AMERICA ADJUSTED: CONFORMITY, BOREDOM, 
AND THE MODERN SELF, C. 1920-1980 

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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This dissertation is a history of twentieth-century socio-psychological “adjustment.” The concept can be traced back to the burgeoning social sciences in the early years of the century, to a time when practitioners were trying to create a technical, consensus-building vocabulary that would allow them to move beyond the imprecise language of the humanities, metaphysical categories of theology, and biologism of the natural sciences. The language of “social structure,” “function,” and “roles”—the terms of adjustment—promised to do just that.

Adjustment caught on for a host of reasons. Besides providing social scientists with an argot around which they could construct and carry out research programs, convey results, and foster professionalization, the language of adjustment propagated the reformist ethos of progressivism, inspiring—albeit in more secular, less strident tones—a utopian vision of a more efficient, integrated, and stable social order. That optimism could also be inverted. Adjustment was married with Freudianism to explain both Depression-related ills at home and the rise of totalitarian regimes abroad in the thirties.
Adjustment precipitously spilled over into popular culture, creating new idioms and metaphors, ways of speaking and, thus, thinking. This process of vernacularization was stimulated by the emergence of fascism overseas, by World War II militarization, and then after, postwar, through the wholesale “readjustment” of millions of service personnel, which sparked a dramatic expansion of higher education. Through a host of mechanisms—demobilization programs, “Dear Abby” advice columns, novels, textbooks, among others—the U.S. population was inculcated in the ways of adjustment.

Not everyone thought adjustment a worthy goal, of course. The popularity of anti-adjustment authors Norman Mailer and Betty Friedan attest to that. Yet, both advocates and detractors contributed to its propagation and ensured it hegemony. People began to believe, whether or not it was true or verifiable, that Americans had indeed become too adjusted, too acquiescent to the dominant culture. This dissertation argues that the hegemony of adjustment helps to explain not only the great debates about conformity, boredom, and all things “mass” in the fifties, and then the student uprising of the sixties, but also other essential elements of mainstream mid-century American thought.
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The production of a dissertation is in many ways an act of faith, the belief—sometimes sure but often shaky—that one’s toil will result in something that is tangible, enduring and, hopefully, of some greater use. Little do we realize when we embark, however, just how utterly insufficient our own idealistic ambitions are compared to the enormity of the task and, as a result, how often we will need to throw ourselves onto the good faith and generosity of others to see it, and us, through. My debts run far deeper than I can acknowledge here in a few lines. Suffice it to say, though, that without the confidence, tangible as well as intangible support and sacrifice, hard work, and sage advice of others, this dissertation would simply not exist. And I would not be where I am today. Thanking these individuals and institutions is truly a pleasure.

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In 1955 in a lecture honoring the centennial of Sigmund Freud’s birth the literary critic Lionel Trilling stood before the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society and warned the assembled guests that America had drifted into the strong headwind of another national crisis. Common consensus outside the Institute and Society might have disputed the claim had it been put to the test; the label “crisis” is, after all, itself a term of exceptional relativity. And yet, many Americans were concerned that the country had drifted off course. Intellectuals, pundits, professors, artists, ministers, critics, and writers waxed ominously and wrote feverishly about Trilling’s crisis.

Trilling, guided by his own light, said he could trim it down to a single though profound and pervasive “misapprehension.” America had veered off course because it had misconstrued the “nature of the self” and “the right relation of the self to the culture.”¹ What Trilling wanted to address that evening at the Institute was known in less philosophical terms as the problem of mid-century “conformity.” By 1955 the topic had

acquired an obsessive quality, filling newsstands and bookshelves, radio broadcasts and lecture circuit schedules. Trilling had hoped in his lecture to peel back the rhetoric to get at conformity’s root causes, which still lacked a sturdy explanation. McCarthyism and loyalty oaths were merely symptoms, he and others said, not the disease, not the real crisis. The problem was that Americans had lost a sense of themselves, as distinct “selves.” Americans had become, as the sociologist David Riesman put it, “other-directed”—that is, “adjusted.” Americans had lost the ability to think and act independently from their suburban neighbors and cubicle coworkers.

Nearly a quarter century later, in 1978, the cultural critic and historian Christopher Lasch published *The Culture of Narcissism*. For all that had changed in American society in the interim, for all the movements, from civil rights to feminism to gay rights, one thing had not, said Lasch, in what was a scathing critique of post-sixties U.S. culture. It was still as narcissistic as ever—although, he noted, narcissism was not to be confused with self-centeredness, nor the other selves that seemed to be multiplying everywhere. Self-absorption, self-help, self-realization, self-actualization, these were mere surface effects of a deeper cultural pattern that was, ironically, rather self-less. That is, the idea of the self, of the personal “I,” had become too weak, too incapacitated, too ephemeral (i.e., too narcissistic) to enact meaningful change out in the world. This, he argued, was the source of America’s post-Vietnam “malaise.”

Lasch’s most precise definition of narcissism came not in *The Culture of Narcissism* but in his next book, *The Minimal Self* (1984). He had felt the need to define it more precisely because too many readers had, he claimed, misread or failed to grasp the original. (“Narcissism is a difficult idea that looks easy—a good receipt for
confusion,””2 he wrote in his defense.) “As the Greek legend reminds us, it is this confusion of the self and the not-self—not ‘egoism’—that distinguishes the plight of Narcissus. The minimal or narcissistic self is, above all a self uncertain of its own outlines, longing either to remake the world in its own image or to merge into its environment in blissful union.”3 It represented a kind of “survival strategy” in a world of diminished expectations, disposable commodities, prolonged boredom, and “inner emptiness.”4 As the editor and critic Robert Boyer reminds us, though many reviewers of The Culture of Narcissism took issue with tone of the book, Lasch was nevertheless writing in a well-established tradition of cultural criticism.5

Although quick to distance himself from mid-century “highbrow” critics of mass culture, Lasch took aim at essentially the same target, the transformation in America society from a nation of production and producers to one of consumption and consumers, dated approximately to the end of World War I. Not only had that economic transformation altered the relationships between the producers and consumers, work and leisure, things and their makers and owners, but of the self to the world outside and beyond the self. Mass consumption, he argued, made the self, like the mass-produced commodity, seem weaker, less authentic, more dependent, less sturdy, and well defined—less in control of its own destiny. In this new consumer culture, the self had contracted itself; he said, echoing Trilling’s critique. It took on the appearances of the world around itself; indeed, it became the world around itself.

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3 Lasch, Minimal Self, 33.
4 Lasch, Minimal Self, 57.
Lasch managed to acquire a significant following, despite his rather dour assessment of the nation. He reached the best-sellers list, was interviewed by *People* magazine in the summer of 1979, and was read even by President Carter and his inner White House circle. On July 15, 1979, the president gave what would become a defining speech of his presidency, titled “Crisis of Confidence,” otherwise known as the infamous “malaise speech.” Lasch had helped the president to articulate his rather somber outlook. “I want to speak to you first tonight about a subject even more serious than energy or inflation. I want to talk to you right now about a fundamental threat to American democracy,” Carter warned. “The threat is nearly invisible in ordinary ways. It is a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our nation.” These were dark days indeed.

For all the relevancy of Lasch’s own misgivings, his image of narcissism echoed the core argument of Trilling’s 1955 Psychoanalytic Institute and Society guest lecture. Granted, Lasch was more argumentative, and the thesis of his books more complex and nuanced, yet the two shared both an outlook and theorist—namely, Freud. Both relied heavily upon the Viennese analyst to make their own arguments about the self’s misapprehension in modern America. In making their case against the contraction of the individual self, both critics were doing more than constructing an argument about the state of American society and culture, however; they were also articulating a method of

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cultural criticism that relied on psychoanalytic insights. “Every society reproduces its
culture—its norms, it [sic] underlying assumptions, its modes of organizing experience—
in the individual, in the form of personality. As Durkheim said, personality is the
individual socialized,” Lasch explained. 8 By examining the “clinical investigations” of
psychoanalysis, which constituted a “storehouse of indispensable ideas,” Lasch was able
to immerse himself, he said, in the individual unconscious, which then allowed him to
turn outward to analyze the culture as a whole, as a coherent structure, with a personality.
It had allowed him to penetrate the “inner workings of society itself,” he said.

The cultural historian Warren Susman in a provocative essay on the emergence of
“personality” in the twentieth century argued that the best way to understand
developments within any given culture was to explore how that culture defined the self.
In a highly “unscientific” sketch, Susman suggestively subdivided the American Century
according to its psychological conditions and maladies as well as the psychoanalyst who
best articulated these conditions. From 1910 through the late 1920s, for instance, he
asserted that the self was defined in terms of guilt (call it the age of Freud). Shame then
dominated from 1929-1938, best represented by the writings of Alfred Adler. From 1939
through the late 1940s, the summarizing, he said, had already been done. It was the age of
anxiety (represented by Jung). If the search for “identity” marked that period from the
end of the 1940s through the late 1950s (the age of Erik Erickson), then perhaps, he
suggested, the next, from the 1960s onward, might be called the age of Wilhelm Reich,

8 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing
Expectations (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 34.
obsessed as it was with personal liberation, especially of a sexual nature. His assertions are intriguing. Yet every one of these periods would fall under Freudianism’s larger umbrella. All are a variation on a psychoanalytic theme.

For intellectuals who lived within this sequence, the question, then, was not whether one was a Freudian. Rather, the question was what kind of Freudian. This issue of adherence had definitive implications, notably in Lasch’s and Trilling’s way of thinking. Not only were these two critics classical (orthodox) Freudians. They were also polemicists in the fray. Trilling was more delicate and circumspect, tending toward the philosophical; Lasch was downright combative, especially when it came to his targeted archenemy, the neo-Freudian Erich Fromm. Lasch considered Fromm’s humanistic therapeutic psychobabble an abomination, a great betrayal of first principles. A celebrity psychoanalyst if ever there was one, Fromm, he argued, had turned narcissism into an antisocial self-focused obsession, which in his (Fromm’s) vapid critique covered “all forms of ‘vanity,’ ‘self-admiration,’ self-satisfaction,’ and ‘self-glorification’” (so said Lasch). Not only, thus, had he drained the concept of narcissism of all its pungent “psychological content” and “clinical meaning,” but in so doing he had validated that therapeutic-age inclination “to dress up moralistic platitudes in psychiatric garb.” For all Fromm’s influence and prestige, he was no better than your run-of-the-mill self-help guru and psychoanalytic popularizer, Lasch complained.

As the nation’s leading neo-Freudian psychoanalyst, Fromm was an easy target, especially as he drifted further away from his earlier years as a Marxist critic with the

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10 Lasch, *Culture of Narcissism*, 31.
Frankfurt School and into a more genteel liberal humanism. As one of his biographers has observed, “Erich Fromm’s career as an intellectual, social critic, and psychoanalytic theorist and therapist was a roller coaster of renown and dismissal.”\(^\text{11}\) For his part, Lasch pulled few punches. “Whereas [Richard] Sennett reminds us that narcissism has more in common with self-hatred than with self-admiration, Fromm loses sight even of this well-known clinical fact in his eagerness to sermonize about the blessings of brotherly love,” he wrote. “As always in Fromm’s work, the trouble originates in his misguided and unnecessary attempt to rescue Freud’s thought from its ‘mechanistic’ nineteenth-century basis and to press it into the service of ‘humanistic realism.’ In practice this means that theoretical rigor gives way to ethically uplifting slogan and sentiment.”\(^\text{12}\) Lasch’s attack comes across as vindictively personal. Yet, more was at stake here than one man’s reputation. It was a tradition of engagement in cultural criticism that for several decades had absolutely dominated America’s intellectual life.

No one has given that tradition a name or definition. Nevertheless, if one were to list some of the titles that came out of it, they would be recognized immediately by a large swath of the reading public, especially those who came of age when they were written. That list might include, among others, Erich Fromm’s *The Sane Society*, *Escape from Freedom*; David Riesman’s *The Lonely Crowd*; Margaret Mead’s *Male and Female*; Herbert Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man*; and Betty Friedan’s *The Feminine Mystique*. As our histories of the mid-century indicate, not only did these works of criticism shape, form, and alter how novelists and painters, journalists, columnists, and playwrights,

\(^{12}\) Lasch, *Culture of Narcissism*, 31-32.
presidents and politicians, as well as everyday citizens imagined their own culture, they shaped how these decades would be remembered in retrospect. If the 1950s is known as the Age of Conformity, it is to no small degree because of books like *The Lonely Crowd*, which coined the term the “other-directed” American.

Scholars look to such postwar social and cultural critics as Riesman to be learned, detached observers. As recently as 2005 the historian James Gilbert dedicated a chapter to Riesman in his *Men in the Middle* and wrote that Riesman was the period’s central public intellectual. It was an uncontroversial assessment. Yet he speaks of him as merely stimulating a widespread “dialogue” about conformity, as only giving Americans the “language” for how to discuss the issues. Likewise, the historian Lizabeth Cohen speaks of Riesman, Marcuse, and others as “trenchant observers.” Another scholar has suggested that these critics were doing nothing more than seeking to “describe” the roots of alienated behavior.\(^{13}\) *The Lonely Crowd* literature has had an almost incomprehensible effect. Nevertheless, surprisingly little has been said about the intellectual and contextual conditions that made this literature possible.

How was it that Americans came to accept as valid their core arguments? One could appeal to the cogency and persuasiveness of their theses, the data they marshaled, the forcefulness of their narratives. However, one had to (and must still today) make certain assumptions about society, culture, and the self in order to accept their premises—

especially the assertion that cultures acquire psychological states of mind. For instance, to say as Lasch did that American culture was “narcissistic” was to make a certain commitment to psychoanalytic authority, terms, language, methods, practices, and arguments.\(^\text{14}\) In explaining his method of analysis, Lasch was explicit, “By conducting an intensive analysis of individual cases that rests on clinical evidence rather than common-sense impressions, psychoanalysis tells us something about the inner workings of society itself, in the very act of turning its back on society and immersing itself in the individual unconscious.”\(^\text{15}\) From these case studies and immersion in the “individual unconscious” Lasch said he could then turn around and analyze the general characteristics of the culture.

It is one thing to talk colloquially and in generalities about a widespread malaise, excitement, anxiety, or some other state of mind using “common-sense impressions; it is another thing to attribute these psychological states to entire societies or cultures or a few “character types” constituting a culture. To question the underpinnings of *The Lonely Crowd, The Sane Society, The Feminine Mystique*, and other representatives in this tradition is to bring out into the light the foundational question of what constitutes “culture.”

If it is true, as the literary critic and novelist Virginia Woolf remarked, that “on or about December, 1910, human character changed,” then so as well did society and thus culture, although we might date the change closer to May 18, 1924, when Wolf originally


\(^\text{15}\) Lasch, *Culture of Narcissism*, 34.
read these lines before The Heretics Club in Cambridge, England.\textsuperscript{16} That would have given Americans more time to absorb the impact of Sigmund Freud’s famous September 1909 lectures at Clark University’s twentieth anniversary celebration. More specifically, it would have given social scientists time to start incorporating psychoanalysis into their research methods and writings. The endeavor would bear much fruit. Though initially read only furtively by a select group of avant garde social scientists, with time the Viennese analyst would make an indelible impact on social theory in the United States, in ways that today are still not well understood. By 1955, Trilling could write,

\begin{quote}
It is not only that the modern practices of psychiatry is chiefly based upon [Freud’s ideas]. They have had a decisive influence upon our theories of education and of child-rearing. They are of prime importance to anthropology, to sociology, to literary criticism; even theology must take account of them. We may say that they have become an integral part of our modern intellectual apparatus.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Works of mid- and late-twentieth-century cultural criticism, like \textit{The Lonely Crowd} and \textit{The Culture of Narcissism}, are thus the beneficiaries, the progeny, of this intellectual integration.

The marriage between psychoanalysis (defined broadly, not just in the strict Freudian sense) and the social sciences (defined just as broadly) was a complicated affair. Critics of American culture, from the psychologist and juvenile delinquency expert Robert Lindner to the feminist activist Betty Friedan, wanted their audiences to believe that popularizers and armchair analysts were to blame for the misapprehension of the self and its relationship to culture. “[T]he practice of psychoanalysis as a therapy was not primarily responsible for the feminine mystique. It was the creation of writers and editors

\textsuperscript{17} Trilling, \textit{Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture}, 11-12.
in the mass media, ad-agency, motivation researchers, and behind them the popularizers and translators of Freudian thought in the college and universities,” Friedan differentiated. Thus, “Freudian and pseudo-Freudian theories settled everywhere, like fine volcanic ash.”\(^1\) Readers of mid-century criticism were always led to believe that if there was a misapprehension of the self, it was someone else’s fault, never the critic’s—and never Freud’s. Some other process had to be culpable. The mass media, conspicuous consumption, functionalism, Talcott Parsons, automation, Freudian heretics—these were some of the usual suspects. To accept Friedan and the other critics at their word is, however, to misapprehend the misapprehension.

For psychoanalysis is inherently ambivalent about the relationship between the self and its host culture. “[W]hatever we may conclude about the intellectual value of Freud’s formulations, we cannot fail to know that it was Freud who made the idea of culture real for a great many of us,” Trilling started to explain. “It was he who made it apparent to us how entirely implicated in culture we all are.” And yet, Trilling noted, “Freud’s relation to culture must be described as an ambivalent one.” That is, “he indeed see the self as formed by its culture. But he also sees the self as set against the culture, struggling against it, having been from the first reluctant to enter it.”\(^2\) In twentieth-century American thought this tension was never resolved. Further, it was only exasperated as psychoanalysis was incorporated into social scientific discourse and cultural criticism and, likewise, as Freud was in turn “Americanized” by such neo-Freudians as Erich Fromm, stressing social and cultural conditions above instinctual drives. The goal of cultural criticism has always been implicitly or explicitly about the

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\(^2\) Trilling, *Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture*, 36, 39.
liberation of the self. But, almost definitionally, that was an impossibility in this
intellectual framework: in order to extricate itself from the grip of culture, the self needed
to understand just how thoroughly implicated it was in that culture. It was a revolving
door with no exit.

This dissertation is a history of that revolving door focused at its hinge:
adjustment, a term that designated how the individual in society assumed the function,
role, and identity that society had assigned them—how, that is, they had adapted to the
culture. Conceptually, we can trace adjustment back to early twentieth-century social
theory, to a time before it had acquired the heavier baggage of psychoanalytic discourse.
Chapter One suggests that adjustment acquired its salience in early twentieth-century
social theory in the attempts of sociologists and other social scientists to move beyond the
incremental, ecological “adaptative” social theories of neo-Darwinism. The language of
adjustment found its most receptive environment in the environs of America’s urban
centers, especially Chicago. It is no coincidence that the Windy City was not only the
country’s manufacturing powerhouse and commodity distribution hub, but also where the
social sciences emerged full force as independent disciplines of knowledge. Chicago was
an unruly place, filled with migrant workers and wayward taxi dance hall girls, reformers
and robber barons. The terms of adjustment best captured the city’s fluidity—the fluidity
of its geography, its inhabitants, its economic resources, technologies, and social
institutions. It also best captured the desire of civic leaders and big city bosses to control
and order this fluidity. All of these factors inspired a new conceptualization of the self in
relation to society and culture.
The immediate application of adjustment was often aimed at the prostitutes, migrant workers, immigrants, and juvenile delinquents of the city, employed to enjoin their incorporation into respectable middle-class values. Slowly the discourse of adjustment spread, however. From Chicago it moved into the Tennessee Valley Authority and out into other federal government’s Depression-era social programs. The language of adjustment was the language of social workers and school teachers, and social scientists, although it was still a minor tributary in popular discourse. Chapters Two and Three examine how this tributary then turned into a roaring stream in mid-century American thought. What ultimately catapulted the discourse of adjustment into public awareness en masse was the rise of totalitarian governments overseas in the 1930s and then the outbreak of a global war, World War II. Chapter Two focuses specifically on the ways in which adjustment was applied to the American soldier and veteran. Though most assumed that the adjustment of young men into the military would come rather naturally (it had to), not so their adjustment afterward. Soldier readjustment into civilian society was the measuring stick by which the nation would judge its victory. Instead of feeling rather assured and confident, many were left wringing their hands. The maladjustment of veterans was a grave concern in the war’s immediate aftermath.

America made it through but the terms of maladjustment stuck, exerting an inordinate influence over postwar social thought. First, though, Chapter Three takes a step back into the 1930s to examine how the terms of adjustment were employed to explain the forces behind the war. Here, in the context of totalitarian’s emergence, the full impact of Freud’s incorporation into social scientific discourse would be felt. The practice of psychoanalyzing entire cultures found its traction as Erich Fromm and the
other neo-Freudians turned their analytic gaze on Germany, Japan, then back on the U.S. Fromm’s *Escape from Freedom*, which limned the social “character types” of his fellow Germans, had not only explained to readers why the Germans behaved as they did, but how cultures functioned. Before the 1930s, the incorporation of psychoanalysis had been rather ad-hock, loosely defined, and unevenly employed. Neo-Freudianism changed that.

In this chapter I trace the lineage of 1950s social and cultural criticism, such as Riesman’s *The Lonely Crowd*, to its source in the 1930s.

If Chapter Three takes up how psychoanalysis was incorporated in social theory in the social sciences, Chapter Four turns to how it was received outside these disciplines, in the culture more generally. Although Robert Lindner, Norman Mailer, and Betty Friedan might be read as populist anti-adjustment activists, this chapter will assert that they were in fact deeply engaged in its proliferation. Nowhere were the revolving-door contradictions of adjustment more evident than in their writings. Not until after 1960, this chapter argues, did adjustment receive its real challenge. The election of John F. Kennedy and the rise of the New Left created an alternative discourse of social engagement—based not on “apathy” but engagement. While many who were involved within university protest movements, such as Berkeley’s Free Speech Movement, took as axiomatic the arguments about the overwhelming power of culture (the “machine,” the “system,” the “Establishment,” they called it), in protesting it they began rejecting its psychological implications. Here the defiant “I’m a human being!” protestation of Berkeley “rebel” Mario Savio takes on additional shades of meaning, which this chapter will explore.

Boredom went from being the malady of adjustment to the rallying call of its detractors. Although not completely severing the relationship—as evidenced by Lasch’s books—
“the sixties” ensured that the tight relationship between psychoanalysis and the social sciences and social criticism would no longer enjoy the privileges of intellectual hegemony. The humanistic reassertion of “I’m a human being!” ultimately ensured adjustment’s demise.

If one were to follow Susman’s suggestion that each decade between 1910 and the late 1960s and 1970 could be viewed by the dominance of one psychoanalyst or another, the entire span might be called the age of adjustment, a period of time when psychoanalysis and the social sciences came together and provided Americans with new ways of thinking about themselves, the self, culture, and conformity. Of necessity this dissertation has only sketched some of the most visible terrain of this age of adjustment, the more significant nodes of its deployment and contestation. Its aim is to start a dialogue, not bring resolution.
The Hobo (1923) was written by a hobo. Rather, to be more precise, it was written by a young and poor but determined ex-hobo. Its author, Nels Anderson, wanted to believe the tedious effort of compiling a social scientific study of the hobo “problem” would not only earn him a little respect among his peers but a new occupation as well. His father, a German immigrant, was a coal miner, farmer, and bricklayer, a jack-of-all-trades nomadic handyman. This was the world Anderson knew best growing up, that of the impecunious migrant worker. It was also the world he was eager to leave behind.

Becoming a social scientist was, he thought, just the way to do it, too. When Anderson hopped into a Chicago-bound Utah freight train with grand fantasies of studying sociology at the University of Chicago, he had less than twenty dollars in his pocket and sub-par academic credentials. But he was desperate and determined. “Going

1 Nels Anderson, “Early Years of the ‘Chicago School of Sociology,’” lecture at the University of New Brunswick, Canada, 12 Jan. 1972, fol. 6, box 18, Robert E. Park Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (hereinafter Park MSS).
to Chicago was my final effort at riding freight trains,” he confessed. John Swenson, one of his undergraduate professors at Brigham Young, had told him that at Chicago “they work with new ideas.” And indeed they did, for when he arrived in the fall of 1921 its joint anthropology-sociology department—the first of its kind in the country—was at the front end of its mythic Golden Era. “The University of Chicago awed me, those graystone buildings, some with towers, the lawns, trees and walks,” Anderson many years later recalled. His first night on campus he slept outside on some newspapers next to the rumbling smoke stacks of the university’s power plant. Broke, he had nowhere else to go.

“To so many others, although it need not have been so, the hobo was a character of romance and perhaps of mystery. He was a stranger to my professors. For me, then, it was an ideal subject for a Master’s thesis,” Anderson later recalled. He could certainly claim “personal knowledge”; plus, he wanted to turn his experiences to “good account”; and Chicago was definitely the ideal place to conduct research. A swath of the city that cut down West Madison Street and across Halsted Avenue, “Hobohemia” was a massive, teeming marketplace for seasonal labor. Overrun with 30,000 to 70,000 inhabitants, it was dilapidated, unruly, utterly unprepossessing, filled with bars and brothels, and according to local boosters, social gospelers, and municipal workers in critical need of

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5 Guy B. Johnson, interview with James T. Carey, Chapel Hill, NC, 27 March 1972, fol. 11, box 1, Department of Sociology Interviews with Graduate Students of the 1920’s and 1930’s, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (hereinafter Chicago Sociology Interviews).
6 Nels Anderson, Men on the Move (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940), 1.
reform. Robert Park, a bombastic, absent-minded University of Chicago sociologist, and one of Anderson’s mentors, spoke for many citizens of this upstart progressive haven when he called the West Madison St. district the city’s “human junk heap.” It “probably falls short of realizing all the value of wholesome, not merely physical but social life, to a greater degree than any other region of the same size in America,” he scorned. Yet this is precisely where Anderson felt most at home, more so, certainly, than around Chicago graduate students. Unlike Anderson, most of them hailed from solid middle-class parentage.

Rolling down and off the University’s presses, in 1923 The Hobo inaugurated Chicago’s landmark Sociological Series. Other tantalizingly titled studies would soon follow. Louis Wirth’s The Ghetto (1928), Ruth Cavan’s Suicide (1928), E. Franklin Frazier’s The Negro Family in Chicago (1932), Paul Cressey’s The Taxi-Dance Hall (1932), Walter Reckless’s Vice in Chicago (1933), Frederic Thrasher’s The Gang (1936), and Harvey Zorbaugh’s celebrated Gold Coast and the Slum (1929) were all written by University of Chicago graduate students and launched some rather exceptional academic careers. Although neglected today, in their day they helped launch a sea change in American thought, its social politics, academic culture, progressive reform, and social theory.

Nowhere was the need to think beyond social evolutionism more patent, and urgent, than in cities like Chicago and New York. The tidal waves of immigrants that flooded America’s urban centers strained beyond credulity the idea that culture,

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7 Robert Park, “The Significance of Sociological Research in Social Service,” 6 April 1924, unpublished, fol. 3, box 6, Park MSS.
connected to biology, evolved through stages over long periods of time. Between 1880
and 1890 the population of Chicago had doubled, rising from 503,000 to one million; in
the next two decades it doubled yet again, reaching 2.2 million. The historian Walter
Nugent puts this meteoric expansion into perspective by reminding us that when Chicago
was chartered in 1837 it claimed only 4,000 residents. In its first four decades Chicago
multiplied 123 times. By 1890 it had attained the moniker America’s “second city,”
besting historic Philadelphia; and by 1910 only five Euro-American cities could boast
more citizens: New York, London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna.\(^9\) Quipped Mark Twain,
“She is always a novelty, for she is never the Chicago you saw when you passed through
the last time.”\(^10\) The city seemed overwhelmed; and, indeed, it was overwhelmed.
Between 1900 and 1915, fifteen million immigrants had entered the country—that
number is equivalent to the intake of the previous four decades.\(^11\)

Chicago, the city and the university, played a critical role in the development of
twentieth-century social theory: it was a laboratory for adjustment. As the cultural
historian Christopher Lasch observed, “For two generations or more, the University of
Chicago dominated the emerging field of sociology, even more thoroughly than Boas and
his students at Columbia dominated anthropology in the twenties and thirties.”\(^12\)

Explaining the University of Chicago’s dominance, as well as the prestige of its

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\(^9\) Walter Nugent, Demography: Chicago as a Modern World City,” *The Electronic

\(^10\) Mark Twain, *Life on the Mississippi* (Montreal: Dawson Brothers, 1883), 511.

\(^11\) John Whiteclay Chambers, II, *The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era,

\(^12\) Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged* (New York: Basic
sociology department, over other institutions and departments elsewhere was its relationship to its host city (at least in part), to those prostitutes, delinquents, revolutionaries, immigrants—to hobos and ex-hobos like Anderson.

The seemingly intractable social problems that the city’s remarkable expansion had created in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century begged for the kind of practical, ameliorative solutions social scientists promised. The city’s legendary political corruption reaches back deep into the nineteenth century, municipal institutions were feeble and under-funded, the state could hardly cope with the flood of foreigners, and at a time when most denizens only knew Springfield as their capitol, the federal government was, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. Chicago needed answers. And social scientists filled the stead, guaranteeing “mechanisms” for the city’s and its denizen’s adjustment.

In this chapter I argue that adjustment was first conceived in the urban milieu of cities like Chicago. Moreover, I argue that the problem of adjustment was the problem of social control. That is, social scientists replaced Darwinian social adaptation with post-instinctual adjustment as they tackled the city’s tumult. There were other intellectual reasons for preferring the latter over the former, but the social environs of the city’s underworld provided the context and fired the imagination. The goal of many a social scientist was total social control. They could not think of adjustment without thinking of the unadjusted, “disorganized” world around them. The two were inextricably linked—the world of gothic spires and shady nightclubs.

Not only is Chicago an ideal location to begin exploring adjustment because the University of Chicago’s sociology department dominated the field for several decades
and because it was a haven for progressive reformers, but also because it challenges the ways in which we think of cultural relativity. Cultural relativity was a kind of home-rule debate, more than it was a beneficent encounter with the foreign “other.” As I suggested above, we can hardly speak of race, class, and gender without speaking the language of interwar sociology. We may do well to emphasize the fluidity of these categories of analysis, but we would also do well to reckon with their history within the early twentieth-century idioms associated with social control. Therein lies the history of adjustment.

Not since Origin of Species (1859) first appeared had the study of the self, as an individual and in society, undergone such a remarkable revolution as during this massive influx of immigrants, particularly during the 1910s and 1920s. In America’s collective memory, Clarence Darrow’s trouncing of William Jennings Bryan in the “Scopes Trial” overshadows the 1920s as the intellectual achievement, yet, ironically, Darwinism was being thrown overboard all over the social sciences.¹³ No single idea, event, or influence explains this rush to jettison biologically based models of social evolution, particularly the more trenchant views of neo-Darwinian theorists, like Herbert Spencer. Not the development of quantum physics, not the failure of the ideals of scientific “objectivity,” or the rise of relativity theory, not evolution’s epistemological limitations, not industrialization or technological innovation or the dynamo—nothing alone explains it. All do. The desire to move beyond Darwinism was evident everywhere in the social

¹³ On the perpetuation of the Scopes Trial in America’s collective memory, as well as an example of its perpetuation, see Edward J. Larson, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America’s Continuing Debate over Science and Religion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
sciences, first and foremost in anthropology, sociology, and psychology (and psychiatry), then in (slightly) older disciplines, such as history.\textsuperscript{14}

Within the interdisciplinary social sciences, this shift in thinking developed in three interconnected directions. The first was the effort to extricate the core behavioral mechanism of social evolution—namely, “instincts.”\textsuperscript{15} Through instincts, social theorists had anchored culture to biology and ecology. “Under the influence of biology, group activity and behavior were seen as biological products. It was the nature of man to behave this way in groups. It was instinct,” sociologist William Ogburn, who came into the department in the late 1920s, explained. The new concept of “culture” severed sociology’s tie to biology. “The evolution of culture, once free of biology, came to be seen in terms of cultural factors such as inventions, the diffusion of culture traits, culture contacts and isolation, the relation of the stock of knowledge existing at any one time to the rate of new inventions, social attitudes toward change, resistance to the adoption of inventions, and other such factors of a social nature.”\textsuperscript{16}

What these ambitious Chicago students and like-minded colleagues accomplished was the toppling of social Darwinism. Some were more eager to confront the Master and his protégés, while others were hardly aware of the sea change that lay ahead. Their Progressive-era forbearers had resolutely disavowed the implications of biological

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. Thomas L. Haskell, \textit{The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority} (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977).


\textsuperscript{16} William F. Ogburn, “Culture,” lecture given before the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago, 3 June 1937, fol. 3, box 40, William F. Ogburn Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (hereinafter Ogburn MSS). This lecture was published as “Culture and Sociology,” \textit{Social Forces} 16 (Dec. 1937): 161-69.
determinism, and they had effectively kept at bay the crass machinations of right-wing race-baiters—those in the minority among them who espoused the unforgiving, inhumane “survival of the fittest” doctrine and warned of “race suicide.” Yet they all, to varying degrees, relied on instinct-based notions of social and cultural “adaptation.” After 1920 Darwin still had his followers, to be sure. Yet his influence upon and within the social sciences would wane precipitously. “The instincts were going down the drain very fast you see,” Chicago graduate student Ruth Cavan explained. “I think [in the 1920s] the whole Sociology Department was anti-instinct.”

By jettisoning the biological and ecological models of their predecessors and mentors and supplanting social theory with now-recognizably modern—relative, fluid, contextual, denatured—concepts, not only did these upstarts alter the ways in which social scientists thought about their research subjects. Within a generation they altered the ways in which average, ordinary denizens everywhere thought about themselves, about their neighbors and fellow citizens, and the culture they inhabited, created, and sustained. Since the initial press run of The Hobo, social theory has been augmented, contested, altered, appended, restated, and nuanced. Nonetheless, all of us remain indebted to Wirth, Frazier, Anderson, and their colleagues. We can hardly speak of race, class, and gender without speaking their language.

Although there is a caveat, to put it mildly. Rather than encouraging a more sanguine and emancipatory outlook on human nature, mainstream post-instinctual social theory moved, ironically, in precisely the opposite direction—toward a greater emphasis on both the need for, and potential of, social control. No concept better expressed this

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17 Ruth Shonle Cavan, interview with James T. Carey, De Kalb, IL, 28 April 1972, fol. 3, box 1, Chicago Sociology Interviews.
stifling reversal than “adjustment.” The certitude of the prickly but influential Chicago sociology Ph.D. L. L. Bernard will prove the point. Bernard was one of the most vocal anti-instinctual social scientists during the interwar period and by the early 1920s had already “sounded the final doom of all ‘social instinct’ theories,” Read Bain, a fellow alumnus, observed. In a provocative and iconoclastic *Psychological Review* article, “The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences,” he argued,

> The fundamental problem of the social sciences which have grown out of the attempt to adjust man to his social environments, is therefore to work out the mechanism by which new and non-instinctive action and thought patterns are built up to mediate these adjustments of man to social environments which the social sciences undertake.\(^{18}\)

The shift in language from the ecologically derived Darwinian concept “adaptation,” which had less predictable, more ambiguous connotations, to this more precise and technical (and technological) term “adjustment,” which connotes calculated interference (“mechanisms”) was subtle but quite deliberate.

> “We are all aware that human relations are not what we would have them. We have war, and crime, and pauperism, and problems of labor and capital, and prostitution, and revolution, etc.,” W. I. Thomas, another Chicago Ph.D. as well as a professor in the sociology-anthropology department, wrote,

> and in view of this imperfect state of society it is the task of the social sciences to develop a method of determining social laws and their application which will give in the human world a control approximately as perfect as the control obtained in the physical world through the laws developed by physics and chemistry and in the animal and plant world through the study of biology.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{19}\) Statement published in “Thomas Defends Self as a Daring Social Explorer,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 22 April 1918, 15.
Among his peers Bernard was not alone in thinking that social scientists had a critical, unique role to play in progressive society, not merely to shepherd social change, advise government officials, and appraise the advance of progress where it might be measured. They should control it. “Social control is the logical end of all social sciences” was the “central thought” of Bernard’s career, Bain concluded. His mainstream colleagues would hardly have disagreed. Particularly at the University of Chicago.

Historians of post-instinctual social theory (“cultural relativity”) have emphasized 1930s anthropology—Columbia University’s Franz Boas and the trailblazing graduate students he trained during the interwar period, in particular Ruth Benedict. Historians have done so not only to highlight anthropology’s intellectual credentials and the popularity of Boasian ideas, but also to emphasize the academy’s and their own discipline’s liberal cosmopolitan identity. “The active center of the historic movement in the twentieth-century social science that goes by the name of cultural relativism was a principled doubt that ‘our’ people are right while groups who do things differently are wrong,” the intellectual historian David Hollinger has argued. It was an “active center” with a brick-and-mortar beacon, Hollinger emphasizes: Columbia in the 1930s. Cultural relativism was not only an ideology, Hollinger maintains, but also a “critical device,” which was “fashioned for the purpose of undermining the authority of aspects of a home culture.”

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22 Hollinger, “Cultural Relativism,” 710.
Boas was, to be sure, an important player in the long, protracted, sometimes-pugalistic post-instinctual scrimmage. And yes, he was indeed one of cultural relativity’s standard-bearers. Yet within the contest, the history of adjustment illumines the presence of less-open-minded, more assured (and self-righteous) strain, one that I would argue was as, if not more, influential not only in the social sciences, but in American intellectual life more generally; one that sought not to undermine the home culture, but to shore it up, against prostitutes, “revolutionaries,” immigrants, and the like. Social control, not personal emancipation, accounts for the popularity of post-instinctual social theory among many social scientists.

**Making Culture Relative**

On March 30, 1922, the *Chicago Tribune* reported that the evening prior two University of Chicago professors, identified as Robert Peck and C. W. Burgess, were caught stealthily attempting, in the paper’s words, “to get local color” at Hobo College. Located at 7112 West Harrison St., on the second and third floors of an ancient-looking wood-framed building with a bare barn-like interior, “Hobo College” was a far cry from the University of Chicago’s spired campus. The “college” was founded in 1908 by one of Chicago’s most colorful figures, Dr. Ben Reitman. And in a city as rowdy as Chicago was back then, that was no mean feat. The “outrageously Byronesque” Reitman had been a manager for the radical Emma Goldman (as well as her lover), an anarchist, the doctor for Al Capone’s whorehouse prostitutes, an advocate of free love and birth control, a bohemian who, in addition to Hobo College, had also founded a welfare agency and a
church (of course), and was a mainstay at the Dill Pickle Club, a bumptious hang-out for radicals in the city’s Near North side. Despite all Reitman’s free publicity—the local papers loved Reitman copy—the aims of the college were rather more serious. Anchored in the heart of Hobohemia, it offered courses to the migrant workers in a host of subjects, from law to literature, history to economics. Peppered in-between were lectures on radicalism and debates on free love.

When the two were discovered, the crowd demanded a speech. Burgess, who was misidentified by the Tribune—his name was Ernest W., not C. W. Burgess—must have cut an awkward pose. He was a shy, small, fragile-looking man who stuttered through lectures and spoke in a high-pitched chirp. Robert Park was also misidentified, as “Peck.” He was a barrel of a man, especially next to Burgess. The two were the department’s Odd Couple, different on so many levels yet the closest of collaborators. Together they wrote their discipline’s most influential textbook, a classic in the true sense of the word, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1921). Burgess and Park said they were amazed by the stories they had heard that evening and suggested the men write them down (presumably so they could use them in their research). In turn, the men in the room responded with a hearty cheer, thinking this a grand idea too. Dr. Reitman and James Eads How, the “millionaire hobo,” another Hobohemia leader, told the audience that
migrants’ manuscripts could be submitted anytime over the following two weeks. After, a meeting would be called, and the autobiographies read.

The decision to “startle the public with novel life stories” was not the only agreement made that evening. A “unanimous vote carried a motion” that Hobo College send two “exchange professors” to the Department of Sociology at the University, “in recognition of the work done by the two visitors.” They would send over “Prof.” Mike Smith of New York City and “Prof.” Frank Gibbons. Known to his intimates as “Chinatown Whitie,” Smith would address the subject of unemployment among migratory laborers. Gibbons, also known as “Chicago Red,” would give “an entomological discourse” on the “customs” of lodging-house insects, based on his many years of observation. Burgess and Park, the University of Chicago “representatives,” said that they would be most happy to receive the proposed visitors anytime they wished to come. It was a lively crowd that evening, apparently, though not unusually so. Later, Reitman caused his own outburst when he declared he had vacated the vermin in one West Madison Street flophouse. A hobo shouted back, “It can’t be done!” Reitman loved the banter. After the crowd dispersed, he took Burgess and Park on a tour of “inspection” of the places where the hobos slept. In time Burgess would teach a course at Hobo College, alongside other Chicago notable scholars. Progressive-era Chicago was a fluid world where “riff-raff” and professors might rub literal shoulders.

This was neither the first nor the last time the worlds of the University and Hobo College would mix. “‘Bos and U. of C. Men Indulge in Oratory Orgy” ran another Chicago Tribune headline. Back in 1917 Hobo College had hosted an intercollegiate

debate, pitting their own School of Public Speaking against the University of Chicago’s Debating society. There were four hobos (“soapboxers”), five collegians, and four judges—Judge Harry M. Fisher, Dr. H. C. Norborough, Bishop Francis, and Jack Lait. The topic was “Birth Control,” although the men sparred over a number of wide-ranging topics, from peace and prohibition to economics. The press was out for sport. The veteran boxcar contingent was well represented, too. And a coterie of U of C boys was wedged in with the rest of the crowd. They confidently belted out a few football cheers. All for naught, however. The hobos carried the evening. The scene would repeated itself a year after Burgess’s and Peck’s incognito tour. Boxcar Bernie, Larry the Loud, and Fred Fournice were formidable adversaries. Reitman’s biographer, Roger Bruns, relished the victory himself. Also he noted one seemingly unimportant fact. The secretary for the 1917 event was a University of Chicago sociologist.

Burgess and Park were most likely at Hobo College because Anderson, their student, had already started fieldwork for his study of Hobohemia, and they wanted to see the place themselves. Yet this is not merely an entertaining case of “slumming.” It points to a shift in the way social scientists were doing research. Social theory had long been grounded in moral philosophy, in philosophical reflections on the “self,” not on empirical fieldwork. A sociologist like Herbert Spencer could write from his desk in the British Museum’s library without ever having a face-to-face encounter with his subjects.

25 Bruns, The Damndest Radical, 212.
Burgess’s and Park’s slumming, and the story of how *The Hobo* came to be written, suggests an alternative way of reading the emergence of “ethnographic” studies.

Prior to 1929, the sociology department at the University of Chicago was a joint sociology-anthropology department. This marriage would not have struck social scientists of the period as a particularly odd pairing. W. I. Thomas, a leading sociologist in the department, had compiled the discipline’s first sourcebook in 1909, *Source Book of Social Origins*. In truth it is more anthropology than sociology. “Ethnological Materials, Psychological Standpoint Classified and Annotated Bibliographies for the Interpretation of Savage Society” was its subtitle. Articles listed in its bibliographies had been culled from the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, *American Anthropologist*, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, among others. Thomas admitted, “The literature of anthropology is very large, almost comparable in volume to that of history”; and sociology simply paled by comparison.26

Thomas had included in the collection Franz Boas’s famous “The Mind of Primitive Man,” which limned the key ideas of the empirically oriented “participant-observer” research method. It was also one of the classic anthropological essays aimed at dismantling evolutionism in the social sciences. In it, Boas argued that the chief aim of anthropology was to “study of the mind of men,” minds which vary not by constitutional or biological differences, but by “conditions of race and of environment.” Reading cultures meant reading minds. And in order to understand a foreign mind one must first, Boas advised, divest “entirely” one’s own—that is, its “opinions” and “emotions,” which

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intrinsically are also tied to particular environments. “[The student] must adapt his own mind, so far as feasible, to that of the people whom he is studying. The more successful he is in freeing himself from the bias based on the group of ideas that constitute the civilization in which he lives, the more successful he will be in interpreting the beliefs and actions of man,” Boas explained. “He must follow lines of thought that are new to him. He must participate in new emotions, and understand how, under unwonted conditions, both lead to actions.”

Certainly no one of importance at Chicago would have seriously objected to Boas’s perspective: it was theirs as well; they were all moving away from biological determinism. In the Windy City, though, empirical ethnography would exhibit different and sometimes less benign shades of cultural alterity.

In Burgess’s and Park’s *The City* (1925), the city is defined not as “a congeries of individual men and of social conveniences”; not merely an accumulation of streets, tramways, buildings, telephones, and electric lights; neither as a “constellation of institutions and administrative devices” (courts, hospitals, etc.). Rather, the city is—think of Boas—a “state of mind, a body of customs and traditions, and of the organized attitudes and sentiments.” “The city is not, in other words, merely a physical mechanism and an artificial construction. It is involved in the vital processes of the people who compose it; it is a product of nature, and particularly of human nature.” It is a kind of “psychophysical mechanism.” And it is likewise a kind of foreign culture. Other

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disciplines had taken on the city as an object of study, but ethnography promised to open new worlds of interpretive possibilities.

Anthropology, they noted, had been concerned primarily with “primitive” peoples. Not only is the “civilized man” as “interesting” an object of study as primitive peoples, Park suggested; he is also “more open to observation and study.” “Urban life and culture are more varied, subtle, and complicated, but the fundamental motives are in both instances the same.” With Boas they thought the study of other societies was, essentially, an exercise in cultural mind-reading. “The same patient methods of observation which anthropologists like Boas and Lowie have expended on the study of the life and manners of the North American Indian might be even more fruitfully employed in the investigation of the customs, beliefs, social practices, and general conceptions of life prevalent in Little Italy on the lower North Side in Chicago,” Park recommended, “or in recording the more sophisticated folkways of the inhabitants of Greenwich Village and the neighborhood of Washington Square, New York.” Histories of ethnography emphasize anthropological studies of Boas’s students, especially Ruth Benedict. Yet earlier studies of foreign cultures within the U.S. are of at least equal importance.

W. I. Thomas’s Source Book was a clear move in this direction, and his (co-authored) The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (5 vols., 1918-1920) was of seminal influence within and without the department. Not only was it a model for empirical social science research, but, Eli Zaretsky writes, “The work should be understood as a summing up of the diverse assumptions and insights of a whole generation of urban reformers, especially as they were concerned with immigrants, and as

29 Park and Burgess, The City, 3.
an attempt to influence social policy and reform directly.\textsuperscript{30} It had enormous reach.

“[E]verybody was making lists by that time of motives”—to replace “instincts”—Cavan recalled.\textsuperscript{31} No one had a universally accepted model of the “self” and the self’s relation to society and culture in the 1920s. But alternatives were emerging everywhere.

The second trend was to posit a universal mind as the foundation for all cultural mind-reading. That move entailed also jettisoning the evolutionary model of the mind, which had tied the evolution of culture to the evolution of minds (from “primitive” to “civilized”); it also entailed accepting the premise that foreign minds were essentially identical in structure and substance to that of the mind-reader. In Source Book, in a reprint of an earlier article, Thomas argued that the brain was “relatively fixed in all times and among all races.” “The brain will never have any faculty in addition to what it now possesses, because as a type of structure it is as fixed as the species itself, and is indeed a mark of species.”\textsuperscript{32} Boas, “Mental Life and Education,” would argue similarly in a long discourse on the mind. He concluded that in comparing the languages, customs, and activities of various cultures there was no sufficient justification for ascribing “materially lower stages to some people and higher stages to others.” More to the point, “We are not inclined to consider the mental organization of different races of man as differing points.”\textsuperscript{33} The assertion was essential. Recall earlier his argument that ethnographic knowledge began with observers emptying the contents of their own minds entirely so

\textsuperscript{31} Cavan, interview.
\textsuperscript{33} Boas, “Mental Life and Education,” 148-49.
they could be “adapted” to the subject’s mind. Different minds have to think alike in order to read and to be read, in a manner of speaking.³⁴

An important shift in language accompanied these two other trends. It relates to the idea of “personality” and personality’s extrication from biology. By 1923, social scientists like Burgess were drawing a clear distinction between the “individual” (the organic being) and the “person” (the social self, a product of social forces).³⁵ In his study of 1,313 Chicago gangs, Frederic Thrasher, who also published in Chicago’s Sociological Series, put this emergent consensus most succinctly. The sociologist defines the personality as “the rôle which the individual plays in his group. His personality, in this sense, is a function of the activities of the group into which he fits, and is a product of his struggle for a place and a part in its life. The person, therefore, is the individual placed with reference to all the other individuals in the group, that is, the individual in his social matrix.³⁶ Robert Park would concur and argue that only through the acquisition of “status” does an individual become a person. “Status” means, simply, one’s “position in society.”³⁷ “Adjustment” is nothing more or less than achieving fit-ness within the social matrix. If an individual deviates from the pattern, or social matrix—that is their determined role—they are said to be maladjusted. If they are maladjusted in the extreme,

they are called “neurotic.” In short, Anderson would argue, as others would have, “Where maladjustment is a matter of social change, science measures the rate and seeks for generalizations about the trends of change that will be useful in developing techniques for control.”

This distinction between personality and the individual body was not merely a theoretical distinction. It was also borne of experience. “The importance of this distinction between the biological individual and the person was, perhaps, first fully revealed in the work of rehabilitating the wounded soldiers, and even those who were not wounded of the World War,” Park suggested. “In order to rehabilitate a man who had lost a leg, an arm, or an eye, it was found necessary, not merely to give him, as far as possible, an artificial substitute for the lost member, and teach him how to use it, but, most important of all, it was necessary to help him make the moral readjustment.” The wounded soldier needed to be helped “to redefine his ambitions and hopes”—and “to conceive himself as a totally different person from what he had been—a person with very different habits, associations, ambitions, and ideals.” Park made these observations in 1924. By the mid to late 1930s the notion that personality was not primarily determined by biology but by culture was widely accepted. William Ogburn would observe, “Not even the different personalities of the sexes, is now admitted to be wholly determined by the obviously different sexual constitutions of male and female.” There may be biological limits here. “But for the moment, the culture enthusiasts are forgetting the biological limits to cultural influence, even though there be an alarming number of psychotics.”

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40 Ogburn, “Culture.”
In Chicago cultural relativity had a particular “thrust,” Leonard Cottrell, an alumnus of the department, observed. Relativity had its own “matrix” in the city of chaos:

I mean the great flood of different cultures moving in and just the sheer problem of digesting this mess, had everybody pretty well floundered and floored. You had to make some sense out of it, you had to become aware of the fact that these people lived by, or listened to an entirely different set of drums from what you were listening to. They were strange and exotic, disgusting and what not. But anyway, here they are and you have got to somehow handle them. The school is faced with what the hell you can do, the community, and the church and so on. Some kind of approach to these problems, I think, gave a lot of thrust particularly to Chicago. I don’t know why it didn’t get going stronger in New York, because they were just [as] badly off, but in Chicago it was somewhat more evident as a—well, here was German town, and little Italy, and little Poland and all these sort of laid out. These were obvious, accessible, and visible, different cultures that had somehow to be assimilated into some kind of coherent and controlled urban life. This presented a whole array of problems. . . . But a lot of my friends and [I] all seemed to have the same kind of [challenge], having rejected a former kind of religio-moral orientation to the business. Being challenged by and fascinated by the possibility of [finding an] answer to these things—that gave it kind of a zest. And furthermore, it was promising to do some good; I mean we all still underneath . . . wanted to do some good. We wanted to make the city better, solve the problems of the family and do something about crime and so on. This was an answer.\footnote{Leonard S. Cottrell, interview with James T. Carey, Chapel Hill, NC, 28 March 1972, fol. 6, box 1, Chicago Sociology Interviews. This oral interview has been very slightly edited for ease-of-reading purposes only.}

Cottrell’s explanation is rather simple but also quite startling. Principally, it cuts against the grain of some very common ways of thinking about cultural hybridity, relativity, and the construction of “identities.” These were ethnographers with a purpose—namely, control.

The fluidity and relativity of culture was inextricably linked to social control. One idea would not come to mind, for Cottrell and the others, it seems, without conjuring the other—and the “Other.” In the encounter with hobos and prostitutes and immigrants there was a keen awareness that these people “lived by, or listened to an entirely different set
of drums.” They were perceived as “strange and exotic” yet intimately accessible. While on a personal level the incognito interactions with “maladjusted” so-called deviants and delinquents might well have been liberating for the student of the social sciences, a “sheer delight,” the entire exchange was predicated on the perception of (or actual) disparity. Recall: “Here they are and you have got to somehow handle them.” Homi Bhabha’s verity that “mimicry emerges as one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge” applies equally to mimicry elsewhere, not just in the colonies. One might think of the “participant-observer” model as but another practice of mimicry. Mimicry, a sort of “role-playing,” is a strategy, “a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which ‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualizes power,” Bhabha suggests.  

**Incognito**

Nels Anderson had a year to do his fieldwork and writing. He took a single room in the rear of a low-class hotel on Halsted Street, near Madison. There he could pound out the documents he was amassing on a typewriter at night without disturbing anyone. The district was filled with saloons, houses of prostitution, flophouses and low-cost hotels, rooming houses, missions, 

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42 Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 85-86.
gambling places, and “leg-show” entertainments. Park had given him little instruction, merely, “Write down only what you see, hear, and know, like a newspaper reporter.”

Burgess liked Anderson’s idea of starting with personal interviews, which he would collect from informal conversations while posing incognito as a hobo. That, Anderson wrote, is how he began. He would sit with a man on the curb, with another in the lobby of a hotel, with someone else in a flophouse. His goal was to collect as many interviews (“documents”) as possible. Anderson knew the area well, the hobo way of life, and their work. Hobohemia was actually his old home. For a short while in his youth he had lived not so far from his room on Halsted. As a ten- and eleven-year-old he had sold newspapers on those same dusty streets, which seemed to Anderson to have changed little. Back then he ran errands for prostitutes who bought his papers. “I was at home in that area.”

“I was equally at home among the inhabitants . . . I did not need to be self-conscious in conversation with different types of men. I could talk without uneasiness about having come from one place or other in the West, of having done one kind of work or another.” Starting an “interview” was easy enough; just sitting next to someone and kind of “thinking out loud” he could strike up a conversation, Anderson explained. “Even men who at the time of meeting were living entirely by begging had their work histories of one type or other, especially if the beggar was an older man, often he was wont to relive his work life gladly.”

The key, though, was to hide the fact that one was being

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interviewed. A few wrong moves might give a researcher away. In one of his own life histories, which contradicts certain details, Anderson intimated that he had already started to collect stories before arriving in Chicago. On his trek from Utah he had tried to get individuals to fill out “case cards,” upon which he had listed twenty-five questions. “[S]uch a method was not practical, as the reactions of the men were generally negative,” he admitted; they thought him either an “intellectualist” or simply too suspicious.\(^{46}\) Therefore in Hobohemia he turned to covert methods. He would slip into his two vest pockets two stacks of his “case cards” and from memory would jot down details of his conversations. “One must avoid causing those approached to feel that he is after something; the price of a beer, a cup [of] coffee or a meal. One must expect to do some spending but must keep at the level of frugal spending.”\(^{47}\) When the year was up, he still had a third of his report to finish, but he had material for a thousand pages. He had collected “documents” from four hundred men.

Anderson disavowed the duplicity—when it became too uncomfortable. His dilemma was not how to slip in and out of Hobohemia; it was how to convince himself and the world around him that he was a respectable sociologist and not just a masquerading ex-hobo. In his defense against those who said he had had to “descend” into the filth before ascending into the clear air of objectivity, Anderson wrote (well after the fact), “I did not descend into the pit, assume a role there, and later ascend to brush off the dust. I was in the process of moving out of the hobo world.”\(^{48}\) He was already


\(^{47}\) Anderson, \textit{American Hobo}, 164.

ascending, he retorted, chagrined. The project was merely a way of “getting by” while getting out. Far removed in distance as well as in time, he reaffirmed, “The role was familiar before the research began. In the realm of sociology and university life I was moving into a new role.”

Anderson wanted to control the trajectory of his own metamorphosis.

Some of his fellow graduate students warned Anderson that by associating with disreputable people like Reitman, the “king of the hobo,” he was taking a risk, that Reitman’s “filth” might just “smear off.” Around his middle-class classmates, he kept his research under wraps, only speaking about how much he was working. He hid the fact that he had used his own experience as a migrant worker to fill out portions of his thesis. And he was terribly self-conscious about even being at the university. His friends seemed instinctually to talk with sociological sophistication, while he groped around, clueless, too embarrassed to ask questions. Even the suit Anderson had purchased for his first day on campus as a prospective student had been worn by someone else; it was a clean, well-fitted suit—yet it was still second-hand. He knew he was the “outsider.”

“I couldn’t answer if asked about my ‘methods.’” The memory of his Master’s thesis oral defense would haunt Anderson for many years to come. He was unable to answer many of his professors’ questions, especially on theory, which seemed to amuse Albion Small and the other examiners. He could hear them chuckling during their close-door deliberations. “When I was called back into the room for the verdict, Professor Albion W. Small pointed to the street, ‘You know your sociology out there better than we

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50 Anderson, “A Stranger at the Gate,” 401-02.
do, but you don’t know it in here.” They agreed to “take a chance” and approved him anyway. With The Hobo’s favorable reception, Anderson received a string of invitations to speak before social groups, classes, and clubs, for which he said he was “ill-suited”—he would walk away each time “dissatisfied” with himself—each time evading the personal questions. Doubt was unassuaged. “I would try to nurture the fiction that I was only a student with a curiosity about hobos and their way.” The difficulty for Anderson was that he was the Other. Mimicking a hobo was perfectly acceptable. But who would believe a hobo could masquerade as a university social scientist? The professoriate would elude Anderson. “The Hobo gave me identity, a lasting identity, which continued to mark me as something less than a fully accepted sociologist.”

Anderson was not the only Chicago graduate student masquerading. There was “the sheer delight of discovering a lot of things you never dreamed of, all sorts of crazy things going on in the world,” Cottrell, an ex-YMCA worker, recalled. And if “you found out you could get close to them, and understand these criminals or these addicts or these prostitutes, all the seamy sort of thing that you were sort of protected from in your conventional life,” perhaps “[you] could interpret [your] own experience.” This, Cottrell said, helped to explain the department’s popularity in the interwar period. Through the encounter with the deviant, the prostitute, and the criminal, the social scientist imagined the possibilities of finding, creating, and achieving new identities for her- or himself.

Mind-reading was a mirroring process. It was a form of mimicry. Park, a former

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52 Anderson, On Hobos, 25.
54 Anderson, American Hobo, 170.
journalist, insisted that his own students get “inside and intimately acquainted” with their subjects and the foreign populations within the city. “This was one of the great thrusts in Chicago,” Cottrell recalled; “people had to get out, and if they wanted to study opium addicts, they went to the opium dens and even smoked a little opium maybe. They went out and lived with the gangs and . . . the hobos, and so on, [to get] to know them in a way that I don’t think today they do.”

In addition to the allure of the masquerade, Cottrell connected sociology’s appeal to the loss of confidence in older Victorian verities and values. Sociology promised answers that the well-intentioned but naïve Sunday School teachers failed to comprehend. John Dollard, a graduate student in the department in the 1920s, acknowledged, “A good many of the students had a theological background and took sociology as a kind of substitute for good deeds—or as a kind of holy work or substitution or substitute for a mission.” (Dollard said he had dropped his Catholicism in college “like taking off an overcoat.”) Although never ordained, the founder of the department, Albion Small, had studied theology; W. I. Thomas was of the fold; his successor as Chair, Ellsworth Faris, had been a former missionary; ditto Burgess, who was raised a “good Baptist” in a minister’s home—he too was on his way into the ministry, but then fell out for sociology. Students in the department followed their mentors’ lead; if you were going to be a sociologist, Dollard reminisced, “you should escape, deny, and renounce theological notions.” And a lot of those early social scientists had a lot to renounce. “Social Reform was sort of in the background. A good many of the earlier Sociologists had come out of

55 Cottrell, interview.
56 John Dollard, interview with James T. Carey, New Haven, CT, 14 April 1972, fol. 7, box 1, Chicago Sociology Interviews.
Social Work or Religion or something like that, and I think that still hung over, but the ’20’s was the period when it shifted from social reform and from social philosophy, armchair philosophizing to empirical research,” Ruth Cavan concurred.  

