Modern American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Roots behind it:
An Examination of How Western Nations Fight Insurgencies

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A Capstone Project prepared in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts in Liberal Studies,
Rutgers University--Camden

MAY 2009

Approved by: ________________________________
Capstone Adviser          Date
ABSTRACT OF THE CAPSTONE

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In the past sixty years, western nations including the United States, France, and Great Britain have been involved in various counterinsurgency campaigns around the world. Despite America’s experience in the Vietnam War and the lessons that France and Great Britain made available after their counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1950’s and 1960’s. The United States entered the 2003 Iraq War with no real counterinsurgency doctrine available. The main objective of the United States once the insurgency began was still of a conventional mindset. This capstone has tracked the shift in American military philosophy from a failing conventional mode of thinking to a successful thought out and implemented counterinsurgency doctrine under Gen. David Petraeus. FM 3-24 the new counterinsurgency manual for the United States Army and Marine Corps as well as “the surge” played a critical role in altering the outcome of the Iraq War. While the manual was written due to the Iraq War, this piece of doctrine inculcates the post colonial experiences of France and Great Britain. The authors took great care to construct the manual in a manner that will allow it to be used for future conflicts, because of this; FM 3-24 looks as if it is here to stay even after the current American conflicts in the region conclude.
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Introduction

After the initial invasion of Iraq and the fall of Baghdad it became quite clear that the United States was not just facing a conventional war against Saddam’s Republican Guard. The situation on the ground became a war against multiple combatants not just the remnants of Saddam’s armed forces but of different groups vying for power and attempting to gain retribution for past injustices. Despite misconceptions about popular literature on fourth generation warfare (insurgency and terrorism) counterinsurgency warfare has existed in one form or another since before the Roman Empire. America is not dealing with a type of warfare it is unfamiliar with, rather it is a type of warfare that America dislikes to train for. The media may see this style of warfare as new but it is one that America has fought in the past with varying degrees of success.

The United States has fought countless counterinsurgency campaigns in its history and almost every single time it has had to relearn the way in which it fights that type of war. This work will mainly critique America's current counterinsurgency doctrine and ask whether or not it is adequate for current and future conflicts. This work will examine the origins of the new FM (Field Manual) 3-24 and assess whether or not it is written for a specific conflict or if it is written in such a way that it can benefit the US Army in future counterinsurgency conflicts. This work will focus primarily on military issues and is not meant to be a political assessment of America's involvement in the Middle East or a study on specific foreign policy issues. Some international relations and political science topics may be discussed, however they will purely be held in a military context, such as the use of nation building as a tool of counterinsurgency warfare and not as a political doctrine. This paper will also mention conventional war and those who believe
that conventional doctrine should not take a back seat due to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In order to fully understand the genesis of FM 3-24 one must look into the history of modern counterinsurgency warfare. FM 3-24 owes much of its genesis to French and British experiences in post colonial wars as well as American involvement in the Vietnam Conflict. This new era of warfare requires more than just war fighting skills and the ability to mass firepower. The new battlefield requires commanders to have a fundamental understanding of subjects not normally seen as pertinent to combat commanders. In a 2006 reprint of *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, forwarded by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, Nagl writes in the forward that

“Those who aspire to high command in the new age of irregular warfare should study cultural anthropology, economics, political science, international relations, and languages in addition to conventional warfare. They must also master the principles of both insurgency and counterinsurgency – and understand the differences between the two forms of warfare” (Galula 10).

These new war fighting skills will be discussed briefly however since this paper deals with counterinsurgency warfare, insurgencies and their type will be discussed greatly. One must understand the nature of insurgencies to combat them and as such, insurgent doctrines and the different types that can be utilized will be pointed out.
Why Insurgencies?

Why or how does an insurgency take place? While in specific conflicts there are historical and political reasons for warfare to erupt and that is certainly a central part of conflict, however the simple answer for why an insurgency arises is simply power and numbers. “Guerrilla strategy offers the underdog a cheap, efficient, and often the only way to remain militarily active in spite of logistical, numerical, and material inferiority” (Merom 46). When the United States began its war for independence against Great Britain the militia that began the war did not fight in a traditional European manner. They fought a guerrilla war until a larger better trained regular army could be recruited and built up. The fact that Great Britain was a superpower was made irrelevant when the Thirteen Colonies initiated a campaign of guerrilla warfare or an insurgency. Another example also involving Britain would be the campaign the IRA initiated against the British government at the start of the 20th century. The IRA under Michael Collins never had anymore then 3000 combatants at any one time while the British initially began with over 80,000 soldiers and police (Smith 35). Despite their relatively low numbers the IRA was able to eventually bring about the establishment of an Irish Republic.

Insurgencies

Insurgent strategies can be divided into four broad types of doctrines as well as a fifth doctrine currently being developed and explored by Al Qaeda. The four broad doctrines that have been in use over the centuries are the conspiratorial strategy, the
protracted popular war strategy, the military focus strategy, and the urban-warfare strategy. These doctrines have been in use for centuries and are still being utilized by modern insurgent and terrorist organizations, especially modern Islamic terrorists.

The conspiratorial strategy is one of the least complex and probably one of the easiest insurgent strategies that can be utilized. Julius Caesar and Vladimir Lennon both utilized this strategy when they came to power. The Bolshevik Revolution is however, the textbook example of the conspiratorial strategy. The objective in the conspiratorial strategy is the commanding heights within the capital city of a country. The commanding heights does not refer to a key piece of military terrain or a hilltop but rather, a symbolic piece of real estate, such as key government buildings, rail stations, capital buildings, and so on and so forth. Such a strategy is also referred to as a coup d'etat. An assassination attempt could also be utilized in such a strategy as in Julius Caesar’s demise at the hands of the Roman Senate. The Iranian Revolution could be seen as the conspiratorial doctrine at work as well as Egypt in the 1970’s with the Muslim Brotherhood (though unsuccessful) (O’Neil 46-49).

