THE NECESSITY OF INSPIRATION AND THE CRISIS OF MODERN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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My dissertation seeks to fully recover one of the most important elements of republicanism—and yet an element of republicanism that is overlooked in most of the literature—persuasive political rhetoric (“rhetoric-as-movere”) in order to improve political communication and participation in the United States. Through rhetoric-as-movere is not without its problems, I argue that it has two major advantages over the type of political communication necessitated by strict deliberative democracy, a type of political communication that I suggest is rooted in “rhetoric-as-docere,” a tradition that developed alongside the rise of scientific empiricism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: it is better at drawing out action from novice citizens because it does a better job than deliberative democracy of dealing with the barriers to political entry, and it is more inclusive. Rhetoric-as-movere allows an orator to explicitly make use of all the persuasive tools at his or her disposal. While it is true that these tools are at times contrary to “rationality,” throughout history they have always been the first recourse of leaders and movements truly concerned with popular participation. I demonstrate this affinity between rhetoric-as-movere and popular participation through an historical
survey of movements ranging from 14th century English peasant revolts to 20th century American civil rights movements. I also analyze the development of the rhetoric-as-docere tradition in thinkers like Hobbes, Smith and Hume. I conclude that the rhetoric-as-docere tradition, which includes contemporary deliberative democracy, is predicated upon a suspicion of popular action that renders it insufficient as a model of political communication.

Finally, I create a multi-level model of political communication that incorporates rhetoric-as-movere and the republican ethos of civic education as well as certain aspects of deliberative democratic theory and rhetoric-as-docere. Most importantly, I contribute a curriculum of rhetorical education that rehabilitates persuasion and teaches students about the three classical proofs of logos, pathos and ethos as well as modern empirical proofs. Both of the model of political communication and the educational curriculum are crucial for the necessary and proper recovery of rhetoric-as-movere and the improvement of political participation in the United States.
DEDICATION

To the Machiavellians, the Man-Harem and Margot
Acknowledgments

I always knew these would be interesting for me to sit down and write—as though they will be read! Of course, I must begin with those who set me up to succeed in graduate school—my parents, Fred and Karen Hoerl, and my sister, Jessica Hoerl. I am also grateful to the many professors at the University of North Carolina who took an interest in me and my work. Chief among these is Gerald Unks, my undergraduate thesis advisor and a constant source of inspiration. James J. Gallagher and David Dill, who also sat on my thesis committee, are also due my thanks. Mary-Ruth Coleman and Daniel Gitterman both showed me great kindness.

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Any errors or other infelicities that remain in this work are my own.

As my luck would have it, I attended Rutgers at the same time as a lot of other excellent and entertaining people, and without them, I'd probably still be stuck in a Hickman Hall elevator. From outside my department, good friends like Joshua Beall, Marian Chen, Jie Chen, Benedicte Lebehot, Jennifer Miller, Susan Nakley, Tuna Sare, and Peter Sorrell made me laugh, and God knows I needed to! So many of my fellow Political Science graduate students reached out to me: Din Ambar, Dave Andersen, Susan
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The Necessity of Inspiration

During the course of the Symposium, Agathon is forced to say, “It’s probable, Socrates, that I knew nothing of what I had said.” Socrates calmly replies, “And yet you spoke beautifully, Agathon.”¹ This exchange focuses on the tension between speaking beautifully and communicating knowledge that seems doomed to plague the practice of politics in a popular setting. The proponents of speaking beautifully and those who privileged communicating knowledge fought their first major battles in the public forums and deliberative bodies of fifth century (BC) Athens. Leading thinkers, including Plato, cast aspersions on the art of speaking beautifully, arguing that beautiful speech obscured truth and meaning and could be used to create dangerous falsehoods in the minds of the people. However, other Athenians, like Aeschylus, argued that persuasive speaking and the institutions that accompany it offered the only way out of the bloody, unstable cycle of passion, duty and vengeance.²

On its face, this debate may seem rather obscure for a work of political theory that is interested in model building and augmenting the current discussion of what political communication in a properly functioning popular government ought to look like. Indeed, for a very long time the question of the fate of classical rhetoric was the domain of historians, classicists and literature scholars, and when political theorists found the need

² For an Athenian example, see the Oresteia, where Apollo tells Orestes, “we will charm them with words, we will find a way/to finally free you from this ordeal,” and Athena frequently makes references to the ability of speech to soothe passions and permit orderly decision-making. All quotations are taken from Aeschylus. Oresteia, Peter Meineck, translator (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998). Apollo is quoted from lines 82-3 of “The Furies.” Athena uses persuasive rhetoric to soothe the enraged titud goddesses at many junctures: “If you have any respect for the power of persuasion/let my words soothe and enchant you/to decide to stay” (885-7); “When I faced your harsh rejections/dear Persuasion watched over me/leading my lips, training my tongue/Zeus of Good Council prevailed/bringing a victory for both/for common good, forevermore” (970-6). The Furies admit to Athena: “Your charms are working, the rage is subsiding” (900).
to engage with the subject, they generally did so in order to understand the historical context that produced the work of another thinker. However, the political theory literature is starting to consider what classical rhetoric itself can contribute to our understanding of political communication.\(^3\)

In this context, rhetoric is often put forth as an alternative to the more venerable literature on “discourse,” “exchange” or “deliberation.”\(^4\) This is an important contribution, and many important criticisms of models like deliberative democracy have emerged from this literature. Equally important is the emerging literature that defends the practice of persuasion itself (see especially Garsten (2006) and Hall (2005)), as it was criticism of persuasion itself that led to the marginalization of classical rhetoric.

However, I want to suggest that this partial recovery of classical rhetoric and persuasion is missing two things. First, this literature does not discuss the problems with persuasive rhetoric that caused the initial backlash, and second, this literature does not address the ways in which persuasive rhetoric would have to be reconstituted in a contemporary context in order to satisfactorily address the legitimate problems of persuasive rhetoric.

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\(^4\) Representative theorists include Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson, Jane Mansbridge and, of course, Jurgen Habermas. While there are critical differences in the positions taken by these thinkers, they have all identified as deliberative democrats. Other scholars such as Seyla Benhabib (*Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1992)) and Iris Marion Young, (*Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford, 2000)) also advocate deliberative democratic goals, but criticized early models of deliberative democracy because they were not sensitive to issues of identity. Later in this work, I will argue that their initial objections are part of a larger objection to deliberative democratic theory (“the problem of homogeneity”), and that the objection is still a problem today.
Despite these small criticisms of the emerging pro-rhetoric literature in political theory, I am on their side and agree with their central contention that the form and persuasive nature of classical rhetoric can serve an important need in twenty-first century politics. I also agree that it is of utmost importance for intellectual elites to overcome their suspicion of persuasion and instead consider how to sensibly incorporate it in their models of political communication. This book is dedicated to providing another, separate case for persuasion in order that it may be added to the others and help demonstrate to reluctant intellectual elites that persuasion is critical to the achievement of many of their own most important goals. It is also dedicated to providing an integrated model of political communication that incorporates the best of the rhetorical and deliberative movements in modern political theory and will provide an avenue for improving popular political participation in the United States.

Citizen apathy and the problem of public participation in politics is a perennial problem for scholars of democratic theory and I believe that democratic theorists are charged with creating solutions for this problem. While there can never be complete and perfect public political participation,\(^5\) citizens who are politically engaged are more aware of threats to their individual liberty and autonomy and are better prepared to fend off

\(^5\) Indeed, the question of what we can expect is one that has been taken up by democratic theorists. Some scholars have advanced the thesis that elite decision-making is really more beneficial and that there are problems with popular participation. For examples, see David Stasavage, “Polarization and Publicity: Rethinking the Benefits of Deliberative Democracy” The Journal of Politics (February 2007); Sidney Verba, “Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn out to Be a Nightmare?” Perspectives on Politics (December 2003)—though Verba does conclude that “Political equality is an important ideal. While it is true that we will not achieve it soon, this is no reason not to continue trying” (676); and Nadia Urbinati, “Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation” Political Theory (December 2000). Mark E. Warren’s work acknowledges the challenges of popular government, but puts forth some suggestions on how to achieve a richer sense of participation. See his “What Can Democratic Participation Mean Today?” Political Theory (October 2002) and “What Should We Expect from Democracy? Radically Democratic Responses to Politics” Political Theory (May 1996). While those who know me know that I am not necessarily unsympathetic to the position taken by Stasavage, Verba and Urbinati, my solution to the dilemma would look rather different.
those threats. We can only start to address the higher-order questions of human political interaction in a truly democratic fashion when a sufficiently high number of people have achieved the individual liberty and autonomy\(^6\) that will allow them to function as discretionary, judging citizens\(^7\). Solving the problem of participation and identifying its causes are truly paramount concerns for scholars in political theory\(^8\).

Political scientists have suggested a number of causes, material and emotional, for this lack of participatory drive. Theorists who adopt an aggregate conception of democracy\(^9\)—where interests compete and the interests with the highest numbers are melded together—suggest that the low participation has a material basis. Studies of public policy formation indicate that certain interests—and the status quo—tend to

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\(^6\) I adopt a very narrow negative definition of liberty and autonomy—by one who is free and autonomous, I mean one who does not fear for his or her life and one who has the ability to maintain property (such as a residence) and economically support oneself. My conception is rather Hobbesian, except that I imagine the achievement of this liberty and autonomy taking place in a state that provides reasonable protection for one's life. It is an extraordinarily low baseline and the fact that we have not yet achieved it in the United States is a poor commentary on the state of our politics.

\(^7\) Anyone who knows me certainly knows that I am by no means a classical liberal in that I do not believe that a system of classical liberalism should represent the final endpoint of political societies. I believe that political theorists should continue to imagine communities that are able to improve their citizens, provide their citizens with a geographical identity while preserving other important types of identity, engage all citizens in an investigation of the question of justice and work to the preservation of each citizen as an end, not a means. I do not believe that the classical liberal system is the best system for the realization of these goals. However, classical liberalism does offer a very stable political structure that allows us to address issues of liberty and autonomy, and I see the achievement of liberty/autonomy as the precondition for addressing these other higher-order questions as a complete and egalitarian democratic body of citizens. Indeed, injustice and economic inequalities represent significant roadblocks in the achievement of the liberty and autonomy briefly discussed in footnote 5, but in our current situation, where many are dependent, others must fight for the dependent in order to clear away the roadblocks to liberty and autonomy. While clearing away those roadblocks will represent important steps on our way to understanding questions of injustice and inequality, I do not believe that we will be able to fully solve them until we take them up not as defenders and dependents, but as a complete body of liberated and autonomous beings.

\(^8\) In this hyper-popular focus, I find myself sympathetic to agonists like Chantal Mouffe (see, among many works “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?” in Social Research (1999)) and Bonnie Honig (see Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell, 1993) and her response to Dana R. Villa, “The Politics of Agonism: A Critical Response” Political Theory (August 1993)). As Michael Sandel says, "fundamentalists rush in where liberals fear to tread" (quoted in Dana R. Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror: Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000), 108), which contributes to the marginalization factor that I will discuss later in this chapter. Agonistic democracy does not cede that space to the fundamentalists.

\(^9\) Gutmann and Thompson have an excellent (if not critical) discussion of what aggregate democracy is in chapter one (pgs. 13-21) of their Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004).
prevail.\textsuperscript{10} If, theoretically, the achievement of preferred policy goals is the chief motivation for political participation, as it is under the aggregate conception of democracy, then prospects for a healthy democracy are dim indeed.

However, many political theorists are unsatisfied with the aggregate conception of democracy and cite the fact that, in spite of the dim outlook for advancing one's preferences, citizens do participate in government. Those who do participate often do so in pursuit of what Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) call social and civic gratifications. These gratifications certainly extend beyond that which is measured from an aggregate viewpoint, and indicate the need for democratic theory to move beyond that point. Indeed, “the proportion of activists who mentioned some civic purpose—the desire to do their duty as a member of the community, to make the community or nation a better place to live, or to do their share—is remarkably high.”\textsuperscript{11} Political theorists who are concerned with questions of political participation are often concerned with participation in this sense, because it not only helps create a government that is responsive to the preferences of its citizens, but it helps citizens develop important civic skills in a way that aggregate practices like voting simply cannot.

This type of civic and social gratification is a higher-order goal for all citizens. However, this requires increased levels of political participation, and more importantly, increased equality in political participation. If we are not committed to the goal of

\textsuperscript{10} See David Weimer and Aidan Vining, \textit{Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed.} (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), pgs. 409-11. Because “once policies are adopted, it is often difficult to repeal them...policies with large net social costs usually have vocal constituencies who receive benefits” (409) and “the public organizations that house programs on the whole enjoy great longevity” (409), sunset provisions and other attempts to terminate policies and facilitate change are often ineffective. Weimer and Vining conclude that “even if we are fairly certain that a proposed policy is desirable, and will remain desirable for a long time, the inherent persistence of policies should give us some pause” (409).

achieving increased and more equal participation, then we must seriously reconsider our views on “popular” government, else we are left with a society that embodies the most divisive and dangerous aspects of the increasing divide between people whose profession is politics, and the rest of the citizenry,\textsuperscript{12} where policy goals pursued by professionals are the only goals considered worthy. Deliberative democrats and their critics believe that this quest for equality in participation and the pursuit of not only policy, but civic and social goals, is tied up closely with the question of how we communicate with our fellow citizens, thus the connection between models of political communication and the problem of political participation.

I believe that the type of popular political government—the type of democracy—that can encourage citizens to come together and hammer out the solutions to the problems of injustice and inequality that work for them as a group is not easy, but it must serve as the goal. In a democracy, all citizens should have the real opportunity to involve themselves in issues of local governance, and they should have the real opportunity to become aware of what issues are important at the national level, so that they may choose to pursue activism. Our current “representative democracy” where, due to a lack of knowledge—whether that lack comes from information asymmetry or poor publicizing by political elites—most individuals are unaware of the political opportunities that surround them is not an acceptable endpoint for political society.\textsuperscript{13} Of course, no small

\textsuperscript{12} Many authors speak to this gap of expertise: In Political Parties (Oxford: Oxford UP 1919), Robert Michels writes, “there is thus effected a continuous enlargement of the gulf which divides the leaders from the masses” (70). The gap is also a consequence of Theodore Lowi’s (1979) interest-group liberalism, and in Diminished Democracy (Norman, OK: Oklahoma UP, 1999), Theda Skocpol writes, “Professionally managed, top-down civic endeavors simultaneously limit the mobilization of most citizens into public life and encourage a fragmentation of social identities and trivial polarizations in public debates.” (232)

\textsuperscript{13} It would perhaps be too bold to suggest that representative democracy is reaching the end of its usefulness and it is time for the next evolution in government, but certainly one can understand the growing discontent that some have with the representative democracy format. In the eighteenth century
part of the blame for our current situation must be laid at the feet of the citizens themselves, but as many have noted, it is difficult to be a citizen in a modern democracy, particularly with the heavy demands on leisure time.\textsuperscript{14}

Indeed, there are a variety of factors that contribute to the participatory problem, and the most important ones are the material “barriers to entry” such as adequate leisure time, networks and resources.\textsuperscript{15} However, even if these barriers are overcome, there are a whole host of psychological factors—the mental “barriers to entry”—that can prevent individuals from participating.\textsuperscript{16} Citizens may be dogged by a deep sense of exclusion from the process—even though there might be many groups or individuals actually inviting them to participate in the process. They may also be hounded by the niggling idea that their participation, as a single individual, is rather ineffectual.

These struggles are the staging ground for one of my major objections to most deliberative democrats. I believe that their methods (e.g., community assemblies, citizen groups) are \textit{incomplete}, because they fail to see that citizen engagement has two components. It is, of course, important to allow democratic citizens opportunities for

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\textsuperscript{14} Verba, Schlozman and Brady, \textit{op cit.}, p. 129. According to their surveys and interviews, lack of leisure time is the most commonly cited reason for non-participation.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, Chs. 10-13.

\textsuperscript{16} These problems can rear their head in the recruitment phase. See Brady, Schlozman and Verba, “Prospecting for Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political Activists” \textit{American Political Science Review} (March 1999).
equal participation, the voicing of their opinions, and a feeling of equality at the table. However, it is equally important—and this is a precondition to the community assembly form of participation—to get potential citizens involved and inspired. Deliberative democracy answers the problem, “How do we deal with citizens who have chosen to participate?” but completely fails to answer the question, “How do we induce and sustain citizen participation in the first place?”

That is an incredibly important question, particularly in light of the history of the development of popular government. Even in contemporary times, the residents of a particular nation cannot simply decide “today, we would like to be governed democratically.” Circumstances must conspire—both now and during the course of history—to create a window of opportunity for popular involvement and the advance toward a popular government. Open windows eventually close, and the leaders of popular movements and democracies have a limited time to create popular institutions and imbue the people with a participatory ethos. The examples and institutions provided by the deliberative democrats do not appear adequate for this task.

I argue that theories of deliberative democracy must be necessarily inadequate for this task because they are designed to work in a world that has satisfied certain necessary preconditions of educational equality, cultural familiarity and societal justice. Indeed,

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17 I am, of course, assuming that if the United States is going to persist in calling itself a democracy, widespread political participation is a necessary goal.

18 The entire idea of windows is adapted from John W. Kingdon’s concept of the policy window in the American public policy process. See his *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman Classics, 2002) for more on the concept of policy windows. As for the windows for popular participation, the list of circumstances is varied and complicated, and far beyond the scope of this work—and perhaps more properly the province of historians. However, some examples would include the presence of an elite/bourgeois class with the time and resources to lead a popular movement, economic circumstances that have allowed for the weakening of the monarch/dictator in power, and conditions that are desperate enough to cause unrest, but not so devastating as to cripple the populace’s ability to act *en masse*. 
one could argue that deliberative democratic principles represent the highest and most
noble notions of what a system of political communication should resemble. However,
no one, not even the most ardent proponents of deliberative democracy, would suggest
that we as a society have met the preconditions that I want to suggest are necessary for
deliberative democracy to be implemented on a wide scale. If we are to ever have any
hope of reaching that point, we must carefully theorize an imperfect model of political
communication that is specifically designed to help transition citizens ever closer to being
“ready” for deliberative democracy.

The model I put forth in this book is designed exactly for that purpose. It
possesses two components, one that calls upon standard deliberative democratic theory
and one that calls upon the classical rhetorical style. Earlier I suggested that we as a
society have not met the preconditions for deliberative democracy on a wide scale.
Certainly there are individuals in our society who possess the ability to conduct
themselves in deliberative democratic institutions and who stand to reap the benefits of
discussion in that setting. My model of political communication provides an opportunity
for those individuals to do so, but, most importantly, it re-embraces the role that
persuasive classical rhetoric plays in inspiring citizens to become involved in politics—to
take that first, critical step.

In order to make sure that this model of political communication does not
establish a hierarchy or limit “movement,” I also prescribe a basic curriculum of
rhetorical education19 that looks to achieve a number of goals. First, this education looks

19 On pgs. 126-33 of her work, Cheryl Hall argues that education is necessary to take the passion of
rhetoric-as-movere and mold it into something politically useful: “Educating passions may seem like
‘programming’ if passions (in contrast to reasons) are perceived as unchangeable once they have developed
in a particular way. But this is a familiar misconception. In spite of external influences, people are not
to present a balanced view of persuasion that draws attention to both its positives and negatives. The mindset that appeals to emotion are necessarily bad, dangerous or improper must be abolished. This can only be done through the study and proper understanding of rhetoric-as-movere. Persuasive rhetoric is not inherently evil, does not necessarily lead to ill-advised action and is not used exclusively by demagogues. The inspiration and inclusion it provides when used properly is necessary if a society hopes to overcome some of the most important barriers to political participation.

Second, this education creates a new fourth type of proof to match the three classical proofs of logos, ethos and pathos—the proof of empiricism. While proof via empirical observation is foundational, students in school are often taught about this proof in the context of natural sciences and there is little discussion as to what empiricism has to contribute to the creation of public policies and political institutions. Since this rhetorical curriculum will help students understand the relationship between empirical claims and the practical science of politics, it will allow students to judge whether or not there is sufficient empirical evidence for claims in a political speech.

These first two goals are designed to help students realize the diversity of valid rhetorical and political appeals. The third goal of the rhetorical education curriculum is to help students measure and evaluate the ethos of politicians and policy experts.

Operating under the assumption that the vast majority of citizens, due to constraints on simply passive victims of their own passions. They help to construct them, and though it is not always easy, they can change them. This agency is why it is possible to talk about educating passions in the first place” (133). Also see Michael Walzer, “Deliberation and What Else?” in Deliberative Politics. I envision this rhetorical curriculum as a small part of the larger curriculum of rhetorical education.

20 This bias against persuasion can take the most devious forms. Consider a typical unit taught in American high schools on the subject of advertising. Students are taught that any appeal designed to manipulate or draw interest is somehow wrong, and that ads should focus on the facts. I argue that it would be more helpful to give students a serious lesson on the different types of appeals—to use Aristotle’s words, ethos, pathos and logos—and teaching them the techniques for evaluating each type.

21 Hall, 35-6.
resources and leisure time, will be unable to remain on the cutting edge of developments in complicated, constantly advancing policy areas like health policy, technology policy, foreign policy, etc., this curriculum will help students develop as many tools as possible for evaluating speakers who are making claims that they may not be able to fully understand and investigate. Not only will students be able to use their knowledge of rhetorical proofs like *logos* and *pathos* to analyze the actual argument of the speaker, but through being educated about *ethos*, students will be able to evaluate the agencies that credential a speaker, the journals that publish a speaker, the websites a speaker publishes at, and other things that give some clue as to the speaker's standing among the wider community of experts.

However, before I can elaborate further on this education and piece together a model of political communication that combines both deliberative democracy and classical rhetoric, I must accomplish a number of tasks. I must demonstrate why deliberative democracy, on its own, is an insufficient model for addressing the political participation problems I discussed earlier. I must also demonstrate that the classical rhetorical model has something important to contribute to contemporary political communication and that I understand its inherent problems and am ready to address them. The majority of this work uses both critical analysis of contemporary literature and the methods of the intellectual historian to achieve these tasks, allowing me to conclude with a preliminary sketch of my model of political communication and rhetorical education.

**The Basic Case for the Necessity of Inspirational Rhetoric**

No one would contest the idea that language is a crucial part of politics. Many scholars believe that language is one of the key elements in overcoming some of the
“barriers to entry” in our political system. As the deliberative democrats rightly point out, language can be used to explain and justify political decision-making. It can also be used to create a more inclusive environment and to communicate examples of effective politics. Most importantly, language can be used induce and sustain active political participation.

The above claim is not revolutionary; from the time of the earliest canonical authors, the art of speaking and persuasion has been granted a place in politics and learning how to speak persuasively was a key component of rhetorical education. Cicero attributed three purposes to rhetoric: to teach [docere], to delight [delectare] and to move [movere]. It is the central claim of this book that the tradition of persuasive political rhetoric, a tradition that I will refer to throughout this work as “rhetoric-as-movere” is an essential part of motivating citizens to climb over the barriers to entry and begin their journey toward becoming better, more complete citizens. Rhetoric-as-movere is the cornerstone of institutions of political communication that are designed to answer the question, “How do we induce and sustain political participation in the first place?”

Through rhetoric-as-movere is not without its problems, I argue that it has two major advantages over the type of political communication necessitated by strict deliberative democracy: it is better at drawing out action from novice citizens because it

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22 For the historical importance of changing vocabularies and language in political history and political theory, see the work of J.G.A. Pocock, particularly Politics, Language and Time (Chicago: Univ of Chicago, 1989) and The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975) Chs. 1-3. In Chapter 7 of Politics, Language and Time, Pocock cites Toulmin and Goodfield's example of archaic villagers and the transformation of their consciousness by “physical scientists” and “changes in social theory” (235). As a consequence, we must be “concerned with the conceptualisation of tradition” and thus language (236-7). For a summary of Pocock's work in this subject, see Iain Hampsher-Monk, “Political Languages in Time—the Work of J.G.A. Pocock” British Journal of Political Science (January 1984).

23 For a few prominent examples of this literature, see Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon, 1984), pgs. 285-295; Gutmann and Thompson, op. cit.; and Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1983).
does a better job than deliberative democracy of dealing with the barriers to political entry, and it is more inclusive. Rhetoric-as-*movere* allows an orator to explicitly make use of all the persuasive tools at his or her disposal. While it is true that these tools are at times contrary to “rationality,” throughout history they have always been the first recourse of leaders and movements truly concerned with popular participation and movements. We do not see this power to move in the models of deliberative democracy, and that is their great practical failing.24 Something else is necessary: inspiration.

Inspiration, persuasion, *movere*—we believe that all these ideas are potentially dangerous because they intimately involve the dreaded enemy of liberalism, the passions. As Bryan Garsten has noted in *Saving Persuasion* and Cheryl Hall has noted in *The Trouble with Passion*, political thinkers since the time of Hobbes have been engaged in a successful and sustained war against persuasion and its passions.25 Because of this attack, a responsible, fully realized program of rhetorical education is almost non-existent in this country. The results of this are devastating. They are devastating because I am not claiming that the “decline” of classical rhetoric or the “decline” of rhetoric-as-*movere* is related The basic principles of rhetoric-as-*movere* have not vanished, rhetoricians using rhetoric-as-*movere* have not vanished, but the tools are now more often than not used by political elites against a citizenry that has lost its knowledge of the techniques of *movere*, and is thus unable to properly analyze and evaluate rhetorical claims. Furthermore, the “shunning” of *movere* by intellectual elites has resulted—in recent US elections—in candidates who come from the intellectual elite or are trying to appeal to the intellectual

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24 Most examples of deliberative democracy in practice involve carefully selected small groups. For an example, see Douglas Walton, “Criteria of Rationality for Evaluating Democratic Public Rhetoric” from *Talking Democracy*.

25 I will argue in Chapter Three that the attack precedes Hobbes by 50-100 years, but I basically agree with Garsten’s characterization of the hostility against persuasion.
elite failing to move the popular mass of the US electorate (chief example: Gore, Al). By refusing to embrace move, intellectual elites are ceding claims to political inspiration, and as a result, they find it difficult to achieve a popular mandate (and an avenue for achieving their policy goals).

This neglect of the proper study of rhetoric-as-movere has left the tool of persuasive political rhetoric—and it is not a tool without considerable dangers—in the possession of wolves. Individuals are utterly unprepared to judge the variety of appeals and the numbers of “proofs” directed at them by the statesmen of our times. Without a vigorous examination of both the pros and cons of rhetoric-as-movere, and a calculated attempt to create a model of political communication and education that fully incorporates this type of political communication, facts and appeals will remain separate.

This separation is harmful for democracy. If this separation holds, the deliberative democracy literature and political participation literatures will continue on their separate tracks, the former driven by its quest for rationality and justification in political communication and latter by its quest to move citizens. Yet without a sense of movement and purpose, deliberative democrats will continue to be met with charges of irrelevancy and unrealistic expectations, and political participation activists will continue to find their quest hollow if their participation lacks that justification and rational purpose. However, the ancient solution of classical political rhetoric—rhetoric-as-movere—and proper rhetorical education can work to bridge these two conceptions of

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26 In comparison, Senator Barack Obama has mounted a campaign based on his lack of Washington “political machine” experience. His slogan is “Yes We Can!” and his rhetoric is peppered with specific calls for political action. His campaign is marked by an energy and popular involvement that has not been seen in some time.
political communication, and such a union cannot be anything but beneficial for the practice of democracy and the state of democratic theory.

Indeed, a study of the history of popular movements and their rhetoric bears this out and demonstrates that rhetoric-as-*movere* is a key part of growing and sustaining popular movements. This is one of a series of historical claims that I will make in this book, and in demonstrating these claims I will be able to assemble one of the first histories of the political function of rhetoric and its interaction with political theory and institutions. Through the tracing of historical examples, I hope to be able to establish an historical affinity involving the use of rhetoric-as-*movere*, the open participation window, and instability in the political system that yields increased political participation.

**Objections to Deliberative Democracy: Responses to the Literature**

Despite my critique, I am not completely unsympathetic to the goals of deliberative democrats. I adopt the theoretical assumption, shared by deliberative democrats like Gutmann and Thompson, that bare minimum, aggregate democracy is almost useless if one is dedicated to truly popular government. A healthy democracy requires increased and more equally distributed political activity among the citizenry, and contemporary democratic theory should pursue this goal with vigor. However, in a society where politicians “take the expressed preferences as the privileged or primary material for democratic decision-making” and “pay little or not attention to the reasons that citizens or their representatives give or fail to give,” it is not surprising to understand why many citizens are confused and frustrated by politics.

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Although some scholars have identified deliberative democracy as a move against liberalism,\(^{29}\) I believe that by studying the history of rhetoric and political theory we can clearly see that the desire for talk and deliberation among citizens that is so prevalent in this literature has its roots in general liberal theory and Hobbes in particular.\(^{30}\) The disapproval of persuasion, emotion and their effects that is at the base of the rational and dialogic communication praised by the deliberative democrats is the perfect accompaniment to liberal political theory, which disapproves of rash action and is, at base, suspicious of the actions of government, particularly as they relate to the preservation of the rights of citizens.\(^{31}\)

It is these skeptical and suspicious roots that make talk and deliberation problematic when attempting to induce and sustain political participation in a diverse and unequal nation. These models adopt assumptions that make perfect sense in a setting of scholars: that facts can stand on their own, that individuals have the time and ability to carefully evaluate complex claims, that we are working from a shared vocabulary and set of interests—in other words, “the truth will set us free.” The history of political movements does not provide much evidence for these assumptions. Facts cannot stand on their own, citizens do not have all the time in the world, and the vocabulary and goals of any given assembly are probably going to be heterogeneous rather than homogeneous.

While suspicion can serve as an imprimatur for action, it can also ferment apathy. Without jettisoning liberalism whole cloth, we need to look at more robust liberal models

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\(^{29}\) Stephen Macedo, “Introduction” in Deliberative Politics, p. 3
\(^{30}\) This view is also shared by Garsten, Hall and, to some extent, Quentin Skinner (1997).
that include elements of republicanism, and its historical attendant, rhetoric-as-
movere.\textsuperscript{32}

In my conclusion, I will use principles of both liberalism and “modern” classical republicanism to create a framework of political communication that takes advantage of both these approaches.\textsuperscript{33}

Before elaborating on that model, I wish to submit three objections to deliberative democracy (keeping in mind that all three objections do not apply to all of the various deliberative models that have been proposed) and detail how rhetoric-as-
movere could ameliorate some of the problems that result from these objections. The three major grounds on which I object to deliberative democracy are as follows: first, and most important, is that the fact deliberative models have extremely high barriers to entry.\textsuperscript{34} To fully participate in a deliberative model requires time, issue-centered education, and knowledge of prevailing norms of civility. Stemming from this is the second objection, that deliberative models privilege certain broad norms of civility and reason that are exclusive. However, these models profess to be open and concerned with the expression of the common will and creating a richer picture than aggregative democracy. As many scholars have pointed out, this privileging of norms and civility—unofficial tickets to

\textsuperscript{32} For more on the specific quest to recover republicanism, see Alain Boyer, “On the Modern Relevance of Old Republicanism” \textit{The Monist} (January 2001) and Gurpreet Rattan, “Prospects for a Contemporary Republicanism” \textit{The Monist} (January 2001).


entering the deliberation—is one of the most difficult aspects of the deliberative democratic project.\footnote{In his Introduction to Deliberative Politics, Macedo talks about the need for civility (p. 10), which leads us to ask, “Whose civility?” While this question might open dangerous doors to unproductive relativism, as Ian Shapiro, in his discussion of deliberation and fundamentalists (pgs. 30-1 of “Enough of Deliberation, Politics is about Interest and Power”), William Galston (p. 43 of “Diversity, Toleration and Deliberative Democracy” and Stanley Fish (p. 91 of “Mutual Respect as a Device of Exclusion”), all in the same volume, all agree that deliberative democracy is particularly susceptible to privileging a set of norms that work to exclude large groups of the eligible citizenry from the deliberative table.}

The third, and final, objection is a more generalized statement of the second. The discussion required in deliberative democracy is susceptible to what I term the “problem of homogeneity.” This is the phenomenon whereby political communication becomes exclusionary because it draws upon a vocabulary, cultural references, norms and educational curriculum that only a certain portion of the population has access to. Those who cannot conform properly—particularly to the established norms—never achieve their goal of equal participation. As pieces by Fish, Galston and Shapiro indicate, in the American context, this conflict is often staged between fundamentalist religious norms and academic norms of reason and demonstration.\footnote{Ibid.}

The first two criticisms of deliberative democracy are not particularly original.\footnote{See Garsten \textit{(op cit)}, Hall \textit{(op cit)}, Remer, “Cicero and the Ethics of Deliberative Rhetoric” in \textit{Talking Democracy} and others for these criticisms.} Although the problem of homogeneity has been covered in historical context,\footnote{The work of Ryan J. Stark is notable.} there has been little focus on its contemporary effects.\footnote{The rest of this discussion of deliberative democracy is reproduced from Alexandra Elizabeth Hoerl, “The Necessity of Inspiration,” paper delivered at the 2005 APSA meeting.} The high barrier to entry and the necessity of equality inherent in deliberative democracy both speak to the problem of homogeneity. It is very difficult to cross the barriers to entry unless one shares a cultural heritage with the dominant group (i.e., the group that determines entry into deliberation). Individuals who do not conform to established norms and definitions of “rationality” and
“politeness”\(^{40}\) will not be given an equal voice at the table.\(^{41}\) The necessity of equality in deliberation recalls similar problems in Rousseau’s construction of a republic in the Social Contract. Heterogeneity makes the equality of discussion and dialogue rather difficult to achieve.

Take this as a suggested rule: any time there are equals in terms of education, information and time, there can be a deliberative assembly. A group of regular citizens who are concerned with an issue can operate in a deliberative manner, if they trade off leadership/enforcement responsibilities. However, if they were to choose someone who was not their political equal to lead their assembly, then some of the deliberative character would be lost. The deliberative assembly would also not be the ideal way to bring individuals into the political fold, as they would not have the knowledge necessary to be equal contributors. Thus, they would be relegated to the status of “audience,” or even worse, if they try to participate, they might be made to feel uninformed or unworthy of political participation.\(^{42}\) We must not forget how high the barrier to participation in a truly deliberative assembly can seem to someone who is just starting to develop an interest in politics.

Though models of deliberation often assume that rationality can be taught through what is learned in the deliberation, there still have to be some rational citizens deliberating in the first place. When that sort of stratification is introduced, there is a problem of expertise. Some people’s opinions are more valued than others, and the equal

\(^{40}\) I use the word “politeness” in one of its eighteenth century contexts—proper forms of address in dialogue and letter-writing that was meant to foster a sense of equality among a small group of participants who often had much in common in terms of social background and economic class.

\(^{41}\) See Why Deliberative Democracy?, chapter 1, where Gutmann and Thompson state that the same opinion expressed in rational terms (i.e., conforming to the norms of rationality and the academy) by Prof. William Galston is inherently more valuable than the same opinion expressed by average citizens who lack both Prof. Galston’s training and his knowledge of the “proper norms.”

\(^{42}\) On the other hand, they might just get bored by the conversation.
voices that are supposed to come out in deliberation may never materialize. These high barriers make it difficult to effect widespread participation, particularly when the deliberation is so structured.\(^{43}\) Most constructed models of deliberation have carefully delineated steps and many rules that must be carefully followed, or else things fall apart.\(^{44}\) This concern with rules and procedure makes deliberative models susceptible to Benjamin Barber’s “problem of uncertainty,” slowness in decision-making, and more general gridlock, particularly if it is to be implemented on a large scale.\(^{45}\)

Apathy is one of the consequences of the high barriers to entry and problem of homogeneity. To be crude, deliberative democracy, compared to other options, is boring, unless an individual enters the deliberation with pre-existing interest and information. Deliberative models do not effectively describe the source of this interest and information.\(^{46}\) Republicanism had an answer: these things were generated through participation and a sense of civic duty, which were motivated by the use of, among other

\(^{43}\) For an example of highly structured democratic deliberation, see Douglas Walton, *op. cit.*

\(^{44}\) The importance of rules for deliberative democratic models cannot be underestimated. Not only rules, but enforcement of those rules, is crucial. With these “enforcers,” we once again see inequality entering the picture—some people matter more than others in the deliberation. When I taught democratic political philosophy, I had students simulate various models of democracy, including the deliberative model (following the precepts of Gutmann/Thompson and Wilson). What became quickly evident through the simulation of the other models (direct, representative, interest-group liberalism, communitarianism and proportional representation) was that the students—who on the whole represented an educated and interested populace—were uninterested in maintaining any sense of order. Their chief concern was that their own opinions be voiced. Only through the most stringent enforcement of the rules by a student with “real-life” experience as Parliamentarian of the Rutgers University Senate who was also recognized by his peers as one of the most intelligent and competent students in a class of extraordinary students, were the rules of the deliberative model able to be enforced. I believe this student’s experience was crucial to things—he had the confidence to adjudicate disputes over enforcement of the rules with grace, and thus prevented chaos, which had ensued in previous presentations where the students who were in charge of enforcing the rules did not have experience in the area. We were able to run the simulation with 40 students, but the people in charge of enforcement (not just of the rules of deliberation, but of answering questions, seating people, and keeping order) were raised above the deliberators, and were not able to share their opinion in the matter because they were too busy playing referee.

\(^{45}\) Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1984).

\(^{46}\) Hall (pgs. 35-6) argues that passion is necessary to generate this interest. A good example of assuming interest without demonstrating its source—particularly in light of barriers to entry—is Macedo, p. 9.
things, rhetoric-as-

However, this meant that there had to be some catering to the audience to induce participation—to make it interesting. Since political participation in a liberal society is competing with many other things for the increasingly small amount of leisure time that most potential citizens have, it is essential that there be some step below this formal deliberative democracy that will actually draw in and compel citizens to become involved.

The exclusivity of deliberation has the potential to be at odds with participatory democracy. The major problem with all deliberative models is that they assume some form of bourgeois rationality, while wanting to maintain a popular tenor. The deliberative democrats have similar expectations to Plato—they want citizens who participate to be individuals who have already developed a sense of rationality and a sense of their interests and desires in the private sphere or in civil society. However, assuming this fully-developed rationality is quite dangerous, and it flies in the face of the assumptions about Americans and civic education that have existed since the earliest days of the American Republic. I argue that all of these assumptions created gaps in the relationship between methods of political communication and theorized political institutions that may explain the contemporary frustration with political communication.

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47 It cannot be stressed enough that rhetoric-as-
movere is only one component necessary to address the problem of participation.


49 The entire deliberative democracy literature is a response to the perceived lack that we find in modern political communication. Theorists of deliberative democracy take up the very questions of audience, participation and evidence in their works. While I do not wish to impugn their understanding of classical rhetoric, I argue that their solution of deliberative democracy does not fully address the gaps that a thorough study and comparison of classical rhetoric with modern political communication will reveal.
Thinkers like Madison, Hamilton and Tocqueville realized that only so much education and learning could be done prior to entering the public sphere and governmental life. Part of the education—part of the citizen rationality—had to be developed in the public sphere itself. Only through the participation in public functions would the citizen be able to achieve full consciousness and realize what his interests (properly understood) were. It was also in this sphere that people learned how to be other-regarding to those who were not necessarily friends and family—people learned what the common good was. The educational and governmental institutions built around recognition of the importance of persuasion and rhetoric-as-movere in political life provided the conduit for this lesson. There is still room in contemporary American society for these educational and governmental institutions, and we cannot deny that they lessons they can teach are sorely needed.

The Limits of Deliberative Democracy: Lessons from Political History

My Introduction and Conclusion specifically focus on arguing for and outlining models of political communication and rhetorical education. The substantive chapters in this work employ an historicist approach to political theory in order that I may defend a number of important historical claims that stand as the largest part of my argument for developing models of political communication and rhetorical education that embrace the norms of rhetoric-as-movere. First, I must define and articulate a notion of rhetoric-as-movere, enumerate its forms, and demonstrate its place in the classical rhetorical system. As a corollary, I must also establish the fact that, while there has always been what I will call the Classical Objection to the illegitimate use of rhetoric-as-movere, even the

50 It is no accident that Thomas Hobbes lovingly translated The History of the Peloponnesian War.
thinkers associated with this objection, like Plato and Thucydides, did not deny the necessity or power of proper rhetoric-as-movere.

Because there is a copious literature available for me to draw on that covers the literary and technical details of ancient rhetoric, I establish the basis for these claims quickly in Chapter Two. First, I introduce the basics of classical rhetoric and discuss its three purposes: docere, delectare and movere. As I take a closer look at rhetoric-as-movere, I outline its four functions. Three are just: the legitimate urging function, the legitimate restraining function and just revolution rhetoric. One is unjust: the improper demagogic function. In focusing on the importance of rhetoric-as-movere in Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian—where the ability to use rhetoric-as-movere demonstrates the highest ability and provides the best chance for glory—and on the nature of the Classical Objection in Plato and Thucydides, I emphasize the fact that the Classical Objection was always directed toward those who called upon the improper demagogic function of rhetoric-as-movere, not the tool of movere itself.

In my treatment of medieval rhetoric, which comprises the bulk of the chapter, I will highlight the role of rhetoric-as-movere in relation to the ars praedicandi [art of preaching]. I will demonstrate that the dominance of scholastic rhetoric-as-docere (i.e., rhetoric designed to persuade its audience that a teaching is proper, without suggesting an action based on that conclusion) in the “dark” ages and the “high” middle ages shows what happens to rhetoric-as-movere when the window for popular political participation is closed. While the reopening of the window of political participation marked most sharply by the 1381 Peasants' Revolt provided a new opportunity for rhetoric-as-movere
to once again serve as an effective tool in organizing popular political action, the dominance of scholastic rhetoric-as-docere provided the norms of rhetoric-as-docere with a legitimacy that they did not previously possess, and thus the struggle for dominance between docere norms and movere norms took root.

Sixteenth century developments in dialectical logic and the emergent scientific method of the seventeenth century were harmonious with the norms of rhetoric-as-docere and their nascent rise marked the beginning of rhetoric-as-docere's rise over rhetoric-as-movere. I cover this relationship in Chapter Three. Beginning with the work of Petrus Ramus, the man most responsible for severing rhetoric and dialectic, I show that sixteenth century logicians were concerned with purifying dialectic and logic by divorcing them from the rhetorical treatises that were overly concerned with ornament, figures, and copia. Ramus and others like him were revolting against the ossified and flowery rhetoric of the Renaissance (at some level perhaps best characterized as part rhetoric-as-docere and part rhetoric-as-delectare) and their attack was compatible with the advances in learning and science that were taking place in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century.

The nature of these advances, typified by the work of Francis Bacon and his New Science, placed a premium on clarity, economy and plainness of words. The modern idea of plain speech rhetoric emerged from their work. Abhorrence of the “occult” in

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51 The documents from this period are, by and large, in Middle English. The fact that rhetoric-as-movere was communicated in the vernacular is extremely critical.
52 In his Rhetoricae Distinctiones ad Quintilianum [Arguments in Rhetoric Against Quintilian] (trans. Carole Newlands, James J. Murphy, ed., Northern Illinois, 1986), Ramus expresses his frustration against Quintilian—and the dominant style of rhetoric—for “[collecting] to the absolute limit all the inanities and trivialities of rhetoricians.”
53 “Plain speech” is a term with a confused meaning in the scholarship on the history of rhetoric. It is a very old term, and was most frequently used to set the Athenian orator Demosthenes—the exemplar of plain speech in the ancient world—against Cicero. However, under my definitions, Demosthenes, like
rhetoric, a turn from *ethos* to the empirical, and an embrace of terminology from the natural sciences were all a hallmark of this rhetoric as it developed in the seventeenth century. Because it was concerned with knowledge and most of its practitioners were learned men who wanted to be able to converse with each other, it did not embrace action (i.e., *movere*) as a primary goal. It was also primarily a written, not oral mode of rhetoric. As other scholars have pointed out, this type of rhetoric suffered from what I call the problem of homogeneity, or the use of specialized terminology and allusions that are only sensible to a select group of people and thus exclusionary. One of the central claims that I will defend through the rest of the work is that the problem of homogeneity is endemic to rhetoric-as-*docere*, and thus theories of communication that are grounded in the norms of rhetoric-as-*docere*, like deliberative democracy, cannot be the only basis for a system of political communication.

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Cicero, was a practitioner of rhetoric-as-*movere*. Brian Vickers, “The Royal Society and English Prose Style: A Reassessment,” deals with this difficult issue, but when I use the term “plain speech,” I am referring specifically to communication grounded in the norms of rhetoric-as-*docere* that is empirical (thus lacking ornament or figure) and uses technical terminology.

Peter Walmsley’s work on Locke and the *Essay* demonstrates the pervasive influence of this mode of intellectualism, even among individuals who were not primarily empirical scientists (see “Dispute and Conversation: Probability and Natural Philosophy in the Rhetoric of Locke’s Essay” *Journal of the History of Ideas* (July 1993)).

Syllabi for classes that cover the history of rhetoric are very much tilted toward non-political works that emphasize *docere* over *movere*. Dialogues of Plato, such as the *Gorgias* are often read, but the political content of the dialogue is not a focus. Hume, Smith and Hobbes are all studied to some extent, but once again, their political importance is considered secondary to their contributions to rhetoric, and the connections between those two areas of their work is often not thoroughly explored. Skinner’s *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) is a notable exception to this, and remains a nearly unique piece of scholarship. Victoria Kahn’s *Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformation to Milton* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994) is another example of this type of work. Blair Worden’s *The Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney’s Arcadia and Elizabethan Politics* (New Haven: Yale, 1996) is not as closely related to rhetoric as the work of Skinner and Kahn, but it deals with a rhetorical text and examines the connection between politics and literature, which is related to the connection between politics and rhetoric.

The fourth chapter introduces the Hobbesian Objection and shows its basis in the fear of _movere_ itself. Historically, it deals with the use of rhetoric-as-_movere_ in the English Civil War. The example of the English Civil War once again demonstrates the affinity between the open window of popular political participation, the use of rhetoric-as-_movere_ and resultant radical (and destabilizing) political action. However, my examination of the actual rhetoric of the pamphleteers does not suggest that the republicans used only the “dangerous” improper demagogic form of rhetoric; in fact, the rhetoric of the republican pamphleteers is varied, and even true Leveller radicals are as likely to call on the legitimate restraining function of rhetoric-as-_movere_ as any other function. However, despite these varied rhetorical approaches, the political action that resulted from their rhetorical call to action nearly shook the stable foundations of English society to their breaking point.

For this, the English republicans had to deal with the wrath of Thomas Hobbes. While Hobbes scholars have definitively demonstrated that he moved away from _De Cive's_ explicitly anti-rhetorical position in his _Leviathan_ and that Hobbes was rhetorical even when specifically arguing against rhetoric. The _Leviathan_ contains a blistering attack on certain republican virtues like (vain)glory and the courageously active impulse. This attack on republican virtues, especially the virtue of action, marginalized the English republicans' particular type of republicanism in the eyes of intellectuals and regular people who were tired of dealing with the consequences of political instability. Through undermining this conception of republicanism that gave pride of place to action

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57 It is interesting to note that Hobbes and Plato followed similar progressions in their thought concerning rhetoric. Both authors started out with diatribes against rhetoric—the _Gorgias_ for Plato and _De Cive_ and _Elements of Law_ for Hobbes—and later produced more mature statements that acknowledged the necessity of rhetoric (_Phaedrus_ for Plato and _Leviathan_ for Hobbes).
by tying it to irresponsible notions of glory and then further accusing the English republicans of advancing this irresponsible notion of glory and action, Hobbes marginalized both these republicans and their particular type of political persuasion, rhetoric-as-*movere*.

The tumult of the seventeenth century gave way to the staid and polite eighteenth century in England. Chapter Five deals with this polite stasis and connects it to the marginalization of active republicanism. I also use the eighteenth century English case to begin building my claim that, due to the fact that rhetoric-as-*movere* was marginalized, rhetoric-as-*docere* “assumed” the legitimate urging and restraining functions of rhetoric-as-*movere*. In doing so, political communication was more influenced by the norms of rhetoric-as-*docere* than ever before and the problem of homogeneity was rampant. When we examine the belletristic lectures of Adam Smith and Hugh Blair, we can clearly see that polite plain speech rhetoric became tied to the aspirations of the English middle class, which included economic and intellectual prestige and being able to imitate the nobility. These aspirations were an excellent match for the re-purposed legitimate urging and restraining functions and thus the co-optation of rhetoric-as-*movere* by rhetoric-as-*docere* continued apace.

In Chapter Five I also examine the situation in the American colonies and use the American example to provide more evidence for the relationship between rhetoric-as-*movere*, the opportunity for political action, and radical popular political action (instability). Through an examination of American pamphlets and sermons (both about politics and about rhetorical pedagogy) prior to, during and after the American

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Revolutionary War, I also want to use the American example to demonstrate that all three proper functions of rhetoric-as-movere can work in the same sphere without destroying political stability, and the early American example provides a historical precedent for the usefulness of the localized rhetoric-as-movere that I advocate in my synthesized model.\textsuperscript{59} The local practices described by observers like Tocqueville were a form of institutionalizing the practices of rhetoric-as-movere and sustaining the window of political participation. The American example is not perfect, however, since there was still a lack of diversity in the electorate.\textsuperscript{60}

Chapter Six shows the fall of rhetoric-as-movere in the United States. The story of the decline of movere in the United States historically resembles the decline of movere in England: in the wake of the American Civil War the republicanism of the South—which I call individualist republicanism (as opposed to the institutionalist republicanism that was more popular in New England and with many American intellectuals)—was marginalized as the Southerners were blamed for the war. Rhetoric-as-movere was identified with this individualist republicanism and consequently found itself marginalized as well.

Given the agenda of the nineteenth and twentieth century Southern and Populist demagogues who continued to employ rhetoric-as-movere,\textsuperscript{61} it would seem that

\textsuperscript{59} It is important to—once again—note the crucial role of religion and the ars praedicandi tradition in delivering the message.