Before mimicking the other, Burgess taught his students how to mimic the self by gazing back at one’s own memories and reinterpreting their content. One needed to learn how to talk like a social scientist and rid oneself of competing perspectives, the kind one might have picked up in a Sunday School. In courses like “social pathology” and “crime and & vice,” Burgess assigned a “background paper.” Students were asked to write a personal narrative about their interest in and knowledge of the subject matter. Some wrote vivid biographies about the emotional impact of injuries, thoughts of suicide, racial discrimination, and, in one instance at least, antisemitism. A few wrote of labor strikes, factory working conditions, and the travails of being an immigrant in America. In his paper, Philip M. Hauser, a widely respected mid-century social scientists, made the terribly dark confession that his first act of delinquency occurred when he was a diminutive five-year-old. He was playing barber with his sister and sheared off all her golden locks. His mother let out a curdling shriek. Hauser recoiled in fear. [I]n that moment I realized I had committed a delinquency. The situation was clearly defined to me by the thrashings, unusual in my experience, administered by my mother and again by my father upon his arrival.”  

Belying its innocence, Hauser’s confessional illustrates a noteworthy point, that not only was Burgess extracting personal information about his subjects through his subjects; he was asking them in turn to reinterpret their own memories in light of being  

57 Cavan, interview.
subjects. Saul Alinsky recalled in his background paper several instances of personal “disorganization.” One day while he was training to be a pilot, the engine in his plane quit on him. “The moment before the expected crash completely disorganized me. I was afraid (and I’m not ashamed to admit it) so scared that my body was shivering,” he confessed. Those few minutes before he thought it was all over were utterly blank. To those people who say their life flashed before them when facing death, Alinsky shouted, “Bunk!” “[I]n those few minutes I was completely disorganized. What do conventions, mores, folkways or anything mean to a man facing death.” Miraculously the plane recovered. “Well, that finishes the story of my experience with personal disorganization.” Having examined the content of his own memories, he was ready to conquer the criminal’s. “I am interested in crime from the standpoint of seeing things in the criminal’s way of thinking, seeing what peculiar modes and customs they have created that are antagonistic towards the conventions approved by society,” Alinsky wrote, beguiled. “I would like to see why the gunman is a gunman, why the prostitute is a prostitute and delve into their social sphere to ascertain the background of these, well let us put it mildly, unconventional people.” (Because of “various political connections,” Alinsky said he would be able to find plenty of cases to “observe” vice—“liquor traffic, gambling, prostitution, etc., coupled with the graft accrued by the city for allowing these places to operate.”)\(^59\)

Other essayists spent most of their time turning their gaze onto their friends, family members, co-workers, and acquaintances. And when they did so, not surprisingly, they were far more confident of their analytic certainty. Albert Dunham, a black student

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in the department, who like Anderson and others had to work his way through the university, wrote that he had encountered plenty of vice. He was working at the time as a clerk at a small Black Belt Hotel, which apparently must have doubled as a brothel. “Overnight, it seemed, I was brought face to face with that most virulent of social diseases, Vice, with many of the subtle complications that arise in such a cesspool as society has made of Chicago’s Black Belt.” What most surprised Dunham was not all the gambling and illegal liquor but the prostitution. He had had contact with all sorts of black prostitutes and had even started to collect “documents” for further research. “I should like to select some one particular phase of sex vice and attempt a thorough scientific study of it.”

R. L. Gibbs, a preacher-cum-sociologist, had plenty to share and, because of his religious temperament and experience, seemed particularly adept at spotting maladjustments. He wrote about streetwalkers, juvenile delinquents, suicide, promiscuity among reformatory schoolgirls, about an assortment of boys who had “expressed numerous delinquencies, as stealing, drinking and sex delinquencies with both local girls and occupants of ‘houses’ in the near by city.” Chicago, however, had been his real education. Not only was he able to investigate the conditions of a “somewhat disorganized community,” where “social contracts are so very impersonal”; he too had lost his religion. At the end of the typed manuscript, he scribbled in pen, “Perhaps I should have indicated my change of point of view from that of religion to that of science,

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60 Albert Dunham, “My Practical Experience in Social Pathology,” n.d., fol. 1, box 143, Watson MSS.
from ethical interest to that of understanding the phenomena rather than corrective interest.” Why make the point? one wonders.

Philip Hauser had come a long way since his delinquent days of cutting off the golden locks of an innocent sibling. Crime, he now understood, was not inherent in the criminal’s constitution; it was instead “symptomatic of maladjustment.” (“I [do] not hold the criminal responsible for his acts” anymore.) Now he was prepared to turn out the objective gaze, if only he could find an object. “I am particularly interested in crime from the standpoint of the personality development of the criminal, although I have no special opportunities of observing criminal behavior or obtaining life histories of criminals.” The goal of his well-intentioned research, he said, would be to see if he could devise a method for predicting the criminal’s behavior. Chicago’s St. Valentine’s Day Massacre was a boon for the budding social scientist. He snuck into three of the seven funerals for the murdered Moran gang members, Al Weinshank, the ex-safe-cracker Johnny May, and a young optometrist, Dr. Reinhard Schwimmer. After, he handed in his observations and noted that further work was needed: “An attempt will probably be made to get more complete autobiographical materials of the persons involved.”

Armed with social scientific insight into the world of delinquency, vice, deviance, and maladjustments, these budding cultural mind-readers were excited to survey the city as spectacle. A great amount of the empirical work done in the department was carried out not by the professors but, as evidenced by the University Press’s Sociological Series,

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by its graduate students. Students trekked to Morals Court and heard cases of prostitution; they participated in police raids of prohibition-violating nightclubs. While working for local vice agencies, like the Juvenile Protection Agency, they visited brothels and reported on the prostitutes and their patrons—all to get close to the delinquent, to observe their ways and read their minds. Burgess was famous for being the implementer. He had helped Cottrell get a job with the Cook County Juvenile Court as a probation officer and with the Institute of Juvenile Research as a clinical sociologist. He had opened doors for Robert Faris, the Chair’s son, to ride with probation officers, so he could collect data and do his research. “Burgess had a lot of connections in the city; all the agencies knew him,” Faris acknowledged with gratitude.\footnote{Robert E. L. Faris, interview with James T. Carey, Seattle, WA, 24 May 1972, fol. 8, box 1, Chicago Sociology Interviews.} Walter Reckless had worked at venereal disease clinics and for the Committee of Fifteen (a social watch-dog agency), of which, for a time, Burgess was on the executive committee. Burgess had also directed Reckless to the Morals Court, where he got to know the staff and interviewed prostitutes. Cynthia Cohen doubled as a health clinic worker while pursuing her degree; Paul Cressey doubled as an inspector and surveyor for the Juvenile Protective Association, and after Nels Anderson had \textit{The Hobo} published, so as well did he. In many of these cases, the graduate students conducted their research, like Anderson, incognito, in secret. They were “role-playing” themselves.

As a volunteer with Chicago’s Central Howard Association (a Protestant agency that assisted ex-convicts), Clark Tibbits had ample access to vice as an investigator. “It was fascinating work because I was in direct contact with persons who were regarded as
offenders against society.”65 Yet, contact went well beyond simply observing. Tibbits, who lived in a low-rent apartment on 29th St. in an ethnically mixed neighborhood while he was a student, held a party one evening at his place that gave his friends something to remember. John Dollard was there, as were, presumably, some of his classmates.

“[D]uring the middle of the evening,” Dollard reminisced many years later, “a guy climbed through the back window with a gun in his hand and lined us all up against the wall, passed his hat and wanted us to put our money and rings in there. It was really something, everybody was wondering whether his manhood really demanded that he attack this guy or not.” Nobody did. The man and his accomplice were Tibbits’s parolees, it turned out. “He gave back our valuables and discussed the caper.”66 The parolee mimicking the act of a criminal—the criminal masquerading as a criminal and testing Dollard’s and the other’s manhood—takes the Other for another role-playing reversal. Who is the participant and who the observer? Of course what makes this role-playing acceptable was the self-consciousness and control of the parolee playing the role.

Role-playing, the act of assuming an identity, the act of mimicry, was for the social scientists, tantalizing and exciting. When it came to the delinquent playing roles themselves, however, social scientists could be far more ambivalent about the possibilities, particularly when (unlike the parolee’s performance) the act threatened the social order. In The Gang, Frederic Thrasher suggested that the difference turned on the delinquent’s understanding of their “roles.” “Not only does the gang boy transform his sordid environment through his imagination,” Thrasher warned, “but he lives among

66 Dollard, interview.
soldiers and knights, pirates and banditti. His enemies are assigned special rôles: the crabby old lady across the alley is a witch; the neighborhood cop becomes a man-killing giant or a robber baron; and the rival gang in the next block is a hostile army. Sometimes he created companions where they are lacking."

The problem with the role-playing is that the gang boy takes role-playing too seriously—without realizing it. Many times “he does not distinguish between what is real and what is not. He interprets his own social situation in his own terms and with the utmost seriousness.” The problem with delinquents is not that they assume a role but that they act it out, threatening the social order. In “playing Indian” with a companion, a boy might in fact burn his playmate at the stake—that is, literally. Thrasher argued, “To understand the gang boy one must enter into his world with a comprehension, on the one hand, of his seriousness behind his mask of flippancy or bravado, and on the other, of the role of the romantic in his activities and in his interpretation of the larger world of reality.” Thrasher has made a distinction here between the delinquent and the social scientist by suggesting that the social scientist knows the “larger world of reality,” unlike the delinquent, and this is why the cultural mind-reader is able to move in and out of it without compromising its social order—because the social scientist sustains it.

“Deviant” sexuality confounded this distinction. And in fact, it seemed, more than any other “deviant” practice, to best epitomize Burgess’s, Park’s, Thrasher’s, and other’s definition of the modern social self. Recall the three trends of post-Darwinian social theory: the disavowal of biological determinism, the universality of minds, and the nature of role-playing, and consider this narrative culled from Earl Bruce’s research on

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homosexuality (Burgess was his advisor). He was reporting on what he had encountered in a spontaneous, private party held in an apartment of a gay dance school proprietor, Mr. J. The dance instructor, Bruce recalled, put on some of his pornographic, homosexual-themed records, while another went out for some booze. The rhumba and tango records came out next. “All the homosexuals danced the rhumba,” Bruce wrote. They danced on and on. After, four of the men sat on a large, wide divan and began to kiss and fondle each other. They told Bruce they were “just good friends.” No obligations. What Bruce saw next sent his mind spinning, though. Mr. J. brought out two pairs of toe dancing slippers, put one set on his own feet and the second on another boy’s, and began to teach his partner to toe dance. “Then one homosexual who had been taking the followers part in dancing, suddenly took the lead and said, ‘Oh, I think I will treat her as my wife, and be a man for a change,’” Bruce wrote, fascinated by the reversal of roles.

“We . . . assume that in heterosexual groups there is a give and take relationship, whereas in homosexual groups, the individuals are concerned with the self and its expression. In other words, group life centers around self expression and expression of sexual drives not satisfied,” Bruce concluded. “Due to the nature of the homosexual group life, sexual and love relations are fluid, out of this arises much disillusionment and disappointment.” The questions began to roll through his mind:

What is the nature of this adjustment, what is back of it, how does it make for stability, for instability, for a lack of confidence in the relationships of life? . . . Does group life in the homosexual world serve the purpose mainly for self expression? For that matter, it can be argued that all group life serves that function. But it can be further argued that there exists in the homosexual group life, a different type of self expression than in normal or heterosexual group. . . . Is the group serving just for self expression?68

What especially intrigued Bruce, it seems, was not the self-consciousness that attended the reversal of roles, although that in itself set his mind reeling with speculations. It was rather the fluidity of identities predicated on, and focused on, “sexual drives not satisfied” (the disavowal of biological determinism), which prompted the self-conscious role-playing.

Elsewhere he would argue, “The sex function like original nature is plastic, and may become integrated with the role one assumes during sexual intercourse. But the component parts of this sex role it seems must be related to and be in harmony with other roles which are not sexual in nature.” From these observations Bruce would begin to question the broader field of role-playing, self-awareness, adjustment, and how one ought to conceive of the modern self. He would question the Humm Wadsworth personality tests that he had administered to diagnose adjustment, thinking them incapable of measuring the homosexual’s sociability. “[T]he questions were designed for heterosexuals, whose problems of social acceptability are not the same as the homosexual,” he wrote to Burgess. “The homosexual lives in a hostile world. The heterosexual essentially does not.” An individual might be maladjusted in one context (the hostile world)—yet not in another.

69 Earle W. Bruce, “Case of Mr. D.,” n.d., unpublished, fol. 2, box 98, Watson MSS.
70 Bruce, “Observations of a Homosexual Party.”
A write-up of a drag club on North Halsted, Ballyhoo, from 1933 describes an equally evocative scene. It too is contained in Burgess’s files, although we know little of its origin. It describes a drag queen performance. The queens paraded one by one around a circle, all in costume (one made entirely of paper), the crowd clapping as each exited the stage, and as each approved of the performance. Someone by the name Perley had a particularly impressive performance. “As he walked around, he arched his back, tilted his head, and used his hands in an effeminate manner, gracefully. His role could be characterized as follows: A French demoiselle, aloof, smart, haughty, charming and graceful, head flung back.” The reading of gestures as the principal means by which one reads another’s role, or performance, recalls George Herbert Mead’s classic, *Mind, Self, & Society* (1934).71 Although his appointment was in Chicago’s philosophy department, Mead had had a profound effect on social theory in the sociology and anthropology department. Mead, like the others, had thrown Darwin overboard (in a manner of speaking). He, too, was searching for a new conception of the social self. And his answer was “social behaviorism.”

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Mead concluded that cultural mind-reading was, in essence, the reading of gestures, and not the reading of introspecting, instinct-driven minds. Mead defined gesture capacious (language as gesture, gesture as language):

[Gesture] are part of the organizations of the social act, and highly important elements in that organization. To the human observer they are expressions of emotions, and that function of expressing emotion can legitimately become the field of the work of the artist and of the actor. The actor is in the same position as the poet: he is expressing emotions through his own attitude, his tones of voice, through his gestures, just as the poet through his poetry is expressing his emotions and arousing that emotion in others.72

Mead suggested that not only does one perform a “role” through gesturing, but as Perley had so artfully accomplished, by gesturing one elicits the role in others. “This taking the rôle of the other, an expression I have so often used, is not simply of passing importance. It is not something that just happens as an incidental result of the gesture, but it is of importance in the development of cooperative activity,” Mead stated. “The immediate effect of such role-taking lies in the control which the individual is able to exercise over his own response.”73 The gesture expresses and is the expression of the social self. Role-taking—the glue that holds society together—is a kind of dance like Mr. J’s. “The [homosexual’s] impersonating of this [the woman’s] role, in its over aspects is limited by the conception of self, (what he thinks others think of him) and which takes the form of a role for comparison, and personality traits.”74

Burgess worked closely not only with Bruce but many of the other graduate students in the department during the 1920s, 1930s, and after. “[H]e gathered a lot of sexual questionnaires, autobiographies,” William Carter remembered. He was speaking

72 Mead, Mind, Self, & Society, 44.
73 Mead, Mind, Self, & Society, 254.
of Burgess, his advisor in the 1920s. “He wanted my sex life, I wouldn’t give it to him—I was just married.” Circumspect in so many other ways, Burgess was attracted to the possibilities of sex, particularly of unorthodox varieties—as a topic of research, of course. We can only speculate on what Burgess thought of all of Bruce’s research. What must he have thought of this narrative taken while the subject was under hypnosis? “Queers are clean and decent,” it began. “By the action of their eyes they look for friendship . . . When they shake hands with you they have that peculiar look in their eyes that have a wanting feel of expression. They have a sort of personal magnetism between them.” A student of Mead, and a chief articulator of the post-Darwinian self, Burgess must have pondered “the gesture” and “the gaze.” Indeed, Bruce had sent Burgess these snapshots after one of their meetings. Burgess’s archive is replete with life histories, personality tests, interviews, and other items documenting and analyzing gays, queers, drag queens, prostitutes, and “punks” (young male prostitutes). There are lexicons of homosexual euphemisms, transcriptions of gay jokes, as well as graphic descriptions of all varieties of sexual play. Many are the observations of an ethnologist studying their subject, the city’s deviants—the incarcerated in Chicago’s reformatory and penal institutions and hospitals. Denizens who needed to be surveyed, analyzed, documented, and “controlled.”

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75 William P. Carter, interview with James T. Carey, Cape Girardeau, MO, 17 March 1972, fol. 5, box 1, Chicago Sociology Interviews. Note: the punctuation of this quote deviates slightly from the transcript for ease of reading only.


Duplicity was inherent to the task of cultural mind-reading, to urban ethnographic studies and “participant-observer” methods. One cannot help but register the false note in Burgess’s introduction to Paul Cressey’s The Taxi-Dance Hall (1932). The study had a threefold purpose, he explained. The first object of the inquiry was to offer “an unbiased and intimate picture of the social world of the typical taxi-dance hall”; second, “to trace the natural history of the taxi-dance hall as an urban institution”; and third, “to present as impartially as possible the present kinds of control operating to maintain order, to create codes of conduct, and to enforce standards, whether on the part of the managers, instructresses, patrons, police, social workers, or the press.” Burgess seemed utterly unaware of the contradictions inherent in the study’s threefold purpose (an unbiased but intimate picture that leads to control?). Perhaps more telling is his endorsement later that, thanks to Cressey’s study, “The reader is given an entrée into the social world of the taxi-dance hall such as the casual visitor never gains. Vicariously, he may imagine himself in the place of the taxi-dancer or her patrons participating, as it were, in their experiences, and getting some appreciation of their outlook and philosophy of life.”

The social scientist’s “objective” analysis would allow the reader, “vicariously,” to “imagine” him- or herself as a taxi-dancer or a patron, “participating” in their “experiences.” All in the name of control?

The taxi-dance hall was itself a simulacrum. It was a new, flourishing urban entertainment institution, a night club that was fronted by a “dance school” with “instructresses.” Men, the “students,” would come and buy tickets for a nickel or dime.

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and pay a girl—“hired” like a taxi—to instruct them in dancing. It cost a ticket per dance, which would last for a minute or two, or maybe a little longer, depending on the time of evening and hall. The girls were young, often new to the city; the men were a motley crew, mostly immigrant—although the halls attracted all sorts of characters.

The patrons of the taxi-dance hall constitute a variegated assortment. The brown-skinned Filipino rubs elbows with the stolid European Slav. The Chinese chop-suey waiter comes into his own alongside the Greek from the Mediterranean. The newly industrialized Mexican peon finds his place in the same crowd with the “bad boys” of some of Chicago’s first families. The rural visitor seeking a thrill achieves his purpose in company with the globe-trotter from Australia. The American Negro remains the only racial type excluded from the taxi-dance hall.79

In short, it was a fluid world where identities mixed and mingled.

“Ogling, in fact, seems here to be the chief occupation of the male,” Cressey observed.80 Gazing out from the sides of the dance floor, the men could imagine themselves dancing with the girls and imagine what the dance would feel like; once in a girl’s arms, they could fantasize, Cressey surmised, about an intimacy with American girls that seemed entirely foreign to them as immigrants, as transients and outsiders. For some it was the fantasy of escape. It was a slummer’s paradise; they “are not displeased by their experiences in the taxi-dance hall,” Cressey noted. “Under the cloak of anonymity in the taxi-dance hall they may seek to experience something of the thrill and fascination of unconventional life in the city.”81 Under the cloak, the Filipino, too, could imagine a new identity. Spurred by the sense of intimacy dancing afforded, the Filipinos could fantasize about their courtship and marrying a “white” taxi-dancer, intimating a sense of belonging, Cressey argued. Anonymity, in either case, was the tie that bound

79 Cressey, Taxi-Dance Hall, 9.
80 Cressey, Taxi-Dance Hall, 8.
81 Cressey, Taxi-Dance Hall, 124.
them all together. Anonymity and uncertainty, these were the bywords of modern city
life. “Today with the radio, the telephone, and the automobile urbanizing the entire
country, the question becomes even more crucial. Will modern man be able to readjust
his standards and practices in such a way that he and his descendants will prosper?”
Cressey asked, rhetorically. “This is the problem implicit not only in the development of
the taxi-dance hall, but in almost all maladjustments in city life.”

The dance hall was a by-product of modern urban life, and a sign of the new age.
The great fear within the Juvenile Protection Agency, for whom Cressey “inspected,” was
that the young women in the dance halls were being taken advantage of, that dancing
would lead to sex (which was not so far from the truth around some halls). The pay-for-
pleasure transaction fueled the perception that no good could come of the artificial
relationship that the halls encouraged. The fluidity of intentions, only encouraged by
anonymity, proved too unsettling for the moral reformer. The dance hall, they thought,
was only a new substitute for the brothel (which ironically the dance hall had helped to
close). Vigilant surveillance was required. “The situation presents a challenge to the best
social planning of which we are capable. Sociologists no doubt should have some
valuable suggestions to make. But in the end the problems presented by the taxi-dance
hall, if they are to be solved, must be met through the collective thought of our best
‘social engineers.’” As had been the case with The Hobo, Cressey includes
recommendations precisely along these lines, namely, a regime of JPA surveillance to
ensure the control of public immorality.

82 Cressey, Taxi-Dance Hall, 288.
83 Cressey, Taxi-Dance Hall, 293.
The irony here (or some might say the hypocrisy) is that Cressey was himself ogling. Were it not for the fact that the taxi-dance hall fostered a culture of anonymity Cressey could not have done his research. “My methods of study have been chiefly through visits to these halls as a regular patron. In this manner a general observation of behavior, of mores, can be gained. By constant vigil considerable amount of concrete data can be secured,” he wrote in his “research proposal.” “As far as possible my effort has been to get data without revealing anything concerning my identity.” In addition to his own observations, he had “considerable information” from a loquacious patrolman, and he would rely extensively on JPA records, which would be of “great value.” He had tried to secure police records, too, but was stymied there. “The suspicion of investigators and reformers handicap the securing of data.”

He also proposed a thorough survey of the immigrant Filipino population in Chicago. They would serve as something of a case-study in Americanization. He would analyze the role the dance hall played in that process, in their “adjustment.” In the final version, Cressey devoted an entire chapter to the Filipino, which is perhaps its most suggestive section. And yet, from reading The Taxi-Dance Hall, one would not know that some of these figures were, in fact, University of Chicago students. One, at least, “J.A.,” was a graduate student. More than one was a friend of Cressey. We know because he wrote to Cressey when he got into a fix with the girl he was seeing. “Cressey,” he wrote, “I consider you my best American friend, and I think maybe you can help me.” The maladjusted and adjusted—the sociologists and their subjects—not only mingled but

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85 Letter to Paul G. Cressey, n.d., fol. 8, box 130, Watson MSS.
sometimes became friends. In the intimate settings the city created, the distinctions confounded the expectation that one could and would control the Other.

**Affairs of Science**

Were it not for Ben Reitman, Nels Anderson might not have written a thesis on Hobohemia. Midway through his first year he was still searching for a thesis topic. A social worker classmate told him about Reitman and said he should attend one of his upcoming lectures. The topic would be the social worker—how they were unimaginative, uninformed, and servants of the middle class. Anderson went and found himself engaging in a heated argument with the Byronesque lecturer. He remembered Reitman years later as being a real showman, a big man with a bush of black hair, who wore a large hat and walked with a heavy cane. After the lecture, Reitman tugged on Anderson’s arm and asked him to join him and two social workers for a cup of coffee and some pie.

At a local café they talked for an hour or so, and Reitman suggested Anderson conduct a study of the homeless man in Chicago. See me in a week with a proposal, Reitman said, inviting Anderson to attend another lecture he was scheduled to give on a different topic. From Anderson’s notes the next week they outlined the project. And Reitman promised to drum up the money. Anderson, who still felt like a hobo masquerading as a sociologist, agreed to the plan, with skepticism. A few days later when he met Reitman at his downtown office, a venereal disease clinic that serviced the city’s prostitutes, pimps, and “men about town,” Reitman was beaming. He had the money, and
he would place it with the United Charities of Chicago, payable to Anderson as he would need it.

A wealthy retired physician and good friend, William Evans, who was also head of the city’s Public Health Department and columnist, had agreed to underwrite the study. Anderson could now afford to pay for his own coffee—which he could not before—and a second, second-hand suit, too. “My project was quite in line with what the sociology department was trying to do. It concerned an area of the city and the way of life there. Better still, it came without help from the university,” Anderson explained. The funding arrangement for the hobo study was typical of the period, in certain respects. Back then the social science departments at the University of Chicago relied upon foundations, charities, churches, civic organizations, municipal funds, and private donations to underwrite its research. The department of sociology and anthropology’s seminal study of the Polish community in Chicago, published as The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (5 vols., 1918-20), was funded, for example, by a $50,000 donation from Helen Culver, who was a real estate developer, the owner of Hull House, a significant philanthropist—and one of the University’s most generous benefactors (over the years she donated $1.1 million to the school).^{86}

Anderson’s start-up grant was more modest, seventy-five dollars a month, plus twenty dollars a month for

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expenses. With the money secured, he went to Burgess, his advisor. Ever aware of propriety, Burgess was nervous about having the rather infamous venereal disease doctor attached to the study. For the sake of appearance, if nothing else, a committee was proposed: Joel Hunter, the director of the United Charities, could be on it and serve as treasurer, Reitman too, and Burgess would be its director and “science advisor.” “In time, I came to realize that he was being cautious. A university had to avoid research regarded as outside the zone of respectability,” Anderson would later write; and “Hobohemia was widely held to be an underworld populated by ‘undesirable’ persons. If Burgess ever held that view, it vanished as, week after week, he read my ‘documents.’”

The Committee’s presence in the published, public version of *The Hobo* was far more impressive looking. Burgess appears as chairman; and Wilfred S. Reynolds, the director of the Chicago Council of Social Agencies, as secretary. There are twelve other members listed, representing, among others, the Salvation Army, Juvenile Protection Agency, Illinois Free Employment Service, United Charities of Chicago, Jewish Social Service Bureau, Chicago Christian Industrial League—and Dr. Ben L. Reitman for Chicago’s Department of Health. The Committee’s Preface states that the “Committee on Homeless Man” was organized by the Executive Committee of the Chicago Council of Social Agencies in 1922, to study the “problem of the migratory casual worker” and that Anderson had been “selected to make the study.”

The study’s history already sounds more august. (Burgess, Hunter, and Reitman, according to Anderson, formed the Committee after he had already submitted his

study.\textsuperscript{88} Anderson had received the “generous assistance and encouragement” of Evans, Reitman, and Hunter, and the “assumption” of the project by the Chicago Council of Social Agencies, alongside the JPA, had enabled its enlargement. The “object of this inquiry” was to secure those “facts” that would enable social agencies to “deal intelligently with the problems created by the continuous ebb and flow, out of and into Chicago, of tens of thousands of foot-loose and homeless men.”\textsuperscript{89} To be noted, Reitman does get a nod. Anderson included his picture and a positive review of Hobo College, alongside the other reformers working to improve the lives of the hobo.

At the end of \textit{The Hobo}, the Committee published their recommendations. It is a substantial list. “The Committee on Homeless Men held many meetings which were devoted to outlining the plan of investigation, to reports upon the progress of field work, and to the drafting of the findings and recommendations which appear as Appendix A.” Again, according to Anderson, the public statement does not quite capture the truth. He claimed that the Committee had “commissioned” Burgess to prepare the appendix.\textsuperscript{90} “The findings of this study indicate conclusively,” Burgess wrote: “\textit{(a)} that any fundamental solution of the problem is national and not local, and \textit{(b)} that the problem of the homeless migratory worker is but an aspect of the larger problems of industry, such as unemployment, seasonal work, and labor turnover.”\textsuperscript{91} Social services had been remedial, Burgess noted, and not preventative, organized, and coordinated. Therefore, a number of surveillance measures should be implemented. Many of the recommendations were noble: the building of a municipal lodging house, a municipal laundry and bathhouse, a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{88} Anderson, \textit{American Hobo}, 169.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Anderson, \textit{The Hobo}, xi-xiii.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Anderson, \textit{American Hobo}, 169.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Anderson, \textit{The Hobo}, 269-70.
\end{itemize}
vocational clinic, and so forth. Others were decidedly more disciplinary. After five o’clock, for example, the “vagrant boys” under seventeen should be turned over to the police, who should take them to the Detention Home. The very next morning the staff there should take the vagrant straight to the office of the chief probation officer. (One of the concerns was to protect the boys against preying homosexuals.) Order, control, and surveillance were the recommendation’s watchwords.

As a document of social reform, The Hobo displayed tendencies that were typical of the period. As Daniel Rodgers reminds us in Atlantic Crossings, “[A] century ago the city stood at the vital center of transatlantic progressive imaginations.” To reform the city was to reform the nation. Thus to solve a local problem was to initiate a national solution to a national ill. Consider the make-up of the Committee. Of the organizations represented, only one bears the name Illinois, and not one indicates national origins. This was Chicago for Chicago (first), then the nation second. Note, too, the composition: the secular and sacred sat side by side around the reformer’s table. Over a third of the study details “How the Hobo Meets His Problem,” and included are a number of references to reform and church agencies.

The section starts with short biographies of Hobohemia reform leaders, beginning with “Dr. James Eads How, ‘The Millionaire Hobo,’” then “Dr. Ben L. Reitman, ‘The King of the Hobos.’” A photo of Reitman is prominently displayed. His title was “well earned,” Anderson wrote. Anderson, who came to respect Reitman, inserted Reitman’s own short biography: “I am an American by birth, a Jew by parentage, a Baptist by adoption, a physician and teacher by profession, cosmopolitan by choice, a Socialist by

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inclination, a celebrity by accident, a tramp by twenty years’ experience, and a reformer by inspiration.” Among descriptions of the soap-boxers, the Industrial Workers of the World, and church missions, are, not surprisingly, discussions of the reform agencies, organizations, and institutions represented on the Committee—including Hobo College.

While Anderson noted the shortcoming of this social work, he wrote, “the fact must not be lost sight of that they are absolutely necessary to [the hobo’s] social existence. Only in these social and political organizations can the migratory worker regain his lost status. Only in association with his fellows can he again hope and dream of an ideal world of cooperation.” “Were these organizations destroyed, the anti-social grudge of the individual would undoubtedly be reflected in criminality,” he warned.

During his years at Chicago, Robert Park was known for having driven one student or another to tears, barking reproofs, like, “You’re not one of those damn do-gooders.” One of his students recalled a particularly testy confrontation with an elderly do-gooder in the class, an aggressive reformer. What set her off was Park’s derogatory comments about the Quakers and their “self-righteous meddling” in the abolition movement. And to top it off, he charged that “the greatest damage done to the city of Chicago was not the product of corrupt politicians or criminals but of women reformers.” The two got into fight, which carried over into another class. When they met next, Park strode in with a book under his arm. It contained William James’s essay, “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” which addresses our incapacity to understand the inner

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world of others. Park had had the essay read to him by James himself while he was at Harvard. With time it would become Park’s mantra as well. “The trouble with our sociology in America is that it has had so much to do with churches and preachers. . . . The sociologist cannot condemn some people and praise others.”

This image of Park, as hostile to reform, appears to contradict the keynote of remarks made by friends and loved ones at his memorial service. “Robert Park was a reformer,” Everett C. Hughes began. “All his life he was deeply moved to improve this world.” Hughes had a long history with the department, both as a student and as a faculty member. He and his colleagues all knew about Park’s worked on the “negro problem” with Booker T. Washington. Park had worked for Tuskegee before being recruited by Thomas to come to Chicago. He had traveled extensively with Washington, had been his ghostwriter, speechwriter, an organizer, and promoter. After finishing his dissertation, he had also served as secretary for the Congo Relief Agency in Massachusetts. Park could not have been too hostile to the idea: his wife was involved in social work. Nonetheless, his views had evolved over the years.

“If he became emancipated from his belief in one particular reform after another and finally even gave up trying to reform reformers, it was not that he had become cynical or indifferent,” Hughes asserted. “Rather it was that his observing eye came to see each social problem in an ever wider web of human relations and that his spirit felt the pull of the ties that bind each passing trouble to the eternal impulse of man.” He took his reform like he took his religion: he believed in belief. “Whatever my individual

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predilections for one creed or another may have been at different times in my life, I had come finally to believe in religion itself; believe in it, that is to say, as an essential element in a wholesome individual and social life.”

Park left the preaching and the reform to others. “Sociology cannot be mixed with welfare and religion. ‘A moral man cannot be a sociologist.’ Sociology should not help to build up reform programs, but it should help those who have to build these programs to do it more intelligently,” Park lectured.

Burgess, on the other hand, was not so shy of getting involved. He was elected to the Board of Directors of the American Eugenics Society in 1946; he was also on the executive committee of the Social Hygiene Council, which was affiliated with the Illinois Social Hygiene League. Jane Addams and Herman Adler were both on the state’s Advisory Committee; Harold L. Ickes was its Vice-Chairman. Burgess served and/or helped lead a potpourri of other civic, professional, national and local reform agencies, societies, and associations, including, but not limited to, the American Association of Social Workers, the American Society of Criminology (which he helped to establish), the Citizens’ Police Committee, Chicago’s City Club, the Committee of Fifteen (whose purpose was “to aid the public authorities in the enforcement of laws against pandering and to take measures calculated to prevent traffic in women”), and the Citizens’ Association of Chicago. The list goes on. Burgess’s service to community, state, and national organizations gives the lie to the idea that post-Progressive Era social scientists were divorced from “application,” despite their own occasional disavowal. It also gives

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98 Robert E. Park to Samuel C. Kincheloe, 12 Oct. 1940, fol. 1, box 14, Park MSS.
99 Quoted in Raushenbush, Robert E. Park, 97.
the lie to the idea that post-progressive social scientists abandoned the idea of social reform.  

Park’s liberalism and Burgess’s activism led in the same direction—towards social control. Robert Park would explain to his students, “All our modern problems [are a] product of forces represented in the growth of cities.” Then he would tick off his litany of maladjustments: race suicide, birth control, political corruption, the boss system, the “boy and girl problem,” divorce, the breakdown of the family, unemployment, waste—“conspicuous waste.” Not only do the social sciences describe, analyze, and classify, he suggested: they also seek to control. “Social Control,” this is the “central problem in sociology”—control of the individual, control of the group.

William Thomas took his progressivism (he was for women’s suffrage) with his eugenics. In a 1909 article—published the same year as his *Source Book*—entitled “Eugenics: The Science of Breeding Men,” he wrote, “Eugenics means primarily good reproduction, and to the degree that it is possible to carry it out, it will eliminate the congenital criminal, the insane, the idiotic, the dipsomaniac, those tainted with hereditary disease, the violent, and it is to be hoped, the Philistine.” He asserted that the task of the social sciences was to develop methods for determining social laws, as well as their


102 Robert Park, class notes, n.d., [addenda] fol. 3, box 18, Park MSS.

103 Robert Park, class notes, n.d., fol. 2, box 5, Park MSS.

application, which would give the human world a “control approximately as perfect” as
the laws developed by physics and chemistry for the control of the physical world and
biology for the animal world.\textsuperscript{105} Thus, the same discussions that fostered a culture-is-
relative perspective also engendered visions of controlling that relativity.

In his lectures to students, Burgess would ask rhetorically, How should social
“disintegration” and lack of intimacy in modern life be treated? He would answer
himself, “I can only say briefly, that is seems to me that we must evolve a form of control . . .” This control must “appeal” to the interest of the people and must also “follow the
lines of vocational and professional aptitudes and activities in all likelihood.”\textsuperscript{106} To be
sure, control was the professional’s domain, not the amateur’s. Walter Reckless liked to
think of Burgess as “the implementer”: “he’s the one that got the contacts with the
agencies; he’s the one that got the money . . . ; he was the implementer.”\textsuperscript{107} Recall that
Burgess had helped Cottrell get a job with the Cook Juvenile Court as a probation officer,
that he was on the executive committee of the Committee of Fifteen, which Reckless
worked for. When students needed to do research, he often knew just whom to call. He
knew how to open doors precisely because of his assistance to reform agencies.

Remember as well that Cynthia Cohen had doubled as a health clinic worker, and that
Paul Cressey and Anderson had doubled as inspectors and surveyors for the JPA. Social
scientists at the University of Chicago were not just masquerading around the city. They
were working for agencies of social reform and control. The one act justified the other.

\textsuperscript{105} “Thomas Defends Self as Daring Social Explorer,” \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune}, 22 April 1918, 15.
\textsuperscript{106} Ernest W. Burgess, “Social Pathology, IV,” lecture notes, n.d., 46, fol. 8, box 29, Watson
MSS.
\textsuperscript{107} Walter C. Reckless, interview with James T. Carey, 28 June 1972, fol. 21, box 1, Chicago
Sociology Interviews. See also Faris, interview.
The Migrating Machine

In 1940, the University of Chicago Press republished *The Hobo*, in an expanded and revised form, as *Men on the Move*. Anderson had been reluctant to update the book for which he was so famous (or, in some circles, infamous). “Perhaps it was praised too much by reviewers, and I’ll admit it began to pall on me to be introduced year after year in this wise: ‘You know———, author of *The Hobo*?’”¹⁰⁸ He was so sick of the hobo that in 1931 he wrote a parody of the original book, *The Milk and Honey Route*—albeit under a pseudonym, Dean Stiff, if nothing else to cleanse his own memories. But he accepted the revision project anyway. Migrancy was once again a problem to be solved. Indeed, the Great Depression might well have been called the Great Migration. Not only were thousands of young and old men and boys hopping freight trains again, looking for odd jobs where they could find them. Now entire families were on the move, too. John Steinbeck’s *The Grapes of Wrath* (1939) was not simply a sentimental novel. Like everyone else, Steinbeck was trying to make sense of what he was reading about in the papers and seeing on the streets. He was trying to capture a massive social phenomenon in personal terms.

The Great Migration was a boon for social scientists like Anderson. The fluid city became the fluid nation. “The Great Depression was impressively present. Peddlers were at every corner, especially those selling apples. In every city there were parades of the jobless. Private welfare agencies were staging drives, not getting a fraction of what they needed,” Anderson recalled. “Local public welfare was severely limited and only a few state governments were appropriating funds for relief, claiming that was a responsibility of local government.”\textsuperscript{109} Social scientists with experience on the local, urban level found themselves called upon to solve the national crisis. Head of the newly established New York Emergency Relief Administration, Harry Hopkins first hooked Anderson, who was in New York City, to help with the state’s crisis. At the time, Franklin Roosevelt was New York State Governor. When Roosevelt became president he took Hopkins with him and made him head of the Federal Emergency Relief Agency.

Shortly thereafter, Anderson received the call, too. He was needed in Washington, D.C. “I was asked to be the labor relations officer. It was also true that nobody seemed anxious to take the job, or use pressure to get it,” Anderson acknowledged.\textsuperscript{110} He demurred at first, wanting instead an academic position. But as a forty-year-old and only a few years out of his Ph.D. program, Anderson found his prospects dimming. “That job

\textsuperscript{109} Anderson, \textit{On Hobos}, 213.
\textsuperscript{110} Anderson, \textit{On Hobos}, 214.
took me away from the old hobo identity and gave me a labor relations identity.\textsuperscript{11}\textsuperscript{11} Like other social scientists, Anderson thought it a temporary job. But as he and the others would learn, once in the government, access had its benefits. On the title page of \textit{Men on the Move}, Anderson appears as Director of the Section of Labor Relations for the Works Projects Administration. With time and governmental experience, he would go on to direct the newly established UNESCO Institute for Social Sciences in Cologne, and stay, until 1962-63, when it closed.

\textit{Men on the Move} is a very different book from \textit{The Hobo}. “The book is not the product of research,” he readily acknowledged. “The materials are drawn from other publications, from the researches of the experts.” Most of the material had been culled from the research on migrancy over the preceding decade. The goal of the volume was far more modest than \textit{The Hobo}, which aimed at alleviating and reforming the migrant man’s conditions. “It may be a service to bring such information together in a small volume for the convenience of readers who are not expert researchers in the field.” Moreover, and more to the point: “Nor have I in this book attempted to present any plan or scheme for solving the migrancy problem. I am not concerned much about the migrancy of people, so long as their goings and comings are to some purpose.” Not only had Anderson’s elevation to the Federal government changed his perspective, from an activist moral reformer to a more passive administrator of knowledge and consolidator of expertise: it also had the effect of changing his reader’s perspective.

Namely, gone are the Reitmans and the Hows, the concentration on Chicago’s relief organizations, charities, and reform institutions. Indeed, he argued,\textsuperscript{11}\textsuperscript{11} Anderson, \textit{On Hobos}, 215.
Whatever may be done about this problem for the guidance and control of migration will have to be carried out under the leadership of the federal government. State and local communities may be able to share in such a program, but the problem is too far flung for their leadership. Federal agencies are already confronting the problem, but their efforts are not co-ordinated, and what is being done is generally of a secondary or incidental character. There is need of a federal policy for dealing with migrants. There is need, too, of fixing federal policy so that the agencies already active will operate in relation to this problem in some co-ordinated manner.\textsuperscript{112}

Robert Park’s agnostic liberalism had become Anderson’s faith—that is, in centralized federal planning. In 1930 Park had told a researcher studying a Chinese village, “Our ideal is to have a scientist in each social institution—a person who isn’t interested in improving any particular case a bit, but is interested in cases of that kind.” Although, he also warned, “New ideas arise, whether in the individual or in the group, from the contact and ferment of the people who are moved to act—moved with the urge, the desire and aim to achieve something or other.”\textsuperscript{113}

Two additional features characterize the revised and extended study. At the core, the original was constructed on the foundation of life-histories, the informal interviews and case-study documents that Anderson had assembled on individual migrant workers. Anderson’s duplicity, his masquerading as a hobo, had facilitated a kind of personal

\textsuperscript{112} Anderson, \textit{Men on the Move}, 4-6.
\textsuperscript{113} Raushenbush, \textit{Robert E. Park}, 121-22.
surveillance. The debate over the life-history document was all the rage in the department at Chicago in the late 1920s, especially after the arrival of William Ogburn, a Columbia professor and protégé of Franklin Giddings, who, unlike Park, had a national reputation. Ogburn was a statistics man and would edge the department in the direction of quantitative analysis. His arrival made “quite a splash,” recalled one graduate student.\(^{114}\)

The splash was, at least partially, the product of the methodological clash between Park, who was a qualitative man—the “journalist sociologist”—and Ogburn, who was most certainly not: he was a \textit{scientist}. Anderson had finished his degree before Ogburn’s arrival, yet Ogburn’s edging would mirror the discipline’s (and Anderson’s) move toward quantitative methods, chiefly statistical analysis.

Anderson was critical of \textit{The Hobo} not only for being too journalistic—for having “colored up too much the culture” of the homeless migrant—but also for having overlooked the impact of technological innovation. “No thought was given to the technological devices which were at that time invading the various fields of labor that afforded the hobo his livelihood. These changes not only took the hobo’s job away from him, but they very soon filled the roads with the new generation of migrants, which are the subject of this report,” he wrote.\(^{115}\) \textit{The Hobo}, he thought, was out-of-date the day it hit the bookstores. Again, Anderson’s shift in emphasis away from the particularities of the urban context to the influences of technology on modern-day life trends with the discipline as a whole (although, of course, urban sociology never dropped out entirely). In fact, all three of the significant revisions that \textit{The Hobo} underwent are interrelated and are, at the same time, a reflection on the direction social theory and the social sciences

\(^{114}\) Cottrell, interview.
were headed, generally. The migration in emphasis from the vernacular reform of the city to the centralizing, bureaucratic tendencies of the federal government; from the predominance of qualitative methods to statistical, quantitative analysis in the social sciences; as well as the shift in emphasis away from migrancy toward technology as determining cultural patterns—these three are all of a kind. “Today, as always, migrancy and technology have gone hand in hand,” Anderson, the Federal government bureaucrat, wrote.116

In 1935, William Ogburn warned Americans, “We have cut off immigration from Europe, but an army of metallic men are coming to do the work the immigrants did, and to take jobs away from many of us.” In a *New York Times Magazine* article, Ogburn described a scene out front of a restaurant window on Broadway in New York City. A group has gathered there to watch a machine that mixes a batch of cake batter, then bakes the cakes. “After a precise number of seconds, a turner, mechanically operated, is inserted under each cake and turns it over. By the same mechanical process the cakes are taken off and placed on a plate that passes by on a belt, at just the right time.” The machine might not be as “pretty as the girl in white” who once stood there in the window doing the same job, nor is the scene as “picturesque” as the Western pioneer, squatting over a campfire, tossing his flapjacks up in the air. “[B]ut beauty and color give way to the all-conquering machine.” Around the corner is an automatic soda foundation in a restaurant, not a salesman is in sight. Customers drop a coin in a slot, and out comes their soda. A block away is another modern restaurant; this one is without a waitress. Ogburn does not call it an automat, but that is what it is. “Automatic salesmen, the coin-in-the-

slot device, sell also apples, shoeshines, towels and soap, car rides, drinking water, music, gambling games, mechanical shows and aspirin tablets.” Americans should be thankful for these newfangled devices, Ogburn commended. If it were not for machines, unemployment could be even worse: machines might take away some jobs, but they create even more. Indeed, while the machines create—men and women can sell. Although, “there are some things a machine can’t do, as for instance, practice law; though I am aware that machines can now see, hear and talk.”

In 1935 Ogburn was riding a wave of publicity that the publication of Recent Social Trends (1933), of which he was a leader, had generated. The two-volume tome was the product of President Hoover’s initiated Research Committee on Social Trends. The scope of their work was unprecedented. The Rockefeller Foundation provided much of the funding, and the Social Science Research Council contributed services and personnel. A number of federal departments and bureaus, including the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Budget (U.S. Department of the Treasury), Federal Reserve Board, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Labor, and the Women’s Bureau (U.S. Department of Labor), assisted as well. The President himself wrote the foreword. And a top adman, Edward L. Bernays, was brought on board for promotional purposes. The book contained twenty-nine chapters, required five hundred collaborators, contained 2.5 million words, spun off numerous other studies and volumes, and was not only a snapshot of the country (of the 1920s)—but also of the federalization of social science research.

The University of Chicago also supported the project, providing space in its recently constructed Social Science Research Building as well as freedom to its faculty to produce chapters and volumes and to help administrate the project. Sociology professor Edwin Sutherland co-authored a chapter on “Crime and Punishment,” Leonard White on “Public Administration,” Charles Merriam on “Government,” Charles Judd on “Education,” Ogburn on the “Family and its Function,” and S. P. Breckinridge on “Activities of Women Outside the Home.” Ogburn, in addition to chairing the committee, also wrote another chapter, “The Influence of Invention and Discovery.” As Ogburn would point out, “trend” in the project’s conception had an important pedigree: “trend” started as a statistical term in social research. “The word ‘trend’ suggests measurement.” Thus, he wrote, the Committee had “combined the nonquantitative description of trends with statistical measurement of series. The methodological lesson learned was that of describing a nonquantitative process without drawing conclusions and interpretations not based on scientifically treated data.”

America and its “nonquantitative” data had fallen under the statistician’s non-interpretive, objective, “scientific” gaze.

As Chairman of the President’s Commission on Social Trends, Ogburn commanded a national spotlight, which he quickly put to promotional use. The public face of Recent Trends was Ogburn’s specialty: technology. In addition to writing editorials on “trends” for newspapers (like the New York Times), periodicals, and journals, he also spoke frequently to the public on the topic of change and technology. In short, his message was clear: technology was taking over. He told the graduating class at Randolph-Macon Woman’s College that he had inventoried one thousand social effects

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of automobiles. “The pathway of life is literally strewn with the wrecks of those who have been left behind by the march of progress.” It is impossible, he averred, to stop the march. A moratorium on inventions and discoveries was wishful thinking at best.

So we must continue our race to catch up with the pace set by inventors and discoverers. This, I take to be, the chief problem facing the young graduate today. To the extent that you keep yourselves in fit condition to adapt yourself in the quickest and best possible way to the new conditions, to that extent are you well educated. . . . [A]n education that makes you quick to adjust yourself well to the new, will be a very durable legacy, for life is a matter of adjustment.  

Ogburn’s prognostications were unrelenting. In the Rockefeller Foundation-funded booklet, Living With Machines (1933), Ogburn capitalized again on what become an oft-repeated refrain: “invention of machines comes first and their social effects later.” He called it “cultural lag.” Cultural and social institutions, he suggested, are always one step behind technological progress. The beginning of all maladjustment was the failure to adjust to technology:

The machines are setting us a dizzy pace. It is as though we were always behind time with our social life, because technology changes first. Our government, our church, our family, our community life, our laws, our schools, do not keep up with the changes. We use a machine like a slave. It brings us added comforts, more money, greater speed. Nevertheless machines drive us, also. They crack the whip over our lagging institutions. Man as an individual is master over the machine which he owns, but the institutions of mankind are far from being master over technology. Rather the other way round. Civilization is en route—we do not know just where. But we do know that the different interconnected parts are traveling at unequal rates of speed. The result is that our civilization is out of joint. . . . There must be constant human adjustment to machine progress.  

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120 William F. Ogburn, Living With Machines (Chicago: American Library Association, 1933), 14-16.
Not everyone appreciated Ogburn’s scare tactics. A. A. Miles, responding on behalf of electrical workers and operators, denounced *Living With Machines*. “The Ogburn book represents the academic spirit and method at its worst. It is rhetorical and contents itself with a description of what machines are doing to men, rather than to analyzing the problem and offering a solution.”

Next to the scathing review is a picture of a robot built out of cardboard holding the American flag. The caption reads, “The Soulless Man Struts His Stuff.”

“There is no use in looking for a haven of rest—not in this life,” Ogburn countered. “Since we cannot and will not undo technological progress the wise thing to do is speed up the social changes caused by such progress and so shorten or avoid a period of social maladjustment.” Thrasher’s maladjustment to the social “matrix” is in Ogburn’s revision maladjustment to the social machine. “The parts of culture are not related so simply as the links of a chain, but are integrated more like the parts of a machine, so that when one part is changed the various other parts are likely to be affected also, even though in some cases only slightly,” he argued. It is perhaps fitting that he would make the connection between the immigrant and the “army of metallic men,” conjuring as it does the images of uncertainty and hostility. Only here control comes not from the expert social scientist but the machine itself. Ogburn retains the idea of fluidity, although it acquires the speed of an uncontrollable, racing locomotive.

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123 Ogburn, “Culture.”
It is also fitting that he made these comments while lecturing on the concept of “culture.” The historian Warren Susman argued in his iconic “The Culture of the Thirties” essay that Americans “discovered” the concept of culture in the 1930s. He pointed to the popularity of Ruth Benedict’s best-seller, *Patterns of Culture* (1934), and to the pervasive search for an American Way of Life as demonstrative evidence. That discovering emerged on the battlefield of “culture” vs. “civilization.” “It is in fact possible to define as a key structural element in a historical reconstruction of the 1930s the effort to find, characterize, and adapt to an American Way of Life as distinguished from the material achievements (and the failures) of an American industrial civilization.”

According to Susman, “civilization” referred to “technology, scientific achievement, institutions and organizations of power, and material (financial) success,” where “culture” referred to the more noble attempt by Americans to create “patterns of a way of life worth understanding.” It was part nostalgic, part Luddite, part romantic, and another part simply humble. Culture emerged like a phoenix out of the wasteland of Progressive-era hubris, where “progress,” “power,” “efficiency,” and “organization” were “magic words.”

Central to the idea of “cultural history” today is the notion of fluidity, which is akin to the notion of cultural relativity. With the triumph of cultural history, libraries and bookstores have been flooded with histories of masquerading; mimicry; representing; staging; imitation; “passing”; all sorts of performing of race, class, and gender—the myriad ways that identities are made and unmade—in Anne McClintock’s words, the “parading of identity as difference” as well as the “masking of ambiguity: difference as

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identity.”125 Wendy Doniger’s The Woman Who Pretended to Be Who She Was: Myths of Self-Imitation (2005) takes the logic of these cultural “performances” to its outer-reaches where they reach back in: “Many cultures tell stories about people who pretend to be other people pretending to be them, thus in effect masquerading as themselves, impersonating themselves, pretending to be precisely what they are.”126 Histories of masquerading have had the greatest impact where cultures and peoples mingle, mix, and co-exist. In particular that has meant urban and (post)colonial studies. Ann McClintock’s Hannah Cullwick straps on a leather “slave-band,” while Seth Koven’s James Greenwood and other “slummers” slip off their starched white collars. And in the U.S. urban context, a Jewish Al Jolson dons a blackface, in Jazz Singer (1927), to pass as a Caucasian.127 Increasingly so, literature on “culture” emphasize how denizens perform their own, subjective identities.

The idea of “culture” did not emerge after 1930 but rather before. The dating of its emergence is significant. Matthew Frye Jacobson notes that 1924 was a watershed in American culture: it was the year that America essentially closed the door to mass immigration. Quoting Reforging America (1927), Jacobson writes, “From the vantage point of post-1924, suddenly it seemed that the new immigrants were ‘so basically like us in blood, culture, and outlook that their eventual assimilation is only a matter of time.”128 Nativist sentiments were hard to purge, yet in the years after 1924, immigrants would

125 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York: Routledge, 1995), 65.
128 Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 98.
seem less threatening to the social order. Cultural relativity became more palatable to Americans post-1924 precisely because of the immigration act of 1924. This, I would argue, helps to explain the popularity of *Patterns of Culture*. As a result, Jacobson argues, “The treatment of race in the sciences underwent two fundamental changes in the years between the eugenic triumph of 1924 and the post-World War II period: culture eclipsed biology as the prime determinant of the social behavior of races, and ‘race relations’ displaced characterology as the major field of racial inquiry.”

What also helps to explain the *Patterns of Culture*’s popularity is that Americans had already been prepared for its reception. “For two generations or more,” the historian Christopher Lasch observed, “the University of Chicago dominated the emerging field of sociology, even more thoroughly than Boas and his students at Columbia dominated anthropology in the twenties and thirties.” Scholars at Chicago were making the shift toward a post-Darwinian definition of the “self” and “culture” before 1924. Indeed, their interest coincided with the massive flood of immigrants into the city in part because of that flood. However, it led not to liberal cosmopolitanism, but, in fact, in the very opposite direction—toward “social control.” Consider a final example. Luther Bernard was a product of the joint anthropology and sociology department at Chicago, and he was also the center of the anti-instinctual debate. Bernard’s work, one friend wrote, “sounded the final doom of all ‘social instinct’ theories.”

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Psychological Review in 1921, “The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences,” Bernard argued:

The theory of innate or inherited ideas or images has been abandoned and relegated to the poetry of the mystics. Ideas and images are the product of acquired functional organizations of neural structures or habits. Likewise are our social and ethical ideals or values the result of such acquired organization. . . . The fundamental problem of the social sciences which have grown out of the attempt to adjust man to his social environments, is therefore to work out the mechanism by which new and non-instinctive action and thought patterns are built up to mediate these adjustments of man to social environments which the social sciences undertake. \(^{132}\)

The problem of “adjustment” was the problem of post-instinctual social control. As early as 1911, when he finished his University of Chicago Ph.D., Luther Bernard already showed himself a true convert to social control. “It may be urged that in an ultimate perfect state of society there will not have to be unpleasant adjustments, and that the pleasant and the socially useful activities tend to merge. But this is presupposing an ultimate statistical condition which the facts of individual and social life do not justify us in assuming,” Bernard argued. Life was dynamic and ever changing. Therefore: “Life must always be a continual adjustment, though the more we secure a scientific control of the physical and social environment the less radical and unpleasant adjustments are likely to be.” \(^{133}\) After Bernard’s death, Read Bain wrote a tribute in the American Journal of Sociology, reminding readers that Bernard’s “central thought,” was his argument that “Social control is the logical end of all social science.” \(^{134}\) To be sure, in Chicago the two

\(^{133}\) Luther Lee Bernard, The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1917), 72.
\(^{134}\) Bain, “L. L. Bernard: Social Theorist”: 287.
ideas—culture and control—went hand in hand. As the next chapters will show, that marriage would have a profound effect on the course of “adjustment” in U.S. culture.
In far-away places, men dreamed of this moment [of returning home]. But for some men, the moment is very different from the dream. Here is human salvage, the final result of all that metal and fire can do to violate mortal flesh. Some wear the badges of their pain, the crutches, the bandages, the splints. Others show no outward signs. Yet they too are wounded.


On New Year’s Day, 1946, New York City’s Museum of Modern Art launched a six-month documentary film exhibit. The exhibit included Depression-era movies, like *Land Without Bread*, as well as other historic footage, of suffragettes protesting outside the White House in 1918, and President Wilson signing the declaration of war in 1917. America’s first Technicolor war, which had just ended, figured most prominently, however. *To the Shores of Iwo Jima* would be shown, as would other Allied propaganda. So, too, German newsreels, *The Triumph of the Will, The Spanish Earth, The Baptism of Fire*, and, promised the *New York Times* “many heretofore secret war training and incentive films.”¹ The content of the exhibit was provocative, but no one expected a raid by the military police and the confiscation of a War Department documentary.

Two entries by John Huston were supposed to be screened during the exhibit, *Let There Be Light* and *San Pietro*. “Major” Huston, like other Hollywood movie-makers, had supported the war by producing documentaries for the U.S. Armed Forces and as an

officer with the Army Signal Corps directed three—a trilogy—*Report From the Aleutians*, *San Pietro*, and *Let There Be Light*. *San Pietro*, which was nominated for an Oscar award, captured (and staged) the U.S.’s hard-fought Italian campaign. It included disturbing images of bloodied bodies and decomposing corpses. *Let There Be Light*, was in sharp contrast filmed in a sterile white-tiled psychiatric hospital out on Long Island, not on some godforsaken barren battlefield, yet it proved the more controversial of the two. Not only would it not be shown by MoMA in 1946—it would not be screened by the public anywhere else. Indeed, for the next thirty-five years it remained under lock and key at the National Archives. And even then, in 1980, its release required the intervention of Vice President Walter Mondale and pressure from Hollywood insiders and sympathetic Army personnel.

On May 7, 1945, the War Department had given Huston orders to tackle one of the war’s mounting side effects: its “unseen wounds.” Pentagon officials wanted Huston to (a) emphasize that very few men suffered from psychoneurosis, (b) eliminate the stigma attached to the psychoneurotic by explaining what the condition was and was not, and (c) explain that although psychoneurosis might make for a bad Army recruit, the same rejectee could be a “real success in civilian life.” The point was that maladjustment was not debilitating. The new documentary was tentatively titled “Nervously Wounded (or Psychoneurotic).”

While the immediate need for reassurance was economic (convincing companies to rehire psychoneurotics), there were other considerations motivating the directive. The Pentagon wanted Huston to “offset the exaggerated picture that has already been given to
the public through the press, magazine and radio stories” regarding the condition.\(^2\) The War Department was afraid that the media had gotten the upper hand and was propagating the impression that the federal government and U.S. Armed Forces had lost control of the problem. The nation had become keenly aware of psychoneurosis because of the war, but the military did not want the onus put on them. The perception was bad for the military. It was bad for morale. And it was bad for the nation. The defensive reaction within the War Department was to blame the nation’s media, although in truth the sources of the “exaggerated picture” would have been harder, if not impossible, to pin down. The media was not entirely to blame.

Having witnessed firsthand the ravages of war while filming *San Pietro*, Huston tackled the new project with grand ambition and great sympathy. After visiting several Army hospitals, he quickly settled on what turned out be an ideal location, Long Island’s Mason General Hospital. The largest psychiatric hospital on the East Coast for soldiers, Mason General typically admitted two groups of seventy-five psychoneurotic patients a week for a six- to eight-week rehabilitation cycle. With the hospital staff’s support and soldiers’ approval, Huston was allowed to follow one group of patients with his cameras—“Many cases had all the suspense of a thriller,” Huston later recalled—and for much of the shoot he simply set up two cameras, one focused on the patient or patients and another on the doctor, and then let the devices capture whatever happened.\(^3\)


the other, the men tell the psychiatrists—and us, the viewers, too—their moving stories of combat.

Some men stumble and stutter, others tremble uncontrollably. Some can hardly speak a word. They cry and occasionally rejoice. “No scenes were staged. The cameras merely recorded what took place in an Army Hospital,” Walter Huston, John Huston’s father and the documentary’s narrator, warmly reassures.4 One young veteran who lost his memory in a shell burst on Okinawa is hypnotized before the viewer’s eyes and almost instantaneously begins to recall his fears and terrors. The shuttered memories come pouring out. Another is administered an injection of sodium amyntal, “a short cut to the unconscious mind.” He is convinced he cannot walk but physically is perfectly able. Moments after the injection and a few reassuring words of comfort from the doctor, the patient regains his legs.

