ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN: THINKING GLOBALLY, RESEARCHING LOCALLY

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ABSTRACT

Analysis of Economic and Social Factors Associated with Trafficking in Women: Thinking Globally, Researching Locally

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The purpose of this research was to address the issue of trafficking for sexual exploitation by using macro-quantitative analysis to identify the characteristics of source and destination countries, and by studying the micro-level context in which human trafficking emerges.

In the macro-quantitative component of the study, data on a range of variables were compiled from national indicator databases developed by intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and similar agencies. The trafficking status of each country was determined based on ratings developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006) through content analysis of third sources. Data were analyzed separately for source and for destination country status using logistic regression analysis as well as different visual representations of the data.

For the micro-level component, an in-depth case study that focused on Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country identified as a destination for trafficking for sexual exploitation, was conducted, using various sources of data. Interviews with representatives of numerous agencies, governmental and non-governmental, (total $N = 25$) were conducted. Furthermore, databases (MIMOSA database, and Counter Trafficking Module Database) developed by the International Organization for Migration that contain data on victims identified in Bosnia and Herzegovina were used. Finally, information from various

reports complemented the findings. All this information was used to understand why this country has become a destination for trafficking for sexual exploitation. Further, who traffickers and pimps are, how victims are recruited and exploited, how responses to trafficking affect the trafficking problem, and how macro-level variables translate into behaviors at the micro-level were explored as well.

Results of the macro-quantitative analysis indicate that low GDP and negative Population Growth were good predictors of a county's status as a source country, while country's status as an immigration country and high Human Development Indicators Index values were associated with country's status as a destination country. The case study revealed that very complex economic, social, and political processes contributed to the emergence of trafficking in Bosnia and Herzegovina, partly as a result of the war and post war economy, indicating that simple economic explanations are insufficient in explaining human trafficking.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
EU	European Union
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
FBiH	Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IFOR	Implementation Force
ILO	International Labor Organization
IO	Intergovernmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPTF	International Police Task Force
KILM	Key Indicators of the Labour Market
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RS	Republika Srpska
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SIPA	State Information and Protection Agency
TIP report	Trafficking in Persons Report
UN	United Nations
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCRC	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOHCHR	UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WDI	World Development Indicators

NOTE ON THE USE OF TERMS

Trafficking
In this manuscript, the term *trafficking* is used to refer to human trafficking for sexual exploitation. The author understands that trafficking for sexual exploitation is not the only form of trafficking. However, given that this dissertation focuses solely on trafficking for sexual exploitation, for reason of simplicity the term *trafficking* is used as indicated.

Prostitute/Sex Worker - Prostitution/Sex Work
Those two terms have been used interchangeably. However, the term *sex worker* was used exclusively in reference to willing participants in the sex industry, while *prostitution* was more often used in reference to forced prostitution. This use of terminology is aimed to acknowledge that willing sex workers are not considered victims by the author, and that those who are forced into prostitution are not considered to be *working*; rather they are being exploited.

Paid sex/Commercial sex
Paid sex and *Commercial sex* were used in descriptions of client's side of prostitution. The author decided to use these terms, rather than prostitution, in order to avoid confusion. For example, "men who are involved in prostitution" could be understood as men who sell sex, rather than the other way around. Hence, when talking about clients of sex workers, it was said that they are getting engaged in *paid sex* or *commercial sex.*

Trafficker
This term was used in line with the Palermo definition of the traffickers. However, in certain chapters the term was used more selectively in order to differentiate between traffickers who are not involved in exploitation of their victims and those who are (pimps). This use was duly noted in relevant chapters.

Brothel
The term brothel was used as a term for any physical establishment where commercial sexual activity takes place, including massage parlors, clubs, bars, saunas, health clubs, strip clubs, etc.

INTRODUCTION

Human trafficking[1] is considered to be a global problem, involving serious violations of human rights, and contributing to the rise in transnational criminality worldwide. Many countries have acknowledged the fact that they have a trafficking problem, either as source, destination, or transit country. Laws have been passed to criminalize trafficking in order to punish traffickers and assist victims worldwide. Additionally, prevention programs are being developed, and rehabilitation programs for victims are being implemented. Yet, there is still a gap in understanding exactly what trafficking is, how it happens, and perhaps most importantly, why it is happening.

It has often been said that trafficking in women for sexual exploitation has *emerged*, *increased*, or *exploded* in the last 10-15 years, yet it is hard to find a time in the past when moving women in order to get them to engage in sex work and similar activities was not an occurrence, from antiquity on (Edlond & Korn, 2001; Bales, 2000). At those times, it may not have been called trafficking, but "white slavery" for example, and it may not have even been considered to be a bad thing or even a problem. For instance, towards the end of 18th and during the first half of 19th century, thousands of men and women were trafficked from Africa to the New World for slavery, and within such a social context the potential sexual exploitation and abuse that female slaves were subjected to is unlikely to have raised any additional concerns. Given that practices of slavery have existed as long as mankind, it is safe to conclude that there has hardly been a

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[1] While the author recognizes that human trafficking is not limited to trafficking for sexual exploitation, since the focus of this study will be on that particular form of trafficking, the term "trafficking" and other related terms (victims of trafficking, traffickers, etc.) were used in that narrow sense, unless specified otherwise.

society or a civilization that at some point in its past did not have the institution of slavery (Bales, 2005), and thus trafficking for sexual exploitation as well. Hence, when talking about trafficking for sexual exploitation, one should keep in mind that we are talking about an age old phenomena, perhaps as old as the civilization itself.

Throughout history, there have been periodic spurs in the attention given to the issue of trafficking. Notably, in the late 19th century, the term "white slave trade" emerged in reference to increasing reports of the recruitment of women into prostitution through force or deception (Nadelmann, 1990). It is now argued that the raising concern was actually triggered not so much by legitimate reports of such trade in young women, but by fears over the decline of family values and racial purity in the context of increased female migration (David, 1999; Kempadoo, 2005), and in response to the perceived ultimate immorality of any type of prostitution (Nadelmann, 1990). In response to raising debates, on the international level an International Convention for the Suppression of the While Slave Traffic was adopted in 1904, and on the national level in 1910, the United States passed the White Slave Traffic Act (better known as the Mann Act[2]) in an attempt to address the perceived problem. The text of the act, however, indicates that it was more than an attempt to address trafficking. By making it punishable to transport women across state lines for purposes of enticing them into , what was considered, "immoral activity" (even if not prostitution), the Mann Act was an attempt to legislate morality and respond to the increasing panic over increased liberty and freedom for women (Langum, 1994). This early movement to prohibit "while slavery" culminated with the adoption of the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the

[2] 18 USC 2421

Prostitution of Others, which was adopted by the UN in 1949 (McDonald, 2004). Following this period, up until the 1980s there was little interest in the topic. In the 1980s radical feminists started to write about the issues again (i.e. Barry, 1984), focusing on sexual slavery as a reflection of patriarchal oppression, thereby making this topic central to the international women's movement (Kempadoo, 2005), creating a new wave of interest in the topic. The 1983 Global Workshop to Organize Against Traffic in Women that took place in Rotterdam has been identified by some activists as a triggering point of the new anti-trafficking movement among women's groups (Chew, 2005). This increased interest continued during the 1990s, triggered by the reports of trafficking in women from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, following the collapse of the Eastern Block in 1989. While foreign born sex workers were common in European countries even before this period, prior to the 1980's, they were mostly from the developing countries of Africa and South America (Council of Europe, 1997). In the 1990s, the stories of sex workers from former socialist countries created a new image of the emerging and changing profile of the typical sex worker in Europe. While there is no doubt that a majority of sex workers who were migrating to Western Europe were partaking in the activity as a matter of choice, reports started to emerge of instances of women being doped, exploited, held against their will, and sold back and forth between pimps and traffickers. Service providing agencies that had started offering shelter and assistance to victims started to publicize the issue, pressuring the governments to take action and respond to the situation. With increased attention, reports, articles, and publications on trafficking started to emerge, creating a knowledge base and a framework from which anti-trafficking policies would be developed. With the new millennium, we have

witnessed a continuing surge in the interest in the topic, with new policies being developed, a number of non-governmental and intergovernmental institutions addressing the issue emerging, along with a flow of funding allocated for combating human trafficking. In the USA, for example, the State Department spent over $500 million since 2001 on trafficking related programs, (U.S. Department of State, 2007b).

Despite a long history and unusually high public interest in the topic, human trafficking has only started to be studied empirically over the last few years. While the literature on trafficking is large, a lot of it was generated by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and lately governments themselves in attempts to raise awareness, lobby, and put trafficking onto the agenda. As a result, human trafficking has remained a subject that generates a lot of debate, but with a rather weak theoretical basis and limited empirical studies.

The goals of this particular study are multiple. The study will mainly focus on the issue of destination countries for trafficking by trying to shed some light on what the characteristics of those countries are and why certain countries become destinations while others do not. In Chapters I, II, and III, the theoretical model of trafficking, based on a combination of migration and market theory, will be developed in order to create a basis for the study of destination countries. Chapters V and VI will report the first part of the study that will focus on an attempt to identify common characteristics that destination countries have and to identify how they are different from source countries as well as other countries. Chapters VII, VIII, and IX report on a case study of a single destination country, in an attempt to elaborate on how macro-level factors translate into actual trafficking incidents. The case study will also be a more in-depth study of trafficking,

aiming to improve our understanding of how local legal, political, and social contexts influence the trafficking process.

CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Defining Trafficking

Trafficking has been defined differently by different organizations, groups, and governments. The lack of uniformity in how trafficking is defined is frequently cited as a major problem for the development of data sources and comparative analysis (Laczko & Gramegna, 2003; Kangaspunta, 2003). Such disagreements make it hard to agree on what is actually being studied. They also make it hard to compare the results and the findings of studies conducted. This problem partially stems from the fact that the term *trafficking* does not refer to a particular act or action and its particular effect, but rather to a number of possible acts and their different consequences, sometimes co-occurring, sometimes not (Melrose and Barrett, 2006; O'Connel Davidson, 1998). To further complicate matters, some of those acts maybe completely legal (such as for example entering a country with a visa), and it may only become evident that they were a part of the trafficking process after the fact. Furthermore, trafficking may or may not involve crossing borders, it may involve legal or illegal crossing of borders, it may involve one working legally or illegally as a sex worker, etc.

When it comes to legal definitions, until recently, few countries had even defined trafficking as a specific offense in their criminal codes. Over the last 5 years, great progress has been noted in this regard. Yet, some countries still deal with trafficking through the legal mechanism of a combination of different crimes, such as illegal migration, prostitution, pimping, organized crime, worker exploitation, etc. Intergovernmental organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have developed definitions that fit their activities, focusing on human rights violations, labor

issues, exploitation of women and minors, etc. This variability reflects not only the multi-dimensionality of the problem of human trafficking, but also differing priorities and points of view within different groups, organizations, and governments. The following are just some of the numerous definitions of trafficking that have been used (and in some cases still are):

- Europol:

  Traffic in human beings means subjugation of a person to the real and illegal sway of other persons by using violence or menaces or by abuse of authority or intrigue, especially with the view to the exploitation of prostitution, forms of sexual exploitation and assault of minors or trade in abandoned children (Europol, 2001: 10).

- International Organization for Migration:[3]

  Trafficking occurs when:

  - A migrant is illicitly engaged (recruited, kidnapped, sold, etc) and/or moved, either within national or across international borders;
  - Intermediaries (traffickers) during any part of this process obtain economic or other profit by means of deception, coercion and/or other forms of exploitation under condition that violate fundamental human rights of migrants (International Organization for Migration [IOM], 1999: 4-5).

- Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women:

[3] IOM has since adopted the definitions of Trafficking and of Smuggling as set forward by the Palermo Protocol supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

All acts and attempted acts involved in the recruitment, transportation within or across borders, purchase, sale, transfer, receipt or harbouring of a person involving the use of deception, coercion (including the use or threat of force or the abuse of authority) or debt bondage for the purpose of placing or holding such person, whether for pay or not, in involuntary servitude (domestic, sexual or reproductive), in forced or bonded labour, or in slavery-like conditions, in a community other than the one in which such person lived at the time of the original deception, coercion or debt bondage (Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women, 1999);

- Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (Sec. 103)

  (8) SEVERE FORMS OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS.--The term "severe forms of trafficking in persons" means--

  (A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or

  (B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.

  (9) SEX TRAFFICKING. -- The term "sex trafficking" means the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act.

In 2000, representatives of 80 countries signed the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (known as the Palermo Protocol) to the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The Convention went into force on September 29th 2003, and the Protocol itself went into force on December 25, 2003. So far, 117[4] countries have signed it[5]. This means that there is a single internationally agreed upon definition of trafficking, as set forth by the Protocol:

> Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. (Palermo Protocol, 2000: 32).

Even though definitions listed above differ somewhat in wording, all of them use concepts that involve movement of individuals, exploitation of their bodies, work or services, and coercive mechanism as defining elements, although some definitions put more emphasis on one or the other of these three elements. The presence of all three elements (movement, exploitation and coercion) is what separates trafficking in humans from labor exploitation or migrant smuggling. Migrant smuggling may include movement of individuals and even exploitation of migrants' work. However, migrants are not coerced or deceived into the work – rather they are considered to be willing

[4] The number of countries that have signed the Protocol changes frequently. Please see the UNODC website for the most up to date information http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html

[5] Only by ratification does the country fully implement its obligations created by being party to a treaty, or in this case the Protocol. Signing the protocol represent the legal and political obligation on the part of the signatory country to implement and hence ratify the treaty.

participants, and rather than being victimized by the experience, they are considered to personally benefit from it. Moreover, coercion and exploitation that do not include transportation of people should be treated as labor exploitation, in which local workers are forced to work under inhumane conditions, work long hours, or for low wages. Trafficking includes a combination of these three elements. However, it is possible that migrant smuggling could turn into trafficking if, at some stage, a smuggled migrant is coerced into the type of work or the conditions of work that were not agreed on previously. This means that the element of *coercion* would be introduced. It is also possible that a bonded laborer would be sold and transferred to another business owner, as is often done with bonded laborers (Bales, 1999a), and effectively becoming a trafficking victim. This introduces the element of transportation into what is otherwise a case of labor exploitation.

The Palermo Protocol defines *exploitation* as "... at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs" (Palermo Protocol, 2000:32). Since different countries treat prostitution differently, the text of the Protocol remained somewhat vague with regard to sexual exploitation in order not to violate any national laws. In some countries all sex work is treated as sexual exploitation, while in other countries voluntary sex work is decriminalized. In the latter countries, the trafficking definition would only be applicable to cases that involve forced or coerced prostitution. How exactly trafficking is defined in those different national legal frameworks depends on the ratification process, and on how the Palermo definition was translated into national law.

The issue of coercion has also remained somewhat vague. According to the Protocol definition, deception, fraud, abduction, and abuse of power are all coercive methods that allow trafficker to get the trafficked person to do something she/he originally did not want to do. Therefore, straight forward physical coercion is not a necessary element. In fact psychological pressure, false promises, and other types of deception can be equally, if not more effective, tools of coercion, and the Palermo Definition acknowledges that to be so.

Trafficking is usually discussed in an international context, as trafficking of people often takes place across international borders. The Protocol, however, does not include any such restrictions. While trafficking is often international in its nature, this is not always the case, and transportation of people within national borders can also be trafficking as long as other elements are satisfied. The Protocol also does not specify to what exactly *transportation* refers. While it may sound straightforward, in some cases traffickers may arrange for transportation, rather than directly transport the victims, while in other cases, victims may arrange their own transportation and traffickers may only cover the expenses or may just lend the money. In the Protocol, however, the term *transportation* was probably not intended to refer to any particular mode of movement/transfer of individuals, but rather to any type of movement of individuals for the purpose of exploitation that involves some mechanisms of coercion. The Protocol, thus, does not set any restrictions on how such movement would have to take place.

Despite the fact that the legal definition should bring clarity to the definitions of an offence given the positive nature of the law, trafficking remains somewhat vague. Even when using the Palermo definition, trafficking must be viewed not as an act, but as

a process (of victims' transportation, harboring, moving, etc.) that carries a particular consequence for its victims (exploitation) and is realized through use of some type of coercion. While such a definition may be conceptually correct, it is problematic when it is used for research and data collection as well as in practice for the identification of victims and prosecution of traffickers.

To further complicate matters, most countries have not translated the Palermo definition literally into their criminal codes. It could be said that the Palermo definition, from the point of view of legal technique, is not even a very good one because it leaves major elements of the offense rather vague (such as the above mentioned transportation, or sexual exploitation), yet as protocol it is an instrument of international law, it represents minimum standards that countries should satisfy through their domestic legislation, rather than a final word on how to legislate an offence into criminal law. Thus, despite the fact that Palermo includes a single definition, trafficking has been defined differently in the penal codes of different countries. Moreover, it is possible that NGOs and other service providers, whose funding often depends on the size of their beneficiary pool, have redefined trafficking in ways that allow them to show that the targets set by their funders have been reached. Finally, researchers have used different terms and different definitions that are more useful for the particular topic being studied or for a particular point of view. Hence, some (e.g. Hughes, 2006) still define any transportation of sex workers as trafficking (due to the fact that they consider any sex work exploitation), while others use trafficking and smuggling interchangeably (see Paiva, 1998; or Widgren, 1994) or consider trafficking to be just a form of illegal migration (see Lee, M., 2005: 2). Finally, given that prostitution often by nature involves

violence, coercion and exploitation, it may in practice be difficult to draw the distinction between women who are voluntary sex workers and those who are trafficked.

The problem of definition partly has to do with the fact that legal definitions are just that – legal definitions – and are not developed with the considerations of service providers or data collectors and researchers in mind. As a result, they may not be the most suitable definitions for explaining and/or describing what a particular phenomenon is, or how it is different from other similar phenomena. This problem makes data collection and research even more difficult, given the inconsistent use of the definition across countries, organizations and researchers.

Scope of the Trafficking Problem

> When it comes to statistics, trafficking of girls and women is one of several highly emotive issues which seem to overwhelm critical faculties. Numbers take on a life of their own, gaining acceptance through repetition, often with little inquiry into their derivations. Journalists, bowing to the pressures of editors, demand numbers, any number. Organizations feel compelled to supply them, lending false precisions and spurious authority to many reports (United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], n.d., as cited in Loff & Sanghera, 2004: 566).

While most agree that trafficking is a problem, it is difficult to tell just how much of a problem it is. Counting all trafficking, or any other occurrence, is neither possible nor feasible. Nonetheless, estimates that inevitably include some error tend to be used. Good estimates are those developed from data, rather than from secondary information or speculation (Albanese, J. S., 2007). When it comes to trafficking, accurate data have been difficult to come by and a majority of the estimates regarding the scope of the trafficking problem were developed without using particularly sound methods. This problem has become evident over the last few years with conflicting estimates, changing numbers, and opaque data collection strategies (McDonald, 2004).

Over the last decade, a few different estimates of the size of the trafficking problem worldwide have emerged in the literature. The highest of those, cited by IOM, USAID, and the UN put the number of trafficking victims worldwide at 4 million (UNESCO, 2004; Kelly, L., 2005). Those estimates, however, have shrunk over time. For example, the TIP report for 2002 estimated 700,000 – 4,000,000 victims worldwide, that for 2003 estimated 800,000-900,000 victims, and that for 2004 600,000-800,000[6] (respectively, U.S. Department of State, 2002; U.S. Department of State 2003; U.S. Department of State, 2004). The International Labour Organization places their estimate at 2.4 million (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2006a). Over the last few years, lowering and adjustment of estimates has been noticeable in publications possibly due to rising criticism that sources of estimates are unclear and possibly exaggerated. This is because only a small number of victims have actually been identified, both in the U.S. and worldwide[7]. The usefulness of these estimates has been questioned for a number of reasons. Opaque methods used to develop estimates mean that it is impossible to replicate the methodology in order to check their correctness independently. Secondly, when developing estimates, one is faced with a number of unknowns, meaning that, in the end, estimates are not based on hard data, but rather other estimates. This makes their

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[6] Since 2004, the figure of 800,000 has remained an annual estimate, but in the 2007 report, it was also stated that the estimate is the result of the research, even though no reference is given in the report to the research that produced this estimate (U.S. Department of State, 2007a). For more detailed description of the methodology used by the U.S. Department of State in developing this estimate, see Kutnick, Belser, & Danailova-Trainor, 2007. This new methodology was used only in 2006 and 2007 TIP reports. Prior to that date, estimates have been based on intelligence based data, with rather unclear methods used to extrapolate estimates (Albanese, J. S., 2007).

[7] IOM identified close to 8000 victims in the last 5 years (GAO, 2006). As of 2006, 1,000 victims were certified as trafficking victims in the USA (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2006). However, individual countries have collected their own data that does indicate that IOM data underestimates the total number of victims. Central Statistical service of Sweden, for example, reported estimated 400-600 victims a year in Sweden alone (Magnussoni, Bjorling, & Pappila, 2005).

reliability even more questionable (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2006). Additionally, data and estimates have often been developed for purpose of advocacy or as a component of a larger project (GAO, 2006). As such, research needed to be completed quickly, often with problematic methodology. Activist groups, who were trying to get the attention of the government, may not have seen this as a major problem, especially when their advocacy work resulted in changes to the government's policy. The trouble is that when such estimates become known and accepted, then governments start to develop policies based on those numbers. As a result, bad estimates do result in poorly targeted programs, even when developed and used with the best intentions (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2003). In response to these discussions and recognizing the criticisms regarding estimates and "guesstimates" (as called by Kelly and Regan, 2000: 16), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) refused to develop any estimates in its analysis of the trafficking problem worldwide (Kangaspunta, 2003; GAO, 2006).

On a national level, official data sources generally tend to be very poor indicators of the actual trafficking situation. Trafficking is likely to go unreported. Victims may fear reprisals from traffickers and may be mistrustful of law enforcement (in some countries law enforcement was reported to be actually involved in trafficking). In some cases, traffickers will return victims to their countries of origin after certain periods of time, so the victims may never get the opportunity to report the crime. Even when the crime does come to the attention of the authorities, it may never be registered as the crime of trafficking. Many countries still do not have trafficking legislation, so trafficking is not recognized as a separate offense. Consequently, when law enforcement is faced with a

trafficking case, it often will not be registered as such. Rather, a case may be identified as a case of sex work or illegal immigration or migrant smuggling in these countries. Even in countries that have anti-trafficking laws, law enforcement agents may not be trained properly or may not recognize the crime as trafficking, so they process it and record it differently. Official data on trafficking suffers from all the problems that crime related data generally suffers from, further exacerbated by the fact that victims are not free to go to authorities, rendering reporting rates even lower that what is seen for other crimes.

