his irrational desire in the disguise of a rational, or true, proposition, which he makes the major premiss of a new Practical Syllogism, and his incontinent act, though really proceeding from irrational desire, seems to be the conclusion of this syllogism, and to be performed 'under the influence of Reason'—ὅπερ συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγον πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύωσθαι. He incontinently tastes something sweet, and then pleads in justification of his act the authority of a principle which he can represent as a rational one; for it is certainly true that 'all sweet things are pleasant.' It is not quod true that this principle is contrary to the other principle—that of Right Reason or Temperance—ἡ καθόλου ὡς κολύουσα γενέσθαι, but quod implying the desire to disobey that principle. The two general propositions 'Immoderate indulgence in sweet things is evil,' and 'Sweet things are pleasant,' are both true, and, so far, there is no contrariety between them; but when the latter is put thus in its true colour, 'I must have sweet things!' then its contrariety to the former becomes evident. Ἡ μερικὴ δόξη—'this thing is sweet,' and the corresponding καθόλου—'all sweet things are pleasant,' are placed in an attitude of opposition to the principle of Temperance by their
association with desire, although in themselves they are not opposed to that principle—ὡστε συμβαίνει ἵπτο λόγον πως καὶ δάξις ἀκρατεύονται, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ δύση—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ. The λόγος, under the influence of which the ἀκρατής is said to act incontinently, is simply his principle of uncontrolled ἐπιθυμία transmuted into the true proposition—‘all sweet things are pleasant.’ But it is not the truth of this proposition that is in dispute, but its value as a principle of conduct. It is no justification of an incontinent act to say ‘all sweet things are pleasant,’ when this only means—‘I am passionately fond of sweet things,’ and the point at issue is—‘Ought I to yield to my passion?’ The Ald. Schol. has a good note—οὐκ ἐναντία δὲ ἐστι καθ' αὐτὸ ἢ δύση ἢ μερικὴ ἢ λέγουσα ὅτι τὸ ὅλον ἀκυκλήτως τοῦ λέγουσιν ὀδυνεύοντας διὰ τοῦτο πάιν γὰρ ἐναντίον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας; γίνονται δὲ ἐναντία κατὰ συμβεβηκός, διότι γὰρ ἐμπιθυμεῖ τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ συνελεύσας τῇ μερικῇ δύσῃ καὶ καταναγκάζει τὴν γεύσιν γενόμενην τοῦτο τοῦ γεύσιον.—τ. i. ἢ μερικὴ δύση, ‘this is sweet,’ is the occasion of contrariety to the moral law, by arousing desire, which is directly contrary to it. Then men attempt to excuse themselves by pleading the ‘rationality of their desire’—by transmuting ἐπιθυμία into πᾶν γλυκό ἡδύ. ‘Die Sophistik der Begierde, von der unter §§ 10, 11 die Rede ist (says Rassow, Forsch. p. 129, note), macht sich natürlich noch auf anderen Gebieten geltend, als dem der ἀκρασία, und sie ist um so gefährlicher, je mehr sie das ἡδύ in eine sittliche Form zu kleiden weiss. Der Feige, der sein Leben nicht preis giebt, weil er sich für seine Kinder erhalten will, der Hungernde, der stiehlt, indem er dem siebenten Gebote das Gebot der Selbstbehaltung gegenüberstellt, sind derartige Sophisten.’ Cf. Plut. de Virt. Mor. 6 σοφιστικῆς οὖν ψυχῆς ἡ ἀκρασία.

b. 4. § 11. τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατή] because ἀκρασία implies a struggle between ἐπιθυμία and λόγος, and the brutes have not λόγος. They have no principle ‘forbidding them to taste’; they cannot even construct a spurious λόγος by transmuting τῇ γλυκῷ δύσῃ ἡδύ. They have nothing but the impression or idea of the particular—οὖν ὁ δυσῆς ἐνέπεσε τῷ τῷ βόθρῳ, διὸ καὶ ἐκτετεινόθαι τῷ βόθρῳ φαντάζεται ὅτι ἐκεῖ ἐπεσε καὶ ἀποφεύγει αὐτῶν (Ald. Sch.). Cf. E. E. ii. 8. 1224 a. 26 οὗ γὰρ ἐχει τὰ ἄλλα ζώα λόγου καὶ ορέξου ἐναντίαιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ορέξῃ εξής ἐν 8° ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέστην ἄμφω.

b. 8. § 12. φυσιολόγων] See Grant’s note ad loc. He quotes Sext.
Empir. Adv. Math. vii. 129, on the theory of Heraclitus, that in sleep the οἰσθητικοί πόροι are closed, and the νοῦς is cut off from its connexion with τὸ περίκεν. The treatise de Somno also gives a physiological account of sleep and waking, in which ἀναθυμάσεις, produced by τὸ θερμὸν, and rising to the sleeper's brain, play an important part. The Ald. Schol., probably with a recollection of this account, speaks of the ἀναθυμάσεις of drunkenness in his note on the present passage.

§§ 13, 14.] If Ramsauer's very plausible conjecture—δὲ after b. 9. ταῦτα b. 10—be accepted (it is accepted by Susemihl), the words ἐπεὶ b. 9 . . . ὅρον b. 14 make the protasis, the apodosis beginning with καὶ ἐπεκέν b. 14: if Ramsauer's conjecture be not accepted, ἐπεὶ b. 9 . . . πράξεων b. 10 is the protasis, and ταῦτα b. 10 . . . Ἐμπεδοκλέους b. 12 the apodosis of one sentence; while καὶ διὰ b. 13 . . . ὅρον b. 14 is the protasis, and καὶ ἐπεκέν b. 14 . . . συμβαίνειν b. 15 the apodosis of another sentence. This is the alternative accepted by Bywater. Bekker's punctuation—a comma after Ἐμπεδοκλέους, and a full stop after ὅρον—must, one would think, be due to the printer. It gives no construction.

I understand §§ 13, 14, in their connexion with the whole chapter, as follows—Τὸ ἀκρατεύσθαι has been accounted for by the latency of the knowledge of the particular, and it has been carefully pointed out that, although the knowledge of the particular is latent, that of the universal is actively present in consciousness—ἐκοινοῦν μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν καλύπτει πράξεων παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μὲντοι τῇ καθήλου ἄλλα μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος § 6—if a man's knowledge of the particular—viz. that 'this particular act is wrong'—be rendered latent by passion (see §§ 7 and 8), there will be nothing to prevent him performing the wrong act, for it is one's view of a particular act, not one's general maxim of conduct, which is the immediate antecedent or efficient cause of the performance of the particular act: without the δόξα αἰσθητοῦ, the act could never take place—see de Anima iii. 11. 434 a. 19 ἔνθα αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ δόξα (i.e. ἡ τοῦ καθ' ἐκαστα), οὐχ ἡ καθήλου, ἡ ἀμφοτέρων ἄλλη ἡ μὲν ἡμετρούσα μᾶλλον (i.e. as a regulative principle, and point d'arrêt), ἡ δ' ὥστε. Now, ἡ δόξα αἰσθητοῦ ἡ κυρία τῶν πράξεων (i.e. their efficient cause or κυριϊκὴ αἴτια), which is rendered latent by passion, is a 'minor premiss'; and, since the knowledge involved in the minor premiss is not really ἐπιστήμη, as is that involved in the major premiss, we can see that
the Socratic position is not without foundation: the passion which prevails in incontinence is not matched directly against real knowledge (οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης ἐξαιτὶ δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος § 14)—real knowledge, though consciously present in the mind of the ἀκρατής, is not near enough (οὐ παρούσης) to this passion to be buffeted about and suppressed by it (οὐδ' αὐτῇ περιέλθεται διὰ τὸ πάθος): it is only the knowledge of the particular (ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη=δόξα αἰσθητοῦ) which stands near enough to the passion to be affected by it, or, indeed, is of a nature to be affected by it—i.e. suppressed and rendered latent by it. But this knowledge of the particular (that ‘this particular thing is wrong’), as we said, is not really knowledge (ἐπιστήμη): so, we have explained ἀκρασία (knowing the right and doing the wrong) without entirely discrediting the Socratic position. This is a result in perfect keeping with the principle of procedure laid down in vii. 1. 5 δεὶ δὲ ... δεικνύον μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἓνδοξα περὶ ταύτα τὰ πάθη, εἶ δὲ μὴ τὰ πλείουτα καὶ κυρίωτα. I am accordingly unable to agree with Cook Wilson that an ‘obvious concession of the Socratic principle’ (Arist. Stud. paragr. 60) is contained in ch. 3 generally, and in §§ 13 and 14 in particular, which contributes to make it probable that the chapter is not by the same author as some of the most important parts of Ἐ. Ν. vii. I would put the case, as between Socrates and the writer of this chapter, thus—Socrates denied the existence of ἀκρασία, because ἐπιστήμη cannot be conquered by πάθος. The writer of this chapter opposes the view that ἀκρασία does not exist; but ‘concedes’ the point that true ἐπιστήμη cannot be conquered by πάθος. He is enabled to make this ‘concession’ by drawing a distinction—the ἀκρατής has actively present in his mind the true ἐπιστήμη, the general proposition that ‘it is wrong to yield to πάθος,’ but this ἐπιστήμη, to quote the expression used in de An. iii. 11. 434 a. 20, ἤρεμει μᾶλλον, and can touch action only through the intermediation of the δόξα αἰσθητοῦ—‘to do this particular act would be to yield to πάθος.’ This δόξα αἰσθητοῦ, however, is not true ἐπιστήμη, and its latency, caused by πάθος, sufficiently accounts for the occurrence of an act of ἀκρασία, without obliging us to say, against Socrates, that true ἐπιστήμη is affected by πάθος. The clause οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης ἐξαιτὶ δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος I understand to mean that ‘the affection (τὸ ἀκρατεύουσα) does not occur in the immediate presence of real knowledge’—‘real knowledge,’ though actively present in the consciousness
of the ἐκρατής, does not operate as an efficient cause (ὁπειρημένον de Ἀν. 1147 b. 9. iii. 11. 434 a. 20) of action, and so does not come into conflict with ἐπιθυμία. Only particulars can come to close quarters with particulars. Only μερικὴ ὀφθαλμὶς are κόμη τῶν πράξεων, and the μερικὴ ὀφθαλμὶς, ‘this is wrong,’ is defeated by another μερικὴ ὀφθαλμὶς—that of ἐπιθυμία—‘it is pleasant.’ While I am at one with Cook Wilson (paragr. 66) in thinking that the context does not allow us to understand τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης to mean the presence of both minor and major premisses, I cannot accept his view that ὅτι γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης ἐναὶ δοκοῦσις παροῦσας κ.τ.λ. means that ‘the Socratic opinion about ἀκρασία agrees with the theory just given, inasmuch as knowledge proper has not been allowed to the ἀκρατῆς’: and consequently I cannot follow him in a difficulty which he expresses a few lines below—‘The reason (which the present passage) assigns for the absence of knowledge proper is ‘that the minor premiss is not so much of the nature of true knowledge as the major.’ This must mean that the ἀκρατῆς has not true ἐπιστήμη, because he has only the minor and not the major, which of course is in direct contradiction to the beginning of § 13 and to the rest of the chapter.’

According to the view which I have attempted to state above, it is not argued in § 14 ‘that the ἀκρατῆς has not true ἐπιστήμη,’ but ‘that the true ἐπιστήμη, which he has—and has consciously—is not in a position to be affected by πάθος, because it is universal, and so does not enter the arena of particular action.’

While the word παροῦσας may be thus, I think, satisfactorily explained, I have considerable doubt as to its genuineness. The homoeoteleuton δοκοῦσις παροῦσας  is suspicious, and the awkwardness of having to take τὸ πάθος in a different sense after γίνεται and διὰ respectively—as ‘the affection, viz. ἀκρασία’ in the first case, and as ‘passion’ in the second case—seems to suggest that there is something wrong in the text as it stands. I offer the conjecture, I confess with hesitation—for what it is worth—that παροῦσας represents ἐπιρή and a dittograph of the termination of δοκοῦσις, the

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1 Ramsauer understands the words to mean this.  
2 CCC and NC, however, have τῆς κυρίως ἐναὶ δοκοῦσις ἐπιστήμης παροῦσας.  
3 Ramsauer says ‘τὸ πάθος vs. 16 intelligas τὸ τῆς ἀκρασίας quod fit διὰ τὸ πάθος vs. 17 affectum qui facit quasi impetum.’ Similarly, Stahr translates the first πάθος by Unenthaltsamkeit, the second by Leidenschaft. Both Grant and Peters manage ingeniously to render πάθος in each place by phrases containing ‘condition,’ or ‘passion.’
1147 b. 9. dittograph ὄσθης having (by a blunder which sometimes appears in MSS.) inserted itself between the περι and the γίνεσαι of an original περιγίνεσαι. The deliberate alteration of the resulting περιούσης into παρούσης would then be natural, even if παραγίνεσαι had not, before the insertion of the dittograph ὄσθης, taken the place of περιγίνεσαι, by a blunder which often occurs in MSS. The sentence then would originally stand—οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης περιγίνεσαι τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὐτὴ περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς. Here τὸ πάθος means 'passion' in both places, and τῆς αἰσθητικῆς is governed, as is τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης, by περιγίνεσαι = 'gets the better of.'

The following is the Paraphrast's explanation of §§ 13 and 14. It seems to me to be a very satisfactory explanation of the text as it stands: "Ὅταν δὲ ἐν τῷ πάθει γίνεσαι ὁ ἀκραθής, τὴν ἐλλάτω πρῶταν, τὴν κυρίων τῶν πράξεων, τὴν ὅτι τόδε κακῶν, ἢ οὐκ ἦκει οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἢ οὐκ ἦκει δοκούσης καὶ οἱ μανεύοντες ἐπὶ τιμὰ καὶ ἀποδίηςεις λέγουσιν ἄλλως τε, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἢ ἐλλάτων πρῶτας αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπιστημονική ἐστιν, ὅσπερ ἡ καθόλου καὶ μείζων. ὅσπερ ἦκει πρὸς τὸν περιγίνεσαι τῆς κυρίως εἶναι δοκούσης ἐπιστήμης, ἦτε ἐστὶν ἡ καθόλου, γίνεσαι τὸ πάθος· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτας κρατεῖ ἡ ἐπιστήμης· ἀλλὰ τῆς κυρίως τῶν πράξεων, ἦτες ἐστιν ἡ ἐλλάτων καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ καθέκαστα ταῦταν γὰρ διαφθείρεσθαι ὁ πρῶτον, ἦτες ἐστὶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αὐτὴ περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου.


CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

Let us now determine the sphere of incontinence, strictly so called.

It is plain that continence and endurance, incontinence and softness, are relative to pleasures and pains.

Now the things which cause pleasure are either necessary, such as food,
or not necessary, but desirable in themselves, such as honour, or wealth. Those
then who, against their own sound judgment, exceed in relation to these latter
sources of pleasure, are not described as 'incontinent' simply: the term is
indeed applied to them, but not in its strict sense, only with a qualifying
addition—'incontinent about honour or about wealth.' That 'incontinence'
has different meanings as ascribed on the one hand to the man who yields
against his judgment to the pleasure of getting honour or wealth, or of giving
vent to his anger, and on the other hand to the man who yields against his
judgment to the pleasures of touch and taste, is shown by the circumstance that
we blame it in the latter case as a form of vice, but not in the former case; and
also by the circumstance that we call people 'soft' in relation to the sensations
of touch and taste, but not in relation to honour or wealth. Our conclusion,
then, is that the term 'incontinent' is applied strictly, and without qualifying
addition, to the man who errs, against his judgment and resolve, in relation
to those pleasures (and pains) of touch and taste, in relation to which the
incorrigible or intemperate man errs deliberately, and the temperate man
observes moderation. Non-deliberate excess in the pursuit of such objects as
honour and wealth (good and desirable in themselves) is ' incontinence' with a
qualification: similarly, we have to add a qualification, if we apply the term
'incontinent' to one who yields to the unnatural pleasures which may be
derived from the contraries of things good and desirable in themselves. 'Incon-
tinence' is ascribed with a qualification also to the man who cannot restrain
his anger; without qualification only to the man who exceeds, against his
judgment and resolve, in relation to the normal pleasures of touch and taste.

§ 1. ἑφεξῆς] See ch. 3. § 1. 1146 b. 9 εἰτα κ.τ.λ.

§ 2. εἰπέ] here='whereas': see Cook Wilson, Arist Stud. parag. b. 23.

39. The apodosis begins with τοὺς μιὰν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα b. 31. Cf.
Simplicius (fol. 56 b) quoted by Trend. on de An. iii. 3. 1—ἐν δὲ
τῇ λέξει (i.e. de An. iii. 3. 1) πρὸς τὸν ἐπεὶ σύνδεσμον διὰ μακροῦ ἀπο-
δέδωκεν διὰ κ.τ.λ. . . . διὰ τὴν διὰ μακροῦ ἀπόδοσιν τὸν οὖν προσθεῖς
σύνδεσμον.

dιαλεγόμεθα, πρῶτον ὀργώμεθα τάς τε ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τάς μη; . . .
oὐκοῦν ἃς τε οὐκ ἐν οἷον τ᾽ εἴμεν ἀποτρέψαι, δεκαῖος ἄν ἀναγκαία καλόντο,
καὶ ὅσα ἀποτελοῦμεν ὕφελθον ἡμᾶς; τούτων γὰρ ὀμφατέρων ἐφεσθαί
ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνιγκή. . . . ἄρ᾽ ὡς τις ἀπαλλάξεις ἄν, εἰ μελετή ἐκ νέου,
καὶ πρὸς οὔτε ἀγαθόν ἑνώσας δρόσου, αἳ δὲ καὶ τουσιτον, πάντας ταῦτας εἰ
μὴ ἀναγκαίοις φάιμεν εἴναι, ἀρ' οὖν καλὸς ἄν λέγοιμεν; . . . προελθομέθα δὴ
ti παράδειγμα ἐκατέρων, αἳ ἐνώσα, ἵνα τόπῳ λάξωμεν αὐτὰς . . . ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ
ἡ τοῦ φαγείν μέχρι ὑγείας τε καὶ ὑγείας καὶ αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ ὅψου
ἀναγκαῖος ἄν εἴη; . . . ἡ πέρα τούτων καὶ ἄλλων ἐξεσμάτων ἡ τουτῶν ἐπιθυμία,
δυνατῇ δὲ κολαζομένη ἐκ νέων καὶ παιδευομένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν

1147 b. 24. ἀπάλλαττεσθαι, καὶ βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχὴ πρὸς τε φράσησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἢρὰ γε ὅρθεος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἄν καλοῖτο;

For the Aristotelian use of ἀναγκαῖος, Rassow (Forsch. p. 22, note 1) compares E. N. i. 9. 7. 1099 b. 27, x. 6. 2. 1176 b. 2 ; Pol. 1333 a. 32, 1338 a. 13 and 32.

b. 28. ἔθεμεν] E. E. iii. 2, or E. N. iii. 10. When we use the term ἀκρατής simply by itself (ἀπλῶς) without qualifying addition, we signify the man who yields, after a struggle, to those bodily pleasures (of touch and taste), the deliberate pursuit of which constitutes ἀκολούθια: but the man who pursues gain incontinently can be called ἀκρατής only with a qualifying πρόσθεσις—ἀκρατής κέρδους: also the man who does not succeed in controlling his anger is ἀκρατής with a πρόσθεσις—θυμῷ.

Rassow (Forsch. pp. 21, 22) has called attention to the circumstance that § 5 goes over the same ground as § 2; and Cook Wilson (Arist. Stud. parags. 6-9 and 37-42) resolves the whole chapter into duplicate passages forming different versions. His resolution (Table II) is as follows:—

A § 1 (Introduction common to both versions).
B, § 2 ἐπεὶ . . . ὑδέων = B, § 5 ἐπεὶ . . . ὑπερβιάλλεων.
C, τοὺς μὲν οὖν—οὔθεις = C, § 5 Διό . . . § 6 κακῶν.
D, § 3 τῶν δὲ—§ 4 λύπας εἶναι = D, § 6 δοσπερ—φαμέν.

'Both columns,' says Cook Wilson p. 8, 'begin with ἐπεὶ δὲ, and it will be seen that either may be read after the first section of the chapter, A, with equal coherence both in syntax and subject-matter. Thus each of the two orders A B, C, D, A B, C, D, yields a chapter on the same subject as the other, and very like it.' I entirely agree with this statement of the case; I also agree with Cook Wilson's conclusion (parag. 42) that there are differences in style and subject-matter between the two columns which 'point in the direction of diversity rather than of unity in the authorship.' The discrepancy also between E. E. iii and E. N. iii on the one side, and this ch. on the other, with respect to the object of σωφροσύνη and ἀκολούθια, is a point of great interest noticed by Cook Wilson (parag. 39), and I am inclined to think with him that it proves that this chapter is not by the writer either of E. E. iii or of E. N. iii.

b. 34. καὶ θυμῷ] 'The position of ἀκρασία θυμῷ in ch. 4,' says Cook Wilson (parag. 70), 'is not without obscurity, for θυμὸς cannot be called φύειν αἴρετόν, φύει τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, αἴρετόν καθ' αὐτό, in the
same sense as the examples κέρδος, τιμή, νίκη: it is not classed with 1147 b. 34. these higher ήδέα, and ἀκρασία in respect of it is associated with ἀκρασία in respect of them without explanation. Perhaps the over-sight occasioned later the introduction of a separate proof in ch. vi that ἀκρασία θυμοῦ is not so blameworthy as ἀκρασία of bodily pleasures: and it is worth notice that § 3 (ch. 6. 1149 b. 19) adds, as corollary, the assertion that it is not properly (ἀπλῶς) ἀκρασία, without reference to the result of ch. iv, which may well have been thought insufficient.' The suggestion here made by Cook Wilson seems to be supported by a passage in M. M. ii. 6. 1202 b. 3—referred to by Rassow (Forsch. p. 47) in his discussion of the place of ch. 6 in E. N. vii (see below, note on vii. 6. 1, a. 24): ἔστιν γὰρ peri ἠδονῶς καὶ λίπας τῶν σωματικῶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής.—δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι peri ταύτα ἡ ἀκρασία· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ψεκτὸς ὁ ἀκρατής, ψεκτὰ εἶναι δεῖ τὰ ἐποκείμενα τιμή μὲν οὐκ καὶ δόξα καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ χρήματα καὶ peri ὅσα ἄλλα ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται, οὐκ εἰσίν ψεκτά, αἱ δὲ ἠδοναὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ ψεκταὶ διὸ εἰκόσως ὁ peri ταύτας ἄν μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος, οὕτω ἀκρατῆς τελέως λέγεται. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐστὶ τῶν peri τὰ ἄλλα ἀκρασίων λεγομένων peri τὴν ὀργὴν οὕτω ἀκρασία ψεκτοτάτη, πίστευον ψεκτοτέρα ἐστὶν peri τὴν ὀργὴν ἢ peri τὰς ἠδονὰς;—then follows a passage founded on E. N. vii. 6.

ωσπερ ἀνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὁλυμπία νικῶν ἔκεινο γὰρ . . . ὃμως ἔτερος ἦν] b. 35.

Bywater restores νικῶν from Kb, in place of Bekker's νεικηκώς.
Cambr. is, so far as I know, the only MS. which agrees with Kb in giving νικῶν. I explain the passage as follows, making ἀνθρωπος a predicate—"The Olympionices" in the school-example—"The Olympionices is a man," will illustrate the distinction between the ἀκρατῆς ἀπλῶς and the ἀκρατῆς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν. "The Olympionices," though described generally as "a man," has also, qua "Olympionices," a notion of his own, which differs, slightly indeed, but yet differs, from the notion "man."' Cf. Pol. iii. 2. 1276 b. 21 (quoted by Zell) τῶν δὲ πλωτήρων καὶ πέρ ἄνωμοι ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐρετῆς, δὲ κυβερνητής, δὲ προφυτεύς, δὲ ἄλλην τινὰ ἕχων τοιαύτην ἐπωνυμίαν) δῆλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἐκάστου λόγος ἔδοξε ἐσται τῆς ἐρετῆς, ὄμοιως δὲ καὶ κοινῶς τις ἐφαρμόσει πάσην. ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτικῆας ἐργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν πάντων· τούτου γὰρ ἐκαστὸς ὀρέγεται τῶν πλωτήρων. The writer means that the man who is incontinent in relation to certain bodily pleasures is ἀκρατῆς without qualification, and the man who is incontinent in relation to money is ἀκρατῆς with that qualification, just as ἀνθρωπος, when unqualified, stands for ζων λογικῶν...
1147 b. 35. ἑπτῶν, but when qualified as ὁ τά ὁλύμπια ἰνῖκῶν, stands for ζῷον λογικὸν ἑπτῶν ἀθλοφόρου. So the Paraph.—'Ο μὲν οὖν πρὸς τά ἡδία ἐπερβάλλων τά μὴ ἀναγκαία οὐ λέγεται ἀπλῶς χαρις προσθήκης ἀκρατῆς, ἀλλὰ ἀκρατῆς δόξης, ἡ ἀκρατής πλούτου, ὡς ἔτερος ὄν ἐκεῖνον τοῦ κυρίως καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατοῦς, ὑομαζόμενος δὲ ἀκρατῆς διὰ τινα πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὁμοίωτητα θάλαπτη διαφέρει ὁ ἀνθρωπος ὁ τά ὁλύμπια νεικηκός τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀνθρώπων καὶ γὰρ εἶ καὶ μικρῶν ἐστὶ τὸ διάφορον αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ ὄνομα διαφέρει, καὶ ἔτερος ἐστὶ διὰ τὴν προσθήκην. Clearly the parallel here is not an exact one: the Olympionices is called a man, because he has ὀλοκλήρωσε the nature of man, and is included within the class man: whereas the ἀκρατῆς κέρδους is not included within the class of the ἀκρατεῖς ἀπλῶς, but belongs to a class which is coordinate with it. Under the general notion of ἀκρατῆς fall (1) ὁ τῶν σωματικῶν ἢδῶν ἀκρατῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς ἀκρατῆς, and (2) ὁ κέρδους (ορ τιμῆς) ἀκρατῆς: ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατῆς does not include ὁ κέρδους ἀκρατῆς, as ὁ ἀπλῶς ἄνθρωπος includes ὁ τά ὁλύμπια ἰνῖκῶν. Rather, in the expression ἀκρατῆς κέρδους, the proper meaning of the term ἀκρατῆς is metaphorically extended, as the proper meaning of man (= human being) is extended in the expression 'wild man of the woods' (= ape). Nor do I think that the parallel between the ἀκρατῆς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν and the Olympionices would be made more strict if we accepted the incredible and plainly 'aetiological' story about the Olympian victor whose proper name was Ἄνθρωπος—see Alex. Soph. Elench. 316 b. 34 ὄσπερ καὶ ὁ ὁλυμπιονικῆς ἄνομαζετο αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἀνθρωπος. Alex. Ἱ. β. 262 b. 14 ἄνθρωπος ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἵδιον ὁνόμα τούτο τοῦ ὁλυμπιονικοῦ πύκτου ὥθεν ἥδικοι εξημόρνευσαν. Σuida s. v. ἄνθρωπος—ἄνθρωπος τὸ προσωρινὸν καὶ Ἀνθρωπος ἵδιον ὁνόμα ὥθεν ἥδικοι Ἀριστοτέλης μημονεύει. Eustath. Η. Λ. p. 847 καὶ ὁλυμπιονικῆς τις κατὰ κυριωμείαν ἐκλήθη Ἀνθρωπος. Mich. Eph. on Eth. Νίκ. ν. init. fol. 56 b ἡ δὲ προκειμένη ἁρτή (i. e. κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη) δικαιοσύνη μὲν λέγεται καὶ ὁμοριέται τῇ τῆς ὅλης δικαιοσύνης ὄνοματι ὁνόμα δ’ ἵδιον ὧν ἐκλήρωσατο, ἀλλ’ ὄσπερ ἔκεινος ὁ ὁλυμπιονικῆς οὐ Σωκράτης οὐ Πλάτων οὐκ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἀλλὰ τῷ κοινῷ πάντων ἄνθρωπων ὄνοματι ἄνθρωπος ὄνομαζεται, ὁτι καὶ ἡ παρόντα ἁρτή δικαιοσύνη καλεῖται τῷ κοινῷ τῆς ὅλης δικαιοσύνης ὄνοματι. Ald. Schol. on the present passage—ὁσπερ καὶ Ἦ ἡ τις ἔκαστα ἐϊς τὰ ὁλύμπια καὶ ἤκουσ "Ἀνθρωπος, ὄσπερ ὁ δεῖνα ἀκούει Σωκράτης ἡ Πλάτων, ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος ἦτοι ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος ἦτοι τὸ ζῷον λογικὸν θυτὸν μικρὸν διέβευε τοῦ ἱδίου ὄνοματος, ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ δέτος ἤκους μικρὰ γὰρ τὸ προσθήκην ποιεῖ τὴν διαφοράν: "οι μελλοντες γὰρ δηλώσαι αὐτὸν καὶ διαχαρίσαι αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ καθόλου, προσετίθουν ὃτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ ὁλύμπια νεικηκός.
This story is accepted by Michelet, Williams, and Stahr. Stahr 1147 b. 35. indeed adds a finishing touch to the myth which is worth recording (p. 240, note 2)—'Anthrōpos mit langem ὀ heisst auf griechisch Mensch. Der Sieger in den olympischen Spielen hiess nun ebenfalls Anthropos (vgl. Suidas s. v. *Ἀνθρώπος*), aber wahrscheinlich wurde sein Name mit kurzem ὀ gesprochen und geschrieben.' Grant's suggestion that the historical tenses διέφερεν and ἦν gave rise to the fiction about a person called *Ἀνθρώπος* is probably correct; and his further remark that the past tenses 'must be understood to mean a reference to some previous logical discourse with which the school was familiar' I accept, substituting 'grammatical example' for 'logical discourse': see the grammarian Apollonius, peri συντάξεως, Book i. § ε —πλικος ἄνθρωπος ἐνίκησε τὰ Ὀλύμπια. λ. ὡς ἐπίδεικμεν ἐν τῷ περὶ ῥήματι, αἰ προκείμενα οὐν συντάξεις, ὑποστελ- λομένων τῶν κυρίων ἀνθρώπων ἀδιαφόρους ἔχουσι τὰς ἀναστροφὰς χωρὶς ἄφθονον λεγόμενας ἄνθρωπος δραμὼν ἐνίκησε. The circumstance, vouched for by these passages, that ἄνθρωπος ἐνίκησε τὰ Ὀλύμπια was a grammatical example in use, seems to me entirely to dispose of the *Ἀνθρώπος* myth as accepted by Michelet and Stahr, and to make it unnecessary to have recourse to Peters' conjecture (p. 221, note)—'As we do not know the facts to which Aristotle alludes, we can only conjecture his meaning. It may be that the man in question had certain physical peculiarities, so that though he "passed for a man" he was not a man quite in the common meaning of the name. So Locke asks (Essay iv. 10. 13), "Is a changeling a man or a beast?"

§ 3. peri δὲ λέγομεν] Those mentioned in E. N. iii. 10 and 11. a. 5.
1148 a. 7. καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων] sc. τὰς ὑπερβολὰς. Instead of understanding τὰς ὑπερβολὰς, Ramsauer suggests the insertion of ὤτιῶν after τῶν λυπηρῶν: ‘idea sunt ἀκόλαστοι et ἀκρατεῖς quod ipsam voluptatis absentiam tanquam miseriam ferre nequeunt’ is the reason which he gives for his suggestion; and he refers to E.N. iii. 11. 5, and to § 4 of the present chapter (διὸ μᾶλλον . . . σφόδρα), and to vii. 14. 2 ἐναντίος δ’ . . . τὴν ὑπερβολήν. Similarly, Rassow (Forsch. p. 78) suggests the insertion of τὰ μέτρια before τῶν λυπηρῶν, comparing the καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας of § 4 below. His words are—‘Sehr auffällig ist τῶν λυπηρῶν. Der, welcher das Übervmass des Schmerzes flieht, wäre ein ἀκρατής? Unmöglich kann dies die Ansicht des Aristoteles sein. Jeder vernünftige Mensch flieht das Übervmass des Schmerzes, und nur der, welcher auch vor mässiger Unlust rückzuschreckt, kann ἀκρατής genannt werden.’ Rassow seems to find support for his suggestion in the fact that Bekker’s τε before ἢδέων a. 7 (if genuine: Bywater omits it: it is not given by Lb, Mb, r, CCC, or Ald.) is wrongly placed, as the sentence stands: τῶν ἢδέων and τῶν λυπηρῶν, on account of the different verbs φεύγων and διώκων in the two clauses, cannot, he thinks, be connected by τε—καὶ: but τῶν τε ἢδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς, καὶ τὰ μέτρια τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων would be grammatically correct.

Ramsauer’s ὤτιῶν and Rassow’s τὰ μέτρια seem to me to originate in a misunderstanding. The passage which Ramsauer quotes from iii. 11. 5 describes the ἀκόλαστος, not the ἀκρατής: and the passage which they both quote from vii. 4. 4 describes the ἀκόλαστος as avoiding μετρίας λύπας. But the character described here (§ 3) is not the ἀκόλαστος, but the ἀκρατής—ὁ μῦ τῷ προωρείσθων διώκων . . . καὶ φεύγων—the man who struggles with strong desires (pleasures and pains), and who succumbs dia τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα—because he has been overtaken by a νεανική ἐπιθυμία καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἄναγκαιων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά (§ 4 below). It is not ὤτιῶν τῶν λυπηρῶν, οί τὰς μετρίας λύπας, that such a person yields to, but τῶν λυπηρῶν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς. The passage, again, which they both (and Bywater, Contrib. p. 55) quote from vii. 14. 2 is not, as I understand it, intended to describe the ἀκρατής, but the φαίλος (of 1154 a. 16), i.e. the ἀκόλαστος, who is the subject of φεύγει—ἐναντίος δ’ ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης οὗ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἄλλ’ ὀδοὶ οὗ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπῃ ἐναντία ἄλλ’ ἦ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν—‘the ἀκόλαστος pursues excessive pleasure, and avoids, not only
excessive pain (as the *akratēs* does), but any pain, even the absurd 1148 a. 7. pain of absent pleasure (see *E. N.* iii. 11. 5)—a pain which only an habitual follower of excessive pleasure, like himself, feels at all.' See note on vii. 14. 2. With regard to Rassow's remark—that every rational man avoids excessive pain, I would say—surely the *ēgrafētēs* and *karterikos* deliberately endure it, and the *akratēs* and *malaκos* try to endure it, but fail.

ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους] Cook Wilson (paragraph 39) remarks that a. 8. the doctrine of the present passage, according to which the *ākō-lastron* has to do with the pains of heat and cold, 'disagrees as much with the Eudeman as the Nic. Ethics. According to Nic. Eth. iii. 10 and 11, the *sōφrōν* and *ākōlastron* have to do with pleasures and pains, but the pains are only those of unsatisfied desire for pleasure. Compare Nic. Eth. iii. ii. 5, 6. 1118 b. 28—

But this chapter (4 of Book vii) gives as examples of pains within the sphere of *sōφrōsini* and *ākōlastria* . . . πίνα, δίψα, ἀλέα, and ψύχος. The last two of these are obviously excluded by the definition of Book iii: they are not pains caused merely by the desire for pleasure; it cannot be said of them τὴν λίπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

'Two other passages in *Nic. Eth.* iii show how much stress the author laid on the exclusion of all pains originating independently of imagined pleasure—ch. 10. §§ i. 1117 b. 24—27, i. e. it is primarily of pleasure and only secondarily of pain, so far as pain may be 'caused by pleasure'; ch. 12. §§ i, 2. 1119 a. 21—25. If the account of *sōφrōsini* in the Eudeman Ethics (iii. 2), which answers to the above part of Nic. Eth. iii, showed the same deviation from the Nicomachean version as Book vii. ch. 4, there would be some ground perhaps for referring the last to the author of Eud. Eth. ii. But on the contrary, the Eudeman account (ii. 2) follows the Nicomachean (iii. 10 and 11) in mentioning no other pain as object of *sōφrōsini* and *ākōlastria* save that of unsatisfied desire for pleasure: compare Eud. Eth. 1231 a. 30—32 καὶ οὐκ εἶδον οἴδη λέγονται *ākōlastron* ὧν γὰρ ὑπερβίβαλλοντι τῷ χαῖρειν μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ τυχάνοντες καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ μὴ τυχάνοντες. The pains of ἀλέαι and ψύχη are referred to (Eud. Eth. 1229 b. 5) in the chapter on ἄνδρεα, and not in any connection with *sōφrōsini* and *ākōlastria*, but associated with the objects of ἄνδρεα and δειλία.' To the passages quoted above by Cook Wilson from the *Nic. Eth.* may be added *E. N.* iii. 10, 11 οὗ

1148 a. 8. περὶ πῶν τὸ σῶμα ᾦ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν μέρη: by this limitation the pains of ἀλέαι and ψύχη are excluded.

a. 12. § 4. μαλακοὶ] ἀκολαστοὶ, the reading of CCC, Ald. Sch., Heliod., Ald., is accepted by Coraes and Michelet: but μαλακοὶ is obviously right. The fact that people are popularly called (λέγονται) μαλακοὶ in relation to σωματικά, and not in relation to κέρδος &c. (πέρι ἐκείνων σοφικῶν), is a σημεῖον in favour of the correctness of our view that in the σωματικά we have a very definitely marked off and important class of objects or motives, which warrants us in distinguishing people who are ἀκρατεῖς in relation to them as ἀκρατεῖς ἀπλῶς, from people who are ἀκρατεῖς in relation to other objects or motives. Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, p. 47) remarks that these words καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται ignore the doctrine of ch. 7, in which μαλακία is technically distinguished from ἀκρασία, as the yielding (after a struggle) to pain, from the yielding (after a struggle) to pleasure. And on p. 73 he writes— 'The way in which μαλακοὶ occurs 1148 a. 12 (vii. 4. 4) is remarkable: it is said that the pains with which the μαλακία ἔργους has to do are bodily, and a sign of this is that people are called μαλακοὶ for yielding to them: whereas according to ch. 7 . . . μαλακοὶ is the proper name for such characters. This difficulty admits of explanation . . . It has been pointed out (parag. 39 β) that the third book of the Nic. Ethics and the Eudemian book corresponding associate μαλακία with cowardice, and not with ἀκολασία, and that there is no trace of the definite coordination (see ch. 7) of καρπερία and μαλακία with σοφροσύνη, ἀκρασία &c. The author of vii. 4. 4, though deviating in one respect from Eud. Eth. ii and Nic. Eth. iii (i.e. as to the painful motives which concern σοφροσύνη and ἀκολασία), has not advanced to the development of the theory of μαλακία found in ch. 7: 1 he merely calls attention to the fact that the ignominious term μαλακός is applied where men yield to bodily pains, to show that such conduct is held specially bad, and belongs therefore to ἀκρασία proper, and not to ἀκρασία κατὰ πρόσβεσιν.' I am not sure that it is safe to say, with Cook Wilson, that 'the author of vii. 4. 4 . . . has not advanced to the development of the theory of

1 'In Nic. Eth. iii. 10 and 11 there is no thought of separating the desire for pleasure and the pain of such desire as different motives, and constitutive of different characters, but they are clearly aspects of the same thing.' Cook Wilson, Arist. Stud. p. 47.
μαλακία found in ch. 7.' We must remember that in vii. 4. 4 1148 a. 12. it is only the popular denotation of the term μαλακία that the writer appeals to, in order to show, by a σημείον, that the sphere to which he has assigned the ἀκρατής ἀπλός is very definitely marked off from other spheres of so-called ἀκρασία. His immediate object does not require him to give his own theory (stated in ch. 7) of the connotation of μαλακία.

οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δὲ οὐ προαιροῦνται] The προαίρεσις of the a. 17. ἀκλάστος sides with his ἐπιθυμία, and he is said to act προαιρούμενος rather than ἐπιθυμῶν: whereas the ἀκρατής acts ἐπιθυμῶν but not προαιρούμενος—from mere desire, and not from deliberate choice—ὁ ἀκρατής ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δὲ οὐ (E. N. iii. 2. 4). We can understand what is meant by the προαίρεσις of the ἐγκρατής which opposes ἐπιθυμία, and prevails over it—ὁ ἐγκρατής δὲ ... προαιρούμενος μὲν πράττει, ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ οὐ καὶ προαιρεῖται μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναιτοῦνται, κ.τ.λ. (E. N. iii. 2. §§ 4 and 5); but what is this προαίρεσις of the ἀκλάστος which sides with ἐπιθυμία? The object of ἐπιθυμία is present pleasure as such: surely it is the function of προαίρεσις, as βουλευτική δρέπις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, to look at present pleasure, not as such, but in relation to a system of life? Is not the very notion of προαίρεσις, then, travestied in a definition like this—vii. 7. 2 ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διόκων τῶν ἑδῶν ἢ καθ’ ὑπερβολὰς ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δε’ αὖτα καὶ μηδὲν δε’ ἔτερον ἀποβαίνον, ἀκλάστος; If it is true that ἢ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἑδῶν καὶ ἐπιλύτως, ἢ προαίρεσις δ’ οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ’ ἑδος (iii. 2. 5), how can it be προαίρεσις, as distinguished from ἐπιθυμία, in the ἀκλάστος, which makes present pleasure, as such, its object? Indeed, except in a somewhat recondite sense (to be noticed afterwards), the ordinary ἀκλάστος cannot be said to act προαιρούμενος, any more than the ἀκρατής. The ordinary ἀκλάστος was once ἀκρατής. Strong ἐπιθυμία, after a struggle, have their own way in the ἀκρατής. As time goes on the same man yields to feeble ἐπιθυμία without a struggle, and is called ἀκλάστος. This he does habitually—i. e. he always, with perfect consistency, yields to feeble ἐπιθυμία without struggling, or thinking it wrong to yield. The consistency of his conduct, as compared with the inconsistency which exists between the theory and practice of the ἀκρατής, seems something rational and deliberate; he may even get credit for strength of character, and hopes may be entertained of his reformation, if he would only listen to good advice. But this ‘consistency’ of the ἀκλάστος is only the weakness
of the ἄκρατῆς in an intensified form, and become chronic. Such a
man is after all more correctly conceived as acting ἐπιθυμῶν, than as acting προαιρούμενος: unless it be said that, since action breeds belief, he eventually acquires a false λόγος, or theory of life, in virtue of possessing which he may be conceived as acting προαιρούμενος—
as deliberately choosing means to the end which that false theory of life holds up before him. This is the recondite sense, just now referred to, in which he may be said to act προαιρούμενος—ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκόλουθος ἀγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων δὲι δὲν (this is his theory of life) τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν vii. 3. 2. But after all it is his long-indulged craving for pleasure, rather than his false theory, which makes him act as he does. And in the sentence just quoted note the contradiction in the terms—ἀγεται—προαιρούμενος. Man is an ἀρχή in his προαιρήσει: it is by his ἐπιθυμία that he is led—ἀγεται.

So much for the ordinary ἄκλαστος—the ἄκλαστος who once was ἄκρατῆς. But it perhaps ought to be admitted that there are also born ἄκλαστοι—men in whom λόγος, or conscientia, was never effectually present to mar the pleasures of indulgence by its shadow; who never viewed these pleasures askance, as forbidden fruit, but always calmly, as pleasures; and so have been able early to make them objects of the nice comparisons and deliberate preferences and rejections of the connoisseur. Such men may be described as προαιρούμενοι with more correctness than the ordinary ἄκλαστοι, or chronic weaklings, with whom the Seventh Book is, I believe, chiefly, if not exclusively, concerned.

816. The conjunction διό, says Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, p. 73), ‘may of course be taken in its non-illative use, but even thus it must at least be equivalent to “and so,” and implies that the subject which it introduces has been in some way prepared for: but it is by no means prepared for, and succeeds most abruptly. The subject of the whole chapter is the distinction of the ἄκρατῆς ἀπλῶς from the ἄκρατῆς κατὰ πρόοδος, which is wound up in § 4 by the statement that the ἄκρατῆς ἀπλῶς has to do with the same pleasures and pains as the ἀκόλουθος, ἐγκρατής, and σώφρων, and that the characters so associated differ as regards προαίρεσις: it is clear that the special depravity of that ἀκόλουθος who has little or no ἐπιθυμία is put in no sort of connection with this.’ I confess I cannot see any difficulty in taking διό closely with the words οἵ μὲν προαιρούνται, οἵ δ’ οὐ προαιρούνται, immediately preceding:
the ἀκόλαστος is προσωρόμενος: and this is why (διὸ) we ascribe 1148 a. 17. ἀκόλασία rather to the man whose acts of indulgence are not attended at all, or not to any considerable extent, by ἐπιθυμία, than to the man whose acts are consequent upon strong ἐπιθυμία: the acts of the former, not being explicable by ἐπιθυμία, must be due to προαίρεσις. Σημεῖον δὲ μᾶλλον γὰρ might have taken the place of διὸ μᾶλλον without changing the sense of the passage.

It is to be observed that Cook Wilson, as quoted above, takes μᾶλλον with ἀκολάστον = ἀκολαστότερον—he speaks of 'the special depravity of that ἀκολάστος who has little or no ἐπιθυμία.' Similarly Ramsauer speaks 'de diversis quasi gradibus τῆς ἀκολασίας': Grant says 'it is more intemperate to pursue luxury, &c., in cold blood than to do so under the influence of passion.' Coraes has καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀκολαστότερον, and Peters translates—'And so a man who without desire or with only a moderate desire pursues excess of pleasure, and avoids even slight pains, should be called more profligate than one who, &c.' This, I think, is wrong: the clause, as I understand it, means—'And this is why ἀκολασία is ascribed to the man who, without desire, pursues excessive pleasures, rather than to the man who, &c.' Degrees of ἀκολασία are not distinguished, but ἀκολασία is distinguished from ἀγραπία. The τοῦτον ὅτις a. 19 is the ἀκρατής. That is this the meaning of the passage is clearly shown by a comparison of it with what is probably its 'duplicate'—vii. 7. 3 παντὶ δ' ἄν δόξεις χείρων εἶναι, εἰ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα πράττει τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφάδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τυπτοῖ ή εἰ ὀργιζόμενος τί γὰρ ἀν ἐποίης ἐν πίθει δο; διὸ ὁ ἀκολάστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. On the 'duplicate' character of vii. 4. 4 δὸ ... ἵσχυρά and vii. 7. 3 παντὶ ... ἀκρατοῦς, see Rassow, Forsch. p. 23 and Cook Wilson, Arist. Stud. p. 71.

§ 5.] ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.] A 'duplicate' of vii. 4. 2: see note on vii. 4. a. 22.

Bekker and Bywater make τῶν γάρ ἡδέων ἔνα φύσει αἱρέτα a. 23, 24 parenthetical. I prefer to make τῶν γάρ ἡδέων a. 23 ... πρότερον a. 25 parenthetical, thus referring the examples χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή το τῶν τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων a. 23 (=τῶν φύσει αἱρέτον). The τὰ τῷ γένει καλὰ καὶ σπουδαία or τὰ φύσει αἱρέτα of this section correspond to the αἱρέτα καθ' αὐτά of § 2: the ἐνυπτία τοῦτον were not mentioned in § 2: they are the φευκτά of chapter 5: while τὰ μεταξὶ—so called, I think, simply
1148 a. 22. because the present list is a threefold one, whereas that in § 2 was only twofold—answer to the ἀναγκαία or σωματικά of § 2. Rassow (Forsch. p. 79), followed by Bywater, inserts τῶν before τῷ a. 23, rightly, I think.

a. 26. πρὸς ἀπαντὰ δὲ] Zell, Bekker and Ramsauer (Ramsauer reading δῆ) begin the apodosis here. Bywater (making διὰ δῶμι a. 28 . . . μορφαίνω b. 2 parenthetical—and apparently following the Ald. Sch. in understanding the construction to be διὰ δῶμι μὲν παρὰ τῶν λόγον κρατοῦντα . . . ψέγονται) seems to make the apodosis begin with μονοθρίᾳ μὲν οὖν b. 2. That this is really the apodosis is clear, I think, from the ‘duplicate’ passage vii. 4. 2, in which the apodosis begins b. 31 with τῶν μὲν οὖν πρῶς ταί'α (i.e. τὰ αἱρέτα καθ' αὐτὰ).

a. 28. τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν] Bekker omits καὶ with Kb Mb; but καὶ (approved by Rassow, Forsch. p. 66) is necessary. The meaning is ψέγονται τῷ πῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν Ἡτὸ τῷ ὑπερβαλλόντως ἐπιθυμεῖν. Lb, Ob, NC, CCC, Cambr., B1. 2. 3 give καὶ.

On the relation between § 2 and § 5 of this chapter Cook Wilson (Arist. Stud. p. 6) has the following remarks—‘§ 2 divides objects causing pleasure into two classes . . . § 5 gives the same under different phraseology. . . . The examples too of the first class in § 2 are repeated in § 5. . . . But § 5 adds a third class not found in § 2. . . . This amounts to a correction of § 2. In § 2 it is said of the αἱρέτα καθ' αὐτά that they admit of excess, implying that they are wrong in excess. . . . In § 5 the same thing is put in a clearer and better way: “it is not susceptibility to these, nor desire and liking for them which are bad, but a certain excess in them.” . . . The badness of ἀναγκαία or σωματικά when indulged in to excess is not stated in § 2; though half implied by the term ἀναγκαία, and asserted lower down in the same column (§ 3). In § 5 the fact is expressly mentioned. From these considerations it is evident that § 5 is not a mere recapitulation of § 2, for it contains more; that it is not a mere addition to § 2, for it contains the same matter as § 2: it is rather an entire reconstruction which makes § 2 quite unnecessary.’ Then on pp. 33, 34 he says—‘In subject-matter the second version, as already seen, expands the main statements of the first. The additions (in the second version) seem a true advance. . . . Of two versions of the same subject, the more advanced may be by the
same author as the other, and written when his mind has developed 1148 a. 28. further: but among other alternatives it is possible also that the advance may be the work of another and even inferior writer, representing merely the general progress of philosophy since the first author, or the advantage which the second author had in having the works of the first before him. The latter hypothesis will be the more probable, if, while the advance is such as might be made by an inferior thinker under the conditions aforesaid, there are found real traces of inferior philosophic ability in the second version. And the inference will be much strengthened if there is a considerable falling off in style. . . . In the case of the second of the two versions now under discussion, though the improvement is such as would in all probability not be retraced by the same author if once made, it is not too great to be due to the less able philosopher reflecting on the work of the abler. And on the other hand there do seem to be marks of less ability'—e.g. the writer of § 2, wishing to classify ἡδοναὶ and ἐπιθυμίαι, begins with a division of objects causing pleasure (ποιοῦσα ἡδονήν) and gives νίκη, τιμή &c. as examples of these objects; the writer of § 5 begins with ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι and 'involves himself in the inaccuracy . . . of giving ἡδέα and ἐπιθυμητά, νίκη, τιμή &c., as instances of ἡδοναὶ and ἐπιθυμίαι, which of course is avoided in § 2.' Here I think Cook Wilson is a little hard on the writer of § 5. Although the writer of § 5 leads off with ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμίων αἱ μὲν, he goes on—εἰς τὸν τῷ γένει καλῶν ἱ.τ.λ., which really means 'since the objects of some pleasures and desires are to be classed as noble and good. . . .' This writer, equally with the writer of § 2, seems to me to have a classification of τὰ ποιοῦσα ἡδονήν primarily in view. Although, however, I differ from Cook Wilson on this small point, I agree with him in thinking that § 2 and § 5 are probably by different authors, of whom the author of § 5 is probably the later.

διὸ δοσι . . . μορφηρία μὲν οὖν ωδεμία κ.τ.λ.] I have said that I think that the apodosis of the sentence ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. a. 22 is μορφηρία μὲν οὖν ωδεμία περὶ ταῦτ’ ἐστί: but the passage διὸ δοσι a. 28 . . . b. 2 μωραῖνεσ, made parenthetical by Bywater, is not ignored by the writer when he comes to this apodosis: for ταῦτ᾽ b. 2 is not the ἀπαντά καὶ τὰ τοιοῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξός of a. 26, but only τὰ τοιοῦτα (χρήματα, κέρδος, νίκη, τιμή) to which the words διὸ . . . μωραῖνεσ confine themselves.

1148 a. 28. The meaning is—'Those who pursue τὰ φύσει αἰρετά to excess are not μοχθηροὶ, ı. e. ἀκραστοὶ—because their objects are not ἀναγκαία, or σωματικά, but φύσει αἰρετά: and for the same reason (ἀλλ᾽ ὥσ ὡς § 6) they are not ἀκρατεῖς ἀπλῶς—their objects are φύσει αἰρετά, the excessive pursuit of which is φευκτῶν but not strictly ἄγετῶν, as in the excessive pursuit of τὰ σωματικά. They are, however, called ἀκρατεῖς καθ᾽ ὀμοιότητα.’ Ramsauer is of opinion that the reason stated—ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἰρετῶν ἕκαστῶν ἐστί δὴ αὐτό—is not sufficient to prove μοχθηρία μὲν ὅν ὁδήμα περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστι: it seems to me to be sufficient, if understood as above—‘their objects are φύσει αἰρετά, as recently distinguished from σωματικά—the objects of μοχθηρία or ἀκολοσία.’ On the words with which § 6 opens, Cook Wilson (p. 35) says—‘In § 2 the fact of the greater guilt in true ἀκρασία is clearly expressed in the sentence ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὧσ ἀμαρτία μόνον ἄλλα καὶ ὧσ κακία τις: the corresponding phrase in § 6 ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτῶν ἄλλα καὶ τῶν ψευτών ἐστὶν is much weaker and gets the author into a confusion, for here he makes ἄγεσθαι the differentia of the ἀκρασία ἀπλῶς from the ἀκρασία κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, whereas above (πρὸς ἀπαντά δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξῷ . . . ψέγοντας) the term ἄγεσθαι is used of the error of both.’ I am inclined to think that, whereas the verb ἄγεσθαι may be used popularly and vaguely, τῶν ψευτῶν—‘the class of τὰ ψευτά’—is a technical expression, and marks that severe censure which we pass on ὑπερβολαί in σωματικά.

a. 34. Σάτυρος] The stories given by the Ald. Sch. and the Paraph. (different stories) are not worth transcription. There were kings of Bosporus of this name. Isoc. τραπεζιτικὸς 370 b. mentions Satyrus I. (B.C. 407–393) as continuing his father’s policy of favouring Athenian grain-shippers. See note on v. 5. 13, b. 8.

b. 7. § 6. περὶ ἕκαστον] Restored by Ramsauer, Susemihl and Bywater for Bekker’s περὶ ἕκαστον. ‘We use the term ἀκρασία by analogy, adding in each case what the ἀκρασία is in’—λέγοντι τὴν ἀκρασίαν προσεπιθέντες τὸ ὅτι περὶ ἕκαστον.
CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

There are things which are (1) naturally pleasant, either (a) generally, or (b) for certain kinds of animals and human beings; and (2) things which are not naturally pleasant, but (a) become pleasant for constitutions depraved by mutilation or habit, or (b) are pleasant for constitutions originally bad.

To the different sorts of 'pleasant things' enumerated under (2) will correspond different dispositions, which may be distinguished as brutish (e.g. cannibalism), as caused by definite diseases (thus it was mental disease which made the man eat his fellow-servant's liver), and as generally 'morbid' or due to perverted habit (e.g. eating earth, unnatural lust). In so far as he has, and gives himself up to, one of these dispositions, a man is outside the boundaries of what we call vice; for vice is relative to normal human desires; and in so far as he has one of these dispositions and keeps it under control, or is mastered by it, he is not 'continent' or 'incontinent' in the strict sense of the term, but in a qualified sense, just as we have seen that the man who controls his anger is 'continent' in a qualified sense. We must qualify the terms vice and incontinence when we use them in relation to the 'pleasant things' enumerated under (2), and speak of brutish or morbid vice, brutish or morbid incontinence.

Introductory Note.] This chapter goes on still further to limit the sphere of ἐπιθυμία. If a man have unnatural desires (whether (i) connate, or (2) induced by (a) disease, or (b) habit), and keeps them in check, or yields to them, he is not ἐγκρατής or ἀκρατής ἀπλῶς, but so κατὰ πρόσθεν—i.e. the unnatural desire which he checks or yields to must be specified (just as κέρδος &c. must be specified in the cases mentioned in ch. 4), for the terms ἐγκρατής and ἀκρατής, even in relation to σωματικά, are applied strictly (ἀπλῶς) only to the man whose desires are natural. As Grant says—'In states that are entirely morbid, whether originally so, or from the effects of an ill-regulated life, the distinctions of right and wrong are no longer applicable.'

§§ 1-8.] The writing of this chapter is very careless, and has given much trouble to the critics (see Rassow, Forsch. pp. 79, 80, and Imelmann, Obs. Crit. p. 22 note); but the general meaning is plain:—Unnatural propensities are (1) θηριώδεις—bestial (e.g. cannibalism), exhibited, for the most part, by savages. These θηριώδεις ζέεις are connate, belonging to the μυθηρά φύσις of the
race, or of the individual: (2) νοσηματώδεις—morbid propensities. These νοσηματώδεις ἔξεις are either (a) due to supervening disease, bodily or mental—αἱ δὲ διὰ (omit τὲ after διὰ with Κb Λb: see Rassow, Forsch. p. 67) νόσους γίνονται καὶ διὰ (insert διὰ with Κb: see Rassow, l. c.) μανίαν ἐνίοις κτ.τ.λ.1 § 3, b. 25—cf. below § 6, a. i i οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικὰς, ἡ μανίας νοσηματώδεις: or (β) νοσηματώδεις, in a specific sense, as being morbid constitutional states—όσοι μὲν οὖν φύσει αἰτία § 4, b. 31. From the νοσηματώδεις ἔξεις in this specific sense must be distinguished (ε) or (ζ) αἱ ἔθος—how closely, however, the two kinds are connected is shown, not only by the expression αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἡ ἔθος § 3, b. 27, but by the difficulty of determining how far the ἔξεις adduced as examples (οἷον τριχῶν . . . ἄρρεσιν § 3, b. 27–29) are due to constitutionally morbid conditions, and how far they are habits the formation of which could have been avoided. The expression § 4, b. 33 καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδεις ἔχοντες δὲ ἔθος seems to show that the distinction most prominent in the writer’s mind was that between constitutionally morbid states, and morbid states produced by bad habits. The question—how far bad habits can result in morbid states, where there is no constitutional bias—he does not go into. He merely says, with special reference to the last instance in his list b. 27–29, that these unnatural propensities are due sometimes to φύσει, sometimes to ἔθος—τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ’ ἔθοις φυσικῶς διαφέρουσιν § 3, b. 29.

The foregoing explanation of the distinctions intended in αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις b. 24—αἱ δὲ νόσους γίνονται b. 25—αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις—ἡ ἔθος b. 27 renders unnecessary, I think, while it practically gives the same sense as, Rassow’s conjecture (adopted by Susemihl) αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἡ (φύσις ἡ) ἔθος (Forsch. p. 80), and also shows that the omission of ἡ before ἔθος (Κb), approved by Imelmann (Obs. Crit. p. 22 note), is a blunder.

b. 33. § 4. ὅσατοι δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδεις ἐχουσι δι’ ἔθος] ὅσοι is Bywater’s correction for the τοῖς of the MSS. Rassow (Forsch. p. 80) says—’Gedanke und Sprache fordern gleicherweise den Accusativ: ὅσατοι δὲ καὶ τοῖς νοσηματώδεις ἐχουσι δι’ ἔθος sc. αὐτοῖς αὖ ἐπεφέυγαν ἀκρατεία. Die äußere Unwahrscheinlichkeit dieser Aenderung leuchtet mir ein, aber ich habe mich vergleichbar

1 It may be noted that cannibalism, which seems to be the typical θηριώδης ἔξεις, is instanced here as due to supervening disease or madness.
bemührt einen anderen Ausweg zu entdecken.’ The meaning is 1148 b. 33. undoubtedly that expressed by Rassow’s conjectural reading.

I had made up my mind, however, to acquiesce in τοῖς, supposing that the writer intended to convey this meaning, but, instead of correctly employing the accusative, blunderingly wrote ὁσαίτοσ δὲ καὶ τοῖς to correspond with ὅσοις μὲν οὖν οὖν above. But now Bywater’s convincing ὅσοι removes all difficulty.

§ 5. τὸν ὑ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν] Bywater reads τὸν with Kb instead 1149 a. 1. of τά. I prefer τά, notwithstanding the τὸν in a. 3.

κρατεῖν] We ought to have οὐχ ἡ ἀπλὴ ἔγκράτεια answering to a. 2. this, as οὐχ ἡ ἀπλὴ ἄκρασία answers to κρατεῖσθαι.

καθάπερ . . . λεκτέον] ‘just as we call one who stands to his a. 3. angry feelings in this relation (i. e. in a relation of inferiority to them—κρατεῖσθαι) incontinent in respect of those feelings (τοῦ πάθους ἢ ὅτι τοῦ θυμοῦ ἄκρατῆς), but not incontinent without qualification.’ I thus read τοῦ πάθους ἄκρατῆς, ἄκρατῆς ὑ' ὡς λεκτέον with Lamb., Coraes, Susemihl. Coraes writes καθάπερ . . . τοῦ πάθους ἄκρατῆς, ἄκρατῆς ὑ' ὡς λεκτέον προσέβηκα τὸ πρῶτον ἄκρατῆ προσβεβήκαν εἶναι καὶ ἐτέρων κρατάτων. ὁ γὰρ νοῦς καὶ ἡ συνάρτησις, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ τοῦ τῶν τρόπων τοῦ θυμοῦ (μετὰ προσβήκης δηλοῦστι) καὶ οὐκ ἄκρατῆ (ἄπλως καὶ δίχα προσβήκης) λεκτέον.

§ 6.] In this section ἐκ φύσεως is opposed, as the characteristic a. 7. of a θηρίωδης ἔξις, to διὰ νόσου, which is made the characteristic of a νοσηματώδης ἔξις. There is some confusion in the opposition. A θηρίωδης ἔξις is φύσει as belonging to the μοχθηρὰ φύσις of a race or individual; but, as we have seen, a νοσηματώδης ἔξις may also be φύσει. Only those νοσηματώδεις ἔξις can be fairly said not to be φύσει, which have been contracted solely by ἔθος (if that is possible), or are due to νόσου ἐπιληπτικαὶ or μανίαι—supervening disease, as distinguished from a morbid constitutional state.

ἡν γαλήν] Cf. Plut. (?), Fragm. (ed. Tauchnitz vi. 341) εἰ ἐννοι καὶ a. 8. ἀνθρώποι ὡς ὡς φοβοῦνται φαῦλα ἄττα, οἷον γαλήν ἡ ἀλεκτρώνα ἀπ' οὐδὲμας φανερὰς αἰρίας. The γαλήν or γαλη seems to have been the polecat, and only in later writers the domestic cat. See Liddell and Scott.

νοσηματώδεις] The construction of course is—οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, a. 12. οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς, ἡ μανίας ἀλέγιστοι ὡς εἰσὶ νοσηματώδεις.
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1149 a. 13. § 7. ἐνίστε μὲν μόνον] Bywater adds μὲν with Kᵇ and Mᵇ. Although ἐνίστε μόνον stands in Cambr., there are signs of correction.

a. 23. § 9. ἀλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας] ὧν answering to other objects (the φύσει αἰτεῖα of chapter 4 and the φευνεῖα of chapter 5, as distinguished from the ἀνωπόλεια) there are states 'specifically distinct from ἀκρασία,' to which the term ἀκρασία is applied in an extended, not in its proper, sense.

CHAPTER VI.

Argument.

Incontinence in anger is not so disgraceful as incontinence in desires, for anger indeed lends an ear to reason, but misapprehends its instructions. Like a hasty servant who runs away to execute his master's orders without waiting to hear them out, anger rushes off to take reprisals, if reason or imagination only suggest that insult or slight has been offered—the mere suggestion is enough to make anger rush off with the inference that the insult must be forthwith avenged. Desire, on the other hand, rushes off to enjoy itself, if only reason or sense have said that something is pleasant. Thus anger serves reason in a manner, while desire does not. Again, anger is more constitutional, and even hereditary, than bad desires are, and therefore the man who yields to it is more excusable; also, anger is open—not, like desire, an insidious principle plotting against the just rule of reason. Moreover, it is pain which makes a man vent his anger; but pleasure which actuates the wantonness of desire; and wantonness arouses our just indignation rather than excesses of anger. Since, as we have seen, bodily pleasures are either normally human, or brutish, or morbid, it is with the first class only that temperance and intemperance are concerned; and the brutes are not to be described as either temperate or intemperate—except perhaps by a metaphorical transfer of the term.

Brutality is not such an evil as vice—for in brutality principle simply does not exist, has not been destroyed—but it is more formidable.

a. 24. § 1. οὔ δὲ καὶ ἣττον αἰχρὰ ἀκρασία ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἢ τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν, θεωρῆσομεν] Apparently ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρασία, as occupying a peculiar position among the other kinds κατὰ μεταφορὰ λεγόμενα (see note on vii. 4. 2. 1147 b. 34), is selected here for comparison, 'from a moral point of view' (Grant ad loc.), with ἀκρασία proper: cf. especially M. M. ii. 6. 1202 b. 3 (quoted in note on vii. 4. 2. 1147 b. 34), a passage which Rassow (Forsch. p. 47) accounts for.
by the desire of the writer to give some reason for discussing the special question of the superiority of ἀκρασία θυμὸν to ἀκρασία ἀπλῶν —ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, when already it had been established that the forms of ἀκρασία κατὰ πρώσθεσιν generally (ἀκρασία θυμὸν being one of them) are better than ἀκρασία ἀπλῶς. I gather that Rassow regards vii. 6 as interpolated. Susemihl brackets it.

ἐσικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δὲ] Cf. a. 25.

Probl. KH. 3. 949 b. 13 διὰ τί ἀκρατεῖς λέγεται κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμιὰς μόνον, οὐδὲν τῆς ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργήν; ἢ ὅτι ἀκρατῆς μὲν ἔστιν ὁ παρὰ τὸν λόγον τι πρῶσθων, καὶ ἀκρασία ἡ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἄγωγή, εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπιθυμίαι ὡς ἐπίσταν εἰσεῖν παρὰ τὸν λόγον, αἱ δ’ ὀργαὶ μετὰ λόγου, οὐχ ὡς κελεύσαντος τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλ’ ὡς δηλώσαντος τὸν προσπλακισμὸν ἢ τὴν αἰτίαν. In E. N. vii. 3. 10 the ἀκρατῆς proper is said to act ὑπὸ λόγου in a sense, just as here the ἀκρατῆς θυμὸν is said ἀκούειν τι τοῦ λόγου. Moreover even within the limits of the present passage λόγος is represented as influencing ἐπιθυμία no less than θυμὸς—ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ἀπόλαυσιν ἀλλ’ αἰτίαν. The writing is thus very careless and confused, but the sense intended is true. The λόγος upon which ἐπιθυμία acts is the sophistry of the selfish passions in the ἀκρατῆς, or the hedonistic theory of the ἀκόλαστος, whereas that which prompts θυμὸς is 'an idea of justice, however wild that idea may be'—Grant ad loc.

Anger and Desire, in themselves, are equally irrational; but Anger coexists with a certain consciousness of what is due between man and man, whereas Desire thinks only of its own gratification. 'Anger is a less immediately selfish passion than Desire. It is less debasing in the long run to the character.'—Grant ad loc. Cf. Plato, Rep. 440, where θυμὸς is said to aid λόγος against ἐπιθυμία. Resentment is roused by the thought of base and selfish acts: see note on iii. 8. 10, b. 23. Cf. also Butler, Sermon 8 Upon Resentment: 'The only way in which our Reason and Understanding can raise anger is by representing to our mind injustice or injury of some kind or other.... Since... it is necessary for the very subsistence of the world that injury and injustice and cruelty should be punished, and since compassion, which is so natural to mankind, would render that execution of justice exceedingly difficult and uneasy; indignation against vice and wickedness is... a balance
to that weakness of pity, and also to any thing else which would
prevent the necessary methods of severity. Those who have never
thought upon these subjects may perhaps not see the weight of
this: but let us suppose a person guilty of murder or any other
action of cruelty, and that mankind had naturally no indignation
against such wickedness and the authors of it; but that every body
was affected towards such a criminal in the same way as towards
an innocent man: compassion amongst other things would render
the execution of justice exceedingly painful and difficult and would
often quite prevent it. And notwithstanding that the principle of
Benevolence is denied by some and is really in a very low degree,
that men are in great measure insensible to the happiness of their
fellow creatures; yet they are not insensible to their misery, but
are very strongly moved with it: insomuch that there plainly is
occasion for that feeling which is raised by guilt and demerit, as a
balance to that of compassion. Thus much may, I think, justly be
allowed to resentment in the strictest way of moral consideration.

§ 2. [φυσικαίς] It is more excusable to follow those ὀρέξεις (ἀρέξεις
is the generic term covering θυμός and ἐπιθυμία) which are φυσικαί,
i.e. καναλ, not ἴδιαι καὶ ἐπιθετοί (see Ἐ.Ν. iii. ii. 1). And θυμός,
that is (καί) ἡ χαλεπότης (= ὁ θυμός ὁ καθ' ὑπερβολήν), is φυσικώτερον
than αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς. Θυμός is, as Grant puts it, 'more
constitutional,' and is even hereditary: as the Ald. Schol. says—
ὅτι δὲ φυσικὸς ὁ θυμός δὴλον διότι κατὰ γενεὰς ἐπακολουθεῖ. Of course
the writer's elsewhere-expressed view—that ἡ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία, though
concerned with αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς, is nevertheless confined
within the limits of man's normal φύσις, must not be regarded as in
any way modified by the present passage.

Cf. M. M. ii. 1202 a. 25—he was acquitted!

§ 3. δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς] a lyric fragment of unknown
authorship. The editors compare Sappho—

ποικιλῶρον ἀδάνατο Ἀφροδίτα
παί δίως δολίσπλοκε, λίσσομαι σε.

κεστὸν ἱμάντα] 'the embroidered (κεντεῖν to stitch) girdle.'

"Ομηρος] Ἰ. xiv. 214–217

ἡ, καὶ ἀπὸ στῆθεσθιν ἐλύσατο κεστὸν ἱμάντα,
ποικιλῶν ἔνθα δὲ οἱ θελκῆμα πάντα τέτυκτο.

§ 4. δ' ὀργὴ τῶν τῶν οἱ ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, δ' ὑβρίς [περὶ ἡμῶν] b. 20.

Grant observes that 'this argument is similar to that used Eth. iii. 12. 2 to prove that intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice.' In Rhet. ii. 2. 1378 a. 31 ὀργή is defined—ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὑβρίς μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένη διὰ φαινομένην διεγωρίαν.

eἰ οὖν οἷς . . . ὑβρίς] The reasoning here is—(1) that the b. 21. indulgence of an ὑβρίς which involves pain is less voluntary than that of one which involves pleasure, and consequently, if wrong, less unjust: therefore θυμός is less unjust than ὑβρίς—(2) since the object of anger is supposed injustice (see E. N. v. 8. 10 ἐπὶ φαινομένη ἀδικία ἡ ὀργή ἐστι), that which raises anger with greater justice is more unjust than that which raises it with less: we are more justly angry at ὑβρίς, than at excesses of θυμός which do not involve ὑβρίς: therefore acts of ὑβρίς are more unjust than excesses of θυμός.

In short, ὑβρίς is worse than χαλεπότης, because (1) χαλεπότης is painful, and ὑβρίς pleasant: (2) we do not feel so indignantly angry at acts due to χαλεπότης, as at acts due to ὑβρίς.

It may perhaps be thought that the question is begged in the words ὁς ὀργίζεται μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταύτα ἀδικώτερα. The truth however remains that, roughly, things are wrong or unjust in proportion to the indignation they rouse. This is all that the writer means by the unfortunately worded statement that 'they are unjust in proportion to the justice of the indignation.'

§ 6. εἰρηται κατ' ἀρχάς] The distinction is made in chapter 5: b. 27. but if we suppose that the expression κατ’ ἀρχάς must refer to the beginning of the present treatise on ἀκρασία, we may adopt the view of Cook Wilson (Arist. Stud. p. 15) and others, that the reference is to ch. 1 § 3: see Cook Wilson (A. S. p. 14)—'The phrase ὁσπερ κατ’ ἀρχάς does not seem to be used when the “beginning” referred to is at such a short distance (the preceding chapter) as ch. 5 would be in the present case: but only when it is so far off that it is better for the sake of clearness to take this rather than a more general form like ὁσπερ εἰρηται. This is borne out by all the passages collected in Bonitz's Index'—where, according to Cook Wilson, the intervals are of 83, 22, at least 15, 12, 9, and 4½ pages (Bekker) respectively, 'the smallest interval being about 350 lines.' Grant, however,
1149 b. 27. holds that the reference in the passage before us (vii. 6. 6) 'goes back to ch. 5. § 1, and gives colour to a suspicion that the book may have been put together out of separate pieces, and perhaps lectures, one of which may have commenced with the fifth chapter.' So Stahr (Eth. Uebers. p. 248, note)—'Der Ausdruck "zu Anfang" geht auf den Anfang der "heutigen" Vorlesung. Denn die Aristotelischen Schriften tragen durchaus den Character mündlicher Vorlesungen und Vorträge.' Without expressing any opinion on the point of 'the oral character' of the Ethics, I would say that I have little hesitation in referring the present εἰρηταί καὶ' ἀρχάς to vii. 1.

b. 31. διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία κ.τ.λ.] The connexion seems to be this:—'ἀνθρώποι are called σώφρονες or ἄκολαστοι in respect of a relation subsisting between προαιρετικ and ἄνθρωπων καὶ φυσικαί, not νοσηματώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις, ἐπιθυμίαι: hence τὰ θηρία are not described as σώφρονα or ἄκολαστα (except sometimes metaphorically—e.g. when the members of a race distinguished by extraordinary voracity or lasciviousness are described as ἄκολαστα): for (1) their ἐπιθυμίαι are θηριώδεις, and (2) they have no προαιρετικ. In short, σωφροσύνη and ἄκολαστικ are ascribed to man with his normal human desires and rational principle, not to the irrational brutes with their brutish desires.

b. 32. τιν] If we read τιν it must go with ἦβρι—'remarkable for wantonness, it may be, or lechery' (Grant): but Bywater's suggestion τι is preferable.

b. 35. ἐξειστήκει τῆς φύσεως, ἤσπερ οἱ μαννόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων] Ramsauer is wrong, I think, when he makes τοιαύτα γινὴ τῶν ζῴων the subject of ἐξειστήκει, and adds—'Cogitatur igitur generalis quaedam omnium animalium sana natura, a qua nonnulla genera (περὶ φύσιν) degeneraverint.' The subject of ἐξειστήκει is the same as that of ἐχει in the line above—viz. τὰ θηρία—all brutes generally, and the meaning is that the normal condition of brutes resembles that of madmen in being without the consciousness of those limits which define the 'nature' of rational beings. The term φύσεως must be regarded as coloured by its proximity to προαιρετικ and λογισμῶν, just as φυσικαί above is coloured by its proximity to ἀνθρώπων. The Paraph. brings this out in his version—οὐδαμῶς ἐξωστρὶ (τὰ θηρία) λόγων ἀλλὰ πάντῃ τῆς φύσεως ταύτης ἀφεστήκεν ἄσπερ οἱ μαννόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
Similarly the Ald. Schol.—οὐ τούτῳ φησιν ὅτι ἔξω τῆς φύσεως τοῦ 1149 b. 35. ἀλάγου ἐγένοτο, καὶ λογικὴν φύσιν ἔλαβον, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰ θηρία ἐδίκασε τοῖς ἔξεστηκαί τῆς φύσεως ἦτοι τοῖς μανυμένοις.

§ 7. Ἐλαττὸν δὲ θηριότης κακίας] Rassow (Forsch. p. 81) reads 1150 a. 1. Ἐλαττὸν δὲ κακῶν θηριότης κακίας, quoting the Paraphrast in support of the insertion—διὰ τούτῳ καὶ Ἐλαττὸν κακῶν ἡ θηριότης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κακίας, εἰ καὶ φοβερὸτερον.

διοιον . . . θηρίου] Rassow (Forsch. p. 23) regards διοιον a. 3. a. 3 . . . ἀρχή a. 5 and παραπλήσιον a. 6 . . . θηρίον a. 8 as duplicates. ‘The last passage,’ says Cook Wilson (Arist. Stud. p. 16), ‘is evidently a bungler’s work, for the comparison συμβάλλειν ἄδικων πρὸς ἀνθρωπῶν ἄδικων is an unfortunate substitute for ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἐμψυχον, and can hardly be by the same author.’ It is to be observed that the Paraphrast does not notice the clause παραπλήσιον a. 6 . . . κάκιον a. 7: his commentary is good—διὰ τούτῳ καὶ Ἐλαττὸν κακῶν ἡ θηριότης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κακίας, εἰ καὶ φοβερῶτερον. ‘Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνη κακία τὸ βέλτιστον τῶν ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ διαφθείρει, δηλούσθ' τὸν λόγον, ἢ δὲ θηριότης σύμμαχος' ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἄψυχον κακῶν Ἐλαττὸν τὸν ἐμψυχον κακοῦ· τὸ γὰρ κακῶν τὸ ἐμψυχον ἀρχὴν, ἤτις αὐτὸ κωμεῖ, βλαβερῶτερον τοῦ μή ἐχουσος· τὸ γὰρ ἀκάμητον κακῶν ἀνεκτάτερον τοῦ κυσμιμένου κακοῦ, καθός Ἐλαττὸν δύναται δρᾶν, ὡσπερ ὅδ' τὸ ἐμψυχον κακῶν χείρον τοῦ ἄψυχον, ὅτι ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἤτις αὐτὸ κωμεῖ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ λογικὸν, ὅτι τοῦ ἀλόγου μᾶλλον ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βλαβερῶτερον καὶ χείρον· μυριπλάσια γὰρ ἐν ποιήσειν ἄνθρωπου κακὸς θηρίου. The Ald. Schol., however, comments on παραπλήσιον . . . κάκιον in a manner which amply bears out the truth of Cook Wilson’s remark that ‘the comparison συμβάλλειν ἄδικων πρὸς ἀνθρωπῶν ἄδικων is an unfortunate substitute for ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἐμψυχον. The Scholiast’s comment is to the following effect—‘That the unjust man is hurtful in proportion to the degree in which he participates in Injustice: therefore Injustice, as the source, is worse than the unjust man (εἰ γὰρ τὸ προσεγγίζον τῷ πυρὶ θερμαίνεται, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἔσται τὸ πῦρ θερμότερον). On the other hand, Injustice is a lifeless thing in itself, unable to hurt unless realised in the unjust man; and in this sense is not so bad as the unjust man.’
CHAPTER VII.

Argument.

The man who struggles against those pleasures and pains of touch and taste to which ἀκολασία and ὀσφορότητι are related, may exhibit either more or less than the average power of coping with them. If he exhibit more than the average power of coping with the pleasures, we call him ἐγκαρθής, more than the average power of coping with the pains, καρτερικός: if he exhibit less than the average power of coping with the pleasures, ἀκαρθής, with the pains, μαλακός.

On the other hand, the man who does not struggle against the necessary pleasures of touch and taste, but pursues them excessively, of deliberate choice, is ἀκόλαστος—that is 'incorrigible,' for he is not the man to feel regret for what he does, and so is incurable: opposed to him is the man who deliberately indulges too little in these pleasures, while the ὀφρών occupies the mean. There is also the man who shuns bodily pains, not because he is conquered in a struggle with them, but deliberately. He is not exactly μαλακός—for τὰ ἀλλὰ is the non-deliberate avoidance of pains—but it is a sort of μαλακία (§ 3 μαλακίας ἑδὸν μᾶλλον) which he exhibits. Those who do not act from deliberate choice are to be distinguished as the man who is led on by pleasure, and the man who shuns the pain of unsatisfied desire for pleasure. The man who does something wrong without the spur of any, or a strong, desire is plainly worse than the man who does it under the influence of a strong desire. So the ἀκόλαστος is worse than the ἀκαρθής.

The real opposite of the ἀκαρθή is the ἐγκαρθή, and of the μαλακός the καρτερικός. Ἐγκαρθήσις is a higher quality than καρτερία, for to overcome (κατείχει) is better than merely to hold one's ground (ἀντέχει). Under the head of μαλακία may be brought luxurious effeminacy, with its indolent valetudinarian ways. A man may be pardoned who after a struggle is overcome by powerful pleasures or pains—like Philoctetes or Cercyon in the play, or like Xenophon, who could not restrain his laughter: but there is no excuse for one who, without constitutional or morbid weakness, yields to what most people can resist.

The man who is very fond of amusement is sometimes thought of as ἀκόλαστος, but he is really μαλακός, for amusement is relaxation from the pain of work, and it is this pain which the man who is very fond of amusement shirks.

There are two species of ἀρασία—that of the impetuous 'melancholic' temperament, and that of the weak character. The weak man deliberates and then falls away from his resolve under the influence of passion, whereas the impetuous man does not deliberate and is therefore carried away by passion.

1150 a. 11. § 1. διώρισθη] sc. ἐνιαυ or γίνομαι (Zell).

ἔστι μὲν οὖσις ἔσχειν ... a. 16 χειροσ] Grant has a good note.
Here the terms 'continent' and 'incontinent' are fixed 'relatively to what is, as implying more or less continence than people in general have. And yet there is evidently some reference beside to the standard of what ought to be, else it could not be said that people in general verge rather to the worse side. To represent the majority of mankind as possessing a mediocre moral character, neither eminently good nor bad, but inclining to weakness, was in accordance with the Greek point of view. Widely different from this was what may be called the Semitic point of view, which, regarding man with greater religious earnestness, attributed to him "desperate wickedness." The latter feeling was not confined to the Jews and to the pages of the Bible, but in some degree made itself known to the world in the Stoical philosophy.'

§§ 2, 3.] According to Rassow (Forsch. p. 23) these §§ contain a. 16. an unnecessary discussion of the difference between ἀκολασία and ἀκρασία, which repeats what has already been said in ch. 4. §§ 1-4. The conclusion of the passage ch. 4. §§ 1-4 διὸ μᾶλλον 1148 a. 17 ... ἱσχυρά a. 22 presents a striking resemblance to that of the passage ch. 7. §§ 2, 3, παντὶ δ’ ἄν 1150 a. 27 ... ἐν πάθει ὅν a. 30, and nothing would be lost by the omission of the whole passage ch. 7. §§ 2, 3, the words ἀντικείμενα κ.τ.λ. § 4, a. 32, following naturally after πρὸς τὰς χεῖρας § 1, a. 16.

§ 2. ἐπεὶ 8’ ... ἄλλα γείσαι] ‘Since some pleasures are necessary (while others are not), and the necessary pleasures are so only within certain limits, their excess and defect not being “necessary” (i.e. being wrong)’: see Stahr—‘wir haben ferner gesehen, dass einige Genusse nothwendig sind, andere dagegen es nicht sind, dass ferner jene ersteren es nur bis zu einem gewissen Grade sind.’ Grant is wrong in referring καὶ μέχρι τῶν to αἱ 8’ ὅδ’ translating—‘Now, as some pleasures are necessary, but others are not to be called so, as being (καὶ) only necessary in certain degrees.’ The words αἱ 8’ ὅδ’ are really parenthetical.

λύπας] Rassow (Forsch. p. 132) conjectures φυγᾶς, referring to a. 18.
1150 a. 18. § 1, where we have ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς, and to the verbs διώκειν and φεύγειν which follow in the present §.

a. 19. ο μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἠδέων + ἕ καθ’ ὑπερβολὰς + ἕ διὰ προαιρεσίαν] See Rassow (Forsch. p. 132): ‘Sicher verderbt sind die Worte: καθ’ ὑπερβολάς ἕ διὰ προαιρεσίαν. Nicht bloss ἕ, das man in ἕ oder ei hat ändern wollen, sondern auch καθ’ ὑπερβολάς ist anstössig. Was man erwartet, findet sich in der Handschrift M: καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ διὰ προαιρεσίαν. Sollte diese Lesart eine Correctur sein, so ist sie wenigstens wahrscheinlicher als die neueren Änderungsvorschläge.’ I think that Bywater’s suggestion—ἡ ὑπερβολάι for ἕ καθ’ ὑπερβολάς—is good; the meaning, I take it, being that ‘he pursues excessive pleasures, because they are excessive, that is (ἔ) deliberately’; but nothing would be lost to this meaning, it seems to me, by the simple omission of the words ἕ καθ’ ὑπερβολάς ἕ.

The Paraphrast’s explanation of the text as it stands (the second ἕ apparently omitted) is satisfactory enough—ο μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἠδέων, καὶ ἕ τὰς φύσει μεγάλας ἐκ ζύγων ἢδονάς, ἢ τὰς φύσει μετρίας ὑπερβάλλωνς ζύγων, ὅχι ἀκόμην διαίως πως ἢ π’ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ προαιρέσεως ἢ π’ αὐτὰς τρέχων, οὐ δὲ ἄλλο τι δόξαν, φέρει εἰπέτι, ἥ κέρδος, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς δὲ εἰστάς, ἀκόλαστος.

a. 21. ἀνάγκη γὰρ . . . ἐμπρόμισθη τὸ ἀνίατος] These words seem out of place here, unless the suggestion thrown out by Grant be accepted, that they ‘lay some stress on the etymology of the word ἀκόλαστος.’ Ramsauer places them after ἀκρασίας § 3, a. 31.

a. 31. § 3. τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ἐδ’ ἀκόλαστος] These words refer to the distinction drawn in § 2 between ό μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἠδέων . . . διὰ προαιρεσίαν and ό φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λίπας μή δὲ ξεχθαν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαιρεσία—i.e. the deliberate pursuit of bodily pleasure and the deliberate avoidance of bodily pain are distinguished, just as the non-deliberate yielding to pleasure is distinguished from the non-deliberate shrinking from pain. For non-deliberate action, according as it refers to pleasure, or to pain, there are appropriate technical terms—ἀκρασία and μαλακία: but there are no appropriate technical terms to mark the similar distinction which obtains in deliberate action, and the writer is obliged to retain the term ἀκόλαστος for the deliberate pursuit of pleasure, and to describe the deliberate avoidance of pain as ‘rather a kind of μαλακία’—
BOOK VII: CHAP. 7: § 3.

μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον,—not as μαλακία simply, for that term is technically retained for the non-deliberate avoidance of pain: see Rassow (Forsch. pp. 132, 133), who explains as above, and Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, paragr. 77, p. 69).

The intervention, however, of the passage τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρομένων a. 25 . . . ἀκρατοὺς a. 31, which relates to non-deliberate action, has induced many critics to suppose that τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων must be the ἀκρατὴς and μαλακὸς, and hence that ὁ δὲ ἀκόλουθος a. 32, the reading of all MSS., should be ὁ δὲ ἀκρατής: see Michelet ad loc., who reads and defends ἀκρατής, and Spengel (Arist. Stud. p. 213), who proposes τὸ δὲ ἀκρασίας. The intervention of τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρομένων a. 25 . . . ἀκρατοὺς a. 31 is certainly awkward, but I do not think that there can be any serious objection to treating the passage as a parenthesis, so far as its length is concerned. Of course, if the passage is an interpolation, as Cook Wilson argues (Arist. Studies, paragr. 78, p. 70), all difficulty disappears, τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων following immediately after προαιρέσεων § 2, a. 25. ‘In the first place,’ says Cook Wilson, ‘the sentence παντὶ δὲ ἵνα δοξεῖ ε.κ.λ. (a. 27) interrupts in the most irrelevant manner a context which has for its object to explain the characters of καρπεία and μαλακία, and in the second place it is equally difficult to keep the first part of § 3 in the text, because it makes the pain to which the μαλακὸς yields that of unsatisfied desire, which by no means suits the description of the μαλακὸς in §§ 5, 6, where the examples are certainly not of such pains.’ Holding the distinction drawn in § 3, ὁ μὲν a. 25—ὁ δὲ a. 26 . . . ὡστε διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλων, to be between two sorts of ἀκρασία proper (see paragr. 83)—that in which the motive is pleasure and that in which it is pain caused by the absence of pleasure—not between ἀκρασία and the μαλακία of which instances are given below in § 5, Cook Wilson supposes the original locus of vii. 7. 3 τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρομένων a. 25 . . . ἀκρατοὺς a. 31 to have been somewhere after the passage ὦσπερ 1148 b. 9 . . . φαμέν b. 14, vii. 4. 6, which and vii. 7. 3 τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρομένων a. 25 . . . ἀκρατοὺς a. 31 he presents (Tab. IX) as fragments of a duplicate of vii. 4. §§ 3, 4 τῶν δὲ περὶ 1148 a. 4 . . . ἵχυρα a. 22, a passage—also presented by him as somewhat fragmentary—in which the ἀκρατής is said to yield to bodily pleasures and to avoid bodily pains. The bodily pains enumerated in vii. 4. 3 are, it is true, those of πένα, δίψα, ἀλέα, ψίχος, whereas those mentioned in vii. 7. 3 are only those of unsatisfied desire: Cook Wilson notices this discrepancy between
vii. 7. 3 and vii. 4. 3, but does not find it serious as between duplicate versions (see Arist. Studies, paragr. 83); while between vii. 4. 6 and vii. 7. 3 τῶν δὲ μὴ προσαρμομένων . . . ἀκρατῶς, which he presents as parts of the same version, there is no such discrepancy, vii. 4. 6 merely describing generally the objects of ἀκρασία as the same as those of ἀκολούθια.

I offer no opinion as to the correctness of Cook Wilson’s view that the original locus of vii. 7. 3 τῶν δὲ μὴ προσαρμομένων . . . ἀκρατῶς is after vii. 4. 6. I limit myself to saying that, with Rassow (Forsch. p. 23), I think that the whole passage ἐπεί 1150 a. 16 . . . ἀκόλογος a. 32, vii. 7. §§ 2, 3 interrupts the sense, being a repetition (especially in the latter part of § 3) of what has been said before in vii. 4. §§ 1-4.

a. 32. § 4.] ἐγκρατής is the proper opposite of ἀκρατής, because ἐγκρατής involves τὸ κρατεῖν (and ἀκρατής, τὸ κρατεῖσθαι); and καρτερικός is the proper opposite of μαλακός, because τὸ καρτερεῖν involves τὸ ἀντέχειν—‘bearing up’ against the pressure to which the μαλακός, or ‘soft’ man, yields. There is no value in the distinction drawn here between the ἐγκρατής and the καρτερικός, on the ground of the difference between ‘victory’ and ‘bearing up.’ It may surely be said that the ἐγκρατής ‘bears up’ against pleasure, and that the καρτερικός is ‘victorious over’ pain; at any rate, both succeed in acting well, one in spite of pleasure, the other in spite of pain: the καρτερικός is not fairly distinguished from the ἐγκρατής merely by the possession of the negative virtue of ‘bearing up.’ If he ‘bears up,’ it is in order to act well.

Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies pp. 17, &c., and pp. 45, &c.) regards § 4 as part of a version parallel to § 1 (see Table IV)—‘In § 1 the relation to one another of the ἀκρατής, μαλακός, ἐγκρατής, and καρτερικός is determined. The first two of these yield (ἡττᾶσθαι) to the bad impulse, but for the ἀκρατής, this is given by pleasure, for the μαλακός by pain. The last two agree so far as both overcome (κρατεῖν) the bad impulse, and differ, like the first two, in its nature. Κρατεῖν then is common to the ἐγκρατής and καρτερικός, ἡττᾶσθαι to the μαλακός and ἀκρατής. This is contradicted by § 4, according to which κρατεῖν belongs to the ἐγκρατής alone, and not to the καρτερικός, whose action is mere ἀντέχειν: and this difference is made a reason for preferring the former to the latter, because κρατεῖν is better than μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι. Two such opposite views cannot have been intended.
for the same context' (p. 17). The version to which § 4 belongs 1150 a. 32. Cook Wilson regards as composed of §§ 2, 4, 5, 6, and holds it to be 'the work of an inferior thinker who, in attempting to make advance on the other [i.e. the parallel version § 1] only adds subtleties, partly confused, partly fallacious' (p. 45)—i.e. he adds a character standing to ἀκρασία in the relation in which μαλακία stands to ἀκρασία, calling this new character somewhat confusedly εἶδος μαλακίας μᾶλλον, and yet is silent as to his reason for not completing the symmetry by adding another character differing from καρτερία as σωφροσύνη from ἐγκράτεια. 'Another unsuccessful attempt to refine is the substitution by the second version of ἀντέχειν for κρατέων as characteristic of καρτερία: for this so far from being an improvement is a fallacy . . . ἀντέχειν could only mean a balance of motives, when the agent is quite undecided and no action results. But this is not the meaning of καρτερία, nor is there any ground in the context for believing such a meaning here intended. And if it were, the division ought to have been carried further, and a corresponding character put on the side of pleasure, differing as only withstanding pleasure, from the ἐγκράτης who overcomes it. The author probably thinks of the καρτερικός as "enduring" (καρτερών), or "holding out (ἀντέχων) against" pain which cannot be annihilated . . . and in that sense cannot be overcome (κρατέων). But since this "holding out" means that the man does not allow the pain to determine his will, it is κρατέων in the fullest sense; the other kind of κρατέων which he has not, is of no importance morally, because it is not in the sphere of his will at all. It is quite mistaken therefore to rank ἐγκράτης higher than καρτερικός, on the ground that the latter does not "overcome" in the sense described' (Arist. Studies, p. 45).

I entirely agree with Cook Wilson in the criticism which he passes in the last sentence; but I cannot see why the writer of § 4 should not still be the writer of § 1. Having said μεταξὺ δ' ἦ τῶν πλείστων ἐξις, the writer of § 1 would very naturally go on to explain, as is done in § 4, which of the four—ἀκρασία, ἐγκράτεια, μαλακία, καρτερία, are really ἀντικείμεναι, or vis à vis to which. Appealing to etymology, and the usage of language (καρτερίν means ἀντέχειν—'to resist pressure,' 'to be hard': ἐγκράτης and ἀκρασία are both compounds derived from κρατέων), he shows that it is the ἐγκράτης, not the καρτερικός, who is the vis à vis (ἀντικείμενα) of the ἀκρασία, and the καρτερικός, not the ἐγκράτης, of the μαλακός. It so happens that his appeal to etymology and popular usage betrays him into the error
1150 a. 32. of representing the καρτερίκος as inferior to the ἐγκρατής in not achieving 'victory'; but I do not see why the writer of § 1 should be deemed incapable of falling into this error, which, after all, does not come into conflict with anything stated in § 1. As I read it, § 1 only says that the ἐγκρατής and καρτερίκος are stronger (κρείττους) and the ἀκρασίας and μαλακός weaker (ηττους) than the average man, where pleasures and pains are concerned.

If I have explained correctly the nature of the appeal to etymology made in § 4, Cook Wilson's conjecture (Arist. Studies, p. 70) cannot be accepted.

b. 5. § 6. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειας καὶ ἀκρασίαν] καρτερία καὶ μαλακία are relative to ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἐξις: so also are ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἀκρασία: then follow explanatory remarks—οὐ γὰρ εἰ τις κ.τ.λ., which concern both ἀκρασία καὶ μαλακία, as is plain from the words ἡδονῶν ἡπτάται ἡ λυπῶν b. 7.

b. 9 Θεόδεκτος] Theodectes was a rhetorician and tragic poet, often mentioned and quoted by Aristotle—e.g. Rhet. ii. 23. 1400 a. 27 as the author of a piece called the Ajax: Rhet. ii. 23. 1397 b. 3 of an Alcmaeon: Rhet. ii. 24. 1401 a. 35 of an Orestes: Rhet. ii. 23. 1399 a. 8 of a Socrates: Pol. i. 2. 1255 a. 36 of a Helenē. The Rhetoric of Theodectes (probably founded on Aristotle's lectures) is alluded to in Rhet. iii. 9. 1410 b. 2 ἐν τοῖς Θεόδεκτεων ἐξηρίθμησα. He was a native of Phaselis in Pamphylia, but spent most of his life at Athens, where he was the pupil of Isocrates and Aristotle (see Teichmüller, Literarische Einfühlen, pp. 260 and 266: he deserted Isocrates for Aristotle: and, in fact, seems to have put Aristotle in possession of some of the secrets of Isocrates' rhetorical teaching). Aristotle evidently thought very highly of him. The writer of the Rhet. ad Alex. 1421 b. 2 alludes to an Aristotelian rhetorical treatise with which the name of Theodectes was associated—ἐν ταῖς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τέχναις Θεόδεκτη γραφείας. He seems to have died at Athens: see Plut. (? Oratorum vitae. Isocrates, ἐμαθῆτε τοῦ αἰτῆς καὶ Θεόδέκτης ὁ Φασηλίτης ὁ τάς τραγῳδίας ὑστερον γράφας, οὐ ἐστὶ τὸ μνήμα ἐπὶ τὴν Κυμάων πορευόμενοις, κατὰ τὴν ἱερὰν ὁδὸν τὴν ἐπ' Ἑλευσίνα, ταῦτα κατερρρεμένους. With regard to the Philoctetes mentioned here the Ald. Schol. has the following:—ὁ Θεόδεκτης τραγικός ἤ ἤν καὶ παρέγει τὴν χειρὰ δεδημένου τῶν Φιλοκτήσην ὑπὸ ὄφεως καὶ μέχρι μὲν πολλοῦ καὶ ἀντέτευς

There were two tragic poets called Carcinus, one an Athenian, the other an Agrigentine. In \textit{Rhet.} iii. 16. 1417 b. 18 'the \textit{Oedipus} of Carcinus' is mentioned: in \textit{Rhet.} ii. 23. 1400 b. 9, the \textit{Medea}: \textit{Poet.} 16. 1454 b. 23, the \textit{Thyestes}: and in \textit{Poet.} 17. 1455 a. 26, the \textit{Amphiaraos} (?). In this last passage Aristotle refers to a blunder in the acting of the piece, which displeased the spectators very much — \textit{σημεῖον δὲ τούτῳ ὁ ἐπιτιμᾶτο Καρκίνῳ}: ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφιάραος έξέφη γήγερε, ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς τὸν θεᾶτην ἀλάβασεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐξέπεσε, δυσχερανών τούτῳ τῶν θεατῶν. From this passage we may infer that the play mentioned was acted at Athens, and that its author was the Athenian Carcinus. We may assume that in the other places where Carcinus is mentioned by Aristotle the Athenian dramatist\footnote{There was a comic Carcinus too: he is mentioned by Aristophanes, \textit{Nub.} 1261, \textit{Pax} 781.} is intended. With regard to the \textit{Alope}, the Ald. Schol. has the following: — ὁ Κάρκινος τραγικὸς ἦν: ὁ δὲ Κερκύων ἔχει θυγατέρα τὴν Ἀλόπην, μαθὼν δὲ ὅτι ἐμοιχεύση ἡ αὐτοῦ θυγάτηρ Ἀλόπη, ἑρώτησεν αὐτήν ὅτι ἦν ὁ μοιχεύσας, λέγων: ἐν τούτῳ ἰσός ἦν, οὐδ’ ἐν καὶ ἐν λυπηθὼν. ἐπὶ ἐπισοεύσῃς τῆς Ἀλόπης τοῦ αὐτήν μοιχεύσαντα, οὐκ ἔπι τὸν Κερκύων ὑπὸ τῆς λύπης ἐθερεῖ ἥν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἥν ἀπελέγετο. \textit{Cf.} Nauck, \textit{Fragm. Trag.} p. 619: and for a discussion of the myth of Kercyon and Alopē, as represented in art, see Miss J. E. Harrison's Introductory Essay to \textit{Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens}, pp. cv–cix.

\textit{Συνοφάντῳ} Alexander is said to have had a musician of this name, \textit{b. 12.} who may have been known to Aristotle: see Seneca, \textit{de Ira} ii. 2, quoted by Zell—'Alexandrum aium Xenophanto canente manum ad arma misisse.'

\textit{ἀλλ’ ἐν τις} \textit{i. e. οὐ βαμαστῶν ἐν τις ἵσχυρῶν ὡδινῶν ἢ λυπῶν ἤτταται} (\textit{b. 7}), \textit{ἀλλὰ βαμαστῶν ἐν τις πρὸς δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἤτταται.}

\textit{ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῖσιν} It is not necessary to suppose with \textit{b. 14.} many commentators that the reference here is to the infirmity.