The protracted popular war strategy is one of the more complex doctrines available to insurgent leaders, however, it is also one of the most popular doctrines and since its inception has been copied many times over. Mao Tse Tung is credited with developing this strategy. While it may have existed prior to Mao, Mao is given credit for utilizing it best and for developing it into the type of doctrine it is today. The protracted popular war calls for a three phase war against a superior more well established enemy. The fist phase of the war is referred to as the strategic defense, and as such the main objective of the insurgency is to survive. Key terrain must be utilized and the insurgency
must stay away from government forces and focus on building up its strength. The next phase of the war calls for a strategic stalemate. This stalemate will allow guerrilla forces to utilize lightning raids and selected terrorism to harass government forces wherever possible. Once guerrilla forces are trained up and sufficient in number the third phase of the doctrine the strategic offensive may come into play. This final phase calls for the formalization of the guerrilla force into a standing regular army. Guerrilla tactics are still utilized; however the emphasis is now on conventional warfare (O’Neil 49-55).

The protracted popular war also utilizes limited to full support of the local population and this support is crucial for its success. Such was the case for the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong in the Vietnam conflict. While American forces lost no battle, they were unable to win the war due to no support from the local population. Finally, while the protracted popular war strategy is extremely complex it is also extremely flexible. If an insurgent group is beat back while in the third phase they may regroup back to the second phase, carry out guerrilla attacks and then at a later date reform conventional forces. This strategy was best utilized by Mao Tse Tung, however many Palestinian terrorist groups also utilize this model, however, they have not used it effectively and move between phase one and two regularly. Whenever such groups signal that they want a truce with Israel, they are simply stating that they are moving back to the first phase of the protracted popular war strategy. This also seems to be the strategy that is currently being utilized by the Taliban in Afghanistan and various groups in Iraq.

The military focus strategy is similar to the protracted popular war strategy, however terrorism is less likely to be used and the support of the population is not emphasized. The objective in the military focus strategy is the destruction of the
government’s military and police units. The Cuban Revolution is the best example of the military focus strategy, as well as the American Civil War. With the American Civil War, the Confederate insurgency was able to inherit the institutions of the United States in the south as well as the popular support of the people since the south seceded mainly by referendum. This allowed the Confederacy to concentrate all its efforts on the federal military formations. In the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro and “Che” Guevara had to start from scratch and as such needed to build some type of a popular support base as well as revolutionary institutions, however, their main focus was still the destruction of government military and police units (O’Neil 56-60).

The urban-warfare strategy is becoming the most popular guerrilla doctrine currently available. With the world population increasingly moving to larger and larger cities, this dictates that the majority of world conflicts will take place in and around cities. Military planners for the last several decades have been predicting this and as such have been gearing up US Military assets to deal with the new problem. Today’s operations in Iraq are combating terrorists and insurgents utilizing an urban warfare strategy. The urban-warfare strategy can also be used in conjunction with other doctrines such as the protracted popular war strategy. One of the reasons this strategy is a doctrine is that traditionally armies and insurgencies tended to avoid cities at all costs. Regular military formations are often bogged down in the heavy street to street house to house fighting and force multipliers like artillery and tanks become useless in city fighting. Insurgencies tended to stay away from cities because government support as well as control was strongest in the city where there are often larger numbers of police as well as military units. Cities were dangerous places for insurgent and guerrilla forces. However,
with more and more of the population concentrated in large cities, it becomes more difficult for a country to police its own citizens. Coupled with corruption or government disorganization an urban battlefield can be the ideal setting for an insurgency, especially one that utilizes terrorism as there are many soft targets in a city. Iraq is the best example of this doctrine at work; however, prior to 9/11 Northern Ireland was the text book urban-warfare conflict (O’Neil 61-63).

It must be established that terrorism and insurgencies are not the same thing. An insurgency is a group of people who are discontented with the current rule of law and seek to change their form of government by military means. Terrorism is the use of violence on a civilian population, administration, or military to force a political change. The reason terrorism can be utilized on a military force is that not following the Geneva conventions in certain ways could be considered terrorism. Examples of this could be executing prisoners of war (POW’s), torturing those captured or detained, and intentionally targeting medical personnel on the battlefield. Terrorism can be used by insurgent groups as a means to an end but the two terms are not and ought not to be used interchangeably.

France in Algeria

France was in an unusually advantageous position at the start of its Algerian operation. Advantageous in the sense that it was in a much better position then most western imperial powers in fighting a modern counterinsurgency campaign. First and foremost Algeria was close to home, just a short hop over the Mediterranean. This made
logistically supporting the campaign easy. France had just pulled out of Indochina where it had fought a long and hard counterinsurgency campaign; this meant that France’s ground commanders had first hand experience in fighting insurgencies. After the embarrassment of Indochina there was an atmosphere of reform among French officers. With Algeria’s close proximity and the feeling that it wasn’t a French colony but rather a piece of France, the reform minded and experienced mid-level officer class along with veteran troops gave France an extreme advantage and a high level of confidence going into the war (Merom 92-93). Furthermore, since the French considered Algeria a part of France, the French public was largely behind the military effort to put down the Algerian Front for National Liberation or the FLN. This was an advantage that the United States has not always had going into small wars in the past 30 years. The Communist Party of France was even in support of the campaign despite their anti-colonialist position (Merom 91). France was committed to the war from the man in the café on a Paris street corner to the combat experienced junior officer. With all these advantages and a high level of commitment by the French people why did the FLN ultimately succeed in achieving independence?

While all the advantages that France had are necessary to win any war, France misunderstood the manner in which to carry out the campaign. The focus of any military commander in that era and arguably even today is the systemic destruction of the enemy. Making enemy forces combat ineffective is the quickest way to ensure victory. France had just come out of the Second World War where the main focus across the globe was conventional warfare. Despite reform minded attitudes the French military missed the fundamental objective of counterinsurgency warfare. The fundamental objective in a
campaign like Algeria is not the systemic destruction of the enemy but a battle over hearts and minds. Much is mentioned about hearts and minds in references to counterinsurgency warfare but those that don’t have a military mindset are sometimes unsure as to how a war fighting force is supposed to win over hearts and minds.