Attempts to collect and use official data so far have ended up with rather poor and disappointing results. In a report by Europol, only Germany, Greece, and Sweden submitted statistics on trafficking out of 15 European Union countries from which Europol requested statistics (Europol, 2001). In a similar study by IOM, it was found that only 12 of 25 European Council countries could produce case data, and only 11 were able to produce data on convictions related to trafficking, and the situation in less developed countries is even more dismal.

In an attempt to develop better estimates based on actual data, Kelly and Regan (2000) have used a combination of official and NGO data and media reports. Media reports are frequently cited and used in trafficking literature. As with many other crimes, however, only the most dramatic and extreme cases tend to show up in the media, which needs to be recognized by the researchers. In their research, Kelly and Regan have attempted to cross-match reports by media and police to determine how likely cases reported by media are to also have been identified as trafficking cases by police. Additionally, they have used data from service providers to determine whether there are other cases that somehow got lost and never got counted. While based on numerous

estimates and calculations, this report nevertheless manages to develop estimates regarding trafficking based on actual data.

Another methodology has been proposed by Tyldum and Brunovskis as useful for determining the size of the victim population, the so called *capture-recapture* methodology (2005). This method, initially developed to study the size of populations in biology (such as the number of fish or birds in particular environment), allows rather specific estimates to be developed based on smaller samples and simple calculations (see Johnson, n.d., for a simple description of the methodology). In this method, a small sample is selected and marked and later (in the case of animals) released back into the population. Then, another sample is selected. The size of the total population is calculated by using the number of marked units that were captured into the second sample[8]. This method has been used in attempts to estimate the number of homeless, of street children, and of street sex workers (Tyldum & Brunovskis, 2005), but has not been used yet to study trafficking. It is not quite clear how selection would have to be done in order to develop reliable trafficking estimates.

Determining the scope of the problem (i.e. how many people are trafficked) is not the only, nor arguably the most important question that needs an answer, and the lack of reliable data on this matter should not hinder other research into the topic. Kangaspunta (2003) argues that it is not self evident why it would even be important to know the number of trafficking victims worldwide, adding that worldwide estimates have rarely been discussed for other serious crimes, such as rape or homicide. She further questions

[8] For example, 100 fish are selected and marked, and then released back into a pond. Then, 100 fish are again selected, and it turns out that 10 of those were marked. The total size of the population is estimated through the following formula: (Number of fish marked *number of fish selected the second time)/number of marked fish in second selection, hence (100*100)/10= 1,000.

the importance of knowing the scope of the trafficking problem worldwide, as this information alone is not sufficient for effective policy development. How trafficking takes place, how the victims are recruited, how the victims are transported, who the traffickers are, how the traffickers are related to other intermediaries at different stages of trafficking, what good ways of investigating trafficking cases and prosecuting traffickers are there? – these are all questions that not only can, but have to be answered through data, other than just the number of cases. While knowing the scope of the problem may be very important when it comes to policy planning, it just tells us how big we have to think, but not how to think.

Going Beyond the Scope: Research into the Nature and Patterns in Trafficking

What would be useful for policy planning is to have a better understanding of the trafficking process, characteristics of the victims, trafficking pathways, and the motivations of the offenders. Such data are, however, not easy to come by. Researchers and organizations, discussed below, have tried to develop alternative sources of data and different methods of collecting information in an attempt to produce more useful information on how trafficking happens and to whom it happens.

IOM has been using data collected through their shelters for trafficking victims around the world. Since they provide assistance to victims of trafficking, they were able to develop statistics regarding their beneficiaries. In fact, data collected through their shelter work in the Balkans and the Eastern European region have been compiled into a single well-integrated database (Counter Trafficking Module Database – CTM Database), and this database was later extended to include data collected from all field missions of IOM that take part in counter trafficking programs (total of 26 countries). As of

December 2007, information on 12.500 victims who were assisted by IOM was included into this database (IOM, no-date). Unfortunately, even these data have problems. Most of the trafficking victims assisted by IOM were victims of trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Thus, their statistics rarely include female victims trafficked for other purposes or men. It is difficult to determine what percentage of trafficking victims seek the assistance of IOM, and it is likely that there is a significant self-selection problem - women who do not seek assistance or those who never manage to run away may have very different trafficking experiences from those who do (IOM, 2001). Consequently, statistics about victims represent a limited population and cannot be fully generalized. Nevertheless, information obtained from these trafficking victims has been useful for developing a picture of types of victims, their characteristics, and the recruitment methods used by the traffickers (see GAO, 2006; Laczko & Gramegna, 2003).

IOM, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), and other organizations have also utilized numbers of issued visas that are reportedly used for trafficking (such as entertainer visas for women who are trafficked for the purpose of sex work) to identify possible patterns of trafficking. Through their research, a change in the patterns of visas issued was detected. For example, it was found that, in 1990, no entertainer visas were issued to Russian women by Swiss authorities. By 1995, however, 20 percent of all visas in that category were issued to Russian women (Caldwell, Galster, & Steinzor, 1999), indicating a possible pattern worth exploring. Similarly, in Korea, such data indicated that, despite the fact that the number of such visas issued to males has been declining, the number of visas issued to females was increasing, more than doubling between 1995 and 2000 (Lee, J. J. H., 2002). While this may be an indicator of migration

for work patterns, it tells us which countries are more likely to be targeted as destinations and which countries tend to produce the potential victims. Research has indicated that within Europe, trafficking usually involves legal entry into the destination country through official border crossing points. Traffickers obtain entertainer visas, artist visas, or tourist visas for their victims. Time limits of the visas are often exceeded (called *overstaying*). A sudden and rapid increase in the number of such visas issued to women from a particular country may be an indicator of possible trafficking routes.

So far, the most complete information we have on trafficking has been collected through interviews with either NGO workers or law enforcement officials, or victims seeking their assistance. Victims provide first hand information, but it is difficult to determine how representative this information is, considering the very small number of victims who actually seek help from shelters and authorities. Further, victims may have very limited, or skewed knowledge of the trafficking process, as they only see it from their own perspective, that can be rather limited. Very few attempts have been made to contact victims directly where they are held prior to their rescue, and this is probably because of ethical and safety issues related to this type of research. Exceptions to this are research by McDonald, Moore and Timoshkina (2000), where they contacted sex workers at massage parlors as well as escort services, and an earlier attempt made by Caldwell, Galster, and Steinzor (1999), who made contact with victims while pretending to be traffickers. While NGO workers and law enforcement officials are unable to provide first hand information, they are able to offer insight into the patterns and changes associated with trafficking from the collection of experiences and cases with which they have been

dealing. Information provided by them, however, may be influenced by their own agendas, and therefore must be treated conservatively.

So far, very few researchers have attempted to obtain information from traffickers or other people involved (pimps, customers[9], etc.). Clearly, that type of study could put the researcher in danger and there may be ethical concerns associated with asking criminals about their work, but traffickers would clearly be the richest source of information. They can provide information on the financial aspects of the work, the rotation of victims, the numbers and the ages of victims, their nationalities, and the information on modus operandi, the criminal networks involved, etc. The report by Global Survival Network (Caldwell, Galster, & Steinzor, 1999) is one of the rare examples of research based on information obtained from traffickers. While their research involved a number of different sources -- including interviews with representatives of NGOs, law enforcement and other authorities, as well as victims -- in order to obtain more detailed information the researchers also established a mock trafficking ring. Over a period of two years, they taped conversations they had with traffickers and collected documentation about their modus operandi, generating unique information about trafficking in action. This part of the research, however, focused more on uncovering the phenomena, rather than on scientifically and systematically studying it, and it did not focus on generating systematic data.

Finally, unlike some other types of transnational crimes, it is very difficult to place informants for the purposes of investigation and research. Even though trafficking is believed to be a global organized crime phenomenon, most recruitment is very

[9] There is quite an extensive research on the customers of sex workers. However, there have been no studies directly targeting customers of trafficking victims.

informal, and the whole process takes place through loose networks of people providing services at different stages (IOM, 1999; Galiana, 2000; TRANSCRIME, 2004). Frequently, these people are friends, acquaintances, and family, so it is difficult to bring in outsiders. Furthermore, it is practically impossible to insert female informants who could pose as victims, because of the very high risks of rape and violence (O'Neill Richard, 1999).

CHAPTER II: DYNAMICS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

The Role and the Perspective of a Victim

Defining who the victims of trafficking are is not simple. While legal definitions can be used to identify a victim post hoc, they do not allow us to identify victims at other stages of the trafficking process. For instance, it is impossible to separate victims of trafficking from voluntary legal or illegal immigrants at the point of border crossing, or during the recruitment process, as method of recruitment and mode of transportation across border are not what defines an incident as trafficking. Victims of trafficking cannot be defined as such until their experience includes coercion into work under exploitative conditions. Until the moment when coercion and exploitation begin, it is difficult to argue that one is a victim of trafficking. Up until that point, we are talking about a migrant, or at most a kidnapping victim.

In some cases, it is even difficult to decide whether coercion and/or exploitation are taking place. For example, in India, brothel keepers reportedly do not use violence or threats to keep women trafficked from Nepal or to pressure them into work. Yet, these women are afraid of leaving since they are in a foreign country where they do not speak the language, do not know how to return home, and do not have money (Human Rights Watch – Asia, 1995). While it is possible that they are deceived into sex work, it is difficult to say with certainty whether they are being coerced. Consequently, it is difficult to define them as victims of trafficking, as it is hard to determine both elements of deception as well as coercion. Exploitation of a worker by itself is not enough to conclude that a person is a victim of trafficking, according to the Palermo Protocol definition of trafficking. There have been reports of illegal immigrants from China who

enter the United States with the help of snakeheads having to work to pay off their debt, under rather exploitative conditions, but their situation is temporary (Bolz, 1995). In such a situation, the lines are blurred even further: both movement and exploitation are present, but it is still hard to conclude that migrants are trafficking victims, given that migrants consent from the beginning. As a result, it is very difficult to draw the line between what exactly is and is not exploitation and what is and what it is not coercion. Consequently, it is difficult to determine who is a victim of trafficking and who is not. Furthermore, some victims who have actually been exploited simply do not see themselves as such and thereby fail to identify themselves to the authorities or researchers (Aromaa, 2007; Jahic, 2007), which makes it even more difficult to decide who exactly is a victim.

From the little research that we have, and much anecdotal evidence, it seems clear that the characteristic of victims vary from region to region. The victims of trafficking in South-East Asia have different characteristics than the victims of trafficking in Eastern Europe. One characteristic that all victims of trafficking seem to share is that they tend to come from poor regions and countries, with the level of poverty varying greatly. For example, victims of trafficking in Nepal tend to come from extremely poor rural areas, tend to be very young (around 15), and are often given or sold to traffickers by their parents or relatives (Human rights Watch – Asia, 1995). In Eastern Europe, the women tend to be somewhat older, in their late teens and twenties, have higher levels of education (in some cases post secondary education), and they tend to get recruited through promises of good jobs and better lifestyles (IOM, 2001). The latter may be offered jobs as models or dancers. While poor and disadvantaged, women in countries

such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia are not necessarily at the edge of starvation. They do, however, tend to be young women brought up to wish for better and more for themselves; for something that their countries are not able to offer. Victims from these countries are actually a potential migrant population. While they are not willing participants in their abuse, the beginning of their journey tends to start with them seeking a way to migrate to a country where they see more opportunities for themselves. In some cases, sex workers who decided to move and work abroad in hopes of making more money may end up coerced into working conditions that they did not initially sign up for, effectively becoming trafficking victims (Banwell, Phillips, & Schmiechen, 2000; Skeldon, 2000).

In Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, which are also traditional source countries, the situation is rather different. Victims from these countries tend to play a more passive role, and their families are more likely to be involved somehow in their recruitment. Parents may actually sell or give their daughter to traffickers and sometimes are even aware that the girls will be involved in sex work (IOM, 1997). Additionally, promises of marriage may be used to get parents to give their daughters away. In these countries, we are talking about people taking desperate measures to survive, rather than proactive women seeking self-actualization and self-improvement. Thus, such victims tend to be younger, less educated, and easier to control.

The characteristics of victims vary from region to region. Logically, victims come from groups that are easiest to recruit and easiest to control by traffickers. Local traffickers may seek poor young women, who are easy to scare, or they may recruit young women willing to travel abroad and cooperate through the process of illegal

migration. From the traffickers' point of view, the specific characteristics of the victims are irrelevant, as long as they do not interfere with the trafficking process.

The Role and the Perspective of Traffickers

Very little is known about individuals who are involved in recruitment, transportation, and exploitation of trafficking victims, and very little research has been done on traffickers. There is speculation that trafficking is run by organized crime groups and is conducted by the same networks involved in drugs and arms trafficking (Savona, di Nicola, & da Col, 1998). Little evidence exists, however, to supports this notion (Schloenhardt, 2001). For example, research in Netherlands concluded that trafficking in women and drugs tend not to go together (Vocks & Nijboer, 2000).

While trafficking in women requires organization and cooperation between different actors, this does not necessarily mean that we are taking about organized crime. Not every crime that requires a certain level of organization is executed by an organized crime group (Finckenauer, 1998), at least not according to the classical definitions of organized crime that picture these groups as highly organized and centrally managed.[10] In fact, research on organized crime indicates that, quite to the contrary, it may be rather decentralized and diffused (Reuter, 1985; Salt, 2000). Thus, rather than talking about *organized crime groups*, it would be more appropriate to talk about *criminal organizations* involved in trafficking. In the research by TRANSCRIME on trafficking in EU countries (2004), it was found that in Belgium about 77 percent of traffickers belong

[10] Organized crime has been defined in many different ways. While some definitions are based on the structure and organization of the group, others have focused more on the activities that organized crime groups are involved in. Continuing organization, profit as a motivating factor, use of force, and use of corruption have been identified as overlapping characteristics of organized crime groups by Albanese, J. S., (2000). For more discussion on different ways of defining organized crime see Maltz (1985), Das (1997), and Fiorentini (1999).

to small clusters of pimps and their contact points. The rest were individuals or even smaller task groups. In Germany, about half of the traffickers belonged to small informally structured groups (1-10 people), while the rest belonged to somewhat bigger groups (more than 10 persons), yet still hardly a traditional mafia. Consequently, it can be said that human trafficking seems to be an activity that involves networks of small task oriented groups and individuals that form a chain, rather than a hierarchically organized group that is centrally controlled (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2002).

When talking about *traffickers*, we are actually talking about individuals who are involved with the trafficking process at any of three stages of trafficking: recruitment, transportation, and/or exploitation. Therefore, it can be concluded that traffickers are persons who are involved in any of the three tasks that are the pillars of a trafficking incident: task of recruitment, task of movement or transportation, and task of exploitation. The task of recruitment may involve finding women, but also working with women who contacted traffickers, putting them in touch with transporters or even pimps at the end of the chain. The task of transportation may involve arranging documentation (falsified passports, real or falsified visas, etc), providing transportation to and across borders, meeting victims in the airports and transporting them to their accommodations, providing such accommodation along the way, receiving girls, and selling them or directing them to brothels and pimps. The task of exploitation may involve pimping the women, providing them with accommodation during the exploitation stage, etc. (Savona, di Nicola, & da Col, 1998). Traffickers are not a homogenous group in terms of their roles. Instead, traffickers are individuals who in some way participate in the trafficking process, possibly independently from one another, undertaking different tasks in the

trafficking process. Hence, it is difficult to talk about traffickers as a group. They may not even know each other, or may work together only occasionally.

Bruinsma and Bernasco (2002) argue that trafficking in women involves lower risks and lower profits and as a result, does not require tight control mechanisms among traffickers. As a result, fluid and flexible networks that change over time are likely to be the characteristic of these trafficking networks. There are indications that smuggling of people is also organized by such flexible and fluid networks, and that larger scale organized crime groups are not directly involved (Chin, 1998; Finckenauer, 1998).

It is unclear how much cooperation and direct communication there is between the front and the back end of the trafficking process. Do recruiters also own or manage brothels where the women are exploited, or do they only provide women to brothel owners for a fee? Who organizes the transportation – recruiters, brothel owners, or the middlemen? Hypothetical models of trafficking present the possible different versions of the organization of trafficking.

The model presented in Figure 1 is a classical organized crime model, in which the whole process is being centrally managed and organized. While recruiters, transporters, and pimps are communicating with one another, the process is managed by higher level organized crime figures, and so all three tasks are executed by individuals who are part of a single larger group. While this is assumed to be the actual model, and in the literature there are plenty of references to organized crime figures who “run the trafficking business”, there is little evidence that trafficking is in reality so centrally and tightly organized; rather, it is argued that trafficking organizations are loose and rather fluid networks (Salt, 2000; Aronowitz, 2001).



Figure 1. Trafficking according to a classical organized crime model.

The process of trafficking process may also be initiated by pimps in the case of shortages of willing sex workers or appropriate sex workers (i.e. age or ethnicity wise). Pimps and recruiters may be in direct contact and, in fact, work on demand – recruit and direct girls when requested to do so by pimps. In this case, transporters are involved solely with organizing the transportation. They are individuals who know how to obtain documents, are familiar with the easiest way to get people across borders, know safe places to stay, have ongoing relationships with border patrols and can easily bribe these officials, etc. They are not otherwise involved in any decision making; they simply provide a service to a separate group. This model of organization is depicted in Figure 2.



Figure 2. Trafficking model in which the transporter is only providing services, rather than being part of the decision making.

The third possibility is that transporters also act as middle men or the contact between the recruiter and the pimps. Here, the transporter becomes a main player because they actually *own* the women before selling them to the pimps (see Figure 3). The transporter in this case is a free agent and has flexibility to distribute girls in ways that bring him/her the most income. Since all cells are independent, recruiters may be working with different transporters, who, in turn, may be working with different pimps and vice versa.



Figure 3. Trafficking model in which each of the actors is independent.

Recruiters may also be responsible for the transportation, meaning that one group could undertake two tasks. This is similar to what smugglers do for illegal immigrants, but in this case, the trafficked women are sold to the pimps for exploitation rather than being released once they reach the new country. It is at this point that the *migrant* becomes a trafficking victim. Recruiters and transporters may be making their profit from fees paid by the pimps at the point of delivery, may be charging advance smuggling fees to the victims, or may involve some combination of the two. It is likely that they receive some payment from pimps because they would otherwise have no interest in delivering individuals to the pimps or participating in further criminal activity. This possibility is depicted in Figure 4.



Figure 4. Trafficking model in which recruiters serve as transporters as well, and brothel owners are only involved in the exploitation stage.

Finally, it is also possible that eventual victims undertake transportation on their own and even reach out to the brothel owners and pimps, only to then be exploited and resold by them at a later stage. In such a model, recruiter and transporters as such may not exist or may be unconnected in anyway to the final exploitation. This model may reflect the situation in countries that do not require visas, whereby victims can easily enter the country on their own, search for a job, and eventually end up entangled into the trafficking rings. The brother owners and pimps would be the ones who exploit them, or resell them to other pimps. This model is presented in Figure 5. This model may represent how willing sex workers who travel abroad on their own may become trafficking victims once they become involved with pimps who exploit them and resell them to other pimps



Figure 5. Trafficking model in which recruiters may not exist, victims take care of their own transportation, rendering transporters nonexistent.

In either case, it is important to recognize that human trafficking has three distinct steps that involve three different tasks, and therefore, when we refer to *traffickers,* we are referring to people who may be involved in any or all tasks of this process. It is possible

that trafficking may involve other actors, who help complete any of the three tasks. Thus for example, fake marriages could be performed so that it is easier to get a victim into the country, and therefore the "fake husband" would be part of the transportation task. Or similarly, intermediaries may be used when reselling the victims, making them a part of the exploitation task.

Very little is known about the characteristics of traffickers since most research has been focused on victims, rather than the traffickers. Recruiters reportedly are likely to be friends, acquaintances, or even relatives of the victim, and therefore known to the victim (Vandenberg, 2002; IOM, 1997). Recruiters may be men or women, and in some cases it has been reported that former victims may become recruiters themselves (Banwell, Phillips, & Schmiechen, 2000). Recruitment can also be active, where recruiters approach potential victims in different settings. They may be promising employment or marriage. In other situations, recruiters may play less active roles and the victims approach them when looking for assistance in finding jobs abroad. Such passive recruiters may be advertising their services as job placement or modeling agencies, but they do not directly approach victims; rather, they wait to be approached by them (McDonald, Moore, & Timoshkina, 2000).

When it comes to transporters and pimps, even less is known. Pimps have often been reported to be of the same nationality as the victims or at least from the same region (Salt, 2000), although this is not the rule. Often, they are locals from the destination side, with no particular contact with the countries of victims' origin. Since victims have little contact with those who organize their travel, they are not able to provide a lot of information about them. Brothel owners and pimps may not exclusively be involved in

trafficking. In fact, they may also hire or pimp voluntary sex workers or may change their way of work depending on demand. For instance, they could be working with voluntary sex workers, but may decide to “hire” trafficked women to improve their profit margins. Yet, it must be kept in mind that shifting from voluntary sex workers to trafficked women would require that brothel owners and/or pimps change their business tactics. Since trafficking victims are not willing participants, they need to be watched and coerced to ensure their compliance using different methods, which is not necessary with willing sex workers. Switching back and forth between different business tactics may not be as easy to accomplish for pimps.

CHAPTER III: BUILDING A THEORETICAL MODEL OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Even though trafficking has generated considerable interest with governments, international organizations, and NGOs, national and international, most of the research on trafficking that has been conducted focuses on determining the scope of trafficking (determining the number of victims), characteristics of victims, or strategies used by traffickers to recruit, transport, and control their victims (examples are Caldwell, Galster, & Steinzor, 1997; O'Neill Richard, 1999; Laczko, 2000; Raymond & Hughes, 2001). Over the past few years, there have been increased efforts to identify data sources and develop better formulas for estimating the number of victims from the officially available data in a response to criticisms of the estimates used by different organizations, as discussed previously (see Kelly and Regan, 2000; Clawson, Layne, & Small, 2006; Laczko & Gramegna, 2003; Kutnick, Belser & Danailova-Trainor, 2007, for discussion and proposals of some new methodologies). Despite the fact that the latest research indicates improvements in the quality of the research conducted, the scope of the research has largely remained limited, especially when it comes to the causes of trafficking.

The question "What causes trafficking?" demands that a mechanism of how trafficking takes place is developed. According to Mayntz, such mechanism must show how "… a certain outcome follows a certain set of initial conditions" (2003: 241). Such mechanism, in order to be useful, has to indicate what the initial set-up conditions would need to be, what the intermediate activities are, and what outcomes these produce, rather than to just indicate a possibly random relation between different variables (Mechamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000).