Another soldier under the influence of sodium amyntal is likewise, by all appearances, cured, this time of severe stuttering. “Oh, God, listen! I can talk!” he shouts. Huston excised from the final print the footage he captured of back-arching shock “therapy.” Nonetheless he was smitten—so much so that he learned how to hypnotize while filming and was permitted to put patients under himself. In the end he shot 375,000 feet of film (much more than he needed) for a fifty-eight-minute documentary. “[T]he time at Mason General affected me almost like a religious experience,” recalled the director.5

The trilogy’s last installment rankled Pentagon officials. On February 14, 1946, Major Huston received orders to hand-carry a release print to Washington D.C. for final

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approval, which he did, and initially the Army Pictorial Service okayed it for public viewing. But something somewhere happened between the end of February, when it was approved, and the middle of March, when an official, or some group, within the War Department started a campaign against it. Even though the War Department had released photos from the film print as early as the previous October for a short story John Hersey had written for Life magazine on neuropsychiatric casualties, the Pentagon reversed course and claimed that the documentary constituted an invasion of the soldiers’ privacy (despite the fact that the men had executed releases). “I think it boiled down to the fact that they wanted to maintain the ‘warrior’ myth which said that our American soldiers went to war and came back all the stronger for the experience, standing tall and proud for having served their country well. Only a few weaklings fell by the way side,” wrote Huston many years later, still miffed.

A few minutes before the documentary’s MoMA debut, according to one report, two MPs arrived and demanded the print (which they got). “No reasons given. No arguments. That is the last anyone has seen of it,” the New York Post critic Archer Winsten wrote after the dramatic eleventh-hour confiscation. “One explanation is that the Army, having shrunk to its unleavened core of pre-war top executives, is re-embarking upon a do-nothing, say-nothing, think-nothing policy,” Winsten groused. The audience’s only consolation, he said, was that the film’s foes would “all retire or die sooner or later”: “Some future audience is guaranteed not only a beautiful film experience, but also the

certainty that their generation has better sense than ours.”\(^8\) As late as 1980, just prior to its first public screening, Huston still did not know who in the Pentagon had opposed his picture. One reviewer, shrugging off the entire affair, commented after the long awaited public screening, “it’s difficult to see what the fuss is about.”\(^9\)

Despite its sympathetic treatment of psychoneurosis and support of psychiatric medicine, *Let There Be Light* became ensnared in a histrionic national debate about the “veteran problem,” which extended far beyond Huston’s and the Pentagon’s control.\(^10\) As the educational psychologist Jerome Bruner rightly observed in 1944, “The returning soldier is to the American people more than a fact-to-be. He is at once a symbol and an alarum. As a symbol he is the sentimental cynosure around which our interests in domestic post-war problems center.” As an alarum he is “a pang to the conscience, a dread to the wayward politician, a nightmare to the businessman,” although he is also a brother, neighbor, and son.\(^11\) As the country debated its postwar future, “readjustment” of service personnel quickly emerged as the measuring stick for judging how well the U.S. could reconvert to peace. Dixon Wecter, the popular wartime author of *When Johnny Comes Marching Home*, referred to the returning soldier as “a kind of proving ground for post-war life.”\(^12\) In short, a lot was riding on readjustment.

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\(^8\) Quoted in Huston, *Open Book*, 126.
\(^12\) Dixon Wecter, *When Johnny Comes Marching Home* (1944; Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970), 492.
As the censorship of *Let There Be Light* indicates, successful readjustment was by no means self-evidently inevitable. Plenty of Americans doubted. On one level, it was simply an issue of magnitude. “Social and psychological dislocations on this scale have never before occurred in history,” Frank Fearing, a UCLA psychologist and Hollywood consultant, worried. “If [impediments to readjustment] are uncompensated for, and if the psychological and social gaps which separate soldier from civilian are not closed, we may face disaster equal to the war itself.”

Fearing was voicing a common concern. Over sixteen million men had served in the war, more than one tenth of the population (the majority overseas, and most as draftees). Only the Civil War had more casualties. Skin would need to be grafted, muscles rebuilt, flesh mended, and where the damage was catastrophic prosthetic limbs, hands, and feet attached. Not so the dark unpredictable interior world of the psychoneurotic’s mind. No other issue provoked quite the same level of public or private hand wringing.

Well in advance of V-J day, a tsunami of readjustment advice aimed at meeting “the problem” head on flooded bookstores, newsstands, and the airwaves. Although the aims of the advice were laudable, the barrage was attended by unintended consequences. It fomented not just sympathy but a range of emotions, including dread, doubt, and fear. “It was only after victory that the invasion of America became a reality,” wrote one very perturbed GI defender. “The ‘enemy’ consisted of United States soldiers, sailors, marines, and coastguardmen who were proceeding against what they themselves might have termed the ‘PFC’s’ (Poor—er—Frightened Civilians).” The advice literature had given Americans the impression that the nation was about to be overrun with an invading

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force of psychoneurotic men. “Armchair strategists,” attacking “the ‘problem’ energetically and at great length,” had, he observed, shifted their talents from planning the defeat of Germany and Japan to building a bulwark against the “invading” veterans.14 The line between genuine humanitarian concern and sympathy and pure unadulterated sensationalism was easily (and often enough intentionally) blurred.

Bowker and others who shared his views were annoyed by those adjustment commentators who seemed more interested in advancing their own careers than in actually helping veterans to readjust. Their appeal to the worst-case scenario seemed to appeal only to America’s fears, not its hope. The title of Alanson Edgerton’s 1946 readjustment roadmap well illustrates the tendency: Readjustment or Revolution?15 More than a few authors played to the sensational at the veterans’ expense. “At the end of the war this will be a nation burdened with problems, debts and emotions. No one can foresee the shape of tomorrow. One thing, however is clear beyond doubt,” warned one newspaper editor—“this will be a nation supercharged with the gravest social problem in its history, that of re-adjusting the war veteran to the peaceful society from which he was hastily jerked and transformed into a killer and race-hater.”16 The U.S. would have upwards of three million psychoneurotics on their hands after the war, some claimed. Would they turn into killers and race-haters? Truthfully, no one really knew just how many men were out there suffering privately. The proliferating question mark was the sign of the times.

The problem of unseen wounds among American service personnel and Selective Service rejectees would open a new chapter in the history of adjustment, for the war had uncovered (or at least appeared to have uncovered) an epidemic of maladjustment within the rising generation of American youth. No longer was the problem of adjustment the problem of delinquents, prostitutes, and immigrants, but Tom, Dick, and Harry—the kid next door, the soda jerk down at the local five and dime, the son who went off to war and came back a different man. Many were led to believe that the process of screening the American Male, both in preparation for war and in the accounting of war-related psychiatric casualties after, had given the country a “measuring stick” for evaluating the nation’s youth. “The cold facts of the draft induction centers and service discharges are there for everyone to see, and although they are military figures they provide a definite cross-section sampling of our population,” reckoned Eugene Meyer, the president of the National Committee on Mental Hygiene. The outcome was troubling indeed, Meyer confided. Three million psychoneurotics equaled 20 percent of all male recruits. If this “sample” represented America’s “virile” youth, one could only imagine how many neurotics America had on its hands.

While it is true that the soldiers who fought in forward combat areas were profoundly affected by their service, no one need assume that maladjustment and psychoneurosis best explained their mental states and the psychological impact of those experiences. “Every month thousands of men return home from preinduction examinations or from the U.S. Army with N-P stamped on their medical records. N-P (neuropsychiatric) sometimes means insane but usually means psychoneurotic. What

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psychoneurotic means, few laymen know. Most psychoneurotics do not know either,”
\textit{Time} magazine noted in its report on the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA’s) 1944 convention, where NP was a hot topic. Many of the psychoneurotics thought they were insane or soon would be. So, too, did family members and employers (who often refused them jobs). And, “Because few NPs discuss their plight, few people realize how many there are” \textit{Time} noted.\textsuperscript{18} A large contingent of medical professionals and military personnel did not know what NP was either, in the same way that they had no idea how they were contributing to this fear of mass maladjustment.

Just as the terms of maladjustment in urban Chicago proved remarkably flexible and fluid, amenable to whims, prejudice, politics, and professional aspirations, so, too, would war-related psychoneurosis and veteran maladjustment.\textsuperscript{19} “[T]here is no such thing as ‘the veteran’s problem,” Benjamin Bowker bemoaned. “In fact, ‘the veteran’ does not exist. What we have is a group of several million individuals who varied greatly from one another when they entered uniform, had widely different experiences on duty, and thus emerged as assorted people with a few things in common.”\textsuperscript{20} The great diversity of individuals involved, the variances of their experiences, and the delicate politics of wartime service precluded the kind of direct social control that had been advocated in

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\item\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Time} skewered the psychiatric profession’s penchant for neologisms, calling it “scientific gobbledygook,” yet it accepted the new nomenclature and then proceeded in a footnote to offer its own “laymen” definition: “high-strung, nervous people who are not crazy but who cannot face certain difficulties without developing bothersome symptoms such as headaches, tiredness, weakness, tremors, fears, insomnia, depression, obsessions, feelings of guilt” (“N-P,” \textit{Time}, 29 May 1944, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,850915,00.html).
\item\textsuperscript{20} Bowker, \textit{Out of Uniform}, xi.
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cities like Progressive-era Chicago. Readjustment was a fluid concept that required indirect application. Psychiatrists, doctors, social scientists, and other behavioral experts had to rely on wives, advice manuals, rehabilitation programs, and the cooperation of service personnel, government officials, and community leaders. The proliferation of adjustment also relied upon racial stereotypes and new models of womanhood.

How would America’s sons and husbands behave after they returned home to Cleveland, Ohio; Scottsdale, Arizona; Kalamazoo, Michigan; and countless other towns, parishes, farms, and cities? Would they be maladjusted psychoneurotic killers and race-haters or upstanding citizens who understand that for everything there is a season and that now it was for peace? No one knew for sure. How is it that Americans came to believe that America was going to be invaded by its own defenders? What were they told by medical professionals about the problem and how best to solve it? How should adjustment be carried out? And who should oversee the task? These are a few questions this chapter aims to explore. The best place to begin is with the most obvious question: what is psychoneurosis?

**Words at War**

During World War I, a psychoneurotic soldier would have been labeled “shell shocked.”21 (Today one would assign the diagnosis post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD.) Because of shell shock’s colloquial imprecision, interwar-period psychiatrists had dropped the term, although without choosing a clear successor. Clumsily,

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psychoneurosis filled the void. If nothing else, at least the new term sounded more clinical. Yet, as the Army’s Chief Consultant in Neuropsychiatry and future president of the APA, William Menninger, was himself forced to admit, “When those of us responsible for interpreting psychiatric concepts tried to explain what the psychoneuroses were, we hit a snag. There is no simple, adequate, one-sentence or even five-sentence definition.”\(^\text{22}\) (Clarification required an entire chapter, and then some, in fact.\(^\text{23}\))

Various colloquial expressions were used during the war to describe “neurotic” responses and reactions: “gangplank fever,” “flak-happy,” and “shipboard jitters,” among others. And another alternative set of psychiatric terms emerged in clinics and on the field, competing for legitimacy, terms like “psychopathic personality,” “constitutional psychopathic inferior,” “gastric neurosis,” “conversion hysteria.” Neither side won; there were no clear victors. Further complicating the situation, halfway through the war, in October 1943, the Army issued an order that personnel should henceforth put the non-descript, benign label combat “exhaustion” on the emergency medical tags of patients who were being moved from clearing stations to hospitals, so that a more accurate diagnosis could be made later.\(^\text{24}\) In the Air Forces, instead of combat exhaustion they used operational “fatigue.” The terms stuck and were used beyond the field. While preference for this nondescript vagueness grew out of an acknowledgement of environment—war—as well as respect for the soldier’s dignity, it did little to foster psychiatric precision.


At the intersection of neuropsychiatric diagnostics and the language of everyday English, on the field and in the clinic, psychoneurosis was simplified and distilled to one baseline idea that both military personnel and psychiatrists could agree on. A neurosis indicated a soldier’s or sailor’s failure or inability to adjust, whether to combat condition, military discipline, regimentation, the sometimes grueling and other times monotonous work that came with waging war, so on and so forth. Thus, a psychoneurotic soldier was a maladjusted soldier, a psychoneurotic draftee a maladjusted draftee. The simplification worked for both camps. The psychoanalyst or Freudian-influenced psychiatrist would argue that everyone with an id and an ego can on occasion develop a neurotic response or reaction. Such is the consequence of our having to manage, or, rather, adjust, to the inner and outer tensions of life. The thin red line of actual neurosis hinges not on any particular symptom or set of symptoms but instead the simple notion of “incapacitation.”

As the Army’s Chief Consultant in Neuropsychiatry would explain (or at least try to),

There is no sharp dividing line between a neurotic adjustment and a neurosis. In the former the individual “adjusts” to his neurosis or “lives with it.” Perhaps he is even more productive because of it—for instance, as a temperamental but excellent artist or musician. If the symptomatic expressions become incapacitating, i.e., prevent him from working or getting along with people, even temporarily, the individual has a neurotic reaction that psychiatrists have labeled as a neurosis (psychoneurosis).

From the perspective of many commissioned officers, “adjustment” was rather more black and white. Maladjustment was simply a soldier’s inability or incapacity to carry out his duties, or function, whatever the reason or cause. Either way, psychoneurosis became something of a makeshift “wastebasket” diagnosis, encompassing a range of (so-called)

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neurotic reactions, from homosexuality, alcoholism, “gold-bricking” (malingering), and insubordination to true psychosis.

Given the ambiguities of the distinction, no wonder there were five times as many psychoneurotics discharged in World War II in comparison with World War I. Desperate for search for clarity, the Neuropsychiatry Consultants Division called in the National Research Council for help, convening a conference on February 25, 1944, to discuss the problem. The challenges were outlined but nothing was resolved. During the Centenary Meeting of the APA in May 1944—the object of Time’s derision—the problem was again discussed. Still, no action was taken. The breakthrough did not come until January 1945, during another conference, this time of Division staff, social science and medical consultants, the Veterans Administration, representatives from the Office of the Air Forces Surgeon General, the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and the U.S. Public Health Service.

Together they resolved to revise and refine the military’s medical nomenclature, and over the course of the following year a number of additional conferences would be convened and consultants consulted as the revision moved forward. The project was one of the Neuropsychiatry Consultants Division’s chief undertakings that year. It went through fifteen different drafts and reflected the advice of over one hundred psychiatrists. In the final draft the categories of neurotic syndromes were clarified—and enlarged. Finally, in September 1946, long after the war had ended, the War Department adopted the revision.

By then the die had been cast. According to official figures culled from hospital admission records, of the fifteen million soldiers admitted to Army hospitals around the
world between January 1942 and June 1945 over nine hundred thousand were for neuropsychiatric services. During the same period, 256,134 discharges were issued on the same grounds. That was around five times the rate of World War I. A closer inspection by the Army’s Surgeon General’s Office revealed its own statistics. One study of the Europe-based First Army by the chief of the Resources and Analysis Division, Eli Ginzberg, reported that during the first two months after the D-day invasion, its eight divisions logged 11,000 neuropsychiatric admissions, a medical-to-psychiatric admission ratio of two to one.

Some divisions were harder hit than others. In one division, for instance, the per annum ratio was 944 psychiatric admissions out of a total of 1,100 for medical causes. (Were the trend not reversed, Ginzberg estimated, within a year one-fifth the strength of the entire division would have been depleted from psychiatric attrition.) Although some European campaigns saw higher neuropsychiatric rates, up to seventy-five percent, the average hovered around forty percent, which was comparable to Pacific-theatre figures. The neuropsychiatric evacuation rate for the 1942 Guadalcanal campaign was also forty percent. What these rates do not record were the many cases that were never admitted to the hospital. Nor does it cover misdiagnoses.

The neuropsychiatric rates were troubling, to be sure. Yet they were rivaled by another set of statistics. During its inspection of the America’s young men, the Selective Service System rejected 1,846,000 for mental deficiencies and defects. That was twelve percent of all examined recruits and thirty-eight percent of all rejections for all causes. Of

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the men who did manage to pass their initial screening, another half a million (plus) were later discharged as well for the same reason. That accounts for almost half of the total discharges for mental and physical defects. No one was prepared for these kinds of numbers. During the processing of recruits for the First World War, “mental deficiency” and “mental and neurological disease” barely made the top-ten list for elimination (for mental or physical defects), breaking through at ninth and tenth place, respectively, at 4.1 and 3.9 percent. Weighing in at 5.6 percent, even hernias ranked higher.27

Given that history, 1.8 million was an astonishing figure. After learning in the autumn of 1941 that four hundred thousand of the first million selectees had been rejected for defects, the President himself requested a recount.28 At thirty-eight percent, psychoneurosis emerged as the leading cause for a defect-related rejection, far surpassing all others (“musculo-skeletal,” the second leading cause, ran a distant second, at 17.8 percent).29 In some reporting the number was in fact higher because of double or triple examination. Between January 1942 and June 1945 2,309,000 of the fifteen million examinees were, according to one report, excused for neuropsychiatric reasons. Although the policy toward NP examinees changed (originally they were rejected outright), the percentages hardly improved over time.30 In 1944, 45.8 percent of all rejects were for an NP defect or deficiency.

Even the reject himself was sometimes caught unaware. Indeed, some were never told the reason for their elimination, as Menninger tried to explain:

29 Menninger, Psychiatry in a Troubled World, 590.
30 Menninger, Psychiatry in a Troubled World, 281-82.
Many rejectees first learned of their disability at the induction center. This was specially true of men turned down for psychiatric reasons. . . . [Many] became upset or alarmed. For many, rejection was the first news of their condition either to themselves or their families. To others, what had previously been regarded was not serious suddenly appeared important because of rejection. Very real problems were the dread of the stigma popularly given to individuals with psychiatric illness and the fear that they might suffer special vocational handicaps.  

The stigma lingered. In one study more than a quarter of the men were not re-employed in their old jobs after receiving an NP “4F” rejection.  

John Huston’s task of convincing the public that these 4Fs represented only a “small proportion” of draftees and that the public media, and not the military and its psychiatrists, had created the “exaggerated picture” would have been impossible, even had *Let There Be Light* not been suppressed.  

“By its policies the War Department created a system that encouraged the development of a neurosis,” Menninger himself was forced to admit. A fuzzy diagnosis of maladjustment for a draft recruit was not good enough for the War Department; they wanted an identifiable illness. And so many examiners, under pressure, simply opted for the less objectionable designation psychoneurosis, even when they knew the diagnosis was at times dubious—even when the “maladjustment” was, say, the fear of killing another human being or a reluctance to take up arms.  

Even though he was an indefatigable booster of psychiatry, Menninger nonetheless had to rue the consequences. “In many, many instances this diagnosis was unwarranted. Not only did we reject many men from the Army who undoubtedly could have given good service, but at the same time we did them a great injustice in labeling so

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many 4F’s with the diagnosis of a condition they did not have.”

Discretion, expressed after the fact, would have no discernible effect on public perception, however. The idea that America was turning neurotic had already begun to take hold. One United Press correspondent veteran complained, “The medicos have done the fighting man no favor by applying to him the term ‘psychoneurotic.’ That’s the bad word of this war, for it automatically suggests to most people that a fellow is crazy.” Henry Gorrell, the correspondent, had been stricken not once or twice but four times by NP, although he preferred the term “shell shock,” thinking it more “respectable.” “But there you have it. We are now ‘psychos,’ and we are stuck with it.”

The term “psycho” entered the American lexicon not through Alfred Hitchcock’s 1960 classic film, but through the Second World War.

“[U]nfortunately statistics live on to become public property,” regretted William Hunt and Cecil Wittson, two World War II Naval neuropsychiatrists who later became insider critics. It was a “grim” picture that they and their colleagues had helped to create, they confessed. It was also a picture that, once created, acquired a life of its own. The philosopher Ian Hacking has provocatively suggested, “Today we hold numeracy to be at least as important as history.” (All on their own, World War II psychoneurosis statistics prove his point.) “Categories had to be invented into which people could conveniently fall in order to be counted. The systematic collection of data about people has affected not only the way we conceive of a society, but also the ways in which we describe our neighbour,” Hacking writes. “It has profoundly transformed what we choose to do, who

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33 Menninger, Psychiatry in a Troubled World, 125.
we try to be, and what we think of ourselves. . . . Probability and statistics crowd in upon us.”

And, yes, histories did vanish. That a young man’s reticence to undress in public was cause enough for an NP rejection; that many of the examiners were not experienced psychiatrists but instead hastily retrained doctors; that some psychiatric evaluations were done in groups of as many as thirty or lasted only a minute or two, or three; that illiteracy was folded in with epilepsy, “feeble”-mindedness, and psychosis in the finally tally of defects and deficiencies was entirely lost to the efficiency and simplicity of numeracy. Under its influence Americans reimagined their society; it molded how denizens described their neighbors; their choices; who and what they would try to become; and, perhaps most important, how they thought of themselves.

Americans would read about psychoneurosis in their Sunday newspaper magazines, Reader’s Digest and Saturday Evening Post, Ladies’ Home Journal and Life magazine. It was everywhere. To be sure, few, if any, who relied on, quoted, and believed those NP statistics would have thought that they themselves were abetting the loss of history, certainly not the wounded soldier’s. But unwittingly they were. Take the case of the nation’s Commander-in-Chief, Harry Truman. On November 19, 1945, President Truman delivered the nation’s first presidential speech on the nation’s health. Although it marked neither the beginning nor end of the president’s (ultimately failed) effort to ensure “health security to all” by expanding Social Security to include a government-sponsored health insurance program, it was an important moment in the struggle, which promised to benefit millions of Americans, especially the poor. It also marked an

important cultural moment in the history of psychoneurosis: the ultimate public legitimization, the presidential seal.

In September, where he raised the issue of the nation’s health security at a cabinet meeting, he mentioned the lack of doctors and adequate medical facilities—the nation’s medical infrastructure needed shoring up—while he also made much of a statistic that all the secretaries must have known: the high number of Selective Service System draft rejects. To “re-establish the health of the nation,” he implored cabinet members, “radical steps” were required.\(^\text{37}\) Congressmen, Democrats included, were dragging their feet, and as a consequence the president started applying public pressure. Throughout the autumn he had his staff drafting his historic health security message, sometimes meeting daily. The president wanted mental illness highlighted, based on his own observations of mental health facilities in Missouri. Not only was mental illness highlighted in the speech: it was its centerpiece.

“The people of the United States received a shock when the medical examinations conducted by the Selective Service System revealed the widespread physical and mental incapacity among the young people of our nation,” he declared to Congress, and the nation. “We had had prior warnings from eminent medical authorities and from investigating committees. The statistics of the last war had shown the same condition. But the Selective Service System has brought it forcibly to our attention recently—in terms which all of us can understand.” Though his aims were honorable, the president, too, had helped to instantiate this “exaggerated picture” of mass maladjustment. He as well would rattle off the same statistics: five million 18- to 37-year-old male registrants

mentally and physically unfit for service, thirty percent of all recruits examined; a third of
the women recruited for the Women’s Army Corps rejected as well for the same reason;
another million and a half men discharged after induction, again for the physical or
mental disabilities, exclusive of wounds; and an equal number treated for pre-existing
conditions.

“These men and women who were rejected for military service are not necessarily
incapable of civilian work. It is plain, however, that they have illnesses and defects that
handicap them, reduce their working capacity, or shorten their lives,” Truman warned.38
Once again, in another context, for another set of reasons, here to prod Congressmen into
supporting a fractious legislative initiate, a compilation of statistic through reiteration was
acquiring an independent existence—characteristics, relations, implications,
 imperatives—in short, legitimacy.39 With every recitation, for whatever reason, they
would work their way further into the nation’s psyche, transforming how the nation
thought of itself—especially its youth. Many would of course deny that they had been
“handicapped” by illness and defects; after all, had they not won the war? Still doubts
 lingered. And like an open wound, they would fester.

38 Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress Recommending a Comprehensive
Health Program,” delivered 19 Nov. 1945, The American Presidency Project [online], eds. John
T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters (Santa Barbara: University of California [hosted], Gerhard Peters
39 My philosophy of the natural and social sciences has been influenced by, among others (in
addition to Hacking and Latour), Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, “Do the Social Sciences
Create Phenomena?: The Example of Public Opinion Research,” British Journal of Sociology 50
(Sept. 1999): 367-96; Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes,
The Race of Ishmael

NBC listeners in the autumn of 1944 heard what might be the only sociological text ever dramatized for radio, “The Veteran Comes Back.” The play was based on Willard Waller’s widely read book of the same title, which was published earlier in the year. Ben Kagan adapted it for NBC and the propagandist Writer’s War Board in cooperation with the Council on Books in Wartime. It was part of NBC’s “Words at War” series (1943-1945), a pro-war program of adapting war-related books to the medium of radio. The Veteran Comes Back was perfectly suited for the medium. It was sensational, timely, dramatic, verging on gothic noir. At the same time, once again, in a different medium, it expounded and extended that dominant cultural pattern wherein America’s postwar reconversion was reduced to the personal, to the veteran—although here the picture is far from reassuring. “Remember, the veteran who comes home is a social problem, the major social problem of the post war world,” Clifton Fadiman, the narrator, announces in the radio play’s introduction. “No man could have a better moral claim to the consideration of his fellows, and no man could have a better right to bitterness. How are [we] going to give GI joe his rightful place in society?” The play outlined is thin on specifics and long on what would happen to the country should it shortchange the veterans. The picture Kagan paints is grim if not catastrophic.

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40 Another readjustment book by the psychiatrist George K. Pratt, Soldier to Civilian: Problems of Readjustment (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1944) was also adapted as well as a radio play for the Words at War series. It was first broadcasted by NBC on 29 May 1945. “The Veteran Comes Back” was rebroadcast throughout the autumn and winter of 1944 and 1945.
“The Veteran Comes Back” is framed by the moral debt of civilians to soldiers. A chorus of civilians gush, “There is no one closer to our hearts than GI Joe!” Throngs chant, “Nothing’s too good for GI Joe!” Everyone wants a quick and easy readjustment. Yet, the GI is unconvinced, bitter, unlikely to believe the slogans of well-intentioned but sycophant civilians. “[D]uring any war in history, nothing is too good for the veteran. After the war nobody gives a damn. But this time the boys aren’t coming back to selling apples and they’re not coming back to charity,” GI Joe warns. “This time—if we don’t get what we want, if we don’t get what we’ve been promised, if we don’t get what we deserve—you can kiss your democracy goodbye!” Audiences are told repeatedly that the soldier is more than a social “problem.” He is a “grave” threat. If all twelve million (plus), one-tenth of the country, are deprived their just deserts, the country better prepare itself. By the end of the play American Stormtroopers are practically poised to invade their own capitol.

The rationales for rebellion, GI Joe says, are to be found in the “pages from history written in blood.” To explain the veterans’ mutiny, he will parade the ghosts of wars past before the nation as witnesses, starting with patriots of the Revolutionary War, running up to the present with the fate of World War I’s forgotten warriors. Each war has accumulated empty promises and long forgotten debts, says GI Joe. And the veteran, not the civilian, has been left in the lurch. Not only had past veterans been reduced to panhandling, vagrancy, and petty larceny, reduced to selling apples and pencils, begging for bread, and pawning their medals, GI Joe remonstrates. Many of the desperate were forced to look elsewhere for support, to secret societies and anti-democratic institutions, to violence and rebellion. “The whole South became the Invisible Empire. Our leaders
were our officers. Our methods were force, violence and rule of terror,” warns one bitter Confederate ghost, explaining the rise of the Ku Klux Klan. (In the background another will yell, “Kill the Negroes!”) Is this the kind of nation Americans want? Beware!

The nation is warned that unless consequential action materializes in concrete changes the veteran’s cause will descend into the demonic world of totalitarianism and irrepressible mutiny. Doubting listeners are reminded of the overheated summer of 1932. That year disgruntled and impoverished World War I veterans, some twenty-thousand strong, had marched into Washington en masse with ragtag families in tow demanding a “bonus” from Congress, a bonus that was promised too little, too late—it was the nadir of the Depression—and the only force that was able to turn back the “pitiful maladjusts” was the U.S. Army using guns, tear gas, and tanks. Let that be a lesson, GI Joe wags his finger. When the tickertape parades have passed, the veterans of the current war—who far outnumber that Bonus Army—will be taking out their bitterness and hatred on somebody. “And,” says GI Joe, “it would be just too bad if it were taken out on the people of America. It would be just too bad if GI Joe came home and followed an American Hitler who promised him the things he will not find.” Although the veterans’ wants are simple and humane—planned jobs, decent wages, housing, security (social and otherwise), basic human rights, an improved educational system, medical care, a rehabilitation program, the “prosperity and peace” that other civilians enjoyed during the war—if they do not get what they deserve, all twelve million plus will be right there, waiting—“enough to make a better America or enough to destroy it.”

“The Veteran Comes Back” undermines the notion put forth by the Pentagon and others that the popular media had created the “exaggerated picture” of wartime and
postwar maladjustment. Willard Waller claimed his principal task was quite simple (and honorable), to present and illuminate the veteran problem by explaining the “veteran’s mental and emotional nature” and “the problems in the way of his readjustment” (what he called the “art” of “veteranology”). And he said he had only the veteran’s interest in mind, writing, “If we choose to go to war we must be willing to take the responsibility of compensating its victims. The obligation is clear, unavoidable, and almost limitless. Whatever the price of rehabilitating our veterans, we must be prepared to pay it.” One might be forgiven, nonetheless, for questioning motives.\(^4^2\) He had produced in the original perhaps the bleakest picture of postwar readjustment.

And of the veteran. Waller portrays him as half victim, half beast. Indeed, he is represented quite literally as an alien. “The newly returned veteran is of the race of Ishmael. ‘And he will be a wild man; his hand will be against every man, and every man’s hand against him; and he shall dwell in the presence of all his brethren,’” Waller wrote, quoting Genesis 16:12, the biblical prophecy about the exile of Abraham’s son, Ishmael. “Civilians do not understand the veteran,” he continued. “They do not sympathize with his strange resentments or approve of his rough and violent manners. He has become an alien.”\(^4^3\) “Wild man,” “rough and violent manners,” the veteran is seen as utterly incapable of self-readjustment and should be feared, not pitied. Ben Kagan’s workup was no exaggeration. If anything, Waller had given him too much material to work with.

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\(^4^3\) Willard Waller, *The Veteran Comes Back* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1944), 193
Were these the machinations of a short-story hack or one-off novelist? No. Willard Waller was a professional sociologist and the go-to expert on veteran readjustment. On the book’s dustjacket Waller was billed as a “World War I Veteran and Associate Professor at Columbia University.” This claim of personal experience and academic credentials was critical to the author’s (and the book’s) success, although the former, his veteran status, was admittedly a bit overstated (he saw only six weeks of the war). More certain, though, was his connection to institutional power and his claim of academic authority. When Waller was hired in 1937 by Columbia’s Barnard College, the university’s sociology department was in the process of building a powerhouse faculty. Robert Lynd of Middletown fame, Robert Merton, and Paul Lazarsfeld were, or would quickly become, heavyweights in the field. Soon they would be joined by other up-and-comers, such as the irascibly independent C. Wright Mills. William Ogburn, F. Stuart Chapin, Howard Odum, and, later, Daniel Bell all studied at Columbia; all would become leaders in the field, to say nothing of the Frankfurt School of social scientists’ stink in Morningside Heights.

Waller’s book was a quick sell. Within its first year it ran through three press printings and transformed this vested, bespectacled professor into a lecture-circuit celebrity. Alongside Dixon Wecter’s When Johnny Comes Marching Home (1944) and George Pratt’s Soldier to Civilian (1944), his was the most widely read, quoted, and cited book on soldier-to-civilian readjustment. Waller played the part of a learned expert. But he also preyed on people’s fears, using tabloid-like tactics throughout his book. The Veteran Comes Back had sources and citations, synthesis, literature and history, breadth,

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and authority. And it was laced with the language of adjustment. Yet the academic
aplomb was a façade for what amounted to mass-marketed fear-mongering. Remember
the Ishmael prophecy. A good gauge of Waller’s mass marketing appeal was his
colleague’s reaction: ambivalence. While some approbated Waller’s “fine historical
perspective,” “analysis,” and “sound advice”; his lack of “prejudice”; and his “giving all
sides of the picture” with “high purpose in mind”—others spurned his taste for that
“Chautauquan flavor” of “popular consumption” and chastised his failing to uphold a
“standard of scientific sociological analysis.” Waller would himself admit, “Scholarship
is not enough. We must synthesize and popularize if our knowledge is to be of any use.”

Trained earlier in life as a journalist, Waller coveted headlines. He was known
among friends as a “disturber of the peace,” liked to shock students and colleagues, and,
as he put it, “stick his neck out.” Reared by strict Midwestern Baptists—an upbringing
he was never quite able to shake—later in life he rebelled and liked to think of himself as
a free-spirited Bohemian. “He had always imagined what it might be like to be famous,
and he could now [with the publication of The Veteran Comes Back] play the role of the
public figure,” noted his biographers.

45 Philip Klein, review of The Veteran Comes Back by Willard Waller, American Sociological
Review 10 (Feb. 1945): 107; Carle C. Zimmerman, review of The Veteran Comes Back by
Should Counsel the Veteran,” Journal of Higher Education 16 (Oct. 1945): 367; Fitzsimmons,
review of Veteran Comes Back: 419. For more critical assessments, see Paul A. Dodd, review of
The Veteran Comes Back by Willard Waller, American Economic Review 35 (March 1945): 221-

46 Waller, Veteran Comes Back, 306.

47 Quoted in Willard W. Waller, On the Family, Education, and War: Select Writings, ed.
William J. Goode, Frank Furstenberg Jr., and Larry R. Mitchell (Chicago: The University of
Family Living 7 (Autumn 1945): 88.
Waller loved to see new worlds and accepted with glee all invitations. In 1945, he reported to his friends some of his encounters with what he called “the Wall Street boys.” With gusto he described being conducted by private elevator to a private dining room, delighted to find himself the center of attention in a group of powerful people who represented some of the very forces he occasionally attacked. He seemed to understand what veterans wanted, and how their allegiance could be captured. At the same time, “the Wall Street boys” were doubtless convinced both by Waller’s personal magnetism and his analyses of propaganda that he knew how to mold public opinion.48

If journalism whetted his appetite for notoriety, publicity, and status, his time in Chicago earlier in the 1920s provided him a model for achieving all three.

For five quarters between 1923 and 1926, Waller had been a graduate student of sociology at the University of Chicago. There he befriended Carle Zimmerman and worked out in the gymnasium with Herbert Blumer, a one-time football professional and rising star in the department. And then there was the influence of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess. Later in life one of Waller’s colleagues would comment that “Waller’s laboratory was life itself,” which recalls Park, who seconded the sentiment.49 Chicago had corroborated Waller’s intuition that sociology of the (laboratory) streets could learn from the journalist (and vice versa), that the two need not be enemies. Chicago had been called derogatorily by its detractors the “Journalistic School of Sociology.”50 Public activism made stars out of professors, although, as Morris Janowitz, Waller’s contemporary and fellow Chicago sociologist, rued public notoriety could prove risky. Regretfully, he wrote, “[Waller] became tied into the mass media and the public speaking circuit, and even to the consultantship, which was just beginning to develop. He partook

48 Waller, On the Family, 102-103.
49 Joseph K. Folsom, “Willard Waller, 1899-1945
50 Leonard S. Cottrell, interview with James T. Carey, Chapel Hill, NC, 28 March 1972, fol. 6, box 1, Department of Sociology Interviews with Graduate Students of the 1920’s and 1930’s, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.
of and oversubscribed to the variety of money making and prestige ventures which spelled in his case the death of the craftsman sociologist.”51

Though his hobnobbing with the “Wall Street boys” and acting like a consultant might have raised eyebrows among colleagues, mixing with local elites had been a standard practice at Chicago. Waller was a beneficiary of the conviction upheld there and elsewhere that social scientists had a unique and invaluable role to play in shaping, guiding, and adjusting society. Waller was not only a convert and evangelist, but also, in the end, a martyr. Requests for articles, speeches, and commentary poured in after the publication of *The Veteran Comes Back*. Everyone from the white-gloved socialites who oversaw the highbrow speaking circuit to the white-coat staff who manned the country’s new naval hospitals wanted him. His book, in one form or another, appeared in *This Week*, *Colliers*, the *New York Times*, *Science Digest*, and elsewhere, in addition to being dramatized for radio. Waller wanted to influence public opinion, and he did, although at a cost. In 1945, while waiting to catch the train at Columbia’s 116th & Broadway subway station, Waller was stricken with a heart attack. The racing from one public lecture to another, up and down those private elevators, no doubt contributed to his untimely death. He was only 46.

In the same way that Chicago social scientists in the 1920s (before and after, too) referred to urban migrants, blacks, and juvenile delinquents, the destitute, taxi dance hall girls and their patrons as maladjusted misfits, so now would they, Waller especially, do the same with the veteran. Calling them Ishmaels was one of his tactics. Playing the race card was another. Harnessing longstanding fears about blacks, slavery, and rebellion,

51 Morris Janowitz, forward to Waller, *On the Family*, ix.
Waller conflated the soldier and veteran with the mythological savage, the black man run
wild. “The demobilized soldier has a furious craving to live, but he is geared to a
demoniacal restlessness. He does not know where or how to begin to live. . . . [H]e learns
that life is will and therefore frustration,” Waller wrote.

[H]e cannot immediately get the fevered pulse of war out of his ears, nor can he
believe that the time he is living in is real; it is borrowed time and does not count.
Having no time for the real satisfactions of life, the soldier has to accept the
ready-to-serve substitutes that are easily available, furtive amourettes with quick
and easy women, gambling, fighting, alcohol.52

“Wild man,” “restlessness,” life as “will,” “frustration,” all shaded the veterans’ actions
as bestial and beyond the pale of (white) civilization.

Such coded language tapped a deep current in American culture that status-
anxious citizens could draw upon to mark the “alien.” Though the principal target was
most typically African Americans, Native Americans, and the country’s new
immigrants—the ethnic “Other”—Waller’s equation suggests ways in which whites
could be colored as well. “Civilization’ positioned African American men as the
antithesis of both the white man and civilization itself,” the historian Gail Bederman has
argued. “As such, black men embodied whatever was most unmanly and uncivilized,
including a complete absence of sexual self-control. . . . Without manly self-restraint,
civilized men would be no better than these vicious savages.”53 To convey the “grave”
threat of veteran maladjustment, Waller simply exploited these incendiary codes by
applying them indiscriminately to the veteran. He equated the soldier with the over-

53 Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the
sexualized black “savage” thereby adding a race-linked imperative to the potency and urgency of readjustment.

Not solely was this a tactic of secret codes, veiled threats, and innuendo. Waller conflated, quite explicitly, the veteran’s readjustment with America’s long battle over racial justice and warned that World War II had inadvertently stoked a soon-coming battle of the races. “When the veteran must return to a degraded and oppressed status at home, he may become very dangerous to the established order,” he wrote. “The Negro veteran is certain to be a storm center of trouble when he returns to his home community. He will resent discrimination and the doctrine of ‘The Negro in his place’ as he has never resented such things before.” Having had a “taste of ‘equality’” while fighting for freedom, blacks would no longer be in a “docile frame of mind.”

All have been taught to kill, and to kill white men. Negroes have acquitted themselves like men in this war, as in all our wars, whenever they have had the chance; they have offered their bodies and their lives freely and have asked no odds of any man, whatever the color of his skin. Negro soldiers and civilians earnestly believe that they will never again submit to injustice as before, and even the gentlest and mildest among them are beginning to believe that the time has come to fight.

There were among them, he wrote, “fierce and terrible men,” “good revolutionaries” who had “learned to hate and to kill.”54 In the other camp, white soldiers as well were being recruited for the counterrevolution with the Ku Klux Klan promising to protect the freedom of white patriots, those who, Waller wrote, had “fought for the flag and” and “absorbed some of its mana.” “They need a cause in which to lose themselves and find their souls.”55

54 Waller, Veteran Comes Back, 110-11.
55 Waller, Veteran Comes Back, 189, 188.
Waller’s experience with race and riots extended back to his earlier days in Chicago also. In his book, Waller boasted, “For twenty-five years the writer has been trying to decipher the meaning of their [the veteran’s] inarticulate rage.” He had lived in the city during one of its most violent summers, the “red summer” of 1919, the year of Chicago’s great race riot (the worst of the country’s twenty-five that summer). The World War I veterans who returned home that year found a markedly different city than the one they had left. Between 1910 and 1920, according to Census Bureau statistics, the black population had mushroomed from just over 44,000 to nearly 110,000, the majority arriving during the war to work in factories. The riot started on July 27th on the city’s sprawling, segregated beachfront with the stoning of a young black male by white gang members. From there it spread rapidly. All told, it lasted several days, required the martial intervention of six-thousand National Guard troops, resulted in thirty-eight deaths (fifteen whites, twenty-three blacks), widespread looting and arson, and 537 reported injuries. In the words of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, it was a “reign of lawlessness that shamed Chicago before the world.”56 (The associate executive secretary of the committee, which the governor of Illinois commissioned to investigate the rioting, was Robert Park’s student and friend, Charles S. Johnson.)

Although many of the witnesses of the riot blamed the city’s “athletic clubs,” among them the Hamburgers, Sparklers, and Ragen’s Colts, gangs of the marauding young men, Waller took a special interest in the Chicagoan “veterans-on-the-streets.” Earlier in the year, before the riot erupted, he had already begun interviewing them. He wanted to understand their bitterness, anger, and disillusionment. What for we do not

know, but whatever the reason, that search led to a life-long pursuit. In 1944 he wrote, “For years the writer has been trying to puzzle it out and to understand what these inarticulate men wanted to say.” The ex-military academy teacher had wanted, quite innocently he thought, to “find words for them,” “supply logic” for their grievances, and “penetrate” their “great feelings of injustice.” While not directly implicating these maladjusted veterans in the 1919 riot (only supplying the logic of bitterness), Waller would make the connection between war-related maladjustment and the deadly race riots of 1943 rather more substantial. That year there were over 250 race-based disturbances in almost fifty U.S. cities. Rumors of blacks buying up ice picks, hoarding guns, and raping white women fueled widespread paranoia that a race war loomed on the horizon.

For his part, Waller did little to allay the alarm. Instead he blazenly milked it. “The veteran is politically dangerous because he has a great deal of hatred to work off. By making him into a soldier, we have carefully cultivated his sadistic-aggressive impulses, taught him to fight and to kill without mercy, and then done him a series of injustices—should we then be surprised that he fights back?” he wrote. “He is full of anger, needs something to hate, something to fight, something to protest against.” Such fear mongering not only purported to explain race rioting; it also proffered a logic for individual acts of violence. “Veteran Beheads Wife with Jungle Machete” ran one sensational newspaper headline; “Ex-Marine Held in Rape Murder” ran another; and another, “Crazed Vet Goes Bezerk [sic]. Under the banner “Ex-Soldier Arrested in Sanitarium Murder,” the Los Angeles Times reported the story of Vivian Simon’s untimely demise. In late May 1945 she was found slashed and stabbed near the Glendale,

57 Waller, Veteran Comes Back, 95.
58 Waller, Veteran Comes Back, 187.
California sanitarium where she was a patient. Her murderer, James O. Bullack, a 29-year-old discharged soldier, was arrested outside his Los Angeles rooming house, blood-spotted, with a twin-bladed pocketknife. Simon had been found with her undergarments stuffed down her throat. Although he admitted to roughing Simon up, Bullack pleaded innocent.\(^5\) The *LA Times* in its reporting made sure to highlight Bullack’s veteran status. They knew it would attract readers’ attention, just as Waller did in the writing of *The Veteran Comes Back*.

Social scientific analysis fed upon social anxieties, while purporting to explain their “logic.” The fear of a race war was certainly palpable in 1943 in the wake the race riots. Yet, an emergent all-consuming anxiety would prove racism’s equal: the threat of nuclear annihilation and a truly global war. Argued Martin Gumpert, a popular author and regular contributor to *The Nation*, “We are, indeed, faced with a world-wide psychiatric emergency, and we have every reason to be afraid when we hear people talking about a third world war as inevitable. We have the urgent task of determining which of our reactions, which of our friends’ or enemies’ reactions, are rational and which are obviously neurotic.” Germany was one “huge insane asylum”—if only America had applied “psychiatric political-therapeutic methods” to the Nazi “madness, World War II would have never been necessary, he argued—and the French suffered from their own “collective castration” (“zazou”). All the rest of Europe was in a “state of moral and physical exhaustion” too. No one was immune, neither “the victors nor the

vanquished nor the neutrals.\textsuperscript{60} Note how easily Gumpert moved between psychiatric discourse of the individual and national diagnoses.

Not even the United States. Gumpert wrote, “Imagine your own state of mind reproduced by the million—in your contemporaries—and you have some explanation for the chaos that ranges from hysteria over nylon stockings and white shirts through the state of the stock market to hunger, hate, and the confusion in the arts.” Like Waller and Menninger, Gumpert would also rely upon and interpret the military’s NP data liberally, here citing the 1.8 million rejects and the many thousands of discharges to substantiate his argument that the United States faced a worldwide psychiatric emergency. After citing these NP statistics, he reckoned:

\textit{Not only are millions of people openly suffering from nervous breakdowns, but the fog of mental and emotional disturbance affects almost every public function and can be felt in the United Nations, in Congress, in our schools, and on our streets. . . . It is not only a medical scandal. It is a fateful social and political scandal. This ‘tremendous army of maladjusted persons’ is not only an army of patients but an army of voters, of citizens. And if we fail so seriously in the treatment of individuals, we fail disastrously in the treatment of nations—many international problems are caused by mass mental disorders.}\textsuperscript{61}

Gumpert was not the first to posit the argument that entire nations could succumb to mass mental disorders. That person would be the neo-Freudian German-Jewish émigré, and one-time Frankfurt School psychoanalyst, Erich Fromm. If Fromm was not the first, he was certainly the most influential and commonly cited; his widely read \textit{Escape from}

\textsuperscript{60} Martin Gumpert, “Political Psychotherapy,” \textit{The Nation}, 15 June 1946, 720, 719.
Freedom (1941) had offered a damning psychological critique of Nazi Germany, including accusations of pandemic neuroses.

Relying upon the military’s NP rates, Gumpert’s jeremiad extended the argument significantly, not only using mass mental illness to explain World War II, but also hysteria over nylon stockings and confusion in the arts. Numerous other postwar social ills were also explained best, Gumpert averred, through mass neuroses. “Inflation, the black market, the breakdown in housing, labor strife, minority persecutions, crime waves, juvenile delinquency are not only political but medical problems. Our relations with Russia, our attitude toward the atom bomb, are psychologically impaired,” he wrote.62 Gumpert was not alone in making the connection between the cold war and mass neuroses. Robert Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, warned Americans after the atomic bombs were dropped over Japan that they had created a “bipolar” world. His usage, in the context of a “world which must live in perpetual fear,” would have elicited the double entendre.63 As Gumpert’s article illustrates, the fear of widespread neuroses would have remarkable reach in the immediate postwar years. One should note as well that Gumpert was not only a popular author, but also a New York physician.

By inscribing the problem of veteran readjustment onto America’s long bloody tradition of slavery, Jim Crow, and racial unrest, and by tapping maladjustment to explain the origins of World War II and the emerging cold war, Waller’s and Gumpert’s own “logic” leads to an important observation about the power of numeracy, the proliferation of psychoneurosis, and the cultural history of adjustment. The social act of legitimizing is

62 Gumpert, “Political Psychotherapy,” 720.
not singular. The perception of mass neurosis acquired legitimacy because of the personal experiences of men and women who were psychologically impaired or damaged by the war. Yet, it also acquired a cultural legitimacy through the validation of institutions (the Oval Office, the Neuropsychiatry Consultants Division of the Army, Columbia University, among others); the status and authority of individual social scientists, psychiatrists, doctors, and other public figures, “experts” (President Truman, William Menninger, Willard Waller, Martin Gumpert, and others); and mere recitation and repetition, regardless of the source, whether by word of mouth, Emily Post, Hollywood movies, or popular magazines.

What drove the idea of mass maladjustment, what allowed it to acquire such power, status, momentum, and urgency, was the ease with which it could be deployed both to explain as well as inflame social and political tensions, those that preexisted and were germane to American culture (like race), and those (like the cold war) that were just then emerging in the international arena. Supported by the purported objective facticity of numeracy, the threat of a race war and specter of world annihilation proved a powerful combination for those wanting to instill paranoia of mass maladjustment—just as the desire for love would prove a powerful antidote to such overwhelming insecurities.

**Spellbound Lovers**

What was the solution to this mass maladjustment of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of men? David Selznick, who was very much concerned about the problem of readjustment and psychiatric illnesses, offered one model in his Alfred Hitchcock-
directed *Spellbound* (1946). It reassured audiences that the problem of veteran psychoneuroses could be solved rather simply, with a little old-fashion love and tender care. It was an uncomplicated picture on the surface, yet beneath contained a subtle, more progressive message about the role women could play in postwar readjustment. In an earlier film, *Since You Went Away* (1944)—one of wartime America’s most popular films—David Selznick, the producer, had already advocated a strong role for women in readjusting male veterans. It was, says William Fagelson, “a woman’s film through and through.”64 The woman’s therapeutic role in *Spellbound* was even more pronounced. And as a result a new “modern” woman was born—a role model for women everywhere. To love best, wives were told they needed more than just good old-fashioned love: they also needed Freud.

On the surface, *Spellbound* appears to be a sappy love story between a shy psychoneurotic World War II veteran, John Ballantine, played by Gregory Peck, and Ballantine’s lover-psychiatrist, Dr. Constance Petersen, played by Ingrid Bergman. As with other Hitchcock movies, a mystery appears to be an “excuse” for the love story. The mystery here is the murder of Dr. Edwardes, who is scheduled to replace the retiring chief psychiatrist of an upscale private sanitarium where Petersen works, Green Manors Retreat. In the beginning of the movie Ballantine, an amnesiac, inexplicably assumes Dr. Edwardes’s identity and shows up at the sanitarium to fill the doctor’s new position. Soon he is discovered to be an imposter and, as the chief suspect of the murder, is charged with the crime.

64 William F. Fagelson, “‘Nervous Out of the Service’: 1940s American Cinema, World War II Veteran Readjustment, and Postwar Masculinity” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2004), 162.
Only Petersen, who is falling in love with Ballantine, thinks him innocent, and it is up to her to find the true killer. While on the run with Ballantine, she does just that using psychoanalytic techniques (dream analysis) and her quick intelligence, mixed in with a little love, patience, and understanding. She not only solves the mystery; in the process she cures Ballantine’s amnesia. The murderer is in fact Dr. Murchison, the outgoing chief of the sanitarium. (He would rather see Dr. Edwardes dead than see him replaced at Green Manors.) Once discovered by Petersen, Murchison will take his own life, and Peck and Bergman will marry and live happily ever after.

The film historian Lesley Brill has suggested that the film’s main concerns can be summed up, in ascending order of importance, by looking at an exchange between Peck’s and Bergman’s characters:

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JOHN
How does it feel to be a great analyst?

CONSTANCE
Not so bad.

JOHN
And a great detective?

CONSTANCE
Wonderful.

JOHN
And madly adored?

CONSTANCE
Very wonderful!
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“Although Spellbound presents psychoanalysis sympathetically, it nonetheless makes clear its ultimate inadequacy,” Brill contends. “Scientific impersonality and dependence
on deductive procedures cannot finish the journey they begin. In order to heal our
wounds and make us new, science must enlist the miracle of love.”

Brill is half right. Love needed psychoanalysis in the film as much as psychoanalysis needed love: they were each other’s equal.

_Spellbound_’s producer, Selznick, was serious about the role of psychiatry in treating postwar psychoneuroses and maladjustment. Already in _Since You Went Away_ he had begun lobbying. One of the film’s technical consultants, Dr. Walter Treadway of the U.S. Public Health Service, had prodded the producer into accentuating psychoneurosis in the movie, which Selznick did, creating a significant role for a Dr. Golden, who treats NP soldiers. Initial drafts of _Spellbound_’s screenplay also played up the psychoneurotic angle. Though the final script opens with only a very short introduction, in earlier drafts of Ben Hecht’s screenplay the opening sequence is far more substantial (Hecht, too, was under analysis). While watching scenes of electric and insulin shock treatment, hot and cold water bath therapy, and other forms of psychiatric treatment, audiences were to be lectured on the history and treatment of mental illness since the turn of the century.

Our forefathers were not far wrong when they diagnosed a lunatic as a human being possessed by the Devil. In Psycho-Analysis the Devil wears a new name. He is the presence in the soul of unholy and inhuman or anti-social desires. An impulse that lures, shames, and frightens the human conscience is the beginning of mental disorder.

This old devil with a new name is like a masked “criminal” lurking in the “basement” of one’s mind (the subconscious), hiding and growing like a “fungus in the dark,” seeking to “shatter our personalities,” the script explained analogically, and it was the job of “the

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new detective”—the psychoanalyst—to “unmask” the criminal by creating an awareness in the mind of the war raging within. The sequence ends with a Socratic aphorism: “Know thyself, says Socrates. And our most modern of sciences echoes this admonition.”

Selznick would educate the public by translating Freudian jargon into vernacular English (there is no reference to Id, Ego, or Superego). So, as well, would he draw from current events. One of the later drafts of the screenplay is especially revealing in this regard. It retained the introductory sequence, which focused on patients and various psychiatric treatments, yet an alternative introduction to the science of psychoanalysis/psychiatry was inserted. The war had created a great demand for more doctors of the mind, it explained: “There are almost a million people in the United States who live in hospitals and institutions set apart from mentally deranged. The war will increase this number immensely. For the strains of battle are vastly more difficult than those of civilian life—and under them the most valiant of men frequently give way temporarily.” Selznick was well aware of the problem of psychoneuroses among America’s returning veterans and sought to interject himself by popularizing and championing the “science” of psychoanalysis and psychiatric medicine.

Not only does the screenplay’s introduction explain in lay terms “psychoses,” “antisocial impulses” and “personalities,” and “neuroses,” and highlight what was becoming a popular method of treatment among those who could afford it, the analysis of dreams, but it references the treatment of psychoneurotic soldiers by the military to substantiate the technique’s effectiveness and legitimacy: “This form of cure or therapy is

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67 Ben Hecht, script for “Spellbound, House of Dr. Edwards,” first draft, 3 April 1944, box 510, fol. 1, David O. Selznick Collection, Harry Ransom Center for the Humanities, Austin, TX.
being practiced not only in private offices, private institutions but has been adopted by the government in its treatment of battle-shocked soldiers.” In short, it is no coincidence that Peck’s character was a World War II veteran, that his amnesia had been caused by a combat-induced psychoneurotic episode, and that his cure was found not simply through love but also through analysis of dreams.

Selznick was no stranger to psychoanalysis. In July 1943 he wrote to his story editor Margaret McDonell that he was “almost desperately anxious to do this psychological or psychiatric story with Hitch,” and prior to making the movie he was a patient of Los Angeles’s top psychoanalyst, May Romm. He went so far as to say that he himself was an expert. After finishing the smash-hit, Since You Went Away, he bragged to William Menninger’s brother, Karl (also a famous psychiatrist), that he had included in the movie a sequence that he had personally conceived and written in the hope that it would “have a value in making the America public aware of the work being done by psychiatrists to rebuild men who have been shaken by their experiences.” As Leonard Leff has stressed, Selznick wanted to conceive a picture “about psychotherapy, not psychopaths.” His “psychiatry movie,” as it was called, was to educate the public. In the end, however, his story editor, McDonell, found the screenplay “too ‘psychiatric’ for the general public,” and there were concerns from others (including British censors) about such a controversial subject, so Selznick’s analyst, Romm and a graduate student in

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68 Ben Hecht, script for “Spellbound, House of Dr. Edwards,” second draft, 29 June–1 Aug. 1944, box 511, fol. 5, David O. Selznick Collection, Harry Ransom Center for the Humanities, Austin, TX.
70 Leff, Hitchcock and Selznick, 117.
psychology, Eileen Johnston, were brought in to trim and edit it, and that included removing the long-winded opening narration.  

*Spellbound* captures and highlights an important moment in the twentieth-century history of the mind, mental health, and postwar readjustment. Although families, communities, the military, state and federal governments all believed that the soldier’s readjustment to civilian life would require the aid of tens of thousands of community leaders, voluntary organizations, veterans groups, pastors, teachers, professionals, and other concerned citizens, when it came to psychoneurosis only one profession (actually two together) bore the responsibility, or one might say took the responsibility: psychiatrists and psychoanalysts. William Menninger was especially forthright, boasting, “Psychiatry struggled from the rear seat in the third balcony to finally arrive in the front row at the show” in the war.  

In mental health millions had learned, for the first time, through the experience of war, that “environmental stresses on the personality” could “interfere with or partially wreck an individual’s efficiency and his satisfaction with life.” “The universality of neurotic reactions became evident to the layman,” Menninger wrote. “Many discovered that failure in adjustment was not a disgrace and often could be avoided when an individual, finding himself in a blind alley, sought well-qualified help.” The key was not any help, but *well-qualified* help. Willard Waller warned, “Veterans are certain to return to an extraordinarily complex set of marriage and family relationships. Helping

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people to straighten out such relationships is a job for the trained experts, and one in which the amateur will do better not to meddle if he can help it.”

As the historian Ellen Herman has noted, the incorporation of psychology into the war had created the most favorable conditions for its postwar boom. Psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts had created a remarkable “growth industry,” Herman has observed, and through the war effort had lengthened the “menu of services” available to a “rapidly expanding consumer market.” Simply look at the numbers, she contends. The American Psychological Association (APA) between 1940 and 1970 increased its membership by 1,100 percent, to over 28,000. (There were only 2,730 members in 1940.) For its part, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) grew almost as rapidly, adding almost 16,000. That was a 760 percent increase.

Rebecca Jo Plant, another historian of postwar psychiatry, takes a finer-grain look at the numbers and points out that in 1952 one-third of the American Psychoanalytic Association’s members had joined only in the previous four years. Moreover, over a half of its memberships had affiliated themselves after 1942. “Most impressive of all,” she notes, “was the fact that 900 candidates were undergoing training in approved institutes” at the time of the survey. In the immediate postwar years psychoanalysis was a “veritable cultural phenomenon.”

Numbers, of course, are one-dimensional indicators and can only outline the rate and proportions of the growth. They do little to explain the phenomenon itself. Put simply, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts pulled off what might just be the most

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74 Waller, Veteran Comes Back, 284.
75 Herman, Romance of American Psychology, 83, 2.
impressive public relations coups of the twentieth century. No other comparable
profession experienced the kind of turn-around in public perception as psychiatry and
psychoanalysis in the 1940s. Having outlined the grave threat of war-induced mass
maladjustment, they adroitly managed to convince the country that they were the best
qualified to deal with the epidemic. The tactic was anything but mysterious. In fact, it
was brilliant and obvious. Waller wrote:

We already know something about the veteran problem, but it is not enough that
this knowledge should exist; it must also be put together, it must be disseminated
widely, and it must be applied. It is not enough for the psychiatrist to know that
the shell-shocked veteran has a tendency toward explosive aggression; everybody
must know it in order to understand how to live with and treat such a man. . . . As
long as these facts are kept in solitary confinement in the minds of a few learned
men, they can be of little use. But put such facts as these together with a thousand
others, puzzle out their significance, then shout this knowledge from the house-
tops, and we shall begin to solve the veteran problem.78

In 1946 Menninger established the “Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry” for just
such a purpose. It would issue periodic reports on psychiatry’s relevance to the hot-button
issues of the day: loyalty oaths, civil defense, primary- and secondary-school education,
among others. Psychiatric and psychoanalytic advocacy was deliberate—and it was
effective.

A year and a half after Truman’s 1946 national health address, Menninger was
still pressing the issue. In a face-to-face meeting with the president—which Truman’s
press secretary, Charles Ross (whose brother was a Chicago analyst), had helped to
arrange—he urged him to incorporate the issue of mental health into his campaign and
managed to convince him as well to sign off on a “message of greeting” for the annual
ApA and APsaA convention, a message that Menninger would himself write and Ross

78 Waller, Veteran Comes Back, 306.
would edit. Truman assented. “Never have we had a more pressing need for experts in human engineering. The greatest prerequisite for peace, which is uppermost in the minds and hearts of all of us, must be sanity—sanity in its broadest sense, which permits clear thinking on the part of all citizens,” the statement read. “We must continue to look to the experts in the field of psychiatry and other mental sciences for guidance in the evaluation of our mental health resources.” Menninger would go on to become the APsaA’s president and wrote to Truman that the membership was most impressed by the president’s validation.\(^79\) The point was clear: the expert—the human engineer—not the citizen, was the key to country’s sanity, clear thinking, peace, and security.