The best analogy that is used in describing successful counterinsurgency operations is the fish and water analogy. In this analogy the fish represents the enemy combatants and the water represents the population. If the counterinsurgent force is able to win over the population it in effect removes the fundamental element that insurgencies need in order to survive… the water. If the counterinsurgents simply go about killing the enemy within this environment where the population lives, the collateral damage will do more to recruit insurgents and in the long run does nothing to remove the essential element of an insurgency… that is the tacit or overt support of the population. Removing the support of the population to the insurgency no matter how small the support is it is the only way to win a counterinsurgency campaign.

In Algeria the French did not go about initially attempting to win over the population. The objectives in Algeria at the start of the war were strictly military… strictly military in the sense that France was attempting to fight an unconventional war in a conventional sense. The first four years against the FLN saw numerous mistakes made fighting the insurgents and by the time France developed an effective counterinsurgency doctrine the political reasons for keeping Algeria French no longer existed.

The start of the war saw conventional French formations sweep across the Algerian countryside in order to pacify what was first believed to be groups of ill-equipped bandits and thugs. These FLN insurgents were able to ambush French troops in
mountain passes and similar terrain suitable for guerilla warfare. The French then followed this strategy with a police sweep (Operation Bitter Orange) of all suspected enemy leaders and combatants. This is where the French made one of their largest blunders in the campaign. These police sweeps also swept up moderate Muslim groups like the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties or MTLD which sought about peaceful change in Algeria’s status. These sweeps also included brutal forms of torture in interrogation techniques which had the unintended consequence of driving the moderate Muslims in Algeria over to the side of the FLN (Peterson 11-12).

Military strategy conceived by the senior French officers in Algeria was that of moving into areas occupying them and removing the insurgent elements. Unfortunately for the French the FLN would hear of these operations and move it before the French arrived with any serious firepower. Once French forces would move out of the area the FLN would punish those who aided or collaborated with government forces. Those mid level officers and below who had served in Indochina attempted to adjust the strategy in order to win over the population by permanently occupying villages and areas of the countryside. However, there were not sufficient numbers of these experienced officers in Algeria to make a huge impact (Peterson 13). Most of these officers were still in the process of leaving Indochina or redeploying from France. The French high command thought it easier to simply find the FLN and destroy them as if they were a group of thugs. This was a more conventional way of fighting then actually attempting to follow a counterinsurgency doctrine which was quite an alien concept to those who had not experience Indochina.

After a few years of fighting by 1956 the French could no longer hide the fact that
they were in a full blown out war against the FLN and that the previous methods at attempting to pacify them had failed. The French Premier Guy Mollet and his government decided that enough was enough and ordered 500,000 troops to Algeria in order to pacify the FLN once and for all. This decision would change the favorable conditions France held at the start of the conflict. Deploying 500,000 soldiers to Algeria would require calling up the reserves and the start of conscription, something that would upset the home population. On the international level this did not bode well as such a large troop surge would require France to pull divisions out of West Germany which it had committed to keep there as a part of the NATO force charged with deterring Soviet aggression (Peterson 15). However, public opinion was already slowly starting to turn against the war as allegations of torture were becoming more and more public. As far back as 1951 Claude Bourdet and other French journalists and French politicians began to ask the question if France was operating a Gestapo in North Africa. Political groups in France began to splinter away from pro war factions and began to defend the rule of law and argue against French abuses of power in Algeria. This was further aggravated by government reports that actually condoned torture in Algeria (Merom 111).

The new Governor-General of Algeria, Robert Lacoste was given a new order from Premier Mollet. Win the war. Lacoste possessed the common sense and intelligence to know that if France proceeded on its present course it would be unable to win the war. Lacoste ordered the armed forces to win over the population. This was able to be done with the help of large numbers of veterans from the Indochina war who had first hand seen the mistakes France had made conducting counterinsurgency operations in Indochina. These new officers and soldiers had learned from the mistakes made in a war
half a world a way and applied them to the present situation. These new officers made special use of what the American Military coins as Civil Affairs soldiers but referred to by the French as the Special Administrative Sections or SAS for short. These teams were comprised of a handful of soldiers who had linguist and cultural skills suited for the region and commanded by a low ranking officer. Their objective was to move into areas and reestablish contact with the population. They were further enhanced by Native Affairs Officers who were indigenous troops recruited in the area who spoke the language and were a part of the local culture. These troops were used to police the locals and did not use a heavy hand as French forces had done earlier.

Eventually this was coupled with a military strategy by General Andre Beaufre which;

“…was called the quadrillage system. The quadrillage system was based on three principles: 1) Cutting off the insurgent from the population that sustained him. 2) Render the guerilla zones untenable. 3) Coordinate these actions over a wide area and for a long enough time period so that results will happen” (Peterson 17).

Like the fish in water analogy if you cut the insurgents off from the population that supports them they no longer have any sort of environment from which to strike out from. This first step requires empowering the local population in their own defense. A military force has to go in identify the people through a census and establish who is trustworthy and faithful to the government. These people are placed in positions of power and responsibility and local troops and police are then raised. The second step is to make the areas in which the insurgents occupy unsustainable; this is done by a combination of local troops dismantling the political and military cadres that exist in the towns now occupied by government and local forces. The military can then have a field day by attacking the
insurgents out in the open and destroying their supply lines as well as any military formations unwise enough to gather outside of towns and villages. The third step is rinse and repeat in other areas and on a larger scale.

