VARIABLES AFFECTING NATION-BUILDING: THE IMPACT OF THE ETHNIC
BASIS, THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SUDDEN
SHOCKS

by

IONAS AURELIAN RUS

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

VARIABLES AFFECTING NATION-BUILDING: THE IMPACT OF THE ETHNIC BASIS, THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SUDDEN SHOCKS

By IONAS AURELIAN RUS

Dissertation Director:

Jan Kubik

My dissertation examines the impact of four key independent variables on nation-building, on the evolution of the spread and intensity of nationalism. An ethnic basis (language, culture, identity, etc.) similar to the desired end-product as well as the growth of education facilitate nation-building. In most cases, industrialization hinders nation-building. Sudden shocks (collapses of empires, wars and revolutions) change the intensity of nationalism scores significantly during very short periods.
Preface

The writing of this dissertation was meant to fill an important gap in the literature and to introduce a new approach to the study of nation-building. Yet its completion has not been an easy task. The topic was very ambitious and I made enormous efforts not to cut corners, more than it was required of me by my dissertation committee members. I would certainly not recommend to others who are writing dissertations in political science to attempt to be as inductive as I originally was or to write as thorough and thus as long a dissertation as I did. I would also not encourage others to do as much research that would ultimately not be included in the dissertation as it has been true in my case.

On the other hand, I have tried to write a work that, while theoretically rigorous, would also present sufficient data, enough to allow others to reach conclusions that are somewhat different from mine. I wrote this text in such a way so as to maximize the chance that it would be embraced rather than merely tolerated by numerous types of researchers. They include not only scholars of nationalism, but area studies specialists and academics outside of political science, such as historians, sociologists, specialists in international education, anthropologists, etc. I have tried to be as objective and relevant to the “real world” as possible, with the hope that the representatives of all of the populations covered by my dissertation would appreciate my effort and be able to relate to it.
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Many individuals have helped me with this dissertation. First, I wanted to thank my late maternal grandmother, Rada Nicolae, for exposing me to the topic of interwar nation-building through her reminiscences. I want to thank my parents, Emilia and Ioan Rus, for their multi-faceted support during the period when I have written my dissertation, ranging from financial assistance to moral support. I wanted to thank my dissertation advisor, Jan Kubik, for patiently helping me with my work, for his thorough comments, suggestions, questions, encouragement and friendship. He has helped me a great deal in making my dissertation clearer and more presentable as well as topically broader.

I would also like to thank my other dissertation committee members, Myron (“Mike”) Aronoff and Robert (“Bob”) Kaufman of Rutgers and William Crowther of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, a Romania and Moldova specialist, for reading this dissertation and for their comments and suggestions. A number of individuals have read my entire dissertation even though they did not have to, and they have made valuable comments and suggestions. One of them was one of Romania’s top historians, Dumitru Sandru, who was born geographically very close to Bukovina, and was experientially acquainted with Bukovina during the late interwar and World War II years.

A number of other individuals have read large parts of various drafts of my dissertation, sometimes even most of it. I would like to thank them for their suggestions as well as for conveying to me that I was on the right track. Victor Todoruc, the only ethnic Romanian associated with northern Bukovina who has obtained advanced social
science degrees in the West, deserves special thanks. So does Jim Niessen, European and Asian history librarian at Rutgers and the moderator of HABSBURG as well as a Romania and Habsburg monarchy specialist. I would also like to thank those professors who have read and have made suggestions to one or several chapters of my dissertation even though they did not have to. They include Jennifer Cash, a Moldova specialist at the University of Pittsburgh and Beth Leech, the placement director in the Political Science department. The latter and my dissertation advisor have helped me select a portion of this dissertation as a writing sample and to adjust it so that I could “sell myself” better, including to the professors at Raymond Walters College of the University of Cincinnati, which has hired me for a tenure-track assistant professor position.

A number of my colleagues and friends who were graduate students when I was writing my dissertation, but are now assistant professors and doctors in Political Science or related fields, have also read and commented on chapters of my dissertation. They include Elizabeth Radziszewski (then at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, now at Yeshiva University), Jonathan DiCicco (at that time at Rutgers, now at Canisius College), and Elizabeth Anderson, an international education and Moldova specialist (then at New York University, now at American University).

I would like to thank a number of my friends for their moral support and advice regarding the dissertation. One of them is Dan Teodoru, a medical doctor who also has an MA in Political Science and who lived in Austria for a short period after World War II. Another one is Elizabeth Radziszewski, who provided me with numerous useful tips. I will also thank one of the top historians from Moldova, Aurelia Felea, most of whose work dealing with Moldova and Romania touches on the issue of nation-building.
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There are a number of professors who, through their very assistance on related projects, have indirectly helped me with my dissertation as well. They might not realize this, but it is true. They include Jan Kubik, Mike Aronoff and Richard Wilson of the Political Science Department at Rutgers-New Brunswick. Others are the historians Seymour Becker and Ziva Galili (Rutgers), Dumitru Sandru (A.D. Xenopol History Institute of Iasi, later of the Lower Danube University of Galati in Romania), plus Irina Livezeanu and Jennifer Cash (University of Pittsburgh). I should also thank Istvan Deak, Mark von Hagen, Lars Tragardh and Silvana Patriarca of Columbia University, and Dan Dungaciu of Bucharest University in Romania.

I would like to thank those past graduate school colleagues who have given me advice regarding my dissertation, including Martin Edwards plus Marat and Regina Akopian. I would like to thank the Political Science Department at Rutgers for four years of full funding as well as for the opportunity to teach a number of courses that had some topics that overlapped a little bit with the topic of my dissertation.

I would like to thank a number of Ukrainian-American and Ukrainians-Canadian professionals and Ukrainian citizens of various ethnicities for their assistance with my dissertation in terms of information, opinions and for providing me with relevant links. They include Miron Krizhan-Iwskij of Michigan and the Ukrainian-Canadian documentary director and editor of E-Poshta Myroslava Oleksiuk, who is of partly northern Bukovinian origin. I would also like to thank Andy Ihnatov, Natalya Belitser and Olexia Basarab, who work or worked in the Kyiv NGO and think-tank sector for the
information that they have provided me and for the opinions that they have expressed. I am particularly grateful to Anatoliy Kruglashov, the head of the political science department at the university in Chernivtsi. I would like to thank Ion Popescu, the ethnic Romanian deputy in the Verkhovna Rada in Kyiv and Aurica Bojescu for placing me on their mailing list and a number of Romanian-American university professors and for sending me a number of articles about the ethnic Romanians, including self-styled Moldovans, of Ukraine. I would also like to thank the Rusyn-American genealogist Larry Krupniak and other Rusyn-Americans for acquainting me with the Rusyn/Ruthenian perspective. I should also be grateful to Iulian Chifu of the Center of Conflict Prevention and Early Warning, which has offices in Bucharest as well as Chisinau and Kyiv for sending me numerous relevant materials during the early party of the writing of my dissertation.

I would like to thank numerous inhabitants of Romanian southern Bukovina, which I have visited more than ten times, of Vienna, Austria and the surroundings, as well as of a number of ethnic Romanians who originate from Ukraine, including Professor Sergiu Vacaru. I would also like to thank a number of individuals with a Moldovanist point of view for familiarizing me with this perspective. One of them is Vitalie Sprinceana, who has an MA in Political Science and is the nephew of one of the authors of the current Moldovanist, pro-Communist textbooks introduced in Moldova in 2006. I would also like to thank the former rector at Moldova State University, Gheorghe Rusnac, and the head of the Political Science department at the same institution, Valentin Mosneaga, for their own input.

Yet most of my sources of input are either Romanian citizens or inhabitants of
the Republic of Moldova with a Romanian ethnic identity. I will have to mention Argentina Gribincea as well as Vitalia Pavlicenco, and the author of the 1994 Moldovan constitution Nicolae Osmochescu, but the full list is truly long. A large number of individuals with whom I have served on panels, or with whom I have talked at various conferences stand out. They include Dominique Arel, Charles King, Rebecca Chamberlain-Creanga, Dmitry Tartakovsky, Anastasia Gnedenetskaya, Stefan Wolff, Zenon Waslyw, Hugo Lane, Jeff Mankoff, Hans Haas, Vladimir Solonari, Ewald Hiebl, Pieter Judson, Paul Robert Magocsi, Blaire Harms, Elaine Rusinko, Taras Kuzio, Gheorghe Buzatu, Stelea Cheptea, etc. Finally, I would have to thank the staff of Arhivele Statului Iasi and of the Mihail Eminescu University Library of the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi for my access to various works that are not widely available outside Romania. I should also thank the relevant members of the staff of the Rutgers and New York Research Public Libraries. I would also like to thank those whose names I have not mentioned. I will certainly do it at the beginning of the book that I plan to publish that will be based on this dissertation.

However, I am responsible for all the deficiencies of the dissertation.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Mechanisms of Nation-Building:

The Literature, Theory and Case Selection

1.1. Introduction: Nationalism – Definition and Typology

1.2. The Existing Literature on Nation-Building and the Variables

1.3. Case Selection

1.4. Process-Tracing in the Educational System

1.5. Problems with the Data: Public Opinion and the Ballot Box

1.6. A Relatively Unimportant Intervening Variable: Mass Media

1.7. Findings, Conclusions and Generalizations
1. 1. Introduction: Nationalism – Definition and Typology

Nation-building is a complex process through which individuals become the members of a nation. I propose four criteria for measuring nation-building (as a dependent variable). They include the integrative, satisfacional, identificational and symbolic ones. There are four main independent variables that account for changes on the dependent variable, nation-building. They explain the scope of distribution of its values in terms of spread and intensity. The first one is the nation-building potential of the ethnic basis, which facilitates nation-building. Another one is the educational system, which tends to further it. The elementary educational system provides a basic grounding in nationalism, whereas the higher reaches of the system foster more intense nationalism, which is particularly true as one goes up in the system. Industrialization tends to hinder ethnic/cultural nation-building, whereas sudden shocks play a great role in shaping self-determination preferences by speeding up the pace of change. My model is intended for a generalized use, particularly for European groups (I will look in depth at two case studies), but also more universally.

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2. This conclusion is contrary to the established view, which is argued by, for example, Ernest Gellner.
3. The model is largely based on my previous work dealing with the case of the Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians covering the period from 1900 to 1940 and on my work dealing with the Bukovinian Romanians covering the period from 1880 to 1918. See Ionas Aurelian Rus, “Variables Affecting Nation-Building and the Bukovinian Romanian Case from 1880 to 1918”, presented at the World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, April 2002, Columbia University. Also see Ionas Aurelian Rus, Self-Determination, Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism, and Nationality Conflict in Bessarabia, 1900-1940, Rutgers University History and Political Science Departments, Henry Rutgers Thesis, April 1995. Consult Ionas Aurelian Rus, "The Roots and Early Development of ‘Moldovan’-Romanian Nationalism in Bessarabia (1900-1917)”, in Anuarul Institutului de Istorie A.D. Xenopol, 1996, vol. 33, p. 287-301. Also see an earlier text, Ionas Rus, “Romanii si minoritarii in Basarabia interbelica” ("The Romanians and the Minorities in Interwar Bessarabia"), in Revista de istorie a Moldovei ("Moldovan Historical Review"), vol. 5, no. 1(17), January-March 1994, Chisinau, Institutul de Istorie a Academiei de Stiinte a Republicii Moldova, p. 29-39. The Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians are ethnic Romanians living in the historical province of Bessarabia who, in most cases, have had a predominantly or exclusively “Moldovan” identity. My findings in Ionas Aurelian Rus, "The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Right in the Interwar Years (I)" , in Arhivele Totalitarismului, no. 4, 1998 (Year 6, no. 21), p. 8-24, Ionas Aurelian Rus, "The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Right in the Interwar Years (II)", in Arhivele Totalitarismului, no. 1-2, 1999 (Year 7, no. 22-23), p. 12-31, and Ionas Aurelian Rus, "The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Right in the Interwar Years (III)", in Arhivele Totalitarismului, no. 3-4, 1999 (Year 7, no. 24-25), p.8-32. Also see Ionas Aurelian Rus, “Accounting for Civic Culture” in Eurojournal.org, May 2003 (see http://eurojournal.org/more.php?id=A38_0_1_0_M ).
In the first part of the introduction, I will discuss the process of nation-building in general, and my principal methodological goals. The second part of this chapter will include a brief discussion of a few basic works and the reasons behind my selection of variables and cases.

According to Anthony D. Smith, nationalism is “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’”⁴. In this work, however, instead of focusing on a movement, I will study the attitudes of support for the goals listed above, as well as the means (actions and activities) designed to further them. In this conceptualization, nationalistic attitudes are a subset of the broader category of nationalism, while nationalistic movements represent another subset. These two and other subsets of “national” phenomena are interconnected with each other and interact with each other; nationalism is a broader phenomenon than either one of them. One of the greatest problems in the study of nationalism is the confusion between nationalism and any one of its numerous conceivable forms.

What can we generalize about the goals of the nationalists? The desire for the political union of all the members of one nation into a single nation-state, including irredentism, is not the only possible type of nationalism. It is only one of the more far-reaching or intense types of nationalism. I would argue that all nationalists believe that the nation is or should be an institutionalized form of self-organization of the members of the national group, whether as an independent or autonomous state or province, or another type of geographically bounded governance unit⁵, or a non-geographically bounded unit in any kind of consociational arrangement. The evidence suggests that nationalists do not imagine nations without leaders or an internal organization. However, some desire, or are willing to accept, nothing more than a form of consociationalism that would give the nation “its fair share” in a multinational state.

According to Smith, “[a] nation can therefore be defined as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”⁶ The common myths, historical memories, and other attributes of a nation would have to be unique and distinguishable from those of other nations at least in the

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⁵. See Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). I would like to thank Professor Jan Kubik for bringing this to my attention.
⁶. Smith, p. 14. According to the same author, nations also have specific national identities, symbols and traditions.
eyes of those who believe that they are members of that nation. I would also note that national identities (that is, when people identify themselves as members of a nation), which are a form of collective identity, are intersubjective, as opposed to either objective or subjective, constructs.

I define nation-building or the nationalization of the population, my dependent variable, as the process that transforms the “ethnic basis” (or “ethnic raw material” in the parlance of certain nationalists) into a nation. The “ethnic basis” refers to inhabitants of one or more ethnic groups that exist on a given territory prior to the nationalization process; these people become subject to the process.

It is my intent to study populations in which nation-building generated an increase in the proportion of nationalists until it produced generalized political nationalism, as well as cases in which this did not happen. The Irish political scientist John Coakley notes that when we look at the social characteristics of supporters of nationalism, we find two types of cases that are of little interest. The first refers to those situations where hardly any voters support nationalistic parties, while the second has to do with the cases in which practically all the members of a group support nationalistic parties. The first type mentioned by Coakley refers to cases in which nationalistic demands “are weak or almost non-existent, or, if strong, are expressed through existing parties or cultural or socio-economic organizations whose primary concerns are with other issues”. The second refers to circumstances in which all the parties contest the elections on a variety of issues, and the identification of parties that are more nationalistic than others in significant ways “is problematic”.

Therefore, my case selection will be influenced by the extent to which the data covers elections in which there are meaningful differences between political parties on issues related to nationalism. This approach disqualifies a large number of cases and orients the researcher to areas and times where and when nationalism and various levels of its intensity have been an issue. Yet it also forces the researcher to look at different types of nationalism.

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7. The terms will be defined later in the chapter. My original preferred formulation was not the blander “ethnic basis” (used, for example, in the title of Smith’s chapter 2, “The Ethnic Basis of National Identity”, p. 19), but the more politically incorrect “ethnic raw material”. I do not subscribe to the idea that people should be classified as “raw material”, but this phrase is more suggestive and memorable.


In the scholarly literature on nationalism, there has been a tendency to classify nationalism primarily according to criteria that differentiate between “political” or “civic”\(^{10}\), and “cultural” or “ethnic” nationalism. This distinction has also been made by numerous nationalists, and by other members of the general population of several Eastern European countries, albeit with the use of a different terminology. The more civic/political nationalists are called “patriots”, whereas the more “ethnic”/“cultural” ones are “nationalists”. This is undoubtedly largely caused by the fact that the word “nationalism” has a largely negative connotation in the West due to its association with ethnic conflict, ethnic cleansing and “tribalism”.\(^{11}\) Whereas the advantages and perils of distinguishing normatively between the various types of nationalism are worth debating, the concepts first have to be defined.

One of the key early theoreticians of nationalism, Hans Kohn, whose conceptualizations form the basis for some further theorizing about the various types of nationalism, wrote in The Idea of Nationalism (1951):

> In the Western world, in England and in France, in the Netherlands and in Switzerland, in the United States and in the British dominions, the rise of nationalism was a predominantly political occurrence; it was preceded by the formation of the future national state, or as in the case of the United States, coincided with it. Outside the Western world, in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia, nationalism arose not only

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\(^{10}\) Some would unfortunately treat political nationalism as being identical to “statal” or polity-based nationalism. They confuse the larger category of political nationalism, whose proponents seek to promote the institutionalized political governance of the members of the national group by actual members of that national group, with one of its subcategories, state or statal nationalism, called by some “nation-statism”, the nationalism associated with a polity, with a sovereign unit of the international system. A nationalist might be a political nationalist, voting for, and being active in, if not in the leadership of, a nationalistic party, in other words, participating in the organized network of political nationalistic organizations, which are his reference point. Yet he might desire nothing more than that the members of the ethnic group should elect lawmakers that would represent only members of that group, that their share of representation in the legislature be equal to the share of the group in the total population, etc. He might also desire proportional representation in the civil service, including that a majority of the members of the civil service in areas where the group represents a majority of the population should be members of that national group. He would also request that the language of the national group should obtain an official status, a higher official status, or an enhanced status. There were many such nationalists in favor of consociationalism among the Romanians in Bukovina during the last period of Austrian rule in 1900-1918 for whom the point of reference was the Bukovinian Romanians as such rather than the Kingdom of Romania. They were loyal to the Austrian state, but dissatisfied with its insufficiently consociational character.

\(^{11}\) One could think of a number of articles in the British press, such as A.C. Grayling, “The Last Word on Nationalism”, in The Guardian, 2/12/2000.
later, but also generally at a more backward stage of social and political development: the frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality rarely coincided: nationalism, there, grew in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern, not primarily to transform it into a people’s state, but to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with the ethnographic demands.

Because of the backward state of political and social development, this rising nationalism outside the Western world found its first expression in the cultural field... a venture in education and propaganda rather than in policy-shaping and government.

Two main concepts of nation and fatherland emerged in the intertwining of influences and conditions... The one was basically a rational and universal concept of political liberty and the rights of man, looking towards the city of the future.... The other was basically founded on history, on monuments and graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries of ancient times and of tribal solidarity. It stressed the past, the diversity and self-sufficiency of nations... The two concepts of nationalism are the poles around which the new age... will revolve.12

It should be noted that a nuanced distinction between the two ideal types of nationalism used by Smith is very similar, but not fully identical, to the one offered by Kohn. The insights of both scholars are relevant and useful and I will treat the terminological differences between the two authors as issues of form rather than of content, at least for the purpose of this introduction. I do prefer Kohn’s terminology, partly for aesthetical reasons and partly because Kohn formulated his distinction chronologically before Smith did, but I will treat the two sets of terms as synonymous (ethnic= cultural, civic=political) unless I will specify otherwise.

According to Smith, the Western, “civic”, conception of the nation emphasizes the compact, well-defined, “historic” territory, the “homeland”, and the “cradle” of the people, which constitutes a “patria”. We are dealing with a community of laws and institutions, with a single political will, with a polity inhabited by individuals who are legally equal. The people possess civil and legal rights, political rights and duties, as well as socio-economic rights, that is, a common citizenship. It is necessary for nations, especially of the “Western” type, to have a common culture and civic ideology or civic education. There is a need for a set of common understandings, aspirations, sentiments and ideas that connect people.

The non-Western, including Eastern European, model is identified as the “ethnic” one. There was, first of all, a community of (presumed) common descent. This type of nationalism is more explicitly populist and demotic. There is an emphasis on vernacular culture, including language and customs, plus related elements, such as folklore. Most specific nationalisms have a combination of both “ethnic” and “civic” features. The balance between the two orientations shifts through time, and differs among various groups in the population.

Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that there exist ethnic/cultural and civic/political visions among the nationalistic discourses produced by the representatives of specific “nation-building” groups. The level of support for each of these distinct visions among the population varies from low to high, and is often quantifiable. It should also be noted that we are dealing with a continuum rather than with a simple dichotomy.

In order to operationalize my concepts I will look at what proportion of a given population was nationalistic as a percentage of the total population. If this proportion ranges from 0 and 25, I will label it as “low” intensity nationalism and between 25 and 50 is the case of “medium low” intensity nationalism. “Medium high” intensity nationalism ranges from 50 to 75, and “high” intensity nationalism ranges between 75 and 100. I will place some emphasis on the 50% threshold. However, actual percentages will be more important for me than labels in most of the dissertation. I will also try to gage the level of intensity of nationalism. I will rank it as “intense” from 3.5 to 4, “high” from 2.5 to 3.5, “moderate”, from 1.5 to 2.5, “low”, from 0.5 to 1.5, or “negligible”, from 0 to 0.5. If there has been no, or minimum, nation-building, and there are hardly any nationalists (up to 10% of the population), then we are still dealing with, or are at the stage of, merely an “ethnic basis”/”ethnic base”. One should also consider the case in which the nation-
building process has been completed. In other words, nationalism is shared by a very large majority of the members of the group (at least 80%), even though unanimity is not necessary. At that stage, we have “completed nation-building” or “generalized nationalism”.

Keeping in mind the distinctions between political/civic and cultural/ethnic nationalism, etc., I argue that there are four topical criteria or categories of nationalism (and national identity), but perhaps also nation-building. They are instrumental for operationalizing my dependent variable. The four criteria for measuring nation-building, which refers to the spread, or distribution, and intensity of nationalism, are the integrative, satisfacional, identificational and symbolic ones. They will be defined below. Therefore, intensity of nationalism can be seen as a composite variable that includes four components.

A person who scores as nationalistic for a particular type of nationalism (let us say, Romanian in Bukovina) on the basis of all four of these criteria is “intensely” nationalistic (a score of 1+1+1+1=4). Individuals for whom the sum of the scores in the four categories is lower will have to be placed in different categories. A subpopulation could have a score of 0, 0.5 or 1 in each of the four categories. In numerous cases, particularly in cases in which I will use pre-polling data, it would be assigned either a 0 or a 1, unless we are dealing with more complex circumstances. For example, we could be dealing with intermediate categories, such as a desire for autonomy rather than independence, or with cases in which the measurement is based on more than one clearly distinct question in the same survey or (and this possibility is mostly hypothetical) unless the score measured on different data sets at the same time is different. (For example, individuals are or may seem inconsistent in their attitudes because of the wording of different closely related questions in the same survey.)

Even though I have developed the four categories on my own, my conceptualization has been influenced by the four categories used by Peter Katzenstein in his article “The Last Old Nation: Austrian National Consciousness since 1945”.13 The reason for my selection of categories has been the nature of the data, and particularly of the recent public opinion data, but also much of the historical data. The latter type of data includes the electoral results, which are a proxy useful for ascertaining the spread and intensity of nationalism, unless we have access to the results of a plebiscite/referendum or single-issue elected convention whose goal is to determine the status of a region (and there is some referendum and convention

data. It also includes the number and distribution of the signatures of mass petitions and the memberships in relevant civic groups, as well as the intersubjective consensus in administrative and journalistic reports that allow us to estimate the numerical value of nationalism on the four criteria.14

The first two categories are designed primarily for measuring the political/civic nationalism, whereas the latter are mostly, but not exclusively, useful in measuring cultural/ethnic nationalism. The integrative category focuses on political loyalty toward governance units, and refers to whether the citizens are loyal to the state, or would desire its break-up, union with another state, a border change in which they would come under a different sovereignty or a constitutional change through which they would gain more autonomy/self-rule. Would they be willing to fight for their country?

The satisfacional category pinpoints the relative level of satisfaction with the circumstances of people’s lives. In other words, we could look at the distribution of answers to questions such as when they were better off overall, and on certain specific issues, such as economic welfare or income. Were they better off in the current polity, or under a different polity that had ruled the area in the past, in one that might conceivably rule the geographical area in the future, or before their territory lost its autonomy? Would they be better off on this side or the other side of the boundary of a governance unit?

The identificational category looks at self-identification as defined by Brubaker and Cooper, at what people identify themselves as being. Do they think of themselves as “Germans”, “Austrians”, or as “Austrians” in terms of membership in a political nation, and as “Germans” in terms of their membership in a cultural nation? Do they feel that they are “Romanians” or “Moldovans”? “Romanians” by ethnic origin, “Moldovans” by political allegiance, speakers of the “Romanian” language, primarily “Moldovans” but secondarily “Romanians” or what?

The symbolic category is concerned with how individuals react to symbols, and myths and rituals. Did the people deeply love the king or the emperor? Did they punish at the ballot box the politicians who would have liked to replace the reigning monarch by another? Are other ethnic groups seen as

14. Almost all of the examples of questions presented in the next few paragraphs were those that appeared in the survey data used by Katzenstein and others. Titles of several studies have been listed elsewhere in this chapter. See Katzenstein, “Last”, passim. A few of the questions appear in more or less the same form in the literature dealing with all of my three case studies whose selection I will discuss below, in a later chapter of this proposal, while others appear in only two of the three cases. The largest sets of data are for Austria (see, for example, Katzenstein, “Last”, and Bluhm, p. 220-241).
“disloyal” or “exploitive”? Does the constitution have a symbolic value, in the sense that large numbers of individuals who do not know its contents according to some opinion polls might be opposed to its amendment or replacement by another even through a referendum? In what ways do the people react to the politicians who call the borders of the province sacred and therefore unchangeable, as opposed to those who are accept the idea of changing them? What attitude do people have toward the flag of the country and its desecration? Do they state in opinion polls that they would tear it down? Alternatively, would they verbally chastise, or engage in physical violence against, those who would do this? What is their attitude as to which day should be the state or national holiday? Do they agree with the choice of national anthem (or pledge of allegiance), disagree with it or are not sure?

The progress of nation-building will be ascertained for each specific kind of nationalism (e.g., German nationalism in Austria, Austrian nationalism in Austria, Romanian nationalism in Bukovina) by matching the vote for each particular party or candidate with values on the four selected criteria for measuring nation-building. This will be accomplished by adding up the figures on the four components of nation-building, and by having new figures for the years for which we have data, in units that are as small as the data that has been obtained permits.

Let us examine an example. In a certain district of Bukovina in 1911 (this is not an actual district, but a composite of a few districts “imagined” for the sake of concreteness), 85% of the adult male ethnic Romanians cast their ballots for two Romanian nationalistic parties that were clearly and explicitly loyal to Austria. About 60% voted for the Romanian National Party (as opposed to 52% in 1907), whose platform and local candidate argued that Romanians should be loyal to Austria, but not collaborate with other ethnic groups and their parties, and noted that Romanians should be dissatisfied on account of problems “A”, “B” and “C”. The party clearly demanded more political power for the local ethnic Romanians. About 25% (as opposed to 33% in 1907) voted for a candidate from another party, the (National) Democratic Party that was explicitly loyal to Austria and emphasized that Romanians have some reasons to be satisfied with Austrian rule.

However, according to this party, problem "A" still had to be solved. This indicated a desire that ethnic Romanians should not lose political power. About 5% voted for a candidate that desired union with Romania, which implied a different attitude on the integrative issue than that of the two previously
mentioned candidates. Additionally, another 5% cast their ballots for an implicitly nationalistic candidate from a non-nationalistic, not explicitly Romanian party. He identified himself as an ethnic Romanian quite publicly, but only symbolically. The candidate also emphasized his love of the Austrian emperor, but did not have any nationalistic demands and said so (nationalism only on the symbolic side and a deep and strongly emphasized love of the reigning monarch). Moreover, 5% voted for an openly non-nationalistic candidate who was a Social Democrat and whose ethnicity could only be inferred.

In this case, I will count the spread of nationalism at 95% (100% minus the votes for the non-nationalistic party). In terms of the intensity of nationalism, 5% of the population may be inferred to have had a low intensity of nationalism (one criterion, the symbolic, is met) and 25% to have been moderate nationalistic (two criteria are met, the identificational and the symbolic). About 60% could be counted as highly nationalistic (three criteria are met, symbolic, identificational and satisfactional), and about 5% as intensely nationalistic (all four criteria are met). In 1912, there was a petition that demanded a solution to problem “B”, which was backed by the National Romanian Party and by the irredentists, but not by the National Democrats. About 68% of the males, including the 20% who did not vote, signed the petition, or placed a cross next to their name signed by others after the village teacher read it to them. Therefore nationalism that was more intense than merely moderate (1.5-2.5 on my scale) increased between 1911 and 1912, even though we do not know by how much.

The same procedure will be used for every region and period. Quantification is therefore clearly possible and by no means as difficult and problematic as some might assume.

1.2. The Existing Literature on Nation-Building and the Variables

There are a number of ways in which to classify the existing literature on nation-building. Perhaps the most productive way is to look at the key variables in various works. After discussing the literature that emphasizes the role of the key independent variables that I will use in this study, I will discuss the other variables, including those that will be de-emphasized. My dissertation will also deal with these variables, albeit only to a much smaller extent. Therefore, I will provide a partial explanation why I believe that they are less fruitful, have less explanatory power, and why their operationalization is difficult.
Some influential theorists, such as Ernest Gellner and Miroslav Hroch, emphasize the role of socio-economic modernization/development, including industrialization. The former talks about how nationalism develops along with, or in the shadow of, industrialization. Miroslav Hroch, by contrast, emphasizes the role of the intelligentsia. He also argues that the key factor in the development of nationalism is the mobilization of such strata of the society as various sections of the middle class, including the old or traditional bourgeoisie, teachers, white collar employees, etc., as well as the proletariat. The extent to which each of these groups joined the national movement is for Hroch a key factor that needs to be analyzed.

The Bessarabian Moldovan case up to 1917, and until 1940, tends to disconfirm Gellner’s and Hroch’s contentions. The spread of nationalism among the proletariat and among sections of the economic bourgeoisie and white-collar class linked to industrialization was comparatively insignificant. This was true not only in comparison to the intelligentsia, but also to some extent in comparison to the peasantry. The Bukovinian Romanian case shows this even more clearly. Therefore, at least in the cases in which most nationalistic activists display a negative attitude toward industrialization, the latter process hinders nation-building.

Some studies emphasize the importance of various cultural variables. For example, Roman Szporluk, who emphasizes an element that had already been mentioned by Kohn, notes that Eastern European nationalism, and civil society, first appeared in the sphere of culture. He argues that a nationally conscious economic bourgeoisie (and, I would add, a nationally conscious proletariat) appeared after the national cultural intelligentsia. This is chronologically true in the case of both the Bessarabian Moldovans

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18. See my “Variables Affecting Nation-Building and the Bukovinian Romanian Case from 1880 to 1918”. One also needs to identify a key intervening variable that is difficult to measure quantitatively, but whose role needs to be looked at very carefully during process-tracing, namely economic self-interest. William T. Bluhm shows that Austrian nation-building during the post-1945 period has been successful due to this factor. See Bluhm, p. 10-11 and passim.
and of the Bukovinian Romanians. It is also accurate in terms of the primacy of the role of the latter class in
the nation-building process.\(^{21}\)

For Szporluk, the educational system is only one of the relevant cultural phenomena. According to
Gale Stokes, the appeals of nationalism are successful only when an individual is what he defines as
"operational". In other words, he or she is able to understand abstract, logical thinking, a skill that is
allegedly acquired exclusively through schooling.\(^{22}\)

The Bessarabian Moldovan case indicates the importance of the educational process and system. It
also shows that there was a diffusion of nationalism from "operational" people, including teachers and
individuals reading newspapers to non-operational, illiterate ones, and particularly peasants, both before
and after 1918.\(^{23}\) A similar diffusion process occurred among the Bukovinian Romanians. Irina Livezeanu
also emphasizes the role of the educational system in the nationalization of the masses in interwar
Romania, and before 1918. She notes the importance of the nationalistic content of teaching, and of the key
role of the educational system in nation-building.\(^{24}\)

Another independent variable is the nation-building potential of the ethnic basis. Anthony D. Smith
introduces the concept of "ethnies", construed as the foundation of nations. Smith attributes a number of
characteristics to ethnic communities ("ethnies"). These include a proper name, a myth of common
ancestry, shared historical memories, and one or more differentiating elements of a common culture. They
also include an association with a specific "homeland", and a feeling of solidarity shared by significant

\(^{21}\) However, consistently with the hindrance that industrialization often constitutes for nation-building, one
should not omit the fact that in some cases, nation-building among the industrial working class and the
industrialists was considerably more retarded than in other groups of the population. This is true of the
Bessarabian Moldovan/Romanian proletariat and of the Austrian German-speaking industrialists even
during the interwar period. For Austria, see Peter J. Katzenstein, *Disjointed Partners: Austria and Germany
since 1815* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 47, 76 and 151. Also see Ronald Grigor
Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (ed.), *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation* (Ann Arbor: University of

\(^{22}\) Szporluk, p. 145-148.

\(^{23}\) See Rus, *Self-Determination*, p. 11-12, 32, 57-58 and passim; Rus, "Roots", passim; and Ionas Rus,
"Romanii si minoritarii in Basarabia interbelica", in *Revista de istorie a Moldovei*, no. 1 (17), January-
March 1994, passim.

\(^{24}\) Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic
segments of the population.\footnote{Smith, passim.} According to my typology, an ethnie would have a high value on one of my independent variables, the nation-building potential of the ethnic basis.

Smith notes that “the nation seems in many ways modern, [but that] it is also deep rooted”. The author believes that “the stronger and more persistent the pre-existing ethnic identity, the more likely was any nation that might emerge to be based on that identity”.\footnote{Smith, p. 69, 71.} He argues further that the transformation of an ethnie into a nation occurs through a movement from passive subordination of the community to its active political assertion.\footnote{Smith, passim.} This is an important process that “feeds” the growth of national movements. A national movement is, in Smith’s words, “a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize its rational will.”\footnote{Smith, p. 72.}

I would argue that the closer the ethnic basis is to the ideal type of the ethnie, with everything else being equal, the easier is the nation-building process. In this dissertation, the nation-building potential of the “ethnic basis” will refer to the features of the pre-nation-building ethnic identity (self-identification) and other cultural characteristics. Some of these are linguistic characteristics, including language per se, dialect, sub-dialect, accent, and the linguistic consequences (if any) of bilingualism. In certain cases, they could include geographical/regional and/or sub-ethnic origin. They could, but do not have to, also include similarities and differences in religious beliefs and practices, that is, not merely differences in religious denomination per se, but also differences in religious orientation (the level and type of religious traditionalism, etc.), as well as in the cultural predispositions (if applicable) that might be fostered by the religious orientation.

Another variable is sudden shocks. I will focus on sudden external shocks. While it would not be counter-intuitive to argue that historical shocks impact nation-building, we need to understand several phenomena or problems. Sudden external shocks operate in both directions. They could facilitate the process of nation-building or could hinder it. What needs to be kept in mind is their sudden, massive impact, which should be contrasted with the slower, in the short run, hardly perceptible, impact of the other

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Smith, passim.}
\item \footnote{Smith, p. 69, 71.}
\item \footnote{Smith, passim.}
\item \footnote{Smith, p. 72.}
\end{itemize}}
variables discussed above - ethnic basis, education and industrialization. The literature in the field of International Relations has not ignored the impact of exogenous shocks. However, my concept of the sudden external shock is wider and more comprehensive. When I conceptualized this variable, I was concentrating on what international relations scholars call “The second image reversed” (the impact of the international system on the domestic politics of the various countries).

The sudden external shocks could be triggered by the collapse of an empire, a lost war, a revolution caused by a lost war, the occupation of an area by troops coming from outside its borders, possibly a coup d’état, etc. All of these types of sudden shocks are major, external and their impact is often measurable. The internal shocks could include the implementation of a repressive policy, a recession/depression, etc. Their impact is more difficult to measure, and I am inclined to de-emphasize them.

I have introduced four main variables that account for nation-building. The first one is the nation-building potential of ethnic basis, which facilitates nation-building. Another one is the educational system, which also tends to further it. The elementary educational system provides a basic grounding in nationalism, whereas the higher reaches of the system foster more intense nationalism, which is particularly true as one goes up in the system. Industrialization, whose role will be analyzed in more detail later in this text, tends to hinder nation-building. Sudden shocks, which will be discussed in more detail later in this text, tend to play a very significant role in shaping self-determination preferences.

1.3. Case Selection

The following discussion of the case selection is partially meant to differentiate between the cases that will be selected for in-depth study and the ones that I will cover much more briefly, in a table, a

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29. See Paul Pierson, History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 79-102, including the Table 3.1. (p. 81), on the “time horizons of different causal accounts”.

sentence or several paragraphs. My focus will be partly to identify the principles behind case selection, the manner in which I will implement them and why I have selected my main cases.\footnote{For a discussion of the problems of case selection, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, \textit{Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) and Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences}, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005).}

My conclusions (chapter 13, and especially Table 7.1.2.) will compare and sum up the findings from the 15 cases for which I have tested the impact of all of my independent variables. My main cases will be those of (1) the Bukovinian Romanians and (2) of the Austrians of Austria within its present boundaries, and particularly those that are of German ethnic origin, language and culture (see Maps 1A, 1B and 1C). The treatment is meant to touch on the entire time span of nation-building, but will focus more extensively on certain periods in particular. The period until 1918 will be discussed in chapters 2, which deals with the dependent variable (nation-building), and 3, which deals with the independent variables (ethnic basis, educational system, industrialization and sudden shocks). The period between 1918 and 1944 will be discussed in chapters 4, which deals with the dependent variable, and 5, which deals with the independent variables. These two chapters will also deal briefly with the nation-building processes of the major non-Romanian ethnic groups in Bukovina. The case of “Romanian” and “Moldovan” nation-building in the Chernivtsi region of Ukraine, which includes northern Bukovina, northern Bessarabia and Herta, since 1944, and especially since 1989, is discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 8. Partly for the sake of comparison, I will look at “Moldovan” and “Romanian” nation-building in the Odessa Region of Ukraine since 1944, and especially since 1989. The Austrian case is discussed in chapters 10 and 11. In chapter 12, I will briefly look at numerous other cases without a thorough description of the mechanisms, which have been described in detail in the previous chapters.
Map 1A. The Location of Austria in Europe\textsuperscript{32}

Map 1B. The Provinces of Austria-Hungary, including Bukovina and those of present-day Austria\textsuperscript{33}


Table 1C. The Ethnic Map of Austria-Hungary from the Historical Atlas by William Shepherd, 1911

The cases have a few elements in common. First, I have selected cases where the quantitative operationalization/measurement of nation-building for selected long periods of time is possible. In other words, there is statistical data (primarily electoral, but also related to civil society and collective action) that allows us to measure exactly what we are looking for across time and geographical space.

The fact that the measurable cleavages in the electoral, civil society and collective action areas were along the lines of the existence and intensity of nationalism, which is necessary, as I have indicated above, is relevant. It makes the comparisons in each case, and across cases, valid.

One can think about many other cases where, in all the elections, in a specific territory, nationalistic parties won numerous votes on issues that were not particularly related to nation-building. They were instead related to protectionism, liberalism, conservatism, local politics, the fight between socialists and non-socialists, class, monarchism vs. anti-monarchism, patron-client relationships, performance in office and public policies. In the three cases that I have selected, all but the “Austrian” one can be largely controlled for all of these factors. These “isms” and cleavages might at most influence the
study of some of the cases over an extended period of time, but not for the entire period or for long periods, for some of the cases, but not for all. My argument is not that the cases are perfect, but that they are best for studying nation-building in East Central Europe.

Of course, I also need to look at reasonably free, reasonably periodic fair elections and some quantitative data regarding collective action and civic groups. The Bukovinian Romanian case during the Austrian elections of 1907 and 1911 is one of the best examples of this, possibly the best one.

Another characteristic of all of these cases is that the members of ethnic groups distinct from the ones that we are studying hardly ever voted for the relevant nationalistic parties. In other areas, this was not the case. During the 1930’s, in the Romanian part of Moldova, the Roman Catholics of Hungarian origin and mother-tongue often voted for the right-wing, anti-Semitic reactionary or semi-fascist National Christian Party and its predecessors.

Another potential problem is the single-facet nationalistic party. Even though nationalism in various areas was complex and multi-faceted, sometimes the nationalistic party incorporated only some of its elements. For example, the interwar autonomist Slovak National Party was much more anti-Czech than anti-Hungarian and it did not get the votes of many nationalists who were more anti-Hungarian than anti-Czech. Therefore, its electoral performance did not reflect the incidence of nationalism accurately enough.

It is not my intent to ignore qualitative data. Since I study the distinctions between more moderate and more intense nationalistic groups, there is a need to select cases where the cleavages showed by the quantitative/electoral data match fairly well those suggested by the qualitative data. My own earlier work on the topic shows that among the Romanians in Wallachia during the 1930’s, the overlap between intense nationalism and the vote for intensely nationalistic parties is weak. By contrast, among the Romanians of Bukovina and during the same period, the overlap was much more extensive, sufficient for the comfort of this researcher.35

Another advantage of my case selection is the relatively plentiful data that is available. Some empirically and theoretically interesting cases have been excluded because of the relative lack of data. Sometimes, the scarcity of passable quantitative data goes along with the shortage of plentiful or adequate

qualitative data. For example, such limitations make it rather difficult to estimate the extent of Macedonian (Slav) nationalism before the 1990’s.

In some cases, there is hardly any good quantitative data of unquestionable validity. The case of the Transylvanian Romanians is one good example of this type. Before 1919, all the elections (while Transylvania was under Habsburg/Hungarian rule) were conducted under a very limited suffrage, and were far from being free and fair. During the interwar period, in Transylvania, it would be difficult to say which of Romania’s two main parties was more nationalistic (the differences were small, and they varied geographically). In addition, the linkage in the variation between the intensity of nationalism and its reflection in electoral results is significant only for a few elections. Besides, the non-nationalistic parties did not build their electoral appeal on issues related to nationalism. In my study of the performance of the most intensely nationalistic parties, a fascist and a reactionary/semi-fascist one, show that the electoral data allows us to measure perhaps anti-Hungarianism (anti-Magyarism), but not necessarily nationalism as such.

The cases have not been selected on the basis of the existence of conglomerate linguistic national movements. However, one can not ignore the national movements that bring together individuals with different national self-identifications, including those of the “Russian-speakers” discussed in David Laitin’s seminal work. Several of the cases discussed in here (but not the Bukovinian Romanian case between before 1900 and 1940, the Austrian German case before 1918, etc.) have experienced such “linguistic nationalism” phenomena for certain periods of time. The emergence of these types of national movements is made possible by a common language (Romanian, German, etc.). I would argue that their survival depends on the existence of perceptions of common ethnic origins, a common mother tongue and sufficient elements of a common culture, and, even more importantly, of common aspirations regarding the self-determination status of the relevant territory. All of these issues can be discussed within the framework of the dissertation.

A good way to improve the reliability of my conclusions is to look for the convergence of empirical evidence from sources whose biases are very different, if not diametrically opposed to each other. In the Bukovinian Romanian case, the pro-Austrian, pro-Romanian and pro-Ukrainian historical, anti-Communist and pro-Communist accounts are broadly consistent with each other regardless of the nationalistic or other biases that they display. My findings, while going beyond what has been previously ascertained, do not contradict this consensus.

One of the drawbacks for selecting my cases is that some of them are not likely to elicit too much interest in themselves (as opposed to in relation to theory-building), partially because they are complex. Yet sometimes it is necessary to select cases that have been largely ignored (the Bukovinian Romanians and the Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians), and complex ones (the Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians). Territories that are passing from the rule of one state to the rule of another state are particularly appropriate for the study of self-determination options and nation-building. This is partly because the self-determination options often change.

The cases that I have selected reflect various types of nation-building. One of them is what some would regard as the “classical” (as opposed to “reactive”) pattern of nation-building, which had the potential to lead to intense nationalism. In these cases, after a number of decades of nation-building, the national identities of the overwhelming majority of the population are well-established, constant and predictable rather than volatile. The Bukovinian Romanians fit into this pattern.

The other one is the “reactive” type of nation-building. In cases like these, balancing and band-waggoning through the manipulation of one’s identity (e.g., “Austrian” instead of “German”) are common. Sometimes, the borders change and so do the identities, either against, or away from, the officially promoted identity (e.g., an “Austrian” identity when Austria was a part of Germany in 1938-1945), or in the direction promoted by the authorities, in the case of band-waggoning (e.g., an “Austrian” identity in independent Austria since 1945).

The attempt to impose on a population a new national identity, often implemented through insensitive and rigid means, may provoke the passive resistance of that population, whose sense of national identity is clear-cut. Neither highly ideological ministers of education nor the policies of totalitarian regimes such as the Soviet or the Nazi ones have been able to change the national identities of certain
populations “by decree” for the short or medium run. In the long run, the level of success might be higher, but there is no evidence that it could affect more than a small minority of the members of a group, and the jury is still out as to how stable or ephemeral the success might be.

The classical Western European case is, of course, Luxembourg. Its inhabitants are overwhelmingly of German ethnic origin and speak a dialect of German, but have developed a Luxembourger national identity. On October 10, 1941, the authorities of Nazi Germany conducted a census in occupied, annexed Luxembourg in which the German citizenship, ethnicity and language were officially dominant. About 96% of the urban Luxembourgers and 98% of the rural ones declared themselves Luxembourgers in terms of citizenship, ethnicity and language for the areas for which there is data. (The authorities subsequently stopped the filing of the census forms because of the undesirable results.)

Another example of “classical” nation-building is the Bukovinian Romanian case. The nation-building process of this group was straightforward, with no complications. The Bukovinian Romanians have represented between 34% and more than 45% of the population of the province (there are variations from census to census), including an overwhelming majority in the southern half. Most of them originally identified themselves as “Moldovans”, and acquired a Romanian national consciousness (self-identification) as a result of their relationship with the adjacent Romanian territory.

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38 Bukovina is the northwestern part of the historical Principality of Moldova, which existed as an independent or autonomous polity between 1359 and 1859, when it united with Wallachia to form Romania. The territory in its entirety has been under Moldovan rule from the late 14th century until 1775, under Austrian Habsburg rule between 1775 and 1918, and under Romanian rule between 1918 and 1940 and 1941 and 1944. After the division of the province in 1940, the southern part has remained a part of Romania (1940-1941, 1944-present), while the northern part of Bukovina has been under Soviet (1940-1941, 1944-1991) and subsequently Ukrainian rule (1991-present). Soviet and subsequently Ukrainian Northern Bukovina has included the small area of Herta, annexed from Romania in 1940 even though it had never been part of Bukovina.

39 The Moldovan identity emerged after, not before, the foundation of the principality, and many inhabitants continued to view themselves as “Romans” or of “Roman” origin into the early modern period. Until the late 18th century and early nineteenth century, the non-elite inhabitants of the historical principality of Moldova (mostly ethnic Romanians) identified themselves (to the extent to which there is a record of their identity at all) and were identified by some outsiders mostly as the “Moldovan people” (“poporul moldovenesc”), rather than as ethnic Romanians. However, the members of the group seldom identified it as the “Moldovan ethnie” (“neamul moldovenesc”). Among the literate elite (aristocrats, scholars, intellectuals, etc.), “Moldovan people” and “Romanian ethnic” identities coexisted. The identities of the population that had a “Moldovan” identity in the late eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth century subsequently evolved, but not identically for everybody. Those who lived in the part of Moldova that united with Wallachia in 1859 and in Bukovina since the early nineteenth century developed a
The “Moldovan” identity became a regional identity, and, in the overwhelming majority of the cases, the national identity was clearly more important than the regional one.

There was a small irredentist minority in favor of Romanian rule during the period up to the First World War. Yet the war caused a shift in the self-determination options in favor of Romanian rule by late 1918. At that time, the quasi-totality of the members of the ethnic group preferred Romanian rule. The preference for Romanian rule continued, and by the 1930’s and the early 1940’s, nationalism was very intense.

The initial Soviet/Stalinist attempt to transform the ethnic identity of those Romanians who lived in Northern Bukovina from “Romanian” to “Moldovan” starting in 1940-1941, and particularly during the early 1950’s (Stalinist period), did not have a great deal of success, particularly during the initial period. This is shown by the self-identification of the overwhelming majority of these people as “Romanians” in the 1959 Soviet census. This occurred despite the end of Romanian-language education and publishing in the Latin alphabet, the introduction of the name of the term “Moldovan” to describe the language, “Moldovan” schools, etc., and the replacement of the Latin script by the Cyrillic alphabet.

Romanian ethnonational identity. However, a minority of the peasantry viewed itself as belonging to “the Moldovan ethnie” (“neamul moldovenesc”) in the second half of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century. Most of the Bessarabian and Transnistrian Moldovans retained a “Moldovan identity”, and have tended to view themselves as part of the “Moldovan people”. The term “the Moldovan ethnie” has also been used, but less often. Finally, the local Ukrainians were identified by the Bukovinian Austrian and Bessarabian Russian authorities as Ruthenians, and, respectively Little Russians, and eventually developed these identities, and subsequently a Ukrainian identity. One can not always distinguish a Bessarabian inhabitant who identifies oneself as a “Romanian” from one who identifies oneself as a “Romanian”. The person with a “Moldovan” identity is much more likely to have a “Moldovan” as distinct from a standard “Romanian” accent. About 53.2% of the Moldovan citizens who identify themselves as “Moldovans” believe in the identity of the “Moldovan” and “Romanian” languages, as does the Moldovan Communist president Vladimir Voronin. He said, “There are not and there can not be any differences between the Moldovan and the Romanian languages”. See Alla Skvortsova, “The Cultural and Social Makeup of Moldova: A Bipolar or Dispersed Society” in Kolsto, National, p. 168 and Voronin’s speech at the closing of the session of the Moldovan parliament on December 26, 2003 at http://www.president.md/press.php?p=1&s=1579&lang=rom. In addition, whereas almost all Romanians from Romania itself and many, but not all, of the self-identified Bessarabian Romanians celebrate Christmas according to the New Style (on December 25th), the self-identified Bessarabian Moldovans celebrate it on January 7th.

See, for example, Simion Florea Marian, Traditii populare romanesti din Bucovina, (Bucuresti, 1895).

For English-language texts that show that in Northern Bukovina, during the Soviet period, there were only “Moldovan” schools, and no “Romanian” ones, see, for example, Dov Levin, “The Jews and the Inception of Soviet Rule in Bukovina”, in Soviet Jewish Affairs, vol. 6, no. 2, 1976, p. 80. Also see Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, “Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian”, in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, The Nationalities
By the late Soviet period, the policy of trying to induce the Bukovinian Romanians to identify themselves as “Moldovans” was toned down. A Romanian self-identification was tolerated, but the Soviet regime to some extent discouraged it until August 31, 1989. On that day, the “Moldovan” alphabet was officially switched from Cyrillic to Latin, and Moldovan legislation postulated the absolute identity between “Moldovan” and “Romanian”. During the Gorbachev period, a few individuals switched to a “Romanian” identity. Yet the change was not statistically significant, and the survival of the “Moldovan” identity was demonstrated by opinion polling data collected by Ukrainian researchers starting in 1992.

In independent Ukraine since 1991, both the “Romanians” and “Moldovans” of the Chernovtsy Oblast / region in Ukraine (Northern Bukovina and Northern Bessarabia) supported mother-tongue education in the Romanian language, efforts to make the Romanian language official in the largely Romanian-speaking areas, and the teaching of “The History of Romania”. They also supported the same parties and candidates for electoral office, particularly before the late 1990’s, when numerous “Moldovans”, but hardly any “Romanians”, started to vote for the Communist Party. By 1992, the Northern Bukovinian “Moldovans” thought of themselves as secondarily “Romanians”, by 2001 identified themselves primarily as “Romanians.”


In 1959, in the Chernovtsy (Cernauți in Romanian) Oblast (region) of Ukraine (including the northernmost part of Bessarabia), there were 79,790 “Romanians”, out of which 65,637 declared that they spoke “Romanian” (82.26%) as their mother-tongue and 71,645 “Moldovans”, out of which 69,867 (97.52%) declared that they spoke “Moldovan”. It is likely that some of the 1,484 “Romanians” who indicated that they spoke neither Romanian, nor Ukrainian (12,304), nor Russian (365) declared that the spoke “Moldovan”. Therefore, the total number of ethnic Romanians (“Romanians” plus “Moldovans”) was 151,435, out of which 52.69% identified themselves as “Romanians” (a slightly lower percentage than in 1989), and out of which 43.34% identified themselves as both “Romanians” and “Romanian-speakers”, and 46.14% as both “Moldovans” and “Moldovan-speakers”. According to the same Soviet census of 1959, 326 (19.6%) of the 1,663 inhabitants of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic who declared themselves as “Romanians”, and who were not native to Bessarabia, declared their mother-tongue to be “Moldovan”. See Dennis Deletant, “Language Policy and Linguistic Trends in the Republic of Moldova, 1924-1992”, in Donald L. Dyer (ed.), *Studies in Moldovan: The History, Culture, Language and Contemporary Politics of the People of Moldova* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1996), p. 66, 71.

42 The opinion polls/surveys showed no significant differences in the distribution of values and attitudes between “Romanians” and “Moldovans” in these areas, and the differences within the two identity groups are larger than the aggregate ones between them. For example, in the fall of 1992, 19.3% of Moldovans and 15.1% of the Romanians agreed that the Ukrainian language “tends to become little by little the main instrument of communication in all fields of the communal life”, and 77% of the Moldovans and 71.4% of...
The Soviet policy in Northern Bukovina, though seemingly successful by 1989, had no lasting effect on the results of the Ukrainian census of 2001. In 1989, even many individuals who identified themselves as “Romanians” (not to speak of those who called themselves “Moldovans”) did not know the Latin alphabet used by Romanian, which might explain why many of them declared then, but not subsequently, that their mother tongue was “Moldovan”. However, by the early years of the third millennium, this “Romanian ethnicity, but Moldovan language” combination has been overwhelmingly eliminated. There was an increase in the number of “Romanian” residents of Ukraine between the censuses of 1989 and 2001 (in thousands) from 134.8 to 151.0 and a decrease in the number of “Moldovans” from 324.5 to 258.6. This reflects a massive shrinking of the population with a “Moldovan” census self-identification and numerous inhabitants’ acquisition of a “Romanian” census identity.

the Romanians desired that their children should be taught in the Romanian language. In the district of Hliboca, 66.7% of the Moldovans and 90% of the Romanians desired Romanian to be an official language in the areas with a large Romanian-speaking population, while in the district of Storojinet, the figures were 100% and 75%. See Ion and Alexandra Popescu, “A Survey of Socio-Linguistic Aspects Concerning the Spoken Languages in the Region of Cernauti”, in Romanian Civilization, vol. 2, no. 2, Spring 1993, p. 48-49, and also p. 51-52. Dr. Ion Popescu was until recently the representative of the mostly-Romanian electoral district of part of the Cernauti region in the lower house of the Ukrainian parliament.

43. In January 1989, in the Chernovtsy Oblast (region), among the 100,317 “Romanians”, 53,211 (53.04%) declared their mother tongue as “Romanian”, 11,738 (11.70%) as Ukrainian, and 2,956 (2.95%) as Russian, and the rest, 32,412 (32.31%) declared that they spoke “other” languages. We do not know how many of these declared that the language that they used for speaking and writing purposes was “Moldovan”. However, it is a well-known fact that most of these claimed that their mother-tongue was “Moldovan”, and that very few Romanians used German, Polish, etc., as their mother tongues. Among the 84,519 “Moldovans”, 80,637 (95.41%) declared that they spoke “Moldovan”, 2,132 (2.52%) spoke Ukrainian, 1,749 (2.07%) the Russian language, and 1 “other”. See Dr. Ion Popescu, “Populatia romanofona a Regiunii Cernauti si zonele ei sociolingvistice”, in Glasul Bucovinei, 1994, no. 3, p. 24. Therefore, out of 184,836 ethnic Romanians (“Romanians” plus “Moldovans”), 54.27% declared that they were ethnic “Romanians”, a slightly higher percentage than in 1959, and 28.79% both ethnic “Romanians” and “Romanian-speakers”, a figure that was much lower than the comparable percentage in 1959. By contrast, in 1989, 43.62% of the ethnic Romanians were both “Moldovans” and “Moldovan-speakers”, hardly a decrease in comparison to 1959. It should be noted that the distinction between the speakers of “Romanian” and those who declared their tongue in a manner that was classified in the census results as “other” was demonstrably one of alphabet. The former knew the Latin alphabet used by the Romanian language in its standard form, which had not been taught in Soviet schools at all since Stalin’s time. The latter knew only the Cyrillic alphabet used by Russian and, until August 31, 1989, by “Moldovan”, which was taught to “Romanian” children too. It should be noted that in the Bukovinian districts of the oblast (ruled by Austria until 1918), 81.42% of the ethnic Romanians identified themselves as such rather than as Moldovans.

In the two Bessarabian districts (raions) of the Chernovtsy region that were located immediately to the north of the Republic of Moldova, 9.67% of the ethnic Romanian inhabitants (“Romanians” plus “Moldovans”) identified themselves as “Romanians” in 1989. The percentage is calculated from the detailed data in Popescu, “Populatia”, p. 22. Few of the Bessarabians would have dared do declare themselves “Romanians” in 1959 in Ukraine or in January 1989 in Moldova. The Communist Party leadership of Ukraine was more reformist than the one of Moldova in January 1989, or than its predecessor had been in 1959. Also see Ion and Alexandra Popescu, “A Survey of Socio-Linguistic Aspects Concerning the Spoken Languages in the Region of Cernauti”, in Romanian Civilization, vol. 2, no. 2, Spring 1993, p. 42-52.
particularly in the Chernivtsi district (Northern Bukovina and Northern Bessarabia).\textsuperscript{44} Overall, in the study of the Bukovinian Romanian case, I will focus overwhelmingly on the period from around 1880 until 1918, and, to a lesser extent, until 1940. However, some discussion of the preceding and especially subsequent periods will also be included.\textsuperscript{45}

The reasons for selecting Austria within its present-day boundaries are different as in this case there are elements of both “classical” and “reactive” nation-building. Even more importantly, because of the divergence of the process of nation-building between its ethnic and civic components, we may look at the two processes comparatively. Nation-building in Austria has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars, including political scientists such as Peter Katzenstein and William T. Bluhm. This has happened largely because Austria, whose population after the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy in 1918 was almost 100% ethnically German, has been the only case of unambiguously successful civic nation-building (at least in Europe) since World War II.\textsuperscript{46}

The process of nation-building during the Habsburg period (until 1918), in the Republic of Austria before 1933, and during the early part (1938-1942) of the period of German Nazi rule (1938-1945) basically led to a German ethnonational identity shared by practically everyone. There was also an Austrian, purely civic and in most cases “low-intensity” identity, which was shared by less than half of the population between 1918 and 1945. During most of the period between 1918 and 1945 (but probably not between 1933 and the Nazi occupation of the country in 1938), a majority of the Austrian population

\textsuperscript{44} See Tadeusz A. Olszanski, “Results of the 2001 Census in Ukraine”, on the website of The Centre for Eastern Studies (CES) / Osrodek Studiów Wschodnich, at http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/epub/ekoment/2003/01/030109.htm. Unlike in the 1989 census, 91.7% of the “Romanians” used “Romanian” as their mother-tongue, 6.2% Ukrainian, 1.5% Russian and 0.6% “other”, whereas among the “Moldovans”, the figures were 70% “Moldovan”, 10.7% Ukrainian, 17.6% Russian and 1.7% “other”.

\textsuperscript{45} The existence of a common national movement for two identity groups in Northern Bukovina, the “Romanian” and the “Moldovan” ones, also called the national movement of the Romanophones (“Romanian-speakers”), during the period starting in 1990 is instructive. However, its study is not easy, and the amount of work necessary for an in-depth study is not warranted in terms of its potential returns within the context of this dissertation.

desired union with Germany. The German ethnic nation-building process was successful, but unfinished. Moreover, there can be no doubt that the result was, in some cases, a muted German nationalism.

The German-speaking Austrians have undergone a process of identity change from a German identity (“Germanist”) to an Austrian one (“Austrianist”) starting on a limited scale in 1942-1943, on a massive one in 1945, and continuing until at least the 1980’s. The polling data shows that it was only by the late 1960’s, at some point between 1966 and 1970, that the average Austrian came to identify himself or herself as a member of a distinct Austrian nation; as an Austrian rather than a German.47 The process of the perceived change in self-identification, even though quantitatively well-documented by polling data, etc., needs to be researched in some depth, not in the least because differently phrased questions have elicited different distributions of answers.

Some would argue that the Austrian case is one of the few or even the only case of an almost complete change of national identity, in other words, of nation-building largely from scratch, at least in the twentieth century. The fact that it could be studied through the existing opinion polls (for the period after 1945), electoral results, surveys of elites, etc., that the data is plentiful and that process tracing is possible, makes the case attractive for many reasons, including the fact that one does not have to dig for too many obscure sources. The question arises why nobody has used all of the existing data until now. The answer seems to be simple: very few scholars combine the skill and interests of the political scientist, sociologist, and historian. The change in sovereignty of the Austrian territory, from Austrian Habsburg to Austrian Republican to Nazi German to an independent Austria, originally under, but then free from, Allied occupation, makes this an attractive case within the context of my criteria for case selection.

Even though I have not selected the cases because of my linguistic abilities, there is a match between the subject matter and the linguistic knowledge that is required. My native command of the Romanian language and my good knowledge of the existing secondary and primary sources facilitated my work on the Bukovinian Romanian case. My sufficient knowledge of the German language limited how

47. There is indeed just as much of a scholarly, and a popular consensus, indeed quasi-unanimity, in Austria, that most Austrians view themselves as the members of a distinct nation as there would have been in 1931 that the overwhelming majority of the Austrians thought of themselves as being part of the German nation.
much work I can do in the other case (Austria). However, it is probably adequate to do less extensive and in-depth research related to it than to the Bukovinan case.

I am well acquainted with a large portion of the secondary sources on Bukovina and with a minority of the primary sources. I have largely used them in my previous work, and I have kept up with many of the latest published works. I have analyzed the complete and detailed Romanian pre-Communist census results, the interwar Romanian electoral results, etc., for the periods in which I am interested. I have looked at the Austrian census and electoral results for Bukovina during the Austrian period, etc. The overwhelming majority of the sources that I have consulted in all the relevant disciplines (more than 500) have not been published in English.

I am also fairly well acquainted with more than three dozen of the English-language political science, or, more often, historical (but not, for example, sociological) books related to nation-building in Austria. I have also consulted some other published material dealing with Austria. I have also consulted the Austrian statistical (demographic, electoral, educational, etc.) data for the period until 1918 and the relevant opinion polls.

1.4. Process-Tracing in the Educational System

Process-tracing in the case of nation-building is not the easiest task. I will discuss only two factors within the broad problématique of process tracing as it pertains to nation-building: the role of teachers and textbooks. That educational systems have played a role in nation-building has hardly been either denied or quantified by anybody. However, one should make distinctions between the various levels (elementary, etc.) as well as discern the mechanisms (the role of the textbooks, of the teachers, etc.). Keeping in mind my “macro” focus, I am placing more emphasis on the levels than on the mechanisms.

In here, one would have to differentiate between “cultural/ethnic” and “political/civic” nations. Overall, it would appear that in the cases of the “cultural” (“ethnic”) nations, in which the educational system had a sufficient, or, more precisely, predominant, ethnic, content, there were certain distinctive features. The primary educational systems operating in the mother tongue of the students have played the key role in fostering the development and reinforcement of a basic level of nationalism. The post-primary educational systems have tended to foster the development of more intense varieties of nationalism, including
irredentist ones. This involved mostly individuals who had passed through this system, and especially those who had currently been linked with it. The mechanisms for civic nation-building have worked in more complicated ways. Above a certain educational level, the intensity of nationalism in the “political/civic” cases starts to decrease. Yet an even more important element in this generalization is that the level differs from case to case.

What was more important in the process, the textbooks and other teaching aids or the teachers and other pedagogical staff (one could think of priests teaching religion, educational inspectors, etc.)? It would appear that the teachers had a more important role than the textbooks. First, significant numbers of ideas presented in numerous textbooks have traditionally been both rudimentary and counter-intuitive. The evidence clearly indicates that textbook notions such as “Our forefathers, the Gauls” did not persuade the Algerian Muslim children during the period of French rule in Algeria.

By contrast, teachers have hardly ever been as counter-intuitive as the textbooks, particularly in subjects related to nationalism and nation-building, such as the native language and history. In the cases where the messages from the textbooks and the teachers diverged to some extent, the line of the teacher seems to have been absorbed by the students to a larger extent. Thus, at the university level, traditionally there were few textbooks and academic freedom reigned supreme during most of the period under review. The messages of the professors were less constrained by other factors (textbooks, school inspectors, etc.) and had more impact in promoting a more intense nationalism (if they taught in a nationalistic fashion).

A problem is that researchers could only comprehensively measure the impact of educators who were more intensely nationalistic than average in influencing their students to be more intensely nationalistic than average. They could do it only for the Bukovinian Romanian case and for only part of the period between 1880 and 1918. In other cases, the evidence does not allow us to look at cause and effect at the micro level, for pre-university education, or at least the evidence that I have found has been rather

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48. This is consistent with Elizabeth Anderson’s recent findings in the case of the Republic of Moldova. I would like to thank Aurelia Felea for details concerning numerous concrete cases of teachers who are lecturing in a more “Western-style” manner than the one presented in the history textbooks required starting on September 1, 2006 in Moldova. The latter textbooks were promoted by the ruling Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova. For some of my criticisms of the coverage of both world and national history in the new Moldovan history textbooks, see Ionas Aurelian Rus, cited in Aurelia Felea, “Note pe marginea Declarației Institutului Georg-Eckert din Braunschweig, 15 decembrie 2006”, in Jurnal de Chisinau, No.563, March 30, 2007, accessed at http://www.jurnal.md/article/2913/ on March 30, 2007. Additional evidence supporting my contention in some of my main cases, see chapters 2-9 of this dissertation.
sketchy. That the intensity of nationalism exhibited by university professors had an impact on that of the students is clear. Yet their personality and the extent to which the students loved and respected them also played a role.

The one mechanism that I have discovered is that for intensely nationalistic teachers, teaching has tended to be a vocation, rather than merely a profession, and that this factor has helped them in influencing the ideological content of the views of their students. However, the evidence that I have collected only suggests this mechanism without fully documenting it. It can not be thoroughly documented beyond a few dozens of instances in the Bukovinian Romanian case. My intent is to provoke an investigation of this pattern for other cases rather than to exhaust the topic.

In conclusion, process-tracing in the case of nation-building is not the easiest task. However, the existing data indicates the importance of the teachers and seems to suggest certain mechanisms through which the educational process has facilitated nation-building.

1.5. Problems with the Data: Public Opinion and the Ballot Box

Overall, the combined use of electoral and referendum results and of opinion polls allows us to reliably measure nation-building, regardless of the existence of certain problems, because of the convergence of evidence. On the other hand, we need to be very explicit about the complexities and ambiguities of the data and about the fact that it is not merely the results of one election, or of one poll, about which we may be skeptical. It is the convergence of a massive quantity of electoral and polling data, and of the occasional plebiscite/referendum, that provides us with persuasive evidence.

There are a number of problems with the data and with its interpretation. One of them is the relationship between public opinion and electoral behavior. For the pre-World War II period, for the cases at which I have looked at, practically all of the intense nationalists, and others, voted for the available

49. This is discussed in detail in other parts of this dissertation, particularly in chapter 3, and also some of the sources cited therein. Also see Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). For an additional discussion of some non-Bukovinian cases, see "The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Right in the Interwar Years (I)", in *Arhivele Totalitarismului*, no. 4, 1998 (Year 6, no. 21), p. 8-24, "The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Right in the Interwar Years (II)", in *Arhivele Totalitarismului*, no. 1-2, 1999 (Year 7, no. 22-23), p. 12-31 and "The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Right in the Interwar Years (III)", in *Arhivele Totalitarismului* (“The Archives of Totalitarianism”), no. 3-4, 1999 (Year 7, no. 24-25), p. 8-32, as well as some of the sources cited therein.
intensely nationalistic parties. The data from Austria since World War II indicate that there is a close correlation between certain brands of politicized ethnic nationalism (German or Romanian) and the voting patterns (votes for the relevant political party or parties). On the other hand, a larger percentage of the voters than before 1945 have cast ballots for parties that have not been intensely nationalistic. The number of individuals who have not been intensely nationalistic but who have voted for intensely nationalistic parties is not lower, but higher, than during the pre-World War II period. Therefore, one could conclude that recent elections are less useful in studying nation-building than those held before 1945, and, in some respects, than opinion polls.

The less than perfect match between elections and public opinion for recent elections could generate some skepticism toward my findings for the period before World War II. However, the polling data that corresponds to the Austrian post-war elections is revealing. It shows that the overlap between intense German ethnic nationalism and voting for the Freedom Party, which has supported a German ethnic nationalistic position between 1945 and at least the 1980’s, has been decreasing. My study of interwar elections and my in-depth look at the electoral data from post-1989 Romania and Moldova supports the same conclusion. The difference between the interwar and postwar periods needs to be documented, and, if possible explained, but, even before that, clearly stated.

There are also a number of problems connected with electoral data. One problem is the impact of the change in electoral systems (SMPS vs. PR, electoral thresholds, etc.) on the expression of public opinion. Only the elections based on universal and equal suffrage are sufficiently comparable to each other. I will emphasize looking at elections under universal suffrage, and will de-emphasize some of the earlier, less than fully democratic elections.

There is also the issue of the quality of the opinion polls and surveys. Most Austrian post-1945 polls, and the exact formulations of some of the questions that they have asked, have tended to have a certain pro-Austrianist bias by favoring an Austrian civic nationalism. However, a number of scholars, including outsiders such as the American William Bluhm, the German Manfred Koch-Hillebrecht, as well as Austrians such as Albert Reiterer, can not be accused of devising loaded questions or of having other

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50 I have also communicated with numerous individuals in relation to their voting preferences. The newspaper interviews of prospective voters are also useful.
systematic biases. In northern Bukovina (or, more exactly, in the Chernovtsy region), the opinion polls have been conducted by Ukrainian academics whose focus has been on inter-ethnic relations rather than “Romanian” and “Moldovan” identities. They do not seem to display any bias toward one of the two identity groups at the expense of the other.

Another device for measuring nation-building is the study of referenda, in which citizens are asked about their preferences concerning the self-determination status of the territory that they inhabit. In a seminal work on the Austrian nation-building, the Danish historian Peter Thaler correctly notes that “One might want to take into account that demonstrative expressions of the popular will have a tendency to overaccentuate the general sentiment; nonetheless, these votes provide an important picture of national consciousness.” This was true of the results of the plebiscites in certain Austrian lands in 1921 (98.6% in favor of union with Germany in Tyrol and 99.3% in Salzburg) and of the large majority in favor of Ukrainian independence among Bukovinian Romanians on December 1, 1991. In all of these cases, the abstainers have tended to oppose the predictable outcome. The results of the plebiscites or referenda conducted under democratic conditions, which are neither more reliable nor less reliable than the opinion polls and electoral results in the measurement of nation-building, are very useful for the researcher.

The combined use of electoral and referendum results, and of opinion polls allows us to measure nation-building. This can be accomplished regardless of the existence of certain problems, and is possible because of the convergence of evidence. It is not the results of one election, or of one poll, about which we may be skeptical, that constitutes the base of inference. It is the convergence of a massive quantity of electoral and polling data, and of the occasional plebiscite, that provides us with the confirming evidence.

1.6. A Relatively Unimportant Intervening Variable: Mass Media

For a number of reasons, I will not emphasize some of the variables that have been suggested by the literature dealing with nationalism. My pilot studies on the Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians and on the Bukovinian Romanians, as well as on interwar Romanian elections, have convinced me that some variables

52. Thaler, p. 166
do not have any significant impact. One of them is the (print) mass media. Some studies, such as Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities emphasize the role of this factor.53 My research in the next chapters of the dissertation suggests that the mass media is one of the less important intervening variables. It is so partly because, at least after the initial stages of a national movement, the readers select newspapers whose intensity of nationalism is attuned to their own.

I have serious doubts whether newspapers have a long-term impact on the evolution of ideological movements, whether fascist or merely nationalistic. In fact, it would appear that they have had some impact on the electoral evolution of the Romanian interwar fascist group, the Iron Guard, including at the geographical level, between 1927 and 1937. However, the impact was not overwhelming as the Iron Guardist press played an important role only during the early period of the movement. In the long run, the movement was electorally less successful in the areas with Iron Guardist newspapers founded in the early period of the movement.54 This is consistent with recent research on the mass media, which emphasizes that the mass media has more impact in reinforcing already existing choices and beliefs than in shaping them.55

In the latter stages of nation-building, many nationalistic newspapers emerge, whose messages vary. To some extent, they compete with each other. Their message is less monolithic than at the beginning of the process of nation-building.56 Besides, a problem arises. How did the people know how to read, and why did they start reading nationalistic papers or non-nationalistic papers? The answer to this question seems to suggest the importance of the educational system. The influence of the mass media on nation-building is less significant than it is often believed. I am envisioning it as an intervening variable between the educational system and the results of the nation-building process. It will be discussed, but less extensively than some might see fit. Due to the difficulty in quantitatively operationalizing the impact of the mass media, I will not look at the role of this alternate variable in any depth in my cases.

56 Even though I have vaguely understood this for a long time, I am greatly indebted to Elizabeth Radziszewski for helping me to conceptualize this more clearly. I am also relying on her discussion of the pre-1989 and post-1989 Polish media in “‘Social Networks”, p. 7, and on her pilot project’s survey data.
It appears that the role of the mass media in nation-building is less significant in the long run than Benedict Anderson has argued. Moreover, mass media seems to be an intervening rather than an independent variable. At least this is what my pilot studies discussed in subsequent chapters of my dissertation would suggest.

1.7. Findings, Conclusions and Generalizations

Nation-building is undoubtedly a complex process that refers to the transformation of individuals into members of a nation. The process should be analyzed by taking full account of old categories or typologies, such as civic and ethnic nationalism and political and cultural nations. Nation-building (as a dependent variable), should be measured according to four criteria, the integrative, satisfactual, identificational and symbolic ones.

There are four main variables that account for nation-building. The first one is the nation-building potential of the ethnic basis, which facilitates nation-building. The second one is the educational system, which tends to further it. The elementary educational system provides a basic grounding in nationalism, whereas the higher reaches of the system foster more intense nationalism. This is particularly true as one goes up in the school system. Industrialization tends to hinder ethnic nation-building, while sudden shocks play a great role in shaping self-determination preferences by speeding up the pace of change. My model is intended for a more generalized use (I will look in depth at three case studies), particularly for European groups.57

In the paragraphs below, I will summarize my findings, mainly for the Bukovinian Romanian case. I will also attempt to sketch some more general patterns consistent with them. There will be a primary, but far from exclusive, focus on the period from around 1850 until 1945.

The Bukovinian Romanian case is an unambiguous example of ethnic nationalism, and is in many ways an example of an “unproblematic” case. The acquisition of the specific ethnonational identity associated with the relevant group (in the Bukovinian case, the “Romanian” one) early in the nation-

57. As an Europeanist, I can not fully evaluate the impact of the relationships between castes, races and tribes, as well as of non-Christian and non-Jewish religions in some parts of the world. Therefore, I can not dismiss the explanatory power of alternate variables.
building process facilitated the subsequent emergence of generalized nationalism. The previously dominant “Moldovan” identity, like in some other cases, became a provincial one that was part of a larger Romanian identity. This pattern applied not only in the case of the Bukovinian Romanians, but also in most other Eastern European cases.

The Eastern and Central European traditional systems of elementary education have tended to be the main catalysts of nation-building. This applies to the Bukovinian Romanian one during the late Habsburg period and to the Austrian German-language one before 1938. This pattern has usually operated whenever teaching has been conducted in the native language and in a nationalistic spirit, and therefore not in pre-1917 Bessarabia, where the language of instruction was Russian. The teachers in “nationalizing” educational systems, the chief agents of change, taught in the classrooms not only reading, writing and arithmetical skills, but also nationalism, which they also disseminated in the community. 58 We are dealing with a very important process of diffusion of ideas from the teachers, and from other educated and literate individuals, to the illiterate. Not only intellectual and practical skills were diffused, but also cultural and political ideas, including nationalism.

One of my most important conclusions is that the traditional post-elementary educational system was often the chief catalyst for the blossoming of irredentist, and, for that matter, other kinds of intensely nationalistic, activism. This has been the pattern in cases of cultural/ethnic nationalism. The same pattern has applied in most Eastern and Central European areas. In cases of more or less political/civic nationalism, there is some evidence that, at the university level, the university environment lowers the intensity of nationalism (as it could be seen in Alsace, even during the interwar period).

That industrialization has tended to hinder nation-building seems clear for cases of Eastern European ethnic nationalism. In the Bukovinian Romanian case during the period under review, industrialization has apparently delayed the nation-building process among those directly employed in industry and related activities. This contradicts Gellner’s contentions. The same mechanism seems to operate sometimes, but not always, in cases of civic nationalism, and in the case of the German-speaking Austrians. The uprooting of Eastern European rural inhabitants to work in industry in ethnically heterogeneous localities and/or places of work criticized by most nationalistic activists has hindered nation-

58. Consult Livezeanu, passim.
building. By contrast, in Austria in its present-day boundaries, most of the nationalistic activists did not criticize industry or industrialization. As a result, the process of industrialization hindered nation-building more often than not, but far from always.

To be sure, during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth, the European industrial working classes were in most cases more likely to vote for various non-nationalistic socialist, social-democratic, or, later, Communist, parties than other sections of the population. Moreover, industrialists, a tiny but influential group, artisans, and others employed in industrial and related (as opposed to intellectual, professional and public service) occupations have often been swayed by economic considerations into following a less intensely nationalistic, or even non-nationalistic, line. This was the case in Austria in 1931, when the Austrian “chambers of commerce voted against the customs union [with Germany] by a margin of four to one.” Yet one should differentiate between populations that were not extensively involved in industrialization, which was still in its infancy, such as the Bukovinian Romanian one, and those that were, such as the Austrian German one.

In the cases of the populations that were more extensively influenced by industrialization, the leadership of the labor movement was more bureaucratized and more strongly linked to Social Democratic parties whose leaders and intellectuals were highly educated. The German nationalistic positions of the leaders of the Austrian Social Democratic Party between 1918 and 1933 were not always actually shared by a majority of the Social Democratic working class, but were always tolerated by it.

At least in cases of ethnic nationalism, the development of nationalism among the newly industrial strata was hampered and delayed, and lagged behind the nationalization of the peasantry. This is what happened in the Romanian, Ukrainian and other cases. One may find a few apparent counter-examples in more developed, industrialized areas (Upper Silesian Poles, Trentino Italians, etc.).

The sudden shocks tend to explain large-scale, short-term changes in loyalties. For example, until World War I, for the overwhelming majority of the Bukovinian Romanians, nationalism was compatible with loyalty toward the Austrian Empire. In the fall of 1918, there was a decisive shift toward a desire for union with Romania. This option had previously not been particularly popular. This was actually

59. Katzenstein, Disjoined, p.151.
implemented through the union of the entire province with Romania in November 1918. Germany’s loss of
World War II induced numerous Austrians to reorient their loyalty toward the restored Republic of Austria.

These shocks have been of various types. They have included the weakening or fall of overgrown,
multinational empires, revolutions such as the Russian Revolution of 1917, in both Eastern Europe and
elsewhere, foreign occupations, etc. Wherever nationalism associated with one particular identity was
already generalized, that is, characteristic of more than 80% of the members of the group, as in the
Bukovinian Romanian case, one could observe the sudden emergence of mass secessionism or irredentism.

In conclusion, there are two basic types of nationalism, four selected criteria to measure nation-
building and four main variables that impact nation-building. Their role deserves to be investigated
rigorously in the manner discussed above, which is my intent.
Chapter 2
The Case of the Bukovinian
Romanians from 1880 to 1918\textsuperscript{61}
The Dependent Variable

1. Introduction: The Bukovinian Romanians: When and Why

1.1. Summary of the Argument

2. The Dependent Variable

2.1. The Spread and Intensity of Nationalism until World War I: The Various Visions and the Political Framework

2.2. Politics and Elections

2.3. The Romanian National Party

2.4. The Irredentists

2.5. The Democratic Party

2.6. The Social Democrats

2.7. Non-Romanian Candidates

2.8. Conclusions

3. The Electoral Patterns: Interpreting the Statistical Data

3.1. Elections before Universal, Equal Suffrage

3.2. Elections under Universal Suffrage: 1907 and 1911

4. Conclusions

\textsuperscript{61} The text of this chapter expands on the empirical parts of my paper “Variables Affecting Nation-Building: The Bukovinian Romanian Case from 1880 to 1918”, paper presented at the 7\textsuperscript{th} Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), Columbia University, April 2002.
1: The Bukovinian Romanians: When and Why

1.1. Summary of the Argument

In this chapter, I will start testing my model in the case of the Bukovinian Romanians for the period from 1880 until 1918, which I will continue in chapter 3 with a discussion of the impact of the independent variables. The Bukovinian Romanians were a group in which nation-building\(^{62}\) produced generalized nationalism by 1911, as the electoral results and other data show. An analysis of the electoral results indicates that the spread and intensity of Romanian nationalism in Bukovina increased over time.

The period at the beginning of the twentieth century, between 1901 and 1911, was characterized by the increasing turnout of the eligible Bukovinian Romanian electorate at the polls. Moreover, people began voting in a progressively more nationalistic manner. The first shift was from non-nationalism to nationalism among those participating in the political process, which occurred between the elections for the Austrian lower chamber of 1885 and 1891. Subsequently, the proportion of the rural, overwhelmingly peasant, electorate that actually cast ballots increased; this indicates the spread of politicization. The intensity of the Romanian nationalism score in the mostly Romanian parts of Bukovina increased from low scores under less than universal and equal suffrage before 1907\(^ {63}\) to 2.38 in the first round of the 1907 elections and to 2.66 in the first round of the 1911 elections under universal and equal suffrage. These developments are discussed in this chapter. As we shall see in chapter 4, the score went up to 3.5 in 1919.

I will analyze the evolution of the nation-building process in terms of the increasing spread and intensity of nationalism through a study of the party programs, party propaganda as well as of the ideology of various collective action campaigns. The chapter will focus on the highly nationalistic and very popular

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\(^{62}\) The issue of whether the process should be called nation-building or nation formation, a broader concept, is an interesting question, particularly in the case of Bukovina. Was it being built in Bukovina, or just forming? Building implies the existence of agents acting upon the population. While the jury is still out on whether the term should be nation-building or nation formation in the Bukovinian Romanian case, I will use nation-building for the sake of consistency and convention. The Austrian German-speaking (Germanophone) and Bessarabian Moldovan/Romanian cases provide clear evidence of nation-building as opposed to nation formation during at least certain periods.

\(^{63}\) Since this is the only case in which I will discuss in depth the electoral patterns prior to universal and equal suffrage, I will do it in sufficient depth to allow other scholars to compare my data with that from other cases.
Romanian National Party and its splinter groups and on the moderately nationalistic Democratic Party. The intensely nationalistic, but not irredentist, candidates of the Romanian National Party and of the Romanian irredentist “Junimea” were supported by only 58.1% of those who voted for Romanian candidates in 1907. Yet they were endorsed by 73.93% of them in 1911. The chapter will also discuss the irredentists, the Social Democrats and the non-Romanian politicians for whom some Romanians cast their ballots. The electoral results discussed in this chapter do reflect quite well the differences between the Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants who voted for the various parties, including differences in the intensity of their Romanian nationalism. The quantitative data on collective action presented in this chapter generally supports the validity of my interpretation of the electoral data discussed below.

This chapter deals with the Romanians of Bukovina during the last period of Habsburg rule in the province, which lasted from 1775 to 1918. I will focus overwhelmingly on the period from around 1880 until 1918 when the bulk of nationalization of the Romanian ethnic population occurred. We have the relevant data for this period. However, some discussion of the preceding period will also be included.\textsuperscript{64} By contrast, the period between 1918 and 1940, discussed in chapters 4 and 5, was characterized by the integration and assimilation of some members of the national minorities. It was also characterized by the increasing popularity of non-nationalistic currents such as the Socialist and Communist ones as well as of extreme nationalism (Romanian, Ukrainian and German). Finally, the Romanian electoral and indeed political systems, as well as the cultural and social environment were different from those in the period of Austrian rule, as are some of the types of data.

In Bukovina during the period under review, Romanian nationalism coexisted with Ukrainian (“Young Ruthenian”), Ruthenian/Rusyn (“Old Ruthenian”) and Russian nationalism, as well as with German and Jewish nationalisms (the latter in the Zionist and Diaspora varieties). This was facilitated by the fact that (particularly during the era of universal suffrage, but even earlier) Bukovinian, and, in general, Austrian electoral districts were crafted to give representation to the predominant ethnic group within them. The gerrymandering was extreme, but fair. I will largely ignore the non-Romanian national movements, but deal sufficiently with Austrian dynastic patriotism, as well as with Bukovinian particularism and the pre-

\textsuperscript{64} The subsequent period will be treated in later chapters. I will proceed in this manner partly in order to make the reading of the study easier for the non-specialist reader. Moreover, the division of the study of Romanian nation-building in Bukovina into various chapters is not merely chronological, but also topical. One has to cover different issues under different circumstances with different kinds of data.
1890 “Moldovan” identity.

There are also certain peculiarities of the Bukovinian Romanian situation during the late Habsburg period that make the case somewhat of an outlier in terms of methodological issues, in the sense that it allows us to control for a large number of obscure factors. The results of the elections of May 1907 and especially 1911, held under universal, equal male adult suffrage, are the key piece of evidence demonstrating that Romanian political nationalism had acquired a mass character by the early years of the twentieth century. Theoretically, this could be inaccurately explained by a combination of factors and it could be argued that the causes of the changes are difficult to pinpoint. In fact, within the context of a “most similar systems/cases” design, one could clearly indicate the causal effects.

It should be noted that the boundaries of the electoral districts for the elections of 1907 were identical to those for 1911.65 The same was also largely true of the candidates (including four of the five winners), which allows us to largely control for issues such as match-ups between the political skills of a successful candidate and the demographics of a district. The elections in which the same party fielded two candidates in the same district and the successive elections in which the candidate for the first election differed in terms of personality and electioneering techniques are noteworthy. So is the fact that for an even longer time span, the two main parties could be treated as constants in terms of ideology and of the balance of power within the party. In some other Eastern European cases there was a correlation between the intensity of nationalism and the favoring of radical socio-economic reforms (e.g., mass land redistribution in favor of the peasantry) which make it difficult to distinguish between the impacts of the two factors. In Bukovina, during this period, we could fully control for this. I believe, therefore, that in no other case we control for so much and can make such a strong case for causation, rather than mere correlation, as in the Bukovinian Romanian case dealt with in this chapter.66

65. This was also true of those held before universal suffrage.
66. The human tendency toward lack of impartiality is a reason for skepticism, but in this case, this is less of a problem. The emphasis on this case gives us a chance for a more in-depth study because of the greater quality of available data that was discovered after the case selection than in the other cases. The parish chronicles written by the priests of many villages allow us to engage in cross-regional comparisons in Bukovina; besides, nobody’s horizontal or vertical advancement within an organization depended on the contents of these chronicles. The relative legal and administrative neutrality or impartiality of the authorities of the Austrian half of the monarchy (Cisleithania, also called Austria or the Austrian Empire) toward the Romanian ethnic group and other ethnic groups, especially during the early twentieth century, is also important. Neither the actions nor the analyses of this bureaucracy impedes the reliable and valid analysis of this case, but assists it.
In the next section, I will deal with the various visions of nationalism, the Austrian electoral system and the province-wide quantitative data that can not be broken down by electoral district. Then I will present and discuss the electoral statistics and attempt to ascertain the separate impact of each of my four variables on nation-building. I will have a section for each.

2: The Dependent Variable

2.I. The Spread and Intensity of Nationalism until World War I: The Various Visions and the Political Framework

2.2. Politics and Elections

In this section, I will discuss the evolution of the nation-building process in terms of the increasing spread and intensity of nationalism through a study of the party programs, party propaganda as well as of the ideology of various collective action campaigns. This will provide a picture of growing nationalism and set the stage for the subsequent parts of the dissertation, which will account for this evolution. I will emphasize the role of the political parties.

At no other times in the politics of the territories covered by this dissertation could we control so much for so many different factors. This should eliminate some of the reasons for potential skepticism; if this does not minimize a reader’s skepticism, it is not easy to imagine what will.

This chapter will be substantially longer than the others for a number of reasons. First, since one could control for more things, one needs to discuss and document this more extensively. Second, there is more data, particularly more high quality, highly relevant data. Finally, some issues do need to be discussed in this chapter, but they will assist in the understanding of the other cases too. They include the nature of the pre-1918 Austrian electoral system, the “Moldovan” and “Romanian” identity, and the differences of the ethnic basis within the Romanian people (which should also make it easier to explain similar issues for the Austrian case), etc. In this chapter, I will make my case in much more detail, in much more depth, whereas in the subsequent chapters, I will work at a higher level of generality and discuss the results in less detail, like the pre-1907 electoral data for Bukovina.

The cases should not be selected because of how interesting they are in terms of their human dimension. One should nevertheless indicate why a case is interesting for a general readership, not in the least in order to encourage the reading of the chapter. Even though this is not necessarily methodologically relevant, there was also an appearance or reality, and certainly a hegemonic official discourse of extreme ethnic diversity, multiculturalism, tolerance, consociationalism and relatively civilized varieties of nationalism as well as enormous socio-economic inequalities and injustices. The invoking of the positive aspects of the situation was used to drown out the discussion of the negative ones until the sudden shock of the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy. This led not only to a transfer of solidarity, but also to the end of the Old Regime and a change in discourse to one originally emphasizing the importance of justice and equality during the early Romanian period. The reverse side was the striving for uniformity and “justice” in the educational system and elsewhere at the expense of the minorities.
During the 1848 Revolution in Austria, it is likely that a majority of the ethnic Romanian peasant voters of Bukovina cast their ballots in favor of Ruthenian peasant candidates who were elected as deputies. The parliamentary elections held as late as 1885 also show that a majority of the population of all social strata was not nationalistic. Yet by 1891, a majority of the electorate that actually cast ballots did vote nationally. However, only a small, but growing, minority (less than one-sixth) of the potential Romanian rural electorate with a right to vote participated in this process.

After suffrage became universal and equal in the elections of 1907, the extent of rural participation increased enormously in comparison with the previous elections of 1900-1901. Both the spread and the intensity of nationalism among the rural population increased between the two elections held under universal suffrage. In the urban electoral precincts, the share of the nationalistic votes decreased, but they became more intensely nationalistic over time. The age of mass politics also led to a massive increase in the number of Romanians who participated in demonstrations and signed petitions: there was roughly a 150% percent increase between 1870 and 1906 and almost a tenfold increase from 1906 to 1912 (see Table 2B).

An analysis of the nationalistic discourse of a student nationalist association (“Junimea”, the Youth) shows that on its 25th anniversary in 1904, the organization congratulated itself and the Bukovinian Romanian population for the apparent success of the nation-building process. The president of the organization boasted that the Romanian nationalist idea “had caught roots even in the strata of the Romanian people that were the furthest away [from the nation-building process]”. This is the first of a number of unambiguous “victory” self-congratulatory statements made by the nationalists that were not contested by anybody. They appear not only in the public discourse, but also in documents that were not meant to be public (e.g., parish chronicles written by priests). Even a few years before that, the same organizations, and sometimes the same people, were arguing something else. In 1900, the president of the same organization still talked about how “Junimea” “struggles to wake up the people from its centuries-old

67. See, for example, I. M. Nowosiwsky, Bukovinian Ukrainians: A Historical Background and Their Self-Determination in 1918 (New York, N.Y.: The Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1970), passim.
lethargy, the reawakening of the national sentiment and the steeling of the spiritual forces”. No complaints about insufficient popular nationalism were made after 1904.

Those nationalists whose opinions are known argued that a process of nation-building that had gone on for about a quarter of a century was finally completed. They were often not explicit enough to allow us to understand why they thought so. However, the electoral data for the all-Austrian parliamentary elections of 1911, and, in most areas of Bukovina, in 1907, indicated that right before World War I, about 95% of the Romanians were voting Romanian nationalist tickets. The key question for most of this chapter is what led to this development. By contrast, in the Austrian-German and Bessarabian Moldovan/Romanian cases, there were no such “victory statements”. There were never any objective reasons for them.

Robert W. Dahl argues in his seminal work dealing with democratization, *Polyarchy*, that stable democracies are most likely to happen in those polities in which public contestation (liberalization) develops before participation (the right to participate in elections and office, that is, inclusiveness). I would argue that in cases such as the Bukovinian Romanian one, where the nation-building process has been completed by 1890, this was made possible by a similar process, but with a different twist. Incontestability preceded mass support. In other words, a specific nationalist idea eliminated any viable long-term competitor among the politically active population (e.g., a nationalism based on a different identity) and only then the support for the idea spread among the general population to reach the level of near-universality.

To some extent, one could relate this periodization to Miroslav Hroch’s break-down of the fundamental phases of the national movement into three periods, namely phase A, the period of scholarly interest, Phase B, the period of patriotic agitation, and Phase C, the rise of the mass national movement. However, I will not focus on Phase A.

In Bukovina, as in many other areas of Eastern Europe, a “national awakening” started in 1848. Of course, during the 1848 Revolution in Austria, most ethnic Romanians of Bukovina were not nationalistic.

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70. Jumara, p. 163.
71. Iacobescu, p. 182.
In fact, a section of the Bukovinian Romanians who voted in the elections for the all-Austrian parliament in that year cast their votes for Ruthenian peasant candidates. They acted in this manner not because these peasant candidates were Ruthenian, but rather because they were peasants. This explains why there were only two Romanian deputies who were peasants, 5 Ruthenian ones (including the leader of an earlier Ruthenian peasant revolt) and an urban German pro-Romanian one.

In all likelihood, the peasants who voted for the Ruthenian peasant candidates thought that the Austrian governor of Galicia, which at that time included Bukovina, backed those individuals. In their opinion, these candidates would favor not only the end of serfdom (so did the mostly Romanian Bukovinian aristocracy), but a more generous land reform in favor of the peasants, most of whom came to own some land. The Bukovinian Romanians were one of the few groups in Europe in 1848-1849 most of whose members de facto opposed the national movement based on their own ethnicity.

The gradual liberalization of the Habsburg monarchy, as well as the Bukovinian provincial autonomy granted in the 1860’s, had little immediate impact on the average inhabitant of Bukovina. The 1867 reorganization of the Habsburg monarchy included the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, which divided the monarchy into two separate and equal polities (“Dualism”). It also included the constitutional settlement of 1867 in the Austrian half of the monarchy. However, they were of much more interest to the elite than to the peasantry.

Until 1885, the mass, especially peasant, nationalism or nationalistic activism were weak, and nationalism manifested itself mostly among the elite and the intelligentsia. In 1885, a large majority of the elected representatives of the Romanian rural communities still elected an ethnic German to the Austrian House of Deputies. One of the things that need to be explained is how a large majority of the Romanian electorate in the villages came to vote for intensely nationalistic candidates in 1907 and 1911. Another one is how a majority of the literate Romanians came to sign a nationalistic petition by 1912.

The electoral data discussed below indicates that until shortly after 1900, the bulk of the population, particularly the peasantry, was not politicized. Subsequently, increasing majorities of the Romanian voting public supported strongly nationalistic candidates in 1907 and in 1911. The population’s increasing

75 For more information on pre-1880 Bukovina, see Mihai-Stefan Ceausu, *Bucovina Habsburgica de la Anexare la Congresul de la Viena, Iosefinism si postiosefinism (1774-1815)* (Iasi, Fundatia Academica “A.D. Xenopol”, 1998) as well as the various numbers of the journal *Zorile Bucovinei*. 
preference for the more intense, yet not irredentist, nationalism of the Romanian National Party, as opposed to the more moderate strands of nationalism of the Democratic Party is noteworthy. It went together with the predominance of a relatively hard-line position toward the Ruthenes.\textsuperscript{76} A sudden external shock, the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy, led to a mass shift in opinion. The options of most Bukovinian Romanian nationalists switched from loyalty toward the Austrian Empire toward a generalized desire for union with Romania.

Austrian elections under Dualism, and particularly those in Bukovina starting in the 1890’s, fit my definition of liberal multi-party elections: there was frequent competition among political figures and parties for elective positions in the central legislature and in provincial and local governmental bodies. Moreover, there was a great deal of change in the electoral performance of the various parties or electoral tickets, none of which obtained a majority among the elected representatives.\textsuperscript{77}

The electoral patterns for the lower chamber (“Abgeordnetenhaus”), the House or Chamber of Deputies, of the federal or imperial parliament (“Reichstag”) of the Austrian half of the Habsburg or Dual Monarchy are very salient for the study of nation-building. Between 1907 (or rather 1891) and 1914, they fit my minimalist definition of multiparty democratic elections. The elections were liberal, multi-party, and generally free and fair by the standards of a period when, in almost all elections, women did not have the right to vote. There was universal, equal, secret suffrage for all adult males, twenty-four years and older who had lived for one year or more in a commune where they decided to vote. If no candidate obtained an absolute majority of the valid votes cast in a single-member constituency district, there was a runoff. There

\textsuperscript{76} I will use the terms “Ruthenes” instead of “Ukrainian” in this chapter because this was the customary term used at the time. Of course, the “Ruthenians” are ethnic Ukrainians. A majority of them seems to have regarded themselves in this way by the time of World War I or soon thereafter. In the subsequent chapter, I will call the members of the group “Ukrainians”.

\textsuperscript{77} The Austrian archives and other sources clearly indicate that the parliamentary elections in Bukovina until 1890 did not meet sufficiently high standards of freedom and fairness. They were marred by a degree of administrative interference. See Robert A. Kann and Zdenek V. David, \textit{The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918} (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1984), p. 419-420; Nowosiwsky, p. 71-72, 73; and C. A. Macartney, \textit{The Habsburg Empire 1790-1918} (New York: The Macmillan Press, 1969), p. 605, 677, and passim. These problems, such as the existence of a great deal of favoritism toward certain candidates by the Austrian bureaucratic apparatus before 1890, however, do not invalidate this analysis. The persistence of similar problems in the elections for the Bukovinian provincial diet until after the turn of the century is, however, one of the reasons why it is useful to de-emphasize non-parliamentary elections in this analysis.
were, of course, compulsory voting laws, which existed in many provinces of Austria. Such laws did perhaps induce a small minority of those who cast ballots to vote for the incumbents in 1911. Bukovina was the only part of the empire where voting for representatives in the Reichstag was compulsory in 1911, but not in 1907.78

2.3. The Romanian National Party

The main Romanian political force in Bukovina was the Romanian National Party. It existed under various names and included various factions. Its creation, mostly through the absorption of less intensely nationalistic activists, and subsequently its increasing popularity, is one of the phenomena that reflects the growing spread and intensity of Romanian nationalism in the province.

A seminal event in provincial politics was the creation of the Romanian National Party of Bukovina (RNPB) on March 7, 1892. It called for the “solidarity of all Romanians in political, national and ecclesiastical questions”, and was founded through the joining of the ethnic Romanians from three political groups. Two were elitist and had fought for the control of public affairs in Bukovina since the 1860’s. One had previously been non-nationalistic and multiethnic, and had been dominant in the province from 1867 to 1870 and from 1871 to 1892. The members of this group, which had 19 of the 30 seats in the diet in 1871, were called the “Centralists”. They were nineteenth century liberals who believed in the interest harmonization between the central government in Vienna and the provinces and in the rights of all national groups in the province. This meant that they favored greater rights for the Ruthenes. They included a majority of the aristocracy and of the intellectuals, allied themselves with the German Liberals (who included both Germans and Jews), and emphasized an ethnically colorless Austrian patriotism.79

There were also the “Autonomists” or “Federalists”, sometimes called Societatea Autonomistilor Nationali (“The Society of National Autonomists”), who emphasized Bukovinian specificity, and the historical Moldovan-Romanian character of Bukovina. Their agenda was to cultivate among the

(Romanian) people (of Bukovina) “political instruction and national consciousness.” These activists, who controlled a majority of the diet between 1870 and 1871, argued for more devolution of power to the level of the provinces for “the achievement, strengthening and organic development of [Bukovina’s] autonomy in all the branches of public life.”\textsuperscript{80} They included a minority of the landowners, a majority of the Romanian high clergy and of the intelligentsia, and some peasants, and were most of the time (but not in 1870-1871) in the opposition.\textsuperscript{81} The third group was the predominantly middle-class, nationalistic and democratic “Concordia” group, founded in 1885, which originally had 300 members\textsuperscript{82}, but whose membership increased after 1889. In 1891, a general assembly of the organization proposed candidates for the Austrian parliament in the first quasi-primary elections ever held among ethnic Romanians and organized rallies in the provincial capital and in the cities surrounded by predominantly Romanian populations.

\textsuperscript{81} See Mihai-Stefan Ceausu, “Der Landtag”, p. 2187 and Ioan Scurtu, Ion Alexandrescu, Ion Bulei, Ion Mamina, \textit{Enciclopedia de istorie a Romaniei} (Bucuresti: Editura Meronia, 2001), p. 247. In 1885, 1892 and 1897, 7 out of 12 representatives of the curia of the rural communities in the Bukovinian diet were Romanians.
\textsuperscript{82} Ioan Scurtu, Ion Alexandrescu, Ion Bulei, Ion Mamina, \textit{Enciclopedia de istorie a Romaniei} (Bucuresti: Editura Meronia, 2001), p. 207.
Map 2.1. Electoral Map of Bukovina, by Electoral Districts and Subdistricts, for the 1911 Elections
The National Party was rather conservative (for example, there were no demands for land reform) and it often tried to present itself as the only Romanian national formation in Bukovina representing all the Romanians. Until 1897, it did represent all the Romanian nationalist activists in the province. It was an ethnic nationalistic party, but not strictly so in terms of membership and leadership; anybody who was willing to uphold the national aspirations of the Romanian people was welcome.

The party president between 1897 and 1899 was an ethnic Armenian of Armenian Orthodox (rather than Greek Orthodox) faith, Varteres Pruncul. He identified himself as an ethnic Armenian rather than an ethnic Romanian. In terms of symbols, the party endorsed the right of the Bukovinian Romanians to use the Romanian tricolor flag (red-yellow-blue) as an ethnic flag and its actual usage.

The party and its various factions always had the support of a majority of the Bukovinian Romanian voters in all the Austrian parliamentary elections after 1892, or rather since 1891. It held three seats in the lower chamber of the Austrian parliament in 1907, and four in 1911, out of the five seats from mostly Romanian electoral districts. The Romanian National Party sequentially had eight presidents and about eight highly influential members who were never presidents, and was for some periods managed “by committee”. It had a significant degree of internal pluralism. The party’s most prestigious figure and short-time leader was the landowner and lawyer Dr. Iancu Ritter von Flondor. The party often broke apart or splintered, and then reunited, mostly because of principles rather than of personalities.

83. Ioan Scurtu, Ion Alexandrescu, Ion Bulei, Ion Mamina, *Enciclopedia de istorie a Romaniei* (Bucuresti: Editura Meronia, 2001), p. 206. The declaration of the Armenian Orthodox population of Bukovina in favor of union with Romania under the leadership of Varteres Pruncul in late 1918 indicates that the leadership of the community viewed themselves as ethnic Armenians.

84. The Romanian National Party in its various guises, which is discussed in these sections, will be called the Romanian National Party. The previous sentence is a pure tautology. Remove or rework. I will do this in order to make it easier for non-specialist readers to follow Bukovinian politics. Even though one should not dwell on the complexities, one should not ignore them either. In April 1897, the younger generation of activists had split and created the Radical Romanian National Party of Bukovina, which in August 1900 changed its title to the Romanian Popular National Party of Bukovina (“Partidul Poporal National Roman din Bucovina”). In July 1902, it united with another splinter group of the party, the Romanian Conservative Party of Bukovina (“Partidul Conservator Roman din Bucovina”), which existed between 1900 and 1902. The party dissolved into its original component parts in 1904, and the Radical Romanian National Party of Bukovina dissolved itself, only to reappear in October 1906 as the [National] “Defensist Party” (“Partidul Apararist). This partially explains the name “Romanian National (Defense) Party” in the Austrian electoral statistics of 1907-1911. On July 17 1905, the Democratic Party (also called the Peasant Democratic Party of Bukovina) united with the Conservative Romanian Party to form the Romanian National [Democratic] Party, which ceased its activity on October 10, 1908. The Christian Social Romanian Party of Bukovina (founded on October 10, 1908) united the former members of the “Defensist Party” together with a part of the former members of the Democratic Party. The Christian Social Romanian Party of Bukovina changed its name to the Romanian National Party of Bukovina in January 1909. See Ioan Scurtu, Ion Alexandrescu,
offshoots were center-right and right-wing political parties which would more or less fit into the current European People’s Party, that is, the Christian Democratic political/ideological family.\textsuperscript{85}

Almost all the leaders of the RNPB were loyal to the Austrian state, but the party newspaper was sometimes so tough on the Austrian administration that both the Austrian administration and post-1918 Romanian historians have “sensed” irredentism.\textsuperscript{86} The leaders and elected politicians of the party also did not “make money” through politics or political connections.

The program of the party changed through time, but it had several constants.\textsuperscript{87} It called for Romanian primacy (not exclusive control) in the province, concretized through continued Romanian control of the Orthodox Church in Bukovina. It requested that its rights should be respected by the other religious denominations. The party called for the enlightenment and organization of the Romanians, for the growth of their national consciousness, the development of the Romanian-language educational system through an increase in Romanian-language elementary, secondary and vocational schools and, wherever possible, their separation from schools in other languages. It proposed the education of the Romanians in a national fashion, without any political propaganda (apparently an impossible task), that the Romanian language should be used in administration at all levels, etc. It also demanded that the Romanian peasant should remain the owner of his, and, much less often, her, land and other belongings, the improvement of the living conditions of the agricultural workers, the development of credit and insurance institutions for the agricultural population, for appropriate tariffs. It argued that individuals who were foreign to Bukovina should not become public officials, that public employees should know the Romanian language and understand its culture, and, of course, universal suffrage. There was also a demand to create a Court of Appeals in Bukovina rather than to continue to rely on the one in neighboring Galicia, and for autonomous administration of the Bukovinian railways. In other words, the party demanded more autonomy for Ion Bulei, Ion Mamina, \textit{Enciclopedia de istorie a Romaniei} (Bucuresti: Editura Meronia, 2001), p. 206-208, 243, 246, 247.

\textsuperscript{85} Many, possibly most, but not all, of the leaders and activists of the Romanian Christian Social Party were anti-Semitic, but what united all of them was populism. The reactionary and conservative populists were in most cases anti-Semitic, but the progressive populists were often not anti-Semitic, but neutral toward anti-Semitism. An example of a non-Romanian, non-Anti-Semitic progressive populist Christian Social political figure within the Austrian Empire was one of the Trentino Italian politicians who would later serve as the prime minister of Italy and would be one of the “fathers” of the European Union, Alcide de Gasperi.

\textsuperscript{86} See Iacobescu, passim. Whatever one may say about the journalists associated with the party, its politicians and leaders were mostly “serious people”, with gravitas.

\textsuperscript{87} We need not concern ourselves with the details. They do not affect the coding of votes for the party.
A majority of the Romanian nationalist activists and numerous other Romanians, from at least the 1890’s onward, had strong views on the key ethno-cultural issues. Many of the leaders in the Romanian National Party shared such views. The Ruthenian question stirred them most. The key issue was the control over the Orthodox Church in Bukovina and therefore of the lands of the Orthodox Religious Fund, which owned roughly 52% of the land in the province. On June 11, 1870, 2,000 individuals participated in a rally in the provincial capital of Czernowitz that unsuccessfully demanded the union of the Bukovinian Orthodox bishopric with the Transylvanian Orthodox Romanian ones under the same metropolitan. In October 1899, shortly after the nomination (on January 19, 1899) of two Ukrainian clergymen to the board of the Orthodox consistory by the emperor and of two Ukrainian professors of Theology at the University of Czernowitz, there was a reaction. Around 300 priests and parishioners (probably around 50% of the participants were clergymen) demanded the preservation of the Romanian character of the church in terms of organization, leadership and control over the Orthodox Religious Fund.

In 1906, there was a rally of more than 4,000 which opposed a key Ukrainian nationalist demand, namely the division of the Bukovinian Orthodox archdiocese (and of the religious fund) on an ethnic basis, between an Ukrainian north and a Romanian south. Ethnically, the participants were overwhelmingly Romanian, but also in small part “Old Ruthenian” (that is, ethnic Ukrainians who thought that they were ethnic “Ruthenes” rather than “Ukrainians”).

A substantial majority of the literate, adult members of the ethnic group signed a mass petition (“The memorandum of the Oriental Greek Romanians concerning the church question in Bukovina”) to be present at a mass rally in the provincial capital of Cernauti (Czernowitz) on March 12, 1912. The number of signatories was 46,136, a majority of the literate Bukovinian Romanians. They demanded unsuccessfully the preservation of Romanian supremacy over the Ukrainians in the Eastern Orthodox Church in Bukovina.

89. This could be observed not only through the reading of the relevant writings of these activists, but also by the role in rallies, petitions, etc., which also gives us a good sense of the spread of nationalistic activism.
91. Iacobescu, p. 113.
92. Iacobescu, p. 189-190.
The more intensely nationalistic elements associated with the Romanian National Party were in favor of this line. Some of the leaders of the party and all the more moderately nationalistic leaders of the Democratic Party, Aurel Onciul, were neutral. Only 5 of the 23 Romanian deputies in the Bukovinian Diet, 13 of which were members of the Romanian National Party, signed this petition. Therefore, by 1912, it would appear that radical nationalistic views were more widespread among the Romanian electorate than among their elected representatives.

Numerous Romanians were dissatisfied with the fact that the “internal” official language used within the state apparatus in Bukovina was German rather than Romanian. Yet they were willing to tolerate this fact of life, perhaps because the Romanian language was used for external communication with the inhabitants. Interestingly enough, there was no objection against the fact that the study of the German language was mandatory in all the schools in the province. This was true despite the fact that Romanian was not studied in the overwhelming majority of the non-Romanian schools. However, Romanian nationalists were unwilling to tolerate the fact that sometimes the local administrations of predominantly Romanian areas did not use Romanian sufficiently.

Overall, the platform and candidates of the Romanian National Party argued that Romanians should be loyal to Austria, but not excessively patriotic and should not collaborate with other ethnic groups and their parties. They also noted that Romanians should be dissatisfied because of a variety of problems. The party did not promote Austrian patriotism as such, even though it did include actual Austrian patriots. Particularly during the last two decades of Austrian rule, the party clearly requested more political power for the local ethnic Romanians. With the possible exception of a candidate who will be discussed below, the party scores 1 on three criteria, the symbolic, identificational and satisfactional, and a 0 on the integrative one. The party therefore scores 3 on the intensity of nationalism scale proposed earlier.

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94. For a brief, but illuminating discussion of the attitudes of the interwar Bukovinian Romanian peasants relevant to this point, see Mircea Tiriung, "Slobozia-Pruncului, un sat de mici agricultori din Bucovina", in Anton Golopentia and D.C. Georgescu (eds.), *60 sate Romanesti* (vol. 4, *Contributii la tipologia satelor romanesti: Sate agricole, sate pastorale*), (Bucuresti; Institutul de Stiinte Sociale al Romaniei, 1943), passim.

95. The integrative dimension focuses on political loyalty toward governance units, and refers to whether the citizens are loyal to the state, or would desire its break-up, union with another state, a border change in which they would come under a different sovereignty or a constitutional change through which they would
Therefore, the main Romanian political force in Bukovina was the Romanian National Part under its various guises. Its creation and its increasing popularity are two of the phenomena that reflect the growing spread and intensity of Romanian nationalism in the province.

2.4. The Irredentists

The Bukovinian Romanian irredentists were until 1914 the supporters of the most intense Romanian nationalism. They were a political force with very little, but increasing, popular support.

The extent of the irredentist current can not be always measured with precision. Some of its sympathizers were members of the Romanian National Party and some of them were not. A part of them was strict ethnic nationalists, and other ones, like the members of the Romanian National Party, were less strict. At no time did more than 10% of the votes cast for Romanian candidates in parliamentary and diet elections characterized by universal manhood suffrage go to individuals who clearly sympathized with irredentism before 1918.

In 1907\(^{96}\), a member of the Romanian National Party, Teodor V. Stefanelli, the only Romanian National Party candidate for the House of Deputies who would display irredentist behavior by fleeing to Romania at the beginning of World War I, obtained 1,022 votes, or 1.88% of the total number of votes cast for Romanian candidates in that year. I am not sure whether we are justified in calling him an irredentist until 1914 even though he went out of his way to associate himself with all the irredentists that he could. The votes for him will get a higher score than the other votes for his party, 3.5, with a 0.5 instead of a 0 on the integrative dimension.

In 1911\(^{97}\), some of the five Romanian unsuccessful independent candidates for the House of Deputies were affiliated with the “Junimea” academic society, which was covertly irredentist. The Junimea

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\(^{96}\) All the statistics for the parliamentary elections in Bukovina for 1907, unless I will state otherwise, are from "Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrate Vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern im Jahre 1907", in *Osterreichische Statistik*, vol. 84, no. 2 (Wien: Karl Gerold’s Sohn, 1908), p. 142-145, 204-205 and passim.

\(^{97}\) All the statistics for the parliamentary elections in Bukovina for 1911 are from ” Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrate Vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern im Jahre 1911”, in *Osterreichische Statistik* (Neue Folge), vol. 7, no. 1 (Wien: Karl Gerold’s Sohn, 1912), p. 142-145, 204-205 and passim.
("Junimist") candidates were more intensely nationalistic than the Romanian National Party, indeed probably irredentist. However, it is not clear whether during the electoral campaign of 1911 there were any open displays of irredentism. The candidates who ran in overwhelmingly Romanian districts should get the same score as Stefanelli. No irredentist display was either possible or attempted in the mostly Ukrainian districts. There, the candidates should get a score of 3, just like the Romanian National Party.

Those who ran in the areas that were overwhelmingly Ruthenian-speaking benefited from the fact that they were Orthodox, even if Romanian. By contrast, many Bukovinian Ruthenians, including many elected legislators to the all-Austrian and Bukovinian legislators, including the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, were Greek Catholic. So were most of the Eastern Galician "Old Ruthenes" who opposed the Ukrainian self-identification. Overall, some of these candidates were also more socio-economically progressive than the Democratic Party (see below) or the Romanian National Party. Other irredentist candidates did not impress the electorate and achieved less impressive results. In 1911 the irredentists did not have prestige they would enjoy in 1918 among Moldovans/Romanians in Bessarabia. Only the radicalization of nationalism under the impact of the sudden shock of the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1918 turned almost all significant public figures irredentist.

Romanian irredentism was also weak in the Bukovinian diet. In the provincial legislature, only a notary elected in 1911 as a representative of the Romanian National Party turned out to be an irredentist sympathizer who would flee to Romania during the first part of World War I. Overall, Romanian irredentism was a minor, but growing, political and electoral, phenomenon.98

Some criticisms of the situation in Bukovina came disproportionately from current or future irredentists, particularly urban inhabitants. I have not found any text written by Romanian nationalists that indicates that they felt threatened by what they called the "domination"99 of the civil service and professions by the German-speaking element (21.24% of the population in 1910). The latter term referred to the "genuine" ethnic Germans (8.76% of the population in 1910), called "first class Germans" by the

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99. In colloquial Romanian, “domination” could, and in this case does, refer to what we would call “majority in the occupation or economic sector”.
irredentist Aurel Morariu, as well as to the Germanized population. The latter included the “German-speaking” Jews, who were called “second-class Germans” by Morariu, and Eastern Christians (8.76% of the population in 1910).

Among the Jews, who constituted 12.95% of the population, 92.99% spoke German according to the census. But in fact 75% of them were Yiddish-speakers. However, the Jews who worked in the professions and government service were overwhelmingly German-speaking rather than Yiddish-speaking. Within the free professions, 37.37% of the economically active inhabitants were German-speaking, and 25.18% of the Jewish faith, as opposed to 25.10% Romanian-speaking. Among the white-collar employees in the civil service and the professions, the figures were 46.73%, 26.17%, and 23.33%.

Even irredentist sources admit that the administration used Romanian whenever it was necessary. These sources note that although a number of administrators committed some abuses, they also admit that transgressions had nothing to do with ethnicity. The situation was similar in the judiciary, with a few exceptions. The fact remains that even though the law did permit pleading by lawyers in Romanian, the custom had been to do the pleading in German; this was codified by a 1913 decision of the court of appeals. It would seem that “anti-Germanization protests” were the most conspicuous among lawyers and notaries.

The irredentist current was supported by the leaders of the teachers’ and lawyers’ associations. It was also backed by the student fraternities in the universities and by numerous professors. Yet it was not well-known by the average Bukovinian Romanian. Its exponents were known and appreciated by approximately one third of the population. In this sense, we are dealing with what might have appeared to superficial outsiders as a blurring of the distinctions between irredentists and non-irredentists. The Romanian irredentists of Bukovina were not visionaries, but conformists. The Bukovinian Romanian population was loyal to Austria, but did not show hostility toward the irredentists. In fact, the Romanian National Party, whose leaders loved Romania as the country of their ethnic group, but did not want to join it, served as their defenders and apologists.

After 1911, the political star of the irredentists was slowly rising, at least in the sense that they benefited from greater public notoriety. A few of the Bukovinian Romanian irredentists who had settled in

100 Dr. Aurel Morariu, Bucovina 1774-1914 (Bucuresti: Libraria si Papetaria Pavel Suru, 1915), p. 128-130.
Romania between 1914 and 1916 were both in favor of land redistribution to the peasantry and anti-Semitic. So were some of those who had visited Romania and interacted extensively with those irredentist nationalists in Romania. The latter expressed similar views before the war, particularly starting in 1909 on Romanian, and in 1911-1912 on Bukovinian soil.101

In comparative terms, Bukovinian Romanian irredentism was somewhat more widespread than the German irredentism of the Austrian Germans who inhabited the territories of today’s Austria right before World War I. This is indicated by both electoral and non-electoral data. Even more importantly, unlike in German Austria, irredentism had prestigious supporters, who, however, did not use the weight of their prestige to push the irredentist cause until World War I.

Thus, the Bukovinian Romanian irredentists were before 1914 the supporters of the most intense Romanian nationalism. They had little, but increasing, popular support.

2.5. The Democratic Party

The Democratic Party represented the less intensely nationalistic current among the Bukovinian Romanians. Its decreasing popularity was one of the symptoms of the increasing intensity of Romanian nationalism.

The anti-irredentist forces among Romanians included the Democratic Party, the Social Democrats and the supporters of non-Romanian politicians who ran in predominantly Romanian electoral districts. At the beginning of the twentieth century, an ostensibly liberal party emerged. The Democratic Party was in some ways social-liberal and in others populist. It was genuinely pro-Habsburg, socio-economically progressive, center-left, and moderately nationalistic. This political formation was sometimes called the Peasant Democratic Party of Bukovina, the “Union” Society, and at other times, the National Democratic Party.102 Its leader, who lived in Bukovina between 1902 and 1918, was a lawyer and Austrian official, Dr. Aurel Ritter von Onciul (Aurel cavaler de Onciul). He was a non-conformist of aristocratic origin, a man “of ideas”, indeed of vision, with a large ego, who deeply loved the Habsburg dynasty. Onciul preferred the

102. The original name of the party, founded in 1902, was the Democratic Peasant Party (“Partidul Taranesc Democrat”). See Hausleitner, p. 57.
union of all Romanians (including those of Romania and Bessarabia) in an autonomous unit under the Habsburg scepter.

His party, unlike any other in the pre-1918 Bukovina, was “personalistic.” Onciul, its founder, by far overshadowed all other leaders. The only choice left for a member who opposed Onciul was to leave the party. This partly explains why the party lost some of its membership and the support of a part of the local elite, particularly after 1907 and after 1911, and why in late 1918 Onciul could not count on the support of his party. Onciul’s militarism between 1914 and 1918 made him very unpopular among Bukovinian Romanians. He would endorse the war against Russia in 1914 enthusiastically. He would even organize a poorly-armed Romanian Legion of Bukovinian Romanians (armed with pistols!) to fight for the Habsburgs in 1914. Since the Legion was destroyed by the regular Russian troops, Onciul ended up being discredited in the eyes of many of his former supporters.\textsuperscript{103}

Many of the other leaders and activists of the party were high-level civil servants, including relatives of the party leader who had previously held other views on socio-economic questions. Onciul’s brother-in-law, Florea Lupu, the second most important person in the party, had been more socio-economically conservative. The party leaders also included officials of the Romanian savings and loans associations and the occasional lawyer in private practice.

In contrast to the Romanian National Party, all the leaders were ethnic Romanians, and the party compensated for its more moderate nationalism by its more “ethnicist” discourse (e.g., “Romanian blood”)\textsuperscript{104}, and by its greater secularism. The Democratic Party called for the renting of the land of the Orthodox Religious Fund to the small peasants rather than to (mostly Jewish) arendars, leaseholders who would sublease it to the peasants, a reform of local government, and a decrease in the political power of the Romanian great landowners.\textsuperscript{105}

Onciul was much too Ruthenophile (Ukrainophile) for the taste of the overwhelmingly Bukovinian

\textsuperscript{103} Nistor, p. 176.
\textsuperscript{104} Onciul wrote in a manuscript of one of his books that the Romanian prime ministers Bratianu and Marghiloman were of Bulgarian ethnic origin. See Vaida Voevod, p. 112.
Romanian intelligentsia. Moreover, the mild opposition of the Democratic Party toward the use of the Romanian tricolor flag by the Bukovinian Romanians led to some criticism that was voiced despite the party’s acceptance (particularly among its journalists) of other Romanian ethnic symbols [e.g., the great medieval ruler of Moldova, Stephen the Great, Stefan cel Mare (1457-1504)]. Onciul felt that there was no need for an anti-Ukrainian line because he believed in the “vitality of the Romanian people”.106

The newspaper that was sympathetic to the Democratic Party, occasionally even its press organ, Vointa Poporului (“The People’s Will”), unlike the press of the Romanian National Party, bashed the intelligentsia of the Kingdom of Romania. In 1917, Onciul (who labeled the Bucharest intellectuals as “irredentists”) was dissuaded by a Transylvanian Romanian politician from using certain statistics that would have presented Romania in a negative light.107 More intense nationalists might have disagreed with irredentism, but would not show distaste toward its bearers.

Onciul allied his group with the Ukrainian National Democratic Party, and with Jewish, German and other groups until 1905. In 1903-1904, this interethnic alliance diminished the power of the Romanian National Party in the Bukovinian diet; it had 17 of the 31 mandates.108 In 1905, the death of a Romanian member of parliament from central Bukovina, Gheorghe Popovici, opened up a seat. Onciul successfully contested the ethnically mixed central Bukovinian district (Czernowitz, Storojinetz and Sereth) in a by-election against the Greek Catholic Ukrainian National Democrat Arthur Malyk. He ran the first truly modern campaign in Bukovina, and indeed in Romanian history, in the fall of that year. He benefited from the support of more intensely nationalistic Romanian leaders, of the student organizations and of the civil

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106. See a partial reproduction of Dr. Aurel Onciul, “Chestiunea romaneasca in Bucovina”, in Vita Romaneasca, Iasi, no. 10, 1913, and the commentary by I.M. Nowosiwsky, in Nowosiwsky, p. 43-45. He wrote in the famous populist publication that, “our intelligentsia completely lost confidence in the vitality of the Rumanian people”. See Calafeteanu, Unirea, p. 293-295. Among the use of myths and symbols by the party, one could think of the cult of the peasant, the blood brotherhood myth (Romanians have the same blood, etc. See Institutul de studii istorice si social-politice de pe linga C.C. al P.C.R. and Institutul de Istorie “N. Iorga” al Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, Marea rascoala a Taranilor din 1907 (Bucuresti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1967), p. 610-613. On the opposition by Onciul to some of these myths, see Onciul, “Chestiunea”. However, Onciul was also against some myths that subsequent research has shown to be accurate (see the works of Mihai Ceausu for more details). In effect, he was promoting opposing myths. On the avoidance of, and neutrality toward, nationalistic myths and symbols of other Democratic politicians, a very praiseworthy attitude, see Calafeteanu, Unirea, p. 293-295.

107. See Vaida-Voevod, p. 112.

108. See Kann and David, p. 444-446, Ion Alexandrescu, Ion Bulei, Ion Mamina and Ioan Scurtu, Partidele politice din Romania - Enciclopedie (Bucuresti: Mediaprint, 1994), and Radu Economu, Unirea Bucovinei 1918 (Bucuresti: Editura Fundatiei Culturale Romane, 1994) and Hausleitner, p. 57.
A society called “Arcasii” (“crossbow groups” is an imperfect translation) organized by the Democratic leaders Onciul and Florea Lupul. After this, the old quarrels between the Romanian leaders re-emerged.

The electoral appeal of the Democratic Party, as perceived at the local level, had three main sources: apparent malapportionment plus gerrymandering, incumbency and anti-Semitism. In the area in which Onciul had been a deputy between 1905 and 1907, his party benefited from the votes of many inhabitants of his old district, but not from a majority, including a plurality in the first round. Of course, his electoral district had been broken up into a Romanian and a Ukrainian one for the 1907 elections and the electoral boundaries were not identical.

The “Romanian Club” to the Austrian parliamentary commission of 1906 whose task was to institute universal suffrage selected Onciul. The commission also made the final decision on the boundaries of the districts. This was probably because he had the greatest expertise on this issue. Yet it was also possibly because the most controversial electoral district borders would pass through Onciul’s own district. Onciul apparently eyed two other districts, made them the smallest in Bukovina and shaped them to create the optimal match between his own electoral offer and the inhabitants’ desires. The districts in which Onciul did not run had an average of 15,433 voters, while the districts in which he ran had an average of 9,999 voters. This was the most blatant case of malapportionment and gerrymandering committed by any ethnic Romanian in Bukovinian history.