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1150 b. 14. mentioned in Herod. i. 105. Nor do I find, in the detailed account given by Hippocrates (περὶ ἄφρων ὢδάτων τόπων 21, 22, ed. Littré, vol. ii. pp. 74 sqq.) of the physique of the Scythians, anything answering to the μαλακία of the present chapter, which is περὶ λέιτος. The θεία νόοσ is indeed said by Hippocrates to attack the richer classes especially, but it has nothing in common with the μαλακία here mentioned.

b. 15. καὶ ὅς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἀρρεν διέστηκεν] The point is the natural inferiority of women in the power of bearing up under pain.

b. 17. § 7. ἢ γὰρ παιδιὰ κ.τ.λ.] The παιδιώδης—the man given up to amusement—is thought to be ἀκόλαστος, but is really μαλακός, for παιδία is an ἄνεσις πόνων. This relaxation from πόνος the παιδιώδης pursues excessively. He is therefore μαλακός, or too fond of avoiding πόνος, not ἀκόλαστος, given up to ἡδονή. The true use of παιδία is given in E. N. x. 6. 6 παίζειν δ’ ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ’ Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ.

b. 19. § 8. οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ] οἱ μὲν refers to ἀσθενεία, and οἱ δὲ to προσέτεια. Cf. M. M. ii. 6. 1203 a. 30 ἦστι δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀκρασίας δύο εἴδη, ὃ μὲν προπετικὴ τις καὶ ἀπροκόπης καὶ ἐξαιρᾷς γνωμένη (οὗτοι ὅταν ἰδομείν καλὴν γνωσια, εἰδῶς τὴν ἐπάθομεν, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθους ἁρμῆ ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸ πραξάι τι ὅπως οὐ δεῖ), ἢ δ’ ἐτέρα ὅπως ἀσθενικὴ τις, ἢ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου οὕσα τοῦ ἀποτρέποντος. ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν οὐθ’ ἂν λιῶν δοξέειν εἶναι φεκτή’ καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἡ τουαύτη ἐγγίζεται, ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς καὶ εὐφυνέστως ὃ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιούτω φεκτοί.

b. 22. ἐποι ὅρῳ κ.τ.λ.] This clause is added to show the value of τὸ βουλεύσασθαι, which is absent in προσέτεια. The implication is that the προσετεῖς, as distinguished from the ἀσθενεῖς, are strong enough to abide by the results of deliberation, if they deliberated at all, which they do not.

προγαργαλίσαντες] It seems to me that we must supply ἄλλως, not (as Zell does) ἐαυτοῖς, with προγαργαλίσαντες: and understand the reference to be to a 'tickling match,' in which the aggressor has the advantage. The reading of Lb, Mb, CCC, B', NC, Asp., Hel., is προγαργαλισθήσες: cf. Probl. AE. 6. 965 a. 11 (quoted by the editors) διὰ τί αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς γαργαλίζει; ἢ ὃτι καὶ ὑπ’ ἄλλον ἤτον, ἐὰν προαιπνητῇ, μᾶλλον δ’, ἀν μὴ ὀρὰ; ὄσθ’ ἑκοτα γαργαλισθήσεται, ὅταν μὴ λαυτώῃ τούτῳ πάσχων’ ἔστι δὲ ὁ γέλοιος παρακοπῆ τις καὶ ἀπάτη.
See Grant's excellent note ad loc. in which he refers to "the curious disquisition on μελαγχολικοί and the μέλανα χολή in Ar. Probl. xxx. 1," to show that "both passionate impetuosity and cold sluggishness were considered by the ancient physiologist to be different manifestations of the same strange temperament." . . . With the moderns," he adds, "the term "melancholy" is restricted to the cold and dejected mood; while the ancients much more commonly applied the term μελαγχολικός to denote warmth, passion, and eccentricity of genius." The opening sentence of Probl. a. 953 a. 10 presents the μελαγχολική κράσις as associated with genius—διὰ τί πίντες ὅσοι περίττοι γεγονασὶν ἄνδρες ἥ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἢ ποιήσαι ἢ τέχναι φαίνονται μελαγχολικοὶ ὄντες; In these cases the μέλανα χολή (which may be either cold or hot) is moderately hot. Where it is too hot, men are given up to their passions, and tend to madness; where it is too cold, it anticipates and aggravates the chilling effect of the thought of danger and trouble, and makes men dejected and timid, and drives them to suicide. In de Memor. a. 453 a. 19 the μελαγχολικοί are said to be easily affected by ideas, and images of the mind—τούτους γὰρ φαντάσματα κοινὰ μᾶλλον: and in the treatise περὶ τῆς καθ' ὑπὸν ματικῆς a. 463 b. 16 they are said to be great dreamers—ὅσων ὥσπερ ἀν εἶ λύπος ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ καὶ μελαγχολική, παντοτάτας ὅψεις ὅρωσι—, and to be distinct dreamers—ἐὕθυνειροι, and capable of divining the future in their dreams—2. 464 a. 32 οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ διὰ τὸ σφόδρα, ὥσπερ βαλλοντες πόρρωθεν εὐστοχοὶ εἰσὶν καὶ διὰ τὸ μεταβλητικὸν, ταχὺ τὸ ἐγχύμονα φανταζόμεθα αὐτὸν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ Φιλαγίδου ποιήματα καὶ οἱ ἐμμανείς ἐχόμενα τοῦ ὅμοιον λέγοντο καὶ διανοοῦντο, οὗτο 'Αφροδίτην καὶ οὕτω συνειρτοῦσιν εἰς τὸ πρόσω. Εἰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ σφόδροτητα οὐκ ἐκφράσεται αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις ύφ' εὐτέρας κινήσεως:—on this passage seeThemistius fol. 105 b. (vol. ii. p. 296, ed. Spengel) ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ Φιλαγίδου ποιήματα μὴ ἔχοντα μεταβολὰς προσόπων καὶ δυγιματῶν μεταπτώσεις δὲ ἐχόμενα τοῦ ὅμοιον διανοοῦνται καὶ συνειρτοῦσιν, οὗτο εἰ τις 'Αφροδίτην εἰ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπὶ καὶ μέχρι τέλους ταύτης ἔχεται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἐμμανείς ἐχόμενα τοῦ ὅμοιον διανοοῦνται καὶ βλέπουσιν. In short, the μελαγχολικοί are persons of strong passions and vivid imagination, who allow themselves to drift down the torrent of their fancies and feelings:—cf. E. N. vii. 14. 6 οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δέονται δὲι ταρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνύμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κράσιν, καὶ δὲι ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρὰ εἰσίν.
CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

The ἀκόλαστος, as we said, is not the man to repent of what he has done; but the ἀκρατής is always ready to repent. Hence it is not the ἀκρατής, as was suggested in 2. §§ 10, 11, but the ἀκόλαστος who is incurable. Ἀκολολαία is like a chronic disease, such as dropsy or consumption; ἀκραία like a temporary seizure. In short they differ generically—ἀκολολαία is present in its subject without his knowledge, but the ἀκρατής knows that he is ἀκρατής.

Of the two species of ἀκραία, that of the impetuous character is the better.

The ἀκόλαστος and the ἀκρατής are then distinct characters, the former acting as he does from deliberate choice, the latter acting as he does against deliberate choice. What they do, however, is much the same: as 'the Milesians are not unintelligent, but do the things that unintelligent people do,' so the ἀκρατής is not ἀκόλαστος, but does the things that the ἀκόλαστος does. But since the character of the ἀκρατής is such that he follows bodily pleasures immoderately without thinking it proper to do so, whereas the ἀκόλαστος thinks that it is proper to follow them because it is his character to follow them, our conclusion must be that it is the ἀκρατής, and not the ἀκόλαστος, who can be easily induced to 'think differently'—the ἀκρατής may still be reformed, because he still has the Principle of good conduct within him—that Principle which virtue (as in the ἄφθορον) preserves intact, and vice (as in the ἄκολαστος) destroys—the good end which in conduct is the principle, as the assumptions are the principles in mathematics: in mathematics it is not a process of reasoning which leads to principles; so, in conduct it is not reasoning of any kind, but virtue, natural or acquired by habit, which gives a right view of the Principle. The ἄφθορον, then, has the right view, as the ἀκόλαστος has a false view; while the ἀκρατής, though constrained by passion to follow bodily pleasures immoderately, is not constrained by it to believe that it is proper to do so. He is not wholly bad; for that which is best—Principle—is alive in him. Opposed to the ἀκρατής is the ἐγκρατής, in whom reason prevails against passion.

1150 b. 29. § 1.] The writer now passes naturally from οἱ μὴ ἐμένουσε (ch. 7. § 8) to the ἀκόλαστος—ἐμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει.

ὡσπερ ἐλέχθη] A reference (bracketed by Susemihl) to ch. 7. § 2. 1150 a. 21 ἄνεγκῃ γὰρ τούτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελήτων, ὡστ' ἀνίατος  ὃ γὰρ ἀμεταμελήτως ἀνίατος—a clause which (as noted ad loc.) comes in awkwardly in its context.

b. 31. ἡπορήσαμεν] Ch. 2. §§ 10, 11. The appropriate conception μεταμελήτων εἶναι solves the ἀπορία which was caused by the inappropriate conception μεταπειθόμενοι ἂν ch. 2. §§ 10, 11. The
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akratĭs, after he has gratified the desire of the moment, ceases to look back upon the gratification with the same satisfaction with which he regarded it before he effected it; the idea of the desire is now weak, and the sense of the harm done by its gratification proportionally strong. This means that he now 'regrets' that he has gratified the desire. But the ἄκολαστος acts under the habitual influence of desires so comparatively feeble, that if the ideas of them occur to his mind at all after gratification, they must occur with a vividness little inferior to that which they possessed before gratification. If it seemed good to gratify them then, it now seems good to have gratified them. This means that the ἄκολαστος does not feel 'regret.' Indulgence has become so habitual to him, that it is no longer, in each case, accompanied and followed by the consciousness of a system of life which is being sacrificed. Acts of indulgence are no longer regarded as involving the agent in a serious responsibility, but are performed as it were mechanically, and in unconsciousness of all but their momentary pleasure. Thus ἦ μὲν κακία λαυθανεί, ἦ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λαυθανεί — explained by the Ald. Schol. ἦ μὲν κακία ἦτοι ἰ ἀκολασία λαυθανεί ἑαυτήν οὐ γινώσκει γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μοιχεύειν κακὸν ἐστί, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ οἴεται: ἦ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λαυθανεί, ἦτοι οὐκ ἀγαθεὶ ὅτι τὸ μοιχεύειν κακὸν ἐστί.

§ 2.] Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, pp. 25 and 66) regards this § 1151 a. 1. as interrupting the line of thought begun in § 1, and pursued in § 3. Grant, on the other hand, says—'the thread of reasoning goes on continuously from the end of the preceding chapter, and so there is nothing remarkable in the writer's now reverting to the two kinds of incontinence, as if he had never digressed from discussing them.' I am inclined to endorse Grant's view, which seems to agree practically with that of Ramsauer—'Adjuguntur haec (a. 1-5) haud alieno quidem loco, sed tamen ita ut unā istâ sententiā ab ea disputatione quae per reliquum caput obtinuētur devertatur. Ita vero jam agitur, ut nisi et praecesserit 1150 b. 19-28 et eodem respiciatur verba vix intellegi possint.' Although § 2 opens rather awkwardly with αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων, which are not the ἄκολαστος and ἀκρατῆς as might perhaps be supposed, but the ἀκρατεῖς themselves (οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ being the προπετεῖς, and οἱ μη ἐμμένουσε the ἄσθενεῖς of ch. 7. § 8), I cannot think that its subject is out of place. Section 1 has solved the old ἀπορία of ch. 2. §§ 10, 11 by pointing out that the ἄκολαστος sticks to his bad principle
throughout—i.e., never repents of having, on any occasion, stuck to it, whereas the ἀκρατής always repents of not having stuck to his good principle. It is with the ἀκρατής as μὴ ἐμένων, then, that the ἀκόλαστος as ἐμένων is contrasted in § 1. But ch. 7. § 8 (with which ch. 8. § 1 is thus obviously connected) has just mentioned two varieties of the ἀκρατής—not only the μὴ ἐμένων τῷ λόγῳ, but the μὴ ἀναμένων τὸν λόγον. What, then, more natural than that § 2 should supplement § 1 by showing that if oǐ μὴ ἐμένωντες τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ are thus better than oὶ ἐμένωντες τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ, still better are oὶ μὴ ἀναμένοντες τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον?

Ramsauer notes that oǐ ἐκστατικοί in ch. 8. § 2 are the προπέτεις, as distinguished from the ἀσθενεῖς, whereas below in § 5 διὰ πᾶδος ἐκστατικός a. 20 describes the ἀκρατής generally, whether προπέτεις or ἀσθενής. This is one of the reasons why Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, p. 26) thinks that ch. 8. § 2 and ch. 8. § 5 were not intended for the same context: but see note on § 5.

Grant observes that the terms ἐκστασις, ἐκστήναι, and ἐκστατικός are frequently used in Probl. Λ, in connexion with the μελαγχολικοί. The analogy between the μελαγχολική κράσεις and drunkenness is also insisted on in Probl. Λ.

a. 3. ἤττωνται] sc. oὶ μὴ ἐμένωντες.

δμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής κ.τ.λ.] The Paraph. Heliod. understands this of ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀσθενὴν ἀκρασίαν ἀκρατής, and the Ald. Schol. has ὁ γὰρ ἀσθενῆς ἀκρατής κ.τ.λ. This must be the writer’s meaning, but it is very careless to use the generic term thus.

a. 6. § 3. ἄλλα πῇ ἵσως] Ramsauer brackets these words, which certainly interrupt the run of the sentence. If we retain them (Bywater makes them parenthetical), the sentence will mean—'it is plain, then, that ἀκρασία is not κακία (= ἀκολασία), if each be regarded per se, or as what it is in itself: yet perhaps we may say that they are the same secundum quid; for, although ἀκρασία, viewed as what it is in itself, is παρὰ προαιρέσεως, and ἀκολασία is κατὰ προαιρέσεως, nevertheless they are much the same in respect of their πράξεις.'


καὶ τὸῦ Δημοδόκου: Μιλήσιοι ἄξιον τοῦ μὲν
οὐκ εἰσίν, δρόωσι δ’ οὐὶ περ ἄξιον τοῦ.

καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἀδικοὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικήσουσι δὲ[1151 ἀ. 10.]

(Forsch. p. 133) shows that καὶ stands for ὥστε καὶ, and that Bekker’s full stop after ἀξίωσην ἀ. 10 should be replaced by a comma. Susemihl and Bywater follow him in this punctuation. Bywater introduces ἀδικήσουσι, the reading of Kb, CCC, and Cambr. I prefer the ἀδικοῦσι of other authorities, so far as the sense is concerned; and suspect that the preceding εἰσίν may have given rise to the form ἀδικήσουσι.

§ 4. μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπείσθαι[205 a. 11.]


'conviction' or 'theory' of the ἀκόλαστος is plainly said here to be the result of moral depravity: see note on vii. 4. 1148 a. 17. To be 'convinced' as the ἀκόλαστος is convinced, implies the loss of moral character, which is irreparable: moral character is not produced, like the conclusion of a syllogism, by a process of reasoning (ὁ λόγος ἀ. 17), nor can it be reinstated by such a process; it is rather a Life (analogous to the life or nature of a plant or animal), inherited in germ by the individual (φυσικὴ ἁρετή ἀ. 18), and largely developed by him (ἐνεργή ἀ. 19) in correspondence with the conditions of his special environment. If this life be once lost by the individual, it is lost irreparably. But the ἀκρατὴς has not yet suffered this irreparable loss: he still thinks that his acts (which, as acts, are much the same as those of the ἀκόλαστος) are wrong: he still has the principle of moral life in him (ἀρχή, τὸ ὁ ἐνεκὰ ἀ. 16)—the conception of conduct, and is εὑμεταπειστὸς (ἀ. 14), i.e. amenable to moral influences—can still be touched by reproof and example, and still has some regard for other people, and for his own better self. It is true that he has no need to 'change his conviction,' for it is already correct: he must change his acts; and it is the possibility of his doing this which is conveyed by the term εὑμεταπειστὸς—used here, I think, not because it is the most appropriate term, from the writer's own point of view, to express the conversion, or reforma-

the term, without being misunderstood:—'if,' he in effect says, 'we may use the misleading term εὑμετάπειστος, it is the ἀκρατὴς, not, as our opponents argue, the ἀκόλαστος, who is εὑμεταπειστὸς.'
1151 a. 16. ὃσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ὑποθέσεις in the sense of the ὑποθέσεις, or peculiar ἄρχαι, of mathematics which are ὅρισμοι, is not in accordance with strict Aristotelian usage. According to the doctrine of the An. Post. the ὑποθέσεις, or immediate principles, of a particular science (as distinguished from the ἄξιωματα or immediate principles necessary to all sciences) are either ὑποθέσεις or ὅρισμοι. Ὑποθέσεις are ὑποθέσεις which assert existence or non-existence, while ὅρισμοι are ὑποθέσεις which state formal essence. Mathematical science has, as its peculiar ἄρχαι, ὑποθέσεις of the latter kind, i.e. ὑποθέσεις which are not ὑποθέσεις, but ὅρισμοι. See An. Post. i. 2. 72 a. 14. Ἀμέσως δ' ἄρχης συλλογιστικής ὑποθέσεις μὲν λέγω ἦν μὴ ἐστὶ δεῖξαι, μηδὲ ἀνάγκη ἔχει τὸν μαθησόμενον τι. ἂν δ' ἀνάγκη ἔχει τὸν ὁτιοῦν μαθησόμενον, ἄξιωμα ἐστὶ γὰρ ἔνα τοιαύτα τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστ' ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶσε-θαμβέν ὅνωμα λέγειν. Ὑποθέσεις δ' ἦν ὑποτερονοῦν τῶν μορίων τῆς ἀπο-φάσεως λαμβάνοντα, ὥσπερ λέγω τὸ εἶναι τί ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τι, ὑποθέσεις, ἢ δ' ἂνει τοιοῦτο ὅρισμος. Ὁ γὰρ ὅρισμος ὑποθέσεις μὲν ἐστὶ τίθεται γὰρ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς μονάδα τὸ ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι κατὰ τὸ ποσόν ὑποθέσεις δ' ὅρις ἐστὶ τὸ γὰρ τί ἐστι μονάς καὶ τὸ εἶναι μονάδα οὐ ταῦτα. See also An. Post. ii. 7. 92 b. 15 τί μὲν γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ τρίγωνον ἔλαβεν ἃ γεωμέτρης ὃτι δ' ἐστὶ δεῖξιν—on which Themistius has (fol. 10 a. vol. i. p. 77, ed. Spengel) λαμβάνοντες τί σημαίνει τὸ τρίγωνον ὠτὶ περιέχειθαι ὑπὸ τριῶν εἴδειων, οὕτω δεικνύοντος ὃτι ἐστὶ, συνεστάτους αὐτὸ ἐκ τριῶν εἴδειων: see also An. Post. i. 10. 76 b. 35 οἱ μὲν οὖν ὄροι οὐκ εἰσὶν ὑποθέσεις οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι λέγονται... τούτῳ δ' οὖν ὑποθέσεις, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν ὑποθέσειν τις φύσεως εἶναι. Accordingly, in the passage before us (E.N. vii. 8. 4), if the ὅρισμοι of mathematics are meant, the employment of the term ὑποθέσεις to convey the meaning is against strict Aristotelian usage.

Grant observes that the term ὑποθέσεις is used in precisely the same way in the E. E. as here—viz. E. E. ii. 10. 1227 a. 8 περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βούλευται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄρχη καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὡσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμης ὑπόθεσεις (ἐφηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἄρχη βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δὲ ἀκριβείας), and E. E. ii. 11. 1227 b. 28 ὡσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑπόθεσεις ἄρχαι, οὐτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἄρχη καὶ ὑπόθεσις. Now, these passages both agree with that before us (E. N. vii. 8. 4) in adducing the ὑποθέσεις of mathematics to illustrate the τέλος, or οὐ ἐνεκα, of πράξεις, for which βούλευσις finds means. Remembering that it is with mathematical analysis that βούλευσις is compared in E. N. iii. 3. 11,
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12 (where see notes), we may ask the question—is it probable that 1151 a. 16.
the writer employs ὑποθέσεις here (E. N. vii. 8. 4) for ὑπομολ, or the ἀρχαί of the synthetic process in mathematics, and consequently violates strict Aristotelian usage? May he not be employing the term quite accurately, to denote the assumption of the thing to be proved, from which an analytical proof in mathematics starts? I am inclined to think that he probably employs the term ὑποθέσεις in this sense. Of course the general statement which immediately follows—οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν—may be thought to point the other way.

'end' is given by his character; his 'end' is the assertion throughout life of a character, just as the 'end' of an animal or plant is the assertion and maintenance of its particular organism. Cf. E. N. iii. 5. 17 ὅπως ποθ' ἐκαστὸς ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ: or as the same truth is stated, more generally, by Spinoza (Eth. iii. 6 and 7), 'Unaquaque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur. . . . Conatus, quo unaquaque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam.' It goes without saying, in short, that the good man's 'end' or 'principle' is good, and the bad man's bad. Cf. E. N. vi. i. 12. 10 οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχῆς ἔχοντες εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιοῦτο τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἀριστον, ὀτιδήποτε δὲν (ὥστο γὰρ λόγον χάριν τὸ τυχόν) τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐ φαίνεται διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαφεύγεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχὰς: and E. N. vi. 5. 6 αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὖ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτὰ· τὰ δὲ διευθυνμένα δι' ἑδονὴν ἡ λύπην εὔθες οὖν φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δειν τούτον ἔνεκαν οὐδὲ διὰ τούθ' αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἐστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτική ἀρχής. On φυσική and ἐθική (or κυρία) ἀρετή, see E. N. vi. 13. 2. 6.

Plutarch (de Virt. Mor. ch. 6) illustrates the difference between the ἀκολαστὸς and the ἄκρατὴς from the poets—

'Ακολάστων μὲν ἀιδὲ φοινίκι·

τὸς δὲ χάρις, τὰ δὲ τερπνῶν ἀνευ χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης;

τεθυάνην ότε μοι μηκέτι ταύτα μέλει.

καὶ ἑτέρος·

τὸ φαγέων, τὸ πιείν, τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τυγχάνειν,

tὰ δὲ ἄλλα προσθήκας ἀπαντ' ἐγὼ καλῶ . . .
1151 a. 19. φησίν' αἰ δὲ τῆς ἀκρασίας ἔτεραι καὶ διαφέρουσαι
γνώμην ἣχοντά μ’ ἡ φύσις βιάζεται,
καὶ
αἰ αἰ, τὸ δὴ θεῖον ἀνθρώπους κακὸν,
ὅταν τις εἰδὴ τάγαθον, χρήται δὲ μῆ.
καὶ
ἐλκει μὲ γὰρ ἡδῆ θυμὸς, οὐδ’ ἐτ’ ἀντέχει,
θυμόδε ὡς ἀγκαστρόν ἁγκύρας σάλφ᾽.

θυμόδε ἀγκαστρόν οὐ φαύλως λέγον τὸ μή κάταχον τοῦ λογισμοῦ μηδὲ ἄραρός, ἀλλὰ μακρύτερος τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ μαλακός προϊόμενον τῆν κρίσιν, οὐ πόρρῳ δὲ τῆς εἰκόνος ταύτης κακείνα εἰρηταί,


νὰς ὀς τις ἐκ μὲν γῆς ἀνήργηται βρόχανος,
πνεύ δ’ οὖρος, ἡμῖν δ’ οὐ κρατέι τὰ πείσματα.

πείσματα γὰρ λέγει τὰς ἀντεχούσας κρίσεις πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν . . . τὸ γὰρ ὄντι πληρότητος μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ἡδῶνας ὁ ἀκόλουθος. Ἑυφροσύνης he illustrates thus (de Virt. Mor. ch. 7)—


δὴ τοῖς ἐπείρ’ ἀνεμοὶ μὲν ἐπάυσατο, ὃ δὲ γαλήνῃ
ἐπέλευν νυμφῆ, κομίσασε δὲ κύματα δαίμων.

. . . πᾶσαι ὄρμην εὐάγγειον οὐσαν,
ἀθηλὸν ἑπὶ πῶλον ὡς ἀμα τρέχειν.

a. 20. § 5. ἐκστατικὸς] Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, p. 26) thinks that § 5 and § 2 ‘were not intended for the same context.’ In § 2 ‘the terms ἐκστατικὸι and μὴ ἐμμένουται κ.τ.λ. are opposed, as denoting different species of the same genus’—i.e. προπητεία and ἀσθένεια, the two species of ἀκρασία: but in § 5 ‘the passages 1151 a. 26 ὁ ἐμμενετικός καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικός διὰ γε τὸ πάθος τοῦ ἐγκριθῆς, and 1151 a. 20 ἔστι δὲ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ἄρθρον λόγου shew . . . that the terms ἐκστατικοὶ and μὴ ἐμμενετικοὶ [οἰ τῶν λόγων ἔχουσι ἡμὲν ἐμμένουτες δὲ] are identical, and not opposed to one another.’ In § 5 each term ‘is used to characterise all ἀκρασία, and not a species of it.’

The circumstance that § 2 and § 5 differ in their use of the term ἐκστατικὸς (μὴ ἐμμενετικός does not occur in § 2) is noticed by Ramsauer also (see above note on § 2. 1151 a. 1), but he does not draw Cook Wilson’s inference from the circumstance. I think that the significance of the circumstance may be easily exaggerated. The use of ἐκστατικὸς in the generic sense, as in § 5, is of course the regular use of the term in this book: but I confess that I do not find much
difficulty in allowing the writer of § 5 to use οἱ ἑκστατικοὶ in § 2 for 1151 a. 20. 

οἱ μὴ ἀναμένοντες τὸν λόγον, as opposed to οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δὲ. Associations derived from ἑκστασις and ἑκστάματι naturally place the ἑκστατικοὶ, as ἀλογιστος, in opposition to οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχον: and I do not see why even the writer of § 5 should not be allowed to yield to these associations for a moment in § 2.

Cook Wilson is of opinion that § 4 ἐπει a. 11 . . . τὴν ἀρχὴν a. 19 and § 5 σώφρων a. 19 . . . φαινή a. 28 are parallel versions (Arist. Studies, pp. 35 sqq., Table vi), § 4 being the later, and by an inferior thinker:—'at least there are confusions in it from which § 5 is free' (p. 36), viz. in § 4 'the sentence ἐκεῖνος . . . σῶζει implies that the ἀκρατής has ἀρετή': the attribution of ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν to φυσική ἀρετή 'is quite against the tenor of the doctrine about φυσικὴ ἀρετή which is given in Ἑἰθ. vi. 13. There it is distinctly said that φυσικὴ ἀρετή does not belong to the δοξαστικοῖς but to the ἠθικοῖς in the soul' (vi. 13. 2): lastly 'the substitution of the more determinate εὐμετάπειστος (§ 4) for βελτίων (§ 5) disturbs the text awkwardly.' I cannot see that it is implied in § 4 that 'the ἀκρατής has ἀρετή.' What the writer says is that ἀρετή (sc. in the σώφρων, mentioned at the end of the §—in a sentence with which Cook Wilson begins the parallel version contained in § 5) σῶζει τὴν ἀρχὴν, and what he implies is that the ἀκρατής has not yet lost the ἀρχὴ which ἀρετή (in the σώφρων) keeps permanently safe. As for the attribution of τὸ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν to φυσικὴ ἀρετή being against the tenor of vi. 13, because φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ is said (vi. 13. 2) to belong to the ἠθικοῖς and not to the δοξαστικοῖς—is not vi. 12. 6 ἦ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή (sc. ἦ ἐθιστή) τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθὸν equally against the tenor of vi. 13. 2? Both kinds of ἀρετή belong to the ἠθικοῖς. An intellectual function is ascribed in vi. 12. 6 to ἦ ἐθιστή ἀρετή—inaccurately, no doubt, if we insist on the point that it belongs to the ἠθικοῦ μέρους: what, then, is there to prevent the writer of vii. 8. 4—inaccurately, but not against the lead given in vi—ascribing an intellectual function to φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ—especially, I would add, in a clause in which the two kinds of ἀρετή are mentioned so closely together, in one breath, as it were—ἀλλὰ ἀρετή ἦ φυσικὴ ἦ ἐθιστή?

With regard to the use of the term εὐμετάπειστος in § 4 see note on that §, a. 13.
CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

To revert to a former difficulty—Is it any view and choice, or the right view and choice, that the έγκπάτης abides by? Is it any view and choice, or the false view, and wrong choice, that the διχαρή gives to abide by?

Our answer must surely be, that per accidens it may be any view or choice, but essentially it is the true view and the right choice that the one abides by, and the other fails to abide by.

There are certain people—described generally as 'people with strong views'—who hold very firmly to their own opinions, and are very hard to convince of error. Their quality resembles έγκπάτης, but is spurious; for the έγκπάτης, while maintaining an unchanging attitude towards passion, is ready to yield, if need be, to the persuasion of reason; whereas these 'people with strong views' are not actuated by reason but by desire—they are ignorant clownish people 'with views of their own,' who are actuated by the pleasure of not being beaten by those who try to persuade them—they are unhappy if they have not their own way, like a democratic assembly. They thus resemble the διχαρή rather than the έγκπάτης.

There are others, again, who do not abide by their resolves and yet are not διχαρής: e.g. the Neoptolemus of Sophocles did not abide by his resolve to tell a lie: it was pleasure which made him abandon his resolve—but noble pleasure—the pleasure of telling the truth. It is only where the pleasure which determines action is bad that we speak of ἀκόλασια and δικαια.

Just as ἀφροσύνη seems to have only one contrary—ἀκόλασια, because the man who avoids pleasure from deliberate resolve is seldom met with; so έγκπάτης seems to have only one contrary—δικαια, because we seldom see a man whose resolve to seek the due amount of pleasure is overpowered by a disinclination towards pleasure. Such a man, however, when he occurs, is to be accounted bad.

We speak, in a loose way, of the Continence (έγκπάτης) of the temperate man (του ἀφροσύνης); but we must always remember that, although both έγκπάτης and ἀφροσύνη are men who do not transgress the law of reason under the influence of bodily pleasures, yet they differ in this most important respect, that the έγκπάτης has bad desires, and the ἀφροσύνη has not: the ἀφροσύνη does not feel those things to be pleasant which transgress the law of reason; the έγκπάτης feels pleasure in them, but does not let them lead him away.

So also the διχαρή and the ἀκόλαστος resemble, and differ from, each other. They both follow bodily pleasures, but the δικαια does not think, that it is proper to do so.

1151 a. 29. § 1. ὁποαθου, i.e. good or bad, as the Ald. Schol. explains. Fritzsche and Michelet (but not 'Aspasius,' i.e. the Ald. Schol., as
Grant erroneously states) carry on ἐμμένων from μὴ ἐμμένων to 1151 a. 29. govern τῷ ψευδεί λόγῳ κ.τ.λ. But, as Grant remarks, ‘this will not do. The ἀκρατής cannot be said “to abide by a false opinion.” ’ Hence the reading τῷ μὴ ψευδεί λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ (μὴ ἐμμένων being understood) adopted by Bywater and some other editors (Susemihl reads ψευδεί instead of μὴ ψευδεί). I prefer to leave the text as Bekker gives it—τῷ ψευδεί λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ—following all the MSS. (except Lb, which has τῷ μὴ ψευδεί λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ) and Asp., and to suppose that the writer, wishing to make a symmetrical schema, added ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων τῷ ψευδεί λόγῳ on the μὴ ἐμμένων side, as the diametrical opposite of ὁ ἐμμένων τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει, or τῷ ἀληθεί λόγῳ, on the other side, thus—

οἱ ἐμμένων

ὁποιωφόν — τῷ ἀληθεί

ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων

tῷ ψευδεί — ὁποιωφόν.

Does sticking to one’s opinion or purpose, right or wrong (ὁποιωφόν), characterise continence, or does the continent man stick only to a right opinion, or purpose? And does not sticking to one’s opinion, or purpose, right or wrong, characterise incontinence, or must we say that the incontinent man does not stick to a false opinion and wrong purpose? Here, I think, the desire for symmetry has led the writer to mention a case so inconsistent with the notion of ἀκρατία (although, it is to be noted, vii. 2. 7 shews that it was regarded by some as possibly a case of ἀκρατία) that critics, among them Rassow ¹, have thought it necessary to rescue him from inconsistency by changing the text which rests on the authority of all MSS. save Lb.

α. 32.

ὁσπερ ἡπορήθη πρότερον] vii. 2. 7.

Κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκός κ.τ.λ.] moral strength (τὸ ἐμμένων) is the a. 33. general characteristic of the continent man, moral weakness (τὸ μὴ ἐμμένων) of the incontinent man. It may sometimes happen that moral strength is the cause of a man’s sticking to a mistaken purpose or opinion (κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκός ὁποιωφόν), but, as a rule, it

¹ Rassow (Forsch. p. 100) approves the emendation of Muretus—ὁ τῷ ἀληθεί λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, believing that the passage has been corrupted in deference to the view that the opposition between ἐγκράτεια and ἀκρατία makes it necessary to give λόγος opposite predicates.
1151 a. 33. is a good purpose, or right opinion, that moral strength enables a
man to stick to, and we apply the term continent strictly (καθ' αὐτό
or ἀπλῶς) to the man who sticks to a good purpose, or right
opinion; for the man who sticks to a bad purpose, or wrong
opinion is ἀκολαστός (see vii. 8. 1). Again, it may sometimes
happen that moral weakness is the cause of a man’s departing
from a bad purpose or wrong opinion; but such an exceptional
case is not contemplated in the term ‘incontinent,’ which is strictly
applied only to those who do not stick to a good purpose, or
right opinion (δόξα ἀληθής, or λόγος ἀληθής). We must remember
that it is the ἀκολαστός and the ἀκρατής who are distinguished in
respect of δόξα, or λόγος, that of the ἀκολαστός being ψευδής, and
that of the ἀκρατής being ἀληθής; but it is not in respect of λόγος
that the ἀκρατής is distinguished from the ἐγκρατής, but in respect
of strength of character (ἐμμένειν and μὴ ἐμμένειν);—as Zeller puts it
unterscheidet beide (i.e. ἐγκράτεια and ἀκρασία) von den sittlichen
Eigenschaften der Selbstbeherrschung (σωφροσύνη) und Zügellos-
igkeit (ἀκολασία) durch das Merkmal, dass die Beherrschung oder
Herrschaft der Begierden bei diesen auf einer grundsätzlichen
Willensrichtung, bei jenen nur auf der Stärke oder Schwäche des
Willens beruht.’

The sentence εἰ γὰρ τις a. 35 . . . καθ' αὐτό b. 3 seems to be
merely a logical note introduced to explain the difference between
καθ' αὐτό and κατὰ συμβεβηκός—which hardly needs explanation—
and to enable the writer to wind up with the satisfactory formula
ἐστι μὲν ὡς . . . ἀπλῶς. The article before τῇ ἀληθείᾳ b. 4 should be
omitted: see Rassow (Forsch. p. 100) and Ramsauer ad loc. It
is bracketed by Bywater.

b. 4. § 2. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσίν κ.τ.λ.] The
ἐγκρατῆς ‘sticks to’ his true opinion; but there are people who
resemble him in ‘sticking to’ their opinions, but differ from him in
that their opinions are often wrong. The obstinate man or
ἰσχυρογνώμων is related to the ἐγκρατῆς as the ἀσωτος is to the
ἐλευθερος. Both ἀσωτος and ἐλευθερος ‘spend,’ but the ἀσωτος
spends foolishly, the ἐλευθερος wisely. So both ἰσχυρογνώμων and
ἐγκρατῆς ‘stick to’ an opinion, but the opinion of the ἰσχυρογνώμων
is often foolish, while that of the ἐγκρατῆς is necessarily true.

b. 9. ὁ ἐγκρατῆς] In both places where ὁ ἐγκρατῆς occurs, here and in
b. 10, it seems to be interpolated. Susemihl brackets it in both 1151 b. 9. places: Bywater in b. 9.

οἱ δὲ αὖχ ὑπὸ λόγου] sc. μεταβάλλουσιν. b. 10.

ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἀγωνταὶ πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἠδονῶν] b. 11. "For they (i.e. the obstinate) often enough conceive desires, and are led away by their pleasures." The expression ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι occurs in E. E. iii. 2. 1231 a. 28 πάντες γὰρ τούτοις φύσει τε χαίρουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι.

§ 3.] ἰδιογράμμοινε] 'εἰν ἀν οἱ Γαλλιστὶ καλούμενοι ὁπινιδῖτες' b. 12. (Coraes).

οἱ μὲν ἰδιογράμμοινε] The μὲν contrasts the ἰδιογράμμοινε with the b. 13. ἀμαθὲς and the ἄγρακοι, who, however, are not characterised.

ὅστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἑοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγρατεῖ] because they are b. 16. too much influenced by pleasure (χαίρουσι) and pain (λυποῦνται). They are ἀκρατεῖς περὶ νίκην, however, not ἀκρατεῖς ἀπλῶς.

§ 4.] To abandon a bad resolution, so far from being an b. 17. indication of weakness (ἀκρασία), may often be an indication of moral strength and the power of principle, as in the case of Neoptolemus: see vii. 2. 7. Zell refers the point raised in this § to the question mooted in § i of the present chapter—"an etiam is impotens sive incontinens dici possit, qui falsam et perversam sententiam susceptam non tueatur?" This he does believing that in § i the question conveyed by the words η ὁ τῷ θεόν κ.τ.λ., as they stand, is inadmissible, and that what the writer really means to ask is 'whether even he who, like Neoptolemus, departs from a wrong purpose, is nevertheless to be called incontinent'—as if the text stood η καὶ ὁ τῷ θεόν κ.τ.λ. Ramsauer, in his note on § i, after giving his approval to the emendation η ὁ τῷ ἀληθεί λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, adds—'ne enim leviori correcturā eadem quaestio quae prior erat aliis verbis iterum efficiatur ἡ καὶ ὁ τῷ θεόν κ.τ.λ. dissuadet, si non ipsa sententia, at lex concinnitatis.'

καλῶν] 'imo auth ἡδυ ἤν ὑν καλῶν' (Ramsauer). b. 20.

οὐ γὰρ πᾶς κ.τ.λ.] The best ἐνεργειά have their own καλαὶ ἠδοναί, b. 21. which sustain and perfect them: thus ὁ θεός ἄει μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἠδονήν E. N. vii. 14. 8. The καλὴ ἠδονή which attends the function vol. ii.

1151 b. 21. of εἴδαμνία can never lend itself to intemperate uses; nor can the pleasures of sight and hearing, although perhaps they may sometimes be pursued to a somewhat reprehensible extent: see E. N. iii. 10. §§ 2–6: with which compare Plutarch, Sympos. vii. 5 ἀκρασίας μὲν ἐφ’ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπολύω τὸ φιλόσυνον καὶ φιλοθέμον’ οὐ μὴν Ἀριστοτέλης γε συμφέρομαι παντάπασι, ταύταις μόναις φάσκοντι ταῖς ἧδουσί τὸ καλὸς ἐπιλέγεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ὄψε παλά καὶ μῦρα καλοῦσι, καὶ καλὸς γεγονέσθαι λέγουσι, δειπνήσατε ἡδός καὶ πολυτέλεις’ δοκεῖ δὲ μοι μὴν Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτῇ δικαίᾳ τὰς περὶ θεῖαν καὶ ἀκράσιαν εἰςπαθεῖς ἀπολύειν ἀκρασίας, ὡς μόναις ἀνθρωπικὰς δόσις’ ταῖς δὲ άλλαις καὶ τὰ θεραπεύσαντα φύσιν ἐχοντα χρὴσθαι καὶ θυμωνεῖν’ ἀρόμενον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ μουσικὴ πολλὰ κηλεῖται τῶν ἀλόγων.

b. 23. § 5. Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ . . . μέσος δ’ ἐγκρατὴς] In b. 24 Bekker, following all the MSS., reads χαίρων. Muretus, objecting to the participles after τοιοῦτος οἷος, wishes to read χαίρειν and οὐκ ἐμέμενεν, forgetting, as Rassow (Forsch. p. 134) points out, that ἐμέμενεν would require μή. Susemihl and Bywater adopt χαίρειν (which Asp. seems to have read), retaining ἐμέμενον. Zell and Coraes, on the ground that the Ald. Schol. speaks of the ἑλείστων as ἄνώνυμος, and the Paraph. of the ἑλείστουσα ἔξις as ἄνώνυμος, think that words to that effect have dropped out of the text, and Zell suggests that these words may have justified the participles χαίρων and ἐμέμενον. Rassow, however (p. 134), quotes M. M. ii 9. 1208 a. 1 for the participle after τοιοῦτος οἷος—οὐ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὧν οἷος ὑποστελλόμενος τι τῶν ἄγαθῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐναι αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἐν δόξῃ καλός καὶ ἄγαθός εἶναι. I do not think that the Ald. Scholiast’s remark that the ἑλείστων is ἄνώνυμος, or the Paraphrase’s that the ἑλείστουσα ἔξις is ἄνώνυμος, by any means makes it even probable that either commentator had words to that effect in his text. Each makes the remark, indeed, at the place near the beginning of § 5 where Zell suspects that the words have dropped out of the text; but repeats it later on in connexion with the statement ἄλλα διὰ τὸ τὴν b. 30 . . . τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ b. 32. The Paraphrase’s words, in this connexion (he has already said at the beginning of his remarks on § 5 ἢ δὲ ἑλείστουσα ἔξις ἄνώνυμος are—ἄλλ’ ὅτι ἡ ἑλείστουσα ἔξις ἄνώνυμος καὶ ἑλάξαστα συμβαίνει (σπάνιος γὰρ οἱ ἦτον τοῦ δέοντος χαίροντες ταῖς σωματικαῖς ἧδουσί) διὰ τοῦτο μόνη ἡ ἀκρασία δοκεῖ ἑνστὶ εἶναι, ὅτι ἡ ἱλισθήτης ὀλγάκες εὐρίσκεται. Here the use of the word ἄνώνυμος is naturally suggested to the Par. and Ald. Schol. by the words ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκεις, and goes no way, in the circumstances, towards proving that it stood in their text. It
would be very rash indeed to found any inference here on the words of commentators who are so careless as to say, as they virtually do, that 'the ἕσις is ἀνώνυμος and it is called ἡλιθιότης.' I see no reason for supposing that ἀνώνυμος, any more than ἡλιθιότης, stood in their text.

All MSS., except M\(^b\), read 6 instead of Bekker's \(\gamma\) (M\(^b\) has \(\gamma\)) before τουότος b. 24. The reading \(\gamma\) τουότος seems to me to give exactly the sense required—viz. that there is a character defined as departing from consciously realised dictates of reason in the direction of the avoidance of bodily pleasures, which stands to the transitional states ἐγκράτεια and ἀκρασία in the same relation that ἀναισθησία stands to the fixed states σοφροσύνη and ἀκολουθία: see E.N. iii. ii. 7. Of course M\(^b\) is generally an unsafe authority, but I think that here it has made a safe emendation. All MSS. seem to give τουότος b. 24, which Bywater (reading 6) brackets:

\[\text{cf. his Contributions, p. 57.}\]

\[\text{μέσος 6 ἐγκρατῆς} \] 'It is plain,' Grant says, 'that ἐγκράτεια is not b. 25. a mean in the sense of being a balance or harmony of the mind. It is only imperfect temperance, it is temperance in the act of forming.' The writer simply means, I take it, that the ἐγκρατῆς 'stands between' the ἀκρασία and the ἕττον ἡ δεῖ τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρων.

\[\text{οὐδὲ δὲ ἔτερον} \] 'τὸ λεγόμενον οὐδὲ δὲ ἔτερον συντάκτηκα κατὰ τμῆσιν b. 27. συνῆθος τοῖς 'Αττικοῖς ἀντὶ τοῦ δὲ οὐδέτερον, καθὰ καὶ ἡμήνειν καὶ ἔν τῇ ἈΡΓ, ὅβ neutrum' (Coraes).

\[\text{§ 6. καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια . . . ἡκολούθηκεν} \] 'We come to speak b. 33. metaphorically of the continence of the temperate man' (Peters). The writer probably uses ἡκολούθηκεν here with some consciousness of the technical meaning of the term, for which see Bonitz, Met. p. 42 'verbo ἡκολούθηκεν pariter ac verbo ἔπεσθαι Aristoteles denotat praedicari aliquam notionem de altera, ita ut hac posita illa etiam ponenda sit, cf. Γ. 2. 1003 b. 23 et de interpr. 13 passim.'
CHAPTER X.

Argument.

The next point to notice is that the same man cannot be both φρόνιμος and ἀκρατής, for φρόνιμος, as we have seen, implies goodness, and is not simply knowledge, but knowledge which issues in good actions, whereas the ἀκρατής is not one who performs good actions. Cleverness—διάνοιας, is indeed compatible with incontinence; hence, because διάνοιας and φρόνιμος are nearly related (see vi. 12. §§ 9, 10—as intellectual faculties they are nearly related, but from the moral point of view they differ), some have taken up the notion that φρόνιμος and ἀκρατία are compatible. But so far is ἀκρατία from being compatible with the active knowledge of the φρόνιμος, that we ought rather to compare the ἀκρατής with one who is asleep or drunk. Of course he acts voluntarily (for he knows after a fashion what he does and why he does it); but his character is not bad, for his deliberate choice is good—his badness is thus only partial; and he is not unjust, for he does not do evil deliberately—being either a weak irresolute man who fails to abide by the result of deliberation, or an impetuous man who does not deliberate at all.

The incontinence of the impetuous man is more easily cured than that of the irresolute man: and incontinence, due to habit, is more easily cured than natural incontinence; although habit may become a second nature.

So much for continence and incontinence, endurance and softness.

1152 a. 6. § 1] takes up vii. 1. 7.

a. 7. ἀμα γὰρ . . . δεδεικται οὖν] See E. N. vi. 13. Φρόνιμος is the clear consciousness of one’s moral nature, as an organic whole: it insures the maintenance and proper function of the moral organism.

a. 9. § 2. τῷ πρακτικῷ] sc. εἶναι. The φρόνιμος not only knows what is right, but applies his knowledge, or acts upon it. He is σπουδαῖος τὸ ἔθος—i. e. his feelings and desires have been so accustomed to move in harmony with his knowledge, that what is technically called πράξεις may be always looked for from him. Πράξεις is ‘moral action,’ or ‘conduct.’ It is deliberate, being the outcome and expression of definite organisation or λόγος. Isolated πάθη do not produce πράξεως: hence E. N. vi. 2. 2 αἰσθήσεις οἰδεμέναι ἄρχῃ πράξεως· δήλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θυρία αἰσθήσεων μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. The ἀκρατής, although he possesses the general knowledge of right and
wrong (τὸ εἰδιναί), lets his πάθη prevent the application of it. His 1152 a. θ. acts are mere responses to isolated πάθη, not πράξεις καὶ ἀρετὴν—δὲ ἀκρατῆς οὐ πρακτικὸς a. 9.

τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατὴ εἶναι] See E. N. vi. 12. 9, 10. a. 10. Δεινότης is the cleverness with which the means to an end are discovered and employed. It does not give the end, or make it good or bad (being a purely intellectual faculty), but merely pursues it cleverly when given. If the end be morally good, cleverness in the pursuit of it, having become habitual, is called φρόνησις: and πανουργία, if the end be bad. It is only when the end is not one which can be viewed morally—as morally good or bad—that the neutral term δεινότης can be properly used. How then is the ἀκρατής here said to be sometimes δεινός? His end is good, and he is blind to the means thereto. This difficulty admits of the following answer, I think. It is the steady influence of a morally good end which converts the δύναμις of δεινότης into the ἕξις of φρόνησις, the steady influence of a bad end which converts it into πανουργία: i.e. the δεινὸς, as such, is clever and ingenious, and doubtless shows his cleverness in many ways in non-moral matters; but it requires ‘a good or bad end’—a steady inducement appealing strongly to his will and emotions—to make him show and use his cleverness habitually in the moral sphere. Hitherto, we suppose, his cleverness, so far as the moral sphere is concerned, has not been habitually shown—i.e. it has existed merely as the δύναμις of either φρόνησις or πανουργία. Now, the ἀκρατής has ‘a good end’; but it is inoperative in him—in his ill-regulated nature it does not appeal strongly enough to his will and emotions to make him show, in the moral sphere, as φρόνησις the δεινότης which he probably shows in non-moral matters, where the ends are sufficiently interesting to him to make him exert his natural ability for the discovery and employment of the suitable means. The end of the ἀκρατής is good, but not good with the constraining power over conduct which, in the σπουδαῖος (the man who is ‘in earnest’ about good conduct), presses the morally neutral δεινότης into the service of morality. Thus the ἀκρατής, in spite of his so-called ‘good end,’ remains merely δεινός, his δεινότης being inferred from his non-moral activity, and doubtless, as time goes on (for the ἀκρατής is on the downward path), from indications suggestive of incipient πανουργία. The Paraph. has a good note—Katὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον

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1152 a. 10. καὶ τινας ἀκρατεῖς φρονίμους ὄνομαζοντι καθ' ὁμοίωτητά τινα πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν· τινες γὰρ τῶν ἀκρατῶν δεινοὶ εἰσιν· ἡ δὲ δεινότης ἐνεῖκε τῇ φρόνησι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ δεινοὶ κατὰ τὴν γνώσιν τοῦ δέους εὐκαίτα τοῖς φρονίμοις· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν γνώσκοντι μόνον τὸ δέον, οὐ προσαρχοῦντι δὲ πράττειν, οὐδὲ πράσσοντων· οἱ δὲ φρόνιμοι γνώσκοντες τὸ δέον καὶ πράττοντες· καὶ διὰ τούτῳ ὁ μὲν φρόνιμος σπουδαῖος ἐστιν· ἀκρατὴς δὲ κἀ̂ν δεινὸς ἦ, φαίλεις ἐστι· καὶ φέγηται.

a. 13. κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἔγχυς εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν] ‘as far as reason goes they are closely allied, though they differ in purpose’ (Peters). This translation might be understood to imply that δεινότης involves purpose (προαιρεσις), though a different sort of purpose from that involved in φρόνησις: but δεινότης (so far as morality is concerned) is merely a δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων, not a προαιρετική ἔξις. The meaning is—‘deinosity resembles φρόνησις in being an intellectual faculty, but differs from it in not involving moral choice.’ The Ald. Schol. is wrong in two points in his comment here—κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἦτοι τὸν ὀρισμὸν ἔγχυς ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ δεινότης . . . καὶ γὰρ ἡ δεινότης ἔξις ἢν ἐφευρετικὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, διαφέρουσι δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ φρόνιμον ἡ προαίρεσις ἀγαθὴ . . . τοῦ δὲ δεινοῦ ἡ προαίρεσις φαύλη.

a. 14. § 3. οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδώς . . . οἰνωμένος] sc. ἀκρατεῖται Ασπ., ἡττᾶται ὁ ἀκρατὴς Αδ. Σχολ. Notwithstanding his formal possession of a ‘good end,’ the ἀκρατής keeps his intellectual endowment at the level of δύναμις, so far as moral matters are concerned: i.e. he is δεινός, not φρόνιμος, because his good end is otiose, and does not interest him sufficiently to call forth his δεινότης into its service, and transform it into φρόνησις: cf. the Paraphrast’s note—καὶ γὰρ εἰ καὶ γνῶσκει τὸ δέον (ὁ ἀκρατὴς) ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡσπερ ὁ φρόνιμος ἐνεργεῖα θεωρῶν καὶ χρόμενος τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἐνίπτει, ὥσ ὁ καθεύδων καὶ οἰνωμένος· ἵνα ταύτην δὴ τὴν ὁμοιότητα ὁ δεινὸς ἀκρατὴς φρόνιμος ὄνομαζεται, καὶ οὐκε φρονίμῳ. See Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, p. 27) on the difficulty of connecting the words οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδώς καὶ θεωρῶν with what goes before. He thinks it ‘probable that the end of the book (i.e. ch. 10) is made of pieces not belonging to each other.’ Bywater connects οὐδὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ. closely with ὁ δ’ ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός § 2, a. 9, making the intervening words τοῦ δὲ δεινῶν a. 10 . . . προαίρεσιν a. 14 parenthetical.

a. 15. καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν . . . ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιστῆς] The ἀκρατὴς acts
voluntarily, because ἐπιθυμία is the cause of voluntary actions: see 1152 a. 15.

There is some confusion of language in the statement ἡ γὰρ προαιρεσις ἐπικήσις (as also in the statement τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαιρεσιν vii. 8. 3), because προαιρεσις is the act of choice, and the ἀκρασία of course does not 'deliberately choose' (προαιρεται) what he does, but acts from πάθος. He is, in fact, distinguished as μὴ προαιρούμενος from the ἀκραστὸς, who acts προαιρούμενος. We must suppose that προαιρεσις is used loosely here for 'the good intentions' which are overcome by πάθος in the ἀκρασία. Βούλησις would have been more correct than προαιρεσις: see E. N. v. 9. 6 παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει (ἀκρασίας) αὐτή γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς ὁ μὴ οὐσία εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ἢ τε ἀκρασίας οὐχ ὁ οὐσία δεῖ αὐτῶν πράττειν πράττει. Aspasius sees the awkwardness of ἡ γὰρ προαιρεσις ἐκκεισις: he says (141. 6 Heylbut)—προαιρεσιν δὲ πάλιν ἢ τὸν λόγον εἴρηκεν ἢ σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν βούλευσιν.

καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος—οὐ γὰρ ἐπίθεολος | Cf. E. N. v. 8. 8 ὅταν δὲ εἶδος a. 17. μὲν μὴ προβουλέσθησα δὲ, ἄδίκημα, οἶνον οἰκὸς τι τι διὰ θυμῶν καὶ ἅλλα πάθη, ἃς ἀναγκαία ἡ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις' ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνσι τοῦτο ἄδικον χρὴ, καὶ ἄδικηματὰ ἐστὶν, οὐ μέντοι πῶς ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδέ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρῖαν ἢ ἀλάβη· ὅταν δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. Again, below (v. 8. 10), the ἄδικος is described as ἐπιβουλεύσαι.

On οὐ γὰρ ἐπίθεολος here in vii. 10. 3 Grant remarks that 'though lust, as compared with anger, is called ἐπίθεολος (cf. ch. 6. § 3), yet it is true on the other hand that the incontinent man is not a designing character.'

Ἀναξανδρίδης[1] a comic poet, a native of Camirus in Rhodes: a. 22. mentioned by Aristotle three times in Rhet. iii, viz. 1411 a. 18, 1412 b. 16, 1413 b. 25. Athenaeus preserves (p. 374) the following passage relating to Anaxandrides from the περὶ κομψίας of Chamaeleon of Heraclea—Ἀναξανδρίδης διδόσκων ποτὲ διδύμαμβοι Ἀθάνασιν, εἰσῆλθεν ἐφ' ἵππου, καὶ ἠπίγγειλε τι τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἄσματος. ἦν δὲ τὴν ὄψιν καλὸς καὶ μέγας, καὶ κόμην ἔφεβη, καὶ ἐφόρει ἀλουργίδα καὶ κράσπεδα χρυσᾶ. πυκνὸς δὲ ὃν τὸ ἱδος, ἐποίη τι τοιούτοι περὶ τὰς κομψίας. ὅτε γὰρ μὴ νικήφη, λαμβάναν ἑδοκεν εἰς τὸν λεβαντόν κατατείμνιχα, καὶ οὐ μετεκείσατο ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ. καὶ πολλὰ ἔχοντα κομψὸς τῶν δραμάτων ἡφάντες, δυσκολίαις τοῖς θεαταις διὰ τὸ γήρας. λέγεται δὲ εἶναι τὸ γένος Ῥόδιος ἐκ Καμάρου, βαμμάξω οὖν πῶς ὁ Τηρεύς περιεσώθη, μὴ τυχῶν νίκης, καὶ ἅλλα δράματα τῶν

1152 a. 22. ὅμοιων τοῦ αὐτοῦ. Chamaeleon, the writer of this passage, was a Peripatetic philosopher, one of the immediate disciples of Aristotle. Coraes thinks that the line before us is from the πολειτ. of Anaxandrides. Athenaeus (p. 299) preserves fourteen lines of this play. The present line is quoted also by Cyril, de Trin. ii. p. 96 (see Meineke, Fragm. Com. vol. iii. p. 200). Anaxandrides seems to have imitated Euripides (apud Aelian, H. A. iv. 54)—"Ομηρός μὲν οὖν ἔδωκεν ἵππῳ φωνήν, ἀσπίδι δὲ ἡ φύσις ἥν νόμων ὠδήν μέλει, φήσιν Εὐριπίδης.

a. 27. § 4. εὐιαποτέρα . . . τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι] This passage Cook Wilson (Arist. Studies, Table V) places after vii. 7. 8, and regards as a duplicate of vii. 8. 2.

a. 29. ψυκῶν] Ramsauer suggests ψωνει.

a. 31. τῇ φύσει ἔφεκεν] Zell and Fritzsche quote de Mem. 2. 452 a. 27 ὅσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος. διὸ ἂ πολλάκις ἐννοούμεθα ταχὺ ἀναμμηνο-κόμεθα. ὅσπερ γὰρ φύσει τὸ ἐστὶ μετὰ τὸ ὀφθαλμὸν. τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν ποιεῖ.

Εὐηνὸς] There seem to have been two elegiac or gnomic poets of this name, natives of Paros. One of them (whether the elder or younger is uncertain) is said to have instructed Socrates in poetry. Plato refers several times to Euenus as a teacher of rhetoric, in somewhat satirical terms—Apol. 20 A, Phaedr. 267 A, and Phaedo 60 D—61 A. In Met. Δ. 5. 1015 a. 25 and E. E. ii. 7. 1223 a. 31 he is named as the author of the line πὰν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πράγμα ἀναρρόν ἔφυ, which is also quoted in Rhet. i. ΙΙ. 1370 a. 10 without his name. See Schwegler, Met. vol. iii. p. 203. For the verses of Euenus see Poet. Gnom. (ed. Tauchn. p. 109).

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

The subject of Pleasure and Pain is one which the Political Philosopher must consider; for he is the Architect of Life—he gives us the End to which we refer when we call this good and that bad.

Moreover, it is necessary to consider this subject, because we assigned moral
virtue and vice to the field of 'pains and pleasures,' and because most people affirm a close connexion between Happiness and Pleasure.

There are three opinions which (following our ordinary method of stating the opinions held on the subject under discussion) we begin by noticing—

(1) That no pleasure is good, either per se or per accidens.
(2) That some pleasures are good, but most of them bad.
(3) That, even if all are good, yet the chief good cannot be pleasure.

The first opinion is supported by the following reasons:—(a) all pleasure is a process in consciousness towards natural perfection, and accordingly is itself imperfect; (b) the temperate man avoids pleasures; (c) the prudent man seeks absence of pain, not pleasure; (d) pleasures hinder thinking; (e) there is no art of pleasure: if pleasure were a good thing there would be an art of it; (f) children and brutes follow pleasures.

The second opinion is supported by reference to the bad, disreputable, and hurtful pleasures which admittedly exist.

The third opinion is held on the ground that pleasure is not Perfection or End, but Process.

So much for the 'sayings' on this subject.

§ 1. περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης] The discussion of ἡδονή contained in the last four chapters of vii, and that contained in the first five chapters of x, follow the same general lines, but arrive at different results in some points. The mere circumstance by itself that two treatises on ἡδονή exist side by side in the E. N. raises a strong presumption in favour of the view that the corpus of the E. N., as we have it, is the result of editing: for either the two treatises on ἡδονή were composed by the same author writing at different times, from somewhat different points of view—in which case it seems highly improbable that he would publish them both together in one work, though a later editor might do so; or they were composed by different authors—in which case the hypothesis of an editor is of course necessary. So much for the antecedent presumption in favour of the hypothesis of an editor raised by the mere circumstance of two treatises on ἡδονή coexisting in the Nicomachean Corpus. But we can go further than this, and say that an editor is certainly accountable for the Nicomachean Corpus, as we now have it. There can be no doubt that E. E. iv, vi (≡E. N. v, vi, vii) belong, in thought and style, rather to the E. E. than to the E. N. It is impossible to account for the fact that these three books are common to the E. N. and E. E., by supposing

1 It may be sufficient to refer the student to Grant's Ethics, Essay i. pp. 50-71, and Jackson's Book V, Introduction, pp. xxii-xxxii.
that their original locus was in the \textit{E. N.}, and that they were transferred thence \textit{en bloc} into the \textit{E. E.}. We must rather believe that they were compiled, subsequently to the composition of the \textit{E. N.}, from materials already to hand, and were transferred \textit{en bloc} from the \textit{E. E.} into the \textit{E. N.} by an editor of the \textit{E. N.} who wished to supply an original deficiency in that corpus, or, more probably, to repair a loss which it had suffered. But it may be asked—Why did the editor of the \textit{E. N.} admit the superfluous account of \emph{ἡδωνή}? This difficulty suggests the supposition that, when he inserted \textit{v}, \textit{vi}, \textit{vii}, he did not find \textit{x} attached to the Nicomachean Corpus. It may have attached itself at a later time. That this supposition is not gratuitous seems to be shown by the fact that the writer of the \textit{E. E.} (or perhaps I ought to put myself in order by saying—the writer mainly responsible for the composition of the \textit{E. E.})—who apparently had Nicomachean materials before him in the following order—

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(a)] \textit{E. N.} i–iv.
  \item[(b)] Books on the subjects of \textit{E. E.} iv, vi, vi. \textit{i–10 = E. N. v, vi, vii.} i–10.
  \item[(c)] A treatise on \emph{ἡδωνή} perhaps identical with that in \textit{E. N.} x.
  \item[(d)] \textit{E. N.} viii, ix \textit{περὶ φιλίας}—
\end{itemize}

ends his work with two chapters (appended to his lengthy discussion of \emph{φιλία})—one on \emph{εἰρυχία}, and the other on \emph{καλοκαγαθία}—written without reference to the contents of \textit{E. N.} x. \textit{6–9}. It is difficult to suppose that the Nicomachean work, which he follows very carefully up to the close of its discussion of \emph{φιλία}, can have ended with our \textit{E. N.} x. Even if the Eudemian writer differs from the Nicomachean, as Schleiermacher and Fritzsche suppose (see Fritzsche, \textit{Eth. Eud. pp.} \textit{262, 263}), in treating Ethics as a subject distinct from Politics, this does not appear to me to account for the Eudemian writer omitting to reproduce \textit{more suo} much of the latter part of \textit{E. N.} x, had that book been actually before him.

The suggestion, then, which I venture to make is this—When the Eudemian compilation was made, the Nicomachean Corpus ended with part \textit{(d)}; and when, parts \textit{(b)} and \textit{(c)} of that corpus having been afterwards lost, an editor supplied the gap by inserting \textit{E. E.} iv, vi, the treatise on \emph{ἡδωνή}, contained in the last-named book, was inserted with the rest, because the Nicomachean Corpus still ended with \textit{(d)}. Afterwards, however, the missing Nicomachean
treatise on ἑδονή, or one very like it, was recovered, and, its original 1152 b. 1. locus immediately after the discussion of ἀκρασία being now occupied by its Eudeman equivalent, it was placed, together with x. 6–9, at the end of the composite edition, thus completing the Nic. Eth., as we now have the work.

I offer this suggestion for what it is worth. Much uncertainty, I take it, will always remain as to the exact circumstances in which the two treatises on ἑδονή found their way into the Nic. Ethics.

To pass then from speculation to facts—it may be useful here, at the outset, to state, without detail, the chief points in which the two treatises on ἑδονή differ and agree.

In the first place, it may be noticed that the present treatise gives somewhat more prominence to bodily pleasures than that in x. This I do not attribute, as some do (e.g. Bendixen, Bemerkungen zum Siebenten Buch der Nik. Eth. Philologus, vol. x. pp. 270-92), to the difference between the positions of the two treatises—that which has more to say about the σωματικαὶ ἑδοναὶ following immediately after the discussion of ἀκρασία, and that which has less to say about them leading up to the discussion of εὐδαιμονία: for I think it probable that the original position of the treatise in x (or of its archetype) was that now occupied by the treatise in vii—viz. immediately after the discussion of ἀκρασία. It seems better to explain the greater prominence of the σωματικαὶ ἑδοναὶ in the last-mentioned treatise simply by the preference of the writer. The subject of ἀκρασία, involving as it does that of the σωματικαὶ ἑδοναὶ, had a greater interest for the writer (or writers) of the Eudeman Corpus, than it had for the writer of the E.N. This is very evident, for instance, if we compare the Eudeman treatment of τὸ ἔκούσων with the Nicomachean 1. It is not necessary, then, to go to the position which the Eudeman treatise on ἑδονὴ occupies after the detailed discussion of ἀκρασία to account for the greater prominence given in it to the σωματικαὶ ἑδοναὶ. That the subject of ἑδονὴ is closely connected with that of ἀκρασία in the mind of the Eudeman writer, and that his special interest is in the σωματικαὶ ἑδοναὶ, is shown by a passage, E. E. iii. 2. 1231 b. 2 (referred to by Fritzche, E.E. Prolegom. p. xiv, and Spengel, Arist. Stud. p. 197), which promises a more accurate account of the ἑδοναὶ when ἐγκάρσεια and ἀκρασία come up for special

1 See introductory note to vii.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that, because the present treatise has more to say about the σωματικὰ ώδουι than that in x has, its connexion with the subject of εὐδαιμονία is less vital. The words with which the present treatise opens (vii. 11. §§ 1, 2) are as explicit as those with which the treatise in x opens, in declaring the intimate connexion of the two subjects of ώδουι and εὐδαιμονία. Moreover, there is a highly interesting passage in an earlier part of the E. E. (quoted by Fritzsche, E. E. p. 179, and by Grant on vii. 11. 1), in which the writer promises to discuss the relation of ώδουι to εὐδαιμονία, with special reference to the σωματικὰ ώδουι. It is E. E. i. 5. 1216 a. 30–36 τοῦτων δ’ η μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαίσεις ώδουι, καὶ τὰς καὶ ποιὰ τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνος, οἷς ἄδηλον, ὅστ’ οὐ τῶν εἰσὶ δεὶ ζητεῖν αὐτὰς, ἀλλ’ εἰ συντείνωσι τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν η μῆ, καὶ πῶς συντείνουσι, καὶ πότεν εἰ δεὶ προσάπτεται τῷ ζην καλῶς ἰδουίς τινας, ταῦτας δεὶ προσάπτειν, δ’ τοῦτων μὲν ἄλλων τινα τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖ, ἄπερα δ’ εἰς ἔδονι δε’ ὡς εὐδόγος οἴσται τὸν εὐδαιμόνα ζῆν ἱδέως καὶ μή μόνον ἀλώπης. It is worth noticing, too, that the writer of the M. M. introduces his account of ώδουι in the following terms—M. M. ii. 7. 1204 a. 19 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον ἄν εἰη περὶ ώδουίς ἐπειθέπερ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας ἐστιν ὁ λόγος κ.τ.λ. I accordingly disagree entirely with the view that the two treatises on ώδουι in vii and x respectively were written with different objects—that in vii ώδουι is considered merely as the material of continence and incontinence, in x as sweetening εὐδαιμονία: see Coraes ἄλλοι δ’ ἀναφ. ἐκ προσφαίας διὸ τῶν φιλόσοφον περὶ αὐτῆς γράφαν, ἐνθάδε μὲν οὖν ὑπ’ ἂν περὶ ἦν ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία τῇ ώδουί ὑποτελέμενοι εἰ δὲ τοὺς έξης (i. e. x) ὡς φιλοσοφίκες ἄλος τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ θεωροῦσα. The object of both treatises is one—to show how ώδουι is related to εὐδαιμονία or the ἀγαθόν—how it hinders, and how it furthers, the performance of duty. Thus, after a few introductory remarks, the treatise in x opens its subject with the words εἰ μὲν γὰρ τάγαθον ώδουίν λέγομην, and that in vii with τὸς μὲν ὁδὸν δοκεῖν σωματικὰ ώδουί εἶναι ἀγαθόν. ‘Is Pleasure good?’ then, is the chief question for both treatises. The answers, however, seem, at

1 Perhaps, however, we ought to read, for τοῦ γένους, τούτου τοῦ γένους, referring to τὰ ἰδέα τὰ εἰρημένα τῶν αἰσθητών 1231 a. 38. If so, the passage would not promise a treatment of ώδουι generally.

2 For τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαίσεις ought we not to read τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαίσεις!
first sight, to differ *toto coelo*. According to the writer of vii a 1152 b. 1. pleasure may be found which is identical with the *summum bonum* (vii. 13. 2); according to the writer of x (3. 13) pleasure is not the *summum bonum*. No two positions surely could differ more widely. The writer of vii must be a ‘Hedonist.’ But he is no more a hedonist than the writer of x is. The difference between the two positions, in fact, reduces itself to very moderate limits, when we examine the scholastic ground on which it rests—viz. on the fact that according to the writer of vii *hēdonē* is *ēνέργεια*, whereas according to the writer of x it is not *ēνέργεια*, but attends and ‘perfects’ it—the formula of vii being *ēνέργεια* Δημιουργικός *hēdonē* (vii. 12. 3), and that of x τελειωτι την *ēνέργειαν* *hēdonē* (x. 4. 8). If—the writer of vii infers—*ēνέργεια* and *hēdonē* are convertible terms (where vital functions are concerned), then the *ēνέργεια* *ψυχῆς* κατ’ ἄρετήν, or *εὐδαιμονία*, will be a *hēdonē*. Plainly, this position (identical, it may be noted, with that of the writer of *Met.* A. 7. 1072 b. 16) differs only verbally from that of Aristotle in *E. N.* i. 8. 12 οὖθεν δὴ προσδείκται τῆς *hēdonῆς* ο βίος αὐτῶν (i. e. τῶν εὐδαιμώνων) ὡσπερ περίπτωτον τινός, ἀλλ’ ἔχει τὴν *hēdonῆν* ἐν ἐαυτῷ. Both master and disciple are fundamentally at one: both connect the most desirable pleasure inseparably with the life of virtuous activity—against the hedonists who connect it with the passive life of personal enjoyment. Perhaps I may venture to formulate the difference between the writer of vii and the hedonists in this way.—The writer of vii says—‘The Good (meaning the strenuous performance of the highest duty) is Pleasure’: the hedonists say—‘Pleasure (meaning the pleasure of sense) is the Good.’ The writer of vii comes to the subject of pleasure with a firm grasp of the Aristotelian definition of the Good: his identification of *hēdonē* and *ēνέργεια* is a piece of scholasticism which does not affect his position as a moralist.¹ It is because he does not see

¹ Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 48, 49) believes that the treatise in vii, as distinguished from that in x, has a ‘hedonistic character’: he says—‘Beide Abhandlungen differieren in den wesentlichsten Puncten. Im zehnten Buche wird die Lust von der Thatigkeit gesondert (1175 b. 32), so dass sie nichts als eine blosse Qualität derselben erscheint, im siebenten wird sie als *ēνέργεια* Δημιουργικός definiert; das zehnte Buch bekämpft die Ansicht, dass die Lust das höchste Gut sei, das siebente sucht, wie sich bei seiner Grundanschauung erwarten lässt, wahrscheinlich zu machen, dass mindestens eine Art der Lust das ἄριστον sei. Schon diese Ansicht genügt, um die Abhandlung des siebenten Buches als unecht zu kennzeichnen; denn sie würde der Aristotelischen Ethik einen hedonistischen Charakter aufdrücken, der mit ihren sonstigen Anschauungen unvereinbar ist.’ I differ from this view in (1) at-

1152 b. 1. this that Aspasius (151 Heylbut)—who turns out to be the writer of the ‘notable scholium’ discovered by Brandis in the Vatican (quoted by Fritzscbe, E. E. p. 189, and by Grant on vii. 13. 2)—thinks of ‘Eudemus’ (to whom he conjecturally attributes the treatise peri ἡδονῆς in vii) as merely airing ‘a probable opinion’ (ἐπιχειρεῖ ἐνδύσως ὡς ἐνὼ αὐτὴν τὸ ἀριστον λέγειν), and not giving his own real view, in the statement (vii. 13. 2) ὧστε εἰ ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἀριστον.

Ἡδονή, then, is discussed here in the seventh, as it is in the tenth book, in relation to the good—i.e. not theoretically, as interesting from a physiological or psychological point of view, but with a practical reference. In other words, the object of the enquiry is not to tell us what pleasure is, but to tell us what it does—how it hinders, and how it helps virtuous action—in short, to place its relation to the practical end in a true light, as against the erroneous views of others—extreme Platonists, on the one side, who held that pleasure can only hinder morality, and hedonists of the Cyrenaic stamp, on the other side, who held that passive enjoyment is the chief good. It is true that the following chapters abound with extremely abstract considerations, which might easily be mistaken for what a barren scholasticism has to offer as physiology and psychology; but we must remember that an abstract scholastic treatment of the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer by the nature of the arguments which he has to meet—and the same remark applies to the writer of the treatise in x. If, however, we turn to the doctrine concerning ἡδονή which may be extracted from the E. N. and E. E. elsewhere than from the treatises in vii and x, we find that, not being advanced in a polemical form, it is free from the subtleties which mark (and, it may be thought, mar) the discussions in vii, and also, though perhaps in a less degree, those in x. We must be careful, then, not to pronounce the doctrine of vii and x worthless, because verbal criticism of it lands us in the difficulties so cleverly exposed by J. S. Mill in the 25th chapter.
of his *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*. Mill's 1152 b. 1.

Mill's criticism is relevant only against writers who profess to give an answer to the purely scientific question—'What is Pleasure, as a physiological or psychological phenomenon?' Mill has little difficulty in showing that the formula εὐφροσύνη ἀνεμπόδιστος, as reduced to 'Pleasure is the result of a pleasurable state of the sense and a pleasure-giving quality in the object presented to it,' is scientifically worthless. But he fails to see that the real object of the writers is, as has been said, to explain what pleasure does—how it helps or hinders the attainment of the ethical end—ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν εὐφροσύνη. It is inseparable from εὐφροσύνη, enhances εὐφροσύνη, is εὐφροσύνη, was the formula in which Aristotle and his school summed up the results of their practical enquiry. This formula cannot be taken out of its setting in the practical enquiry, as it is by Mill, without being entirely misrepresented. Its true significance, missed by Mill, is that it asserts the opposite of 'Pleasure is γένεσις or ἀναπλήρωσις'—that it maintains the paramount importance, in human life, of the pleasures of active function, against those who ignored them—the hedonists, because they wished to recognise only the pleasures of ἀναπλήρωσις, or passive reception, as worth anything—the ascetic Platonists because they wished, in their argument against the hedonists, to dwell on pleasures which could easily be shown to be unsatisfactory.

ἀπλῶς] Things are called good or bad in the strict sense, when b. 3.

regarded as means, or hindrances, respectively, to the attainment of εὐδαιμονία. When they are called good or bad in relation to minor ends, the ends have to be specified; the terms good and bad cannot, in that case, be used by themselves—ἀπλῶς or simpliciter—without further specification.

§ 2. ἐθεμεν] *E. E.* ii. 4. 1221 b. 38.  b. 6.

ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν] Muretus conjectured ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλα χαίρειν, and b. 7.

Μ is has ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλα χαίρειν. The Ald. Schol. has ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν ἐν ὁλῳ τὸ βίο, as if μακάριος were μακροχάριος. Asp. has τὸν εὐθαίμονα μακάριον ὀνομάσθαι, οἶνον ὡς ἂν εἴποτε μᾶλα χαίροντα.

§ 3. τοῖς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.] No pleasure is good. This was the view b. 8.

of Antisthenes the Cynic (as Asp. notes): see Aul. Gell. ix. 5 (quoted by Fritzscbe) Antisthenes summum malum dicit esse voluptatem: ejus namque hoc verbum est μανεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ ἡσθεῖν. Cf.
224  


1152 b. 8. Euseb. Praep. Evang. xv. 13 (quoted by Mullach Frag. Phil. vol. ii. p. 286) 'Αντιονένς 'Ιρωκλείτευσ ης ἀνὴρ το φρόνημα, δε ἔφη τοῦ ἑδέσθαι το μαίνεσθαι κρείττον εἶναι δι καὶ παράστην τοῖς γνωρίμοις, μηδέποτε χάριν ἠδονής διάκτυλον ἑκτείναι. Speusippus (nephew and successor of Plato) also held that no pleasure is good. See vii. 13. 1 for the argument with which he maintained this position: cf. Aul. Gell. ix. 5 (quoted by Fritzsche) 'Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter se.'

b. 10. τοῖς δ' ἐναι κ.τ.λ.] This, as Fritzsche observes, is the view of Plato (Phileb. 48 A, sqq., where ἀληθεῖς, καθαράι, ἀδικτοί are distinguished from μικταί and ἀκάθαρται ἠδοναί).

b. 11. ἐν κ.τ.λ.] Plato's view, expressed in the Philebus, and referred to in E. N. x. 2. 3 τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναίρει ὁτι οὐκ ἐστιν ἠδονή τὰ γάμπον. The view of E. N. x is also ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἀριστον ἠδονήν.

For Bekker's ἄγαθον in b. 9, Bywater reads τὸ ἄγαθων with Kb. This is not to be understood as the sumnum bonum, but simply as 'that which is good.' 'They think that no pleasure is good, either in itself (as the ἄρεται are good in themselves), or relatively (as ἀκροβια are relatively good); for "good" and "pleasant" are not the same.'

b. 12. § 4.] The Paraph. explains the connexion between this § and § 3—τὰ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσα περὶ τῆς ἠδονῆς ταῦτα ἐστὶν ῥητῶν δὲ δὲ δὲ ἑδοκεῖ.

δῶς μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἄγαθον] i.e. οὐδεμία ἠδονή εἶναι ἄγαθον b. 8.

b. 13. ὅτι . . . οἰκίᾳ] The reference here cannot (or, in justice, ought not to) be to Plato himself, for he did not regard all pleasures as γενεῖσις: see below note on vii. 12. 3. a. 8. The phrase γένεις εἰς φύσιν ἀισθητή does not occur verbatim in Plato's writings (although ἀναπληρωσις αἰσθητῆ does in Phileb. 51 B: see Fritzsche, E. E. p. 181); it was probably used in the Platonic school, however; perhaps, Fritzsche thinks, by Speusippus. It may have been borrowed from Aristippus (who is probably referred to in Phileb. 53 C ἀρα περὶ ἠδονῆς οὐκ ἀκρόκομαν ὡς ἢ γενεῖς ἐστιν, οὐδαὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἠδονῆς): an expression of his preserved by Diog. Laer. ii. 8. 6. 85 (quoted by Fritzsche, E. E. p. 181) resembles it—'Ἀρίστιππος τέλος ἀπέφανε τὴν λείαν κίνησιν εἰς αἰσθησιν ἀναδιδομένην.
The Paraph. gives the following version of the words before us 1152 b. 13.

Φάσσα ἡδονή γένεσις ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν ἀφάθητη. Η γὰρ εἰς τὴν φύσιν γένεσις τῶν φυτῶν οὐκ ὅσα αἰσθητή, ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕως τῶν ἡδονή γένεσις, ἡ δὲ γένεσις ἀτέλες, τὸ δὲ ἀτέλες οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τὸ ἱδή γεγονός, εἰσὶν ὑπερθεται οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ γένεσις ὑμογενῆς τῶν τέλεσιν, εἰς τὸ τελευτά τοῦ γὰρ ἡ οἰκοδομία ὑμογενῆς τῷ οἴκῳ.

This argument must not be ascribed to Plato himself. He recognised the value of the pleasures which attend the virtuous life: see Philol. 63 E ἂλλας δὲ ἡδονάι ἀληθείας καὶ καθαρὰς ἀδεῖπτες, σχεδὸν οἰκείαι ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς τοῖς τὰς μεθ' ὑγείας καὶ τοῖς σαφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἔμπυας ἀρετῆς ὁπότεις καθάπερ θεοὶ ὁποδοί γιγάντημεν αὐτὴ ἔννοιος ὑματοθεοὸς ἀπὸ τοῦτο, τοῖς μίγνυ τὰς δὲ δι' ἀφαρώνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης καθαρίας ἐπομένης πολλή ποὺ ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μοινήν. Those ascetics who argue that 'pleasure is bad because the σῶφρον avoids pleasure' fall into the error noticed in E. N. ii. 3. 9 διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρκετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡμείας· οὐκ εἰ δὲ, ὅτι ἀπόλος λέγοντι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅς δεῖ καὶ ὃς καὶ δὲι καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθενται.

But the good which the φρόνιμος seeks is not an abstraction; it is always given concretely in the ὦν of the human affections and passions: it is therefore incorrect to say that the φρόνιμος shuns pleasure for the absence of pain. Pleasure for pleasure's sake he shuns; but not pleasure as the vehicle of duty. The dictum of Antisthenes expresses pretty exactly the Aristotelian (and Eudemian) doctrine of the relation of φρόνιμος to ἡδονή—Ἀντισθένης δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάσκων προσέθηκε τὴν ἀμεταμελητὸν: Athenaeus 513 (see Mullach, Fragm. Phil. ii. 286).

But the pleasures of thought stimulate, do not hinder, thought, as will be shown later on.

Τῇ τοῦ ἀφροδισίων] Susemihl and Bywater read τῇ with Kb, Mb, b. 17. Cambr., for Bekker's τῇν.

No argument of this kind in Plato, according to Spengel, p. 525, quoted by Fritzsche.

vol. ii.
Children and brutes seek pleasure by an irrational impulse (ἄλογας φερόμενα Paraph.), and that which is thus sought cannot be good. From this very fact, that children and brutes seek pleasure, the Cyrenaics, Fritzschæ observes, drew the opposite conclusion—that it is good.

CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT.

The arguments mentioned in chapter 11. §§ 4, 5 do not prove that pleasure is not good, or even that it is not the Chief Good: for (1) they ignore the fact that a thing may be 'good' in either of two senses—either 'good absolutely,' or 'good relatively.' There are doubtless many pleasures which are good relatively to bad or impaired states and natures, and which are consequently bad; but there are also pleasures which are good absolutely.

(2) They ignore the fact that the term 'good' may be applied to an actual function, as well as to a state or condition. It is argued that pleasure is 'not good' because it is only a 'process towards' goodness—i.e. towards the perfect restoration of an impaired state: but the pleasures of thinking are forgotten, which are not 'processes towards the restoration of impaired states,' but functions put forth by a perfect state. Even the pleasure attending the satisfaction of a bodily want is really a 'function put forth' by an unimpaired nucleus in the state requiring restoration.

The 'goodness' of a state, then, is not the only or the highest 'goodness': there is also the 'goodness' of function proceeding from state, and this is the higher kind of 'goodness.'

Thus it is not necessary to suppose that there is something better than pleasure, as the end is 'better than' the process towards the end: for pleasure is not a 'process towards' (nor are all pleasures even associated with 'process') : it is rather a 'function proceeding from' ; it is an end realised by the subject qua doing something, not qua undergoing a process ; and it is to be defined, not as a 'process of which one is conscious,' but as 'unimpeded function.'

There are some again, who, giving another meaning to 'process,' identify pleasure and 'process,' because, they argue, pleasure is absolutely good. They confound 'process' and 'function.'

To argue that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are bad for health, is absurd—for even thinking is sometimes bad for health. Neither thought nor any faculty is hindered by its own pleasure, only by alien pleasures;
may, the pleasure of thinking and learning makes us think and learn all the better.

As for there being 'no art of pleasure'—that is just what one might expect: art deals with the conditions of the performance of a function, not with the actual function itself, as such.

As for the argument that the temperate man shuns pleasure, and the prudent man seeks the life devoid of pain rather than the life of pleasure—we answer it, as above, by distinguishing pleasures: the pleasures which are associated with painful craving—the excessive bodily pleasures—the temperate or prudent man indeed shuns; but he has his own pleasures—those of the good life.

§ 1. τω ἀγαθόν μὴ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον] As Michelet notes, the 1152 b. 25. present chapter deals with μὴ εἶναι ἄγαθόν, and ch. 13 with μὴ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον.


φύσεις. The term ἀκολουθήσων must be understood to mean, not only that the general distinction, formulated in the protasis, between τὸ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθόν and τὸ τυι will be found applicable to ἄγαθον φύσεις καὶ ἔξεις, with their κινήσεις and γενέσεις, but also that a corresponding general distinction between τὸ ἀπλῶς φαύλον and τὸ τυι may be inferred (on the principle laid down in E. N. v. 1. 6 ἀκολουθεῖ ὅς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐὰν διάτειν πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ διά τεν πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι), and that it will be found applicable to φαύλαι φύσεις καὶ ἔξεις, with their κινήσεις and γενέσεις. The Paraphrast sees this—

"Ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη διὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν ἄγαθόν, μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶν δέ ἥλιον. ἔπει γὰρ τὸ ἄγαθον διχός λέγεται, τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς καὶ καθ' αἷτα καὶ κυρίως, ὡς ἡ ἁρτή, τὸ δὲ διὰ ἀπλῶς μὲν ἄγαθόν, τυί δὲ ἄγαθον, ὡς τὸ λοιποῦ εἰς τὸ λοιποῦ ἄγαθον, ἀκολουθεῖ ἐστὶν ὅτι καὶ φύσεις πάσα, καὶ ἔξεις, καὶ πάσα κινήσεις, καὶ γενέσεις, ἢ μὲν ἐσται ἀπλῶς ἄγαθη, ἢ δὲ τυί. ὑμίων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κακοῦ. κινήσεις γὰρ, καὶ γενέσεις, καὶ ἔξεις, αἱ μὲν φαύλαι ἁπλῶς, αἱ δὲ τυί, καὶ τῶν φαύλων τυί: καὶ αἱ μὲν καὶ ἀεὶ φαύλαι τυί, αἱ δὲ κατὰ τινὰ τρόπον, καὶ διόγον χρόνον.

The argument in this §, directed against oi λέγοντες μὴ εἶναι ἄγαθόν τὴν ἡδονήν, may be explained as follows—When we say that a thing is 'good,' we mean, either that it is good without qualification—good in itself: thus Wisdom is good in itself, without qualification—or that it is good in a qualified sense—not in itself, but in relation to something else: thus the venom of a snake is good in relation to the welfare of the snake, the amputation of a limb is good in relation to the survival of the patient, but they are 'bad' in themselves—cf. M. M. ii. 7. 1205 a. 29 ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαύλη, ὁδὸν ἡ τῶν Q 2
Now, those who say roundly that 'no pleasures are good' regard exclusively motions and processes (κινήσεις καὶ γενέσεις), which are 'good' only in a relative sense, and 'bad' in themselves—viz. the motions and processes which belong to bad or impaired natures (φύσεις) and states (ἐξεις). The motions and processes (equivalent, in the view of the philosophers here criticised, to the pleasures) of bad natures are good for the possessors of the bad natures (being their own pleasures, see E. N. i. 8. 10), but are in themselves bad—i.e. unworthy of human nature: the motions and processes of a remedial kind, which restore impaired natures and states to their normal condition, are good for the possessors of the impaired natures or states, but bad in themselves—i.e. not characteristic of healthy human nature: indeed they are often not even felt as pleasures by the patients, but are only thought to be pleasures because they remove pain. It is from looking exclusively, then, at these 'pleasures'—the 'relatively good' but 'intrinsically bad' motions and processes of (1) bad, and (2) impaired natures and states, that they draw the sweeping conclusion—'no pleasures are good.' They ignore the existence of pleasures (indicated in the next §) belonging to the free activities of the rational nature of man, which, as rational, is good in itself, and suffers no losses needing painful repair. The argument of this §, as given above, is summed up later on by the writer himself—vii. 14. 4 καὶ ὁ σπουδαίον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο τάτα, ὡσπερ εἰρήται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεως εἰσὶ πράξεις . . . αἱ δὲ ἱατρεία ένδειοι.

On the ground that the φαίλαι κινήσεις ought to be subdivided in the same manner as the σπουδαία, Rassow (Forsch. pp. 81, 82) conjectures that after αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς φαίλαι b. 29 the words αἱ δὲ τινὶ μὲν φαύλαι have fallen out; and instead of understanding ἀπλῶς with αἱρεταὶ δ᾽ οὖ b. 31 (as Bekker's χρώνων, αἱρεταὶ δ᾽ οὖ requires—cf. Ald. Schol. αὖτα δὲ καθ᾽ αὐτὰς αἱρεταὶ οὐκ εἰσίν), he conjectures χρώνων αἱρεταὶ, ἄει δ᾽ οὖ. This last conjecture (accepted by Sus.) gives, I think, a good meaning, and is palaeographically probable. Bywater's αἱρεταὶ, ἀπλῶς δ᾽ οὖ b. 31 does not seem to me to bring out so well the contrast intended, which is between the ἀπλῶς φαύλαι ἀλλ᾽ αἱρεταὶ τῷ δὲ ὀλίγῳ χρώνῳ, and the ἀπλῶς φαύλαι ἀλλ᾽ αἱρεταὶ τῷ πάντα τῶν βλον. So far as the authority of Asp. goes, I think that it is quite as much in favour of supplying ἄει as ἀπλῶς—αἱ δὲ οὖδε αἱρεταὶ τῷ, ἀλλὰ πατὲ
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οἰς τῷ ποσοῦντι τομαί καὶ ἰατρείαι τάτε ὅτε νοσεῖ. ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐκ εἰσίν αἱρεταί. \[1152 b. 26.\] 

ἀὶ δὲ δὲ, αἰ δὲ σὺ. I cannot, however, accept Rassow's other proposal—the insertion of αἰ δὲ τοι μὲν φανλαῖ in b. 29 (accepted by Sus.). This would favour Rassow’s, I think mistaken, view that ἀπλῶς is used in two senses in this §—in the clause τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τοι in its ordinary sense, as defined in Top. ii. 115 b. 29 τὸ δ’ ἀπλῶς ἐστὶν ὁ μηδενὸς προστεθέντος ἑρείς ὃτι καλὸν ἐστὶν ἣ τὸ ἐναρτῖον—i. e. = \(\text{per se, 'in itself,' 'without qualification,' 'in the abstract,' 'ohne Einschränkung, schlechthin'; but in the clause αἰ μὲν ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ. b. 29 in another sense, meaning 'generally,' 'in the majority of cases,' as opposed to τοῖς, 'in an exceptional case.' For this second meaning of ἀπλῶς Rassow quotes E. N. v. 1. 9. 1129 b. 2 περὶ τάγαθα ἐσταὶ (sc. ὁ ἄδικος), οὗ πάντα, ἄλλα περὶ σὰς εἴνυχια καὶ ἐνυχία, δ’ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ ἐγαθά, τυλὶ δ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ. But if ἀπλῶς in v. 1. 9 means 'generally,' 'in the majority of cases,' as distinguished from 'in itself'—why is αἰ added? The writer of v. 1. 9 means, I take it, that 'money' (e.g.) in itself, or in the abstract, is always regarded as something good; though when we view it in the concrete—qualified as the profligate's money—we may think of it as a bad thing. So in the present § (vii. 12. i) ἀπλῶς may, I submit, be translated '\(\text{per se}\)' in both places where it occurs.

αἰ δ’ οὖν ήδοναί] 'nedum aíreptai' (Ramsauer). The motions b. 31, which proceed from a bad nature, though good and pleasant to that nature, as being its own motions, are in themselves bad: the motions which are called forth to allay pain and want are not good in themselves, or even pleasant, but are chosen merely as less evils than the pain and want which they allay. No wonder that those who confine their attention to motions of these two kinds arrive at the conclusion that 'pleasure is not good.'

§ 2. ἐν . . . τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεούσας οὐσίᾳ In § 1 the writer has b. 33. referred to the formal distinction between τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν and τὸ τοι ἀγαθὸν, in order to suggest to his opponents—οἱ λέγοντες μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἴδιαν, ὃτι πᾶσα ἴδια γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν—the one-sidedness of assuming, as they do, that only 'relatively good' pleasures exist—only those which are 'good' as καὶ γένεσις whereby the cravings of some inferior or defective φύσις are satisfied: similarly, in § 2, he now refers to another formal distinction—that between τὸ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθὸν and τὸ καθ’ ἐξω ἀγαθὸν, in order to intimate to his opponents that they err in assuming that the only

1152 b. 33. 'good' they have to consider in this connexion is that of the \( \varepsilon \gamma\varepsilon \iota \varsigma \). They argue—the \( \varepsilon \gamma\varepsilon \iota \varsigma \), as end, is 'good' and 'real': therefore pleasure, which is \( \acute{\eta} \varsigma \varepsilon \varsigma \varsigma \iota \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma 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pleasures are "good." But we must not allow them to stop short at the "goodness" of the mere state. The "goodness" of its function is higher; and when desire for restoration is being satisfied, the state, in so far as it remains partly unimpaired, performs a function: it is this function which is the pleasure experienced in the restorative process—not but that there are pleasures without accompanying pain and desire—for instance the functions of thought, proceeding from a state, or faculty, which lacks nothing to the fulness of its nature.' Aspasius has a good commentary (145.1 Heylbut)—ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δὲ ἔξεις, ὡς ἔξεις μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀρετή, ὡς ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἀόσθεσις μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔξεις (λέγω δὲ ἀόσθεσιν τὴν δύναμιν, ἡ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αὐσθεσίας ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἐνέργεια), ἡ ἤδωρη ἀγαθὸν ἔστων οὖχ ὡς ἔξεις ἄλλ' ὡς ἐνέργεια τῆς φύσεως. κατά συμβεβηκός δὲ αἱ ἀναπληρώσεις καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεις, αἱ εἰσὶν εἰς τὴν φύσιν, ἡδοία. προφοσομενὼς μὲν γὰρ ἡδομέθα διὰ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῆς φύσεως τρεφομέναν ἡμῶν λέγω δὲ φύσιν τὴν ψυχὴν. ἐνέργεια γὰρ τότε ἡ ἀρετικὴ, καὶ διὰ τούτο ἡδόμεθα. συμβαίνει δὲ τὸ τρικάτισ καὶ ἀναπληρωσιμος γενεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἱδίον ἐνέργεια τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἐν ἡμῖν φύσεως καὶ ἔξεως. κἂν γὰρ ἐνδειξὶ διμεν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα τὴν γε φύσιν ἐπαλειμμα-μένην καὶ δυναμένην ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνεργεῖν ἔχομεν (ὡστε Diels) αὐτὴν συμ-παρομοίαν αὐτὴ τῶν στιῶν καὶ τῶν ποτῶν ἐνεργεῖν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἱδίον κατ' ἐνέργειαν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ, ὁς φησιν, ἀναπληρωσις γίνεται τοῦ ἐνδεικτος ἐν τῷ σώματι.

ai καθιστάσας] sc. ai κυνῆσεις καὶ ai γενέσεις—(a sort of hendiadys) b. 34.

= 'the κυνῆσεις which produce and restore ἔξεις' to be carefully distinguished, as ἀτέλεις (see vii. 11. 4 οὐδεμιὰ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν), from the ἐνεργεία, or functions, which proceed from the ἔξεις. The writer's point is that his opponents, not looking beyond 'the good of the ἔξεις,' forget that there are ἐνεργεία proceeding from the ἔξεις (which are 'better than' the ἔξεις), as well as κυνῆσεις (=γενέσεις) leading up to it. The tendency to acquiesce in 'the good of the mere ἔξεις' is one to which the Aristotelian school offers opposition all along the line—cf. E. N. i. 8. 9 τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐξω ἐνδεχεται μὴ ἐγκαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχονταν κ.τ.λ. For the phrase ai καθιστάσας εἰς τὴν φύσιν ἔξεις Fritzsch quotes Philob. 42 D εἰς δὲ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καλοτίθηται, ταῦταν αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἱδιον ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια εν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἔξεως καὶ b. 35. φύσεως] 'but what performs the function (i.e. actually experiences
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1152 b. 35. *pleasure*), when the desires are being satisfied, is that which is left of the natural state. 'Evêrgeia is used here in a way which seems to anticipate the identification made in § 3.

'Υπολοίπον (Kb, NC, Asp.) means 'remaining,' 'left untouched' by the decay which has destroyed the rest of the state: *cf.* vii. 14. 7, which is a complete commentary on the present passage—λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἱατρεύονται ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἱατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ἰγνώσων πράσατος τι, διὰ τὸ ςτὸ ἱδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι φύσις δ’ ἡδέα, ἀ ποτε πράξεων τῆς τοιαύτῃ φύσεως. The reading of Mb, CCC, and Cambr.—ὕπολοίπον (adopted by Zell, Coraes, and Michelet), is plausible on account of ἀπὴς in the line below, but must be dismissed, as inconsistent with the τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ἰγνώσους of vii. 14. 7. Nor can the meaning given by the Ald. Schol. and others to ὑπολοίπον, viz. 'defective' (ὅτι τῆς λοιπαζομένης φύσεως καὶ ἐν ἐνδείᾳ σώζῃς βραμμάτων Ald. Sch.)—suggested apparently by οὐκ ἐνδειούσος σώζῃς—be defended: ὑπολοίπον can mean only 'left behind,' 'left untouched,' 'remaining.' Lb and Ob have ἐπιλοίπον, and ι’ apparently ἐπιλιποῦσι (indigentis et imperfecti).

Grant gives the gist of § 2 excellently when he says—'The argument is that it is only life, and the vital action (ψυκή ἐξις καὶ ταύτης ἐνέργεια) which is good and pleasant: the restorative processes are only secondarily, non-essentially, and by a sort of inference pleasant. ... The argument goes on to add that, even in these restorative processes, there is vital action (ἐνέργεια), namely of those organs that remain unimpaired.'

b. 36. ἐπεῖ] The transition marked by ἐπεῖ here may be brought out thus—'In restorative processes the pleasure is the reaction of the vitality left in the ἐξις: but it must not be supposed that all pleasure is reaction, for there are pleasures which are spontaneous actions.' For this use of ἐπεῖ (= 'although,' 'not but that') *cf.* vii. 12. 7 ὁ σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας, ἐπεῖ εἰσὶν ἱδοναὶ καὶ σώφρωνος.

1153 a. 2. σημεῖον 8’) sc. τοῦ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἶναι ἱδονὰς (Fritzsche). *Cf.* M. M. ii. 7. 1205 b. 20 ἐπεῖ δ’ οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἱδονή καὶ καθυσκαμένης τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκιά, οἷον καθυσκαμένης μὲν αἰ ἐξ ἐνδείας ἀναπληρώσεις, καθεστηκιάς δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀψεως καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὖσα, βελτίως καὶ ἐφισαν αἱ καθεστηκιας τῆς φύσεως ἐνέργειαι· αἱ γὰρ ἱδοναὶ καὶ ἀμφίφθερο εἰνεχείμεναι τοὺς τρόπους ἐνέργειαι εἰσὶν ὡστε ἄγαλμα ὅτι αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀψεως ἱδοναὶ καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τοῦ διανοεῖασθαι βελτίωτα ἐν ἐφισαν, ἐπεῖ αἱ γε σωματικαὶ ἐξ ἀναπληρώσεως.
Both pleasures—that of ἀναπλήρωσις and that of διανοοέσθαι—are *a* 2.

ἐνέργειαι—vital functions proceeding from their respective states; but the former is apt to be confused with the accompanying ἀναπλήρωσις, while the latter is ignored by those who, on the strength of the confusion, conclude that ‘pleasure is not good.’ The circumstance, however, that there are plainly two classes of things called ‘pleasant’ (ἡδία)—the one indefinite, the other perfectly definite—indicates that there are two kinds of pleasure. The first kind of pleasure is related to anything which, however temporarily and superficially, relieves the pressing want (e. g. τὸ ὀξύ καὶ τὸ πικρὸν), the second to things really pleasant (τὸ φύσει ἢ ἀπλῶς ἡδύ)—i. e. to a definite class of healthy functions, and the special circumstances in which—and in which alone—these functions are manifested in their full perfection.