“Demobilization” centers offered good counseling on technical and financial matters but not, suggested the sociologist Robert Nisbet, the “subtler” matters of the mind. Although some World War II veterans would find the postwar adjustment to civilian life easy, most, he argued (using the military’s NP statistics), would not and would require “psychological assistance.” “Just as the army was led to establish mental hygiene clinics for soldiers who found the transition difficult from civilian to military life, so will it be necessary for the government to organize agencies to provide similar aid for the new civilians,” Nisbet put forth. He thought a mental hygiene clinic should be established in every sizable community, staffed by psychiatrists and social workers (preferably those who had actual wartime experience with soldiers), and should provide training, just as the army trained “lay soldiers” in psychological counseling. The cost of staffing these clinics would be considerable, he acknowledged. But the alternative was

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\(^79\) I am indebted to Rebecca Jo Plant for both the quote and background research on the presidential message (see “William Menninger and American Psychoanalysis, 1946-48”: 184; 198, ns. 10-11).
“the possible depredations upon society of a swelling stream of men,” men who had been impaired serving their country?\textsuperscript{80} Without adequate treatment, there was a “grave danger that he will become a permanent social casualty,” warned another.\textsuperscript{81}

All of this required planning and co-ordination: between rehabilitation agencies, welfare groups, veterans organizations, chambers of commerce, among others, seconded the New York University social philosopher Eduard Lindeman. “A centralized and well-staffed service office, with clear defined working relations with all institutions and groups in the community, should be the ed product of organizational effort,” he wrote. Nothing should be left to chance. “Social adjustment is not attained merely through the establishment of good relations with a few individuals. It is achieved only when the individual, in this instance the veteran, finds himself in a working relationship with those institutions which serve the needs of people in general,” he argued. “An intimate friendship with another person, for example, is not an adequate indication of social adjustment. Indeed, when such personal relations become too absorbing, they actually prevent complete adjustment to the environment.”\textsuperscript{82} Argued one Yale University psychologist, agreeing, “full success” of “normal human adjustment” requires “highly effective co-operation” and “peculiarly” dependent upon the availability of the services

\textsuperscript{81} Norman Cameron, “The Socially Maladjusted Veteran,” \textit{Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science} 239 (May 1945): 29.
\textsuperscript{82} Eduard C. Lindeman, “Community Programs for Social Adjustment,” \textit{Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science} 239 (May 1945): 146, 144.
of an “appropriate specialist”—which was a matter of “governmental and community responsibility.”

Optimally the maladjusted veteran would be best served if all of these functions were housed within one institution. The director of New York City’s Institute for the Crippled and Disabled, Colonel John Smith Jr., a West Point graduate, thought his own rehabilitation center was a good, “industrial” model. Where feasible, cities and large towns should establish a rehabilitation center, like the Institute, he suggested, with medical examination and physical therapy facilities, “functional” re-education, vocational training, and placement services, as well as occupational therapy. All of this required a “team” approach to adjustment, involving the “interrelated and combined thought and efforts”—what he called the various “professional processes”—of physician, nurses, physical therapists, and a host of other professionals: so, too, psychiatrists and psychologists. “They must all work as a team with each knowing the part the other is to play in attaining the goal.”

Clark Tibbitts, the director of the University of Michigan’s Institute for Human Adjustment, and Wilma Donahue, a clinician in the university’s psychological clinic, writing in that same special 1945 issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* as Smith, entitled “The Disabled Veteran,” estimated that at the end of the war there would be at least eight million working-age males disabled (translated to one disabled worker for every fifth home, on average). Ten thousand psychiatrists and thousands of psychiatric social workers were needed to tackle the mass

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neurosis. “Industry, educational institutions, community counseling centers, and the armed forces could use today 20,000 persons trained in clinical psychology and vocational counseling,” Tibbitts and Donahue contended.\(^\text{85}\) Willard Waller agreed. “[W]e should plan to turn over as much as possible of the work with difficult cases to persons trained for such work. And certainly we should begin at once to train a new army of social workers—to help us win, if that is possible, the battle of the peace.”\(^\text{86}\)

Martin Gumpert weighed in as well. “Psychoanalysts are today scarcer than bacon,” he quipped. “There is hardly a chance for a poor neurotic fellow to buy himself a good analyst or to devote as much time to his treatment as would be required by psychoanalytic doctrine.”\(^\text{87}\) Faced with that “world-wide psychiatric emergency,” Gumpert would outline his own psychiatric four-point program for the nation: “We need (1) psychiatric consultants to governments, (2) an efficient nation-wide and international system of mental hygiene, (3) thorough investigation of social behavior by scientific psychological methods, (4) application of psychological knowledge to political practice.”\(^\text{88}\) The fate and sanity of the world hung in the balance, and yet the planet’s governments were woefully unprepared. America needed to educate more (and better) psychotherapists, integrate psychotherapy into the general practice of medicine, and incorporate mental health into the nation’s institutions of public health, said Gumpert. The fate of the nation depended on it.

\(^{86}\) Waller, *Veteran Comes Back*, 269.
\(^{87}\) Martin Gumpert, “What to Do with Neurotics,” *The Nation*, 16 Nov. 1946, 553-54.
\(^{88}\) Gumpert, “Political Psychotherapy,” 720.
A good indicator of the PR campaign’s effectiveness is the reaction of its opponents. Having analyzed several thousand articles and essays for his book, *Out of Uniform* (1946), Benjamin Bowker concluded that psychiatrists were some of the sorriest “special-pleaders” out there. Most of people who had written about the veteran and the “veteran problem,” he found, had written not about flesh-and-blood veterans but their own pet projects. “The returning veterans made a new argument for an old theme,” Bowker wrote. “Each [special-pleading group] found its particular bête noire among the veterans, just as each had previously found it in the nation at large.” Psychiatrists were, he thought, particularly zealous and effective.

Amid the “darkening war clouds,” they had found their opportunity to “catapult into public consciousness,” he wrote. And yet their “real triumph” came in the discussion about the soldier’ readjustment after war:

Quoting statistics of personality disorders among service personnel and detailing gruesome case histories of individuals, the more aggressive and public-relations-minded psychiatrists bombarded the American public with assertions of their professional indispensability to future domestic tranquility. . . . Like the other special-pleaders, the psychiatrists used the veteran as a package for displaying the same wares to which the public had previously been apathetic.  

A six-year veteran of the armed services (1940-46), Bowker had been coaxed into writing *Out of Uniform* by the late, great publisher W. W. Norton himself. Norton, a World War I veteran and Legionnaire, was miffed by all bête noire special-pleading and thought someone needed to stand up for the misunderstood (and misappropriated) veteran. This, Bowker promised his readers, was not just another “angry book.”

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It should come as no surprise that Pentagon officials, military officers, and those proud, already-adjusted veterans who wanted nothing to do with psychiatry were some of the PR campaign’s most vocal critics. When asked about the veteran problem upon returning home, the triumphant General Eisenhower shot back rather emphatically, “I don’t care what you do with them, but for God’s sake don’t psychoanalyze them!” Eisenhower represented a side of the military establishment who thought Freudian theory absolute bunk. “If the soldiers pay much attention to what they read in the papers, they must by now have a terrific inferiority complex,” Lt. William Best Jr., another officer, balked. “They can no longer see themselves as boys who have left home for a few years, to return later, but as tamed dogs gone wild who must pause on the road back to normalcy in order to be rehabilitated. They are, according to current doctrine, definite ‘cases.’” While Best acknowledging that some veterans would need help, he thought readjustment for most of the men would be rather like going from school into business, and all those “well-intentioned but ill-informed people” with their “fancy notions” should just keep to themselves.91

When the Marine Corps combat correspondent Samuel Shaffer returned home he was surprised and irked by the fact that everyone expected a basket case. “I feel as if I am robbing the home front of a priceless illusion. I have been in the battles of Guadalcanal and Tarawa. Surely my face should reflect the misery of jungle, mud and disease! Surely the terrors of sudden death on the beaches of bloody Betio have scarred my soul!” he

90 Quoted in Bowker, Out of Uniform, 34.
91 William Best, Jr., “They Won’t All Be Psychoneurotics!” Saturday Evening Post, 14 April 1945, 112.
protested.\textsuperscript{92} Some sarcastically retorted to all the readjustment advice by claiming it was actually turning them into psychoneurotics. “‘Yeah, I know,’ said an ordnance sergeant. ‘Ma kept watching me all the time, trying ‘not to do anything that would make me nervous.’ Of course that just made me nervous as hell.”\textsuperscript{93} In his study of readjustment, the sociologist John Cuber encountered this common reprisal: “To hear some people talk you would think we were a bunch of psychological lepers. Everybody goes around making amateur psychoanalyses. . . . Why can’t we be left alone to make our way back without making our tortuous gropings so damned conspicuous. . . . I don’t hanker for living in a sociological aquarium.”\textsuperscript{94}

The reprisals of the tech sergeant David Dempsey illuminated a common strain in the anti-psychiatry rhetoric. Dempsey was particularly chagrined by all the advice that mothers and wives were getting from “authorities.” Not only was it turning the women into “kitchen psychologists determined to ‘cure’ the veteran,” but, he charged, the psychiatric deluge might actually cause the veteran to go insane. “The danger of regarding every veteran as a ‘problem’ is that it may actually turn him into a problem,” he warned. “A wife can make her husband’s adjustment easy, not by ‘psyching’ him, but with a little pre-Freudian love and understanding.”\textsuperscript{95} This echoes a second common complaint Cuber encountered while studying veteran readjustment. “Why can’t you see us as individuals and forget the categorical labels?” one respondent grumbled. “Even my

\textsuperscript{93} Quoted in Don Wharton, “The Soldiers Say Don’t Do It!” \textit{Reader’s Digest}, March 1945, 16.
\textsuperscript{94} John F. Cuber, “Family Readjustment of Veterans,” \textit{Marriage and Family Living} 7 (May 1945): 30.
\textsuperscript{95} David Dempsey, “Veterans Are Not Problem Children,” \textit{American Mercury}, Sept. 1945, 326, 331.
wife acts as if she had been studying a book on how to make the veteran happy and she is so preoccupied with the book that she has forgotten that she’s married to me and not to the Veterans’ Administration.”

What must the tech sergeant and this anonymous respondent have thought of Selznick’s Dr. Petersen, Ingrid Bergman’s character in Spellbound?

Bergman’s character represented a new model of womanhood for postwar women (especially war brides). She is strong, young, intelligent, feminine, and independent. Connected to all of that, she is also a trained Freudian psychoanalyst/psychotherapist. In the film script, Dr. Petersen is described as just under thirty, “slightly austere,” and “a bit arrogant looking,” and she speaks with a “professional voice.” Her specialty, she says, is “emotional problems and love difficulties.” Perhaps appropriately, her colleagues find her cold and distant. One amorous Green Manors psychiatrist early in the movie calls her work “brilliant—but lifeless”; there was no “intuition” in it. “You approach all your problems with an ice pack on your head,” he teases. “Are you making love to me?” she retorts, indifferent but amused. To that he responds, “I will in a moment. I’m just clearing the ground first. I’m trying to convince you that your lack of human and emotional experience is bad for you—as a doctor. And fatal for you as a woman.” On one level this is mere precursor to the love affair, a way of creating a pre-existing condition that will predispose Petersen not to want Ballantine, an obstacle that must and will be overcome, while driving the movie forward. And yet, on closer inspection her initial coldness suggests an alternative reading, one which opens up the logic of this new model of womanhood.

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96 Cuber, “Family Readjustment of Veterans”: 30.
Dr. Petersen becomes a woman in the process of curing Ballantine, her maladjusted veteran patient. This is how she falls in love, through the application of psychoanalysis. Psychotherapy not only unmasks the criminal lurking in the basement, in other words: it can also unleash passion and help a woman fulfill her potential as a woman. While on the run with Ballantine, Petersen turns for help to her former mentor, an older bearded and bespectacled psychoanalyst (who just happens to speak English with a quintessentially authoritarian German accent), and in a heated exchange between the two, the analyst warns Petersen not to trust Ballantine. As his lover she will, of course, defend him, and herself:

CONSTANCE
You don’t know this man! You know only science. You know his mind but you don't know his heart.

BRULOV
We are speaking of a schizophrenic and not a valentine.

CONSTANCE
(angrily) We are speaking of a man.

BRULOV
Oh! (he turns from the phone and starts filling a pipe. She is silent) Love! (he looks up at her and smiles) Look at you, Dr. Petersen, the promising psychoanalyst is now all of a sudden a school girl in love with an actor. Nothing else!

When Petersen proves her lover’s innocence, Brulov eats his words; after Petersen’s marriage to Ballantine, he tells his former pupil, “Any husband of Constance is a husband

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of mine—so to speak.” Throughout the movie, psychoanalysis and love are in constant
dialogue, the one playing off the other. Leonard Leff called the linking of the two a
“masterstroke.”

Although no expert actually advised wives and single women to become, like
Petersen, a professional psychiatrist (at least none that I have read), women were told that
they could and should learn how to apply psychoanalytic knowledge to their readjusting
husbands and boyfriends. As Plant has noted, “Together, the wife and the doctor
formed a therapeutic team, supplanting the sentimental mother who had tended to the
veteran in previous eras. To them fell the duty of restoring men who had suffered not
only the trauma of war, but also the effects of distorted familial relationships.” In a
Ladies’ Home Journal article with the byline “Learning to become a civilian again is
harder than learning to become a soldier… Help wanted—Women!”—Willard Waller
wrote to women readers that the greatest need of the returning soldier was “emotional
security” in a “loveless world,” which they were uniquely qualified to offer. “If the wife
had a good education, and is capable of systematic intellectual work, she may be in a
position to profit from serious study of the veteran and his psychology.”

Whether the young woman studies alone or in groups, she should, Waller
suggested, read to “reflect and consider, to broaden her understanding and to develop her

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99 Leff, Hitchcock and Selznick, 124.
100 On gender discrimination in the psychiatric/psychological professions in the 1940s, see
James H. Capshew, Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in
America, 1929-1969 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), ch. 3.
101 Rebecca Jo Plant, “The Veteran, His Wife and Their Mothers: Prescriptions for
Psychological Rehabilitation after World War II,” in Tales of the Great American Victory: World
War II in Politics and Poetics, ed. Diederik Oostdijk and Markha G. Valenta, 95-100
(Amsterdam: Vrije, 2006), 98.
102 Willard Waller, “What You Can Do to Help the Returning Veteran,” Ladies’ Home
judgment, but without any expectation of finding formulas which will save her the
trouble of thinking.” Waller would outline for readers of the Journal his own “four-point
program” for the nation, which started with this recommendation to all its women and
wives: “1. She should begin by making a thorough study of the psychology of the
veteran, his habits, attitudes, beliefs, desires and capacities, the ideals and values by
which he lives. Many books, articles and manuals are already available for such study,
and there will be many more.”¹⁰³

Incorporated into the article is this prominent offset quote from the sex researcher
H. G. Beigel: “Times have changed to the advantage of women. In America’s colonial
days, the husband usually outlived his first wife, and more men than women married a
second time.” Continuous childbearing had in the past taken a “heavy toll,” but: “Today,
women live on average four years longer than men and their chance to marry a second
time as against that of their husbands is two to one.”¹⁰⁴ To be conversant in Freud,
psychoanalytic terms, and educated in the literature was to be modern. The two were
made equal and analogous.

Women, of course, would need help, and not just from books, articles, and
manuals—but, Waller argued, from erudite men such as himself. (Even Dr. Petersen had
turned for help to her mentor, Dr. Brulov.) “We are learning now that it is no disgrace to
call in the specialist to help with problems of human relations,” he reassured. “It would
be best to go to a psychiatrist or a trained social worker for such assistance, but this may
not be possible.”¹⁰⁵ Only if such a specialist could not be found should a wife or

girlfriend turn to a family doctor, psychologist, or sociologist, a minister or friend (in that order of authority). Particularly in the case of the psychoneurotic and psychotic veteran where their “mental equilibrium” had been “upset,” Waller was adamant: professional advice was not an option but a requirement. “[A]ll such cases require professional advice, and for this there is no substitute.”¹⁰⁶ Women’s advancement over men, their self-improvement through education, and the incorporation of outside social and behavioral experts were all rolled into one, all a part of a whole. “Marriage counsel has become a necessary part of American life. Some 250 college courses this year are giving lessons in living together in marriage,” Mona Gardner similarly reassured the Journal’s readers. “Thousands of marriage counselors, dealing in common sense and impartiality, are functioning steadily, unobtrusively, effectively in thousands of American cities and towns.”¹⁰⁷

Journalists emphasized that the Freudian wife was distinctly modern not only by penning encomiums to her intellectual capacity but also by creating enmity between the generations, particularly between young wives and husbands and their mothers and mothers-in-law. Philip Wylie may have coined and popularized the infamous slur “Momism” in Generation of Vipers in 1942. Yet his rant took off and became a bestseller most likely because social, behavioral, and mental health experts, and their promoters, incorporated his indictment into their finger-pointing national campaign.¹⁰⁸ When it came time to explain the weakness of the American Male, why thousands of soldiers and

¹⁰⁶ Waller, “What You Can Do to Help the Returning Veteran,” 98.
draftees had succumbed to their neurotic impulses, they blamed not the man but his coddling and overbearing “mom.”

Edward Strecker, a consultant to the Surgeon General of the Army and Navy, adviser to the Secretary of War, and chair of the psychiatry department at the University of Pennsylvania, was the campaign’s chief strategist and publicist. “Why did the desire for self-preservation defeat one group of men [in war], to their discredit, and not the other? The answer in ninety percent of the cases can be given in one word, IMMATURE,” he charged. He had surveyed numerous hospitals and patients, well knew the military’s dismal NP rates, and could cite one case history after another (and did). It was his learned conclusion that psychoneurosis started at home—with the mom’s “Silver Cord,” that is, her unwillingness to untie the “emotional apron strings” that bound her to her children. (Neither the war, nor the military, in other words, were to be blamed for the epidemic.)

“In the vast majority of case histories [of psychoneurotics], a ‘mom’ is at fault,” Strecker indicted.\textsuperscript{109} His \textit{Their Mothers’ Sons} was one long diatribe against the country’s matriarchy of moms: the narcissistic mom, the pollyanna mom, moms in pants (weak, immature, responsibility-shirking husbands), moms by proxy and surrogate moms (religion, the military for some), “mom in a bottle” (alcoholism), homosexuality, and, finally, “momarchies” (Nazi Germany and Nipponese momism).

\textit{[T]}here is nothing of which Psychiatry can speak with more confidence and assurance than the danger to our democratic civilizations and cultures from keeping children enwombed psychologically and not permitting them to grow up emotionally and socially. Here is our gravest menace. Our war experiences—the alarming number of so-called “psychoneurotic” young Americans—point and

emphasize this threat to our survival. Mom is a surface fissure warning us of deeper defects.  

Few were as excoriating as Strecker, yet many experts did argue that psychoneurosis started in the home with a coddling, overly affectionate (and controlling) mother.

The solution was not to shun motherhood. Quite the contrary: by being modern, by learning social and behavioral techniques and incorporating expertise into childrearing and their marriages, women, especially the young, could and would become better housewives and mothers. The key, again, was reliance on expertise. Regarding that “mom in a bottle” surrogate, alcohol, Strecker would contrast moms from mothers in this way: “Once the mother or mature wife understands what the doctor is trying to accomplish for the alcoholic son or husband and appreciates the sound reasons for his technique, she becomes a helpful ally,” Strecker wrote. But then he added: “Not so with mom. Never is she more than halfway convinced, and she is likely to follow her own system.”

Mom goes her own way, unlike the “sensible,” “straight-thinking” mother who has the “knowledge to seek professional help when it is needed,” argued another psychiatrist.

Having cleaved the two—modern efficient motherhood from old-fashioned bumbling motherhood—boosters of behavioral and social expertise made the rather brilliant move, in terms of tactics, of then turning around and reaffirming traditional, home-centered family values. Women could have it all: they could be both modern and


112 Strecker, “What’s Wrong With American Mothers?” 92.

113 “Many More Neurotic Ills Caused by This War Than by the Last,” *New York Times*, 27 March 1944, 24.
traditional. The two were not seen as antithetical or contradictory.\textsuperscript{114} Consider the regular advice columns of Lt. Comdr. Leslie Hohman—an Associate in Psychiatry and M.D. at Johns Hopkins University, and regular contributor to the \textit{Ladies’ Home Journal}. (For a start, note that the \textit{Journal} actually had a psychiatrist and officer providing advice to its readers.) Because of Hohman’s work in World War I in the Army Medical Corp’s psychiatric branch with “so-called” shell-shock cases and because of his work with these cases in private practice after the war, he said that he felt impelled to urge families and patients to follow their psychiatrist’s directions “explicitly.”\textsuperscript{115} Unlike “over anxious parents,” these professionals will offer “skillful” and “dependable” advice. Leave nothing to chance.

Two months later he followed this column up with another lauding stereotypically traditional roles for wives and girls. “At the very time when it is most valuable for the bride to know something about homemaking and the bridegroom to know something about budgeting, the ones who have had no training are just starting to try to learn. Starting too late, some of them never succeed,” he lectured. Basking in honeymoon, the young husband might think his wife’s failures in homemaking are “cute” and “amusing,” yet her (and his) failures may well lead to “open trouble later” (based on his experience as an expert). So his best advice to women was that they start training their daughters as early in life as they can, when they are young, for that is when they are “almost

invariably eager to learn household skills.”¹¹⁶ From here he would outline five “rules” for training young girls, based on “sound psychological principles.”

In another column, written a month prior to his one about family members sticking to their psychiatrist’s advice, Hohman warned the Journal’s readers, “The greatest danger to marriages in everyday situations is in not remaining intelligently alive. The greatest danger is boredom”—so don’t be dull.¹¹⁷ In another article, he would introduce readers to his idea of an ideal family—a Connecticut couple who had come through the war “without any signs of emotional upset or ‘jitters.” Hohman in particular rather liked how Bud, the husband (a veteran), had modeled his family’s hierarchical structure after his wartime submarine’s chain of command and wanted to use Bud’s advice as a blueprint for other households. Bud’s rules had worked for him, his wife and daughter, and, Hohman wrote, “I record them as a psychiatrist in order that they may help other couples to as successful a solution as Bud and Ellie have achieved.”

Many would call Bud’s model not traditional but medieval. There are times, Bud explained (and Hohman reiterated), when the needs of the whole ship had to “supersede those of the individuals, and when the ship must function as a whole.” And only one voice can give orders. “The same is true of family life, particularly at a period when families must be governed by ‘remote control,’ under trying circumstances,” Hohman wrote. “Then the admiral of the fleet or the captain of the family must rule by authority—an authority earned through the wisdom of following the calm, patient, deliberate and understanding methods of the first rules.” The first of those rules which Bud had instilled

in the men under his command as an officer aboard a submarine—and apparently had
applied to his family—was, “Keep your eyes and ears open and your mouth shut!”

Although most of the advice literature was far less authoritarian than this, the
juxtaposition of extremes illuminates the boundaries of what was emerging as a general
pattern. The historian David Gerber has suggested that much of the prescriptive advice
literature was aimed at women because these writers and experts “shared the traditional
assumption that women bore singular responsibility in the family and in caring for men”
and “shared the view that the restoration of peace must lead to the restoration of the status
quo antebellum in gender relations.”

Susan Hartmann in the late 1970, in her survey of the advice literature, argued it was less a shared assumption than a shared fear, that
“women had changed, had matured and grown in ways that posed a threat to family
stability. Thus the writers asked women to conceal or to reverse those changes.”

Hohman’s articles, and others, too, force us to rethink this reaffirmation of domesticity,
to see it not as a retreat into the home, but, rather, as a revolution of what it meant to tend
to, manage, and care for the home. Just as social scientists exploited fear to their
advantage, fear of mass maladjustment, psychoneurotic veterans, the rebellion of the
Ishmaels, and cold war annihilation, so, too, would they exploit the bonds of love. Fear,
on the one hand, and the craving for love, on the other, were driven by what was in the
immediate postwar years a near obsession: the need for “security.”

Life magazine published John Hersey’s short story, “Joe is Home Now,” in its July 3, 1944, issue, in the heat of the readjustment debate. The protagonist, Joe Souczak, is a disabled veteran who lost his arm in the war and must now return home and face the long, hard road of readjustment. Though fictional, the story was based on the experiences of forty-three discharged soldiers, and Joe is their composite. To understand the significance of his struggle, Life editorialized, “multiply him by millions,” for “human reconversion,” alongside economic conversion, would rank as the “greatest of U.S. problems in the months and years to come.” (By the time of its printing, 1.25 million service personnel had already been discharged.) Joe’s life was in many ways not only a composite portrait but a fulfillment of the pattern that has already been outlined, right down to the overprotective mom (all she does is cry when she embraces Joe, then bawls when she smells the alcohol on his breath). An understanding and patient young woman, his fiancée Mary, never quotes Freud, but she is, nevertheless, key to his reconversion—she is “Joe’s greatest help.”

Soon after his return home, Joe suffers from flashbacks and mood swings, resorts to drinking and brawling, and cannot hold down a job; he is bitter and resentful (just as Willard Waller predicted). When his fiancée asks him why he is angry, he ruminates—“It’s a lot of things.”

One thing, out there a man is proud, he’s in the best damn unit in the whole United Nations, he’s got buddies who would gladly die for him, he’s got something to do all day, a routine. He’s got responsibility. If he flops, somebody’s going to die. Back here, I’m not busy, I got no buddies, nobody’s interested in giving me responsibility. I’m just burning my days.”
Mary offers this advice to Joe to console him. “Don’t try to earn a million dollars the first job you take,” she says. “Don’t try to be a bank president, Joe. Don’t try to earn a thousand bucks.” Forlornly he will agree: “I guess you’re right, Mary, I got thousand-buck ambitions and forty-five-buck abilities.” With the help of a local syndicate, Joe is able to pull enough money together to open a little bakery of his own, and though he will never be rich, Mary is steadfastly proud.

Social scientists predicted that military service would produce two kinds of veterans: adjusted conformists (like Joe) and maladjusted rebels. The one-or-the-other perspective resulted from the simple fact that for the vast majority of servicemen World War II was their first personal encounter with, and submission to, a total institution, and it was thought that that encounter would elicit one of two reactions: acceptance or rejection, adjustment or maladjustment. A soldier was a part of a “unit” within the “whole”—“he’s got something to do all day, a routine,” Hersey wrote. And “everyone has a special place of his own,” Willard Waller observed. Being part of a unit meant not only fulfilling a function in a larger organization, and having one’s time routinized. Military service also came with a sense of security.

The military was “the ideal welfare state,” Bill Mauldin, the celebrated World War II cartoonist, suggested. “[The soldier] has no responsibilities beyond obeying the people who are paid to think for him, if he’s a private, or passing orders along if he’s a

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121 John Hersey, “Joe is Home Now,” Life, 3 July 1944, 76, 78.
122 Waller, Veteran Comes Back, 21.
noncom. So long as he keeps his nose reasonably clean, he’s guaranteed a decent bed, three daily meals, chocolate bars and plenty of spending money,” Mauldin wrote, “and even if he gets in trouble all they usually take away is his money.”123 Noted another, “In the military situation his physical needs and many of his personal desires were cared for by the government because the person was ‘in service.’ The status assured him shelter, food, clothes, transportation, entertainment, and free medical, legal, and religious advice, as well as the regularity of payday!” And only one thing was required in return: “The person in service did not need to do anything but serve to have these things assured to him.”124 Serving was key.

Of course security through adjustment and service came with a price: an independent identity and existence. Each recruit was to fit into the military’s “behavior system.” “The adjustment process, from the viewpoint of the person, consists in reorienting his behavior from the civilian frame of reference to the military standard,” Waller expounded. “The perfectly trained soldier is one who has had his civilian initiative reduced to zero. In the process the self becomes identified with the institution and dependent upon it for direction and stimulation.” Ideally all needs, not just material needs, but “personal, social, and emotional satisfaction,” would be met by the institution.125 While in agreement with Waller, his fellow sociologist Robert Nisbet was rather less sanguine about the process of regimentation:

Uprooted from job, community, and family, he is set down in the midst of strangers, a discrete atom among other atoms, and subjected to an undreamed-of regimentation and discipline. From relative individuality he is transported to a

125 Waller, Veteran Comes Back, 441.
state of anonymity, and he becomes a unit whose only identity is in his serial number. . . . The soldier is concerned with but one thing—the infinitesimal activity assigned to him by his superiors.\textsuperscript{126}

Soldiers hung \textit{Yank} pin-ups over their bunks, carried with them letters from girlfriends and siblings, and welcomed packages from mom and dad back home. No one was completely reduced to “zero.” But the ideal of total organization was pervasive.

As was the sense of “belonging.”\textsuperscript{127} If there was one thing Joe was proud of it was his unit, because the soldier knew “he’s got buddies who would gladly die for him.” Nisbet observed that this sense of belonging was the soldier’s “acutest sense” and that the loss of this solidarity after the war would be for most “deeply disquieting,” provoking a range of reactions from simple nostalgia to bitter and hostile discontentment. “Here perhaps lies the crux of the social problem of demobilization,” Nisbet wrote. “It is not merely the sudden loss of an orderly world, of discipline from without, of paternalistic certainty, although the problem touches upon all of these. Fundamentally, it is a loss of a sense of belonging, of close identification with other human beings and clearly perceived values.”\textsuperscript{128} Waller, too, thought this solidarity a “mixed blessing.” Soldiers in war “satisfied the hunger for ‘belonging to a group,” but in the dog-eat-dog world of the civilian—where it was “each man for himself”—replication of comradeship was impossible. “Once he is returned to civilian life, he will feel the lack of the security of

\textsuperscript{126} Nisbet, “Coming Problem of Assimilation”: 262-64.
\textsuperscript{127} If as Warren Susman once suggested, ‘The 1930s was the decade of participation and belonging,” then the war effort bore its fruit (\textit{Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century} [New York: Pantheon Books, 1984], 172.
\textsuperscript{128} Nisbet, “Coming Problem of Assimilation”: 266.
solidarity—there will be a great void in his life. He will remember the companionship; it will haunt him and he will seek to recapture it,” he wrote.129

Owing to the popularity of mid-century bestsellers like William H. Whyte Jr.’s *The Organization Man* (1956) and David Riesman’s classic, *The Lonely Crowd* (1950), Americans have long held to the notion that the postwar impulse toward conformity, the longing for togetherness, and the searching for belonging were the result of Cold War anxieties, McCarthy’s reign of terror, the country’s postwar corporate take-over, and material affluence.130 In 1945, Norman Cameron, a psychology professor at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, expressed this longing for security and togetherness most presciently. The soldier, he observed, would

miss the orderliness and regularity of life, the sense of belonging to a great organization with great and tangible aims set out by his leaders. He longs for authority because it is his only way of gaining personal security. He needs an organization so that he can recapture the confidence and significance he once derived from identifying his life and his aims with the work and aims of the military society that adopted him.131

The Organization Man was a product not of the commodity rich ’50s, but the war-torn ’40s.

Already by 1949 observant Americans were awakening to the reality that the veteran might seek to adjust himself a bit too eagerly. Instead of rejecting organization, regimentation, and “bigness”—the stuff of “military society”—many veterans, in fact, wanted to conform, just as Nisbet and Waller predicted. “Forty-nine is taking no chances,” noted one commentator. “It is what they don’t want rather than what they do

129 Waller, *Veteran Comes Back*, 43.
131 Cameron, “Socially Maladjusted Veteran”: 34.
that the men of ’49 know best. And what they don’t want is risk.” Elders who had come of age in the “roaring” ’20s, and turbulent ’30s, thought the Class of ’49 had grayed and balded rather prematurely. “If ’49 has a class bogey, it is ulcers,” quipped this commentator.132 “Hell,” quipped another elder more colloquially, “I’d rather these kids’d be Communists or something else y’can put your finger on. They got about as much spark as a bowl of Jello.”133 Having shunned the prerogatives of youth—i.e., rebellion—they seemed to want only one thing: security.

That ’49s’ obsession with security was connected to their experiences in the war was not lost on this, and other, commentators. Many had assumed World War II would inspire a great wave of licentiousness and free-spiritedness, whereas exactly the opposite resulted. “The teen-ager in uniform may have chafed, but he was malleable, and in an organization in which conformity was emphasized and reward de-emphasized, he learned easily how to keep his nose clean. And he has not forgotten it,” observed this critic. “He is not afraid of bigness; where his brother of the twenties, fearful of anonymity, was repelled by hugeness in an organization, he is attracted. To a ’49 conditioned to organization, big business spells security.”134 While many today would blame 1950s conformity on abundance and McCarthy’s red-baiting, here we see a very different source.

The drive for security through adjustment was both psychological and pragmatic. On a psychological level, ‘49s had been born and reared during a period of great insecurity. What in the thirties looked like great social and civic ferment from one perspective, looked to these organization men like social chaos. Add on top of that experience the deprivation of the Great Depression. The majority of these men would have been teenagers back in the mid-thirties and therefore not only unemployed but, due to the glut in the labor market, unemployable. And let us not forget the menacing rise of fascism abroad. The precariousness of prewar life drove many Americans to a near obsession with postwar security.

At the same time, adjustment was also rooted in the practical mundane, daily life of military employment. That is to say, ‘49s looked for the kinds of jobs that “service” best prepared them for: service in another large, bureaucratic organization. Military service had not only prepared millions of young men to serve within hierarchical organizations, but also to perform particular kinds of tasks within those entities. “Looking back on their military careers, whether they ‘handled’ a squad or a company, ’49 feel themselves admirably equipped for the work” in large companies of “handling” other men. Human relations and “personnel” were some of the hottest postwar professions. In writing about the military “society,” Ed Seldon (and other critics) believed that the military was happy to blur these lines. The same of the soldiers themselves. Seldon had

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encountered two prevalent views of what it was like “serving one’s country.” The one was the traditional view of the “Fighting Man—Killer Joe.” The other was the modern view of war as work.

“Male civilians of draft age prefer to think of soldiers, like themselves, doing a job. Recruitment publicity for ‘The Modern Army’ complements this view with a great deal of emphasis on technological training,” he wrote. “Advertising artists present the handsome half-naked American in the Jungle, alone with his walkie-talkie (the same one the ‘defense’ worker has fitted the parts for), dreaming of a better job under better working conditions Back Home.”136 Seldon was himself headed overseas for a three-year stint himself, post V-J day. “The organization of the Army,” Seldon concluded, was “perfectly pyramidal and more tightly knit by the hierarchic principle of rank than any civilian society of our day, including the most totalitarian. The nature of this organization is scarcely veiled by recruitment publicity or the Public Relations Office of the Secretary of War.”137

The war had prepared many a veteran not for hand-to-hand blue-collar labor, but white-collar paper pushing.

One of the first to outline this risk-aversion was not the left-leaning Partisan Review, but the nation’s premier “big business” magazine, Fortune. Ostensibly ’49’s graduation had prompted the magazine’s survey, yet the editors had other reasons for sounding this alarm, for it was clear to them that search for security and over-adjustment was squelching the country’s entrepreneurial spirit. Organization might be good for efficiency but not innovation, creativity, and the opening of new markets. “Spiritually, [security] means working for people, in the sense of service, of justifying one’s place in the community. Materially, it is, simply, working under them. The class of ’49 wants to work for somebody else—preferably something big,” noted the magazine.\(^{138}\) The loss of individual initiative and industry troubled Fortune’s editors.

With their aggressive college recruiting and feel-good brochures touting low executive turnover, generous pensions and annuity plans, and other “family” advantages, big business was, Fortune acknowledged, partially at fault. So, too, universities and business schools, which were too focused on “human relations” and other industry-and big-business-centered majors, “how-to” practical courses (instead of the humanities), and technology-oriented programs; nevertheless, the onus was also on the collegians themselves. In response to a business recruiter’s observation that the young men in interviews hardly mentioned salaries anymore—assuming industry had no intention of exploiting them—Fortune observed that ’49s did not talk about the future in terms of dollars because they were most interested in, and articulate about, promises of the “Good Life.”\(^ {139}\)

\(^{138}\) “The Class of ’49,” Fortune, 85.
\(^{139}\) “The Class of ’49,” Fortune, 86.
They wanted calm and order, a life pictured with “a touch of elms” and “quiet streets.” Graduating seniors wanted a “good wife” and “comfortable home, about three children, one, maybe two cars (‘a little knockabout for the wife’), and later, perhaps, a summer cottage.” Whereas prior to war ambitious young men had migrated to the higher-paying East coast in search of work and opportunities, the Class of ’49’s great urge was to “sink roots.”140 (The few entrepreneurs left among them sojourned not to the East coast, but the sunny wide-open Southwest.)141 “I guess a lot of us must look pretty awful to those elders who believe in neither the initiative-killing security of big business nor the socialism of big government, but cherish the crapshooting tradition of little individuals with big ambitions,” Bill Mauldin admitted. “We must look like scared rabbits diving for holes.”142 And thus Mary’s advice to her fiancé Joe now takes on a different tone. The image of success readjustment did more than allay postwar concerns about the soldier’s reintegration; it also reset the bar of the American Dream down to the level of a steady bi-weekly paycheck and respectable suburban bungalow.

In writing “Joe is Home Now,” John Hersey did more than render a composite of forty-three veterans. One might multiply his story many times over, indeed, and see in it the composite experience of millions of veterans. Although Bowker, the author of Out of Uniform, correctly maintained that there was no “veteran,” that no one man’s experience was the same as another’s, a new cultural type did emerge as Americans grappled with the war’s effect on the men who had served. In the Hollywood blockbuster The Best Years of Our Lives (1946), “Joe” is the ex-Sgt. Harold Russell, a handless veteran who

140 “The Class of ’49,” Fortune, 86.
141 “The Class of ’49,” Fortune, 86.
played himself. He is a Keith Dadier, the soft-spoken English teacher and veteran who is taunted by juvenile delinquents Los Angeles in *Blackboard Jungle* (1955). He is the white-collared ex-officer Tom Rath in *Man in the Gray Flannel Suit* (1955). He is Frankie, a recovering addict played by Frank Sinatra in *The Man with the Golden Arm* (also 1955), and the psychoneurotic Zackary Morgan played by Joseph Cotten in *I’ll Be Seeing You* (1945). This was “Class of ’49.”

At least this was the mainstream. There was, however, another streak that ran counter to the current. Joe Souczak’s had his doppelganger, his black sheep alter ego: the maladjusted “rebel.” Marlon Brando’s performance as “Bud” Wilcheck in *The Men* (1950) was prototypical in many ways, providing young men everywhere with a compelling figure to model themselves after. Brando had already proven his mercurial charismatic abilities to near-universal acclaim on the stage in Tennessee Williams’s “A Streetcar Named Desire” (1947); in the role of Stanley Kowalski, he had already crafted the persona of an erratic, temperamental outcast as an inebriated and embittered blue-collar World War II veteran. But until *The Men*, the New York theatre crowd had had this twenty-six-year-old heartthrob all to themselves. Brando’s performance in *The Men*, Brando’s first full-length feature film, earned the upstart actor rave reviews from the critics. Almost overnight with the movie’s help “brutish” Brando became a national phenom, the nation’s most appealing anti-Establishment, anti-Hollywood “rebel”—the first of a kind.

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143 Used in reference to the returning veterans who had enrolled in college under a GI Bill grant and graduated in 1949. For a discussion of the veteran problem in film, see Fagelson, “‘Nervous Out of the Service.’”
Even while filming, the rebel was already earning a reputation in Hollywood as an irreverent “nonconformist.” “My objective,” he told Hedda Hopper, “is to subject myself to what I think and feel until I’m in a position to think and feel as I please.” Hopper responded, “Don’t look now, Marlon, but you’ve got a head start.” When Hopper had introduced herself to Brando between scenes while he filming *The Men*, he responded to the columnist by grunting. He had not even completed his first picture. After the movie’s release, film critics swooned. “Mr. Brando as the veteran who endures the most difficult time is so vividly real, dynamic and sensitive that his illusion is complete,” praised the *New York Times* critic Bosley Crowther. “Out of stiff and frozen silences he can lash into a passionate rage with the fearful and flailing frenzy of a taut cable suddenly cut. Or he can show the poignant tenderness of doctor with a child.”

In *The Men*, Brando plays the role of an embittered paraplegic who refuses to adjust to his injury, just as he refuses to adjust to society. Before the war Bud had been a star athlete. Now he has to rely on VA nurses for his every need. When audiences are introduced to Bud at the beginning of the movie he has been at the VA hospital for a year. He will not go through any therapy or retraining, and he shuns his fiancée, Ellen. Only with contempt will he begin to accept what the war has done to him. Only fitfully (an understatement) will he give in to the social pressure of the other paraplegics and to the orders of the VA’s dictatorial doctor, Dr. Brock, who treats the men more like a drill sergeant than a healer. Bud is not going down without a fight (or two), however. When he

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is asked by the other men to join the PVA, the Paralyzed Veterans of America association, he balks, barking, “I’m not a joiner.” He refuses to join with the other paraplegics, and he refuses to join the outside world as well. Just as he recoiled from therapy, he does not want to leave the safety of the VA hospital, where he can play the role of the martyr. It takes an actual eviction from the VA facility, as a result of a night of bacchanalian hell raising, to force him finally out into the “real” world.

His mood swings are unpredictable, his temper explosive, although Bud is not the only maladjusted patient at the VA. “No, I don’t want to be rehabilitated, readjusted, reconditioned or re-anything. And if you don’t mind, I don’t want to take my proper place in society either. Does that make my position clear?” one paraplegic barks at Dr. Brock, when he is sarcastically asked if he really wants to be rehabilitated. Bud is the worst of the lot, though. The movie ends with him marrying Ellen, who has broken him down with her persistence and sheer will power, and they will even move into a white-picketed home, which she has prepared for the two, yet his adjustment seems forced at best. Brando did not like the Hollywood ending, and it shows.

To prepare for his role, Brando moved into the VA hospital in Van Nuys, California, learned how to use a wheelchair, and endured the grueling therapy routine. After, he famously went out drinking with the vets, as though he were just one of the guys (many of whom were extras in the movie). The training earned him the respect of the patients and plaudits from the Hollywood crowd. Hardly could it have compensated for his own attitudes regarding military service, however. In 1950 he dodged the draft. At an induction center he was given a questionnaire to fill out, and when asked his race, he

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wrote “Human.” For “color” he wrote “Seasonal—oyster white to beige.” When asked if there was any reason why he should not be inducted, he answered, “I’m psychoneurotic.” “I had a very bad history in military school,” he explained to the psychiatrist. “I don’t respond well to authority and I got kicked out. Besides, I have emotional problems.” In the exchange that followed the psychiatrist learned that Brando’s therapist was an old friend of his and after a few more minutes of chatting (according to Brando) the doctor happily scribbled on the actor’s file “Not suited for military service.” “And that was why I didn’t go to Korea,” Brando bragged.148

It did not take “Bad Boy” Brando much time to back “the cinema critics into the adjective bin,” quipped Time magazine, in a large October 1954 cover-story spread on Brando.149 Critics and columnists wrote of his “sheer animal vitality” and called him Hollywood’s “Enfant Terrible.”150 Brando was “intense” and “moody,” “rude, vulgar, and uncouth,” and “mysterious.”151 He was hypersexual, an animal, dangerous, unpredictable, raw, barbaric. People liked to refer to him as a “brute.” He was, said one top producer, “half man and half beast.”152 Over the years Brando would refine the nonconformist persona. And he would continue to accrue accolades and adjectives. Yet, it bears recalling where he found his voice as a rebel—while playing two bitter

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maladjusted veterans. Actually, one should say three: his first role was as Sage McRae, a psychologically troubled veteran who murders his girl in Maxwell Anderson’s now-forgotten, short-lived “Truckline Café” (1946). Even his famous white skin-tight T-shirt was a throwback to the war. (Navy seamen were issued T-shirts to wear under their uniforms.) His teacher, Stella Adler, called Brando the “universal actor.” “He had the potential for any role,” she remarked. His “instinct,” the director Robert Lewis suggested, was “to fit himself to a character, not the character to himself.”

It was a perfect marriage between the role of the (veteran) rebel and Brando in that the “character” was already there for him to assume. And in the same way, American audiences were prepared for the maladjusted rebel’s arrival. Robert Nisbet’s observations about maladjustment seem particularly appropriate (and prescient) here. “If our culture is unable or unwilling to receive these [veterans], morally and economically, it is left open to the threat of the mass man, the disinherited creature in whom restlessness becomes sullenness, flaring finally into open rebelliousness,” he prophesied in 1945. “The mass man, being no longer a part of society, becomes its enemy. Having lost membership and a sense of community, he ceases to be governed by the subtle restraints of tradition and social code." This was Brando’s role, his on- and off-stage persona: sullen, disinherited, openly rebellious, the enemy of society, unrestrained.

“Half man and half beast”—Brando had channeled the World War II psychoneurotic. Psychiatrists and other behavioral experts had warned Americans that the conflict had encouraged “aggressive primitive urges” in their sons. During war those urges had been expressed in hate, violence, and destruction—feelings that would not

153 Quoted in “A Tiger in the Reeds.”
easily dissipate once they had returned. The discharged soldier, Americans were told, 
would “crave” new experiences, excitement, and adventure; he would be “restless” and 
“disorganized” and would seek “expression in nomadic behavior.” These urges needed to 
“reshaped” and “controlled,” social scientists warned. Wrote the director of psychiatry 
and sociology at one rehabilitation center, Perry Wagley, “Failure to achieve this end will 
result in unrestrained patterns of belligerency, hate, violence, corruption, and plunder. 
Those who can’t adjust may become involved in conflict with the law.”155 Provisions 
needed to be made to meet the needs of the country’s youth, that is, if the country wanted 
to avert a “postwar wave of delinquency.”

Americans were forewarned. “The cessation of armed conflict is a narcissistic 
trauma for all,” lectured the psychoanalyst Ernst Simmel. Cessation would be especially 
traumatic for the men who fought who would be deprived of the war’s “inspiring 
brotherhood.” This “insecurity” would result, Simmel predicted, in all kinds of addictions 
and widespread alcoholism. Individuals would try to live beyond their psychological 
means, he wrote, which would lead to “discharges of pent-up aggressive or erotic 
instinctual energies,” criminality, the unleashing of “infantile instinctual cravings,” and a 
desire to gratify “infantile sexual demands.”156 Restlessness, apathy, confusion, aversion 
to crowds—these were signs of psychoneurotic reactions among veterans, observed 
another researcher.157 Agreed the war correspondent Arch Soutar, “We’re irritable, 
impatient, restless.” Yes, (some) veterans are “jittery, jumpy and emotionally unstable.”

156 See Ernst Simmel, “Alcoholism and Addiction,” Psychoanalytic Quarterly 17 (1948): 6- 
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1946): 466.
Be on guard, he advised readers of *Saturday Evening Post*; be alert to the veteran’s “tantrums and periods of alternating elation and depression,” and be patient (it was not the veteran’s fault). In his artificially fitted T-shirts, grimy blue jeans, and oversized leather jacket, Brando intensely personified all of these qualities.

Although Brando’s performance in *The Men* grabbed audiences’ attention, the movie was a box-office flop. A full-frontal attack of the “veteran problem,” and only that, it already felt dated to audiences in 1950. Not only had thousands of articles, radio dramas, movies, and books already covered the topic, but a new global threat in Korea would consume the nation and change the moral equation. Karl Shapiro, an English professor at the University of Nebraska at the time, well articulated the shift in the country’s attitudes about war. For the youth, Korea was “an abstract war in which real blood was shed.” “The generation of students that fought the Korean War was deeply embittered by it; I think this applies whether the students soldiered in Korea or stayed home,” Shapiro observed. “They fought under an abstract banner over imaginary boundaries; when they ‘won’ the war they suddenly lost it in an abstract retreat. . . . I am convinced that political idealism was shattered or paralyzed in the minds of our Korean generation.”

A confrontational scene from the rock-and-roll blaring, anti-Establishment classic *Blackboard Jungle* (1955) captures the new mood, and the beginning of the teenage craze. Keith Dadier, the movie’s crew-cut protagonist, is a ’49. After World War II he

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had attended an all-girls school because there was no room anywhere else, and now he is thrown into a rowdy urban high school in Los Angeles to teach English. This is his first gig. When he meets the other teachers he is told not to be a hero. The school is overrun with little juvenile delinquent knife-wielding hellions who drink, smoke, car jack, fight, terrorize teachers, and worse. “Maybe the kids today are like the rest of the world: mixed up, suspicious, scarred. I don’t know. But I do know this. Gang leaders are taking the place of parents,” says one officer to Dadier after the English teacher’s first beating, by his own students.

The scene that captures this new mood occurs midway through the movie in an alleyway confrontation between Dadier and Artie West, one of the school’s pugnacious gang leaders. Dadier will try to warn West to change his ways before he gets arrested, thrown into jail, or sent off to reform school, but West hardly hears a word of it:

West: You know, a year from now, the army comes by and they say, “Okay, Arty West you get in a uniform, and you be a soldier, and you save the world,” and you get your lousy head blowed right off. Or maybe, maybe, I get a year in jail and maybe when I come out, the army they don’t want Arty West to be a soldier no more. Maybe what I get is out.

Plastered behind West is a large Uncle Sam recruiting poster for the Marines. All Keith says in response is, “I see.” West is every bit the imitation of Brando’s rebel. The mantle had been passed.

In a conversation about dodging the draft, Brando would give an irreverent answer that is remarkably akin to Artie West’s. “I always wondered why people went off to war, get themselves blown apart,” he said in wonderment. “Why not say, ‘Christ, I’ll go to jail for five years and that will be worth it, but I’m not going to get my head blown

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off, that’s absurd, I’m not going.” What had inspired the distrust, Brando could not say, although he thought working on *The Men* might have had something to do with it. There is some poignancy in the fact that even as Brando dodged the draft to avoid military service his persona as a rebel was modeled on fictional veterans who had fought themselves. Even more so, that he should claim to be a psychoneurotic as his excuse, and then boast of it after, seems particularly apropos, reflective of the change in mood among the country’s youth.

### Conclusion

In his discussion of rebellion and over-conformity, Willard Waller made what was for him, at least in this book, an uncharacteristically humane observation about the psychological terrain of regimentation and the human spirit. “Boredom is something to rebel against, but it is more than that: boredom *is* rebellion. Boredom is an unsuppressible, un-put-down-able mutiny, the most damaging form of resistance to authority. Boredom is the great social force before which all compulsion fails,” he wrote. “Ennui is the rebellion of the human soul against regimentation. It sets the limits beyond which the individual cannot go in conforming to external compulsion. It is the curse of institutions, flourishing always in armies, prisons, schools, and churches.” Though people know what boredom is, Waller recognized that it was sometimes difficult to distinguish boredom from other mental states, like anger. Moreover, he thought it was both introverted *and* extraverted—introverted when the external world imposes itself upon the

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mind in ways that our alien to its own inner desires and wishes, extraverted when there is nothing outside the mind that occupies or interests it. In either case it was an “automatic, uncontrollable reaction to frustration,” a desire to be somewhere else or do something different.163

“No matter how hard he tries to conform, no matter how well and cheerfully he does his duty, the soldier, with some small part of himself rebels against the army,” Waller wrote.164 Although it surprised Waller that more sociologists and psychologists had not studied boredom, his observations would not have found much resistance among the men and women who fought in World War II. “Some people think war is glamorous. Some people think war is hell. It isn’t glamorous. It isn’t hell,” D-Day veteran and retired corporal Stephen Strauss insisted. “It is mostly just a boring, tedious dirty job, lots of waiting, lots of moving, mostly short periods of fighting, and do it all over again. Lots of hurry-up-and wait, hurryup-and-wait [sic]!”165 “The biggest, the second biggest battle of survival was boredom, really,” William MacKenzie, another veteran, readily acknowledged. “[T]he first one was fear, which was always there, interrupted

163 Waller, Veteran Comes Back, 74.
164 Waller, Veteran Comes Back, 24. Two researchers, Leo Crespi, and G. Schofield Shapleigh, were intrigued by Waller’s excursion into boredom and rebellion in military life and thought his observations compelling, so they tested his hypothesis. They embarked on a study of 199 Princeton University veterans to ascertain if boredom, restlessness, and the need of entertainment had persevered among veterans postwar as a consequence of their experiences in the war, and found, through self-reporting, that they had indeed: 58.8 percent of the men said they had (Leo P. Crespi and G. Schofield Shapleigh, “‘The’ Veteran – A Myth,” Public Opinion Quarterly 10 [Autumn 1946]: 370-71).
occasionally by periods of terror. But actually the one—boredom in between. You were just there. You didn’t really know why you were there.”

Boredom predates World War II, of course. Veterans of the First World War would have reminded their offspring of that. While stationed in France during that conflict, Augustus Trowbridge, for instance, wrote in one of his missives home that he was learning French, for “it helps to kill the ‘cafard,’” “You may not know this bit of French war slang for boredom,” he wrote. “‘Cafard’ is literally a cockroach; the little beast that goes around aimlessly just as the ‘poilu’ does at the front and in rest billets.” He was learning French from a French non-commissioned officer. The two shared more than an interest in language. *Poilu* is French for “hairy one,” a term of endearment of sorts, similar to the American slang term for non-commissioned soldiers, GIs. What these two shared was the experience of boredom, and staving it off. Boredom transcends language, time, battlefields, biographies, and culture. And, yes, it certainly predated World War II.

Nevertheless, in important ways World War II did differ from World War I and all previous wars, just as the experiences of the Class of ’49s differed from the classes that preceded it. Frank Fearing, that UCLA psychology professor, made this

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166 William H. MacKenzie, interview with G. Kurt Piehler and Sandra Stewart Holyoak, New Brunswick, NJ, 8 Feb. 1996, Rutgers Oral History Archives of World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War, New Brunswick, NJ.

perspicacious observation, which helps to illuminate what set this generation apart.

“Whatever military life may have signified in the way of boredom, discomfort, pain, and suffering, for many men it has also meant security and solidarity of purpose,” Fearing wrote. “A common cause was being served, perhaps with a surface skepticism and resentment, but also, perhaps, with more passion and devotion than the civilian suspects.”

Boredom was the “curse,” the consequence, the cost, the side effect of service and security, the trade-off in the bargain (not that many men had a choice). The “Silent Generation” had bought “security for themselves in the full knowledge that the price [was] conformity,” agreed another professor.

In prior wars the pact between the citizen-soldier and the militarized state ended once the treaties had been signed and the principal parties had retired to peace. Not so this war. Not so these veterans.

Veterans of World War II perpetuated the pact. A young man who had just passed his loyalty oath and was hoping for a job as a ladder-climbing executive with Metropolitan Life Insurance tried to explain to Bill Mauldin, the cartoonist, why he agreed to the anti-Faustian bargain. Times and circumstances had changed his “sense of values,” he said. At one time he would have liked to strike out on his own, start a new venture, invent something new, have people beating down his door. “But the struggle for that kind of success takes a long time. How do I know how much time I’ve got?” he said.

“They’re practically guaranteeing we’re going to get into another war. I’ll fight all right, but wouldn’t I look silly defending a beachhead on Coney Island in a home-guard uniform with one pocket full of moldy cartridges and an engagement ring and a bunch of big government bongs in the other pocket, when I’ve just heard that the Treasury in Washington was stonked by a guided missile? . . . I don’t want paper in my pocket,” he said. “I want to walk through those big brass doors at Met Life and fade into the labyrinth, so to speak—at a good salary, of course,

so I can pay instalments [sic] on a house, a car and a family that I can enjoy now, on the chance that something’s going to happen in a few years. I’m going to buy an insurance policy and let my boss and the instalment collectors take the risk. They’re not going to catch me with a pocketful of savings. When they stop scaring me about another war I’ll start believing in pieces of paper again, but now I want something that doesn’t burn so fast in a fire.”

Mauldin found this an extreme example of a kind of cynicism that was quickly spreading. With such a strong desire for security, the threat of another war, and the perpetuity of the draft, the pact would extend for an entire generation, and then some.

Recall again Waller’s words, that boredom was an “unsuppressible, un-put-down-able mutiny, the most damaging form of resistance to authority. Boredom is the great social force before which all compulsion fails.” Just as boredom was the “curse” of institutions, in the postwar period in the continued militarization of the country, it would be a curse on all American homes. At odds with the human soul, boredom was not a benign side effect of the anti-Faustian bargain; it was a persistent, nagging, tension that the broader culture was incapable of resolving. The threat of mass neurosis and widespread maladjustment evinced that. So, too, the avalanche of books about conformity and adjustment that rolled off of postwar presses, which continued to aggravate the “unseen wounds” of America’s “un-put-down-able mutiny.”

170 Bill Mauldin, “Care and Handling of a Heritage,” 98.
Figure 12: “Why I Left the Army and Became a Civilian,” *MAD*, June 1957, 17–19.
Standing next to me in this lonely crowd,
Is a man who swears he’s not to blame.
All day long I hear him shout so loud,
Crying out that he was framed.

Bob Dylan, “I Shall Be Released” (1967)

When Time magazine’s assistant managing editor, Otto Fuerbringer, offered
David Riesman his painted portrait, which the editors had commissioned for the cover of
their September 27, 1954, issue, in typical Riesman fashion he demurred. After thanking
Fuerbringer he explained he was a poor collector of mementos and he and his wife
preferred to have photos of their four children, rather than their “own fine mugs,”
hanging on the walls at home. “I know that the picture would just clutter up an already
crowded household,” he wrote Fuerbringer, “and if I won’t hurt any feelings I would
really prefer not to have it.”¹ Riesman was the first sociologist in the magazine’s history
to grace its cover. Little did he understand at the time what impact that honor would have
on his life as well as his profession.

Riesman was ambivalent about a lot of things in life, not only about seeing his own fine mug on a wall (let alone on the cover of millions of magazines!). When he learned that *Time* was working a story about him—what he thought was a small write-up in the education section or a review of his *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (1950)—he dispatched his good friend Carl Friedrich to dissuade the magazine. Friedrich failed, however: not only was he unpersuasive (he “only loused things up,” Riesman complained), but his interference drew ire from executives at the magazine. In a tartly worded rebuke, Vice President C. D. Jackson informed Friedrich that they were indeed planning to feature his friend, however “not because of the conformation of his ears or his favorite breakfast food.” Rather, Riesman had made “significant scholarly contributions,” and the editors thought his work “might not only be of interest, but possibly of value, to a larger circle than his colleagues, his pupils, and the readers of his books.”² To allay Riesman’s concerns, the senior editor in charge of the story was dispatched to Cambridge to discuss the matter with Riesman personally.

Fuerbringer also placed a call.

Fuerbringer and Riesman had been friends as undergraduates at Harvard and both worked on the editorial staff of *The Harvard Crimson*, the school’s student newspaper.

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When they talked, Riesman tried to explain to Fuerbringer in their long phone conversation that he was in a “precarious scholarly position” and would be harmed by the write-up, however well intentioned. Having come into academia through the back door, Riesman’s concern was certainly understandable. His training in the social sciences had been informal and haphazard. He was a pre-med major at Harvard, and although he had a Harvard law degree, he still lacked the requisite academic credentialing—an earned Ph.D. He and his collaborators on *The Lonely Crowd* were “under-socialized” sociologists, he joked (later in life).³ *Time*’s cover-story might weaken his standing where it mattered most: his colleagues, especially the hardcore number-crunching empiricists at the University of Chicago, where he was teaching.⁴

*Time* was going ahead with the piece, and there was little Riesman could do to stop them, although he did eventually grant a photo op. Fuerbringer told Riesman not to worry; cover-stories had not ruined the careers of either Arthur Toynbee, a British historian, or the playwright and novelist Thornton Wilder. All the same, Riesman was still nervous. Seeking advice from another rising intellectual star, John Kenneth Galbraith, he was told there was essentially nothing he could do. What was done was

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³ David Riesman, “Innocence of *The Lonely Crowd*,” *Society* 35 (1990; Jan–Feb 1998): 341. Although Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney are listed as co-authors on *The Lonely Crowd*, following Glazer’s (perhaps overly modest) clarification that the book was “properly and truthfully” David Riesman’s, I will refer to it as such (Nathan Glazer, “Tocqueville and Riesman,” *Society* 37 [May-June 2000]: 26).

done. He wrote to his collaborator and tennis partner, Reuel Denney, “While the

substance of the story is for me less important, whether good or bad, than the fact of it, I
do fear to be used as a club to beat other intellectuals with... What I need, like a Frank
Costello [America’s most notorious crime boss at the time], is a public-relations man to
keep me out of the public eye.”⁵ He was writing to Denney not only to complain. He
wanted to know what Denney, a Lonely Crowd co-author, may have told Time in their
investigation.