\textsuperscript{60} I wish to distinguish the problem of homogeneity from a lack of diversity in the electorate. The problem of homogeneity occurs when political equals are unable to integrate themselves into a deliberative body due to the barriers created by exclusionary language. Lack of diversity in the electorate means that certain groups are barred from citizen participation based on descriptive characteristics. In our contemporary situation, where there is some conflation in that we are all technically political equals before the law (but not so in reality, due to exclusions that come from language use, among other things), the problem of homogeneity becomes even more pervasive.

\textsuperscript{61} One could reasonably ask why there was not a similar hate-fueled demagoguery in the aftermath of the English Civil War. There appear to be a number of explanations: forced reparation and Reconstruction
marginalizing rhetoric-as-*movere* was the right thing to do. However, I want to use the counter-example of Karl Marx to demonstrate that it is the message, not the tool, that is dangerous. Marx's ability to blend rhetoric-as-*movere* and rhetoric-as-*docere* techniques in response to his varied audience made his program of political communication very powerful and effective. Most attractively, he was able to overcome the problem of homogeneity and organize many different types of people. That he used rhetoric-as-*movere* as one of his tools shows that *movere* is value-neutral and it was a tool that helped Marx achieve a number of admirable and beneficial ends. I offer the example of Marx in Chapter Six and the example of the Civil Rights Movement in the first part of the Conclusion as yet another demonstration of the relationship between rhetoric-as-*movere* and well-organized, effective popular political action even as the American demagogues show the dangerous side of that relationship.

However, the central claim that I wish to demonstrate through the examples of the labor and Civil Rights movements is the fact that rhetoric-as-*movere* is a value-neutral tool and that the fact that it has been marginalized among intellectual and policy elites (such as academics) as a part of individualist republicanism has led to a self-fulfilling

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were not forced on one particular area of England, thus fostering geographical resentment and separation. Second, England did not experience anything like the sustained economic impoverishment of the South in the long eighteenth century.

One could reasonably suggest that it was the attractiveness of Marx's message itself that allowed him to bring so many people together. However, there are as many, if not more, counter-examples of people coming together behind a deleterious message, and there are also many examples where people were not effectively gathered behind a good message because of the problem of homogeneity.

Scholars in English and History have completed studies of Hume and Smith's rhetoric, particularly in the context of the politeness movement, but this is not an angle that has received much attention in political theory. However, work on Marx from a rhetorical perspective is shockingly limited. For one of the few examples, see Richard W. Wilkie, “Karl Marx on Rhetoric” Philosophy and Rhetoric (1976). James Arnt Aune, Marxism and Rhetoric (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994) offers a more peripheral view.

For an excellent analysis of Martin Luther King’s rhetoric, see Jonathan Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 58-85.
prophecy in regards to rhetoric-as-movere.\textsuperscript{65} John G. Gunnell traces this tendency, at least in political theory, to a desire to “[escape] its rhetorical origins and [achieve] and independent scholarly authority based on its contribution to knowledge of the past.”\textsuperscript{66}

Since individual and policy elites tend to favor the norms of docere, they will communicate among themselves using those norms\textsuperscript{67} (and that political communication suffers from the problem of homogeneity, making it very difficult for non-elites to access) and when they do try to call upon the trappings of rhetoric-as-movere, they are often stilted and their authenticity is sometimes questioned (indeed, given elite antipathy to the type of political persuasion represented by movere, these speakers may be uncomfortable because they are convinced that rhetoric-as-movere is necessarily manipulative). Their populist opponents also use their use of rhetoric-as-docere against them, and play upon the trope of anti-intellectualism to foster the notion of separation between “intellectual elites” and “salt of the earth” people. In the Southern case, these rhetors can call upon the “myth of the lost cause” and peculiar notions of Southern defeatism that still persist over 100 years after the end of the Civil War to ensure separation.

\textsuperscript{65} Robert F. Durant’s “The Democratic Deficit in America” \textit{Political Science Quarterly} (Spring 1995), 25-47 offers an excellent example of this. He praises elite Congressional debate “for eschewing personal and unseemly attacks on the motives or integrity of opponents” (26) and suggests that as politics is democratized, it degenerates into “public spectacle” (26), which certainly seems to be a criticism of rhetoric-as-movere. He further criticizes local groups for their “distrust of ‘normal science’ as elitist” (32) without considering that such a reaction no doubt comes about from the fact that these groups feel violated by and divided from people in positions of power, whether it be political power or the power of knowledge (like scientists). The tension is replicated in a number of other places; examples include “Rationalism or Revelation?” an exchange between Robert Garstein and Darrell Dobbs in the June 1988 \textit{American Political Science Review} and Simone Chambers and Jeffery Kopstein, “Bad Civil Society” \textit{Political Theory}, (December 2001), 832-65.


\textsuperscript{67} Any study of the policy process emphasizes the importance of professionalism. See Kevin M. Esterling, “Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy Analysis in Congressional Committees” \textit{American Political Science Review} (February 2007), 93-110.
This perpetual separation is unhealthy for the United States. I firmly believe that one of the ways to heal this wound is for intellectual and policy elites to fight the co-optation of rhetoric-as-*movere*. We must begin a partial “de-marginalization” of the norms of individualistic republicanism. Even if the *only* norm we work to de-marginalize is the norm of *movere*—of truly active political participation beyond the aggregative democracy notion of voting—we will do a great service for healthy political participation in the United States. Before I am accused of an anti-intellectual argument let me reiterate that my goal in critiquing *docere*-based systems of political communication like deliberative democracy is not to supplant them with a wild society of demagogues and unthinking mass movements fueled by an irresponsible rhetoric-as-*movere*. I merely want to demonstrate that our political society has lost some of its ability to make space for inducing and sustaining a truly popular participatory democracy with the marginalization of rhetoric-as-*movere*.

Of course, this is a difficult long-term goal to achieve (as most worthwhile goals are), and it will necessitate both a new conception of political communication and a new rhetorical pedagogy. I offer preliminary thoughts on both topics in the Conclusion to this work. I have previously outlined the content of my new curriculum (see pgs. 9-13), so I will now turn my attention to the rhetorical model, which mixes both rhetoric-as-*movere* and rhetoric-as-*docere*, and is most heavily indebted to the successful examples of Karl Marx and the American Civil Rights movement leaders.

I include a place for rhetoric-as-*docere* systems like deliberative democracy because I do not deny the numerous benefits of deliberative democracy that have been
described by its proponents.\textsuperscript{68} Indeed, since the days of Socrates and Plato we have seen that a dialogue and discussion where each individual is able to contribute and is capable of being an engaged and active listener promotes learning. It makes perfect sense that a deliberative assembly where competition has been reduced\textsuperscript{69} and there is a leisured quality to decision-making would allow for increased understanding and opportunities for compromise.

However, rhetoricians want an audience that has something in common with them, and nowhere is this truer than when all the participants are rhetoricians in their own way. Given the current level of political engagement among citizens, and, perhaps most critically, the quality of that political engagement, scholars concerned with both political communication and political participation should assume that the deliberative democracy (rhetoric-as-\textit{docere}) conception of political communication will generally be more successful when employed by the educated and relatively homogeneous political elite.\textsuperscript{70}

In terms of a specific practical template for this elite deliberation, the corporatist model of deliberation described by Mansbridge is ideal because it is predicated on an assumption of exclusivity at the outset, with an eye toward expansion and inclusion.\textsuperscript{71} The problems of leadership and rules enforcement endemic to this type of political communication can be equally shared among these elites, because they are relative equals. The discussants can trade off leadership/enforcement roles and thus no one

\textsuperscript{68} See footnote on deliberative democratic authors, esp. Mansbridge and Benhabib.
\textsuperscript{69} See Weithman, \textit{op. cit.} for more on the relationship between deliberative democracy and competition.
\textsuperscript{70} Benedetto Fontana in “Rhetoric and the Roots of Democratic Politics” (from \textit{Talking Democracy}) writes, “Conversation presupposes a closed—even elite or aristocratic—space, for it is here that reason finds its domain; whereas rhetoric requires a wider, open and more popular forum” (56). We also see this at work in the circle of Lord Shaftesbury, among other examples.
\textsuperscript{71} This model is described in “A Deliberative Theory of Interest Group Representation.” In this article, Mansbridge consciously limits deliberation to a specific group with an eye toward expansion. I believe the model I am sketching can work toward that goal as well.
member of the group is forced to be the “benevolent overseer” and diminish his or her capacity to be heard and express strong opinions. In addition, no one else in the deliberative assembly will feel either vastly superior or inferior to the leader and so the leader will probably not be able silence any of the other participants.

Many theorists agree that deliberative democracy is most effective in the elite domain, but they do not offer thoughts on what type of political communication is most appropriate for other situations. This, I argue, is the place of rhetoric-as-movere. Rhetoric-as-movere can create an open political space below the deliberative fora of the experts and in that space there is room for citizens to be active, vigorous participants as well as room for citizens to take their first steps into the political arena. We can exploit rhetoric-as-movere's demonstrated ability to raise interest and excitement in people to help them begin developing the skills and creating the networks that will allow them to become effective democratic citizens.

While the synthesis of rhetoric-as-movere with elements of deliberative democracy looks promising, there are two major objections to such a blending. The first is the Classical Objection, as it is simply a restatement of a formulation that can be traced back to Plato. The Classical Objection to rhetorical synthesis simply states that the inclusion of rhetoric-as-movere opens up the political arena to dangerous and unnecessary manipulation and distortion of the truth. I elaborate on this objection in Chapter Two and in the conclusion I suggest that the best way to counter the Classical Objection is through a thorough program of rhetorical education.

I reply that anyone who is interested in the goal of participatory democracy, and also agrees that “bare minimum” citizenry or aggregative democracy will do next to
nothing to solve the problem of increasing and equalizing political participation, must accept that there is some role for rhetoric-as-*movere* in political society. I also reiterate the claim that persuasion is not inherently bad and call attention to the historical evidence that indicates that rhetoric-as-*movere* has always been an important component of inducing and sustaining political participation. Furthermore, given the rise of the professionalized political expert—and the high potential for the problem of homogeneity in the phenomenon of professionalization—inducing and sustaining political participation among citizens is more important than ever. However, I accept the claim that if a society does not present educational safeguards, rhetoric-as-*movere* can be manipulative and troublesome, as the example of the nineteenth and twentieth century American demagogues demonstrates.

In light of this, participatory democrats need to carefully create a civic education curriculum that widely disseminates knowledge of rhetoric-as-*movere*—as I have noted earlier. While turning to education may seem like a frustrating solution, given its long term nature, we must keep our goals in mind. If our goal is to foster *real* democracy and widespread political participation, compromise solutions will simply not be enough. The fact that we as a society have not been able to address some of the serious questions surrounding injustice and inequality in our society is *prima facie* evidence of our shortcomings as democratic citizens. However, given my desire to start effecting change as quickly as possible, the educational curriculum that I will detail in the concluding chapter is not revolutionary in nature, and could easily be implemented in a wide variety of settings.
These difficulties and costs of a democracy come to the forefront in the second objection, one that I term the Hobbesian Objection and describe fully in Chapter Four. Thomas Hobbes’s antipathy toward rhetoric-as-movere is well documented in the literature, and it is part of a larger discomfort with political systems (i.e., republicanism) that are action-oriented. This objection is rooted in a fear of persuasion because persuasion leads to dangerous instability. Hobbesian Objectors support the marginalization of romantic or individualist republican norms—which include rhetoric-as-movere—because they are concerned about the political consequences of popular instability.

It is difficult to find internal flaws with Hobbes’s line of thinking. His abstract fear of persuasion is firmly in line with the Platonic tradition, and the events of Hobbes’s life—and the events of history in general—clearly demonstrate that robust and diverse political participation necessarily yields political instability. However, I believe that if we are committed to a notion of popular government, then we are also committed to managing the instability that is part and parcel of a truly popular government that involves its citizens beyond the mere performance of acts like voting. Through the de-marginalization of rhetoric-as-movere, we will necessarily reintroduce some of the chaos of classical republicanism that comes along with popular government. Still, if we are truly interested in creating theoretical models that can foster the very important goal of an engaged public, this appears to be the trade-off we are forced to make.

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This dilemma illustrates the tension—neatly summarized in the *Federalist*—between certain goals of liberalism and participatory democracy. Popular and diverse participation historically makes it more difficult for the “security” goals of liberalism, such as the strict preservation of private property and creation of clear buffer zones for individual rights, more difficult. On the other hand, such participatory democracy is very compatible with the liberal goals of toleration and open discussion. However, achieving this union—and my work is designed to move our political society toward that goal-- would require a shift away from the limited “liberalism of fear” or “fear foundation” that has taken hold in contemporary society.

There appear to be two ways to synthesize rhetoric-as-*movere* and deliberative democratic norms. One features corporatist deliberation at the federal level of government and rhetoric-as-*movere* at state and local levels of government. The other model flips this one, and features rhetoric-as-*movere* at the national level, and deliberative rhetoric at state and local levels of government. Both models have benefits and drawbacks. The first model allows educated elites to deliberate in a style that lets them take advantage of their dialectic abilities and the expertise that they bring to the table. Operating on the assumption that those with more education are more open to debate and discussion, this model allows that debate and discussion to take place at the national level. At the local level, it allows the people who really need to be inspired to encounter the type of rhetoric that has been historically adept for mass inspiration.

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73 In writing this I am not endorsing liberalism as the ideal political theory, nor am I giving an unqualified endorsement of participatory democracy. This work is not to be taken as my ideal theoretical statement. However, given the contemporary situation, I believe that strengthening participatory democracy within a loose liberal framework is most likely to yield an appreciably better society for most citizens in the most reasonable amount of time.

74 Shklar, *op. cit.*
However, this model also has serious problems. The most pressing is the problem of homogeneity. By allowing our national leaders to huddle together and engage in deliberation without any restrictions, we risk this problem of homogeneity and a communication gap that will separate the elite decision makers from the rest of the people and present another barrier to participation. Also, it will be difficult to prevent the emergence of a participatory elite at other levels of government who control other individuals through their use of exclusionary rhetoric.

The second model assumes a lot of national leaders, for it only works if those leaders are informed and eloquent national leaders and it assumes that it is right that our elected leaders have political power (i.e., that we chose wisely). At some level, it is also dangerous to encourage emotional rhetoric from national leaders. The distance between those leaders and we citizens makes them hard to control, and thus it could prove difficult to prevent them from manipulating us and becoming demagogues. On the other hand, this model allows for deliberative, educational discussion at the local level that can provide citizens with the knowledge and tools they need to become more effective and more able participants in the system of politics. However, this model is plagued by the standard objections to deliberative democracy that I listed earlier in the chapter: we must deal with the “barriers to entry” of deliberation, and it will be more difficult for local participants to assume that cost than it would be for national leaders. If corporatist deliberation at the local level does nothing but create an elite that creates a gap of expertise between themselves and the rest of the citizens, its purpose is defeated.
I propose a compromise model that recognizes the fact that a participatory elite will (and should) emerge at both the national and local levels. The opportunity costs of political participation are simply too high to ever ensure that most people will ever take the first steps to becoming effective democratic citizens without some sort of law or ethos that *habituates* them. Please note that I am making a distinction between becoming an effective democratic citizen and being a mere political participant. There are plenty of citizens in this country who will be on-and-off political participants, particularly when their own self-interest is involved. There are also people who vote every four years. However, this sort of inconsistent and incomplete participation will not lead to the creation of effective democratic citizens.

Since the prospects for an Aristotelian-inspired system of laws designed to habituate citizens to virtue in the United States are poor, we have to use indirect means to inculcate these habits. Education is one of those means, and political communication can serve as another. The goal of a system of political communication should be to give political elites and effective democratic citizens twin sets of skills. Political experts and elites should be able to communicate among themselves to increase their knowledge and hammer out the fine technical details of policy, but they should also have respect for *movere* and its ability to create a connection between them and their fellow citizens and be able to effectively use rhetoric-as-*movere* to motivate and connect themselves to others. Effective democratic citizens, on the other hand, need to have a thorough grounding in rhetorical techniques and rhetorical education so that they will be able to properly evaluate the claims made in the marketplace of ideas. However, there also needs to be space for citizens and neighbors to simply talk to each other on a local level.

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75 Here is one place where we can see the influence of J.S. Mill.
and local leaders need space where they can use rhetoric-as-movere to inspire action. All these points of movere are potentially dangerous, given its relationship to instability, but movere is constantly checked by deliberation and dialogue throughout all stages of the model.

The relationship between political instability and political participation illustrates an important point and speaks to another benefit of my model. It seems that popular government always asks us to make a trade-off between political stability and widespread political participation. With all the attention given to Hobbes and his objections and the subsequent marginalization of rhetoric-as-movere, one would think that intellectual elites would be willing to allow the goal of widespread political participation to slide a bit, but political theorists and political scientists fret over political participation all the time. Despite the influence of the Hobbesian Objection, authors who discuss methods for increasing political participation in the United States rarely consider the potential negatives of this increased participation, and they certainly do not seriously consider the potential for serious instability, even though history seems to signal that as the base of citizens becomes wider, the potential for instability becomes greater.

Indeed, it is on this issue of instability that the deliberative democratic conception of political communication may be able to make its greatest contribution to the functioning of an effective popular democracy. It is grounded on rhetoric-as-docere norms that have historically proven themselves more conducive to stability than the norms of rhetoric-as-movere. The problem with most previous models of political communication is that they have treated the question of persuasion as an either/or

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Hall notes this: “Another consequence of passion, in the classical liberal view, is political instability” (24). Her discussion continues to page 25.
question: adopt either a \textit{movere} approach or a \textit{docere} approach. This either/or tendency is only reflective of the pendulum-swinging from extreme popular discontent and unrest to what is perceived as extreme public apathy. I call this the Anger-Apathy cycle and it is a great obstacle to effective participatory democracy.

James Morone describes the cycle in \textit{The Democratic Wish}: “At critical moments throughout American history...broad political movements take up the populist call; American attack the status quo and demand changes that will empower the people.”\textsuperscript{77} However, this utilization of “a rhetorical and ideological pattern through which Americans have converted vague social tensions into concrete political change” \textsuperscript{78} generally leads to the return of “a liberal political equilibrium (around a new political status quo)” and “new bureaucracies, new political privileges, and newly legitimated groups.”\textsuperscript{79} The end result is less than satisfactory for participatory democracy: “The institutional forms that were intended to mobilize a communitarian people ultimately remake the liberal state.”\textsuperscript{80} The return to the status quo comes about as a necessity; the energy of reformist and radical movements is simply not sustainable over a long period of time. Citizens involved in such movements extend themselves to their limit, and then turn authority back over to the institutionalized powers.

The model that I propose seeks the golden mean between anger and apathy. The model and my curriculum reform both work to give citizens skills, both through classroom and civic education, that will allow them to be \textit{consistent} and \textit{effective} democratic participants. Indeed, \textit{consistent} and \textit{effective} participation would reduce the

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Ibid.}, 11
\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Ibid.}, 13
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid.} Note also that Morone's work gives much credence to the idea of the historical affinity.
probability of threatening political instability and would help break a frustrating
democratic cycle that sees (legitimately) angry people agitate for change through
activities that create instability, achieve their goals, and then turn their attention to the
numerous other (legitimate) things that compete for their time. This turning away leads
to a dip in political engagement during which unmonitored elites tend to engage in
behavior that creates that state of anger once more. This cycle demonstrates that neither
the communitarian view of the world where individuals are constantly striving together
for a common goal nor the classical liberal view where each man is an island unto
himself work out all that well in practice. When no man is an island, each man is struck
with a need for some privacy and his own space; he fears losing his independent being.
However, when every man is an island, even though he may be able to see other islands,
the sea appears very vast indeed.
Lessons from Medieval History

Rhetoric’s lengthy history makes it difficult to give the tale of rhetoric-as-movere proper start and end points. While most of the literature on the development of rhetoric focuses on the ancient, Renaissance and early modern periods, it also focuses on the history of rhetoric-as-docere. Because numerous authors have amply covered that history, mine shall have a different slant. This chapter is designed to demonstrate how the realities of politics in the medieval period (roughly construed from the fall of the Roman Empire to the mid-14th century) necessitated certain mutations in the purpose and usage of scholastic rhetoric. These mutations amply demonstrate the symbiotic relationship between the window of political participation and rhetoric-as-movere.

Although the classical influence of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian did not abate during the medieval (or Renaissance) periods, the political situation in most of Europe stifled the impulse of rhetoric-as-movere. While the work of early and middle medieval scholars is nearly identical in key ways to that of the classical authors—and this includes attention to persuasion—by necessity, rhetoric’s purposes had to mutate in light of the closed window of political participation. During the medieval period, education and literacy were severely limited, and it was difficult to transmit knowledge in the immediate wreckage of the Roman Empire. Concentrated in the hands of the schoolmen, rhetoric gained an association with education and knowledge that would figure prominently in its development in the early modern period. This scholastic association of rhetoric with education privileged a concept of rhetoric-as-docere instead of rhetoric-as-movere.

81 It is really only in the Renaissance period that the serious and sustained attack against persuasion becomes a part of rhetorical and political theory, but the turn begins during the medieval period.
The church provided an interesting exception, as here the educated preachers interacted with the common people. To respond to this need, treatises on the *ars praedicandi* [art of preaching] were perhaps more popular than treatises on deliberative [political/legal] rhetoric. These treatises on preaching urged speakers to use passion and to appeal to emotions in much the same way as the classical texts did. These sermons provide the strongest examples of rhetoric-as-movere in either period. This established an important pattern in the history of rhetoric-as-movere in the West: it flourished most completely in the religious setting. This idea of the religious setting taking the place of republican one is rather alien, but both settings had one very important thing in common: they embraced passion in speech. Although the types of passion were very different—passion for God versus passion for fatherland—classical rhetoric thrived on that passion, and was thus able to thrive in the churches while withering elsewhere.

This religious connection leads us to examine the English Peasants’ Revolts and thus truly begin our English vernacular story. Documents from the time of the revolts show how rhetoric-as-movere was used to motivate popular action once the window of political participation had been re-opened. The fact that the event is called the Peasants’ Revolt and not the Peasants’ Discussion clearly demonstrates the affinity between popular participation and political instability. The history of the revolts further shows that without widespread knowledge and institutionalized education in rhetoric, especially rhetoric-as-movere, there was no way to mediate the popular impulse and keep the window of participation from being slammed shut.

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82 Although it is an alien notion, it is the mirror opposite of Marx calling for a republican form of transitory government because a republic could satisfy the needs that were once filled by religion.
Classical Rhetoric in the Wreckage of Rome

Before I am able to give a treatment of medieval rhetoric as a locus for beginning of the division between rhetoric-as-movere and rhetoric-as-docere, I must provide a summary of classical rhetorical principles as they stood at the beginning of the period. The system of classical rhetoric remained remarkably constant during the “ancient” period, and orators of the Empire relied on Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.

In Rome, rhetoric was necessarily linked to action and was designed to cause action. Given the geography and history of the city, action and expansion were necessary for the city’s survival. Thus, Roman statesmen rejected any sort of Socratic/Platonic deliberative or conversational norms for rhetoric because of this active (later expansionist) perspective. This, of course, was an ethos that was heavily criticized by Christian authors—particularly Augustine—and other intellectuals of the late Imperial period. However, we shall come to that objection later.

The Roman rhetorical ethos had a very long life—and it is not yet dead, though it does not have the potency it once did. In fact, this book is the story of that ethos, its

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85 The issue and origins of Roman and Athenian virtue are very complicated. One could easily argue that Athens developed its virtue due to its well-protected geographical position and the fact that the city itself was able to enjoy relative freedom from outside threats. Rome, on the other hand, was forced to develop its virtue because it was a relatively unprotected city that had to deal constantly with external threats. As David Hackett Fischer points out in his study of American migrations, Albion’s Seed (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991), people in border nations or continually contested territory (his particular example is the borderlands of England and Scotland that were a matter of “debate” between English and Scottish kings for nearly 800 years) will develop a conception of virtue that is war-based and very similar to the Roman virtue that is held up as an exemplar. Historically, this type of virtue tends to decay as external threats decrease. The virtue usually becomes decadent, and decays until the bottom comes out completely. No one, except perhaps Niccolo Machiavelli, has ever tried to create a transitional virtue that prevents the cycle of decay.
decline and its fall, and what we gained (and lost) as it faded. It was Cicero who provided rhetoric with its tripartite purpose that this book turns on—to teach \(\textit{docere}\), to delight \(\textit{delectare}\), and to move \(\textit{movere}\)—and in his dialogues on rhetoric he provided both method and ethics for those who wanted to learn the art of speech-giving.

To learn the system of classical rhetoric that was at the base of Roman political life required dedication and sophistication. Nowhere is this more clearly stated in Cicero’s dialogue \textit{De Oratore}. In addition to being influential during the Imperial period, \textit{De Oratore} was the most frequently cited work by medieval and Renaissance authorities on the topics of \textit{ethos} and ethics. \textit{De Oratore} paints the picture of a man who possesses an incredible breadth of learning. Oratory, as Cicero writes in the first book’s prologue, is not supposed to be easy:

To begin with, one must acquire knowledge of a very great number of things, for without this a ready flow of words is empty and ridiculous; the language itself has to be shaped, not only by the choice of words but by their arrangement as well; also required is a thorough acquaintance with all the emotions with which nature has endowed the human race, because in soothing or in exciting the feelings of the audience, the full force of oratory and all its available means must be brought into play. In addition, it is essential to possess a certain esprit and humor, the culture that befits a gentleman, and an ability to be concise in rebuttal as well as attack, combined with refinement, grace, and urbanity. Moreover, one must know the whole past with its storehouse of examples and precedents, nor should one fail to master statutes and the civil law.\(^{87}\)

Cicero has much more to say on the subject; this passage continues for almost an entire paragraph. The rest of the dialogue is geared toward discovering the way to produce a

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\(^{86}\) Some words about rhetoric-as-\textit{delectare} are necessary here. “Delighting” seems to be a rather general category and one that could be easily subsumed under the heading of rhetoric-as-\textit{movere}. In classical rhetoric, the distinction is sharp. The \textit{delectare} function of rhetoric—speeches of praise-giving—were designed for events like funerals and celebratory games. Given the private character of (most of) these functions in our society, I have chosen to leave a discussion of rhetoric-as-\textit{delectare} to the side. In contemporary instances where speeches at funerals and celebrations are made public, I believe that they are more properly categorized as examples of rhetoric-as-\textit{movere}.

man such as the one described above. The orator must be familiar with the law, precedents and customs for arguing in the courts, and both must have sophisticated knowledge of human emotions. Cicero seeks to establish a connection between speaker and audience.\(^{88}\) This involved varied forms of persuasion, as the orator and his audience often came from different stations in life, particularly if the orator served as tribune of the plebs.

This Roman (and republican) \textit{ethos} of rhetoric easily relates to many of my earlier assumptions and claims about participatory democracy. Historically, the example of the Roman Republic, at least until the time of Sulla, demonstrates the popular benefits of rhetorical institutions and education. Perhaps no other society in history embraced rhetorical education as the Romans did and they united their embrace of rhetoric with an emphasis on basic civic education.\(^{89}\) This education, which was widespread, put the statesmen of the republic on relatively equal footing, and gave them the ability to judge the claims of others. Persuasion was not perfect, but it was not evil, and there are plenty of speeches where rhetoric-\textit{as-movere} turned the tide toward the just cause.\(^{90}\) Likewise, all of their institutions, from the Senate to the Tribunes, were designed with rhetoric-\textit{as-movere} in mind. So long as these institutions remained relatively true, they served to alleviate the political instability—the result of relatively impressive popular involvement—that threatened the city from time to time, but also kept the \textit{optimates} on their toes.

\(^{88}\) See \textit{De Oratore}, Book II, 34-6; Book II, 185-196 (the orator's \textit{pathos}); the entire section on Delivery from Book III (213-227); Book III, sections 210-12 (the discussion of appropriateness)

\(^{89}\) H.I. Marrou points out the fundamental importance of civic education in “old Rome” in his \textit{A History of Education in Antiquity} (Madison: Univ of. Wisconsin, 1956), 233-8.

\(^{90}\) Machiavelli cites examples in \textit{Discourses} I.54
Roman rhetoric-as-*movere* was able to both spur and curb passion because Roman orators understood that there were multiple functions of rhetoric-as-*movere*. Three major functions emerged; two of them were just and proper. These just and proper functions included the legitimate urging function and the legitimate restraining function. As their names imply, these functions of rhetoric-as-*movere* allowed the orator to either inspire his audience toward proper ends (while taking care not to inflame the audience overmuch) or restrain his audience from taking a foolish action. Later on in this work, I will argue that a third proper function emerged alongside the development of a theory of the right to revolt, and I term this third function just revolution rhetoric. Just revolution rhetoric is rhetoric that urges revolution against a government that has violated its contract with its citizens. We will return to this notion in chapter four.

Finally, there was the illegitimate function of rhetoric-as-*movere*, improper demagogic rhetoric, or rhetoric that improperly and unjustifiably inflamed the passion of the audience in order to convince them to take a course of action without proper consideration. When we examine the nature of what I call the Classical Objection, we will see that it is always directed toward those who use the improper demagogic function of rhetoric-as-*movere*, not those who merely use rhetoric-as-*movere* itself (Plato accounts for this in the *Phaedrus* and Thucydides’s praise of Nicias, who is using the legitimate restraining function of rhetoric-as-*movere* serve as just two examples).

The use of the improper demagogic function of rhetoric increased as Rome’s republican institutions began their decline with the feud between Marius and Sulla. This revealed the dangerous side of the relationship between rhetoric-as-*movere* and popular instability. It is both tragic, and yet not surprising, that the noblest example of Western
eloquence, Marcus Tullius Cicero, delivered his greatest speeches in the Roman republic’s darkest hours. The emotion, anger and fear that still bleeds through the words of the Catiline orations—to say nothing of Cicero’s Philippic orations against Marcus Antonius—and so moves contemporary readers could only be born in a time of dire peril.

The Roman impulse toward activity constantly battled the Athenian impulse toward philosophy. The “Athenian” objection concerned both republicans like Cicero and later figures like Augustine. The anti-democratic intellectuals of Athens—were ambivalent about the relationship between rhetoric and action.\(^9^1\) In myriad Platonic dialogues such as the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Apology*, we see the devastating consequences of being too quickly swayed by rhetoric.\(^9^2\) “This is what will bring about my destruction,” says Socrates, “not Meletus or Anytus, but the slander and jealousy of a very large section of the people. They have been fatal to a great many other innocent men, and I suppose will continue to be so.”\(^9^3\)

Although Socrates asks time and time again for the Athenian assembly to calmly consider the issues set before them during his trial, they act quickly, and are not reflective.\(^9^4\) Socrates claims that the Athenian jury is annoyed by “a lack of

\(^{9^1}\) However, as Debra Hawhee notes, the Presocratics understood rhetoric and action to be explicitly related. She traces the way in which early rhetoricians borrowed heavily from the vocabulary of athletics, and conceptualizes early Greek rhetoric as an example of *agonistic* interaction. Plato also uses this language to describe rhetoric, but he is being derogatory, whereas authors like Pindar and Protagoras were being complimentary. See “Agonism and Arete” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* (2002), 185-207.

\(^{9^2}\) This was a common complaint of even minor Athenian aristocrats like the Old Oligarch. The Athenian aristocrats and intellectuals could not determine who to blame for their problems—the foolish crowds, or the wretched sophists who irresponsibly preyed upon them. Many seem to think that approbation was reserved for the former. Harvey Yunis writes: “The opponents of democracy speak in these passages with a blatant disdain for the common people who form the vast majority of the citizen population and, therefore, of the decision-making audience in the Assembly and courts.” *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1996), 39.

\(^{9^3}\) Plato. *Apology of Socrates*, 28a-b.

\(^{9^4}\) In *Knights*, Aristophanes also makes the same criticism of the demos through the character of Megabyzus. Yunis writes, “In sentences (2) and (3) the herald suggests two conditions necessary for “assessing speeches correctly”: understanding and attention to communal affairs. Because of limited time,
effrontery…and the fact that I have refused to address you in the way which would give you the most pleasure.”⁹⁵ In the Gorgias, Socrates again makes the same call for internal reflection, and is contested by Callicles, who wants to use rhetoric to produce action. Callicles is the “bad guy” of the dialogue, and we are clearly meant to dislike him (the same can be said about Thrasyvachus in the Republic—he is also a man of action, and he is the chief enemy of Book I). To be overeager for action is seen as careless and reckless. Harvey Yunis properly sums up the issue that grated at the Athenians, and currently bothers modern day theorists of democratic government: “One of the basic problems in devising useful political discourse is discovering the rhetorical means for preventing an Assembly of deliberating citizens from degenerating into a mob.”⁹⁶ In other words, the challenge is to prevent the legitimate urging function of rhetoric-as-movere from becoming the improper demagogic function of rhetoric-as-movere.

Lest we think that this is merely a Platonic caution, the same lesson can also be drawn through an analysis of the speeches in The History of the Peloponnesian War.

⁹⁵ Apology, 38d.
⁹⁶ Yunis, 45. One could easily argue that this problem was first solved by the existence of a Senatorial and patrician class, then by the concept of representation, and by political experts [bureaucrats] in contemporary societies. Theoretically, both systems were designed to corral political debate to a class of individuals that was educated enough to avoid the snares of the sophists. However, this presents problems for theorists of democracy and those who favor direct participation at local levels of United States government. Clearly, the federated system of the United States means that different styles of rhetoric will be needed for different levels; there will have to be a mixture of classical and more plain, reflective rhetoric. While many authors like Mansbridge suggest a deliberative, corporatist model at the top levels of government and consequently a more classical, motivating model at lower levels, this seems to only exacerbate the ancient problems of the mob and the sophists. However, to look at it the other way, where the deliberative, corporatist model is practiced at lower levels, and more classical techniques are used by our national leaders ignores the fact that corporatist deliberation, and deliberation more generally, demands levels of education that are much more likely to be found among national leaders than among those who would participate in direct government at the local levels. It seems that we are left with two choices: solve the mob problem or solve the education problem.
particularly the speeches of the Sicilian debate. Thucydides clearly felt that the events of this debate were disastrous and that the incorrect decision that was made here killed off what was left of Periclean Athens. In his speeches, Nicias urges caution and consideration:

…and to me it seemeth that we ought rather once again to consult whether it be not better not to send it at all than, upon a short deliberation in so weighty an affair and upon the credit of strangers to draw upon ourselves an impertinent war.

Action is rash, and unseemly—“neither your haste is seasonable nor your desires easy to be achieved,” says Nicias to the Assembly. His calls for continued deliberation and reflection would make Plato quite proud. “Besides,” he says, “the matter itself is full of great difficulties, such as it is not for a young man to consult of, much less hastily to take in hand.”

Nicias had a specific young man in mind when he delivered those remarks, but it was that young man who carried the day in the Assembly. The young, beautiful and ever-active Alcibiades bested Nicias. In his introduction to Alcibiades’ remarks, Thucydides creates a link between his desire for action, and his desire for glory:

But the expedition was most of all pressed by Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, both out of desire he had to cross Nicias, with whom he was likewise at odds in other points of state, and also for that he had glanced at him invidiously in his oration, but principally for that he affected to have charge, hoping that himself

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97 Yunis comes to a similar conclusion in his discussion of the Sicilian expedition on pgs. 103-9 of *Taming Democracy*: “Despite Nicias’ warning against succumbing to the pressure of the crowd (6.12.2-13.1), the prevailing passion overwhelmed isolated opposition. The transition to a mob is complete. Face to face with the insistent crowd, Nicias finally relents (6.25); the *demos* vote the commanders full power to equip the expedition as they see fit (6.26.1). Alcibiades imposed his will without even allowing Nicias’ original request for reconsideration to come to a vote.”


should be the man to subdue both Sicily and Carthage to the state of Athens, and
withal, if it succeeded, to increase his own private wealth and glory. Alcibiades, calling upon his record of military and athletic action, assured the
Athenians that he could secure victory in Sicily. His speech is filled with praise for
action, and disdain for deliberation. “Let not the speech of Nicias,” he says, “tending
only to laziness and to the stirring of debate between the young men and the old, avert
you from it.” Properly seduced, the Athenians grant Alcibiades his charge, to the utter
ruin of their city’s fortunes.

Of course, those Greeks who were not in the Platonic tradition were not hostile to
rhetoric; how could this accusation be laid at the feet of the culture that produced
Demosthenes and Aristotle? Aristotle’s contribution to rhetorical theory was immense;
he laid the groundwork for Cicero and Quintilian. In *On Rhetoric*, Aristotle categorized
styles of rhetoric based on the spoken word. The categories he established were
deliberative, judicial and demonstrative [epideictic]. Each category of rhetoric asked the
audience to play a different role: “Now it is necessary for the hearer to be either a
spectator or a judge…A member of a democratic assembly is an example of one judging
about future happenings, a juryman an example of one judging the past. A spectator is

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102 See his comments about his Olympic performance (6.16) for an example.
103 Alcibiades says, “And in such things as these, as there is honour to be supposed according to the law, so
there is also a power conceived upon the sight of the thing done” (6.16), and declares that “[Worthy and
laudable acts] being the thing I aim at and for which I am renowned, consider now whether I administer the
public the worse for it or not” (6.17). Most tellingly, he says, “Nor are we [Athenians] to weigh quietness
in the same balance that others do” (6.18). This demonstrates the connection between war that led to a
virtue that valued action. We will see a similar pattern in Rome.
104 Thucydides, 6.18. Later in this section, Alcibiades predicts that liberty will be lost if the Athenians
grow idle. This is an extremely Roman sentiment, but it receives approbation in Thucydides, and the
attitude was not in favor with the Athenian intellectuals. They would have preferred Nicias.
105 Marrou, Part I, especially 46-60 (on the sophists).
concerned with the ability [of the speaker].”\textsuperscript{106} Deliberative rhetoric and judicial rhetoric were composed for judging audiences in either the assembly or the courts, while demonstrative rhetoric was composed for spectators.

For our purposes, his most important contribution was the definition of the proofs of rhetoric. Aristotle created two large headings: non-artistic and artistic means of persuasion. Non-artistic means of persuasion included “witnesses, testimony of slaves taken under torture, contracts and the like.”\textsuperscript{107} The other type of persuasion, artistic, was more complicated, for it included “whatever can be prepared by method and by ‘us’; thus one must \textit{use} the former [non-artistic] and \textit{invent} the latter [artistic].”\textsuperscript{108} The artistic category was further divided into three, and these three terms are familiar to people with only a passing knowledge of rhetoric: “Of the \textit{pisteis} provided through speech there are three species: for some are in the character [\textit{ethos}] of the speaker, and some in disposing the listener in some way [\textit{pathos}], and some in the argument [\textit{logos}] itself, by showing or seeming to show something.”\textsuperscript{109} The argument from authority, the appeal to emotion, and the logical argument, all united under one banner in \textit{On Rhetoric}, would war with each other for hundreds of years.

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\item[\textsuperscript{107}] \textit{Ibid.}, 1355a.
\item[\textsuperscript{108}] \textit{Ibid.}, 1355a.
\item[\textsuperscript{109}] \textit{Ibid.}, 1356a. Aristotle goes into the three types of persuasion at length. Of \textit{ethos} he writes, “[There is persuasion through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt” (1356a). From \textit{ethos} we get arguments from authority. When Aristotle describes \textit{pathos}, he writes, “[There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion [\textit{pathos}] by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile” (1356a). Although Aristotle chastises his contemporaries for too much focus on emotion, he does not discount the validity of this method of persuasion. Finally, in describing \textit{logos}, Aristotle writes, “Persuasion occurs through the arguments [\textit{logoi}] when we show the truth or apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case” (1356a). Much of \textit{On Rhetoric}, and indeed, much of Aristotle’s entire corpus is dedicated to the logical methods of persuasion.
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Medieval Rhetorical Philosophy: The Closed Window and Rhetoric-as-Docere

The war among these proofs simmered in the background of the scholastic landscape. While medieval rhetorical precepts from the early and middle part of the period bore strong resemblance to the classical, and I will begin this section by talking about some classical texts that were potentially more influential in the medieval period than in their own time. The most critical thing we will in the use of these classical texts and principles is the transformation of their use, necessitated by historical circumstances, from *movere* to *docere*. H.I. Marrou suggests that this process began in the Hellenistic period, with the valuation of “the public lecture”\(^{110}\) as a key rhetorical expression. We will also see how this period of ossification started to reveal a preference for the latter.

Two of the most important texts during the medieval and Renaissance periods were the treatises *De Inventione*, written by a youthful Cicero, and *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which was erroneously attributed to Cicero for centuries. The *Rhetorica* may have been the most readily-available rhetorical manual of the period. It uses the Aristotelian divisions of rhetoric, but it also set the parts of rhetoric in concrete. Those parts were invention [the creation of an argument], arrangement [the organization of the argument], style [the ornamentation and language used to present the argument], memory and delivery. The *Rhetorica* contains long sections on the various methods of legal proof permitted in court (this is the topic of Book I.18-25 and all of Book II) and the literary figures. The majority of Book IV is dedicated to describing the various literary figures.\(^{111}\) In describing these figures the *Rhetorica* provided examples and *topoi* for

\(^{110}\) Marrou, 195.

\(^{111}\) For example: “Metonymy is the figure which draws from an object closely akin or associated an expression suggesting the object meant, but not called by its own name. This is accomplished by substituting the name of the greater thing for that of the lesser, as if one speaking of the Tarpeian Rock
those faced with the task of preparing their own speeches. This may have been one of the reasons for its popularity. *Topoi* and literary figures were essential parts of persuasion.

The work of the Silver Age rhetorician Quintilian formed the basis of a young boy’s education. Quintilian was the one who tried to devise a systematic method of education that could achieve the Ciceronian standard.¹¹² His lengthy Institutes begins with the following advice: “As soon as his son is born, the father should form the highest expectations of him.”¹¹³ Quintilian’s rhetorical system is more rule-bound than the Ciceronian system, but even Quintilian admits, “No one however should expect from me the sort of rules that most writers of textbooks have handed down, or ask me to lay down for students a set of laws, as it were, bound by immutable necessity.”¹¹⁴

However, much like the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the Institutes contains lengthy descriptions of figures. Much like Cicero, Quintilian believes that rhetoric should not *only* be persuasive; the orator must be a good man. However, in the end, he concludes that the goal of rhetoric is to “speak well.”¹¹⁵ This is not the same thing as persuasion, and Quintilian certainly did not mean persuasion when he wrote it, but the phrase ‘speak well’ provides a somewhat unsatisfying summation of rhetoric’s ultimate end.

¹¹² As James J. Murphy points out on p. 89 of *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from St. Augustine to the Renaissance* (Tempe, AZ: The Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2001), we must remember that the *Institutio oratoria* was still missing in the medieval period and did not gain its fame until the Renaissance.

¹¹³ Quintilian. *Institutio Oratoria* [The Orator’s Education], trans. by Donald A. Russell, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard, 2001), 1.1

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.13

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.15
The classical rhetorical system was predicated on the idea that rhetoric was part of the *trivium* (with grammar and dialectic) and thus one of the worthiest and most essential fields of study. The system was well-established, with three categories of speeches, five parts to the speech, and numerous rules dictating the use of various proofs and figures. Because proofs could range from *logos* to *pathos* (Quintilian devotes the entirety of Book Five of the *Institutes* to the discussion of proofs), the orator had to have an excellent and wide-ranging education that allowed him to understand the logic required for the former and the human emotions required to effectively convey the latter.

The work of St. Augustine served as one of the major bridges between these classical texts and the grammar and rhetoric manuals that dominated the medieval period. While Augustine’s critique of rhetoric in his *Confessions* (and the extended critique of the Roman society that embraced rhetoric) is severe, Book IV of *De Doctrina Christiana*, “The Christian Orator,” embraces even the persuasive element of rhetoric. This particular section of *De Doctrina* was ‘paraphrased’ by many other authors (later in this chapter we see one of these extended paraphrases), but here we find Augustine arguing that “If, however, the hearers require to be roused rather than instructed, in order that they may be diligent to do what they already know, and to bring their feelings into harmony with the truths they admit, greater vigor of speech is needed. Here entreaties and reproaches, exhortations and upbraidings, and all the other means of rousing the emotions, are necessary.”

This is an explicit embrace of rhetoric-as-*movere*, but what

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116 The Seven Liberal Arts were arranged as follows: the *trivium*, or *artes sermocinales*, were grammar, rhetoric and dialectic. The *quadrivium*, or *artes physicae*, were arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music. The first three were considered foundational and the *quadrivium* were considered more intermediate disciplines.

117 Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana*, R.P.H. Green, trans. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999), Book IV, Ch. 4, Sec. 6.
is important to note is the shift of ends: persuasion is only appropriate when it serves the needs of the Christian community. Persuasion must be linked with spiritual salvation, not the issues of the city of man. Augustine’s work establishes a link between rhetoric and religion that proves to be the nursing ground for rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} during the scholastic period.

While the examples I am about to present from a variety of early and middle scholastic authors have much in common with the foundational ideas listed above, they were developed in an entirely different political context. Aristotle and Cicero prepared their rhetorical treatises in a more or less republican environment, where there were opportunities for at least \textit{some} citizens to deliberate in a legislative body. Quintilian's treatise was written during a time when this notion of the active deliberative body was a useful “functional fiction,”\textsuperscript{118} so there are many similarities between his treatise and the earlier works, despite the fact that were fewer opportunities for popular political action during the Principate. On the other hand, these scholastic authors lived at a time where opportunities for political action were drastically limited, and the \textit{novus homo} as statesman was uncommon. It was preposterous to even try and sustain the “fiction” of popular government. Despite this, they were left with no less an authority than Aristotle himself proclaiming the importance of rhetoric to the learned mind. A place had to be made for what had once been, at least in part, the study of political persuasion. Instead of focusing on that aspect of rhetoric, interest turned to its other functions, particularly rhetoric-as-\textit{docere}, and the system of classical rhetoric began to ossify.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{118} I thank Prof. Sarolta Takacs of the Rutgers University Department of Classics for providing this phrase to describe Quintilian's work.
\textsuperscript{119} And yet, as Prof. Takacs notes, kept the ideal of republicanism intact.
The idea that rhetoric ossified in the medieval period is not a new one. Again, Marrou sees it as early as the Hellenistic period.\textsuperscript{120} E.R. Curtius, author of *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, perhaps the definitive survey of rhetorical developments in this period, writes, “Thenceforth its [rhetoric’s] destiny is no longer a living growth. It exhibits symptoms of degeneration, atrophy, distortion.”\textsuperscript{121} In their Preface to *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric*, Miller, Prosser and Benson claim that “During the millennium in question, oratory came to have ever less influence on political and social behavior; only in such restricted fields as missionary preaching in pagan lands did oratory retain even a vestige of its traditional grandeur.”\textsuperscript{122} They also note the focus on education and that the leading figures were “more interested in formulating a program for the training and education of young clerics than in teaching them how to preach.”\textsuperscript{123} Finally, they address the lack of avenues for political action during this period: “Thirdly, there recurs throughout the Middle Ages an ever increasing tendency to view rhetoric as a tool of administrative procedure rather than as a means of persuasion, somewhat in the manner of administrative journalism in certain modern authoritarian states.”\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{120} “The most characteristic thing about all this teaching of rhetoric was that it gradually forgot all about its original aim, which was to prepare the would-be orator for real life by teaching him how to compose speeches that he would actually need for serious occasions...It is worth noticing that [school speech], which deliberately turned its back on life, first appeared...just when the loss of political liberty deprived genuine eloquence of any real significance” (Marrou 202).
\textsuperscript{122} Miller, Joseph H.; Prosser, Michael H.; and Benson, Thomas W. *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1973), xii. In the rest of the chapter this source will be abbreviated as MPB.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., xii.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., xiv. The authors also note that “thus the teachers who shaped the minds of those young people fortunate enough to receive an education were themselves imbued with the sense of values and the order of priorities inherent in a cenobitic-contemplative life...they gave much greater emphasis to personal and individual spiritual needs than to social responsibility” (xiv). The traditional avenues to political action were meaningless; it was much more important to secure personal salvation in what might be crudely referred to as the private realm.
Despite the overwhelming neglect of rhetoric-as-movere and the consensus that the literature has reached on this point, we are still forced to confront the fact that some of the largest minds of the period embraced persuasion qua persuasion, and did not believe that it was an evil in and of itself. The lack of rhetoric-as-movere in this period appears to be more for want of chances, not as a hostile response to the goals of movere. Boethius, in his “Overview of the Structure of Rhetoric,” acknowledge that “it is the duty of the faculty of rhetoric to teach and to move [author’s note: the third function, delighting, is neglected here]”\textsuperscript{125} and that the rhetorician “must be able to say …that he has spoken well…that is, that he has spoken in a way calculated to persuade.”\textsuperscript{126} Isidore of Seville’s “Etymologies” also defines rhetoric as a science [relying on the term’s older meaning—body of knowledge] concerned with “civil questions” and “whose purpose is to persuade men to do what is just and good.”\textsuperscript{127}

It must be noted that both authors were drawing heavily on the classical sources, particularly Cicero, in reaching their conclusions about rhetoric and persuasion. The same, simple historical point holds: at the time the Ciceronian treatises were written, there were some avenues for popular political expression. At the time these Ciceronian treatises were being adapted by Boethius and Isidore, those avenues for political expression and participation, by and large, had been closed off.