A source of support for the Democratic Party was rural anti-Semitism, which the party did not advocate, but from which it benefited. The party ran the Romanian popular bank (Raiffeisen) system that lent money to the peasants at lower interest rates than the overwhelmingly Jewish moneylenders did. (Onciul was indeed sympathetic toward, and sometimes allied himself with, Jewish non-Zionist Diaspora Nationalists.) Unlike among the Germans of the monarchy, anti-Semitism (and, more broadly speaking, economic xenophobia) would become a very important issue only during the interwar period in Bukovina. Before 1918, it was more widespread among the public and the village elite (priests and teachers) than

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110. See William Alexander Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907 (New York: Octagon books, 1974), passim. On the other hand, Onciul did play a role in the giving of one additional seat to each of the three contending groups in Bukovina: Romanians, Ruthenians and German-speakers (Germans plus Jews) than the Austrian cabinet had originally intended.
among politicians.

In 1910, those earning their livelihood from these economic sectors as self-employed, clerks, permanent blue-collar workers, apprentices and auxiliary family members, were 68.38% German-speaking, 67.16% of the Jewish religion, and 6.98% Romanian-speaking. The comparable figures for industry and trade were 55.58%, 33.70% and 10.52%. Jews represented 83.81% of the merchants, and Romanians only 4.31%. Among artisans, the figures were 54.61% and 7.91%.\footnote{111}

Numerous rural Romanians had grievances against arendars and money-lenders. The latter groups were overwhelmingly Jewish. Austrian statistics show that in all of Austria (there is no breakdown by religion for Bukovina) there was only one Romanian-speaking self-employed banker or money-lender. There were 112 Bukovinians in these occupations.\footnote{112} According to various Jewish reference sources, Jews owned 42% of the privately owned landed estates and either owned or administered 85% of the large estates in Bukovina. However, according to the 1910 census, there were 101 Romanian-speaking agricultural arendars out of 621 (16.26%), as opposed to 371 (59.74%) German-speaking arendars, and only 43.80% of the Jewish religion. In 1909, the 25 arendars of land from the Orthodox Religious Fund included 19 Jews, 4 German Christians, 1 Pole and 1 Romanian. In 1894, all the owners of forestry firms who rented the lands of the Fund had owners with Jewish or German names.\footnote{113}

Mihai Iacobescu studied the archive of the Metropolitan Church that contains numerous peasant petitions sent against the “foreign” arendars, tavern keepers, etc. (in most cases, their ethnicity was not mentioned, but whenever it was, Jews and less often Germans were mentioned). The petitions, sent to the


\footnote{112}{"Berufsstatistik nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910 in Österreich", in Österreichische Statistik, Neue Folge ("New Series"), vol. 3, no. 3, p. 63, 77 and "Berufsstatistik nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910 in Österreich: Galizien und Bukowina", in Österreichische Statistik, Neue Folge ("New Series"), vol. 3, no. 10, p. 95. For more information on the Jews in Bukovina during the Austrian period, see Arie Leon Schmelzer, "Der Juden in der Bukowina (1914-1919)", in Hugo Gold (ed.), Geschichte der Juden in der Bukowina (Tel Aviv: Olamenu, 1958), vol. 1, passim. In all of Austria, 54.34% of the self-employed inhabitants in these fields in all of Austria were Jewish in 1910.}

mostly Romanian leadership of the church, the peasants demanded to be allowed to rent the land directly from the Religious Fund. What is interesting about these petitions is that they identified the peasant population mostly not as “Romanian” (or “Ruthenian” or any other ethnic group) or “native”, but as “Orthodox”, “Greek-Orthodox”, “Greek Oriental” or “Christian”. This might indicate that the population in these villages was less nationalistic and more intensely “religious”. Just like Onciul, they emphasized the fact that they had the same Christian religion as the Ruthenians more than the voters for the Romanian National Party did. 114

There is little doubt that by raising the issue of the direct leasing of land to peasants, Aurel Onciul and the Democratic Party in general helped themselves to be elected in 1907-1911. The press of the Democratic Party, even though it was not openly anti-Semitic, used veiled anti-Semitism, or at least anti-money-lender, anti-arendar discourses, in its news coverage at least around the elections of 1907. It was also accusing (probably falsely) the party organ of the National Party of being financed by “foreign” (i.e., non-Romanian) capitalists. 115 The only strongly anti-Semitic Romanian deputy elected to the Bukovinian diet, Mihai Chisanovici, was a member of the Democratic Party. He preached anti-Semitism and proclaimed that Romanians had every reason to be satisfied with Austrian rule. 116

In the south-central electoral district in which he was actually elected in 1907 and 1911 (the Gura Humorului and Solca area), Onciul benefited mainly from votes against local Jewish businessmen, who were criticized by the party’s press more extensively than by the Romanian National Party’s press. In his parish chronicle, the priest Ilie Androchovici talks about the situation in the geographical area where this party did the best. He analyzes how Aurel Onciul won a majority of the vote in the Solca area117 (87.87% - 500 out of 569 votes), in 1907. “The people, discussing together and seeing that, on the side of candidate [Dorimedont] Popovici [of the Romanian National Party] were the Jews, decided to vote Mr. Dr. Aurel

114. It is nevertheless also likely that the references to religious as opposed to national groups were because they were addressed to the church and often written by, or under the influence of, some clergymen. Therefore, it is not completely clear how these letters should be interpreted, and the two possibilities are not incompatible. See Iacobescu, p. 77-82 and passim.
115. For the relevant citations from the Democratic Party’s press organ, “Vointa Poporului”, see Marea rascoala, p. 610-612.
117. In some of my examples, I will focus on the situation in the Solca area more than on other areas because it is an outlier; nowhere did the Romanian National Party do so poorly. However, since there is insufficient information on some other outlier areas, I will not talk about them in equal detail.
Onciul, knowing from their own experience that, wherever the Jews are in the middle, it can not be good for the people.\(^{118}\) The anti-Jewish vote probably represented a majority of the vote for the party, and the party obtained a majority of the votes in the district in 1907 and 1911.\(^{119}\)

The Romanian National Party, the Romanian Democratic Party and irredentists did include a significant number of activists and supporters who held anti-Jewish views. Yet anti-Jewish views could not become a serious electoral issue for some Romanian National Party politicians, including the representatives elected on the Romanian National (Defense) party ticket in 1907 and 1911 because of the business dealings (including the leasing of estates, joint ownership of property) of several Romanian National Party figures with Jewish businessmen.\(^{120}\) Moreover, the relatively low focus of the mainstream Romanian National Party elite and of the largest part of the irredentists on anti-Semitism was mainly caused by other priorities, particularly anti-Ukrainian mobilization.

Notwithstanding the accumulation of anti-Semitic votes by Aurel Onciul, the party in general preached interethnic peace and tolerance. In 1908, Onciul proposed an interethnic compromise for the province. It was passed, in an amended form, by the diet, with the support of both main Romanian parties, and approved by Emperor Franz Joseph I (1848-1916) in 1910. This interesting, and mostly successful experiment in democratization and consociationalism had a pragmatic motivation. It was meant to


\(^{119}\) Prokopowitsch, _Rumanische_, p. 49-50, talks about the anti-Semitic propaganda coming from all the Romanian parties.

\(^{120}\) Iancu Flondor’s Romanian Christian Social Party was also associated with anti-Semitism, but the exact nature of the link is not clear, because some of the leaders of the party were not anti-Semitic. Within the Austrian state, the German Christian Social Party was anti-Semitic, particularly in the areas of old strength, but the Italian Christian Social Party was not. Among Romanians, the situation was intermediate. In 1907, some Romanian peasants from southeastern Bukovina crossed the border into Romania and participated in the peasant revolt of 1907, including in its anti-Jewish aspects. Some Bukovinian Romanians displayed their sympathy for the 1907 revolt in all of its aspects. For more information related to the topic of anti-Semitism among the Bukovinian Romanians, see Institutul de studii istorice si social-politice de pe linga C.C. al P.C.R. and Institutul de Iстorie “N. Iorga” al Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, _Marea rascoaloa a Taranilor din 1907_ (Bucuresti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1967), p. 617-618. Also consult _Documente privind marea rascoaloa a taranilor din 1907_ (Bucuresti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1983), vol. 2, passim and Stephen Fischer-Galati, _Twentieth Century Rumania_ (2nd ed.) (New York; Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 24-25; Petre Turlea, _Nicolae Iorga in viata politica a Romaniei_ (Bucuresti: Editura Enciclopedica, 1991), p. 76-77; and _The New York Times_.

guarantee the rights of all ethnic groups (Romanians, Ruthenians, Germans, Jews, Poles, etc.) in the most multinational crown land of the empire. It will be discussed later.\textsuperscript{121}

The party was clearly losing elite support, though, and probably would have lost more if the Great War would not have intervened. In the Electoral District no. 10 (Campulung-Vatra Dornei), the Democratic activists seem to have crossed over to the Romanian National Party between the elections of 1907 and 1911. By 1912, the party was also losing the support of members of the local elites who were anti-Semitic and for whom the party had not delivered what they wanted; these individuals had become disillusioned with politics.\textsuperscript{122} Some important figures of the party were shabbily treated by the Austrian system, and Onciul’s lack of reaction probably caused him to lose popularity.\textsuperscript{123}

The (National) Democratic Party was explicitly loyal to Austria and emphasized that Romanians have some reasons to be satisfied with Austrian rule. However, the party’s line was that ethnic Romanians should not lose political power. The party obtains a score of 1 on the identificational and a 0.5 on the symbolic dimension because it opposed the use of the Romanian tricolor flag as a Bukovinian Romanian ethnic symbol. Yet it accepted and used other Romanian symbols. The party scores of 0 on the satisfacional and integrative dimensions. Its overall score is therefore a 1.5.\textsuperscript{124} Aurel Onciul was more of an Austrian patriot than a Romanian nationalist. As the Democratic Party represented the less intensely

\textsuperscript{121} For more details, see , see Mihai-Stefan Ceausu, “Der Landtag der Bukowina”, in Die Habsburger Monarchie 1848-1918, vol. 7 (Verfassung und Parlamentarismus, second part) (Wien: Der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000), p. 2179-2180 and passim.

\textsuperscript{122} See Iacobescu, passim. The discussion about the Romanian National “serious party” and “serious politicians” is based on the comments that I have heard in the early 1990’s from various older professionals and intellectuals born in Bukovina. It seems to have been passed down from parents and grandparents from that period. A similar spin may be found in Nistor, p. 176, but it predates Nistor’s criticism of a former opponent who was not “serious” in 1933. The other Democrat politicians were serious, but were committed to the Democratic program. Interestingly enough, this cultural preference for “serious” parties and politicians has often influenced elections in Romania and Moldova.

\textsuperscript{123} When the lawyer Modest Cezar Scalat wrote the documents of a case in Romanian, claiming that he did not know German, the judge Dr. Grunfeld demanded on April 6, 1913 that the client change his lawyer or defend himself and accused the lawyer of chauvinism. Scalat refused to do what the judge had asked, and Grunfeld judged the case in his absentia. This led to a protest of the Romanian lawyers and notaries in the province after a few days (at the instigation of an irredentist lawyer), but the judge’s decision was upheld by the appeals court. See Aurel Morariu, Bucovina 1774-1914 (Bucuresti: Libraria si Papetaria Pavel Suru, 1914), p. 128-130.

\textsuperscript{124} It should, however, be noted that the private opinions of some of Onciul’s associates (e.g., Florea Lupu), which could be inferred based on their political stances before or after joining the party, were more radically nationalistic. Florea Lupu, who was an important banking official of the duchy’s bank, and therefore an important, well-paid and influential government employee, could very well have found Austrian rule personally satisfying because of what he thought that he was doing and could do. If the positions were likely to disappear through the disappearance of Austria, these characters were prone to change loyalties.
nationalistic current among the province’s Romanians, its diminishing popular support may be seen as a sign of the increase in the intensity of Romanian nationalism.

2.6. The Social Democrats

The originally internationalist Social Democrats were initially opposed to Romanian nationalism. However, by 1907 and especially 1911, social democracy and nationalism were made increasingly compatible by various political actors. This contributed to the spread of Romanian nationalism.

The most leftist party of the monarchy, the Social Democrats, obtained a number of Romanian votes. There was indeed a Romanian section of that party, just as there was the dominant German one as well as a Ruthenian one. The party, which had a solid record of inter-ethnic pluralism and rejected Romanian national myths, symbols and rituals, fielded several ethnic Romanian candidates in several districts. One of them was in an overwhelmingly Romanian electoral district in 1907. Another one in a plurality German-speaking Czernowitz district (Electoral District no. 2). In the latter district, the candidate was the medical doctor Gheorghe Grigorovici, the leader of the Romanian section of the Social Democratic Party in Bukovina, in both 1907 and 1911.

Various politicians from the Romanian National Party, particularly the progressive populists were somewhat sympathetic toward Grigorovici, who was perceived as a “serious man” and as a “Romanian socialist”. Even the “bourgeois nationalists” respected him, and he, in turn, showed respect toward a few progressive nationalist populist politicians who cared for the workers. All of these were possible because he was not a Marxist and believed in the convergence of the goals of socialism and liberal nationalism. At any rate, he won the election in south Czernowitz in 1907 and 1911, the last time with the support of the Romanian National Party, and particularly of its progressive populists, who actually campaigned for him.


126. Erich Prokopowitsch, *Das Ende der österreichischen Herrschaft in der Bukowina* (Munchen: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1959), p. 15-16. Unlike Onciul, Grigorovici was not accused by more intensely nationalistic figures of „collaborationism“ with the Austrian authorities. One does get a sense that Grigorovici, the son of a teacher, was more nationalistic than his discourse and the party program of the Social Democratic Party indicated around 1907. For more relevant information on these topics, including Grigorovici’s
Until and after 1918, the Romanian Social Democratic activists did indicate a preference for integration with both the social democrats of other ethnic groups throughout Austria and Bukovina and with the Romanian ethnic community as such. Not surprisingly, Grigorovici joined the Romanian Club in the Chamber of Deputies only in 1918 as its sixth member.

The scoring of the candidates of this party needs to be nuanced. For 1907, it should get 0 on three dimensions (integrative, satisfactional and symbolic) in Czernowitz and 0 on two of these and 0.5 on the symbolic dimension in the predominantly Romanian district. In 1911, Grigorovici defended a Romanian historian’s right to irredentism (a rather unique position for a Social Democrat). Because of this, he should get a score of 0.5 on the symbolic dimension for the 1911 elections. The campaigning done on his behalf by the more progressive Romanian nationalists could not be understood outside this context.\(^{127}\) For both elections, votes for Romanian Social Democratic candidates should get 1 on the identificational dimension (the candidates did identify themselves as Romanians). By 1911, the score of the intensity of nationalism for the votes for Romanian Social Democratic candidates was the same as those for Romanian Democratic Party candidates, and the same as those for German Social Democratic candidates in various parts of German Austria.

By 1907 and especially by 1911, social democracy and Romanian nationalism were becoming increasingly compatible due to the actions of the Romanian Social Democrats. This increased the overall apparent spread of Romanian nationalism.

2.7. Non-Romanian Candidates

\(^{127}\) The increase in the level of nationalism expressed by Grigorovici probably helped him attract the support of individuals who had found him too little nationalistic in 1907. The candidate of the Romanian Democratic Party in Grigorovici’s district obtained 640 votes in the first round in 1907 (10.84% of the votes). An independent, intensely nationalistic, candidate obtained 322 votes in 1911 (4.57%).
The non-Romanian candidates typically did not espouse Romanian nationalism. In predominantly Romanian districts, however, some of them tried to attract the Romanian electorate through an appeal to Romanian nationalism on the symbolic dimension. This also apparently increased the overall spread of Romanian nationalism. The absence of such candidates from the ethnic Romanian electoral districts in 1911, by contrast to previous elections, suggests that the intensity of Romanian nationalism was increasing.

Not all the candidates in the Romanian electoral districts were Romanians; members of other ethnic groups also won seats. The standard explanation provided by Romanian nationalists for occasional victories by minority candidates in post-1918 Romania has been the “tolerance of the Romanian people”. They did not note the use by these candidates of some of the myths, symbols and rituals of Romanian nationalism. Sometimes, the candidates did not attempt any kind of ethnic appeal (e.g., in the case of a cabinet minister who ran in the southern Romanian rural district in 1885). They score 0 on all the dimensions of Romanian nationalism. But, since around 1900, the non-Romanian politicians tried to make some symbolic connection. The only example is a non-Romanian candidate who tried to emphasize his service to the Romanian population, who formed a local majority in the district. In this case, the candidate would get a score of 0 on three dimensions and 1 on the symbolic dimension.

There was only one such case, an independent, non-nationalistic Austrian aristocrat of Tyrolean Ladin128, and therefore Latin or Romanic origin129, Count Bellegarde (Franz Graf von Bellegarde, 1866-1915). He was a philanthropist who was kind toward the Romanian peasants in his position as the chief administrative official of the district. He was regarded as an “empathetic man”. The image did not fit with the Romanian local stereotypes toward the Germans.130 He won in District no. 10 of Campulung-Vatra Dornei, with 55.18% of the vote, against the candidates of each of the two major Romanian parties, neither of whom originated from the district nor seemed to understand local problems. Like the nationalists, he would eventually become a member of the Romanian Club in the Chamber of Deputies.

In 1909, the count indicated clearly and publicly that he was opposed to the more militant strands

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128. The Ladins are a small ethnic group in south Tyrol (Alto Adige in Italian) whose Romance language is very similar to Romansch in Switzerland and Friulian in northeastern Italy.
129. It would appear that the family originated from present-day France.
of Romanian populist nationalism. He engaged in polemics with the most intelligent among the intense nationalists, Professor Nicolae Iorga. Bellegarde condemned Iorga for allegedly being an irredentist enemy of Austria, which was probably true, as Iorga would openly take such a position in 1914. Bellegarde had thus come into conflict with the Romanian teachers who would bash him at the grass-roots level for being unsympathetic toward the Romanian culture.

Bellegarde now appeared in the eyes of the ethnic Romanians from his district as the opposite of the empathetic man whom they had elected, and whose actions went against the spirit of his electoral use of Romanian symbolism. Moreover, he was not doing a good job in terms of constituency service ("pork barrel") since he thought that the "natural" benefits of Austrian rule were sufficient for his constituents. This decreased his popularity and guaranteed a clear victory of the Romanian National Party in his district in 1911, albeit of a non-irredentist progressive populist "commoner" from the district, who understood its problems.

The non-Romanian candidates were not Romanian nationalists. In predominantly Romanian districts, however, some of them used the symbols of Romanian nationalism for electoral purposes. These candidates' absence from the ethnic Romanian electoral districts in 1911 indicates that the intensity of Romanian nationalism was increasing.

2.8. Conclusions

The year 1914 would have brought about several changes to the equation even if World War I

\[\text{\footnotesize 131. To be sure, a conservative politician from Romania in a Czernowitz paper accused the latter of "anarchist instigations".}
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\[\text{\footnotesize 132. This allegedly happened under the influence of Mochi Fischer, whose family leased more land and subleased it to the peasants than any other family in Bukovina and Romania, and who was dissatisfied by Iorga's ad hominem press attacks against him.}
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\[\text{\footnotesize 133. See Nagy-Talavera, p. 156-157, 158, Prokopowitsch, Rumanische, p. 118-122 and the exchanges of letters between Iorga and Bellegarde, published in the newspaper "Romanul", on p. 165-166. It should be noted that Bellegarde did not mention the fact that Iorga held anti-Semitic views, and not merely because the issue was somewhat off-topic. Keeping in mind the fact that the most patriotic parties in Austria, such as the German Christian Social Party, were more, not less, anti-Semitic than Iorga, this is not surprising. The conservative Take Ionescu designated "Iorga's anarchist instigations" as one of the key causes of the 1907 peasant revolt in Romania in Czernowitzter Tageblatt, 10 April 1907 (cited in Nagy-Talavera, p. 153).} \]
would not have started. For a number of reasons, Romania was becoming potentially more attractive than the Austrian Empire to some sections of the Bukovinian Romanian population.

Now, at the end of the discussion of the various electoral tickets, yet another important issue needs to be discussed: demands for the redistribution of land to the peasants, for land reform in Bukovina, which was not in the party program of any party, except, in a vague sense, of the Social Democrats. Yet some Bukovinian Romanian peasants did cross the Romanian border and participated in the 1907 peasant revolt. Both the calls for social reform and anti-Semitism were perceived as distracting attention from the conflict with the Ukrainians. Some thought that a generous land reform would increase the proportion of land owned by Ruthenes, and the ratio of land owned by Ruthenes in comparison to Romanians.

Yet in 1913, during the Second Balkan War, many, though not all, Romanian peasants marched into Bulgaria and observed that the Bulgarian peasants, who owned their own land, were better off than they were. In Romania, after proposing a partial expropriation of large estates in late 1913, the National Liberal Party had won regular elections in February, after which the parliament voted in favor of equal suffrage for everyone and land redistribution to the peasants. These changes were supposed to be approved by a Constituent Assembly elected in May 1914. The start of the Great War shelved the issue, but the fact that the issue was seriously considered led to an increase in irredentism in Bukovina.

By October 1918, it was clear that only the Romanian government and the irredentists would be able to push through a land reform. This factor led to a massive increase in the support for union with Romania. However, no matter how reformist or impressive the irredentists might have been, a socio-economically unreformed Romania in which there was not even equal suffrage could not impress the average Bukovinian Romanian in 1907 or 1911, but could do so in 1918. The union of Bukovina with Romania allowed the peasants to benefit from the Romanian land reform, the second largest land redistribution of the period in terms of total surface after the Russian/Soviet one. This is a “sensitive issue”, which pro-Habsburg nostalgics have tended to ignore.

Another reason for an increase in irredentism and non-irredentist dissatisfaction with Austrian

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rule was the end of parliamentarism in Austria on March 16, 1914. On that day, the sessions of the Austrian lower house were prorogued indefinitely. This ended both the opportunities of the deputies to get “pork barrel” for their constituents and gave a feeling of disempowerment to a part of the Bukovinian Romanian elite.\textsuperscript{135} Aurel Onciul accepted the temporary end of parliamentarism (until early 1917), but the leaders of the Romanian National Party were not happy.\textsuperscript{136}

In this section, I have analyzed the evolution of the nation-building process in terms of the increasing spread and intensity of nationalism through a study of the party programs, party propaganda as well as of the ideology of various collective action campaigns. I have emphasized the role of the political parties, with a focus on the highly nationalistic and very popular Romanian National Party and the moderately nationalistic Democratic Party. This has been done without ignoring the irredentists, the Social Democrats and the non-Romanian politicians for whom some Romanians cast their ballots. The electoral results discussed above do reflect the differences between the Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants who voted for the various parties, including in terms of the intensity of their Romanian nationalism. The quantitative data on collective action presented above generally supports the validity of my interpretations of the electoral data discussed below.

3. The Electoral Patterns: Interpreting the Statistical Data

3.1. Elections before Universal, Equal Suffrage

An analysis of the electoral results prior to 1907 indicates that the spread and intensity of Romanian nationalism in Bukovina has generally increased over time. The first shift was from non-nationalism to nationalism among the minority of the population that was participating in the political process. This occurred between the elections for the Austrian lower house held in 1885 and 1891. Subsequently, the proportion of the rural, overwhelmingly peasant, electorate that actually cast ballots increased. This indicates the spread of politicization. The increasing spread and intensity of Romanian nationalism was, of course, not a linear process. The phenomenon may be observed in the mostly Romanian rural areas and

\textsuperscript{135} Jenks, \textit{Austrian}, p. 206.
\textsuperscript{136} See Vaida Voevod, p. 114-115.
even in some predominantly Ukrainian areas. It also operated in the few predominantly Romanian urban localities. Yet it was not visible in the mostly German-speaking cities or in the predominantly German villages.

Before looking at the elections for the Austrian lower house, let us look briefly at the elections for the Bukovinian diet, even though, unfortunately, the exact numbers of votes that the various candidates obtained are very difficult to obtain. The general results should support the validity of my interpretation of the parliamentary elections. Under the consociational agreement, the Romanians, who constituted 34.37% of the population in 1910, were supposed to hold 22 out of 63 seats (34.92%) in the provincial diet, but won 23 seats. By contrast, in the diets of 1892 and 1897-1898, there were 13 out of 31 deputies (41.94%) in the diet who were Romanians representing the Romanian National Party.

In the elections for the rural curia, the Romanians had obtained a slight majority (7 out of 12 of diet seats) in 1885, 1892 and 1897-1898. In 1892, all of them represented the Romanian National Party. In 1897-1898, the more radical Romanian nationalists of the Romanian National Radical Party of Bukovina obtained 4 seats (with a score of 3 on the intensity of nationalism scale). The less radical ones, the leftover elements of the Romanian National Party, obtained 3 (with a score of 2).

Each ethnic group was allocated a certain number of seats through the consociational agreement of 1909. This was achieved through a system of ethnic “cadastres” used for the election of representatives to

137. For more details on the Bukovinian Landtag, see Mihai-Stefan Ceausu, “Der Landtag der Bukowina”, in Die Habsburger Monarchie 1848-1918, vol. 7 (Verfassung und Parlamentarismus, second part) (Wien: Der Oesterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000), p. 2172-2198. I have tried to obtain the results of the Romanian interwar parliamentary elections at the sub-county (that is, locality, level) as well as for local elections. While I did obtain the results for some localities, mainly cities, from various books and newspapers, I did not obtain most of this kind of data, and I do not believe that the time in which I attempted to find the data was well-spent (too much work for results that are bound to be very incomplete). I would even go further and say that my attempts to find the data have been unsuccessful. The importance of local issues in influencing the diet vote would also make the data so laboriously obtained open to charges of lack of validity. The very fact that even for the German elections of 1933, Karl Othmar Freiherr von Aretin found it impossible to find the data for the state, provincial and local elections is indicative of the difficulty of the task. See Karl Othmar Freiherr von Aretin, “The Forgotten Elections in Prussia of 12 March 1933”, in Solomon Wank, Ghitte Mazohl-Walnig, Reinhold Wagnleitner (eds.), The Mirror of History: Essays in Honor of Fritz Fellner (Santa Barbara, California and Oxford, England: ABC-CLIO, 1988), p. 451-465.

138. The diet was elected in late 1897 and convened in early 1898.

139. For the elections of 1885, 1892, and 1897, see Ceausu, “Der Landtag”, p. 2176, 2183, 2189. For the elections of 1897-1898, also see Iacobescu, p. 55-57. In 1897-1898, the more radical nationalists complained that administrative pressures had been used against the voters for their candidates in some areas of Bukovina. Unlike the free and fair parliamentary elections, the Bukovinian diet elections before 1911 were more or less free, but not fair before 1890, and there are disputes about their fairness during the next two decades.
Deputies were elected through the universal, secret, equal suffrage of the adult male members of the ethnic group. Romanians were allocated 16 of the 46 seats (34.78%) that were filled through elections in single-member constituency districts. The Romanian “cadaster” also included by choice the Magyar-speaking population (1.31%), which formed majorities of the population in four communes (in the previous parliamentary elections, they had voted for Romanian candidates).

The results of the diet elections of 1911 were generally consistent with the levels of popularity of the various parties in the parliamentary elections: 13 members of the Romanian National Party and 6 Democrats were elected. There were also 3 Conservatives (who were not elected through universal suffrage) whose leanings were more pro-RNP than pro-RDP. In the parliamentary elections, they were in fact more a faction of the Romanian National Party. Alexandru Hurmuzachi was not only the president of the diet, who was supposed to be neutral in its proceedings, and therefore could not declare himself as a party member in the diet, but was also elected on the Romanian National Party ticket in the parliamentary elections of 1907 and 1911).

The results of the Austrian elections for the Chamber of Deputies after 1892 provide us with the best picture of Romanian political nationalism in Bukovina. After all, they were less related to purely local issues than the diet and local elections, whose results were nevertheless generally consistent with those of the imperial ones. I define as Romanian parties and candidates those that defined themselves as such, and/or were recorded as such in Austrian statistical publications. I define as (politically) nationalistic those parties and candidates that identified themselves as nationalistic and ran on nationalistic platforms.

The dominant tenor of Romanian nationalism before the introduction of universal, equal, direct male adult suffrage in 1907 was moderate. In the last pre-democratic elections, those of January 1901, in the competition for seats in the primarily Romanian electoral districts, the more moderate and conservative nationalists were the more successful ones. They obtained more votes than the more radical and populist

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ones by a ratio of at least three to one, in all predominantly Romanian electoral districts.

Under the pre-1907 system, there were originally four, then, beginning in 1897, five, electoral curiae or classes that selected their deputies separately. They included curiae for: 1. great landowners, 2. chambers of commerce and industry and 3. the cities, market towns, and industrial towns. Elections in them were direct (individual voters voted directly for the member of the parliament). There was also 4. the curia of the taxpayers from rural communities, and 5. the general or universal curia, whose electorate included almost all the literate males older than twenty-four. In the last two, the voters chose electors who voted for the deputies.

The pre-1907 elections tell us something about the level of politicization and nationalistic mobilization of the masses in the predominantly Romanian electoral districts of the southern and central part of the province. Roughly, between a seventh and a quarter of those who had the right to vote in the rural curia, which included the better off rural inhabitants, who voted in indirect elections (selected “electors” who voted for the deputies), cast ballots.\textsuperscript{143} It would seem that the overwhelming majority of the Romanian peasants were not nationalistic by 1885. This was the first year when the deputies to the parliament were no longer selected by the provincial diet.

In that year, Freiherr Sigmund Conrad von Eybesfeld, an Austrian cabinet minister of German ethnicity, ran for a seat in the third “rural” district (including Radautz, Suczawa and Kimpulung) that covered most of the Romanian ethnic area. He won the votes of 362 electors, 93% of the 390 electors who cast their ballots and of 411 as the total number of electors (Wahlmanner) against a Romanian competitor. Out of 18,470 individuals with the right to vote in the selection of the electors in the district, merely 3,163 (17%) had cast their ballots in the district. Two Romanians from the Centralist Party won the other two seats. In the largely Romanian district of Czernowitz, Johann Lupul won 69% of the votes of the “Wahlmanner”, which probably indicates that a majority of the Romanian “Wahlmanner” of that district had voted for the more nationalistic Autonomists rather than for the Centralists.\textsuperscript{144}

The elections of February-March 1891 are unusual because in the curia of the rural communities,


out of 1,102 “Wahlmanner” / electors, 357 did not submit a vote, while 358 voted for Ruthenian candidates and 387 for Romanian candidates.\textsuperscript{145} This reflects, among other factors, the reluctance of the Romanian villagers in some areas to cast their ballots for Romanian nationalist candidates. On the other hand, during the period between 1885 and 1891 the proportion of the Romanian rural population that supported the nationalists increased from roughly one-third to two-thirds. Yet, until some point in the 1890’s, in a minority of the mostly Romanian villages, at least some Romanian voters did vote for non-Romanian local councilors.\textsuperscript{146}

The elections of March 1897 were the first elections for which it is possible to ascertain, even if indirectly, the spread of Romanian nationalism among “electors” selected by the entire population (“general curia”). By 1897, practically all the Romanian “electors”, and some Ruthenian ones who resided in central Bukovina, voted for Romanian nationalist candidates in the rural and general curiae.\textsuperscript{147}

In 1901, the elections were contested by various factions, and the electors were fundamentally the delegates of those who voted for them. One faction was composed of intensely nationalist and socio-economically radical “Young Romanian” candidates, who were in opposition to the provincial governor; they score of 3 on the intensity of nationalism scale. The other one was the less intensely nationalistic, more socio-economically conservative “Old Romanian” candidates, who were more accommodationist toward the governor, score 2.\textsuperscript{148} The more intensely nationalistic, more socio-economically reformist candidates lost, but won almost twice as many (28.64% vs. 15.32%) votes of the Wahlmanner (“electors”


\textsuperscript{146} See Iacobescu, passim.

\textsuperscript{147} In the district of Czernowitz, in the rural curia, there were 406 votes for the Romanian nationalist candidate representing “Concordia” (see above) and 10 for the “Young Ruthenian” (Ukrainian nationalist) one. In the Radautz district, all the 433 votes were cast for the Romanian “Concordia” candidate. In the southern “general curia” district, all the 597 votes were cast for the Romanian candidate out of 649 electors (with the right to vote), while in the north, the Ukrainian candidate obtained 503 votes and the socialist one 89. In all likelihood, the electors who did not cast ballots, or valid ballots, were generally distributed among the population. Yet those who spoiled them had been elected mostly by non-Romanian urban voters. After all, there were no spoiled ballots in the elections for the rural curia. The data comes from Bureau der K.K. Statistischen Central-Commission, \textit{Osterreichische Statistik}, vol. 49, no. 1 (“Die Ergebnisse Reichsrathswahlen in den im Reichsrathe Vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern Fur Das Jahr 1885“) (Wien: Karl Gerold’s Sohn, 1898), p. 18-19, 26-27.

\textsuperscript{148} The votes for the candidates for both factions have been assigned a score of 0 on the integrative dimension of Romanian nationalism, and scores of 1 on the identificational and symbolic dimensions. The “Young Romanian” candidates were fundamentally dissatisfied with the situation of the Romanians in Austria. They deserve a score of 1 on the satisfictional dimension. By contrast, the “Old Romanians”, who were satisfied with Austrian rule, deserve a score of 0 on this dimension.
who were selected by the citizens to vote for a deputy) in the general curia than in the curia of the local communities.\footnote{See Bureau der K.K. Statistischen Central-Commission, \textit{Osterreichische Statistik}, vol. 59, no. 3 („Die Ergebnisse Reichsrathswahlen in den im Reichsrathe Vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern Fud Das Jahr 1900/01“) (Wien: Karl Gerold’s Sohn, 1902), p. 58-59, 72-73. For the curia of the rural communities, the less intensely nationalistic electors included 341 Old Romanians, 272 Conservative Romanians and 111 United Romanians. By contrast, the more intensely nationalistic electors included 122 Young Romanians, 4 Radical Romanians and 5 Romanian People’s Party electors, overall 15.32\% of all the electors who favored the Romanian factions. For the general curia, the numbers were 294, 70 and 87 for the same factions with a score of 2 and 151, 10 and 20 for those with a score of 3 (28.64\%).} In 1900/01, the social basis of the more intensely nationalistic visions seems to have been constituted disproportionately by the poorer literate peasantry.

The Austrian electoral system allows to check how the upper and urban middle classes voted. In the first curia, or the great landowners’ curia, based on direct voting, a large majority always voted. Originally, in 1885, the three Romanian non-nationalist, centralist candidates obtained 67 and 69\% of the votes of the secular landowners, to 70\% of the votes cast by the high clergymen.\footnote{Bureau der K.K. Statistischen Central-Commission, \textit{Osterreichische Statistik}, vol. 9, no. 5 („Statistik der Reichsrathswahlen im Jahre 1885“) (Wien: Der Kaiserlich-Koniglichen Hof und Staatsdruckerei, 1885), p. 2.}

In 1891, 1897 and 1900-1901, the higher clergy voted exclusively for the “Old Romanians”. The two deputies of the landowning class received an almost equal number of votes for the candidate of the united Romanian faction and for that of the Armenian and Polish conservative faction within the context in which each voter had two votes. We could ascertain the number of intense Romanian nationalists and of the opponents of Romanian nationalism by looking at what proportion of votes cast each candidate lost. In 1897, out of 155 landowners with the right to vote, 107 cast their ballots and the Romanian candidate obtained 106 votes, while a conservative Polonized Armenian won 103, while in 1900-1901, the figures were 151, 81, 81 and 81.\footnote{Consult Bureau der K.K. Statistischen Central-Commission, \textit{Osterreichische Statistik}, vol. 49, no. 1 („Die Ergebnisse Reichsrathswahlen in den im Reichsrathe Vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern Fud Das Jahr 1897“) (Wien: Karl Gerold’s Sohn, 1898), p. XXII- XXIII, 2.}

In conclusion, while the Romanian clergy did vote nationalistic starting in 1891, practically all the Bukovinian large landowners endorsed simultaneously both Romanian nationalist candidates and candidates opposed to Romanian nationalism. Most of the aristocracy was beyond nationalism until the beginning of the twentieth century. Most nationalist aristocrats in the late Habsburg period were using
nationalism purely instrumentally, were recent converts to nationalism or were the children of non-nationalistic aristocrats.\textsuperscript{152}

Until 1885, there were some non-nationalist Romanian representatives of the curia of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry (the second curia) and of the curia of cities, market towns and industrial districts (the third curia). After that, that was no longer the case, because Romanian nationalism was not supported either by the urban non-Romanians or by some of the urban Romanians.\textsuperscript{153} Even so, by 1914, two cities where the population was at least 5/8 Romanian had Romanian mayors.\textsuperscript{154}

An analysis of the electoral results prior to 1907 indicates that the spread and intensity of Romanian nationalism in Bukovina has generally increased over time. The first change was from non-nationalism to nationalism among the minority participating in the political process. Subsequently, the proportion of the rural, overwhelmingly peasant, electorate that actually cast ballots increased and most of them voted for nationally. The phenomenon was the most visible in the mostly Romanian rural areas.

3.2. Elections under Universal Suffrage: 1907 and 1911

At the beginning of the twentieth century, between 1901 and 1911, the electoral turnout among the eligible Bukovinian Romanians increased. Moreover, they voted in an increasingly nationalistic manner.

A puzzle of Romanian electoral politics is what explains the increase in voter turnout between 1901 and 1907. The primary role was played not by the politicians, but rather by institutions and enthusiasts. A large majority of the Romanian rural population was not sufficiently concerned about politics, let alone nationalistic politics, to vote during the elections prior to 1907. By contrast, under universal and equal suffrage, in 1907 and 1911, about three-fourths of the population in mostly Romanian areas did actually

\textsuperscript{152} See Prokopowitsch, passim and Iacobescu, passim.


vote. The new electoral rules that guaranteed universal suffrage seem to have given numerous individuals a feeling of empowerment that translated into electoral participation, particularly in 1907.

One also can not forget the emergence of modern campaigning (e.g., students from the various student associations were going through the villages and campaigning for specific candidates). This pattern emerged in a by-election in 1905 won by Aurel Onciul against a Ukrainian nationalist candidate. Yet in order to be effective, such a campaign needs to benefit from a receptive public and even more importantly, by the right institutional structure (direct elections).

We also need to look at a phenomenon whose importance has been ignored until recently, namely the anti-alcoholism crusade of an itinerant Orthodox preacher. The researcher Mihai Iacobescu, who has read the parish records, memorial materials written by teachers and others, has observed the importance of an itinerant preacher against alcoholism around the turn of the century in inducing the peasants to pay attention to politics.\footnote{Mihai Iacobescu, \textit{30 de zile in Siberia: Cautand Arhivele Bucovinei}, (Iasi: Editura Junimea, 2003).}

At any rate, the elections of May 1907 and especially 1911 finally demonstrated that Romanian political nationalism had acquired then a mass character. It should be noted that the boundaries of the electoral districts for the elections of 1907 were identical to those for 1911. The same was also largely true of the candidates. This allows us to control for the political skills of a successful candidate and the characteristics of a district. At no other times in the politics of Romanian ethnic territories covered by this dissertation was this continuity so widespread or important. It gives us a chance for a more in-depth study, and it eliminates some of the reasons for potential skepticism. At any rate, in 1907, in Bukovina, there were 158,352 eligible voters. Among these, almost three-fourths went to the polls. The Romanian parties and candidates obtained 54,423 votes (46.68\% of the provincial total) in the first round, and 54,270 votes (46.92\%) in the second.

In the first round, the six candidates of the Romanian National Party obtained 31,674 votes (58.2\% of the votes cast for Romanians), while the five of them who participated in the second round obtained 31,530 (58.1\%). All the runoff votes were from the rural and urban localities of the five predominantly Romanian districts, whose boundaries had been determined based on the linguistic data in the 1900 census. Overall, two-thirds of their inhabitants were Romanians. Roughly 62.36\% and 64.13\% of the valid votes in these
districts were in favor of the Romanian National Party in the two rounds.

The Romanian Democrats obtained 15,195 votes in the first round, and 14,542 in the second one. These included 13,637 and 12,984 votes from the predominantly Romanian districts (26.85% and 26.41% of the votes cast in these areas). The rest came from two overwhelmingly non-Romanian districts.

However, not all the Romanian votes went to nationalists. Two ethnically Romanian Social Democratic candidates obtained slightly more than 5% of the votes cast for Romanian candidates. There was also the independent, non-nationalistic German-Austrian aristocrat of non-Romanian, but still of Romanic origin, Count Bellegarde (Franz Graf von Bellegarde), who was kind toward the Romanian peasants in his position as the chief administrative official of the district.\(^{156}\) He won in District no. 10, with 55.18% of the vote, against the candidates of each of the two major Romanian parties. Like the nationalists, he would eventually become a member of the Romanian Club in the Chamber of Deputies.

However, in 1909, the count showed all too clearly and publicly that he was opposed to the more militant strands of Romanian nationalism. This cost him any chance for re-election, and guaranteed a clear victory of the National Party in his district in 1911.

In June 1911, ethnic Romanian candidates obtained 59,697 votes (49.98% of the Bukovinian total).\(^ {157}\) Among the 164,948 Bukovinian inhabitants who were entitled to vote, slightly more than 73% cast ballots in the two rounds of the election.

The Romanian National Party, or as it appears in the Austrian statistical publication covering the election of 1911, “The Romanian National (Defense) Party” obtained 38,408 votes, or 64.34% of the ballots cast for Romanian candidates, in contrast to 58.1%-58.2% in 1907. Of these, 38,375 were cast in the five above-mentioned Romanian districts. In these districts, in which ethnic Romanians represented 70.32% of the population, 74.39% of the votes were cast for the Romanian National Party. The latter political formation obtained the votes of the clear majority (55.92%) of those entitled to vote in mostly Romanian districts.


The Democratic Party, identified as “The Romanian National (Democratic) Party” in the official electoral statistics for 1911, had been somewhat more nationalistic in 1909-1910 than before 1907. It lost rural and small town votes to more intensely nationalistic candidates, and city votes to social democrats. It obtained 11,810 votes, or 19.78% of the ballots cast for Romanian candidates, as opposed to 27.92% and 26.8% in the two rounds in 1907. They came exclusively from all of the five Romanian districts, where they represented 22.89% of the total, in contrast to more than 26% in 1907. Independent candidates, including irredentists, obtained 5,728 votes, or 9.6% of all the votes cast for ethnic Romanian candidates.

The industrialization of the provincial capital hampered the nationalization of a part of its Romanian population. A majority of the Romanian workers, and an increasing number of Romanian intellectuals from District no. 2 of Czernowitz, which had a Jewish ethnic plurality, cast their ballots in favor of the victorious ethnically Romanian leader of the Social Democratic Party in Bukovina, Gheorghe Grigorovici, in 1907 and 1911. Until 1918, the Romanian Social Democratic activists chose integration with the social democrats of other ethnic groups throughout Austria. By contrast, the candidate of the Romanian Democratic Party in Grigorovici’s district obtained 640 votes in the first round in 1907 (10.84% of the votes). An independent, intensely nationalistic, candidate obtained 322 votes in 1911 (4.57%).

At no time did more than 10% of the votes cast for Romanian candidates in parliamentary and diet elections characterized by universal manhood suffrage go to individuals who clearly sympathized with irredentism before 1918. In 1907, a member of the Romanian National Party, the only candidate for the House of Deputies who would display irredentist behavior by fleeing to Romania at the beginning of World War I, obtained 1,022 votes, or 1.88% of the total number of votes cast for Romanian candidates in that year. In 1911, there were five Romanian unsuccessful independent candidates, some of whom were affiliated with the “Junimea” academic society and were more intensely nationalistic than the Romanian National Party, indeed irredentist, and as socio-economically progressive as the Democratic Party, if not more so.

These independents obtained 5,728 votes, or 9.6% of all the votes cast for ethnic Romanian candidates. Some of them ran in the districts which were overwhelmingly Ruthenian-speaking, but in which the population did not view itself as Ukrainian (electoral districts 6 and 8). In the Bukovinian diet, 158

only a notary elected in 1911 turned out to be an irredentist sympathizer who would flee to Romania during the first part of World War I. Overall, Romanian irredentism was a minor, but growing, political, also electoral, phenomenon.159

As the available electoral data indicates, the Romanian National Party obtained the support of a clear and increasing majority of the Romanian ethnic electorate, and of the population in mostly Romanian areas, in 1907 and 1911. In the latter year, a majority of the ethnic Romanians among those entitled to vote, as calculated based on the census data voted for it. So did numerous inhabitants of other ethnicities who lived in mostly Romanian electoral districts. Moreover, the strongly nationalistic candidates of the Romanian National Party and of “Junimea” were supported by only 58.1% of those who voted for Romanian candidates in 1907. Yet they were endorsed by 73.93% in 1911.

An analysis of the electoral results indicates that the spread and intensity of Romanian nationalism in Bukovina increased over time. The first shift was from non-nationalism to nationalism among those participating in the political process, which occurred between the elections for the Austrian lower chamber of 1885 and 1891. Subsequently, the proportion of the rural, overwhelmingly peasant, electorate that actually cast ballots increased; this indicates the spread of politicization. The increasing spread and intensity of Romanian nationalism was, of course, not a linear process. The phenomenon may be observed only in the mostly Romanian rural areas, and even in some predominantly Ukrainian areas. It also operated in the few predominantly Romanian urban localities, but not in the mostly German speaking cities or in German villages.

Between 1901 and 1911, there was an increasing turnout of the eligible Bukovinian Romanian electorate at the polls. These voters also cast their ballots in an increasingly nationalistic manner.

Table 2A: The Intensity of Minority Nationalism Scores for Bukovina, and Its Northern and Southern Parts (1919-1937)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Assembly of Deputies</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Characteristic (most of the votes of the respective minority)</th>
<th>Most ethnic votes?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Bukovina</td>
<td>Northern Bukovina</td>
<td>Total Bukovina</td>
<td>Southern Bukovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907 (Ukrainian)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>NA/NE160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 (Ukrainian)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>NA/NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 (Jewish)</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>NA/NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 (German)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>NFC161</td>
<td>NA/NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919 (Ukrainian)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919 (Polish)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919 (German)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919 (Jewish)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 (Ukrainian)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 (Jewish)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922 (Ukrainian)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922 (Jewish)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922 (German)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2B: Collective Action and Civil Society Comparison: Bukovinian Romanian and Ukrainian Nationalism163

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Bukovina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group / Nationalism</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census Results</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in 1910 Census</td>
<td>273,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census by Colloquial Language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in 1930 Census</td>
<td>379,991 (nationality)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

160. “NA/NE” means “Not available because there was no elected Senate”.
161. The 1919-1922 scores for Bukovina in its entirety might not be fully comparable because of the lower electoral turnouts in the Northern Bukovinian electoral districts inhabited mostly by non-Romanians. This was not characteristic of the Habsburg period.
162. Most of the ethnic Ukrainian votes for the Assembly of Deputies in the districts were cast in favor of Socialists, but the Senate votes went to Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists.
163. The numbers are documented elsewhere in this dissertation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Signatures or Members</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>46,136</td>
<td>signatures at March 12 rally in opposition to the creation of a Ruthenian Orthodox Bishopric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>members of Ruthenian Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>More than the Ukrainian one in the same year</td>
<td>10,000 at a rally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>signatures on petition in favor of education in the Ukrainian language education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>(bloc of votes for the Ukrainian National Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>at far-right National Christian Party rally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>113,860</td>
<td>irredentist sympathizers in Northern Bukovina (47.37% of total ethnic Ukrainian population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>signatures in the Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine (the quasi-totality of the ethnic Romanians, including the self-styled “Moldovans”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2C: The Number of Bukovinian Romanians and Ukrainians in 1910-1941, by Census Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group(s) or Category/Categories</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>273,254</td>
<td>368,149</td>
<td>379,691</td>
<td>438,766</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

164. These are the scores for the two rounds of elections.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ukrainians, Ruthenians and Hutsuls</th>
<th>305,101</th>
<th>215,605</th>
<th>248,567</th>
<th>269,973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanians + Ukrainians</td>
<td>578,355</td>
<td>583,754</td>
<td>628,258</td>
<td>708,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians/(Romanians + Ukrainians)</td>
<td>47.25%</td>
<td>63.07%</td>
<td>60.44%</td>
<td>61.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>794,929</td>
<td>Not Found</td>
<td>853,009</td>
<td>763,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Romanians + Ukrainians) / Total Population</td>
<td>72.76%</td>
<td>Not Comparable</td>
<td>73.65%</td>
<td>92.80% (Not Comparable)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4: Conclusions

In this chapter, I have analyzed the evolution of the Romanian nation-building process between 1880 and 1918, by looking at the political party programs and ideologies, the electoral results and collective action patterns. Nationalism was a generalized phenomenon among the Bukovinian Romanians by 1911. The intensity of the Romanian nationalism score in Bukovina increased from low scores under less than universal suffrage before 1907 to 2.38 in the first round of the 1907 elections and 2.66 in the first round of the 1911 elections under universal and equal suffrage.

I have focused on the highly nationalistic and very popular Romanian National Party (including its splinter groups) that had the support of an increasing majority of the ethnic Romanians, and on the moderately nationalistic Democratic Party. The latter’s support declined after 1907. The increasingly popular yet insignificant irredentists, the Social Democrats of the provincial capital, and non-Romanian politicians, who obtained no more votes in mostly Romanian districts after 1907, were also a part of the equation.

An analysis of the electoral results between 1885 and 1911 indicates that the spread and intensity of Romanian nationalism in Bukovina increased over time. The first change was from non-nationalism to nationalism among those participating in the political process. It occurred between the elections for the Austrian lower chamber of 1885 and 1891. The next significant process/event was the increase in electoral turnout among the rural portion of the population that was overwhelmingly peasant (and tended to vote nationalistic by 1891).
Chapter 3
The Case of the Bukovinian
Romanians from 1880 to 1918

(Part 2. The Independent Variables)

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2.1.2. The Bukovinian Romanians – Sub-Ethnic Similarities and Differences with Other Romanian Groups

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3. Alternative Explanations and Reasons for Skepticism

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4. Conclusions
1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will test my model in the case of the Bukovinian Romanians for the period from 1880 until 1918. The importance of the ethnic basis for nation-building will be demonstrated. The Bukovinian Romanians are a group in which nation-building produced generalized nationalism by 1911. The acquisition of a “Romanian” identity on top of the previous “Moldovan” identity, which became a provincial as well as secondary rather than main identity, was finished by 1890. This development was not merely a key early step in the nation-building process. It was also a precondition for generalized nationalism among a large majority of those who came to share it. Nation-building was also facilitated by the lack of linguistic and cultural differences not among the Bukovinian Romanians. The lack of differences between them and the Romanians right across the border in Romania, in the province of Moldova, also helped.

The influence of the German language, and the impact of bilingualism, hindered nation-building among the Romanian urban population. The emergence of Bukovinian provincial and Austrian statal, as opposed to Romanian national, identities was not a widespread phenomenon. It occurred among many of the Germanized and urban Romanians, among aristocrats and part of the middle class. This temporarily retarded the development of the national movement until around 1891. It either delayed nationalization or made it less intense during the period of Austrian rule until 1918 in the urban environment.

The Bukovinian Romanian-language elementary education system, including the impact of the teaching personnel outside the school, was the key facilitator of nation-building. It played this role partially by fostering the spread of nationalism to the elementary school students. The post-elementary system was the key catalyst for early active irredentism.

Industrialization delayed nation-building outside the cities until the period from 1907 to 1911 everywhere in the province. However, by 1911, this effect disappeared wherever the Romanian nationalists
did try to appeal to the Romanians employed in industry. Industrialization did prevent the emergence of the most intense varieties of nationalism in this case during this period. Yet the city environment (urbanization) with its Germanizing influences, not rural industry, hindered Romanian nation-building.

The sudden shock of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy provoked a change in the self-determination options of the Romanian inhabitants of Bukovina in favor of union with Romania. This option was supported by the quasi-totality of the Bukovinian Romanians by 1918. This attitudinal shift took place at a slower pace among the Bukovinian Romanians in the U.S. than among those who stayed in their native province. In the latter country, the identification with Romania had not been finalized for thousands of individuals by 1920. This latter group from North America had not been affected by the sudden shock.

2. The Independent Variables

2.1. Independent Variable 1: The Ethnic Basis of Nation-Building among Bukovinian Romanians

I will start by looking at the nature and impact of the ethnic basis within the context of the Romanian nation-building process in Bukovina until 1918. The spreading of a “Romanian” ethnonational self-identification, which took the place of the old “Moldovan” ethnic self-identification, was important and necessary for Romanian nation-building in Bukovina. The fact that very few ethnic Romanians, and more precisely those under the influence of the languages and cultures of other ethnic groups shared various other competing identities (e.g., “Bukovinian”, Austrian and “Ruthenian”), is interesting. This pattern is both consistent with the importance of the ethnic basis and very important in the Romanian nation-building process in the province.

2.1.1. From a “Moldovan” to a “Romanian” Identity

Map 3.1. The Ethnic Map of Bukovina According to the 1910 Census (by Ion Nistor)
By the 1890’s, the process of transition from a “Moldovan” to a “Romanian” identity had been completed. This evolution was influenced by several factors. The elites were unanimously behind the idea of a “Romanian”, as opposed to a “Moldovan” ethnic identity or self-identification, or to a mixture of the two, as were the Austrian authorities. The transition to the Latin alphabet facilitated it, as did the fact that there was nothing in the ethnic basis to impede the process. The term “Moldovan” had gradually come to
be understood by the Bukovinian Romanian population as a regional, as opposed to ethnic, identity.

The concept of ethnic basis (or ethnic base) is related to what Anthony D. Smith calls an “ethnic category” and later identifies as “ethnie”. The former are “human populations whom at least some outsiders consider to constitute a separate cultural and historical grouping. But the population so designated may at the time have little awareness, only a dim consciousness that they form a separate collectivity.” Therefore, outside observers and scholars should be included in a discussion of the nature of the ethnic basis. We should also not place excessive emphasis on the ethnic self-identification of the relevant population. In other words, nineteenth century peasants could call their ethnicity “Moldovan” while their descendants called themselves “Romanians”. Yet the descendants had identical ethno-cultural characteristics as their forbears in all other respects. In my analytical framework, one can not talk about “assimilation” or the “objective transformation” of “Moldovans” into “Romanians”.

One of the first preconditions of the finalization of the nation-building process was the acquisition by the population of a Romanian ethnic identity. This process had been completed by the early 1890’s in both the Kingdom of Romania and Bukovina. Ion Nistor described one aspect of the process of nation-building in 1915, with a degree of simplification: “We can all very well remember after all that until recently the Romanian peasants from Bukovina did not call themselves anything but “Moldovans” and their language “Moldovan”. Influenced by the literary language the term “Moldovans” was subsequently replaced by that of “Romanian.” The key factor in this change was the fact that the educational system, mass

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167. Smith argues that “the nation seems in many ways modern, [but] it is also deep rooted”. See Smith, p. 69. I do accept that this is indeed the case, but often in a somewhat more complex manner than it has been suggested by the British scholar.
168. One could find several statements of a number of foreign diplomats in Romania for evidence that the nation-building process had been completed by the early 1890’s. See, for example, the telegram of the A. Loudon Snowden, U.S. Resident Minister to Bucarest, Athens and Belgrade, May 28, 1891, p. 372-373 (in English) and p. 182-183 (in Romanian) in Keith Hitchins and Miodrag Milin, Relatii Romano-Americane 1859-1901/Romanian-American Relations 1859-1901 (Bucharest: The Foreign Languages Press Group “Romania”, 2001). “From the deplorable condition of twenty-five years ago, we turn to the present – and find a united homogeneous and self-reliant people, full of patriotism and love of country.” The reference was, of course, to the Romanians of Romania, but similar remarks were made about the Bukovinian Romanians. The diplomatic evidence is not conclusive, but merely suggestive, and sufficient for a study that does not attempt to study nation-building in Romania in its pre-1918 borders in depth, but merely to suggest possible parallels.
169. Ion Nistor, Romanii si rutenii in Bucovina: Studiu istoric si statistic (Bucuresti: Librarile Socec, 1915), p. 73, cited in Livezeanu, p. 92-93. This process of identity change should be understood within its proper
media, church and authorities (in Romania, the Romanian authorities and in Austrian Bukovina, Austrian authorities) used the term “Romanian”.¹⁷⁰ No member of the elite or of the educated classes argued in favor or the existence of a Moldovan language or ethnic group distinct from other Romanians. Not even the few Moldovan separatists who caused a riot in the spring of 1866 in the capital of Moldova, in Iasi (Jassy), did this.¹⁷¹ In 1846, the Austrian statistical publications still called the inhabitants of Bukovina “Moldovans”, but this changed soon after the 1848 Revolution, in which the Romanian national movement in Bukovina emerged.¹⁷² By the 1860’s, the term “Moldovan” was no longer used officially.¹⁷³

context. “Romanian” (“roman”, the form most likely to be used historically in Moldova) and “Rumanian” (“ruman”, historically widely used in Wallachia and Transylvania, and less often in Moldova) originally meant “Roman” in the early Middle Ages. However, later in the medieval period, “roman” (or “ruman”) acquired an ethnic connotation. It was used for purposes of self-identification by most of the population of Romanian ethnicity. In Transylvania and in Wallachia, and among part of the Moldovan elite, the ethnic Romanian population has identified itself as “Romanian” in terms of ethnicity since the Middle Ages. The Romanians from Transylvania who settled in Bukovina during the period of early Habsburg rule in the latter province did not have a “Moldovan”, but only a “Romanian” identity. The result of the nation-building process by the late 1890’s was clear. By that time, in the Old Kingdom (pre-1918 independent Romania), Bukovina and Greater Transylvania, a “Romanian” identity was generalized. These areas, plus Bessarabia, united in 1918 to form Greater Romania (“Romania Mare”). The process was never completed among the Moldovans of Bessarabia, the province between the Prut and Dniester rivers, whose territory is largely identical with that of the present-day Republic of Moldova. Most Bessarabian Moldovans have always had a predominantly or exclusively “Moldovan” identity. Yet at no time has an overwhelming majority of the members of the group been nationalistic in any form. A major proportion of this population, about three-fourths in recent years, according to opinion polls, has identified itself as exclusively “Moldovan”, as opposed to “Romanian”, or as primarily “Moldovan” and secondarily “Romanian”. See Rus, Self-Determination, passim; and Rus, "Roots", p. 287. It should be noted that, from an ethnographic point of view, the Moldovans are “Romanians” in terms of language, customs, folklore, etc. In terms of religion, the Romanians of Romania, and the Greeks, like the Catholics and Protestants, follow the more accurate Gregorian or “New Style” calendar. The situation is different in the case of the Moldovans of Bessarabia and Transnistria, the area between the Dniester and Bug rivers. Like most other Eastern Orthodox faithful, a majority of them have followed the “Old Style” or Julian religious calendar. For example, Christmas is celebrated on January 7, not December 25.

¹⁷⁰ See Brubaker and Cooper, p. 15-17.
¹⁷² Nowosiwsky, p. 58. According to the official statistics of the Austrian monarchy for 1848, there were 1,029,680 Romanians in Hungary, 1,290,000 in Transylvania, 303,931 on the Military Frontier and 20,700 in the Imperial-Royal Military, as well as 1,555 in the Littoral (Istria, etc.), and 140,626 Moldovians in “Galicia, Bucovina and Cracow” [Krakow]. See the table in Anatol Murad, Franz Joseph I of Austria and His Empire (New York, Twayne Publishers, 1968), p. 14-15, and derived from Historisch-ethnographisch-
The transition to the Latin alphabet also helped as the alphabet change is a proxy for the phenomenon of the shift in ethnic identification. The Romanian language was traditionally written in the Cyrillic alphabet. The process of change lasted from around 1840 until around 1890, when the Orthodox Church in Romania discontinued printing in the Cyrillic alphabet. There were texts that mentioned about the Moldovan people and language in the Cyrillic alphabet, as well as about the Romanian language and the Romanian people in the same alphabet. Some important old texts were published or republished in the Latin alphabet. Yet the dominance of the Romanian identity in the intellectual, as distinct from popular, discourse since the late Middle Ages only reinforced the Romanian identity. At any rate, there is no evidence in church chronicles or the texts (diaries, etc.) written by teachers after 1890 that there were any persons who thought that they were part of the Moldovan people or spoke the Moldovan language. After all, in Canada, a country of destination for numerous Bukovinian immigrants, there were numerous Ukrainians who declared their language as “Bukovinian” according to the Canadian census bureau. However, this institution does not mention Romanians who declared their language as “Bukovinian”. Moreover, as we shall see, even the Ruthenian activists who pushed for linguistic Ruthenization among the illiterate Romanians made references to the “Romanian”, not the “Moldovan”, language.

Therefore, the process of change in ethnic and linguistic self-identification from “Moldovan” to “Romanian” had been completed in Bukovina by 1890 or at least by the early 1890’s. In the texts published by the Bukovinian Romanian folklorists Simion Florea Marian and Dimitrie Dan by 1895 and 1898, we do not see any references to the “Moldovan people”, etc. The term “Moldovan” had gradually come to be
understood by the Bukovinian Romanian population as a regional, as opposed to ethnic, identity, and it was
demphasized through the use of the term “Bukovinian Romanians” ("romani bucovineni"), which
coexisted with the “Moldovan Romanian” one. The discourse of a “Bukovinian” Romanian regional
identity as opposed to a “Moldovan” Romanian regional one was indirectly fostered by the Austrian
regime.

By the 1890’s, the process of transition from a “Moldovan” to a “Romanian” identity had been
completed. This process involved a few factors. The elites were unanimously behind the idea of a
“Romanian”, as opposed to a “Moldovan” ethnic identity or self-identification, or to a mixture of the two,
as were the Austrian authorities. The transition to the Latin alphabet facilitated it, as did the fact that there
was nothing in the ethnic basis to impede the process. The term “Moldovan” had gradually come to be
understood by the Bukovinian Romanian population as a regional, as opposed to ethnic, identity.

2.1.2. The Bukovinian Romanians – Sub-Ethnic Similarities and Differences with Other Romanian
Groups

The Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants, particularly in the rural areas, saw themselves subjectively
as identical to the Romanians in the province of Moldova of the Romanian state. They were also identified
as such by most outside observers, from an “intersubjective” point of view. The provincial “Bukovinian
Romanian” identity nevertheless had a certain role in creating a feeling of subjective differentiation.
However minor the differences between the Bukovinian and Moldovan Romanians on one hand and the
Transylvanian Romanians or the Bessarabians Moldovans/Romanians on the other were, they influenced
the pace of the nation-building process. For example, the potential ties between the Transylvanian
Romanians and the Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians had to be developed; they were not “automatically”
generated by a common sense of “Romanianess.” This pattern therefore reflects the importance of an
appropriate ethnic basis in facilitating nation-building.

Teodorescu-Kirileanu, Faptele si vitejile lui Stefan cel Mare si Sfint (Bucuresti, 1943), reproduced from S.
Fl. Marian, Traditii populare romanesti din Bucovina (Bucuresti, 1895), f. 119. “Stefan-Voda si ungurii”,
in Canciovici, p. 144-154, reproduced S. Teodorescu-Kirileanu, Faptele, p. 80-91, reproduced from
Marian, f. 958, “Dealul leahului”, in Canciovici, p. 170-173, reproduced S. Teodorescu-Kirileanu, Faptele,
p. 133-136, reproduced from Marian, f. 275, etc., are also relevant.
The relevance of the distinction between a Bukovinian and a Moldovan regional identity may be seen through a comparison with the province of Moldova in Romania. In Moldova (the territory of the old principality that was part of Romania), the process of acquiring a “Romanian” identity was also by and large completed by the first half of the 1890’s. It was at last finalized only by 1924. This was the last time when, as far as this author knows, there were references to “the Moldovan people” in legends collected in the southern part of the Romanian province of Moldova. The reasons why the finalization of the nation-building process in Bukovina took longer than in Moldova can not be fully elucidated. However, the existence of a “Moldovan Romanian” as opposed to a “Bukovinian Romanian” identity might have being a decisive factor.

There were differences between the Romanians from Bukovina and those from Moldova; the former practiced a more intensive agriculture than the latter as they had easier access to schools and the agricultural extension stations, experts from the crown domain, and the Orthodox Religious fund. However, the traveler with an untrained eye could not have discovered the location of the old frontier during the interwar period. A factor that facilitated nation-building was the circumstance that the Bukovinian Romanians were identical to those of the Romanian province of Moldova in terms of ethnicity and language broadly defined. This was also applicable in terms of dialect and sub-dialect, accent, folklore, folk music, customs, dress, traditions, etc. With both populations being overwhelmingly of the Eastern Orthodox religion, there was also no religious difference. There were then, as there are now, peasant pilgrimages for the relics of Sfanta Paraschiva, the patron saint of Moldova. In other words, the two groups

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176 Incidentally, this is one of the reasons why the use of the term “Bessarabians” and “Bessarabian Romanians” is characteristic of those in the Republic of Moldova who argue that the Bessarabians Moldovans are Romanians and tends to be criticized by those who say that they are not.
were identical to each other in terms of being part of the same ethnic, and indeed, sub-ethnic category.\textsuperscript{177}

The overwhelming majority of the Bukovinian Romanians, particularly among the peasants, thought that they were identical to the Romanians from Moldova. This was so not in the least because the villages, Orthodox places of worship and medieval fortresses were indistinguishable. By contrast, the fields, the urban localities, the official buildings, which had the same architecture throughout the empire, were somewhat different from those across the border. The same was true of the aristocratic mansions and the health spas.\textsuperscript{178}

There were, and there are, certain elements specific to Bukovina. They include the numerous train tunnels built during the Austrian period and the medieval and early modern monasteries that were painted on the outside. The latter were built in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. However, these distinguish certain parts of Bukovina (southwestern Bukovina and south-central Bukovina not only from Moldova, but also from southeastern Bukovina, which is indistinguishable from Moldova.\textsuperscript{179}

Importantly, the Bukovinian Romanian population did observe some significant sub-ethnic differences between the Bukovinian and Transylvanian Romanians that could be perceived in our days too. The Bukovinian Romanian immigrants who had arrived at the turn of the century in Chicago thought that the Transylvanian Romanians were somehow different, as Christine Avghi Galitzi showed in 1929 in A Study of Assimilation among the Romanians of the United States. “We certainly are Roumanians [said Mrs. S] but don’t you see we use other expressions than those of the Transylvanians or the Banatians? Their pronunciation is different and they have many words that we do not understand, so we keep to our own co-villagers. But when it comes to national fetes, such as the Tenth of May or when the “Imperateasa” [the correct spelling is Imparateasa] (the Empress, meaning her Majesty Queen Marie of Rumania) comes

\textsuperscript{177} Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), first used the term “ethnic category”.
\textsuperscript{178} See, for example, the Bukovinian Romanian newspaper \textit{Vointa Poporului}, March 31, 1907, cited in \textit{Marea Rascoala a Taranilor din 1907} (Bucuresti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1967, p. 611-612. “Our [Bukovinian Romanian] peasant is a very good brother with the Moldovan peasant [from Romania]. The same past, the same blood, the same needs connect them. Whoever hits one, also hits the other. And the pain of one must be felt by the others”. The differences and similarities between the various types of localities and buildings are apparent to those who see pictures from that period. Some of them may be found on the internet at \url{http://www.bukovinasociety.org}, and are still obvious for those who visit Bukovina.
\textsuperscript{179} The literature on this topic is immense. For pictures, see, among others, Petre Baron, \textit{Romania: Schituri, Manastiri, Biserici; Romania: Ermitages, Monasteres, Églises; Romania: Hermitages, Monasteries, Churches} (Bucuresti Romania: Editura Royal Company, 1999), p. 32-41.
here with her children, we do not think of ourselves as Bukovinians, Banatians or Transylvanians, but we all feel a Roumanian colony which must combine its efforts in order to show to the Americans that we are capable of organizing and of doing as well as the Poles, the Czechs and the other nationalities. “180

The Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants were as a group, and perceived themselves subjectively as, nearly identical to the Romanians in the province of Moldova of the Romanian state. Their provincial

180. Christine Avghi Galitzi, *A Study of Assimilation Among the Romanians of the United States* (New York: AMS Press, 1929), p. 202. An issue that has not been discussed by the available literature is whether the Bukovinian Romanians thought that they were identical in terms of sub-ethnic characteristics to the Bessarabian Moldovans. The view of the German ethnographer Gustav Weygand that “Romanian-speakers in Bessarabia and Bukovina spoke a dialect distinct for those in the Romanian kingdom, but that those differences were no more striking than regional variations inside Romania itself” is not accurate. It does not fit in with my own perceptions and those of other speakers of the Romanian language who have heard people using the Bukovinian and Bessarabian idioms. See Charles King, *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), p. 64 and 241, citing Gustav Weigand, *Die Dialekte der Bukowina und Bessarabien (mit einem Titelblinde und Musikbeilagen)* (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1904). The Bukovinian Romanians clearly found the latter more similar to them than the Transylvanian Romanians, as they indeed were, and about as similar or dissimilar as the Romanians of Wallachia. At some point before 1890, they seem to have thought that the Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians were identical to them, but by 1914, this perception had slightly diminished. The basis seems to have been largely objective, even though the fact that the border was on land, unlike the border between Ro-mania and Bessarabia, facilitated interaction and smuggling along the border, including of Romanian nationalist books. The Bessarabian Moldovans were no longer wearing their folk costumes (except for the Hotin area of Northern Bessarabia) by then, having replaced them with modern clothes, and their linguistic repertoire was diverse due to the increase in the vocabulary of the Bukovinian peasants exposed to the impact of mass education. Some minor sub-ethnic differences were already observed by 1914 by the Englishman W.F. Bailey. He also observed the presence of Bukovinian Romanian peasants who were selling their products in Kamenets-Podolsk, which means that they had traveled through northern Bessarabia. See the rather impressionistic, superficial and flighty impressions in W.F. Bailey, *The Slavs of the War Zone* (London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1917), and p. 14-15. Nevertheless, we should not take these to the extreme; the Bukovinian and central Bessarabians might have seemed slightly different, but not the Bukovinian and northern Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians of the Hotin area, currently in Ukraine. This explains why between the Soviet Ukrainian census of 1989 and the Ukrainian census of 2001, the Romanian identity has spread among many northern Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians on Ukrainian territory. This is not to in any way deny the existence of a cultural (not sub-ethnic) difference. It was observed by the early 1930’s by the Romanian writer Geo Bogza. According to him, the Bukovinian Romanians did not engage in binge drinking, while the Bessarabians did. See Geo Bogza, *Basarabia, Tara de pomint* (Bucuresti, Editura Ara, 1991). This might be indicative of the fact that the anti-alcoholism campaign of the priests and of the preacher Stefan Sain in Bukovina around 1900 had a lasting cultural impact. However, overall, the similarities between the northern Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians of Hotin seems to have been a reason why this area was included in Soviet Ukraine, and indeed in the Chernivtsy (Czernowitz) oblast, rather than in Soviet Moldova. This similarity paralleled the sub-ethnic identity of the Bukovinian and northern Bessarabian Ukrainians, who speak the Bukovinian dialect. This factor seems to have some-thing with the fact that the Austrians occupied the Hotin area, apparently with the purpose of annexing it to Bukovina. Between 1938 and 1940, and between 1941 and 1944, it was administratively part of Bukovina, and many Ukrainians think that the Ukrainian part of the old Tsarist and interwar Romanian county of Hotin is part of Bukovina. Indeed, between 1711 and 1812, it had been temporarily under Turkish administration (Raiaua Hotinului), and this has made both the local Romanians and Ukrainians unique in a way that will be discussed in a later chapter. See one of the relevant think-tank papers, Centrul de Prevenirea Conflictelor and Early Warning (received by e-mail from the think-tank, from the e-mail cpc_ew@txmail.ro , on June 13, 2004), “The Romanian Minority in Ukraine”, Policy Paper nr.704R/19 Iunie/June 19, 2004, p 1-6.
“Bukovinian Romanian” identity nevertheless had a role in creating a feeling of subjective differentiation. The minor differences between the Bukovinian and Moldovan Romanians and the Transylvanian Romanians or the Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians were popularly perceived. This circumstance made the potential ties with the Transylvanian Romanians and the Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians less close. This reflects the importance of a similar ethnic basis in facilitating nation-building.

2.1.3. The “Austrian” and “Bukovinian” Identities of a Minority of the Group

There were differences in the ethnic basis between the overwhelming majority of the Romanian peasants and a significant part of the urban Romanians. The latter’s idiom was to some extent influenced by Romanian-German bilingualism. The group included a certain number of people of Romanian, or of partly Romanian origin, with a German mother-tongue, or at least colloquial language. This “modified ethnic base” explains the existence of small minorities of the Romanian population with a different identity. Some of them viewed themselves as “Austrians” rather than as “Romanians” in terms of their membership in a cultural nation. Others had a “Bukovinian” provincial identity that substituted, or was more important than, their Romanian identity.

The magnitude of the phenomenon of linguistic Germanization is difficult to ascertain, but is quantifiable. In 1910, there were 3,444 such people who practiced Eastern Christian religious faiths (Greek Orthodoxy, Armenian Orthodoxy and Greek Catholicism). They were presumably of Romanian, Ruthenian or Armenian origin, but they spoke German. What is more difficult to measure is the spread of an Austrian as distinct from a Romanian identity among Romanian-speakers. In terms of occupations, the “casinos” (clubs) in urban areas helped spread the Austrian identity (and the increasing use of the German language) among civil servants. The Austrian identity was the most widespread among the urban ethnic Romanians in the mostly-German speaking medium-sized provincial towns who voted for Austrian patriotic parties such as the German Christian Social Party, the Christian Social Party and the German

Progressive Party. Parties that were less “Austrian-patriotic” could attract votes from self-identified ethnic Romanians.

The decline in the “highly Austrian patriotic” vote was the most marked in the urban localities where the increase in the Romanian population between 1900 and 1910 was the highest (the provincial capital of Czernowitz and the old capital of historic Moldova, Suczawa, the most “historical” city in Bukovina). The new arrivals tended to be highly educated and highly nationalistic, occasionally even irredentist, and tend to explain most of the decline of the Austrian identity. Of course, they could also influence some older Romanian inhabitants.

Neither the Austrian, nor Romanian, nor Soviet censuses gave individuals a chance to identify themselves as being a part of the Austrian nation. Therefore, we could document the existence of this small group by looking at the statements of Romanian political or cultural figures that in one way or another acknowledge its presence. Even more importantly, we could look at the number of individuals listed as being of Austrian “race” (i.e., ancestry) and Romanian mother-tongue (and Eastern Orthodox religion) in the Canadian censuses from 1921 to 1941, who had come (or whose ancestors had come) to Canada overwhelmingly before the Great War.

According to the 1921 and 1931 Canadian censuses, 538 and, respectively, 583 inhabitants were 10 years old or older and stated that they were Austrian by “race” and Romanian by native tongue. There were also 41 and, respectively, 106 individuals who viewed themselves as Romanians by “race” who spoke the “Austrian” language (presumably in most cases the Bukovinan German dialect). If one also includes those who were younger than 10, the figures for 1931 were 796 Romanian-speaking “ethnic Austrians” and 128 Austrian-speaking ethnic Romanians. In 1931, Canada had 29,056 ethnic Romanians and 18,115 Romanian-speakers, most of which were of Bukovinan origin. There were 12,356 and, respectively, 5,728 such Romanians and 13,843 and 7,178 Romanian-speakers above 10 years of age in 1931 and, respectively, 1921.

Slightly more than 10% of all the Bukovinan Romanians in Canada in 1931 and marginally less

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than 10% in 1921 were in some sense “Austrian.” This percentage was somewhat higher than among the Bukovinian Romanians who remained in Bukovina if only because those inhabitants which identified with the old supra-national Austria were less likely to find their place in the post-1918 Romanian national state and were more inclined to immigrate.

A certain admixture of German and other languages influenced the language of numerous Romanians in many, probably most, Bukovinian urban localities. This typically affected the less educated individuals. The phenomenon was neither universal nor uniform, but was worrisome, for some activists. The authors of the 1908 appeal “Toward the Romanians from All Four Corners”, a committee of the Romanian National House of Solca, deplored this phenomenon in the small town of Solca, half of whose population was Romanian, as well as in other urban areas.

As we shall see, the electoral data indicates that the spread of intensity of Romanian nationalism was lower in the urban areas. This is demonstrated by the electoral results from the Austrian and the early Romanian periods. The linguistic and cultural interaction with and closeness to members of other ethnic groups was alleged to explain this. The spread of first names such as Erast, Isidor, even the occasional Otto, possibly also Aurel, etc., which are not found in other areas inhabited by Romanians are a reflection of this atmosphere in the Bukovinian urban localities, and, as we shall see, among the aristocracy. The extent of intermarriage between Orthodox ethnic Romanians and other Orthodox inhabitants, a potentially significant factor, can not be estimated. In Czernowitz, there was a rather high rate of marriage (often greater than 10%) between Orthodox inhabitants, including ethnic Romanians, and the faithful of other Christian denominations. This might have reflected the Austrian identity of numerous inhabitants.

184. “Ethnic Austrians” represented 4.21% of all the Romanian-speakers in Canada who were older than 10 and 4.99% of those younger than 10. In all likelihood, those who were in some sense Austrian were more likely to live in families rather than as single individuals possibly because those who came to the New World after World War I were more inclined to leave Romania for good.

185. An example of such a pattern, albeit from the Hungarian half of the Habsburg monarchy, would be my paternal great-grandfather on my father’s side. He was a gendarme officer, who, after serving as a reserve officer in the Habsburg army during World War I, tried to immigrate to the United States in 1919. He was not allowed to enter, probably because of his status as an officer in an enemy army.


187. In 1895, 10.31% of all the marriages in the capital of the province in which an Eastern Orthodox inhabitant was a party were religiously mixed marriages. The percentages of religiously mixed marriages involving an Orthodox partner were 1.29% in 1895, 0.92% in 1898 and 1.67% in 1908 for the entire province. See Bureau der K.K. Statistischen Central-Commission, Osterreichische Statistik, vol. 49, no. 1 (Wien: Karl Gerold’s Sohn, 1898), p. 22-23; Bureau der K.K. Statistischen Central-
Yet over 95% of the Romanian ethnic population was neither linguistically Germanized nor culturally Austrianized. In Bukovina, in the rural areas, and in the Romanian-language press, the influence of the German language (or, for that matter, of the Ruthenian language) did not change the usage of terms by the public. It did not lead to the creation of a specific Bukovinian Romanian idiom with a large admixture of German and/or Ruthenian words. This was in contrast to the specific Bessarabian subdialect of the Romanian language that emerged during the period of Russian rule that included a certain admixture of Russian words. The only exception that I have found was the use of the term “valman”/“valmani” (elector/electors), which referred to the representatives elected by the population of the fourth and fifth electoral curiae (which will be discussed below), which elected members of the parliament.

Overall, the Bukovinian Romanians could have one of three competing ethnic identities: Romanian, Austrian, which have already been discussed, and Bukovinian. Romanian nationalism did not spread to all the members of the population of Romanian ethnic origin. It only spread to the overwhelming majority of these individuals. Non-nationalistic, non-aristocratic Romanian townsmen were the most numerous exceptions to this rule, but only some of the social democratic sympathizers in their ranks combined an Austrian identity with a Bukovinian one.

Among the more privileged classes, the Austrian and Bukovinian identities seem to have gone hand-in-hand. The most conspicuous exceptions to the Romanian nationalization of the population were some members of a socially important and powerful group whose members were linguistically Germanized or at least under the influence of German culture: the aristocracy and, to a lesser extent, the high Orthodox clergy. Numerous great landowners of Romanian origin were the most conspicuous members of the group. These aristocrats identified themselves as belonging to the Bukovinian (“der Bukowiner”) nation.189 Terms


188. This point and a few others are loosely based on my discussions with a Romanian-American of the older generation, Serban Tarnovschi, in the early 1990’s. The same was applicable to my discussions with two historians working for the Institute of Center for European History and Civilization, Stela Cheptea and Emil Ioan Emandi.

189. The “Bukovinian identity was also shared by many pre-World War I Ukrainian immigrants to Canada, as Ukrainian historians have noted. Interestingly enough, many of the aristocrats were actually of bourgeois origin, ennobled by the Austrian government, particularly in the first half of the nineteenth century. See Mihai-Stefan Ceausu, “Der Landtag der Bukowina”, in *Die Habsburger Monarchie 1848-1918*, vol. 7 (*Verfassung und Parlamentarismus*, second part) (Wien: Der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000), p. 2180. It should be noted that noble titles did not exist in Romania after the union
such as “Bukovinism” (“Bukowinaerthum”) were used to describe the outlook of those individuals who spoke German in their families. They were mostly members of the well to do classes, the upper middle class and the upper class.190

Some of the members of these strata (both the Germanized and the non-Germanized ones) served as elected legislators (the largest single occupational group until 1900), as high-level administrators, or held influential public positions. Some of them had a strong, supra-national Austrian Bukovinian identification, and a weak or non-existent Romanian ethnonational identity, but by the 1890’s, the members of this group which desired a career in electoral politics had to identify themselves as Romanians (which is what happened in most cases) or as Ruthenians, which was true in the case of Count Mykola Wasilko.191 The decreasing power and influence of the aristocrats just because they were aristocrats was a salient phenomenon. Between the elections of 1891 and 1911, if some aristocrats became or remained important in politics, this happened increasingly because of their nationalism, not their social class.192

To summarize this section, there were differences in the ethnic basis between the overwhelming majority of the Romanian peasants and some of the urban Romanians. The Romanian urban idiom was to some extent influenced by Romanian-German bilingualism. The group included a certain number of people of Romanian, or of partly Romanian origin, with a German mother-tongue, or at least colloquial language. This “altered ethnic base” or cultural hybridization explains the existence of small minorities of the Romanian population with another identity. They thought of themselves as “Austrians” rather than “Romanians” in terms of their membership in a cultural nation. This is also the reason why some others had a “Bukovinian” provincial identity that substituted, or was more salient than, their Romanian identity.

2.1.4. The Impact of Ruthenization and Romanization

The Ruthenization of some Bukovinian Romanians hindered Romanian nation-building. By
contrast, the Romanization of some Ruthenians facilitated Romanian nation-building. Over time, due to the progress of the nation-building process, the bilingual populations that were on the borderline of the two ethnic groups shrank. They increasingly had to make choices in reference to the nation-building process. They had to choose membership in a nation. The evolving character of the ethnic basis had a key role in shaping these choices.

An analysis of Romanian nation-building in Bukovina must deal with the interactions between Romanians and Ruthenians. It must look at the issue of how members of one ethnic group developed a national self-identification normally associated with the ethnic basis of another group. The duchy had roughly equal numbers of ethnic Romanians, called “Moldovans” until the 1860’s by the Austrian authorities, and of Ukrainians, always called “Ruthenians” (or “Ruthenes”) by the Habsburg state apparatus. All the more or less accurate official statistics, including censuses, from 1846 onward showed the two groups to be almost evenly balanced.

The method of counting, with its biases, affected the results one way or another. So did linguistic and ethnic assimilation in both directions. The linguistic self-identifications of some bilingual individuals did change between censuses. In 1846, there were 180,417 (48.61%) Ruthenians and 140,628 Moldovans (37.89%). In 1851, there were 144,982 (38.07%) ethnic Ruthenians and 184,718 (48.51%) ethnic Moldovans. According to an Austrian administrative report that combined the data from the two above-mentioned censuses, the Ruthenians represented 42.11% and the Romanians 39.30%.

The figures from the 1880 decennial census based on “language customarily spoken” (“Umgangsprache”) were 239,690 Ruthenian-speaking Austrian subjects (42.16%) as well as 190,005 (33.43%) Romanian-speaking Austrian subjects. The numbers were 268,367 (41.77%) and 208,301 (32.42%) in 1890, 297,798 (41.16%) and 229,018 (31.65%) in 1900, and 305,101 (38.38%) and 273,254 (34.37%) in 1910. The population of the province was 44.51% Romanian and 29.14% Ukrainian (including “Ruthenian” and “Hutzul”) by nationality, and 41.14% Romanian and 32.90% Ukrainian by

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mother tongue according to the Romanian census of 1930, when Bukovina had 853,009 inhabitants.

The southern and east-central areas of the province were overwhelmingly ethnically Romanian. \(^{196}\) By contrast, the northern and northwestern parts were overwhelmingly Ruthenian. In 1910, almost all the Bukovinian Romanian-speakers (268,992 out of 273,254 Romanians) were Eastern Orthodox (there were 548,056 Bukovinians of this faith). An only slightly smaller proportion of the province’s Ruthenian-speaking population (274,758 out of 305,101) was Eastern Orthodox. Ruthenian-speakers also represented an overwhelming majority of the province’s Greek Catholics (21,508 out of 26,178). The Ruthenian Greek Catholics were of Galician rather than Bukovinian origin.

There was also a group of individuals of Ruthenian mother tongue with a Romanian ethnic identity. The phenomenon could be analyzed by looking at the Romanian, Soviet, Ukrainian and Canadian censuses. At any rate, the number of Ukrainian-speaking ethnic Romanians according to the Canadian census of 1931 was 4,459 in 1931, while the number of Romanian-speaking Ukrainians was 229. Most, but not all, of these people, were Bukovinians. \(^{197}\)

Moreover, the Romanian electoral “cadastre” right before World War I included all the electors who indicated, through a free declaration, a preference to be part of the Romanian national community, and to vote for Romanian representatives in the diet. It included all the inhabitants who identified themselves as ethnic Romanians, including those who spoke other colloquial languages, including German, and especially Ruthenian. These individuals were particularly numerous in three communes just south of Czernowitz, located right on the Romanian-Ukrainian ethnic border. For example, in Cuciurul Mare, the combined population of the two ethnic groups was 40.9% Romanian and 59.1% Ukrainian by colloquial language in 1910, and 81.4% Romanian and 18.6% Ruthenian by electoral “cadaster” in the same year. \(^{198}\)

The connection between language and religion is very relevant for the process of nation-building,

\(^{196}\) The detailed, locality-by-locality ethnic map of Bukovina (Ethnographische Landkarte der Bukowina nach der Volkszählung von 1910 von I. Nistor), for the year 1910 may be found at http://www.bukovinasociety.org/map1910m.html and at http://www.bukovinasociety.org/map1910.html (in German). It may also be found at the end of the work Dr. I. Nistor, Der Nationale Kampf in der Bukowina mit besonderer Refucksichtigung der Rumanen und Ruthenen (Bucuresti: Der Romanischen Akademie, 1918). This is the German-language version of Dr. Ion I. Nistor, Romanii si Rutenii in Bucovina: Studiu Istoric si Statistic (Bucuresti: Editiunea Academiei Romane, 1915). It also appears in Arhivele Statului din Romania, Romania: Documentele Unirii 1918 (Bucuresti: Editura Fundatiei Culturale Romane, 1993), p. 99 (the explanations appear in Romanian, French and English).


\(^{198}\) Economu, p. 127.
and fuzzy collective memories and religious artifacts from the past were used. Around the turn of the century, there were complaints from Romanian priests to the Orthodox leadership of Bukovina that Ruthenian intellectuals, who were in a position of authority or prestige vis-à-vis the neighboring Romanians, were promoting the use of the Ruthenian language. Thus, the Galician Greek Catholic Ukrainian teacher Dimitrie Makahon of the two-thirds Ruthenian, one-third Romanian village of Lucavita, told the Romanian students to stop saying the prayer “our father” in the Romanian language. He argued that “this language is a Gypsy speech”, that it is “an idiom that is not pleasing to God” and that “whoever speaks Romanian can not get to Heaven”. The evidence that he provided was that “all the books of the true faith” were written in the Church Slavonic language and not in Romanian.

In his memoirs, the Romanian priest Constantin Moraru provides concrete examples (drawn particularly from the areas close to Czernowitz) of how Romanian peasants were told that one could get to heaven only by speaking at home Ruthenian, that is, the language of God. The language of heaven was Ruthenian, the angels spoke Ruthenian, God spoke Ruthenian, and the last judgment would be in Ruthenian. Many illiterate, fanatically religious Romanian peasants in central Bukovina, believing inaccurately that the Ruthenian language was the Slavonic language, the language of the old “holy books” before the Orthodox church in Moldova and Wallachia had switched to the use of Romanian in the 17th century, began using Ruthenian.\textsuperscript{199}

As we shall see, the population of the areas affected by this phenomenon included the areas of the Austrian district of Czernowitz (not the city, but the adjacent areas), and at least some of the suburbs of the city, where the process was more advanced as the Romanian speech was half-Ruthenized, as well as some other neighboring areas. In these areas, Romanian nationalism was not particularly intense in 1907. It became more intense in 1911, after the Ruthenization process had started to be reversed as one can see in the linguistic census results. This largely explains the greater support for the more nationalistic party.\textsuperscript{200} Our expectation was that hardly any Romanians in the suburbs would vote for Romanian nationalistic candidates and that the inhabitants in the rural area affected by “Ruthenization” would vote for less intensely nationalistic candidates. The evidence confirms this.

In conclusion, the Ruthenization of some Bukovinian Romans hindered Romanian nation-

\textsuperscript{199} Iacobescu, p. 187-189.
\textsuperscript{200} Iacobescu, p. 187-188.
building. By contrast, the Romanization of some Ruthenians aided Romanian nation-building. Due to the progress of the nation-building process, the bilingual populations that were on the borderline of the two ethnic groups decreased in size.

In summary, the first step toward Romanian nation-building consisted of a generalized process of acquisition of a Romanian national identity by numerous individuals who had not previously had this identity. This group included almost all the Bukovinian Romanians. The emergence of this identity on top of the previous “Moldovan” one, which became a provincial identity, was a key early step in the nation-building process. It was also a precondition for the development of generalized political nationalism among a large majority of those who displayed it. Very few ethnic Romanians shared various other competing identities (e.g., “Bukovinian”, Austrian and “Ruthenian”). Such individuals were under the influence of the languages and cultures of other ethnic groups. This important pattern is consistent with my theory emphasizing the importance of the ethnic basis.

2.2. Independent Variable 2: The Educational System

The Romanian-language elementary educational system, the second independent variable, played a key role in fostering nation building. The more advanced the level of education, the more likely it was for nationalism to be particularly intense among both the instructional personnel and those subjected to the process of education. The post-primary educational system fostered the growth of early irredentist activism. This involved mostly individuals who had been socialized in the system until the early fall of 1918, and especially those who were linked with it during World War I.

Toward the end of the Austrian period, the primary or elementary, and, to a lesser extent, the post-elementary, education of the Romanian population was conducted overwhelmingly in Romanian language classrooms. By around 1880, the conditions in most schools created an atmosphere that helped promote a nationalistic worldview. The percentage of such schools increased over time. In most cases, however, the educators also fostered loyalty toward Austria. The exceptions were situations where teachers were irredentist nationalist.
2.2.1. Romanian Elementary Schools Increasingly Promote Nationalism: From Mixed to Monolingual Schools

The Romanian monolingual schools facilitated nation-building to a larger extent than the mixed (multilingual) schools. Therefore, the transformation of multilingual schools into monolingual schools (e.g., a Romanian-German school would be broken up into a Romanian school and a German school) was crucial. It fostered Romanian nation-building.

The importance of the educational system in nation-building has been noted by various scholars. For example, Roman Szporluk, who emphasizes an element that had already been mentioned by Kohn, notes that Eastern European nationalism, and civil society, first appeared in the sphere of culture.\(^{201}\) He argues that a nationally conscious economic bourgeoisie (and, I would add, a nationally conscious proletariat) appeared after the national cultural intelligentsia.\(^{202}\) Irina Livezeanu has also emphasizes the role of the educational system in the nationalization of the masses in interwar Romania, as well as before 1918, including in Bukovina. She has noted the importance of the nationalistic content of teaching, and of the key role of the educational system in nation-building.\(^{203}\)

The dissemination of nationalism occurred in most schools after, and even before, 1880 because those who taught in Romanian were overwhelmingly Romanian nationalists. Moreover, from 1906-1909 onward they were supervised by Romanian nationalistic school inspectors. In 1910, the Romanian nationalistic intellectual elite provided the 646 Romanian elementary school teachers with educational material. These educators represented 35.87\% of the 1,801 teachers in the province, and 90.1\% of the 717 Bukovinian Romanian teachers. The support was channeled through “Societatea pentru literatura si cultura romana in Bucovina” (“The Society for Romanian Literature and Culture in Bukovina”), founded in 1863. It was also fostered in a similar way through the society “Scoala romana” (“The Romanian School”), founded in 1883.\(^{204}\)

\(^{201}\) Roman Szporluk, "In Search of the Drama of History: Or, National Roads to Modernity", in East European Politics and Societies, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 141-143.
\(^{202}\) Szporluk, p. 145-146,148.
\(^{204}\) Prokopowitsch, Rumanische, p. 87.
Therefore, the nationalistic intellectual elite also shaped the ideological content of Romanian language education. The transformation of multilingual schools into monolingual schools through the breaking up of the old multilingual schools (e.g., a Romanian-German school would be broken up into a Romanian school and a German school) was important. This process fostered Romanian nation-building.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, Romanian language education was characterized by the increase in the number of Romanian schools, and by the increasingly “purely Romanian character” of these establishments, particularly starting in the 1860’s. The “mixed”/multi-lingual schools were better for nation-building than the schools teaching in another mother-tongue than the children’s mother-tongue. Yet they facilitated it less than purely monolingual schools. This happened not only in Bukovina during that time period, but also in Bukovina after 1918, and also in the other cases that we shall look at in subsequent chapters (Moldovan-languages schools in Bessarabia during the Soviet period, and Slovene-language schools in the Austrian land of Carinthia), for a number of reasons. Luckily enough, the conditions in a particular Bukovinian school have been studied in detail.205

We need to define a few concepts. These include the politically dominant language, the language that had a higher official status (which was German in Bukovina) and the culturally dominant language (which was again German to some extent in Bukovina). Other key terms are the economically dominant language and the language in which economic interactions occurred (typically German in the urban and some other areas, but in some areas often Romanian or Ruthenian or something else). There was also the “language of pressure”. In other words, various pressures could be used to encourage the students to study in that language more than they or their parents might have desired them to do. This language was not very often German. In most localities, there was no “language of pressure”, but wherever there was one, according to the available Romanian sources, that language was indeed Ukrainian rather than German.206

Overall, the Bukovinian mixed-language schools should be defined as “balanced” (no language was

205. The mechanisms operating in monolingual vs. multilingual elementary schools, of course, operated in the cases of higher schools too, but to a lesser extent, as we shall see. We are fortunate that there has been a study of comprehensive studies dealing with the teachers and classmates of Mihai Eminescu, who would become Romania’s foremost poet; the fact that it covers the 1860’s does not detract from its value, while the fact that he was not a politician makes the study less politically partisan. See Teodor V. Stefanelli, Radu I. Sbiira and SamoiI I. Isopescu, Amintiri despre Eminescu: Profesori si colegi bucovineni ai lui Eminescu (Craiova: Editura “Serisul Romanesc”, 1996). The analysis below relies chiefly on this book, on Iacobescu, Prokopowitsch and other sources cited above.

206. Ukrainian sources, such as Nowosiwsky, do not discuss this issue, even though they cite the relevant Romanian sources that make these claims on other issues.
dominant). The mixed unbalanced urban schools of Soviet Moldova, in which the Russian language was superior in prestige to Moldovan (Romanian) had a different impact. It promoted both Russification among some, and a more intense nationalism among other, Moldovans. This was especially true for those who were beaten up by gangs of Russian-speakers, which was a more common occurrence than we might imagine. Events such as these did not happen in Habsburg Bukovina. To be sure, the students in even Austrian, including Bukovinian middle schools were not always guaranteed their right to education in their mother-tongue, or the language of their parents’ choice. This could be done only in monolingual schools.

Sometimes, particularly earlier during the period, there were teachers for certain classes who did not know Romanian well enough. This was particularly common if they were not ethnic Romanians. Whereas the impact of the above-mentioned factors was more sporadic after 1900, other factors were more or less constants.

The students were in most cases induced to feel legally equal to each other regardless of ethnicity. Unlike in Soviet Moldova, the extra-curricular activities were not always held in a common language. The interactions and friendships with children of other languages were much more likely to happen in linguistically mixed schools. This could keep the students’ level of nationalism lower than it would have been otherwise, particularly for the lower-level schools. Often, the broadening of the linguistic range of the children through such friendships made them speak poorer Romanian than those from monolingual schools, particularly in the area of vocabulary.

In linguistically unbalanced mixed schools, children could also be exposed to disparaging ethnic comments from the children of groups. They could be exposed to similar reactions even from teachers from the dominant ethnic and linguistic groups (e.g., Russians/Russian-speakers in Soviet Moldova). As a rule, this did not happen in the balanced mixed schools of Bukovina, even from the on average economically better-off groups, such as Germans or Jews, or from ethnic groups who were in conflict with Romanians, such as Ruthenians. The teachers who were not Bukovinian natives, even though often highly competent, were often not sufficiently culturally sensitive. This was sometimes a problem, particularly in the case of the German Roman Catholic and Ukrainian Greek Catholic teachers.

To be sure, in linguistically mixed schools, children were exposed to differences in socio-

207 I would have to thank my friend Marin Eladi for this point. He attended a mixed high school in the town of Anenii Noi in the late ‘80’s – early ‘90’s.
economic status, which were mostly across the ethnic line. By contrast, the socio-economic differences in some rural monolingual schools, although visible, could be ignored. This was largely because not only the non-Romanians, but also the well-to-do Romanians who attended private schools, were missing. Regardless of whether the reaction against these differences in socio-economic status later in the life of the students in these mixed schools attended during the Austrian period would be equalitarian-socialist, anti-Semitic, or philo-German, or philo-Jewish, this kept the level of nationalism of those Romanian voters lower. Most of those individuals voted for the Social Democrats, for the Democratic Party, for the anti-Semitic German Christian Socials or for independent Jewish candidates, or of non-ethnic Romanians in local elections. If Bukovinian Romanian nationalism would have been more anti-German, these experiences might have helped nation-building. Yet it was not, so it did not affect the process in any significant way.208

In 1870-71, there were 30 Romanian elementary schools.209 In 1882/1883, there were 101 Romanian or partly Romanian schools in all, 47.64% of the 212; out of these, 53 were purely Romanian in terms of language of instruction, and 48 used Romanian and one or more other languages. In that year, there were 14 Romanian-German schools, 7 Romanian-Ruthenian-German schools, 12 Romanian-Ruthenian schools and 15 Romanian-Ruthenian-Polish-German schools.210 In 1912/1913, the last year for which we have Austrian statistical information, there were 564 elementary public schools in Bukovina, out of which 214 (37.94%) were Romanian (190 purely Romanian and 24 mixed, including 17 German-Romanian, 2 Ruthenian-Romanian and 5 German-Romanian-Ruthenian schools). Moreover, 45 other Bukovinian public elementary schools taught the Romanian language. Out of 34 private elementary schools, 14 taught in Romanian (41.18%); 12 were German-Romanian, 1 German-Romanian-Ruthenian and 1 German-Romanian-Ruthenian.211

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208 For more qualitative details and concrete examples, see Iacobescu, passim.
Table 2D. The Evolution of the Numbers of Romanian-Language Public Elementary Schools in Habsburg Bukovina in 1870-1913, in Numbers and Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Purely Romanian Language</th>
<th>Partly Romanian Language</th>
<th>All Romanian Language</th>
<th>Romanian as the Second Language</th>
<th>All Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870-1871</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882-1883</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22.64</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-1913</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>33.69</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Romanian monolingual schools fostered nation-building to a larger extent than the mixed (multilingual) schools. Therefore, the transformation of multilingual schools into monolingual schools through the breaking up of the old multilingual schools (e.g., a Romanian-German school would be broken up into a Romanian school and a German school) was very consequential. It facilitated Romanian nation-building.

**2.2.2. Increases in Literacy**

The increase in literacy facilitated nation-building. Moreover, the thresholds in the growth of literacy largely explains why the growth in nationalistic voting occurred when we have seen that it did, namely between 1901 and 1911. The statistics on literacy by age indicate that the year 1880 was a threshold year. Most of the Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants born before that year were illiterate in 1900 and later. Yet most of those who were born subsequently were literate.

There was a massive increase in school attendance and literacy during the late Austrian period. Even though elementary education was compulsory, in 1882/1883, only 35% of the Bukovinian children of school age got any education. In 1912/1913, with the same laws and enforcement mechanisms as before, only 3% of the children of school age, mostly Ukrainians from the Hutzul subgroup, did not receive any

school instruction at all. Consequently, illiteracy decreased. The number of fully literate inhabitants, of people who could read and write increased was 52,446 individuals (9.17%) in 1880, and it included 33,662 males (11.89%) and 18,784 females (6.58%). The number of semi-illiterate individuals, who could only read, but not write, was 6,527 individuals (1.14%), including 3,629 males (1.28%) and 2,898 females (1.02%). The number of illiterates was 512,690 (89.68%), including 249,051 males (86.98%) and 263,647 females (92.40%).

The illiteracy rate was 79.88% for males and 86.17% for females in 1890. In 1900, the percentage of Bukovinians who were literate was 28.68% (32.74% for males, 24.48% for females); the semi-illiterates formed 0.97% (0.98% of the males and 0.96% of the females) and 70.35% were illiterate (66.27% for males and 74.45% for females). In 1910, among the Bukovinians above 10 years of age, 259,328 were literate (45.23%), including 142,042 males (50.41%) and 117,826 females (40.40%). There were 5,053 semi-literate inhabitants (0.88%), including 2,264 males (0.80%) and 2,789 females (0.96%) and 309,028 illiterates (53.89%), including 137,477 males (48.79%) and 171,551 females (58.83%). In 1910, 60.4% among the Bukovinian Romanians, and 70.6% among the Bukovinian Ruthenians above the age of ten, were illiterates, as opposed to 76.68% and 83.15% in 1900. While the statistics of 1910 are not completely comparable with the previous ones (after all, in 1910, the literacy of those below 10 was not counted), it is clear that the literacy rate increased substantially over time.

However, it would be wrong to measure the impact of the educational system merely by the percentage of literates and illiterates in the population. This is an indirect proxy. The statistics of literacy by age indicate that the year 1880 was a threshold year. Most of the inhabitants born before it were illiterate in

212 Prokopowitsch, Rumanische, p. 73.
1900 and later, but most of those who were born after that date were literate.

The percentage of the population that was literate increased slowly until around 1890, after which it took off. According to the census of 1900, the percentage of literates was 4.56% for the ethnic Romanians in Bukovina born before 1830, 2.99% for those born between 1830 and 1839, 4.01% for those born between 1840 and 1849 and 7.04% for those born within the next decade. The percentages were 10.22% for those born in the 1860’s, 22.35% for those born during the next decade and as high as 54.16% of those born in the 1880. The percentage decreased to 19.94% for those born in the 1890’s for the simple reason that these people had less than 10 years in 1900. Among the males, the figures were 30.31%, 60.41% and 20.75% for the cohorts born in the last three decades of the century.\footnote{217} The picture that one gets is that a large majority of the younger generation of Romanian voters was literate by the time of the elections of 1907.

Before analyzing the impact of the educational system, it is important to answer two related questions. Why did parents send their children to school? Why, as we shall see, did most of the illiterate Romanians apparently vote for the more intensely nationalistic candidates by 1907 and in 1911? The answer to the second question is easy. The older generation followed the opinions of the younger, literate generation, while the young and old illiterates, even if they did not know how to read and write, did have texts (books, newspapers, etc.) read to them individually or in the reading clubs which sprawled in the Bukovinian villages starting in the 1890’s. Some husbands probably read to their wives, and even some parents listened to what their school children were reading from the textbooks. The entire village community therefore shared the benefits of the literacy of a majority of a generational cohort, at least in most communities.

This is a necessary and sufficient explanation for the overall increase in nationalistic voting that has been quantified above. We will touch on inter-regional variation later. The Romanian areas with less intensely nationalistic votes had a lower proportion of literate citizens. They also had a higher incidence of more naïve petitions that asked the Orthodox Religious Fund to lease land to the peasants in the first decade

of the twentieth century.\footnote{See Iacobescu, passim.}

The increase in literacy facilitated nation-building. Moreover, the thresholds in the growth of literacy largely explain why the growth in nationalistic voting occurred between 1901 and 1911. The literacy statistics indicate that the year 1880 was a threshold year. Most of the Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants born before that year were illiterate in 1900 and subsequently. By contrast, most of those who were born after that date were literate.

\section*{2.2.3. The Microfoundations of School Attendance and of Its Impact}

The direct impact of the local village elite, and particularly of the priests, in shaping how the inhabitants voted, should not be overstated. The relatively efficient and efficacious Bukovinian Romanian teachers in the Romanian schools had an indirect impact. They did it through their role in making the children, the future voters, literate. This task was achieved after less extensive formal education than in the case of the average Bukovinian student.

There has also been an alternative hypothesis, namely that the peasants voted for the candidates for whom the priests and the teachers told them to vote. This hypothesis should be evaluated logically and empirically. The parish chronicles have been studied and discussed by Mihai Iacobescu. They do not support the view that the clergy had such a strong political role. The teachers had a slightly greater importance. The clergymen did believe that they had had some role in making the parents send their children to school, and, to a lesser extent, to stop drinking, but thought that they had less influence over votes. Besides, the assumption is that the teachers and the priests in a locality had the same partisan preferences. They clearly did not.

Besides, if the peasants voted for the parliamentary candidate favored by the local elite but not for the candidates for local government (which was less often the case), why should we assume that the elite could influence national but not local politics?\footnote{See Iacobescu, passim.} Yet if the role of “the usual suspects” was less than expected, this does not mean that individual actors did not play a role.

One of the factors that led to an increase in school attendance was the enormous impact of an
itinerant Orthodox preacher. His role has been overlooked until the publication of Mihai Iacobescu’s original research in 2003. Another one was the efforts of the teachers to attract students to school by convincing their parents about the necessity of this step. This was also part of a broader effort by the teachers to spread nationalist visions in the community. Finally, around the turn of the twentieth century, the newly literate children were finally allowed to take their books home with them. This facilitated their reading of textbook material to their parents and grandparents. This helped the spread of the ideas in the textbook, including more intense versions of Romanian nationalism. The educational system was more important than that of the Orthodox Church in nation-building. This was largely because the most important way in which priests had a role was through their connection with the educational system.

By the 1880’s and around 1890, drunkenness was a serious problem among the Bukovinian Romanians, but after that the prevalence of the problem declined abruptly. During the period 1890-1913, the effective popular preacher, Stefan Saint, traveled through the Bukovinian villages and, on Sundays and holidays, preached against, “the sin of drunkenness and the inequities committed under the influence of this vice”. While in some villages, the changes were incremental and partial, in some others, the entire Romanian population stopped drinking. According to the same priests, one of the benefits of this change was that the people who had stopped drinking were sending their children to school and kept them there for longer continuous periods.220

As we have seen, over time, there was a great increase in the number of students attending elementary schools. As we have seen and we shall see, this facilitated the spreading of political nationalism because of the diffusion of ideological nationalism by the teachers, including by numerous clergymen who were also teachers of religion. Former students inside and outside the classroom also furthered the process. This diffusion can not be measured directly. What we could ascertain was the fact that the textbooks were written in a nationalistic spirit.

The extent to which the students were ready and able to absorb quickly the lessons that the teachers taught them, whether in the areas of reading and writing or nationalism, can not be ascertained. In fact, there is Austrian statistical data that allows us to ascertain how long it took the students to learn how to read and write. This would allow us to compare the efficacy of the educational process for the key groups

in Bukovina. The percentage of school-age children among Romanians and among the Bukovinian population as a whole according to the 1900 census were 3.79% and 6.78% for six-year-olds, 45.77% and 40.52% for seven-year-olds, 61.08% and 56.48% for eight-year-olds, 66.36% and 63.54% for nine-year-olds, 65.30% and 62.75% for ten-year olds.221

This to some extent measures, albeit indirectly, the greater enthusiasm, skill and success of the teachers in Romanian language classrooms, which helped Romanian children learn how to read sooner than average. Less efficacious teachers could have been seen as more of a burden by the older generation, but this was not at all the case among the Bukovinian Romanians. The popular respect for generally well-performing teachers facilitated the spread of a process whose agents they were, namely nation-building.

The relatively efficient and efficacious Bukovinian Romanian teachers in the Romanian schools had an indirect impact, through their role in making the students literate. This was particularly important since this task was achieved after less extensive formal education than in the case of the average Bukovinian student.

2.2.4. Toward More Intense Nationalism: The Post-Elementary Educational System

The Austrian, and particularly Bukovinian, post-elementary educational system was a key catalyst in facilitating the growth of the more intense varieties of Romanian nationalism, and particularly irredentism, from 1871, and especially from 1909, onward. This occurred partly due to its partly Romanian character, and increasing “Romanianization” in terms of teaching language. Another factor that accounts for this was the more intense than average Romanian nationalism of those students who had advanced as far on the “ladder” of the educational system. One can also partly trace it very clearly to the involvement in intensely nationalistic activities of many actual and former students. This took place under the influence of strongly nationalistic, often irredentist, student fraternities and academic associations and societies. It was also influenced by fellow students and faculty, by academic guest speakers from Romania and by summer

classes in that country. Student and educational publications also had an impact in the same direction.\textsuperscript{222} Gale Stokes has already provided a possible explanation for the greater intensity of nationalism among the more highly educated inhabitants. According to him, the appeals of nationalism are successful only when an individual is what he defines as “operational”. In other words, he or she is able to understand abstract, logical thinking, a skill that is allegedly acquired exclusively through schooling.\textsuperscript{223} I would tend to go somewhat farther than Stokes. In my view, the greatest ability and willingness to engage in abstract thinking seems to be more characteristic of the more highly educated individuals. These individuals were more likely to be able to “see” or “imagine”\textsuperscript{224} the entirety of the nation than the members of the nation with only a primary education. The latter’s “geographical span” was more likely to be more local, and to focus on the province, or a part thereof, or the province plus some adjacent areas. To be sure, the nation seemed equally “real” for both groups, but only some were able to see it in its entirety.\textsuperscript{225} However, my main concern is to demonstrate the link between higher education and a greater intensity of nationalism, not

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{222} Prokopowitsch, \textit{Rumanische}, pp. 91, 95, 112, 113, 114, 120, 123-124.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Szporluk, p. 145-148.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Benedict Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism} (London, New York: Verson, 1995), has undoubtedly inspired my use of this word or concept.
\item \textsuperscript{225} For more information on the more local nationalistic outlook of the less educated Bukovinian Romanians, see, for example, the parish chronicles cited in Iacobescu, passim, but also Christine Avghi Galiză, passim, in her work on the Bukovinian Romanians in America, with a number of case studies of pre-1914 peasant arrivals. The cultural anthropological study dealing with the Romanians from that period, \textit{see Die Osterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild} (Wien: Druck und Verlag der kaiserlich-königlichen Hof und Staatsbuckerei, 1899), vol. 20 (Bukowina), p. 191-228 does provide the broader context, but rather little information on this topic. The folktales collected during the pre-1914 period that are reprinted in Mihai Canciovič (ed.), \textit{Domnitori romani in legende} (București: Editura Sport - Turism, 1984), and Octav Paun and Silviu Angeleascu (eds.), \textit{Legende Populare Romanesti}, (București: Editura Albatros, 1983), are more useful. The information from various articles from the interwar numbers of \textit{Sociologia Românească}, and particularly those cited in Ionas Aurelian Rus, "The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Right in the Interwar Years (II)", in \textit{Arhivele Totalitarismului}, no. 1-2, 1999 (Year 7, no. 22-23), p. 12-31, is also relevant. This is particularly true in the case of the information concerning the older generations, whose worldview had been formed before 1914. The same may be said about the Austrian administrative reports cited in Prokopowitsch, \textit{Rumanische}, as well as other sources. The local focus of the local civic groups, e.g., the “arcasii”, discussed above, also gives us a clue. For more information on the worldview of the most highly educated population, we benefit from the relevant writings of numerous individuals (scholars, newspapermen), the Austrian administrative reports in Prokopowitsch, \textit{Rumanische}. The status of the various civic organizations, and particularly academic ones, is also revealing. See Jumara, “Contribuția”, passim, Prokopowitsch, \textit{Rumanische}, passim, Hausleitner, passim and the relevant entries in one of the pre-Communist encyclopedias, Lucian Predescu, \textit{Enciclopedia Romaniei - Cugetarea: Material romanesc - Oameni si infaptuiri} (București: Editura SAECULUM LO., 1999). The reminiscences of various individuals, biographies of specific important individuals that provide us with the outlook of their friends, classmates, fellow members of various associations, etc., are often invaluable. See, for example, Theodor V. Stefanelli, Radu I. Sbiera, Samoil I. Iospeșcu, \textit{Amitiri despre Eminescu}, passim. Bits and pieces of information on this topic may indeed be found in tens of additional sources.
\end{itemize}
the psychological reasons why it was so.

The academic society “Junimea” (“Youth”), founded in 1878, was made up of current and former students of the University of Czernowitz. Through various festivals organized by this society, and by other similar ones, in the cities and towns of the province, the red-yellow-blue tricolor flag of Romania, the distinctive sign of Junimea members, became widely used. It spread throughout the Romanian population, including the peasantry, as the Bukovinian Romanian flag.\footnote{Lucian Predescu, Enciclopedia României - Cuvetarea: Material romanesc - Oameni si infaptuirii (Bucuresti: Editura SAECULUM LO., 1999), p. 459; and Jumara, passim.}

Originally, the German language was dominant in post-elementary education in the province. However, the system evolved over time due to political pressure, also from Romanian nationalists. Romanian was, together with German, a teaching language in only one of the four gymnasia (middle and high schools). It was a Greek Orthodox one, founded in 1860. The Greek Orthodox technical high school founded in 1862 used Romanian and Ruthenian for teaching purposes.

The number of post-elementary schools using Romanian increased over time, through the introduction of parallel Romanian classes in three state gymnasia. The number of gymnasia with parallel Romanian classes increased to two in 1906, three in 1908, and four in 1910. The originally German-language teaching college of Czernowitz, opened in 1870, also started parallel Ukrainian and Romanian classes in 1909.\footnote{Prokopowitsch, Rumanische, pp. 68-74, 126. Information on the Franz Joseph State Gymnasium (Franz Josef-Staatgymnasium), including a list of the students between 1906 and 1914, may be found at http://bukowina.info/FJSereth.pdf.}

At the University of Czernowitz, Romanian was increasingly used as one of the teaching languages in the department of Eastern Orthodox Theology.

Toward the end of the period of Habsburg rule, the Romanians, who formed 0.9% of the population of Austria in 1900, and 0.98% in 1910, were disproportionately represented among secondary and university students in Austria as a whole, but underrepresented in Bukovina. Romanians formed only 22% of all gymnasium students in Bukovina in 1908, but represented 1.1% of all Austrian students in secondary schools in 1912-1913. The Romanian proportion at the University of Czernowitz varied from 23% in 1903 to 26.2% in 1913. However, in the same two years, 1.29% of all university students in Austria and 1.01% of those studying at technical colleges were Romanians.\footnote{See Hitchins, Rumania, p. 236-237; and Urbanitsch, Tabelle 9 and 11.}
The Romanian language elementary educational system played the key role in fostering nation-building. The more advanced the level of education, the more likely was for nationalism to be particularly intense among both the instructional personnel and those subjected to the process of education. The post-primary educational system fostered the growth of early irredentist activism. This involved mostly individuals who had passed through this system until the early fall of 1918, and especially those who were currently linked with it.

The Austrian, and particularly Bukovinian, post-elementary educational system was a key catalyst in facilitating the growth of the more intense varieties of Romanian nationalism, and particularly irredentism, from 1871, and especially from 1909, onward. This occurred partly due to its partly Romanian character, and increasing “Romanization” in terms of teaching language. Another factor that accounts for this was the greater than average Romanian nationalism of those students who had advanced so far the “ladder” of the educational system. One can also partly trace it very clearly to the involvement in intensely nationalistic activities of many actual and former students as well as to other related factors.

2.3. Independent Variable 3: The Impact of Industrialization

The impact of industrialization in Bukovina on Romanian nationalism during the period until 1918 was complex. Industrialization originally hindered Romanian nationalism in general and everywhere by delaying its development. It continued to do so in the urban areas until World War I. This was because the “more intense” Romanian nationalists ignored industrial areas. They were not friendly toward those employed in the industrial sector and related ones. The fact that in the southwestern area of Bukovina, this changed between the elections of 1907 and 1911 facilitated an increase in voting for the Romanian National Party.

2.3.1. Early Mutual Avoidance: The Romanian Nationalists, Industry and the Urban Environment

The Romanian nationalists originally ignored and disparaged industry and did not serve its
interests. This generally hindered Romanian nation-building among the Romanians employed in industrial pursuits before 1911.

In the period before the Austrian annexation of Bukovina and even during the early Austrian period, there was a substantial Romanian urban population, including artisans. However, the percentage of the Romanians in the urban population, and in commerce, industry (including crafts) decreased until some point in the early 20th century. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find sufficient statistics on this issue for the years before 1910. The reasons for the declining importance of the Romanians in urban, industrial and commercial life are multiple, but the bottom line is that Romanians lost the prominence that they had previously enjoyed in urban politics.

At any rate, as late as 1861, 3 out of the 5 representatives of the urban localities in the Bukovinian diet, including the unelected bishop of Bukovina, were Romanians. In 1873, half of the representatives of the chambers of Commerce and Industry to the same diet were Romanians. Even in 1885, the ethnic Romanian Centralist, Dr. Constantin Tomaszuk (Tomasziuc), was re-elected with 1,099 votes (63% of the total) in the urban parliamentary district of southern Bukovina. Starting in 1891, there were no more Romanian representatives of the chambers of commerce and industry or of the urban localities in the Bukovinian diet or in the imperial parliament.229

Some influential theorists, such as Ernest Gellner and Miroslav Hroch, emphasize the role of socio-economic modernization/development, including industrialization. The former talks about how nationalism develops along with, or in the shadow of, industrialization.230 The Gellnerian prediction would be that this would represent doom and gloom for Romanian nationalism. Indeed, some Romanian intellectuals of Bukovina and of the Kingdom of Romania had similar and equally gloomy scenarios for Romanian nationalism, and indeed for the Romanian identity and nation due to this pattern. These predictions were wrong.

To be sure, we have already seen that the Romanian nationalistic candidates either did not run or did not get too many votes in the industrialized urban electoral districts of Czernowitz, Suceava, Radautz, Sereth and of the predominantly German villages in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This

pattern had already emerged in these areas before universal suffrage.

The argument that the overwhelmingly non-Romanian character of the population might explain the lack of efforts, or at least of too much success, of the Romanian nationalists to get votes is not sufficient or satisfactory. A much more important factor was the fact that the Romanian nationalistic politicians were in most cases not willing or able to appeal to those who worked in industry, or for that matter, commerce, and to the urban population, even to the Romanians in those classes. Even as late as 1918, numerous nationalistic political figures connected with the more mainstream “core” of the Romanian National Party made statements such as “we [i.e., the Bukovinians] do not have industries”, and ignoring the inhabitants involved in industry, including the industrial employees, and their needs.\textsuperscript{231}

Did this matter? Industrialization had already started in Bukovina by the middle of the nineteenth century, before Romanian nationalism had become a mass phenomenon. In 1861, 87,554 Bukovinians were employed in agriculture and 14,984 in more “modern” occupations. The latter included 169 intellectuals and artists, 20 lawyers and notaries, 2,935 house owners, 4,815 manufacturers and craftsmen, 1,620 merchants as well as 4,710 workers in industry and 715 in commerce. Therefore, the 9,525 inhabitants employed in industry and crafts represented 9.29% of all the Bukovinians employed outside the public sector.\textsuperscript{232} One gets the sense that the number of Romanians employed in industry did not grow by much between 1861 and 1910.

The electoral statistics that we have presented demonstrate the existence of rather little nationalistic voting among the Romanians employed in industrial and related activities, and not merely in the sense that inhabitants employed in industry stayed away from irredentism. According to the 1910 census, the 3,740 Bukovinian Romanians employed in industry (and no industrialist, unlike in the period until 1908), minus the artisans, represented 3.79% of the separately economically self-sustaining Romanians in the province, and 20.48% of the non-agricultural ones.

The Romanian nationalists originally disregarded industry. This generally hindered Romanian nation-building among the Romanians employed in industrial pursuits before 1911.

\textbf{2.3.2. Making Nationalism Relevant to the Industrial Population}

\textsuperscript{232} Ceausu, “Der Landtag”, p. 2180.
In 1911, a Romanian progressive nationalist politician, Gheorghe Sarbu, turned his attention to the industrial sector. He attempted to serve the Romanian industrial population and to attract its support. He and his supporters tried and were able to make a successful appeal to a very significant portion of the Romanian industrial population.

Could any Romanian nationalists make Romanian nationalism more relevant to inhabitants employed in industry as their main or secondary occupation? The period until 1907 seemed to indicate that the answer would be “yes”, but the results of 1907 seemed to indicate that the answer would be “no”. The “corrective measures” before the 1911 elections won over most of these inhabitants in at least the district where the rural population employed in industry formed a critical mass. In the first elections held under conditions of universal suffrage, the Romanian nationalists did not do well in the most industrialized Bukovinian district outside the provincial capital of Czernowitz, the Kimpulung administrative district.

The Romanian industrial work force was mostly made up of the individuals working in the industrial forestry, in the electoral district of Dorna Watra (Vatra Dornei in Romanian). The area included the entire administrative district minus the German settlements and its small Ruthenian north-western area. Its electorate gave a majority of their votes in 1907 to Count Bellegarde, who obtained 4,655 votes. The Romanian parties simply neglected talking about industry and those employed in this sector.

Yet this does not explain the greater support for the Democratic Party’s candidate Aurel Onciul (2,758 votes), rather than for the Romanian National Party (1,022 votes). The Romanian Nationalist candidate, Stefanelli, was indeed selected late, less than a month before the election. Since he was no politician, he had no campaign experience. The fact that Stefanelli was at that time more intensely nationalistic than the average Romanian National Party candidate, aloof and elitist did not help him electorally. The aristocratic philanthropist and official Bellegarde was well known and kind to the Romanians, whether they were peasants or worked in the industrial sector. For once most were willing to overlook his non-Romanian ethnicity. However, even more importantly, as we have seen, the program of the Romanian National Party did not talk at all about industry.233

233. A detailed sociological discussion of the conditions in one of the villages of the district, focusing mainly on the interwar period, but also dealing with previous patterns, was published during World War II. See Mircea Tiriung, "Bucsoaia, un sat de muncitori forestieri si industriali din Bucovina", in Anton
During the elections of 1911, the Romanian National Party, even though divided (it had two competing candidates), was able to obtain a majority of the votes in the district. The fact that the successful candidate of the party, a forestry engineer, Gheorghe Sarbu, a politician who was not born in a wealthy family, did know about the problems of the forests and of forestry apparently helped him electorally. This progressive populist did not neglect industry or the people employed in this type of activity, but catered to them more than other Romanian politicians.

Gheorghe Sarbu, who was associated with the society “Progresul” (“Progress”), was the only Romanian politician whom the Socialist Gheorghe Grigorovici trusted in general, and on the issue of a potential redistribution of land to the peasants in particular. This was the first time under universal suffrage in which the population of a mostly Romanian area elected to any parliament a politician who was both a nationalist and a “man of the people”.

The impact of industrialization in Bukovina on Romanian nationalism during the period until 1918 was complex. It initially hindered Romanian nationalism by delaying its development, particularly in the urban areas. The Romanian nationalists and especially the more intense ones ignored industry. They were not attentive toward those earning their livelihood in this sector and in related ones. In the southwestern area of Bukovina, this changed between the elections of 1907 and 1911. This facilitated an increase in voting for the Romanian National Party.

In 1911, the Romanian progressive nationalist politician Gheorghe Sarbu attempted to serve the Romanian industrial population and attract industrial support. He and his supporters were able successfully appeal to a very significant part of the Romanian industrial population.

2.4. Independent Variable 4: Sudden Shock, Neo-Irredentism and the Union with Romania

2.4.1. Introduction

Golopentia and D.C. Georgescu (eds.), 60 sate Romanesti (vol. 5, Contributii la tipologia satelor Romanesti: Sate cu ocupatii anexe) (Bucuresti; Institutul de Stiinte Sociale al Romaniei, 1942), p. 177-181. See Iancu Flondor’s October 27, 1918 statement in document 99, the transcript of debates of the Romanian National Council of Bukovina, the first session, and Gheorghe Grigorovici’s November 13, 1918 speech in document 106, the transcript of the debates of the Romanian National Council of Bukovina, the third session, in Calafeteanu, Unirea, p. 263, 288 and 291. Irredentism, which was already strong in the district, did not decrease after 1911, and 3 of the 5 Romanian peasants and 3 of the 5 soldiers who fled to Romania for irredentist reasons who fled from Bukovina to Romania for irredentist regions came from the district.
Irredentism had been a very marginal phenomenon until 1914. The sudden shock of World War I and especially of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy had a significant effect. The shock disrupted (destroyed or brought to an end) the satisfaction of the minority of the Bukovinian Romanian population with the Austrian Empire. The war, the decay and the collapse of the empire terminated the integration of the Bukovinian Romanian population in the polity (the Austrian Empire). It thereby pushed the non-irredentist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants toward irredentism. The same factors led to the discrediting, and often to the literal or physical tearing down, of the symbols of the Austrian imperial polity.

The variables discussed in previous sections played their role in the growth of irredentism during World War I. The post-primary educational system, particularly at its higher levels, favored, in a number of ways, the growth of irredentist activism before 1916-1918. This type of movement involved overwhelmingly individuals who had been a part of it until the fall of 1918, and especially those who were part of the system at that time. The sudden shock of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy caused a change in the self-determination options of the Bukovinian Romanians in favor of union with Romania. This process was much slower among the Bukovinian Romanians in the U.S. In the latter country, the identification with Romania (as the country of their birth) had not been finalized in thousands of cases by 1920. However, it was finalized by 1921 in Canada.

Before judging the growth of irredentism during the war, we need to evaluate the objective reasons why a person would be irredentist or non-irredentist, as well as the magnitude of nationalism in the few years before the war. The average Bukovinian Romanian before the war sensed that the level of performance among the politicians and bureaucrats in Romania was not particularly high. He (she?) thought that the officials in Bukovina, including those of the Bukovinian Romanian background, performed better.