The following passage in *M. M.* ii. 7. 1204 b. 6–36 renders the doctrine of vii. 12. 2 excellently, showing (1) that there are some pleasures, viz. those ἀπὸ τοῦ βουθείν, and those of seeing, smelling, and hearing, which are obviously not γενέσεις; and (2) that, after all, no pleasure is a γένεσις—even the pleasure experienced in eating or drinking is the ἐνέργεια of a part of the ψυχή, and accompanies, but is not to be confounded with, the process by which hunger or thirst is relieved—ἐστι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πάσα ἡδονή γένεσις. η γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ βουθείν ἡδονή γινομένη οὐκ ἑταί γένεσις, οὐδὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκούσαται καὶ ἰδεῖν καὶ ὀσφραίβησαι. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνέδειας γινομένη, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν. αὐτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἐνέδειας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς γίνονται, τῷ τῇ τῆς ἐνέδειαν ἀναπληροῦσαν τῇ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι διὸ γένεσις δοκεῖ εἶναι. δὲ ἐνέδεια καὶ ὑπερβολὴ λύπη. λύπῃ οὖν ἑναῦθα ἑνῆ ἡδονῆς γένεσις. ἐπὶ δὲ γε τοῦ ἰδεῖν καὶ ἁκούσαται καὶ ὀσφραίβησαι οὐκ ἑστιν προσποληθήσαται οὔδεις γὰρ ἡδομένος τῷ ὀρ当中 ἡ ὀσφραίνεσσα προσποληθήσῃ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διανοίας ἑστιν θεωροῦντά τι ἡδονῶν ἀκόμη τοῦ προσποληθήσαται. ὥστε εἰπ ἃν τις ἡδονή ἢ οὐκ ἑστι γένεσις. εἰ οὖν ἡ μὲν ἡδονή, ὡς ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν ἔχει, διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθῶν, ὥστε γένεσις, ἔστι δὲ τις ἡδονή, ἢ οὐκ ἑστιν γένεσις, αὐτὴ ἢ ἐν ἡγαθῶν. τὸ δὲ ὅλον οὐκ ἑστιν οὐδεμία ἡδονή γένεσις οὔδε γὰρ αὐτὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ φαγεῖν καὶ πιεῖν ἡδοναί οὐκ εἰσὶ γενέσεις, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτανόμενοι οὐ ταύτα φάσκοντες εἶναι τὰς ἡδονὰς γενέσεις. οὕνως γὰρ, ἐπειδὴ τῆς προσφορὰς γινομένης γίνεται ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτο γένεσιν εἶναι ἑστι δ' οὖ. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἑστι τῆς ψυχῆς τι μέρος ὑ' ἡδομέθα ἢμα τῇ προσφορᾷ διὰ ἐσμῆν ἐνέδειας, τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ἑνεργεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, ἢ δὲ κινήσεις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἑστιν ἡδονή· διὰ δὴ τὸ ἀμα τῇ προσφορᾷ ἑκεῖνῳ τὸ μόριον τῇ τής 233

1153 a. 2. ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖν, ἣ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνεργιάν, οὔταντι γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ τῆν προσφορὰν δίλημα εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μόριον ἀδηλον. ὀμοιον οὖν ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν οὔταν εἴη σῶμα, ὅτι τούτο μὲν αὐθητὸν ἑστιν, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὗ ἔστι δὲ γε καὶ [ἡ] ψυχή. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου· ἐστὶν γὰρ μόριον τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ ἡδομέθα, ὃ ἀμα τῇ προσφορᾷ ἐνεργεῖ. διὸ οὐκ ἔστων ὀυδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις.

a. 7. διέστηκεν] The MSS. have συνέστηκεν, but a correction in CCC anticipates the conjecture of Bonitz—διέστηκεν, adopted by Bywater.

§ 3. ἐτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔτερον τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς] The Paraph. is wrong in thinking that the writer passes on here to discuss the second of the two points indicated at the beginning of this chapter—ὅτι δ᾿ οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ τούτα μὴ εἶναι ἁγάθων μηδὲ τὸ ἀριστον, ἐκ τῶν δὲ δῆλον. He is still concerned with the first point, and does not deal with the second till vii. 13. 2.

a. 8. ὀσπερ τινὲς φασιν κ.τ.λ.] The argument ‘that there is something “better than” pleasure, i.e. something for the sake of which pleasure is chosen, because pleasure is only a γένεσις,’ falls to the ground, for pleasure is not a γένεσις. For the distinction between the τέλος (or οὐσία) and the γένεσις, on which this argument relies, see Phileb. 54 C (quoted by Zell and Fritzsche) φημὶ έκαστη γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἐκιστής ἔνεκα γένεσθαι, ξυμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἐνεκα γέγνεσθαι ξυμπάσης. οὐκοῦν ἡδονὴ γε, εἰπέρ γένεσις ἐστιν, ἐνεκα των οὐσίας εξ ἀνάγκης γίγνομεν ἄν. τὸ γε μὴν οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ ἐνεκά τοῦ γνώμομεν ἀεὶ γίγνομεν ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἁγάθου μοίρα ἐκείνῳ ἔστιν τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἐνεκα γνώμομεν εἰς ἄλλην μοίραν θετείον. ἄρ’ οὖν ἡδονὴ γε, εἰπέρ γένεσις ἐστί, εἰς ἄλλην ἥ την τοῦ ἁγάθου μοίραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθοὶς θήσομεν; ὀρθάτα μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν τῷ μενοσαντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μὲν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδ’ ἡμισχων αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάρῳ ἔχειν δει, δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φαισκότων ἡδονὴν ἁγάθῳ εἶναι καταγελά. Here Plato thanks others for the formula γένεσις ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή. See also Phileb. 53 C ἀρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκώμεν ὧς δὲ γένεσις ἐστὶν οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπασα ἡδονῆς; καὶ τούτο γὰρ δὲ τινὲς [generally thought to be the Cyrenaics: see Grant, Ethics, vol. i. p. 176, Essay ii] αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων ἐπεξερεύνασι μηνής ὑμῖν οἷς δὲ χάρῳ ἔχειν. The formula then was not invented by Plato, and he did not apply it to the pleasures of thought and of the higher senses, except in a way which deprives it of the significance which it has as applied to those of eating and
drinking: for, although he thinks of the former pleasures as ἀναπληρώσεις, he distinguishes them, as καθαρὰ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης, from the latter, which are ἀπαλλαγαὶ λύπης: see Rep. 584, and Phileb. 51, 52.

Grant may be right when he says, speaking of the argument βέλτιον τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως criticised in the present section—'In all probability the school, and perhaps the actual writings, of Speusippus are here alluded to.'

οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πάσαι] πᾶσαι, of course, a. 9. refers to οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως only. No pleasures are γενέσεις, although some are μετὰ γενέσεως. The words οὐδὲ γυνόμενον συμβαίνουσι, equivalent to οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσίν, must be translated so as not to contradict the truth—μετὰ γενέσεως τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι. Συμβαίνειν, as in the formula of the syllogism Τῶν, i. 1, and as one sense of the term is defined in Μελ. Δ. 30. 1025 a. 30 (λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις συμβεβηκὼς οὗν δοσα ἵππαρχει καθ' αὑτὸ ἑκάστῳ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὑμτα' οὗν τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δύο ὀρθός ἔχειν), marks necessary consequence, as of the effect from its cause, the property from the essence. It is in this sense, and not in that of accidental concomitance, that it must be understood here. Grant's 'result from' brings this out well—'they do not result from our coming to our powers (γυνόμενον), but from our using those powers (χρωμένων).’ The subject of γυνόμενον and χρωμένων is ἡμῶν. Γένεσις is sometimes materially necessary to the χρήσις (e.g. the ὑπόλοιπος ἔξις of the hungry man feels pleasure, on the occasion of eating), but is not to be identified with it.

ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέσιν ἀγομένον τῆς φύσεως] = τῶν καθεστασών a. 12. εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἔξιν, according to Ramsauer: i.e. ἀγομένον is middle, and its subject is κινήσεως understood. This is the view of the Paraph. also, who has—Καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐνεργείων δοσι μὲν εἰς τελείωσιν ἀγομένος φύσεως, οὐκ αὐτὰ εἰσὶ τέλος, ὡσπερ ἡ καθ' ἔξιν ἀτρικήν ἐνέργεια τέλος ἔχει τὴν ὑγείαν· ἅσι δὲ οὐκ ἄγοσον εἰς φυσικὴν τελείωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ εἰσὶν ἡ φυσικὴ τελείωσις, δήλων ὡς οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἄλλο τέλος, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοιν αὐτὰ εἰσὶ τέλη· ὡσπερ εἴ τις κατὰ τὴν τελειαν ἔξιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνεργεῖ.

I am inclined to think that the writing is very careless, and that ἀγομένον is passive, its subject being the persons whose nature (τῆς φύσεως) is in question. I think that it is easier to suppose carelessness of this kind, than to take ἀγομένον = ἄγοντον.
The definition rejected on philosophical grounds here (and, so far as γένεσις is involved, also in χ. 3. 5) is not very different from that accepted by Aristotle as adequate for the more popular purpose of the student of rhetoric—Rhet. i. 11. 1369 b. 33 ἀποκεισθαί δὲ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ἠδονὴν κινήσει των τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἄρδεαι καὶ αὐθητήν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τουκαντίον. Ramsauer (p. 487) quotes two other passages in which Aristotle describes pleasure in terms which recall those of the definition here condemned, viz. Probl. 878 b. 11 ἢ εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδοῦ, εἶναι ζήτητη, and E. N. ix. 9 τὸ δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὧν τῶν ἡδῶν καθ' αὑτό (φύσις γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωῆ, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδοῦ).

a. 14. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέων ἑνέργειαν κ.τ.λ. 'Aristotle,' says Grant, 'when writing accurately distinguishes pleasure from the moments of life and consciousness (ἕνεργεια) from which it is inseparable. Cf. χ. 5. 6. He, however, does not more specifically define it than as ἑπαγωγιμένον τῷ τέλοι τῇ ἑνέργεια Euth. x. 4. 8. Eudemus does not preserve the distinction, but simply says that pleasure should be defined as "the unimpeded play of life." Aristotle himself occasionally writes in this way: cf. Met. xi. 7 (Δ. 7. 1072 b. 16) ἐπει καὶ ἠδονὴ ἡ ἑνέργεια τούτου.'

a. 15. ἀνεμποδίστοσ] ἀνεμποδίστος occurs nowhere in the E. N., and only here and in ch. 13. § 2 in the E. E.; but in Pol. Δ. 9. 1295 a. 35 the following words occur—ei γὰρ καλὸς ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εὑρήσῃ τὸ τῶν εὐδαιμονιῶν ἔστι εἰναι τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμποδίστον κ.τ.λ. Hence Bendixen (Bemerkungen zum siebenten Buch der Nicomachischen Ethik: Philolog. x. 199–210, 263–292) maintains that Aristotle must refer to E. N. vii, because it is only in E. N. vii that the term ἀνεμποδίστος occurs: consequently, that E. N. vii is by Aristotle. Against this view Spengel (Arist. Stud. pp. 189 sqq.) has little difficulty in showing that the reference in the Politics is not to the definition of ἠδονή given in vii, but to the doctrine of E. N. i and χ, according to which εὐδαιμονια is ἑνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαι ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ καὶ τῶν ἑκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένω, the term ἀνεμποδίστος being employed to sum up what is there expressed by ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ and τῶν ἑκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένῳ—cf. E. N. i. 10. 12 τὰ δὲ μεγάλα (τῶν ἀντικαλῶν) ... ἐμποθίζει πολλάκις ἑνέργειας. See also Grant, Ethics, Essay i. vol. i. pp. 55, 56.

The ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια of vii is, after all, not very different from the τέλειοι δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ of E. N. x (4. 5). According to E. N. x pleasure perfects, or is the perfection of, an ἐνέργεια—supervenes upon it, or crowns it, as beauty crowns youth (x. 4. 8)—without pleasure an ἐνέργεια is, in fact, ἀτέλης—falls short of the full vitality which it is its raison d'être to realise. In the phraseology of E. N. vii, such an ἐνέργεια is 'impeded,' 'has not free play.' Pleasure is 'the free play of a function' in E. N. vii; in E. N. x it is 'the perfection of a function.' As in Pol. δ. 9 ἀνεμπόδιστος takes the place of the τέλειοι of E. N. i in the statement of the doctrine of εὐδαιμονία, so in E. N. vii it takes the place of the τέλειοι of E. N. x. 4. 6 in the statement of the doctrine of ἡδονή. Undue importance has been attached to the difference between the ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια ἡ ἡδονὴ of vii and the τέλειοι τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ of x, because the doctrine ἐὰν ἄν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον (vii. 13. 2), logically necessitated by the former formula, has been thought to mark the writer of vii as a 'hedonist.' I have tried to show (note on vii. ii. 1. 1152 b. 1) that his ethical position is substantially the same as that of the writer of E. N. x. He differs merely in attempting to do more with the term ἐνέργεια, as a symbol of thought, than the writer of E. N. x attempts; and he perhaps strains its use. He is, in short, somewhat scholastic, but in no sense a 'hedonist.' And, as has been noticed above, he does not stand alone in identifying ἡδονὴ and ἐνέργεια. The writer of Met. λ. 7. 1072 b. 16 describes God's life as ἐνέργεια, ζωὴ ἄριστη, and ἡδονὴ, using these expressions as interchangeable. It may perhaps be said that it is natural to fall into a more scholastic use of terms in describing the life of God than in describing the life of man, and that while Met. λ. 7 is not inconsistent with Aristotelian principles, the present treatise is, being 'hedonistic.' To this we may answer—that it is not 'hedonism' to identify the highest pleasure with the highest function. 'Hedonism' takes no account of the pleasure of action; its highest good is passive enjoyment. Aristotelianism—represented by the writer of vii as well as by the writer of x—places pleasure in a position of philosophical dignity which it does not occupy in any other Greek school. As εὐδαιμονία is Life—what a man does, not what he receives—so Pleasure is not mere relief, or even passive enjoyment, but that which sustains function—or, as the writer of vii says more simply, it is function. So intimately is it bound up with Life, that it is difficult to say which is chosen for the sake of which
All living beings striving after fulness of life according to their kinds, it is in the consciousness of successful life—\textit{i.e.} in pleasure—that, for man and the other animals, the fulness of life is actually given. Life and Pleasure therefore cannot be separated as outer and inner—

\begin{quote}
Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale:  
Alles ist sie mit einem Male.
\end{quote}

The high position thus assigned to Pleasure by the side of, or rather in implication with, Life, or the Chief Good, marks the theory contained in vii and x as one to be viewed in a practical, or moral, rather than in a scientific light. The question, as I have said, which the theory sets itself to answer is (in spite of superficial appearances to the contrary) not 'What is pleasure as a physiological or psychological phenomenon?' but 'Is it good? And if so, how?'—\textit{i.e.} 'What are the relations of the various pleasures to the good life?' Some of them doubtless hinder it; but others again sustain and heighten it. The hedonists placed the wrong pleasures—those of passive enjoyment—highest; the Platonists unduly depreciated pleasure. To show, as against both schools, that the pleasures of virtuous function, or Duty, crown life with perfection, seems to me to be the object of the Aristotelian theory—a practical, or moral, object, which is misrepresented by Mill when he points out (truly enough) that the object of a scientific psychology has not been attained—that no answer, or worse than no answer, has been given to its question, 'What is pleasure?' See Mill, \textit{Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy}, ch. 25. p. 486: 'Aristotle's theory, which, as understood by our author, differs little from his own, is presented by Sir W. Hamilton in the following words (\textit{Lectures on Met.} ii. 452): 'When a sense, for example, is in perfect health, and it is presented with a suitable object of the most perfect kind, there is elicited the most perfect energy, which at every instant of its continuance is accompanied with pleasure.' The same holds good with the function of Imagination, Thought, \&c. Pleasure is the concomitant in every case where powers and objects are in themselves perfect, and between which there subsists a suitable relation.' The conditions whereon upon this showing pleasure depends are the healthiness of the sense, and the perfection of the object presented to it. This is simply making the fact its

\footnote{This is the theory of \textit{E. N.} x rather than of vii.}
own theory. When is a sense in perfect health, and its object perfect? The function of a sense is twofold—as a source of cognition and of feeling. If the perfection meant be in the function of cognition, the doctrine that pleasure depends on this is manifestly erroneous: according to Sir W. Hamilton it is even the reverse of the truth, for he holds that the knowledge given by an act of sense and the feeling accompanying it are in an inverse proportion to one another. Remains the supposition that the perfection of which Aristotle spoke was perfection not in respect of cognition but of feeling. It cannot, however, consist in acuteness of feeling, for our acutest feelings are pains. What, then, constitutes it? Pleasurableness of feeling; and the theory only tells us that pleasure is the result of a pleasurableness state of the sense and a pleasure-giving quality in the object presented to it. Aristotle and Sir W. Hamilton did not certainly state the doctrine to themselves in this manner; but they reduced it to this by affirming pleasure or pain to depend on the perfect or imperfect action of the sense, when there was no criterion of imperfect or perfect action except that it produced pain or pleasure. Mill is perhaps right in his contention that our scientific knowledge of the nature of pleasure is not enriched by the statement that 'it is the concomitant of perfect action.' But as a protest against those who said 'all pleasure is evil,' and those who made passive enjoyment the end, the statement is of great ethical importance. An interesting account of the Platonic and Aristotelian theories of pleasure, and notices of later theories, notably of Kant's, will be found in Hamilton's Lectures on Met. Lect. 43. Kant's theory of pleasure and pain is thus stated in his Anthropologie § 60, as rendered by Hamilton, Met. ii. 472—'Pleasure is the feeling of the furtherance (Beförderung), pain of the hindrance of life. Under pleasure is not to be understood the feeling of life; for in pain we feel life no less than in pleasure, nay perhaps even more strongly. In a state of pain life appears long, in a state of pleasure it seems brief; it is only, therefore, the feeling of promotion—the furtherance of life which constitutes pleasure. On the other hand, it is not the mere hindrance of life which constitutes pain; the hindrance must not only exist, it must be felt to exist.' 'These definitions of pleasure and pain,' Hamilton observes, 'are virtually identical with those of Aristotle, only far less clear and explicit.' But Kant's theory soon parts company from Aristotle's, as may be seen from another passage.
in the *Anthropologie*, which, however, I quote to show that Kant, though differing from Aristotle in important respects, is at one with him in having a practical purpose to serve with his theory of pleasure; and I would suggest that the Kantian theory of pleasure is as likely to be misrepresented as the Aristotelian, if treated as a contribution to 'scientific psychology.' The passage is given by Hamilton (*Met.* ii. 472) as follows—'If pleasure be a feeling of the promotion of life, this presupposes a hindrance of life; for there can be no promotion if there be no foregoing hindrance to overcome. Since, therefore, the hindrance of life is pain, pleasure must presuppose pain. . . . When we cast our eyes on the progress of things, we discover in ourselves a ceaseless tendency to escape from our present state. To this we are compelled by a physical stimulus. . . . But in the intellectual nature of man there is also a stimulus which operates to the same end. In thought man is always dissatisfied with the actual; he is ever looking forward from the present to the future. . . . Man is urged on by a necessity of his nature to go out of the present as a state of pain, in order to find in the future one less irksome. Man thus finds himself in a never-ceasing pain; and this is the spur for the activity of human nature. Our lot is so cast that there is nothing enduring for us but pain. . . . Pleasure is nothing positive; it is only a liberation of pain, and therefore only something negative. . . . It is certainly the intention of Providence that by the alternation of pain we should be urged on to activity. [Here Kant applies his theory; and its significance lies in the practical application he makes of it, not in the scientific meaning which may be extracted from the terms in which it is couched.] No one can find pleasure in the continual enjoyment of delights; these soon pall upon us. . . . There is no permanent pleasure to be reaped except in labour alone. . . . Labour is irksome, labour has its annoyances, but these are fewer than those we should experience were we without labour. As man, therefore, must seek even his recreation in toil itself, his life is at best one of vexation and sorrow. . . . Men think that it is ungrateful to the Creator to say that it is the design of Providence to keep us in a state of constant pain; but this is a wise provision in order to urge human nature on to exertion. Were our joys permanent, we should never undertake aught new. That life we may call happy which is furnished with all the means by which pain can be overcome; we have, in fact, no other conception of human happiness.'
A very different conception this of life and happiness, and of the relation of pleasure to life and happiness, from Aristotle's: my object, however, is not to contrast the theories, as such, of Aristotle and Kant, but to illustrate by another example the danger of taking a theory of pleasure (and the remark applies to any particular theory advanced by a great moralist in the construction of his ethical system—e.g. to a theory of Conscience such as Cardinal Newman's, or of Will such as Kant's) out of the context of the ethical system in which it is embedded, and of treating it as a contribution—valuable or worthless—to 'psychology.' Thus Kant's 'theory' that 'pleasure is nothing positive' may be accepted as a valuable psychological truth (as by Schopenhauer), and a whole system of 'psychological truths' may be deduced (to the psychologist's satisfaction) from it; or it may be rejected as 'psychologically untenable.' But plainly our view of its significance as that which helps Kant to express, in yet another figure, his deepest thought in presence of the problem of life, is not affected in the least by the favourable or unfavourable verdict of 'scientific psychology.' Indeed, 'untenable psychology' matters as little in Kant as untenable Ptolemaic cosmology in Milton. So with Aristotle's theory of pleasure. Mill's criticism may effectually dispose of it, as abstracted by Hamilton from its ethical context, and presented as a contribution to psychology: but it is not a contribution to psychology. It is an integral part of Aristotle's theory of duty—'The performance of duty,' Aristotle tells us, 'has its own pleasure, which ensures and perfects the performance. All other pleasures are inferior to this pleasure. The ascetics who say that pleasure is not good, and that we can do our duty without aid from pleasure, and the hedonists who say that the pleasures of passive enjoyment are the only pleasures worth seeking, are wrong;' Mill's criticism misses all this.

ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον] ἰ. ε. it is important to substitute the term ἀνεμπόδιστον for the term αἰσθητὴν. It goes without saying that, being an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, it is αἰσθητή or realised in consciousness; but unless it be ἀνεμπόδιστος, it is not realised as pleasant. The term αἰσθάνεσθαι is wide enough, according to Aristotelian usage, to cover the consciousness of thought, as well as that of sensation. I therefore think that the Paraphrast goes off on a wrong line here, when he says—ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν ἠδονή οὐκ ἐστὶν αἰσθητή.
1153 a. 15. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τισιν εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθῶν] This refers not to the Platonists hitherto criticised, but probably to the Cyrenaics; and γένεσις must be here understood to mean the outcome or operation of a ἔσις, not the process by which a ἔσις is formed or restored, as the term was understood by the Platonists. The hedonists here referred to maintain that Pleasure is really or perfectly good (κυρίως ἀγαθῶν); hence that it cannot be a ἔσις, which is only potentially or imperfectly good, but must be a γένεσις—the realisation or operation of a ἔσις: cf. E. N. i. 7. 13 (quoted here by Ramsauer) τὴν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ϑετέων κυριώτερον γὰρ αὐτὴ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. Instead of the term γένεσις, the writer suggests the term ἐνέργεια as better fitted to signify 'the operation of a ἔσις.' Rassow (Forsch. p. 100) reads τισιν for the τις of the MSS. after γένεσις, on the ground that the clause mentions a view which has not hitherto been alluded to. His words are 'Diese Worte sind völlig unverständlich, wenn man sie auf die in dem vorhergehenden Satze bestrittene Platonische Lehre bezieht. Man hat daher wohl mit Grant an die Cyrenaiker zu denken. Damit es aber erkennbar wird, dass man es mit einer neuen und noch nicht besprochenen Ansicht zu thun hat, ist wie ich glaube, das ohne dies auffallige ρὶς nach γένεσις in τισιν zu ändern. Diese von mir schon, Observ. Crit. p. 28, vorgeschlagene Aenderung ist von Bekker in der kleineren Ausgabe von 1861 [and by Susemihl and Bywater] aufgenommen worden. Der Paraphrast, der die Stelle richtig erklärt, hat vielleicht τισιν gelesen: γένεσις δὲ ἐδοξέ τισιν εἶναι ἠδονὴ ὅτι ὁφθη τὴν ἠδονὴν εἶναι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον· τὸ δὲ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι ἐνέργειαν δὲ καὶ γένεσιν μυθὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν· τὸ δὲ αὐχετικὸν ἐξεί.'

1158 a. 18. § 4. τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἐνα πρὸς χρηματισμοῦ] elliptical: τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἶναι φαῦλα, ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἐνα πρὸς χρηματισμοῦ.—' To say that pleasures are bad, because some pleasant things are unhealthy, is like saying that healthy things are bad, because some of them are bad, for money-making': cf. the Paraph. εἰ φαύλη λέγεται ἡ ἠδονὴ ὅτι ἐνα ἠδια νοσώδη, ἐσονται καὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ φαῦλα, ὅτι τὰ ὑγιεινὰ ἐμποδον ἵσταται τὸ πλουτεῖ, ὅτι πολλῶν χρημάτων ἔστω ἀναλυτικὰ. Peters, I think, is wrong with '... is like arguing that some things that are healthy are bad for money-making.' I take σο ὁ in a. 18, as in a. 17, to mean, not that, but because.

1158 a. 19. ταύτη] πρὸς χρηματισμοῦ. He means that both ἠδια and ὑγιεινὰ may be bad κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς—in some particular relation; but they
are not, on this account (κατά γε τοῦτο) bad in themselves—φαύλα 1158 a. 19. ἄπλως.

§ 5] answers vii. 11. 4 ἐπιδόσεων τῷ φρονείν αὐτῷ ἡδονή, on the a. 20. lines of E. N. x. 5. §§ 1-7, where it is laid down that every function has its own (oikeia) pleasure, which stimulates and perfects it, and that if a function is good (as judged, we must assume, not by the subjective standard of pleasurable feeling, but by the objective standard of correspondence with environment) its pleasure is good. It is by thus connecting pleasure with function, or correspondence with environment, that Aristotelianism meets hedonism and asceticism. It is to be observed that the writer here speaks of the ἐξις being impeded or stimulated by ἡδονή: whereas the writer of E. N. x. 5 speaks consistently of the ἐνέργεια (distinguished by him from the ἡδονή) being impeded or stimulated.

Φρονήσει, as Grant remarks, is used here generically for 'thought,' and not in the restricted sense given to it in Book vi.

§ 6] refers to vii. 11. 4 τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονής καὶ τοι πᾶν ἄγαθον a. 23. τέχνης ἔργον.

εὐλογος συμβεβηκα] 'is but natural' (Peters): 'is just what one a. 24. might expect to find.' Τέχνη is concerned with the ordering of the conditions (τῆς δύναμεος ἐστιν ἀποτέλεσμα) ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν δύναμις ἡ τέχνη, ἢ δὲ δύναμις προάγει τῆν ἐνέργειαν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς τέχνης αὕτη ἐστὶ τὸ δύνασθαι κυβερνῆν τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι κυβερνῆν αὐτῶν ἐστιν τῆς κατὰ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν ἐνέργειας. So close is the connexion between τέχνη and δύναμις, that such τέχναι as ῥητορική, λατρική and διαλεκτική are often simply called δύναμεις. They are the δύναμεις αὐτὶ μετὰ λόγου of Met. Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1, which are said to be concerned with contraries—καὶ αὐτὶ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσι τῶν ἐναντίων αὐτὰ. So long as alternatives are open—so long as this possible arrangement, or that, may be preferred—so long as preparations have to be made, τέχνη rules; but the result of these preparations,—that for the sake of which they have been made, when once it is realised, is something definite, which τέχνη cannot modify. Art may instruct a man how to hold his bow and point his arrow straight for the mark; but the ἐνέργεια of all this instruction—the flying arrow—has already escaped beyond the reach of art. Cf. M. M. ii. 10. 1208 b. 1 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀλλὰ ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τῷ χρῆσιν παραδίδουσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐξιν.

1153 a. 26. καίτω καὶ κ.τ.λ.] We have here what the Ald. Schol. describes as an ἐνστάσις brought against the πρότασις— ἥδων ὧν ἦστι τέχνη advanced by the opponent. It is submitted that arts of pleasure are popularly recognised. This ἐνστάσις however is obviously not so seriously meant as the ἀντιπαράστασις (Ald. Sc.), or rejoinder, contained in the first part of the §. The writer of M. M. ii. 7. 1206 a. 26 oddly omits entirely the weighty rejoinder οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἑνεργείας οὐδεμάκα τέχνη ἦστιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, and confines himself to the captious ἐνστάσις. His words are ἀλλος ἦν λόγος ὧν οὐδεμία ἐπιστήμη ποιεῖ ἱδωνήν. ἦστι δὲ οὐδὲ τούτῳ ἄλλης· οἱ γὰρ δεινοσυν- ποιοὶ καὶ στεφανοποιοὶ καὶ οἱ μυρεψοι ἱδωνής εἰσὶ ποιητικοί. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις οὐκ ἦστιν ἡ ἱδωνή ὡς τέλος ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἱδωνής τε καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ ἱδωνής. ἦστιν οὖν ἐπιστήμη ποιητική ἱδωνής. This is all that the writer has to say in answer to the thesis οὐδεμία ἐπιστήμη ποιεῖ ἱδωνήν.

a. 27. § 7.] 'Most of the arguments,' says Grant ad loc., 'against pleasure ignore the distinction between different kinds of pleasures, the one kind being of the nature of life, and the end, and therefore good in themselves (§ 3); the other kind being connected with inferior conditions of our nature, with pain, want, etc., and being therefore only secondarily and accidentally good (§ 2). This latter kind of pleasures, and excess in them, are made the ground of reproaches against pleasure in general.'

τὸν σῶφρονα φεύγειν] sc. τὰς ἱδωνᾶς.

a. 28. τὰ θηρία διώκειν] sc. τὰς ἱδωνᾶς.

a. 30. ἀπλῶς] Fritzsche believes that this word has crept into the text from a scholium; thus the Ald. Schol. has πῶς ἄγαθαί ἦτοι ἀπλῶς καὶ κυρίως.

τὰς τοιαύτας] τὰς μὴ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθὰς Par.

a. 31. καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος] sc. διώκειν. These words seem to form a parenthesis. The φρόνιμος tries not to be pained by the absence of these bodily pleasures. ὁ γὰρ φρόνιμος τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τῶν σωματικῶν ἱδωνῶν βούλεται μὴ λυπεῖσθαι (Ald. Schol.).

a. 35. ἱδωναὶ καὶ σῶφρονοι] τῷ γὰρ δικαίῳ ἱδωνῆ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν καὶ τῷ ἀνθρεῖῳ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ ἀνθρεῖα, καὶ τῷ σῶφρονε ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν τὰ σῶφρονα ἱδωνή γίνεται (Ald. Schol.). Cf. E. N. ii. 3. 1 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἱδωνῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαῖρον σῶφρον.
CHAPTER XIII.

ARGUMENT.

That pain is evil and avoided (evil in itself, and as impeding function) is admitted. Now, that which is contrary to what is avoided (qua avoided and evil) is good. Pleasure therefore, as the contrary of pain (qua avoided and evil), is good—for there is nothing in the argument of Speusippus, that, as greater, though contrary to less which is unequal, is not therefore equal, so pleasure, though contrary to pain which is evil, is not therefore good.

As for the view that pleasure is the chief good—there is nothing in the circumstance that some pleasures are bad to prevent its holding it: nay, we must hold it, if we define pleasure as 'unimpeded function'; for Happiness or the chief good is 'highest and best function,' and it would not be 'highest and best' if it were 'impeded': thus there will be a pleasure, viz. 'the highest and best (sc. unimpeded) function,' (other pleasures being bad, if you like, in themselves) which is identical with the chief good. This is why all men bind up the idea of pleasure with that of Happiness: the notion of 'perfect function' they naturally cannot separate from that of 'unimpeded function'; hence the importance attached to external prosperity—and to the absence of all that 'impedes' (for those who maintain that Happiness is possible in the midst of tortures and great adversities, if only a man is virtuous, either intentionally or unintentionally say what is untrue); hence the identification which is made of prosperity and Happiness by those who forget that even prosperity, when too great, 'impedes' as well as adversity.

The fact that all creatures—beasts and men—follow pleasure, points to its being the chief good. If all do not follow the same pleasure, yet it is pleasure that they all follow—nay, perhaps at bottom the same pleasure, for they are all members of the one divine system.

The bodily 'pleasures' have appropriated the name, because all men experience them, and many men know no others.

Further, unless pleasure, or function, be good, the 'Happy Life' need not be 'pleasant'—for pleasure is superfluous, if not good—nay, the 'Happy Life' might even be 'painful'—for if pleasure is not positively good, then pain is not positively bad, but neutral, and there is no reason for avoiding it. Thus the good man's life need not be more 'pleasant' than the bad man's.

§ 1. Ἄλλα μὴν ὃτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακῶν, ὅμολογείται, καὶ φευρτὸν ... 1153 b. 1. 

διὰ ἀγάπης οὖν τὴν ἤδουῃν ἄγαθόν τι εἶναι] This is the second part of the argument of Eudoxus given in E. N. x. 2. 2.

ἡ δὲ τῷ πῷ ἐπιστολική] The words as they stand cannot, I b. 2, think, be translated otherwise than as they are translated by Peters—'partly bad as in some sort an impediment to activity,' or by
1153 b. 2. Stahr—'theils is er (der Schmerz) es (ein Uebel), insofern er uns irgendwie behindert':—πῇ πῇ ἐμποδιστική (sc. εἴναι) forming a single expression in which πῇ qualifies ἐμποδιστική = 'as hindering in some way or other.' But the balance of the clause requires ἡ δὲ πῇ, τῷ ἐμποδιστικῆ (εἴναι)—'Pain is partly bad in itself (ἀπλῶς), partly bad in relation to something else (πῇ = κατὰ τι) i. e. inasmuch as it hinders good activities'—πῇ ἐμποδιστικῆ (εἴναι) being epexegetical of πῇ. Πῇ is frequently opposed to ἀπλῶς by Aristotle, but the Index gives no instance of τῷ πῇ where πῇ alone would be sufficient. Of course πῇ, like ἀπλῶς, or any such term, can be converted into a substantive by means of the article; but this use of the article would plainly be out of place here, where the meaning of the formula πῇ is not explained, but the formula is used. The Paraphrast seems to have read πῇ τῷ. His version is—ἡ μὲν καθ' αὐτῷ ἐστὶ φευκτῆ, ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ ἀρετῆ λύπη, ἡ δὲ πῇ, ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ ζημία τινὶ λύπη, ἦτες φευκτῆ ἐστι κατὰ τι, ὅτι ἐμποδίζει τῇ θεωρίᾳ. Similarly the Ald. Schol. ἡ δὲ οὖν ἐστιν ἀπλῶς κακῶν, ἄλλα πῇ κακῶν καὶ φευκτῶν ἦτοι καθὸ ἐμποδιστικῆ.

b. 4. ὡς γάρ Σπεύσιππος κ.τ.λ.] The best commentary on this obscurity brief reference is E. N. x. 2. 5, where the argument is given more fully but without the name of Speusippus.

The Paraph. explains the present reference thus—οὐ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ Σπεύσιππου λύσις καθ' ἡν ἐναστάμενος λύων ἐπιχειρεῖ τόνδε τῶν λόγων συμβαίνει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. φησὶ γὰρ ὃτι καθάπερ τὸ μείζων καὶ τὸ ἔλαττων ἐναντία ἐστὶ τῷ ἵσφ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄρετῶν τὰ παρ' ἐκάτερα ἐναντία, τῶν αὐτῶν δὴ τρόπων καὶ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ ἀντίκειται ἡ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπη, ἡ μὲν ὡς μείζων ἡ δὲ λύπη ὡς ἔλαττων καὶ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀλυπίᾳ ἄγαθον, ἡ δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ ἡ λύπη κακῶν, οὕτω γὰρ ὁ λόγος παντελῶς ἀδόξος ἔστιν ὡδειν γὰρ ἡ ἡδονὴ κακῶν δοκεί. Similarly the Ald. Schol. ἔλεγεν ὁ Σπεύσιππος ὅτι ὃς τὸ μείζων ἀντίκειται τῷ ἔλαττων καὶ τῷ ἵσφ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄκρα ἦτοι τὸ μείζων καὶ τὸ ἔλαττων ἦτοι κακά, τὸ δὲ μείζων ἦτοι τὸ ἴσων ἄγαθον ἕν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἡδονή ἀντίκειται τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ τῇ λύπῃ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄκρα ἦτοι ἡ λύπη καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ εἰσὶ κακά, τὸ δὲ μείζων ἦτοι ἡ ἀλυπία ἄγαθον ἕν—i. e. Speusippus argued that, 'as greater and less are both contrary to equal, and therefore both unequal, so pleasure and pain are both contrary to the neutral state which is good, and therefore are both evil.' To this the writer of x, and the present writer, reply—'Pleasure is not in itself (ὅσπερ) evil. We appeal to universal experience against you. You make a wrong application of a useful formula (ὅσπερ τὸ μείζων

τὸ ἐλάττων καὶ τὸ ἵσω (ἐναντίον) τὸ Pleasure: cf. E. N. x. 2. 5 1153 b. 4. λέγουται ταύτα ὡς κακῶς, ὡς μὴ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνθρώπους.

The formula thus misapplied by Speusippus is given in Cat. 11. 13 b. 36, with the caveat that it is applicable only within narrow limits, ἐναντίον δὲ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν μὲν εἰς ἀνάγκης κακῶν τόυτο δὲ δὴλου τῇ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἐπαγωγῇ οἷον ἔγειρέ νάσος καὶ δικασσούρα ἀδικία, καὶ ἀνδρεία δελεία ὀμοίος δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακῶς δὲ ὅτε μὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν ἐναντίον ὅτε δὲ κακῶν. τῇ γὰρ ἐνθεία κακῷ ὡντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακῶν δὲ ὀμοίος δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκάτερα ὀδύη, ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἐπὶ δλίγων δὲ ἄν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἵδοι τις ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τοῦ ἀγαθῶν ἐναντίον ἐστὶν. Speusippus neglected the caution conveyed in these words. On Speusippus see Grant, Ethics, Essay iii. vol. i. pp. 217, 218, and Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil. §§ 289–294. His theory of Pleasure is thus stated by Aul. Gell. ix. 5—Speusippus, vetusque omnis Academia, voluplātem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter se: bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη δηπερ κακῶν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν] Grant says—b. 6. 'We are probably to understand τις, with the Par. and Schol. Speusippus would have said that pleasure is an evil: cf. Eth. x. 2. 5.' I am not sure that Grant is right here. Speusippus would certainly have said that pleasure is an evil accidentally—probably he would have said that being evil is an 'inseparable accident' of pleasure; but would he have said that it is essentially evil? It seems to me that the word δηπερ (see next note) makes it possible to understand Speusippus as the subject of φαίη—which is, of course, what the run of the sentence naturally suggests.

δηπερ] 'For no one would say (or, Speusippus would not say) that pleasure is in itself and essentially an evil.' Eustratius in his note on E. N. vi. 4. 3 ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ δηπερ ἐξις τίς μετά λόγου ποιητικὴν ἔκφρασιν, explains correctly the technical meaning of δηπερ—το δὲ δηπερ δηλοῦν κειται τὸ υδύσιώδος καθηγορεῖται τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς τῆς τέχνης. See Alex. ad Trop. iii. 1. 273 a. 14 (quoted by Bonitz, Μετ. p. 176. q. v. on the use of δηπερ) το δηπερ αὐτῷ τοῦ κυρίως ἐστι δηλοτικόν, καὶ δ’ ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ δηπερ τὸ κυρίως ἐκεῖνο ἐστι σημαίνει, οἷον δηπερ ἀνθρώπος ὁ κυρίως ἀνθρώπος. On which Bonitz remarks—'excludit igitur pronomēn δηπερ quaequaque rei accidunt, includit unice ea quae in substantia, ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ἐνυς, insunt... omnino eo (i.e. by δηπερ) denotatur id ipsum quod res est, τὸ τί ἐστι, vel ἢ
1153 b. 6. οὐδεὶς τοῦ πρᾶγματος. 

The fundamental meaning of ὅσερ, the term is often used as synonymous with γένος, as in Τόρ. iv. 1. 120 b. 23 οὐσέ γὰρ ἡ χιών ὅσερ λευκών, διόσερ οὐ γένος τὸ λευκὸν τῆς χίωνς, οὐθ' ἡ ψυχὴ ὅσερ κινούμενον συμβέβηκε δ' αὐτῇ κανείσθαι: but this only, as Bonitz points out, and as is plain from the terms of the passage just quoted Τόρ. 120 b. 23, because τὸ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν καὶ πρῶτον ὑποτίθεται τῶν ἐν τῷ ὀρισμῷ λεγομένων Τόρ. iv. 5. 142 b. 27. Accordingly, with Waitz (Organon, vol. i. p. 467) simply to say that ὅσερ and γένος are synonymous is unduly to narrow the use of the former term. It may be noted that the Ald. Schol. on the present passage narrows the sense of ὅσερ in the way deprecated by Bonitz: his words are—οὐδεὶς ἂν φαίη τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅσερ κακὸν, ἣτοι ὡς ἐν γένει ἀνάγεσθαι τῷ κακῷ καὶ εἴδος τοῦ κακοῦ τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι. The Paraphrast brings out the fundamental sense of the term better—οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ὅσερ ἐστὶ κακὸν εἶναι.

b. 7. § 2. τάριστῶν τ'] The MSS. have ἄριστων τ', or ἄριστων δ'.

The conclusion εἰδὴ ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον formulated in this § is logically necessitated (ἵσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ.) by the identification of ἡδονὴ with ἐνέργεια: but, as I have tried to show, it does not involve any departure from Aristotelian principles, in the direction of 'hedonism.'

b. 8. ὅσερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινά ἐνών φαύλων οὐσῶν] Cf. M. M. ii. 7. 1205 a. 31 ἄμοιλος δ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμαι φαύλαι, οἷον ἂν βίανασιν' ἀλλ' ἄμοιλος οὐ διὰ τοῦτο φαύλων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ἀγαθῶν τῷ γένει. But the parallel drawn in the passage before us requires us to think of a certain ἐπιστήμη (φιλοσοφία Ald. Schol.) not as merely good, but as possibly the sumnum bonum. This is seen by the Paraph., who says—καὶ γὰρ πολλῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐδὲν κολύει τὸ ἄριστον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην. If, then, a certain ἐπιστήμη is the ἄριστον, how, it may be asked, can a certain ἡδονή also be the ἄριστον? Grant is probably right in thinking that we need not take the parallel very strictly: but the writer, if asked to defend the apparent inconsistency, would not have much difficulty in doing so, for θεωρία ἡ ἡδονὴ on his principles.

b. 9. ίσως δὲ . . . τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή] It is only if unimpeded (ἀν ἦν ἀνεμπόδιστος) that the ψυχὴ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀρετήν, which we call εὐδαιμονία, can be described as ἀρετωτάτη: for, as he says below,

οδηγεῖαι ἐνέργεια τελειος ἐμποδιζομένη b. 16. If then ἐνδαμονία, as 1153 b. 9. τελειος and αἴρετοτάτη, is ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος, it is ἤδονή, for ἤδονή has been defined as ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος.

eἰδ' ἡ πασών ἐνέργεια ἐστὶν ἐνδαμονία εἶτε ἡ τυνὸς αὐτῶν] ἡ τυνὸς b. 10. αὐτῶν is rightly explained by the Ald. Schol. as θεωρία, for which he refers to x (see Ε. Ν. x. 8. 8).

The Aristotelian doctrine of ἐνδαμονία does not, however, amount to the exclusive acceptance of either of the alternatives here presented εἰδ' ... εἰτε ... These alternatives mark rather two points of view from which ἐνδαμονία may be regarded. If it be regarded as an ἐννοιον εἴδος—as a life concretely realised, it presents itself as the harmonious play of all human functions, intellectual, moral and bodily—as the expression, in many ways, of the concrete unity—mens sana in corpore sano. But since such a concrete result cannot be produced or maintained without θεωρία, or the organising and regulative agency of Reason—is in fact nothing but the material manifestation of θεωρία which is its Form, Law, οὐσία ἄνευ ὅλης, or τι ἦν εἶναι: and since the Form or Law is the thing, philosophically considered (see Μελ. 2. 6. 1031 a. 17 ἐκαστόν τε οὐκ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι τῆς ἐαυτοῦ οὐσίας: καὶ τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἡ ἕκαστου οὐσία), it follows that ἐνδαμονία, considered formally or philosophically, is identified with θεωρία its Form or Law. It is especially in Ε. Ν. x that ἐνδαμονία is so identified. But we must be careful not to fall into a somewhat natural misunderstanding of the language employed in such passages as Ε. Ν. x. ch. 7 and ch. 8. §§ 1–8. When the writer says (Ε. Ν. x. 8. § 8) διὸν εἰπ' ἂν ἐν ἐνδαμονία θεωρία τις, he means that ἐνδαμονία formally considered is θεωρία. He does not mean that if we look at the ἐνδαμον in the concrete, we shall find that he is essentially a philosopher or man of science, spending his whole life in the exercise of his intellectual faculties, as such, in some department of knowledge: on the contrary, so to cultivate the intellect, as such, that the other powers of the human ensemble are allowed to lie fallow, would imply, in the writer’s opinion, a narrow and partial conception of life—would, in fact, indicate the absence of the ‘comprehensive view,’ ‘the survey,’ ‘the regulative agency of reason,’ or θεωρία in which ἐνδαμονία essentially consists.

We may say, then, that in the passage before us the clause εἰδ' ἡ πασών ἐνέργεια ἐστὶν ἐνδαμονία indicates the more concrete way of
looking at the Happy Life, and the clause eîte ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν the more formal philosophical way which sees it in its true nature: see Met. Z. 6 quoted above, and cf. E. N. ix. 8. 6 άκτερ δὲ καὶ πῶς τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πῶς ἅλον σύστημα, οὔτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος. It is quâ rational that man so organises the exercise of all his powers, intellectual, moral and bodily, as to be Happy; we may therefore say that Happiness is an employment of Reason—θεωρία τις.

b. 13. φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἐνυξεν, ἀπλῶς] 'Even if most pleasures are bad, and, if you like, bad in themselves.'

b. 17. διὸ προσδείται κ.τ.λ.] Cf. E. N. i. 8. 16, x. 8. 9. Fritzsche quotes Cic. de Fin. ii. 6. 19 Aristoteles virtutis usum cum vitae perfectae prosperitate coniunxit: and Alex. περὶ ψυχῆς (β) p. 157 Ald. describes εὐδαιμονία as συμπλήρωσις τῶν ἄγαθῶν.

b. 18. ὡς μὴ ἐμποδίζεται ταῦτα] The Ald. Schol. makes ταῦτα the subject—ὡς καὶ ταῦτα ἢ τὸ ἐκτὸς ἄγαθα, ἀπότινα μὴ παρεμποδίζωσι τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ εὐδαιμόνου: but it is better to take ὁ εὐδαιμόνως as the subject, and make ταῦτα = κατὰ ταῦτα, 'in respect of body, or estate, or fortune.'

b. 19. § 3. τροχίζομενον] Zell quotes Cic. Tusc. v. 9 In eo libro quem scripsit (Theophrastus) de vita beata in quo multa disputat quam-obrem is qui tortueatur qui crucietur beatus esse non possit. In eo etiam putatur dicere in rotam beatam vitam non escendere: non usquam id quidem dicit omnino; sed quae dicet idem valent. The τροχίς is described by the Schol. ap. Suidas as ξύλων τι ἐν ὁ δεσμομένου οἱ οἰκεῖαι ἐκολάζοντο.

b. 20. φάσκουτες] The Cynics. Thus Antisthenes Fr. 58 apud Mullach, ii. p. 284 αὐτάρκη γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδένος προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικὴς ἰσχύος (Diog. L. vii. 11–12).

b. 24. § 4. πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ἄρος αὐτῆς] 'For good fortune can only be defined by its relation to happiness' (Peters). τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τῆς εὐτυχίας ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν (Paraph.).

b. 25. § 5. καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἀπαντά κ.τ.λ.] The argument of Eudoxus quoted in x. 2. 1.

b. 27. φήμη κ.τ.λ.] Hesiod, ἐργ. καὶ ἡμ. 763. The second line continues —φημίζουσιν θεῶν νυ τις ἑστι καὶ αὐτή. Here, as Stahr remarks, we have the origin of vox populi vox Dei.
§ 6. *dXV* lirel oux aurr) cure <f>u(ri5 ou6' !£is 1^ dpiort) OUT* IOTIV 1153 b. 29. oûte dôkei*] ‘since however there is no one nature or state which is, or is thought to be, the best for all, so neither do they all pursue the same pleasure . . . ’ (Grant): πάσων, necessary in the protasis, is carelessly omitted, perhaps because the writer looked forward to πάντες in the apodosis.

*άλλα τὴν αὐτήν πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θείον*] If all pursue b. 32. ‘the same pleasure,’ it must be because they have ‘the same nature’ fundamentally. In man this is νοῦς, resulting in the function of νόσησις or θεωρία, often characterised as ‘divine.’ But the same organising principle, which appears in man as νοῦς, appears in the irrational animals (and in plants) as a nisus impelling them to purify the specific form, or ἐidos, from the incidents of individual decay and death, and make it eternal in the race (see *de An.* ii. 4. 415 a. 29). While individual animals seem to live κατὰ πάθος, for themselves, and to satisfy merely their own immediate wants, there is all the while at work within them ‘an eternal principle not themselves’ (θείων τι), by which their behaviour is regulated in conformity with a plan which includes all Nature: ἐὰν τουάτης ἀρχῆς ἦρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις (Μελ. Α. 7. 1072 b. 13). The Aristotelian God is the abstract of all the various modes of the organising nisus in Nature. He is described as ἐνέργεια ἀίδως—eternal function; and this eternal function is also said to be ἡδωνή (Μελ. Α. 7. 1072 b. 16). Inasmuch, then, as the lives, or ἐνέργεια, of all creatures are particular cases of this one ἐνέργεια ἀίδως, which is ἡδωνή, all creatures may be said τὴν αὐτὴν διώκειν ἡδωνήν.

*θείων*] Cf. *de An.* ii. 4. 415 a. 29, where it is said that living creatures propagate their kinds ἵνα τὸν ἄει καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχουσιν ᾗ δύναται.

*παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτάς*] sc. ἀντωνότες according to Michelet: but b. 34. the *Index* takes it intransitively—‘to pass over to’ ‘to incline to’: so the Ald. Schol. οἱ πλείονες πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς μᾶλλον ἰόπουσι.

*διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίσουσι κ.τ.λ.*] Cf. the simile *M. M.* ii. 7. 1205 b. 35. b. 13 ἀλλ’ οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν ἡδωνὴν οὐ σπουδάζουσιν, πεπώθουσιν οἷον οἱ μη εἰδότες τὸ νέκταρ οὐνται τοῦς θεοῦς οἶνον πίνειν, καὶ οὖκ εἶναι τοῦτον ἡδίων οὐδὲν τούτο πάσχωσιν διὰ τὴν ἄγριων ὦν ὁμοίων πεπόθουσιν οἱ πάσας τὰς ἡδωνὰς γενέσεως φάσκοντες εἶναι καὶ οὖκ ἄγαθον. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ
CHAPTER XIV.

Argument.

Those who so discriminate between 'noble pleasures' and 'bodily pleasures,' as to maintain that, while the former are good, the latter—for they are the intemperate man's pleasures—are not, must be asked to explain why the pains contrary to these bodily pleasures are bad. 'Bad' implies 'good' as its contrary. The truth is that the bodily pleasures partake of the nature of the bodily states and motions with which they are associated—states and motions which are good up to a certain point, but bad beyond that point; for where a state or motion cannot pass beyond the point of absolute perfection, the corresponding pleasure does not admit of excess. Bodily pleasures are good, and necessary up to a certain point; bad as pursued to excess by the intemperate man, who, it may be further observed, avoids, not excessive pain, but pain simply—notably the pain which is opposed to excessive pleasure (i.e. the pain caused by the absence of excessive pleasure)—a pain which only intemperate people feel.

Let us now try to make the truth about the bodily pleasures more convincing by showing how an erroneous view about them has naturally recommended itself. The erroneous view is that the bodily pleasures are more desirable than other pleasures. Why does this view recommend itself as true? Because (1) the excessive bodily pleasures banish pain; they are eagerly sought after as anodynes and restoratives; (2) because they are the only pleasures known to inferior natures—and here we are reminded of what was mentioned above in ch. 12—that these are the two points—(1) certain pleasures belong to bad natures, and (2) certain other pleasures are restorative of impaired natures—which are brought forward by some to support the equally erroneous view that pleasure is not good. Both views—that which makes the bodily pleasures the most desirable, and that which maintains that pleasure is not good—ignore the existence of pleasures which do not admit of excess and are associated with no pains. These pleasures are related, not to things 'pleasant per accidens'—
restoratives which set up recuperative activity in the sound part of an impaired organ or state—but to things ‘really, or naturally, pleasant’—things which call forth the function of an unimpaired organ or nature.

It is because man is a composite and corruptible being that the ‘accidental pleasures’—the ‘pleasures of change’—play such a large part in his life; the pure nature of God, in the performance of its one unchanging function, enjoys eternally one pure pleasure.

§ 1. Fritzsche and Grant point out that ‘Eudemus’ here discusses a subject (‘untouched by Aristotle’—Grant) which he had proposed to himself in his first book—viz. E. E. i. 5. 1216 a. 30 toûs δ' ή μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονῆς καὶ τίς καὶ ποιὰ τις γίνεται, καὶ διὰ τιών, οὐκ ἄδηλου. διὸς οὖ τίνες εἰσὶ δεὶ ζητεῖν αὐτὰς, ἀλλ' εἰ συνενεώμαι τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ή μή καὶ πῶς συνενεώμαι τις καὶ πότεν εἰ δεὶ προπάγειν τῷ καλῷ καὶ λειτουργίας, ταῖται (ὑ. τ. σωματικάς) δεὶ προσπάστεις, ἡ τούτοι μὲν ἄλλων τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν ἐτέρα δ' εἰσιν ἡδοναὶ δι᾽ αἰ πελάγος οἴονται τῶν εὐδαιμόνων καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλόπως· ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὑπέροχων ἐπισκέπτεται.

§ 2. διὰ τὶ οὖν κ.τ.λ.] Aspasius, the Paraph., and the Ald. Schol. a. 10. seem to connect this question more closely with ἐπισκέπτειναι a. 8 than Bekker, Sus. and Byw., with their full stop after ἀκόλαστος a. 10, do. ‘Those who say that bodily pleasures are not good, must be prepared to meet the question—why then are the contrary pains bad? Surely bad involves good as its contrary.’ Aspasius has—

τὸι δὴ ταύτα λέγουσιν ἐπισκέπτειν, διὰ τι αἱ ἐναντιὰ λήπται μοχθηραί; the Paraph. has—ἀπορήσει δ' ἀν τις, εἰ τινὲς ἡδοναὶ ἀγαθαὶ εἰς καὶ αἴρεται, τινὲς δὲ φαύλας, διότι αἱ σωματικαὶ περὶ τὸ ἄκολαστος, διὰ ταία λατης μοχθηρᾶ ἐστὶ καὶ φευγκή; δεὶ γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐναντῖα ταῖς ἀγαθαῖς ἡδοναῖς λύπην ποιημαίν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ταῖς φαύλασις ἐναντᾶτρὶ ἀγαθήν κακῷ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἁγαθοίντων εἰ δὲ καὶ αὕτη ἡ λύπη ποιημαίν, δόξειν ἀν τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονάς ἁγαθοῖν εἶναι. Similarly the Ald. Schol.—πάλιν ἐπιστορεῖ τις . . . εὰν αἱ σωματικὰς ἡδοναὶ ἄλλας κακὰς, λειτοῦτο ἄρα τὸ ἐναντίον ἢτοι τὰς λαύσεις ἁγαθῶν εἶσιν λυποῖς δὲ καὶ αὕτη ἡ λύπη ποιημαίν, δόξειν ἀν τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονᾶς ἁγαθοῖν εἶναι. Grant understands τοὺς λέγουσιν a. 9 to be ‘that section of the Platonists referred to above ch. 11. § 3 τοὺς δ' ἐνανταὶ μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαύλαι.’ Ramsauer follows Grant: I agree with Grant and Ramsauer against Zell and (apparently) Fritzsche, who understand ἐναντιὰ with τοὺς λέγουσιν. The writer having discussed the καλὰ ἡδοναὶ of the εὐδαιμόνων goes on as he (?)
1154 a. 10. promised (E. E. i. 5. 1216 a. 30) to examine the σωματικά ήδονα: and he recommends those who say roundly that they are bad to consider their nature a little more carefully. If they are bad, as they say, then how are the contrary pains also bad? The truth is that it is only in excess that the bodily pleasures are bad.

a. 12. αἱ ἀναγκαίαι: i. e. αἱ σωματικαί: cf. vii. 4. 2. The Ald. Schol. has ἀναγκαίαι δὲ εἰσὶ τὰ σύμμετρα ποτὰ καὶ συνία.

Of the two suggestions introduced by ἡ (a. 11 and a. 13), the latter gives the writer's opinion. The bodily pleasures are not merely negatively good—'good in the sense in which the absence of evil is good '; but positively good up to a certain point, beyond which, however, they become bad.

a. 13. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐξεων καὶ κυνῆσεων οἱν τῆς ἐξεως τῆς βεβαρητικῆς ύπερβολῆς οὐκ ἔστιν (Ald. Schol.); and the same may be said of any ἀρετή, as such: its notion involves definite form, and excludes excess or the negation of form. Cf. E. N. ii. 6. 20 σαφησθήνης καὶ ἀνθρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ύπερβολή καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πως ἀκρον . . . ἄλως γὰρ οὐθ ύπερβολῆς καὶ ἔλλειψεως μεσότης ἔστιν, οὔτε μεσότητος ύπερβολῆ καὶ ἔλλειψις.

a. 18. εὐαντίως δὲ . . . διόκουν τὴν ύπερβολὴν: 'But with pain the case is reversed: not merely the excess of pain, but pain generally is to be avoided; for the opposite of excessive pleasure is not painful except to the man who pursues the excess' (Peters). Similarly Stahr—'Entgegengesetzt ist es mit dem Schmerz, denn hier flieth der Mensch nicht das Uebermass, sondern den Schmerz überhaupt; der Schmerz ist nämliche nicht das dem Uebermasse Entgegengesetzte, außer für den, der dem Uebermasse nachtrachtet.'

Grant, after translating to the same effect, adds—'This argument goes to prove that bodily pleasure is, in itself, good; only when in excess is it evil. On the other hand, all pain is evil. Pleasure and pain, then, are opposite terms, the one being good, and the other evil. To make the doctrine of Speusippos (ch. 13. § 1) hold good, it would be necessary to make pain and the excess of pleasure opposite terms. But they are not so, except perhaps in the mind of the intemperate man, who thinks that the only alternative is between excessive pleasure and a painful sensation.' Fritzsche has—'Contra se res habet in dolore: nam hujus non fugimus quod nimium est: sed hunc fugimus in universum.
Itaque contraria sunt dolor, qua dolor est, et voluptas, qua voluptas est, non qua nimia est.

According to these interpretations (which agree substantially with those of the Ald. Schol., Zell, and Michelet), τις understood is the subject of φεύγει a. 19. I think that ὁ φαίλος a. 16 (= ὁ ἀκόλογος) is the subject: see note on vii. 4. 3. 1148 a. 7. This is the view of the Paraphrast, whose comment seems to me very good—"Οσα τοίνυν ὑπερβάλλουσι τὸ δέον φαίλαι εἰς, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἀκόλογος ἐστι, καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής' κατὰ τὰς δὲ ἐναντίας λύπας ἀκόλογος οὐ περὶ τὰς ὑπερβολικὰς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν ὑπερβάλλουσας ἥδωνας διώκει, τὰς δὲ μικρὰς λύπας φεύγει: ὧστε φανερὸν ὦτι ταῖς ὑπερβαλλούσαις ἥδωναὶ αἱ ἐν τῷ ἀκολόγῳ ἀνικείμενα λύπαι οὐχ ὑπερβολικά εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ μέτρα, καὶ ἀλλὰ οὐδεὶς ἀν φύγοι τῶν σπουδαίων, ὦτι οὐδέ λύπαι εἰσιν' ἀλλὰ τῷ διάκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν ἥδωνῶν ἀγελεύων δοκεῖ τὸ μετρίον καὶ κατὰ λόγον αὐταῖς χρήσασθαι. The φαίλος is assumed to err both in his pursuit of pleasure and in his avoidance of pain. The unnatural contrary which he sets up to excessive pleasure—the pain which those who pursue moderate pleasures do not feel at all—helps us to appreciate the moral difference—ignored by οἱ λέγοντες μὴ εἰναι ἁγαθὰς τὰς σωματικὰς ἥδους—between the excessive and the moderate pursuit of bodily pleasures.

§ 3. Ἐπεὶ . . . αἱρετῶτεραι] The apodosis of this sentence begins a. 22. with ὧστε a. 25.

τοῦ ψεῦδους] The view that the bodily pleasures are better than a. 23. those of the εὐρεγεία καὶ ἀρετήν. That the latter are better than the bodily pleasures is τάληθες which the writer seeks to corroborate by pointing out how τὸ ψεῦδος came to be believed—διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἥδωναι αἱρετῶτεραι. 'This section,' as Grant says, 'no longer deals with the opinion of the Platonists [Ramsauer erroneously supposes that it does] that bodily pleasure is an evil, but takes up another question already partly anticipated ch. 13. § 6: namely, How is the vulgar error to be accounted for, which gives so much prominence to physical pleasure in the scale of pleasures?'—i.e. this § returns to the εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ἀνόμοιος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἥδωναι κ.τ.λ. of 13. § 6.

§ 4. διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι] sc. αἱρετός, suggested by a. 30. διώκονταί. 'They seem good by contrast.'

καὶ οὗ σπουδαίον . . . οὗν σπουδαίαι] These words, suspected by a. 31.
1154 a. 31. Zell, are bracketed by Ramsauer, as interrupting the flow of the argument; Ramsauer says—'et quae ante ista praecedunt, et quae insequuntur, eo spectant ut intellegatur διὰ τὶ διώκονται αἱ σωματικαί: haec vero ipsa fere in contrarium sententiam disputata sunt δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἔνεκα ἡ ἡδων ὀλος φαύλη εἶναι δοκεῖ. Nec dubito equidem quin e medio tollenda sint.' Grant observes—'This paragraph reverts parenthetically to the opinion of the Platonists.' I am inclined to take the paragraph as the writer's parenthesis suggested by the mention of ἰατρεῖαι immediately preceding. ὥσπερ εἴρηται a. 32 refers to ch. 12. § 1, and the δύο ταῦτα a. 31 are (1) ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης κ.τ.λ. a. 32, and (2) αἱ ἰατρεῖαι ἐνδεοῦς a. 34. Ramsauer, I think, does injustice to the writer of the paragraph, when he accuses him of saying, first, that there are two reasons, and then enumerating three, viz. (3) αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελειομένους b. 1. The words αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελειομένους merely expand what is said of the ἰατρεῖαι in the sentence immediately preceding, and do not introduce a third class of pleasures: see Coraes ad loc. αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι ὅμοιαι τῶν ἡδων ὧν ἀπαλλαγμένοι εἶναι διότι τὸ ἐνδεοῦς εἶναι ἀναπληρόσεις . . . αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦτα πληρώσεις συμβαίνουσι τοῖς τελειομένοις, τούτεστι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδέιας εἰς τὴν πλήρωσιν προϊούσι καὶ οὐ τοῖς τετελειομένοις 1.

Admitting, then, that the paragraph is parenthetical and very loosely attached to the context, I think the connexion of the writer's thought may be satisfactorily traced as follows—'Bodily pleasures, though inferior, are sought after more than other pleasures. Why? Because they are good remedies of pain by reason of their excessive character. And, in passing, it is interesting to observe, that the very qualities which recommend them to the vulgar—their excessive character (in the φαύλη φύσις), and their suitableness as remedies, are seized upon by certain theorists, mentioned before, to establish the sweeping generalisation that Pleasure is not good.'

a. 34. αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι [ὅτι] ἐνδεοῦς] Bywater's omission of ὅτι removes a great difficulty: but how ὅτι got into the MSS. (and I do not think that we can be sure that it was not in the MS. used by Aspasius) still remains a difficulty.

ἐξευτ] to be in a natural state (ἐξευτ).

1 Bywater (Contrib. p. 58), taking this view of the position of αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι, suggests ὅ for δὲ.
§ 5. **ἐτι** The argument, broken by the parenthesis καὶ οὐ σπον—b. 2.

§ 6. **εν μὲν** η τε νεότητι...**ἀσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται**] Grant b. 9.

**Τελεσομένουν**] Cf. vii. 12. 3 καὶ τελος οὐ πασῶν ἐτερὸν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς 1154 b. 1. τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως.

**§ 5. ἐτι** The argument, broken by the parenthesis καὶ οὐ σπον—b. 2.

§ 5. **ἐτι** The argument, broken by the parenthesis καὶ οὐ σπον—b. 2.

dαιον a. 31 . . . b. 2 σπονδαία, is now resumed.

**διψα** Zell, Coraes, Michelet, and Grant take this metaphorically, of artificially produced desires generally, ἐπισκευασταὶ ἐπιθυμίαι as they are called by the Paraph. Fritzsche follows the Ald. Schol. in taking the word literally—βουλόμενοι πίνειν ἢ ἀλης τῆς ἡμέρας ἐσθίοναι ἀλματὰ τινα ὰνα δεψάτεροι οὖτω γίνονται. So also Aspasius. I am inclined to think that it ought to be taken literally, as a special example (introduced by γον) of the length of the διψάμενοι ἀλλας χαίρει will go in the pursuit of excessive pleasures. Perhaps, however, τυάς is against the literal interpretation.

**ἀμλαβέεις**] Not διψα παρασκευάζωσι, but ήδονάς παρασκευάζωσι. b. 4.

**οὐτε γάρ κ.τ.λ.**] This clause explains φαίλον: so, Aspasius. b. 5.

**τὸ τε μηδέτερον...φασίν**] The mere absence of pleasure is b. 6. painful to many men by reason of their temperament (διὰ τὴν φύσιν: the reference is chiefly to the μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν about to be mentioned): for ‘physiology’ teaches us that Life is a continual struggle, to the pain of which we become accustomed: some of us, however, so imperfectly that when the pleasure, which generally aids ‘custom’ in deadening pain, is absent, we feel this absence of pleasure (which to perfectly regulated or ‘accustomed’ minds ought to be a neutral state) positively painful, i.e. we become aware again of the fundamental pain of Life, which has been kept beneath the level of consciousness by the aid which pleasure gives to imperfect ‘custom.’ Aspasius ascribes the aphorism δεὶ ποιεῖ τὸ ζύφων to Anaxagoras.

§ 6. **ἐν μὲν** η τε νεότητι...**ἀσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται**] Grant b. 9.

appositely quotes Goethe’s

Trunken müssen wir alle sein;
Jugend ist Trunkenheit ohne Wein.

He refers to *Probl. xxx. ch. i (L. 953)* as the best commentary on the present passage. There ‘a frequent comparison is made between the effects of wine, youth, and the melancholy (or bilious) temperament, in producing desire. . . . The principle of **αὐξησις** in vol. II.
1154 b. 9. Youth is represented as producing the same results as the humours (χυμός ὁ μελαχολικὸς—ἡ τῆς μελαίνης χολῆς κράσις) in the bilious temperament.

The account which the Ald. Schol. gives of the operation of the μελαινα χολή in arousing desire is as follows: οἱ δὲ μελαχολικοὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν . . . ἔχουσι τὴν χολὴν θερμοτάτην ὑσσαν, συντόμως κατανικοῦσι κοιαναμάν τὰ ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ βρόματα, καὶ ἕνα μὴ τῆς γαστρὸς κενωθείσης διακαύσῃ πάντα ὑπόσθεν ἡ χολὴ ἡ μελαινα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ἐτερῶν τι κατανικίσκειν, διὰ τοῦτο δεῖται ἀδὲ τὸ μελαχολικὸν ιατρεύειν ἦτοι ἀνασπληρόν βρωμάτων τῆς γαστέρα αὐτοῦ. On the μελαχολικοὶ see note on vii. 7. 8, b. 25.

b. 14. η τ ἐναντία καὶ τ ἥ τυχοῦσα] Aspasius (156. 16 Heylbut) has the following comment—καὶ τὸν Ἀνασπλήρωσον αἰτίαται Θεόφραστος ἐν Ἡθικοῖς λέγων ὅτι ἐξελαύνει ἡδονή λύπην ἢ γέ ἐναντία, οἷον ἡ ἁπὸ τοῦ πίνειν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δίνειν, καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, τούτεστιν ἦτοι ὧν ἦν ἐὰ πληγοῦσα ὡστε ἐνίστε πείνας ἐξελαύνει καὶ ἀκούη ἡδονή, ὅταν ἄφαιρεν ὡς ἄλλος τοῖν ἀκούσασι διαφερόντως χαίρωμεν.

b. 15. ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαύλοι γίνονται] It is natural to suppose that οἱ μελαχολικοὶ are specially intended: but it is possible, with Aspasius (καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι γίνονται ἀνθρώποι), to understand the remark generally.

b. 16. § 7. τῶν φύσει ἡδέων] See note on i. 8. 11.


b. 20. φύσει δ ἡδέα, ἀ ποιεῖ πραξίν τῆς τοιάσθη φύσεως] Those things which effect ἀνασπλήρωσιν, or τὸ ιατρεύεσθαι, are pleasant indirectly—i.e. relatively to the nature which is being restored: this nature must have a sound part left in it (τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ἑρμοῦ: cf. ὑπολοίπον vii. 12. 2), otherwise it could not be restored at all. But those things which stimulate the functions of a completely sound nature (τῆς τοιάσθη φύσεως) are in themselves pleasant—as the Paraph. puts it φύσει δὲ ἡδέα οὐ τὰ ἀνασπληροῦστα τῆς ἐνδεικτικῆς τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ τὰ ποιοῦντα πράξειν αὐτῆς: οἷα ἐστὶ τὰ θεωρητὰ' τελειοῦσα γὰρ τῆς ψυχής τῆς ἐνέγρειαν. Ramsauer gives the correct meaning of τῆς τοιάσθη φύσεως—'quae talis est qualis est, nec corrupta nec egens.' Peters has an instructive note here, which I take the liberty of quoting—'I am sick and take medicine, hungry and take food (which seems
to be here included under medicine); but neither the drug nor the food can of themselves cure me and restore the balance of my system—they must be assimilated (for the body is not like a jar that can be filled merely by pouring water from another jar), i.e. part of my system must remain in its normal state and operate in its normal manner. But this operation, this ενέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξως, is pleasure (by the definition given above 12. 3), and in ignorance of the process we transfer the pleasure to the medicine and call it pleasant. The weakness of this account is that it overlooks the fact that, though the medicine cannot itself cure without the operation of τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξως, yet on the other hand this ἔξως, this faculty, cannot operate in this manner without this stimulus; so that there seems to be no reason why the medicine, as setting up an ενέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξως, should not itself be called φύσις ἱδέα. But the whole passage rests on the assumption that there can be activity without stimulus, i.e. without want—an assumption which has become inconceivable to us.

It is perhaps true that, on the whole, Aristotelianism takes too little account of stimulus, where the higher functions are concerned: but I think that the present passage, with its φύσις ἱδέα, & τοιεῖ πράξιν τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως, cannot be said to ignore it. Τὰ φύσει ἱδέα constitute the environment with which the healthy organism corresponds; τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἱδέα, or τὰ ἱατρεύοντα, are the circumstances in which an impaired, but not ruined organism, recovers its health.

§ 8. μὴ ἀπλὴν τὸ σύνθετον of E. N. x. 7. 8. In man's composite b. 21. nature the principle of Form asserts itself with difficulty against Matter. Νόησις, the purest expression of this principle, cannot be long kept up, for it is soon checked, and the pleasure attending it destroyed, by the resistance of the material part of his nature. Before νόησις can be resumed, and its attendant pleasure experienced again, the material resistance must have had time to subside—matter must have its own way, for a while, and be allowed its own pleasure. Thus the life of the individual man is broken up into short periods of νόησις, properly so called, alternating with times during which the material vehicle asserts itself on its own account: and this experience of the individual is paralleled, on a great scale, in the life of the race, the specific form of which is not realised in one immortal individual, but asserts itself, more or
1154 b. 21. less perfectly, for a short time in the adults of one generation, is eclipsed by their decay and death, regains force in their young descendants, and again asserts itself, more or less perfectly, in these when they reach adult age. But God is not thus discrete, like the higher moments of man, or the individuals of a species. He is continuous—ζωὴ καὶ αἰῶν συνεχὴς καὶ ἄθικος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ (Met. Α. 7. 1072 b. 29). His nature is ἀσημί: it is ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως—Form not confronted by Matter—Form in itself, actually always achieved, not again and again to be imposed, by fatiguing efforts, upon τὸ δεικτικὸν. His ἡδωνή therefore is ἀσημί. Thus, the contrast between the immutability of God, as pure Form, and the mutability of the individual man, as compounded of Form and Matter, is the burden of the closing sentences of this treatise on Pleasure. But we must remember that Aristotelianism does not really acquiesce in this contrast. Man has—if I may venture to use the expression—his eternal and immutable moments—the moments of νόησις which he enjoys, when his Form—God's Form—asserts itself victoriously in his Matter. These moments have immeasurable worth and dignity—ἀναγωγὴ δὲ ἄγαν οὐκ ἡ ἄριστη μικρὸν χρόνων ἡμῖν (Met. Α. 7. 1072 b. 29): or, as Alexander (Met. p. 77 ed. Bonitz) says (in a passage which shows how easily Aristotle's theology lends itself to neo-Platonic doctrine) —ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς δυνάμει διὰ τὰ νοητά, ὅταν ἐκ τῆς ἄκρας ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς ἀγαθοίς ἐνεργεία γένηται τὰ νοητά, τότε ξώμεν τὴν ἀριστήν καὶ μακαρωτάτην καὶ πάσης ἡδονῆς ἐπέκειται καθ᾽ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἀνερμήνευτος, γνώσκεται δὲ τοῖς τὸ μακάριον τούτι παθοῦσι πάθος.

b. 23. δὲν θ᾽ ἵσαξθ ἀλλὰ τὸ πραττόμενον ἵσαξθ intransitive—'And when the two elements are balanced, the result appears neither painful nor pleasant' (Grant). The Paraph. (followed by Coraes, Michelet, and Fritzsche) is wrong in thinking that the 'balance' mentioned, is the ὑμεταίρια of the virtuous character, in which reason rules, and sense cheerfully obeys. The actions of the virtuous character are pleasant, not neutral. The writer is thinking rather of the effect which custom has in dulling the pleasure and pain of acts: see above § 5, b. 6.

b. 27. ἀκινησίας] God, or ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως, is described as ἀκίνητον in Met. Α. 7. 1072 a. 25 ἦστι τι σε ὁ τὸ κυνομελῶν κινεῖ, ἄθικον καὶ νόημα καὶ ἐνέργεια ὁδὸν ἦστι τι κυνοῦν αὐτῷ ἀκίνητον ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ δὲν. The First Cause of the motion of material things in space is not itself
motion, and is not itself a material thing in space: *Met.* A. 7. 1154 b. 27. 1073 a. 3 ἀκίνητος οὐσία ἄδιδος καὶ ἀκίνητος, καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν . . . μέγεθος οὖθεν ἐνδεχεται ἢ λάθος ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλ’ ἀμερής καὶ ἀδιάρρετος ἔστιν. Cf. *Met.* I. 8. 1012 b. 28 ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐν μετάβαλλειν (i. e. ἀνάγκη δὲ τι εἶναι εἰ τε μεταβάλλει Bonitz, p. 217) ἐκ τινος γὰρ εἰς τι ἡ μεταβολή. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ πάντα ἡ ἰδέα ἄνεστι ποτὲ, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἦν τι γὰρ τι δ’ ἄνει καὶ κατὰ τὰ κανονικά, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κακὸν ἀκίνητον αὐτὸ.

When we are told that the eternal energy of this immaterial Principle is Pleasure— Hedone ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου (*Met.* A. 7. 1072 b. 16)—we must ask no questions. The language is not that of science, but of poetry. As poetry we must accept also the words before us here (vii. 14. 8), notwithstanding that they begin with a 'wherefore'—διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἡδονὴν b. 26.

καὶ ἡ ἰδιότητα μᾶλλον ἐν ἡμερᾶ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει] because the purest ἡδονή is that of θεωρητική ἐνέργεια, or νόησις, and the νοητῶν (with which νόησις is identical) is a fixed intelligible system, as distinguished from the fluctuating crowd of sensible particulars. Thus in *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 a. 6 ἐν καθολον (the object of νόησις) is said ἡρεμήσασθαι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ: and in *de An.* i. 3. 407 a. 32 we read— ἡ νοῆς εἰς οὐκ ἢρεμήσει τινὶ καὶ ἐπιστάσαι μᾶλλον ἡ κινήσει: cf. also *E. N.* x. 4. §§ 1–4, where it is shown that ἡδονή is διὸν τι, and therefore not a κινήσις. Equally irreconcilable with its being a κινήσις, or being ἐν κινήσει, is the doctrine of this Book that it is ἀνεματάδος ἐνέργεια, or perfect function; for κινήσις is always in itself imperfect: cf. *Phys.* iii. 2. 201 b. 31 ἢ τε κινήσις ἐνέργεια μὲν τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἀπελθεὶ δὲ.


ἡ δεομένη] Rassow (Forsch. p. 101) argues that ἡ must be b. 30. either expunged or changed into ἡμῶν: δεομένη is the predicate—'As the bad man is changeable, so our nature, being neither simple nor good, needs change.' If we retain ἡ, then πονηρά must be understood as predicate to the subject ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολής, and the clause οὐ γὰρ ἀπλὴν οὐδ’ ἐπισκεῖσ (ἐπὶ διὰ πονηρίαν των) is superfluous.

§ 9.] Probably the work of an editor.
BOOK VIII.

Introductory Note.] The space given to φιλία in the Ethics is very large, and doubtless indicates by its extent the importance of the subject to Aristotle's moral system. It must be remembered, however, that Aristotle's φιλία is a wider term than Friendship, and that, although the latter is discussed at considerable length, these two Books treat also of other subjects under the general head of φιλία.

The width of the field covered by the treatise may be estimated from the range of the two questions propounded respecting φιλία. These are (1) What is its Natural History? and (2) What may be done with it in the interests of the Higher Life? As discussing the first of these questions the treatise amounts to 'an enquiry concerning the Principles of Sociology'; as discussing the second question it is 'an Essay in the Metaphysic of Ethics.'

Examining the Natural History of φιλία, Aristotle finds that there are various forms of it, all more or less obvious phases of that gregarious instinct, to which, rather than to a perception of the advantages of co-operation and division of labour, society owes its origin and its maintenance—see Pol. iii. 4. 1278 b. 20 φύσιν μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνθρωπος ζωὴν πολιτικόν. διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεῖς μονόν τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας οὐκ ἔλατον ὅμοιον τὸν συζύγον οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινῆς συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιφάνει μέρος ἐκάστου τοῦ ζην καλῶς.

The earliest form of the gregarious instinct in man, as in the lower animals, is that natural affection, or στοργή, which unites parents and offspring, and generally those closely related by blood.

I do not wish to commit myself to Grant's view (Ethics, vol. ii. p. 249) that 'nothing is more clear than that [the present treatise on Friendship] was written to form a part of Aristotle's work on Ethics'; but I readily admit that it might have been, so far as subject and treatment are concerned. At any rate, if originally an independent treatise among Aristotle's moralia, it soon had a definite position assigned to it immediately after the Books on the ἀρεταί, ἀκρασία, and ἡδονή. It must be assumed, I take it, that the writer of the E. E. found it in this position.
'Η συγγενεική φιλία (viii. 12. 2) is the primitive φιλία. As the Family grows into the Village, and Villages are organised into the City, persons more and more distantly akin are thrown together, and find pleasure and advantage in association. The aggregates so produced not only crystallise, as wholes, into political forms (βασιλεία, ἀριστοκρατία, τιμοκρατία) which retain traces of the original family relationships, but the individuals composing the aggregates contract, as individuals, mutual relations in which either social pleasure or private advantage is the more prominent feature. Where social pleasure is the more prominent feature the mutual relation is called ἐταιρική φιλία (viii. 5. 3); where private advantage, ἡ φιλία ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον. Aristotle's method is thus to generalise the notion of φιλία. Not only is there ἐταιρική φιλία, but there are also συγγενεική φιλία, πολιτική φιλία (ix. 6. 2), and ἡ φιλία ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον (viii. 3. 1-4). Two men become friends, or enter into a business contract, not only or principally because they now agree, as individuals, to be friends, or to make this particular bargain, but essentially because they are members of a social order or community which was constituted and is held together by fellow-feeling—by ὁμόσωσις or πολιτική φιλία. Πολιτική φιλία in its turn may be traced back to συγγενεική φιλία—the natural affection binding together parents and offspring, and kinsmen generally; while συγγενεική φιλία itself touches the First Principle of Nature, being the consciousness of that endeavour after τὸ ἄλλο καὶ τὸ θεῖον, which Aristotle recognises as φυσικότατον in all creatures. Contract and the division of labour, effecting public and private advantage (τὸ χρήσιμον, τὸ συμφέρον), can operate only among persons who already occupy the status of members of an established community, and feel confidence in one another. The expression ἡ φιλία ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον marks Aristotle's recognition of the truth that the individual cannot secure his own private advantage except in so far as he is the φίλος of those with whom he deals. He cannot secure his own advantage in a state of 'war of every man against every other.' Men are naturally 'friendly' to one another, and therefore secure advantages to themselves by fair dealing, not by plunder and murder. The thought of the private advantage which he buys reacts upon a man's 'friendly' feelings, and gives these the colour described by Aristotle in his account of ἡ φιλία ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον: yet, save in a society ultimately held together by 'friendly' feelings, private advantage could not be bought at all.
The rules of Justice express the various ways in which my advantage may be reconciled with yours in such a society. Justice, as a habit of the mind, is a preparedness to act according to rules which are established to secure the good of the community, and, through it, the good of its individual members. But the existence of such rules, and of the preparedness to observe them, imply that, on the whole, the good of the community is desired, although individual members may be often tempted to disregard it. In other words, there would be no δικαιοσύνη without φιλία. Φιλία, which is η τοῦ συζητούσων (Pol. iii. 5. 1280 b. 39), is the individual's interest in τό κοινόν συμφέρον, and τό κοινόν συμφέρον is the standard of Justice—see Pol. iii. 4. 1279 a. 17 δει τῆς μὲν πολιτείας τό κοινόν συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὐτάμ μὲν ὧρθαι τυχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον.

From one point of view, then, Aristotle's treatise περὶ φιλίας is 'an Enquiry concerning the Principles of Sociology,' containing, as it does, his whole theory of the natural evolution of the State with its political forms and institutions, its rules of universal and particular justice, its economic laws, and its various associations for pleasure, business, and culture.

From another point of view, however, this treatise is 'an Essay in the Metaphysic of Ethics.' The end or final cause of the social evolution which has been traced is the friendship between good men. This beautiful relationship is the highest product of social life. In it the chief end of man—θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια—is most fully realised. Each friend sees in the other a 'second self,' in whom he can 'contemplate' the law of excellence more clearly and continuously than he can do if he regards it only in himself.

One recognises in this view of friendship the influence of Plato's doctrine of διάλεκτική. In the conversation (διαλέγεσθαι) of sympathetic friends, Plato held, the truth is touched, as it can be in no other way. Νόησις is called forth, and the Idea of the Good is seen. Similarly, Aristotle's Perfect Friendship is a Dialectic (like Plato's Dialectic, the last product of culture) by which a few virtuous and fortunate men in each generation are enabled to see the Chief End (what Eudemus calls ὁ σκοπὸς ὁ τῆς καλοκαγαθίας) more clearly, and keep it in view more continuously than their contemporaries. It is for the sake of these 'dialecticians' that the City exists.
CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

We must next discuss Friendship, for it is a virtue, or involves virtue: moreover, it is necessary as a means to social life: without it the rich could not preserve and use their wealth, or the powerful their influence: it is the refuge of poverty and misfortune; it guides the inexperience of youth, and succours the weakness of old age; 'Two together' are better than one in thought and action. But when we say that 'it is necessary as a means' to social life, we do not imply that it is a means arbitrarily or artificially selected:—it is natural to man: it appears in the natural affection which exists between parent and offspring (the lower animals also exhibit this kind of 'friendship'); men of the same race are naturally friendly—nay, men as men are naturally friendly to one another, as we see when strangers meet on a journey. Friendship, in short, is the bond of society. The lawgiver thinks it more important than Justice. If the citizens be merely just that is not enough; they must be well-disposed to one another, and of one mind. 'If they are this, they will be just to one another in the highest sense.

So much for the 'necessity' of Friendship. But it is not only necessary as a means to social life. It is also an end beautiful in itself.

Many views have been put forth about it. Some people say that it is 'similarity,' and quote 'Birds of a feather.' But others oppose this view with 'Rival Potters.' Then, there are those who go deeper, explaining Friendship in connexion with some theory of 'the nature of things.' Thus Euripides speaks of 'Parched earth in love with rainy sky,' and Heraclitus tells us that 'Strife is parent of all': others again, as Empedocles, maintain that 'Like seeks like.' We shall not follow those who thus carry the enquiry back to the ultimate 'nature of things.' It is the 'nature of man' that we are concerned with—man's feelings and dispositions: and the questions which we shall ask are these—'Can all men be friends, or can bad men not be friends?' and 'Is there only one species of Friendship, or are there several species?' Those who maintain that there is only one species, because there are degrees of friendship, are mistaken in their inference: in passing along a series of qualitative distinctions, i.e. of species, we may at the same time be aware of parallel quantitative differences.

§§ 1-5.] These sections suggest the chief points in Aristotle's 1155 a. 3. account of ϕιλία. Friendship is necessary to rich and poor, young and old. Without it life would be impossible; and, even if possible, not worth living (§§ 1, 2). It subsists naturally between parents and children, among the lower animals, as among men (§ 3). It is the bond which holds society together, and, as such, is the basis of
Justice (§ 4). But not only is it thus necessary to the existence of human society (representing, as it does, the force which, originating in the family, caused the evolution of society), but it is also καλόν (§ 5). The higher life requires what may be called the Dialectic of Friendship.

§ 1. ἔστι γὰρ ἄρετή τις ἡ μετ’ ἄρετῆς φιλία in the wide acceptation of the term is not itself an ἄρετή: it is that sense of being a member of the body politic without which the individual could not have the various ἄρεται included under the general designation of ἡ δικαιοσύνη. But ἡ τελεία φιλία (viii. 3. 6), in which the communis sensus is displayed in the most eminent way, may be described as ἄρετή τις—and also as μετ’ ἄρετῆς, because it manifests itself in association with τελεία ἄρετή. Of course the disposition described in iv. 6 is not alluded to here.

§ 2. βοηθείας] So Sus. and Byw. instead of βοηθεῖ, preferred by Bekker. The weight of MS. authority is in favour of βοηθείας, which is given by K₅, L₅, O₅, Cambr., NC, CCC, B¹, B₅; but the construction suffers. Perhaps we ought to read βοηθεῖν and make it depend on ὄνται, the subject of βοηθείν being τοὺς φίλους.

§ 3. πρὸς τὸ γεγενημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καί] om. K₅, which, however, reads πρὸς τὸ γεννήσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι. Ald. and CCC margin (hand, I think, which wrote the text) agree with K₅ in giving τὸ γεγενήσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι (they omit πρὸς before τὸ γεγενήσαν), but read the words omitted by K₅——(CCC omits the first πρὸς in line 17). All other authorities, it would seem, omit the words (καί) πρὸς τὸ γεγενήσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι. Susemihl brackets them.

§ 4. καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων ὀδὴν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ’ ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ] When men are friends, no pressure is required to make them act justly towards each other; they rather vie with each other in beneficence. Indeed, mere pressure could never succeed, in the long run, in making men act justly. Friendly feeling made men invent the rules of justice at first, and must always be present if they are to be applied rightly; for to be applied rightly, just rules must be equitably applied, and equity, which is the perfection of justice (τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα), involves friendship (φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ) and fellow-feeling (cf. vi. II. 1 ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἕνα συγγρώμαν).
It is better, with Zell, Coraes, Fritzsche, Grant, and Peters, thus 1155 a. 26.
to understand τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα of τὸ ἐπιεικὲς (cf. E. N. v. 10. 2 
tαυτῶν ἀρα δίκαιαν καὶ ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ἀμφότεροι σπουδαίοι οὕτως κρίθην τὸ 
ἐπιεικὲς, and vi. 11. 2, quoted by Peters, τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν 
ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον), than, with Aspasius, Lambinus, 
and Gifanius, of τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. Aspasius writes—πολλὰ γὰρ 
εἴδη τοῦ δικαίου, καθάπερ ἐλέηθη ἐν τοῖς περὶ δικαιοσύνης, οἷον τὸ πολιτικὸν 
kαὶ τὸ πατρικὸν, καὶ τὸ δευτεροποιοῦν τούτων δὲ τὸ μάλιστα δικαίαν ἔστι τὸ 
πολιτικὸν, διότι διοίκει τὸ ἐστὶ τῷ φιλικῷ· καὶ ἴσως γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν 
κοινωνῶν. Aristotle has, indeed, just used the words ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὰς 
pόλεις συνίχειν ἡ φιλία, but we are not therefore obliged to identify 
tῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα with τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. Indeed, to do so 
would be to make Aristotle merely repeat himself; whereas, if we 
understand him to refer to τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, something is added to what 
has been said. He begins § 4 by pointing out generally that Justice 
in the State—that system of νόμοι which we call τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον— 
was produced and is upheld by φιλία or ὀμόνων: he ends it by 
imitating that the highest manifestation of this justice—the 
application of the general rule in its spirit and not in its letter to the 
particular case—τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, involves a special degree of φιλία, or 
fellow-feeling, elsewhere called συγγνώμη—E. N. vi. 11. 1 τὸν γὰρ 
ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστα φαμέν εἶναι συγγνωμοικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἑαυ 
συγγνώμην. It is only the continued working in us of the constitu-
tive principle of fellow-feeling which can preserve the habit of 
justice against our inclination to take too formal a view of the rights 
of others, and to make too much of our own rights; and he realises 
best the spirit of justice (τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα) who, from regard 
for others (φιλία or συγγνώμη), often declines to press his own strict 
rights—E. N. v. 10. 8 ὃ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἄλλ᾽ ἑλπτωτικός, 
kαίστηρ ἔχουν τὸν νόμον βοηθὸν, ἐπιεικής ἔστι.

§ 5. οὔ μόνον θ᾽ ἄναγκαίον ἑστὶν ἄλλα καὶ καλὸν] 'This is repeat- 
ing in other words that friendship is ἄρετῆ τις' (Grant). Fritzsche 
ad loc. quotes E. N. iii. 7. 2 τὸ καλὸν τέλος τῆς ἄρετῆς. The clause 
toῦς γὰρ φιλοφίλους (G, Lb, Ald., and CCC read φιλοφίλους, other 
authorities φίλους) ἐπαινοῦμεν adds a reason for regarding φιλία as 
an ἄρετῆ: cf. E. N. i. 13. 19 τῶν ἐξεὼν δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἄρετὰς λέγομεν. 
On the opposition between ἄναγκαιον (that which is materially 
necessary) and καλὸν (the beautiful result) see notes on viii. 12. 7 
and ix. 11. 1.
BOOK VIII: CHAP. 1: §§ 5, 6.

1155 a. 31. καὶ ἄτοις ἀδικός ὀνται ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ φίλως] Bekker reads καὶ ἄτοι for καὶ ἄτοι with M b, r, Cambr., and NC. Peters ad loc. compares Rep. 334 φίλος μὲν ὅπως ἐκεῖ, τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἦσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ πονηρός; ναὶ.

a. 32. § 6. διαμφισβητόμενοι κ.τ.λ.] Taken from Plato, Lysis 214 sqq.: see the notes of Zell and Grant. Both quotations—ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὀμοίον ἐγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὀμοίον (Odys. xvii. 218), and καὶ κεραμέως κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ὀοίδος ὀοιδῷ | καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ (Hes. ἔρυ. καὶ ἤμ. 25), occur in the passage in the Lysis. In M. M. ii. 11. 1208 b. 9 the proverb κολοιδος παρὰ κολοιδον ἵξαιε is given. Ramsauer is of opinion that Aristotle, who uses ποτὶ not παρὰ, has in view another and an older proverb than that given by the writer of the M. M. It is to be noted, however, that L b reads παρὰ, and O b παρά. In E. E. vii. 1. 1235 a. 8 (the parallel passage) παρὰ is the reading.

b. 2. ἄνωτερον καὶ φυσικότερον] ‘φυσικῶς ζητεῖν etiam per se utrumque valet: tum ita disputare ut ad rei veritatem penetratur opp. imprim. λογικῶς, tum ita ut naturalia in quaestionem vocentur opp. e.g. ἦθικῶς’ (Ramsauer ad loc.). ‘Others go deeper into these questions and into the causes of the phenomena’ (Peters).

Φυσικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν, as opposed to λογικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν, is to investigate a subject in a concrete way with special reference to proximate causes; while λογικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν is to investigate it in the light of general formal principles: see de Gen. et Corrupt. ii. 9. 335 b. 25 sqq., where φυσικότερον λέγειν means to state the efficient cause—εἰ δὲ τὴν ἄληθν τοις φύσεις γενέσθαι διὰ τὴν κίνησιν φυσικότερον μὲν ἄν λέγοι τῶν οὕτω λεγόστων (i.e. than those who make the exampleInput of causes of γένεσις and φύσοι) τὸ γὰρ ἄλλοις καὶ τὸ μετασχηματίζον αἰτιώτερον τοῦ τοῦ γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἀπασχολεῖν τοιοῦτο λέγειν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὀμοίως ἐν τοῖς φύσεις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνησ, δὲ ἀν ἦ κηρυκόν. Cf. de Coelo 283 b. 17 φυσικῶς δὲ καὶ μὴ καθόλου σκοποῦσι (see also note on E. N. i. 3. 4, b. 23). But in the passage before us the special opposition is rather that between τὸ φυσικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν and τὸ ἦθικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν, as may be seen from the words with which § 7 opens. The result is that here τὸ φυσικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν, ‘bringing in,’ as Grant says, ‘the analogies of the whole of nature,’ is, as contrasted with the narrower ethical enquiry, indistinguishable from τὸ λογικῶς καὶ καθόλου ἐπισκαπτεῖν. Hence the Paraphrast ad loc.—τὸ μὲν αὐν ἀνάγειν τὸν λόγον εἰς καθολικῶς τιμᾶς καὶ φυσικῶς λόγους, καὶ ζητεῖν ἀπλῶς πῶς τὰ ἐναντία τῶν
BOOK VIII: CHAP. 1: § 6. 269


The special meaning which φυσικώτερον has in the present passage is illustrated by the neighbouring ανώτερον: see *Ind. Arist.* s.v. ἄνω—‘in serie notionum ἄνω dicuntur quae magis sunt universales.’

There is no reference by name to Heraclitus or Empedocles in the passage *Lys.* 214, 215. But cf. *Sympos.* 187 A τὸ ἐν γὰρ φησὶ [Ἡράκλειτος] διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἔμμερεσθαι, ὡσπερ ἄρμονιαν τάξιν τε καὶ λύρας. See Bywater, *Heracliti Eph. Relig.* Fr. 45 and 46. Perhaps the idea in τὸ ἀντίξων συμφέρον is that of things rubbed against each other till they become smooth and fit well together, as, for example, the structures of organic beings modified in relation to one another in the course of the struggle for existence—ἐκ τῶν διαφερόμενων καθότητι ἄρμονιαν (juncturum) καὶ πάντα κατ’ ἐρυν γίνεσθαι—see *Origin of Species*, ch. 3 ‘The structure of every organic being is related in the most essential, yet often hidden manner to that of all the other organic beings with which it comes into competition for food or residence, or from which it has to escape, or on which it preys. This is obvious in the structure of the teeth and talons of the tiger, and in that of the legs and claws of the parasite which clings to the hair of the tiger’s body.’ Herodotus, however, uses τὸ ἀντίξων, without any suggestion of its derivation from ἄνω, to mean simply ‘opposition.’ Heraclitus probably uses it in the same way.

According to Empedocles φιλότης is the principle of unification and order, νέικος of disintegration (see Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* § 170)—

καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀλλάσσοντα διαμηρεῖσι οὕδαμὶ λήγειν,
ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἐν ἀπαντα,
ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ δι’ ἐκαστα φορεῖμενα νέικους ἔχειν.

His ‘like loves like’ principle is illustrated by an anecdote in *E. E.* vii. 1. 1235 a. 11, repeated as follows in *M. M.* ii. 1. 1208 b. 11 φοιν ὃ καὶ κῦνος ποτε ἀεὶ καθενδουόν ὡς τῆς αὐτῆς κεραμίδος, ἐφωτισθέντα τῶν Ἐμπεδοκλέων, διὰ τὸ ποτε ἡ κῦνον ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κεραμίδος καθεπεδέ, εἰτεῖν ὅτι ἔχει τὰ τῇ κεραμίδι ὄμοιον ἡ κῦνος, ὡς διὰ τὸ ὄμοιον τῆς κύνη φοιάταν.

The words quoted from Euripides belong to a fragment preserved by Athenaeus (xiii. 599), and Stobaeus (*Ecl.* i. 9. 1. 208). It appears in Dindorf’s *Poetae Scenici* as Fr. 890—ἀδήλου δράματος.
This question, as Grant points out, is started in the *Lysis* 214 D τοῦτο τοῖνες αἰνίττονται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, δὲ ἔταφη, οἷο τὸ ὅμοιο τῷ ὅμοιῳ φίλον λέγοντες, ὡς ὁ ἄγαθος τῷ ἄγαθῷ μόνος μόνῳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακός οὔτε ἀγαθὸς οὔτε κακῷ οἰδέποτε εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν ἔρχεται. Aristotle's answer is conveyed in viii. 4. 2 δι' ἥδων μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους εὑρέσεται φίλους ἀλλήλους εἶναι καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλους καὶ μηδέτερον ὑπομονήν, δὲ αὐτοῖς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνον τοὺς ἄγαθοὺς οἷο γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίροντως ἐνυπότις, εἰ μὴ τις ὀφέλεια γίνοντο.

Michelet says—' contendunt unam tantum speciem amicitiae esse, quia quae quantitate tantum differunt (ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἤττον), qualitate vel genere diversa esse non possint; quantitate autem diversas esse amicitias, quia, ut dicit Aspasius, μᾶλλον μὲν ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἄγαθῶν, ἤττον δὲ ἢ τῶν πονηρῶν. Ηoc argumentum refutat Aristoteles optimo jure, dicens hanc quantitatis differentiam aliam etiam qualitatem et speciem efficere, cum nihil impediat quominus diversae species ita inter se distinguantur ut altera sit amplificatio, altera deminutio (δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἤττον καὶ τὰ ἐτερὰ τῶν ἐδει).’ Michelet’s ‘hanc quantitatis differentiam aliam etiam qualitatem et speciem efficere’ is hardly to the point here. It cannot be said that the three species of Friendship distinguished by Aristotle (viii. 3. 1) are constituted by mere differences of degree. There are profound qualitative differences between the ἄγαθον, the ἤδυ, and the χρήσιμον (viii. 2. 1). But these are all φιλητά, and this general attribute may enter in various degrees into the specific forms, although the degree in which it enters into a given form has nothing to do with the specific differentiation of that form from another form. The friendship for pleasure differs qualitatively from the friendship for the good, because the good differs qualitatively from pleasure; but nevertheless we can say that the friendship for pleasure is less friendship than that for the good. The specific characteristics make it an inferior form, just as those of the ape place him beneath man. Οἷς ἐν οἴς ἐνυπότις forget that it is possible both to distinguish species, and to arrange those species so as to exhibit the quantitative variation of a given quality throughout the series of species taken as a whole. That however τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον is not itself εἰδοποιῶν is shown by Pol. i. 5. 1259 b. 32 καθόλου δὴ τούτ’ ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτόν περὶ ἄρχωμεν φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερον
The species of Friendship are like the various ἄρσταί, which are specifically distinct, and yet may be compared with one another in respect of the degree in which they conduct to the Noble Life: thus ἀνδρεία is more of a virtue than εὐτραπελία, but it is not this more which differentiates them specifically: or, to take the Paraphrast's example—ἡ γὰρ ὀψία καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἑτερά διστα τῷ ἔδει, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἦττον ἐπιδέχονται οὔ γὰρ ὀμοίως εἰσὶν ὑπα.