Even though rhetoric-as-movere was in a period of stasis, the rhetoricians of the scholastic period did not believe that rhetoric’s powers were inherently bad. In “The Book of Rhetoric,” an influential Middle Ages treatise by Martianus Cappella, we see Rhetoric personified: “For she had the power, so to speak, of a queen over all things, able

\textsuperscript{125} Ancinus Manlius Severinus Boethius, “An Overview of the Structure of Rhetoric” in MPB, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., p. 73.
to lead men where she would and to hold them back when she would, to bring them to tears or to rouse them to frenzy, and to bring about a change in attitudes and convictions in governments as well as in armies at war, wheresoever she was able to stand before an assemblage of people.”¹²⁸ The medieval authors recognized what early modern writers (led by Hobbes), and even ancient Greek thinkers like Plato and Thucydides did not always properly acknowledge: rhetoric-as-movere did not have to move people to reckless action—or to any action! Rhetoric-as-movere could be used to still a rambunctious crowd or zealous soldiers, providing time for deliberation and prudent decision-making. In other words, rhetoric-as-movere had a legitimate restraining function.

Many of the most notable medieval treatises focus only on the way in which material is to be arranged, not on the type of material that orators should consider. Widely read authors such as Fortunatianus, Emporius the Orator and Rufinus of Antioch dedicated the larger part of their works¹²⁹ to discussions of arrangement and composition of material. There is little discussion of persuasion, and the political aspect of rhetoric is almost completely ignored. However, as previously stated, this makes no small degree of sense, as there were few outlets for popular political action in Europe during this time.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ C. Chirius Fortunatianus. Artis Rhetoricae Libri Tres; Emporius the Orator. Concerning Ethopoëta (Second Sophistic); Rufinus of Antioch. Verses of the Famous Scholar, Rufinus, on Word Arrangement and Metres in Oratory, all in MPB. Miller, Prosser and Benson note that Fortunatianus and Rufinus were influential (particularly the former), but that Emporius “represents a typically pedestrian treatment of the predominant elements of rhetoric [i.e., issues relating to composition, arrangement and delivery] as seen by the less-gifted rhetoricians of the time.”
¹³⁰ The case of the Italian city-states and Southern Europe more generally is different; I am focusing on Northern Europe, particularly the British Isles. As many scholars, notably Pocock (op. cit.) have pointed out, the early flowering the Renaissance, the presence of Venice and the Roman republican heritage adopted by city-states like Florence led to a radically different developmental track, particularly as it relates to monarchy, in the medieval and early Renaissance periods.
Miller, Prosser and Benson argue that the Venerable Bede, more than any other author, “anticipates a peculiarly English attitude of the next eight centuries: the equating of rhetoric with style.” In “Concerning Figures and Tropes,” Bede creates a simple list of figures, citing their use in many texts, particularly the Bible. Treatises like Bede’s mark the beginning of a slow transition in the focus of rhetorical theory. It was the advent of printing that brought these controversies—and the unique character of Renaissance rhetoric—to the fore.

The preceding authors represent a consistent shift from political concerns to concerns about arrangement, the role of dialectic and the application of figures and tropes that would become full-blown controversies during the Renaissance period. These debates, found in the works of Erasmus and his contemporaries, presaged a new conception of the relationship between rhetoric and action that would flower in the work of Hobbes. They addressed the non-political functions of rhetoric, teaching and delighting. Little attention was paid to moving people to action, particularly in the sense of moving a large group of people. Classical rhetoric as imagined by Cicero and Aristotle was standing on a house of cards because whatever popular opportunities had allowed for the advancement and development of the movere/political persuasion function of rhetoric were starting to die out. Rhetoric's triune purpose was being severed, movere was starting to starve on the vine, and with the increased emphasis on tropes and figures, copia, and the blurry distinctions between dialectic and rhetoric, both the study of speaking well and the results of that study (i.e., the speeches) were increasingly the property of a minority of well-educated men who, unlike the minority of well-educated

131 MPB, 97.
132 See Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (State College, PA: Penn State, 2003) for the political applications of Erasmus’ writings on rhetoric.
statesmen in Greece and Rome, were less interested in *movere* and more interested in other uses for rhetoric. The groundwork was being established for what would become “the problem of homogeneity” in the late seventeenth century.

**The Small Light of the Ars Praedicandi**

There was one area of life where rhetoric-as-*movere* was able to thrive, and that was the church. Preachers’ handbooks advised homilists to use rhetoric-as-*movere* to persuade their flock to pursue salvation. Unlike the political arena, where opportunities for meaningful action were almost non-existent, even the poorest parishioner could actively pursue the goal of salvation. The chance for prayer was the outlet for action that sustained the *ars praedicandi* and persuasive rhetoric when that exact rhetoric was floundering in the political realm.

A typical *ars praedicandi* manual is Robert of Basevorn’s *The Form of Preaching*, which was written around 1322. After some preliminary remarks, Robert describes the French and English methods of preaching, and refers to the work of Augustine and Pope Gregory frequently, while praising the preaching of St. Paul. Paul “used reason with great success, especially together with authority.”

Robert embraces the bold, writing, “What some say therefore seems to me altogether reprehensible: that

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133 Of course, throughout history the study of rhetoric had been the domain of the financially and politically fortunate. Most of the exceptions were to be found among boys from poor families who studied in monasteries. However, until the time of the Renaissance, the speeches that these orators produced were disseminated to the people—there had always been a group of people too poor to be involved in such matters, but by this time, the audience of most non-preaching rhetoric was more limited than it had ever been.

134 What of instability? Indeed, instability is not as obvious here as it is in political examples of rhetoric-as-*movere*. However, one could argue that the explosion of religious instability in the Reformation was a result of people (in this case, the educated priests) who had been persuaded to act toward salvation. Convinced that this was a proper end, they sought the best way to do so, and when that “best way” clashed with the status quo, they looked to destabilize the system.

preaching ought not to shine with false verbal embellishments—for in very many sermons of St. Bernard the whole is almost always rich in colors.”

The manual includes chapters on invention and the proper construction of figures, like the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and its ilk, but it also contains extended passages concerning “the Winning-over of the Audience.”

Here Bernard, without hesitation, suggests “another way is to frighten them by some terrifying tale or example.” He also recommends stories about the Devil as a method to gain the favor of the audience and tells his readers that “Zeal will teach him who does not have an evil intention about these and other methods.”

Despite these extended sections that basically pay close attention to the *pathos* category of persuasion, Robert also cites philosophers from Plato to Boethius, and presents many Aristotelian categorizations. The “procedures” he recommends for ornamenting a speech are as serious as measured as can be. The preaching manuals, which were popular, though in altered form up until the seventeenth century, represented the best marriage of *logos* and *pathos* under the banner of classical rhetoric since antiquity.

Another *ars praedicandi* is Guibert de Nogent’s *A Book about The Way a Sermon Ought to be Given*. Guibert is similar to Rabanus Marus in his emphasis on inspiration, and shares the concern with audience in common with many of the *ars praedicandi* authors. He recognizes the necessity of rhetoric and its power to inspire: “And how can a mangled or stammered phrase serve to inspire others, when we know perfectly well that speech of that kind does not usually sooth the minds of listeners, but

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rather oppresses them with boredom and seriously irritates and angers them.”

He continues, “Where a few ideas might have been presented effectively, a plethora of ideas presented at too great length leads to apathy and even, I fear, to hostility.”

The prescience of these medieval authors is rather striking. Their acceptance of the necessary fact that individuals have limited attention spans, need to have their interest piqued, and do not easily process large chunks of “fact-based” communication are very instructive for many modern political theorists. Furthermore, Guibert’s goal of producing sermons that “make clear and lucid for the peasants and common people ideas which at first seem difficult and confusing even to the learned,” is most admirable.

The character of medieval preaching was influenced most strongly by Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana and Pope Gregory’s Cura Pastoralis. Gregory’s work reinforced the importance of reaching a heterogeneous audience and he was often cited in preaching manuals:

Since we have now shown what manner of man the pastor ought to be, let us now set forth after what manner he should teach. For, as long before us Gregory Nazianzen of revered memory has taught, one and the same exhortation does not suit all, inasmuch as neither are all bound together by similarity of character…Therefore according to the quality of hearers ought the discourse of teachers be fashioned, so as to suit all and each in their several needs, and yet never deviate from the art of common edification.

According to Murphy, this strong focus on heterogeneity in the audience made Gregory almost unique among his contemporaries. However, Murphy also notes that “he [had] no intention of providing a new [my emphasis added] rhetorical theory for preachers.”

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139 Guibert de Nogent, A Book About the Way a Sermon Ought to be Given, in MPB, 169.
140 Ibid., 169.
141 Ibid., 170.
142 Pope Gregory is quoted in Alexander of Ashby, On the Mode of Preaching, quoted in Murphy, 293.
143 Murphy, 294.
I argue that no new rhetorical theory was necessary. The precepts of the *ars praedicandi* stayed true to rhetorical theory, which was developed to teach, to delight, and to move. Indeed, the other genres of medieval rhetoric (letter-writing and poetics) were the ones that needed a new theory, for they were not concerned with moving, not in the same way preaching was. As Greece and Rome used the power and passion of their orators to fuse an identity, so the Doctors of the Church embraced the same power and passion of the “pagan” classical rhetoric to forge an identity for the body of Christ.

This line of thought dominated treatises on preaching. Rabanus Marus, summarizing Augustine in his own *On the Training of the Clergy*, writes:

Since rhetoric can be used to convey either truth or falsehood, who would dare maintain that the defenders of truth should come unarmed against liars? That those who wish to support what is false should know how to win attention, good will and acceptance from an audience, while their opponents remain ignorant of these matters? The former could lie succinctly, clearly and convincingly; the latter would speak the truth in such a way as to tire the listener, confuse the issues and make belief impossible. The former would defeat the truth with fallacy and would assert lies, while the latter would be able neither to defend right nor to refute error. The former would frighten, *move* [my emphasis], elevate, and inspire the hearts of their listeners, leading them into error and compelling them by sheer eloquence; the latter would put them into a long cold sleep for the sake of truth.\(^{144}\)

Though this passage is both medieval and religious, thus making it anathema to many modern readers and scholars, it bears great truths concerning rhetoric and persuasion.

Rhetoric is a powerful tool, and thus there will always be those willing to employ it, for good, or for ill. Realistically, rhetoric will always be effective, even if this displeases Plato and his stepchildren. Those who believe in the justness of their cause must not be foolish enough to believe that the cause alone will draw people to their side. If people are confused, if the proponents of good cannot refute their enemies, and if those

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who would lead citizens astray can do eloquently and unopposed, the polity can do naught but suffer.

However, Marus, and others like him, were focused on Heaven, not the polity. Thus we only see this spirit of action expressed forcefully in the *ars praedicandi* treatises of the medieval period. While built upon the same principles as the classical rhetorical system, preachers’ rhetoric had to reach a more heterogeneous audience. James J. Murphy, one of the leading modern scholars of medieval rhetoric, writes, “These methodologies [of Jewish study] were for the sake of the community, not merely for the scholarly isolate (as in some Eastern religions); consequently, Christ, as a member of this Jewish community, inherited an imposing array of rhetoro-grammatical tools that had been developed over time and shared with the whole community through the oral readings and discussions of the learned men among them.”

Certainly, following the rabbinical tradition, religious sermons and discussions had to focus on the more subtle aspects of doctrine and determining God’s will. However, these discussions had to be undertaken with the advancement of the common good of the community, not the enrichment of the individual mind, as the goal. Furthermore, these discussions had to be distilled to the community in a vernacular that they could comprehend.

Although I have criticized medieval rhetoric for its lack of focus on persuasion in the political sense and lack of concern with action and rhetoric-as-*movere*, this conception of the broad audience intimated by Murphy and others is quite clear in medieval treatises. Priscian the Grammarian, an influential medieval author who adopted the important work of the classical rhetorician Hermogenes, includes the section on fables. Fables are intended for use with an uneducated audience: “In developing the

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145 Murphy, 273.
fable, one should avoid circumlocutions and be more informal.’’\textsuperscript{146} He also observed that “orators frequently use fables among their examples.”\textsuperscript{147} From this, we can only conclude that these orators intended to expand the audience who could understand their rhetoric, and did not wish to exclude those who did not possess literacy and the other hallmarks of education. Indeed, the fable “is a composition made up to resemble life,”\textsuperscript{148} and was designed to appeal to a wide variety of listeners. Isidore also comments on the audience and instructs the orator to “make the audience indulgent, docile and attentive…by supplicating them…instructing them…exciting their interest” and “[stating] our case as briefly and plainly as we can.”\textsuperscript{149}

In addition to the remarks by Priscian, the pseudo-Augustinian On Rhetoric includes this note: “Demosthenes frequently used such introductions [\textit{adoxos}] in speaking to those freedmen who were considered unlearned; they were used even more frequently by Lysias and by our own ancients [the Romans, e.g., Cicero].” The definition of \textit{adoxos} is critical for understanding the ways in which ancient and early medieval orators understood the potential composition of their audience. They understood that some speeches “ought to be very conversational; do not argue in high-flown sentiments or with outrageously flower phrases, use no weighty brief; but be relaxed and unaffected. The point of everything said in these preliminary comments ought to be this: we want to take what is of merely personal interest and present it to a wider audience; we want to prove that the matter under consideration is of importance to all [emphasis added in both

\textsuperscript{146} Priscian the Grammarian, \textit{Fundamentals Adapted from Hermogenes} in MPB, 53.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid.}, 53
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Ibid.}, 52
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Etymologies}, 87.
instances].”¹⁵⁰ We see a similar concern in Alberic of Monte Cassino’s Flowers of Rhetoric. He writes: “one will succeed in thus moving the heart when he suits both his words and his thoughts to the dignity of the theme; therefore he must study the subject, the person and the purpose.”¹⁵¹

The influence of religious institutions and preaching upon the rhetorical tradition is very important. Sermons were important modes of political communication in the English and American revolutions, and many of the leaders in the American Civil Rights movement had a background in religious preaching. At all these moments, preachers have been able to understand and inspire their audiences, and so it was in the medieval period. From this medieval ars praedicandi tradition and its preservation of persuasion, emotion and a true concern for a diverse audience came the ability to produce rhetoric-as-movere when the historical circumstances were right.

The English Peasant Revolt and Rhetoric-as-Movere

One of the most notable moments of organized popular political action in the late medieval period was the Peasants' Revolt of 1381.¹⁵² Most experts agree that this outpouring of popular political action was brought about by years of punitive government economic policy that was a result of “the tendency to bow to pressure from the landed classes”¹⁵³ (i.e., restrict the political opportunities for most English, resulting in the

¹⁵¹ Alberic of Monte Cassino, Flowers of Rhetoric, in MPB, 150.
popular political stasis described earlier) and that it was unique in character.\textsuperscript{154} When we examine the vernacular rhetoric composed around the time of the revolts, we see something else that is unique, at least for the time: we see pieces of rhetoric explicitly composed to move a diverse audience. We see the same classical rhetorical techniques that were used by the composers of more formal pieces like lays and mirrors, in the service of rhetoric-as-movere. There is an activity and an embrace of persuasion that we do not find in other fourteenth (or early fifteenth) century vernacular works like Chaucer's \textit{Canterbury Tales} or the political treatises of Walter of Milemete, Thomas Hoccleve and William of Ockham. This unique episode in English medieval political history demonstrates the affinity between opportunities for true popular political action and rhetoric-as-movere.\textsuperscript{155}

Jean Froissart's \textit{Chronicles} offer a contemporary, and unsurprisingly elitist, account of the uprising. Froissart constantly refers to the peasants as “the common people” and “these bad people” and blames their “abundance and prosperity”\textsuperscript{156} for encouraging them to revolt against their feudalistic bonds. He also harps on the mob or pack mentality of the people involved in the revolt. Their numbers were so great that they could surround London and “they passed by like a tornado.”\textsuperscript{157} Most critically for our purposes, Froissart ascribes a prominent role in all this to the sacred rhetoricians John Ball and Jack Straw, who “were cheered by everyone, for the whole town was on their

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\textsuperscript{154} Ormrod, 19: “At no other time in the Middle Ages were the political assumptions and administrative structures of the state subject to such profound criticism and widespread violence.”
\textsuperscript{155} Marrou's discussion of the educational advances, including the rediscovery of Aristotle, among other things, is also relevant to this discussion, since Aristotle's rhetorical treatises reawakened knowledge of the active function of rhetoric (movere).
\textsuperscript{156} All quotations in this paragraph are from Jean Froissart’s \textit{Chronicles}, (“The Peasants' Revolt in England”) translated by Geoffrey Bereton (New York: Penguin Classics, 1968), 211.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid.}, 214.
\end{flushright}
Froissart names Ball as the chief agitator and cites one of his sermons as follows:

Let us go to the King—he is young—and show him how we are oppressed, and tell him that we want things to be changed, or else we will change them ourselves [emphasis added]. If we go in good earnest and all together, very many people who are called serfs and are held in subjection will follow us to get their freedom.  

This sermon is very important, as it demonstrates the *ars praedicandi* being used for active purposes and moving beyond the didactic. This is a superior example of rhetoric-as-*movere*, and it (along with other pieces that also stand as excellent examples of rhetoric-as-*movere*), was quite effective in terms of inspiring action, as there were uprisings in London and many other cities in England.

There are a number of texts preserved from this period, and many of them are polemical, leading us to believe that Froissart was not grossly misrepresenting the sermons he quoted. Ball was polarizing, and he was not the only cleric who supported common action; Jack Straw and John Wrawe were also notable for their actions in this regard. All these clerics made frequent references to the poem *Piers Plowman*, another piece of popular vernacular. This work was representative of a genre of poetry that, in

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158 Ibid., 214.
159 Froissart quotes Ball's sermon on page 212.
160 James M. Dean, “Introduction to 'Literature of Richard II's Reign and the Peasants' Revolt'” in Middle English Political Writings (Kalamazoo, MI: TEAMS Middle English Texts Series, 1996), 120.
161 The literature on *Piers Plowman* is copious; works that focus on the use of rhetoric and language (sometimes in the political context) include, Middleton, *op. cit.*; Anna P. Baldwin, *The Theme of Government in Piers Plowman* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1981); Edwin D. Craun, *Lies, Slander and Obscenity in Medieval English Literature: Pastoral Rhetoric and the Deviant Speaker* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997); Britton J. Hardwood, “Dame Study and the Place of Orality in *Piers Plowman*” *ELH* (January 1990), 1-17; Steven Justice, *Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381* (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1994); Kathryn Kurby-Fulton, *Reformist Apocalypticism and Piers Plowman* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990); Tim William Macham, “Language Contact in *Piers Plowman*” *Speculum* (April 1994), 359-85. Hardwood's article is particularly interesting since it suggests that *Plowman* and other works of its kind were aimed at protecting a tradition of orality. As we have started to see in this chapter and will see in subsequent chapters, the development of written rhetorics seems to contribute to the suspicion of persuasion and the decline of rhetoric-as-*movere*. However, this view must be read against
the words of Anne Middleton, was “public poetry.”

Piers Plowman stood as a symbol for the common man and humility, and by appealing to this well-known work, the clerics further demonstrated their commitment to a diverse audience that moved beyond the royals and the gentry.

“The Letter of John Ball” (Royal MS) urges all concerned men to “stondeth togidre in Godes name” and includes a rather threatening verse:

Be war or ye be wo
Knoweth your friend fro your foo.
Haveth ynow, and seith “Hoo!”
And do wel and bettre, and fleth synne,
And seketh pees, and hold you therinne.
And so biddeth Johan Trewman and all his felawes.

According to Dean's notes on the poem, “Ball appropriates the figure of Piers as symbol of the political cause, representing the commons as industrious and faithful” and that the famous “do wel and bettre” reference to the Plowman poem “equates 'do well' with

Justice, who argues that the act of writing down the contents of these “letters” was crucial because “the letters announced the documentary competence of the insurgent population, a determination not to be excluded from documentary rule” (35).

In “The Idea of Public Poetry in the Reign of Richard II” Speculum, (January 1978), 94-114, Anne Middleton outlines the genre of vernacular public poetry. Unlike the poetry of Chaucer, this poetry featured “impassioned direct address” (94) as opposed to the “indirect discourse” (94) of the more advanced poets and “was to be a 'common voice' to serve the 'common good'” (95).

For example, in Book VI “Piers sets the world to work,” Plowman tells a knight: “Never ill-treat your tenants, and see that you punish them only when Truth compels you to—even then, let Mercy assess the fine and be ruled by Meekness, and at all costs have no truck with Fee...And take care also that you never ill-use your serfs. It will be better for you in the long run, for though they are your underlings here on earth, they may be above you in Heaven, in greater happiness, unless you lead a better life than they do.”

Taken from Frank Langland, Piers the Ploughman (also rendered Piers Plowman), translated by J.F. Goodrich (New York: Penguin Classics, 1966), 82.

“The Letter of John Ball” (Royal MS) in Middle English Political Writings. Using the work's glosses, we can read this as: “Beware or be sorry; know your friend from your foe. Be content and say 'Whoa!' Do well and better and avoid sin, and seek peace and stick to it. So bids John Trewman and all his allies.”

Dean, “Notes to 'Literature of Richard II's Reign and the Peasants' Revolt'” in Middle English Political Writings, 160.
seeking political justice.”\textsuperscript{166} The overt politics of this poem stand in stark contrast to non-public poetry, such as Chaucer's 'Tale of Melibee' from The Canterbury Tales.\textsuperscript{167}

Indeed, the 'Melibee' makes for an interesting comparison, but before moving to that, it is important to look at some other political documents from the time of the Revolt. The Chronicon Henrici Knighton contains numerous “Addresses of the Commons” which continue to develop the same populist and persuasive themes that we see in Froissart's quoted sermons, Piers Plowman, and “The Letter of John Ball.” Dean says, “[Knighton's] “Addresses of the Commons” include alleged statements by commons” but concludes that the “Addresses” “seem to constitute variants of John Ball's Letter dispersed among several voices.”\textsuperscript{168} Some themes are repeated multiple times, including the exhortation to “make a gode end of that ye have begunnen” [make a good end of that which you have started], the call for “wylle and skylle” [will and skill], and the (again, ominous) declaration that “God do bote, for nowe is tyme” [God bestow (rewards?) for now is time].\textsuperscript{169} All of these common elements are meant to persuade the audience to act—the audience is to apply its will and skill to properly conclude its quest for economic relief. Most importantly, \textit{it is now time}, for such action. God wills it.

This focus on \textit{movere} and call for action is even more noticeable when we compare these documents to other vernacular works. Chaucer's previously mentioned 'Tale of Melibee' is no persuasive piece, but a meditation of the nature of authority both

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Ibid.}, 161.
\textsuperscript{167} The 'Melibee' is an interesting counter-example and an illustration of Middleton's point. Of all of Chaucer's Tales, it is the one with the strongest connection to politics, or at the least, ethical philosophy. The tale was based on Albertanus of Brescia's \textit{Liber de consolationis et consilii} (G.E. Sansone's translation (Barcelona: Editorial Barcino, 1965) is considered superior) and Renaud de Louens \textit{Le Livre de Melibee et Prudence} (found in J. Burke Severs' Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales (Humanities Press 1958)).
\textsuperscript{168} Dean, “Introduction,” 124.
\textsuperscript{169} “Addresses to the Commons” in Middle English Political Writings. Once again, the translations are a combination of my own work and Dean's glosses.
in and out of the home. The other major readings of the ‘Melibee’ that address the role of authority deal with it almost exclusively from a feminist/gender standpoint—Wallace’s reading deals with these issues in the ‘Melibee’ as well, but his reading is more far-ranging than these are (not surprisingly, since these are articles). Generally, they see a relationship between virtue and authority or rhetoric and authority; women gain authority by practicing the feminine virtues like prudence, by engaging in effective rhetoric, or some combination of the two.

Carolyn Collette reads the ‘Melibee’ as an instruction manual that teaches women how to use the noble feminine virtue of prudence to achieve goals, while Mari Pakkala-Weckstrom argues that Prudence’s “maistrie” comes from her politeness and her skilled use of rhetoric. Dolores Palomo sees the Tale as a demonstration of the folly of authority, or at least of arguments from authority, while Schauber and Spolsky instead read Dame Prudence as a “Boethian” lady who effectively argues in a philosophical manner, and is thus an ideal authoritative woman. Celia R. Daileader looks at issues of authority and gender from a slightly different angle, arguing that not only does the ‘Tale of Melibee’ itself deal with issues of authority, but that Chaucer as author attempts to give the Tale authority within the Canterbury collection.¹⁷⁰

The Tale's focus on the moral/ethical dimension of the political is reflected in the vernacular political treatises of the time as well. Walter of Milemete's On the Nobility, Wisdom and Prudence of Kings contains a chapter entitled “On the Gratitude of the

King.” Indeed, we again see overtures to the moral language of duty and obligation, culminating in the virtue of gratitude. The chapter begins, “Most Beloved Lord King, Your Sublime Nobility should know that kings, dukes, princes and great men ought to exercise a certain graciousness toward subjects, so that the meritorious are rightly rendered the profits of their merits.”\(^{171}\) However, Walter goes on to detail an account that would be less than satisfactory to the prophecy poets and Plowman-inspired writers. He mixes this idea of Sovereign and Subject obligation with Christian ideas of hierarchical love, which is passive and not active, and considers this to be virtuous.

At some level, the religious and even strangely millenial roots of our examples of politically persuasive rhetoric-as-movere should not be surprising. As we have seen in our survey of the earlier Scholastic period, the ars praedicandi tradition was the only tradition that maintained some sort of serious concern with movere, even when opportunities for popular political persuasion were almost non-existent. So, when the common people of England decided that they had borne all they could bear, it was sermons and priestly rhetoric that convinced them to march to London, sixty-thousand strong.\(^{172}\)

**Conclusion**

The ambivalence towards rhetoric-as-movere is ancient, but the prevailing attitude of prominent ancient rhetoricians like Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian was that rhetoric-as-movere had an important and essential place in the political world. Although Plato

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\(^{172}\) This is the number provided by Froissart: “They were a full sixty thousand and their chief captain was one Wat Tyler. With him as his companions were Jack Straw and John Ball” (213). Ball and Straw, as I have already noted, were both priests.
and other anti-democratic critics expressed concerns over the power of persuasion, the oral culture necessitated persuasive rhetoric. Thus, the Romans made persuasive rhetoric the engine of their political institutions. While, as we will see, medieval, Renaissance and early modern authors admired this, the figures of the late Imperial period, such as Augustine, criticized the Roman focus on rhetoric and were deeply skeptical of the deceptive powers of persuasion (though the De Doctrina Christiana is certainly not an anti-rhetorical treatise). This deeply suspicious attitude was extremely influential in the early medieval period.

In terms of my examination of medieval rhetoric, I have started from the commonly held position that rhetoric was static in the scholastic period, and I have attributed this stasis to the lack of opportunity for popular political expression. Since rhetoric-as-movere, the active and volatile function of classical rhetoric, depended on such outlets for its expression, the scholastic switch to rhetoric-as-docere necessitated stagnation. However, I also attempt to complicate the understanding of medieval rhetoric and to demonstrate what the period has to offer scholars of modern political communication and rhetoric. In particular, I would like to bring to light the lesser-known ars praedicandi tradition that provided opportunities for popular involvement and preserved the “political” function of rhetoric: rhetoric-as-movere. This rhetoric contributes a positive view of persuasion (though not one consistently oriented toward action) and receptivity to the idea of a heterogeneous audience.

Indeed, one can cite the example of Themistocles and the triremes (using deceptive tactics to convince his audience that it was necessary to use the silver discovered at Laurium to fund triremes instead of using the silver to provide a small one-time allowance to each citizen) as an example of the positive power to persuade.
Despite these important contributions, it is still important to note that purely political-institutional instances of rhetoric-as-
\textit{movere} declined in the medieval period due to the combination of historical circumstances that did not allow for a lot of popular involvement and influence upon institutions, such as the decline of republicanism, the changes in rhetorical philosophy that stemmed from rhetoric’s connection with education in the medieval period, and the connection of educational issues to those of class, and even gender. While it is extremely important to note that the rhetorical treatises that emerged from this combination of circumstances and philosophy laid the groundwork for important work on the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric in the Renaissance and early modern periods, it is also equally important for political theorists and scholars of political participation to note that this part of the medieval rhetorical tradition is exclusionary and to take care that in creating our own theories of political communication that we do not privilege the ancestors of only this tradition, but of the more popular and inspirational \textit{ars praedicandi} tradition as well.

The next chapter examines the rhetoric of the Renaissance and early modern periods. The \textit{ars praedicandi} are left to the side for a moment to focus on controversies in Renaissance rhetoric, such as the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic, which have their roots in the ossified rhetoric of the scholastic period. While we will return to the \textit{ars praedicandi} and the political tumult of seventeenth century England in the fourth chapter, the third chapter establishes the scientific-logical foundation for the modern conception of rhetoric-as-\textit{docere} that presages contemporary deliberative democracy.
In light of the medieval political situation and the continuing development of monarchical government in Europe, the period of stasis for rhetoric-as-*movere* endured well into the Renaissance. A number of controversies developed over rhetoric's deployment in arts and letters. This chapter briefly traces those controversies, particularly the controversy over the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic, in order to connect the discourse concerning Renaissance rhetoric with the emerging discourse surrounding the New Science of Francis Bacon. The collision of rhetorical criticism with New Science was a seminal moment in the slow decline of rhetoric-as-*movere*. Through an examination of the work of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and the members of the Royal Society, I will demonstrate how the product of this collision was a concept of plain speech rhetoric that was designed to serve the acquisition of scientific knowledge, rhetoric-as-*docere*, as opposed to the end of moving individuals in the context of a popular government—or rhetoric-as-*movere*. Furthermore, in this chapter I begin to build my argument that asserts that the roots of contemporary deliberative democratic theory, which suffers from the same problems as this seventeenth-century conception of plain speech, lie in the interaction between the discourses of science and rhetoric.

The Renaissance controversies over ornate language (*copia*) and the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic reflected a move toward rhetoric-as-*docere* (teaching/instruction toward truth) that came to pass with the invention of the printing press. The ancient and venerable relationship between classical rhetoric and educational institutions showed no signs of abating; classical rhetoric and grammar were still the
basic foundation of the curriculum. However, the dearth of republican and popular
governments meant that there were few opportunities for the practicalities of politics and
statecraft to mediate between rhetoric and the schools. With the invention of the printing
press and the development of literacy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, rhetoric
utterly transformed and was as much a concern to the scientist and the mathematician as
it had always been to the poet and the politician.

Indeed, it was the poets and men of letters who first took the reins of rhetoric-as-
docere in the wake of printing, and it was their use of florid language that caused the
logicians and the new men of science to take a hard look at what classical rhetoric had
become, to contemplate what it could become and to speculate how that could serve the
goals of the new empirical trends in science and higher learning. The effect of
developments in empirical science and logic on classical rhetoric cannot be
underestimated. The method of proof—careful, unbiased observation and recording—
flew in the face of previously fashionable methods of proof such as the argument from
authority. The system of classical rhetoric was designed to accommodate the older
methods of proof. Most importantly, the system of classical rhetoric was set up to use
those non-empirical (and thus, at some level, non-demonstrable) proofs to persuade—to
move—people to take action. This would clash with the methods of empirical scientists
and late Renaissance logicians. These individuals believed in the notion of res ipsa
loquitor—that the demonstrable written proofs of logic or the demonstrably visible
empirical evidence had to speak for themselves and persuade on their own merits.
Movere could introduce bias.
A showdown between these radically different ways of thinking about persuasion was inevitable. In terms of the direction of classical rhetoric and in terms of influencing our opinions on what rhetoric and what persuasion should do, the docere side won easily. We will see that most of the major thinkers of this period, if they wished to use the tool of rhetorical persuasion at all, wanted to persuade others as to the benefits of experimental method and empirical observation. Few of these thinkers talked about political goals as the ends of persuasion. After the work of Hobbes this redefinition of rhetorical ends led to a significant decrease in intellectual attention to the proper deployment of rhetoric-as-movere.

Intellectual, poetic and scientific interests were privileged over political interests during this time period. We see this clearly in the work of Petrus Ramus, Francis Bacon, Thomas Sprat and John Wilkins. Even someone as politically active as John Locke engaged in the debates on plain speech and rhetoric-as-docere. This chapter focuses on these British pioneers and practitioner of empirical science and demonstrates how their concerns led to the development of a plain speech rhetorical theory that was so focused on the presentation of specific and advanced empirical findings that it became exclusionary and susceptible to what I have termed 'the problem of homogeneity.' It is in this movement that we have the roots of the modern crisis of political communication, of expert jargon and discussions about things that most of the populace does not have the time or inclination to learn to understand. It is important to reiterate that these are roots. Many of these thinkers, Bacon in particular, were surprisingly open to various techniques of persuasion and recognized the need for traditional techniques like the use of figurative
language and were not necessarily the rhetorical revolutionaries that we might assume they were, given their position as ambassadors of the New Science.

The redefinition of the ends of rhetorical persuasion and the conscious decision (on the part of some of these thinkers) to limit the audience had a tremendous effect on the historical development of rhetoric. Work done by literary scholars shows that the rhetoric of this time period closed out many groups of people and created a place of privilege for those who shared the vocabulary of empiricism. While there is nothing wrong with an elite vocabulary and elite gatherings of experts per se, when that model of language and persuasion becomes a model for political communication in a large popular democracy, difficulties and inequalities are inevitable. In subsequent chapters, I will argue that due to the decline in attention to rhetoric-as-movere, most future intellectual and academic attempts to theorize about the form of political communication, including the deliberative democratic movement, are based in the study of rhetoric-as-docere, and thus present problems when we try to implement them in a heterogeneous world that demands the flexibility and inspiration of rhetoric-as-movere.

Preliminaries on Written vs. Spoken Rhetoric and the Place of Proofs

Any discussion of the transition between medieval and Renaissance rhetoric must begin with the impact of the printing press and the spread of literacy throughout Western Europe. This created a divide between written and spoken rhetoric. This division is audience dependent, and the great difference between written and spoken rhetoric is that the latter is usually composed for a particular audience, while the former must be created for an imagined audience. Indeed, the issue of performed rhetoric—i.e., actual speeches—versus the written rhetoric of pamphlets and the like is very important to the
issue of *movere*. The expectations for written and spoken arguments evolved differently; because the written word was easily preserved and did not have to be memorized, written rhetorics valued an increasingly complex argument structure, and consequently devalued the importance of the appeals that were so central to *movere* in the classical rhetorical system. The work of Walter Ong focuses on the consequences and issues of the written imagined audience. In “The Writer's Audience is Always a Fiction,” Ong calls attention to the distance between the author of written rhetoric and his or her audience. While this sort of distance lends itself well to more academic treatises, it does not lend itself to healthy political communication between elites and popular citizens. There is a great political value to spoken and performed rhetoric, but this period marked the beginning of spoken rhetoric's decline.

Although the major focus of this chapter is the reaction against *movere*, there is another important political characteristic to the rhetoric that emerged during this time period quite apart from the influence of the New Science. We cannot forget the importance of the New Separation between audience and orator. Ong argues that all those who create written rhetorics must imagine their audiences, because, unlike a medieval bard, they cannot see their audience in order to judge how the audience is reacting to their rhetoric.\(^{174}\) In other words, novelists and writers must “fictionalize” their audience. In response, the audience must learn to play the role that has been fictionalized for them.

One could argue that we see such an occurrence during this time period. The Baconian plain speech movement came about because one particular audience (the highly

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\(^{174}\) In describing this process in an article entitled, “The Writer’s Audience is Always a Fiction” *PMLA* (Jan. 1975), 9-21, Ong writes, “…the writer must construct in his imagination, clearly or vaguely, an audience cast in some sort of role…the audience must correspondingly fictionalize itself.”
educated and progressive audience of Bacon and his fellows at the Royal Society) refused to play the role that classical rhetoric had created for them because that role did not correspond to their collective identity as scientists interested in investigating empirical proofs. Thus, Bacon and company fictionalized an audience very similar to themselves—in fact, the audiences may have been identical—and articulated a number of rhetorical principles that would be satisfying to that audience.

In subsequent years, thinkers like Hume and Smith would add to and modify the plain speech movement, once again by fictionalizing an audience similar to themselves—middle class, rational, and temperate. In both cases, the audiences were forced to either fit themselves to the mold, or face exclusion. The classical rhetorical tradition, on the other hand, aimed itself at a more broad audience. By reconceptualizing the audience of persuasive rhetoric, the members of the Royal Society moved the rhetorical system even further away from its classical roots and the political institutions that had been designed to accommodate political discourse based on that rhetoric. If we are interested in recovering citizen connections, we must not only encourage rigorous spoken rhetoric and its interaction between orator and audience, but we must carefully consider what kind of audience we imagine when we compose written political arguments.

Another important part of the transition from medieval to Renaissance rhetoric was the transition of persuasion itself. Ancient and medieval rhetoric depended on the categories of proof laid down in Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* and introduced in chapter two of *this work*. During the scholastic period, *ethos* and *logos* were crucial. This held during the Renaissance, but toward the end of that period *logos* became the most

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175 The importance of *logos* can be seen in the use of the syllogism as the basis for most treatises (e.g., Dante’s *Monarchy*), and the importance of ethos during the scholastic period can be seen in the reliance on Aristotle and the Scriptures for proof (e.g., Aquinas).
important of the three classical proofs. It would soon be united with a uniquely modern proof: the empirical proof. This is not to say that *pathos* and *ethos* were scorned during the Renaissance—far from it. Most of the major authors were perfectly aware of the potential for abuse inherent in the use of *pathos* and *ethos* and felt that *logos* was the “safest” type of proof. This new concern with “safety” and soundness would become even more important in the early modern period with the development of the scientific method.

This change in favored proofs represented a change in the favored way of thinking. What was “educated” and what was “simplistic” changed more rapidly from the end of the Renaissance to the beginning of the seventeenth century than at any previous time in human history. Much of what had been educated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was relegated to the “simplistic” category. While the loss of *pathos* has obvious consequences for rhetoric-as-*movere*, the loss of *ethos* is almost as damaging.\textsuperscript{176} There is an explicit connection between spoken rhetoric, its political uses, and the proof of *ethos*.\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{176} Aristotle elaborates on *ethos* in this way: “There is persuasion through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt” (On Rhetoric, 1356a).

\textsuperscript{177} We also see an argument for the importance of *ethos* in the modern context. Copious work in the agenda-setting and framing literature (see Baumgartner and Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1993); Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1991); Druckman, “The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence,” *Political Behavior* (September 2001), 225-56; and Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson, “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence,” *American Journal of Political Science* (October 2003), 729-45)—as well as common sense—dictates that we are unable to comprehend the entire universe of political issues. Whether we like it or not, we will never be those perfect democratic citizens who are able to debate and understand all the issues pertinent to the democracy's well-being. We need these fair-minded people of character to let us know, for lack of more elegant phrasing, what is important. The character of the speaker is easier (though not easy!) to evaluate comprehensively than the information that he or she provides. This footnote is based on my “Recovering the *Ethos* of the Orator through an Understanding of Rhetoric-as-*Movere*” a paper prepared for presentation at the 2006 Association for Political Theory meeting.
These shifts in favored proofs during the Renaissance could not truly destroy classical rhetoric—for the system was set up to receive any type of proof. However, what that transition did contribute to was the neglect of the political function of rhetoric. The decline of rhetoric-as-movere was further exacerbated by the problem of homogeneity. While this problem was more prevalent in the seventeenth century, in the Renaissance an educated minority pushed the envelope of the classical rhetorical system (the major innovations were philosophical and literary, and the political function was not of prime importance).

**Controversies in Renaissance Rhetoric and the Role of Ramus**

By the time of the Renaissance, the surest sign of a superlative rhetor was *copia*, or abundance of words. This marks a definite break from the classical, and even the scholastic periods, where persuasive ability was one of the chief hallmarks of a great orator. The focus on *copia* was part of the continuing shift toward rhetoric-as-docere and rhetoric as something more literary, not spoken. As Terence Cave rightly points out, the etymology of *copia* is quite loaded: “Furthermore, it [*copia*] is commonly (thought not exclusively) used in an affirmative sense: it confidently asserts the values of affluence, military power, and rhetorical fluency.”

*Copia*’s root word is *opes*, which is Latin for ‘wealth’ and is the ancestor of modern words like opulence. This is a telling link, as it sheds some light what was acceptable and considered the mark of a good orator. Cave concludes that “it is as if the instruments of power—money, armies—were aligned with the linguistic facility which assumed the role of resolving both political and private

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178 This section is taken from Alexandra Elizabeth Hoerl, “Recovering the *Ethos* of the Orator through an Understanding of Rhetoric-as-movere,” a paper presented at the 2006 meeting of the Association for Political Theory.

tensions in the *quaestiones civiles* of forensic oratory.” Given all this, it is not surprising that oratory leaned toward the excessive in this period. The fact that memorization was now less important because of printing technologies only exacerbated these tendencies.

The ideal of *copia* was praised not only by rhetorical instructors, but also by the leading minds of the time. Erasmus, a weighty and learned man, had the highest praise for *copia*—done well, of course. “Just as there is nothing more admirable or more splendid than a speech with a rich *copia* of thoughts and words overflowing in a golden stream,” he wrote, “so it is, assuredly, such a thing as may be striven for at no slight risk.” Erasmus stressed the fact that *copia* had two parts, “thoughts and words.” He also had harsh words for those who strove for *copia* without method, for, according to him, the good orator could speak both briefly and at length:

Accordingly, our precepts will be directed to this, that you may be able in the fewest possible words so to comprehend the essence of a matter that nothing is lacking; that you may be able to amplify by *copia* in such a way that there is nonetheless no redundancy; and, the principle learned, that you may be free either to emulate laconism, if you wish, or to copy Asian exuberance, or to exhibit Rhodian moderation.

*De Copia* is at heart a training manual, and Erasmus includes many exercises for the development of *copia*. He recommends competitions among students and presents a number of memorization procedures for amplifying words and developing proper *copia*. Book I of *De Copia* closes with an exercise that stuns the modern reader. The reader is instructed to take the sentence, “Your letter has delighted me very much” and use the

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180 Ibid., 3
181 Erasmus of Rotterdam. *On Copia of Words*, I.1
182 Ibid., I.7
183 Ibid., I.6
various techniques to create different ways of expressing the same sentiment. Erasmus
includes an exhaustive list of examples that lasts for almost four pages.

The idea of teaching oneself to express the same sentiment in a hundred different
ways may seem ridiculous to us now, but during the Renaissance such ability was
treasured and the sure sign of a learned man. However, the Erasmian approach to copia
was not universally embraced. Rudolph Agricola, a contemporary of Erasmus, felt that
copia verba was set too far above copia res and he devised a method designed to increase
the copia res. While Erasmus had his students performing variation exercises, Cave tells
us that Agricola used a system dependent on the “‘fruition’ or production of knowledge
by constant practice (exercitatio) and the invention of new ‘things.’” Unlike his
contemporaries, “for Agricola, the key to abundant discourse is provided by dialectical
method.”

The copia debates paved the ground for two controversies that were far more
pointed. The first great controversy was over the use of tropes and figures. While
important in medieval rhetoric and referenced in the classical texts, tropes truly flowered

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184 Cave, 12  
185 Ibid., 13  
186 There is a copious (!) literature on these controversies in Renaissance rhetoric. The vast majority are
written from the perspective of literature and written rhetoric or history and written rhetoric. See Victoria
Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence and Skepticism in Renaissance Rhetoric (Ithaca: Cornell, 1985); Brian Vickers,
In Defense of Rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Jennifer Richards, Rhetoric and Courtliness in
Early Modern Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2003); Cary J. Nederman, “Rhetoric, reason and
republic: republicanisms—ancient, medieval and modern” in Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals
and Reflections, ed. James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000); Jerrold E. Seigel, Rhetoric and
Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1968); Renaissance Rhetoric, edited by
Peter Mack (New York: St. Martin's, 1994); Jean Dietz Moss, Novellies in the Heavens: Rhetoric and
Science in the Copernican Controversy (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1993); Moss and William A. Wallace,
Rhetoric and Dialectic in the Time of Galileo (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,
2003); Douglas Bush, The Renaissance and English Humanism (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto, 1939); Debora
1988); Peter Mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002); 
(Ithaca: Cornell, 1994).
during the Renaissance. One of the reasons for the increasing popularity of tropes was the new relationship between poetics and rhetoric, which had also started in the medieval period and reached its flowering in the Renaissance. Treatises such as Puttenham’s “The Arte of English Poesie” talk about the “maker” of words, and the emphasis in these treatises is certainly on the *copia verba* and the ornamentation of language. After the publication of Thomas Wilson’s *The Arte of Rhetorike*, the first vernacular rhetoric, the number of English language listings of tropes and figures exploded. Some of the most notable works of this type include Abraham Fraunce’s “Arcadian Rhetoricke” (1588), Henry Peacham’s “The Garden of Eloquence” (1593) and John Barton’s “The Art of Rhetorick Concisely and Completely Handled,” which dates to 1634 and is one of the latest works of this type. Many of these works completely dropped the invention aspect of rhetoric and focused solely on eloquence. “Arcadian Rhetorike” opens with the following proclamation: “Rhetorike is an Art of speaking. It hath two parts, Eloqution and Pronuntiation.”¹⁸⁷ Other works define rhetoric in radically different ways. This confusion is characteristic of the late Renaissance period, and foreshadows the radical changes that were coming for rhetoric. Again, the important thing to note is that these controversies were literary and they were not concerned in any meaningful way with the function of rhetoric-as-*movere*.

One man who was at the forefront of the rhetorical revolution was a Frenchman named Petrus Ramus. Ramus was a highly influential Renaissance rhetorician who inveighed against not only figures, but also more importantly, the relationship between relationship and dialectic. However, let us cover his attack on the former before moving to his work on the latter. In his *Rhetoricae Distinctiones ad Quintilianum* (1549), Ramus

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attacked the Institutes. During the discussion on Style, Ramus makes frequent disparaging remarks about the gathering and usage of tropes and figures—though Ramus does not say that tropes and figures should not be used at all. Still, he chastises Quintilian for “[collecting] to the absolute limit all the inanities and trivialities of rhetoricians.”

Although Ramus recognized the need for some ornamentation because “the audience is generally dull and slow witted, like a bad horse which does nothing unless spurred,” Ramus was frustrated by the lack of definition in the rhetor’s art and even more incensed by the overuse of tropes and language that ordinary people would not use. In yet another stream of invective, he writes:

But, I say, structure and rhythm are a fashioning of style removed from everyday usage; therefore, each is a figure. If, however, you had learned this rule for reaching a conclusion though the syllogism, and if you had applied the law for describing an art and organizing a theory, you would have never babbled forth such ill-considered remarks, O Quintilian.

The works of Ramus were very influential. Ramus himself was a controversial figure, and had first drawn recognition by attacking the logic of Aristotle which was sacrosanct in the universities at the time. His works were widely read (though they were not supposed to be read by Catholics) and he had disciples in both England and Germany. Undoubtedly, his most important contribution to rhetorical theory was his argument on dialectic. His attack in the In Quintilianum, focused on Quintilian’s appropriation of philosophy, grammar and other arts under the flag of rhetoric. Using the logic of the syllogism, Ramus states that Style and Delivery are the only parts of Rhetoric; the other

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190 Ibid.
three parts of classical rhetoric, Invention, Arrangement and Memory properly belong to Dialectic reasoning.

He also developed this argument in even more depth in his works attacking Aristotle and Cicero. The Brutaiae Questiones is Ramus’ open letter to Cicero, and he provides some advice and asks some pointed questions:

Reason and speech are the two universal gifts of the gods granted to men, and the source of almost all the others. Dialectic is the theory of reason. Therefore whatever is the property of reason and mental ability and can be handled and practiced without speech, attribute this by right to the art of dialectic.\(^{191}\)

Yet what will be left for rhetoric? Not only style in tropes, and figures, which you consider here the only property of the orator, but also delivery. This alone is the proper virtue of rhetoric, its ability to diversify through the brilliance of tropes, to embellish with the beauties of figures, to charm by the modulation of the voice, and to arouse by the dignity of gesture.\(^{192}\)

Ramus undercuts not only the “turf” or rhetoric, but its ethical ground as well. Going against the De Oratore, he writes, “On the other hand, speaking well is covered by the virtue of style and delivery.”\(^{193}\) He takes philosophy away from the orator, and leaves him with nothing but mere “speaking well.”

Ramus's arguments center on issues of literary and logical importance. They are controversies over the superiority of one obscure figure to another, arguments over how many ways one needs to know how to say “you wrote a nice letter,” and debates over the definition of dialectic logic and its relationship to rhetorical invention. Debates over suitability of rhetoric for an audience, serious discussions of the political messages and lessons about virtue that ought to be found in rhetoric, and extended discussions of ethos were not the center of academic Renaissance writing on rhetoric. A conception of the

\(^{191}\text{Ibid., 16}\)
\(^{192}\text{Ibid., 34}\)
\(^{193}\text{Ibid., 25}.\)
audience started to drop out\textsuperscript{194} and this further damaged the prospects for \textit{movere} in classical rhetoric. Rhetorical scholarship continued down the path set by reformers like Ramus, and the literary and dialectical influence is prominent in modern scholarship.\textsuperscript{195}

\textbf{A Note on the Meaning of the Term 'Plain Speech'}

Before proceeding, it is necessary to talk about the various meanings ascribed to the term 'plain speech,' as they changed radically over time. The idea of the plain style is a classical one, and the great orator Demosthenes was said to be the major example of this style (while Cicero was offered up as an example of a more ornate style of rhetoric). Demosthenes was well known for using a moderate vocabulary and, most crucially, word arrangements and sentence constructions that were not intricate and tricky for an audience to follow.

By the early modern period, calls for plainness in speaking in England, as on the Continent, were directed against the abuse of tropes and appeals to emotion. In the scholarly literature, there is some controversy as to exactly what is meant by the term plain speech at this time. Some have argued that plain speech rhetoric was and is an attempt to excise all figurative language from rhetoric, such as metaphors, irony or other devices that could be misinterpreted and obscure the meaning of the speaker.\textsuperscript{196} Others, such as Ryan J. Stark, have argued that this is too expansive a definition. Stark defines

\textsuperscript{194} For more on the ramifications of the transition from spoken to written rhetoric on the conception of audience, see Ong, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{195} Indeed, Quentin Skinner argues in “Moral Ambiguity and the Art of Eloquence” from \textit{Visions of Politics, Vol II} (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002) that by the time of the seventeenth century, at least in England, “the anxieties...about moral ambiguity stem less from the rise of Pyrrhonism than from the Renaissance revival of the classical art of eloquence” (266).