Most, but not all, the Bukovinian Romanians thought that they lived materially better than their counterparts in Romania did and that the Austrian administration was more honest, but also less lenient, than the Romanian one. However, there was no perception that the schools, hospitals and other public services were better in Austria than in Romania. The average Bukovinian Romanian preferred Austrian rule for objective, rational reasons, but was necessarily attracted to Austrian myths, symbols and rituals. World
War I would put the loyalty of most Romanians to Austria to the test; the dynamics were in favor of irredentism.

Even though a large majority of the conscripted Bukovinian Romanians served the Austrian Empire loyally during World War I, I have not found any evidence that the beginning of the war was popular with most Bukovinian Romanians. One can not find any explicit endorsement of the decision to go to war from the overwhelming majority of the Romanian National Party politicians. This is also applicable to all of those elected on the party ticket to the Austrian parliament.

The explicit or implicit endorsement of the war in 1914-1916 manifested itself in a specific way, through propaganda for the entry of Romania into the war on the side of the Central Powers for acquiring Bessarabia. Only Aurel Onciul and three other politicians conducted it. Only one of them was from the Romanian National Party, and none of them was a member of the Austrian lower house. After the entrance of Romania into war against Austria in 1916, all the members of the “Romanian Club” made a declaration indicating their loyalty to Austria on August 29, 1916.235

2.4.2. Early Irredentism among Those with a Post-Elementary Education (1914-1916):

A Quantitative Look at the Defections to Romania (Part I)

A large majority of the openly irredentist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants in the early part of World War I, when Romania was not yet a participant in the war (1914-1916), had the expected characteristics. They were, as my theoretical model would predict, individuals with a post-elementary education. The inhabitants who were part of the educational system and/or had a particularly advanced education (the higher the level of education, the greater the likelihood) were, as predicted, the most likely to defect to neutral Romania during this period.

A number of factors decreased the number of loyal subjects of the Austrian emperor. These included the intensification of Romanian irredentist propaganda by 1914, Romania’s entry into the war against the Habsburg monarchy in August 1916, and the temporary wartime occupation of southeastern Bukovina by Romanian troops. Another factor was the large number of wartime drastic, often unwarranted, measures

taken by the Austrian authorities against allegedly, but in many cases, not truly disloyal, pro-Entente ethnic Romanians. These included at least 42 summary executions in 1914, as well as incarcerations in concentration camps, which were either preventive, or for suspicion of high treason or espionage. These measures were taken from the beginning of the war until after the Central Powers had made peace with both (Soviet) Russia and with Romania in early 1918.

By 1914, the Bukovinian post-elementary schools were, particularly as one went up the educational ladder, a hotbed of intense nationalism, including active irredentism. The latter phenomenon included concrete activities that were clearly in favor of the irredentist goal, namely the preference for union with Romania, rather than merely a passive sympathy for irredentism. The people involved in irredentist activism were overwhelmingly individuals who had passed through the post-primary educational system, particularly at its higher levels, until, and especially during, the Great War.

A large majority of the irredentist nationalist activists, including all of those who got into trouble with the authorities because of this from 1877 on, were professional, and particularly post-elementary, educators, and current college or high school students. Out of 200 refugees to Romania in the early part of World War I until March 1916 who should be classified as irredentist activists, 144 (72%) were in this category. Moreover, 101 (50.5%) or 102 (51%) were involved with the post-elementary school system. Between 1877 and 1918, almost all of the others had some post-elementary education.236

The Romanian irredentist activists that fled to Romania during the first part of World War I, in 1914-1916, included 180 individuals who apparently had a post-elementary education (90%). Among them, there were 45 individuals with a finished higher education (22.5%), and 86 (43%) with some higher education, including current students. They included 2 university professors, 16 middle school and 2 vocational school teachers, 40 elementary school teachers and 3 dismissed teachers. Secondary school teachers were three times more likely to flee than elementary school teachers were. The refugees also included 81 students, 39 of which studied in gymnasiuims, 39 at the college and university level, two in a technical college and one unknown.237

Secondary school teachers were three times more likely to flee than elementary school teachers were. Among students who attended Austrian gymnasiuims for males, 2.97% fled. At the level of higher

236. The data is from Prokopowitsch, Rumanische, p. 136, 137, 167-169.
education, the figures were higher, with 15.38% among the university faculty, 10.63% among university students, and 11.11% among the technical school students. The post-elementary educational system, and particularly the university, was therefore a hotbed of irredentist activism. This was true both in terms of its influence over those who had gone through the system, and especially among those involved with them directly at that time, regardless of gender, social origin, etc.\textsuperscript{238}

The role of the post-elementary educational system should be understood within the context of the weakness of Romanian irredentism in the province. Until the very last days of Austrian rule in Bukovina (October and early November 1918), irredentism was not very widespread among the general population. For a large majority of the ethnic Romanians, support for Romanian nationalism was combined with loyalty to the emperor until the fall of 1918.

It would be inaccurate to argue that, until 1916, the massive participation of educators and students in irredentist activism was part of a broader irredentist current affecting other social groups to a significant extent. Among the refugees, there were 18 self-employed intellectuals, professionals and unemployed persons of independent means. They represented 9% of 5,858 Bukovinian Romanians counted in these categories by the 1910 census (0.31%). Many more, 82 out of 200 (41%), were civil service and professional employees. These people actually represented 2.22% of the 3,559 Romanians involved in these occupations resident in the duchy. However, only slightly more than 0.7% of the non-educational state employees, as opposed to 6.82% of all the pre-college professional educators fled to Romania.

Most Romanians between the ages of 13 and 75 who were punished for irredentist deeds and attitudes through executions and internments at the concentration camp in Thalerhof in Styria seem to have been members of the intelligentsia (teachers and priests), which only supports the importance of the educational system.\textsuperscript{239} Not surprisingly, only a minority of the Romanians who were detained in concentration camps during World War I happened to be peasants. Yet a large majority of those who were detained preventively after Romania entered the war were peasants.\textsuperscript{240} Among some Austrian historians, there has been a certain tendency to argue that the outcry against the executions and internments was due to the previously existing irredentism of a small minority of critics among the Romanians. This view is not

\textsuperscript{239} The Hungarian authorities interned a much larger proportion of the Transylvanian Romanians.
\textsuperscript{240} Prokopowitsch, \textit{Rumanische}, p. 148-149.
A large majority of the openly irredentist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants in the early part of World War I, were, as my theoretical model would predict, individuals with a post-elementary education. The individuals who were part of the educational system and/or had a particularly advanced education were the most likely to defect to neutral Romania during this period.

2.4.3. Irredentism among Other Groups and the Impact of Other Variables (1914-1916) – A Quantitative Look at the Defections to Romania (Part II)

The explanation of the rest of the defections to Romania is also consistent with my model. For example, all the peasants who defected were soldiers who had fought in the war and were affected by the sudden shock. The single artisan who had fled had a post-primary nationalistic education and was part of an “irredentist cluster” of defectors from his village whose make-up would be predicted by my model.

In the censuses of 1900 and 1910, the peasants represented 83% and, respectively, 80% of the separately economically self-sustaining Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants. This census-based category excluded the auxiliary working, and dependent non-working, family members. Very few peasants behaved in a manner that could be interpreted as irredentist before 1916. Most peasants who were executed or sent to concentration camps were innocent of irredentist deeds. The refugees to Romania until 1916 included 5 peasants who owned land (2.5%) plus 5 peasant soldiers who were members of the Romanian Legion (2.5%). Three of the five peasant-soldiers who deserted and fled to Romania were not soldiers who had been drafted into the Austrian army. They were patriotic volunteers who had volunteered to fight for

241. In 1906, 1,500-2,000 Bukovinian Romanian peasants (according to Erich Prokopowitsch) or over 2,000 (according to Dan Jumara), at any rate, more than 2% of the statistical category, traveled to Bucharest, the capital of Romania. They participated in the celebration of the fifty-year jubilee of the reign of the Romanian monarch, King Carol I (1866-1914). The Austrian historian Erich Prokopowitsch hints that these peasants were in some sense irredentist, but Dan Jumara has unintentionally unearthed information indicating that this was not quite the case. Prokopowitsch is not able to distinguish between the irredentist intent of those who arranged for the free transportation of the peasants on Romanian railways and the effect on irredentism, which was rather insignificant. See Prokopowitsch, Rumanische, p. 118 and Jumara, p. 169-170. According to Jumara (p. 169), the organizing committee talked about how, „The prouder that our participation to the Bucharest fair would be, the more would we prove that our development under Habsburg rule has kept up with the cultural development of the Kingdom of Romania“.

the monarchy in the Austrian “Romanian Legion”. 243

The fact that the Austrian authorities did commit human rights abuses, including the executions of innocent people suspected of disloyalty and collaboration with the Russians presumably did turn these people against Austria because some of the victims were Romanians. So did the fact that some people were suspected because of the common religion of the Romanians and Russians, Eastern Orthodoxy, and because some non-irredentist nationalists were labeled irredentists and repressed. 244 The overzealous gendarmerie general, Eduard Fischer, who also commanded the Romanian and Ukrainian Legions in Bukovina, was responsible for these crimes.

The fact that the Russian army and authorities committed worse atrocities, including against ethnic Romanians, did not matter because these people did not defect to the Russians, but fled to Romania. At any rate, these first desertions are the early sign of the impact of one of the independent variables, sudden shock, on the self-determination options.

To what extent does the available data confirm the role of the various variables discussed in this dissertation? The non-electoral data also shows the weakness, in fact, the virtual non-existence of irredentism among the Romanian inhabitants employed in industry. Industrialization slowed down the nationalization of those employed in industrial and related activities, at least in the sense that inhabitants employed in industry stayed away from nationalism. According to the 1910 census, the 3,740 Bukovinian Romanians employed in industry (and no industrialist whatsoever), minus the artisans, represented 3.79% of the separately economically self-sustaining Romanians in the province, and 20.48% of the non-agricultural ones. The number of nationalist, including irredentist, activists, and of documented passive irredentists, among them was zero.

All of the 190 non-peasant irredentist refugee activists, and, incidentally, the other identifiable separately economically self-sustaining nationalist activists and passive irredentists, had other occupations. They were professionals and intellectuals, government officials and employees, students, artisans, commercial clerks, and persons of independent means who did not work. These population groups included

10,285 individuals, and represented 10.43% of the separately economically self-sustaining Romanian population, and 56.31% of its non-agricultural portion.

There was only one artisan. He was a young cabinet-maker who fled to Romania. He had apparently been educated at the Campulung vocational school of woodworking, a recently founded stronghold of Romanian nationalism. One gets the sense that the factor that led to his defection was the impact of the educational system. The various considerations related to his occupation tended to have a different impact in other cases (which explains why he was unique). Yet the spread of irredentism in his village was also probably a key factor. He and a peasant fled from the village of Tereblestie, together with two Gymnasium students. No other rural village in Bukovina supplied such a variety of refugees.\(^{245}\) Why this village? The extent of the economic interactions across the border was probably a very important factor, which probably led to intermarriages, etc. It explains why the inhabitants of the border villages in this area participated in the Romanian peasant revolt of 1907.\(^{246}\)

Indeed, the other villages whose inhabitants crossed the border to Romania in 1907 and participated in the 1907 Romanian peasant revolt (Mitocul Dragomirnei - 2, Scheia - 4 people) were in the same boat. They also had more defectors than expected.\(^{247}\) In other words, until Romania entered the war against Austria-Hungary in mid-August-1916, the spread of irredentism was the one expected based on my model.

The explanation of the rest of the defections is also consistent with my model. For example, all the peasants who defected were soldiers who had fought in the war and were affected by the sudden shock.

### 2.4.4. Disillusionment with Austria, August 1916-October 1918

The war against Romania bred a great deal of disillusionment that had not manifested itself before Romania went to war against the Habsburg monarchy. The period 1916-1918 brought to an end the satisfaction of the minority of the Bukovinian Romanian population that had previously been satisfied with

\(^{245}\) Prokopowitsch, p. 168-169.

\(^{246}\) See *Marea Rascoala*, p. 618, relying on a newspaper account from the Viennese *Neue Freie Presse*, and the various numbers of *The New York Times* from March 1907, which, however, do contain a number of geographical and factual errors.

\(^{247}\) See the data in Prokopowitsch, p. 168-169 and *Marea Rascoala*, p. 618.
the Austrian Empire.

This is not the place for a thorough discussion of Bukovina’s union with Romania in 1918. We will look at the mass shift in the self-determination options of ethnic Romanians from pro-Austria to pro-Romania preferences after 1916.

The period of the war between Austria-Hungary and Romania led to some changes. After Romania entered World War I, a few hundred Bukovinian Romanians deserted from the Habsburg army or were captured by the Entente, particularly on the Russian front. They eventually joined the Romanian army. Most of them seem to have been peasants, but the majority of peasants among the group do not seem to have been large enough to suggest that a majority of the peasants, and indeed of the Bukovinian Romanians, had become irredentists.\textsuperscript{248} Those who switched sides fought against the Central Powers and their allies in Romania, the lands of the Old Russian Empire and Italy in 1917 and 1918.

The war also had an impact on the “home front” in Bukovina. The renewed promises of the Romanian political class and of King Ferdinand to redistribute land to the peasants announced in 1917 were increasingly making it rational for the Romanians in Habsburg lands to favor union with Romania. Moreover, after the death of Emperor Franz Joseph in 1916 (1830-1916, ruled from 1848), his successor, Charles I (Karl I), showed less gravitas, solemnity, ability and decisiveness, and was indeed called “the stupid August” by the Romanian National Party leader Iancu Flondor.\textsuperscript{249} The emperor’s plan for the federalization of the Austrian Empire from October 16, 1918 into ethnic units responded to the changes in the self-determination options of the various ethnic groups of the state, but did not succeed in averting the collapse of the old monarchy.

The war against Romania bred a great deal of against the Habsburg monarchy. The period 1916-1918 brought to an end the satisfaction of the minority of the Bukovinian Romanian population that had previously still been satisfied with Austria.

\textbf{2.4.5. The Union with Romania: The Romanian National Council and the Role of Political Actors}

\textsuperscript{248} See Calafeteanu, passim.
\textsuperscript{249} Calafeteanu, \textit{Unirea}, p. 287.
We have already seen that the shock of World War I and in particular the war between the Habsburg Monarchy and Romania had a significant role in increasing the spread of irredentist attitudes as well as their increasingly open expression. The “coma” and break-up of the empire caused the disappearance of the feeling of connection of the Bukovinian Romanian population with the Austrian Empire. It thereby pushed the non-separatist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants toward irredentism, which became the dominant ideology. The overwhelming majority of the Bukovinian Romanians supported this line by late October 1918. The same factor led to the discrediting, and often to the literal/physical tearing down, of the symbols of the Austrian imperial polity in the first days of November. By that time, Romanian irredentism had become generalized. Therefore, this factor facilitated the separation of the province from Austria. This move was universally acclaimed by the Romanians of Bukovina by early November 1918 and subsequently.

A growing number of Romanian irredentists began expressing their views in public. Iancu Flondor led the Romanian National Council. It had 50 members. They were elected by the National Assembly of the Romanians of Bukovina, which included 300-400 members, on October 27, 1918. The National Assembly included, or was supported by, four of the six Romanian deputies in the Austrian lower house. They were those members who were not of aristocratic origin, including Grigorovici. Practically all the Romanian members of the Bukovinian diet also backed it. It also included some local officials selected by their peers, the Romanian mayors and other elected representatives of the primarily Romanian localities.

On the same day, the National Assembly decided that all of Bukovina should unite with Romania. This move was fully endorsed by all those present or who had sent telegrams of support. These people represented practically everyone in the Romanian National Party, and the irredentists who had not fled to Romania. It also represented most of the Democratic Party, as well as several unaffiliated figures, especially journalists. The Romanian National Party representatives, the irredentists and the unaffiliated

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250. Deputies Gheorghe Grigorovici (SDP) and Gheorghe Sarbu (RNP) were present at all the meetings of the body. The deputies Constantin Isopescu-Grecul and Teofil Simionovici (both RNP) indicated their approval of the creation of the body and of its decisions, both before and after they were taken. Yet due to the fighting in Galicia between Poles and Ukrainians, their rail connection was interrupted, and they had to return to Vienna. See Economu, p. 6, 8, 9. Deputies Alexandru Hurmuzachi (Alexander von Hurmuzaki, RNP) and Aurel Onciul (Aurel von Onciul, DP) were in Czernowitz, but stayed away from the meetings of the body because the former felt loyal to the emperor, while the latter desired a division of Bukovina on an ethnic basis.

251. See Economu, p. 6-9; Nowosiwsky, p. 105; Prokopowitsch, Rumanische, passim and Calafeteanu, Unirea, passim.
figures desired the union of the entire province with Romania, based on historical rights, as a former part of
the principality of Moldova. However, some of the Democrats as well as the Social Democrat favored the
democratic idea of giving the mostly Ukrainian districts in the north, to the Ukrainians.252

In the summer of 1918, on July 22, this seems to have been the view of four or five of the six
Romanian deputies in the Austrian Chamber of Deputies (two of the four deputies from the Romanian
National Party, the Democrat and the Social Democrat). However, the intensely nationalist Bukovinian
Romanian public opinion and press, which opposed the division of the province, had shown its disapproval
toward this more democratic line.253 Since the parliamentarians had been in Vienna during most of the war,
and due to the war-related censorship, they seem to have been less than fully knowledgeable about the
attitudes of their constituencies. Probably in the attempt to placate the more moderate minority among the
Romanians, Flandor agreed on November 2, 1918 to give to the Ukrainian authority control over “the
indisputably Ukrainian part” of Bukovina provisionally, until the peace conference. The Ukrainian
leadership whose make-up will be discussed below rejected this proposal.254

Before the subsequent entrance of the Romanian army into the province, the top leader of the
Democratic Party, Aurel Onciul, desired a partition of the province along ethnic lines, locality-by-locality.
He proposed that if a locality had a Romanian plurality, the Bukovinian Romanian government would run it
and if it had a Ukrainian plurality, the Bukovinian Ukrainian government would run it. If neither condition
applied, then the communal council would choose one of the other, except for Czernowitz, which would be
administered jointly.255 In other words, what mattered to the supporters of this idea were not the results of
the parliamentary elections of 1911. They emphasized the open census declarations of the individuals and

253. See the declaration of Constantin Isopescu-Grecul in the Vienna parliament, in the name of the
Romanian parliamentary group, on July 22, 1918, in Viata Noua of Suceava, vol. 5, no. 12/18, which
appears in Calafeteanu, Unirea, p.254-256. On the opposition of the press and public opinion, see Viata
Noua, October 27, 1918, cited in Calafeteanu, Unirea, p. 256, Nistor, Problema, p. 183-184, and Economu,
p. VI. Nistor’s allegation that a majority of the Bukovinian Romanians opposed Isopescu-Grecul’s line is
persuasive. It is indirectly supported by the 46,136 signatures of the 1912 Romanian nationalist petition that
talked about the indivisibility of Bukovina and by the fact that the Romanian National Party deputies did
heed this public opinion. Even Alexandru Hurmuzachi, who avoided supporting the October 27 decision in
favor of the union of Bukovina with Romania, believed in an indivisible Bukovina. Ukrainian, Romanian
Democratic Party and neutral sources support the view that this was indeed the distribution of public
opinion among ethnic Romanians. See, for example, Nowosiwsky, p. 120. Cezar Scalat (see Calafeteanu,
Unirea, p. 300-302) is an example of a Democratic politician who desired an undivided Bukovina.
255. See Nowosiwsky, p. 163-164, and Nistor, Problema, p. 211-212.
the results of previous elections, which had often been decided on local issues.

This somewhat undemocratic solution was disadvantageous to the Romanians in comparison to the results of the 1911 parliamentary elections. A number of Democratic and Social Democratic representatives in the Romanian National Council seem to have preferred, or at least accepted, the union with Romania of only the districts that wished to be included in that country. However, Onciul desired that the Bukovinian Romanian territorial unit should remain within a Habsburg monarchy federalized along ethnic lines. Practically nobody except for Onciul supported this view.\textsuperscript{256} The public expression of such views would eventually end after Emperor Charles I (1916-1918) de facto gave up his throne. The Austrian Empire was formally dissolved on November 11.

Meanwhile, the Bukovinian Ukrainian national council included four of the five Ukrainian parliamentary deputies and the representatives of the Ukrainian parties. It was also made up of 14 of the 17 Ukrainian diet representatives, including the four parliamentary deputies and ten who were exclusively members of the Bukovinian diet. It also seems to have enjoyed the support of the other Ukrainians elected to the Austrian parliament and to the Bukovinian legislature. The Bukovinian Ukrainian national council called for a division of the province along ethnic lines, and it took over Czernowitz and the mostly Ruthenian areas of the duchy between November 2 and 6, 1918. By November 5, the “old” imperial authorities had no more power in the mostly Ukrainian areas, but the authorities of the Austrian areas of Galicia and Bukovina declared their preference for federal status for this Ukrainian unit within Austria.\textsuperscript{257}

Increasing Romanian nationalistic disloyalty to Austria was already visible on November 4, the emperor’s birthday. On that day, some Orthodox clerics refused to show their allegiance to the monarch, and there were nationalistic riots against Austrian rule. Starting on the next day, the Romanian preference to break away from Austria manifested itself through widespread riots, attacks on military depots, and the removal of the symbols of Austrian rule. There were also calls by the population of certain localities for the entrance of the Romanian army in Bukovina, and other types of displays of irredentist nationalism.\textsuperscript{258}

\textsuperscript{256} See Calafeteanu, passim, on the disagreement of a majority of the Democratic politicians against Onciul’s actions.
\textsuperscript{257} Emil Ioan Emandi and Louis Roman, “Bucovina si spatiul demografic romanesc. Studiu demopolitic si statistic (1775-1940)”, in Hierasus, no. 9, p. 427; and Nowosiwsky, p. 96-121, 134, 167 and especially the documents on p. 155-160.
\textsuperscript{258} Prokopowitsch, Ende, p. 44-45; and V. Liveanu, 1918: Din istoria luptelor revolutionare din Rominia
November 5, the union with Romania of only the Romanian parts of the province enjoyed far less popularity among the members of the ethnic group than the option of the Romanian annexation of the entire province.259

These factors, and the demand of the Romanian National Council for intervention, triggered the Romanian government’s official decision that the Romanian army should enter Bukovina. It was made during the evening of November 5, implemented starting early on November 6, and completed on November 24. The advance of the Romanian army, which entered Czernowitz on November 11, caused the retreat of the Ukrainian leaders and of their soldiers almost without a fight.

On November 28, 1918, the 100-member General Congress of Bukovina voted to unite, immediately and without any conditions, Bukovina with Romania. Seventy-four of its representatives were the members of the enlarged Romanian National Council that included some new members. The latter established a government of the Country of Bukovina (“Tara Bucovinei”) on November 12.

Onciul was excluded from the Romanian National Council. After all, he had made a deal with the Ukrainian leadership for the partition of the province along ethnic lines on November 6. This agreement did not enjoy any Romanian support apart from a few activists of the Democratic Party who soon jumped on the union bandwagon. To be sure, the explanation lies largely in the fiasco of the Romanian Legion 1914 discussed above, which had discredited Onciul in the eyes of the voters for his party, but this only confirms the importance of the war as an element of the sudden external shock.260 By November 15, even Onciul supported the union of the entire province with Romania. The decision for union was strongly supported by the Romanian population, and there is no evidence of Romanian open dissent from this line.

The shock of World War I and, within this context, of the war between the Habsburg Monarchy and Romania had a significant role in facilitating the spread of irredentist attitudes and their increasingly open expression. The “coma” and break-up of the empire led to the disappearance of the feeling of integration in the Austrian polity of the Bukovinian Romanian population. It thereby pushed the formerly non-irredentist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants toward union with Romania. The overwhelming majority of the

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259. Nowosiwsky, p. 120.
260. As we shall see in the next chapter, the distaste of the Ukrainians in some of the areas from where the population had flocked to join the Ukrainian Legion would discourage electoral and other support for Ukrainian nationalism until the middle of the 1920’s.
Bukovinian Romanians supported the latter option by late October 1918. By the first days of November, Romanian irredentism became generalized. This factor facilitated the separation of the province from Austria. The Romanians of Bukovina universally acclaimed this move by early November 1918.

2.4.6. The General Congress of Bukovina and the Union of Bukovina with Romania

The union of Bukovina with Romania on November 28, 1918 was supported by the quasi-totality of the Bukovinian Romanian population. Large majorities of the German and Polish ethnic groups in the province also backed it. The elected representatives who endorsed this change in sovereignty represented a majority of the Bukovinian population. However, the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainians was opposed and Jews were neutral. These developments were expected. They are consistent with the importance of the sudden shock suggested by my model.

The Romanian National Council was extended through the inclusion of additional Romanians as well as the representatives of some of the non-Romanian ethnic groups. The congress also included seven elected representatives of the German National Congress. They represented the ethnically (not linguistically) German population (8.76%). The Poles (4.56% of the population), who had supported the Romanians in Czernowitz even before the arrival of the Romanian army, were represented through six elected Polish delegates. There were also thirteen Ruthenian peasants from the compactly Ruthenian north of the province. These individuals were the elected mayors and representatives of 5 of the 180 predominantly Ruthenian communes.

A large majority of the Jews were neutral. To be sure, in early 1919, the Jewish communities of southern Bukovina, which was mostly ethnically Romanian, endorsed the union. The electoral list of the Jewish communities had represented the Jewish religious communities, or rather the very religious Jews. It had obtained the votes of only a minority of the Jews (749 votes) in 1911. The Jewish communities in the three cities also represented those who had voted for a moderate nationalist Jewish candidate (2,074 votes in the first round, 2,219 votes in the second round) of the cities of Radauti (Radautz), Siret (Sereth) and

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261 Economu, p. 130-131, 137-140.
262 Economu; and Nowosiwsky, p. 80.
The overwhelming majority of the Ruthenians were originally opposed to the union with Romania. However, within the context of the American proposal to grant much of northwestern Bukovina to an autonomous Ukrainian entity within Poland, some developed a more nuanced perspective. Much of the local Ruthenian (Ukrainian) population showed its opposition to this idea, and its preference for being under Romanian rule, through the sending of letters to the Paris Peace Conference. Those who wrote these petitions mentioned economic, political, cultural and religious reasons for preferring Romania. They emphasized the fact that they were Orthodox, and that they would endanger their faith through union with a Roman or Greek Catholic country, such as Eastern Galicia within Poland. These letters were influential, in the sense that they helped in the awarding of the territory to Romania.

To be sure, the inhabitants had originally preferred to be part of an independent Western Ukrainian state in November 1918. However, times had changed. Bukovina would have had autonomy within the Western Ukrainian quasi-federal state, which the population had hoped would unite with Eastern, ex-Tsarist, Ukraine. However, the terms had now changed, and so did the self-determination options.

Slightly more than half of the population of the province apparently endorsed the decision of November 28 at that time. Its initial supporters included 36 out of 63 deputies in the Bukovinian diet, and 25 of the 46 deputies elected through universal suffrage. They also included 8 of the 14 Bukovinian parliamentary deputies. The political parties and factions that would support the union before it was officially given to Romania in the latter part of 1919 were quite popular. They obtained 59.45% of the votes in the Austrian parliamentary elections of 1911 during the first round of the elections, and 60.23% during the second round. They exclude the Ukrainians who decided at the last moment to prefer Romania as “the lesser of two evils” in comparison with Poland.

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264. See Ion I. Nistor, *Problema ucraineana in lumina istoriei* (Radauti: Editura Septentrion, 1997), p. 213 and one of the letters to the conference from the commune Carapciu pe Ceremus (in the Ukrainian language), in Nistor, *Problema*. Also see Economu, passim, and Hausleitner, p. 113. Even Hausleitner, who is not particularly sympathetic toward Romania or Romanian nationalism, does take the letters at face value. The communes that sent the letters included Plosca, Sarghieni, Putila, Dihtenet, Chiselieni, Rastoace, Campulung pe Ceremus, Iablona, Ciornohuzii, Milie, Banila, Vascauti, Carapciu, etc. (Nistor, *Problema*, p. 213).

265. The expectations of the peasants that they would get more land in the Romanian land reform might have also have played a factor. Indeed, they did.
At the Paris Peace conference after the war, the Romanian prime-minister, Ion I.C. Bratianu declared on February 1, “In the Bukovina there are about 200,000 inhabitants of various races who had rallied to the Roumanian rule… 500,000 inhabitants out of 800,000 were represented at the proclamation of the union of the Bukovina with Roumania”. Surprisingly enough, the electoral data are consistent with his statements. On December 19, 1918, Bukovina was formally annexed to Romania. The Treaty of Saint Germain of 1919 recognized the Romanian possession of the territory of Bukovina.

The decisive majority of the Bukovinian Romanian population supported the Union of Bukovina with Romania on November 28, 1918. Large majorities of the German and Polish ethnic groups in the province also backed it. The elected representatives who endorsed this change in sovereignty represented a majority of the Bukovinian population. The opposition of the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainians and the neutrality of the Jews should be noted. These developments are consistent with the importance of the sudden shock suggested by my model.

2.4.7. Measuring the External Shock: The Switch of Self-Determination Options among the Bukovinian Romanians in North America

The importance of the sudden shock is also demonstrated by a comparison between the populations of Bukovina, which were affected by the sudden shock on the one hand, and the Bukovinian Romanians who had migrated elsewhere. They had gone overwhelmingly to the North American continent, and were not affected by the sudden shock. In the latter case, the adjustment to the idea of Romanian rule in Bukovina had not yet occurred in numerous cases by the end of 1918. It would take a longer period, often several years.

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266. For the details, see Nina Almond and Ralph Haswell Lutz, *The Treaty of St. Germain: A Documentary History of Its Territorial and Political Clauses, With a Survey of the Documents of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference* (Stanford University, California: Stanford University, California, 1935), p. 546. At the Paris Peace conference after the war, the Romanian prime-minister, Ion I.C. Bratianu declared on February 1, “In the Bukovina there are about 200,000 inhabitants of various races who had rallied to the Roumanian rule… 500,000 inhabitants out of 800,000 were represented at the proclamation of the union of the Bukovina with Roumania”.

The Bukovinian Romanian prisoners of war and those inhabitants who resided in Bukovina had switched their self-determination preferences by late 1918. One can not say the same about all the Romanians outside of these areas until the agrarian reform of 1921. To be sure, the Canadian censuses of 1921 (and 1931 and 1941) do show that by that time the ethnic Romanians of Canada, most of whom were Bukovinians, started to indicate that they had come from Romania rather than Austria. Yet by the time American census of 1920, only perhaps one-half of the Romanian-speakers in the United States who originated from Bukovina indicated their country of origin as Romania; the other half put down Austria.268

By contrast, about 85% of the Transylvanian Romanians put their country as Romania, not Hungary, which had possessed the area until 1918.269 By 1930, practically all of these individuals were

268. The 1920 U.S. census lists 7,241 persons who spoke Romanian as their mother tongue as listing their country of origin as Austria. See Galitzi, p. 32.
269. The population of Romanian mother-tongue living in the United was born in the several countries, or had parents born in several countries, according to the 1920 U.S. census. The numbers by country were Romania 71,805, Hungary 10,819, Austria, 7,241, Russia 484, Turkey in Europe 416, Greece 209, Turkey in Asia 97, Bulgaria 68, Serbia 65, and other countries 125, while 354 were of mixed parentage. The Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration indicate that between 1899 and 1928, 15,304 of the ethnic Romanians who came to the United States came from Romania while 124,637 came from Austria-Hungary. It is obvious that a majority of those who claimed that they were born in Romania actually came from Austria-Hungary but declared their country as Romania rather than either Austria or Hungary. See Galitzi, p. 31, 32. An analysis of the U.S. census results indicates that the number of individuals who stated in the census that they were born in Austria was 1,174,973 in 1910, 575,627 in 1930, 370,914 in 1930, and 479,906 in 1940 in the continental United States. See U.S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1938* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 26 and U.S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1943* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 31. Also see U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 117, 118. The increase in the proportion of native-born individuals of foreign or mixed parentage from Romania, from 26,934 in 1910 to 64,776 in 1920 and to 147,060 in 1930 is interesting. So is the decrease in the numbers of those of Austrian heritage (but not birth) from 538,518 to 316,318. These changes were caused mostly by the re-identification of these inhabitants with the countries that controlled the territory from which their parents had come from. The numbers are from Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 65 and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 116. It is obvious that almost all of the decrease in the population that claimed Austrian birth between 1910 and 1930 was caused by a reclassification by the inhabitants of the country that they listed as their country of origin to one of the successor states. The decrease was caused almost exclusively by the reclassification of their places of birth by their census respondents to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania; Poles tended to declare that they had been born in Poland even before 1920. It would also appear that even in 1910, a majority of the Romanians in the United States who declared that they were born in Romania (65,923 inhabitants of Romanian, Yiddish and other native tongues declared that they were born in Romania in 1910) were actually born in Austria-Hungary. One should keep in mind that an overwhelming majority of the ethnic Romanian immigrants were Transylvanian Greek Catholics. Therefore, it is possible that a majority of the Romanian ethnic population of the Orthodox faith declared its country of origin as Romania even in 1910, possibly with the aim of making an irredentist statement. The welcoming of the Romanian army in Transylvania, whose Romanian population was about equally divided between Orthodox and
indicating their country of origin as Romania. Even more importantly, an insignificant number of Romanians who hailed from Bukovina, but who had moved out to other parts of Austria, found their way in armies other than the Romanian one, including in the Western Galician Ukrainian army in 1919.270

The variables discussed in previous sections played their role in the growth of irredentism during World War I. The post-primary educational system, particularly at its higher levels, favored, in a number of ways, the growth of irredentism before 1916-1918. This type of activism was typical of individuals who had passed through the educational system until the fall of 1918, and especially those who were part of the system at that time. The sudden shock of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy caused a change in the self-determination options of the Bukovinian Romanians in favor of union with Romania. This process was much slower among the Bukovinian Romanians in the U.S. In this country, the identification with Romania as the country of their birth had not been finalized in thousands of cases by 1920. However, it was finalized by 1921 in Canada.

The importance of the sudden shock is also suggested by a comparison between the populations of Bukovina, which were affected by the sudden shock, and another group of inhabitants. They were the Bukovinian Romanians who had migrated elsewhere, overwhelmingly to the North American continent. The latter were not affected by the sudden shock. Their adjustment to the idea of Romanian rule in Bukovina had not yet occurred in numerous cases by the end of 1918, but would take a longer period, often several years.

Romanian irredentism in Bukovina had been a very marginal phenomenon until 1914. The sudden shock of World War I and especially of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy had a significant effect. The Greek Catholic inhabitants, by a large majority of the Romanian population was genuine. Yet one should also not forget the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Romanians in the areas occupied or liberated by the Romanian troops was Eastern Orthodox. We do not know about the religious backgrounds of the more than 20,000 Transylvanian Romanians of military age who had crossed the Carpathian Mountains to the Kingdom of Romania between the beginning of the war and early 1915 or of the around 5,000 who had volunteered to serve in a Transylvanian Legion which would liberate Transylvania during the same period. For more background on the Romanian American population, see Galitzi and Vladimir Wertsman, *The Romanians in America 1748-1974: A Chronology & Fact Book* (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1975). Also consult James Paul Allen and Eugen James Turner, *We the People: An Atlas of America’s Ethnic Diversity* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988), p. 92-93 and passim. Also see Miron Constantinescu et al., *Unification of the Romanian National State: The Union of Transylvania with Old Romania* (Bucharest: Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1971) p. 94-96, 100-103.

shock disrupted (destroyed or brought to an end) the satisfaction with Austrian rule of the minority of the Bukovinian Romanian population that had supported Austria only several months previously. The war as well as the decay and collapse of the empire disrupted, that is, brought to an end, the integration of the Bukovinian Romanian population in the polity (the Austrian Empire). It thereby pushed the non-separatist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants toward irredentism. The same factors led to the discrediting, and often to the literal or physical tearing down, of the symbols of the Austrian imperial polity.

3. Alternative Explanations and Reasons for Skepticism

One could consider a large number of alternative explanations dealing with the dynamics of Romanian nation-building in Bukovina that are, distinct from those discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. Yet they are of limited merit. Either I have been able to falsify them or there is no data to test them. It is unlikely that additional data will modify my conclusions.

3.1. Actor-Based Alternative Explanations

Some of the alternative explanations that have been falsified emphasize the importance of political actors, that is, of politicians. To the extent to which “classical” explanations, such as “pork”, are valid, they are consistent with my model.

It could be alleged that an alternative explanation of part of the evidence, and namely of the electoral patterns, would be the changing electoral system. In other words, the proportion of the population that expressed nationalistic electoral options increased in 1907 because voting that was already universal before 1907 was not equal. Therefore, most of the voters of the last two curiae, the rural and the general ones, who did not vote before 1907, did not go to the polls. Their votes were not worth that much. There is merit to this contention.

However, we should also not forget the changes in electoral patterns, the increasingly nationalistic choices of those who voted between 1885 and 1901 discussed above. The fact that the more modern

\[271\] This explanation has been suggested by Jim Niessen, whom I thank for this suggestion and for reading an earlier version of this chapter.
campaigning style that emerged in a by-election in 1905 was able to draw more voters to the polls can not be ignored. Moreover, even in 1907, as we have seen, the voters in many villages voted after they discussed among themselves how to vote, a vestige of the old elections in which the voters had elected “electors”. By 1911, there are no more reports of this practice of “caucusing” before voting.

One alternative explanation is the role of political actors (politicians) and does not contradict the data discussed above, but interprets it differently. In other words, the more pro-Habsburg opponents of the Romanian National Party, Count Bellegarde and Aurel Onciul won in their respective electoral districts because they faced “weak opponents”. This is to some extent accurate of Aurel Onciul’s opponents in 1907, but it does not explain the short life of Bellegarde’s political career. The late selection of Stefanelli as a candidate for the imperial parliament, and his possibly less than great enthusiasm for being a candidate could have played a role in his defeat, but it does not explain why Count Bellegarde also defeated Aurel Onciul.

The role of incumbency was real. Aurel Onciul decided to run in the Gura Humorului-Solca district and in the Câmpulung district in 1907 even though he neither resided in that district nor was born there. This is indicative of the greater weakness of more intense nationalism in those districts in his opinion, including in comparison to the district around Czernowitz, which he had represented for two years. Yet Onciul’s choice not to benefit from his incumbent status does show the limitations of this advantage. So does the end of Bellegarde’s political career.

The local birth and/or residence of the candidates in the district did not really have a role. Almost all the candidates, whether winners and losers, were born, lived and had “natural power bases” (if any) outside the district, so this could not have been a factor. The wealth of the candidates did help wealthy aristocrats such as Count Bellegarde and Alexandru Hurmuzachi to win elections. Yet the latter was reelected in 1911, whereas the former did not even run for reelection. Moreover, the district of Câmpulung in 1907 elected the wealthiest candidate and in 1911 the poorest candidate. Divisions within the Romanian National Party in two districts in different years once led it to victory and at another time led it to defeat.

The most memorable Romanian politician, Aurel Onciul, was by 1918 the most hated Romanian politician in Bukovina. The electorate could, and often does, judge the politicians mainly by the effects of their deeds. Overall, the role of political actors should not be exaggerated. In three Romanian districts, they
played no role whatsoever, and in two, they were one of the factors that influenced the vote. Another reason why I did not emphasize the role of political actors is that I have not been able to generalize about their impact.

However, the bringing in of “pork barrel” benefits to the district and to specific constituents (“favors, permits, tax exemptions, exemptions from military service, etc., etc.”) did help the politicians’ re-election efforts. The biggest pork barrel item was assistance for the opening of new schools and for the material upkeep of the old ones. The nationalists from the Romanian National Party and from the Democratic Party, unlike the non-nationalist, non-Romanian Bellegarde, “fought for” this. In all probability, it was rational for the voters who desired improvements in the Romanian-language school system to vote for nationalists, because they and only they would “deliver”. Pork barrel of at least a kind did play a role, but it was often “nationalistic pork barrel”. Moreover, this alternative explanation is consistent with the great role of the educational system, so it is not an alternative explanation.

One of the possibilities that need to be taken into account is the possibility that due to personal friendships, some seats were not really contested. Aurel Onciul, the leader of the Democratic Party, was seemingly a friend of two parliamentary deputies of the Romanian National Party, the politically skilled Constantin Isopescu Grecul and the balanced Teofil Simionovici. Since Onciul was so unchallenged a leader in the Democratic Party, he could have been, and possibly was, behind the decision for the party not to contest their seats in 1907. The weakness of the Democratic Party in the districts was all too real, and shown by the 1911 elections.

It could be that the weakness in 1911 might have had a little with the fact that the party did not even contest the seats in 1907. It is also possible that the Democrats did not do the utmost to do well in those districts (no. 12 and 13) in 1911 because of the above-mentioned friendship. Even if it were true, it could not have distorted the electoral results too much.

Some of the alternative explanations that have been falsified emphasize the importance of political actors, that is, of politicians. To the extent to which “classical” explanation are valid, they are consistent

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3.2. Other Explanations, Reasons for Skepticism and the Potential Impact of New Data

There are some potential hypotheses that can not be tested because we do not have the data, or because we have data for only some localities, etc. The factual gaps in our knowledge on other issues, although real, do not affect the testing of the model.

There is no data on the participation of Romanians of various groups in various types of collective action (rallies, petitions, etc.), or in activities such as desertion from the Austrian army and defection from Austria, but merely the number of participants and the discourse. We know about the political roles of the elites of some villages, but not of others. We also know how the self-determination options were different in 1918 in comparison to 1914, the reasons related to the sudden shock (war) that led to changes in these options in auto-biographical declarations and social commentaries, but the fact that we know the what and why does not mean that we know the “when. “ We also do not know the attitudes of the inhabitants who did not vote in the Austrian elections. However, Austrian official reports during World War I did indirectly indicate that the non-voters had similar opinions to the voters.

The fact that the union of Bukovina with Romania in 1918 was practically universally popular among ethnic Romanians was clear. Yet the attitude of the elected representatives and of the multitudes welcoming the Romanian troops does not allow us to establish how universal this attitude was beyond the fact that there was no evidence of opposition among ethnic Romanians. It is possible that there was some seeming “indifferentism” among a small minority of the ethnic group. Those who participated in the military revolt of Romanian troops in 1919 were exclusively ethnic Ukrainians, and included no Romanians. The lack of desertions among ethnic Romanians from the Romanian army, the absence of pictures of the Austrian emperor in the homes of Romanian peasants and the existence of numerous pictures of the Romanian king indicate a preference for Romanian rule.

There is also the potential “religious explanation” of pro-Romanian irredentism. It has been argued that many Romanians were treated as second-class citizens as Orthodox worshippers. This was not the case, notwithstanding that some citizens were obviously “more equal than others”. The Orthodox Church was
treated as a second-class church because it was less independent than other religious communities, more influenced by the authorities. Yet the Orthodox Church in Romania before 1918 was equally non-independent. This reason should not have led to irredentism, and there is no evidence that it did beyond the dissatisfaction to the fact that the Austrian authorities pushed for equality for the Ukrainians in the church leadership. However, this was a nationalistic, not confessional issue.

There was a great deal of Romanian resentment against the Russian invasions and the misbehavior of the Russian army, notwithstanding the Orthodoxy of the Russian state. Moreover, the first kings and queens of Romania until 1927 were Roman Catholic, like the Habsburgs, not Orthodox. Finally, non-Orthodox Romanians, who were mainly Greek Catholic, and non-Orthodox Romanian-speakers supported union with Romania in 1918, whereas almost all Ruthenian speakers tended to oppose it in 1918. Non-Romanians of non-Orthodox faiths (Germans, Poles, even the Jews in some areas) were more likely to support union with Romania in late November 1918 than Orthodox non-Romanians (Ukrainians) were.

There has been a trend for some Romanian and non-Romanian historians to exaggerate the extent of irredentism before 1918. Although most of the available evidence would contradict this view, there is no evidence that any sizable number of Romanian peasants, unlike their Bukovinian Ruthenian counterparts, had pictures of the Austrian emperor in their homes during the Austrian period. Factors such as this, plus the use of the Romanian tricolor as the ethnic Romanian flag and various press articles that identified “the country” as Romania could lead one to believe that irredentism was very widespread. What this shows is that there was rather little enthusiasm for Austrian rule during the late Habsburg period, but merely a preference for it based on material reasons and loyalty to the Habsburgs.

There are some potential hypotheses that cannot be tested because we do not have the right data. The factual gaps in our knowledge on other issues, although real, do not affect the testing of the model.

One could think of a large number of alternative explanations dealing with the dynamics of Romanian nation-building in Bukovina. They are of limited merit. Either I have been able to falsify them or there is no data to test them.

4. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have tested my model on the case of the Bukovinian Romanians between 1880 and 1918. The importance of the ethnic basis has been demonstrated. The Bukovinian Romanians are a group in which nation-building produced generalized nationalism by 1911. The acquisition of a “Romanian” identity on top of the previous “Moldovan” identity, which became a less important sub-national identity, was finished by 1890. This was a key early step in the nation-building process. It was also a precondition for generalized nationalism among a large majority of those who came to share it. Nation-building was facilitated by the lack of linguistic and cultural differences among the Bukovinian Romanians (with the most conspicuous partial exception of some urban inhabitants). The enormous similarity between them and the Romanians right across the border in Romania, in the province of Moldova, was a decisive factor.

The influence of the German language and the impact of bilingualism hindered nation-building among the Romanian urban population. The emergence of Bukovinian (provincial) and Austrian, as opposed to Romanian national, identities among many of the Germanized and urban Romanians, among aristocrats and part of the middle class had an impact. It temporarily retarded the development of the national movement until around 1891. It either delayed nationalization or made it less intense during the period of Austrian rule until 1918 in the urban environment.

The Bukovinian Romanian-language elementary education system, including the impact of the teaching personnel outside the school, was the key facilitator of nation-building. It fostered the spread of nationalism to the elementary school students. On a different level, the post-elementary system was the key catalyst for early active irredentism.

Industrialization delayed nation-building outside the cities until the period from 1907 to 1911 everywhere. Yet by 1911, this effect disappeared wherever the Romanian nationalists tried to appeal to the Romanians employed in industry. But industrialization did prevent the emergence of the most intense varieties of nationalism. What seems to have hindered nation-building, as opposed to merely delayed the emergence of intense nationalism, was the city environment (urbanization) with its Germanizing influences, not rural industry.

The sudden shock of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy caused a change in the self-determination options of the Romanian inhabitants of Bukovina in favor of union with Romania. This new
option was supported by the quasi-totality of the Bukovinian Romanians by late 1918. This attitudinal change took place at a slower pace among the Bukovinian Romanians in the U.S., where the identification with Romania had not been finalized in thousands of cases by 1920. This constitutes an interesting test for the significance of the sudden shock: the segment of the population that was not exposed to it, Bukovinian Romanians in New World, developed Romanian national self-identification at a slower pace.
Chapter 4
Romanian and Ethnic Minority Nation-Building in Bukovina, 1918-1944:
The Dependent Variable

1. Introduction: The Bukovinian Romanians after 1918: When and Why
   1.1. Summary of the Argument

2. The Dependent Variable
   2.1. The Spread and Intensity of Nationalism, 1918-1938: The Various Visions and the Political Framework
      2.1.1. The Politics of Interwar Romania in Bukovina
      2.2. The Romanian Electoral System and Institutions
      2.3.1. Patriotic, Unpatriotic and Ultranationalist Votes (1919-1922)
      2.3.2. The Continuation of Cosmopolitanism in Cernăuți (1918-1922)
      2.4.1. The Mainstream Parties between 1926 and 1937
      2.5. Extreme Romanian Far-Right Electoral Nationalism and Anti-Semitism during the Interwar Period

3. Conclusions: Expectations and Results
1. Introduction. The Bukovinian Romanians after 1918: When and Why

1.1. Summary of the Argument

During the period from 1910 to 1941, the percentage of self-identified ethnic Romanians in the population of Bukovina increased from 34.4% in 1910, to 44.5% in 1930, and to 57.4% in 1941. These numbers statistically inflate the success of Romanian nation-building in the province because of the impact of the genocide and of the departure of majorities of several ethnic groups in 1940-1941. Yet there was some genuine incremental “growth” in the number of self-identified Romanians. Moreover, the intensity of Romanian nationalism among the members of the ethnic group was higher at the end of the period than at the beginning.

Even more importantly, the intensity of Romanian nationalism was greater during the interwar period than before World War I. Thus, in southern Bukovina, the intensity of Romanian nationalism in the elections to the lower house of the Austrian parliament, and later of the Romanian parliament (elected under male universal suffrage), was 2.07 in 1911. Yet it ranged from 3.10 and 3.50 during the interwar period, and it consistently grew between 1932, or earlier in some parts of the province, and 1937. A similar increase in intensity was visible in northern Bukovina and for the Senate elections, in which the males over 40 participated. The greater intensity of Romanian nationalism which characterized the elections of the Romanian interwar era in comparison to those of the Austrian period is consistent with our expectations, which are that the intensity of nationalism scores will increase until they are clearly above a score of 3. After that, they could, and did, go up and down. Thus, the small fluctuations from year to year during the interwar period, including the “plateau” between 1926 and 1932, do not invalidate this broad, upward trend. They are explained by the actions of political actors, by the dynamics of partisan competition, and even by the uneven level of freedom and fairness of the various elections. Yet the growth of the nationalistic far right, particularly among the youth educated exclusively in Greater Romania during the 1930’s is explained by my model.

The evolution of the intensity of nationalism among other groups is more difficult to ascertain, but Ukrainian, Jewish and German electoral nationalisms continued to be strong, particularly in northern
Bukovina, whose population was overwhelmingly not ethnically Romanian. Overall, the intensity of minority ethnic nationalism after 1918 was greater than it had been prior to 1918. This is suggested both by the numerical scores based on the electoral data and by their qualitative substitutes. The changes in the electoral system made the expression of Ukrainian nationalism more difficult after 1922. For most of the later elections after 1922, the presence of minority ethnics, including ethnic nationalists, on many of the Romanian party tickets in the northern counties of the province makes the scoring of the intensity of Romanian and minority nationalism impossible. This is not meant to deny the impact of political actors, of the dynamics of the various political parties, or the impact of the uneven level of freedom and fairness of the various elections. The members of the ethnic minorities who were educated overwhelmingly in the Romanian language (the self-styled Hutsuls, etc.) did not display any specific ethnic nationalism worthy of the name.

As in the other chapters of this dissertation, the electoral data will be discussed extensively. In terms of focus, I have investigated the acquisition of a Romanian identity among some of the "borderline" individuals and among the ethnic minorities. I have not looked at those individuals who were intersubjectively ethnic Romanians, who, or whose families, already had a Romanian national identity. This is due to the fact that I have investigated the finalization of the process of their acquisition of a Romanian identity among them in chapters 2 and 3.

2. The Dependent Variable

2.1. The Spread and Intensity of Nationalism, 1918-1938: The Various Visions and the Political Framework

2.1.1. The Politics of Interwar Romania in Bukovina

Even though there is no single book that adequately covers Bukovinian, and indeed Romanian, politics during the interwar period, the body of existing sources do give us a coherent picture. During the

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274. In addition to the maps from chapter 2, useful maps of parts of Bukovina from the interwar period could also be found in Philip Gabriel Eidelberg, The Great Rumanian Peasant Revolt of 1907: Origins of a Modern Jacquerie (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).
interwar period, Romania had a number of nationalistic parties. Most of them were moderately nationalistic, but some were extreme. The construction of typologies is easy as the calculation of the intensity of nationalism scores is not marked by too much ambiguity. There is, however, a need for an enormous attention to detail.

Throughout the interwar period, the overwhelming majority of the ethnic Romanians voted for four main parties. Their greater importance, derived from their popularity at one time or another and/or status as governing parties on more than one occasion. They include the Democratic Union Party, the National Liberal Party (and its various factions and splinters), the People’s Party, and the National Peasant Party. There existed also radical Romanian nationalistic parties, such as the Legion of the Archangel Michael, the League of National Christian Defense and the National Christian Party that had little support from non-Romanian Bukovinians.\(^{276}\)

After the union of Bukovina with Romania, a majority of the Romanian National Party as well as the old irredentists from the Junimea and other groups\(^{277}\) united to form a new political force. Its name was Partidul Democrat al Unirii (The Democratic Party of Union or the Democratic Union Party). This political party won the elections for the Romanian parliament of 1919 and 1922 in the province. This new force included some of the candidates from the irredentist factions before World War I, as well as a handful of members of the ethnic minorities. The leadership of the party believed that Romania, including its new province of Bukovina, should be ruled in a centralized manner.

The Democratic Union Party was allied with the countrywide center-right National Liberal Party of the Old Kingdom of Romania. It eventually became a part of the latter in early 1923. Just like the more intensely nationalistic parties, it did not campaign in the languages of the ethnic minorities, such as Yiddish or Ukrainian. The leadership of the political formation did however make deals with various members of the elites of the national minorities. The latter supported it, and some candidates on the party ticket did use non-Romanian languages in campaigning. The Democratic Party of Union viewed Romania as a state for ethnic Romanians that would display tolerance toward minorities, who, however, in Bukovina

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\(^{276}\) The parties that represent exceptions to this rule, such as the non-Romanian nationalistic parties, as well as the socialist and Communist parties, will be discussed later.

\(^{277}\) For more details, see chapter 2.
should “stay in their places”.

Overall, the platform and candidates of the Democratic Union Party of Bukovina argued that Bukovinians, whether ethnic Romanians or members of the national minorities, should be loyal toward the Romanian state. Therefore, the party should get a score of 1 on the integrative dimension of Romanian nationalism. The party argued that Bukovinians, whether Romanians or minorities, should be satisfied with Romanian rule and their situation in the Romanian state not only under ideal conditions, but also in general, so the party should also get a score of 1 on this dimension.

In terms of the identity issue, the party believed in ethnic Romanian primacy, but it accepted the existence, the rights and the participation of the minorities in politics. The party’s elite saw itself as representing the rights and demands of the Romanian citizens of minority ethnicities too. The party was officially primarily a civic nationalistic party. Therefore, the party should get a score of 0.5 on the identificational dimension.

The party did use Romanian symbols, such as the Romanian red-yellow-blue flag and the symbols of the Romanian monarchy. Some of those running on its tickets were members of the national minorities, and key activists campaigned in the main minority languages. (The language of campaigning is a part of the score on the symbolic dimension.) These practices were not only functionally important, but also conveyed an appeal for minority votes. Therefore, the party’s score on the symbolic dimension should be a 0.5 in those districts where campaigning in minority languages was necessary because most of the population was mostly of another ethnicity.

However, wherever the campaigning was conducted overwhelmingly in Romanian, in the more purely Romanian electoral districts, a score of 1 is warranted. As with other parties, we can not fully know to what extent they campaigned in other languages locality-by-locality. The party should therefore get a score of 3 in the mostly non-Romanian districts to 3.5 in the mostly Romanian districts.

The National Liberal Party, which won the elections of 1927, 1933 and 1937, and, in a certain sense, those of 1931 (the main group of the winning electoral coalition slate of that year was the National

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278. Its leaders, as National Liberal politicians, would close most Ukrainian language schools in 1924-1927.
279. For our intents and purposes, it interests us that it campaigned in Ukrainian and German and possibly in Yiddish.
280. In that year, it was the main party in the victorious coalition, the National Union. The other members of the coalition were the German Party and the National Democratic Party of Prime Minister Nicolae Iorga.
Liberal Party) is in numerous ways a continuation of the Democratic Union Party. It generally has identical scores to the latter party. However, the candidates of the party did not use minority languages in campaigning. Nevertheless, the political parties representing national minorities that were allied with it did engage in this practice. The local elites in favor of the party also seemed to do it. However, the party was able to promote a “Romanian symbolism” in all conceivable ways. Its score on the symbolic dimension should therefore be a 1. The party should therefore receive a score on the intensity of nationalism scale of 3.5.

Some leaders and activists of the Romanian National Party of Bukovina during Habsburg times, together with a residue of the old Democratic Party and some old irredentists opposed the Democratic Union Party and the National Liberals from early 1919 onward. They formed the Bukovinian branch of the People’s Party led by Marshal Ion Averescu. This political force won the elections of 1920 and 1926 both nationwide and in Bukovina. Overall, the platform and candidates of the party argued that Bukovinians, whether Romanians or minorities, should be loyal toward the Romanian state. Therefore, this political group is awarded a score of 1 on the integrative dimension.

The People’s Party was a moderately centralistic. It favored, particularly in Bukovina, the adaptation of administrative practices to local conditions. It accused the Democratic Union Party of corruption, and of using nationalism, which was regarded by the People’s Party as beneficial, for selfish purposes. Since it attacked such “sacred cows”, and accepted the view that Romanian nationalism could be used for inappropriate purposes, its score on the satisfactional dimension should be coded as a 0.5.281

In the worldview of the People’s Party, Romania was seen as a state for Romanians that should nevertheless embrace the minority populations. Therefore, the party should get a score of 0.5 on the identificational dimension. The party included some conspicuous intensely nationalistic Romanians, mostly from outside Bukovina, but it represented a more liberal ethnic type of nationalism in the province than the Democratic Union Party and the National Liberals.

The party did promote Romanian symbols, such as the Romanian red-yellow-blue flag and the symbols of the Romanian monarchy. The party as such did campaign in non-Romanian languages such as

281. Since the party argued in favor of popular satisfaction with Romanian rule, it could be argued that it should get a 1 on the satisfational dimension. However, this level of satisfaction refers to the hypothetical conditions in Romania after reforms rather than how the party's leaders described them as being at that point in time.
Ukrainian, which was necessary in view of the demography of many districts of Bukovina, and, unlike the Democratic Union Party and later the National Liberal Party, in Yiddish. Moreover, just like the Democratic Union Party, this political force did make deals with various minority factions and parties whose candidates ran on its lists, whose activists did use non-Romanian languages in campaigning.282

Therefore, the score of this political force on the symbolic dimension should be a 0.5 in those districts where this was necessary on a large scale because most of the population was non-Romanian by ethnicity and language. Nevertheless, even in those districts, a significant amount of campaigning was conducted in Romanian. The score should be a 1 in the more purely Romanian districts, where this was not necessary. Therefore, the party’s score on the intensity of nationalism scale ranges from a 2.5 in the districts with significant numbers of ethnic minority inhabitants to a 3, in the districts without significant ethnic minority inhabitants.

The National Peasant Party (PNT) was, at least originally, in favor of greater decentralization, more at the county ("judet"), that is, sub-provincial, rather than at the provincial level, but to some extent at the provincial level too. It was also more sensitive and sympathetic toward national minorities in areas such as linguistic and educational rights, as well as toward the economic rights of the peasants of all ethnicities. The party believed in a better material and social condition for the Romanian as well as Ukrainian, German and other minority peasants. Therefore, it could be argued that its nationalism was more civic than that of the People’s Party and especially than that of the National Liberal Party.

By 1929-1930, the party became more “bourgeois” and “national” (to some extent more intensely nationalistic, but ethnonationalist as opposed to nationalist in a civic sense), and less “peasant”, that is, more bourgeois. The party always called for loyalty toward the Romanian state, so it should receive a score of 1 on the integrative dimension.283

Before coming to power in 1928, and again in 1937, the PNT discourse displayed less “satisfaction” with the conditions than subsequently. So the score on the satisfacional dimension for most the elections will be a 0.5 until, and during, the elections of 1928, and in 1937. This was not the case in 1931, 1932 and 1933, when it should get a 1. In terms of the identificational dimension, the numbers could

282 For our intents and purposes, it is relevant to this project that it campaigned in Ukrainian, German and Yiddish.
283 The wide regional differences between the leaders in various regions of Romania make the coding of votes for this party more problematic, but this does not concern Bukovinian politics.
be 0.5 or 1, depending on a variety of factors. During the years before 1928 everywhere, and later in the
districts with significant ethnic minority populations, it will be 0.5. After 1928, in the overwhelmingly
Romanian districts, that is, in some regions outside Bukovina, it was 1. The party was a Romanian peasant
nationalistic party that was in favor of the moderate currents of the ethnic nationalisms of all the mostly
peonant minority populations.

In terms of the symbolic dimension, the National Peasant Party in some regions outside of
Bukovina was rather disrespectful toward the monarchy until around 1927. It subsequently became
respectful. For this reason, with everything else being equal, the intensity of nationalism of the party on this
dimension seems lower than in the case of the three parties mentioned above. The party also used minority
languages in campaigns. Therefore, the score of the party on the symbolic dimension should be a 0.5 in the
early years until 1928 and always in the mostly minority districts. It is assigned a 1 in the mostly Romanian
ones in later elections. Overall, the scores of the party on the intensity of nationalism scale range from 2.5
to 3 in Bukovina and from 2.5 to 3.5 in some other areas of the country.

As a rule, the minor “mainstream” parties that splintered from the main parties should receive
the same scores as those of the main parties with similar “lines” toward nationalism. The various
“dissident” peasant parties included the Radical Peasant Party of 1932-1938 led by Grigore Iunian, and the
Democratic Peasant Party of 1931-1933 led by Constantin Stere. Another one was the Peasant Party (the
Peasant Party of 1927-1934, led by Dr. Nicolae Lupu, not to be confused with other parties with the same
name in Romanian history, etc.). These political forces were to the left of the National Peasant Party. They
should receive the same scores as the National Peasant Party during its early period. This is not the place to
discuss all the smaller Romanian moderate parties beyond noting that I will calculate their scores on the
same principles.

In the case of other lists, including individual candidates, typically previously associated with
a political party, I will use my judgment based on the party program without discussing the coding in here.
They obtained too few votes to merit discussion. Whenever in doubt, I will treat a party that has split off
from another in the same way as the original party.

The parties of the various ethnic minorities were typically “bourgeois” in their leadership.
With the exception of the German and Jewish minority parties, they were regarded as secessionist by some
ethnic Romanians. The Romanian authorities would not have allowed open secessionist parties. After the openly secessionist Magyar People’s Party was dissolved by the Romanian government on October 30, 1921, secessionist minority nationalists tended to bypass the issue.

The typical minority parties did not openly advocate either in favor of secessionism, or of loyalty, as neither did the German and Jewish parties. They did not advocate patriotism. These formations practically never obtained votes from those who were not from their ethnic or linguistic group, or, occasionally, other minority groups.

There were certain independent candidates who were ethnic nationalists of their ethnic groups (German, Jewish or Polish) who were openly loyal to the Romanian state. These politicians were able to obtain votes from the members of other ethnic groups, including, sometimes even disproportionately, the Romanian one. A similar pattern had applied to some other candidates from the German and Jewish ethnic groups during the Austrian period. Some Jewish associations (not political parties), as well as Jewish politicians, ran on the tickets of the Jewish Party of Romania of the Old Kingdom of Romania. This formation had candidates for public office that openly expressed loyalty toward the Romania state, an attitude shared by a large majority of the Jews of the Old Kingdom.

The Bukovinian voters for certain German ethnic parties would in certain periods display nostalgic attitudes for the Habsburg period. Starting in 1933, many of them would display sympathies for Nazi Germany, including for its plans to bring Romania into its sphere of influence. The voters for the pro-Zionist Jewish Party of Romania were loyal to the Romanian state rather than to neighboring states. It was nevertheless not perceived as Romanian nationalistic, pro-integration, etc., by the non-Jewish population and by most of the Bukovinian Jews. Besides, if given a choice between multi-national and supranational imperial Austria and the interwar Romanian national state, most of the Bukovinian voters for the Jewish Party of Romania would have chosen the former.

I have assigned a score of 0 on all dimensions to the German, Jewish and Ukrainian nationalist parties in the Bukovinian districts. It ignores loyalty that some members of these nationalities felt for Romania. Yet these parties’ programs, leaders and majorities of voters were not at all Romanian nationalistic.
A thorny problem is the issue of the inclusion of non-ethnic Romanians on the electoral lists
of the various parties discussed above that did not identify themselves as “minority” parties, but as “Romanian” parties, even if often in a partially civic sense. The presence of minority candidates on a multi-member list would obviously facilitate the task of obtaining minority support for the ticket for reasons other than its program. By placing members of the ethnic minorities on the list, the political formation was making an “ethnic” appeal to a specific minority.284

There is the option of scoring each candidate separately on the identificational dimension. If a party’s ticket was half or more ethnically non-Romanian, it can not receive more than a 0 on the identificational dimension. This rule applies to the cases of electoral coalitions in which the main partner was a Romanian nationalistic party and in which the minor parties were minority and other political formations not normally seen as Romanian nationalistic (e.g., Social-Democrats, which will be discussed below).

There is nevertheless a “penalty” for coalitions with the nationalistic parties of the ethnic minorities. If half or more of a ticket of a Romanian nationalistic party was made up of representatives of political parties that were allied to the main party whose score on the intensity of nationalism scale for Romanian nationalism was much lower, then adjustments will be made. If half or more of the members of the list or of the elected representative of a party came from minority nationalist parties, then the ticket will get a score of 0 on both the identificational dimension and will lose 1 point on the other dimensions. I have done this in order to reflect the attitudes of the presumed electorate for that ticket. On the other hand, the goal is at the same time not bring the score below that of the maximum possible intensity of Romanian nationalism score for the Socialists (1.5), which would distort reality.285 This will lead to an overstatement of the spread and intensity of Romanian nationalism in some areas of Bukovina (northern Bukovina, the counties of Cernauti and Storojinet between 1925 and 1937), where this was often the case.

However, one can not observe the same phenomenon in southern Bukovina, in the counties of Radauti, Campulung and Suceava. For this reason, the scores for the two parts of Bukovina will not only be provided, but also treated as more important than those for Bukovina as a whole. For some years, the scores for northern Bukovina will be treated as tentative, and will not appear in this chapter, but only in the

284 For example, putting a German on the list could attract Polish support or vice versa.
285 The minority ethnic nationalists were less opposed to Romanian ethnic nationalism than the socialists were, but desired to place some concrete empirical limits on it.
appendix. This is due to a number of complexities listed below and due to a lack of consensus among the students of Bukovina.\footnote{The extent to which the findings for northern Bukovina are valid will be left to the readers to judge.}

Realities were, of course, more complex.\footnote{Unless stated otherwise, the reader should assume that a number of individuals with an expertise in the region, not all of whom desire that their name should be mentioned for each specific case, but only in the acknowledgments, agree with my coding.} There were also differences, at least in the perception of the Romanian ethnic population or at least of its opinion leaders, between various categories of minority candidates. The members of the ethnic groups that had supported the union of Bukovina with Romania in 1918 were mostly seen in a different light than those of other ethnicities. This issue had an indirect impact on their political future. For example, it could influence whether they could get on certain lists (e.g., the National Liberal ones) at certain times because they had high status in the party, partly because of “seniority”.

However, as important and well known as these distinctions might have been for the political elite and opinion leaders, they were not as important for most of the electorate. Only a minority of the voting public knew, for example, that the Germans and the Poles had supported union with Romania in 1918.

As we have already seen, on the symbolic dimension, the center-right and center-left lists whose campaigning was exclusively in the Romanian language in a district will get a 1. The parties that also campaigned to a large extent in minority languages in a district will get a 0.5.\footnote{The electorate judged parties and politicians on the basis of programs, promises and reputations.}

The Communists will get overall scores of 0, while the intensity of nationalism scores for other Marxist and Marxian parties would vary, depending on the characteristics of the candidates. The Communist Party and its front organizations and the Socialist Party (except for candidates that happened to be moderate Romanian nationalists, who will get a 0.5) will get a 0 on the identificational dimension. The Socialists, Social Democrats and other revisionist Socialists will receive between a 0 and 1 on the integrative dimension.

The candidates requesting a referendum over whether northern Bukovina should be ruled by the Romanian state or by a Ukrainian state should get a 0, those advocating “patriotism” should get a 1, and all the rest a 0.5. The Communists will receive a zero on this dimension. All the Marxist and Marxian parties...
will receive a 0 on the satisfacional dimension (they did not advocate attitudes of satisfaction) and on the symbolic dimension (they did not use the symbols of the Romanian state, but only the symbols of their ideological visions).

There were also some extreme nationalistic tickets. There is an “award” for extreme nationalism, a higher score on the intensity of nationalism scale. This applies to the political parties of the intensely reactionary, semi-fascist, or fully-fledged fascist varieties. If such a party could technically be given a score of less than 1 on the identificational dimension due to the presence of non-Romanians on the list, the party should receive a score of 1 anyway.

The only exception to this rule would be if the member of a national minority represented a minority political group (party) rather than only the candidate as a person. Sometimes an individual member of an ethnic minority ran on the electoral ticket of such a formation. This was possibly because the anti-Semitism or other elements in the platform of the respective far right party were congenial to him. Such a case should be treated with care. One can not assume that the person represented other members of the non-Romanian minorities. The purpose of this practice is to prevent the substance or appearance of possibly giving similar scores to the fascist Legion of the Archangel Michael and to the National Liberal Party in certain Bessarabian counties. The former was clearly an extremist party, while the latter was clearly not one.

Even though there is no single book that adequately covers Bukovinian, and indeed Romanian, politics during the interwar period, the existing sources do allow us to present a coherent picture. During the interwar period, almost all of Romania’s parties were nationalistic. Most of them were moderately so, but several of them were extremely nationalistic.

### 2.2. The Romanian Electoral System and Institutions

For an understanding of the electoral developments, one should look at a number of countrywide patterns, with an emphasis on both the province-wide results and the district-by-district

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289. The Legion was incapable and unwilling to make alliances with the political formations of any ethnic minority. It was the only major Romanian political formation in this category.

290. The fact that the interwar Communists did not see too much difference between the two does not mean that social scientists should not.
electoral results. Since the Romanian electoral data will also be used in subsequent chapters, a through explanation of the nature of the system will be useful.

The counties ("judete" in Romanian) were the key legal, administrative and electoral units of the country. They were no complaints that they had gerrymandered borders from any of the major parties, but they had constant borders, even though these borders were partially changed in 1925. The county electoral bureaus calculated the electoral statistics for their respective counties, and sent them to the central electoral bureau, which used these numbers for the apportionment of seats. The same figures were published in Romania's official gazette, Monitorul Oficial.

In 1919-1922, Romania had a Single Member Plurality System electoral system for the lower house of the parliament. From 1926 on, a very complicated and intricate non-standard system of proportional representation for the selection of the 387 members of the Assembly of Deputies was introduced. They had to be males older than 25 years. The franchise was direct, secret, compulsory, and universal for all males who were at least 21, and who enjoyed electoral rights.

If a party obtained at least 40% of the countrywide votes in the elections for the lower house, it was declared a "majority group", while the other parties were declared "minority groups". Regardless of its overall level of nationwide popularity, any "minority group" which obtained a majority of the votes cast in any individual constituency (county) obtained a number of seats from that county. Their number was calculated by multiplying the percentage of the vote polled by its electoral ticket in that specific county multiplied by the number of deputies apportioned to that constituency based on its population (3 to 20).

The other seats were mathematically distributed to the various political parties for the country as a whole, rather than county-by-county, based on the percentage of the votes cast that were not disregarded. The discarded votes included the votes of an electoral list through which that party had already obtained

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291. “Judet” is the singular and “judete” the plural. Before the 1926 parliamentary elections, the counties were smaller, more or less, often literally identical to the Austrian administrative districts. After that, Bukovina has had five counties with stable boundaries.

292. In Bessarabia, and, to a lesser extent, in Greater Transylvania (Transylvania, Banat, Crisana and Maramures), their boundaries had been "inherited" from the period of Russian and, respectively, Hungarian rule before 1918. Large numbers of people felt genuine attachment to their counties, which often represented long-standing historical, or at least administrative-political, units.

293. The only adult men who had no electoral rights were those guilty of certain offenses, who had been sentenced by the courts to the loss of political rights, the insane, as well as those who were part of professional categories that were kept away from political influences and involvement, namely soldiers and magistrates.
seats in individual counties, plus "the annulled votes, and the votes polled by the parties which had obtained less than 2%" of the votes cast. The "majority group", if it existed, received half of the remaining seats as a "bonus".

After the awarding of the "bonus", if applicable, the remaining seats of the Assembly of Deputies were apportioned to the various political parties (including the "majority group") that had obtained at least 2% of the votes cast. This was done based on their percentage of the nationwide vote. The individual seats allocated in this last "round" of apportionment were distributed county-by-county, "according to the number of votes polled by the different parties in the various constituencies".\(^{294}\)

The other house of the parliament, which was also called the National Representation ("Reprezentanta Nationala"), was the Senate ("Senatul")\(^{295}\). The 204 elected senators, who had to be older than 40 years, were elected mostly by pluralities of the electorate in their respective, typically multi-member, constituencies (counties). The 113 senators who were elected directly were chosen through the universal suffrage of the males who were 40 years or older. Other members were elected indirectly, mostly through the votes of all the members of the communal and county councils (1 for each of the 71 counties).

Additionally, each of the four multi-county precincts elected sixteen senators for each of the four specific categories of economic chambers, namely the chambers of commerce, of industry, of agriculture, and of labor of each county. These economic chambers were elected by the eligible electorate, which included almost the entire population that enjoyed political rights and could vote for the lower house, but in most cases in only some chambers. The faculties of each of Romania's four universities (Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj and Cernauti), including, from 1927 on, the female academics, elected a senator.

The Senate also included a large, and variable number of the ex officio members such as former prime ministers, long-serving ministers, and the leading clergymen of all the major denominations. Overall, the representation of the electorate in the Senate was substantially less consistent with the practices and spirit of democracy and proportional representation than the popular representation in the Assembly of


\(^{295}\) "Senat" means "Senate", whereas "Senatul" means "the Senate".
Deputies.296

Three-fifths of the members of the local government councils were elected, and two-fifths were appointed ("co-opted") or ex officio members. The local elections were not held at the same times as the national ones. The elected councilmen (or, from 1930 on, councilwomen) were chosen by citizens who were adults (over twenty-one years of age), through universal, equal, secret manhood suffrage, and, from 1930 on, by certain categories of women. These included widows, mothers of three or more children, as well as women who were educated, decorated, employed in the civil service, or members of organizations of civil society.297 By contrast, the only women who could vote in national elections were academics who participated in choosing the senators elected by the faculties of each of the four universities.

The electoral results, and especially the performance of the opposition parties, were to some extent influenced by the competitiveness, freedom and fairness of the electoral process. Interwar Romania had only three or four national elections that were free and fair by Western standards, namely those held in 1919, 1928 and 1932. The manner in which the elections of 1926, 1927, and 1933 were conducted left much to be desired because of some irregularities, such as ballot stuffing, the buying of votes, "voting by dead people", intimidation, etc.298

By comparison, the elections of 1931 and especially 1937 were closer to the first, more adequate, category than to the second, while the elections of 1922 should be placed somewhere in the middle. For the sake of consistency with the freedom and fairness of the elections held in other polities discussed in this text, and particularly in imperial Austria, some comparisons will be necessary. The elections of 1919, 1928, 1932 and 1937 will be classified as comparable to the 1907 and 1911 elections in Bukovina.299

Despite these, the problems with the quality of the elections, Romania was what Freedom House calls an electoral democracy. This was partly because of the rotation of various ruling parties and coalitions in power. No party or coalition followed itself in power or ruled for more than one electoral cycle. It is customary to classify countries such as present-day Moldova and Ukraine before 2005 as (illiberal)

298. They were comparable to the post-1989 Ukrainian elections discussed in chapter 5.
299. In the case of the elections of 1937, which were of reasonable quality, the fact that the government lost the elections leads us to classify them as generally free.
democracies. It would be inconsistent if one would deny that status to Romania, which was a democracy between 1918/1919 and 1938, was similar: it was a democracy, albeit an illiberal democracy for most of the period.\footnote{Interwar ministers in office lost many judicial cases against regular citizens. I would like to thank Dumitru Sandru for this point. A salient interwar electoral pattern was the long-term decline in voter turnout in national elections throughout the 1930's, partly because numerous citizens were turned off from parties, politics and elections. The fact that voting was compulsory induced many people who did not have any preferences for any political party, but who desired to obey the law, or to do their civic duty, or, less commonly, were driven to the polling booths by the gendarmes, who sometimes enforced the compulsory vote provision. These and other people who were not committed to any particular party, often stamped list number one. By 1937, electoral manipulation consisted mostly of preventing people from voting through methods such as the quarantining of numerous villages whose voters tended to be anti-governmental. This happened especially in those areas where the civic spirit of the electorate was not particularly high. See Scurtu, "Political Parties", p. 65-66; Ioan Scurtu, "Alegerile parlamentare din Martie 1922", in Analele Universitatii Bucuresti. Filozofie. Istorie. Drept., vol. 23, 1974, p. 93-95 and C. Enescu, "Semnificatia alegerilor din Decembrie 1937 in evolutia politica a neamului romanesc" (an almost complete reprint from Sociologie Romaneasca, year 2, no. 11-12, Noemvrie-Decemvrie 1937), in Petre Datulescu and Klaus Liepelt, Renasterea unei democratii: Alegerile din Romania de la 20 mai 1990 (Bucuresti: I.R.S.O.P., 1991), p. 162, 173. Also consult Gh. I. Ionita, P.C.R. si masele populare (1934-1938) (Bucuresti: Editura Stiintifica, 1971), p. 316-317; and Institutul Central de Statistica, Recensamantul general al populatiei Romaniei din 29 Decembrie 1930 (Bucuresti: Monitorul Oficial, Imprimeria Nationala, 1938-1940), subsequently cited as Recensamantul, vol. 2, p. 384-401. In 1937, the main winners of this dirty politicking were the ruling National Liberals and, inadvertently, unintentionally and, to the surprise of the establishment, the Legion of the Archangel Michael.}

Imperfect elections were not equally free and fair throughout the country; regional variations were present. The 1922 elections were more deficient in Bukovina than in Bessarabia and do overstate the spread of Romanian nationalism (at the expense of Ukrainian nationalist and socialist candidates). By contrast, the 1933 and 1937 elections were less fair in Bessarabia than in Bukovina. Their results understate the intensity of Romanian nationalism. Another pattern is that the most intensely Romanian and minority nationalistic tickets did particularly well in parliamentary by-elections, which should be treated as a useful, but separate, category.

Local electoral results will be rarely used in this analysis. In my judgment, in the Romanian local elections, the voters have tended to prefer individuals to ideologies and platforms, but I have obviously not ascertained this for every single locality.\footnote{For more details about how this applied even to the extreme right, see Armin Heinen, Die Legion "Erzengel Michael" in Rumanien: Soziale Bewegung und politische Organisation (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986), p. 382. Consult Peter H. Merkl, "Comparing Fascist Movements", in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (eds.), Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), p. 756.}

For an understanding of the electoral developments, one should look at a number of nationwide patterns, with an emphasis on both the province-wide results and the district-by-district electoral results. A
through explanation of the nature of the system is useful.

2.3.1. Patriotic, Unpatriotic and Ultranationalist Votes (1919-1922)

The period from 1919 until 1922 was one of accommodation or habituation of the population of Bukovina to the Romanian rule. The intensity of Romanian nationalism, particularly on the integrative and satisfactual dimensions, increased identification with Romanian nationalism on these dimensions started was shared by increasingly large numbers of members of the national minorities. These included not only numerous inhabitants from those ethnic groups whose representatives and leaders had endorsed Bukovina’s union with Romania in 1918, but also some who had not, especially among Ukrainians and Jews. The electoral evidence also indicates that among ethnic Romanians, to the extent to which public opinion diverged from the “line” of the ruling party or coalition, it tended to be more intensely nationalistic.

The institutional framework of the Romanian electoral system makes the analysis of the elections of 1919-1922 in some ways more revealing than that of the subsequent electoral contests. This warrants their more detailed treatment. An analysis of the elections of 1919 and 1920 does show that some of the patterns observable in the elections of 1907 and 1911 were also visible on these occasions. The predominantly ethnically Romanian districts whose population was more intensely nationalistic than average were the same in 1919 and 1920 as in 1907 and 1911. Also, in the areas dominated by ethnically non-Romanian population that was overwhelming or at least largely unsympathetic to Romanian rule, the electoral data for consistently show these sentiments.

The most important party in the province during the early period of Romanian rule was the

302. The results of the Romanian interwar elections may be found in Monitorul Oficial, part 1, 1919, no. 163 of November 7; No. 164 of November 8; No. 165 of November 11; No. 166 of November 12; No 168 of November 14; No. 171 of November 18; No. 172 of November 19; No. 173 of November 20; 1920, No. 44 of May 30; No. 45 of May 31; No. 46 of June 1; No. 47 of June 2; No. 48 of June 3; No. 49 of June 5; 1922, No. 272 of March 4; No. 273 of March 5; No. 274 of March 7; No. 275 of March 8; No. 277 of March 10; No. 278 of March 11; No. 279 of March 12; No. 280 of March 14; No. 283 of March 17; No. 285 of March 19; No. 286 of March 21; 1926, No. 122 of June 4; No. 123 of June 5; No. 124 of June 6; No. 153 of July 14; No. 155 of July 16; 1927, No. 283 of December 19; No. 285 of December 21; 1928, No. 131 of June 10; No. 134 of June 13; 1931, No. 173 of July 26; No. 126 of July 29, 1932; No. 173 of July 26; No. 126 of July 29; 1933, No. 300 of December 29; No. 301 of December 30; 1934, No. 3 of January 3; No. 5 of January 5; No. 301 of December 31, 1937; No. 4 of January 4, 1938.
Democratic Union Party. This political formation represented, especially symbolically, but also substantively, some individuals who had played an important role in bringing about Bukovina’s union with Romania. It had ethnically and geographically uneven levels of support from the population of the region. It received less support from the Ukrainians than from other groups, and was opposed by a majority of the population of the provincial capital of Cernauți/Czernowitz. This was first revealed by the elections of 1919, which were generally free, but not competitive enough because of the large number of uncontested seats.

A majority of the potential opposition, namely the individuals connected to Iancu Flondor, who had been so important in bringing about the union of Bukovina with Romania, but who had quarreled with the leadership of the new formation, boycotted the elections. So did the parties of the national minorities. Yet the boycott did not work, because the overwhelming majority of the electorate voted.

Numerous Bukovinian Romanians respected both Iancu Flondor and the leader of the Democratic Union Party, Ion Nistor. They therefore voted for the Democratic Union Party in elections that were framed in a plebiscite-like manner on the issue of union with Romania.

The politicians associated with the Democratic Union Party were at that time all Romanians in terms of ethnic self-identification. In 1919, they avoided running in districts where they could not win. They won the seats in all the districts in which they ran. In the case of the Senate race for Radauti County, which, as we have seen, was an old Romanian nationalist stronghold during the Austrian period, the party’s candidate won with only a plurality of the votes. His opponents were two opposition ethnic Romanian candidates who were even more intensely nationalist.

A look at the map of the elections of 1919 (see Map 3!!, The Electoral Results for the Elections of 1919) is revealing. It shows that Ion Nistor’s party obtained a majority of the votes of the ethnic Romanian population. It also obtained the votes of a majority of those people, who lived in the northwestern areas of the province, and who are variously referred to as Ukrainians or Hutsuls. Most of these minority inhabitants had indicated its desire to remain a part of Romania in mid-1919. They took this position because they did not desire union with even a potentially autonomous Ukrainian Greek Catholic

303 Iancu Flondor’s boycott undoubtedly had a great deal to do with his personal conflict with Ion Nistor. This clash led to Flondor’s resignation from his position of head of Bukovina’s de facto council of ministers in early 1919. It was also related to the connection of the Flondor group and of the nationalists of the minority ethnic groups with the emerging People’s Party, which boycotted the elections.
(Uniate) region of a Roman Catholic Poland. They even sent letters to the Paris Peace Conference to that effect.

In addition, the logging industry on which so many of them were dependent tied them economically to Romania because the Cheremosh River flows into the Prut River, most of whose course ran through Romania. It would take a few more years before Ukrainian nationalism would trump economics. The Democratic Union Party did not put forward candidates in the city of Cernauti and in the northernmost areas. In there, a majority of the Ukrainians and other minorities were opposed to union with Romania.

Southern Bukovina included the future counties of Campulung, Suceava and Radauți during the period 1925-1940. The intensity of Romanian nationalism score for the Assembly of Deputies for southern Bukovina for 1919 was 3.5, the same score as for the Senate. The percentage of votes for the Democratic Party of Union was 91.03% for the Assembly of Deputies and 97.66% for the Senate. The citizens over 40, who were eligible to vote for the Senate, were more likely to vote for the local dominant party. In the Senate elections, the electoral results also allow us to evaluate the intensity of the support for the nationalism of various minority groups.

The intensity of Polish nationalism in northern Bukovina was 0.21, while that of Jewish nationalism was 0.27. For the Assembly elections in northern Bukovina, the score for Ukrainian nationalism was 0.08, while that for German nationalism was 0.1. Each of the main minorities was represented in the parliament, but not proportionally. In the overwhelmingly Ukrainian districts, the intensity of nationalism scores for the Assembly was 0.43 for Ukrainian nationalism and 2.99 for Romanian nationalism. For the Senate, the figure for Polish nationalism was 0.22, and that for Romanian nationalism was 3.28.

In some parts of the overwhelmingly Ukrainian electoral districts north of the Prut River (Zastavna and Ocna), the parliamentarians who were elected were members of the non-Romanian ethnic minorities or individuals who were sympathetic towards them. One of them was the Ukrainian nationalist Vasile Sniatinciuk304 in the district of Oraseni. Dr. Florea Lupu was elected in the district of Zastavna, one of the few remaining pockets of open Ukrainian secessionism. Most eligible voters in his district either did

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304 His name indicates a Galician Ukrainian origin (from the city of Sniatin) and presumably a Greek Catholic/Uniate religious affiliation.
not participate or spoiled their ballots; 41.58% of those who voted chose the latter option, the largest percentage in Bukovina.\footnote{See Hausleitner, passim. One should also not forget the fact that the Count George Wassilko-Serecki, an aristocrat with a Romanian identity, but Ukrainian ancestry was elected in 1919 and in 1922. He was chosen in two Senate districts (first in Vijinita, then in Vijinita plus Vascauti). They largely overlapped with the district of a relative of his with the same last name, the Ukrainian nationalist leader Mykola Vasylko.} Numerous inhabitants of north-central and northeastern Bukovina were opposed to Romanian rule. This view is also supported by the pro-socialist, somewhat irredentist, rebellion of late 1919 of some, though not most, northern Bukovinian Ukrainian soldiers.

Hostility toward union with Romania seemed to be shared not only by numerous Ukrainians, but also by other minority inhabitants from the northern part of the province. In Cernauti, the electoral district of a recent Jewish convert to the idea of union with Romania, Iacob [Jakob] Hecht, who was popular among Orthodox Jews and Jewish diaspora nationalists, showed similar electoral patterns as Lupu’s district; 38.32% of the voters of his district spoiled their ballots. The 1,794 spoiled votes against Hecht, a majority of the spoiled votes cast for senators in Bukovina, presumably came mostly from the members of the national minorities.\footnote{These included even the Jews sympathetic to the Socialists, Zionists, and labor Zionists (Poale-Zionists). Iacob [Jakob] Hecht was a prosperous and well-known, politically independent Jewish timber merchant. He was a moderate diaspora nationalist rather than a Zionist. Hecht had the support of not only the ethnic Romanian elite and electorate, and of the elite of other ethnic groups that were predominantly sympathetic toward Romanian rule (Poles and Germans). He also had the support of the religious Jews and of the Jewish diaspora nationalists. Yet Hecht was particularly opposed in Jewish circles whose clashes with him had to do less with the issue of union with Romania, but rather with his opposition to either Zionism or socialism. This kind of infighting between Jewish factions had existed in Bukovina before the Great War too. In the second round of the parliamentary elections of 1911 in the electoral district of the cities of Suceava, Radauti and Siret, the Zionists had played a role that temporarily hurt their prospects. They had been neutral between a Jewish diaspora nationalist and an anti-Semitic German Christian Social Party in the second round of the elections and had abstained from voting. In this way, they had guaranteed the Christian Social candidate’s victory.} For example, the Jewish socialists, Zionists and Poale-Zionists were united in the Jewish National Council (“Judische Nationalrat”), which decided to boycott the elections of November 1919.\footnote{On Hecht and the Jewish vote in the elections of 1919 in Cernauti, see Hausleitner, p. 187. Militant opposition against Romanian rule and/or militant Zionist and socialist opposition against Jewish diaspora nationalism were clearly more widespread among the older voters.}

The elections of 1920 were free, yet not completely fair in Bukovina. There were fewer irregularities than in other parts of Romania. There were no significant complaints about these elections, particularly from the major ethnic minorities. The intensity of Romanian nationalism scores for southern Bukovina will receive scores of 3.3 for the Assembly of Deputies and 3.21 for the Senate. This suggests that the older inhabitants voted for less intensely nationalistic candidates. Perhaps the less educated, older
The electorate was less nationalistic.

In southern Bukovina, the ruling People’s Party obtained 81.96% of the votes for the Senate. For the Assembly of Deputies, the percentage of votes for the People’s Party was 53.59%, while the People’s Party dissidents obtained 6.04%. The older individuals were more likely to vote for less intensely nationalistic candidates, who were more likely to be the candidates of the victorious party. The impact of industrialization might have also played a role. The intensity of nationalism score for the most industrial district of Campulung was 3.26 for the Assembly. The score for the most industrial Senate district of Gura Humorului - Campulung was 3.07. The score for German nationalism in northern Bukovina was 0.1 for the Assembly, while that for Jewish nationalism was 0.06 for the Assembly and 0.11 for the Senate.

Table 3V - The Intensity of Nationalism, by Sub-Population, in Bukovina, 1919 -1922 and the Impact of the Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Ukrainian, Northern and Northeastern Bukovina</th>
<th>Ukrainian, Northwestern Bukovina</th>
<th>Mostly Romanian Southern and Central Bukovina</th>
<th>Cernauți, non-Romanian ethnic majority</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic base</td>
<td>Ukrainian, Bukovinian Dialect</td>
<td>Ukrainian, Hutsul Dialect</td>
<td>Romanian, Bukovinian-Moldovan Subdialect</td>
<td>Jews, Germans, Poles, Romanians, Ukrainians, mostly German Language</td>
<td>Tests model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Ukrainian language and nationalism</td>
<td>Ukrainian language and nationalism</td>
<td>Romanian language and nationalism</td>
<td>Mostly German language secular</td>
<td>Tests model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>Non-industrial</td>
<td>Non-industrial</td>
<td>Non-industrial</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>Tests model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudden Shock</td>
<td>1918, end of Habsburg Monarchy</td>
<td>1918, end of Habsburg Monarchy</td>
<td>1918, end of Habsburg Monarchy</td>
<td>1918, end of Habsburg Monarchy</td>
<td>Tests model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>Ukrainian nationalist (boycott 1919), Romanian nationalist, incl. Democratic Union Party (DUP)</td>
<td>Ukrainian nationalist (boycott 1919), Romanian nationalist, incl. DUP</td>
<td>Romanian nationalist (including DUP) various intensities</td>
<td>Jewish, socialist, independent, Romanian nationalist (including DUP)</td>
<td>Intensity of nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>Rural and small town</td>
<td>Rural and small town</td>
<td>Rural and small town</td>
<td>Large city</td>
<td>Related to industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome (Elections)</td>
<td>Partly DUP, part abstentions and independent, part</td>
<td>Partly DUP, partly abstaining and</td>
<td>DUP and independent Romanian</td>
<td>Overwhelming independent Jews and</td>
<td>Free, not competitive elec-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of my model confirmed</td>
<td>Ethnic base, shock, educational system 1920</td>
<td>Ethnic base, shock, educational system 1920 (partially)</td>
<td>Intense Romanian nationalism</td>
<td>Romanian civic, minority ethnic nationalism</td>
<td>Minority Differentiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome (Nation-building status), 1922</td>
<td>Very low intensity Ukrainian nationalism</td>
<td>Very low intensity Ukrainian nationalism</td>
<td>Intense Romanian nationalism</td>
<td>Romanian civic, minority ethnic nationalism</td>
<td>Minority Differentiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome (Elections), Explanatory, 1922</td>
<td>Voted mostly Romanian nationalistic candidates</td>
<td>Voted mostly Romanian nationalistic candidates</td>
<td>Romanian nationalists, overwhelmingly DUP</td>
<td>Majority DUP, including minority candidates</td>
<td>Elections partly free, not fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome (Elections), Explanatory, 1920</td>
<td>Mostly Ukrainian nationalism in mostly Ukrainian areas</td>
<td>Mostly Ukrainian nationalism in some mostly Ukrainian areas</td>
<td>Mostly People’s Party, some independents</td>
<td>Mostly socialist, minority nationalism significant</td>
<td>Free, competitive, not fully fair elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome (Nation-building status), 1920</td>
<td>Greater intensity of Ukrainian nationalism than in 1911</td>
<td>Greater intensity of Ukrainian nationalism than in 1911 in some areas</td>
<td>Greater intensity Romanian nationalism than in 1911 in most areas</td>
<td>Less intense Romanian patriotism, minority nationalism than in 1919</td>
<td>Ukrainian nationalism, Marxism big, as expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome (Nation-building status), 1920</td>
<td>Less intense Ukrainian nationalism than 1911</td>
<td>Less intense Ukrainian nationalism than 1911</td>
<td>More intense Romanian nationalism than 1911</td>
<td>Romanian civic/ minority ethnic nationalism</td>
<td>Romanian rule accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory, 1919</td>
<td>pro- Ukrainian independent nationalist</td>
<td>German candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The intensity of Romanian nationalism score for the north of the province (the future counties of Storojinet and Cernauti) for the Assembly was 1.78, while the one for Ukrainian nationalism was 0.69.

The Senate scores were 1.84 and 0.71. In the four overwhelmingly Ukrainian districts of Cotmani, Zastavna, Vijina and Vascauti as a whole, the score of the intensity of Romanian nationalism for the Assembly elections was 0.71, while the score of the intensity of Ukrainian nationalism was 1.54, the same score as in 1907. For the Senate, the scores for these electoral districts were 0.97 for Romanian nationalism and 1.94 for Ukrainian nationalism.

This suggests that there was an increase in the intensity of both Romanian and Ukrainian nationalism.
nationalism in these areas among older individuals, among whom nationalism was more intense than among the younger voters. Based on my model, one would have expected that older people would have been less nationalistic. This would be due to the greater impact of education among the more literate younger generation. On the other hand, the impact of the sudden shock was stronger among the younger generation, which had fought in the war and was tired of it.\textsuperscript{308}

\textsuperscript{308} The lower scores for Ukrainian nationalism than in 1911 should be noted (see Table 3A2).
Map 3!! – The Electoral Results for the Elections of 1919

Table 3A2: The Intensity of Ukrainian and Romanian Nationalism Scores in the Overwhelmingly
In some districts, several Ukrainian Socialists, Ukrainian nationalists, German pro-governmental and independent Romanian nationalist candidates, who were linked with Ion Nistor’s irredentist group during the war, won seats. Nistor’s group was more intensely nationalistic than the People’s Party.

The Assembly of Deputies seats in the provincial capital were won by two socialists and by a prominent Jewish diaspora nationalist, Benno Straucher. He won a seat as a “Jewish National” candidate allied with the People’s Party. The Romanian secret police was describing the attitude of a majority of the Jewish population, including specifically of the Zionists, as “anti-Romanian sentiments”. Romanian rule was accepted as a “fact of life” by most of the Jewish population of the provincial capital.310

A veteran politician, the Socialist Gheorghe Grigorovici, won the Senate seat in Cernauti.311 Opposition forces associated with the Democratic Union Party performed the best, and were victorious in, a district in which nationalism had been more intense than average during the late Habsburg period (Radauti). The same was also true in some geographical areas in which the intensity of nationalism had

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309 The proportion of Ruthene-speakers was 89.11% according to the 1910 Austrian census. The Ukrainians represented 85.39% of the population according to the Romanian census of 1941. See the statistical data in Nowosiwsky, p. 167-168. The ethnic map in Livezeanu, p. 50, which is based on the 1930 census results, presents the Ukrainian ethnic area as smaller and the Romanian ethnic area as larger than the 1910 and 1941 census results warrant.

310 See Hausleitner, p. 187-188, citing sources such as “Miscarea evreiasca-sionista”, which appears in Ioan Scurtu and Ioan Dordea, Minoritatile nationale din Romania 1925-1931, vol. 2 (Bucuresti, 1996).

311 For details on his earlier career, see chapter 2.
been average, such as Ciudeiu. Some of the candidates who ran on the People’s Party ticket were actually National Liberals, who were defeated, and/or individuals who were still members of the old Democratic Party\textsuperscript{312} who were successful. The electoral turnout decreased dramatically in comparison to 1919. In some districts, less than a majority of the eligible voters actually cast valid votes.

This decline in turnout reflects an increasing disenchantment with the politics of Romania, especially among members of the national minorities, and particularly among the Ukrainians and the Jews. It also occurred among the ethnic Romanians in electoral districts in which electoral nationalism had been particularly intense in 1907, 1911 and 1919. For example, this was the case in the Vicov district of the old Romanian nationalistic stronghold in the Austrian and pre-1925 Romanian Bukovinian district of Radauti. This was the area where Ion Nistor was born and elected in 1919 and where he did very well in 1920. It is possible that numerous voters were prevented from voting so that they could not re-elect this “native son” and local hero to the assembly. Absenteeism was also very high in the district where nationalism had been weaker in 1907 and 1911, Aurel Onciul’s old district. This was particularly the case among younger voters. It was therefore more pronounced in the Assembly of Deputies elections than in the Senate ones.\textsuperscript{313}

The elections of March 5, 6 and 7, 1922 for the Assembly of Deputies and of March 1 and 2, 1922 for the Senate are revealing. They were not as free and fair as the 1920 ones in Bukovina to provide us with a good picture about the level of popularity of those members of the elites who were in power locally, namely those of the Democratic Union Party. The latter group was already de facto a part of the ruling National Liberal Party, with whom it officially merged in early 1923. Unlike in the case of the 1919 elections, no political forces boycotted the ones from 1922.\textsuperscript{314} Pro-governmental forces won almost all the seats.

The score of the intensity of Romanian nationalism in southern Bukovina for both the Assembly

\textsuperscript{312} Their role until 1918 has already been discussed in chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{313} This might also reflect the fact that the candidate of the People’s Party, Dorimedont Popovici, was seen as dishonest because of his dealings with Jewish businessmen. This explains his defeat in the contest against Aurel Onciul in 1907. This has been discussed in the previous chapter. Another factor was the fact that the opposition candidates in 1920 were remarkably numerous and undistinguished.

\textsuperscript{314} The electoral districts were multi-member rather than single-member districts. Just like in previous Romanian elections, they were gerrymandered. However, this was not done in the sense that they diverged from district boundaries, which were similar to the ones during the Austrian period, but through different combinations of district to form electoral units. The various administrative areas were simply combined in districts in a manner that was convenient to the Democratic Union Party. Ironically, the typically single-member, electoral districts in previous Romanian elections, which were more gerrymandered in terms of district borders, had been more fair.
of Deputies and for the Senate in 1922 was 3.47, and, unlike in 1919, not mostly due to a lack of choice. The Democratic Union Party obtained 94.25% of the votes for the Senate and 95.41% of the votes for the Assembly of Deputies. The codes for the north of the province were 2.43 for the Assembly and 3.13 for the Senate, and 2.82 and 3.33 for Bukovina as a whole.

### Appendix 3A1: The Intensity of Minority Nationalism Scores for Northern and Southern Bukovina (1919-1922)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Assembly of Deputies</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Characteristic (most of the votes of the respective minority)</th>
<th>Most ethnic votes?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Bukovina</td>
<td>Northern Bukovina</td>
<td>Total Bukovina</td>
<td>Southern Bukovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>NA/NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>NA/NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>NA/NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>NA/NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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315. The focus on the table is Ukrainian nationalism. The pre-1918 data on the nationalisms of smaller ethnic groups is included only if it is sufficiently valid not to provoke skepticism. As it has been shown in other chapters, the full political parting of the ways between the Germans and the Jews occurred between 1907 and 1911.

316. “NA/NE” means “Not available because there was no elected Senate”.

317. The 1919-1922 scores for Bukovina in its entirety might not be fully comparable because of the lower electoral turnouts in the Northern Bukovinian electoral districts inhabited mostly by non-Romanians. This was not characteristic of the Habsburg period.

318. Most of the ethnic Ukrainian votes for the Assembly of Deputies in the districts were cast in favor of Socialists, but the Senate votes went to Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists.
The intensity of Ukrainian nationalism in the north of the province was reduced enormously, to only 0.71 for the Assembly and 0.04 for the Senate. This was a tremendous decrease in comparison to 1920. However, unlike in 1920, there was also Ukrainian nationalistic voting in southern Bukovina. In that part of the province, the intensity of Ukrainian nationalism in the Assembly elections was 0.01, an infinitesimal figure. By contrast, the score for Jewish nationalism in northern Bukovina was 0.35 for the Assembly and 0.11 for the Senate, and for German nationalism and Polish nationalism 0.1 for the Assembly. By now, the four overwhelmingly Ukrainian districts voted mostly for intense Romanian nationalism, with intensities of 3.32 for the Assembly, and 3.29 for the Senate. The scores for Ukrainian nationalism were much lower (0.11 and 0.1).

The fact that the Ukrainian nationalists did poorly could be partially explained by the militant irredentist newspaper articles that were spread as leaflets, printed in Vienna, and smuggled into Bukovina. The authors of the texts were some of the Bukovinian Ukrainian politicians that in October-November 1918 had been members of the Bukovinian section of the West Ukrainian Rada. Their activities had been discussed in the chapter 3. Those inhabitants who desired to be left alone, including typical Ukrainian voters, in most cases hesitated to vote for Ukrainian nationalistic politicians who in the past had been associated with these militant secessionist figures. Most voters avoided even the socialists, with their calls for a referendum on whether northern Bukovina should be ruled by Romania.319

The open secessionism, especially from “outside”, was self-defeating. No nationalist or socialist

ethnic Ukrainians were elected to parliament, and all the candidates with these ideologies performed poorly. Moreover, the land reform of 1921, a massive redistribution of land toward the peasantry, temporarily satisfied numerous ethnic Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian elite had not yet been co-opted by the time of Greater Romania’s third parliamentary elections, but the Jewish had been. In 1922, the Democratic Union Party performed better because of the cooptation of various minority elements as well as of some ethnic Romanian politicians who had originally opposed Ion Nistor.320

The Socialists also obtained an Assembly of Deputies mandate in Czernowitz for Dr. Iacob Pistiner, an ethnic Jew. The Socialists did well, and won more opposition votes than other opposition forces, including Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, in the overwhelmingly Ukrainian areas. Nevertheless, due to the land reform of 1921, which temporarily satisfied the electorate, the rural support for this political force had largely disappeared.

The main opposition party, the People’s Party, was not victorious in any area. It performed the best in the more heavily industrialized areas (the city of Cernauti/Czernowitz and the district of Campulung). This is exactly what one would expect based on my model, in which industrialization correlates with a lower intensity of nationalism.321

The period from 1919 until 1922 was one of habituation of the population of Bukovina to Romanian rule. The intensity of Romanian nationalism, particularly on the integrative and satisfactional dimensions, increased. Parties espousing Romanian nationalism were even supported by some of the members of the national minorities. These included not only many from those ethnic groups whose representatives and leaders had endorsed Bukovina’s union with Romania in 1918, such as the Germans and the Poles, but also some Ukrainians and Jews. The electoral evidence also indicates that ethnic Romanians whose views diverged from the line of the government, tended to be more intensely nationalistic than those who voted for pro-government parties.

320. Among the new acquisitions of the Democratic Union Party were two Jewish intellectuals who combined a Jewish nationalism (toned down for the elections, but not at other times) with a newly developed Romanian patriotism. One was the famous Jewish Diaspora nationalist Dr. Benno Straucher, who was elected on the party’s assembly lists in the city of Cernauti. The other one was Dr. Salo Weisselberger, who won a seat in the Senate.

321. Self-styled independents also obtained more votes than the main opposition party, the People’s Party, did.
2.3.2. The Continuation of Cosmopolitanism in Cernauti (1918-1922)

The first three elections in the provincial capital reveal the continuation of the cosmopolitan tradition. The number of Romanian nationalistic votes in the most “analytically fruitful” elections, those of 1920, represented only a minority of the ethnic Romanian votes. This suggests that urbanization hindered Romanian nation-building.

The pre-1918 cosmopolitan tradition of Cernauti largely continued throughout the interwar period. The Romanian authorities were in no hurry to end even its symbolic presence. By November 1919, street signs in the provincial capital were still written with the largest letters in the center in German, on top in Romanian, and on the bottom in Ukrainian. German and Romanian might have been sufficient to communicate with everyone during the interwar period, but the former language seemed to remain more useful. The electoral patterns were consistent with this atmosphere, and the city that was nicknamed “Little Vienna” retained this atmosphere until 1940-1944.

In the first three elections in the provincial capital, there were fewer intense nationalists of any kind and anti-Semites than either before or after this period. Practically all the inhabitants of Cernauti had indeed voted for Jewish candidates representing the various parties. This should be seen as evidence of relatively low levels of intensity of various nationalisms of the Christian population. In the elections of 1920, out of 10,775 Assembly votes in Cernauti, the Socialist Dr. Iacob Pistiner obtained 6,421 votes from the Socialist part of the spectrum. There were also 3,261 for Dr. Beno Straucher and 2,755 for Dr. Iosef Bierer from the minority segment of the electorate. They represented a Jewish-German alliance of these two Jewish National candidates and of an ethnic German.

In 1922, practically every Cernauti voter voted for a Jewish candidate. Dr. Benno Straucher, who ran on the Democratic Union Party ticket, won 7,012 votes. Norbert Kippert ran on the same ticket and won 7,005. The Socialist Dr. Iacob Pistiner obtained 4,292 votes, more than the 4,276 votes for the German Rudolf Gaidosch and the Romanian Romulus Dan, with 4,270.

322. See Charles Upson Clark, United Roumania, p. 77.
323. I am classifying the Zionists, who originally had the support of a minority of the Jewish population, as more intensely nationalistic than the originally more popular Jewish diaspora nationalists, who, as we have seen, could also obtain non-Jewish votes.
The Zionist Dr. Mayer Ebner who ran on the People’s Party ticket won with 1,908 votes, more than another candidate on the same list, the Pole Iosif Ladislaus Ratsky, with 1,864 votes, and the Independent Isak Israel Weiser with 231 votes. For the Senate, the Democratic Union Party’s Jewish candidate, the diaspora nationalist Dr. Salo Weisselberger obtained 3,800 votes and the Jewish Socialist Leon Geller obtained 1,971.

The People’s Party’s Dorimedont Popovici, who had, as we have seen, lost an election in 1907 because he had been seen as too pro-Jewish and with too much Jewish support obtained 860 votes. By comparison, the intensely nationalistic Zaharia Voronca, who happened to be anti-Semitic, won only 383 votes. The independent Jew Isak Israel Weiser, who would have nothing to do with Romanian or Socialist parties, won 231 votes.

The elections of 1919, and especially 1920 and 1922 reveal some very interesting phenomena in terms of ethnic relations that would never be replicated again. One of them was the lack of support for candidates that desired, for example, the Romanization of minority schools. Another one was the lack of success of the anti-Ukrainian and anti-Jewish candidates among the Romanian, and respectively, Christian electorates. This was soon about to change.

The first three elections in the provincial capital reveal the continuation of the cosmopolitan tradition. The number of Romanian nationalist votes in the most “analytically fruitful” elections, those of 1920, represented only a minority of the ethnic Romanian votes.

The period from 1919 to 1922 is interesting in a number of ways. It seems to show an increasing acceptance of Romanian rule by a large portion of the minority population, and especially among Germans, Poles, by 1922, even among most Jews and Ukrainians. It also shows that among ethnic Romanians, to the extent to which public opinion diverged from the line of the government, it tended to be more intensely nationalistic.

The time span from 1918/1919 until 1922 was one of accommodation to Romanian rule. The intensity of Romanian nationalism, particularly on the integrative and satisfacional dimensions, increased. Romanian nationalism started to be displayed by some of the minority inhabitants. These individuals

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324 These phenomena are puzzling in the view of future developments. In the next few years, most Ukrainian schools were officially turned into Romanian ones. As early as December 10, 1922, there were anti-Semitic student demonstrations in the city of Cernauti, just like in the other university centers in Romania.
included not only those ethnic groups that had endorsed Bukovina’s union with Romania in 1918, but also numerous Ukrainians and even most Jews.

The main parties’ scores on the intensity of nationalism scale reflect a number of complexities, changes over time, local variations and acknowledgments of problems. My system may be challenged, but it is the best that I could develop, and I have tried to justify my coding.

2.4.1. The Mainstream Parties between 1926 and 1937

Throughout the period from 1922 to 1937, the intensity of Romanian nationalism among ethnic Romanians seems to have increased. The support for Romanian moderate nationalistic parties went down, particularly toward the end of the period. This was partly due to the increase in the proportion of votes going to Romanian far right nationalistic parties, and to a general, but non-linear, decline of the Marxist vote. This was compensated by the fact that in order to get minority votes, the Romanian parties increasingly made use of non-Romanian candidates in the mostly non-Romanian two northernmost counties of Bukovina.

Sometimes, these ethnic minority candidates represented the political parties of the national minorities that were allied with the respective Romanian parties. This subchapter will deal with the evolution of the mainstream Romanian parties between 1926 and 1937, under a proportional representation electoral system.

The political situation in Romania after the elections of 1922 changed. The electoral system was changed to a proportional representation system. The peculiarities of the composition of the lists, as well as the rather large size and the relative heterogeneity of the counties as electoral districts, do limit our opportunities for uncontroversial electoral analysis. The presence of relatively intense Romanian nationalists on the same list with representatives of national minorities that often in fact represented minority parties is interesting.

These ethnic minority parties were allied to the main parties or represented minority factions that had joined the factions after previously having stood for election on a more “minority-minded” ticket. Nevertheless, the electoral data does permit the falsification of some contentions. An analysis of a few
relevant by-elections is often even more revealing.\textsuperscript{325}

Even though the appendices will include all the intensity of nationalism scores, including the controversial ones, the table below only includes the data that is overly controversial (“Ocon”) or controversial enough (“Con”).\textsuperscript{326} This happened due to the existence of formal electoral coalitions between Romanian nationalistic parties and various political parties and factions of the ethnic minorities, especially Ukrainians, which influenced the electoral results very substantially in northern Bukovina. The “overly controversial” scores and particularly the electoral data behind them are still useful, but not valid enough to be fully comparable to the other scores. Nevertheless, the electoral percentages for the various political parties that represented only the nationalism of one ethnic group are as valid as those in the counties for which the intensity of nationalism scores are not “overly controversial”.

Various other signs indicate other problems with the elections that might have influenced their outcome. One of them was the potential impact of the martial law. Another one was “candidate confusion” (a candidate with the same last name as a previous candidate, which could have confused the voters) (“\textdagger”). Another issue was the support of some Romanian tickets by ethnic minority parties for their own reasons (“\textdaggerdbl” for ethnic Ukrainians, “G” for Jews). Another problem was elections whose actual conditions were free and fair, but were uncompetitive because most of the opposition boycotted them (-).

Appendix 3a: The Intensity of Romanian Nationalism Scores for Bukovina, and Its Northern and Southern Parts (1919-1937)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Election</th>
<th>Assembly of Deputies</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Government Majority</th>
<th>Election Quality</th>
<th>Minus Specific Support\textsuperscript{328}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\textsuperscript{325} The multi-party character of Romanian politics and the variations in terms of program, including in terms of the intensity of nationalism, explain and justify the transition from a district-based system that, as we have seen, increasingly included multi-member constituencies, to a proportional representation system. The change, however, was not in the interests of some of the ethnic minorities in Romania.

\textsuperscript{326} The differences between “OCON” and “CON” are irrelevant to the use of the data as such and are unimportant for the purposes of this chapter. They nevertheless convey differences of opinion between various people with an expertise in the area.

\textsuperscript{327} This applies to the lower house of the legislature.

\textsuperscript{328} This excludes the support for the winning party from some minor Romanian nationalist parties, the Social Democrats and the German Party.
### Appendix 3b: The Intensity of Romanian Nationalism Scores for the Counties of Bukovina (1919-1937)

#### A. Assembly of Deputies Elections, by County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Election</th>
<th>Campulung</th>
<th>Cernauti</th>
<th>Radauti</th>
<th>Storojinet</th>
<th>Suceava</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1919</strong></td>
<td>NI/NC<strong>334</strong></td>
<td>2.91IB-</td>
<td>NI/NC</td>
<td>3.50IB-</td>
<td>NI/NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1920</strong></td>
<td>NI/NC</td>
<td>1.57IB</td>
<td>NI/NC</td>
<td>2.11IB</td>
<td>NI/NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1922</strong></td>
<td>NI/NC</td>
<td>1.73IB*</td>
<td>NI/NC</td>
<td>3.40IB*</td>
<td>NI/NC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**329.** “NA” means that the rule is not applicable.

**330.** The sign “*” indicates that the score can not be calculated with accuracy because of some electoral coalitions between “mainstream Romanian” parties and ethnic minority parties or fractions in northern Bukovina.

**331.** “DIF” implies that it is difficult to ascertain.

**332.** The score could not be computed due to missing pages in the number of Monitorul Oficial from which the data was collated. Obtaining it from another university library in Romania would have been logistically too difficult.

**333.** NI/NC = “Not identical/Not computed”. Since the boundaries of the electoral districts of Romanian southern Bukovina between 1919 and 1922 do not fully match the borders of the electoral districts of the period of 1926-1937, I have not computed the intensity of nationalism scores for these counties.
The elections of 1926 (May 25th for the Assembly, May 28th for the Senate) were somewhat more free and fair in Bukovina than those of 1922. They were organized and won by the same party as in 1920, the People's Party. Out of 122,137 votes cast from among the 171,917 men entitled to vote, which makes the turnout 71.04%, the People's Party obtained 50,975, or 41.74% of the votes for the Assembly of Deputies. The National Liberal Party was supported by 7,857 voters (6.43%). The intensely nationalistic, anti-Semitic League of National Christian Defense, LANC, received 15,729 votes (12.88%). The National Peasant Bloc, the future National Peasant Party, obtained 23.98% of the votes, the Socialists obtained 12,975 (10.62%), while 4,467 votes (3.66%) were not valid. The victorious People’s Party did the best in the area of pre-1918 populist strength, Campulung County (51.05%), as did the anti-Semitic LANC (27.54%).

Overall, the Romanian peasants in the more mountainous of Campulung and of the nationalistic Radauti county areas were more likely to vote for these parties. By contrast, the Romanian peasants of the hilly areas voted disproportionally for the left-of-center National Peasant Bloc, which obtained 35.81% of
the vote in Suceava County in comparison with 36.13% for the People’s Party and 17.6% for LANC. The anti-Semitic, intensely nationalistic, parties did not do well in the counties of Cernauti and Storojinet, whose populations were overwhelmingly non-ethnically Romanian.

The votes for the socialists (24.87% of the votes in Cernauti County, 12.28% from Storojinet and 2.54% in Radauti) came overwhelmingly from the members of the ethnic minorities, overwhelmingly Ukrainians. In all likelihood, about a fourth of the ethnic Ukrainians in the province voted for the party, sometimes for irredentist reasons. After all, the party had been in favor of national self-determination for the northern Bukovinian Ukrainians. The 1926 elections confirm the view, suggested by the 1922 elections, that most Bukovinian Ukrainians in all areas accepted Romanian rule, or at least gave the outward appearance of doing so.

In the mostly non-Romanian areas, minority candidates represented 3 out of 6 candidates for the People’s Party, the National Liberal Party and the Socialist Party in Cernauti County. In Storojinet, 1 out of 3 People’s Party candidates, and 2 of the 3 of National Peasants and 2 of the 3 Socialists were members of the national minorities. This reflects the joining of the organizations of these parties by minority activists as well as the alliance of many of the country’s minorities, the Hungarians, Germans, and even a part of the Bukovinian Ukrainian population, with the People’s Party in 1926. Paul Shapiro estimates that about 6% of the Bukovinian vote in that year represented the votes of Bukovinian Germans and Hungarians cast for the People’s Party. The score of the intensity of Romanian nationalism in southern Bukovina for the Assembly of Deputies was 3.21, lower than in 1922, while the one for the northern part of the area was 2.85, while the overall provincial score was 3.05.

The elections of 1927 have the dubious distinction of being the least free and the least fair of the multi-party elections held under universal suffrage in Romania before World War II. In fact, the National Liberal Party, which was confirmed in office by these elections, was removed from power in 1928. This was partly due to the opposition’s outcry against some of the practices in the elections of 1927. At any rate, these elections still allow us to compare the strength of the various opposition groups.

334. Unlike the National Liberal Party and the extreme nationalists, but like most Romanian parties, the People’s Party also campaigned in minority languages, even in Yiddish, throughout the 1920’s. See Vago, “Jews and the Left-Right”, p. 25.
The score of the intensity of Romanian nationalism in southern Bukovina for the Assembly of Deputies was 3.15, lower than in 1926, and 3.28 for the Senate. The scores for northern Bukovina were 2.83 and 2.05, while those for all of Bukovina were 2.44 and 2.59. The southern Bukovinian score for the elections for those senators selected by the local councils was 3.41 for southern Bukovina, 3.46 for the north, and 3.43 for all of Bukovina.

All of this data indicates that the older voting public, with a larger percentage of illiterates, was more intensely nationalistic on this occasion (Romanian nationalist in southern Bukovina and non-Romanian, typically Ukrainian, nationalist in the north). The fact that the score of the elections of the senators by the local councils showed a higher score of the intensity of Romanian nationalism seems to indicate that those elected in local elections were more intensely nationalistic than those elected in national elections.

The turnout was rather high (73.01%). The National Liberals obtained 51.82% of the vote (67,885 out of 130,998 votes). The next most popular party was the Social Democratic one, with 21,759 votes (16.61%). After that came the National Peasants with 15,423 votes (11.97%).

Another list that obtained a large number of votes, 9,635 or 7.36%, was the Magyar and German ticket, which also had ethnic Ukrainians on its lists. This election showed the existence of a substantial Ukrainian nationalistic electorate in Suceava County, many of whose members voted for this ticket; there were simply not enough Germans and Magyars (8.9%) to give the party 9.74% of the vote even if one discounts the vote of many of the members of these groups for the Social Democrats and other parties. There were 9,065 votes for the League of National Christian Defense and its splinter groups (6.92%). The votes of most of the dissatisfied minorities undoubtedly went for the Social Democrats, who did particularly well in the mostly minority Cernauti County (13,453 votes, 31.53%) and Storojinet County (4,897 votes, 18.42%).

The Senate elections, whose voters included males who were over 40, are revealing. The voters over 40 were somewhat more likely than younger ones to cast ballots in the elections of 1927. Some younger voters, who were significantly less likely to vote for the National Liberal Party, were prevented from voting through various techniques.336 The more aged members of the national minorities in the two

336. The situation in Bukovina was better than the Romanian average in this respect.
northern counties were slightly less likely to vote for the ruling National Liberals than the younger ones. The minority inhabitants who rejected the parties with a Romanian core were somewhat more likely to be young. This was typical of the more radical opposition parties (center-left, far right, minority radical) in general. The minority voters for the more establishmentarian parties tended to be older. The Social Democratic voters were about 70% under 40 years of age.

Just like among the minorities, the more intensely nationalistic Romanians, who voted for the League of National Christian Defense, were disproportionately young. The elections of 1927 show the increasing nationalism among younger inhabitants of Romanian, Ukrainian and perhaps other ethnic groups, who were more likely to be educated. In local elections (local councils and county councils), the elected councilors overwhelmingly voted for National Liberal Senate candidates. The fact that the National Peasant Party was doing increasingly well, often better than at the parliamentary elections, was an indication that this party was becoming increasingly competent and developing local cadres.

The elections of 1928 are interesting because they were free and fair. The victorious National Peasants obtained 78.52% of the votes (108,364 out of 138,013 voters), when the turnout was 74% (out of 186,496 eligible voters). It has been estimated that about 20% of the total votes represented the support of the German and Social Democratic Parties, the allies of the National Peasants. Another chunk of the votes represented the support of the Ukrainian and Jewish allies of the party.

A Bukovinian-born ethnic Ukrainian historian estimated that the Ukrainian National Party’s electoral basis in (northern) Bukovina at that time was 32,000 votes. This represented almost 30% of the provincial votes, somewhat less than the Ukrainian proportion in the population even according to the Romanian census. Most of the self-styled “Hutsuls” as well as most of the self-styled “Ukrainians” of southern Bukovina, as well as a small minority of the self-styled “Ukrainians” of northern Bukovina did not support this political formation. The National Liberals (8,786 votes, 4.71%) and LANC (3,362 votes, 1.78%)

337. The exception was the rather old-fashioned National Party, led by Nicolae Iorga, which hardly had any younger voters. This ticket was presumably more popular in Campulung during the various elections because Iorga had made the local potentate Count Bellegarde a laughing-stock twenty years earlier. For more details, see chapter 2. This is an indication of the importance of the legacy of the past in terms of the impact of personalities, a common pattern in Romanian politics.


2.44%) obtained their votes almost exclusively from ethnic Romanians. Many of the votes of the left-wing populist Peasant Party (4.81%), who had two Jews out of three candidates on the ticket in Storojinet County, came from the national minorities, and particularly non-Ukrainians. This party, whose national leader Nicolae Lupu was rather philo-Semitic, had not had a pro-Ukrainian record.

The 3,993 votes for the Communists (“The Bloc of Workers and Peasants”, 2.89% of the total, including 6.69% in Cernauti and 3.65% in Storojinet), all of whose candidates in the two mostly minority northern counties were non-Romanian ethnics were practically all from ethnic minorities. A notable feature of these elections was the support of the National Peasant Party for education in the mother tongue in Ukrainian for the Ukrainian school children. This was displayed through the speeches of politicians such as Teofil Sauciu-Saveanu. This made the party very popular among ethnic Ukrainians.340

The score of the intensity of Romanian nationalism in southern Bukovina for the Assembly of Deputies was 3.10, lower than in 1927. The score for the Assembly for northern Bukovina was 2.66, which would bring the score for the entire province at 2.87. The Senate numbers were 2.72 for the south, 2.52 for the north and 2.61 overall.

Two very revealing by-elections for the Assembly of Deputies in Cernauti County took place in 1930-1931. In May 1930, the Ukrainian National Party’s candidate, the lawyer Vasyl Dutcak, who had been involved in composing memoranda regarding minority rights sent to the League of Nations, won against the candidate of the ruling National Peasant Party. In the January 1931 by-election, the candidate of the Ukrainian National Party, Orest Skraba also had the support of the Jewish Party and of the German People’s Union against the Social Democrat Gheorghe Grigorovici. Skraba obtained 44%, including about half of the ethnic Ukrainian vote, as opposed to 28% for his main opponent.341 The Jews were less likely to vote for the Ukrainian nationalistic candidate than the Ukrainians and Germans. It was so not merely because Grigorovici talked to the Jewish electorate in Yiddish. He also used Romanian, Ukrainian and German.342

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342. In the elections for the Jewish Community Council of the provincial capital of Cernauti, the Zionists polled 25%, the National Peasant Party 22%, the National Liberals 9%, The Socialist Bund 17% and five other lists 27%. See Bela Vago, “The Attitude Toward the Jews as a Criterion of the Left-Right Concept”, in Bela Vago and George L. Mosse (eds.), Jews and Non-Jews in Eastern Europe 1918-1945 (New York,
The electoral system for by-elections, unlike the proportional representation system used in Romanian Assembly of Deputies general elections, was based on the single-member plurality system. Therefore, this election showed that most members of the national minorities in the county preferred a non-Romanian nationalist candidate. The fact that in other elections this did not happen was partially due to the features of the Romanian electoral system, with its 2% nation-wide threshold.

The elections of the 1931 were less than free and fair nationwide. However, the “official ticket” lost in most of Bukovina. As many as 68.87% of the Bukovinians with the legal right to vote cast ballots. The most important component of the victorious National Union was the predominant wing of the National Liberal Party. However, the National Democratic Prime Minister Nicolae Iorga led the coalition. It obtained 47,425 Bukovinian votes (33.69%). The National Union ticket did the best in Campulung County, where Iorga’s small party had done well in the past for reasons that have already been described, with 8,200 votes (48.82% of the total).

The main opposition party was the anti-Semitic, semi-fascist League of National Christian Defense (LANC), with 31,420 votes (22.32% of all ballots). It outpolled the nationally victorious coalition in the counties of Suceava (with 40.02%) and Radauti (38.3%), which had a tradition of consistent more intense nationalism. It also came in first place in the predominantly Ukrainian Storojinet County, with 29.53%. The fascist Legion of the Archangel Michael obtained 2.43% of the vote (but 19.13% in the only county in which it had a list, Campulung, with its populist tradition). The two far-right parties perhaps obtained a majority of the Bukovinian Romanian vote or something close to this.

About 2/3 of the votes of the Jewish population were cast in favor of the third most popular party, the predominantly pro-Zionist Jewish Party, with 8.55% of the Bukovinian votes. The Social Democrats did less well than in the past (6.52%), and did only slightly better in the mostly-minority two northern countries. They had lost many votes to the Communist front list, which obtained 5.5%. The Communist support came overwhelmingly from northern Bukovina, with 5,184 votes in Cernauti County or

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Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), p. 38. The Bukovinian Ukrainian and German politicians who ran against Grigorovici were accused of irredentism by the Bucharest press, while the Jewish ones were not. See Hausleitner, p. 270. This was not due to philo-Semitism, but partly due to the fact that Jews and Jewish politicians avoided the appearance of supporting Ukrainian irredentism, which was not the case for the Ukrainians or even the Germans at that time.

Iorga’s diatribes almost a quarter of a century before, in 1908-1909 (see chapter 2), had neutered its Austrian deputy, Count Bellegarde.
12.2%, where it was the second best performing party. It also performed well in Storojinet, with 2,059 votes of 6.78% of the total. Another way to protest against Romanian rule was the spoiling of ballots suggested by some radical Ukrainian nationalists (5,403 votes, or 3.84% of the total, including 3,316 votes or 7.84% of the total in Cernauti County and 1,034 or 3.40% in Storojinet County).

Overall, most votes went to the non-centrist parties of the right and left, Romanian ultra-nationalists as well as Communists, Socialists, radical peasantists of various splinter parties of the National Peasant Party as well as the spoilers of ballots. The score of the intensity of Romanian nationalism in southern Bukovina for the Assembly of Deputies was 3.28, higher than in 1928.