Riesman worried more than he needed to. Time had written the profile as though
Henry Luce’s flagship publication was the professor’s public relations agency. The
magazine may not have discussed the conformation of Riesman’s ears, but it did veer in
the direction of favorite foods. Readers learned that Riesman lived an “active family and
social life” in a large Chicago house with two servants and summered in Brattleboro,
Vermont, on his own dairy farm. “He plays vigorous, competent, year-round tennis, is
interested in his clothes and his food, keeps a good wine cellar, drinks orange juice mixed
with soda, likes movies (but not ‘message’ movies, because the movies’ proper message
is the ‘enrichment of fantasy’).” He “has tried hard not to bore anybody—or to be
bored.”⁶ Complementing Riesman’s profile is a photograph showcasing the family as

MSS. Time had already used Riesman as a club against other intellectuals. During the nadir of
Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Communist witch-hunt, the magazine promoted an article Riesman
had written for The American Scholar, claiming the harm of McCarthy’s purge had been
exaggerated by anxious leftist intellectuals (see “The New Front,” Time, 23 Nov. 1953,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,860157,00.html; also, David Riesman, “Some

⁶ “An Autonomous Man,” Time, 27 Sept. 1954,
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,820312,00.html, paras. 4-5.
they rehearse Mozart together. Becoming a professor in the social sciences had never looked so refined.

In a tribute to his independent “wide-swinging imagination,” *Time* entitled Riesman’s sidebar profile “An Autonomous Man.” A more felicitous title might have been “The Rather Plush Life of Our Saint of the Social Sciences.” Riesman could not have asked for better coverage. Not only did it turn this bespectacled “egg-head” into a household name and help win him an endowed chair at Harvard. It also helped to recast the role of the social scientist, as a public intellectual and critic of “culture.” In the past, this social function had been fulfilled principally by philosophers, novelists, artists, ministers, an assortment of humanists, and independent intellectuals.\(^7\) Not anymore, said *Time*. So, too, did many other observers. “Since World War II, the intellectual climate has been changing. Social scientists, drawn back to the exciting and challenging present, have begun to update the future,” *Time* gleefully announced—a more affluent postwar future of second homes, wine cellars, and Mozart.\(^8\)

Eric Larrabee called his friend Riesman a “patron saint” of this new movement. “David Riesman has become, in turn, the name for a phenomenon. The appearance of *The Lonely Crowd* coincided with an onset of national self-analysis,” Larrabee observed. “Manners and morals, patterns of behavior, the clichés of speech and character—in short,


part of sociology’s subject matter—[had attracted] nonprofessional writers and readers, amateur anthropologists who looked upon their fellow Americans as though we were a newly discovered tribe of aborigines.”

For his part, Max Ways, the principle author of *Time*’s cover-story, used what might be a more apt analogy. “Riesman seems to be leading thousands of Americans on his quest,” wrote Ways. “*The Lonely Crowd* contains a typological menagerie. The occupants of the cages are not real people, who are almost always a blend of a blend of types. But real people and real politics can be understood better by walking through Riesman’s zoo, reading the signs on the cages, and looking at the occupants.”

When in a lecture at Harvard the artist Ben Shahn referred to the other-directed American by the patron saint’s name—the “Ries-man”—everyone in the audience knew the reference as well as the pejorative connotations.

This assertion that Riesman was leading thousands of Americans on his own “quest” warrants further consideration. Typically, historians portray Riesman & Co. as “observers” of American culture, as though he and his colleagues are all standing above the culture atop Olympus looking down below. They probe, observe, detect, note, consider, identify, and then report their findings, interpretations, and recommendations.

This chapter in contrast seeks to challenge this image of the social scientist. “Riesman’s

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11 See Larrabee, “Riesman and His Readers,” 60.
prominence as a spokesman of the era is a sign that the social sciences have come of age in our culture,” argued Dennis Wrong, a Canadian sociologist and contemporary of Riesman, essaying his colleague’s influence. “Riesman’s role is that of a broker of ideas, a synthesizer of intellectual trends, and a demonstrator of the relevance of what others have said and thought to the lives we live ‘pressed against the knife-edge of the future.’”

Clyde Kluckhohn, another mid-century social scientist, agreed with Wrong. Riesman, he wrote, merely “brought together and dramatized much that many others had already said.” Max Ways, Otto Fuerbringer, and the other editors at Time certainly agreed, which is why they slapped Riesman on the cover.

“Idea broker” is an appropriate way of describing Riesman’s role in the intellectual history of the United States. So, too, his likeminded colleagues. What he had most effectively brokered were the ideas of neo-Freudianism, a movement that started in the small, cliquish world of European psychoanalysis but achieved its greatest success after emigrating to the United States, turning its back on orthodox European psychoanalysis, and adopting American idioms and habits of thought. Through that transatlantic transformation and its incorporation into the other social sciences, neo-Freudianism became one of the most influential intellectual movements of the twentieth century, attested to by the reach and impact of Riesman’s book, as well as America’s “obsessive”-ness with “mental health,” especially in its mass dimensions, Kluckhohn noted. Only when we understand what he referred to as the “domestication” of Freud can

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we understand the reach and import of this revolution in the social sciences and the role of social scientists as public intellectuals.\(^\text{15}\)

The backstory behind *The Lonely Crowd’s* success leads to Europe in the 1930s. The sudden eruption of European fascism had American intellectuals scrambling for explanations. How could entire populations have abandoned their individual rights and civil liberties so easily? The question became more insistent as European refugees started flooding into the country. Among the tens of thousands were Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Walter Gropius, Henri Matisse, and Jacques Maritain. Neo-Freudian psychoanalysts, such as Erich Fromm, amounted to a drop in the stream. Yet given the political crisis, this particular drop would have a far-reaching ripple effect in a remarkably short time. Fromm, in his *Escape from Freedom* (1941), offered one of the most compelling explanations for the rise of German fascism. He looked not at individual motivations and behavior for answers but rather at the country’s social psychology, what he called its “character structure.” Coupling Karl Marx’s social analysis with Freud’s psychoanalysis (and with a little Max Weber thrown in), Fromm’s book did more than provide readers with a compelling answer. It also gave social scientists who worked on adjustment something they lacked: a consistent and theoretically compelling psychological “dynamic,” a theory to explain what motivated people to adjust or maladjust.

Published in 1950, *The Lonely Crowd* marks a pivotal moment in the history of twentieth-century social thought. The book capitalized on the decade-and-a-half integration of neo-Freudianism into American social thought as well as the decades-old

\(^{15}\) Clyde Kluckhohn, “The Evolution of Contemporary Values,” *Daedalus* 87 (Spring 1958): 98
social scientific language of adjustment. At the same time it adapted these streams to fit an emergent culture, a culture that would become known for abundance. To Riesman’s credit, *The Lonely Crowd* had all the right ingredients and asked the right kinds of questions. Yet, it and its author did more than just observe these cultural and social changes from afar, from atop Olympus. “Has a society ever been so often taken apart and put together again by the writing breed as the American? Probably not. This is because it is a new type of society, and recently social criticism has become a profession in and of itself,” observed Robert Brunn in 1961. That “profession” was bound to and produced by this “new type of society”—and vice versa.16

Never before had so much national self-reflective social criticism appeared in such a brief period of time. “Americans have been turning the searchlight on themselves for a hundred and fifty years, more intensely than any people have ever done, and never with such concentrated and indeed narcissistic attention as in the last twenty years,” Richard Chase in 1958 complained.17 *The Lonely Crowd* and William H. Whyte Jr.’s *The Organization Man* (1956), were followed by a “flood” of other similar books, noted Brunn.18 C. Wright Mills’s *White Collar* (1951), as well as Fromm’s *The Sane Society* (1955) and *The Art of Loving* (1956) were three of the more notable.19 A. C. Spectorsky’s *The Exurbanites* (1955), Peter Viereck’s *The Unadjusted Man* (1956), Richard LaPiere’s *The Freudian Ethic* (1958), Erving Goffman’s *Asylums* (1959), Paul Goodman’s

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19 Not only was *White Collar* read in conjunction with *The Lonely Crowd* but shared some of the very same data. Nathan Glazer, a contributor to the latter, was one of Mills’s assistants at Columbia University.
Growing Up Absurd (1960), Daniel Boorstin’s The Image (1961), Robert Lindner’s Rebel without a Cause (1955) and Must You Conform? (1956), and Vance Packard’s paperback best-sellers were all of a piece. Not only were these critics in conversation with each other, but they all benefited from the often overlooked “paperback revolution,” the mass distribution of affordable, “quality” paperbacks for the general reading public. The 1953 abridged paperback edition of The Lonely Crowd, which sold for 95¢, retail, was, for instance, the star performer for the industry pacesetter, Doubleday. By 1961 The Lonely Crowd and The Organization Man (also published by Doubleday) had sold 500,000 copies.\textsuperscript{20} By 1970, the former had passed the million copies sold mark; by 1997 it was over 1.4 million.\textsuperscript{21}

No one knows how many lectures were delivered, how many newspaper and magazine articles were written, or radio programs broadcasted on the subject of the “lonely crowd.” Nor do we know the extent to which cultural producers who were influenced by this genre of literature and translated what they read into fictional characters, short stories, works of art, plays, and other media. “An extraordinary new mirror for Americans to see themselves in, warts and all, but with fresh insights, has been devised by sociologist David Riesman . . .,” effused one reviewer. “Few books, if any, of such serious content and purpose have made such an impact on the public mind in recent years, so penetrated public awareness far outside the academic confines.”\textsuperscript{22} While the book came in for some harsh criticism from fellow social scientists—a distinguished

anonymous Yale University Press reviewer, a Yale professor, called it “pure
gobbledygook”—the public ate it up. So, as well, did a lot of intellectuals and academics
outside the empirically driven social sciences.\textsuperscript{23} By the mid-fifties it was already being
hailed a “modern classic” for having “thrown brilliant flashes of light upon contemporary
culture.”\textsuperscript{24} It was read by high school students, undergraduates, book clubs, and church
groups; it was essayed in newspapers and magazines, on the lecture circuit and radio, all
in a national conversation about the “American character.” “One of the most important
books written in our generation. . . now cited in almost every serious book on present-day
social conditions” is how another reviewer described its impact.\textsuperscript{25} Alongside Whyte’s
book it was “accepted as gospel,” observed another.\textsuperscript{26}

Not only within the U.S. but far beyond, \textit{The Lonely Crowd} would shape how
people around the world would imagine what it was like to be an American, to shop on
Main Streets, and work on Madison Avenue. “Even more important, however, you have
given me a better picture of the United States than I had ever hoped to gain from the
caricature I have been subjected to of it since I was a boy,” wrote one Canadian in a fan
letter to Riesman. “You have taught me something of the vast problem which such a rich
and pluralistic society presents for those who live in it and think about it.”\textsuperscript{27} Two decades
after publication the book was available in a host of other languages, not only in German

Crowd,” box 39, HUG (fp) 99.16, Riesman MSS.
\textsuperscript{24} Jacques Barzun, “In the Struggle to Be One’s Self,” \textit{New York Times} 13 June 1954, BR6;
\textsuperscript{25} Gerald Ashford, “‘Lonely Crowd’ Probes Deeply Today’s Life,” \textit{San Antonio Express and
\textsuperscript{27} H. G. D. Richey to DR, 27 Sept. 1960, fol. “The Lonely Crowd Correspondence, 2 of 2,”
box 41, HUG (fp) 99.16, Riesman MSS.
and French but Serbo-Croatian, Japanese, and Czech. It proved great fodder, especially for critics of America and Western culture. In *La Société du spectacle* (1967), France’s Guy Debord cited Riesman in his pungent critique of capitalist reification. “The reigning economic system is founded on isolation: at the same time it is a circular process designed to produce isolation,” he wrote “Isolation underpins technology, and technology isolates in its turn; all goods proposed by the spectacular system, from cars to televisions, also serve as the weapons for that system as it strives to reinforce the isolation of ‘the lonely crowd.”

*La Société du spectacle* was something of a Bible for 1960s students.

Despite his initial misgivings, Riesman loved *Time*’s cover-story. “I want to say what an extraordinary job you and your colleagues have done: very few—and none so succinctly—have had such a sense for what was salient in the work or elucidated it so ably and discerningly,” he wrote Max Ways. “If there had to be a story, this one went as far as any possibly could do to convey the ideas while moderating harm to one of their ‘producers.’ . . . My coworkers and I are greatly in your debt.”

Riesman’s success, and that of his colleagues and coworkers, is intertwined with forces within and without their control. The receptivity of *Time* magazine’s editorial staff, and their decision to publicize Riesman’s work whether he liked it or not, was one example of that. The following pages seek to outline what appear as the most germane forces bearing on the production and reception of this book as well as, in general, the neo-Freudian movement.

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28 Chester Kerr to DR, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, 10 Dec. 1970, Riesman MSS.
This chapter will argue that the reception, integration, and influence of neo-Freudianism into and upon American social thought cannot be understood apart from the emergence of European fascism, the waging of the World War II, and the postwar transition to “peace and prosperity.” Likewise, the role and influence of social scientists in American society cannot be understood apart from the applicability of their ideas to the emergence of fascism, the waging of the war, and the transition to peace. All are bound together. Charting the ways in which their ideas, methods, research, and interpretations were produced and circulated through these channels, channels, which were intellectual, institutional, cultural, ideological, personal, as well as geographic, will be the goal of this chapter.

The history of mid-century maladjustment was enmeshed in the experiences of World War II soldiers, psychoneurosis, and the postwar reintegration of veterans. Remember Dixon Wecter’s belief that the returning soldier was a “kind of proving ground for post-war life.” In that chapter I focused on the soldier as an individual and upon the adjustment or maladjustment of these individuals. There was a complementary conversation about social adjustment as social, as applying to entire populations, societies, and culture. In order to tell the history of twentieth-century adjustment we must balance these interlocking conversations, not only because each informed the other, but because they are a reflection of, as well as reflect upon, yet another bubbling debate that World War II had also precipitated.

Some called it the “crisis of the individual.” This chapter begins by immersing us in that “crisis” by way of a minor scandal in the ranks of New York Marxists, the defection of Dwight Macdonald. That particular event captures the salient features of the
crisis. So, as well, does it highlight how Americans tried to come to grips with the war. Having laid out these issues, the chapter will then go on to take the longer view on the problem of adjustment, neo-Freudianism’s relationship to it as well as the social sciences in general, and how the circulation of these ideas altered how Americans thought about themselves as “Americans.”

“The Root is Man”

“Did you hear the terrible news?” David Bazelon blurted out as he busted through the door. It was the Christmas holiday, 1945, and a few friends were gathering at Daniel Bell’s place for a Christmas party. Bell was then just starting his academic career at the University of Chicago, with a three-year stint teaching in the same social science program that Riesman would soon join. David Bazelon was himself a sociology neophyte. Paolo Milano, the European intellectual refuge and novelist, was also there and would add to the gossip. All three were very much connected to the celebrity cabal of (mainly Marxist) New York intellectuals, within which there were signs of a troubling development—a defection. Bell smiled inscrutably. “Do you mean Dwight has got religion?” “How did you know?” asked Bazelon, bemused.31

Everyone knew. Dwight Macdonald, the defector, was the editor of the “little magazine” Politics, which during its short-lived heyday in the mid1940s had a remarkable following. The Marxist Trotskyites read it “with a nervous fascination,”

31 Daniel Bell to Dwight Macdonald, 28 Jan. 1946, fol. 138, box 7, series I, group 730, Dwight Macdonald Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT (hereinafter Macdonald MSS).
admitted a truer convert than Macdonald, Irving Howe. “Sharp and amusing, feckless and irritating,” it was “the liveliest magazine the American Left had seen for decades,” he acknowledged. Norman Mailer in a letter written to Macdonald late in the sixties said of the latter’s influence over him and his generation, “Those pieces you used to do on politics taught a whole gang of us how to write, whether we give you credit for it or not. And I thought directly of you when I started making the analyses of language, and even said to myself, ‘It’s a pity Dwight isn’t doing this now.’” Whether readers agreed or not, the magazine made them think.

An ambivalent admirer as well as one of Macdonald’s sharpest critics, Howe mocked Macdonald after the defection, calling him the “thirteenth disciple.” Still, he said, “During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Macdonald wrestled with almost all the political issues that absorbed other American writers. If anything, he took politics too seriously in the sense that he cared what effect governments actually had on their citizens.” Because Macdonald was one of the central figures in New York City’s famous intellectual coterie as an editor of Politics, and before that Partisan Review, his defection affords us the opportunity to see some of the fault lines of American intellectual history at the war’s end.

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33 Norman Mailer to Dwight Macdonald, 24 Nov. 1964, fol. 804, box 32, series I, group 730, Macdonald MSS.
35 Howe, Margin of Hope, 175.
At the crux of Macdonald’s defection from socialist politics in New York was the belief that the autonomous “I” was facing grave perils and none of the current political options, on either the left or right, seemed capable of preserving what was so dear to Macdonald: the independent thinking, feeling, creative individual, the human being. Though the war had precipitated Macdonald’s disaffection, the war was but the occasion; beneath the surface other undercurrents had already been pulling him away. U.S. intellectuals had moved inexorably lockstep with the dominant political powers waging the war, and this he simply would not tolerate.

Macdonald, like Mailer, possessed that rare, cultivated gift of inspiring an equal measure of attraction and repulsion yet hardly any indifference. He was incapable of walking a straight party line (“sober or drunk,” joked Irving Howe) with the exception of one—pacificism. And that was precisely the sticking point that precipitated his disaffiliation. The U.S.’s decision to decimate Nagasaki and Hiroshima with atomic warheads had him up in arms. The lack of protest from other Marxists against the making of the bomb had irked him for some time, but he had seen not a single protest resolution from his peers and only patriotic cheering from the local unions who had helped build it after it was dropped, and that was simply too much for Macdonald. “THE CONCEPTS, ‘WAR’ AND ‘PROGRESS,’ ARE NOW OBSOLETE,” Macdonald erupted in an editorial, having learned of the attack. “ATOMIC BOMBS ARE THE NATURAL PRODUCT OF THE KIND OF SOCIETY WE HAVE CREATED.”

The bomb was the “catalyst,” he called it, for what turned out to be a very public, very messy end to Macdonald’s affair with Marxism. In a Politics-sponsored meeting in

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New York City toward the end of 1945—the source of Bazelon’s gossip—Macdonald began airing his grievances and could be seen grouping toward a proportional intellectual response to the catastrophe. Then, in the April and July 1946 issues of Politics he ran a rambling two-part essay as well, entitled “The Root Is Man.” Macdonald did not merely “get religion” after Nagasaki and Hiroshima. He did not simply leave the Marxist fold. He slammed the door. Throwing down the gauntlet, not only did he believe that Marxism was “no longer a reliable guide either to political action or to an understanding of what is happening in the world”—it was, in fact, “an obstacle,” he charged. He did not merely “get religion” after Nagasaki and Hiroshima. He did not simply leave the Marxist fold. He slammed the door. Throwing down the gauntlet, not only did he believe that Marxism was “no longer a reliable guide either to political action or to an understanding of what is happening in the world”—it was, in fact, “an obstacle,” he charged.37 “What has happened is that the traditional aspirations which the dominant Marxian ideology has implanted in the masses of Europe have come to coincide to a dangerous degree with the interests of their rulers, so that the tribunes of people find themselves in the absurd and demoralizing position of demanding what will be granted anyway,” he wrote.38 Marxists wanted for the proletariat worker “Full Production, Nationalization, Planning, and above all Security,” and the ruling elites gave it to them—on their own terms (with no proletariat revolution). The bargain demanded the perpetuity of war, adjustment, social regimentation, and the loss of autonomy.

The loser in all of this was the individual: the millions of Holocaust victims, the thousands of Japanese who had been obliterated, the individual soldier who gave up his life in executing the war. And the individual would keep losing, even in peace, he prophesied. In an earlier editorial Macdonald painted a bleak, unforgiving picture of modern-day life in and out of war. “Modern society has become so tightly organized, so rationalized and routinized that it has the character of a mechanism which grinds on

38 Macdonald, “Root is Man,” 102.
without human consciousness or control. The individual, be he ‘leader’ or mass-man, is reduced to powerlessness, vis-à-vis the mechanism. More and more, things happen TO people.”

Thus the only reasonable response, in his mind, was to buttress the individual. “Why not begin with what we living human beings want, what we think and feel is good? And then see how we can come closest to it—instead of looking to historical process for a justification of our socialism?” Start off, he said, “from one’s own personal interests and feelings, working from the individual to society rather than the other way around.”

Be a “partisan” for “those on the bottom of present-day society—the Negroes, the colonial peoples, and the vast majority of common people everywhere, including the Soviet Union.” This, he declared, would be the new orientation of Politics. Its new motto came from Marx’s own words: “To be radical is to grasp the matter by the root. Now the root for mankind is man himself.”

What had served as a catalyst for Macdonald’s defection had also prompted serious soul searching in others, too. The U.S.’s use of atomic warheads against the Japanese as well as Hitler’s genocide of the Jews and killing of other undesirables were hard to reconcile with anything other than sheer pragmatic expediency and a bald will to power. When Commentary, then a left-leaning Jewish little magazine, was (re)launched in the winter of 1945 it positioned the war’s moral debate regarding the fate of the individual front and center.

Page one of the second issue led off with an announcement that the magazine would start a series entitled “The Crisis of the Individual,” which

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would include essays from prominent intellectuals such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt, Martin Buber, John Dewey, and Sidney Hook.

The vision of the series and terms of the debate were clear: “In our time, the individual human being has been more violently debated than in many centuries. Every aspect of the human personality—his civil rights, his individuality, his status, the regard in which he is held, the dignity accorded him—all have been violated,” stated the series introduction. Not only were millions of literal bodies disappearing from the face of the planet—used as “beasts of burden,” “guinea pigs,” and treated as “natural resources”—in the hearts and minds of people everywhere the very idea of the “inviolability of the human being” was “dying,” they warned. Could “Western civilization” survive?43

To be sure, the vast majority of Americans were de facto realists. They thought about the conflict in terms that were personal and immediate, yet framed it within an overriding perception of necessity. Americans had to protect democracy. Otherwise, who else would, or could? Duty called. Yet this justification often failed to assuage the guilt, anger, outrage, and despair of war. The moral implications, to say nothing of the personal toll, were impossible for some to ignore. The conflict did not end with V-J day but continued to press the consciences of many. “The overwhelming scale of power, size, destruction, extermination in the modern world make individual moral scruples, problems and conflict seem puny and irrelevant,” wrote the Marxist Jewish-German émigré Leo Lowenthal, who also contributed to Commentary’s series. “The individual today realizes, more or less consciously, that his moral values do not greatly matter, because not much depends any more, either materially or spiritually, upon his decisions. He feels alone,

deprived of the material and moral heritage which was the basis of his existence in liberal society.”

Lowenthal’s nightmare of total adjustment was ineluctable. “Paradoxically,” he wrote (echoing Macdonald’s sentiments), “in a terrorist society [fascist or totalitarian], in which everything is most carefully planned, the plan for the individual is—to have none; to become and to remain a mere object, a bundle of conditioned reflexes which amply respond to a series of manipulated and calculated shocks.” For Lowenthal, as for Macdonald, Nazi concentration camps were not an historical aberration but a potent sign of all humanity’s eventual “atomization,” for the difference between concentration camp victims and the general population was “only in degree,” Lowenthal argued, not kind.

“The individual under terrorist conditions is never alone and always alone. He becomes numb and rigid not only in relation to his neighbor but also in relation to himself; fear robs him of the power of spontaneous emotional or mental reactions,” he explained. The inexorable psychological outcome of atomization was apathy, indifference, despair. It was a kind of “moral coma,” “the complete breakdown of the personality”—the “final stage of adjustment.” Here, adjustment ended not in perfect, happy-and-healthy integration into the social body but into total disintegration.

The novelist and Nobel laureate Pearl Buck did not need her Das Kapital to tell her what was wrong. Marxists were not the only people troubled by the “atomization” of individuals—so too were other thinking Americans. The bomb had cut short the possibility of natural death, that “remote cessation of life,” she wrote, and now it was “complete arbitrary”: “It can come at any moment, from any side. An enraged neighbor

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45 Lowenthal, “Terror’s Atomization of Man,” 3, 2, 5.
in another nation can drop a bomb which will put an end to thousands of us in a second. .
. . The human being is at the mercy of the very forces which he created for his own
protection and comfort.” Though fearful of “movements” and “causes” and “policies,”
the individual searches for some modicum of security—somewhere, anywhere. Some
throw themselves into the “warm and comforting” arms of the Catholic church, others
into labor unions, Communism, and other enclaves of “minority” living. But belonging to
a group only provided members an “illusion of shelter and safety,” for the truth, Buck
rued, was more tragic. “[N]o group today is more safe than the single individuals it
contains. There is no possible safety for any group, whether racial, national or political,
so long as there is no safety in the world, because the individual group is only the
enlargement of the individual being, and it is individuality itself which is in danger,” she
warned.46

Buck’s essay, which was entitled “The Solitary,” anticipated The Lonely Crowd.
Despite all the promises to the contrary, the “little cluster of lonely individuals” was still,
and would remain, powerless, she thought: “Whether they number a dozen or a million or
ten million they are still lost. They are only an enlargement of the lonely individual. The
lonely individual today may be one veteran in his home town, or the remnant of the Jews,
desperately trying to salvage themselves.” Everywhere, whether as “one solitary” or as a
“group solitary,” human beings were “frantically trying to discover where [they could]
belong,” she wrote.47 Unlike Lowenthal, who had little succor for the afflicted, Buck did
nevertheless offer a modicum of hope. “The individual must think of all other individuals
as equally deserving with him of life, and then he must move to make life possible for all.

When life is possible for all then it is also possible for him,” she wrote.\textsuperscript{48} For Buck, the most important thing was the “human life”; that, she argued, as Macdonald did, was where all hope must begin. “Until I know there is something better and higher in development and potentiality, for me the human being is the highest in creation.”\textsuperscript{49}

Neither Buck’s nor Lowenthal’s response to the crisis of the individual appealed to Macdonald, for both required a faith in as well as allegiance to group solidarity (Leo Lowenthal was Marxist, and Pearl Buck—whose essay was subtitled “We Must Be One Family”—a communitarian). In the “Root Is Man,” it was clear that Macdonald was groping for a new “political vocabulary,” as he called it, a new political alignment that might move politics beyond the two-party, Marxist-Left and “organic”/communitarian-Right paradigm, for both had failed the individual. What was his proposal? Redefine the term “radical”:

“Radical” would apply to the as yet few individuals—mostly anarchists, conscientious objectors, and renegade Marxists like myself—who reject the concept of Progress, who judge things by their present meaning and effect, who think the ability of science to guide us in human affairs has been overrated and who therefore redress the balance by emphasizing the ethical aspect of politics. They, or rather we, think it is an open question whether the increase of man’s mastery over nature is good or bad in its actual affects on human life to date, and favor adjusting technology to man, even if it means—as may be the case—a technological regression, rather than adjusting man to technology. . . . [T]he firmest ground from which to struggle for that human liberation which was the goal of the old Left is the ground not of History but of those non-historical Absolute Values (truth, justice, love, etc.) which Marx has made unfashionable among socialists.\textsuperscript{50}

As audacious was his claim of a uniquely radical position, it was in fact radical. Consider his program: if you want morals in politics, disavow history, science (more or less), and

\textsuperscript{48} Buck, “Solitary,” 11.  
\textsuperscript{49} Buck, “Solitary,” 7.  
\textsuperscript{50} Macdonald, “Root Is Man,” 100.
progress, and while at it use an intellectual “Absolute Values” framework that had been jettisoned half a century earlier. Daniel Bell’s 1945 Christmas holiday party was abuzz for good reason. What was Macdonald thinking?

The reaction to Macdonald’s piece was immediate, fierce, often personal, and unforgiving. Subscriptions were returned, letters were written. Wrote Milton Subotsky, an adversary who thought the essay an “unadulterated piece of nonsense”: “Hey, Prof. Hutchins!—another Neo-Thomist—grab him! Why don’t you get out of your ivory and pink tower and look at the world about you?” George Elliot, who cancelled his subscription out of disgust, berated Macdonald as well. “From a speculative, far-roving, hyper-critical (and destructive purely) analytic journal, [Politics] has become quasi-religious, obsessed with private political morality, and anarchistic in the extreme.”

Whereas the magazine “used to be destructive” and had served a valuable function and met a “real need,” it was becoming too “constructive,” he condemned. In a time when there was no possible “‘good’ course of action politically,” it was, Elliot balked, trying to turn back to “man’s more decent traits for a basis for action,” and thereby “omitting a just accounting for his instincts—and becoming in the process mystical.”

As comfortable in the ring as out, Macdonald admitted to being taken aback and unprepared for the “volume and violence of this hostile reaction.”

The response to Macdonald’s renegade manifesto effectively captures the state of social theory as well as cultural and social criticism at the end of the war. What particularly set off people like Elliot, who berated Macdonald’s mysticism, was that in

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52 George P. Elliot, letter to the editor, Politics (May 1946): 138.
his “radical” alternative he had declared that non-historical “Absolute Values” had to supplant the scientific method. The latter was incapable, he thought, of establishing worthwhile—i.e., humane—“values” in politics. “In a word,” Macdonald suggested, “there seems to be something intrinsically unknowable about values, in a scientific sense, although artists and moral teachers have shown us for several thousand years that knowledge is attainable by other methods.” Values, he wrote, “belong to an order of reality outside the reach of scientific method. There are two worlds, not one.”

Macdonald readily acknowledged that this made him a dualist, yet in a world where “Evil is so patent,” the scientific method proved itself unable to provide politics with a sense of ought-ness, a way toward “the good,” he argued. His alternative solution of returning to “the root” was to advocate a “selfish,” intuitionist ethic/politic: that is, each person needed to “decide what he thinks is right, what satisfies him, what he wants.” This paradoxical intuitionist “moral relativity” and appeal to absolute values that somehow existed outside time and space did not set well with his readers.

What is especially revealing about the affair were the efforts made to cajole Macdonald back into the fold. Even among those friends who agreed with him that the root of social thought was the individual human, there remained an unwavering conviction that the social scientific method could and must protect humanity’s future, that it alone must solve the ethical and moral dilemmas of total war and totalitarian regimes. Granted, some were less subtle, and certainly less persuasive, than others. “No retreat,” demanded Subotsky, who had written Macdonald in protest. “Technology can not be adjusted to man: man must adjust himself to technology. And there you have the crux of

the problem. Can man adjust himself and his society to the Power Age?” For Subotsky
the way forward was clear indeed, for the mere suggestion of returning to some pre-
technological past was absurdly impossible: “The answer to our problem is not in truth,
justice, love—the abstract eternals. . . . The answer is total science—the scientific method
applied to everything in the universe—including social organization.”

This kind of attitude was precisely what troubled Macdonald. Subotsky viewpoint represented “a
social philosophy with every tenet of which I passionately disagree,” Macdonald wrote in
a terse rebuttal.

Others tried more persuasive tactics. For instance, in a long rebuttal to
Macdonald, Don Calhoun, a contributor to Politics, was quite happy to concede that the
greatest “value” was to “preserve human life and free human beings from external and
internal coercion,” and he believed that absolute values were not incompatible with the
scientific method—in fact, science could help determine the definite “objective” of those
values—however, argued Calhoun, “people can’t just go around intuiting” these values;
otherwise, there would be “no alternative save ethical anarchy.” Holding no particular
interest in the “cult of science,” Calhoun nonetheless insisted, “good action will be better
action insofar as it rests in the broad sense on the scientific method.”

The sociologist Rose Coser, who wrote Macdonald a long, personal letter in
response to his article, was agreement with Calhoun. The conciliation between values,
ethics, politics, and science was best achieved not by giving up on reconciliation, she
thought, but by reforming science:

56 Subotsky, letter to the editor, 249-50.
original).
If we have to fight a certain kind of scientific approach, most prevalent today, we should do so from the ‘inside’, i.e. by stressing another scientific approach but not by throwing science overboard. If science is a means to solve problems, then obviously these problems must have their origin in some kind of values: if we find that poverty is a problem which should be solved it is because we have a certain value judgment. But if we want to do more than give money to the poor or do social work we have to study the relationships in society which make for poverty. . . . And the solution can be provided only by a scientific approach.

Coser would let it be known that she, too, held no stock in the cult of science either; in her thinking science meant simply “analysis,” not statistics, curves, and percentages. And like Calhoun, she, too, thought that only through knowledge could the “powerless” become masters of their own destiny and transform “impotence into active participation.”

Conforming to his growing reputation, C. Wright Mills was far more assertive, combative, and a bit cocky. He told Macdonald, a good friend at the time, “It is a damn good thing you wrote it. I admire greatly the bravado of attempting to assert such an ambitious round of topics. I mean, let’s forget differences: who the hell tries to state what is happening in the world and its relevance to where ‘we’ stand? So, for that I’m for it 100%.” To be sure, Mills had a few bones to pick. He dismissed entirely the second half of the article on political action, as well as the “little metaphysical notes.” (“Let Dwight have his sallies into the unknown mysteries, I say: of course they are shit.”) What was at issue in the debate were not these “little” things but rather the bigger picture of what the social sciences required of the social critic.

A young and ambitious sociologist, Mills reflected the prevailing intellectual winds at Columbia University and in general in the profession. While admitting that a lot

59 Rose Coser to Dwight Macdonald, 3 Dec. 1945, fol. 258, box 12, series I, group 730, Macdonald MSS.
of “naïve” technicians and empirical researchers had handled philosophical matters poorly, and likewise that “Tolstoyan ethics” were of vital importance, Mills reminded Macdonald that social philosophy had “come a long way from 19th-century thinking.” Now, said Mills, whoever wants to engage in social and cultural criticism has to “face up” to the social sciences and “earn the right” to do it, and that meant “going thru the social science disciplines.” The social philosopher had “no right, e.g., to a view on mass culture, without having at least walked thru a public opinion survey shop.” That is, one could not simply read widely in the social sciences. The critic had to roll up his sleeves and do the empirical work, for “the kind of moral grounding that will stand up among intelligent and politically sensitive people 10 years from now will be created by people who have gone thru and thus beyond the social sciences,” Mills maintained. One could not start elsewhere.60

Even in those intellectual circles where the “crisis of the individual” was undergoing the closest of scrutiny, one can see the ineluctability of the social. A month before Commentary launched its series “The Crisis of the Individual,” it announced an editorial department called “The Study of Man,” headed by Nathan Glazer, Sidney Hook, and Ben Seligman. Its purpose was to “rove” the social sciences in search of the kind of “research, discussion, thought and speculation” that would provide solutions to present-day problems and might be of interest to Commentary’s readers. A former Trotskyite and Mills research assistant, Glazer would cover anthropology, sociology, and social psychology, and wrote the first essay to the series. “The ivory towers now stand

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60 C. Wright Mills to Dwight Macdonald, 22 July 1946, fol. 855, box 34, series I, group 730, Macdonald MSS (for ease of reading, numerous grammatical errors and errors of punctuation in this letter have been corrected).
abandoned,” he declared; “almost every scholar of note in the field of sociology, psychology and anthropology concerns himself with how the studies devoted to the extension of man’s knowledge of man may advance solutions to the problems of a free society.” No longer could the social scientist ignore the problems facing the world; thus, “[t]he theoretical equipment developed in the study of the social life of Melanesians or the learning habits of rats is now turned on Western Man.”

Starting with the Germans. In this leadoff article by Glazer, *Commentary* would contribute—ironically, if understandably—to the very process that they would also bemoan. On the one hand, the magazine’s raison d’être, as a Jewish periodical, was tied to the Holocaust and the atomization of the individual. With the “fearsome knowledge” that through “our inventiveness we have unleashed a power that has proved it can end a world war by a single blow” and with the knowledge that “4,750,000 of 6,000,000 Jews of Europe [had] been slaughtered like cattle, subjected to every physical indignity—processed,” *Commentary* felt a “sense of human destiny” to light its own “candle” in the face of such darkness as an “act of faith.” “It is an act of faith of a kind of which we seem peculiarly capable, we who, after all these centuries, remain, in spite of all temptation, the people of the Book,” read *Commentary*’s inaugural editorial statement. The magazine’s “The Crisis of the Individual,” focusing on the atomization and depersonalization of the individual, was entirely in keeping with this. Recall Lowenthal’s article on the atomization of Jewish concentration camps victims.

On the other hand, Glazer’s first article favorably covers discussions of how to depersonalize the Jews’ enemy: the German. In the summer of 1944, a number of

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distinguished psychiatrists, psychologists, and social scientists, including Talcott Parsons, Erich Fromm, Abram Kardiner, and Hilda Taba, had been assembled to consider what to do with Germany after the war. The consensus was that there was a “distinctive” German “character-structure” that had precipitated the war and Holocaust and that that “character-structure” had to be altered through what was popularly known as “social engineering” or “planning.” The technical term, following Parson’s functional analysis, was “controlled institutional change,” though in another discussion it was called more diplomatically “intercultural education.” Regardless, the aim was the same. Wrote Glazer in summation, “The conclusion of this group of scientists is that ‘many individuals must go through what amounts to a therapeutic experience rather than the more typical conception of an educational procedure before . . . prejudices can be yielded up for new constructive sources of satisfaction.”

Glazer never specifically addressed German depersonalization; however, the process is certainly implied.

The coexistence of social engineering and individualism was not uncommon. Other intellectuals condemned depersonalization and atomization on the one hand, while defending various kinds of “group think” on the other. The philosopher John Dewey contributed essays to both Commentary series. In the first essay he argued that it was actually a mistake—indeed an “absurdity”—to speak of an “individual,” for “individual and social stand for traits of unitary human beings” and the former could not be known separate from the latter.

If there was a “crisis,” it was the fault of individualism, not totalitarianism, he suggested.

The latter was merely a reaction against the excesses of the former, Dewey thought, and therefore any attempt to retreat into the kind of ego-centric, spiritual “personalism” being advocated by “frustrated former devotees of a one-sided socialistic creed” was simply wrong-headed.65 Instead, Dewey argued, a more scientific social-scientific approach to present-day problems was needed. Then, he prophesied, “The dream of a well-ordered transformation of human affairs as extensive as that which followed change in physical inquiry . . . will cease to be a dream.”66 One can hear Mills shouting “Amen!”

Yet Macdonald did have his supporters. After Bell had heard that “all hell [was] breaking loose around Politics in New York,” he wrote Macdonald a long letter of support. In it he confessed that he was probably closer to Macdonald’s new radical position than to those of Macdonald’s critics. Bell told Macdonald that he was writing an article on industrial relations research with a similar sense of the present crisis, and that he also felt far too much emphasis in social research was being placed on adjusting people to machines; that America was quickly becoming (or perhaps already had become) a bureaucratized society; and, moreover, that “rationalization” of society had extended into all areas of life, including personal relations. Individuals were being conceived, he wrote in frustration to Macdonald, as “parts designed to serve the organizational and institutional structures of which the individual is a part, not as individuals in themselves.” What was worst, Bell complained, the people who were

helping to create this “perfect picture of the benevolent bureaucratic state” were social scientists.\(^67\)

Some of Bell’s criticism would come out in a 1947 survey article of industrial relations in *Commentary*’s “The Study of Man” series, entitled “Adjusting Men to Machines,” and focused on the research being conducted at four major universities in the field, the largest and oldest being a group at Harvard Business School, directed by Elton Mayo; another at the University of Chicago, under the direction of W. Lloyd Warner; a labor-management center at Yale, and a fourth at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All of them well illustrated the extensive cooperation between the two, corporations and research universities. No long was industrial relations focused solely on number-crunching efficiency. As Bell outlined, increasingly it had shifted its focus onto the actual “behavior” and “social relations” of the worker—how they “felt” and how they could feel even better about their work.

In the article, Bell’s criticism of adjustment is less forceful than in his confession to Macdonald, yet one senses the condescension in his treatment of “human engineers” and “efficiency engineers” and he does go in for a jab or two: “[A]lmost none among [these professors] seem to be interested in the possibility that one of the functions of social science may be to explore alternative (and better, i.e., more human) modes of human combinations, not merely to make more effective those that already exist,” Bell inserted.\(^68\) The increased “rationalization” of living for the benefit of greater efficiency

\(^67\) Daniel Bell to Dwight Macdonald, June 1946, fol. 138, box 7, series I, group 730, Macdonald MSS.

\(^68\) Daniel Bell, “Adjusting Men to Machines: Social Scientists Explore the World of the Factory,” *Commentary* (Jan. 1947): 87. See, also, Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the
was “pervading all areas” of life and “narrowing all choices,” and was, Bell argued, the “root cause of the stresses and breakdown in social living that everybody decries.” This “research” was not a genuine “science of man,” but was more often, he charged, mere “cow-sociology.”

Bell acknowledged to Macdonald that there was little that either of them could do to prevent total bureaucratization, as “the men of action can only choose alternative paths within the dominant framework.” Bell wanted to establish a “true distinction between society and the individual,” but admitted that most of the thinking in Marxist and Deweyan circles—i.e., the dominant framework—was “completely colored by the Hegelian conception of organic identity, a concept shared with the Catholic Church.” “To an Hegelian the proposition I am I is meaningless. There are no unique Is. I am a doctor, I am a teacher, I am a worker is meaningful in Hegelian terms because the individual is identified in terms of the social role he plays,” he wrote.

Both Bell and Macdonald longed to see human beings transcend their allotted social roles and break free of the dominant framework; they wanted, at the very least, to keep alive the possibility of spontaneity and independence—what Riesman would call “autonomy.” Perhaps “some meaningful choices [could be] possible say in fifty years,” Bell ventured a guess. But even that glimmer would fade. As ideological battle lines became iron and concrete walls, utopian possibilities would turn into near-certain improbabilities, and along with it the dominant framework would continue marching

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69 Bell, “Adjusting Men to Machines,” 88.

70 Bell to Macdonald, June 1946.

71 Bell to Macdonald, June 1946.
forward more or less in lockstep. So, too, the diminishing I. A decade later the debate would still be raging, with Erich Fromm claiming, “In the nineteenth century the problem was that God is dead; in the twentieth century the problem is that man is dead.”

The Great Escape?

Harold Clurman, the Jewish Broadway director and theatre critic, was amazed that he had not seen any publicity or reviews of Fromm’s new book, Escape from Freedom. Other than his friend Donald Ogden, the playwright, who had recommended it, he found no one who was familiar with it yet, not even the title. Had he simply missed the reviews? he wondered. In a show of support and solidarity, he wrote a short letter to Fromm to tell him how much he appreciated his book, calling it “nothing less than a masterpiece.” He effused, “You have taken a really important thesis and, with an admirable expositional skill, have given it a clarity, a force and a usefulness that are beyond anything I have seen in this field.” Clurman thought Escape from Freedom was the kind of book people needed to know and discuss. In addition to writing the note, he promised Fromm, “I shall act privately as the book’s freelance publicity agent.”

Clurman, who was then working for Columbia Pictures, admired the book in part because it confirmed some of his own thoughts and feelings. He had written a preface to Clifford Odets’s plays, which he had helped stage; and told Fromm he had written his remarks “from a point of view and with a sense of life that is akin to the one expressed in

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73 Harold Clurman to Erich Fromm, 16 March 1942, fol. 3c, box 1 [reel 1], Erich Fromm Collection, New York Public Library, New York, NY.
your book.” What in particular had piqued Clurman’s interest were the ways Fromm had helped him frame current events and explain deeper cultural forces. “In your book, what is valuable in psycho-analysis, in the methodology of Marx, and, in the truest sense, a classic philosophy of life have been integrated with a remarkably wholesome and realistic feeling for our time.”

For this Jewish Broadway director, what Fromm had helped to explain in *Escape from Freedom* was seemed inexplicable: why the Germans did what they did to the Jews.

Clurman may have missed a review or two; however, he simply needed to give the book a little more time to circulate, because it was indeed a book people would talk about and long remember. Many years later Noam Chomsky, the celebrity MIT linguist, would look back and speak nostalgically of its influence in his own life. “I did not know [Fromm] well, but admire him greatly, and had virtually since childhood, when I came across *Escape from Freedom,*” he wrote to Fromm’s editor, Ruth Nanda Anshen. “He really was a great man and left an imprint that will not fade.”

While reading the book as a teenager in 1941, David Schecter, like others, was deeply impressed as well, for in it he had found what he called a deeper “orientation to Man and Life.”

In the immediate context *Escape from Freedom* had helped Americans like Schecter understand why Germans became Nazis and had allowed and perpetuated the Holocaust. It also, however, taught people like Clurman how to think about themselves and their culture, as a culture. In particular *Escape from Freedom* helped to introduce Americans to a second, perhaps more influential stream of psychoanalysis: neo-Freudianism. It was a marriage of sorts,

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74 Clurman to Fromm, 16 March 1942.
75 Noam Chomsky to Ruth Nanda Anshen, 26 March 1980, box 1, Ruth Nanda Anshen Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York, NY.
an intellectual synthesis, between European psychoanalysts, such as Fromm, and some of
the most influential voices in the social sciences in United States. Either directly or
indirectly, every major work of postwar cultural and social criticism is in some way
indebted to this synthesis of ideas, so profound was its impact.

Well before Erich Fromm’s 1934 emigration to the U.S., scholars in the social
sciences had been integrating Sigmund Freud’s ideas into their own research and had
been translating psychoanalytic jargon into American idioms. Helen Swick Perry has
suggested that in Europe “Freud remained an early and lonely pioneer in terms of social
psychological theory, trying singlehanded to synthesize European social science and
philosophy with his own clinical discoveries,” moreover, that most of his assistance came
not from collaborators in other disciplines, but from his own disciples (who were
famously known for not always being so keen on collaboration). 77 Not every social
scientist was a committed Freudian, of course. The Berkeley anthropologist A. L.
Kroeber could write as late as 1939, “I see no reason to waver over my critical analysis of
Freud’s [Totem and Taboo (1920)]. There is no indication that the consensus of
anthropologists [in the past] twenty years has moved even an inch nearer acceptance of
Freud’s central thesis.” 78 There was some truth to this. Yet Freud had made some

77 Harry Stack Sullivan, The Fusion of Psychiatry and Social Science, intro. Helen Swick
Perry (1964; New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), xxvii. Cf., for instance, Gregory Zilboorg,
“Sociology and the Psychoanalytic Method,” American Journal of Sociology 45 (Nov. 1939):
344.

1939: 446. Kroeber’s review of Totem and Taboo in 1920 was, noted Weston La Barre, a fellow
anthropologist, the first article in an American anthropological journal to discuss psychoanalysis
(“The Influence of Freud on Anthropology,” American Imago: A Psychoanalytic Journal for the
Arts and Sciences 15 [1958]: 289).
significant inroads, even in anthropology. Kroeber was himself a lay analyst in San Francisco (albeit on the sly).\textsuperscript{79}

Some of the first scholars to integrate psychoanalysis into their social research were sociologists working on the Pacific coast and in the Midwest, at places like the University of Chicago.\textsuperscript{80} Although Fay Berger Karpf, who was a graduate student at Chicago in the 1920s, well remembered “a tremendous resistance” to Freud initially, it eventually “conquered the field” and “took it over,” especially among the practitioners in social work, she recalled.\textsuperscript{81} Leonard Cottrell, who during the twenties was also a graduate student, concurred. Although he, too, acknowledged that Freud was at first the “target of antagonism and attack” in the classroom—professors like Robert Park would “rumble” about the “stupid Freudians”—he well remembered other graduate students, like himself, and faculty who were also eager to integrate Freudian concepts into sociological theory and methods. At Chicago, Freud would have significant intellectual reach.\textsuperscript{82}

When Ernest Burgess surveyed the influence of Freud upon sociology in 1939, he could include as early advocates, in addition to himself, a number of other Chicago faculty, in addition to faculty elsewhere who had picked up psychoanalysis while


\textsuperscript{80} See A. A. Brill, “The Introduction and Development of Freud’s Work in the United States,” \textit{American Journal of Sociology} 45 (Nov. 1939): 325.

\textsuperscript{81} Fay Berger Karpf, interview with James T. Carey, Berkeley, CA, 1 May 1972, fol. 11, box 1, Chicago Sociology Interviews.

\textsuperscript{82} Cf. Martin Bulmer, the go-to historian of the Chicago School of Sociology, who oddly contradicts himself in minimizing psychoanalysis’s influence in the department, referring to it as only a “minor tributary” (see, Bulmer \textit{The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research} [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984], 199-202.)
graduate students at Chicago, people like William Ogburn (who came to Chicago from Columbia), Willard Waller, Harold Lasswell, Leonard Cottrell, John Dollard, and Kimball Young.\textsuperscript{83} As early as 1912, W. I. Thomas had tried to get Park to read Freud—he had read all of Freud himself—because he thought he was good “for our business.”\textsuperscript{84} Following Thomas, Ernest Burgess would himself attended meetings of the Psychoanalytic Institute uptown after it was founded; he would assign lots of Freud to his students and incorporate psychoanalysis into his and Robert Park’s class textbook, \textit{Introduction to the Science of Sociology} (1921), the first textbook to do so.\textsuperscript{85} Burgess was simply smitten. “It remained for the genius of Professor Sigmund Freud of Vienna to breathe [sic] life into all this material [on mental deviation] and to establish a wide spread interest in the neuroses,” he lectured his Social Pathology students.\textsuperscript{86} Bolstering Freud’s presence on campus, during the 1931-32 academic year the famous Berlin psychoanalyst Franz Alexander taught his own courses in the joint sociology-anthropology department. (When Alexander established the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis in 1932, that department’s leading faculty member, William Ogburn, was a founding member.)

Psychoanalysis flowed into the pool of Chicago graduate students. An announcement for Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis’s Winter 1932-33 seminars featured several University of Chicago scholars who had come up through the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} Ernest W. Burgess, “The Influence of Sigmund Freud upon Sociology in the United States,” \textit{American Journal of Sociology} 45 (Nov. 1939): 365
\item \textsuperscript{84} William I. Thomas to Robert E. Park, 16 May 1912, fol. 6, box 18, Robert E. Park Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Leonard S. Cottrell, interview with James T. Carey, Chapel Hill, NC, 28 March 1972, fol. 6, box 1, Chicago Sociology Interviews; also, Burgess, “Influence of Sigmund Freud”: 365.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Ernest W. Burgess, Social Pathology lecture notes, II-28, n.d., fol. 4, box 29, Watson MSS. Bulmer characterized Burgess as only having “taken some interest in psychoanalyst in the late 1920 and early 1930s,” which, again, is misleading (see Bulmer, \textit{Chicago School of Sociology}, 201).
\end{itemize}
department: Robert Redfield, Harold Lasswell, and Herbert Blumer were all on the docket. In the 1920s, Lasswell as a graduate student had traveled to Europe on a Social Science Research Council (SSRC) fellowship and while there would undergo analysis in Berlin under Theodor Reik; after he returned he would train and become an analyst himself; and would use his classmate, Leonard Cottrell, as a kind of free-association guinea pig. Cottrell’s friend, John Dollard, a fellow graduate student, was brought into the fold during the twenties, too. As Dollard recalled, “analysis was up for discussion all the time” among his peers. “Power people” had also gotten Dollard an SSRC fellowship to study psychoanalysis in Germany, also. It was, he said, “an absolute dream.” He became an analyst, moved to Yale with Edward Sapir (who was also integrating psychoanalysis into his work), taught his students Freud, and jumped a number of disciplinary walls along the way. Given the trajectories of the careers of these scholars—which included presidencies in several academic societies (i.e., anthropology, sociology, and political science)—and given the marked influence of their writings, Freudian theory would have extensive reach in the social sciences in the U.S.

In the late 1920s, these influences took institutional forms and extended beyond the Midwest. The SSRC, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Foundation, and Rockefeller Foundation—all of which had strong ties to Chicago—were early and

87 Seminar announcement, n.d. [1932], fol. 7, box 29, Watson MSS.
88 Cottrell, interview. See, for instance, on the Freudian influence, Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930).
90 John Dollard, interview with James T. Carey, New Haven, CT, 14 April 1972, fol. 7, box 1, Chicago Sociology Interviews.
91 See, for instance, John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937).
generous supporters of interdisciplinary collaboration and funded projects and initiatives that brought psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, and other social scientists together. In 1929, Yale University established its interdisciplinary Institute of Human Relations to great fanfare and with a generous amount of Rockefeller money. Yale then scooped up Sapir and Dollard, which helped extend the neo-Freudian network eastward. Under the auspices of these institutional umbrellas, colloquia, conferences, committees, seminars, studies, and reports would bring some of the most influential social and behavioral scientists in the country together to discuss and work at the intersection of “culture and personality,” people like Ogburn, Park, Thomas, Burgess, Lasswell, Robert Redfield, Charles Merriam, L. L. Thurstone, William Healy (all of Chicago), as well as from elsewhere, Floyd and Gordon Allport, Elton Mayo, James Plant, Harry Stack Sullivan, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, George Kline, and William A. White.92 Not all of these people became thoroughgoing Freudians; but the influence, appeal, and incentives were certainly there.

Karen Horney’s, Erich Fromm’s, and Franz Alexander’s emigration to the U.S. in the early 1930s may very well have had as great an impact on the incorporation of Freud into the social sciences as Freud’s own highly publicized U.S. tour in 1909.93 On the one
hand, Freud intrigued many Americans because he had developed a seemingly universal, “dynamic” individual and social psychology, that is, he had devised a theoretical model to explain social behavior on a micro and macro level—the “dynamic” aspect being the how and why of people’s adjustment or maladjustment. Interwar social scientists had already constructed the intellectual structure and the grammar of social adjustment; what was needed was a theory to explain the movement within that structure, a way to explain people’s and peoples’ actions, for behavioralism, which was all the rage in physiology-based psychology, seemed a far too one-dimensional explanation.

The great obstacle to acceptance, on the other hand, was Freud’s evolutionary biologism, his reliance on “instincts” and sexual drives to explain the dynamics of human behavior. The sociologist Read Bain was especially blunt in asserting what many others believed. “The Freudians are belated individualists, rugged and atomistic, in a world that is rapidly becoming organic, relativistic, and sociocentric,” he charged. The “Hegelian conception of organic identity,” to which Bell referred in his letter to Macdonald, essentially held unopposed court in U.S. social sciences, with John Dewey its chief ambassador and defender. In other words, before advocates of Freud could plant their own stakes as reputable social theorists in America they first had to reckon with the Deweyites and other sociocentric intellectuals. There was no way to go around them.


94 Cf. Zilboorg, “Sociology and the Psychoanalytic Method”: 343-44.
95 By no means was this the only objection. See, for others, Burgess, “Influence of Sigmund Freud”: 356-74.
This was the challenge that Fromm and Horney walked into, and in important ways overcame.

In 1932, Franz Alexander, who was the first graduate of the first psychoanalytic institute (Berlin), opened on the banks of Lake Michigan what would become the second in the U.S., behind New York City, and the sixth in the world. Karen Horney had helped launch the Berlin institute in 1920 and would accompany Alexander to Chicago as the founding associate director. Although Horney’s stay in Chicago was rather short-lived—she left for New York City in 1934—she did coax Fromm to come briefly as a visiting guest lecturer. Still in his early thirties, Fromm had also shot up the small but elite ranks of psychoanalysts. He had earned a Ph.D. in sociology from Heidelberg at twenty-two; and only one year after entering didactical analysis with Hanns Sachs in 1928, and taking up psychoanalytic studies with Karl Abraham at the Berlin Institute, he, like Horney, also helped to establish a psychoanalytic institute, this one in Frankfurt, with several other analysts. In 1930, he finished his studies, started his own practice, and became the psychoanalyst for the Institut für Sozialforschung—the Frankfurt School.97

Like so many other German-Jewish refugees who emigrated after Hitler became Führer in 1934, the staff of the Institute for Social Research, including Fromm, made New York City their new home. Horney and Fromm, who were more than close friends, quickly forged productive long-lasting relationships within the city’s sprawling intellectual community, as well as beyond in the Boston-to-Washington D.C. corridor. Horney joined the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and began lecturing at the New

School. Fromm had his connections uptown at Columbia, where the Institute for Social Research had reconstituted. He also joined the Psychoanalytic Institute and the New School, then later, with Horney, the new Washington-Baltimore Psychoanalytic Institute. Neither suffered from intellectual atrophy or social isolation during their American “exile.”

These relationships functioned on more than an institutional level. Harry Stack Sullivan, an American clinical psychiatrist, had been very much influenced by the Chicago School of sociology and the neo-Freudian analysts, and was part of that SSRC network, proved to be an important liaison. Fromm and Horney were both fixtures in his intellectual salon, dubbed the Zodiac group. “Over the years we had been accustomed to translating Freud’s Viennese, period-bound statements into cross cultural terms where they had been enormously productive,” recalled Margaret Mead, speaking of these intellectual dialectics. “We tried to get the analysts to match individual case histories with whole cultures; Ruth [Benedict] and I would present the ‘plot’ of a culture and one of them [Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, John Dollard] would present the plot of a patient that seemed to match it in someway.” In addition to these small gatherings, Benedict, Sapir, Mead, M. F. Ashley Montagu, Melford Spiro, Robert Merton, Clara Thompson, Erik Erikson, Talcott Parsons, Fromm, Lasswell, Horney, and another up-and-coming

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98 Contra François Cusset’s assertion that “the exiled all had the more or less brutal experience of being socially marginalized, culturally uprooted, and normatively disposed . . .” (French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States, trans. Jeff Fort [2003; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008], 20).

Freudian sociologist, David Riesman, all published in Sullivan’s journal, *Psychiatry*. These were the country’s leading social scientists.

The working relationship between neo-Freudian psychoanalysis and the social sciences was an intellectual boon. For the European psychoanalysts, immigration accelerated and completed their journey toward a culture-based, as opposed to instinct-based, psychoanalysis. As Horney’s biographer would say of Horney, the move “seems to have liberated her expansiveness.” The same could be said of Fromm. And just as her “fortunes rose rapidly” in New York City, so did his. Although both faced stiff resistance by the strict orthodox psychoanalytic establishment, both had lucrative private practices and had a wide, loyal following. Of course Americans benefited as well. Mead, Benedict, and the other social scientists profited from Fromm’s and Horney’s intellectual acuity and European psychoanalytic pedigree.

The immigration of European refuges invigorated debates among social scientists regarding the relationship between the self and society, or, as it was described in anthropology, between “culture and personality.” Lasswell proclaimed that because of Freud he and his colleagues, as well as the rest of America, stood “on the threshold of rapid advance throughout the entire range of social scientific research.”

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100 Of the 197 contributors to the journal in its first years, 19 were sociologists, 13 anthropologists, 9 scholars unspecified, 7 political scientists, 6 educators, 4 social workers, 3 lawyers, psychiatric social workers, 2 philosophers, 2 historians, and 5 others ([Harry Stack Sullivan], “Ten Years of Psychiatry: A Statement by the Editor,” *Psychiatry* 10 (Nov. 1947): 433.


force” of his contribution to sociology was “well-nigh incalculable,” declared another.\(^\text{104}\)

There was so much enthusiasm for this neo-Freudian synthesis in the mid-1930s that Read Bain, a more classic Freudian social scientist, felt it necessary to remind Mead, Benedict, and the others that what they (the anthropologists) were working toward in integrating psychoanalysis into the social sciences was not new, because sociologists and social psychologists had been doing the “the same thing for years.”\(^\text{105}\)

To be a “neo”-Freudian was to agree with Freud that one’s personality was the dynamic, dialectical product of internal and internalized forces (insecurity, repression, anxiety—especially insecurity and anxiety), while concurrently accepting as axiomatic John Dewey’s assertion that one cannot know the human being, including those internalized forces, apart from the social.\(^\text{106}\) After citing Horney, Sullivan, and Dewey in *Escape from Freedom*, Fromm minced no words: “Contrary to Freud’s viewpoint . . . [m]an’s nature, his passions, and anxieties are a cultural product; as a matter of fact, man himself is the most important creation and achievement of the continuous human effort, the record of which we call history.”\(^\text{107}\) There went Freud’s libidinal theories right out the window (almost). Culture and society trumped sex drives and biological instincts. Both would still hover around the discussions of insecurity, anxiety, psychosis and neurosis, but they would no longer figure as the explanation for human motivation. “Making further use of anthropological findings we must recognize that some of our conceptions about human nature are rather naïve, for example the idea that competitiveness, sibling

\(^{104}\) Zilboorg, “Sociology and the Psychoanalytic Method”: 345.
\(^{105}\) Bain, “Sociology and Psychoanalysis”: 208.
rivalry, kinship between affection and sexuality, are trends inherent in human nature,” Horney wrote. “Our conception of normality is arrived at by the approval of certain standards of behavior and feelings within a certain group which imposes these standards upon its members. But the standards vary with culture, period, class and sex.”