The mechanism can be described on a micro-level, as well as on a macro-level. In the former, one can study motivations of victims to migrate, how their behaviors trigger or even contribute to trafficking, how and why traffickers get involved in the trafficking business, etc. The macro-level perspective attempts to explain trafficking by looking at the qualities of *countries* that are source or destination countries, exploring how countries become and sometimes stop being destinations, by looking at macro-level indicators such as unemployment rates, poverty levels and others.

In order to better understand why and how trafficking happens, it is necessary to look at how different macro-level factors translate into actual actions by women who end up as victims, traffickers who decide to venture into this criminal activity, and authorities who deal with the issue. Many women who are poor do not end up as trafficking victims, and many criminals who could venture into the trafficking business do not. Clearly, it is a combination of factors that stimulate trafficking in humans – a pool of potential victims, demand for their services, high levels of profitability and low levels of risk, a relatively uninterested public, even less interested authorities, etc.

The theoretical approach drawn from market analysis, economics, and migration theory, has emerged over the last decade.[11] This approach uses the combination of the analysis of labor markets and migration pressures in studying causes and patterns of trafficking in women (and persons in general). Integrating these theories suggests that trafficking results from a combination of migration pressures and demands for specific types of labor (in this case sex work) that cannot be met otherwise. As a result, these two markets overlap and some of those individuals willing to migrate end up trafficked into a

[11] Some of the examples of this type of approach can be found in Aronowitz, 2001; Salt, 2000; Skeldon, 2000; and Williams, 1999.

labor market where the conditions of work are so poor that coercion has to be used to force work. Rather than focusing on the specificities of trafficking, this approach focuses on the driving forces on both sides of the equation – demand and supply of workers, the conditions of their interactions, the size and scale of particular labor markets, migration pressures, the facilitators and inhibitors of the process, comparative levels of development (Williams, 1999), and historical and cultural links between source and destination countries (Schloenhardt, 2001). This provides a theoretical basis for using macro-level economic and social factors as predictors of the scale and directions of human trafficking. This approach, of course, is one of many. In the following pages, detailed discussion of migration theory and a demand based approach will be discussed in order to provide an understanding of how trafficking can be viewed by using this theoretical perspective.

Mechanisms of Human Trafficking – How Victims Become Victims

In order to develop a theoretical basis for explaining why certain individuals become and remain victims, while others do not, in the following pages two mechanisms that in the literature are most often associated with trafficking from the victim's side will be discussed. These are the issue of migration and the issue of debt bondage. This is not to argue that these are the only existing mechanisms, or that they are present and evident in all cases of human trafficking. Rather, their significance is in how well they fit the trafficking discussion from a theoretical point of view, drawing from a combination of the market and the migration theory of human trafficking.

Migration Potential

Why certain people are recruited and why certain regions or countries become sources where recruitment takes place are, in part, determined by the migratory push and pull variables. When talking about the causes of trafficking, push and pull variables such as unemployment and low wages are often mentioned (Toussaint, 1999; Raymond & Hughes, 2001). Even though migration is closely associated with the trafficking phenomenon, the migration component of trafficking has received little attention in trafficking literature. There are numerous reasons for this oversight. First, trafficking is different from migration and smuggling. That difference is defined by the very last component of the process: the victimization that involves exploited labor and often the loss of freedom. While the reasons people decide to migrate and how they are smuggled into different countries are important, they do not differentiate between trafficking and other types of irregular migration. This may be why those interested in the trafficking phenomenon may not have any particular interest in this topic. The second reason is somewhat more political. While it is clear that victims of trafficking do not wish for the particular form of victimization that they will eventually experience, they do play an active role in the process by placing themselves in a vulnerable position. Many anti-trafficking advocates avoid addressing this reality because it may inadvertently reduce the empathy for the victims whom they are interested in protecting and helping. Finally, as previously mentioned, some victims are abducted and kidnapped, and this may in some cases make the migration component irrelevant.

This omission means that we will ignore the process through which some victims are self-selected. While victims differ in many ways, they are also similar in that they are

all willing to move to a different country (city, region) for work. Willingness to migrate is a crucial characteristic of trafficking victims. Individuals who are not willing to migrate are much less likely to become victims of trafficking, regardless of their nationality, SES, level of education, etc. Exceptions to this rule are victims who are kidnapped, and therefore transported against their will, or those who are forcefully sold to traffickers by their parents or relatives. Such victims, however, comprise a smaller part of the victim population. In a study conducted in the Netherlands, out of 72 victims interviewed, 20 percent reported having been kidnapped (Vocks & Nijboer, 2000). In the case of women trafficked to Bosnia and Herzegovina, less than 5 percent have reported being kidnapped or abducted. Most were recruited through offerings of employment abroad (IOM, 2003). Similarly, of the women trafficked to Kosovo, 68 percent reported being recruited with a job promise, and about 13 percent reported being abducted (IOM - Kosovo, 2002). This is why it is important to study how and why people migrate and what their decision making process is. In the case of trafficking, many turn their wish to migrate into actions through measures such as contacting a recruiter.

Events that lead to human trafficking are, in most cases, initiated by a desire for a better life. While there are more and more migrants who leave their home countries in order to advance their careers or search for adventure and a change of pace, most of the migrants worldwide migrate in hopes of gaining a higher income abroad (Stalker, 2000). As with all other economic migrants, the motivation on the part of those who end up being victimized, is the search for better work and a better life. While victims may be lured and deceived with false promises or employment, nevertheless, they fit the

definition of being economic migrants[12] very well. As a result, when studying the causes of trafficking, it is essential to explore causes and forces behind migration processes and pressures.

Theories of migration are numerous and vary from theories based in anthropology, which study how the culture is maintained in immigrant communities to the influence of the national and international laws and regulations on population movements (Massey, 1999; Brettell & Hollifeld, 2000). In the context of trafficking, since victims of trafficking do not deal with the post-migration processes, theories that deal with the decision making process are the most relevant ones, rather than cultural and anthropological ones.

Economic explanations based on neoclassical economics utilize the push and pull model (Bohning, 1981). The basic postulate of the economic migration theory is that the migration process is determined by a cost-benefit decision undertaken by an individual, such that it maximizes the expected income (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, & Taylor, 1994). A decision to migrate is made when the potential return from the move is greater than the total investment that needs to be made into the move itself. This is not a solely economic formula, as people take into consideration social and psychological costs, in addition to the financial benefits and costs. Social and psychological costs include being separated from one's family, adapting to and living in a new culture, in some cases living and working illegally, etc. (Stalker, 2000). Push factors

[12] "Economic migrants are those who move from one place of work and residence to another, either within a country or across international boundaries, primarily because of economic opportunities, as distinct from refugees and those who move because of the migration decisions of others (tied movers)" (Chiswick, 2000: 61).

may include factors other than economics ones, such as an oppressive political situation, violations of human rights, ethnic conflict, and others (Savona, di Nicola & da Col, 1998). Potential migrants are also concerned with the ease of entry into the destination country, their future legal status, their ability to return to their home country, the overall quality of life in the destination country, the likelihood of bringing their family over, and so on, as all these represent costs of migration (Massey & Espana, 1987).

Some have argued that economic migration can be divided into voluntary and involuntary migration, with involuntary migration being prompted by a desire to reclaim "lost welfare" (Grecic, 1991: 242) and voluntary migration being prompted by a desire to improve the existing welfare (an example would be professionals who travel abroad in search of better and higher paying career options, such as CEOs). In other words, if one's desire to migrate is motivated by an overall decrease in income and quality of life, it can be considered involuntary. Yet, *involuntary* in this sense is not synonymous with *forced*. Involuntary migrants can choose not to migrate, while forced migrations, such as war refugees, often have their very survival at stake. When it comes to trafficking victims, it could be argued that most are involuntary migrants according to definition because they decide to migrate in order to reclaim lost welfare.

While a trafficking incident can only be identified after the victim has been held, coerced and exploited, it begins at the point of communication when opportunities to migrate are presented at the beginning of the recruitment process. Potential migrants make a decision whether to take some action towards migrating or not, based on the information that they receive**.** The goal of traffickers at this stage is to get potential

migrants to choose migration and to do so with their assistance, rather than through other legal or illegal channels.

When using the push-pull theory of trafficking, it is important to keep in mind that migrants are often not perfectly informed. While migrants do have good understanding of their push factors (reasons why they want to leave their country, village, region, or place of residence), they may not have as clear of an understanding with regard to pull factors, and in all likelihood do not have very good information about destination countries. This means that pull factors are determined by the images and interpretations of where migrants *think* they are going. Their decision making is based on this image, rather than on the reality. This gives great advantage to potential traffickers and recruiters, as they are not in any way bound by the reality of the countries to where the victims are actually trafficked. The traffickers can make promises about life style, employment, and income levels that create a pull, which may be completely fictional. Indeed, a study in the Netherlands indicated that women who were trafficked prior to coming to the Netherlands had rather unrealistic representations of what life in Western European countries looked like (Vocks & Nijboer, 2000).

Furthermore, when discussing push and pull factors, it is often assumed that pull factors originate from a particular country or region and a migrant decides to migrate to that particular county. When it comes to trafficking, decisions on where to migrate are often not made by the trafficking victims (Salt & Stein, 1997). Victims may be told that they are being transported into one country but actually end up being transported into a different one. They may not even be told which country they are going to. Data collected by IOM through the CTM Database indicates that when it comes to victims trafficked to

the Balkans, only a minority actually intended to work in the Balkans and 20 percent actually thought that they would be going to Italy (Laczko & Gramegna, 2003). Victims may sometimes think that they are in transit while in a particular country but later find that they are being exploited and cannot escape. So, trafficking destination countries, or countries where victims are exploited, are not necessarily countries that one would assume to have strong pull factors for migrants. This is because those countries may not necessarily be the choice of the victim if they were migrating freely and fully informed.

Apart from these factors, the relative difference between the potential wages that a person thinks they could be earning and the current wage they make is one of the main motivating factors behind migration (Lucas, 1981; Schloenhardt, 2001). A particular job in a new country may not be offering a particularly high wage. However, if the difference between the wage in the destination country and the source country is large enough, this will positively influence the decision to migrate. Another scenario that could occur is if the wage offered in the destination country is high enough or meets one's standards, a person who is not poor could still decide to migrate. This is because it has been argued that aspirations, rather than poverty alone, are an important influence when it comes to migration (Tyldum, Tviet, & Brunovskis, 2005).

According to Chiswick (2000), the level of expected return from migrating is directly related to the decision to migrate in a positive way. The higher the potential return, the more likely it is the individual will to decide to migrate. Consequently, traffickers manipulate information that they give to potential migrants about the wages. They also misrepresent the costs and the benefits of moving to a new country in order to get the women to agree to migrate using their assistance and services. This eventually

places the women under the control of the traffickers. It is in the interest of the recruiters and the traffickers to get victims to believe that they have the potential to earn wages high enough to cover the expenses of the trip and still provide them with savings.

The cost of migration is another very important issue. Since the moving process requires a certain amount of money (paying for false documentation, visas, travel, and accommodation expenses along the way, etc.), the poorest segments of the population are generally filtered out (Bohning, 1981; Salt, 2000). Because the initial cost of migration is a self-selecting factor when it comes to migration, traffickers and, in particular, recruiters manipulate the composition of the migrating population. They offer different payment arrangements and, in this way, remove the requirement for the initial money investment on the part of the potential migrant. As a result, they are offering the members of the lower income groups, who would otherwise not be able to afford migration, what appears to be an opportunity. An additional benefit for traffickers is that these potential victims tend to have less information and can be presented with a more favorable picture of opportunities than reality is.[13] For traffickers, it is more desirable to recruit from the lower income groups because individuals with higher incomes (those who can pay for their own transportation and other expenses) tend to also have better access to information. They are also less likely to be manipulated and are considered more difficult to control. It is in the trafficker's interest to recruit those who otherwise would not be able to migrate, but are *willing* to do so. In this sense, traffickers cater to a particular type of migrant, the atypical one.

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[13] The idea that migrants lack information and that they are prone to being duped by traffickers has been criticized for being an argument that governments use to launch their own information campaigns. It has been said that governments are actually trying to discourage the potential migrants from migrating by showing the "reality" of migration (Nieuwenhuys & Pecoud, 2007).

The recruitment strategies that are often used involve some type of assistance and financial support. In other words, the pool of potential economic or labor migrants is the key to the occurrence of trafficking, in combination with the communication of selective or even false information. This recruitment strategy makes the whole process much easier and less risky for recruiters and traffickers because it assures the cooperation of the victims. The transportation of the trafficking victims is probably the riskiest part of the trafficking process. This is because it may involve crossing numerous, tightly controlled borders. Cooperating migrants are much more likely to get across those borders than abducted and kidnapped victims who try to get attention. This is why the element of coercion is often not present at the beginning of the trafficking process (Schloenhardt, 2001; Tyldum, Tveit & Brunoskis, 2005). While the trafficking could take place without these economic migrants, it is more difficult to execute it when the victims are kidnapped or in other ways coerced into the migration.

A *supply* approach to migration holds that regardless of what the conditions are in the targeted destination countries, there are always people willing to migrate (Jandl, 1994) - a certain migration potential[14]. While this may be the case, the fact that such migration potential exists does not necessarily mean that migration will actually take place. As noted by Sassen, if simple poorer-to-richer migration was the rule, the volume of international migration would be much more massive than it is. In fact, "only certain people leave" (Sassen, 1999, as cited in Agustin, 2005). At this time, 97 percent of the world's population is living in their own country and 90 percent live in their own regions. Most of those displaced internally have changed place of living due to natural disasters,

[14] Migration potential has been defined as "the pool of individuals who possess certain characteristics that predispose them to desire to migrate" (Rogers, 1992: 36).

not because of economic migration pressures (Schmid, 1998). Border controls obviously play a role and prevent potential migration from becoming actual migration (Zolberg, 1989). It has been argued that for migration to take place, a certain demand in the destination countries has to exist (Jandl, 1994). This makes it worthwhile for migrants to take risks and try to enter illegally or for destination countries to allow illegal and irregular migration to happen.

According to Bohning (1981), if no one employed or wanted to employ the immigrants, there would be no economic immigration (at least no voluntary immigrants, which excludes forced or political migration and refugees). With no migrant success stories, economic migration would eventually die out. This means that demand for migrants and their labor is crucial in continuing migration patterns. For emigration to occur, immigration opportunities have to exist elsewhere; the immigration opportunities precede the emigration process. According to this approach, the immigration opportunities arise from needs that cannot be satisfied through local resources. This does not mean that there are no available workers in the local labor market. The problem is that the jobs that are offered to immigrants are usually socially undesirable jobs that are highly dangerous, dirty, unpleasant, have a low status, are poorly paid, and are often insecure (all characteristics of secondary labor market jobs) (Schmitter Heisler, 2000). Considering all these disadvantages, the local population is not interested in such jobs and that segment of the labor market remains unfilled. This has been due to the overeducated working class in a society that still needs a very large number of low-skilled workers. In such a society, locals may simply refuse to take low level jobs, which then remain open for the migrants (Van Liemt, 2004). Certain job sectors may not even

exist in the absence of migrants since they seem to be the ones willing to take such jobs under conditions that make the business profitable for their bosses (Collinson, 1993). At the same time, immigrants lack the skills and qualifications required for 'the good jobs' (they often do not speak the language, do not have legal permits, do not have the necessary education, are not legally certified, etc.), and they remain stuck with the bad jobs, under very poor working conditions. Even in countries that have high unemployment rates, demand for immigrant workers remains because they are willing or can be pressured into taking very unstable and poorly paid jobs, thereby be exploited (Mueller, 1998). This is supported by the evidence indicating that the rising unemployment rates in countries are not associated with decreasing employment opportunities for immigrants (Portes, 1981).

Trafficking has mostly been associated with sex work, but cases of trafficking for other types of labor, such as agricultural work, domestic work, hard physical labor, and other secondary market jobs have also surfaced (U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division, 2002; Bales, 1999a). Sex work has all the characteristics of the secondary labor market. In addition to being illegal in many countries, it is considered immoral and culturally unacceptable almost everywhere around the world. Nevertheless, while many condemn the sex workers, the force behind the whole trafficking process is demand, or the need for a particular service (sex) at a particular price (low). Some have argued that the rise in trafficking and the demand for foreign born prostitutes in Europe is associated with the changes in the nature of the sex work labor market. This has been due to the increased protection of the sex workers, the legalization of prostitution in some countries, and the overall better organization among the sex

workers. Since the sex workers are not under threat for committing criminal acts any more in some countries, their empowerment is reflected in higher prices (because they are now able to negotiate their pay) and in limitations on the types of services they are ready to provide (like refusing to engage in sex without protection and so forth) (Brussa, 1991). Consequently, foreign sex workers, who are often illegal immigrants, are more vulnerable, more marginalized, and consequently less able to negotiate terms of their engagement. They are thus more likely to get recruited to fill in that segment of the sex labor market that local sex workers are not filling. This is similar to the way foreign workers are more likely to get recruited into non-unionized meat processing jobs than local workers are. It is important to keep in mind that the money that sex workers make is usually determined by the pimps or the brothel owner. So, in reality, even if those who pay for sex worker services may be willing to pay more money for such service, sex workers may not benefit from that. The pimps do. Therefore, it is really pimps and brothel owners who are looking for and are recruiting those who can be exploited for little money because it maximizes their profits.

Debt Bondage

Slavery is considered to be the earliest form of labor importation (Zolberg, 1981). For centuries, armies of conquering countries have imprisoned and enslaved the local populations and transported them back for hard labor. The trafficking phenomenon has often been compared with slavery. Slavery involves not only the loss of freedom, but also non-numerated work, both of which are characteristic of trafficking cases (at least to a degree). Why are the trafficked (sex) workers often treated as slaves and how do they get in that situation?

Petras (1981) argues that in situations when the wages one earns fall below a minimum that allows for basic survival (a minimum wage that provides for basic necessities, including food and shelter), workers quickly become too weak or ill to be productive. This is due to poor health, poor nutrition, a low quality of life, etc. It also results in labor loss - workers not achieving their maximum level of productivity. Obviously, in a situation when labor is scarce, employers have an interest in avoiding further labor loss, so they may keep the wages above the minimum level. On the other hand, in a situation when labor is cheap and easily available, the pressure to maintain high productivity of an individual worker does not exist, since any laborer can be easily replaced (Bales, 1999a). If the worker is easily replaceable, the employer has no particular interest in keeping the worker happy or healthy. They do not benefit from paying the worker larger sums of money and profit the most when paying nothing at all. According to Bales, with the fall of the price of slaves over the last few centuries, today's slaves (i.e. similarly trafficking victims and those held in debt bondage) are not seen as expensive property (as they used to be seen, for example, in the American South), but rather "as disposable inputs into production" (Bales, 2000: 461). As a result, they are likely to receive even worse treatment by their exploiters than was historically the case.

To get the workers to continue working when they are paid little or nothing, it is necessary to either coerce them or to somehow manipulate them into cooperation. While physical coercion has been eliminated in most legal markets, it is still prevalent in illegal markets. Traffickers often physically abuse and/or threaten the victims in order to ensure their continued cooperation. While the physical coercion is an option, the manipulation of victims into cooperation, exploitation, and work is easier and has better results for

traffickers. In his research on modern day slavery, Bales (1999a) has found that slave owners rely heavily on manipulation of slaves into work and obedience through debt bondage and half truths and fake father-child like relationship. They only resort to physical force as a last tactic.

Lucas (1981) argues that potential migrants accept that migrating requires an initial investment and sacrifice with the expectation of a higher return following only after some time. It has been argued that most economic migrants are ready to endure severe exploitation upon arrival, believing that it will not last, especially if they heard of other migrants who endured it and made it (Van Liemt, 2004). Women who are recruited and trafficked for sex work, just like all other economic immigrants, expect to encounter hardship at first and are prepared for some sacrifice in the hope of better times to come.

A “free” immigrant invests his/her own money and resources into the migration process. If things do not work out as expected, the free immigrant can decide to return home at any point, accept the damage, and forget about the investment made. The trafficking victims do not have that luxury. They often do not directly invest their own money, but rather have traffickers cover their expenses. Additionally, they do not have the option of forgiving themselves their debt. Traffickers make them believe that their work will eventually pay off through labor bondage – they are told that once they pay their depth off, they will start earning money. Just like the other migrants, they continue to believe that a certain amount of sacrifice in the beginning is necessary to ensure the returns in the future. The existence of the debt, whether real or imagined, creates a condition of debt bondage for victims, which makes them easily controllable.

While the conceptual difference between slavery and debt bondage is substantial, people in dept bondage and those who are enslaved are in very similar situations. Slavery involves complete ownership of an individual, including their labor, their life, their body, etc. According to Anti-Slavery International "a person enters debt bondage when their labor is demanded as a means of repayment of a loan, or of money given in advance." (1998: 2), or *working off* the debt. Bonded laborer can technically be defined as a "…free wage laborer whose state of servitude may be terminated on payment of the debt" (Genicot, 2002: 102). Debt bondage involves ownership of labor only. However, masters often create such circumstances that bonded laborers have no opportunity to leave (by having them work in remote areas, never giving them any cash, taking away their documents, etc.). While debt bondage, along with slavery, is prohibited in most countries, it still persists, partially because people in the position of debt bondage are fearful of leaving and losing their jobs, shelters, and fake security (Bales, 1999a). In fact, reports indicate that trafficking victims too often continue working and cooperating with the pimps and the brothel owners because they *hope* that the work will eventually pay their debt off and they will be free to go. In a way, bonded laborers, trafficked or not, live in the hope that they will be able to buy their freedom back through their work. From the trafficker's point of view, the debt bondage is more useful than the slavery, because it gives hope to the victims and reduces the necessity for physical coercion and violence. In terms of profits, it makes minimal or no difference for the brothel owners and pimps because they are able to manipulate the "debt" any way they like. As a result, they can gain profit from the victim as long as they want. Debt may not be real. Victims may simply be told that they will be released after they work off a certain amount, meaning

that their “debt” is actually a cost of their freedom, that they need to pay in advance. Therefore, even victims whose recruitment cost nothing for the pimps may still find themselves in a situation of debt bondage.