εἰρηταὶ δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐμπροσθεν] The commentators refer us b. 15. to E. N. ii. 8, where the ἐπερβολή and ἐλεψις opposed to a virtue are presented as specifically distinct from it, although they are only the amplification or diminution of the πάθος which is held in moderation by the virtue: see Michelet ad loc. Aspasius, not finding any passage in the E. N. exactly answering to the present reference, suggests—δοκεὶ δὲ εἰρήσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἕκπεπτωκοίς τῶν Νικομαχείων. But the view of Grant and Ramsauer (supported apparently by Sus.) that the words εἰρηταὶ . . . ἐμπροσθεν are spurious seems to be correct; for ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν must be equivalent to περὶ τοῦ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον καὶ τὰ ἑτερα τῷ ἔδει, while περὶ αὐτῶν in the next line (b. 17) refers to τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη: and further, as Ramsauer points out, ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν = περὶ αὐτῶν is unusual in the Ethics: see Eucken über den Sprachgebrauch des Arist.—die Praepositionen, p. 47—'Im allgemeinen nun ist dies (ὑπὲρ = περὶ mit gen.) bei Aristoteles nicht häufig, in einigen Schriften und zwar in der Ethik', Rhetorik und Topik findet es sich öfter als in den andern.' It is to be noted that in the M. M. and Rhet. ad Alex. ὑπὲρ = περὶ with gen. is almost universal: see Ind. Arist. and Eucken, o. c. p. 47.

1 The six passages in which it does occur in the E. N. (see note on iii. 3. 2 and add iv. 2. 4 to the passages there quoted) are, with the exception of the second, short connecting clauses which might have been inserted by an editor.
CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

But this question as to whether there are several species of Friendship may be settled by reference to the objects of Friendship—i.e., the things which occasion it. Now these are three—the good, the pleasant, and the useful—the first two being ends for the sake of which the third is chosen as means. The good or pleasant thus loved as an end by a particular individual is what that particular individual thinks good or pleasant for himself. What he thinks good or pleasant for himself may or may not be really good or pleasant—that is another question which does not here concern us.

The term 'Friendship' is not applied to the affection which we may have for a lifeless object: for a lifeless object cannot return affection, and we do not wish its good for its own sake, as we wish the good of our friend for his own sake. Where, however, the person whose good we thus wish does not reciprocate, our feeling towards him is well-wishing rather than Friendship: for Friendship is reciprocal well-wishing—or, more accurately, reciprocal well-wishing of which the parties are aware: for A might wish well to B whom he had never seen, and B might wish well to A, and yet each be ignorant of how he is regarded by the other. In that case A and B would not be friends, but merely well-wishers.

1155 b. 17. § 1. περὶ αὐτῶν] περὶ τῶν τῆς φιλίας εἰδῶν.

b. 18. φιλητῶν] The author of M. M. (ii. 11. 1208 b. 37) distinguishes between τὸ φιλητῶν which is τὸ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθόν and τὸ φιλητέον which is τὸ αὐτῷ ἄγαθόν. Similarly τὸ βουλητῶν is τὸ ἀπλῶς, and τὸ βουλητέον τὸ ἐκκάτω ἄγαθόν. Cf. E. N. iii. 4: as there the σπουδαῖος wishes τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἄγαθόν, so in the treatise on φιλία, he loves that which is ἀπλῶς ἄγαθόν—human nature as a rational system.

The ἄγαθόν and the ἰδὸ are loved as ends while the χρήσμον is only a means—as the Paraphrast says χρήσιμα φιλητά ἑστὶ ἀ πρὸς τὰ δοκοῦτα ἴδεα καὶ ἄγαθα φέρει.

b. 21. § 2.] Three objects of love are distinguished in this section:
(1) τῶν ἄγαθών, (2) τὸ ὑπὸ αὐτῶ ἄγαθόν, (3) τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ ἄγαθόν. See the Paraph. ad loc. ὡστε ἄπλως μὲν φιλητῶν τὸ ἄγαθόν ἔστι τοιαὶ δὲ φιλητῶν τὸ τισιν ἄγαθόν φαινόμενον δὲ φιλητῶν τὸ δοκοῦν τισιν ἄγαθόν εἶναι. The words ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἰδό imply that a similar threefold division obtains also where τὸ φιλητῶν is τὸ ἰδό. Ramsauer compares vii. 12. 1 αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς φασί λα τινὶ δ’ ὡς ἀλλ’ αἱρέται τὸ δε ... αἱ δ’ οὖν ἰδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται.
The *φιλήτων* is always something that is good or pleasant for a man, or which he thinks good or pleasant. For the good man that is good and pleasant which is really so, being absolutely suitable to human nature as a rational system. Such a man comprehends life as a system, and calls things good and pleasant only in virtue of their occupying their fit places in the great whole; the inferior man follows his *φαντασία*, which gives him partial and abstracted views. Things are good and pleasant for him because they satisfy a self which is isolated in its own sense and imagination. In the good man the matter of sense and imagination has received that form which is Reason, and there is no longer any discrepancy between τὸ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθὸν and τὸ αὑτῷ ἄγαθὸν, as *φαντασία* presents the latter. *Φαντασία* has become the vehicle of Reason, and no longer abstracts τὸ αὑτῷ ἄγαθὸν, but presents it concretely as an aspect of τὸ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθὸν— *sub specie aeternitatis*. The good man sees clearly that *ὁκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτὸν εἰς ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὖδὲ ἄνευ πολιτείας* (*Ε. ᝴. vi. 8. 4), and that the πρακτικὸς *βίος* itself is for the sake of the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*.

**§ 2.** ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ ἐκάστῳ] i. e. ἐκάστῳ φιλήτων τὸ ἐκάστῳ ἄγαθὸν.

διοίσει δ’ οὔδέν’ ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλήτων φαινόμενον] This will make b. 26. no difference to our position—it is not altered by the substitution of τὸ φαινόμενον ἄγαθὸν φιλοῦσι for τὸ ἄγαθὸν φιλοῦσι: indeed τὸ ἄγαθὸν is always given as τὸ φαινόμενον ἄγαθὸν.


δι’ ἂν] Kᵇ omits δ’, which is accordingly bracketed by Ramsauer. But the omission seems to be a mere blunder: cf. δὲ ἐν τί τῶν εἰρημένων at the end of § 4. The δι’ ἂν are the ἄγαθον, ἡδυ, and χρήσιμον.

ἐκείνω] Byw., ἐκείνων codd.: ἐκείνω is ‘the particular ἄφικαν that b. 29. happens to interest the man’—Byw. (*Contributions*, p. 59), who refers to *Ind. Arist.* 166ᵃ 61 for the construction—δ. dat. after, verbal substantive βούλησα.’

οὖν] Fritzsche and Grant compare *Lysis* 212 D—οὔδ’ ἄρα φιλεῖν, οὔδέ ἐπεὶ μὴ ἀντιφιλοῦσιν, οὔδέ φιλότρυγῆς, οὔδ’ αὕτον ὁμόλογον γε καὶ φιλοῦσιν, κ.τ.λ. The writer of the *M. M.* (ii. 11. 1208 b. 27) denies the possibility of friendship between men and

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1155 b. 29. gods—ίστι γάρ, ὡς οἴοντα, φίλια καὶ πρὸς θεῶν καὶ τὰ ἄνυχα, ὡκ ὀρθῶς. τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ἑνταῦθα φανεν εἶναι οὐ εἰσὶ τὸ ἄνυξιάσθαι, ἢ δὲ πρὸς θεῶν φιλία οὔτε ἄνυξιάσθαι δέχεται, οὔθ ὅλως τὸ φιλεῖν. ἀτοπον γὰρ ἄν εἰὴ εἰς τις φαίη φιλεῖν τὸν Δία.

b. 32. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους . . . λανθανούσαν:] If A wishes good to B for B’s sake, but B does not reciprocate, A is said to be ‘well-disposed’ to B—not to be B’s ‘friend’; for the notion of ‘friends’ is that of two persons reciprocally well-disposed towards each other. This definition, however, is not complete—they must both know that they are reciprocally well-disposed towards each other.

According to §§ 3 and 4 φιλία requires (1) τὸ τῶν φιλούντων τῷ φιλομένῳ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκεῖνον ἕνεκα—i.e. ἤ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλομένος (ch. 3. § 2) : (2) τὸ ἄνυξιάσθαι : (3) τὸ μὴ λανθάνεων.

1156 a. 5. § 4. δι’ ἐν τῷ τῶν εἰρημένων] i.e. διὰ τὸ ἄγαθον, ἢ τὸ ἡδονό, ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον. This is added somewhat irrelevantly, for it is obvious that in the friendships διὰ τὸ ἡδονό ἀπὸ τὸν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον the first requirement of friendship, viz. τὸ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκεῖνον ἕνεκα, is not strictly satisfied: as he says in ch. 3. § 2 οἱ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἄγαθον στέργοντας, καὶ οἱ δὲ ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδονή, καὶ οὖς ῥ ὁ φιλομένος ἕστω, ἄλλ’ ὁ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδονή. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὕται εἰσιν. These friendships for profit and pleasure, however, satisfy the first requirement after a certain fashion. A person who is merely a means to profit or pleasure may, like money, come to be regarded after a certain fashion as an end. This seems to be what is meant by the statement made below in viii. 3. οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἄλληλοις βούλονται τἀγαθὰ ἄλληλοις ταύτῃ ἡ φιλοσίων. We may perhaps suppose that the ‘friendship’ of the dog for his master satisfies the first requirement of friendship in this way.

CHAPTER III.

ARGUMENT.

There being three objects of friendship, there will be three species of friendship, each involving reciprocal liking known to both parties.

Friends wish good to each other in respect of that which is the ground of their friendship—virtue, pleasure, or utility: i.e. they wish each other to be as virtuous, as pleasant, or as useful as possible. In the first case only do we love
our friend for what he is in himself; but where utility is the ground of friend-
ship, we love our friend not as an end in himself, but as a means to our own
advantage; similarly, where pleasure is the ground of friendship—we do not
love an amusing companion for himself, i.e. for what he is, but because he
gives us pleasure. The friendships then which are based on pleasure and
utility are friendships per accidens: men are loved, not for being themselves
what they are, but for happening to be pleasant or useful to other people. Such
friendships are easily dissolved, depending as they do on accidental relations—
the friendship of utility, which exists chiefly between elderly people, who do not
care to see much of each other or take much pleasure in the society of each other,
except in so far as some advantage is hoped for—the friendship for pleasure,
which is chiefly between young people who live as feeling rather than as interest
dictates, and get the immediate pleasure, which they want, by close companions-
ship, or, it may be, by falling in love; therefore cannot see too much of each
other, so long as close companionship is pleasant, but when it ceases to be
pleasant, cease to be friends—sometimes as suddenly as they became friends,
sometimes by 'growing out of' their friendship.

Perfect Friendship is that between men who, being good, are of like cha-
racter. In such friendship A wishes the same good for B as B wishes for A,
i.e. each wishes for the other that he may remain what he is—a good man.
Such friendship is lasting, for goodness is a lasting quality. Moreover, each of
the friends is good in himself, and good in relation to the other, i.e. useful. He
is also pleasant in himself, and to the other: for one's own actions and those
like one's own always give one pleasure; and the actions of good men are the
same or like. Thus in the similar goodness of the friends, upon which this
friendship is based, are involved their similar pleasantness and their similar
utility—for each friend, being really good (not good in some temporary relation),
is also really pleasant and really useful—which means that he is pleasant and
useful in the same way that the other is. Friendship like this then is naturally
lasting; but it is rare, for good men are rare; it takes them a long time to test
each other and gain each other's confidence and fit their characters together.
People may all at once wish to be friends; but they do not become friends all at
once. They must have time to know each other's characters.
1156 a. 12. τοῦ ποιούσ τινας εἶναι] 'for their quality simply.' An ἀρετή (e.g. εὐτραπελία) is a ποιότης; see note on ii. 5. 1, b. 20. Having all the ἀρεταῖ—being good—is the ποιότης par excellence; see E. N. i. 9. 8 (referred to by Fritzsche) ἡ πολιτικὴ πλεῖστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούσ τινας καὶ ἀγαθῶν τοὺς πολῖτας ποιήσας καὶ πρακτικοῖς τῶν καλῶν.

a. 16. § 2. οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν] = ἐστίν ὁσπερ ἐστίν, two lines below. Fritzsche, omitting ὃ with Kb, makes φιλούμενος a predicate like χρῆσιμος and ἡδός: but the omission in Kb is probably a mere blunder. Susemihl, following Bonitz, inserts ὁσπερ ἐστίν after φιλούμενος ἐστιν, line 16. I think that it is unnecessary to do so.

κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche (E. N. viii, ix) has an important note here—'consociatae particulae τε δὴ ad concludendum rationem ita faciunt, ut cum barbara dictione und also comparari possint . . . Nam utitur auctor particula δὴ ad rem antea exploratam aut necessario ex superioribus consequentem indicandam . . . Jam vero ante hanc particulam quam insuper ponatur τέ, causa haec videtur esse, quod, pronunciata voce τέ, sententiam novam, subjecta voce δή, conclusionem aliquam se additurn superioribus declarat auctor.' Zell says to the same effect—'Particula τε pleonastice superaddita est, vel potius particula mere copulativa conclusivae conjuncta, quo arctius orationis membra cohaerent.' Eucken (de Aristotelis dicendi ratione: pars prima: de particularum usu, pp. 21, 22) opposes this view on the grounds that the meaning und also is expressed by καὶ δή, and that in almost all places in which τε δή occurs the τέ is followed by another copulative particle. In the present passage, Eucken reads δὲ with Mb instead of δή after εὐδιάλυτοι a. 19, and makes this δὲ answer per anacoluthiam to τε a. 17. He thinks that two conclusions are thus drawn from the fact that οἱ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρὴσιμον φιλούστε διὰ τὸ αὐτῶς ἀγαθῶν στέργονται, καὶ οἱ δὲ ἡδῶν διὰ τὸ αὐτῶς ἡδοῦ, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ χρῆσιμος ἢ ἡδός—viz. (1) κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἱ φιλίαι αὐταῖ ἐστιν, and (2) εὐδιάλυτοι αἱ τοιαῦτα εἰσίν—these two conclusions being coupled, per anacoluthiam, by τε—δὲ. In the parallel passages adduced by Fritzsche, viz. Phys. 186 a. 4, de Animal. gen. 729 b. 8, and Pol. 1263 b. 7, the τε before δὴ is, Eucken points out, taken up

1 So apparently Bywater, Contributions, p. 59.
by καὶ in the next clause. Cases of τε followed, per anacoluthiam, 1156 a. 16.
by δὲ are not rare in the best writers (see Eucken, o. c. p. 17), and
Eucken’s suggestion that we should read δὲ instead of δὴ after
ἐπὶδιάλυσις a. 19 is strictly legitimate. But is it necessary? We
have the authority of Eucken himself for the remarkable fact that
while τε, not followed by another copulative particle, is very rarely
used in Books i–vii of the E. N., it occurs in Books viii, ix, and x
much more frequently than in any other work of Aristotle. In
E. N. i it does not occur; nor in ii; it occurs once in iii; twice
in iv; not at all in v; once in vi; and once in vii. On the other
hand, in viii it occurs eight times; in ix twelve times; and in x
sixteen times. In these three Books Eucken finds that the style
approaches that of poetry, the subject not being evolved by means
of intricate ratiocinations, but graphically presented to the mind’s
eye. Hence the particles by which clauses are subordinated to one
another are of rare occurrence, while those which simply coordinate
clauses are numerous. Thus ἐπὶ, which is so common in the
writings of Aristotle and in the seven earlier Books of the E. N., is
very rare in these three Books: see Eucken, de Arist. dic. rat. p.
14, and pp. 75, 76. Eucken’s inference from this and from other
peculiarities is (p. 77)—‘cum libri ita inter se discrepent, hoc
videtur elucere, non omnes eodem tempore ab Aristotele scriptos,
sed postea demum alios cum aliis conjunctos esse.’

May we not then regard the τε of 1156 a. 17, notwithstanding the
immediately following δὴ, as an instance of the τε not followed by
another copulative particle (τέ adjunctivum: see Ind. Arist.) which
Eucken finds characteristic of viii, ix, and x? I prefer so to regard
it—to suppose that τε here merely facilitates the transition to a
clause which may be viewed either as a conclusion from what has
gone before (hence δὴ), or as merely adding (hence τε) an alterna-
tive phrase—κατὰ συμβεβηκός—to express the notion already ex-
pressed by the clause οὐχ ἡ ὁ φιλοφιλεῖν ἑστιν, ἀλλ' ἡ χρῆσιμος ἡ
ηδὸς.

§ 3. πρὸς ἐκεῖνα] πρὸς τὸ χρῆσιμον ἡ τὸ ἡδὺ. a. 24.

§ 4. πρεσβύταις] Cf. Rhet. ii. 13. 1389 b. 37 καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον
ζώσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν, μᾶλλον ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλαντροπίν εἶναι τὸ μὲν γὰρ
συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἑστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς.

1 Here, 1112 a. 9, Bywater restores δὲ from Kb.
BOOK VIII: CHAP. 3: §§ 4-6.

1156 a. 29. *tis touaitis ylima*] the constant and pleasant intercourse tov suxyn.

a. 30. *eis taautas de kai tiv zevikiv tithesiv.*] zevikiv philia subsisting *e.g.* between an Athenian and a Spartan, does not imply tov suxyn, and rests merely on mutual convenience. Ramsauer, admitting the correctness of classing zevikiv philia under *phila* *d*ia to chrjmov, thinks these words out of place here, and brackets them. The pronoun taautas, he urges, has nothing to which it can be grammatically referred, and the clause is almost a transcript of viii. 12. 1161 b. 15 *eis taautas de tazeven an tiv kai tiv zevikiv.* I think that taautas (viii. 3. 4) may easily be taken to relate to the various utilitarian *phila* mentioned above—those of *proetbontais,* oi ev akvm, and nevi. The writer of the *M. M.* ii. u. 1211 a. 12 looks at zevikiv philia from a different point of view—*Beitaostat* 6 deutereuven eina tov philiv *ev zevikiv* ou gar estin oideven autous telos koivon uper ou *amphiasthousiv,* ouv ev tois politais *diaphrosbthontes gar prois allhous kata toin uperosin oiv mevouisv philoi oves.

a. 31. § 5.] Zell, Coraes, and Fritzsche quote *Rhet.* ii. 12. 1389 a. 3 oiv en oiv nevai to v thei elain evidevntikoi, kai oiv oivei ev evvthevnavoi.

b. 3. *dioper philousi kai taxeivos paoontaiv*] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 33, 34) suggests *dioper taxeivos philousi* kai *paoontaiv,* comparing *di* taxeivos yivovtau philoi kai *paoontaiv* above 1156 a. 34. But there is a difference between philousai and yivovtau philoi which perhaps sufficiently accounts for the different position of taxeivos. Bywater’s note on *kai taxeivos* b. 3 is ‘fort. *taxeivos* kai.’

b. 5. *tiv philian*] ‘their friendship’—is the reading of K*bo,* O*bo,* Cambr., CCCb, B*bo,* B*bo,* and seems preferable to Bekker’s *philias,* the reading of L*bo,* M*bo,* NC, Ald.

b. 7. § 6. teleia . . . b. 11 *sumbebezkos*] ‘The friendship between those who are good and alike in excellence is perfect; for in it each friend, being good in himself [*i.e.* not merely good for another, or useful], wishes alike the good of the other quei good in himself:
and those who thus wish each the good of the other for the other’s sake are friends in the truest sense, each being the friend of the other for what he is essentially, not for what he is accidentally.’ This friendship between those who are both good in themselves (καθ’ αὐτοὺς) is here shown to be τελεία, because in it each friend loves the other for what that other is himself (δι’ αὐτοῦ) — i.e. loves him as ἐτέρους αὐτός (ix. 9. 10) — ‘treats Humanity in him as an end, not as a means.’ In line b. 10 δι’ αὐτοῦς οὖσαν ἔχουσι means ἐκάτερος φιλόκως ἔχει πρὸς ἐκάτερον δι’ ἐκεῖνον — i.e. the expression δι’ αὐτοῦ marks the two friends regarded as each the final object (hence διὰ) of the other’s love, not regarded as subjects each of whom has the feeling of love for the other — in that case we should have had καθ’ αὐτοῦς.

It is to be observed that the Paraphrast reads δι’ αὐτοῦς, not δι’ αὐτοῦς: his comment is — οἱ δὲ ὑμῶν τοῖς ἄγαθος, οὐχ ἕαυτῶν ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τῶν φιλῶν, οὔτοι εἰσόν οἵ μαλίστα φίλοι δι’ αὐτοῦς γὰρ τοῖς φίλοις φιλοῦσι, καὶ βούλονται αὐτοὶ τὰ ἄγαθα, καὶ οὐ δὲ ἄλλο καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

ἡ δ’ ἀρετὴ μόνιμον] Cf. E. N. i. 10. 10.

οἱ γὰρ ἁγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἁγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλους ὄφειλοι] Here b. 13. ἀλλήλους ὄφειλοι explains τῷ φιλῷ ἁγαθῷ of the preceding clause. These words are quoted by Rassow (Forsch. p. 83) in support of his remark — ‘die Erklärer des achten Buches sind oft zu Irrthümern verleitet durch das Wort ἁγαθός, das bald im Sinne von καλὸς bald im Sinne von χρήσιμος gebraucht wird.’ Cf. the use of ἁγαθὸν τι in viii. 3. 1, 2 = χρήσιμον οἱ ὄφειλοι.

καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἁγαθοὶ ἴδεις καὶ ἀλλήλους] οἱ ἀπλῶς ἴδεις are b. 15. those who, living the rational life, therefore give pleasure by their society to others who live the same life. It is the fact that the rational life is one for all men who live it that makes οἱ ἀπλῶς ἴδεις also ἴδεις ἀλλήλους. In the life of reason man derives from man true pleasure and true profit — pleasure which can never bring pain afterwards — profit which never results in loss to oneself or to others. The common consciousness of a noble life lived together is pure pleasure; and to live this life together is the highest good. Accordingly in the life of Reason there is no conflict of pleasures or utilities, but all men necessarily agree. As Spinoza says (Eth. iv. 35) ‘quia unus quisque ex sua naturae legibus id appetit quod bonum et id amovere conatur quod malum esse judicat; et quum praeterea id quod ex dictamine rationis bonum aut malum esse
judicamus necessario bonum aut malum sit, ergo homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt eatenus tantum ea necessario agunt quae humanae naturae et consequenter unicuique homini necessario bona sunt, hoc est quae cum natura uniuscujusque hominis conveniunt. Atque adeo homines etiam inter se, quatenus ex ductu rationis vivit, necessario semper conveniunt. Nihil singulare in rerum natura datur quod homini sit utilius quam homo qui ex ductu rationis vivit. Nam id homini utilissimum est quod cum sua natura maxime convenit, hoc est homo. At homo ex legibus suae naturae absolute agit quando ex ductu rationis vivit, et eatenus tantum cum natura alterius hominis necessario semper convenit. Ergo homini nihil inter res singulares utilius datur quam homo.'

b. 16. αἰ οίκεια πράξεις καὶ αἰ τοιαῦται] 'his own actions and those that resemble them.'

b. 17. αἱ αὐταί ἡ ὀμοιαί] This is the reading of Lb Mb (Kb has αὐταὶ ὀμοιαί) and seems preferable to τοιαῦτα ἡ ὀμοια, the reading of Ῥ, Ob, CCC, NC, Camb., Ald. Thus αἱ αὐταί corresponds to οίκειαι (line b. 16), and ὀμοια to αἰ τοιαῦται.

§ 7. ἡ τοιαῦτη δὲ φιλία κ.τ.λ.] Stahr (E. N., p. 280, note 10) and Rassow (Forsch. p. 24) regard this section as merely a repetition of § 6, b. 11 διαμεῖται οὖν ... b. 17 ἡ ὀμοια. Stahr accordingly brackets the whole section; and Ramsauer brackets down to b. 23 ἀπλῶς ἑστίν.

b. 18. συνάπτει] intransitive—'meet together.' The editors refer to viii. 4. 5 οὕτω πάνυ δ' αὐταὶ συνάπτουσιν. Cf. also Cat. 6. 4 b. 36.

b. 20. καὶ καθ' ὀμοιότητά τινα] This is generally taken (e.g. by the Paraph., Zell, Fritzsche, Williams, Peters) to mean that all friendship 'implies some similarity between the friends.' But Grant would omit the comma after φιλοῦντι and take the phrase to mean that a friendship which is for the sake of a relative good or pleasure, i.e. relative τῷ φιλοῦντι, is a friendship only καθ' ὀμοιότητα τῆς τελείας φιλίας—so called because it resembles the perfect friendship. In support of this rendering of καθ' ὀμοιότητα he refers to viii. 4. 4 εἴη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτος μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ἀγαθοί, τάς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὀμοιότητα. He also refers to viii. 6. 7 δοκεῦσαι δὲ καὶ δι' ὀμοιότητα καὶ ἀναμοιότητα ταῦτα εἶναι τε καὶ οἷκ εἶναι φιλίαν καθ'

ομωτητα γαρ της κατ’ αρετην φαινονται φιλιαι κ.τ.λ., and to viii. 4. 1 1156 b. 20.

η δε δια το ήδη ομωσυμα ταυτης εχει. Grant's interpretation is supported by Aspasius (167. 25 Heylbut); but I have no doubt that the ordinary interpretation is correct. In the 'duplicate' passage (§ 6) the ομωτητης is the similarity of the friends.

tαυτη δε πανθ' υπαρχει τα ειρημενα καθ' αυτοις "but this (sc. b. 21. perfect friendship) has all the specified characteristics (sc. goodness, pleasantness, usefulness) as essential attributes of the parties.'

ταυτη γαρ ομωα και τα λοιπα] The difficulties which this clause b. 22. has raised for the commentators are well set forth by Coraes. In transcribing his note, I insert explanations and the views of later editors within square brackets. αι μεν εζηγησαντο [Aspasius, Michelet, Grant, Williams] ταυτη τη φιλια των συνοδων ομωα και τα λοιπα ειδαι των φιλων, η αι λοιπαι φιλιαι, η τε δια το χρησμον και η δια το ήδου οι δε μετασχωντες την γραφην εισ το ομωοι [the reading of Kb, G, Cambr., known to Aspasius, accepted by Fritzsche, Rassow Forsch. p. 24, and Susemihl], ταυτη, κατα το άγαθους ειναι δηλαδη, οι άγαθοι φιλοι ομωοι εισι και εν τοις λοιποις, ουτωτει και ήθεις αλληλους και χρησμου [Aspasius rendering the alternative reading ομωοι, Laminus, and Fritzsche]. η ΑΡΡ [i.e. the paraphrase of Argyropylus], λεγοντα huic enim similis sunt et ceterae, τοιαυτην τινα γραφην εμφαινει, ταυτη γαρ ομωαι και αι λοιπαι, τουτεστι, ταυτη τη φιλια ομωοι εισι και αι λοιπαι φιλιαι οπερ δηλοι και η ΠΑΡ [the Paraphrast Heliodorus] 'και καθ' ομωσυτητα ταυτης αι άλλαι φιλιαι ονομαζονται.' εισι δ' οι [Muretus] και (πιθανωτερον ισος) περαιρειν δλως του κειμενου ως υ' γηναιας τα εξ λεγεις [the clause ταυτη ... λοιπα b. 22] παραμεσαν.

Here then we have two alternative interpretations, according as we read ομωοι or ομωαι: (1) reading ομωαι—'for the other kinds of friendship resemble this, the perfect kind'; (2) reading ομωοι—'for being similar in respect of virtue, they are similar also in the other respects.' As for the first interpretation—I think that it introduces an entirely irrelevant remark, obviously suggested by a misunderstanding of the preceding καθ' ομωσυτητα των, and must be rejected. The rejection of this interpretation of ταυτη γαρ ομωα και τα λοιπα may seem to raise a presumption in favour of ομωοι, for which the MS. authority is certainly strong; although, on the other hand, there is a certain awkwardness in having to take ταυτη as=κατα το άγαθους ειναι, whereas in the line above (b. 21) it is the
pronoun for τὴν τελεία φιλίαν. But can ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμοία καὶ τὰ λοιπά not be interpreted otherwise than as above? Zell suggests the following interpretation—'Potest autem lectio vulgata alio modo explicari: Huic bonorum virorum amicitiae sive in hac bonorum amicitia similia sunt, id est morum similitudine et reliqua, id est, reliqua quae ad firmam et veram amicitiam requiruntur, id est, absolute bonum et absolute jucundum.' Peters, apparently following Zell, translates—'for here there is similarity and the rest, viz. what is good simply and pleasant simply.' Surely ὁμοία cannot mean 'similarity,' as distinguished from τὰ λοιπά, 'the rest': and is it not better to regard ἡδον without the article as the predicate of a clause introduced by the 'τέ adjunctivum' so common in Books viii, ix, x?—see note on viii. 3, and Eucken, de Arist. die. rat. p. 14, where this case is quoted.

Reading ὁμοία I venture to offer the following rendering—'every friendship is for good or pleasure (the good or pleasure being such either in itself or in relation to the person who has the friendly feeling), and implies some similarity between the parties; but true friendship possesses all the aforesaid characteristics in virtue of the essential nature of the friends—I say all, for in this friendship the other characteristics also (καὶ τὰ λοιπά, i.e. the pleasantness and usefulness of the friends to each other, as distinguished from their goodness) are similar (ὁμοία), the truly good being also truly pleasant.' True friends have a similar, or indeed identical, pleasantness and usefulness, as well as goodness—cf. below ch. 4. § 1, b. 34 κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα γίνεται καὶ ὁμοία ἐκατέρω παρ' ἐκατέρων, ὅπερ δέ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν—the qualities which the one friend really has the other truly loves, because they are similar to, or identical with, his own real qualities reciprocally loved by his friend. This means that these qualities exist ἀπλῶς, or that friends between whom this perfect ὁμοιότης subsists are ἥδεις καθ' αὐτούς, &c. Where all qualities are not ὁμοία, the one is not the other's alter ego, and, if called his 'friend,' must be so called because loved for some quality not inherent essentially in his character, but attaching to the special relation in which the two happen to be placed. The leading idea of my rendering is that where κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα γίνεται καὶ ὁμοία ἐκατέρω παρ' ἐκατέρων, there the good pleasant and useful qualities of each friend must be absolute—ἀπλῶς, καθ' αὐτούς, not relative; for

1 I have not altered the punctuation of the above quotation, but what I take to be Zell's meaning would be made clearer by a comma after similitudo.
BOOK VIII: CHAP. 3: §§ 7, 8. 283

if they were relative, then a dissimilarity between the friends would be implied, whereas good men cannot be dissimilar: cf. M. M. ii.

§ 7. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ καθ’ ἀνυφότητα ή τῶν σπουδάσων καὶ ή τελεία φιλία: ἢ δὲ κατὰ ἀνυφότητα ή κατὰ τὸ συμφέρουν.

μᾶλλον δὲ] The weight of MS. authority is in favour of δη here, b. 23.

and all MSS. seem to have δη in b. 24: but I think that Bywater's δε in b. 23 and δη in b. 24 make the passage run better.

§ 8. ἐὰν δὲ προσδείται χρόνου καὶ συμφερεῖ] οὐ μόνον δὲ ἀρετῆς b. 25.

dείται ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία καὶ τρόπων ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρόνου καὶ συμφερεῖας (Paraph.).

τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλας] Cf. E. E. H. 2. 1238 a. 2 διὸ εἰς παραμλαν b. 27. εἴκαθεν ὁ μέγιστος τῶν ἀλῶν.

οὔθ ἀποδέχοσθαι δὴ πρῶτον οὖθ’ εἶναι φίλους] 'nor can they b. 28.

accept one another as friends, or be friends' (Peters). Cf. viii. 5. 3 ο_refl ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους: cf. also E. N. ix. 8. 7 τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδεχόταται καὶ ἐπαυγοῦν.

For δη Λb, Μb, γ, Cambr. read δει.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

This Friendship, then—that between good men—is perfect in duration and in all other respects, the friends always returning each other's offices in the same kind.

The friendship which is for the sake of pleasure, and that which is based on utility, are like this Friendship between good men; for good men, as friends, are pleasant and useful to each other. These imperfect friendships are most durable when, as in the Perfect Friendship, the return which each friend makes to each is in the same kind—such as pleasure, and that derived from the same thing—e.g., the pleasure derived from witty conversation which is the same for both talkers if both be witty, as distinguished from the pleasure of lover and beloved. Lover and beloved do not derive their pleasure from the same thing: the lover's pleasure is derived from seeing the beauty of the beloved; the beloved's pleasure from being courted by the lover; but when the beauty fades, the friendship too sometimes ceases, unless the two, from long familiarity, have come to love each other's dispositions. Where mere utility, however, is the ground of association
on one side, lover and beloved can scarcely be called friends, and the friendship between them cannot last long. Where utility, as distinguished from pleasure, is the ground of association on both sides, the so-called friendship ceases as soon as the parties cease to be useful to each other.

It will be seen then that for the sake of pleasure and utility bad men may be friends of bad men, good men of bad men, and men neither good nor bad of others neither good nor bad: but for the sake of each other, as such, only good men can be friends; for bad men do not delight in each other as such, but only in so far as some advantage is desired.

The friendship between good men is the only friendship which is proof against slander: such friends have known each other too long and too well to believe evil of each other.

It must be understood that we make a concession to popular usage when we call those who associate for utility friends—(in the same way we speak of allied states as friendly states—utility is the bond of alliance between states): we also make a concession to popular usage when we call those who associate for pleasure friends (as we speak of childish playmates as friends): it is only good men who love each other for their goodness who are friends in the primary and strict sense of the word. The other friendships are only metaphorically so called, because, while they are based on that which is good, it is not on that which is absolutely good, but on that which is only relatively good that they are based; for pleasant things are good in relation to the man who takes pleasure in them.

The two metaphorically called Friendships, or Friendships per accidens, seldom subsist together: there is no law by which accidents are conjoined—the parties to a 'friendship' for utility seldom happen to be the same as the parties to a 'friendship' for pleasure.

1156 b. 34. § 1. ταύτα] This is Bekker's reading (after Muretus) for the ταύτα of most MSS.

1157 a. 10. πολλοὶ δὲ αἱ διαμένουσιν] Zell very appositely compares Sympos. 183 Ε ποιησόν δὲ ἔστων ἔκκων ὁ ἐραστὴς ὁ πάνθης, ὁ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔρως. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ μονιμός ἐστιν ἀτε οὐδὲ μονίμου ἐρῶν πράγματος· ἀμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος άνθει λήγοντι οὐτεπή ἡρα, οἰκείαν ἀποστάμενοι, πολλοῖς λόγοις καὶ ὑποσχέσεως κατασχεῖς. ὁ δὲ τοῦ Ἡθους χρηστὸν ἄντος ἐραστῆς διὰ βίου μὲνει ἀτε μονίμῳ συνταχεῖαι.

a. 13. § 2. καὶ εἶσον ἦττον φίλου καὶ διαμένουσιν] supply ἦττον with διαμένουσιν.

a. 18. μηδέτερον ὑπομονοῦν] i.e. one who is neither good nor bad may be a friend to a man of any sort, good, bad, or indifferent.

δι᾽ αὐτῶν δὲ δὴ ἡλιον ὃτι μόνους τοὺς ἰγαθόν] Only good men can each love the other for the other's sake, because only good men
are so alike that each finds his ἐτέρως αὐτός in the other. But bad 1157 a, 18. men differ indefinitely. A bad man has no ἐτέρως αὐτός. He cannot identify himself with another man; he can only use him as a means to his own pleasure or profit—

έσθλοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παρτοσαπῶς δὲ κακοὶ.

οὐ χαίρουσιν ἐαυτοῖς = ἄλληλοι (Coraes).

§ 3. ἄδιάβλητος] 'can defy calumny' (Peters).

ἐν τούτοις i.e. between the good men who are friends.

§ 4. ἐτεί γάρ] For γάρ, the reading of all other MSS. apparently, a. 25. Susemihl reads δέ with Mb. But the scribe of Mb (or the scribe or corrector of the MS. from which he copied), as I have had occasion to point out before, and as Susemihl himself is aware (see Eth. Nic. Praefat. p. viii), is very fond of removing difficulties by conjectural emendations; and I have little doubt that he has tried to do so here by substituting δέ for γάρ. Retaining γάρ, we may explain the connexion thus—'suspicions and recriminations arise in the other (ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις) friendships; for we too must call the persons standing in these relationships friends, since they are commonly so called.' See the notes of Zell, Fritzsche, and Ramsauer.

ὡς λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἶδη δὲ τῆς a. 29. φιλίας πλείω] We must so far conform to popular usage as to call such persons φίλοι, but we must make it clear that their friendships are specifically distinct from friendship proper.

καθ' ὀμοιότητα] 'in a secondary sense,' i.e. on account of their a. 31. resemblance to the real friendship—the friendship strictly so called: cf. E. N. vi. 3. 2, where ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι is opposed to ἀκολούθειν ταῖς ὀμοιότηται.

ἡ γὰρ ἁγάθων τι καὶ δροιδών τι] 'in so far as there is involved in a. 32. their relationship something good and resembling the good' or, if we treat ἁγάθων τι καὶ δροιδών τι as a hendiadys, 'in so far as there is involved in their relationship something good in a secondary sense,' e.g. pleasure—καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἱδον ἁγαθόν τοῖς φιλήδειαν. So the Paraph. καὶ ἔστι φιλία πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως ἡ τῶν ἁγαθῶν, ἡ ἁγαθοί καθ' ὀμοιότητα δὲ αἱ λοιπαὶ καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἱδον, καθό ἁγαθόν τι ἔστι, ὡς ἱδον συνάπτει τοὺς φιλήδειαν ἁγαθόν γὰρ τί ἔστι τοῖς φιλήδειας τὸ ἱδον καὶ

1157 a. 32. ἀγαθὸς ἐοικεν, ὅτι αὐτῶς ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ τῷ χρωμῖνοι διὰ τοῦτο καθ' ὁμοίωτητα τῆς ἄληθεον φιλίας αἱ τοιαύται φιλίαι λέγονται. So also Michelet, with ὅμοιον τι εἰς ἁγαθόν, and Grant. The emendation ᾱ' γὰρ ἁγαθὸν τινὶ ὅμοιον suggested by Coraes, although, I think, inadmissible as an emendation, gives the sense correctly. His note is—ἡ γὰρ ἁγαθὸν τι καὶ ὁμοῖον τι κτλ. γραφὴ ὑποπτος, ὡς δήλουσι καὶ αἱ μεταφράσεις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἈΡΓ [Argyropylus] παρέλυε τὸ τελευταῖον ἐγκλινόμενον, τι [и. е. after ὅμοιον: so Bek. and Sus.]: ἡ δὲ ἈΡ (Aretinus) τοῦτο παραλείψασα καὶ τὸν συμπλεκτικὸν εἰς τοὺς διαζευκτικοὺς ἔτρεψεν, ὁ ὅμοιον, aut similis. ἦσ. γρ. ἡ γὰρ ἁγαθὸς τινὶ ὅμοιον, ὡς ὁ νοῦς, καθ' ὁ γὰρ τὸ συνδέον αὐτοῦ εἰς φιλίαν (ἤδε ἡ χρήσιμον) ὁμοίωται πως τῷ ἁγαθῷ, κατὰ τοῦτο εἰς φιλίαν.

a. 33. § 5. οὐ πάντα δὲ αὕτη συνάπτουσιν] 'But these two latter kinds are not apt to coincide' (Peters). μικρὴ δὲ φιλία ἄπο χρησίμου καὶ ἤδεος οὐ πάντα γίνεται, ὡστε τῶν φιλῶν τὸν μὲν διὰ τὸ ἢδι φιλεῖ τὸν δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον (Paraph.). The Paraph. is hardly right here. Mixed friendships in which one party supplies pleasure and the other recompenses him by profit are not very rare. The kind of mixed friendship here alluded to by Aristotle is that in which both friends are mutually pleasant and useful. This seems to be sufficiently recognised by the editors—Fritzsche, Stahr, Ramsauer, Williams. Ramsauer's note is good—'Quantum differat ἡ πρώτως καὶ κυρίως λεγομένη a reliquis, exponitur ut non possit melius. Quod enim per illius naturam ulterior efficitur ut boni et utiles inter se iidemque suaves sint, id in his vel casu vix semel contingit: aliis utiles, aliis suaves.'

a. 35. τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός] The sense of τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός here is clearly given in a passage (Met. A. 30. 1025 a. 14) quoted by Fritzsche and Grant—συμβεβηκός δὲ λέγεται ὁ ὑπάρχει μὲν τινι, καὶ ἀληθές εἴπερ, οὐ μὲντοι οὔτε ἢ ἀνάγκης, οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὗν εἰ τοῖς ἄριττοις φυτῷ βάδροιν εὑρεθήσατρον, τοῦτο τοῖς συμβεβηκός τῷ ὑπάρχοντι τὸν βάθρον τοῦ εὐρίτου θηραυροῦ οὔτε γὰρ ἢ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦτον ἡ μετὰ τοῦτο οὔθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀν τις φυτεύῃ θηραυρὸν εὑρίσκει, καὶ μονικὸς γ' ἀν τις εἰς λευκός 'ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὔτε ἢ κακός οὐθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ τοῦτο γίνεται, συμβεβηκός αὐτῷ λέγομεν.

b. 2. § 8. ταύτη δὲ χρήσιμα ὅτες] Here Grant seems to fall into error from a desire to be perfectly consistent in his rendering of χρήσιμον
as it occurs in this and the previous chapter. His rendering is \textit{1157 b. 2.}

'In this respect (\textit{i.e.} as affording and seeking pleasure or utility) being like (the good),' Peters adopts Grant's view, translating—

'resembling true friends in this respect.' Aspasia gives the correct interpretation when he says \textit{ta\v{t}a\v{t}y \phi\v{s}\v{s}n \v{d}m\v{m}oi \v{d}v\v{t}es t\v{t}o\v{t}\v{t}a\v{t} \v{t}o\v{t}\v{t}a, \v{d}m\v{m}oi \v{d}v\v{t}es k\v{a}d\v{o} \v{h}d\v{e}\v{i}s \v{h} \v{h}r\v{h}s\v{m}\v{m}oi \v{a}l\v{h}s\v{m}\v{m}oi k\v{a}l \v{h} p\v{a}\v{r}e\v{h}s\v{m}\v{w}n \v{a}l\v{h}s\v{m}\v{m}oi \v{h}d\v{h}s\v{m} k\v{a}l \v{h} \v{h}d\v{h}s\v{m} \v{f}\v{i}l\v{o}i e\v{i}s\v{y}n, \v{a}p\v{l}w\v{s} \v{d}e \v{o}\v{u}k e\v{i}s\v{y}n \v{d}m\v{m}oi.}

This interpretation is followed by Michelet, Fritzsche, Stahr, Williams, and Ramsauer. The reference is to \textit{viii. 4. 2}, where the difference between true friendship and the other kinds turns on the essential similarity of good men, as distinguished from the merely superficial similarity of bad men; but it must be admitted that the words \textit{k\v{a}l T\v{p} \v{h}m\v{i}o\v{n}\v{w}\v{t}h\v{h} t\v{t}o\v{t}\v{t}o\v{s} following immediately (b. 5) are awkward, and might be thought to favour Grant's rendering of \textit{ta\v{t}a\v{t}y \v{d}m\v{m}oi \v{d}v\v{t}es.}

\textbf{CHAPTER V.}

\textbf{ARGUMENT.}

\textit{Just as we may look at the virtuous man either as 'having a virtuous disposition' or as 'acting virtuously,' so we may look at Friends either as having the disposition of friendship, or as actively manifesting it. A and B may have constant opportunities of enjoying each other's society: C and D may live at a distance from each other and merely be so mutually disposed as to meet as friends when they do meet: for separation—unless it be very long—does not destroy the disposition of friendship, only prevents the active manifestation of the disposition.}

\textit{Seeing much of each other and taking pleasure in each other's society is the great mark of friends. Hence old and morose people do not make friendships easily, because little pleasure is to be had from such people, and nobody cares to spend his days with people who are unpleasant.}

\textit{Those who are on good terms, but do not see much of each other, are well-wishers rather than friends. Seeing much of each other, as we said, is the great mark of friends—whether they be those who depend on each other for assistance, or fortunate persons who love each other's society for its own sake. But people cannot see much of each other whose companionship is not mutually pleasant.}

\textit{The friendship between good men is the truest friendship. Each is loved by each both for what he is in himself and for what he is to the other, what each is to the other being, in fact, what each is in himself. The nature of each is the same: accordingly each finds and loves his own good in the goodness of the}
other: each gives to each and derives from each the same advantage and pleasure. The proverbial ‘equality of friends’ is thus realised most truly in the friendship of good men.

1157 b. 9. § 1. ὡστ' ἐνεργεῖν] Ramsauer and Susemihl read ὡστ' ἂν ἐνεργεῖν, which the sense seems to require—‘they do not perform friendly acts, but their state is such that they would perform them,’ if circumstances permitted. L b reads ὡστε καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, which perhaps points to κἂν, as Ramsauer suggests.

b. 10. οὐ διαλύωσι τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν] not the friendship regarded as such, i.e. as ἔξις, but its manifestation or ἐνέργεια: cf. E. N. v. 1. 20 ὅ ἐστι τεύχει ἔξις ἀπλῶς.

b. 13. πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀποφηγορία διέλυσεν] Cf. Athenaeus v. p. 187, where τρὸπον φιλίαν ναϊς τοις εἰσὶν φίλοις is characterised as μισαιθροφοστάτῃ τῶν παροιμίων—πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἔλογον τόπῳ τὴν φιλίαν καὶ οὐ τρόπῳ κρίνεσθαι;

§§ 2, 3.] The passage οὐ φαίνονται b. 13 . . . b. 24 ἕχειν is regarded by Fritzsche and Rassow (Forsch. pp. 24, 25) as the first of gemini loci, the other passage being ch. 6. § 1 ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς 1158 a. 1 . . . φιλικά a. 10. See note on ch. 6. § 1.

b. 18. § 3. ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους] ‘are on good terms’—or ‘know each other’: see note on viii. 3. 8, b. 28.

b. 19. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φιλων ὡς τὸ συζήν] Peters has a useful note here—‘To a Greek of course this does not necessarily imply living under the same roof, as it does to us with our very different conditions of life.’

b. 21. καὶ οἱ μακάριοι] ‘even the happy.’ It seems better to take μακάριοι here, with the Paraph. and Asp., as equivalent to εὐδαιμονεῖς and ἀγαθοὶ than, with Zell and Coraes, as meaning ‘rich’ like the Latin beati. Coraes’ note is—μακάριοι] ἐπὶ τοῦ πλούσιον ἐνθάδε ὦ δὲ νοῦς, ὄργοντα ἐκ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι συμπεριεῖν τοῖς φίλοις, καίπερ οὐ χρῆσοντες τῆς παρ’ αὐτῶν ὑφελείας, ὁσπερ οἱ ἐνδείκτες. This is plausible; but rendered improbable by the words immediately following μονόται μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. which suggest ix. 9. 3 ἄτοπον δ’ ἵσως καὶ τὸ μονότιμον ποιεῖν τῶν μακάριον, where the μακάριον is the εὐδαιμων = ὦ καὶ’ ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργῶν.

b. 23. ἡ ἑταίρικη (φιλία)] ‘comradeship’ (Peters). The friendship of
those who have been inseparable since boyhood = the Latin 1157 b. 23.

sodalitas: see Fritzsche and Michelet. Ramsauer thinks that the clause ὅπερ ... ἕξεσθαι is an interpolation like εἰς τείταρα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἑξευκρίνην τιθέσθαι viii. 3. 4.


ἐκάστῳ δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὁ δὲ ἄγαθος] These words are omitted b. 27.
by K, which reads ... ἡδυ, τὸ δὲ ἄγαθῳ ἀμφό ταῦτα. Fritzsche adopts the text of K, interpreting thus—‘That which is good and pleasant in itself is the object of love and choice; and the good man possesses both these qualities (i.e. the good in itself and the pleasant in itself).’

Retaining the text of all other MSS. and authorities (for very little weight ought to be attached to the mere omissions of K), we have to decide between two alternative interpretations of ἀμφὸ ταῦτα—that of the Paraphrast, and that of Aspasius. The Paraphrast says—δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλήτων μὲν καὶ αἰρετῶν τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ κυρίως ἁγαθὸν ἡ ἡδυ. ἐκάστῳ δὲ φιλήτων καὶ αἰρετῶν τὸ αὐτῷ ἁγαθὸν ὁ δὲ ἁγαθὸς τῶν ἁγαθῶν φιλεῖ διὰ ἀμφὸ ταῦτα τὸ γὰρ ἁγαθῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ κυρίως ἁγαθὸν ἐστι, καὶ τῷ φίλῳ ἁγαθὸν ἐστὶν ὡστε ὁ ἁγαθὸς φιλήτως ἐστι, καὶ κατ’ ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς τρόπους. This view is adopted by Victorius, Zell, Coraes (ὅπερ ἀμφὸ ταῦτα τὸ γὰρ συναπτόν αὐτῶν ἁγαθῶν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἁγαθῶν ἐστι καὶ αὐτοῖς ἁγαθῶν γίγνεται) and Michelet. On the other hand Aspasius says—φιλήτων μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς καὶ αἰρετῶν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἁγαθὸν, καὶ ἡδυ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἡδυ, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ ἑκάστου, τῷ δὲ ἁγαθῷ καὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ ἡδυ ὁ ἁγαθὸς. Grant adopts this view. I am in favour of the Paraphrast’s interpretation. That of Aspasius seems to make the words ἐκάστῳ δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις useless. I understand Aristotle to argue that a friendship which rests on the single ground of the subjective τὸ αὐτῷ ἁγαθῶν ἡ ἡδυ must be surpassed by one which rests on the double ground of τὸ αὐτῷ ἁγαθῶν ἡ ἡδυ in perfect harmony with the objective ἀπλῶς ἁγαθῶν ἡ ἡδυ.

§ 5. In this § Rassow (Forsch. p. 32) would transpose the sentences ὅπερ δὲ ... ἀφ’ ἕξεσθαι and καὶ τῶν ἁγαθῶν θεολογεῖ ... καθ’ ἕξεσθαι, on the ground that the sentence ὅπερ δὲ ... ἀφ’ ἕξεσθαι contains an explanation of the words ὅπερ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἕξεσθαι b. 32.

พอใจος] amor or amatio (Victorius), as distinguished from φίλν gia
amicitia. In *E. N.* ii. 5. 2 φίλα is enumerated among the πάθη. But too much must not be made of a merely popular enumeration. Aristotle's fully considered theory of φίλα makes it a ἔξις, i.e. the result of the rational formation, or εἰδοποίησις, of certain natural affections, many of which may be conveniently brought under the general designation of φιλήσις. See the notes of Zell, Fritzsche, Michelet, and Grant.

b. 30. ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως] This is not a very true or relevant remark if intended merely to bring out the difference between φίλα and φιλήσις: ἄψυχα indeed cannot love in return, but there are many other objects of mere φιλήσις which render φιλήσις in return, ἀνεύ προαιρέσεως, and even in many φίλαi so called, viz. in many of those δὲ ἠδονὴν (cf. especially viii. 3. 5), love is mutually given ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. The words ἀντιφιλοῦσι μετὰ προαιρέσεως serve to distinguish not so much between φίλα and φιλήσις, as between ἡ τελεία φίλα and the inferior kinds; and may well be intended as another argument in support of ἡμερικαί ἔλεος. Friends of the inferior kinds never indeed properly acquire a ᾧς of friendship at all. This is shown by the fact that their friendships come to an end as circumstances alter. A good ἔξις is that by which a man corresponds with his permanent environment—the world as reason apprehends it, which is the same for all men, and has a place for every man. The friendship of the good, as based on the recognition of an orderly system of life, is the only friendship which can be properly described as a ἔξις. The friendships for pleasure and profit, based as they are on the feelings of the isolated individual irrationally seeking his own gratification without regard for others who are as truly persons in a kingdom of ends as himself, may be characterised as friendships κατὰ πάθος.

b. 31. καὶ τάγαθα βούλευται τοῖς φιλομένοις ἐκεῖνων ἐνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἔξιν] Βούλησις is of the τέλος (iii. 2. 9), as distinguished from τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. But such a τέλος, being good, can be apprehended only by reason, not by sense or feeling. See Themistius, vol. ii. 208 (ed. Spengel) ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἡ ἀϊσθησις ἡ ἀϊσθησις ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι οἷς οὐ τε ὀνῆ ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ τοῦ τέρτου ἦ
BOOK VIII: CHAP. 5: § 5.

αὐτὸντος, τὸ δὲ ἄγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦ νου μόνον κρίνειν ἐστὶ. The 1157 b. 31. apprehension of a good end requiring reason, the wish to realise it, or the moral interest in it, requires a εἶσι of rational disposition of the desires. In the life of mere desire there is no such thing as an end in the true sense of the term.

τῇ θεωρήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεί] Williams brings out the meaning of b. 36. this passage in its context correctly, I think, as follows—'And hence each friend not only loves that which is his own good, but also makes a perfectly equivalent return in the good which he wishes his friend, and in the pleasure which he yields him.' Here θεωρήσει = the wish for the good (cf. καὶ τὰ ἄγαθα θεωρήσαται above) naturally suggests ἡδεί, i.e. τῷ ἀκρότῳ ἡδεί, which is always associated with τῷ ἀκρότῳ ἄγαθῳ. Cf. viii. 3. 7 τῷ ἀκρότῳ ἄγαθῷ καὶ ἀκρότῳ ἡδεί ῄστι.

The Vet. Tr. and pr. Lb read εἶσιν, which Zell, Fritzsche, Stahr, and Rassow (Forsch. p. 32) adopt. Zell writes—'Non enim amicus amico par omnino pari refert, ut uterque eandem alterum demerendi voluntatem habeat, sed genere et specie quoque paria refert, id est, bona pro bonis, suavia pro suavibus, pro utilibus utilia': and Stahr has—'Mithin liebt auf beiden Seiten jeder das für ihn selbst Gute und gewährt seinerseits durch seine Willensbestrebung das Gleiche auch in derselben Gattung.' Susemihl now reads ἡδεί after Zeller (see Susemihl, Eth. Eud. append. p. 173). The MSS. perhaps do not help us to come to a decision in the case of two forms so similar in sound and appearance as ἡδεί and εἶσιν: but apart from MSS., the weight of probability seems to me to be greatly in favour of ἡδεί, which would naturally occur to the writer as the constant concomitant of ἄγαθον, the object of βουλήσεως. Grant's point too that ᾳσον εἶσιν would not be a natural expression, as confounding degree with kind, is worth noticing.

The Paraph. has ἐκάτερον οὖν φιλεῖ ἐκάτερον, ὡς ἄγαθον ὀλικεῖον, καὶ βουλήσαι τὰ ἄγαθά, καὶ ἓν ἐστιν ὀμοίως: and Aspasius has words to the same effect.

φιλότητι ἱσότητι] This is the reading of Kb adopted by Bywater. All other MSS. apparently read ἡ before ἱσότητι. In E. N. ix. 8. 2 the proverb is given as ἱσότης φιλότης, and in E. E. H. 6. 1240 b. 2. In E. N. viii. 8. 5, however, we have ἡ ἡ ἱσότητι καὶ ὑμοίτης φιλότης.
BOOK VIII: CHAP. 5: § 5.

1157 b. 36. As Ramsauer remarks, the old proverb was doubtless ἵστος φιλότης or φιλότης ἵστος without the article: but Aristotle allowed himself to alter a proverb to suit his purpose; and it would be a mistake to suppose that here the sense makes it impossible to take ἵστος as the subject. It is the predicate however, I take it, in the passage quoted by Fritzsche from Diog. L. viii. 1. 8 πρῶτος εἰπε Πυθαγόρας κοινά τὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ φίλιαν ἵστοτα.

CHAPTER VI.

Argument.

As for stiff-tempered and elderly people—the more difficult they are to get on with, and the less pleasure they take in one another's society, the less likely is friendship to spring up between them: for nothing is so characteristic of friendship and so productive of it, as taking pleasure in one another's society: this is what young people do: and therefore they become friends quickly: but not so old people—or stiff-tempered people: nevertheless such people may be well disposed to one another (wishing one another good and helping one another in need); but they cannot properly be called friends, since they do not spend their time together or take pleasure in one another—thus failing to realise the two most characteristic traits of friendship.

To be a friend to many in the way of Perfect Friendship is impossible, just as it is impossible to be in love with many at the same time: for Perfect Friendship is an exalted state of feeling, and, as such, has naturally one person as its object; also it is not easy for many to afford the highest satisfaction to the same person: not to mention the difficulty of finding many who are good: moreover, there cannot be perfect friendship unless the friends know each other well, and have come to enter familiarly into each other's dispositions—a hard thing to do where only two persons are concerned, and much harder where many are concerned.

Where, however, the object of friendship is utility or pleasure, it is possible to have many friends; for useful and pleasant people are numerous, and the services rendered are quickly rendered.

Of the two inferior friendships that for pleasure resembles Perfect Friendship most when the same services are rendered by both parties, and they take pleasure in each other or in the same things—as young people do in their friendships: there is something liberal in these friendships, which distinguishes them from the friendship for utility—the friendship of business. Further, the Happy need, not useful friends (since their material wants are already otherwise provided for), but pleasant friends—i.e. they wish for persons with whom to associate intimately: pain and ennui they can bear for a little while; but no
one would go on always enduring that which gave him pain—no, not even if it were the summum bonum itself. This is why the Happy seek to have their friends pleasant: they ought of course to seek to have them good as well as pleasant—good both absolutely and relatively; thus their friendship will have all that perfect friendship requires—the good, the pleasant, and the useful or relatively good.

Men of wealth and station have their friends in distinct sets: they have useful friends and pleasant friends, and it seldom happens that the same friends are both useful and pleasant—able subordinates, and amusing companions: the good man is indeed, as we have said, both pleasant and useful; but the good man does not allow himself to become the friend of one who is his superior, unless the superiority be in goodness as well as in wealth and station; for if the superiority were in wealth and station only, the good man could not compensate for his inferiority by any proportionate return. High station and goodness, however, seldom go together.

The imperfect friendships mentioned are ‘friendships between equals’: equals render to each other the same things, or exchange one thing for another, e.g. pleasure for profit. They are thought to be or not to be ‘friendships’ according as they are viewed as resembling or as differing from the standard friendship. They are thought to be friendships, because they are for pleasure or profit, since the standard friendship—that based on virtue—has its elements of pleasure and profit; but in so far as the friendship based on virtue is proof against slander, and lasting, while the friendships for pleasure and profit quickly pass away and differ from the friendship based on virtue in many other respects, they are not thought to be ‘friendships’.

§ 1.] Fritzsche brackets this § as being merely a repetition of viii. 5. 1158 a. 1.

2, 3. Rassow (Forsch. pp. 24, 25), after printing the gemini loci in parallel columns, leaves it undecided whether the first or the second ought to be bracketed. Against the claim of the first passage to stand he notes the point, overlooked by Fritzsche, that just that part of it which is not repeated here occurs again in another passage—ch. 6. § 4 καὶ οἱ μακάρωι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὗδὲν δεόμεν ἡδίων δὲν ὑπεράντων τινα, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ἄλγων μὲν χρόνον φῆμοιν, συμβέβηκαν δ' οὖν δὲν ἦν ὑπομεῖναι, οὗδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν ἀντὶ ἕν. On the other hand he thinks it undeniable that the second passage connects itself less naturally with what precedes it than the first passage does. Sussemihl agrees with Rassow in leaving it undecided which of the gemini loci ought to be bracketed.

πρεσβυτικὸς] Spengel (Aristotelische Studien i. p. 215) asks a. 2. why πρεσβύτας should not be read as below in this §, and in ch. 5.

§ 2. Victorius contends that πρεσβυτικὸς is intentionally employed,
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1158 a. 2. as Aristotle in this passage (as distinguished from 5. § 2) regards the disposition rather than the years of the old men in question—'neque enim cuncti hujus aetatis sunt difficiles.'

a. 3. ταῦτα γάρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἰναί φιλικᾶ καὶ ποιητικᾶ φιλίας] Ramsauer regards these words as spurious, finding nothing to which ταῦτα can be satisfactorily referred. Fritzsche refers ταῦτα to ὅμιλαις by a loose construction not uncommon in Aristotle's writings. Ramsauer notices the circumstance that the words ἀ δή μάλιστ' εἰναί δοκεῖ φιλικά at the end of this § say the same thing as the words which he brackets as spurious. I would call attention to the circumstance (whatever it may indicate) that three passages end with similar expressions—viz. ch. 5. § 3 μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἀπερ ἡ ἑταρικὴ δοκεῖ ἔχειν, ch. 6. § 1. 1158 a. 3 ἦτον ταῖς ὅμιλαις χαίροντων ταῦτα γάρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἰναί φιλικᾶ καὶ ποιητικᾶ φιλίας, and ch. 6. § 1. 1158 a. 9 μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλῆλοις, ἀ δή μάλιστ' εἰναί δοκεῖ φιλικά.

a. 8. φίλοι δ' οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ.] ‘They cannot properly be called friends.'

a. 12. § 2. ἔσικε γάρ ὑπερβολῇ] Fritzsche is wrong, I think, in making τὸ ἐρᾶν the subject of ἔσικε. The Paraph. gives the sense of the passage rightly—πολλοὶς δὲ φίλον εἰναί τῶν σπουδαίων κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἀπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἁμα δυνατῶν. ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ τὶς ἐστὶ φιλίας ἡ τελεία φιλία, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον πρὸς ἐνα πέρυκε γίνεσθαι. In keeping with this interpretation Aspasius says λεκτεόν δ' ὑπερβολὴν τὴν κατὰ τὸ εὖ. Cf. E. N. ii. 6. 17, where ἀρετή is said to be κατὰ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρίτης. As Coraes says, ἡ γὰρ τελεία φιλία . . . φιλών ἐστιν ἡ ἀκροτάτη, καὶ οὐκ ἐστιν αὐτῆς ὑπερτέρα ἅλλη φιλία. Perfect friendship is 'an exalted state.' In ix. 10. 5, however, which resembles this passage closely, τὸ ἐρᾶν ἐστιν ὑπερβολὴ τὶς φιλίας.


a. 16. § 3. πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν] Ramsauer conjectures πολλοῖς: unnecessarily, for πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν means simply, as Aspasius says, πολλοῖς εἰναί φίλους. His commentary is—διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον ἢ καὶ τὸ ἰδόν ἐνδέχεται πολλοῖς εἰναί φίλους: καὶ γὰρ πολὺ τὸ τών τοιοῦτων γένος, ἐτι οὐδὲ πολλοῦ χρῶνον δεῖ οὐδ' ἐξετάσεως: εν ὀλίγῳ γὰρ χρῶνι εὐθέως φανεροὶ γίνονται αἱ περὶ τῶν χρησίμων καὶ τῶν ἠδέων ὑπηρεσία, καὶ καταμάθω ἢ τις ταχέως τῶν αὐτῷ ἦδῶν ἢ χρησίμων, ὅταν δὲ μηκέτι γίνεται τούτων ὑποτεροῦν, λύοται ἡ φιλία: εν ὀλίγῳ γὰρ χρῶν Ϝυστάσα, καὶ τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἔχει ὀλεγχοχρώνων.
§ 4. ἐοικε φιλίᾳ] The MSS. read φιλία, but Asp. and the Paraph. 1158 a. 18. φιλίᾳ, which is adopted by Victorius, Ramsauer, and Bywater.


καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ] On καὶ—δὲ see Eucken, de Arist. dic. rat. a. 22. p. 32—‘adjungit autem καὶ—δὲ rem novam, saepe tam leni modo ut idem fere valeat atque tē.’ It is most frequent in E. N. iv, viii, ix, x.

οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν] ‘If Aristotle had been capable of a joke, we must have considered this to be meant as such’ (Grant).

δεῖ δὲ ἵνα καὶ ἀγαθοῦς τοιούτους δίνας, καὶ ἐτί αὐτοῖς] ‘The μακάριοι require their friends to be pleasant: but they ought to require them to be good too, as well as pleasant (τοιούτους δίνας = ἡδεὶς δίνας), and also useful (lit. good for themselves); for thus they will have all that belongs to true friendship.’ This rendering represents Rassow’s (Forsch. p. 83) view of the interpretation of these words. With ἐτί καὶ αὐτοῖς he supplies ἀγαθοῦς, regarding the phrase as equivalent to χρησίμους. Thus to supply ἀγαθοῦς after ἐτί καὶ αὐτοῖς (cf. the Paraph. τοὺς φίλους οἱ συνθαύματοι ἡδεὶς εἰσεύρεται, ἀγαθοῦς δίνας, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθοῦς, with whom Ramsauer, Williams and Peters agree) is obviously correct, although I think it would not be right to press (if indeed Rassow does so) the identity of αὐτοῖς ἀγαθοῦς with χρησίμους in the more material sense of the latter term. It has just been stated that the material wants of the μακάριοι are fully supplied—that they do not need merely useful friends, χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δένται. Stahr seems to give the true sense of the passage when he writes—‘Freilich sollten sie wohl auch dazu Menschen nehmen, die nicht nur an sich gute, sondern auch für sie selbst sittlich fördernd sind.’ To supply ἡδεῖς after ἐτί αὐτοῖς with Fritzsche and Grant is, I think, quite inadmissible; ἀγαθοῦς evidently being the dominating thought of the clause beginning δεῖ δὲ ἵνα, as ἡδεῖς was of the clause beginning διὸ a. 25. After ἀγαθοῦς a. 26 Rassow (Forsch. p. 84) supplies καθ’ ἑαυτοῖς, which he considers necessary to bring out the opposition to αὐτοῖς (ἀγαθοῦς), and Susemihl introduces καθ’ ἑαυτοῖς into his text.

§ 5. οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις] λέγει δὲ ἐν ἐξουσίαις τοὺς τυράννους a. 27. (Asp.).

1158 a. 32. **Δεινοὶς**] After Δεινοὶς Rassow (Forsch. p. 84) conjectures that εἰς τὸ has fallen out. Bywater's suggestion however (Contrib. p. 60)—to 'take τοῖς δὲ to mean “others,” and understand Δεινοὶς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθὲν to be a kind of predicate after ζητοῦσι'—seems to meet the difficulty.

a. 34. **§ 6. ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι κ.τ.λ.**] Aspasius gives the more generally accepted interpretation of this passage—ὑπερέχοντος οὐ γίνεται φίλος ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἄρετῇ ὑπερέχηται ὁ ὑπερέχων κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. δέι δὲ οὕτως ἀκούει τοὺς ὑπερέχουσα τῶν δυνάστην, ὡστε καὶ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἔχειν πρὸς τόν σπουδαίον ὡς πρὸς κρείττονα' οὔτω γὰρ ἦσαν ἡ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν ἰσότης, ἀν οὕτως μὲν πλούσιο καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχειν, βασιλέως δὲ τόν ἄγαθον ὡς καὶ ἄρετὴν αὐτοῦ διαφέρεται. This view, according to which the subject of ὑπερέχηται is ὁ ὑπερέχων (κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν), is accepted by the Paraphrast, Victorius, Lambinus, Zell, Coraes, Fritzsch, Michelet, Stahr, Williams, and Peters.

As for ὑπερεχόμενος a. 36—some of these commentators make it the great man or prince, and others the good man: the Paraph. e. g. makes it the good man—οὐτώ γὰρ ἔξεσάει ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ κατ' ἐξουσίαν ὑπερέχειται, ἀνάλογον ὑπερέχον καὶ ὑπερεχόμενος. Coraes on the other hand makes ὑπερεχόμενος the great man or prince—εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπερέχοντο δ ἐν ἐξουσία κατ' ἄρετὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου, οὐκ ἔσαει τῷ σπουδαίῳ (οὐ γίνεται φίλος δηλαδή, εἰ γε ἐν ἰσότητι ἢ φιλίᾳ) ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος, τούτῳ τοσοῦτον ἄρετὴν ὑπερεχόμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου, διὸν ἐκεῖνον ὑπερέχει κατ' ἐξουσίαν.

According, then, to the view of Aspasius and most other commentators, Aristotle means to tell us here that the good man will not become the friend of a superior in rank and power unless that superior is his inferior in goodness—or, to use Grant’s words, 'a good man would not be a friend to a potentate, if that potentate had superior moral qualities.' This cannot be Aristotle’s meaning. Grant, Ramsauer, and Jackson (Arist. Nic. Eth. Book v, p. 91) are undoubtedly right in making ὁ σπουδαῖος, not ὁ ὑπερέχων, the subject of ὑπερεχθεῖται, and rendering—'the good man does not become the friend of a superior in rank and power unless he is surpassed in goodness, as well as in rank and power, by that superior.' The awkwardness of making the subject of ὑπερεχθεῖται different from that of γίνεται is thus avoided, and account is taken of the force of καὶ before τῇ ἄρετῇ, ignored by the other rendering.

1 So also Fritzsch, reading ὁ ὑπερεχόμενος without MS. authority.
As for εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενοι—Grant, Ramsauer, 1158 a. 34. and Jackson agree that ὁ σπουδαῖος is still the subject; but Jackson alone seems to me to have got the meaning of the clause clearly:—

‘because otherwise the inferior will not feel for the superior that love and regard by which alone he can requite superior services.’

Cf. E. N. viii. 7. 2 ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν πάσιν ταῖς καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν οὐδαίς φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἄμεινον μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὄφελιμωτέρον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστὸν ὁμοίως’ ὅταν γὰρ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἢ φίλησις γίνεται, τότε γίνεται ποιό ἴσοτης, δ' δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ. Cf. also viii. 8. 1. The equality found in αἱ φιλίαι αἱ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν could not be realised in such a case of inferiority as that of a poor good man to a bad (or not good) rich man, for the poor good man would not be warranted in repaying the great material benefits, which he might receive from the rich man, with an amount of love and esteem equal to them. Between a poor good man and a very good rich man equal reciprocation, and therefore a friendly relation, is indeed possible; but—rich men are seldom very good—οὐ πάνυ δ' εἰσάβαι τοιαύται γίνεσθαι (sc. οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἔξουσίαις, Ασπ.)

The clause εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενοι may be rendered—'for if this be not so, he (the poor good man) cannot put himself on an equal footing by compensating for his inferiority’—i. e. by making a proportionate return for the benefits which he, in his inferior position, receives. I take ἀνάλογον with ὑπερεχόμενοι: see the Paraph. (ἀνάλογον ὑπέρχον καὶ ὑπερεχόμενοι) and Coraes quoted above, and cf. viii. 13. 1 τοὺς δ' ἁνίσους (sc. δεῖ) τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι.

Peters’ contention that ὁ σπουδαῖος cannot be the subject of ὑπερέχειται, because ‘the ideally good man cannot be surpassed in virtue,’ would have force if it were necessary to assume that Aristotle has here in view ‘the ideally good man.’

§ 7. εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρήμεναι φιλίαι ἐν ἴσοτητι] i. e. these φιλίαι, b. 1. as they have been hitherto described, are ἐν ἴσοτητι: but all three may be also καθ’ ὑπεροχή—see viii. 13. 1 τριτῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἄρχῃ εἰρήναι, καὶ καθ’ ἐκαστὴν τῶν μὲν ἐν ἴσοτητι φιλῶν ὅτινον τῶν δὲ καθ’ ὑπεροχή (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χειρῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἠδεῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χάρισμα, ἵστασται ταῖς ὄφελειασ καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἱσοὺς μὲν κατ’ ἴσοτητα δεὶ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἁνίσους τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι.
CHAPTER VII.

Argument.

Another class of friendships is that of the friendships between unequals — between father and son — and generally between elder and younger; between husband and wife — and generally between ruler and ruled. These friendships differ from each other — that of parents for children is not the same as that of rulers for ruled; and, further, the friendship of father for son is not the same as that of son for father, or of husband for wife the same as that of wife for husband; for the goodness and the function of the husband or father are not the same as the goodness and the function of the wife or son, and the reasons for which each feels friendship to each are different. The services rendered by each differing, there will be a fair and lasting friendship when children render to parents, and parents to children, those things which are due to parents and children respectively. The affection also in all these friendships between unequals ought to be 'in proportion' on each side — i.e. the better or the more useful ought to be loved more than he loves: for when there is affection in proportion to desert then, in a way, equality is produced — equality the great mark of friendship.

Equality is not the same in Justice and in Friendship. In justice proportionate equality is of primary, and absolute equality of secondary importance; in friendship absolute equality comes first, and proportionate equality takes the second place. This is shown by the fact that if the distance, e.g. in goodness or wealth, between the parties becomes great, they cease to be friends, or even to think of each other as friends. The clearest case is the relation between the gods and men; other cases are the relation between kings and their subjects, and that between men who are very good and very wise and those who are good for nothing. It is impossible to define exactly the distance at which people may still be friends: they may still be friends though the distance is considerable; but not if it be that at which the gods stand from men. Hence the question — Whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest good? Surely they do not wish them to become gods, and to cease to be their friends, i.e. their good. If we were right in saying that a friend wishes good things for his friend for his friend's sake, then his friend must remain what he is: a friend will wish the greatest of good things for his friend as a man; but perhaps not all these good things; the very greatest of them he will wish for himself.

b. 12. § 1. τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχήν] 'another kind of friendship in which the persons are unequal' — Peters.
§ 2. καὶ τὴν φιλήσιν] Aspasius notices the καὶ before φιλήσιν, b. 24. but scarcely helps us to understand its force—ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν φιλίαις οὗ μόνον τὴν φιλίαν δεῖ εἶναι ἀνάλογον, ἄλλα καὶ τὴν φιλήσιν καὶ σχεδὸν διὰ τὴν φιλήσιν καὶ ἡ φιλία ἔξει ἀνάλογον. I would explain as follows—The ἰσότης realised in these φιλίαι καθ' ὑπεροχήν is not merely that of a fair commercial συνάλλαγμα, in which equivalent amounts of different wares are exchanged; it is the ἰσότης of φιλία—the superior does not give merely assistance in return for the equivalent amount of respect which he receives from the inferior; he gives φιλήσις as well—since he is the other’s φίλος—and expects a proper return of φιλήσις. The mutual exchange of φιλήσις between the superior and inferior is indeed more characteristic of their friendship than the exchange of assistance and respect—materially necessary though the latter exchange may be to their ‘friendship.’ But in this mutual exchange of φιλήσις the difference between superior and inferior must not be lost sight of—οἱ (here = i. e. not e.g.) τὸν ἄμεινο (ἐς. δεῖ) μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν.

§ 3.] The essential thing in Justice is that every man shall b. 29. get his due whatever that happens to be; the essential thing in Friendship is equality. Justice does not care how unequal the persons are, but gives them their due shares; whereas strict equality between the persons is required by the highest kind of Friendship, and although there are Friendships so-called in a secondary sense (δευτέρως b. 33), viz. αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχήν in which the absence of strict equality is compensated for by ‘proportionate equality,’ yet this compensation is possible only within certain limits. If the real inequality becomes very great φιλία also becomes impossible. See the Par. ad loc. εἶναι κατ' ἄξιαν καὶ ἀνάλογον γίνεται ἡ διανομή δικαία ἐστὶ, κἂν σφόδρα τὸ ποσὸ διαφέρει οὐδὲν κολύει τὸ τοῦ δικαίου σώζεσθαι λόγον, εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἵνα εἴη καὶ ἡ ἀνάλογον οὐ δύναται εἴην. Cf. Grant’s good note ad loc.

§ 4. διάστημα] τὸ κατὰ ποσὸν ἵσον is primary in Friendship, b. 33. otherwise Friendship would not be destroyed by διάστημα.
CHAPTER VIII.

Argument.

Most men are ambitious of the honour of being loved more than they love (this is why the majority of men love flatterers); being loved is very nearly the same thing, in their view, as being honoured; and to be honoured is what the majority of men strive after. But honour is not sought for itself. The majority of men take pleasure in receiving it from persons who have much in their power, because they recognise it as the sign of the advantages which they hope for; while others seek to be honoured by good men who are connoisseurs of goodness, in order that they may have confirmation of their own good opinion about themselves. To be loved, on the other hand, gives men pleasure in itself. Accordingly to be loved is a better thing, it would seem, than to be honoured, and friendship is something in itself choiceworthy. But by 'friendship' we mean 'loving' rather than 'being loved.' The love of mothers for their young children by whom they cannot be loved in return may help us to see that friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved: this being so, and those who 'love their friends' being praised, it follows that 'loving one another' is the virtue of friends; and those who do this in proportion to desert are lasting friends. It is by this loving in proportion to desert that those who are not
equals may be made equals and so friends. Equality and similarity is friendship—especially similarity in Virtue. Virtuous men are stable in themselves, and remain stable friends to one another, neither seeking for themselves, nor helping one another to, anything that is evil—nay, trying to keep one another out of evil. But wicked men have no stability. They do not remain long the same; they become friends to one another for a short time, pleased with one another’s wickedness. Those whose friendship is for utility or pleasure remain friends longer—that is, as long as advantage or pleasure is forthcoming.

The friendship of utility seems especially to arise out of contraries—e.g. it arises between rich men and poor men, between the man who knows and the man who is ignorant. Under this head too may be brought that between lover and beloved, between one who is beautiful and one who is plain. Hence lovers sometimes make themselves ridiculous by expecting to be loved as much as they love, although they are not equally loveable. But perhaps the one contrary does not seek the other as such, but only per accidens—the mean being the real object of desire: for the mean is good; thus the good for the ‘dry’ is not to become ‘wet,’ but to reach the mean.

§ 1. ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος δ ᾗ κόλαξ] We see from this that the 1159 a. 14. ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος of viii. 6. 6 effects the equality required in friendship by rendering more love than he receives.

προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος] Bekker’s εἶναι after τοιοῦτος, omitted by a. 15. Byw., seems to have no MS. authority. NC reads προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτο.

§ 2.] Grant compares E. N. i. 5. 5. a. 17.

§§ 2–3. τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ’ αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν κ.τ.λ.] See the Par. a. 25. ad loc. ἐστὶ δὴ οὕτω μόνον τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δ’ ἐαυτῷ αἴρετον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ μᾶλλον, δογρ βέλτιον. To be loved is better than to be honoured. Thus φίλα, looked at even on its passive side, stands very high in the scale of human good things. But active love is its true mark—δοκεῖ δ’ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖ μᾶλλον ἡ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι (§ 3). The ἐνέργεια of τὸ φιλεῖν, proceeding from the virtuous ζῆς of φιλία, brings the good man, quod φίλος, into ‘the intelligible world’ of active reason, as distinguished from the region of passive feeling. If we consider in this connexion the doctrine which Aristotle shares with Plato, that reason in all its flights is moved and sustained by love, we can see what a high place in the Aristotelian Metaphysic of Ethics φιλία occupies. Here, however, its place is merely indicated; in Book ix it is more accurately determined. Cf. M. M. ii. 11. 1210 b. 6 ἐστὶ δὲ βέλτιον τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖν ἐνέργεια τις ἡδονής καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι οὐδεμία τῷ

1159 a. 25. φιλομένοι ἑνέργεια γέρεται· ἦτε δὲ βιλτιον τὸ γνωρίζειν ἢ γνωρίζεσθαι . . . ἦτε τὸ εὐποιητικὸν εἶναι βιλτιον ἢ μὴ· ἦ μὲν οὖν φιλῶν εὐποιητικὸς ἢ φιλεῖ, ὡς φιλομένου ἢ φιλεῖται οὔ. Cf. Aspasius on viii. 8. 3 ἦστι μὲν οὖν ἢ φιλεῖν εἰν τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ φιλεῖσθαι· μᾶλλον δὲ δοκεῖ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἢ γὰρ ἑνέργεια ἑκατέρων τῶν φιλῶν ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι οὐκ ἦστιν αὐτοῦ ἑνέργεια· ἐκατός δὲ περί ἐκείνω ἦστι περὶ δὲ ἔχει τὴν ἑνέργειαν.

a. 33. § 4.] Those who actively love their friends are praised; so, loving is the true virtue of friends. See E. N. i. 13. 19 τῶν ἔχεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαίνετας ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

b. 1. § 5. οὕτω 8' ἐν κ.τ.λ.] ἀλλοι are equalised τῷ φιλεῖν ἀνάλογον—thus ὑπερέχων : ὑπερεχόμενος : ἡ τοῦ ὑπερεχόμενου φιλήσης : ἡ τοῦ ὑπερέχοντος φιλήσης.

b. 3. τῶν κατ' ἀρετήν'] 'sc. φιλῶν' (Ramsauer): but it seems better to understand ὅμοιοι.

b. 6. ἄλλ' ὃς εἰπεῖν καὶ'] 'nay rather, I ought to say . . .'

b. 20. § 7. ἄλλα κατὰ συμβεβηκός] οὐ γὰρ, καθὸ φιλοῦσιν ἄλληλα, ἑνναι ἦστιν, ἄλλα συμβεβήκεν αὐτοῖς ἑνναι ἦσιν καὶ γὰρ ὁ πίνης ἐρά τοῦ πλουσίου ὅτι ὁφελισμὸς ἦστιν αὐτῷ καὶ χρήσιμος (Paraph.).

η δ' ὅρεξικτοῦ μέσου ἦστιν· τοῦτο γάρ ἄγαθον] Cf. E. N. ii. 6. 9 ἡ ἀρετὴ . . . ὄσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἄν εἰ τῷ στοχαστικῷ. 'Correspondence with environment' is the law of life.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

The sphere of justice and of friendship is the same. Every association or common undertaking has its kind of justice, and consequently its kind of friendship. Thus men speak of their fellow-soldiers as their 'friends.' As far as their common undertaking extends, so far does their friendship extend. Thus the proverb 'Friends have things in common' is true.

Brothers and comrades have all things in common: other friends have more or less in common, for some friendships are greater than others; and as the friendships vary, so does the justice in each case. The justice which a parent
owes to his child differs from that which brothers owe one another—or, again, comrades—or fellow-citizens: injustice is aggravated in proportion as it is done to a nearer friend. This shows that justice and friendship have the same sphere.

All associations or common undertakings are parts of the great association of the Commonwealth. As the association of the Commonwealth sprang up and is maintained in order to secure the common good of its members, so each of these particular associations exists in order to secure some particular good. It is the common good (identical with that which is just) which legislators aim at; the minor associations aim at some particular good—e.g. business associations at wealth, military associations at victory. There are other associations again which are for pleasure—clubs, and guilds, and festivals in which the worship of the gods is combined with relaxation: it is to be noted that the ancient religious assemblies were harvest festivals, for the time immediately after harvest was the time at which people had most leisure. These associations then for worship and relaxation are parts of the great association of the Commonwealth which looks not to the advantage of the day but to that of the whole of life. Each of these associations has its own kind of friendship.

§ 1. ἐν ἀρχήν vener. i. 4, according to Asp. 1159b. 25.

ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς 'between the same persons': see Asp.—ἐν τοῖς b. 26. αὐτοῖς νῦν φιλία ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς (συν)οπρατισταις . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ: περὶ τὰ συμμαχικά γάρ κ.τ.λ.

καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον] sc. ἐπὶ τοσούτων ἐστὶ καθ ὅσον κοινωνόισι b. 30. (Fritzsche).

§ 3. τοῦ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι] πρωθυπότητος ἀντὶ τοῦ τῷ πρὸς 1160 a. 4. φίλους μᾶλλον εἶναι (Coraes).

αὐξεῖσαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἀμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τῷ δίκαιῳ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν a. 7. τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς λουποῖς, αὐξῆσιν δὲ λαμβάνει τὸ δίκαιον τοῦ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους γίνεσθαι. Βουλόμενος δὲ τοῦτο δείξαι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνακρίτου ἐπιχειρεί. εἰ γὰρ δευνότερον τὸ χρημάτων ἀποστερήσει ἐτάρον ἡ πολιτεία, καὶ τὸ πρὸς φίλους γινόμενον δίκαιον καὶ κρατήτων ἐστὶν, εἰ δὲ αὐξῆσαι ἡ φιλία, αὔξεται καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀντα (Asp.).

§§ 4, 5, 6.] Since, ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἡ φιλία (§ 1), the various associations a. 8. (κοινωνίαι) included in the commonwealth (πολιτικὴ κοινωνία), all of them subserving its end—the public good, by means of their own special ends (whether these special ends be described as useful or pleasant), involve their corresponding friendships.

§ 4. καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ έξ a. 11. ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν] Zell and Fritzsche remind us that this
1160 a. 11. is not a complete statement of Aristotle's theory of the origin and maintenance of society, and refer to *Pol.* iii. 4. 1278 b. 20 φύσιν μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπως żon polيتικῶν δὲ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενον τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας οὐκ ἔλαστον δρέγονται τοῦ συζήν οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινή συμφέρον συνύγει, καθ’ ὅσον ἐπιζάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ żon καλῶς. Ramsauer refers to *Pol.* i. i. 1252 b. 29 γυμνόν τοῦ żon ἐνεκεν, οὔσα δὲ τοῦ εἴ τιν. Cf. also *Pol.* iii. 5. 1280 a. 25 εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτημάτων χάριν ἐκοινώσθησαν καὶ συνήθουν, τούτου μετέχουσι τῆς πόλεως ὅσοντερ τὸ τῆς κτήσεως; ὀφθ’ ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγως δύσευσιν ἓν ἱσχύειν ... εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ żon μόνον ἐνεκεν, ἄλλα μᾶλλον τοῦ εἴ τιν ... μήτε συμμαχίας ἐνεκεν, ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδένα λιθώσεται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρήσιν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ... περὶ δ’ ἀρέτης καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν, ὅτι φροντίζουσιν εὐθυμίας κ.λ. Comparing the passage before us (*E. N.* viii. 9. 4) with the passages quoted from the *Politics* we observe (1) that according to Aristotle's complete theory other and more powerful causes than the conception of material advantage brought men into social union, and keep them in it; and (2) that τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον is a wide expression including τὸ καλόν, and not to be identified with the 'useful' as distinguished from the 'noble and good.'


φασὶν] so Aristotle himself—*Pol.* iii. 4. 1279 a. 17 φανερῶν τοῦν ὥς ὅσα μὲν πολιτεία τὸ κοινή συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὐτὰ μὲν ὅρθα τνγχάνουσιν οὔσαι κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον.

a. 17. § 5. πόλεως ὀργάμενοι] as colonists or as exiles—Ramsauer.

a. 19. ἐνενεὶ δὲ τῶν κοινωνίων δὲ ἡδονή δοκούσῃ γίνεσθαι] The Par. takes pains to show that even those associations which seem to have pleasure as their end, ultimately subserve τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον, because ἀναπαύεις μὲθ’ ἡδονῆς are necessary to the proper performance of earnest work. τινὲς δὲ τῶν κοινωνίων τοῦ ἡδονῆ εἶναιται ... ὀσπὲρ ἡ τῶν βιοτικῶν κοινωνία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἔραυστῶν ... καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ μέρη εἰς τῆς πολιτικῆς τάττονται γὰρ καὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον ὑπὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὁ νῦν ἐστὶ συμφέρον ἐξετάζει· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ νῦν μὲν οὐ συμφέρει, συνοίσει δὲ, καὶ τούτῳ διώκει ... διὰ τούτῳ θυσίας τε εἰσήγαγε καὶ συνάδους καὶ συνονίας μεθ’ ἡδονῆς καὶ πόνων ἀναπαύεις’ μετὰ γὰρ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιῶς αἰ τε σύνοδοι ἐγένοτο καὶ αἱ θυσίαι, ἀπαρχαὶ τοιες οὔσαι μάλιστα γὰρ τοῦ συνὸς ἐσχάλαζον τοῖς καρποῖς διὰ δὴ τοῦτοι τῶν κοινωνίων τὸ τὰς θείον ἱλεοὺς αὐτοίς ἐγένητο, ὅ συνοίσει εἶδόκει, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύμενοι, νεαροῖ τῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ συμφέροντος πόνων ἤπτοτο. Διὰ τοῦτο
BOOK VIII: CHAP. 9: § 5.

The members of religious guilds and social clubs. The θιασωτός was a guild of persons who danced along the streets in procession, and joined in sacrificial feasts in honour of a god—especially Bacchus. An ἐφανος was a social club in which each member made his contribution (συμβολή) to the common fund.

Chapter X.

Argument.

Constitutions are of three species—kingly rule, aristocracy, and timocracy. In each of these the end of government is the common good. But there is, corresponding to each of these three, a degraded form in which the good of the governing power is made the end of government. Thus tyranny is the degradation of kingly rule—the tyrant is the bad king who rules for his own
advantage; oligarchy, of aristocracy—the few, who are rich, rule in the interest of their own class; and democracy, of timocracy—the moderate property qualification recognised in timocracy is abolished. Of these degraded forms tyranny is the worst, because it is the contrary of the best—kingly rule; and democracy is the least bad, for it does not involve a very great declension from timocracy, since timocracy itself is the rule of the many—i.e. of those who are equals in virtue of coming up to a moderate property qualification.

Of all these constitutional forms we have analogues in the Family. The relation of the father to his children corresponds to kingly rule—thus, Homer calls Zeus, Father: and where, as in Persia, a father treats his children as slaves we have a relation which corresponds to tyranny. The relation between husband and wife corresponds to aristocracy, for the husband rules the wife in those things in which his superiority entitles him to rule her; where he takes all power into his own hands his rule becomes like oligarchy: sometimes again the domestic oligarchy is that of the wife, if she be an heiress. The relation between brothers corresponds to timocracy: brothers are equals except in so far as age makes a difference. The analogue of democracy is, for the most part, found in households which are without a head or where the ruler is weak and the members are allowed to do as they please.

1160 a. 31. § 1. πολιτείας δ' ἐστιν εἴδη τρία, ἵστατο δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεως] See Pol. iii. 5. 1279 a. 22 sqq. and Pol. iv. 2. 1289 a. 26. Grant and Ramsauer think that this chapter can hardly have been written after the Politics: see their notes ad loc.

a. 34. πολιτείαν δ' αὕτην κ.τ.λ.] 'constitutional government' (Peters). Ἡ ἐκ τιμημάτων is called πλουτοκρατία in Xen. Mem. iv. 6. 12.

b. 6. § 2. μὴ τοιοῦτος] μὴ αὐτάρκης.

κληρωτός ἀν τις εἶνας βασιλεῖς] Fritzsche supposes the reference to be to the αὐθωμήτης mentioned in Pol. iii. 9. 1285 a. 31, or αἰερτὸς τίφανος. But Coraes is more probably right with κληρωτός ἀν τις εἶνας βασιλεῖς, καθάπερ ὁ πρῶτος τῶν ἐννέα κληρωτῶν ἀρχότων 'Αδριάντης ἐπονομάζετο βασιλεῖς. Peters and Ramsauer adopt this interpretation, the latter quoting Plato, Polit. 291 A τούτοις τε τούν τούς κληρωτούς βασιλεάς ἀμα καὶ ιερέας, and 290 Ε καὶ δὴ καὶ παρ’ ἑαυτόν ἐργάζεται ταν μάλιστα πάτρια τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅσιών ἀποδεδώθαι

All recorded sources except Ob and NC read ἡ after εἶνας: this reading requires μᾶλλον to be supplied: see the Paraph. ὁ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχων κληρωτὸς μᾶλλον ἀν τις εἶνας βασιλεῖς.

b. 8. καὶ φανερότερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χειρίστη] According to Ramsauer and Peters this means that it is more evident from an inspection of
BOOK VIII: CHAP. 10: §§ 2, 3. 307

τυραννὶς that it is the worst, than it is evident from an inspection of 1160 b. 8. βασιλεία that it is the best form of government. Surely this is not the meaning. Nothing can be more evident, on Aristotle's principles, than that βασιλεία is the best form of government. The comparison in φανερώτερον is between the worst of the ὁρθαὶ πολιτείαι, viz. τιμοκρατία (see above, 1160 a. 36 χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία), and the worst of the παρεκβάσεις, viz. τυραννὶς. The latter is quite plainly the worst on its side because it is ἐναντίον to βασιλεία which is the best of all forms; whereas it is not so plain that τιμοκρατία is the worst on its side, because the difference between it and βασιλεία does not amount to ἐναντίατης.

§ 3. μεταβαίνει] impersonal = ἡ μεταβολὴ γίνεται, according to b. 10. Ramsauer; but the Paraph. makes ἡ πολιτεία the subject—a construction supported by θέεται μεταβαίνουσιν at the end of the present section.

καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία] i.e. timocracy, as well as democracy, is a b. 18. government of the many: see Pol. iii. 5. 1279 a. 37 ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύεται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὅνημα πασῶν τῶν πολιτείων, πολιτεία.

παρεκβάσεις] taken transitively in the Ind. Arist., and by the b. 20. Paraph., Ramsauer, and Fritzsche. The term παρεκβάσεις seems to have been derived from the terminology of music: see E. E. H. 9. 1241 b. 28 πολιτεία... καὶ αἱ ὁρθαὶ καὶ αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὁπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄρμονῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις: and Pol. θ. 7. 1342 a. 22 εἰσὶ δ' ὁπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξωσι, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἄρμονῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ, καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύνοια καὶ παρακεχροσμένα: on which see Susemihl's Arist. Politik, note 1098.

Democracy is the least evil of the debased forms (ἡματα δὲ μοχθηρῶν ἐστὶ ἡ δημοκρατία), because it arises out of a form in which the governing body is large. In timocracy the governing body, being the majority of the people, governs for the good not of itself—the majority—but for the good of the whole State, the minority included. In democracy the majority governs for its own good, and neglects the rights of the minority. But still in democracy the rights and interests of the majority, at least, are attended to; whereas in tyranny and oligarchy, where the governing body is very small, the majority is oppressed. On the principle there-
fore of the greatest good of the greatest number, the deflection implied in tyranny or oligarchy is a much more serious evil than that implied in democracy. But extremes meet. There is a form of Democracy in which everything is determined by ψηφίσματα, and not by νόμος. This form of Democracy, which Aristotle (Pol. Δ. 4. 1292 a. 4 sqq.) compares to tyranny, must be excepted from the application of the judgment ἡκατόν δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστὶ ἡ δημοκρατία, and may have been present to the mind of Aspasius when he wrote—εἰ καθ’ αὐτὸ σκοπήσεις, χείρῳ ἄν εὑρήσῃς τὴν δημοκρατίαν τῶν ἐτέρων’ εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πάντες ἀρχοῦσιν, ἐν τῇ τυραννίᾳ καὶ διλεγαρχίᾳ, τῇ μὲν ὀλιγοκρατίᾳ δὲ εἰς χείρον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τολμοῦσα φαύλας ἀρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ὀλίγους ἢ καί ἑνα.

These then are the ways in which the several constitutions are most apt to change (Peters); most apt,’ for, there are other ways, as Aristotle himself points out in Pol. Θ, e.g. tyrannies sometimes arise directly out of oligarchies or democracies: democracies directly out of tyrannies. See Ramsauer ad loc.

The parallels drawn in §§ 4, 5 and 6 differ in value and suggestiveness. Those drawn between the normal conjugal relation and aristocracy, and the abnormal conjugal relation and oligarchy are perhaps more ingenious than useful; but on the other hand, those drawn between the father and the king, between the master and the tyrant, between brothers and the members of a timocracy or democracy, rest upon a true view of the natural history of society.

The clan or village-community with its Chief (βασιλεύς) is the expansion of the house with its Father: see Pol. i. 1. 1252 b. 17 ἢ κόμη ἀποκια ὀικίας ἢ καλοῦσι τῶν ὁμογενῶν παιδῶν τε καὶ παῖδων παιδα. διδ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύσατο αἰ πόλει, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἐθνον ἐκ βασιλευμένων γάρ συμφέρων πάσα γὰρ ὀικία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου· ὡστε καὶ αἱ ἀποκια διὰ τῆς συγγενείας. Cf. Pol. i. 5. 1259 b. 10 ἢ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχή βασιλική· τὸ γάρ γενόμενα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ προσβείαν ἔστιν, ὡσπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἰδος ἀρχῆς. διδ καλὸς ὄμηρος τὸν Δία προσεγγίσατο, εἰτῶν πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

It is only, however, while a community remains small that the patriarchal kingship is possible; and in the Hellenic world, when Aristotle wrote, it had long become a thing of the past. Monarchy now existed chiefly in the form of tyranny, where the monarch was able to coerce a mixed and divided mass of subjects, as a master coerces his slaves. Greek communities, when they became too large to submit to the rule of the patriarchal chief, naturally became aristocracies and timocracies; that is—the customs (vómos) which had grown up under the rule of the patriarchal chief, continued to govern the community after the disappearance of that rule. These customs expressed originally what kinsmen deemed due to one another in their various relations. It is true that on the disappearance, in a large community, of the lively sense of kinship which produced them, the customs underwent many transformations in correspondence with a changing environment: but in all their transformations they continued to give merely new expression to that social sense—that communis sensus, which, wide as its scope may become, can always be traced back to the feelings of near kinsmen—members of the same village, descended from brothers, members of the same family—πάες καὶ παίδων παίδες.

Aristocracy and timocracy represent different stages in the evolution of the primitive association of brothers. First we have the preponderating influence of the 'elder branches'; then power becomes more equally distributed among all the 'kinsmen,' as population increases, and wealth becomes diffused. In other words—the aristocratic families whose local power made the central rule of the patriarchal chief impossible, continued to exercise that power till new families became influential and competed with them. In this evolution however from aristocracy to timocracy there is no break in continuity. The old customs inherited from the patriarchal period are slowly changed. But either in aristocracy or in timocracy force may break with old customs and introduce disorder. Hence oligarchy or democracy. If aristocracy does not, with increasing population and wealth, pass naturally into timocracy, it is because circumstances have aggrandised certain aristocratic families, and made them too powerful in a large community the customs of which have ceased.
1160 b. 22. to be those of the patriarchal or the early aristocratic period. Timocracy becomes democracy chiefly under stress of population and poverty, when the old customs fail to meet the new circumstances, and the many poor take it into their own hands to alter the old customs more or less rudely. But a democracy which springs from timocracy, the development of aristocracy, is obviously much better than one which springs from oligarchy, the παρέκβασις of aristocracy. The former democracy is after all of the nature of an inevitable development; the latter implies a break in continuity and a revolution, followed soon by a 'Saviour of Society' in the shape of a tyrant.

b. 31. διαφέροντων] The slave is φύσει a slave: he differs from the free man as the body differs from the soul; see Pol. i. 2. 1254 b. 16 οὐκ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτον διεστάσεσθαι δος ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἄθρωπος θηρίου, διάκεισθαι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. οὕτως ἐστὶν ἤργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρήσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστ' ἀπ' αὐτὸν βελτιστοῦ, οὗτος μὲν εἰς φύσει δουλος οἷς βελτιστῶν ἐστὶν ἀρχεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἄρχην, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἐστὶ γὰρ φύσει δουλός ο ἐννάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστὶ (i.e. he is not a Person) καὶ τὸ κοινωνῶν λόγον τοιοῦτον δοὺς αἰσθανόμενα, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχεις τα γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα ὃν λόγον αἰσθανόμενα, ἀλλὰ παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἥ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν' ἡ γὰρ πρός τάναγκα τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ' ἠμφότερον, παρὰ τε τῶν δουλῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ζωῶν. δουλεύει μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα πιείν τὰ τῶν εὐερέτων καὶ τῶν δουλῶν, τὰ μὲν ἵσχυρα πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν, τὰ δ' ὥρθα καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς τυπάντας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον . . . συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοῦναύτιον κ.τ.λ.

b. 32. § 5. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς] sc. κοινωνια.

b. 36. μεθίστησιν] sc. τὴν κοινωνίαν.

1161 a. 1. ἐπίκληροι] Zell, Fritzche, and Grant quote Menander in illustration of the Greek feeling about heiresses—

δοτὸς γυναῖκ' ἐπίκληρον ἐπιθυμεῖ λαβεῖν
πλούτοις, ἢτοι μὴν ἐκτίνει θεῶν,
BuilderFactory' ἄνυχεῖν, μακάριος καλούμενος.

In Pol. ii. 6. 1270 a. 23 the evil consequences arising to the Spartan state from the heiresses are noticed—ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν γυναικῶν κ.τ.λ.: see Newman's note on 1270 a. 21.

§ 6. oikhsen] 'Dicuntur autem haud male oikhsen quae non sunt oikia nedum oikoi' (Ramsauer). The habitations of wild animals are oikhses: see Ind. Arist. s. v.

CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

In each of the constitutional forms we find a friendship coextensive with the justice involved in the particular form. The friendship of a king for his subjects is that of one who confers the greater benefits. The king tends his people. Thus Homer calls Agamemnon 'The shepherd of the people.' The friendship of a father is of this kind—only, a father confers greater benefits than a king: he confers existence—thought to be the greatest of all—nurture and education; forefathers too are thought of as conferring these benefits. The father has a natural right to rule over his children. The king also has a natural right to rule over his people, because he represents the forefather.

These friendships, being between unequals, involve, like the kinds of justice corresponding to them, 'return in proportion to desert': this is why parents receive honour—the only thing which children can return in an amount proportionate to the benefits which they receive.