Fromm, Horney, and the other neo-Freudians turned Freud on his head and argued, with Dewey, that one starts and ends not with the individual but with the social (with the “social structure,” said the sociologist) or with culture (or “cultural patterns,” said the anthropologist). In an important statement on this neo-Freudian synthesis, Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry Murray explained the integration this way. “The approach of the editors is a ‘field’ approach. That is, we regard the conventional separation of the ‘organism and his environment,’ the drama of ‘the individual versus his society,’ the bipolarity between ‘personality and culture’ as false or at least misleading in some important senses,” they wrote. “Knowledge of a society or a culture must rest upon knowledge of the individuals who are in that society or share that culture. But the converse is equally true. Personal figures get their definition only when seen against the social and cultural background in which they have their being.”

Erasing the fundamental distinctions between the two, between the individual and society, which were “inextricably interwoven,” Kluckhohn and Murray insisted: “One defines the other. In actual experience, individuals and societies constitute a single field.” Within this emerging social scientific consensus, Fromm could quite easily, as

he did, reinterpret “neurosis” as a “culturally patterned defect,” rather than as a personal maladjustment. In other words, neo-Freudians like Fromm retained Freud’s preoccupation with the psycho-pathological dynamics of character formation, the language of anxieties, impulses, conflicts, tensions, inhibitions, guilt, inferiority, frustration. They simply redefined them, many would say beyond Freudian recognition. If an individual becomes “sick,” mentally, it was an indication that perhaps society is the real source of the sickness, not the individual.

The Deweyan point had been conceded. The social scientists won the argument. Edward Sapir, who was one of Sullivan’s analysands, and led Yale’s “culture and personality” seminar, seemed especially pleased that the Freudians had come around to seeing things his and his colleagues’ way:

The extreme individualism of earlier psychiatry is evidently passing. Even the pages of Freud, with their haunting imagery of society as censor and of culture as a beautiful extortion from the sinister depths of desire, are beginning to take on a certain character of quaintness; in other words, it looks as though psychiatry and the sciences devoted to man as constitutive of society were actually beginning to talk about the same events—to wit, the fact of human experience.

In the social sciences, too, there has been a complementary movement toward the concerns of the psychiatrist. At long last the actual human being, always set in a significant situation, never a mere biological illustration or a long-suffering carrier of cultural items, has been caught prowling about the premises of society, of culture, of history.


Disabused of their “too many superstitions,” psychiatrists on the “advance guard” were “rapidly discovering the fruitfulness of the concepts of society and culture for a richer and a more realistic analysis of personality” and therefore had finally “become sufficiently aware of social patterning to be granted a hearing by the social scientists.” They now had “as much to give as to receive,” Sapir conferred.114 This synthesis was not, he reassured, the result of some “pussyfoot” either. It was, rather, a “sincere recognition of the importance, perhaps even the reality, of the things connoted by the words ‘society’ and ‘culture.’”115

Social scientists who had been hostile to the biological and behavioral Freud were happy to see a more social Freud emerge. They could accept this version without having to betray Dewey or the “social” in the social sciences. Neo-Freudian psychoanalysis’s integration into the social sciences would be rapid and pervasive, for in the estimation of Frank Lawrence and many others, the “psychocultural approach” had solved the “seemingly unresolvable dilemma” of the “individual versus society.” Now, both “personal difficulties” and “widespread social disorders” could be expressed as but “different expressions or symptoms of” social pathologies, thanks to the adjustments that Fromm, Sullivan, and Horney had made to psychoanalytic theory.116 None too soon, either, said Lawrence, given the insecure state of the world with wars and rumors of wars. “Today we have so many deviations and maladjustments that the term ‘normal’ has lost

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almost all significance,” Lawrence feared. These quotes are taken from his book and article that were both entitled *Society as Patient*.

Plenty of others dipped into the neo-Freudian psychoanalytic literature without fear of reprisal for being branded a Freudian quack. Indeed, so ubiquitous did this version of Freud become that there is no way to describe the boundaries of its reach; it became, simply, part of the prevailing climate of opinion. Consider the career of Robert Merton and that of his theory of *anomie*, a theory he borrowed from Émile Durkheim then elaborated upon and set out in a path-setting 1938 article, entitled “Social Structure and Anomie.” The article made Merton famous. By the 1950s his work on anomie absolutely “dominated” the criminology literature, so claim the sociologists Robert Agnew and Nikos Passas. It virtually launched a sociology subfield, becoming “the most-quoted paper in the literature on deviance for the period 1955 to 1970,” argues another sociologist. Did anyone take Merton to task for siding with the neo-Freudians? By all indications, not at all.


The aim of the paper was “to provide a coherent, systematic approach to the study of socio-cultural sources of deviate behavior.” In other words, Merton wanted to discover how, in his words, “some social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in nonconformist rather than conformist conduct,” what he called maladjustment, or anomie. Now, the paper opens not with a sociological but with a psychological point: Merton discredits Ernest Jones’s Freudian biologism because it was incapable of accounting for the “nonbiological conditions” that give rise to maladjustment. In the essay that followed, Merton hewed to neo-Freudian theory and theorists—Kingsley Davis (who had written on mental hygiene and class structure), Talcott Parsons, Edward Sapir, John Dollard, and, notably, Karen Horney, Ernest Jones’s foe. “If the Freudian notion is a variety of the ‘original sin’ dogma,” Merton wrote, contra Jones, “then the interpretation advanced in this paper may be called the doctrine of ‘socially derived sin.’” In another footnote later, Merton would paraphrase Elton Mayo: “the problem is not that of the sickness of an acquisitive society; it is that of the acquisitiveness of a sick society.”

If the openness of social scientists to psychoanalysis in the Midwest and Pacific Coast, then New York, had prepared the way for Fromm and Horney and other neo-Freudians, then Hitler becoming Chancellor then Führer of Germany would create the moment for their arrival, and not just in the literal sense. Hitler’s political ascendancy in Germany, Mussolini’s in Italy, and Franco’s in Spain, and the wars that were waged against them, charged these debates about the individual versus society with a palpable sense of urgency. As one postwar Brooklyn education professor observed, “It is hard to

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imagine that, prior to 1941, many Americans would have seen Fromm’s thoughts as relevant to any very serious problems we faced.”

During the Depression, the common perception had been, he said, that psychoanalysis was “a rich man’s toy,” the professor (rightly) noted; and the poor were seen “simply as the victims of their failure, as healthy and even noble, but betrayed”; however, Nazism had “put an end to this sort of sentimentality, at least as an effective intellectual force.” The “common man” was not so innocent anymore. Totalitarianism required a total psychology, a psychology of the nation-state, an explanation that could explicate the motives and behavior of the rich and the poor, the leader and their followers, for “Such grisly phenomena could hardly be explained by any theory of individual psychopathology. They required, instead, a kind of social psychology which retained its psychodynamic character,” he explained.

Neo-Freudians in the lead up to, during, and after the war descended down the proverbial ivory tower and put Freud to work. In August 1939, Margaret Mead, with her British anthropologist husband, Gregory Bateson, wrote Eleanor Roosevelt personally to offer her her services, “as a professional anthropologist.” “Winning the war is a job of social engineering, we have said. We must understand and use American character in the process. We must develop the insights of social science to a point where we can say how

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this is to be done,” she wrote in *And Keep Your Powder Dry.*\(^{125}\) In 1940, Sullivan became an influential consultant to the U.S. Selective Service and trained physicians to weed out psychoneurotic recruits.\(^{126}\)

Sullivan also made the war a priority for *Psychiatry*. Of the 350 pieces published in the journal in its first ten years, 71 items pertained directly to the war effort. He was, by anyone’s standard, a bellicose editor.\(^{127}\) After noting that the “Western world” was still, thankfully, “relatively uncontaminated with the virus of the European and Asiatic disease,” an editorial warned that only by “sustained efforts” could the “fortunately placed peoples of the Western Hemisphere . . . ward off the encroaching evils and insure humanity a continuing forward path.” Psychiatrists had hoped to progress slowly but steadily toward a psychiatry of politics, but “the course of events forbids this quiet progress. A psychiatry of the state is demanded.”\(^{128}\) Harold Lasswell would lead this effort for the journal as the editor for political psychiatry.

While Lasswell was working on a political psychiatry of the total state, Fromm, Mead, Benedict, and fellow anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer were doing their part by launching a new field of scholarly inquiry, aligned at first with anthropology, although it quickly spread into other disciplines: “national character studies,” they called it. Writing within the Sapir- and Dollard-inspired psychoanalysis/anthropology synthesis, Mead published *And Keep Your Powder Dry* (which was U.S. focused), Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (1946), and Gorer, *The...* 


\(^{127}\) [Sullivan], “Ten Years of *Psychiatry*”: 433.

People of Great Russia (1949, with John Rickman). A whole herd of scholars were busily pounding out their own character studies as well—especially of Germany.

For reasons obvious to many people Germany deserved special attention. Nothing did more to encourage the emergence of social psychiatry and the neo-Freudian synthesis than the specter of fascism in Europe. “No one will deny that a person who, in the current sense of the word, is well adjusted in Nazi Germany is and must be a neurotic, because the Nazi social-cultural environment is an extremely clearcut example of a social neurosis, if not psychosis,” wrote the anthropologist George Devereux, stating the consensus.\(^{129}\) The bellicosity of Germany’s leadership and the apparent apathy and acquiescence of the German population could not be explained in any terms other than mass psychosis or neurosis, many thought.

One of first books coming out of this neo-Freudian synthesis to reach a broad, popular audience was Fromm’s Escape from Freedom. An analysis of Germany’s Nazi social psychology, the book brilliantly began not with the immediate threat of Nazism, but instead with a debate in political theory and social philosophy that Americans had wrestled with throughout the previous century and a half: that is, what is the nature of “liberty”? Now, this alone was not particularly brilliant, but it was Fromm’s turning this debate into a social-psychological problem, and then proceeding to analyze it as a social psychoanalyst. The question was not how did Hitler wrest power from the people (politically), but, instead, why did the citizenry give up their hard-fought freedoms (psychologically)? Fromm wrote, “It is the thesis of this book that modern man, freed from the bonds of pre-individualistic society, which simultaneously gave him security

\(^{129}\) Devereux, “Maladjustment and Social Neurosis”: 849.
and limited him, has not gained freedom in the positive sense of the realization of his individual self; that is, the expression of his intellectual, emotional and sensuous potentialities."\(^{130}\)

Having not found a “positive” freedom of self-realization, modern men irrationally accept a kind of substitute, a “negative freedom.” That is, they either long to submit to authority or they lust for power: in either case, they long to “belong.” This, in a social psychological nutshell, was the attraction of fascism, the need for security, said Fromm. Following Weber, Fromm argued that the insecurities that so many working-class Germans felt during the worldwide depression in the 1930s was not merely the result of speculative capitalism but rather was rooted in the Protestant Reformation.

Reared in an Orthodox Jewish household, Fromm said of himself that he was more a product of the Middle Ages than of Weimar Germany. And it certainly showed. (Being a graduate student of Max Weber’s brother no doubt played a role as well.) Fromm readily acknowledged that pre-Reformation inhabitants had been “chained” to their role in the “social order,” lacked “freedom,” in the modern sense. However, that immobility had “rooted” medieval Europeans in a “structuralized whole.” Furthermore, with that rootededness came a sense of “security” and “belonging.”

The Protestants razed Eden—“man became a spiritual \textit{individual}, and recognized himself as such”—ensuring that all future human relations would be “poisoned” by the “fierce life-and-death struggle for the maintenance of power and wealth,” he wrote.\(^{131}\) Put simply: “The result of [the] progressive destruction of the medieval social structure was

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\(^{130}\) Fromm, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, x.

\(^{131}\) Fromm, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, 47.
the emergence of the individual in the modern sense.\textsuperscript{132} ‘The individual was left alone; everything depended on his own effort, not on the security of his traditional status,’ Fromm wrote.\textsuperscript{133} Although Fromm’s vision of humanity’s spiritual and economic descent was thoroughly Marxian, as the historian Jackson Lears has argued, idealized fealty to medieval Europe could also be profoundly conservative.\textsuperscript{134} Either way, Fromm tapped a widespread and deep-seated unease regarding the consequences of industrial “modernity,” an unease that was felt in both Europe and the U.S.

Fromm did not end with the Protestants and the rise of capitalism. He introduced the American public to a new neo-Freudian Freud, scrubbed of his sexual obsessions and seamier side. Fromm reworked the psychological dynamics of the Reformation—in particular its individuation—and placed them within a psychosocial and cultural framework. The “insecurity of the isolated individual,” which Protestantism had encouraged, produced three significant “mechanisms of escape” within the German’s “personality structures,” he argued. They were authoritarianism, destruction, and conformity. The first, “authoritarianism,” can be found in the strivings for submission (masochism) as well as for domination (sadism), which, argued Fromm, are merely two sides to the same sociopathological coin, the same desire to overcome “separateness” and the “unbearable feeling of aloneness and powerlessness.”\textsuperscript{135} This striving will only lead to one thing, however: the death of the self.

\textsuperscript{132} Fromm, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, 45.
\textsuperscript{133} Fromm, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, 58-59 (emphasis in original).
\textsuperscript{135} Fromm, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, 150-51
“Automaton conformity,” argued Fromm, was the mechanism of escape that had the greatest social significance, appearing in well-adjusted German citizen as well as neurotics. Here, too, “The discrepancy between ‘I’ and the world disappear and with it the conscious fear of aloneness and powerlessness.”

In this case, though, the people seeking to escape their freedom believe in individualism, albeit a belief that is in most instances, argued Fromm, merely an “illusion,” a kind of false “rationalization.” As if under a hypnotic spell, “A great number of our decisions are not really our own but are suggested to us from the outside,” Fromm wrote of the well-adjusted German automaton; “we have succeeded in persuading ourselves that it is we who have made the decision, whereas we have actually conformed with expectations of others, driven by the fear of isolation and by more direct threats to our life, freedom, and comfort.”

If one wants to know why Germany succumbed to Nazism, this is it, said Fromm. The nation’s social psychology is best explained by an authoritarian leadership that had a “lust for power” and a population that was “craving for submission.” Germans had been “seized with the feeling of individual insignificance and powerlessness,” traded in their freedom for the promise of “security,” and in the process lost themselves.

(This same outcome, the death of the self, was also, of course, the result of literal “destruction,” that third alternative.)

Although Harold Clurman could find no reviews, in the long term the impact of this book was enormous. Lewis Hill, writing in 1942 in a Psychiatry symposium dedicated to the book, declared, “Of all the studies of Nazism, this analysis probably

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136 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 184.
137 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 197.
138 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 216.
gives the most devastating picture.” Praised Ruth Benedict, “Modern man’s feelings of loneliness and insignificance has never been put more frankly in its social context than in Dr. Fromm’s book. All who read *Escape from Freedom* must admit the impeachment.” Benedict’s fellow anthropologist M. F. Ashley Montagu regarded it “as one of the most important books published in our time.” The sociologist Lewis Coser wrote to his friend Dwight Macdonald, “Fromm’s book has seemed to many the sole contribution to political insight in book form in recent years. It is a very serious job and merits at least a serious answer.” To be sure, not everyone agreed with Fromm, even in *Psychiatry*’s symposium. One minister took umbrage with Fromm’s humanistic psychoanalysis of the Reformation; Louis Wirth said Fromm’s thesis was “so cosmic in scope and so full of ambiguous terms that even if its meaning were clear one would scarcely know, after reading the book, whether it had been proved or not.” Still, this was a book that was read, and read widely.

Fromm became “an institution,” said one sociologist in 1962. “When I left home to enroll at the University of California in 1958, Erich Fromm was a leading figure in American life and thought,” recalled Lawrence Friedman. “My parents and most of their friends in the Marxist ‘Old Left’ had purchased first editions of his books and I had perused several of them as I was growing up.” Moreover: “Fromm was a staple in my undergraduate education; I encountered his works in my history, psychology, philosophy,

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140 “*Escape from Freedom*: A Synoptic Series of Reviews”: 111.
141 “*Escape from Freedom*: A Synoptic Series of Reviews”: 122.
142 Lewis Coser to Dwight Macdonald, n.d. [1945?], fol. 258, box 12, series I, group 730, Dwight MSS.
143 “*Escape from Freedom*: A Synoptic Series of Reviews”: 129.
144 Friedenberg, “Neo-Freudianism & Erich Fromm,” 305.
political science, and sociology classes.”

Although taking very different careers paths, one in the theatre, the other in academia, Clurman and Chomsky both learned how to analyze society (at least in part) through Fromm.

The political scientist and psychoanalyst Paul Roazen echoed the sentiments of many. “That text [*Escape From Freedom*] not only became central to the professional education of my generation of students of politics, but it also once had an immense influence within fields like sociology, anthropology, and clinical psychology,” he wrote. “Yet by now it is easy for beginning students to be unaware of how momentous an impact that one book was capable of having had throughout the social sciences.” Roazen had been assigned the book in 1955 as a Harvard University undergraduate in political science.

*Escape from Freedom* was assigned and read not simply because it illuminated fascism. Fromm’s jeremiad could also be applied to American society and culture. He warned, “[A]lthough foreign and internal threats of Fascism must be taken seriously, there is no greater mistake and no graver danger than not to see that in our own society we are faced with the same phenomenon that is fertile soil for the rise of Fascism anywhere: the insignificance and powerlessness of the individual.” If any country suffered from the “illusion” of individualism surely it was America, thought Fromm, the country where people wish to sell their services they must smile on cue to show they have a “pleasing personality,” like flicking on an electric switch; the land where “pseudo feelings” have replaced deep and meaningful “spontaneous emotions,” indeed where

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145 Friedman, “Recovering Erich Fromm’s Life”: 12.
“feeling” itself is discouraged, repressed, and inspires an attitude toward the world that has a “quality of flatness and indifference.” America was the land of pseudo-thinking pseudo-selves: “Modern man is starved for life. But since, being an automaton, he cannot experience life in the sense of spontaneous activity he takes as surrogate any kind of excitement and thrill: the thrill of drinking, of sports, of vicariously living the excitements of fictitious persons on the screen,” Fromm argued. This was America.

It was also adjustment. Fromm’s jeremiad, which turned debate about “conformity” into an ideological struggle over the meaning and possibility of freedom, established a trajectory for many other cultural critics to follow. And yet, it also contained a contradiction, impossible to overcome. On the one hand, Fromm belittled the “modern man” for fulfilling the “role” assigned him by society. “We have become automatons who live under the illusion of being self-willing individuals,” he wrote. On the other hand, he argued that people fill these roles because they must, because they are conditioned to. Hence, there is no real choice, nor can there be. “If we look at social character from the standpoint of its function in the social process, we have to start with the statement that has been made with regard to its function for the individual: that by adapting himself to social conditions man develops those traits that make him desire to act as he has to act,” he claimed. There is no option here. The function of “character” for the “normal person” was to lead him or her to do what is necessary. Character, like

“[m]an’s nature, his passions, and anxieties,” was a cultural product. Because the “normal person” fulfills the role assigned to him or her—desires, that is, to act as he has to act—there is no way that he or she could act otherwise. This was the iron cage of culture.

Once in it, there was no way out. Conformity was the only outcome when the individual was seen as only a mirror of society. Toward the end of *Escape from Freedom*, Fromm called for a “positive” kind of freedom—autonomy; however, in order to make the argument for its possibility he was forced to regress back into a quasi-mystical humanism. In a complete reversal, he claimed that “human nature has a dynamism of its own.”\(^\text{152}\) In other words, all along he argued that human nature was the product of culture, yet at some point, through some inexplicable means, this “nature” can rise up above culture and muster the strength to resist its master. Not only was this positive freedom belied by the rest of the book; it was also at odds with Fromm’s own political response to fascism, that of “democratic socialism.” This program required not less planning but more. “The irrational and planless character of society must be replaced by a planned economy that represents the planned and concerted effort of society as such. Society must master the social problem as rationally as it has mastered nature.”\(^\text{153}\) In later books, Fromm would retreat more and more into a cultural-free definition of human nature, but not without overcoming the contradictions of the neo-Freudian synthesis.

\(^\text{152}\) Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, 287
Adjusting to Loneliness

*The Lonely Crowd* was for Jonathan Yardley a life-defining document. “To one who came of age, as I did, in the middle-class America of the ’50s, *The Lonely Crowd* was an intensely personal document, in which one sought to find oneself . . . I came to it in the throes of a garden-variety case of teen-aged *angst*, and the book appeared to be an unexpected deliverance,” he wrote in the spring of 1972.154 Two decades earlier, in 1952, Carribel Young wrote to Riesman expressing the same reaction to the book as Yardley and countless hundreds of thousands of others—not just middle-class teenage boys. Not only did she find in it answers to “some of the questions” she too had been asking, but also, she wrote in praise, it “bolstered my ego by substantiating some of my own ideas!”155 Some were so moved by it that they felt compelled to buy copies for friends. One reader, Jane Mayer, went out and bought a dozen to hand out even before she had finished it herself because, she wrote Riesman, “it stated so much I’d been pondering so long plus more I’d not thought of, and I felt that it would be a waste of time to discuss the contemporary scene (as my friends and I so often do) without their having read it.”156

As Mayer’s and Young’s comments indicate, people took to Riesman’s book because it was intensely personal, but for reasons that are less than straightforward. “My guess is that most of the book’s nonacademic readers were educated people who felt that they were, somehow, apart from or even better than the ‘crowd of peers,’ and were

155 Carribel Young to DR, 18 Feb. 1952, fol. “The Lonely Crowd: Correspondence,” box 40, HUG (fp) 99.16, Riesman MSS.
looking for confirmation of their status, or for ways by which to make sure of being more than faces in the crowd,” Yardley himself admitted. As he observed, correctly, many readers took to the book in large part because it confirmed what they already suspected and thought about other Americans, which was in contrast to what they thought about themselves. Recall that Carribel Young liked *The Lonely Crowd* because it “bolstered” her own ego. After thanking Riesman for writing the book, she closed by saying she hoped “lots of people” would read it as well—but that “they’d rather look at TV, probably.”

Again, for Young as for others the book was a source of personal validation. When David Lurie wrote the editors of *Time* magazine to tell them how much he enjoyed their cover story, he gave this reason: “Your articles about Riesman, Brando and Toynbee have illuminated one of the cancers which is destroying our American society—this cancer being the psychological norm. We are afraid to be different since we might be called neurotic or ‘crazy,’ he wrote. “We are afraid to live according to our Judeo-Christian-Buddhist principles since such an infinitesimal number live in this way. I hope your articles have restored sight to the blind . . .” This we-few, holier-than-the-rest-of-America condescension was widespread among Riesman’s readers.

While the “typologies” that Riesman used in the book (“other-directed,” etc.) became the stuff of a new “parlor game,” many of his readers took to the book because in it they found the source of their own struggle to adjust to life after the war. For these people, this was no parlor game. Robert Blevins wrote Riesman:

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158 Young to DR, 18 Feb. 1952.
I have been reading your book ‘The Lonely Crowd.’ It has answered some of the questions in my mind about trying to come from a country town to a city town and trying to live. I have always been inner directed and must now become other directed due to having to work for other men. It is not easy to do this but in a survival situation of one’s employment life one must learn the reasons why one is not like other people and try to get to be like they are. When in Rome do as the Romans do should be the policy but not being raised in Rome or Chicago has its adjustment difficulties. Thank you so much for your enlightened book.\textsuperscript{160}

As had been the case with Carribel Young and David Lurie, Blevins found in \textit{The Lonely Crowd} the reasons for his sense of alienation. And yet, unlike these two, Blevins saw something else between those covers, a way to survive—a rationalization for adjusting. Riesman must have read this letter with ambivalence, if not dismay. His goal was to inspire not adjustment but autonomy.

\textit{The Lonely Crowd}’s success can be attributed to many factors. Chief among them was its ability to craft a compelling narrative to explain postwar readjustment, particularly for the millions of men who returned from overseas and found themselves in unfamiliar settings. To do this \textit{The Lonely Crowd} would pick up where \textit{Escape from Freedom} left off; it would place the problem of the war in a much larger historical and cultural framework. The similarities between chapter seven of Fromm’s book, where he laid out his argument about conformity and the “illusion of individuality” are indeed markedly similar to the framework of \textit{The Lonely Crowd}. Just as Fromm had Americanized European social theory and psychoanalysis, Riesman in turn would further Americanize Fromm (and Weber), by fleshing out their “character structures” with American data—with interviews, analysis of children’s literature, references to popular culture, movies, and so on. Although supported by the ideas of a number of other neo-

\textsuperscript{160} Robert Blevins to DR, n.d., fol. “The Lonely Crowd: Correspondence,” box 40, HUG (fp) 99.16, Riesman MSS.
Freudians, like Margaret Mead, Fromm’s influence was paramount. He was, said Riesman, “decisively influential.”  

_The Lonely Crowd_ differed in that totalitarianism was stripped away—as was the war experience of those millions of American soldiers who came home and had been expected simply to “adjust” to their new roles. Some observant readers took note of the elision and protested. Although, for instance, Max Ascoli called Riesman a “Jeremiah,” he wrote to Riesman and said that he simply had to address the lacuna. “[T]o speak bluntly, I found it shocking that, as far as I could see, you left out entirely the combat experience of the American people. For that kept together the American soldiers and made of them an army was exactly that spirit of team-loyalty, devotion to one’s buddies (or one’s peers, if you like) that you analyze so admirably through your investigation,” he wrote Riesman. That omission helps to account for the book’s popularity. By avoiding a discussion of the war, it evaded the moral and ethical debate about the war and also the consequences of the U.S.’s militarization. Dwight Macdonald might have wanted that debate to occur, but not most of Riesman’s readers. Riesman had supported the war, and so had many of his readers. It was much safer, politically, and otherwise, to place adjustment within the larger framework of America’s economic and technological advance.

Riesman’s decision to turn his back on the war experience and focus on history, culture, and capitalism, had certain unforeseen consequences. As seen from Blevins’s

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162 Max Ascoli to DR, 9 Dec. 1949, fol. “The Lonely Crowd: Correspondence,” box 40, HUG (fp) 99.16, Riesman MSS.
letter, many readers found comfort in the book because it allowed them to view their own sense of alienation in a less culpable light: adjustment was a product not of one’s own misfortune, incapacities, or failures but of forces outside and beyond one’s control. Following Fromm, Riesman argued that Americans were not, as most thought of themselves, highly individualistic—what he called “inner-directed.” That was the dominant social character type of the pull-yourself-up-by-your-own-bootstraps nineteenth century (even though that type too could be conformist as well). Instead, they were what he called “other-directed.” Obsessed with “belonging” and “togetherness,” other-directeds took their cues not from the past or their parents (as other character types would do), but from a “jury of peers,” from friends and classmates, comic books and movies, pollsters and advertisers—in short the marketplace (“the sources are many, the changes rapid,” he wrote). Riesman thought that “other-directedness” resulted not only from capitalism’s advancement but also from population stagnation, an argument for which he was roundly criticized. What went almost without notice was the absence of the war.

There was no suggestion that militarization had anything to do with American “togetherness.” By not isolating the experiences of war and dealing with its contingencies as unique, Riesman ended up reifying the war’s effects. “Togetherness” acquired unintentional, almost omnipotent qualities. In other words, the demands of wartime cooperation became America’s story, not the story of one generation. Riesman acknowledged that one could still find pockets of inner- and what he called “tradition-directed” resistance in the United States, among, say, bankers and Southern patricians. And he insisted that “conformity” was not unique to other-directeds. Yet, these caveats

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were lost in the book’s tangled web of neologisms, anecdotes, metaphors, and other qualifications. Also, they were lost in the ineluctable powers of adjustment. In the land of multiplying suburbs, burgeoning cities, glistening shopping centers, and a mobile, rapidly expanding middle class the other-directed conformists were “spreading in numbers and influence” and taking over.\(^{164}\) Moreover, there was little anyone could do to reverse the trend. That was the message that most people took away.

Mere recognition of one’s other-directed conformity was not the goal, to be sure. Against automaton adjustment, Riesman laid out two alternatives: anomie and autonomy. The former concept he borrowed from Robert Merton. It meant “ruleless,” directionless, ungoverned—i.e., “maladjusted.” To illustrate the concept Riesman quoted at length from a study of psychoneurotic World War II soldiers, suffering from “apathy” (one of the few references to the war, ironically):

> The most striking characteristic of the apathetic patient is his visible lack of emotion and drive. At first glance he may seem to be depressed; closer scrutiny, however, reveals lack of affect. He appears slowed up in the psychic and motor responses; he shows an emptiness of expression and a masklike facies. . . . They behave very well in the ward, complying with all the rules and regulations. They rarely complain and make no demands . . . these patients had no urge to communicate their sufferings and no insight into their condition.”\(^{165}\)

Riesman would impose this war-related diagnosis onto noncombatant postwar citizens, onto both the maladjusted and what he called the “overadjusted.” The “ambulatory patients in the ward of modern culture” exhibited “many analogous symptoms of too much compliance and too little insight,” he wrote. “Taken all together, the anomics—ranging from overt outlaws to catatonic types who lack even the spark for living, let alone

\(^{164}\) “Freedom—New Style,” para. 17.

for rebellion—constitute a sizable number in America.”

Not only did Riesman universalize “adjustment” and “togetherness,” but he also universalized “psychoneurosis” and “maladjustment.” They were blight on all American homes.

Riesman did see glints of redemption. He did not want *The Lonely Crowd* to straightjacket the culture, but to liberate it through a vision of “autonomy,” the second option. Because “the anomic person tends to sabotage either himself or his society, probably both,” wrote Riesman, the only real possibility of liberation was to embrace this autonomy.

It meant controlling one’s own social radar by ignoring certain transmissions; it entailed developing a “style of life,” beating the advertisers at their own game, honing “skills and competence in the art of living,” fostering tolerance and self-consciousness, cooperating with others politically while “maintaining the right of private judgment”—and, perhaps most crucially, learning how to play. For “Play’s the Thing,” quipped Riesman. “[It] may prove to be the sphere in which there is still some room left for the would-be autonomous man to reclaim his individual character from the pervasive demands of his social character [i.e., other-directedness].” (The social scientist even opened a leisure research center at the University of Chicago to develop the idea.)

As Yardley suggested, Riesman’s sense of autonomy’s possibilities was indebted to Riesman’s own upper-class upbringing. Though Riesman tried to suggest autonomy

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166 Riesman, *Lonely Crowd*, 244-45.
was independent of a particular social and economic class, in his own case a
“bluestocking” upbringing played a decisive role. His mother was a well-to-do, well-
educated German-Jewish Philadelphian, and his father was a successful University of
Pennsylvania physician. The historian Wilfred McClay describes Riesman’s mother as a
“snobbish aesthete who admired Spengler and Proust and looked down on people who
did the day-to-day work of the world, including her own husband,” despite the fact that
he was a respected professional. Riesman grew up in “sheltered city life,” was cared
for by a governess, went to the opera and concerts often, and summered with his parents
in Maine. He was autonomous enough in his youth to go on a bicycle trip with his brother
through France’s Rhône valley, then later was able to visit Russia.

Riesman himself acknowledged, “I was a spoiled youth who needed discipline,”
and was absolutely “haunted” by the “fear of responsibility.” His parents had cajoled
him into selecting a respectable profession while at Harvard, like law or medicine, but
they also wanted to ensure that he did not “overstrain” himself physically or
financially. Young Riesman happily obliged. Concerning his clerkship with U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis, he said, “Brandeis, too, felt that I was spoiled—I would
occasionally be coming into the office after a party, in white tie and tails, to find him
starting work as usual at 5 A.M.” Brandeis managed only to make him feel guilty about
his “self-indulgence,” and not much else. This indifference toward work showed up in
politics as well. Before going to college he said he had not even known a Democrat,
much less a Socialist or Communist. He was by self-designation a “provocative Tory”

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171 Riesman, biographical statement, 15, 17.
172 Riesman, biographical statement, 12.
173 Riesman, biographical statement, 15.
who was “not an early critic of the American social order.” In addition to thinking that bourgeois society was “pretty good,” he tried to convince Hannah Arendt of capitalism’s finer qualities, arguing, “Actually, businessmen are very seldom corrupt, especially in Big Business. They have no chance to be.” It was Riesman’s rosy belief that as “affluence” spread and the middle class grew, all this autonomy would be there for the taking.

The Lonely Crowd’s utopian vision of classless autonomy was class-based and highly problematic. This was not lost on Riesman’s skeptical readers. The book was at odds with itself, just as Fromm’s was. “Riesman’s whole book gives the impression that the majority of Americans are now other-directed and vitally concerned with consuming the right thing in the right way. Actually, the majority of Americans are presently concerned with consuming enough to keep alive, and the even more interesting problem of where to get the consumable goods,” wrote one critical reviewer. “If he does not embrace, he certainly flirts with contradictories almost from the beginning. In the final passages, wherein is discerned a rosy dawn, he constructs an elaborate, and really quite enchanting, fugue upon a dreamy ‘perhaps.’” Eugene Davidson, who read the book in manuscript, also took serious issue with Riesman. “But the four-hour day and the special jobs for adolescents and the allowances for moppets, hitherto mentioned, are really tossed

175 DR to Hannah Arendt, 13 June 1949, file 009253; and DR to Hannah Arendt, 14 June 1949, file 009246, box 14, Hannah Arendt Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
out.” Furthermore, he wondered what “competent economists” would have to say.177

Autonomy was a nice idea, he thought.

Robert Wheeler, another reviewer, was not about to buy the autonomy line either, nor the argument that other-direction was the result of abundance. “If abundance and leisure in a social group explain the presence of other-direction in it, one must then ask whether these things in turn are sufficient to inhibit autonomy. For if they are not, whatever our present culture ills, other-direction cannot be said to be the cause of them.”178 Although otherwise sympathetic, Rose Coser, too, thought the ending a complete letdown for comparable reasons. “[Y]ou make it appear now as if your autonomous type is rather a kind of perfect consumer with a wider range of choice than the range that is open to the ordinary marketing consumer now,” she scolded Riesman. “To talk of ‘autonomy’ here seems to me exceedingly frivolous . . .” The book did more than let Coser down—it ‘perturbed” her.”179 Some of Riesman’s harshest critics were his fellow social scientists.180

Lacking a realistic alternative to adjustment, autonomy was shrugged off as a mere pipe dream by a number of readers. The obstacle to autonomy was not merely the lack of or too much abundance, however. It went deeper than that. Neo-Freudianism effectively precluded autonomy. The contradiction between adjustment and autonomy in the book are in part a reflection of contradictions in Riesman’s own life. Early on,

177 Eugene Davidson to DR, 20 Sept. 1949, fol. “The Lonely Crowd Correspondence, 2 of 2,” box 41, HUG (fp) 99.16, Riesman MSS.
179 Rose [Coser?] to DR, 12 Nov. 1950, fol. “The Lonely Crowd: Correspondence,” box 40, HUG (fp) 99.16, Riesman MSS.
Riesman’s mother had introduced him to Dewey as well as to Freud. With a life-long interest in education, she greatly admired the former and according to Riesman become an acquaintance. Her interest in Freud would in the 1930s lead her to Karen Horney’s office in New York City. The neo-Freudian became her analyst, and it was through her prodding that her son would ask Fromm to become his analyst. Riesman’s father took an interest in psychiatry, too, particularly in its social aspects, and would later become a historian of medicine. Together, both parents had inspired in their son a “life long” interest in Freud, Riesman said.  

Although no book to come out of the neo-Freudian synthesis did as much to popularize the movement’s methods, research, and perspective than *The Lonely Crowd*, no person was more indebted to the movement, personally and professionally, than Riesman. Before entering Harvard, Riesman already had a strong interest in Dewey and psychology, thanks to his parents. While a reluctant Harvard pre-med student, Riesman met and became very good friends with Carl Joachim Friedrich, a rising German political scientist in the Department of Government and former student of Max Weber’s brother, Alfred (Erich Fromm’s dissertation advisor—it was a small world). Friedrich not only introduced young Riesman to social criticism, mainly of the European varieties, but he also introduced him to a whole host of living cultural and intellectual refugees who, like himself, hailed from the Continent: Gaetano Salvemini, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, and

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181 DR to Edward L. Bernays, 8 April 1947, fol. “Freud—Correspondence,” box 1, HUG (fp) 99.57, Riesman MSS.  
Rudolf Serkin, among others. Friedrich was, said his young admirer, a true “Renaissance figure.”

Riesman gave up the idea of medicine, stayed on in Cambridge, moved into Brattle Inn, and enrolled at Harvard Law. At Brattle Inn, Riesman’s neighbor fortuitously happened to be Elton Mayo, and the two became good friends. Ever so slowly, from all different directions, Riesman was being pulled more and more into the orbit of the social sciences. “Mayo took an interest in what he regarded as my naïveté about the world and what he saw as my obsessiveness. He told me about Pierre Janet’s psychology both to interest me and to help me,” he recalled. “Mayo’s combination of physiological and social-psychological concerns was as remote from law school as I could have wished. Moreover, I felt that there was something mysterious about Mayo.”

Riesman’s full conversion to a neo-Freudian point of view came in 1939. As an ambivalent law professor at the University of Buffalo, Riesman started commuting down to New York City on alternate weekends to undergo analysis with Fromm. This exposure and experience opened up new worlds to young Riesman. He took courses at the Washington School of Psychiatry in New York City with Harry Stack Sullivan and Fromm and sat in on Fromm’s lectures at the New School. The latter, who offered Riesman “intellectual companionship,” became more than just his analyst; his influence on Riesman’s development in social theory was indelible. In one of his earliest article on Freud, Riesman would cite with approval Fromm’s assertion that the individual is inculcated with the values that lead him (or her) to “want to do what, under the given

social and economic conditions, he has to do.”¹⁸⁴ There was no confusion on what camp Riesman was in.

Not long after this initiation, a yearlong research fellowship at Columbia in 1941-42 helped to introduce Riesman to an even wider ambit of neo-Freudians, including Margaret Mead; as well as the famous authors of *Middletown*, Robert and Helen Lynd, whom he had read as an undergraduate; and Ruth Benedict. Through the Lynds he met Paul Lazarsfeld, then Marie Jahoda, and Fran Neumann. Additionally, while in the city, he met Lionel and Diana Trilling and through them a host of the other New York intellectuals, including the *Partisan Review* cabal. “The Columbia location would help put me in touch with people in the social sciences who, I was beginning to realize, were my truer colleagues,” said Riesman.¹⁸⁵

Then came his big break in 1946, when he was invited by the undergraduate College at the University of Chicago to take a position as a Visiting Assistant Professor of the Social Sciences. (They needed help teaching the new veterans on campus.) “My ambition was no less than to become an all-round social scientist, familiar with sociological and psychological materials as well as with economic and political and historical ones,” Riesman recalled. “I could not have done better than to land as I did in the College at Chicago, among a group of enterprising colleagues who sought a similar scope and were engaged in building it into a teaching program in general education.”¹⁸⁶

In January he arrived right after Daniel Bell’s Christmas party. Bell taught in Soc. 2; Riesman, in Soc. 3, a thoroughly interdisciplinary “capstone” course that included

¹⁸⁶ David Riesman, biographical statement, 3.
theorists from across the spectrum, from John Stuart Mill to Karl Marx. For his lectures, Riesman focused on Freud, a man he deemed the “most seminal thinker of modern times,” a man whose ideas had been reshaped by Fromm and Sullivan. As Riesman would later recall, “Freud and psychoanalysis had overwhelming authority” on campus.

One cycle in the circulation of ideas could be completed, for one of the first things Riesman did was help Milton Singer and Daniel Bell reshape Soc. 2 into a Dollard- and Sapir-like “culture and personality” course. A second iteration would soon be completed when Riesman got the call to return to the East Coast to head a project at Yale with its Committee on National Policy (Harold D. Lasswell was on the committee). To help with the project, Riesman pulled in Nathan Glazer, whose work in Commentary’s “Study of Man” series he had admired, as well as his good friend, Reuel Denney, whom he had wooed to Chicago from Buffalo. The template for the project was Chicago’s revised Soc. 2 “culture and personality” course. (Perhaps appropriately, C. Wright Mills—Glazer’s professor—filled in for Riesman during one of his stints at Yale, so he could work on the project.) Both Glazer and Riesman participated in Yale’s “culture and personality” seminar, then chaired by Ralph Linton. Fromm, too, was a participant. This marked the beginning of The Lonely Crowd, the most famous study to come out of the “cultural and personality” movement.

Just as Fromm had wanted to hold on to the possibility of autonomy and self-realization, so, too, did Riesman. Yet both had to work against themselves to make the case—precisely because they began with the social, not the individual, and argued that

187 DR to Bernays, 8 April 1947.
human nature was the product of culture. To explicate his social “characterology,”

Riesman wrote:

The “adjusted” are those whom for the most part we have been describing. They are the typical tradition-directed, inner-directed, or other-directed people—those who respond in their character structure to the demands of their society or social class at its particular stage on the curve of population. Such people fit the culture as though they were made for it, as in fact they are. There is, characterologically speaking, an effortless quality about their adjustment, although as we have seen the mode of adjustment may itself impose heavy strains on the so-called normal people. That is, the adjusted are those who reflect their society, or their class within the society, with the least distortion.  

“Culture,” as Riesman here defines it, is anything but liberating. People do not make culture—they are made for it and simply reflect it. Elsewhere he wrote, “Only in the rarest and greatest instances, that is, can one individual’s inner, generative power lift him up by his own bootstraps, and give him enough energy to combat the overwhelming atmospheric pressure of the total culture.”

The Lonely Crowd did more than teach Americans what to think about American culture, but also how to think—and that was as a neo-Freudian social scientist.

Whose Cage Anyway?

As social scientists sought to advance their position up the academic ladder, the possibilities of escape from other-directedness became increasingly more difficult to imagine. Consider this prophecy of ultimate predictability, written in 1938. “The anthropologist’s concept of culture is . . . on a par with the physicist’s concept of the

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189 Riesman, Lonely Crowd, 241-42.
atom. Given knowledge of the particular culture construct involved, it becomes possible for the investigator to predict with a high degree of probability how most members of a society will behave under most circumstances,” wrote the Columbia University anthropologist Ralph Linton. “The concept of culture is thus justified by its utility. It is the most efficient tool so far developed for the organization and comparison of data on the behavior and attitudes of people living in organized groups.”

Pretensions of scientific predictability were padded with concession that culture did not render individuality extinct—yet this was very cold comfort. As Harry Stack Sullivan wrote, in “The Illusion of Personal Individuality,” adjustment had a “special use” for neo-Freudians: “namely, “the adjustment of potentialities to necessities.”

How could anthropologists and other “culture and personality” scholars, who considered themselves “cultural relativists,” hold to views that were decidedly anti-relative on a personal level? Riesman unintentionally suggested it had something to do with the social scientists’ sense of their own relativity. “I am inclined to think that we [social scientists] are not going to add appreciably to the evil in the world, or to the good, whatever we do, and so we can safely get on with our work—wherever our curiosity leads us,” he wrote. “Just as I don’t like to hear novelists and poets being asked to be ‘constructive,’ or to take their places in the war of ideas, so I resent it when even from the best of motives the ivory tower is converted into a battlement.” Because this provocative Tory saw so much in the world that seemed “shaky and uncertain,” he felt “all the more

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strongly how important it [was] that social scientists be idly curious and refuse immediate responsibility for such indubitably good causes as world peace or better race relations.”

Oddly, Riesman’s suggested that the best evidence that this work could be pursued “in a detached and scientific spirit” were the national character studies that Ruth Benedict, Geoffrey Gorer, and Margaret Mead had turned out during the war. “For instance, Ruth Benedict’s book on Japanese culture, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, persuasively testifies to the objectivity with which trained anthropologists can pursue applied research,” he boasted. Riesman failed to acknowledge that while preparing *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* Benedict worked for the Division of Cultural Analysis and Research in the Office of War Information (OWI), the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency. While searching for the “key” to “the Japanese character,” Benedict was anything but “detached” and “objective.” As I have argued, the emergence of neo-Freudianism within the social sciences is inseparable from the rise of fascism and the war’s execution. Neither Benedict’s nor Mead’s work was an exception to this observation.

This innocuous understanding of scientific objectivity was facilitated by and grounded within an a-biological conceptualization of culture. Riesman praised anthropology for having challenged “Western ethnocentrism,” for having helped Americans “to appreciate the values of other, quite different cultures,” and in response to

194 Riesman, “Psychological Types and National Character”: 327-28.
those with misgivings about the scientific study of culture, he would vigorously defend his “ethically sensitive colleague[s],” especially Margaret Mead.\textsuperscript{196} He did so by emphasizing her cosmopolitan liberalism. “Anthropologists have been among the most valiant and capable in the battle against racism; and Margaret Mead among them is quite understandably wary of work that would classify people by their hereditary endowment”; furthermore, it was her considered “judgment” that “at this historic moment” it was “unstrategic to emphasize the constitutional or biological differences among peoples, lest this be an invitation to a renewed scientistic racism or some malignant program of eugenics.”\textsuperscript{197}

Because of biological racism and ethnic antagonisms, the term “culture” was therefore preferred because it was viewed as more benign. “Anthropologists,” he observed, “tend to avoid such nouns as ‘Germany’ or ‘Japan’ or ‘France,’ and to substitute their term, ‘culture,’ for older terms like ‘nation’ or ‘people.’ In fact, whether we think of culture with the little ‘c’ of the anthropologist or with the big ‘C’ of the humanist, as long as we don’t use the capital ‘K’ of \textit{Kultur}, the overtones are neutral ones.”\textsuperscript{198} Riesman had smuggled in a traditional definition of culture, as arising above the work-a-day world of politics, ideology, and power, to justify what was inherently a highly charged, ideologically infused notion of culture, a usage that was employed to advance war. Just make sure not to call his Tory culture \textit{Kultur}. Later in life Riesman would become far more involved in political issues, but that came later, when he thought the arms race might lead to a worldwide holocaust.

\textsuperscript{196} Riesman, “Psychological Types and National Character”: 325-26.
\textsuperscript{197} Riesman, “Psychological Types and National Character”: 326.
\textsuperscript{198} Riesman, “Psychological Types and National Character”: 328.
As Robert Blevins’s letter to Riesman suggests, books about “culture” and “national character” were not innocuous, just as social scientists were and are not “detached” and “neutral.” Social scientists may have erased the language of biological determinism and eugenic engineering, yet not the underlying premise that justified their intervention in society, politics, and power. The sociologist Read Bain had even greater pretension than his anthropology colleague Ralph Linton. Social scientists like himself should be performing surgery on “sick” societies. He explained:

It involves analyzing the “societal unconscious,” i.e., by scientific research to define and demonstrate the existence of functional as well as structural psychotic groups and then to eradicate them by societal surgery—destroy them root and branch. This would cure much individual psychopathy and prevent the repressions and conflicts which produce our constant and increasing population of neurotics and psychotics. It would usher in the age of mass mental hygiene and societal psychotherapy. . . . I am convinced that socioanalysis and sociotherapy will gradually become very important methods of treating most all of the functional neuroses and possibly psychoses. . . . If we can determine the mechanisms of societal behavior, we may also be able to devise techniques for manipulating them. We shall be able to predict the course of societal development, as well as the results of our therapeutic and preventive prescriptions.\(^{199}\)

The immediate context of these statements was a discussion of what to do about the menace of European fascism, which, as Nathan Glazer’s “Study of Man” article on the subject indicated, was very much concerned with applying social scientific knowledge to solve practical (and politically acute) “problems.”

These sentiments were not confined to the enemy. During the cold war, socioanalysis was applied equally to America. When he went before the Sub-Committee on War Mobilization of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in the autumn of 1945, William Ogburn had a very clear sense of how the social sciences could contribute to the

\(^{199}\) Bain, “Sociology and Psychoanalysis”: 214-16.
U.S.’s war mobilization. It was based on the experience of the past several years. “In the war just ended our social science knowledge about prices, index numbers, money, credit, economic organization, population, age distribution, transportation, productive processes, the measurement of public opinion, labor relations, mass psychology, propaganda techniques, etc., was invaluable,” he wrote; “for it was this knowledge that made it possible for us to mobilize quickly and effectively the organizations of industry, commerce, agriculture, and government in efficient and unified cooperation.”

What the war had taught Ogburn was that the “democratic procedures of society need to be changed,” that they were still too inefficient, despite America’s victory.

“Execution means orders, obedience, quick decisions and fulfillment. So our usual democratic procedures must be speeded and supplemented by hundreds of administrative agencies,” he recommended. Total war required total preparation and the total organization of society. Rather than wait for an atomic attack, Ogburn advocating establishing a pre-emptive plan for the dispersal of the population, which would require a tremendous amount of dedicated research—which was why he was addressing the Subcommittee, to advocate the establishment of a social science national research foundation. In a supplemental document, ostensibly for the subcommittee, Ogburn returned to a familiar theme, that society must adapt to machines, not the other way around.

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201 Ogburn, “Research in Social Science in a Program of Nationally-Sponsored Research,”
“Society is to be seen as a highly interrelated mechanism more or less like a watch, but which, unlike a watch, is in process of change. But as the inventional change come first, then the other parts of this mechanism must be adjusted to the changing machines,” he wrote. “It is clear that in an age of inevitable social changes that planning cannot be escaped. There is no better way, I think, of undercutting the maladjustment of society than by planning.” Recall that this was the same man who helped to found the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis; he was also at the same time a leading figure in the SSRC. That one could run in both circles—advocating therapeutic Freudian analysis on the one side and total, rationalized social engineering on the other—must shade, if not challenge, our understanding of both movements.

Even Riesman’s “ethically sensitive colleague,” Margaret Mead, a “cultural relativist,” succumbed to the temptation to reify culture and inject it with almost dictatorial powers over the individual. By profession she was a democrat, a liberal’s liberal, declaring, “[T]hose of us who, recognizing the values of a democratic society, are wholly committed to a society that can grow and change, and within which other men will be left free to make new choices, are not only committed to resist manipulation, but are also committed not to manipulate.” This was as close to the anthropologist’s Hippocratic oath as one will likely encounter. She called it the “ethics of insight-giving.” Having participated in the war effort, Mead was well aware of the power of the social sciences, that it could be used destructively as well as constructively. And with respect to her usual subjects—the Samoans, Balinese, and other inhabitants of the Southeast Asian

202 William F. Ogburn, “Research Aspects of the Relation of Technics to Society, with Special Reference to Adjustment,” n.d., pp. 3-4, 6, fol. 15, box 34, series VI, Ogburn MSS.
203 Margaret Mead, Male and Female (1949; New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 413.
islands—she was especially sensitive to the relativity of cultures and quick not to essentialize biology or culture. Qualifications are stacked upon other qualifications, one on top of the other, in books like *Male and Female* (1949).

Yet, something happened to Mead when she started envisioning the “patterning” of American culture. Intercultural relativity gave way to a kind of intracultural lockdown, the complete standardization and uniformity of the individuals within the culture. She wrote:

> Where each little village, each separate caste or dialect group, in Europe or Asia has been standardised by the experience of the past, faultlessly transmitted to each new generation, the people of America, North and South, East and West, are being standardised by the future, by the houses all hope to live in, not by the houses where they were born, by the way they hope their wives will look, not by the folds of Mother’s skirt in which they hid their faces.\(^{204}\)

Americans succumb to the illusory American Dream, to fantasies of “supersoft” wash-clothes, “white detached houses with green shutters,” nylons, and vitamins, not simply because they can afford them, but because only the dream can unify a country that is this fluid, mobile, and diverse, lacking a “group style.” “[T]he image of the new ways, of the modern ways, of the standard American ways, has come,” she bemoans.\(^{205}\) Here, Mead threw off her cultural relativity and spoke only in terms of a totalizing “standard American culture,” whereby, “The members of the great central majority blur their perceptions, sacrifice the sharpness of their experience, in order to live as if they had been bred to live in the dream.”\(^{206}\)

\(^{204}\) Mead, *Male and Female*, 233.

\(^{205}\) Mead, *Male and Female*, 228.

\(^{206}\) Mead, *Male and Female*, 240.
The illusory dream can be traced back to the beginning, Mead asserted—back to birth. In America sex is not “attained.” No: “the child is absolutely and completely named and identified from birth. The recurrent sentimental colour-note, blue for a boy and pink for a girl, runs through announcements, gifts, and nursery decoration,” she wrote.\textsuperscript{207} Her description of the hospital-bound birthing process befits Aldus Huxley’s \textit{Brave New World} (1932). “The primary bodily capabilities with which the children enters the world are initially unrewarded. It can suck, but no breast is given it; it can cry for help, but no one holds it close and feeds it. Its body is wrapped complete in soft cloth, the first lesson in expecting cloth to intervene between one body and the next.”\textsuperscript{208} In Mead’s America a mother would not dream of offering her child a breast.

Instead, they are offered a cold hard nipple from which to suckle the good life. “The well-fed, well-bathed, well-powdered, well-clothed baby lies in its crib and drinks its well-pasteurised milk out of its well-sterilised bottle.”\textsuperscript{209} This pattern of normalization and standardization—“conformity”—will continue throughout one’s life at a relentless pace, she argued. The “pattern of maturation” is conditional—everyone has a “role,” although “No one represents a permanent place on the ladder.”\textsuperscript{210} A committed neo-Freudian, Mead infused this dreary picture with the “anxiety” and “insecurity” that the movement would become most known for. “[T]he actual sensuous experience must be adjusted to the visual ideal that is held up before [its denizens]. No sensuous actuality fits the dream, each must be to a degree denied, blurred, or critically rejected, so that one may

\textsuperscript{207} Mead, \textit{Male and Female}, 247.
\textsuperscript{208} Mead, \textit{Male and Female}, 248.
\textsuperscript{209} Mead, \textit{Male and Female}, 250.
\textsuperscript{210} Mead, \textit{Male and Female}, 286.
continue to live,” she claimed. Success, acceptance, praise, comfort, love are as elusive for the full-grown adult as for the sterilized swaddled babe.

Using the same neo-Freudian framework as Fromm, Mead anticipated Riesman’s “other-directeds”: “This discrepancy between the actuality and the ideal is experienced as a discrepancy between ‘myself and the others,’ a falling-behind the standards of the block, the clique, the school class, the other men in the office, the rest of the faculty; and also as a discrepancy between what one should be and feel and what one does feel,” she wrote. The unifying, standardizing future-oriented dream of the American Way held absolute power over (Mead’s) anxious and insecure subjects. Now, Male and Female was conceived not in the cornucopian 1950s, but as a lecture on sex psychology and delivered in November 1946 in California. Mead acknowledged that poverty still existed in America, which is why, in part, she focused on the American Dream.

The dating is important. It suggests that adjustment and the problem of conformity were not a by-product or response to McCarthyism Communist witch-hunts, and a skyrocketing GDP. Rather, these were the occasion for the application of a way of talking about culture. Max Ascoli, the founding editor of the liberal bi-weekly newsmagazine, The Reporter, who had chastised Riesman for ignoring the war turned around and praised his prophetic vision of American culture. “If I had more time to let myself go, I think that I would write you an inordinate number of pages, so strong was the impact that your book has made on me,” wrote Ascoli. “You are a Jeremiah disguised in sociological paraphernalis [sic]. As a jeremiad, I welcome your book. I hope it will stimulate and irritate many people as much as it has stimulated and irritated me. Above

211 Mead, Male and Female, 242.
212 Mead, Male and Female, 237-38.
all I hope that it will stir many to prove that you are dead-wrong. I am sure that you wish for nothing better." There was no disguise here, and while some may have tried to prove Riesman dead wrong, the coming consumer revolution would only seem to justify the value and perspicuity of this particular, social scientific vision of culture—one that was intrinsically incapable of setting the captive “individual” free again. Do prophets make for good physicians is an intriguing question.

Long after the publication of The Lonely Crowd, Riesman continued to use the concept of other-direction to illustrate sociological arguments about culture. Yet, as was the case with Fromm, he would also retreat from the implications of his own argument about culture’s omnipotence and omnipresence. In lockstep with his mentor, he did so by aligning himself with the classical humanist tradition, emphasizing the integrity of the individual “self.” In a review essay on the African-American author Richard Wright, written in 1953, for instance, one can see Riesman making overt connections to an earlier essays he wrote on (his own) Jewish “marginality.” Although he thought it difficult for an individual to ascend above the “overwhelming atmospheric pressure of the total culture,” he thought a “minority position” had a “superior vantage point for understanding” and “self-development.” Riesman wrote, “The nonconformity which I admire may be defined as a map of the world made from where the given individual sits, not from where somebody else sits—an individualized map but not a crazy one, since it has some basis in reality, including social reality.”

213 Max Ascoli to DR, 9 Dec. 1949, fol. “The Lonely Crowd: Correspondence,” box 40, HUG (fp) 99.16, Riesman MSS.
One can also sense in this essay a hint of culpability, a possible awareness that the neo-Freudians may have eased the way for adjustment rather than having stemmed the tide. He had come to suspect that the psychotherapist’s ideal of “integration” was a kind of “translation” of “socialist ideology into therapeutic ideology, in which the classless society is replaced, so to say, by the classless individual”:

It is a concept of the withering away of conflict and contradiction—in inner contradiction rather than capitalist contradiction. It is a marriage of Freud and Marx which robs both of their sharpness, a vision of life as a sort of fluid-ball-bearing drive without shifts or jolts or, for that matter, ruts. It represents a transfer to the individual of the efficiency expert’s view that all social disharmonies can be erased by better communication; it is the panacea of the semanticists, with insight taking the role of the inner clarifier of communications, with no questions raised as to the possibility that life, at its best, might be, as Lionel Trilling has said, an uncomfortable series of choices, not among evils but among competing goods.  

Marrying Freud to Marx was Fromm’s principle contribution to social psychotherapy. Whether Riesman saw his own role in spawning the therapeutic culture of adjustment is another matter. On his end, from his perspective, Wright and other nonconformists started looking far more attractive, as though they had found the key to the cage. “Among the variety of selves any one of us includes, we ought to have the inalienable right to choose our own cast, and to play such parts in the human drama as we can play,” he asserted, praising Wright. If nothing else, Riesman had lightened his own atmospheric pressure. This would not be his first or last “Pauline conversion.”

Some of Riesman’s critics thought his better intentions were beside the point. Instead of having a social scientist review *The Lonely Crowd* for “Study of Man,”

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216 Riesman, “Marginality, Conformity, and Insight”: 256.
217 Riesman, “Marginality, Conformity, and Insight”: 257.
Commentary allowed the literary critic Joseph Wood Krutch to take a crack at it. And he got right to the nub of the matter, asserting that Riesman’s method largely determined the conclusions he would and did reach: “The whole contemporary tendency to study everything in sociological terms is itself a part of the phenomenon with which this particular study is concerned.” He explained,

Mr. Riesman is concerned with mass phenomena and the concern with mass phenomena is itself a phenomenon of the age. He talks exclusively about the “average man” [and the tastes of the average man]. . . . But that does not change either the fact that this is itself a sociological phenomenon [the “average man”] or that the dominance of the sociological approach tends to promote the very tendencies which a sociologist like Mr. Riesman seems to disapprove of.

Moreover, “the more one concentrates one’s attention on mass phenomena the greater the weight that will be given them.” This raises an interesting question: Is it possible to discuss these sociological phenomena (e.g., conformity, adjustment, “other-direction”) as anything other than sociological phenomena?

That Krutch, a literary critic, was embroiling himself in these sorts of issues suggests something about the power and influence of the social sciences in postwar America. The mere fact that there was such a fulsome and protracted debate about adjustment in the 1950s and early 1960s says as much, if not more, about the status and influence of the social sciences as it does about the actual behavior of Americans. Indeed, the author and literary critic Richard Chase complained, “We have saturated and obscured ideas with prestige and power values, or with psychiatric and sociological symbolisms. The mood of sociology has settled on the country like a blight, from

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Madison Avenue to the ‘communications media’ to the universities to the Pentagon.”

As Chase suggested, social scientists did not merely shuffle down the Ivory Tower. Many leapt. “American sociology has become the most omnivorous of all the social sciences,” noted the Columbia University-trained sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset. “It has set itself the task of systematically investigating the operations of contemporary society, in much the same fashion, and with similar theoretical conceptions, as the biological sciences seek to investigate the structure and function of living organisms.” It set about not only to investigate but also disseminate. In the following chapter we shall see what it meant to have done so, and done so so successfully.

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220 Chase, “Max Lerner’s America,” 255.
Chapter 4 | THE ENDS OF ADJUSTMENT

I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed
by madness, starving hysterical naked,

... Breakthroughs! over the river! flips and crucifixions! gone
down the flood! Highs! Epiphanies! Despairs! Ten
years’ animal screams and suicides! Minds! New loves!
Mad generation! down on the rocks of Time!”