The elections of 1932 were free and fair. In elections with a 65.97% turnout in the province (145,423 citizens voted out of 220,424 who had the right to do so), the victorious National Peasant Party obtained only 26.72% of the votes cast (38,856 votes). The second most popular party was the anti-Semitic League of National Christian Defense (20,704 votes, 14.24% of the total). The party performed the best in the old nationalistic stronghold, Radauti County. Its performance in that area (8,673 votes, 31.57% of the total) was better than that of the ruling National Peasant Party (5,567 votes, or 20.23%).

In those elections, more intensely nationalistic, right of center parties, extreme or mainstream, outpolled the less intensely nationalistic ones. The National Liberals would have been the second most popular party if they had remained united. However, the Liberal vote was split between the National Liberal Party led by I.G. Duca, with 17,077 votes (11.74%) and the Gheorghe Bratianu wing (4,146 votes, 2.85% of the total).

Another popular party was the Social Democratic one (19,579 votes, 10.71%). Its basis of support was no longer so disproportionately northern Bukovinian and so overwhelmingly minority as in the past, which indicates that an increasing part of its electorate came from among the Romanian ethnic group. However, the party continued to perform best in Cernauti County (7,014 votes, or 14.57%) and in Storojinet (3,399 votes or 11.33%). About two-thirds of the Jewish vote again went to the Jewish Party, a nationalistic, pro-Zionist formation. This political force obtained 11,992 votes (8.25% of the total). This time, this political formation performed about equally well among the Jews of all the areas of Bukovina. Since there was no Communist Party ticket, many pro-Communist voters spoiled their ballots. The 6,250

annulled votes (4.3% of the total) were cast overwhelmingly in Northern Bukovina (3,471 or 7.24% in Cernauti County and 1,180 or 3.94% in Storojinet County).

As always, the more moderately nationalistic parties did better and the more intensely nationalistic parties did less well in the elections for the universal college of the Senate, with its older, less literate and well-educated electorate. By comparison, the electorate for the more intensely nationalistic fascist and semi-fascist lists was disproportionately young, sometimes very much so, and more literate and well-educated. In the mostly Romanian areas, where social democracy clashed with nationalism, the older, less educated voters were more likely to vote social-democratic. In the predominantly Ukrainian areas, the Social Democrats, who were able to attract some Ukrainian nationalistic votes, were younger than average.

In the mostly non-Romanian areas, the abstainers, who seem to have been overwhelmingly non-Romanian ethnics, were disproportionately young. In the elections of those senators, as on other occasions, in Suceava County, the population’s preferences for the local and county councils indicated preferences for moderate nationalists of minor parties. In this case, a senator from the People’s Party, which was passé in parliamentary elections (272 out of 647 votes or 42.04%), was victorious. The women, many of whom, as we have seen, had the right to vote in local elections, voted much less intensely nationalistic than the males; hardly any female voters voted fascist or semi-fascist. The lower literacy and education rates among females partially account for this.

The National Peasant Party did particularly well among Romanian and minority females, whereas the National Liberals did better among older minority female inhabitants from the two, mostly minority, northern counties. In Suceava County, the female vote apparently went overwhelmingly for the People’s Party, whereas the nationalist extremists of LANC did not obtain female votes.

The score of the intensity of Romanian nationalism in southern Bukovina for the Assembly of Deputies was 3.19, lower than in 1932, while the score for the Senate was a 3.29. The scores for northern

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345. The National Peasant Party’s mostly minority, overwhelmingly Ukrainian, voters in the predominantly Ukrainian two northern counties ranged from slightly younger than average in areas with fewer peasants to substantially younger in more heavily agricultural areas.

346. This presumably reflected the increasing nationalism among the younger ethnic Ukrainians noted by Romanian and Ukrainian sources.

347. About half of the Ukrainians of Storojinet County seem to have voted for Ukrainian nationalistic local and county councilors.
Bukovina were 2.5 and 2.68, while those for the entire province were 2.84 and 2.95. The score for the intensity of nationalism for the senators elected by the county and communal councils were 3.24 for the south, 3.25 for the north and 3.22 for the entire province. The older folks were more likely to vote more intensely nationalistic in two of the three southern Bukovinian counties.

The elections of 1933 for the Assembly of Deputies were interesting. In Romania as a whole, they were somewhat less than fully free and fair. However, the electoral conditions in Bukovina, where the turnout was 74.01%, were better than in the country as a whole. The National Liberal Party, which was headed by Gheorghe I. Duca, obtained 35.91% of the votes in the province as a whole. It accomplished this in an alliance with moderate Germans and moderate Ukrainian nationalists. It polled the largest share of the vote from the mostly Romanian counties, Campulung with 44.32% of the votes (8,144 ballots) and the county of Radauti with its nationalistic tradition, with 48.79% (14,248 ballots).

The anti-Semitic League of National Christian Defense had the second best performance with 18.09% (27,873 votes). The party did particularly well in the overwhelmingly Romanian Suceava County (with 5,668 votes or 24.11%). The third best performing ticket was the Radical Peasant Party, which was allied with the National Ukrainian Party, whose leader was elected to the Assembly of Deputies on this ticket. It obtained 11.82% of the votes cast in Cernauti County (6,050 ballots) and 17.77% of the total votes cast in Storojinet County (5,649 ballots).

A premier, Ion Gheorghe Duca, who did not have the reputation of being anti-Semitic, banned the fascist, anti-Semitic Legion of the Archangel Michael. The Iron Guard assassinated him soon after the elections. This allowed the I.G. Duca dominant branch of the National Liberals to attract numerous Jewish votes.

The Jewish Party did well, possibly obtaining a slight majority both the northern and southern Bukovinian Jewish vote, but only 5.20% of the total Bukovinian vote (8,006 ballots). Nevertheless, most Jews of some parts of Bukovina (Campulung, Storojinet and Radauti) no longer voted for the nationalistic party of their ethnic group. Originally, most of them were in favor of union with Romania in late 1919 and early 1919. As we have seen in the previous chapter, most southern Bukovinian

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348. The more intensely nationalistic Ukrainian National Party was allied with, and provided a disproportionate number of votes for, the Radical Peasantist Party, led by Grigore Iunian.

349. The turnout might have been lower than average among the members of this ethnic group in the province.
Jews voted for this mostly Zionist party because of the massive anti-Semitism of between early 1933 and some time before the elections of 1933. Nevertheless, most northern Bukovinian Jews voted for that party, thereby indicating the possible dissatisfaction of most of them to living under Romanian rule.

The Peasant Party, which also did well among Ukrainians, was the fifth best performer. It received 6,368 votes or 4.13% of the total in the entire province, including 2,784 or 8.76% in the predominantly Ukrainian Storojinet County. As always, the spoiled ballots (3,427 votes or 2.22% of the total) were cast overwhelmingly in Cernauti County (1,704 votes or 3.71% of the total). The score of the intensity of Romanian nationalism in for the Assembly of Deputies was 3.29 for the south, 2.78 for the north and 3.03 for everything. The numbers for the Senate were 3.24, 3.15 and 3.19.350

The 1937 elections were not perfect, but they were free and fair. This was partly because of a non-aggression pact between most of the opposition parties. The turnout of 70.51% in the province was quite high. The single most successful party in Bukovina was the opposition National Peasant Party. It obtained 43,027 votes, or 25.43% of the votes cast. Indeed, this political formation recovered a great deal of its support among the ethnic minorities, especially Ukrainians, but also Jews.

Its disproportionately ethnic minority electoral support accounts for its vastly superior performance in the mostly-minority northern areas of the province. It obtained 21,572 votes, or 36.89% of the total, in Cernauti County, and 12,391 votes, or 37.52% of the total, in Storojinet County, two and a half times more than in the predominantly Romanian counties.

The second most popular party in the region was “Totul Pentru Tara” (“Everything for the Country”). It was the political front for the Legion of the Archangel Michael. It performed the best in the mostly Romanian areas in the south of the province. It might have obtained the votes of a majority of the Bukovinians with a Romanian mother tongue (38,562 votes, or 22.80% of the total).

The fourth most popular formation was the semi-fascist National Christian Party, with 15,757 votes (9.32%). This party was the most successful in its old stronghold of Suceava County, where it had won a by-election during the previous year, with 5,413 votes (20.81%). The two far right parties obtained a sizable majority of the votes of the ethnic Romanians of the province. The third best-performing party was

350 That the score would be so similar in two successive years in elections that were almost equally free, yet with a distribution of the votes that showed such a different party distribution, indirectly shows the validity of my scoring system.
the ruling National Liberal Party, with 21.07% of the vote. It had roughly equally strong performances in northern and southern Bukovina. In addition to ethnic Romanian votes, it also obtained numerous Ukrainian, German and Jewish votes.

The fifth best performing party was the Jewish Party, with 8,216 votes (4.86% of the total). It obtained only a minority of the overall Bukovinian Jewish vote in both southern and northern Bukovina. This only shows the importance of the ethnic basis. The only exception was Storojinet County\textsuperscript{351}, where the proportion of Hassidic Jews was the highest. The Social Democratic Party continued its decline. It obtained only 3,247 votes (1.92% of the total, mostly in Cernauti County, with 1,797 votes or 3.07% of the votes).

The number of annulled votes was 2,472 (1.46%), and they were cast disproportionately cast in the northern Bukovinian areas, with their mostly dissatisfied predominantly Ukrainian and Jewish populations. The German People’s Party, that is the German Nazis, obtained 4,608 votes (2.72%), and did the best in Suceava, with almost half of the German vote\textsuperscript{352}, and between slightly less than one-fifth and slightly more than one third elsewhere. This party did the most poorly in the more industrial counties, which would also be consistent with my model.

The score of the intensity of Romanian nationalism in southern Bukovina for the Assembly of Deputies was 3.38, a somewhat higher score than in 1932 and 1933. For the north, the number was 3.00, while the overall score was 3.18. The scores for the Senate were 3.69 for the south, 3.5 for the north and 3.6 for the entire province. The latter score was in the ballpark of the scores of 1919-1922. It would seem that the rise of the Romanian extreme right, which started to attempt to hijack the title of “nationalist” starting in late 1922, had an interesting effect. It helped produce, together with other factors, a counter-reaction among large sections of the ethnic minority populations and of the more left-leaning (center-left) Romanians.

This guaranteed a less nationalistic voting public for a while, until the second half of the 1930’s. It hindered more than it helped Romanian nation-building, but not that much. What the rising popularity of fascism hurt the most were the prospects for democracy and humanitarianism in Romania in the late 1930’s. It is interesting to note that the higher score of 3.69 for the Senate indicates that older

\textsuperscript{351} The proportion of Hassidic Jews as a percentage of the Jewish population was higher in this county than anywhere else in the province.

\textsuperscript{352} It obtained 1,007 votes, with 3.91% of the votes (about 47.48% of the proportion of the Germans in the county).
voters were more intensely nationalistic than the younger ones.353

The National Liberal Party apparently had done better than expected in the local elections. Its representatives won majorities of the votes for the Senate from most counties, except for Suceava County, where the Agrarian Party candidate was victorious.354

After the 1937 elections, in which no party obtained the support of a majority of the countrywide electorate, King Carol II appointed a government of the National Christian Party. The latter partly was able to obtain the support of a heterogeneous group of allies, including the right wing of the National Peasant Party, the German and Ukrainian parties, etc. Yet it did not stay in power for too long.

On February 10, 1938, the premier Octavian Goga was dismissed, and Romania became a royal dictatorship. All the political parties were soon banned, except for the royal dictatorship’s newly created Frontul Renasterii Nationale (The Front of National Renaissance).355 The next free and mostly fair Romanian elections would be held after the fall of Communism, on May 20, 1990.

It could be concluded that the increasing importance of the separate minority tickets and in particular of the Jewish and German ones in Bukovina, particularly during the 1930’s, reveals the success of the nation-building of those two groups. To some extent, it reflects a reversal of Romanian nation-building among many members of the national minorities on the integrative and satisfactional dimensions.

353. A comparison of the results of the elections to the Assembly of Deputies to those for the Senate is revealing. One should assume that the individuals voted for the same tickets (which both my research and common sense indicates was the case) in both elections. There was the exception of some minor party tickets, which were not represented in the lists for the Senate. One observes some interesting patterns. In most counties, the older voters were less likely to vote, except for Suceava County. This explains why the turnout for the Senate, elected by males over 40 years of age, was only 62.96%. The voters for the National Liberal Party and for the National Peasant Party tended to be older, as did the voters of the so-called “youth wing” (or “young wing”, “Aripa Tanara”) of the National Liberal Party led by Gheorghe I. Bratianu. By contrast, the voters for the Legion, the National Christian Party and for the Radical Peasant Party were younger. This was true everywhere except for the highly nationalistic Radauti County, where the Legionary supporters were on average slightly older and where the members of the Legion included an unusually large number of peasants (see below). Older voters were less likely to spoil their ballots, except for Cernauti County, where older voters were sometimes more likely to do this, possibly due to Habsburg nostalgia among some older folks of non-Romanian ethnicity or Ukrainian nationalism. This nostalgia for the old Austrian times has intermittently explained the higher than expected ballot spoilage for the Senate than for the Assembly in the city of Cernauti even for the elections of 1919 (see above). This, however, does not necessarily show anything about the impact of education, because the older inhabitants of the provincial capital were a more highly literate bunch than the other inhabitants of the province.

354. Nevertheless, the political character of the local councils was less nationalistic everywhere, presumably because the female voters were less nationalistic. Practically none of them seems to have voted for the Legion of the Archangel Michael, and few voted for the National Christian Party.

355. The next free and mostly fair Romanian parliamentary and presidential elections would be held after the fall of the Communist regime (1945-1989), on May 20, 1990.
The increasing numerical representation in the legislature of Ukrainian nationalists during the decade 1928-1938 is also consistent with the increasing spread and intensity of Ukrainian nationalism during the period.

Throughout the period from 1922 to 1937, the intensity of Romanian nationalism seems to have increased. This was partly due to the increase of the proportion of votes going to Romanian far right nationalistic parties, and to a general, but non-linear, decline of the Marxist vote. The support for Romanian moderate nationalistic parties went down, particularly toward the end of the period. The Romanian parties increasingly made use of non-Romanian candidates in the mostly non-Romanian two northern counties of Bukovina. Sometimes, the minority candidates represented the political parties of the national minorities that were allied with the mainstream Romanian parties.

2.5. Extreme Romanian Far Right Electoral Nationalism and Anti-Semitism during the Interwar Period

The most intensely nationalistic parties became increasingly popular throughout the interwar period, until they obtained the support of a majority of the Bukovinian Romanians in 1937. However, the growth of their support should be seen as a symptom of the more general mechanisms described in here rather than a separate independent variable. First, we need to distinguish between the maximum intensity of nationalism and extremism. There were several Romanian parties whose intensity of nationalism score in some districts was 4 but who were not extremist. However, there were also a number of extremist parties with electoral lists; only one of them was literally fascist.

The anti-Semitic League of National Christian Defense (Liga Apararii Nationale Crestine, LANC) led by Alexandru Constantin Cuza tended to do better in among Bukovinian Romanians than among the electorate of Romania as a whole. After the 1927 splitting of the LANC into Cuza's group and the

356. The creation of PNC through the fusion of LANC with the somewhat more moderate National Agrarian Party (Partidul National Agrar, PNA) led by Octavian Goga was an important event. The new reactionary or semi-fascist party (popularly known as “gogo-cuzisti”, that is, Gogo-Cuzists) lost most of the support that their component parts had gained in 1933. In the Assembly elections of December 1937, it obtained 9.3% of the votes (as compared to 9.2% of the national average), compared to an all-Bukovinian vote of 20.1% in 1933. In the 1937 elections for the lower chamber of the legislature, they polled up to 14.52% of the votes of the ethnic Romanians legally entitled to cast ballots. Most of the Gogo-Cuzist votes of 1933 were lost in 1937 to the more radical, fascist Legion of the Archangel Michael.
Legion, the leader ("captain")[^357] of the Legion, Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu performed better in the province than in the country as a whole.[^358]

It would appear that, statistically, in 1931 and 1937, if one would assume that all of the votes for the two parties came from ethnic Romanians, which was not fully the case, but merely almost so[^359], the results are startling. Most of the ethnic Romanian votes cast had gone for the Cuzists (later Gogo-Cuzists) and for the fascist Legion. In the latter year, a hypothetical 50.06% of the ethnic Romanians eligible to vote cast ballots for the Legion alone. The extremely small number of non-Romanian ethnics who voted for the extremist Romanian nationalists clearly shows the importance of the ethnic basis in shaping the level of support of the extreme and/or extremist nationalism.[^360]

What role did sudden shocks play? I have documented, that the growth in the support for the extremely nationalist movements was greatly facilitated by the Great Depression.[^361] This factor led to an increase in anti-Semitism, which was electorally very salient.

The voters who supported the Legion during the last interwar elections in Bukovina tended to be anti-Semitic, while anti-Semitism was even more widespread among the LANC/PNC supporters. Anti-Semitism became quite widespread due to a sudden shock, the Great Depression. The spread of anti-Semitism is particularly striking if one thinks about the fact that the extent of objective conflicts of interest and friction between Jews and Christians, and particularly Romanians, in Bukovina was more limited than

[^357]: "Capitanul" in Romanian.
[^358]: It "inherited" most of the old LANC Bukovinian voting potential (3.9% of the provincial total) for the elections of 1927. The movement polled 2.4% in 1931, 5.5% in 1932, and 22.8% in 1937, the highest percentage for any province in Romania’s last interwar multi-party elections.
[^359]: In fact, the Gogo-Cuzists had made electoral agreements with some German factions during some of the elections, and sometimes had ethnic Germans on their electoral tickets. The Germans were seen as a model, loyal minority. Some individuals who might be objectively classified as members of the Christian ethnic minorities voted for the Legion in 1937. Yet they seem to have identified themselves as Romanians in the 1930 census.
before 1918.

The Jews represented 10.91% of Bukovina's population and 30.16% of its urban inhabitants in 1930. In that year, 12.26% of those actively involved in commerce were Romanians, and 67.97% were Jews by nationality. In 1938, there were 1,553 Romanian commercial firms (14.65%), 8,163 Jewish ones (77.01%), as well as 884 (8.34%) owned by inhabitants of other ethnicities. Jews also represented 53.24% of those actively employed in credit. In the 1930's, the proportion of Jews among lawyers was 65.85%, and among doctors, 69.59%. Jews also owned all, or almost all, of the enterprises in most key branches of manufacturing.  

The actual chronological record of the impact of the Great Depression is well documented. In 1930, there were riots, more massive than at any other time, against certain Jews, and specifically against Jewish moneylenders. Another example of a massive collective action was the large LANC rally in Cernauti, in which about 100,000 inhabitants participated.

There were several Romanian parties whose intensity of nationalism score was 4. Some of them were moderate parties that also appealed to minorities. There were several intensely nationalistic parties. The most intensely nationalistic parties became increasingly popular throughout the interwar period, until they obtained the support of a majority of the Bukovinian Romanians. However, the growth of their support should be seen as a symptom of the more general mechanisms described in here rather than a separate independent variable.


3. Conclusions: Expectations and Results

The percentage of self-identified Romanians counted by the censuses in the population of Bukovina increased from 34.4% in 1910 to 44.5% in 1930 and 57.4% in 1941. In 1918-1940 and 1941-1944, there was also a significant increase, and then a significant decrease, in the proportion of the population that accepted Romanian rule in the province.

What could possibly account for these changes? The nation-building process that had occurred among the population that was very clearly Romanian in terms of ethnic basis was finalized before the beginning of the twentieth century. It provided a more solid basis, or at least a more solid starting point, for increases in the intensity of Romanian nationalism and less for its spread to inhabitants who were unambiguously members of the ethnic minorities.

The intensity of Romanian nationalism was greater during the interwar period than before World War I. Thus, in southern Bukovina, the intensity of Romanian nationalism in the elections to the lower house of the Austrian parliament, and later of the Romanian parliament, elected under male universal suffrage was 2.07 in 1911. Yet it ranged from 3.10 and 3.50 during the interwar period, and it consistently grew between 1932, or earlier in some parts of the province, and 1937. The growth of the nationalistic far right, particularly among the youth educated exclusively in Greater Romania during the 1930’s is explained by my model.

The evolution of the intensity of nationalism of the ethnic minorities is more difficult to ascertain. Yet Ukrainian, Jewish and German electoral nationalism continued to be strong, particularly in northern Bukovina, whose population was overwhelmingly made up of the members of these ethnic groups. Overall, the intensity of minority ethnic nationalism after 1918 was greater than it had been prior to 1918. This is suggested both by the numerical scores based on the electoral data and by their qualitative substitutes. The changes in the electoral system made the expression of Ukrainian nationalism more difficult after 1922. The ethnic minorities who were educated overwhelmingly in the Romanian language (the self-styled Hutsuls, etc.) did not display any specific ethnic nationalism worthy of the name.

Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that the Bukovinian Romanian case supports most of my contentions about
the impact of the various variables. Over time, Romanian patriotism (nationalism on the integrative and satisfacional dimensions) did spread to various sections of the provincial population that were distinctly, openly and sometimes proudly, non-Romanian by ethnicity. This process was much more common in southern Bukovina than in northern Bukovina. In the latter area, most non-ethnic Romanians were not integrated into Romanian society or satisfied with how the Romanian state and society treated them. The failures to assimilate or even to integrate and satisfy the minorities was caused by a combination of religious, linguistic and cultural differences, by the existence of clear nationalistic aspirations among most Bukovinians of ethnic minority origins and because of the anti-Semitism and other types of xenophobia of many ethnic Romanians. Various minority populations, such as the Germans, Poles and self-styled “Hutsuls”, did continue to prefer Romanian to other potential sovereignties. However, numerous ethnic Ukrainians, particularly in northern Bukovina, and numerous Jews regarded Romanian rule as at most the lesser of several evils. This analysis is supported by the electoral data.

I have not presented a great deal data that would be “convenient” for my argument, in the sense that it supports my model. The selection of a case like the 1918-1944 Bukovinian one should verify the robustness of the model under circumstances of problematic data. This makes interwar Bukovina both a good case from the vantage point of theory testing and a case that is difficult to deal with.365

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365 The skeptics should also consult the other chapters, which leave much less room for skepticism. The writing of this chapter and of chapter 5 has been more agonizing than the writing of the other ones, partly because of the greater complexity and sometimes ambiguity of the data. There are several ways to interpret the same data. There is also greater room for skepticism concerning the data in comparison with the period before 1918. This has persuaded me to eliminate some of the data from the tables in the body of this chapter. The existence of a certain room for skepticism regarding the reliability or validity of some of the intensity of nationalism statistical data that I was planning to use in this chapter, but did not, should not lead to the questioning of the project.
Chapter 5
Romanian and Ethnic Minority Nation-Building in Bukovina, 1918-1944:
The Independent Variables

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2.1.1. Ethnic Romanians
2.2. The Minorities
2.2.1. The Bukovinian Ukrainians and the Hutsuls
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3.1.3. Ethnic Educational Experiences of Diaspora Minorities and Their Impact: Jews and Poles
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7. Conclusions: Expectations and Results
1. Introduction: The Independent Variables

In Bukovina in 1918-1944, the intensity of Romanian nationalism among the members of the Romanian ethnic group increased. The nation-building that had already manifested itself during the Austrian period among the population whose ethnic basis was very clearly Romanian provided a more solid base for increasing intensity, but not for a significantly wider spread. The existence of ambiguities in terms of the ethnic basis (individuals who were on the borderline of two ethnic groups, one of which was the Romanian one) originally helped Romanian nation-building.

The fact that an entire cohort received their education under Romanian rule helps account for the growth in the intensity of nationalism starting in 1931, particularly among young national extremists. The impact of the educational system during the period of Romanian rule was more complex than many members of the ethnic minorities would have preferred. The educational process facilitated the increase in the intensity of nationalism not only among ethnic Romanians, but also among most Ukrainians, Jews, etc. The “diluted minority ethnicity” educational systems hindered the increase of nationalism of large groups of members of the ethnic minorities. It affected those who were not very exposed to their group’s ethnonationalism in the educational system (self-styled “Hutsuls”, ethnic Poles, etc.).

As my model predicts, industrialization mostly hindered Romanian nation-building, and, to a lesser extent, the nationalism of the ethnic minorities. The sudden shock of 1918, the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy, helped Romanian nation-building during the next few years. Some of the subsequent sudden shocks (the Soviet occupations of 1940 and 1944 of Northern Bukovina) hindered Romanian nation-building in the province. These occupations predictably facilitated the nation-building projects of other ethnic groups, and particularly the Ukrainian one.

2. 1. The Ethnic Base

2.1.1. Ethnic Romanians
The ethnic base is, as expected, a good predictor of the intensity of Romanian nationalism scores in Bukovina between 1918 and 1944. Ethnic Romanians were much more likely to vote for Romanian nationalistic tickets than the members of the ethnic minorities. After them, the groups that were the most likely to prefer more nationalistic tickets were the “initially loyal minorities” (Poles and Germans). Most Ukrainians and Jews often supported the national movements of their ethnic groups.

The Romanian censuses of 1930 and 1941 classified the inhabitants by ethnicity (“neam”, that is ethnie, more or less the equivalent of “volk” in German), by mother-tongue and religion. The meaning of ethnicity was the sharing of the national aspirations of the respective ethnic group. In other words, unlike the educational statistics, the census “ethnicity” did not always show a person’s ethnic origin, but rather the person’s subjective self-identification. The linguistic self-identification was closer to the results of non-Romanian censuses in the same areas, whereas the ethnic self-identification figures were better matched to the electoral results. The religious statistics were very objective, and have never been questioned.

An analysis of the appendixes 3A and 3B would lead to certain expected conclusions. First, the intensity of Romanian nationalism scores was substantially higher for mostly southern Romanian Bukovina than for the overwhelmingly non-Romanian north. The differences in ethnic basis between the two counties of northern Bukovina and the three counties of southern Bukovina remain very large. Moreover, in all elections, the county of Storojinet (34.10% ethnically Romanian) had higher intensity of Romanian nationalism scores than Cernauti County (25.67% Romanian).

The differences also appear in the south, with the most thoroughly ethnically Romanian (79.45%) county of Suceava having practically always the highest scores. The differences are applicable to both all the voters as a group and to Senate voters, who were over 40 years of age. They also operate at the level of the county and communal councils. The only exception is Radauti County (where more than 54% of the inhabitants were ethnic Romanians). Although this area was less thoroughly ethnically Romanian than Campulung County (61.28% ethnically Romanian), its population was more intensely nationalistic in a minority of the Senate elections and in most Assembly elections. This was determined by the fact that Radauti County was less industrialized than Campulung.

The Romanian nationalistic parties obtained not only the support of the overwhelming majority of the votes of the ethnic Romanians, but of some members of the ethnic minorities. We can not always
determine the amount of support of the members of the non-Romanian ethnic minorities for Romanian nationalism. Nobody has denied the fact that practically all ethnic Romanians desired to remain under Romanian rule during the interwar period. The only exceptions were those who emigrated, among whom ethnic Romanians were underrepresented, and the few Communists.

**Picture 3R - Regional, Supra-Regional and Ethnic (National) Nested Identity among the Northern Bukovinian Romanians from the Late Habsburg Period to the Post-Soviet period**

1. Romanian regional identity (Bukovinian Romanian)
2. Romanian supra-regional identity (Moldovan Romanian)
3. Romanian national identity (Romanian)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Area</th>
<th>Bukovina</th>
<th>Western Moldova</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Southern Bukovina</td>
<td>Northern Bukovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>Currently in Romania</td>
<td>Currently in Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>“Bukovinian” or “Moldovan”</td>
<td>“Bukovinian” or “Moldovan” Romanians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Romanian ethnic base was solidly Romanian, with a “Romanian” self-identification. We know this from how the imposition of the “Moldovan” identity occurred in 1944. Thus, in the village of Molodia, in May 1944, all the adult males below 50 years of age were called to city hall. All of them were asked what they were, “Romanians” or “Moldovans”. All of them declared that they were Romanians, and that their parents and ancestors thought that they were Romanians. The Soviet military personnel involved were screaming that there is no difference between “Romanians” and “Moldovans”, and that from now onward, they will be called “Moldovans”. Some of them accepted the new identity and some did not. All of them were asked to come and enroll in the army. Those who accepted that they were ethnic “Moldovans” were sent to the front. Those who did not were sent to the work camps in the Soviet north, close to Lake Onega, where more than half of them died.366

The Romanian ethnic basis was not “constant”. In 1919, the Romanian Orthodox Church decided to switch from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar, which meant that Christmas would be celebrated on December 25, not January 7. The effect was that practically all the ethnic Romanians and a few of the ethnic Ukrainians switched to the new calendar.367

The ethnic base is, as expected, a good predictor of the intensity of Romanian nationalism scores. Ethnic Romanians were much more likely to vote for Romanian nationalistic tickets than the members of the ethnic minorities were. After that, the groups that were the most likely to prefer more nationalistic tickets were the “initially loyal minorities” (Poles and Germans). Most Ukrainians and Jews often supported the national movements of their ethnic groups.

367. See Bancos, p. 265.
2.2. The Minorities

The Romanian nationalistic parties obtained not only the support of the overwhelming majority of the votes of the ethnic Romanians, but also of some members of the ethnic minorities. This was true during most elections of practically all southern Bukovinians who were not of Romanian ethnicity/nationality. Among the southern Bukovinian exceptions were most Jews in the parliamentary elections of 1931-1933, that is, during the Great Depression, and in many urban local council elections. The same was also true of a substantial minority of the Germans in 1937 and of a sizeable number of Ukrainians in Suceava County in 1927.

The southern Bukovinian Ukrainians of Radauti and Campulung counties, most of whom had a “Ruthenian” or “Hutsul” identity (see below), as well as the self-identified Ukrainians of Suceava County, were in an interesting position. Most of them had not voted for Ukrainian nationalists during any previous elections. This was also true of the Poles, as well as some of the smaller groups (e.g., Hungarians), from all parts of Bukovina. Numerous northern Bukovinian Ukrainians throughout the interwar period, including a majority in 1928, and a majority in 1941-1942, and during the 1930’s, supported the Ukrainian national movement. This was also true of most northern Bukovinian Jews, who supported Jewish nationalism in the early 1930’s. We have already seen that in many Bukovinian elections, it was difficult to measure the intensity of Romanian nationalism. This is also the case for the nationalism of many ethnic minorities for many elections. Let us look in depth at the various ethnic groups one by one.

2.2.1. The Bukovinian Ukrainians and the Hutsuls

The Bukovinian Ukrainian case is interesting, not in the least because the individuals whose ethnic identities were changed from Ukrainian to Romanian ones between 1918 and 1944 were overwhelmingly previously identified as ethnic Ukrainians (including “Ruthenians” and “Hutsuls”). There was a clearer differentiation between the Romanian and Ukrainian ethnic basis during the interwar period than previously. This was because the ethnic Romanians, unlike the ethnic Ukrainians, started to follow a
different religious calendar. This factor ironically “solidified” the ethnic basis that facilitated Ukrainian nation-building. The ethnic basis also had a critical role in determining which ethnic Ukrainians would eventually identify themselves as Ukrainians and which ones would identify themselves as “Hutsuls”. The presence of a “Hutsul” identity hindered Ukrainian nation-building and facilitated Romanian nation-building on the integrative and satisfacational dimensions.

The chronological evolution of the numbers of ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Romanians is remarkable. The sudden shocks which led to the acquisition by Romania of Bukovina in 1918 induced very many Ukrainians to re-identify themselves as ethnic Romanians by January 1919. At that time, according to a less than perfect Romanian regional census, largely conducted through the Service for Agriculture, there were 368,149 Romanians, about 95,000 more than in 1910, and 215,605 Ukrainians, 90,000 less than in 1910 in Bukovina (see Table 3.1). Almost 30% of those who had declared a Ruthene mother-tongue in 1910 declared that they were of Romanian nationality in 1919. One of the reasons for this change was apparently the fact that during the short period of Ukrainian nationalistic rule in November 1918, there was an attempt to impose a “Ukrainian” identity on the inhabitants with a “Ruthenian” identity, some of whom resented this.

In the first Romanian censuses, those of 1919 and 1924, there were no “Ruthenian” or “Hutsul” census categories, which made many of these “Ruthenians” and “Hutsuls” choose to declare a Romanian rather than Ukrainian national identity. Moreover, since Ukrainian irredentism was more of a current events issue especially in January 1919 more individuals chose “safety” and declared that their nationality was Romanian. Many even acquiesced to the Romanian official rhetoric, associated with the National Liberal Party that they were in fact “Ukrainianized Romanians”. We do not know how many of these individuals had a Romanian ethnic rather than a merely civic one.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁸ I have heard about these general processes from several inhabitants with a “Hutsul” rather than Ukrainian ethnic identity in southern Bukovina who had declared that they were of Romanian nationality in the most recent Romanian censuses at that time, namely those of 1977 and 1992. There are also references to this phenomenon in the current Romanian-language local press of Suceava County, basically southern Bukovina. “Beyond the ‘mystery’ of the Hutsuls, who desire to maintain their traditions, customs, but typically do not have the courage to declare themselves in the census as Hutsuls or Ukrainians, but rather as Romanians…” (“Dincolo de „misterul” huțului, care vor să-și păstreze tradițiile, obiceiurile, dar nu prea au curajul să se declare la recensământ drept huțăli, dar nici ucraineni, mai degrabă romani…””) See ‘Festivalul „Huțului” de la Lucina – „O dovadă că huțului nu sunt ucraineni sau ruteni”’ in Monitorul de Suceava, October 4, 2005 accessed at http://www_monitorulsv_ro/showstire.php?tip=reportaj&id=2232&arh_caut=da on May 8, 2007.
The percentage of Ukrainians among was smaller in comparison to later Romanian statistical data in 1930 and 1941 (see Table 3.1.). This was perhaps because the censuses of 1930 and 1941, which were conducted by the census bureau, were conducted more professionally, more impartially. Individuals were asked what their ethnicity or ethnic origin was. Therefore, there was no census pressure, as distinct from general societal pressure, to declare a Romanian “nationality” in order to display one’s patriotism. Moreover, those who counted the inhabitants for the census bureau were typically teachers. They had less power to coerce or reward those who were counted than the civil servants who counted them in 1919 or the secret police agents who did the same in 1924. If they had had more power over the inhabitants, perhaps school attendance would have been higher.\textsuperscript{369} Even more importantly, those who ruled Romania in 1941 and especially in 1930 did not subscribe to the idea that numerous ethnic Ukrainians from Bukovina were in fact “Ukrainianized Romanians”.

Different census takers had different agendas. The purpose of the census bureau was to count inhabitants for no other official purpose than counting them. By contrast, the administrative census of 1919 also had the purpose of preparing the ground for land redistribution to the peasantry. For this purpose, the declaration of a Romanian ethnic identity was potentially materially more useful for the inhabitants who were counted. The secret police census of 1924 was meant to count the number of individuals who were potentially disloyal, and it was therefore disadvantageous for one to identify oneself as a Ukrainian.

Since a number of self-declared ethnic “Romanians” in 1919 had re-identified themselves as members of the ethnic minorities, overwhelmingly as Ukrainians, by 1930, the number of Ukrainians (and of other groups) increased slightly in that year.\textsuperscript{370} The proportion of “Ukrainians, Ruthenians and Hutsuls” (row 3, Table 3.1.) increased in relative terms in comparison to the number of “Romanians” (row 4) between 1919 and 1930 from 36.93% to 39.56% (row 6) due to a number of reasons. One of them was the shifting in a “Ukrainian” direction of numerous Romanian-Ukrainian bilinguals and other individuals of unstable, and therefore shifting, ethnic identity. These individuals were using the “old style” religious calendar often acquired a clear Ukrainian national identity that had not existed previously. It was built on a

\textsuperscript{369} See Economu, p. 48, citing “Glasul Bucovinei”, no. 224, of August 24, 1919.

\textsuperscript{370} According to the census of 1930, the rural population included 304,520 ethnic Romanians and 216,967 Ukrainians, Ruthenians and Hutsuls. See Livezeanu, p. 50.
Ukrainian ethnic basis, more differentiated from the Romanian ethnic basis than previously.\textsuperscript{371}

Table 3.1. The Number of Bukovinian Romanians and Ukrainians in 1910-1941, by Census Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Ethnic Group(s) or Category/Categories</th>
<th>1910 Austrian Census (Census Bureau)</th>
<th>1919 Administrative Census</th>
<th>1924\textsuperscript{372} Administrative Census</th>
<th>1930 Census (Census Bureau)</th>
<th>1941 Census (Census Bureau)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Romanians</td>
<td>273,254</td>
<td>368,149</td>
<td>379,691</td>
<td>438,766</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ukrainians, Ruthenians and Hutsuls</td>
<td>305,101\textsuperscript{373}</td>
<td>215,605\textsuperscript{374}</td>
<td>227,000\textsuperscript{375}</td>
<td>248,567\textsuperscript{376}</td>
<td>269,973\textsuperscript{377}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Romanians + Ukrainians</td>
<td>578,355</td>
<td>583,754</td>
<td>628,258</td>
<td>708,739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Romanians/ (Romanians + Ukrainians)</td>
<td>47.25%</td>
<td>63.07%</td>
<td>60.44%</td>
<td>61.91%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ukrainians/ (Romanians + Ukrainians)</td>
<td>52.75%</td>
<td>36.93%</td>
<td>39.56%</td>
<td>38.09%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Total Population</td>
<td>794,929</td>
<td>Not Found</td>
<td>853,009</td>
<td>763,718</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. (Romanians + Ukrainians) / Total Population</td>
<td>72.76%</td>
<td>Not Comparable</td>
<td>73.65%</td>
<td>92.80% (Not Comparable)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The middle of the interwar period brought about a greater differentiation in terms of ethnic basis between ethnic Romanians and ethnic Ukrainians. Unlike the quasi-totality of the Bukovinian Romanians, practically all ethnic Ukrainians continued to be “stylists” (“stilisti” in Romanian). In other words, they continued to follow the old Julian calendar, the “old style” calendar. In this respect, they were similar to the contemporary Ukrainian Galician Greek Catholics and to the Ukrainian Orthodox inhabitants elsewhere.\textsuperscript{378}

Within this context, the priests had a more important role in furthering the process of Ukrainian nation-

\textsuperscript{371}. In 1919, there were more benefits from declaring a Romanian identity than in 1930. Land redistribution to the peasantry had already taken place between the two years.

\textsuperscript{372}. The American Committee on the Rights of Religious Minorities, \textit{Roumania Ten Years After} (Boston: The Beacon Press, Inc., 1928), p. 94. The complete figures are obviously not easily available.

\textsuperscript{373}. Ruthenian language.

\textsuperscript{374}. Ukrainians.

\textsuperscript{375}. Ukrainians.

\textsuperscript{376}. Ukrainians, Ruthenians and Hutsuls.

\textsuperscript{377}. Ukrainians and Hutsuls.

\textsuperscript{378}. The latter is accurate even at the present moment.
building in Bukovina than in other processes of nation-building. As a rule, the Ukrainian clergymen did not follow the order form above to use also Romanian in church services.  

Paul Magocsi notes that the “parishes in Ukrainian villages were expected to conduct the traditional Church Slavonic liturgy partly in Romanian (an instruction that in practice was rarely followed).”

The “new calendar” started to be enforced sporadically in a more systematic manner in April 1926. However, the old style was tolerated, notwithstanding the harassment directed against those who were observing it from that time onward. This cultural contrast between the Bukovinian Ukrainians and the Bukovinian Romanians, as well as the Bukovinian Ukrainian similarity with the Galician and other Ukrainians was salient. It was not expected to lead to a greater intensity of Ukrainian nationalism, but it did. This was because the Ukrainian Eastern Orthodox priests made a link between the Old Style and Ukrainian nationalism, particularly during the period of 1941-1944, after a short period of political union with practically all other ethnic Ukrainians under Soviet rule.

The phenomenon discussed above indicates not only the importance of the ethnic basis, but also of that of various local actors. Even the partial enforcement of the calendar change was a factor that fostered dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction was only gradually channeled into a Ukrainian identity, and eventually into Ukrainian nationalism among the bilingual inhabitants with an ambiguous identity. If an individual was already officially labeled as a “Stylist”, and discriminated because of that, was there any point to declare oneself an ethnic “Romanian” when the inhabitant was of “Ukrainian” ethnicity? Moreover, there was more official tolerance toward “Stylist” among the Eastern Slavs than among the ethnic Romanians. It was thought that it was more “natural” for the former than for the latter.

Table 3V - The Intensity of Nationalism, by Sub-Population, in Bukovina, 1926 -1937, and the Impact of the Variables

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379. See Bancos, p. 265, 271.
382. See Bancos, p. 265, 271.
383. It is noteworthy that starting in 1926, less than half of the northern Bukovinian inhabitants voted for the party that won the elections nationwide, the People’s Party.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Ukrainians in Northern and Northeastern Bukovina</th>
<th>Ukrainians in Northwestern Bukovina</th>
<th>Mostly Romanian Southern and Central Bukovina</th>
<th>Urban, especially Cernauti, especially minorities</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic base</td>
<td>Ukrainian, Bukovinian Dialect, Julian calendar</td>
<td>Ukrainian, Hutsul Dialect, Julian Calendar</td>
<td>Romanian, Bukovinian-Moldovan Subdialect, Gregorian calendar</td>
<td>Jews, Romanians, Germans, Poles, Ukrainians, Germans and Romanian language, Gregorian calendar</td>
<td>Tests model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Education             | Less Ukrainian language and nationalism, most cases | Less Ukrainian language and nationalism, most cases | Romanian language and nationalism (intense) | Mostly bilingual education | Tests model |

| Industrialization     | Non-industrial | Non-industrial | Non-industrial | Industrial | Tests model |

| Sudden Shock          | 1940, 1941, 1944 | 1940, 1941, 1944 | 1940, 1941, 1944 | 1940, 1941, 1944 | Tests model |

| Political Parties     | Ukrainian nationalism, Romanian nationalism, Marxists | Ukrainian nationalism, Romanian nationalism, Marxists | Romanian nationalist, various intensities | Romanian and ethnic minority parties, minority candidates, Socialist and Communist minorities | Intensity of nationalism |

| Urbanization          | Rural and small town | Rural and small town | Rural and small town | Large city | Related to industry |

| Outcome (Elections), Explanatory, 1926-1927 | Mostly opposition, large Socialist minority | Mostly opposition, large Socialist minority | Right-of-center Romanian nationalist establishment parties win | Romanian mainstream, large Marxist vote, some minority MP’s | Rota-tion in power, right-of-center win |

| Outcome (Nation-building), 1926-1927 | Less intense Ukrainian nationalism than 1911, 1920, weak | Less intense Ukrainian nationalism than 1911, 1920, weak | Intensity of Romanian nationalism goes down | Little progress in nation-building | Romanian rule mostly accepted |

| Outcome (Elections), Explanatory, 1928, 1930 (by-elections) | Large number of votes for allies of Ukrainian Parties | Large number of votes for allies of Ukrainian parties | National Peasant Party large majority, less intense nationalism | Weakening Marxism, more intense minority nationalism | Free, competitive elections |

<p>| Outcome (Nation-building), 1931-1937 | Intensity of nationalism goes up, greater Ukrainian fascism | Intensity of nationalism goes up, greater Ukrainian fascism | Intensity of nationalism goes up, greater Romanian fascism | Greater minority ethnic nationalism (including most Jews) | Minority ethnic nationalism broader and greater intensity |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Subpopulation by Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians in Northern and Northeastern Bukovina</td>
<td>Ukrainians in Northwestern Bukovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome (Self-determination preferences, 1938-1944)</td>
<td>Greater Pro-Romanianism, large majority pro-Ukrainian, later anti-USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome (Nation-building), 1938-1944</td>
<td>Large majority wants independent Ukrainian by 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of my model confirmed</td>
<td>Ethnic base, shock, educational system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those inhabitants with a Ukrainian, or even “Ruthenian”, ethnic identity, were, or had the potential of becoming, Ukrainian nationalistic voters. An increasing number had a Ukrainian identity. By 1941, and indeed 1928, this process had been finalized in northern Bukovina. Almost all the non-Romanianized individuals, or the descendants of such individuals, who had declared their language as “Ruthenian” in 1910 or their nationality and language as “Ukrainian” or “Ruthene” in 1930, declared their ethnicity as Ukrainian in the latter year in that area. In the northern Bukovinian Cernauti and Storojinet counties, there were only two self-styled “Hutsuls” in the latter county, a decrease from three in 1930.

The Romanian authorities in northern Bukovina gradually stopped identifying the ethnic Ukrainians as “Ruthenians” during the interwar period. This was partially because the two terms were used as synonyms. The Ukrainian nationalists did not immediately get more educational opportunities in the Ukrainian language due to their deals with various Romanian parties, but only the dropping of the term “Ruthenian”. Ukrainian nation-building advanced not only in terms of identity changes, but also through the increase in the intensity of Ukrainian ethnic nationalism in a number of geographical areas.

It was not until the victory of a Ukrainian nationalist in the elections for the Senate in 1928 in

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384. The “Ruthenes” called themselves “Rusnaks”.
385. For one of the last documents in which they were called “Ruthenians”, see Livezeanu, p. 66.
Storojinet County that one could conceivably speak about the final victory of “Ukrainian” nationalism in all the compact areas of northern Bukovina. This was not yet the case in 1920 in the old county of Vascauti. The elections of 1920 demonstrated that Ukrainian nationalism enjoyed the electoral support of a majority of the population in the old Zastavna, Cotmani and Vijnita counties, but not in Vascauti. In that area, most Ukrainians did not yet display Ukrainian electoral nationalism. This was so presumably because many of them still had a “Ruthenian” identity. The greater popularity of the “Old Ruthenian” ticket and thus the relative weakness of the Ukrainian ticket in comparison in 1907 in the same area (Vascauti) is worthy of note. It geographically overlaps with the weakness of Ukrainian nationalism in the area during the early part of Romanian rule.

Practically all of the Ukrainians of the three southern Bukovinian counties lived in mostly ethnically Romanian electoral districts/counties (51.47% in 1920, close to 100% after 1925 – see Table 3G), including if one uses the 1910 Austrian census data as a reference point. Most of these individuals did not display Ukrainian nationalism in their voting patterns. There was hardly any Ukrainian nationalism among the self-identified ethnic “Hutsuls” (see Table 3C below).

The prominent Romanian nationalistic professor and politician Ion Nistor notes, by the early twentieth century, the Hutsuls of western Bukovina identified themselves as “Russian people”, “Christians”, “mountaineers” or “inhabitants of the mountain peaks”, not as “Hutsuls” or even less as “Ukrainians”. They thought that they spoke the “Ruthenian” language. (“Do you know how to speak Hutsul/Ruthene/Rusyn” is translated into the southern Bukovinian Hutsul idiom as “te znae şpu ruschiî?”) Most of them declared a Hutsul or Ruthenian identity to the census-takers of 1930, but in most cases declared a Romanian identity in the 1919 and 1924 censuses.

The “Hutsul” identity of some inhabitants of southwestern Bukovina has been alleged by some Ukrainian authors to be a phenomenon that emerged during the twentieth century, during the period of Romanian rule. The purpose of the Romanian authorities was to “divide-and-rule”. This is unlikely, in the view of the 21,429 self-styled “Hutsuls” counted in the Ivano-Frankivs’k region by the Ukrainian census of

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386. See Nistor, Problema ucraineana, p. 75.
388. This has also been true of the Communist and post-Communist era censuses.
2001, and of the 21,400 self-styled “Hutsuls” in Ukraine as a whole.\textsuperscript{389} Moreover, these “Hutsuls” had declared that they were of Romanian nationality in 1919 and 1924. Therefore, the emergence of the “Hutsul” census answer was done at the expense of the “Romanian” census category.

Nevertheless, these self-styled Hutsuls of southwestern Bukovina had voted for Ukrainian nationalist parliamentary candidates in the 1907 and 1911 Austrian parliamentary elections. Could the emergence of a “Hutsul” identity in interwar Romanian have been an attempt to make a virtue out of necessity? This is possible. After all, most of the southern Bukovinan Hutsuls were working in forestry as their occupation or as one of their occupations. The timber was floating down rivers that were flowing toward Romanian ethnic territories in southern Bukovina, not toward Ukrainian ethnic territories in northern Bukovina. Moreover, they were buying their food from the Romanian peasants downstream. Their territorial separation from Romania would have been economically disastrous.\textsuperscript{390}

In numerous cases, the southwestern Bukovinan Hutsuls had multiple ethnic identities during the interwar period. They included a predominant “Hutsul” ethnic one, which in some cases became very important during Romanian rule, and a secondary “Romanian” civic one. The latter had not existed in 1907 or 1911. They were no longer showing their support for the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people as they did in 1907 and 1911. There were no Ukrainian co-operatives, cultural societies, voting for Ukrainian ethnonationalistic candidates, etc. The self-styled “Hutsuls” were thus indicating the low level of popularity for interwar Ukrainian nationalism among them.

During the interwar period, as Irina Livezeanu’s ethnic map shows, these self-styled southern Bukovinan “Hutsuls” were geographically isolated from the compact ethnic Ukrainian area in the north of the province.\textsuperscript{391} Hardly any of these self-styled “Hutsuls”, who were in practically all cases loyal toward Romania, supported Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, just as in Suceava County, a large majority of them

\textsuperscript{389} See “The number of persons of distinct ethnographical (sic!) groups and their mother tongue, Ivano-Frankiv’sk Region”, at http://ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/nationality_population/nationality_5/n55/?box=5.5W&out_type=&id= &rz=1_1&rz_b=2_1&k_t=26&id=&botton=cens_db and “The number of persons of distinct ethnographical groups and their mother tongue, Ukraine”, at http://ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/nationality_population/nationality_5/n55/?box=5.5W&out_type=&id= &rz=1_1&rz_b=2_1&k_t=00&id=&botton=cens_db.

\textsuperscript{390} This analysis is based on my numerous visits to the area and on numerous conversations with locals of Romanian and Ukrainian ethnicity.

\textsuperscript{391} See Livezeanu, p. 50.
knew the Romanian language.\textsuperscript{392} A common cultural habit among the Hutsuls of southwestern Bukovina is to write their dialect/sub-dialect in the Latin alphabet rather than in the Cyrillic one characteristic of Ukrainian.\textsuperscript{393} They have been taught predominantly in the Latin alphabet and in the Romanian language since 1919. By the 1930’s, most of them probably already knew them better than the Cyrillic alphabet or the literary Ukrainian language. After the early 1920’s, unlike in the north, there were no de facto “Ukrainian” schools in the southwestern Bukovinian “Hutsul” areas.\textsuperscript{394}

Partly because of this developments, these southwestern Bukovinian “Hutsul” mountaineers were seen as “less linguistically and culturally pure” and as “inferior Ukrainians” or “backward Ukrainians” by some other ethnic Ukrainians. The latter were primarily educated members of the ethnic group, especially from urban localities, as opposed to barely literate peasants. This phenomenon gave an additional incentive to numerous southwestern Bukovinian Hutsuls to emphasize their “Hutsul” primary identity.\textsuperscript{395} Numerous Ukrainian nationalists were irredentists, and the self-styled “Hutsuls” avoided associating with them. On April 6, 1941, these self-styled census “Hutsuls” formed a majority of the Ukrainians in the Radauti and Campulung counties, and in southern Bukovina as a whole (see Table 3C). They declared this identity not in the least because of Soviet rule in northern Bukovina, which they were glad to have escaped.\textsuperscript{396}

These “Hutsuls” had seldom had a chance to vote for tickets that included Ukrainian, but not Romanian, nationalists during the period of Romanian rule. Yet even when they did have a chance to do so, as in 1927, only a very small minority cast their ballots accordingly. By contrast, most of the Ukrainians of

\textsuperscript{392} This analysis is fully consistent with the electoral data and with the documents consulted by Dumitru Sandru, who came to the same conclusion, namely that the “Hutsuls” were loyal toward Romania, by reading the various Romanian administrative, police, etc., reports. While my travels through the old Hutsul region of southern Bukovina are inconclusive on this issue, my conversations with some local ethnic Romanians in 1991 and 1994 gave me the same impression.
\textsuperscript{393} See “Limba Huțulă - Huțulschi Izec” at \url{http://hutzul.googlepages.com/home}. The Hutsuls of northern Maramures in northern Greater Transylvania use both the Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet. See “Little Conversation Guide”, at the website of the mostly Hutsul-Ukrainian village Poienile de sub Munte from Maramures County, accessed at \url{http://www.geocities.com/poienile_de_sub_munte/limba.htm}.
\textsuperscript{394} Some of the few individuals with a “hard-core” Ruthenian identity who did not acquire a Ukrainian identity in these counties might have called themselves “Russians”.
\textsuperscript{395} I was told about this during my travels through adjacent areas of southwestern Bukovina. Victor Todoriuc and Daniel Teodoru have confirmed this point.
\textsuperscript{396} I have found the discussions with Dumitru Sandru on the topic of the “Hutsul” identity very useful. This prominent historian specialized in the Romanian rural world has not only consulted numerous official documents, but has traveled quite extensively through the area with a population that had previously had a “Hutsul” identity.
Suceava County voted for a general minorities’ ticket, the Magyar and German Parties’ Cartel, in 1927. Therefore, these differences in ethnic identity, a component of the “ethnic basis”, were translated into voting for Ukrainian nationalists among the self-styled “Ukrainians” and into not voting for them in the case of the self-styled “Hutsuls”. The reason for the Ukrainian nationalistic voting in Suceava County in 1927 was a reaction against excessive official Romanization. The emergence of a “compromise solution”, namely the reintroduction of the teaching of the Ukrainian language in their schools after a few years prevented further Ukrainian nationalistic voting or mass support in the county.

It would be inaccurate to claim that the Romanian state authorities consciously imposed the “Hutsul identity” on some Ukrainians. The Romanian educational statistics identified the self-styled “Hutsul” children and their parents as “Ukrainians” or as “Romanians”, depending on their declarations. Therefore, the Ukrainian nationalist claims, which are not endorsed by the Ukrainian government, indicate otherwise. Although understandable, they are erroneous. After all, the 1919 and 1924 censuses, as well as the official school statistics, listed only a Ukrainian “nationality”, not a “Hutsul” one. At that time, most of the “Hutsuls” declared that they were ethnic “Romanians”, as most of them do now (see Table 3.1.).

Numerous Ukrainian authors have accurately presented the Hutsuls as objectively being of Ukrainian ethnic ancestry in terms of language, culture, etc. Some Romanian historians have claimed that these Hutsuls’ ancestors, or at least some of them, were Ukrainianized Romanians. By contrast, the leadership of the present-day Hutsul organization in Romania, Uniunea Generala a Asociatiilor Etniei Hutule din România (The General Union of the Associations of the Hutsul Ethnie from Romania) claims that the Hutsuls are of free Dacian ancestry. They are allegedly descended from the Dacians who were

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397. A situation somewhat similar to that of the southern Bukovinian Hutsuls of Radauti and Campulung counties was applicable, and is still applicable, in the case of a group of ethnic Ukrainians that call themselves “Lemkos”, formerly and sometimes currently of present-day south-eastern Poland. Thus, in a 1991 survey, their answer to the question “Is there any real difference between Lemkos and Ukrainians, 67% said “yes”, 28% said “no” and 6% had no opinion. When asked, “Is there any real difference between Lemkos and Rusyns?”, the results were “yes” – 6%, “no” – 82%, and “no opinion” – 12%. It should be noted that whereas, according to the Polish census of 1931, in Eastern Galicia there were much larger numbers of “Ukrainians” than of “Ruthenians”, the situation was reversed in the Lemko area of the Krakow Voivodship. See Susyn Y. Mihalasky, "Ethnonational Orientation among Lemkos in Poland: The Results of a Survey", in Paul Best and Jaroslaw Moklak (eds.), The Lemkos of Poland: Articles and Essays (New Haven, Connecticut: Carpatho-Slavic Studies Group, 2000), p. 185. In Slovakia, according to the 1991 census, there were 16,937 self-styled “Rusyns” and 49,099 self-styled “Rusyn-speakers”, 13,847 self-styled “Ukrainians” and 9,480 self-styled “Ukrainian-speakers”, as well as 1,624 self-styled “Russians”. See Paul Robert Magocsi, Of the Making of Nationalities There is No End (vol. 1, Carpatho-Rusyns in Europe and North America) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 351, 366-367.
never conquered by the Romans. This view was developed during the interwar period. The Romanian historians claim that all the free Dacians were eventually linguistically Romanized and came to be included in the emerging Romanian people.\(^{398}\) The Romanian and Hutsul ethnic myths therefore clash rather than commune with each other.

The interwar Romanian preference for the “Ukrainian” identity over other identities is confirmed by a letter of the “Ukrainians' Union of Romania” from 2003 to the president of the Chamber of Deputies. The memorandum had a great deal of supporting documentation, including census results and letters from the Romanian Academy, the National Institute of Statistics, the Ukrainian Embassy in Romania and copies of Romanian dictionaries and encyclopedias. The official translation of the text into English prepared by the organization is full of misspellings, but interesting. “It’s worth mentioned the fact that the Romanian people had never considered the Ruthens as another people, apart of the Ukrainians, and the official statistics concerning the Romanian population structure on nationalities had included, every time, to Ukrainians those few people which considered themselves as Ruthens or Hutzul.”\(^{399}\)

The comparison of the census results shows significant increases in the number of Eastern Slavs, greater than those in the number of Romanians, in the Radauti and Suceava counties, between 1930 and 1941 (see Table 3C). The growing number of self-styled Hutsuls explains the increase in the number of

\(^{398}\) See the statement of Gică Iliesi, the executive vice-president of Uniunea Generală a Asociațiilor Etniei Huțule din România (The General Union of the Associations of the Hutsul Ethnie from Romania), cited in “Huțulii au dat o petrecere haiducească de Anul Nou”, in Monitorul de Suceava, January 16, 2006, accessed at http://www.monitorulsv.ro/showstire.php?tip=local&id=6481&arh_caut=da. Iliesi claims that “The Hutsuls are not Ukrainians, Ruthenians or Russians, but a unique ethnie, well developed in the Carpathian space, a fact which is proven by the numerous results of historical research. Just like the other mountaineers in the Northern Carpathians, they are the descendants of the free Dacians” (that is, the Dacians that were never conquered by the Romans).

\(^{399}\) The text of the letter, signed by the (late) engineer Stefan Tcaciuk (Tkachuk in Ukrainian spelling), the president of the Ukrainians' Union of Romania, and a member of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies, appears in Romanian and then in English at http://www.rusynmedia.org/Documents/Misc/Romania-Ukr.pdf. The decision of the lower chamber of the Romanian parliament to allow a representative of the "Ruthene (Ukrainian) - Rusyn" minority to sit in the Romanian parliament was seen as a recognition of the "Ruthene/Rusyn" minority. (Ethnic minority representatives need fewer votes than other candidates in order to be elected, but only if their organization wins more votes than any other organization of the same ethnic group.) Moreover, the Romanian government is funding Rusyn cultural activities. Romania has never had any “Ruthene” or "Rusyn" schools, and the Ukrainian language and ethnic history have been the only minority language and history courses taught in the Ukrainian-language schools in Romania. The Romanian census-takers have encouraged a "Ukrainian", not a "Ruthenian", "Rusyn", etc., self-identification. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Ukrainians' Union of Romania obtained 10,888 votes in the entire country, while the Cultural Union of the Ruthenes from Romania obtained 2,871 votes (20.87% of the votes for the two organizations). In Suceava County within its 2004 borders, which largely overlap with southern Bukovina, the figures were 1,406 (90.24%) and 152 (9.76%).
Eastern Slavs. It is likely that by April 1941, many of those who declared themselves Romanians in 1930 now had a Ukrainian identity. However, this was determined by the fact that more Ukrainians moved from northern to southern Bukovina than vice versa after the Soviet occupation of Northern Bukovina in 1940. What we do not see is the statistical Romanianization of significant numbers of ethnic Ukrainians, including “Hutsuls”, during the period between 1930 and 1941.

4X. The Regional Patterns of Ukrainian Nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area and Period and Census Identity</th>
<th>Census Identity</th>
<th>Voted for Ukrainian Nationalistic Tickets or Not</th>
<th>Area, Year and Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Zastavna, Cotmani and Vijnita Ukrainians (pre-1925 districts)</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1907-1911 (large majority in all areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1919 (in a few areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1920 (in all the areas),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1926-1937 (in all the areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vascauti Ukrainians (pre-1925 districts)</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1907 (small majority in most areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1911 (large majority in all areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1919-1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1928-1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Campulung and Radauti, Mostly “Hutsuls” or “Ruthenians” (post-1925 borders)</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1907-1911 (a minority in all areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Interwar Years (post-1925 borders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Suceava Ukrainians (post-1925 borders)</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1907-1911, 1919-1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1927 (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1928-1937</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3G – Southern Bukovinian Ukrainians from the Three Southern Counties, in Mostly Non-Ukrainian Districts According to the Austrian Census of 1910 and the Romanian Censuses, by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Districts</th>
<th>1910 Census</th>
<th>1920 Census</th>
<th>1930 Census</th>
<th>In present-day Romania (2002)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly</td>
<td>22,907</td>
<td>44.96%</td>
<td>26,255</td>
<td>51.47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

400. This is an approximation, because the boundaries of the districts are very similar, but not identical.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Districts</th>
<th>1910 Census</th>
<th>1920 Census</th>
<th>1930 Census</th>
<th>In present-day Romania (2002)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ethnically Romanian electoral districts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominantly Ukrainian electoral Districts</td>
<td>28,045</td>
<td>55.04%</td>
<td>24,727</td>
<td>48.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50,952</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50,952</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3C - The Number of Romanians and Eastern Slavs in Southern Bukovina According to the Censuses of 1930 and 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Groups</th>
<th>Southern Bukovinian Counties</th>
<th>Southern Bukovina (total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radauti</td>
<td>Campulung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930 Census</td>
<td>1941 Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians + Ruthenians + Russians</td>
<td>18,342</td>
<td>12,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutsuls</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>21,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Eastern Slavs</td>
<td>30,586</td>
<td>33,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Hutsuls/Eastern Slavs</td>
<td>40.03</td>
<td>63.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Slavic Proportion 1941/1930</td>
<td>110.21%</td>
<td>110.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>89,302</td>
<td>102,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians, Increase 1941/1930</td>
<td>115.69%</td>
<td>115.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>57,217</td>
<td>76,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted403</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

401 For the sake of consistency, this is done on the basis of the data of the Austrian census of 1910.
402 For the sake of consistency, this is done on the basis of the data of the Austrian census of 1910.
403 A piece of northern Transylvanian territory with 1,443 inhabitants, including 887 Romanians, was part of Campulung County in 1930, but became a part of Hungary in 1941, after the temporary return of northern Transylvanian to Hungary. Consult University Roumane de Cluj, Centre D’Etudes et de Recherches Relatives A la Transylvanie, *La Transylvanie* (Paris: Boivin et Cie, Editeurs, 1946), p. 116-117.
The dwindling number of individuals with a “Ruthenian” identity, a category that did not exist in the 1941 census, indicated a switch to a “Ukrainian” identity in the two northern counties (Cernauti and Storojinet), but sometimes to a “Hutsul” one in the south.\footnote{This pattern of a switch from a “Ruthenian/Rusnak” identity to a “Lemko” rather than to a “Ukrainian” identity was also characteristic of the Lemkos of Poland.} This was obviously not the case in the counties of Radauti and Campulung until after 1945. A Ukrainian identity was later imposed on the “Ruthenes/Rusyns” and “Hutsuls”, just as it was in Poland, Slovakia and Soviet Subcarpathian Ukraine.\footnote{The website “Limba Huțulă - Huțulschiă Izec” at http://hutzul.googlepages.com/home, created by a number of Hutsuls from Romania notes that “… the Hutsuls belong from the linguistic point of view to the group of the Ruthenians/Rusyns. The Hutsul language is spoken in Romania in the western part of Bukovina and Maramures, and in the mountainous parts of Ukraine, Slovakia and Poland. Even though it is similar to the Ukrainian language, it also displays some noticeable differences. In the last years, due to the minority policy applied by the Romanian state, the teaching of the Ukrainian language in the localities where important communities of Hutsuls live has become compulsory. The direct consequence (of this) is a modification of the Hutsul dialect toward the official Ukrainian language within certain communities that have always considered themselves distinct from the Ukrainian community. If rapid efforts for the recovery of the words of the Hutsul language, which is fluently spoken only by the old, will not be made, the next generation of Hutsuls from Bukovina will be assimilated by the Ukrainians from Romania and the linguistic traditions of the area will be lost.”}

Among the self-styled “Hutsuls” of present-day southern Bukovina under Romanian rule, Ukrainian nationalist candidates started to be electorally mildly successful only during the post-Communist period after 1989. This was largely because the Ukrainian-language schools after World War II taught them that they were ethnic Ukrainians. The “Ruthenian” identity had universally become “politically incorrect” by 1941 in Romania. It reemerged starting in 2000 as a minority phenomenon in an expanded Suceava County including all of southern Bukovina. Its proponents obtained 21% of all the “Ukrainian” plus “Ruthenian” votes in 2004. Nevertheless, even in 2004, there were numerous localities with Romanian ethnic majorities with more votes for the Ruthenian candidate than for the Ukrainian one.\footnote{The electoral results for 2004 by locality are available at http://alegeri.referinte.transindex.ro/telepules.php.}

Overall, during most elections, a majority of the Ukrainians of the Cernauti and Storojinet counties voted predominantly for fully or partially Ukrainian, and more specifically Ukrainian nationalist, tickets. The Ukrainians of Radauti and Campulung counties consistently voted for explicitly exclusively Romanian (nationalistic) electoral lists. Most of them were not Ukrainian nationalists, and had a “Hutsul” identity in 1941. The Ukrainians of Suceava County voted mostly for tickets of minority nationalists in 1927, but not on other occasions during the interwar years.
2.2.2. Other Minorities

The official Romanian nationalistic tickets obtained not only the overwhelming majority of the votes of the ethnic Romanians, but those of some members of the ethnic minorities, including those of most southern Bukovinian inhabitants of non-Romanian ethnicities. The exceptions were the Jews in 1931-1933 and the Germans in 1927 and 1932. During the early 1930’s, most northern Bukovinian Jews supported various Jewish national forces united in a common electoral bloc.

The Romanian nationalistic parties obtained not only the support of the overwhelming majority of the votes of the ethnic Romanians, and of some ethnic Ukrainians, but also those of many, sometimes even most, members of other ethnic minorities in Bukovina. This was applicable in the case of the Poles (3.58%), as well as of some of the smaller ethnic minority groups (e.g., the Hungarians, with 1.39%). These minorities had never had their local nationalistic parties, and practically never voted for specific nationalistic tickets or factions of their ethnic groups. The members of these groups, including the Poles, who had supported the union with Romania in 1918, voted for various “Romanian patriotic tickets”. This was true even if they could choose German, German and Magyar, or “general minority” lists, as it was the case in 1927. The national ideology of the Bukovinian Poles, Magyars, Armenians, etc. prescribed “respect” for Romanian “historical rights” to the province.

The situation was different in the case of the Germans (8.86%) and Jews (10.91% by religion, 10.84% by “ethnicity”). The more traditionalist German party, the German Party of Romania (“Deutsche Partei in Rumanien”) and various German politicians, professed and preached loyalty toward Romania. The factions of the ethnic minority allied themselves with various Romanian parties, with the partial exception of the elections of 1937. At that time, a pro-Nazi German party, the German People’s Party of Romania (“Deutsche Volkspartei in Rumanien”) ran in the parliamentary elections alone. Paul Shapiro estimates that the German Party of Romania “gave” the political formation that it supported 7% of all Bukovinian votes in 1932 (the beneficiary was the National Peasant Party), a majority of the German

407. The Magyars were an exception in 1927.
408. Consult Scurtu et al., Enciclopedia de Istorie, p. 187-188.
ethnic vote, and 4% in 1933 (the beneficiary was the National Liberal Party).\textsuperscript{410}

A majority of the southern Bukovinian Germans also voted in favor of the ethnic minorities’ electoral ticket in 1927. This was due to their dissatisfaction toward the transformation of the German schools into Romanian-language schools in which the students were taught the German language for only 4-5 hours a week.\textsuperscript{411} The Germans not only spoke a different language and had a different culture than the ethnic Romanians, but also were predominantly Roman Catholic and to a lesser extent Lutheran. The fact that there were greater differences in the ethnic base between the Romanians and the Germans is significant. It partially explains the minimal ethnic Romanianization of the ethnic Germans as well as the significant level of support for German nationalism among the ethnic Germans. So does the tradition of German nationalism in Bukovina dating back to the Habsburg period, particularly in southern Bukovina.

The study of the case of the German minority indicates the importance of the educational system. The Ukrainian ethnonational education system was more nationalistic and more native language-oriented than the German one. This largely explains the greater intensity of Ukrainian nationalism in comparison to German nationalism. The same was also true in the case of the Jews. The Ukrainian ethnic basis was less distinct from the Romanian one than the German one, while the Jewish one was more different due to religious-cultural reasons. This indicates that the cultural distance between the ethnic groups played only a limited role. The Poles, Hungarians, etc., who were typically Western Christians, did not have schools or classes in their own language. Yet they were almost as different from the ethnic Romanians as the ethnic Germans were. These small minorities did not vote for ethnic minority electoral lists. This is also consistent with the view that an educational system in the language of an ethnic group, and promoting its nationalism, facilitates its nation-building.

The same was also true of most of the Jews. They voted for Jewish parties or factions that ran alone or in electoral combinations with the Romanian parties. In the two northern Bukovinian counties, most Jews voted for specifically Jewish nationalists in 1920 and in the 1930’s. This was also the case in the three southern counties in 1931-1933.

It has been assumed that the explanation for this phenomenon was the anti-Semitic wave that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{410} See Shapiro, p. 50-52. Shapiro attributes 6% of the total provincial vote in 1926 to the German and Magyar parties.
  \item \textsuperscript{411} Livezeanu, p. 68.
\end{itemize}
started in 1930, which undoubtedly sustained it. However, the view that the massive support for Jewish tickets started so late ignores most of the empirical evidence. One is reminded of the Jewish electoral nationalism during the Habsburg period and during the entire Romanian period including in the elections of 1919 and 1920, when there were separate electoral tickets.

A large majority of the Jewish population in most Bukovinian urban areas started to vote solidly Jewish nationalist, and more specifically Zionist, in the municipal council elections in 1929. This was foreshadowed by the Zionist victory in the Jewish community council elections of 1928 in Cernauti, the provincial capital. At that time, anti-Semitism was at its lowest during the interwar period. The opposition to the decrease in the number of state Jewish schools was the strongest. In the old Zionist stronghold of Suceava, where the Jewish population of 3,751 formed 36% of the inhabitants, the Zionist parties obtained 38% of the votes for the municipal council in 1929.412 In this case, support for Zionism was strong more due to opposition against assimilation (Romanianization through the schools) than due to resistance against anti-Semitism. One could conclude that the success at the ballot box of the Jewish nationalists was made possible by an ethnic basis that facilitated this.

The Jewish ethnic basis discussed above included several elements. These were the Yiddish language, a belief that the Jews were not merely a religious group, but also an ethnic nation, and Orthodox Judaism. These characteristics were shared by the overwhelming majority of the individuals of Jewish faith in Bukovina. The National Jewish Party did the least well in 1931 and subsequently in Cernauti County. This is explained by the fact that larger proportions of the Jews in the city and county than in any other areas of the province used German as their mother-tongue and were either secular or practiced Reform Judaism.

This view is also supported by the Jewish community council elections. The 1929 elections for the board of the Jewish Community Council of the city of Cernauti are revealing. The Zionists polled 25%, whereas 17% of the electors were sympathetic toward a “Jewish socialist” vision, the Socialist Bund. The National Peasants’ Party obtained 22%, the National Liberal Party 9%, and other lists 27%.413 An analysis of the electoral data indicates that the vote for Jewish nationalistic candidates overlaps in terms of

geography and chronology not with the presence of the most intense anti-Semitism (it was mostly quite the opposite). It matched more with a strong Jewish ethnic basis, resistant to assimilation and acculturation.

The Romanian nationalistic parties obtained not only the overwhelming majority of the votes of the ethnic Romanians, but those of some members of the ethnic minorities, including those of most non-Romanian southern Bukovinians. The exceptions were the Jews in 1931-1933 and the Germans in 1927 and 1932. Many, often most, northern Bukovinian Ukrainians and, in the early 1930’s, most northern Bukovinian Jews supported the national movements of their respective ethnic groups. Overall, the ethnic basis played a key role in explaining the voting patterns and the intensity of nationalism of various minority sub-populations.

3.1. The Educational System

3.1.1. The General Impact

The Romanian educational system seems to have facilitated the spread of what one might call Romanian patriotism (nationalism on the integrative and satisfactional dimensions) among numerous ethnic non-Romanians, but only to a limited extent. This development helps explain the rise of the intensity of nationalism in voting in both northern and southern Bukovina. This was the case not merely among ethnic Romanians. It was also the case among the relatively non-ethnonationalistic minority inhabitants. The trend promoted the increase in the intensity of all dimensions of Romanian nationalism among ethnic Romanians. The schools could not disseminate a Romanian identity or Romanian symbols, or any other aspect of Romanian nationalism if the teachers of the schools and the parents were immersed in a different nationalism. In the other contexts, it promoted the intensification of the ethnonationalism of the minority populations. This happened particularly among the ethnic minority inhabitants who had educational opportunities in their own national language and in their own nationalistic spirit.

The preponderance of the available data does suggest that spread of education helped Romanian nation-building as much as expected, even if not as much as during the Austrian period. To the extent to which it has done that, it was partly due to the chronological factor. The younger generation was educated in Greater Romania, in a more nationalistic environment.
If the issue is analyzed geographically, and in terms of the ages of the electorate, one observes a few patterns. The older people over 40 more often than not voted in a more intensely nationalistic manner than the younger voters. This was particularly true during the last elections (1932-1937). This does not constitute disconfirming evidence for my model. The voters for the Senate were over 40 years of age. These inhabitants were more literate than the voters for the lower house below 40, as counter-intuitive as this may sound. The complexity of the situation does make the conclusions on this issue more tentative than on other issues.

The Romanian educational system facilitated the spread of what one might call Romanian patriotism (nationalism on the integrative and satisfactional dimensions) among numerous ethnic non-Romanians who were not particularly ethnonationalistic. This trend was especially pronounced among the Poles and the self-styled “Hutsuls”. It also helped in reinforcing loyalty among inhabitants of other ethnic groups. The school system did not have this impact only among the population of school age. Yet the non-Romanian inhabitants who sympathized with non-Romanian ethnonationalist movements were not greatly affected by the inculcation of Romanian patriotism through the schools.

The facilitation of Romanian nation-building by the educational system in Bukovina has already been documented by Irina Livezeanu. She focused more on individuals of minority ethnicities than on ethnic Romanians. Livezeanu has also indicated that in some respects, its impact was limited. I share this view.414 It facilitated some assimilation to the Romanian nation, overwhelmingly among bilinguals, typically Romanian-Ukrainian bilinguals. It helped in the retention of a Romanian identity among ethnic Romanians whose mother-tongue was not Romanian. Livezeanu also documents the fact that the higher reaches of the educational system also produced more intense nationalism, including national extremism.

The percentage of the literate population increased faster in Bukovina than in any other Romanian province between 1910 and 1930, with roughly 10.25% per decade. It went up from to 45.2% to 65.7%.415 One could safely estimate that the percentage of the provincial (male) electorate that was literate increased from less than 60% in 1919 to more than 80% in 1937. The percentages of literate inhabitants in Bukovina in 1930 by county were the ones shown in the table 3CL below. While the proportion by ethnicities and counties does not seem to be available, it is obvious that a number of electoral patterns are

414. See Irina Livezeanu, passim.
415. See Sandru, Populatia Rurala, p. 169, 177.
consistent with the data. For example, the more literate minority populations of Cernăuți County were more likely to support early on the nationalism of their ethnic groups than the less literate ones of Storojinet County.

The Romanian interwar school statistics are not always plentiful. Fortunately enough, a special investigation conducted in 1931-1932 does give us a fuller picture. In that year, 74.8% of the registered Bukovinian students attended school regularly, 61.42% were promoted, and 11.8% finished either the fourth or the eighth grade. About 27% of them were in first grade in 1931-1932. If everyone would have passed, only roughly 16.42% should have been in the first grade in 1932-1933. This would mean that the rate of promotion was roughly similar for the first grade and for subsequent grades. In 1932-1933, only 67.6% of all school-age students were registered, and only 59.1% of them, or 39.91% of the total, passed the grade. In fact, the percentage of registered students who were passing the grade changed from 71.23% in 1925-1926, 68.53% in 1927-1928, 68.69% in 1928-1929, 67.46% in 1929-1930, 65.80% in 1930-1931, 61.52% in 1931-1932 and 59.1% in 1933-1934.

Those who were graduating either the fourth or eighth grade was 5.34% in 1927-1928, 4.54% in 1928-1929, 11.26% in 1929-1930, 11.95% in 1930-1931, 11.8% in 1931-1932 and 11.87% in 1932-1933. The explanation of the decrease in the proportion of students who were passing the grade is the increasingly lax attendance. The increasing graduation rates were caused by a “bump” in the performance of the system in the middle of the 1920’s, just like in the other provinces of Romania. This was probably due to the Angelescu Law of 1925. This statute was criticized extensively and correctly by the ethnic minority activists due to its emphasis on education in Romanian at the expense of minority languages.

Table 3C1. Literacy Statistics for Bukovina, by County, Region and Gender, According to the Censuses of 1930 and 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1930 Census (percentages)</th>
<th>1948 Census (percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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416. See Enciclopedia de Istorie, p. 343, 377.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bukovina(^{419})</th>
<th>72.2</th>
<th>59.7</th>
<th>65.7</th>
<th>NA (Not Applicable)(^{420})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counties (1925-1944)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campulung</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cernauți</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radauti</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storojinet</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suceava</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Bukovina(^{421})</td>
<td>2/3(^{422}) (proportion)</td>
<td>83.5(^{423})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Qualitative table 3 F’ – The Interaction of the Linguistic Base with the Educational System in Bukovina (also for Other Chapters)

A ____ language population plus a(n) ____ school in the ____ language often led to a ______ linguistic identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Native Language</th>
<th>School System</th>
<th>Language of Education</th>
<th>Final Linguistic Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Pre-1918 and interwar</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Romanian (always)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
<td>(in Bessarabia)</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>interwar</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>interwar</td>
<td>Romanian, with Ukrainian language taught too</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, the “performance” of the educational system was for a period until 1925 less impressive in some respects than under Austrian rule.\(^{424}\) How was it possible to have both such an educational system that “took its time to get off the ground” and significant increases in literacy? The answer lies in something that has not been studied in detail and for which I have not found extensive statistical data, namely the adult schools in the army barracks. The higher-than-average intensity of nationalism during some Senate elections, and particularly those of 1932-1937 was partly caused by this.

\(^{419}\) This refers to the five counties of Bukovina.

\(^{420}\) “NA” means that the numbers are not available for the respective territorial unit.

\(^{421}\) This refers to the area of Bukovina that stayed under Romanian rule in 1940-1941 and from 1944 onward, that was never annexed by the USSR.

\(^{422}\) The proportion is estimated based on the data for the three southern Bukovinian counties, a small part of one of which (Radauti) went to the Soviet Union in 1940. The borders of the units for which there is data are not identical.

\(^{423}\) This still refers to the old, pre-Communist counties, rather than to the present-day county of Suceava, which was inherited from the Communist period and which includes a few neighboring non-Bukovinian localities.

\(^{424}\) Among other things, the Romanian authorities were less tough in enforcing the fining of the parents who did not send their children to school than the Austrian ones.
Since going to adult night schools in the army barracks has been perceived as shameful, the subject has been largely taboo. Yet in this way, without being graded, many older people learned what they should have learned as kids.

The educational system was influenced by the interface between “generation” and education. Thus, a child born in the period between mid-1917 and mid-1918 or soon thereafter, who did go to school starting in 1925, would have been much more likely than his predecessors to graduate elementary school in 1929 or soon thereafter (most Bukovinian ethnic Romanians did). He or she would reach the age of political mobilization in the middle of the 1930’s. Without a right to vote in 1937, many of these young people would campaign for the Legion of the Archangel Michael in 1937. This had something to do with the growing intensity of Romanian electoral nationalism in Bukovina in 1937.

In northern Bukovina, the (rural) older male citizens over 40 more often than not seemed to vote for more intensely Romanian nationalistic tickets than the younger inhabitants. This was true in 1920 and 1922. In the two overwhelmingly minority northern counties, the older generation of the minority inhabitants, particularly among the ethnic Ukrainians, was more likely to vote for more intensely nationalistic Romanian tickets at the expense of minority tickets and socialists in 1920 and 1922, due to a less intense minority, typically Ukrainian, nationalism. Subsequently, some of the Romanianizing measures in the educational system politicized the older, more passive Ukrainian population against these measures. It therefore facilitated an increase in the intensity of Ukrainian nationalism among them.

Yet this pattern also operated in the overwhelmingly Romanian southern Bukovinian counties, largely because the older individuals were more likely to be literate than the younger individuals. This does indeed sound counter-intuitive. However, the census of 1948 shows that the individuals over 50 were more likely to be literate than younger folks. Thus, in Romania as a whole in its January 25, 1948 borders, including southern Bukovina, 32.7% of the inhabitants between 30 and 49 years of age, who had formed the younger part of the electorate in 1937, were illiterate. By contrast, among the 50-64 year-old group, who were 39-53 years old in 1937, the figure was 23.9%. In the 65-year plus group, the figure was

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425. This was partly because many of its members remembered a time when the members of the group called themselves “Ruthenians” rather than “Ukrainians”.
426. See Livezeanu, p. 65.
The explanations for this pattern are the adult schools as well as the higher life expectancy of the more literate inhabitants.

The impact of the educational system might have been important in a different way. The children whose education had taken place completely or predominantly under Romanian rule were turning 21, and therefore were obtaining the right to vote starting in the early 1930’s. This pattern helps account for the increasing intensity of the nationalism of the electorate, and for the massive successful recruiting for the fascist Legion of the Archangel Michael among the young. The rise in the intensity of nationalism scores characteristic of the elections starting in 1932 (1931 in southern Bukovina) was caused by the addition to the electorate of a new generation, educated in a more intensely nationalistic spirit in the schools of Greater Romania.

The available evidence presented in the previous chapters show clear evidence of Romanian nation-building. We have looked at the cases of students and of other individuals who were objectively ethnic Romanians, and counted in the Austrian censuses as Romanian-speakers, developed a Romanian national identity that did not exist previously. By contrast, no such evidence could be obtained for the interwar period. The ethnic Romanians were overwhelmingly nationalized, in a proportion much larger than 90%, by the beginning of the period.

Ethnic Romanian children typically learned that they were Romanians at home. National identity and nationalism was learned as a part of “primii sapte ani de acasa” (the first seven years at home), as a part of “good manners”. A factor that allows us to infer this is the fact that by the interwar period, all the legends in Bukovina were calling the Romanian “Romanians”, not “Moldovans”, “Christians” or something else. The fact that the teaching of national identity among ethnic Romanians would occur at home and in the church was taken for granted. Since it was seen as normal, and ordinary, it was treated as axiomatic. Since the process was perceived as automatic and since there was no perceived change, its exact mechanisms through which this occurred were not discussed in depth in any source consulted by this author. The interwar history textbooks did not promote concepts of national superiority, but only, in subtle yet persistent ways, Romanian national pride. It might very well be that the home was already the key

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428. What is documented is that some children developed Romanian national pride in school. This was one
The available data does suggest that the educational system seems not to have helped Romanian nation-building for a period of time to a large extent, or as much as during the Austrian period. However, it enhanced rather than hindered Romanian nation-building, and it had a great impact at the end of the period. To the extent to which it did, this was due to the temporal factor, including the more intense nationalism of the younger generation educated mostly in Greater Romania.

The Romanian educational system seems to have facilitated the spread of what one might call Romanian patriotism (nationalism on the integrative and satisfacational dimensions) among numerous ethnic...
non-Romanians. This promoted the increasing intensity of Romanian nationalism in both northern and southern Bukovina among Hutsuls, Poles, etc. Even more importantly, it facilitated the increase in the intensity of Romanian nationalism among ethnic Romanians on all dimensions.

3.1.2. The Educational System’s Inability to Induce the Assimilation of the Ethnic Minority Populations

The favorable impact of the educational system on nation-building on the identificational dimension was more limited. The educational system could not, and often did not, attempt to assimilate as members of the Romanian ethnic nation the inhabitants who were clearly members of non-Romanian ethnic groups.

The success of the attempt to turn into ethnic Romanians the members of other ethnicities, and particularly the Ukrainians, who were not fluent in Romanian in 1918, or the descendants of such individuals, was limited. As Irina Livezeanu notes, this is shown by the census data. Not even the educational system could help very much, largely because most elementary schools in the compactly Ukrainian areas were so, as we shall see, only on paper, at least during most of the interwar period. The internal documents of the Romanian Ministry of Education paint a similar picture. Moreover, there were numerous cases of mostly minority schools in the compact Ukrainian minority areas in which most of the teaching was done in minority languages by minority ethnonationalist teachers. What was being built was another specific ethnic nation, the Ukrainian one.

An exception to the “no nationalization rule” refers to some of the individuals who were bilingual speakers of Romanian and a minority language, typically Ukrainian. They had thought of themselves as “Austrians”, “Bukovinians”, etc. These identities were in the process of disappearing. The mechanics of this process are incompletely understood, but its effects were real and measurable, as we have seen. There were also the inhabitants who were the products of mixed marriages, etc. Many “ambiguous ethnics” on the Romanian-Ukrainian ethnic borderline were nationalized in a Romanian direction, and some in a Ukrainian direction. However, this was not genuine assimilation, because these individuals could change their de

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431. See Livezeanu, p. 65-68 and passim.
432. See Livezeanu, p. 66-68, 75-78 and passim for Bukovina and p. 119-120 for Bessarabia.
facto multiple identity “depending on the situation”. The educational system perhaps helped these people learn how to “seem Romanian”. Yet the circumstances, not the schools, “made them do it”. The table 3D below indicates that a number of individuals who called themselves “Romanians” in 1930 probably declared themselves “Ukrainians” or “Hutsuls” in 1941.433

Does the educational system help explain these patterns? In some areas, the Ukrainians, including those who identified themselves as “Hutsuls”, tended to be too few and scattered to have any schooling in their own language. Their numbers decreased, partly because they were educated exclusively in Romanian. This was a typical pattern in Campulung County, where in 1941, there were only 25% as many Eastern Slavs as in 1930 (see Table 3D).

By contrast, wherever they were concentrated (or lived in compact areas) and the de facto language of the schools was Ukrainian, regardless of the laws, as in many parts of Storojinet County, including in the Vascauti area, the Ukrainians “assimilated” some “census Romanians” even during the interwar period of Romanian rule.434 The Ukrainian element was also increasing much faster than the Romanian one in two of the three southern Bukovinian counties between 1930 and 1941 (see Table 3D). The same was also true in one of the two northern ones. The numbers also increased faster in the northern part of the Romanian county of Radauti, which came under Soviet control in 1940, than in the county as a whole.

Table 3D: The Number of Romanians and Eastern Slavs in Southern Bukovina According to the Censuses of 1930 and 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Cernauti (Us)</th>
<th>Storojinet (Us)</th>
<th>Northern Bukovina</th>
<th>All of Bukovina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930 Census</td>
<td>1941 Census</td>
<td>1930 Census</td>
<td>1941 Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Romanians</td>
<td>78,589</td>
<td>81,877</td>
<td>57,595</td>
<td>58,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>104.18</td>
<td>104.18</td>
<td>101.32</td>
<td>101.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

433. To be sure, the Table 3D exaggerates the magnitude of the phenomenon, because the ethnic Romanians were more likely to be victims of Soviet repression than the ethnic Ukrainians.
434. See Livezeanu, p. 67.
435. “Us” refers to Ukrainian-language schooling within a Ukrainian nationalist school environment.
Therefore, the Ukrainian population was increasing about as fast as one would demographically expect between 1930 and 1941, but only in those localities in which there was some Ukrainian-language teaching. Sometimes, this happened even at the attraction of individuals who were intersubjectively Ukrainians who had declared that they were “Romanians” in 1930. This explains why in many areas of southern and northern Bukovina, the Ukrainian population increased faster than the Romanian one despite a lower birth rate. This partly accounts for the increase of the Ukrainian population in Suceava County by 218.89\% between the two Romanian censuses. (Another factor was the fact that a number of ethnic Ukrainians had fled from northern Bukovina to the city of Suceava.) In the opposite direction, some bilingual ethnic Ukrainians re-identified themselves as Romanians between 1930 and 1941, as some 75\% of the Ukrainians in Campulung County did.\textsuperscript{436}

\textsuperscript{436} The Ukrainian-language education was more or less missing during a part of the 1920’s, but not from 1930 onward until the present. This partly explains why in 1941, there were more self-declared ethnic Ukrainians than expected based on the previous Romanian decennial census. These developments also
We need to account for the increase in the number of ethnic Romanians from 273,254 in 1910 to 379,691 and the decrease in the number of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians (see Tables 3D and 3E)\textsuperscript{437} from 305,101 to 256,535 between 1910 and 1930. One observes the increase of the Romanian percentage from 34.4\% in 1910 to 44.5\% by nationality and to 41.1\% by language in 1930. There was a decrease of the Ukrainian and Russian population from 38.4\% in 1910 to 27.7\% by nationality and 32.9\% by language in 1930. Since the numbers of Ukrainians increased faster than the numbers of Romanians between 1919 and 1941, the explanation for the major decrease in the number of Ukrainians was the sudden shock of 1918.

The institutional Romanianization of the Bukovinian schools did not have too much of an impact. Numerous ethnic Ukrainian elementary schools, and often the schools of the other ethnic groups (Jewish, but especially German and Polish), were Romanianized in terms of teaching language, at least on paper, during the mid-1920’s. The techniques of Romanianization were interesting. The process started earlier in some of those regions which were mostly, but not overwhelmingly, Ukrainian, in which most schools had been Ukrainian. In those regions, the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists and socialist separatists won only very small minorities of the votes in the elections of 1920 (and 1922). These included the rural Cernauti County, as distinct from the city, and Vascauti County.

By 1922, there were already more Romanian schools and classes in these districts than Ukrainian ones.\textsuperscript{438} By contrast, in the districts in which the Ukrainian nationalists overwhelmingly won the elections of 1920 (Cotmani, Zastavna and Vijnita), the educational conditions were similar with those during the Habsburg period, with large numbers of Ukrainian schools and no Romanian schools as late as 1923.\textsuperscript{439}

Table 3E: The Number of Romanians and Eastern Slavs in the Romanian and Soviet Parts of Radauti County According to the Censuses of 1930 and 1941

probably brought the numbers of Romanians and Ukrainians more in line with the population of the respective mother tongues in 1930. However, the mother-tongue statistics for 1941 have not been published.\textsuperscript{437} The Russian-speakers declared that they had a “Ruthenian” native tongue in 1910.\textsuperscript{438} In the rural Cernauti County, in 1918, there were 63 schools, out of which 20 were Romanian schools, 35 Ukrainian ones, 7 German-language and 1 Polish. The numbers of classes were 59, 109, 31 and 2. In 1922, there were 59 schools, out of which 38 were Romanian, 17 Ukrainian, 2 German and 2 Polish. The number of classes was 206 overall, and 138, 55, 7 and 6 in the four languages. In Vascauti County, in 1918, there were 36 schools, 29 of which were Ukrainian. None of them was Romanian, and seven were in other languages. In 1922, out of 37 schools, 17 were Romanian, 13 Ukrainian and 7 Polish or German-Jewish. See Livezeanu, p. 64.\textsuperscript{439} See Livezeanu, p. 64-65.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>The Northern Part of Radauti County (under Soviet rule in 1940-1941)</th>
<th>The Southern Part of Radauti County (under Romanian rule in 1940-1941)</th>
<th>Radauti County (All)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930 Census</td>
<td>1941 Census</td>
<td>1930 Census</td>
<td>1941 Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Romanians</td>
<td>12,804</td>
<td>12,920</td>
<td>76,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage, 1941 over 1930</td>
<td>100.91</td>
<td>100.91</td>
<td>117.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians (or Russians)</td>
<td>9,883</td>
<td>11,550</td>
<td>8,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>67.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians + Russians, percentage in 1941 over 1930</td>
<td>116.98</td>
<td>9.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutsuls (estimated)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>&lt;6,767</td>
<td>&gt;14,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Slavs</td>
<td>&lt;18,328</td>
<td>&gt;15,342</td>
<td>30,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Slavs, percentage 1941 over 1930</td>
<td>&lt;36.92</td>
<td>&lt;94.94</td>
<td>40.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The calls of some Romanian officials on the ground for the transformation of the Bukovinian Ukrainian schools into Romanian schools in 1923 led to this transformation during the period from 1923 until 1927.\(^{440}\) In 1923, the Ukrainian high school in Cernauti was romanianized, in the sense that the Ukrainian language became only an elective course.\(^{441}\) The Ukrainian language was largely eliminated from the school system. This was done based on the pretext that most of the Ukrainians were in fact “Romanians who had lost the native tongue of their ancestors”\(^{442}\).

\(^{440}\) See Livezeanu, p. 65.
\(^{441}\) See Livezeanu, p. 70-71. The Polish high school in the same city was closed.
\(^{442}\) See Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Seattle: University of Washington Pres, 1998), p. 602. By contrast, the situation of the southern Bessarabian Ukrainians, who colonized Bessarabia after Russia annexed it in 1812 and were not alleged to be of Romanian ancestry, was better. “During the interwar years, the Ukrainians in southern Bessarabia were permitted to have their own elementary schools (120), a few cooperatives, and representatives in the Romanian parliament. Whereas Ukrainians in southern Bessarabia enjoyed minimal cultural and national rights, the situation in northern Bukovina was virtually the opposite”. See Magocsi, *History*, p. 600.
Its importance in schools with numerous Ukrainian students had started to increase again in 1930. This was due to some arrangements between some local Ukrainian politicians and Romania’s National Peasant parliamentary majority and governments of 1928-1931. The subject was taught only 4 to 6 hours a week in localities with large numbers of Ukrainians. The process was supervised by two Ukrainian inspectors (superintendents) starting in 1931. Ukrainians also established numerous private schools, which were attended by one-quarter to one-half of the students in some overwhelmingly Ukrainian regions of northern Bukovina. Another reason for this change was the fact that Ukrainian nationalism was by then affecting some individuals who had previously not been affected by it. Identificational and symbolic Romanization had backfired. It was therefore partially rolled back.

The educational system could not, and often it did not attempt to, assimilate into the Romanian ethnic nation the inhabitants who were clearly members of non-Romanian ethnic groups.

3.1.3. Ethnic Educational Experiences of Diaspora Minorities and Their Impact: Jews and Poles

The electoral success of the Jewish Party and of other Jewish national tickets was significant. It was only partly related to the “strong” Jewish ethnic basis that helped Jewish nation-building. Most Jewish children were educated in a more intensely Jewish nationalistic spirit than previous cohorts were. This partly explains the Jewish nationalist electoral successes of the 1930’s. By contrast, the Poles, who did not have opportunities for a high school education in Polish institutions starting in 1923, and a less “ethnonationalizing” school environment voted overwhelmingly for Romanian nationalistic parties. Their activists never joined ethnic minority coalitions.

The electoral successes of the Jewish nationalists were not related exclusively to the “strong” Jewish ethnic basis that helped Jewish nation-building. They were also due to the ethnic, mainly private, educational system that served a large majority of the Jewish school-age population. The latter was educated in a more intensely Jewish nationalistic spirit than previous cohorts had been. It also voted in a

444. See Livezeanu, p. 68, 76-77. Similar practices had also been applicable in the case of the schools of the German minority by 1923. The Germans were seen as loyal and supported the party or coalition in power, and were not alleged to be of Romanian descent. There were four or five hours of teaching in German.
more intensely nationalistic manner. By contrast, the Poles, who had a relatively low level of ethnonationalism and who did not have opportunities for a high school education in Polish institutions starting in 1923, voted for Romanian national parties. Their activists never joined ethnic minority coalitions.

The individual members of the Jewish minority were the targets of more hostility from inhabitants of other ethnicities than the members of any other minority except for the Roma/Gypsies were. However, unlike in the case of any other minority, most members of this ethnic and religious group could still get a sufficiently Jewish national education during the entire period under review. It was a more often a more thoroughly Jewish national education than it was customary during the Habsburg period. It occurred in either public or, more commonly, in private, typically religious, schools. The students were exposed not only to the Jewish religion as a subject taught intensively in school. In the overwhelming majority of cases, they were also exposed to a pro-Zionist curriculum and to pro-Zionist teachers.

The Romanian authorities were favorably inclined toward the Jewish nationalist attempt to reverse the Germanization of the Jews. The Jewish high school in Cernauti officially stopped teaching in German and switched to Romanian and Hebrew. Pro-Zionist activists, including certain Bukovinian Jewish parliamentarians, had first promoted the teaching in Hebrew. The latter had been elected on predominantly Romanian nationalistic tickets, as the allies of certain Romanian nationalistic factions. The Romanian officials had not initiated the move. The teaching in the ancient language of the Jewish people must be seen as a sweet pill for some Jews that went together with a bitter pill, namely that the rest of the teaching should be in Romanian as opposed to German. The same change also occurred in the Jewish elementary schools.


446. The Bukovinian Jews were able to retain a Jewish school system and Jewish national education because they had Bukovinian Jewish parliamentarians. The need for a national education for Jews was linked to electoral support and a parliamentary platform for politicians such as Benno Straucher, who brought up educational issues in parliamentary speeches and letters to the prime ministers. The Romanian state authorities were not altogether happy with the content of the education in Jewish ethnic private institutions, and the Romanian state certainly discriminated against the Jewish religious community more than against any other traditional religion in the allotment of money. Just like in the cases of the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist and other minority religious schools, typically in Transylvania, minority ethnic nationalism in denominational schools was tolerated, but was a factor in the granting of smaller subsidies to the respective denominations in comparison to more “favored denominations”. The latter included the
By contrast, the smaller Polish ethnic minority overwhelmingly attended public schools. It typically voted for Romanian nationalistic parties, or, in very few cases, for the Socialist tickets. One of the reasons of this pattern was the lower intensity of ethnonationalism. Another one was the more “Romanian” educational experiences of the ethnic Poles in schools, particularly at the high school level, in comparison to the Ukrainians, Jews and Germans. The latter groups could get a somewhat “ethno-specific” high school education in separate schools.

In 1923, the Polish high school in the provincial capital was romanianized. Its students were transferred to the Romanian Lycee (High School) No. 1. Some opportunities for learning the Polish language in elementary schools continued to exist, just like in the cases of the Germans. Yet they were more limited because the Poles did not live in compact areas. Even so, in Poiana Micului, in Campulung County, the local Slovaks wrote a memorandum complaining that the local priests and teachers were trying to polonize them. The Polish minority did originally have certain grievances, but it was never irredentist. The group never supported “all-minority tickets”, as in 1927 in the province as a whole and in the Cernauti by-election of 1931. Due to this and its early, enthusiastic and unconditional support for the union of Bessarabia and Bukovina with Romania in 1918, its members, just like the Turks and Tatars, were seen as a “loyal” minority. It benefited from equal civil rights, from the absence of official discrimination. Even several streets in Cernauti were named after Polish national heroes. The situation of some very small minorities, such as Czechs, Slovaks, Armenians, Italians, etc., was similar to that of the Poles, except for the fact that, due to their small size, they never had opportunities to learn their ethnic languages in schools.

The electoral success of the Jewish Party and of other Jewish national tickets was only partly related...
to the “strong” Jewish ethnic basis that helped Jewish nation-building. Most Jewish children were educated in a more intensely Jewish nationalistic spirit than previous cohorts were. This partly explains the Jewish nationalist electoral successes of the 1930’s. By contrast, the Poles, who did not have opportunities for a high school education in Polish institutions starting in 1923, and a less “ethnonationalizing” school environment voted overwhelmingly for Romanian nationalistic parties. Their activists never joined ethnic minority coalitions.

3.1.4. The School Atmosphere and Minority, Especially Ukrainian, Nation-Building

Regardless of what the situation might have been formally or officially, a majority of the Ukrainian teachers in public schools taught in the Ukrainian language. Overall, there were several types of schools in which teaching was conducted in Ukrainian, particularly during the period after 1930. All of them helped in the retention of the Ukrainian language, prevented Romanianization, etc., between 1919 and 1941. Only the state and private schools in which numerous teachers were Ukrainian could a “Ukrainian national” atmosphere help sustain Ukrainian nationalism. In the other schools attended by ethnic Ukrainians, the teaching was mostly in Romanian, mostly not done by Ukrainian nationalist teachers. The Ukrainian-language summer schools for those in mostly-Romanian schools did not serve a very large number of individuals.450

The members of the ethnic minorities were underrepresented in the teaching profession, but that teachers of those ethnicities were still numerous in northern Bukovina. Most of these non-ethnic Romanian teachers, typically teachers in mostly Ukrainian areas, did not know the Romanian language by 1934. Thus, in Storojinet County, the Romanians represented 34.1% of the population in 1930. Out of 339 teachers, 110 (32.45%) were members of the national minorities. Moreover, ‘almost half of that number “knew the Romanian language hardly at all.”451 In Cernauti County, 180 (35.43%) out of 508 (public school) teachers were not ethnic Romanians, and 105 (20.67% of all teachers, and 58.33% of the minority teachers) did not know the Romanian language.452

450. See Hausleitner, passim.
451. See Livezeanu, p. 66.
452. See Livezeanu, p. 66.
In 1922-1924, in mostly Ukrainian areas such as Vijnita and in 1934, in mostly Ukrainian areas such as Vascauti, according to a Romanian school principal, “the overwhelming majority of the teachers there still did not know Romanian and “worked openly against our state interests.” A large majority of the ethnic Ukrainian students in overwhelmingly Ukrainian localities in compact areas with a Ukrainian majority were in fact taught mostly in the Ukrainian language and in a Ukrainian national spirit during most of the interwar period.

In the mostly Ukrainian areas, primarily in the old Austrian and early interwar districts of Cotmani, Zastavna, Vijnita and Vascauti, Ukrainian nation-building continued. This was possible thanks to the Ukrainian current and retired teachers and Orthodox priests, who also taught religion. These local notables were called in some Romanian internal documents “the most ardent adversaries of everything that is Romanian”. Instead of the Romanians assimilating Ukrainian teachers and students after 1930, in the overwhelmingly Ukrainian areas, individuals of ambiguous ethnicity who declared a Romanian identity in the 1919-1930 censuses switched to a Ukrainian identity.

The calls of the 1920’s for the replacement of the Ukrainian teachers and priests with Romanians had not been implemented to any large extent in the compact Ukrainian areas. This helped sustain Ukrainian nationalism. This explains the emergence in these areas of a cohort of young, intensely nationalistic Ukrainians who had reached physical maturity by 1941.

No problems with Ukrainian irredentists were reported during the interwar period in southern Bukovina, or could be inferred from the electoral results. This was even true for the Ukrainians of Suceava County, most of whom voted for the Cartel of Magyar and German Parties in 1927. There was much less Ukrainian secessionism in these areas than in the two northern Bukovinian counties, and this separatism was a minority phenomenon among the local members of the ethnic group.

These patterns of successful Ukrainian nation-building of northern Bukovina were not applicable in other areas, and more precisely in the “Hutsul areas” of southern Bukovina. This happened not in the least because a larger proportion of the teachers in these localities (in most places, a majority) were ethnic

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453. See Livezeanu, p. 66, 68.
454. See Livezeanu, p. 67-68.
455. See Livezeanu, p. 67-68.
456. Table 3D exaggerates the magnitude of the phenomenon, because the Romanians were more likely to be victims of Soviet repression than ethnic Ukrainians.
Romanians. In these areas, most Ukrainians knew the Romanian language. Because of the propitious ethnic basis discussed in a previous section and due to these educational patterns, the percentage of self-styled “Hutsuls” among all Ukrainians (including Hutsuls) in southern Bukovina increased from 32.83% to 52.88%. The absolute numbers of those who identified themselves as such increased from 12,434 to 22,425 between 1930 and 1941.

The original, historical “Hutsul” ethnic basis, including the use of the Hutsul dialect of the Ukrainian language, was undeniable. Yet it also existed in most of the northwestern Storojinet County. There were hardly any “Hutsuls” counted by the above-mentioned censuses in that area. However, the educational environments were different. There was a predominantly Ukrainian nationalist teaching corps in the northwest. Yet the teachers were mostly “Romanian patriots”, indeed mostly Romanian nationalists, in the predominantly Hutsul area of southwestern Bukovina.

The Romanian nationalist line, and the Hutsul ethnic activists’ line, was that the self-styled “Hutsuls” were not ethnic Ukrainians, but ethnic “Hutsuls”.457 In Suceava County, where the Ukrainian population was not part of the Hutsul sub-ethnic (and Hutsul dialect-speaking) group, no Hutsuls were counted in the 1930 or 1941 censuses. Therefore, the variation in the educational systems during the interwar period helped determine which Ukrainians from the Hutsul sub-ethnic group would identify or continue to identify themselves as Ukrainians, and which ones would identify or continue to identify themselves as “Hutsuls”. The ethnic basis determined which ethnic Ukrainians could not develop a “Hutsul” identity, and which ones could. Therefore, both independent variables were important in facilitating the emergence, reproduction and maintenance of a “Hutsul” identity.

Table 3 C – The Ukrainians: Ethnic Basis and Nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Basis (Ukrainian Dialect)</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Identity, 1899</th>
<th>Identity, 1911</th>
<th>Identity, 1941</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Separatism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bukovinian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Ruthenian, Ukrainian</td>
<td>Ukrainian, Ruthenian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Ukrainian, Strong</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukovinian</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Ruthenian, Ukrainian</td>
<td>Ukrainian, Ruthenian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Ukrainian, Weak; Romanian patrio-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

457. See Livezeanu, passim.
In addition to increasing nationalism among ethnic Romanians on all dimensions, the educational system also promoted patriotism (nationalism on the integrative and satisfactional dimensions) among some inhabitants of other ethnicities. It accomplished this most successfully mostly among the Poles, and, as we have seen, the Hutsuls, and, to a lesser extent, among the Germans. The German and Polish groups had favored union with Romania in 1918. The groups that had not been in favor of the union, the Ukrainians and Jews of northern Bukovina were rather resistant to this event.

Teaching was conducted in Ukrainian, particularly during the period after 1930 in two types of schools. Both of them helped in the retention of the Ukrainian language, prevented Romanianization, and even facilitated official switches from a Romanian to a Slavic identity during the period under review. Nevertheless, only the schools where most teachers were Ukrainian and in which the atmosphere was predominantly Ukrainian nationalist helped sustain Ukrainian nationalism. In the other schools, the teaching was mostly in Romanian, mostly not by Ukrainian nationalists, and the atmosphere tended to favor a “Hutsul” identity over a “Ukrainian” one.

### 3.1.5. Ascertaining Nation-Building through Educational and Demographic Statistics

The statistical data suggests that the educational system did not change the self-identification of significant numbers of children of individuals with an ethnic minority identity, including Ukrainian, to Romanian. It at most taught the children of self-declared Romanians of other mother-tongues the Romanian language.

The ethnic Romanians formed a larger proportion of the student body than of the population of Bukovina as a whole. This is shown by the 1919, 1924, 1930 and 1941 census data, which has been
presented above, and in the Tables 3E and 3’, which appear below. Since there were no “Ruthenian” or “Hutsul” statistical options, the children in the two categories were counted as Romanians. Granted that not everyone who had the right and the obligation to attend school attended it, the patterns in Table 3E are interesting. Around 59.83% of the rural school-age children were allegedly Romanians, in comparison to 56.46% of the parents of those who attended.

For Ukrainians, the figures were 26.72% and 27.61%. The census data suggests that the children of very few non-Romanians who declared themselves as such to the educational authorities “became” Romanians through exposure to the school system. This was to be expected based on my model, which emphasizes the nationalism of the educational system. The magnitude of the phenomenon is small, as expected.

The birth rate was substantially higher among ethnic Romanians, particularly in the rural areas. Thus, in 1931, the year immediately after the December 29, 1930 census, the birth rate by counties is the one presented in Table 3’. The generation of the rural school-age children had a higher ratio of Romanians to Ukrainians (2.24) than the ratio among the parents of these children by ethnicity (1.97). Due to the self-inclusion of the “Ruthenians” and “Hutsuls” into the “Romanian” category, the latter figure included more Romanians than the general population, including the grandparents’ generation (1.39) (see Table 3E).

There were a few individuals who identified themselves as being of Ukrainian (including “Ruthene” or “Hutsul” ancestry) in 1930 whose children were classified as being of Romanian nationality (“nationalitate”) in 1932-1933 (see Table 3E). This indicates a small amount of genuine Romanianization through the school system. Yet, at Table 3E indicates, there were many children who were identified as ethnic Romanians who did not know Romanian, more than one would expect based on the census data. In these cases, the ethnic basis predisposed them toward a Ukrainian identity, while the school authorities were pushing them in the direction of a Romanian identity. The 1941 census data shows the “victory” of the ethnic basis, while the Soviet and post-Soviet censuses in Bukovina show that the “Ukrainian-speaking Romanians” of 1930 and their descendants by then declared that they were Ukrainians.

458. Anuarul Statistic 1934, p. 43, 45, 52-53. Also see Valeanu, passim and Scurtu et al. Enciclopedia de Istorie a Romaniei, passim. The birth rates of the predominantly Romanian southern counties were higher, and the fact that the birth rates among the mostly Romanian Eastern Orthodox inhabitants were higher than among the overwhelmingly Ukrainian Greek Catholics is noteworthy. See Table 3’.

458.
Table 3’ - Demographic and Educational Statistics Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area or Population</th>
<th>Birth Statistics</th>
<th>School Statistics</th>
<th>Population statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural Rate</td>
<td>Total Rate</td>
<td>Percentage of births</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campulung</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cernauti</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radauti</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storojinet</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suceava</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Religions          |                  |                   |                       |                                   |                              |
|--------------------|                  |                   |                       |                                   |                              |
| Eastern Orthodox   | 84.6             | 33.3              | 79.3                  | 77.9                               | 71.9                          |
| Uniate (Greek Catholic) | 1.2         | 4.1               | 1.8                   | 1.8                                | 2.3                           |
| Roman Catholic     | 9.2              | 28.5              | 10.9                  | 11.1                               | 11.5                          |
| Lutheran           | 1.7              | 4.6               | 2.0                   | 2.0                                | 2.4                           |
| Calvinist          | 0.1              | 46.0              | 0.1                   | 0.0                                | 0.1                           |
| Lipovan            | 0.1              | 6.6               | 0.1                   | NA                                 | NA                            |
| Jewish             | 1.4              | 12.2              | 4.4                   | 7.0                                | 10.9                          |
| Total              | 33.3             | 30.8              | 100.0                 | 100.0                              | 100.0                         |

Table 3E: Population and Educational Statistics (by Ethnicity) Compared, Overall and For Rural Areas (1930-1933)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>1930 census</th>
<th>1932-1933 school age population</th>
<th>1930 census in rural areas</th>
<th>Counted school attendance (rural)</th>
<th>Registered (Nationality of the parents)(^{459})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>rural total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Ethnic Romans</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>55.55%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>59.83%</td>
<td>56.46% 52.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ethnic Ukrainians</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>24.58%</td>
<td>32.8% (35.1%)</td>
<td>26.72%</td>
<td>27.61% 25.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Romanian language</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>49.33%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>52.53%</td>
<td>NA NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ukrainian language</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>24.58%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>34.02%(^{460})</td>
<td>NA NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ratios (of rows)

|                |      |      |      |                  |                              |
|----------------|------|------|------|------------------|                              |
| 3/2            | 1.37 | 2.01 | 1.27 | 1.97\(^{461}\)  | NA                           |
| 3/4            | 1.20 | 1.61 | 1.13 | (1.54)\(^{462}\) | NA                           |

\(^{459}\) Of students who were attending elementary schools.

\(^{460}\) The author estimates this figure on the assumption that the "non-Romanian-speaking ethnic Romanians" were Ukrainian-speakers.

\(^{461}\) This calculates the proportion of Romanian-speakers divided by that of Ukrainians.

\(^{462}\) This calculates the proportion of Romanian-speakers divided by that of Ukrainians-speakers.
The official accounting of the students of school age in 1933 reveals that in the rural areas, there were 92,796 students (59.83% out of 155,089) who were classified as being of Romanian nationality by the school authorities. They included 11,327 students who did not know the Romanian language (12.21% of those identified as “Romanians”).\(^{464}\) In the urban areas, there were 10,290 students (33.77% of 30,469) who were listed as Romanians, out of which 217 (2.11%) did not know Romanian.\(^{465}\) There were 103,086 Romanian students (55.55% out of 185,558 Bukovinian students). Out of them, 11,544 did not know Romanian (11.20%), probably because they were mostly “Ruthenians” and “Hutsuls” rather than Romanians. Overall, 49.33% of all the students were ethnic Romanian Romanian-speakers, in comparison to roughly 41.1% of the total population.

According to the statistics, 88.05% of the rural male Romanian students allegedly knew Romanian, whereas only 87.53% of the females did. In the cities, the percentages were 98.04% for males and 97.74% for females. Whereas this could be partially due to chance, in all likelihood the fact that boys were more likely to attend school than girls, particularly in the urban areas, also seems to have played a role.

Out of 103,987 registered rural students in Bukovina in 1932-1933, 58,711 were Romanians (56.46%), 8,689 Germans (8.36%), 28,706 Ukrainians (27.61%), 2,137 Poles (2.06%), 2,985 Jews (2.87%) and so on.\(^{466}\) In the urban schools, there were 21,324 registered students, out of which 7,166 were Romanians (33.61%), 3,927 Germans (18.42%), 3,028 Ukrainians (14.2%), 1,238 Poles (5.81%) and 5,832 Jews (27.35%).\(^{467}\)

Unlike in the general population census of 1930, all the Jews by religion were listed as Jews by nationality. It is also very doubtful that any significant number of members of the ethnic groups that were typically Roman Catholic or traditionally Protestant identified themselves as ethnic Romanians. There was

\(^{463}\) This calculates the proportion of Romanian divided by that of Ukrainians.


\(^{465}\) Ibid.

\(^{466}\) Anuarul Statistic al Romaniei, 1934, p. 404-405.

no attempt to encourage such a process. In 1932-1933, in the urban areas, there were 5,179 students of the Western Christian religions (Roman Catholic, Reformed, Unitarian, Evangelical-Lutheran), and 5,242 members of the Western Christian ethnic groups (Italians, Germans, Hungarians, Poles and “Czechoslovaks”). The numbers of these groups in the rural areas were 12,843 by nationality and 11,236 by religion. It is likely that numerous Greek Catholic and Orthodox inhabitants of Ukrainian ethnicity defined themselves as the members of these ethnic groups.468

The chief cause of this discrepancy in the numbers was the overrepresentation of the Germans among urban schoolchildren (14.7% of the population, but 18.42% of the students), much too high for a population whose age was higher than average and had few children. A minority of the urban Ukrainians had an “Austrian” identity, and the parents in these families desired that the children should learn German in school. Therefore, their children were listed as “Germans”, particularly if they had German last names, as thousands of Bukovinian Ukrainians did.469

The results of the Romanian census of 1930 published during the interwar period did not indicate the number of individuals for whom the Romanian language was not their mother tongue also knew Romanian as a second language. However, the data has recently become available. Thus, in the county of Storojinet, out of 120,865 individuals with a non-Romanian mother tongue, 37,037 (30.6%) knew the Romanian language. In the county of Cernauti, the numbers were 239,010 and 92,118 (38.5%). The spreading of the knowledge of the Romanian language was especially visible in the cities; 70.5% of those with a non-Romanian native language in the city of Storojinet and 63.2% in the city of Cernauti knew the country’s official language. These numbers suggest that a majority of the population of northern Bukovina, particularly in the urban localities, knew the Romanian language.

The cause of the lower levels of urban ethnic nationalism among the minority inhabitants was increasingly due to the acquaintance with the Romanian language and Romanian culture. It was also, albeit progressively less so over time, due to support for socialism caused by industrialization.470 The knowledge

468. It is also likely that a few of the 77 Baptists, 879 Greek-Catholics, and 147 members of other confessions in the rural areas might have been the members of these typically Western Christian ethnic groups.


of the Romanian language, largely facilitated by the exposure to the Romanian school system, did not change national self-identification in many cases, but it sometimes hindered the ethnic nationalism of some of the minorities, and particularly of the Polish and German ones, and, in the city of Cernauți, also of the Jews.

Overall, the pattern applicable during the pre-1918 period, namely, “the higher the level of education, the more intense the nationalism” still holds true for Bukovina. A large number of professionals, intellectuals and university professors, particularly in Cernauți, came from other areas of Romania, so the fact that the data is reliable does not make it valid.

At a different level, unlike in the pre-1918 period, the highly educated did not represent a large majority of the intensely nationalistic, so the issue is less salient than for the pre-1918 period. The data on the membership of the Legion of the Archangel Michael, whose voters have a score of 4 on the intensity of nationalism scale, supports the view. In 1936, 69.1% of the members of the Legionary organization of Raduți County were peasants, lived in all the seventy localities of the county, whose ethnic Romanian population was 88.1% agricultural in 1930. Unlike during the period until 1916, a majority of the most intense Bukovinian Romanian nationalists were peasants.

The growing spread of Romanian nationalism seems to have facilitated the expansion of what one might call Romanian patriotism among numerous ethnic non-Romanians, particularly on the integrative and satisfactional dimensions, and particularly among those who knew the Romanian language. There was also an increase in the intensity of nationalism among ethnic Romanians. The impact of the educational system in turning ethnic minority inhabitants into ethnic Romanians was minimal.

4.1. Industrialization and Sudden Shocks

The impact of industrialization and of sudden shocks has already been partially discussed. In most numbers also help explain why it was easier to integrate into Romania northern Bukovina than northern Bessarabia. The latter area had lower incidences of knowledge of Romanian among non-Romanian speakers, particularly in the cities. Thus, in the county of Hotin, only 27% (70,669 individuals) of those with a non-Romanian native language, and only 42.5% of the population of the county seat, Hotin, knew the country’s official language.

cases, for most elections, industrialization has hindered the electoral expression of nationalism in Bukovina. The correlation of extreme Romanian ethnic nationalism with industrialization during the late interwar period was expected based on my model. As we shall see in more detail in later sections, the sudden shock of the Soviet occupations of 1940 and 1944 ended the loyalty toward Romania of many members of the national minorities in the north of the province.

The two most industrialized areas of Bukovina were Cernauti and Campulung counties. In the former, the staff of 22,375 employees represented 7.31% of the total population, including those who did not work, in 1930. In Campulung, the figures were 7,375 and 7.78%, respectively. In the other counties, the percentages of the staff or industrial enterprises in the total population ranged from 3.63% to 4.88%.472

A number of contemporary observers emphasized the fact that the long-standing Communist “fighters” and sympathizers in the city of Cernauti were blue-collar workers and artisans of all ethnicities.473 This finding is consistent with my model. Yet the electoral geography of the ballots cast for the Legion of the Archangel Michael is consistent with the pattern that the greater the level of industrialization, the more support was there for the Legion in 1937. This evidence thus partially goes against my model. Yet this was partially counterbalanced by the lower intensity of nationalism for the non-Legionary segment of the electorate. As tables 3A and 3B show, industrialization practically always hindered nation-building or it had a neutral role. A partial outlier is the county of Campulung, which was more nationalistic than predicted. This was partly because of the “solid Romanian” ethnic base and partly because of the political actors.474

472. See Traian Valeanu, “The Question of Bukovina – Then and Now”, in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. 4, no. 4, January 1945, p. 393. For Storojinet County, the number of employees and their proportion of the population were 6,135 and 3.63%. For Radauti County, the numbers were 7,853 and 4.88% and for Suceava 4,808 and 3.96%.


474. The easiest stronghold of the Legion, but also the weakest terrain for the PNC, in 1937, was the particularly mountainous, forested county of Campulung, the second most industrialized in the province. The Legion, which was only able to place a candidate in this Bukovinian county in the 1931 elections, obtained 19.13% of the vote in that year, and 12.04% in 1932. Yet the role of political actors was also significant. The writings of the leader of the Legion of the Archangel Michael, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, reveal the paramount importance of the early activism of the radical students who later formed the Legion, and later of the Legion, in this county. See Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, *Eiserne Garde* (Berlin: Brunnen-Verlag, 1939). In 1937, the movement obtained 32.85% of the Assembly vote, or 38.39% of the votes of all the ethnic Romanians entitled to go to the polls. See Heinen, p. 496, 498. The largest estimated percentage of the ethnically Romanian eligible voting public who supported the Legion in the same elections of 1937 (53.35%) was in the county of Cernauti. In this district, the Romanian ethnonational minority of the
The impact of the sudden shock of the Soviet occupation of 1940 brought to an end the loyalty toward Romania of numerous ethnic Ukrainians, particularly in the compact Ukrainian areas. Before that time, most interwar ethnic Ukrainians were possibly loyal to Romania. After that, even during the period 1941-1942, most were not. Many of the local Ukrainians became sympathetic toward Nazi Germany during the late 1930’s. The latter country was originally encouraging, abetting and at least indirectly subsidizing the Ukrainian nationalists in northern Bukovina. The situation in southern Bukovina, which was not affected by the sudden shock of the Soviet occupation in 1940, was different. In there, the support for Ukrainian irredentism was not higher in 1941-1944 than before 1940.

The impact of industrialization and of sudden shocks has already been partially discussed. As a rule, as we have seen, industrialization hindered the electoral expression of nationalism, yet the (chronologically) late correlation of industrialization with extreme nationalism should be taken into account. As we shall see in more detail in later sections, the sudden shock of the Soviet occupation of 1940 ended the loyalty toward Romania of many members of the national minorities in the north of the province, affected by the sudden shock, but not in the south.

5.1. The Ukrainian National Movement and Romanian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration

The Ukrainian ethnic population of Bukovina was affected by two processes of nation-building during the interwar period. One of them was the Romanian one. The other one was the Ukrainian one, which progressed in comparison to 1911 in Northern Bukovina. As a result, nationalism among ethnic Ukrainians from the northern part of the province was more intense in 1941-1942 than in 1911.

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475. See Sandru, Miscari, passim, and Bancos, Social, passim.
One of the patterns on the Ukrainian nationalistic scene was that there were two main kinds of nationalists. There were the bourgeois ones, typically with a score of 3 (on the satisfactional, identificational and symbolic dimensions) on the scale of Ukrainian nationalism. There were also the Socialists, with scores of 1 on the satisfactional and identificational dimensions, and a score of 0.5 on the integrative dimension and of 0 on the symbolic dimension of Ukrainian nationalism. They thus had an overall score of 2.5. The former were more intensely Ukrainian nationalistic. Both camps scored 0 on the scale of intensity for Romanian nationalism. Yet the latter’s call for plebiscites in northern Bukovina over whether it should stay in Romania displeased the Romanian authorities and political parties to a greater extent during the early interwar period.

Unlike in the case of Romanian nation-building before 1918, a process which has been discussed in the previous chapter, Ukrainian nation-building had not been finalized, whether electorally or in terms of identity, by then. By 1918, or rather by the time of the elections of 1911, a minority of the ethnic Ukrainians in mostly Ukrainian ethnic areas still voted for “Russophile” or ethnic Romanian candidates. The lesser intensity of nationalism of the votes for the Ukrainian ethnonationalistic than for the Romanian ethnonationalistic tickets also suggests this. In the predominantly Romanian electoral districts in 1911, the intensity of Romanian nationalism was therefore 2.66, while in the similar Ukrainian districts, for Ukrainian nationalism, the score was only 1.69 (see Table 3$).477

The (Ruthenian/Ukrainian) National Democrats of Bukovina, called Populists before 1907, and labeled as Young Ruthenes on the ballots, received a large majority of the Bukovinian Ukrainian votes in 1907 and 1911. They should receive, based on their electoral appeals, a score of only 2 on the intensity of

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477. This went hand-in-hand with the greater difficulty in mobilizing the Bukovinian Ukrainians to fight against the Romanian army and the local Romanians, in comparison to that of the Bukovinian Romanians to fight against the idea of letting a part of Bukovina become a part of a Ukrainian state. A fact that is also noted in various Ukrainian sources is that during the period 1907-1912, a number of ethnic Ukrainians migrated to Romania. See Mirchuk, p. 111.
Ukrainian nationalism scale (1 on the identificational dimension, 0.5 on the symbolic dimension and 0.5 on the satisfactional one).478

It was only in 1912 that a part of the Ukrainian National Democrats became the more radical Ukrainian National Party, made up largely of teachers, as expected based on my model. The latter energetically called for the union between mostly Ukrainian eastern Galicia and northern Bukovina.479 The Galician-born Greek Catholic Stepan Smal-Stotsky, a parliamentary deputy, professor and author of grammar textbooks, led this party. The new political formation criticized the “servilistic” loyalty of the national democratic deputies480, led by the native Bukovinian, Orthodox and aristocratic Count Mykola Vasil’ko. This denunciation was largely caused by the “fact that the deputies failed to support the demands of the teachers for salary increases”.481

The pre-1918 Ukrainian National Party was led by the Greek Catholic elites of Galician origin and by the teachers. The National Democrats represented the Eastern Orthodox elite of Bukovinian origin and the priests. The fallout from this infighting was significant. It helps explain the greater electoral popularity of the Socialists in 1920 and of the Romanian candidates in 1919 and 1922 in the mostly Ukrainian ethnic areas.482 Two factors that weakened the Ukrainian national movement between 1912 and the late 1930’s was the infighting between political actors for material reasons, and a largely Greek Catholic leadership of Galician origin for the national movement.