Before the victim completely loses the hope that she will ever pay her debt off, pimps can sell her or transfer her over to a new pimp. By doing so, the pimp makes an additional profit and places the woman in a new debt situation (Kelly, L., 2005). Sadly, victims are more likely to believe that they eventually can pay the debt back through the work, rather than accept the fact that pimps have no intention of ever freeing them. In the end, women are afraid to run away because they are made to believe that their debt and responsibility to pay it back are real. The debt bondage position and fake hope become more powerful control mechanisms than locks and violence. Furthermore, going back home with nothing can be particularly hard for those who have left their countries full of hope to return home with enough money to support their families (Kelly, L., 2005). This was reflected by a sex worker: “To return to the provinces and to live as poorly as your parents would be like dying” (Pickup, 1998, as cited in Agustin, 2005). If the family is aware that a woman has been involved in sex work, the situation is dire, as she would have no money to offset the shame. In the end, if the suffering does not produce any benefit, the trafficking victim will have nothing to justify her ordeal, leaving her with a feeling of loss, thus creating a form of psychological pressure. In addition, victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation, unlike other laborers, do not have any transferable skills. Trafficking victims forced to work in agriculture may decide to continue to work in agriculture upon rescue; trafficking victims forced to prostitute are much less likely to desire to do the same thing following the rescue (Bales, 2005: 67) and this makes their

prospects look even bleaker. Thus, it can be argued that victims with their undying hope and refusal to accept the grimness of their prospects become their own enslavers. Their situation becomes "…part of the normal, if regrettable, scheme of things" (Bales, 2002).

Mechanisms of Human Trafficking – The Demand Side of the Equation

Following the increased interest in the trafficking issue in the1990's, a lot of focus has been placed on the victims of trafficking. The "victim", as a survivor, has been used as a mascot of the organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in their fight to bring attention to trafficking and expose its horrific dimensions to the world. Many reports published in the last 10 years open with a short vignette about the life story of a human trafficking victim, a young woman from Eastern Europe, living in poverty being offered a good job in Europe by a trusted friend, only to be raped and trafficked upon her arrival there. Due to this great focus on victims, most of the initial research and debates addressed the issue of establishing the number of victims. Most anti-trafficking programs focused on victim rescue, increasing awareness of trafficking among potential victims, and assisting victims with returning to their home countries. Over the last few years, however, a number of researchers have started to argue that explaining trafficking by focusing on victims, their motivations, their lack of knowledge, and their poverty creates a paradigm in which trafficking is presented as being almost natural, given the supply of such potential victims. Furthermore, the victim-centered explanation of trafficking focuses mostly on source countries and problems that victims face there, which motivate them to migrate. The second part of the equation, the destination countries, has gotten very little attention. Most importantly, the question of why some countries become destination countries remains. The migration approach may tell us why victims decide to

migrate and how that puts them at risk of trafficking. In other words, it focuses on the supply side of the trafficking business. Yet, it does not tell us what fuels the trafficking mechanisms from the other side of the transaction – the demand.

Discussions of demand as an alternative to victim-based explanations have started to gain momentum over the last few years[15]. The demand approach highlights the labor aspect of trafficking (as opposed to migration or organized crime). Simple market perspectives argue that for a market to exist, any kind of market, income potential, which is a result of demand, has to exist first (ILO, 2006b). Supply is simply a response to this demand with demand referring to "desire or preference by people for a particular kind of person or service" (ILO, 2005: 4). In order to try to explain or describe trafficking in human beings by using demand and related concepts, one first has to dissect the concept of the demand itself. According to the above definition of demand, it is necessary to identify what about human trafficking victims may particularly be in demand.

First, it is important to note that, when it comes to human trafficking, demand is multidimensional. Perhaps the most obvious demand is that of consumers. Here, one could argue that certain categories of customers are seeking sex workers who are obedient, less likely to insist on using protection, or easier to control, all of which may be easier to provide with sex workers who are trafficking victims. Nevertheless, other than a very small minority of customers who may be particularly interested in trafficking victims, perhaps for sadistic reasons, customer demand is not particularly for trafficking victims per se, but for certain types of sex workers. This, however, means that demand for *trafficking victims* does not arise from customers themselves, at least not in the huge

[15] Relevant publications include Andersen & O'Connell Davidson, 2002; Andersen & O'Connell Davidson, 2003; ILOb, 2006; ILO, 2005; Hughes, 2000; Hughes, 2004.

majority of cases. In the majority of cases, customers are simply after sex workers with a preference for cheaper (although not always the case), more docile, and more eager-to-please sex service provider, or sex workers who are from a different country or from a different ethnic background – exotic.

The demand for trafficking victims may be coming from persons who provide prostitutes for customers, such as pimps. For pimps, pimping trafficking victims may increase their profits. The ultimate service or *quality* that is in demand from their perspective is, in fact, not the sex work provided by the victims to consumers, but the characteristic of being easy to control by pimps. It would be hard to imagine that a pimp would turn away a sex worker who is not a trafficking victim but would be willing to work under the same conditions as one. In fact, a pimp would probably prefer such a sex worker, given that she would be less likely to cause trouble, go to police, run away, etc. However, given that such sex workers may not be easy to find, the demand for trafficked women may arise. Demand can also be created by those who can potentially profit from it, as is evident in everyday life were the consumers are constantly bombarded by new products that they never really had demand for. As such products become popular or become status symbols, the demand develops.

Yet, demand for paid sex cannot be overlooked as a part of the demand debate. While customers may not have a particular demand for trafficking victims since they represent such a small segment of the sex market, if there was no demand for sex workers in the first place, there would also not be a *market* for trafficking victims as sex workers either. If no one was willing to pay for sex, pimps would not be able to make money from

trafficking victims in the sex industry. This means that demand for paid sex must be addressed as one of the factors causing human trafficking.

Demand for Commercial Sex

Two main approaches are evident in the literature on demand for paid sex. The first one is *the every man* approach, which implies that customers of sex workers are not particularly different from the rest of the (male) population. Conversely, the second approach, *the peculiar man* approach, argues that men who pay for sex are somehow different from the general (male) population (Monto & McRee, 2005). According to this approach, men who pay for sex are doing so as a result of certain personal and social deficiencies. Earlier studies, such as those by Kinsey and associates (1948, as cited in Monto & McRee, 2005) and by Benjamin and Masters (1964, as cited in Monto & McRee, 2005) have provided support for the *every man* approach, with close to 70 percent of men in the Kinsey study reporting having paid for sex in their lifetime. More recent research on the extent of prostitution is not on the scale of Kinsey's research, and has mostly focused on small convenience samples, making it difficult to have confidence in the generalizability of the findings. Yet, support for the *peculiar man* approach has emerged with the accumulation of smaller studies. These recent studies found that not all men are ready and willing to pay for sex and the majority of men never do so (Mansson, 2006; Monto, 2004). For example, in research conducted in 1999 in Finland, it was found that 19 percent of men had at some time in their lives paid for sex (Haavio-Mannila & Rotkirch, 2000, as cited in Mansson, n.d.). Research conducted in Spain in 1992 showed 39 percent of the male population had paid for sex at some point in their lives (Leridon,

Zesson, & Hubert, 1998, as cited in Mansson, n.d.). In 1981, it was found that about 10 percent of Swedish men had paid for sex in their lifetime (Kuosmanen, 1999).

These results require explanation as to why some men seek prostitutes and others do not. There is also a need to explain why there is such a great variability among the countries. The fact that, in Europe alone, proportions of male population that paid for sex at least once varies from 7 percent to 40 percent (Mansson, n.d.), indicating that very subtle social and cultural pressures have a strong influence on this kind of behavior, resulting in great variability even among culturally similar countries. Poverty, gender inequality, and cultural norms that limit women's sexual activities have been argued to contribute to prostitution (Kelly, L., 2005). Yet, prostitution even occurs in countries where poverty is relatively low, gender inequality is not as much of a problem, and female sexuality is much less controlled by the society.

The increase in noncommercial sexual activity in the U.S. has been said to have contributed to the decrease in prostitution in the U.S. over the last 50 years (Monto, 2004). Men in certain professions, such as truckers, the military, police, and frequent travelers have been more likely to pay for sex in their lifetime than has the general population of men (Anderson & O'Connell Davidson, 2002). In addition, research has found that unmarried men are more likely to visit prostitutes than married men, and they held more liberal views on sexuality (Monto & McRee, 2005). Furthermore, situations that highlight masculinity, such as war and conflict, are also argued to contribute to demands for paid sex (Anderson & O'Connell Davidson, 2002: 29).

Since only some men seek commercial sex and since this kind of behavior varies a lot from country to country, theories that are based on the idea that sex workers are a

response to “natural male sex urges” loses merit. The idea that prostitution is a safety valve that allows for a safe way for men to satisfy their sexual urges reflects a particularly masculine vision of sexuality. According to this vision, male sexuality is seen as uncontrollable (Jordan, 1997); an urge that eventually needs to be discharged, whether via sex with a sexual partner, prostitution, or rape. It is now well established that how sexuality is perceived is strongly influenced by culture and the nature of gender relationships in a given society, and such one-dimensional approaches have been abandoned.

Some more recent studies on sex workers and their clients have started to shed light on why men actually pay for sex. These studies focus on personal motivations for such behavior. Some have reported shyness and difficulty in establishing relationships as their motivation while others reported that they seek sexual experiences that they feel they cannot ask from their partners. Some find the illicit nature of this activity to be a thrill and some prefer it to non-commercial sex due to its convenience (Monto, 2004: 160). Mansson (2006) summarized findings of a number of smaller studies conducted in Scandinavian countries on men who pay for sex, indicating five motivations for seeking paid sex as reported by the men in those studies. The first one, *the whore fantasy*, is based on the desire to have sexual experience with a woman who “makes herself available,” a woman who is repugnant but exciting. For men who seek prostitutes with this motivation, the sexual experience that they get is not a substitute for a conventional sexual relationship, but rather the fulfillment of a fantasy. The second motivation was deemed to be demand for *another kind of sex* that a man cannot have with his partner. This does not necessarily mean that men are seeking sexual acts that their partners would not do or that

they think would not do. In fact, studies done in Asian countries (ILO, 2006a) as well as those conducted in Sweden (Kuosmanen, 1999) indicate that vaginal sex is still the most predominantly paid for sexual act. A study conducted in Los Angeles indicated that oral sex and vaginal intercourse were both the most frequently and, more or less, equally requested services (Lever & Dolnick, 2000). The same study also indicated that other types of services, such as manage-a-trois or SM, were very rarely requested. Another U.S. study indicated that only a very small minority of men requested unusual sexual behaviors, such as spanking, and that dissatisfaction with marital sex was not clearly associated with using prostitutes (Sawyer, Metz, Hinds, & Brucker Jr., 2002). Demand may be simply for a different, often more passive experience where men allow themselves to be *seduced* by a highly sexual woman who takes charge, perhaps feeling that they cannot behave like that with their partners who expect them to be the assertive and sexually aggressive. Such experience may put less pressure on them because the expectation that they perform is much lower. The third demand identified was for a *kind-hearted comforter*. This is where men express longing for a woman in general, meaning that the demand is not solely sexual in nature. Men with such motivations were those who primarily feel that they cannot have meaningful relationships with regular women due to shyness, mental handicaps, or physical handicaps. The fourth motivation was *sex as consumer product*, as opposed to the view of sex as a part of an intimate relationship. Demand is particularly based on the idea of the customers that men have the *right to* sex, just the way they have the right to any other product or service, as long as they pay for it. Paid sex is simply seen as service consumption: easy and convenient. The final motivation as identified by Mansson is for *another kind of woman*, in response to the

reduction of men's dominance in intimate and sexual relationships. These "other women" are seen as obedient or submissive (for example Asian women), or wild (for example African women), but in a way always in touch with their feminine natures. By being with these women, men purchase a "romanticized" moment where sexual roles are traditional and "women do what women should do."

Mansson's findings, however, came from research conducted in Scandinavian countries only. It would be safe to assume that motivations of men may be very different in countries where gender relationships are framed differently. Nevertheless, research conducted by the ILO in five Asian countries[16] indicates great similarities in the explanations provided by men. Lack of other options for release of sexual desire was the most frequently cited reason in Nepal and Bangladesh. Convenience of obligation-free sex, low satisfaction with sex with normal partners, the need for closeness with a female, and seeking variation in sex were also frequently cited explanations. These all greatly overlapping with the five bases for demand as summarized by Mansson. Similar themes emerged in the study in New Zealand by Jordan (1997), where men reported dissatisfaction with sexual experiences at home, desire for an *uncomplicated* sexual encounter, and the opportunity to share details of their life and intimacy as reasons for visiting prostitutes. In Finland, men described their encounters with sex workers as having "no pressure to perform," "feelings of independence," "power," "easy lay" and similar reasons (Martilla, 2003).

These explanations can be seen as reflections of how gender roles are perceived in contemporary societies and what common expectations are. Men, on one hand, seek the

[16] Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

ultimate femininity (defined as submissiveness and sexuality) that they cannot find with their partners, in prostitutes. At the same time, they can allow themselves to be more passive with prostitutes, which they feel would repel their partners from them. In a way, sex workers allow them to consolidate two conflicting gender role views: that of a strong man and a passive woman, with that of a man who is also allowed to be passive. By simply paying the sex worker to take part in sex where men play a passive role, men actually reverse the roles in a way, as they are the ones who *pay/use*, while the sex worker is the one who *gets used* (Jordan, 1997), meaning that even being *passive* is converted into *active*. The hassle of arranging non-commercial sexual encounters is resolved by paying for it and avoiding any obligations towards the women. Yet, the sex worker is expected to provide the intimacy that is normally expected in an intimate relationship. By obtaining both from sex workers, men resolve a conflict between their need for intimacy and expectations about being promiscuous, masculine, and independent. Finally, men appear to resolve needs for intimacy through visits to sex workers, which allows them to be emotional and sexual at the same time (Jordan, 1997). In other words, the sex worker is capable of providing an experience that can respond to those conflicting messages and inconsistencies in the gender roles for both men and women by the simple nature of being *neutral* herself and having basically no needs of her own within the framework of any particular encounter. In this sense, only one party's expectations and insecurities need to be resolved and responded to, making the relationship simpler and easier to frame within the gender role expectations imposed by the consumer.

The argument that suggests that the act of visiting a sex worker is not simply for the release of sexual build up is further supported by the fact that men often believe, or at least want to believe, that sex workers are also enjoying the act. In a study by Jordan (1997), this sentiment was expressed by both men and sex workers. In fact, men expressed dissatisfaction with sex workers who did not appear eager, indicating that they would prefer the sex workers to pretend, rather than to reduce the act to what it is: sex for money. In a study in Finland by Martilla, men's view of the sex workers indicated that they are seen as "hypersexualised and enjoying [one's] work" (2003: 5). Research in the USA by Sawyer, Metz, Hinds, and Brucker Jr. (2002) also indicated that men who use prostitutes tend to believe that prostitutes enjoy their work, genuinely like the men they serve, make a lot of money, etc. In another study conducted in New Zealand (Plumridge, Chetwynd, Reed, & Gifford, 1997), men reportedly continued to believe that sex workers enjoy the experience even when they clearly stated otherwise. Furthermore, they found it rude of sex workers to express their dissatisfaction with the encounter. Based on their research, authors conclude that men's demand is not just for sex, but for a fully emotionally responsive woman to have sex *with.* It could be said that rather than just paying for sex, men are actually paying for an approximation or an illusion of a real intimate relationship, one where pressures on men assigned by their gender roles are significantly reduced. In fact, in Plumridge et al., some men reported that they were sometimes trying to develop "miniature relationships" with the sex workers they visit (1997: 175). Reportedly, men who actually develop such mini relationships with sex workers while traveling abroad failed to see themselves as sex tourists (Günther, 1998, as

cited in Mansson, n.d.). This indicates that even they do not perceive themselves as traveling for just sex.

Clearly, the market for sexual services varies just as any other market. Not all commercial sex provides the opportunity for men to even express their demands or expectations, given that a lot of commercial sex happens fast, in very unsanitary conditions, sometimes even on the street or in a car (Brown, 2000). Nevertheless, these studies indicate how men construct their demands, but this does not mean that those demands are always satisfied. Additionally, it is likely that men may not even be aware of what their actual expectations are until asked by researchers. However, they may refuse to talk about their simple sexual desires with researchers and focus on more socially acceptable justifications. While these descriptions of why men use prostitutes can be questioned, they cannot be simply discarded in a discussion of the nature of demand for commercial sex.

Knowing this, the question is how demand for human trafficking fits with what we understand regarding the general demand for commercial sex. It is much easier to discuss demand for sex alone, as such demand is rather unspecific and persons who can satisfy such demand for simple sexual discharge can vary. However, the discussion above points to the fact that the demanded service may not be that simple. In this sense, it is relatively unlikely, as argued earlier, that demand for trafficking victims is rooted in the men who seek commercial sex, other than for a small minority. In a study by Anderson and O'Connell Davidson (2001) in India, Japan, Sweden, and Thailand, it was found that the majority of men who seek commercial sex were not interested in having sex with trafficking victims. They reported that they would actually call the police, try to help the

victim, or at least go to a different prostitute. Similar results were found among men who do not seek commercial sex. While this does not necessarily mean that this is what men would do if they actually encountered a trafficking victim, it does indicate that their demand for commercial sex does not extend indefinitely. In the ILO study in five Asian countries (2006b), it was also found that regardless of the age of the client, the highest demand was for sex workers aged 25 or younger, but only if they were old enough to consent. This is another indicator that consent of the sex worker is something that customers find important. It falls in line with the previously discussed demand for an illusion of relationship or desire to believe that the sex worker is also enjoying the encounter.

The fact that men generally have no preference for trafficking victims and that they have preference for willing sex workers does not mean that trafficking victims are not used. In fact, if trafficking victims can be made to look and behave as if they are actually willing sex workers, they fit into demand for commercial sex, as expressed by men. This preference for willing sex workers just limits the strategies that brothel owners, pimps, and traffickers need to use when trying to control their victims and coerce them into prostitution.

Demand by Brothel Owners and Pimps

Given that the customers typically only buy sexual services and not the victims themselves, (or sexual services by trafficking victims as such) it is crucial to explore the nature of the demand by brothel owners and pimps in any analysis of the demand for trafficking victims.

Research on the use of prostitutes among sailors by Bellis, Weild and Beeching (1996, as cited in Anderson & O'Connell Davidson, 2002) indicates that men are more likely to pay for sex when the cost of such service was lower. Hence, it was found that some sailors were more likely to visit prostitutes in ports where such services were provided at a lower price, as opposed to ports where such services were more expensive. Furthermore, there are indications that men are likely to travel to nearby countries if sexual services are provided there at a lower price. This indicates that low price can create or increase the demand for such service. Those who pimp the sex worker are usually those who set the price, indicating that pimps are motivated to keep sexual services cheap.

In the pimping business, costs involve all the payments associated with running the business, including paying for the accommodations for the sex workers that work for the pimp, paying off police officers and other authorities, and also paying the sex workers their share. Revenues come from the money paid by the clients. Profits are equal to revenues minus costs. There are not many things that a pimp can do in order to improve his profits.

In order to increase profitability in the long run, a short term reduction of prices and profits in order to create demand is a strategy that has been used in other illegal markets, such as drug markets, (Boyum, 1993). However, drug markets operate under different mechanisms due to the relatively lower elasticity of the demand (once established, the demand is unlikely to go down with an increase in prices, due to the addictive nature of the product sold). So, while drug sellers can risk reducing their profits for a while in order to create a more stable demand, the same is not the case with

"sellers" in the sex market, as their product or service is not addictive and newly created demand can easily disappear with an increase in prices. Therefore, pimps cannot manipulate prices too much.

Under the condition of stable revenues, in order to increase profits the only thing that pimps can do is reduce the costs associated with running the business. This can be accomplished in a number of ways, from not providing a hotel room for the encounter, to paying the sex workers a smaller share. While keeping the costs down can be and is often used as a strategy, it reduces the quality of the *total experience* sold and commands an even lower price. In other words, pimps cannot charge the same for sex on the street and for sex in the hotel room. Thus, even though sex on the street may reduce the cost, it will also reduce the total revenue. Consequently, the only other available option to reduce the costs is to reduce the share given to the sex worker.

Any significantly reduced profit margin for the sex worker will basically result in an exploitative condition, such that the deal may simply not be desirable for the potential sex workers, even the more desperate ones. Again, an unsatisfied sex worker means a lesser interest in the work and consequently a poorer performance. As a result, the pimp may be pushed to pressure and coerce women into such exploitative conditions or recruit women who are not in a position to leave if their profit share is too small; thereby creating the conditions of human trafficking.

Demand for trafficking victims may not be limited to low end prostitution. Pimps always have interests in maximizing their profits, just as any other businesses do. Hence, it is possible that the demand for trafficked victims is present in the higher level sex market as well, as it always leads to increased profits for the pimp without raising the

price of the services sold and without reducing demand. An additional benefit from working with trafficking victims is that this may actually increase the demand, regardless of the price level. This is because the victims have less power to set the conditions of engagement. In other words, victims of trafficking provide less restricted service at the same or lower price, which for some customers may be an important and enticing factor.

The question that remains is why a pimp would prefer victims trafficked from other cities, regions, or countries, over simply coercing local sex workers. Apart from the fact that migrants often arrive prepared to endure a period of hardship, they are less resourceful, have less access to information and welfare networks (Musacchio, 2004), and are easier to manipulate. If physical force by itself was the most effective method of coercion, it would be irrelevant for the pimp whether the victim was local or not. Debt bondage, threats, and manipulations, on the other hand, are easier to use as methods of coercion because they require less physical security (to prevent victims from running away), and do not leave visible scars. Bruising and scars on the sex worker may be off-putting for the men who are paying for sex, as they are indices that the prostitute is not consenting and consent was found to be an important issue. Trafficking victims are migrants with no social networks and are often limited with little to no language skills. This is relevant because as newly arrived migrants, they are also less resourceful and less able to realistically evaluate their situation and options.

Pimps, in other words, have demand for trafficked victims since this gives them the opportunity to increase their profits without also increasing prices and in that way jeopardizing the level of demand. In a way, working with trafficking victims can be seen as a business model, which is efficient only if it is relatively easy to coerce victims into

cooperation with minimal use of physical force. Otherwise, maintaining security and ensuring cooperation may become too costly and dangerous.

Traffickers[17]: Combining Demands

The activities of criminal groups often revolve around providing goods and services demanded by different segments of the general public that could not be obtained through legal means (Schloenhardt, 2000). Individuals approach organized crime groups to obtain monetary loans that they cannot obtain from banks and traditional financial institutions, to obtain help with entering countries that would otherwise not allow them entry, to purchase drugs that they cannot access legally. Such groups create opportunities to gamble where gambling is illegal and there are no legal casinos. Thus, activities associated with criminal groups are a response to an existing demand for goods and services.