The friendship of husband and wife is the same as that between rulers and ruled in an aristocracy. The friendship between brothers resembles that between comrades—for they are equals and belong to the same generation; and those who are such generally feel and are disposed alike. Now the friendship found in a timocracy is of this kind—its members stand on an equal footing, and take turns in holding office. But in the degraded forms, as justice exists to a small extent, so does friendship. When ruler and ruled have nothing in common there is no friendship between them, for there is no justice: the relation between them is like that between workman and tool, soul and body, master and slave: the slave is a living tool: one cannot make a slave, qua slave, a 'friend,' any more than one can be 'just' to him: although qua man he may be the object of friendship and justice.

In tyrannies there is very little friendship and very little justice: in democracies more than in the other degraded forms: for in democracies men are equal, and so have much in common.

§ 1. filia fainei, ef' doson kai to dikaiou] i.e. filia subsists 1161 a. 10. between those only whose relations to one another are regulated by nomos: cf. E. N. v. 6. 4 toto 8 (i.e. to politikon dikaiov) estin epi koumwn bion pros to eimi autarkian, eleuberon kai doson h kai analogian h h arithmon oste dosos h esti touto, ouk esti toutois pros
BOOK VIII: CHAP. 11: § 1.

1161 a. 10. ἄλληλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἄλλα τὶ δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. Ἡστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς. Cf. below viii. 11. 7 δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον παντὶ ἄνθρωπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνίσαι νόμον καὶ συνθήκησ' καὶ φιλία δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. By νόμος we are to understand the social system of laws and customs into which individuals are born, and in which they as it were inhere, being thus not mere individuals—separate centres of force and caprice, but members of a body politic or commonwealth, having in common (cf. κοινὸν § 6) a general rule of life which they are of one mind (ὁμονοοῦσι ix. 6) to observe in their various positions. But as men and beasts belong to different worlds, and cannot agree to live together under one system of general rules, so master and slave, quid slave, belong to different worlds between which force is the only intermediary. The slave indeed belongs with his master to one great social system—the brotherhood of speaking men; and so far, just and friendly relations may subsist between a master and his slave; but political justice and its corresponding friendship cannot. The tyrant, again, as such, and oligarchs, as such, are external to any social system or body politic regulated by law and custom. They rule by mere force; there is no ὁμοσπονδία between them and their subjects. Hence justice and friendship are equally absent from the relation subsisting between them and their subjects. The action of their rule is, if the metaphor be allowed, mechanical, not physiological; they do violence to the 'social organism' from without; they do not preside within over its natural functions.

a. 11. βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους] As Ramsauer notes, the friendships corresponding to the various πολιτεία are presented in this chapter as friendships between the rulers and the ruled. It is to be observed however that in a timocracy the distinction between the rulers and the ruled is very different from that in the two other ὀρθαὶ πολιτεία. In a timocracy the same persons rule and are ruled in rotation. There is therefore a certain ambiguity in the use of the term φιλία in this chapter. Ἡ φιλία ἡ κατὰ τὴν βασιλείαν is between one man—ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν between a few men, on the one hand, and the great body of the people on the other hand; whereas ἡ φιλία ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατίαν has no reference external to the popular body, but is complete within it, uniting its equal members man to man. Indeed, it is not in
a very real sense that we can speak of 'friendship' existing in a. 11. between king, or aristocrats, and subjects; and probably Aristotle is led to use the expression merely in the interest of the parallels which he is anxious to make out between the king and the father, the aristocrats and the husband. The φιλία between king, or aristocrats, and subjects is not 'friendship,' but rather willing obedience and loyalty, on the one side, to those who administer laws which represent the ζήσος of the community; and, on the other side, moderation and public spirit shown in their powerful position by the hereditary administrators of such laws. That there can scarcely be φιλία, in the sense of 'friendship,' between a king and his subjects is admitted by Aristotle viii. 7. 4 δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτων ἀξιότιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταθέστεροι.

ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἐδεργεσίᾳ] The king guides and protects his people: a. 12. they must honour and obey him in return.

§ 2. ἡ πατρικῇ] sc. φιλία. It is to be noticed that in E. N. v. 6. 8 a. 15. it is laid down that the relation between a father and his children is not one involving justice (τὸ δίκαιον) in the proper sense of the term. Justice in the proper sense of the term exists where the relations are those of contract as distinguished from those of status. The φιλία which marks the latter relations is στοργή, and loyalty, rather than friendship.

καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται] 'and we attribute these a. 17. benefits to our ancestors also': ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται, ἦτοι συγκεκφόρητα παρ’ ἡμῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὰ λουπά, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀμέσως ἀλλὰ διὰ μέσων τῶν πατέρων (Asp.). Ramsauer thinks that the words καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται interrupt the sense and he accordingly brackets them. Fritzche, Susemihl, and Bywater read προσνέμεται with K b, L b, O b. Ramsauer reads ἀπονέμεται (Μ b, Bek.), remarking that προσνέμω is a rare word in Aristotle.

φύσει τε ἄρχικόν κ.τ.λ.] Fritzche, Michelet, and Susemihl read a. 18. γὰρ after τε with L b, M b, Ῥ, Cambr. 1, CCC, NC, Ald. But, as Ramsauer points out, the clause beginning with φύσει adds (not a reason for anything) but a second point—viz. τὸ φύσει ἄρχικόν

1 This part of Cambr. (from 1157 a. 12 to 1161 b. 19) is supplied by a later hand.
1161 a. 18. εἶναι—in which the father resembles the king, the other point of resemblance being τὸ ἐνεργετικὸν ἐἶναι, ἢ άιτιος τοῦ ἐϊναι καὶ προφής καὶ παιδείας. The sense of the section may be stated as follows—The positions of the father and of the family ancestor are of the same kind. The father benefits his children by giving them existence, sustenance, and education; so also ancestors benefit their descendants. The father has a natural right to rule his children; so also the hereditary king, representing an ancestor, has a natural right to rule his people who represent the descendants of that ancestor. Accordingly, although I agree with Ramsauer that γὰρ ought not to be read before ἀρχικόν, I cannot agree with him that the clause καὶ τοὺς προγόνους δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται (or προανέμεται) is superfluous. I regard it as occupying a place in the first part of the section similar to that occupied by καὶ πρόγονοι ἐγγόνων in the second part.

20. § 3. καὶ τιμῶνται] Καί emphasizes τιμῶνται. Τιμή is the proper due of such superiority as that of parents and gods. Ramsauer compares iv. 3. 19 ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γὰρ, τὸ δ' ἄγαθον ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμοτερον: viii. 14. 2 τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχουσιν τιμὴς (πλέον δὲι νέοις) . . . τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἄρτης καὶ τῆς ενεργεσίας ἢ τιμὴ γέρας: cf. also viii. 14. 4 τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ ἡ φιλίᾳ ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἄξιον οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστω ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαίς καὶ τοὺς γόνεις' οὐδέσι γὰρ τὴν ἄξιον ποι' ἀι ἀποδοθῇ, οἷς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιτειχία εἶναι δοκεῖ.

21. οὗ ταῦτο] Williams brings out the meaning of this expression correctly—'Neither are the claims of justice in these . . . relations equally balanced on either side, but rather, as is also the friendship, proportioned to the benefits received.' The Paraph. has—ἔστι δὴ πάντα αἱ ταὐταὶ φίλαι ἐν ὑπεροχῇ' διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γόνεις' καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ ἀκολούθως τῇ φιλίᾳ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπεροχῇ. τὸ γὰρ πρὸς πατέρα δίκαιον ὑπερέχει τοῦ πρὸς υἱὸν τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἄξια ἀποδοθῆκεν δὲι. Cf. E. E. H. 9. 1241 b. 37 οὗ γὰρ ταῦταν δίκαιον τὸ ὑπερέχοντι καὶ ὑπερεχομένῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.

23. § 4. ἢ αὐτὴ φιλίᾳ κ.τ.λ.] A comparison more ingenious than instructive.

25. § 5. ἐταιρικῇ] ἢ ἐταιρικῇ φιλίᾳ answers most nearly to what in modern times we understand by friendship. It subsists between those who, without being necessarily kinsmen, are of one age, have
been brought up in close companionship, and have common tastes. 

ἐοίκε δὲ  Bekker reads δη. I prefer δὲ, which Ramsauer, Suse- mihl, and Bywater read, following K, M.

ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολίται θουλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι  i. e. in a timocracy ‘the citizens wish to be equal and fair’ (Peters), or perhaps better—‘in a timocracy it is characteristic of (θουλονται) the citizens to be equal and fair.’

ἐν μέρει δὴ κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Pol. iii. 2. 1277 b. 13 δεὶ δὲ τῶν πολίτην τῶν αὐτὴν πολίτου τῷ τῆς τῶν ἔλευθερῶν ἢ ἐπίστασθαι ἐπι ἀμφότερα.

§ 6. μὴ δὲν κοινών] i. e. they do not participate in a common νόμος, or belong to the same social organism. In an ὀρθή πολιτεία every member, whether ruler or ruled, acts within the social organism in a manner conducive to the good of the whole. This is to act justly—see Pol. iii. 7. 1282 b. 16 ἐστὶ δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ δικαίῳ, τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶ τῷ κοινῷ συμφέρον. But the tyrant’s acts are not thus functions of the social organism. They are assaults from without upon that organism. Again, the social organism, like the physical organism, requires for its subsistence many things which are not part of itself: see Pol. iii. 7. 1328 a. 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ὡσπέρ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτων οὐ ταύτα ἐστὶ μόρια τῆς ὀλίγης συνάσφασις, διὸν ἄνευ τὸ διόν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δὴ λόγων ὡς οὐ δὲ πόλεος μέρη θετέων οὔτ' ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, οὔδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς . . . κτήσεως μὲν δὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστιν ἢ κτήσεις μέρος τῆς πόλεως· πολλὰ δ' ἐμφύσεια μέρη τῆς κτήσεως ἐστιν· ἢ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐπικεφαλέως ἢ τῇ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης. Slaves, who are ἐμφυσεῖα ὄργανα τῆς ἀναγκαίας κτήσεως ἕνεκα, are not parts of the social organism, between the ‘parts’ or members of which alone just and friendly relations can subsist.

ὁφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων] Fritzsche and a.

Grant compare E. E. H. 10. 1242 a. 13 ἄλλων γὰρ τρόπον συνήθθην πρὶν καὶ τέχνη, ὥς ἐνκεκακυνότα τινὸς (οὗν γὰρ ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῆ) ἃλλα τοῦ χρωμένου ἐνεκεν. ἵσμαίνει δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τῷ ὄργανον ἐπιμελεῖας τυγχάνει, ὡς δικαίως πρὸς τῷ ἀρχον ἐκείνον γάρ ἐνεκεν ἐστι. ‘The instrument,’ says Grant, ‘receives just so much care from its master, as will
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1161 a. 35. keep it in proper condition for the exercise of its functions. The slave, who is treated not as a person but as a thing, receives the same kind of attention. Friendship and justice imply the recognition of personality; they imply treating men not as instruments, but as ends in themselves.

The benefit received by slaves is thus, as Ramsauer remarks, an ὀφέλεια κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

b. 4. ἔμψυχον ὅργανον] See Pol. i. 2. 1253 b. 32.

b. 5. § 7. ἦς ἄνθρωπος] Aristotle, writing in a reflective age, attempted to explain and excuse the historical institution of slavery by means of the abstract notion—φύσιν δούλος: but the political and ethical difficulties encountered in the attempt were so great that he was obliged to admit the distinction ἦς δούλος—ἲ ἄνθρωπος, a distinction which the Roman jurists, with their theory of the 'natural equality of all men,' afterwards brought into prominence: see Ulpian, quoted by Zell ad loc.—Quod attinet ad jus civile servi pro nullis habentur, non tamen jure naturali: quia, quod ad jus naturale pertinet, omnes homines sunt aequales: cf. Justinian Inst. i. Tit. 2. § 2 jure naturali ab initio omnes homines liberi nascebantur. But this distinction between the slave and the man is presented by Aristotle and the jurists in too abstract a manner to furnish material for answering the questions—'In what sense then is he a man? What is meant by his capacity (τὸν δυνάμενον b. 7) for participating in νόμος and συνθήκη? Can there be a capacity of this kind which is not actualised in some definite way?' Aristotle, mainly concerned to find in the institution of slavery, as it existed, an economic basis for his brilliant Hellenic life, did not trouble himself much with the history of the institution. It suited his purpose to represent the slave as a thing. If, following his usual method in social enquiries, he had examined the history of slavery, he would have found that the slave is essentially a person—i.e. a member of the particular social organism to which the master belongs, not merely a 'human being'—ἄνθρωπος, as he vaguely admits, in much the same way as nowadays we admit that the lower animals are 'fellow-creatures.' Aristotle had little appreciation of the 'dignity of labour'; he did not see clearly that industry is an essential function of the social organism—something καλὸν and not merely ἀναγκαῖον—and that the δοῦλος, the organ of this function, is as much a member of the organism as his master, who,
as μεγαλοπρεπής for instance, is the organ of another social function. \textit{1161 b. 5.}

The truth is that the Greek δοῦλος actually ‘participated in’ νῦμος in a sense not realised by Aristotle at all, when he said that ἄνθρωπος he ‘can participate.’ The slave’s position, though of course more open to the encroachments of violence than the positions of the other members of society, was secured as a tolerable one by guarantees of essentially the same kind as those which secured the free man against the arbitrary action of his legitimate rulers. They could not rule without the good-will of their free subjects, nor on other lines than those defined by the history and traditions of the community over which they ruled. Similarly, we may feel sure that ‘slavery’ would not have long continued to subsist, in the free and mobile Greek states, as the normal condition of a large part of the working class, if force had been the only reason for its continuance. The good-will of the slaves was necessary. They acquiesced in a well-defined historical status which was far from being intolerable. To that extent, \textit{quod} slaves they actually participated in νῦμος and συνθήκη—were, in short, not things, but persons to be reckoned with—‘parts’ of that social organism which is held together by the ὁμόνοια of its members. Aristotle’s theory of \textit{εὐδαιμονία} prevented him from seeing this, and allowed him merely to make the vague, and in the context, almost unmeaning admission—διότι γὰρ ἤνα τὸ δίκαιον παντὶ ἄνθρωπῳ πρὸς πάντα τῶν δυνάμεων κοινωνίας νῦμον καὶ συνθήκης καὶ φιλία δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. He left unanswered the questions which touch the root of the whole matter—‘In what sense then is the slave a man? What is meant by his \textit{capacity} for participating in νῦμος and συνθήκη? Can there be a capacity of this kind which is not actualised in some definite way?’

The answers to these questions, as the ‘Historical Method’ enables us to give them, are indicated by Maine (\textit{Ancient Law}, ch. v. pp. 162 sqq.) in a manner so conducive to a just estimate of the value of Aristotle’s view regarding the personality (or impersonality) of the slave, that I venture to transcribe the passage.—‘The legal rules by which systems of mature jurisprudence regulate the connexion of master and slave present no very distinct traces of the original condition common to ancient societies. But there are reasons for this exception. There seems to be something in the institution of slavery which has at all times either shocked or perplexed mankind, however little habituated to reflection, and
however slightly advanced in the cultivation of its moral instincts. The compunction which ancient communities almost unconsciously experienced appears to have always resulted in the adoption of some imaginary principle upon which a defence, or at least a rationale, of slavery could be plausibly founded. Very early in their history the Greeks explained the institution as grounded on the intellectual inferiority of certain races and their consequent natural aptitude for the servile condition. The Romans, in a spirit equally characteristic, derived it from a supposed agreement between the victor and the vanquished, in which the first stipulated for the perpetual services of his foe; and the other gained in consideration the life which he had legitimately forfeited. Such theories were not only unsound but plainly unequal to the case for which they affected to account. Still they exercised a powerful influence in many ways. They satisfied the conscience of the master. They perpetuated and probably increased the debasement of the slave. And they naturally tended to put out of sight the relation in which servitude had originally stood to the rest of the domestic system. This relation, though not clearly exhibited, is casually indicated in many parts of primitive law, and more particularly in the typical system—that of ancient Rome.... It is clear, from the testimony both of ancient law and of many primeval histories, that the slave might under certain conditions be made the heir, or universal successor, of the master, and this significant faculty... implies that the government and representation of the family might, in a particular state of circumstances, devolve on the bondman.... What then is meant by saying that the slave was originally included in the family?.... When we speak of the slave as anciently included in the family, we intend to assert nothing as to the motives of those who brought him into it, or kept him there; we merely imply that the tie which bound him to his master was regarded as one of the same general character with that which united every other member of the group to the chieftain. This consequence is in fact carried in the general assertion already made that the primitive ideas of mankind were unequal to comprehending any basis of the connexion *inter se* of individuals, apart from the relations of family. The Family consisted primarily of those who belonged to it by consanguinity, and next of those who had been engrafted on it by adoption; but there was still a third class of persons who were only joined to it by
common subjection to its head, and these were the slaves. The born and adopted subjects of the chief were raised above the slave by the certainty that in the ordinary course of events they would be relieved from bondage and entitled to exercise powers of their own; but that the inferiority of the slave was not such as to place him outside the pale of the family, or such as to degrade him to the footing of inanimate property, is clearly proved, I think, by the many traces which remain of his ancient capacity for inheritance in the last resort... The Roman law was arrested in its growing tendency to look upon him more and more as an article of property by the theory of the Law of Nature; and hence it is that, wherever servitude is sanctioned by institutions which have been deeply affected by Roman jurisprudence, the servile condition is never intolerably wretched.'

φιλία] So Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater. Bekker reads b. 8. φιλίας with the codd.

§ 8. ἐπὶ πλείων] Kb and Asp.; the other authorities, followed by b. 10. Bekker, read πλεῖστον. Aspasius gives the meaning correctly—ἐν δὲ τῶν δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶν ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἦπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις παρεκβάσεωι.

CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT.

It is always between those, then, who are joined together in some association or other, in which they meet on common ground, that friendship, in whatever form, subsists: although perhaps the friendship of kinsmen and comrades may be distinguished from the other forms; at any rate such friendships as those of citizens, tribemen and fellow-voyagers seem to have more of the character of associations—i.e. they seem to involve a sort of agreement entered into to associate, while friendship between kinsmen and comrades subsists without any such agreement. To the class of friendships which seem to involve an agreement may be assigned also the guest-friendship between two men who are citizens of different states.

The friendship of kinsmen has many forms, but can always be traced back to that involved in the relation between parents and children. Parents and children, as stock and offspring, are bound together by ties of mutual affection:
parents, however, have a deeper consciousness than children have of the common nature which unites stock and offspring—a consciousness too which dates from the birth of the children, whereas children do not become conscious of union with the parent stock till they arrive at the years of intelligence. This explains the greater love of mothers. Brothers love one another because they spring from the same parents. Hence we speak of "the same blood"—"the same stock." Of course, their being of about the same age and being brought up together must also be taken as contributing largely to the friendship of brothers, which in these respects resembles the friendship of comrades. The friendship which unites cousins and other kinsmen is to be explained likewise by their common origin: it is greater or less as the common ancestor is near or remote.

The friendship of children for parents (like that of men for the gods) is a friendship which has the good, as presented by a superior, for its object—parents confer on their children the greatest of all good things—existence, nurture, education. This friendship is also more useful, in the ordinary sense of the term, and more pleasant than that with strangers, in so far as the common life to which it belongs is more intimate. The friendship between brothers has the characteristics of that between comrades—and if the brothers are good, is a comradeship of the best and most lasting kind. The friendship between husband and wife is natural, for man is naturally first a conjugal being, and only afterwards a political being, since the family is chronologically prior to the state, being materially necessary to it, and procreation is common to man with all other animals. Human beings, however, differ from other animals in not pairing merely for the sake of procreation, but also for objects which have to do with the proper conduct of life. Husband and wife have their separate functions and their separate virtues, and both contribute by division of labour to the common good. Thus the friendship between them is both useful and pleasant, and, if they are virtuous persons, has, as manifested by each, the goodness peculiar to the other for its object. But children are a great bond of union, being something common. Childless couples are more quickly estranged than those with children. To ask how a husband should regulate his life with his wife, and generally how one friend should behave to another, is to ask how justice requires the husband or friend to behave in the circumstances.

1161 b. 11. § 1.] All friendship, as we have already said, implies association; but we may separate from the rest the friendship of kinsmen and that of comrades. The friendships of fellow citizens, of fellow tribesmen, of fellow sailors, &c., seem, as opposed to these, to have more to do with association; for they appear to be founded on some sort of compact. The friendship of host and guest might also be included in this class (Peters). All friendship is ἐν κοινωνίᾳ, or κοινωνική in the generic sense. There are three species under the genus—(1) ἱννευκῆ, (2) ἐταμικῆ, (3) κοινωνική in the narrower, specific sense, where a more or less express ὀμολογία exists. Thus in Ε. Ε. Η. Ι.Ο. 1242 a. 1 we have λέγονται δὲ φιλία, ἱννευκῆ, ἐταμικῆ,
BOOK VIII: CHAP. 12: §§ 1-3.

κοινωνία, ἡ λεγομένη πολιτική. The Paraph. has—πάσα µὲν οὖν φιλία ἐν 1161 b.11. κοινωνία ἐστί, καθάπερ εἷρηται· µόνη δὲ ἡ συγγενική καὶ ἑταιρική φιλία οὐ δοκοῦσιν ἐν κοινωνίᾳ εἶναι· κοινωνικὰ γὰρ εἰσὶ φιλίαι αἱ καθ' ὀμολογίαν καὶ συνθήκην τινὰ συνιστάμεναι, οἷα εἰσὶν αἱ φιλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοκαὶ καὶ διατὰ τουταίς, εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξεις ἄν τις καὶ τὴν εξευκήν. ἡ δὲ συγγενικὴ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ οὐ καθ' ὀμολογίαν ἡ συνθήκην τινὰ συνιστάται, ἀλλὰ τοὺς µέν ἡ φύσις συνεδριάζει, τοὺς δὲ τὸ τυχεῖν ἠλικώτατα εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτεθέμενα σπουδάζειν. Asp. has—ἀφορίζει δ' ἀν τις, φησὶ, τὴν συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, ἥτοι χαρίστων ὡς ἐχούσας τε διαφέρουν τῶν κοινωνικῶν λαμβάνει δὲ κοινωνικὰς τὰς καθ' ὀμολογίαν τινὰ. Coraes' note is—ἀφορίζει δ' ἀν τις κ.τ.λ.] ἡ γὰρ συγγενικὴ καὶ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον εἰσὶ καὶ οὐ κατὰ συνθήκην, διότερ αἱ κοινωνικαὶ.

§ 2.] Ramsauer notes that we have in this § three separate reasons given for the superior love of parents—viz. (1) μᾶλλον δ' ἰσας, (2) μᾶλλον συνφιλοκραταί, (3) καὶ τῷ πλῆθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου ἡ ἐκ τῶν γονέων φιλίσωσ διαφέρει τῆς τῶν τέκνων. Victorius has a note to the same effect.

ai μητέρες] Zell, after Muretus, quotes in illustration of this b. 27. remark—

Eurip. Frag. inc.—

μήτηρ φιλότεκνος μᾶλλον ἑστὶ τοῦ πατρός' ἡ µὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς οἶδεν διὰ δ' δ' οἶδεν.

Menander—

αὐτὸν γὰρ οἴδεις οἶδε τοῦ πατ' ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ ὑπονοοῦμεν πάντες, ἡ πιστεύουμεν.

Hom. Od. i. 215—

μήτηρ µὲν τ' ἐµὲ φησὶ τοῦ ἐμεμνα, αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδ' οὐ γὰρ πώ τίς ἐων γάρν αὐτὸς ἄνεγκρω.

§ 3. ἐτεροὶ αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι] 'a second self separately existing.' b. 28.


Τῷ κεχωρίσθαι qualifies αὐτοὶ paradoxically—though indeed the paradox is already contained in the application of ἐτεροῖς αὐτοῖς. I cannot agree with the interpretations which make τῷ κεχωρίσθαι give the reason for ἐτεροῖς. Thus Lambinus translates—' nam qui ex eis nati sunt, eo ipso quod separatni sunt, tanquam alteri ipsi sunt'; and Victorius—' qui enim sunt ex ipsis, veluti alteri ipsi,

1161 b. 28. quia separati sunt.' The object of the clause is not to show how children, being αὐτοὶ, are at the same time ἑπεροὶ, but to state the paradox that, being ἑπεροὶ καὶ κεχωρισμένοι, they are yet αὐτοὶ. Peters too misses, I think, the exact force of the clause with—' for what proceeds from them is as it were a second self when it is severed.'

Ramsauer ad loc. remarks that, while Justice is πρὸς ἑπεροῦ, Love is πρὸς ἑπεροῦ αὐτῶν.

b. 31. πρὸς ἑκεῖνα] ' sunt haec, unde generati sunt, parentes: id quod neutro genere propter superius ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν (quo item neutro parentes indicantur) positum est' (Fritzsche).

b. 34. § 4. ἡλικύς γὰρ ἡλικα] sc. τέρπει, see Rhet. i. 11. 1371 b. 15, E. E. H. 2. 1238 a. 33.

1162 a. 1. ἐκ τοῦτων] ' Verba ἐκ τοῦτων intellige: ex his causis, propter hoc. Nam alias sequens γὰρ languet' (Zell). Peters seems to agree with Zell in making τοῦτων neuter. He has—'Cousins and other kinsfolk become attached to each other for the same reason—I mean because they come of the same stock.' But it is better, I think, to refer τοῦτων to ἀδελφοὶ understood from the previous ἀδελφικῇ. This is the view of Asp., the Paraph., Grant, Stahr, Williams, and Ramsauer.

a. 5. § 5. πρὸς θεοῦς] Zell and Fritzsche quote E. E. H. 10. 1242 a. 32 παρὸς δὲ καὶ νῦν ἡ αὐτὴ [φιλία ἔστιν] ἤπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἀνθρώποι καὶ τοῦ ἐκ ποιήσαντος πρὸς τῶν παθόντα καὶ ὅλως τοῦ φύτει ἀρχώντος πρὸς τῶν φύτει ἀρχώμενον. Ramsauer brackets the words καὶ ἀνθρώποι πρὸς θεοῦς as probably spurious, on account of their inconsistency with Aristotle's doctrine (viii. 7. 4) that friendship cannot subsist between gods and men.

a. 8. § 6. μᾶλλον τῶν ἄθνεῶν] i. e. μᾶλλον τῆς τῶν ἄθνεῶν φιλίας.

a. 10. καὶ μᾶλλον] ' The friendship of brothers has all the characteristics of the friendship of comrades, and has them in a greater degree (provided they are good and generally resemble one another)' Peters. So Stahr ' und in noch höherem Grade.'

a. 12. ὑπάρχουσιν στέργοντες ἀλλήλους] ' Have an original love for one another.'

a. 15. § 7. ἀνάλογον κ.τ.λ.] αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι (συγγενικά φιλίαι) ἀνάλογον ἔχουσι τῇ κατὰ γένος οἰκειότητι (Paraph.).
BOOK VIII: CHAP. 12: §§ 7, 8.

δὴν πρότερον καὶ ἄναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως] See Grant's note 1162 a. 18.

ad loc. ‘In point of time the family is prior to the state, but in point of idea (λόγῳ) and essentially (φύσει) the state is prior. Cf. Ar. Pol. i. 2. 12 (i. i. 1253 a. 19) καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλεως οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ δὸλον πρότερον ἄναγκαιον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους ἀναρχομένου γὰρ τοῦ δολοῦ οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν. Aristotle argues that without the idea of the “state,” the terms “man” and “family” would lose their meaning. Thus the idea of family presupposes that of the state, which will accordingly be prior. In the same way the family is more necessary as a means, the state as an end.’ A thing is ἄναγκαιον which is a means: cf. Pol. Θ. 2. 1338 a. 12 τὰς μὲν μαθήσεις ἑαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν ὡς ἄναγκαιας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων. The ἄναγκαιον is thus opposed to the καλόν, which is choiceworthy on its own account; cf. Pol. Θ. 2. 1338 a. 31 ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν ἐστιν παιδεία τις ἴνα οὐχ ὡς χρησίμως παιδευτέον τοὺς νείπις, οὗτ' ὡς ἄναγκαιας ἄλλ' ὡς ἀδελφέριον καὶ καλήν, φανερῶν ἐστίν. Hence ἄναγκαιον is descriptive of ἴλη, as distinguished from εὖδος, or λόγος, which is καλόν. See Phys. ii. 9. 200 a. 12 ἄναγκη ἀρα σιδηροῦν εἶναι, εἰ πρῶτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἐργὸν αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως οὖν τὸ ἄναγκαιον, ἄλλ' οὐχ ὡς τέλος. ἐν γὰρ τῇ Ἰλη τὸ ἄναγκαιον, τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. The statement, then, ἄναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως means that the family belongs to the matter of which the state is the form.

ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον] sc. ἐφ' ὅσον ἐν τεκνοποιήσῃ (Paraph.). Zell and a. 20.

Fritzsche compare Oecon. i. 3. 1343 b. 13.

§ 8. ταὐτών] καὶ οὗ ταὐτών ραίνεται εἶναι δικαιών φίλων πρὸς φίλου καὶ α. 31.

τὸν ὀνειδικὸν ὡς τὸν ἀδελφὸν κ.τ.λ. (Paraph.).

συμφοιτήτην] ‘condiscipulus’ (Victorius). Peters can hardly be a. 33.

right with ‘Travelling companion.’

CHAPTER XIII.

ARGUMENT.

We have seen that there are three species of friendship, and that each may subsist between those who are equal, or those who are unequal—that those who are equally or unequally good, useful, or pleasant may be friends. Those then who are equal must love each other equally, and render other services equally;
those who are not equal must put themselves on an equality by loving and otherwise remunerating each other in proportion to desert.

It is only, or chiefly, in the friendship for profit that friends bring charges against each other, and find fault with each other. Those whose friendship is based on virtue have no reason to find fault with each other or quarrel, for their object is to benefit each other, and each tries to outdo the other in this: nor is fault-finding common in the friendship for pleasure. The friends take pleasure in each other's society: it would be ridiculous to find fault with one's friend because his society does not give one pleasure, when one is at liberty to drop him. But in the friendship for profit fault-finding is very common. People are not easily satisfied with what is done for them.

As justice is either unwritten or embodied in written law, so friendship for profit relies either on character or on law. That which relies on law is concluded on express terms—a certain service is rendered for a return expressly stated; the return being made either at once or after a time: in the latter case, although a debt has been contracted about which there is no doubt, yet the element of friendship comes in with the permission to defer payment: and this is why in some states actions for recovery of such debts are not allowed.

In that form of friendship for profit which relies on character no terms are mentioned: A makes a present of something to B as to a friend, but expects (from his general knowledge of B's character) to receive in return as much, or more, for what is really not a gift but a loan; and if he does not come out of the transaction in the way he expected when he entered into it, he is sure to find fault with his 'friend'; for all, or most, men have a general wish to do the handsome thing, but, when it comes to the particular case, choose the profitable thing.

Accordingly, if one can, one must voluntarily make a return equivalent to that which one has received: one must act as though one had made a mistake at first about the service being rendered out of pure friendship, and make a return just as if there had been an express bargain: for one must not treat a man as a disinterested friend against his will. But of course it is advisable to consider at the beginning who it is who confers the service and in expectation of what return, and decide whether one will accept it in the circumstances or not.

The question arises whether the amount of the return should be measured by the benefit actually experienced by the receiver, or by the trouble, money, etc. expended by the giver. Where the friendship is for profit the standard according to which return ought to be made (sc. in the absence of an express agreement) is the benefit actually experienced by the receiver; but where the ground of the friendship is virtue, the intention of the giver is the standard: for intention, or deliberate choice, is the criterion of virtue and character.

1162 a. 34. § 1. φιλων] Asp. has των φιλων which Byw. (Contriib. p. 61) thinks is probably right.

ἐν δραχαι] viii. 3. 1.

b. 1. ὁμοιως δὲ καὶ ἣδεις] 'and a similar remark applies to friendships
based on pleasure and profit.' The full expression would be—

**1162 b. 1.**

| ομοίως δὲ καὶ ομοίως ήδεις φίλου γίνοντι καὶ τῷ ήδει διαφέροντες. |

*Isá̂zontes tais ὑφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες*] 'conferring equal or unequal benefits on each other.' This clause, though strictly applicable, so far as expression goes, to *οἱ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον,* must be taken to refer also to *οἱ ήδεις,* as if it had been—*isá̂zontes τῷ ήδει καὶ ταῖς ὑφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες.* It ought not to be taken to refer to ἀγαθοὶ too, the precise distinction required under that head having been already marked by the expressions *ομοίως ἀγαθοὶ—ἄρεινον χείρον.* Peters, I think, is wrong when he translates—'Sometimes two equally good persons make friends, and sometimes a better and a worse (and so with those who are pleasant to one another, and with those who are friends with a view to profit)—effecting equality by the services they exchange, even though they are themselves different.' Does Bywater also, with the comma after *χρήσιμον,* refer *isá̂zontes κ.τ.λ.* to the ἀγαθοὶ?

**1162 b. 2.**

| καὶ ἵστοτη*] 'Those who are equal must effect the equality required in Friendship by making exactly equal returns in love and friendly offices.' Aspasius incorrectly takes *καὶ ἵστοτη* with τοὺς ἱσοὺς. His words are—*τοὺς ἱσοὺς καὶ ἵστοτη τὴν διὰ τὸ ἁγαθὸν καὶ ἢδο καὶ χρήσιμον δεῖ καὶ κατὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἵσαζειν. But ἵσαζειν τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ ἵστοτη* is contrasted with ἵσαζειν τῷ ἀποδίδοναι ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.

| τοὺς δ' ἁνίσοις τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδοῦναι] τῷ ἀνάλογον b. 4. is the reading of corr. cod. Par. 1417 accepted by Bek. and Sus., while Kb, Ob, Mb, Ha, Nb, Ald., and pr. Par. 1417 have τὸ ἀνάλογον, accepted by Bywater. Bonitz (s. v. ἁνίσον) decides in favour of the latter reading; but Rassow (Forsch. p. 67) contends that τῷ is indispensable, because not δεῖ but δεὶ ἵσαζειν must be supplied after ἁνίσοις, and remarks that the variation of the MSS. (which he exaggerates) rather points to τῷ τὸ ἀνάλογον as the original reading. Rassow quotes Meteor. ii. 5. 363 a. οἱ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἀποδίδει, which he seems to take as an instance of the ordinary transitive use of ἀποδίδοναι, whereas it is given in the Ind. Arist. under the intransitive uses. I think that Rassow's τῷ τὸ ἀνάλογον is right.

**1162 b. 3.**

| § 2. χαρίεις] a man of good taste. b. 10. |

| τυγχάνων οὗ ὤφειται] i. e. the friend who, in the competition b. 11. |
1162 b. 11. (ἀμιλλομένων b. 8), succeeds in conferring superior benefits, gets what he desires, viz. the good of his friend, and has no reason to complain. The other again who is defeated in the competition cannot dislike one who confers such benefits upon him—γάρ φιλούντα καὶ εὖ πουίντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἄλλα . . . ἀμείνηται εὖ δρῶν.

b. 13. § 3. οὗ πάνω δ' οὖθ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἱδρούντι] εἰρέται εὐκλήματα.

b. 21. § 5. τὸ δίκαιον ἔστι διδόν, τὸ μὲν ἀγραφὸν τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον] Ramsauer contends (without stating the reasons for his opinion, but merely giving certain references to the Rhet.) that this distinction is not (as Zell and Fritzsche take for granted) exactly that between τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον and τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον of E. N. v. 7. Bonitz however (Ind. Arist. sub v. δίκαιον) makes τὸ ἀγραφὸν δίκαιον synonymous with τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον. The following passages in the Rhet. (referred to by Ramsauer) will enable us to decide between these two views.—Rhet. i. 14. 1374 a. 18 sqq. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν δικάιων ἦν δύο εἰδῆ (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ' ἀγραφα), περὶ δὲ μὲν οἱ νόμοι ἄγορεύονται εἰρήνη, τῶν δ' ἀγράφων δύο ἕκατον εὐθῆ· τάυτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' ἐπερβολὴν ἀρτήρια καὶ κακίας, ἐφ' οἷς δὲν οἰκία καὶ εὐπαινοὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δορεαὶ (the moral and social sanctions, as distinguished from the legal sanction), οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαι εὖ καὶ ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαιτα καὶ θητηρικῶν εἰναι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαύτα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων νόμοι καὶ γεγραμμένων ἱλλείμματα τὸ γὰρ ἐπικεῖσθαι δικαίων εἰναι, ἐστι δὲ ἐπικεῖσθαι τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τούτῳ τὰ μὲν ἀκόσμων τὰ δὲ ἐκόσμων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόσμων μὲν ὅταν λάθη, ἐκόσμων δ' ὅταν μὴ δύνασται διώρισαι, ἄλλ' ἀναγκαῖον πέφθαλον εἰπτείν, μὴ γ' δ' ἄλλ', ἄλλ' ὅσ' ἐπί τὸ πολύ καὶ ὅσα μὴ Ῥάδιον διωρίσαι δ' ἀπειρίαν, οἷον τὰ τρῶσαι σιδήρῳ πτερίκῳ καὶ πούρῳ τῶν ὑπολείπον γὰρ ἄν ὁ αἰῶν διαρθμοῦται· ἀν οὖν μ' ἀδύναμον, δέχεται καὶ νομοθέτησαι, ἀνάγκη ἀπλῶς εἰπτείν, ὡστε κἂν δικαύλων ἔχουν ἐπάρῃ τὴν χεῖρα γ' πατάξῃ, κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἐνοχὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδικεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀλήθες οὐκ ἄδικε, καὶ τὸ ἐπικεῖσθαι τοῦτο ἔστι. Cf. Rhet. i. 14. 1375 a. 17 τὰ μὲν οὖν γεγραμμένα εἰς ἀνάγκης τὰ δ' ἀγραφα οὖ, and Rhet. i. 15. 1375 a. 31 . . . τὸ μὲν ἐπικεῖσθαι ἄλλ' μὲνε καὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ο' κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἐστίν), οἱ δ' γεγραμμένοι πολλακίς. ἄλλ' εἰρήνη τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους 'Ἀντιγόνη' ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔβαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοστος νόμον, ἄλλ' ο' παρὰ τὸν ἀγραφὸν

οἷς γὰρ τὶ νῦν γε τὰ καθήσει, ἄλλ' ἄει ποτε.

These passages seem to me to support the view that the distinction
between τὸ ἀγγαφὸν δίκαιον and τὸ κατὰ νόμον is not identical with 1182 b. 21.
that between τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον and τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον. Τὸ ἀγγαφὸν
dίκαιον and τὸ κατὰ νόμον are of course mutually exclusive. The
dίκαια and ἀδίκα recognised under the first ἐίδος of τὸ ἀγγαφὸν δίκαιον
—viz. τὰ ἐφ’ ὁσ’ ὁνείδη καὶ ἐπαινοῦ, where the sanctions are merely
‘social,’ cannot, from their nature, be brought within the scope
of the written law. They belong essentially to the unwritten
law. They cannot be enforced by ‘legal sanctions.’ The ἐπιεική
again included under the second ἐίδος of the ἀγγαφὸν δίκαιον cannot
be embodied in the written law. The particular issues involved in
them must be determined independently of, and even in spite of,
the written law. But it does not follow from this that τὸ ἀγγαφὸν
dίκαιον is identical with τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον. In a good state much
of τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον (τὸ πανταχὸν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν) is
embodied in the written law. Τὸ ἀγγαφὸν δίκαιον is, in part, that
residuum of τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον which either cannot be, or has not
hitherto been, embodied in the written code; in part, it consists
of νομικὰ — local customs and etiquettes, which, so far from
falling under the φυσικὸν δίκαιον, may conflict with it.

I take it, then, that we must not identify the distinction before
us here with that between τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον and τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον,
as described in E. N. v. 7. We have to think simply of ‘unwritten’
and ‘written’ regulations. The unwritten regulations may be
‘naturally’ just, or they may be only ‘conventionally’ just; they
may be such as can, or such as cannot, be embodied in a written
code. The distinction before us indeed seems to answer exactly
to that between the Lacedaemonian and the Athenian δίκαια noted
in the following passage of Justinian’s Instil.—i. 2. § 9 ‘ex non
scripto jus venit quod usus comprobavit. nam diuturni mores
consensu utentium comprobati legem imitantur. et non ineleganter
in duas species jus civile distributum videtur. nam origo
ejus ab institutis duarum civitatum, Athenarum scilicet et Lacedaemonis,
fluxisse videtur. in his enim civilitatis ita agi solutum erat, ut Lacedaemonii quidem magis ea quae pro legibus observ-
quarent memoriae mandarent: Athenienses vero ea quae in legibus
scripta reprehendissent [comprehendissent?] custodirent.’

ἡ μὲν ἡθική ἡ δὲ νομική] Williams brings out the force of this b. 23.
distinction very well with—‘the friendship of confidence and the
friendship of covenant.’ Cf. Ε.Ε. Η. 10. 1242 b. 31 ἔστι δὲ τῆς
1162 b. 23. "complaints arise when a transaction is not ended in the spirit in which it was begun," or in which at least one of the parties thought it was begun: e.g. A lends B a sum of money. When B repays it he does so without interest, thinking that A lent it as a friend; but A, it appears, lent it as a matter of business and expected the usual interest: see Asp. ἐγκαλοῦσιν οὖν ὅταν μὴ διαλυθῶσιν ὅσι καὶ συνῆλθαν εἰ γὰρ τις ὁς φίλος ὅφη τινὶ πεντήκοντα νομίσματα, μηδὲν περὶ τόκου εἰπὼν, ἀλλ’ ἄγραφος συναλλάγας, εἰδ’ ἄστερον ἀπετεί τόκον, ἄλλως μὲν συνῆλθας, ἄλλως δὲ σπεύδει διαλυθῆναι. We have here an illustration of the truth of the saying that 'understandings are misunderstandings.'

b. 24. ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κ.τ.λ.] 'complaints arise when a transaction is not ended in the spirit in which it was begun,' or in which at least one of the parties thought it was begun: e.g. A lends B a sum of money. When B repays it he does so without interest, thinking that A lent it as a friend; but A, it appears, lent it as a matter of business and expected the usual interest: see Asp. ἐγκαλοῦσιν οὖν ὅταν μὴ διαλυθῶσιν ὅσι καὶ συνῆλθαν εἰ γὰρ τις ὁς φίλος ὅφη τινὶ πεντήκοντα νομίσματα, μηδὲν περὶ τόκου εἰπὼν, ἀλλ’ ἄγραφος συναλλάγας, εἰδ’ ἄστερον ἀπετεί τόκον, ἄλλως μὲν συνῆλθας, ἄλλως δὲ σπεύδει διαλυθῆναι. We have here an illustration of the truth of the saying that 'understandings are misunderstandings.'


b. 32. § 7. ἡ ὀτιδήποτε ἄλλο] διαφέρει τι, ἡ ἄλλην τινὰ ἄφέλειαν ἄφελεί (Paraph.).

κομίζοντες δὲ κ.τ.λ.] i.e. the motive of this ἠθικὴ φιλία, no less than of νομικὴ φιλία, is after all τὸ χρῆσιμον.

b. 35. § 8. βούλεοντες μὲν ... τὰ καλὰ, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὀφέλιμα] We have here the difference between the wish for something remote and perhaps unattainable, and the definite choice of something immediately before us. The ideal of a noble life, though present intellectually to most civilized men, is practically too weak to regulate their conduct in the midst of objects appealing immediately to their desire for pleasure or profit. Therefore 'to choose profit'—προαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὀφέλιμα—is here tantamount to acting παρὰ τῶν ὄρθων λόγων, i. e. κατὰ πάθος.
§ 9. δυναμένω δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν δέξιαν ὄν ἐπαθέν [καὶ ἐκόντι] 1163 a. 1. ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὗ ποιητέον] 'A man ought, then, if he can, to return the worth of what he has received, and to do so willingly (i.e. without waiting to be asked); for he ought not to make any one a friend against his will'—e.g. by retaining as a friendly gift what was intended (though not stated) to be a loan. There is a certain awkwardness in the proximity of ἐκόντι and ἄκοντα, referring, as they do, to different persons; and accordingly the words καὶ ἐκόντι (omitted by Kb, Ob, Cambr., Asp.) are bracketed by Fritzsche, Grant, and Bywater, as an interpolation. 'They may easily be conceived,' Grant says, 'to have arisen out of the following words ἄκοντα γὰρ.' Rassow (Forsch. p. 102), however, lets them stand as genuine, and conjectures οἵτινες for ποιητέον, making ἄκοντα refer to the subject of δώρον and ἐκόντι. I cannot regard this conjecture (which is adopted by Susemihl) as at all probable; nor do I feel that the passage, as translated above, presents the difficulty which some of the commentators have found in it.

διαμαρτύντα . . . παθόντα] The accusatives are to be taken with a. 3. ἀνταποδοτέον or διαλυτέον. Fritzsche quotes E. N. vii. 1. 1, viii. 14. 4, ix. 2. 1, and (for both dat. and acc. with the same verbal adjective) E. N. viii. 14. 3 τὸ ὄφελομένῳ . . . ἀνταποδοτέον ἀνταποδιδότα to ἐνδεχόμενον, and Plato, Rep. 453 D οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειρατέον . . . ἐλπίζοντας.

δ' αὐτὸ τούτο] 'i.e. δ' αὐτὸ τὸ εὖ ὅραν μὴ ὑνα ἀντιπάθη' (Ram. a. 4. sauer).

ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἂν] I prefer ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἂν in correspondence a. 6. with ἤξιοσεν ἂν a. 7. The meaning is—If it had been put to the receiver when the benefit was conferred, he would have agreed to make repayment, if able; while, on the other hand, the giver would not have expected repayment from one obviously unable to make it—and, it must be supposed, would not have conferred the benefit. οὐδ' ἤξιοσεν ἂν does not mean 'would not have asked him for repayment when he delayed to make it,' as the Paraph. and most of the commentators seem to suppose, but 'would not

1 Bywater (Contrib. p. 61) thinks that ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὗ ποιητέον is an adaptation of Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 9 ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον ἐλείν ἐργάζεσ.
1163 a. 6. have begun by expecting repayment from one obviously unable ever to make it.' In short, the fact of a benefit having been conferred raises the presumption that the giver expected, when he conferred it, to be eventually repaid. He believed that the receiver would be able to repay it; otherwise he would not have conferred it. There is no reference here, it seems to me, to the case of a friend διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, or creditor, finding out in course of time that the debtor is insolvent, and making him a present of the sum owed.


'Consent to receive the benefit on these terms, or decline it.'

§ 10. ἀμφισβήτησιν κ.τ.λ.] We must repay benefits καβάσει ἐπὶ ῥητά εὐεργετηθέντας when no ῥητά exist. How are we then to determine what the ῥητά would have been had they existed? We must put ourselves back into the position we occupied before the benefit was conferred, and suppose ourselves to be making an express bargain for an advantage which we wish to get, but of course should be unwilling to pay too dear for. The price for which we could have got the advantage, supposing the question of price to have been raised, is what at least we ought to pay now in return. It is of course very difficult thus to construct ῥητά after an interval of time. The giver will maintain that the circumstances were exceptional and enhanced the value of the benefit, and that he would not have conferred it if he had known that so small a return would be offered for it. The receiver on the other hand will point out that the benefit has not come to much, and will maintain that he never thought that it would. The standard however which must be found, if an agreement between the parties is to be reached, is—What did the receiver think it worth before he got it? The giver cannot expect more than this: see ix. i. 9 ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τασοῦτον δῶσον ἀν τάττοσιν οἵ λαμβάνοντες. δεῖ δὲ ἵσωσιν οὐ τασοῦτον τιμᾶν δῶσον ἔχοντες φαίνεται ἀξίων, ἀλλ' ἐσο λίπν πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

From Theoph. *peri συμβολαίων* (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. ii. 166 sqq. ed. Meineke) we learn that understandings likely to develop into misunderstandings of the kind indicated in the section before us (viii. 13. 10) were discouraged by many Greek codes, which contained provisions for the payment on the spot of an ἀπροβαίνω proportioned to the amount to be afterwards paid in full.
§ 11. In the friendship of Profit equal advantages are exchanged: the question is—What is the amount of the advantage received? for an equal advantage must be given in exchange for it. But the Friendship of Virtue is not a συνάλλαγμα, but a Life in which the friends stimulate each other to the manifestation of that which proceeds from virtue.

τῆς ἀρετῆς . . . κύριον] 'for in choice lies that which is essential a. 22. to virtue and character.' It is προαιρετικός which converts the δῶσαι τῶν ἐναρτῶν into the ἔξεσι (Met. 9. 2 and 5), and ἀρετή is defined as a ἔξεις προαιρετική (E. N. ii. 6. 15). In E. N. x. 8. 5 we read ὁμοίωσις βητειαὶ τε πότερον κυρίωτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ή αἰ πράξεως. The answer had been given in iii. 2. 1 οἰκεῖότατον εἶναι δοκεῖ (ἡ προαίρεσις) τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἢθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. Taking these passages in connexion, we can see that in the section before us (viii. 13. 11) τὸ κύριον means that which, being essential to virtue, serves also as a κριτήριον, by means of which we may determine whether virtue is present in a given case. Accordingly in the friendship of virtue, the standard by which we measure the worth of a friendly office is the choice or intention of the agent, for this is a true expression of his virtuous character, to manifest which in fellowship with a ἐρετός οὐτὸς is the one object of the friendship.

CHAPTER XIV.

ARGUMENT.

People fall out in the unequal as well as in the equal friendships: for each of the unequal ‘friends’ thinks that he ought to get ‘the larger share’: the ‘friend’ who is better or more useful thinks that, as in a joint-stock business the larger contributor gets the larger share of the profits, so in friendship the better or more useful ‘friend’ should get a larger share of remuneration, unless the ‘friendship’ is to become a burden or tax. On the other hand, the needy and inferior ‘friend’ thinks that the only use of a good and powerful ‘friend’ is to help the needy. Each seems to be right—each ought to get out of the friendship ‘a larger share’—but not, of course, of the same thing: the superior friend ought to get his larger share in honour, and the needy friend his larger share in material advantage. The same rule holds in public life as in friendship: it is in honour that those who spend money for the common good get their reward,
honour being what the community has to give for benefits received. A man cannot get at the same time both money and honour out of the community: and as no one cares to be a loser all round, if money is spent for the common good, honour is expected in return.

It is proportion, as we have said, which introduces equality into unequal friendships and preserves them: the friend who does more for the moral and material advantage of the other must get honour—this is what the other has to give: even honour is not really equivalent to the greatest benefits (such as those conferred by the gods and by parents): but it is the best thing which the other can give, and as such meets the requirements of friendship. We have said that the benefits conferred by parents have no real equivalent. This is why a father may disown his son (of course natural affection and interest will restrain him from doing so unless his son is very bad); but a son may never disown his father (if the son is bad he may think it his interest to disown his father), for he can never clear off the debt which he owes to his father.

1163 a. 24. §§ 1, 2.] These sections are best illustrated by the parallel passage E. E. H. 10. 1242 b. 6 ἐν μὲν τῇ καθ’ ὑποροχὴν ἀξιόωντα τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὁσαίτως, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ὑπερέχων ἀνεστραμμένος τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάσττο, οὔτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάσττονος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ’ αὐτοῦ, διακείμενος διὸ πρὸς ἄρχων πρὸς ἄρχόμενον εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ῥεῖν κατ’ ἄριθμον ἀξιόων, καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναλων κοινωτίκων οὔτω συμβαίνει’ ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἄριθμῳ τοῦ ῥείν μετέχουσιν, ὅτε δὲ λόγῳ... οὗ ὑπερεχύμενος τοὐναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον, καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγησαν (on this see Jackson, Book v, pp. 95 sqq.). δόξειε δ’ ἄν οὕτως ἐλαστοῦσθαι ὑπερέχων καὶ λειτουργία ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ κοινωνία, δεῖ ἄρα τούτῳ ἔτερῳ ἀνισάσα, καὶ ποιήσαι ἀνάλογον. τούτῳ δ’ ἔστιν ἡ τιμή, διόπερ καὶ τῷ ἀρχιντὶ φύτει καὶ θεῷ πρὸς τὸ ἄρχομενον, δεῖ δ’ ἵσασθαι τὸ κέρδος πρὸς τὴν τιμήν.

a. 29. § 1. λειτουργήν] properly a public service defrayed by a private citizen—a τρημαρχία, χορηγία, or ἀρχεθεωρία.

b. 7. § 3. ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινὸν] Fritzschc quotes i. 5. 4 τιμῇ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τέλος.

b. 8. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι] Rassow (Forsch. p. 26) brackets these words as merely a repetition of the words οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται κ.τ.λ. b. 6. The clause εῦ πᾶσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. b. 9 has no causal connexion, he thinks, with the bracketed words. Susemihl places the words οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται... ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινὸν after the words bracketed by Rassow. I think that the received text is satisfactory, and that the connexion may be
traced as follows—δ' τον κοινόν εὐρυγετῶν gets a reward from the 1163 b. 8. κοινόν. This must be τιμή, not money, for, γιὰδ εὐρυγετῶν τὸ κοινὸν (e.g. as ἀρχιθεώρος) and not ἐαυτόν, he spends money—and that such a εὐρυγετῶν must get τιμή, since he does not get money, is plain, for no one is willing to sacrifice himself all round.

ἀφελουμένῳ... ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα] For the change of case b. 13. see note on διαμαρτώντα viii. 13. 9. a. 3.

§ 4. ἀπείπασθαι] According to the Athenian law a father might b. 19. dissolve the legal connexion between himself and his son by the process of ἀποκήρυξις:—cf. Plato, Legg. 928 Ε ἔξειναι σφυρώ, ἀν βουίλονται, τὸν νιῶν ὑπὸ κήρυκος ἑνακίων ἀπάντων ἀπειπεὶν νιῶν κατὰ τὸν νόμον μηκὸν εἶναι. He had to prove to the satisfaction of the court his son’s deficiency in filial attention, riotous living, and profligacy generally. If the ἀποκήρυξις were not avoided by the father’s subsequent pardon of his son, the latter was disinherited at his father’s death. Apparently his privileges as to the tribe and state however were not affected by ἀποκῆρυξις (cf. Plato, Legg. I. c. εὖ μὲν οὖν ἄλλη πολιτεία πᾶς ἀποκηρυγμένος οὐκ ἄν εὖ ἀνάγκης ἀπολίν αἰὴ, τάτης δὲ, ἥς οἱνοὲ οἱ νόμοι ἔσονται, ἁναγκαῖος ἔχει εἰς ἄλλην χώραν ἐξοκιζέσθαι τὸν ἀπάτορα). See Smith's Dict. of Antiquities article, Apokeruxis, (summarised above), and Lucian’s (?) ἀποκηρυγμένος, which opens as follows—'

A son disinherited by his father studies Physick, and by a specific remedy cures his father who was become distracted, and was given over by all other physicians. Thereupon the father cancels the will, and again declares him his heir. But afterwards upon the son’s refusal of curing his mother-in-law that was fallen into the same distemper, he is disinherited a second time, against which the son makes the following oration.'

ἀμα δ’ ἵσως κ.τ.λ.] ἵσως δ’ οὐδεὶς πατήρ ἄφισται τοῦ νιῶν εἰ μὴ b. 22. ὑπερβαλλόντος εἰς μοχθηρόν (i.e. the son)—Paraph. οὐδεὶς δὲ ποτε ἀποστήσεται τοῦ νιῶν εἰ μὴ μοχθηρόν ἢδοι αὐτῷ ὄντα—Asp.

διωθεῖσθαι] of the father. b. 25.

τῷ δὲ] the son.
Book IX.

Introductory Note] The Ninth Book may be described as a not very systematic collection of ἄποψεις regarding Friendship, which are discussed and answered on the general principles laid down in the Eighth Book. Michelet (pp. 281 sqq.) thinks that this collection did not originally belong to the Εὐθήκες, and he identifies it with the θείες φιλικαὶ β, in the list of Diog. Laert. (No. 72, Rose), the περὶ φιλίας α of the same list (No. 24) being the Eighth Book. But although the Ninth Book undoubtedly consists, in main part, of ἄποψεις, there are certain chapters (4-6, 1166 α. 1-1167 β. 16) of an expository character which seem out of place in a collection of ἄποψεις. Spengel (Arist. Stud. i. pp. 215 sqq.) calls attention to the fact that the Eudemian equivalent of these chapters, and of chapter 7—Ε.Ε. H. 6-8, 1240 α. 8-1241 β. 12 (= Ε.Ν. ix. 4-7, 1166 α. 1-1168 α. 27)—is inserted at a point which corresponds in the Ε.Ε. to that between chapter 8 and chapter 9 of Ε.Ν. viii—1159 b. 25. Whether the writer of the Ε.Ε. found Ε.Ν. ix. 4-7 in Ε.Ν. viii between chapter 8 and chapter 9, or merely altered the arrangement in his own version, is a question which, in Spengel’s opinion, cannot be answered.

The writer of the Μ.Μ., without following exactly the order observed by the writer of the Ε.Ε., does not, in Spengel’s view, deviate seriously from it. Susemihl however (Νεό. Eth. p. 203) is of opinion that the writer of the Μ.Μ. must have read ix. 4-6 where we find them, and not in viii, because the order of his discussion (Μ.Μ. 1210 b. 32-1212 b. 23) is partly that of the Ε.Ε. and partly that of our Ε.Ν.
BOOK IX: CHAP. 1.

Why and how ix. 4–6 stand where we find them, whether the writer or editor of the Book intentionally placed them there, or they came there by some accident, are questions which, I think, cannot now be answered, and therefore need not be asked. As a whole however Book ix has a distinctive character of its own, and I see no reason for doubting that it was written to follow Book viii. As Spengel (Arist. Stud. i. pp. 215 sqq.) says, ‘Das neunte Buch besteht aus Aporien: es sind Zweifel und Bedenken, die, nachdem die Erklärung von der φιλία im vorausgehenden Buche gegeben ist, entstehen können und gelöst werden müssen, wie etwa bei der δικαιοσύνη.’

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENT.

The proportion which equalises persons who are dissimilar and maintains friendship between them is the same as that which regulates the exchanges by which the shoemaker, weaver, and other members of the community receive due returns for their products. In commerce, however, the dissimilar products exchanged are all referred to a common measure—money: whereas the dissimilar services rendered by such ‘friends’ as lover and beloved have no common measure: hence recriminations, and dissolution of ‘friendship.’ The liking of such ‘friends’ is not for each other as persons, but for the stock of pleasure or profit which each has at his disposal; and if this comes to an end, or turns out to be different from what it was supposed to be—as when the musician found out that his patron had already paid him with the pleasure of expected payment—their friendship comes to an end.

Who ought to decide what is the worth of a service rendered, where no bargain has been made beforehand? The person who confers the service, or the person who receives it? The receiver surely, for the person who confers a service, without making a bargain, leaves the remuneration to the pleasure of the receiver. This is what Protagoras did: he let the pupil fix the amount of the fee: but in such matters some people like better the principle of ‘fixed fees.’ As for the teacher who begins by ‘receiving’ the fee, and then fails to fulfil the extravagant promises by which he induced his pupils to pay in advance—he naturally becomes the object of complaint: this is what the sophists have to do, for under no other system would people pay them anything for their knowledge. But those who confer benefits for the sake of the persons benefited (this is what they do in the friendship based on virtue), are, as we have said, never objects of complaint, and ought to get a return equivalent to their good intention, for
intention is the measure of true friendship and of virtue. The service rendered
by a true teacher of philosophy must be estimated in the same way as that
rendered by a true friend. It cannot be measured by the standard of money;
honour cannot be weighed in the balance against it; but perhaps enough is done
if the disciple gives in return what he can, as to the gods and to parents.

Where the service is rendered, not for the sake of the person to whom it is
rendered, but in view of some return (which, however, has not been agreed upon
beforehand), it is, of course, best that the return made should be one which
both parties think adequate: failing unanimity on this point, it would seem to
be not only necessary but fair that the receiver should fix the amount of the re-
turn, he being the only judge of how much benefit he has derived from the
service: and this rule does not apply only in ‘friendship,’ for the price even of
a thing that is bought is what the buyer will give for it; and in some states
there is no legal recovery of debts—on the principle that if you begin by
trusting a man you ought not to end by suing him.

When a service, then, is rendered without any arrangement as to the return,
it is for the receiver to fix the amount of the return—the giver cannot be allowed
to do so, for people put too high a value on the things which they give: but in
fixing the amount the receiver must go, not by what he thinks the service worth
now that he has received it, but by what he thought it worth before he received
it: for people generally do not put the same value on a thing when they have it
as they did when they wished to get it.

1163 b. 32. § 1. áνυμοιοειδέων] These ‘heterogeneous friendships,’ as Ram-
sauer points out, have not been previously referred to under this
name. They are not the same as αἱ καθ’ ὑπεροχήν, but exist where
the object of the association is not the same on both sides, one
party seeking for instance pleasure, and the other one in
return for pleasure provided. Cf. viii. 4. 1 μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
αἱ φιλίαι μένουσιν, ἓκαστὸ τὸ ἀυτὸ γίνεται παρ’ ἄλληλοις, οἷον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ
μονὸν οὕτως ἄλλα καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀυτοῦ, οἷον τὸις εἴσπεσθεῖσι, καὶ μὴ ὡς
ἐραστῆ καὶ ἐρωμένων οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονὴν οὕτως, ἀλλ’ ὃ μὲν ὄραν
ἐκέειν, ὃ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ. It is obvious that persons
whom it would be impossible to distinguish as ὑπερέχουσιν καὶ ὑπερ-
ἐχόμενοι may be ἀνυμοιοειδεῖς φίλοι.

b. 33. καθάπερ εἴρηται] It has been said before (e.g. viii. 14. 3) that
proportion equalises the difference between the superior and
inferior, and so preserves friendship between them: but it has not
been said (expressly at least) that it preserves friendship between
those whose difference is not quantitative, but qualitative (ἀνυμοιο-
ειδεῖς). See Ramsauer ad loc. Grant’s reference to viii. 13. 1 is
thus hardly relevant.
The Paraphr., simply identifies αἱ ἀνομοιοειδεῖς φιλίαι with αἱ καθ' άπεροχήν (ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς κατ' ἴσοτητα φιλίαις τὰ ἵσα ἀνταποδοτέων ἀλλήλοις τοὺς φίλους, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδεῖσι φιλίαις, καθὼς εἶρηται, τὸ ἀνάλογον), but the writer of the commentary on this Book styled Eustratius by Aldus (but identified with Mich. Eph. by Rose, Commentaire zur Ethik des Aristoteles, Hermes, vol. v) sees the difficulty, and takes great pains to show how αἱ ἀνομοιοειδεῖς are καθ' ἀπεροχήν.—ἀναμιμήσατε τῶν ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦτον βιβλίῳ εἰρημένων καὶ διδαγμένων ἢ δεδεξί ἡ ὅτι τὸ ἀνάλογον σφέτε τὰς ἀνομοιοειδεῖς φιλίαις. ὁμοιοειδεῖς δὲ φιλίαι εἰσίν, ... αἱ τῶν ἁγαθῶν, αἱ δ' ἄλλα πάσαι ἀνομοιοειδεῖς (the reading of Lb, Mb, Ald., CCC., Cambr., B1, B3), ὁμοιαί γὰρ καὶ ἵσοι ἀρμικαὶ καὶ συνώμει αἱ ἁγαθοί ... ἡ δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς τὸν φιλότητα, ἡ τοῦ νῦν πρὸς πατέρα, συν' ὁμοιοὶ ὁμι' ἵσῃ ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ. It is scarcely necessary to point out that this identification of αἱ ἀνομοιοειδεῖς φιλίαι with αἱ καθ' ἀπεροχήν, on the ground that αἱ τῶν ἁγαθῶν, being ὁμοιοειδεῖς, are not καθ' ἀπεροχήν, ignores Aristotle's plain statement that in all the three kinds of φιλία we have ἀπεροχή and ἴσοτητα—viii. 13. Ἡ τρίτων δ' οὖσῶν φιλίων ... καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἴσοτητι φιλεῖν ἄντων τῶν δὲ καθ' ἀπεροχὴν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἁγαθοῖ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείων χείρω, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἤδεις καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἰδαίοιτες ταῖς ὀφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες) κ.τ.λ.

πολιτικῆ] sc. κοινωνία Mich. Eph., Par., Fritz., Stahr, Peters. b. 34. Ramsauer however supplies φιλία, which is probably right, as it has certainly to be supplied in the next § with ἐρωτική: cf. E. Ε. Η. 10. 1242 b. 32 βλέπει δ' ἡ μὲν πολιτική εἰσὶ τὸ ἴσον καὶ εἰσὶ τὸ πράγμα, ὅσπερ οἱ πολλοῦτες καὶ οἱ ὀνομένοι. διὸ εἴρηται

"μισθός ἀνδρὶ φιλῷ." οἵτινες δὲ μὲν καθ' ὁμολογίαν ὃς ἡ πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία, καὶ νομικῆ ὃτιν ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἡπὶ καὶ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἐταυρίκη. These words occur in a context extensively drawn from Ε. Ν. ix. 1.

§ 2. ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ κ.τ.λ.] i.e. here there are misunderstandings 1164 a. 2. because there is no common measure.

§ 3. ταύτα δὲ μὴ ἄμφοτέροι ὑπάρχη] Peters with 'they do not both a. 8. get what they want,' misses the force of ὑπάρχῃ here, which (as may be seen from the use of ὑπάρχοντα below, a. 11) marks the subsistence of a quality—τὸ ἢδειον εἶναι or τὸ χρήσμον εἶναι—in A, not the satisfaction derived by B from that quality in A. The Paraphr.
is right with ἄνθρωπειν δὲ τὰ τουαίτα, ὅταν ὁ μὲν δὲ ἕδοιν ἔρων, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, εἶτα μὴν οὗτος πάντων ἰδίως ἢ, μὴν ἐκεῖνος χρήσιμον.

10. ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα] Mich. Eph. has συμβαίνει ... τῆς φιλίας διαλύσεις ... διὰ τὸ ἀπολιπτέω τὸν μὲν ἔραστὴν τὰ χρήματα, εὑρίσκει δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀκμήν, τὸν δὲ ἐρώμενον τὸ κάλλος φύος αὐτοῖς ἐφίλον ὡς οἱ σπουδαῖοι ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτοῖς ταῦτα δὲ ἦσαν τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὰ χρήματα οὐ μόνον διότα.

12. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν] Mich. Eph., the Paraph., Stahr., Rams., and Grant take this as equivalent to ἡ καθ' ἀρετὴν φιλία, or perfect friendship. Victorius however refers to viii. 4. 1, where, speaking of the instability of the friendship between ἔραστῆς and ἐρώμενος, Aristotle says πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν εἰ τῆς συνθείας τὰ ἡθή στερέσωσιν, ὁμοίεσθε δοντες. The words of Victorius are 'quod sequitur apud auctorem ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν καθ' αὐτὴν οὖσα μὲν εἶται ἰτα accipio ut pertineat ad eandem amicitiam declarandam qua juncti sunt inter se amator deliciaeque ipsius: usus enim venit aliquando ut ipsa quoque maneat, cum pura atque integra est: neque colitur propter explendam libidinem, aut fructum inde aliquem commoendumque auferendum: sed propter morum ingeniique similitudinem: nam quod addidit nunc hoc a se antea dictum fuisse, intelligit locum eum in quo primus superiore in libro de ipsa praecepit: usus enim quoque illic est in aliiis iisdem quibus hic verba, quae sunt haec πολλοὶ δ' αὖ κ.τ.λ. viii. 4. 1.' Zell takes the same view as Victorius, referring the words ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν κ.τ.λ. to the ἔρωτική φιλία of the immediate context and quoting viii. 4. 1. 'Ερωτικὴ φιλία (as Victorius and Zell understand the present passage) is peculiarly unstable unless it happen that similarity of character (ἡθη whether good or indifferent) establishes a more lasting bond between the lovers.

Against this interpretation are the words καθ' αὐτήν οὖσα, which can scarcely be anything but an abbreviated expression for ἐν ἡ (i.e. εἰ τῇ τῶν καθ' αὐτῶν ἑγαθόν) δὲ αὐτῶσ φιλοί εἰσί: see E. N. viii. 3. 6—the passage, I take it, referred to here (ix. 1. 3) in the words καθάπερ εἰρηται. Of course ἡ τῶν ἡθῶν φιλία has, in any case, nothing to do with the ἕθικη φιλία of E. N. viii. 13. 5, which falls under the head of ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον.

15. § 4. κινηρῳθῇ] See the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant, for the story.

κακείνου γε χάριν ταύτα δώσει] ἐκείνου is ὧν a. 20 and ταύτα what 1161 a. 21.

he has to offer in return: ὧν γὰρ ἐκαστὸς δεῖ ταύτα τούτων ἐνεκα δίδωσιν ἄ τυχανε κεκτημένοι αὐτὸς (Paraph.). The reading τὰ αὐτὰ (Ob, and an authority known to Mich. Eph.) is accepted by Michelet with the sense—'he will be ready to give of his own an amount equal to that which he receives.' Coraes reads τὰ αὐτῶν—the conjecture of Muretus. The change of number (ὁν—ἐκείνου) hardly calls for notice in a writer like Aristotle: at any rate I cannot think that Fritzsche's explanation adopted by Grant is satisfactory—'Pro-nomen ἐκείνου singulari numero ad priorem multitudinis numerum (ὧν δέομενος τυχάνει) referetur propterea quod una res, singulari desiderata occasione, exprimitur.' The passage viii. 3. 3 referred to by Fritzsche in illustration seems to me rather to be a good example of a change of number carelessly made without any reason.

§§ 5–9. τὴν ἀξίαν κ.τ.λ.] When a service has been rendered a. 22.

without any previous διομολογία, or understanding between the parties respecting its value and the remuneration to be given in return for it, διαφοραὶ and ἐγκλήματα naturally arise. With whom, in such a case, does it rest to put an end to them by fixing the value or remuneration? With the recipient: for the other party cannot force a service (or whatever else), at his own price, on an unwilling recipient, and if (without an express διομολογία) he performs it, he evidently does so leaving the remuneration to be settled by the recipient. This is what Protagoras did; but what ordinary sophists do not venture to do. They even collect their fees in advance. It is to be carefully noted that, in these sections, Aristotle is speaking only of those cases in which no previous διομολογία exists. The ἐνεργεία ἀνευ διομολογίας of these sections may be compared with the ἥλιας ἀξία of viii. 13. 7. When, in viii. 13. 11, Aristotle says generally that the standard of value in ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλία is ἡ τοῦ παθώντος ὀψέλεια, he states the basis indeed on which the question of price must be discussed by ἐνεργεία and παθών, but does not of course mean it to be under-stood that the latter can (except in the absence of a διομολογία) fix the price of the ὀψέλεια. The unwillingness, due to various causes, of the prospective ἐνεργεία to perform the service has the effect of making the (prospective) παθών estimate the ὀψέλεια more highly. The unwillingness of the one to perform the service below a certain price, has as much to do with the result of the διομολογία, as
the unwillingness of the other to receive it above a certain price: or otherwise.—The ὑφέλεια of the buyer is the ultimate standard of value, but the application of this standard to a particular case, resulting in the naming of a price, is not left to the buyer alone. If it were possible for him to fix the price as low as he liked, it would be possible for the seller to go on always selling at a loss. It is therefore only of at ἀλὰ ἀλερορογίας εἰςεγερσία, or of transactions falling under the head of ἱδίκη φιλία, that Aristotle’s answer to the question asked here at the beginning of § 5 applies.

§ 5. προειμένου... προλαβάντος] Zell thinks that προλαβάντος is simply equivalent to λαβάντος: but Coraes is right, I think, with τοῦ πρώτου λαβάντος, ἀντιπαραλληλικῶς πρὸς τὸν ἀντιλαμβάνοντα καὶ ἀντικομίζομεν τὸ ὑπηρετήθην.

Πρωταγόραν] Coraes, Michelet, and Stahr quote Plato, Protag. 328 B ἐπειδὴν γὰρ τινὶ παρ’ ἑμοῦ μάθῃ ἐὰν μὲν βούλησα, ἀποθέσακεν δ’ εἰπ’ ἡπτάμαι ἀρχήν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ, ἔλθον εἰς ἁρμόν, ὁμόνως, δοκεῖν ἂν ἐὰν ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν. But perhaps the pressure exercised by means of this method was more considerable than Protagoras wished it to be thought.

ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ’ ἐνίοτος ὁρέσκει τὸ “μισθὸς δ’ ἄνδρι’”] Ramsauer brackets these words as out of place. The context in which the quotation occurs in the Eth. Eud. (H. 10. 1242 b. 34)—viz. where πολιτικὴ φιλία, ἰ. ἐ. ἦ τῶν πολιοῦντων καὶ ὠνομεῖν, is discussed—he considers more natural. But if we remember what the line (Hesiod ἔργ. κ. ἥμ. 368) is in full, and what its context is, it will appear, I think, that Ramsauer is wrong in bracketing the words before us.

μισθὸς δ’ ἄνδρι φιλο ἐρημείνος ἄρκιος ἔστω,
καὶ τε καταγρήτῳ γελάσας ἐπὶ μάρτυρα βέβαιαν
πίστεις δ’ ἁρα ὅμως καὶ ἀπαστια ἀλέσαν ἂνδρας—

ἰ. ἐ. even with a friend, nay even with a brother, let there be no ‘mere understandings’; let every contract be entered into ἐπὶ ρητοῖς. This is the advice of Hesiod. After mentioning that Protagoras allowed his pupils to fix the fee, Aristotle proceeds to say that in the matter of fees to be paid for philosophical instruction (ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις), some teachers (ἐνίοτος) are of the opinion of Hesiod, that there should be a stated fee (to be paid after the instruction has been received), although the relation of teacher and pupil is one of friendship rather than of business.
Thus all ἐγκλήματα are avoided. Those Sophists however who, 1164 a. 26. not satisfied with having a fair arrangement beforehand as to the remuneration to be paid afterwards, go to the extreme of requiring that fees proportioned to their extravagant pretensions be paid in advance, naturally become objects of complaint when their pupils find out that they have been swindled. We have thus three relations between teacher and pupils—(1) where the pupils fix the fee: (2) where the fee is fixed beforehand in a fair manner, according to the standard of remuneration commonly recognised for such instruction: (3) where the pupils are swindled by an impostor. The expression οἱ προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον is to be understood in close connexion with the τοῦ προλαβόντος of line a. 23. Where there is no διομολογία, the προλαβῶν, not the προϊμένος a. 23 (or ἀντιλαβῶν b. 11), fixes the return; but if the προληψις be of money received for services yet to be rendered, the transaction is a disgraceful one in which the rule laid down at the beginning of § 5 does not apply. Οἱ προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον (as distinguished from those προλαμβάνοντες τὴν εὐεργεσίαν) cannot be allowed to 'fix the price.' Their services would be dear at the lowest price.

If I am right in supposing that Aristotle has Hesiod's whole context in his mind here—viz. μισθὸς δ' ... ὄλεσαν ἄνδρας— the superior appositeness of the quotation in the Eudemian connexion cannot be admitted.

§ 7. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας] The subject a. 33. of αἱ ἄνευ διομολογίας ὑπουργία is now resumed after the digression about the teachers who act on the maxim μισθὸς δ' ἄνδρι, and insist on a διομολογία.

οἱ μὲν δὲ αὐτοὺς προϊμένοι] those whose friendly services are a. 34. rendered to and for the sake of the personality of their friends, not with a view to some advantage (ἐπὶ τινὶ § 8, b. 6) to be received in return: οἱ ὀφελοῦστες τοὺς φίλους δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ προϊμένοι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τῶν φίλων ἐνεκα οὓοι εἰσον οἱ σπουδαῖοι, as distinguished from οἱ ἐπὶ τινι, ἢ διὰ χρήσιμον ἢ διὰ ἠδονήν (Paraph.).

ἀνέγκλητοι] In Perfect Friendship a διομολογία is unnecessary. a. 35. No misunderstanding is possible, because the value of a service consists in its being the true expression of a virtuous character, and as such it is immediately recognised by the agent's ἕτερος αὐτός.
BOOK IX: CHAP. 1: §§7, 8.

1164 b. 1. τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιητέων κατὰ τὴν προαιρεσιν (ἁπτὴ γὰρ τοῦ φιλοῦ καὶ τῆς δρετῆς)] 'The return made must be for what the giver intended; for it is the intention which is the significant thing in a friend and in virtue.'

b. 2. οὔτω δ' ἐσθει κ.τ.λ.] sc. ποιητέων εἶναι according to the commentators; but Ramsauer suspects the passage. As we shall see later, the highest friendship is of the nature of philosophical intercourse—a kind of Dialectic.

b. 6. § 8. μὴ τοιαύτης] i.e. μὴ δὲ αὐτῶς.

ἐπὶ τινὶ] 'for some return'—i.e. not δὲ αὐτῶς, 'for the friends' sake.' The expression ἐπὶ τινὶ does not necessarily imply that the transaction is ἐπὶ ρητοῖς, or founded on a definite διαμολογία, as Mich. Eph. seems to take for granted—ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινὶ, τοντέστι δὲ ἀντίδοσι καὶ ἀντεποίησι τὴν διὰ χρημάτων τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ ἡ δὲ διαμολογία. An adequate return is expected by the giver, but no definite bargain has been made in the case which the section has in view—a case answering to the description of ἡδική φιλία given in viii. 13. ἦ δ' ἡδικὴ οὖκ ἐπὶ ρητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλω διωρίσει ἡ ὀπισθήποτε ἄλλοις κομισθοῦν δὲ ἀξίω τὸ ἐσον ἡ πλέον, ὡς οὐ δεδοκῶς ἄλλα χρήσαν. There being no previous agreement, or διαμολογία, the recipient, as an honest man, must try, if possible, to meet the expectations of the giver—μᾶλιστα μὲν ἵσως κ.τ.λ. b. 7; but if this be not possible, he has the matter in his own power, and must make what payment he thinks equivalent to the benefit received.

b. 9. προέχοντα] =προαλαβόντος of § 5.

b. 12. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὁνόμασι οὔτω φαῦνεται γινόμενον] 'for even when a thing is offered for sale, this rule holds good'—i.e. the buyer fixes the price: a fortiori, then, in the cases just mentioned, where a more or less friendly gift or loan has been made ἐπὶ τινὶ, but ἄνευ διαμολογίας, the receiver fixes the amount of the return. It is not necessary to think, with Ramsauer, of a thing being bought ἄνευ διαμολογίας—this would surely be an unusual case—but rather of the 'higgling of the market,' by which a διαμολογία as to price is arrived at. Where things are not offered for sale 'at fixed prices,' the buyer rather than the seller seems to 'fix the price,' when he beats down the seller. Again, at an auction the highest bidder seems to fix the price. The Paraph. and Mich. Eph. both seem to understand the reference to be to the 'higgling of the
BOOK IX: CHAP. 1: §§ 8, 9.

§ 9. ἐπιστρατεύον τ' εἰς νόμοι τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι b. 13. κ.τ.λ.] Having instanced the 'higgling of the market' to show how much power rests with the 'receiver' even as prospective buyer, Aristotle now adds that in some states the law declines to interfere with him as debtor—it may be even as fraudulent debtor.

The expression ἐκουσία συμβολαία (cf. Plato, Rep. 556 A) seems to be equivalent to the ἐκουσία συναλλάγματα of E. N. v. 2. 13, viz. πράσις, ἄνθις, δανειμός, κ.τ.λ., with this difference perhaps that it calls special attention to credit given in these transactions. In Athenian law συμβολαία (plur.) is a bond or covenant—more particularly with regard to money lent. Where credit was given, even ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, it would appear from this and the parallel passage viii. 13. 6 (where see note), that in some states there was no legal remedy against one who declined to fulfil the contract. See Newman's notes on Pol. 1263 b. 21 and 1267 b. 37, where he quotes Strabo 702—δίκην δὲ μὴ εἶναι (among certain Indians) πλὴν φόνου καὶ ἐμπείριον ὅπου ἐπὶ αὐτῷ γὰρ τὸ μὴ παθὲν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις ἐπὶ αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ, ὅτε ἀνέχεσθαι δεῖ εἶναι τις παραβηγή τὴν πίστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσέχειν ὅτῳ πιστεύειν, καὶ μὴ δικῶν πληροῦν τὴν πόλιν.

§ γὰρ ... b. 20 λομβάρωτες] Ramsauer regards these words as b. 15. out of place here, and in themselves confused, and brackets them: νόμος, or νομοβέτης (suggested by Mich. Eph.), is scarcely satisfactory, he thinks, as subject of οὕτως: and the comparison begun by δικαιότερον is not completed—i.e. the reason for the failure of the giver to make a just estimate of the value of the benefaction is indeed stated, but evidently the writer intended to go on to point out that the receiver's estimate is also prejudiced, though not to the same extent as the giver's, for he adds ἀλλ' ὅμως κ.τ.λ. In addition to these points noted by Ramsauer, I would call attention to the point that όι ἔχοντες in the suspected passage is used of όι προίμενοι, whereas in § 8 προέχοντα is the receiver, and
BOOK IX: CHAP. 1: § 9.

1164 b. 15. ἐχοντι and ἔχειν at the end of the present § also refer to the receiver.

If the passage suspected by Ramsauer be allowed to stand as it is, ἀλλ' ὠμοι will mean, I suppose, 'notwithstanding the extravagant value attached by the giver to his gift, it is the receiver's estimate that he has after all to accept as final.'

b. 20. δεὶ δ' ἵσως κ.τ.λ. The statement that the receiver, in estimating the value of a service, must keep in view the distinction between ἐχοντι and πρὶν ἔχειν shows that the case here contemplated is one in which the service has already been rendered without previous δομολογία, and it devolves upon the receiver alone to determine as an honest man what return he will make. Ramsauer's suggestion to read the sentence τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὗ τὸν ἵσων τιμῶσιν οἱ ἐχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβέιν after ἔτιμα b. 21 seems to me an excellent one, and enables us to give οἱ ἐχοντες its proper meaning, which, as I have pointed out, we cannot give it where it now stands. I offer the following rearrangement, which not only allows us consistently to refer ἐχοντι, ἔχειν, and οἱ ἐχοντες to the receiver, but meets Ramsauer's difficulty about δικαίωσεσ, and places ἀλλ' ὠμοι where its force is felt:—ὁ γὰρ ἐπετράφη, τοῦτον οἴεται δικαίωσεσ τάξαι τοῦ ἐπετρέψαντος τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖο καὶ τὰ διδόσαν ἐκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξιον· δεὶ δ' ἵσως οὗ τοσοῦτον τιμᾶν δοσον ἐχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὠμοι πρὶν ἔχειν ἔτιμα τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὗ τὸν ἵσων τιμῶσιν οἱ ἐχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβέιν ἀλλ' ὠμοι ἡ ἁμοιθή γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον δοσον ἀν τάττωσιν οἱ λαμβάνετες. The difficulty of finding a subject for οἴεται, points, I think, to a lacuna between ἐκουσώσεσεν and ὁ γὰρ b. 15.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT.

The following also are difficult questions.—Ought a man always to give the preference to his father, and obey him in all things? Or ought he, when sick, to obey his doctor rather than his father, and, in electing a general, vote for the candidate who has military experience? And again—should one do a service to a friend rather than to a good man? Should one recompense a benefactor
rather than bestow a gift on a comrade, when one cannot do both? Well, it is not easy to give exact answers to such questions. Cases differ indefinitely, and what is right or necessary in one case is perhaps not so in another case. But this is plain—that one ought not to give the same person the preference in all things. Also, as a rule, one ought to treat services rendered as debts and repay them before one makes presents to one's associates—as a rule: for there are exceptions—A has been ransomed from brigands by B: should A ransom or repay B, or should he ransom his own father? There can be only one answer. He ought to ransom his father. Another case in which the general rule that services ought to be repaid like debts is perhaps inapplicable, is where A does a service to B whom he knows to be a good man, and B is thus put in the position of owing a return to A whom he supposes to be a bad man. Thus, if A lends money to B knowing that B is an honest man and will pay back the loan, B is not bound in turn to lend money to A whom he looks upon as a dishonest man and not likely to repay it. B's return does not stand on the same footing as A's original service, if B is right in his opinion of A's character; and if his opinion is mistaken, yet it is his opinion, and we need not be surprised at his acting on it. However, where circumstances vary indefinitely it is impossible to give definite answers: only thus much is clear—that the same returns are not to be rendered to all persons, and that all things are not to be rendered even to a father, any more than all things are offered to Zeus. There are things which are properly and fittingly rendered to parents, brothers, companions, and benefactors respectively—this is indeed commonly recognised: thus it is their kinsmen whom people invite to weddings and funerals, on the ground that these are important family events.

To parents, as to the authors of their being, children ought to render support, and also honour, as to gods: but not every kind of honour; for in the first place the honour due to a father differs from that due to a mother; and again the honour due to a father differs from that due to a philosophic teacher or to a general. Indeed, to all those who are elder honour is due according to age—in respect of seats and other such matters.

To comrades and brothers our bearing ought to be frank and open. To kinsmen, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-citizens, and all others we must try to give what is severally due to them according as they stand in different degrees of relationship to ourselves, and differ in virtue or in usefulness. Where people are of the same kind it is not very difficult to assign to each his due; but where they differ it is a harder task; still, we must not shrink from it, but do our best to assign rightly.

Introductory Note.] In this chapter, Michelet remarks, we have the beginnings of Casuistry. 'Casuistry' has got a bad reputation because it has manufactured, in imitation of bond fide cases of moral perplexity, cases which no honest man would find perplexing—and this, with the concealed object of resolving them in a sense favourable to some dishonest inclination. The perplexing cases given in this chapter are all, however, bond fide ones, though
the form in which some of them are presented reminds one of the Debating Society. They are cases with which an honest man might find himself confronted—cases in which he has to choose between two courses of conduct, each of which alternately 'common sense' presents as a 'duty'—if it seems right to choose the one, it then seems wrong not to choose the other.

Common sense takes out of their real context certain points of view, presented by imagination, and recommended to the attention by feeling, and makes them into absolute and self-subsistent 'entities,' incapable, naturally, of reconciliation as parts of a rationally consistent system. To attempt to solve for himself 'the problems of casuistry' from the level of 'common sense' can accordingly only weaken the moral nature of the man who attempts it. He has to believe in 'two duties' in the same circumstances, to one of which he must needs be unfaithful. Haunted by the thought of unfaithfulness to a 'duty,' every time he is forced to make a choice in circumstances of moral perplexity he does violence to an honestly entertained moral sentiment, and brings himself gradually nearer a point at which it is no longer doubtful that his decisions have become dishonest.

'The problems of Casuistry' are only for the man who has risen above 'common sense' to the height of reason; who can see life clearly as a single organic whole. Of course the practical difficulties of distinguishing between the right and the wrong, and of choosing the right, remain for such a man; but the fallacy of the 'two duties in the same circumstances'—of the moral imperium in imperio—no longer imposes upon him. He now perceives that there can be only the one duty, however hard to find, in the one set of circumstances. His attitude towards the perplexities of life is a resolute and objective one. He is not paralysed by the thought that, when he does what is right, he is also doing what is wrong. His philosophy has not made life less perplexing in detail, but it has given him the great idea of the organic unity of the world—an idea which inspires him with fortitude and resignation. It is the clearness with which Aristotle presents life as a rational whole that makes the discussion of 'the problems of Casuistry' so satisfactory in his system. Φωτασία and πάθος break Duty into a multitude of 'cases of conscience'—Life, into a chaos of separate and repugnant items, making it 'a series of episodes, like a bad play.' The perplexities of 'Casuistry' represent the work of

φαντασία and πάθος. The resolution of these perplexities is the work of Reason. On the relation of Philosophy to Casuistry, see Green's Prolegomena, §§ 314–328.

§ 2. τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαῖῳ] τῷ καλῷ marks the claims of the 1164 b. 29. Form or Ideal which the good man strives to realize; τῷ ἀναγκαῖῳ, the limitations imposed upon him by the matter of his circumstances. ‘For the different cases differ in all sorts of ways, according to the importance or unimportance, the nobility or necessity of the act’ (Peters).

§ 4. ἀπαίτοντι δὲ] τὰ λύτρα (Coraes).

§ 5. προοίμαρχὴν] ‘the primary obligation’ (Grant).

§ 8. εἰπὲ...τῷ δὲ] Both refer to the same person, viewed first as a. 6. προείμενος, and then as ἀντιλαμβάνων.

οὐκ ἰσον τὸ ἀξίωμα] ‘the claim is not equal’ (Grant): cf. Mich. a. 10. Eph.—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰσον τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν πονηρὸν δανείζειν ἐπιεικεῖ ἄξιον, τὸν δ’ ἐπιεικῆ τὰ ἴσα καὶ τὰ ἀυτὰ πρὸς τὸν μοχθηρὸν ποιεῖν οὔδεὶς ἀν ἄξιόσει. Victorius has—Non est par postulatum.

οἰόνται] Coraes reads οἴεται, which the Paraph. seems to support a. 11. with—ἐἰτε τοῖς ἄληθείς περὶ τοῦ μοχθηροῦ νομίζει ὁ ἀγαθός, ὥς καὶ τοῦτο μοχθηρὸν ἐσται, καὶ οὐκ ἀποδώσει, εἰκότα ποιεῖ μὴ δανείζεως πρὸς μὴ οὐτῶς ἔχει, οἴεται δὲ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀμείβεται τοῖς ἰσοῖς, καὶ οὔτως οὐ πάρρω ποιεῖ τῷ δικαίῳ. Coraes also reads δύοζες with r, M b, Ob, Ald., instead of δύοζες given by K b, L b, Cambr., the subject of οἴεται and δύοζες being the σπουδαίοι. There can be no doubt, however, that if we read οἰόνται and δύοζες, their real subject is still the σπουδάιοι, not both parties. Ramsauer sees this, for on the words οὐκ ἄν δύοζες ἄτοπα ποιεῖ οἵς ἔχει—‘sc. οἱ ἐνίοτε τὴν προοίμαρχὴν οὐκ ἀμειβόμενοι.’ The change from the singular ἐπιτίθει to the plural οἰόνται need not surprise us in Aristotle.

§ 6. πολλάκις] i. 3. 1, ii. 2. 3.

τῷ Δί] Grant refers to v. 7. 1.

§ 7. κῆθη] ‘funerals.’ Mich. Eph. is certainly wrong with κῆθη a. 20. δ’ εἰπε τὰ πρὸ τοῦ γάμου συναλλάγματα. Why, as Michelet asks, if this is the meaning, are τὰ κῆθη mentioned separately from and after
1165 a. 20. the γάμοι? According to the *Ind. Arist.* the word occurs only here in Aristotle.

a. 22. § 8. τροφής . . . γονεῖς . . . ἐπαρκεῖν] The genitive is partitive—‘to supply one’s parents with their due share of sustenance.’ Zell and Coraes, following the Paraph., conjecture τροφήν. The regular construction of ἐπαρκεῖν is dat. of the person and acc. of the thing. The dat. of the thing however occurs. Perhaps we should read τροφή.


a. 27. § 9.] Fritzsche, Grant, and Ramsauer quote Plato, *Rep.* 425 A συγά τε τῶν νεωτέρων παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις, ὥσ πρέπει, καὶ κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις.

a. 32. συγκρίνειν τὰ ἐκάστως ὑπάρχοντα] ‘to assign to each what is properly due on the ground of relationship, goodness, or usefulness.’

a. 33. χρήσις] Williams very plausibly translates this by ‘intimacy’—cf. Latin usus; but the commentators are probably right with ‘usefulness’: χρήσις is not quoted in the *Ind. Arist.* in the sense of ‘intimacy.’

a. 34. § 10. ἡ σύγκρισις] So Bywater after Ruelle (*Rev. de Phil.* 12, p. 175), for the κρίσις of the MSS. ‘The question,’ says Bywater (*Contributions*, p. 62), ‘here is not of “judgment” or “distinction” or any thing of that sort, but rather of combining the persons and their respective dues’—and he quotes *de Gen. et Corr.* 329 b. 26 for the usage, and compares σύγκρισις here with σύζευξις in *E. N.* v. 3. 12.

**CHAPTER III.**

**Argument.**

*Another difficult question is about the dissolution of friendship with those who do not remain the same. Where friendship is for profit or pleasure, of course it is quite natural that it should be broken off when the profit or pleasure ceases: no fault can be found with the friend who then breaks it off, unless he has been pretending to like the*
other for his personal character, while all the time he was really in love with his usefulness: in that case the other would have a right to complain of counterfeit friendship—a much worse thing than counterfeit coin. But if a man make another his friend on account of that other's goodness and that other become bad, can he continue to have him as a friend? Surely not. He cannot love that which is evil, or be like it; for, as we have seen, like loves like. Is he then to break off the friendship at once? Not unless the other has become incurably bad. If the other's character can still be reformed, he could not do anything more worthy of friendship than trying to reform it. Again, if one of the two friends remain the same, and the other become a much better man, is the latter still to keep up his friendship with the former? He can hardly do so—at any rate not if his friend be a friend of boyhood who has remained a boy in understanding, while he has himself become a man of distinguished excellence; for what could the tastes of two such persons have in common? How could two such persons see much of each other? Is the distinguished man then to make no difference between his old friend and a stranger? Our answer is—he ought to remember the old intimacy. Something is due to bygone friendship where the separation has not been occasioned by the old friend turning out a very bad man.


ἐν ἀρχῇ] No remark exactly corresponding to this has been b. 6. made. Zell, Coraes, Friztsche, and Michelet however refer to ix. 1. 4, and Michelet regards the expression ἐν ἀρχῇ as showing that this collection of θέσεις φιλικαί constituting the Ninth Book was published separately. Ramsauer finds the ἀρχῇ in viii. 13. 5 γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλιστ' ἦταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξεις καὶ διαλύνοντα, where the discussion of διαφοράι begins.


χρυσοῦ κυβιθρεύοι καὶ ἀργύρου ἀναχετος ἁτη
Κύρτε, καὶ ἑκευρεῖ ἐνδιον ἀνθρι σοφαῖ
εἰ δὲ φιλον νύσσε ἀνθρι ἐνι στήθεσι θλήθε
ψυχρός ἐὼν, δόλιων δ' ἐν φρεσίν ἡτορ ἐχει,
τούτο θεὸς κυβιθρεύοντα ποίησε βροτοίσι,
καὶ γρῶνα πάντων τούτ' ἀνηρότατον.

§ 3. ἀποδέχωςα] 'receive into his friendship.' b. 13.

οὐτε δὲ φιλητῶν (τὸ) ποιηρῶν] This is Bywater's reading, b. 15. after Stahr, for Bekker's οὐτε δὲ φιλητῶν ποιηρῶν. Ramsauer and Susemihl, however, rightly (I think) bracket the words (omitted by Γ), reading οὔτε (Ramsauer's conjecture) before δὲ b. 15. K⁶⁷ omits οὐτε δὲ φιλοπόνηρον. We may suppose that the scribe of K⁶⁷,
with a text before him like Bekker's, accidentally omitted ὀὖθε δὲὶ φιλοπόνηρον, because of the similarity of these words to ὀὖθε δὲὶ φιλητέον πονηρόν which he had already transcribed. They are very similar; and a reason for their similarity may be given as follows—The original text being ὅπε ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητόν ἄλλα τάγαθον, οὐδὲ δεῖ; φιλοπόνηρο γὰρ κ.τ.λ., an early blunder repeated the words οὐδὲ δὲὶ φιλοπόνηρον. The blunder was then rationalised by the alteration of the first member of the ditto-graph into ὀὖθε δὲὶ φιλ[πε]το[ν] πονηρόν, and of οὐδὲ in the second into οὐδὲ. The scribe of Κᵇ, with this rationalised ditto-graph before him (as we have it in Bekker's text), was led by the similarity between ὀὖθε δὲὶ φιλητέον πονηρόν and ὀὖθε δὲὶ φιλοπόνηρον accidentally to omit the latter. Fritzsche omits ὀὖθε δὲὶ φιλητέον πονηρόν ὀὖθε δεῖ, supposing that these words represent two glosses on φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρή εἶναι, viz. οὐ φιλητέον πονηρόν and οὐ δεῖ φιλεῖν πονηρόν.

b. 15. φιλοπόνηρον] Zell and Coraes quote Theophrastus, Char. 14 (29) περὶ φιλοπονηρίας. καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοπονηρία ἀδελφή ἐστι τῆς πονηρίας καὶ ἀλλήλης ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς παρουσίας τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον πορεύεσθαι.

b. 21. τῷ τοιοῦτῳ] τούτῳ ἥ τοιοῦτῳ is the reading adopted by Coraes, Fritzsche, and Susemihl, and found in Par. 1417, corr.² Κᵇ, Camb., and γρ. Οᵇ. Τούτῳ ἥ τοιοῦτῳ is the reading of Κᵇ, Μᵇ, Β², Β³, γ, Ald. Bekker's and Bywater's τῷ τοιοῦτῳ is the reading of Λᵇ, Οᵇ, CCC, and Β¹. See Bywater's Contributions, p. 63.

b. 29. § 4. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἄλλοιν ταῦτα ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς] ὅ. τ. ἀρέσκεσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς, &c. 'for not even in regard to each other's character will their tastes agree' (Peters).

b. 31. εἰρηταί] Cf. viii. 5. 3, and viii. 7. 4.

§ 5. ᾧ ὁ ἐν οὐδὲν ἄλλοιτερον κ.τ.λ.] 'ought he then to place himself in no other relation towards him than towards one who had never been his friend?'
CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

The characteristic marks of our friendship for others seem to be copies of those which belong to the feelings with which we regard ourselves. The marks popularly recognised as characteristic of our friendship for others are that we wish and try to effect the good of our friends, or what we think to be their good—that we wish them to exist for their own sakes (this is what mothers wish for their children, and friends who have had a difference wish for each other)—that we spend our time with them and choose the same things as they do, sympathising with their joys and sorrows (as, again, mothers especially do as regards their children). Now these are the marks which characterise the feelings of the good man towards himself, and the feelings of other men towards themselves, in so far as they suppose themselves to be good—for the good man, or his virtue, as we have seen, is always the standard. The good man is in concord with himself, and seeks after the same things with all parts of his soul. He wishes and tries to effect his own good for his own sake—that is, for the sake of the rational part of his nature: he also wishes to exist, and continue in existence, for to him existence is a good thing—that is, his own existence within the limits of human nature, for he does not wish to leave his old self behind, and become another being—not even God with all the good which God as God possesses. Such a man wishes to spend his life with himself; for what could be more pleasant! his life is full of happy memories and good hopes: his mind is richly stored with things worth thinking about. Moreover, he sympathises to the full with his own pains and pleasures. The same things always give him pain, and the same things always give him pleasure, without exception: for he never, we may say, feels regret.

Such, then, being the good man's relation to himself, his relation to his friend—his other self—will be similar. Whether his relation to himself is 'friendship' is a question which need not be discussed at present: thus much however may be said, that it seems to be friendship in so far as it has two or more of the characteristic marks of friendship just mentioned. Also, the expression, 'He loves his friend as himself'—meaning that his friendship for him is very great—seems to imply that a man can be his own 'friend.'

The characteristic marks of friendship which have been mentioned seem to belong even to the feelings with which men who are bad regard themselves; only, however, in so far as such men are pleased with themselves and think themselves good. The feelings with which those who are so utterly bad as not to be able to think themselves good regard themselves have certainly none of the characteristics of friendship; and, perhaps we ought to say, even the feelings of those who are bad without being utterly bad are destitute of these characteristics; for such men are at variance with themselves; their desires and wishes
conflict like those of the incontinent: instead of that which they recognise as
good, they choose that which is pleasant and brings harm: or through cowardice
and sloth they hold aloof from doing what they think right; and sometimes the
thought of the evil deeds they have done, and the detestation in which they are
held for their vice, make them flee life and destroy themselves. Also, the
wicked seek associates, fleeing from themselves. When they are by themselves
they remember and look forward to much that is disagreeable which they do not
think about when they are with others. There is nothing in them to attract
friendship, and so they have no friendly feelings towards themselves. They do
not enter in a friendly way even into their own joys and sorrows. Their souls
are broken up into factions; one part is grieved because it cannot get something,
and another part is glad thereat: they are soon sorry that they have been glad:
they are full of regrets. This is the state of the wicked—surely a wretched
state: it behoves us therefore to flee wickedness, and try with all our might to
be good, and so become friends to ourselves and others.

[See Introductory Note to Book ix for the relation of Chapters 4-6
to the rest of the Book.]