If one adds the increasingly popular, but less intense, Ukrainian nationalism, and the

478. There was no Ukrainian national flag until 1917, even though blue and yellow were the Ukrainian national colors in Galicia since 1848, with a yellow lion on a (light) blue flag. The Galician flag itself was a dark blue-red-yellow tricolor, but the Bukovinian flag was a red-dark blue bi-color (the historical colors of Moldova). Therefore, the score on the symbolic dimension should be a 0.5 because of the existence of other symbols. See the details about the various Ukrainian flags at http://flagspot.net/flags/ua_1918.html#rlr , http://flagspot.net/flags/ua_1848.html and http://flagspot.net/flags/ua-gal.html . The lack of irredentism among the Ukrainian national democrats (“Young Ruthenes” or “The National Democratic Party”, which tended to avoid the term “Ukrainian” in 1911, unlike their Galician counterparts) should mean that their score on the integrative dimension should be a 0. Due to their satisfaction with the conditions under Austrian rule in 1911 and to dissatisfaction with the conditions in the national democratic movement or current and its activists, the score on the satisfactional dimension should also be a 0.5 (see Nowosiwsky, p. 74-77). The Bukovinian Ruthenian/Ukrainian National Democratic score would be lower than that of the angrier, more dissatisfied Ukrainian National Democrats in Galicia.
480. Nowosiwsky, p. 77.
481. Nowosiwsky, p. 77. Also see Kann and David, p. 420, Nowosiwsky, p. 76 and Livezeanu, p.66.
482. Somehow, this pattern of material interests fits in well with the Marxist, including Socialist, “class analysis”.
increasingly unpopular, but more intense, Ruthenian/Russophile nationalism together, the results are surprising. The intensity of nationalism scores for the two types of nationalism combined together was declining over time during the period from 1907 and 1920. It thus did not increase in a linear fashion. In the four overwhelmingly Ukrainian districts of Cotmani, Zastavna, Vascauti and Vijnita, the intensity of Ukrainian nationalism scores for the lower houses in 1907 and 1920 were identical, 1.54. The score for the Senate in the latter year was 1.94. The intensity of Ukrainian nationalism was lower among the younger voters in some areas, who preferred the socialists. The lower-intensity Ukrainian nationalism of the socialists had more electoral support than the higher intensity Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism in 1920 and 1922.

In 1920, a majority of the Ukrainians cast their ballots for Ukrainian nationalist or, more commonly, Socialist candidates in Northern Bukovina. Most Bukovinian Ukrainians subscribed to less intense Ukrainian nationalistic visions until some time between 1926 and 1930. This view is supported not only by the parliamentary electoral data, by the Cernauti county be-elections of 1930 and 1931, as well as by collective action statistics.

The largest number of Bukovinian Ukrainians involved in any collective action until late 1918 was about 10,000 on April 14, 1918, in Vijnita, the future stronghold of electoral Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.\textsuperscript{483} By 1914, the “Ruthenian Society” had a number of 13,000 registered members.\textsuperscript{484} It was significantly lower than the 46,136 Romanians who, as we have seen, signed a petition in favor of upholding the Romanian national character of the Orthodox Church in Bukovina at a rally in Chernivtsi on March 21, 1912.\textsuperscript{485}

The Ukrainian national movement reached the same capacity to mobilize individuals as the Romanian national movement had had in 1912 only by 1926 (see Table 3\textsuperscript{S}), but it passed through rough times between 1922 and 1926. A school inspector even noted in 1923 that “for the most part, the rural Ruthenian-speaking population hardly participates at all in the Ukrainian political movements”.\textsuperscript{486} Even on July 28, 1926, the principal of High School no. 4 in Cernauti noted that “The population understands the

\textsuperscript{483} See Nowosiwsky, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{485} See Scurtu et al., \textit{Enciclopedia de Istorie a Romaniei}, p. 208.
\textsuperscript{486} Livezeanu, p. 67.
moment and wishes to learn Romanian”. He argued that only the intellectuals “do not want to accommodate themselves to the new structure of the Romanian state”.

The Romanian authorities were able to exploit the existing cleavages in order to weaken Ukrainian nationalism and to Romanianize the former Ukrainian schools without too much resistance. During the Habsburg period, only Ukrainian candidates were able to promote the material well-being of the Bukovinian Ukrainians. During the early Romanian period, some Romanian ethnic candidates also did the same. The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalistic elite, perceived to be motivated by self-interest and divided by cleavages, could not redeem itself in the eyes of most Bukovinian Ukrainians until 1926.

The ability of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists to mobilize their ethnic constituency started to increase only by 1926. It allegedly had a lot to do with “agitation”, which shows the importance of political actors, often teachers. About 40,000 ethnic Ukrainians had signed a petition against the Romanization of Ukrainian schools in Bukovina in July 1926. Yet this affection for the Ukrainian national cause was not always transferred into electoral support for the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist parliamentary candidates who were running. This was because of the ad-hoc organization of the Ukrainian political national movement and because of its high level of factionalism. There was also a high degree of malleability, because various factions had the leeway to ally themselves with Romanian nationalistic parties at election time. According to the Historical Dictionary of Ukraine, the Ukrainian National Party (1927-1938)

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487 Livezeanu, p. 66.
488 They might have done it because they wanted to be re-elected or because they thought that most Bukovinian Ukrainians were Ukrainianized Romanians, the official view of the Romanian state during certain periods and the semi-official one during certain periods. Yet, as Romanian “political and ethnic insiders” from the ruling party, they were better able to bring in pork barrel to their districts, as well as that more of the land that would be taken from the landowners (who were often Romanians) would go to their ethnic Ukrainian constituents between 1921 and 927. The Transylvanian Magyar experience of expressing more nationalism and of getting greater educational opportunities in their mother-tongue than the Ukrainians was clearly not identical to the Ukrainian one (fewer educational opportunities, but more pork-barrel and a level playing field in comparison to the ethnic Romanians in land reform). If there would have been no “pork barrel” and no land reform, things might have been different, but we should look at the choices made “under the circumstances”.
489 See Livezeanu, p. 66-67.
490 See Hausleitner, p. 179.
492 See Livezeanu, p. 66. The Vascauti district, which voted Ukrainian nationalist in 1911, became irreversibly Ukrainian nationalist only more recently The “Old Ruthene” candidate defeated the “Young Ruthene” candidate in a part of the region in 1907, and “Old Ruthene”, “Russophile” and Romanian candidates did well in the area in 1911. After 1918, many Ukrainians from the pre-1925 Vascauti County signed petitions in favor of union with Romania in 1919 and did not even vote for Ukrainian nationalistic
“lacked a permanent organization and staff, relying on local “men of trust” in its day-to-day operations.”

This made it less able to compete in elections than some other political parties, including ethnic minority parties, did.

**Table 3§. Collective Action and Civil Society Comparison: Bukovinian Romanian and Ukrainian Nationalism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Bukovina</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Census Results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in 1910 Census by Colloquial Language</td>
<td>273,254</td>
<td>305,101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in 1930 Census</td>
<td>379,991 (nationality)</td>
<td>280,651 (language), 261,024 (nationality)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in 1941 Census by Nationality</td>
<td>438,766</td>
<td>273,660</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in 2001 Census by Nationality in the Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine</td>
<td>181,780 by nationality, including 67,225 “Moldovans”, 171,303 by mother-tongue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalistic Collective Action and/or Civil Society - Year</td>
<td>Nationalistic Collective Action and/or Civil Society – Numbers and Description</td>
<td>Nationalistic Collective Action and/or Civil Society – Numbers and Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intensity of Nationalism Scores</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907 Elections</td>
<td>2.38 first round, 2.67 second round</td>
<td>1.50 (0.68 Russian, 0.03 Romanian)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 Elections</td>
<td>2.66 (0 for other nationalisms)</td>
<td>1.69 (0.02 Russian, 0.32 Romanian)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalistic Civil Society (Quantitative Data)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>46,136 signatures at March 12 rally in opposition to the creation of a Ruthenian Orthodox Bishopric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,000 members of the Ruthenian Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>More than the Ukrainian one in the same year</td>
<td>10,000 at a rally</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

candidates in 1920. Most of its Ukrainian schools became Romanian by 1922, before this became generalized Romanian official policy, unlike in the areas that had voted nationalistic in 1920. The local inhabitants tolerated it. By 1934, Ukrainian nationalism was more intense in the area than at any time since 1918.


494. The numbers are documented elsewhere in this dissertation.

495. These are the scores for the two rounds of elections.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Bukovina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Romanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>40,000 signatures on petition in favor of education in the Ukrainian language education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>32,000 (bloc of votes for the Ukrainian National Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>100,000 at far-right National Christian Party rally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>113,860 irredentist sympathizers in Northern Bukovina (47.37% of total ethnic Ukrainian population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000 (The Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine)</td>
<td>150,000 signatures in the Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine (the quasi-totality of the ethnic Romanians, including the self-styled “Moldovans”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The electoral support for Ukrainian nationalism was growing during the 1930’s. A Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist won a by-election for the Assembly in 1930 in Cernauti County. During the period 1928-1938, there was an increase in the number of Ukrainian parliamentarians.

According to Romanian administrative reports, by 1934 all the compact Ukrainian areas close to the Polish border were inhabited mostly by individuals sympathetic to Ukrainian nationalism.496 By the middle of the 1930’s, most northern Bukovinian Ukrainians accepted Romanian rule for the moment. They were irredentists, but not pro-Soviet ones. The Communist perspective was unappetizing to most of them. They preferred not to unite with Soviet Ukraine, but with a bourgeois nationalist, Orthodoxy-friendly Ukraine. The decline of the support for the Social Democratic Party and for the front organizations of the Romanian Communist Party is indicative of this reality. The two groups called for a plebiscite in northern Bukovina in the case of the Social Democrats, or for the union of Bukovina as a whole with Soviet Ukraine, as in the case of the Communists.497

The decision of the non-Communist Ukrainian secessionists to stay away from electoral politics makes it impossible for us to estimate Ukrainian separatism/secessionism in the 1937 elections. Romanian

internal documents suggest that Ukrainian separatism increased, particularly after 1933. They also note that the separatists wished to be out of sight and not to challenge the Romanian authorities at that time.\textsuperscript{498} It is likely that the end of parliamentary democratic government in Romania in 1938 also made Ukrainian secessionism even more popular.

The Soviet occupation of Northern Bukovina in 1940 and the attendant Communization, as well as the Romanian occupation of the area in 1941\textsuperscript{499} represented major sudden external shocks.\textsuperscript{500} Numerous Ukrainians did welcome Soviet rule at the time of the Soviet occupation in 1940. Yet large numbers were opposed to this change, as were almost all ethnic Romanians, Poles and Germans. Many stood on the sidelines. The exact distribution of the various groups is disputed. Yet it is clear that numerous ethnic Ukrainians did not welcome the Soviet troops and authorities and that most of them did not welcome the imposition of the Communist system.\textsuperscript{501} The ‘reunion with Soviet Ukraine” was originally popular enough among ethnic Ukrainians, but the Soviet regime was hated. The popular view among the local ethnic Ukrainians after 1940 was in favor of a Ukrainian non-Communist independent national state.\textsuperscript{502}

After a period of Soviet rule and of living in the same Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic with their fellow Ukrainian ethnics, the northern Bukovinian Ukrainian inhabitants preferred to come under Ukrainian non-Communist rule. After the collapse of Soviet power caused by the advance of the German and Romanian armies into northern Bukovina, local Ukrainian authorities emerged and seized power in those areas with a compact Ukrainian majority in northern Bukovina. They killed local Jews in a more extensive and systematic manner than did the local northern Bukovinian Romanians.

The Ukrainian nationalists benefited from ethnic Ukrainian popular support, even enthusiasm. The returning Romanian authorities replaced them. The subsequent period of Romanian rule was regarded as a let-down, as the lesser of several evils, in comparison to Soviet rule, and in the beginning not necessarily more favorably than German rule in neighboring Galicia.

\textsuperscript{498} See Hausleitner, p. 271-275.
\textsuperscript{499} In fact, during the summer of 1941, most of the Ukrainian villages liberated themselves from Soviet rule before the arrival of the Romanian and German armies.
The 3-4 hours of teaching of the Ukrainian language in the schools with a mostly Ukrainian student population in 1941-1942 was even less than the 4-6 hours during the interwar period. It was difficult for the Romanian authorities to find non-Communist ethnic Ukrainian teachers after the June 1941 Soviet deportations and the Soviet retreat. Yet the Ukrainian population was pleasantly surprised by the Romanian authorities’ efforts in this direction, and Romanian rule was again seen as better than Soviet rule.\textsuperscript{503} However, a majority of the northern Bukovinian Ukrainians was held under control more by the implicit threat of the use of military force than before 1940, when there was more voluntary compliance.

The right-wing military dictatorship of Ion Antonescu (1940-1944) might have not been seen as bad as the Soviet ones, or, later, than the Nazi one, by the local Ukrainians. Yet most of the ethnic Ukrainians no longer accepted Romanian rule, and were sympathetic not merely to Ukrainian irredentism. For a while, a Ukrainian nationalist rebellion in northern Bukovina was possible.\textsuperscript{504}

The clandestine, potentially insurrectionary, Ukrainian network was strong and it had an estimated intensity of nationalism score that is controversial, but which could not be lower than 3.5, and often 4, in view of the evidence presented below. It had the support of most northern Bukovinan ethnic Ukrainians, of not less than 72% of the total number of such adults (see below), but it was inactive in practice. The text of a captured letter of the northern Bukovinan irredentists to the headquarters of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) movement in Lviv (Lvov) is interesting. It was a response to a letter from the OUN leadership written on September 22, 1942. This acquisition of the Romanian secret service (Serviciul Special de Informatie – the Special Service of Information, SSI) does provide us with information on the demographics of the activists and sympathizers of the movement (see Table 3F).

Out of 2,260 individuals who were actively involved, 64 were from Cernauti, whose inhabitants were underrepresented among the activists, as my model would predict. Out of these active members, 92 were intellectuals without occupation, a group that was overrepresented among the activists, as my model would again predict. A group that was underrepresented was the commercial class (32 merchants and 38 employees of commercial enterprises). In addition to the active members, there were also very many sympathizers; 1,600 of them were in Cernauti. This seems to confirm the underrepresentation among the

\textsuperscript{503} Bancos, p. 265-266.
OUN sympathizers and of those connected to the movement in general of the Ukrainian inhabitants of this urban industrial area. There were also 110,000 sympathizers in the rest of Northern Bukovina. My expectation that industrialization mostly hinders nation-building is therefore totally confirmed.\textsuperscript{505} Most, but not all, of the villages in northern Bukovina had OUN irredentist activist cells.

Table 3F. The Ukrainian Irredentist Movement in Northern Bukovina (September 1942) – Quantitative Data\textsuperscript{506}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number of Activists\textsuperscript{507}</th>
<th>Number of Sympathizers\textsuperscript{508}</th>
<th>Movement Total (Columns 2 +3)</th>
<th>Ukrainians\textsuperscript{509} in Northern Bukovina in 1941</th>
<th>Movement (column 4) as a percentage of the total population</th>
<th>Activists (column 2) as a percentage of total Ukrainian ethnic population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Bukovina</td>
<td>2,260</td>
<td>111,600</td>
<td>113,860</td>
<td>240,350</td>
<td>47.37%</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Cernauți</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>8,055</td>
<td>20.66%</td>
<td>0.79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the dream of an independent Ukraine under German rule seemed to start to appear unrealistic by 1942, there was confusion in the ranks of the secessionist activists and sympathizers, and an attempt to come to terms with Romanian rule.\textsuperscript{510} Many accepted the return of the Soviets authorities rather passively. However, the Ukrainian nationalistic OUN guerrilla movement in northern Bukovina between 1944 and 1955 was strong. The Soviet authorities systematically and cruelly repressed it.

A careful analysis of the electoral performance of the Ukrainian tickets in interwar Romania shows the importance of the ethnic basis for Ukrainian nation-building. The Ukrainian nationalistic political forces did not obtain support from those individuals who identified themselves as “Ruthenian-speakers” in the 1910 Austrian census but who identified themselves as Romanians (though not necessarily

\textsuperscript{505}. See Dorel Bancos, \textit{Social și national în politica guvernului Ion Antonescu} (București: Editura Eminescu, 2000), p. 269, citing A.S.B., fond P.C.M., Dosar 1.262/1943, f. 13. This is a document of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of Romania. Southern Bukovina, which had not been under Soviet rule, was hardly affected by the movement.

\textsuperscript{506}. For the data, see Bancos, p. 269 and Nowosiwsky, p. 168.

\textsuperscript{507}. Their intensity of nationalism score was 4.

\textsuperscript{508}. Their intensity of nationalism score was 4.

\textsuperscript{509}. The self-styled “Hutsuls” will be classified as “Ukrainians” in this table.

\textsuperscript{510}. See Bancos, p. 267-268.
as Romanian-speakers) during the censuses of the Romanian period. The increasingly fewer individuals who were objectively Ukrainians, but had other identities (e.g., Hutsul, Ruthenian/Rusyn, Austrian, Bukovinian, etc.) also tended to shy away from supporting Ukrainian nationalism. Something that seemed to help was the fact that the Romanian state, by providing the “Ukrainian”, not “Ruthenian” or “Hutsul” schools and teachers, preferred to identity the group as Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians. The electoral coalitions of the Ukrainian nationalists with Romanian nationalists after 1922 helped this process.

The importance of the educational system is also obvious in terms of the spread of Ukrainian identity and sometimes of more intense Ukrainian nationalism. Sudden shocks (the changes of status of Bukovina in 1940, 1941 and 1944) greatly influenced self-determination preferences, strengthening the intensity of Ukrainian nationalism and the preference for an independent, non-Communist Ukraine.511

Unlike in the case of Romanian nation-building before 1918, a process which has been discussed in the previous chapter, Ukrainian nation-building had not been finalized, whether electorally or in terms of identity, by the same year. It was completed by 1941 in the counties of Cernauti and Storojinet, but not in southwestern Bukovina, where the process has not yet been finalized. A “proper” Ukrainian ethnic basis and a Ukrainian linguistic and nationalistic school atmosphere facilitated it, as did the sudden shocks of 1940, 1941 and 1944. Urbanization hindered it.512

6.1. Other Ethnic Groups and National Movements

Romanian nation-building seemed to make some headway on the integrative and satisficial dimensions for most non-Ukrainian ethnic minorities. However, the increase in the popular support for the National Jewish Party, etc., is an indication that among the Jews in particular, the rise of anti-Semitism had a negative impact on the satisficial dimension of Romanian nationalism. The rise of both anti-Semitism and Zionism were important phenomena. The last period of Romanian rule, right before and during World

511. What we need to account for is why in 1941-1944, under a Romanian nationalist dictatorship, the expression of Ukrainian nationalism was even more widespread and intense than in times that are more liberal. These were the late Habsburg period and the interwar democratic period (1918-1938).The public expression of Ukrainian nationalism was possible under the parliamentary regime, with some limitations during certain periods during the 1920’s, but not under the dictatorship. Therefore, the importance of the opportunities to express Ukrainian nationalistic visions has to be excluded as the key explanation.

512. For more details, see, the sources listed in note 189.
War II, nullified most of the successes that had been achieved in Romanian nation-building among the minorities. The only exceptions were the Bukovinian Poles, the Romanian-speaking Roma (Gypsies) and the “Hutsuls”.

Whereas Romanian nation-building was facilitated by interethnic marriages between Romanians and Germans, Poles and Ukrainians, the widespread anti-Semitism discouraged any potential Jewish assimilation. The existence of Romanian nationalistic xenophobia, including anti-Semitism, prevented not only Jewish ethnic assimilation, which was not genuinely desired by the Romanian state, but also Jewish integration, which was.

The impact of industrialization hindered both Romanian nation-building among ethnic minorities and the nation-building of the specific minority groups (Jewish nation-building among Jews, German nation-building among Germans, etc.). This is shown by the electoral data for the Romanian parliamentary elections and for the local elections, as well as by other data (Jewish community elections, etc.).

The impact of the sudden shocks was not identical for all the groups. Most, but not all, Jews did welcome the Soviet occupation of 1940. In a large majority of the cases, this was not due to any sympathies for Communism, the Soviet Union or the Soviet system, or socialism. Most Jews rather had this attitude because they viewed Soviet rule as “the lesser of two evils” in comparison to a Nazi Germany and to a Romania that seemed increasingly pro-Axis. They accurately feared that Romanian would become increasingly anti-Semitic and close to Nazi Germany after the fall of France on June 22, 1940. The latter event must be seen as a sudden shock for the Jews in a way in which it was not for inhabitants of other ethnicities.

The Romanian and German Holocausts in the area involved numerous village Ukrainians and, to a lesser extent, Romanians, in addition to the German and especially Romanian troops and gendarmerie. This led to the death of almost half of the Jewish inhabitants of Bukovina, and an overwhelming majority of the Jews of Bessarabia and Transnistria, the territory between the Dniester and Bug rivers administered by Romania in 1941-1944. Numerous Jews were killed in northern Bukovina after the arrival of the Axis forces. A large majority of the survivors were deported to Transnistria. About half of these deportees died

514 See, for example, see Dov Levin, The Lesser of Two Evils: Eastern European Jewry under Soviet Rule (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1995), passim.
in there. About 16,000, mostly middle-class, mostly German-speaking, Jews were allowed to remain in the provincial capital out of a population of 93 thousand Bukovinian Jews in 1930.

The Holocaust was another sudden shock that changed the self-determination preferences of a large proportion of the Jewish population. After the experience of the Holocaust and of Soviet rule, or of the aftermath of Soviet rule, life was never the same. This was especially so in the case of the southern Bukovinian Jews who were deported to Transnistria and returned to Romania in 1945. They heard many horror stories about Communism while in Transnistria. Neither the Romanian state nor the Soviet Union seemed appealing to a large and increasing proportion of these Jewish inhabitants. Almost all of them have subsequently immigrated to Israel, and, to a lesser extent, to the United States and to other countries. Soon after World War II, the overwhelming majority of the northern Bukovinian Jews left for Romania, and later left that country. 515

Before World War I, a majority of the Jewish population had been sympathetic toward various varieties of Jewish diaspora nationalism, and the individuals of Zionist sympathies were only a minority. In post-1918 Romanian Bukovina, the consistent pro-Zionists originally represented only a minority of the Jewish population. However, numerous other Jews sympathized with Zionism, including a majority in the north of the province, starting around 1928-1929. The fact that Zionism was taught in the Jewish schools as well as the sudden shock of the Holocaust turned a large majority of the diaspora nationalists, and many of the religious non-nationalistic Jews, into supporters of Zionism.

The ethnic Germans as a group did not welcome Soviet rule, and a large majority of the Poles were also opposed to the Soviet occupation. At any rate, numerous minority inhabitants left Bukovina for Germany. About 95,770 ethnic Germans departed from Bukovina (including 52,219 or 52,250 from southern Bukovina) for Greater Germany in the fall of 1940, while only 7,180 remained in the province.

A majority of the Poles of the city of Cernauti emigrated along with the Germans to the zones of Poland controlled by the Germans at that time, or even to Germany itself. This explains why the number of ethnic Poles in the city of Cernauti decreased from 10,885 in 1930 to 3,523 in 1941. 516 Almost all the Magyars (11,104 in 1930 in Bukovina, including 9,501 in southern Bukovina) departed southern Bukovina

515. On the post-war repatriations to Romania, see Popescu, “Crearea Regiunii Cernautii”. Several hundred Bukovinian Roma, a minority of the population of this ethnic group, were also deported to Transnistria.
for Hungary in April-May 1941. Individuals could opt to stay or leave, and they overwhelmingly chose to leave. After World War II, a large majority of the remaining northern Bukovinian Poles left for Poland, but a majority of the southern Bukovinian ones chose to remain under Romanian rule.

The only group among whose members pro-Romanian attitudes have survived on a mass scale until the 1990’s, and have manifested themselves in votes for Romanian nationalistic tickets during recent years, has been the Romanian-speaking Roma (Gypsies) of both southern and northern Bukovina. These Roma have often identified themselves as ethnic Romanians, including in the Romanian, Soviet and Ukrainian censuses. The same phenomenon also applies to the case of the Romanian-speaking members of other ethnic groups who do not classify themselves as ethnic Romanians.

The self-styled “Hutsuls” of central-western Bukovina in Soviet and later independent Ukraine developed a Ukrainian identity. Many of the self-styled “Hutsuls” of southern Bukovina have retained their “Hutsul” identity and Romanian patriotism up to the present.

Romanian nation-building made some headway on the integrative and satisfactional dimensions for most minority, but not self-styled “Ukrainian”, inhabitants. However, the increase in the popular support for Zionism starting in 1928-1929, and for the National Jewish Party in 1931-1932 is an indication that among the Jews in particular, the rise of anti-Semitism and of fears of assimilation had a negative impact on the satisfactional dimension of Romanian nationalism. The rise of both anti-Semitism and Zionism also decreased the score on the integrative dimension. The last period of Romanian rule, right before and during World War II, nullified most of whatever successes had been achieved in Romanian nation-building among the ethnic minorities, and, more precisely, the growth of patriotism. The only exceptions were some of the Bukovinian Poles and the Romanian-speaking Roma (Gypsies).

7. Conclusions: Expectations and Results

The Bukovinian Romanian case supports most of my contentions about the impact of the

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518 See Ion Popescu, “Crearea Regiunii Cernauti”. In March 1945-July 1946, 10,490 inhabitants of northern Bukovina, including 8,140 Poles, 2,041 Jews, and 309 inhabitants of other ethnicities departed for Poland. Northern Bukovina had 15,128 inhabitants of Polish ethnicity in 1941, while the entire Chernivtsi region, including Herta and northern Bessarabia, had 6,007 in 1959. See Nowosiwsky, p. 169.
various variables. If one were to believe the view that the educational system facilitated nation-building, one would expect that the more literate, more educated, voters would vote in a more intensely nationalistic manner than the other inhabitants. This was indeed the case.

The impact of the ethnic basis was the one predicted by my model. Romanian ethnonationalism was overwhelmingly restricted to the population of Romanian ethnicity. The existence of the “proper ethnic Romanian” ethnic basis fostered Romanian nation-building. So did a process of ethnic assimilation that was not very widespread in the region, but only in certain “ethnic borderline” areas.

Over time, Romanian patriotism (nationalism on the integrative and satisfactional dimensions) did spread to various sections of the provincial population that were distinctly, openly and sometimes proudly, non-Romanian by ethnicity. This process was much more common in southern Bukovina than in northern Bukovina, where most non-ethnic Romanians were not integrated into Romanian society, or satisfied by how the Romanian state and society treated them. The failures to assimilate or even to integrate and satisfy the minorities was made possible by a combination of religious as well as linguistic and cultural differences. It was also facilitated by the existence of clear nationalistic aspirations among most Bukovinians of ethnic minority origins and because of the anti-Semitism and other varieties of xenophobia of many ethnic Romanians.

The sudden shock of late 1918 (the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy) led to a more widespread acceptance of Romanian rule than one could have thought possible even earlier during the same year, including among many inhabitants of non-Romanian ethnicity. The sudden shocks of the Soviet occupations of northern Bukovina in 1940 and 1944 led to the end of the loyalty of a large majority of the inhabitants of non-Romanian ethnicity for Romania. The impact of the Romanian reoccupation of the area in 1941 operated very little in the opposite direction.

What could possibly account for the changes? The nation-building process that had occurred among the population that was very clearly Romanian in terms of ethnic basis was finalized by the beginning of the twentieth century. It provided a more solid basis, or at least a more solid starting point, for increases in the intensity of Romanian nationalism and less for its spread to inhabitants who were unambiguously members of the ethnic minorities. The impact of the educational system was complex. It facilitated increases in the intensity of Romanian nationalism among ethnic Romanians. It had an analogous impact on
the nationalism of the other groups among ethnic minority inhabitants who were exposed to the teaching of
the language and nationalism of their specific ethnic group. Yet it also facilitated the increase of Romanian
patriotism among some minority inhabitants.

One of the conclusions that emerge is that after ethnonational identities become stabilized, the
ethnic basis and sudden shocks trump in terms of importance the impact of the educational system. The
latter can no longer be very effective in assimilation. During the period when all of Bukovina was under
Romanian rule, and particularly in its later years, practically the entire Romanian ethnic population was
nationalistic. Moreover, various minority populations, such as the Germans, Poles and self-styled
“Hutsuls”, did continue to prefer Romanian sovereignty to other potential sovereignties. However,
umerous ethnic Ukrainians, particularly in northern Bukovina, and Jews regarded Romanian rule as at
most the lesser of several evils, and later as merely “evil”. These inhabitants supported Ukrainian and
Jewish nationalism. Anti-Semitism and xenophobia hindered Romanian nation-building in the province.
Chapter 6
“Romanian” and “Moldovan” Nation-Building in the Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine
(1944-2005): The Census Data

1.1. Introduction

1.2. “Romanian” and “Moldovan” Nation-Building in the Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine (1944-2005) and the Justification of the Case Selection

2.1. Chapter Summary: Romanian Nationalism and Nation-Building in Bukovina after 1944: The Soviet Period and Its Impact on the Post-Soviet Period

3. The Census Data: The Evolution of the “Romanian” and “Moldovan” Groups in the Chernivtsi Region since 1989

3.1. The Ethnic Basis and the Educational Process

3.1.2. The Impact of Industrialization and Urbanization

4.1. Conclusions

519. An earlier, somewhat more extensive version of this part, “Romanian Nation-Building in the Chernivtsi and Odessa Regions of Ukraine (1989-2005)”, contains somewhat more details, more documentation, and a discussion of certain complexities that are useful and relevant for those who are well acquainted with the case. This additional material is in my view quite interesting. I have excluded it from this version of the chapter because it makes the text less easily readable for those who are not at all specialists in the case, who are interested in more clarity and less information.
1.1. Introduction

Based on my theory, one would have expected several trends to be discernible between 1989 and 2001, and to be reflected in the census data. They indeed took place. Since the ethnic basis is key to nation-building, one would have expected certain changes among the northern Bukovinian and Herta Romanians. The latter typically spoke Romanian with the same accent as across the border in Romania. To the extent to which during the Soviet period they claimed that they were “Moldovans” or “Moldovan-speakers”, one would have expected them to switch in the overwhelming majority of the cases to a “Romanian” and “Romanian-speaking” identity, which they did.

By contrast, the presence of the “Bessarabian Moldovan” accent in northern Bessarabia and of the memory of the large numbers of individuals with a “Moldovan” ethnic identity before 1940/1944 has had a different impact. It has encouraged the preservation among most, but not all, of the Bessarabian Moldovan of a “Moldo-van” primary identity. In those areas where there have recently been no Romanian schools and the children have been taught in Ukrainian and/or Russian, the Romanian idiom spoken by the individuals is more affected by Slavic influences. The lack of schools and school teachers who would promote a “Romanian” identity in the school and in the village has hindered the switch to a “Romanian” identity.

The impact of urbanization has favored Ukrainization and Russification, and has served as a brake to the spread of a “Romanian” identity. Industrialization has also favored Ukrainization and Russification to the detriment of a “Romanian” identity.

1.2. Introduction and Justification of the Case Selection

In this chapter, I will look at “Romanian” and “Moldovan” ethnic nation-building in the Chernivtsi region of Ukraine since World War II, and particularly since 1979. The process of Romanian nation-building during the (Soviet and) post-Soviet period in the Chernivtsi region is presented schematically in Qualitative Table 4 A (see below). It is also explained throughout this chapter, and it
confirms the predictions of my model. The starting point in the process was 1944 and the closing point was 2005. The two key variables are the ethnic basis and the educational system. In those geographical areas, northern Bukovina and Herta, where the ethnic basis was identical to that of the ethnic Romanians in Romania, Romanian nation-building was facilitated by this (see Map 4A2). A sizable minority of the Bukovinian and Herta Romanians had developed a “Moldovan” identity by 1979. A large majority of even the self-styled “Romanians” declared during the census of that year that they spoke the “Moldovan” language.

Map 4A2

Ethnic map of all of Bukovina, based on the Ukrainian census of 2001

The “Romanian” ethnic basis identical to that south of the border in present-day Romania is salient. It allowed those Bukovinians and Hertans whose ethnic and linguistic identity had been changed by the Soviet regime from “Romanian” to “Moldovan”, or their descendants, to return in almost all cases to their pre-Soviet “Romanian” ethnic and linguistic identity. The Bukovinian and Hertan Romanians would vote overwhelmingly (in 1994-1998) or with a smaller majority (in 2002) for relatively intense Romanian

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520 For a discussion of my model, see my chapter 1.
nationalistic parliamentary candidates.

Since 1989, a sizable proportion of the self-styled “Moldovans”\textsuperscript{522}, particularly from the Bessarabian part of the region, have acquired a “Romanian” and/or “Romanian-speaking” primary, or, in

\textsuperscript{522} The “Moldovan” identity emerged after, not before, the foundation of the principality of Moldova. Numerous inhabitants continued to view themselves as “Romans” or of “Roman” origin into the early modern period. Until the late 18th century and early nineteenth century, the non-elite inhabitants of the historical principality of Moldova (mostly ethnic Romanians, some of them of Transylvanian rather than local origin, but also inhabitants of Ukrainian ethnicity and mother tongue) had an interesting identity. They viewed themselves, to the extent to which there is a record of their identity at all and were identified by some outsiders, mostly as the “Moldovan people” (“poporul moldovenesc”), rather than as ethnic “Romanians”. However, the members of the group seldom identified their ethnicity as the “Moldovan ethnie” (“neamul moldovenesc”). Among the literate elite (aristocrats, scholars, intellectuals, etc.), “Moldovan people” and “Romanian ethnic” identities coexisted. The identities of the population that had a “Moldovan” identity in the late eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth century subsequently evolved differently for various groups of the population of the old principality of Moldova. Those who lived in the part of Moldova that united with Wallachia in 1859 and in Bukovina since the early nineteenth century developed a Romanian ethnonational identity by the 1890’s (for Bukovina, see chapter 2 of this dissertation). A majority of the Bessarabian and Transnistrian Moldovans retained a primary “Moldovan identity”. They have tended to view themselves as part of the “Moldovan people”, even though many of them have recently acquired a “Romanian” secondary ethnic and/or linguistic identity. The term “the Moldovan ethnie” has also been used, but less often. Finally, the local Ukrainians were identified by the Bukovinian Austrian and Bessarabian Russian authorities as “Ruthenians”, and, respectively “Little Russians”. They eventually developed these identities, and subsequently a Ukrainian identity. The person with a “Moldovan” identity is much more likely to have a “Moldovan” as distinct from a “standard Romanian” accent. About 53.2% of the Moldovan citizens who identify themselves as “Moldovans” believe in the identity of the “Moldovan” and “Romanian” languages, as does the Moldovan Communist president Vladimir Voronin. He said, “There are not and there can not be any differences between the Moldovan and the Romanian languages”. See Alla Skvortsova, “The Cultural and Social Makeup of Moldova: A Bipolar or Dispersed Society”, in Kolsto, \textit{National}, p. 168, and Voronin’s speech at the closing of the session of the Moldovan parliament on December 26, 2003, at http://www.president.md/press.php?p=1&s=1579&lang=rom. In addition, whereas almost all Romanians from Romania itself and many, but not all, of the self-identified Bessarabian “Romanians” celebrate Christmas according to the Gregorian or “New Style” (on December 25\textsuperscript{th}), the self-identified Bessarabian “Moldovans” tend to celebrate it on January 7\textsuperscript{th} according to the Julian or “Old Style”. It has recently been reported in the mass media that two-thirds of the Moldovans/Romanians in the Republic of Moldova declared during the October 2004 census that their mother tongue was “Romanian”. One-third called it “Moldovan”. See “Moldovan language”, in \textit{Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia}, accessed at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moldovan_language (accessed August 2005). According to the leader of the main opposition force in the Republic of Moldova, the Our Moldova Alliance, 60% of all the Moldovans/Romanians in the Republic of Moldova declared their mother-tongue as “Romanian”. See the text of the BBC interview, “Serafim Urecheanu contracandidatul lui Vladimir Voronin”, November 30, 2004, accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/news/story/2004/11/041130_urecheanu_interviu.shtml in January 2005. The data in the “ethnobarometer” of the Institute for Public Policies of Chisinau partially contradict Urecheanu’s statements and the \textit{Wikipedia} article. See http://www.ipp.md/files/Barometru/Enobarometru/Rezultate%20sondaj%20de%20opinie%20pe%20esanti on%20MoldoveniRomani.pdf, especially p. 12-13. The percentage of individuals with a “Moldovan” or a “Romanian” identity who declared that they speak “Moldovan” “perfectly” was 91\%, in contrast to 56\% who declared that they spoke “Romanian” “perfectly”. An additional 5\% declared that they speak “Moldovan” and 32\% “Romanian” “very well, but with an accent”. Moreover, 86\% of them declared “Moldovan” their native language and 17\% “Romanian”; 77\% declared that they desired “Moldovan” to be an official language in the Republic of Moldova and 25\% declared that “Romanian” should have that status. It is likely that the discrepancy between the sources is explained by the fact that most “Moldovans” declared to the census-takers that they spoke both “Moldovan” and “Romanian”.

most cases, secondary identity. Yet only a small minority of these northern Bessarabian Moldovans in the areas where they live compactly supported Romanian nationalistic candidates until 2002.

Significantly, most of these “Moldovans” have signed a Romanian nationalistic petition in 1999-2000 asking for a multicultural Ukrainian-Romanian-German-Jewish university in Chernivtsi. They voted for a candidate (with a Romanian mother and a German father) supported by the regional authorities, whose rhetoric and campaigners appealed moderately to “Romanian” nationalism in 2002. As a result, the score on the intensity of Romanian nationalism in the mostly Romanian electoral district (no. 204) has remained the same. This was because the decline in the intensity of Romanian nationalism among “Romanians” was compensated by its spread to self-styled “Moldovans”. A majority of these “Moldovans” voted for Viktor Yushchenko in the presidential elections of 2004, as did a larger majority of the “Romanians”. Whereas the “Moldovan” identity still remains as a primary identity in a large majority of the cases, most “Moldovans” in the area also have a “Romanian” or at least “Romanian-speaking” identity, and support Romanian or Romanophone low-intensity nationalism electorally.

The change of attitude of a majority of the “Moldovans” in the direction of a “Romanian” linguistic and ethnic identity is an interesting phenomenon. It is explained largely by the direct and indirect impact of the Romanian ethnic, “Romanian-language” educational system in the area. The increase in the proportion of the population with a progressively more advanced education helped nation-building in the Chernivtsi region, as it was predicted by my model. However, this increase continued unless it was trumped by the negative impact of two other variables, namely urbanization/industrialization and a “Moldovan” identity that made nation-building slower. My model would also predict this. By contrast, a large majority of the “Moldovans” of the Odessa region do not support Romanian nationalism. The “Moldovan-language” educational system in the latter region does not foster the development of a “Romanian” identity, and the fact that most of the Moldovan children attend Russian-language schools fosters Russification and Russianization.

The impact of urbanization has favored Ukrainization and Russification, and has served as a break to the spread of a “Romanian” identity. Industrialization has also favored Ukrainization and Russification. The sudden shock of the failed August 1991 coup and of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the Chernivtsi region has fostered the spreading of “Romanian” self-identification and nationalism. By contrast, in the
Odessa region, the sudden shock had a minor influence, which was largely reversed in subsequent years.

The moderate impact of an alternate independent variable, the autonomous role of political actors, could be noticed during the past few years, since 2002 in the Chernivtsi region and since 1997 in the Odessa region. They have not affected the aggregate intensity of Romanian nationalism at the time of the parliamentary elections in the Chernivtsi region in 2002 in comparison to 1998. Yet they have influenced its geographical distribution. Therefore, this variable is useful, but it can not substitute for my four structural variables. The developments in the post-1989 period indicate the importance for nation-building of the ethnic basis, and the changes therein, and, in northern Bukovina, of the educational system. However, I would contend that political actors play an important role only when the ethnic elite is divided into competing groups, when there is widespread patronage, cronyism, etc. Moreover, there are no opportunities for the inhabitants to select electorally between varieties of nationalism associated with political parties.523

The case of Romanian nation-building in the Chernivtsi region has been selected because of the existence of a considerable amount of variation on a number of independent variables. These include the ethnic basis and the educational system. In terms of ethnic basis, there are self-identified “Romanians” and self-identified “Moldovans”, self-styled “Romanian-speakers” and self-identified “Moldovan-speakers”, regional differences in accent, etc. (see the Qualitative Table 4 A). The great extent in the chronological variations in the curriculum of the educational system is found in few other cases. All the schools were “Moldovan schools” using the Cyrillic alphabet during the period from the 1940’s until 1989. They became “Romanian schools” using the Latin alphabet in 1989. A brief comparison with the Odessa region of Ukraine, where the overwhelming majority of the Romanian population had a “Moldovan” identity is interesting because it allows us to control for the smaller sudden shock in 1991 in the region and for

523. For a number of reasons, largely in order to facilitate comparison, I will deal with Romanian nation-building in northern Bukovina rather than in southern Bukovina, which had been long finalized and was not controversial. Moreover, the concept of northern Bukovina will be expanded to include areas that are currently customarily believed to be part of the area, but were not so historically. These include the non-Bukovinian areas of the Chernivtsi oblast, or region, of Ukraine. The comparisons between the Bukovinian and non-Bukovinian areas of this region are very fruitful in the study of nation-building. A deficiency is that it would lead to a non-historical approach to the study of Romanian nation-building in the non-Bukovinian areas of this Ukrainian administrative region. For an administrative map of the region, with its component rayons, see http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article?art_id=116742&cat_id=32596 (accessed March 2005).
another change from “Romanian” to “Moldovan” schools in 1998-1999.\textsuperscript{524}

Throughout this chapter, I will include the self-styled “Moldovans” together with the self-styled “Romanians” in the broader category of Romanians without quotation marks. The distinction between Romanian and “Romanian” is that the former group refers to the population that is intersubjectively ethnically Romanian, whereas the latter category includes those who identify themselves as such. The same principle has been used in ascertaining linguistic self-identification. This is done for a number of reasons, namely as a tribute to the existing scholarship of ethnic Romanian and Ukrainian authors\textsuperscript{525} and due to a number of factors that will be discussed below. These include the preference of the Moldovans of the region to have “Romanian” rather “Moldovan” school, of their support for specifically Romanian nationalist petition drives and other explicitly Romanian collective actions and, in the cases of some individuals, support for Romanian nationalistic candidates.

\section*{B. Romanian Nationalism and Nation-Building in Bukovina after 1944: The Soviet Period and Its Impact on the Post-Soviet Period\textsuperscript{526}}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Independent Variable (or Element Thereof) & Romanian-speaking areas of Northern Bukovina and Herta & Romanian-speaking areas of Northern Bessarabia, especially Noua Sulita \\
\hline
\hline
\textbf{Ethnic basis} & & \\
\hline
- a. Intersubjective ethnicity (expert opinion) & Romanian ethnicity & Romanian ethnicity \\
\hline
- b. Ethnic speech (language, dialect, idiom, accent) & Romanian ethnicity, Romanian-speaking, accent as in Romania & Romanian ethnicity, Romanian-speaking, Bessarabian accent \\
\hline
- c. Subjective self-iden- & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Qualitative Table 4A – The Evolution of “Romanian” and “Moldovan” Identity and Nationalism in the Chernivtsi Region (1989-2004), Particularly in Electoral District 204}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{524} The impact of the sudden shock will be dealt with only summarily. We could at least explore how sudden it was based on various evaluation devices (opinion polls, electoral data, etc.).


\textsuperscript{526} In addition to the detailed maps from chapter 2, useful detailed maps of parts of northern Bukovina, the entire Herta area and the entire northern Bessarabia from the interwar period could be obtained from Philip Gabriel Eidelberg, \textit{The Great Rumanian Peasant Revolt of 1907: Origins of a Modern Jacquerie} (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable (or Element Thereof)</th>
<th>Romanian-speaking areas of Northern Bukovina and Herta</th>
<th>Romanian-speaking areas of Northern Bessarabia, especially Noua Sulita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>- c1. Subjective linguistic self-identification</strong></td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>Recent past - “Moldovan”, present - mostly “Romanian”, especially “Moldovan language = “Romanian” language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly primarily “Moldovan”, increasingly “Romanian”; “Moldovans and “Romanians” are one people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**- d. Religion**

| - d1. Religious celebrations and calendar | “New Style” (Gregorian), as in Romania | Mostly “New Style”, as in Romania, not the “Old Style” (Julian) of most inhabitants of the Republic of Moldova |
| - d2. The name given the to Romanian language used by churches | “Romanian” | In a large majority of the cases, “Romanian”, much less often, “Moldovan” |
| - d3. Religious Jurisdiction | Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate | Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate |

Dependent Variable, as measured by elections, petitions, in terms of the characteristics of the votes cast and the characteristics of the candidates

**1990 Elections**

| - Parliamentary vote 1990 | No ‘Moldovans’ or ‘Romanians’ elected | No ‘Moldovans’ or ‘Romanians’ elected |
| - Ukrainian Independence referendum (December 1, 1991) | Minority of “Romanians” (1/3) boycott (due to Romanian irredentism) | No boycott (no Romanian or Moldovan irredentism) |

Dependent Variable, as measured by Elections, Petitions, in terms of the characteristics of the votes cast and the characteristics of the candidates

**The Elections of 1994**

| - Local elections 1994 | “Romanians” | “Moldovan” majority, “Romanian” minority |
| - Parliamentary vote of 1994 | Overwhelmingly “Romanian” identity, mostly “Romanian” nationalism, anti-Communist (I. Popescu) (I. Popescu for SMPS deputy) | They were grouped in a mostly ethnically Ukrainian district, and the issue was therefore irrelevant |
| - Presidential vote of 1994 | Mostly Kuchma, minority Kravchuk | Kuchma |

**The Elections of 1998**

| - Parliamentary vote of 1998 | Mostly “Romanian” identity, mostly “Romanian” nationalism, anti-Communist independent Popescu for (SMPS) deputy | Some “Moldovan”, some “Romanian” identity, no “Moldovan” nationalism, plurality Communist (Chiril) vote for (SMPS) deputy |

The Developments of 1999
Predictably, the intensity of Romanian nationalism during the Soviet period was low. Moreover, even a number of self-styled “Romanians” and “Romanian-speakers” switched their identities to “Moldovans” and “Moldovan-speakers”. Yet during the post-1989 period, the intensity of electorally expressed Romanian nationalism increased in the first few years until 1998, and then subsequently stayed at a plateau level. In recent years, Romanian electoral nationalism has also spread to the northern Bessarabian areas of Chernivtsi oblast. It has affected most self-styled Moldovans, whose attitude is been characterized by Moldovanism. Yet this Romanian nationalism has manifested itself only at a low level of intensity.527

Table 4D -The Interaction of the Variables in the Chernivtsi and Odessa Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable (or Element Thereof)</th>
<th>Romanian-speaking areas of Northern Bukovina and Herta</th>
<th>Romanian-speaking areas of Northern Bessarabia, especially Noua Sulita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The presidential vote of 1999</td>
<td>Mostly “Romanian” nationalism, anti-Communist (Kuchma)</td>
<td>Mostly “Romanian” nationalism, mostly anti-Communist (Kuchma), minority Communist (Symonenko)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Petition of 1999</td>
<td>Multi-cultural Ukrainian - Romanian - German - Jewish university; quasi-totality sign</td>
<td>Multi-cultural Ukrainian - Romanian - German - Jewish university; quasi-totality sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Parliamentary vote 2002</td>
<td>Mostly “hard” “Romanian” ethnicity, most voters - intense “Romanian” nationalism; Anti-Com-munist, Popescu plurality for deputy; Majority Yushchenko coalition</td>
<td>Mostly “soft” “Romanian” ethnicity, most voters - less intense “Romanian” nationalism; Anti-Communist; Bauer majority for deputy; Majority pro-Kuchma parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The presidential vote of 2004</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly Yushchenko</td>
<td>Substantial majority Yushchenko</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

527. The term “Moldovanism”, by which I mean “ethnic Moldovanism” has referred to “we are ethnic Moldovans, therefore not ethnic Romanians” attitudes, and “we speak Moldovan, therefore not Romanian” attitudes. It should be noted that the most important Moldovanists have recently admitted that the Moldovan and Romanian languages are identical. See the speech of the Communist president of the Republic of Moldova at the closing of the session of the Moldovan parliament on December 26, 2003 at http://www.president.md/press.php?p=1&s=1579&lang=rom. Also see the August 26, 2004 interview with BASA-press by the author of the “Moldovan-Romanian Dictionary”, “Vasile Stati: Limba romana si limba moldovenesc nu sunt doua limbi distinste – ele au doua lingvomite, national moldovenesc si national romanesc”. It also appears in an English-language news release of the same agency on August 27, 2004, “Vasile Stati: Romanian and Moldovan Are Not Two Distinct Languages – They Have Two Names, Moldovan National and Romanian National” (see www.basa.md).
"Expected" = The impact of the variable is the one expected on the basis of my model.

"Refines" = The observed patterns have helped me to refine my model.

"Not Discussed" = This element, although real, was not discussed in my original model.

The evidence for the period from 1990 until 2002 suggests the importance of an “appropriate” ethnic basis for nation-building. A “Romanian” identity was a better facilitator of Romanian nationalism than a “Moldovan” one. A Romanian mother tongue was also a better facilitator than a foreign mother tongue. The educational system was important in two ways. Specifically “Romanian” schools teaching in the Romanian language facilitated a Romanian identity and “Romanian nationalism”, whereas their absence did not. In addition, the rising and declining level of activism among teachers partially accounts for the spread of Romanian electoral nationalism. Industrialization has tended to hinder nation-building because it facilitates the dilution of the Romanian ethnic base, particularly through Ukrainization. The impact of the sudden shock was important. The defeat of the August 1991 anti-Gorbachev coup led to the jump-starting of an assertive Romanian nationalism on September 17, 1991.
The emergence, or indeed, re-emergence, of Romanian civic organizations in 1989-1990 did not immediately bring about Romanian electoral nationalism during the 1990 elections and other types of nationalistic activism until after the failed 1991 coup. These phenomena were a post-August 1991 coup phenomenon. These developments seem to indicate the importance of the sudden shock.

During the Soviet period\textsuperscript{528}, the ethnic Ukrainian and Russian populations increased\textsuperscript{529} through immigration and assimilation. Some members of the other ethnic groups (Romanians, Poles, Jews, etc.) were assimilated to one of these populations, while most Jews left for Israel. Not only did numerous Romanians leave the area in 1940 and again in 1944, but also they were disproportionately represented among the victims of the Soviet repressive system.\textsuperscript{530} During the Stalin-made famine of 1946-1947 in Bessarabia, many Bessarabians, mostly Moldovans, came to Bukovina and Herta in order to survive, but then returned home.\textsuperscript{531} Most of the 0.8% of the 2,794,749 ethnic Moldovans of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic who had been born in Ukraine according to the 1989 census came from the Chernivtsi region.\textsuperscript{532} The capital


\textsuperscript{529} Some of these Ukrainians came from Eastern Ukraine. See “Chernivtsi Oblast”, in \textit{www.Answers.com}, at \texttt{www.answers.com/main/ntquery?method=4&dsid=2222&dekey=Chernivtsi+Oblast&gwp=8&curtab=2222_1}.


of the Republic of Moldova, Chisinau, was in Soviet times, and it still mostly is, the “cultural capital” of the Romanians, both “Romanians” and “Moldovans”, of the Chernivtsi region much more than Bucharest is. A large number of members of the Romanian cultural elite were educated in Chisinau and have relatives in that city.  

As we shall see, there was little urbanization of the local Romanian element in the Chernivtsi region. The Soviet authorities were also not satisfied that the Bukovinian Romanians, who had originally, in the early Habsburg period, identified themselves as “Moldovans”, had, as it has been shown in chapters 2 and 3, acquired a Romanian national consciousness by the 1890’s, during the period of Habsburg Austrian rule. The Soviet authorities therefore attempted to undo partially the process through a return to a “Moldovan” identity in parts of northern Bukovina. As we shall see, they had very little long-term success. Nevertheless, during the Soviet period, numerous individuals who had had a Romanian identity before 1940/1944 re-identified themselves as ethnic Ukrainians. As a rule, their descendants are ethnic Ukrainians.

The initial Soviet/Stalinist attempt to transform the ethnic identity of those Romanians who lived in Northern Bukovina and Herta from “Romanian” to “Moldovan” starting in 1940-1941 and after 1944 was overall not very successful because such a change was mandatory only in a minority of the localities. Since the late Stalin period, the inhabitants of certain Bukovinian localities east of the regional capital and

533. I would like to thank Victor Todoriuc, Victor Todoriuc, of Atlanta, Georgia, whose father is a northern Bukovinian Romanian, and who was born in, and spent his childhood in Patrautii de Jos in Storojinet rayon.
534. See, for example, Simion Florea Marian, Traditii populare romanesti din Bucovina (Bucuresti, 1895).
536. Herta was continuously a part of Moldova and later Romania until it was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940.
close to the Bessarabian areas of the Chernivtsi region were treated in a very specific way. These inhabitants of the Chernivtsi and Sadagura rayons were very “strongly encouraged” to call themselves “Moldovans”. This description was used in their internal passports. During the Stalin period, those who refused the “Moldovan” identity that they were officially assigned could be deported to the northern parts of the Soviet Union.537

An eyewitness reports what happened in the village of Molodia. “Around the month of May of the year 1944, all the men of up to 50 years of age were called to the village hall. Each of them was asked whether he was of “Romanian” or “Moldovan” nationality. [All of] the men answered that they were Romanians from the time when their fathers and forefathers were, but the occupiers were screaming that between Romanians and Moldovans there was no difference and that from this day onward, all of them would be called Moldovans. During the same month, the “Moldovans” from Plaiul Cosminului (Molodia) received an order of conscription into the Red Army. Assembled near the village hall, they were organized in rows and accompanied by a musical band to the recruiting center. Those who refused to declare that they were “Moldovans”, that is [those who declared that they were] Romanians, were not sent to the front, but to labor camps in the region of Lake Onega, where more than half of them died before their time.”538

537. These Bukovinian localities included Mahala, Boian, Ostrita, Voloca, Molodia, Corovia, Ceahor, Hruiseuti, Valea Cosminului, Tureni and Mamornita. See Stefan Broasca, in “Ucraina: De ce este incurajat “moldovenismul”?”, in Lumea Magazin, no. 9, 2002, accessed at http://www.lumeam.ro/nr9_2002/tranzitia_la_vecini.html on June 11, 2005, and Popescu, “Populatia Regiunii Cernauti prin prisma rezultatelor recensamantului din 2001”, p. 114, 137, 142, 149. It should be noted that in some, but not all, of these localities, a substantial minority of the inhabitants did state that they were “Romanians”. Thus, Valea Cosminului of Hliboca rayon had 907 “Moldovans” and 138 “Romanians” in 1989, Ceahor from the same rayon 1,095 “Moldovans” and 221 “Romanians”. In the large Bukovinian village of Boian of Noua Sulita rayon, right on the “border” between Bukovina and Bessarabia, the population included 3,724 “Moldovans” and only 40 “Romanians”. See Popescu, p. 114, 149. On the sending to the Gulag of the “recalcitrant Romanians”, see Ion Popescu, “Crearea Regiunii Cernauti, chapter 3. Populatia regiunii Cernauti in perioada sovietica: 1940-1941, 1944-1959”, in Observatorul (Toronto), February 13, 2005, accessed at http://www.observatorul.com/articles_main.asp?action=articleviewdetail&ID=195 in June 2005. According to Victor Todoriuc’s father, a teacher, at that time in northern Bukovina, now in the Republic of Moldova, the Soviet authorities followed an interesting policy. They attempted to impose a “Moldovan” ethnic identity through “Moldovan” internal passports everywhere in Bukovina and Herta in 1940. In some areas, such as the Storojinet and Herta rayons, etc., this was adamantly rejected, and the regime exchanged the “Moldovan” passports for “Romanian” ones. In some other areas, the population opposed getting “Moldovan” internal passports, but less strongly. In those areas, the “Moldovan” passports were not exchanged for “Romanian” ones. My source is a phone conversation with Victor Todoriuc, who, with M.A.’s in Sociology and European Studies. He is a person of Romanian ethnicity from the region who lives in the U.S. He also has advanced training in the social sciences.

After these events in 1944, about 20% of the Romanians of Bukovina and Herta, who had had a “Romanian” identity since around 1890, did list a “Moldovan” identity in their internal passports. The members of this group were also generally listed as “Moldovans” in the Soviet censuses. A large majority of those who lived between the provincial capital and the Bessarabian border were forced to identify themselves as ethnic “Moldovans” during the Stalin period. The overwhelming majority of these inhabitants identified themselves in this way until after the January 1989 Soviet census. The preservation of a “Romanian” self-identification among about 80% of the Romanians of Bukovina and Herta occurred despite the end of the use of the label “Romanian language” in education, and of publishing in the Latin alphabet. This happened despite the introduction of the term “Moldovan” to describe the language, “Moldovan” schools, etc., and the replacement of the Latin script by the Cyrillic alphabet.

Nevertheless, one should note that the Soviet period affected the development of a somewhat different system of nested identities among the northern Bukovinian Romanians under Soviet rule than among the southern Bukovinian ones in Romania (see Picture 4R and Table 4S). In interwar Romania, the typical Bukovinian would call himself a “Bukovinian Romanian”, that is, a Romanian from Bukovina, with “Bukovinian” serving as a regional identity. He would also use of the term “Moldovan Romanian”, that is, a, a Romanian from Moldova, with the “Moldovan” serving as a sub-national, but supra-regional identity. The phrase stopped being used by many, who started to see differences between themselves and the “Moldovan Romanians” of Moldova and Bessarabia (see chapter 3). The use of the “Moldovan” sub-national identity among self-identified “Bukovinian Romanians” again became generalized during the

http://www.observatorul.com/articles_main.asp?action=articleviewdetail&ID=195 in June 2005. In many of these villages (Ceahor, Molodia, Corovia, Codrul-Cosminului, Valea-Cosminului and Cuciurul Mare), the Romanian-language schools did not become “Moldovan-language” schools, but were turned into Ukrainian-language ones.

539. This is shown by the self-identification of the overwhelming majority of these people as Romanians in the 1959 Soviet census.


The evolution of the numbers of self-styled “Romanians” in the region during the Soviet period is interesting. In 1959, in the Chernivtsi (Chernovtsy in Russian, Cernauti in Romanian) oblast (region) of Ukraine (including the northernmost part of Bessarabia), there were 79,790 “Romanians”. They represented about 79% of all the members of this identity group in Soviet Ukraine. Out of these, 65,637 declared that they spoke “Romanian” (82.26%) as their native language. There were also 71,645 “Moldovans”, out of which 69,867 (97.52%) declared that they spoke “Moldovan”.

Picture 4R - Regional, Supra-Regional and Ethnic (National) Nested Identity among the Northern Bukovinian Romanians during the Late Soviet Period and the Post-Soviet period (and during the Late Habsburg Period)

1. Romanian regional identity (Bukovinian Romanian)

I would like to thank Victor Todoriuc for this point, which is actually quite consistent with other individuals’ experiences.

2. Romanian supra-regional identity (Moldovan Romanian)

3. Romanian national identity (Romanian)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Area</th>
<th>Bukovina</th>
<th>Western Moldova</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Southern Bukovina</td>
<td>Northern Bukovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>Currently in Romania</td>
<td>Currently in Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>“Bukovinian” or “Moldovan” Romanians</td>
<td>“Bukovinian” or “Moldovan” Romanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late interwar period</td>
<td>“Bukovinian”, or, less often, “Moldovan” Romanians</td>
<td>“Bukovinian”, or, less often, “Moldovan” Romanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Soviet and post-Soviet period</td>
<td>“Bukovinian” Romanians</td>
<td>“Bukovinian” or “Moldovan” Romanians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Qualitative Table 3E – The “Romanian” and “Moldovan” Population during the Soviet Period in the Chernivtsi Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement, question</th>
<th>Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Bukovina and Herta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Romanian” majority areas of Northern Bukovina and Herta</td>
<td>“Moldovanized” northeastern Northern Bukovina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Statement, question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary ethnic identity in 1918</strong></td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary ethnic identity - 1937-1939</strong></td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Did most accept Romanian ethnic identity in 1937-1939?</strong></td>
<td>Yes, all as primary identity</td>
<td>Yes, all as primary identity</td>
<td>Yes, most as secondary identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Did most support Romanian national movement in 1937-1939?</strong></td>
<td>Yes, almost all</td>
<td>Yes, almost all</td>
<td>Yes, most</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic identity during the 1959-1979 censuses</strong></td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linguistic identity during the 1959 census</strong></td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linguistic identity during the 1979 census</strong></td>
<td>Mostly “Moldovan”, large minority “Romanian”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linguistic identity during the 1989 census</strong></td>
<td>Mostly “Romanian”, large minority “Moldovan”</td>
<td>Mostly “Moldovan”, large minority “Romanian”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orthodox Church language name during the Soviet period</strong></td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orthodox church language name since 1990’s</strong></td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>Substantial majority “Romanian”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic identity during the 2001 census</strong></td>
<td>Almost all “Romanian”</td>
<td>Large majority “Romanian”</td>
<td>Large majority “Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Did most support Romanian nationalism in 1994-1998?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Did most support Romanian nationalism in 1999-2002?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is likely that practically all of the “Romanians” who indicated that they spoke neither
“Romanian” (1,484), nor Ukrainian (12,304), nor Russian (365) declared that they spoke “Moldovan”. Therefore, the total number of ethnic Romanians (“Romanians” plus “Moldovans”) was 151,435. Out of these, 52.69% identified themselves as “Romanians”, a slightly lower percentage than in 1989; 43.34% identified themselves as both “Romanians” and “Romanian-speakers”, and 46.14% as both “Moldovans” and “Moldovan-speakers”.544

In 1970, 10% of the population of the oblast declared itself “Romanian”, whereas 9.3% called itself Moldovan, in comparison to 10.3% and 9.3% in 1959. The Ukrainization of many of them probably caused the decline in the proportion of “Romanians”.545

The Soviet policy also allowed the self-styled “Romanians”, who were educated in the Cyrillic alphabet in “Moldovan-language” schools, to declare that their language was “Romanian”. The impact was seen in a few cases by 1959 and in most cases by 1979. By then, the educational system had been able to have a mass impact on the linguistic self-identifications. In 1979, out of 122,000 “Romanians” in Ukraine, 90,000 “Romanians” (about 74%) lived in the Chernivtsi region. Only 22,000 of the Chernivtsi region “Romanians”, or about a quarter, a disproportionately elderly group educated in pre-Soviet times, declared their mother tongue as “Romanian”. In addition, 2,000 declared that it was Russian, 12,000 or more than one-eighth Ukrainian, and 54,000 or three-fifths, said that it was “other”, practically exclusively “Moldovan”.546 Nicholas Dima believes that in 1979-1989, the Soviet authorities were allowing those whom they permitted to self-identify themselves as “Romanians” to declare their mother tongue as whatever they chose.547 Yet a number of Soviet sociologists identified the self-identified Bukovinian “Romanians” and even Transcarpathian Romanians as “Moldovans” in their sociological studies.548

546. See Nicholas Dima, Moldova and the Transnistrian Republic (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 110. The census does not indicate in how many cases the language that these “Romanians” with “another” mother-tongue called it “Moldovan”. However, it is a well-known fact that almost all, much more than 99%, of these claimed that their mother-tongue was “Moldovan”, and that very few Romanians used German, Polish, etc., as their native language. This view is supported by the 2001 census data.
547. See Dima, p. 110. Even as late as 1989, self-styled “Moldovans” were not allowed to do this.
548. See V.I. Naulko, “The Present Ethnic Composition of the Population of the Ukrainian SSR”, in Soviet
By the late Soviet period, and especially during the Gorbachev period (1985-1991), things changed. The factors that had been influencing Bukovinian and Herta census “Romanians” to call themselves “Moldovan-speaking” were increasingly countered by other factors. One of them was the movement, starting in 1987, to call the language “Romanian” and to demand a switch to the Latin alphabet. By 1989, a majority of the self-styled “Romanians” were already identifying their language as “Romanian”.

In January 1989, out of 135,000 “Romanians” in Ukraine, 100,317 lived in the Chernivtsi region (again...
about 74%) the Chernovtsy (Chernivtsi) Oblast (region). Among these 100,317 “Romanians”, 53,211 (53.04%) declared their mother tongue as “Romanian”. These included a large majority of the Romanians in the Storojinet rayon. The local Romanian population’s voting patterns had been more nationalistic in pre-Communist times than those in the other rayons of the region.

In addition, 11,738 (11.70%) declared it as Ukrainian, and 2,956 (2.95%) as Russian, and the rest, 32,412 (32.31%) declared that they spoke “other” languages. I believe that this re-identification of many “Moldovan-speakers” as “Romanian-speakers” should be seen as evidence of Romanian nationalism, particularly in the Storojinet rayon. Among the 84,519 “Moldovans”, 80,637 (95.41%) declared that they spoke “Moldovan”, 2,132 (2.52%) spoke Ukrainian, 1,749 (2.07%) the Russian language, and, because of Soviet official disapproval, only one “Moldovan” indicated his language as “other”.551

A Romanian self-identification was tolerated, but not fostered, in the Chernivtsi region. The Soviet regime to some extent still discouraged it, and especially the use of the Latin alphabet, which was nevertheless quietly supported by most Romanians in the late 1980’s, until August 31, 1989. On that day, the “Moldovan” alphabet was officially switched from Cyrillic to Latin, and Moldovan legislation passed a bill equating the “Moldovan” and “Romanian” languages.552

551. See Dima, p. 110 and Dr. Ion Popescu, “Populatia romanofona a Regiunii Cernauti si zonele ei sociolingvistice”, in Glasul Bucovinei, 1994, no. 3, p. 24. Therefore, out of 184,836 ethnic Romanians (“Romanians” plus “Moldovans”), 54.27% declared that they were ethnic “Romanians”, a slightly higher percentage than in 1959, and 28.79% called themselves both ethnic “Romanians” and “Romanian-speakers”, a figure that was much lower than the comparable percentage in 1959. By contrast, in 1989, 43.62% of the ethnic Romanians were both “Moldovans” and “Moldovan-speakers”, hardly a decrease in comparison to 1959. It should be noted that the distinction between the speakers of “Romanian” and those who declared their tongue in a manner that was classified in the census results as “other” was often one of alphabet. The former in fact implied that they used the Romanian language in its standard form, which had not been taught in Soviet schools at all since 1940. By contrast, the latter implied that they only used it in its Cyrillic alphabet form, used by Russian and, until August 31, 1989, by “Moldovan”, which was taught to self-styled “Romanian” children too. It should be noted that in the Bukovinian districts of the oblast (ruled by Austria until 1918), 81.42% of the ethnic Romanians identified themselves as such rather than as “Moldovans”. In the two Bessarabian districts (rayons) of the Chernovtsi region that were located immediately to the north of the Republic of Moldova, 9.67% of the ethnic Romanian inhabitants (“Romanians” plus “Moldovans”) identified themselves as “Romanians” in 1989. The percentage is calculated from the detailed data in Popescu, “Populatia”, p. 22. Few of the Bessarabians would have dared to declare themselves ethnic “Romanians” in 1959 or even 1989. Also see Ion and Alexandra Popescu, “A Survey of Socio-Linguistic Aspects Concerning the Spoken Languages in the Region of Cernauti”, in Romanian Civilization, vol. 2, no. 2, Spring 1993, p. 42-52.

552. I have obtained some interesting details regarding the pre-1989 discouragement of the writing of Romanian in the Latin alphabet from Victor Todoriuc in November 2005. Such a practice could lead to the loss of one’s status as a pioneer or Komsomolist. Interestingly enough, in the Soviet memorandum calling for the establishment of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the conceptualization was different (“a Romanian dialect – the Moldovan language”). See “Memoriul cu privire la necesitatea crearii
The Soviet policy in Northern Bukovina had much less of a lasting effect on the results of the Ukrainian census of 2001 or on the electoral results since the collapse of the Soviet Union than on the census results of 1959-1989. In the Chernivtsi/Cernauti/Czernowitz region, including its non-Bukovinian parts, the number of self-styled “Romanians” increased from 1989 to 2001 by 14.23%, from 100,317 to 114,600. By contrast, the number of self-styled “Moldovans” in 2001 was 67,200, only 79.51% of what it had been in 1989 (84,519). It is obvious that a considerable number of individuals, probably about 17,000-18,000, had “switched” their primary national identity from “Moldovan” to “Romanian” during the period between the censuses. Overall, the number of people who declared either of these two identities slightly decreased in absolute numbers from 184,836 to 181,800. It increased insignificantly, from 19.7% to 19.8% of the population of the oblast, between the two censuses.553

There was an increase in the number of “Romanian” residents of Ukraine between the censuses of 1989 and 2001 (in thousands) from 134.8 to 151.0 and a decrease in the number of “Moldovans” from 324.5 to 258.6. The change from a “Moldovan” to a “Romanian” mother tongue has been even more dramatic. This reflects a massive shrinking of the population with a “Moldovan” and “Moldovan-speaking” identity. This was partially due to Ukrainization, Russification, and emigration for work to other countries. It was also due to the official switch to a “Romanian” identity by numerous inhabitants, especially in the Chernivtsi554 region (Northern Bukovina, Herta and Northern Bessarabia).555

In 1989, a large minority, and in 1979, a majority of the individuals who identified themselves Republicii Sovietice Socialiste Moldovenesti”, in Moldovan Academic Review, no. 1, August 2002, accessed at http://www.iatp.md/academicreview/1/ro/doc1.htm on June 8, 2005. The officially postulated, but empirically non-existent, difference between the “Moldovan” and “Romanian” languages did not prevent the Soviet authorities from imposing the teaching of the “Moldovan language” in the Cyrillic alphabet in northern Bukovina and Herta, where the Romanian nation-building process had been finished by the 1890’s. It did not stop them from doing the same in Transcarpathia, where the local Romanian population had had a “Romanian” identity since the time of the Romanian ethnogenesis about a thousand years ago, and had never had a “Romanian” identity.

553. See the official Ukrainian census results at http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/chernivtsi/ (in Ukrainian, accessed March 2005). There are large numbers of inhabitants from the region, including from among ethnic Romanians, and especially from among self-styled “Moldovans”, working outside Ukraine. They are earning their living particularly in southern Europe, and were not always counted in the December 5, 2001 Ukrainian census. The percentage increase was largely caused by the permanent immigration to other countries of a large majority of the Jewish population and of a minority of the Russian population.

554. Chernovtsy is the form in Russian. The form in Ukrainian is “Chernivtsi”, and the form in Romanian is “Cernăuți”.

as “Romanians” did not know, or pretended not to know, the Latin alphabet used by standard Romanian. This might explain why they declared then, but not in 2001, that their mother tongue was “Moldovan”\textsuperscript{556}. After 1989, the knowledge of the Latin alphabet became practically universal among ethnic Romanians, including “Moldovans”, just like in the Republic of Moldova. This did not bring about the end of the “Moldovan” ethnic and linguistic self-identifications. The continuing survival of the “Moldovan” ethnic identity, including in the non-Bessarabian areas where it had not existed in 1940, was demonstrated by opinion polling data collected by Ukrainian academics in 1992\textsuperscript{557}.

The opinion polls/surveys of the early 1990’s which dealt with interethnic, linguistic and other cultural issues showed no significant differences in the distribution of values and attitudes between “Romanians” and “Moldovans” in the various rayons of the Chernivtsi region. By contrast, the differences within each of the two identity groups are larger than the aggregate ones between them\textsuperscript{558}. For example, in the fall of 1992, according to a poll conducted by professors from the University of Chernivtsi, 19.3% of the region’s “Moldovans” and 15.1% of the “Romanians” agreed that the Ukrainian language “tends to become little by little the main instrument of communication in all fields of the communal life”\textsuperscript{559}.

According to the same 1992 poll, 77% of the “Moldovans” and 71.4% of the “Romanians” preferred that their children should be taught in the Romanian language. In the district of Hliboca (Hlybotskyj in Ukrainian), 66.7% of the “Moldovans”, overwhelmingly “local” individuals who originated in the same rayon, and 90% of the “Romanians”, thought that Romanian should be an official language in the areas with a large Romanian-speaking population. In the district of Storojinet (Storozhynetskyj in Ukrainian), the figures were 100% for “Moldovans”, who were mostly “immigrants” rather than locals, and

\textsuperscript{556}. However, by the early years of the third millennium, this problem has been eliminated in the sense that the Latin alphabet is quasi-universally known among ethnic Romanians, including self-styled “Moldovans”. However, a decreasing minority of the latter continue to use also the Cyrillic alphabet.


\textsuperscript{558}. By comparison, the opinion surveys conducted by William Crowther show the existence of greater differences between the self-styled “Moldovans” and the self-styled “Romanians” in the Republic of Moldova. The cultural differences between the two identity groups are not very large. They are smaller than those between the ethnic Romanians from various parts of Romania. See Lavinia Stan, \textit{Leaders and Laggards: Governance, Civicness and Ethnicity in Post-Communist Romania} (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, 2003), passim and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, \textit{Transilvania subiectiva} (Bucuresti: Humanitas, 1999), passim.

75% for “Romanians”.\textsuperscript{560}

Map 4A3 - Ethnic map of all of Bukovina, based on the Ukrainian census of 2001 and the Romanian census of 2002\textsuperscript{561}


\textsuperscript{561} See \url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Bucovethn.png}.  

The survey data indicate that in the post-Soviet Chernivtsi region, we are dealing with a “Romanian and Romanophone revival”, thus with “Romanian”, or “Romanian and Romanophone nation-building”.562 The politically-active population demanded, and obtained, the teaching of Romanian ethnic history and the history of Romania in the Romanian-language schools in the Chernivtsi and Transcarpathian regions, a practice that has continued to have strong “Romanian” and “Moldovan” support.563

The evaluation of the status of the “Romanian and Romanophone minority” by the Ukrainian authorities is a controversial issue. It varies from very satisfactory564 in Transcarpathia to problematic for the Odessa region. The situation of the Romanians of the Chernivtsi region is adequate. One should nevertheless note their great under-representation among university students and professors.565 Most northern Bukovinian Romanians do not feel “at home” in Ukraine; most of their ancestors did in imperial Austria. Yet their treatment is in my opinion better than the treatment of the Ukrainian minority during most of the Romanian interwar period, which is discussed in chapters 4 and 5. With a 19.7%-19.8% Romanian minority in the Chernivtsi region, 16.56% of the region’s school-age population was studying in the Romanian language in 2002.566

Other pieces of evidence are consistent with this picture. The statistical data for the whole country seem to show that the civil service was open to ethnic Romanians. Self-identified “Romanians” represent

562. Alternatively, perhaps, in the view of the partial reversal of the Romanian nation-building process during the Soviet period, we are dealing with a process of “national rebuilding”. The existence of a common national movement for the two identity groups in Northern Bukovina, the “Romanian” and the “Moldovan” ones, also called the national movement of the Romanophones (“Romanian-speakers”), during the period starting in 1990 is instructive.


564. It should also be noted that the treatment of the Ukrainian minority in Romania is also adequate. This topic, however, is outside the scope of this chapter. The topic of the relations of the Ukrainian state with Romania and Moldova is discussed in, for example, Roman Wolczuk, Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policy 1991-2000 (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 83-97.


566. See Popescu, Populatia regionii Cernauti, p. 113-114.
0.03% of the work force, but 0.09% of the public employees, including in areas where the Romanian population identifies itself predominantly as “Moldovan”. Nevertheless, during the late part of the Leonid Kuchma presidency and after the Orange Revolution, ethnic Romanians have been discriminated in obtaining top positions within the regions in which they lived, and particularly in the Chernivtsi region.

In the sections below, I shall look at the evolution and impact of the Romanian ethnic basis according to statistical data, with a focus on national and linguistic identity. Subsequently, we will look at the electoral evolution of Romanian and Romanophone nationalism in the Chernivtsi region. The impact of the variables will be clearly outlined. The “proper” ethnic basis has facilitated Romanian nation-building. The educational system has promoted Romanian or at least Romanophone nationalism. Industrialization has hindered the Romanian minority’s nation-building, and even more the spreading of a “Romanian” identity. The sudden shock of the failed August 1991 coup and of the collapse of the Soviet Union has helped Romanian and Romanophone nationalism in the Chernivtsi region.

C. The Census Data: The Evolution of the “Romanian” and “Moldovan” Groups in the Chernivtsi Region since 1989

1. The Ethnic Basis and the Educational Process

Based on my theoretical model, one would have expected a number of trends to be visible between 1989 and 2001, and to be reflected in the census data. Since the ethnic basis is key to nation-building, one would have expected that the northern Bukovinian and Herta Romanians would switch to a “Romanian” and “Romanian-speaking” identity. They spoke Romanian with the same accent as one may hear across the border in Romania. During the Soviet period, the “Romanians” in some areas claimed, or were forced to claim, to be “Moldovans” or “Moldovan-speakers”. By contrast, the presence of the Moldovan accent in northern Bessarabia, and of the memory of a “Moldovan” ethnic identity has had an impact. It has encouraged the preservation among most, but not all, of the Bessarabian Moldovans of a

569. This has already been documented in chapter 2.
“Moldovan” primary identity. In those areas where there have recently been no Romanian schools and the children have been taught in Ukrainian and/or Russian, the situation was different. The speech of the individuals, more affected by Slavic influences, and the absence of schools and school teachers who would promote a Romanian identity in the school and in the village, are important. They have both hindered the return to a “Romanian” identity.

Before looking in depth at the ethnic basis, it is important to recognize that it is a part of the culture, a cultural phenomenon. Thus, the reproduction of the ethnic basis is done through a communicative process. However, it is not my intent to discuss fully this process, beyond saying that families, social networks and the church had an important role in it. What I am most interested in is in discussing the nature of the ethnic basis at particular points in time, how we know that this was so, as well as how and why it changed. The outcome of the nation-building process, the intensity of the politically expressed nationalism, as measured by a numerical score, is a political phenomenon. It could be measured by using electoral data, statistics on collective action, including mass petitions, etc. It would therefore be a misconstruction of my model to argue that the value of both my independent and dependent variables could or would be “Romanian”, because a “Romanian ethnic basis” does not equal “Romanian nationalism” (see Qualitative Table 4T).

**Qualitative Table 4T. The Ethnic Basis Explained**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable (Cause)</th>
<th>Dependent Variable (Outcome)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Basis</td>
<td>The intensity of nationalism for each type of nationalism (e.g., “Romanian”, “Moldovan”, etc.), as measured by the electoral data, the results of mass petitions, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Intersubjective ethnic basis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ethnicity (ascertained by others), language, idiom, accent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Subjective ethnic identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Subjective linguistic identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Salient cultural features</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Religious features, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example (long explanation):</td>
<td>Example (long explanation):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Romanian objective ethnicity, speaking the Romanian language in the same way as across the border in Romania, a “Romanian” ethnic and lin-</td>
<td>Romanian nationalism, with a score of X (e.g., 0.84) on the intensity of nationalism scale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Independent Variable (Cause) | Dependent Variable (Outcome)
---|---
guistic identity, the Gregorian religious calendar |
Example (in a nutshell) | Example (in a nutshell)
“Romanian ethnic basis” | “Romanian nationalism”
Misconstruction or simplification of my model: | Misconstruction or simplification of my model:
“Romanian” | “Romanian”

Qualitative Table 4 V – The Interaction of the Various Elements of the Ethnic Basis (Simplified)

1. Ethnicity (ascertained by others)
2. Language, idiom, accent
3. Religious features, etc.
4. Ethnic & linguistic self-ID

Subjective ethnic
Subjective linguistic identity

The situation in the northern part of Bukovina is very fascinating for the study of both Romanian and Ukrainian nation-building. It should be noted that the Ukrainian Chernivtsi region (oblast) includes not only northern Bukovina, but also the northern part of Bessarabia and the region of Herta. All of these territories became a part of Ukraine in 1940 and again in 1944. During the Soviet period, the Ukrainian Soviet authorities originally pushed in favor of the adoption by the Romanian population of many parts of northern Bukovina of a “Moldovan” identity. This went hand-in-hand with the imposition of the Cyrillic alphabet for both those who used “Romanian” and called it this way, and for those who called their mother-tongue “Moldovan”.

Only a minority of the Bukovinian Romanians was told to call themselves, and re-identified themselves as, “Moldovans”. Yet an increasing number of these individuals started to identify their language as “Moldovan”, the term used in schools. In 1959, an overwhelming majority of the Romanian population of northern Bukovina and Herta identified itself as “Romanian” as opposed to “Moldovan”, just as it had done in during the whole Soviet period. However, due to Soviet administrative pressures, a minority of this population, and a majority of this population in certain localities, did outwardly accept the

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“Moldovan” identity, particularly in the 1989 census. In 1989, 81.42% of the Romanian population in the Bukovinian sub-districts (rayons) of the Chernivtsi region called themselves “Romanians”. By contrast, 18.58%, including some who had moved from the Bessarabian areas into Chernivtsi and its suburbs, called themselves “Moldovans”.

571 Dr. Ion Popescu claims that the census-takers in some localities of Bukovina simply classified the inhabitants as “Moldovans” regardless of how they declared themselves. See Popescu, “Populatia Regiunii Cernauti prin prisma rezultatelor recensamantului din 2001”, p. 137. Popescu claims, in his discussion of the situation in the rayon of Hliboca, that the Romanians from the suburban area of the city of Cernauti (Molodia, Ceahor, Corovia, Valea Cosminului, Voloca and Hruseuti), were listed arbitrarily as “Moldovans”.

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571
Map 4!! – Bukovinian Localities in Which Most Inhabitants Declared that They Were “Moldovans”
in the Last Soviet Census of 1989

However, by the time of the December 5, 2001 census, the overwhelming majority of these new “Moldovans” whose identity had been imposed by the Soviet regime had switched to the “Romanian” identity that they or their ancestors had had before 1944 (see the rayon-by-rayon data in Table 4A). In 2001, 89.82% of the Romanians in the northern (Ukrainian) part of historical Bukovina called themselves “Romanians” and only 10.18% “Moldovans”.\(^{572}\) In the Herta rayon (Hertsajivskyj in Ukrainian), between 1989 and 2001, the share of self-identified “Romanians” among the total number of Romanians (“Romanians” and “Moldovans”) increased from 85.54% to 97.51%. The proportion of “Moldovans” decreased from 14.46% to 2.49%.\(^{573}\)

Overall, among the northern Bukovinian Romanians, a disproportionate number of the individuals with a “Moldovan” identity are partially slavicized. The families of the Slavicized individuals were typically removed from the influence of the Romanian-language educational system. This was usually because they live or lived in localities without Romanian-language schools.\(^{574}\) In other words, even in the non-Bessarabian areas of the region, the fact that some individuals had a “Moldovan” identity was often explained by schooling in an Eastern Slavic language (Ukrainian or Russian). My model predicts this.

There was an even more amazing change in the native language declarations of the population between the two most recent censuses. In 1989, the non-Bessarabian rayons, that is, both the Bukovinian rayons and Herta had 120,521 Romanians, including 99,268 “Romanians” (82.37%) and 21,253 “Moldovans” (17.63%). However, in terms of languages, the 120,521 Romanians, including those

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\(^{572}\) See Ion Popescu, “Populatia Regiunii Cernauti prin prisma rezultatelor recensamantului din 2001”, in Uniunea Societatilor Romanesti “Pentru Integrare European”, in *Romanii in Ucraina: Intre trecut si viitor* (Centrul Bucovinean Independent de Cercetari Actuale), p. 111-150. In the 2001 Ukrainian census, in the exclusively or overwhelmingly Bukovinian rayons of the Chernivtsi oblast, 8,782 inhabitants declared themselves “Moldovans” (10.01% of the total Romanian population) and 78,940 (89.99%) declared themselves “Romanians”. In the Herta rayon, the 756 “Moldovans” represented 2.49%, while the 29,554 “Romanians” represented 97.51%. Therefore, the total for the non-Bessarabian areas of the region was 9,538 “Moldovans” (8.08%) as well as 108,494 (91.92%) “Romanians”. My calculations are based on the table in Popescu, p. 144.

\(^{573}\) The information and exact numbers on which I have based my computations are found in Popescu, “Populatia”, p. 141-142.

individuals who had ceased to be Romanophones (Romanian-speakers), included the following groups. There were 52,662 “Romanian-speaking Romanians”, or 43.70%, 18,239 “Moldovan-speaking Moldovans”, or 15.13%, 1 “Romanian-speaking Moldovan” or 0.00%, and 32,381 “Moldovan-speaking Romanians”, or 26.87%. By 2001, the situation had changed substantially. At that time, out of 118,160 Romanians there were 100,194 “Romanian-speaking Romanians” or 84.89%, 7,038 “Moldovan-speaking Moldovans” or 5.96%, 388 “Romanian-speaking Moldovans” or 0.33% and 405 “Moldovan-speaking Romanians” or 0.34%. As one may see, the number of “Romanian-speaking” self-identified “Romanians” practically doubled.

The overall trend in northern Bessarabia has been in the same direction, from a “Moldovan” to a “Romanian” identity. In the northern Bessarabian rayons, there were 57,589 “Moldovans” and 6,031 “Romanians” in 2001. The clearest example of this pattern has been the increase of the “Romanian” population of the overwhelmingly Bessarabian Noua Sulita (Novaselita or Novoselytskyj in Ukrainian) rayon from 585 in 1989 to 5,904 in 2001 at the expense of the “Moldovan” one, who decreased from 55,669 to 50,329. This too reflected a return to past, pre-Soviet, patterns. Numerous (northern) Bessarabian “Moldovans” have been acquiring a “Romanian” secondary identity since the late 1980's. This process was helped by the fact that they lived in an area where a substantial proportion of the inhabitants, including the relatives of the respective individuals, had identified themselves as “Romanians” before 1940/1944. This pattern is also visible in the Bessarabian parts of the Republic of Moldova.

Table 4P - Types of Identities in the Chernivtsi and Odessa Regions, the Republic of Moldova, etc.

A. (One’s own) identity ascertained by the official population census.

1. Romanian ethnic and linguistic self-identification.

575. Let us look at the few Bukovinian villages of the rayon of Noua Sulita. The data of the Soviet census suggests that there were more “Moldovan-speakers” than “Romanian-speakers” among the Bukovinian and Herta Romanians by the time of the 1989 Soviet census.
577. See Popescu, “Populatia Regiunii Cernauti prin prisma rezultatelor”, passim.


B. (Theoretical) conceptualization of the relationship between the “Romanian” and “Moldovan” ethnicities and languages.

a. Accepts/believes that the “Moldovan” and “Romanian” ethnicities and languages are identical, that “Romanians” and “Moldovans” are one people.

b. Believes that the “Moldovan” language is identical to the “Romanian” language, but that the “Moldovan” ethnicity is not identical to the “Romanian” ethnicity.

c. Believes that the “Moldovan” ethnicity is identical to the “Romanian” ethnicity, but that the “Moldovan” language is not identical to the “Romanian” languages. This is theoretically possible, but in practice absent in these cases.

d. Believes that the “Moldovan” ethnicity is not identical with the “Romanian” language, and that the “Moldovan” language is not identical to the “Romanian” language. Practically non-existent (absent) in the Chernivtsi region.

Possible Combinations of Outlooks on “Romanianness” and “Moldovanness”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptualizations</th>
<th>Group to which this applies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>1a</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>1b</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1c</td>
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<td>d</td>
<td>1d</td>
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<tr>
<td>Census Identities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1a</td>
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<td>1b</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Ukrainian official linguistic statistics are unusually revealing. In the Chernivtsi region, there were 3,297 “Romanians” and 1,672 “Moldovans” language listed “Moldovan” as their first language and “Romanian” as their second language. Moreover, 1,391 “Moldovans” and 476 “Romanians” declared that they spoke “Romanian” as their first language, and “Moldovan” as their second language.579 My speculative interpretation of the numbers is that most of the rest regarded “Moldovan” and “Romanian” as the same language, and did not feel that they had to list both of them. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that this is a reasonable position. The approval of almost all the “Moldovans” in the region that the language that is taught in the schools of the Bessarabian part of the region should be called “Romanian” is only one of numerous such pieces of evidence.

The lack of exposure of numerous Romanians to the influence of Romanian schools was largely due to the absence of Romanian schools in some localities in Bukovina and Herta. It has hindered Romanian nation-building. Wherever there are no Romanian schools, a “Moldovan” ethnic identity is retained in some cases due to the force of habit. This explains why in areas where there are very few Romanians and no Romanian schools and identity changes from “Romanian” to “Moldovan” have taken place during Soviet times, the “Moldovan” population was particularly large in comparison to the “Romanian” one.580

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579. See Popescu, p. 145.
580. For some related material, see “Kuchma Ignored the Interest of His Compatriots in Bukovyna”, at http://www.polit.com.ua/index.php?PHPSESSID=f2431ddba6f0b1ac8cb67eb2affd807f&lang=eng&spoid=1&poid=1&id=19235&PHPSESSID=f2431ddba6f0b1ac8cb67eb2affd807f (accessed February 2005). Also consult “Moldavians will be supported materially if they will become Romanians” at
In some of the northern Bessarabian and northern Bukovinian areas with few Romanians and no Romanian schools, the proportion of “Romanians” in comparison to that of “Moldovans” decreased between 1989 and 2001. This was a continuation of Soviet-era trends. The proportion of self-identified “Moldovans”, as distinct from “Romanians”, was higher in some areas. These included the places where there were rather few ethnic Romanians, and where the proportion of Ukrainians was overwhelming. Thus, in the northernmost areas of Bukovina, in the rayons of Putila, Zastavna, Chitmani and Vijnita combined, in 1989 the Romanians called themselves “Romanians” in 56.49% of the cases and “Moldovans” in 43.51%. In many of these areas, the proportion of “Moldovans” increased in comparison to that of “Romanians” between 1989 and 2001, when the proportions were 37.46% “Romanians” and 62.54% “Moldovans”. One of the reasons for this was the fact that these individuals had few opportunities to use the Latin alphabet, which was linked to a “Romanian” ethnic and linguistic identity.

There is a correlation between “Romanian” schools and a “Romanian” primary identity in the areas with a larger Romanian population outside of northern Bessarabia. Thus, in the rayon of Herta, where all the villages have Romanian-language schools, only 1.7% of the Romanian-speakers are “Moldovan-speaking Moldovans”, only 0.01% of them are “Moldovan-speaking Romanians” and 0.79% of them are “Romanian-speaking Moldovans”, whereas 97.51% are “Romanian-speaking Romanians”. One could very well minimize the importance of some of those cases whose identity diverges from the regional norm as individuals who have migrated from Bessarabia or their descendants, which might very well be the case.


In the Northern Bukovinian areas that were solidly Ukrainian (the rayons of Putila, Zastavna, Chitmani and Vijnita), the number of “Romanians” decreased from 705 (56.45% of all local Romanians) to 221 (37.46%), while that of “Moldovans” increased from 221 to 369. See Popescu, “Populatia Regiunii Cernauti prin prisma rezultatelor”, p. 130-134, 144. In the Chelmenet rayon, in 1989, there were 87 “Romanians” (13.49%) and 558 “Moldovans” (86.51%), in comparison to 25 “Romanians” (4.98%) and 477 “Moldovans” (95.02%) in 2001. In the Hotin rayon, there were 197 “Romanians” (3.68%) and 5,157 “Moldovans” (96.32%) in 1989 and 59 “Romanians” (1.14%) and 5,102 “Moldovans” (98.86%) in 2001. In the Secureni rayon, the respective numbers were 13 (0.75%) and 1,723 (99.25%) in 1989, and 43 (2.49%) and 1,681 (97.51%) in 2001. However, in the city of Novodnestrovsk, the number of self-styled “Romanians” decreased from 42 (21.32% of the population of Romanian ethnic origin) to 30 (23.44%), and that of the self-styled “Moldovans” decreased from 155 (78.68%) to 98 (76.56%). This means that the numerical decrease of the latter group was slightly steeper. In 2001, in the Bessarabian rayons of the province, the self-styled “Romanians” represented 9.48% of the Romanian population, while the self-styled “Romanian-speakers” represented 13.03% of the Romanian population. See Popescu, “Populatia Regiunii Cernauti prin prisma rezultatelor”, passim. Ion Popescu obtained the 2001 detailed census results from the Ukrainian-language Național’nzi sklad naseleneia Cerniņi ko oblasti ta ioho movni oznaki (za dannzmz Vseukrain’s koho perepzu naseleneia 2001 roku). – Ceastzna I. (Cernivți, 2003).
The same may be said about the rayon of Storojinet. In there, the “Romanian-speaking Romanians” represent 99.25% of the entire Romanian-speaking population, including those with “Moldovan” ethnic and/or linguistic identities. Yet one can not claim that the 87.12% proportion of “Romanians” in Hliboca rayon could be explained away primarily in this manner.\textsuperscript{582}

\textbf{Table 4 I - The Ethnic Basis and Other Variables}\textsuperscript{583}

| Reinforced or changed by the educational system (native language and respective identity system and facilitates nation-building = intensification of nationalism) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Family | Church | Ethnic Basis | National Identity | Intensity and spread of (intermediate variable) political nationalism |
| Identity documents (state) | Industrialization (hinders nation-building in general and the maintenance of the minority’s ethnic identity and language) | Sudden shocks | Political actors influence policy content (policy outcome), but probably not the intensity of nationalism |

The lower proportion of “Romanians” in the Hliboca rayon is partially explained by the impact of the educational system. In the Herta and Storojinet rayons, practically all the children from Romanophone families are receiving some Romanian-language education. This is the case with only an

\textsuperscript{582} See Popescu, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{583} Ethnic self-identification (“identity”) is only one element of the ethnic basis, but one very salient to my model.
estimated 86.35% and 75.85% of the number of the school-age Romanophones and, respectively, “Romanians” plus “Moldovans” of Hliboca rayon. These numbers were calculated based on the assumption that the percentages of the ethnic and linguistic groups among the children equal the percentages in the general population of those areas.584

The larger than expected number of “Moldovans” in the non-Bessarabian urban localities of the Chernivtsi region585, at least in comparison with the neighboring rural localities, was undeniable by 1989. A possible cause was the lack of exposure of many of the Bukovinian Romanians raised in urban areas to the Romanian-language educational system. A comparison of the situation in the rural, largely Romanian, localities in the compactly Romanian areas and the local small towns is interesting because it also shows the statistical impact of higher education. In the small towns, where the proportion of Romanian inhabitants with a higher education was larger, the proportion of self-identified “Romanians” was higher and that of self-styled “Moldovans” was lower.

Therefore, the existence of a very propitious ethnic basis in northern Bukovina and Herta helped the process of re-identification as “Romanians” and “Romanian-speakers”, particularly wherever the influence of the educational system went in the same direction. A non-altered ethnic basis plus a “nurturing” educational system guaranteed a return of an overwhelming majority of the “Romanian-speaking” inhabitants to a “Romanian” and “Romanian-speaking” identity.

A key element of the ethnic basis was the mother-tongue of the parents. The importance of this “linguistic basis” in fostering a “Romanian” or “Moldovan” identity as opposed to a “Ukrainian one” is clear. As Ion Popescu demonstrated based on the 1989 and 2001 census results as well as his own fieldwork, the children of ethnic Romanian parents with a Ukrainian native language as a rule identify themselves as Ukrainians rather than as “Romanians” or “Moldovans”. He has also shown that both the existence of Romanian schools and Romanian-language churches facilitates the use of the Romanian language, and therefore the maintenance of a Romanian identity for subsequent generations.586

A key element of the demographic evolution was the increasing proportion of the Romanophone population. The Romanian-speaking (including the self-styled “Moldovan-speaking” population) increased

584. Calculated by me based on the data from Popescu, p. 144 and passim.
585. The same was also true of the “Romanians” in the Bessarabian urban localities of the region.
586. See Popescu, “Populatia Regiunii Cernauti prin prisma rezultatelor”, passim.
in the northern Bukovinian rayons plus Herta from 15.11% to 16.61% of the population of the area between 1989 and 2001. This occurred notwithstanding a small decline of the Romanian (including “Moldovan”) ethnic population as a percentage of the total population, from 18.25% to 18.15% of the total. The explanation of this phenomenon is purely demographic. The population of the overwhelmingly Romanian areas, and particularly of the rural ones, increased. This has occurred largely through a natural increase in the numbers of the local population, which was overwhelmingly Romanian.  

The churches also had an important role in maintaining Romanian-speaking environments in numerous localities and in fostering Romanian nation-building. Most of the parishes were Eastern Orthodox, but a minority was neo-Protestant (Baptist, Pentecostal or Adventist). Another factor that had an impact on the switch from “Moldovan” to “Romanian” ethnic and particularly linguistic identities was the change of the name of the language used in church services in largely Romanian communities. During the Soviet period, the language of religious services was called “Moldovan” throughout the Soviet Union due to a decision of the regime. However, starting at the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century, the language of the religious services in largely Romanian churches throughout the entire Chernivtsi region started to be called “Romanian” and only “Romanian”. In 2004, 106 out of 396 Orthodox parishes in the region used the Romanian language, while 24 used both the Romanian and Ukrainian languages.

Based on my theory, one would have expected a number of developments to take place between 1989 and 2001, and to be reflected in the census data. They indeed took place. Since the ethnic basis is key to nation-building, one would have expected certain changes among the northern Bukovinian and Herta Romanians, who typically spoke Romanian with the same accent as across the border in Romania. To the extent to which during the Soviet period they claimed that they were “Moldovans” or “Moldovan-speakers”, one would have expected them to switch in the overwhelming majority of the cases to a “Romanian” and “Romanian-speaking” identity, which they did.

By contrast, the presence of the “Bessarabian Moldovan” accent in northern Bessarabia, and of the memory of the large numbers of individuals with a “Moldovan” ethnic identity before 1940/1944,

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587. It is not completely clear how the collapse of the Soviet Union might have played a certain role in encouraging the increase in the Romanophone population. The existence of a Romania that was substantially more democratic and with a higher standard of living than Ukraine helped.
588. See Popescu, “Populatia Regiunii Cernauti prin prisma rezultatelor”, p. 113, 149.
589. This has already been documented in chapter 2.
has had a different impact. It has encouraged the maintenance among most, but not all, of the Bessarabian Moldovan of a “Moldovan” primary identity. In those areas where there have recently been no Romanian schools and the children have been taught in Ukrainian and/or Russian, the speech of the individuals is more affected by Slavic influences. The lack of schools and school teachers who would promote a “Romanian” identity in the school and in the village has hindered the switch to a “Romanian” identity.

Qualitative table 4 F – The Interaction of the Linguistic Base with the Educational System in the Chernivtsi Region

A ___ language population plus a(n) ____ school in the ____ language often led to a ______ linguistic identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Native Language</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Language of Education</th>
<th>Linguistic Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Pre-1918 and interwar</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Romanian (always)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
<td>Interwar</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Interwar</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Interwar</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
<td>Early Soviet (1944 - 1970)</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Ukrainian (more often) or “Moldovan” (less often)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>Late Soviet (1970’s and 1980’s)</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>“Moldovan” (more often) or Ukrainian (less often)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>Soviet (1944-late 1980’s)</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
<td>“Moldovan” (more often) or “Romanian” (less often)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>Soviet and independent Ukrainian periods (Late 1980’s -2005)</td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
<td>Soviet and independent Ukrainian periods (Late 1980’s -2005)</td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>“Moldovan = Romanian” (more often) or “Romanian” (less often)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The Impact of Industrialization and Urbanization

The impact of urbanization has favored Ukrainization and Russification, and has served as a break
to the spread of a “Romanian” identity. Industrialization has also favored Ukrainization and Russification.

The impact of industrialization on Romanian nation-building in Bukovina is difficult to measure directly (see tables 4 G, 4 G1 and 4G2). However, in Ukraine, including in the Chernivtsi region, industry is concentrated in the municipalities. The number of ethnic Romanians, who work mostly in agriculture, in the industrial areas has decreased due to assimilation, overwhelmingly to the Ukrainian ethnic majority in the region. The total number of ethnic Romanians living in municipalities, that is, heavily industrialized localities, decreased from 19,575 inhabitants in 1989 to 14,456 individuals in 2001 and from 10.59% of the Romanian population to 7.05%. If one includes only the self-styled “Romanians”, the population residing outside municipalities increased from 87,258 in 1989 to 103,972 in 2001, mostly through the changing self-identification from “Moldovan” to “Romanian”.

Among the self-identified “Moldovans”, the numbers decreased from 78,003 to 63,298. The proportion of self-styled “Romanians” who lived in the municipalities decreased between the two censuses from 13,059 (13.02% of the self-styled “Romanians”) to 10,583 (9.24%). Among self-styled “Moldovans”, the decrease was from 6,516 (7.71% of the self-styled “Moldovans”) to 3,927 (5.84%). The proportion of “Moldovans” who re-identified themselves as “Romanians” between 1989 and 2001 was probably slightly lower in the municipalities than in other areas. The percentage of the “Romanians” residing in municipalities was on December 5, 2001 only 70.97% of what it had been in January 1989, whereas among “Moldovans”, it was 75.77%. Therefore, Romanian nation-building was hindered by industrialization. This was due to linguistic Ukrainization (assimilation to the Ukrainian ethnic group), Soviet-era linguistic Russification, and a slower process of re-identification of “Moldovans” as “Romanians”. 590

Qualitative Table 4G. The Impact of Urbanization (also a Proxy for Industrialization) during the Period 1989-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Category or Process</th>
<th>Numerical Evolution of the Category</th>
<th>Name of Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Romanians</td>
<td>Decrease from 10.59% to 7.05%</td>
<td>Urban Ukrainization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Romanian-speakers</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Urban linguistic Ukrainianization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

590. See the statistical tables in Popescu, p. 115, 117, 120-123.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Category or Process</th>
<th>Numerical Evolution of the Category</th>
<th>Name of Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reidentification of urban “Moldovans” as “Romanians” (ethnic self-identification)</td>
<td>Slower and less common than in the rural areas</td>
<td>Slows down and hinders “Romanian” nation-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch from “Moldovan” to “Romanian” linguistic identification in urban areas</td>
<td>Less common than in the rural areas; even slower than the ethnic reidentification as “Romanians”</td>
<td>Slows down and hinders “Romanian” nation-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Moldovan-speaking” “Romanians”</td>
<td>19.67% of them were urban in 2001, compared to 21.39% of all “Romanians”</td>
<td>Slows down and hinders “Romanian” nation-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Romanian-speaking Moldovans”</td>
<td>3.65% of them were urban in 2001, compared to 11.36% of all “Moldovans”</td>
<td>Slows down and hinders “Romanian” nation-building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The impact of urbanization is interesting (see Tables 4G, 4G1 and 4G2). In 2001, there were 24,499 urban ethnic “Romanians” (21.39% of the total number of Romanians in the region). Out of these, 20,115 (82.11%) of them spoke “Romanian”, 3,430 (14%) Ukrainian, 858 (3.5%) Russian and 96 (0.39%) spoke other languages, practically all “Moldovan”. There were 7,636 urban “Moldovans” (11.36% of all the “Moldovans” in the region). Out of these, 5,701 (74.66%) spoke “Moldovan”, 1,120 Ukrainian (14.67%), 718 Russian (9.40%) and 97 (1.27%) other languages, practically all “Romanian”. Among the 90,056 rural “Romanians”, 85,181 (94.59%) spoke “Romanian”, 4,364 spoke Ukrainian (4.85%), 119 (0.13%) spoke Russian and 392 (0.44%) spoke other languages, practically all “Moldovan”. Among the 59,589 rural “Moldovans”, 55,897 (93.80%) spoke “Moldovan”, 1,051 (1.76%) spoke Ukrainian, 78 spoke Russian (0.13%) and 2,563 (4.30%) spoke other languages, practically all “Romanian”.591 One would

observe that the retention of the native language was substantially higher in the villages, and that almost half of those who no longer spoke Romanian as their mother tongue were urbanites. This shows the impact of industrialization and of lack of exposure to a Romanian educational system of some urban members of the population educated in Russian, typically before around 1990, or, subsequently, in Ukrainian.

Table 4G1 - The Impact of Urbanization on the Population with a “Romanian” Self-Identification in the Chernivtsi Region in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>“Romanian” Inhabitants</th>
<th>Who spoke “Romanian”</th>
<th>Who spoke Ukrainian</th>
<th>Who spoke Russian</th>
<th>Who spoke other languages (almost always “Moldovan”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>10,583</td>
<td>7,526</td>
<td>71.11</td>
<td>2,224</td>
<td>21.01</td>
<td>766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>24,499</td>
<td>20,115</td>
<td>82.11</td>
<td>3,430</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>90,056</td>
<td>85,181</td>
<td>94.59</td>
<td>4,364</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>114,555</td>
<td>105,296</td>
<td>91.92</td>
<td>7,794</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage urban of total: 21.39%  
Percentage industrial of total: 9.24%

Table 4G2 - The Impact of Urbanization on the Population with a “Moldovan” Self-Identification in the Chernivtsi Region in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>“Moldovan” Inhabitants</th>
<th>Who spoke “Moldovan”</th>
<th>Who spoke Ukrainian</th>
<th>Who spoke Russian</th>
<th>Who spoke other languages (almost always “Romanian”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.39%</td>
<td>19.10</td>
<td>44.01</td>
<td>87.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.24%</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>28.53</td>
<td>78.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

592. This refers almost exclusively to the self-styled “Moldovan” language.  
593. This refers almost exclusively to the self-styled “Romanian” language.
Urbanization and industrialization have also had an important impact in lowering the numbers of individuals with a “Romanian” ethnic and linguistic self-identification and in increasing the numbers of those with “Moldovan” ones. Thus, 19.67% of the region’s ethnic “Romanians” who spoke “Moldovan” as their native language resided in urban localities. So did 19.11% of all the ethnic “Romanians” who declared that they spoke “Romanian” or “Moldovan”, and 21.39% of all the “Romanians” in the region. Only almost 4% of the “Moldovans” whose native language was “Romanian”, in comparison to 11% of all “Moldovans”, were urban dwellers. The patterns for industrialization are similar (see tables 4 G1 and 4G2). Urbanization and industrialization have therefore favored a “Moldovan” linguistic identity. They were unpropitious for a “Romanian” one. By contrast, the impact of the ethnic basis and of the educational system in the rural areas has hindered the maintenance of a “Moldovan” primary linguistic identity and fostered a “Romanian” one. The key factor seems to have been the lack of exposure to, and influence by, the Romanian-language educational system among numerous urban inhabitants of Romanian ethnicity.

The impact of industrialization is difficult to ascertain. The Romanians who resided in the regional capital voted for the eventual winner, but so did those in other areas of the region. The impact of industrialization on the 2004 elections in this case is complex, difficult to fully ascertain and will be discussed in a later chapter. Urbanization has favored Ukrainization and Russification, and has served as a brake to the spread of a “Romanian” identity. Industrialization has also favored Ukrainization and Russification.

4.1. Conclusions

Based on my theory, one would have expected several trends to be observable between 1989 and 2001, and to be reflected in the census data. They indeed took place. Since the ethnic basis is key to nation-building, one would have expected certain changes among the northern Bukovinian and Herta Romanians. The latter typically spoke Romanian with the same accent as across the border in Romania. To the extent to which during the Soviet period they claimed that they were “Moldovans” or “Moldovan-speakers”, one would have expected them to switch in the overwhelming majority of the cases to a “Romanian” and “Romanian-speaking” identity, which they did.

By contrast, the presence of the “Bessarabian Moldovan” accent in northern Bessarabia and of the memory of the large numbers of individuals with a “Moldovan” ethnic identity before 1940/1944 has had a different impact. It has encouraged the preservation among most, but not all, of the Bessarabian Moldovan of a “Moldo-van” primary identity. In those areas where there have recently been no Romanian schools and the children have been taught in Ukrainian and/or Russian, the idiom spoken by the individuals is more affected by Slavic influences. The lack of schools and school teachers who would promote a “Romanian” identity in the school and in the village has hindered the switch to a “Romanian” identity.

The impact of urbanization has favored Ukrainization and Russification, and has served as a brake to the spread of a “Romanian” identity. Industrialization has also favored Ukrainization and Russification to the detriment of a “Romanian” identity.
Chapter 7
“Romanian” and “Moldovan” Nation-Building in the Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine
(1989-2005): An Electoral Analysis

1.1. Introduction

2. Data Sets – The Values of the Dependent Variables

2.1. The 1994 Local Elections

2.2. The Ukrainian Statewide Elections from 1994 to 2002 in the Compact Romanian Area

2.3. Reconciling “Orange” Liberal Nationalisms in the Chernivtsi Region in District 204 in 2002-2004

3.1. Conclusions

595 An earlier, somewhat more extensive version of this chapter, “Romanian Nation-Building in the Chernivtsi and Odessa Regions of Ukraine (1989-2005)”, contains somewhat more details and more documentation. It discusses certain complexities that are useful and relevant for those who are well acquainted with the case. This additional material, although in my view quite interesting, has been excluded from this version of the chapter. It makes the text less easily readable for those who are not at all specialists in the case, who are interested in more clarity and less information.
1.1. Introduction

The process of Romanian nation-building during the (Soviet and) post-Soviet period in the Chernivtsi region, confirms the predictions of my model developed in chapter 6.\textsuperscript{596} The “Romanian” ethnic basis identical to that south of the border in present-day Romania allowed those Bukovinians and Hertans whose ethnic and linguistic identity had been changed by the Soviet regime from “Romanian” to “Moldovan” to return in almost all cases to their pre-Soviet “Romanian” ethnic and linguistic identity. The Bukovinian and Hertan Romanians would vote overwhelmingly (in 1994-1998) or with a smaller majority (in 2002) for relatively intense Romanian nationalistic parliamentary candidates.

Only a small minority of the northern Bessarabian Moldovans in the areas where they live compactly supported Romanian nationalistic candidates until 2002. However, most of these “Moldovans” have signed a Romanian nationalistic petition in 1999-2000 in favor of a Ukrainian-Romanian-German-Jewish multicultural university in Chernivtsi. They voted for a candidate (with a Romanian mother and a German father) supported by the regional authorities, whose rhetoric and campaigners appealed moderately to “Romanian” nationalism in 2002. As a result, the score on the intensity of Romanian nationalism in the mostly Romanian electoral district (no. 204) has remained the same. It has been so because the decline in the intensity of Romanian nationalism among “Romanians” was compensated by its spread to self-styled “Moldovans”. A majority of these “Moldovans” voted for Viktor Yushchenko in the presidential elections of 2004, as did a larger majority of the “Romanians”. Whereas the “Moldovan” identity still remains as a primary identity in a large majority of the cases, most “Moldovans” in the area also have a “Romanian” or at least “Romanian-speaking” identity, and support Romanian or Romanophone low-intensity nationalism electorally.

The impact of an alternate independent variable, the autonomous role of political actors, could be noticed during the past few years, since 2002 in the Chernivtsi region and since 1997 in the Odessa region. They have not affected the aggregate intensity of Romanian nationalism at the time of the parliamentary elections in the Chernivtsi region in 2002 in comparison to 1998, but have altered its geographical

\textsuperscript{596} For a discussion of my model, see my chapter 1.
distribution. Therefore, this variable is useful, but it can not substitute for my four more structural variables. The developments in the post-1989 period indicate the importance for nation-building of the ethnic basis, and the changes therein, and, in northern Bukovina, of the educational system. However, I would contend that political actors play an important role only when the ethnic elite is divided, when there is widespread patronage, cronyism, etc. This is also the case when there are no opportunities for the inhabitants to electorally select between varieties of nationalism associated with political parties, and when political competition has become less ideological.597

Throughout this chapter, I will include the self-styled “Moldovans” together with the self-styled “Romanians” in the broader category of Romanians without quotation marks. The distinction between Romanian and “Romanian” is that the former group refers to the population that is intersubjectively ethnically Romanian, whereas the latter category includes those who identify themselves as such. The same principle has been used in ascertaining linguistic self-identification. This is done for a number of reasons, namely as a tribute to the existing scholarship of ethnic Romanian and Ukrainian authors598 and due to a number of factors that will be discussed below. These include the preference of the Moldovans of the region to have “Romanian” rather “Moldovan” school, of their support for specifically Romanian nationalist petition drives and other specifically Romanian collective actions and, in the cases of some individuals, Romanian nationalistic candidates.

The study of the Chernivtsi region also allows us to control for the political forces and politicians running for offices, sometimes the same politicians running in the same district at different times. The data from local elections also supports the findings from the (particularly single member district) parliamentary elections.

597. For a number of reasons, largely in order to facilitate comparison, I will deal with Romanian nation-building in northern Bukovina rather than in southern Bukovina. The latter process had been long finalized and is not controversial. Moreover, the concept of northern Bukovina will be expanded to include areas that are currently customarily believed to be part of the area, but were not so historically. These include the non-Bukovinian areas of the Chernivtsi oblast, or region, of Ukraine. The comparisons between the Bukovinian and non-Bukovinian areas of this region are very fruitful in the study of nation-building. A deficiency is that it would lead to a non-historical approach to the study of Romanian nation-building in the non-Bukovinian areas of this Ukrainian administrative region. For an administrative map of the region, with its component rayons, see http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article?art_id=116742&cat_id=32596 (accessed March 2005).

2.1. The Politics of the 1990-1994 Period

Overall, the evidence for the period from 1990 until 2002 suggests the key role of the ethnic basis in accounting for nation-building as expressed in electoral results. A “Romanian” ethnic and especially linguistic identity was a better facilitator of Romanian nationalism than a “Moldovan” one. A Romanian mother tongue was a great catalyst of Romanian nation-building, while a different mother-tongue hindered the process a great deal. The educational system was important in two ways. Romanian schools facilitated a Romanian identity and Romanian nationalism, whereas their absence prevented it. The rising and declining level of civic activism among teachers partially accounts for the regional variations of Romanian electoral nationalism, but not for its overall level.

It would be an exaggeration to contend that Bukovinian Romanian, as well as Bukovinian Ukrainian, nationalism survived unchanged during the Soviet period. Both of them blossomed after 1990. After its initial growth in 1991-2000, Bukovinian Romanian nationalism is still the attitude that describes the outlook of most self-identified “Romanians”. By contrast, this attitude became predominant among “Moldovans” only starting in 1999.

During the time when Mikhail Gorbachev was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1985-1991), things changed. Both open Romanian and public Ukrainian nationalism were originally weaker in Bukovina in comparison with the pre-Soviet period, discussed in chapters 2-5. One of the causes of this phenomenon was the greater strength and resilience of the Communist Party structures and personnel in the Chernivtsi oblast in comparison to, for example, the three Eastern Galician oblasts. It is significant that there was no Romanian (including “Moldovan”) among the eight deputies elected to the Ukrainian parliament during the first multi-candidate elections of March 4, 1990.

Both Ukrainian and Romanian nationalism expressed at the ballot box in the Chernivtsi region were weak until the end of 1991, until after the sudden shock of the failed attempted hard-line coup of

599. The reaction was somewhat delayed in comparison to both Ukrainian nationalism the former territories of Western Ukraine that had been a part of interwar Poland, such as Eastern Galicia, where Ukrainian nationalism had been the strongest, and to Moldovan/Romanian nationalism in the Republic of Moldova.

August 19, 1991. In the March 17, 1991 referendum in Ukraine, a majority of the Bukovinian population (80.8%), including most Romanians, voted in favor of the preservation of the Soviet Union with a turnout of 79%. Nevertheless, 83.2%, including most of the local Romanians, voted in favor of greater Republican sovereignty for Ukraine within the USSR (see Table 4D). Both percentages were above the Ukraine-wide averages of 70.5% and 80.18%. Those who are assumed to have favored Ukrainian independence, that is, those who voted against the preservation of the Soviet Union and those who abstained, represented 36% of the regional electorate and 34.3% of the countrywide one.\textsuperscript{601}

A massive sudden shock, the attempted coup of August 1991, changed everything. After the failed August 19, 1991 coup organized by those who attempted to overthrow Gorbachev, Ukraine declared its independence on August 24, 1991. According to an October 1991 opinion poll, 85% of the population of the region, as compared to 88% for the entire country, supported Ukrainian independence (see Table 4D). Numerous ethnic Romanians from the region were undecided on this issue in October 1991, but became pro-independence soon thereafter.\textsuperscript{602} It would appear that the fact that both the Romanian and Moldovan leaders endorsed the idea of Ukrainian independence induced many of the group to adopt a stance in favor of Ukrainian independence.\textsuperscript{603} During the December 1, 1991 referendum on


\textsuperscript{602} Jarosław Martyniuk, “Ukrainian Independence and Territorial Integrity”, in \textit{RFE/RL Research Report}, vol. 1, no. 13, March 27, 1992, p. 65-66. Martyniuk writes (p. 66), “Two western Ukrainian oblasts, Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi, however, do not have a large Russian population. The reason for the difference between the results of the survey and those of the referendum in those oblasts could be related to the fact that the Transcarpathian Oblast has a small Hungarian minority and the Chernivtsi Oblast a small Romanian minority. Analysis of the data shows that at the time of the survey, non-Russian minorities tended to be undecided about whether to vote for or against Ukraine’s independence.”

Ukrainian independence, whose purpose was to ratify the decision of the parliament, 92.78% of the population of the region voted in favor of Ukrainian independence. The countrywide figure was 90.32%. Only 4.13% of the region’s population voted against independence. The regional turnout rate was the relatively high 87.67% of the vote. This means that 81.37% of the population in the region with the right to vote indicated its support for Ukrainian independence.

Table 4D – Measuring the Statistical Impact of the Sudden Shock – Chernivtsi Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Determination Occasion</th>
<th>In favor of Ukrainian Independence (as a percentage of the population)</th>
<th>Against Ukrainian Independence (as a percentage of the population)</th>
<th>Comments and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1991 referendum in favor of the Union Treaty</td>
<td></td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>83.2% of votes - pro-sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favor of Ukrainian independence in March 1991 referendum (of total electorate)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>Calculated by Andrew Wilson (anti-USSR votes + abstentions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1991 opinion poll</td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1991 referendum (the total electorate)</td>
<td>92.78</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>87.67% turnout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1991 referendum among ethnic Romanians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No irredentist minority of “Moldovans” or “Romanians” boycotts referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-independence in December 1991 (of the total electorate)</td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increases in pro-independence vote (of the total electorate), March-December 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1994, p. 44. It should be noted that in 1990, 50% of the public in the Republic of Moldova, and probably a larger percentage of the ethnic Moldovans/Romanians “wholly or partly supported” the demand for the union with the Republic of Moldova of the Ukrainian parts of Bessarabia. See Edward Ozhiganov, “The Republic of Moldova: Transdniester and the 14th Army”, in Alexei Arbato, Abram Chayes, and Lara Olson, Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives (London: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 162-163.  
604. See Kuzio, Ukraine, p. 200.  
The group in favor of Ukrainian independence included a significant majority of the Romanian ethnic population of the oblast. Nevertheless, as a number of analysts have noted, a small minority of the self-identified ethnic “Romanians” abstained from voting in order to show their preference for a return to Romanian rule. The call of the newly founded Christian Democratic Alliance of Romanians in Ukraine for a boycott of the referendum was supported by only about a third of the region’s “Romanians” and by practically no “Moldovans”.606 It has been alleged that the attitude of the mayor in each of the mostly Romanian localities had a very important impact on the results. If the local elected mayor was in favor of the referendum, a significant majority of the inhabitants cast ballots, overwhelmingly in favor of Ukrainian

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606. See Kuzio, Ukraine, p. 210-212. The Christian Democratic Alliance of Romanians in Ukraine had been founded on November 26, 1991. It identified itself as “a national movement for the protection of the legitimate rights and freedoms of Romanians in northern Bukovyna and other parts of Ukraine”. The only other group to call for a boycott of the referendum was the Russophile Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united). See Taras Kuzio, “SDPU(u) hijacks a long Social Democratic Tradition”, op-ed in Kyiv Post, January 17, 2002, accessed at http://www.taraskuzio.net/media/sdpu.pdf#search=’Buzduhan%201994’ on June 2, 2005. The reasons for the call for the boycott of the polls were irredentist according to Kuzio, p. 210. This is largely true. I do believe that the importance of Romania’s claims to the Island of Serpents, given to the Soviet Union by the Romanian Communists in early 1948 and of a small portion of territory “inadvertently given to the USSR (Soviet Ukraine) in the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, which Romania renounced in June 1997, have been exaggerated. It has often been implied that Romania claimed all the Bukovinian and Bessarabian areas that had been part of Romania. To be sure, the Romanian parliamentarians did claim those areas on November 28, 1991. However, their rhetoric had no statutory value. Moreover, a number of factors have been forgotten. One of them was Ukraine’s alleged support for Transnistrian secessionism in the Republic of Moldova. The support of the Russian as well as Ukrainian Cossacks, the sympathetic presentation of the “Appeal to the People of Ukraine” of the Transnistrian leadership in the Ukrainian press, including the publicly owned newspapers, did indeed create an unfavorable perception in Romania and Moldova. So did the visits of the secessionist authorities by delegations from Ukraine, such as the one from the Odessa city council. The November 28, 1991 claims by the parliamentarians were made within the context of the commemoration of Bukovina’s union with Romania. The extent to which the Romanian parliamentary claims were caused by a combination of frustration provoked by Ukrainian support for Transnistrian secessionism has not been sufficiently discussed. The relevant speeches that contained territorial claims or the expressed desire for the union of Moldova with Romania may be found in Vasile Diacon, Reintregirea: Basarabia, Bucovina si Insula Serpilor in dezbateri ale Parlamentului României (Iasi: Editura “Unirea”, 1992). My e-mail communications with Olga Capatana, who worked for Moldovan military intelligence before and during the Transnistrian war, have also provided me with some information about Ukrainian official support for the Transnistrian separatists in December 2004.
independence. If he or she opposed the referendum, which is what happened in a minority of the cases, only a small minority of the inhabitants voted. According to Bohdan Nahaylo, “Ethnic Romanians in several villages in Chernivtsi Oblast are reported to have boycotted the referendum on Ukraine’s independence.” Yet according to an October 1991 opinion poll, a majority of the “Romanian” and “Moldovan” population of Ukraine, just like a majority of every other ethnic group at that time, overwhelmingly believed in the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

In 1991, there was a strong autonomist current in the Chernivtsi region among most of the population. Most of the region’s population spoke a Ukrainian dialect, the Bukovinian dialect, which was unique to the area. Moreover, the autonomy of Bukovina as a duchy during the Habsburg period was widely remembered, as was the autonomy granted to northern Bukovina in a future Ukrainian state in November 1918. As a result, 89.3% of the electorate voted in favor of a “special economic status” for the Chernivtsi oblast. An even larger majority of the Romanians voted in favor of this economic autonomy proposal. This electoral result had no practical effect, and, as we shall see, open pro-regionalist/pro-autonomy, or, for that matter, openly separatist attitudes in the region were by 1998-2005 shared by only a minority of the Romanian ethnic population, and never in a noisy manner.

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607 I would like to thank Victor Todoriuc for this point.
609 Jaroslav Martyniuk, “Ukrainian Independence and Territorial Integrity”, in RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 13, March 27, 1992, p. 67-68. Among “others” (that is, individuals who were neither ethnic Ukrainians nor ethnic Russians), 74% desired to keep Ukraine’s borders intact, 4% believed that some territories should be relinquished by the new state, and 22% did not know.
610 The Bukovinian dialect of the Ukrainian language contains numerous Romanian and fewer German words, thus reflecting Bukovina’s historical past.
612 The issue of the extent of Romanian irredentism in the Chernivtsi region is a controversial issue. Open irredentism and/or openly pro-autonomy attitudes, that is, whatever is expressed in the public sphere, are characteristic of only a conspicuous minority of the Romanian (disproportionately “Romanian” as opposed to “Moldovan”) population of the region. Hidden or secret irredentist longings might be widely expressed privately, overwhelmingly among individuals who believe that union with Romania is impossible. These attitudes are not expressed electorally or through collective action. Victor Todoriuc believes that about 60% of the Bukovinian and Herta Romanians have pro-Romania irredentist sentiments, 20% do not care, and 20% are anti-irredentist. The corresponding percentages among the northern Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians in his opinion are 40-50%, 25-30% and 25-30%. Some other observers have also
A factor that made the 19.65% of the population that called itself “Romanian” (10.66%) or “Moldovan” (8.98%) in 1989 in the Chernivtsi region supportive of the cause of Ukrainian independence was the early flexibility of the regional Ukrainian authorities, particularly in comparison to the situation prevailing during the Soviet period, toward their demands. The oblast council of the Chernivtsi region conceded to the Romanian, including self-styled “Moldovan”, “demonstrators on 17 September 1991 that in areas of Romanian ‘compact settlement’ that the Romanian language and national symbols could be used alongside the Ukrainian.”

During the presidential election that was held on the same day as the referendum (December 1, 1991), 43.56% of the population of the Chernivtsi region voted in favor of a moderate nationalist of Communist apparatchik background. He was the incumbent head of state Leonid Kravchuk. The percentage was low in comparison to his 61.59% nationwide. Nevertheless, the Romanian population voted overwhelmingly for Kravchuk. Overall, 49.04% of the population of the oblast, and a clear majority of the Ukrainian ethnic population, voted for the three Ukrainian candidates who were more intensely nationalistic than Kravchuk.

At any rate, the public loyalty of a majority of the Romanian population toward the Ukrainian state in my opinion has been clear since 1991. The score on the integrative dimension of Romanian nationalism for practically all the inhabitants as well as for the candidates for whom they have voted should be a 0, which would indicate a lack of secessionism.

The Romanian minority was loyal, but nationally assertive in ways that attracted media attention. Without a past of either mutual good will or bloodshed, the trend in Ukrainian-Romanian interethnic relations has not been ethnic hatred, but mutual avoidance.

alleged that most of the Romanians of the Chernivtsi region would prefer to unite with Romania. One of them was Albert Thaur, a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the New School in New York City, of mixed German, Romanian and Ukrainian descent. The electoral data does not support these contentions, even though separatism and a desire for autonomy have been explicitly shown by the electoral results in other areas of Ukraine, and particularly in Crimea.

614. The Chernivtsi oblast was the only oblast outside of Eastern Galicia where the Ukrainian national democrats of Rukh performed so well within the relevant Ukrainian ethnic constituency.
615. This should be contrasted with the immense agitation in favor of union with Romania in the Republic of Moldova. The issue is not how loyal the Romanians of Ukraine were toward the Ukrainian state, but how patriotic.
2.1. The 1994 Local Elections

The “ethnic basis” played a key role in facilitating Romanian nationalistic voting in the 1994 local elections. As a rule, ethnic Romanians voted for ethnic Romanian candidates. Self-styled “Romanians” voted overwhelmingly for self-styled “Romanian” candidates, while a smaller majority of the self-styled “Moldovan” candidates voted for self-styled “Moldovan” candidates. The important indirect role of the educational system in facilitating this result in the areas of Ukrainian northern Bessarabia with a self-styled “Moldovan” population is also demonstrated by these local elections.