This is the first attempt at indoctrinating a counterinsurgency strategy by French forces in Algeria. This let the French see results across the country. Militarily the FLN was crushed by this new strategy but politically the French had already been defeated at home by the bad press of the early mismanagement of the crisis. This strategy was repeated by the British in Malaya and later laid the framework for American strategy in Iraq during and after “The Surge”. America however ignored this simple outline during the Vietnam War despite the British sending a military mission to help (a military mission is usually a contingent of senior officers sent to an allied country to aide in a specific military task) and publications by French officers on how to practice a successful counterinsurgency campaign. The principle one of these officers being David Galula, a combat commander who spent much time on the frontlines in both Indochina and Algeria…

In summation of what was successfully used to combat the FLN by French forces was the quadrillage system coupled with the use of native troops and SAS or Civil Affairs detachments. What caused France to eventually give up Algeria despite winning the war was the bad press and publicity it had received at home and abroad. This press was received due to harsh treatment of civilians by Gestapo like police forces and an indiscriminate use of force by French soldiers. These are lessons that could have been used by the United States going into Vietnam but unfortunately fell upon deaf ears.
Great Britain and Malaya

Great Britain had had a tremendous amount of experience fighting counterinsurgency wars because of its vast empire. The old saying that “the sun never sets on the British Empire” also meant that the amount of small wars she fought never ended so long as it was a sunny day. Furthermore, the British Army is quite different from most other western armies. The British Army as an institution is a learning institution and does much to attempt to correct the mistakes it has made in the past. Being that the British Empire had been around for quite some time it has had ample opportunities to make minor and monumental mistakes alike. However, the British Army prides itself on learning from these mistakes. The Malayan Emergency as the conflict was named was no different, the British Army took the conflict from the outset and learned from doctrine it had used fighting similar wars in the past and attempted to adapt and improve upon it for use in Malaya.

While the British had this great learning institution called the British Army a few mistakes were made at the start of the conflict. However, what military power can avoid making mistakes. Similar to what France did in Algeria, the first British troops that tackled the communist insurgency in Malaya first attempted a conventional war against the insurgents however it was quickly realized that the insurgents could not be defeated in a conventional sense. Young officers began to step up and develop new methods or improved upon methods from previous counterinsurgency campaigns in order to eliminate the insurgency.

Malayan insurgency originated back during World War II right before the
Japanese occupation of Singapore and Malaya. The British trained a force of mostly ethnic Chinese called the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army or MPAJA. These troops were organized in such a fashion as to harass the advancing Japanese armies up the Mayan peninsula however, MPAJA for the most part played little to no role against the Japanese. The force which had been infiltrated largely by the Malayan Communist Party MCP was conserving it's strength so as to fight the British after the Japanese occupation ended. Since the bases of the MPAJA were far from Japanese positions this gave the MCP the opportunity to politically indoctrinate its force during the war. At the close of the war with Japan it became extremely difficult for the civil authorities to force MPAJA to surrender its weapons to British Military units that arrived to garrison Malaya (Nagl 60-61) Prior to the fall of Singapore the British forces in region seemed invincible and Singapore was thought to be some akin to a Gibraltar of the east. Unfortunately for the British when Singapore fell rather easily to the Japanese the end was near for British colonialism in the Far East.

“The British forces that arrived to reoccupy the country in September 1945 had lost their aura of invincibility after their defeat four years earlier; they found a very different Malaya then the one they left behind” (Nagl 62).

Just to the north of Malaya, Mao Tse Tung’s communist party led a successful revolutionary movement against’ Shang Ki Shek’s Nationalist Chinese government. The military strategy that the MCP hoped to emulate was that of Mao’s protracted popular war strategy which was used to great effect in China. The terrain in Malaya was similar to that of parts of China and it would certainly give the insurgent many advantages over the counterinsurgent. A substantial percentage of the population in Malaya was of Chinese origin which also composed the majority of the MCP. These substantial yet
minority Chinese were for the most part on the periphery of society and not major players. This gave the MCP a base from which to strike out at the British and the Malayan administrators that worked for them.

The British forces throughout the first three years of the Malayan Emergency blundered similar to the manner as the French had done in Algeria that is fighting the enemy in a conventional sense. Richard Clutterbuck and Royal Engineer officer in the far east and a later trail blazer in the field of political violence had this to say about senior officers in Malaya at the start of the conflict;

“The predilection of some army officers for major operations seemed incurable. Even in the late 1950’s, new brigade commanders would arrive from England, nostalgic from World War II, or fresh from large scale maneuvers in Germany. On arrival in Malaya, they would address themselves with chinagraphs to map almost wholly green except for one red pin. ‘easy,’ they would say ‘Battalion on the left battalion on the right, battalion blocking the end and then the fourth battalion to drive through. Can’t miss old boy.’ Since it took the better part of a day, with more then one thousand soldiers to get an effective cordon even a half mile square around a jungle camp. The guerrillas hearing the soldiers crashing through the jungle into position had no difficulty getting clear before the net was closed. Except for a rare brush with a straggler all the soldiers ever found was an empty camp but this enabled officers to claim that they had ‘cleared the area of enemy.’ This would be duly marked on the maps and the commanders would go to bed with a glow of satisfaction over a job well done. The soldiers nursing their blisters had other words for it” (Clutterbuck 51-52).

However, the British Army has a reputation of learning quickly from its mistakes and the final nine years of the emergency were carried out in a much more efficient manner. Those with service in the Burmese theater of operation during the Second World War began to arrive. These officers like LTC Walter Walker and Brigadier “Mad Mike Calvert. These two men were responsible for the development of new special operations forces that would operate in the Malayan Emergency. Walker recruited former members
from the Special Operations Executive or SOE who operated in Southeast Asia against the Japanese. His teams were similar to the SAS teams that the French used in Algeria, small teams with subject matter experts and linguists along with local forces. Walker also established a Jungle Warfare school for his new force as well as for other British Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). Calvert on the other hand reorganized the Special Air Service Regiment to operate in a deep jungle environment (Nagl 68-70). The SAS is today one of the most elite counterterrorist, counterinsurgency, special operations forces in the world. Their origins date back to the Second World War but the Malayan Emergency was one of those experiences that made them the elite fighting force they are today. Officers like Calvert and Walker spearheaded a new type of counterinsurgency doctrine that would systematically destroy the MCP and their newly created Malayan People's Anti-British Army or MPABA.

One of the problems that existed that the British were able to identify at an early stage was the lack of a political movement amongst the Chinese population in Malaya. This gave the MCP a clear advantage as they were a political organization that existed in country and all too willing to fill up that vacuum of no political party. The British early on within those three years that the military was making mistakes the problem of lack of political organization was identified. The British then began to encourage the Chinese population to form their own political movement. The Malayan Chinese Association or MCA was organized and from this political organization would later form a coalition with the main Malayan parties. Furthermore the MCA was able to recruit local troops and police for the war effort against the MCP. This was a good first step in securing victory in Malaya. Furthermore, Britain’s political objectives with Malaya were to grant it
independence once the communist threat was removed.