\textsuperscript{196} This view is contested by most major scholars. Brian Vickers, among others, points out that many individuals like Sprat freely used rhetorical figures (for examples, see footnote 69). Skinner has detailed Hobbes's use of rhetorical techniques in writing against rhetoric in \textit{Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes} (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996).
plain speech as rhetoric that “denotes a lack of occult influence in language.”

Certainly the plain speech movement did not wish to remove metaphor completely—Stark, like Vickers and Skinner, points out that the proponents of plain speech often turned to metaphor in their own rhetoric. However, plain speech was characterized by “scientific” language—language that was concrete and could be used to refer back to empirically observed objects.

If we adopt this narrower definition of plain speech—speech that did not excise all evidence of rhetorical technique and figure, but that strove to ensure that words had specific meanings, could be used to refer to empirically observed phenomena, and, in the words of Wilbur Samuel Howell, “aligned itself...with the theory of scientific investigation”--we can why this style of rhetoric developed alongside the New Science and political liberalism. Stark argues that as the seventeenth century wore on, the standards of plainness became more severe. For the men at the forefront of this movement, “to write in a plain style...meant to emulate the objective methodology, tempered skepticism, and detached disposition of the new scientist.” Appeals to emotion once again came under fire, and calls went out for a detached, scientific mode of rhetoric—some of the more zealous members of the Royal Society, as we shall see,

198 In the writings of Luther, and especially Calvin, one can see a struggle between the precepts of classical rhetoric and the desire for a more plain speech. The controversy over whether or not priestly interpretation was necessary for understanding the Bible is related to the “plain speech” vs. classical rhetoric debate. The plain speech controversy as it relates to religious preaching is a very important element of this debate, but beyond the scope of this chapter. The issue is covered in great detail in Stark, op cit. and Vickers, op. cit.
199 For more on this aspect of plain speech, see the section on Locke in this chapter.
201 Stark, 326.
wished to make rhetoric resemble mathematics!\textsuperscript{202} One the central contentions of this chapter is that this concept of plain speaking is exclusionary and subject to the problem of homogeneity,\textsuperscript{203} thus making it an unsuitable foundation for politically persuasive rhetoric in a popular democracy. This contention will be examined in greater detail in the section on the Royal Society. First, we must return to the work of Francis Bacon, one of the first prophets of the New Science, and a careful, thoughtful reformer of rhetoric.

**Francis Bacon and the Redefinition of the Ends of Rhetoric**

Despite the fact that a chronological gap exists between Bacon and the major works of the Royal Society—Bacon published at the dawn of the seventeenth century and the *History of the Royal Society* was published in 1667—these men were working on a grand project whose culmination had profound effects on rhetoric and politics. Bacon laid the groundwork for a new scientific way of thinking that later members of the Royal Society seized upon and took to lengths that seem silly to us now, but represented a new spirit that would call into question the very foundations of the “old” system of thinking and the institutions that supported it. In Bacon, some of the earliest tenets of scientific rationalism, systematic thinking, and the mindset that gave the world the political system of liberalism and reigned supreme over the eighteenth century were given form. However, despite all this, Bacon himself was not a radical figure when it came to rhetoric. In his work we find praise for figurative language (so long as it is not abused, of course), permission to persuade, and a concern with reaching a popular audience. What is important to note is that Bacon directed these rhetorical flourishes in the defense of the

\textsuperscript{202} Stark writes, “To aspire to a style ‘as near the mathematical plainness’ as possible is the distinctive requirement of the Royal Society’s philosophy of style. Sprat and other members of the Society conceptualized mathematics and a universal and unambiguous form of writing” (326).

\textsuperscript{203} I define this a phenomenon where rhetoric is so wrapped up in exclusive vocabulary, experiences and cultural allusions that only a small, homogeneous group can both understand and communicate effectively.
new science and experimental method, not the type of popular political action embodied in rhetoric-as-
movere. In fact, his attitude toward popular audiences and more politicizes forms of persuasion was far more ambivalent than his views on other types of persuasion. We see this hesitation amplified in the work of those who followed him.

The important thing to note here about all the thinkers in this chapter (except Locke) is that their ends were not political. Their emphasis on non-political ends, combined with the shock of the English Civil War, placed political persuasion in a dangerous and lonely place. While rhetoric itself might have escaped criticism at some level, very few thinkers were coming out to praise rhetoric-as-
movere. Bacon wanted to grasp Truth—not Truth about God and other divine mysteries, but the Truth about Nature and the things of the earth. To this end, he developed and refined a system of philosophic inquiry that was based on logic and empirical observation, and not arguments from authority. He, like most of the other thinkers of this period, also criticized the excesses of figurative language in rhetoric.

Bacon's Essays provide key insights into his epistemology and his attitudes toward political action and persuasion, the hallmarks of rhetoric-as-
movere. Bacon was very suspicious of the passions that might support a proof of pathos, particularly if the passion in question was love. In his essay “Of Love,” he writes, “They do best who, if they cannot but admit love, yet make it keep quarter, and sever it wholly from their serious affairs and actions of life [my emphasis]; for if it check once with business, it troubleth men's fortunes, and maketh men that they can no ways be true to their own

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The essay “Of Boldness” is explicitly critical of the action impulse found in rhetoric-as-*movere*. The passage is lengthy, but critically important:

Question was asked of Demosthenes, *What was the chief part of an orator?* He answered, *Action*. What next? *Action*. What next again? *Action*. He said it that knew it best, and had by nature himself no advantage in that he commended. A strange thing, that the part of an orator which is but superficial, and rather the virtue of a player, should be placed so high above those other noble parts of invention, elocution and the rest—nay, almost alone as if it were all in all. But the reason is plain. There is in human nature generally more of the fool than of the wise; and therefore those faculties by which the foolish part of men's minds is taken are more potent. Wonderful like is the case of boldness in civil business...And yet boldness is a child of ignorance and baseness, far inferior to other parts. But nevertheless it doth fascinate and bind hand and foot those that are either shallow in judgment or weak in courage, which are the greatest part; yea, and prevaleth with wise men at weak times. Therefore we see it hath done wonders in popular states, but with senates and princes less...

This passage says multitudes of things about attitudes toward rhetoric-as-*movere*. It is critical to note that Bacon himself explicitly recognizes the link between politically persuasive rhetoric and popular government, and furthermore admits that rhetoric-as-*movere* is necessary for popular government (“Therefore we see it hath done wonders in popular states...”). Now Bacon likes neither rhetoric-as-*movere* nor popular government, but seeing as how our contemporary political universe is dominated by popular states Bacon's lament is simply another piece of evidence in favor of incorporating rhetoric-as-*movere* and its ability to inspire popular political action.

Clearly, Bacon disapproved of the type of action he imputed to Demosthenes (which, logically, would have to be some sort of political action, given Demosthenes’s status and profession) and felt that it was bold and dangerous. Other essays call attention

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205 Bacon, Francis. *The Essays*, edited by John Pitcher (New York: Penguin Classics, 1985), “Of Love.” Bacon reiterates this point in more quotable language: “…and therefore it was well said, *That it is impossible to love and to be wise*” (89) and “For whosoever esteemeth too much of amorous affection quitteth both riches and wisdom. This person hath his floods in the very times of weakness, which are great prosperity and great adversity...both which times kindle love and make it more fervent, and therefore show it to be the child of folly” (89).

to the type of action Bacon felt was acceptable. In “Of Great Place,” he advocates moderate action.\(^{207}\) In this same essay, he places a call for relative equality among interlocutors (it is interesting to note that Bacon imagines these instances of political communication and counsel as occurring in private) that would not be out of place in a theory of deliberative democracy: “but let it rather be said, When he sits in place, he is another man.”\(^{208}\) As we will see, it was this skeptical attitude toward popular action and bold action that led Bacon to redefine the appropriate ends of rhetoric.

For a more formal expression of Bacon's stance on rhetoric, we must turn to The Advancement of Learning (1605), where Bacon addressed, among a variety of other topics, the art of rhetoric. Bacon believed that rhetoric had an important place in the world, and was not something simply to be accommodated. He writes, “the duty and office of rhetoric, if it be deeply looked into, is no other than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to imagination, in order to excite the appetite and will.”\(^{209}\) There is even a persuasive element in Bacon's conception of rhetoric. However, as we have seen from his Essays, his idea of persuasion was tempered, particularly in the political arena.

Bacon was not as violent a critic of the rhetorical system as those who would follow him. Wilbur Samuel Howell has an apt description of the nature of Bacon’s criticism and its effect:

In other respects, Bacon’s work had tremendous consequences at home, particularly in its call for an experimental approach to knowledge and in its frank request for the development of a new arts and sciences. Although it cannot be said to have proposed a complete new rhetoric, as distinguished from

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\(^{207}\) Ibid., 91: “Reduce things to the first institution, and observe wherein and how they have degenerate, but yet ask counsel of both times: of the ancient nature, what is best; and of the latter time, what is fittest. Seek to make they course regular, that men may know beforehand what they may expect; but be not too positive and peremptory; and express thyself well when though digressest from thy rule.”

\(^{208}\) Ibid, 93.

Indeed, Howell hits the nail on the head. Bacon, more than any other man since perhaps Plato, stressed rhetoric’s duty to knowledge over its duty to the state in the political arena (the privileging of docere over movere), and thus began the redefinition of rhetorical ends. According to Vickers, for Bacon “there were two areas where metaphor was not welcome: scientific method and scientific observation.” However, in Bacon's aftermath, this caveat against metaphor and figures eventually expanded well beyond scientific observation into other realms such as politics. At some level, this contradicts Bacon's own system, which certainly made room for general persuasion. In her exhaustive study of Bacon's relationship to discourse, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse, Lisa Jardine notes that Baconian texts such as Colours of Good and Evil and The Antitheses of Things were meant to help an orator “ensure that the colour is presented in terms particularly suited to audience and occasion.” These are bold statements in favor of persuasion of all stripes.

However, these bold statements on persuasion must be read in light of the question of audience that Ong raises. James Stephens carefully considers the question of Bacon's audience and finds that even though Bacon used myths to communicate with a popular audience that “a fear of the common man informs all his works.” He draws on

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211 Vickers, “A Reassessment,” 12. This is the view taken by Wormald, who writes, “Condemnation of excesses and faults is more than offset by Bacon's commendation of rhetoric as an art, by thorough employment of it on his own part, by praise of its condition, and by approving explanations of its use” (88).
213 James Stephens, Francis Bacon and the Style of Science (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1975), 2.
Bacon's essays, notably, “Of Praise,” where Bacon writes, “For the common people understand not many excellent virtues. The lowest virtues draw praise from them...but of the highest virtues they have no sense or perceiving at all.”\(^\text{214}\) Stephens argues that Bacon did work very hard to develop a style of rhetoric that “preserved [scientific] content in its discovered form and delivered it with charm and persuasive force.”\(^\text{215}\) Presaging the techniques of Karl Marx—and to some extent, even Nietzsche—Bacon worked to make every audience member “feel superior, by virtue of...understanding”\(^\text{216}\) even though Bacon did not consider his popular audience part of his circle. Still, he worked to ensure that “the appeal is irresistible to become one of the chosen.”\(^\text{217}\)

It would have been fascinating if Bacon used this technique in a political context, but that end was not as important to him as persuading people to study natural science. He did not consider his entreaties in this regard successful,\(^\text{218}\) and laments his failure in the preface to *The Great Instaturation*. In his quest to preserve scientific advances, he laments that “among the masses, of course, the prospects for learning are bleaker still, for the popular love only what is 'contentious and pugnacious, or specious and empty,' and the effect of popular demand on would-be scholars is to pressure them into research which promises to reward the reputation.”\(^\text{219}\)

If Bacon was more moderate on the issues of persuasion *qua* persuasion and the use of figurative language, then why is he associated so strongly with a movement that is

\(^{214}\) “Of Praise,” 215.

\(^{215}\) Stephens, 4.


\(^{217}\) *Ibid.*, 14. What is critical to note is that once again, science is the end of persuasion. The complete quote is as follows: “The appeal is irresistible to become one of the chosen, and the distinction between rhetorical strategies could not be clearer. The new breed of inquirer will look for answers, not premises; he will challenge nature directly, using the tools of science, not the principles of debate” (14).

\(^{218}\) For Bacon's struggles with this, see Stephens, pgs. 5-14.

considered anti-rhetorical? I believe that this occurred for two reasons. First, was his redefinition of rhetorical ends. Second, the legacy of his followers and fellow New Scientists has affected our interpretation of Bacon. Whatever his misgivings, Bacon truly attempted to live up to the New Science principle of communication across classes. He was not nearly as subject to the problem of homogeneity as those who came after him. As Lisa Jardine notes, “It appears that Bacon uses the philosophical myths as a convincing medium for presenting unfamiliar scientific ideas to a popular audience, just as he advocates in discussing this 'method of discourse' in the De Augmentis survey of presentation of knowledge.”

However, Jardine also noted that political myths and political teachings took a backseat to those concerning natural science. For Bacon, persuasion is most acceptable when it concerns science and the discovery of real wisdom; this is the shift from rhetoric-as-*movere* to rhetoric-as-*docere*.

**Locke and the Essay**

John Locke's concept of the political, grounded in property and industry, and featuring citizens of mild appetites who were able to govern their own action with fairly limited interference from the sovereign, was a perfect accompaniment to Baconian New Science. Both Bacon's conception of science and Locke's conception of the citizen were grounded in a sense of industry and independence. Locke's conception of government-citizen relations allowed a wide private sphere for individuals pursue whatever they deemed worthy of their time, including scientific experimentation and empirical observation. Furthermore, Locke's conception of government, while grounded in

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221 Jardine, 192-3.
republican principles, did not place explicit duties on citizens in the way that previous republican systems did.\textsuperscript{223}

Locke's "liberal republicanism" is more sedate, and more buttressed than the republicanism of his predecessors and colleagues like Algernon Sidney.\textsuperscript{224} His conception of representation, when it was fully fleshed out in the eighteenth century, was easily connected to a rhetorical style that came from the plain speech tradition. Locke gives pride of place and sanctity to the natural order and law that he uses to create a set of natural rights that cannot be abridged. This move seems to respond to Hobbes's fears about the republicans and the popular instability that they represented. Whereas previous popular governments had been criticized because they were susceptible to the whims of the rabble, Locke's popular government established a bottom line—that notably did not have to be necessarily religious—to serve as a barrier to the more decadent whims of the populace. By doing so, Locke necessarily slowed down the process of government, and reduced the role of action.\textsuperscript{225}

Locke practiced what he preached from a citizenship standpoint and used his leisure time for a variety of productive activities, including the pursuit of the new scientific knowledge.\textsuperscript{226} His best-known work in this area is the \textit{Essay Concerning...}

\textsuperscript{223} It is clear that Locke radically reconceptualizes the duty relationship between citizen and sovereign. From Chapter VI of the Second Treatise: "But all these give no Authority, no right to any one of making Laws over him from whom they are owing. Also, A note from Laslett's introduction provides a small piece of evidence in this regard. Laslett writes, "He [Locke] is quite confident that civil laws do not necessarily oblige the individual conscience, but he maintains that there is a law of God..." ("Introduction", p. 35).

\textsuperscript{224} James Harrington may be an exception to this; however, Harrington was an unusual English republican. See Jonathan Scott, "The Rapture of Motion: James Harrington's Republicanism" from Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner,eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993).

\textsuperscript{225} Of course, representation as a principle in popular governments has always been a way to slow down the role of action.

\textsuperscript{226} For an extended discussion of the relationship between Locke and the members of the Royal Society, particularly Boyle, see the Introduction to Peter Walmsley's Locke's Essay and the Rhetoric of Science (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell UP, 2003). Note that this book is an expansion of the article "Dispute and
Human Understanding, which follows many of the Baconian principles and is especially concerned with empirical observation. It also contains a section entitled “On the Use of Words,” which might initially be read as attempt to meld plain speech and politics. However, I argue that Locke is dangerously close to being trapped in the problem of homogeneity, and that his conclusions from the Essay are not compatible with rhetoric-as-movere. This leaves us with a potentially dangerous hole in Lockean liberalism in terms of inspiring popular political action.

Locke's objections are rooted in a desire for plain speaking. In the Essay, Locke's major complaint against the use of words is “the using of words without clear and distinct ideas.” Also, men are inconsistent in their use of words, ascribing different meanings to them at different times, and most importantly for our purposes, “another abuse of language is an affected obscurity.” He lays much of the fault for this at the feet of the practice of disputation and the scholastic method. We see much in common with the Baconian project, and in the criticism of the scholastics Locke is in line with Sprat. Locke argues for plainness because he believes that “gibberish” is a good way to “cover [orators’] ignorance...and procure the admiration of others” while obscuring truth and stunting the promotion of knowledge. Locke is also critical of the subtle tricks of the philosophers who could “prove that white was black” and thus “had the advantage to

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227 For a philosophical reading of the Essay, see William Walker, Locke, Literary Criticism and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994).
228 See my discussion of the literature discussion liberalism and whether or not it engenders political apathy from the Introduction to this work.
230 Inconstancy is covered in Sec. 5 and affected obscurity is covered in Sec. 6. Affected obscurity may be brought about by “either applying old words to new and unusual significations; or introducing new and ambiguous terms, without defining either; or else putting them so together as may confound their ordinary meaning.”
231 Ibid., Secs. 7-8.
destroy the instruments and means of discourse, conversation, instruction and society.”

While there is a more populist sensibility in Locke's text than we see (perhaps) in Bacon and (certainly) in the work of the Royal Society, again, the discussion of political ends is nearly absent. This entire chapter is devoted to the ends of knowledge, much in the mode of Bacon.

This is not to say that politics are absent from the Essay. There is political space and an explicit discussion of the phenomenon of obscured language on justice and religion (Secs. 12-13), wherein Locke concludes that “language...should not be employed to darken truth and unsettle people's rights; to raise mists, and render unintelligible both morality and religion.”

There is also the famous passage on men and their opinions, which they perhaps hold “only because they never questioned, never examined their own Opinions?” Indeed, the consequences of such behavior tend to be men acting “with the greatest stiffness...generally being the most fierce and firm in their Tenets,” and, perhaps the most likely to instigate civil strife. Thus, argue interpreters of the Essay, there are many civic connections in the work.

Despite this, the overall tenor of Chapter X of the Essay is in keeping with the Baconian spirit. The final section of the chapter is a criticism of the excesses of rhetoric and its potential for deception. Locke laments, “I cannot but observe how little the

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232 The quotations from this paragraph are taken from Secs. 8-10.
233 Ibid., Sec. 13. I must reiterate what I said in footnote 27 about the preaching controversy in plain speech. It was crucial, but a discussion is beyond my scope.
236 Peters, 226-7.
237 Walmsley is careful to note Locke's “easy middle style enlivened by occasional descents into colloquial diction,” (“Dispute and Conversation,” 390), but this is by no means an indicator that Locke approved of certain types of rhetoric.
preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind; since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred.”

It seems that the entire point of rhetoric is reduced to the transmission of knowledge and learning, and any discussion of persuasive rhetoric along the lines of rhetoric-as-movere has fallen out of the conversation. Of course, a review of other sections of the Essay demonstrate otherwise, and there is a clear political connection in Locke that is absent many of the other scientific thinkers of the period, but it is a confused connection, and it is a connection that is somewhat at odds with the basic principle of political movere itself.

**Scientific Knowledge and Symbolic Reality: The Royal Society and Rhetoric**

In the *History of the Royal Society*, Thomas Sprat comments on rhetoric and its relationship to the new conception of experimental knowledge in a variety of places, but most notably in the very beginning of the work and in the third part defending experimental education. The view that emerges is a complex one. While it might seem on an initial reading that Sprat and his fellows were entirely opposed to rhetoric on the grounds that it spurred action itself, we see that their opposition is only to certain kinds of action, certain types of ends. In the third part of the work, Sprat sets up a dichotomy between political action and scientific action, favoring the latter and thus confirming his place in the Baconian project.

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238 Sec. 34. The quote continues, “It is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is publicly taught, and has always been had in great reputation: and I doubt not but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality, in me to have said thus much against it.”


240 This is not an uncommon view, but Vickers reminds us, “Sprat's *History* is an official, quasi-commissioned document, written in straightforward English prose, but with a free use of rhetoric, both of figures (various forms of parallelism) and tropes (especially metaphor).” Vickers, “A Reassessment,” 3.
While Sprat was not trying to subdue all political action, the many goals of this third part of the History, which include separating the contemplative philosopher from the man of active experimentation and distinguishing the experimental curriculum from the curricula of the medieval and Renaissance periods, lead to confusion on this point, particularly when read with the criticism of rhetoric and statesmen from the early part of the text. However, the language that Sprat uses to describe the experimental man is a language of industry that is quite similar to that of John Locke, and I would argue that a Lockean political actor and a Spratean man of science could co-exist in one and the same person.

Why then, are Sprat and the men of the Royal Society part of the story of the decline of rhetoric-as-movere? There are three reasons. First, these men were certainly wary of action in the political arena, and some of them, such as John Wilkins, appeared to be very hostile. Second, the ideas of these men were read in conjunction with those of Thomas Hobbes, and the fused position that emerged combined the thorough and well developed experimental curriculum and defense of scientific knowledge found in Sprat and Bacon with the uncharitable view of human nature and fear-based political theory of Hobbes. Third, over time the increasing professionalization of the experimental man changed the experimenter from an independent and curious amateur man of industry to a credentialed individual subject to rules and codes exclusive to that profession. This was concurrent with a rise in the problem of homogeneity.

The first pages of Thomas Sprat's History of the Royal Society take their place in the tradition of rhetorical criticism that goes back to Plato. Sprat wished to defend Bacon's program of thought because he believed that only experimental philosophy could

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241 This argument is made in the next chapter, which focuses on the influence of Hobbes.
give humanity “room to differ without animosity.” In this desire for peaceable relations, he is a brother in arms of Thomas Hobbes. In the first pages, Sprat traces the history of knowledge, and while he does not criticize rhetoric explicitly, he implicitly implies that rhetoric is the tool of those who have not yet arrived at “Real Knowledge.” In his discussion of the early Greek poets, he writes, “And that they might the better insinuate their opinions into their hearers minds, the set them off with the mixture of Fables, and the ornaments of Fancy” [emphasis added]. More important for our purposes is his complaint about the methods employed by the Greek and Roman philosophers and statesmen. Sprat argues that “instead of joining all their strength to overcome the secrets of Nature...they fell into an open dissention, to which of them, her spoyls did belong.”

The History of the Royal Society raises the question of whether or not the language and institutions that existed in England at that time were at all conducive to the pursuit of Real Knowledge. Rhetoric, the system of the “many subtleties of confuting and defending.” created dissent, and that dissent stunted the pursuit of truth, which was the ultimate goal of human inquiry, according to Sprat, and the Royal Society. However, in all his discussion of the pursuit of truth, Sprat does not give any real time to a serious discussion of political institutions. This is somewhat unusual, since peace, a real political consideration, is so important to Sprat because it is a necessary condition for experimental inquiry. He writes, “Such studies as these [studies in the pursuit of Real

242 Prof. John Guillory’s phrase.
244 Ibid., 9. The complete quote reads as follows: “Factions were made: many subtleties of confuting, and defending were invented: but so instead of joining all their strength to overcome the secrets of Nature (all which would have been little enough, though never so wisely manag’d) they onely did that, which has undone many such great attempts, before they had yet fully conquer’d her; they fell into an open dissention, to which of them, her spoyls did belong.”
Knowledge], as they must receive incouragement from the Sovereign Authority, so they
must come up in a peaceful time, when mens minds are at ease, and their imaginations
not disturb’d, with the cares of preserving their Lives and Fortunes.”

Despite this belief, Sprat held politics, the art by which peace is achieved, in great disdain:

But besides this, there have been also several other professions, which have
drawn away the Inclinations of Men, from prosecuting the naked and unfettered
Truth. And of these I shall chiefly name the affairs of State, the administration
of Civil Government, and the execution of Laws. These by their fair dowry of
gain, and honour, have always allur’d the greatest part of the men of Art, and
reason, to addict themselves to them: while the search into severer knowledge
has been lookt on, as a study out of the way, fitter for a melancholy humorist, or
a retir’d weak spirit, then to make men equal to business, or serviceable to their
Country. And in this, methinks the Experimental Philosophy has met with very
hard usage.

This hostility to practical politics, despite the fact that it is a necessary thing to achieve
Sprat’s desired goal of peace, seem to go hand in hand with the symbolic language work
of John Wilkins.

In works such as An Essay Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical
Language (1668) and An Alphabetical Dictionary (1668), Wilkins categorizes the
world and then creates a language of symbols to go alongside those categories. In doing
so, Wilkins moves language closer and closer to his interpretation of the perfect learned
paradigm. He also renders language completely ineffective for those individuals who are
not as educated as he and his ilk. Symbolic language would certainly succeed in creating

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246 Ibid., 26.
247 For more on this work, and philosophical critique, see Jorge Luis Borges, “The Analytical Language of John Willkins” in Other Inquisitions: 1937–1952 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993). Borges points out the obvious difficulties and ambiguities in Wilkins’ scheme, starting with his contestable forty-class division of the universe.
248 In this work, Wilkins merely categorizes the words of the English language as they are—he does not attempt to put them in symbolic terms. However, the mindset that led him to work on his project of symbolic language shines through in this work as well.
a political discourse that did not move people to conflict, which was an outcome that
would have pleased him.\(^ {249} \) However, it would also limit the number of people prepared
to participate in the discourse so severely that its positive effects would be negated by the
fact that the rest of society would be engaging in a bastardized form of the old discourse
that was even less regulated than it had been before. While Wilkins “did not speak for
all the scientists or reformers” and “no one else showed any sign of wishing to abolish
written or spoken language,”\(^ {250} \) in breaking this ground he shifted the center of discourse
on what was appropriate, and he did so in a way that contributed to the intellectual
neglect of rhetoric-as-movere.

While the attitude toward rhetoric, particularly rhetoric-as-movere, seems rather
negative, when we look at the third part of the History, a subtler picture emerges. The
general goal of the program of education described in Part III, Sections iv-xii of the
History is indebted to Baconianism, empiricism and the new views of proof. Sprat asks,
“were it not as profitable to apply the eyes, and the hands of Children, to see, and to
touch all the several kinds of sensible things, as to oblige them to learn, and remember
the difficult Doctrines of general Arts?”\(^ {251} \) To reduce it to one simple question, Sprat
asks, “Whether a Mechanical Education would not excel the Methodical?”\(^ {252} \)

This tactile and mechanical education is set up as a direct response to the
educational vestiges of Scholasticism and some of the intellectual excesses of the

\(^ {249} \) William Lynch writes, “Constructing a consistently referential language was seen as one way to build a
natural philosophy founded upon things themselves, reflecting an interest in Baconian epistemology as well
as growing suspicion that fanciful notions fed the enthusiasm behind much of the religious and political
turmoil of the time” (118).
\(^ {251} \) History, 329.
\(^ {252} \) Ibid., 329.
Renaissance. Sprat frequently refers to the artifice of previous systems of learning, explicitly criticizing parts of the rhetorical method such as invention and performance [delivery], and further criticizes them for overkill. In an attack on *copia*, Sprat writes, “...Knowledge which is only founded on thoughts and words, has seldom any other end, but the *breeding* and *increasing* of more thoughts and words.” Experimental philosophy, on the other hand, does not create thoughts and words that will simply expire in the ether. It creates real satisfaction and true knowledge that can be observed and shared meaningfully with others. As Vickers reads it, it is this criticism of excess, not or rhetoric itself, that marks the main accomplishment of the *History*. However, I suggest that if we read part III closely, we see that indeed, rhetoric may be preserved in its “traditional role as the protector of good against evil,” but that the dichotomy of good and evil refers, for Sprat, strictly to the pursuit of knowledge. In terms of the political function of rhetoric, the criticism is more severe because the ends of rhetoric, once again, have been redefined.

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253 *Ibid*, 332: “I confes the Ancient Philosophy will hardly be able to vindicate itself from this charge [of making men “too plentiful in their thoughts”]: For its chief purpose is to enlarge the fancy, and to fill the head with the matter and artifice of discours.” On p. 337 Sprat attacks, in part, the argument from authority: “Another Principal mischief to be avoided, is the conformity of our Actions to times past, and not the present. This extravagance is generally imputed to *studious* men...” Indeed, “Experimental Philosophy will prevent mens spending the strength of their thoughts about *Disputes*, by turning them to *Works*” (341). Finally, on p. 341: “The *Formal* man may be compar’d to the meer *Speculative Philosopher*: For he vainly reduces every thing to grave and solemn general *Rules*, without discretion, or mature deliberation.”


255 Looking through Part II of the *History* and reading the “Method for making a History of the Weather” by Mr. Hook, “Proposal for making Wine” by Dr. Goddard, “Mr. Rook’s Discourses Concerning the Observations of the Eclipses of the Satellites of Jupiter,” and “Experiments on the Recoiling of Guns” by Lord Brouncker, we can see the varied applications of experimental philosophy and the practical knowledge to which they aspired. Indeed, these subjects are a far cry from the subjects of scholastic disputation.

256 See Vickers, “A Reassessment,” 6-7, esp., “Sprat is not attacking language but the excesses of language: he speaks of a “luxury and redundance” of speech...” (6).
One thing clearly emerges from the pages of the *History*. The experimental man is a man of reality and a man of a certain type of action. Unlike the imaginary satisfaction of the speculative man, the experimental man “is drawn from things that are not out of the world, but in it.”\(^{257}\) Experimental education is useful because it is “excellent preparation toward any habit or faculty of life whatsoever” since all things “effected by *mortal Industry*”\(^{258}\) can be improved with experimental knowledge. As we have seen, the connections to the language of John Locke are unmistakable. However, the type of action that Sprat advocates in the *History* is not necessarily conducive to the practice of politics for two reasons. First, Sprat seems to set up a division between scientific action and political action, with preference for the former. Second, Sprat's work suffers from the problem of homogeneity. It is very clear that he is composing this work for a limited audience of educated men of leisure, and that the exclusionary problems outlined by Ryan Stark certainly affected the political use of this work.

We have already seen the ways in which Sprat criticizes the actions of statesmen and takes a sour view of politics. However, he also criticizes scholastic and Renaissance modes of education: “[The education] weakens mens arms, and slackens all the sinews of action.”\(^{259}\) He praises experimentation because it is action and takes great pains to distinguish the experimental man from the “meer contemplative man [who] is obnoxious to this error [of lofty and romantic thinking].”\(^{260}\) Indeed, what emerges here is really

\(^{258}\) Both quotations in this sentence are *ibid.*, p. 337. There are more examples of this language. Continuing the first quotation from p. 341 cited in footnote 82, Sprat continues, “That it may well be attended by the united *Labors* of many, without wholly devouring the time of those that *labor*."
\(^{259}\) *Ibid.*, 332. The complete quotation is as follows: “It weakens mens arms, and slackens all the sinews of action: for so it commonly happens, that such earnest disputers evaporate all the strength of their minds in arguing, questioning and debating; and tire themselves out before they come to the *Practise*."
more a critique of the medieval and scholastic period than the Renaissance itself. Sprat was repulsed by the stasis, but instead of pushing for breakthroughs via *movere*, he supported them via *docere*, construed as the pursuit of real knowledge through experimental methods.

Experiments lit a path to a wonderful future. Sprat eloquently sings their praises: “they bring us home to ourselves, they make us live in *England*, and not in *Athens* or *Sparta*; at this present time and not three thousand years ago: though they permit us to reflect on what has bin done in *former Ages*; yet they make use chiefly to regard and contemplat the things that are in our *view*. What happened to this dream? I argue that it fell victim to the problem of homogeneity. Sprat gives us a clear picture of his audience, and it is a homogeneous one. Vickers estimates that there were approximately 100 men in the circle of the Royal Society at the time that Sprat and Wilkins were doing their work. Walmsley points out that the preferred modes of exchange among English scientists were “private networks or correspondence and small gatherings.” Sprat argues that experiments “expect no more than what [the experimenters’] business, nay even their very *recreations* can spare,” asserting that his audience of experimental men

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261 Vickers disagrees, but I believe that Sprat's bone to pick with scholastic artifice was more significant that his (important) complaints about *copia*. Sprat writes on p. 339, “It cannot be denied, but the men of *Reading* do very much busy themselves about such *conception*, which are no where to be found out of their own Chambers. The *sense*, the *custom*, the *practice*, the *judgment* of the world, is quite a different thing from what they imagine it to be in private. And therefore it is no wonder, if when they come broad into business, the sign of Men, the Tumult and noise of Cities, and the very brightness of Day it self affright them: Like that *Rhetorician*, who having bin us'd to declaim in the shade of a *School*, when he came to plead a true cause in the open *Air*, desir'd the judges to remove their Seat under som roof, because the *light* offended him.”


263 Vickers, 25.

264 Walmsley, 17. In “Dispute and Conversation,” Walmsley concludes that “Boyle clearly aspires toward polite conversation” and that this desire is “an expression of both his own social status and the class composition of his scientific audience” (both quotes, p. 387).

265 *Ibid.*, 333, and the complete quote is as follows: “From the rest they expect no more but what their *business*, nay even their very *recreations* can spare. It is the continuance and perpetuity of such
had to have access to a type of education and a quantity of leisure time that excluded many people from entering the circle of discussion. We see further evidence of this in the Latinate writing and a vocabulary “so abstruse, so artificial, as to be almost out of touch with the subject matter.” Vickers concludes that, “This Latinity defeats one of the main ideals of the New Sciences, communication and cooperation open to all classes of English readers, for such language is comprehensible only by an educated philologist who works from books, not life.” This is in complete contradiction to the talk of action and the move away from contemplation that Sprat promised us in the History.

The problem of homogeneity was already evident in the New Science movement before the close of the seventeenth century. Stark finds that this rhetorical movement had the potential to create a broad gap among different groups of people in England. While the consequences for rhetoric-as-movere were perhaps not immediately obvious, these attitudes toward audience and the effects of the redefinition of rhetorical ends reverberated into the eighteenth century and the “polite” middle class plain speech advocated by thinkers such as Adam Smith and David Hume. The focus on conversation and intimate group settings was picked up by figures like Shaftesbury, and perpetuated the problem of small, homogeneous groups that had little chance to achieve active political gains. As the New Science's advances in epistemology took root in a variety of disciplines, even the humanistic ones, and the quest for knowledge became increasingly professionalized and confined to the universities, the problem of homogeneity became more severe, as did the neglect of any serious conception of rhetoric-as-movere.

*Philosophical labours*, to which they principally trust; which will both allow a sufficient relaxation to all the particular laborers, and will also give good assurance of the happy issue of their work at the last.”

266 Vickers, 34.
268 The plain speech style had “damaging implications for women…and the working class.” Stark, 330.
Conclusion

The work of thinkers like Francis Bacon, John Wilkins and Thomas Sprat was an early and important part of the sweeping movement that started the transition to what we would call the modern period with its hallmarks of the scientific revolution, capitalism, and liberalism. While there may be nothing more than an elective affinity among those things, the mindset they instilled had profound consequences for political communication in the eighteenth century and beyond. A desire to tame rhetoric—to shape it so that it could be used in the process of empirical scientific inquiry—dominated an important category of English intellectual discourse in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This desire meshed with the relatively static political legacy of the medieval/Renaissance period and the Renaissance logicians' critique of rhetoric and its proofs to create the critique of \textit{movere}—the political purpose of rhetoric itself.

Writing in response to the controversies over \textit{copia}, tropes and the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic, Petrus Ramus created a critique of the great pillars of classical rhetorical education like Aristotle and Quintilian. The focus of the critique was the problem with Aristotelian proofs like \textit{pathos}, the confusion of rhetoric with dialectic, and Quintilian’s use of tropes. Ramus condemned most tropes (or their overuse) and argued for the separation of rhetoric and dialectic. The intellectual class took a hold of the new dialectic, and rhetoric-as-\textit{movere}, which was not needed overmuch due to the general dearth of opportunities for popular political participation, declined in prestige.

The critique of \textit{movere} could not have gained the steam it did in the seventeenth century without the work and influence of Francis Bacon. Bacon’s system of

\footnote{269 There are, of course, always exceptions to a statement like this. Even in absolute monarchies such as France, there was popular action from Huguenot dissidents and others. In England, of course, the tumult of the 1640s and 1650s neatly separated the early Bacon from Sprat’s \textit{History of the Royal Society}.}
experimental, empirical philosophical inquiry ignited a zest for scientific knowledge (Sprat’s “Real Knowledge”) in the men of the Royal Society, both during and after the events of the 1640s and 1650s. While Bacon did not reject the classical rhetorical system, he did something else that was critically important. He redefined rhetoric's proper end as persuading individuals that the New Science and pursuit of true knowledge was the most worthy endeavor.\textsuperscript{270} Bit by bit, the classical rhetorical system was being looted. Ramus stole dialectic and Bacon stole docere. Less than 200 years after Bacon started writing, the system would be so fragmented as to be ineffective. Indeed, all that would be left behind for the vultures, carrion feeders and demagogues would be the improper demagogic function of rhetoric-as-movere.

In the concluding chapters of this work, I will argue that the neglect of rhetoric-as-movere and the subsequent development and refinement of rhetoric-as-docere eliminates a very important inspirational component. In the next chapter, I argue that the work of Hobbes meshed well with the New Scientists' redefinition of the ends of rhetoric. Whereas the Classical Objection to rhetoric-as-movere had been aimed only at its improper function, this Hobbesian Objection called all of rhetoric-as-movere’s functions into question, even the legitimate restraining function. This was a radical move. Republican states established political institutions like legislatures that were based on the very idea that through language, through discussion, through the proper use of rhetoric, violent conflict could be avoided, and a peaceful solution for the problems of the people could be found. To call the legitimate urging function of movere into question was to call into question the very foundation of key republican institutions.

\textsuperscript{270} At some level, this is all rehashing Plato, but the fact that Bacon was concerned with the empirical rather than the metaphysical is important.
While Thomas Hobbes still chose to work within the old framework—to a point—and used that framework in an attempt to undermine the English republican movement in the 1640s and 1650s, the idea of movere troubled Hobbes and he was easily bright enough to recognize the relationship between movere and what could loosely be called “republican” principles, especially the desire for (vain)glory, which, for Hobbes, was bad enough when perverted by kings and nobles. However, the possibility of (vain)glory being a popular goal was intolerable. Thus, he felt compelled to strike at the source of his opponents' power: rhetoric-as-movere and its power to inspire.

In the fifth chapter, I will show how Adam Smith and David Hume took up the mantle of Bacon and his fellows in the eighteenth century. Smith and Hume were nowhere near as radical as their intellectual forefathers, but as we shall soon see, they kept pushing the rhetorical system in the same direction as Sprat and Wilkins. Their “polite” middle class rhetoric is the less revolutionary descendant of symbolic language, and demonstrates the (impossible to predict) cooling effect of professionalization and the problem of homogeneity on the goals of the seventeenth century New Scientists. The active and amateur part of the New Science declined. At the same time, the scientific method perhaps reached its zenith of influence in intellectual circles and was considered the paradigm for intellectual discourse, even for those in the humane disciplines such as political theory.\textsuperscript{271} This legacy, which is contrary to the serious treatment of rhetoric-as-movere, has endured down to the contemporary period.

\textsuperscript{271} Of course, there were prominent thinkers who attacked this phenomenon. Rousseau's First Discourse on the Arts and Sciences is probably the most notable work in this vein.
Hobbes Against Movere

We now come to one of the most crucial and frequently studied “test cases” of the historical affinity between rhetoric-as-movere and popular political participation: the English Civil War. Those who follow in the tradition of Quentin Skinner and David Johnston consider this period to be the crucial moment in the history of modern rhetoric in the English speaking tradition. During the English Civil War and the pamphlet debate that surrounded it, we see, for the first time, the learning and rhetorical attitudes of the new empirical science specifically brought to bear on a major question of politics.

Indeed, if we apply the theories and concepts introduced earlier, the English Civil War represents a moment where historical circumstances such as the solidification of the merchant middle class, increased literacy and increasing animosity toward the aristocracy opened the window for political participation. Proponents—particularly against the Crown, but not necessarily—embraced the techniques and philosophy of rhetoric-as-movere, which were easily “accessible” through the religious life of the time,\footnote{Indeed, the \textit{ars praedicandi} tradition had not vanished during the medieval period, but continued to flourish alongside empirical scientific treatises. While the two genres informed each other, the \textit{ars praedicandi} tracts, even late into the seventeenth century, did not lose their focus on the necessity of persuasion.} and were able to sustain popular involvement in the “Good Old Cause” for decades. The case of the English Civil War seems to provide further evidence for my earlier claims that rhetoric-as-movere is necessary to keep the window of participation open. The instability of the Interregnum also seems to provide some preliminary evidence for my claim that a
political society that uses rhetoric-as-movere to engender more widespread political participation will also have to deal with increased instability.\textsuperscript{273}

Working against this we have Thomas Hobbes and those of his ilk. Indeed, Hobbes's objections to rhetoric-as-movere and the political power of persuasion were not wholly new; they were quite similar to Plato's. The key difference is that Hobbes’s ultimate conclusion was not that the improper demagogic function of rhetoric-as-movere was dangerous, but that rhetoric-as-movere in any form, even its legitimate urging and restraining forms, was dangerous because, in Hobbes’s view, the volatile political environment of a society that widely accepted rhetoric-as-movere would always necessarily be too unstable to ensure a high quality of life. Indeed, when faced with the historical record of the Protectorate, one has to conclude that Hobbes had a point. Despite this demolition of movere, Hobbes did not specifically attack the rhetorical curriculum or devote his efforts toward prescribing rhetoric-as-docere as a solution to the problem (even though he had some affinities with those authors who argued for a more deliberative and empirical style, even in political debate).

Indeed, part of the problem in dealing with the changes in rhetorical theory in this period is that it is not all that evident that those who caused the change (i.e., Hobbes) were looking to cause the changes in rhetoric. I will argue later on in this chapter that any Hobbesian attacks that may have happened to include rhetoric-as-movere were really aimed toward “republicanism” and when we examine the individual pamphlet exchanges,

\textsuperscript{273} I feel I must reiterate what I noted in the Introduction to this work; I do not wish to make explicit causal relationships between the presence of rhetoric-as-movere and the presence or absence of things like instability. I am merely trying to establish an historical affinity and pattern—that when we see rhetoric-as-movere, we also almost always see increased popular participation and stability. Other elements enter the causal mix, and the historical chain of causality that opens the window itself appears to be divorced from the presence or absence of rhetoric-as-movere, but in this key social upheaval, and in the multiple key social upheavals I will examine in Chs. 5-7, we consistently see rhetoric-as-movere being properly deployed.
we see arguments that are traditionally “rhetorical.” One of the major conclusions that emerges from chapters three and four read together is that this moment of defeat for rhetoric-as-
*movere* was, at some level, accidental. When opponents of British republicanism began to use arguments grounded in a more modern rhetoric-as-
*docere* mindset, they were doing so while following the *logic* of classical rhetoric. There was not a conscious, philosophically driven effort to divorce rhetoric-as-
*movere* from rhetoric-as-
*docere* or to diminish the importance of classical republicanism. However, the political circumstances of the time were far more open to widespread popular political action than they had been in reasonable memory. Thus, *in the moment*, rhetoric-as-
*movere* and classical republicanism were dangerous from the perspective of the Royalists and their allies. Using different types of persuasion, these authors attacked *movere* and republicanism because, in their view, the necessity of the moment dictated it. However, this move, even though it might have been motivated more by necessity than a serious and sustained examination of rhetorical philosophy in England, dovetailed in a most fortunate way with the developments in scientific method and investigation that also occurred in this time period.

From the perspective of rhetoric-as-
*movere*, there was another development of importance during this time. In some of the English republican pamphleteers, we see the use of what I termed in chapter two as “just revolution rhetoric.” This rhetorical style was deployed by those who felt that the mere legitimate urging function of rhetoric-as-
*movere* was not effective because kingly prerogative constrained liberty. This rhetorical style was angry rhetoric and urged violent action, leading to instability and regime change.
Despite the more hysterical claims of individuals on the republican side who employed this just revolution rhetoric, there was certainly a place for rhetoric-as-*movere* in seventeenth century Britain even during the reign of Charles I. Through the pamphlet discourse, we can see all the functions I have just described in play. The republican pamphlets tried to move people to action using both proper urging and improper demagogic methods. On occasion, they also argued using the restraining function of classical rhetoric. Those arguing for the Crown used the restraining function of republican rhetoric. However, Hobbes argued for restraint in a relatively new way, by adopting tactics and language made possible by the new mode of thinking behind the scientific-empirical movement. As we have already established, this particular mode was very hostile to the root rhetoric-as-*movere* behind not only improper demagoguery, but also proper republican urging.

Hobbes's actions are particularly important because scholars in political theory have sided with Hobbes on this particular quarrel; most intellectuals and educated people have as well, at least in theory if not in practice. I would argue that those who are forced to actually do participatory politics have not sided with Hobbes, but that is an issue that will be touched upon in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Whatever the case there, I believe that we scholars must reconsider the choice we have made in this matter. By accepting Hobbes's course of action we also seem to have accepted the particular grounds for his objection—i.e., the fear of the power of persuasion. We reject the claim that, even though it creates instability, rhetoric-as-*movere* is necessary to foster proper participation in a popular government. In making both of these moves, we help to create and validate the “fear foundation” for liberalism that has its roots in Hobbes.
I argue that if we accept this fear foundation for liberalism as it is, and reject rhetoric-as-

movere and republican elements of governance on those grounds, we position ourselves to be forever frustrated by the question of citizen participation. While a polity whose liberalism is grounded on the fear foundation will probably have stability and do a reasonably good job of safeguarding the basic rights and liberties of its citizens, it will never yield the robust political participation that political theorists and political scientists desire as a protection against the corruption of a popular government. Certainly there are many solutions to this problem—to propose a Rousseauan republic or a localized communitarian government are only some of the options. I argue that if we are willing to go beyond Hobbes's fear foundation for liberalism just a little bit, and reintroduce rhetoric-as-
movere and some of the political instability that comes with it, we can go a long way toward restoring some hope for more robust popular political participation.

Of course, the voluminous literature on Hobbes and rhetoric has revealed Hobbes's own use of rhetoric and has drawn attention to the more nuanced position of his later work. Indeed, I am not arguing that Hobbes was an extremist who strongly believed in the “truth” of rhetoric-as-
docere as the only proper way of political communication. Hobbes's objection to rhetoric-as-
movere was that it was dangerous and fueled the flames of vainglorious republicanism that nearly destroyed England. Hobbes is right and based his objection on a reasonable historical claim. It is unclear how “far” Hobbes wanted to go with his criticisms of persuasion, but those who picked up (perhaps without proper attention to nuance) his critique of persuasion combined with the late seventeenth century evangelists for the “new science.” I argue that this combination of views was the beginning of the creation of a “new view” of rhetoric-as-
movere and rhetoric-as-
docere
that appropriated the urging and restraining functions of republican rhetoric and reformed them as functions of rhetoric-as-*docere*. In doing so, they made those functions of rhetoric-as-*move re* less effective and left demagoguery and just revolution rhetoric as the only remaining functions of *movere*, thus further damaging *movere*'s reputation among intellectuals.

**The Historical Climate**

To accept the case of the British seventeenth century as a demonstration of the historical affinity between the opportunity for political action and the effectiveness of rhetoric-as-*move re*, we must briefly establish the historical climate of the time. Historians of fifteenth and sixteenth century England have devoted much scholarship to the development of the country's middle class during that period. The new emergent class has also been examined by Chaucer scholars as a critical influence on *The Canterbury Tales.* As this new class solidified, it acquired the leisure time necessary to engage in reading and learning. Given the excellent widespread literacy in England, and the accessibility of print material after the landmark 1485 publication of Caxton's edition of Malory, not only did more people have access to wealth in England than ever before, more people had access to political and social ideas than ever before. It was a rather different situation before the widespread availability of printed material; before printing, the limited ability to disseminate the knowledge of politics meant that numbers of people with access to political influence remained quite small. That situation had led to the ossification discussed in the previous chapter and partially explains why the debates about rhetoric involved persuasion on arcane bits of knowledge, the relationship between

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rhetoric and poetry, the question of the vernacular, and questions of literary
ornamentation of language. Political questions and questions of popular political action
could not be central during this time. The historical window of popular participation was
closed, or only propped open a little.

In the latter part of the sixteenth century, the situation in Ireland foreshadowed the
troubles of the 1630s and 1640s, and all sides, both revolutionary and status quo, started
to reconsider how rhetoric-as-*movere* could assist their cause. One of their more notable
literary figures of the sixteenth century, Sir Philip Sidney, was adamant about the need
for action in his *A Defence of Poesy*. He was quite critical of those who lived the
contemplative life, and argued that thought and rhetoric without action would only lead to
degeneration. Nicholas Canny quotes Sidney in this work: “[I] can endure at no time to
be idle and void of action.”275 The situation around him undoubtedly motivated his
opinion: his father, Sir Henry Sidney, was serving as governor of Ireland for Queen
Elizabeth, and had to deal with the various insurrections, rebellions, and other problems
attendant with the position. As Canny has detailed, one of the most pressing problems
was the corruption of the Old English officials and captains serving in the Pale,276 who
were likely to take bribes and bend rules so long as they could exploit the local Gaelic
lords.277 There was no time for Sidney to sit and be patient, and this held not only for
him, but for most of the English *intelligentsia*. Violent protest had forced open the
window of popular political participation in Ireland278 and Sidney, along with some of the

The connection between poetry and action is also discussed at length by Blair Worden in *The Sound of
276 The Pale was the area surrounding Dublin that marked the English seat and stronghold of power in Ireland.
277 Canny, *op. cit.*, ch. 2
278 Bringing, of course, instability.
other English elites, realized that now that the popular participation window was opened, “their side” would have to adopt a more favorable position toward movere/action or face being overrun by the revolutionaries.