Businesses models employed by such criminal organizations may depend on the type of service that is in demand, the level of risk associated with providing such service, and profit levels, among other things. As discussed in the Chapter II, persons who are involved in the recruitment and transportation may have a final say in the exploitation of trafficking victims, depending on the particular trafficking model of organization. Consequently, their business models may vary. For those involved in the exploitation of

[17] While "trafficker" is a term used for persons who are involved in any way in the process of trafficking from recruiting to exploitation, in this particular chapter, it will be used solely for persons who are involved in the process from the point of recruitment up until final exploitation (as pimps have been addressed in the paragraphs above). The fact that all persons involved in any way in the trafficking process are traffickers arguably stems from the belief that trafficking is a criminal business run by well organized criminal organizations that run the business from the beginning until the end. The idea is that traffickers recruit women and exploit them as well, making their profits from the exploitation. Research, however, indicates that this model may not necessarily be the best description of the reality. Smaller groups and fluid networks are more likely to be involved at different stages of trafficking rather than a big criminal organization who manage the task from the beginning to end (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2002; Skeldon, 2000), as was discussed in the previous chapter.

trafficking victims, demand is shaped by the factors discussed in the chapter on pimps. If, on the other hand, they are not directly involved in the exploitation, their business model and demand are significantly different. Those traffickers who recruit women, transport them, and deliver them to pimps act as a bridge between the two different types of demand: demand for migration assistance services and demand for women who can be easily controlled and coerced into low-pay sex work. They use the mechanisms of one demand to satisfy another instead of treating these two as separate business activities, thereby turning two businesses into one single more complex business model.

Demand for migration assistance stems mostly from the fact that only a small minority of the population actually has the information and the resources, whether legal or illegal, that allows them to migrate without such services. Migration policies severely restrict legal migration options. Even when legal options do exist, many people may not be able to navigate the bureaucracy on their own. The fact that many trafficking victims actually arrive to their destination countries legally, with tourist or entertainer visas (Caldwell, Galster, Kanics, & Steinzor, 1999), suggests that such legal options do exist and it is possible to benefit from them, if one is resourceful. Many potential migrants never make the first step in the absence of such resources. In this sense, the existence of legal alternatives does not necessarily guarantee that trafficking will not take place, as long as the information about those alternatives is not available or the accessibility of such legal options is poor (Kelly, E., 2002). Traffickers act proactively, offering their services to such potential migrants and dealing with the bureaucracy for a fee. This service may involve obtaining passports, visas, working permits, tickets, guarantee letters, invitation letters, initial employment, marriage, etc. As such, traffickers actually

provide services that are already widely offered: many travel agencies often provide all or some of these services for a fee[18]. The difference is that traffickers organize their work in a way that it targets persons who would otherwise not make the first step, do not have the resources, financial or otherwise, to make this step, or are not aware of these opportunities. In this sense, the service that they provide may not be illegal at all. What differs in the business model of the traffickers who use this method, as compared with regular travel agencies that provide a similar service, is that traffickers offer services to persons who cannot pay upfront, which gives them the opportunity to charge higher rates and interests. This is very similar to a business model of loan sharking, a money lending service, which is commonly offered by a regular business and made available to those who cannot use legal services for various reasons. This results in a higher cost for the borrower. In a sense, traffickers cater to what would be called the *higher risk* market in the legal economy and operate on the very edge of legality. When legal migration options are more limited, traffickers provide what appears to be an even more valuable service to the victims - the possibility of migration when no legal options exist. In a way, they are acting as illegal travel agents (Williams, 2005). They may provide fake passports or visas and illegal entries into the destination countries. The basic method is the similar to legally available services, except that in this case, traffickers are more clearly on the illegal side of the line. This increases their risks and the costs of operating such a business. Increases in the costs are probably passed down to the consumer of the service, or the victims themselves. Overall, it can be said that the business model used by the traffickers is very similar to business models of legitimate businesses. According to the enterprise theory of

[18] In fact, there have been reports of legitimate travel agencies being involved in the trafficking business in this fashion (Bruinsma & Meershoek, 1999; Belser, 2005; TRANSCRIME, 2004).

organized crime, organized crime activity is governed by the same economic principles that formal legal businesses are driven by, in the context of marketplace (Halstead, 1998). All businesses operate on a scale of legality (Liddick, 1999), and all products and services that those businesses provide as well as the tactics that they employ fall somewhere within this scale.

From the description above, it is easy to conclude that the trafficker is no different from the smuggler. Yet, this is not the case. The smuggler sells a service to the migrant, while the trafficker only appears to do so or leads the migrant to believe so. Besides providing a "travel agent" service to the migrant women, traffickers perform a different service: they do not ensure the arrival of the victim to the new destination, but instead ensure the delivery of the victim to the pimp. In this sense, traffickers combine two demands that are normally independent from one another, rather than acting on a particular demand for trafficking victims. If there was no demand for migration assistance services, traffickers would have to kidnap women to traffic them, which does happen but is not the predominant model (Belser, 2005). However, if there was no sure customer for the women among the pimps in the destination countries, they would have to develop a different business model for providing migration services. This might require longer term engagement, through which employment for the migrants would be ensured so that the latter can pay off their debt.

While participating in the exploitation of the victim would probably yield higher profits for traffickers over the longer term, it is also more risky. By simply selling the victim to the pimp, the traffickers finalize their business deal, make their profit, and end their relationship with the victim. This strategy may be the result of the nature of the

"task environment"[19] where further exploitation takes place (Smith, D. C. Jr., 1980; Smith, D. C. Jr., 1994). The task environment of illegal businesses provides no guarantees that the conditions of the contract between actors involved will be respected (services paid, profits shared as agreed, etc). In the absence of guarantees that legal business have, new tactics must be developed (Naylor, 1997). Such tactics involve violence and threats (Arlacchi, 2001) as well as disengagement from long terms business arrangements. One strategy includes turning money around fast by selling the debt of the victim off at a profit to the pimp or the next intermediary in line. This leaves it to the pimp or intermediary to recover their initial investment and make a profit by using long-term exploitation. The idea that the main source of profit in trafficking is exploitation has been used as a way of differentiating it from smuggling (Aronowitz, 2001). It is true that trafficked victims continue to provide profit to the pimps, even long after the initial investment has been collected. However, for traffickers, the term of the engagement may be short and complete with the selling of the victim to the pimp. In that sense, even though trafficking does produce a profit over a much longer period of time and quite possibly generates more profit than smuggling all together, it does not necessarily produce such long term profits for all parties involved.

Understanding Trafficking on a Macro-Level

The model of factors and reasons behind trafficking presented in the previous chapters address the problem from a rather micro-level perspective by looking at the decision making processes of individual actors involved in the trafficking, such as

[19] The "task environment" refers to the sectors, organizations and individuals that an organization interacts with and that have direct impact on the organization's ability to achieve its goals. In the context of illegal business, all individuals and other structures that are involved in running the business form a "task environments" of the business in question.

victims, traffickers, pimps, and customers. The next step would be to use this micro-level model to develop explanations of why trafficking looks the way it does on an international level. Certain countries and regions are more likely to be sources, while some countries and regions are more likely destinations. This also needs to be explained.

Macro-level factors that are used in migration theory have often been used to explain trafficking on a national level, with the argument often stating that women are trafficked from poor to rich countries. Poverty (United Nations Development Fund for Women, 1998) and the feminization of poverty (Lee, M., 2005), unemployment (Trafficking of Women and Children, 1999), inequality (Widgren, 1994), economic development (Ruggiero, 1997), level of industrialization (Human Rights Watch – Asia, 1995), and repressive social regimes (Lee, M., 2005) have all been associated with human trafficking. All of these are variables derived from the migration theory approach. As previously stated, while migration-related variables may be relevant to explain source countries, they are much less relevant for describing destination countries because victims often do not have a choice when it comes to where they are going to. Thus, the traditional *pull* side in trafficking is much less relevant. While it can be hypothesized that source countries are poorer, have more inequality, and have higher unemployment, there are no theoretical bases to claim that destination countries should be just the opposite. Moreover, not all poor countries end up as source countries (Kelly, E., 2002). Some countries that are a known source of migrants, such as Turkey, are also not sources of trafficking victims for sexual exploitation (Jahic, 2007; U.S. Department of State, 2007a). This reminds us again that while migration theory is useful in explaining human trafficking, the mechanisms of trafficking are somewhat different.

An increase in the use of sex workers and a growing sex industry (Lee, M., 2005) have been argued to be associated with certain countries becoming trafficking targets, although there is no direct evidence that would support those claims. It is very difficult to measure the size of the sex industry and, in particular, the size of the market for commercial sex. This makes it difficult to disprove or even gain support for this approach. Studies that have made such attempts focused on relatively limited areas where it is easier to conduct exhaustive surveys, such as known red light districts and call girl services (Magnusson, Bjorling, & Pappila, 2005). The particular nature of the market for sexual services has also been found to dictate the method of exploitation used. Hence, in some countries, trafficked women work from brothels; elsewhere, they are engaged in street prostitution or sent to private apartments (TRANSCRIME, 2004). Purchasing power has also been put forward as a possible factor. According to this approach, non-tradable services, such as sexual services, tend to have higher prices in high-income countries compared to low-income countries, meaning that exploitation of the victims yields higher profits for the traffickers (Danailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006). This argument is based on the idea that traffickers and exploiters work together while traffickers continue to receive profits derived from the exploitation over long periods of time. In the case, traffickers and pimps run separate operations. Traffickers will only care to hand victims over and receive return on their investment. Additionally, any country in which they can make such a profit would be an equally interesting destination, regardless of what level of profit the victims will generate for the pimp later on.

Other studies have indicated that prostitution is, in general, more common in poorer countries than richer ones and that it is in decline in more developed countries

(Edlund & Korn, 2001). Another possibility that exists is that traffickers actually create demand by "dumping" trafficking victims into the sex market in the country where it is safest for them to do it. These countries tend to be those with high corruption levels, where official are easily bribed, and where borders are uncontrolled and porous. In the study of trafficking in EU countries, it was concluded that a variety of loopholes make a particular country a transit or destination country. Such loopholes may be geographical (i.e. particular topography), institutional (i.e. lack of or low domestic control or corrupted officials), or bureaucratic (i.e. particular immigration policy or visa requirements) (TRANSCRIME, 2004).

All this indicates that we know very little not only about micro-level mechanisms that influence trafficking, but also about the macro-level mechanisms behind prostitution and even migration. Only a few studies have attempted to shed some light on these issues by focusing on macro-level variables as possible explanations or predictors of human trafficking.

In his study, Bales (1999b) entered 76 variables (national level indicators) into regression model to determine which ones are associated with trafficking. Variables included measures of economic activity, energy consumption, food production, tourism, population profiles, extent of censorship, and a number of others. Variables on the extent of slavery in the country and trafficking into and from the country were derived from the author's own research files. These were measured on a 5 point scale: Unknown, rare, occasional, regular in small numbers, and regular in large numbers. The following six variables were found to be the best predictors of trafficking from a country (variables identifying a source country): Government corruption (positive), infant mortality rate

(positive), proportion of population below age of 14 (positive), food production index (positive), population density (positive), and conflict and social unrest (positive), with government corruption being the best predictor. When it comes to trafficking to a country, the following five variables were found to be the best predictors of trafficking, meaning that they were positively associated with trafficking: percentage of male population above age 60, government corruption, infant mortality, food production, and energy consumption. Bales, acknowledging that this study was only preliminary and not derived from a theory, did not discuss these results in a lot of detail. Furthermore, the report was not clear in just how the regression analysis was run, considering that there were over 70 independent variables. In addition, there were no indications on how possible multicollinearity between variables was controlled for, or how biases due to missing data were handled. In another book, Bales concedes that predictors for destination countries were much weaker than those for source countries. He argues that the former are simply indicators of general prosperity. Bales concluded that a *typical* destination country is a "relatively rich one country with just enough corruption to allow low-risk passage thought its borders" (Bales, 2005: 140).

In their study of supply and demand in trafficking, Danailova-Trainor and Belser (2006) hypothesized that openness of the country (such as openness of the borders), incidence of prostitution, and price of services provided by trafficked victims are the factors that drive demand. On the supply side, they hypothesized that female unemployment and corruption in the source countries would be the main predictive factors. Additional variables included in the study were used in order to capture the socio-economic situation in countries. These included ILO's Key Indicators of Labor

Markets and Gini coefficients, literacy rates, corruption index, institutional quality rates, etc. When it comes to measures of trafficking, they have used ILO's database of open sources (reports prepared by different organizations) that contain qualitative information on trafficking, in additional to ILO's own data. The authors have calculated an average of all available estimates of human trafficking incidences for every country; the same was done for prostitution. This estimate of number of annual trafficking incidences was used as the main dependent variable. The authors acknowledge that this method is far from perfect. Considering that many estimates quoted in the literature have been developed without a sound database, it is questionable how reliable the data used by the authors were. Results of the regression analysis indicated that a higher incidence of sex work is a predictor of human trafficking for destination countries. Openness was not significant. Since there was no way to disentangle legal from illegal prostitution, the authors were not able to reach any conclusions on whether legality or illegality of prostitution in any way contributes to trafficking into a country. In the supply model, no variables were found to be good predictors of trafficking from a country. None of the socio-economic variables yielded significant results either. The somewhat limited results of this study may be due to the problematic variables and to the use of incidence estimates that are problematic due to the fact that they are not based on good data and more prone to error.

Smith, R. B. (2007) has studied what accounts for variability in the Human Development Index[20] among different countries and regions using a somewhat different approach. Unlike in the previous two studies, slavery, rather than trafficking, was one of

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[20] The Human Development Index combines a measure of economic development by using measures of per capita income, social development, literacy, and longevity. For more information on the HDI, see UNDP Human Development Reports website at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hdi/ .

the independent variables used to predict HDI. It was hypothesized that slavery reduced human development because it reduces the access to good education (which is one of the dimensions of HDI) for those who are enslaved, reduces per capita income of the poor, and shortens the life span. While this effect may be real, if slavery is not very widespread, these effects may not be detectable on the national level. Yet, in this study, it was found that slavery was negatively associated with levels of human development. Furthermore, it was found that slavery accounts for much of the regional variance in the Human Development Index. In the report, it is unclear from where the slavery data were derived, apart from the information that it was an ordinal variable. Nonetheless, it hypothesizes the relationship in an intuitively illogical direction: that slavery causes low HDI, rather than the other way around.

All three of the studies mentioned are preliminary steps to study trafficking on a global level, by using macro-level variables. The problems that were faced in these studies, such as lack of reliable measures of trafficking, make it difficult to interpret the results. An alternative to this method would be to conduct a large-scale comparative study, similar to the study of low-crime country characteristics by Adler (1983) which involves an in-depth study of a number of countries. Such an approach would allow for an in-depth study of the nature of the problem in each country. It would also make it possible to develop models of what variables are associated with trafficking from the bottom-up. Such studies, however, are time consuming and suffer from their own generalizability problems.

CHAPTER IV: GOALS OF THE STUDY AND APPROACH TO METHODOLOGY

In the previous chapters, what human trafficking is has been discussed, along with possible explanations of how and why trafficking takes place. In order to offer a theoretical approach to the question of why human trafficking occurs, current explanations of human trafficking were reviewed, along with economic migration theory on the source country side and demand explanations on the destination side. Despite the fact that these explanations have been proposed and debated by governments, IOs, NGOs, and service providers, it must also be acknowledged that these explanations have emerged only recently and have not been extensively tested for their efficacy. In response to this state of the affairs, the main goal in this study is to build on these ideas and to elaborate on how economic migration theory and demand explanations can be further studied. In particular, the question addressed by this research is whether it is possible to identify the characteristics of countries, either as source or destination countries, which have a trafficking problem in a way that would be in line with these two theoretical approaches. The overarching issue addressed in this research is whether there is something special about source and destination countries that makes them susceptible to a trafficking problem.

Even though both source and destination countries were studied, the main focus is on destination countries. This emphasis is due to the fact that explanations of why certain countries become destinations are much less coherent than the explanations of why certain countries are source countries. When it comes to source countries, as discussed, explanations based on the economic theory of migration have been used to theorize about trafficking *from* countries. Yet, despite so many claims that factors causing migration are

also associated with trafficking, there has been little research in this direction, apart from a few macro-level studies described in the previous chapter. Simple observation that some of the well known sources countries of economic migrants are not sources of trafficking victims indicates that the mechanisms cannot be completely identical. Thus, we need to look further into what the characteristics of trafficking source countries are, rather than simply assuming that they are the same as migrant source countries. The examination of various theoretical explanations in previous chapters reinforces the idea that how a potential migrant and/or trafficking victim understands their situation in the home country and how they perceive their potential for future improvement elsewhere - when combined with the presence of enterprising traffickers - is what results in trafficking. It is not due to the simple difference in income between two countries. So, even though the model, based in economic migration theory, is proposed to explain trafficking, it puts much more importance on the particular cognitive processes of victims and traffickers. The fact that trafficking is explained at this very micro-level does not mean that particular conditions, which allow cognitive processes to be more widespread in one country, cannot be detected at the macro-level. Quite the contrary, the goal of this study is to reinforce the theory and to describe how macro-level characteristics can translate into micro-level behaviors and vice versa.

Theory is much less coherent when it comes to trafficking *into* countries. Discussions of demand have only recently emerged. Given the multidimensionality of the demand, it is hard to pinpoint exactly what demand should be studied in human trafficking and how this would be reflected on a macro-level. A study by Danailova-Trainor and Belser (2006) indicated that the prevalence of prostitution may be associated

with trafficking into countries. However, these results are very preliminary and the methodology used was rather problematic. In this study, the attempt is made to identify macro-level characteristics that are common for destinations countries and that differentiate those countries from others.

From these overarching issues, the following research questions can be derived:

1. The combination of push factors (such as unemployment, work restrictions, discrimination against women, stigma associated with sex work, and overall poverty) and perceived pull factors (potential for better living conditions, higher earnings, and more interesting life) create a large pool of potential migrant women.
    - What push factors can be identified in trafficking countries? Which ones are more important? Can common pulls, as predicted by economic migration theory, be identified for destination countries?
2. What is the nature of the demand (at what price, for what services)?
    - Where does it come from? How and why does it emerge and change?
3. The conditions of work offered are very poor and the work itself is undesirable, so "voluntary" workers are unlikely to accept them (Jandl, 1994).
    - What is the nature of the work for which legitimate workers cannot be found? What are the conditions of this work? Why cannot the demand be satisfied locally? Are there reasons other than the undesirability of the work?

4. Because of low individual resourcefulness, potential migrant women who become trafficking victims rely on different services to obtain jobs, arrange travel, obtain

documentation, etc. Those services are often available from smugglers and traffickers.

- Do trafficked women benefit from such services and to what extent? Do women look for such services?

5. Women smuggled into a new country are coerced (physically or psychologically) to accept the work and the working conditions offered and consequently, their work is then exploited.[21]

- What is the nature of exploitation and coercion? How are women controlled and pressured into work? What is the degree of exploitation? (For a sex business to be successful, traffickers have to be able to strike a balance, such that pressures and threats and level of coercion are not such that women would be ready to take *any* risks to escape. Rather they have to make sure that conditions of exploitation and degree of coercion has to be just enough to keep victims in line, silent, and obeying, without pushing their limits.)

6. Trafficking requires a certain level of organization on the part of the traffickers because it usually involves crossing borders, travel, false documentation, etc.

- Who are the traffickers? How well are they organized?

7. Trafficking takes place within a certain legal and social environment that may stimulate or hinder the trafficking process. This environment is responsible for the trafficking situation in a particular country or a region.

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[21] It is important to note that a definition of trafficking victims includes even those individuals who know the nature of the job she/he will be involved in, if, in the end, she/he is coerced into working under conditions that are exploitative.

- What particular social, economic and political peculiarities can be associated with trafficking?
- How do authorities view trafficking? Do they believe that it is a legitimate problem? How do these views on trafficking influence anti-trafficking policy?

While some of these questions are more general, others are more specific. The purpose is to paint a picture of the particular context in which trafficking takes place, both on a macro and micro-level. A combination of complementary data can provide systematic understanding of why trafficking takes place and what are the factors influencing it. In this manner, current theoretical approaches will be elaborated and tested.

Two very different methods will be used to address those issues. The first component of the study uses a macro-level approach, employing national economic and social indicators to study the characteristics of destination and source countries. The second component of the study is a case study of one destination country where the particular social, economic, and political context in which human trafficking emerged as a problem in that country will be viewed. By using two different methodologies, each representing a different form of analysis, this study will addresses the research questions and represent a methodological test, allowing us to evaluate the advantages and drawbacks of each approach.

Studies that use macro-level variables and nations as units of analysis are called macro-comparative studies. They are used widely in political science and macroeconomic research. There are three main techniques used in such studies: small N studies,

qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), and regression and pooled regression analysis (Kenworthy & Hicks, 2008). Since regression method was used in this study, a technical overview of such studies and their problems is presented below.[22]

Regression is frequently used as a quantitative comparative method, testing the relationship between variables that are aggregated on the national level (Kittel, 2006). The first problem with using regression in macro-comparative research is the limited number of cases, since the number of nations is limited and data are often not available for all countries. Since the availability of data can be associated with other characteristics of countries, like efficiency of the government or general wealth of the country, this self-selection may result in a bias (Ebbinghaus, 2005). The small number of cases makes it impossible to run analyses with more than just a few independent variables. In order to overcome this problem, pooled regression is often used. This refers to an analysis in which the data point is not a country but a country-year, meaning that for the same country there can be more than one data point (for example, GDP for country A in 1990, 1995 and 2000 would be used as three separate cases). However, this causes other problems, such as collinearity and outcome-delay associated problems. Macro-level variables, such as GDP, unemployment rates, and literacy rates, do not change fast over small time periods, meaning that data regarding the same country, even though taken from three separate points in time, will be auto-correlated. This may skew the distribution and even change the variance of the dataset. Such analysis combines the "space and time dimension" (Kittel, 1999: 245) in a single dataset, which violates the assumptions of the regression analysis.

[22] Technical information on how small N studies and QCA studies are conduced can be found in Appendix A.

A second problem that will be encountered when using regression analysis in macro-quantitative research is again related to the time dimension: data used in the analysis are often from the same time period for both dependent and independent variables even though in many studies it is recognized that there is a time lag in the effect of the independent variable (Kenworthy & Hicks, 2008). Even if one attempted to use data for dependent and independent variables by accounting for the time lag effect, it is often hard to tell how long it will actually take for a change in what is hypothesized to be an independent variable to result in a change in the dependent variable. A time lag that is too small or too large between data points may render the data meaningless. Furthermore, as argued by Ebbinghaus, researchers tend to assume that the sampling frame from which countries are selected consists of countries that exist in the present, while it actually consists of an "unknown universe of past, present and future cases" (2005: 135)[23]. Since any conclusions reached with analysis should be generalizable to points of time other than right now, all previous and future country conditions are actually part of the population from which the sample needs to be selected, biasing the sample used in the analysis greatly towards a simple point in time.