1166 a. 1. §§ 1, 2.] Five φιλικά, or characteristics of Friendship, are enu-
merated in § 1, all of which are to be found in the good man’s
relations to himself, § 2. These are—

1. τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ πράττειν τάγαθα ἡ τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκείνου ἑνεκα.
2. τὸ βουλεύεσθαι εἶναι καὶ ζην τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάρων.
3. τὸ συνιάγειν.
4. τὸ τὰ αὖτα αἱρεῖσθαι.
5. τὸ συμπάθεια καὶ συγγκάρειν τῷ φίλῳ.

The good man (§§ 3–5) (1) wishes good to himself for his own
sake—i.e. for the sake of his Reason which is himself; (2) he
wishes his own continued existence; (3) he dwells with himself in
the pleasant memories of the past, and the good hopes of the
future; (4) he is of one mind, always seeking the same things with
all parts of his soul; and (5) the same things are always distasteful
to him, and the same things pleasant; he does not now fail to
sympathise with feelings which he entertained then; he has no
cause for repenting. Bad men on the other hand (§§ 8–10) flee
from themselves, even to the length of suicide. Their souls are
full of disorder and regrets. As Eudemus says (E. E. Η. 6. i240
b. 16, a chapter to be read in connexion with the chapter before
us)—ἀ γε Μοῦθηρος οὐκ εἰ φλὰ πολλοὶ, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας έτερος καὶ
ζυμπληκτος (unstable).

These feelings, then, with which the good man regards himself
are said (§ 1) to be the source of the feelings with which a friend is regarded; or—the chief characteristics by which friendship is defined, find their explanation in the good man's attitude to himself; as Eudemus says (Ε. Ε. Η. 6. 1240 b. 2)—ἀπαγόρευτα ταῦτα (i. e. τὰ φιλικὰ) ἐπαναφέρεται πρὸς τὸν ἑαυτόν, and (1240 b. 17) ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίᾳ ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. The good man realises perfectly in himself that oneness of soul and life which characterises the relationship of those who are ἐτέρων αὐτοὶ to each other. But this derivation of the feelings of friends from the feelings of the good man towards himself must not be taken too literally. The logical order may be that stated by Aristotle in ix. 4. 1; but the chronological order is different. The good man himself is the result in time of that development of society from Family to City which φιλία or social feeling has rendered possible; or, to put the same truth otherwise—that Reason which gives the good man his unity of life, and in virtue of which he is his own constant 'friend,' is realised not in an isolated individual but in a citizen; it is the form under which, at last, after ages of incessant struggle with disintegrating forces, the good of men, as members of a society held together by utility and natural affection, has presented itself to the most gifted minds: or again—the 'self' which the good man loves so constantly is not the isolated self of sense which seeks its own good at the cost of others, but the rational self which consists in the happy consciousness of being joined together with others in a beautiful social order.

The 'good man' therefore cannot be abstracted from the society in which he has his being, in order that the feelings with which he regards 'himself' may be represented as the source of those with which he regards his friends; for we can define 'himself' only as 'a being whose very essence is regard for others—devotion to Justice and Friendship.' Eudemus indeed (Ε. Ε. Η. 6 sub init.), before beginning the remarks parallel to those in this chapter, points out that φιλίᾳ πρὸς αὐτῶν can be spoken of only in the sense in which ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς αὐτῶν is spoken of (see Ε. Ν. v. 11. 9). Friendship, like justice, is properly between man and man. Those whom it unites most perfectly are indeed similar in character and interests; but it is only by a figure of speech that those who are similar can be represented as one person.

We must suppose therefore that Aristotle is describing the logical as distinguished from the chronological order, when he
§ 1. \( \text{τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους} \) Bywater’s reading for \( \text{τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους} \). These words are omitted by Spengel (\textit{Arisi. Stud.} i. 217), after Muretus and Scaliger, as superfluous. It seems to me that the antithesis to \( \text{ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν} \) requires us to retain them. I do not agree with Ramsauer, whose note on \( \text{ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν} \) is—‘ne addas

1166 a. 1. writes (ix. 4. 1) \( \text{τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὤρίζονται, ἐσικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐλθεῖναι.} \) Just as the State is said in the \textit{Politics} to be logically or metaphysically prior to the individual, though chronologically subsequent, so here Reason is represented as prior to the State itself—the harmony of the rational soul within itself is represented as the source of those friendly relations which bind men together in the State. This is the logical or metaphysical, not the chronological order: and Coraes is, I think, much mistaken when, on the strength of this passage, he ascribes to Aristotle the view which derives the altruistic feelings in time from egoistic feelings—ἐδών δὲ τούτῳ τὸ κεφαλαιον τῶν ἀριστά πειθοποιημένων ἐστὶν περί περὶ γὰρ ἐν συντόμῳ τὰ τὸ ἕνωτα ἐν ποιησοῦν διὰ μακρῶν πε- πραγματευμένη περὶ τῆς λεγομένης πρὸς τοὺς ὀμίσοις συμπαθείας. ἐκ τῆς περὶ ἑαυτῶν γὰρ φιλικῆς διαθεσεως ἡ φιλαντίας, ὡς ἀπὸ πηγῆς, ἐξερχόμεθα λέγει τῷ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους φιλίαν. Here, as I have said, Coraes is much mistaken. Aristotle is not concerned, in this chapter, with the Natural History of φιλία. This is one of the most metaphysical contexts in the whole of his writings. He insists exclusively on the metaphysical priority of \( \text{τὰ πρὸς ἑαυτόν} \) to \( \text{τὰ φιλικὰ} \) \( \text{τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας} \), because he wishes us to regard the Friendship of Good Men towards each other as the \textit{mise en scène} of Reason. To know oneself, to be able to contemplate with the eye of Reason the System of Human Nature, and, in contemplating it, to maintain it as \textit{καλὸν} in the midst of the \textit{ύλη} of our passions and necessities, is Happiness or the Chief Good. But how shall a man ‘know himself’? Only by seeing himself in his friends—\textit{i.e.} by having friends towards whom he can act, and so realise himself; for he is what he is to his friends. As Eudemus puts it (\textit{E. E. H.} 12. 1245 b. 18) \( \text{ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ \textit{καθ' ἐτέρων, ἐκεῖνω δὲ (\textit{i. e. theφ} \textit{αὐτὸς αὐτῶ} \textit{τὸ \textit{ἐστίν}}.} \) It is in strict conformity therefore with the metaphysical basis of his ethical philosophy and in the interest of the development of his ethical philosophy on that basis, that Aristotle here derives \( \text{τὰ φιλικὰ} \) \( \text{τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους} \) from \( \text{τὰ πρὸς ἑαυτόν} \).
BOOK IX: CHAP. 4: §§ 1, 2. 355

cogitatione φιλικῶν. Rei prima sedes tā πρὸς έαυτῶν dicuntur esse: 1166 a. 1. nomina a duorum societate petita sunt. Surely we ought to supply φιλικῶν here—cf. ix. 4. 10 oύτω γάρ καὶ πρὸς έαυτῶν φιλικῶν ἄν ἔχοι καὶ ἐτέρῳ φίλοις γένοιτο.

καὶ οἷς] Spengel (Arist. Studien i. 217) suggests οἷς καὶ.

οἱ προσκεκρουκότες] 'friends who have had a difference' (Peters), a. 6. but still are well disposed to each other at a distance. Mich. Eph. has ἄλλα καὶ τῶν φίλων, φησί, οἱ προσκεκρουκότες, καίπερ μηδὲ συζώτες, μηδὲ συνδιημερεύοντες, μηδὲ ἀλλήλοις συνώστες διὰ τὴν γεγονούς διαφορὰν καὶ πρόσκρουσιν, καὶ οὕτωι τοιούτωι ἔχοντες βαύλονται ἀλλήλους καὶ ζην καὶ καλῶς διάγειν. Ramsauer regards the words καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες as spurious, on the ground that οἱ προσκεκρουκότες, who have omitted that which is most characteristic of friendship, viz. τὸ συζήν, can hardly be adduced in support of a definition of friendship—'vereor ne absurdum sit, ad probandam aliquam amici definitionem eos laudare qui τὸ μάλιστα φιλικῶν (τὸ συζήν) sane parum amanter omiserint et εὖν, potius quam amici, appellandi sint.' To this it may be replied that Aristotle is here immediately concerned with only one aspect of friendship, viz. τὸ βολεσθαί εὖν καὶ ζῆν τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ χάριν, and οἱ προσκεκρουκότες are specially fitted to illustrate this one aspect, which they, as it were, isolate from the other aspects for separate examination. It is not implied that οἱ προσκεκρουκότες are perfect friends, any more than that the relation of a mother to her young child (to which Ramsauer does not object as an illustration) is, in the absence of ἀντιφιλησία, perfect friendship.

καὶ τήν φιλίαν] ἀπὸ τούτων δὲ καὶ οὖς φιλίας ὀρισμός, ἀπὸ τοῦ α. 9. ὀρισμοῦ τῶν ἐκόνων καὶ οἱ ὀρισμοὶ τοῦ σώφρονος τῆς σωφροτήτος ὀρισμῶν παρέχει (Paraph.). Cf. E. Ν. vi. 5. I peri δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἄν λάβωμεν, θεωρήσας τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους.

§ 2. ἢ τοιούτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἰναι] The effect of this false a. 11. ὑπάρχεις is explained below in § 7; they think that they are good, and so are pleased with themselves—φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα (i. e. τὰ φιλικά) καὶ τῶς πολλῶς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὐσί φίλοις. ἡ αὖ t' ἄρσκοντος ἓαντοι καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἑπίκεισι εἰναὶ, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; it is only by deceiving himself into the belief that his life has the unity of the good man's, that a bad man can feel on 'friendly terms' with himself. I think that Bywater's δὲ, line 12, for γάρ is an improvement: see Contrib. p. 63.
BOOK IX: CHAP. 4: §§ 2, 3.

1166 a. 12. καθάπερ ἐξηται] e.g. iii. 4. §§ 4, 5.

ἐκάστων] Bywater's reading after K for Bekker's ἐκάστῳ. This is easier than Spengel's conjecture ἐκάστων neut., for which he quotes (Arist. Stud. i 217) iii. 4. 5 σπουδαίος τῷ ἀληθείᾳ ἐν ἐκάστοις ὁράν, ἀπείρα κανῶν καὶ μέτρων αὐτῶν ὁν, and x. 5. οὐ δὲ τούτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ οὕτων ἐκάστου μέτρου ἢ ἀρετῆ καὶ ὁ ἁγάθος.

a. 14. § 3. κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχῆν] τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρέγεται κατὰ τε λογικὴν ψυχήν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἁλογον καὶ οὐ καθάπερ ὁ ἀκρατῆς τάμαντα ὁρεῖ, καὶ τὸ παθητικόν αὐτῷ τῷ λογιστικῷ πολεμεῖ (Paraph.). Cf. E. N. i. 13 §§ 16, 17 καὶ εἰς τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστών εἶναι τί παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐκανονύμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀνυμαίνον . . . λόγον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν . . . πειθαρχεῖ γονύν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐγκρατοῦ—ἐτι δ' ἱσως εὐκοιτεροτέρον ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὥμοφανεὶ τῷ λόγῳ.

Τὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρέγεσθαι κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν is σπουδαία προοίμεσις—cf. E. N. vi. 2. 2 ὡς ἐπεἰδὴ ἡ ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἔξις προοιμική, ἢ δὲ προοίμεσις ὁρέσις θυλευτική, δὲ διὰ ταῦτα τὸν τῷ λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁρέσιν ὅρθην, ἐπερ ἡ προοίμεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῶν μὲν φάναι, τὴν δὲ διόκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀληθεία πρακτικὴ.

ψυχῆν· καὶ βούλεται δὴ] Rams. and Sussemlh put a full stop after ψυχῆν instead of Bekker's comma, and write δὲ for δῆ. This seems right. Having implied that the good man's προοίμεσις is σπουδαία, Aristotle proceeds (καὶ—δὲ) to describe his βουλήσις. His ὁρέσις being κατὰ τῶν ὁρθῶν λόγων, the λόγος will be ὁρθὸς in relation to a rationally apprehended end which he wishes for (βουλήσι). This rationally apprehended end which the good man wishes for is the perfection of his own nature as an organic whole—or as a rational system (τὸ διανοητικὸν), i.e. as a system of harmonious relations not liable to be disturbed by passion. The good man, as the Paraph. expresses it, τὴν θεορίαν ἔχει τοῦ τέλους τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πράξεων, whereas the bad man has only φαίλη ἠδονή.

a. 15. τάγαθα καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα] Explained by viii. 2. 2 φιλεῖ δ' ἐκάστος οὗ τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ ἁγάθον ἀλλὰ τὰ φαινόμενα. δοιοείς δ' οὐδὲν ἐσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητῶν φαινόμενον. In the case of the good man, however, the difference between τὸ ἁγάθον and τὸ φαινόμενον ἁγάθον is merely a formal one; for ἐν ἐκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται (E. N. iii. 4. 4).

(τοῦ γὰρ ἁγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν]) added to explain καὶ πράττει. The good man does not stop at βουλήσις, but goes on to πράξις.
BOOK IX: CHAP. 4: §§ 3, 4. 357

τὸν γὰρ διανοητικὸν χάριν κ.τ.λ. We must not suppose Aristotle 1166 a. 16. to mean that the good man devotes himself entirely to his ‘intellect’ strictly so called; that he gives himself up to the cultivation of his ‘scientific faculties.’ If he did, his life would be as onesided in its own way as that of the politician who sacrifices the good of his nature as a whole to his ambition, or as that of the tradesman who sacrifices it to his desire for gain. Τὸ νοοῦν οὐ τὸ διανοητικὸν is the whole nature of man quâ conscious for itself of the harmonious action of all its parts. These ‘parts’ are feelings, self-regarding and altruistic, as well as faculties and acts of knowledge. Reason realises itself in the discovery of truth, and in the regulation of the feelings.

διὰ τὸν ἐκαστὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ] The ‘personality,’ or self-identity, of a. 17. man is not given in any separate impression of sense or feeling, or separate outgoing of desire; it exists only so far as impressions are related to one another, and desires are regulated. Reason (τὸ νοοῦν—τὸ διανοητικὸν), as the source of all relations and rules, in the sphere of conduct as well as in that of science, is therefore the true man. Τὸ βουλεύεται . . . καὶ πράττει . . . τοῦ διανοητικοῦ χάριν is a life κατὰ λόγον, in which both knowledge and conduct have due place, as distinguished from a life κατὰ πάθος, whether the πάθος be an erroneous or prejudiced notion in the sphere of science, or the undue influence of a pleasure or pain in that of conduct. The order of Human Nature as a whole is, in short, here opposed to the disorder. Τὸ διανοητικὸν is co-extensive with Human Nature as an orderly system.

§ 4. ἁγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῷ εἶναι] Cf. Spinoza, Eth. iii. 6 a. 19. and ἦ Ἰπποκράτεις, ὡς σπουδήν καὶ πεισθήσει, τῷ γὰρ σωτηρίᾳ τῷ εἶναι ἐκαστὸς δὲ ἐαυτῷ βουλεύεται τάγαθα, γενόμενος ὁ λίπος αἰρεῖται ὁδείς πάντ᾽ ἔχειν [ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον] (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τάγαθον) ἀλλ᾽ ἐν δὲ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἄν δὲ τὸ νοοῦν ἐκαστὸς εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα] Susemihl brackets these words (ἐκαστὸς a. 19 . . . μάλιστα a. 23), and Ramsauer brackets ἐκαστὸς a. 19 . . . δὲ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν a. 22. The passage may be a ‘duplicate’ of the preceding section: it is certainly obscure, and interrupts somewhat the otherwise straightforward account of the traits distinguishing the good
man’s ‘relations to himself.’ I transcribe Stahr’s translation, as fairly representing the interpretation given by those commentators (the majority) who do not make the words έχει γάρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεός τάγαθών parenthetical, but refer ὅν ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν το ὁ θεὸς.—‘Ein Jeder wünscht sich aber das, was für ihn ein Gut ist; wird er aber ein Anderer, so wird kein Mensch wünschen, dass das neue, so entstandene Wesen noch Alles das fortbehalte, was es in seinem früheren Zustande besass. Freilich hat die Gottheit auch heute noch das absolut Gute in sich, aber eben nur darum, weil sie ewig ist, was sie ihrem Wesen nach ist; dies Wesen ist für Jeden das denkende, entweder schlechthin oder doch vorzugsweise.’

Grant and Bywater (see Bywater’s text as quoted at the head of this note) differ from other commentators in making the words έχει γάρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεός τάγαθών parenthetical, and referring ἀλλ’ ὅν ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν, not to ὁ θεός, but to ἔκαστος. See Grant’s note. Susemihl prints the passage thus—ἔκαστος δ’ ἐαυτῷ βούλεται τάγαθα, γενόμενος δ’ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς αἰρεται πάντ’ έχειν ἔκειν τὸ γενόμενον. έχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεός τάγαθων, ἀλλ’ ὅν ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν. δοξεῖε δ’ ὅν τὸ νουν ἔκαστος εἶναι, ἡ μάλιστα.

If we are to assume, with Susemihl and Ramsauer, that the passage is an interpolation, we must, at the same time, recognise it (punctuated as in Susemihl’s text) as the work of an ‘interpolator’ who understood well the metaphysical drift of the context which he thus ventured to interrupt in its even flow. We cannot help seeing that the present context, with its τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτρεπεῖς αἱ μνήμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπίπεδες ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιοῦτα δ’ ἥδεια (§ 5), and its θεωρημάτων δ’ εὑρομένη τῇ διανοίᾳ (§ 5), reminds this ‘interpolator’ of other descriptions of man’s ἀρίστη διαγωγή, in which its shortness, and yet immeasurable worth, are pressed on our notice by the comparison with it of the life of God: perhaps we may suppose that Met. Λ. 7 (1072 b. 14-18), with its διαγωγή δ’ ἐστίν ὡς ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἔμαθον ὡς γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔκειν (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπει καὶ ἥδονή ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου καὶ διὰ τούτου ἐγρήγορος ἀισθήσεως νόσος ἦδοντον, ἐπιπέδες δὲ καὶ μνήμαι διὰ ταῖτα—was specially in his mind, and that his ‘interpolation’ means that ‘every man wishes good things for himself: for himself, as he is, not as having become another being: wishes—God, indeed, now and for ever possesses the good, but possesses it as being what He is.’ The two points which the comparison of man’s estate with God’s brings out elsewhere (e.g. in Met. Λ. 7) would thus appear to be
brought out in this ‘interpolation’:—(1) Man touches the good in so far as he is a self-identical being, i.e. rational; and God also touches the good as a self-identical rational being. This is the point in which God and Man are alike: (2) Man, however, differs from God in the manner in which he touches the good. Man’s good lies in the future, and he touches it after reaching forward to it in \( \beta \omega \lambda \eta \sigma \iota \). God’s good is always present with Him in His continuous \( \mu \epsilon \tau \alpha \lambda \lambda \psi \iota \varsigma \tau \omicron \omicron \upsilon \omicron \nu \sigma \omicron \omicron \). The time which intervenes between Man’s \( \beta \omega \lambda \eta \sigma \iota \) and its realisation may change him (for he is immersed in \( \dot{\alpha} \lambda \lambda \eta \)), and may make his \( \beta \omega \lambda \eta \sigma \iota \) vain. He may not be present in his old person to welcome the good wished for, when at last it comes. God \( \epsilon \nu \epsilon \rho \gamma \gamma \epsilon \varepsilon \dot{h} \chi \omega \nu \) \( \text{Met. } A. 7. 1072 \text{ b. } 22 \); time does not elapse during which He possesses a capacity which is not yet actualised (on the expression \( \epsilon \nu \epsilon \rho \gamma \gamma \epsilon \varepsilon \dot{h} \chi \omega \nu \) see Rosmini, \textit{Opere} vol. viii. p. 525, Torino, 1857, and Schwegler, \textit{Met.} vol. iv. p. 267). He has not an ideal, held up by \( \beta \omega \lambda \eta \sigma \iota \), of future good never fully realised. Capacity and actuality, the ideal and its realisation are one in Him: see \textit{Met. } A. 7. 1072 \text{ b. } 20 \epsilon \alpha \upsilon \tau \alpha \omega \nu \delta \varepsilon \nu \theta \nu \iota \varsigma \alpha \delta \kappa \alpha \eta \varsigma \nu \varsigma \nu \iota \omega \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \na...
for his own good what has already been said elsewhere about his wish for his friend’s good, and the purport of the present chapter is precisely to show how closely the good man’s feelings towards himself resemble his feelings towards his friend. The passage with which I compare the section before us is E. N. viii. 7. 6 ὁ δὲν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μὴ ποτ’ οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοὺς φίλους τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἁγάθων, οἶνον θεοὺς εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ ἐτὶ φίλοι ἵπτονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἁγάθων οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἁγάθων. εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἰρήτω ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκεῖνον ἐνεκα, μὲνεν ἀν δέν οἷς ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος' ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὃν τι βουλῆσται τὰ μέγιστα ἁγάθα. ἦσος δ’ οὐ πάντα αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ’ ἐκαστὸς βούλεται τἀγαθά. In the light of the above passage I would explain the section before us as follows—'Every man wishes good things for himself, that is, for himself as remaining the same person; no man desires to become another being, and let that other being possess all good things—thus, no man desires to become God, in order to possess the absolute good which God possesses now and for ever in virtue of being what He is.' God’s possession of the good depends on His self-identity; the good man’s wish for his own good cannot overpass the limits of his self-identity—he cannot wish good for himself as having become God; nor (as we have seen viii. 7. 6) can he wish good for his friend—his second-self—as having become God. My explanation may be shortly described as consisting in the insertion after ἔνωπεν δ’ ἄλλος a. 20 of οἶνον θεὸς as a mentally supplied gloss; indeed, although on the whole I prefer Susemihl’s punctuation to Grant’s and Bywater’s, I cannot help thinking that it is just possible that the words ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν were originally a marginal note explanatory of οἶνον θεὸς, and that οἶνον θεὸς once stood in the text after ἔνωπεν δ’ ἄλλος, and afterwards fell out. On that hypothesis, of course, ἀλλ’ ἄν δ’ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν would refer to ἐκαστὸς. Viewed as an original part of the text, however, the words ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ο ἄλλος τἀγαθόν, I confess, appear to me pointless, unless ἀλλ’ ἄν δ’ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν be referred to ὁ θεὸς, and taken closely with them.

The Paraphrast’s explanation is peculiar. He thinks that the transformation marked by ἔνωπεν ἄλλος takes place when one identifies one’s good with τὸ ἄλογον μέρος. His words are—‘Ο δὲ σπουδαῖος βούλεται ἐκατον τῇ ἁγάθῳ ἁγάθῳ γὰρ τῷ σπουδαῖῳ τὸ εἶναι τῷ γὰρ θεωρητικῷ διόκει ἐσώμεν’ ἐν γὰρ τῷ νοεῖ ἡ ἐκαστὸν οὐσία συνισταται, ἡ ἐν τούτῳ μάλιστα. Ὁ δὲ τῷ ἄλογῳ βούλεται τὸ εἶναι καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ
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§ 4. 

ἐαντὶ βούλεται τὰ ἁγαθὰ τοῦ οἰκεῖου εἶναι παρατραπέντε, εἰκχ ἐαντὶ βούλεται 1166 a. 19. τὰ ἁγαθὰ, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνος, εἰς ὁ μεταβληθῇ καὶ ἐκαστὸς ἐπὶ ἐαντὶ βούλεται γενέσθαι τὰ ἁγαθὰ, οὕτως μὲν εἰς ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἰ δὲ συνδιὶ ἐαντὶ ἁλλὸν γενόμενον, οὐκ ἂν ἐλείοτο πάντα τὰ ἁγαθὰ ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο το γενόμενον οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸν τινὶ ἡμεῖς τὰ ἁγαθὰ, ἂν ἐαντὶ ἐστὶν αὐτὸς ὁ, τὸ ποτὲ ἐστί. Ἐρόκ. Ἐφ. explains in the same way.

In line a. 22, K b and CCC margin have ἀλλ’ οὐν ὅποι’ ἐστὶν for ἀλλ’ ἄν τι ποτ’ ἐστὶν, which may perhaps be thought to point to ἀλλ’ ἄν οὐς ποτ’ ἐστὶν: cf. the μένειν ἄν δὲ εἰς ὅλος ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος of viii. 7. 6.

As regards the bracketing of the words ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον—the clause reads more easily without them: the subject of ἔχειν is naturally that of ἀλκεῖται.

δόξει  δ’ ἄν ... μᾶλιστα] This has been said before in § 3—τοῦ a. 22. γὰρ διανοητικὸν χάριν, ὅπερ ἐκαστὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ. Reason is the Form or εἶδος of man. This Form the good man preserves pure amid the ὅλη of circumstances, as plants and animals preserve their various ἐιδὴ from generation to generation, realising τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἄει in the permanence of the race-type. It is as corresponding with his whole environment, and not merely as exercising his ‘intellectual faculties,’ that man is identified with Reason in this and similar passages, e.g. in x. 7. 9 ... ὃ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, ὅπερ τοῦτο μᾶλιστα ἀνθρώπος. The qualification μᾶλιστα is added because man is not, like God, μάρτι εἶδος, but a σύνολον, or an ἐκτόσον εἶδος. See Mich. Eph. on ix. 4. 4—εἰπὼν δὲ ἐκαστὸν τὸν νοὸν ἐστὶν, ἐπίγαγε, ἡ μᾶλιστα τούτο, ὅτι συντελεῖ καὶ μέγα συμβάλλεται καὶ τὸ ἄλογον ἥμαν εἰς σύντοσιν τοῦ ἰδίου παρὰ τοῖς περιστατικοῖς λεγόμενον ποιον λέγοντω δὲ οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἰδίος ποιον τὸν εὖ ἰδιοτέτοις συνεστηκότα ἄρωμαν οὖν τὸν Σωκράτην, τὸν Πλάτωνα, διὸ ἰδιοτέτοις, τοῦ Σωκράτους τὸ ἀθροίσμα οὐκ ἂν ἐπ’ ἁλλῷ ποτὲ γένοιτο κοινῶς δὲ ποιῶ λέγοντι τὸν καθόλου ἀνθρώπον.

§ 5. τῇ διανοίᾳ] Bekker has a comma after διανοίᾳ. There a. 27. should be a full stop, the clause belonging to what has gone before, not to what follows (see Ramsauer). ‘His mind is stored with objects of contemplation’; his rich experience supplies him with θεωρίματα, ‘views of life,’ pure from admixture with that merely
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1166 a. 27. personal element which makes the experience of the bad man a source, not of pure 'views,' but of unhappy recollections and miserable forebodings. The good man's life is the ἰδέων τιμῆς βίος.

a. 29. ὡς εἰπεῖν] 'in one word'—see Fritzsche, E. N. viii. 8. 5, on the use of the expression.

a. 34. § 6. δύοιεν θ' . . . ὑμοιούσαι] These words are bracketed by Ramsauer as the interpolation of a scribe who had in his mind E. E. H. 6. 1240 a. 8 sqq. and M. M. ii. ii. 1211 a. 33, where ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία is said to exist in so far as, there being different μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, these agree—ἐπεί οὖν ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πλεῖον μέρη, τά τ' ἐσται μία ψυχὴ ὅταν συμφωνῶσιν πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁ τέ λόγος καὶ τὰ πάθη, οὔτω γὰρ μία ἐστα. ὡστε μᾶς γενόμενης, ἐσται πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία (M. M.). If the words δύοιεν . . . ὑμοιούσαι are an interpolation suggested by these passages in the E. E. and M. M., as Ramsauer thinks, then it will be right to accept the explanation given by Mich. Eph., the Paraph., and others (e.g. Stahr and Peters), according to which ἡ ἐστι δύο ἡ πλεῖον means 'in so far as man, or the soul, consists of two or more parts,' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων being 'in accordance with what has been said'—e. g. in E. N. i. 13. 9. The clause being an interpolation, the occurrence of τα εἰρημένα in a different sense immediately afterwards (§ 7. 1166 b. 2) need cause no surprise. If, however, the clause is not an interpolation, no other interpretation seems possible than that of Victorius, Michelet, Grant, and Williams—'But whether friendship towards oneself is or is not possible, we may leave undecided for the present. It would seem to be possible in so far as two or more of the above-mentioned conditions (i. e. τὸ βούλεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ—τὸ βούλεσθαι τὸ ζῆν—τὸ συνδιάγειν—τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ ἀνγχαῖρει) exist, and because the extreme of friendship resembles one's feelings towards oneself' (Grant). Against Ramsauer's view (that the passage is an interpolation) is the fact (noticed by Michelet, and apparently observed by Ramsauer himself) that the writer of the M. M. gives both interpretations, beginning with that adopted by Grant: see M. M. ii. ii. 1210 b. 33 πάτερον δ' ἐστίν αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία ἢ ὃν μὲν ἄφεισθω, ὁστερον δ' ἑρώουσιν πάντα ἡ βουλόμεθα ἢμιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ γὰρ συζην μεθ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βουλόμεθα κ.τ.λ.

1 Bywater, placing a comma after πλεῖον, adopts this interpretation, and suggests the insertion of τε after ἐστί: see Contrib. p. 63.
After dismissing the question thus (νῦν μὲν ἀφείσθω), the writer 1166 a. 34. almost immediately resumes it (1211 a. 16) with ἐχόμενον δ΄ ἄν εἴη νῦν τοῦτ᾽ εἰπεῖν, ἀπερέων ἐστὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν φίλα ἣ ὃ, and answers it, as Eudemus had done, by reference to the parts of the soul. We seem to have the compilation of one who had before him the text of the Nic. Eth. as we have it, i.e. with δόξει δ᾽...ὁμοου- τα, and the text of the Eud. Eth. I therefore see no reason for bracketing the clause in question with Ramsauer and Susemihl.

§ 7. ἢ τ᾽ ἀρέσκουσιν ἐαυτοῖς] see note on § 2, a. 1 1, above. Mich. b. 3. Eph. has the following comment here—δὲ δὲ λέγει τοιοῦτον ἄν εἴη: ὁ μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμῶν ἄλλα δὲ βουλόμενος δῆλος ἐστὶν ὡς οὐκ ἀρέσκεται ἐαυτῷ: δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρεγόμενοι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ θέλων καὶ βουλόμενος ἐαυτῷ ἀρέσκει τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ πολλοί, ἀρέσκουσι γὰρ ἐαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βούλευσθαι· καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρθῶν γενόμενοι· οὐκ οὖν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρέγονται καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βούλονται καὶ βέλουσιν ἀρέσκουσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἀπαρέσκονται δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν ὅταν ὁ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βούλευσθαι, δὲ δὲ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μηδὲ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπεὶ οὖν οἱ σπουδαίοι ἐαυτοῖς ἀρέσκουσιν, ὑπολαμβανοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ σπουδαῖοι εἶναι ὅτι ἀρέσκεσθαι ἐαυτοῖς, διότι ἀμαρτάνοντες· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἐαυτοῖς ἀρέσκονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸ ἄθλον ὁ τὰ ἁρεστὰ πράττοντι, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ λόγος· ἐπείτα ὅτι μὴ ἀληθῶς ἀντιστρέ- φουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ σπουδαῖος ἀρέσκει ἐαυτῷ, δὲ τὰ ἀρέσκοντα τῷ λόγῳ πράττει· οὐ μὴν καὶ ὁ δοκῶν ἀρεσκεῖν ἐαυτῷ σπουδαῖος ἐστιν.

§ 8. ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται] 'The "desire" b. 7. of the wicked as being of the particular, and subject to the domination of the senses (Eth. vii. 3. 9), is at variance with their "wish," which is of the universal and implies a conception of the good' (Grant).

οῖον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς] The description of the φαίλοι (as distinguished b. 8. from the κομητὸς φαίλοι § 7) given in §§ 8 and 9, corresponds with sufficient accuracy to that of the ἀκρατεῖς, as distinguished from the ἀκόλαστοι, in Book vii. Cf. vii. 8. 5 ὡς ἐν τοῖς διὰ τὸ πάθος ἐκστασιάς παρὰ τὸν ἀρχῶν λόγον, δὲ ὡς μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὡς ὡς δ᾽ ἐν τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπείθοντο διὰ κοίμων ἀνέδειν δεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἡδονᾶ τὸν κρατεῖ· οὕτως εἶτε τὸν ἀκρατῆς, βελτίων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀκόλαστου, οὐδέ φαίλου ἀπλῶς· σφηται γὰρ τὸ ἄληλτον, ἢ ἀρχή. Similarly the φαίλοι here αἱροῦνται ἀπὸ τῶν δοκοῦντων ἐαυτοῖς ἅγαθον εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα Βλαβερᾶ
BOOK IX: CHAP. 4: §§ 8-10.

1166 b. 8. ousa, and in § 10 are said to be a prey to μεταμέλεια: so in vii. 8. i the ἄκρατης is described as μεταμελητικός. The ἀκόλαστος on the other hand is οὐ μεταμελητικός, in this respect resembling (for extremes meet) the σπουδάσων who is ἀμεταμελητος ὡς εἰπέων (ix. 4. 5).

b. 19. § 9. στασιάζειν] ‘This picture,’ says Grant, ‘of the mental struggles of the bad does not recall either the phraseology or the doctrines of Book vii, where μοχθηρία is contrasted with and opposed to ἄκρασία (cf. vii. 8. i).’ Grant here, I think, overlooks the fact that Aristotle is speaking of οἱ φαίλοι = οἱ ἄκρατες (b. 8 οἱν οἱ ἄκρατες, where οἱν = scilicet as distinguished from οἱ κομμηθηκαί φαίλοι = οἱ ἀκόλαστοι οἱ μοχθηροί of Book vii. The word μοχθηρίαν occurring in this § is evidently used loosely and not in the more technical sense in which it is used in Book vii; for τὸ μὲν δὲ μοχθηρίαν κ.τ.λ. is opposed to τὸ δὲ ἥδεται which is the λόγον ἔχον μέρος, as the Paraph. explains—καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄλογον ἀλγεῖ τῶν μοχθηρῶν ἀπεχόμενον, τηρικαίτα δὲ οὐ συναλγεῖ τὸ λογιστικόν, ἀλλὰ χαίρει. Thus, notwithstanding the use of the term μοχθηρίαν, the ἄκρατης (in whom a struggle between λόγος and πάθος goes on), not the μοχθηρός of Book vii, is here described.

For the expression στασιάζει in this connexion compare Plato, Ῥεφ. 352 Α, quoted by Fritzsche and Grant—ἡ ἄδικα ἐν ἑαυτῷ πρῶτον ἐνοῦντον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐκ ὁμοούντα αὐτῶν αὐτῷ, ἐπειδὴ ἡθροῦ καὶ ἐαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις. Cf. Ε.Ν. i. 13. 15 φαίνεται δὲν αὐτῶς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ ἀποτεινεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.

b. 20. § 10. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle seldom addresses his reader, as here, in the language of direct exhortation.

CHAPTER V.

ARGUMENT.

Well-wishing must be distinguished from friendship, which it resembles. We wish well to people whom we do not know, and who are not aware that we wish them well; but in friendship the parties must know each other, and be aware of each other’s feelings. This however has been pointed out before. Nor is well-wishing affection, for it has not the intensity and desire which cha-
racterise affection. Again, affection grows up with intimacy; while we may wish well to a stranger, e.g., an athlete, all at once, taking his side, so far as feeling is concerned, without caring to do anything actively to help him. Well-wishing is thus a superficial liking for a man. It seems therefore to be the beginning of friendship, as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love. As no one falls in love without first being charmed by the sight of beauty; but, though charmed, is not necessarily in love—is in love only if he longs in absence for the beautiful one: so men who have not first been well-wishers cannot be friends; for, as well-wishers merely, they would not go out of their way to help each other, but confine themselves to good wishes. So we may transfer the name of ‘friendship’ to well-wishing, and call it ‘inactive friendship.’ As time, however, goes on, and intimacy grows, it becomes friendship in a sense no longer metaphorical—and true friendship, not that for profit or pleasure; for well-wishing has no place in the friendship for profit or pleasure, where it is oneself as the recipient of profit or pleasure, and not one’s friend, to whom one wishes well. The object of genuine well-wishing is always another regarded as having some beautiful or good quality.

§ 1. ἡ δ’ εὐνοια κ.τ.λ.] Sussemlh thinks that chapters 5, 6, and 1166 b. 30. 7, 1166 b. 30—1168 a. 27 ought to be inserted after chapter 8, at 1169 b. 2.

καὶ πρῶτον δὲ ταῦτ’ είρηται] viii. 2. §§ 3, 4. b. 32.


§ 2. διὰ τὸ γάρ ἐπομεν] i.e. at the end of the first and beginning 1167 a. 2. of the second section; έπιπολαίωσ referring to οὐ γάρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ’ ὄρεξιν.

BOOK IX: CHAP. 5: § 3.

1167 a. 4. καὶ πρὸς ἐίδος σπευδόντων. Cf. Merch. of Ven. iii. 2, quoted by Grant—

‘It is engendered in the eyes,
By gazing fed.’

a. 10. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἀν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλιάν] Mich. Eph., CCC marg. γρ., and Argyropylus read ἀρχὴν εἶναι φιλιάς. But what μεταφορά (defined Poet. 21. 1457 b. 6 μεταφορά εὐθὺν ὑνίματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορά ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἴδος, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ γένους, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἴδος, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνώλογον) is implied in merely stating the truth that ἐννοια is the ἀρχὴ φιλιάς? Whereas there is a μεταφορά of the term φιλία when it is taken over from its proper place, where it denotes a relation characterised by the φιλιά enumerated in ch. 4. § 1, and applied to an otiose state like εὐνοια. There is a μεταφορά of the term φιλία, when it is qualified as ἀρχὴ, just as there is of ἀκρασία when it is qualified by θυμοῦ—cf. E. N. vii. 5. 9.

Victorius has a good note here, in support of ἀργὴν against ἀρχὴν—‘qui dicit benevolentiam esse principium, non transfert verbum ò sua in alienam sedem, quod manifesto facit qui concedit ipsis amicitiam esse, sed inchoatam et ignavam; indicatque quod non sinit eam absolutam perfectamque esse: caret enim eo quod requiritur in plena amicitia: id autem est quod non studet prodesse et opitulari benevolo.’


a. 10 δὲλαν ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν φιλιάν (to be distinguished from the ἡθικὴ φιλία of E. N. viii. 13. 5) ἡ εὐνοια ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν εὐφοιτῶν βούλευται μόνον ἐστὶ, τοῦ δὲ φίλου πράττειν ἄ βούλευται. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ εὐνοια ἀρχὴ φιλιάς, ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὐνοια, ὁ δὲ εὐνοια οὐ πᾶς φίλος ἀρχαιμένο γὰρ ἔσκεν ὁ εὐνοιον μόνον, διὸ ἀρχὴ φιλίας ἀλλ᾽ ὡς φιλία.

Ramsauer points out the seeming variance between the doctrine laid down here (ix. 5. 3) and that of viii. 2. 4 πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶν εὐνοι οἳ οὐχ ἑοράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνοντι δὲ ἑπιεικεῖς εἰναι ἡ χρησίμους: either, he argues, if we may speak of φιλία for the χρησίμου, we may speak of εὐνοια for the same; or both terms—φιλία and εὐνοια—should be reserved for relations δι᾽ ἀρετήν.

a. 14. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεῖς κ.τ.λ.] This gives the reasons for refusing to recognise εὐνοια in the ‘friendship’ of Profit. (1) The man who has been benefited owes εὐνοια. But εὐνοια thus owed, and not
arising spontaneously is not properly εὔνοια. (2) The man who 1187 a. 14. expects to be benefited, though he may seem to wish well to his prospective benefactor, really does not wish well to him, but to himself; and this is not εὔνοια. Mich. Eph. describes Aristotle, in the words δὲ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθῆσαι . . . δρῶν, ἀσ χωρίσας τὴν εὔνοιαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀντιεὐνοιας—εὔνοιας μὲν οὐκ ἀν ῥῇθει διότι εὖ δρᾶ, δικαιο δέ δικαιον γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἰσα ἀπονέμειν.

§ 4. 'Der ganze Schluss,' says Stahr (note ad loc.), 'dieses a. 18. schönen Kapitels zeigt, dass Aristoteles unter dem Wohlwollen, welches der Ursprung (ἀρχή) der wahren Freundschaft ist, jenes rein menschliche, οὐειγενεῖς, nur durch das Schöne und Gute in der menschlichen Brust erweckte Empfinden versteht. Das Wohlwollen, das eines Anderen Glück und Erfolg wünscht, weil es davon zu profitiren hofft, ist gemeiner Egoismus, Gesinnung gemeiner Menschen.'

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

Unanimity also seems to be allied to Friendship. Accordingly it is not mere identity of opinion, for that may subsist between those who do not know one another, and between students of astronomy and other subjects in which agreement of views has nothing to do with the persons who agree being 'friends.' Unanimity subsists between citizens who are of one mind about important political questions which can be settled in a way pleasing to those who are said to be 'of one mind' about them. Thus, there was unanimity between the Mitylenaeans who wished Pittacus to rule over them and Pittacus, when he was willing to do so: there is unanimity between the lower and upper classes in a city when both agree that the best men should hold office: so unanimity may be described as the friendship of citizens. Now, there is unanimity like this in the soul of the good man, and between good men. The wishes of good men stand fast; they do not fluctuate like the Euripus. But bad men cannot be of one mind, any more than they can be friends, except for a little way, inasmuch as they are always seeking to get for themselves the larger share of advantages, and to put the burden of their duties on other people.

[On δρόμων see E. E. H. 7 and Μ. Μ. ii. 12.]

BOOK IX: CHAP. 6: §§ 1, 2.

1167 a. 24. ἡ ὀμόνοια ἡ φιλική, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὀμονοοῦσι, καὶ ὅσα εἰς τὸ συζην συντείνει.

a. 26. τὰς πόλεις] Fritzsche and Ramsauer point out that we are not to think here of the concord of several cities, but of the unanimity between the πολιτικ of one city.

a. 28. § 2.] There are three characteristics of ὀμόνοια mentioned here, (1) it is περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ, (2) περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει, (3) περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἡ πάσην.

On τὰ ἐν μεγέθει the Paraph. has—τοῖς ἄξιολόγοις ... περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ μικρῶν οὐ λέγονται ὀμονοεῖν ἀλλήλως οὕτω πόλις (πόλεις;) οὕτε φιλοι, οἰον οἰκοι μένειν, ἡ βασιλεῖα εἰς ἀγοράν, ἡ τόδε εἰπέων ἡ ἁράσσαι, δι' οὖν οὕτε ὑφελεῖα τις μεγάλη οὕτε βλάβη ἄκολουθεί.

The meaning of ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἡ πάσην is explained below by the words οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται οὐ ἐφέσται b. 1. Unanimity is concerned with important practical questions which admit of a solution agreeable to the wishes of both parties, if there are only two, or of all the citizens where public interests are involved. Cf. E.Ε. Η. 7. 1241 a. 27 οὕτω δὲ δεί τῶν αὐτῶν ὑρέγεσθαι, δοῦτ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοτέρως ὑπάρχειν οὐ δρέγονται ἄν γὰρ τοιοῦτον ὑρέγανται ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, μαχοῦται οἱ ὀμονοοῦντες θ' οὐ μαχοῦται.

In this and the Nicomachean passage the word ὑπάρχειν is somewhat misleading as suggesting that both or all parties actually get the same thing, and that therefore the objects of ὀμόνοια are things which both or all can share in alike. But the examples given show that ὀμόνοια may exist with regard to the possession by one of the parties of an office which the other or others cannot hold. What is meant is that ὀμόνοια is concerned with things about which both or all parties, having the same wishes, may have these wishes satisfied. The People and Pittacus agree in wishing Pittacus to rule; Pittacus rules, and everybody, Pittacus included, gets what he wishes. Peters therefore is hardly right with 'people are said to be of one mind, especially with regard to matters of importance and things that may be given to both persons or to all the persons concerned.'

a. 32. ἡ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἡθελεὶ] Pittacus was elected Dictator by the Mitylenaeans. He ruled for ten years, and, having restored order into the affairs of the city, voluntarily laid down his office, although the Mitylenaeans wished him to retain it: see
BOOK IX: CHAP. 6: §§ 2, 3.

Valerius Max. vi. 5—‘Postquam autem pax victoriâ parta est, 1107 a. 32. continuo, reclamandibus Mitylenaeis, (imperium) depositü.’ Hence the words δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὤθελεν. The Mitylenaeans wished him to rule, and so long as he consented there was ὁμόνωα; but when, at the end of the ten years, the people still wished him to rule while he wished to resign, the ὁμόνωα was at an end. On Pittacus see Susemihl’s note to Pol. iii. 9. 1285 a. 35, and Grote’s Hist. Part ii. ch. 14 end.


tὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] i. e. τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. τῷ αὐτῷ is probably masc. α. 35.

‘Unanimity does not mean merely thinking of the same thing whatever it may be, but thinking of the same thing in connexion with the same person.’ Cf. M. M. ii. 12. 1212 a. 21.

eἰ γὰρ ἔνωσοντο ἁμφότεροι ἄρχειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ μὲν αὐτῶν, ἐκ’ αὐτῶν, ἀρά γε ἕθη ὁμονοοῦν οὐ; ἀλλ’ εἰ κἀγὼ ἐμαυτῷ βούλομαι ἄρχειν, κακεῖνοι ἐμὲ, οὕτως ἔδω ὁμονοοῦμεν . . . . περὶ ἄρχοντος ἄρα κατάστασιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑπτάν ὁμόνωα ἡ κυρία λεγομένη.

οἱ ἐπισκείκεις] ‘The upper classes,’ cf. Pol. Z. 2. 1318 b. 35, where b. 1. oἱ ἐπισκείκεις καὶ γυνώρμοι αἱ oἱ ἐπισκείκεις are opposed to the δῆμος, and Pol. Z. 2. 1319 a. 3, where oἱ ἐπισκείκεις are opposed to τὸ πλῆθος.

πολιτικὴ δή] The codd. have δὲ: so Bekker. I prefer δὴ with b. 2. Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater. This sentence draws out what is implied in the remark made above—περὶ τὰ πρακτικὰ δῆ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγεθεὶ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἁμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἡ πάση.

καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται] ‘we see then (φαίνεται δὴ) that ὁμόνωα β. 3. is πολιτικὴ φίλα, and indeed it is actually spoken of under this name—’ or, ‘and indeed the word ὁμόνωα is commonly used in this sense’—as e.g. by Arist. himself Pol. E. 5. 1306 a. 9. ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ἄλγαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὐτῆς: Thuc. viii. 75 ἄρχον πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους ὄρκους, καὶ αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἄλγαρχίας μάλιστα, οὐ μὴν δημοκρατήσεται τε καὶ ὁμονοίησειν . . . . ἐξουμνοῦσιν δὲ καὶ Σαμίων πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρκον οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: Thuc. viii. 93 ἐνενεχωρήσαν τε ὁστὶ ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιήσαται ἐν τῷ ἄλγωσι περὶ ὁμονοίας.

ἡκοντα] Cambr. agrees with Mb in giving ἡκοντα. b. 4.

§ 3. ἐν τοῖς ἐπισκείκεισιν] the ‘good’ generally as opposed to οἱ β. 5.

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b. 6. ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν µένων µένων of Pol. E. 3. 1304 a. 38 ... στάσιν κυνώσων ἢ γὰρ οἱ τούτοις φθονοῦντες τιµωµένοις ἱρχόντα τῆς στάσεως ἢ αὐτοὶ διὰ τὴν ἐπεροχὴν οὐ θελοντι µένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπὸν.

Lambinus however gives a different meaning to ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ, which he translates—‘Cum in iisdem (paene dicam) consiliis et factis versentur ac perseverent’: and Stahr takes the same view, with ‘da sie, so zu sagen, immer bei und mit denselben Dingen beschäftigt sind’: and Fritzsche follows, quoting Dem. Phil. ii. p. 66. 15 ὡς κωλύειν’ ἄν Φιλίππου πράττειν ταῦτα ἐφ’ ὧν ἐστὶν, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπὸν, i. e. ‘on which he is now intent.’

Grant (followed by Williams) adopts an entirely different view. His note is ‘"Being on the same moorings, as it were," as opposed to the ebbings and flowings of a Euripus. Cf. Dem. de Cor. p. 319, § 281 ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρµεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς sc. ἀγκύρας.’ Surely, if Aristotle had intended to use this nautical metaphor, he would have employed the proverbial expression, which seems to have been a very definite one.

b. 10. § 4. καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι] = καθάπερ οὐχ οἷον τε φίλους εἶναι πλὴν ἐπὶ µικρὸν.

b. 13. ἐξιτάξεις] τὸν ἔτερον εὐθυνεῖ, περὶ τῶν λειτουργίων ἀκριβελογοῦµενος (Paraph.).
CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

Why do benefactors love those whom they benefit more than the latter love them? The answer generally given is that benefactors are like lenders, and the benefited like borrowers; and that lenders are anxious about the welfare of borrowers, whereas borrowers do not care what becomes of lenders. Epicharmus would perhaps say that this is to look at the matter from a bad point of view; and yet, it might be replied, the explanation seems to be true enough to human nature, for the majority of men are ungrateful, and more anxious to receive benefits than to confer them. The cause, however, lies deeper. The analogy of lenders and borrowers is misleading. Lenders do not feel any affection for borrowers—only wish them to live, and flourish, and repay; whereas benefactors love those whom they have benefited, even when the latter can be of no use to them. The analogy to help us here is that of the artist and the thing which he makes, not that of the lender and borrower. The artist loves the thing which he himself makes more than the thing, if it were endowed with life, would love him: poets are perhaps the best instances—they are excessively pleased with their own works, loving them as parents love their children. Similarly, the object of his beneficence, quâ benefited, is the work of the benefactor, and he loves this object more than this object loves him. The cause of this is that a work is its maker actualised. A maker loves his work because he loves his own actual existence. Again, what the benefactor does is beautiful in his own eyes, and therefore he rejoices in it; but in the eyes of the person benefited it is, at best, only useful, not something beautiful for which he takes pleasure in the benefactor and loves him. His work therefore abides for the doer—the beautiful is lasting; but the profit of the receiver is soon a thing of the past. Further, a benefit is received without labour, but to confer it effort is needed, and men always love those things more which have cost them labour—e.g. money made, more than money inherited. For the same reason mothers are fonder of their children than fathers.

§ 1. ἐκ ποιητοῦ θεωμένου] 'Looking at the matter from a bad point of view'—as from a bad seat in the theatre. This expression doubtless used by Epicharmus occurs only here; and it is impossible to determine with certainty its exact force; but Coraes' suggestion that it refers to a bad place at the play is very plausible. His note is—οὗ ῥάδιον ἄκριβῶς γρῶμαι τι λέγειν ἰθαφάλειον Ἐπίχαρμος, μόνον τοῦ φιλοσόφου, καὶ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ χωρίῳ τῷ δὲ χρησιμένου τῷ ῥητειδῷ.

§ 2. Φυσικώτερον [a deeper reason.]

καὶ οὖν ὁμοιότατον τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανειστῶν
Byw. for Bekker's καὶ οὖν ὁμοιότατον τῷ περὶ κτλ. For οὖν (Kb) he compares 1105 a. 26: see Contrib. p. 64.

b. 30. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους [i.e. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ φίλησις τῶν δανειστῶν περὶ τοὺς δαφείλοντας. Mich. Eph. has οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ φίλησις τῶν δανειστῶν πρὸς τοὺς δαφείλοντας. This seems better than, as Stahr apparently does, to take ἐκείνους of both δανειστῶν and δαφείλοντας—"meiner Ansicht nach dürfte ... die Ursache ... keineswegs dem Verhältnisse zwischen Gläubigern und Schuldnern entsprechen; denn zwischen diesen letztern findet überhaupt gar kein Verhältniss der Liebe statt, sondern nur auf der Seite des Gläubigers der Wunsch," &c.

1168 a. 1. § 3. Ποιητάς] Cf. iv. i. 20.

a. 6. § 4. ἐσμέν δ' ἐνεργεῖα] Cf. i. 7. 13, 14 διὰ τῶν δὲ καὶ ταύτης (i.e. τῆς πρακτικῆς ζωῆς) λεγομένης τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέουν κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ... ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἐργον ζωῆν τω, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πραξίας μετὰ λόγου.

a. 7. ἐνεργεία δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἐργον ἐστὶ πως] Mich. Eph. gives the true interpretation of these words—ἐστὶ δὲ, φέρε εἰπεῖν, τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐργον οὐδέν ἀλλο ἡ ἐνεργεία αὐτὸς ὁ Σωκράτης, the subject being ἐργον, and the predicate ὁ ποιήσας. "The work is in a sense the realisation of the workman." Bekker's ἐστι (retained by Bywater) should accordingly be corrected (as by Susemihl) to ἐστὶ. For other renderings (which agree in making τὸ ἐργον acc. after ποιήσας) see the notes of Victorius, Zell, Grant, and Fritzsche. Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater read δὲ for Bekker's δὴ, rightly I think: there is no inference.
are to be taken closely with τὸ δὲ φυσικὸν which they explain. The ‘deeper reason’ (φυσικῶτερον § 2 above) is found in that law of nature by which δύναμις rises up into ἐνέργεια. A man is really what he does: cf. Met. Θ. 8. 1050 a. 7 ἄπαν ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γεγονόμενον καὶ τέλος. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὁδ ἑνέκα, τοῦ τέλους δ' ἑνέκα ἡ γένεσις τέλος δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τοῦτον χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται . . . ἐπὶ ἡ ὑλή ἐστὶ δυνάμει, διτ ἐλθοί ἄν εἰς τὸ εἶδος; ὅταν δὲ γ' ἐνέργεια ἤ, τότε ἐν τῷ εἶδει ἑστίν . . . τὸ γὰρ ἐργον τέλος, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια τὸ ἐργον. διὰ καὶ τούτων ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἐργον.

The Form of Reason is realised perfectly and purely—as ἐνέργεια ἐν τω δύναμισι—in One Eternal Being; is immersed—as an ἐνιαίος λόγος—in many mortal beings, in the best of whom it strives resolutely to free itself from its condition of passivity by creative acts—by embodying itself in external works, which may last for the use and joy of future generations, and especially by reproducing itself in Persons whom it reverences as Ends because they realise itself: see E. E. H. 12. 1245 b. 14 ο θεός ου τοιοῦτος οὐς δεισδαί φίλος . . . ο γὰρ οὕτως ο θεός εὖ ἔχει, ἄλλα βελτίων ἢ διότε ἄλλο τι νοεῖν παρ' αὐτὸς αὐτόν. αἰτων δ' ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ ἐτέρου, ἕκεινο δ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἑστίν.

§ 5. καλὸν] The καλὸν is the orderly work of νοῦς, or the active a. 10. Reason. Being νοητῶν it can be apprehended for what it is only by νοῦς, or the active Reason. An act which, for the rational agent who has performed it, takes its due place as καλὸν in an orderly system of life, appears as an isolated and transitory occurrence to the person who is merely affected by it (τῷ παθώντι)—the person whose mere πάθος or αἰσθήσις has been called forth by it. This state of mere passivity is the mental attitude of the great mass of the uneducated, and of the self-seeking among the educated, towards the social good which the leaders of human progress have placed at their disposal, and towards the conveniences of daily life devised for them by science. Nothing to them is καλὸν or βαυμαστῶν. They have an eye only for the narrow field of the personally συμφέρων. Their life is one of passive reception and feeling, as distinguished from the life of active Reason, which thinks and organises. Cf. Alex. on Met. L. 6. 1071 b. (p. 660, 26 ed. Bonitz) τὸ καλὸν ἐν τῷ εἴδει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῇ ὑλῇ. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ποιοῦσι
1168 a. 10. μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι: καὶ ἐστὶ πάσχον τὸ δυνάμει ὄν, ποιοῦν δὲ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα ὄν.

a. 13. § 6. ηδεία κ.τ.λ. ] Every ἐνεργεῖα has its own pleasure—see x. 5. 6 καθ’ ἐκάστην ἐνεργεῖαν οἰκεία ἡδονή ἐστιν, or pleasure and ἐνεργεῖα are identical—see vii. 12. 3. Hence ἐλπίς and μνήμη are pleasant, quid suggesting ἐνεργεῖα. See Met. A. 7. 1072 b. 13 ἐκ τοιούτης (i. e. ἀναγκαίον οὕτως, ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ εὗ Αλεξ.) ἄρα ἁρχὴς ἦρτησαι τὸ οὐρανὸς καὶ η ἡφίσσις. διαγωγὴ δ’ ἐστιν ὅτι η ἀριστή μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτω γὰρ αἱ ἑκατέσταται ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατων ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνεργεῖα τούτων καὶ διὰ τούτο έγρήγοροι αἰσθήσεις νόησις ἡδασθον, ἐλπίδαις δὲ καὶ μνήμαι διὰ ταῦτα: on which Alex. has the following commentary: λέγει οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἐστιν η ἁριστή ἡμῖν διαγωγὴ ἐπί μικρὸν χρόνου (οὔ γὰρ δεῖ, ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἐνεργεῖα γένηται ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς τά νοητά) ταῦτην τὴν ζωήν αἱ ἑκατέσταται . . . . ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνεργεία αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἦ τὸ νοεῖν ἑαυτόν, ἢ δὲ ἐνεργεία αὐτοῦ ἡδονή αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν, ἢ πολλῆς ἢ ἑκατέστατη αἱ ὑπ’ τὴν ζωήν, λέγω δὴ τὸ νοεῖν ἑαυτόν . . . καὶ διὰ τούτου, φησί, καὶ τὴν ἀισθήσιν καὶ τὴν ἐγρήγοροι καὶ τὴν νόησιν ἡδασθαί φανεῖν, ὅτι ἐνεργείαι των οὐδεὶς ἐνδιάλεκτα των καὶ σκεπαί εἰσαι ἥν ἐνεργείαις μὲν ἐνεργεῖαις καὶ ἦν τῶν ζωῆς ζωῆν, ὅταν ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς γένηται πῶς τὰ νοητά. τόσος δὲ ἐλπίδαις πάλιν καὶ μνήμαις φιλούμεν διὰ τότε ἐνεργείαις μεμνημένοι γὰρ των ἐνεργείαις ἐπεισόδες ἐνεργηθεῖσαι φιλούμεν τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ τὴν μνήμην.

a. 18. η προσδοκία 8’ ανάπαλιν] τούτους, τῶν μὲν χρησίμων ηδεία, τῶν δὲ καλῶν οὐ πάνω (Coraes). Αἱ καλὰ καὶ χρήσιμα are referred to here, the inferiority of the pleasure attending the anticipation of the former will be due to the fact that they are χαλεπά: but perhaps only τὰ χρήσιμα are referred to.

a. 20. τοῖς υπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πράξιν] i. e. τοῖς ενεργέταις.

a. 21. ἐπεταί] ‘are attributes of,’ see note on vii. 9. 6, b. 34, and Bonitz on Met. A. i. 981 a. 27.


a. 26. καὶ μᾶλλον ἵσαν δι’ αὐτῶν] Ramsauer brackets these words as out of place here, where Aristotle is concerned to show why benefactors love more. Surely, he argues, those who receive know as well what they receive as those who give know what they give,
CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Another question is, whether a man ought to love himself or some other most. Not himself, some argue, for ‘self-love’ is bad: bad men are noted for their ‘self-love’; good men for their love of what is beautiful and right, which makes them forgetful of ‘self’, and devoted to their friends. But facts, it may be urged, are against this view. Self-love is not bad: a man is his own truest friend, if a true friend is one who wishes the good of the object of his friendship disinterestedly, or for that object’s own sake; and if it is his truest friend whom a man ought to love most—whom ought he to love more than himself, his own truest, most disinterested friend? Our statement that a man’s love for his friend is merely an extension of his love for himself may be taken as favouring this contention; and all the proverbs about friendship accord with it—‘one soul’—‘things in common’—‘equality’—‘knee nearer than shin’—these are all most truly applicable to a man’s friendship for himself. Which of these two opposite views then must we follow? Both are plausible.

In dealing with such views we must draw distinctions, and try to see how far, and in what sense, each is true. Let us see then in what sense each view understands ‘self-love’. The view which understands it in a bad sense takes it to mean the habit of assigning to oneself the larger share, where money, honour, and bodily pleasure are concerned. These are the things which the majority of men think best, and compete keenly for—in their selfish pursuit of them living for the satisfaction of their desires and the irrational part of their nature. The ‘self-love’ of such men then is justly held up to contempt; and it is it which those who say that a man ought not to love himself most, have in view.

But if a man were seen to be always bent on acting virtuously and identifying himself with all that is beautiful and good, no one would blame him for this kind of ‘self-love’—‘self-love’ too, in the truest sense, inasmuch as it is the true
'self'—the governing principle in him—which such a man obeys and lives for. That Reason is the True Self is shown by the use of the terms 'continent' and 'incontinent'—i.e., able and unable to 'contain himself' or govern his passions; also by the fact that the most rational acts are thought to be the most voluntary; and by the fact that the good man loves his Reason most.

There would seem, then, to be two kinds of self-love, which differ as widely as the life according to Reason and the life according to Impulse. The good man therefore ought to love himself. In so doing he will benefit both himself and others; but the 'self-love' of the wicked man is hurtful both to himself and to his neighbour, for it consists in following evil passions. The wicked man does what he ought not to do; the good man does what he ought to do, for Reason always chooses that which is best for itself, and the good man obeys the rule of Reason. For his friends too the good man will do much, and for his country—even laying down his life, if need be. He will give up wealth, and station, and all the good things which men compete for, so that he may make the glory of well-doing his own. He will prefer the great joy of a short time to feeble satisfactions continued throughout a long time: he will prefer one glorious year to a long lifetime of ordinary doings—one great and glorious deed to many small performances—dying, it may be, for his country, and winning what he chooses for himself—to be the doer of a glorious deed. Or, he will let his chance of making money slip, that so his friend may come in for a larger share; for thus he secures for himself what is better than money—the glory of performing a virtuous action. Similarly, he will let honours and offices go past him in favour of his friend; nay, it may be that he will sometimes leave even good actions to be performed by his friend, where there is more virtue in being the cause of his friend's performing them than in performing them himself. In short, where virtuous actions are concerned the good man will always take to himself the larger share. This is the sense in which he loves himself most—rightly, we have seen, not as the many 'love themselves.'

[Cf. M. M. ii. 13, 14, where ὁ φιλανθρός is discussed in much the same way as here; but there is no corresponding discussion in the E. E., Π. 6 περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτῷ φιλον ἐστὶν ἡ μῆ' going over the same ground as E. N. ix. 4. Indeed the term φιλανθρός does not occur in the E. E. It is pretty evident that Eudemus had not E. N. ix in exactly its present shape before him.]

1168 a. 32. § 1. οἶνος] introduced into the text by Susemihl and Bywater, is given by Cambr. and CCC, as well as by K b and ι.

a. 33. ἀδ' ἑαυτοῦ] πάροσ ἑαυτοῦ (Mich. Eph.); 'without thinking of self.'

b. 2. § 2. δ βουλόμενος ὑ βουλεῖται] For δ K b and Cambr. have ἦ δ. Bywater's conjecture ἦν φ' is very likely. The ἦν would refer to 1155 b. 31: see Contrib. p. 64.
BOOK IX: CHAP. 8: §§ 2, 3. 377

καὶ αἱ παρομίαι δὲ κ.τ.λ.) τούτοις δὲ καὶ αἱ παρομίαι πᾶσαι μαρ- 1168 b. 6. τυροῦσι. Τοὺς γὰρ σφόδρα φίλους διηλύντες, μία ψυχή φασὶ: ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων εἰς τοῦτο φέρει, καὶ ἵστης φιλότης, καὶ γόνυ κυήμας ἐγγιον. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν, καὶ ἡ ἵστης, καὶ τὸ ἐγγιον, φίλα, τι γένοιτ' άν ἐκάστοφ φιλικότερον ἑαυτοῦ; (Paraph.). These proverbs all go to show that Friendship is a very close relation; and to whom can a man stand in a closer relation than to himself?

γόνυ κυήμας ἐγγιον] Stahr and Fritzsch refer to Theoc. xvi. 18, b. 8. where ἀπωτέρω ἄ γόνυ κυήμα is put into the mouth of one who excuses himself for keeping his money to himself.

δὴ] So Bywater for δὲ—' to indicate that the statement is a b. 11. conclusion drawn from what precedes it in the text—' Contrib. p. 64.

§ 3. διατεί] What is the precise force of διατεί here? Does b. 12. it mean that we are to 'analyse’ each view by itself? or that we are to ‘distinguish between’ the two views? Peters, adopting the first alternative, translates—' Perhaps the best method of dealing with conflicting statements of this kind is to analyse them, and then clearly distinguish how far and in what sense each is right.' Stahr adopts the other alternative and translates—'Allein ich denke, man muss dergleichen Raisonnements scharf von einander halten und genau bestimmen, wie weit und in welcher Art sie wahr sind.' I am inclined to Stahr's opinion, on account of what follows. It turns out that each of the two λόγοι is concerned with a different φιλαυτοῦν. Instead of being contrary theories on the same subject, they are theories relating to entirely different subjects. This being clearly seen, the two theories are properly 'distinguished,' cf. Ramsauer's note—' Dirimentur autem certantes (διατεί) atque utrique rem non male gessisse videbuntur, si apparuerit, diversa eos censuisse de nomine quidem vel titulo uno, sed de re vel hominum genere diverso.'

ei δὴ λαβομεν τὸ φιλαυτοῦν πῶς ἐκάστεροι λέγουσιν κ.τ.λ.) Both Mich. b. 13. Eph. and the Paraph. in their commentaries on these words seem to take διατεί in the sense of 'analysing’ first the one and then the other of the two theories. While, I think, on this particular point they are hardly right, their remarks are useful for the general understanding of the present passage. Mich. Eph. has—δὲ διατ—

116b.13. τῶν τούτων, τούτωσι θεός διαφεύτων ἃ τῆς φιλανθίας ὅνομα ὑπὲρ ἄμφοτερον προϊσχοντα εἰς τὰ σημαινόμενα πράγματα· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἀπλοῦν ἡ φιλανθία ἄλλ' ὑμνίωμοι, ὡς ἡ κύριον, καὶ διαφοράς, λέγειν ὅτι ἄμφοτερον καθώς λέγουσι οἱ τε φιλεῖν εὐαυτῶς λέγοντες καὶ οἱ μῆς φιλεῖς. χρῆ οὖν διαφοράς λέγειν ὅτι τὸ φιλανθυτικὸν διαφόρων ἡ ἑλθη ἐγγυτός καὶ μισθοφορεῖν τὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἄνθρωπον τῆς ἀγαθίας ἢ τῆς κακίας ... ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτῳ τῷ τῆς φιλανθίας σημαίνομένῳ ὑπὲρ ἐστὶ φαῦλον καὶ αἰσχρόν· καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλανθός ὅποτε κυρίως φιλανθός ἐστὶ κάκιστος τῷ διώτι καὶ αἰσχρότατος· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν οὖν ἀνθρωπός ἡ αἰσθήσεις ἤν αὐτὸς φιλεῖ ἀλλ' ὃ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκπεπήρωκεν ... ἀλλ' δὲ φιλανθίας σημαίνομενον τὸ φιλεῖν τὸν δυνάμενον ἀνθρωπὸν ὑπὲρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἄμφιστοι· ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλανθός ὅποτε αἰσχρός ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ κάλλιστος. The Paraph. has οὕτω τοῖς ἄμφοτέροις μὲν λόγῳ ἀληθῶς εἶναι δοκοῦντα, εἰκὸς ἄμφοτεροι δέος ἀκολουθεῖν. εἰρήμην δὲ διελέουσι καὶ διαρμασμένοι εἰς' ὅσον καὶ πῶς ἐκατέρως ἀληθεύει (which Heinsius translates, doubtless correctly, Nos igitur si diligentem dividamus rem ipsam et distinguamus &c.) κ.τ.λ.—to the same effect as Mich. Eph. above.

b. 15. §§ 4, 5.] The two kinds of φιλανθεία contrasted in these sections may be compared with those who act from ideae inadaequatae or are passionibus obnoxii, and those who live ex ductu rationis, as distinguished by Spinoza. The former are dominated by the abstract and onesided views presented by passion and imagination, which hold up the same thing in different lights to different persons, between whom accordingly dissensions and conflicts arise. But those who live ex ductu rationis see nothing partially; they understand everything truly as its nature is determined by the place it occupies in the universal system. Between men who look at things in this way there can be no disagreement. Aristotle's ὁτι τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περισσεύσαν (§ 5) is Spinoza's 'Acting in a manner suitable to that rationally constituted and apprehended Human Nature in oneself which is common to oneself with all men.' In seeking his own highest good a man seeks ipso facto the highest good of all other men; the distinction between 'his own' highest good and that 'of other men' being merely a formal one. See Spinoza Eth. iv. 18, Schol.—' Quum ratio nihil contra naturam postulet, postulat ergo ipsa, ut unusquisque se ipsum amet, suum utile, quod re vera utile est, quarerat, et id omne, quod hominem ad majorem perfectionem revera ducit, appetat, et absolute ut unusquisque suum esse, quantum in se est, conservare conetur ... Deinde quandoquidem
virtus nihil aliud est quam ex legibus propriae naturae agere, et nemo suum esse conservare conetur, nisi ex propriae suae naturae legibus; hinc sequitur . . . virtutis fundamentum esse ipsum conatum, proprium esse conservandi, et felicitatem in eo consistere, quod homo suum esse conservare potest.' . . . iv. 35

'Quatenus homines affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt esse natura diversi et invicem contrarii . . . sed quia unusquisque ex suae naturae legibus id appetit, quod bonum, et id amovere conatur quod malum esse judicat; et quum praeterea id, quod ex dictamine rationis bonum aut malum esse judicamus, necessario bonum aut malum sit: ergo homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, eatenus tantum ea necessario agunt, quae humanae naturae, et consequenter unicuique homini necessario bona sunt, hoc est, quae cum natura uniuscujusque hominis conveniunt: atque adeo homines etiam inter se, quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, necessario semper conveniunt.'

§ 6. τοῦ κυριωτάτου

'As the ruling part in it seems to be the state, or system, in the truest sense, so his ruling part is the man in the truest sense.' Mich. Eph. says—"ός πόλις κυρίως ἐστὶν οὗ τὰ τείχη οὐδὲ αἱ οἰκίαι, οὐδὲ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἐν αὐτῇ οἰκούντες . . . ἀλλὰ πόλις ἐστὶ τὸ ἄρχον καὶ ἐξουσιάζων οὗν ἐν τοῖς βασιλευομένοις πόλις ἐστὶν ὁ βασιλεύς, (l'état c'est moi) ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατούμενοις ὁ δῆμος, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλγοφοιναῖοις οἱ εὐποροι . . . οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος κυρίως ἐστὶ τὸ πεθυκός ἐν ἡμῖν μέρος ἄρχειν τῆς ψυχῆς' ὀπερ ἐστὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον ἡμῶν καὶ φρονοῦν καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ κυρίως ἐστίν . . . ὁ τούτῳ φιλῶν.

" οὐ τούτου ἐκάστου οὖν] "οὔτε τοῦ μὲν νοοῦ κρατοῦσιν αὐτὸς τις λέγεται b. 35. κρατεῖν, τῶν δὲ πάθων κρατοῦντων, οὐκ αὐτὸς κρατεῖν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κρατεῖσθαι. (Paraph.).

καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκουσώσις τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα] The acts of the rational agent represent a consistent and single personality to which we always refer them; whereas the acts of the ἄκρατής represent merely the prevalence for the time of certain ἐπιθυμίαι, and are regretted and as it were disowned, by the man 'when he comes to himself' again. On this ground the acts of the rational agent are spoken of here as voluntary in a higher sense.
than those of the ákratís. But it must be remembered that the doctrine of the Third Book (and we have no reason to suppose that Aristotle wishes to modify it here) makes no practical difference between acts done kata lágon, and those done de' episthémwan h deía thumon, quâ voluntary. If our good acts are voluntary so are also our bad acts: see iii. 1. 20 tò ékousion dáxein åi eían oô h árkhè én avtô eîdòti tà kath' ékwsis èn ois h pràxis. This description applies as well to acts caused by mere páthos as to those due to boulêutikè érézis. Póteron (iii. 1. 23) oûden ékousiow práttomèn tôw de' episthémwan kai thumon, h tâ kalâ müv ékousiow tà ò aîschrà ákousiow; h gelêiôn ènôs ge aîtiou ènôs; We may perhaps say that while this is the practical view as it recommends itself to the sociologist, the statement πεπραγέναι δοκούσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λάγον μάλιστα is made in the spirit of ‘the metaphysic of Ethics.’

Coraes, following the Paraph., is doubtless right with δοκούτος συμφέρειν] Coraes, following the Paraph., is doubtless right with ὅσον διαφέρει τὸ κατὰ λάγον ἐὰν τὸ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ἦ τοῦ καλοῦ ἄρετος τῆς ἄρετος τῶν συμφέροντος. The writer’s careless use of ἅ before τοῦ δοκούτως has betrayed some MSS. (Kb, Mh, Cambr., CCC, Ald. followed by Bywater) into the insertion of ἅ before τοῦ καλοῦ.

With this § cf. again Spinoza Eth. iv. Prop. 36—Summum bonum eorum qui virtutem sectantur, omnibus commune est, coque omnes aeque gaudere possunt. Demonstr. ex virtute agere est ex ductu rationis agere, et quicquid ex ratione conamur agere est intelligere. Atque adeo summum bonum eorum qui virtutem sectantur est Deum cognoscere, hoc est, bonum, quod omnibus hominibus commune est, et ab omnibus hominibus, quatenus ejusdem sunt naturae, possideri aeque potest.

a. 11. εἴπερ ἡ ἄρετη τοιοῦτον ἔστιν] i. e. each man individually will have the greatest of good things, ‘for such is virtue.’

In man νοῦς is the principle which maintains the ἐννοεῖν ἔδος of his nature, to maintain which is his chief good; while in the organisms of animals and
plants the same formative principle appears as an effort, cha-

racterised as θείον, to preserve and perpetuate the type of the race. A divine Reason thus penetrates Nature, producing εἶδος out of ὦν—

εἰκ τοιαῦτας (i.e. ἀναγκαῖοι οὕτως ὅτι ἰὼν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶ)—Alex. ad loc.) ἄρα ἄρχής (i.e. the divine ἐνέργεια ἰὼν δυνάμεως, οὐ τοῖς νομίζεις) ἦργηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. (Met. A. 7. 1072 b. 13): τά κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οὖν τε καλλιτά έχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν (Ε. Ν. i. 9. 5): ἐπειδή ὁμιλεῖ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐκάστου τῶν φύσεως γνωμένων, οὖν άνθρώπων ὑπέτου κ.τ.λ., καὶ ἡ ταύτα δημιουργοῦσα ἄρχή μέχρι τοσοῦτον πρόεικε κινοῦσα τὴν ἐλεν μέχρις οὗ τὸ εἶδος τούτο καὶ τὴν μορφὴν τελείως ἐναρμόσαι τῇ ὑθῃ (Themist. in Phys. vol. i. p. 171, ed. Spengel): cf. Rhet. i. 6. 1362 a. 24, quoted by Ramsauer—(ἀγαθὰ δ’ ἐστὶ) ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἰὼν ἐκάστῳ ἀποδοῖ, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἐκάστου νοοῦ ἀποδιδῶσιν ἐκάστῳ. Mich. Eph. remarks on πάς γάρ νοος ἀλητά τὸ βελτίστων ἐκαίτι τότε παίζει—(Mich. Eph. then gives several examples of the ‘instinct’ of animals; and proceeds—) τὰ ἄι παλλὰ γράφεις πλήρεις τοιοῦτον αἱ περὶ ζώων Ἀριστοτέλης πράγματες καὶ εἰς ἐκείς ὁ βουλόμενος λαμβάνεται τὰ πίστεις τοῦ πάντα τού καίτι νοοῦ αἱρείσαι τὸ βελτίστων ἐκαίτι· διότι καὶ ὁ ἐπιθετής ἐπειδὴ πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νόῳ, ἀναφερόμενον δὲ τὰς ἀλλογεῖς δρεῖες, τὰ βελτίστα καὶ ἐκαίτι καὶ τοῖς πέλας ἀφήνεται καὶ πράξει.

§ 9. αἱροῦται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἐκαίτις] We see how far removed a. 26. the φιλάνθρωπος of the good man is from ordinary self-seeking. For the sake of the καλὸν the φιλάνθρωπος will lay down his life. He will not cast it carelessly away as inferior men, falsely called courageous, do under the influence of anger or other excitement, but will lay it down rationally for the sake of his ideal of Human Perfection. He knows that Human Perfection, unlike the Divine Perfection which is realised in One eternal Being, is realised in a succession of mortal beings. The mere prolongation, as such, of a mortal life he sees to be a matter of little moment, because Human Perfection is secured by the succession of lives. He cares only for Human Perfection, and if he finds that he can further it by doing something that can be done only at the cost of his own bodily life, he gladly
lays down his life. Here all the ordinary motives operating within the region of the sensibility are left behind, and the agent rises into the sphere where action is determined by 'reverence for law universal.' Thus the doctrine of φιλανθροπία, which in its highest form amounts to 'self-sacrifice,' belongs to what may well be called 'the Metaphysic of Ethics.' That there is such a 'Metaphysic' is surely a great practical truth, attested by the fact that men are found thus ready to lay down their lives.

§ 10. ἔνδεχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φιλῷ προέσθαι] If the μεγαλόψυχος—the form under which the highest excellence is presented in the Fourth Book—be compared with the form under which it is presented here, certain, perhaps not unnatural, misunderstandings will be avoided in connexion with the earlier account.

§ 11. ἐν πάσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἐαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων] not at the expense of others, but for the sake of our common Humanity. By ἐπαινετά we are to understand the virtues: see E. N. i. 12. 6 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινωτις τῆς ἀρετῆς πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης. The 'larger share,' then, which the good man 'takes to himself' is a larger share of καλά πράξεως, some of them involving the sacrifice of all that is dear to flesh and blood. The good man takes to himself a 'larger share' of 'self-sacrifice.' Grant well compares with this account of the φιλανθροπία 'the elevated description of the self-sacrifice of the brave man in Eth. iii. 9. 4-5.'

CHAPTER IX.

Argument.

Another question is whether the Happy Man will need friends or not. No, say some: he is self-sufficient: he has the good: why, then, should he need a second or supplementary self to help him to attain a good which he already has? 'When Heaven is kind, what need of Friends?' To this it is replied that it seems absurd to assign all good things to the Happy Man with the one exception of—friends, the greatest of external good things. Also, since the good man is essentially a benefactor, and it is better to benefit friends than strangers, the good man will need friends to be the objects of his beneficence. Hence another question arises—Whether it is in prosperity or adversity that friends are more needed? In adversity a man will need benefactors; in prosperity, objects for
his beneficence. Again, are we to make the Happy man a Solitary? Surely this would be absurd. Man is naturally social. No one would choose to have all by himself the whole list of good things. The Happy Man, then, must have society, and, plainly, the society of good friends—for that is better than the society of strangers.

What, then, is the truth contained in the first view—that the Happy Man is self-sufficient, and does not need friends? The view is true so far as friendship for profit, and friendship for pleasure are concerned. The Happy Man does not need to make the former kind of friendship, because his material necessities are otherwise sufficiently provided for; nor does he need to make friends for the sake of pleasure, for his life is in itself pleasant, and has no need of imported pleasure. But it is not true to say, without qualification, that he does not need friends, for he must have good friends, since Happiness is a Life—a function performed, not a possession treasured, and this function is good and pleasant in itself for the good man who performs it, and pleasant too, because it is his own function, but he can contemplate the like function in his friend better than he can contemplate his own function. The Happy Man thus needs the mirror of friendship in which to see clearly that which is his joy—the Life of good action—his own Life. Further, it being admitted that the life of the Happy Man ought to be pleasant, it could hardly be this were he a Solitary, for by himself he could not easily perform his function continuously. With others, and in relation to others, however, he will be able to do so more easily. A function pleasant in itself will thus be more continuously performed; and this accords with our notion of Happiness. Again, a man gets practice in virtue by associating intimately with good men, as Theognis tells us.

But there is a still deeper reason in the nature of things, from which we infer that a good friend is naturally the object of the good man’s choice. We have seen that that which is naturally good is good and pleasant in itself for the good man. Now, Life, which is the power of perceiving and thinking—or more strictly, the exercise of the power, actual perception and thought—is good and pleasant in itself, for it is definite; it is therefore good and pleasant for the good man—all men indeed strive after it, but the good man especially strives after it, inasmuch as it is best and most blessed as realised by him. Further, he who sees or hears or walks perceives that he sees or hears or walks: there is a faculty in him which perceives that he exercises the various functions of sense-perception, and of thought: but to perceive that he perceives or thinks is to perceive that he exists (for existence or life, we saw, is perceiving or thinking): now, to perceive that he exists or lives is pleasant in itself, and especially to the good man whose life is especially choiceworthy: since, then, the relation in which the good man stands to his friend is the same as that in which he stands to himself, the good man who, perceiving himself as good, makes his own existence the object of his choice, will necessarily make the existence of his friend also the object of his choice, perceiving his friend’s existence and goodness in perceiving his own—for a friend is a second self. This common perception of his own existence and of his friend’s the good man will realise in that common-wealth of speech and thought which constitutes the social life of man, as distinguished from the gregarious life of cattle grazing together in the same pastures.

Our conclusion, then, is that the Happy Man must have good friends.

The subject of this chapter (excellently summarised by Grant ad loc.) is discussed in Ε. Ε. II. 12 (a chapter the interpretation of which labour under great textual difficulties), and in Μ. Μ. ii. 15.

1169 b. 6. § 1. τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἔτερον αὐτῶν ὄντα, πορίζειν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖν
i.e. the notion of the ἔτερος αὐτὸς or supplementary self, who supplies what the αὐτὸς by himself cannot obtain, is inconsistent (a priori) with the notion of the αὐτάρκεια of the αὐτὸς.


b. 9. § 2. δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι] I cannot recall any passage in which Aristotle explicitly pledges himself to the view that friends are the greatest of external good things. The value of the ἔτερος αὐτὸς as he is characterised in the present book is scarcely that of an external good; while in Ε.Ν. i. 8. 15 and Rhet. i. 5, friends are simply enumerated among other external good things, without being placed in a position of marked superiority. Thus in Ε.Ν. i. 8. 15, 16, we have—φαίνεται δ᾽ ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ μᾶς καλὰ πράττειν ἀρχηγήτων ὄντα. τολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττει, καθάπερ δὲ ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· εἰὼν δὲ τιτωμένου ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἰον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους' οὐ πάνω γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἱδέαν παναίσχυς ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἠτε δ᾽ ἤσω ἤστοιν, εἰ τῷ πάγκακοι παίδες εἶπεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνάσαι, and Rhet. i. 5. 1360 b. 18 sqq. εἰ δὴ ἦστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγενείαν πολυφιλίαν χρηστοφιλίαν πλούτου εὐτεκνίαν πολιτικῆς εὐγερίαν, ἐτὶ ταῦ τοῦ σῶματος ἀρέτας οἰον ἔγειες κάλλος ἰσχύν μέγεθος δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικῆν δύο χαίρειν εὐτυχίαν . . . οὕτω γὰρ αὐτοκράτατος εἶη, ἐι ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ τὰ ὑπὸ αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταύτα· ἦστι δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἐξο δὲ εὐγενεία καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή. ἠτε δὲ προσήκειν οἰόμεθα δυνάμεις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τύχην' οὐτω γὰρ ἦν ἀσφαλέστατος ὃ βίος εἰη.

b. 16. § 3. μονώτητι] Cf. Ε. Ν. i. 7. 6 ὁ δὲ αὐτάρκης λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῶ μόνω, τῷ ἥσοιτι βιών μονώτητι, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονέως καὶ τέκνως καὶ γυνακί καὶ θλος τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολιτάσι, ἐπεὶ ἂν εὑςει πολιτικὸν ὃ ἀνθρωπος.

b. 22. § 4. οἱ πρῶτοι] οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ δεῖν φίλον τούς μακάριους (Paraph.).


μακάριος ὅσιος οὐδιν καὶ νοῦν ἔχει.
Happiness is a function performed, not a thing possessed. This function, as performed by the good man, is pleasant on two grounds—as good, and as 'his own'—and invites contemplation. But the good man stands, as it were, too near himself to see properly 'his own' as realised in himself. He sees 'his own' better at the distance of his 'second self.'

Actions which are oikeia and oikeia, to be experienced as pleasant, must be contemplated (theorēin), i.e. must be clearly realised in consciousness (cf. for the use of theorēin, in the sense of 'being fully conscious,' E. N. vii. 3. 5 διώσει τὸ ἐχοντα μὲν μή θεωροῦντα δὲ κ.τ.λ.). This consciousness of one's own actions—ἡ τῶν οἰκείων πράξεων θεωρία—becomes explicit in the contemplation of the actions of a good friend. The actions of such a friend are good, and, although not oikeia in the narrow personal sense in which actions often stand too near the observer to be objects of clear vision, they are in the sense of being Ómous, and realising the one law of rectitude common to all good men: cf. viii. 3. 6 καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ θεωρεῖν καὶ ἀλλήλους ἑκατέρω γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσι καὶ οἰκείαι πράξεως καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἡ Ómous.

In God 'subject and object' are one. He realises and sees
1169 b. 29. Himself in Himself. But man realises and sees himself in and through others—E. E. 11. 1245 b. 18 ἢ μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἄλλον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ (sc. θεῷ) αὐτὸς τὸ εὖ ἐστίν. For man, as immersed in ὅλη, 'subject and object' are two. Hence, to fulfil the injunction γνῶθι σεαυτόν, he must place himself at a certain distance from himself, as it were. He must by an effort make himself an object to himself. This he does by universalising his own conduct, by regarding it not as the conduct of himself only, but also of others. Thus the idea or ideal of 'conduct' is abstracted from the ὅλη of the individual's sensibility, and made an object of contemplation. It is no longer his conduct, but the conduct of all good men. Πράξεις performed by the individual with the consciousness that they are such as all good men perform are pleasant par excellence; true pleasure either being (book vii), or attending (book x), the consciousness (θεωρία) of good actions, and this consciousness being vastly heightened in each individual, when he sees other rational agents obeying the same Law of Rectitude with himself: as Spinoza says Eth. iv. 37 'Bonum, quod homo sibi appetit et amat, constantius amabit, si viderit, alios idem amare. Atque adeo conabitur, ut reliqui idem ament. Et quia hoc bonum (i.e. bonum quod unusquisque qui sectatur virtutem sibi appetit) omnibus commune est, coque omnes gaudere possunt; conabitur ergo ut omnes eodem gaudeant, et eo magis quo hoc bono magis fruetur.'

b. 35. οἱ τῶν σπουδαίων ἔτη] I prefer ὅ, beginning the apodosis here. Zell and Michelet, however (and apparently also Susemihl and Bywater who read ὅ with CCC, Camb., Ald.) make it begin with ὅ μακάριος δὴ 1170 a. 2. It seems to me necessary to state as a conclusion from (1) τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεία, (2) τοῦ οἰκεῖου τῶν ἡδείων, and (3) θεωρεῖν ὅ μάλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἡ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις τὰ ὁ οἰκεῖα, that 'a good friend's actions are pleasant to the good man': then, from the premisses εἰπερ κ.τ.λ. a. 2, follows the different conclusion that 'the μακάριος will need good friends.'

1170 a. 1. ἀμφω] i.e. τὸ ἐπιεικὲς (or τὸ σπουδαῖον) and τὸ οἰκεῖον. Cf. below εἰπερ θεωρεῖν προσαρκεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικέις καὶ οἰκείας. Zell and Fritzsche are evidently wrong in making ἀμφω nominative, i.e. ὅ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ φίλος αὐτοῦ σπουδαῖος ὄν.

a. 6. συνεχῶς] Cf. x. 4. 9 τῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἦδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεί συνεχῶς ἐνεργείν. Cf. Mel. Λ. 7. 1072 b.
The form of God is realised in one Eternal Being: the form of man in a multitude of contemporary and successive examples. Each individual man realises himself only by looking away from his own mere particularity, and assimilating into his consciousness the form of man's reason as other examples—his friends and fellow-citizens—by their cumulative influence impress it more purely upon him. The great embodiment of human reason, the social order into which he has been born, exists independently of himself. It is there already as an object for him to contemplate and identify himself with. It has not to be held up, as it were, in actual existence by his own unaided reason, as the abstractions of Philosophy have to be maintained (and cannot long be maintained at a stretch) by the thinker himself; see E. E. H. 12. 1245 b. 16 oú γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεὸς εἶ έχει, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἢ ὡστε ἀλλά τι νοεῖν αὐτὸς παρ’ αὐτόν. αἰτίων δ’ ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ’ έτέρων, ἐκείνῳ δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν τὸ εὖ εὕτε. To contemplate, and in contemplating to identify himself with, the social life is a thing which a man can do almost continuously, because his οὐσία or φύσις is to be a person who sees himself in others and lives in others. But to identify himself with νοητά which involve no social reference is a godlike act, which he can only at rare intervals, and for a short time, perform. Cf. Alex. in Met. p. 671 (ed. Bonitz)—ὁ ημέτερος νοῦς, δυνάμει δὲν τὰ νοητά, ὅταν ἐκ τῆς ἰκρασ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς ἀγάν εὑρίσκει ἐνεργεία γίνεται τὰ νοητά, τότε ᾿Ζώμεν τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ μακαριωτάτην καὶ πάσης ἵδον ἐπέκεισι ζωῆς, ἤτις λόγοι μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνεμφάνητος, γινώσκεται δὲ τοῖς τὸ μακάριον τοῦτο παθοῦσι πάθος. ... p. 687 οὔκ ἦστα ἐπίσην αὐτῷ (i.e. τῷ πρῶτῳ νῷ) τὸ συνεχές τῆς νοησίας εἰ νοεῖ ἐστὶ καὶ νοησίας. ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ημέτερον νῷ οὐσιωμενῷ ἐν τῷ νοοῦ εἶναι ἐπίσην εἶστι τὸ συνεχές τῆς νοησίας; ἢ οὔκ ἦστιν ὁ ημέτερος νοος ἐνεργεία νοος καὶ ἐνεργεία ὡς ἐκείνος, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει; As Alex. quaintly says, it is not difficult for a man to be always a man, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπος οὐσίωτα: but it is difficult for him always to walk, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐν τῷ ᾿Βαθίζειν οὐσίωσθαι (p. 687). So it is difficult for man to think continuously, as God does, because man's νοσία stands to his νοος as his walking does to his physical power—it is something which tends to sink
back into the potentiality (δύναμις) from which it springs; whereas
p. 211 (ed. Spengel)—ἡ ἐλάσσωσις αὐτῆ (i. e. τὸ ἀνθρωπίνῳ νῷ) πρὸς
tὸν θεῖον νοῦν νοῦ ὧτι μηδέποτε δύναται νοεῖν τὰ ἄκλη εἴη, ἀλλ' ὧτι μὴ
σωνεχῶς καὶ δει. But in his own lower sphere—that of conduct,
man is able ἐνέργειν σωνεχῶς more easily and successfully. The
weakness of the individual is aided by the strength of the race;
the law of rectitude is embodied in the good men of the race, and
in the institutions which have held their ground, and does not
depend much for its actuality on the efforts of any single indi-
vidual. The efforts of the individual are rendered easier and more
continuous by the stimulation which they receive from an object
which they have not themselves, with pain and weariness, to hold
up in actuality.

These words are to be
taken in connexion with οἴονταί τε δείν ἡδέως τὴν τῶν εὐθαμονον. a. 4.
The μονότης cannot well be εὐθαμον on account of the difficulty
(as explained in the foregoing note) of an approach in his case to
τὸ σωνεχῶς ἐνέργειν. But, sustained by society, the individual can
make an approach to it. The words μονότης . . . ἥδιον a. 5, 6 have
thus nothing directly to do with the statement οἴονταί τε δείν ἡδέως
τὴν τῶν εὐθαμονον, being rather an assertion of the general truth that
εὐθαμονον as a σωνεχῆ ἐνέργεια requires (in man's case) friends and
society. But having thus almost parenthetically hit upon τὸ σωνεχῆ
as distinctive of εὐθαμονον, Aristotle then proceeds in regular course
to point out that the requirement οἴονταί τε δείν ἡδέως τὴν τῶν εὐθα-
μονον is justified by the law that 'his function, because pleasant in
itself, will be more continuous'—συναίτει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία
ἡδονὴ (x. 5. 2): and we are to understand that the pleasure of
friendship contributes—a good friend making the good man take
increased pleasure in his own πράξεις. I understand the ταῖς κατ'
ἀρετὴν πράξεις a. 9 to be not only those of the good man himself,
but also those of his friend; and, although the passage (like other
passages in this chapter) is somewhat confused (whether by the
fault of Aristotle or his editors it is impossible to say), I do not
think it necessary, with Ramsauer, to bracket the words a. 8 ὧ γὰρ
σπουδαῖος ὑ σπουδαῖοι . . . a. 11 λυπεῖται. They seem to be fairly
enough suggested by ἡδεία ὑστα καθ' αὐτὴν—'The function of the
εὐθαμον is truly pleasant—he rejoices or takes pleasure in virtuous
actions, his own and his friends'. Susemihl places 1169 b. 33 1170 a. 7.
§ 6, 7. 389

§ 7. ἄσκησις τις τῆς ἁρετῆς] This consideration seems to owe a. 11.
at least the form in which it is presented to the words ταῖς κατ' ἁρετήν πράξεως in the passage a. 8 ὁ γάρ . . . a. 11 λυπεῖται, bracketed
by Ramsauer.

Θεογνίς] i. e. as quoted at the end of this book—ἔσθλῶν μὲν γάρ a. 12.
ἀπ' ἐσθλὰ (διδάσκαλος, ἢν δὲ κακοίσαι Συμμίσγης, ἀπολείπης καὶ τῶν ἑώτα νόσων):
 cf. Menander's φθέρουσιν ἢθη χρησθ' ὀμλίαι κακά.

φυσικώτερον] It is difficult to see in what respect the enquiry a. 13.
contained in this section and the subsequent sections of the chapter
is more 'concrete' (see note on vii. 3. 9, a. 24) than that in §§ 5
and 6. Both are concerned with the manipulation of abstract
formulas; unless it be said that the second enquiry, by its use of
the psychological terms αἰσθήσις and νόσης, is rendered more concrete.
It must be admitted, however, that these terms are used in a very
abstract way.

tο δὲ ἣν . . . δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως] Cf. de An. ii. 2. 413 b. 2 το δὲ a. 16.
ζώον διὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν πρώτως: cf. E. N. i. 7. 12 and 13.

αἰσθήσεως ἢ νόσησεως] Zell reads καί which gives the sense which a. 17.
το δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται] 'a faculty results in a
function.' Fritzsche and Grant compare Met. θ. 9. 1051 a. 29 το δύναμει ἃντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα εἰρήσκεται.

το δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνέργεια] 'The reality is in the function; life, a. 18.
then, in the real sense (κύριος), is perceiving or thinking.' Cf. Met.
θ. 5. 1048 a. 10, where it is said that the δύναμις must be realised
by a determining cause external to itself—ἀνάγηκ ἣρα ἐτέρον εἶναι τὸ
κύριον, and Met. θ. 8, in which it is laid down that ἐνέργεια is prior to
BOOK IX: CHAP. 9: §§ 7, 8.

1170 a. 18. δύναμις both λόγω and τῇ ουσίᾳ. The priority ουσίᾳ is set forth thus 1050 a. 7 ἄρχῃ ἡ τοῦ τέλους ἐν ἡ γένεσις. τέλος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτον χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται. οὐ γὰρ ἦνα δύναμις ἔχωσιν ὥστε τὰ ζωὰ, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὀρῶσιν ὅφει ἔχοσιν.

a. 19. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ... § 8, a. 25 φανερώτερον] This is a very confused passage, which Ramsauer proposes to mend by omitting the half of it—viz. from διόπτερ a. 22 to φανερώτερον a. 25: indeed he practically recommends the omission of the whole of it, for he suspects the clause ὀρισμένον γὰρ a. 20 ... φύσεως a. 21, leaving only τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἁγαθῶν (καὶ ἥδεων), τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἁγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπισκεί. Of course the argument which proceeds from the beginning of § 9 would not suffer if the whole passage, τὸ δὲ ζῆν a. 19 ... a. 25 φανερώτερον, were omitted, for the parenthesis οὐκε δὲ καὶ a. 26 ... a. 29 ζηῇ contains all of material importance that would be thus lost; and indeed, by making τὸ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μᾶλλον τοὺς ἐπισκεί καὶ μακαρίους α σημείου α τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἁγαθὸν καὶ ἥδυ, puts the matter much more clearly than it is put in § 7, where the corresponding τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἁγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπισκεί διόπτερ έικε πᾶσιν ἥδει εἶναι appears as a deduction from τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἁγαθῶν καὶ ἥδεων. Notwithstanding all this, I cannot bring myself to think that the passage, with its references to τὸ ὀρισμένον and to λύπη, ought to be omitted. These references are not of material importance to the argument, but are just such as may naturally be made in passing without interrupting it.

a. 20. ὀρισμένον] Cf. E. N. ii. 6. 14. Life is unthinkable except as the realisation of definite forms and functions.

a. 22. § 8. οὐ δεὶ δὲ ... λύπαις] When we say that life is naturally good, because 'definite,' and naturally pleasant, we must remember that vice and pain make it 'indefinite' and bad, and that they connect it with bad pleasures—for all men, not only good men, find life pleasant—with the pleasures of excessive indulgence and of relief from pain.

a. 24. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἐσται φανερώτερον] Grant says—This must be after all (see vol. i. p. 49), undoubtedly an interpolation. The editor probably had in his mind a confused

reference to x. 3. 2.' Ramsauer urges that there is nothing in 1170 a. 24. x about pain being ἄρσωτοι. It may be replied that there are frequent references to pain in x; and that indeed the promise made here does not pledge Aristotle to speak more fully of pain being ἄρσωτοι: moreover the epithet ἄρσωτοι used here applies to the μοχήνα καὶ διεφθαρμένη ζωή as well as to that ἐν λύπαι. Vice with its pleasures destroys the ἄρχη or λόγος of man's nature, and makes it chaotic—ἄρσωτοι: similarly, pain distorts it; although here we do not attach blame; cf. E. N. iii. 12. 2 καὶ ή μεν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τήν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν.

§§ 9, 10.] The apodosis of the sentence el δ' αὐτό κ.τ.λ. begins a. 25. with οὖν b. 8. See the notes of Fritzsche, Michelet, and Grant: cf. also § 10 b. 14 el ἢ τῷ μακρῷ ... b. 17 ἢ— a sentence which epitomises the sense, and reproduces in skeleton the grammatical construction of the more diffuse reasoning which precedes. The apodosis of this sentence begins with καὶ ὁ φίλος b. 16.

§ 9. δ' ὁ ὅρων ὅτι ὥρα αἰσθάνεται] Cf. de An, iii. 2. 425 b. 12 a. 29. ἐπεὶ δ' αἰσθητομένα ὅτι ὅρωμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγχη ἢ τῇ ὁψεὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὥρα, ἢ ἔτερα. ἄλλ' ἢ αὐτή ἔσται τῆς ὁψεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χρώματος. ὡστε ἢ δόο τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐσονται ἢ αὐτή αὐτή. ἢτι δ' εἰ καὶ ἔτερα ἐν ἢ τῆς ὁψεως αἰσθήσεις, ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἰσιν ἢ αὐτή τι ἔσται αὐτή. ὥστ' ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης τοῦτο ποιητέον. See also de Somno 2. 455 a. 15 ἢτι δ' εἰς καὶ κοινή δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, ἢ καὶ οὗ ὥρα καὶ ἀκούει αἰσθάνεται ὤν γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὁψεὶ ὥρα ὅτι ὥρα: see Edwin Wallace's Aristotle's Psychology, note on de An. iii. 2. 425 b. 12, and Introduction § ix, 'common or central sense'—especially his excellent remarks on pp. lxxxii—ii, where he reconciles the passage in de Somno 2. 445 a. 15 with de An. iii. 2. 425 b. 12: 'unless,' he says, 'we are prepared to credit Aristotle with a wonderful amount of inconsistency we must regard the one passage as illustrative of the other. So taking them we cannot but allow that if Aristotle asserts in the one passage "it is not by sight mind sees that it sees," and in the other passa writes "sight perceives that it perceives," he is using sight in the former passage as the mere particular organ, whereas in the other it is identified with that original faculty of sense which serves as basis to the whole system of the senses. The consciousness of sense-perception is then, we may conclude, an attribute of that same central sense
which enabled us to compare and distinguish the different reports transmitted by our isolated senses. The two functions are in fact but different aspects of one and the same process; for the comparison of the reports of sense involves as its presupposition the conscious recognition of them as our own, the faculty, in other words, of holding them before the mind.'