We see a similar recognition in the literary and political work of Edmund Spenser. Spenser was a minor official in Ireland who participated in the Munster Plantation experiment and wrote political treatises on affairs in Ireland (A View of the Present State of Ireland), but he is best known as the author of the epic poem the Faerie Queene. The Faerie Queene takes the same line as Sidney in dealing with action. Canny writes: “The corollary to this—which was also made manifest in the Faerie Queene—was that, without this continuous activity for the attainment of godly purpose, even persons of the highest rank and most commendable education would be seduced by the evil they had been appointed to destroy.” While one could argue that the calls for action represent the seeds of popular government (somewhat ironic, as the solution that Spenser had in mind for Ireland was drastically anti-republican), it is also easy to conclude that Sidney and Spenser represent a time nearly foreign to us: a time when educated and literate elites did not fear the power of rhetoric-as-movere.

Returning to Spenser himself, we see that in both the View and FQ, as Canny points out, he advocates the active use of violence. Another treatise, Solon, his Follie.

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279 Canny, 14.
280 One might be able to make the case that the Irish situation clearly demonstrates the problems with Rousseau’s “forced to be free” dictum, as the English reformers, who continued with their plans in Ireland long after popular government had been established in England, Scotland and Wales, justified their continued meddling by reasoning that the Irish people were not ready for liberty, and that what they possessed was liberty of the wildest sort and unsuited for any civil people. They had to be converted to Protestantism and made receptive to the English common law before they could be considered ready for the freedoms enjoyed elsewhere in Britain.
281 Ibid, 14. “...a close reading of the entire poem indicates that the essential “lesson by example” which Spenser conveyed consistently was the belief of zealous Protestants in England (and ironically of zealous Catholics where that religion was dominant) that evil could be overcome only through confrontation, and
written by Richard Beacon, which thinly disguises the England-Ireland situation in the
clothing of Athens’ dealings with Salamina, has Hobbesian echoes. In his opening
address to Queen Elizabeth, Beacon writes, “…for that you have changed the life of man
which before your time was rude, cruell, and wilde, in Irelande, and brought it for the
most part to be obedient, gentle and civill, in such sort as we may truly say with the
subject of Irelande.”

This language is obviously quite similar to the famous
description of Hobbes’s state of nature that we see in the Leviathan. In this work, Beacon
calls for “an absolute and thorough reformation of the whole bodye of the common-
weale, namely of the ancient lawes, customes, governments and manners of the
people.”

This follows in the same vein as Spenser’s View: violence, conflict and combat are necessary to achieve the Crown’s goals in Ireland. Not since the heyday of republican Rome have we seen such a willingness to embrace conflict and war—there is no fear in these men who wished to reform Ireland. And yet, these men were not really active republicans, nor did they represent the downtrodden masses. The change in elite attitudes in less than fifty years is truly stunning and reflective of the influence of empirically based discourse and calls for rhetoric-as-docere.

that the moment of conflict resolution would be attained only through continuous action, guided by contemplation, which would result in the destruction of everything that lured people from the path of righteousness.”

Beacon, Richard. Solon his Follie, or a Politique Discourse, Touching the Reformation of common-weales conquered, declined or corrupted. Oxford, 1594 [EEBO copy].

Ibid.

Compare this with the pacifism that we saw in the medieval and Renaissance chapter—there is certainly a stark change in attitude. Why? Chief among the reasons was the zeal for Protestantism and the desire to engage in Catholic conversions, but the desire for action was undoubtedly motivated (at least on Spenser’s part) by the fact that he stood to gain from any sort of Plantation plan—as Canny shows, he was an initial settler on the Munster Plantation, but when that project was overthrown, he was as well.

There is a voluminous literature that focuses on the republican sentiments of late sixteenth/early seventeenth century figures like Sidney, Spenser and Shakespeare. The current consensus is that Sidney and Shakespeare were sympathetic to the republican cause though they were not active in republican politics along the lines of a John Milton. See Deborah Shuger, “Castigating Livy: The Rape of Lucretia and the Old Arcadia” in Renaissance Quarterly (Summer 1998), 526-48 and Andrew Hadfield, Shakespeare and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005).
On the other side, the grounds for the English middle class’s animosity toward the nobility were numerous and had been festering for some time.\textsuperscript{286} The explosion of organized popular political action was astounding and utterly ruptured the [false?] security of the Renaissance. Steve Pincus argues that the commercial development of England was crucial in creating the circumstances that led to the ability for an anti-Crown movement to develop.\textsuperscript{287} It was a time of amazing change; for the first time in history, the people of a nation executed their King for a failure to properly perform his office. There was an attempt at a republic, and then a Restoration of the line of kings, and all this happened in less than 50 years.

Such change was possible because the merchant class—and their noble sympathizers—were not afraid to agitate. They wanted laws changed, they wanted the nobility to be expanded, they wanted new types of representation, and they envisioned a new pride-of-place for their interests in Parliament. These were educated men who had received basic instruction in rhetoric, and they put that instruction to good use, truly restoring the politically active function of the classical rhetorical model. Their speeches and pamphlets, of which there are thousands, embrace rhetoric-as-{\textit{movere}}. They make use of the conventions of classical rhetoric, but do not dwell on them or call excessive attention to them in the same way that the classical rhetoricians of the Renaissance did.

\textsuperscript{286} The beginnings of this can be seen as early as Chaucer’s \textit{Canterbury Tales}, but by the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, the tide was high. See Sarah Barker’s \textit{Regicide and Republicanism} (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1998), among others, for an illustration of the connection between the rise of the merchant middle class and the desire for republicanism and action.

\textsuperscript{287} Steve Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth.” \textit{American Historical Review} (June 1998), 705-36. Pincus asserts that the English republicans took classical precepts and “melded a new ideology appropriate to a commercial society” (712). In making this argument he critiques arguments put forth by Pocock and Macpherson. I do not wish to evaluate that particular set of arguments here; I cite the article only as evidence of the importance of the commercial class in creating the circumstances for the English Civil War.
The point is not to demonstrate skill or subtlety (again, as any good scholar of this period is all too aware), but to *inspire people to action*.

**The “Traditional View” of Rhetoric-as-movere and its use in the English Civil War**

The rhetoric of anti-Crown pamphlets demonstrates that the English republicans recognized all the functions of classical rhetoric-as-*movere*. Most pamphlets employ the urging function, the just revolution function, or, sadly, the demagogic function. However, there are other pamphlets use the restraining function to frame their argument and major authors like Parker and Pym, responding to arguments that the political instability that would come about if the King were to be removed would destroy England, consistently assert that the existing English law is a proper mediator. In doing so, they employ the rhetoric of the restraining function. This is very much in keeping with the “traditional view” of rhetoric-as-*movere* that I described earlier. The Royalists who answered in response almost exclusively used the traditional restraining function of rhetoric-as-*movere* (though they were, at some level, attacking the idea of *movere* itself) and thus also kept with the “traditional view” of the classical rhetorical tradition.

In terms of action, the “Root and Branch Petition” of 1640 asked “that said government [the monarchy of Charles I] with all its dependencies, roots and branches, may be abolished, and all laws in their behalf made void.” These men were undaunted by the massive task of instituting an entirely new government. The monarchy had become that intolerable to these men who had been denied their share of England’s glory and honor. The “Petition” further chastised “the great increase of idle, lewd and

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dissolute, ignorant and erroneous men in the ministry.” The English republicans were not the first men to complain about idleness in the nobility, but it was a very popular, very republican complaint, and attendant to that complaint was the assumption that ministers and governments should be engaged in action.

Through rhetorical techniques like the extended metaphor of the root and branch, the Petition was eye-catching and easy to read. Alliteration and other techniques were used to make the most uninteresting offenses seem grave:

The multitude of monopolies and patents, drawing with them innumerable perjuries; the large increase of customs and impositions upon commodities, the ship-money, and many other great burthens upon the Commonwealth, under which all groan [alliterations emphasized].

The passage also creates the visual of the groaning Commonwealth, one that would be quite resonant with the working people of England.

The Leveller wing of the New Model Army certainly contributed a number of examples, both well-known and lesser-known, of urging and just revolutionary rhetoric to the cause. William Walwyn's “The Fountain of Slander Discovered” (1649) emphasized the fact that the present conflict, for Englishmen, was indeed a battle:

I say, all the war I have made, hath been to get victory over the understandings of men, accounting it a more worthy and profitable labour to beget friends to the Cause I loved, rather then to molest mens persons, or confiscate mens estates: and how many reall Converts have been made through my endeavours, reproaches might tempt me to boat, were I not better pleased with the conscience of so doing.

Walwyn, like all the Levellers, linked action and labor (again, a link that a more popular audience would be sympathetic to): “So that I do what I will for the good of my native

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289 Ibid. The petition also raged against “the swarming of lascivious, idle and unprofitable books and pamphlets, play-books and ballads,” including the “Parliament of Women,” and various works of Ovid.

290 Ibid.

Country, I receive still nothing but evil for my labour; all I speak, or purpose is construed to the worst; and though never so good, fares the worse for my proposing.”

However, even the populist Levellers recognized the need for restraint in some cases. In “The Bloody Project” (1648), we see the employment of both the classical restraining function and the classical urging function of rhetoric-as-movere. The pamphlet author opens with many warnings about unjust war, including this very explicitly anti-action argument: “Nor will it in any measure satisfy the Conscience, or Gods justice, to go on in uncertainties, for in doubtfull cases men ought to stand still, and consider, until certainty do appear, especially when killing and sleying of men...is in question.” This is not the only Leveller pamphlet to refer to the role of conscience in the question of action. At the same time, “The Bloody Project” calls on the same faculties of conscience and discretionary judgment that can sometimes counsel restraint and as justification for decisive and radical action against Parliament:

If the Peace of the Nation cannot be secured by the continuance of this Parliament, let a Preiod be set for the dissolution thereof, but first make certain provision for the successive calling, electing and sitting of Parliaments for the future; let their Priviledges be declared and power limitted, as to what they are empowred and what not; for doubtless in Parliaments rightly constituted consists the Freedom of a Nation: And in all things do you as you would be done unto, seek peace with all men.

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292 Ibid., p. 247.
295 “The Bloody Project”, 146
As this example shows, the employment of rhetoric-as-*movere* by the side that could claim to represent the “widespread popular political action” of the time was not simply an unreflective and unrelenting call to revolution for revolution's sake (indeed, “The Bloody Project” asks, “Can there be a more bloody Project then to engage men to kill on another, and yet no just cause declared?”)[296]. In fact, the employment of the various functions of rhetoric-as-*movere* was the simple recognition of the importance that *explicitly* political persuasion (*movere*) would play in a situation where popular opinion was so critical. Certainly there were many authors writing both for and against the Crown who were learned and used techniques indebted to rhetoric-as-*docere*, but even those authors realized that *movere* was the end, and that it was a different end than *docere*.

The Royalist opponents also made use of classical rhetoric, for, even though they opposed what they saw as the irresponsible behavior of the republican side, they saw no reason not to use rhetoric-as-*movere* in its traditional function of restraining. This most basic and traditional response represents the first type of attack against republicans in England. In the “Extract from the Instructions to the Committee in Scotland” [1641], the Royalists in Parliament compose a long, elegant passage that uses loaded vocabulary and many classical techniques:

…we cannot without much grief remember the great miseries, burdens, and distempers, which have for divers years afflicted all his kingdoms and dominions, and brought them to the last point of ruin and destruction; all which have issues from the cunning, false and malicious practices of some of those who have been admitted into very near places of counsel and authority about him…authors of false scandals and jealousies betwixt His Majesty and his loving subjects, enemies to the peace, union and confidence betwixt him and his Parliament, which is the surest foundation of prosperity and greatness to His Majesty…[297]

[297] “Instructions to the Committee in Scotland” [1641] in Gardiner.
The use of periods and repetition of certain words and phrases (“His Majesty,” “betwixt”) reveals this passage as coming from the hand of a well-educated rhetor, for this is sophisticated composition. However, it seems stilted in comparison with passages from “The Root and Branch Petition,” and its closing leaves much to be desired in terms of action: “And, if herein His Majesty shall not vouchsafe to condescend to our humble supplication, although we shall always continue with reverence and faithfulness to his person and his crown…we are obliged, yet we shall be forced…to resolve upon some such way of defending Ireland.” There is an obsequious tone to this passage that is absent from the strident demand of the “Root and Branch Petition” that Charles I lay his Crown aside. In this passage from the “Instructions,” we see the same ossified form of classical rhetoric that had developed in the Renaissance.

Royalist writing during the seventeenth century continues to reflect this stilted rhetoric and it continued to try and paint the republican cause as demagogic and irresponsible in its demands for action. As we have seen even from our study of classical authors like Plato and Thucydides, these are time-honored traditional objections. In “The King’s Speech to the Recorder of the City of London”, Charles writes (says):

As for the City in particular, I shall study by all means their prosperity; and I assure you, I will singly grant those few reasonable demands you have now made unto me, in the name of the City; and likewise, I shall study to re-establish that flourishing trade which now is in some disorder amongst you, which I doubt not to effect with the good assistance of the Parliament.

“I shall study,” “I assure you,” “I doubt not to effect,” and all the other “I” phrases in this paragraph are not statements of action. They are vague promises of action to come, but the King does not give any particulars. He does not say which “reasonable demands”

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298 Ibid.
299 The King’s Speech to the Recorder of the City of London” [1641] in Gardiner.
shall be granted, nor does he give any real indication on how he will solve the problem of trade that he “shall study to re-establish.” Again, this is a well-written and nicely composed statement, but it does not show what will be done, and thus loses some effect as a political document. The documents of Parliament, such as “The Grand Remonstrance,” are often composed in such a way that a numbered list of desired changes, often quite specific and directed toward action,\footnote{Examples of these demands for action from “The Grand Remonstrance” [1641] include: “That His Majesty be humbly petitioned by both Houses to employ such councilors, ambassadors and other ministers, in managing his business at home and abroad as the Parliament may have cause to confide in, without which we cannot give His Majesty such supplies for support of his own estate, nor such assistance to the Protestant party beyond the sea, as is desired,” “That all Councillors of State may be sworn to observe those laws which concern the subject in his liberty, that they may likewise take an oath not to receive or give reward or pension from any foreign prince, but such as they shall within some reasonable time discover to the Lords of His Majesty’s Council.” Here we can see the specificity of the Parliamentarian side: they ask the King to perform specific actions, and tell him in no uncertain terms what action they will take if their demands are not redressed.} form the centerpiece of the document.\footnote{Note that this is quite similar to the technique adopted by Thomas Jefferson when he composed the American Declaration of Independence.} Consider the King’s reply to the “Remonstrance,” where he and his Councilors continue to insist that all things are well, and that there is very little need for action or change. “[W]e profess we cannot at all understand them…did we know of [the concerns of Parliament] we should be as ready to remedy and punish as you are to complain of…”\footnote{“The King’s Answer to the Petition” [1641]. The opening to the “King’s Answer” is full of the same well-written but evasive classical rhetoric that we saw in the “Speech to the Recorder.” The “King’s Answer” begins: “We having received from you, soon after our return out of Scotland, a long petition consisting of many desires of great moment…we had take some time to consider of it, as befitted us in a matter of that consequence…”}

Now the fact that the King and his Council “[took] some time to consider of” Parliament’s “Remonstrance” is not on its face a bad thing. Indeed, as we have seen throughout this chapter, the pamphlets and petitions of Parliament and the republicans were filled with audacious demands, and it would have been foolish to act on them quickly. However, the rhetoric used by the King is not the rhetoric of true deliberation;
he never reveals what the conclusions of those deliberations were. He merely uses well-written, but stilted, classical rhetoric that is devoid of any call to action to stymie the action-filled and specific requests of the Parliament. Of course, Charles's evasiveness no doubt contributed to Parliament’s anger and frustration.

However, Charles and these other Royalist writers were fairly traditional—and lacking in innovation—in their replies to Parliament. When we examine some other exchanges between Crown and Country, we can see the first seeds of a slightly different attack that draws a connection between *movere* itself, even when used in its proper, traditional republican urging function, and unhealthy political instability. This is the second of three types of attacks that were made against the republicans in England. The republican responses, in turn, more carefully argue that law is a control on *movere* and so long as law functions properly, this concern over damaging political instability is a frivolous one.

Peter Heylyn's 1637 tract “A Briefe and Moderate Answer” (look at the title!) was one of the earliest treatises that blurred the distinction between “good” and “bad” *movere*. Heylyn was responding to the firebrand Henry Burton, a notable Puritan preacher who was well versed in not only the basic techniques of classical rhetoric, but also the flourishes of the *ars praedicandi* tradition. In an attempt to debunk Burton's pro-Parliament arguments, Heylyn writes, “...you doe therein as Rebells doe most commonly in their insurrections: pretend the safety of the King, and preservation of Religion, when as they doe intend to destroy them both.”

Unlike the more traditional “restraint” replies that we read earlier, Heylyn is more direct, more strident, dare we say—more

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rhetorical. His strategy is to hammer home the connection between republicanism or republican-like sentiments and vocabulary and unjustified revolution. In the very next sentence, he writes, “The civil warre in France...was christened by the specious name of _Le bien Public_, for the Common-wealth; but there was nothing lesse intended than the common good.”\(^{304}\) Burton and his allies are guilty of “action faulty.”\(^{305}\) In closing, Heylyn has this to say about those who follow the republican line of argument: “Or could the most _seditious person_ in a state have thought upon a shorter cut to bring all to _Anarchie_?”\(^{306}\) As a result of this line of attack that makes _republicanism itself the enemy_, all forms of _movere_ are called into question because all the functions of rhetoric-as-_movere_, both the good and the bad, are part and parcel of a true republican system.

Henry Ferne's “The Resolving of Conscience” (1642) was another Royalist pamphlet that drew numerous responses from his opposition. By defining “resistance” as “not a denying of obedience to the Prince's command, but a rising in arms, a forcible resistance,”\(^{307}\) Ferne's argument against the republican cause is similar to Heylyn's. Republicanism itself is the enemy, for republican doctrine, which places law as the sovereign, allows for resistance to any executive who abuses his power. Indeed, Ferne's next complaint is lodged against republican military bills that were being passed by parliament: “we see at this day to our astonishment, first the power of arms taken from the Prince by setting up the _Militia_, then that power used against him by an army in the field.”\(^{308}\) If this is not a criticism of republican institutions, then nothing ever written has

\(^{304}\) _Ibid._, 76.
\(^{305}\) _Ibid._, 81.
\(^{306}\) _Ibid._, 88.
\(^{308}\) _Ibid._, 183.
been. Ferne maintains this criticism throughout his pamphlet.\textsuperscript{309} Of course, as Schochet notes, Ferne “initiated a controversy that...would ultimately course beyond his control”\textsuperscript{310} when he introduced arguments surrounding conscience and judgment. These notions were easily adopted by republican authors as well.

Responses to Ferne, such as Charles Herle's “Fuller Answer to a Treatise by Doctor Ferne” (1642) honed in directly on these attacks against basic republican principles; clearly everyone participating in the debate was fairly well-advised as to what was at stake. Herle's first major response to Ferne is to establish the independent autonomy that Parliament had to \textit{take action} no matter what the King's will. Herle asserts that Parliament is not a subject of the Crown and that “it was the \textit{consent} of both King and people, in the first \textit{coalition} or \textit{constitution} of the Government, that makes them in their several \textit{Houses coordinate} with his Majesty, not \textit{subordinate} to him, how else were the \textit{Monarchy mixt} more than that of Turkie?”\textsuperscript{311} As Pocock has noted in his work on the ancient constitution in England, the members of the Good Old Cause were able to build on the mythology of the “mixt” kingdom to further their claim that the people had the right to subject the king to their will.\textsuperscript{312}

\textsuperscript{309} Ferne attacks the fundamental sovereignty of the people: “But here we may take notice by the way, that however the Fundamentals of this Government are much talked of, this is according to them the Fundamentall in all Kingdomes and Governments; for they say power was everywhere from the people at first, and so this will serve no more for the power of resistance in England, than in France or Turkey. But if this must be a Fundamentall, it is such a one as upon it this Government cannot be build, but Confusion and Anarchy may readily be rais'd; as shall appear by the clearing of these two particulars, Whether the power be so originally and chiefly from the people as they would have it; then, Whether they amy upon such causes resume that power” (193). This proves his basis for a fairly standard Biblical-patriarchal defense of the monarchy.

\textsuperscript{310} Schochet, “Persuading the Heart,” 155.

\textsuperscript{311} Charles Herle, “Fuller Answer to a Treatise by Doctor Ferne” (1642) in \textit{The Struggle for Sovereignty}, 229.

\textsuperscript{312} J.G.A. Pocock, \textit{The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A study of English historical thought in the Seventeenth Century (A Reissue with a Retrospect)} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Pocock writes, “The fact seems to be that conquest theory was no more an essential part of pro-Stuart reasoning before the Civil Wars (or indeed after them) than was absolute sovereignty. Those who
The republican principle of mixed government, and the venue for action on the part of the people that it provided, was extremely dangerous in the eyes of the Crown, and thus it was that republican principle that many Royalists felt had to be attacked most vigorously. I would suggest that this is why the opposition “constantly thought it necessary to refute an argument which nobody was putting forward;” perhaps no Royalist pamphleteers were putting forward arguments grounded in conquest theory or absolute sovereignty, but they were, in key ways, attacking the dangers of the “mixt” principle of republican theory because it allowed Parliament a disturbing amount of leeway and an ability to inspire action that threatened the stability of England and the endurance of the Stuart monarchy.

At this point some might object to the fact that I am highlighting this notion of demonizing republicanism. After all, doesn't it make sense that the Royalists would do this since they were opposing the republicans? Yes and no. I would submit that there is a difference between demonizing republicans and demonizing republicanism. It would make perfect sense for the Royalist authors to demonize the republicans as misguided and malcontent, but to take on republicanism itself seems to me to be something else entirely. To criticize republicanism in the way that Heylyn, Herne and others did—to assert that it inevitably led to the destruction of security and the political order—flew in the face of the respect that the republican tradition had been accorded throughout history. To criticize supported what the Stuart kings were doing did not normally regard their ruler as a sovereign maker of law—however vigorously they might assert his prerogative—and consequently did not argue that the laws flowed from his will or that he ruled above the law as a conqueror—the two doctrines to which as a theory based on historical criticism would have led. This conclusion makes it hard to explain why the opposition constantly thought it necessary to refute an argument which nobody was putting forward; but it reminds us that the believe in an immemorial law was not a party argument put forth by some clever lawyer as a means of limiting the king's prerogative: it was the nearly universal belief of Englishmen. The case for the crown was not that the king ruled as a sovereign and that they were no fundamental law, but that there was a fundamental law and that the king's prerogative formed part of it” (54-55)
republicanism in this way was not just to criticize Nedham, Milton, Sidney, Vane, Shaftesbury and others, but it was to criticize Cicero, the Roman tradition, Aristotle—the very foundations of Western political thought. Furthermore, in terms of the rhetorical dimension of republicanism, these attacks de-legitimized the legitimate urging and restraining uses of rhetoric-as-*movere*.

Indeed, as I will suggest later in this chapter, Thomas Hobbes's attack, while focusing on a different aspect of republicanism, follows in this larger vein. However, I do not want to suggest that there was necessarily an earth-shattering change in intellectual attitudes toward republicanism and that these intellectual developments led to the types of arguments made by Hobbes and the Royalist supporters. Rather, I would argue that it was the realization that the republican “dream” could actually come to fruition—that historical circumstances were now very favorable to widespread popular political action—that led to these somewhat sudden attacks. It was well and good for Shakespeare and other English Renaissance authors and intellectuals to dwell on the virtues of republics and republicans when the political circumstances were not favorable to republican *action*. As republican *action* (and the attendant threat of instability) became a more “real” threat, the virtues of republicanism were suddenly much less appealing.

Republican authors who responded to attacks like the one made by Heylyn had to demonstrate that republicanism itself would not inevitably lead to instability in and destruction of the political order. To do this, they looked back to republicanism's foundation: the law. In Henry Parker's notable “The Case of Shipmony” (1640), one of

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313 When we consider this along with the developments in science and epistemology, I argue that it makes much more sense to consider this period as the beginning of “modernity” in Western political thought.

314 The question of Shakespeare's republicanism or lack thereof has recently the subject of Hadfield, *op. cit.*
the frequent refrains is that the fact that the ancient constitution allows Parliament and the King to work independently together—thus creating liberty—is the great strength of the English nation.\textsuperscript{315} To wit, “Here we see, that the liberty of the subject is a thing which makes a King great; and that the King's prerogative hath only for its ends to maintaine the people's liberty.”\textsuperscript{316} This is not instability; it is the very foundation of stability itself: “Our wisest Kings in England, have ever most relied upon the wisdome of Parliaments.”\textsuperscript{317} Liberty is created through Parliament's transformation of the “\textit{vox Populi}” into the “\textit{vox Dei}” of the law.\textsuperscript{318} Since the law is the basis of the ancient constitution and of England's greatness, the activity of Parliament cannot be the threat that the Royalists suggest.

This point about Parliamentary sovereignty, along with other discussions about consciences, oaths and other matters generated literally hundreds of exchanges between the King and his enemies where the proponents of the Good Old Cause did not hesitate to embrace rhetoric-as-\textit{movere}. The resulting execution of the king and the sustained attempt at a republic further demonstrate the historical affinity between the presence of rhetoric-as-\textit{movere}, popular political participation, and political instability. These wealthy men were skilled in the use of rhetoric. They wanted a system that was less restrictive than England’s monarchy and system of peerage. They wanted a system that

\textsuperscript{315} Parker adopts an interesting rhetorical technique here: in the beginning of the pamphlet, he specifically lists “republists” as having a separate type of government from the glorious government he sees in England, but, of course, the rest of the pamphlet goes on to defend the mixed principle, which certainly seems to belong to the republican tradition.

\textsuperscript{316} Henry Parker, “The Case of Shipmony Briefly Discussed” (1640) in The Struggle for Sovereignty, 98.

\textsuperscript{317} “Shipmony,” 117.

\textsuperscript{318} Parker uses the terms “\textit{vox populi}” and “\textit{vox Dei}” in the pamphlet itself. In the next paragraph he continues his praise of law: “Secondly, no advice can bee so faithful, so loyall, so religious and sincere, as that which proceeds from Parliaments, where so many are gathered together for God's service in such a devout manner, we cannot but expect that God should bee amongst them: and as they have a more especial blessing promised them; so their ends cannot be so sinister” (117).
would give them the liberty to pursue that which they sought—glory and noble reputation—that which the current system would deny them. To curry favor they rested their arguments on the authority of the ancients and the ancient constitution—not an uncommon or unusual practice—and clothed their arguments in the rhetoric of glory.

This disgusted their chief enemy (in terms of intellectual talent and ability), Thomas Hobbes, who saw their ploy as not only a threat the social system, but a general danger, for he believed that while they used the classical rhetoric of glory, they glory they desired was more modern—the glory they desired was for themselves. Hobbes wanted to bring them down, and he chose to attack them at the heart of their argument. He attacked the idea of glory.

**The Hobbesian Objection and the Fear Foundation**

Thomas Hobbes's criticism of the situation in seventeenth-century England was of a third type; it did not merely argue for restraint and it did not merely attack republicanism itself. The English republican strategy was quite an effective one: they created a conception of liberty that played on the language of Roman politics, particularly the conception of striving, or glory. As Quentin Skinner has demonstrated, the definition of liberty that emerged during this period and gained prominence was intimately tied up with the idea that all men should have the liberty to achieve something akin to glory—whether it be glory in politics, glory in war, or glory in merchant production. Action was extremely important.\(^{319}\) Individuals such as Hobbes, who did not feel that there needed to

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\(^{319}\) The connection between glory and action is a fascinating one. In Russian, and other languages, the words that are translated in English to mean “glory” are often more literally translated as “striving.” The implication in those words is that glory is connected to the doing of a great deed. Action is not only inherent in glory, it is the key to being glorious. For more on this in the Russian case, see Vladimir Nabokov’s introduction to the translation of his novel, Glory, which is *Podvig* [striving] in Russian. He discusses why he chose the word “glory” even though that is not a literal translation.
be a radical departure from the status quo, foresaw nothing but instability and disaster from the program advocated by the republicans, and so he launched an attack. The attack, as it is portrayed in De Cive and Leviathan, focused on undermining the idea of glory. With glory undermined, the English republican definition of liberty could be called into question, and the connection between glory and (in Hobbes’ mind) reckless action—that people would be spurred to by the inconsiderate employers of rhetoric-as-movere—could be examined seriously.

Hobbes’s position on rhetoric in general and rhetoric-as-movere specifically cannot be understood unless the reader understands his position on glory and vain-glory. This one concept is the center of Hobbes’s work, both pre and post-Leviathan. While Tuck and others are correct to point out that vainglory occupies a more crucial position in De Cive, I believe that it is by no means shunted to the side in Leviathan. However, few scholars have chosen to center their readings of Hobbes on the idea of glory. I believe that if we look at the historical context that gave birth to Leviathan and Hobbes’s other works, we see why glory must still maintain a crucial position in the final analysis.

Quentin Skinner has recently identified a third concept of liberty that he calls republican liberty. While Skinner is not the first to suggest this idea, he has provided

320 Indeed, as Prasanta Chakravarty points out, the more radical wings of the GOC, such as the Ranters felt that all the political discourse should be devoted to the “mobilization of multiplication of personal practices” (183). For more on the desire for political action in the Ranters and their radical allies, see pgs. 155-183 in Like Parchment in the Fire: Literature and Radicalism in the English Civil War (New York: Routledge, 2006).
321 An exception to this is Gabriella Slomp’s Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). Even Slomp does not completely focus her reading of Hobbes through the lens of glory.
322 Negative liberty is usually construed as “the area in which a man can act unobstructed by others” (Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”), while positive liberty is the realization of “the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master” (Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”). The essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” is taken from Liberty, edited by Henry Hardy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
323 See also Philip Pettit, “Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican” from European Journal of Philosophy, (1993), pgs. 15-38; Allen Patten, “The Republican Critique of Liberalism” from British
one of the most thorough descriptions of what this third type of liberty resembles. He defines republican liberty as a state in which you are free to “not be subject to the power of anyone else.”

Skinner finds the republicans in the 1640s advocating the idea that “a mere awareness of living in dependence on the goodwill of an arbitrary ruler does serve in itself to restrict our options and thereby limit our liberty.” To achieve a space that is free from domination, citizens united for the common-weal must carve out such a space, for the would-be dominators will not yield it to them. This act of carving out the space requires great men—men worthy of glory.

Skinner provides ample evidence of pamphleteers who identified with the republican cause using the rhetoric of glory in an attempt to win people over. An English translation of Sallust read as follows: to allow “everie man to estimate his owne worth, and to hammer his head on high disceigns, we must be sure to establish and uphold a ‘free state’, a form of government under which all forms of discretionary or arbitrary power are eliminated.” In speaking to Parliament, Thomas Hedley urged freedom, because kingly rule would “so abase and deject their minds, that they will use little care and industry to get that which they cannot keep and so will grow poor and base-minded like to the peasants in other countries.”

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325 Ibid., 256-7.
326 This is, of course, an extremely Machiavellian argument, and we see it put forth in authors like Harrington, who were clearly influenced by the Florentine See Pocock, Ancient Constitution, Ch. VI and The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Revised edition, Princeton: 2003). Pocock's comments on pgs. 214-18 where he ties Machiavelli's idea of the eternal competition of republics to Harrington would seem to speak to this matter of carving out the space free from domination.
327 Quoted in Skinner, 258.
328 Ibid., 261.
for the freedom to achieve glory appear to be behind the demands of these English republicans.

Obviously this glorious act of carving—a momentous and dangerous action—was a great threat to the status quo. Skinner also asserts that this threat was one of the motivating factors behind the attacks in De Cive and Leviathan. The republicans’ rhetoric of glory was a great threat to the stability of the system. Skinner writes:

The Act of March 1649 abolishing the office of king duly confirmed that monarchy is ‘dangerous to the liberty, safety, and public interest of the people’, adding that in England the effect of the prerogative has been ‘to oppress and impoverish and enslave the subject.’ It was at the moment that Hobbes picked up his pen [emphasis added].

The republican rhetoric of glory was motivated by the desires of men who felt that they had no place in the system of nobility, and no way to gain the glory given systematically to others. Hobbes knew that if they were not stopped, the system would have to change to accommodate their demands.

In order to stop them, he attacked the foundation of their rhetoric: the idea of glory. He turned glory into vainglory, and made it the virtue that led to the downfall of states and rulers. It is, after all, the vain-glorious men who

…without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are inclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.

Hobbes was also keenly aware of the fact that his opponents were skillful with words. He connects glory and vain-glory to ambition in the following manner:

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique

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329 Ibid., 255.
Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisedome, both to themselves and others [emphasis added].

His presentation of those who were captured by vain-glory is rather negative; these men are show as irrational and uncivilized, for “the Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either great vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride…” Glory is also one of the causes of Quarrell among men. Hobbes's most virulent attacks against rhetoric were really virulent attacks against republicanism and its connection with movere.

I argue this because Hobbes’s move against rhetoric-as-movere based itself on a premise that is only intuitive to the cynical: rhetoric creates political instability. While the jaded among us might assent to this statement with a hip nod of the head, we do not stop and think how radical this notion actually is. The notion that rhetoric is the cause of all the trouble in the world as opposed to the method in which the solution to all the trouble in the world can be determined goes against the great majority of rhetorical tradition with which Hobbes was quite familiar. Although some would argue that Plato had similar beliefs about rhetoric, Plato distinguished between sophistry and rhetoric, arguing that the former was a poor version of the latter, which could be used for good.

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331 Ibid., 72.
332 Indeed, as David Johnston notes on pgs. 31-3 of The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986), Hobbes's portrayal of vanity is quite heightened in order to underscore vanity's offensiveness. Haig Patapan, in his article, “‘Lord Over the Children of Pride’: The Vaine-Glorious Rhetoric of Hobbes's Leviathan” Philosophy and Rhetoric (2000), 74-93, also agrees that “the structure and movement of part I of the Leviathan can be better understood when it is seen as a direct assault on human pride, a stripping away of all claims that may lead to vaine-glory (75).” However, Patapan argues that Hobbes is unsuccessful in this endeavor and “refounds [pride] on the bases of rights and the promise of [my emphasis] unlimited progress through science and commerce” (75); I would suggest that this conception of refounding fits with my later discussion of Hobbes's docere ends.
333 Leviathan, 54
334 Ibid., 88
Hobbes combined the two and ascribed the nasty qualities of sophistry to the mix, calling the whole thing rhetoric and then he linked this rhetoric with the major proponents of the republican movement in England. *Leviathan*'s readers would only be able to assume that any individuals or parties that employed the rhetoric of glory only employed such language to conceal their vainglorious and Alcibidean desire to “conquer” a space in English society for themselves. Such men should not be praised as conquering heroes, but as treasonous usurpers of the stable order.

Of course, to make these arguments against the republicans, Hobbes himself employed rhetoric. As Skinner has concluded, by the time of *Leviathan*, there is little doubt that Hobbes had accepted rhetoric's utility. However, what Hobbes would not accept was rhetoric-as-*movere*. Again, this is not to say that Hobbes found all persuasion abhorrent—he was merely suspicious of the *politically* persuasive function of rhetoric and the threat it posed to political stability. Persuasion using proofs drawn from the new science and the new empirical proof that discovered it, or even persuasion following the dictates of rhetoric-as-*docere* had their place in any reasonable society.

This ambivalent position toward rhetoric which is seen throughout Hobbes's entire corpus has been expertly delineated by Quentin Skinner and David Johnston and seems to add weight to the argument that Hobbes's real quarrel was with active and populist republicanism's inherent instability and that rhetoric-as-*movere*, which had the power to persuade people to take action on behalf of such a republic, was a minor casualty in a war that had to be won. Skinner argues that Hobbes explicitly saw apolitical purposes for rhetoric335 and that there were definitive differences between the type of rhetoric used for moving a large crowd during a sermon and the type of rhetoric that

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would ensure calm and learned policy.\footnote{Ibid, 70. On 86-92, Skinner discusses the fact that Hobbes clearly recognized that one would approach a speech to a Senate versus a speech to a King in very different ways.} This recognition of the importance of audience also seems to run hand-in-hand with the idea that a smaller audience—for the creation of calm policy—is preferable. It seemed that Hobbes accepted the need for eloquence, but not for \textit{movere}. \textit{Docere}, based in the new science, was on its way to being recognized by intellectuals and elites as the proper end of persuasion.\footnote{Ibid, 275, 294, 300-1. Johnston also writes about the “struggle between enlightenment and superstition, between the forces of light and the forces of darkness” (131). Also see my note on Patapan in fn. 60.}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The results of this Hobbesian move were monumental in the history of political thought. His reconstitution of man as a scared, vile creature (as opposed to the strong, brave creature of pre-modern virtue) allowed man to confront his cowardly side in a direct fashion for perhaps the first time in intellectual history. Post-Hobbesian thinkers took very seriously the idea of fear, and suspicion toward the idea of rhetoric-as-\textit{movere}, assumed from the work of Hobbes and others like him, was (and I would suggest still \textit{is}) an important part of the fear foundation for liberalism.\footnote{See Judith Skhlar, “The Liberalism of Fear” in Liberalism and the Moral Life, Nancy Rosenbloom, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard, 1989).} However, because the urging and restraining functions of rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} were absolutely legitimate functions (and, indeed, I would suggest that just revolution rhetoric, in certain cases, is a legitimate function as well) and were, to some extent, necessary in a society that, in response to the events of the English Civil War and Glorious Revolution, could never completely shut the people out from government again, the fact that the Hobbesian/Royalist attack had de-legitimized them was problematic.
In chapter five I will suggest that the stability (indeed, the *stasis*) of the period, as well as the influence of politeness and the continuing growth of the influence of “Baconian” plain speech (i.e., communication geared toward the discussion of empirical scientific events) during the Enlightenment, created an environment in the United Kingdom where the legitimate and stabilizing functions of rhetoric-as-*movere*, urging and restraining, were co-opted under the larger framework of rhetoric-as-*docere* and thus urging and restraining were considered in the context of teaching and the pursuit of the knowledge, not explicitly political ends. The politeness movement and the continuing emergence of the bourgeois middle class both contributed substantially to this transformation. When we examine the liberal writings of the eighteenth century we see that there are still concerns about action, and an impulse toward careful deliberation of all decisions in order that nothing reckless should be done. After this transformation, one can argue that the only two true remaining functions of rhetoric-as-*movere* were just revolution rhetoric and the illegitimate function of demagoguery. Since both these functions were connected with instability, rhetoric-as-*movere*’s “problems” remained and its proper use continued to decline.

On the other hand, since the eighteenth century was a period where, in England, there was much suspicion of and little threat of action, certain circles of intellectuals were able to dream the republican dream again without much interference or objection. In the United States, where political circumstances were certainly more conducive to widespread popular political action, the ideas in the documents of these republican dreamers and their forerunners were translated into a vigorous discourse of pamphlets

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339 This Baconian spirit, or at least a translated version of it, clearly influenced many of the chief thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, particularly (at least for our purposes) Hume.

340 Once again, we see why the historical circumstances are such a crucial part of this formula.
and sermons that clearly showed that the classical functions of rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} still served in the American colonies.
The Legacy of Politeness in the English-Speaking Tradition

The restraint of politeness matched the political stability (indeed, the political *stasis*) of what is now called “the long eighteenth century.” This century—which venerated Neo-Classical severity and tamed Gothic revival—was concerned with propriety, with manners, and with moderation. It kept the faith in the ability of scientific investigation to improve man's quality of life and ensured that rhetoric-as-*movere* would continue its post-Hobbesian decline *in the United Kingdom*. The historical circumstances that had set the table for expressions of widespread political participation in the early 1600s were no longer “in play” at this time and since rhetoric-as-*movere* had not been institutionalized during the seventeenth century; movements of diverse popular participation were again stifled.

There were no political revolutions, but there were revolutions in literature, as new forms like the novel and the short essay grew in popularity, and revolutions in science, which demanded the continuing development of “Baconian” plain speech (i.e., communication geared toward the discussion of empirical scientific events). It is the central contention of this chapter that these two revolutions conceived of their rhetorical ends in terms of either rhetoric-as-*delectare* (i.e., rhetoric that delights) or rhetoric-as-*docere*. Even the essayists, who were writing about political issues, seemed more interested in moving their audience to agree with their arguments (falling widely under the “teaching” ideal of rhetoric-as-*docere*) instead of necessarily insisting that their audiences take political action. Due to the effectiveness of Hobbes's attack on *movere*, the legitimate and stabilizing functions of rhetoric-as-*movere*, urging and restraining, were co-opted under the larger framework of rhetoric-as-*docere* and thus urging and
restraining were considered in the context of teaching and the pursuit of the knowledge, not in the context of widespread popular political action.

The politeness movement and the continuing emergence of the bourgeois middle class both contributed substantially to this transformation. The major British authors who tackled the subject of rhetoric focused their theories on the connection between politeness (sometimes reduced to moderation) and literary qualities of style. A concern for *movere* is almost entirely absent from their work. Though some of these authors, like David Hume, were more aware of the contemporary disconnect from the classical tradition than others, they rejected the thought of closing that gap. None of this is to say that passion and activity were *ignored*. The major writers from this period were very concerned about action and passion, and though they did not have a vehement vendetta against inspirational rhetoric and those who would employ it (perhaps because historical circumstances did not provide the same chances for action in the eighteenth century as they had in the seventeenth century), they all felt that action and passion needed to be properly controlled in all instances, particularly by those who were in the governing classes, which continued to evolve.

The “spirit” toward action in eighteenth century liberal texts is quite cautious; there is an impulse toward careful deliberation of all decisions in order that nothing reckless should be done. Any action must be learned or connected with a deliberative or learning process. This is the major reason that I assert that rhetoric-as-*docere* had co-opted the legitimate restraining and urging functions of rhetoric-as-*movere* during this period. During and after this transformation, one can argue that the only two true remaining functions of rhetoric-as-*movere* were just revolution rhetoric and the
illegitimate function of demagogy. Since both these functions were connected with instability, rhetoric-as-movere's “problems” (i.e., Hobbes's claim that rhetoric-as-movere engenders instability) remained and salvaging its reputation became nearly an impossible task.

On the other hand, since the eighteenth century was a period of such political stasis in the United Kingdom, intellectuals were able to compose hymns to the virtues of republicanism and distribute them freely. Government officials were not particularly worried about another Long Parliament or New Model Army, so “commonwealthmen” were as free to write in praise of Algernon Sidney's life and death as Shakespeare had been to write in praise of Brutus about one hundred years prior. However, the increased “mobility” of printed material meant that the paeans of British authors did not necessarily have to remain idle.

In the American colonies, where political circumstances were more conducive to widespread popular political action, the same ideas that languished in the rhetoric-as-docere directed discourse in the United Kingdom were reinvented in a vigorous exchange of pamphlets and sermons that demonstrated that, at least in the colonies, rhetoric-as-movere had not yet been fully co-opted by rhetoric-as-docere; indeed, the circumstances would not allow as such. We also see rhetoric-as-movere operating in all its forms, from urging and restraining to just revolution and demagoguery. While the American eighteenth century should not be read as a mere repeat of the English seventeenth century, the two moments of revolution exhibit enough similarities that place them both into the pattern of “presence of rhetoric-as-movere + political circumstances that allow for widespread popular political action YIELDS political engagement and activity +
(some measure of) political instability.” Indeed, when one examines the essays and treatises being published in the United Kingdom at this time directly against the pamphlets and sermons being distributed in the American colonies, the sometimes frustrating and subtle difference between a docere approach to persuasion and a movere approach to persuasion—and the movere approach’s obvious suitability for channeling and directing political action—becomes more clear.

**Politeness, Political Atmosphere and Mores in the Eighteenth Century**

Historians agree that there was a period of stasis in popular politics and rhetoric in the first half of the eighteenth century. The ideas of popular republicanism—the type of ideology that could lead to political action if given the proper spark—were kept alive in Whig circles. However, the ideas of Sidney and Milton were only guarded, not put into action. The fact that these ideas were confined to polite academic circles doomed them to relative obscurity during this period. As Caroline Robbins reminds us, most of the commonwealthsmen were not major players in the politics of the time, and they represented a minority of political men in Britain. Some of their number actively agitated for change, but they were largely unsuccessful in the British political arena.

The idea of the “governing class” continued to change during this period in English history, an extension of the process that had started centuries earlier and initially

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341 From Robbins: “The social status of dissent had declined [in the eighteenth century]” (218); “The victory of the status quo seemed inevitable. Along with the growth of rationalism went a certain contempt for differences in worship and a considerable emphasis on uniformity” (218); “This was not a very dangerous or radical movement. Any association with Interregnum anarchy in popular parlance seems during most of the period to have been pretty far-fetched…Their weakness was brought about by the perforcefully academic nature of their activity” (228).

342 Robbins: “Throughout the whole period the inexperience and detachment of the reformers from practical politics hampered them” (373).
laid the groundwork for the explosion of popular action in the seventeenth century.343

The British merchant/capitalist class continued to assert itself and as its institution, the House of Commons, grew in power, their cries for agitation died down. In response to the ascendancy of the Commons, the influence of the monarchy and the House of Lords continued its (not always consistent) decline. Despite the fact that this middle class was becoming the truly dominant power, not only in terms of numbers and financial resources, but also in terms of political and institutional influence, the members of this class still wanted to blend in with the old aristocracy, which still held considerable sway.344

Despite the fact that the middle class was constantly acquiring more influence, its members were desperate to hew to the cultural and behavioral norms of the nobility. As a result, the eighteenth century was seized in the grip of politeness—a concern with manners and a way of being that was moderate. Politeness was a concept that combined elements of what would later be called “bourgeois” morality and a few elements of an older republican moral world view. There was a plain element in this conception of man: men were to be men—not the stereotypical effeminate noble, nor the brutish soldier, uncultured farmer or worker. Old republican dreams became increasingly unrealistic—and thus safer to dream—and many polite gentlemen’s circles espoused commonwealth

343 Peter Laslett, calling upon demographic research in his work The World We Have Lost (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), suggests that the eighteenth century saw a decrease in the numbers of those made “politically marginal” based on literacy (281-2).

344 As Thomas Woodman points out in Politeness and Poetry in the Age of Pope (Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh-Dickinson University Press, 1989), “to talk about class in eighteenth-century England is to enter naively into a theoretical minefield” (17). He continues, “This was an age, as Lawrence Stone, John Cannon and J.C.D. Clark have amply shown, of domination of the political system by elaborate aristocratic patronage and the reaffirmation and extension of the aristocracy’s “cultural hegemony,” (17) but also notes that “to a considerable degree, as Michael McKeon has stressed, capitalist values are transforming this aristocracy, ‘eating away, as it were from within, at a social structure whose external shell still seems roughly assimable to the status model’” (17). While it would be irresponsible to claim that the middle class and the capitalists had, in any way, reached the apex of their power, their influence grew dramatically during this period, as the amount of material designed for middle class audiences clearly indicates.
principles. This republican influence many explain why the English idea of politeness had elements of the Roman suspicion of the wholly contemplative life. One who received perfect marks in philosophical subjects was probably too “phlegmatic” and tied to books, but one who failed completely at his studies was a hopeless brute.

This new middle-governing class mimicked the aristocracy in many things, and style of speaking was certainly one of them. The preferred rhetoric was heavily influenced by mannered aristocratic norms of politeness. Given this desire to imitate the aristocracy, rhetoricians especially praised the conversation setting and cited it as an inspiration for the ideal type of rhetorical discussion. The rhetorical instructors suggested that this setting allowed for the mature and moderate expression of ideas and allowed all the interlocutors to demonstrate their knowledge. Lord Shaftesbury’s *Characteristicks* was a premiere literary example of such a setting.

Despite this veneer of politeness and the lip service being paid to republican moral principles, the rhetoric of this period was, at its base, grounded in the principles of rhetoric-as-**docere**. Enlightenment thinking affected the development of rhetoric in many ways. It continued to emphasize the rational, scientific, and empirical character of Baconian rhetoric, but the influence of neo-Classicism allowed rhetoric to maintain loyalty to the organizational components of the classical system and once again start using classical allusions. While the extreme instance of the problem of homogeneity

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345 For opposition to the wholly contemplative life, see Cicero, *De Off.* Bk. II. This was the most “difficult” aspect of politeness, for it often conflicted with the impulse toward dialogue and conversation that was popular in the eighteenth century. This aspect of politeness was more important in the United States. However, the English commonwealthmen of the eighteenth century did advocate a more “active” education. In her summary of Molesworth’s *Account of Denmark*, Caroline Robbins writes, “The curriculum, with its false emphasis on dead languages, was designed for the cloister rather than the world. Englishmen should learn to love their country and study its history and literature as well as its political advantages, and this, before they went abroad” (96). Robbins, Caroline. *The Eighteenth Century Commonwealth* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987).
undoubtedly contributed to the reinstitution of some classical stylistic principles, the desire of the merchant middle class to show off its education, which at this time meant knowledge of science and logic, combined with the memory of seventeenth century strife and the lingering effects of Hobbes's critique of movere prevented a full return to politically persuasive rhetoric-as-movere.