Allen Ginsberg, *Howl* (1955)

All I know is that first you’ve got to get mad! You’ve got
to say, “I’m a HUMAN BEING, GODDAMNIT! My LIFE
has VALUE!!” So, I want you to get up now. I want all of
you to get up out of your chairs. I want you to get up right
now, and go to the window, open it, and stick your head out
and yell: “I’m as mad as hell, and I’m not going to take this
anymore!!”

*Network* (1976)

Reflecting on his first multimedia event with The Velvet Underground—the
upstart rock band the artist was sponsoring—Andy Warhol thought the venue and
audience Pop perfect. “I loved it all,” he said, looking back on the mid-January 1966
performance. “It couldn’t have happened to a better group of people.”¹ The New York
Society for Clinical Psychiatry had invited Warhol to provide entertainment for their
annual black-tie banquet. It was certainly a bold move by the society. The theologian
Paul Tillich had been a previous special speaker. “Creativity and the artist have always
held a fascination for the serious student of human behavior,” said Dr. Robert Campbell,

¹ Andy Warhol and Pat Hackett, *POPism: The Warhol ’60s* (New York: Harcourt, 1980),
147-48.
the program chairman. “And we’re fascinated by the mass communications activities of Warhol and his group.” The “happening” was billed “The Chic Mystique of Andy Warhol.”

Society members and their wives started to arrive at the Delmonico Hotel around 6:30 p.m., gowns flowing, tuxes fitted. For his part Warhol wore a black tie, dinner jacket, corduroy work pants, and his (for the moment) trademark sunglasses; Velvet leader, John Cale, wore a black suit and stone-studded neck choker, while Nico, Warhol’s lanky supermodel, actress, now crooner, wore a gleaming white pantsuit. The poet Gerard Malanga was there along with the artist’s on-the-way-out ingénue, Edie Sedgwick, Dannie Williams, Billy Lunich, and the avant-garde filmmaker and critic Jonas Mekas. They had with them the usual props—hand-held cameras, lighting and band equipment, and a whip for Malanga for his special performance, a whip dance. One Warhol associate referred to “The Chic Mystique of Andy Warhol,” the performance, as “a kind of community action-under-ground-look-at-yourself-film project.”

As the guests started carving into their delicate green beans and roast beef entrées, bedlam erupted. The Velvets cranked up the volume on their heavily distorted amps and started pounding away in the darkened ballroom. Malanga swayed and gyrated center stage in front of the band’s spotlight, occasionally cracking his whip for dramatic effect. Edie attempted to sing herself while bopping around, but only contributed to the deafening distortion. (Campbell later called the performance “a short lived torture of cacophony.”) This was only one part of the event. Armed with a camera and blazing lighting equipment, Mekas started impromptu interviews, cornering psychiatrists and

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their partners. With the help of Barbara Rubin, a fellow underground (porn) filmmaker, Mekas began a series of klieg-light interrogations, asking guests the most direct and intrusive questions about their sexual preferences and practices as well as the shape, size, and feel of their partner’s genitals. “You’re a psychiatrist, you’re not supposed to get embarrassed!” they scolded their red-faced interviewees. (Mekas was collecting material for another one of Warhol’s film projects.)

Before Mekas could give a brief concluding talk on the art of film, many of the guests got up and left. Grace Glueck recorded some of the reactions for the New York Times: “I suppose you could call this gathering a spontaneous eruption of the id,” said Dr. Alfred Lilienthal. “Warhol’s message is one of super-reality,” said another, “a repetition of the concrete quite akin to the L.S.D. experience.” Many were far less cerebral and gracious in their response. “Why are they exposing us to these nuts?” a third asked. “But don’t quote me.” . . . “It was ridiculous, outrageous, painful,” said Dr. Harry Weinstock. “Everything that’s new doesn’t necessarily have meaning. It seemed like a whole prison ward had escaped.” The Pop impresario, as usual, struck his oh-well pose and disavowed all responsibility, claiming he could hear nothing above the shrill blaring of the speakers either. A mere spectator (although not), he said of his bemused noninterference, “I was too fascinated watching the psychiatrists. They really were upset, and some of them started to leave, the ladies in their long dresses and the men in their black ties.”

This carnivalesque event is loaded with symbolic meaning. Most obvious, it symbolized the returning of the psychiatric and psychoanalytic surveilling glare, a point

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4 Warhol and Hackett, POPism, 147.
at which the object who had become the subject would double back upon its observer.

This reversal was made possible in a larger field of meaning by events far removed from the Delmonico. The year that had just ended, and which this party literally celebrated, 1965, was a fulcrum not merely for the decade, but for a generation, an era. Todd Gitlin has suggested that the mood in 1965 might be best captured by listening to its music and comparing it to that of the previous year. P.F. Sloan’s “Eve of Destruction,” sung by Barry McGuire, was by August 1965 at the top of the sales charts, whereas in 1964 the number one hits included the Shangri Las’ ‘Leader of the Pack,’ the Beach Boys’ ‘Deuce Coupe’ and ‘California Girls,’ the Supremes’ ‘Baby Love, and the Beatles’ ‘A Hard Day’s Night’—all bouncy.” In contrast, “‘Eve’ was strident and bitter.” Not everyone was bitter, nor was everyone strident. In fact, plenty of people were still hopeful. But something had changed in the atmosphere.

President Johnson ordered air strikes against targets in North Vietnam in February 1965; that same month Malcolm X was assassinated in New York in front of 400 people. Six-hundred civil rights activists marched in Selma, Alabama, in March. Johnson soon thereafter would send 4,000 troops to Selma and Montgomery to quell the unrest. Freedom Marchers reached Montgomery. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed. Yet there was also rioting in Watts. Twenty thousand National Guard troops were put into place: thirty-four died. West Chicago was up in arms as well. That fall Ken Kesey and friends started holding Acid Tests parties, “public happenings,” using the purest (then-still-legal) LSD. The “pranksters” regaled themselves in costumes and paint. Partiers glowed in pulsating colored lights, bombarded with throbbing music and

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amplified talk, looped tape-recorded messages and jittery home movies. By the end of November, 15,000-20,000 antiwar protestors had besieged the nation’s capitol. Campuses were in mental if not physical lock-down. And by Christmas over 180,000 troops were in Vietnam.

It is no coincidence that these events share the same chronological space as the idea of the “psychedelic.” Part of the symbolic resonance of the events of that carnivalesque evening at the Delmonico emerge from the observation that psychiatric knowledge—practices, prestige, position, power—and its practioners perform at the level of culture, that they are part of its warp and woof, caught up not only in its pranks and pranksters but also its battles. Debates about the self and the self’s relationship to its culture, to society, are inextricably bound up in a complex set of debates, arguments, conversations, and performances of knowledge about types of knowledge—sociological, psychological, psychoanalytic—and their uses in mid-century culture.

Though “countercultural” figures and cultural critics like Norman Mailer wished to rescue the self—conceptually and biographically—from the tight grip of society and culture, society and culture managed to survive relatively unscathed. That is to say, not only did “society” and “culture,” in their various meanings, intimations, relations—continue to animate the thoughts of the dominant culture, it also continued to animate their own. Their criticism of culture was not possible without the same concept of culture that they were, in turn, criticizing. These two sections will examine in particular the hegemonic status of neo-Freudianism in cultural criticism, beginning with Robert Lindner’s work on juvenile delinquency, moving through Norman Mailer’s famous essay “The White Negro” (1957) and the little magazine Neurotica, and ending with Betty
Friedan’s *The Feminine Mystique* (1962). This analysis will not argue that they were merely neo-Freudians. Indeed, their quarrel opened up further possibilities for others to make a more radical break with the dominant discourses of socio-psychoanalytic knowledge.

The second half of the chapter shifts away from the textual analysis of cultural criticism to sites and practices, politics and pedagogy. This portion of the chapter will interrogate the end of the neo-Freudian cultural self—the end of “adjustment”—as the dominant theoretical apparatus for discussing, debating, and analyzing the self. The disintegration was not merely the result of debates within the profession, to practitioner of socio-psychoanalytic knowledge. It was tightly bound with decidedly non-professional matters, to debates about “national purpose” that erupted in 1960, to the election and assassination of Kennedy, student “rebellions,” and the war in Vietnam. In the end, neo-Freudian adjustment expired, if not in truth than in power, because of its incapacity to inspire, communicate, convey, reach, or sustain meaning, values, and purpose. At the heart of the sixties—the civil rights marches, student rebellions, feminist activism, Vietnam protesting—was a rather simple, even unsophisticated, yet culturally profound idea, an idea encapsulated by a declaration proclaimed on the steps of Sproul Hall on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley: “I’m a human being.”

This, then, is the story of the self—in context.
A Quarrel

When Jay Landesman, an antique dealer from St. Louis, Missouri, started talking with his friend, Richard Rubenstein, about starting a new literary magazine, the two agreed on at least one point: it needed to have a “definite point of view” (in contrast to the other highbrow *Hudson Review*-varieties). The magazine would be “for and about neurotics, written by neurotics,” for “the time had come for the neurotic personality to defend himself against a hostile world.” Landesman explained:

In various psychiatric magazines we found articles analyzing the neurotic’s influences in art and literature, going back to Freud. The relationship between art and neurosis was well documented; it was up to us to put it into language that readers of *Neurotica* could understand. We wanted the neurotic writer, artist, etc. to share his vision with other neurotics. We began to write manifestos that would explain our purpose in publishing, but with each attempt we failed to come to terms with the problem. It was either too technical, like the practitioners’ journals, or too pseudo like *Popular Psychology*. Finally we hit the right note.  

*Neurotica, épater le bourgeois*, was, on the one hand, unpredictable, irreverent, titillating, playful, and sarcastic; yet on the other, it could be penetratingly self-righteous and condescending. After only nine issues it was effectively scuttled by the U.S. Postal Service for indecency; however, in that short span it managed to present an impressive array of rising cultural figures. Not only did it publish Allen Ginsberg’s collaborative “Song: Fie My Fum” and the writings of other Beat littérateurs, like Holmes; it also promoted and published other rising intellectual and cultural figures, like Marshall

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McLuhan, William Barrett, Peter Viereck, Anatole Broyard, Leonard Bernstein, and Chandler Brossard, the future senior editor of *Look* magazine.\(^7\)

On the side of titillation and play, Landesman and his Balzacian-looking assistant editor, Gershon Legman, published articles with titles like “Why American Homosexuals Marry,” “The Attack Upon Prostitution As An Attack Upon Culture,” “The Psychopathology of the Comics” (Legman’s specialty). In addition to covering an “eye-witness” report on shock therapy from Carl Gentile (pseudonym Carl Goy), who claimed to have “slept through fifty comas,” they also published an early Charles Newman piece, entitled “Hair,” devoted entirely to a man shaving his pubic hair.\(^8\) (In the sixties, Newman became the first editor of the prestigious literary magazine *TriQuarterly*.) On the lighter side were the magazine’s classifieds: “NEUROTIC hausfrau, Californian, seeks correspondence re neuroses and psychological lore. Box 113,” for instance. Another one ran, “AMATEUR photographer, pseudo-artist and chronic neurotic, now in rut. Will one of Satan’s helpers get behind and push? Box 117”; and another, “MALE. Interested in the rare feather, Odd fetishes, strange quirks costumes trinkets props and people of the surrealist underground. Box 122.”\(^9\) It was called the “Degenerates’ Corner” of the magazine.

There was another, more strident, sober dimension to *Neurotica*, which deserves equal attention. Legman in particular was dead serious about the state of affairs in the

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\(^7\) According to Landesman, the journal was so successful that the king of mass magazines, Henry Luce, tried to scoop it up and add it to his own expanding collection (*Rebel without Applause*, 86ff).


\(^9\) On classifieds, see unnumbered back-pages in *Neurotica* 3 (Autumn 1948); and *Neurotica* 4 (Spring 1949).
nation, post-World War II. “No more poetry . . . unless it makes a point,” Legman demanded of Landesman, who he regarded as dilettantish at times. “I’m going to get you writers who clearly see that America is on the brink of a nervous breakdown.”

Neurotica’s editors, Landesman in particular, very much saw themselves engaged in meaningful sociopsychanalytic criticism; this was not just for fun. They tried to get leading psychoanalysts to write for the publication, sending invitation letters to Karl Menninger and Gregory Zilboorg, among others. In the third issue, they started running book reviews of the latest writings in psychoanalysis, including not only Reich’s books, but also The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis (vol. 3, 1947), Lionel Goitein’s Art and the Unconscious (1948). In issue five, they started abstracting as well and included Psychoanalytic Quarterly; Sándor Lorand’s Technique of Psychoanalytic Therapy (1946); and Psychoanalytic Quarterly. In the next issue, they began another section, entitled “Anti-Psychiatrica,” in which they quoted anti-psychiatry pieces in the popular media. Two issues later, they devoted most of the issue to an analysis of “the Machine” and included in it serious criticism analysis from McLuhan and others.

The editors of Neurotica did, indeed, have a definite point of view. In their way of thinking the traditional literary magazine was “dead,” and in an “Editorial Gesture” (which was more of a demand), they laid out exactly what they wanted from contributors. “We want needle-nose analysis of a culture clearly going insane. We do not particularly want quasi-neurotic poetry and fake-psychopathic prose—and that is what we are

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10 Landesman, Rebel without Applause, 67.
11 Both declined, although Menninger thought it a “brave project” and was intrigued by the title of one proposed piece, “The Castration Complex in Animals”; Zilboorg was kind as well, saying (in Landesman’s recollection of their meeting), “I doubt if any analysts would be interested in writing for Neurotica. They are much too neurotic to be associated with anything so neurotic as Neurotica. Best of luck” (Landesman, Rebel without Applause, 47-48).
Neurotica was the country’s first “lay-psychiatric” magazine, they boasted—professional practitioners had their journals; now patients had theirs as well. This was not an anti-psychiatry outlet, in other words. In fact, the editors commented that they were “appalled by the slowness with which the psychiatric and anthropological disciplines [were] filtering down into literature,” and what they wanted to do through the magazine was to “expedite this process,” that is, to “describe a neurotic society from the inside.”

We define neurosis as the defensive activities of normal individuals against abnormal environments. We assume that human beings are born non-neurotic, and are neuroticized later. We do not agree that it is the measure of social intelligence and psychiatric health to adapt to, and rationalize for, every evil. We do not subscribe to the psychosomatic fashion of throwing the gun on the corpse and the blame on the victim. We give space to the description of the neuroses with which human beings defend themselves from an intolerable reality. But it is with this reality that we are primarily concerned. . . . It is our purpose to implement the realization on the part of people that they live in a neurotic culture and that it is making neurotics out of them.

Getting at America’s neurotic culture would be difficult. But they saw only one way of doing it: “We believe that the psychiatric perspective can best describe and most clearly interpret the impact of human society on the human individual. We wish to popularize and perhaps implement that perspective. The psychiatrist encourages the patient to speak. In NEUROTICA the culture will speak—and be analyzed.”

America’s complicated relationship with psychoanalysis is captured in Herbert Benjamin’s essay, “Psychiatrist: God or Demitasse.” “The principles of psychiatry and psychoanalysis are not at stake here, but psychiatry as a social dynamic is in question. Psychiatry may be pure scientific objectivity itself, but some of its ancillary significances at least are grist for the social historian’s mill,” Benjamin suggested. On the one hand,

13 Herbert S. Benjamin, “Psychiatrist: God or Demitasse?” Neurotica 4 (Spring 1949):
the essay offers a cutting critique of psychiatry’s power over the American imagination. He likened its mystical, mythical influence to that of a religious cult. He wrote, “Not too long ago the poet or philosopher was assumed to be the repository of wisdom. Before that the pagan oracle resolved his specific dilemma. Or the priest. Or the witch doctor. For modern man, the psychiatrist has appropriated the heuristic function.”¹⁴ In a long mediation of his own, he mocked:

The Believer goes to the corporeal representative of his mythic father, the analyst, who becomes oracle, guide, and opiate, or more accurately, spiked demi-tasse, to be sipped for a feeling of warmth and well-being. He knows that at last in a limited period of time his apprenticeship to life will be consummated. By semi-weekly administrations of the drug he knows he will come to see the light, and all things of heaven and earth and men and women will be made clear to him, not in a glorious epiphany—this is no really imaginative man, but in a comfortable way—through a kind of “Personality Adjustment.”

The Believer has entered “the Fold, the community of normality.”¹⁵

For all his mockery, Benjamin implicitly positions himself as a kind of true believer, implying that “personality adjustment” (“normalcy”) best be viewed, in this analogy, as a misguided heresy deviating from authentic orthodoxy. Remember, he said, “The principles of psychiatry and psychoanalysis are not at stake here.” At the heart of this heresy Benjamin observed an “initial deception (which must be broken down rather than nourished),” he said.¹⁶ “As any educated modern man with the slightest trace of Kulturhistoriker [cultural history] in him knows (or anyone at all with a radio), ours is a sick, or dying culture, strangling from over-civilization, over-mechanization and

¹⁴ Benjamin, “Psychiatrist: God or Demitasse?” 33.
¹⁵ Benjamin, “Psychiatrist: God or Demitasse?” 35, 37.
¹⁶ Benjamin, “Psychiatrist: God or Demitasse?” 37.
dehumanization, world wars, mass butchery, killing and degradation,” he explained.17

What the deceived person does not realize is that by adjusting to this “sick society” they can never reach their “fullest possible development as an individual being,” which is the reason why they want to adjust in the first place. Not only does conformity to a sick society press one through this “dehumanizing process” (which reduces one’s “vitality” and “spontaneity”). It obscures the fact that it was the “sick society” that made the believer neurotic in the first place. To explain this evil cyclical process, who and what does he quote? Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom.18

For all their diversity, these individuals, from Robert Lindner to Herbert Benjamin, share a similar view of society. Although the early counterculture used “harsher terms” in their critique of this society, their views differed little from the mainstream, from the likes of Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, and David Riesman. Moreover, all of them continued to believe in the redemptive role of psychiatry and psychoanalytic knowledge. In this too they differed little from the likes of the Freudians and neo-Freudians. It remained to the next generation to break this hegemonic mold.

Nowhere was the complex, ambiguous, contradictory relationship between America’s dominant culture of adjustment and its antiauthoritarian critics more clearly stated than in the career of Robert Lindner, the author of Rebel Without a Cause (1944). Lindner’s vocation as a psychologist and psychoanalyst, on the one hand, and, on the other, his direct influence upon hipsters like Norman Mailer suggest that the distinctions between those who were accused of adjusting society and those doing the accusing were not always clear and distinct. James Dean’s sultry performance in Rebel Without a Cause,

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17 Benjamin, “Psychiatrist: God or Demitasse?” 33.
18 Benjamin, “Psychiatrist: God or Demitasse?” 37.
the movie, turned the title of Lindner’s book into a catchy pop culture slogan and helped
glamorize juvenile delinquency. This was not Lindner’s intent in writing the book, certainly. It also ran completely against the aims of his profession. He was a
criminologist and child psychologist, working at the maximum-security Federal
Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.19

By the time Warner Brothers finally released the film in 1955, Lindner was already enjoying the spoils of notoriety. And he had a lecture-circuit schedule to prove it, too. Henry Luce’s editors extracted “The Mutiny of the Young,” one of his essays, for Time magazine’s December 6, 1954, issue, and within three days of publication, the psychologist had received over five hundred letters from readers. Editors from around the country started banging down his door wanting the original.20 The criminologist’s work touched a live nerve. Postwar juvenile delinquency had emerged as something of a national crisis, and community leaders, parents, teachers, and social workers were desperate for answers. Time ended the piece by concluding that Lindner had essentially reached the same “diagnosis” of “other-directedness” as David Riesman”—although in “harsher terms.”21

Harsher, to be sure, and more dramatic, too. Like many of his colleagues, Lindner found a ready answer for the nation’s social ills in contemporary global events—namely, the “insecurity” of the Great Depression and World War II. Together in succession they had unleashed on the planet what he likened to an unstoppable “virulent epidemic” and

“soul-destroying” psychopathic plague. “[T]he integrity of each individual has been ground to dust” in the “huge power presses” of the twentieth century, he explained. “Millions of men, as catastrophes and cataclysms signalized by wars and economic upheavals fell upon them, have been displaced. Their identities as persons have been lost or stolen. And with the displacement, the dispossession and the loss of identity, has come insecurity.” The signs of this global psychopathic crisis were in Lindner’s mind quite obvious. Simply recall, he said, a “few geographic place names—Madrid, Munich, Buchenwald, Warsaw, Hiroshima, Kargopol, Los Alamos, Seoul, Hau.”

Juvenile delinquency was, in his expert opinion, only one indicator of a greater tumult, the spread of mass psychopathy across the world.

This emphasis on world-historical events represented a shift away from the more specific arguments about and characteristics of delinquency outlined in Lindner’s earlier work. Set in the Lewisburg Penitentiary, not sunny Southern California, Rebel Without a Cause—the book—is a technical piece, focused on the “revivification” of an inmate, Harold, using an experimental therapeutic technique, called “hypnoanalysis.” Lindner the criminologist was keen on exploring and explaining Harold’s class status, immigrant background, social milieu, biographical details, and family dynamics in Rebel. Not so, however, in Must You Conform? and his other popular paperbacks. With the wind of an ascendant profession at his back, Lindner charted a more ambitious (and ultimately ambiguous) course—right into the middle of white, middle-class suburbia. Gone in his

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22 Lindner, Must You Conform?, 25, 22, 20.
latter work is the emphasis on poverty and class disparity. These particulars gave way to the anecdotal as well as to the universal, to events like a world war.

What caused this epidemic in juvenile “mutiny” was not the war or the economic depression of the 1930s, per se; it was an even greater, more sinister (although also more nebulous) force, which is the ultimate target of Lindner’s excoriation. He called it “Society.” What the neo-Freudians took to be axiomatic—the notion that one’s personality was largely determined by society and culture—Lindner considered repulsive and “anti-human”: “No more is society the servant of man, no more does it reflect and implement his personal requirements, no more does it find its source in the consent of its parts, and no more can it be held that society is man,” Lindner warned. “For it has come about over the centuries that the organism originally created by the participation of its individual units has assumed a life of its own. . . . In short society has become a stranger to man, and a hostile stranger at that.” The psychologist conjured a whole series of metaphors and adjectives to describe the great all-consuming beast of society: “Frankenstein,” a “devouring monster that can never be satisfied,” among others.\(^24\)

To get to the nub of the issue, society had one goal, expressed in one inviolable law, what he called the “Eleventh Commandment”: “You Must Adjust!” Lindner took the language of Riesman, Fromm, and the other ambivalent critics to a whole new level of hyperbole. There was no escaping the commandment, he warned:

This is the motto inscribed on the walls of every nursery, and the processes that break the spirit are initiated there. In birth begins conformity. Slowly and subtly, the infant is shaped to the prevailing pattern, his needs for love and care turned against him as weapons to enforce submission. Uniqueness, individuality, difference—these are viewed with horror, even shame; at the very least, they are treated like diseases, and a regiment of specialists are available today to ‘cure’ the

\(^{24}\) Lindner, *Must You Conform?*, 150-58.
child who will not or cannot conform. . . . You must adjust . . . This is the legend imprinted in every schoolbook, the invisible message on every blackboard. Our schools have become vast factories for the manufacture of robots.\footnote{Lindner, Must You Conform?, 167-68.}

Since World War II the “great lie of adjustment”—the “myth of conformity”—had been “etched above the door of every church, synagogue, cathedral, temple, and chapel”; it was the “slogan emblazoned on the banners of all political parties,” “the inscription at the heart of all systems that contend for the loyalties of men.” Through this one inviolable commandment, adjustment, the entire world was being transformed, he said, into a “giant Lubianka and an immense Dachau.”\footnote{Lindner, Must You Conform?, 27, 170-73.}

Though in Lindner’s mind the enemy seemed all too obvious, his indictment presents the close reader with rather thorny terrain. Take the case of the psychotherapist within Society. While the ministers of adjustment are many, Lindner’s colleagues come under a barrage of accusations. “Joined in the criminal conspiracy against human nature, they have poisoned the last oasis for the relief of man. Of all betrayals, their treachery has been the greatest, for in them we have placed our remaining hope, and in them, sadly, hope had fled,” he wrote.

Equating protest with madness and non-conformity with neurosis, in the clinics and hospitals, the consulting rooms and offices, they labor with art and skill to gut the flame that burns eternally at the core of being. Recklessly and with the abandon of some demented sower of noxious seeds, they fling abroad their soporifics, their sedatives, their palliative drugs and their opiate dopes, lulling the restlessness of man, besetting him so that he sleepwalks through his days and does not recognize the doom-writing on the wall.\footnote{Lindner, Must You Conform?, 173.}
When not wielding their “silent knife” (performing lobotomies) or standing at the controls of their “little black box” (administering “shock ‘therapy’”), these “sorcerers’ apprentices of conformity” were busy drowning everyone else, he said, in a “rising flood of imbecilic recipes for contented existence.”

Lindner was walking a very fine line here, so fine in fact that at times one might justifiably question its existence. How different were his ultimate aims from those of his evil-minded colleagues? The last chapter of the book reads very much like a recipe for contented existence. Through an “education for maturity”—the title of the chapter—readers were told that they needed to cultivate what Lindner referred to as a “positive rebellion,” which he distilled into six attributes: awareness; identity; skepticism; responsibility; employment; and tension. Were these goals that different from other therapists? In this self-education, readers needed to learn “positive ways” of cultivating those “values” that arose “from the nature of man, the conditions of his life, and the aspirations and purposes of his existence,” he wrote. (Lindner was calling for a little bit of rebellion—but not too much.) Not to be overlooked, what legitimated Lindner’s critique and educational mandate and what set his book apart from other popularizers were precisely his bona fides as an expert on psychopathy and juvenile delinquency. Indeed, as the book’s front- and back-cover blurbs state, it was his credentialing as a professional that made Must You Conform? a must read. “Dr. Lindner draws his material from his immense experience with American men and women who have grown ‘sick-minded trying to be true to themselves in an era of rigid attitudes and senseless pressures,’” read a back-cover endorsement from the novelist Philip Wylie.

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28 Lindner, Must You Conform?, 173.
29 Lindner, Must You Conform?, 189.
Lindner railed against Frankensteins and sorcerers; however, there was never a question of psychiatry’s intrinsic value. Various portions of the book had been presented as lectures in psychiatry and delinquency at the Hacker Foundation and Clinic in Los Angeles, a Nassau County Psychological Association event, psychological colloquia, a meeting of the Southern California Chapter of Correctional Service Associates, among other venues. Some of the material had also appeared in the scholarly journal *Psychoanalysis*. Lindner stirred controversy, to be sure—but not disavowal or renunciation. He was thoroughly embedded in the psychiatric and social reform community. Likewise, he was staunchly committed to what he thought psychiatry’s uniquely redemptive role in society, as well as the (qualified) practitioner’s prophetic vision. Here was no apostate; he wrote in a long footnote in defense of his profession, “I am further convinced that the ‘cycle of civilizations,’ the eternal round of societal birth-and-death, can be broken, now that we possess a tool for understanding it in psychoanalysis. It was only man’s ignorance of himself that sustained it, anyhow. The question is: will we employ this knowledge?”

Americans would indeed employ this knowledge, although not always as Lindner had envisioned. “Positive rebellion” was a bit too buttoned-down for some, including the psychoanalyst’s good friend, the novelist Norman Mailer. More radical steps were needed in order to break through the “Super-Ego of society.” While Mailer considered his friend the “most imaginative and most sympathetic of the psychoanalysts who have studied the psychopathic personality,” he reckoned that even he “was not ready to project himself into the essential sympathy—which is that the psychopath may indeed be the

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30 Lindner, *Must You Conform?*, 159.
perverted and dangerous front-runner of a new kind of personality which could become the central expression of human nature before the twentieth century is over.” In his widely read and influential *Dissent* essay, “The White Negro” (1957), Mailer intended to turn juvenile delinquents like Harold into prototypes of a kind of anti-conformist cultural savior: the psychopathic hipster. In this transfigurative project, not only did Mailer rely heavily on his friend Lindner and another psychoanalyst, the instinct-driven (and seemingly button-less) Wilhelm Reich. He also turned to Marx.

“Hip is an exploration into the nature of man, and its emphasis is on the Self rather than Society,” the novelist explained in a self-referential tribute, which was first published in the *Village Voice* then again in *Advertisements for Myself* not long after. As a by-product of the industrial revolution, humanity had been reduced, he argued, to “a biochemical mechanism placed in some insignificant corner of the rational and material universe,” and it was his bold goal of returning “man to the center of the universe.”

Although recent discussions of “The White Negro” have done well to limn the essay’s existential affinities, less attention has been focused on Mailer conceptualization of “Society,” which, like that of Erich Fromm, tried to balance the introspectivist insights of Freud and the social analysis of Marx. Typically ignored are the comments that conclude “The White Negro,” in which Mailer reaffirmed his belief that Marx still held out the best possibility of inspiring a “God-like view of human justice and injustice” and where he called *Das Kapital* a work of “epic grandeur” for having incorporated the “drama of human energy” as well as its “social currents and dissipations, its

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imprisonments, expressions, and tragic wastes” into a “gigantic synthesis of human action.”

Mailer included in Advertisements for Myself a “Riddle in Psychical Economy” where readers are asked to guess who wrote two long passages. Only later did Mailer reveal the mystery writer (himself). In the riddle he merely rewrote in his own words the opening passage to Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams and Marx’s Das Kapital. The first of the two is especially enlightening. The original Freud, translated by James Strachey, begins with: “In the pages that follow I shall bring forward proof that there is a psychological technique which makes it possible to interpret dreams, and that, if that procedure is employed, every dream reveals itself as a psychical structure which has a meaning and which can be inserted at an assignable point in the mental activities of waking life.” Mailer’s rewrite forgoes the personal:

In the pages that follow I shall bring forward proof that there is a psychological technique which makes it possible to interpret the unconscious undercurrents of society, and that, if that procedure is employed, every society reveals itself as a psychical structure which has an unconscious direction or conflict of direction which can be detected at any assignable point in the over activities of social life.

This move from the personal to the social is mirrored in Mailer’s rewrite of Das Kapital’s introduction, where the materialism of economic commodification is transformed into personal desire: Mailer replaced Marx’s “immense accumulation of commodities” with (his) “immense accumulation of unsatisfied [sexual] desires.” A turn toward the existential did not, in Mailer’s mind, necessitate the jettisoning of Marxian sociology.

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35 Mailer, Advertisements for Myself, 438-39.
In the conclusion to “The White Negro,” Mailer did not praise *Das Kapital* as a masterful presentation of dialectical materialism or an artful debunking of Hegelian idealism, but instead as a work of psychological acuity. It was, he said, the “first of the major *psychologies* to approach the mystery of social cruelty so simply and practically as to say that we are a collective body of humans whose life-energy is wasted, displaced, and procedurally stolen as it passes from one of us to another.” If there really was going to be a revolution in human values, Mailer reckoned that what would make a “crucial difference” is if, beforehand, “someone had already delineated a neo-Marxian calculus aimed at comprehending every circuit and process of society from ukase to kiss as the communications of human energy.”

That neo-Marxian calculus, as Mailer indicated in his writing “The White Negro,” would need to begin with an accounting of the country’s great mass of alienated psychopaths.

Neo-Marxism had a very specific, concrete reference point in the mid to late 1950s. Although many leftists and liberals had already abandoned the politics of Marxism, Marxist cultural analysis experienced a minor revival in the postwar years when some of his earlier unpublished writings started showing up in print and translation, first in Europe (before the war), then in the U.S. (after). Readers were presented in these manuscripts with a more philosophically compelling (read humanist) “younger” Marx, with a Marx who was less hostile to “the self.” Of the six-hundred-plus pages in Père Jean-Yves Calvez’s *La Pensée de Karl Marx* (1956) four hundred and forty, for instance, were devoted to the theme of “alienation.”

Fragments started appearing here and there,

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37 Some historians have come to equate the terms of “alienation” exclusively with postwar existentialism. Douglas Rossinow has little to say about Marx and Freud and argues, for instance,
although the neo-Marxian revival did not begin in earnest until somewhere around 1958—the same year *Advertisements for Myself* was published—when the first substantial English translation of the most influential of these early writings, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, appeared in Raya Dunayevskaya’s *Marxism and Freedom.*

Marxian structural analysis cast a long if sometimes undetectable shadow over Mailer’s thinking. Not always did it conform acquiescently to his more impulsive, existential thinking either. “One is Hip or one is Square (the alternative which each new generation coming into American life is beginning to feel),” he wrote in a famous passage in the essay, “one is a rebel or one conforms, one is a frontiersman in the Wild West of American night life, or else a Square cell, trapped in the totalitarian tissues of American society, doomed will-nilly to conform if one is to succeed.” To be conformed in defeat was to be “jailed in the prison air of other people’s habits, other people’s

“The poles of alienation and authenticity define existentialism, and existential politics spins political analysis and action between these two poles. It is not merely a historian’s conceit to call this politics existentialist” (*The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New Left in America* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1998], 5. See also Cotkin, *Existential America*, ch. 9).

defeats, boredom, quiet desperation, and muted icy self-destroying rage,” he warned.39

The Manichean struggle between Hip and Square, taken by some to be emblematic of the black-and-white decade in which it was written, is premised, however, on a dubious dichotomy, which Mailer’s own idiosyncratic thinking produced.40 For as the essay unfolds, it becomes clear that both of these figures are psychopathic. The question in Mailer’s mind was not “if” they were psychopathic, but rather in what way.

Midcentury America was experiencing a “crisis of accelerated historical tempo and deteriorated values,” Mailer said. This was overstressing everyone’s “nervous systems” and creating a pandemic of mental illness. Each year, he wrote, the country’s “contradictory popular culture” was adding “new millions” to its already burgeoning psychopathic population of at least “ten million (a “modest” estimate, Mailer reckoned). In a long disjointed discourse on psychopathy—where he quoted from his friend’s Rebel Without a Cause—the novelist divided these incalculable psychopaths into two camps: the great mass of “less good, less bright, less willful, less destructive, less creative” psychopaths; and the more “elite,” “philosophical,” and “antithetical” psychopaths (the hipsters).41 In all the parsing, the reader might be forgiven for overlooking the fact, undisputed, that this argument began with an assertion of ten million-plus psychopaths. This was the figure that the “squares”—i.e., the country’s leading psychiatric experts and the people who paid them—had been promulgating since the end of World War II.

40 John Leland has recently put it exactly this way, even quoting this passage, when he writes, “So much of hip’s history is based on a relationship of polarities: black and white, high culture and low, mainstream and underground, insider and outsider. Hip worked the ground between the poles, shuttling intelligence across the gap or conspiring with one side to elude the other. . . . You could tell what side anything was on because there were only two sides” (Hip: A History [New York: Ecco, 2004], 336).
Mailer likened the elite among the conventional psychopaths to a type of “psychic outlaw.” They had accepted the terms of death and had made the willful decision to “encourage the psychopath” within. While the conventional types were tossing back their tranquilizers to ensure the least amount of psychic resistance to the demands of conformity, Mailer’s outlaws were busily building for themselves a “new nervous system.” Only by embracing their inner psychopath could they then live in the existential “theatre of the present”; do whatever they wanted whenever they wanted and gamble with their life; and liberate “the self from the Super-Ego of society,” which, said Mailer, was the ultimate goal. By linking courage, violence, anarchism, and psychopathy together, the prophet of hip was not just referencing some random characteristics of psychopathy, however.

This particular constellation had a history. The figure lurking behind Mailer’s description of the hipster was the maladjusted soldier-turned-veteran. Though Mailer’s own World War II, *The Naked and the Dead*, served as a backdrop to “The White Negro,” another backdrop could have easily been Willard Waller’s *The Veteran Comes Back*, for the similarities between Waller’s bitter (racially stereotyped) veteran and Mailer’s psychic (also racialized as black) outlaw are remarkable. Consider Waller’s description of the soldier’s nihilism, taken from a section appropriately titled for the comparison “He Learns a New Code of Morals: Courage Is All.” “Death is always possible, and it may be just around the corner. Any day, any hour may be the last. Small wonder that the soldier snatches eagerly whatever satisfactions his life affords without weighing the implications of his behavior with too great a degree of moral nicety,” he

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wrote. Death is all-encompassing, omnipresent, and “[b]ecause the soldier’s life is not under his own control, he is freed from the sense of personal responsibility. He cannot plan, because he has no control over his future,” he wrote.\textsuperscript{44} This was essentially Mailer’s defense of the hipster and his ethic of courage.

In \textit{The Veteran Comes Back}, Waller’s soldier-veteran is a rebel and a gambler. After his discharge he has a “furious crazing to live”—“Ennui is the rebellion of the human soul against regimentation,” he wrote—“but he is geared to a demoniacal restless.” He is wild, even bestial, and super sexual. He is of the race of Ishmael.

Although he yearns for love, he settles for lust. Trained to be a killer by necessity, he has “an almost prideful attitude toward murder and its instruments,” Waller said. Mailer could have written the same—or rather he rewrote the same. Waller did not paint all rebel-soldiers as psychopaths (unlike Mailer), though he did think many were “mentally unbalanced.” During the war they “suffer[ed] mental shocks which leave them with a form of psychoneurosis characterized by an inclination toward explosions of aggressive behavior.” This, too, Mailer might have written.\textsuperscript{45} Both figures, whatever their differences, shared these interconnected qualities (according to the prototype): they were sexually potent, slightly psychotic, and therefore prone to violence, and easily bored.

“The Beat evaluation of American life is exactly that of the most extreme reactionaries; it’s just that the plus and minus signs have changed places,” wrote a fellow traveler of the Beats, the radical Christian poet Kenneth Rexroth. “Read the Beat novelists on most any subject: their opinions differ in no wise from those of the squares with whom they are engaged in a tug of war. The two parties are pulling on opposite ends

\textsuperscript{44} Willard Waller, \textit{The Veteran Comes Back} (New York: The Dryden Press, 1944), 57.
\textsuperscript{45} Waller, \textit{Veterans Comes Back}, 127-28, 74, 64, 127, 124.
of a rope which even the most moderate sophisticated are aware does not exist.” Rexroth was referring specifically to the hipster/beat literature on African Americans; however, one might extend in a number of directions his contention that their criticism was “not rejection, alienation,” but, as he argued, “reflection.”\textsuperscript{46} That, Christopher Lasch argued in a rather harsh critique, was precisely the problem. Liberals like Mailer were “too committed” to the culture they claimed to “despise” to be effective critics of it, Lasch charged. Mailer had written, “In America few people will trust you unless you are irreverent”; Lasch came back and wrote—“the truth is that people trust you most when you merely seem to be irreverent.”\textsuperscript{47}

Others commented on the mirror image. The range of reactions ran from ambivalent or dismissive to scornful. “It all comes too easily, too glibly,” the novelist Dan Jacobson wrote, mocking the Beats’ “criticism.” What was so shocking or especially perceptive about writing against the conformity of suburban bedrooms and supermarkets? “[T]he outsider cannot but be struck by how totally these ‘rebels’ accept the most vulgar of the received ideas of ‘America’ as the truth about America. ‘I am obsessed by Time Magazine,’ Mr. Ginsberg cries; and he speaks more truly than he perhaps knows.”\textsuperscript{48} In an article entitled “The Bored, the Bearded and the Beat,” Look magazine put it this way, more playfully: “There’s nothing really new about the Beat philosophy. It consists merely


\textsuperscript{47} Christopher Lasch, \textit{The New Radicalism in America: The Intellectual as a Social Type, 1889-1963} (1965; New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 343.

of the average American’s value scale—turned inside out. The goals of Beats are not watching TV, not wearing gray flannel, not owning a home in the suburbs and especially—not working.” For those unable to retire completely from the “rat race of everyday living” Look suggested temping as a “human guinea pig for medical tests.”

This was not just the view from the outside but also from within. “Though it is certainly a generation of extremes, including both the hipster and the ‘radical’ young Republican in its ranks, it renders unto Caesar (i.e., society) what is Caesar’s, and unto God what is God’s,” John Clellon Holmes, a Beat figure and author, wrote of his comrades and friends in an influential New York Times article. “For in the wildest hipster, making a mystique of bop, drugs and the night life, there is no desire to shatter the ‘square’ society in which he lives, only to elude it.” One might extend this making of a “mystique” to include psychoanalysis and psychiatry. Although much has been made of Reichian psychoanalysis’s role in forging an instincts-driven countercultural identity, the Beats’ critique of the country’s “madness” explicitly and implicitly drew also from the non-Reichian (neo-Freudian) mainstream, so much so that it is sometimes hard to make out the distinction between eluding the adjustive demands of the dominant culture and rendering them.

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In one of the most influential indictments against postwar adjustment, *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), the feminist Betty Friedan stated that it would be “half-wrong” to blame Sigmund Freud for the feminine mystique. Although Friedan acknowledged that the mystique was “an idea born of Freud,” when it emerged full force in the forties it was merely “old prejudices” reappearing in “Freudian disguise.” Friedan was very careful to distinguish that she was not anti-Freudian. “[T]he very nature of Freudian thought makes it virtually invulnerable to question. How can an educated American woman, who is not herself an analyst, presume to question a Freudian truth?” she qualified. “No one can question the basic genius of Freud’s discoveries, nor the contribution he has made to our culture. Nor do I question the effectiveness of psychoanalysis as it is practiced today by Freudian or anti-Freudian.”

What she would question, however, was its “application”—in light of her “own experience as a woman.” These introductory qualifications were important. She wanted readers to know that she was not going to challenge the integral facticity of Freudianism; she was still of the fold. As in the case of Lindner, Mailer, and the editors at *Neurotica*, the debate in *The Feminine Mystique* would be over interpretation and usage. In Freud’s defense as well as her own engagement with psychoanalysis, Friedan again clarified, “[T]he practice of psychoanalysis as a therapy was not primarily responsible for the feminine mystique. It was the creation of writers and editors in the mass media, ad-

agency motivation researchers, and behind them the popularizers and translators of Freudian thought in the college and universities.”

Like Lindner and Legman, Friedan was a committed believer. Going back to her days as an undergraduate at Smith College, she had wanted to pursue a career in psychology, having studied under Kurt Koffka, a co-founder with Max Wertheimer and Wolfgang Köhler of Gestalt psychology. Koffka’s influence over Friedan’s intellectual development was profound. “[T]he elegant conceptual structure of Gestalt psychology made me feel like some kind of mental mountain goat, leaping from peak to peak, perilously, behind that austere impassive guide,” she wrote of Koffka years later in life. “And I learned, forever, that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, that human behavior can only be understood in its cultural context, that our vision cannot be wholly objective.” Psychology “frightened me, obsessed me, scared me,” she wrote. Yet through it she discovered the life of the mind. While at Berkeley, she would study as well under another celebrated psychoanalyst, the great Eric Erickson.

The Feminine Mystique was Friedan’s Ph.D. thesis in social psychology, at least the one that she wanted to write but which, she said, Columbia University was unwilling to recognize. As she embarked on the project, Friedan had staff members at the New York Public Library pulling all the latest research as well as classic texts in psychology, sociology, and social psychology. Although known for her use of women’s magazines, Friedan also consulted and referenced numerous scholarly publications, American Imago, the Journal of Social Issues, the American Journal of Sociology, the Journal of Social

Psychology, among others. She poured over Arnold Green’s and Clyde Kluckhohn’s writings. Likewise, Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom and David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd provided rich troves of neo-Freudian insight. On a page of notes she took on Escape from Freedom, she scribbled, “What he says of man, true of women.” She was particularly piqued by Riesman’s analysis of boredom and apathy. On one page in her notes, the only thing that is written is “Boredom,” in bold lettering, with the following comment “even with ads/as with politics–Riesman, p. 264,” as though she had discovered something very important. Elsewhere she scribbled hastily with copious emphasis, “*boredom* !!! — ?” as if it held the key to some secret about this problem that had no name.  

Like Lindner, Friedan was walking a fine line. She used neo- and classical Freudian scholarship both to attack other neo-Freudians and to critique American culture. And like Lindner she took a very similar tactical approach: lead readers to believe that ignoramuses and charlatans were at fault, that they were behind the Eleventh Commandment of “You Must Adjust!” In truth, however, the situation was more complicated. Friedan herself slipped and admitted, “There are many paradoxes here.” And in the book it shows. For instance, as her biographer Daniel Horowitz has noted, Friedan relied on Karen Horney and Carl Jung for her historicization and criticism of

55 Friedan, Feminine Mystique, 104.
Freud. As her research notes indicate, she was very much indebted to Fromm and other neo-Freudians, such as David Riesman. And yet, in a chapter entitled “The Functional Freeze, the Feminine Protest, and Margaret Mead,” she demonstrated outright contempt for the premise of neo-Freudian analysis—although she gave Fromm and Riesman a free pass.

“Instead of translating, sifting, the cultural bias out of Freudian theories,” she charged, “Margaret Mead, and the others who pioneered in the fields of culture and personality, compounded that error by fitting their own anthropological observations into Freudian rubric.” Friedan’s cultural critique of Freud, namely, that his misogynist blindness was a product of his Victorian milieu, was antedated by Karen Horney’s own arguments. Adding to the confusion, Friedan then turned around and described Mead’s work as nothing but anti-feminist “functionalist” drivel. In Friedan’s employment functionalist essentially meant adjustment-focused, although here as well in her discussion a host of finer distinctions were elided. Everyone she fingered came out looking more or less like a functionalist drone of the status quo, a la Talcott Parsons (a leading sociologist at Harvard who soon became just about everyone’s whipping boy as the chief sociological defender of the status quo). Neo-Freudianism or Freudianism was not really the sticking point. It was instead the desired outcome: would a practitioner’s usage of theory advance the politics of gender equality? (Mead’s work plainly did not.)

56 Daniel Horowitz, Betty Friedan and the Making of The Feminine Mystique: The American Left, the Cold War, and Modern Feminism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998), 75.
57 Friedan, Feminine Mystique, 127.
“For years, psychiatrists have tried to ‘cure’ their patients’ conflicts by fitting them to the culture. But adjustment to a culture which does not permit the realization of one’s entire being is not a cure at all, according to the new psychological thinkers,” she wrote. One of these “new psychological thinkers” was Rollo May, an analyst who, in a passage Friedan quoted, suggested that a person’s internal conflict was a healthy sign of “freedom,” for a world without conflict and anxiety—a world of total adjustment—is, he argued, a world without “being.” She not only agreed wholeheartedly but suggested that new psychological thinkers did not understand the profundities of their own insights. She wrote, “These thinkers may not know how accurately they are describing the kind of adjustment that has been inflicted on American housewives. What they are describing as unseen self-destruction in man, is, I think, no less destructive in women who adjust to the feminine mystique.”

There is more than a little irony here. Having trained at Harry Stack Sullivan’s (neo-Freudian-friendly) William A. White Institute, May’s conception of culture was very much indebted to Horney and company. Indeed, Fromm was his supervisor. Moreover, she herself included Riesman, Horney, and Fromm in a list of these “new psychological thinkers.” According to Friedan, the difference between the one kind of culturalist (the Meads) and another (the Fromms and Mays) was that the latter still respected the need for human growth.

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59 Friedan, Feminine Mystique, 311.
60 On Fromm’s influence, see, for instance, Rollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety (1950; New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), 191ff. To be noted, May was not merely a neo-Freudian clone. In The Meaning of Anxiety and elsewhere, he leavened the cultralist’s approach with a heavy dose of the proto-existentialist Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard. See Cotkin, Existential America, ch. 4.
61 Friedan, Feminine Mystique, 310; also 310, n. 1.
Beyond taking to task America’s most visible anthropologist, Mead, Friedan made another bold move. She compared her desperate housewives to holocaust survivors (with qualification, to be noted). After acknowledging that the suggestion might seem “far-fetched,” she opined, “[T]he women who ‘adjust’ as housewives, who grow up wanting to be ‘just a housewife,’ are in as much danger as the millions who walked to their own death in the concentration camps—and the millions more who refused to believe that the concentration camps existed.” Building on the psychoanalyst and educator Bruno Bettelheim’s study of Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camp prisoners, she suggested that the camps had been conceived as confines for “dehumanization.” Prisoners there were “forced to give up their individuality and merge themselves into an amorphous mass.” Through “great fatigue” and “monotonous, endless” work that required “no mental concentration,” emanated not from the prisoner’s own “personality,” and permitted “no real initiative, no expression of the self, not even a real demarcation of time”—the prisoners “surrendered their human identity.” They became “prisoners of their own minds.”


This, she argued, was analogous to the “problem that has no name”—i.e., “adjustment.”

“All this seems terribly remote from the easy life of the American suburban housewife. But is her house in reality a comfortable concentration camp? Have not women who live in the image of the feminine mystique trapped themselves within the narrow walls of their homes? They have learned to ‘adjust’ to their biological role,” she wrote. “For the problem that has no name, from which so many women in America suffer today, is caused by adjustment to an image that does not permit them to become what
they now can be.” In making this bold analogy, Friedan was not referring to the mere individual, to the life of the singular biological woman in 1950s America, but to womanhood in general—to frustrated, bored suburban housewives everywhere.

In the fifteen years after World War II, this mystique of feminine fulfillment became the cherished and self-perpetuating core of contemporary American culture. Millions of women lived their lives in the image of those pretty pictures of the American suburban housewife, kissing their husband goodbye in front of the picture window, depositing their station wagonsful of children at school, and smiling as they ran the new electric waxer over the spotless kitchen floor.

The power of this analogy of the comfortable concentration camp comes from her laying the haunting mental image of the real concentration camps over the conceptual framework of neo-Freudianism. With great ease the language of *The Feminine Mystique* weaves back and forth between descriptions of “American women” and “the American woman.”

Friedan was neither the first nor the last social critic to invoke the concentration camp comparison. “Probably, we will never be able to determine the psychic havoc of the concentration camps and the atom bomb upon the unconscious mind of almost everyone alive in these years,” Norman Mailer wrote in the opening line of “The White Negro.” Those who lived through the war and survived continued to live with the sense of dread, the gnawing sense that another war might indeed end all wars. They lived, he wrote, believing they “might still be doomed to die as a cipher in some vast statistical operation” in which their “teeth would be counted” and “hair would be saved” but their death would be “unknown, unhonored, and unremarked”—“death by *deus ex machina* in a gas chamber or a radioactive city.” It was America’s “collective condition,” he lamented, to

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63 Friedan, *Feminine Mystique*, 307, 311.
64 Friedan, *Feminine Mystique*, 18.
“live with instant death by atomic war, relatively quick death by the State as *l’univers concentrationnaire*, or with the slow death by conformity with every creative and rebellious instinct stifled.”\(^{65}\) The concentration camp was an effective metaphor in a cold war environment.

As the historian Wilfred McClay has suggested, “The parallel was overdrawn, even outrageous.” However, Friedan (like Mailer) made the comparison not merely for “dramatic or rhetorical effect”—she actually believed it. Moreover, through it she could tap into a “pervasive American postwar fascination with, and fear of, total institutions or closed social systems—with totalitarianism, hard and soft.” (Mailer was a perfect example of this, obsessed as he was with America becoming what he often referred to as a “totalitarian society.”). As McClay explained,

> The camp image was not only a representation of a particular set of institutions used under particular historical circumstances; it was an archetypal symbol of all that was most threatening about the postwar world; its tendency to subjugate the individual to the social whole or otherwise to make genuine individuality dangerous, undesirable, superfluous, or impossible. The idea of the camps became a kind of defining prototype for those fears.\(^{66}\)

While McClay notes that Friedan found “considerable support” from contemporary social scientists like Riesman to sustain her conclusions, this does not quite do justice to the relationship between neo-Freudians and the camp. The social, as opposed to personal, orientation of social psychology supported and helped to extend the logic of the metaphor. The two were a perfect match, the one complementing the other. Neo-Freudianism was made for the all-encompassing “totalitarian society” and “feminine

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mystique,” as the import and employment of Fromm’s *Escape from Freedom* demonstrates.

Friedan, like her male counterparts, continued to believe in the salvific role of psychology. In navigating toward the ultimate goal of total gender equality she found the psychologist A. H. Maslow particularly helpful. Maslow had discovered the key to fulfillment, she claimed. In a study of the great men and women in the past, he had found that those who had reached a level of “self-actualization” and “self-realization” were the most satisfied in life (sexually and otherwise). Indeed, according to the picture Friedan conveys of his findings, “self-actualizing” people “never stale in their enjoyment of the day-to-day living, the trivialities which can become unbearably chafing to those for whom they are the only world.” Moreover, they have the “tendency to more and more complete spontaneity, the dropping of defenses, growing intimacy, honesty, and self-expression.” The list of positive attributes continues, although the key was this: he had found, she wrote, that such people “made no really sharp differentiation between the roles and personalities of the two sexes.” Maslow proved the necessity of complete equality and validated Friedan’s mission as social reformer. Again, there was no real repudiation of psychological expertise. Indeed, she continually referred to Maslow as “Professor.” Her role was instead as a mediator—picking and choosing arguments that furthered the cause.

The distinctions here mattered. As the mass of letters addressed to Friedan by her fans indicate, there were real implications to these arguments. “You’ve done it!”—a woman from Wilmington, Delaware, declared in a September 7, 1963, letter. “The sense

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of relief that has engulfed me since completing *The Feminine Mystique* is inexpressible. Thank you for giving me the courage to do something about it.” *The Feminine Mystique* encouraged women to restart their education, to resume writing, to begin new careers and return to others. “I finished *The Feminine Mystique* last week—I have been in a state of awe because of its revealing, realistic truth,” another woman wrote. “At one point during my reading I was so enthralled, my heart beating only for the next word—next fact—next idea—I had to stop and do something to express my fervor; I splashed out a big sign, ‘YEA BETTY FRIEDAN,’ to tape on the wall in front of me.” Whenever she read something that struck a chord, she would just look up at the sign and “bask in [her] violent emotions.” “At another point I found myself literally crying because of all the chains the feminine mystique has placed on women and men alike, children, and our American culture as a whole.”

Another woman wrote, “All the way through I kept almost cheering out loud, and mentally exclaiming, ‘Exactly!’” She had purchased eight copies, sent them to friends and family, and would soon buy another four or five. While holding down four jobs, she had put her Korean Army veteran husband through a Masters degree after quitting school herself. (The marriage ended in divorce.) This was not the only veteran’s wife to have welcomed the salve of Friedan’s work. A Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, veteran’s wife with twins wrote that she could not find the words to express what the book meant to her. She too had quit college and helped to put her husband through his Ph.D. program. “However, after our children were about 2 years old—I became bored to tears with articles on ‘1,000 ways to cook hamburger’—I already knew them all! I took up bridge—but after about a

68 All letters have had their authors’ names removed. See fols. 682, 680, carton 19, series III, Friedan MSS.
year—this, too had run its course—and I was bored. . . . I was very close to severe emotional illness.” Eventually, gradually, she began training and breeding dogs, although not without feeling guilty for indulging her own interests—that is, until she read Friedan’s book, she said.69

Friedan’s work had helped her readers to realize that over the years they had made something of a Faustian pact. Following the advice of “experts” in psychoanalysis and the behavioral and social sciences might have made them more “modern,” than their mothers and grandmothers, but it cost them something in return. It still entailed sacrifices. Some were temporary and minor, others life-long and irreversible, like a brood to care for. These wives of veterans, sometimes through great pain and misery, came to the realization that by agreeing to help “readjust” their soldiers and sailors back into civilian life that they had been adjusted as well. What Friedan helped to do was to remove the isolating guilt associated with their inner rebellion against the pact and what was seen as their patriotic duty. Another woman, who had been married for twelve years, with six children to show for it, thought Friedan and her theories ought to be ranked as highly as those of the great men of civilization—namely, Darwin and Freud. She confided to Friedan in one missive, “[M]y husband and I practice ‘togetherness’ (I’m afraid you’ve made it a bad, bad word!) to an alarming degree, often saying proudly ‘our only interest is our children and our home’—we have even given up our social life as not particularly worthwhile.” (During labor her husband could do the breathing exercises better than she could, she joked.)70

69 See fols. 681-82, carton 19, series III, Friedan MSS.
70 See fols. 682-83, carton 19, series III, Friedan MSS.
This woman from Vancouver, British Columbia, joked about her and her husband’s excessive togetherness. Too often, however, there was a darker side to the hollowness of these promises. Blissful security did not await all wives at the end of the rainbow of adjustment. “Where is a woman’s SECURITY when the wars begin and her husband goes to war and never comes back?” wrote one middle-aged widow to Friedan. The woman had married her late husband during the war (World War II). While serving, he went missing. Two years passed before he was presumed dead. “I had a home, a child, a husband and security, huh? I wanted to ask Hermione Gingold, where was my security? Don’t people realize the husband may die—may run off with a blonde? There is no security, the only security is within yourself.” The American dream had no guarantee. Not every woman like this one from Forest Hills, New York, took the same bitter pill. But as the popularity of Friedan’s book suggests, women were eager to push back against the problem that now had a name.

What set Friedan’s book apart from Must You Conform? and other sociopsychological critiques was not Friedan’s conception of adjustment—not her conceptual understanding of society and the relationship of the individual to it, that is. Friedan managed, in contrast, to channel her critique against adjustment into a political and social movement, beginning with the foundation of the National Organization of Women. A number of women who wrote to Friedan praising The Feministic Mystique were also steeped in psychology and psychoanalytic literature. Many were not—which gave the book not only a different kind of audience but also a different sort of relevance.

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71 See fol. 683, carton 19, series III, Friedan MSS.
Two months before officially declaring his presidential candidacy, John F. Kennedy warned guests at the hundred-dollars-a-plate Jefferson-Jackson Day diner at the Beverly Hilton that perilous times lay ahead. “The harsh facts of the matter are . . . that as a nation we face a hard, tough course ahead for perhaps a generation or more but also, as a nation, the harsh facts of the matter are that we have gone soft—physically, mentally and spiritually soft,” he said. “We are, I’m afraid, in danger of losing something solid at the core. We are losing that Pilgrim and pioneer spirit of initiative and independence—that old fashioned Spartan devotion to duty, honor and country.” Americans had taken for granted their security and had grown soft on affluence.\textsuperscript{72}

Push-button gadgets, TVs, precooked meals, automobiles, and prefab houses were threatening America’s moral fiber and collective resolve. So, too, its long cherished traditions, namely, its Puritan work ethic. To bolster his case, Kennedy, like President Truman before him, used Selective Service rejection rates to make his point about national declension. During the Korean War, one out of two male recruits had been declared mentally, physically, or morally unfit for military service, of any kind, and after induction even more young men had been weeded out. More sat in naval prisons than served in the entire Norwegian and Danish navies combined, he reported. The nation’s standard of living had improved dramatically. Profits were up. Yet rates for divorce,

mental illness, and juvenile delinquency, sales of tranquilizers, and school dropouts were up as well. “What has happened to us as a nation?” he asked.\textsuperscript{73}

What America lacked, so he and many others said, was a compellingly clear “national purpose.”\textsuperscript{74} The “Great Debate” of 1960, of which Kennedy’s speech was very much a piece, had its most immediate and concerted origins in the mid-fifties in a commissioned special studies project under the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The project’s ambitious goal was to study the challenges facing the nation at midcentury, particularly on the international scene.\textsuperscript{75} Forward looking in conception, the project turned defensive, literally and psychologically, with the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957, which stunned many on both the sides of the ideological aisle, and in-between as well, demonstrating that the Soviets were far more technologically advanced than many had assumed. After Khrushchev’s icy Camp David meeting with the president in 1959, called “the second Sputnik,” during which the Soviet premier declared, “We will bury you,” doubts and misgivings turned to alarm. “The crisis came, and soon enough it was discovered that we in fact did not know what or who we were,” noted one contemporary.\textsuperscript{76}

The two Sputniks—abetted by a downturn in the economy in 1959—spurred a period of sober reflection and political reconfigurations. Small town newspapers in front of local courthouses organized symposiums to discuss this growing, gnawing sense that

\textsuperscript{73} Blanchard, “Slow Corrosion of Luxury,” 6.
\textsuperscript{75} The project’s six panel reports were published in Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961).
America needed a new national purpose to overcome its apathy and drift. Church groups held round-table discussion. Moralizers railed. National organizations like the Junior Chamber of Commerce and the American Veterans made it a central theme of their annual summer conventions. “In that spring of 1960 national purpose was a subject heard across the nation at political meetings, in commencement addresses, in magazine columns, in newspaper editorials, and on radio and television,” the historian Donald White comments. At the beginning of that year Eisenhower established a “President’s Commission on National Goals” to study this lack of national focus; in June Henry Luce went before Congress an urged escalation in the cold war to wrest it out of clutch of the Soviet Union; also that spring and summer, Life magazine with the New York Times launched a highly touted joint symposium on the current “crisis.” It was called “National Purpose.” Luce himself introduced the series, which showcased, in White’s term, the “leaders of the consensus.” Invited contributors included Adlai Stevenson, Archibald MacLeish, Billy Graham, and Walter Lippmann. Life and the New York Times both published the symposium’s addresses in their magazine and newspaper then all together in a coffee table kind of book. Other magazines picked the symposium up, too. Both presidential candidates agreed to contribute.

