DescriptionIn the past sixty years, western nations including the United States, France, and Great Britain have been involved in various counterinsurgency campaigns around the world. Despite America's experience in the Vietnam War and the lessons that France and Great Britain made available after their counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1950's and 1960's. The United States entered the 2003 Iraq War with no real counterinsurgency doctrine available. The main objective of the United States once the insurgency began was still of a conventional mindset. This capstone has tracked the shift in American military philosophy from a failing conventional mode of thinking to a successful thought out and implemented counterinsurgency doctrine under Gen. David Petraeus. FM 3-24 the new counterinsurgency manual for the United States Army and Marine Corps as well as "the surge" played a critical role in altering the outcome of the Iraq War. While the manual was written due to the Iraq War, this piece of doctrine inculcates the post colonial experiences of France and Great Britain. The authors took great care to construct the manual in a manner that will allow it to be used for future conflicts, because of this; FM 3-24 looks as if it is here to stay even after the current American conflicts in the region conclude.