I call this type of rhetoric that was inspired by the conversational approach and the new spirit of rhetoric-as-docere polite plain speech. Polite plain speech was a combination of classical principles and educated, empirical plain speech that developed in a time where popular political action was in a period of stasis. Unlike the stasis of the Renaissance, the rhetoric of the eighteenth century did not demonstrate the excesses of the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. Extreme attempts at plainness such as Wilkins's symbolic language had collapsed and the religiously motivated crusade against removing all figures from speech no longer dominated the controversies over language, and it was clear that there would be no recurrence of the days of speechifying and copia.

However, this admiration and codification of dialogue and conversation resulted in the continuing problem of homogeneity. Since the larger issues behind the problem of homogeneity were of little to no concern to mainstream rhetorical theorists at the time, the fact that the problem still existed did not prevent the polite plain speech style of rhetoric from acquiring important cachet among the economically and educationally advantaged in Britain. Polite plain speech allowed space for argumentation, persuasion in regards to principles, discussion of definitions, and other important tasks that were appropriate to the evolving urging and restraining functions of rhetoric-as-docere (that

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346 Unfortunately for the Royal Society, while the colleagues of Wilkins could comprehend his technical rhetoric, it was useless as a political tool even in a time of stasis.
used to belong to rhetoric-as-

movere). Polite plain speech rhetoric was a less effective vehicle for inspiring and organizing political action. Indeed, Shaftesbury, one of its chief proponents, reminded one of his friends that when he defended conversational polite plain speech he was actually defending “the Liberty of the Club, and of that sort of Freedom which is taken amongst Gentlemen and Friends, who know one another perfectly well.”

Given this caveat, why am I including his analysis of rhetoric appropriate for private conversation in a work on political rhetoric? I do so because these precepts, not the precepts of more traditional oratory, undergird contemporary models of political communication.

While it might seem odd that models of political communication would be more indebted to private, conversational polite plain speech (as an evolution of rhetoric-as-docere) instead of rhetoric-as-movere, the story of the remaining chapters of this work is the story of the continuing evolution of the rhetoric-as-docere tradition from the polite plain speech rhetoric of the eighteenth century to the deliberative democracy movement in contemporary political theory. All of these movements that belong to the rhetoric-as-docere family tree share a number of factors in common; two are most critical for our purposes. First, the conversational ideal requires that a group of people be able to share the same references, the same vocabulary, and the same culture. If these things are not shared among the speakers in a group, then the conversation will not be as effective (this is basically a restatement of the problem of homogeneity). Second, there is also a need for a basic sense of equality among the participants or else dialogue will not flow freely (in a contemporary context this relates to the “barriers to entry” problem with deliberative democracy that I described in the Introduction).

My chief aim in studying the various progressions of rhetoric-as-*docere* in the English speaking tradition is to show how incongruous they are with popular political action. Throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries rhetoric-as-*docere* iterations like polite plain speech and deliberative democracy fail to engender widespread popular political action, while rhetoric-as-*movere* iterations like populist protest rhetoric and religiously based inspirational rhetoric are consistently deployed by the leaders of widespread popular movements. In this eighteenth century case we see that observations of political history to the eighteenth century show that conversation as a form of rhetoric (as opposed to speechmaking) had not historically been effective in politically connecting a heterogeneous group of people. It was difficult to make strides in this area as the circle/salon tradition of the noble class continued during this time. The problem of homogeneity and the literal barriers to entering these circles and salons (in the form of class separation and restrictions) limited the reach of rhetorical messages.

Shaftesbury's *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* codified many of the unofficial rules and expectations that governed polite plain speech. When we examine the *Characteristicks*, we can see some of the limitations of this type of conversation. Shaftesbury’s conception of polite rhetoric did not have a focus on action. Indeed, the entirety of the “Letter Concerning Enthusiasm” seems to serve as a polemic against rhetoric-as-*movere*. It is Shaftesbury’s hope that eloquence can be called upon “with indifferent Company, or in any easy or cool hour,” and his great fear was that the people would be stirred: “Thus popular fury may be call’d *Panick*, when the Rage of the

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People, as we have sometimes known, has put them beyond themselves.” What is the most liable to be the source of panic? Persuasive words, of course: “And when Men find no original Commotions in themselves, no prepossessing Panick which bewitches ‘em; they are apt still, by the Testimony of others, to be impos’d on, and let credulously into the Belief of many false Miracles.” Shaftesbury critiques persuasion because of what he saw as its connection to instability (and the resulting instability's threat to a gentlemanly way of life). We see that Shaftesbury shares a root fear with Hobbes and is also indebted to the Protestant tradition—in his lamentations concerning miracles we can see the shade of the more strident Protestant theological objections to rhetorical flourishes.

Not only was Shaftesbury worried that rhetoric could be used to create panic, but he also suspected it could be used as a tool of confusion. Following his characteristically Protestant disdain for the excitement caused by the idea of miracles, Shaftesbury’s conception of politeness eschewed ornament. In “An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor,” he wrote, “But to go about industriously to confound Men, in a mysterious manner, and to make advantage or draw pleasure from that Perplexity they are thrown into, by such uncertain Talk; is as unhandsome in a way of Raillery.” It is in Shaftesbury, more than any other author of this period, that we see the praise of conversation. We see that Shaftesbury too seems to have forgotten the old dictum, for when he lists the benefits of conversation (that are denied by oratory), he only names

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349 Ibid., 10.
350 Ibid., 27.
351 The undisputed authority in the extensive literature on Shaftesbury and politeness is Lawrence Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994).
353 Particularly in “Essay on Wit and Humor”: “Orationes are fit only to move the Passions: And the Power of Declamation is to terrify, exalt, ravish or delight, rather than to satisfy or instruct.”
satisfying [delighting] or instructing [teaching; docere]. Persuasion [moving; movere] has become unimportant, if not outright dangerous.

Given Shaftesbury's notable thoughts on humor and "railery," one would think that the most important part of his conception of politeness would be the integration of polite humor, and at some level it is. Railery and humor have the ability to diffuse tensions which would distract from the goals of fine conversation. As Shaftesbury writes, "A great many fine schemes, 'tis true, were destroy'd; many grave Reasonings overturn'd: but this being done without offence to the Partys concern'd, and with improvement to the good Humour of the Company [emphasis added], it set the Appetite the keener to such conversations." This is an incredibly important statement, as it shows that polite plain speech was a) built around the idea of a "Company" of fellows who would have enough in common to be able to use humor in a way "set the Appetite the keener to such conversations" and b) not thought of as a method for inspiring political action, but for dealing with reason and argument. If there is any doubt about the second part of this assertion, one has to only keep reading Shaftesbury: "...the Notion I have of Reason, neither the written Treatises of the Learned, nor the set Discourses of the Eloquent, are able of themselves to teach the use of it. 'Tis the habit along of Reasoning which can make a Reasoner...In matter of Reason, more is done in a minute or two, by way of Question and Reply, than by a continu'd Discourse of whole Hours."

This then leads into his criticism of standard rhetoric [in the forms of oration and declamation]

354 Ibid., 45.
355 Ibid., 45.
which “move the Passions” and “terrify, exalt, ravish.” Such results—results deeply connected with the idea of political persuasion—must be avoided.

Shaftesbury asserts that these results must be avoided because they promote unstable behavior among the masses and because they are inimical to freedom, which is connected to reason. “Must I always be listener only?” writes Shaftesbury, lamenting the powerlessness of such a passive position, “is as natural a Case of Complaint in Divinity, in Morals, and in Philosophy as it was of old.” Shaftesbury creates a connection between the ability to freely participate in a conversation—demonstrating one's rational faculty—and one's status as a free individual. Despite the fact that Shaftesbury himself was writing specifically about private group discussion, the connection that he—and other authors who wrote on the benefits of salon conversation—created between rational discussion and freedom was incredibly important and influential in the evolution of ideas concerning what political rhetoric and discourse ought to look like. Shaftesbury's model of conversation made the issue of freedom and autonomy of the rhetorical participants themselves a point of contention and as political writers and (later) political theorists became increasingly concerned with questions of freedom and autonomy for participants in a political process, Shaftesbury's model of private rhetoric became the inspiration for a new way of looking at political rhetoric. The decline of movere and the repackaging of rhetoric-as-movere's urging and restraining functions as urging and restraining functions of rhetoric-as-docere made the integration of political rhetoric and Shaftesburian principles (Reason as the chief goal of discourse) almost seamless.

356 Ibid, p. 45
357 Ibid., p. 45
It is this connection that polite plain speech makes between rational capacity and the “right” to be considered free and equal to converse with other free rational men that leads to me to suggest that the more fundamental and important idea behind polite conversation—one that is hinted at in the descriptions of Shaftesburian railery—is an idea of frankness. William Bowman Piper quotes a description of Samuel Johnson’s use of “Sir,” as follows:

“Sir” used as an introduction to a vigorous attack means: “I acknowledge that this is a civilized gathering and that we are all ladies and gentlemen. In general, you have a claim to be treated with respect and the claim I hereby acknowledge. But you will grant me the privilege, which one gentleman grants another, of speaking frankly. To have lost, as we have, the use of such formulae is to make conversation that is at once full-blooded and civilized more difficult. It makes it harder to escape from merely vapid amiability without falling into what looks like mere rudeness.\(^358\)

There are many important elements to this passage. Joseph Wood Krutch, the man being quoted by Piper, has concerns about discourse that rather resemble our own. He is concerned with finding a balance between “conversation that is at once full-blooded and civilized,” which is certain an apt description of persuasive rhetoric, or rhetoric-as-movere, and proper forms that “acknowledge that this is a civilized gathering.” Most importantly, all of these acknowledgments and privileges are those “which one gentleman grants another” and they help establish that all-important sense of equality and “Company” (even if it is the rather loose Company of gentlemen) that are necessary for proper polite plain speech.

In one phrase Krutch establishes the connection between polite conversational rhetoric and the problem of homogeneity. The ability to be frank, to use humor, to poke

fun at another's argument and to perhaps “push the envelope” of one of your interlocutors—all these things require some sense of familiarity and fellow-feeling.

Much as the Socratic method is not really Socratic unless the participants have a genuine friendship and wish the others in the conversation well (else it degrades into mere passive-aggressive posturing), conversation loses its finer qualities without a sense of friendship and familiarity. If conversations are among familiar friends, that necessarily means that those who are unfamiliar and not friends (not enemies, just people who have not yet become friends with the speakers) are excluded. Even in a broader sense social judgments—are you a gentleman?—become the basis for inclusion in conversations, thus creating surprisingly narrow and homogeneous environment within the conversation. Certainly, one might object, there are “conversations” that are not so exclusive. I would be forced to grant this, but I would further suggest that the “new” individuals who lack familiarity with the group and its norms will be at a disadvantage. Those who do not meet the group's definition of “gentleman” or “lady” or “educated” or any other number of descriptive markers will not be made to feel welcome.

This problem has many applications and expressions in contemporary American politics that appear to speak to the very close link between the polite conversational rhetoric of the eighteenth century and contemporary deliberative democratic rhetoric. I would like to highlight two contemporary manifestations: the idea of the “hollow core” and the links between the equality of conversation and the generalized sense of “equality” that is a part of the American political mindset. Whether or not it is supported by facts, part of the unique American mindset is the idea of equality.\footnote{This would be part of an “American exceptionalism” argument along the lines of Kingdon, America The Unusual (New York: Bedford/St. Martins, 1999).}
intellectualism and contrary nature of its people can be explained, in part, by their adverse reaction to anything that smacks of patronization. Most of us believe that “you have a claim to respect,” but also—and most importantly—‘you’ must “grant me the privilege,” i.e., ‘you’ must acknowledge my equality and my rights as a speaker in a conversation. Given the nature of contemporary politics—specialized, technical, and requiring expertise—it is very difficult to sustain an “equal” conversation. Most citizens do not understand the intricacies of tax policy or environmental policy, but they are apt to become frustrated and offended if not politely invited into the conversation. Given the trend toward equality, this contribution of politeness—recognizing the claims to respect of all participants—is as important as ever. Indeed, as we see later in the chapter, it was this blending of the proper form, frankness, and historical circumstances that necessitated action that make the political rhetoric of the Revolutionary period and the early American republic so moving and effective.

**Docere co-opting Movere: Middle Class Rhetoric and the Ambivalence to Movere**

While Shaftesbury's principles of polite conversation have become important parts of contemporary political discourse norms, political discourse in his time was still largely governed by the traditional forms of oratory, pamphleteering and letter-writing (with the latter two sometimes being combined, as in Cato's Letters). However, even in these traditional forms, we see the beginnings of the co-optation of the urging and restraining forms of rhetoric-as-*movere* by rhetoric-as-*docere*. While hostility toward political persuasion was not monolithic, the major social and moral theorists of the period, like Adam Smith and David Hume were ambivalent at best about *movere*. They were opposed by rhetoricians like Thomas Sheridan who believed firmly that “moving
others to action is the chief end of eloquence.” However, Sheridan was a rarity. Most other lecturers, like George Campbell and Hugh Blair focused on written rhetoric, but Sheridan “[highlighted] the limitations of the “dead letter” and the powers of the “living voice.” Sheridan’s program of public speaking was unusual, and placed him among a group known as the elocutionists. That these elocutionists are not treated well by historians of rhetoric stands as an indication of the relative unimportance of the history of truly persuasive political rhetoric, of rhetoric-as-

movere, to contemporary scholars of rhetoric.

Adam Smith’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, while, of course, not rejecting the classical tradition (particularly in terms of terminology and organizational precepts) entirely, does demonstrate the shift away from concerns of movere to concerns of docere. Smith is very concerned with encouraging plainness of language in rhetoric. The Lectures contain multiple exhortations towards this plainness. He warns his students that “Our words must also be put in such order that the meaning of the sentence shall be quite plain and not depend on the accuracy of the printer in placing the points or of the readers in laying the emphasis on any certain word.” He is disdainful of the tropes and figures of speech, concluding that “they have no intrinsick worth of their own.”

At times the Lectures read very much like Locke’s Essay.

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361 Ibid., 148.
362 Ibid. 148-51.
364 In his sixth lecture, he writes, “In these [tropes and figures] as we mentiond they tell us all the beauties of language, all that is noble, grand and sublime, all that is passionate, tender and moving is to be found. But the case is far otherwise. When the sentiment of the speaker is expressed in a neat, clear, plain and clever manner, and the passion or affection he is poss<ess>ed of and intends, by sympathy, to communicate
Despite this focus on plain style and the influence of the rationalistic culture of the eighteenth century, Smith's rhetoric had two important classical qualities. First, as though he was, at some level, aware of the problem of homogeneity, Smith is keenly aware of different audiences. “Our words,” he writes, “must not only be English and agreeable to the custom of this country but likewise to the custom of some particular part of the nation. This part undoubtedly is formed of the men of rank and breeding.” However, he also acknowledges that “On the other hand many words as well as gestures or peculiarities of dress give us an idea of some thing mean and Low in those whom we find them.” While the fellows of the Royal Society believed that all communication had the goal of inching closer to Real Knowledge, and were thus less sensitive to the question of audience, Smith fell in line with the majority of thinkers up until the seventeenth century and proclaimed that the goal of rhetoric was to communicate an idea to a particular audience, and thus the particular audience had to be seriously considered. Still, Smith asserts that “It is the custom of the people that forms what we call propriety and the custom of the better sort from whence the rules of purity of stile are to be drawn.” While at first recognizing the existence of a “Low” audience that was not as educated as those of “rank and breeding,” Smith moves past this point quickly and does not discuss rhetoric for the Low again in the Lectures.

The second classical quality of Smith's rhetoric was that it did not excise sentiment from rhetoric, and in fact concluded that “this beauty [of elegant ancient

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365 Ibid., 26.
366 Ibid., 4.
367 Ibid., 4.
368 Ibid., 35: “It is here to be observed that an Orator or didactick writer has two parts in his work: in the one he lays down his proposition and in the other he brings his proof of that proposition.”
369 Ibid., 5.
passages] flowed from the sentiment that was behind them. This is not a solitary instance; in Smith’s lectures, we can see the re-embrace of many classical ideas. While he, like Ramus, believed that the tropes and figures were just a poor and mimetic way of expressing the true sentiment—only plain language could express true sentiment, he did recognize that sentiment and emotion did have a role to play in contributing to the effectiveness of rhetoric and the beauty of language. Although Smith does dismiss excessive use of figures (oddly enough, because they make discourse too accessible to the low and vulgar), it is still fair to say that Smith again tempers the position of the Royal Society and those inspired by Bacon. On this point, Smith's thoughts on rhetoric appear to be representative of the polite plain speech position. It was this median aspect of polite plain speech that made it so appealing to the commercial class. The polite plain speech of Smith had enough grounding in classical theory that it could assist its users in imitating the nobility that they seemed destined to supplant, but it did not require the specialized technical aptitude required for Baconian inspired scientific rhetoric.

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370 Ibid., 26.
371 Ibid., 34: “On the other hand there is nowhere more use made of figures that in the lowest and most vulgar conversation. The Billingsgate language is full of it. Sancho Panca and people of his stamp who speak in proverbs, always abound in figures.”
372 Smith is, however, all too willing to chastise those authors who are too florid in their rhetoric. He puts Plato above Lysias, who “exaggerates everything and often affirms what is far from being true,” and, “is very fond not only of all sorts of figures but even is full of Exclamations and Wonder.” Pericles is placed even higher than Plato because he “is more correct, less exuberant and extravä<ga>nt than the form<er>, strong and nervous, precise and pointed and carries along not only a direct commendation of the Athenians but an indirect discommendation of the Lacedemonians then their rivals” (all quotes from p. 141).
373 In Hypocrisy and the Politics of Politeness (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004), Jenny Davidson notes the way in which “commerce operates by means of manners to define the characteristically modern virtue of politeness…Although truthfulness continues to be valued, the identification of virtue with politeness renders the ideal of sincerity increasingly problematic, with the effect of polarizing truth and civility” (2).
374 Indeed, there was a lot of imitation going on here—Woodman speaks of “genteel-mania” and cites Bolingbroke’s complaints about the number of tradesmen who imitated higher stations (he also notes that Bolingbroke blamed this on nascent capitalism). Politeness and Poetry in the Age of Pope, 19-21.
Indeed, while Smith acknowledges the superiority of the newer methods of scientific and logical demonstration, Smith argues that those methods are not appropriate for rhetoric:

The Didacticall method tho undoubtedly the best in all matters of Science, is hardly ever applicable to Rhetoricall discourses. Thes People, to which they are ordinarily directed, have no pleasure in these abstruse deduction; their interest, and the practicability and honourableness of the thing recommended is what alone will sway them and is seldom to be shewn in a long deduction of arguments.

Here we see the co-optation of restraining and urging rhetoric by docere. Smith absolutely did not believe that the only proper rhetorical ends were what we might call docere ends, such as academic presentation or the discussion of empirical scientific experiments, but he did not believe that move are ends of persuading people to political action were entirely appropriate. What emerges from Smith's work on rhetoric is a type of rhetoric that seeks to persuade listeners on social and moral questions, but does not necessarily seek to move them to any specific action as a result of reaching certain moral and political conclusions.

The tension in Smith's work between docere and move are would explode in later years. Smith distinguishes between rhetoric, as a spoken performance before an audience, and didactical writing that pursues truth. Smith believed that rhetoric had to reflect education. Smith criticizes Shaftesbury because “he has not kept up with modern

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375 Ibid., 146: “This Latter which we may call the Newtonian method is undoubtedly the most Philosophical, and in ever science whether of Moralls or Nat<urall> phi<losophy> etc., is vastly more ingenious and for that reason more engaging than the other.”

376 Ibid., 146.

377 I want to suggest that these sorts of goals combined with the goals and method of Shaftesbury to create the general norms and form of theories of twentieth century political communication.
scientific advances.” In this, he mirrors the attitudes of the merchant middle class that used polite plain speech rhetoric. As literacy rates improved and printed materials became more accessible, this rhetoric/didactic distinction that Smith made throughout the Lectures became less meaningful. The didactic written form asserted its superiority, and so did its proofs and its method. Part and parcel of this change in attitudes is the fact that Smith does not seem to conceive of rhetoric-as-movere. “The End of every discourse is either to narrate some fact or prove some proposition.” Following both the Royal Society and the Scholastics, rhetoric’s chief function in Smith’s view is teaching.

Written didactic rhetoric and its preferred proofs became increasingly popular and non-empirical “folksy” wisdom (such as proverbs) reached the nadir of its popularity. As Carey McIntosh points out, “The point is not that proverbs were eradicated between

378 Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, 16. Didadctick rhetoric occupied “the central place in Smith’s whole conception of discourse…where it emerges as not only a mode of expression but as a procedure of thought: the scientific” (14).

379 The eighteenth century was a time of great cultural change in England, and the ascension of written over spoken rhetoric was part of that change. In his lectures on the difference between history and rhetoric, we see Smith leaning toward rhetoric as the superior form of communication. “The Rhetorician,” Smith writes, “will not barely set forth the character of a person as it really existed but will magnify every particular that may tend to excite the Strongest emotions in us. He will also seem to be deeply affected with that affection which he would have use feel toward any object…The Historian on the centenary can only excite our affection by the narration of the fact and setting them in as interesting a view as he possibly can” (101). He praises the purposes of historical writing: “It sets before us the more interesting and important events of human life, points out the causes by which these events were brought about and by this means points out to us by what manner and method we may produce similar good effects or Similar bad ones” (90).

380 Ibid., 89. However, in the opening to Lecture XII, he writes, “The Rhetoricall again endeavours by all means to perswade us ; and for this purpose it magnifies all the arguments on the one side and diminishes or conceals those that might be brought on the side conterary to which it is designed that we should favor” (62).

381 Even in Smith, who was clearly working to balance classical principles and principles informed by empiricism, we see a preference for the empirical in the end. In the Introduction to the Lectures on Rhetoric, J.C. Bryce writes, “The task Smith set himself in the Rhetoric was to substitute a ‘Newtonian’ (or Cartesian, cf. ii. 134), a philosophical and ‘engaging’ explanation of beauty in writing, for the old rigamarole about figures of speech and thought, ‘topics’ of argument, subdivisions of discourse, characters of style and the rest. In this sense, his lectures constitute an anti-rhetoric” (36). While I agree that Smith’s lectures constitute an anti-rhetoric compared to sixteenth century writers like Erasmus and works like The Art of Rhetoric, I believe that they actually represent some form of recovery when compared with the rhetoric of the late seventeenth century.
1700 and 1800 but that they were dropped by the learned and polite."\(^{382}\) We saw Smith chastise Lysias for appealing to the “Wonderful,” showing that, to some degree, the radical empirical bias against the supernatural and superstitious continued:

In 1700, the music, dance, theatre, poetry, art, and sculpture of the people was still largely hand-made and home-made: ballads, harvests, festivals, songs by and for the miners or the weavers or the shepherds, puppet theatre, painted signs and carved bowls….it was the growth of cities, of communications, and of commerce in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that gradually stifled popular culture of this older kind.\(^{383}\)

While there had always been a divide between the culture of the nobles and the culture of the commons, the culture of the middle class exploded during this period: “In 1500 ‘popular culture was everyone’s culture; a second culture for the educated, and the only culture for everyone else.’ By 1800 all over western Europe ‘the clergy, the nobility, the merchants, the professional men—and their wives—had abandoned popular culture to the lower classes.’”\(^{384}\) One could argue that the idea of spoken rhetoric delivered to a popular audience was part of this popular culture that the educated had abandoned by 1800. It had been replaced by polite plain speech rhetoric deployed in written form so that both producers and consumers could demonstrate their education and moderation.

Unlike Smith, who seemed relatively untroubled by this evolution, David Hume was more ambivalent about rhetoric and its role. In one of his Essays, “Of Eloquence,” Hume writes:

At present, there are above half a dozen speakers in the two houses, who, in the judgment of the public, have reached very near the same pitch of eloquence; and no man pretends to give any one the preference above the rest. This seems to me a certain proof, that none of them have attained much beyond a mediocrity in their art, and that the species of eloquence, which they aspire to,
gives no exercise to the sublimer faculties of the mind, but may be reached by ordinary talents and a slight application.\textsuperscript{385}

Hume appears to be lamenting the passing of classical eloquence from England, claiming that “if we be superior in philosophy, we are still, notwithstanding all our refinements, much inferior in eloquence.”\textsuperscript{386}

“In ancient times,” Hume writes, “no work of genius was thought to require so great parts and capacity, as the speaking in public.”\textsuperscript{387} However, as Hume points out, “In enumerating the great men [of England], we exult in our poets and philosophers; but what orators are ever mentioned?”\textsuperscript{388} On numerous occasions Hume compares the ancient and modern attitudes toward action and passion and finds the ancients more open to both.\textsuperscript{389} Hume does not believe that this sort of eloquence has no place in his England. He examines three arguments against the ancient eloquence and disputes them all. First, he takes up the claim that the involved nature of studying the law—which he suggested was much more complex than it was in ancient times—necessarily leads to a decline in eloquence. Hume admits “that this circumstance, of the multiplicity and intricacy of laws, is a discouragement to eloquence in modern times: But I assert that it will not entirely account for the decline of that noble art.”\textsuperscript{390} Hume believed that the types of

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\textsuperscript{386} Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{387} Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{388} Ibid., 99.
\textsuperscript{389} Ibid., 101-2: “Suitable to this vehemence of thought and expression, was the vehemence of action, observed in the ancient orators. The \textit{supplosio pedis}, or stamping with the foot, was one of the most usual and moderate gestures which they made use of; though that is now esteemed too violent, either for the senate, bar, or pulpit, and is only admitted into the theatre, to accompany the most violent passions, which are there represented.”
\textsuperscript{390} Ibid., 103.
\end{flushleft}
discussions that made possible the ancient, eloquent discourse were “very frequent in
[England].”\textsuperscript{391}

In his discussion of the second argument, Hume, like Smith, takes a very
conservative turn on the nature of rhetoric. He writes:

It may be pretended that the decline of eloquence is owing to the superior good
sense of the moderns, who reject with disdain all those rhetorical tricks,
employed to seduce the judges, and will admit of nothing but solid argument in
any debate or deliberation. If a man be accused of murder, the fact must be
proved by witnesses and evidence; and the laws will afterwards determine the
punishment of the criminal. It would be ridiculous to describe, in strong
colours, the horror and cruelty of the action: To introduce the relations of the
dead; and, at a signal, make them throw themselves at the feet of the judges,
imploring justice with tears and lamentations...Now banish the pathetic from
public discourses, and you reduce the speakers merely to modern eloquence;
that is, to good sense, delivered in proper expression.\textsuperscript{392}

In these paragraphs, Hume summarizes the objections that had been mounting against the
classical rhetorical system for hundreds of years. He summarizes the modern position as
one in which rhetoric was meant to be plain, without strong (and manipulative) appeals to
emotion, and bolstered with empirical evidence to support all the propositions made in
the speech. “Modern eloquence,” as Hume describes it, seems to be remarkably close to
Smith’s ideal rhetoric. At this juncture, it appears that Hume is much more conservative,
and perhaps even reactionary in comparison to Smith. Having suggested that he is open
to a return to passion in rhetoric, Hume addresses one more argument against ancient
elocuence: that the magnitude of crime in ancient times (Hume cites the cases of Verres
and Catiline that made Cicero immortal) prompted the great ancient eloquence. Hume

\textsuperscript{391} Ibid., 103.
\textsuperscript{392} Ibid., 103-4.
dismisses this line of thought rather quickly, writing, “It would be easy to find a Philip in modern times; but where shall we find a Demosthenes?”

Though Hume’s view of modern eloquence seems somewhat dim, he would not throw away all the advancements of learning and admits that “our modern customs, or our superior good sense, if you will, should make our orators more cautious and reserved than the ancient.” However, while confronting the realities, Hume also asks his reader to seriously consider the consequences of a return to that which was: “But, I see no reason, why it should make them [orators] despair of absolutely succeeding in that attempt [of inflaming the passions of the audience].”

Hume takes issue with the very idea that the inflammation of passion is a bad thing, writing, “Nay, to consider the matter aright, they [the audience] were not deceived by any artifice. The orator, by the force of his own genius and eloquence, first inflamed himself with anger, indignation, pity, sorrow; and then communicated those impetuous movements to his audience.”

Hume concludes that the lack of modern eloquence must be attributed to “the want of genius, or of judgment in our speakers, who either found themselves incapable of reaching the heights of ancient eloquence, or rejected all such endeavours, as unsuitable to the spirit of modern assemblies?” He continues his assault on modern eloquence, particularly its exclusionary (to put it in a modern sense) aspects:

The principles of every passion, and of every sentiment, is in every man; and when touched properly, they rise to life, and warm to the heart, and convey that satisfaction, by which a work of genius is distinguished from the adulterate beauties of a capricious wit and fancy. And if this observation be true, with

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393 Ibid., 106. Demosthenes assailed Philip with his famous Phillippic orations (when Cicero spoke against Mark Antony toward the end of his life, the speeches were so eloquent and powerful that they were also called the Phillippics).
394 Ibid., 104.
395 Ibid.
396 Ibid.
397 Ibid., 106.
regard to all the liberal arts, it must be peculiarly so, with regard to eloquence; which, being merely calculated for the public, and for men of the world, cannot, with any pretence of reason, appeal from the people to more refined judges; but must submit to the public verdict, without reserve or limitation.\textsuperscript{398}

What Hume says here is extraordinary. Smith, in a manner more typical for his time, sees plainness as the readiest route to persuasion; Hume sees it in the passions. The passions unite men, and eloquence must appeal to all men (another place where Smith and Hume differ). Because of this common appeal, “ancient eloquence, that is, the sublime and the passionate, is of a much juster taste than the modern, or the argumentative and the rational; and, if properly executed, will always have more command and authority over mankind.”\textsuperscript{399} However, we never see Hume make an explicit statement endorsing the use of this ancient eloquence (obviously closely related to rhetoric-as-\textit{movere}) in the political arena.

Hume's political allegiances might explain this. Whatever overtures toward ancient eloquence we might find in Hume’s essay, Hume himself stood against the Country Opposition, and thus, inevitably, against a full expression of their ancient eloquence. In his other works, he is much clearer about his desire for polite, plain speech. In \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature}, he laments “tis not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army.”\textsuperscript{400} Indeed, his final position on the matter was very complex: “For Hume, the orator’s “flowers” are rationally deceitful and

\textsuperscript{398} \textit{Ibid.}, 107.
\textsuperscript{399} \textit{Ibid.}, 108.
\textsuperscript{400} Hume, David. \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature}, Intro, p. xiv.
socially “arrogant,” but they are also the test of an audience’s ’sensibility’ and ’delicacy of
taste.’”\textsuperscript{401} In other words, they spoke to the orator’s education and his knowledge
of/ability to use the proper gentleman's conventions that certified him as a person of “the
better sort.” Again, the tension between \textit{docere} and \textit{movere}: the idea that rhetoric should
lead to truth and truth alone had been rejected, but the tension between appropriate proofs
and issues of taste and aesthetics were coming to a head.

Because of this tension and Hume's attitude toward rationality throughout the rest
of his corpus, some Hume scholars have seen “Of Eloquence” as a peculiar and
challenging piece. Indeed, many of the readings of “Of Eloquence” play down its
reactionary moments in regards to the desire for a classical eloquence that engaged the
passions. Adam Potkay’s reading of Hume sees him as united with Smith in a quest for
polite plain speech that appealed to the emerging middle class. Potkay argues that any
reading of Hume that does not explicitly consider the influence of “politeness” is nothing
more than a surface reading, because politeness was such a crucial concept for Smith,
Hume and all the other eighteenth century moralists.\textsuperscript{402}

Is it possible to assert both that Hume praised ancient eloquence and would not
have been opposed to its return \textit{and} that Hume is also, in the end, on the quest for polite
plain speech rhetoric? I argue that it is: in practice, Hume wanted to further the cause of
polite plain speech rhetoric because its moderation fit the necessity of politics in England
and Scotland. Hume was aware of the historical affinity among popular action,
instability and the use of rhetoric-as-\textit{movere}. He knew that a return to ancient eloquence,

\textsuperscript{402} Potkay argues that Hume rejects ancient eloquence on polite, not philosophical grounds: “That is, he
[Hume] came to disapprove of eloquence not so much because it is deceptive or impolitic as because it is
impolite” (4).
while not devoid of benefits, also carried a great risk of instability. Not wishing to take
that risk, he advocated polite plain speech rhetoric—*but not without reservation*.

Indeed, the historical circumstances that made Hume shy away from the risk of
political instability were crucial. Hume and Smith did distance themselves from classical
rhetoric and eloquence grounded in rhetoric-as-*movere* for the same reasons that Bacon
did—they distanced themselves from those things because they were not temperate. In
that regard, they are both more similar to Hobbes, and their writing on the issue reflects
his considerable influence. Issues of class, spurred on by urbanization and rapidly
evolving technology, were becoming increasingly important. England’s educated split
along the Country-Court divide, and left the lower classes to fend for themselves.
Because the lower classes had been abandoned, Potkay writes, “professing politeness
meant, for any writer (once) sympathetic to Country ideals, distancing oneself from the
openly democratic ideal of ancient eloquence.”403 He traces Hume’s increasing
dissatisfaction with the Country idealists, and also dwells on the strangely lukewarm
conclusion to “Of Eloquence,” and asks whether or not Hume really wished for ancient
eloquence to be revived.404

**Different Circumstances, Different Translation: American Colonists and Movere**

Hume seemed to believe that ancient eloquence could only be revived in a
fantastic world. In a sense, he was right. The rich and varied landscape of America
*seemed* fantastic, with a variety of natural features, different climates, exotic fruits—and
a political climate that was parts familiar, fantastical and frightening. American colonists
were forced to remain more active than their fellow-men in Britain because

circumstances required them to more carefully monitor their rights and freedoms, as they believed Parliament would be more than willing to curtail the rights and liberties they believed were their birthright due to the distance between Britain and the colonies. Religious institutions were a critical conduit for discussing these questions and the issues were further examined in a rigorous pamphlet discourse.\(^{405}\) The contrast between Britain and her colonies clearly demonstrates the way in which rhetoric-as-movere and the desire for action need each other (and why I say they are in affinity with each other as opposed to saying that one must cause the other). In the English case, the desire for political action was largely absent and thus polite plain speech rhetoric was ossified in the same way that classical rhetoric was ossified in the medieval and Renaissance periods. However, in the American colonies, the desire for action did exist and they were able to play on the classical elements of polite plain speech rhetoric to inspire action.

The religious sermons and political pamphlets of the eighteenth century differ from those of the seventeenth in that they pay mind to the norms of politeness. The leading colonial intellectuals were influenced by British ideas, particularly those of the commonwealthsmen, and because of this, they added a new favorite to Cicero: Longinus. They liked Longinus and the histories of Tacitus, because these two men popularized the idea that liberty and eloquence were inextricably linked. The Country Opposition, as their “ancestors” such as Milton and Sidney had years before, took up republicanism as the government of liberty, and classical rhetoric as the eloquence of virtue.\(^{406}\) Poets like

\(^{405}\) I *certainly* do not wish to make the claim that religion was unimportant in England, merely that its effect was to curb action as opposed to spurring action, as we see in the American case.

\(^{406}\) Robbins: “Longinus’s first speaker accordingly attributes the decay of sublime eloquence in his own era to the loss of political liberty under the Romane Empire, whereas his second speaker inveighs against not only “slavery” but also “the love of money,” “bribery,” “corruption,” and “luxury” (chap. 44). This litany comprises, of course, the very terms adopted by the Opposition to denounce the age of Walpole. Correspondingly, the Longinian nostalgia for an age of eloquence found an echo among the “patriots”:...
Bolingbroke, Glover and Thomson painted a picture in which ancient eloquence and ancient virtue were united. This belief, combined with the political climate in the colonies, further increased the dominance of a *movere*—not a *docere*—approach to persuasion in the colonial context. British pamphleteers who straddled the line between *docere* and *movere* and were clearly influenced by Longinus, like John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, were popular and influential in the colonies. Trenchard and Gordon's *Cato's Letters* emphasize the important connection between eloquence and freedom and give passion a prime place in politics.

The 44th Letter states, “Dry reasoning has no force.” Trenchard and Gordon clearly understood that passion was essential to creating political action. They conclude, “in order to persuade and govern men, you must know what will please or frighten them.” Placing themselves in opposition to Smith at least, if not Hume as well, Trenchard and Gordon state that “this world is governed by passion, and not by principle; and it ever will be so long as men are men.” They echo Longinus when they write:

This talent [eloquence] therefore has been ever cultivated and admired in commonwealths, where men were dealt with by reason and persuasion, and at liberty to reject or ratify propositions offered, and measures taken, by their magistrates, to examine their conduct, and to distinguish them with honors and punishments as they deserved. But in single monarchies, where reason is turned into command, and remonstrances and debating into servile submission, eloquence is either lost, or perverted to sanctify publick violence, and to deify the authors of it.

We also see here, however, that they do not reject reason, or consider it unimportant. The author’s of *Cato’s Letters* sought a mixture of reason and passion in their rhetoric.

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Unlike other thinkers of the time who demonized or downplayed the passions, Trenchard and Gordon fully recognized their importance.

Hobbes agreed with Trenchard and Gordon on the power and important role of the passions, but he took drastically different action. He sought to subdue the passions—particularly the dangerous ones like vainglory—because of the threat they presented to the stability of the state. However, Trenchard and Gordon do not necessarily embrace, but do accept, the powerful role that the passions play in life, particularly over any principles, religious or philosophical. Unsurprisingly, they also reject the Baconian-Royal Society rhetoric project, asserting that “it [human judgment] is so liable to be corrupted and weighed down by the biases that passion, delusion and interest hang upon it, that we ought never to trust, without caution and examination, either to our own or that of others.” In other words, a rhetorical project that claimed to eliminate such biases was subject to suspicion.

However, despite their acceptance of passion and its role in moving the people, Trenchard and Gordon make a place for politeness and science in society. Two letters (nos. 78 & 79) rail against superstition in much the same way that the members of the Royal Society had done (and were doing). In the letter concerning political rhetoric, “Cato” acknowledges the importance of audience:

As eloquence itself is necessary, or checked, or quite discouraged, in different forms of government; so the manner of eloquence must vary, even where it is useful, according to the various classes of men to whom it is addressed. There is a considerable difference between the speeches spoken by Cicero in the Senate, and those which he spoke to the people. In an assembly of gentlemen,

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411 Again, from the 44th Letter: “Upon the whole I think it very plain, that if you separate from the principles of men the penalties and advantages which are annexed to them by laws human and divine, or which every man has annexed to them in his own mind, you will hardly leave such a thing as principle in the world; the world is therefore not governed by principle” (305).

412 Ibid. 315.
he who speaks with brevity and clearness, and strong sense, speaks best...But in speeches to assemblies of the people, much greater latitude is allowed; and vehemence of tone and action, a hurry and pomp of words, strong figures, tours of fancy, ardent expression, and throwing fire into their imaginations, have always been reckoned proper ways to gain their assent and affections.  

Here we see Smith’s position augmented. “Cato” admits that the polite, plain rhetoric that Smith admires has its place, but unlike Smith, he accepts the use of other types of rhetoric, and recognizes the heterogeneity of his audience. Once again, the role of the passions in moving individuals is highlighted: “The substance and reasoning part of this potent speech [Demosthenes’ Philippic] might have been comprise in a few plain and short propositions...But such a summary and dry representation of the orator’s meaning would probably not have moved a fifth part of his auditory.”

While Trenchard and Gordon's fellow Brits might not have responded to their challenge, Americans were more than happy to create this public sphere of action and reason and politeness. Reading American political documents, speeches and sermons of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we can see that—much like the rhetoric of the English Civil War—action was the goal. The documents in England and America are radically different on this score. In terms of form, both use polite conventions, both suffer to some extent from the problem of homogeneity (the English more so than the American), and thus, on the surface, appear to be very similar. However, their attitude toward persuasion is quite different, and this is the key contribution of early American rhetoric. The effective deployment of rhetoric-as-movere in the American Revolutionary period demonstrated that the complete Hobbesian-inspired rejection of rhetoric-as-

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413 Ibid., 730-1.  
414 Ibid., 731. A few paragraphs later, we once again see “Cato” advocating the combination of reasoned and passionate rhetoric. “I mean no sort of reflections upon the gentlemen of the long robe,” he writes, “or upon their manner of speaking, which is I think the only proper manner for our bar; where the rules of proceeding being strict and ascertained, there is no room for haranguing” (732).
*movere* was perhaps rash, and although the situation demonstrated the threefold historical affinity between opportunities for popular political action, the use of rhetoric-as-*movere* and political instability, the resulting instability was nowhere near as damaging as British eighteenth century authors (like Hume) imagined it could be.

American documents from the eighteenth and early nineteenth century are rife with republican ideals *and* calls to action. Philo Publicus, in his “Frugality” played on the ancient republican revulsion to luxury and also presented an ideal of republican womanhood:

> And on this Occasion, my fair Country-women will allow me to wish a general Reformation among them.—May they lay aside their Fondness for Dress and Fashions, for Trinkets and Diversions, and apply themselves to manage with Prudence the Affairs of the Family within, while their Husbands are busied in providing them the Means…And especially do I wish they would bear on their Minds the Importance of educating their Children in the Principles of Virtue and Oeconomy, and assiduously apply themselves to cultivate the Mind, and form the Manners of those who in future Times will be either the Glory or Disgrace of NEW ENGLAND.\(^{415}\)

These common republican tropes—and references to English republican authors—are found in other writers of the time, such as Stephen Hopkins and Richard Bland. “The Tribune” was a Charleston, SC based author who also inveighed against luxury. In his contribution to the 6 October 1766 *South Carolina Gazette*, we can see the way in which American authors used republican virtue to create a direct link with action. He writes, “for if administrators are seen to encourage luxury and profusion, it may certainly be concluded, that they do it on the view of creating a necessity in men to become servile and corrupt.”\(^{416}\) His explicit use of Machiavelli against luxury and corruption is

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\(^{416}\) The Tribune, “No. XVII,” reprinted in Hyneman and Lutz.
particularly interesting, and further cements the connection between outlets for action, an embrace of republicanism, and the use of rhetoric-as-*movere* to motivate individuals.

We see that call to action—expressed politely, of course—in these American pamphlets. An anonymous respondent to the *Boston Gazette* wrote, “…when the laws of God and man are openly violated, and those who are entrusted with the execution of them, are abused and insulted, it is high time for all order citizens to united in a proper defence of them, as openly to countenance them in bringing such notorious offenders to punishment…”\(^{417}\) Indeed, writers like “Aequus” did not favor reckless action—perhaps the American revolutionaries learned from the English revolutionaries?—but admitted that if the political circumstances did not change, if “that birthright [to liberties under English common law] by which they are themselves tied in interest to the mother country”\(^{418}\) was not secure, then action would be necessary. Silas Downer urged his listeners to “let us with unconquerable resolution maintain and defend that liberty wherewith GOD hath made us free…it will be our indispensable duty manfully to oppose every invasion of our rights…we will be freemen, or we will die.”\(^{419}\)

The “Election Sermon” delivered by Timothy Stone, a Connecticut Congregationalist, argues for action on both political and religious grounds. Citing techniques from no less a work than the Hebrew Bible itself, Stone argued that the text was “to excite in that people a spirit of obedience…that…would raise their character in the sight of the nations.”\(^{420}\) Stone calls for his audience to “pursue that conduct which shall be productive of their highest happiness” and reminds them that “[i]t is in the interest and

\(^{417}\) Anonymous letter in 17 September 1764 edition of *Boston Gazette*, reprinted in Hyneman and Lutz.

\(^{418}\) Aequus, “From the Craftsman,” reprinted in Hyneman and Lutz.

\(^{419}\) A Son of Liberty [Silas Downer], “A Discourse at the Dedication of the Tree of Liberty,” reprinted in Hyneman and Lutz.

\(^{420}\) Timothy Stone, “Election Sermon” [1792], reprinted in Hyneman and Lutz.
privilege of an enlightened free people to be acquainted with the characters of their most worthy citizens.” Stone praises both Greece and Rome because their example “lay a foundation...for public spirit and vigorous exertion [emphasis added] to rest upon.” That vigorous exertion was to be applied toward “the jealous inspection of a people, possessed of the knowledge, and love of liberty, together with the means of its preservation.”

Stone's work does a wonderful job of demonstrating the difference between British rhetorical practice, which was giving way to techniques based in rhetoric-as-docere, and colonial rhetoric, which still firmly believed in the just restraining and just urging functions of rhetoric-as-movere. Most importantly, these works retain the traditional end of rhetoric-as-movere: political persuasion. These colonial works do an even better job than their English predecessors of balancing the restraining and urging functions of movere; this would seem to be one of the consequences of the influence of polite culture. Fisher Ames's “The Dangers of American Liberty,” a tract written in the early Republican period (1805) demonstrates this balance. He was very wary of the negative use of movere: improper demagogic rhetoric. He wrote, “So long as popular licentiousness is operating with no lingering industry to effect our yet unfinished ruin, she may flourish the whip of dominion in her hands; but as soon as it is accomplished, she will be the associate of our shame and bleed under its lashes.”

Again, later in the work: “The people, as a body, cannot deliberate. Nevertheless, they will feel and irresistible impulse to act and their resolutions will be dictated to them by

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421 All of the remaining short quotations in this paragraph come from Stone's “Election Sermon.”
422 Indeed, as we saw with the authors from the English Civil War period, there is a concern about demagoguery in colonial rhetoric. Stone himself condemns “[c]reatures, who have risen in rebellion, against the holy and perfect government of JEHOVAH; have partial connections, selfish interests, passions and lusts, which often interfere with each other [author's note: it is important that Stone qualifies his criticism of passions, whereas those operating from a Hobbesian base would be less likely to do so], and which, will not always be controlled by reason, and the mild influence of moral motives...”
demagogues.” While Ames was not hostile to the people taking action (in this particular piece he is in fact taking umbrage at citizens acting in factions—he felt that “individual” action would not have the same deleterious effect), and thus did not reject movere, he certainly made liberal use of its restraining function.

Most importantly, Ames used this balance of legitimate movere-based functions to highlight the negative side of the affinity between popular government and in arguing for republican institutions, he cited the historical dangers of unrestrained urging in a popular context: “All such men are, or ought to be, agreed that simple governments are despotisms; and of all despotisms a democracy, though the least durable, is the most violent.” While Ames's caution is traditionally republican, and Ames does not call movere into question, it is certainly reasonable to suggest that this caution was particularly resonant in the wake of the American Revolutionary War. In the following chapter I will argue that the historical circumstances of war (beginning with the Revolutionary War, including “minor” skirmishes like the War of 1812 and culminating in the American Civil War) created political circumstances in nineteenth century America that reflected the eighteenth century circumstances in Great Britain in the wake of the English Civil War. When these circumstances were combined with the increasingly powerful influence of European intellectual movements, the groundwork was laid for the move to rhetoric-as-docere to begin in America.

**Conclusion**

No one can doubt the existence of movere in the both the minor and the canonical authors of the American Revolution—the Paines and the Jeffersons and the Henrys. It

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424 Ibid.
425 Ibid.
was through their works that the unasked question was answered: what happened when eloquence inspired by the teachings of classical rhetoric was combined with the rational and scientific spirit of the Enlightenment? Unlike the English, who seemed to have a difficult time choosing (and seemed to think that they had to choose!) between republicanism or rationalism (as Hume's struggles on the question of ancient eloquence demonstrate), the American colonists chose to embrace both. They believed that Longinus was correct—eloquence and freedom were linked, but they also believed in the new science of politics. The rhetoric of the early American republic shows these two things entwined in effective and stirring ways.

Now the fact that the rhetoric of the period so adequately balanced the principles of the two extreme periods that preceded it would seem to make it the base of an ideal solution to our modern crisis of political communication. However, even in the United States, the problem of homogeneity was still an issue. Certainly, the Americans embraced action in a way that their British brethren had not done in some time. However, the character of their rhetoric was different from that of the seventeenth century English republican movement. While some, like Jefferson and the anti-Federalists, were more in sympathy with those earlier republicans, many like James Madison and Alexander Hamilton had reservations about such populism. These men knew that some political action was necessary, but they were also affected by polite culture and deeply believed in the classical republican principle of a governing class (except they wanted the governing class of America to be elected, not selected based on birth). To this end, their federal system allowed for robust popular participation at the
state and township level, but created homogeneity at the top levels of government. The cadre of decision-makers behind the Constitution and the other important events of the American Revolutionary period were subject to the problem of homogeneity and the rhetoric within their group reflects this.

Because of both this issue of homogeneity and historical circumstance, we cannot follow the Founders’ example wholesale. As the American institutions federalized and began to more closely resemble their British counterparts, and as the social climate of America moved toward urbanization, the same gaps that had started forming in Britain starting forming in the United States as well. The drive toward urbanization, and the true emergence of what might be called the modern city, was key, as it birthed the type of middle class that Smith and Hume were trying to address with their brand of rhetoric. This was not the landed, gentleman’s middle class whose emergence and embrace of republicanism so disturbed Hobbes. These people lived in cities and suburbs, and were the forerunners and early members of the bourgeoisie. Members of this class were very driven by social norms and had a strong desire to appear polite.

Not only did urbanization birth this new middle class in the United States, it also contributed to the continuing evolution of political institutions. As urbanization increased, and the cities/suburbs and their middle class began to assume power, the influence of the gentleman farmer was marginalized. In both Britain and America (America lagging behind Britain), the reaction against classical rhetoric and the political

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426 See the work of Ames (op. cit.) as well as the Federalist for an expression of this more “elite” view.
427 This may explain why classical rhetoric was able to maintain a hold in certain parts of America until just before the Civil War. In many areas of the country, particularly the Southeast, urbanization was delayed, the ethos of republicanism was strong, and the landowners held great political sway. Analysis of Southern rhetoric, songs and documents from the antebellum and Civil War periods shows strong classical influence. However, after the Civil War, this sort of rhetoric was on its way to finding itself marginalized in the Southeast as well.
ideas that go along with that rhetoric involved some variant of rejecting passion for reason. Passion, the motivating force of classical rhetoric’s *movere*, was seen as simpleminded, a relic of a less enlightened age, it was no longer viewed as something that helped and facilitated politics, but that caused problems in politics. Intellectuals cited post-war trauma, and criticized *movere* (sometimes in the guise of criticizing populist republicanism) for the part it had to play.