A controversial but ultimately successful military and civil strategy was that of forced resettlement. The Chinese population centers and villages were deep in the jungle and spread out over vast areas of the country. This gave the MCP a massive advantage as the limited number of British and local troops were unable to be everywhere at once. The British then built up new villages in which police and local forces would police. The British forces would act as strike forces at the company and platoon level. These strike forces would go out on jungle patrols and hunt the enemy away from the population centers. Back at the villages, the villages that would refuse to provide intelligence would have their food rations cut as well as other services. While controversial, the program yielded results almost immediately with massive numbers of MCP operatives and supporters given up to local authorities. John Nagl describes an incident like this that yielded these kinds of results. These moves began to take place as Soon as General Sir Gerald Templer took command of the Malayan Operation;

“After haranguing the town’s leaders, assembled in the town hall for that purpose, Templer imposed a twenty-two-hour daily curfew, cut the rice ration in half, and closed the schools. After listing the many attacks of the terrorists in the district, Templer declared: ‘This is going to stop. It does not amuse me to punish innocent people, but many of you are not innocent. You have information which you are too cowardly to give.’ In addition, Templer required every house in Tanjong Malim to submit a ballot providing information on Communists or their supporters. The resulting information led to the arrests of some forty Communist supporters in the town; the curfew was lifted. The idea to collect information on secret ballots was a junior Irish police officer’s” (Nagl 89).

Because of the protection these new communities provided against MCP terrorist actions the local Chinese population began to support these new villages and even began to join
home guards. This freed up more forces to go out and eliminate MCP camps and training areas. Eventually the MCP was cut off from its support in the civilian population and former MCP fighters began to defect and fight against the MCP towards the end. Once the MCP was defeated by the local population, Great Britain pulled out of Malaya.

Two other pillars to British success in Malaya was a Jungle/Counterinsurgency field manual that put to paper all the lessons learned in Jungle School and all of the recent successes. This allowed all soldiers including those who had not attended Jungle School the ability to reference crucial knowledge. This manual was small enough to fit in a soldier’s pocket and could be referenced almost whenever a soldier desired the information. Another crucial pillar in British successes on the peninsula was that of the intelligence network and collection activities put forth by the British. First and foremost all of the intelligence services were put under an intelligence czar. His main duty was not to command the intelligence apparatus but to direct its focus by putting out questions that needed to be researched. This would prevent intelligence services from being side barred by unnecessary research (Nagl 91).

Furthermore, the ability to have a coordinated effort between the military and civil authorities resting under the command of one person is what made victory possible. Without that coordination the military and civil effort would have both been heavily wasted. The civil arm of the counterinsurgency can not be conducting nation building operations like building schools and roads and then the military arm destroy them the next day because the insurgents are using those structures as supply depots.
Vietnam

The United States during the Vietnam conflict ignored almost all of the lessons that other western powers had learned in the previous two decades. The United States Army at this point in history was not a learning institution and despite having fought many counterinsurgency campaigns in Latin America, the Philippines, and on the American frontier, counterinsurgency warfare was not even viewed as a secondary or tertiary role, it was more of an afterthought if anything at all.

The problem off the bat for the United States was the training of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam or ARVN. It built up the ARVN as a miniature version of the United States Army. With heavy and mechanized divisions that were more or less designed to tackle the Soviet Union in Europe and not a guerilla force designed to melt away into the jungles of South Vietnam (Marston 140). Furthermore the objectives right off the bat were strictly military and ignored almost completely the hearts and minds strategy that worked well in Malaya and was beginning to work well in Algeria. While the Americans could and would effectively clear large swaths of jungle of an Enemy presence this ground would be lost almost immediately due to no nation building effort on the part of civil administrators. Programs existed on the South Vietnamese side but these programs were ineffective due to no coordination between them and the military.

“The American Mission and the Military Assistance Command – Vietnam had not succeeded in coordinating American and South Vietnamese military operations with follow-on Vietnamese government programs to reestablish control in the newly cleared regions. If they couldn’t make it work in Bong Son – where the most powerful American division available had cleared enemy forces from the countryside – how could they possibly hope to reestablish South Vietnamese
control in other regions where the American military presence was much weaker” (Marston 138)?

The military even criticized itself for the manner in which it was conducting the war in South Vietnam, despite numerous studies done that pointed out similar strategies that the British and French had used in their respective campaigns the commanders on the ground in including Gen. Westmorland found it difficult to adapt to these new strategies and at times simply ignored suggestions. Those who have served in the American Military know that it is not an institution that wants to change easily even if for the better.

Towards the end of the war when Westmoreland was made Chief of Staff for the Army and was replaced on the ground with General Creighton Abrams the man for which the M1A1 Abrams tank was named after and a man which won great acclaim in World War II as a tank battalion commander.

Abrams understood the problem in Vietnam and was one of the officers critical of the manner in which the Unites States was prosecuting the war. Abrams quickly switched from the search and destroy or “body count” effort that is often associated with Vietnam to a strategy of hearts and minds. However, despite Abrams being in charge he found that the organizational culture of the United States Army would not allow him to implement these changes.

“…Abrams’ new strategy, learned at such a great cost during nearly 20 years of American experience in Vietnam, ran head-on into the organizational culture of the Army, which still had little intention of changing its focus. In the words of one senior US Army officer, ‘I’ll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war’” (Marston 143).

Abrams was aware of this insubordination but he did not wish to destroy the careers of
his subordinates because he felt that if he relived them their replacements would have a similar attitude.

Despite learning the lessons late and having several recent western counterinsurgency campaigns succeed and fail, the United States was unable to overcome its own organizational culture and adopt an effective strategy in Vietnam. Similar to how the unmentioned officer above put it. Better to lose Vietnam then to adapt the Army to the current threat. The war in Vietnam was not treated like a war despite the heavy casualties. The Americans underestimated their enemies and over estimated the Republic of South Vietnam. Since Vietnam was seen as a sideshow to a possible war with the Soviets the Americans never saw the need to adopt a counterinsurgency mentality. This unfortunately for the United States cost it the undeclared war in Vietnam.