The first multi-party Ukrainian local elections took place in 1994, and those who were elected then served until 1998. In 1998, just like previously in 1994, a majority of the elected local officials in the areas where most of the local population was ethnically Romanian were ethnic Romanians. The Christian Democratic Alliance of the Romanians of Ukraine (“Alianta Crestin-Democrata a Romanilor din Ucraina”) endorsed most of them. This organization continued to be nationalistic, but was no longer irredentist after 1991.

616. Unlike in other places and other periods discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, the detailed data from local, as distinct from countrywide elections, is quite useful and revealing, and more accessible than the early data on parliamentary elections. Since the data for the pre-1998 parliamentary elections available to this author, as well as to various Ukraine specialists such as Andrew Wilson, tells us only who won in which electoral district, there is a great need for alternative electoral data.

617. See “Declaratie ACDR Ucraina”, a news item of the AP Flux press agency, April 17, 1998, available at http://groups-beta.google.com/group/soc.culture.romanian/browse_frm/thread/9730ad35bba644767a8d91a8af2147b4?q=Noua+Sulita&num=5#7a8d91a8af2147b4 in soc.culture.romanian (accessed 05/08/2005). The program of the Christian Democratic Alliance of the Romanians of Ukraine calls for “the respect and implementation of our [i.e., ethnic Romanian] political, economic, social, national and cultural rights, our recognition as Romanian natives in the lands of our forefathers; the preservation and development of the Romanian language, and its use as a co-official language in the localities with a compactly Romanian population; the preparation of national cadres and the development of education in the mother-tongue; the preservation of the faith and customs of our forefathers, the undiluted respect of the right to our national history and culture. Let us not admit any kind of national discrimination and let us oppose all the tendencies toward denationalization and assimilation.” For an abbreviated version of the same text, see “In Rada Suprema a Ucrainei a fost ales romanul Ion Popescu”, in Mesagerul, No.16 (205), April 24, 1998, part II, accessed at http://groups-beta.google.com/group/soc.culture.romanian/browse_frm/thread/45c5f49f50a9de23/b13bfc0ec30860747?q=Noua+Sulita&num=14#b13bfc0ec30860747 on May 8, 2005. For more information about the elections, see “O noua manifestare de antiromanism in Ucraina”, in Mesagerul, December 15, 1997, at http://groups-beta.google.com/group/soc.culture.romanian/browse_frm/thread/9c4ceb205f6a9b84/1608265e3391d60c?q=Noua+Sulita&num=8#1608265e3391d60c (accessed on May 8, 2005). For more information about a civic group in Herta rayon, see “Bravii fii ai Hertei”, in Mesagerul, September 12, 1996, at http://groups-beta.google.com/group/soc.culture.romanian/browse_frm/thread/f264ba198d6a9/454a5348dd8b0b3e?q=Noua+Sulita&num=6#454a5348dd8b0b3e (accessed May 8, 2005).
The proportion of Romanians in the Chernivtsi regional council elected in 1994 was 19 out of 104 (18.27%). In 1998, it increased to 25 members (24.04%) only to decrease to 16 out of 104 (15.38%) in 2002. An analysis of the representation of ethnic Romanian inhabitants in local and regional government elected in 1994 in the Chernivtsi oblast, for which complete figures are available, reveals a number of interesting patterns.

The overwhelming majority, practically the entirety, of the Romanian population in areas with a significant Romanian population apparently voted for ethnic Romanian candidates in rayon council elections. This was especially true of the rayons in which Romanian-speakers were dominant, particularly if they identified themselves as “Romanians” as opposed to “Moldovans”. Thus, in the Herta rayon, the Romanian ethnic population represented 93.29% of the population. The Romanophones (individuals with a Romanian mother-tongue, even if it was called “Moldovan” by the speaker) represented 93.41%. The Romanian share in the rayon councils elected for the period 1994-1998 was 95%. In the Bessarabian Noua Sulita rayon of the oblast, the percentages were 64.29%, 63.71% and 63.3%, and in Hliboca 51.39%, 45.63% and 50%. In Storojinet, the figures were 37.15%, 35.22% and only 30%. This shows the importance of the ethnic basis in influencing electoral patterns.

This political configuration explains why the presidents of the rayon councils of the three mostly Romanian rayons (Herta, Noua Sulita and Hliboca) were of Romanian ethnicity. The vice-president of the Storojinet rayon council was a Romanian. For the last few years of the Kuchma presidency (1994-2005), the heads of the rayon administrations of Herta and Storojinet were ethnic Romanians. The regional governors, who were appointed by the president of the country, appointed them.

Out of 283 presidents of local councils during the previous term in office, 37 were “Romanians” (13.07%) and 22 “Moldovans” (7.77%), that is, a total of 59 (20.85%). This means that

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619. See the official statistics at the website of the Chernivtsi region in English at http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/division/Chernivtsi/.
practically all the localities with Romanian majorities had self-identified “Romanian” or “Moldovan” mayors. There were also 624 Romanian (including Moldovan) deputies in regional, rayon, city, town and village councils (22.8% of the total). Out of these, 447 were self-identified “Romanians” (16.33%, as compared to 12.46% of the population of the oblast in 2001). By contrast, only 147 were self-identified “Moldovans” (5.37%, as compared to 7.31% of the population of the region).620 Obviously, there were more “Romanian” and fewer “Moldovan” elected officials than we would expect based on the census results. The inhabitants of Romanian ancestry generally tended to elect candidates for local offices who were identical to themselves in terms of ethnic self-identification. Most self-identified “Moldovans” voted for “Moldovan” candidates. A significant minority of self-identified “Moldovans” voted for candidates who called themselves “Romanians” in the local elections. Their number was larger than those voting for ethnic Ukrainian candidates.621 Similar patterns were visible, albeit to a lesser extent, in the 1998 elections, which will be discussed below.622 This again shows the importance of the ethnic basis.

620. See the official statistics at the website of the Chernivtsi region in English at http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article?art_id=116742&cat_id=32596 (accessed March 2005). According to Ukrainian official statistics, in 2001, the region contained 11 rayons (districts), 11 towns, 8 other urban settlements and 252 village councils. See http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/division/Chernivtsi/ . There were three Romanophone, that is Romanian-speaking, presidents of the Noua Sulita, Herta and Hliboca rayon councils. The predominantly Romanian districts had the following number of additional elected executive officials: Herta (Hertsa in Ukrainian) – 1 at the town and 13 at the village council levels, Hliboca (Hlyboka in Ukrainian) – 1 for urban-type settlements and 24 for village councils, Noua Sulita (Novoselytsia) – 1 at the town and 30 at the village council levels. The district of Storojinet (Storozhzynets’ in Ukrainian), with a substantial Romanian minority, had 1 town and 24 village councils. See http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/division/Chernivtsi/ . This should not obscure the fact that since various localities had different sizes, and due to other demographic factors, one should not expect that the proportions of the inhabitants of various self-identifications would also be preserved among mayors and elected councilors. In the region as a whole, 71.63% of all the Romanian local councilors were self-styled “Romanians”, not self-styled “Moldovans”. They represented some of the predominantly self-styled “Moldovan” voters with a secondary “Romanian” identity.

621. Another reason was the on average lower intensity of nationalism among the self-styled “Moldovans”, which will be discussed later. This manifested itself in the aggregate electoral and educational choices. The proportion of “Moldovans” that sent their children to Ukrainian or Russian as opposed to Romanian schools was also higher than among “Romanians”.

The data from the local elections is quite revealing. A large percentage of the self-styled “Moldovans”, larger than in the Republic of Moldova, accepted to be viewed as “Romanians”, or at least as Romanian-speakers (Romanophones). This has been true at least vis-à-vis the local Ukrainians and the Ukrainian state. Moreover, whereas there were many self-styled Romanian civic organizations, there were no organizations with the word “Moldovan” in their official name in the region. Many of the local “Moldovans” have insisted that they were “Moldovans”, but only vis-à-vis the other Romanians, who called themselves “Romanians”. In other words, for many “Moldovans”, including a majority of the “Moldovans” of the Chernivtsi region since at least 1999, they are “Moldovan” because they are not “merely Romanian”. The data for the period since 1999 will show that this was the case.

The “ethnic basis” therefore played a key role in facilitating Romanian nationalistic voting in the 1994 local elections. As a rule, ethnic Romanians voted for ethnic Romanian candidates. Self-styled “Romanians” voted overwhelmingly for self-styled “Romanian” candidates. A smaller majority of the self-styled “Moldovan” candidates voted for self-styled “Moldovan” candidates, and a significant minority voted for self-styled “Romanians”. The important role of the educational system in facilitating this result in the areas of Ukrainian northern Bessarabia with a self-styled “Moldovan” population is also demonstrated by these local elections.

### 2.2. The Ukrainian Statewide Elections from 1994 to 2002 in the Compact Romanian Area

During the parliamentary campaigns in independent Ukraine, most self-identified “Romanians” have voted for Romanian nationalistic parliamentary candidates, and especially Dr. Ion Popescu. The intensity of Romanian nationalism (as scored according to my method) for the 2002 parliamentary elections is demonstrated by these local elections.

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623. This had also been the case with most self-styled “Moldovans” in interwar Bessarabia under Romanian rule. A somewhat similar pattern of subjective self-identification could be observable among the “Nones” (Rhaeto-Romans) of the South Tyrol studied by John W. Cole and Eric R. Wolf, *The Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in an Alpine Valley* (New York and London: Academic Press, 1974), p. 275 and passim. They identified themselves as Italians only vis-à-vis the local Tyrol Germans, not vis-à-vis the Italians of Italy in its pre-1918 territories. Yet the two situations are not identical. The Rhaeto-Romans are ethnically distinct from Italians, and their Italianization implies the abandonment of their old language in favor of Italian, which gives the process an objective linguistic dimension. There is no such process in the Bessarabian Moldovan case, because the “Moldovan” and “Romanian” languages are the same.
among ethnic Romanians (“Romanians” plus “Moldovans”) was identical to that for the 1998 ones. Its declining intensity among “Romanians” was “compensated” by its greater spread among self-identified “Moldovans”. The results of the presidential elections are consistent with this picture.

The first relatively free, multi-party elections in the unicameral parliament of independent Ukraine, the Supreme Council (Verkhovna Rada) took place in 1994. The Ukrainian nationalist parties obtained 21% of the vote in the region, the fifth best showing in Ukraine during the first round of the 1994 parliamentary elections. The Communist and Communist-like left did not get any seats from the oblast in the Ukrainian unicameral parliament, the Supreme Council (Verkhovna Rada).624 The incumbent president Leonid Kravchuk, who ran on a platform of Ukrainian nationalism and espoused a more pro-Western orientation than Leonid Kuchma, obtained 55.66% of the region’s votes in the first round and 61.84% in the second one.625 A majority of the Romanian inhabitants of the Chernivtsi oblast (a minority in the Storojinet rayon, a majority in Hliboca and Herta, and a substantial majority in Noua Sulita) voted for Kravchuk’s challenger, the former prime minister and subsequent president, Leonid Kuchma. The reason for this was the lack of support of many Romanians for the more intense Ukrainian nationalists. The latter as a rule supported Kravchuk.626

The most important ethnic Romanian politician in Ukraine was a nationalist intellectual from the Chernivtsi region. He was the only ethnic Romanian from the region, and one of only two who were able to win a seat in the Supreme Council (parliament) in Kyiv in that year. He was Professor Ion Popescu of the University of Chernivtsi. He was born in 1964 and was a Sociology professor specialized in Sociolinguistics. He had doctorates in Philology and Philosophy and an MA in International Relations and

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624. Wilson, Ukrainian, p. 138. On the elections, see Marko Bojcun, “The Ukrainian parliamentary elections in March-April 1994”, in Europe-Asia Studies, March 1995, accessed at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3955/is_n2_v47/ai_17202846?cm_ven=YPI on June 13, 2005. The number of votes cast in the presidential elections of that year in the region was 501,847 in the first round, with 55.66% of the votes cast for Kravchuk and 21.14% going to Kuchma. The turnout decreased by 0.8% in the second round, when the results were 309,176 votes for Leonid Kravchuk (61.84%) and 176,342 for Leonid Kuchma (35.72%). See the electoral data on the website of Bohdan Skrobach at http://www.skrobach.com/ukrel94p1.htm and http://www.skrobach.com/ukrel94ps.htm , accessed on June 13, 2005.

625. See Wilson, Ukrainian, p. 141, 144 and “BRAMA - 7/10/94 Presidential Election Results in Ukraine”, at http://www.brama.com/ua-gov/el-94pre.html (accessed on June 1, 2005). Kravchuk’s percentage in the Chernivtsi region was less impressive than the ones obtained by him in the areas that had been under Polish or Czechoslovak rule during the interwar years. Half of all the deputies in the Chernivtsi oblast were Ukrainian nationalists.

626. I would like to thank Victor Todoriuc for this information. Also see the sources listed at http://www.gesis.org/Datenservice/Osteuropa/Links/xdacountry.htm .
participated in the writing of Ukraine’s post-Communist constitution. Ion Popescu was first elected as an independent in the second round of the 1994 single-member district elections, held on April 10, 1994. He won about three-fifths of the vote. He represented the mostly Romanian electoral district no. 434, one of the eight districts of the region, which included the adjacent rayons of Hliboca and Herta. In the second round, the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine supported him.

At any rate, according to the 1989 census, the district was 67.82% Romanian (53.86% “Romanian” and 13.95% “Moldovan”). The population of this electoral district was 61.52% Romanian-speaking (21.55% “Romanian-speaking Romanians”, 13% “Moldovan-speaking Moldovans” and 26.97% “Moldovan-speaking Romanians”). In 2001, the district was 64.44% Romanian, including 59.51% “Romanian” and 4.93% “Moldovan”. Linguistically, it was 60.34% Romanian-speaking (55.55% “Romanian-speaking Romanians”, 0.32% “Moldovan-speaking Romanians”, 0.28% “Romanian-speaking Moldovans” and 4.18% “Moldovan-speaking Moldovans”).

Ion Popescu appealed to the overwhelming majority of only Romanians. He was particularly attractive to the self-identified “Romanian-speaking Romanians”, “Romanian-speaking Moldovans” and “Moldovan-speaking Romanians”. Very few other inhabitants (e.g., Ukrainians) preferred him. The results

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indicate that the demographic picture is more characteristic of the situation as described by the 2001 Ukrainian census. At that time, the district’s population was made up of self-styled “Romanian-speaking Romanians” in a proportion of 55.55%, not 21.55%. It is clear that a large majority of the individuals who called themselves “Moldovans” and/or “Moldovan-speaking” in the district in the 1989 census supported the Romanian national movement by 1994. In other words, Romanian nation-building in Bukovina and Herta seems to have been basically finalized by 1994.

In subsequent parliamentary elections, the rules were different. Half of the 450 parliamentary seats were contested by proportional representation tickets, with a threshold of 4% necessary for representation. The other seats were contested in Single Member Plurality System elections. The population in the mostly Romanian electoral district number 204 elected Popescu in 1998, but failed to do the same in 2002. According to the 2001 census, this district, which was larger than district 434, included 3 rayons (Hliboca, Noua Sulita and Herta) and the Romanian ethnic part of another one (Storojinet) instead of only two rayons (Hliboca and Herta). The four rayons were mostly (55.36%) ethnically Romanian. They were 35.96% “Romanian” and 19.4% “Moldovan”, and 53.40% Romanian-speaking, including, 35.03% “Romanian-speaking” and 18.37% “Moldovan-speaking” in terms of declared mother-tongue. The district was about 2/3 Romanian, with more than two-fifths of the population having a “Romanian” identity and about a quarter a “Moldovan” one. Ion Popescu’s partisan political affiliations and “connections” were not constant. He was supported by the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine in 1994, was affiliated with the pro-Kuchma Party of Regions in 1998 and was even on its proportional representation list. He subsequently came to identify himself, and be identified, with European, as opposed to CIS, Social Democratic leanings and started to oppose the Kuchma regime.
Parliamentary Elections of March 31, 2002 – Electoral Districts (Same Boundaries as in 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral District Number</th>
<th>Electoral District Center</th>
<th>Number of Polling Places in 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Chernivtsi</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Kitsman'</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>Novoselytsia (Noua Sulita in Romanian)</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>Khotyn</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both he and, even more importantly, his voters as a group should receive a score of nationalism on the intensity of nationalism scale of 2.5 for the 1998 elections. In the March 29, 1998 elections, Ion Popescu’s score on the integrative dimension of Romanian nationalism in 1998 was a 0. He was no irredentist, nor was he perceived as one in Kiev or Bucharest, but merely desired cultural autonomy for the ethnic Romanians. His score on the satisfactory dimension is a 1. His line has always been that the Romanians have every reason to be dissatisfied about how they are treated. On the identificational dimension, he has been strongly Romanian in terms of ethnic self-identification. He is a member of the Romanian World Council and has signed some petitions of the Council, and has been endorsed and supported by the Christian-Democratic Alliance of Romanians of Ukraine. On the symbolic issue, he should get a score of 0.5 because he has used many of the relevant Romanian symbols, but was in 1998 too “academic” to use all of them. (In 2002, he would use all of them himself and would get a score of 1 on this dimension.) Overall, the score of 2.5 is appropriate. See “Rezolutia Conferintei Consiliului Mondial Roman”, adopted at the Conference of the Romanian World Council at Vatra Dornei, June 26-July 2, 2004, accessed at http://www.consiliu.org/VDrezolutie.html on June 5, 2005. Also see “BRAMA - Parties Registered for the March 1998 Election in Ukraine” at http://www.brama.com/ua-gov/pol-dtl.html.
Popescu obtained 34,575 votes 31.51% of the total vote cast for specific candidates. Another Romanian nationalist, Arcadie Opait, whose score on the intensity of nationalism scale was a 1.5, obtained 3,555 votes, or 3.24% of the valid votes for specific candidates. The two independent Romanian nationalistic candidates obtained 38,130 votes. This represented 34.75% of the valid votes cast for specific candidates. The electoral turnout was 76.91%, and 66.18% of the electorate voted for specific individual candidates.

Popescu soundly defeated his main rival, the Communist candidate Vladimir O. Chiril. The latter's ethnic self-identification was “Moldovan.” Chiril, a collective farm chairman in the Noua Sulita rayon, obtained 31,175 or 28.41% of all the valid votes for specific candidates. His score on the intensity of Romanian nationalism was 0. The line of the Communist Party of Ukraine in both 1998 and 2002 was that Russian should become a state language. There should be a return to the principles of Communism and


629. The difference between Arcadie Opait and Ion Popescu was that the former would be satisfied with how the ethnic Romanians were treated by some ethnic Ukrainian politicians, but not necessarily by the state. The votes for him on the satisfactual dimension should be a 0.5. His score on the integrative dimensions is a 0, while on the identificational on it was a 1 and on the symbolic issue a 0.5, just like for Ion Popescu. On December 1, 2000, Arcadie Opait participated in the commemoration of the union of Transylvania with Romania in 1918. See Gh. Anghel, “‘Masa rotunda” a societatilor, asociatiilor si fundatiilor cultural-patriotice neguvernamentale din tara si a romanilor de peste hotare la Alba Iulia’, accessed at http://216.109.117.135/search/cache?c=Zenaida+Pinteac&ei=UTF-8&u=www.dacoromania.go.ro/nr06/masa.htm&w=zenaida+pinteac&d=892D99278A&icp=1&intl=us on June 17, 2005.

630. The candidates of Romanian ethnicity, including the self-styled “Moldovan” Vladimir Chiril and independent Alhip O. Rosca (Alchip O. Roshka in Ukrainian), obtained 71.85% of the total vote in the electoral district. This figure was larger than the percentage of ethnic Romanians in the district. Numerous ethnic Ukrainian voters, especially Bessarabian ones, cast ballots for Chiril. The Romanian nationalistic candidates therefore obtained 48.53% of the non-Communist valid votes cast for specific candidates. If one adds Rosca, the figure for Romanian non-Communist candidates was 60.68% of the non-Communist valid votes.

631. See the electoral statistics at http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0e?kodvib=1&rejim=0 .

632. His name on the official ballot, in Ukrainian, was Volodymyr O. Kyryl. I would like to thank Victor Todoriuc for the information that he has provided me about him and his electoral support.
favored a "voluntary alliance of brotherly peoples, of equal, independent states, which have been created on the territory of the former Soviet Union" (and "only" a military bloc in 2002). It was also demanded that Ukraine should be a parliamentary republic without a president, etc. The party was specifically anti-nationalistic. It appealed to the fear that a section of the electorate felt toward nationalism, and particularly Ukrainian nationalism. Chiril was a self-identified “Moldovan”, but he did not identify his “ticket” as such. It would appear that a large majority of those “Moldovans” who voted for him accepted the view that the “Moldovan language” was identical to the “Romanian language”. He won such a large number of votes because of his voters’ nostalgia for their allegedly greater material prosperity during the late Soviet period. He intelligently avoided espousing “linguistic Moldovanism” (that is, the argument that the “Moldovan language” was different from the “Romanian language”) among a “Moldovan” population that desired to go to “Romanian” as opposed to “Moldovan” schools, etc.\footnote{The preferences of the self-styled “Moldovans” of the Chernivtsi region for “Romanian” as opposed to “Moldovan” schools has been noted by analysts such as Natalya Belitser, by individuals with ancestors from that area, such as Victor Todoriuc, etc.}

Chiril obtained a plurality of the vote of the self-identified “Moldovans” of Noua Sulita rayon and numerous non-Moldovan votes, overwhelmingly from ethnic Ukrainians, but hardly any from self-identified “Romanians”. He also won numerous votes from inhabitants of the Noua Sulita rayon who believed that this local official from the town of Noua Sulita would provide them with more “pork barrel” (roads, schools, etc.) at the expense of other areas of the electoral district. This opponent of nationalism should receive a score of 0 on the identificational dimension of any nationalism, whether Romanian or Moldovan, and an overall score of 0.\footnote{On the program of the Communist Party of Ukraine, see Marta Kolomayets, “Justice minister and Communist Party spar over plebis cite on Ukraine's future”, in The Ukrainian Weekly, February 25, 1996, No. 8, Vol. LXIV, accessed at http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/1996/089606.shtml in June 2005. Also consult George Skoryk, History of Ukraine – Year 2002 Chronicle, accessed at http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/parel02.html in June 2005. On the subsequent support of the Communist Party of Ukraine for the transformation of Russian into a “state language” (official language), see the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report, “Russian Nationalism Comes under Attack in Ukraine”, accessed at http://www.infoukes.com/rfe-ukraine/2002/0207.html in May 2005. The Ukrainian Communists desired the resurrection of the Soviet Union and were not in favor of union with Romania, so the score on the integrative dimension of Romanian nationalism was a 0. On the satisfactual dimension, it was a 0, because what satisfied them was not Romanian cultural autonomy, but a return to Soviet patterns and approaches. On the identificational dimension, the candidate viewed himself as a “Moldovan” rather than as a “Romanian”, but his campaign did not dwell on this issue, partly because he was running in an electoral district with more “Romanians” than “Moldovans”, but partly because of his “internationalism”. Since Chiril identified his party and ticket as “multi-ethnic” or internationalist, he should get a score of 0 on the identificational dimension of either “Romanian” or even “Moldovan” nationalism. On the symbolic
Another candidate whose name indicates a Romanian origin was Alhip Rosca (Alchip Roshka). He obtained 9,543 votes (8.70% of the votes cast for specific candidates in the district). He should get a score of 0 on the identificational dimension of Romanian nationalism.635 There is no evidence that he deserves a score higher than 0.5.636 The candidates who were subjectively “Romanians” obtained a large majority of the votes of the self-identified “Romanians” and a significant minority of the votes of the self-styled “Moldovans” in 1998.637

It should be noted that on the proportional representation side of the ticket in 1998, an overwhelming majority of the Chernivtsi region’s voters (roughly 78.82%) voted for parties that looked favorably toward the president, and supported him. One of these was the regionalist Party of Regions638, two of whose candidates (who were not party members) on the nationwide proportional representation list were Romanians from the region (Ion Popescu, no. 9 and an older journalist, Vasile D. Tarateanu, no. 53). It had the second best performance in electoral district 204, with 15,510 votes (13.08% of the valid votes cast for parties). Nowhere else in the country did this mostly Russian-speaking party that favored local

dimension, the Communists used Communist, not “Romanian”, or even “Moldovan”, symbols. It is interesting to note that the town of Noua Sulita has a “Lenin Street”. See “Location of Disposition of Tax Militia Subdivisions”, at http://www.tax.tk.cv.ua/english/mlocation.php , accessed on June 5, 2005. In more anti-Communist areas of Ukraine that had not been part of the Tsarist Empire, the symbols of the Soviet Union were torn down in 1991. See “Newsbriefs from Ukraine”, accessed at http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/1991/359106.shtml on June 5, 2005, “The Bulletin of the Rotary Club of Calgary South”, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, at http://www.rotarycs.org/Bulletins/Bull121604.pdf#search='Lviv%20Lenin%20statue' , accessed on June 5, 2005. I would like to thank Victor Todoriuc for the information that he has provided me about Chiril and his campaign.

635. I would like to thank Olesia Franchuk, a former graduate student at the Rutgers Graduate School of Education, who originates from the city of Chernivtsi for the information that she provided me in the summer of 2001 on the various groups of Bessarabian Moldovans.

636. He was not regarded as a Romanian nationalist. Nevertheless, the fact that Romanophone names attract Romanophone votes suggests some voters’ ethno-linguistic identification with the candidate unless the candidate clearly indicates that he is opposed to Romanian nationalism, which was not true in this case. His ticket will be assigned a score of 0.5 on the identificational dimension.

637. See the electoral data for all the candidates at http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0e?kodvib=1&rejim=0 and the party and biographical data on the candidates at http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0e?kodvib=1&rejim=0 (accessed April 2005). The self-styled “Romanians” and “Romanian-speakers” voted mostly for Popescu and Opait in 1998. A significant minority of the votes cast by self-identified “Moldovans”, probably including a majority of those who declared their mother-tongue in 2001 as “Romanian”, were cast for the self-styled “Romanian” parliamentary candidates in 1998. Non-Romanians have been extremely unlikely to vote for Romanian nationalistic candidates. Those ethnic minority inhabitants who probably did, including most Romanian-speaking Roma (Gypsies), have officially identified themselves as ethnic Romanians in the censuses.

638. The future prime minister Viktor Yanukovych would eventually lead this party.
autonomy do so well as in this mostly Romanian district.\textsuperscript{639}

In 1999\textsuperscript{640}, the incumbent president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, obtained 54.65\% of all the presidential votes (valid and invalid) in the district during the first round of the 1999 elections held on October 31, 1999, and 71.48\% of all the votes during the second round held on November 14, 1999. The Communist candidate and party leader, Petro Symonenko, obtained 7.33\% and respectively 23.23\% of all the votes. Kuchma’s most widely publicized locally relevant electoral promise was to create a multi-cultural university in Chernivtsi. It would teach in Ukrainian, Romanian, German, Yiddish and Hebrew. The Romanian community of the region requested it. After the elections, in 2000, Kuchma indicated that he still liked the idea, but claimed that the task could not be accomplished because of the insufficient budgetary resources.\textsuperscript{641} He also met President Emil Constantinescu in Cernauti in the late spring of 1999. Kuchma also allowed the former king of Romania, Michael (Mihai) of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (1927-1930, 1940-1947), to visit northern Bukovina in late May 1999. The former king is very popular among the ethnic Romanians of northern Bukovina and the Herta region in Ukraine, etc. Kuchma was hoping to use

\textsuperscript{639} The total percentage of the votes that were cast for political forces that sympathized with President Kuchma was 78.82\%. According to Roman Solchanyk, “The Party of Regional Revival in Ukraine, whose name reflects its main focus but which also supported strategic partnerships with the “fraternal peoples of Russia and Belarus” and promised “legal priorities for the Russian language, managed to get 0.9 percent.’ See Roman Solchanyk, \textit{Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition} (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), p. 143. These lines in the party program were not reflected in Popescu’s electoral campaign. One would suspect that the wide discrepancy between the votes for Ion Popescu in the SMPS election and the PR votes in the district for the party on whose list he ran was due to the anti-Russian attitudes of most local Romanians. Also see the electoral results at \url{http://www.cvkv.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0e?kodvib=1&rejim=0} (the party is listed as “The Party of Regions”), and the PR list of the party at \url{http://www.cvkv.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0e?kodvib=1&rejim=0} (accessed June 7, 2005). The party did not pass the threshold for being represented in the Supreme Council in Kiev in 1998.

\textsuperscript{640} Albert Thau, a Ph.D. Candidate in Economics at the New School in New York City, visited his native city of Chernivtsi and a Romanian village in 1999. He believes that most Romanians with whom he talked to desired union with Romania rather than a continuation of Ukrainian rule. However, an even more widespread and intense preference of the local Romanians was to immigrate to the West, or at least to work in the West for a period of time. Ukrainians shared this preference too. The key reason was not so much poverty, which did play a part, but lack of hope. On the other hand, he noted that the local Romanians appreciated the fact that the government in Kyiv was far away and did not have sufficient “reach” to tax them, which the Romanian government would have had the ability to do. Other sources do not mention mass irredentism, which might have been, just as in 1991, shared by only around a third of the self-styled “Romanians”.

\textsuperscript{641} See Alexandrina Cernov, Cernauti, „Am pierdut tot!...“, in Viorel Patrichi, “Un tratat intre romani”, in \textit{Lumea Magazin}, no.7, 2000, accessed at \url{http://www.lumeam.ro/nr7_2000/un_tratat_intre_romani.html} in May 2005. The Romanian government also did not have any money, and in 1999, Romanian president Emil Constantinescu noted this and indicated his hope that the German government would pay for it. The rector of the institution opposed the idea and threatened that “there will never be a Chernivtsi multicultural university”. In the end, the university became a “Ukrainian National University”. 
these visits to get votes from the local ethnic Romanians, which he accomplished. A vote for Kuchma in the district will therefore receive a score of 1 on the intensity of nationalism scale due to a score of 1 on the symbolic dimension. The validity of this approach is somewhat controversial, particularly because this score is also unfortunately applied to the Ukrainian ethnic minority in the district.

A comparison of the Communist performance in the 1998 and 1999 elections is very interesting. The Communist candidate in the single member district obtained 31,175 votes (28.41%) in 1998. The Communist Party obtained 35,450 votes (29.91%) on the proportional representation side of the ballot in the same elections in 1998. In 1999, the Communist Party leader and presidential candidate Petro Symonenko obtained 8,408 in the first round and 30,913 in the second round (24.53% of the votes cast for Symonenko or Kuchma). This would suggest some very interesting patterns. There were some voters (Ukrainians, Russians, and possibly self-styled “Romanians”) who might have voted for the Communist Party PR list, but who did not vote for a self-styled “Moldovan” candidate in 1998. The results also indicate the fact that most of the local Communist voters were not enthusiastic supporters of this party. By 1999, the Communist Party was not seen as a political formation that promoted Romanian, including “Moldovan”, minority rights.

The parliamentary elections of March 31, 2002 in the same district were marked by widespread irregularities, allegedly including some electoral fraud. This caused the incumbent deputy Ion Popescu to lose the elections. One of the techniques that were used was “candidate cloning”. A younger Popescu, Vladimir Popescu, had been induced to run in order to confuse the voters. On the proportional

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642. See Sorin Avram, “Autoritatile ucrainene au aprobat vizita Regelui Mihai I in nordul Bucovinei cu jumatate de gura”, in Ziarul de Iasi, June 1, 1999, accessed at http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/arhiva/1999/06/01/local/suceava/01.ro.html in July 2005. The quasi-totality of the Romanians of northern Bukovina and Herta and a majority of the Bessarabian “Moldovans” have a positive opinion about the period of interwar Romanian rule, but many of these individuals are not irredentists. The region’s Romanians welcomed the former monarch more universally and enthusiastically than the various post-1989 Romanian presidents who visited the region.

643. As I have previously noted, the issue was symbolically very important for the Romanian national movement. A vote for Kuchma should get a 0 on the integrative dimension of Romanian nationalism because it was not an irredentist vote. It will be assigned another 0 on the satisfactional dimension, because voting with the incumbent president indicates satisfaction, not dissatisfaction. Kuchma should also get a 0 on the identificational issue. Not only was he not a Romanian, but his regime promoted a “Moldovan” identity in the Odessa oblast in 1998-1999, and the issue was fresh in the minds of the Romanian electorate. The votes for all the other presidential candidates should be 0.


645. Vladimir Popescu was an individual from an ethnically mixed family, the guard of the alcohol factory
representation side of the ballot, the political forces that would later be associated with the “Orange Revolution” obtained 51.1% of the vote. The pro-Kuchma forces obtained 30.29% and the left 14.16%. These political parties were loosely allied with the (pro-Yushchenko) Popescu campaign, and were sometimes served by the same individuals.

The corrupt, “mafia-type” governor of the region, Theofil Bauer (replaced in 2003 by President Kuchma for incompetence) was not seen by pro-Yushchenko analysts as an Ukrainian nationalist or as a person with a clear Ukrainian ethnic identity, but merely as someone bent on making money. He and his underlings engaged in systematic electoral harassment, intimidation, the use of patronage, as well as other unfair electoral techniques in favor of this local potentate’s brother, Mikhail Bauer. Mikhail was the head of the Direction for Education and Science of the Chernivtsi Regional State Administration in 1998-2002. He was elected because he won 45.96% valid votes cast for specific candidates in electoral district 204. The only Romanian nationalistic candidate, Ion Popescu, obtained only 20.03% of the valid votes cast for candidates. He apparently obtained a majority or plurality of the vote of those individuals who declared “Romanian” as their mother-tongue. By this time, his score on the intensity of nationalism scale had increased from a 2.5 in 1998 to a 3 because of the use by his campaign of all Romanian ethnic symbols. Vladimir O. Popescu, an individual with a Romanian father and non-Romanian, Ukrainian, mother, obtained 4.38% of the votes and should get a score of 0.5 on the identificational dimension of Romanian nationalism and in general.

Some candidates with a score of 0 on the intensity of Romanian nationalism scale should also

in the village of Carapciu. The people in the Ion Popescu campaign believed that the regional administration was behind his candidacy. See the March 12, 2002 e-mail from Ion Cretu, the chief of staff of Ion Popescu’s parliamentary campaign addressed to the Romanian Parliament at http://forum.yam.ro/read.php?f=3&t=4732 (accessed May 11, 2005).


One should not assign a score of 0 to his voters just because many of them confused him with the other Popescu. Moreover, the name Popescu (“the son of a priest”) is an exclusively Romanian name.
get a 0 for “Romanian” or “Moldovan” nationalism. The same Communist candidate with a “Moldovan” self-identification and with the same score on the scale of intensity of “Moldovanist” nationalism, 0, as in 1998, Vladimir Chiril, obtained 4.56%. Another Romanian candidate was the Bukovinian Romanian Iurie Vataman, who obtained 1.04% of the all the votes cast for specific candidates. He represented the anti-Kuchma, somewhat pro-Russian Political Party “Apple”. His score on the intensity of Romanian nationalism is difficult to assign, but, for the sake of conservatism, I will assign him a 0.5 on the identificational dimension.649 The largest number of “Moldovan” voters, unlike in 1998, did not vote for Romanophone, even “Moldovan”, candidates, but for Bauer. The deeds of the Moldovan Communist regime in Moldova right before the elections, such as the attempt to make Russian the second state or official language of Moldova and to mandate the teaching of Russian in Romanian-language schools starting in the second grade, which shall be discussed in a subsequent chapter, were well known to the local electorate. They had left a bitter taste in the mouths of not only the self-styled “Romanians” in the region, but also in those of the self-styled “Moldovans” in the region. It has hurt the electoral prospects of the Communists among the Romanophone electorate in Ukraine at least temporarily.650

Quantitative Table 4C - The Intensity of Romanian Nationalism Score in Ukrainian Elections 1998-2004

Electoral District No. 204 during the period 1998-2004651

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Election</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Election Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0.8363</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.7547</td>
<td>Presidential, second (last) round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.8389</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.7812</td>
<td>Presidential, third (last) round</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

649. The score on the identificational dimensional of Romanophone nationalism of this candidate is a 0.5 for the same reason as in the case of Alhip Rosca. Vataman was ignored by the Ion Popescu campaign. According to Victor Todoriuc, Vataman is a typically Bukovian Romanian name.


651. For the other relevant electoral districts, the scores during the entire period were zero or very close to zero.
Electoral fraud, while real, does not seem to have been the main factor in accounting for the results. However, its presence, presumably on a small scale, has led many observers to overestimate its importance. Nevertheless, the electorate was misled. Mikhail Iosifovich Bauer, whose father was an ethnic German, remembered that his mother was ethnically Romanian before election time, only to “forget” this soon after the elections. Even more importantly, the Romanian-speakers who campaigned for him classified the electoral district 204 as a “Romanian [electoral] district”. They classified the “Moldovans” as Romanians. Bauer’s campaign suggested that he should be elected “because he would do more than a Romanian” for the Romanians, including “Moldovans”, in the district. The candidate’s use of his half-Romanian origin and his campaign’s classification of the “Moldovans” as Romanians should give his ticket a score of 0.5 on the identificational dimension of Romanian nationalism at election time. This is also the candidate’s overall score. This again shows the importance of the ethnic basis as a facilitator of nation-building. Mikhail Bauer, and the political force with which he was linked, “For a United Ukraine”, led by the parliamentary speaker of 2002-2006, Volodymyr Lytvyn, did not favor, but opposed, the idea of making Russian an official language in Ukraine.

Mikhail Bauer seldom spoke Romanian. He obtained the support, and presumably the former voters, of an ethnic Romanian nationalistic candidate from 1998, Arcadie Opait. The fact that this former candidate did not run again seems to indicate the importance of patronage and personality clashes in the 2002 elections. The fact that the score of Arcadie Opait on the intensity of Romanian nationalism scale was closer to that of the Bauer campaign (0.5) than to that of the Popescu campaign (3) made this alignment predictable. It has been alleged that after the elections, Bauer has lost his previous popularity. The


Kuchma camp, including “For a United Ukraine”, certainly did.655

For the entire district, the score of the intensity of Romanian nationalism was 0.84656 for the parliamentary elections of 1998, which should be compared to an identical 0.84657 for those of 2002. This seems to point to a certain stability of the intensity of Romanian nationalism, at least vis-à-vis all other visions. The impressions of local and outside “qualitativist” observers and analysts confirm this overall perception. “Romanian” nationalism was the only Romanophone nationalism expressed electorally in the district. The scores for “Moldovan” nation-building in the district have always been 0. Although this is an imperfect measurement, the score for the last, second round of the presidential elections of 1999 was 0.75. This figure was very close to the one for the final, third round of the 2004 presidential elections, 0.78.658

2.3. Reconciling “Orange” Liberal Nationalisms in the Chernivtsi Region in District 204 in 2002-2004

Over all, the ethnic basis and the educational system have played a key factor in promoting Romanian nationalism after 2002. Romanian nationalism has been correlated with support for Yushchenko and his allies in 2002-2004. The impact of the educational system (the role of Romanian students, and young university-educated professionals, who actively took part in the protests of the Orange Revolution) is somewhat inconclusive. This is because we can not always differentiate between Romanian ethnonationalist motivations and non-ethnonationalist “orange”, for example, anti-election fraud, ones. At any rate, an ethnic basis favorable to Romanian nationalism was a key factor in accounting for the pro-Yushchenko votes. A “Romanian” identity was much more likely to lead to such a vote than a “Moldovan” one.

It was claimed by some in early 2005 that the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” had opened new opportunities for good relations between ethnic Romanians and ethnic Ukrainians, and between Romania and Ukraine. It was also argued that the pro-Yushchenko voting patterns of the Romanians in the

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656. The exact score was 0.8363.
657. The exact score was 0.8389.
658. The exact scores were 0.7547 for 1999 and 0.7812 for 2004.
Chernivtsi region were a “bridge” between the two peoples. The hope was premature. During the Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004, and, indeed, during the parliamentary elections of 2002, the partisan preferences of the Romanian inhabitants of district 204 were similar to those of the local Ukrainians. A large majority of the Romanians of the Chernivtsi region, just like a large majority of the inhabitants of Ukrainian ethnicity in the region, voted for the (mildly) nationalist, democratic, liberal, pro-Western candidate Victor Yushchenko.

A plurality, particularly in the rayons of Storojinet, Hliboca and Herta, had voted for Yushchenko’s electoral ticket, the Election Bloc of Political Parties ‘Victor Yuschenko Bloc "Our Ukraine"’ in the proportional representation elections of March 31, 2002. One of the Romanian nationalists in the region, Vasile Tarateanu, the editor of the Romanian Bukovinian newspaper “Arcasul” (“The Bowman”), and a former campaigner for Yushchenko in 2002 and during the early part of the 2004 campaign, has analyzed the electoral patterns. According to him, a majority of the Romanians voted for Yushchenko’s coalition on the proportional representation list in 2002 (and in the presidential elections of 2004). The bloc obtained 40.63% of the votes cast for political parties in the district. If one adds the votes of Yushchenko’s allies in the first round of Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004, the percentage was 51.10%, a majority of the votes in the district. According to Tarateanu, this was particularly true in the rayons Storojinet, Hliboca and Herta. In those rayons, the Romanian population generally has a “Romanian” self-identification. A “Romanian” identity was therefore correlated with voting not only for self-identified “Romanian” candidates, but also for the “orange” forces in 2002-2004. On the other hand,


660. The first round was on October 31, the “first” second round on November 21 and the repeat second round, or the third round, on December 26, 2004.

661. Nevertheless, whereas among the ethnic Romanians of district 204, only a plurality voted for Yushchenko’s and Yulia Tymoshenko’s election blocs, among the ethnic Ukrainian electorate in the other districts of the region, the supporters of these two tickets represented a majority of the total and ethnic Ukrainian population.

the pro-Kuchma parties did better in the district 204 than in the other electoral districts of the region.663

The former liberal, pro-Western prime minister obtained 85,529 votes in the electoral district 204, 65.74% of the 130,090 votes cast, in the first round of October 31, 2004, in comparison to Victor Yanukovych’s 23,102 votes (17.75%), etc. In the “first” second round of November 21, which was invalidated, Yuschenko won 96,672 votes, 72.51% of the 133,312 votes cast in the second round.664 By contrast, Yanukovych won only 23.49% of the vote in district 204.665 In the repeat second round, out of 133,798 votes, Yushchenko won 100,512 (75.12% of the vote), whereas Yanukovych won only 28,149 (21.03%).666 According to the former Romanian deputy in the Kiev parliament Ion Popescu, who was pro-Yushchenko in 2002-2004667, a majority of the ethnic Romanians in the city of Cernauti/Czernowitz/Cernivtsi also voted for Yushchenko during the presidential elections.668

As a rule, Yushchenko’s electorate from 2004 was mostly Kuchma’s electorate from 1999. A solid majority of the self-declared “Romanians”, and of the Romanian (including "Moldovan") population, of the rayons of Storojinet, Hliboca, Herta and Noua Sulita voted for Yushchenko in all rounds. A majority of the self-styled “Moldovans” in the region, including a majority of the northern Bessarabian “Moldovans” of the Noua Sulita rayon, cast their ballots for the same candidate in all the electoral rounds.669

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664. By contrast, he won 74.50% of all the 506,747 votes in the region, out of which 1.43% voted against all the candidates.


666. See the official results of the Ukrainian Central election commission at http://ic-www.cv.k.gov.ua/wp304ept001f01=502p005f01=204 (accessed March 2005).

667. I would like to thank Natalya Belitser for this point. I have discussed this issue with her on July 17, 2005.


669. For a discussion of the situation of the Romanian minority in Ukraine, see Policy Paper nr.704R/19 Iunie, "The Romanian Minority in Ukraine", e-mailed by the Center for the Prevention of Conflicts and Early Warning, of Bucharest, Romania, on August 13, 2004, and posted by me at http://lists.delfi.lv/pipermail/minelres/2004-November/003694.html. Also see Michael Shafir, "Re:
Among the key differences between Yushchenko and Yanukovych was that the latter was opposed to Ukraine’s membership in NATO, and was not too keen to join the European Union, desired to make Russian the second official (“state”) language in Ukraine and to permit double citizenship. Yushchenko argued that Ukraine should join NATO and the European Union. He was opposed to making Russian a “state language”, and opposed double citizenship. One may see the data showing the demographic differences between the Yushchenko and Yanukovych voters below (Quantitative Table 4B).  


The electorate in the Chernivtsi region, including the Romanians (both the “Romanians” and “Moldovans”), was as a rule in favor of EU and often even NATO accession. A large minority of the Romanians, particularly “Moldovans” from the Bessarabian parts of the region, were in favor of making Russian a second state language, while a majority was against this. The local Romanians were in favor of allowing double citizenship.\textsuperscript{671}

Quantitative Table 4B - The Exit Polls for the Last Round of the 2004 Elections in Ukraine

(December 26) for the Entire Country

Part 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Characteristic</th>
<th>Percentage of the Voters for Each Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yushchenko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity (Ethnic Group) of the Voters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chief Communication Language of the Voters (Either Russian or Ukrainian)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Characteristic</th>
<th>Percentage of the Voters for Each Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yushchenko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Communication Language of the Voters ( Either Russian or Ukrainian)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colloquial Language of the Voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Percentage of the Voters for Each Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yushchenko</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

but to colloquial language.

\textsuperscript{671} The Bukovinian and Herta Romanians were overwhelmingly in favor of NATO accession, even though this issue seems to have been a low priority item for them.
### Part 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Percentage of the Voters Who Agreed with the Following Policies Advocated by Yanukovych</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For Russian to Become the Second State Language</td>
<td>West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against NATO Accession</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow Double Citizenship</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yushchenko, who called for better relations with Romania, including for a strategic partnership with that country, seemed to be more appealing to ethnic Romanians, and particularly to those who identified themselves as “Romanians” rather than as “Moldovans”. The fact that the president Kuchma and his prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, were seen as personally responsible for the friction with Romania at that time alienated them in the eyes of many ethnic Romanians.672

Equally importantly, Yushchenko’s pro-EU, pro-NATO orientation, within the context of a Romania that was a NATO member since the spring of 2004 and close to joining the European Union, presumably in 2007-2008, was consistent with the electoral affinities of most of the Romanians of this region. One of the reasons for this attitude, mentioned by local Romanian journalists of different generations involved with the Yushchenko campaign, was the greater economic welfare associated with EU status. Another one was the fact the Romanian inhabitants’ civil and minority rights would be fully

672. The Romanian-Ukrainian friction that had to do with the control of the territorial waters around the Islands of Serpents and with the deepening of the Bystroe Canal in the Danube Delta by the Ukrainian authorities, which would harm the region’s ecosystem, were other alleged reasons for massive ethnic Romanian support for Yushchenko. See an interview with the young journalist Liviu Rusu of the newspaper “Junimea”, in the article “Ucraina pe urmele revolutiei romanesti din decembrie ‘89?””, in Romanian Global News, November 24, 2004, [http://www.rgnpress.ro/content/view/2760](http://www.rgnpress.ro/content/view/2760) (accessed March 2005). The signatures of various petitions by various ethnic Romanian individuals residing in Ukraine or by local Romanian organizations criticizing the Transnistrian separatist regime seem to show that these were additional reasons why some voted for Yushchenko.
respected only when Ukraine would be a European Union member.\textsuperscript{673} Just like in the Republic of Moldova, Romanian nationalism has become linked with strong support for EU integration. A clear symbolic hint is provided by the Union of Romanian Societies “For European Integration”, founded in 2004, led by Ion Popescu, who was pro-Yushchenko in 2000-2004.\textsuperscript{674} Since the call for joining the European Union which would have Romania as a member implies a partial change of sovereignty, a vote for Yushchenko and his coalition could be given a score of 0.5 on the scale of the intensity of Romanian nationalism.

Both Yushchenko and his opponent Viktor Yanukovych were arguing in favor of the official use of languages such as Romanian in localities whose population was mostly ethnically Romanian, or from another ethnic minority. However, whereas the former did it explicitly, including in reference to Romanian, the latter did it implicitly, giving as an example only the Russian language. Within this context, the eventual winner of the election and some of his ethnic Romanian fans made a sophisticated, but probably inaccurate, yet effective, claim. They argued that in fact Yanukovych’s promise was only applicable, and would be exclusively implemented in favor of, the Russian language.\textsuperscript{675}

According to Yushchenko, the non-Russian minorities were risking not getting this benefit, because no such provision would be made for non-Russian-speaking minorities. In effect, Yushchenko and his supporters were arguing locally in favor of a coalition against the increasing role of the Russian language.\textsuperscript{676} At any rate, overall, Yushchenko seems to have come across as offering a more credible minority rights platform to the local ethnic Romanian-speakers.\textsuperscript{677} For this reason, a vote for Yushchenko


\textsuperscript{674}. The return of kolkhoz land to the peasants as well as Yushchenko’s competence and non-apparatchik image, pro-democratic and pro-Western attitudes also played a role in influencing ethnic Romanians to vote for him.

\textsuperscript{675}. See an interview with the young journalist Liviu Rusu of the newspaper “Junimea”, in the article “Ucraina pe urmele revolutiei romanesti din decembrie ’89?” It appears in \textit{Romanian Global News}, November 24, 2004, at \url{http://www.rgnpress.ro/content/view/2760}, accessed in March 2005. There is some hostility against ethnic Russians and the Russian language among the northern Bukovinian Romanians.


\textsuperscript{677}. See an interview with the young journalist Liviu Rusu of the newspaper “Junimea”, in the article “Ucraina pe urmele revolutiei romanesti din decembrie ’89?” in \textit{Romanian Global News}, November 24,
could be given a score of 0.5 on the satisfactional dimension of Romanian nationalism.

Another reason for Yushchenko’s success among the ethnic Romanians of the region was the popular opposition against the corruption associated with the Kuchma-Yanukovych regime. The number of purely Romanian-language schools in the Chernivtsi oblast, and in Ukraine in general, peaked during Yushchenko’s tenure as a prime minister (December 1999-April 2001). It decreased under his successors by three, including one in the Chernivtsi region, while four purely Romanian schools in the region were turned into mixed Romanian-Ukrainian ones, also favored the former prime minister. It was visible not only in the official statistics, but also noted in various analyses of the reasons why ethnic Romanians had voted for Yushchenko. The young journalist Liviu Rusu of the newspaper “Junimea” did one of them.

This top Romanian local pro-Yushchenko activist of that period attempted to explain the prevailing local opinion. He noted the fact that four mixed Romanian-Ukrainian schools in the region had become completely Ukrainian after the end of Yushchenko’s tenure as prime minister. This led him and many others to think that there was a systematic drive to ukrainianize the Romanian schools in the region and the

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country in 2001-2004.\textsuperscript{679} The extent to which this fact was known by the average inhabitant of Romanian ethnicity is not fully clear. Yet it is clear that most of the respected ethnic Romanian opinion leaders who endorsed Yushchenko were exposed to this information by the middle of 2004.\textsuperscript{680}

The campaign of the former prime minister and current president of Ukraine was, as we have seen, skilled in appealing to the local ethnic Romanians of the Chernivtsi area on the issue of an improvement in their other minority rights as well as more economic opportunities. However, there were indeed Romanophobes among some high-level individuals connected with the Yushchenko campaign, a fact that did indeed provoke dissatisfaction among ethnic Romanians. Many of the older ethnic Romanians voted for Yushchenko for long-term rather than short-term advantages. One of the anti-Romanian individuals with a key position (“trusted man”) in district 205 in northern Bessarabia was the editor of the newspaper Ceas of Chernivtsi, Petro Kobevo. His paper had published numerous anti-Romanian articles. Yushchenko failed to give an answer to a letter of protest from his top Romanian supporters in the Chernivtsi region to his nomination. This deflated their enthusiasm, and the extent of their campaigning, for him. Yet they still voted for him. The Romanian electorate could treat Kobevo’s antics as relatively unimportant. The local Romanians were to some extent used to this variety of unpleasant discourse.\textsuperscript{681}

Yushchenko’s popularity was the highest among the Bukovinian Romanians, then among the Romanians of Herta. His support among the northern Bessarabian Romanians, the overwhelming majority of whom call themselves “Moldovans”, was not surprisingly lower. It was partially explained by the distribution of Romanian identity and nationalism. Other factors were the patterns of Ukrainian and Russian language proficiency of the population. According to the 2001 census, a majority of the Bukovinian Romanians and almost a majority of the self-styled “Romanians” in the region (55,077 of 114,555 or 48.08%) knew the Ukrainian language, the language that Yushchenko used in the presidential debates of 2004. Only a minority of the Bukovinian Romanians, and 46.82% of all the self-styled


\textsuperscript{681} Vasile Tarateanu: “Noul presedinte al Ucrainei este inconjurat de cei mai aprigi dusmani ai neamului romanesc”, in \textit{Timpul}, No. 180, January 21, 2005, which may be found at \url{http://mioritix.tripod.com/discriptio/s21} (accessed on April 4, 2005).
“Romanians” in the region (53,631 out 114,555), knew the Russian language, which was used by Yanukovych during the presidential debates, according to the same census. By contrast, 56.31% of the “Moldovans” of the area knew Russian and 48.23% knew Ukrainian according to the latest census.

Ethnic Romanians in the Chernivtsi region supported Yushchenko and the Orange Revolution not merely through casting ballots or campaigning. Many of them also participated in rallies that protested the election fraud. In Chernivtsi, 30,000 individuals, including thousands of ethnic Romanians, protested. Hundreds of ethnic Romanians took part in the Kyiv rallies. A disproportionate number of the ethnic Romanian protesters seem to have been university students and young, university-educated professionals. This shows the importance of the educational system in nation-building among the Romanian in the Chernivtsi region. However, among the protesters in Kiev who stayed in the tents day and night, there were not only Romanian ethnic nationalists from the Chernivtsi region, but also Romanian students in Kyiv who originated from the Chernivtsi region who know Ukrainian better than Romanian, speak it more often and are not Romanian nationalists. Therefore, not all ethnic Romanian protestors, especially in Kyiv were partially motivated by Romanian ethnic nationalism.

The impact of industrialization is more difficult to ascertain. The Romanians who resided in the regional capital voted for the eventual winner, but so did those in other areas of the region. The impact of industrialization on the 2004 elections in this case is complex and difficult to ascertain fully.

The impact of another independent variable that has been de-emphasized in this study, the autonomous role of political actors, could be observed since 2002 in the Chernivtsi region. As we have seen, it did not affect the aggregate intensity of Romanian nationalism scores in district 204, but only their

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682. See the rayon-by-rayon statistics of the proportion of individuals who knew the Ukrainian language in Ion Popescu, p. 119 and the aggregate statistics on p. 144-145.
683. See the rayon-by-rayon and regional statistics of the proportion of individuals who knew the Ukrainian language in Ion Popescu, p. 119, 144-145. A large majority of the self-styled “Moldovans” in most of the rest of Ukraine know Russian, but not Ukrainian.
684. See an interview with the young journalist Liviu Rusu of the newspaper “Junimea”, who took part in the demonstrations in Chernivtsi, in the article “Ucraina pe urmele revolutiei romanesti din decembrie ’89?”, in Romanian Global News, November 24, 2004, http://www.rgnpress.ro/content/view/2760 , accessed in March 2005. I would also like to thank Victor Todoriuc for the information that he has provided me on the demographic characteristics of the protesters who are his relatives, friends and acquaintances.
It would appear that the Romanian nation-building will continue among self-styled “Moldovans”. More and more individuals who think of themselves as primarily “Moldovans”, but also often secondarily as “Romanians” or “Romanian-speakers”, and often vote for Romanian, including nationalist, candidates, or their descendants, will develop a “Romanian” primary or secondary identity. It is nevertheless unlikely that it will surpass and “outshine” the “Moldovan” one as a primary identity, but it is becoming increasingly widespread.

The ethnic basis has been the key independent variable that has promoted Romanian nationalism after 2002. Romanian nationalism has been correlated with support for Yushchenko and his allies in 2002-2004. The impact of the educational system (the role of Romanian students, and young university-educated professionals, who actively took part in the protests of the Orange Revolution) is somewhat inconclusive. This is because we can not always differentiate between Romanian ethnonationalist motivations and non-ethnonationalist “orange”, for example, anti-election fraud, ones.

3.1. Conclusions

The process of Romanian nation-building during the (Soviet and) post-Soviet period in the Chernivtsi region, confirms the predictions of my model made in chapter 6. The “Romanian” ethnic basis was identical to that south of the border in present-day Romania. This affected those Bukovinians and Hertans whose ethnic and linguistic identity had been changed through compulsion by the Soviet regime from “Romanian” to “Moldovan”, or their descendants. It was therefore not a surprise that, during the post-Soviet period, this population has returned in almost all cases to their pre-Sovi et “Romanian” ethnic and linguistic identity. The Bukovinian and Hertan Romanians would vote overwhelmingly (in 1994-1998) or with a smaller majority (in 2002) for relatively intense Romanian nationalistic parliamentary candidates.

Only a small minority of the northern Bessarabian Moldovans in the areas where they live compactly supported Romanian nationalistic candidates until 2002. However, most of these “Moldovans” have signed a Romanian nationalistic petition in 1999-2000. They voted for a candidate (with a Romanian mother and a German father) supported by the regional authorities, whose rhetoric and campaigners
appealed moderately to “Romanian” nationalism in 2002. As a result, the score on the intensity of Romanian nationalism in the mostly Romanian electoral district (no. 204) has remained the same. This has been so because the small decline in the intensity of Romanian nationalism among “Romanians” was compensated by its spread to self-styled “Moldovans”. A majority of these “Moldovans” voted for Viktor Yushchenko in the presidential elections of 2004, as did a larger majority of the “Romanians”. Whereas the “Moldovan” identity still remains as a primary identity in a large majority of the cases, most “Moldovans” in the area also have a “Romanian” or at least “Romanian-speaking” identity, and support Romanian or Romanophone low-intensity nationalism electorally.

The impact of an alternate independent variable, the autonomous role of political actors, could be noticed during the past few years, since 2002 in the Chernivtsi region and since 1997 in the Odessa region. They have not affected the aggregate intensity of Romanian nationalism at the time of the parliamentary elections in the Chernivtsi region in 2002 in comparison to 1998, but have influenced its geographical distribution. Political actors play an important role only when the ethnic elites are divided and when there is widespread patronage, cronyism, etc. They have an important impact when there are no opportunities for the inhabitants to select in the voting booth between varieties of nationalism associated with political parties. Therefore, this variable is useful, but it can not substitute for my four more structural variables. The developments in the post-1989 period indicate the importance for nation-building of the ethnic basis, and the changes therein, and, in northern Bukovina, of the educational system.

Throughout this chapter, I have grouped the self-styled “Moldovans” together with the self-styled “Romanians” in the broader category of Romanians without quotation marks. The distinction between Romanian and “Romanian” is that the former group refers to the population that is intersubjectively ethnically Romanian, whereas the latter category includes those who identify themselves as such. The same principle has been used in ascertaining linguistic self-identification. This is done for a number of reasons, namely as a tribute to the existing scholarship of ethnic Romanian and Ukrainian authors and due to a number of factors that will be discussed below. These include the preference of the Moldovans of the region to have “Romanian” rather “Moldovan” school, of their support for specifically Romanian nationalist petition drives and other specifically Romanian collective actions and, in the cases of some

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individuals, Romanian nationalistic candidates.

The study of the Chernivtsi region also allows us to control for the political forces and politicians running for offices, sometimes the same politicians competing for office in the same electoral district during different elections. The data from local elections also supports the findings from the presidential and (particularly single member district) parliamentary elections.
Chapter 8

“Romanian” and “Moldovan” Nation-Building in the Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine
(1989-2005): The Independent Variables and the Electoral Results

1. Introduction

2. The Chernivtsi Region: The Impact of the Independent Variables from 1989 to 2004

2.1. The Ethnic Basis

2.2. The Educational System and Other Independent Variables

3.1. Conclusions

687 An earlier, somewhat more extensive version of this chapter, “Romanian Nation-Building in the Chernivtsi and Odessa Regions of Ukraine (1989-2005)”, contains more details, more documentation, and a discussion of certain complexities that are useful and relevant for those who are well acquainted with the case. This additional material, although in my view quite interesting, has been excluded from this version of the chapter. It makes the text less easily readable for those who are not at all specialists in the case, who are interested in more clarity and less information.

The data during the period from 1990 until 2002 suggests the foremost importance of the ethnic basis in accounting for nation-building as expressed in the electoral results. A “Romanian” ethnic and especially linguistic identity was a better facilitator of Romanian nationalism than a “Moldovan” one. A Romanian mother-tongue assisted Romanian nation-building, while a Ukrainian or Russian mother-tongue hindered the process in practically all cases. The educational system was important in two ways. Romanian schools aided in the spread of a Romanian identity and Romanian nationalism, whereas their lack prevented it. The rising and declining level of civic activism among teachers has partially accounted for the geographical variations of Romanian electoral nationalism, but not its overall level.

The impact of the Romanian-language educational system on the intensity of Romanian nationalism was complex. It sometimes furthered, and it never hindered, its regional spread. A key facilitator of this was the instructional personnel, both inside and outside the classroom. The increase in the proportion of the population with a progressively more advanced education helped nation-building, as it was predicted by my model. This happened unless it was trumped by the negative impact of other variables, such as urbanization/industrialization and an ethnic basis that was less helpful for Romanian nation-building. Yet this would also be consistent with my model.

The census data shows that industrialization and urbanization have hindered Romanian nation-building. The available electoral data does not allow us to confirm this in another way. The sudden shock in the Chernivtsi region explains the rapid change in self-determination preferences in 1991 from an acceptance to a rejection of the Soviet Union among the local ethnic Romanians. There was also a renewed demand to use Romanian symbols such as the Romanian flag after the failed August 1991 coup. At that time, a minority of the self-styled “Romanians” became open irredentists who desired union with Romania and boycotted the referendum on Ukrainian independence.

2. The Chernivtsi Region: The Impact of the Independent Variables from 1989 to 2004

2.1. The Ethnic Basis
What accounts for the variations in the level of nationalism as reflected in the electoral results? The key factors that fostered Romanian nation-building were an “appropriate” ethnic basis and the Romanian ethnic educational or school system.

Overall, the evidence for the period from 1990 until 2002 suggests the foremost importance of the ethnic basis in accounting for nation-building as expressed in the electoral results. A “Romanian” ethnic and especially linguistic identity was a better facilitator of Romanian nationalism than a “Moldovan” one. A Romanian mother-tongue was a great facilitator of Romanian nation-building, while a Ukrainian or Russian mother-tongue hindered the process in practically all cases. The educational system was important in two ways. Romanian schools facilitated a Romanian identity and Romanian nationalism, whereas their lack prevented it. The rising and declining level of civic activism among teachers has partially accounted for the geographical variations of Romanian electoral nationalism, but not its overall level.

In addition to the elements of the ethnic basis that have already been discussed related to ethnic and linguistic self-identification, the spoken idioms and accents, etc., one should also note another aspect, the issue of the religious calendar. The overwhelming majority of the ethnic Romanians in the region, and all the Eastern Orthodox ones, have been parishioners of the Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate (The Russian Orthodox Church). In the orthodox churches in the Romanian localities of the Herta rayon, of northern Bukovina, and in most of the Romanian localities of Ukrainian northern Bessarabia, as well as in the neo-Protestant churches (Baptist, Pentecostal and Adventist), the “new” (Gregorian) religious calendar is in use. Thus, Christmas is celebrated on December 25, not January 7, the customary day of observance of most parishioners of the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates. The Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate has made efforts to entice or pressure the worshippers in the “new style” to switch to the “old style”.

As we have seen, hardly any individuals were not ethnic Romanians who voted for ethnic Romanians in local and regional elections. Originally, the self-identified “Romanians” and the self-identified “Moldovans” from northern Bukovina and Herta, whose ethnic basis was identical to that of the local “Romanians” across the border, voted for self-styled “Romanian” candidates in local elections. So

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688. I would like to thank Victor Todoriuc for this point.
690. The idiom of Herta rayon is identical to that across the border in the northern part of pre-1918 Romania, the province of Moldova in the Old Kingdom of Romania. A few words in the Bukovinian idiom
did those “Moldovans” who identified their mother–tongue as “Romanian”.

This was also true in Ion Popescu’s election district no. 434 from 1994, in the sense that he obtained most votes from those self-styled “Romanians” who called themselves “Moldovan-speakers” in 1989 and “Romanian-speakers” in 2001. This shows the importance of the existence of an objective “standard Romanian” ethnic basis (e.g., the absence of a “Bessarabian Moldovan” accent) in fostering voting for “Romanian” candidates in 1994. Overall, the inhabitants with a “Romanian” ethnic basis voted for “Romanian” candidates.

In both 1998 and 2002, candidates with a “Romanian” identity, and especially Ion V. Popescu, obtained a majority of the votes of the Romanian population in the Storojinet, Herta and Hliboca rayons of district 204. In these districts, the Romanian inhabitants, as we have seen, overwhelmingly identify themselves as “Romanians” rather than as “Moldovans”. In 1998, Popescu won an overwhelming victory in these areas. In 2002, he barely surpassed Mikhail Bauer, the winner of the election, among the ethnic Romanians in these areas. In 1998, Vladimir O. Chiril won a plurality of the “Moldovan” votes in the northern Bessarabian rayon of Noua Sulita, which bordered the Prut River and the Republic of Moldova.

In this rayon, whose capital, Noua Sulita, has a “Lenin Street”, the overwhelming majority of

distinguish it from that of Herta, and of the province of Moldova in Romania. They exist both north and south of the Romanian-Ukrainian border, and include some German words related to the railroads. Nevertheless, in a large majority of the conversations, it is impossible to distinguish between the Romanians from northern Bukovina and Herta. I would like to thank Victor Todoriuc for this generalization, which is consistent with my explanations. The same also goes for the Romanians from southern Bukovina and those of the Romanian province of the Old Kingdom, as I have observed during my numerous travels, on television, etc. The idiom of Herta is free of any Ukrainian influences, while the Bukovinian idiom is to a small degree affected by them. Both are free of various neologisms (e.g., certain Anglicisms) that appeared in post-1944 Romania within its present-day borders. The Bessarabian “Moldovans” could be distinguished relatively easily from the northern Bukovinian and Herta “Romanians” based on their accent. The Bukovinian and Herta “Moldovans” whose ancestors originate from these areas as a rule speak indistinguishably from the Bukovinian and Herta “Romanians”. The northern Bessarabian idiom is not completely identical to the one used in the northern part of the Republic of Moldova because of the influence of the idioms of northern Bukovina and Herta and of the Ukrainian language.

One should note the larger than expected number of self-styled “Romanians” and the smaller than expected number of “Moldovans” among those who were elected.

See Florin Dyrdya (Darda), “Boianul din Bukovina: Istorie si Prezent” at Florin Dyrdya’s website at http://www.cv.ukrtel.net/boian/ISTORIE/istorie.html (accessed in July 2005). The young historian Florin Dyrdya (Darda) talks about how his village of Boian, one of the few Bukovinian localities in the Noua Sulita rayon along these lines (“the village of Boian, which, in contrast to most of the localities from the rayon Noua Sulita, has remained both in speech and in clothing purely Romanian”).

One of my sources on this issue was Victor Todoriuc.

the population has had a “Moldovan” primary identity. Moreover, its large Ukrainian minority, just like in the other areas of Ukrainian northern Bessarabia, was more likely to vote Communist than the northern Bukovinian Ukrainians in 1998-2002. In 2002, after the old nostalgia for the Soviet period had diminished, partly due to an improvement in the standard of living, Mikhail Bauer won a large majority, including of the “Moldovan” votes, in this rayon. Therefore, the nature of the ethnic self-identification of the voters seems to have been an important variable in explaining the electoral results. These patterns show the importance of one of the independent variables, the ethnic basis, in facilitating nation-building.

The presidential elections are interesting. In 1994, a majority of the Romanians of the Storojinet rayon, most of whom listed their language as “Romanian” in 1989, voted for the incumbent Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk, who was more of a Ukrainian ethnic nationalist than he had been in 1991. Most other Romanians, including majorities of those in the Hliboca, Herta and Noua Sulita rayons, that is, in the areas where most “Romanians” had listed “Moldovan” as their mother tongue in 1989, voted for Kuchma. In 1999, most of the members of the group in all rayons voted for the candidate favored by the Western Ukrainian electorate, Leonid Kuchma. The same was true of the votes for Yushchenko in 2004.

The support of most “Moldovans” from the region for Romanian nationalism in 1999-2002, which has been discussed in previous sections, needs to be explained. Most of the self-identified “Moldovans” from the Chernivtsi region believe that the “Romanians” and the “Moldovans” are “one people”. The “Moldovans” of northern Bessarabia feel ethnically and culturally closer to the local “Romanians” in the region than do the “Moldovans” from the Republic of Moldova and the Odessa region. They are also ethnographically in some ways closer to the “Romanians” of the region than to those in the Republic of Moldova. They originally spoke the northern Bessarabian Moldovan idiom, but some small fraction of them have since begun to switch to the “Romanian” language.

695. According to Andrew Wilson, with whom I have discussed this matter at the 2005 ASN Convention on April 16, 2005, he is not aware of any electoral data by units smaller than the electoral district. The information exists in an unpublished form. See http://groups-beta.google.com/group/soc.culture.romanian/browse_frm/thread/c4eb3c8f468a51b/6e966a43d1302c66?q=Ion+Popescu+204&num=13#6e966a43d1302c66 on 05/08/2005. The reason why the other electoral districts in the Chernivtsi region are largely ignored is the lack of Romanian parliamentary candidates in those districts. For an electoral analysis, see Vasile Tarateanu: “Noul presedinte al Ucrainei este inconjurat de cei mai aprigi dusmani ai neamului romanesc”, in Timpul, No. 180, January 21, 2005, which may be found at http://mioritix.tripod.com/discriptio/s21 (accessed on April 4, 2005).

696. My conversations with Victor Todoriuc about the Noua Sulita rayon were particularly useful.
lexical and more significant cultural differences have developed between the Moldovans of the Chernivtsi region and those of Moldova.697

A part of the explanation is based on some common elements of the ethnic basis of both the “Romanians” and the “Moldovans” of the Chernivtsi region. These include some words coming from the Bukovinian dialect of the Ukrainian language, and some local wedding customs and dances adopted from the Ukrainians. These elements do not exist in the Republic of Moldova and the Odessa region, or, for that matter, in Romania.698

The percentage of the Chernivtsi area “Moldovans” who knew the Russian language in 2001 (56.31%) was more similar to the one among the local “Romanians” (46.82%). This sets them apart from the “Moldovans” of the Odessa region, for whom the figure was 79.74%.699 The same also goes for the knowledge of the Ukrainian language, for which the numbers were 48.23% for the local “Moldovans” and 48.07% for the “Romanians” in the Chernivtsi region, but only 36.59% for the “Moldovans” in the Odessa region.

Overall, the evidence for the period from 1990 until 2002 suggests the foremost importance of the ethnic basis in accounting for nation-building as expressed in the electoral results. A “Romanian” ethnic and especially linguistic identity was a better facilitator of Romanian nationalism than a “Moldovan” one. A Romanian mother-tongue was a great facilitator of Romanian nation-building, while a Ukrainian or Russian mother-tongue hindered the process in practically all cases. The educational system was important in two ways. Romanian schools facilitated a Romanian identity and Romanian nationalism, whereas their lack prevented it. The rising and declining level of civic activism among teachers has partially accounted for the geographical variations of Romanian electoral nationalism, but not its overall level.


698. See V. T. Zinich and V.I. Naulko, “The Convergence of the Peoples of the Ukrainian SSR in Culture and Life-Style”, in Soviet Sociology, Summer-Fall 1974, vol. 13, no. 1-2, p. 11, 15-19, 21. I would also like to thank Albert Thaur for a similar comment, based on his observation of a Romanian rural wedding in the region in 1999, with Ukrainian dances, etc.

### Qualitative Table 4 B – The Evolution of the Romanian Ethnic Basis in the Chernivtsi Region and the Republic of Moldova

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Base Component or Year</th>
<th>Northern Bukovina and Herta</th>
<th>Ukrainian Northern Bessarabia</th>
<th>Republic of Moldova minus Transnistrian secessionist area</th>
<th>Transnistrian secessionist area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable 1: Ethnic Base</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Language, subdialect, idiom, etc., evaluated according to linguistic criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1989</td>
<td>Romanian as in Romania</td>
<td>Romanian, Bessarabian accent</td>
<td>Romanian, Bessarabian accent</td>
<td>Hybridized Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1998-2000</td>
<td>Romanian as in Romania</td>
<td>Romanian, Bessarabian accent</td>
<td>Romanian, Bessarabian accent</td>
<td>Hybridized Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Ability to speak standard Romanian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1989</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Local idiom</td>
<td>Local idiom</td>
<td>Local idiom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1998-2004</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mostly yes, small minority only local idiom</td>
<td>Mostly yes, small minority only local idiom</td>
<td>Mostly no, minority yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Know and use the Latin alphabet of standard Romanian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1989</td>
<td>Most, not all</td>
<td>Mostly no</td>
<td>Mostly no</td>
<td>Very few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1998-2004</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Almost all</td>
<td>About 2/3</td>
<td>Minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Religion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “Romanian” language called in churches</td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
<td>Mostly “Romanian”</td>
<td>Mostly “Moldovan”, minority “Romanian”</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Religious calendar</td>
<td>“New Style” (Gregorian)</td>
<td>Large majority “New Style”</td>
<td>Large majority “Old Style”</td>
<td>“Old Style” (Julian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Orthodox Patriarchate (Moscow or Bucharest)</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly Moscow</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly Moscow</td>
<td>Large majority Moscow, large minority Bucharest</td>
<td>Exclusively Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic and Linguistic Identity Preferences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support “Romanian” history in schools</td>
<td>Almost all</td>
<td>Overwhelming majority</td>
<td>Large majority supports</td>
<td>Minority supports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support “Moldovan” history in schools</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Very few</td>
<td>Minority supports</td>
<td>Not clear, non-issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Accept to call language “Romanian” in 1989?</td>
<td>Almost all</td>
<td>Overwhelming majority</td>
<td>Most</td>
<td>Minority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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700. The situation in the Republic of Moldova will be discussed in chapter 5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Base Component or Year</th>
<th>Northern Bukovina and Herta</th>
<th>Ukrainian Northern Bessarabia</th>
<th>Republic of Moldova minus Transnistrian secessionist area</th>
<th>Transnistrian secessionist area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accept a “Romanian” identity</td>
<td>Transnistrian secessionist area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1989</td>
<td>Large majority accepts</td>
<td>Minority accepts or tolerates</td>
<td>Minority accepts or tolerates</td>
<td>Minority accepts or tolerates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1998-2004</td>
<td>Almost all accept</td>
<td>Majority accepts, almost all tolerate</td>
<td>Majority tolerates, minority accepts</td>
<td>Minority accepts minority tolerates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Ethnic Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1989</td>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>Moldovans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1998-2004</td>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>Moldovans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary ethnic identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1998-2004</td>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>Romanians, large majority</td>
<td>Romanians, large majority</td>
<td>Romanians, small minority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2. The Educational System and Other Independent Variables

As we have seen, the census data shows that industrialization and urbanization hindered Romanian nation-building. The available electoral data does not allow us to confirm this in another way. The sudden shock in the Chernivtsi region explains the rapid change in self-determination preferences in 1991 from an acceptance to a rejection of the Soviet Union among the local ethnic Romanians. There was also a renewed demand to use Romanian symbols such as the Romanian flag after the failed August 1991 coup. At that time, a minority of the self-styled “Romanians” became open irredentists who desired union with Romania and boycotted the referendum on Ukrainian independence.

The impact of the Romanian-language educational system on the intensity of Romanian nationalism was complex. It sometimes furthered, and it never hindered, its regional spread. A key facilitator of this was the instructional personnel, both inside and outside the classroom. The increase in the proportion of the population with an increasingly advanced education helped nation-building, as it was predicted by my model. This happened unless it was trumped by the negative impact of other variables, such as urbanization/industrialization and an ethnic basis that was less helpful for Romanian nation-building. Yet this would also be consistent with my model.

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The Romanian schools in the localities of the Chernivtsi region are identical in terms of their textbooks and educational program, regardless of the nature of census or other ethnic self-identifications of the populations in these localities. The textbooks and other educational tools, and the Romanian-language teachers and professors, promote a “Romanian” identity, but tolerate a “Moldovan” one. They also promote various cultural elements that correlate with a “Romanian” ethnic basis, such as the association of Christmas with December 25 rather than with January 7. The textbooks are Romanian nationalistic, but moderately so, because they need to be, and are, approved by the Ukrainian authorities.

The fact that a large majority, but, of course, not all, of the teachers in the Bessarabian “Moldovan” areas of the region view themselves as “Romanians” does provide a partial explanation for the relevant electoral patterns. At the pertinent teachers’ congresses, these individuals have been as Romanian nationalistic as the teachers from the Bukovinian and Herta “Romanian” areas of the region outside northern Bessarabia. Moreover, in the Chernivtsi area, some “Moldovans” are more entitled to feel gratitude toward Romania than toward the Republic of Moldova. This is partly because some of them could study at no cost in Romania. They would do it on (more generous) Romanian government stipends rather than in the smaller and less economically developed Moldova. The stipends of the Moldovan government were proportionally less numerous and less generous.701

It should be noted that in 1999, more than 150,000 inhabitants of the Chernivtsi region, practically all ethnic Romanians, signed a petition for the transformation of the University of Chernivtsi

701. Whereas the “Moldovan” population represented 43.04% of the Romanian population in the four rayons with Romanian schools and in the city of Chernivtsi, the 104 stipends provided by the Moldovan authorities represented only 35.86% of the stipends offered by the two Romanian-speaking countries together. See “MINELRES: The Romanian Minority in Ukraine”, November 24, 2004, accessed at http://lists.delfi.lv/pipermail/minelres/2004-November/003694.html and Popescu, “Populatia regiunii Cernauti”, p. 144. Another reason for gratitude would be their chance to travel and therefore to work illegally in EU countries with a Romanian passport.
into a multi-cultural Ukrainian-Romanian-German-Jewish university, with extensive programs in the Romanian language, Romanian history, etc., on behalf of the local Romanian minority. There was no mention of the “Moldovan language”, “Moldovan history” or “Moldovans”. The self-styled “Moldovans” and the self-styled “Moldovan language” were treated as Romanian. The petition was promoted by ACDR (The Christian Democratic Association of the Romanians in Ukraine).702 Both an overwhelming majority of the self-styled “Romanians” and of the self-styled “Moldovans” of the region signed the petition.

Indeed, since the “Romanian” plus “Moldovan” population was 181,780 in 2001. Only 191,457 individuals used Romanian as a native language, or knew or used it as secondary language. Therefore, one would guess that very few adult ethnic Romanians did not sign the petition.703 For a short period in 1999-2000, the multi-cultural university was such a key demand of the Romanian national movement that it temporarily acquired a symbolic value. The local Romanian national movement is still demanding it, but both the Ukrainian and Romanian authorities have stopped discussing the issue.

In the pre-2002 parliamentary and local elections, the teaching personnel had supported Romanian intense nationalists. In 2002, many of the teachers engaged in electoral propaganda for Bauer. Yet the presentation of Bauer as a self-styled “half-Romanian” who knew “Romanian” was done within a Romanian nationalistic framework, not outside it.

In 2002, on Mikhail Bauer’s orders, the teachers supported him because he was their boss. However, in the process, they also promoted discourses associated with a “Romanian” identity, including through the classification of the “Moldovans” as a group of Romanians. Bauer was allowed to meet the teachers every time when he desired, but other candidates could do it only after school. The press owned by the regional government also demonized Ion Popescu. Only Bauer’s pictures, not those of the other candidates, appeared in schools. A part of the teaching personnel encouraged the pulling down of the electoral posters for candidates other than Bauer by the students.

Yet there was also another factor related to the educational system that helped Bauer. Some support was lost by Ion Popescu and his allies running in local elections because a new, more left-wing,

703. We do not know how many non-Romanians signed the petition.
government of Romania headed by the center-left Social Democrat Adrian Nastase (2000-2004) was perceived as less sympathetic to the ethnic Romanians of Ukraine than it should have been. It was less so than the previous center-right Democratic Convention government headed by Mugur Isarescu (1999-2000). The Nastase government reduced the number of scholarships for Romanians from Ukraine to study in Romania from 425 for 2000-2001 to 96-98 in 2001-2002. The coming to power of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova in 2001 also led to a decrease in the number of scholarships for ethnic Romanians, especially “Moldovans”, offered by the Moldovan authorities. Therefore, one of the promises of the national movement, namely that of upward mobility through the educational system, became less and less real, and accommodations with individuals such as the Bauer brothers seemed more necessary.704

My model is generally supported by the statistics related to higher education. “Romanians”, and to a lesser extent, “Moldovans”, have been greatly underrepresented as one goes up both in the present-day educational system and as a proportion of the population with a higher education as a whole. In 1991/1992, the Romanian population represented 19.7% of the regional population. However, only 4.44% of the university students (434 of 9,769) at the state university in Chernivtsi were Romanian. The percentage further decreased to 3.9% subsequently. About two-thirds of the numerous graduates of Romanian-language high schools from the region who studied at the university level in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic remained there, thus decreasing the proportion of ethnic Romanians with a higher education in the Chernivtsi region.

The Romanians were greatly underrepresented among the university personnel at the University of Chernivtsi in 1991-1992. Out of 603 university instructors in 1989, only 9 were “Moldovans” (1.4%) and 7 were “Romanians” (1.1%), including 5 in the Department of Philology and Classics. Most of the members of the latter group would be intense nationalists after 1989, which is exactly what would be expected based on my model, and provided some of the leaders of the national movement. At the Institute of Medicine, there were 4 Romanian lecturers out of 260 (1.5%), whose intensity of nationalism could not be ascertained, but who did not provide leaders for the national movement. Only 1% of its students were

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Romanians. As Table 4A indicates, the areas that were largely ethnically Romanian had fewer inhabitants with a high school or with a higher education. To some extent, this minimized the growth of nationalism among the region’s Romanians. This would be expected based on my model.

**Quantitative Table 4A – Education and Ethnic Groups by Rayon in the Chernivtsi Region (Number per 1000 Inhabitants 15 Years Old and Above)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rayon or City</th>
<th>Specialized High School Education (Incomplete)</th>
<th>Finished Higher Education (I) and Incomplete Higher Education (II)</th>
<th>Percent “Romanians” of the population according to the census of 1989</th>
<th>Percent “Moldovan” of the population according to the census of 1989</th>
<th>Percent Ukrainians of the population according to the census of 1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entire Chernivtsi Region</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernivtsi (city)</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secureni (a)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novodnestrovsk (b)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) + (b)</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vijnita</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelmenet</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotin</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chitmani</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putila</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zastavna</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noua Sulita</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storojinet</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hliboca (c)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herta (d)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) + (d)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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705. See Gabriel Gherasim’s interview with Ion Popescu, “Romanii bucovineni sub cizma straina”, in *Ziua*, August 16, 2005, accessed at [http://www.ziua.ro/display.php?id=182813&data=2005-08-16&kword=Herta](http://www.ziua.ro/display.php?id=182813&data=2005-08-16&kword=Herta) in August 2005. In addition, there were 465 Ukrainians (77.1%), 102 Russians (16.9%), 6 Belarussians (0.9%), 5 Jews (0.8%), 2 Bulgarians (0.3%) and 2 members of other ethnic groups (0.3%).


707. The municipality of Novodnestrovsk formed a part of the Secureni rayon in 1989.

The impact of the educational system on nation-building is interesting. Ion Popescu notes that the rural teachers and agricultural specialists, who lived in the countryside, had “national spirit”. This would be expected based on my model. According to him, the urban educated people did not get a chance to manifest their “national spirit”; this confirms the negative impact of urbanization and industrialization on nation-building. The slightly higher level of education in the mostly Moldovan Noua Sulita rayon than in the other largely Romanian areas is noteworthy. The fact that it did not lead to nationalistic voting is explained by the differences in the ethnic basis that we have discussed. Therefore, the increase in the proportion of the population with a progressively more advanced education helped Romanian nation-building, as it was predicted by my model. This would be applicable unless it was trumped by the negative impact of other variables, such as urbanization/industrialization and a “Moldovan” ethnic basis. These factors made nation-building visibly more difficult and/or slower. Yet this would also be consistent with my model.

During the first years of the 21st century, the teachers have been civically less active than previously. For example, Dr. Aurel Constantinovici was elected as the president of the Scientific-Pedagogical Republican Association “Aron Pumnul” with the participation of only 37 members. The declining activism among the teachers on the aggregate intensity of nationalism scores suggests that this is not the key component of the impact of the educational system.


710. See the interview with Vasile Tarateanu in Viorel Patrichi, “Bucovina: Intre Germania si Ucraina”, in Lumea Magazin, no. 11, 2002, which may be found at http://www.lumeam.ro/nr11_2000/bucovina.html (accessed March 2005). Tarateanu noted that “Our national organizations have lost their combativeness, have deviated from their initial purposes.” According to Albert Thaur, a Ph.D. candidate in Economics and a native of Cernauti who knows both Romanian and Ukrainian and visited Northern Bukovina in 1999, the main reason for the greater civic apathy among the population, and particularly the college-educated population, was the lack of hope. During Kuchma’s second term, the solution to this problem in the view of both Romanians and Ukrainians from the Chernivtsi region was immigration (discussions with Albert Thaur on April 15 and 16, 2005).

250 votes. In 1998, he performed poorly in the parliamentary elections, with 3.24% of the valid votes cast for specific candidates. This indicates the relative unimportance of civil society. In 2002, the “civil society” around Opait supported Bauer, and in 2004, it supported Yanukovych. Obviously, the percentage of the representatives of Romanian civil society in favor of the Arcadie Opait faction was larger than among the general Romanian population.

The impact of the Romanian-language educational system on the intensity of Romanian nationalism was complex. It sometimes furthered, and it never hindered, its regional spread. A key facilitator of this was the instructional personnel, both inside and outside the classroom. The increase in the proportion of the population with an increasingly advanced education helped nation-building, as it was predicted by my model. This happened unless it was trumped by the negative impact of other variables, such as urbanization/industrialization and an ethnic basis that was less helpful for Romanian nation-building. Yet this would also be consistent with my model.

As we have seen, the census data shows that industrialization and urbanization hindered Romanian nation-building. The available electoral data does not allow us to confirm this in another way. The sudden shock in the Chernivtsi region explains the rapid change in self-determination preferences in 1991 from an acceptance to a rejection of the Soviet Union among the local ethnic Romanians. There was also a renewed demand to use Romanian symbols such as the Romanian flag after the failed August 1991 coup. At that time, a minority of the self-styled “Romanians” became open irredentists who desired union with Romania and boycotted the referendum on Ukrainian independence.

3.1. Conclusions

The evolution of Romanian nation-building during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods in the Chernivtsi region confirms to the predictions of my model. The two key variables are the ethnic basis and the educational system. The ethnic basis was very useful for facilitating Romanian nation-building. The Bukovinian and Hertan Romanians would vote overwhelmingly, in 1994-1998, or with a smaller majority, in 2002, for relatively intense Romanian nationalistic parliamentary candidates.

712. Natalya Belitser confirmed Opait’ support for Yanukovych in 2004 to me on July 17, 2005.
A sizable minority of the self-styled “Moldovans”, particularly from the Bessarabian part of the region, have developed a “Romanian” and/or “Romanian-speaking” primary, or, in most cases, secondary, identity, particularly since 1989. Yet only a small minority of the Bessarabian Moldovans in the areas where they live compactly supported Romanian nationalistic candidates until 2002. During the last years, while retaining their primary “Moldovan” ethnic identity, most of the “Moldovans” have supported a Romanian nationalistic petition in 1999. Most have voted for a candidate supported by the regional authorities with a Romanian mother whose rhetoric appealed moderately to “Romanian” nationalism in 2002. As a result, the score on the intensity of Romanian nationalism in the mostly Romanian electoral district (no. 204) has remained the same. The decline in the intensity of Romanian nationalism among “Romanians” was compensated by its spread to self-styled “Moldovans”. A substantial majority of these “Moldovans” voted for Viktor Yushchenko in the presidential elections of 2004, as did the overwhelming majority of the “Romanians”. The “Moldovan” identity remains as a primary identity in a large majority of the cases. However, most “Moldovans” in the area also have a “Romanian” identity, and support Romanian low-intensity nationalism electorally.

This apparent change of attitude of a majority of the “Moldovans” is explained partly by the direct and indirect impact of the Romanian ethnic, “Romanian-language” educational system in the area. The increase in the proportion of the population with a progressively more advanced education has helped nation-building in the Chernivtsi region, as it was predicted by my model, but within some limits. This process has occurred unless it was counteracted by the negative impact of other variables, such as urbanization/industrialization and a “Moldovan” ethnic basis. These factors served as a relative, though not absolute, hindrance to Romanian nation-building. This pattern would also be consistent with my model.

The impact of urbanization has favored Ukrainization and Russification, and has minimized the spread of a “Romanian” identity. Industrialization has also promoted Ukrainization and Russification. The sudden shock of the failed August 1991 coup and of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the Chernivtsi region has fostered the spreading of “Romanian” self-identification and nationalism.
Chapter 9

“Moldovan” and “Romanian” Nation-Building in the Odessa Region of Ukraine

(1989-2005)

1. Introduction

2. Politics I: Identities and Elections among a Predominantly Non-Nationalistic Public

3. Politics II: The Triumph of Moldovanism in the Schools of the Odessa Region

4. Independent Variable I: The Ethnic Basis

5. Other Independent Variables: The Impact of Industrialization, of Sudden Shocks and of Political Actors

6. Conclusions
1. Introduction

The official census data, electoral statistics, collective action statistics, the observations of ethnic Romanians born in Ukraine who are acquainted with the area and of certain Kyiv think-tank and NGO leaders, etc., are revealing. They confirm the continued predominance of a “Moldovan” as opposed to a “Romanian” linguistic and especially ethnic identity among the Romanian-speaking (“Moldovan” and “Romanian”) population of the Odessa region during the period from 1989 to 2004.713

Starting before 1989, a sizable minority of the self-styled “Moldovans”, particularly from the Bessarabian part of the region, have developed a “Romanian” and/or “Romanian-speaking” primary, or, in most cases, secondary identity.714 Most of the Moldovans/Romanians voted for candidates with ethnic identities other than “Moldovan” or “Romanian” and were clearly not ethnonationalistic. A majority of them voted for Leonid Kuchma in the presidential elections of 1994 and 1999, for Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential elections of 2004, and for the Party of Regions in 2006.

This “Romanian” identity and nationalism of a minority of the local Moldovans/Romanians is only partially explained by the direct and indirect impact of the Romanian ethnic, “Romanian-language” educational system in the area in 1992-1998. The transformation of the 18 “Romanian-language” schools into “Moldovan-language” schools in 1998 was promoted by Anatol Fetescu and by a change of policy in Kyiv. About half of the population to whom they catered approved it. The other half disapproved it. Russification has hindered the spread of both “Moldovan” and “Romanian” ethnonationalism.

The impact of urbanization has favored Russification, and has served as a brake to the spread of both “Moldovan” and “Romanian” identities and ethnonationalism. The sudden shocks, namely the collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian independence and the Orange Revolution, have favored the

713. The greater number of “Romanian” as opposed to “Moldovan” local counselors elected in 2006, typically on Party of Regions tickets, and the processes that led to this outcome, will not be analyzed in detail. They would suggest a rejection of the radical “Moldovanism” of a former Kuchma supporter, Anatol Fetescu, the chief of staff of the (at that time) “Orange” governor of the region, the Socialist Vasyl Tsushko.
714. Yet only a small minority of the Bessarabian Moldovans in the areas where they live compactly supported candidates and tickets who appealed to a “Romanian” identity and nationalism until 2006.
increasing spread of a “Romanian” identity and of “Romanian” ethnonationalism. The role of political actors will also be discussed.

The focus of the chapter will be on southern Bessarabia, that is, on the electoral districts no. 141, 140 and 138 of 1998-2004 because of the greater concentration of the Moldovans/Romanians in these areas. I will deal mainly with the parliamentary and presidential elections, and will largely ignore the regional and local ones. The relevant official census and electoral statistics, a large number of Romanian-language press articles, the opinions of some ethnic Romanian and Ukrainian activists from the areas with numerous ethnic Romanians/Moldovans and from Kyiv, etc., will be discussed.

Throughout this text, I will include the self-styled “Moldovans” together with the self-styled “Romanians” in the broader category of Romanians without quotation marks. The distinction between Romanian and “Romanian” is that the former group refers to the population that is objectively or intersubjectively ethnically Romanian. By contrast, the latter category includes those whose primary ethnic identity (self-identification) is “Romanian”. The same principle has been used in the assigning of labels to linguistic identities. 715 An ethnic basis close to the desired “final product nation”, and education in the mother-tongue, facilitate nation-building. By contrast, industrialization hinders the process and sudden shocks serve as a catalyst.

2. Politics I: Identities and Elections among a Predominantly Non-Nationalistic Public

In the Odessa region, most of the Moldovan/Romanian population has supported neither “Moldovan” nor “Romanian” nationalism since 1989-1991. 716 In this area, “Romanian” nationalism is substantially less widespread than in the Chernivtsi region, a minority phenomenon among the members of the Romanian/Moldovan ethnic constituency. Moldovanism is the view that holds that ethnic Moldovans are distinct from ethnic Romanians and that the Moldovan language is distinct from the Romanian

715. For a similar approach, see, for example, Roman Solchanyk, Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), p. 146. One should note the preference of the “Moldovans” of the Chernivtsi region to have “Romanian” rather than “Moldovan” schools.

716. According to Natalya Belitser, with whom I have discussed this issue in New York City on July 17, 2005, the Romanians of Transcarpathia, just like the population of the region as a whole, voted overwhelmingly for Yushchenko. On the Transcarpathian Romanians, see Paul Robert Magocsi and Ivan Pop, Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), p. 392-394.
language. This ideology, as well as a pro-Russia orientation, is much more widespread than in the Chernivtsi region.

The impacts of different values on two of my independent variables largely explain these different patterns. One of the phenomena to which I am referring to is the differences in the ethnic basis, partly due to the massive Russification in the Odessa region and to cultural and even linguistic patterns more propitious to Moldovanism than the ones in the northern Bessarabian part of the Chernivtsi region.

A less important factor is the nature and evolution of the “Romanian”/“Moldovan”-language educational system. The Odessa region’s authorities are since 1998 promoting a “Moldovan” as opposed to “Romanian” ethnic and linguistic identities through the educational system. They had implemented a policy more favorable toward “Romanian” ethnic and linguistic identities during the early post-Soviet period, in 1992-1998. The decrease of the Moldovan population between the two censuses of 1989 and 2001 in absolute numbers was the most visible in the area with the “Moldovan” schools, southern Bessarabia. This was due to the Russification or Ukrainianization of those not educated in Romanian/Moldovan language.

The impact of industrialization on “Romanian” or “Moldovan” nation-building in the region has been negative. The impact of the sudden shocks could be studied only sketchily. The sudden shock, that is, the failed August 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev and the collapse of the Soviet Union, significantly fostered the spreading of “Romanian” self-identification and nationalism among the ethnic Romanians (“Romanians” plus “Moldovans”) in the Chernivtsi region. By contrast, in the Odessa region, the sudden shock had a minor impact in the same direction.

For the sake of comparison with the Chernivtsi region and of the use of valid data, I will focus on the data for the 2004 parliamentary elections. In terms of terminology, the most adequate name for these individuals who are ethnic Romanians by language, origin and culture from the Odessa region might be the “Romanian cultural community”. However, I will use the term “Romanians” or preferably Moldovans-ROMANIAN or Moldovans/Romanians for the sake of clarity and consistency, keeping in mind that most of them call themselves “Moldovans”.

The number of self-identified “Moldovans” and “Romanians” on the territory of the present-day Odessa region has decreased very much since the time when southern Bessarabia came under Soviet rule in 1940. Southern Bessarabian initially formed the Izmail oblast in 1940-1941 and 1944-1954, and
subsequently became a part of the Odessa region. By 2001, the ethnic Moldovan-Romanian (“Moldovan” + “Romanian”) population represented 12.80% of the population of the region, while the ethnic Ukrainians represented 41.14% and the ethnic Russians 20.17%.

For the entire larger Odessa oblast/region, which included the Izmail oblast since 1954, the absolute number of Moldovans/Romanians has gone up between 1959 and 1989 and has subsequently decreased. The numbers increased to 145.3 thousand (including 144.6 thousand “Moldovans” and 0.7 thousand “Romanians”) in 1989 and then decreased to 124,475 (including 123,751 “Moldovans” and 724 “Romanians”) in 2001. The decrease between the last two censuses occurred overwhelmingly in the Bessarabian areas of the rayon, where 74% of the decrease occurred, from 93.6 thousand to 78.3 thousand. Unlike in the Chernivtsi region, there are allegations of systematic and massive census fraud in 2001. Yet even this fraud was possible because a less nationalistic population tolerated it.

The political attitudes of the Moldovans in the Bessarabian part of the Odessa region during the period of Romanian rule (1918-1940, 1940-1944) cannot be discussed in detail in here. What should be said for now is that during the Russian Revolution of 1917, their political preferences were markedly

717. However, Iulian Fruntasu lists statistics for Ukrainian southern and northern Bessarabia. Out of 959,115 inhabitants, 272,314 or 28.39% were Romanians, and there were 244,017 Ukrainians or 25.44%, 18.70% Russians and 27.47% members of other nationalities. See Iulian Fruntasu, O Istorie Etnopolitica a Basarabiei, 1812-2002 (Chisinau: Editura Cartier, 2002), p. 163-164. Also see David R. Marples, Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940’s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 36. In the sub-county districts of Reni, Bolgrad and Fantana Zanelor (Izmail), according to the Romanians census of 1930, there were 163,700 inhabitants, out of which 34.65% were Romanians, 21.89% Russians, 2.48% Ukrainians, 25.44% Bulgarians and 15.54% inhabitants of other ethnicities. See Vitalie Varatec, “Dezmembrarea teritoriala a Basarabiei”, in Revista de Istorie Militara, no. 6 (17), 1992, p. 21. In 2001, roughly the same geographical area had 255.4 thousand inhabitants, out of which 39.9 thousand (15.6%) were Moldovans (a substantial decrease in comparison to 1930), 61.2 thousand Ukrainians (24%), etc.

718. There are allegations that in 2001, individuals in the Odessa region were threatened with dismissal from their jobs if they declared that they were “Romanians”. It was also claimed that the ethnicity of some individuals was listed arbitrarily by census-takers who did not even ask these individuals what their ethnicity was. See George Coman, “SOS romani din Ucraina!” in Ziua, March 4, 2003, accessed at http://www.ziua.ro/archive/2003/03/04/docs/5846.html on June 5, 2005. Also see http://bugeac.networklive.org/ . For the results of the 1959 census, see Robert King, p. 98. For the results of the 1970 census, see Nicholas Dima, Moldova and the Transdnestr Republic (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 109. For those of the 2001 census, see http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/nationality_population/nationality_1/s5/?button=cens_db&box=5.1W&k_t=51&p=60&rz=1_1&rz_b=2_1%20%20%20%20&n_page=4 . Also consult http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/nationality_population/nationality_1/s5/?button=cens_db&box=5.1W&k_t=51&p=80&rz=1_1&rz_b=2_1%20%20%20%20&n_page=5 . For some of the detailed results of the census of 1989 and for the predominant ethnicity of the localities in various rayons, see Marius Mioc’s text at http://www.moldova.net/printthread.php?id=2660 , accessed in July 2005. It relies on the data in the periodical Cugetul, published by Ministerul Stiintei si Invatamantului din Republica Moldova (“The Ministry of Science and Learning of the Republic of Moldova”), no. 5-6, 1993. Marius Mioc is an attorney and the author of a book on international law.
different from those of the Moldovans of the northern Bessarabian currently under Ukrainian rule. Those who lived in the present-day Odessa region voted almost exclusively for all-Russian parties, and particularly for the countrywide winner of the elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly of November 1917. These all-Russian political forces were opposed to Bessarabian autonomy and to an official status for the Moldovan/Romanian language in the Latin alphabet in the administration, justice, schools and in the Orthodox Church in the province.

By contrast, the Moldovans of the present-day Republic of Moldova, and, to an even larger extent, those of the northern Bessarabian part of the Chernivtsi region, had had different preferences at that time. They, and particularly the northern Bessarabians whose descendants live in the Chernivtsi region, voted overwhelmingly for the Soviet of Deputies of the Peasants (“Sovietul de Deputati ai Taranilor”). This latter political force was mostly a Moldovan moderate nationalistic ticket, including at the level of the attitudes of the leaders and activists. It called for Bessarabian autonomy and for an official status for the Moldovan/Romanian language using the Latin alphabet in the administration, justice, schools and Orthodox Church of Bessarabia.

This political group was opposed to any further colonizing of the province, including of landless peasants from other provinces of the Russian state with a greater rural overpopulation, who might have gotten land through the agrarian reform. The leaders of the Soviet of Deputies of the Peasants would eventually support union with Romania on March 27, 1918.

During the period of interwar Romanian rule, the Moldovans/Romanians of the (southern) Bessarabian part of the future Odessa region, unlike sometimes up to a majority of the ethnic minority voters, cast ballots in favor of parties that postulated a preference for the maintenance of Romanian rule. What should be noted is the fact that the contrast between the Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians of the Chernivtsi and Odessa regions is not altogether a post-Soviet phenomenon, but it reflects the legacy of the

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past.

It is known that a large majority of the Moldovans/Romanians in the Odessa oblast voted for Leonid Kravchuk for president in 1991. A majority preferred Kuchma in 1994, when he appealed primarily to the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Ukraine, but also in 1999, especially in the second round, when he appealed to the pro-Western forces. Kuchma obtained 66.8% of the total (valid and invalid) votes in the second round of the presidential elections in the region in 1994 and 52.83% of those in the last round in 1999. In the latter year, Kuchma’s percentages of the valid votes in the second round in the electoral districts with the largest concentrations of Romanians, the districts of southern Bessarabia (141, 140 and 138) was 53.7% (157,718 votes). By contrast, 46.3% (135,960 votes) cast ballots for his Communist opponent, Symonenko.

In 2004, a solid majority of the ethnic Moldovans/Romanians in the Odessa region voted for Yanukovych. In the above-mentioned three southern Bessarabian electoral districts, the pro-Western Yushchenko obtained 102,978 votes (35.84%), while the pro-Russian Yanukovych obtained 184,339 votes or 64.16%, slightly less than in the oblast as a whole. The lack of a mostly Romanian district similar to district 204 in the Chernivtsi region makes it difficult for us to engage in the most detailed comparisons.720


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Number of the Constituency</th>
<th>Number of polling stations</th>
<th>The Center of the Constituency</th>
<th>Geographical Location of the Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number 134</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Odesa, Kyivs’kyi rayon</td>
<td>Ukrainian Transnistria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 135</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Odesa, Malynovs’kyi rayon</td>
<td>Ukrainian Transnistria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 136</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Odesa, Tsentralnyi rayon</td>
<td>Ukrainian Transnistria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 137</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Odesa, Suzorovs’kyi rayon</td>
<td>Ukrainian Transnistria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 138</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>Bilhorod-Dnistrovs’kyi</td>
<td>Southern Bessarabia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

720. I would like to thank Natalya Belitser, Andy Ihnato v, project manager at the Kyiv NGO Maidan, and Victor Todoriuc for the information that they have provided me on the Romanian ethnic vote in the various areas of Ukraine. For the electoral data for 1994 and 1999, see the data of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine at http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp1999/webproc0 (in Ukrainian, accessed in April 2005), and for those of 2004, see http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e (accessed March 2005). The overwhelmingly pro-Yushchenko results among ethnic Romanians in the Chernivtsi and Transcarpathian regions were not replicated among majorities of the ethnic Romanians in the oblasts that had once been a part of the Tsarist Empire. A part of the explanation is that in these regions, substantially more Romanians knew the Russian language and did not know Ukrainian. The differences between the Romanians in the Chernivtsi and Odessa regions in terms of electoral patterns are very significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Number of the Constituency</th>
<th>Number of polling stations</th>
<th>The Center of the Constituency</th>
<th>Geographical Location of the Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number 139</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>Biliaivka</td>
<td>Ukrainian Transnistria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 140</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>Izmail</td>
<td>Southern Bessarabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 141</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>Artsyz</td>
<td>Southern Bessarabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 142</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>Kominternivs’ke</td>
<td>Ukrainian Transnistria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 143</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>Kotovs’k</td>
<td>Ukrainian Transnistria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 144</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>Rozdil’na</td>
<td>Ukrainian Transnistria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The minority of Romanians who voted for Yushchenko in the third round of the 2004 presidential elections was disproportionately made up of individuals who accepted a “Romanian” ethnic and/or linguistic identity and from those who sent their children to the “Moldovan” schools. These pro-Yushchenko voters typically desired minority rights in the educational and linguistic spheres.

In the electoral districts with the highest concentrations of Moldovans/Romanians, the proportion of votes for Yushchenko was the highest in the entire region. They were district 141, in which the share of the vote for Yushchenko was more than double the percentage of the ethnic Ukrainians in the population, and district 140. The population of district 141 was the most pro-Yushchenko, had the largest
share of “Moldovans” (14.58%), a large majority of whose school-age inhabitants attended Moldovan-language schools. In the latter district, some outspoken individuals were both pro-Yushchenko and had a “Romanian” identity. In electoral district no. 141, Yanukovych obtained 48.04% of the vote in the first round of the presidential elections, 60.54% during the second round and 57.41% during the repeat second round.\

The ethnic Romanians, overwhelmingly self-styled “Moldovans”, who preferred Yushchenko to Yanukovych, came disproportionately from the ranks of the more nationally inclined, which meant overwhelmingly the more anti-Russian, section of the group. The more nationally inclined/anti-Russian Romanian voting bloc in the region largely overlapped with the 42% of the total who sent their children to Moldovan language schools. Most of these “culturally nationalistic” individuals had voted for Kuchma in the second round of 1999, and for Yushchenko in 2004.

**Table 4E – Measuring the Statistical Impact of the Sudden Shock – Odessa Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Determination Events</th>
<th>In Favor of Ukrainian Independence (as a percentage of the population)</th>
<th>Against Ukrainian Independence (as a percentage of the population)</th>
<th>Comments and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1991 referendum in favor of the Union Treaty</td>
<td>82.15</td>
<td>84.5% pro-sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favor of Ukrainian independence in March 1991 referendum (of total electorate)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1991 referendum (the total electorate)</td>
<td>85.38</td>
<td>11.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1991 referendum, ethnic Moldovans/Romanians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No irredentist minority of “Moldovans” or “Romanians” boycotts referendum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**723.** The population of electoral district 141 was the most pro-Yushchenko, had the largest share of Moldovans, and these Moldovans were the mostly likely to go to Moldovan-language schools in the entire region. The local Romanians included some outspoken individuals who were both pro-Yushchenko and had a “Romanian” identity. See, for example, Dumitru Pavel, "Romanilor din Ucraina le sunt incalecete drepturile…", in *Timpul*, April 1, 2005, no. 208, at [http://www.timpul.md/Article.asp?idIssue=106&idRubric=1526&idArticle=4035](http://www.timpul.md/Article.asp?idIssue=106&idRubric=1526&idArticle=4035) (accessed April 1, 2005). Dumitru Pavel is from the village Cartal of Reni rayon.
The absence of Moldovan/Romanian parliamentary deputies, and the small number of Moldovan/Romanian candidates, who moreover largely avoided the issues discussed in this section, does not allow us to measure accurately the intensity of “Romanian” or “Moldovan” nationalism in the Odessa region, except very indirectly. In 1998, in electoral district no. 140 (see Map 9.1.), a majority of the “Moldovans” voted for the victorious candidate of Soviet nomenklatura (managerial background) origin Vasyl’ P. Tsushko (Vasile Tusca in Romanian). He would later make his mark as a Socialist politician, as the governor of the Odessa region (oblast) in 2005 and as the leader of the parliamentary faction of the Socialist Party starting in 2006. In 1998, he was a member of the Peasant Party of Ukraine, nominated by the Bloc of the Socialist Party and Peasant Party. He won with 51,195 votes (48.18% of the valid votes for specific elections).

Panas (Panaitas?) Radukan, a candidate in district 141 (see Map 9.1.), whose Romanian last name also indicates some Romanian ethnic descent, also obtained numerous Romanian votes, and lost by 939 votes in district 141. Radukan, a member of the Ukrainian Party of Justice nominated by the election Bloc “Working Ukraine”, obtained 15,589 votes (15.98% of the valid voted for specific candidates). Tsushko, Radukan, and others will receive a score of 0 on the intensity of “Romanian” and “Moldovan” nationalism scales, because their campaigns were not at all nationalistic in terms of platform. There were no important ethnic Romanian candidates in the 2002 parliamentary elections in the single-member districts, but

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724. I would like to thank Andy Ignatov for the information that he has provided me about Tsushko. Also see “Ecourile alegerilor parlamentare in Ucraina”, in Mesagerul, No. 15 (204), April 17, 1998, part II, accessed at http://groups-beta.google.com/group/soc.culture.romanian/browse_frm/thread/c4eb3cc8f468a51b/6e966a43d1302c66?q=Ion+Popescu+204&rmnum=13#6e966a43d1302c66 on 05/08/2005.
Tsushko was elected on the proportional representation list from the party.\textsuperscript{725}

The key reason that explains the absence of Romanian parliamentary candidates, especially after 1998, in the Odessa region was the fact that they did not represent a sufficient share of the population in any electoral district. Another factor was the friction between the minority who identify themselves as in some way “Romanians” and the “Moldovanists”. The last term refers primarily to those whose line is “we are ethnic Moldovans, nor Romanians, and we speak Moldovan, not Romanian”. Still another factor has been the fact that these issues are dealt with at the level of civil society/interest groups, which will be discussed below.

In the Odessa region, Romanian nationalism is substantially less widespread than in the Chernivtsi region, a minority phenomenon. Moldovanism as well as a pro-Russia orientation are also more widespread than in the Chernivtsi region.

**Qualitative Table 4 C – A Comparison between the Moldovans of Northern Bessarabia in the Chernivtsi Region and those of the Odessa Region in terms of elections, educational system and sudden shock**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Geographical Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Bessarabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Chernivtsi Region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Bessarabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Odessa Region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainian Transnistria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Odessa Region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The Independent Variable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Basis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Ethnic Self-Identification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current overwhelming majority census self-identification among ethnic Moldovans/Romanians</td>
<td>“Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabitants with a “Romanian” census identity among ethnic Moldovans/Romanians</td>
<td>Small minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very small minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Religious Patterns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{725} See “Ecourile alegerilor parlamentare in Ucraina”, in *Mesagerul*, No. 15 (204), April 17, 1998, part II, accessed at \url{http://groups-beta.google.com/group/soc.culture.romanian/browse_frm/thread/c4eb3cc8f468a51b/6e966a43d1302e66?q=Ion+Popescu+204&num=13#6e966a43d1302e66} on 05/08/2005 and the official electoral results at \url{http://www.cv.k.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0e?kodvib=1&rejim=0}. There are no adequate data for the local elections.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Geographical Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Bessarabia (Chernivtsi Region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How is the Romanian language in churches called?</strong></td>
<td>Large majority “Romanian”, much less often “Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Which religious calendar do they follow?</strong></td>
<td>Majority “New Style” (Gregorian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To which Orthodox patriarchate do they belong?</strong></td>
<td>Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language used in religious services</strong></td>
<td>Romanian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>B. Independent Variable</strong> Educational Patterns</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were they in favor of “Romanian” (as distinct from “Moldovan”) schools in 1990-1997/1998?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were they in favor of “Moldovan” (as distinct from “Romanian”) schools in 2004-2005?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many “Moldovans” have support the teaching of “Romanian” ethnic history in the schools?</td>
<td>Large majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did the “Romanian school” or “Moldovan school” teachers call the language in education-related settings before 1998?</td>
<td>Uniformly and exclusively “Romani-an”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did the “Romanian school” or “Moldovan school” teachers call the language in education-related settings after 1998?</td>
<td>Uniformly and exclusively “Romani-an”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History, language and literature textbooks used in terms of quality until 1998</td>
<td>European standards (developed by Romania and Ukraine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History, language and literature textbooks used since 1998,</td>
<td>Meeting European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic</td>
<td>Geographical Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Bessarabia (Chernivtsi Region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evaluated in terms of quality standards</td>
<td>standards (developed by Romania and Ukraine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The name of the language preferred by the Ukrainian authorities in educational settings and forums</td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The name of the language used by the teachers in educational settings and forums</td>
<td>“Romanian”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textbooks also imported from what countries or places before 1998</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textbooks also imported from what countries or places after 1998</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Independent Variable Sudden Shock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was there a sudden shock in 1991 (the collapse of the Soviet Union)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the effects of the sudden shock reversed?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Electoral Results/Dependent Variable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Patterns (parliamentary, regional and local)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How “Moldovans” support the teaching of “Moldovan” ethnic history in the schools since 1998?</td>
<td>Very few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most voted for “Moldovan” local candidates in 1994?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many voted for “Moldovan” Parliamentary candidates in 1998?</td>
<td>Many, the rest “Ro-manian”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for “Moldovan” nationalistic candidates in 1998</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much support was there for “Romanian” ethnic nationalistic</td>
<td>Most, but little intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic</td>
<td>Geographical Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Northern Bessarabia</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Chernivtsi Region</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tickets in 2002?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most vote for “Romanian” or “Moldovan” candidates</td>
<td>Yes, 1994-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns in the Presidential Elections, by Year (Victorious Candidate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly Kravchuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 (round 2)</td>
<td>Mostly Kuchma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (round 2)</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly Kuchma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 (rounds 2 and 3)</td>
<td>Mostly Yushchenko</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Politics II: The Triumph of Moldovanism in the Schools of the Odessa Region

Whereas in the Chernivtsi region, the promotion of a Romanian identity in the public sphere has been victorious, and is reflected in the curriculum of the “Romanian schools”, in the late 1990’s, the “Romanian schools” in the Odessa region became “Moldovan schools”. The majority of the teaching personnel in the Romanian-language schools, who opposed the changes, were fired, forced to quit or to comply with the new policy. This shows that, through the political process, the nature and content of the educational system could be changed substantially. Nevertheless, before the “Romanian” identity was marginalized in the schools, some teachers promoted it, and, after they were fired, they encouraged it outside the schools.

Moldovanism has had a significant impact on public policy in the Odessa region. The top local leader of those in the Odessa oblast who claimed that the local Moldovans are “Moldovans, not Romanians” has been a noisy, provocative, in your face, anti-Romania public figure, Anatol Fetescu. He had served as a former agronomist and Communist Party instructor at a party school during the Soviet period. Fetescu later became a businessman and amateur linguist, historian and political scientist. By 1997, he was already starting to promote Moldovanism through the newspaper Luceafarul [“The (Large) Star”],

726. I would like to thank Natalya Belitser for this characterization of Anatol Fetescu. The Romanian-language press is equally critical of Fetescu, but in less detail.
which appeared in “Moldovan” with Cyrillic characters, as well as in Ukrainian and Russian. Anatol Fetescu's line and activities were supported by the central authorities in Kiev and to the Russophone officials in the largely Russian-speaking Odessa region in the predominantly Russophone city of Odessa.\footnote{See the official Ukrainian census results for the Odessa region for 2001 at http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/Odesa/ (accessed April 2005). Also see the map of the regions of Ukraine based on the 1989 census in Taras Kuzio (ed.), Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. XXI, and Nahaylo, Ukrainian, p. 239. According to these sources, there are more Ukrainian-speakers than Russian-speakers in the Odessa region according to both the 1989 and 2001 censuses. In the most recent census, 46.3% of the population was Ukrainian-speaking and 41.9% was Russian-speaking (compared to 47.1% in 2001). However, Odessa is a mostly Russian-speaking city that did not even have a Ukrainian ethnic majority in 1989 (48.9%). On the widespread political “Russophonism” (Russian-speaking or Russophone "nationalism") in the Odessa region, most of whose population seems to have desired that Russian should be the second official language in Ukraine, see Nahaylo, Ukrainian, p. 232, 236-237, 321, 322. See “Dosarul Transnistria (2)”, in Evenimentul, May 27, 2006, accessed at http://www.evenimentul.ro/articol/dosarul-transnistria-2.html . Also consult “Un nou an de învățămînt în școlile din Transnistria”, in Evenimentul, August 26, 2006, accessed at http://www.evenimentul.ro/articol/un-nou-an-de-invatamint-in-scolile-din-transnistria.html .}

Map 9.2. Map of the Odessa Region

The Ukrainian authorities supported him for reasons that probably did not have to do exclusively with the alleged popularity of Fetescu’s views among local inhabitants of Romanian origin. In 1997, the Ukrainian parliament had already listed “Moldovan” as one of the languages of the ethnic minorities of the country that should benefit from protection according to the treaties signed by Ukraine. During the same year, representatives of the “Moldovan” minority started to attend conferences on the education of ethnic
minorities.\textsuperscript{728}

In 1998, in the Odessa region, Fetescu founded "Asociatia national-culturala a moldovenilor din Ucraina" ("The National-Cultural Association of the Moldovans of Ukraine"). In February 1999, due to his initiative, the conference "Moldovenii din Ucraina: retrospectiva istorica si actualitate" ("The Moldovans of Ukraine: Historical Retrospective and Current Developments")\textsuperscript{729} was organized. It was sponsored by the Ukrainian presidency under Kuchma\textsuperscript{730} and by the administration of the Odessa oblast. It pushed Moldovanism and the idea of "Moldovan-language schools". It was a step toward the enforced transformation of the "Romanian" schools into "Moldovan" ones, notwithstanding the dissatisfaction of many teachers, who were forced to comply with the change by the Ukrainian security forces. Other school
directors and teachers who opposed the change were punished by firing or “relocation” to other positions. Some of those who disapproved stayed in their positions and complied by trying to find a compromise formula. Since most of the overwhelmingly female teachers have disliked the term “the Moldovan language”, they have instead used the neutral term “the mother tongue”.731

On September 1, 1998, the “Romanian schools” in the Odessa oblast (9 pure and 9 mixed Romanian-Russian) were officially transformed into “Moldovan schools” or “mixed Moldovan-Russian” schools. This change was implemented even in the villages where most villagers clearly disagreed with the change. Among these were the three villages whose Orthodox churches were subordinated to the Bessarabian Metropolitan Church (“Mitropolia Basarabiei”) of the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate. The required textbooks, which have been produced in Ukraine, have used the Latin alphabet. However, “Moldovan-language” textbooks printed in the Cyrillic alphabet have also started to be imported from the Transnistrian secessionist region of Moldova. This has been done in order to accommodate the preferences of a minority of the group, and more precisely of some of the parents who support Fetescu’s movement.732

The Ukrainian Ministry of Education approved a curriculum for the teaching of “Moldovan literature”, as opposed to “Romanian literature”, for the school year 2001-2002 for the Moldovan schools from the Odessa region.733 “Moldovan” ethnic history started to be taught instead of “Romanian” ethnic

733. See the testimony of Mr. Petru Grozavu, the president of the “Danube and Sea” Cultural Association of southern Bessarabian part of the Odessa region of Ukraine in front of the Commission for Human Rights, Cults and Problems of the National Minorities of the Romanian House of Deputies on September 2, 1998. Consult “Comisia pentru drepturile omului, culte si problemele minoritatilor nationale: Sinteza sedintei din 2 septembrie 1998”, accessed at http://www.cdep.ro/comisii/drepturile_omului/pdf/1998/sz0902.pdf#search=`Anadolu%20Ukraina` on May 17, 2005. There are 24 villages in the region where the church services are held in Romanian. Only three of these villages have ever had parishes under the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate in which the language was called exclusively “Romanian” since the middle of the 1990’s. In the rest, it is more likely to be called “Moldovan” than “Romanian”. See the website of the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate at http://www.patriarhia.ro/pag/romgranite.htm and http://www.ournet.md/~sobo/romania.htm (consulted at May 17, 2005). Also see Gh. Anghel, “’Masa rotunda’ a societatilor, asociatiilor si fundatiilor cultural-patriotice neguvernamentale din tara si a romanilor de peste hotare la Alba Iulia”, accessed at http://216.109.117.135/search/cache?Zenaida+Pinteac&ei=UTF-8&u=www.dacoromania.go.ro/nr06/masa.htm&w=zenaida+pinteac&d=892D99278A&icp=1&intl=us on June 17, 2005. On the “Moldovan literature” curriculum, see Stefan Broasca, chief editor of the review Plai romanesc, ‘Reanimarea "limbii moldovenesti" si a "moldovenismului" in Ucraina: imperativ etnic sau
history. By March 2003, the Bucharest mass media was reporting that the role models used in the educational process in these “Moldovan schools” were the Soviet partisans during World War II, the “liberating” Soviet soldiers and Lenin. His statues may be found in a large majority of the larger localities in the region. Starting in 2005, after the Orange Revolution, the curriculum has been democratized, Europeanized and de-Sovietized, and has become more Ukrainian patriotic.

There are differences of opinion concerning the merit of these educational changes. Natalya Belitser claims that most “Moldovans” from the Odessa region desired that their language should be called “Moldovan” and that the Romanian-language schools in the region should be called “Moldovan-language” rather than “Romanian-language” schools. Romanian nationalists claim that most of the Moldovans/Romanians who have been served by these schools have preferred that the educational institutions should continue to be called “Romanian-language” schools. The Ukrainian authorities had accepted the latter view during the early and middle of the 1990’s, but not subsequently.

Victor Todoriuc believes that in the largely ethnically Romanian villages in the Bessarabian part of the region with Moldovan/Romanian-language schools, about half of the inhabitants, and majorities in half of the localities, have preferred that the schools be called “Romanian-language schools” in 1998-2005. The rest preferred that they should be identified as “Moldovan-language schools”. I agree with this analysis, which was applicable to the period before the curriculum changes of 2005. I also believe that it is possibly compatible with Natalya Belitser’s opinion concerning the situation in the summer of 2005 and with the reaction to the new, post-Orange Revolution, curriculum. I nevertheless disagree with her belief.
that the curriculum of 1998-2005 was acceptable to an actual majority of the Moldovans/Romanians served by the schools in their language in the Odessa Region. I also believe that a majority of the Moldovan/Romanian constituency not served by the Moldovan/Romanian language educational system prefers that the language should be called “Moldovan”, not “Romanian”.739

There have been some efforts to make the schools return to their “Romanian”, non-Communist or non-Soviet, ideological character of the early and middle 1990’s. One fired post-elementary teacher who was active on this issue was Zenaida Pinteac. She was the vice-president of the Christian-Democratic Association of the Romanians of Southern Bessarabia (Ukraine) [Asociatia Crestin-Democratilor Român din Basarabia de Sud (A.C.D.R.), (Ucraina)]. Ms. Pinteac unsuccessfully attempted to undo the change through street demonstrations in Kiev and through the courts, but complained against the official pressure on the lawyer who was helping the organization in this case.740 The involvement of the teachers in the fight against this policy demonstrates the importance of one element of the educational system, namely the teaching personnel, in facilitating nation-building.

The new line was eventually accepted or at least acquiesced to by a large proportion, but not by the totality, of the local Moldovan/Romanian population of the Odessa region. The (Bessarabian-born) Romanian president Emil Constantinescu decorated Zenaida Pinteac in 2000 for her fight.741 Leonid Kuchma, whose presidency sponsored the conference that led to the changes, had won the support of most of the Odessa region’s Moldovans/Romanians in the presidential elections of 1994 without arguing that the schools should become “Moldovan”. He retained the support of most of them during the 1999 elections, after this change, partly because of the accurate belief that there would be more opportunities to study in, or at least learn, Moldovan/Romanian in the schools.

However, Fetescu’s intent to reintroduce the Cyrillic alphabet was very unacceptable to a very large majority of the students in the “Moldovan-language schools” and to their parents. Therefore, perhaps

739 Conversation with Victor Todoriuc on November 21, 2005.
740 See an article dealing with a roundtable from December 2000, Gh. Anghel, “Masa rotunda” a societăților, asociațiilor și fundațiilor cultural-patriotice neguvernamentale din tara și a romanilor de peste hotare la Alba Iulia’, accessed at http://216.109.117.135/search/cache?Zenaida+Pinteac&e=892D99278A&icp=1&.intl=us on June 17, 2005. In the Romanian language, the words “profesor” and “profesoara” refer not only to male, and, respectively, female, college professors, but also to middle and high school teachers.
741 The source is the e-mail from Mircea Popescu, the president of the Romanian World Council from September 1, 2004, “Membrii CMR - promotori ai culturii si civilizatiei romanesti”, in consiliu_roman@yahoogroups.com, the internal forum of the Romanian World Council.
in order to prevent unrest, the Ukrainian educational authorities retained the use of the Latin alphabet in these educational establishments.\textsuperscript{742}

By the early period of the Yushchenko presidency (2005 – present), in early 2005, the formerly pro-Kuchma Anatol Fetescu had become the chief of staff of the Socialist Odessa Oblast governor Tsushko. In all probability, Fetescu was selected because of his affiliation with the Socialist Party of the regional governor after the 2004 elections.\textsuperscript{743} It is by no means clear when Fetescu has changed his political affiliation.