In the final two chapters I will show how this polite plain speech of the middle class, rooted in rhetoric-as-*docere*, survived and inspired the dominant norms of political communication in the twentieth century. This type of rhetoric, because it was seen as connected to the “educated class” acquired intellectual prestige, which was one of the critical factors that allowed it to assume such a powerful normative position. In particularly, the conversational norms of Shaftesbury have become immensely influential, particularly in the context of deliberative democracy. However, none of the modes of rhetoric studied in this chapter, especially the rhetoric-as-*docere* based models espoused by Shaftesbury, Smith and Hume, have been able to separate themselves from the problem of homogeneity. The second important thing I will demonstrate in the final two chapters is how this problem of homogeneity continues to undermine the political efficacy of many contemporary models of political communication.

While the political discourse of the American colonial period embraced all the legitimate functions of *movere* (and, one could argue, was not as pockmarked by “improper demagogic” rhetoric as was the pamphlet discourse in seventeenth century England), it is only one of the potential solutions for the problem of inspiring people to act in politics. While this American founding solution to the problem is promising, the
problem of homogeneity at the highest levels of government must be overcome. The
diversification of the American electorate since the eighteenth century, and the new
pluralism and populism of the twentieth century demand that the federal sphere of
government be de-homogenized in some way, or else the structured federal solution will
prove to be ultimately unsatisfactory.
Docere's American Ascent and the Counter-example of Marx

The previous two chapters have touched on two examples of popular political upheavals\(^{428}\) that demonstrated an affinity between the deployment of rhetoric-as-*movere* and successful popular political action with resulting political instability (however, there is no way to predict the degree of “popular” action or the amount of instability), given that historical/political circumstances provided outlets for such action. The earliest of these two movements was the English Civil War, and I suggested that in the aftermath of that upheaval, the very idea of *movere* itself, particularly as it was associated with republican theory, came under assault, and as a result, its two legitimate functions—restraining and urging—were co-opted by rhetoric-as-*docere*.

In this chapter I will argue that the same pattern replicated itself after the American Civil War. The colonial and early republican periods in the United States were characterized by rhetoric-as-*movere*, informed by norms of politeness. In the previous chapter we saw a number of examples that demonstrated that colonial and early republican political and religious leaders were well aware of the need for *movere*, but were also cognizant of *movere*'s dangers, and were unafraid to use the restraining function of *movere* just as often as the urging function. However, the combination of political instability and political circumstances that led to the open animosity of the American Civil War created an environment that allowed for *movere* to be criticized in the same way as it had been approximately two hundred years earlier—i.e., through a critique of republican norms.

\(^{428}\) A “popular” political upheaval is, of course, a relative term. While neither the English Civil War nor the American Revolution seriously worked to include groups that were marginalized at the time (women, etc.), both movements expanded the number of citizens who were able to exercise privileges like voting right.
Many of the Southern states had a Cavalier heritage and most of those that did not had a strong agrarian background. Both of these perspectives were open to an engagement with republican norms of duty and honor (Cavalier tradition) and republican norms of independence and republican institutions (agrarian tradition). There was also an especial openness to movere (though this was not peculiar to the South). During the Reconstruction period, the South's critics found fault with these norms and intimated that they were the cause of the many moral and economic problems in the region. As the republican tradition came under attack, so did movere itself. While this was happening, top American scholars and intellectuals were engaged in an important exchange with European scholars (from Anglo and Continental backgrounds) and during this exchange they were influenced by the more dominant rhetoric-as-docere forms of rhetoric and their accompanying norms. We can view the Populist and Progressive movements and their conflicts as the “playing out” of the old and the new view. Unintentionally, American intellectual discourse began the same transition that British intellectual discourse had undergone in the eighteenth century, and the legitimate urging and restraining functions of rhetoric-as-movere began to be co-opted by rhetoric-as-docere.

Despite the growing influence of rhetoric-as-docere, the nineteenth century saw a number of important—and truly popular—social movements, particularly the labor movement on the European continent (and its shade—the Populist movement in the United States). The rhetoric used by the leaders of these movements (and I will primarily study the example of Karl Marx in this chapter) to communicate with the wider membership acknowledged, used, and respected movere's power. Establishing the

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429 Unintentionally in that the Progressives did not explicitly look to change American attitudes toward the practice of rhetoric (and they were even less strident and obvious about their opposition to movere persuasion than English authors were).
template that would be used to great effect in the twentieth century anti-colonial and civil rights movements, Marx's program of political communication was truly exceptional. Marx's singular genius as a rhetorician was his constant awareness of his audience, and his recognition of the fact that written work would have numerous audiences. To this end, he used both rhetoric-as-*movere* and rhetoric-as-*docere*. By doing this, he was able to do a much better job of avoiding the problem of homogeneity than his predecessors. His popular pamphlets like the “Communist Manifesto,” were brilliantly crafted with multiple layers of meaning and we can see that different sections of the “Manifesto” would appeal to different audiences. Marx's various addresses employ a similar recognition of multiple audiences. Even his English-language newspaper editorials, whose audience would be among the more literate and educated of the time, were not constructed wholly with rhetoric-as-*docere* techniques.

That Marx was able to successfully inspire a large number of people to join with his movement is undeniable. While, of course, his movement was able to provide many tangible benefits to people who joined, it would not have been able to achieve the successes it did without a program of political communication that achieved a number of things. First, it provided a philosophical justification for the actions of the movement's activists and leaders that was intended to sway members of the privileged classes who had been provided with a liberal education, and were also sympathetic to the Communist cause. Second, it provided a way for Marx to elegantly state his platform and the goals that he wished to achieve. Third, it allowed him to—when it was necessary—sweep his audiences up in a dramatic narrative that placed them at the center of a great and important movement whose work would benefit the future generations of humanity.
(including their own children). Given the frustrating and slow process of progress, such rhetoric-as-*movere* was necessary to help re-inspire individuals and convince them to keep working for the larger—and more long term—goal.

*Movere* was required for this movement to be truly popular and that is something that we should not forget in our own attempts to organize and motivate individual citizens to participate in politics. However, the chief lesson we can draw from the example of Marx is that successful programs of political communication (in terms of inspiring citizens and helping to foster and facilitate political participation) respect the contributions of rhetoric-as-*docere*, but do not spurn rhetoric-as-*movere*, despite whatever concerns their might be about *movere* (the danger of the improper demagogic function, the affinity between the popular movements that use *movere* and instability).

The model of political communication that I put forth in the Conclusion is indebted to this mixed rhetoric of Marx and looks to draw on the strengths of *movere* and *docere* to create norms of political communication that avoid the problem of homogeneity and make political participation inviting for a number of diverse audiences.

**Southern Republicanism, Its Critics and the Decline of Movere in the United States**

In the previous chapter we focused on the growing role that norms of politeness and the Scottish belletristic movement played in creating a culture that would accept the norms of *docere* and how these changes made the problem of homogeneity a greater concern in the United States than it had been during the time of the Revolutionary War. That narrative seems to agree with standard introductory surveys of early nineteenth century American history, literature and culture that tend to focus on the work of

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430 This would be the examination of Witherspoon's educational program in the late eighteenth century.
Northern authors like Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry Thoreau,\textsuperscript{431} Walt Whitman, Nathaniel Hawthorne and James Fenimore Cooper. While many of these authors reflect austere republican mores (the veneration of Cora as a figure of republican womanhood in \textit{The Last of the Mohicans} is a prime example), the work of the transcendentalists and their sympathizers, with its heavy emphasis on the individual, necessarily moves beyond the group-oriented approach of republicanism.\textsuperscript{432} Thus we see one of the ways in which republican dominance over morals and ethics (and necessarily over politics) was beginning to decline.\textsuperscript{433} The growing industrialization of the North also contributed to this phenomenon: “American educators [in the North] also invoked claims about the professional utility of vernacular mastery. Running through these attacks was a specifically bourgeois utilitarianism, which built on John Locke's argument for education in 'things not words.'”\textsuperscript{434} Furthermore—and perhaps most important for the story of the decline of \textit{movere} in the United States—these college presidents and influential educators

\textsuperscript{431} As a proponent of civil disobedience, Thoreau did embrace some ideas of \textit{movere}. See the discussion on civil disobedience in the Conclusion for more.

\textsuperscript{432} I thank my colleague Aaron Keck, far more schooled in the intricacies of this period than I am, for pointing me to the most notable sources that focus on the role of individualism in the Transcendentalists: see George Kateb, \textit{Emerson and Self-Reliance} (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995) and \textit{The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture} (Ithaca: Cornell, 1992); Stanley Cavell, \textit{The New and Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures After Emerson After Wittgenstein} (Living Batch 1989); and Thomas Augst, “Composing the Moral Senses: Emerson and the Politics of Character in Nineteenth-Century America.” \textit{Political Theory} (February 1999).

\textsuperscript{433} Mark Garrett Longaker, in \textit{Rhetoric and the Republic: Politics, Civic Discourse, and Education in Early America} (Tuscaloosa: Univ. of Alabama, 2007), rightly points out that there were many different types of “republicanisms” and connected rhetorical pedagogies in early nineteenth-century America, and many of these reflected a polite, belletteristic influence. See Chs. 3-5 where he discusses the nature of the curriculum at Yale, King's College (Columbia) and the College of New Jersey to demonstrate the fact there was no hegemonic conception of republicanism in the early United States, and that some of these conceptions, particularly in the North, clearly telegraphed the role that \textit{docere} would play in nineteenth and twentieth century American rhetoric. In \textit{The Language of Democracy: Political Rhetoric in the United States and Britain, 1790-1900} (Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), Andrew W. Robertson paints a slightly more unified picture of early republican rhetoric in America, arguing that this rhetoric was still “active” and looked to engage the people along the lines of what I term rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} (see pgs. 37-53).

\textsuperscript{434} Longaker, \textit{op. cit.}, 55.
were wary of “Whiggism as a 'leveling notion' that threatened the republic's stability.”

Indeed, the example of the French Revolution was particularly troubling, and that event had a profound effect on rhetorical practice and pedagogy in the nineteenth century. Despite the French Revolution's example, the unstable—but not too unstable—political circumstances in the United States ensured that rhetoric-as-movere would have a place in the discourse of the new republic.

The Southern intellectual tradition is often painted in opposition to this tradition. The more concentrated “aristocracy” in the South permitted fewer variations on the republican theme, and education was designed to create “Cavalier republicans,” if that is not a contradiction in terms: “Southern elites wanted an education to polish their patrician sons...these same citizens railed against William and Mary for teaching a bookish scholasticism rather than the genteel smattering of Latin and Greek needed for a southern plantation owner to circulate in polite company.”

While it is not proper to call this a tension between norms of movere and docere, it certainly shows Southern antipathy to norms of docere and demonstrates that the South was preserving movere, perhaps in ossified form, and that should political circumstances ever change, that ossified classical rhetoric would transform itself into rhetoric-as-movere, which is exactly what happened after the Civil War.

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435Ibid, 49. He is quoting William Smith Jr., who was involved in the curriculum controversies at King's College.
436Robertson (op. cit.) writes, “With the violent passions aroused by the French Revolution, panegyric gave way to invective...Verbal abuse had often surfaced earlier when tensions were high and when politicians sought popular consent on matters of overriding concern...After the French Revolution the invective did not subside: gradually it became less personal and more general, more obsessed with conspiracy and often verging on political paranoia” (27).
437Robertson (ibid) attributes the endurance of classically grounded rhetoric that was concerned with popular motivation to conflicts (28) like the War of 1812, which produced “not only axioms, but slogans and symbols” (45).
438Longaker, op. cit., 52.
Furthermore, the tensions between the Northern and Southern relationships to the idea of “republicanism” serve to show the difference between what one could call “institutional” republicanism and “individual” republicanism. Institutional republicanism is the conviction that law is the chief political institution and that institutions that flow from it or are created because of it (the legislature, etc.) are legitimated in that they divide the powers and responsibilities that are put forth in the institution of the law. In the American case (and even the English case, to a lesser extent), even those whom I characterize as “hostile” to Southern republicanism or a republican spirit remained institutional republicans. Very few thinkers, Northern or Southern, ever questioned the supremacy of law or the fact that legislative and executive functions were both needed to execute that law.

However, “individual” republicanism, or romanticized republicanism was a focus of criticism. This type of republicanism, which was more prevalent in Southern writing, focused on the individual moral and ethical dimension of republicanism, without really reflecting on the ways in which institutions were supposed to shape that moral and ethical character. These types of republicans were very taken by the individual stories (fairy tales?) of the great figures of Roman history. They fixated on the image of Lucretia.

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439 Longaker’s portrait of Northern intellectual elites is very much in line with a portrait of institutional republicans. In fact, institutionalist norms completely dominate or monopolize his actual definition of republicanism—he seems to read the romantic individualist republican impulse in the South as something else. On pgs. 40-2, he praises the elite communal institutions in colleges like dining clubs as republican institutions when I have insinuated elsewhere that these institutions foster the problem of homogeneity and are hostile to republican rhetoric-as-movere. I still hold to this position and suggest that any “republicanism” that readily accepts such a hierarchical distinction can only be institutional republicanism, and that considering republicanism only in its institutional form allows us to miss much of the power that the tradition has always held (see also my discussion in the Introduction to this work).

440 Indeed, as Ferald J. Bryan notes, spoken oratory, which was more important in the antebellum South than in the antebellum North, preserved a sense of community in addition to creating a romanticized ideal of the South. See Henry Grady or Tom Watson? (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1994), 9-10.

441 Bryan writes, “the emotional force of metaphor to fuel romantic visions [in the Old South] should not be neglected” (25).
with the knife in hand; of Cato shaking his fist at Caesar and the sky; of Cicero's tongue and hands nailed to the Rostrum; and of Brutus, who loved Rome more. They sought everywhere for a new Rome to whom they could dedicate themselves and among their great daydreams was that they would one day prove themselves fearless in death like the great men of old.

The fancy of individualized republicanism has been with us in the West to some degree or another since the days of the Roman Republic itself. It expresses itself in everything from Shakespeare to *Star Trek,* and it is generally harmless (and sometimes even improves the ethic of its believers). I absolutely do not wish to suggest that the English and American Civil Wars were started by a bunch of men who were afflicted with this fancy and just happened to be able to put together arms and other resources in order to fight. The various causes of both of these wars, economic and otherwise, have been discussed at length. However, in the aftermath of those wars, when it came time to place the blame and time for the winners to try and figure out why the losers had kept on fighting, this ethic of individualized republicanism became a convenient scapegoat (thus Hobbes's attack on the vainglory of his English republican opponents).  

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442 Shakespeare, of course, dallies in such dreams with *Julius Caesar* and *The Rape of Lucrece.* The TV show *Star Trek's* original presentation of the alien race of the Romulans (note: name might be suggestive!) in early episodes like “Balance of Terror” (1966) was one of a noble people who had a level of loyalty to their state and a fearlessness in death that were admirable, yet alien, to us. Modern science fiction TV shows like *Babylon 5* continue to demonstrate a fascination with Roman qualities; *Babylon 5* presents the alien race of the Centauri, who, with their “Centarum” and Emperor, clearly recall the Roman Empire in her decadence. The Centauri are presented as self-centered villains at the start of the show, and the most important Centauri character on the show does not begin to pull himself up from the pit of villainy until he starts to re-embrace individual ethical qualities like loyalty to his friends and replaces his self-interest with true patriotism. He does not find ultimate redemption until he sacrifices his own life and demonstrates fearlessness in death. See Paul Cantor’s *Gilligan Unbound* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002) for more on the political nature of *Star Trek* (among other artifacts of popular culture).

443 Henry Grady, the editor of the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution,* and one of the major proponents of the “New South” movement, was convinced that the agrarian ethic (and economic basis) had been the ultimate root of the South’s fall, and he constantly criticized those who wished to hold onto that mindset. Grady’s
This scapegoating served to marginalize the ethic of individualized republicanism among the intellectual, educated and prestigious classes in the English-speaking tradition. Indeed, in wake of their respective civil wars, the only serious republican movements in the US and the UK that tend to receive approval from these educated classes more resemble institutional rather than individual republicanism. Individualist republican movements like the Populist movement, or even, at some level, the Temperance movement, were, at some level, marginalized and separated from most members of the intellectual and prestigious classes. This sort of rupture resembles the English rupture in the seventeenth century. As I suggested in my reading of the political discourse of the English Civil War period, movere was not marginalized because the Royalist authors specifically attacked it. However, since rhetoric-as-movere was more easily identified with individual republicanism rather than institutional republicanism, the marginalization of individual republicanism also meant the marginalization of movere. Indeed, institutional republicanism, which had always been an important conception of republicanism in some areas of the United States, started to dominate the entire nation after the Civil War. The evolution of movere during this time period is complex; it did not vanish—certainly not in the South, and not even in the North and other areas where pedagogical theory had created a fertile soil for the norms of docere to speeches constantly focus on the need to put agrarianism aside and embrace the Northern models of industry and business in order to obtain renewal (Bryan 2).

444 Of course, if we look at the three proper functions of rhetoric-as-movere, only one of them, just revolution rhetoric, can be unambiguously defined as part of individual republicanism. Both the urging and restraining functions of rhetoric-as-movere could be properly used either in the context of a republican institution or in the context of inciting popular revolution. The spurious function of rhetoric-as-movere, the improper demagogic function, would also be aligned with individual republicanism (incorrectly, in my opinion).

445 Henry Grady (quoted in Bryan, 54) expresses the role that docere norms and ends had started to play in American rhetoric very plainly. In a speech presented to an audience of farmers, he said, “the professor walks by [the farmer’s] side” and “Physical prowess has had it day and the age of reason has come.”
take root. However, what started to change was what people were being asked to do. The development of political parties and “party machines” strongly affected the requests that rhetors made of their audiences, both before and after the war. The rise of the party machine and the importance of electioneering meant that, as the century moved on, people were being asked to vote in order to secure victory (and patronage) for their side. Voting became the most important act; it was painted as the political duty par excellence of the American citizen.

At first, voting was the just the primary duty among many for a loyal party soldier. However, as the nineteenth century wore on, voting was portrayed by many orators not as the first duty of a political citizen, but as the only duty of a political citizen (obviously I will argue that Southern and Populist rhetoric did not follow this pattern, though both emphasized the importance of voting). We see this trend not only reflected in the evolving rhetoric of the period but also in the civic participation, involvement and engagement numbers for the period. As Theda Skocpol, Dan Tichenor, Richard Harris and other scholars of nineteenth century American civic engagement have clearly demonstrated, the “richness” of civic participation and civic involvement in America began its long decline during this period. Scholars of political participation,

446 Robertson highlights the increasing connection between rhetoric and elections, even early in the century on pgs. 22-24.
447 Ibid., 148-9; 152
448 Whereas Tocqueville's township (as well as his other comments on democratic character in Democracy in America such as his comments in Vol. II, Book I, Ch. II (“On the Principal Source of Belief Among Democratic Nations” and Vol. II, Book III, Ch. VIII “Influence of Democracy on Kindred”) is taken as the paradigm for early republican participation, as Robert T. Gannett, Jr. (in “Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville's Township,” APSR (February 2003)) points out, this paradigm assumes “local liberty” (7) and, in Tocqueville's words, “a more elevated and more complete idea of the duties of society toward its members” (Gannett quotes Tocqueville on pg. 7). Furthermore, Aurelian Craiutu and Jeremy Jennings (in “The Third Democracy: Tocqueville's Views of America after 1840,” APSR (August 2004)) find that Tocqueville was less optimistic about prospects for American democracy after 1840: “The institutions in place were able to do relatively little to stave off this growing corruption. As such, American politics appeared to Tocqueville more and more as an arena for brute instincts and appetites...” (403-4). While
communitarianism and democratic theory have been trying to recapture the “political organization” spirit of the earlier part of this century ever since! While this sort of phenomenon obviously cannot have just one cause, I do not think it is too radical to suggest that the fact that orators demonstrated an increasing—almost singular—focus on the act of voting as the century progressed contributed to this more passive electorate. Indeed, the conclusion that “The Gilded Age lacked a 'common will' and a force to mobilize it” certainly seems like a consequence of this political mindset that placed such a tremendous importance on voting like an eternally loyal soldier whose “default” setting is to passively wait for orders—small ones, like voting.

It is, of course, this sort of passive electorate that critics of aggregative democracy (who are often also proponents of deliberative democracy), which, of course, praises voting as the ultimate democratic act, want to re-energize. I agree with them on this point and, following my discussion in the Introduction, maintain that aggregative democracy or a democracy that focuses on voting as its most important act simply cannot produce the citizens necessary to drive a democracy that is able to combat serious and lasting problems of injustice and inequality. However, as these historical chapters demonstrate, this process of re-energization cannot take place without some role for rhetoric-as-

Tocqueville's local township conception might be able to serve as part of a model of political communication, much like deliberative democracy, it cannot be the only part of that model. Even Tocqueville noted that the landscape he described had changed in his lifetime, and as scholars of 19th century American Political Development and Historical Institutionalism have noted, civic life became less rich and more professionalized as the century wore on. See Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 2003); Theda Skocpol, Marshall Ganz and Ziad Munson, “A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United States,” American Political Science Review (September 2000), 527-46; Laura Janara, “Commercial Capitalism and the Democratic Psyche: The Threat to Tocquevillean Citizenship.” History of Political Thought (Summer 2001), 317-50; Daniel J. Tichenor and Richard Harris, “The Lost Years: Taking a Long View of American Interest Group Politics,” Paper presented at the 2002 American Political Science Association Meeting. Tichenor and Harris do “demonstrate that the rise of an extensive national system of organized interests occurred long before the post World War II era or 1960s,” but there is every indication that those systems were more professionalized and dependent upon the type of aggregative, thin democratic behavior discussed earlier in this chapter.
movere. However, these chapters also demonstrate that we must consider move's role very carefully.

The evolution of Southern rhetoric in the late nineteenth and twentieth century beautifully demonstrates one of the key points I have tried to make throughout the course of the dissertation: when move is marginalized by intellectuals, it is more likely to be used only by people and groups that are marginalized by intellectuals. Given the effectiveness of rhetoric-as-movere, this is particularly dangerous and the fact that the educated classes have left this tool in the hands of the irresponsible due to a fear of move’s power seems irresponsible and cowardly. Indeed, the rhetoric of Southern race-baiting demagogues embraced persuasion and rhetoric-as-movere. However, we must divorce their use of rhetoric-as-movere, a value-neutral tool, from their malfeasant ends. After all, as we will see in the examples of Marx and the Civil Rights leaders, rhetoric-as-movere, when applied as a tool toward the advancement of positive ends for society, provides a net benefit.

Still, it is not entirely difficult to see why educated and tolerant individuals would have marginalized everything associated with the Southern expression of romanticized individualist republicanism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—even things like move, which are value-neutral. The demagogues who assumed the mantle of agrarian republicanism in this period used the vocabulary of individual republicanism to mask and advance a bigoted and backward agenda that was intended

\footnote{While it is easy to argue for the value-neutrality of move, it is more difficult to present the case that individualized republicanism is value-neutral, and I do not wish to do so. However, I do not think that the individual republican ethic necessarily must culminate in repugnant ideas; the English case, for one, did not take this turn. Nor did the French case, although the French case is certainly a stark example of the problematic relationship between move and instability.}
to heal the wounded pride of the region. Indeed, the South was in a tricky spot during this period of American history: there was a clear need to industrialize, but the poor economic condition of the South made it difficult to come up with the money to fund the education necessary to spur industrialization and leave the agrarian heritage behind. The Southern demagogues were able to take advantage of this frustration when they stumped in front of desperate farmers and instead of insisting on moving forward, their message of hatred and their insistence to their audiences that it was OK to crave the past undoubtedly retarded the progress of the region by decades. They used the “myth of the lost cause” and called upon the agrarian virtues of individualist republicanism to create a

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450 Rollin G. Osterweis suggests that that desire to soothe the wounded pride of the South led to the prevalence of the “Lost Cause” myth which romanticized a primitive South and was popular throughout the nation. Northern audiences were charmed by theatre that played on this myth (see The Myth of the Lost Cause, 1865-1900 (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1973), 102) and Southern rhetoricians were able to play on the myth as well.

451 Byran, 19-20. Cal M. Logue and Howard Dorgan also point out in the volume The Oratory of Southern Demagogues (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State, 1981) that “Southern states entered the last decade of the nineteenth century infected by an inflated vision of a new prosperity. Increased business and industrial activity generated by promoters during the 1880s had in several areas created a booming economic environment…the real benefits of this stimulated economy, however, were monopolized by moneyed interests…during the twenty years prior to the turn of the century the economic status of these persons [farmers, industrial and craft workers] tended to worsen” (1). Donald H. Ecryod, in “The Populist Spellbinders” also focuses on the role that economic conditions played in creating people who were ready to be “taken” by demagogues. The piece appears in The Rhetoric of Protest and Reform, 1879-1898, edited by Paul H. Boase (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1980) and can be found on pgs. 132-152. For more on these conditions as they pertained to the Midwestern United States, see Norman Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial America: Midwestern Populist Thought (Cambridge: Harvard, 1976). For a general overview of the period, see Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Views of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale, 1999), Chapter 10 (pgs. 286-346). In addition, we should consider the example of North Carolina, which, for a very long time, was the example by which other Southern states judged themselves in terms of education and providing industrial opportunities for its citizens. The crown jewel of North Carolina’s most important reforms, which came under its great governor Terry Sanford, was the development of the Research Triangle Park, which was not approved until 1959.

452 The usage of the term “Southern demagogue,” which is almost universal in the discussions of Southern rhetoric from this period, demonstrates the depths to which moveve has fallen. It is only considered in its improper demagogic function.

453 According to Bryan, most of the demagogues focused on the primitive nature of the Old South as a strength (1). Logue and Dorgan suggest that these demagogues (as well as their Midwestern populist counterparts) played on the fears of poor white Southerners (4-6) and they quote G.M. Gilbert as saying “[their] behavior is guided more by its potential effect in beguiling public opinion than by any scrupulous regard for the truth” (quoted on 4).
defeatist glory that valorized marginalization and thus further separated their audience from the reach of Northerners, intellectuals, members of the Progressive movement and others who were starting to rely on the norms of rhetoric-as-docere.

In the Conclusion, I want to suggest that this technique of valorizing the marginalization of a strongly bastardized form of individualist republicanism (that is often now combined with certain types of Christian evangelism) is still being used to the detriment of the United States. I strongly believe that the only way people who are hostile to the message of these marginalizers can combat them is by de-marginalizing some of the notions inherent in individualist republicanism and working to create unity. I believe that one of the easiest components to de-marginalize is the concept of rhetoric-as-movere. I want to strongly suggest that it is in avoiding their type of message, not the tools that they used to convey that message that we can make sure the horrific episodes of the early twentieth century do not repeat in American politics.

That the men peddling these messages were aware of movere’s effects there can be no doubt: Logue and Dorgan quote Allan Louis Larson as saying “persuasion linked to passion” (movere, when that object of persuasion is political) stands out as “the hallmark

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454 Osterweis points out that many of the notable contributions to theatre and literature by Southerners and about the South tend to be ultimately defeatist and dwell on the primitive (Osterweis examines theatre reviews on 109) or pine for the agrarian ethos (this is Osterweis’s conclusion on Southern literature, pg. 145). His discussion on Southern textbook revision on pgs. 111-7 gives further credence to the idea that Southerners were cultivating a romantic defeatism that attempted to hide their shame over Reconstruction. Robert W. Smith in “The One-Gallus Uprising: Southern Discontent” (in Boase, op. cit.) also reiterates the importance of finding “triumph in defeat” for the Southern and Populist demagogues (see 169-172).

455 To those who would continue to insist that these tools are not value-neutral because they are more often used by those people who espouse a (thankfully diminished) version of the message of the original Southern demagogues than by those who oppose them, I would submit that they are missing my point. First, as I will suggest in the Conclusion, there are more people out there already using movere for good than we might recognize. Second, I must reiterate the assertion that movere is a useful tool in politics and that means that someone will always utilize it. If the tool is unjustly demonized by the intellectual and educated classes—and thus they avoid it—is there any wonder that the only people who use it are people who are repugnant to the intellectual and educated classes?
of the demagogue as charismatic leader.”

Charismatic leadership was certainly the goal of the demagogues: in his analysis of Tom Watson’s rhetoric, Bryan notes that “rural audiences...needed a sense of hope and direction that was missing in Grady’s rhetoric” and that they embraced Watson’s “vision for the South’s future” which “contained metaphors of tension and conflict [emphasis added].” This embrace of conflict (and instability) is nothing more than recognition of the role that rhetoric-as-movere had in amassing popular support to a cause.

In a study of the technique of Arkansas demagogue Jeff Davis, Annette Shelby details the ways in which he used the tools of movere to create a connection with the masses and concludes that, “The coalition, agrarian in philosophy, tied the hillbillies to the red-necks; it also linked the dispossessed from the country to the “outsiders” from the towns. More importantly, it inextricably bound Davis to the people.”

In his description of the early twentieth century Mississippi statesman James Kimble Vardaman, William M. Strickland finds yet another orator using the tool of movere to prop up a message clothed in the vocabulary of individual republicanism: “The White Chief often invoked another myth which was not bound solely to the southern region…it was the “Agrarian Myth” of the Populist movement.” Agrarian Grange movements also drew upon the agrarian mythos and were focused on “mobilization of participants for

456 Logue and Dorgan quote Larson on page 5.
457 Bryan, op. cit., 94.
458 Shelby, Annette. “Jeff Davis of Arkansas” in Logue and Dorgan, 44.
459 Strickland, William M. “James Kimble Vardaman: Manipulation Through Myths in Mississippi” in Logue and Dorgan, 79.
which they did through not only holding meetings to decide which candidates to support, but also through protest and arranging cooperative buying.\footnote{Paul Crawford, “The Farmer Assesses His Role in Society,” in Boase, 104.}

It is also critical to note that movements like the Grange undertook such activities because “professional politicians were disinclined to advocate new and radical proposals.”\footnote{Ibid., pgs. 109-110; 114-5. For more on the action of this movement, see Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage, 1960); Malcolm Sillars, “Rhetoric as Act,” Quarterly Journal of Speech (October 1964); Herbert Simons, “A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements,” Quarterly Journal of Speech (February 1970); Howard Erlich, “Populist Rhetoric Reassessed.” Quarterly Journal of Speech (April 1977).} This professionalism was a hallmark of the Progressive movement, a movement that appealed to intellectuals and elites, and embraced the norms of rhetoric-as-\textit{docere}. Speeches from early Progressives, unlike the speeches of the Southern and Populist demagogues, assume that institutions guided by intellectual experts are the best solution for societal ills. Rebecca Latimer Felton, a Georgia activist, used a number of specific economic figures and historical appeals when she spoke to Georgia legislators on the issue of school reform.\footnote{Crawford, 107.} Her speech is arranged more like a lecture, and she appears to have the goal of \textit{teaching} legislators about the extent of the problem.\footnote{For one historical-political perspective on this movement, see Smith, \textit{op. cit.}, Chapter 12 (410-469). Smith asserts that this period was driven by the assumption that “the U.S. Should be a modern democratically and scientifically guided nation...Thus structured and guided, centrist progressives promised, Americans could do more than cope with a rapidly changing world: they would lead it” (411).} This idea that public policy is best created by using rhetoric to \textit{teach} about the nature of the problem, not through public action, demonstration and participation, demonstrates the norms of rhetoric-as-\textit{docere} in action.

\footnote{Rebecca Latimer Felton, “Address Before the Georgia Legislature” in W. Stuart Towns, ed., \textit{Public Address in the Twentieth-Century South: The Evolution of a Region} (Westport, CT: Praeger 1999). She uses these tactics on 12-19).}

\footnote{Some of the headings include: “Thirty Years of Experience,” “Georgia's Conditions Different from Many Other States,” “Many Children do not Attend Common Schools,” and “The Governor Says.”}
Jessie Daniel Ames uses similar “teaching” techniques in attempting to use rhetoric-as-docere to change the newspaper depictions of lynchings in her hometown. She provides a potted “lecture” about the development of journalism and expresses shock over the inappropriate tactics used by newspapers:

Editors do condemn lynchings. They condemn even particular lynchings. Their handling of such crimes is dignified and logical...But the very nature of the editorial, its dignity and its balanced phrases, restricts its effect on public opinion and its influence on human conduct. The editorial writer competes in a losing battle with his news stories. He is lost to the public while that public reads on his front page—in language that fairly bristles with expressions calculated to awaken the ever-present fear and hate in the less-privileged members of the white race—a dramatic and inflammatory account of some violation of the white man's code by a 'giant Negro.'

Here Ames laments the effects of rhetoric-as-movere, that “language that fairly bristles” with calculated phrasing and shows sympathy to the editorial writer who uses rhetoric-as-docere. Of course, as she herself points out, the editorial pages, with their style of writing and learnedness, are not as accessible to a general readership; the problem of homogeneity is in action. Would that such editors had condemned lynching and extended their effect on public opinion with rhetoric-as-movere!

Ames's admiration for rhetoric-as-docere and her co-optation of the legitimate urging and restraining functions of rhetoric-as-movere under the “persuasion through teaching” framework of rhetoric-as-docere were simply reflective of larger trends in American intellectual circles. The turn of the century saw German sociological and bureaucratic theory grow in influence; the “merit reforms” of the bureaucracy were an early sign of this influence.

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of political science and rhetoric-as-docere clearly presage the post World War II professionalization of politics. This process of professionalization is the American version of the co-optation of rhetoric-as-movere's legitimate urging and restraining functions, which focused on persuasion as it related to action, by rhetoric-as-docere which focused on persuasion through logical argument, with either no specific call to action, or a call to action that emphasized basic, not complex civic skills (such as voting). Individualist republican norms were marginalized and employed by demagogues who advanced a terrible agenda. Their use of rhetoric-as-movere only contributed to its marginalization. However, a look at nineteenth century European movements clearly demonstrates that movere did not necessarily have to be connected with marginal political causes.

**An Alternative: Karl Marx's Mixed Rhetoric and the Importance of Movere**

Surprisingly, given the devotion that Marx has inspired in the academy, there is very little work on Marx and his rhetoric. The journal of record in this field, *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, has published only one article on Marx and rhetoric. This article focused on Marx’s philosophical ideas on rhetoric, not how he used rhetoric in his time as a political organizer.\(^{468}\) The only scholar who has done extensive work on Marx’s rhetoric in recent years in James Arnt Aune, in his books *Rhetoric and Marxism* (1994) and his

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article “Cultures of Discourse: Marxism and Rhetorical Theory.” However, as the titles of these works indicate, the main focus is not on Karl Marx and his use of rhetoric, but on the rhetoric of scholars and activists in the Marxist tradition. The existing literature is, at best, an incomplete introduction to Marx’s rhetorical techniques and why they were successful.

A short example from D.A. Drennen's textual explication of the *Manifesto* demonstrates Marx's ability to measure audience and his acceptance of the *movere* function of rhetoric. Drennen points out that the language of the official English translation of the “Communist Manifesto” (approved by Marx and Engels) is much more stringent than the original German. While this is a contestable point, if it is granted, why would Marx and Engels approve of this change in tone? The move makes the most sense if we remain aware of Marx's great ability to imagine his audience and the fact that his goal was to move people to action. We could suggest, in a modification of the famous argument of Louis Hartz, The United Kingdom was too far removed from feudalism to be moved *merely* by a description of the situation between classes, though this is not to say that there had not been radical movements. The “unstamped presses” were part of

469 While, of course, the great contest will come between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, much of the “Manifesto” speaks to the need for the bourgeoisie and proletariat to engage in temporary cooperation in order to dispose of the pernicious threat of the noble class. 

470 Before the crucial Reforms in the 1830s, the “unstamped press” was the primary vehicle for political radicals in England. Robertson (*op. cit.*) writes, “the 'great unstamped' played a very significant role in extending political information to the unenfranchised classes. The unstamped editors proved instrumental in changing the dominant form of political discourse, and in their journals hortatory rhetoric [my addition: by this Robertson means something very similar to what I term rhetoric-as-*movere*] reached its apogee” (103). Indeed, when political circumstances in the UK seemed to necessitate the Reform legislation and a moment of popular involvement, even establishment papers like the *The Times* recognized the connection between rhetoric-as-*movere* and increased popular involvement: “Tyrants shall look on and tremble, when they see united freemen—not tamely possessing rights—but actively using them in the best interest of humanity, by nobly supporting a single man struggling to be free...” (quoted in Robertson 103). It is this connection between the persuasion of *movere* and citizens *using* their rights that remains so important for democratic theory today. Opponents of Reform continued to cite the danger that radicals presented to stability and even likened them to the Roundheads who had destroyed Charles.
On the other hand, in Germany, where the middle class was not as large and the peasantry still plentiful, the situation described in the “Manifesto” was more real: amplification was not necessary with them. However, Marx in permitting the English translation, allowed for the classical rhetorical device of amplification to be used in order to gainsay the attention of the people in Britain and America so that they would be persuaded and moved to action.

In the “Manifesto,” Marx makes a very skillful appeal to many types of audiences. In the Introduction to the work, Engels heaps high praise upon it and gives it near religious status when he writes, “But, then, the Manifesto has become a historical document which we no longer have any right to alter.” While the fact that this praise comes from Marx’s best friend and collaborator may damn it in the eyes of some, Engels is probably not overstating things by much, if he is overstating them at all.

471 Patricia Hollis in *The Pauper Press* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1970) describes the middle-class and working-class leaders in this Reform coalition. She characterizes the middle-class figures as interested in the teaching/learning/knowledge aspect of the newspaper tax (11-3) and that neither they nor the aristocracy really considered or approved of political activity that took place outside of institutions (5). This demonstrates the degree to which rhetoric-as-docere and institutionalist republican norms had taken hold. On the other hand, the working-class leaders were convinced that Reform would require direct action (10) and wanted to challenge the notion that stability was the highest political goal—much in the way that we will see MLK do so in the Conclusion: “What the Government could not ignore, was radical efforts on the platform and through the press to create that popular feeling, for that potentially threatened public order” (26). While Hollis suggests that the middle-class influence led to an overall program that was more restrained (253-5), in *The War of the Unstamped* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1969) Joel H. Wiener finds that the “working class ideological spectrum involved a much greater intensity of feeling of emotion and a deeper personalization of the newspaper issue” (115) and believes that many of the figures in this movement subscribed to the notion that “the oppressed...have never secured a redress of grievances ‘by any other means than intimidation, menaces and coercion’” (216). Pages 237-59 of this work further build the case for the Reformers as radicals.

472 Fortunately for the health of his movement in the United Kingdom, Marx was writing after what Robertson calls the “period of restraint” (ended in 1832). His chapter on repressed agitation (pgs. 55-67 of *The Language of Democracy*) covers this period and focuses on how the “character and conduct of worthy candidates” (66) was the chief topic of discussion in rhetoric, because radical rhetoric—rhetoric most likely to adopt the techniques of rhetoric-as-movere to induce the people to take a specific action besides voting—was suppressed. The politics of this period reflected a strong aristocratic and hierarchical ethos (see pgs. 58-9) that created political conditions that were not favorable to the sentiment behind movere.

473 From the Preface to the German Edition of 1872.
Each section of the “Manifesto” seems aimed at a different sort of audience, yet no one section is so unique in style or so complex in its arrangement that it would be repellant to one of the many audiences that Marx knew would read the pamphlet. Section I, of course, contains the famous opening about the “spectre” of Communism and how it is haunting Europe. Despite the fact that such language would risk upsetting a select few who were still beholden to the idea that figural language must be stripped down (refer back to the work of Ryan J. Stark in Ch. 3), the image of the spectre serves as a powerful focal point, and Marx refers back to it throughout: he references “halos” and “veils” and even “sorcerers.” Through the use of this imagery, Marx is able to draw the attention of a wide audience (only a select few would be so offended by the idea of ghosts as to put down the pamphlet) and persuade them to keep reading and to hear him out. While this is not an example of rhetoric-as-movere in that Marx is not asking people to do anything other than listen (at least not yet), figural language is a classical technique and it is one that is certainly not in line with the norms of rhetoric-as-docere—it grooms the audience for the movere appeal that is to come later in the text.

Marx’s truly great figurative technique in this section, the technique that truly draws in the audience of the proletariat, is personification. He does not, however, personify the proletariat—the Behemoth in this section is the bourgeoisie. In the opening section of the “Manifesto,” the bourgeoisie is a frightening monster that has “felled feudalism” and run rough-shod over all of history. As Thomas Jefferson so characterized

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474 These words appear as follows: “The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured…” (476), “The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil…” (476) and “Modern bourgeois society…is like the sorcerer, who is not longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells” (478). All these statements are found in Section I of the “Manifesto.”
the King in the Declaration of Independence, so Marx characterizes the bourgeoisie in the “Manifesto.”

From the “Declaration:”

“He has refused his assent to laws…
He has forbidden his Governors…
He has refused to pass other Laws…”

The *He*, is the King. Now, let us examine the opening section of the “Manifesto:”

“The bourgeoisie historically, has played a most revolutionary part…
The bourgeoisie, whenever it has got the upper hand…
The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo…
The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family…”

The similarity is striking. Still, after personifying the bourgeoisie in such a way to almost make it seem invincible, Marx assures his readers that “its fall, and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.” Marx not only rolls up the many individuals in the bourgeoisie into one monstrous being, he simultaneously rolls up *all the proletariat* into one humble, yet heroic, warrior. Indeed, it is not surprising that so many people were inspired to fight.

How is Marx able to convince his humble, heroic proletarian warrior that victory is inevitable? As Stephen Eric Bronner has pointed out on numerous occasions, the genius of Marx is that he can show in his writings “the future in the present.” He does this by using many empirical examples and appealing to history. These are the tasks of sections II-IV of the “Manifesto.” In these sections, the figurative language and allusions found in section I disappear almost entirely. It is replaced with the detached and plain language of plain speech, indebted to the norms of rhetoric-as-*docere*. This language

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475 This personification of the bourgeoisie occurs in Section I of the “Manifesto,” 475-77 of the Tucker edition.
opens the appeal to a more educated audience, perhaps an audience that did not feel like it was part of the warrior of section I, peaking in section III, which is basically a glorified literature review that references the major intellectual figures of the day, and their works. No doubt, the educated among Marx’s readers lingered over this section more than they did sections I or II. These sections also contain specific proposals that seem eminently realizable, and while Marx does not use one of his favorite and most effective techniques—a long listing of achievements of the Communist party—until the very end of the “Manifesto,” the technique of listing goals still makes readers want to trust him and join in his program of action, because he is able to call upon a past record of successes.

Section IV of the “Manifesto” sees some of the classical elements return to the work, combined with the more polite plain speech. This is, indeed, where the specific achievements of the Communist party are listed, nation by nation:

The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class, but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement...In Switzerland they support the Radicals, without losing sight of the fact that this party consists of antagonistic elements, partly of Democratic Socialists, in the French sense, partly of radical bourgeois. In Poland they support the party that insists on an agrarian resolution as the prime condition for national emancipation, that party which formented the insurrection of Cracow in 1846. In Germany they fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squire-archy and the petty bourgeoisie.\footnote{Ibid., 500.}

Notice that in this section Marx does not use figurative language. He does not use emotional appeals. Also notice that he does not use philosophical jargon or take the time to discuss concepts from his philosophy; he presents facts in very plain language.

Immediately after this, he closes the Manifesto with a very Ciceronian exhortation to action that he certainly would have omitted if he felt that rhetoric-as-movere would not
assist him in his goal of organizing a popular social movement. It is very interesting that when Marx obviously wishes to speak to the workers—this exhortation is aimed directly at them—he switches, a bit abruptly even, to a declaration of rhetoric-as-movere: “The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be obtained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.”

In addition to the written “Manifesto,” Marx also prepared many speeches for the different Communist groups. Two of his more famous speeches are the “Address to the Central Communist League” and the “Inaugural Address of the International Working Men’s Association.” These two speeches brilliantly illustrate Marx’s ability to understand his audience and to blend both rhetoric-as-movere and rhetoric-as-docere to appeal to the largest possible number of people. The first speech, to the Central Communist League, is packed with appeals to pathos and is very classical in its style, whereas the speech to the International is much more detached and plain in its language and also includes many carefully, carefully documented empirical examples.

Once again, we see that the audience of the speech plays an important part in the style that Marx decides to use. The “Address” is aimed directly at the workers—the audience is lower class and more “popular” in character than the audience of the “International” address. That address was aimed more toward the educated leadership of the International than the workers of the International itself. Returning to the “Address,” I believe that here is one of the most eloquent appeals to pathos that I have seen in Marx—and he is using it to demand sacrifice. Unlike some of his other speeches, Marx works to integrate himself with his audience. The speech opens, “Brothers!” and Marx

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478 Ibid.
continually uses the first person plural hortatory throughout the speech. Using this tense or appealing to its sense of collective brotherhood and shared struggling is one of the most powerful rhetoric-as-*movere* strategies there is; Cicero himself famously employed it in his speech against the agrarian laws. By deftly creating a sense of brotherhood with the gathered audience of Roman citizens and creating a division between *us* (Cicero and the people) and *them* (the tribunes of the people), Cicero was able to persuade the people to take action against the agrarian legislation. Marx's strategy is startlingly similar.

Cicero wanted to convince the people that agrarian legislation was not in their interest (although it almost certainly was). Marx's onerous task was to ready the working class for the casualties they would suffer in the struggle for the proletarian revolution. He says, “It is self-evident that in the impending bloody conflicts, as in all earlier ones, it is the workers who, in the main, will have to win the victory by their courage, determination and self-sacrifice.” Later on in the speech, he continues, “Above all things, the workers must counteract, as much as is at all possible, during the conflict and immediately after the struggle, the bourgeois endeavours to allay the storm, and must compel the democrats to carry out their present terrorist phrases.” In order to stir the workers and to keep them to his cause, Marx does not offer religion’s great promise—

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479 For example, “Brothers! We told you as early as 1848 that the German liberal bourgeois would soon come to power and would immediately turn their newly acquired power against the workers. You have seen how this has been fulfilled,” Tucker edition, 502.

480 This move, of course, is considered by many to be Cicero's chief political blunder, but that aside, the speech is one of his finest persuasive creations, and it is his deployment of the spirit of the first person plural that allowed him to separate the people from their tribunes—from their chosen delegates—that allowed the speech to be successful.

481 This also makes Marx’s strategy similar to the Southern demagogues, underscoring the value-neutrality of rhetoric-as-*movere*.

482 Tucker edition, 506.

that a better life lies beyond the temporal—in order to stir the people. Instead, Marx offered the great promise of republicanism—eternal memory and glory—and he presented it in the classical republican rhetoric of rhetoric-as-
movere.\textsuperscript{484} At some level, Marx himself is appealing to the glamour and romanticism of what I called individualized republicanism. It is also in this speech that Marx issues the famous and timeless call for permanent revolution. The speech is absolutely marvelous and stirring to read; we can scarce imagine it to be the work of the man who also composed \textit{Das Kapital} and the \textit{Grundrisse}, yet it is the fact that he could do both, that he could range from stirring to ponderous (and everywhere in between), that made him so incredibly effective at creating, organizing and inspiring such a large explosion of popular political activity.

The speech to the International is aimed at a different audience and has a different purpose. The International address was aimed toward those who would be doing the leading and planning for the group, and thus it had to be specific and concrete in character—these were not people who needed to be roused to action; by account of their leadership positions, they had demonstrated that they were willing to take action. These men, unlike those to whom the “Address” was aimed, needed to be told \textit{exactly} what to do. They had already decided that they were going to do, and thus were a different audience than those who still needed to be convinced that they ought to be doing. Marx's willingness to recognize and work with these two different types of political audiences is a great strength, and the model of political communication put forth in the conclusion attempts to replicate this ability to speak to both types of audiences.

\textsuperscript{484} Marxism and republicanism have an interesting relationship. The two positions do not necessarily have to be far apart (recall the strains of Leveller and Digger populist republicanism of the English 17\textsuperscript{th} century, for example) and the self-sacrificing spirit of romanticized republicanism was certainly useful for Marx at the time. Furthermore, populist republicanism certainly seems like a reasonable enough positive first step on the progress to the end of history and the true communist state.
In this speech, Marx presents ponderous evidence from government reports during the first half of the speech. The research is exhaustive, and Marx makes a very convincing case. However, Marx would have to know his audience—he would have to know that his audience had the attention span and capacity to listen to him list these facts and figures and quotations from these reports without getting bored, drifting off, or otherwise feeling uninspired—for Marx surely knew that he could not afford leadership that was uninspired. The speech is extraordinarily empirical and meticulously holds to the norms of rhetoric-as-\textit{docere}—certain sections are very close to the description found in Bacon’s \textit{New Atlantis}. Like the work of Bacon, this part of the speech contains almost no figurative language and no allusions. The second half of the speech lets up on the empirical detail, contains more figural language and closes with the exhortation, “Proletarians of all countries, Unite!” Still, the speech is clearly geared for a more sophisticated audience and this type of closing is surely intended to remind them of their purpose and reiterate important phrases and rallying points.\footnote{The speech appears to be a mixture of the Baconian and polite plain speech styles, with only fragments that could be called classical in character. Marx cites a variety of sources—sources that his audience was probably familiar with, which demonstrates their level of education and awareness—including the Blue Book, the Sixth Report on Public Health, reports from the House of Lords and Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Income and Property Tax Returns that were presented to the House of Commons.} The important thing to keep in mind with both speeches is Marx's overall purpose: he is attempting to move people to take some sort of political action.