The 2003 Iraq War

The initial invasion of Iraq went almost without a hitch. It looked like a replay of the 1991 Gulf War with US and Coalition armored forced bushwhacking Republican Guard units across Iraq. With the toppling of Saddam’s statue many in the media, the military, and the world believed the war was over. With President George W. Bush declaring victory aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln in a flamboyant fashion after touching down on the flight deck in an S-3 Viking anti-submarine aircraft. Whether or not the banner meant mission accomplished for the crew of the Abraham Lincoln or the War in Iraq as some people have argued is irrelevant. The general impression given to the American people is that the United States had just declared victory in Iraq and that
incident is now considered a gaffe for the Bush administration. Many in the public did believe the war to be over except something was still happening in Iraq; casualties were still continuing to mount.

The interwar period between the first and second Gulf War saw combat in Somalia not unlike a counterinsurgency environment and an air campaign in the Balkans. However, these wars were seen as sideshows and not the type of mission to prepare for. The Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Units or MEU’s, units designed to strike from amphibious assault ships just over the horizon, did focus much of their training on Military Operations in Urban Terrain or MOUT prior to the war in Iraq. This training was insufficient for a full blown out counterinsurgency campaign but an emphasis on MOUT is better then an emphasis on solely armored and mechanized warfare. The Army also focused some training on MOUT but the main training mission for any peacetime active army unit was a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) in Ft. Irwin California. The scenarios at NTC focused on epic tank battles and mechanized formations. This of course illustrates how and why the coalition was able to quickly overwhelm Saddam’s conventional and even irregular forces until the start of the insurgency.

Despite the massive success of the conventional campaign, the conflict began to fall apart with the start of the occupation and a slue of blunders from civilian and military leaders. However, not all ground commanders took the wrong course of action at the end of the conventional campaign. General David Petraeus and his 101st Air Assault Division which took charge of Ninewa Province took a different approach to “post war operations”. Instead of carving out a base outside of his largest city Mosul, he garrisoned his troops in outposts across the city.
“…Petraeus considered securing the population to be key to effective counterinsurgency [operations] and concentrated his entire division in Mosul, the largest population center in the province. Determined to minimize harm to the population, before approving any operations he would ask his commanders, ‘Will this operation take more bad guys off the street than it creates by the way it is conducted?’ Rather than undertaking large sweeps, his troopers operated outposts in the heart of the city and focused on collecting detailed actionable intelligence for raids against insurgent leadership” (Marston 243).

Petraeus did not wait for his higher headquarters to tell him how to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign and he did not have to react to his mistakes in order to create a usable counterinsurgency doctrine. Instead he started from the begging to shape an effective counterinsurgency doctrine by having a common sense approach to the problem. As 101st’s deployment continued insurgent attacks slowed down in the Mosul area unfortunately the unit that replaced the 101st did not continue the same practices that Gen. Petraeus had laid down and much of those successes were lost. One of the lessons that the United States had learned during the Vietnam conflict on the subject of war, any war not just counterinsurgency warfare, was that it is always best to leave the specifics of the war to the commanders on the ground who were their to prosecute it. Looking back at Vietnam many scholars, amateur historians, and veterans point out micromanagement from Washington D.C. as one of the causes of overall failure in South East Asia. This lesson was used to great effect during the 1991 Gulf War were Washington left the day to day details of running the war to coalition commanders in Saudi Arabia. While the management of 2003 Iraq War can not be compared to the management of the Vietnam War as far as meddling from Washington is concerned. One incident in particular where Washington meddled with the ground commander’s job was the First Battle of Fallujah. This political interference from Washington would have
severe short term and arguably long term consequences for soldiers on the ground.

On 31 March 2004 four civilian contractors were murdered in the city of Fallujah. Their bodies were then hung on a bridge inside the city amid videos and pictures of insurgents and civilians cheering. This outraged the American people and the Bush administration. The emotional response to this political and military problem was not carefully thought out.

“Against the advice of Major General James Mattis and Lieutenant General James Conway (the Marine commanders), the Bush administration ordered an offensive to clear Fallujah. Determined to signal their resolve, they made the decision with little consultation with the Iraqi Governing Council and allowed insufficient time (just days) to evacuate civilians, gather intelligence, and construct a public relations campaign to mitigate the negative effects of attacking a Sunni city” (Marston 244).

The massive offensive had to be halted after a few days because the few Sunnis in the government threatened to walk out of the government if the American administration in Iraq under Paul Bremer did not stop the fighting (Metz 166).

This is a prime example of lack of common sense on the part of political leaders. A politician in Washington can not possibly know what right looks like on the ground in Iraq without being there, a civil administrator in Baghdad away from the fighting and with no military experience can not possibly know what right looks like. The reason George H.W. Bush left the command decisions on the battlefield up to General Norman Schwarzkopf during the first Gulf War was because Gen. Schwarzkopf was closest to the fight and he had been trained and groomed for that job for over twenty years. Military leaders are trained to make military decisions on military matters for their civilian commander in chief. While the President is at the top of the chain of command he is not always a subject matter expert on war and even within the military chain of command,
senior officers will often defer authority to subordinates because they are in a better position to evaluate the situation and make a better course of action than the superior who is removed to a higher headquarters away from the action. While responsibility can never be delegated as it always rests with the senior man or woman including the president at the top, authority certainly can. When officers are commissioned in the United States military they are commissioned by the president and they serve it his or her pleasure. This is why a senior officer or the president can remove a ground commander who is not prosecuting his or her orders with the command philosophy of the superior officer in mind. A good example of this is when General Douglas McArthur was removed from overall command of UN forces in Korea for not keeping with the command philosophy of President Truman. Never did Truman interfere with McArthur’s handling of the war. When Truman realized that McArthur had a different set of goals then he did he simply removed him from command and placed an officer in charge that would follow his intent.