In seeing, hearing, walking, etc., a man is conscious of himself—of his own existence: 'he perceives that he sees, hears, etc.' This perception of self, however, would hardly be possible to man if his only objects of experience were his own sensations. In that case the sensation and the perception of the sensation as his sensation would coalesce, as they practically do, we may suppose, in the experience of the lower animals, or of most of the lower animals. Even his experience of his own actions would be accompanied by only a dim consciousness of a self distinguished from them. But man is not confined to his own actions. He has a 'sympathetic consciousness' of the actions of his friend—of actions which are still in a sense 'his own' (for his friend is a ἐτερος αὐτός), and yet are not in such a way 'his own' as to make it difficult for him to distinguish 'himself' from them. The distinction between 'himself' and 'his friend' (for his friend is a ἐτερος αὐτός) helps him to the distinction between 'himself' and 'his own sensations and actions.' In other words—it is in the consciousness of the existence of another that a man becomes truly conscious of himself. τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἄγαθον ὄντος b. 9 cannot be realised apart from τὸ συνασθάνεσθαι καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν b. 10. Man is distinguished from the brutes by the mental distance, as it were, at which he places his sensations and actions. He stands behind them and observes them: but this he does because he is a social being; because he can recognise, and takes pleasure in the recognition of, acts, thoughts, and feelings, not 'his own' but 'like his own.'

There can be no doubt that the term συνασθάνεσθαι, as employed in §§ 9 and 10, is intended to be accurately distinguished from αἰσθάνεσθαι. The term αἰσθάνεσθαι marks a man's consciousness of his own life; συνασθάνεσθαι his consciousness of his friend's

1 The two terms are carefully distinguished in E. E. H. 12. 1244 b. 23 δῆλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ ζῇν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὁ τέλος, φανερῶν οὖν ὤτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ συκῆν τὸ συνασθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ συγγνωρίζειν ἐστὶν.
life—his 'sympathetic consciousness' of his friend's existence, as Grant well puts it. Where the term συναυσθάνεσθαι occurs in § 10, b. 10, this is clearly its meaning: but συναυσθανόμενοι at the end of § 9, b. 4, in its present context seems to describe merely the consciousness which the individual has of his own life, and to be equivalent to the simple αἰσθανόμενοι: hence Ramsauer is of opinion that it is employed after the analogy of ἔαυτῷ συνείδεινα, and stands for ἐαυτῷ συναυσθάνεσθαι τού καθ' αὐτῷ ἄγαθον—i.e. 'being conscious of...'. Consistently with this view he remarks that συναυσθάνεσθαι in the next § is used in a different sense. But is it likely that συναυσθάνεσθαι b. 4 has a different sense from συναυσθάνεσθαι b. 10? Perhaps something has dropped out before συναυσθανόμενοι b. 4 which served to make the transition from the individual's simple αἰσθάνεσθαι of himself to his συναυσθάνεσθαι of his alter ego. The words αἴητων δὲ b. 3... b. 4 καὶ ἤδι (which Ramsauer brackets) certainly do not serve to make the necessary transition, but may perhaps be a fragment of the lost passage, τοῖς ἄγαθοις being the good friends required as the subjects of συναυσθάνεσθαι. I am more inclined, however, to think that συναυσθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτῷ ἄγαθον is an interpolation; for the words ώς δὲ πρὸς b. 5... b. 7 φίλος ἐστίν seem to be written as if nothing had been said before to justify the transition from αἰσθάνεσθαι το συναυσθάνεσθαι, a circumstance which makes it difficult to suppose that the ἄγαθοι, regarded not as separate individuals, but as συζώντες, are the subjects of συναυσθανόμενοι b. 4.

Bywater (Contri b. p. 65) explains his reading a. 31 ὡστε ἐὰν αἰσθανόμενοι, ὅτι αἰσθανόμενα, καὶ νοούμεν, ὅτι νοούμεν (Bekker has ὡστε αἰσθανομένοι ἀν ὅτι αἰσθανόμενα, καὶ νοούμεν ὅτι νοούμεν) by saying 'it would be strange indeed if, with αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι νοούμεν in the immediate context, he lapsed into different language in 1. 32 and said, what the vulgate makes him say, νοεῖν ὅτι νοοῦμεν.'

§ 10. ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοιάς] Cf. Pol. iii. 5. b. 11.

1280 b. 29 φανερῶν τοῦν, ὅτι ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μη ἀδικεῖν σφάς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔστιν πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὖν ὑπάρχουσιν τούτων ἀπάντων ἡδη

Cf. 1245 b. 21 ἐνδεξαμένοιν γὰρ πολλοῖς συζῆν ἢμα καὶ συναυσθάνεσθαι ὡς πλείοντος αἰρετώτατον ἐνεῖ δὲ χαλεπώτατον, ἐν ἐλάττωσιν ἀνάγηκε τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς συναυσθάνεσθαι εἶναι.
CHAPTER X.

Argument.

Should a man try to have an indefinitely great number of friends, or must he draw the line somewhere in the number of his friends, as in the number of his guests? As regards useful friends, he must certainly draw the line at the number which he finds useful: to have more is to burden himself with the duty of recompensing supernumeraries, and hinders the life of noble action. As to friends for pleasure—a few will be enough, like a little sweetening in food. But what shall we say about the number of friends chosen because they are good men? Here again there are limits. The circle of true friendship, like the city, must not be too large or too small. Its extent cannot be accurately fixed, any more than the size of a city; it varies according to circumstances, within definite limits. This is the sense in which its extent is definite. Perhaps we may say that it ought to include as many as it is possible to live on intimate terms with; but, plainly, a man cannot live on intimate terms with, and distribute himself among, many: further, one's friends must be friends also to one another, if all are to meet together constantly in one's company; and it is a difficult matter to get many people to be thus all friends of one another. Again, it is hard to make the joys and sorrows of many people one's own, for one would often have to sympathise with the pleasure of this friend, and the distress of that friend at the same time. So perhaps it is best not to try to have a great many friends, but to limit oneself to the number sufficient to make up a circle of intimate friends, for it is impossible to be on terms of intimate friendship with many, as it is impossible to be in love with many. Wherever friendship is strong it is for few: take for example the friendship of comrades—it does not extend to many; and the famous cases of it are between two. Those who have many friends, and treat everybody they meet as 'My dear friend,' are recognised to be nobody's friends. Their friendship, if it is friend-
ship at all—some people call it fawning complaisance—it friendship in the sense in which we speak of a man’s ‘friendship’ for his fellow-citizens. A man may indeed have many citizen ‘friends,’ without being chargeable with over-complaisance—nay, a truly good man may have many ‘friends’ of this sort; but it is impossible to have many friends of the sort who are chosen for their goodness, that is, for themselves. We must be satisfied if we have been able to find even a very few friends of this sort.


§ 2.] ‘This section may be said to retract upon further con- sideration what was admitted Eth. viii. 6. 3—δὰ ἡ χρήσιμων δὲ καὶ τὸ ἴδιον πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδεχεται: πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ εὐ δίλην χρῶν αἱ ὕπηρεσίαι’ (Grant).

ὁ βίος] may be ‘their means,’ which seems to be the view of b. 25. Mich. Eph., who has βίος γὰρ καὶ περιουσία ἐνὸς οὐχ ἱκανῆ οὗτῳ πολλοῖς ὑπηρεσίαιν: but the more ordinary sense of the word is, I think, preferable.

§ 3. ὀσπερ πόλεως] Cf. Pol. H. 4. 1326 a. 9 sqq. ὁδὸνωται μὲν οὖ ν b. 30. οἱ πλείστοι προσήκειν μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν εὐδαίμονα πόλιν: εἰ δὲ τούτῳ ἀληθεῖ, ἄγωνοιν ποία μεγάλη καὶ ποία μικρὰ πόλις: καὶ ἀριθμὸν γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἑνοικοῦντων κρίνουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεὶ δὲ μάλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος, εἰς δὲ δύναμιν ἀποδέηται. ἢτι γὰρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον ὅστε τὴν δυναμεῖν τοῦτο μᾶλιστα ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰκείον εἶναι μεγίστην . . . εἰ ἢ δὲ βαθαντοῖ μὲν ἐξέχρωνται πολλοὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν, ὅπλιται δὲ ὅλην, ταύτῃ ἄδυναν εἶναι μεγάλην οὖ γὰρ ταύτων μεγάλη τε πόλις καὶ πολιοῦνθροπος: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο γε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων φανέρων ὅτι χαλεπῶν, ἵππως δὲ ἄδυναν εἰςομείηται τὴν λιasion πολιοῦνθροπον . . . ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ πόλις ἢ μὲν εἰ δλίγων λιὰν οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἢ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἠγάν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὀσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλὰ οἱ πόλεις πολειτείαι γὰρ οὐ ράδιον ὑπάρχειν . . . διὸ πρώτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαίον τὴν ἐκ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος ὁ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ἔστι κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν . . . δῆλον τοῖν οὐκ ὡς οὔτος ἐστὶ πόλεως ὀρὸς ἀριστος, ἢ μεγίστη τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐνούοντος. The State is an organism, and like all other organisms must observe definite limits. As realising τὸ καλὸν, however, it must be on as great a scale as is consistent with order—see Poet. 7. 1450 b. 36 τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγεθεὶ καὶ τάξει ἐστὶ: Pol. H. 4. 1326 a. 29 ὁ γὰρ νόμος τάξεις τίς ἐστι, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαίον ἐνταξιαν εἴω: ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεος: θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο
b. 31. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ. | Plato, in a passage in which he is concerned with the logical analysis of the present conditions of society, rather than with the natural history of the origin and growth of society, says, εἰ ὤν ἐν ἡ γαρ ἀναγκαίατη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἡ πέντε ἀνθρώπων Ῥεπ. 369 D.

οὔτ’ ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων | Cf. Pol. iii. 1. 1276 α. 28 Βαβυλων . . . ἄτις ἔχει περιγραφήν μᾶλλον ἑδύνου ἡ πόλεως κ.τ.λ. ‘This extremely limited idea of the size of a state,’ says Grant, ‘is based on the Greek notion that each citizen must personally take part in the administration of affairs. On this hypothesis, a state consisting of a hundred thousand citizens might easily appear unwieldy.’

According to the allegation of the 400 in Thuc. viii. 72, the actual attendance at the Athenian Assembly always fell short of 5000. Grote (Hist. of Greece, Part 2, ch. 2, vol. v. p. 392 note: ed. 1862) remarks on this—’That no Assembly had ever been attended by so many as 5000 (οἶκετῶν) I certainly am far from believing. It is not improbable, however, that 5000 was an unusually large number of citizens to attend.’ Xenophon (Mem. iii. 6. 14) tells us that the city of Athens consisted of more than 10,000 houses—ἡ μὲν πόλις ἐκ πλευρῶν ἡ μυρίων οἰκίων συνεστήκε. Boeck (Staatshaush. d. Ath. i. p. 43, quoted by Kühner on Xen. Mem. iii. 6. 14) estimates the population of Athens (including the Piraeus) at 180,000—citizens, women, children, and slaves.

b. 32. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν | i.e. the size of the city.

1171 a. 2. ἑδόκει] viii. 5. 3 οἴκετι γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζήν.

§ 4. δίτι] Fritzsche reads δίτι with Kb; but δί- is to be explained as a dittograph of the preceding -α-.

a. 3. οὐχ οἷὸν τε πολλαῖς συζην καὶ διανέμειν ἑαυτὸν | Cf. i. 7. §§ 6, 7

§ 5. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ... a. 13 ὀλίγους] 'For it would a. 10. appear that it is not even possible to be a great friend of many persons; and this for the same reason that (dióter—'eandem ob causam ob quam,' Ramsauer) it is impossible to be in love with several persons; for, as love, which may be described as an excessive friendship, is for one person, so (δὴ a. 13) great friendship (τὸ σφόδρα φίλον εἶναι) is entertained towards a few. As the ἑπερχόλη φιλίας limits itself to one, τὸ σφόδρα limits itself to a few.


πλὴν πολιτικῶς] 'except in the sense in which fellow-citizens are a. 17. "friends."

Mich. Eph. cautions us against referring ὁς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἄρεσκους το πολιτικῶς, the words πλὴν πολιτικῶς being a parenthesis, the subject of which is taken up in the next sentence—πολιτικῶς μὲν ὁν κ.τ.λ. a. 17. On πολιτικὴ φιλία see ix. 6. §§ 2 and 3. On the ἄρεσκος see iv. 6. 9.

δὲ ἄρετὴν δὲ καὶ δὲ αὑτοῦ] αὑτοῦ is Bywater's reading for the a. 19. αὐτοῦ of the codd. I think that δὲ αὑτοῦ is right here, while δὲ αὐτοῦ is right in viii. 4. 2, a. 18: see note on that passage.

tουοῦτοις] worthy of being loved δὲ αὐτοῦς. a. 20.
CHAPTER XI.

ARGUMENT.

We come now to the question, Whether friends are more needed in prosperity or in adversity; for they are sought in both—in adversity, to render assistance, and in prosperity, as associates and recipients of beneficence. Well, our answer is that in adversity it is more necessary to have friends—accordingly in adversity men look out for useful friends; but better to have friends in prosperity—hence men are anxious to have good friends in prosperity, for these are more worthy associates, and recipients of beneficence: not that the very presence of one's friends is sweet in adversity, as well as in prosperity; for those who are in sorrow are lightened by their friends grieving with them—whether they are lightened because their friends take a share of the burden, as it were, or whether it is because the sorrow is made less by the sweetness of friends' presence and by the thought of sympathetic grief, need not be discussed here: the fact, at any rate, is that the presence of friends lightens sorrow. And yet the sweetness of their presence is a mixed sweetness. The very sight of one's friend, especially when one is in distress, is indeed sweet, and helps one to restrain sorrow; for the sight and word of a friend give one courage, if the friend have tact: he knows one's disposition so well, and the things which give one pleasure or pain. On the other hand, to see another in pain for one's misfortunes is painful. Everybody avoids being the cause of pain to his friends. Hence stout-hearted natures shrink from making their friends share pain with them, unless some great relief be thereby gained: indeed such natures cannot endure companions in lamentation, because they are not themselves given to lamentation. Lamentation they leave to weak women, and men as weak, who delight in it and love as friends those who join with them in their distress. It is these stout-hearted natures that we ought to copy; for we ought to copy, in all things, the better example.

In prosperity, however, the presence of friends gives sweetness to the employment of leisure, and it is sweet to think that they are near to take pleasure in one's well-being: wherefore it would seem right to be forward in calling in one's friends to share one's prosperity, but backward in calling them in to take part in one's adversity—'One for sorrow is enough': but if they are to be called in adversity, let it be when, with a little trouble, they are likely to do great good. On the other hand, a friend ought to come uncalled, where adversity may be aided; but, unless to help in carrying out some noble work, ought to be slow in coming where there is prosperity, and good things are to be enjoyed: but here again he must be careful not to seem churlish in rejecting advances.

Our conclusion then is, that the presence of friends is always desirable.
§ 1. ἀναγκαίωτερον μὲν ... κάλλιον δὲ] In adversity a man struggles with matter which opposes itself to the form of his εἴδαιμον: in prosperity he realises the beautiful form without hindrance. In the former case friends are means—instruments by means of which he grapples with his difficulties; in the latter case they are ends—persons in whom the object of his contemplation, human nature as a rational system, is adequately represented.

§ 2. ἡδεία καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις] Bekker a. 28. omits the words καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις. The authorities for their omission are Κb and CCC (CCC omits them in the text, and a later hand supplies them on the margin). They ought to be restored to the text: see Rassow, Forsch. pp. 67, 68. For δυστυχίαις Λb, Οb, and Ald. give ἀτυχίαις.


ἡ τούτῳ μὲν οὖ, κ.τ.λ.] Perhaps one’s friend does not relieve one of any part of the burden of one’s sorrow, but encourages one (παραμυθητικόν γὰρ ὁ φίλος § 3) to bear the whole weight manfully.

§ 3. παραμυθητικόν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ δὴ δφει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ] Coraes, b. 2. Michelet, and Fritzsche quote Eurip. Ion 132—
ei τι ντυγχάνοι κακόν,
eἰς ἄμματ' εἶνοι φωτός ἐμβλέψαε γλυκύ.
Cf. Menander (apud Stob. Flor. iv. 65, ed. Meineke)—
ὑδύ γε φίλου λόγος ἐστὶ τοῖς λυπουμένοις.

§ 4. καν μὴ ὑπερτείη τῇ ἀλυσίᾳ] ‘unless there be a great balance of relief’—otherwise expressed at the end of the next section, b. 19 ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὄχληθέντες μεγάλ’ αὐτῶν ὄχληθένσι. I cannot agree with the interpretation offered by Grant and most of the editors—‘unless he (i.e. ὁ ἀνδρώδης) be excessively impassive.’ The change from the plural εὐλαβοῦνται b. 7 to the singular ἱστομένει b. 8 is awkward, but need not surprise us. Bywater suggests that the clause b. 6 διὸπερ ... b. 7 ἀντοίς should be placed after θρηνητικός b. 10.

§ 5. ἐργητικόν] ἐργητικόν given only by Οb is accepted by b. 18.
1171 b. 16. Bekker. The word is a ἀπὸς εἰρήμενον. All other MSS. recorded give εὐφραγεῖκόν, which is rightly restored to the text by Rassow (Forsch. p. 68).

b. 18. ἀλὴς ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν] The Paraph. says—ὅ τραγῳδὸς φησιν. The words, however, do not occur in any extant play; and Ramsauer is perhaps right in thinking that too much has been made of the Paraphrast’s remark, and that we have here a common phrase, which it is not necessary to ascribe to a particular poet. Mich. Eph. refers the words to Euripides, whose ἀλὴς ἔχω τοῦ δυστυχῶν (Orest. 240) is quoted by the editors.

b. 22. § 6. καὶ [τὸ] μὴ δειξόσαντας] Rassow (Forsch. pp. 68, 69) advocates δειξόσαντας the reading of Kb (and CCC). This reading makes the τὸ (which is difficult with δειξόσαντας, and is omitted by Mb, and bracketed by Bywater, and gives place in Ald. to τοῦ) quite natural. Bywater’s suggestion, τὸ before εὖ ποιεῖν b. 21, ought, I think, to be accepted.


CHAPTER XII.

ARGUMENT.

As sight is the sense dearest to lovers, being, above all other senses, the seat and origin of their love; so, to spend their lives together is that which for friends is most choice-worthy, for friendship is communion. Now, as a man stands related to himself, so he stands related to his friend. The perception of his own existence is choice-worthy; therefore the perception of his friend’s existence. This latter perception he realises in spending his life with his friend. It is natural, then, that he should seek to spend his life with his friend. It follows that, in whatever a man makes his existence to consist, in that he wishes to spend his time with his friend. Wherefore some spend their time in drinking together, others in gambling together, others practise athletics, or hunt, or study philosophy together—all, according to their sorts, spending their days together in the pursuits with which they identify their lives.

Thus the friendship of bad men is an evil thing, for they are unstable, and share in things that are bad, becoming evil and like to one another: the friendship of the good is a good thing, and grows with intercourse; they become better by practice and mutual correction, being moulded to one another’s tastes.

§ 1. ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτής ἐν τῷ συζύγῳ i.e. ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ τῆς 1171 b. 35. αἰσθήσεως περὶ τῶν φιλῶν ὅτι ἑστὶν. For αὐτής, restored to the text by Susemihl and Bywater, Bekker reads αὐτοῖς: αὐτής is given by NC, and by corr. CCC.

§ 2. οἷς οἶονται συζύγῳ] haec faciunt haecque inter se communi- 1172 a. 8. cant, quibus se arbitrantur communi vitae societate inter se copulari’ (Lambinus). I think that the words are corrupt. I suggest ἐν οἷς οἶονται εἶναι τὸ ζῆν. NC and Paris. 1853 have οἷς οἶονται ζῆν. The Paraph., with οὕτω γὰρ συζύγῳ δυνατὸν, seems to have had before him the blunder ὥς οἷον τε which appears in Kb.

§ 3. ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες] See viii. 8. 5. a. 9.

ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ’ ἀλλήλων οἷς ἁρέσκονται] Fritzscbe quotes a. 12. Aristoph. Ranxe 1040 ὅθεν ἢ ἡ μὴ φρὴν ἀπομαζαμένη πολλάς ἁρετάς ἐποίησε Πατρόκλων Τεῦκρων, and Alciphro Ep. iii. 64 ὃ παῖς ἐστὶ ἄκριβεσταν ἐξεμάζου ὅν διδάσκαλου. Mich. Eph. has ἀπομάττοντας γὰρ ἀν’ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐπιστᾶνται πρὸς ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἀλλήλων έργα. These examples of the use of ἀπομάττεσθαι, or ἐκμάττεσθαι, seem to me to support Ramsauer’s remark—‘ἀπομάττεσθαι παρὰ τινὸς τι minus est “formam exprimere ex aliquo ut epistola obsignatur anulo,” quam “ea quae placet imitando (quasi digitis) apud se effingere.’”—‘For they copy from each other those traits which please them.’ Grant’s rendering—‘For they take the stamp of one another in those things which they like’—scarcely gives the exact force of ἀπομάττονται, or brings out the construction, which is ἀπομάττονται (middle) παρ’ ἀλλήλων ταῦτα οἷς ἁρέσκονται.

ἔσθλων μὲν γὰρ ἄν’ ἔσθλά] Theognis: see above ix. 9. 7, a. 12 : a. 13. quoted by Plato, Meno 95 D.
BOOK X.

CHAPTER I.

Argument.

Our next subject is Pleasure—admittedly a most important one: for Pleasure is inbred in our nature; pleasure and pain are the rudder-bands of education; there is nothing so important for morality, and consequently for the attainment of the Happy Life, as learning to like and dislike aright.

The subject then must by no means be omitted, especially as it is one on which there is great difference of opinion: for some maintain that Pleasure is the Chief Good, — while others—whether from conviction, or by way of pious fraud (pious frauds, it may be remarked, are generally found out, and do harm in the end—there is nothing so useful as the plain truth)—maintain that it is utterly bad.

1172 a. 19. § 1. peri ήδονής] See Introductory Note to vii. 11.

a. 20. συνωκειόμεθα] 'to have an intimate connexion with our nature' (Peters). Mich. Eph. has—οικεία τῇ φύσει ἡμῶν ἐστί καὶ ὡς οἰκείαν ἀπαντες αἰρούμεθα καὶ διώκομεν.

a. 21. πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἡθους ἁρετήν] Kb, Mb, Nb, and Cambr. read ἀρχήν. Mich. Eph., however, seems to have had ἁρετήν before him. His note is—μέγιστον δὴ φησὶ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἡθους ἁρετήν τὸ χαίρειν όις δεῖ—ἡθος ἁρετήν εἰπὼν αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρετήν ός εἰ ἔλεγε, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἡθικῆς ἁρετῆς κτήσιν μέγιστα συντελεῖ τὸ χαίρειν όις δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, Legg. 653, and E. N. ii. 3. §§ 1–4, also Pol. Θ. 5. 1340 a. 14 sqq., where the principle ἃ δὲ ἁρετή peri τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς
καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μοιεῖν is applied to determine the place of Music in 1172 a. 21. education, and the kinds of music that are to be taught.

§ 2. ὁπέρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων] For ὁπέρ = περὶ with gen. in the Ethics, a. 26. see notes on i. 5. 7; i. 6. 13, iii. 3. 2, iv. 2. 4.

οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ] Eudoxus . . . Speusippus. 'In all probability,' a. 27. says Grant ad loc., 'Aristotle here alludes immediately to two sections of the Platonists, (1) the party represented by Eudoxus, whose arguments are quoted; (2) that headed by Speusippus, whose antihedonistic arguments were contained in two books mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, under the titles περὶ ἡδονῆς α' 'Αριστερούς α', and which are now passed under review. Under the class of those who "call pleasure the chief good," Aristotle less directly refers to Aristippus, who, though he belonged to a bygone era, still lived in the pages of Plato's Philebus, and in the book of Speusippus bearing his name.'

Ramsauer has a pertinent observation—that in the parallel passage vii. i. 3 oἱ τἀγαθῶν ἡδονήν λέγοντες are not mentioned. Mich. Eph. has a very interesting note here—Ἐδεδόξες μὲν τὴν ἡδονήν ταύτων θέτο τἀγαθός ἔιδεκιν γὰρ ἄρχην καὶ αἰτίαν πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑτέρω, ός οἱ τὰς ιδεῖς πρεσβιέωντες τὸ αὐτοξύμων τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὸ αὐτώι τῶν ἄνων καὶ τὸν αὐτοκαλοῦς τῶν θεών καὶ τὸ αὐτοκάλλος τῶν καλλῶν. According to this account the doctrine of Eudoxus concerning pleasure was a development of, or perhaps only another way of stating, Plato's doctrine of the ιδία τἀγαθών. If it was this, Aristotle is unfair to it when he insinuates (as he does below ch. 2. § 1) that it was a doctrine of mere hedonism (in the Cyrenaic sense)—a doctrine which was not supposed to be so immoral in tendency as it really was, only on account of the temperate character of its author. Aristotle is too much inclined to criticise Plato and the Platonists au pied de la lettre. Is his criticism of Eudoxus a case in point?

οἱ μὲν ίσοι πεπεισμένοι . . . οἱ δὲ] Two classes of οἱ εἰς ἐνναῖας a. 29. καὶ δὴ φαίλῃ λέγοντες. So the Paraph.

διὰ δὲ εὖν . . . μέσων] Cf. ii. 9. 5. 'Aristotle does not approve of a. 32. this being done by means of a sacrifice of truth' (Grant).

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1 Cf. the marginale in Lb on i. 12. 5 (where see note) ἐλεγε γὰρ (ἢ Εὐδοξος) τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπίκεισα εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
§ 3. tois kata thn aisthethin] ‘palpable facts’ (Peters).

b. 2. toiauthe] i.e. efetiv understood from efemeneos. Mich. Eph. has—λεγοντες την ἥδουν φαύλην, είτα ἀποφαίνοντες ἁγαθὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιδιόκεισαν αὐτήν. The Paraph. has—ὁ γὰρ ψέων τὴν ἥδουν ὀφθαλίς ποτε ἐφεμένος αὐτῆς, ἀποκλίνει δοκεῖ πρῶς αὐτήν καὶ ἁγαθὸν ἠγείρον· καὶ οὕτω δοξα ἐντίθησι τοῖς ἀρώσιν οὗ τινα ἥδουν ἁγαθὸν εἶναι, ἄλλῃ ἀπλῶς ἀπανε ἐπικύνεσαι· τὸ γὰρ διοίρειν καὶ διαρέιν καὶ τὸ μὲν ἁγαθὸν κρίνειν, ἔνθεσθαι δὲ ἀλλην φαύλην εἶναι, οὐκ ἐστὶ τῶν πολλῶν· ἄλλα ἀμα τε εἶδον τῶν νοῦν ἔχουσα ἠδονή τινὶ χαίροντα, καὶ πάσαν ἥδουν ἁγαθὸν καὶ άπετέχθαν φύσισαν εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως οὗ μίνου ἐξαύλωσον οὐκ ἔτεσαιν, ἄλλα καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν προσαπόλεσαν—i.e. they say without qualification, by way of pious fraud, that all pleasure is bad; but when they are seen to seek some pleasures, they are thought to intimate that all pleasure is good. They thus not only fail to get people to enter into their pious fraud—to believe the general proposition ‘all pleasure is bad’—but they also discredit the particular proposition ‘some pleasures are bad,’ which, as their own actions show, is what they really believe to be true, and wish people to act upon. It would have been wiser to say at first that ‘some pleasures are bad’—to distinguish for the benefit of those who, unable to distinguish for themselves, generalise hastily from ἔργα. For ὡς τοιαῦταν Ald., NC, Paris. 1853, and B reads ὡς οὗ τοιαῦτην (= ἐκτητήν).

b. 3. § 4.] But a distinction which is consonant with ἔργα is of great practical use to those who understand it (τοῖς συνιένταις); of course, only those can understand moral distinctions placed before them, who have had the preliminary moral training insisted on in E. N. i.: cf. i. 4. 6 διό δὲ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἥχθαι καλῶς τῶν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ δῶς τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουστικῶν ικανῶς. Without such moral training no one can display the σύνεσις which consists ἐν τῷ χρησθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ᾧ ἡ φρόνησις ἐστιν, ἀλλον λόγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς (E. N. vi. io. 3). It is in connexion with the doctrine of σύνεσις thus laid down that we must understand the expression τοῖς συνιένταις in the present passage. For the practical value of λογοι, or γνώσις, to those who have received good moral training, see note on i. 3. 7—τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὑρέξεις ποιειμένους καὶ πράττουσι πολυμφελές ἀν εἰη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι.
CHAPTER II.

Argument.

Eudoxus thought that Pleasure was the Chief Good, (1) because all creatures, rational and irrational, pursue it (his doctrine was accepted as true, not so much on its own merits, as because it came from one who, being very temperate, was supposed to take an impartial view of Pleasure); (2) because all creatures avoid its contrary, Pain. Further, he argued that no one asks why Pleasure is desirable; and that added to any good thing, e.g. the performance of justice, it makes that good thing better. This last argument, we may say in passing, proves that Pleasure is a good thing, but not that it is the good—indeed it is the sort of argument that Plato employs to show that Pleasure is not the Chief Good—the Chief Good, he argues, cannot be enhanced by the addition of any other good, and Pleasure with Wisdom is better than Pleasure without Wisdom.

Those who meet Eudoxus with the objection—that what all pursue is not good, commit themselves to an untenable position. What all pursue must be good: manifestly what all rational beings pursue; and even the irrational creatures are divinely impelled to seek after their own good.

Nor is there any force in the objection raised against the argument which Eudoxus draws from the universal avoidance of Pain, the contrary of Pleasure. The objection is—that it does not follow from Pain being evil, that Pleasure is good; for evil may be opposed to evil, and both evils to that which is neutral. This formula of opposition is all very well as a formula, but it is not applicable to Pleasure and Pain: for if both were evil, we should find both avoided; if both were neutral we should find neither avoided, or both avoided alike; whereas we see plainly that men avoid the one as evil, and seek the other as good.

§ 1. Εὐδόκεος] of Cnidus, one of Plato's disciples, a celebrated astronomer, mentioned in Met. A. 8 as the author of a theory of the motions of the heavenly bodies, which is described; and in Met. A. 9. 991 a. 15, as holding the view that the ideas are mixed in sensible things, like the ὅμοιομερή of Anaxagoras—cf. Alex. ad loc. (p. 72. 4) καὶ Εὐδόκεος τῶν Πλάτων ψυχρίμων μὲν τῶν ἱδεῶν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰς τὸ εἶναί ἔχουσιν ἔχειτο ἐκαστὸν ἐναι: of which view he proceeds to give the refutation contained in the second Book of Aristotle's peri ἱδεῶν, but omitted in the Metaphysics: see Alex. Met. 73. 11 (ed. Bonitz). Eudoxus' theory of pleasure,
1172 b. 9. discussed here, has already been mentioned E. N. i. 12. 5, on which see note. Spengel (Arist. Stud. i. Nic. Eth. pp. 218, 219) and Ramsauer complain, unnecessarily I think, of the confused manner in which the argument of Eudoxus is here presented.

b. 15. διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἢδους ἀρετὴν] Grant sees in this 'a pleasing reference to the personal character of Eudoxus': but see note on x. 1. 2, a. 27.

b. 20. § 2. ὅμοιως i. e. καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσι (Ramsauer).

δὲ μὴ δι' ἑτερον μὴ δὲν ἕτερον χάριν] The latter of these expressions seems to be added merely as an alternative for the former. They seem to have exactly the same meaning.

b. 25. αὐξησθαι δὲ] Bekker reads καὶ αὐξησθαι δὴ. Kb and Lb omit καὶ. Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater read αὐξησθαι δὲ, the δὲ being Ramsauer's conjecture for the δὴ of the codd. Spengel (Arist. Stud. 218) asks with some force—How could Eudoxus, who wished to prove that ἢδων is τάγαθον, have used this argument as Aristotle here (§ 3) understands it? What Eudoxus really meant, Spengel thinks, was something very different—viz. When ἢδων is added to any good thing however small, that good thing surpasses all other good things however great, to which ἡδων is not added. That which can thus enhance the smallest good above the greatest, must itself stand higher than the greatest—must be, in short, τάγαθον. This view of the relation of ἢδων to ἄγαθον, attributed to Eudoxus by Spengel, agrees substantially with the account of his theory given by Mich. Eph. (see note on E. N. x. 1. 2), and with the marginal commentary on i. 12. 5 in Lb (see note ad loc.) ἔλεγε γὰρ τὴν ἢδωνν ἐπέκεινα εἰναι πάντων τῶν ἄγαθῶν.

b. 28. § 3. Πλάτων] See Philebus 60 D, E, where it is shown that the best life for man is ὁ μικτὸς βίος ἢδωνς τε καὶ φρονήσεως.

b. 31. οὐδεῖν γὰρ προστεθέντως αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ.] 'For the highest good is not made better by the addition of anything.' For αὐτῷ Kb (alone it would seem) gives αὐτῷ preferred by Bekker and Susemihl.

b. 34. § 4. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ.] 'What good is there, then, which is thus incapable of addition, and at the same time such as men can participate in it?' (Peters.)

Those who bring against the first argument of Eudoxus the objection, or ἐννοητικος (An. Prior. ii. 26, 69 a. 37 ἐννοητικος δʼ ἐστι προτάσει προτάσει ἐννοητικος), that 'what all seek is not good,' commit themselves to an untenable position in Aristotle's opinion; ἀ γὰρ τὰ δὲ δοκεῖ, ταῦτα εἶναι φαινεῖ—securus judicat orbis terrarum. Their ἐννοητικος is παράδοξος, and, as such, is dialectically inadmissible, dialectic admitting only ἐννοητικος, save when the paradoxes are those of great philosophers (θεωρία), for as the paradoxes of ordinary men, it would be silly to pay attention to them—Tôp. i. i. 104 b. 22 τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐννοητικος τοὺς διάκεις ἀποφημαμένου φροντίζειν εἴδης.

ὁργητα] Bekker's ὁργητα is the reading of Lb, Paris. 1853, 1173 a. 2, and apparently of Mich. Eph. and the Paraph. All other authorities (including CCC, Cambr., B1, B2, B3) have ὁργητα, adopted by Bywater. For εὶ in this line and in the next, we perhaps ought to follow Michelet in reading ἢ.

alpha] Cambr. has αὐτής.

Ἀν ἐν τε λεγόμενον] Bekker's τὸ before λεγόμενον is omitted by Kb, Lb, Mb, Ob, Cambr., NC, Paris. 1853, B3.

φαῦλοις] the 'inferior,' or irrational animals—τὰ ἄνόητα.

ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν] Susemihl, following Thurot, brackets ἀγαθὸν, and Bywater's note is—'φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν fort. secludenda.' I think that it is likely that both words come from the margin.

tοῦ οἰκεῖου ἀγαθοῦ] 'their proper good' (Peters): ὡς, when a. 5. they seem to be indulging merely their own caprices, as individuals, they are really maintaining the εἰδος of their race—striving after τὸ ἐκ καὶ τὸ θεῖον. At the end of the Philebus (67 B) Socrates says that to go to the lower animals for arguments in favour of pleasure is to trust 'the augury of birds,' instead of 'the Muse of Philosophy—ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πτέρυγαν κατὰ τὴν κατίσιν, ἢν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπεφήνατο γένοις' ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις. ΠΡΩ. Του εὐκεν. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον δὲ γε οὐδὲν ἤν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἄλλα ξύμπαντα θηρία φώσα τῷ τῷ χαίρειν διάκειν. οῖς πιστεύοντες, ἀπερ πάντες ἀρνοῦν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ γὰρ ἦν ἢν εὗ κρατῖσται εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἐφαίται οἶονται κυρίους εἰναι μάρτυραι μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἐν Μοῦσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντε-μένον ἐκόστοιε λόγον. Aristotle may have had this passage in his mind here.
BOOK X: CHAP. 2: § 5.

1173 a. 5. § 5. oük έσοικε δε οὔδε περὶ τοῦ ἑναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι] ‘nor is what the opponents of Eudoxus say about “the contrary”’ (i.e., about his argument from the contrary—viz. pain—οὐκ ἤττον δ’ φείτ’ εἶναι φανερῶν εκ τοῦ ἑναντίου § 2 above) satisfactory either.'

a. 6. οὗ γάρ φασιν, κ.τ.λ.] See notes on vii. 13. 1. Mich. Eph. has the following commentary here—ο’ εκ τοῦ ἑναντίου συνιστῶν τὴν ἡδονήν ἀγαθὸν λόγος τοιοῦτος ἵνα εἰ ἡ λύπη ἑναντία οὕσα τῇ ἡδονῇ κακῶν ἐστὶν, ἀγαθὸν ἄρα ἡ ἡδονή. πάθεν δὲ—ὅτι ἡ λύπη κακῶν, εκ τοῦ πάντα φεύγειν αὐτήν. πρὸς τούτον τῶν λόγων τὸν ἑκ τοῦ ἑναντίου συνιστῶτα τὴν ἡδονήν ἀγαθῶν, ἐνώστατα ὁ Σπεύσιππος λέγων, οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἐπείδη κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ λύπη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀντικείμενην αὐτῆς ἡδονήν οὐ γὰρ πάν τὸ ἀντικείμενον κακῷ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἀντίκειται γὰρ τῇ βραχύτητι κακῷ ὀντι, ἡ δελία, καὶ οὗ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἡ δελία, ἀλλὰ κακῶν . . . ἀντίκειται οὖν φησι Σπεύσιππος καὶ κακῶν κακὸ καὶ ἀμφότερον τοῦ μηδετέρου, τοῦτοτι καὶ ἀμφότερα τὰ κακὰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ μηδετέρου γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶπεν. αἱ γὰρ ἄρεται μεσότητες οὐσαί οὐδετέρον τῶν ἄκρων εἰσὶν. γὰρ ἄρη ἀνδρεία οὔτε δελία οὔτε βραχύτητι ἐστὶ . . . καὶ λέγει ταύτα καλῶς, ἀλλήλες γὰρ ἐστὶν εἰπέων ὅτι ἀντίκειται κακῶν κακῷ, καὶ ἀμφότερα τὰ κακὰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ τοῦτο μὲν οὖν λέγουσα καλῶς: τὸ δ’ ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ὡς κακῶν κακῷ ἀντίκειται τῇ λύπῃ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς. οὐ γὰρ ἀντίκειται ἡ ἡδονή τῇ λύπῃ ὡς κακῶν κακῷ ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀγαθὸν κακῷ: εἰ γὰρ ἡν κακὸν ἡ ἡδονὴ ἢ καὶ φειδτὸν καὶ μοιητὸν ὡς ἡ λύπη· νῦν δὲ τῷ μὲν λύπην φεύγει πάντα . . . ὡς κακῶν, διώκει δὲ τῇ τὴν ἡδονήν ὡς ἀγαθὸν.

a. 8. ἀμφῳ τῷ μηδετέρῳ] τῷ μηδετέρῳ seems to be the reading only of ι, Mich. Eph., and Ar. All other authorities apparently read τῷ μηδετέρῳ (so KĻB, Ob, B1, B2, CCC, NC, Cambr., Ald.) or τῷ μηδετέρων (Mb, B2). The reading τῷ μηδετέρῳ is strongly supported by Plato, Rep. 583 E ἤ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδετέρων ἢ ἀμφότερα γίγνεσθαι—words which occur in a context which, I think, Aristotle has in his mind here.

a. 10. ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν (τῶν) κακῶν] Bywater adds τῶν—a distinct improvement to the clause. The ὄντων κακῶν of KĻ (and B2), accepted by Bekker and Susemihl, shows us how the original τῶν dropped out.

a. 11. τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδετέρων ἢ ὁμοίως] The construction apparently is τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ ὄντων (if both pleasure and pain belong to the class of neutral states), μηδετέρων (neither of them) ἢ δει λεγοῦν εἶναι, ἢ ὁμοίως ἐκάτερον φιλεῖν:—or as Coraes puts it—ἐι ἦσαν
As directed against Speusippus the words before us are pointless. Speusippus did not regard pleasure and pain as μηδέτερα, but as κακά—'Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dixerunt opposita inter se, bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret'—Aul. Gell. ix. 5. In fact, only the words ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ὅστιν (τῶν) κακῶν are referable to Speusippus. As regards the words τῶν μηδέτερων δὲ μηδέτερον ἡ ὁμοίως, one would be tempted to accept the latter of the alternatives offered by Ramsauer—'aut corrigenda, aut secludenda'—were it not possible to point to the discussion in Rep. 583 sq. (mentioned above), where ἡσυχία, or τὸ μεταξὺ is spoken of as sometimes 'painful,' sometimes 'pleasant.' It will be seen that Plato's attitude to the supposition τῶν μηδέτερων δὲ is practically the same as Aristotle's—Καὶ εὖ ἄλλος γε, οἴμαι, πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι αἰσθάνει γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπώσι, τὸ μη λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὥς ἤδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαῖρεν. Τούτῳ γάρ, ἐφι, τὸτε ἦδο ἦσοι καὶ ἄγαπητὸν γίνεται, ἡσυχία. Καὶ τῶν παύσιται ἄρα, εἰπον, χαῖρον τις, ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρῶν ἦσται. Ἦσοι, ἐφι. Ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφότεροι ἐφαμέν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτο ποτὲ ἀμφότερα ἦσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή. Ἔοικεν. Ἡ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὄν ἀμφότερον γίνεσθαι; Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. Καὶ μὴ τὸ γε ἦδο ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κινήσις τις ἀμφότερος ἦστον ἦ oὐ; Ναι. Τὸ δὲ μητε λυπηρόν μητε ἦδο οὐχ ἡσυχία μένοι καὶ ἐν μὲσῳ τούτῳ ἐφανῇ ἄρτι; Ἐφανὴ γάρ. Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἄλγειν ἦδο ἢγειτθαί ἢ τὸ μη χαίρειν ἄναρν; Οὐδεμάς. Οὐκ ἦστιν ἄρα τούτο, ἄλλα φαίνεται, ἢν o' εὖ, παρὰ τὸ ἄλγειον ἦδο καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἦδο ἄλγειον τότε ἡ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδεν ὑγείας τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡσυχίας ἀλλήλων, ἄλλα γοητεία τις. Ὄς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἐφη, σημαινεί. Ἡδε τοῖνυν, ἐφην εὖ, ἡδονᾶς, αὐτε εκ λυπῶν εἰςιν, ἵνα μή πολλάκις οἰδήθη ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω τούτῳ περικείναι, ἡδονὴν μὲν παύλαν λύπης εἶναι, λύπην δὲ ἡδονῆς. Ποῦ δὴ, ἐφη, καὶ ποιεῖσθαι λέγεις; Πολλαὶ μὲν, εἰπον, καὶ ἄλλαι, μᾶλλον δ' εὶ θελεῖς ἐννοησαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ὁσμᾶς ἡδονᾶς. αὐτὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόλυ- πηθέντει ἐξαιτίας ἀμέλειας τὸ μέγεθος γίγνοντα, παυσάμεναι τε λύπην οὐδεμιᾶν καταλείπουσιν. Ἀληθεύτατα, ἐφη. Μὴ ἄρα πειθώμεθα καθαρῶν
CHAPTER III.

**ARGUMENT.**

The argument that 'Pleasure is not good, because it is not a Quality' proves too much:—virtuous actions are not qualities, nor is Happiness a quality.

To those who argue that 'Pleasure is not good, because it is indefinite, and indefinite because it admits of degrees' we answer—(a) Perhaps your conclusion relies on the circumstance that people are pleased in various degrees: but you cannot infer that there are degrees in Pleasure itself because people are pleased in various degrees, any more than you can infer degrees in Συναισθήσεως because Συναισθήσεως admits of comparative and superlative degrees—δικαιότερος, δικαίωτατος.

(b) Perhaps you will reply that you look, not at people pleased, but at pleasures themselves, and find that they admit of degrees: then, we answer, it is at the mixed pleasures you look: they indeed admit of degrees; but it is not to the mixed but to the pure pleasures that you ought to go for evidence.

(c) Finally, if you maintain that even the pure pleasures admit of degrees, we may grant that they do, without allowing your inference that therefore they are indefinite and bad: a thing may admit of degrees within definite limits—health, e.g. varies, without ceasing to be the definite thing that it is: so may pleasure too.

The argument that the good is perfect, or has realised the end, whereas Pleasure is only a Motion or a Process which is imperfect, we meet by pointing out that it is unmeaning to speak of Pleasure, which is neither quick nor slow, as a Motion; or as a Process of generation—for what, it may be asked, is generated out of what by the so-called process, and what is resolved back into what by the reverse process, Pain? To say that 'Pain is the dissolution of that of which Pleasure is the generation' is to use words without meaning. Where, it may be asked, are the elements organised by the so-called 'generation,' and separated by the so-called 'dissolution'?
Again, to describe Pleasure as Repletion is to confound Pleasure itself and a bodily process with which certain pleasures are associated—those lower pleasures which are felt when want is being satisfied; for the higher pleasures—those of thinking and some of the bodily pleasures—are not associated with the repletion of want and the relief of pain.

To those who bring forward the disgraceful pleasures as evidence against Pleasure in general, we have to point out that it is only to ill-conditioned natures that the objects of these pleasures are 'pleasant': in short, that there are good pleasures and bad pleasures—those being good which attend good functions, or are raised by good objects, bad, which attend bad functions, or are raised by bad objects.

That pleasures differ specifically as their objects differ is, in short, our final answer to those whose arguments we have been examining. It is unmeaning to say 'Pleasure is good,' or 'Pleasure is bad.' Pleasure in what objects? we ask. There are objects in which we ought not to take pleasure, and there are objects which we should pursue even if no pleasure were connected with them.

We see, then, on the one hand that Pleasure is neither the Chief Good nor all desirable, and on the other hand that some pleasures are desirable.

§ I] See Cal. 8. 8 b. 27, where ἐξεύς are given as the first and most important kind of ποιότητας. The ἄρετα, or virtuous ἐξεύς, are, it is true, ποιότητας—and, as possessing such ποιότητας, we are ποιοὶ τινες καὶ ἀγαθοὶ (E. N. i. 9. 8); but there are things which are not ποιότητας, and yet are good. The ἐνέργεια which spring from ἄρετα are not ποιότητας: cf. Poet. 6. 1450 a. 18 καὶ γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν πρᾶξις ἔστι, καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξεις τις ἔστιν οὐ ποιότητα εἰσά ἔν κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἰθή ποιοὶ τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαιμονες ἡ τοιοῦται. To be good, a thing need not be a permanent state (ἐξεύς), like virtue or health. The act of vision, e.g., is good and perfect within the limits of a moment. So also is the experience of pleasure (see x. 4. 1). The argument which Aristotle here opposes is founded on a very natural feeling—viz. that to be good, and worth having, a thing must endure permanently; especially the conscious life of the individual to be worth having at all, must endure permanently. But Aristotle does not share this feeling. Consciousness, he would tell us, is fully good within the limits of an indivisible moment; its essential goodness is independent of time: let those who maintain that, if the individual consciousness is ever to be extinguished, then it is not worth having at all, look at Nature. Why does Nature produce the individual organisms of plants and animals, and allow them to perish without possibility of revival? Is it not 'good' for these individuals to live while they live, and are their lives less perfect and good, because they are not permanent?
BOOK X: CHAP. 3: §§ 1, 2.

1173 a. 13. 'Alla mhn oude to aidiou einai mallon agathov estai, etper mide leniokteron to polychronon tov efhiperou.

It will be observed that the position combated in the present § (x. 3. 1) is really that which the writer of vii. 12. 2 attacks—the simple identification of eigos and agathon: see note there on tov agathou to mev energeia to de eigos 1152 b. 33.

a. 15. § 2. λέγουσι... ηττον] See Plato, Philebus 24 Σ Σ. Nīn mēntoi abrei tēs tov apeiropou phōneos eī toûto deziōmeva simeios, ēna mē pānt' epexwntes mekūnonem. ΠΡΩ. Tō pōtan dh lēgeis; Σ. 'Opea' ēn ēmīn phainetai mallon te kai ἥττον γεγράμενα kai to sphōdra kai ἡρμα dekhamena kai to lian kai ἄsta toaia ta panta, eis to tov apeiropou gēnos os eis èn deĩ panta tausta tisbainai: see also Philebus 31 A noûs mēn aitias ēn xunygennh kai toušov schedon tov gēnos, ηδων dh ἀπειρος te autē kai toû mīte ērhv mīte mēsa mīte tēlos ēn ēautt' ἀφ' ēautου ἐχωντος μηδὲ ἐξουντος ποτὲ gēnos.

a. 17. eĩ mēn ouῦn ēk toû ἕδεσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι] 'If it is from observing people pleased that they come to the conclusion that pleasure admits of degrees and is therefore not good, they will have, by parity of reasoning, to conclude that justice admits of degrees and is therefore not good, because people are just in various degrees.' Cf. Cat. 8. 10 b. 33 dikaiosúnh ēn mēn gar dikaiosúnh os ou pānu fasī dēn lægesaī mallon kai ἥττον, oudē ēγειαν ἑγειας ἥττων mēntoi ēxei ἐτέrhoν ἑγειαν, kai dikaiosún̄ ἐτερον ἑτέρου... dikaiosteros γαρ ἐτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται. Thus to ἕδεσθαι, 'the being pleased'—for which we may substitute ὁ ἡδομένος, 'the man who is pleased,' answers to the adjective dikaios in the passage quoted from the Categories; and as dikaios may become dikaiosteros, so ὁ ἡδομένος may be 'more pleased'; but as we do not infer from dikaiosteros that dikaiosunh itself is indefinite and bad, so we must not infer from ἕδεσται tis mallon that ἡδων is indefinite and bad. The Paraph. ēn ἡ ἐπίταυς kai ēn ēnsws ēn τῶ ἕδεσθαι γίνεται ὅτι ἡδομένοι mallon kai ἥττων ἡδονα τοῦτο δὲ kai ēn tais āretaís sēmbaivn duo phainetai dikaios gar ēnai mallon kai ἥττων āndrhoi... ēlλα ou diá touto ānostrōi ēsoun al āretaí tōn autōn dh tρόπων kai ἡ ἡδων āutē mēn kath ēautēn òk ēstivn āmēsos, ēn dh tais ἡδομένως tē ēpitaun kai tēn ēnswn epidēℓεται. Similarly Mich. Eph. speaks of the eidos or tī ēnai of anādeia, σωφροσύνη, or ἡδων, as being tōu' ὅτερ ēstivn, and as ēnπίσταν τε καὶ ἀνίσεν. The distinction drawn here and in Cat. 8. 10 b. 33, between dikaios and dikaiosunh is now familiar as that between an adjective which admits of 'degrees of comparison,' and an abstract noun which does not.
But this and other distinctions of the kind did not present them- selves to Aristotle and his contemporaries as 'grammatical' distinctions. Grammar, as a separate πραγματεία, did not as yet exist. Much that seems out of place, and even frivolous, in Aristotle's discussions of physical and other questions, and especially in his refutations of the views of opponents, is to be explained by this circumstance. Distinctions not clearly recognised as grammatical were thought to be germane to subjects with which we should say at once that they have nothing to do. But although the scientific subjects immediately in hand often derived little benefit from such verbal discussions, language, the instrument of all science, was being perfected by them for future use. One of the most interesting achievements of the Greeks was the abstraction of the Form from the Matter of Speech, as we find it made by Apollonius and his brother-grammarians; and not the least important aspect in which Greek philosophical activity (and notably Aristotle's philosophy) may be regarded is as the process by which the abstraction was gradually effected, and language made an instrument of fine thinking. The services of the schoolmen, too, in this respect must not be ignored.

εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς . . . μεῖκτα[1] I agree with Rassow (Forsch. a. 22. p. 69) that the correct reading is that of Κb, εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς sc. τῶν κρίνων. With κρίνων either εἴ or the dat. may be used in cases like this, but not εὖ, which Bekker reads before ταῖς ἡδοναῖς. 'But if they come to the conclusion that pleasure is bad from looking not at people pleased, but at the nature of the various pleasures themselves, I fear that they have not got hold of the right premisses for their purpose, if there be any truth in their own distinction between pure and mixed pleasures'—i. e. although the mixed pleasures may be indefinite, the pure pleasures certainly are not: and it is to them, rather than to the mixed pleasures, that we have a right to ask ὅταν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς κρίνωντες to go for their premisses. Cf. Philebus 52 C, where ἀμετρία is assigned as the characteristic of the mixed, and μετρία of the pure pleasures. 'Speusippus,' says Grant, ii. p. 319, 'forgetful of this distinction appears to have made ἀμετρία a universal predicate of pleasure.' The μεῖκταί ἡδοναί of Plato are the bodily pleasures which involve pain and want, the ἀμεγές or καθαραῖ the intellectual pleasures and those bodily pleasures which involve neither pain nor want—the
pleasures of smell, sight, and hearing. Mich. Eph. is, therefore, entirely wrong when he says λέγει δὲ ἀμυγεῖς μὲν ἡδονὰς αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ χωρὶς τῶν ὑποκειμένων τὸ εἴδος τῆς ἡδονῆς νουθέτων . . . μεμημέναι δ' αἱ ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοι ἐν ἑπτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει ιστανται.

§ 3. καὶ τὶ κωλύει, κ.τ.λ.] Bekker's τὶ γὰρ κωλύει is the reading of Mb alone. Ob has τὶ γὰρ κωλύεται, but γὰρ is not given by any other MS. Kb has καὶ τὶ κωλύεται, Γ τὶ δὲ κωλύει, and Lb, CCC, Cambr., B1, B2, NC, P2 all have τὶ κωλύει δὲ. The authority therefore for Bekker's γὰρ is of the slightest. γὰρ seems to have been substituted for καὶ or δὲ to make the clause explain the erroneous meaning attached to μικταί, which were taken (as by Mich. Eph. quoted at the end of last note) to be αἱ ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοι, while αἱ ἀμυγεῖς were thought to stand for τὸ εἴδος τῆς ἡδονῆς. But if we read τὶ δὲ κωλύει (see Rassow, Forsch. pp. 69, 70), the clause is seen to contain not an explanation of a. 22 εἰ δὲ . . . a. 23 μικταί, but a new argument against the view τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀόρατον εἶναι. The first part of § 2 argued that the fact that people are pleased more and less does not imply that pleasure itself admits of more and less, or is indefinite: the second part of § 2 argued that even though the mixed or lower bodily pleasures may themselves admit of more and less and be indefinite, yet the pure pleasures are not indefinite: while the clause beginning τὶ δὲ κωλύει goes further, and questions the validity of the inference ἀόρατον εἶναι δὲ δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἦττον, and suggests that the εἴδος of even a pure pleasure may display degrees without ceasing to be the εἴδος that it is, or becoming ἀόρατον.

οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία] These words seem to me to prove that Aristotle is not thinking of the mixed pleasures in this section, as most of the commentators suppose, but of the pure pleasures which involve συμμετρία or proportion (Phil. 52 C). Aristotle, using for the occasion Platonic language, points out that the definite proportion which constitutes a pure pleasure may be realised and maintained in different ways, just as the balance of health or virtue may be effected by many different arrangements of the elements which are organised. Grant seems to me to be wrong when he says in his note here—'even the mixed pleasures, says Aristotle, admit the idea of proportion (συμμετρία).'

§ 4. τέλειον τε τὰ γαθὸν τιθέντες] Plato, Philebus 53 C–54 C: see notes on vii. 12. 3. Aristotle's argument against the view that
pleasure is a κίνησις is—If pleasure is a 'motion,' it must be quick or slow. Can we speak of pleasure as quick or slow? We may pass into a pleasurable state quickly or slowly; but the pleasure actually felt is not quick or slow: see Phys. E. i. 225 b. 8 for the three kinds of κίνησις—(1) ή τοῦ ποιεῖν = ἀλλοιώσις: (2) ή τοῦ ποιοῦ = αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις: (3) ή κατὰ τόπον = φορά.

καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὐτῆς, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο] The κόσμος a. 32. is here the universe, as one whole, moving with the πρῶτος οὐρανὸς, or ἀπλανῆς σφαῖρα, the κυκλοφορία of which is uniform, and therefore cannot be called either quick or slow, when regarded per se—καθ' αὐτήν, although πρὸς ἄλλο—compared with the proper motions of the inner planetary spheres—it is quick. With οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου we must understand οἷον ἐστι τάχος καὶ βραδύτης καθ' αὐτήν. On the motion of the πρῶτος οὐρανὸς see de Coelo ii. 6. 288 a. 13 peri de τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ ὅτι ὁμαλῆς ἐστι καὶ οἷον ἄνωμαλος, ἐφεξῆς τῶν εἰρημένων διελθεῖν λέγω δὲ τούτῳ peri τοῦ πρῶτου οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς πρώτης φορᾶς: see notes on iii. 3. 3. The comment of Mich. Eph. on the present passage is—ο δὲ λέγει ἐστίν εἰ μὴ πᾶσα κίνησις αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν τὸ βάττον ἐπιδεχεται, οἷον ἡ τοῦ κόσμου, λέγων νῦν κόσμου αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπλανῆ σφαῖραν ἀνεπιδεκτος γὰρ ἐστὶ τάχους καὶ βραδύτητας διὰ τὸ ὁμαλῶς κινεῖσθαι τὴν τοιαύτην σφαῖραν, ὡς ἐν τῷ peri οὐρανοῦ δώδεκα τ' ἄλλ' οἷον πρὸς τὰς τῶν πλανωμένων κινήσεις εἰ τές αὐτῆς παραβάλλοι, εὑρίσκει βάττον πάνω πολλῷ τῶν κινήσεων ἑκείνων.

tούτων δὲ ἄλλως] Pleasure has τάχος καὶ βραδύτης neither καθ' a. 33. αὐτῆς, οἷον πρὸς ἄλλο.

ἡθήναι] 'to become pleased' = μεταβάλλειν eis τὴν ἡδωνή a. 34. 1173 b. 2.

ἡδεσθαι] 'to have the feeling of pleasure' = ἐνεργεῖν κατ' αὐτῆν b. 1. b. 3.

§ 5.] In this section Aristotle deals with the view that ἡδωνή is b. 4. a γένεσις, in the same way as he has dealt with the view that it is a κίνησις. If it is a γένεσις, he argues, there must be certain definite elements which this particular γένεσις called ἡδωνή organises; and the disorganising process, or φθορά, contrary to this γένεσις—which is λύπη according to the Platonists, for they say οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδωνή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορᾶ—will leave these same elements in separation for our inspection. Where are the elements in question?
They are not to be found. The term γένεσις is used with as little regard for its real meaning as the term κίνησις is when applied to that which is neither quick nor slow. It is to be carefully noted, that καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου η λύπη φθορά is the statement of the Platonists. See Grant’s note ad loc. to which I am much indebted. Mich. Eph. has the following comment on this section—ἐὰν οὖν καὶ ἡ ἡδονή γένεσις ἦν, ὃν ὁδός τις καὶ μεταβολὴ ἐκ τινος εἰς τι, ὡς ἡ μελαν- σίς ἐκ λευκοῦ εἰς μέλαν . . . οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὸ ἀφ’ οὔτε οὔτε τὸ εἰς, οὐκ ἐστὶ γὰρ οὔτε τὸ ἀλλοιώμενον καὶ μεταβάλλειν καὶ γεγομένων τι διὰ ἡδονῆς, οὔτε τέλος τι εἰς ὁ τελευτὰ ἡ ἡδονή, ὡσπερ ἡ ὑγιεστερία εἰς τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ ἡ θέρμασις εἰς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως συμβαίνει, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ γένεσις ἄλλ’ ἑνεργεια, ὡς δείχνει, καὶ αἱ ἑνεργείαι τέλη εἰσάν ἄλλ’ οὐχ ὁδὸι πρὸς τέλη . . . οὐκ ἐστὶ γὰρ μόρφων τοῦ τοῦ χρόνου καθ’ ὃν ἦθεται ἐν φ’ οὗ τέλος ἦν ἐν τῷ ἡδομένῳ ἡ ἡδονή. τὸ δ’ ἐν ὅπεσα τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου τέλεων τι καὶ ὀλύκληρον δὲν οὐ γένεσις ἑστὶν ἄλλ’ ἑνεργεια. See x. 4. 4.

b. 7. § 8.] The following passage in the Philebus (31 E–32 B) presents the doctrine criticised in this section, as well as that disposed of in §§ 5—ΣΩ. Πείνη μὲν πον ἡδονή καὶ λύπη; ΠΡΩ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Ἐδοκή ἰδὲ, πλῆρως γεγομένη πάλιν, ἡδονή; ΠΡΩ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Δίψος δὲ αὐτοῦ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λέσσει], ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ἕρμαυτον πληροῦσα δύναμις ἡδονή. διάκρισις δὲ γ’ αὐτῷ καὶ διάλογος ἡ παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνεύμονος πάθη, λύπη; κατὰ φύσιν δ’ ἡ πάλιν ἀπάθεια τε καὶ ψυχῆς ἡδονή. ΠΡΩ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Καὶ ρίγουσι ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ὀξοῦ τῆς ὑγρότητος πτηζὶς λύπη· πάλιν δ’ εἰς ταῦτα ἀπίστων καὶ διακριμένων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδός ἡδονή. καὶ εἰναὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἰς οὐκ ἔντως ὁ λόγος, δὲ ἐν φῃ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέραστος κατὰ φύσιν ἐμψυχον γεγονός εἴδος, ὀπέρ ἔληγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τούτῳ ἰδέερηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ’ εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν ωσίαν ὁδόν, ταῦταν δ’ αὐτὸ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.

b. 11. οὖ δοκεῖ δὲ] ‘but nobody thinks so.’ Aristotle speaks here as if Plato differed. Plato is entirely at one with Aristotle in holding all pleasure to be psychical.

b. 12. ἀλλὰ γνωμένης μὲν ἀναπληρῶσεως ἡδονή] ἐν τῷ—And this was what Plato meant after all. Any one but a very captious critic can see that when Plato says ἐδοκῆ δὲ πλασίμματος γεγομένη ἡδονή, he merely uses an abbreviated expression, as when we say ‘work is a pleasure to him,’ meaning that work gives him pleasure. Again, when Aristotle says b. 13 ἡ δὲ οὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενήθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, he merely states what Plato himself
consistently maintains—that the pleasures which are ἀναπληρώσεις or 1173 b. 12. ἀπαλλαγαί λύπης are those of eating and drinking; but that they are not the only pleasures—there are pure pleasures which are not associated with pain and want—a statement which Aristotle makes in § 7 as if it were an original correction of his own necessitated by the onesidedness of the Platonic theory, which he allows his readers to infer took its idea of all pleasure from the ἀναπληρώσεις of eating and drinking. All this strikes one as being very disingenuous; unless indeed it be that, not Plato, but Speusippus is criticised, and that Speusippus entirely ignored the ‘pure pleasures’ of his master—which is unlikely.

Spengel conjectures κενούμενος, Zeller δεδομένος, Bywater ἕυθείς γινόμενος. I hardly think that any alteration is necessary. The parallel—‘pleasure goes with filling, just as pain goes, e. g. with cutting’—seems to me to be satisfactory enough.

§ 7. αἱ τῇ μαθηματικῇ ‘the pleasures of knowledge.’ That b. 16. Plato recognised as fully as Aristotle the existence of pleasures which do not arise out of pain is shown by the passage in the Rep. (583 sq.) quoted above in note on x. 2. 5, a. 11 9. v. The passage in the Philebus (51 B) in which the καθαραί ἡδοναί are described is as explicit as that in the Rep. in its doctrine that they are ἀλτυποῖ—τὰς περὶ τὰ τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχῆματα καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τὰς πλειστὰς, καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων, καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀνασπητῶν ἔχουσα καὶ ἀλτυποῖ τῶς πληρώσεις ἀισθήσεις καὶ ἡδείας παραδίδοντο. It will be noticed that Plato still speaks here of certain ‘pure pleasures’ as πληρώσεις: so also in Rep. 585 B ὅπως πληροῖ ἀν ὅ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὅ νοὺς ἵκων—although the terms in which the pleasures of smell are described in 584 B, ἐξαφνής ἁμήχανος τὸ μέγεθος γίγνονται, seem to be inconsistent with the view that they are gradual πληρώσεις. The truth is that we must not press the word πληρώσεις as applied to ‘pure pleasures’: the essential part of Plato’s theory of the ‘pure pleasures’ is not affected by the retention of the word.

§ 8.] Cf. vii. 11. 5. b. 20.

§ 9. η οὕτω λέγοι τίς ἄν] This is Bywater’s correction for b. 25. Bekker’s η οὕτω λέγοντ’ ἄν.

αἱ μὲν ἡδοναί αἰρεται εἰσὶν, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γε τοῦτον] ‘The pleasures b. 20.
in question are in themselves choiceworthy, although not when viewed with reference to the source from which they are derived," Williams: i.e. as pleasures they are desirable, but not as disgraceful—or, as he puts it more clearly in the next section, there are good and bad pleasures.

§ 10. ἡ τὰς εἰδείς διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἱδώναι] 'pleasures differ specifically.' This is the best expression of Aristotle’s answer to τῶς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἱδώνων: and in support of the doctrine thus expressed he points out (§ 10) that different classes of persons have their own pleasures which others cannot enter into: that (§ 11) the pleasure which the Flatterer aims at giving to his Patron is a very different sort from that which sweetens the intercourse of virtuous Friends; and (§ 12) that when we become men we put away childish pleasures as unworthy of us. To these considerations is added the remark (§ 12) that indeed there are many pleasures which we consider it to be our duty to avoid, and do avoid; for, after all, we are more independent of pleasure than might, on a superficial view, be supposed—there are many actions and functions performed by us independently of the pleasure attending them. This last remark I do not regard as made with the special object (as some commentators suppose) of showing that pleasure is not the Sumnum Bonum, but as flowing naturally from what the writer has just said about the power we have of detaching ourselves from certain pleasures. Our power of detaching ourselves from these particular pleasures is, of course, a special case of the law of our nature, that function is primary and pleasure only attendant.

§ 11. ὁ φίλος] as described in viii. 3. §§ 6, 7.

§ 12. ὣς οὖν τεμάλιστα] CCC, NC, and Cambr. read ὣς οἴωναι μάλιστα, an obvious blunder (although Zell tries to make sense out of it: 'significat opinari quidem pueros maximis se gaudiiis perfriui, sed decipi in hoc') which occurs elsewhere—e.g. in E. N. i. 9. 5 Kb reads οἴωναι, in iii. 3. 13 Mb reads οἴωναι, in iii. 5. 17 Kb and CCC read οἴωναι, and in iv. 2. 11 Kb, CCC, and Cambr. read οἴων τε.

§ 13. ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . a. II ὅν] bracketed by Ramsauer, who thinks that hitherto Aristotle has argued rather in favour of, than against, the view of Eudoxus which makes pleasure the Sum-

*mum Bonum,* and that if, in §§ 11 and 12, he seems to argue against the view, he merely goes the length of pointing out that not only are some pleasures not good, but some good things are not pleasures. Susemihl follows Ramsauer in bracketing the words before us. I see no sufficient reason for suspecting them. The distinction drawn at the end of § 12 between vital functions and their attendant pleasures is exactly that of which so much is made later on (see x. 5. 7), and which enables Aristotle to distinguish between *εὐδαιμονία,* or the Chief Good, and even the highest experience of *ήδονή.* Accordingly the abrupt ὅτι μὲν ὁδὸν οὔτε τὰγαθῶν ἡ ἡδονή seems to me to be in favour of the genuineness of the clause. The remark § 12, a. 4 περὶ πολλά τε σπουδήν . . . . a. 8 ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή, though, as I believe, directly suggested by the terms in which the reasons for supposing ὅτι εἶδες διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί have been stated, is, as soon as made, recognised by the writer as having a bearing on the other question (only incidentally, and as yet insufficiently answered in x. 2. 3), whether ἡδονή is the *Summum Bonum.* Hence οὔτε τὰγαθῶν ἡ ἡδονή escapes him, although certainly no sufficient proof of it has as yet been brought forward. In a. 9 τὰγαθῶν which the sense demands is given by Lb and r: other authorities (including the Paraph.) read ἐγαθῶν.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

Now let us start again from the beginning, and try thus to make the true nature of Pleasure plainer.

Pleasure is like Seeing—something indivisible, and perfectly realised at any moment you take it: therefore it is not Motion, for Motion (e.g. that of building) is always in time, and towards an end, and perfect, not in its parts (e.g. not in the processes of fitting the blocks, and fluting the columns—these 'parts' traverse different ground, and thus differ specifically from one another and from the whole Motion to which they belong), or at any moment, but—if to be called 'perfect' at all—only in respect of its whole duration, i.e. only conceived as a process which has at last 'come to its end' in attaining the object (e.g. the completed temple) for which it started. Of Pleasure, on the contrary, the
specific form, or nature, is perfect at any moment you take it—a finished indivisible whole, like seeing, or the mathematical point, of which we cannot say 'it moves towards, or grows up to, the perfection of its nature.'

Every faculty of sense and understanding puts forth its function in relation to an object; perfectly, when, its condition being perfect, it meets with a perfect object; and, if perfectly, then with the fullest pleasure. Every function of sense and understanding has its own pleasure. This pleasure perfects the function—not, however, as organ and object, by their excellence, 'perfect' it—it 'perfects' it as the doctor 'causes' the patient's health; but pleasure 'perfects' function, as the principle of health 'causes' the patient's health. If object and faculty be perfect of their kind, and perfectly suited to each other, there will always be pleasure in the function; the pleasure 'perfecting' the function, not as the faculty does by its permanent subsistence, but as a sort of supervening end, like the bloom of youthful prime.

As long as perfect faculty is perfectly related to perfect object, there will be pleasure in the function. But man's nature is weak. He cannot keep up this perfect relation continuously; function flags, and with it pleasure is dulled.

It may be thought, that the reason why all strive after pleasure is that all seek life—the performance of function, which, as we have seen, is perfected by pleasure. We will not at present go into the question whether it is for the sake of Pleasure that we seek Life, or for the sake of Life that we seek Pleasure: enough has been said to show that the two are so bound up together that they cannot be separated: without function there is no pleasure; and every function is perfected by its pleasure.

1174 a. 13. § 1. τί δ' ἑστιν ἢ ποιόν τι] not the same as τί ἐστι καὶ ποιόν τι:
see note on i. 7. 19. a. 31.

a. 14. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἢ μὲν ὧρασις ... a. 19 εἴδος] ὧρασις is an ἐνέργεια as distinguished from a κίνησις; see Met. Θ. 6. 1048 b. 18 sqq. and Bonitz's important note, p. 396. Ἐνέργεια, strictly so called, is action or function which contains in itself the end for the sake of which it is performed, and does not, like κίνησις, cease to be when its end has been attained. In the case of a κίνησις such as οἰκοδομήσις, which has an external end, viz. οἰκία, and ceases when that end is attained, we cannot say ἄμα οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ἀκοδόμηκεν, as we can say ὅρᾳ καὶ ἑώρακεν ἄμα in the case of ὧρασις, which is an ἐνέργεια strictly so called. Λ κίνησις is ἐνέργεια μὲν τις, ἀπελής μέντοι (de An. ii. 5. 417 a. 16), whereas in an ἐνέργεια strictly so called ἐνσαρχεῖ τὸ τέλος (Met. Θ. 6. 1048 b. 22). Such an ἐνέργεια is perfect (τελεία), or realises its end (τέλος) at every moment of its duration—καθ' ἐντιθνοῦν χρόνον τελεία ἐστὶ (E. N. x. 4. 1): cf. Soph. El. 22, 178 a. 9 ἅρ' ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἄμα ποιεῖν τε καὶ πεποιηκέναι; οὔ. άλλα μὴν ὅρᾳ γέ τι ἄμα καὶ ἑώρακεν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ ταύτα ἐνδέχεται. The passage (Met.
BOOK X: CHAP. 4: §§ 1, 2.

as follows, according to the emended version given by Bonitz, p. 397... 

I. 6. 1048 b) referred to at the beginning of this note runs in part 1174 a. 14. 

§ 2. Kal ἔνθις τινός] 'for the sake of some end,' sc. external to a. 20. itself.

οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ ἐφίεται] This is Bywater's correction of Bekker's οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική τελεία, ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ ἐφίεται, and, I think, a great improvement. The καὶ before τελεία seems to exist only in Kb. For οἰκοδομική Ramsauer conjectures οἰκοδόμησις. This is plausible; cf. Met. Θ. 6, quoted in note on x. 4. 1 a. 14, where we find ἰσχυρισμα μάθησις βάδισε σικοδόμησις.
1174 a. 20. M\(^b\) has οικοδομή—a late form meaning the same thing as οικοδόμησις or οικοδομία. The Paraph., in explaining the present passage, uses οικοδομία and οικοδόμησις, but not οικοδομή. I think that οικοδομή (= the art of building) is not quite in place here, where we are to think of the process of building. Perhaps the οικοδομική τελεία of the MSS. is a corruption of οικοδομία, καὶ τελεία.

a. 21. ἦ ἐν ἀπαντᾷ δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἦ τοῦτῳ] So Bekker, Susemihl, and Bywater, the meaning being—'it (i.e. motion) is perfect, then, viewed either in the whole time of its duration, or at the moment when it reaches its end.' This meaning is quite satisfactory; but I am not at all sure that the text on which it relies is sound. L\(^b\), M\(^b\), and B\(^b\) have ἦ ἐν ἀπαντᾷ δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦτῳ. Instead of the second ἦ of Bekker's text, O\(^b\) and Paris. 1417 have δὴ, which they omit after ἀπαντᾷ. This misplaced δὴ was perhaps the origin of the second ἦ. This supposition seems to be supported by K\(^b\), Camb., and B\(^b\), which, omitting δὴ with O\(^b\) and Paris. 1417 after ἀπαντᾷ, read ἦ not δὴ before τοῦτῳ. Of recorded MSS. only CCC, NC, and B\(^b\) have both δὴ (after ἀπαντᾷ) and Bekker's second ἦ. The MS. authority for ἦ ἐν ἀπαντᾷ δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἦ τοῦτῳ is thus decidedly weak. The reading of L\(^b\), M\(^b\), and B\(^b\)—ἡ ἐν ἀπαντᾷ δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦτῳ—accepted by Michelet, requires us to explain ἦ as = ἦτοι: 'motion is perfect when it has effected its end—that is, it is perfect in respect of the whole time needed for effecting its end,' —τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦτῳ being, as Michelet explains, equivalent to τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ ποιῆσαι οὐ οικοδομήσαται.

a. 22. καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ] introduced into the text by Bywater from K\(^b\) instead of the τοῦ χρόνου of the other MSS. It seems to me that we must either retain τοῦ χρόνου, or accept Bywater's 'fort. τῷ χρόνῳ secludendum.' I hardly think that one can go the length of saying with Bywater (Contriib. p. 67)—'The vulgar reading ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου may be dismissed at once as implying an erroneous view as to the sense of μέρεσι, which stands for the various parts of the work, as is shown by the explanation which follows, ἦ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ...' Notwithstanding the 'explanation,' I think that the context, with its contrast between ἐν τῷ ἀπαντᾷ χρόνῳ and ἐν ὅποιῳ χρόνῳ, allows us to retain (if otherwise desirable) the vulgar ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου.

πάσαι] sc. αἱ κινήσεις.
BOOK X: CHAP. 4: § 2.

ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις] ‘the fitting together of the stones’ 1174 a. 23. after they have been hewn; not, as Grant says, ‘the collection of the stones.’ I believe that here ἡ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις means the fitting together of the separate drums composing one column.

ῥαβδώσεως] Coraes’ note here is ῥάβδωσις κιόνος ἔστιν ἡ τῇ τῶν a. 24. γάλλων φωτή cannellure (i.e. fluting) λεγομένη, καὶ ῥαβδωτὸς κιόν ἡ colonne cannelée.’ What does Mich. Eph. mean by saying here—ῥαβδώσειν δὲ κιόνος λέγει τῇ κατὰ μήκος τοῦ κιόνος πῆξιν ἡ γίγνεται ὅταν πρὸς ὀρθὰς γωνίας ἵσταται? See Facciolati and Forcellini s. v. stria =πτύξις=ῥαβδώσει. Hesych. has πτύξις=the act of making a πτύξις or fold. Is the πῆξιν of Mich. Eph. a corruption of πτύξιν?

τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποίησις] I think that Stahr is wrong in translating—‘die Herstellung der Tempelcella.’ Νάος is indeed sometimes used technically for the cella, or inner part of the ἵππον—as perhaps by the Schol. (cod. H) on Thuc. iv. 90 ἱππὸ ναοῦ διαφέρει ἱππὸ μὲν αὐτὸς οἱ προσειρωμένοι τόποι τῷ θεῷ νεῶς δὲ ἐνθα ἔδρυται αὐτὸ τὸ ἄγαλμα τοῦ θεοῦ. But here since the ποίησις τοῦ ναοῦ is contrasted, as τελεία, with the ποίησις τοῦ μέρους, οἶνον τὴν κρηπίδος, which is ἀπελή, it is necessary to understand by νάος the whole temple: so the Paraph.—τῆς γὰρ ἀλής ποίησις, φέρε εἰπεῖν, τοῦ ναοῦ ἐτέρα ἡ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις κ.τ.λ.

ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία] At the last moment of the whole ποίησις a. 25. there exists a perfect product, which has just burst into existence as a perfect product; the last touch has been given which makes the ποίησις the ἐσχάτη ἀλή of the resultant μορφή—and, except as logically distinguished, identical with that μορφή, or ἔδος—see Met. H. 6. 1045 b. 18. The words καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ ποίησις τελεία are thus equivalent to καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀλή ποίησις τελεία—τουτέστω ὅταν ποίησις τοῦ νεῶν: ‘when the temple is made, the process of building has realised its end; the plan requires nothing more: but the processes of constructing the foundations, and carving the triglyphs, do not realise the end of the work.’


τριγλύφου] ‘the triglyphs’ (in the Doric temple)—tablets divided into vertical flat bands by grooves—were placed above the architrave at equal intervals (one over every column, and one between) along the frieze. They probably represent the ends of beams in the old wooden temples. The spaces between them were originally open
1174 a. 26. (ἀπαντή, hence the term μετόπη), but afterwards filled in and ornamented with sculptures.

a. 27. ἐν ὀτροφων χρόνῳ] ‘at any moment’ (Peters).

a. 28. ἀλλ’ ἐπερ, ἐν τῷ ἀπαντῷ] ‘In the whole time of its duration.’ I agree with Grant that these words are against reading ἦ τεῦτων in a. 21.

a. 30. § 3. ἡ φορά] See Phys. vii. 2. 243 a. 6 ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς εἰσὶ κινήσεις ἢ τε κατὰ τόπον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσῶν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ κινούμενα τρία εἶναι ἢ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τόπον φορά, ἢ δὲ κατά τὸ ποιόν ἀλλώσεις, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποσῶν αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις.

a. 32. τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποὺ οὐ τὸ αὐτό] ‘the whence—whither,’ i. e. ‘space traversed,’ is not the same: and sometimes, of course, κινήσεις will differ as taking place in opposite directions over the same space.

a. 34. γραμμήν] Ramsauer appositely quotes Eurip. El. 953—

δοδὲ τις κακούργος ἄν 
μὴ μοι, τὸ πρῶτον βηθ’ ἐὰν δράμῃ καλῶς, 

μικᾶν δοκεῖτω τὴν δίκην, πρὶν ἄν πέλας 

γραμμῆς ῥηταὶ καὶ τέλος κάμψης βιοῦ.

b. 3. ἐν ἀλλοῖς] in the Physics.

ἔσθηκε δ’ οὐκ ἐν ἄπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς] ‘motion is not perfect at any time you take it (ἐν ἄπαντι = ἐν ὀτροφῶν), but the many motions into which a given motion may be resolved (e.g. the whole motion from starting-point to goal in the course may be resolved into the motion over the first hundred yards, the motion over the second hundred yards, and so on) are imperfect, and differ specifically, since different spaces traversed, or different directions over the same space, make the motions traversing them, or it, specifically different.’ So the Paraph.—τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀκριβεῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγους ἐν ἀλλοίς ἐποιησάμεθα. Τούτῳ δὲ μένων εἴπατα εἰπέν ἀναγκαίων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐν παντὶ χρόνῳ τελεία ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ ὀλίφ. 

Αἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὀλίου χρόνων κινήσεις, ἀτελεῖς εἰσί, καὶ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων τῷ εἴδει. This interpretation seems to me to be that required by the context, in which ‘a whole motion’ and the ‘parts’ into which it may be resolved have been distinguished. I take it that the clause b. 5 εἰπερ τὸ πόθεν ποὺ εἰδοποιοῦν can be explained only in connexion with a. 32 τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποὺ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ
§§ 3, 4.

k.π.λ., where the specifically distinct motions are the ‘parts’ of 1174 b. 3. a ‘whole motion.’ Another interpretation is given by Mich. Eph., who takes ἀλ πολλαὶ to mean ‘most motions,’ i.e. all motions except circular motion, which alone is ‘perfect.’ He says—τὸ πολλαὶ πρόσκεναι διὰ τὸς κυκλοφορίαν αὐτα γὰρ ἀλ κινήσεις ἀδεὶ ἐν τῷ τελεί, καὶ ἐφησεν πῶς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς περι οὐρανοῦ πραγμάτειας. Ramsauer, adopting this interpretation, conjectures b. 3 οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἀπαντὶ χρόνῳ (NC and Paris. 1853 support this conjecture so far as οὐδ' is concerned), and explains by reference to Phys. Θ. 8. 264 b. 27—‘hoc quidem ὅτι αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν κινήσεων s. φορῶν οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἀπαντὶ χρόνῳ τελεία περ αὐτίκος auctoritatem stat (“τοικे”): v. Θ. 8. ἦ δὲ τοῦ κύκλου συνάστει καὶ ἐστὶ μόνη τελείως 264 b. 27 s.; cujus rei causa est quod reliquae, quum in infinitum abire nequeant, necessario aliquando sistantur et interpositâ quieta de novo incipientur (ἰστανταί, ἀνακάμπτουσι).’ I think it is very unlikely that, if Aristotle had wished to say that all motions, except κυκλοφορία, are ἀτελεῖς, he would have begun with the general statement that ‘κινήσεις—not Ramsauer’s αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν κινήσεων—is not perfect even (οὐδ') in the whole time of its continuance.’ Of course if Aristotle had written the αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν κινήσεων οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἀπαντὶ χρόνῳ τελεία ὑπ Ραμσαιροῦ note, I should have had nothing to say.


καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μή ἐν χρόνῳ] This is another b. 8. argument to show that ἡδονὴ is ἀλών τι, and therefore not κινήσεις.


τὸν ἡδονήν] so Bekker and Bywater with the codd. Susemühl, b. 10. following Ramsauer’s conjecture, reads τής ἡδονῆς. This reading, I think, has much in its favour. The καὶ (b. 9) before ὅτι seems to introduce a new point (the words b. 6 δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἔτερα τ' ἐν εἴλεν ἀλλήλων mean οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἡδονή κινήσεις: he now adds ἡδονής οὐκ ἔστι κινήσεις), and the words b. 13 οὖδ' δὴ ἡ ἡδονής seem to give the conclusion of the argument establishing the new point.

In b. 13 the reading οὐδενός (cod. Turnebi) for οὖθ'εν is plainly a
BOOK X: CHAP. 4: §§ 4-6.

1174 b. 10. blunder: οὖν τῶν οὐδενὸς κίνησις οὖν γένεσις would merely repeat what has just been said.

οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται] ταῦτα αἰ κίνησις καὶ γένεσις.

b. 14. § 5. Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης κ.τ.λ.] The apodosis of this sentence begins b. 18 with καθ' ἐκάστην δὴ (Bekker and Susemihl read καθ' ἐκαστον δὲ; Bywater restores ἐκάστην from Mb and Alex.—see Bywater’s Contrib., p. 68, and reads δὴ with Lamminus and Rassow—see Forsch. p. 102). After αἰσθήσεως b. 16, Β, Λ, Ο, Αld., Β¹, Β², CCC, NC, and Cambr. read κειμένων. Of recorded authorities only Κᵇ, Mb, and apparently Alexander Aphrod. (who quotes this passage ἀπορίας καὶ λύσεις τυ. § 14. p. 258 sq. Spengel) omit κειμένων.

The doctrine of this section is shortly, that pleasure attends functions which are in correspondence with environment; and that functions which maintain the most perfect correspondence with the best environment open to the organism are the most perfectly pleasant. For J. S. Mill’s estimate of this doctrine (Examination of Sir. W. Hamilton’s Philosophy: ch. 25), see note on vii. 12. 3, a. 15.

b. 17. ἦ ἐν ὧν ἐστὶ] τὸ ζῆν (Mich. Eph.).

b. 23. § 6.] Pleasure perfects function; but not as the object and faculty of sense (τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ἥ αἰσθησις), if good, ‘perfect’ it. The difference between these two modes of ‘perfecting’ function is like that between the ways in which health is ‘caused’—by a healthy constitution, and the doctor respectively. A healthy constitution (i.e. the principle of health within a man) is the ‘formal cause,’ and the doctor is the ‘efficient cause’ of health. It is by operating as a formal principle, then, that pleasure ‘perfects’ function; whereas the object and faculty of sensation ‘perfect’ it by their efficient operation. According to the doctrine of de An. iii. 2. 425 b. 25 the sensible object, as actually perceived, is identical with the actual perception exerted by the faculty of sense—the two are only different aspects of the same thing: ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὖν ταύτων αὐταίς. The aistheto per se is δυνάμει δυ, and the aistheseis (or aisthetikous per se) is likewise δυνάμει δυ: they are two relata which have no actual existence, or ἐνέργεια, apart from each other: ‘environment’ has no meaning except in relation to ‘organ,’ and
'organ' has no meaning except in relation to 'environment.' The reality of the two is 'correspondence' or 'function.' To *aισθητον* τε καὶ *αίσθησις*, then, 'perfect' *ἐνέργεια* in the sense of 'effecting' it. It is the outcome of the joint efficiency of these two *δυνάμεις.* But pleasure does not 'perfect' *ἐνέργεια* in the sense of 'effecting,' or producing it. Pleasure is that without which the form of *ἐνέργεια* produced, would not be *perfect.* It is the 'formal perfection' of *ἐνέργεια*—a perfection, however, which in § 8 is described as supervening (*ἐπιγεγραμμένον τε τέλος b. 33*): which means that it is not the immanent *τέλος,* or ultimate *raison d'être* of the *ἐνέργεια*—that lies deeper—but a sort of beauty (*ἀρα b. 33*) which reveals *ἐνέργεια* to sense, and may indeed easily be mistaken for the reality of *ἐνέργεια* itself (*§§ 10, 11, and ch. 5, §§ 6, 7*); for the illusion of sense—'Beauty is its own excuse for being'—is always powerful within us.

Mich. Eph. has an instructive comment on this section, which he understands as I have explained it above—except that he falls into the error (I think) of making the construction—οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον τελειοὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἴδων, καὶ τὴν αἰσθήσιν τὸ αἰσθητόν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις: after remarking that τὸ αἰσθητὸν 'perfects' the αἴσθησις (or αἰσθητικὸν) ὡς ἄγου αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ποιοῦν αὐτὴν ἐνεργείαν, and referring to de An. iii. 2. 425 b. 25, he goes on to draw the parallels αἰσθητὸν—ιατρός (both external to τὸ ἐνέργειαν), and ἴδων—ἐγέρα (both in τὸ ἐνέργειαν)—καὶ ἔστι τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰσθανόμενον καὶ ἐνεργοῦντος, καὶ πρότερον τῆς κατ΄ ἐνεργείαν αἰσθήσεως ἡ δ’ ἴδων οἷς οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς τὴν ἐνεργείαν ὡς γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτὴς ἐκτὸς, οὔτε πρότεροι ταύτης, ἀλλ’ ἁμα τέ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν καὶ χωρισθήναι τῆς ἐνεργείας ἐφ’ ἡ ἐστίν οἷς ὄνασαν, τελειοῦν δὲ λέγεται τὴν ἐνεργείαν ἡ ἴδων ὡς συναύξουσα . . . ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἵατρός φησι καὶ ἡ ὑγεία ἀυτῶν τοῦ ὑγείαν τὸ ἔφοι, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἴατρός ἐκτὸς ἐστι τοῦ ὑγείαντος καὶ πρότερος ὁ ἵατρός ὁτε γὰρ ἐνσεί ὁ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ὑγιασθείς, ἴατρός μὲν ὁ ἰασάμενος τῶν νοσοῦν-τα, ὁ δὲ ὑγιασθείς ὑγιὴς οὐκ ἦν· ἡ δὲ ὑγεία οὐκ ἐκτὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγείαντος, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ὡς μέρος ἡ ἴδως ἐν γὰρ τῇ συμμετρίᾳ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ χυμῶν ἡ ὑγεία καὶ τὸ ὑγείαν ἐστὶ, καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτὴν ἀρχιστὸς ἡ ὑγεία, ἐνοὶ ἐν ὑγιασθείς ὡς καὶ ἡ ἴδων συνυπάρχει τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐφ’ ἡ γίνεται . . . τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν τελειοὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὑπὲρ ἐκκαλούμενον καὶ ἄγου αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δυναμεῖ εἰς ἐνεργείαν, ἐκτὸς ὡς καὶ πρότερον τῆς ἐνεργείας . . . ἡ δὲ ἴδων τελειοὶ τὴν ἐνεργείαν ὡς συναύξουσα τε καὶ συνηροῦσα καὶ μένειν οἶον εἰ ἀνατείθουσα.

The Paraphrast falls into the strange error of making the doctor,
or efficient cause (§ 6), answer to pleasure in the comparison, thus ignoring the point on which Aristotle’s whole theory hinges—that pleasure is a sort of immanent final (or formal) cause—something, at any rate, which can only with difficulty be distinguished from the final cause of the ἐνέργεια, and indeed was identified with the ἐνέργεια at its best by the writer of Book vii. The Paraphrast’s words are—καθάπερ οὖν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἱατρὸς ὁμοίως ἀυτῶς εἶσιν τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀυτῇ ποιεῖ μὴ οὖσαν τὴν τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἐνέργειαν, ὁ δὲ συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει, καὶ ὅπως παραμείνῃ ζητεῖ. Ἡ δὲ ὁδὸν ὅσπερ τὸ αἰσθήτων τελειοὶ τὴν αἰσθησιν, ἢ τὸ διανοητὸν τὴν διάνοιαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἱδωνή τελειοὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτῶν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔξις, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμεις εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεία προάγουσι τὴν ἐνεργείαν· ἡ δὲ ἱδωνὴ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ γενομένη συμπερικόν συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει. Πείθει γὰρ ἐνεργείαν ἡ ἔπι ἀυτῷ ἱδωνή. According to this, ἱδωνὴ is ‘called in,’ like a doctor, by ἐνεργεία. Peters seems to understand the relation between ἱδωνή and ἐνεργεία in the same way, for in a note on p. 329 he says—‘the only analogy between pleasure and the doctor is that both “complete the activity” from outside,’—but see E. N. i. 8. 12 οὖν δὴ προσδείται τῆς ἱδωνῆς ὁ βλος αὐτῶν ὅσπερ περιάπτων τινος, ἀλλ’ ἔχει τὴν ἱδωνὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ—a statement which the theories of Book x and Book vii merely expand and develop. The reason why the Paraph. falls into the error noticed is that he does not see that the words b. 25 ὅσπερ . . . b. 26 ὑγιαίνειν are merely parenthetical, giving ὑγίεια and ἱατρὸς as familiar instances of a formal and an efficient cause respectively. It so happens that ὑγίεια is a ἔξις; and, as in § 8 ἱδωνὴ is said not to ‘perfect’ ἐνεργεία as ἔξις does, the conclusion is drawn by the Paraph. here that it must do so as the ἱατρὸς does! But it is τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις (parallel to the ἱατρὸς) of § 6 to which the ἔξις of § 8 corresponds; while ἱδωνή, which in § 6 is parallel to ὑγίεια, is described in § 8 as ἑπικυμάνειν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἢ ὦται.

b. 26. § 7.] This section (Susemihl is wrong in saying that it is omitted by the Paraph.—see his καὶ μᾶλλον p. 216. 34 Heylbut) is bracketed by Zell, Ramsauer, and Susemihl, because it repeats what has already been said in § 5. It may be noted that there is another repetition of the same in the latter part of § 8, b. 33 ἐόσ ἄν . . . 1175 a. 3 γίνεσθαι. Are the passages § 6, b. 23 οὖ τοῦ αἰτῶν . . . § 7, b. 31 πεισομένου and § 8, b. 31 τελειοὶ . . . a. 3 γίνεσθαι ‘duplicates?’
§ 8. οὐχ ὅς ἡ ἔξις ἐνυπάρχουσα] 'Pleasure perfects its function, not as a habit does by subsisting in the agent, but as a supervening end.' Rassow (Forsch. p. 70) and Susemihl omit ἡ with Λb, Mb. I think that η is necessary. We are to think of a given ἔνεργεια in connexion with its own parent ἔξις, as we are to think of it in connexion with its own (οἶκεια) ἡδονή. A formed habit, subsisting permanently in the agent, 'perfects' the ἔνεργεια which proceeds from it, in the sense of easily 'effecting' it (see note on x. 4. 6), or constantly realising itself in it: cf. iii. 7. 6 τέλος δὲ πᾶσης ἕνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. Thus, the ἔξις of the ἀνδρεία realises itself in certain ἕνεργειαι—τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν—which it tends to produce as perfect (τέλεια) as may be, i.e. as well fitted as may be to take their place in the permanent system of things in relation to which all virtuous ἔξεις are formed. Ἐνέργειαi externally indistinguishable from τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, but not proceeding from the ἔξις, are ἀτελή— in the sense of failing to fit into that permanent system of καλὰ πρᾶξεις in relation to which all virtuous ἔξεις are formed. Ἐξις, then, is the organic source from which ἕνεργεια springs; and the 'perfection' which it confers on ἕνεργεια is that of permanence and fitness for a permanent system. But ἡδονή is not the organic source of ἕνεργεια; it is rather a sort of end—the beauty of ἕνεργεια itself, when once it has 'risen up into the borders of light.' As such, it sustains and strengthens ἕνεργεια (see x. 5. 2)—in some such way as the πρῶτον κινεῖν moves the universe—not mechanically, but by the attraction of beauty (Met. Λ. 7. 1072 b. 3 κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον). As was remarked on vii. 12. 3, a. 15, Aristotle's theory does not profess to tell us what ἡδονή is as a psychological or physiological phenomenon, but what it does. It is a theory with a directly practical aim.

οἶν τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὑπάρχει] sc. ἐπιγίνεται, b. 33.

τὸ κρίνον ἡ θεωρῶν] τὸ κρίνον answers to τὸ ἀληθήτων (ἀληθής is b. 34. κριτικῆ: see note on ii. 9. 6 ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἡ κρίσις), and θεωρῶν to νοητῶν.

ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων] see note on vi. 1. 5, a. 8 πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει 1175 a. 1. ἔτερα κ.τ.λ.

καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων] This means that, if the relation between such corresponding (ὁμοίω) faculties and objects
BOOK X: CHAP. 4: §§ 9, 10.

1175 a. 1. experienced as pleasant, remains unchanged, it will continue to be experienced as pleasant.

3. § 9. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἠδεται;] Why then does the relation not remain unchanged? Why is it that no man experiences pleasure continually?

4. ἣ κάμνει;] 'Is it not that man grows weary?' Grant quotes appositely Met. Θ. 8. 1050 b. 22 διὰ αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἡλιος καὶ ἄστρα καὶ δῶς ὁ υἱανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μὴ πάτε στη, ὁ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. οὐδὲ κάμνει τοῦτο δράωντα' οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς αντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἰον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ή κίνησις, ὡσεὶ ἐπίπονον εἶναι τῇ συνέχειαν τῆς κίνησεως· ἢ γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὑπή καὶ δύναμις οὔσα, οὐκ ἐνέργεια, αὐτὰ τούτου. See notes on vii. 14. 8.

5. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὕτως ἠδονή] Ramsauer reads in the text after ἠδονή the συνεχῆς required by the sense. The Paraph. has here ἀπορήσει δ' ἄν τις εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἐχει, πῶς οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἐνέργων συνεχῶς ἠδεται. Πρὸς ὁ ῥήτους, ὅτι κάμνει πάντα τὰ ἀνθρώπεια, καὶ οὐ δύναται συνεχῶς ἐνέργεια. Διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἠδεσθαὶ δύναται συνεχῶς, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἠδονή τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀκολουθεῖ—as if he read in the text:—πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἠδεται; ἡ κάμνει πάντα τὰ ἀνθρώπεια καὶ ἀδύνατε (οὐ οὐ δύναται) συνεχῶς ἐνέργεια; οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὕτως ἡ ἠδονή συνεχῆς· ἐπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. NC omits γὰρ after πάντα a. 4, and reads καὶ οὐ δύνατε (sic). Paris. 1853 has καὶ ἀδύνατε. I think that some such reconstruction of the text as that suggested by the Paraphrase's version is necessary.

6. ἐπεται] see notes on vii. 9. 6, b. 34 and ix. 7. 6, a. 21.

7. διὰ ταῦτα] Κb, Οb—i. e. διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς ἀδύνατειν συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. Other authorities have διὰ ταῦτα or (NC and Paris. 1853) ταῦτα alone.

παρακέκληται] v. 1. παρακέκληται.

9. μετέπειτα δ' οὖ] After οὐ CCC, NC, Cambr., and other authorities (see Susemihl and Bywater) read γίνεται.

10. § 10. καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ] Bekker, following the codd., has δὲ. Susemihl and Bywater, following Aretinus, read δή.

ἐδόλγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἠδονῆς ἐφ' ἑνταί] 'All seek after pleasure’—this is only what we might expect from the intimate association of
pleasure with life: it does not prove the position of Eudoxus that 1175 a. 16. ‘pleasure is the chief good.’

§ 11. ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι] Of course there can be no doubt a. 19. about the answer. As a biologist, Aristotle would tell us that function is the end, not the pleasure of function. At the bottom of the series of ἐνεργεία we see plants performing function without the inducement of pleasure; and at the top of the series we see the ἀνδρεῖοι doing a last act of duty which involves the renunciation of all that is dear to sense. Mich. Eph. has an interesting comment here—

IEEE 4

Τὴν ἐντόπισεν τοῦτο τὸ ὑδόν εἰς ἐνεργεία τῆς ἐνεργείας ὡς ὑποκείτε τῇ ὀικοδομήσεως καὶ ὑγιείᾳ τῆς ὑγιάσεως . . . ὡς ὑδόν ἐνεργεία καὶ τὸ ζῆν χάριν τῆς ὑδόνης . . . ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἦσθι τέλος, ἀλλ' οὖν τέλος, οὐκ εἰρήκη, οὐκ ἂν ἐστήναι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τὴν ὑδόνην, ἀλλ' μᾶλλον ταύτῃ διὰ τὸ ζῆν. He goes on to argue that ὑδόνη is not the end, but ἐνεργεία, because there are virtuous actions which we choose to perform, although they are not pleasant, but painful—ὅτι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑδόνην διὰ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις καὶ τὸ ζῆν διάκομεν ἐκ τῶν μᾶλλον ἀν της πιστεύσεως καὶ πρῶτον ἐκ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαν ἐλ γὰρ καὶ ὡς μᾶλλον ἠδειαί εἰσιν αὕτα, ἀλλ' οὖ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἑνεκα σποουάζοντα πολλά γὰρ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λύπης καὶ πόνου αἵτια ὡς, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρεῖαν ἐνεργείαν καὶ τοῖς ἔδει ταύτας μυσίν καὶ φέειν εἰ τὰς ἐνεργείας χάριν τῆς ὑδόνης αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίον πάντων ἐνεργείαν μετὰ σποουάζει ἐνεργείαν ἦ ἐπετεὶ ὑδόνην ἀλλ' ἐν τοῦ ἐν μη μαίνοντο, πράττεις ἢ καὶ ἐνεργείαν ἀνάμικτον, ὡς ἐποντα τῶν ὑδόνων αὐτοῦ ἀλοχρότετες. . . . δοτε δῆλον ὅτι τὰς ὑδόνους αὐτοῦ διὰ τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείας.