Notwithstanding the change in the educational system from “Romanian” to “Moldovan” schools, the Romanian national movement in the region has continued to have teachers in leadership positions. Almost all of the 134 “Moldovans” outside the Chernivtsi area who declared that they speak “Romanian” reside in the Odessa region. The credit for this probably belongs predominantly to the Romanian-language school system.\textsuperscript{744}

The enrollment of children who were taught Moldovan/Romanian increased from 4,509 students in 1999, all of whom were in Moldovan elementary schools, to 8,000 in 2003-2004, out of which 2,215 were studying it in Ukrainian-language schools. Large numbers of the Moldovans/Romanians, including a

\textsuperscript{742}. On “the demands of Moldovan communal organizations” (in reality only Fetescu’s organization) for a return to the Cyrillic alphabet, see Stefan Broasca, chief editor of the review Plai romanesc, “Reanimarea limbii moldovenesti” si a “moldovenismului” in Ucraina: imperativ etnic sau comanda politica?” at Florin Dyrdà’s (Darda’s) website at http://www.cv.ukrtel.net/boian/ISTORIE/istorie.html, accessed July 2005. The numbers of individuals who privately identify themselves as “Romanians” and as speakers of “Romanian”, often as a secondary identity, are higher than the official census figures would suggest. In the village of Hagi-Curda in the Odessa region, in the old Romanian county of Ismail, there is since 1995 an Orthodox parish under the Bucharest Patriarchate. The church has suffered from vandalism, the priest has received death threats and the local newspaper “Pridunaischie vesti” has claimed that the Romanian Orthodox Church is “foreign to Christian morality”. The opening of two parishes in the localities Anadol and Frecatei by another priest, Nicolae Asargiu, led to his expulsion from Ukraine. See “Regimul impus de Kiev romanilor: biserici demolate, preoți amenintati cu moartea”, in Ziua, May 14, 2005, accessed at http://www.ziua.net/display.php?id=12197&data=2005-05-14&ziua=91bd37f0fa0bb8365b1d6e4a2e54d333 on May 14, 2005. According to the website of the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate, “The Romanian priests and worshippers of these parishes were subjected to some unimaginable pressures on the part of the Ukrainian state, which was accusing them of espionage in favor of Romania for the simple fact that they are using the Romanian language in their religious services.” See the website of the Patriarchate of the Romanian Orthodox Church, at http://www.patriarhia.ro/pag/romgranite.htm.

\textsuperscript{743}. I would like to thank Natalya Belitser and Andy Ignatov (Ihnatov), project manager at the Kyiv NGO “Maidan”, for the information that that they have provided me on Fetescu, Tsushko and the latter’s hiring practices, etc. See the press release of the U.S. Embassy in Kiev, “American Embassy Opens Renovated HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment Center in Odesa”, March 25, 2005, accessed at http://www.usemb.kiev.ua/press/050325_hiv_eng.html in April 2005.

\textsuperscript{744}. See Popescu, p. 144. Moreover, hundreds, if not thousands of “Romanians” and “Romanian-speakers” from the region have left for Romania and the West.
disproportionate percentage among the most proficient, study instead in Romania or in Ukrainian-language, and, much more often, in Russian-language schools. Only 42% of the Moldovan/Romanian children of the region studied in 2003-2004 in the “Moldovan” language, and only slightly less than a third received their education predominantly in that language.

A larger number attend Russian schools, because their parents feel that this would increase their opportunities in life and/or because only the latter are available. Nevertheless, there was an increase in the number of Moldovan-language high school classes in 2003-2004. Yet it should be noted that in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, all the Romanian-language schools were in southern Bessarabia, where almost two-thirds of all the Moldovans/Romanians were receiving some education in their mother-tongue.745

In all likelihood, an increasing number of Moldovans/Romanians from the area will use Slavic languages, overwhelmingly Russian, as their colloquial languages. Their descendants will speak these Slavic languages, and especially Russian, as their native tongues.746

The resistance to Moldovanism, including of the variety sponsored by the Ukrainian state, was

745. On the Romanian-language schools in the Odessa oblast, see “The Romanian Minority in Ukraine”, Policy Paper nr.704R/19 Iunie. It was received from the Center for the Prevention of Conflicts and Early Warning from Bucharest, Romania on August 13, 2004. It was posted by Ionas Aurelian Rus as ““MINELRES: The Romanian Minority in Ukraine” and is accessible at http://lists.microlink.lv/pipermail/minelres/2004-November/003694.html . According to the policy paper, “In Odessa region there are 9 national schools (174 classes) and 9 mixed schools (122 classes) with teaching on (sic!) Romanian language (Moldavian language) (sic!). In seven schools with teaching in Ukrainian, 1715 pupils were studying Romanian language as compulsory subject, and 500 – optional, totally over 8000 pupils were studying the Romanian language (2.5% of all pupils in the region). From statistic (sic!) data it results that only 42% of the Moldavians’ children are educated in Romanian language.” See “The Report of Ukraine on Implementation of the Provisions of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Report Submitted by Ukraine Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, November 2, 1999, The Council of Europe. It was accessed at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/minorities/2._framework_convention_%28monitoring%29/2._Monitoring_mechanism/3_State_Reports_and_UNMIK_Kosovo_Report/1_First_cycle/1st_SR_Ukraine.asp#TopOfPage in July 2005. On the transition from “Romanian” to “Moldovan” schools, see Stefan Broasca, chief editor of “Plai Romanesc” of Cernauti, ‘Ucraina: De ce este incurajat “moldovenismul”?’, in Lumea Magazin, no. 9, 2002, which may be found at http://www.lumeam.ro/nr9_2002/tranzitia_la_vecini.html .

746. Some argue that most Romanians from the Odessa region are Russified or Russianized because they tend to speak Romanian at home and Russian in public places. See, for example, http://wall.riscom.net/flux/messages/1132.htm . According to a Romanian-language newspaper from the Republic of Moldova from 1996, the parents of many students from the Romanian middle school from village of Chitai were demanding that their children should instead study in the Russian language. See “Situatie Scoli Romane Ucraina”, in the report of the Flux press agency, September 5, 1996, accessed at http://groups-beta.google.com/group/soc.culture.romanian/browse_frm/thread/19f009148ca9116/0b04b9256bce8f86f?q=Hliboca&rnum=8#0b04b9256bce8f86f on June 6, 2005.
clearly feeble than among the self-styled “Moldovans” of the Chernivtsi region. This is partly because the proportion of the population with a “primarily Moldovan, secondary Romanian” identity is smaller than in northern Bessarabia. Moreover, about half of the local ethnic Moldovans/Romanians desire that the language of instruction should be called “Moldovan”. The other half would prefer that it should be called “Romanian”.

The attempt to create an association of the Bessarabian Moldovans of Noua Sulita rayon of the Chernivtsi region with the goal of promoting the idea that the “Moldovans” should not even have a “Romanian” secondary ethnic or linguistic identity failed. The chief reason was the very small number of Moldovanist activists and sympathizers in the area. As we have seen, the same can not be said of the Odessa region.747 It is unlikely that the “Moldovan” schools teaching the current curriculum will again turn into “Romanian” schools similar to those of the 1991-1998 period. The current “orange” authorities in Kiev are supporting a continuation of the current educational program.748

In the Chernivtsi region, the official encouragement of a Romanian identity was victorious, and is reflected in the curriculum of the “Romanian schools”. By contrast, in the late 1990’s, in the Odessa region, the “Romanian schools” became “Moldovan schools”. The majority of the teaching personnel in the Romanian-language schools, who opposed the changes, were fired, forced to quit or to comply. This shows that, through the political process, the nature and content of the educational system could be changed substantially. Nevertheless, before the “Romanian” ethnic and linguistic identity was marginalized in the schools, some teachers promoted it, and, after they were fired, they preached the same things outside the schools.

4. Independent Variable I: The Ethnic Basis


748. Interview with Natalya Belitser, July 17, 2005.
The ethnic basis of the Moldovan-Romanian population in the region needs to be discussed both in terms of the “Romanian” vs. “Moldovan” identity issue, and, in some ways even more importantly, of Russification and Russianization. The fact that a large majority of the local self-styled “Moldovan” know the Russian language well, and many use it extensively, has hindered both “Romanian” and “Moldovan” nation-building.

In 1970, out of 135,979 Moldovan-Romanians, 118,096 (86.85%) declared the language of their stated nationality as their native language, while 12,110 (8.91%) declared that it was Russian and 5,415 (3.98%) declared another language, including Ukrainian. According to the results of the December 2001 Ukrainian census, only 90,690 (73.28%) of the 123,751 self-styled “Moldovans” of the Odessa region listed the “Moldovan language” as their mother-tongue. By contrast, 7.66% (9,474 individuals) listed Ukrainian and 22,669 (18.32%) listed Russian as their mother-tongue. A sizable minority of around 100 of the 918 (0.74%) who listed “other languages” as their mother-tongue mentioned “Romanian”. Among the 724 self-identified ethnic Romanians, only 304 (41.99 %) declared their mother tongue as “Romanian”, whereas 119 (16.44%) declared that it was Ukrainian and 215 (29.7%) said that it was Russian. Practically all of the other 86 (11.88%) self-styled “Romanians” called their mother-tongue “Moldovan”.

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750. See the official Ukrainian census results for the Odessa region at http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/Odesa/ (accessed March 2005), http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/nationality_population/nationality_1/s5/?botton=cens_db&box=5.1W&k_t=51&p=60&rz=1_1&rz b=2_1%20%20%20&n_page=4 and http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/nationality_population/nationality_1/s5/?botton=cens_db&box=5.1W&k_t=51&p=80&rz=1_1&rz b=2_1%20%20%20%20&n_page=5 (accessed June 9, 2005). Compare these with the official results for the Chernivtsi region at http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/Chernivtsi/ (accessed March 2005), and particularly with those in the Zakarpattia (Transcarpathian) region at http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/Zakarpattia/ (accessed March 2005). In the latter region, 99.1% of the Romanians speak Romanian as their mother-tongue. The percentage of Ukrainian-speakers among the local Ukrainians in the same region is 99.2%. The data for other regions of Ukraine may be found at http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/ (accessed March 2005), while the nationality (ethnicity) data is available at http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/ (accessed March 2005). The percentage of speakers of “Moldovan” among the Moldovans in the Mykolaiv region was 54.6%, while that of Ukrainian-speakers was 28.5%, that of Russian-speakers 16.8% and that of speakers of “other” languages 0.1%. See the census results at http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/Mykolaiv/ . In the rest of the regions with a major concentration of Moldovans, only a minority of them had Moldovan as their mother-tongue (except for Poltava, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, and Vinnitsya). Most of the speakers of other languages listed Russian, and the percentage of those speaking “other” languages was sometimes larger.
These numbers do not fully convey the reality on the ground. In the village of Glubokoie, in the Tatar-Bunar rayon, which is probably typical of the villages without schools in the Romanian language, most of the inhabitants are ethnic Romanians. However, in recent years, there has been no Romanian school in this locality, but only a Russian school. In localities such as this, the children are learning the Romanian language from their parents and grandparents, but do not know it perfectly because they can not understand all the words. For this reason, many of the students originating from this region who are studying in Romanian universities coming from such localities are having difficulties. Even though a majority declared “Moldovan” or, much less often, “Romanian” as their mother-tongue, only a minority of the younger generation knows Romanian well. Some individuals do not know any language well enough.751

Most of the Moldovans-Romanians of the region are under the influence of Russification and Russianization752, caused primarily by a Russian753 language education. Sometimes, more often than the results of the Ukrainian census of 2001 indicate, their colloquial or even native language is Russian. Many of those whose native language is still Moldovan have not spoken it outside their homes for more than a generation. According to survey data first published in 1972, in the ethnically mixed southern areas of the Republic of Moldova, which resemble Ukrainian southern Bessarabia, 41% of the Moldovans working in mixed work collectives spoke Moldovan on the job and 50% spoke Russian.754

According to the 2001 census, 79.74% (75.87% in the rural areas and 91.12% in the urban ones) of the “Moldovans” speak Russian fluently as a first or as a second language that they speak often and well. This was true of only 56.31% of the northern Bessarabian Moldovans discussed above (54.24%...
of the rural ones and 72.42% of the urban ones), but true of the Moldovans/Romanians of the Odessa oblast, and even more true of those living in the areas to the east of the Odessa region.\footnote{On the Romanian-language schools in the Odessa oblast, see “MINELRES: The Romanian Minority in Ukraine”, at http://lists.microlink.lv/pipermail/minelres/2004-November/003694.html, Policy Paper nr.704R/19 Iunie, a text received from the Center for the Prevention of Conflicts and Early Warning from Bucharest, Romania on August 13, 2004. The “Moldovans” from other regions will largely be ignored.}

rather low level of tolerance for the presence of Romanian schools in the area.

The overwhelmingly rural self-styled “Romanian” population is clearly overwhelmingly native to the region. The census figures are not completely reliable. A large majority of the Moldovans-Romanians have had a predominantly “Moldovan” identity. However, about half of the Moldovan/Romanian population that is served by Romanian-language schools in the region would promote or prefer the view that the language that should be taught is “Romanian”.

The establishments that emphasize this the most extensively and unambiguously are the churches subordinated to the Romanian Orthodox (Bucharest) Patriarchate since the middle of the 1990’s. Their number has been three in the 1990’s, and only one in late 2005. These numbers have represented a small number of the 24 mostly Moldovan/Romanian villages of southern Bessarabia (up to one-eighth of the total) and of the 33 villages in the region that had a Romanian majority or plurality (up to one-eleventh of the total). The freedom of religion of the worshippers of the Bucharest Orthodox Patriarchate has improved after the Orange Revolution.

The teaching in the schools of the “Moldovan” as opposed to “Romanian” language and ethnic history has helped create an atmosphere favorable to the Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate’s efforts to get back some of its worshippers who had temporarily gone over to the Bucharest Patriarchate. The percentage of Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate worshippers in Ukrainian southern Bessarabia is currently substantially lower than in the Republic of Moldova minus the Transnistrian secessionist region, but it was not so in the 1990’s. This indirectly confirms the view that a “Romanian” ethnic and linguistic identity is less common among the Romanians in this region than in Moldova.757

757. The traditionally more “Eastern” flavor of the “Moldovan” identity should not obscure the fact that most self-styled “Moldovans” in both the Republic of Moldova and the Bessarabian localities in Ukraine with Romanian-language schools are in favor of EU membership. They as a rule accept that the “Moldovan language” is identical to the “Romanian language”. Until around 2004, there was a connection between “Moldovanism” and a pro-Eastern, that is, pro-Russia, outlook. The latter term refers to the attitudes of the Moldovan Communists before they accepted the linguistic identity between the “Moldovan” and “Romanian” languages gradually at a point between the 2003 local elections and the 2005 parliamentary elections and their opposition to, and later, until 2004, exclusively verbal support for, Moldova’s membership in the European Union. Most of the self-styled “Moldovans” of southern Bessarabia and areas further to the east, unlike the northern Bessarabian “Moldovans”, voted for Viktor Yanukovych in 2004 and were pro-Russia. On the situation of the priests and churches of the Bessarabian Orthodox Church (under the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate) in the Odessa region, see Felix Corley, Editor, Forum 18 News Service, “Ukraine: People barred entry on religious grounds now free to appeal”, accessed at http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=573 on July 22, 2005. Also see the website of the Patriarchate of the Romanian Orthodox Church, at http://www.patriarchia.ro/pag/romgranite.htm .
Within the Odessa region, there were regional demographic differences. Most of the 123,751 self-identified “Moldovans” in 2001 (or 144.7 thousand in 1989) were Bessarabian Moldovans who lived in the area between the Prut and Dniester rivers (78.3 thousand or 63.3% of all in 2001, and 93.6 thousand, or 64.7% in 1989). The rest were Transnistrian Moldovans, whose speech was historically somewhat more different from standard Romanian than that of the Bessarabian Moldovans. In the areas of “Ukrainian Transnistria” (between the Dniester River or the Moldovan border and the Bug River), which had never been part of interwar Romania, the proportion of Moldovans who accept that their language is “Romanian”, or identical to “Romanian” is lower than in formerly Romanian Bessarabia.

Within southern Bessarabia itself, the areas of the pre-1940 Cahul and Ismail counties, which, unlike the rest of Bessarabia, had all been part of Moldova and Romania between 1856 and 1878, are different from the other areas. The “Moldovans” in these areas represented 40% of all the “Moldovans” in the region in 2001 (49.3 thousand) and 35% in 1989 (50.8 thousand). They include a larger proportion of individuals who speak the same idiom of Romanian just like the Romanians across the border in Romania and have a “Romanian” identity than in the rest of southern Bessarabia. They would overwhelmingly accept the view that their language should be called “Romanian”.

At the other extreme, the Slavic-speaking Moldovan/Romanian inhabitants throughout the parts of Ukraine to the east of the Dniester River are more likely, with everything else being equal, to identify the language and identity of their group as “Moldovan” than as “Romanian” in comparison to those who are Romanian-speaking. Moreover, most Transnistrian Moldovans are more tolerant of Russification than most Bessarabian Moldovans, with everything else being equal. The exact results by rayon of the citizens’ mother tongue are not yet available, but those for the region as a whole are useful.

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758 Victor Todoriuc confirmed my impressions about the differences between the various areas of southern Bessarabia, and the causes thereof. Nevertheless, due to the lack of opinion polls, it is difficult to ascertain the attitudes of the local Moldovans/Romanians. It is possible, but not certain, that a majority of the Moldovans of the Odessa region believe that they are “Moldovans, not Romanians”. One of the pieces of evidence that I have obtained by e-mail during the summer of 2005 from Ion Manole, the president of “Promo-Lex” of Chisinau, Moldova, shows that these differences are not unique to the Odessa oblast. Manole notes the distinctions between the Bessarabian and Transnistrian Moldovans, who are less likely to accept the view that they are “Romanians” or “Romanian-speakers” than the Bessarabian ones, in the Republic of Moldova. Ion Manole is the lawyer for the Transnistrian Moldovan peasants from the Dubasari rayon of the Republic of Moldova, who live in areas controlled by the Moldovan government. These peasants are trying to prevent the confiscation of their lands in the “no man’s land” “security zone” by the Transnistrian secessionist regime.

759 See the official Ukrainian census results for the Odessa region at
The churches have also had an important role in maintaining and influencing the ethnic basis. Practically the entire Moldovan/Romanian population in the Odessa region is formally affiliated to various Orthodox churches, overwhelmingly connected to the Moscow Patriarchate. During the Soviet period, the main language of religious services was Slavic, but the other language used in religious services was called “Moldovan” due to a preference of the regime.

Table 4 V - Regional Distribution of the “Moldovan” Population in the Odessa Region (Ethnic Basis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Geographical Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entire Odessa region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Bessarabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cahul and Ismail (also Romanian in 1856-1878)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban, Southern Bessarabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban, entire region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census Results (1989)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of “Moldovans”</td>
<td>144,700 (144,400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population that was “Moldovan”</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census Results (2001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of self-styled “Moldovans”</td>
<td>123,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population that declared itself “Moldovan”</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>Romania 3-44/47 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania 25-47 years (depending on the area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania 44/47 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idiom</td>
<td>Mostly “Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More “Moldovan”,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Often “Romanian”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Many Russified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Many Russified-ed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


760. Romanian rule lasted from 1941 until 1944 or from 1856/1859 until 1878, from 1918 until 1940 and from 1941 until 1944.
761. Romanian rule lasted from 1856/1859 until 1878, from 1918 until 1940 and from 1941 until 1944.
<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban, entire region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>less “Romanian”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Calendar</td>
<td>Large majority “Old Style”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To which Orthodox patriarchate do they belong?</td>
<td>Large majority “Old Style”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majority “Old Style”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large majority “Old Style”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large majority “Old Style”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusively Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusively Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russification</td>
<td>Most significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly “Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly “Moldovan”, “Romanian”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly “Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly “Moldovan”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the 1990’s, the few Bucharest Patriarchate churches have called the language exclusively “Romanian”. The Moscow Patriarchate parishes continue to call it “Moldovan” in most cases (more often than in the Republic of Moldova itself), and to a lesser extent “Romanian” (less often than in Moldova). The use of the “Old Style” religious calendar (with Christmas on January 7 as opposed to December 25) also sets apart the flock of the Moscow Patriarchate from those of the Bucharest Patriarchate.

The ethnic basis of the Moldovan-Romanian population in the region needs to be discussed in terms of Russification and Russianization, and of the “Romanian” vs. “Moldovan” identity issue. The fact that a large majority of the local self-styled “Moldovan” know Russian well and many use it extensively has hindered both “Romanian” and “Moldovan” nation-building.

5. OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION, OF SUDDEN SHOCKS AND OF POLITICAL ACTORS

The impact of industrialization was significant, and its impact was consistent with my model. However, just like in the Chernivtsi region, urbanization hindered nation-building, largely because the urban Moldovans who lived in the more industrial localities, that is, in the municipalities, were more likely
to assimilate to another culture, typically Russian. The proportion of Moldovans in the region decreased from 5.5 to 5% between January 1989 and December 2001. The number of Moldovans living in municipalities decreased from 20.1 thousand to 15.2 thousand. This means that the proportion of Moldovans living in these municipalities as a percentage of the total Moldovan population decreased from 13.9% to 12.2% between the two censuses.

This was particularly clear in one of the largest industrial cities of Ukraine, Odessa, in which the number of Moldovans decreased from 11 to 7.6 thousand between the two censuses. The regional differences in the area are significant. Thus, in the Bessarabian part of the region, the number of inhabitants of “Moldovan” inhabitants of the municipalities decreased from 5.1 to 4.7 thousand and from 5.45% of the urban total in 1989 to 4.72% in 2001, much less than in other areas of the region.\(^762\)

It should be noted that only a minority of the urban “Moldovans” and “Romanians”, many of whom do not live in municipalities, have Romanian as their mother-tongue. Among the 31,405 urban “Moldovans”, 12,327 (39.25%) used “Moldovan” as their native language in 2001, 2,585 (8.23%) used Ukrainian, 16,279 (51.84%) were Russian-speakers, and 214 (0.68%) used “other” language. Among the 310 urban “Romanians”, only 102 (32.90%) declared their native language as “Romanian”, 36 (11.61%) listed it as Ukrainian, 159 (51.29%) listed it as Russian, and the rest (4.19%) identified it as “other”, generally “Moldovan”. Most of those “Moldovans” who identified their mother-tongue not as “Moldovan”, but as something else, were urban inhabitants (19,708 out of 33,061, or 59.61% in 2001).\(^763\)

The Odessa region was also affected by a sudden shock. However, its impact, although strong, was limited to fewer individuals than in the Chernivtsi region. During the Soviet period, only a few of the local Moldovans/Romanians in the Odessa region were nationalistic, a much smaller proportion than in the Chernivtsi region, where a significant minority was nationalistic. Even after that, the nationalists, whose numbers increased substantially, represented only a minority of the group. This was because “Romanian” or “Moldovan” nationalism was perceived as a phenomenon that had to be avoided in the public sphere.

\(^762\) See the official Ukrainian census results for the Odessa region for 1989 and 2001 at http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Odesa/ (accessed April 2005). The data by rayons and municipalities appears only in Ukrainian.

\(^763\) See http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/nationality_population/nationality_1/s5/?botton=cens_db&box=5.1W&k_t=51&p=80&rz=1_2&rz_b=2_1%20%20%20%20&n_page=5.
because the group represented a very small share of the region’s population.

In 1991, a large majority of the local Moldovans/Romanians were in favor of Ukrainian independence. There was no boycotting of the referendum. It has not been alleged that there has been any significant pro-Romanian, or pro-Moldovan, irredentism in the public sphere among the local Moldovans/Romanians.

Whereas the impact of the sudden shock in helping further a “national reawakening” in the Chernivtsi region has been deep and widespread, the impact of the sudden shock in the Odessa region has been deep for those affected by it, but much less widespread. This was partly because independence did not bring about de-Russification or symbolic de-Communization in the region and partly because sudden shocks could bring about the spreading of nationalistic attitudes, but only if they are widespread enough before the shock. The statues of Lenin are still present in most localities, in a certain sense suggesting that at some level, mentalities have changed less than before 1991 than in areas where this is not the case.

The outcome is of course different in comparison to the middle of the 1980’s, including because of the increase of the minority of the population with a Romanian identity. The extent of de-Sovietization had been sufficient for the “Moldovan”/”Romanian” population not to allow the reinstatement of the Cyrillic alphabet in the Moldovan schools. Nevertheless, in some other areas of Ukraine, including the Chernivtsi region, the last years of Soviet rule, and especially the collapse of the Soviet Union, could, and did, indeed bring about support for Romanian nationalism from a majority of the population on a massive scale.

In the Odessa region, only a minority of the population could support, and has supported, either “Moldovan” or “Romanian” nationalism. This was one of the factors that explain why most of it could not be mobilized to support its preferences. This was true even though the Moldovan/Romanian population had opinions on the issue of whether the schools should be called “Moldovan-language” or “Romanian-language” schools. This suggests that sudden shocks could, and arguably in most cases do, have the impact of deepening nationalism, but that in order for them to facilitate nationalism, the latter ideology should be widespread enough before the shock.

Table 4 Z – The Impact of Sudden Shocks in the Chernivtsi and Odessa Regions Compared
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Chernivtsi</th>
<th>Odessa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion in favor of Romanian rule in 1917-1940, 1941-1944</td>
<td>Overwhelming majority</td>
<td>Less than half</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for “Moldovan” or “Romanian” nationalism (during the Soviet period)</td>
<td>Large minority</td>
<td>Small minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Romanian” or “Moldovan” nationalism after 1991</td>
<td>Majority supports it after 1991 shock (long period)</td>
<td>Enlarged minority supports it after 1991 shock (entire period)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the impact of the sudden shock (the collapse of the Soviet Union) reversed?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Largely yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was there symbolic decommunization among ethnic Moldovans/Romanians?</td>
<td>Yes, very large minority</td>
<td>Partially yes for most, but subsequent partial resovietization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was there symbolic decommunization among the general population?</td>
<td>Yes, large majority</td>
<td>No, minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitude of the impact of the sudden shock</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The roles of Anatol Fetescu on the “Moldovanist” side and of Zenaida Pinteac on the opposing side show the occasional importance of political actors, of ethnic entrepreneurs, in nation-building in the region in recent years, in the civil society or interest group sphere. They should not obscure the fact that some threshold of popular acquiescence was necessary for the enforcement of the educational policies associated with each of these names. The absence of “Moldovan” or “Romanian” nationalistic attitudes among a large majority of the local Moldovans/Romanians was salient. It gave them room for maneuver. It gave them a chance to claim that they represented the majority opinion among the members of the group in the region.

Since Fetescu was more popular with the regional and central Ukrainian authorities, his vision won despite the evenly divided opinions of the target ethnic constituency in the region on this issue, and of the rough equality of numbers of activists on both sides. The role of political actors is well established. Yet their importance lies in the ability of some actors as opposed to others to obtain the support of the state apparatus, not in their ability to mobilize the grass roots. This could be arguably seen since 1997 in the
I would contend that political actors play an important role only when certain conditions are met. These include cleavages within the elite and within the membership of the ethnic group, particularly if the two sides are roughly evenly matched in terms of strength, and a certain absence of grass roots mobilization. It is more likely to play a role when there are no opportunities for the inhabitants of the group to choose at election time between varieties of nationalism associated with electoral tickets, which was true in this case. Under these conditions, the autonomous role of political actors could be important. They represent, and are constrained by, sections of the public.

The self-styled “Moldovans” of the Chernivtsi region will continue to be subjected to a process of Romanian nation-building through the schools in the future. This evolution is approved not only by the local “Romanians”, but also by most local “Moldovans”. Those of the Odessa region will continue to be subjected to a process of “Moldovan” ethnic nation-building with the approval of about half of the Moldovans/Romanians living in communities with “Moldovan-language” schools, but with relatively little mobilization on either side. In 2004, those of the more northern region supported mostly the pro-Western Yuschenko, while those of the more southern region voted mostly for the pro-Eastern Yanukovych.

6. Conclusions

My research confirms the continued predominance of a “Moldovan” as opposed to a “Romanian” linguistic and especially ethnic identity among the Romanian-speaking (“Moldovan” and “Romanian”) population of the Odessa region during the period from 1989 to 2004. The greater number of “Romanian” as opposed to “Moldovan” local counselors elected in 2006, typically on Party of Regions tickets, and the processes that led to this outcome, has not been analyzed in detail. The information became available after the writing of this chapter. This pattern suggests a rejection of the radical “Moldovanism” of Anatol Fetescu. It is also “out of tune” with the “Moldovanist” ideology of the ruling Communists of

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Moldova. Yet it does not automatically herald the acceptance of a Romanian identity by most local Moldovans/Romanians.

We have observed that, starting before 1989, a sizable minority of the self-styled “Moldovans”, particularly from the Bessarabian, southwestern, part of the region, have developed a “Romanian” and/or “Romanian-speaking” primary, or, in most cases, secondary identity. Yet most of the Moldovans/Romanians voted for candidates with ethnic identities other than “Moldovan” or “Romanian”, and were clearly not ethnonationalistic, until 2004. A majority of them voted for Leonid Kuchma in the presidential elections of 1994 and 1999 and for Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential elections of 2004.

This “Romanian” identity and nationalism of a minority of the local Moldovans/Romanians was only partially explained by the direct and indirect impact of the Romanian ethnic, “Romanian-language” educational system in the area in 1992-1998. The lobbying of Anatol Fetescu and a change of policy in Kyiv led to the transformation of the 18 “Romanian-language” schools into “Moldovan-language” ones in 1998. This change was approved by half of the Moldovan/Romanian constituency served by them and opposed by the other half.

Russification has hindered the spread of both “Moldovan” and “Romanian” ethnonationalism. The impact of urbanization has favored Russification, and has served as a brake to the spread of both “Moldovan” and “Romanian” identities and ethnonationalism. The sudden shocks, namely the collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian independence and the Orange Revolution, have favored the increasing spread of a “Romanian” identity and of “Romanian” ethnonationalism. The role of political actors was also significant.
Chapter 10
Austria and the German-Speaking Austrians (1907-1962),
The Dependent Variable

1. Introduction
1.1. Abstract and Expectations: Austrian vs. German Nationalism
1.2. The Case of the Austrian German-Speakers, Overview of the Identity Issue and Methodology

2. The Dependent Variable
2.1. The Early Predominance of the Austrian Identity before World War I
2.2. The Dependent Variable: Political Parties and Camps and the Coding for the Period between 1907 and 1932-1933, etc.
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3. Conclusions
1. Introduction

1.1. Abstract, Dissertation Summary and Expectations: Austrian vs. German Nationalism

In this chapter, I will discuss the evolution of the nation-building processes in the Austrian German-speaking case between 1907 and 1962 on the territory of Austria within its current boundaries. The German-speaking Austrians are an important case of nation-building about which much has been written and which has been used for theory-building by other scholars. This chapter discusses the inhabitants of Austria within its present boundaries, and particularly those who are of German ethnic origin, language and culture, from around 1867 until the 1990’s, but especially between 1907 and the mid-60’s. My research will touch on most of the time span of nation-building, and will rely extensively on historical data.

A majority of the German Austrians of present-day Austria originally shared two identities: German and Austrian. The 1911 elections and other evidence suggest that in most cases the Austrian identity was more salient than the German one. More than half of the population between 1918 and 1945 also shared the Austrian identity. The process of nation-building during the Habsburg period (until 1918), in the Republic of Austria before 1933, and during the early period of German Nazi rule (1938-1945) basically led to a German ethnonational identity shared by practically every member of the ethnic group. The German ethnic nation-building process had the upper hand by 1938, but was unfinished.

The German-speaking Austrians have subsequently undergone a process of identity change from a German identity (“Germanist”) combined with an Austrian identity. The endpoint for a large majority of the population has been an exclusively Austrian identity (“Austrianist”) starting by 1945. It has continued on a more a massive scale after 1945 until at least the 1980’s. By the mid-‘60’s, the endpoint of this study, most Austrians thought that they were a part of the Austrian nation. By 1970, unlike in 1964, the voters of all the important parties were mostly committed to the idea of an Austrian nation and Austrian nationalism.

The sum of the intensity of nationalism scores for Austrian and German nationalism increased before World War I (from 3.88 in 1907 to 3.98 in 1911) and then decreased at the end of World War I.
After that, it increased during the interwar period (from 2.45 in 1919 to 3.36 in 1930) and decreased at the end of World War II. After that, it eventually became broadly stabilized in the 2.91 to 3.03 range by 1945-1962.

I have selected representative cases for which the quantitative operationalization / measurement of nation-building for selected long periods of time is possible and valid. There is statistical data (primarily electoral, but also, to a lesser extent, related to civil society and collective action), and, more recently, opinion polling data, that allows us to measure exactly what we are looking for and to compare. The differences in the values of the independent variables between the cases, and, over time, within each case, allow us to test a model with possibly universal applicability in a methodologically appropriate manner.

The dependent variable is the intensity of German nationalism, of Austrian nationalism, and, whenever and wherever applicable, but less often, of provincial patriotism (Landes patriotismus) and of the ethnonationalism of the various ethnic minorities. I will de-emphasize the study of provincial patriotism and emphasize that of German and Austrian nationalism. As we shall see in chapter 11, the impact of the independent variables mostly confirms my general model.

1.2. The Case of the Austrian German-Speakers,
Overview of the Identity Issue and Methodology

An interesting case of nation-building is that of the population of present-day Austria, and particularly of the Austrian German-speaking speaking inhabitants. The Austrian case is typically cited as a case in which a population that once had one national identity and supported one type of nationalism (“German”) has switched over to another one (“Austrian”) starting in 1945. Moreover, this has happened among mostly literate individuals, in a democracy with free elections under universal suffrage and plenty of opinion polls. What has been missed is how German identities and nationalism have originally become

765. This section will concentrate on the German-speakers of present-day Austria and of South Tyrol. It will not deal with the ethnic Germans from other parts of the former Habsburg Empire, such as the Germans of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. For more information on their case, see, for example, Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1938). The interwar period in Italian South Tyrol will be largely ignored. It is covered extensively in Dennison I. Russinow, Italy’s Austrian Heritage 1919-1946 (Oxford: Clarendon Pres, 1969).
more widespread and intense, at the expense of other identities, including the Austrian one. German, Austrian and other nationalisms and loyalties (e.g., provincial ones), as distinct from identities, will be discussed in later sections.

Nation-building in Austria could, and will, be studied based on electoral data, primarily the parliamentary ones between 1907, the first elections under universal suffrage and 1962. The latter were the last elections with a major party whose supporters confessed that they had a predominantly “German” as opposed to “Austrian” identity. The phenomenon could and will be looked at on the basis of opinion polling data, from 1945-1946 until 1995, with a focus on the period from 1956 onward, that is, after Austria was no longer under foreign military occupation. I will focus on the period from 1945-1946 until 1964.

By 1966 or 1970, unlike in 1962 or even 1964 (when there was no election), the voters for all the important parties were mostly committed to the idea of an Austrian nation and Austrian nationalism. It is by no means clear to what extent the thorough analysis of post-1962 parliamentary results would be meaningful. On the other hand, the polling data is plentiful, even though, unlike in the case of the earlier periods, there are some discrepancies in the answers depending on how the questions are asked. I will also look at plebiscite data, civil society membership, collective action data, at the ethnic self-identification of the Austrian inhabitants of Canada according to that country’s censuses, etc.

The reasons for the selection of the case of Austria within its present-day boundaries are numerous. Because of the divergence of the process of nation-building (except for the period between 1938 and 1945, when Austria was a part of Nazi Germany) between its ethnic and civic components, we may look at the two processes comparatively. Moreover, the change in sovereignty of the Austrian territory, from Austrian Habsburg to Austrian Republican to Nazi German to an independent Austria, originally under, but then free from, Allied occupation, makes this an attractive case within the context of my criteria for case selection. The data is plentiful and process tracing is possible.

Nation-building in Austria has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars, including such political scientists as Peter Katzenstein and William T. Bluhm. This has happened largely because Austria, whose population after the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy in 1918 was almost 100% ethnically
German, was seen during the 1970’s as the only case of unambiguously successful civic nation-building (at least in Europe) since World War II. 766

Austria has been historically and culturally an important country and the importance of the German language should not be de-emphasized. Yet there has been a lack of a thorough study combining the most varied types of data, at least in English. The question arises why nobody has used all of the existing data until now. Simply very few scholars combine the skill and interests of the political scientist or sociologist and of the historian, as well as a thorough search for multiple “angles”. None of them was specialized in Austria. Moreover, all of them were “case study” specialists, who did not learn sufficiently from the in-depth study of other cases.

The process of nation-building during the Habsburg period (until 1918), in the Republic of Austria before 1933, and during the early part of the period of German Nazi rule (1938-1945) is believed to have basically led to a German ethnonational identity shared by practically every member of the ethnic group. There was also an Austrian identity, purely civic, and often not very deep. A majority of the German Austrians of present-day Austria (and present-day Italian South Tyrol) shared both identities.

As we shall see, the 1907 and 1911 elections and other evidence suggests that the Austrian identity was more salient than the German one in most cases during the period before World War I. The Austrian identity was also shared by more than half of the population between 1918 and 1945, yet there was a very substantial minority of the population that had developed a “purely German” identity.

Before 1945, an Austrian identity was compatible with a German identity in the same way in which a Bavarian or a Prussian one could be. Yet many Austrians (and Bavarians, etc.), thought that they were members of “a German people” rather than of “the German people”. This made the “German” ethnic identity of the majority of Austrians more similar to the “Anglo-Saxon” rather than the “British” identity of, let us say, the majority of the people in New Zealand or Newfoundland dominions during the period.

During most, if not all, of the period between 1918 and 1945, a majority of the Austrian population preferred union with Germany. A possible exception may be the period between 1933 and the Nazi occupation of the country in 1938. The terms of such a union would not necessarily have been acceptable to the population or leadership of Germany though. The German ethnic nation-building process was successful, but unfinished. Moreover, there can be no doubt that the result was, in some cases, a less intense German nationalism. What is not clear is to what extent the approval of the union with Germany by most German Austrians in 1938 under terms of no decentralization or autonomy within Germany was facilitated by the fact that Hitler was himself an Austrian.

Since the early 1940’s, the German-speaking Austrians have undergone a process of identity change from a German identity (“Germanist”) to an exclusively Austrian one (“Austrianist”) starting on a limited scale in 1942-1943, on a massive one starting in 1945, and continuing until at least the 1980’s. The polling data shows that it was only by the late 1960’s, at some point between 1966 and 1970, that the average Austrian came to identify himself or herself as a member of a distinct Austrian nation, as an Austrian rather than as a German. The process of the perceived change in self-identification, even though quantitatively well-documented by polling data, etc., needs to be researched in some depth, not in the least because differently phrased questions have elicited different distributions of the answers.

Some would argue that the Austrian case is one of the few or even the only case of an almost complete change of national identity, in other words, of nation-building largely from scratch, at least in the twentieth century. This seems to have been true for a few generations of Austrians, but not necessarily true overall. Most Austrians seem to have always shared an Austrian identity, even if in most cases it co-existed with, and was less salient than, a German one. It would be even more accurate to say that it was the only case in which a national identity that was once shared by a majority of the population (the German one) became shared by only a minority of the inhabitants.

It is nevertheless significant that most of the southern Tyrolese German-Austrians (see Map 4C), who are living under Italian rule since 1918, have continued to have a double identity, a German linguistic

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767. There is indeed just as much of a scholarly, and a popular consensus, indeed quasi-unanimity, in Austria, that most Austrians view themselves as the members of a distinct nation as there would have been in 1931 that the overwhelming majority of the Austrians thought of themselves as being part of the German nation.
and ethnic one and an Austrian national one. Their attitudes could be, and have been characterized as, German nationalism by Cole and Wolff in 1974.

Various Italian official publications from the 1960’s do indicate the use of German textbooks in the South Tyrol and suggest that among the speakers and artistic ensembles who were giving talks in the south Tyrol who came from another country, there were more from Germany than from Austria. It is only in this area, which was not a part of the Austrian First Republic (1918-1938) or Second Republic (1945-present) that the identity patterns of German-speaking Austrians from the Austrian Empire have been preserved in the least changed form.

What has generally been applicable to Austria has been true of all of its Lander (provinces) except for one, at which I will look into in more depth for this reason. In Carinthia, which also has a Slovene minority, and where, unlike in the rest of Austria, the average German-speaking Austrian citizen has tended to support more intense, indeed German or Germanophone, nationalism. It is precisely the phenomenon that helps explain how it was possible for Jorg Haider to become governor of Carinthia. The only problem is that the more recent opinion polls do not pick up the strength of German or Germanophone nationalism in Carinthia. Only the electoral results do.

A partial explanation of the Carinthian uniqueness is Thomas Barker’s analysis of the distinction between public discourse and private attitudes and communications. ‘German nationalism is clearly an embarrassment to the Slovenes’ adversaries when dealing with foreigners. [The German nationalist Landsmannschaft leader Viktor] Miltschinsky went so far as to deny outright its historical existence, writing the author that it was a factor “at the very earliest” during the final weeks of 1918.'

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768 I would like to thank Stefan Wolff for the point that he made to me in March 2006.
770 See Presidency of the Council of Ministers of Italy, German-Speaking Inhabitants of the Alto-Adige (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato P. V., 1960), p. 14. Also, see the Italian Delegation to the XV Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Memorandum on Item 68 of the Agenda (“The Status of the German-Speaking Element in the Province of Bozano (Bozen), Implementation of the Paris Agreement of September 5, 1946) (New York, 1960), p. 66. In the case of the South Tyrol, a large number of German-language textbooks were not Austrian, but from Germany (particularly during the 1950’s and 1960’s), and they promoted a German identity and German ethnic nationalism.
772 Barker, p. 223.
The situation in Carinthia was somewhat different because a large part of its post-1945 population was made up of German refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe. Moreover, the civil society organizations have been uniquely active in promoting a German ethnic and later linguistic identity since the 1860’s. In addition, the significant conflict with the Slovenes, who were also Austrian citizens, encouraged the “us vs. them” conflict to be “German” or “German-speaking” vs. Slovene or “Slovene-speaking”.

Before presenting the expectations based on my model, it is necessary to provide a starting point necessary for the comprehension of the text by non-specialist readers with insufficient background information. The subsequent sections will deal more fully with Austrian and German nationalism in Austria. They need to be discussed in a different place than the identity issue in order to prevent confusions among the non-specialist readers. Finally, the geography of the country has to be understood (see maps 4A, 4B and 4C).

Both the electoral results of the late Habsburg period and the results of the Canadian censuses of 1921, 1931 and 1941, as well as the opinion polling data that was available starting in 1956, are informative. They would suggest that a majority of the population had a predominantly “Austrian” identity until and during the 1911 elections, and indeed until 1918. This was also true of the electoral results starting in 1945 and of the opinion polling data starting in 1966.

The German-language educational system of the (multi-national) Austrian Empire did promote primarily Austrian patriotism, but also a German ethnic identity. However, during the interwar period until 1933, the schools gave teachers more opportunities, and to some extent obliged them, to promote a more intense German nationalism, as did the National Socialists. The post-World War II educational system did promote an “Austrian” identity, which has spread to the younger generations.

Map 4A. The Administrative and Topographic Maps of Austria (1921-2006)

773. Burgenland was a part of Hungary until 1921.
Map 5A. The Administrative and Topographic Maps of Austria (1921-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Bundesland</th>
<th>Landeshauptstadt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Burgenland</td>
<td>Eisenstadt</td>
<td>Burgenland</td>
<td>Eisenstadt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Carinthia</td>
<td>Klagenfurt</td>
<td>Kärnten</td>
<td>Klagenfurt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Lower Austria</td>
<td>St. Pölten</td>
<td>Niederösterreich</td>
<td>St. Pölten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Upper Austria</td>
<td>Linz</td>
<td>Oberösterreich</td>
<td>Linz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Salzburg</td>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>Salzburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Styria</td>
<td>Graz</td>
<td>Steiermark</td>
<td>Graz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Tyrol</td>
<td>Innsbruck</td>
<td>Tirol</td>
<td>Innsbruck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Vorarlberg</td>
<td>Bregenz</td>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>Bregenz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Vienna</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Wien (Land)</td>
<td>Wien</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An important case of nation-building is that of the population of present-day Austria, and particularly of the Austrian German-speaking inhabitants. The Austrian case is typically cited as a case in which a population that once had one national identity and supported one type of nationalism (“German”) has switched over to another one (“Austrian”) starting in 1945. This has happened among mostly literate individuals, in a democracy with free elections under universal suffrage and plenty of opinion polls. What has been missed is how German identities and nationalism have originally become more widespread and intense, at the expense of other identities, including the Austrian one. German, Austrian and other nationalisms and loyalties (e.g., provincial ones), as distinct from identities, will be discussed in later sections.

Map 4C – North and South Tyrol

2. The Dependent Variable

2.1. The Early Predominance of the Austrian Identity before World War I

At the starting point of our study, in 1900-1918, most German-speakers of the German-Austrian provinces had a predominantly “Austrian” rather than “German” identity.

Ethnic Germans/German-speakers were the dominant ethnic group in the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire until 1918, and in a large majority of the cases, identified with the state or fatherland, and were Austrian patriots. Their Austrian identity and nationalism (a civic nationalism) were in most cases more salient than their German identity and nationalism (an ethnic one). According to an April 1956 opinion poll in Austria, 65% of the individuals who were 60 years and older declared that they were a part of the “Austrian people”, and 26% declared that they were a part of the German people. A large majority of the members of the non-German linguistic groups in Austria identified more with their ethnic groups than with Austrian patriotism. We have already seen this attitude exemplified in our study of the Bukovinian Romanians, Ukrainians, etc., before 1918.

As one may see in Table 5Y, in 1921-1941, most of the Austrian-Canadians had a German linguistic identity, but an Austrian ethnic identity, in the Canadian censuses. While it is difficult to estimate the percentages, one observes that whereas 76.98% of all individuals who were born in Austria in 1931 had

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a German mother tongue, only 23.28% declared a German ethnicity (“racial origin”), or 30.24% of the
former figure. In 1941, the percentages were at least 59.80% and 28.48% (47.63% of the former figure).
Among the population of self-styled Austrian ethnicity, regardless of birthplace, the percentage of
“Austrian language” answers was even higher than in 1941.

One also observes that the individuals who claimed that they were of Austrian rather than of
German ethnicity were more likely to retain their Austrian citizenship. It is noteworthy that the ratio
between Lutherans and Roman Catholics was higher than in Austria itself, which is an indication that the
latter had been more likely to migrate. The trend between 1921 and 1931 was for more individuals of self-
styled “Austrian” ethnicity to have their language listed as German, a pattern that was somewhat more
common among those older than 10 years than among those younger than that. This means that parents
with small children were more likely to have an “Austrian” identity than others.

The immigrants came predominantly from among the less well-to-do rural population of
Austria, and it might very well be that the Canadian census reflects only the attitudes of the German-
speaking peasantry of Austria. Still, the large number of individuals with a predominantly “Austrian”
identity can not be swept away, however much some have tried.

The proponents of the view that the German-speaking Austrians have seen themselves as
predominantly ethnic Germans, a group that has been predominantly liberal in the European sense of the
word, have tended to ignore this evidence. So have the “neo-Austrianists”, a predominantly social
democratic group that has looked rather unfavorably toward the pillars of the “old Austrian” identity, the
Habsburg monarchy and the Roman Catholic Church. The traditionalists, a conservative Catholic and
sometimes Habsburg nostalgic crowd have been largely correct on this point. In other areas of Europe, the
traditionalists have been ethnonationalists in recent times, but this has not been true of Austria. They have
also been the most consistent supporters of Austria’s EU membership. Within many contexts, traditionalists
have been maligned, often with the argument that they are ethnic nationalists, but this seems to be more of
a pretext than a cause. Secularism seems to be the root cause of much of the anti-traditionalism. The cases
in which the traditionalists have not been ethnonationalists, but civic nationalists, such as the Austrian one,
have been ignored by some in generalizations about traditionalism.778

778. My evaluation of people’s motives is based on private, personal conversations with them at various
Table 5 Y - The Ethnic and Linguistic Identities of Austrian-Canadians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year and Category</th>
<th>German ethnicity</th>
<th>Austrian Ethnicity</th>
<th>German Language</th>
<th>“Austrian Language”</th>
<th>Roman Catholics</th>
<th>Lutherans</th>
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</table>

At the starting point of our study, in 1900-1918, most German-speakers of the German-Austrian provinces had a predominantly “Austrian” rather than “German” identity.

2.2. The Dependent Variable: Political Parties and Camps and the Coding

conferences and by other types of networking. Thus, various scholars of Eastern European origin are bad-mouthed as “ethnonationalists”, which they sometimes are, but when it comes to specific criticisms, there are comments such as “I bet that the person supports George W. Bush”, which in most cases that I have observed has recently not been the cases.

779. See Census of Canada, 1931, vol. 1, p. 618, 782, 830-831, 984-985, 1034-1035, as well as the various census inserts, such as the one between p. 234 and 235, and Census of Canada, 1941, vol. 4, p. 178-179, 216-217, 534-535, 547, 798-799.

780. According to the Canadian census analysis, most of these were German-speakers.
for the Period between 1907 and 1932-1933, etc.

There are many reasons why the pre-1907 electoral data for the German-speaking Austrian areas has been largely ignored. One of them has been the opinion of experts. Another one is that the data from the period before universal and equal manhood suffrage is not detailed enough and not homogeneous enough across Länder, or even within the same Land. The complexity of the cases, the differences between them and the fact that my original treatment of them (deleted from this chapter) was the opposite of parsimonious justifies the exclusion of this data from the presentation. However, the data is consistent with my analysis below.

Starting in 1966, some interpretations of some opinion polls would suggest that all the political parties obtained the support of mostly voters with an “Austrian” identity. Therefore, in my opinion, only the elections from the period before that year are generally useful. This is not to deny the fact that other free and fair elections could be informative.

The Austrian electoral system, based on universal male suffrage before 1918, has been discussed in chapter 2. Starting in 1919, suffrage was extended to females. Elections in single member districts were changed, just like in Bukovina in Romania, to a proportional representation system.

Any analysis of the Austrian electoral system should fully take into account Austrian federalism. The autonomy of the various branches of the same party in different Länder makes the situation more complex than in Bukovina. I have tried to take into account most of these complexities, but I have not discussed some of them for the sake of parsimony. Since my analysis is “macro” rather than “micro”, I am sure that I have also ignored some complexities about which I am not aware. Finally, I should note that, as a non-specialist on Austrian issues, I do not claim as much expertise as in the Romanian cases.

It is important to note the fact that quite often the Austrian parties and tickets had factions that had different takes on nationalism-related issues. Sometimes the electoral data does allow us to clearly differentiate between the various groups because they represented clear and overwhelming majorities in various areas. Yet there are some complications. For example, during much of the interwar period, a majority of the Austrian population apparently favored union with Germany. However, different groups desired union under different terms. Besides, the declarations of some politicians that they were in favor of
union with Germany should not be taken at face value. Their purpose was sometimes to pressure other countries to make concessions to Austria (e.g., provide credits).

2.3. The Conservative-Traditionalist/Christian Social Camp

Austria has traditionally had three political camps (“Lager”) among the German-speakers. The most important one, and by far the most Austrian patriotic one, was the conservative/Christian Social one.

For the sake of parsimony, I will sometimes code not the parties, but the camps. Sometimes, even the results are reported not by party, but by camp, in the statistical publications. One of them was the Catholic conservative one, traditionally represented by the Christian Social Party (until 1945), later called the Austrian People’s Party (OVP). During the Habsburg period, there were also various “German Conservative”, “Conservative”, etc., parties and tickets that tended to be more elitist and have different socio-economic programs from the Christian Socials. They eventually united with the Christian Socials. Since they should receive the same intensity of nationalism scores for the same reasons, they will not be treated separately. Neither would various splinter groups that will not be mentioned in here for the sake of parsimony.

During the late Habsburg period, the Christian Social party was very much loyal toward the Habsburg dynasty and loyal, indeed patriotic, toward an Austrian state in which Roman Catholicism was the official religion. It should therefore receive a score of 1 on the integrative dimension of Austrian nationalism. The party was satisfied with the Austrian state, and should therefore receive a score of 1 on the satisfactional dimension. The patterns were more complicated on the identificational dimension. The party displayed or used both German (0.5) and Austrian (0.5) identities in most of Austria.

Even in 1907 and 1911, and before that, everywhere, in most of present-day Austria, the Christian Socials ran just as “Christian Socials”, not as “German Christian Socials”. The only exception in 1907 was Tyrol (and, in the case of the “German Conservatives”, Styria). However, in 1911, the same pattern also spread to Carinthia and, after the union of the Conservatives, including “German Conservatives” with the Christian Socials, in Styria.
The “German Christian Socials” label, and a discourse to match that, as well as the rivalry with ethnic Italian and ethnic Slovene Catholic parties warrants a score of 1 on the identificational dimension of German nationalism. In terms of symbolism, the party was both Austrian and German before World War I, which warrants a score of 0.5 on the symbolic dimension of each of the two nationalisms. The original pre-1907 (non-racist) anti-Semitism of the party had been diluted through its mergers with other Catholic conservative and clerical parties, some of whom had not been specifically anti-Jewish.

Picture 4A - Picture of Christian-Social Supporters. Observe the posters, on which it is written “Osterreich” (Austria)

During the interwar period, it was more strongly Austrian and more often strongly provincial, with a score of 0.5 on the identificational dimensions of each one. Both before World War I and during the middle of the interwar period, the party was able to attract the votes of many individuals of non-German ethnicity (e.g., Czechs in Vienna) because of its stand on the issues and Austrian patriotism. Its dominant section of the party did not desire union with Germany even before 1933. This was true of 55 of its 73

deputies in the lower house elected on 1928, who did not endorse the Anschluss (that is, union with Germany) (see Table 5 c).

**Picture 4B - (Anti-Internationalist, Anti-Semitic) Pan-German Poster from 1923**

Between two parliamentary elections, in 1921, the local Christian Social leaders and activists, as well as the pro-Christian Social clergy, openly supported the union of some Lander (Tyrol and Salzburg) with Germany. Some leaders and activists of the party from Styria also supported this line. This was a time of great economic difficulties in Austria, and this should be seen as last resort. It should also be noted that the elements that favored union with Weimar Germany were more likely to be progressive on socio-economic issues, and were more likely to be free of anti-Semitism than those with other views were.

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The party program was vague on the issue of union with Germany, thus allowing the party to attract the votes of both opponents and supporters of such a union, or even omitted the issue. This pattern also characterized the discourse of its leaders. For most pre-1938 Christian Socials, union with the Weimar Republic would have meant the betrayal of their monarchist (“Legitimist”) preferences, which were apparently demonstrated by post-World War II polling data (see Table 5.4 and the adjacent discussion). A strong emphasis on Austrian patriotism, visible in the party’s campaign posters (see Picture 4A), etc., combined with the avoidance of a discourse in favor of union with Germany. This will be regarded as evidence of Austrian patriotism and of the fact that most of those in this camp saw union with Germany as a “last resort”.

The anti-Marxist (and mostly anti-Jewish) paramilitary group Heimwehr, which ran independently in 1930, was mostly made up overwhelmingly of Christian Social members and supporters. This was because most of the anti-Marxist voters were Christian Social sympathizers. The only exceptions were in Carinthia and Styria, where the dominant perspective was similar to that of the Pan-Germans, but less anti-clerical. I will code its Heimwehr votes accordingly.

Austria has traditionally had three political camps among the German-speakers. The most important one, and by far the most Austrian patriotic one, was the conservative/Christian Social one.

### 2.4. The Social Democrats

Before World War II, the second most important Austrian “camp” was the Social Democratic one, which was specifically opposed to nationalism, but without being immune to it. It had a predominantly “Austrian” discourse prior to World War I, and later a predominantly “German” discourse until World War II.

A large majority of the Christian Social voters were more intensely Austrian patriotic than German nationalistic. During the period before World War I and even during the interwar period, the Social Democrats were also as a rule not German nationalists. Analyzing the Socialists is not easy, because party was ideologically an orthodox Marxist (though not revolutionary-dictatorial, except as a means to impose
its power after winning a parliamentary majority) one. It tended to act reasonably pragmatically (in a “revisionist” fashion) on the political scene, but its discourse scared the non-Marxists.

During the period between 1918 and the coming to power of the Nazis in Germany in 1933, it was precisely the left wing of the party. The latter was led mostly by Jewish intellectuals (or rather intellectuals of Jewish origin), such as Otto Bauer, which pushed the hardest and the most enthusiastically in favor of union with Germany. The more revisionist wing of Karl Renner was less enthusiastically in favor of this course.783

Most of the leaders, parliamentary deputies and members of the party were loyal Austrians during the pre-World War I period. Yet the evidence would indicate that they were not Austrian patriots (individuals who loved their country). This justifies an intensity of Austrian nationalism score of 0.5 on the integrative dimension. Before 1907, the party’s name on the ballot was always the “Social Democratic Party”, without any reference to ethnic identity. In 1907, the party called itself the “German Social Democrats” in Tyrol and Styria. Those Lander (provinces) had the large and politically most assertive national minorities in present-day Austria and South Tyrol. In 1911, the pattern also spread to Carinthia.

Before 1918, the party was dissatisfied with conditions in any capitalist country, so the score on the satisfacional dimension should be a 0. On the same dimension, the party’s level of satisfaction with conditions in post-1918 Germany varied, but it was half-hearted. The same was also true of conditions in Austria. So a score of 0.5 on the satisfacional dimensions of both German and Austrian nationalism for the period between 1918 and 1933 is warranted. What the Social Democrats did not particularly care for was provincial identities. Yet the social welfare system in Social Democrat-run Vienna did encourage, probably inadvertently, a Viennese identity.

In 1918 and during the interwar period, most of the leaders hoped for union with Germany. They did this not for “ethnonationalistic” reasons, but for economic ones. The party’s terms for union with Germany, although never fully made public, were not particularly congenial to the German side. They included two capitals, one in Berlin and another one in Vienna, Austria’s right to impose some customs tariffs on the other German states for a period and for some free trade with the other ex-Habsburg

783. Kurt L. Shell, The Transformation of Austrian Socialism (New York: The State University of New York) does provide substantial background, but tends to avoid the issue of the desire for union with Germany and the German vs. Austrian “identity issue”.
territories, etc. This both made it difficult to unite the two countries in practice, beyond the prohibition of this union by the peace treaty of Versailles.

It also shows that the party was not particularly German nationalistic. On the identificational dimension, the “Austrian” and especially “Lander” identities coexisted together with the “German” one, just like in the Christian Social case. They justify a score of 0.5 on the identificational dimension of German nationalism. Moreover, the more revisionist wing of the party led by Karl Renner was less enthusiastically in favor of the idea of union with Germany. The party’s symbols were international and internationalist (e.g., the Internationale as well as the Marseillese), so the score on the symbolic dimensions of both Austrian and German nationalism was 0.

In the lower house of parliament elected in 1927, 59 out 71 of the party’s deputies were in favor of union with Germany. Yet some of the party’s voters and members did not desire union with Germany at some critical times. Most Social Democratic voters in Burgenland and in Vorarlberg, and at times in Vienna, were not in favor of union with Germany. The reasoning had little to do with Austrian patriotism (except in Burgenland), notwithstanding the fact that the Austrian identity was probably stronger than the German one in the cases of the average Viennese workers.

The temporary opposition of some to the idea of union with Germany had to do with the repressions against the radical left in Germany in 1918-1919, and presumably with the fact that some policies of the Austrian state and especially of the municipality of Vienna were more “progressive/socialistic” than in Germany. It is well worth noting that the Viennese welfare state during the interwar period was probably the most elaborate one in all of Europe. Starting around 1919, but not until after the elections of that year, the party displayed and promoted civic loyalty toward the Austrian state, but not patriotism as such.

The working class, particularly in industry, and particularly the Viennese, might have preferred a confederation with Germany with customs barriers against German goods, but not vice versa. It is safe to say that if concrete conditions for a political and economic union with Germany acceptable to Germany would have been placed on the table, most, but not all, of the Social Democratic voters would have supported union with Germany. It was precisely the Social Democratic voters who were the most volatile and utilitarian on the Anschluss issue.
Before World War II, the second most important Austrian “camp” was the Social Democratic one, which was specifically opposed to nationalism, but without being immune to it. It had a predominantly “Austrian” discourse until the end of World War I, and subsequently a predominantly “German” discourse until World War II.

2.5. The German National and Non-Clerical Camp

The camp with the most complicated politics was the German National and Non-Clerical Camp, made up of intense to very intense German nationalists. The movement of votes between various parties of the camp was often fluid. Ultimately, the most successful members of the camp were the Nazis, yet it is inappropriate to conflate “German nationalist” with “Nazi”.

In the so-called German nationalistic camp, the intensity of German nationalism was high and that of Austrian nationalism low. Within the camp, there were often a number of political parties with identical intensity of nationalism scores. They differed on other issues (church-state relations, economic platforms and the characteristics of the leaders, attitudes toward other political parties, etc.). These issues were extremely important. They show the salience of topics other than nationalism in Austrian politics, and of political actors. These factors explain why this camp has been less united than the other two.

Yet they need not concern us here, not in the least because we are not concerned with the qualitative analysis of nationalism, but only with its quantitative one. At the level of various lands, various political parties and candidates with the same intensity of nationalism had common tickets, agreed to support one another in different districts and Lander, etc. During the interwar period, political parties with different intensities of nationalism sometimes made electoral coalitions at the national, Lander and local level, but these issues will be discussed separately.

The German nationalistic camp was bourgeois, but not clerical. It was generally in favor of the separation between church and state, or at least of greater separation between church and state. In pre-1938 Austria, church and state were not separated, and the Roman Catholic Church was to varying degrees (the first faith in the country). Remarriage after divorce was illegal. As we have seen in chapter 2, even in overwhelmingly Eastern Orthodox Bukovina, one could speak about the primacy of the Roman Catholic
Church in Austrian public rituals before 1918. Some groups minded it less (e.g., highly Orthodox Jews in Galicia and Bukovina), and some groups, such as the Romanian Orthodox of Bukovina, the Protestants, and Viennese Jews, minded it more.

The “classical” Pan-German line was represented by the pre-1918 Pan-Germans (All-Germans, “Alldeutsch”) per se, who were highly anti-Semitic, and the “German National, Pan-German” (“Deutschnational, alldeutsch”) electoral tickets. These were fundamentally anti-Austrian parties, who desired the break-up of the monarchy and the union of a part of it with Germany. The intensity of German nationalism of these political parties and activists were 1 on each dimension, and 4 overall. These political forces preferred German rule, hated the Habsburg monarchy, and would be satisfied only by union with Germany. They also viewed themselves as Germans and only as Germans, used German and only German symbols and were anti-Semitic.

The intensely nationalistic, but not irredentist, camp included standard pre-1918 parties, such as the lower middle class German People’s Party and the German Progressive Party. The latter was the heir of the by then discredited German Liberals of the period prior to the one discussed in here. It was led by businessmen, and it was the one major German nationalistic party with wide Jewish support. The German “Liberal” Agrarian Party, which was free of clerical entanglements and the ancestor of the later “Bauernbund”, was in fact a branch of the German Populists. It advocated additional reforms such as social insurance for the agrarian classes.

These parties believed in (Austrian) centralism, the role of German as a state language, which meant a diminishing role for other languages. They advocated a special, highly autonomous, status for Galicia and Bukovina (which endeared them to Polish and Romanian nationalists in the two provinces), etc. In some districts, the three political groups were allies. This group also included the German Radical Party, which formally “talked” Pan-German, but in fact stressed the defense of Germanism in Austria and anti-Semitism, and the German Workers’ Party, the German National, and some smaller groups that did not obtain parliamentary representation. The “German Liberal” and “German National” tickets were local combinations of two of these political forces that retained their identity.784

784 Jenks, p. 179-187. The German People’s Party was more heterogenous in the empire as a whole, but not in present-day Austria.
All of these parties deserve a score of 1 on the intensity of Austrian nationalism on the intensity of Austrian nationalism scale (loyal to Austria). They should get scores of 1 on the satisfactual dimension of German nationalism because they wanted a German-dominated Austria (they sometimes had different visions on this topic, but the same bottom line). They should get a 1 on the identificational dimension of German nationalism, because their leaders, members and sympathizers viewed themselves as Germans and 1 on the symbolic dimension because they used German symbols. Their membership in the parliamentary group called German National Union in 1911 symbolized their common stance. The situation in 1907 was slightly more complicated, but the more restricted membership of the same parliamentary bloc was explained by factors other than the intensity of nationalism.

The interwar Pan-Germans, the “Great German People’s Party” had been formed from this party and some of the former German nationalist, but not irredentist, parties that have been discussed above. The period from 1918 until October 1920 was very fluid on the Pan-German scene. At some points in time, there were more than 17 pan-German parties, some of which had been German nationalistic, but not pan-German before 1918. They should get a score of 4 on the intensity scale of German nationalism, and a 0 on the Austrian.

The “Great German People’s Party” generally deserves the same score, and for the same reasons, based on its programs, discourse and posters, which were also characterized by anti-Semitism. However, a minority of the Pan-German politicians were not anti-Semitic. One of the problems associated with it is that it always talked the talk, but did not always walk the walk of Pan-Germanism. Its parliamentarians in 1922 voted in favor of an international loan in exchange for the banning of the union with Germany by the Austrian parliament for a long period. This violated the party program. The Great German People’s Party attempted to compensate this by increasingly emphasizing anti-internationalism and anti-Semitism (see picture 4B) until it would have a chance to “redeem itself” on the pan-Germanism issue in 1932.

The decision to vote this way in 1922 has not been explained uniformly by various authors. It was presumably linked to the techniques of political actors such as the Christian Social chancellor, Father Ignaz Seipel. Remaining in a coalition with the Christian Socials at the national and, in many states, at the provincial level gave the party some patronage opportunities. By 1933, a few of the members and leaders of the Great German People’s Party did not desire union with Hitler’s Germany. In their opinion, that
Germany was not the one they knew and loved. However, most of the Pan-German leaders accepted an alliance with the Nazis, which had acquired most of their support.

Another German national party was the agrarian, pro-Christian religious rather than anti-religious, but not pro-clerical, the Farmers’ League (first called Bauernbund, then, in 1927, Landbund fur Osterreich and in 1930 Landbund). Before the 1927 elections, there were various provincial splinter Farmer’s Leagues in Carinthian and Burgenland, which were more attractive to local small peasants for reasons that had nothing to do with the intensity of nationalism. The party should receive a score of 2.5 on the intensity of German nationalism scale for a number of elections. The ticket deserves a score of 0.5 on the satisfictional dimension, because of the argument that the peasants were fundamentally suffering even in Germany (and Austria), and 0.5 on the identificational dimension because of the emphasis not only on the German, but also on the provincial (e.g., Carinthian) identity.

In the Carinthian stronghold of the party, this allowed the political formation to get the votes of some ethno-linguistic Slovenes who were not Slovene ethnonationalists. The party was in favor of union with Germany, which should give it a score of 1 on the integrative dimension. It used both German and provincial symbols, which should give it a score of 0.5 on the symbolic dimension.785 I have not found any evidence that the party deserves a score of more than 0 on the intensity of Austrian nationalism before 1927.

By 1927, there was a lessening of the intensity of the party’s German nationalism score to a 2, with only a 0.5 on the integrative dimension. By that time, the party insisted on the importance of respect for the Austrian constitution, which, of course, provided that Austria was a separate, independent country.

The party’s line was in fact more reasonable in comparison to those of the other major parties. It was free of semi-revolutionary Socialism, extremism of the clerical type and anti-Semitism. It was more genuinely attached to democracy than the others were. Its discourse was the least shocking of any other major political party. It was similar to the peasant parties of Eastern Europe. In a fairly pro-Slovenian study of the Slovene minority in Carinthia, the agrarian party is described as “nationalist but anti-Nazi”. Just like the pan-German party, it lost most of its following to the Nazis, but most of its leaders did have a future in

785 See Barker, 75, 98, 171, 175 and passim, 184, 187, 189, 209, 216, 298 on Carinthia and Burghardt, p. 246-247, 251, 252 and passim on the Burgenland.
post-1945 politics as allies of the former Christian Socials, who by now were “Christian”, but not “clerical”, just like the Landbund had been.786

The Nazis obviously deserve a 4 on the intensity of German nationalism scale for reasons identical to those applicable in the cases of the more traditional pan-Germans. As we shall see, they not only talked the talk, but also walked the walk. The Nazis were very highly anti-Semitic, and, unlike the Pan-Germans and Landbund, were explicitly opposed to democracy. They were less anti-clerical than the pan-Germans before 1918 and 1938. Unlike the other anti-Marxist parties, the Nazis emphasized that they were opposed to Marxism, but favored socialism. They also “hijacked” the pro-peasant ideas of the Landbund. There is a universal consensus that most members of the German National Camp, and some from outside the camp, were pro-Nazi in 1933-1945.

There were also other parties which never obtained parliamentary representation, such as the “Ethnonationalist Social Party” (Volkisch-sozialer Block) and the “Commerce and Crafts League” (Handels- und Gewerbebund) that were in the German National, Pan-German range.787

It should be stressed that the camp with the most complicated politics was the German National and Non-Clerical Camp, made up of intense to very intense German nationalists. The movement of votes between various parties of the camp was often fluid. Ultimately, the most successful members of the camp were the Nazis, yet it is inappropriate to conflate “German nationalist” with “Nazi”.

2.6. Small Pro-Austrianist Parties: The Democratic Parties and the Others

The other Austrian parties were also not German nationalistic. However, their platforms varied from each other in significant ways.

A group of parties of so-called Democratic parties appeared after the fall of the Habsburg Empire, such as the Citizens’ Labor Party. They had had some pre-1918 unimportant antecedents. Since they never played an important role, the information that is available about them is not plentiful, but their anti-Socialism, lack of anti-Semitism and massive support in Vienna’s bourgeois neighborhoods (including

786. Barker, p. 189.
787. See Steinbock, p. 811.
of those with the most Jews) is noted. I will assign them, and some other minor parties, only tentative scores.

As a rule, they seem to have identified the inhabitants of Austria as "Austrians" (by citizenship) and not to have tackled issues related to ethnicity. They were rather satisfied with the idea of rule of law, and the constitutional arrangements in/of independent Austria. The opposition of most, but not necessarily all, of them to union with Germany is noted, but I do not know their actual symbolism. It was pro-Austrian. These parties were in the same range of intensity of Austrian nationalism as the two major parties of the post-1945 republic. Although by no means popular, these parties were ignored, not reviled.

There were also even more insignificant (Habsburg) monarchist parties that should receive a score of 4 on the intensity of Austrian nationalism scale. There were also anti-corruption parties ("League against Corruption") or representing economic sectoral interests ("The Small Crafts Party of Austria") that avoided the issue. Their intensity of nationalism scores will not be provided because I have not been able to ascertain them.

The ethnic minority parties should be classified among the pro-Austrianist rather than pro-Germanist forces. They will be discussed later. These parties will get a score of 1 on the integrative dimension of Austrian nationalism and 0 for all the others, and thus 1 overall, and a 0 for the intensity of German nationalism. The pre-1933 Communists will receive a score of 0 for both German and Austrian nationalism for the same reason why the Romanian Communist Party during the interwar period should receive the same score.

The other Austrian parties were also not German nationalistic. Their platforms were diverse.

2.7. The Intensity of Nationalism Scores for the Pre-1933 Period

An analysis of the actual electoral results shows that there was an upswing in favor of a predominantly German identity during the late Habsburg period. The change was particularly drastic during the period of the collapse of the Austrian Empire. The decrease in the percentage of Austrian nationalistic votes was particularly sharp between 1911 and 1919, from 63% to 38%. After that, there was a partial recovery in the percentage of Austrian nationalistic votes, which, however, were always outnumbered by
the German nationalistic ones during the interwar period. Even this recovery was reversed by the onset of
the Great Depression. The evolution of the intensity of nationalism scores suggests that this picture is
accurate.

I will rely primarily on the electoral results for the lower chamber of the Austrian federal
parliament, the only one that has been elected by the population. (This was not the case for the upper house,
which was basically aristocratic during the imperial period, and elected by the state legislatures during the
republican period.) Moreover, the results are more plentiful, detailed and have been analyzed by others.
Even more importantly, issues related to nationalism, and particularly union with Germany, were more
important in the national than in the state elections.

Thus, a significant minority of the Christian Social voters in the elections for the local diets cast
their ballots for various more intensely German nationalistic parties (Pan-Germans, Landbund, etc.) in the
federal elections. They did this largely in order to make a statement on this issue.\textsuperscript{788} Moreover, some small
parties could surpass the low threshold for representation if the district was the entire country, but not in
some specific Länder, or vice versa. These parties were typically a part of the “German national camp”.

The sub-national electoral data\textsuperscript{789} will not been discussed in detail in this chapter. However, it has
been reflected in my analysis. It shows that the second choice of the voters for the pre-1933 German
(intensely) nationalistic parties tended to be the Christian Social Party, not the Social Democratic Party.
This has generally not been so after 1945, as the results of the two rounds of the presidential elections of
1951 show. This has led some to project inappropriately post-1945 patterns to the pre-1933 period. This
mistaken analysis has ignored the fact that the cleavages in the areas of civil society were not determined
by the popular, but unrealistic, prospects for union with Germany between 1918 and 1933. They were
rather determined by the perceived necessity to fight against Marxism, etc.

\textsuperscript{788} This is by no means unique. The Christian Democratic Popular Front (later the Christian Democratic
Popular Party) of the Republic of Moldova also did better in parliamentary elections than in local elections
since 1994/1998. This is because some of the voters that desired union with Romania did not vote for its
local candidates. The reason was that they found the candidates and lists in the local elections of other
political parties better suited for sub-national government tasks and because of issues related to patronage.

\textsuperscript{789} See the data in the various articles in Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik, \textit{Österreich 1918-1938}, vol. 2,
\textit{(Geschichte der Ersten Republik)}, (Graz, Wien, Koln, Verlag Styria, 1983), passim, for the interwar period
as well as for the last pre-World War I elections.
In a polity in which the building of roads, railroads, etc., had to do with sub-national (state) governments, the expectations of pork barrel projects influenced state and local elections more than national elections. The net beneficiary was the party that was usually in power in almost all the states (but not Vienna), either in a coalition, or, more commonly, alone, the Christian Social Party.

The greater preference of the electorates of the pre-1933 bourgeois, non-Marxist, anti-Marxist parties for alliances with each other, particularly between 1920 and 1933, which was also suggested by the electoral patterns discussed above, partly explains the patterns of the actual coalitions. Austria was ruled by coalitions between the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials only between 1919 and 1920. The country was ruled by bourgeois, non-socialist, coalitions between 1920 and 1934/1938.

Table 5a - Intensity of Nationalism Scores for the Various Austrian (Main) Political Parties in the Habsburg Monarchy during the Last Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections and Nationalisms, by Years</th>
<th>Political Parties and Ideologies</th>
<th>Intensity of nationalism scores, by political party or “camp”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christian Socials (and other clericals)</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dimension790</td>
<td>I S I S I S I S I S I S I S I S</td>
<td>I S I S I S I S I S I S</td>
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<tr>
<td>1907 Elections</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.Social Democrats 1.Pan-German parties 1.German nationalist</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most of Austria</td>
<td>Total Score791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of Austria</td>
<td>1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0</td>
<td>3 0.5 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrol (Social Democrats – in Tyrol and Styria)</td>
<td>1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0</td>
<td>Total Score 2.5 1 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.German nationalism</td>
<td>Most of Austria</td>
<td>Total Score791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of Austria</td>
<td>0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1</td>
<td>1 0.5 4 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrol (Social Democrats – in Tyrol and Styria)</td>
<td>0 0 1 0.5 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

790. The dimensions are, in the order used in this dissertation and listed in this table, integrative, satisfactional, identificational and symbolic.
791. The total score is the sum of the scores on the integrative, satisfactional, identificational and symbolic dimensions.
There were no opinion polls during the pre-1945 period. However, Peter Katzenstein has quantitatively analyzed newspaper editorials. During the period from 1919 until 1922, and from 1928 until 1933, the newspaper editorials included more “German people symbols” than “Austrian people symbols”. The numbers were equal between 1934 and 1938. However, “Austrian people symbols” were more numerous than “German people symbols” between 1923 and 1927.793

Do these numbers in any way reflect public opinion? The greater intensity of Austrian than of German nationalism in 1923 (see Table 5Z2), as measured by my intensity of nationalism scores, is consistent with this data. So are the analyses of the 1931 project of a customs union between Germany and

792. The dimensions are, in the order used in this dissertation and listed in this table, integrative, satisfactical, identificational and symbolic.
793. See Katzenstein, Disjointed, p. 141-143, especially the table on p. 142.
Austria. The idea was approved by both governments, but failed because of French opposition. The analyses emphasize the quite vocal character of the opposition of the minority opposed to such a move.

Table 5 b – Austria in Its Present-day Boundaries - Intensity of Nationalism Scores for the Various Austrian (Main) Political Parties during the Early First Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections and Nationalisms</th>
<th>Intensity of nationalism scores, by political party or “camp”</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Christian Socials (and other clericals)</td>
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<td>Dimension</td>
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<td>1919 Elections</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Austrian nationalism</td>
<td>0.5 0 0.5 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Score</td>
<td>1.5               1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. German nationalism</td>
<td>0 0 0.5 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Score</td>
<td>0.5 1.5            4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lander nationalism/patriotism</td>
<td>0.5 1 0 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Score</td>
<td>2                 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 Elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Austrian nationalism</td>
<td>0.5 0 0.5 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Score</td>
<td>1.5               1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. German nationalism</td>
<td>0 0 0.5 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Score</td>
<td>0.5 1.5            4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lander nationalism/patriotism</td>
<td>0.5 1 0 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Score</td>
<td>2                 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923 Elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Austrian nationalism</td>
<td>(political program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Score</td>
<td>1.5               1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. German nationalism</td>
<td>0 0 0.5 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Score</td>
<td>0                  0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The interwar electorate that voted for the political forces in favor of union with Germany always outnumbered, but was sometimes “outshouted”, “outgunned” and “outspent”, by the predominantly pro-Austrianist voters, whose Austrian nationalism tended to be more intense. The overwhelmingly “Austrian patriotic” rural inhabitants were much more likely to have guns. They were also more likely to be members of a paramilitary group. In this case, it was the right-wing, anti-Marxist Heimwehr, the most aggressive of the paramilitary groups.

In a sense, this was a reversal in comparison to the patterns of the 1907 elections, when there were more pro-Austrianist than pro-Germanist voters. However, in that year, the score of the intensity of German nationalism was higher than that of Austrian nationalism. This helped lead to more friction with other ethnic groups of the empire than most German-speaking voters living in the territory of present-day Austria would have desired.

Table 5Z1 indicates the percentages of the votes for various political types of parties. Some of them emphasized a (primarily) German identity, and some of whom emphasized a (primarily) Austrian identity. At no point in time was the Austrian identity stronger than at the time when pro-“Austrian identity” editorials predominated in print. Yet at all times, there were more votes for parties whose scores on the intensity of German nationalism scale were higher than their scores on the intensity of Austrian nationalism.

794. Unity List between the Christian Social Party, the Pan-Germans and even some, but not all of the National Socialists (Nazis).
795. Unity List between the Christian Social Party, the Pan-Germans and even some, but not all of the Nazis.
nationalism scale (see Table 5Z2). Opinion leaders simply could not effectively promote Austrian patriotism. The results might have been different, and continued in the same direction, had there been no Great Depression.

An analysis of the actual electoral results shows that there was an upswing in favor of a predominantly German identity during the late Habsburg period. The change was particularly drastic during the period of the collapse of the Austrian Empire. The decrease in the percentage of Austrian nationalistic votes was particularly sharp between 1911 and 1919, from 63% to 38%. Subsequently, there was a partial recovery in the percentage of Austrian nationalistic votes. However, the German nationalistic ones during the interwar period always outnumbered the latter. Even this recovery was reversed by the onset of the Great Depression. The evolution of the intensity of nationalism scores suggests that this picture is accurate.

### Table 5Z1 – Electoral Results on the German-Austrian Spectrum, 1919-1930 (Austrian Parliament), in Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections (Years)</th>
<th>Type of Nationalism</th>
<th>Who Voted</th>
<th>Trends or Patterns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primarily Austrian</td>
<td>Primarily German</td>
<td>Ethnic Minority</td>
<td>Communists (indifferent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 1907 (first round)</td>
<td>71.02</td>
<td>29.30</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1911 (first round)</td>
<td>62.71</td>
<td>31.00</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 1919</td>
<td>38.30</td>
<td>59.17</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 1920</td>
<td>44.39</td>
<td>51.44</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 1920-1922</td>
<td>35.99</td>
<td>53.24</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 1923</td>
<td>44.65</td>
<td>53.32</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*796. Some political parties had no stance on this issue, so the sum of the percentages could be less than 100.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections (Years)</th>
<th>Type of Nationalism</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. 1907 (first round) | Aus-

|ger-

||istian | German | German+ Austrian | Without Burgenland, including South Tyrol |
|-------|--------|-----------------|------------------------------------------|
| 2. 1911 (first round) | 2.25 | 1.72 | 3.98 | Without Burgenland, including South Tyrol |
| 3. 1919 | 0.92 | 1.53 | 2.45 | Without Burgenland |
| 4. 1920-1922 | 1.25 | 1.44 | 2.69 | Carinthia 1921 and Burgenland 1922 electoral results included |
| 5. 1923 | 1.79 | 1.12 | 2.91 | Mostly “Austrian patriotic” coalition in power |
| 6. 1927 | 1.46 | 1.83 | 3.29 | Mostly “Austrian patriotic” coalition in power |
| 7. 1930 | 1.83 | 1.52 | 3.36 | Mostly “Austrian patriotic” coalition in power |
| 8. 1945 | 2.91 | 0 | 2.91 | Ex-Nazis did not vote, Allied occupation, no German national party |
| 9. 1949 | 3.37 | 0.35 | 3.72 | Ex-Nazis could vote, Allied occupation |
| 10. 1951 (presidential) | 2.61 | 0.46 | 3.08 | Allied occupation |
| 11. 1953 | 2.70 | 0.33 | 3.03 | Allied Occupation |
| 12. 1956 | 2.74 | 0.20 | 2.93 | Independent neutral Austria |
| 13. 1959 | 2.80 | 0.23 | 3.03 | Independent neutral Austria |
| 14. 1962 | 2.80 | 0.21 | 3.01 | Independent neutral Austria |

Table 5Z2. Intensity of Nationalism Scores for German and Austrian Nationalism

2.8. Plebiscites, Civil Society and Collective Action until 1938
The plebiscite, civil society and collective action data strongly suggests that the desire for union with Germany was shared by most Austrian citizens during at least a part of the Austrian period. On the other hand, the mobilization in favor of this goal was not uniform in terms of time and place.

During the period between 1918 and 1938, one could gauge public opinion on the issue of union with Germany not only on the basis of the electoral data, but also on the basis of plebiscites/referenda, civil society membership and collective action statistics. Since the data for the two categories is vast, I will concentrate only on some of the most important aggregate data.

During the period between 1919 and 1921, there were a number of plebiscites in some Lander (provinces or states) of Austria. In Vorarlberg, on May 11, 1919, both the Christian Social and the Social Democratic electorate voted in favor of union with Switzerland. Only the German nationalistic electorate voted against, mainly because it desired union with Germany. In North Tyrol and in Salzburg, the situation was different. In both states, the German National and the Christian Social and Social Democratic electorates voted in favor of union with Germany (see Table 5b1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Election or Plebiscite?</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>February 16, 1919</td>
<td>German National camp 16.21%, Christian Social Party 61.99%, Social Democrats 21.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>Plebiscite</td>
<td>May 11, 1919</td>
<td>80.6% for union with Switzerland, 19.4% opposed (overwhelmingly pro-union with Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(North) Tyrol</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>October 17, 1920</td>
<td>German National camp 14.96%, Christian Social Party 62.44%, Social Democrats 20.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(North) Tyrol</td>
<td>Plebiscite</td>
<td>April 24, 1921</td>
<td>145,302 pro-union with Germany (98.77%), 1,805 against (1.23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(North) Tyrol</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>October 21, 1923</td>
<td>German National camp 9.99%, Christian Social Party 69.89%, Social Democrats 19.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>Election</td>
<td>October 17, 1920</td>
<td>German National camp 23.85%, Christian Social Party 47.45%, Social Democrats 27.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>Plebiscite</td>
<td>May 29, 1921</td>
<td>99,986 pro-union with Germany (99.12%), 889 anti-union (0.88%), 384 invalid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

797. This refers to the Austrian rather than the Italian part of post-1918 Tyrol.
798. Swanson, p. 110.
799. As distinct from Italian South Tyrol.
800. Swanson, p. 228.
801. Swanson, p. 231.
The massive membership in the Austro-German People’s League and other pieces of evidence would suggest that, at least at certain times during the interwar period, an actual majority of the population of Austria desired union with Germany. The 1.8 million membership of this largest organization in favor of union with Germany (but not the only one) represented 44% of the electorate, and 49% of those who actually cast ballots in 1930, but only 26% and 30% in 1923/1925 (see Table 5b2). Most of the members of the organization were not voters for parties in the German national camp.

The regional make-up of the organization has not been fully ascertained. However, the organization had no branch in the capital of Vorarlberg, where, as we have seen, most of the population had desired union with Switzerland. The support for union with Germany was also never a majority phenomenon in Burgenland during the First Republic. In both of these areas, only the voters for the German national camp were presumably in favor of union with Germany.

Table 5b2 – Membership in Civic Society Organization in Favor of Union with Germany, etc.

(Quantitative Data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Society Organization</th>
<th>When</th>
<th>Membership, Participants</th>
<th>Territorial Unit</th>
<th>Electorate, when and percentage in favor</th>
<th>Actual Voters, when and percentage in favor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austro-German People’s League</td>
<td>1925 (June 4)</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3,849,484 (October 21, 1923), 26%</td>
<td>3,312,606 (October 21, 1923), 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austro-German People’s League</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1.8 million</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4,121,282 (November 9, 1930), 44%</td>
<td>3,688,068 (November 9, 1930), 49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opinion of the population on the issue of union with Germany in 1938 in Christian Social strongholds in the rural areas could be gauged based on the following case. The Austrian chancellor of


1934-1938, Kurt Schuschnigg had declared that there would be a plebiscite in favor of Austria’s independence. It was to take place on March 13, 1938. The plebiscite was cancelled, and by that time, Austria was under German control. Yet the plebiscite was held in the mountain village of Tarrenz, and 100% of the population voted in favor of an independent Austria. On April 10, 1938, in Hitler’s plebiscite, 100% of the voters voted for union with Germany. The village’s election time, the voting patterns were solidly conservative.

The overwhelming victory, with more than 99% of the vote in all of Austria of the stance in favor of union with Germany in Hitler’s referendum can not be taken seriously. The support for such a union was perhaps about 39% before the arrival of these troops, but it presumably increased to at least the 51% of the population that found Nazism good in theory, even if perhaps bad in practice, in December 1947.

The overwhelming majority of the German national camp and a majority of the Social Democratic camp supported the union with Germany. As a rule, these camps cooperated with, and materially benefited from, the regime during the period of German rule of 1938-1945. The Roman Catholic priests and those under their influence, namely the supporters of the conservative camp, which as a rule had not favored union with Germany during the interwar period, as a rule kept their distance from the Nazi regime.

This is not the place for a full discussion of the trends in public opinion during the period of the Fatherland Front (1933-1938) and National Socialist (Nazi) dictatorships. A great deal of information has been published on public opinion during these two periods. It has been noted in 1936 that about 40% of the population of Austria desired union with Germany at that time. This figure is also consistent with the percentage of the population that was 60 and above (39%) that indicated something similar to a past approval of union with Germany in 1980. These individuals who were over 60 in 1980 were the remnants of the cohort that would have normally had the right to vote, and that voted in Hitler’s plebiscite, those who were 18 years and older.

The polling data indirectly suggests what we know from the historical data, that the voters in the German national camp looked the most favorably to the idea of union with Germany, being followed by the Socialist supporters and then by the conservative supporters. Those who believed that Austria was in a crisis in 1980 were 10% more likely (43% vs. 33%) to believe that the Anschluss “at long last brought about national unification with the German people”.806

Table 5e - Judgment of the Anschluss (1980) (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: The Anschluss at long last brought about national unification with the German people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Economic Crisis?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Ages</td>
<td>Up to 19</td>
<td>20-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The plebiscite, civil society and collective action data clearly suggests that the desire for union with Germany was shared by most Austrian citizens during at least a part of the Austrian period. On the other hand, the mobilization in favor of this goal was not uniform in terms of time and place.

2.9. Parliamentary Attitudes toward Union with Germany:

The Signers of the 1928 Petition

In December 1928, the deputies of the Austrian parliament had the opportunity to sign a petition on the issue of unification with Germany. A study of their characteristics is very fruitful in helping us identify who was in favor of such a development.

Before we could fully evaluate the electoral nationalism during the interwar period, we should see the attitudes of the elected parliamentarians of each political party in December 1928 on the issue of the union (“Anschluss”) with Germany. This could be determined based on whether they signed a petition of a pro-union organization, the above-mentioned Austro-German People’s League, also called the Austrian Volksbund.\(^7\) It should be noted that the signatures were collected during the winter.

A comparison with various parliamentary votes at certain “forks in the road” of 1921, 1922 and 1932\(^8\) shows that the pro-Anschluss Social Democrats, Greater Germans and Agrarian Union voted in favor of a Pan-German line on two out of three occasions. They voted against it when the economic (sectoral or class interests) of their main constituency were hurt by their ideological vote, consistent with the party program on the issue of union with Germany. What later paid off electorally was not catering to these economic (sectoral or class) interests, but to the party program on the Anschluss issue.

The “patriotic” Christian Socials were always overwhelmingly “against” union with Germany. On November 12, 1918, the deputies of this party elected to the old imperial parliament of 1911, most of whose leaders and elected representatives were against union with Germany, had voted in favor of the pro-Anschluss resolution anyway. At around that time, the intensity of German nationalism score was higher than that of Austrian nationalism (see Table 5Z2).

The fact that their predominantly Austrianist supporters were more intensely patriotic than many of the pro-Anschluss supporters were German nationalists made the intensity of Austrian nationalism exceed that of German nationalism in the proximity of the 1922 and 1932 votes. This is demonstrated by the results of the 1923 and 1930 elections (see Table 5Z2). This circumstance could not help but influence the leaders of the non-Marxist German nationalist political formations who had to weigh a number of factors to engage in a number of mental acrobatics to justify going against their ideology.

The December 1928 Austrian parliamentary petition on the issue of unification with Germany is revealing. It helps us identify who was in favor of such a change.

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\(^8\) One of them was a 1921 attempted improvement in relations with Czechoslovakia, which would have hindered union with Germany. The other two cases dealt with approval or non-approval of international loans whose terms stipulated that Austria should not unite with Germany for long periods. The government of Dr. Schober fell because of his 1921 dealings with Czechoslovakia, but the loans were approved by the parliament.
Table 5c - The Attitudes of the Members of the Lower House of the Austrian Parliament toward Union with Germany during the Winter of 1928-1929, by Political Party

| Political Parties | 
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Social Democrats (SD) | Greater German Party (GGP) | Agrarian Union (AU) | Christian Socials (CS) | Heimatblock (HB) | Total Non-Marxist Coalition | Total Number |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| a. Pro-Anschluss Deputies/Signers | 59 | 10 | 5 | 18 | | | |
| b. Non-Signers | 12 | 2 | 4 | 55 | | | |
| c. Total | 71 | 12 | 9 | 73 | | | |
| d. Signers as a Percentage | 83.10 | 83.33 | 55.55 | 24.66 | | | 35.11 |
| e. Electoral List (1927) | Alone | With CS | Alone | With GGP | GGP, AU, CS | |
| f. Pan-German voting (1921-1932) | 2 of 3 occasions | 2 of 3 occasions | 2 of 3 occasions | 0 of 3 occasions | 0 of 1 occasions | |
| g. All | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | | 6/8 |
| h. Anschluss Platform | Yes | Yes | “Yes, but” | Not quite | So-so | |
| Main Constituency | Working Class | Middle Class | Peasants | Pro-Clericals | Paramilitary | |
| j. Elections 1923-1932 | All | All | All | All | Only 1930 | |
| k. Workers as deputies | 8 | 0 | 0 | 2 | | |
| l. Self-employed in industry and crafts | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | | |
| m. Industrial (k + l)/c (%) | 11.27 | 8.33 | 11.11 | 17.81 | | |
| j. Part of the ruling coalition in 1921-1933 | No | 1922-1932 | 1927-1933 | Always | 1930-1934 | |

2.10. The Intensity of Austrian and German Nationalism Starting in 1945:

The Redefined Camps
The electoral data shows that there has been an important switch in self-identification in general, and in primary self-identification in particular, from “German” to “Austrian” in post-1945 Austria.

During the post-1945 period, Austria has had three main parties that were rooted in the pre-1938 period. One was the conservative Austrian People’s Party (OVP). It was the successor to the Christian Socials, but also of the Agrarian League. Another party was the Socialist Party of Austria (SPO), the avowed descendant of the Social Democrats. Another group, which was descended from the old Pan-German faction and from the Nazis, was the League of Independents (WDU, in some places called VDU), later transformed into the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO). There were also the Communists, various splinter groups and various small pan-European formations.

The intensity of Austrian nationalism of the Slovene nationalists will be scored just like during the interwar period. One observes the fact that before World War II, the parties did not have the name “Austria” in their titles. This reflects increasing post-1945 identification with the Austrian state. All the parties, except for the descendants of the pan-Germans (and their splinter groups) abandoned German nationalism. The exception was Carinthia, whose patterns will be discussed in a different section. There was a gradual societal abandonment of even Germanophone nationalism, except for the German national camp, which after the 1962 elections would switch from German to Germanophone nationalism, and for Carinthia.

As a rule, the two main parties, and most of their electorates, preferred Austrian independence, and therefore deserve a score of 1 on the integrative dimension of Austrian nationalism, and 0 for that of any other, including German. They were satisfied with conditions in Austria, at least during the period until 1966, because both parties were a part of a ruling coalition. This was true of all the post-1945 elections that will be analyzed. This means that they should receive a score of 1 on the satisfactual dimension of Austrian nationalism, and 0 on that of any other nationalism. The identificational and symbolic sides of Austrian nationalism were downplayed, and the scores on the two dimensions were 0.5 and 0.5, and 0 for that of any other nationalism. Austria was defined only as a political nation or a political community, and space was left for other identities and symbols, whether they were provincial, ethnic German or Slovene,
religion, etc. The two main parties tolerated rather than abused the various Austrian symbols, such as the Austrian flag, leaving enough space for other symbols, such as the provincial flags, etc.

As a result, the individuals with a German ethnonational identity could, and, as the opinion polls show, often did, vote for the two major political parties. They were welcome as voters and party members. The two parties therefore deserve a score of 3 on the intensity of German nationalism scale, and a score of 0 on the intensity of German nationalism scale.

The German liberal VDU and later FPO did not advocate the union of Austria with Germany, but noted and supported the independence of Austria. On the satisfactional, identificational and symbolic dimensions, this political trend remained German. Therefore, they had a score of 3 on the intensity of German nationalism scale, and a score of 1 on the Austrian scale. By the 1980’s, the party was more Austrian nationalist, but this need not concern us here.

The Communists preferred a Soviet-dominated, yet somehow independent, Austria, which was a contradiction. This means that they should receive a score of 0.5 on the integrative dimension. On the satisfactional dimension, they expressed dissatisfaction toward the Austrian state, and a score of 0 on this dimension. On the symbolic dimension, they preferred Communist, not Austrian symbols, so they should get a score of 0 on the symbolic dimension. On the identificational dimension, they were against any element of Germanism, for a fully developed Austrian identity, with no space for a German one. For this reason, they should receive the highest score on the identificational dimension of Austrian nationalism, a 1. Notwithstanding their “identificational Austrianism” and their lack of any voters with a “German” as opposed to “Austrian” identity, the Communist score on the intensity of Austrian nationalism scale was a modest 1.5.

It would appear that “identificational Austrianism” was not synonymous with Austrian patriotism. All the other parties were splinters of the major parties, and will be treated accordingly or can not be ranked. The parties of the ethnic minorities will be discussed in a different section. So will the Carinthian particularistic Germanophone nationalist tickets made up of VDU/FPO and the old Landbund section of the Austrian People’s Party.

As we can see in Table 5Z2, the proportion of votes for parties that emphasized specific identities matched the spread of these identities, as ascertained by opinion polls, particularly in terms of the
increasing spread of an Austrian identity at the expense of a German one. This will be discussed in the subsequent section. In 1945, no German nationalist party was allowed, and former Nazis were disenfranchised.

Table 5Z2 – Electoral Results on the German-Austrian Spectrum, 1945-1962 for the lower house of the Austrian Parliament, in percentages of the votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>The Ethnic Identity and Ideology Promoted by the Electoral Tickets</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austrian&lt;sup&gt;809&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>95.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>83.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>79.81</td>
<td>15.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>83.77</td>
<td>10.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>89.06</td>
<td>6.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>89.03</td>
<td>7.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>89.91</td>
<td>7.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The electoral data discussed above shows that there has been an important switch in self-identification in general, and in primary self-identification in particular, from “German” to “Austrian” in post-1945 Austria.

2.11. The Dependent Variable: Austrian and German Nationalism (According to the Opinion Polls)

The proportion of the population that believed that Austrians “are a nation” increased during the post-1945 period in comparison to the interwar period of independence of 1918-1938, after a period when the process was going in the opposite direction.

The proportion of individuals who declared to opinion pollsters that they were a part of the “Austrian nation” increased from 47.37% in 1964, 66% in 1970, 62% in 1973 and 1977, 67% in 1980, 75% 809. Excluding the Communists.
in 1987, 79% in 1989, 74% in 1990, 78% in 1992, 80% in 1993 and 72% in 1994 (see Table 5X).\textsuperscript{810} Obviously, a large number of individuals have thought that they are a part of both the Austrian civic nation and of the German ethnic nation.

Even so, in the polls that gave individuals a chance to display both Austrian and German (cultural or ethnic) identities, the percentage of individuals with an Austrian identity has increased from 49% in 1956 to at least 58% in 1984 and to 70% in 1990. By contrast, the population with a German identity decreased from 46% in 1956 to 38% (13% fully and 25% partially) in 1984 to 28% in 1990 (see Table 5Y).

Table 5X - Percentage of the Austrian Population that Sees Itself as a Part of the Austrian Nation

\textit{According to the Opinion Polls, by Years}\textsuperscript{811}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Column Number)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Austrians Are a Nation</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Austrians Are Slowly Beginning to Feel Like a Nation</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Austrian Nation-Building (columns 1+2)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Austrians Are Not a Nation</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. No Indication</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Percentage with an Opinion (columns 1-4)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Austrians as Nation - percentage among Opinions (column 1/column 6)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Percentage with Austrian Identity - Increase (I) or Dec-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{810} See Thaler, p. 168, and Bruckmuller, p. 63, 65.
\textsuperscript{811} See Thaler, p. 168, and Bruckmuller, p. 63-65, Haller and Gruber, p. 67, etc.
\textsuperscript{812} The questions were not identical as on the other questions in this series.
It is well worth noting that the percentage of individuals who thought that they were “Germans” as opposed to “Austrians” when given a choice between two identities among those born until April 1896 was 26% according to an April 1956 opinion poll (see Table 5Y). This would suggest that present-day patterns of distribution of identities as private opinions are more consistent with the patterns of 100 year ago than it has been generally noted.

The correlation between the answers to different questions within the same opinion polls indicates that most individuals who preferred an “Austrian” as opposed to a “German” cultural (as distinct from civic) identity had an “Austrian” primary identity. By contrast, German ethnic nationalism was

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813. This poll was taken by another poll later.
correlated with provincial patriotism. For the average individual who preferred a “German” to an “Austrian” cultural identity, one’s primary identity and loyalty were the provincial ones.

To a larger extent than it is the case with most individuals in almost all societies, the average Austrian realizes that Austrian national consciousnesses, and indeed the Austrian nation, are recent constructions. The average Austrian believes that Austrian national consciousness is a new, post-1945 phenomenon. In 1977, 15% of those who were polled stated that the Austrian nation dated from before 1918, 14% in the 1918-1934 period, 2% from the 1934-1938 period, 4% from the 1938-1945 period, 29% from the 1945-1955 period, 26% from the period after 1955, 3% in the last years, while 6% did not know.814

Table 5Y - German vs. Austrian Identities among the Austrian Population in Opinion Polls (Mostly in Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
<td><strong>“Framing” of the Identity Groups</strong></td>
<td><strong>Demographic Group Polled</strong></td>
<td><strong>Austrian</strong></td>
<td><strong>German</strong></td>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 1956 (April)</td>
<td>German or Austrian</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1956 (April)</td>
<td>German or Austrian</td>
<td>Older than 60 (by age)</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 1956 (April)</td>
<td>German or Austrian</td>
<td>40-59 (by age)</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 1956 (April)</td>
<td>German or Austrian</td>
<td>18-39 (by age)</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 1959</td>
<td>Austrians, later Germans</td>
<td>Youth (All)</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = positively true, 2 = probably true, 3 = neither true nor false, 4 = probably false, 5 = certainly false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 1959</td>
<td>Austrians, later Germans</td>
<td>Youth (All)</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = positively true, 2 = probably true, 3 = neither true nor false, 4 = probably false, 5 = certainly false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 1963</td>
<td>Degree of similarity, (Austrians are 100% similar or 100% different from Germans)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>100% similar or 100% different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 1963</td>
<td>Degree of similarity, individuals</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>Same poll as number 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

814. See Bruckmuller, p. 64.
<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>“Framing” of the Identity Groups</td>
<td>Demographic Group Polled</td>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>who feel that Austrians are more or less than 50% similar to, or different from, Germans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 1966</td>
<td>Austrian or German</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28% both, Table 5X, column 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. 1966</td>
<td>Austrian and/or German</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>Same as 5, Table 5X, column 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. 1980</td>
<td>“Which nation seems to you the most sympathetic”</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>Table 5X, column 7, Switzerland 11%, U.S. 4%, France 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. 1984</td>
<td>“Who do you feel most closely affiliated with:”</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>“German-speakers”, “Austrians”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. 1984</td>
<td>“Austrian national consciousness artificial, German nation”</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>13% very much, 25% partial (for column 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. 1984</td>
<td>Indirect, civic vs. ethno-cultural</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>48%–58%</td>
<td>48%–32%</td>
<td>Same as 14, 10% “cultural nation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. 1987</td>
<td>“Are you a German?”, if asked outside Austria</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6% Germans, 3% Austrian Germans, Table 5X, column 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. 1987</td>
<td>“Are you a German?”, German, provincial, etc.</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>27% provincial, 29% local, Table 5X, column 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. 1990</td>
<td>Indirect, civic vs. ethnic (“one language”)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>Table 5X, Column 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is unfortunate that there are no opinion polls about what makes one “really German in Austria”. However, Austrians were asked in 1995 what makes one a “real Austrian” (see Table 5’). The data indicates that Austria is both a political and a cultural nation. To some extent, this structures one’s research, even though, as we shall see, the data below does not represent the whole story. What the data suggests is that individuals who were not born in Austria or did not live most of their life there, who are not Austrian citizens, who do not speak German, are not Christian and do not respect Austrian political institutions and laws would have difficulties in being accepted as “real Austrians”.
Something that is not really proven by this data, but is suggested by this and other opinion polls, is that, in order to be accepted as a “real Austrian” by most Austrians, one should be a person of German mother tongue and Christian religion. Yet being an “Austrian” is, as we shall see, “not merely a German”, and, in most cases, not even “the member of a subgroup of Germans”.

Table 5’ Opinion Poll from 1995 – What Makes One “Really Austrian”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In order to be really Austrian, it is important</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important (Factor 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some-what (Important Factor 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important (Factors 1 and 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1… to have lived in Austria for the greater part of one’s life</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>integrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2…to be born in Austria</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>identificational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3… to be an Austrian citizen</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Integrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4… to be a Christian</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>identificational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5… to be able to speak German</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>Integrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6…to feel Austrian</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>identificational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7…to respect Austrian political institutions and laws</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>satisfactional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>54.29%</td>
<td>26.43%</td>
<td>80.71%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrative Dimension</td>
<td>60.67%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>86.67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactional Dimension</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identificational Dimension</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data shows that there has been an important switch in self-identification in general, and in primary self-identification in particular, from “German” to “Austrian” in post-1945 Austria. What we need to explain is the above-mentioned increase and decrease in the number of individuals with a German and an

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816. Nevertheless, the flag of the city of Vienna is a white flag on a red background. Moreover, the Viennese flag is so often seen in Vienna that the unknowledgeable observer might erroneously think that this is the Austrian flag. I am relying on my own observations from my trip to Austria, and primarily Vienna, in May-June 2004.

817. Nevertheless, the average Austrian identifies himself as a German-speaker.
Austrian identity in Austria, and of supporters of German and Austrian nationalism, during the period between around 1900 and the 1960’s. The sections below will deal with the independent variables.

3. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have discussed the evolution of the nation-building processes in the Austrian German-speaking case between 1907 and 1962 on the territory of Austria within its current boundaries. By 1970, unlike in 1964, the voters for all the important parties were mostly committed to the idea of an Austrian nation and Austrian nationalism. The process of nation-building during the Habsburg period (until 1918), in the Republic of Austria before 1933, and during the early part of the period of German Nazi rule (1938-1945) basically led to a German ethnonational identity shared by practically every member of the ethnic group. A majority of the German Austrians of present-day Austria shared both identities. The 1911 elections and other evidence suggest that the Austrian identity was more salient than the German one in most cases.

More than half of the population between 1918 and 1945 also shared the Austrian identity. The German ethnic nation-building process had the upper hand by 1938, but was unfinished. The German-speaking Austrians have subsequently undergone a process of identity change from a German identity (“Germanist”) combined with an Austrian one. The endpoint for a large majority of the population has been an exclusively Austrian identity (“Austrianist”) starting on a limited scale by 1945. It has continued on a more massive scale after 1945, and has continued until at least the 1980’s. By the mid-’60’s, the endpoint of this study, most Austrians thought that they were a part of the Austrian nation.

The German-speaking Austrians have subsequently undergone a process of identity change from a German identity (“Germanist”) combined with an Austrian identity. The endpoint for a large majority of the population has been an exclusively Austrian identity (“Austrianist”) starting by 1945. It has continued on a more a massive scale after 1945 until at least the 1980’s. By the mid-’60’s, the endpoint of this study, most Austrians thought that they were a part of the Austrian nation.

The sum of the intensity of nationalism scores for Austrian and German nationalism increased before World War I (from 3.88 in 1907 to 3.98 in 1911) and then decreased at the end of World War I.
After that, it increased during the interwar period (from 2.45 in 1919 to 3.36 in 1930) and decreased at the end of World War II. After that, it eventually became broadly stabilized in the 2.91 to 3.03 range by 1945-1962.

The dependent variable is the intensity of German nationalism, of Austrian nationalism, and, whenever and, wherever applicable, but less often, of provincial patriotism (Landespatriotismus) and of the ethnonationalism of the various ethnic minorities. I have de-emphasized the study of provincial patriotism and emphasize that of German and Austrian nationalism. As we shall see in this chapter and in chapter 11, the impact of the independent variables mostly supports my general model.
Chapter 11
Austria and the German-Speaking Austrians (1907-1962),
The Independent Variables

1. Introduction
2. The Independent Variables
   2.1. The Impact of the Independent Variables: The Ethnic Basis
   2.2. The Impact of the Independent Variables: The Educational System
   2.3. The Impact of the Independent Variables: Industrialization (and Urbanization)
   2.4. The Impact of the Independent Variables: Sudden Shocks
   2.5. Additional Explanations: The Impact of Voter Turnout and Political Actors, etc.
3.1. In-Depth Case Study: The Carinthian Case and German-Speaking Linguistic Nationalism
3.2. Case Studies: Ethnic Minorities, Ethnonationalists or Austrians? (With an Emphasis on the Carinthian Slovenes)
4. Conclusions
1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will explore the impact of the independent variables on the nation-building processes in the Austrian German-speaking case between 1907 and 1962 on the territory of present-day Austria. As expected, the agenda of the educational system, especially in terms of the teaching of history, had influenced the spread of Austrian and/or German identities and nationalisms. If Austrianism was taught in the classroom, the Austrian identity would predominate among those educated within that context. If Germanism was taught in the schools, the German identity would predominate among those educated within that environment. As expected, the higher the level of education, the more likely were the individuals to have a predominantly German identity and be more intensely nationalistic.

According to my model, one would expect industrialization to hinder nation-building. In practice this was sometimes the case, and sometimes not. While the default option might be that it hinders it, the evidence shows that it depends on the circumstances, including political actors. To some extent, this disconfirms my model.

The impact of sudden shocks is the expected one (massive shifts in self-determination options), with one twist. The loss of World War I and the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy altered the preferences of numerous German-Austrians in the direction of unification with Germany. A majority of the Austrian population, but only a majority of roughly three-fifths, not around 100%, then supported this self-determination option. However, the union with Germany was not consummated due to the victorious Entente states, who forbade it. The collapse of the Austrian clerical dictatorship and the Nazi German occupation of Austria in 1938, another sudden shock, facilitated the increase in support for union with Germany. The loss of World War II and the allied occupation of Austria in 1945 led to an immense increase in the level of popular support for separation from Germany. Both world wars have also decreased the sum of the intensity of nationalism scores for Austrian and German nationalism.

The empirical data of the Austrian case supports my model in every respect but one, for which the evidence is mixed, namely the impact of industrialization on nation-building.
2. The Impact of the Independent Variables: The Ethnic Basis

The evidence suggests that the ethnic basis played the expected important role in nation-building in Austria. German nationalism was the most intense in the areas, and among the groups, that were the closest to mainstream German patterns in terms of ethnic basis. One could note the greater spread and intensity of German nationalism among the Lutherans (a minority in Austria, a majority in Germany) than among Roman Catholics. As we shall see, all the dialects and sub-dialects have historically crossed the Austrian-German borders.

A much better way to frame the issue would be not the German sub-dialects of Germany, but the Central Austro-Bavarian dialect of most of Austria. Those speaking other sub-dialects were in fact less likely to be more intense Austrian nationalists and more likely to be intense German ones. Non-German speakers were not German nationalists. Finally, Austrian identities or self-identifications were correlated with Austrian nationalism, and German ones with German nationalism.

One of the independent variables in this study is the ethnic basis, which, as throughout this dissertation, has four dimensions, which will be presented in a table. The scores below are orientative and sketchy. Their purpose is more to demonstrate that the quantification of the ethnic basis is neither fully possible, nor completely impossible in terms of both theoretical quantification and measurement. With four sub-categories that could lead to a maximum score of 1, each one is worth 0.25.818 It would be useful, but it is not possible to distinguish between various types of individuals with a double German and Austrian identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Basis Elements</th>
<th>Intensity of Nationalism Score, by Categories and Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Intersubjective</td>
<td>Census Ethnic or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unrecognized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

818. Coding is not easy for the Jews, due to the immense differences between Zionists, German nationalists, etc., among them, due to the differences between those who spoke German and those who spoke Yiddish, but were counted as German-speaking.
Largely and in most respects, the ethnic basis has served as a facilitator for nation-building. At the most obvious level, in 1910, about 94% of the population of Austria in its current borders was ethnically German, or rather German-speaking. The proportion increased to 96% by 1923, and then to almost 98% by 1934.823 Yet the intersubjective ethnicity is only one aspect of the ethnic basis.

Another element of the ethnic basis was the dialects and sub-dialects (see Table 5’’). As one can see from the same table and from Map 5.1., the ethnic basis of the German-speaking population of Austria was not uniform in this respect. It was also somewhat different from that of the inhabitants of northern and central Germany. It was more different than among the various sub-dialects of the Romanian language discussed in previous chapters. The northern and central Germans have traditionally spoken other, not easily mutually comprehensible dialects (and have been overwhelmingly of the Lutheran religion).

819. The religious majority was Roman Catholic in the Austrian German-speaking case.
820. These include Old Catholics and Protestants in the Austrian German-speaking case.
821. This also includes Yiddish, which was counted in the Austrian censuses as “German”.
822. Including Austrian and German (in the Austrian case).
Table 5. March 7, 1923 and March 22, 1934 Austrian Census Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistic or Ethnic Category (Column)</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>Changes over 1923 (1923 = 100 %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 No.</td>
<td>2 Percentage</td>
<td>3 No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German-speakers</td>
<td>6,272,892</td>
<td>95.99%</td>
<td>6,584,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech-speakers</td>
<td>93,533</td>
<td>1.43%</td>
<td>42,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak-speakers</td>
<td>5,170</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>3,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb-speakers and Croatian-speakers</td>
<td>46,771</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
<td>42,354 (Croatian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovene-speakers</td>
<td>43,383</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
<td>31,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magyar-speakers</td>
<td>25,071</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>18,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>47,943</td>
<td>0.73%</td>
<td>23,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,534,763</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>6,745,863</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Of which) Jews (by religion)

The Austrian dialects and sub-dialects were broadly similar to those of southern Germany and Switzerland, and existed on both sides of the border. The dialect used in Vorarlberg and in a very small part of Tyrol (the Reutte Valley) is an Alemmanic dialect. It is identical to the one used in Liechtenstein and in the neighboring areas of Switzerland and, particularly in the past, in southwestern Germany.

The sub-dialects spoken in the rest of Austria have been broadly similar to the Bavarian (or Austro-Bavarian dialect), which has historically also been spoken in most of Bavaria. Standard German has later generally replaced the Bavarian dialect as the idiom used by the population in Bavaria after 1945. Therefore, whereas the German-Austrian border was not a linguistic, meaning sub-dialect, border in 1889, 1938 or 1945, it is to some extent one now.

It is nevertheless worth noting that the mainstream Austrian sub-dialect is the Central Austro-Bavarian one (see Map 5.1). It is used in Lower Austria (including a special variation in Vienna, which is seen by some as a special sub-dialect), Upper Austria, Salzburg and northern Burgenland. The sub-dialect

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of Tyrol (including Italian South Tyrol, Carinthia, Styria and southern Burgenland) is distinct from this “mainstream” speech in Austria.

Such differences in dialect could produce, and have produced, distinctions of the “us” and “them” type among speakers of the various sub-dialects. They are presumably at the root of the underrepresentation of southern Burgenlanders among elected representatives from the land.825

The areas whose populations have spoken “Central Austro-Bavarian”, which have traditionally also been used extensively across the German border, have traditionally voted in a less intensely German nationalist manner than those speaking “Southern Austro-Bavarian”. This is not consistent with the view that an ethnic basis closer to the final end-product facilitates nation-building, but to be unrelated to it, and perhaps in some way a type of disconfirming evidence. After all, the “Southern Austro-Bavarian” dialect is slightly further away from standard German than the “Central Austro-Bavarian” one.826 Yet the speakers of the Southern Austro-Bavarian dialect did not “naturally” worship Berlin more than those speaking the “Central Austro-Bavarian” one. They were rather more likely to keep their distance from Vienna and the Austrian federal government, and to have a stronger provincial identity.

This analysis is supported by both recent polling data (see Table 5C) and by the historical evidence. In interwar democratic Austria, for the members and sympathizers of the non-Marxist parties, that meant working with various operatives from interwar Germany, who were most often south Germans, including Bavarians, and who seemed more “helpful” than non-Marxist operatives from Vienna.

Yet, at some deeper level, the more nationalistic voting in the “Southern Austro-Bavarian” sub-dialect areas happened partly because of other reasons. The explanation is the more extensive conflicts with the ethnic Italians in Tyrol, and with the Slovenes in Carinthia and Syria, during the Habsburg period, and to some extent thereafter. This is proven by the fact that the non-German-speakers voted for their own nationalistic tickets or, much less commonly, for less nationalistic German-Austrian ones. Yet this does not help account for Burgenland patterns. The “Southern Austro-Bavarian” sub-dialect populations of southern

825. Just like in other cases similar cases in other parts of the world, there is, or at least I have encountered, an Austrian reluctance to talk about these kinds of things.
Burgenland voted in a more intensely nationalistic manner than those in the northern “Central Austro-Bavarian” ones.

The preceding discussion refers to the pre-1945 period. After 1945, the increasing differentiation between the various Austrian areas of both Austro-Bavarian sub-dialects from areas of Bavaria that had traditionally had the same sub-dialect, and from Germany in general, in terms of this aspect of the ethnic basis was important. It has helped increase the feeling of differentiation between the Austrian and the German nations. In the more parochial atmosphere of Austria, the inhabitants have been more likely to continue speaking their own idioms as opposed to the standard language than the inhabitants in Germany have. By contrast, and particularly in the Bavarian context, most inhabitants of that German Land up to the Austrian border now speak standard “High German”. On a different note, the Austrian polity has been more inclusive and apparently non-discriminatory after 1945 than before, even in terms of sub-dialect.

There is also a third dimension of the ethnic basis of Austrian and German nation-building among the Austrian population. In a nutshell, for many Roman Catholics, and particularly the more religious among them, their religion was their politics. The manifestation of this was the political Catholicism of the Christian Social Party and even the dominant trend in the post-war Austrian People’s Party. This was particularly true among the German-speakers, who have been more likely to be Austrian patriots.

This political Catholicism was not unique to Austrian Catholic German-speakers. Just like in most of Germany, with the exception of those territories that had been Prussian starting in the 18th century, especially Silesia, the German Catholics have been less likely to be intense German nationalists than the German Lutherans. It is also noteworthy that at some points in time during the interwar period, the desire for union with democratic (Weimar) Germany was also common among Austrian Jews. It was often more widespread among the members of this group, who sometimes voted mostly for the Social Democrats, than among the Austrian Catholics. During the entire interwar period, a majority of the Austrian electorate voted for anti-Jewish tickets, whether of the Roman Catholic or Pan-German type. By contrast, until well into the Great Depression, most of the voters of Germany did not vote for anti-Jewish tickets.
In 1910, 94.11% of the population living on the territory of present-day Austria was Roman Catholic, 2.99% Jewish and 2.6% Protestant. Historically, the old German-Austrian border was not a religious border, or even a border between two levels of religiosity. To be sure, the nineteenth century rural population was made up of observant Roman Catholics on both sides of the border. Yet the percentage of the devout, pro-clerical Roman Catholic population in Austria within its previous borders was probably larger than in Bavaria.

The majority of the Roman Catholics in Bavaria (71.2%) in 1871, although overwhelming, was small enough to allow for the union of Bavaria with the rest of Germany. This union occurred with the support of a majority of the Bavarian population and slightly more than two-thirds of the members of the lower house of the Bavarian legislature, but not of most Bavarian Roman Catholics, and particularly of the pro-clerical ones. A factor facilitating cultural differentiation between Austria and Germany was the fact that religious belief (Christian beliefs) and practice (e.g., going to mass often) has decreased faster in the latter than in the former country.

In modern times, Roman Catholics have always represented more than 90% of the population of Austria in its current borders. As a rule, in the cases of those individuals in which the standard (Roman Catholic) religious element of the ethnic basis was not present, in the sense that the inhabitants were without any religion, the incidence of support for the Marxists was higher. Therefore, as I have show elsewhere in this chapter, less intensely nationalistic voting (as determined by the sum of the scores of the intensity of German and Austrian nationalism) was more common among the members of this category.

The inhabitants without a religion represented 1.6% of the Austrian population, including 4% of the Viennese population, in 1934. In the November 1930 parliamentary elections, the Socialists obtained 58% of all the Viennese votes. In the nine districts with more than 4% of individuals without a religion, the Socialists obtained more than 58%. In the 6 districts in which the inhabitants without religion represented less than 3.2% of the inhabitants, the Socialists were in a minority. In the three districts where more than 5% of all the inhabitants were without a confession, the Socialists obtained a majority of three-quarters of the vote. The Viennese Jews were also particularly likely to vote in favor of the Socialists. The other

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district in which three-quarters of the voters voted for the Socialists had a Jewish population of 15%.\textsuperscript{829}

Just like in Germany (and in Saarland when it was separated from Germany, as well as in Alsace-Lorraine between 1870 and 1940, regardless of whether the area was ruled by Germany or France), it was different with the Protestants. The Protestants were more likely to vote for more intensely nationalistic tickets (regardless of the national orientation, even though the Lutherans uniformly preferred German nationalism), before World War II. Only 4.4% of the population of Austria was Protestant in 1934. Due to the migration to Austria of a large number of ethnic German refugees expelled from Communist Eastern Europe, the percentage increased to 6.2% in 1951 and 1961 (5.98% Lutherans and 0.22% Calvinists in the latter year). Out of 4,000 Austrian communities, 65 were mostly Protestant in 1934 and 68 in 1951, and they voted differently than the mostly Catholic communities.

It is noteworthy that the overwhelming majority of the Protestant votes were cast for the German national camp in 1930. This is particularly apparent in the agrarian land of Burgenland, which was 14% Protestant. Out of 44 communities with Protestant majorities in the province, 24 voted mostly for the German national camp. By contrast, in only 12 out of the 192 other (Roman Catholic) communities did most electors vote for the German national camp tickets. Outside the Burgenland, this pattern was even more visible (see Table 5B1). The pattern became less pronounced after 1945. Thus, in 1951, the German national camp obtained more votes in Roman Catholic communities and fewer in Protestant ones than in 1930.

Nevertheless, in 1930, 1949 and 1951, in a large majority of the cases, and in 1953, in a sizable majority of the cases, the “national camp” outpolled the “conservative camp” in these Protestant communities (see Table 5B1). By contrast, the conservative camp heavily outpolled the “German national” one nationwide (see Table 5B2).\textsuperscript{830}


Another element of the national or ethnic basis has been self-identification. According to an opinion poll from April 1956, 49% of the population of Austria said that it was a part of the “Austrian people”, 46% of the “German people” and 4% did not know. In May 1956, between roughly 14% and 16% of the population that identified itself as being a part of the “German people” in the various lands voted for the German Nationalist Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) (see Table 5C2).

Table 5A. Percentage of “nationalistic” votes in the 21 Austrian Protestant Communities outside the Burgenland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalist Percentage of the Votes</th>
<th>Number of Communities, by Election Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalistic Majority of 98%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalistic Majority of 2/3 or more</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalistic Majority of 51% or more</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5B1. The Proportion of “Nationalistic” to Conservative Votes in the 21 Mostly Austrian Protestant Communities outside Burgenland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalist Percentage of the Votes</th>
<th>Number of Communities, by Election Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 : 1 or more</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 : 1 or more</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1 : 1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 : 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 : 1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 : 2 or less</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 5.1. The Dialect Areas of the German Language

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831. This refers to the cases in which the percentages of the votes for the nationalistic camp were at least 5 times larger than the percentages of votes for other camps.

832. See [http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e9/GermanDialectAreas.png](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e9/GermanDialectAreas.png)
Table 5B2. Percentage of All the Votes in All of Austria by Political Camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Camp</th>
<th>Number of Communities, by Election/Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“National”</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Conservative”</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A large number of inhabitants have historically displayed local and provincial, "Austrian" and “German”, that is, multiple, identities before 1945. Historically, the average Austrian’s chief emotional attachment was never primarily to “Austria” or “Germany”, but to his hometown or “Province / Land / Bundesland / Federal Land” (see Table 5C.).

As we have seen, during the Habsburg period, most German-speaking Austrians displayed dynastic patriotism. The “non-historical”, “neo-Austrian” post-1918 and especially post-1945 identity would be clearly accepted, but not be embraced as a primary identity. Nor would the main feature of the “German tradition” of the late nineteenth century, when the provincial identity was more important than the national one, be rejected. An added advantage was the fact that the provincial identity would be more useful for a “German-speaking” or even “German” identity and nationalistic agenda. This line could work in support of South Tyrol autonomism within the Italian state, of the desire to unite that area with Austria, or of the “fight” against Slovene nationalism in Carinthia. Not surprisingly, it has been precisely in these two “lands” (Tyrol and Carinthia) that a clear majority of the population displayed a primary identification with their Bundesland.

There were two other provinces in which the most widespread primary emotional identification, namely Styria and Vorarlberg (see Table 5C.). What these provinces had in common was

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834. Thaler, p. 179.
their sub-dialects or dialects, which were different from the “core Austrian” speech, the Central Austro-Bavarian dialect.

A corollary of this phenomenon is that only in most of the former zone of Soviet occupation in Austria from 1945 to 1955 did the “Austrian” identity seem to win out over other identities. It was precisely in this area (Lower Austria, probably Vienna, perhaps Burgenland and a minority of Upper Austria) that the “social engineering” associated with extreme Austrianism has been more successful. The electoral results discussed later in this chapter will demonstrate this. In the other areas, the old pre-nation-building primary identities asserted themselves. For most of these inhabitants, except in Carinthia and occasionally Styria, German identity and nationalism had historically been weak, a secondary, not a primary identity, as is the Austrian identity and nationalism right now. The reversal of German nation-building meant to a large extent “provincialization”.

Table 5C. Primary Emotional Identification to Territorial Units in 1987\textsuperscript{835}, by Land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Primary Identity</th>
<th>Vienna</th>
<th>Lower Austria</th>
<th>Burgenland</th>
<th>Tyrol</th>
<th>Carinthia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Federal Land</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Austria</td>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgenland</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrol</td>
<td>(Central)-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Central)-</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Primary Identity</th>
<th>Vorarlberg</th>
<th>Styria</th>
<th>Upper Austria</th>
<th>Salzburg</th>
<th>Austria (All Lander)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Federal Land</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Austria</td>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgenland</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrol</td>
<td>(Central)-</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{835} Bruckmuller, p. 67.
Table 5C2. Opinion Poll on Identification (April 1956) and the Electoral Performance of the German Nationalists (May 1956)\textsuperscript{836} in Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas (Provinces or Clusters of Provinces)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) (German Nationalists)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>2.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Austria, Burgenland</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>2.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Austria, Salzburg</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>8.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styria, Carinthia</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>9.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrol, Vorarlberg</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>7.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(All of) Austria</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>6.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna, Lower Austria, Burgenland</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>4.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria without Vienna</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>6.50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evidence suggests that the ethnic basis played the expected important role in nation-building in Austria. In terms of the ethnic basis, German nationalism was the most intense in the areas, and among the groups, that were the closest to mainstream German patterns in terms of ethnic basis. One could note the greater spread and intensity of German nationalism among the Lutherans (a minority in Austria, a majority in Germany) than among Roman Catholics. As we shall see, all the dialects and sub-dialects have historically crossed the Austrian-German borders.

A much better way to frame the issue would be not the German sub-dialects of Germany, but the Central Austro-Bavarian dialect of most of Austria. Those speaking other sub-dialects were in fact less likely to be more intense Austrian nationalists and more likely to be intense German ones. Non-German speakers were not German nationalists. Finally, Austrian identities or self-identifications were correlated with Austrian nationalism, and German ones with German nationalism.

### 2.2. The Impact of the Independent Variables: The Educational System

So my model on the impact of the educational system is confirmed in this respect, in reference to both the contents of the curriculum and the level of the educational system. The emphasis on various identities and loyalties in the school explain their distribution in society. The greater emphasis on German identities and loyalties in the pre-1938 post-elementary schools than in the elementary schools explains the greater prevalence of the German identity and nationalism among the more educated population in 1956.