The First Battle of Fallujah was a mistake; it was a knee jerk emotional reaction that required a careful and constructive response. Instead of securing the population of Fallujah and attempting to win them over in line with a common sense counterinsurgency strategy, the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Bush administration “endorsed harsh military action…” against the 2000 insurgents held up in Fallujah “…thereby de-emphasizing the importance of minimizing civilian casualties” (Marston 245). Another issue that was detrimental to the success of coalition forces in Iraq was the attitude US soldiers and marines held of Iraqis in general. A poll by the US Army Surgeon General pointed to the fact that the majority of soldiers and marines felt that Iraqi lives did not matter and that their leaders had not made it clear that harming
civilians was unacceptable. Such can be an explanation for the Haditha incident where a squad of Marines killed twenty-four Iraqi civilians and then attempted to cover up the crime (Marston 253).

The turnaround point in Iraq was a result of multiple causation. First, in September 2006 Shayk Abd al Sittar Bezia Ftikan al Rishawi announced a Sunni movement in Al Anbar province that opposed Al Qaeda in Iraq and effectively switching sides. Second, it became obvious to the Bush administration after ignoring the situation for several years that Iraq was in a state of Civil War and a change of strategy was implemented. Third, General Petraeus was placed in command of the Iraq war. These three events are what changed the momentum to the side of the United States and its coalition allies. With Petraeus in command a new counterinsurgency strategy based on what worked when he was in command of the 101st up in Mosul was implemented along with the best of what other commanders had utilized. A new counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24 was implemented along with a “Surge” of reinforcements.

FM 3-24, The Surge, and America’s New Intellectual Warriors

When General David Petraeus took charge President Bush announced the “the surge”, the arrival of five more brigade combat teams (BCTs) and two additional Marine infantry battalions, this brought American troop strength in Iraq up to 165,000 up from 140,000. Since Iraq was in the midst of a civil war Petraeus’ main objective was to secure the population of Iraq. The training of local security forces which had already begun under previous commanders was put on the back burner. The surge in extra troops was
meant mostly to secure the city of Baghdad which was becoming an embarrassment to the multinational forces as the capital city in Iraq looked as if it could not be secured by any Iraqi or American military unit. This changed with the surge. Petraeus deployed his soldiers in a similar fashion to what he did up in Mosul. He spread out his brigades over 50 outposts throughout the city and inter-mixed Iraqi Police and Army units with American units. This allowed the troops to interact with the local civilians and slowly over time the civilian populace was convinced that multinational forces were there to help. The command philosophy of the American military had changed and it was now on the correct course. This is what General Petraeus wrote to his troops in March of 2007;

“This statement by Petraeus clearly outlines the new American military strategy in Iraq and makes it clear to the soldiers who would have to implement this new strategy. Clear, hold, build can describe current American strategy in Iraq and at the time of the writing of this capstone the United States is currently in the hold and build phase of the operation. This is due to the surge and the new counterinsurgency strategy outlined by FM 3-24.

FM 3-24 is a unique military manual it does not read like the typical military manual with extreme technical terminology that only a soldier with thousands of acronyms memorized could read and understand it. FM 3-24 has a more academic feel and quality to it then any other field manual ever written for the United States Army and
Marine Corps. The manual was constructed by a group of soldiers, marines, and academics intimately familiar with counterinsurgency warfare. The military officers that contributed much to this work Gen. Petraeus and LTC John Nagl both hold advanced degrees from elite universities. Petraeus holds a PhD from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School and LTC Nagl holds a PhD from Oxford University’s St. Anthony’s College. Both men have devoted their research to the study of counterinsurgency warfare and both have had extensive combat experience in both conventional and unconventional warfare.

These two men are but the tip of the iceberg of a new type of officer that is emerging in the United States Army. These new intellectual warriors are changing the way the United States Army and military carries itself as an institution. These men are slowly changing the culture of the army into a learning institution willing to change and rehash old doctrine to win wars. Unlike in Vietnam where senior officers would rather have lost wars then change the nature of the business. Furthermore when work for the manual began, certain sections were tasked out to individuals to compose, many sections within the manual went to academics that had done extensive research in counterinsurgency warfare or were prior service and had done research in counterinsurgency warfare. The project of putting this manual together was not just a military undertaking it involved a variety of intellectual talents and people.

The manual is divided into eight sections, and it is quite obvious that these sections draw much from the previous experiences of many western nations involved in counterinsurgency warfare. The first chapter gives an overview on the nature of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, true to military form; the authors need to educate
the reader on the subject they are diving into giving them some thorough background knowledge. Furthermore, while this manual is certainly meant for the Iraq war it is written in such a fashion that it could be used in any war. Some examples from Iraq exist but so do examples from Algeria and other notable counterinsurgency campaigns. This book is truly meant to outlast the current war and be a permanent part of American doctrine. Not America’s main doctrine as that still involves conventional war but counterinsurgency warfare is here to stay. Chapter two outlines the integration of Civil and Military activities, no longer is the state department going to go out and build schools and the next month army artillery levels the school when insurgents use it as a safe house. There will now be a coordinated effort on the part of the two arms and they will be integrated for such operations. These operations will involve Civil Affairs personnel from the Army as well as personnel from the State Department, other civilian agencies, and agencies from the home national government. Chapter three details the intelligence war and is the most extensive chapter in the manual. A section of the chapter sums up the purpose of intelligence operations in counterinsurgency operations well;

“What makes intelligence analysis for COIN [counterinsurgency operations] so distinct and so challenging is the amount of socio-cultural information that must be gathered and understood however, truly grasping the operational environment requires commanders and staff to devote at least as much effort to understanding the people they support as to understanding the enemy. All of this information is essential to get at the root causes of the insurgency and to determine the best ways to combat it” (FM 3-24 135).