Thirdly, since the population (nations of the world) that is being studied is very heterogeneous, many macro-level variables are not distributed normally. This makes it difficult to use the data in statistical analysis without previous transformation, as distributions that are not normal violate the basic assumptions of regression analysis (Osborne & Waters, 2002).

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[23] This, however, could be argued for all populations and so, it is not limited to countries.

It has also been argued that macro-quantitative research has been extremely unsuccessful in producing robust findings (Kittel, 2006). The lack of robust findings can be explained by the various methodological problems described above. It can also be attributed to the basic way that such studies are conceptualized. Macro-comparative studies explore relationships by studying what are assumed to be *causes* and *outcomes*, but often without thought being given to the mechanism that would be the link between the two. Such mechanisms can be a sequence of *micro-level-behaviors* (term by Kittel, 2006), triggers and reactions at both the micro and macro-level, or even repeated and accumulating actions (Mayntz, 2004). In other words, studies that are macro-comparative by nature tend to focus on input and outcome without studying the mechanism in between or sufficiently hypothesizing about it. It is possible that researchers feel that macro-level analysis needs to remain macro-level and micro-level explanatory mechanisms would compromise the macro-level nature of the study. Lack of good theory about the mechanisms involved, however, results in studies that resemble "data driven fishing expeditions" (Jackman, 1985: 162), where possible dependent and independent variables are simply thrown in with the hope of finding some relationships. As a result, Kittel argues that macro-qualitative studies should be used as exploratory and descriptive tools to "[observe] unobvious regularities" (Hoover, 2002: 173, as cited in Kittel, 2006: 657).

In order to address some of the problems of macro-comparative analysis discussed above, the issue of trafficking will be addressed in this study using macro-quantitative methods and supplemented with a single case study. The macro-quantitative study will be used to explore whether it is possible to identify relationships between macro-level variables, while the single case study will be used to study the mechanism of

human trafficking and to explore how macro-level variables translate into individual micro-level-behaviors. Although single case studies are problematic due to the fact that there is nothing to compare the case with, unlike in small-N studies, they can be used to "make the case," as a single case can also be used to "confirm, disprove, alter or generate a theory" (Ebbinhghaus, 2005: 142).

On the macro-level, the aim of the study is to identify macro-level variables that can be associated with a country's trafficking situation, using macro-quantitative analysis. While association does not necessarily imply causation, the goal here was to identify if source and destination countries stand out from the pool of the countries in any way, and if so, are these irregularities sufficient to explain a countries' status as a source or a destination? This information can give us an idea on where to look for causes of trafficking and can provide direction for future preventive action in countries with similar characteristics.

However, while different variables, such as the unemployment rate may be associated with trafficking on a macro-level, this does not necessarily mean that people who are trafficked are the unemployed ones. One must not make the error of reaching conclusions based on information obtained from a different level of measurement. Rather than focusing on just inputs and outcomes, mechanisms will also be studied through the case study. This micro-level approach was used to study how a country's general economic, social, and political situations influence whether and how trafficking takes place.

Conducting a study using a combination of small-N or QCA macro-quantitative analysis would produce complementary data, allowing for both analysis of trends as well

as an in-depth study of the nature of the problem in a number of countries. Within the constraints of time and resources, this research represents only a small step in that direction – a macro-quantitative analysis complemented by a case study of a single country that has been reported to have a significant trafficking problem. A case study can be technically defined as:

> (…) an empirical inquiry that
> - Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when
> - the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.[….]
>
> The case study inquiry
> - copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result
> - relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in triangulating fashion, and as another result
> - benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. (Yin, 2003:13-14)

Studying the *context* itself, and studying the borders and relationships between this context and the human trafficking phenomenon are among the main goals of this component of the study. In that sense, the case study can be seen as both exploratory (studying the relationship between context and human trafficking) as well as a form of hypothesis testing (exploring if and how identified macro-level variables translate into the micro-level, if at all). Additionally, given the limitations of macro-comparative research, especially in terms of data availability and number of variables that can be addressed with the very limited number of countries, the case study is a good way to go beyond just a few macro-quantitative variables. It is also a good way to explore how a number of factors that are difficult to capture as quantitative national indicators are associated with trafficking. Lastly, as suggested by the above definition, the case study

benefits from a multitude of data sources, including interviews, documents, observations, and second hand data. While case studies have been criticized for sloppiness and lack of scientific rigor, and for producing few generalizable findings (Yin, 2003), in this particular study, the case study method suits the needs of the research, by providing the content to the outline set forth by the macro-quantitative study. This could not be provided otherwise. By using different methods is the study of a phenomenon, the problems of each of the two methods are being addressed: The lack of "context" of the macro-quantitative studies is made-up for by the case study, and the low generalizability of the case study is compensated for by the macro-level analysis.

While there was no opportunity for comparison with other countries in this study (thus, no horizontal comparison), this was an opportunity to determine whether macro-level variables really can be associated with the trafficking problem on the local level (thus, there will be an opportunity for vertical comparison; macro-level to micro-level). This approach can be seen as an experiment in the methodology for studying trafficking problems in individual countries. The objective of the case study is to determine how the local legal and social context influences the trafficking process. The purpose is to attempt to determine if the macro-level factors are really the factors that somehow influence the decision making processes of victims and traffickers and eventually lead to the occurrence of trafficking.

CHAPTER V THE MACRO-QUANTITATIVE COMPONENT: METHODOLOGY

Methodology and Database Development

The purpose of the macro-level component of the study was to determine which macro-level economic and social factors are associated with the trafficking status of a country.

The variables included in the analysis were determined based on the combination of theories mentioned earlier. For identifying characteristics of source countries, variables associated with what would be migration push factors were studied, including indicators of unemployment, social and economic development level and equality, and political oppressions levels. To identify characteristics of destination countries, variables that should be included were harder to identify, mostly due to the fact that theory on destinations is much less coherent. Indicators which allow us to explore whether trafficking destination countries are the same as migration destination countries are included. This allows testing whether migration theory is also relevant for destination countries. In addition, data on the legal status of sex work in a country is included, which allows studying whether the criminalization of prostitution is in any way associated with the nature of the trafficking problem in a country. Finally, corruption is included, as well as other economic and social indicators, which may help draw a profile of a trafficking destination country. In this sense, the analysis can be considered more theory testing for source countries, while it can be seen as exploratory work for destination countries. The following paragraphs explain specifically which variables were used, how they were compiled, and what kinds of transformations were used in order to address some of the problems of macro-quantitative research.

Dependent Variable (Outcome Variable)

Two dependent variables were the targets of this study: whether a country is a destination country, and whether a country is a source country. While it may appear that it makes more sense to have a single variable that would indicate whether a country is a source, destination, transit, or a no-trafficking country, it was decided that having two variables would make more sense. First, some countries have the multiple status of being destination, transit, and source countries. If trafficking status was treated as a single variable, categories that would reflect those combinations would also have to be included, which would increase the number of categories so that the number of countries per category would be reduced. As a result, this would make analysis difficult because of the small number of countries in the first place. Second, two analyses, that on source and that on destination countries, are conducted independently of one another because different variables are used for each analysis. Here, the comparison is not between source and destination countries, but between source and non-source countries, and destination and non-destination countries.

Sources of data on trafficking that can provide us with information on a large number of countries are very limited. IOM's CTM Database, previously noted, includes only data derived from IOM programs and covers only countries in which IOM has missions. The U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons reports were considered as possible sources because they cover a larger number of countries, but TIP reports have been criticized for being politically motivated (International Rescue Committee, 2004), arbitrary, inconsistent, and shallow (2002 Foreign government complicity in human trafficking, 2002). While the methodology used in TIP reports was considerably

improved after 2006 (Kutnick, Belser, & Danailova-Trainor, 2007), those changes are not relevant for this study since data that were used in this study needed to date back to around 2002-2003.

In the absence of one good source of information on trafficking, deriving the data by analyzing a number of sources, rather than a single source, was contemplated. The hope was that by using different types of sources, the biases that each type carries would even out. In 2006, the UNODC had prepared a report (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006) in which they combined these sources. Existing reports were analyzed for their content, indicating which countries were reported to be source, destination and/or transit countries. For those that were identified as source, destination, or transit, information on how frequently each country was mentioned in each category was included. This was rated on a scale of one to five (from very frequently to very rarely). This UNODC database is suitable and it was used to derive both dependent variables since information on the scope of the problem and on the number of trafficking cases was not of interest in this study.

The UNODC Database on Human Trafficking (the Database) consists of data obtained from reports published by 113 different sources, including reports by government and non-governmental organization, intergovernmental and international bodies, research institutions, universities, think tanks, newspapers, news agencies, academics, etc., published between 1996 and 2003.[24] Reports included in the UNODC database were those that used the Palermo definition of trafficking in order to ensure

[24] For a very detailed description of how the UNODC Database was generated, what sources were used, and how countries were scored, see the original publication: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006). Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns. Vienna, Austria: UNODC. Retrieved January 19, 2009, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/publications.html

uniformity. All the reports that fit these criteria were analyzed for the content. Each mentioned account of trafficking was used to generate data. A total of 4,950 accounts of trafficking were identified in this way. For each, the following information was entered into the database: Source country, destination country, route (transit countries), purpose of human trafficking, victim's profile (gender, minor or not, nationality), offender's profile (gender, minor or not, nationality). Such a record presents one account of human trafficking. While such detail was not available for each account of trafficking derived from the reports, all the data were available in about 55 percent of the accounts.

It must be noted that the record would be identical regardless of whether the source said that 10 or 10,000 persons were trafficked from country A to country B. This database, thus, does not include information about the scope of the problem. Instead, it only provides one with the geographic dimensions of the problem: which countries are sources, which ones are destinations, which ones are transit countries, and how often they are mentioned as such. In order to avoid counting the same account multiple times, subsequent mentions of the country in other publications by the same source were not counted when a particular country was mentioned as a source (destination or transit) by a source (organizations that issued the report). For example, if a particular NGO has issued a particular report on trafficking in Europe from which an account was derived defining Ukraine as a source, Ukraine would not be counted if again if it was mentioned more than once as a source in an annual report by the same NGO. Simply stated, each country could be counted only once per source organization. No country could be counted as a destination, source, or a transit country more than 113 times, i.e. the number of sources. In this way, information was generated for a total of 161 countries listed in Table 1.

The score on how often each country was mentioned was categorized into one of the 5 categories. The ranges used for each group of countries were different due to the fact that the reporting frequencies for destination, source, and transit countries were different, as can be seen in Table 2 for destination and source countries.[25] Appendix B shows which countries were in each category and how they were classified according to the frequency of being mentioned in the database.

Table 1. Countries for which trafficking status was available in the UNODC database.

Afghanistan	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Croatia
Albania	Iraq	Cuba
Algeria	Ireland	Curacao
Angola	Israel	Cyprus
Argentina	Italy	Czech Republic
Armenia	Jamaica	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Aruba	Japan	Democratic Republic of Congo
Australia	Jordan	Denmark
Austria	Kazakhstan	Djibouti
Azerbaijan	Kenya	Dominica
Bahrain	Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro)	Dominican Republic
Bangladesh	Kuwait	Ecuador
Belarus	Kyrgyzstan	Egypt
Belgium	Lao People's Democratic Republic	El Salvador
Belize	Latvia	Equatorial Guinea
Benin	Lebanon	Eritrea
Bhutan	Nigeria	Lesotho
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Norway	Liberia
Botswana	Oman	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Brazil	Pakistan	Lithuania
Brunei Darussalam	Panama	Luxembourg

[25] Since transit countries were not an object of study in this research, related information is not presented in this table or the following paragraphs, even though that information was available in the original report from which the information was derived. For information on transit countries, please consult the original UNODC report.

Bulgaria	Paraguay	Madagascar
Burkina Faso	Peru	Malawi
Burundi	Philippines	Malaysia
Cambodia	Poland	Maldives
Cameroon	Portugal	Mali
Canada	Qatar	Mexico
Cape Verde	Republic of Korea	Morocco
Chad	Republic of Moldova	Mozambique
Chile	Romania	Myanmar
China	Russian Federation	Nepal
China, Hong Kong SAR	Rwanda	Netherlands
China, Macao SAR	Saudi Arabia	New Zealand
Taiwan Province of China	Senegal	Nicaragua
Colombia	Serbia and Montenegro	Niger
Estonia	Sierra Leone	Togo
Ethiopia	Singapore	Trinidad and Tobago
Fiji	Slovakia	Tunisia
Finland	Slovenia	Turkey
France	Somalia	Turkmenistan
Gabon	South Africa	Uganda
Gambia	Spain	Ukraine
Georgia	Sri Lanka	United Arab Emirates
Germany	Sudan	United Kingdom
Ghana	Swaziland	United Republic of Tanzania
Greece	Sweden	United States of America
Guatemala	Switzerland	Uruguay
Guinea	Syrian Arab Republic	Uzbekistan
Haiti	Tajikistan	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Honduras	Thailand	Viet Nam
Hungary	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Yemen
Iceland	Congo(the Republic of the)	Zambia
India	Costa Rica	Zimbabwe
Indonesia	Côte d'Ivoire	

Table 2. Ranges used for categorization of the source and destination countries.

Country of	Number of sources	Index range	Total number of countries
Origin	1	Very low	13
	2-4	Low	30
	5-10	Medium	46
	11-23	High	27
	24-49	Very high	11
Destination	1	Very low	29
	2-3	Low	27
	4-10	Medium	50
	11-24	High	21
	25-40	Very high	10

Countries for which no trafficking accounts were identified were not mentioned in any of the three groups. For this research, they have been considered as *No trafficking* countries.

These data suffer from a problem that is inherent to all data generated from public sources. It is possible that trafficking simply did not attract enough attention to be mentioned in the reports of certain regions and countries. It may also be happening so deep "underground" that it has not become visible and goes unreported. In this sense, the fact that a certain country has been classified as a destination or source country through the UNODC database may be an indication of how much attention a particular country has received while the lack of information may indicate the lack of attention given to the country, rather than the lack of a trafficking problem in the country. The same goes for the categories indicating how frequently a country has been reported as a source or destination. While the fact that a country has only been mentioned once may indicate that the problem in that country did not reach alarming proportions, it may also be taken as an indicator that the problem is starting to emerge from the "underground" and should be

given attention. Thus, low frequency reports can be treated as noise or may be very important indicators of developments in a country.

Another limitation of this type of data is that as with any other type of data, including all crime data, wealthier countries are more likely to have better statistics. Consequently, these countries are more likely to be reported as either source or destination countries. As a potential consequence of this, a small number of trafficking cases identified, in for example Holland, are likely to be reported across different sources, placing such a country into the high frequency group. A country with a poor collection of statistics is less likely to report trafficking cases and also less likely to appear in various sources.

When it comes to using the data from the UNODC database, the problem is the fact that a lot of countries have been reported at least once as either a source, destination, or in some cases, both. This is mostly due to the fact that the scope of the problem is not in any way reflected in the data. While it is possible that a majority of the countries in the world have had some incidents of human trafficking as either source or destination countries, countries where trafficking has reached epidemic proportions are much fewer in number. In order to address this problem, low and very low frequency groups as either sources or destinations were treated as *No trafficking* countries in this study. In this way, only countries that are *consistently* reported to be a source or a destination country across a number of information sources were actually treated as such. Thus, this study actually compared countries that have a well recorded trafficking problem with those that do not.

Consequently, for the purpose of this study 38 countries were identified as source countries and 31 as destination countries. Tables and maps below show these countries.

Table 3. Countries that were treated as source countries in this study.

Albania	Czech Republic	Pakistan	Poland
Armenia	Dominican Republic	Latvia	Moldova
Bangladesh	Estonia	Lithuania	Romania
Belarus	Georgia	Mexico	Russian Federation
Benin	Ghana	Morocco	Slovakia
Brazil	Guatemala	Myanmar	Thailand
Bulgaria	Hungary	Nepal	Ukraine
Cambodia	India	Nigeria	Uzbekistan
China	Kazakhstan	Philippines	Viet Nam
Colombia	Laos		



Figure 6. Map showing countries that were treated as Source countries in this study (shown in black).

Table 4. Countries that were treated as destination countries in this study.

Australia	Czech Republic	Italy	Switzerland
Austria	Denmark	Japan	Taiwan Province of China[26]
Belgium	France	Kosovo[27], (Serbia and Montenegro)	Thailand
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Germany	Netherlands	Turkey
Cambodia	Greece	Pakistan	United Arab Emirates
Canada	Hong Kong, China SAR	Poland	United Kingdom
China	India	Saudi Arabia	United States of America
Cyprus	Israel	Spain	



Figure 7. Map showing countries that were treated as Destination countries in this study (shown in black).

Cambodia, China, the Czech Republic, India, Pakistan, Poland and Thailand were identified as both source and destination countries - a new category (shown is the map

[26] Taiwan was listed as a separate territory in the source report. Thus, it is treated separately in this study.

[27] Kosovo declared independence in February 2008. Up until that date, it was a semi-autonomous part of Serbia. Since it would be impossible to obtain macro-quantitative data for 2003, Serbia and Montenegro were used instead. It should be duly noted that Serbia and Montenegro ceased to exist as a single country in 2006, when Montenegro declared independence, but since data used in this study were from 2003, Serbia and Montenegro were treated as a single country.

below). While this number of countries is clearly not sufficient for any meaningful analysis, some descriptive analyses were conducted in order to explore whether there is any possibility that these countries are somewhat different from those that are just sources or destinations.

Figure 8. Map showing countries that were treated as Both Source and Destination countries in this study (shown in black).

Independent Variables

In this study, country economic and social indicators were used for analysis of both destination and source countries.

Source Countries

For analysis regarding the source countries and in particular, the push factors, individual indicators that were used are shown in Table 5. All variables included in this component of the study are arguably push factors, which encourage migration. By including gender inequality and female unemployment, gender specific push factors were studied as well.

Table 5. Variables and corresponding indicators that were used for the study of source countries.

Variable	Indicator	Data Source
Economic Development	GDP (PPP) per capita $	World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database
Inequality	GINI Coefficient	World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database and UNDP Human Development Reports
Level of unemployment among women	Female unemployment rate	ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) database
Population Pressure	Annual population growth rate %	World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database
Political rights and civil liberties	Freedom status	Freedom House Freedom in the World database
Gender Inequality	Female to male secondary school enrollment ratio	World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database

Economic development

Gross Domestic Product Per Capita Purchasing Power Parity (in current US $) was used as an indicator of economic development. GDP per capita is a basic and powerful indicator of economic development. It represents an allocation of the total production of a nation (production of goods and services) per capita of population (United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, 2007). Purchasing Power Parity adjusts for different consumer prices across countries. As a result, GDP per capita PPP is a better measure of the economic wellbeing of the population than simple GDP per capita. GDP data were obtained from World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database (World Bank, 2007). WDI is a comprehensive database of development indicators that includes data on 575 indicators (social, economic, financial, natural resources, and environmental) covering over 200 countries. It is a publicly available database. GDP per capita for 2003 was used. For this variable, data were available for a total of 183

countries. Those countries are shown in Table C1 of Appendix C. For three countries (Bahamas, Barbados, and Turkmenistan), only 2005 data were available.

Inequality

The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure of inequality within a given group; in this case, within nations. It measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals deviates from a perfectly equal distribution (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2002). It is an indicator of a relationship between the cumulative income share and the cumulative population share. For example, a perfect equality and a Gini coefficient of 0 would be found in a nation where 20 percent of the population with the lowest income had 20 percent of the total income of the nation (Coudouel, Hentschel, & Wodon, 2002). The coefficient varies between 0 and 1 with 0 being an indicator of complete equality. It can also be expressed as a value between 0 and 100.

In this study, the Gini coefficients were obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database (World Bank, 2007). Some of the missing data were completed using data from the Human Development Report for 2006 (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2006). Data used were not from the same year. By including only countries for which 2003 data were available, there would be a very small number of countries and a lot of missing data. In order to ameliorate this for countries for which 2003 data were not available, the nearest year for which data were available was used. Preference was given to years prior to 2003, but in some cases only more recent data were available. Using data from a different year should not create a problem assuming this inequality within a country does not change dramatically over a

period of a few years. Table C2 in Appendix C shows for which countries these data were available, for which year, and the value of the Gini coefficient (on a scale of 0-100). For 67 countries, the Gini coefficient is missing. Comparison of sizes and populations of countries for which data were available (with those for which it was missing) shows that countries for which Gini data were missing were significantly smaller than countries for which data were available in terms of size as well as population. Countries for which data were available had an average population of 44.61 million while countries for which Gini information is not available had the average population of 6.38 million. Furthermore, countries for which these data were available were 3.4 times larger on average in terms of area than the countries for which data were missing. This is due to the fact that these data were missing for most of the island states (such as St. Vincent and Grenadines, Seychelles, Maldives, and others) and other small states as well (such as San Marino or Andorra). Populations of the countries for which the data are available add up to over 93 percent of the world's population at the time (2003). Hence, the data that are available cover countries that comprise a huge majority of the world's population.

Level of Unemployment among Women

Unemployment rates reflect the proportion of unutilized labor supply and as such, are a very strong measure of labor market performance. An unemployed person is defined as "individual(s) without work, seeking work in a past period, and currently available for work" (ILO, 2007). In this study, female unemployment rates were used because high unemployment is considered to be a common push factor for female migrants as well as trafficking victims. The source of the data was the ILO's Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) software and database (2007). KILM was developed by ILO in 1999 to

compile key labor market indicators under a single database and to improve the availability of the labor data and improve monitoring. KILM is a publicly available database that consists of data that have been collected by a number of organizations (such as ILO, the UN Statistics Division, OECD, the World Bank, the UN Industrial Development Organization, EUROSTAT, UNESCO, the US Bureaus of Labor Statistics, and others). KILM does not collect national data directly, however, the sources that ILO derives these data from in most cases include national data collected directly.[28]

Female unemployment rates for 2003 were used. However, where missing, data from the closest year available were used. This can be argued to have resulted in minimal error given that unemployment rates do not change dramatically from year to year. Table C3 in Appendix C shows countries for which rates were available as well as year of the data and other details. These data were available for 135 countries and missing for 62 countries. Over 70 percent of the world's population resides in the countries for which data were available. Similar to the situation with missing data for the Gini coefficient, most of the countries for which these data are missing are island and other small countries. However, China is one significant country for which female unemployment rates were not available (yet, the Gini coefficient was available).

Population Pressure

Population pressure is one of the variables identified by Bales (1999b) as a potentially relevant predictor of trafficking from a country. Population pressure is commonly expressed as population growth, which refers to the average annual exponential growth rate for a given time period (UNDP, 2006). Population growth, when

[28] See "Guide to understanding the KILM" chapter of the KILM report (ILO, 2007) for a detailed explanation of how data are compiled and how repetitions are dealt with.

too high, results in scarcity of food, water supplies, jobs, and services. This leads to overall deterioration in the quality of life. Countries that have suffered from large population growth have also dealt with a fast increase in urban population (UNDP, 2006). This further contributed to the problems above.