The educational system seems to have been very important in influencing national identity (see tables 5C3, 5.4, etc.). The elementary educational system during the imperial period promoted both loyalty toward the Kaiser (emperor) and patriotism toward the Austrian fatherland. It did not promote
“nationalism” toward any Austrian cultural nation as an imagined community. To a lesser extent, it fostered
loyalty toward one’s German ethnic nation. The secondary and post-secondary school system emphasized “Germanness” more than “Austrianness”.

As one can see, the overwhelmingly Austrian (65%) as opposed to German (26%) identity of the population born until 1896 (see Table 5.4) is consistent with what we would expect from an educational system that emphasized “Austria” more than “Germanism” (see Table 5C3). In the case of those who were born between 1896 and 1916, the figures were evenly matched (48% and 48%). They indicate the greater proportion of individuals for whom their German identity was more salient than their Austrian one who were educated during the First Republic.

The generation born between 1916 and 1938 and afterwards was educated in the Austrian Republic, in Nazi Germany and in the post-World War II Second Republic. About 51% of them identified themselves as “Germans” and 44% as Austrians. Keeping in mind that, as we shall see, most of the members of this latter group were educated in a system that promoted German identity and nationalism, a majority of them shared a paramount German identity.

One also observes the fact that throughout the late Habsburg period, and especially during the period of the First Republic, the post-elementary education was ideologically different from the elementary one. It was more intensely German nationalist in ideological content and more favorable toward a paramount German identity, even, during the First Republic, advocating union with Germany (see Tables 5C3 and 5.4). By contrast, the Habsburg-era elementary schools emphasized Austrian patriotism over German nationalism. It is noteworthy that even the interwar elementary textbooks presented both an Austrianist and a Germanist historical perspective in the textbooks. This allowed the teachers to select and emphasize whichever perspective they preferred, and exposed the students to both.

The First Republic was an era of educational innovation. One should also note the fact that there was an attempt by the interwar Socialists to make education and the educational system more “popular” or

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837. By contrast, in the Bukovinian Romanian case, the teachers promoted ethnic loyalties more intensely than dynastic loyalty and especially Austrian patriotism.
838. This is not to deny the obvious fact that many inhabitants thought that they were both “Austrian” and “Germans”, but what the polled individuals found the most important.
839. However, the members of no age group listed by the pollsters received all of their education under the Second Republic.
840. See Suval, p. 196-197.
“democratic” and less “structured” than previously. As a result, elementary (but not post-elementary) school teaching was conducted overwhelmingly in the various dialects and sub-dialects of Austria.

By contrast, standard German (with a few standardized Austrian peculiarities) had been used for teaching purposes during the Habsburg period. It was correctly assumed that the dialects and sub-dialects were the forms of the German language with which the overwhelming majority of the students were the most familiar. However, the decision was controversial.841

Without necessarily hindering German nation-building per se, the fact that standard German was the predominant idiom in use only in the post-elementary system in Austria, as opposed to the entire educational system in Germany, had an important impact. It decreased the ability of the less educated Austrians passing through the educational system to speak and write standard German correctly. It is also related to the continued persistence of the Austrian and provincial identities among the less educated and rural populations.

The Socialist attempt to train “citizens of a democratic republic”, including through “Heimat- und Lebenskunde” (meaning roughly “Homeland and Life Habits”), spread what I would call “civic loyalty” among Austria’s population, leaving a place for a German ethnic identity too.842 The net result of the entire educational system was to encourage a German identity for those with a post-elementary education. It promoted an Austrian identity in the elementary school system.

These interwar patterns were reflected in the first comprehensive post-World War II polls. They explain why in 1956 those with only an elementary education (who also tended to be older) were more likely to have an Austrian primary identity (58%) than a German one (33%). The percentage of individuals with a German identity increased as the educational level increased (51% for middle school and 58% for finished high school or college).

The occupational statistics indicate the same trend. The independents (self-employed) and the professionals, the most highly educated groups, had the highest percentage of self-styled Germans (61%).

841. “The idea of accustomed environment was partly that the break between home and school should be as gradual as possible… Since almost all the youngsters entered school speaking a dialect, it was utilized as the basis of instruction in language and grammar.” See Charles A. Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler (vol. 1, Labor’s Workshop of Democracy) (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1948), p. 561. The use of local idioms in teaching was opposed by the German national camp and by some from the Christian Social camp.

842. Gulick, vol. 1, p. 561-563. I would like to thank Elizabeth Anderson for the term “civic loyalty”.

The group with the second highest proportion of self-styled “Germans” was the clerks (48%). Then came those employed in agricultural occupations (37%) and then the workers (32%) (see Table 5.4). As we have seen in the Romanian cases, the agriculturists, who were somewhat less likely to have reached a threshold of education than the working class, have tended to be more intensely nationalistic than the latter. So my model on the impact of the educational system is confirmed in this respect.

Table 5C3. The Content of Teaching in Austria from the Late Habsburg Period until the Postwar Period (by Importance or Priorities)\(^{843}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronological Period and Educational Level</th>
<th>Language (as Subject, Religion*)</th>
<th>National History Textbook Contents</th>
<th>National Geography Textbook Contents</th>
<th>Political Loyalty Promoted</th>
<th>National Identity Promoted</th>
<th>Level of Success (“Yes” = Y; “Semi-successful” = SS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late Habsburg (elementary schools)</td>
<td>German (standard), Yes*</td>
<td>Austrian history, German history.</td>
<td>Austria &amp; Monarchy, geography</td>
<td>Fatherland (Austria) Germans, province</td>
<td>Austrians, Germans, Provincials</td>
<td>Y/Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Habsburg (secondary and post-secondary)</td>
<td>German, Yes*</td>
<td>German history, Habsburg Monarchy history</td>
<td>Austrian and Habsburg Monarchy geography</td>
<td>Germans, Fatherland (Austria), province</td>
<td>Germans, Austrians, Provincials</td>
<td>Y/SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Republic, democracy 1919-1933/1934 (elementary)</td>
<td>German, (dialect) Yes* (not Vienna)</td>
<td>German history, Austrian history (or reverse)</td>
<td>Austria, Germany</td>
<td>Germans, Fatherland (or reverse), province</td>
<td>Germans, Austrians, Germans, (or reverse), and, to a lesser extent, provinces</td>
<td>Y/Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Republic, democracy 1919-1933/1934 (secondary)</td>
<td>German, Yes* (less in most provinces, not Vienna)</td>
<td>German history, including Austrian Fatherland</td>
<td>Austria and other German areas</td>
<td>Germans, Fatherland (Austria)</td>
<td>Germans, no Austrian culture, and, to a lesser extent, provinces</td>
<td>Y/Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian period (1934-1938)</td>
<td>German, yes</td>
<td>Austrian history, Catholic Germans</td>
<td>Austria and other Germans</td>
<td>Fatherland, Germans</td>
<td>Austrians, Germans</td>
<td>Y/Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Dolfuss - Schuschnigg clerical regime promoted an increased emphasis on teaching Austrian patriotism. In the German Nazi educational curriculum, there was a great deal of emphasis on nationalism (and racism), and there was no discussion of the differences between Austrians and (other) Germans. Religious instruction, already removed from Vienna schools by the Socialists during the democratic period of 1919-1933, was also discontinued.

In the first few years of the Second Republic, Austrian schools avoided calling language instruction in the German language “instruction in German”. The country’s official language was called “the language of instruction” from 1945 until the early 1950’s. This widely seen as ridiculous, and it did not help Austrian nation-building. The “language of instruction” was nicknamed “Hurdestanisch” after the

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844. Most of this period is not covered in my text in depth.
845. This period is not covered in my text in depth.

Other elements of Austrian nation-building were more successful, but the techniques grossly violated human rights. “Whether on the right or the left, politicians and journalists vigorously promoted the idea of the Austrian nation, and academicians discovered new sources and reinterpreted old ones in order to document a sense of Austrian identity separate and distinct from that of Germany. German was equated with Prussian and then in turn with pan-Germanism and Nazism. To argue that Austrians were part of a culturally transcendent, even if politically divided, German nation was to risk charges of neo-Nazism. An example of the ludicrous extremes to which this effort to distance Austria from the Germans, was the insistence by the ÖVP Minister of Education, Felix Hurdes, that school classes in composition and grammar be called “Instruction in Language” [Unterrichtssprache] rather than “Instruction in German” [Deutschunterricht]. Wags dubbed this new “Austrian” language Hurdestanisch.”847

There is a consensus that the teaching of Austrian history and geography, and the promotion of Austrian citizenship through school after 1945 has helped Austrian-nation-building. A lot of the “patriotic” history was propagandistic. Some of the key myths were that Austria was Hitler’s first victim. The textbooks understated the level of popular support that had existed for union with Germany between 1918 and 1945 and exaggerated the importance and impact of the anti-Nazi resistance. There was an omission of the discussion of the role of individual Austrians, and of the Austrians in general, in the Holocaust. The Nazi genocide against the Jews was de-emphasized in the Austrian textbooks in comparison to the ones used in Germany. These educational practices were responsible for many of the popular myths and, indirectly, for the survival of anti-Semitism.

So my model on the impact of the educational system is confirmed in this respect, in reference to both the content and the level of the educational system. The emphasis on various identities and loyalties in the school explain their distribution in society. The greater emphasis on German identities and loyalties in the pre-1938 post-elementary schools than in the elementary schools explains the greater prevalence of the German identity and nationalism among the more educated population in 1956.

847. For more information on Felix Hurdes’ tenure as General Secretary of the Austrian People’s Party (currently in power in Austria) in 1945-1951 and his status as minister of education as Minister of Education between 1945 and 1952, see http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Felix_Hurdes.
2.3. The Impact of the Independent Variables: Industrialization (and Urbanization)

Industrialization has hindered nation-building more than it has helped it, but there have been so many exceptions that generalizations would be hazardous. The same could be said about urbanization, except that it has hindered nation-building even less than industrialization.

It is fortunate that in the Austrian case we could test the impact of industrialization as distinct from urbanization on nation-building. Since the Austrian data on this topic is so vast, I will present only a part of the data. However, the rest of the numbers for the other years are also consistent with the patterns discussed below. What needs to be noted is that industry has been Austria’s main economic sector for a long period. Thus, 31.1% of the Austrian population was employed in industry and crafts in 1934 (see Table 5D).

Industrialization, and, for the most part, urbanization, mostly hindered, but sometimes aided German nation-building and nation-building in general, whether German or Austrian. It should be noted that in 1927, the sum of the scores of the intensity of “German” and “Austrian” nationalism decreased as the size of the localities, as measured by the number of inhabitants, increased. The larger the locality, the less intense was nationalism (see Table 5.1). The relationship at the time of the 1930 elections was just the opposite. The larger the number of inhabitants in a locality, the higher was the intensity of nationalism.

Yet one should differentiate between German and Austrian nationalism. Whereas the intensity of German nationalism was going up as the size of the locality was increasing in 1930, it was just the opposite for Austrian nationalism (see Table 5.2). For the 1949 elections, there is no clear relationship between the intensity of nationalism in general and locality size. However, as the size of the locality went up, the intensity of German nationalism also went up. By contrast, the intensity of Austrian nationalism went down as the size of the locality increased (see Table 5.3).

Table 5D. Population Distribution by Economic Sector in Austria in 1934, According to the Census Data

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848. See Evan Burr Bukey, *Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945* (Chapel Hill and
### Economic Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sector</th>
<th>Census 1934</th>
<th>Census 1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture and forestry</td>
<td>1,842,450</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industry and crafts</td>
<td>2,100,461</td>
<td>31.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Trade and commerce</td>
<td>1,019,034</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Public and private services</td>
<td>452,779</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the same as 5 + 6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Free professions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Civil service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Domestic service</td>
<td>193,375</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Nondependents without an</td>
<td>1,152,134</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occupation (pensioners, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Total</td>
<td>6,760,233</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Industry and crafts/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals with an</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation [2/(10-9)]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a rule, in the case of overlapping and competing nationalisms in a “sub-ethnic ethnic majority state”, with all things being equal, the intensity of nationalism associated with the “larger” identity has in most cases increased with urbanization. The German identity was “larger”/”broader”/”less parochial” than the Austrian one in this case until the 1960’s.849

Even more important are the differences within Austria. In Romania and Ukraine, and even in Austrian Bukovina, there have been many mixed electoral precincts (partly urban, partly rural). By contrast, the Austrian republican statistical service has good data on the votes for various parties by types of localities, including for 1927, 1930 and 1949.

### Table 5.1. The Electoral Results for the 1927 Parliamentary Elections (Lower House), by Political Parties, Locality Size and Gender, by Percentages of the Vote and Intensity of Nationalism Scores850

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849. The situation is similar in the case of the “Moldovan” and “Romanian” identities in the Republic of Moldova.


### Political Parties and Percentages of the Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Unity List</th>
<th>Social Democrats</th>
<th>Agrarian Liberal German Nationalists</th>
<th>Estimated Intensity of Austrian Nationalism</th>
<th>Estimated Intensity of German Nationalism</th>
<th>Estimated Intensity of Austrian and German Nationalism (columns 5+7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 2,000</td>
<td>Male 858</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 2,000</td>
<td>Female 859</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-5,000</td>
<td>All 860</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-5,000</td>
<td>Male 861</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-5,000</td>
<td>Female 862</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-5,000</td>
<td>All 863</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>Male 864</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>Female 865</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>All 866</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-20,000</td>
<td>Male 867</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Intensity of Nationalism Scores or Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Unity List</th>
<th>Social Democrats</th>
<th>Agrarian Liberal German Nationalists</th>
<th>Estimated Intensity of Austrian Nationalism</th>
<th>Estimated Intensity of German Nationalism</th>
<th>Estimated Intensity of Austrian and German Nationalism (columns 5+7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.37</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes

- **851.** This was a common list of the conservative Christian Social Party and of most of the Pan-Germans.
- **852.** Social Democratic Party.
- **853.** The ticket was called “The Agrarian Union for Austria”.
- **854.** The estimated intensity of Austrian nationalism score.
- **855.** This “Nationalistic/Bourgeois Parties’’ group includes not only the German bourgeois parties, regardless of the intensity of nationalism, typically German, but also the “Imperial Loyalty People’s Party”, and the Slovene and Jewish nationalistic parties. As a rule, these political forces perceived nationalism in a positive light.
- **856.** The estimated intensity of German nationalism score.
- **857.** The sum of the scores of the estimated intensities of German and Austrian nationalism, excluding the minor political parties, for which there is no data by locality size.
- **858.** Male.
- **859.** Female.
- **860.** “All inhabitants”, including both males and females.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Localities (by number of inhabitants)</th>
<th>Political Parties and Percentages of the Vote</th>
<th>Intensity of Nationalism Scores or Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Unity List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-20,000 Females</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-20,000 All</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20,000 (without Vienna) Males</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20,000 (without Vienna) Females</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20,000 (without Vienna) All</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Males</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Females</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna All</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria Males</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria Females</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria All</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of German Nationalism All</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of Austrian Nationalism All</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

861. This was a common list of the conservative Christian Social Party and of most of the Pan-Germans.
862. Social Democratic Party.
863. The ticket was called “The Agrarian Union for Austria”.
864. The estimated intensity of Austrian nationalism score.
865. This “Nationalistic/Bourgeois Parties” group includes not only the German bourgeois parties, regardless of the intensity of nationalism, typically German, but also the “Imperial Loyalty People’s Party”, and the Slovene and Jewish nationalistic parties. As a rule, these political forces perceived nationalism in a positive light.
866. The estimated intensity of German nationalism score.
867. The sum of the scores of the estimated intensities of German and Austrian nationalism, excluding the minor political parties, for which there is no data by locality size.
Table 5.2. The Electoral Results for the 1930 Parliamentary Elections (Lower House), by (Major) Political Party, Locality Size and Gender, by Percentages of the Votes and Intensity of Nationalism Scores $^{868}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Localities (by number of inhabitants)</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Social Democrats $^{869}$</th>
<th>Christian Socials $^{870}$</th>
<th>Agrarian Liberal German Nationalists $^{871}$</th>
<th>Semi-fascist Heimatblock $^{872}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 2,000</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 2,000</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 2,000</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-5,000</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-5,000</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-5,000</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-20,000</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-20,000</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-20,000</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20,000 (without Vienna)</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20,000 (without Vienna)</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20,000 (without Vienna)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Females</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{869}$ Social Democratic Party.
$^{870}$ The Christian Social Party.
$^{871}$ The ticket was called “The National Economic Bloc and the Agrarian League”. The two forces represented the democratic, non-Nazi, Pan-Germans.
$^{872}$ The semi-fascist, paramilitary Heimat Bloc.
$^{873}$ Male.
$^{874}$ Female.
$^{875}$ “All”, including both males and females.
### Political Parties and Percentages of the Votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Localities (by number of inhabitants)</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Social Democrats</th>
<th>Christian Socials</th>
<th>Agrarian Liberal German Nationalists</th>
<th>Semi-fascist Heimatblock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intensity of German Nationalism</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

### Intensity of Nationalism Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Localities (by number of inhabitants)</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Intensity of German Nationalism (column 7)</th>
<th>Fascist, Nationalistic parties (columns 4 + 5)</th>
<th>Intensity of Austrian Nationalism (columns 1+4)</th>
<th>Intensity of Austrian and German Nationalism (columns 6+8)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 2,000</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.21</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>1.09</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>3.13</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>3.19</td>
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<td>23</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20,000 (without Vienna)</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20,000 (without Vienna)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>2.225</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>3.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>2.575</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>3.605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

876. This is the sum of the votes for a major German nationalistic ticket and for a major semi-fascist party.
877. Male.
878. Female.
879. “All”, including both males and females.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Localities (by number of inhabitants)</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Intensity of German Nationalism (column 7)</th>
<th>Intensity of Fascist, Nationalistic parties (columns 4 + 5)</th>
<th>Intensity of Austrian Nationalism (columns 1 + 4)</th>
<th>Intensity of Austrian and German Nationalism (columns 6 + 8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Females</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna All</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria Males</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria Females</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.045</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>3.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria All</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As one can see in the table below, the working class was much more likely than the rest of the population to vote for the non-nationalistic Socialists and Communists in 1926-1927, 1949 and 1953-1954. This is demonstrated by comparing the electoral results for the Austrian Labor Chambers and those for the lower house of the Austrian parliament. This was particularly true during the interwar period (see especially tables 5C3, and, indirectly, 5.1. and 5.2).

Table 5.3. The Electoral Results for the 1949 Parliamentary Elections (Lower House), by Political Party, Locality Size and Gender by Percentages of the Votes and Intensity of Nationalism Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality size (by number of inhabitants)</th>
<th>Political Parties and Percentages of the Votes</th>
<th>Intensity of Nationalism Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austrian People’s Party</td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 500</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-1,000</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-2,000</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-5,000</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

881. Social Democratic Party.
882. The ticket was called “The National Economic Bloc and the Agrarian League”. The two forces represented the democratic Pan-Germans.
883. The semi-fascist, paramilitary Heimat Bloc.
884. This is the sum of the scores of the estimated intensities of German and Austrian nationalism.
The level of support for the German national camp in 1949, as represented by the Union of Independents, increased with the level of urbanization. It performed neither better nor worse among the general electorate than in the Labor Chamber elections. This was because it was stronger among those groups of the urban population that were not industrial workers.

Table 5C3. Votes in Austrian Labor Chambers and Parliamentary Elections Compared, by Year and Type of Elections, by Percentages of the Votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Socialists</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Communists</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Socialists</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Peter Katzenstein has noted that the interwar industry/industrialists were opposed to the Austrian union with Germany. In 1931, “Austria’s chambers of commerce voted against the customs union [with Germany – Ionas Rus] by a margin of four to one."\(^{886}\) Largely because of this, the Austrian-German trade negotiations during the 1920’s were difficult. They were sometimes suspended due to a complete breakdown.\(^{887}\)

**Table 5C4. Chamber of Labor Elections Compared to Elections for the Lower House of the Parliament, by Percentages of the Votes**\(^{888}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>1 + 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. OeVP</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. VDU/FPO</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Anti-Socialists</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Manual Workers (Blue-collar), 1949</th>
<th>Salaried Workers (White-collar), 1949</th>
<th>Labor Chamber (All), 1949</th>
<th>(Lower House) Parliamentary, 1949</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Socialists | 66.5%
| 2. Communists | 66.5% |
| 3. Socialists + Communists (1 + 2) | 77.5% |
| 4. OeVP | 10.6 | 28.5 | 14.2% | 44% |
| 5. VDU/FPO | 11.9 | 16.7 | 12% | 12% |
| 6. Anti-Socialists | 22.5 | 45.2 | 22.5% | 56% |

---

\(^{886}\) Katzenstein, *Disjointed*, p. 151.

\(^{887}\) Katzenstein, *Disjointed*, p. 151.

\(^{888}\) The data on the Chambers of Labor elections are from Shell, p. 74.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Chamber of Labor</th>
<th>Parliamen-</th>
<th>Chamber of Labor</th>
<th>Parliamen-</th>
<th>Chamber of Labor</th>
<th>Parliamen-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>50.15</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>52.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Austria</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>39.89</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>42.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgenland</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>44.66</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>46.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styria</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>41.11</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>45.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>48.10</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>50.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Austria</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>38.38</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>41.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>35.41</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>38.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrol</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>29.25</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>31.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>22.66</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>30.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>42.11</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>44.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Percentage of the votes in favor of the Socialist Party of Austria (SPO), by election type and year, and by Type of Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chamber of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Austria</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgenland</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styria</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Austria</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrol</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Industrialization has hindered nation-building more than it has helped it, but there have been so many exceptions that generalizations would be hazardous. The same could be said about urbanization, except that it has hindered nation-building even less than industrialization.

2.4. The Impact of the Independent Variables: Sudden Shocks
Sudden shocks have led to swift changes in self-determination options in Austria, in favor of union with Germany in 1918 and 1938, and in favor of Austrian independence in 1945.

The impact of sudden shocks is more complex. The war of 1866 led to Austria’s exclusion from Germany, but it was not a sudden shock. It is obvious that the Austrian loss of the war of 1866 by the Habsburg Monarchy led to Prussian hegemony in Germany, and to Austria’s exclusion from Bismarck’s new “smaller” Germany. The North German Confederation was created under Prussian leadership. The Franco-German War of 1870-1871 led to the union of southern Germany, including Bavaria, with the north.

Another sudden shock, World War I and the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy on November 11, 1918, led to the proclamation of the independence of “German Austria” on November 12, 1918, and to the declaration that it will form a part of the German Republic. The Entente did not allow the union of Austria with Germany. Yet during the February 16, 1919 elections, the number of Austrian lands whose population voted mostly for clearly pro-Anschluss (and thus pro-Germanist/pro-German nationalist) tickets was greater than ever.

While there were no opinion polls in 1918, the subsequent opinion polls tentatively allow us to ascertain the strength of republicanism, monarchism and of the Austrian and German national orientations in April 1956, and in the case of the older inhabitants, in previous periods. As the opinion polling data shows, a large majority of those born until 1896, who were adults at the time of the change of the regime, had an “Austrian” (65%) rather than “German” (26%) identity (see Table 5.4).

The inhabitants who tended to be less educated (women, those with only an elementary education, the older inhabitants, etc.) were as a rule more likely to have an “Austrian” as opposed to a “German” identity as well as to be in favor of the restoration of the (Habsburg) monarchy. The greater propensity of men to vote for pro-Anschluss (or pro-Germanist) parties was greater than that of women at any time before or since.

The impact of the war seems obvious; those who had fought in the war were more likely to hold these attitudes. While it is impractical to do an in-depth “micro” study on this topic, it is a well-documented fact that the Social Democratic leaders who had fought in the war were more in favor of union with Germany (e.g., Otto Bauer), and that this was sometimes also true among the Christian Socials. The fact
that many peasants lost their horses because they were requisitioned for the army turned them against the
monarchy, but not in favor of union with Germany. The 35% of the population born before 1896 that
favored the restoration of the monarchy in 1956 had been smaller than the percentage that voted for
political formations that did not advocate union with Germany in 1919.

It is noteworthy that a majority of the females, inhabitants over 40, agriculturists, independents
and free professionals, and Austrian People’s Party supporters who had an “Austrian” identity were
monarchists. Most Austrian patriots during the First Republic, including most voters for the Christian
Socials, were also monarchists.

The occupation of Austria by Nazi Germany in March 1938 was another sudden shock that, as we
have seen, led to an increase in the support in favor of unification with Nazi Germany. I have already
suggested that in a plebiscite before the entrance of the German forces in Austria, about 39% of the
population would have voted in favor of union with Germany, as a form of “national unification with the
German people”.

Soon after the entrance of the German troops, the percentage had apparently increased to a
majority. It is difficult to reconcile the view of 51% of the population in December 1947 that Nazism was a
good idea badly carried out with the old “Austrian patriotic history textbook view” that most Austrians
were opposed to union with Germany in 1938-1945. The most that could be said is that for some of these
51%, their primary identity had been “Austrian” rather than “German”.

Perhaps a clue to the change in the attitudes toward the union with Germany in 1938 is provided
by the fact that a large minority of the Austrian population did not state an opinion in favor of Austrian
independence, that is, against union with Germany, or whether Austria should be a monarchy or a republic.
Thus, according to the 1964 SSWG survey on national consciousness, the respondents were asked to react
to the statement that “If Austria did not exist she would have to be created.” “Only 36 percent said that
Austria ought to be created if she did not exist, however, although only 31 percent negated the proposition.
Thirty-three percent did not know.”

Table 5.4. Answers to Opinion Poll Questions on the Form of Government and National Identity, by Percentages

Q1. Should Austria Be Headed by a Federal President or by an Emperor?\(^{891}\)

Q2. In Your Opinion, Are the Austrians a Part of the German People, or Are We a Separate Austrian People?\(^{892}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Group</th>
<th>Column 5/Column 6</th>
<th>Q1, Federal President</th>
<th>Q2, German People</th>
<th>Q1, Emperor</th>
<th>Q2, Austrian People</th>
<th>Q1, No Opinion</th>
<th>Q2, No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyone</td>
<td>44.90</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>38.30</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>51.85</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-39 Years</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-59 Years</td>
<td>54.17</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 Years and Older</td>
<td>53.85</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>44.83</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>45.65</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finished High School or College</td>
<td>42.50</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>41.67</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>24.19</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Occupations</td>
<td>64.29</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVP Supporters</td>
<td>65.45</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO Supporters</td>
<td>13.64</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other or No Partisan Support</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


World War II, its loss, the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews, and the occupation of Austria by the Allies increased the support for an independent state, if not, as we have seen, a rejection of the ideological tenets of Nazism. In 1947, only 16% of the Viennese declared Germany their favorite foreign country, in comparison to 44% in 1993. It is noteworthy that the steepest decline in “German ethnic” identity and “German nationalistic” voting happened exactly in those parts of Austria that were occupied by the Soviet Union, which were traumatized by the murders, rapes and pillaging of the Soviet army. The explanation does not have to do with pre-1945 history, whether electoral or otherwise, but with the behavior of the Red Army and the Soviet relative lack of tolerance toward German ethnonationalism. Some of those areas of the Soviet zone had been areas of pan-German strength. Sudden shocks have led to swift changes in self-determination options in Austria, in favor of union with Germany in 1918 and 1938, and in favor of Austrian independence in 1945.

2.5. Additional Explanations:

The Impact of Voter Turnout and Political Actors, etc.

The electoral performance of the various electoral tickets was to some extent influenced by the political actors. Overall, political actors have more often than not hindered the expression of electoral Germanism. Yet there is no evidence that political actors could “overcome” the ethnic basis or pre-existing xenophobic discourses. This aspect could be studied at both the micro and the macro levels. At the “macro” level, the decrease in the support for the intensely German nationalistic parties between the elections of 1919 and 1920 is partly explained by the abstention of some of the nationalistic voters of 1919. This is particularly accurate wherever the intensely German nationalistic voters were especially numerous. In those areas, the numbers of Christian Social and Social Democratic voters remained similar in 1919 and 1920. By contrast, the number of German nationalistic voters decreased.

894. I would like to thank Daniel Teodoru for this point. He was a refugee (from Romania) in Salzburg during the late period of allied occupation of Austria.
The explanation of this pattern is complex and does not fully elucidate the issue. We are largely dealing with apolitical rural and small-town German nationalistic voters whose one agenda was union with Germany. Since the Versailles treaty system prohibited the union of Austria with Germany, these dispirited voters chose not to vote in the next elections. It was more than anybody else these types of voters who were targeted through pro-Anschluss propaganda by the various political parties.

At various times, the electoral alliances between the various political formations facilitated “getting the German bourgeois nationalistic vote out”. It was thanks to some local leaders, such as the local Landbund chairperson from Carinthia (and future vice-chancellor) Vincenz Schumy, who was of Slovene ethnic ancestry, that a 1923 electoral alliance (and non-aggression) pact was made. It united the Carinthian local Christian Socialists and the German bourgeois nationalists (Pan-Germans and Agrarian Union) into the Carinthian Unity List, and was mutually beneficial (see Table 5.4.1.). A similar electoral alliance and similar patterns in the local legislature brought about the replacement of the Social Democratic governor, elected with the votes of the Social Democratic and Slovene deputies, by Schumy.

Table 5.4.1. Votes for the Political Parties in Carinthia, 1921 and 1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year, etc.</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Valid Votes</th>
<th>Social Democrats</th>
<th>Christian Social</th>
<th>Landbund + Pan-Germans</th>
<th>Slovene Nationalists</th>
<th>Others895</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>203,404</td>
<td>142,129</td>
<td>60,773</td>
<td>25,989</td>
<td>44,763</td>
<td>9,869</td>
<td>735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>206,110</td>
<td>166,866</td>
<td>60,954</td>
<td>31,823</td>
<td>63,642</td>
<td>9,868</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gains or Losses (Numbers)</td>
<td>+2,706</td>
<td>+24,737</td>
<td>+181</td>
<td>+5,834</td>
<td>+18,879</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gains or Losses (Percentages)</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
<td>17.40%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>22.45%</td>
<td>42.18%</td>
<td>-0.01%</td>
<td>21.22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1927, the Christian Socials, the Pan-Germans and the Nazis in most Austrian provinces formed an electoral alliance, the Unity List. However, since the Agrarian Union/Landbund stayed out of the alliance, and a few newer parties, including German national ones, appeared, the results were not equally beneficial as in 1927. In 1930, the alliance between the Pan-Germans and the Landbund under the leadership of the former chancellor Dr. Johannes Schober, the former police commissioner of Vienna,

895. Exclusively (1921) or mostly (1923) Communists.
helped the two political formations electorally. The death of Schober in 1932 disadvantaged the Pan-Germans leaders in their fight for German nationalistic support in comparison to the Nazis.

The role of local-level political actors should also be noted. Some members of the local elite influenced voting patterns. For example, the local priest might have told the inhabitants to vote for the Christian Social Party more enthusiastically or less enthusiastically, and this could have made a difference. Alternatively, perhaps the profession of the Landbund candidate, typically either a peasant or a “professor” (high school teacher) could attract to the polls different groups of people. The membership in various civil society associations also made a difference.

In some areas, local political actors did not have too much of a role (e.g., in the case of the Protestant villages in Burgenland). Intensely nationalistic politicians also brought in votes for their parties from their home districts, as did other politicians. Yet more than 75% of all the Austrian citizens consistently voted for the same political party or their successor, which is a much larger percentage than was the case in pre-1938 Bukovina. The volatility was mostly in the area of those voters who shared the ideology associated with the “German national camp”.

The evidence shows that political actors could have an impact on the industrial working class population, and channel it in a more Social Democratic, Communist or even National Socialist direction, but not in a Christian Social or Pan-German direction. Yet sometimes local actors reflected as much as they shaped local conditions. With history textbooks presenting both Austrianist and Germanist perspectives, the attitudes of the elementary school teachers on this issue influenced the attitudes of the children. Finally, patronage has helped the “big two” parties, and has attracted the votes of a number of individuals with a German nationalist ideology.

The educational system of the Second Austrian Republic since 1945 helped the progress of Austrian nation-building a great deal, but its evolution was influenced by Austrianist political actors, such as Felix Hurdes. The role of political actors can not be dismissed. If Hitler would not have come to power in Germany, annexed Austria, if there would have been no Holocaust, etc., things might have turned out otherwise. There would have been no sudden shock in 1945. Most Austrians would have presumably

896 My small talk in Vienna and in Bukovina with various people was useful on this issue, but so are the electoral results.
continued to display a German ethnic identity. Austria would have been a “second German state”, in the same sense in which Cyprus is a “second Greek state”.

What is noteworthy is that many individuals, including former Nazis, used the contents of the old German nationalist discourse from before 1945 or 1938, reproduced through the help of the educational system, but replaced “German” with “Austrian”. Austrian nationalistic discourses have until recently (until some point in the late 1960’s or early 1970’s) been Germanophone/German-speaking nationalist ones. They have emphasized the importance of the German language, and the need for it to have an increasing role, and the role of the provinces.897

The various types of intolerance that were widespread in the discourse of the old German nationalism, including anti-Semitism, have been tolerated by the post-1945 “vote-hungry” Austrian politicians until at least the 1980’s. They have been preserved to a larger extent than in Germany. What was discouraged was merely the “German” identity and nationalism, not other aspects also linked to Nazism. This has facilitated Austrian nation-building.898

I believe that the political actors influenced the electoral performance of the various electoral tickets. Overall, the latter have more often than not hindered the expression of electoral Germanism. Yet there is no evidence that political actors could “overcome” the ethnic basis or pre-existing xenophobic discourses.

3.1. In-Depth Case Study: The Carinthian Case and German-Speaking Linguistic Nationalism

Carinthia is in some respects a unique area of Austria. A majority of the population is still made up of Germanophone linguistic nationalists, just as it was before 1945.899 The only difference seems to be that the cultural national identification is no longer “German”, but “German-speaking”.

897. I would like to thank Daniel Teodoru for this point. He was a refugee (from Romania) in Salzburg during the middle period of the American occupation of the area.
898. This is by no means unique in the world. It is characteristic of Moldovanist non-Communist discourses, which are in many ways similar to those of Romanian nationalism, except in the area of ethnic identity/self-identification. On the other hand, the Moldovanist discourse coming from the direction of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova is different. This makes the Moldovan case different.
899. Even though current Austrian politics are outside the scope of this dissertation, this circumstance helps explain how Jorg Haider has been able to obtain and maintain his governorship in this land in recent years.
The only difference between 2007 and 1907 or 1923 seems to be that the cultural national identification is no longer “German”, but “German-speaking”. Most of Carinthia’s population seems to be of distant Slovene rather than Germanic ancestry, from before the Middle Ages. Even more importantly, most of the remaining Carinthian Slovenes have been Germanized during the 19th and 20th centuries. German, and subsequently, German-speaking nationalism, has been more widespread and intense than in other areas of present-day Austria, as the electoral statistics show (see Table 5.4.2.).

Map 4D. Administrative Divisions of Carinthia

Municipalities (Statutarstadte)
Klagenfurt (K)
Villach (VI)

Districts (Bezirke)
Spittal an der Drau (SP)
Hermagor (HE)
Villach-Land (VL)
Feldkirchen (FE)
St. Veit an der Glan (SV)
Klagenfurt-Land (KL)
Volkmermarkt (VK)
Wolfsberg (WO)

In most free parliamentary elections under universal male and later suffrage until, and including, 1930, most of the bourgeois (non-Marxist) vote was not “clerical” (Christian Social), but from the “German national camp”. By contrast, in all the other Austrian provinces, most of the bourgeois vote was always

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mostly clerical rather than “national”. This has not been true for the parliamentary elections of the early postwar period.

However, in recent years, it has re-emerged in Carinthian provincial (Land) electoral politics. Through a coalition between the ex-Landbund section of the (mostly conservative Catholic) Austrian People’s Party with the party representing the German national camp at that time (FPO) in the middle of the 1950’s, this has also been true in Carinthian local (sub-provincial) politics.

Table 5.4.2. The Electoral Patterns in Carinthia – Predominant German, Austrian and Other Identities during the Parliamentary Elections of 1919-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Election</th>
<th>Percentages of the Votes, by National Identities Espoused by the Political Parties</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Trend for Columns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primarily or exclusively German</td>
<td>Primarily or exclusively Austrian</td>
<td>Minority Slovene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907 (first round)</td>
<td>64.12</td>
<td>25.13</td>
<td>10.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907 (second round)</td>
<td>67.31</td>
<td>23.45</td>
<td>9.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 (first round)</td>
<td>89.41</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 (second round)</td>
<td>92.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>7.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918 (Provincial Legislat-</td>
<td>80.36</td>
<td>19.64</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

901. Unless stated otherwise, the data refers to the valid votes cast for the lower house of the central parliament, whether imperial, before 1918, or republican, after 1918. The data for the interwar provincial diets refers to the number of mandates, which were determined based on proportional representation, with no threshold needed for representation. For the post-1945 provincial diet, the actual numbers of votes were used.


903. This refers to the distribution of proportional representation mandates for the Carinthian provisional Landrat (diet), based on the 1911 electoral results for the lower house of the Austrian parliament, but taking into account the break-ups and realignments of the various political forces. The two representatives of the soldiers and officers are excluded, because they were not selected on that basis, but were added on ex-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Election</th>
<th>Percentages of the Votes, by National Identities Espoused by the Political Parties</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Trend for Columns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primarily or exclusively German</td>
<td>Primarily or exclusively Austrian</td>
<td>Minority Slovene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>82.36</td>
<td>17.64</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>74.25</td>
<td>18.28</td>
<td>6.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921 (Provincial Legislature)</td>
<td>76.19</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>74.67</td>
<td>19.07</td>
<td>5.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>63.39</td>
<td>26.46</td>
<td>5.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 (Provincial Legislature)</td>
<td>76.53</td>
<td>22.05</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


905. This (“L. Dep.”) refers to the distribution of proportional representation mandates for the Carinthian Landrat (diet).

906. This (“L. Dep.”) refers to the distribution of proportional representation mandates for the Carinthian Landrat (diet).

907. This (“L. Dep.”) refers to the distribution of proportional representation mandates for the Carinthian Landrat.

908. This (“L. Dep.”) refers to the distribution of proportional representation mandates for the Carinthian
It is well worth noting that during all elections between 1891 and 1930, most of the non-Marxist Germanophone vote in Carinthia was for primarily German nationalistic, not primarily “Austrian patriotic” formations. This was not the case in any other Austrian province. Based on the electoral results, one could conclude that Carinthia was one of the two provinces of present-day Austria in which German nation-building seemed to have been largely completed by 1911. It would also appear that a large part of the post-1945 electorate, especially the ex-Landbund (Agrarian Union) segment of the conservative Austrian People’s Party, but also of the Social Democratic Party, in Carinthia was more intensely German or Germanophone nationalistic than elsewhere.

Table 5.4.3. The Electoral Patterns in Carinthia (without the large cities of Klagenfurt or Villach), Predominant German, Austrian and Other Identities, during the Parliamentary and Local (Community) Elections of 1945-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Election</th>
<th>Percentages of the Votes, by National Identities Espoused by the Political Parties</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Trend for Columns&lt;sup&gt;902&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primarily or exclusively German</td>
<td>Primarily or exclusively Austrian</td>
<td>Minority Slovene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945&lt;sup&gt;909&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>91.94</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>20.59</td>
<td>74.55</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949 (Provincial legis-sature)</td>
<td>20.55</td>
<td>72.74</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951 (Presidential)&lt;sup&gt;910&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>23.58</td>
<td>69.86</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>16.61</td>
<td>79.28</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>15.13</td>
<td>81.79</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>13.52</td>
<td>84.01</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>12.49</td>
<td>73.88</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>909</sup> Former Nazis were disenfranchised.<br>
<sup>910</sup> Presidential elections.
Percentages of the Votes, by Type of Nationalism Espoused by the Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Election</th>
<th>Primarily or exclusively German</th>
<th>Primarily or exclusively Austrian (not column 6)</th>
<th>Carinthian German Linguistic (not column 2)</th>
<th>Minority Slovene Nationalism</th>
<th>Communists (anti-nationalists)</th>
<th>Total, Column 2</th>
<th>Total, columns 2 + 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911 Parliamentary (first round)</td>
<td>88.83</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>11.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49,367 (males)</td>
<td>88.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 Communal</td>
<td>19.13</td>
<td>72.67</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>170,330</td>
<td>21.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954 Land</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>60.48</td>
<td>30.37</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>186,916</td>
<td>35.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 Parliamentary, (first round)</td>
<td>15.13</td>
<td>81.70</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>208,278</td>
<td>15.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958 Land</td>
<td>10.91</td>
<td>71.08</td>
<td>14.73</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>198,902</td>
<td>25.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 Land</td>
<td>12.14</td>
<td>73.40</td>
<td>10.17</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>211,468</td>
<td>22.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evidence of widespread Germanophone nationalism in Carinthia does not consist only of electoral data. One should note the special Austrian census on minority languages of November 14, 1976, whose alleged purpose was to bring about the disappearance of locality signs in minority languages such as Croatian (in Burgenland) and Slovene (in Carinthia). A substantial majority of more than 70% of the Austrian population boycotted the census, including majorities in all but one province, and thus supported the maintenance of the rights of the linguistic minorities.

Yet a large majority of population of Carinthia (86.2%) participated in this exercise, a figure that was much higher than that for the other province affected by it, Burgenland (27.6%).

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demonstrates that the average Austrian was by then no longer a Germanophone nationalist, whereas the average Carinthian (still) was.

The German identity also remained widespread in Carinthia. In 1992, the percentage of individuals who claimed that, if asked abroad whether they were Germans, 15% of the Carinthians declared that they were Austrians. This was by far the highest percentage in Austria.912

Carinthia is in some respects a unique area of Austria. A majority of the population is still made up of Germanophone linguistic nationalists, just as it was before 1945. The only difference seems to be that the cultural national identification is no longer “German”, but “German-speaking”.

3.2. Case Studies: Ethnic Minorities, Ethnonationalists or Austrians?

(With an Emphasis on the Carinthian Slovenes)

The patterns of the electoral ethnonationalism of the ethnic minorities in Austria show that the ethnic basis, the educational system and sudden shocks had the impact predicted by my model. However, they neither confirm nor disconfirm the predicted impact of industrialization. On a different note, the worsening situation of the linguistic minorities in terms of linguistic rights after World War II was partly due to the predominantly Social-Democratic “neo-Austrianism”. The linguistic rights of the national minorities were better protected by the 1934-1938 clerical dictatorship of Schuschnigg, which viewed Austria as a second German state than by the “Austrianist” nation-builders. The main victims of the Austrian civic nationalism of the Second Republic have been the traditional linguistic minorities.

This is not the place for a thorough analysis of the electoral performances of the national minorities in the Austrian interwar parliamentary elections. The one ethnic minority that voted consistently nationalistic during the interwar period was the Slovene one, which was concentrated in Carinthia. Table 5.9 makes it obvious that only the Slovenes and initially, in 1919-1920, the Czechs and Slovaks voted for nationalistic tickets of their own ethnic group. This is partly explained by the ethnic basis (the members of these groups retained their own language and viewed themselves as ethnic Slovenes/Czechs/Slovaks). It is

also accounted for by the educational system (the members of these groups had possessed schools in their own languages, in which the teaching had been done in an ethnonationalistic spirit).

The other ethnic groups had less of an ethnic basis (e.g., the Jews were mostly German-speaking and with a German national identity), were too small (Burgenland Hungarians) or had not had schools in their own language with teaching in an ethnonationalistic spirit. This was the case with the Burgenland Croats, who obtained the right to an education in their own language only after the former Hungarian Burgenland became a part of Austria in 1921.

Even though the largest absolute numbers of minority nationalistic votes were cast for the Jewish nationalistic (largely pro-Zionist) tickets, the Jews were not officially recognized as an ethnic minority, but merely as a religious minority. Most self-styled “ethnic Jews” probably voted for the Jewish nationalistic tickets. Despite their mostly German language, they were distinct from the German Christians by their Jewish religion.

The impact of industrialization on minority ethnic nationalistic voting is complex. The Czechs and Slovaks were more likely than the average inhabitant of Austria to be employed in industry, and the Slovenes were much less likely. Yet these were the mostly ethnonationalistic ethnic groups soon after World War I. As for the sudden shock, the sudden transformation of multi-national Austria into a German Austria at the end of World War I increased the level of ethnonationalism among Czechs, Slovaks and Jews in comparison to pre-war levels. The Nazi Holocaust during World War II led to the victory of the Communists and Zionists in Jewish community elections after World War II.

On the other hand, the horrors perpetrated by Tito’s Yugoslav Communist partisans during their occupation of much of Carinthia at the end of World War II turned off numerous ethnic Slovenes from Slovene ethnic nationalism. The electoral nationalism of the ethnic group evolved from a majority phenomenon to a minority phenomenon among the voters of the ethnic group, from 55% in 1927 to 10% in 1949 and 31% in 1951.

Overall, the sense of “Austrianess” among the non-German-speaking ethnic minorities has historically been less developed than among German-speakers, even though the difference might have narrowed in the 1960’s. Interestingly enough, the spread of an Austrian identity, and the growth of Austrian nationalism, among the general population and the ruling elites has led to demands to scale back native
language education for the ethnic minorities. I would argue that the spread of a “neo-Austrian” identity, the Austrian identity without reference to the Habsburg past, which was promoted mainly by the Socialists, has led to setbacks for the rights of the native linguistic minorities in Austria by the late 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s.

Austria treated its linguistic minorities the most generously when it identified itself as a second German state, that is, during the period between 1918 and 1938, not as the “Austrian nation”. The minorities were treated the most ungenerously during the period when Austria was a part of Nazi Germany (1938-1945).

Overall, among the Croatian elites in the Burgenland, the priests, cultural association officials, etc., were in favor of maximal Croatian instruction in accordance to the liberal educational law of 1937. At that time, Austria identified itself as “the second German state”. These members of the local elites were linked to the People’s Party and the local branch of the People’s Party. According to that law, in those areas where the Croatians represented more than 70% of the population, education was to be in Croatian. In the mixed German-Croatian schools in those localities that were 30-70% Croatian, there were to be mixed German-Croatian schools.

The ethnic Croatian Socialist politicians and local opinion leaders preferred to give the parents a chance to select the language of education. This was a pro-assimilation measure in favor of German. The most anti-assimilation ethnic Croatian interviewed by William Bluhm, a 70-year old priest who spoke German with a Croatian accent, identified the Austrian German-speakers as “Germans”, not “Austrians”. He was opposed to union with Germany, probably more than the other members of the Croatian elite were, but was cold toward “Austrianism”.913

The most important case of the nationalism of an ethnic minority was the Slovenian one, particularly in Carinthia. However, a majority of the ethnic Slovenes in the province did not display Slovene nationalism electorally. As one can see in tables 5.5 and 5.6, there was a steady decrease of the Slovene element in the province, regardless of how one counts the number of Slovenes.

The number of individuals with a Slovene census identity was influenced not only by the census practices, but also by the political climate. The latter factor discouraged the expression of a Slovene

identity for most of the interwar period, and during the post-1945 period. The exceptions were the Habsburg period and the period of the 1934-1938 clerical dictatorship of Kurt Schuschnigg. At that time, the prime minister (dictator) of Austria was Kurt Schuschnigg, whose grandfather (Susnik) had been a Carinthian Slovene. Schuschnigg was accused by the Nazis, and by some of his other opponents who were more intense German nationalists, that he was of a Slovenophile. He desired a compromise between the Germans and the Slovenes, and there were progresses in curriculum development for the Slovene-language schools.914

It was probably this more favorable policy toward linguistic minorities in 1934-1938 which explains the increase in the number of individuals who declared a Slovene mother tongue in 1939 (45,000) in comparison to 1934 (26,128, which was much lower than the 66,463 in the last Habsburg census of 1910) (see Table 5.6). The Nazis incarcerated the Slovene pro-clerical leader Dr. Tischler and Slovene nationalistic clergymen in March 1938, and Germanized all the Slovene-language schools in the fall of 1938. This probably discouraged numerous individuals from declaring that they were Slovene-speakers and Slovenes in the 1939 census, which the Nazis intended.915

Table 5.5 – The Evolution of the Number of Slovenes in Carinthia, 1880-1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/census</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>How measured</th>
<th>Number of Slovenes</th>
<th>Percentage of Slovenes</th>
<th>Row a/row b or row a /row c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. 1880</td>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>Austrian Census</td>
<td>Colloquial language</td>
<td>85,051</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 1880</td>
<td>Mixed area</td>
<td>Catholic Clergy</td>
<td>Mother tongue</td>
<td>102,711</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. 1890</td>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>Austrian Census</td>
<td>Colloquial language</td>
<td>84,667</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 1890</td>
<td>Mixed area</td>
<td>Catholic Clergy</td>
<td>Mother tongue</td>
<td>101,782</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. 1900</td>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>Austrian Census</td>
<td>Colloquial language</td>
<td>75,136</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 1900</td>
<td>Mixed area</td>
<td>Catholic Clergy</td>
<td>Mother tongue</td>
<td>100,689</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

914 Barker, p. 189-190.
916 This refers to the linguistically or ethnically mixed area of Carinthia, which was inhabited by German-speakers and Slovene-speakers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year/census</td>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>How measured</td>
<td>Number of Slovenes</td>
<td>Percentage of Slovenes</td>
<td>Row a/row b or row a /row c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. 1910</td>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>Austrian Census</td>
<td>Colloquial language</td>
<td>66,463</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 1910</td>
<td>Mixed area</td>
<td>Catholic Clergy</td>
<td>Mother tongue</td>
<td>99,006</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1910</td>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>Ethnic Slovene parallel census</td>
<td>Colloquial language</td>
<td>115,808</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.6. - The Evolution of the Size of the Slovene Minority in Carinthia – 1910 to 1941, by Year(s)\(^{917}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census/Estimate Year</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1934-1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Slovenes</td>
<td>66,463</td>
<td>36,169</td>
<td>26,128</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manner of Counting Estimates</td>
<td>Colloquial language</td>
<td>Colloquial language</td>
<td>Colloquial language</td>
<td></td>
<td>Colloquial language</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Situation</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Authoritarianism, Less Pluralism</td>
<td>Authoritarianism, More Pluralism</td>
<td>Nazi Totalitarianism</td>
<td>Nazi Totalitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Promoted</td>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>German and Austrian</td>
<td>German and Austrian</td>
<td></td>
<td>German, not Austrian, pro-Germanization</td>
<td>German, not Austrian, pro-Germanization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.7. The Number of Slovenes, including “Wends” in Carinthia, 1951 to 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language(s)</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovene (including Wend)</td>
<td>42,095</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td>21,918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.8. Slovene Nationalistic Voting in Carinthia\(^{918}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1949</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Round</td>
<td>Round 1</td>
<td>Round 2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type/Level</td>
<td>Imperial</td>
<td>Imperial</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Land</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{917}\) Barker, p. 191.
\(^{918}\) There were no such tickets in 1919, 1930 and 1945.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1949</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No/Diet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who voted?</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMMD or PR&lt;sup&gt;919&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>SMMD</td>
<td>SMMD</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were there areas with a Slovene national majority?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovene National Votes</td>
<td>5,616</td>
<td>4,221</td>
<td>9,869</td>
<td>9,868</td>
<td>9,334</td>
<td>2,088&lt;sup&gt;920&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of Slovene Nationalism Score</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Intensity of Slovene Nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of the Carinthian Vote</th>
<th>10.77%</th>
<th>7.71%</th>
<th>6.93%</th>
<th>5.91%</th>
<th>5.4%</th>
<th>0.85%</th>
<th>2.57%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes as a percentage of the population</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>9.76%</td>
<td>9.76%</td>
<td>9.76%</td>
<td>8.40%</td>
<td>8.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census Year</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated percentage of Carinthian Slovene vote</td>
<td>48.30%</td>
<td>34.57%</td>
<td>71.00%</td>
<td>60.55%</td>
<td>55.33%</td>
<td>10.12%</td>
<td>30.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.8.1. The Intensity of Slovene Nationalism in the Six Mostly Slovene Districts**<sup>921</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1911 Elections</th>
<th>1927 Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Vote</td>
<td>31.34%</td>
<td>29.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Male Vote</td>
<td>31.34%</td>
<td>23.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of Slovene Nationalism</td>
<td>0.7835</td>
<td>0.8428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of Slovene Nationalism Among Males</td>
<td>0.7835</td>
<td>0.6935</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.9. The Ethnic Minorities: The March 7, 1923 Census Results and the Interwar Electoral Results**<sup>922</sup>

<sup>919</sup> “SMMD” means “Single Member Majority District”, in which the winner needed a majority of the valid votes in the single-member district. “PR” means “Proportional Representation”.

<sup>920</sup> This is actually the pro-Titoist ticket. It excludes the more than 4,500 Slovene votes that were cast in favor of the Austrian People’s Party by the local conservative nationalist, Catholic Slovenes.

<sup>921</sup> These judicial districts were Ferlach, Rosegg, Bleiburg, Eberndorf, Eisenkappel and Volkermarkt.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistic Group</th>
<th>Absolute Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Minority nationalistic and other politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German-speakers</td>
<td>6,272,892</td>
<td>95.99</td>
<td>Including almost all the Jews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech-speakers</td>
<td>93,533</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly in Vienna</td>
<td>‘19-20- 100%, 80% Czechoslovak nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak-speakers</td>
<td>5,170</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly in Vienna</td>
<td>1919 – majority Czechoslovak nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb-speakers and Croat-speakers</td>
<td>46,771</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly in Burgenland (41,761)</td>
<td>14% nat. 1922, 1/3 Social Democrats, 2/3 Christian Socialists later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovene-speakers</td>
<td>43,383</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly in Carinthia</td>
<td>Mostly ethnonationalistic in 1920-1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magyar-speakers</td>
<td>25,071</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly in Vienna, 9,606 in Burgenland</td>
<td>Not electoral, in Burgenland, mostly irredentist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>47,943</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic minorities counted as “religious minorities”</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Majority nationalistic and other politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>Overwhelmingly in Vienna</td>
<td>1/5 – 1/4 Zionist in the parliamentary elections of 1919, 1920, 1920, 1927, 1/30 in 1930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The patterns of the electoral ethnonationalism of the ethnic minorities in Austria show that the ethnic basis, the educational system and sudden shocks had the impact predicted by my model. However, they neither confirm nor disconfirm the predicted impact of industrialization. On a different note, the worsening situation of the linguistic minorities in terms of linguistic rights after World War II was partly due to the predominantly Social-Democratic “neo-Austrianism”. The linguistic rights of the national minorities were better protected by the 1934-1938 clerical dictatorship of Schuschnigg, which viewed Austria as a second German state than by the “Austrianist” nation-builders. The main victims of the Austrian civic nationalism of the Second Republic have been the traditional linguistic minorities.

4. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have looked at the impact of the independent variables on the nation-building

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processes in the Austrian German-speaking case primarily between 1907 and 1962 on the territory of present-day Austria. The Austrian patterns have predominantly confirmed my general model. In terms of the ethnic basis, German nationalism had been the most intense in the areas, and among the population groups, that were the closest to the mainstream patterns in Germany in terms of ethnic basis. For example, as expected, there was a greater spread and intensity of German nationalism among the Lutherans. The latter were a religious minority in Austria, but a majority in Germany, than among the Roman Catholics. The latter formed an overwhelming majority of the population of an Austria whose official Roman Catholicism was a defining characteristic. This expectation is strongly confirmed by the data.

As we have seen, all the relevant dialects and sub-dialects have historically crossed the Austrian-German border. The best way to frame the issue would not be the German sub-dialects of Germany, but the Central Austro-Bavarian dialect of most of Austria. As expected, those speaking other sub-dialects had lower scores on the scale of intensity of Austrian nationalism, and a higher one on the scale of intensity of German nationalism. This is confirmed by the existing data. Non-German speakers seldom supported German nationalism. Austrian identities, especially if they were the primary or the most salient identities, correlated with Austrian nationalism. The German identities, especially if they were the primary or the most important identities, correlated with German nationalism.

As expected, the curricula of the educational system, especially in terms of the teaching of history, had shaped the spread of Austrian and/or German identities and nationalisms. If Austrianism was taught in the classroom, the Austrian identity would predominate among those educated within that context. If Germanism was taught in the schools, the German identity would predominate among those educated within that environment. As expected, the higher the level of education, the more likely were the individuals to have a predominantly German identity and be more intensely nationalistic.

According to my model, one would expect industrialization to make nation-building more difficult. In practice, this was the case only some of the time. While the default option might be that it hinders it, the evidence shows that it depends on the circumstances, including political actors. To some extent, this partly confirms and partly disconfirms my model.

The impact of sudden shocks is the expected one (massive shifts in self-determination options), with one twist. The loss of World War I and the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy greatly enhanced the
German-Austrian determination for unification with Germany. This alternative was supported by a small, but clear, majority of the Austrian population. However, the union with Germany did not take place due to the victorious Entente powers, who prevented it. The collapse of the Austrian clerical dictatorship, which was followed by the Nazi German occupation of Austria in 1938, was another sudden shock. It facilitated the increase in support for union with Germany. The loss of World War II and the allied occupation of Austria in 1945 facilitated an enormous increase in the level of popular support for separation from Germany.

The empirical data of the Austrian case supports my model in every respect but one, for which the evidence is mixed, namely the impact of industrialization on nation-building.
Chapter 12

Other Cases, Generalizations and Reflections

6.1. Introduction - Attempts at Generalization: Looking at Other Cases

6.2. Saarland

6.3. Trieste and Adjacent Areas

6.4. Other Cases and More General Patterns

6.5. Counterfactuals, Alternative Theories and Limits

6.6. Policy Applications and Reflections

6.7. Conclusions
6.1. Introduction - Attempts at Generalization: Looking at Other Cases

An ethnic basis close to the desired “final product nation”, and education in the mother tongue, facilitate nation-building, whereas industrialization and sudden shocks hinder this process. Other cases, including Saarland, Trieste, Alsace, the Bay of Kotor (Boka Kotorska) in Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, etc., generally confirm my model. I will briefly analyze them in this chapter for the sake of evaluating the generalizability of the model.

Their study does indicate the existence of a number of additional complexities. One of them is that the ethnic basis influences to some extent the self-determination preferences of the population. The educational system does not always have a significant impact in nation-building “by itself”. Yet the attempts to stop making use of it for nation-building are problematic.

Industrialization tends to hinder nation-building. Yet in the cases discussed below, this has happened only when the rural population of the respective ethnic group was already fairly intensely nationalistic. Sudden shocks could change self-determination preferences away from the territorial status quo in the direction of the creation of small, highly industrialized states. Yet the support for such a solution could dissipate within only a few years after the event.

I did not select the cases presented in this chapter at random. These populations have been selected because the areas in which they lived were affected by referenda (plebiscites) and plebiscite-like events that had much to do with the political status of the territory, and by my ability to control for certain variables. Moreover, the empirical information is not contested. Some of these cases deal with instances of failed nation-building. I will also discuss counterfactuals, alternative theories, policy applications, etc.

6.2. Saarland

One such case is the current Saar or Saarland, the only attempt to have nation-building based on pure interest or rational choice that I have identified. France and Germany contested the territory starting in
late 1918. Table 6A presents the quantitative evolution of the public opinion in the area. The highly industrialized Saarland was under League of Nations administration between 1919 and 1935, when its electorate voted overwhelmingly (90.75%) to unite with (Nazi) Germany, under whose rule it remained until 1945.

Between 1945 and January 1, 1957, the territory was under French occupation. Between 1947 and 1957, it was an autonomous state united with France economically and for the purpose of foreign policy. This initially occurred with the approval of the overwhelming majority of its population. As one can see even in the Saar constitution, there was no attempt to create a “Saar people” of German language and German culture as a “cultural nation”, and even only a half-hearted attempt to create a “Saar civic nation”. The latter attempt was not successful or tried, except by making the learning of the French language mandatory in the schools, which might even have been counter-productive.\(^{923}\)

The switching popular sympathies in favor of reunion with Germany eventually brought about reunification with Germany, after the 1955 referendum and elections. On those occasions, the overwhelming majority of the population showed a desire for reunification with Germany.

The territory was homogeneously ethnically German, both objectively, in terms of language, customs, ethnic self-identification, etc., by intersubjective consensus, and according to the Saar legislation. There were no salient differences in the ethnic basis\(^{924}\) (e.g., of dialect) that had any impact on the electoral results. The only “visible” element of the ethnic basis that is not a constant has been religion. The territory had a three-fourths Catholic majority and a sizable Protestant minority, which have not been distributed uniformly.\(^{925}\)

The minority that was overwhelmingly in favor of remaining as a part of Germany even at the times of greatest hardship in the 1946 and 1947 elections was Protestant (Lutheran). The group that desired union with Germany in the 1952 elections for the local parliament (Landtag) was also disproportionately


\(^{924}\) The ethnic basis was reproduced through the family, church, and community. Yet this is not the place for a detailed discussion of how this happened because the cases discussed in this section are not main cases.

Protestant.926

The impact of the educational system, although understudied, can also be controlled, in the sense that it was homogeneous throughout the entire territory. The entire population of the area was literate by 1918 (and in later years). The educational content had been German nationalistic until 1945. During the period between 1947 and 1956, Christian and European civilization was emphasized. Yet the German culture and the German language, as well as the teaching of the French language, were other “pillars” of the educational system.927

We do not know the impact of the post-1945 education on voting patterns, but, in all likelihood, it was insignificant. The differences between the Roman Catholic and Protestant schools simply reinforced differences in the ethnic basis.

I have not conducted any in-depth research into the linkage between industrialization and nation-building beyond looking at the maps. It would appear that the inhabitants of the industrialized areas were more likely than average to be in favor of an associated status to France after World War II. They were also more likely to switch to pro-German self-identification preferences when the economic utility of union with Germany became undeniable starting around 1952. This was not merely true of the industrial, predominantly working-class Social Democratic, electorate. The same also goes for urbanization, as measured by the density of inhabitants by administrative units.928

926. See the electoral and religious maps in Jacques Freymond, The Saar Conflict 1945-1955 (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1960), maps no. 5-11. Also see the sources on the various elections and referendum below. For a “qualitative” discussion by Bernard Newman, who travelled through the area in 1949, see Bernard Newman, The Sisters Alsace-Lorraine (London: Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1950), p. 147-171. “The Saarlanders are still emphatically Germans; and the French would not be the first to find that nationalism remains a stronger force than the soap box orator will allow, and that there is little gratitude to a political or economic benefactor. I went out among the people. The politicians were easy to approach, and I faced an animated group in the parliament building. Speech was quite frank, even when a Frenchman was present. The issue was summed up by one Christian Democrat, who said, “France has treated us generously – but we are Germans.” Here, I thought, was a significant undercurrent to the expressed determination to collaborate economically with France – this at the moment is no more than sheer common sense… If the Saarlanders had to choose between a prosperous France and a prosperous Germany, their choice is an obvious one: especially if a new Hitler should arise. You cannot buy affection. If things began to go badly with France, the Saar would rapidly turn away from her.” See Newman, p. 164, 170.


928. See the electoral, industrial and population density maps in Jacques Freymond, The Saar Conflict 1945-1955 (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1960), maps no.3-4, 6-11 at the end of the
The importance of the sudden shock after World War II, when most of the population came to accept -- albeit only temporarily -- separation from Germany, can not be denied. Yet the increasing proportion of the population in favor of union with Germany in 1952-1956 can not be explained by a new sudden shock. It could be accounted for at most by the wearing off the effects of the sudden shock by 1955. In that year, in May, Germany obtained fully independence and sovereignty again, joined NATO, etc. Yet these circumstances did not “create”, but merely increased, the majority of the electorate that would have voted in favor of reunification with Germany, the option favored by most of the voters in the end.\footnote{Perhaps sudden shocks have stopped having any important impact in many areas of Western Europe by 1955.}

Therefore, the impact of the ethnic basis, industrialization and sudden shock variables is the expected one. Given the data I was able to collect and analyze, the impact of the educational system is difficult to evaluate.

Table 6A. Comparing the Electoral and Referendum Data – Saarland\footnote{In all the elections, there was universal adult suffrage.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District and Characteristics</th>
<th>Election, Referendum or Opinion Poll (by period)</th>
<th>Saarbrucken-Stadt (highly industrial/urban)</th>
<th>Saarbrucken-Land (less industrial/urban)</th>
<th>Entire Saarland (1 + 2 + other)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-independence plus pro-France\footnote{931}</td>
<td>Pro-German\footnote{932}</td>
<td>Pro-independence plus pro-France</td>
<td>Pro-German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. League of Nations Period</td>
<td>Jan. 13, 1935 Referendum\footnote{933}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46,513 pro-independence + 2,124 pro-French = 48,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“French” period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\footnote{“Pro-independence/pro-France” is shorthand for “in favor of anything ranging from independence to French rule, but something different than German rule”.}

\footnote{“Pro-German” is shorthand for “in favor of reunification with Germany”.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election, Referendum or Opinion Poll (by period)</th>
<th>Saarbrucken-Stadt (highly industrial/urban)</th>
<th>Saarbrucken-Land (less industrial/urban)</th>
<th>Entire Saarland (1 + 2 + other)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. 09/15/1946 Communal elections&lt;sup&gt;934&lt;/sup&gt; (Larger Territory)</td>
<td>Pro-independence plus pro-France&lt;sup&gt;931&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Pro-Germany&lt;sup&gt;932&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Pro-independence plus pro-France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(52.55%)</td>
<td>(8.77%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 10/05/1947 Landtag elections&lt;sup&gt;935&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>36,512 (73.37%)</td>
<td>4,202 (8.44%)</td>
<td>98,006 (83.29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/27/1949 Communal elections&lt;sup&gt;936&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1952 Opinion Poll&lt;sup&gt;937&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty Preference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion Poll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personally better off economically</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of 100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 30, 1952 Landtag elections&lt;sup&gt;938&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Eligible Voters (11/30/1952)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## District and Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election, Referendum or Opinion Poll (by period)</th>
<th>Saarbrucken-Stadt (highly industrial/urban)</th>
<th>Saarbrucken-Land (less industrial/urban)</th>
<th>Entire Saarland (1 + 2 + other)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opinion poll 08/8-13/1955(^{939})</td>
<td>Pro-independence plus pro-France(^{931})</td>
<td>Pro-Germany(^{932})</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion poll 10/19-24/1955(^{940})</td>
<td>(30,859) 39.1%</td>
<td>(48,056) 60.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 23, 1955 (referendum)(^{941})</td>
<td>(21,076) 29.9%</td>
<td>(49,414) 70.1%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 18, 1955(^{942}) (elections)</td>
<td>(21,076) 29.9%</td>
<td>(49,414) 70.1%</td>
<td>(36,495) 25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local elections, May 13, 1956(^{943})</td>
<td>15,708 24.3%</td>
<td>48,867 75.7%</td>
<td>28,710 20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District elections, May 13, 1956(^{944})</td>
<td>15,708 24.3%</td>
<td>48,867 75.7%</td>
<td>29,175 21.03%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. German Period (from 1957 onward)

| Bundestag elections, 1957\(^{947}\) | Particularists\(^{945}\) | Centralists\(^{946}\) | 21.3\% | 78.7\% |
| District elections, (May 1960) | | | 11.0\% | 89.0\% |
| Local Elections (May 1960) | | | 8.7\% | 91.3\% |
| Local Elections, (December 1960) | | | 11.4\% | 88.6\% |
| Local Elections, (December 1960) | | | 8.0\% | 92.0\% |

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\(^{945}\) The term “Particularists” refers to electoral tickets characterized by Saar particularism and did not desire the homogenization of Saar with the rest of West Germany.

\(^{946}\) The term “Centralists” refers to the pro-German/pro-Germany electoral tickets that did not subscribe to Saar particularism, but desired the homogenization of Saar with the rest of West Germany.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District and Characteristics</th>
<th>Election, Referendum or Opinion Poll (by period)</th>
<th>Saarbrucken-Stadt (highly industrial/urban)</th>
<th>Saarbrucken-Land (less industrial/urban)</th>
<th>Entire Saarland (1 + 2 + other)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-independence plus pro-France(^{931})</td>
<td>Pro-Germany(^{932})</td>
<td>Pro-independence plus pro-France</td>
<td>Pro-Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landtag Elections (December 1960)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>88.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundestag Elections, 1961(^{948})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3. Trieste and Adjacent Areas

The case of Trieste also shows the importance of the ethnic basis and of industrialization; their impact on nation-building is in line with the predictions of my model. However, the sudden shock of the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the occupation of Trieste in late 1918 by Italian troops had no important or immediate impact, and a substantial minority of the ethnic Italian population would have preferred an independent Trieste, even in the period immediately after World War II.

A majority of the ethnic Italians in the overwhelmingly ethnically Italian port-city of Trieste (see Map 5.1)\(^{949}\) under Austrian rule seem to have desired union with Italy by the time of the Austrian parliamentary elections of 1911. This is suggested by the electoral results, including those under universal suffrage in 1911, and by the other historical data.\(^{950}\)

The process of Italian nation-building in Trieste is complex. Most of the (overwhelmingly ethnically Italian) middle class in Trieste desired that the area should be a part of Italy between 1848 and 1866. Between 1866 and 1875, the electoral data shows an eclipse of the electoral irredentism of the middle class, in comparison with the periods immediately preceding and following it. This is probably accounted


\(^{949}\). This was also true of a majority of the ethnic Italians of in Istria, which does not concern us in here.

\(^{950}\). See “Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrate Vertretenen Königreichen und Landern im Jahre 1911”, in Österreichische Statistik (Neue Folge), vol. 7, no. 1 (Wien: Karl Gerold’s Sohn, 1912), p. 46–48, 166. There are also a number of cases, such as at least a majority of the Orthodox Romanians of Transylvania, where the lack of free elections and the quasi-impossibility of finding the actual results in any language other than Magyar/Hungarian are very salient. It prevents us from evaluating whether the patterns were similar, but where the convergence of other evidence seems to suggest the same pattern.

As one would expect on the basis of my model, the case of Trieste shows the favorable impact of an ethnic basis close to the final “standard end-product” (as do so many other cases). The use of a particularly pure/non-dialectical form of Italian by the early twentieth century signals a place where the development of early irredentism is expected.

The Trieste case also shows the negative impact of industry and industrialization on nation-building. This mechanism is clearly at work not only during the period of eclipse of irredentism in 1866-1875, but also during the first elections under universal suffrage. Among individuals whose ethnic self-identification is identical with the emerging national standard, urbanization and industrialization do not hinder nation-building after a certain point in time. In this case, such a tipping point was reached sometime between 1907 and 1911.

Nevertheless, most of the Austrian or Habsburg-era socialists (Social Democrats) in the city of Trieste (with a primarily industrial, especially working class, electorate) were not in favor of the union of Trieste with Italy before the Italian occupation of the city in early November 1918. A large majority of the local Social Democratic party indicated this in a resolution of October 18, 1918. Those who opposed the resolution had been in favor of union with Italy even before the beginning of World War I.

When the leadership of the local party accepted the idea and joined the Italian Socialist Party in January 1911, the “base” did not follow the leaders. The numerically dominant left wing, including majorities of both the ethnically Italian and ethnically Slovene socialists, simply refused to accept the Italian national state. They instead demanded an Italo-Slav Soviet Republic in Venezia Giulia (Trieste, Istria and Gorizia) until this new faction joined the Italian Socialist Party in September 1919.

\textbf{Map 6.1. The Trieste Area – Geography and Electoral Turnout in the 1911 Elections}
The Italian nationalists mistrusted the sincerity of the support for Italian rule among the Socialists who had been previously opposed to it. The move seemed one of inconvenience, and most of those who
made the move in September had Communist leanings. Unlike in the cases of other territorial changes in late 1918, the sudden shock did not lead to any changes in self-determination preferences immediately before the border change. Few people (Socialists) switched to an attitude of support after the border change. This post-facto change in their attitudes, of course, does not count as a sudden shock.952

In most/many cases, a large majority of a population (national or ethnic group) prefers a change of sovereignty before a sudden shock; the proportion of the population having such preference does not necessarily increase substantially due to the sudden shock. The case of Trieste shows this. My explanation of the sudden shock’s lack of impact on the self-determination preferences of a substantial number of inhabitants is speculative. The socialists were exposed to the support for the union with Italy by an increasing number and eventually the majority of ethnic Italians in the city and its suburbs. Therefore, they were also exposed to the support of a majority of the bourgeoisie (according to the Marxist definition) toward this change of sovereignty. The latter was perceived as “bourgeois” and “not revolutionary”. So many socialists chose not to take the same side because they perceived a potential reorientation as “bourgeois”.

In other cases, the sudden shock changed the self-determination perspectives of the bourgeoisie against the Austrian Empire during World War I. Yet this was not the case in Trieste, because the bourgeoisie was already in favor of union with Italy before the war. In other cases, the sudden shock led to a change in the self-determination options of the majority of the inhabitants, including of the “bourgeoisie”. The mood was more “revolutionary”. Therefore, the desire for a border change was not dismissed in the above-mentioned manner.

After a period of Italian rule between 1918 and 1943-1945953, Trieste and the adjacent areas came under Anglo-American administration in 1945. Together with the Yugoslav-administered Zone B, the Anglo-American Zone A formed a part of the abortive Trieste Free Territory. The expected demographic constituency, much of the industrial (and commercial), and particularly working-class, population, voted disproportionately for parties that supported the Trieste Free Territory of 1947-1954 in the Anglo-

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953. The city and the adjacent territory, although it was still formally a part of Italy, remained under German control between 1943 and 1945. Nevertheless, ethnic Italians administered it.
American-administered Zone A. The largest one of these parties was the (non-Titoist / Moscow-oriented) Communists.\footnote{See Novak, p. 231, 258-259 and passim.}

Therefore, industrialization again hindered (Italian) nation-building. Nevertheless, a majority of the population seems to have consistently preferred to live under Italian rule also between 1943 and 1954, when the area was not under the rule of the Italian state. This was also true during the 1949 and 1952 elections (see Table 6B). These electoral results facilitated the reunion of the territory with Italy in 1954.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Election & Percentage of votes in favor of candidates and/or parties that favored union with Italy (Italian Irredentist parties) \\
\hline
1907, first round & 30.09\% \footnote{See "Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrate Vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern im Jahre 1907", in \textit{Osterreichische Statistik}, vol. 84, no. 2 (Wien: Karl Gerold’s Sohn, 1908), p. I.21, II.26. The elections were held under universal manhood suffrage.} \\
1907, second round\footnote{The elections were held under universal adult manhood suffrage.} & 8.65\% \footnote{The discrepancy between this result and the first round elections was mostly due to an irredentist (National Liberal) boycott in the second round.} \\
1911, first round\footnote{See "Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrate Vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern im Jahre 1911", in \textit{Osterreichische Statistik} (Neue Folge), vol. 7, no. 1 (Wien: Karl Gerold’s Sohn, 1912), p. 46-48, 166. The elections were held under universal adult manhood suffrage.} & 39.41\% \\
1911, second round\footnote{The elections were held under universal adult manhood suffrage.} & 44.68\% \\
June 1949\footnote{See the results in Novak, p. 306. The elections were held under universal adult suffrage.} & 65\% \\
May 1952\footnote{See the results in Novak, p. 395. The elections were held under universal adult suffrage.} & 62.24\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Votes for Political Parties in Favor of Union with Italy in Trieste and Its Suburbs\footnote{According to the 1910 Austrian population census, the Italian-speaking inhabitants represented 62.31\% of the population and the Slovene-speaking ones, 29.81\%.}}
\end{table}  

In conclusion, the case of Trieste shows that industrialization does not necessarily always hinder nation-building in absolute terms. Sudden shocks do not always have an impact, but seem to do so only when a majority of the population supports the interstate borders preceding the sudden shock. In a minority of the cases, a majority of the population already supports a border change before the sudden shock.
The case of Trieste also shows the importance of the ethnic basis and of industrialization, and their impact predicted by my model. However, the sudden shock of the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, and even the occupation of Trieste in late 1918 by Italian troops had no important or immediate impact. A minority of the ethnic Italian population would have preferred an independent Trieste, even in the period immediately after World War II.

Table 6C. (Also See Map 5.1) The Elections of 1911 in Trieste and the Adjacent Areas by Electoral Districts (Turnout, Linguistic Make-up of the Population and the Support Italian Irredentism)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of the Electoral Districts, Divided by Areas</th>
<th>Turnout in the 1911 Elections as a Percentage of the Electorate</th>
<th>Ethnic Make-up of the Population (%) in 1910 According to Colloquial Language</th>
<th>Italian Irredentism</th>
<th>Slovene Nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First or Only Round</td>
<td>Second Round</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>Slovene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trieste (II and VI)</td>
<td>81.53</td>
<td>79.01</td>
<td>79.15</td>
<td>15.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trieste (III and IV)</td>
<td>82.49</td>
<td>74.81</td>
<td>67.67</td>
<td>18.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb Gre-tta</td>
<td>85.45</td>
<td>70.43</td>
<td>45.91</td>
<td>49.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb Sco-reola</td>
<td>85.90</td>
<td>77.13</td>
<td>45.91</td>
<td>43.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trieste (V)</td>
<td>79.58</td>
<td>85.37</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb Chi-adino</td>
<td>85.48</td>
<td>72.81</td>
<td>20.29</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trieste (I)</td>
<td>80.07</td>
<td>76.90</td>
<td>66.29</td>
<td>16.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb Chi-arbola Supe-riore</td>
<td>85.76</td>
<td>82.47</td>
<td>68.07</td>
<td>28.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinterland of Trieste</td>
<td>88.22</td>
<td>67.67</td>
<td>27.82</td>
<td>4.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4. Other Cases and More General Patterns

963. “Italian Irredentism” refers to the electoral support for the Italian National Liberal Party.
964. The Slovene Nationalists as a rule did not desire separation from the Austrian Empire in 1911.
A number of groups were in favor of border changes for the sake of becoming a part of the same state with their co-nationals even before, and without, the sudden shock. All of the Serbs who cast ballots in the Bay of Kotor (Boka Kotorska) area of what was then Austrian southern Dalmatia (currently a part of Montenegro) voted irredentist. As many as 57.4% of the electorate in the elections for the lower house of the Austrian parliament in 1907 and 100% for the ones from 1911 cast ballots in this manner. This was demonstrated by the Habsburg-era electoral results. Yet the data for this small area is too limited to allow a test of all elements of the model. Nevertheless, the evidence shows the importance of the (Serbian Orthodox) ethnic basis. It is highly significant that a majority of the Serb inhabitants of the region were recorded as “Serbs” (53.15%) at the last census of 2003 rather than as “Montenegrins” (46.85%). It should also be noted that the most of the speakers of the Zeta subdialect of the Stokavian dialect of Croatian have a mostly “Montenegrin identity, whereas those who are speaking the East Herzegovinian subdialect of Stokavian tend to have a “Serbian” identity, which shows the importance of the ethnic basis.

The support for (internationalist, or at least not nationalistic or not particularly nationalistic/low-intensity nationalism) Communists and socialists, disproportionately by the population employed in industry, in numerous countries has been demonstrated by R.V. Burks in his study of the dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe. Moreover, irredentists, and the members of separatist and other ethnic disgruntled minorities were more likely to vote for the Communists due to their dissatisfaction toward, and

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967. There were 36,436 Serbs and 32,112 Montenegrins. The numbers were calculated for the districts Budva, Herceg Novi, Kotor and Tivat, from “Montenegrin Census’ from 1909 to 2003”, at http://www.njegos.org/census/index.htm (accessed March 2006). During the period of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants in the area were listed as Montenegrins. Also see the ethnic self-identification map at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Montenegro_ethnic02.png .

hostility toward, the polity in which they lived. This shows the importance of the ethnic basis and of industrialization, whose impact is the one predicted by my model.969

Yet not all the evidence supports my model, perhaps because protest parties with grievances beyond merely national ones constitute a “variable” not accounted for in my explanatory scheme. This is particularly true in the case of industrialization. Thus, the Irish Catholic industrial population of Northern Ireland has been particularly likely to support Irish irredentism. This demonstrates the importance of the ethnic basis, but not the role of industrialization as a hindrance to nation-building. Among Catholics in the area, the industrial working class has been particularly likely to be Irish irredentist (“unionist”).970

In the early twentieth century, before 1918, during the period of German rule, the German-speaking, Alsatian, working class of Strasbourg had originally voted for a German Social Democratic Reichstag deputy who had been mildly in favor of German rule. Similarly, during the interwar period, the same group971 originally voted for Communist parliamentary and local candidates. They were dissatisfied with French rule without necessarily preferring German rule. Later, most of these inhabitants became German irredentists. The latter, and the slightly diminishing electorate that continued to support them, became Communist Autonomists (perhaps originally an early case of proto-Titoism or “independent Communists”), who later became Nazis.

Similarly, the Lutheran population has been mostly in favor of German rule between 1871 and World War II, and under French interwar rule. By contrast, the Roman Catholics have tended to be particularistic, in favor of Alsace-Lorraine autonomy or even independence, under both French and German rule.972

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971. Alsace was under French rule from the seventeenth century until 1871, under German rule from 1871 until 1918, and again under French rule between 1918 and 1940. Under German rule again between 1940 and 1944/1945, the area reverted to French rule again in 1945. Lorraine has had a similar history, even though it came under French dominance somewhat later.
Another complicated issue to consider is the existence of two types of the highly educated people. One was the intense nationalists of the ethnic group in which they were born. Another one was the intense assimilationists, which supported the nationalism of the group into which they are assimilating, and in some cases intense anti-nationalists or internationalists. This was true in the case of the Jews in some areas of Eastern Europe, but also in many other cases. For example, this was true of one of the “fathers of Europe”, the Luxembourg-born and French educated Robert Schuman. A large number of the Romanian ethnonationalist figures in the literary and political world in post-1989 Moldova are of Ukrainian origin and whose mother tongue apparently is Ukrainian.

A high level of education leads to a higher intensity of one’s opinions, but the nationalist option is only one of several possibilities. Nevertheless in many cases the higher the level of education contributed to the greater intensity of national self-identification. Why? The content of the educational system played a key role in this, but this was truer in 1926 than in 1976. In the former year, the more educated Western Europeans (and, indeed, those with a higher socio-economic status in general) were more likely to have a primary national as opposed to a primary local identity. In the latter year, the more highly educated inhabitants (and, indeed, those with a higher socio-economic status in general) were also more likely to have a “European” identity than the less educated ones.973

The cases that have been discussed until now have dealt with individuals whose ethnic self-identifications (identities) were either the same as their objective/intersubjective self-identifications, or different in a particularistic sense (e.g., “Moldovan, not Romanian”). Some individuals were ethnographically a part of one well-established ethnic group (e.g., Belarussian). However, they identified

themselves as members of another ethnic group (e.g., Polish).

More often than not, in fact, possibly in all the cases in which this is true of a majority of the sub-population, this is because of a difference of religion, typically a major one, of clear-cut denominations, between this sub-population and the average member of “their” “objective” ethnic group. Thus, the Roman Catholic Belarussian-speakers identified themselves as ethnic Poles and Polish-speakers in the Polish censuses.\textsuperscript{974} The shifting identities of the majority of a sub-population under separate censuses taken by different polities in the same areas document this pattern, but so do other patterns.

One senses that this pattern was much more widespread around 1800. For example, as I have documented, the native, Eastern Orthodox ethnic Ukrainians of northern Bukovina identified themselves as being of the “Wallachian faith”, and even as “Moldovans”, in order to differentiate themselves from the Greek Catholic Ruthenians of Eastern Galicia.

Within this context, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a sudden shock in some areas and republics. No sudden shock affected the self-determination options of the titular/native ethnic nations of the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia).\textsuperscript{975} The same was also true of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s efforts to obtain independence in 1991.\textsuperscript{976} They were approved by large majorities of the population before the beginning of the collapse of Yugoslavia.

It was also true of Moldova’s and Georgia’s drive for independence in the same year too. In most of these cases, the elections of 1990-1991 led to secessionist majorities of the electorate and members of parliament. The same was also true of the Eastern Galician regions of Ukraine\textsuperscript{977}, which were also mostly pro-independence as early as the elections of 1990 and the referendum on the Union treaty of March 1991.

However, in the Moldovan case, a majority of the population came to support independence not at the time of the March 1990 parliamentary elections, but sometime after them. The change is demonstrated by the successful boycott of the vote for Gorbachev’s Union Treaty in March 1991. During


\textsuperscript{977} See Kuzio, \textit{Ukraine: Perestroika}, p. 131, 169, 197, 200 and passim, and Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 121-122, 127, 129.
that referendum, about 80% of the Russian-speaking/minority voters and 20% of the Moldovans/Romanians planned to take part. In these areas, both before and after the sudden shock, a majority of the population desired independence.

Perhaps those who displayed their separatism in the first free elections mentioned above had preferred this course since at least the late Communist period. In other areas, it was sudden shocks that made most inhabitants desire independence (the collapse of the Soviet Union in most of Ukraine and in the other non-Russian Soviet Republics, as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. The sudden shock of the Kosovo War also led to a switch from a desire for union with Serbia in Montenegro to a desire for independence.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the situation in Moldova was interesting, and it could be interpreted in more than one way. The percentage of the inhabitants and of the Moldovan/Romanian ethnic majority of the population that favored independence increased from a small majority to a large majority of the total population.

6.5. Counterfactuals, Alternative Theories and Limits

Another issue that should be discussed is the one of the counterfactuals. How could things have turned out otherwise? To some extent, the answer is obvious, but to some extent, it is not. Thus, border changes, and the legacy of previous border changes, did influence national identity and nationalism.

The policies affecting industrialization of various states have partially been designed in order to “nationalize” an area. For example, in the South Tyrol (Alto Adige or the Bolzano/Bozen area), the Italian government encouraged the migration of ethnic Italians that would work in industry in order to decrease the proportion of ethnic Germans/German-speakers. The Italian authorities also hoped that some

978. See Charles King, p. 147 and Vladimir Solonari and Vladimir Bruter, “Russians in Moldova”, in Vladimir Shlapentokh, Munir Sendich and Emil Payin, The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics (Armonk, New York, London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 80. At the time of the March 1990 elections in Moldova, 43.1% of the population desired the preservation of Moldova inside the Soviet Union, and 41.8% were for independence. Thus, 54.8% of the Moldovans/Romanians, but only 8.8% of the ethnic Russians and 8.4% of the Ukrainians, not a single Gagauz, 11.5% of the Bulgarians and 26.4% of the others favored independence. By contrast, 29.9% of the Moldovans, 76.1% of the Russians, 72.6% of the Ukrainians, 94.7% of the Gagauz, 88.8% of the Bulgarians and 66.9% of the “others” were in favor of staying in the U.S.S.R. Only 3.9% of the Moldovans/Romanians, 2.7% of the Russians, 1.6% of the Ukrainians and no members of other ethnicities favored union with Romania.
of the ethnic Germans working in industry would Italianize. This has been a factor discouraging ethnic Germans from trying to find jobs in mostly Italian localities, or in large industry.

On a different note, similar policies were followed, with the same intent, by pre-1918 Germany toward the Poles, and by pre-1918 Hungary toward its compact ethnic minorities. They were also followed by interwar Poland toward the Ukrainians and Belarussians, and by Ceausescu’s Romania toward the ethnic Hungarians, etc. These kinds of policies did not seem to have been successful.

By contrast, agricultural/agrarian colonization has been more successful in changing the national identification of the population and in inhibiting nation-building. Another effective technique has been to attract the members of territorial minorities to settle in areas where they were minorities, particularly in urban localities. This has helped with linguistic assimilation, but not always with national assimilation.

Keith Darden has argued that the only successful nation-building through the school was the first one.979 The national identity that was imposed in school earlier than any of the others “stuck”. This applies only to ethnonational identities, not to civic national identities (e.g., the Austrian civic identity during the Habsburg period in Austria for those who were not ethnic Germans).

Darden, in his explanation of nation-building stresses variables similar to the ones I emphasize, namely the family and the church, with an emphasis on their role in transmitting religious oral tradition. I fully agree with his emphasis on the importance of this variable. In fact, these are the mechanisms through which national identity and nationalism are transmitted. I call my category “ethnic basis”, which includes the family and the church, that is, the institutions that transmit religious oral tradition. Yet a broader community (locality) also plays an important role in the reproduction of national identity and in influencing the intensity of national self-identification of an average person. It is also having the same impact in terms of the chance of an individual to become a nationalistic activist.980

For example, in Bessarabia until 1917, the Moldovan-Romanian "nationalist activists" came

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from overwhelmingly Moldovan villages, in which the members of their ethnic group represented between 80.73% and 98.60% of the population according to the Romanian census of 1930 in a province that was only 56.23% Moldovan/Romanian according to the latter census. Hitler also emphasizes the importance of the community (village or small town) in indirectly explaining his own early intense German nationalism.

6.6. Policy Applications and Reflections

There are no ways of eliminating the existence of an ethnic basis on a mass scale. The impact of industrialization could be countered by de-industrialization. This process refers not only to the growth of the services sector. It also includes the decline of Communist-era industries and the “ruralization” of some of the Eastern European former Communist countries. Sudden shocks could be avoided. As for the impact of the educational system, one can not affect some of its effects, but could neutralize other ones.

The impact of the increasing education, and of the personal views of the teachers that they also disseminate, typically can not be effectively countered. The attempt to “neutralize” them is typically ineffective. However, the textbooks in theory could be made ideologically more neutral through objectivity and “multiple perspectives” and through different teaching methods. Yet this not possible if the function of the school system is to create “patriots” rather than “citizens” and “ethnonationalists” rather than “rooted individuals”. Instead of the teachers telling the students what to think, they could theoretically be encouraged to express their own thoughts, including on issues related to ethnicity, nationality and nationalism.

982. See Victor Craciun, Pierdem Basarabia? (Liga Culturala Pentru Unitatea Romanilor de Pretutindeni), Fundatia Hercules, passim.
Yet one should caution against a system of teaching that teaches as few “facts” and as many “ideas” as possible. The “nation-building” post-elementary school systems have emphasized not only nationalism, but, even more importantly, the learning of “facts”, and not merely those related to nation-building, but also the hard sciences, math, etc. The mere learning of sufficient facts “built in” a control against too much ideological indoctrination in favor of the ruling elite. The emphasis on the learning of ideas, and early “multi-perspectives” could lead to individuals who lack the firmness of any convictions, including the strength to oppose the power of the state. This is precisely one of the intents of the Moldovan Communist authorities when they are pushing this approach, together with an ideological content disguised as “tolerance”.

There are some limits to the study of nation-building. It is unfortunate that it is more difficult to evaluate the intensity of nationalism in political systems that do not pass some (relatively low, but legitimate) threshold of democracy. In addition to electoral results, the conclusions about nation-building are supported by membership figures for the relevant civil society groups and for specific incidences of collective action. Yet this measures both the intensity of nationalism and the level of civic culture.

Another issue is the fact that an individual could have two nationalistic attitudes for two national groups. This is by no means something that is abstract for this author, but very concrete, very real, very personal, because he is one of those individuals, as an American citizen by naturalization and an ethnic Romanian (and Romanian citizen) by birth. An adequate study of the electoral patterns of individuals of double-citizenship is not possible. Yet for many of them, the score of the intensity of nationalism in the case of one specific kind of nationalism plus the score of the intensity of nationalism for the other nationalism could equal more than 4.

What is the relationship between the multiple nationalisms of numerous individuals? The opinion polling data for Austria, particularly from around 1960, indicate the fact that there are numerous individuals who share both an Austrian identity and nationalism and a German one. The same was also true in Alsace. In the area, some individuals who were Alsatian particularistic fascists who went to both French fascist and German Nazi rallies in the province. Many in the Republic of Moldova share both a Moldovan patriotism and an ethnic Romanian nationalism.

Finally, there is also another issue. The increasing nationalism of the various “minority”
populations of the old Austrian Empire (and of the Soviet Empire), which could be demonstrated in numerous multiple ways, arguably started the chain of events that eventually led to the collapse of the two empires. It was precisely the increasing separatism, and not merely the Serbian one, that pushed the Habsburg monarchy into World War I. (The increasing separatism was also a key factor that helped trigger the August 19, 1991 hard-liner coup against Gorbachev in the Soviet Union.) In the former case, there was the intent to eliminate a source of irredentist agitation, and to make the population of the empire rally around the army.

The prevailing cleavage was between the more intensely nationalistic members of the various ethnic groups and the low intensity nationalism types. The intent was to switch it to a cleavage between the “separatists” and the “loyalists”. A victorious war could have helped preserve the monarchy for the long run, while a defeat would quicken the seemingly inevitable collapse of the monarchy.

What makes individuals switch from one to the other, and to what extent do many live with complexity and ambiguity? I have observed numerous individuals of Moldovan/Romanian ethnicity and Romanian ethnic self-identification displaying Moldovan civic nationalism and Romanian ethnic nationalism, or even Romanian civic nationalism (some of them are double-citizens). Yet they never seem to display a Romanian and a Moldovan nationalism at the same time in impromptu conversations or e-mail communications. As a rule, they do not display self-consciousness about their displays of two nationalisms.

6.7. Conclusions

An ethnic basis close to the desired “final product nation”, and education in the mother tongue, facilitate nation-building, whereas industrialization and sudden shocks hinder this process. My model is generally confirmed by the cases analyzed in this chapter: Saarland, Trieste, Alsace, the Bay of Kotor (Boka Kotorska) in Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, and so on.

A careful analysis of these cases supports my contentions about the impact of various variables. However, I have developed some fresh insights. The ethnic basis affects to some extent, but not completely, the self-determination preferences of the inhabitants. The educational system does not always have a significant impact in nation-building “by itself”.
Industrialization tends to hinder nation-building. Yet this happens only if the rural population of the respective ethnic group in the area is already fairly intensely nationalistic. Sudden shocks could change self-determination preferences away from the sovereignty status quo in the direction of the creation of small, highly industrialized states. Yet the support for this outcome could dissipate within a few years after the sudden shock.
Chapter 13
Conclusions, Comparisons and Reflections

7.1. Introduction/Abstract
7.2. Dissertation Summary
7.3. My Findings
7.4. Individual/Political Actors, Alternative Explanations and the Limits of My Findings
7.5. Summary of Conclusions
7.1 Introduction/Abstract

My dissertation examines the impact of four independent variables on nation-building, on the spread and intensity of nationalism. I am introducing to the study of nation-building the systematic quantitative measurement of the intensity of nationalization on four dimensions (integrative, satisfactional, identificational and symbolic). Each of them is scored from 0 to 1 and the sum of four scores constitutes the measure of the intensity of nationalism for a given unit (region or group). This provides a framework for the more systematic testing of the impact of various independent variables. An ethnic basis (language, culture, identity, etc.) culturally similar to the desired national “end product” and the spread of education are factors facilitating nation-building. In most cases, industrialization hinders it. Sudden shocks (collapses of empires, wars, revolutions, etc.) change the intensity of nationalism scores significantly albeit during very brief periods.

The empirical data of the Austrian case supports my model in every respect but one, for which the evidence is mixed, namely the impact of industrialization (and urbanization) on nation-building. The analysis of the data collected for my two main cases, the Bukovinian Romanians and the ethnic Romanians (including “Moldovans”) in Ukraine, fully supports my model.

7.2. Dissertation Summary

An ethnic basis that is close to the desired “final product nation”, as well as education in the mother-tongue, facilitate nation-building. By contrast, industrialization hinders this process. Sudden shocks

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984. For more insights into the concept of the nationalization of the masses with an emphasis on myths, symbols and rituals, see George L. Mosse, *The nationalization of the masses: political symbolism and mass movements in Germany from the Napoleonic wars through the Third Reich*, (New York: H. Fertig, 1975).

985. My outlook on this topic is consistent with that of Anthony D. Smith and Roman Szporluk. It partly agrees and is partly in disagreement with Miroslav Hroch’s line, and predominantly in disagreement with that of Ernest Gellner. For more details, see Ionas Aurelian Rus, “Variables Affecting Nation-Building: The Bukovinian Romanian Case from 1880 to 1918”, presented at the 7th Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), Harriman Institute, Columbia University, April 2002. Smith attributes a number of characteristics to ethnic communities (ethnies), including a proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of a common culture, an association with a specific "homeland", and a feeling of solidarity shared by significant segments of the population. See Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991).
(collapses of empires, wars and revolutions) change the intensity of nationalism scores significantly during very short periods.

I define nation-building or the nationalization of the population (dependent variable) as a process that transforms the “ethnic basis” into a nation. Nation-building is a complex process through which individuals become the members of a nation. The four dimensions for nation-building that I try to measure are called: integrative, satisfacional, identificational and symbolic. The integrative dimension focuses on political loyalty toward governance units, and refers to whether the citizens are loyal to the state, or would desire its break-up, union with another state, a border change in which they would come under a different sovereignty or a constitutional change through which they would gain more autonomy/self-rule. The satisfacional dimension is designed to measure the relative level of satisfaction of the various segments of the population with the circumstances of their lives. Relevant data comes from the distribution of answers to such questions as “When (under what polity and/or constitutional provisions on the national question) have you been better off overall?”, or more specific questions concerning economic welfare or income. The identificational dimension looks at identity, at declarations of self-identification. The symbolic dimension is concerned with how individuals react to symbols.

There are four main independent variables that account for changes on the dependent variable, nation-building. The first one is the nation-building potential of the ethnic basis, which facilitates nation-building. Another one is the educational system, which tends to further it. The elementary educational system provides a basic grounding in nationalism, whereas the higher reaches of the system foster more intense nationalism, which is particularly true as one goes up in the system. Industrialization, the third variable I study, tends to hinder nation-building. The fourth variable, sudden shocks, plays a major role in shaping self-determination preferences by speeding up the pace of change. My model is intended for a

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987. This conclusion is contrary to the established view, which is argued by, for example, Ernest Gellner. My conclusions are similar to Deutsch's. See the discussion of the spread of national consciousness and of the changes in values in Deutsch, p. 152-155 and passim is partially accurate.
generalized use, particularly for European groups, but also more universally.

The progress of nation-building has been ascertained for each variety of nationalism (e.g., Romanian nationalism in Bukovina). This has been accomplished by ascribing to the vote for a particular party or candidate a value ranging from 0 to 1. Occasionally, the results of referenda, opinion polls, membership in organizations, the signing of petitions, and participation in rallies were also scored. The total score for a given electoral district, region or social group was determined by adding the values on the four selected dimensions for measuring the intensity of nation-building. These dimensions are instrumental for operationalizing my dependent variable. Some influential theorists, such as Ernest Gellner and Miroslav Hroch, emphasize the positive role of socio-economic modernization/development, including industrialization, in nation-building, but my cases show otherwise.

My principal case is the Bukovinian Romanians. The progress of nation building among them is discussed for the years 1880-2005, but I particularly focus on two periods: 1880-1940/1944 and 1989-2005. I have analyzed this case at the “micro-level”, locality-by-locality, in great depth, especially for certain periods. The other case is Austria within its present boundaries, particularly its inhabitants of German ethnic origin, language and culture. I have looked at this group during the period since the late 19th century, with a focus on the period between 1907 and 1962.988

I focused my research on the most critical periods of nation-building in the studied areas, and have relied extensively on historical data. I have selected representative cases for which the quantitative operationalization / measurement of nation-building for selected periods of time is possible and valid. There is statistical data (primarily electoral, but also, to a lesser extent, related to civil society and collective action), and, more recently, opinion polling data, that allows us to measure exactly what we are looking for and to compare. The differences in the values of the independent variables between the cases, and, over time, within each case, allow us to test a model with possibly universal applicability in a methodologically appropriate manner.

988 Whereas I have visited large areas of Bukovina on numerous occasions, I have visited Austria, and more precisely Vienna and some neighboring areas, only once. My work on Austria has been mostly macro-level, at a higher level of data aggregation, although I have looked at some “micro-level” patterns in certain localities. I have also looked at several other cases, as evidenced by Table 7.1.2. Sometimes it was the nation-building processes of other national groups in the same territories.
An ethnic basis close to the desired “final product nation”, and education in the mother-tongue, facilitate nation-building, whereas industrialization and sudden shocks hinder this process.

7.3. Findings

As we have already seen in chapters 10 and 11, the empirical data of the Austrian case support my model in every respect but one, for which the evidence is mixed, namely the impact of industrialization (and urbanization) on nation-building. In the other cases, including the main one, that of the Bukovinian Romanians (and later that of the ethnic Romanians, including “Moldovans” in Ukraine, many of whom live in Northern Bukovina), the empirical data fully supports my model.

989. Ethnic self-identification (“identity”) is only one element of the ethnic basis, but one very salient to both my model, and one that “communes” a great deal with much of the work on ethnicity and nationalism.
An important case of nation-building is that of the population of Austria in its present-day borders, and particularly of the Austrian German-speaking inhabitants. The Austrian case is typically cited as an example in which a population once had one national identity and supported one type of nationalism ("German"), but has switched over to another one ("Austrian"). This process commenced in 1945 and by 1962, the end point of my electoral analysis, the “Austrian” identity was already dominant.

My case studies as a rule confirm my theoretical model (see Table 7.1.2.). The only major exception is the mixed evidence concerning the impact of urbanization, and especially in the Austrian case. I would argue that my theorizing about the impact of industrialization and urbanization on the nation building is confirmed for most cases I studied; the evidence is mixed for only two cases out of 15 cases. The cases in which my expectations about industrialization and urbanization are confirmed are areas where people with various identities live together. The Austrian case shows that even though the dominant pattern in the cases I examined is that industrialization and urbanization hinder nation-building, nevertheless there are exceptions to this rule.

Political actors could alter, but not reverse, the “default pattern.” They could also play an important role when the public opinion of the relevant group is about equally divided on issues regarding the curricula of the language and history education for a particular group. This was the case with the “Romanian-language” schools in 1992-1998. They were turned into “Moldovan-language” schools in 1998, and catered to the Moldovans/Romanians in the Odessa Region of Ukraine. I should also note that in some of the cases, literacy was so quasi-universal that the impact of the illiteracy of the 10-15% or less of inhabitants on nation-building can not be determined. I have indicated the cases in which this pattern was applicable through the “(no literacy)” abbreviation. Other complexities are summarized in the table, and discussed in more detail in the previous chapters.

The impact of the ethnic basis in the selected cases was the predicted one. (For a graphic display of how this worked in the various specific cases, see Table 7.1.2.) The closer the ethnic basis was to the (desired) national standard, the easier was the nation-building. The ethnic basis has four main sub-components, intersubjective ethnicity, religion and degree of religiosity, dialect and sub-dialect and identity/self-identification.
Table 7.1.2. Impact of Independent Variables as Predicted by My Model (Y/N/Mixed, etc.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable Number &amp; Name</th>
<th>Independent Variable 1</th>
<th>Independent Variable 2</th>
<th>Independent Variable 3</th>
<th>Independent Variable 4</th>
<th>Alternative Explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case, Case Type and Period</td>
<td>Ethnic Basis</td>
<td>Educational System</td>
<td>Industrialization (also Urbanization)</td>
<td>Sudden Shocks</td>
<td>Alternative Explanations (Important or Not?), Comments Discussed in Which Chapter or Part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Cases</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukovinian Romanians (1880-1918)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapters 2 and 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukovinian Romanians (1918-1944)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (for most of the period)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapters 4 and 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians, Chernivtsi Region (1989-2004)(^{990})</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (no testing for literacy)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapters 6, 7 and 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans, Odessa Region (1989-2004)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (no testing for literacy)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No, but political actors were important, Chapter 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria, German-speakers, 1907-1962</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (no testing for literacy)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No, political actors were key in “turning on and off” the impact of industrialization and urbanization, chapters 10 and 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minor Cases (Studied in Less Depth)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukovinian Ukrainians, 1907-1944</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapters 4 and 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukovina, Jews, 1907-1944</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapters 4 and 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukovina, Germans, 1907-1944</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapters 4 and 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukovina, Poles, 1907-1944</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapters 4 and 5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{990}\) Including the self-styled “Moldovans”. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minorities in Austria, 1907-1962</th>
<th>Independent Variable 1</th>
<th>Independent Variable 2</th>
<th>Independent Variable 3</th>
<th>Independent Variable 4</th>
<th>Alternative Explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (no testing for literacy)</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapters 10 and 11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthian Germans-speakers, 1907-1962</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (no testing for literacy)</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No, political actors were important (Chapters 10 and 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthian Slo-venes, 1907-1962</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (not always literacy)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapters 10 and 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland Germans, 1945-1961</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (no testing for literacy)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapter 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trieste, Italians (and Slovenes) 1907-1954</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (no testing for literacy)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapter 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alsacians (German-speakers) 1870-1945</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapter 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Cases (Incomplete Testing)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (Chapter 12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The impact of external categorization\(^{991}\) on the ethnic basis can not be dismissed.\(^{992}\) The Bukovinian peasant with a “Moldovan” identity was still classified an ethnic “Romanian” by the Austrian

\(^{991}\) See Brubaker and Cooper, p. 15. James C. Scott argues that "the modern state, through its official attempts and with varying success, creates a population with those standardized characteristics because it will be easier to monitor, count, assess, and manage. That is a little bolder than I would like to state it and it misses the fact that these efforts fall enormously short. However, I think there is an effort by officials either to transform or to represent as transformed the population, space, and nature under their jurisdiction into a closed system, without the surprises that frustrate their ability to control and observe it. This often provides for some enormous surprises when things do not work out as well." See Atul Kohli et al., "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics", in *World Politics*, October 1995, vol. 48, no. 1, p. 35.

\(^{992}\) Thomas Eriksen argues that "[e]thnic identities are neither ascribed nor achieved: they are both. They are wedged between situational selection and imperatives imposed from without." See Eriksen, p. 57. Rogers Brubaker notes in a subsequent study that “The Romanian ethnocultural nation can also be understood to include Romanian-speaking citizens of Moldova, Ukraine, and other neighboring states.” See Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 14. The linguist Walter Feldman argues that ‘nationality consciousness (asserted nationality identity) cannot be considered apart from subjective group identity, or self-image, which is vulnerable to direct and indirect influences from official pressures. Unlike the concept "nationality" which involves a set of criteria imposed by an outside observer, "nationality consciousness" is a subjective attitude of the group itself.’ See Walter Feldman, "The Theoretical Basis for the Definition of Moldavian Nationality", in Ralph S. Clem (ed.), *The Soviet West: Interplay Between Nationality and Social Organization* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 47-48.
authorities during the 1870’s. Another example: however much a self-styled “Moldovan” in the Chernivtsi region of Ukraine in its present borders, including in Northern Bukovina, might have thought of himself as “only” a “Moldovan”, some of his Ukrainian and other neighbors would still have treated him as a Romanian. They might have labeled him “Romanian = Fascist” and “Romanian = Occupier” during the Soviet period. The Austrians who viewed themselves as “Austrians” rather than as “Germans” still had to live under four-power occupation until October 1955, and were seen and treated collectively as the collaborators of the Nazis by the occupiers. If a self-identified “Austrian” from Carinthia desired a switch from Slovene to German as the language of instruction in a school, the Slovene nationalists would externally categorize him as a “German (nationalist)”, not as an “Austrian (nationalist)”.

There were Saar and Trieste states immediately after World War II, but nobody claimed that there was a “Saar or Saarese nation”. The only people who claimed that there was a “Triestine nation” distinct from the Italians and the Slovenes were those inhabitants who formed a minority of the population and believed that they were the members of such a “nation”. On the other hand, a self-identified “Moldovan” and a self-identified “Austrian” might not like or might not mind if they were called “Romanian” or “German”, but they would not be surprised or startled by such a label. They would certainly be surprised and startled if they would be labeled as Portuguese or Norwegians. This shows the impact of the ethnic base in establishing the framework for the discussion of national identity.

The Austrian case is unique in Central Europe (broadly defined) in the sense that there is an Austrian culture that is somewhat distinct from the culture(s) of Germany, in the same way and to the same extent to which there is a Canadian English-speaking culture distinct from the American one. This distinction could be recognized and articulated by some of the Austrians themselves and by some outsiders. You will not find anything analogous in Ukrainian Chernivtsi Region, including northern Bukovina, where neither the outsiders nor the local Romanians would be able to make similar distinctions between “Romanians” and “Moldovans.” The bottom line is that some nation-building processes benefit from the fact they are based on an intersubjective ethnicity, perhaps based on some cultural elements, while some do

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993. The nation can allegedly be distinguished from subnational and supranational categories because it is, as Rupert Emerson puts it "the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding the claims of both lesser communities within it and those who cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society." See Walker Connor, "When is a Nation", in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 157.
not. Brubaker and Cooper\textsuperscript{994} suggest that identification, understood as the development of individual or collective identity, is a dialectical process in which self-identification and external categorization, including by powerful actors, such as states, mutually influence each other. I agree that this describes what is going on in some cases.\textsuperscript{995} In some cases, self-identification within a given community or category of people is similar to the dominant external categorizations of this group/category. In such cases nation-building progresses rather swiftly. And the case of Moldovans/Romanians in Northern Bukovina seems to belong to this category.

Religion and levels of religiosity are other important elements of the ethnic basis that need to be evaluated. A Lutheran pastor in Austria during the middle of the 1930’s was likely to talk about “Germanism” of his parishioners. The priest of the Bessarabian Metropolitanate of the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate in the Republic of Moldova or Ukraine was likely to talk during the 1990’s and early 2000’s about the “Romanianness” of his parishioners. These clergymen, their preaching and practices, and the relevant religious texts have not promoted “Austrian” or “Moldovan” identities in the contexts discussed above.

The self-identified “Moldovans” of the Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine celebrate Christmas mostly according to the “New Style” or Gregorian calendar, on December 25, just like in Romania. They are different from the overwhelming majority of the self-identified “Moldovans” in the Republic of Moldova, who follow the “Old Style” Julian calendar, and celebrate Christmas on January 7. It is no wonder that they accept at least a “Romanian” secondary identity. Secularization, religious reforms and the individuals’ changes of their religious denomination have affected the ethnic basis. However, if the situation is stationary, the correlation between the type of religion and levels of religiosity on the one hand and national identity on the other is strong. As we have seen in chapter 5, sometimes there is not even a need for political actors to frame the issue in an explicit way.

The dialect and sub-dialect are also important for nation-building. The link between language and national identity and nationalism is so well known that it requires no introduction. “Austrianness” and

\textsuperscript{994} Brubaker and Cooper. ‘Beyond’ “Identity”, p. 15-17.
\textsuperscript{995} See in particular the findings of chapters 2 and 3 in the case of the Bukovinian Romanians under Austrian rule from the 1860’s until 1918 and of chapters 4 and 5 of the self-identified “Hutsuls” of the northwestern part of southern Bukovina under Romanian rule. Also see chapter 9 on the self-identified “Moldovans” of the Odessa Region of Ukraine.
“Moldovaness” are based on more local, parochial characteristics than “Germanness” or “Romanianness.” If you do not use the Bessarabian Moldovan accent and/or sub-dialect of the Romanian language, but another regional accent or the literary language without a regional accent, you will not be perceived as a Bessarabian “Moldovan.” Moreover, with most Austrians speaking the Central Bavarian Subdialect of German, those Austrians who are speaking the Southern Bavarian and Alemmanic ones are seen as somewhat “different”. The dialect and subdialect could be influenced by schooling. However, the typical process is for individuals to learn and become used to speaking the standard, non-dialectical form of a language rather than to be taught in school to shift to a different dialect.

The issue of identity/self-identification is also important in nation-building because our findings indicate that professing one specific national or ethnic identity, particularly as a primary rather than as a secondary one, facilitates the nation-building process associated with that identity. For example, having a “Romanian” identity facilitates Romanian nation-building. An “Austrian” identity facilitates Austrian nation-building and a “German” identity facilitates German nation-building. It has been much easier for a self-identified “Moldovan” to become involved in the process of “Romanian” nation-building than for a self-identified Ukrainian. Moreover, the educational system, which is discussed below, could influence self-identification.

The impact of the educational system should be analyzed in relation to two main issues (see Table 7.1.2.). One is the level of literacy. There is little evidence to suggest that, even within the same kind of electoral system based on universal suffrage, the province or district whose inhabitants are the most literate has the most intensely nationalistic electorate. Yet if a very large majority of the population is illiterate, a large part, perhaps even a majority, of the electorate, does not vote for particularly nationalistic candidates. It is also true that among voters who are mostly illiterate. In general, increases in literacy seem to lead to increases in the intensity of nationalism.

The content of what is taught by the educational system has an impact on national identity. It influences a person to think of oneself as a “Romanian” rather than as a “Moldovan”, or as an “Austrian” rather than as a “German”. This is true among the individuals with a similar, even identical, ethnic basis, including the same language and subdialect. However, in most cases, educational institutions can not turn the members of national/linguistic minorities into members of the national/linguistic majority.
In the Bukovinian Romanian and Austrian German cases, I have found that, with everything else being equal, the higher the level of education, the higher was the intensity of nationalism score. With increasing education, that is, more years of schooling, there has also been a preference for a broader, less “parochial”, identity, such as “Romanian” rather than “Moldovan”, or “German” rather than “Austrian”. This has been particularly true for those who were involved in the educational system, such as professors, teachers and students. In recent years, this factor has helped the spread of a “European” identity, which is increasingly common as the level of schooling goes up. Even though I have not discussed this in the dissertation, I would suspect that the spread of a European identity had an important impact. Starting during the 1970’s, the individuals with a “German” primary and an “Austrian” secondary identity have developed a “European” primary identity instead of a “German” primary one. Yet they have retained their “Austrian” secondary identity. 996

At any rate, “broader” identities are often seen as a form of “flight” of the more educated from the more “provincial” or even “parochial” identities of the less educated. 997 Yet the data presented in this dissertation does not support this contention. This is indeed an area in need of research. More intensely “provincial” identities, such as the “Austrian” one in comparison to the “German” one, could also be made to appear “broader”. This could be accomplished through references to past “broad” imperial glories and greatness. Yet this could work only if such greatness and glory could be credibly invoked. This has worked in Austria in recent decades, but it does not work among self-identified “Moldovans” who attempt to reject or challenge the “Romanian” identity.

The impact of industrialization and urbanization is more complex. Almost all of the cases support my model, but the findings of the Austrian case are mixed (for a summary see Table 7.1.2.). Industrialization tends to be correlated with lower intensities of nationalism, in almost all the cases discussed in this work. But generalizations would be hazardous.

This brings me to yet another variable: political actors. Their actions can to some extent counteract this impact of industrialization and induce the “industrialized” population to vote for political forces and

996. See the coverage of the Austrian case in chapters 10 and 11 of the present dissertation for more details.
candidates with high intensity of nationalism scores. This can be, and, in the Austrian case, was sometimes achieved through the advocacy of policies favorable to the industrial population, and particularly the industrial employees. A similar argument works for urbanization, except for the fact that it hinders nation-building to a lesser extent. In some areas of Austria, the urban population has higher intensities of nationalism scores, particularly in the less industrialized cities and towns. There were important differences between the Bukovinian Romanian case and most other cases on the one hand, and the Austrian German-speaking case, on the other, on these issues. This largely has to do with the role of political actors. What needs to be tested is whether the role of political actors is more pronounced when it comes to for example economic issues (e.g., industrialization) rather than the questions of nation-building.

The evidence presented in this work shows that sudden shocks produce significant changes in the self-determination preferences of the population in the manner predicted by my model. Thus, the percentage of the Bukovinian Romanians who preferred to be ruled by Romania increased from perhaps one-tenth at the beginning of World War I to almost 100% by the end of the war, at the time of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy. There was a massive jump in the percentage of the German-speaking Austrians desiring union with Germany at the end of World War I. Most of these inhabitants became in favor of union with Germany immediately before the collapse of the empire. The same massive sudden changes in preferences for being a part of a polity rather than another took place at the time of the Nazi occupation of Austria, of the collapse of the Soviet Union, etc. It seems, however, that the impact of sudden shocks is sufficient, but not necessary. In some cases (such as the “minor” ones of Trieste before World War I, and Saarland in 1952-1955) which are discussed in chapter 12, massive changes occurred without a sudden shock. However, whereas the change was slow in the Trieste case, it was relatively fast in Saarland. In the latter case, the explanation seems to be the wearing off of the sudden shock of the German defeat in World War II and of its consequences, and of the impact of the formal allied occupation of the country, and particularly of its western parts.

The impact of sudden shocks is not perpetual. There is often a partial “return” to the mentalities of the past. Yet in the cases studied in this dissertation, the nation-building never returned completely to what it had been before the sudden shocks.

Tables 7.3.1., 7.3.2. and 7.3.3. present the parallel evolution of the intensity of nationalism scores
for my main cases. Table 7.4. shows the evolution of civil society and collective action in some of them.

Table 7.3.1. The Intensity of Nationalism Scores for Elections to the Lower House of the Austrian Imperial Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Election</th>
<th>Multi-National (Multi-Ethnic) Empire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907 (1st round)</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 (1st round)</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3.2. The Intensity of Nationalism Scores for Elections to the Houses of the National Parliaments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Election</th>
<th>Ethnic-Civic National State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austrian (lower house)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>NE&lt;sup&gt;999&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>NFE&lt;sup&gt;1001&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>NFE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>998</sup> These are the scores for the two rounds of elections.
<sup>999</sup> “NE”= “No free election in that year in that area”.
<sup>1000</sup> “NA/NU”=“Not available or not used”. See the text of the dissertation for a detailed explanation.
<sup>1001</sup> “NFE”= “No reasonably free and fair elections in that area in that year”.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>German (lower house)</th>
<th>Austrian (lower house)</th>
<th>German + Austrian (lower house)</th>
<th>Romanian Assembly (lower house)</th>
<th>Romanian Senate (lower house)</th>
<th>Romanian Assembly (lower house)</th>
<th>Romanian Senate (upper house)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>NFE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3.3. The Electoral Patterns in Compact Ethnic Minority Areas of National States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Type</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election/Year/Type</td>
<td>Romanian Electoral District 204 (1998-2004) in Ukraine, Score and Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which House of Parliament?</td>
<td>Only House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Characteristics</td>
<td>All Adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preceding Election</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year and Country</td>
<td>Habsburg Austria, 1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Election</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year and Country</td>
<td>Ukraine, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Election</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year and Country</td>
<td>Ukraine, 1999, second round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third election</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year and Country</td>
<td>Ukraine, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Election</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Type</td>
<td>Compact (&quot;Local Majority&quot;) Ethnic Minority Nationalism in a National State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year and Country</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ukraine, 2004, Third Round</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4. Civil Society and Collective Action in Bukovina and Austria (in Its Present Borders)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th><strong>Bukovina</strong></th>
<th><strong>Austria in Its Present-Day Borders</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic or Linguistic Group</strong></td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Census Results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910 Census by Colloquial Language</td>
<td>273,254</td>
<td>305,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 Census</td>
<td>379,991 (nationality)</td>
<td>280,651 (language), 261,024 (nationality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941 Census by Nationality</td>
<td>438,766</td>
<td>273,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 Census by Nationality in the Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine</td>
<td>181,780 by nationality, including 67,225 “Moldovans”, 171,303 by mother-tongue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalistic Collective Action and/or Civil Society, by Year</td>
<td>Nationalistic Collective Action and/or Civil Society – Numbers and Descriptive</td>
<td>Nationalistic Collective Action and/or Civil Society – Numbers and Descriptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>46,136 signatures at March 12 rally in opposition to the creation of a Ruthenian Orthodox Bishopric</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,000 members of Ruthenian Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>More participation than among Ukrainians in the same year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Bukovina</td>
<td>Austria in Its Present-Day Boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 million members of the Austro-German People’s League(^{1002}) (26% of electorate), which favored union with Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>40,000 signatures on petition in favor of education in the Ukrainian language education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>32,000 (bloc of votes for the Ukrainian National Party)</td>
<td>1.8 million members of the Austro-German People’s League(^{1003}) (44% of electorate), which favored union with Germany</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Bukovina</th>
<th>Austria in Its Present-Day Boundaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic or Linguistic Group</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalistic Collective Action and/or Civil Society, by Year</td>
<td>Nationalistic Collective Action and/or Civil Society – Numbers and Description</td>
<td>Nationalistic Collective Action and/or Civil Society – Numbers and Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 at far-right National Christian Party rally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>113,860 irredentist sympathizers in Northern Bukovina (47.37% of total ethnic Ukrainian population)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000 (The Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine)</td>
<td>150,000 signatures in the Chernivtsi Region of Ukraine (the quasi-totality of the ethnic Romanians, including the self-styled “Moldovans”) in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{1003}\) Katzenstein, *Disjointed Partners*, p. 147.
As we have seen, the empirical data of the Austrian case supports my model in every respect but one, for which the evidence is mixed, namely the impact of industrialization and urbanization on nation-building. In the other cases, including the main one, that of the Bukovinian Romanians (and later the ethnic Romanians, including “Moldovans” in Ukraine) the empirical data fully supports my model.

7.4. Individual/Political Actors, Alternative Explanations and the Limits of My Findings

Political actors have had a role, but it has been built either into my model or discussed above, and is not very important in explaining the aggregate data. The other alternative explanations discussed in the previous chapters are not significant. These are moreover highly localized and case-specific, not uniform throughout the cases. There are some limits to the generalizability of my study: it may not be relevant for the period before some point in the 19th century, for the distant future, etc.

The role of individual actors is built into my model and some theoretical discussion on this topic is now in order. It was not my argument that ethnic origin automatically determines nationalism. Yet it seems to me that that the role of political actors is not a viable alternative to or a substitute of my explanation. To some extent, the impact of individual actors who are not politicians or other types of political actors is built into my model, and consistent with it. Thus, if an individual makes the choice to move into an ethnically different locality, and particularly village, whose population is ethnically different from the locality from which he originates, his descendants are likely to have a different ethnic identity and to support a different kind of nationalism than his or her parents. This is what is likely to happen to the ethnic Romanian from an almost exclusively Romanian village in Ukraine marrying into a Ukrainian family and moving into an overwhelmingly ethnically Ukrainian village. It is also true of the ethnic Slovene from a mostly linguistically Slovene locality in Carinthia moving to Salzburg or Graz in Austria.
In terms of the educational system, a parent’s decision to send one’s children to school or not influences his children’s intensity of nationalism score. Of course, if schooling up to a certain level was compulsory, his (or her) choice was influenced by what cost him more, the fine for not sending the child to school or the inability to use the child’s labor. Even though Romanian ethnic nationalism was universal among the Bukovinian Romanian teachers before 1918, only a minority of the teachers taught irredentism, the minority being smaller in elementary schools and increasing as one went up the educational ladder. The ethnic Ukrainian students of interwar Bukovina who were taught mostly by ethnic Romanians were more likely to be loyal to Romania than those who were taught by ethnic Ukrainian teachers. In interwar Austria, a teacher could emphasize Germanism or Austrianism more. The history textbooks gave him or her enough latitude.

Yet there are limits to what individual actors could achieve. I have talked to numerous individuals whose Romanian nationalism and reading of history was fully consistent with the textbooks of the late 1930’s. The level of uniformity was too great for me to believe that it mattered very much which individual teacher taught the subject in school. In a 99% ethnically Romanian village in Ukraine, it might be impossible for an ethnic Romanian to speak mostly in Ukrainian even if he or she wanted to. It would be difficult to get an elementary education in Ukrainian in such a village, which has no Ukrainian school. Moreover, if you do not have the appropriate accent associated with a specific language or even dialect or subdialect, you will likely not be accepted as a member of the linguistic or idiom community.

I have already demonstrated that political actors, including politicians, could overcome the built-in hindrance to nation-building of industrialization and urbanization through their discourse and actions. The decision to move to an urban locality or to work in industry is largely made by the individual. Finally, if after a sudden shock, the percentage of the population of a certain group that desired a shift in sovereignty was close to 100% (e.g., among the Bukovinian Romanians in 1918, who overwhelmingly switched their loyalty from Austria to Romania), there was little that political actors could do to oppose it. However, if the shift was from a minority to “only” about 60%, then political actors could influence the status of the territory, just as it happened in the case of the Republic of Austria in 1919.

The generalizability of this study is limited by types of cases. I have not looked at Asian or African cases. My discussion of the ethnic and national identity of the Romanian, Ukrainian and Austrian-
German immigrants to North America and their descendants is useful. However, due to data and space limits, it is not far-reaching enough for an understanding of these patterns in North America. This study might be of greater resonance to Europeanists dealing with cases on which my model could be tested. Even though I have looked at situations and settings with different levels of literacy, urbanization and industrialization, there have been societies that were 95% rural and 95% illiterate. I did not look at them at those points in time sufficiently. The extent to which my research is relevant to the period before some time in the 19th century is not clear. The growth of a “European” identity is something that has been discussed only briefly in this work; this process may limit the usefulness of my findings for the future.

There is also the issue of area expertise. Since I do not have sufficient expertise in some other geographical areas, it would not be easy for me to test my model in those places, and I could not do it instantly. I would not be the best person to test it in those cases.

7.5. Summary of Conclusions

My dissertation examines the impact of four key independent variables on nation-building, on the evolution of the spread and intensity of nationalism. An ethnic basis (language, culture, identity, etc.) similar to the desired end-product as well as the growth of education facilitate nation-building. In most cases, industrialization hinders it. Sudden shocks (collapses of empires, wars and revolutions) change the intensity of nationalism scores significantly during very short periods. Political actors have had a role, but it has either been built into my model, or it does not seem important in explaining the aggregate data. Neither are the other alternative explanations. They are moreover highly localized and case-specific, not uniform throughout the cases. There are some limits to the generalizability of my study: it may not be relevant for the period before some point in the 19th century or for the future.
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Curriculum Vita

IONAS AURELIAN RUS

EDUCATION

Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, Department of Political Science
Ph.D. in Political Science, October 2008
M.A. in Political Science, May 2002
Graduate Certificate in Russian, Central and East European Studies, May 2002

Columbia University, New York, NY

Rutgers College, New Brunswick, NJ
B.A., Magna Cum Laude, in History and Political Science, May 1995.
  • Minor: Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Part-Time Lecturer, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, 2003, 2007-2008

Teaching Assistant, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, 2000-2004

Grader, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, Fall 1998

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant, The Center for Global Security and Democracy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, 2005-2006

Research Assistant, The Center for Russian, Central and East European Studies, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, 2001-2003

INDEPENDENT EXPERT EXPERIENCE

Independent Expert, Institute of Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS), Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, March - November 2005

PUBLICATIONS

Peer-Reviewed Journal Publications


- "The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Right in the Interwar Years (III)“, in Arhivele Totalitarismului (“The Archives of Totalitarianism”), no. 3-4, 1999 (Year 7, no. 24-25), p. 8-32.


Encyclopedia Article


Internet Publication


Other Publication