78 For a description, see “A Full ‘Cold War’ is Urged by Luce,” New York Times, 29 June 1960, 4.
80 When the Sunday supplement This Week sent out a notice to readers, asking them to send in their suggestions for what America’s national goals should be, they received 45,000 replies. There was, said the editors, a “vague, deep, and very real concern about the health and integrity of the country as a whole” in the mass of responses. Life received over a thousand letters themselves in response to their symposium series, many “filled with a sense of urgency” (“How
Although both national parties incorporated it into their platforms, Kennedy made the Great Debate of 1960 the centerpiece of his campaign. In fact, it was his campaign. Even the phrase “New Frontiers,” as Philip Green noted in a 1961 *Commentary* article, originated in the reporting of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Furthermore, Hans J. Morgenthau’s *The Purpose of American Politics* (1960), which appeared at the zenith of the debate, could be read, said Green, “almost as a campaign document” for the U.S. senator. In speech after speech he hammered home the central themes that emerged out of the national debate—the need for fortitude and moral resolve, civic reengagement and another “city on a hill” mission, a strong national security policy, leadership, and a commitment to freedom at home and abroad. He also harped, on the negative side, on tailfins and prefab houses, the torpor of affluence and the neglect of America’s Puritan work ethic—that is, on a nation “gone soft.” In a country “overwhelmed with chrome” where “the bland leading the bland,” candidate Kennedy would soon receive the mantle of the anti-adjustment president.

In his January 20, 1961, inaugural address, Kenney pleaded with Americans to join “in creating a new endeavor, not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.” The historian and political scientist Clinton Rossiter, who also contributed to the *Life-New York Times* You Can Help The President,” *This Week*, 19 April 1959, 8-9; “Here’s Your Report, Mr. President!” *This Week*, 5 July 1959, 4-5; William I. Nichols, “National Goals: A Crisis of Conscience,” *Vital Speeches* 27 [1 Jan. 1961], 163, all cited and quoted in Jefferies, “The ‘Quest for National Purpose’ of 1960”; 463.


82 On the sexual undercurrent at work here, see Robert D. Dean’s insightful *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy, Culture, Politics, and the Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), esp. ch. 7.

National Purpose symposium, with an article subtitled by the newspaper “A Call to Rise Above Self-Interest to Aid ‘Whole Human Race,’” could have written Kennedy’s address. “If we choose greatness, as surely we must, we choose effort,” Rossiter said, “the kind of national effort that transcends the ordinary lives of men and commits them to the pursuit of a common purpose, that persuades them to sacrifice private indulgences to the public interest, that sends them on a search for leaders who call forth strengths rather than pander to weakness.” When Kennedy issued the nation a new commandment, “ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country,” he was building off of the sermons and entreaties of Rossiter and other participants in the Great Debate, turning their message into a political platform as well as a moral mandate. He even, to boot, added a scriptural reference to augur the moment, quoting the prophet Isaiah: “undo the heavy burdens . . . (and) let the oppressed go free.”

The Great Debate not only installed a Catholic president; it also helped to inspire a new movement, which was in turn social, political, cultural, racial, and religious. A defining manifesto, if there was one, was the Students for a Democratic Society’s Port Huron Statement (1962). Long on aspiration, the document was a cross between a new, revolutionary Declaration of Independence and a longish party platform. “The statement was, without a doubt, one of the most important political writings of the decade, a kind of declaration of majority by the New Left,” James Gilbert asserted on the eve of the next

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decade.\textsuperscript{86} This one statement within the \textit{Port Huron Statement} well captures the utopian vision that animated the movement: “The United States’ principal goal should be creating a world where hunger, poverty, disease, ignorance, violence, and exploitation are replaced as central features by abundance, reason, love, and international cooperation.” It was a reflection of the Great Debate.

Although the New Left, as the left branch of the student movement came to be known, would sour on Kennedy, he and they were of a moment, borne of common circumstances. “At the beginning of the 1960’s, we had two things happening simultaneously that made us feel change was possible, although difficult, within the American system. One was the installation of the new government in Washington, which promised reform and brought a feeling of reform to the country,” explained the SDS leader Thomas Hayden. “And at the same time we had the birth of the civil rights movement in the South and a supporting student movement in the North, which reinforced in many ways the atmosphere that was already being generated by the new President.”\textsuperscript{87} As Todd Gitlin, another leader admitted years later as well, “whatever doubts attached to John F. Kennedy, one could anticipate a thaw, a sense of the possible. What had been underground flowed to the surface. . . . the climate of opinion began to shift.”\textsuperscript{88} That new climate was decidedly anti-adjustment.

The most productive way of reading the \textit{Port Huron Statement} is up against the \textit{Life-New York Times} symposium and Kennedy’s speeches. When placed side by side the documents evince and share three essential characteristics. First, all of them have the feel

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\textsuperscript{86} James Gilbert, “The Left Young and Old,” \textit{Partisan Review} 36, no. 3 (1969): 352.  \\
\textsuperscript{87} Daniel Aaron, et al., “Confrontation: The Old Left and the New,” \textit{American Scholar} 36 (Autumn 1967): 569.  \\
\textsuperscript{88} Gitlin, \textit{Sixties}, 81.
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and tone of a jeremiad. There is an immediacy to the sense of crisis—namely, a foreboding that without a revitalized mission, both at home and in the world, the very foundations of the American “civilization” might collapse. “Although mankind desperately needs revolutionary leadership, America rests in national stalemate, its goals ambiguous and tradition-bound instead of informed and clear, its democratic system apathetic and manipulated rather than “of, by, and for the people,”” the Port Huron Statement states. “Not only did tarnish appear on our image of American virtue, not only did disillusion occur when the hypocrisy of American ideals was discovered, but we began to sense that what we had originally seen as the American Golden Age was actually the decline of an era.” The urgent necessity of “leadership” was a key theme in Kennedy’s presidential campaign as well as a nodal point in the national purpose debate. John Gardner suggested in his Life-New York Times symposium contribution that Americans knew what the problems were. What, then, was lacking? “The answer is simple: We lack leadership on the part of our leaders, and commitment on the part of every American. I want to talk about individual ‘commitment.’ . . . Can we count on an ample supply of dedicated Americans?” The students who met near Port Huron said yes.

Second, contributors to the debate and followers in the youth, acknowledged widespread estrangement and profound alienation in the population. Philip Green put it this way, building off of Morgenthau’s book. “American people in the mass today lack any sense of common responsibility for the organization and improvement of their society.” They were, he said, alienated from government as an institution. In America’s

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complex society, ruled by big government and big business, power had been consolidated in the hands of the precious few, and as a result “the individual” was, Green argued, “less and less a force, the organization more and more of one (the organization, the abstract machine; not the community, a word with more humane connotations).” Therefore, the concentration of power had made identification with the government’s national aims at home and abroad unlikely if not impossible. Kennedy’s response was to establish the Peace Corps; SDS’s was to work toward direct and universal “participatory democracy.” “As a social system we seek the establishment of a democracy of individual participation, governed by two central aims,” declared the Port Huron Statement: “that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common participation.”

Third, participatory democracy required a renewed (Enlightenment?) understanding of humanity. “We regard men as infinitely precious and possessed of unfulfilled capacities for reason, freedom, and love. In affirming these principles we are aware of countering perhaps the dominant conceptions of man in the twentieth century,” read the statement: “that he is a thing to be manipulated, and that he is inherently incapable of directing his own affairs. We oppose the depersonalization that reduces human beings to the status of things.” The statement continued:

Men have unrealized potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity. It is this potential that we regard as crucial and to which we appeal, not to the human potentiality for violence, unreason, and submission to authority. The goal of man and society should be human independence: a concern not with image of popularity but with finding a meaning in life that is personally authentic: a quality of mind not compulsively driven by a

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90 Green, “National Purpose and New Frontiers”: 494.
sense of powerlessness, nor one which unthinkingly adopts status values, nor one which represses all threats to its habits, but one which has full, spontaneous access to present and past experiences, one which easily unites the fragmented parts of personal history, one which openly faces problems which are troubling and unresolved: one with an intuitive awareness of possibilities, an active sense of curiosity, an ability and willingness to learn.

The *Port Huron Statement* enjoined a very different relationship between citizens and government, between the youth and civic institutions—between the self and society—not apathy but engagement. With one statement—produced and emboldened by the Great Debate and a new president—the “Movement” declared the end of adjustment. The terms of adjustment would certainly still circulate, but no longer would they have the same force, the same standing, among intellectuals as well as ordinary citizens—particularly the youth. These ideas were tested around lunch counters throughout the South—so, too, some of the nation’s most prestigious institutions of higher learning.

In April 1963, the president of the University of California, Berkeley, Clark Kerr, made the unfortunate mistake of delivering a series of lectures at Harvard University on the state of the university that were factually accurate but tone deaf. Published soon after as *The Uses of the University* (1963), the Godkin lectures boldly declared the modern research university to be utterly “unique,” a “new type of institution in the world.”91 Kerr even gave this new type of institution a new (soon to be maligned) name: the “multiversity.” (Elsewhere in the lectures he also called it the “federal grant university.”) “The basic reality, for the university, is the widespread recognition that new knowledge is the most important factor in economic and social growth,” he proclaimed. “We are just

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now perceiving that the university’s invisible product, knowledge, may be the most powerful single element in our culture, affecting the rise and fall of professions and even of social classes, of regions and even of nations.”

The multiversity was standing, he said, at a “hinge” in history.

Kerr happily acknowledged, even boasted, that the university had changed inexorably from its medieval, humanistic Oxonian and Cantabrigian origins. The operating expenditures for the newly integrated University of California system neared half a billion dollars, with almost a $100 million slotted for construction. It employed over 40,000 people—“more than IBM,” he bragged—and enrolled close to 100,000 students (30,000 at the graduate level, plus another 200,000 in extension). It offered ten thousand courses; helped to birth four thousand babies; was “the world’s largest purveyor of white mice”; and soon would have “the world’s largest primate colony.” Earlier in the century, the educator Abraham Flexner had likened the university to an “organism,” where “the parts and the whole are inextricably bound together.” “Not so the multiversity,” Kerr said of the adjustable university—“many parts can be added and subtracted with little effect on the whole or even little notice taken or any blood spilled. It is more a mechanism—a series of processes producing a series of results—a mechanism held together by administrative rules and powered by money.”

Fueled by large federal contracts and substantial business investments, the multiversity had in the postwar era

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92 Kerr, *Uses of the University*, xii.  
94 Kerr, *Uses of the University*, 15.
“come to have a new centrality for all of us, as much for those who never see the ivied halls as for those who pass through them or reside there.”

All of this was true enough. But what Kerr failed to realize was just how pyrrhic the university’s triumph appeared in the eyes of so many who were in it and whom it purported to serve. *The Uses of the University* hit all the wrong notes, especially among the youth who came to see the university—thanks in part to Kerr—as society’s adjustment assembly line. Whereas the Great Debate of 1960 had affirmed the belief that civic institutions needed to foster a strong, communal national purpose, a moral imperative that superseded private, parochial, or institutional interests, Kerr had said that the multiversity was being called not to produce knowledge for civic, regional, and national purposes alone but also “for no purpose at all.” Although the Great Debate had declared war on alienation and estrangement, Kerr went ahead and actually validated the ignoble perception that the modern multiversity was a giant, impersonal, unwieldy “mechanism” and machine with “no single constituency” (his words). True, he acknowledged, “The students had all the power once”—but “that was in Bologna” long ago. So much for direct democracy.

Worst of all in the eyes of his future enemies was the way Kerr described his own role and function in the system of adjustment. “It is sometimes said that the American multiversity president is a two-faced character. This is not so. If he were, he could not survive,” Kerr said, in a widely circulated quote. “He is a many-faced character, in the sense that he must face in many directions at once while contriving to turn his back on no

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95 Kerr, *Uses of the University*, xii.  
96 Kerr, *Uses of the University*, 28.  
97 Kerr, *Uses of the University*, 15-16.
important group.” He then rattled off a long list of constituencies within the university and without that he “mediate” between and among. Donning any number of hats, the multiversity president was “leader, educator, creator, initiator, wielder of power, pumps; he is also officeholder, care-taker, inheritor, consensus-seeker, persuader, bottleneck. But he is mostly a mediator.” (His academic expertise was in fact as a labor mediator.)

Where were the strong, moral leadership qualities that Kennedy and the Great Debate had shown to be so vital to the nation’s future? In the era of Camelot, put simply, Kerr looked like a throwback to the age of Eisenhower.99

Although the backdrop behind, and inspiration for, the Free Speech Movement (FSM) at the University of California, Berkeley, in the fall of 1964 was the civil rights movement, the most important event, in the immediate context, was the publication of Kerr’s Godkin lectures. It was Berkeley’s Port Huron Statement—played backward.

Michael Miller, an undergraduate activist on campus at the time, explained:

Nearly everyone who has tried to account for the recent uprising on the Berkeley campus has drawn a picture of students struggling for identity in a vast, impersonal educational and research factory run by IBM cards, remote professors subsidized by federal funds, and administrators with the temperaments of corporation executives. The analysis has the curious effect of making University of California President Clark Kerr the prophet of the student revolution against his administration.

_The Uses of the University_, he commented, was “converted into an ideology of justification for the revolt.”100 The sociologist and co-author of _The Lonely Crowd_, Nathan Glazer, who had accepted a post at Berkeley not long before the FSM took hold,
concurred, claiming that students were “among its most avid readers.” Berkeley’s president quickly became the movement’s “bête noir,” “his hand seen in every move,” Glazer wrote. (One of the anti-Kerr pamphlets published by the Berkeley protestors bore the title “The Mind of Clark Kerr.” Hal Draper, its author, described it as very Orwellian.)

Robert Cohen, a historian and Berkeley rebel, has asserted that the “view of a ‘radical’ FSM is not wrong, but it is incomplete.” Many others who contributed to The Free Speech Movement (2002), a reflection on the 1960s, felt the same way. “In the course of the struggle we students began to affirm a different purpose for public higher education from the industrial service model proposed by Kerr,” Jeff Lustig recalls of his time in the movement. “We began to insist that the original and still primary purpose of public higher education was political, in the broadest sense, not economic. It was to prepare people for democratic citizenship.” It was for this reason that Mario Savio, a Berkeley student and activist, was the movement’s most visibly articulate voice on campus. On December 2, 1964, Savio stood on the steps of Sproul Hall and trounced Kerr, who, apparently, when asked to divulge his communications with the university’s regents, responded with yet another impolitic statement, “Would you ever imagine the manager of a firm making a statement publicly in opposition to his board of directors?”

From the steps outside Sproul Hall, Savio laid into Kerr and his administration in what was a short but catalytic speech. “That’s the answer!” he demanded, finding Kerr’s corporate analogy incredulous:

Now, I ask you to consider: if this is a firm, and if the Board of Regents are the board of directors, and if President Kerr in fact is the manager, then I’ll tell you something: the faculty are a bunch of employees, and we’re the raw material! But we’re a bunch of raw material[s] that don’t mean to have any process upon us, don’t mean to be made into any product, don’t mean to end up being bought by some clients of the University, be they the government, be they industry, be they organized labor, be they anyone! We're human beings!106

With “We’re human beings!” the crowd shouts and applauds. In that one simple sentence the FSM found its voice, its legitimacy, its purpose, its cri de couer. It encapsulated perfectly what students found so onerous about the dominant culture of adjustment, that it cared nothing for the “human being.” The idea lay behind and animated various civil rights marches, sit-ins, and voter registration drives; union strikes; anti-war protests; free speech movement; anti-imperialism rallies—all the “causes” that the youth would make their own. Savio did not own the idea, of course; it did not originate in the movement with him as the Port Huron Statement illustrates. But the timing, energy, tonality, and impact were all pitch perfect (as well as picture perfect). “What he did do was to capture the existential posture of his listeners, the personal sentiments of the students gathered in Sproul Plaza, with remarkable precision,” says Lustig. “His language was radical in the etymological sense; it cut through stock phrases and conventional clichés to the roots of people’s personal convictions.”107

106 Savio, public address, 2 Dec. 1964.
Jerry Rubin, the anarchical Berkeley graduate student drop-out and self-proclaimed leader of the “Yippies,” was less earnest than Savio, but conveyed the same essence. “We Are All Human Be-ins,” he quipped. “Our nakedness was our picket sign.” The physicality of the metaphor was picture perfect because of how effectively it undressed the dominant (Kerr) metaphor of the “machine.” Though the machine is an old metaphor in cultural criticism, in the 1960s it seemed to have almost infinite application, ranging from the personal and ephemeral to the global and systemic. “Dig the environment of a university! The buildings look like factories, airports, army barracks, IBM cards in the air, hospitals, jails. They are designed to wipe out all individuality, dull one’s senses, make you feel small,” Rubin preached. “School addicts people to the heroin of middle-class life: busy work for grades (money) stored in your records (banks) for the future (death). We become replaceable parts for corporate Amerika!” The speeches and banners, placards, handbills, and pamphlets, sermons and songs of the student movement are replete with metaphors of machines. Buttons on Berkeley’s campus read, “Do not bend, fold, spindle, or mutilate,” to mock the ubiquitous IBM cards that all students at the University of California knew so well. The metaphor even worked its way into FSM “Christmas Carols,” sung to Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony: “From the tip of San Diego, to the top of Berkeley’s hills / We have built a

109 Rubin, Do It! 212-13.
mighty factory, to impart our social skills / Social engineering triumph, managers of every kind / Let us all with drills and homework / Manufacture human minds!“

The machine metaphor was pervasive and effective because of the ligaments that connected the image and critique to everyday realities of campus life. In a CBS News “Special Report” on the student uprising, The Berkeley Rebels, which was first aired in June 1965 and narrated by Harry Reasoner, the nation saw a side to higher education that was truly uninspiring. “I learned, but I learned in spite of the university. I got the great bureaucratic education. I learned by beating the system,” Kate Coleman, a disillusioned twenty-two-year-old senior, complains. Like an IBM card she has been stuffed through the machine. Some of the classes have 1,200 and 1,400 students, she says—“body after body just sitting there.” They are so large that not all the students can fit in the lecture halls, and as a result lectures are recorded then broadcast over televisions in smaller classes later.

Coleman describes what it is like watching the small screens and taking notes and the effect it has. “I sit there and wonder what the hell am I doing here? . . . Neither one can see one another in the TV classes, and neither one can communicate. It’s really like. It’s really like looking at one another through a screen. Or it’s like one movie being brought to see another movie and vice versa,” she explains. “And having going through this is a horrifying, impersonal experience, where you start asking yourself why should I sit in class?” During the documentary Reasoner interjects and rattles off statistics that are

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not that different from the ones Kerr had cited. The difference was perspective—here of the “human beings.” “It doesn’t matter to them, they squeeze you in the mold, they just push you into the machine,” Coleman says, challenging “the system.”

If the machine—the system—was one theme, communication was another, as Coleman illustrated with the image of the television screens. Thomas Barnes, an assistant dean at the time and a mediator, was also interviewed for the CBS documentary. Reasoner says the dean has “mixed sympathies” observing the situation. “I am not sure what this generation is trying to say to us, because it has never come through loud and clear. I am not sure what the message is,” Barnes says. “It’s not a simple passivism, it’s not a simple idealism, and it certainly isn’t a simple commitment to civil rights.” The message, if there was one, seemed to be only about “immediacy.” There is, he accused, “no sense of gradation. There’s no real chronological comprehension. It’s a matter of immediacy”—the “now.” Everything needed to be fixed right away, no matter what, and whoever stands in the way is part of the Establishment. Reasoner cuts in after the Barnes interview and says, with subtle inflection of condescension, “The message of this generation may not be clear to some, but it is certainly coming through loud.”

Paul Goodman, who wrote the anti-adjustment tract for the youth back in the mid-fifties, *Growing Up Absurd*, and visited the campus during the heat of the battle, suggested that this “failure of communication” was not isolated to Berkeley but was “endemic in the structure of American society.” In Goodman’s mind the machine and communication metaphors merged. “There is a limitless amount of information, polling, data-processing, and decision-making by objective computation,” he wrote; “yet when the chips are down, it turns out that nobody has expressed himself or been understood.”
Students were withdrawing from “the absurd System and its problems” and returning to life on “more authentic premises.” In the “Knowledge economy,” in a world of IBM computers and punch cards, there was something to this sense of information overload—the sense that information was being produced “for no purpose at all.” Yet there was implied in this critique, as Coleman’s disillusionment suggests, another indictment.

The critique was also about “values” and “purpose.” The idea of a “failure to communicate” worked in two ways. On the one hand, it addressed the grievances of the students who felt that they were not being heard when they said they did not want to be treated like IBM cards being pushed through the system. The “failure to communicate” accusation had a flip side, however. The faculty, the “adults,” had failed to communicate and transmit those essential values for an authentic, meaningful way of life, Coleman and crew implied. (The “jet-set faculty” was too busy with their “contracted research,” Goodman sneered.) Goodman practically installed himself at the front of the barricades and was almost giddy with enthusiasm: “In my opinion, the situation at Berkeley is historical and will not be local. The calm excitement and matter-of-fact democracy and human contact now prevalent on the Berkeley campus are in revolutionary contrast to our usual demented, inauthentic, overadministered American society.”

Although the Paul Newman classic, Cool Hand Luke (1967), would help to turn the phrase “failure to communicate” into the decade’s subtitle, The Graduate (1967), starring Dustin Hoffman, must rank as the most effective and illuminating dissertation on the subject. In every scene, Hoffman’s character, Benjamin Bradock, is misunderstood, misheard, or ignored. The famous affair between Benjamin and Mrs. Robinson is nothing

113 Goodman, “Berkeley in February”: 173, 162.
if not a failure to communicate. One might dissect the nuances and binaries at length. Both are symbols of their generation. Benjamin is naïve and earnest, although unable at times to find his words, whereas the articulate and deliberate seductress, Mrs. Robinson, relies on innuendo (never saying she actually wants an affair), and never delves below the surface of pleasantries. He babbles and reveals his inner, conflicted thoughts, and asks questions. She does not. One never knows what exactly is going on in her mind. He is honest, authentic, curious, scrupulous—she hollow, deceptive, uninterested in words, thought, ideas, details. He is virginal, she worldly. She, a product of togetherness, hates to be alone because she is “neurotic.” Not so Benjamin. One might also explore in addition to these binaries the movie’s visual symbolism. The fishbowl/glass metaphor that runs throughout the movie conveys the message with great effect: everyone can see Benjamin, and Benjamin can see the world, but there is always a barrier between him and the outside world.

One scene in particular merits attention. It touches on a number of themes that have emerged in our discussion. The scene, which takes place near the beginning of the movie, is of Ben at a pool party that his parents have thrown. Ben’s father has gotten what appears to be a graduation gift for his son, scuba gear. Both of his parents are eager for him to test out the new gear in the family’s swimming pool, while all the guests watch in amusement. Benjamin refuses at first, not wanting to embarrass himself, although he is forced into it.
Suited from head to toe, he emerges from the house, walks over to the pool, jumps in, and sinks to the bottom, ignoring everyone—all the while his parents are shouting instructions at him, even though he cannot hear a word they are saying because his head is encased in a giant bubble helmet. Instead he only hears the sound of his own breathing. And that is the point. Everything on the outside, especially his parents, looks farcical—shallow, plastic, superficial—while inside, in the quiet, he hears only himself, his breathing. He is a “human being.” This image is the metaphor of the moment that Benjamin, Savio, Coleman, and the other “rebels” are living in.

The message of the movie is supported brilliantly by its theme song, Simon and Garfunkel’s “The Sound of Silence.” The single, which entered the U.S. pop charts in September 1965, was by the end of the year at number one. Written shortly after Kennedy’s assassination, it went on to become one of the most often played and performed songs of the twentieth century, propelling the two folk singers to stardom. It speaks to the darkness that returned after Kennedy’s death, but the vision “still remains.” Verse three introduces the theme of silence—the failure to communicate:

And in the naked light I saw
Ten thousand people maybe more
People talking without speaking
People hearing without listening
People writing songs that voices never shared
No one dared
Disturb the sound of silence

“Fools,” said I, “you do not know
Silence like a cancer grows
Hear my words that I might teach you
Take my arms that I might reach you”
But my words like silent raindrops fell
And echoed in the wells of silence
One Boston DJ noticed that some of the song’s earliest enthusiastic listeners were the more earnest collegians.\(^\text{114}\)

Viewed from another angle, the movie is a meditation not only on communication, but also on boredom, which, as it turns out, is still about communication. The movie opens with a graduation scene at a large, open-air coliseum. Ben is standing uncomfortably behind the podium, delivering a commencement address. The students sit and stare expressionlessly. “[T]oday it is right that we should ask ourselves the one most important question: What is the purpose of these years, the purpose for all this demanding work, the purpose for the sacrifices made those who love us?” he asks. “Were there NOT a purpose, then all of these past years of struggle, of fierce competition and of uncompromising ambition would be meaningless. But, of course, there is a purpose and I must tell it to you.” The word “purpose” is reiterated several times, that when it is known it should be cherished and remembered. He then says, “The purpose, my fellow graduates—[he pauses]—the purpose is—[he pauses again, searching for the words]—there is a reason, my friends, and the reason is—the purpose is . . .”\(^\text{115}\) He is searching through the sheets of paper to find the answer. The wind is swirling and finally starts blowing Ben’s speech away. He continues in panic. Then there is nothing, emptiness. Viewers never hear what the purpose is—or that there was one. Later in the film, while Ben is drifting in the family pool, his father, annoyed that his son has done nothing since graduation, ask, “Would you mind telling me then what were those four years of college for? What was the point of all that hard work?” Ben replies vacuously, “You got me.”


Boredom was equated with meaninglessness. To invoke again the Great Debate of 1960, the idea of boredom expressed a lack of defined direction and “purpose,” both individual and collective. This is not to say that students did not believe in values, meaning, and purpose, because they did. Boredom had instead a more accusatory quality, much as neurosis did in the 1950s with Mailer, Ginsberg, and crew. The use of boredom as social critique was certainly not invented in the sixties by student activists. But the quality of the critique did change after the Great Debate of 1960. The debate had raised the expectation that America needed a national purpose and, when it was found, would be a beacon to the world. But with Kennedy’s assassination and America’s involvement in Vietnam, as New Left activist Todd Gitlin put it, “hope” turned to “rage.” Boredom as a critique in the minds of many students had a clear (external) target: parents, politicians, educators, and other managers, like Clark Kerr, of the system, the Establishment—the machine.

Writing on the hipster and the nihilism of the Organization Man in 1958, the novelist and screenwriter Clancy Sigal observed, “The fear of life which in Hemingway was translated into bravado, in Salinger to a kind of skeptical cri-di-couer, is in Kerouac reduced to its ultimate: boredom. Sheer, dribbling, vicious boredom. Boredom, self-hating and lonely, to disguise the sense of injury and deprivation blocked of any rational come-back.” While he thought of boredom as a kind of “shield” against what he called the “Neon-life loneliness,” he also suggested that “the cage [had] been internalized. The very act of escape is augury that it is too late to flee, too late to shake off the leeches: it is this which is the hipsters’ fatal irony. They carry the plague with them.” Alienation, he suggested, was complete. Not only were the Beats alienated from others—they were
alienated from themselves. They had internalized the case of culture. And although there had been a glint of hope, he observed, the cold war “shot that promise dead in its tracks.”

The image of Dustin Hoffman sealed inside a scuba diver’s wetsuit certainly suggests this quality of alienation. Yet, within his bubble helmet there is clarity. The sound of his own breathing is peaceful. And after he drops to the bottom of the very deep pool, where no one can reach him, the bubble sounds of the breathing apparatus take on a calm oceanic quality, reminiscent of gentle waves hitting a sandy beach—far away from this suburban nightmare. For inside the suit he is sealed off from the outside world. The scene evokes the I’m-a-human-being stance of the student “counterrevolution.” As the Jewish activist Arthur Waskow explained, this generation wanted nothing but a total “reconstruction of society,” so that “it does not act or seem like a machine, but is always and always looks like people.” We want, he said of his generation, a “non-machine society.” They wanted it not simply because human beings are human beings, but also because machines wage wars (as in Vietnam). The “war machine is a machine,” Waskow asserted, as did so many others around him. The values activists were foreswearing were not their own—just the system’s.

By attacking the machine, protestors were not attacking society in the abstract. They were attacking it in the concrete. That is, they were attacking, among other perceived evils, the “war machine” behind Vietnam. In a Los Angeles KPFK radio interview, which was broadcast on Christmas Day 1964, Mario Savio continued his

attack against Kerr and his administration. When Kerr referred to the university as a factory and as himself just a manager in this knowledge economy—“his metaphors, not mine,” Savio said—he was in the eyes of the students implying that employees, faculty, teaching assistants, and students were merely “raw materials.” But, Savio declared, “We’ve proven ourselves rather intractable raw material.” Kerr’s view, said Savio, referring to Kerr’s own words, “is that we serve the national purpose by being ‘a component part of the military-industrial complex.’ Well, I haven't felt much of a component part and I think that has been part of the problem. Nor, have all these students.”

The full Kerr quote Savio was referring to was culled from The Uses of the University: “Intellect has also become an instrument of national purpose, a component part of the ‘military-industrial complex,’” Kerr wrote. Right above this he had asked the rhetorical question, “Will it [the City of Intellect] be the salvation of our society?” Good question, but rather than answering with a definitive yes—as the students had expected of their university president—he hedges (at best). Here is where he calls the multiversity a “great machine,” moreover a machine that is involved in processes that “cannot be stopped.” “The results cannot be foreseen. It remains to adapt.”

The very title of the book seemed to suggest that the university had no inherently superior purpose, but was, instead, only an instrument to be used. To admit as Kerr had that the City of Intellect now served the “national purpose” of the great “military-industrial complex” was to Savio and others a complete anathema and betrayal. “I think it is a scandal that such a person should

119 Kerr, Uses of the University, 92-93.
be president of a university . . . any university. But, maybe the thing worst about the
university is not that Kerr is president of it but that it's the kind of university that needs
Kerr to run it.” The students do not want to be “managed,” he countered. “They want to
be treated as human beings should be treated. . . . Human beings are not things to be
used.”

In late May 1968, the New York Times ran an article on the university rebellions,
titled “Does Student Power Mean: Rocking the Boat? Running the University?” It
contains a number of pictures of students protesting, holding up various placards. One
reads, “Black Students Occupy This Building Because the Administration Has Turned a
Deaf Ear” (Northwestern University); another says, simply, “RESIGN” (Pratt Institute);
and another “No More Deals. Let Students Decide” (Stony Brook). There is also this one
from Princeton University: “Dunham Children Bored of Trustees.” As the student
uprising spread, so did boredom—as a political statement, not simply as an existential
state of being. “Babies are zen masters, curious about everything / Adults are serious and
bored. / What happened? / Brain surgery by the schools,” Jerry Rubin declared in bold
typeface. “The capitalist—money—bureaucratic—imperialist—middle-class—boring—
exploitative—military—world-structure is crumbling.” This movement was not
confined to the U.S.—and neither was boredom. French students protesting at the
Sorbonne and Nanterre were famous for their protests of the condition. “WE DON’T WANT

121 Joel R. Kramer, “Does Student Power Mean: Rocking the Boat? Running the University?”
122 Rubin, Do It! 212, 246.
A WORLD WHERE THE GUARANTEE OF NOT DYING OF HUNGER IS TRADED AGAINST THE GUARANTEE OF DYING OF BOREDOM,” read one May 1968 poster at the Sorbonne.  

In his televised farewell speech before the nation on 17 January 1961, Eisenhower had warned Americans about the all-powerful military-industrial complex. In that same speech, he also had warned them about the new (federal grant) university. “In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research,” he explained, right after mentioning the power of the military-industrial complex.

Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers. The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded.

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.  

The irony is that Eisenhower had stewarded this massive expansion himself, which gave viewers and listeners the impression that no one was really in charge of the country—that is, that the “complex” itself was and that it had taken on a life of its own. After Sputnik, Eisenhower was the one who established the President’s Science Advisory Committee, which fundamentally altered the culture of research in the country.

From 1958-63, the federal government through the Committee essentially assumed responsibility for the country’s research enterprise. In a kind of social contract

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with the “knowledge industry,” the Committee, through various agencies, funding programs, and contrasts funneled resources back out into the system, especially into nation’s top research universities. Graduate student programs played a vital role in the process, which helps to explain not only the growth of graduate programs nationwide, but also their visible presence in the student movement. During this period, from 1958-63, pure science research expenditures supported by Washington shot up from 52 percent to 76 percent. In that same period, research and development funding within the total federal budget grew by 250 percent, while the proportion dedicated to universities increased a staggering 455 percent. Sponsored research on campuses quadrupled, reaching $1.1 billion by the end of this period, although most of it, ninety percent, was concentrated in the hands of a select few universities (the top hundred)—such as Berkeley. When Kerr, who was very much involved in this revolution, was asked about the federal government’s investments, he crowed, “Washington did not waste its money on the second-rate.”¹²⁵ This, too, provides context to illuminate the animus that was directed against Berkeley’s president.

And it also illuminates what happened at many of those top-hundred academies, at the Universities of Texas, Michigan, Wisconsin, and elsewhere. “We are not out to destroy the University; we are out to recapture it,” stated James Kunen, an unlikely “leader” in the Columbia University uprising.¹²⁶ As the violence erupted on campus after campus, that message got lost in the teargas; nonetheless, it lay behind the motives of the

better intended. John Fischer, the former chief editor at Harper’s magazine, essentially agreed with Kunen. “[I]t is the beginning of a counterrevolution by students—against a quiet, almost unremarked revolution which has changed the whole structure of American higher education within the last two or three decades,” he wrote. “Only recently have these students begun to understand how they are victimized—and their protest is likely to swell until at least some of the results of the earlier revolution are reversed.” Had these larger historical and structural forces not been at work the revolt, he said, would never have taken off, the Vietnam war and incompetent university administrators notwithstanding; the movement would not have appealed as it did to the “ordinary, nonrevolutionary, usually-well-behaved undergraduates.”

Comments like these about victimhood are overwrought, yet Fischer was not roaming out in left field all by himself. Many thoughtful (non-radical) Americans were engaged in this debate about the uses and purposes of the federal grant university. Even if less impassioned in tone than Fischer, there was widespread concern about the drift of the academy, particularly away from the liberal arts. Many (“often the brightest”) undergraduates came to campus expecting one kind of educational experience but experienced another. “They want to learn something about the world and about themselves—to make an appraisal of their own capacities, and of the dauntingly complex world beyond the campus; and to estimate how they might come to terms with it,” Fischer wrote. Instead they were “sold a bill of goods under false pretenses.” America’s

complex, postwar technocracy required managers, “university-trained specialists,” not
broad-minded thinkers. So that was what the system was producing.\textsuperscript{128}

The campus was now just a “training camp” for specialists; and the diploma, a
combined and indispensable “meal ticket, union card, and passport to upper-middle-class
life,” Fischer wrote. What they had wanted was “understanding,” a “liberal education,”
but the chances of that were just “about zero.” (Fischer was not very optimistic.) Who
benefited from this revolution? Mainly the faculty, it appeared. With graduate programs
to develop, larger paychecks to cash, more contracts to secure, and more prestige to
burnish, they had become “the sole purveyors of a scarce and precious commodity.”\textsuperscript{129}
In May 1965, \textit{Time} magazine did not help ease the tensions when they decided to publish an
article entitled “The Flourishing Intellectuals.” The impression they gave was of
glamorous university professors living on easy street, thanks to these scarce and precious
commodities. “Today the intellectual’s place is everywhere. He is far better off than ever
before and far more widely respected. He burst out of the academy not only into
government but into business and industry, and he moves back and forth between them
with complete assurance.”\textsuperscript{130} The professor is portrayed as very much of the world (the
system)—certainly not against it.

The debate about the uses of the university typically took place not in the hard
sciences or in the humanities, but in-between—in the behavioral and social sciences. The
fields of knowledge hardest hit in the counterrevolution’s critique were the fields most
closely associated with the dominant discourse of adjustment. They happened as well to

\textsuperscript{128} Fischer, “Easy Chair,” 9.
\textsuperscript{129} Fischer, “Easy Chair,” 9.
\textsuperscript{130} “The Flourishing Intellectuals,” \textit{Time}, 21 May 1965,
http://jcgi.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,901691,00.html, para. 2.
be closely involved in the war effort. “Radical agitation is fast becoming as much a part of scholarly conventions as job-seeking and long hours logged in hotel cocktail lounges,” the *New York Times* reported in late December 1968. The newspaper was covering the rise of the academic “anticonventions.” “Radical” professors and graduate students had begun employing some of the disruptive political tactics of the New Left against their own professions. One of the fiercest critics of Vietnam with a prominent position within a high-powered research university was Noam Chomsky, a rising linguistic star from M.I.T. Psychology, sociology, systems analysis, and political science scholars were partially to blame for the war, he argued, because it was partially their creation. “In no small measure,” he is quoted, “the Vietnam War was designed and executed by these new mandarins.”

Protestors managed to cause a melee at the Modern Language Association’s annual convention. (Protestors were arrested.) So, too, at the American Sociological Association’s annual convention in Boston in August. It opened the day after Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination. (Fire sirens heading toward the city’s minority populated neighborhoods could be heard from just outside the convention’s hotel doors.) Before the start of the convention, the Association had invited the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Wilbur Cohen, to be the keynote speaker. When members of the newly formed (and short-lived) Sociology Liberation Movement found out, they balked. Cohen was the enemy, a representative of an administration that was waging an illegal war; and by inviting him, the Association, they charged, had become complicit in murder. Out of

the conflict they managed to get another “radical” on the stage with Cohen, Martin Nicolaus, who would offer a rebuttal to the keynote. It was a scatting rebuke against his fellow mandarins, entitled “Fat-Cat Sociology.”

The atmosphere at the convention was tense. Participants had picketed and boycotted some of the sessions. Some members walked out during Cohen’s address. Nicolaus began, “Sociology is not now and never has been any kind of objective seeking out of social truth or reality. Historically, the profession is an outgrowth of 19th century European traditionalism and conservatism, wedded to 20th century American corporation liberalism.” What followed in Nicolaus’s address was a long diatribe against the uses and abuses of academic knowledge, namely, its subservience to power. Nicolaus used the metaphor of downcast eyes and upraised palms. With downcast eyes, his colleagues had been charged with surveilling the “subject population,” whose activities “created problems for the smooth exercise of governmental hegemony.”

Sociologists stand guard in the garrison and report to its masters on the movements of the occupied populace. The more adventurous sociologists don the disguise of the people and go out to mix with the peasants in the “field,” returning with books and articles that break the protective secrecy in which a subjugated population wraps itself, and make it more accessible to manipulation and control.

The sociologist is thus a kind of spy. The image recalls the early days of sociology in Chicago when graduate students, and faculty, did don literal disguises and, as it were, spy on the subject population.

Sociologist also had their palms held upwards. Sociologists had been “schlepping” their “knowledge, coded and quantified, for those who could afford the “ornament.” But in truth they were “nothing more nor less than a house-servant in the corporate establishment, a white intellectual Uncle Tom not only for this government and
ruling class but for any government and ruling class.” Nicolaus went so far as to call the entire enterprise a “criminal undertaking.” Rather than liberating, knowledge was corrupting, “taking knowledge from the people, giving knowledge to the rulers.” “Sociology has worked to create and increase the iniquitous distribution of knowledge; it has worked to make the power structure relatively more powerful and knowledgeable, and thereby to make the subject population relatively more impotent and ignorant.”

It was an unforgiving lecture—against the “honored sociologist,” the “big-status sociologist,” the “fat-contract sociologist,” the “jet-set sociologist,” the “book-a-year sociologist,” all of them.

“Fat-Cat Sociology” was not the first attack against the profession from inside the profession. As early as the late 1950s, the sociologist C. Wright Mills had turned against the sterility of Parsonian functionalist-structuralists empiricism. As a professor at Columbia University, a bastion of quantitative expertise, he knew whereof he spoke. His *The Sociological Imagination* (1959) had a profound effect upon the generation of sociologists and social scientists who came of age in the sixties (and after). Even before the student uprising, others within the discipline were expressing doubts about the uses of sociological knowledge and the limits of the scientific method. Anyone having read Maurise Stein’s and Arthur Vidich’s *Sociology on Trial* (1963), which was written in honor of Mills, could accuse the profession of a total lack of self-awareness and disciplinary criticism. Reviewing a book on sociological methods, Karl Manheim cut to the quick, offering a critique that had wide application, “we must admit a very marked and painful disproportion between the vastness of the scientific machinery employed and

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the values of the ultimate results.”\textsuperscript{133} (The review first appeared not in 1963 but actually 1953.)

Still, something had changed between 1963 and Nicolaus’s speech in 1968. Sociologists like Nathan Glazer had “chosen sides.” And it was not with the I-am-a-human-being crowd. Glazer, for instance, became a visible defender of Kerr and the university administration. Goodman and Glazer took each other on in the pages of the New York Review of Books not long after the uprising. One by one, Glazer dismissed everyone of Goodman’s characterizations of what was taking place and at issue at Berkeley. For instance, when Goodman claimed that middle-class youth represented a new “exploited class,” since they were virtually required to obtain a college diploma, Glazer replied, “Nonsense. Intelligent youth may accept the minimal income for freedom Mr. Goodman has so affectively argued for, and which society provides.” Such options for minimum income include odd jobs and freeloading from parents, friends, and “the unemployment insurance system.” Also, where Goodman saw a fundamental critique of modern university administration, Glazer saw simple “politics” at work. “The student uprising at Berkeley is indeed for very mature ends: the end of a powerful student political movement with impact on the community,” he chided. “The educational aims are less clear, but their clearest part is that the educational process should serve the political ends. This should not be so unfamiliar to us.”\textsuperscript{134}

Glazer would continue to defend institutionalization, not backing down or budging from the “radical” New Left. A month after the assassination of Robert

\textsuperscript{133} Karl Mannheim, “American Sociology,” in Sociology on Trial, ed. Stein and Vidich, 5.
Kennedy, Glazer had an article appear in the neo-conservative *Commentary*, entitled “The New Left and Its Limits.” (There were many.) Not one objective of the New Left merited any real engagement or sympathy. “To my mind, there are fewer and fewer major areas of American domestic policy in which the old-fashioned conflict between interests representing clearly reactionary forces, and the interests of the society in general, still remain central,” he wrote. On the issue of “participatory democracy,” he was equally dismissive. Instead of tracing it back to, say, the civil rights movement and voter registration drives, Glazer briskly dismissed it as “a concept derived from the Paris Commune.” Glazer’s cynicism is utter. “Participatory democracy is suited to truly revolutionary movements and moments—but only moments. No people as a whole has ever been ready to make a primary commitment to political action over a long period of time.” Finally, where the New Left saw “power” and Manichean simplicities (his characterization), Glazer saw only “complexity.” “Because change is continuous in [industrialized] societies, no solution is ever complete or final, and consequently there is no alternative to bureaucracies, administrators, and experts,” he wrote, shrugging off every criticism that had been leveled against the system. He actually repeats several times in various ways the idea that everyone needs institutions.135

Glazer was right to see the New Left through the prism of politics. There was, however, not only a politics of participatory democracy at work in the movement, but also a politics of social scientific knowledge. In the fall of 1968, *Partisan Review* published an article on the student revolt at Nanterre in France. It was an English translation of an article that had first appeared in France, right before the May 1968

general strike. It was written by the students who led the demonstration. It tried to answer the question, “Why Sociologists?” That is, why did the Nanterre uprising find its most fertile soil in departments of sociology and, secondarily, in psychology? The authors dated “the problem” at Nanterre not to any particular event in France—but to Elton Mayo’s human relations experiments at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company in Chicago. The authors stated,

When Mayo demonstrated the importance of affective phenomena in limited groups and suggested the concept of regulating human relations to improve the productivity of workers, he did much more than open up new terrain for sociology. He ended the era of social philosophy and of speculative systems which embraced society as a whole and ushered in the glorious age of empiricism and of the ‘scientific’ collecting of data.

The only meeting ground between sociology’s “methodological techniques” and its “theoretical status,” between the knowledge it produced and the aims of that knowledge was, they wrote, “social adjustment and readjustment.”

Read another May 1968 report, “In this society, knowledge is ever compromised by power.” The members of the sociology department at Nanterre equated the importation of “the ‘white hopes’ of French sociology, Parsonian jargon and the cult of statistics” to that other importation, the “Made in the U. S. A.” “doctrines”—i.e., advanced capitalism. The two were inseparable, the one composed of the other. In a contemporaneous way, students in the U.S. came to a very similar conclusion, that as the dominant discourse sociological knowledge was implicated in the “machine,” because the machine could not have been built without it. To reject one was to reject the other. And

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vice versa. To reject sociological and psychological knowledge was to reject the machine which was to reject Glazer and his discipline.

In 1963, Glazer wrote an article about the malaise in sociology as well as of the Old Left, which were indistinguishable. In an era of lower expectations, the one success he could hail was that of the Department of Defense, which had integrated the expertise of professionals like himself. Organizations, like the Department of Defense, had “loosened up.” For example, he wrote, “national defense, now include in addition to the special expertise of military men, that of economists, industrial managers, political analysts, psychologists, sociologists, town planners, psychiatrists.”139 And, as a result, it had become “more sophisticated, more in touch with advanced ideas than they used to be.”140 When he asked himself rhetorically how, in the future, might society reform itself?—how the “Good Society” might come about?—the response was as uninspiring as Kerr’s.

“I cannot say whether they [police, park department, city planning commissioners, et al.] have an image of a good society, but they certainly do have an image of the best society they feel we can manage under the circumstances,” he wrote. “I go along when we analyze a problem and then urge an organizational solution, because I cannot think of any other.”141 The only real alternative to the current malaise was, therefore, simply, and only, “to improve organizations, and to rationalize the relationships between them”—as the Department of Defense had done.142

Glazer then outlined his own Orwellian future:

140 Glazer, “Good Society”: 229.
142 Glazer, “Good Society”: 233.
This is the vision. At the top there will be the analysts and researchers and programmers and computers and the huge machines into which many kind of data now guarded in the files of separate organizations will constantly be fed and out of which will flow guides and aids to action. The demands on those who manage the great organizations will presumably be infinitely more strenuous than those which today affect ordinary executives. . . but they will all be deployed in accordance with the central analysis. And the central authority will have far more information, and will make much better diagnoses of the effectiveness of certain kinds of programs and specialists than can those who run the programs themselves.

It was this kind of vision that rang the death knell of the sociological imagination, and with it the hegemony of adjustment. The politics of the “I’m a human being” was the antithesis of the vision and politics of adjustment.

The one, the other’s enemy.

\[143\] Glazer, “Good Society”: 233.
During the politically overheated summer of 1968, television audiences could tune in and watch one of the U.S.’s most storied authors go a few rounds with the superstar Canadian communications theorist Marshall McLuhan. The Canadian Broadcast Corporation had arranged the contest between the two, “two of the most remarkable men of this era,” to debate the global effects of violence, alienation, and technological proliferation—humanity’s new “electronic envelope.” Norman Mailer was billed the “prophet of hip and improbable conscience of the nation”; McLuhan, “a prophet of the media and spokesman for the electronic age.”¹

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Mailer’s nonfiction novel about the October 1967 anti-Vietnam War march on the Pentagon, *Armies of the Night*, had just been published by World Press. At the Department of Defense melee Mailer had broken through the barricades himself and had been arrested and convicted (his case was on appeal); he is the book’s self-mocking protagonist. The critic Alfred Kazin wrote that it, and one might say Mailer as well, had “crack[ed] open the hard nut of American authority at the center, the uncertainty of our power—and, above all, the bad conscience that [afflicted] so many Americans.”

McLuhan had also turned his attention to war, although his latest book, *War and Peace in the Global Village*, which was still in the stages of assemblage, would be entirely unlike Mailer’s in presentation. It is a slick pictographic treatment, a juxtaposition of images and commentary on the pervasiveness of technocratic violence. Under the inspiration of Ray Bradbury, McLuhan would maintain that “Violence is really the quest for identity,” and in his book, CBC’s audiences were told, he would “firmly [nail] down his prediction that the media will eventually hurtle twentieth-century man back to tribalism.”

While watching the debate today one is struck by the differences between the two participants, whose superficial stylistic quirks revealed deeper dissimilarities. The “prophet of hip” rocks back and forth, side to side, and leans willfully into the camera to

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3 CBC, “The Summer Way.”
press his arguments. He contorts, gesticulates, frenetically at times, and stutters as the ideas come tumbling out of his mouth, one on top of the other. Mailer grimaces as he searches for inspiration or a fierce retort, and as the two spar his brow will furrow deeper into the creases of its own earnestness. He admits to finding his opponent’s “system of ideas . . . fascinating, almost totally comprehensive, brilliant, charged with metaphor, extraordinary stimulating.” McLuhan’s “genius,” he says, is that he was “the first man to see how totally we were living in an electronic envelope and perceived the detailant [sic].” All the same, Mailer still finds his opponent’s ideas fundamentally “repellent”: in “all of McLuhanland” nowhere could he find the words “good” or “bad.” Mailer is “appalled” by the electronic envelope’s “totalitarian principle,” calling it, as he lunges forward with each accusation, “Faustian. Tragic. Dramatic. Apocalyptic. Cataleptic.” He say, “I think there is a lack of form and order and category in the nature of modern experience which speaks to me of nothing so much as entropy with that disease which concerns the disillusionment . . . of form . . .”

For his part, McLuhan is unflappable, articulate, urbane, detached—devoid of visible emotion with the exception of mild amusement. Was this “prophet of the media” its first “talking head”? He parries Mailer’s earnestness with an occasional knowing glance underwritten by a playful pursed-lipped smirk or cocky grin. McLuhan wants to reassure the audience and Mailer that there was nothing inherently evil about technology. Machines are, he says, merely “extensions of our own beings,” and “metaphors of our bodies and nervous system,” not something to be feared. And on the issue of moral judgment in the electronic age, McLuhan thinks it best to take a disinterestedly “cool” approach:
Norman, do you remember a phrase of Edmund Burke, “I do not know how to draw up an indictment against a whole people”? Now I wouldn’t know how to value the Western world, which we are demolishing by our new technology, or the oriental world, which we are westernizing—we’re demolishing the oriental world and the western world. I don’t know whether that’s good or bad because I wouldn’t know how to make a value judgment on such a scale.

No wonder Mailer says he could find zero “existential common ground” with McLuhan. The existential-Manichean struggle between Good and Evil was his “near obsession,” whereas McLuhan is content to shrug off his unwillingness to involve himself in moral judgments as, perhaps, a “temperamental” difference.4

Despite Mailer’s preciously cultivated reputation of pushing envelopes, ironically it is his staid-looking opponent who is more willing to tease out ideas until they reach their conclusions, wherever they might lead, however extraordinary or audacious they sound, regardless of their implications.5 McLuhan slips seamlessly in and out of his opponent’s claims and counterarguments, often puncturing their denouement by inserting one of his own well-rehearsed aphorisms.

MAILER: Look, Marshall, we both agree that man is accelerating at an extraordinary rate into a super-technological world, if you will, and modes and methods by which men instruct themselves and are instructed have shifted at an extraordinary rate . . .

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4 This “near obsession” assessment is George Cotkin’s (Existential America [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003], 185).
5 On Mailer’s cultivated reputation, see Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America: The Intellectual as a Social Type, 1889-1963 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), ch. 9.
McLUHAN: We have gone into orbit.

MAILER: . . . Well, but, at the same time, I would say that there is something profoundly autoerotic about this process, and it’s sinister for this reason . . .

McLUHAN: It’s psychedelic. When you step up the environment to those speeds you create the psychedelic thrill. The whole world becomes kaleidoscopic, and you go inward, by the way; it’s an inner trip, not an outer trip.  

This is how the exchange begins. And it is, also, in a way, how it ends.

How is it possible that both these men could agree on the totality of world’s electronic envelope and yet disagree so completely on its ramifications? Was this a mere difference in temperament? That may well have played a role; however, both these men had for too long and too carefully cultivated their public personas to reduce the one’s ambivalence and the other’s abhorrence to the quirks of personality. For guidance here, one needs to look elsewhere. Pulling back the lens a bit, it becomes apparent that this event represents a moment in time, a moment during which one intellectual movement was supplanting another. Anyone familiar with McLuhan’s brand of criticism going back to his piece in Neurotica and his book, The Mechanical Bride (1951), knows that McLuhan was not so ambivalent about the proliferation of technologies. That is not the issue, per se; both McLuhan and Mailer observed the structural changes that technology had wrought. Where they diverged, however, was on the moral and psychological implications, represented so graphically by the contrast between Mailer’s Manichean-existential visceral condemnation and McLuhan’s “cool”-ness.

The supplanting of one intellectual movement by another manifested itself at the level of psychology—more specifically a cleavage in social and cultural criticism between structural theories and psychoanalytic discourse. Collegians of the sixties were

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6 CBC, “The Summer Way.”
sometimes referred to as the McLuhan generation because they, too, like McLuhan, had
developed a deep mistrust of the “machine” in all its many guises (just as Mailer had). At
the same time, McLuhan and many among the youth also shared a more ambivalent, if
not hostile, relationship with psychoanalysis and along with it its the tendency to
psychologize cultures. Reading McLuhan’s *The Medium is the Massage* (1967), one will
note the absence of Freud. McLuhan talked at length about “cybernetics” and the ways in
which technologies organize thoughts and emotions. Yet his oppositional stance is more
ironic and detached. If the message is “cool,” so are the emotions. McLuhan speaks to
boredom, not neurosis.

That intellectual movement away from the neo-Freudian synthesis began in
earnest around 1965, precisely as the multiversity was turning into battlegrounds of
adjustment. Like the clash of interests on campus after campus, the supplanting of one
brand of (psychoanalytic) cultural criticism by another, modeled on cybernetics and
communications theory (in the vein of McLuhanism), would not be a peaceful affair. In
journals like *Salmagundi*, Fromm, Irving Howe, and company would be dismissed,
excoriated, translated, and turned into the straw men of liberalism gone wrong. In one
article, for instance, Anthony Wilden actually suggested that the search for the “subject”
in the 1950s was merely a byproduct of Stalinism.

[If] one could see in the fifties a regressive, somewhat narcissistic, and deathly
emphasis on philosophies of individualism or philosophies of the subject
(Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, the Husserl of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Kojève’s
existentialism, the early Sartre, Camus, Mounier’s personalism, Being-towards-
death, the “autonomous ego” of the neo-Freudians), a regression which was
clearly one of many symptoms of the temporary destruction by Stalinist Russia of
idealist hopes for the community, there was at the same time a new movement
towards dispensing with the subject altogether.⁷

Those willing to dispense with the subject altogether to which he referred here were the
French theorists, namely, the structuralist theorist Claude Lévi-Strauss and the
phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty, although others are incorporated. In retranslating
Marcuse and the “Freudian model” into “cybernetic” terms, Wilden suggested, “All
behavior is communication. That is to say, behavior involves the passage of messages
bearing information along mediated and unmediated channels disturbed by ‘noise [not
subjectivity].’”⁸

In this anti-psychiatric moment, depth would give way to surfaces,
representations, and discourse. Again, Wilden’s psychoanalytic translations are
instructive. “Intersubjectivity” was a core theme within mid-century neo-Freudianism,
thanks, especially, to the emphasis of Harry Stack Sullivan. Here in the rewrite, Wilden
suggested, “Now intersubjectivity [sic] means nothing if it does not mean communication,
and communication, at least in the special sense of human communication in open
systems, means language or discourse.” From here Wilden went on to praise the anti-
depth psychoanalysis of Lacan, whose “interpretation of dreams” meant “the
interpretation of discourse, for the dream was above all a translation and a message.”⁹
Sullivan would not have opposed the idea that intersubjectivity is human communication,
but might have questioned the accent. Although it has recently been suggested that
French theory was imported to America at the “margins” of its intellectual life, catching

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on only through the creative, denaturalized “misreading” of the importers, as Wilden’s translation suggests, scholars and intellectuals turned to French theorists and the German Frankfurt School critics rather more deliberately.\(^\text{10}\)

Sensing the change in the intellectual tide, even as early as 1966, the sociologist Daniel Bell was getting in on the act, albeit awkwardly.\(^\text{11}\) The turn to discourse, communications theory, and cybernetics affected not only the position of psychoanalysis within the status-conscious circles of highbrow cultural criticism, but so as well sociology. Earlier in 1960, the sociologist Lewis Coser harped on the fact that he and his colleagues had become “the favorite whippingboys of literary men.” The “animus” grew out of the fact that the domain of cultural criticism and social commentary had been the “almost exclusive preserve of the literary critic, and, less frequently, the humanistically-trained historian,” Coser observed—but of late it had been “invaded by sociologists.” He wrote, “While Samuel Johnson felt the trouble with literary criticism was that there was so little of it, the literary man tends to feel that the trouble with sociology is that there is so damned much of it. It’s all around and cannot be ignored. Like a billboard on a highway it is ugly but commands attention.” With “some violence” literary critics had


been reacting against these so-called “savage” “intruders,” he bemoaned. The importation of French theory, rapprochement between intellectuals and the Frankfurt School, espousal of cybernetics and communications theory—all were wrapped up in this struggle between literary critics (and other humanists) and social scientists. As far as the literary critics were concerned, they were quite happy to welcome the end of the neo-Freudian/social science-psychoanalysis synthesis and to have their preeminent perch restored.

Picking up on a suggestion by the psychiatrist Robert Lifton, the period from the mid-sixties onward might be better thought of as the age of Proteus instead of the age of Narcissus. Christopher Lasch complained that he had been misunderstood by those who were critical of The Culture of Narcissism. Some resisted out of a temperamental reaction against the pungency of his prose; others took issue with the strong moral pronouncements that he was happy to hand down. Yet, perhaps the resistance was inevitable. His advocacy of Freud in a decade of strong anti-psychiatric sentiments was intellectually impolitic. The editor-in-chief of Salmagundi Robert Boyers put it mildly when he suggested that “Lasch’s steady recourse to the language of Freudian psychology was somewhat less of an advantage than he had anticipated.”

In some ways, Proteus is no different from Narcissus—both embody fluid identities. What Proteus did not carry, though, was Freud’s baggage. Moreover, the concept of Proteus fit nicely within the

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13 One need only peruse the pages of Salmagundi to see this changing of the intellectual guard. See, for instance, Salmagundi 10-11 (Fall 1969 – Winter 1970), which was dedicated to German intellectual refugees; see esp., Fredric Jameson, “Introduction to T. W. Adorno”: 140-43; and “Walter Benjamin, or Nostalgia”: 52-68. See also Salmagundi 16 (Spring 1971), dedicated to R. D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry.
visuals of a mass communication network—that is, in the technological envelope of McLuhanland.

As Robert Lifton observed, “Proteus was able to change his shape with relative ease—from wild boar to lion to dragon to fire to flood. But what he did find difficult, and would not do unless seized and chained, was to commit himself to a single form, the form most his own, and carry out his function of prophecy.”  

It was precisely this stress upon “change and flux” and the “self-process” that Lifton found so appealing in 1968. “For just as elements of the self can be experimented with and readily altered, so can idea systems and ideologies be embraced, modified, let go of and reembraced, all with a new ease that stands in sharp contrast to the inner struggle we have in the past associated with these shifts.”  

To be sure, he also thought that “the flooding of imagery produced by the extraordinary flow of post-modern cultural influences” could not only permit each individual to be touched by everything,” but also to be “overwhelmed by superficial messages and undigested cultural elements, by headlines and by endless partial alternatives in every sphere of life.”  

In this sense, Lifton’s “Protean Man” found himself living with that same unresolved tension between the self and the nonself, between the self and its culture. Struggling with “the idea of change itself,” “protean man finds himself ambivalent in the extreme,” Lifton warned. “He is profoundly attracted to the idea of making all things, including himself, totally new—to the ‘mode of transformation.’ But he is equally drawn to an image of a mythical past of perfect harmony and prescientific wholeness, to the

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17 Lifton, “Protean Man”: 16.
‘mode of restoration.’” There remains still a “longing for a ‘Golden Age’ of absolute oneness, prior to individual and cultural separation or delineation.”¹⁸ For all the flux and fluidity Proteus finds himself still living under the long shadow of adjustment.

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