In this study, annual population growth for 2002-2003 was used as raw data. The data were obtained from World Bank's World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2007). When data for this time period were missing, the nearest year was used. Table C4 in Appendix C shows countries for which population growth rates were available and the year that the data originates from. Data were available for 192 countries.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Countries' freedom status data were obtained from Freedom in the World database (Freedom House, 2007) compiled by Freedom House. Freedom in the World is an annual survey that evaluates freedom in individual countries. The database contains ratings regarding three categories (political rights, civil liberties, and general freedom) from 1972 to today.

Freedom House defines freedom as:

> (…) the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination. (…) Freedom House does not maintain a culture-bound view of freedom. The methodology of the survey established basic standards that are derived in large measure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These standards apply to all countries and territories, irrespective of geographical location, ethnic or religious composition, or level of economic development. (Freedom House, 2004)

The overall freedom rating is a composite score derived from scores of political rights and civil liberties of a country. Detailed information on methodology used for

rating in individual measures as well as for calculating overall freedom ratings can be found in "Freedom in the World" publication by Freedom House (2004). These two measures (political rights and civil liberties scores) are expressed on a scale of 1-7. Score of 1 indicates that political rights and/or civil liberties are close to the ideal, while score of 7 indicates practically non-existence of those rights and liberties. Combined points are used to calculate the country freedom status, with combined points of 1-2.5 being categorized as *Free*, 3-5 as *Partly free,* and 5.5-7 as *Not free*.

These scores reflect not only the performance of the government, but also the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals (Freedom House, 2004). Freedoms can be affected by state actions as well as by non-state actors, including terrorists and other armed groups. Therefore, the scores should not be perceived as reflecting solely the actions of the governments.

Data from 2004 report were used because they reflect the situation in 2003. Countries for which these data were available (191 countries) and the freedom status (which was used as raw data in this study) are shown in Table C5 of Appendix C.

Gender Inequality

Initially, World Bank's Gender Equality Rating from The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) database[29] was to be used as a measure of gender

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[29] CPIA is an evaluation system introduced by the World Bank. It consists of a number of different criteria that, when taken together, aim to represent different policy and institutional dimensions within a nation. Gender Equality rating within this system assesses:

> (…) the extent to which the country has enacted and put in place institutions and programs to enforce laws and policies that (a) promote equal access for men and women to human capital development; (b) promote equal access for men and women to productive and economic resources; and (c) give men and women equal status and protection under the law. (World Bank, 2006: 19)

inequality. Due to the fact that this database included data on only 79 countries, this measure had to be replaced by a less perfect indicator that is available for more countries. Since global databases do not include any other direct measures of gender inequality, difference between male and female enrollment in secondary schools was used as a proxy. Unlike elementary education, secondary education is not legally obligatory in most countries, meaning that secondary school enrollment rates reflect parents' decision making. Since continuing education represents a certain financial burden on a household, differences in enrollment figures for male and females reflect different values given to children of different genders. If a family is able to educate one child only, or only some of the children, preference for male child indicates higher perceived value of male children, and thus higher status of male gender is the society.

Data on secondary school enrollment were obtained from World Bank's World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2007). The ratio of female to male secondary enrollment was the variable used (female enrollment rate / male enrollment rate * 100). A ratio over 100 indicates higher enrollment rates for females, while a ratio below 100 indicates higher enrollment rates for males. Data from 2003 were used. For a few countries, these data were missing; data from 2002 or, if not available, 2001 or 2000 were used in those cases. In general, the ratio was generally stable (±1 or 2 at the most)

Each country is given a rating based on three dimensions: (1) human capital development (focusing on education, access to health care and family planning, and youth pregnancies); (2) access to economic and productive resources (focusing on labor force participation, property and inheritance rights, and land tenure); (3) status and protection under the law (individual and family rights, personal security, political participation, violence against women and sexual harassment).

When calculating overall rating, equal weight is given to individual ratings for the three dimensions. The final overall rating 1-6 (1=*low equality*; 6=*high equality*) is assigned.

over years for countries that had data available for more than one year. Table C6 in Appendix C shows the countries for which this data were available (175 countries), source year, and the ratio.

Destination Countries

Indicators that were used for analysis regarding the destination countries are shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Variables and corresponding indicators that were used for the study of destination countries.

Variable	Indicator	Data Source
Economic Development	GDP (PPP) per capita $	World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database
Corruption	Corruption Perception Index (CPI)	Transparency International
Legal status of sex work	Criminalized/not criminalized	U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
Migration patterns	Net Migration flow	UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migration Report
Quality of life	Human Development Index (HDI)	UNDP Human Development Report

Economic development was included in order to test the common presumption that rich countries are those that are more likely to be destinations. It allows us to explore whether general economic welfare is associated with being a destination country, and whether there is any truth in the arguments that trafficking patterns follow migration patterns. Corruption has been included since it has been argued that countries where a certain level of corruption is present and tolerated are those that become destinations, as, arguably, it takes corrupted authorities to maintain a trafficking business without quick

detection. The legal status of sex work has been included in order to explore whether regulation and criminalization of prostitution affects the destination status of the country, as has been often argued. Migration into the country was included to see whether trafficking destination countries are also migration destinations. Finally, HDI was included into the study since quality of life has often been argued to be a pull factor, again following the migration theory approach.

Economic Development

The same indicator, Gross Domestic Product Per Capita Purchasing Power Parity (in current US $), used in for the study of the source countries was also used for the study of destination countries.

Corruption

Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) was used as an indicator of corruption. Transparency International has been publishing the Corruption Perception Index since 1995. At this time, the Index has become accepted as a valid and reliable indicator. The index aims to reflect perceptions of corruption within a given country. It is a composite index developed by combining data from different data sources[30], surveys of business people, and assessments by country analysts (Lambsdorff,

[30] For the 2003 report (year that was used in this study), 17 sources from 13 different institutions were used by Transparency International in the development of the CPI. Those were: Freedom House Nations in Transit (2003), The Economist Intelligence Unit (2003), PricewaterhouseCoopers the 2001 Opacity Index, The Institute for Management Development Lausanne (data for 2001-2003), The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Hong Kong (data from 2001), The World Bank (2001), The World Economic Forum (data for 2001-2003), State Capacity Survey by Columbia University (2003), Gallup International on behalf of Transparency International (Bribery Pay Index 2002), Information International (2003), A Multilateral Development Bank (2002), The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (2002), The World Markets Research Centre (2002).

2003).[31] Data from all sources were combined and expressed as a single value on a scale 0-10, with 10 being *Very clean* country and 0 being *Highly corrupt*.

CPI values from the 2003 report were used in this study (reflecting the situation in 2002). Yet for a few countries, data from 2004 and 2005 were used (reflecting situation in 2003 and 2004). Since Transparency International adds new countries to the survey every year, data from 2004 and 2005 were included where necessary in order to reduce the number of countries with missing data. Table C7 of Appendix C shows the countries and years for which the data were available (157 countries) as well as the CPI values. As with other variables, the majority of countries for which these data were missing were small island countries. The total population of the countries for which the data were missing adds up to less than 2 percent of the world's population.

Legal Status of Sex Work

Data on legal status of prostitution were obtained from annually published Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, which are submitted annually by the U.S. Department of State to the U.S. Congress. Information used during the process of Report preparation is collected through embassies of the USA in respective countries, using a variety of sources. Embassy reports are then sent to U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, where they are fact checked (U.S. Department of State, 2005). The 2004 Report (U.S. Department of State, 2005) was the first report to consistently report on the legal status of prostitution. Prior to that, information was included for some countries but missing for others. For this reason, the 2004 report was used. However, even in 2004 Report, this information was missing for some countries.

[31] Detailed description of the methodology used in developing country ratings can be found in Lambsdorff (2004).

The 2005 Report (U.S. Department of State, 2006) was used in these cases. Since U.S. Department of State reports do not include information on USA, that information was included independently. Information was coded into two categories: not criminalized, and criminalized. This was based on information of whether selling sex is treated as a criminal offence in the country. There was some variability in the language used in the Report. For some countries, it was stated that prostitution was *legal*, *not legal*, *prohibited*, *not illegal*, *not prohibited*, or *illegal*. In this study, *legal*, *not illegal*, and *not prohibited* were all coded as *not criminalized*, and it was not required that prostitution be clearly legalized or regulated in order to be coded as *not criminalized*. Absence of prohibition was sufficient. *Illegal*, *not legal* and *prohibited* were all coded as *criminalized*, assuming that such language indicated the ban. In some countries (such as Moldova), selling sex is not criminal offence, but rather an administrative one. The country was coded as *not criminalized* in such cases. Most reports included information on whether pimping, brothel owning, or buying sex was criminals. However, this information was not used. Inconsistencies in the use of language indicate that country reporters may have used different concepts when preparing the country reports. This means that it is possible that prostitution is not criminalized, but rather is an administrative offence in some of the countries that were coded as *criminalized* simply because language used in the report was not clear enough. In some cases, additional research was conducted when coding data in order to verify the information provided by the Report. However, this was not possible in all cases. It is, therefore, possible that coding does not properly reflect the reality for some countries.

Another problem encountered in coding the information was that of countries in which different territories have the authority to regulate prostitution independently of one another. Some examples include Australia (territories), USA (states and counties), Nigeria (states) and Switzerland (cantons). For such countries, the predominant approach indicated was the base for coding. Thus, even though prostitution is not criminalized in some areas of the USA, USA was coded as *criminalized* because criminalization is the predominant approach in the USA.

It must also be noted that not all countries in which prostitution was not criminalized had taken similar stand. In some countries, selling sex is simply not addressed by the criminal code (such as Singapore). In other countries, it is highly regulated (such as New Zealand). This indicates very different policies (that of silent tolerance and that or active regulation). Given such a variety, *not criminalized* was used as a cutoff point rather than looking at whether prostitution is legalized or regularized. The status of each country as a result of coding of the information from the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices is shown in Table C8 of Appendix C for 189 countries that this information was available for.

Clearly, this type of coding looses a lot of detail regarding the status of prostitution in a country. Just the fact that prostitution is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is not tolerated in the country. Similarly, lack of prohibition may mean that sex workers enjoy social protection (such as New Zealand). However, it may also mean that sex workers are nothing more than just tolerated. Given the range of different ways of dealing with prostitution from legislative point of view, it would have been very

difficult to develop more detailed coding scheme with the information available. Hence, a tradeoff was made, ensuring more representative data, even if it is less detailed.

Net Migration

In order to study whether trafficking destination countries are also migrant destination countries, net migration flow was included into the database. Migration flow data takes into account immigration as well as emigration. The resulting value is a net of migratory movements. In this study, net migration *rate* per 1,000 population was used as raw data. The data were obtained from International Migration 2002 report (United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, 2002). Data in this report were estimates, rather than actual data, for the net migration flow during the time period 1995-2000. Unfortunately, more precise or recent data were not available for such a large number of countries. Table C9 of Appendix C shows countries that these data were available for (162 countries) and their respective migration flow values are shown in. Again, countries with missing data were the same: island and small countries. Population of all countries for which data were missing accounts for less than 5 percent of the world's population.

Quality of Life

In the 1990's, the United Nations Development Programme recognized that measures of a nation's wellbeing that focus solely on wealth (such as GDP) were incomplete and missing important aspects of human wellbeing. As a response, Human Development Index (HDI) was developed as an alternative measure of well being. HDI is a composite index, combining three dimensions: (1) Long and healthy life (measures by life expectancy); (2) Education (adult literacy and school enrollment), and (3) Good standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity). The diagram below shows

how HDI is constructed. For detailed explanation of methodology used in the calculation of HDI, see UNDP's 2006 report (UNDP, 2006). Country HDI data from 2003 were used in this study (reports from previous or later years provided no additional data), and data were available for 178 countries. These countries are listed in the Table C10 of Appendix C.



Figure 9. Diagram of steps involved in calculation of HDI (from UNDP, 2006: 393).

In order to incorporate data on country size, size of country in terms of area and total population were also added to the database. This information was obtained from The 2002 World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2002). World region that a country belongs to was included in the database to allow for regional comparisons. World Bank coding was used, but it was somewhat modified. World Bank uses following regions: South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, North Africa and Middle East, Latin America and Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia, North America, and Sub Saharan Africa. These categories were somewhat changed. Europe and North America were combined into a single category, since the North America region would otherwise include only two

countries (USA and Canada). These two regions are similar both in terms of economic and social variables, making it safe to combine them into a single category. Central Asia was coded separately from Europe and was combined with South Asia. Other categories remained more or less the same. Certain countries were coded differently and in some cases, the decision had to be made on how a certain country should be coded due to changed categories. For example, Malta is coded in World Bank databases as North African country. However, since Malta is a full member of the European Union, it made sense for it to be coded as belonging to Europe and North America Region. The Russian Federation is coded as Europe in all World Bank publication and was coded as such, despite the fact that larger part of its territory is in Asia. All Central Asian republics were coded as South and Central Asia, yet Moldova and Ukraine were coded as Europe and North America due to their political and economic ties with Europe and EU aspirations.

Characteristics of the Database and Approach to Analysis

The first step in the analysis was to explore the distribution of data and to explore the degree to which missing data will represent a problem in any further analysis. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables that will be used for the analysis of source countries are shown in Table 7, and for analysis of destination countries, they are shown in Table 8.

Table 7. Descriptive statistics for independent variables used for source country analysis.

	GDP per capita ppp$	GINI coefficient	Female unemployment rate	Population growth	F/M secondary school enrollment ratio
Valid cases	183	130	135	192	175
Missing cases	14	67	62	5	22
Mean	10070.30	40.49	11.79	1.43	94.73
Median	5322.33	39.05	10.00	1.42	100.00
Std. Deviation	11694.64	9.56	8.52	1.21	18.07
Skewness	1.74	0.62	1.41	0.55	-1.25
Kurtosis	3.06	-0.07	2.32	0.69	1.42
Minimum	236.73	24.70	0.40	-1.38	32.00
Maximum	62044.65	70.70	47.10	5.64	134.00

Table 8. Descriptive statistics for independent variables used for destination country analysis.

	GDP per capita ppp$	Corruption Perception Index	Net migration	Human Development Index
Valid	183	157	162	178
Missing	14	40	35	19
Mean	10070.30	4.06	0.46	0.71
Median	5322.33	3.30	-0.30	0.75
Std. Deviation	11694.64	2.20	7.83	0.18
Skewness	1.74	1.11	3.80	-0.56
Kurtosis	3.06	0.18	28.02	-0.72
Minimum	236.73	1.30	-22.80	0.28
Maximum	62044.65	9.70	62.80	0.96

For categorical variables, the following frequencies were found: For Freedom status, data were available in 191 cases. In 46 percent of countries for which data were available were designated as *Free*, 28 percent as *Partially free*, and 26 percent and *Not*

free. With regard to sex work status, data were available for 189 countries, but was missing for 8 countries. In 43 percent of the countries where the data were available, sex work was not criminalized, while it was criminalized in 57 percent of countries.

All continuous variables were transformed into ranks. Those were used for all analyses. There were many reasons for this. On the one hand, distributions were highly skewed for some variables (such as GDP or female unemployment rates), making it difficult to use the raw data in any further analysis. On the other hand, using ranks rather than raw data reduces the measurement error due to the fact that the data for most variables did not reflect a single year but were derived from different years for different countries. While exact values for continuous variables may change from a year to year, the change would have to be somewhat larger for a country to change a rank. Using ranks make the data more "timeless" since ranks are less likely to change from year to a year. Consequently, results obtained from analysis of ranks can be argued to be valid for not only a particular year, but also longer periods of time (in this case a few years or even a decade) since ranks change slower. To allow for analysis within geographic region, countries were also ranked within regions. There was no need to transform any categorical variables.

When it comes to missing values, it is clear that this is more of a problem for some variables and less so for others. Table 9 below shows the number of source countries for which data were available or missing for each variable. Similar results for destination countries are shown in Table 10.

Table 9. Number of countries for which data were available and missing, for countries identified as source countries, and others.

	Number of Source countries for which data were		Number of Non-Source countries for which data were	
Variable	**Missing**	**Available**	**Missing**	**Available**
GDP per capita ppp$	0	38	14	145
Gini Coefficient	3	35	64	95
Female Unemployment rates	6	32	56	103
Population growth rate	0	38	5	154
Freedom status	0	38	6	153
F/M secondary school enrollment ratio	1	37	21	138

Table 10. Number of countries for which data were available and missing, for countries identified as destination countries, and others.

	Number of Destination countries for which data were		Number of Non-Destination countries for which data were	
Variable	**Missing**	**Available**	**Missing**	**Available**
GDP per capita ppp$	1	30	13	153
CPI	0	31	40	126
Legal status of sex work	0	31	8	158
Net migration	1	30	34	132
HDI	2	29	17	149

As can be seen from the tables above, there was a particularly large number of countries for which Gini coefficient and Female unemployment data were not available (67 and 62 respectively), despite the efforts to include as many countries as possible by using data from a variety of years. A significant but a less serious problem were the missing data for CPI and Net migration (40 and 35 countries, respectively). Countries for which data were missing are predominantly small countries. This reduces the gravity of the problem to a degree, as countries in which the majority of world population lives were represented by data. Furthermore, data were more difficult to obtain for less developed countries.

It was possible to explore the relationship between missing data for particular variables and level of economic development to a certain extent by comparing ranks for GDP per capita for countries where data were available and where they were not. No significant difference was found between GDP ranks of countries for which Gini data were missing, or those for which it was available, χ^2 (1) = 0.70; p > 0.05. For Female unemployment rates, the situation was different. The difference between GDP ranks for countries for which female unemployment data were available and for countries for which data were missing was found to be significant, χ^2 (1) = 24.14; p < 0.05. Average GDP ranks for countries for which data were available was 104.12, while it was 61.46 for countries for which unemployment data were missing. Clearly, this indicates that countries for which the data were missing were the less developed countries. No significant difference was found between countries with and without CPI data in terms of their GDP ranks, χ^2 (1) = 1.94; p > 0.05. Similar results were obtained for comparison of countries with and without Net migration data, χ^2 (1) = 0.10; p > 0.05. However, it should be kept in mind GDP data were not available for 14 countries, and this may have influenced results.

Missing data variables were created for above mentioned four variables in order to account for possible effect that missing data may have on further analysis. For each variable, an additional categorical variable was created, in which countries for which the data were missing were given value of 1, while all other countries were given a value of 0. These variables were introduced at a later stage in the process of building a model in so that their effect on the overall results can be viewed.

Another problem that may arise during analysis is that of collinearity between independent variables. From the start, it can be predicted that there will be high correlation between GDP and HDI ranks due to the fact that GDP is one of the factors used in the calculation of HDI. But even beyond that, macro-level indicators are often strongly correlated. In order to explore whether this may pose a problem, correlations between continuous independent variables have been calculated. Table 11 shows results of correlation analysis applied to rank order data.

Table 11. Results of correlation analysis (Spearman's Rho) for independent variables that will be used in source country analysis.

	GDP per capita	**Gini coef.**	**Female Unemp.**	**Pop. Growth**
GDP per capita				
Gini coef.	-0.39*			
Female Unemp.	-0.12	0.13		
Pop. Growth	-0.50*	0.43*	-0.02	
F/M enrollment ratio	0.46*	0.05	0.21*	-0.38

* significant at $p < 0.05$ level

Indeed, a number of variable pairs have exhibited very strong correlations. In particular, GDP per capita is correlated with all the variables other than Female unemployment, and the correlations are rather strong. Since Freedom status is a categorical rather than a continuous variable, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used instead of calculating correlations, and mean ranks were compared across pairs of Freedom categories. Reliable differences between Free, Partially Free, and Not Free countries were found for all variables, with the exception of Female unemployment rates (GDP per capita ranks: $\chi^2(2) = 44.71$, $p < 0.05$; Gini ranks: $\chi^2(2) = 9.81$, $p < 0.05$; Population

growth ranks: χ^2 (2) = 27.76, p < 0.05; Female to male secondary school enrollment ratio ranks: χ^2 (2) = 30.86, p < 0.05; Female unemployment rate ranks: χ^2 (2) = 0.18, p > 0.05).

Similar results were encountered with the variables that will be used in the analysis of destination countries. Table 12 shows the Spearman's Rho values. Almost all variables are very highly correlated (other than Legality of sex work and Net migration ranks).

Table 12. Results of correlation analysis (Spearman's Rho) for independent variables that will be used in destination country analysis.

	GDP per capita	**CPI**	**Net migration**	**Sex work legality**
GDP per capita				
CPI	0.76*			
Net migration	0.41*	0.34*		
Sex work legality†	-0.24*	-0.24*	-0.06	
HDI	0.87*	0.69*	0.33*	-0.37*

* significant at p < 0.05 level
† dichotomous variable 0 = not criminalized; 1 = criminalized

Two major factors determine to what degree multicollinearity creates a problem in regression analysis: 1) whether data are derived from a sample or from whole population; and 2) whether the model is known and whether all relevant variables are available (Mela & Kopalle, 2002). Here, data were derived from the whole population rather than a sample. One advantage of this is that multicollinearity does not result in inflation or contraction of variance in such situations (Mela & Kopalle, 2002). Yet, the precision of the model proposed is not known. Consequently, multicollinearity can lead to a bias in parameter estimates and attempts to control it (by excluding problematic variables) may result in variable omission bias. Not doing anything about it, however, may results in inclusion of irrelevant variables. In the literature, different levels of

correlation (from 0.35 to 0.90) have been suggested (e.g. Mela & Kopalle, 2002; Farrar & Glauber, 1967) as thresholds of such harmful multicollinearity. Depending on which of those is adopted, multicollinearity may be said to result or not result in biased results in this study. The actual degree to which correlations between variables create a problem can only become clear once the regression analysis is performed. Unfortunately, collinearity in macro-level variables is a state of fact; trying to completely eliminate it would be a lost battle. As stated by Farrar and Glauber:

> The purpose of regression analysis is to estimate the structure of a dependent variable, *y's,* dependence on a pre-selected set of independent variables *X*, not to select an orthogonal independent variables set. (1967: 106)

and by Fox and Monette:

> Collinearity is not so much a problem as a state of nature – like the law of gravity – and (…) railing against collinearity is rather like complaining about not being able to fly by flapping your arms. (1992: 183)

Addressing the Problems of Macro-Quantitative Studies

When developing methodology for this component of the research, attempts were made to address problems associated with macro-quantitative studies that were identified in the discussion of this methodology. Those problems are: (1) Problem of small N; (2) Small number of variables that can be used; (3) Problem of missing data patterns being associated with variables under study (resulting in bias); (4) Outcome delay; and (5) Distributions that are not normal.