We see a very different rhetorical Marx when we examine Marx's English-language journalism, and while his journalism is designed to educate (in the spirit of \textit{docere}), Marx's larger purpose is still connected with \textit{movere}. Marx and Engels wrote many English-language pieces for the New York Daily Tribune, mostly concerning
imperialism and the morality of the colonial mentality.\textsuperscript{486} While Marx is writing for a sophisticated audience that would be able to have regular access to his writing, he does not feed that audience a straight diet of rhetoric-as-\textit{docere}—he includes figural language and clever allusions (always high-brow to resonate with a well-educated audience). Furthermore, and this may sound like faint praise at first, Marx writes in the style of a gossip columnist (for the complete lack of a better phrase). However, this is not done because Marx believes his audience is not sophisticated and is beneath him—instead, it is done because Marx believes this audience is sophisticated, and he wants to create an equal relationship with them. Through using this style, Marx crooks his finger to his audience and says, “you are an initiate to my education and friend to my cause—come here and let me share a secret with you, for I know you will understand.”\textsuperscript{487} Marx accomplishes this via the “gossip columnist” style of writing.

For example, in an article on “The East Indian Question,” Marx writes, “The clauses of the India Bill are passing one by one, the debate scarcely offering any remarkable features except the inconsistency of the so-called India Reformers. There is, for instance, my Lord Jocelyn, M.P., who has made a kind of political livelihood by his periodical denunciation of Indian wrongs, and of the maladministration of the East India Company.”\textsuperscript{488} Marx’s continual mockery of the British MPs, particularly Lord

\textsuperscript{486} Although Marx and Engels never officially distinguished their journalism from each other, scholars have attributed most pieces to either one author or the other. I follow those attributions, which are accepted in the scholarly community, throughout this chapter.

\textsuperscript{487} Stephen Eric Bronner once suggested that Nietzsche behaved in this way, and I have broadened the scope of his original comment.

Palmerston\textsuperscript{489} and Lord Russell,\textsuperscript{490} looks very much like the skewering of celebrities that we see in certain snarky newspapers and magazines today. However, it must be noted that Marx was certainly not the only individual to use this journalistic style at the time—the "yellow journalism" of nineteenth century America meant that many authors would trash public figures that did not see eye to eye with them. I believe that it could be easily argued, however, that there is a difference between Marx’s gossip columnist style and the prevailing gossip columnist style of the day. The prevailing gossip columnist style of the day afforded journalists both the opportunity to present biased slants in their articles and also to obscure or ignore pertinent facts—things that could not happen in today’s newsroom. While Marx certainly used his journalistic license (he also usually wrote columns, which demanded his opinion) to present his slant on an issue, his articles AND his columns are so full of empirical information, examples and other bits of research (and subsequent studies have shown that Marx was very diligent in doing the research for his journalism) that instead of duping his audience, Marx places himself as equal with them—he is merely telling them a story. Marx obviously assumes a great deal of sophistication on the part of the audience of the \textit{New York Daily Tribune}.

Other examples from the journalism show how Marx would create a bond with his readers by making it sound as though he was allowing them to be privy to very secret information—he made his audience feel important. Here are some examples of this: “By

\textsuperscript{489}Engels wrote an article devoted to Palmerston's foibles and flip-flopping and published it in the \textit{New York Daily Tribune} on 19 October 1853. The text can be found in \textit{The American Journalism of Marx and Engels}, Henry M. Christman, ed. (New American Library 1966), 110-125.

\textsuperscript{490}Marx composed two pieces devoted to Russell. The earliest, published on 25 June 1855 in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} (translated from the German just a few days later), mocked Russell: “Lord John seems to have spent his whole life in search of \textit{posts} and to have been holding on so tight to the posts he captured as to have forfeited all claims to power.” In the second piece against Russell, published in the \textit{New York Daily Tribune}, Marx mocks Russell's 'Finality-John' nickname, among other things. Both pieces appear in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, \textit{Articles on Britain} (Progress Publishers of Moscow 1971). The first piece is found on pgs. 245-8 and the second on 249-61.
the latest overland mail from India, intelligence has been received that the Burmese ambassadors have rejected the treaty proposed by General Godwin.”

Again, from an article entitled, “Investigation of Tortures in India,” “Our London correspondent, whose letter with regard to the Indian revolt we published yesterday, very properly referred to some of the antecedents which prepared the way for this violent outbreak.” Once again, Marx is showing his audience that the future he predicted, or was tipped off to by his “intelligence,” is coming to fruition and in doing so he is able to bolster his persuasive case. Since Marx was able to demonstrate to diverse audiences how “his” future was coming to pass using the rhetorical tools appropriate to the audience, his program of persuasion was successful.

**Conclusion**

Americans' positive experience with political instability and popular involvement—the Revolutionary War—was overshadowed in the nineteenth century by the disaster of the American Civil War. When Americans calculated the great cost of the war, their reaction was similar to the reaction of their English brethren in the wake of Cromwell's Protectorate: political instability brings misery. The leading intellectual opponents of the losing side in both causes (the English republicans and the South, respectively) naturally blamed the losers for starting these dreadful conflicts (note that it was not necessarily wrong to blame them for doing so). Most importantly, the winning side's commentators focused on the dangerous role that classical republican values like the desire for glory, a stubborn insistence on the agrarian way of life, and a foolish

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patriotism that never admitted that one's side could possibly be wrong played in creating the type of people who would not only start such a war, but continue it beyond all good sense and right reason.

This is the tragedy of the decline of rhetoric-as-*movere* in the English-speaking tradition. Most of the commentators responsible for its demise were not specifically attacking the classical rhetorical system (at least in any sustained or meaningful manner). They were attacking the ethic of individual republicanism and its role in escalating conflict. Because intellectual exchange between Europe and America brought increased knowledge of the norms of rhetoric-as-*docere* (which also had the cachet of intellectualism attached), there was the same opportunity for rhetoric-as-*docere* to begin co-opting the legitimate urging and legitimate restraining functions of rhetoric-as-*movere*. With *movere* only left to be associated with just revolution rhetoric, or worse, demagoguery, it is easy to see how *movere* became marginalized along with the rest of the individual republican ethic.

Karl Marx did not see the *docere/movere* split as an either/or proposition and because of this, he was able to create a very effective program of political communication. His program serves as inspiration for the model that I will discuss in the concluding chapter. Marx was able to combine both *docere* and *movere* because he was very aware of the type of audience he wanted to reach. His first goal was, of course, to reach out to the proletariat, and in his mind this required some of the techniques of rhetoric-as-*movere*. However, he also wanted to drum up sympathy (and resources) for his cause among sympathetic members of the propertied classes, so he called upon the fashionable and intellectual techniques of rhetoric-as-*docere* to appeal to that audience.
Marx was able to use these two types of appeals in the same work, as the *Communist Manifesto* and the speech to the leaders of the International both ably demonstrate.

The examples of Marx and the English Reformers (see footnote 43) also show the negative effects of the Anger-Apathy cycle which I described at the end of my Introduction, and which I will investigate in more detail through a reading of King's “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” in the concluding chapter. All of these leaders justify their actions, which had the potential (and sometimes the very goal) of creating political instability, by arguing that they are the only appropriate—and historically successful—way of forcing society to address its systematic injustice and lack of true popular political character. My goal is to develop societal institutions and components of democratic theory that will move us beyond the frustrating nature of the Anger-Apathy cycle of political participation and develop a consistent level of participation. If participation is consistent, the need for political actions designed to destabilize the status quo and rooted in anger at injustice should decline over time. This will allow democracies to begin investigating higher order questions that concern the well being of their citizens.

In the next—concluding—chapter, I will start by discussing the relationship between appropriate political circumstances, the use of rhetoric-as-*movere* techniques, popular political action, and historical instability as it plays out in the American Civil Rights movement. In this movement we find, as we did in Marx's example, a wide battery of *movere* (and some) *docere* appeals. However, despite the successes of this movement, the Anger-Apathy cycle of political participation still held as politics became increasingly professionalized in the wake of World War II and the college attendance
boom. I will present both a model of political communication and a rhetorical curriculum that are designed to help flatten this Anger-Apathy cycle.
Preliminary Steps for Addressing the Crisis of Political Communication

In the preceding five chapters I have provided a number of examples that demonstrate an affinity between an open window of political participation, the use of rhetoric-as-movere, effective popular action, and political instability. I have focused on a number of key moments in English-speaking popular politics including the Peasants' Revolt of 1381, the English Civil War, the American Revolutionary War and the Populist demagogue period. In addition, the same affinity held for Karl Marx's labor movement. While Marx's rhetorical example demonstrates that rhetoric-as-movere can be an effective and useful tool for achieving desirable ends, the Populist demagogues demonstrate that rhetoric-as-movere can also be used for undesirable ends. In order to provide another contemporary example of rhetoric-as-movere being used in the service of admirable ends, I want to examine some key moments from the American Civil Rights movement before turning to my model of political communication and, finally, my suggested rhetorical curriculum.

The American Civil Rights movement is a descendant of Marx's labor movement (though its ties to religion mark an important difference) in that it was dependent on numbers of citizens engaged in real political activity (beyond displays of voting and party loyalty). From an examination of the speeches and sermons of the major figures in this movement, it is clear that they were well aware of the fact that not only did they need numbers of people, they needed those masses to do things. Even the famous pieces of rhetoric from Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. acknowledge this debt.

The “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” is part of a venerable genre of prison persuasion that includes other American examples like Thoreau's “On Civil
Disobedience” and traces its roots back to the sixth century AD and Boethius’s *The Consolation of Philosophy*. Both “prison literature” and the civil disobedience tradition have been identified with a pacifism that has sometimes been (generally unfairly) criticized as defeatist, but it would be a folly to attribute defeatism to King; advocating non-violent protest is not the same as disavowing all illegal action. Though King was composing from prison, through his words and example, others were being inspired to engage in popular political action.

King's letter opens by chastising his fellow clergymen who find his actions “unwise and untimely.” What is their objection? King writes, “You deplore the demonstrations taking place in Birmingham. But your statement, I am sorry to say, fails to express a similar concern for the conditions that brought about the demonstrations.”

The interpretation here is not difficult: King is frustrated by the fear that his colleagues have of “direct action,” which King specifically labels as the final step of a nonviolent protest movement. He is also frustrated by the fact that his colleagues do not seem to...

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493 Certainly Boethius is a fatalist—the entirety of the *Consolation* can be read this way, but especially Book IV. However, the linkage between disobedience and defeatism seems to be classical in character (see Cohen). Thoreau is not a defeatist, and his conscious choice not to act could be expressed using the legitimate restraining function of rhetoric-as-*movere*. For more on activity in civil disobedience and the distinction between pacifist action and defeatist action, see Mortimer Adler, *The Common Sense of Politics* (Teaneck, NJ: Fordham, 1996 (reissue)), who specifically links civil disobedience to political instability; Nancy L. Rosenblum, “Thoreau's Militant Conscience.” *Political Theory* (February 1981), 81-110; David Lyons, “Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil Disobedience.” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Winter 1998), 31-49; Marshall Cohen, “Liberalism and Disobedience.” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Spring 1972), 283-314

494 Lyons: “Second, King's commitment to nonviolence did not reflect favorably on the system. He emphasized that violent protest was not only immoral, but impractical. Although violence was justifiably used in self-defense, it had no place in organized resistance, where it would divert attention from the issues and defeat the long term goal...” (43)

495 Of course, this is one of the entire points of civil disobedience: “To be sure, for the classical disobedient the acceptance of jail may be 'the terminus of disobedience,' but that is far from saying it is 'the end of protest.' If one means by 'accepting the verdict' that one goes to jail, the civil disobedient accepts the verdict, but he does not thereby 'cheerfully' accept defeat.” (Cohen 296).

496 All quotations from King's “Letter From a Birmingham Jail” come from the text hosted by the University of Pennsylvania's African Studies Center. The text can be accessed via the following URL: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html

497 Ibid.
recognize that the audacity of direct action must be proportional to the committed injustice. An enduring period of systematic injustice and denial of rights can only be countered with an enduring and committed program of nonviolent protest. If this campaign of protest threatens the stability of the political order, that is of no concern: “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”

Indeed, King was urging on the members of his movement at the peak of one of the cycles of political activity that I described on pgs. 36-38 of my Introduction. I concluded that the inconsistent nature of that cycle made achieving a consistently administered democracy difficult, and we can see how administering a democratic government would be difficult amid the conditions of turmoil and protest that King describes in the “Letter.” This is why one of the goals of my model and rhetorical curriculum are to even out the high and low points of the cycle. Given the legal victories of King's movement, if citizens carefully monitor their rights and are able to respond to a gentle push against their rights with an equally light push back, there should not be the need for the type of hard shove that was necessary for King and his movement. Gentle pushes do not create the type of instability that King's colleagues (and the Hobbesian Objectors) fear.

Indeed, not only does King's “Letter” embrace the necessity of direct action—and thus he employs rhetoric-as-movere as part of his rhetorical program to persuade people that such direct action is necessary—but he also intimates that his movement incorporated some of the norms of individualist republicanism. Not only did King

498 Ibid.
499 I am well aware that this is simplifying the matter somewhat and there are still areas in this country where a hard shove, not a gentle tap, is the only appropriate response to the type of injustice being perpetrated.
embrace the persuasive ideal of *movere*, but throughout the early part of the letter he talks about the process of “self-purification,” one of the steps of a proper nonviolent movement. He writes: “Mindful of the difficulties involved, we decided to undertake a process of self-purification. We began a series of workshops on nonviolence, and we repeatedly asked ourselves, 'Are you able to accept blows without retaliating?' 'Are you able to endure the ordeal of jail?'”

The *virtue* (*virtu*) necessary to hold back from retaliation, but also to have the strength to endure the blows and the sheer will necessary to put oneself in harm's way certainly represent the influence of Christianity on this movement, but these norms can also be considered as part of individualist republicanism. Individualist republicanism, Christianity and the Civil Rights movement all provided their own opportunities for martyrdom, and I want to suggest that the martyrdom of the Civil Rights movement was actually closer to the idealized martyrdom of a Cato or Lucretia, though the act of martyrdom itself was often cloaked in the Christian aesthetic. Both individualist republicanism and the Civil Rights movement invoked the idea of martyrdom (either in a complete or partial form) *for* others and *for* the purpose of protecting or improving the structure of social or political organization. While the Civil Rights movement used the language of religion to provide a source of comfort for its jailed martyrs, the purpose for which they were martyring themselves was explicitly terrestrial.

As the “Letter” progresses, King lays out argument upon argument for the correctness of direct popular action, despite direct popular action's connection to instability:

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*500 Ibid.*
“You may well ask: 'Why direct action? Why sit ins, marches and so forth? Isn't negotiation a better path?' You are quite right in calling for negotiation. Indeed, this is the very purpose of direct action. Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored.”

Along these same lines:

We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct action campaign that was "well timed" in the view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word 'Wait!' It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This "Wait" has almost always meant 'Never.' We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that 'justice too long delayed is justice denied.' We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and God given rights. The nations of Asia and Africa are moving with jetlike speed toward gaining political independence, but we still creep at horse and buggy pace toward gaining a cup of coffee at a lunch counter.  

King continues to take his fellow clergymen to task:

In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn't this like condemning a robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn't this like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth and his philosophical inquiries precipitated the act by the misguided populace in which they made him drink hemlock? Isn't this like condemning Jesus because his unique God consciousness and never ceasing devotion to God's will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion?  

The “Letter” expresses one of King's fundamental critiques: American elites (and one could certainly level this charge at a number of the Western nations), unable to view their nation's situation from any perspective other than theirs (of privilege), considered stability to be the ultimate political goal. This was their failing and in the “Letter” King voices his frustration with these elites:

501 Ibid.
502 Ibid.
503 Ibid.
I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Councillor or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: 'I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action'; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a 'more convenient season.' Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection.  

You speak of our activity in Birmingham as extreme. At first I was rather disappointed that fellow clergymen would see my nonviolent efforts as those of an extremist. I began thinking about the fact that I stand in the middle of two opposing forces in the Negro community. One is a force of complacency, made up in part of Negroes who, as a result of long years of oppression, are so drained of self respect and a sense of 'somebodiness' that they have adjusted to segregation; and in part of a few middle-class Negroes who, because of a degree of academic and economic security and because in some ways they profit by segregation, have become insensitive to the problems of the masses.

This is a stunning direct confrontation of those elites who advocated institutionalist republican norms and were guided by a sense of docere norms (politeness, paternalism, etc.). King is doing nothing more here than railing against the marginalization of movere and of the sense of duty and sacrifice that could justifiably be identified with individualist republicanism. Through his direct criticism of “the force of complacency” and “shallow understanding from people of good will” he looks to reclaim rhetoric-as-movere and demonstrate that it can be a tool for justice. King uses rhetoric-as-movere to inspire and aid in organizing all the people who have a yearning to express their anger over injustice and take action to change that situation of injustice.

King understood that democracies had to be concerned with the equitable distribution of justice and opportunity instead of the mere preservation of order, or else

504 Ibid.
505 Ibid.
they would continually be threatened by outbreaks of demonstrative violence from those citizens who were forced to listen to the elites' rhetoric of opportunity while living in conditions of state-sanctioned injustice. In fact, King speaks to the very affinity I have noted throughout the previous chapters when he writes, “The Negro has many pent up resentments and latent frustrations, and he must release them. So let him march; let him make prayer pilgrimages to the city hall; let him go on freedom rides -and try to understand why he must do so. If his repressed emotions are not released in nonviolent ways, they will seek expression through violence; this is not a threat but a fact of history [emphasis added].”

Again, it is critical to remember that—unlike more radical leaders like Malcolm X—King wanted to break the Anger-Apathy cycle of political participation in democracy because the instability that it had to cause to be effective could only forestall the cooperation necessary for discussing and articulating laws and moral codes that would inch the democratic state ever closer to its quest for justice, its highest goal. While “injustice must be rooted out by strong, persistent and determined action” in the form of protest and civil disobedience, the purification of justice itself must take place in a less combative arena.

King was certainly not the only figure in this movement who adopted this attitude toward rhetoric-as-movere. A number of individuals, some involved with the leadership of groups like SNCC and some not, joined their voices with Dr. King in calling for

506 Ibid. King makes a similar statement in the “I Have a Dream Speech.” Professor Schochet has noted that the speech was interpreted as pacifist and conciliatory, but that it does contain a (veiled?) threat of more destabilizing action if the demands for justice are not met.

507 One has to only read Malcolm X's famous “The Ballot or the Bullet” speech to conclude that he was certainly a proponent of rhetoric-as-movere. Keeping in line with the radical Grange tradition (see Ch. 6) that looked to create its own modes of production and sustenance, Malcolm X demanded a stringent level of political action and engagement from his followers and he had to use the persuasive rhetoric-as-movere in order to convince and prepare his followers for the extraordinary level of social and political engagement.

508 “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.”
popular action. Daisy Bates, a woman who worked with the Arkansas NAACP and helped integrate Little Rock schools, published calls to action in her newspaper. Like Marx's popular rhetoric, Bates focuses on the need for “quiet courage” combined with responsible action. She writes: “The nine children have set an example of quiet courage, dignity and steadfastness and have won the admiration of all. They symbolize the determination of all Negroes to secure and utilize [emphasis added] the full citizenship which the United States Constitution has bestowed upon us all.”

And she asked, very plainly, “How much can a people stand?” She is perhaps less strident than King; she places her defense of the Little Rock Nine within a framework of using and relating to legitimate institutions and her rhetoric resembles more the legitimate urging function of rhetoric-as-movere as opposed to Dr. King's just revolution rhetoric.

Marion Barry, acting within the SNCC leadership, was asked to speak to the Democratic Party Platform Committee in 1960. Barry's remarks demonstrate that he was quite aware of the fact that he was speaking to a varied audience, and he adopts some of Marx's techniques in his speech. Though he is speaking to political elites, Barry is unafraid to explicitly call his movement a “protest and affirmation” and does not shy away from its active, stability-threatening qualities; indeed, “we protests and take direct action [emphasis added] against conditions of discrimination.”

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510 Bates, 86. While she is nowhere near as naked about it as King, there is the very veiled threat of escalation in the way she puts this question.
511 Marion Barry, “Statement to the 1960 Democratic Party Platform Committee” in Towns. On pgs. 91-94, Barry outlines a number of goals for the party platform. He wishes for the Democratic Party to place pressure on legislatures to create laws that will properly enforce a number of important Court decisions, and in speaking this language of institutions, he is able to translate and appeal to an audience composed mostly of institutionalist elites who harbor suspicion toward movere norms and techniques.
512 Ibid., 90.
513 Ibid.
emphasized that “we seek a community in which man can realize the full meaning of the self which demands open relationship with others.”\textsuperscript{514} In this, Barry and the SNCC also express the position we saw earlier articulated in King: the ultimate goal of the movement is to create cooperation so that citizens may gather together democratically and begin to tackle the difficult, higher-order questions of justice.

Diane Nash Bevel, Wyatt Tee Walker and Benjamin Mays were just some of the numerous others who contributed their call for popular action to the rhetoric of the Civil Rights Movement. Walker’s entire speech, “If Not Now When!” is a call for action and was delivered to college students in New York. In this speech he provides images of America “literally immobilized by civil disobedience”\textsuperscript{515} and of “transportation centers...strangled by the bodies of committed witnesses nonviolently insisting, 'Freedom Now!'”\textsuperscript{516} Mays reminded his audience that action, and only action, could move them forward, despite the decades of injustice and substandard living conditions created by that injustice that served as obstacles.\textsuperscript{517} Bevel, whose remarks in “Statement at Jackson, Mississippi” were presented just before she submitted herself to imprisonment, used the image of prison to encourage others to act where she could not. She also reiterated the importance of a “movement involving massive numbers”\textsuperscript{518} and argued that this sort of movement was necessary to provide adequate support to those struggling with the proceduralism and slower pace of courts and other institutions.

All of these examples demonstrate rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} being used in the service of a noble end. The rhetorical program of the Civil Rights movement demonstrates that it is

\textsuperscript{514} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{515} Wyatt Tee Walker, “If Not Now When!” in Towns, 109.
\textsuperscript{516} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{517} Benjamin Mays, “Desegregate and Integrate to What End?” in Towns, see especially 103.
\textsuperscript{518} Diane Nash Bevel, “Statement at Jackson, Mississippi” in Towns, 97.
possible to de-marginalize some of the norms of individualist republicanism, including rhetoric-as-*movere* to support social movements concerned with justice. However, even as leaders like King advocate nonviolent, but destabilizing, programs of action, we see in their rhetoric-as-*movere* a desire to move beyond a participatory democracy where citizens swing between anger and apathy. The ideal democratic citizens are not only able to consistently monitor the political elites necessary for the execution of laws and respond to slight abuses by the executors with equally slight pushes back, but they are also able to gather together and speak about the most complicated issues of justice. To achieve these two goals requires *consistency*. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to describing a model of political communication and a rhetorical curriculum designed to help develop some measure of that consistency in democratic citizens.

**The Model of Political Communication**

This model of political communication, which was briefly described in the Introduction, combines the norms and practices of rhetoric-as-*movere* and rhetoric-as-*docere*. However, instead of merely confining the practice of rhetoric-as-*docere* to political elites and leaving rhetoric-as-*movere* to be used for communicating to non-elites, this model of political communication asks political elites and regular democratic citizens to develop a twin set of skills. Regular democratic citizens are asked to develop the ability to evaluate rhetoric-as-*movere* appeals from political elites AND they are asked to utilize their citizen skills to come together and deliberate on the local level, where they as a group have a relative level of equality. Political elites are asked to continue developing

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519 At some level, it is difficult to call this a model of political communication, since I am actually prescribing a new set of attitudes for political elites and non-elites. However, I believe that the end result of these new attitudes will be a change in the flow of information and political decision-making, so I do use the terminology “model.”
their deliberative skills AND they are asked to mentally de-marginalize rhetoric-as-
movere practices and recognize rhetoric-as-movere's critical role in helping them create a
connection with non-elites.

Breaking down this “professionalization” gap between political elites and regular
citizens is one of the model's chief goals. This gap, which is connected with the problem
of homogeneity, manifests itself in various ways in American political culture. As
Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro demonstrate in their Politicians Don't Pander,
politicians can create rhetorical appeals (“crafted talk”) based on information they glean
from polls in order to move the people's position closer to their own. Koch has
found that elites change their opinions less readily than non-elites, who are more easily
“manipulated.” The problem of homogeneity can also manifest in the context of trying
to create messages that can speak to a pluralistic population with many diverse cultures,
each of which has its own important points of cultural and historical reference. As
Anderson and Paskeviciute note, “...the expression and reception of dissimilar views also
requires that people trust one another. As it turns out, trust is in shorter supply in more
heterogeneous societies.” This lack of trust has obvious problematic consequences for

520 Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro. Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of
Democratic Responsiveness (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 2000), see chs. 1-2 for the discussion of the
theory. Also see Shumel Lock, Jacobs and Shapiro, “The Impact of Political Debate on Government Trust:
Reminding the Public of What the Federal Government Does” in Political Behavior 21.3 (September
1999), 239-64.

521 Koch, Jeffrey W. “Political Rhetoric and Political Persuasion: The Changing Structure of Citizens’
Preferences on Health Insurance During Policy Debate.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, 62.2 (Summer
1998), 209-29. Along these lines, James Druckman also finds that the notion of “reframing” a policy
debate has less of an effect on elites than it does on non-elites (once again, speaking to their ability to be
“manipulated”). See his “Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation and the (Ir)relevance
of Framing Effects” in the American Political Science Review, 98.4 (November 2004), 671-86.

the Prospects for Civil Society: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Behavior.” The Journal of Politics,
68.4 (November 2006), 799. In the public policy context, we see the problems with trust and pluralism in
the social construction of “target populations” for public policies. See Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram,
democracy: “...high levels of trust within close networks but an absence of trust in strangers of those with whom individuals have weak ties may well threaten the vibrancy of cooperative relationships in a democratic society.” Indeed, I suggest that a system of political communication that adopts the Shaftesburian norms of small groups and features the high barriers to entry endemic to deliberative democracy will yield nothing more than an American democracy where citizens feel a high level of trust in small groups, but do not trust the vast majority of citizens who are in their “out group.”

Marx, King and others who overcame this problem were able to do so through the use of rhetoric-as-movere, combined with a serious consideration of audience. These successful, inspirational modern rhetors carefully decided who they wanted to be in their audience and then used what I call the “package of persuasion” to craft sensitive appeals that spoke to all the diverse members of those audiences. Most importantly, they did not marginalize rhetoric-as-movere, but recognized that it was part of the “package of persuasion” (along with rhetoric-as-docere) that would be necessary to appeal to the audience they wanted to attract. I believe that contemporary political elites must follow the same path so that they may make more effective connections with citizens. It is only through using this politically inspirational rhetoric that they will be able to move beyond the problem of homogeneity. Indeed, recent research suggests that the changing media environment will force the hand of professionalized political elites on this question. Matthew A. Baum has found that “doing the talk show circuit” can reap gains for

Ibid, 799.
candidates. Markus Prior has found that “gaps [of political knowledge/participation] based on socioeconomic status will be eclipsed by preference-based gaps once access to new media becomes cheaper and more widely available...Inequality in political knowledge and turnout increases as a result of voluntary, not circumstantial, consumption decisions.” While many have decried these shifts, I believe that they will trigger a critical change in attitudes among political elites. *Unless political elites decide that they will de-marginalize the move-re-based appeals that have been historically demonstrated as the only types of appeals that will motivate and inspire mass popular political participation, we cannot solve the crisis of political communication.*

Unfortunately, there are few institutions that can move political elites to de-marginalize move-re. However, there are plenty of institutional frameworks in place to help political elites realize their second goal under my framework, which is to continue to improve the quality of their deliberation. As I stated in the introduction, I believe that the institutional framework put forth by Jane Mansbridge is best equipped to deal with elite deliberation. I believe that the corporatist deliberation framework can sustain communication across an entire elite policy community, thus improving on the current situation of elite deliberation, which is best represented by the hollow core model, where policy-political elites stake out various positions on an issue and rarely speak directly with those elites who have staked out a different position. Indeed, scholars have also

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524 Baum, Matthew A. “Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk Show Circuit.” *American Journal of Political Science*, 49.2 (April 2005), 213-34. Baum also finds that, once again, citizens who are non-elites tend to be more swayed by such appearances. While we might initially believe that this is a reason to discourage such behavior, this behavior also helps bridge the professionalization gap, and thus has a place in contemporary American political society.


generated similar institutions that will assist political non-elites in achieving their goal of developing and using citizens skills to deliberate on the local level. The institutions suggested by Gutmann and Thompson and James Fishkin can help citizens develop these skills.\textsuperscript{527} However, these models would have to be used on a limited basis for citizens to discuss and deliberate issues with people who are their relative equals. The deliberative groups would also have to be selected carefully in order to ensure that the individuals deliberating have a common concern or set of interests that will allow them to form “deliberative bonds” with each other. Introducing hierarchies into the deliberation or tossing people with only the flimsiest of ties together in a deliberative environment will result in many of the problems described in the introduction. For these reasons, even though I think that deliberative institutions provide citizens with an important learning opportunity, their use must be carefully monitored and deliberative institutions should not be the primary decision-making mechanism.

Indeed, while allowing “non-elite” citizens to develop themselves as political individuals in this modified deliberative context is important, I still believe that the most important skill for these individuals to develop is the ability to judge 	extit{movere} appeals that come from political elites who have more expertise and experience in the political arena. While I believe that professionalized political elites have the responsibility to create opportunities for citizens to be exposed to such appeals (even something like a weekly radio address), professionalized political elites will not be the primary force that moves citizens closer to this goal. The school will be the major institution in our society that we have to monitor and shape (in terms of the curriculum being taught) in order to help

regular citizens achieve this goal. I discuss this in much greater detail in the section on education.

If political elites and political non-elites are able to develop these twin sets of skills, I believe that the flow of political information and the method of political decision-making will improve for the better. Assuming that political elites and political non-elites are able to develop their new skills, my ideal model of political communication and information exchange will be able to function. This model, recognizing the realities of the gap of professionalized expertise and the limits on citizen participation, remains hierarchical. Professionalized political elites (PPEs) communicate downward to political non-elites (PNEs). However, that hierarchical communication is not the first step in the model. The first step in the model is for the PPEs to deliberate, following the principles of corporatist deliberation, among themselves in order to generate policy proposals. The second step in the model is for the PPEs to communicate downward to the PNEs. This communication will feature a “package of persuasion” that includes all four of the types of proofs that I will outline in my “Rhetorical Education” proposal. These four types of proofs incorporate both rhetoric-as-movere and rhetoric-as-docere.

While the PPEs are preparing their “package of persuasion” for consumption by the PNEs, the PNEs are preparing themselves to receive this communication. PNEs prepare themselves in two ways: first, they deliberate among themselves under the appropriate conditions, following institutional frameworks established by Gutmann/Thompson and Fishkin. This deliberation allows PNEs to develop a discretionary faculty, a positive association with “doing politics,” and exposure to different perspectives. Second, PNEs call upon the lessons of their rhetorical education,
particularly those that ask them to consider the *ethos* of the PPEs. When the PNEs receive a communication from the PPEs, they will notice it because it includes rhetoric-*as-movere* as part of its package of persuasion. After they notice it and are inspired to act upon it, they will apply both what they learned in their rhetorical education and what they have learned in deliberation in order to render a judgment, which they will then communicate back to the PPEs.

This model of political communication and information exchange very obviously will create better informed and more politically autonomous PNEs who will be less susceptible to various types of manipulation. The model allows PNEs to become more politically autonomous without having to give themselves over completely to a political process that demands time and professional expertise. PNEs receive the appropriate education in school, and because the deliberative institutions are only used at select times, they are able to participate without having to change their lives in ways that their family or financial situations might not allow. While this “second-order” democracy might not be perfect democracy, and some might believe that these methods of integrating democracy into PNEs lives are shallow, I would respond that they might be more shallow than we would like, but they are *constant*, and in their constant presence, they help guard against the instability and other negative consequences of the Anger-Apathy cycle that is currently so strongly associated with the use of rhetoric-*as-movere*.

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528 While some might argue that citizens will not take advantage of these opportunities to deliberate, recent research has found that if citizens are “reminded” of their duty, that they will generally respond, especially if fulfilling that duty does not force them to completely reconstitute their lives, as regular deliberation might (but my model of occasional deliberation does not). See Cindy D. Kam, “When Duty Calls, Do Citizens Answer?” in *The Journal of Politics* 69.1 (February 2007), 17-29.
Rhetorical Education

My curriculum of rhetorical education has three goals: first, it has the goal of creating a more balanced view of persuasion; in short, it looks to de-marginalize the norms of rhetoric-as-*movere*. The remaining two goals of the rhetorical curriculum concern the teaching of rhetorical proofs. First, I believe that this curriculum must add *empirical* proof to the three traditional proofs of ethos, logos, and pathos. While students are introduced to the importance of empiricism in the scientific context, they rarely consider it in other contexts. Although students do associate empirical methodology with some types of persuasion (scientific, argumentative), they do not associate it with other types of persuasion, like political persuasion. A proper rhetorical curriculum ought to introduce the notion of empirical proofs in contexts other than the scientific or experimental. The second goal relating to proofs, and the third overall goal of the curriculum, is to develop a conception of ethos that is appropriate for the modern context. Ethos and the ability to properly judge it is crucial for a variety of reasons, most stemming from the complexities of modern politics. In some instances it is easier (and necessary) to simply evaluate the speaker's character as opposed to evaluating every element of the speaker's message. We can see how this principle becomes particularly

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529 Some of the work in this section is taken from my own “Recovering the Ethos of the Orator through an Understanding of Rhetoric-as-*Movere*,” which was first presented at the 2006 Meeting of the Association for Political Theory (Bloomington, IN) and then presented as a talk at the University of Vermont in 2007. I am grateful to the discussant and audience of the APT panel (especially Andrew Rehfeld, who encouraged me to highlight the 'second order nature' and 'bridge' quality of my work) and my audience at UVM—Patrick Neal, Gregory Gause, Travis Nelson, Lisa Holmes, Monicka Patterson-Tutschka, Emma Cohen de Lara and many others asked me very interesting and helpful questions.

important in light of the way my model of political communication is designed to function.\textsuperscript{531}

All three of these goals are connected, of course. The recovery of a modern sense of \textit{ethos} and the de-marginalization of the norms of \textit{movere} are intimately connected. While we assume that people can distinguish a less-qualified speaker from a more qualified speaker, that is not necessarily the case (and we have seen examples of this in action). Much of the problem stems from the fact that citizens are led to believe that there are such things as objective and demonstrable proofs of major policy claims \textit{in all cases}. Many people feel—and an education system that rails against “emotional appeals” and “manipulation” in units on advertising feeds this—that only “objective” proofs based on logic and “the truth” are acceptable.

The first goal—to de-marginalize the conception of persuasion that undergirds rhetoric-as-\textit{movere}—is most critical. Until rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} is de-marginalized, I believe that political communication will continue to be dogged by the problems of the professionalization of politics—particularly the problem of homogeneity—and that, as a result, citizen passivity (if not apathy) will continue to frustrate democratic activists and theorists.\textsuperscript{532} I believe that the de-marginalization of rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} has two curricular components. First, there is an historical component. One of the major beliefs that has driven the marginalization of rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} (or, more properly, individualist

\textsuperscript{531} As Koch (\textit{op. cit.}) notes, “Only those possessing the ability to comprehend abstract rhetorical arguments and apply these arguments to their political preferences will undergo attitude change” (212) if citizens are forced to process all the information available on any policy or electoral decision without some sort of filter.

\textsuperscript{532} Joseph Kahne and Joel Westheimer find a strong degree of apathy among young people, rooted in the sense that they do not control politicians and that no one listens to them. I would suggest that part of this comes about because the experts are speaking a language of \textit{docere} that is difficult for a regular citizen to understand. See “The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society” in \textit{PS: Political Science and Politics} (April 2006), 289-96.
republicanism) is the belief that rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} is necessarily associated either with dangerous political instability, or political movements that are “fringe” movements that explicitly reject the role of reason and objectivity in politics.\textsuperscript{533} \textit{Movere} is set against \textit{docere}, which is automatically equated with reason. However, as I have demonstrated, this is a very narrow read of rhetoric-as-\textit{movere}. While there is an association of rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} with varying degrees of political instability, its tactics have been adopted by movements with goals that we consider noble; it has been used by figures who were educated men, like Karl Marx and Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. A curriculum of rhetorical education must be grounded in the \textit{history} of the various types of persuasion and the individuals who deployed them. The conclusion from such a history will most assuredly be that rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} is merely a very effective tool, particularly in a political (democratic) context.

The second curricular component of de-marginalizing rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} focuses on the breakdown of the belief in faultless objective expertise (this goal is very closely tied in with the curriculum's third and final goal of developing a modern sense of \textit{ethos} or character judgment). This is a very difficult task, for it requires students to be able to

\textsuperscript{533} Colleen J. Shogan, in “Anti-Intellectualism in the Modern Presidency: A Republican Populism” (\textit{Perspectives on Politics}, June 2007) has specifically connected the Republican Party (of course, their use of republicanism is not equivalent to individualist republicanism) and the use of anti-intellectual “populist” rhetoric. She also has noted the phenomenon of the gap of expertise: “It would be remiss to neglect the role intellectuals have played in this evolving drama. The professionalization and expansion of the academy has altered common opinions about intellectualism in the United States. Academics now engage in technical dialogues within their disciplines that have grown increasingly specialized and esoteric” (301). However, she still concludes that “policy-oriented debate...should serve as the hallmark of deliberation in an extended democratic republic” (301). There is a strong implicit assumption here that “policy-oriented debate” can only be carried out properly through the norms of rhetoric-as-\textit{docere} because rhetoric-as-\textit{movere} techniques (such as her example of the self-effacing humor that President Bush used in a speech at Yale (295) are sometimes used in the service of dangerous ideological programs that perpetuate ideas like hostility to intellectualism. I, of course, have argued throughout this work that a combination of \textit{movere} and \textit{docere} norms are necessary to create the climate for “policy-oriented debate.” As my dear Professors McWilliams, Schochet and Bronner have all demonstrated in their own way, one can be a rhetorician and still be meaningful.
make subtle distinctions and to understand that the claim that there is no such thing as perfect objectivity is not the same thing as claiming that reason, science and expert knowledge are useless. Why, then, do I include this as part of the curriculum? I do so because our belief in expert objectivity has become a crutch for citizens and it creates passivity. Removing the crutch will make citizens less passive and more critical. Removing this sense of passivity is crucial for further rhetorical education.

Demagogues depend on a passive audience that is simply looking for someone (with some sort of “credentials”) to tell them the answer. By destroying this passive mindset—inasmuch as is possible—we give citizens the foundation to investigate not only claims about ethos and objectivity in research, but logical claims, and appeals to emotion. In short, we prepare them to be a responsible audience.

534 Indeed, Gregory Clark and S. Michael Halloran (eds.), in their introduction to Oratorical Culture in Nineteenth-Century America: Transformations in the Theory and Practice of Rhetoric (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1993), note that “the theory of rhetoric taught in the schools [civic, consensus based] and the practice of public discourse sustained outside them were transformed during the nineteenth century from those of the neoclassical oratorical culture into those of the professional culture we see characterizing both colleges and communities by its end” (5-6). This is, of course, very much the narrative of the decline of move to in the American context that I spelled out in the previous chapter.

535 Kahne and Westheimer (op. cit.) find that a focus on political efficacy—i.e., the notion that politics is successful and important only if you can use it to achieve a laundry list of objective goals—is harmful to a sense of civic development. Indeed, this notion seems to have some relation to the Anger-Apathy cycle, and once again we get the idea that if we could flatten political participation, if we could make it more consistent (if less bold), the quality of our democracy and its citizens would improve. Another threat to curricular reform and a less objectives-based sense of education comes from reformers who believe that schools ought to look like businesses and have vocational training as their only goal. See Larry Cuban, “Making Public Schools Business-Like...Again” in PS: Political Science and Politics (April 2004 Symposium on “The Politics of Civic Education”), 237-40.

536 William N. Denman, in his essay, “Rhetoric, the “Citizen-Orator,” and the Revitalization of Civic Discourse in American Life,” also argues that professionalization has been harmful to the quality of public discourse and that rhetorical education is necessary to “give power to the voices of those who have hitherto been voiceless in American life” (12). Certainly, “the voiceless” are those who have been on the wrong side of the gap of expertise or the problem of homogeneity. Denman continues: “Those whose rhetorical resources have been constrained can find their voices through the practice of rhetoric and participation in civic life” (12). Part of finding the voice is the realization that it is OK to have a voice, even if that voice doesn't conform to an ideal of rationalized objectivity. (Jane Junn speaks to this in the context of civic education in her “Diversity, Immigration and the Politics of Civic Education” (PS: Political Science and Politics April 2004).) Thus, the first goal is to de-marginalize move to and try to paint a more subtle picture of the role of expertise in politics, so that the gap of expertise does not seem quite so insurmountable. Denman's essay appears in Rhetorical Education in America, Cheryl Glenn, Margaret M. Lyday and Wendy B. Shafier, eds. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 2004).
This notion of being a responsible audience member is certainly connected with the idea of being a responsible citizen, and the linkages between this conception of rhetorical education and civic education are very strong indeed. However, I would not want to embed my curriculum of rhetorical education in a larger civic education curriculum (though hopefully teachers in both rhetorical and civic classes would point out the obvious connections). As Westheimer and Kahne, Hess, and Ross note, politics figure broadly in the determination of a civic education curriculum, and this can produce a disjointed set of lessons.\footnote{Hess, Diana E., “Controversies about Controversial Issues in Democratic Education;” Westheimer, Joel and Joseph Kahne, “Educating the 'Good' Citizen: Political Goals and Pedagogical Choices;” and Ross, E. Wayne, “Negotiating the Politics of Civic Education.” All articles appeared in the April 2004 issue of PS: Political Science and Politics as part of the Symposium on “The Politics of Civic Education.” Hess's article appears on pages 257-61, Westheimer and Kahne's article appears on pages 241-7 and Ross's on 249-51.}

Additionally, the lessons about persuasion and proof that are an essential part of this curriculum have a number of intellectual uses. For example, the second recommended component of my rhetorical education curriculum is the development of a proof of “empiricism.” Discussion of such a proof and what it contributes to our understanding in a wide variety of fields. Empiricism as a proof is different from \textit{logos}, because the proof of \textit{logos} traditionally refers to logical proofs such an induction or deduction. It was one of the chief proofs of medieval rhetoric, and in that context it was not united with empiricism in any way, shape or form. Indeed, as I demonstrated in Chapter Three, empiricism did not become a serious concern for rhetoric until the late sixteenth/early seventeenth century. However, the integration of the two was incomplete: “empirical” rhetoric was only considered in the rhetoric-as-\textit{docere} context.

Through a developed understanding of the proof of empiricism and how it should
generally be one part of an overall “package of persuasion.” Through this component, students will learn what good empirical demonstration is, what types of arguments require some sort of empirical proof (i.e., an introduction to the issues of normativity) and how the proof of empiricism can be combined with other proofs. Once again, my goal is to create a more subtle and sophisticated picture of the way things work in the world with the purpose of demonstrating that some amount of cynicism is beneficial and healthy for the democratic citizen (or, at the very least, democratic citizens should not trust without question). Students must be aware of the tools of proof and the different ways in which those tools can be used and abused.

This issue of use and abuse is connected to the third—and perhaps most crucial—component of my recommended rhetorical curriculum. In order to help people bridge the gap of expertise we need to revive an understanding of ethos. In the ancient sense, the proof of ethos was associated with the character of the orator, but a conception of modern ethos goes beyond character. In fact, some argue that it should not include character at all, unless the issue at hand is a specifically ethical or moral one. Our conception of authority—of speakers who have the ethos to speak on issues of policy—now includes

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538 This concept of the “package of persuasion” is very important. Indeed, research demonstrates that all too often, because political elites have marginalized movere, “movere” appeals are nothing more than manipulative appeals to pathos (for a representative article that discusses this in the context of campaign advertising, see Ted Brader, “Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions” in American Journal of Political Science, 49.2 (April 2005), 388-405. While Brader again asserts a link between inspirational/emotional persuasion proofs and actual action, I would want my rhetorical curriculum to stress that such persuasive tactics are only part of the package. Of course, this is all predicated on political elites taking the task of totalistic persuasion seriously.

credentials and demonstrated expertise, but it also refers to the audience's impression of the speaker. In this way, the idea of ethos seems to mix both the intellectual/expertise norms of rhetoric-as-docere and the audience awareness norms of rhetoric-as-movere.

More than any other component of my rhetorical education curriculum, revitalizing ethos helps us deal with the deeply imperfect “democratic” situation created by the combination of constraints on citizens (in terms of their leisure time) and the professionalization of politics. The ability to judge a speaker's ethos (in a meaningful way—thus the focus on education) could serve as a second-order stand-in for being able to judge the entire message and as a consequence, citizens would be able to register opinions of a higher quality in an increased number of policy domains. This second-order solution is what I like to call a deeply imperfect solution for a deeply imperfect form of popular participatory government. I think this particular solution acknowledges the fact that in the expertise and professionalism driven political climate in the United States, it is virtually impossible for a private citizen with other responsibilities to evaluate claims and arguments in a wide number of policy areas. This ethos “bridge” between the worlds of docere and movere could help create access points for citizen participation in the American governmental system and in that way it serves as an excellent compliment to the previously described model of political communication.

What, in general, do I mean by this notion of using ethos to judge, or judging the speaker as a preliminary filter before judging the entire message? It is not really a radical notion and it is something that most of us do all the time when we are asked to evaluate something outside our comfort zone. Although an audience might not have the time to process and understand the background of the developments behind a subsidy for electric
or hybrid cars, they can distinguish between a researcher from MIT and a researcher employed by a private lobbyist. They are able to understand that some people are better qualified to speak on certain issues of policy. If we do this “naturally,” why include it as such an integral part of a rhetorical education curriculum? Once again, the rationale lies in the desire to complicate notions of “objectivity” and “expertise” so that individual citizens begin to understand the dangers of passive acceptance and become more willing to critically examine arguments—or, if such a thing is simply not possible—credentials. As those of us who are on the front lines of researching and producing knowledge know, reality is far more complex. Without a more evolved conception of ethos, citizens are left in a precarious position. When everyone has credentials and no one is obviously more “right” than anyone else, what is to be done? This is the reason that people must be educated about ethos.

Let us consider the case of global warming and ethos. There is a well-known controversy surrounding this topic—everything from its definition to its existence has been questioned at one point in time or another. While it seems that scientists are arriving at some consensus, there is still a lot of disagreement on specifics, and the

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540 To illustrate this, Denman (op. cit.) suggests “Instead of learning that knowledge—and truth or reality—are contained in electronic web pages, library card catalogs, or periodical guides, students would learn that they, too, can create knowledge for themselves, and others through discourse” (13).

541 While a 2004 article in Science found overwhelming academic support for the theory of global climate change (Oreskes, Naomi. “Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change.” Science 306.5702 (3 December 2004)), there are those such as S. Fred Singer of the Science and Environmental Policy Project who present an alternate view. This controversy has leaked into public opinion polls, which show ambivalence. An ABCNEWS.com article summarizing a 2006 poll concluded that “fewer than four in 10 are very sure of it, a level of uncertainty that reflects broad and continued belief that scientists themselves disagree on whether or not it's happening.” http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/GlobalWarming/story?id=1750492&page=1

542 The American Geophysicists' Union, Joint Science Academies and American Meteorological Society are among some of the professional societies that have prepared statements that acknowledge human-induced global climate change. The AMS statement may be accessed here: http://www.ametsoc.org/policy/climatechangeresearch_2003.html. The JSA statement may be accessed
scientific community is a long way from having a comprehensive, easily understandable, “objective” position on the issue. However, citizens are still asked about their opinions on this issue, and many others like it. Politicians campaign on these types of issues and force the issue, as it were. Citizens do not have time to wait on the slow process of research, which operates on a different wave of time than the political process.

Citizens often find themselves in this situation—stuck between two sides of an issue. Neither side can claim a decisive victory, and each side seems to have advocates possessed of an ethos of expertise. What is to be done? There are no easy answers here, but I believe that a proper rhetorical education, combined with a proper education in the realities of research, its design, and its funding (think something slightly more practical than a course in epistemology) can help provide answers. The component of education about research is an essential primer, because it establishes the fact that “objective” research, particularly in the realm of the social sciences, is very difficult to find. For example, we are all aware of the ways in which the pursuit of grants and other outside support can affect the way in which we frame and choose to investigate problems in the world around us. However, this may not occur to the citizen who is unfamiliar with the realities of funding large-scale research.

The purpose of such an education is not to tear the rug out from under legitimate, hard-working individuals who have earned their credentials and their claims to expertise, but to force citizens to recognize that there is—even if it is at a deep level—some bias in all research, and that citizens have to investigate the root of the research and the people who are funding it. In short, they have to aggressively work to ascertain the ethos of the

experts, instead of waiting for the crutch of an “objective” answer to things.

Furthermore, since rhetors generally use ethos to establish either a connection with the audience OR to establish their expertise, the citizen “consumers” of these rhetorical messages need to be trained to evaluate ethos on both accounts and to see the importance of both accounts. In other words, ethos is not just character and inspirational charisma and it is not just expertise.

However, such curricular reform is not possible unless members of intellectual elite circles recognize and value the importance of rhetoric-as-movere. Teaching individuals how to judge the expertise or ethos of a particular speaker will not be fruitful unless those lessons are introduced in the context of a larger discussion about politically persuasive rhetoric. While there is much to be gained from the study of literary techniques and written rhetoric, we should not ignore or discount rhetoric-as-movere because of misgivings we have about persuasion. So long as there are citizens to be moved, there will be those who use rhetoric-as-movere, and those who abuse it. Political theory has a duty to prevent (or at least ameliorate) such abuse. To quote St. Augustine from Book IV of On Christian Teaching, “who could dare maintain that truth, which depends on us for its defence, should stand unarmed in the fight against falsehood?”


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