CHAPTER V.

Argument.

Since each function has its own pleasure which perfects and augments it, and since functions differ specifically—e.g. thinking, seeing, hearing, differ, as functions, specifically—it follows that Pleasures also differ specifically.

That this is so is plain, not only from the fact that its own pleasure perfects and augments a function—e.g. pleasure in working out geometrical problems makes one work them out better—but also from the fact that one function is impeded by the presence of the pleasure which belongs to another function—e.g.
a person who is fond of music cannot attend to a philosophical discussion, if he overhear some one playing the flute: indeed an alien pleasure interferes with a function almost as much as its own pain does—by 'its own' (whether describing a pleasure or a pain) I mean that which attends the performance of the function itself.

Functions, then, differing as good and bad, Pleasures will differ as good and bad. The Pleasures which belong to good functions are good, those which belong to bad functions are bad.

Its own Pleasure belongs more intimately to a function than does the appetite which actuates the function: the appetite is distinct in time and in nature from the function, but the pleasure is so closely bound up with the function, that some would identify them—erroneously, of course, for pleasure is not thinking or seeing—but naturally enough, because they always go together.

The senses differ in purity—e.g. sight is purer than touch—so also do their pleasures: and the purest pleasures are those of thought.

Animals have different pleasures, as they have different functions, according to their races: asses prefer hay to gold, as Heraclitus says. Within the human race, however, individuals differ much in the pleasures they prefer. Here our standard must always be the Good Man. The pleasures which he prefers—those which perfect the performance of the good functions in which Happiness consists—are good. They are real—distinctively Human pleasures: those preferred by disordered natures are not really pleasures.

1175 a. 22. § 1. έτέρων] sc. τῶν εἴδει.

a. 23. οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται] sc. τελειώμενα.

a. 24. καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἀγαλμα] Bekker has ἀγάλματα. Bywater restores the singular from Kb. Cambr. has καὶ ἀγάλμα καὶ γραφή.

a. 28. § 2. αὔτα] αὔτα, the reading of Kb, is accepted by Bekker and Bywater. All other authorities (except γ which has αὔτα αὔτα) give αὔτα (=αι κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις), accepted by Susemihl. Reading αὔτα, we are to understand that there is a generic difference between αἱ τὰς διανοίας ἐνέργειαι and αἱ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, and that under each genus there are specific differences.

a. 29. φανεῖν δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνπειθόσθαι κ.τ.λ.] τούτοις ἂν τὰς ἴδιας τῶν εἴδει διαφέρειν, and another reason (καὶ) for accepting this statement is that pleasures are 'akin' to (συνπειθόσθαι) those ἐνέργειαι (and ἐνέργειαι differ τῶν εἴδει) which they 'perfect.' That they are 'akin' to them (οίκεια) is shown by the fact that they 'augment' them (συναύξουσι a. 36)—the conclusion being a. 36 τῶν ἐτέρων δὲ τῶν εἴδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἐτερά τῶν εἴδει. The distinction between ἴδια as τελειώματα τὴν ἐνέργειαν and as συναύξουσα τὴν ἐνέργειαν is evidently

a very subtle one; perhaps it may be sufficiently explained, if we say that the term συναύξουσα seems to express, more distinctly than the term τελευότα, what ἥδων ἄρες: e.g. in the case of the φιλόμορφος—μάλλον γὰρ ἐκαστὰ κρίνουσα καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσα (§ 2): ἦ μὲν οἰκεία ἥδων ἐξακριβώς τὰς ἑνεργείας καὶ χρονωστήρας καὶ βελτίων ποιεῖ (§ 5).

ἐπιδιδόσαι εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον] 'improve in their work.' a. 35.

συναύξουσα δὲ αἱ ἥδων] Susemihl reads δῆ. I prefer δὲ. a. 36.

§ 3. τούτω] τὸ τὰς ἥδων τῷ έδει διαφέρειν.

κατακούσωσιν] 'overhear.' b. 4.

§ 4. ἀρεσκάμενοι, οὖν καὶ] Bekker after Kb and Mb omits οὖν; b. 11. but οὖν, the reading of Lb, Ob, CCC, Cambr., NC, B1, 3, accepted by Susemihl and Bywater, is probably right.

§ 5. δήλον ὡς πολὺ διεστάσαι] τ. ε. η οἰκεία ἥδων καὶ ἡ ἄλλοτρια. b. 15. They differ (sc. in relation to a given ἑνεργεία) almost as much as ἥδων and λύπη.

σχέδον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Mich. Eph. explains—τά σχέδον πρὸσκειται b. 18. δια το οἰκεία λῦται αἰεὶ καὶ πάντως εἰς τὰ ἑνεργείαν φθαρτικαί, αἰ δὲ ἥδων αἰεὶ δὲ: cf. πλὴν οὐκ ὡς ἢμοιοις at the end of this section, b. 24. Οἰκεία λυπη, as a rule, puts a stop to the ἑνεργεία: ἄλλοτρια ἥδων only retards it.

οἰκείαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἑνεργείᾳ καθ' αὕτην γνώμην] 'by "its b. 21. own" pleasure or pain I mean that which attends the function itself'—as distinguished from that which is associated with consequences which may eventually result κατὰ συμβεβηκός from the function.

εἰρηναι] so Bekker, Susemihl, and Bywater. Lb alone, among b. 22. recorded authorities, gives this reading. All other authorities apparently have εἰρηναι: so Cambr., CCC, NC.

§ 6.] 'Ἐνεργείαι differ as good and bad (some perhaps are in— b. 24. different); hence there are good and bad ἥδων. If we confine ourselves to the subjective point of view—if we look only at the pleasures themselves, as felt, we shall be unable to distinguish them as good and bad—as higher and lower. We shall be able to distinguish them merely as more or less pleasant—as differing.
quantitatively. It is only when we view them as 'augmenting' functions which put us in relation to the objective order, or environment, that we can distinguish pleasures as differing qualitatively (τῶ εἴδη), and say with Mill, 'It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied' (Utilitarianism, p. 14). It is sometimes urged that Mill has no right 'on his own principles' to say this—to recognise, as he does, a qualitative difference between pleasures. I venture to maintain that few moralists have a better right. His critics seem to forget that his standard of conduct is the public good. His standard of conduct is emphatically not pleasurable feeling. Only an eristic treatment of isolated phrases (phrases which need not surprise any one who looks at Mill's system in its place in the History of English Ethics) could represent it as such. Mill's 'hedonism' is pretty much on a par with that of the writer of E. N. vii. 11-14.

b. 30. οἰκειώτεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων] the pleasure involved in (ἐν) a function is more akin to the function than is the appetite which prompts the function (the genitive τῶν ὀρέξεων depends on the comparative οἰκειώτεραι: αἱ μὲν b. 31 are the ὀρέξεις, and αἱ δὲ b. 32 the ἡδοναὶ), for the appetite is separated from the function both in time and in nature, whereas the pleasure is close to the function, and it is so difficult to draw the line between the two (ἀδιάρμητοι οὕτως b. 32) that the question may be argued whether the function is not identical with the pleasure.' Ὅρεξει προέδει ἐνεργεία in time (τοῖς χρόνοις), and differs from it in nature (τῇ φύσει), being a πάθος.

b. 34. § 7. διάνοια] regarded here as an ἐνεργεία = διανόησις: see Ramsauer ad loc.

(ἐτοπον γάρ), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται ὧσι ταύτών] It would appear, then, that the view set forth in vii. 11-14 was held when x. 1-5 was written: also, if we assume that vii. 11-14 was written by one who had x. 1-5 before him, it would appear that he was not deterred by the ἐτοπον γάρ here. The difficulties suggested by these considerations will not escape the student.

b. 36. διαφέρει] here means 'surpasses.'

1178 a. 1. καθαρειώτητι] so Bywater for the καθαριώτητι of other texts. The codd. for the most part seem to give καθαριώτητι—CCC, so far as I know, is the only cod. which gives καθαρειώτητι.

Mich. Eph. has the following comment here—

§ 7. η μὲν ὀψεις τῶν 1176 a. 1. εἰδῶν ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτικὴ δίκαι τῆς ὑλῆς ὡς ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς περὶ ψυχῆς πραγματείας δέδεικται (i. e. de Anima ii. 12. 424 a. 17) ὀσπερ γὰρ ὁ κηρὸς τῆς σφραγίδας μόνην τὴν ἐν τῷ χρυσῷ δακτυλῷ ἀπομαίνεται χωρὶς τῆς ὑποκειμένης ὑλῆς. χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐν ἐγίνετο ὁ κηρὸς ἐπὶ τό ὑποκειμενῷ ὡς ὑλὴ τοῦ χρυσοῦ τῆς σφραγίδας ἐδέστη, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ὀψεις τῶν ἱδών ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτικὴ χωρὶς τῆς ὑποκειμένης αὐταίς ὑλῆς. ὡς δὲ ἀκοή καὶ ἡ ὀσφρῆσις σωματειδεῖς ὀδοῖ καὶ παθητικῶτερα μεθ’ ὑλῆς εἰσδέχονται τὰ ἀίσθητα. μετὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ σύν τῷ ἀέρι οὐ πάθος ἐστὶν ὁ ψύφος καὶ ἡ ὀσμή, ἀντιλαμβάνονται τῶν οἰκείων αἰσθητῶν . . . καθαρωτέρα ἄρα ἡ ὀψεις ὡς ἀλλὰ τού ἀντιληπτικῆς ἀτομῆς καὶ ὀσφρῆσισι. Τὸν ἄλλο παράγεται, because its ὑλή or material vehicle, is the crass ὑδατόδες ὕγρον, which it takes in along with the sensible form: see also notes on iii. 10.

καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν] i. e. καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις a. 2. διαφέρουσιν αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.

καὶ ἐκάτερα ἄλληλων] The meaning is that 'within each of the a. 3. two classes (pleasures of sense, and intellectual pleasures) the pleasures differ from one another in purity'—e.g. in the class of intellectual pleasures, the pleasures of ὁ ἕπιστασθαι are purer than those of ὁ λογίζωσθαι: and among the pleasures of sense, those of sight are purer than those of taste. In all cases the less ὑλὴ, the greater καθαρευτὴς.

§ 8. καθάπερ 'Ἡράκλειτος φησιν ὅνους σύμματ' ἄν ἔλεεσθαι μάλλον ἢ a. 6. χρυσόν] see Bywater, Heracliti Reliquiae, Fr. 51, who gives the fragment as ὅνους σύμματ' ἄν ἔλεεσθαι μάλλον ἢ χρυσόν. This seems to be the only place where the saying is preserved. Bekker and Susemihl read ὅνους: Bywater reads ὅνους, which is given by K², Ald., Mich. Eph. (7), B¹, B², CCC, Cambr., NC. Michael Ephesius has an interesting remark here—τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως 'Ἡράκλειτος τοῦ Ἐφεσίου καὶ ἐμοῦ πολιτοῦ, τὸ ὅνους σύμματ' ἄν ἔλεεσθαι μάλλον ἢ χρυσόν, σύμματα τῶν χωρῶν 'Ἡράκλειτος λέγει, ὡς κατὰ φύσιν ἡδὸς ἐστὶ τῷ ὄνῳ. Σύμματα means 'sweepings': hence litter, or fodder.

§ 9. ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων] 'in particular, ye latet vastum illud a. 10. discrimen naturae inter homines et inter bestias' (Ramsauer). All the animals of the same species, we may suppose (ἐπιλογον a. 9),

1176 a. 10. find pleasure in the same things: but men do not present such a uniformity of taste. Good men and bad men find pleasure in different things. The distinction of good and bad is not found among the lower animals—οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἄρετή vii. 1. 2.

a. 11. τέρπει] The mass of text beginning here with τέρπει 1176 a. 11 and ending with ἰκάνως 1177 a. 30 is omitted by Kb. For the quantitative relation between this mass of text and (1) v. 10. 1137 a. 31–1138 a. 3, (2) v. 11. 1138 a. 4–b. 12, (3) v. 9. 1136 a. 9–1137 a. 30, see Introductory Note to v. 10.

a. 15. § 10.] See notes on i. 8. ii, iii. 4. 4, and vi. 12. 6.

a. 22. τουτών] For Bywater's explanation of his conjecture 'fort. τοῖς vel τουτών,' see Contrib. p. 68.

a. 27. § 11. αι τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἄνδρός] 'Transit ad disquisitionem de beatitudine' (Michelet).

a. 28. κυρίως . . . a. 29 πολλοστώς] Peters brings out the force of these terms very well—' . . . will be called "pleasures of man" in the full meaning of the word, and the others in a secondary sense, and with a fraction of that meaning.'

CHAPTER VI.

ARGUMENT.

The Virtues, Friendship, and Pleasure having been discussed, we shall now end our Treatise with a sketch of Happiness.

It will save time, if we recapitulate what we have already said about Happiness. We said that it is not a Habit, but a Function—not one of the functions which are 'necessary as means,' but one desirable for its own sake: we accordingly identified it with the Function of the Good Man—with his virtuous and beautiful actions, which are desirable in themselves.

But why, it may be asked, identify Happiness with virtuous actions? Is not Amusement chosen (often at the cost of health and money) for its own sake—simply for its own pleasure, not for the sake of any thing beyond? To this we answer—Yes, by tyrants, for instance; and this is one of the chief reasons why it is identified with Happiness in people's minds: but tyrants, and those like
them, are no evidence in this matter—men without virtue or intelligence, who have never tasted pure pleasure. It is to the Good Man, as we have often said, that we must refer, and he prefers the life of virtuous action. Therefore Happiness does not consist in Amusement. The life of virtuous action is Happiness or the Chief End; and the proper place of Amusement is as means to this. ‘Play that you may work,’ as Anacharsis said, should be our rule. Amusement is relaxation; and relaxation is not an end in itself, but—since we cannot always be working—a means to the better performance of serious duty.

It is in the performance, then, of the highest functions of Man, that Happiness consists: if it consisted in bodily enjoyment and amusement, any sensualist—even a slave, to whom no one thinks of ascribing ‘Happiness’ any more than ‘citizenship’—would have to be called ‘Happy.’

§ 1. εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἰδιόσας 1178 a. 30. Ramsauer compares x. 9. 1 eἰ περὶ τῶν πονων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἦτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἰδιόσας, ἱκανῶς εἰρηται τοῖς τύποις: and says—‘agnosci his verbis videtur disputatio quaedam de amicitiae generibus, postita illa inter τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς et inter τὰ περὶ τὰς ἰδιόσας: negligi quae vii. 11—14 περὶ ἰδιόσας acta sunt.’ Connecting-passages like these must be interpreted with great caution. They are evidence only for the order which existed when they were written, and, in many cases, are demonstrably late interpolations. The two passages before us may well belong to the time when the Nicomachean Corpus, as we have it, with the two Treatises on ἰδιόσα, was made up; for the editor, having just left the subject of ἰδιόσα (as treated in x. 1—5), would naturally put it last in his list of subjects hitherto discussed.

NC and CCC have εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς (τὰς ἀρετὰς first hand CCC, τῆς ἀρετῆς corr.) τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἰδιόσας.

§ 2. εἰσπομεν] e.g. E. N. i. 8. 9. a. 33.

τῶν δ’ ἐνεργευόντων αἰ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαία κ.τ.λ.] See note on i. 1. 2, b. 2. and Met. θ. 8. 1050 a. 23 sqq. quoted there.

δῆλον δὴ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν . . . b. 5 αὐτάρκης] See i. 7. 7. b. 3.

§ 3. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἱδεῖαι] sc. ἰδιόσει εἰσι καθ’ αὐτάς b. 9. αἰρεταί. This, of course, is not Aristotle’s own opinion. His answer to the arguments for regarding amusement as an end in itself begins with οἶδεν δ’ ἵσως σημεῖον ὑπ’ τῶν ὑπὸ εἰσίν § 4, b. 17; and in § 6 he states his own view of the place of amusement in life—that it is relaxation, a means to the better performance of earnest work—παῖζει δ’ ὑπὸς σπουδάζῃ b. 33.

1176 b. 10. βλάπτονται γάρ ἄπ' αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.] καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδείαι οὐ δὲ ἄλλα ζητοῦνται, οἱ γὰρ αἵρεσιν αὐτῶς οὐδεν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὁφελεῖται: βλάπτονται μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον (Paraph.).

b. 17. ἀπασχολάζειν ἀπασχολάζειν ('to be entirely engaged with,' 'to make one's business in life') is the reading of H², Lb, Mb, NC—a ἀπαξ εἰρημένον apparently, although ἀπασχολέω occurs. Kb is defective here (see note on x. 5. 9, a. 11); but ἀπασχολάζειν is the reading of Cambr., which has much in common with Kb in Book x (see Anec. Ox. vol. i, part i, English MSS. of the Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 74-83): also of B¹, B², B³.


b. 24. § 5. καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἰρήται] e.g. x. 5. 10.

b. 27. καὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον δῆ] So Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater, for Bekker's δέ.

§ 6. οὐκ ἐν παιδίᾳ ἄρα ή εὐδαιμονίᾳ κ.τ.λ.] See Pol. Θ. 2. 1337 b. 22 sqq.—αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβηλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ εἰρήται πρότερον, ἐπαμφοτεριζοῦσιν ἐστὶ δὲ τέτταρα σχέδια ὧν παιδεύειν εἴσοδοι, γραμματικὴ καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ μουσικὴ καὶ τέταρτον ἐνοικο γραφικὴ, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὖσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἀνδριὰν τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἥδη διαπορθήσεις ἔν τις. οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἡδονής χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτής· οἱ δ' εἶ ἀρχήν ἔταξαν εἰς παιδεία διὰ τὸ τὸν φύσιν αὐτήν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἰρήται, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὁρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἦν καὶ πάλιν εἰσέπομεν περί αὐτῆς.—εἰ δ' ἀμφοῦ μὲν δει, μᾶλλον δὲ αἱρετῶν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἁσχολίας, καὶ τέλος ζητητέον δι τι δει ποιοῦντας σχολάζειν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παῖζοντας· τέλος γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῷ βίῳ τὴν παιδιὰν ημῖν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον εν ταῖς ἁσχολίαις χρηστῶν ταῖς παιδιαῖς (δ' γὰρ ποιεῖν δεῖ τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἐν δὲ παιδία χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστὶν· τὸ δ' ἁσχολεῖν συμβαίνει μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο δὲ παιδίας εἰσάγεσθαι καυσοφυλακοῦστα τὴν χρῆσιν, ὡς προσάγοντα φαρμακεῖας χάριν. ἀνεισίς γὰρ ἢ τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς γυγής, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν ἀνάπαυσις.

1 CCC has ἀπασχολάζειν ὑδεῖπ ν.κ.τ.λ. The letters within [ ] seem to be later, and the [ ] represents space between ἀπασχολεῖν and ὑδεῖπ for only two, or at most, three letters. Was the original reading ἀπασχολεῖν? Cf. intr. use of ἁσχολεῖν Pol. Θ. 2. 1337 b. 31.
Cf. also Pol. Θ. 5. 1339 b. 11 sqq., where the relation of Music to παιδία is discussed. It is shown that music is not merely useful as a relaxation—πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν, but that it has also a higher function—τιμωτέρα δ' ἐστὶν ἣ φύσις αὐτῆς ἣ κατὰ τὴν εἰρήμενη χρήσιν 1340 a. 1, being a great educational instrument—ποιεῖ πνεῦ τὰ Ἡθη γνώμεθα δ' αὐτῆς 1340 a. 7. This point, however, is not before us here, nor its value πρὸς διαγωγὴν—as one of the modes of ‘employing and enjoying’ that σχολή which is the end (see Pol. Θ. 4. 1339 a. 25). 

[Adunatoûtes δὲ συνεχῶς ποιεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δεόνται] Cf. x. 4. 9 b. 34. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἕτεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄνθρωπεα ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν: Mel. Α. 7. 1072 b. 14 διαγωγῆ δ' ἐστίν ὁμ' ἡ ἀρίστη μικρόν χρόνον ἡμῶν' οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ εκεῖνο ἐστιν, ἠμῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον.

Παιδία is a necessity imposed upon man by his composite nature. It is a foolish mistake to make this necessity the end. On εὐπραπελία, as contributing to ἀνάπαυσις, see Introductory Note to iv. 8.

§ 8. εἶ μὴ καὶ βίου] bios is here the life of a citizen, as distinguished from ζωῆς, animal life. This distinction, however, between the two terms is not always observed. On the position of the δουλος, see note on viii. 11, 7, b. 5.

CHAPTER VII.

ARGUMENT.

Happiness consisting in virtuous function, Perfect Happiness will consist in the function which proceeds from the highest virtue—that of the principle which is best in Man, and naturally authoritative in him, and most divine—Reason. That Perfect Happiness is speculative function is a conclusion in accordance with what has already been laid down and with the truth: for speculative function is the highest, most continuous, and most pleasant of all functions: further, the most self-sufficing—for, though the Philosopher and the Just Man both need ‘the necessaries of life,’ the Just man needs other people on whom to

1 The three functions of music are distinguished in Pol. Θ. 5. 1339 b. 13 πότερον παιδέαν, ἢ παιδίαν, ἢ διαγωγήν εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν.
exercise his virtue, but the Philosopher, though perhaps it is better for him to have friends to help him in his thinking, can yet think by himself, being of all men the most self-sufficing. Again, speculative function is the only function which is loved for itself alone; thinking, and nothing but thinking, results from it; whereas in the sphere of moral conduct there are objects attained beyond the actions which we perform. Again, Happiness is thought to be realised in leisure: we are busy in order that we may have leisure—we wage war in order that we may enjoy peace. Now, the moral virtues manifest themselves in war and in the performance of civil duties—in actions with which men 'busy themselves'—actions, indeed, of pre-eminent nobility and grandeur, but yet aimed at some end beyond themselves—at the acquisition of power it may be, or of honour, or—of Happiness for oneself and one's fellow-citizens. But to the life of speculative function belong all the prerogatives which we assign to the life of the Blessed—it is its own end, it has a pleasure all its own which augments it, it is self-sufficient, it is the employment of leisure, it is—so far as man's estate allows—unwearied. This life, if it attain to its perfect duration, is Perfect Happiness. It is a life which is higher than human. It is not as concrete men, but as having in us a divine principle, that we shall live this life. Let us not then listen to those who tell us that we are human, and ought to mind human things—that we are mortal, and ought to mind mortal things; but, so far as in us lies, let us bear ourselves as immortals, and do all for the sake of living in accordance with that which is highest in us—that part of us which, though small in bulk, is, in power and worth, exalted far above all the rest. This part—Reason—being his sovereign part, is the man. He, therefore, who lives according to Reason, lives according to what he truly is. His life is his own—therefore naturally the best and sweetest for him: 'his own' in this eminent sense—therefore realises the highest Happiness.

Introductory Note. Mich. Eph. introduces this chapter with the following comment: ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἡ μὲν ἡθικὴ ἡ δὲ θεωρητικὴ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία διττή. ἐν μὲν τῷ πρῶτῳ βιβλίῳ εἶπε περὶ πολιτικῆς εὐδαιμονίας... ἐν τούτῳ δὲ λέγει περὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ κατὰ αὐτὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, διὰ ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὄντως ἀνθρώπως καὶ ὁ ἀληθῶς ἀνθρώπως, ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν δηλοῦσθαι νοῦς καὶ ἐπιγνώμενος τοῦ τοιοῦτος εὐδαιμῶν τῷ πολιτικῷ εὐδαιμῶν οὕτωσιν γὰρ ἐστιν ἐν τινὶ γενέσθαι νοεῖν ἡμᾶς ἡ μὴ μετρήσατε τὰ πάθη διὰ τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρετῶν, καὶ κατὰ πολιτικῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἡμᾶς εἰρήνη τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει καὶ ἀστάθμῃ... εἰ οὖν ἀμετρα τὰ πάθη καὶ ἀόρατα καὶ ὄξυλοι καὶ παραχθεὶς ἐμποιητικά, πῶς οὖν τε νοεῖν ἐνεργεῖν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλώγων παθῶν περιελκόμενιν;... καὶ αἷμα έρηται τοὺς εἰπόνι τὴν πρακτικὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπιτιθειότατας τυχαί εἰναι πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τῆς θεωρητικῆς εὐδαιμονίας.

1177 a. 13. § 1. κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην] See i. 7. 15 κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελεωτάτην.
What is the alternative to "vovs"? The words a. 15 "eite theiaν" καί αύτοι eite των εν ἠμων το θειότατον seem to help us to the answer. Των εν ἠμων το θειοτατον is man's νος: see x. 7. 8 θειον δ νος προς των ανθρωπων: accordingly something higher than man's νος must be marked by the words eite theiaν καί αύτοι—some immediate presence of God in each man, to guide him providentially, like the inspired ἀρετή—θεια μοιρα παραγιγυμνη άνευ νοο ois αν παραγιγυμναi—of the Meno (99 E). This alternative is, of course, rejected by Aristotle.

On των εν ἠμων το θειότατον Mich. Eph. has the following—ειτε δε eite δη το θειότατον των εν ἠμων, διτθος αυτω και την αίσθησιν και διαος την φύσιν και πάντα τα της φύσεως έργα προσαγερευειν—η γαρ φύσις φησιν αυτως εν ἀλλωιθθος μεν ουκ εστι θειον δε τι και δαμανων άστε η μεν αίσθησις θειον ου θειότατον, το δε λογιζόμενον θειαν και θειότατον.

η τελεια εδαιμονια] This phrase has not occurred before in the a. 17. Ethics; but κατ' ἀρετην τελειαν occurs in the definition of the εδαιμονιν in i. 10. 15.

οτι δ' εστι θεωρητικη, ειρηται] 'at haec nusquam sic leguntur: lacunae igitur habes in libro vi indicium' (Susemihl). Perhaps, in the absence of the Nicomachean original of Book vi, we may be allowed to refer to E. N. i. 5. 2 και τριτος ο θεωρητικος. There is no mention of the θεωρητικος βιος in E. N. i. 7, §§ 3–8—a passage which has much in common with the chapter now before us; but we must assume that Aristotle had not forgotten the θεωρητικος βιος when he wrote i. 7, §§ 3–8.

§ 2. καί γαρ δ νοος κ.τ.λ.] i. e. καί γαρ δ νοος κρατιστος εστι των εν a. 20. ἡμιν, και τα γραατα περι δ νοος κρατιστα εστι των γραατων. For the use of the epithet κρατιστος in connexion with νοος and το νοημα, see Met. A. 9. 1074 b. 33 αυτων αρα νοει, ειπερ εστι το κρατιστον, και εστιν η νοηηα ονησιω νοηηας. Reason is the principle which prevails (κρατει) in the world. It has might as well as right.

πραττειν] as distinguished from θεωρειν: see note on i. 10. 10, a. 22. b. 15—τοιτων δ αυτων αι τιμωται μονημωτερα δια το μαλιστα και συνεχεστατα καταζην εν αυταις των μακρινιν: but cf. note on ix. 9. 5, a. 6—οι γαρ μεριν και αυτων ενεργειν συνεχις, μεθ' ετερων δ και προς ἄλλων ῥοιον—a statement which seems to conflict with the doctrine of this chapter. We must, however, allow much for the difference in the
point of view. In ix the good man is viewed as κοινωνία βίου, in x
as ὁμοωθεὶς τῷ θεῷ.

[1177 a. 22] Instead of Bekker’s comma, Susemihl and Bywater
rightly place a full stop after ὅτιον.

a. 25. § 3. ἡ φιλοσοφία] soφία is the reading of Pb, Ald., CCC, Cambr.,
B¹, B², B³. Of course φιλοσοφία is right, the argument being—‘ if
the pursuit of wisdom (φιλοσοφία) is so pleasant, how much more
pleasant must the possession (σοφία) be?’

explains as follows—αὐλογέρων αἰσθήσεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καθαρωτέραι: the
πολιτικός is immersed in matter, and often repents that he has done
this, or not done that: ὅ δὲ θεωρῶν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπισκεπτό-
μενος οὐδέποτε ἐν μετανοίᾳ γίνεται.

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B¹, B², B³. Of course φιλοσοφία is right, the argument being—‘ if
the pursuit of wisdom (φιλοσοφία) is so pleasant, how much more
pleasant must the possession (σοφία) be?’

explains as follows—αὐλογέρων αἰσθήσεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καθαρωτέραι: the
πολιτικός is immersed in matter, and often repents that he has done
this, or not done that: ὅ δὲ θεωρῶν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπισκεπτό-
μενος οὐδέποτε ἐν μετανοίᾳ γίνεται.

[1177 a. 22] Instead of Bekker’s comma, Susemihl and Bywater
rightly place a full stop after ὅτιον.

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μενος οὐδέποτε ἐν μετανοίᾳ γίνεται.

§§ 3-7. [In these sections it may perhaps be thought that the a. 27. θεωρητικός βίος is presented as a career distinguished from the πολιτικός βίος—the career of the savant, as distinguished from that of the man of affairs. That the savant needs less χορηγία than the man of affairs, and so is αὐτοπρόετερος, is true in a sense—although we must remember that the savant is himself the highest product of civil life, and the order and amenity of that life are materially necessary to his form, being, in a way, his χορηγία. That the career of the savant was partly what Aristotle understood by the θεωρητικός βίος is most likely—it was his own career; but here, I take it, he asks us to look at the θεωρητικός βίος, not as a separate career side by side with other careers in the city, but rather as the form of the πολιτικός βίος, that is, of all life in the city. Accordingly, when he distinguishes ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην ἀρετὴν (x. 7. 1) from ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν (x. 8. 1), he does not distinguish two lives, but rather two points of view. The εἰσάγωνια of the σοφὸς is higher than that of the ἄνδρειος, as the ψυχή is higher than the σώμα—but there is no ψυχή without σῶμα, and no σῶμα without ψυχή. The 'city' exists for the sake of its 'thinkers,' but the 'thinkers' are no caste apart: they are the leaven in the mass. We must remember that it is of ἡ τελεία εἰσαγωγία that he is speaking here. Pure θεωρία constitutes ἡ τελεία εἰσαγωγία. But man cannot engage in this θεωρία continuously, or, even at intervals, perfectly. Only God can continuously and perfectly. The life of pure θεωρία is too high for man, because he is concrete. Ἡ τελεία εἰσαγωγία, then, being beyond the reach of man, he is left with εἰσαγωγία to the extent of his θεωρία: see E. N. x. 8. 8. This means that θεωρία is the formal element in his εἰσαγωγία. The σοφός, as distinguished here (x. 7. 4) from the δικαίος, is this formal element abstracted and personified for the sake of clearer presentation. But we must not make 'a material use of a merely formal principle'—we must not suppose that the σοφός, as described here—E. N. x. chapters 7 and 8—exists as an individual to bear away the prize of actual εἰσαγωγία from the δικαίος. The θεωρητικός βίος is not a separate life coordinate with the πολιτικός βίος, but a spirit]
1177 a. 27. which penetrates and ennobles the latter. When the ‘political’ life is said to be ἀσχολος (x. 7. 6, b. 12), this is doubtless true of the lives of ordinary politicians, who make politics a trade, subjecting themselves to the vicissitudes of party fortune, and placing their end in its domain; but it is not true of the life of the ‘good man,’ whose σχολή consists in the quiet of a well-regulated mind, not in an impossible immunity from the ‘interruptions’ of practical life. Unless we understand σχολή in this sense, we must suppose that in the Ethics the life of the good man is depicted as a more or less troubled and unsatisfactory public career, in which he is painfully conscious of the difficulty of finding occasions for the exercise of his temperance, justice, liberality, and other virtues—ending, if he is ever to reach the highest kind of happiness, in withdrawal from social activity, and the attainment of Nirvana, such as the Neoplatonists understood the θεωρητικὸς βios to be. Nothing could be more opposed than this to Aristotle’s view of life as social from beginning to end.

I take it, then, that when he contrasts the θεωρητικὸς βios and the πρακτικὸς βios, Aristotle sometimes thinks especially of the difference between the life of the student or savant and that of the public man—and sometimes (as here, x. 7, §§ 4-7) wishes rather to call attention to the τι ἦν ἐδαι, or οὐσία ἄνευ ὀλης, as distinguished from the concrete manifestation, of man’s life as a whole. But these two ways of looking at the βios θεωρητικὸς scarcely present themselves to him as two. The result is a confusion of expression which enabled the mystics of a later age to quote Aristotle’s authority for their extravagances—the δικαίος is contrasted, as a man who has difficulty in finding people on whom to exercise his δικαιοσύνη, with the σοφός, who has something better to do than to exercise δικαιοσύνη!

For more on Aristotle’s view of the relation of the θεωρητικὸς βios to the πρακτικὸς βios, see note on i. 5. 2, also notes on vi. 1. 1 and vi. 13. 8.

Plutarch discourses on the inseparability of these two βίου in an interesting passage—de liberis educandis, 10—τελείους δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἠγούμε τοὺς δυναμένους τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν μίξιν καὶ κεράσαι τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ δυνῶν ὄντων μεγίστων ἀγιαθῶν ἐπηθήδους ὑπάρχειν ὑπολαμβάνω, τοῦ τε κοινωφελοῦς βίου, πολιτευόμενου, τοῦ τε ἀκύμονος καὶ γαληνοῦ, διατρίβοντας περὶ φιλοσοφίαν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων βίων, δὲν ὁ μὲν ἐστὶ πρακτικός, δὲ θεωρητικός, δὲ ἀπολαυστικὸς, ὁ μὲν ἐλπιστὸς καὶ δουλὸς τῶν ἠδονῶν, ζωόθες καὶ μικροπρεπῆς ἐστιν ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸς, τοῦ πρακτικοῦ δια-
BOOK X: CHAP. 7: §§ 3-5.

When Plato (Rep. 520 A) compels his philosophers to re-enter the cave, he asserts the soul-and-body like connexion between the theōrētikos bios and the praktikos bios. I understand Aristotle to believe in the same intimate connexion, although, as a professed savant, he probably differed from Plato as to how the savant or 'philosopher' ought to make his influence felt in society; he probably attached more importance than Plato did to the mere presence of 'thinkers'—of an academic element—in the city. He would probably not have wished to see his 'thinkers' take to 'politics'—even if, by so doing, they might have become 'philosopher kings.'

§ 4. ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὗς δικαιοπραγῆσαι καὶ μεθ' ὅν ... a. 30. ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὃν δύναται θεωρεῖν] The σοφός, as thus contrasted with the δίκαιος, is, for the moment, taken out of the human environment. He is not the savant, actually existing in society, but the personification—or even deification—of the theoretic element in man. Then follow immediately the words a. 34 βελτίων ὁ ἴσος συνεργοῦσι ἔχων, which refer to the savant, as an actually existing member of society. Aristotle, as I have said, looks at the theōrētikos bios from two points of view—as the form of human life, and as the career of the savant; but the two points of view sometimes tend to merge in each other.

συνεργοὺς] The special reference is probably to ἡ τελεία φιλία, a. 34. and the boîthéra afforded by its 'Dialectic': see Introductory Note to Book viii. So far as the remarks made in this section apply to the σοφὸς, as an actually existing savant, it seems to me that his independence of ἡ ἐκτὸς χορηγία is exaggerated. Not to mention the remoter social conditions of his existence, he owes much to educational institutions; and, if he is a student of nature, as Aristotle himself was, he will require the special χορηγία of the laboratory.

§ 5. οὖθεν γὰρ ἂπτ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι] See Met. A. 2. b. 2. 982 b. 11 ἄλογ ὅτι ἀνθρώπινοι τίνι καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ήρμηνευταίς φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐκ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀπόρων θαυμάσαστες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρῶν οὖσω προϊόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μειάσαστες, οἷον περὶ τῶν
BOOK X: CHAP. 7: §§ 5, 6.

b. 2. τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων καὶ τῶν περὶ τῶν ἕλλων [καὶ περὶ ἄστρων] καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παινός γενέσεως. ὃς ἀποροῦμεν καὶ θαναταίοις οίκαται ἄγνοιαν (διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφος πώς ἔστω; ὃς μὲν διὸ σύγκειται ἐκ θανατοῦ). ὡστ' εἴπερ διὰ τὸ φείγειν τῷ ἄγνωσιν ἑφαίνοσθεν, φανερῶν ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέαν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι εἴδωκαν, καὶ οὐ χρῆσεσθαι τινος ἐνεκέν. μαρτυρεῖ ὅ αὐτὸ τὸ συμβεβηκός' σχεδὸν ἐὰν πάντων ὑπαρχοντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς βασιλέων καὶ διαγωγῆς ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνιμης ἑρῴως ζητεῖται. δὴ λοιπὸν όν ὃς δὲ καὶ οἴδημαν αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμεῖν χρεῖαν ἔτεραν ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἄθρωπός φαίνει εὐφυέρος ὁ ἐαυτοῦ ἑνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλων ἄν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτῇ, μόνη ἔλευθερα ὑπάκα τῶν ἐπιστημών' μόνη γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐαυτῆς ἑνεκεν ἑστών. διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἐν οὐκ ἄθρωπην νομίζουσα αὐτῆς ἡ κτήσις.

b. 3. πρακτικῶν] so Rassow, Susemihl, and Bywater, for Bekker's πρακτικῶν. Besides K6 and Hel., quoted by Susemihl, Cambr. gives πρακτικῶν. Rassow (Forsch. 70) describes πρακτικῶν as 'das allein richtige.'

The statement ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν... b 4 πράξεων does not conflict with the ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξίᾳ τέλος of vi. 2. 5, for εὐπραξία is the whole system of καλαί πράξεις, whereas the πρακτικαί ἐνέργεια of the present section are actions performed as means: cf. iii. 3. 15 αἰ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἑνεκα.

b. 4. § 6. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σκολῇ ἐνεαί.] 'It is a sort of repose, as it were, the fruit of our exertions' (Grant). 'One of the Aristotelian ideas,' says Prof. Jowett (Politics, vol. i. p. cxliv), 'which we have a difficulty in translating into English words and modes of thought is σκολή or ἡ ἐν σκολῇ διαγωγή. To us leisure means hardly more than the absence of occupation, the necessary alternation of play with work. By the Greek, σκολή was regarded as the condition of a gentleman. In Aristotle the notion is still further idealized, for he seems to regard it as an internal state in which the intellect, free from the cares of practical life, energizes or reposes in the consciousness of truth.' See also his note on τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σκολὴν Pol. viii. 2. 1338 a. 10, vol. ii. p. 295, where he says that the expression is nearly equivalent to τὴν ἐν τῇ σκολῇ διαγωγήν 1338 a. 21: the first sense of the word διαγωγή is 'that employment of leisure which becomes a gentleman'... 'Further it is joined with φρόνιμης (Pol. 6. 4. 1339 a. 25), and therefore seems to mean the rational or intellectual employment and enjoyment of leisure. It is always distinguished from παυδία and ἀνάπαυσις, "amusement" and "relaxation," which are properly, not ends, but only means to
renewed exertion (cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6, § 6); and so means to 1177 b. 4.
means, whereas διαγωγή and σχολή are ends in themselves. The
idea of "culture," implying a use of the intellect, not for the sake of
any further end, but for itself, would so far correspond to διαγωγή.

τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν . . . b. 8 παντελῶς] Rassow (Forsch. p. 32) b. 6.
places this sentence after φόνοι γίνονται b. 12. Thus b. 9 όδιεις γὰρ
αἱρεταὶ . . . b. 12 γίνονται immediately follows πολεμοῦμεν ἐν εἰρήνῃ
διώκουμεν b. 6, which it explains. This is a great improvement to the
run of the passage; but perhaps (since transposing sentences is
always risky work) we ought to be satisfied with the amount of
improvement produced by Bywater's parenthesis όδιεις b. 9 . . .
b. 12 γίνονται.

φόνοι γίνονται] K b has γίνονται, and Camb. has φόνοι.

is itself an ἀτελῆ ἐνέργεια—it results in a τέλος external to itself.

δήλον ὡς] Ramsauer proposes δὴ ὡς, or δήλον ὡς. I do not b. 15.
think that any change is necessary.

§ 7. εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κ.τ.λ. ] The apodosis of this sentence begins b. 16.
with b. 24 ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία.

καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλος] See Mel. A. 2. 982 b. 27 b. 20.
μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ αὐτὴς ἑνεκέν ἐστίν: Mel. Θ. 8. 1050 a. 34 δοσών δὲ 
ἐστιν ἄλλο τι ἐργαν παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὅπως
ἡ ὁράσει ἐν τῷ ὀρῷτε καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντε, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ,
διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία: ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τις ἐστὶν.

καὶ ἔχειν τὴν ἡδονὴν οἰκεῖαν (αὐτῇ δὲ συναυξεῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν)] See
x. 5. 2.

δὴ] So Bekker and Bywater. I prefer Susemihl's δὲ given by M b b. 22.
and O b. On καὶ . . . δὲ see Eucken de Arist. dic. rat: Pars 1 a:
de particularum usu, p. 32 'adjungit καὶ—δὲ rem novam saepe tam
leni modo ut idem fere valeat atque τέ. ' He remarks that καὶ . . . δὲ
is more frequent in E. N. iv, viii, ix, and x, than elsewhere in the
Aristotelian writings.

τὰ κατὰ ταὐτην] The τὰ is introduced by Bywater from K b, M b. b. 23.
The sentence seems to me to run better without it.
448  BOOK X: CHAP. 7: §§ 7, 8.

1177 b. 25. λαβοῦσα μήκος βίου τέλειον] This means that the life of the ευδαιμον must have a reasonable duration; that it must be long enough for him to do his life's work in: see note on ἐν βίῳ τελειφ i. 7. 16, a. 18.

b. 26. § 8.] The θεωρητικὸς βίος is an ideal; it cannot be realised by man, for he is concrete. But the effort to realise it, as far as possible, is all-important in human life. The effort to realise it coordinates man's powers, and exalts their vitality—it gives him ἔλλαν, and carries him on to the attainment of many things within his reach, which he would not otherwise aspire to. Perhaps we may venture to translate the doctrine of this section into the language of modern philosophy, and say that Aristotle makes 'the Idea of God' the 'regulative principle' in man's life. Indeed Eudemus puts the doctrine hardly otherwise in a passage which is the best commentary on this section—Ε. Ε. Η. 15. 1249 b. 6—δεὶ δὴ ὁσσερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον ἔτη, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἔτιν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ὅπως δοῦλον πρὸς δεσπότον καὶ ἑκαστὸν πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου καθήκονσαν ἀρχήν, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπος φύσει συνεκτηνέες ἄρχοντος καὶ ἄρχομένου, καὶ ἑκαστὸν ἀν δεόν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχήν ἔτη (αὐτὴ δὲ διπτὴν ἄλλοσ γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλος ἡ ἰγκεία ταύτης δὲ ἑνεκα ἐκεῖνη) ὥστε δὲ ἔχει κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικὸν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχον ὁ θεός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ἑνεκα ἡ φύσεις ἐπιτάττει (διότι δὲ τὸ οὐ ἑνεκα διάφανται δὲ ἐν ἄλλοις), ἐπεὶ κεῖνος γε ὁδεγεῖς δεῖται, ἦτις οὖν ἀἵρεσις καὶ κτίσης τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιῆσαι μικράται τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν, ἡ σύμμοιρος ἡ χρημάτων ἡ πεπλων τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, ἀυτὴ ἁρίστη, καὶ οὕτως ὁ ἄρος κάλλιστος ἦτις δὲ δὲ ἐνεδέα ἦσθαι δὲ ἐπιβοληκεν καλύτερον τῶν θεῶν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, αὐτὴ δὲ φαύλη. ἔχει δὲ τούτῳ τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ οὕτως τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος ἄριστος, τὸ ἕκταστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ τοιούτῳ. τίς μὲν οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκαγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐντοῦ ἐρημεύον.

b. 28. τοῦ συνθέτου] 'man's concrete nature,' 'man as concrete.' Ἡ σύνθεσις οὐσία is the concrete thing—the union of ὑλή and μορφή, as distinguished from the μορφή which is οὐσία ἄνευ ὑλῆς. Thus ζώον as ψυχή ἐν σώματι is a σύνθεσις οὐσία of which ψυχή is the οὐσία ἄνευ ὑλῆς or τί ἐν εἴη: see Met. Η. 3. 1043 b. 29 sqq.

§§ 8, 9. The saying was evidently proverbial.

It answers to the θεύν θεραπεύον καὶ θεωρεῖν of E. E. H. b. 33. 15. 1249 b. 20 quoted above.

to ὅγκω μικρόν] Nous is 'small in bulk' as compared with the 1178 a. 1. σώματα which it rules. Of course we must not press this statement. The θεύν τι ἐν ἡμῖν is an immaterial principle without ὅγκος—like God in the οὐρανός, Who has no μέγεθος: see Mel. Α. 8. 1073 a. 5: so, Dante (Paradiso xxviii) sees God as a point of piercing light, so small that the smallest star would seem a moon beside it—

La Donna mia, che mi videva in cura
Forte sospeso, disse: Da quel punto
Depende il cielo e tutta la natura.

Zell quotes Soph. Elench. 34. 183 b. 22 μέγατον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ πάντων, διότερ λέγεται διὸ καὶ χαλεπῶτατον’ δόσι γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσοῦτον μικρότατον δὴ τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπῶτατον ἐστιν ὀφθαλμοί.

tµεῖστη] Κδ stands alone, so far as I know, in reading ποιήσει. This is a plausible reading, the contrasted τῷ ὅγκῳ being equivalent to κατὰ τὸ ποιῶν. The conjunction δυνάμει καὶ ποιήσει occurs in Plutarch de Virt. Mor. 5 ἀρετή... ἀκρότης μὲν ἐστὶ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιήσει, τῷ ποιῶν δὲ μεσότης γίνεται.

§ 9. εἰπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄρειεν] Cf. ix. 8. 6 διότερ δὲ καὶ πόλει τὸ a. 2. κυριωτάτου μάλιστ᾿ εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὗτο καὶ ἀνθρώπος.

tὸ λεκθὲν τὲ πρῶτον] the reference may be to x. 5. 8.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

It is but a second-best—a merely human Happiness—that is realised in the life of moral action; for man's moral nature, rooted as it is for the most part in the passions, belongs to him as 'Concrete Human Being,' not as 'Pure Reason.'

The life of Pure Reason—the Happiness of speculative function—would seem...
to need external equipment to a less extent than that of moral action. The 'necessaries of life' thinker and moral agent may perhaps need to an equal extent: but in what each needs for the performance of his proper function they differ widely. The moral agent needs money for his Liberality and Justice (good intentions are not enough for the manifestation of these virtues), power for his Courage, opportunity for his Temperance: but the thinker needs none of these external things for the performance of his function—nay these things even hinder thinking. It is as concrete man, and member of society, and as choosing to live the life of moral action (for he does not separate himself from the life of moral action), that the thinker will need these external things.

That Perfect Happiness is speculative function may be seen also from this—that to the gods, whom we deem most Blessed and Happy, we do not ascribe moral actions—how ridiculous it would be to think of them as restoring deposits justly, facing danger courageously, expending money liberally, tempted by no bad desires forsooth, and conducting themselves temperately!—no: if we go through the whole list of the moral actions we shall find none worthy of the gods: yet we all hold that they live and therefore put forth some function—they do not sleep like Endymion:—what function, then, remains to a living being, when moral action, and with it, of course, the action of the artificer, have been set aside? Only speculative function remains. Such is the function of God. His whole life is blessed; man's life is blessed so far as he realises something like the function of God; the other animals are outside the pale of Happiness, because they have no part in Speculative Thought. Happiness is co-extensive with Speculative Thought. He who has Speculative Thought in fuller measure has Happiness in fuller measure—not as something following upon Speculative Thought, but as involved in the very essence of Speculative Thought: for Speculative Thought is in its own essence precious—it is an end in itself.

Happiness, then, may be defined as a manifestation of Speculative Thought. But human nature is not self-sufficient as regards the performance of speculative function. The thinker, as concrete man, needs external wellbeing—bodily health, sustenance, service: not that he will need great appliances: nay, the performance of those functions in which Happiness consists, is often hindered by too many appliances—a man may do noble deeds without being lord of land and sea: we more often see men in private stations doing that which is good than men in positions of power: Solon was right when he declared those to be Happy who have been sufficiently furnished with external good things, and have achieved the noblest actions, and lived temperately: Anaxagoras too seems to agree with this view that moderate possessions, not great wealth and power, are most conducive to Happiness, or the life of good action; for he speaks of the Happy Man as 'a strange figure in the eyes of the many' who judge by what alone they can see—a man's external condition. Thus the opinions of the wise men of old seem to agree with our view. Such opinions, of course, have their weight; but after all our ultimate appeal must be to the facts of life: by agreement or non-agreement with these our theories must stand or fall.

The man who lives the life of Reason, and serves Reason seems to be at once the best man and the best beloved by the gods. If the gods care for men—and it is believed that they do—it is natural to suppose that they take pleasure in
Reason, which is best in man, and most akin to themselves, and that they recompense with good those who love and honour it. The Thinker then, will be the best beloved by the Gods—another reason for holding that he is the most Happy.

§ 1. ἀνθρωπικά] The θεορητικά ἐνέργεια are θεία: but we must 1178 a. 10. be careful not to misunderstand Aristotle here. When he contrasts the δίκαιος as πράττων πρός ἐπιρέτου, and the σοφός as θεορῶν καθ' αὐτόν, and declares the life of the latter to be happier, he is really contrasting man in the concrete, and reason the form of man (see note on τοῦ συνήθεου x. 7. 8, b. 28). This form, he would tell us, is realised in the concrete life of the just man, as well as in the concrete life of the savant, the μερότης of the just man’s moral nature being determined in relation to the same σκοπός which regulates the speculation of the savant. Man’s concrete life (which, as concrete, is always ἐν κοινωνίᾳ and πρὸς ἐπιρέτου) is ‘happier’ in proportion as it realises this σκοπός more purely. The savant, therefore, who realises the σκοπός theoretically as well as practically (he must have realised it as φρόνιμος before he can realise it as σοφός) stands higher than the just man who realises it only practically. But the conditions of human existence make the comparatively withdrawn life of the savant impossible except for a very few. When Aristotle tells us that the life of the savant is ‘happier’ than the life of the man of affairs, he does not imply that it is open to the bulk of mankind to choose this ‘happier’ life. The exhortation χρη δὲ . . . ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδιέχεται ἰδαναρίεσιν is addressed to the bulk of mankind, because it is open to every man who is not πεπρομένος πρός ἅρετήν to contribute—if not in some brilliant way, as politician, or soldier, or leader of fashion, or athlete—at least as honest man, to the εὐδαιμονίᾳ of a city in which savants are produced and held in honour.

tὰ ἄλλα] So Susemihl and Bywater: Bekker has ἄλλα. The τὰ is given by Lb, Ald., CCC, Cambr., NC.

χρείας] ‘services.’

καὶ πράξεις] Rassow (Forsch. p. 33) places καὶ (ταῖ) πράξεις after πάθει a. 13.

tὸ πρέπον ἐκάστῳ] τὸ πρέπον τῷ πλησίον (Paraph.).

§ 2. ‘Again, moral virtue seems, in some points, to be actually
1178 a. 14. the result of physical constitution, and in many points to be closely connected with the passions’ (Peters). Michelet understands ἡ τοῦ ἰδίου ἀρετή as that morum rectitudo, from which as principle the ἱδικὴ ἀρεταί spring: but in § 3 ἡ τοῦ ἰδίου ἀρετή and αἱ ἱδικαὶ ἀρεταί seem to have exactly the same meaning. The reference in ἐνα seems to be to φυσικὴ ἀρετή—inhherited good tendency, εὐφυία—see vi. 13. 1; in πολλά, not only to the general connexion between ἱδικὴ ἀρετή and the πάθη, so often insisted on (e.g. in ii. 6. 10), but also perhaps to those μεσοτύπες ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι (ii. 7. 14) which are not strictly ἀρεταῖ—such as αἰδώς.

a. 10. § 3. συνεξευκταί . . . a. 17 φρονήσει] See vi. 13. 6 οὔχ οἷον τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἀνεν φρονήσεως, οὕτε φρόνιμον ἀνεν τῆς ἱδικῆς ἀρετῆς, and note there with references.

a. 17. εἶπερ . . . a. 19 φρόνησιν] See note on ἐκ τοῦ ἂργου ἀποτελεῖται κ. τ. λ. vi. 12. 6, a. 6. The Paraphrast’s explanation here is—φρόνησις μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδικῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· τὸ γὰρ ὥρθοδοξῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος ἔκεινεν· ἡ δὲ ἱδικὴ ἀρετή πῶς δεῖ τοῦ τέλους τυχεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς φρονήσεως λαμβάνει.

The motive of the present section (which Grant regards as containing ‘the germ of much that is expanded in the Eudemian books, cf. Eth. vi. 12. 9–10, 13. 4’.) is thus given by Mich. Eph.—Δείξα τὰς ἱδικὰς ἀρετὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς οὕτας, δείκνυσι καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν αὐτὴ γὰρ ἀρετὴ οὕτα τοῦ λογιστικοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, δόξην ἄν εἶναι τοῦ νοο ἀρετὴ καὶ οὗ τοῦ σωθέτου· δείκνυσι δὴ καὶ ταύτῃ ὑπὸ μὴ τοῦ ὅστος ἀνθρώπων ἐντὸς ἀρετὴ ἄλλα τοῦ σωθέτου.

a. 19. συνηρτημέναι δ’ αὐτά καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι] Ḳb has συνηρτημέναι (sc. ἡ φρόνησις) δ’ αὐτάς (sc. ταῖς ἱδ. ἀρεταῖς) κ. τ. λ. Ramsauer conjectures συνηρτημέναι (sc. αἰ. ἱδ. ἀρεταί) δὲ ταύτη τε (sc. τῇ τῆς φρονήσει) κ. τ. λ., οὔ συνηρτημέναι (sc. ἡ τε φρόνησις καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί) δ’ ἀλλήλαις τε κ. τ. λ. Sussemihl conjectures συνηρτημέναι δ’ αὐτή τε κ. τ. λ. I think that συνηρτημέναι δ’ αὐτά is right: the ἱδικαὶ ἀρεταί, notwithstanding their close connexion with the intellectual faculty φρόνησις, are περὶ τὸ σωθέτου, for they are implicated with the πάθη: καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι means ‘not only with φρόνησις, but also with the πάθη.’ I think that Grant is wrong in making αὐτα take up φρόνησις and the ἱδ. ἀρεταί.

a. 22. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοο κεχαρισμένη] We are reminded of de An. iii. 5. 430 a. 17 καὶ οὕτος ὁ νοῦς (i. e. the πνευμικὸς νοῦς, or τι ἦν εἶναι τοῦ νοοῦ τοῦ
BOOK X: CHAP. 8: §§ 3-6.

§ 4. διακριβώσαι] Kβ has ἀκριβώσα, probably omitting the δ—because a. 23.
of the immediately preceding -αι: for Kβ, with all MSS., reads
ἐίρηται which Sus. accepts.

§ 5. προσποιοῦνταί κ. τ. λ.] Coraes has—δεῖ χρημάτων τὸ δικαίον εἰς τὰς a. 31.
ἀνταποδόσεις, ἵνα δὴλος γένηται δίκαιον ὅν τὸ γὰρ βούλευθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν
ἀθήλου· καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι γὰρ, μὴ εὐποροῦντες χρημάτων, προσποιοῦσαντ' ἃν εἶναι
dίκαιοι, τὴν ἀπορίαν διακομίσαντες ἀναγκάζειν αὐτοῖς ἀμέλεια τῶν δικαίων.

§ 6. ἰσόμεσσ] The Paraph. has—δεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀνδρείᾳ καίρου τωδ' κατ— a. 32.
ἀλλ' ἦν καὶ ἔν σώματι ἰσόμεσσ οἷον ἐπιδίειξα τὴν τόλμαν καὶ τὴν
καρτερίαν: Ramsauer, however, thinks of a general with forces at
his disposal.

§ 7. ἐξουσίας] sc. τοῦ ἀκολοῦθουν (Coraes).

§ 8. πῶς γὰρ δὴλος ἦσσε καὶ ὁδός καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τις;] 'for how else can
he, or the possessor of any other virtue, show what he is?' (Peters.)

§ 9. ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε . . . . b. 1 ἃν εἰν] This is a remark a. 34.
made in passing, to show the importance to ἡθικῆ ἀρετῆ of πράξεις
and the opportunity of performing them. Ἡθικῆ ἀρετῆ realises its
end (τὸ δῆ τέλειον) only when good intentions are carried out in
good actions.

After ἀμφισβητεῖταī Lb, Ob read δέ, accepted by Bekker; and
CCC, B1, B2 read δέ τε, which may perhaps be regarded as supporting
τε, given by Kβ, Mβ, and accepted by Susemihl and Bywater. For ἀμφισβητεῖταί,
Lb, r, CCC, NC, B1, B2, B3 have ζητεῖται.

§ 10. πάτερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς] 'which has more to do with
constituting virtue'—'which is the more important element in
virtue.'

§ 11. πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν] The θεωρῶν, quod θεωρῶν, needs no b. 4.
1178 b. 4. χορηγία—no well-appointed stage, as it were, for the exercise of his θεωρητική ἑνέργεια: but, quid ἄθρωπος, he chooses to exercise πρακτικά ἑνέργειαι also, and for them he will need χορηγία.

Indeed the qualification 'quid ἄθρωπος,' applies to him not only when he exercises πρακτικά ἑνέργειαι, but also when he exercises his θεωρητική ἑνέργεια: if he does not require for the latter an elaborate χορηγία, he requires at least fellow-actors—sympathetic and stimulating friends. See Introductory Note to Book viii.

The words b. 6 τὰ κατὰ τὴν (sc. ἡθικήν) ἄρετὴν πράττειν are to be carefully noted, as stating explicitly the inherence of the θεωρητικὸς βίος in the πρακτικός βίος. The θεωρῶν is a man, and chooses to live the social life. Aristotle's θεωρητικὸς βίος was travestied by those who afterwards made it a life of actual withdrawal from the flesh. Aristotle's ideal of θεωρία is a 'regulative idea' of which the Neo-aristotelians made a 'constitutive use.'

b. 7. ἄθρωπευεσθαι] Coraes has an interesting note here—τῶν σπανίων ἡ λεξίς, σημαίνουσα τὸ παρά τοῖς Γάλλοις l'humaniser. ἔσωσε δ' ἀκρικὸν καὶ ἡ συνήθεια, κατὰ μετοχὴν μάλιστα: ἄθρωπευεσθένον γὰρ ἐπαινοῦσε λέγομεν, τῶν ἀστείων τὰ ἡθη, καὶ ἀγαπητῶς τοῖς ἄλλοις συμπεριφερόμενοι.

§ 7.] Grant remarks on this section—'Aristotle argues here that we cannot attribute morality to the Deity without falling into mere anthropomorphism; but it might be replied that there is the same difficulty in conceiving of God as engaged in philosophic thought . . . If it is conceded that the life of God is only analogous to that of the philosopher, we might then ask, why not also analogous to the life of the good man?' With this criticism which amounts, as I understand it, to saying that Aristotle's notion of God is not anthropomorphic enough, it is instructive to compare the criticism of Plotinus—that Aristotle errs in attributing νόησις to the First Principle: 'Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ χωριστὸν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ νοητόν, νοεῖν δὲ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ λέγων πάλιν αὖ οὗ τὸ πρῶτον πουεῖ (p. 490), for the First Principle is ἑπάκειν νοῦ (p. 541).

b. 13. ὑπομένοντας] It seems better simply to accept this bad anacoluthon than to suppose a lacuna after ἄθρωποι—unless indeed we follow Bywater's suggestion (Contriβ. p. 69) and read ἄλλα τὰς ἄνθρωπον ὑπομένοντος τὰ φοβηρὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντος ὅτι καλῶν;

b. 15. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες] To Lb, the only authority quoted by Susemihl for αἱ, may be added Cambr. All other MSS. apparently read εἰ.
BOOK X: CHAP. 8: §§ 7-9.


tοῦ ποιεῖν] 'vide quam procul abesse jubeatur dei creatoris b. 21. imago' (Ramsauer).


§ 8. καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν] Ramsauer's conjecture καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν is b. 30. supported by NC, which reads τὸ.

οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν αὐτὴ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τμία] Θεωρία is itself εὐδαιμονία: it is not a means which produces εὐδαιμονία, as the doctor produces health. For the meaning of τμία, see E. Ν. i. 12.

§ 9.] With this section begins a discussion of the relation of ἰ b. 33. ἐκτὸς εὐπερήμεια to εὐδαιμονία. The discussion is not confined strictly to the relation of τὰ ἐκτὸς to the εὐδαιμονία of the θεωρητικὸς bios. It is suggested that τὰ ἐκτὸς are not nearly so important for the εὐδαι μονία of the πρακτικὸς bios as is vulgarly supposed; and we are allowed to infer a fortiori that their influence in the θεωρητικὸς bios (so far as that bios can be distinguished as a separate career in the city) is very small.

εὐδαιμονήσοντα . . . α. 2 μακάριον] I think that these two words 1179 a. 1. are used here with exactly the same meaning.

αὔταρκες οὐδ’ ἡ κρίσις] This is the reading of K⁵, Ald., and B⁵, a. 3. All other authorities recorded, so far as I know (Susemihl gives Ῥ, L⁵, Mich. Eph., Heliod., Aret., M⁵, O, and I can add B¹, B², Paris. 1853, CCC, NC, Cambr.) interpolate οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις between αὔταρκες and οὐδ' ἡ πράξις. It has been conjectured that κρίσις represents χρήσις. Coraes adopts χρήσις in his text. Mich. Eph. has—οὐδ’ ἡ κρίσις τούτης οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δεί κρίνειν ἐκ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων ἐπερβολῆς. I cannot attach much weight to the mere circumstance
1179 a. 3. that Kb omissions the words; I believe that they represent something original in the text.

a. 8. § 10. τοσσαθ’] μέτρια.

a. 9. § 11. Σόλων] See the conversation between Solon and Croesus Herod. i. 30–32, especially ch. 30, where Solon says that Tellus the Athenian was the happiest man he had ever known. Tellus was well-off, he lived to see his children's children, and he died gloriously in battle, and his countrymen erected a monument to him where he fell.

a. 11. πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλιστα] Kb omissions τὰ: so also do Cambr., NC, and Paris. 1853—thus, apparently, making πεπραγότας intransitive. The intransitive use of πεπραγα, according to Veitch (Greek Verbs) is found in Pindar, Euripides, and Plato: but the intransitive use of πεπραγα is late. Accordingly NC—the only MS. which supports Spengel's conj. πεπραγότας, so far as I know—can hardly be right with πεπραγότας δὲ κάλλιστα.

δὲ ζετο] om. NC, Paris. 1853. Bywater has an important suggestion here (Contrib. p. 69)—'I incline to think that we should revert to the Kb τ' reading, πεπραγότας δὲ κάλλιστα φετο, and understand φετο in the sense of "he thought" or "meant," so as to mark a certain distinction between the actual words (ἲσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλός) and what they meant by implication. Compare E. E. i215 b. 11 for a similar use of φετο.'


a. 13. Ἀναξαγόρας] Cf. E. E. i. 4. i215 b. 6 Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν δ’ Ἐλευθέρων ἐρωτηθεῖς τίς οὐ εὐδαιμονεύσσατος, ἀδελφός, εἶπεν, ὡς ὑποκείεις ἀλλ’ ἀτόπος ἂν τίς σοι φανεῖν τότε τ’ ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐνείκειν, ὅρθω τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδίκον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὑπατα καὶ καλὸν ἐπλουσίων ταῖς τυχάναις τῆς προσηγορίας, αὐτὸς δ’ ἰσώς φετο τόν ζωὴν ἀλών τὴν καθαρὰς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τῶν θεωρίας κοινωνοῦσα θεῖας, τούτοις ὥς ἀνθρωπον εἰπεῖν μακάριον εἶναι.

a. 16. § 12.] The opinions of men like Anaxagoras and Solon are probably true; but we must verify them by direct reference to the facts of human life, as given in our own experience; if they do not agree with these facts, they may be set down as mere theories—λόγοις a. 22.
§ 13.] Ramsauer suggests that this section has been added by 1179 a. 22.

another hand. I think that the suggestion is well worth making.
The section has no connexion with what immediately precedes;
and the view which it seems to favour of a personal relation between
the gods and men is hardly what we expect from a writer who has
described the godhead as in § 7. We seem to have to do with a
Platonising Aristotelian, rather than with Aristotle. Mich. Eph. has
captured the ring of the section in his commentary—

\\\[\text{deoQtXqs (i.e. ov f} \text{fle} \text{i ὁ theos Mich. Eph.) ἀρα ὁ σοφὸς ἐὰν ἦμεις ϕιλούμεν τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας τοὺς ἡμῶν πάθας ἡ συγγενεῖς, πῶς οὐ δεὶ τῶν πανάγαθων θεῶν ϕιλεῖ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας τὸ συγγενεῖς αὐτῷ;}\\

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

We have now completed our Theory of Life: but have we fulfilled the
intention of this Treatise? No: this is a practical Treatise, and cannot stop
short with a mere Theory of the Good Life, but must indicate how we can be
made good men.

If the mere Statement of Theory were in itself enough to make men good, then
indeed Theory would have a right to all those 'great fees' that Theognis speaks
about: but the truth is that Theory, though it may have some good practical
influence on generous youths, and may help to place natural nobility of dis-
position in the safe keeping of Virtue, is powerless to incite the ordinary man
towards the highest goodness: he abstains from evil, not from respect for what
is good, but from fear of punishment: he lives as passion dictates, following his
own pleasures and avoiding the pains opposed to them: he has no conception of
the good and of that which brings real pleasure, for he has never tasted it.
What Theory could transform such a nature?

Three agencies whereby men become good are commonly recognised—Nature,
Habit, Teaching.

Natural endowment plainly does not depend on ourselves: it belongs by the
operation of divine causes to those who are truly fortunate.

Theory and Teaching are not effective unless the hearer's mind has been pre-
pared beforehand, by a course of habits, to like and dislike aright, as a field must
be tilled for the seed.

This preparation—beginning from the earliest years, resulting in the
formation of a good moral character—can scarcely be carried on except by the
State. We must accordingly have Laws regulating the education and conduct
of the young—yes, and of adults too, throughout the whole course of their lives— for the majority of men do what is right, not because it is right, but because they are constrained to do it. Law—expressing the Practical Reason of the community, has that power to constrain obedience which no father—no individual man, who is not an absolute monarch, possesses.

Only in the Spartan State and a few others has the lawgiver given any attention to the nurture and habits of the citizens: most States neglect these matters entirely, and allow each man to rule his wife and children as he pleases, like a Cyclops.

Where the State neglects its duty, it would seem to be incumbent on the individual to do what he can for the moral education of his own children and friends. He will succeed best if he have made himself capable of legislating—if he can educate his own children by unwritten laws as the written laws of the State, did they exist, would educate all the citizens.

This system of paternal education, though only second-best, is not without its peculiar advantages: it has the basis of natural affection in the children to build upon, and it can suit itself to the special needs of individual cases. These special needs may indeed be met, in a way, by merely empirical knowledge; but if they are to be met in the right way, they must be met by a knowledge of general principles—the father must, as we have said, make himself capable of legislating.

How, then, is a man to make himself capable of legislating? Can the practical politicians teach him? It would appear not. The political art is not like the other arts, which are taught by those who practise them. Those who profess to teach the political art are the Sophists, who do not practise the art: and those who practise the art rely on knack and personal experience—the secret of their success they do not attempt to explain in speeches or books, and cannot communicate to their sons or friends—they surely would do so, if they could. Only this seems plain—that experience has not a little to do with their success—for we see that those who live in political surroundings become politicians.

Experience, then, is clearly necessary, as well as theory, to one who would become 'capable of legislating.'

As for the professed teachers of the political art—the Sophists, they are far from being teachers of it: they do not know even what it is, or what it is concerned with: if they knew, they would not identify it with Rhetoric or even place it beneath Rhetoric; and they would not think that it is easy to legislate by making a collection of famous laws, and selecting the best of them—as if the selection did not need intelligence—as if all did not depend on deciding rightly! Who, we would ask, is the intelligent judge of the product of any art—of a musical composition, or a painting? The experienced musician or painter. Now, laws are the products of the political art. How, then, is one to become capable of legislating—capable of deciding which are the best laws—without experience? Collections of constitutions are like collections of medical cases—useless to those who have not got the discerning faculty which comes from the experience of practice: to those who have such experience they are likely to be very useful.

Our predecessors, then, having left the subject of Legislation unexamined, we perhaps ought now ourselves to consider it—and with it the whole subject of the
First then let us try to recount what is good in the various statements of our predecessors; then, looking at the collected Constitutions let us try to see what things preserve and what destroy States and Constitutions, and what are the causes of good and bad government. When we have seen these causes, we shall be better able to see clearly what sort of Constitution is the best, and how each Constitution may be best ordered, and what laws and customs it is best for it to use.

Let us then begin.

Introductory Note] The Ethics may be said to end with chapter 8. The present chapter introduces the subject of the Politics. In the Ethics the theory of life has been set forth. But the object of the Treatise was not simply to supply a theory. A theory of life, which is only a theory—which we cannot see our way to realising at all—is not worth setting forth, even as a theory. It is not interesting, to say the least. The theory set forth in the Ethics has all along awakened interest, because we have seen that it is set forth in order to be applied in practice; but the Treatise, as a practical manual, would be incomplete, unless it ended by indicating more precisely, to those concerned with moral education, for whose use it is intended, how the theory may be applied in practice—how human beings, constituted as they are, may be got to act up to the principles which have been shown in theory to be the true principles of conduct. We accordingly find the Ethics ending with a chapter which indicates (for details we must go to the Politics) the lines on which practical effect may be given to the theory of life which has been set forth.

The gist of the chapter is this:—It is vain to begin by preaching the true theory. The hearers must be first prepared to hear. The moral nature must be trained; and direct appeals to the understanding cannot train the moral nature. Nor can home influences—at least, unaided. They have not sufficient force. ἴσος alone is strong enough to enforce the dictates of reason. Hence it is ἴσος which those interested in carrying out the true theory into practice must try to enlist in their service. It is not by the ill-directed and feeble agency of individuals, but only by the institutions of the State, that citizens can be trained to live up to the true theory of conduct. Let us, then, try to embody the true theory in Legislation. This has not hitherto been done effectively.
The circumstance that this chapter, written so entirely in the spirit of the First Book (see especially E. N. i. 2), follows immediately on the discussion of the theorematikos bios is very significant, showing that Aristotle does not regard his doctrine of the supremacy of the theorematikos bios as in any way inconsistent with his doctrine of πολεική as the ἀρχιτεκτονική ἐπιστήμη.

1179 a. 33. § 1. περὶ τὲ τοῦτων] So Susenmihl and Bywater, with Lb, Ob, CCC, NC, B1, B2, B3. Bekker reads περὶ τοῦτων with Kb, Mb.

With regard to the list given here of subjects which have been discussed in the Ethics, see note on x. 6. 1.

a. 34. τοῖς τύποις] This is the only instance, apparently, in Aristotle of the plural = τύποι, or διὰ τοῦ τύπου: see Eucken, über den Sprachg. des Arist. (die Praepositionen) p. 26.

b. 3. § 2. η ἐὰν ποὺς ἄλλους ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα] Mich. Eph. has—ἐὰν μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἁρμένων χρήσεως γινόμεθα ἀγαθοὶ χρηστέον αὐτῶς: ἐὰν δὲ τινα ἄλλου προτέρου, ἐκείνοις ξηρτεῖν πάντως δὲ χρηστέον ἐκείνοις δὲ ἄν ἄγαθαι ἐσώμεθα: e.g. attention to the rules of health contributes indirectly to morality.

b. 6. § 3. Θέονι] The editors quote ἐὰν δὲ ἄσκησιν τοῦτο γ' ἔδωκε θεός | ἵπτεται κακότητα καὶ ἁτρεῖα φρένας ἄνθρωπος | πολλοὶς ἄν μισθοῖς καὶ μεγάλως ἐφεροῦν. Cf. Plato Meno 95 E, where the last line is cited.

b. 8. ἵσχυεν] The construction is—φαίνονται ἵσχυεν προτρέψασθαι τοῖς ἐλευθερίοις.

b. 9. κατοκώχιμον] This is the reading of Kb and Ald. adopted by Bekker and Bywater. Susenmihl adopts κατακόκυμον, the reading of all other authorities apparently. In Pol. ii. 6. 1269 b. 30 we have κατακόκυμοι (apparently in all MSS.), on which see Newman's critical note, vol. ii. p. 88. There seems to be no doubt that κατακόκυμος is a corrupt form. Coraes gives the meaning of the phrase κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἁρετῆς as follows—οὕτω δὲ κατὰ λέξιν ἡ φράσις, οὕτω διαθέκεται ὡστε κατέχεσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἁρετῆς, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ, καὶ οἴοντε ἐνθουσίαν καὶ βεβηληθῃ γίνεσθαι.

b. 10. καλοκαγαθίαν] This word occurs only twice in the E. N.—here, and in iv. 3. 16, in neither place with the technical meaning which it has in the E. E.: see notes on E. N. vi. 1, §§ 1–3 for the
connexion of the ακοπός of that passage with the ὄρος τῆς καλοκαγα-1179 b. 10. 
θίας of E. E. H. 15.

§ 4. αἰδοί] See E. N. iv. 9, where the moral value of αἰδός is b. 11. 
discussed. It is a praiseworthy πάθος in the young.

§ 5. ἀγαπητῶν ... b. 20 ἀρετῆς] There are so many difficulties b. 18. 
in the way of acquiring ἀρετή, that we must be satisfied if, with all 
the agencies which produce it at our disposal, we succeed in 
getting some share of it.

§ 6. φύσει ... εὖθει ... διδαχή] The identification of τὸ τῆς φύσεως b. 20. 
b. 21 with τὸ διὰ τινάς θείας αἰτίας τούς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχον 
b. 22 enables us to see that the agencies mentioned here are those 
mentioned in E. N. i. 9. 1 ἀπορεῖται πότερον ἐστι μαθητῶν ἢ ἔθοστόν 
... ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῦραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται—where see 
notes. It was not necessary of course for the argument of i. 9 to 
contrast μάθησις and ἔθοστός as moral agencies; both together, as 
involving human effort, were contrasted with non-human agencies 
—θεὸς and τύχη.

διὰ τινάς θείας αἰτίας τούς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει] See E. E. b. 22. 
h. 14, and M. M. ii. 8, where εὐτυχία is discussed—(1) as the gift of 
God, and (2) as the result of natural endowment—φύσις. The 
writers refuse to make the gods the authors of the so-called 
εὐτυχία of the undeserving, and prefer to consider the εὐτυχία as 
one who has a happy natural endowment or instinct (described, 
however, as τὸ ἐν ἡμῶν θείων E. E. 1248 a. 27), which prompts him 
to do the right thing: thus the writer of the M. M. says (1207 a. 36) 
—ὁ γὰρ εὐτυχίας ἐστιν ὃ ἄνευ λόγου ἔχων ὀρμῆν πρὸς τύχαθα, καὶ τούτων ἑπτυχανών, τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶ φύσεως· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ ἑνεκτὸν τῇ φύσει 
τουτοῦν ὃ ὀρμήμεν ὀρμῶν πρὸς ἄν εἰ ἔχωμεν. Cf. the suggestion 
thrown out in the Meno 99 E ἀρετὴ ἀν εἰη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτῶν, 
ἀλλὰ θεία μοῦρα παραγίνεσθαι ἂν οὖν οΐς ἄν παραγίγηναι.

The statement b. 21 τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δήλον ὡς οὔκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν 
ὑπάρχει must be taken with this qualification—that it is one of the 
recognised duties of the νομοβέτης, according to Aristotle, to see 
that a bad φύσις does not grow up in the citizens by the multipli- 
cation of the diseased and the weak. It is within the power of 
the νομοβέτης, as it is within the power of the breeder of domestic 
animals, to improve the breed.
1179 b. 23. ὁ δὲ λόγος κ.τ.λ. | On the uselessness of supplying theory to those whose moral natures have not been trained, see i. 3, §§ 5-7. On τὸ καλὸς χαῖρειν καὶ μυσέιν b. 25, see ii. 3. 2 and x. i. 1.

b. 26. ἀπεργὴ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσι τὸ σπέρμα | Coraes quotes Hippocrates Νόμος § 2 — ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις ἡμέων ὁκεῖον ἡ χώρῃ τὰ δὲ δόγματα τῶν διδασκόντων ὁκεῖον τὰ σπέρματα ἡ δὲ παιδομαθή τὸ κατ' ὀρθὴν αὐτὰ πεσεῖν ἐς τὴν ἀρουραν.

b. 27. § 7. αὐτὸς is the reading of most MSS., but Ἐκ b has αὐτῷ.

b. 28. δὲ λέγει τά CCC and NC have δέ λέγει δὲ. The Paraphrast may have read δὲ λέγει γὰρ ὡς ὅλως δὲ λόγῳ διώνυσα τὸ πάθος ὑπείκειν ἄλλα βία τινί.

b. 30. § 8. οἰκεῖον | Cf. the οἰκεῖος ἀκροαθής of i. 3. 5. Aristotle is perhaps not thinking here so much of the ἰθῶς ἐφευρέτες (x. 9. 3) which ἰθῶς, or habituation, presupposes, as of the ἰθῶς formed by habituation, without which the pupil cannot derive solid profit from λόγος, or an appeal to his σύνεσις (cf. συνετής § 7, b. 27).

b. 31. ἐκ νόμου . . . b. 32 νόμων] Here Aristotle comes to the point. The really potent influence in moral training is that exerted by the rules, written and unwritten, and the institutions of the State as a whole. It is these, then, that we must reform, if we wish to improve the morality of the people.

1180 a. 1. § 9. ὡς ἤκανον . . . a. 4 βιῶν] 'In a spirit the very opposite of this remark,' says Grant, 'Pericles is reported (Thucyd. ii. 37) to have boasted of the freedom enjoyed by the Athenians from all vexatious interference with the daily conduct of individuals . . . On the one hand Thucydides praised the free system of Athens; on the other hand Aristotle praised the organised and educational system of Sparta; see below § 13, and cf. Eth. i. 13. 3, and note. He was probably led into this political mistake, partly by the state of society in Athens itself, partly by the influence of Plato, from whom he imbibed one of the essential ideas of communism,—namely, that the State should arrange as much as possible, instead of as little as possible.'

a. 3. αὐτὰ] ἄττα is an obvious correction (see Susemihl's E. E. Append., p. 176) if correction is needed. The αὐτὰ of the MSS. is explained by most editors, as by Coraes—τὰ ὑπὸ τῆς ὀρθῆς τροφῆς

καὶ ἑπιμελείας προδεδιδαγμένα: but the words καὶ ἐβίβασθαι, and καὶ περὶ 1180 a. 3.
tάῦτα, may be thought to refer us to new habits which have to be acquired by adults, as distinguished from those which have been acquired in youth. I think that αὐτά is so obviously the right word after ἐπιτηδεύειν, that we must not make too much of the difficulty of connecting it with καὶ ἐβίβασθαι, or of explaining καὶ περὶ τάῦτα. I feel that to write δέητα (which occurred to me independently) after ἐπιτηδεύειν is to credit Aristotle with a rather weak remark. The words § 11 εἶδος οὖν ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι εἰς also seem to me to be in favour of αὐτά. The Paraph. has—ἀλλ' ἐπειδή καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας ἐπιτηδεύειν δεὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐαυτοὺς ἐβίβασιν.

Bentham, Principles of the Penal Code: Part 3 (of punishments), ch. 6 (the choice of punishments). 'Search out... the motives of offences, and generally you will recognise the dominant passion of the offender, and you may punish him, according to the proverbial saying, with the instrument of his sin. Offences of cupidity will be best punished by pecuniary fines, when the wealth of the offender admits it; offences of insolence, by humiliation; offences of idleness, by compulsory labour, or forced rest.'

§ 11. τάῦτα δὲ γίνοντ' ἀν]' The apodosis begins here; on the a. 17. construction, see note on i. i. 4, a. i. 4.

§ 12. ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόστασις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἵσχυρὸν] 'Romanus a. 18.
antiqui temporis aliter judicasset' (Ramsauer).

λόγος οὖν ἀπὸ τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοο] Cf. Pol. iii. 11. 1287 a. 28 a. 21.
ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἁρχεῖν δοκεῖ κελεύεων ἁρχεῖν τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν νοῦν. ο' δ' ἀνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησαι καὶ βηρίων ἢ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ο' θεμός ἁρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας διαφθείρει. διότερ ἀνεν ὅρξεσι νοος ο' νόμος ἐστὶν.

1337 a. 31 ἐπανέστη τ' ἀν τις κατὰ τούτο Λακεδαιμονίων' καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦντα σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς πάθας καὶ κοινῆ ταύτην. and Jowett's note (vol. ii. p. 293)—'Aristotle appears to praise the Lacedaemonians, not for the quality of their education... but for the circumstance that it was established by law. According to Isocrates Panath. 276 d, the Spartans fell so far below the general
standard of education in Hellas, that they did not even know their
letters, ... and according to Plato, or rather according to the
author of the Platonic Hippias Major (285 C), “not many of
them could count.”"

The, inserted by Bywater, is of course logi-
cally necessary; at the same time, μόνη μετ’ ἀλίγων does not seem
an ungreek way of saying ‘almost the only.’ The Cretan system
is mentioned along with the Spartan in E. N. i. 13. 3, where see
note.

a. 28. кυκλωπικός] Od. ix. 114:

θεμιστευει δὲ ἔκαστος
παιδῶν ἥδ’ ἀλόχων, ὥστ’ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν.

because, as we have seen, only the State can enforce obedience,
and because—this has not been actually mentioned, but is implied
in the words κοινῇ, νομοθέτης, νόμος—the education of each individual
is part of a single system; the individual does not belong to
himself, so that his education may be conducted with reference only
to himself. He is a member of the body politic; and it is for
πολιτική, as ἀρχιτεκτονική ἐπιστήμη, to see that he is educated for his
function in the organism to which he belongs: see Pol. θ. i. 1337
a. 21 εἴπει δ’ ἐν τῷ τέλος τῇ πόλει πάση, φανερῶν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν
καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινὴν
καὶ μὴ κατ’ ἱδίαν, διὰ τρόπου ἐκαστος νῦν ἐπιμελείται τῶν αὐτῶν τέκνων ἱδίᾳ
tε καὶ μάθησιν ἱδίᾳ, ἢ ἄν δόξῃ, διδασκόν. δεὶ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν
ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν. ἂμα δὲ οὔδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινὰ
εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάλα τῆς πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἐκαστος τῆς πόλεως;
ἡ δ’ ἐπιμέλεια πέρυκεν ἐκαστοῦ μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀλου
ἐπιμέλειαν.

Grant translates—‘and that it should have power to effect the object in question’: Stahr translates—
‘und dass diese die Kraft habe, sich Geltung zu verschaffen.’ The
words are added, like a quoted phrase, with little regard for gram-
matical connexion. Bywater brackets them here a. 30, suggesting
that they should follow συμβάλλεσθαι a. 32. This suggestion has
the merit of bringing the words καὶ δράν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι close to
μᾶλλον δ’ ἀν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειν.
Where the State neglects the education of its citizens, it is incumbent on the private individual to do what he can to help his own children and friends to become good. He will succeed best in this task, if he brings to it the legislator's point of view (νομοθετικός γενόμενος a. 33)—if he remembers that he is educating citizens.

In the passage which begins here, and goes a. 35. down to the end of § 17, b. 28, Aristotle says nothing inconsistent with the statement b. 29 κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὰ γίνεσθαι κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὁρθῆν, but points out how, in the absence of State-education, home-education, conducted from the legislator's point of view, may make the most of certain minor advantages which it has—its power of appealing to the family affections (§ 14), and its being able to suit its system to the special needs of particular cases (§ 15). Mich. Eph. misses the point of the passage—ζητητέον τῶν πρὸδόλγον εἰπὼν μηδὲν ἵσχύειν τὰς πατρικὰς προστάξεις, νῦν φησίν ἐπίσης τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς θεσμικοῖς ἵσχυει, καὶ ῥητῶν ὅτι περὶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μοχθηρῶς ζωτῶν εἰπεν ἑκεῖ μηδὲν ἵσχυειν ἐνταῦθα δὲ περὶ τῶν καλῶς ἀναγορευμένων τούτω λέγει.

Bywater, following K^b, L^b, O^b, for ἡθη (M^b) accepted by b. 4. Bek. and Sus. I think ἡθη is right. The reference is to the 'national character.'

οὗτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ θητοί] not that their authority is equal to that of νόμο (see § 12). Aristotle is making out as good a case as he can for home-education, as second-best. It was doubtless his opinion that even with a good system of State-education, something is left for home-education to do.

§ 15. ὅσπερ ἐπὶ ιταρκη] After these words Coraeus conjectures b. 8. καὶ γυμναστικῆς, on account of the example ὅ τε πυκτικῆς which follows.

οὖ πάσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθεσι] Stahr has an important b. 10. note here. He points out that περιτίθεσι means 'to put on as a garment,' and suggests μελίκην (the cestus) for μάχην. I do not think that this is a happy suggestion; but I think that παρατίθεσι, which he mentions as preferable to περιτίθεσι if μάχην be retained,
1180 b. 10. is probably the right reading. Where peri- and para- are concerned, we need have little hesitation in neglecting MS. authority, and giving full weight to internal reasons (see note on vii. 3. 14, b. 9). Here parapíthēsen gives the exact meaning required—‘the doctor does not prescribe the same treatment to all fever patients; and the boxing-master does not put before all pupils, for their imitation, the same style of defence and attack.’

b. 17. § 16. καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὑντα] τὸν μὴ τὸ καθόλου εἰδότα (Paraph.).

b. 18. δι’ ἐμπειρίαν] The editors quote Met. A. 1. 981 a. 12—πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυχόντας ἰδρύμεν τῶν ἐμπειρῶν τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγων ἐχόντων. άιτιαν δ’ ὅτι μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ’ ἐκατόν ἐπίστευσιν, ἤ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πάσαι περὶ τὸ καθ’ ἐκατόν εἰσιν οὖν γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἑνίκητε ὅ ἢ ἵπτερών, πλὴν ἀλλ’ ἣ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Ἀκρίλην ἢ Ἀκράτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινά τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων, φ’ συμβεβεβηκέναι ἀνθρώπων εἶναι. ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐχω τοῦ τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ μὲν καθόλου γνωρίζῃ, τὸ δ’ ἐν τούτῳ καθ’ ἐκατόν ἀγνῷ, πολλάκις διαμαρτυρησεν τῆς θεραπείας θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ’ ἐκατόν. ἀλλ’ δομος τοῦ γ’ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπιτεύκνῃ τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν ὀδύμενα μᾶλλον, καὶ συνεισφέρον τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπειρῶν ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὡς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσιν τούτῳ δὲ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἰσασιν, οἱ δ’ οὖν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ τὸ μὴν ἰσασι, διότι δ’ οὐκ ἰσασιν’ οἱ δ’ τὸ διδάσκαλον καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν.

b. 23. § 17. τάξα δὲ καὶ τάξα δ’ ἂν καὶ is the reading of Γ, Λb, Ald., Oβ, CCC, Cambr., ΝC: τάξα δὲ καὶ, of Ka,b, Mb, accepted by Bekker and Bywater. I incline to τάξα δ’ καὶ read by Susemihl after Ramsauer.

b. 30. § 18. παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἤδοκε τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι] See vi. 8. 2 τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν ἢ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονική φρόνησις νομοθετική.

b. 31. ἢ οὐκ ἄμοιον κ.τ.λ.] The editors note that Aristotle is indebted here (§§ 18, 19) to Plato, Meno 91 A–100 C, where it is shown that if the sophists cannot teach ἀριστή, neither can statesmen themselves, otherwise they would try to teach their own sons. Cf. also Protag. 319 D, E, 320 A, B. Aristotle's view, we know, is that a father may, as νομοθετικός, teach his son ἀριστή: it is assumed that, if νομοθετικός, he will be able to do so; but the question formally proposed at the beginning of § 18 πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικός γένοις ἂν
The only approach to an answer is (§ 21) that, to people with political experience, the study of codes and constitutions may be profitable.

§ 19. οὐ μὴν μικρὸν γε ἔοικεν ἢ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι] The art of statesmanship cannot be formally taught; but this does not mean that it is incommunicable. It can be picked up informally, by those who live constantly in political surroundings: this shows how much ‘experience’ has to do with its acquirement. We may safely conclude that any one who wishes to become πολιτικός must have ‘experience’ in addition to (προσθεὶς a. 12) ‘theory.’ Aristotle seems here practically to agree with Anytus, in the Μένος 92 E–93 A, who says that the young Athenian acquires the ἀρετή of an Athenian citizen by associating with the καλοὶ καγαθοὶ of Athens, his elders: see the Paraph.—φανερὸν τοῖς, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο διδάσκειν τὰ πολιτικά, ὦτι καὶ ἐβουλήθησαν ὅτι, καὶ ἐδίδασκον· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ φαίνοντας διδάσκατες, φανερὸν ὅτι, οὐτε ἐδύναντο διδάσκειν, οὐτε αὐτοὶ λόγο τινὰ πολιτικὰ ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλὰ ἐμπειρία· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μικρὸν ἢ ἐμπειρία πρὸς τὸ πρᾶττειν συμβάλλειν· γίνονται γὰρ διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνήθειας μᾶλλον πολιτικοὶ. Αἱ δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς ἐφεμένοις περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς εἰδέαν, καὶ ἐμπειρίας τινὸς χρεία καὶ συνήθειας.

1181 a. 16. νομοθέτησαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων[ Spengel (on Rhet. 1399 b. 9) thinks that Isocrates (p. 82, 83) is alluded to here—σπεδηθ' εἰς τοῖς προεκληθέντες ὁστὲ καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους ἀναριθμήτως εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν νόμων ἐπανεικασθαί τοὺς ἀρχαστάτους, τῶν δὲ λόγων τοὺς κανονικούς, ώστε τῇς αὐτῆς διανοίας ἔργον ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς νόμοις τιθεῖσι προαιρομένους προορίζον γέγονε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κειμένων, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς δεῖ ζητεῖν ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς ἀλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας περιβάλλει συναγαγεῖν, δὲ ῥᾴδιος ὅστις οὐκ ἦν βουλήτης ποιήσει, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λόγους πραγματευμένους διὰ τὸ προκατελήφθαι τὰ πλέοντα τοῦντιν συμβεβηκένει λέγοντες μὲν γὰρ ταῦτὰ τοῖς πρότερον εἰρημένως ἀνασχημενοῖς καὶ ληρεὶ πόθους, καὶ δὲ ζητοῦσις ἐπιστῶν ἐφησοῦντο. Much that is interesting and suggestive with regard to the personal relations between Aristotle and Isocrates will be found in Teichmüller's Literarische Fehden im vierten Jahrh. vor Ch. Dritter Abschnitt: Fehde des Isocrates gegen Aristoteles und Plato. For a vigorous attack on the 'sophists,' however, see Isocrates άρα τῶν σοφιστῶν. Grant has a good note here—'Aristotle's account of the sophists' method of teaching politics is precisely analogous to his account of the way in which they taught dialectic. He here speaks of their taking a shallow view of politics and making it an inferior branch of rhetoric; and he adds that they adopted a superficial eclecticism, making collections of laws without touching upon the principles from which legislation must depend. They thus imparted mere results, which to those who are uninstructed in principles are wholly useless. In the same way (Soph. Elench. 34. 183 b. 38 sqq.) he says that they gave various specimens of argument to be learnt by heart, and that this was no more use than if a person who undertook to teach shoemaking were to provide his pupils with an assortment of shoes.' The method of the modern 'crammer' could not be better described than it is at the end of the Soph. El.

a. 17. ὡσπερ οὖθε τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὕσαν] acc. abs.

a. 21. τοὺς δ’ ἀπείρους ἀγαπητῶν κ.τ.λ.] The ἀπείρου here, so far as they are capable of passing a correct judgment on the general result, may be compared with the 'amateurs' mentioned in Pol. iii. 11. 1282 a. 1 sqq. quoted (vol. i. p. 36) in note on πεπαιδευμένου i. 3. 4, b. 23. Or perhaps the Spartans of Pol. Θ. 4. 1339 b. 2 may be thought a closer parallel—ὡσπερ οἱ Λάκκωνε; ἐκείνοι γὰρ οὐ μαθάνοντες ομώς δύνανται κρίνειν ὅρθως, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρήστα καὶ τὰ μὴ χρήστα τῶν μελῶν.
At any rate, the point is that only persons practically acquainted with the conditions of a given city can select the right laws for it.

Good laws are produced by those who know the art of politics in its highest branch—nomothetic. How, then, can the mere study of these products make one who is ex hyp. not yet nomothetic? It can no more do so, than listening to good music can make one a composer—or reading the 'Lancet,' a doctor.

The πολιτικὸς is the reading only of K. All other authorities seem to have τοῖς πολιτικοῖς—except indeed NC, which has τῆς πολιτικῆς.

§ 21. οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται ... b. 5 ξέγες] Grant has a good note b. 2. here, in which he says that συγγράμματα (frequently mistranslated ‘prescriptions’) are perhaps ‘reports of cases’ or monographs on particular diseases.

ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὁφελίμα εἶναι δοκεῖ] See note on b. 5.

ι. 3. 7, a. 10.

ἀνευ ξέγεως] By ξεis here we are to understand the trained eye b. 9. which comes from long familiarity with a subject—διὰ γὰρ τὸ ξεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπείριας ὁμοιὰ ὀρῶν ὀρθῶς (vi. 11. 6).


εὐσυνετώτεροι δὲ εἰς ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.] εὐςυνετώτεροι δέ is contrasted with τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς b. 10. Those who have not the critical ξεῖν which comes only from familiarity with the actualities of
political life cannot be trusted to arrive at sound practical decisions regarding the laws and institutions which it is best to select from the compendia, although perhaps their study of these compendia may sharpen their intelligence for political questions. The merely literary study of politics cannot give a man practical insight (τὸ κρίνειν καλῶς), although it may give him a power of superficial appreciation (εὐσυνεσία). I think that it is necessary thus to distinguish between τὸ μὴν κρίνειν καλῶς and εὐσυνετώτεροι ἓνεκα, although in vi. 10 εὐσυνεσία is simply the faculty τοῦ κρίνειν καλῶς.

b. 11. §§ 22, 23. These sections, evidently added to connect the Ethics with the Politics, fall under the prima facie suspicion which attaches to all such connecting-passages in the Aristotelian writings.

As was pointed out in the Introductory Note to this chapter, the theory of life set forth in the Ethics, is set forth as one which can and must be realised in practice. The Politics, as describing in detail the way in which the theory of the Ethics may be realised, thus logically follows the Ethics in Aristotle's system. But we do not know what was the chronological order in which the two treatises were composed. The references in the Politics to the Ethics, as to a work already in existence, count for little or nothing; they are probably due to later editors. But the question of the order in which the two treatises were written—a question which perhaps cannot be settled—is not before us here. If the Politics were written after the Ethics, they were evidently not written as a mere continuation, starting from the λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι, with which the Ethics now end. The Politics begin (in much the same way as the Ethics) as an independent work. The first book of the Politics has nothing to do with the list of subjects given here in E. N. x. 9. 23. According to this list the Politics ought rather to begin with the second book (see Susmihl: Aristoteles’ Politik griech. u. deutsch, vol. i. p. 72). If Aristotle having written, in whatever order, the Ethics and Politics as separate treatises, afterwards collected his works into a corpus, he might, of course, add a passage to connect the two treatises. It is indeed highly improbable that he ever collected and arranged his works; but if he did, would he have written a connecting-passage like this? With the Republic
in existence—not to mention the Laws 1—could he have said 1181 b.12. παραλιπόντων οὐν τῶν πρωτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περί τῆς νομοθεσίας? Aristotle, I feel sure, could not have said this; whereas the exaggeration would be natural from the pen of an editor in later times anxious to present his Philosopher as the creator of a great self-contained system. A small point may be noticed in passing—it would not perhaps be worth noticing unless suspicion attached otherwise to the passage—the word ἀνερεύνητον is a ἀπαξ εἰρημ. in the Aristotelian writings 2. Another (perhaps smaller) point noticed by Ramsauer, is that the phrase ή περί τα ἀνθρώπων (Byw., ἀνθρώπων Bek. Sus.) φιλοσοφία does not occur in the Ethics or Politics.

The commentators point out that § 23 is a διαγραφή, or rough table of the contents of the Politics (omitting the contents of Pol. i), according to the traditional arrangement of Books. Thus

πρῶτον μέν b. 15 = ii.
εἰσα b. 17 = iii—vi.
θεωρηθητον b. 20 = vii, viii.

The epitome of the Politics in Stob. Ecl. 2. 6. 17—ascribed to Didymus, the instructor of the Emperor Augustus—seems to follow the traditional order of the Books, at any rate, it puts Books vii and viii at the end. For this epitome, see Mullach Fragm. Phil. vol. ii. 100, 101, and Newman’s Politics, vol. ii. p. xvii.

The circumstance that a διαγραφή of the contents of the Politics is given here (E. N. x. 9. 23) is, I think, against the genuineness of

1 Teichmüller (Lit. Fehden, pp. 187 sqq.) founds on the words b. 12 παραλιπόντων οὐν τῶν πρωτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περί τῆς νομοθεσίας, the conclusion that the E.N. were published before the Laws. He thinks that the Rep. is not περί νομοθεσίας. I cannot agree: and the words b. 14 καὶ διὰς δὴ περί πολιτείας seem to me to ignore the Rep. instead, as Teichmüller argues (p. 188), of recognising it.

2 Teichmüller (Lit. Fehden, p. 188 note) makes a very ingenious use of this circumstance in the interest of his theory referred to in the foot-note above—‘Ramsauer sagt: “ἀνερεύνητον vocabulum apud Aristotelem me legere omnino non memini.” Ich meine nun, dass Aristoteles, da er mit den ol πρωτεροι grade den Plato meinte (i.e. the Rep., as distinguished from the as yet unpublished Laws), absichtlich einen Platonischen etwas gesuchten und pretiosen Ausdruck wählte, um damit ironisch auf Plato’s tiefe Forschung anzuspielen, dessen Gesetze erwartet wurden, aber noch immer nicht erschienen waren (Vergl. Platon. Hippias, p. 298 C). Bei Aristoteles kommt das Wort, wie auch Bonitzens Index zeigt, sonst nicht vor; dagegen ist es Heraclitisch und Platonisch.’
the passage. An editor, it seems to me, would be much more likely than Aristotle to give us a diagraφή of this kind.

The last point to notice is b. 17 ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτείων. Grant, following other commentators, understands these words to refer to the now lost collection, known in antiquity as ai πολιτείαι, and ascribed to Aristotle, containing, it would appear, descriptions of 158 Constitutions, Hellenic and non-Hellenic—see Berlin Aristotle, p. 1535 sq. for fragments. Rose (de Arist. libr. ord. et auctor. pp. 57, 58) brings forward, as it seems to me, conclusive reasons for refusing to ascribe this collection to Aristotle. If, then, the reference in ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτείων is (as Grant and others suppose) to this collection, we have an additional ground for considering the passage before us to be non-Aristotelian. In the Politics Aristotle never refers to a collection of πολιτείαι as having been made by himself—in the Politics, if anywhere, he would be likely to do so, if such a collection had existed; and in the present chapter (E. N. x. 9) his tone towards ai συναγωγαῖ τῶν πολιτείων (1181 b. 7) is not that of a man who had himself laid a trap for the unwary by making a συναγωγή. On the other hand, if the συνηγμέναι πολιτείαι mentioned here (§ 23) are merely the πολιτείαι instanced and discussed in Pol. iii–vi, then it must be said that these πολιτείαι are not accurately described as 'a collection of πολιτείαι'—συνηγμέναι πολιτείαι. The writer of this section seems somehow or other to have connected in his mind the πολιτείαι instanced in Pol. iii–vi with the collection known to him as 'the πολιτεία of Aristotle.' He probably supposed that Aristotle used that collection as a book of reference when he wrote the Politics.

I agree, then, with Susemihl (see Aristoteles' Politik griech. u. deutsch, vol. i. p. 71 sqq. Einleitung) that §§ 22, 23 ought to be bracketed.

1 This paragraph was written before the publication of the 'Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, and is printed without alteration.
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