This is why it has been mentioned by men like Nagl that to win these types of wars requires the expertise of sociologists and political scientists’ rather then just airborne rangers and heavy infantry.
Chapters four and five deal with the planning, preparation and execution of counterinsurgency operations. These chapters outline possible approaches to implementing a proper counterinsurgency doctrine. The manual gives examples from history to specifically illustrate how these approaches were used and how they fared in their specific situations. Chapter six is a crucial chapter that deals with building up the home nation’s security forces. This is a central part of a proper exit strategy, if the home nation can not effectively control its own country after American forces leave then the campaign was a failure. This chapter is basically an outline on how to build up your own security forces from the ground on up, from recruiting to pay and bonuses, and promotion systems. Chapter seven deals with leadership and ethics while conducting a counterinsurgency campaign. Because of incidents like Haditha and the Army Surgeon General’s poll on American attitudes towards Iraqi civilians the ethics of warfare must be made absolutely cleared to the soldiers and leaders prosecuting a successful counterinsurgency campaign. If the United States loses the moral high ground, the propaganda victory it would give its political and military enemies would be too disastrous to recover from. If incidents like Haditha and Abu Graib were widespread the United States would be unable to secure any resemblance of victory in Iraq. The final chapter in FM 3-24 deals with sustainment and logistics of the counterinsurgency campaign, both friendly and enemy logistics are covered in this chapter. This chapter is one of absolute critical importance to Quartermaster and Transportation Corps officers as they are the logisticians of the Army.

With FM 3-24 US Forces were able to clear and hold Iraq and despite horrific bombings from time to time Iraq has quieted down substantially since the surge and the
implementation of a well thought out counterinsurgency doctrine. FM 3-24 is not the end all be all manual for counterinsurgency operations as the bibliography for the FM suggests that military leaders have a lot to read when it comes to counterinsurgency warfare. Not all of the answers to a military problem are found in a field manual, some of those answers are found in academia.

America’s experiences in Iraq can best be encapsulated by this passage by Dr. Carter Malkasian director for the Center on Stability and Development at the Center for Naval Analyses;

"In terms of the larger history of counterinsurgency, Iraq highlights the effect that social or political constraints, in this case the sectarian divide, have on the success of attempts to adapt and on the kind of strategy that will be most effective. Other factors – such as the presence of a capable commander, an institutional willingness to adapt, or experience in fighting insurgencies – certainly play a role in effective counterinsurgency, but any successful strategy must conform to the social and political environment in which a conflict is ensconced” (Marston 259).

The Other Side of COIN

Those who criticize the new field manual and counterinsurgency warfare believe that the United States is equipping itself for a future of counterinsurgency style wars only and completely ignoring conventional threats that nations like China and Russia pose to the United States. Only recently did Russia invade the nation of Georgia over its pro-Moscow breakaway province of South Ossetia. That conventional war almost cost Georgia its entire armed forces as it was unable to stand up under the pressure of the more massive and better equipped Russian Army. China is continuing a naval buildup at an unprecedented rate. Its main mission of its naval air arm is the ability to sink a US
carrier and prevent American forces from making a transit to the Taiwan straits and making any difference in a war against Taiwan. Furthermore China’s army is currently ranked number one in the world in numbers with over three million people in uniform and another four million in a paramilitary role (Cordesman 24). Conventional military threats have not disappeared and proponents of a conventional doctrine only point out that America is currently equipping itself to fight counterinsurgency warfare only and is canceling or scaling back programs meant to be utilized against conventional threats. While America is currently fighting a counterinsurgency campaign, the world is still full of serious conventional threats.

Granted the US is cutting back on conventional programs that would be used to fight off a conventional enemy like China or Russia, however the current fight is in Iraq and Afghanistan… both counterinsurgency campaigns. The US Navy and Air Force are the best equipped sea and air arms of any nation. While certainly a war with any of these conventional forces would be extremely difficult with the military spread out over its commitments in the Middle East. The United States still has a sufficient technological punch to be able to fight the type of war it is good at conducting, conventional war. Furthermore any conventional war with China or Russia would be absolutely disastrous whether the United States is pushing one hundred percent in the conventional weapons and doctrine development department or if you look at it from the other side of the coin (no pun intended), if it is putting some of these costly programs on the back burner until current operations are concluded. No proponent of America’s counterinsurgency doctrine is advocating removing conventional war from the field manuals. These proponents of counterinsurgency doctrine are simply trying to avoid the mistakes of the Vietnam War.
Where America fought the war and then refused to learn any of the lessons of that war for future use. FM 3-24 is not only for current use it is for future reference when the United States gets involved in future counterinsurgency wars.

Conclusion

While FM 3-24 is not the end all be all manual on counterinsurgency warfare and the lessons of counterinsurgency warfare were out there in a variety of publications illustrating the lessons that other western nations learned. There was clearly a void in American military publications that illustrated the fact that America was unprepared to fight a counterinsurgency war. Officers like Petraeus and Nagl didn’t need the manual as their academic careers took them to examining counterinsurgency warfare however the rest of the military clearly needed something to reference when fighting this strange type of war where the destruction of the enemy is not the main effort but the protection and prosperity of the civilian population is.

Despite what the narrative of the early portion of the Iraq War might say, the United States has fought counterinsurgencies in the past. The question that needs to be asked after the Iraq war is ‘Will the United States forget what it has learned’? I will argue that with the publication of FM 3-24 and its mostly positive reception I will argue that the new field manual coupled with an up and coming generation of intellectual officers like Nagl and Petraeus will leave room in the Army’s playbook for counterinsurgency warfare despite what the conventional hawks say about counterinsurgency operations. While conventional war may look like a chess game to the lay person, it is really a game of
checkers when you compare it to counterinsurgency warfare…. because 
counterinsurgency warfare contains so many more critical non-military factors that must 
be executed properly for any possibility of success to be achieved. It is easy for a 
technologically superior nation like the United States to roll into a country, use its 
collection of wonder weapons (aircraft, artillery, cruise missiles, etc), and then unleash 
the most highly trained ground force in the world to defeat its enemy. Whereas the 
counterinsurgency war gives the weak insurgent the ability to win against all that the 
United States has by simply using to great effect; words, ideas, and excellent 
organization.

The key to success in this type of warfare is learning the lessons of the past 
whether or not your nation bought the lesson book with its blood or if some other nation 
paid for it. The fiasco that took place in Vietnam could have been avoided had US 
generals and politicians read the extensive literature and experiences that the French had 
in Indochina and Algeria as well as the experiences that the British had just recently had 
in the jungles of Malaya. The counterinsurgency mindset is the graduate level of warfare 
where the commander has to be well versed in not only his or her military history but in 
political science, sociology, and the cultural anthropology of the conflict.
Bibliography