The problem of small N could actually be argued to be no problem at all. When all countries are included into the study, what is being studied is not a sample but actually a whole population. When the whole population is in the database, the question of sample

size becomes irrelevant, as interpretations of the findings are no longer based on sample theory.

The problem of having a small number of variables that can be included was not directly addressed in the macro-quantitative component. However, the micro-level component of this study allows the trafficking phenomenon to be studied in much more depth. Nevertheless, it could be argued that use of certain indicators, such as HDI or CPI that combine a number of different variables and sources of data, are already an attempt to include more variables into the study.

The problem of missing data in this study was address in two ways. First, data from a few different years were used to minimize missing data. This helped reduce the number of countries for which no data were available at all. In other words, if GDP was not available for 2003 but was for 2002, 2002 data were used. This was based on the assumption that macro-level indicators do not change significantly over short time periods. Secondly, for variables that had missing data for a large number of countries, variables that indicate whether data are available or missing for a particular country were created. These variables make it possible to study whether not having data itself is a significant variable.

Time lag remains a problem. All attempts were made to put together database using the data reflecting the situation in and up to year 2003. It is possible that we should look at macro-level indicators from 15 years ago to give the independent variables the time to work their effect. Realistically, this is not possible for a number of reasons, the primary reason being that the missing data problem would be encountered if one was to attempt to use decade old indicators. Another reason it is not possible is because of the

changing political landscape. A number of countries that exist today did not exist 15 or so years ago (including all former Yugoslavian states, all former Soviet Union states, etc), making it impossible to obtain older data. The only consolation is in the idea that using ranks has made the data somewhat more “timeless”, thereby somewhat ameliorating the time lag problem.

Finally, distributions were found to be far from normal for a number of variables. This was addressed by using ranks, rather than raw data.

CHAPTER VI THE MACRO-QUANTITATIVE COMPONENT: RESULTS

Source Countries

Bivariate Analyses

In this section, results of the bivariate examination of the data are presented. Visual inspection of the Figure 10, which shows the distribution of ranks for GDP per capita for Non-Source and Source countries (*just source*, and *source & destination* countries are presented separately), suggests that the distribution of GDP for Source countries is not very different from distribution for Non-Source countries. The source country with the highest GDP per capita was at 78th percentile (Czech republic), indicating that it is not just poor countries that become sources; even countries that are in the top 25 percent in terms of per capita GDP (economic welfare) may become source countries. Figure 11 shows the GDP per capita ranks for all source countries. The ranks are shown on the axis of 183, which is total number of countries for which this data are available. A relatively uniform slope indicates that that source countries can be found among both economically advanced as well as disadvantaged countries. It is only among the most advanced (rank 148 and up) and the very lowest in terms of GDP (below rank 14) that we found no source countries at all. The mean rank for source countries was 80.34, while mean rank for Non-Source countries was 95.06 (indicating higher GDP per capita levels) (Kruskal-Wallis test indicate that the difference between these groups is not statistically reliable, χ^2 (2) = 2.32; p > 0.05.



Figure 10. Distribution of ranks for GDP per capita for Non-Source (NS), Source (S) and Both Source and Destination (S&D) countries.



Figure 11. Distribution of ranks for GDP per capita values for all Source countries (smaller rank numbers indicate lower GDP per capita).

Figure 12 shows the distribution of the ranks for Gini coefficient for Non-Source, Source, and Both Source and Destination countries. In addition, Figure 13 shows the

distribution of the Gini ranks of Source countries. Small Gini values indicate more equality, so smaller rank values represent countries with more equality. Similarly to GDP per capita, source countries can be found in all rank brackets. This means that source countries can be found among countries that have rather high levels of equality as well as among those where economic inequality is rampant. It appears that the concentration of source countries is a bit higher among lower Gini ranks. The mean rank average for Source countries was 55.89, while mean for Non-Source countries was 69.04. Since smaller Gini values that correspond to smaller rank values indicate more equality, these results suggest that, contrary to common belief, Source countries actually have a higher level of equality than Non-Source countries. Yet, this difference was found not to be reliable, χ^2 (1) = 3.12; p > 0.05.



Figure 12. Distribution of ranks for Gini coefficient for Non-Source (NS), Source (S) and Both Source and Destination (S&D) countries.



Figure 13. Distribution of ranks for Gini coefficient for all Source countries (smaller rank numbers indicate smaller Gini value, meaning more equality).

Figures 14 and 15 below show the distribution of ranks for female unemployment rates. Data were missing for six source countries, which must be kept in mind. Smaller rank values correspond to lower unemployment rates. Visual inspection of Figure 14 suggests that countries with all level of female unemployment may become source countries. Figure 15 is a bit more detailed. In this figure, it can be observed that the distribution breaks between ranks 9 and 29, meaning that no source countries can be found between those ranks. The mean ranks for Source and Non-Source countries were found to be very close to one another (65.42 and 68.80, respectively), pointing to no reliable difference between the two groups, χ^2 (1) = 0.67; p > 0.05. These results should be treated with caution since data on female unemployment were missing for a large number of countries. This issue will be addressed at a later point.



Figure 14. Distribution of ranks for Female unemployment rates for Non-Source (NS), Source (S) and Both Source and Destination (S&D) countries. Size of the bubble indicates number of cases at a particular rank.



Figure 15. Distribution of ranks for Female unemployment rates for all Source countries (smaller rank numbers indicate lower unemployment rates).

Figures 16 and 17 below show the distribution of ranks for population growth rates for 192 countries. Population growth rates can be positive or negative, indicating

population growth (when positive) or shrinkage (when negative). Population growth was negative for 16 countries. Therefore, the growth rate of 0 was rank 17.

Once again, Figure 16 suggests that countries with all levels of population growth can be source countries. The mean for Source country ranks was 68.61 while mean for Non-Source countries was 103.88, χ^2 (1) = 11.94; $p < 0.05$. Results of Kruskal-Wallis test indicate that Non-Source and Source-only countries were the only pair with reliable difference in their population growth ranks, χ^2 (1) = 10.72; $p < 0.05$. Countries that are Both Source and Destination countries were not reliably different from Non-Source countries. Respective means of ranks for population growth for these three groups are 103.38 (Non-Source), 67.15 (Source only), and 75.07 (Both Source and Destination).



Figure 16. Distribution of ranks for Population growth rates for Non-Source (NS), Source (S) and Both Source and Destination (S&D) countries. Size of the bubble indicates number of cases at the specific rank.

Figure 17 further explores the distribution and concentration of source countries across ranks for population growth. What is immediately visible is that concentration of source countries is not even across ranks. In order to identify a point of change in the

pattern, a quangle chart, shown in Figure 18, has been generated. Quangle (**"**Quality Control Angle Chart") analysis is traditionally used in engineering as a method for identifying the point of change in the dataset when there is no a-priori assumption about the point of change. Quangle is: "… a chain of equal straight line segments (…) in which each segment makes an angle with a fixed direction proportional to the corresponding term of the series (….) The general direction of any portion of the quangle indicates the mean for the part of the series, and the amount of variation in direction corresponds to the standard deviation about this mean" (North, 1982: 155). Because quangles show change in the mean by a proportionate change in the angle, it is easy to identify points of change in the data by visual inspection of the chart. An inflexion point in the data indicates the point of change. Veysey, Pratt, Kennedy, Stenius, and Banks (2001) have demonstrated the use of this method in social science for indicating points of change in data. While quangle analysis is commonly used for time series data, it can be used for any sequential data as well.

Two change points can be identified by examination of quangle plot. At the first point, seen as rank 19.5, the slope flattens. This is an interesting point of change because rank 19.5 corresponds to population growth rate of 0.01, meaning that ranks below are countries with zero or negative population growth. The second change point was next to the last point of data, which is not particularly useful for interpretation. This indicates that while countries with positive population growth are also among source countries, bigger proportions of countries with negative population growth are sources.



Figure 17. Distribution of ranks for Population growth rates for all Source countries (smaller rank numbers indicate smaller population growth).



Figure 18. Quangle chart of the Population growth rank data for Source countries.

Figures 19 and 20 below show the distribution of ranks for female to male secondary school enrollment rates. The ratio value above 100 indicates that female enrollment is higher than male enrollment, while value below 100 indicates otherwise.

Ratio values do not tell us anything about the actual enrollment rates. Hence, a country where only 30 percent of girls are enrolled could have ratio of 100, if only 30 percent of boys are enrolled as well. Instead, ratios give us information about equal opportunity for males and females. In this dataset, rank 86.5 indicates ratio of 100. Ranks 1-86.5 indicate countries where male enrollment rates and higher, while ranks above 86.5 indicate countries where female enrollment rates are higher. Table 13 shows the number of Source and Non-Source countries with positive and negative ratios. Chi square test of these data did not produce reliable results, χ^2 (1) = 1.21; p > 0.05.

Table 13. Number of Source and Non-Source countries with higher male and female secondary school enrollment rates.

	Male enrollment higher		**Female enrollment higher**	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Non-Source	68	49.28	70	50.72
Source	22	59.46	15	40.54

Once again, the figures below suggest that source countries can be very different from one another when it comes to female and male enrollment levels. The mean of the ranks for Source countries was 83.03; for Non-Source countries, it was 89.33, χ^2 (1) = 0.45; p > 0.05.



Figure 19. Distribution of ranks for Female/Male secondary school enrollment ratio for Non-Source (NS), Source (S), and Both Source and Destination (S&D) countries (lower rank values indicate lower ration – higher male and lower female enrollment rates). Size of the bubble indicates number of cases at the specific rank.



Figure 20. Distribution of ranks for Female/Male secondary school enrollment ratio for Source countries (smaller rank numbers indicate lower ratio, meaning that enrollment rates for females are lower than those for males).

Source countries can be found at both extremes of the spectrum, even though the number of source countries that have ratio below 100 (below rank 86.5) is somewhat larger, as can be seen from Figure 20.

Figure 21 (below) shows the percentage of countries that were evaluated as Free, Not Free, and Partially Free by countries' status as a source country. If countries that are Both Source and Destination countries, and countries that are just sources are considered together (when all source countries are treated as a single category), the distribution of source countries across freedom status categories is very similar to that of Non-Source countries. Chi-square applied to a three (Free, Partially Free, and Not Free) by two (Source and Non-Source) table indicated that there is no statistically reliable difference between the cells, χ^2 (2) = 0.27; p > 0.05, meaning that Source and Non-Source countries are indeed similar when it comes to their Freedom status.



Figure 21. Freedom status for Non-Source (NS), Source (S), and Both Source and Destination (S&D) countries. Bubble size indicates the percentage of countries with a particular Freedom status.

Multivariate Analyses

In order to test how the six variables proposed in this study predict whether a country is a source country or not, logistic regression was conducted using the ranks of all the variables. Since Freedom status was a categorical variable with three categories (*Not free, Partially free, and Free*), it was dummy coded. *Free status* was coded as 1 in dummy 1, and the other two categories were coded as 0. For dummy 2, *Not free* was coded as 1 and the other two variables were coded as 0. The dependent variable was coded as 0 for Non-Source and 1 for Source countries. Two source categories (*Only Source*, and *Both Source and Destination*) were combined into a single category. This was done because small number of countries in Both Source and Destination category would make it impossible to run analysis.

Stepwise backward likelihood ratio (LR) logistic regression was the method used in the analysis of the model. In this method, in every step a variable that is not significant and contributes the least to the model is removed from the model until all remaining variables are significant. This type of analysis is suitable for this study, as the goal is to identify which variables differentiate between Source and Non-Source countries, rather than to produce a model that explains the largest portion of variation in the dependent variable. Hence variables that are not significant can easily be eliminated. We can conclude that those variables cannot be used to differentiate between Non-Source and Source countries, and therefore keeping them in the model is redundant.

Models generated in all the steps were significant. Figure 22 shows the R^2 for each of the six models.



Figure 22. Nagelkerke R^2 values for models that resulted at each step of the backward stepwise logistic regression for Source countries.

The initial model that included all 7 variables (GDP rank, Population growth rank, Female/male enrollment ratio rank, Female unemployment rank, Gini coefficient rank, Free dummy 1, and Free dummy 2) explains 30 percent of the variance in the dependent variable (χ^2 (7) = 23.31; p < 0,05). The final model, in which only two variables with significant effect (GDP rank and Population growth rank) were included, had an R^2 of 0.25, χ^2 (2) = 18.92; p < 0.05. This means that exclusion of variables that are not significant reduced the overall explanatory power of the model by 5 percent. Table 14 shows the summary of results for individual dependent variables for the first and the last (final) model.

Two variables that were significant in the initial model remained the only two variables significant in all remaining steps of the regression. The final model included two variables only: GDP per capita rank, and Population growth rank. Odds ratio for these two variables was 0.98 in the final model. This indicates that for every increase in the rank of GDP per capita or in the rank of Population growth, the odds of a country

being a source country increases 0.98 times (since it is less than 1, it means that odds actually decrease).

Table 14. Results of the full and the final model of the backward stepwise logistic regression with all seven variables for Source countries.

Model	Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Exp(B)
Full model	GDP per capita rank	-0.03	0.01	12.00	0.97*
	Gini rank	-0.01	0.01	1.30	0.99
	Female unemp. rate rank	0.00	0.01	0.37	1.00
	Population growth rank	-0.02	0.01	7.39	0.98*
	F/M enrollment ratio rank	-0.01	0.01	0.59	0.99
	Free dummy1	0.09	0.67	0.02	1.09
	Free dummy2	-0.65	0.77	0.73	0.52
	Constant	4.71	1.41	11.12	111.47*
Final model	GDP per capita rank	-0.02	0.01	12.92	0.98*
	Population growth rank	-0.02	0.01	9.77	0.98*
	Constant	3.08	1.04	8.85	21.80*

* significant at $p < 0.01$ level

In the logistic regression analysis, a large number of cases (99 cases) were lost due to missing data. Therefore, results shown in the last three tables should be interpreted carefully as they were generated using data for 98 countries only. In order to test whether *not* having data for a particular country is an important issue factor, a second logistic regression was performed. Here, the earlier explained dummy variables generated for missing cases for Gini and for Female unemployment rates were used instead of the original variables. The reason behind this was that the two variables had very high proportion of missing cases. Use of these variables, instead of the original “mother” variables, has had an important effect on the results as can be seen from Figure 23 and Table 15.



Figure 23. Nagelkerke R^2 values for models that resulted at each step of the backward stepwise logistic regression for Source countries, with dummy variables replacing Gini and Female unemployment variables.

Table 15. Results of the full and the final model of the backward stepwise logistic regression with five main variables and dummies (for missing Gini and Female unemployment variables) for Source countries.

Model	Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Exp(B)
Full model	GDP per capita rank	-0.03	0.01	13.34	0.97†
	Population growth rank	-0.03	0.01	19.83	0.97†
	F/M enrollment ratio rank	-0.01	0.01	2.00	0.99
	Freedom status dummy1	0.47	0.62	0.58	1.61
	Freedom status dummy2	-0.03	0.64	0.00	0.97
	Dummy for Female unemp. missing cases	-0.84	0.69	1.48	0.43
	Dummy for Gini missing cases	-1.49	0.72	4.22	0.23*
	Constant	4.42	1.20	13.55	83.20†
Final model	GDP per capita rank	-0.02	0.01	15.03	0.98†
	Population growth rank	-0.03	0.01	20.21	0.97†
	Dummy for Gini missing cases	-1.82	0.68	7.20	0.16†
	Constant	3.43	0.95	13.07	30.97†

* significant at $p < 0.05$ level
† significant at $p < 0.01$ level

Using dummies for Gini and Female unemployment missing data allows the inclusion of 164 cases (33 cases were still eliminated due to missing data in other

variables). First, the R^2 generated from these data resulted in a model that explained higher percentage of variance than the original analysis. The initial model with all 7 variables had R^2 of 0.37, and the final model 0.34. This final model explained 9 percent more variance in the dependent variable than final model generated from the original data.

Another important result is that the dummy variable for missing Gini data in this analysis was significant and has remained so in the final model, with a slope (logit) of -1.82. This means that that having data for Gini coefficient decreased the log odds of a country being a source country by 1.82. In this model, odds ratio for Population growth rank was slightly lower, 0.97 than in the original model (it was 0.98).

Using dummy variables for Gini has allowed us to include more countries into the analysis. This adds to the credibility of the results and simultaneously indicates that having (or not having) data for Gini is an important predictor of country's status as a source country. A model that excludes countries for which Gini data are missing may be faulty. In other words, the distribution of missing cases between Source and Non-Source countries is disproportional, and having more missing data in one of the groups may affect results. Conversely, the fact that the two variables that were identified as significant in the original analysis remained so when much larger number of cases were included is a positive outcome, as it indicates that results of the original analysis were not biased as a result of excluded cases in terms of these two variables.

Destination Countries

Bivariate Analyses

In this section, results of the bivariate analyses of the data are presented. Visual inspection of Figure 24, which shows the distribution of ranks for GDP per capita for Non-Destination and Destination countries (Destination and Both Source & Destination countries are presented separately), suggests that the distribution of GDP for destination countries is rather uneven. This is especially true when Destination only countries are considered. The mean rank for Destination countries was 138.33, while mean rank for Non-Destination countries was 82.91 (Kurskal-Wallis test χ^2 (1) = 27.45; $p < 0.05$). Yet, when we look at the means of the ranks of these three categories separately, it becomes clear that countries that are just Destinations are different from those that are Both Sources and Destinations (means for GDP per capita ranks are 82.92 for Non-Destination, 155.61 for Destination only, and 81.57 for countries that are Both Source and Destinations; χ^2 (2) = 37.94; $p < 0.05$). Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test that were applied to category pairs indicate that countries that are Both Source and Destination and countries that are Not-Destinations are rather similar, χ^2 (1) = 0.00; $p > 0.05$, and both are different from countries that are Destinations only (D-S&D: χ^2 (1) = 12.99; $p < 0.05$; D-ND: χ^2 (1) = 37.18; $p < 0.05$). Destinations only countries have GDP per capita ranks much higher than the overall average.



Figure 24. Distribution of ranks for GDP per capita for Non-Destination (ND), Destination (D) and Both Source and Destination (S&D) countries.

These findings should be interpreted to mean that countries with lower GDPs can be destination countries, even thought typical destination countries are more likely to have relatively higher GDP. Figure 25 shows the GDP per capita ranks for all destination countries. Figure 26 is the quangle plot of the same data. As can be seen from the quangle plot, rank 108 (country with GDP per capita of $7,046, at 59th percentile) appears to be a change point, meaning that there is difference in pattern (in this case distributions) above and below this point. The next point is rank 134, which represents a country with GDP per capita of $11,694, which is 73rd percentile. In other words, there is difference in distribution above and below rank 108. Moreover, there is higher concentration of destination countries among countries in the top 30 percent in terms of their GDP per capita.



Figure 25. Distribution of ranks for GDP per capita values for all Destination countries (smaller rank numbers indicate lower GDP per capita).



Figure 26. Quangle chart of the GDP per capita rank data for Destination countries.

The following charts present data on Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Countries with low levels of corruption have high CPI values and ranks with higher values. While destination countries are concentrated around higher ranks, there are still destination countries with low ranks (Figure 27). The difference between the means of the CPI ranks (Non-Destinations 71.96; Destination 107.61) is statistically reliable, χ^2 (1)

= 15.31; $p < 0.05$. The two destination country groups appear to have different distributions. Additionally, their means are very different from one another. The mean of the CPI ranks of Non-Destination countries was 71.96. For Destination only countries, the mean was 118.63. Finally, for countries that are Both Source and Destination, it was 69.86, $\chi^2(2) = 21.56$; $p < 0.05$. Kruskal-Wallis test applied to the pairs of categories indicates that when it comes to CPI ranks, Non-Destination and Both Source and Destination groups are similar, $\chi^2(1) = 0.01$; $p > 0.05$. However, both are different from the Destination only group (D-S&D: $\chi^2(1) = 12.99$; $p < 0.05$; D-ND: $\chi^2(1) = 8.18$; $p < 0.05$).

Figure 27 testifies to the fact that countries with very different levels of corruption can become destinations, even though it appears that destination countries tend to have lower corruption levels.



Figure 27. Distribution of ranks for Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for Non-Destination (ND), Destination (D) and Both Source and Destination (S&D) countries. Size of the bubble represents the number of cases at particular rank.



Figure 28. Distribution of ranks for Corruption Perception Index for all Destination countries (smaller rank numbers indicate lower CPI index and higher corruption levels).

Figure 29 below shows the distribution of ranks for Net migration for countries according to their destination status. When it comes to net migration, the distribution is somewhat different from what we have seen with other variables. The number of destination countries that can be found among the lower ranks is small. The net migration value of zero corresponds to rank 92, with countries raking below 92 having negative migration rates (these are therefore emigration countries). A large majority of the destination countries are above rank 92, meaning that they are mostly immigration countries. The mean of the ranks for countries that are not destinations is 73.55, while ranks for countries that are destinations is 116.47, χ^2 (1) = 20.46; $p < 0.05$, representing a clear difference. When the three destination groups are compared, it becomes apparent that destination countries that are also source countries have lower mean (Destination only: 124.72, Both Source and Destination: 89.36, Non-Destination: 73.55), χ^2 (2) =

23.51; $p < 0.05$. As with the other variables used in the analysis of destination countries, the difference in the means between Non-Destination and Both Source and Destination countries was not found to be statistically reliable, χ^2 (1) = 1.19; $p > 0.05$. These two groups were both different from the Destination only group (D-S&D: χ^2 (1) = 8.09; $p < 0.05$; D-ND: χ^2 (1) = 22.20; $p < 0.05$).



Figure 29. Distribution of ranks for Net migration rates for Non-Destination (ND), Destination (D) and Both Source and Destination (S&D) countries. Size of the bubble indicates number of cases at particular rank.



Figure 30. Distribution of ranks for Net migration rates for all Destination countries (smaller rank numbers indicate negative low net migration).

Figure 31 shows the distribution of ranks for Human Development Index for three country groups. Low levels of human development are reflected in low values of Human Development Index and lower rank values. No destination countries are below rank 43, which corresponds to HDI value of 0.53 (23rd percentile). Among countries that are Destination only, the one with the lowest rank was at rank 84, which corresponds to HDI value of 0.75 (50th percentile). So, while destination countries are less likely to be found among countries with low HDI levels, this only applies to very low levels of HDI. Still, the difference between the means of the ranks for Non-Destinations (80.00) and for Destinations (138.33) was statistically reliable, χ^2 (1) = 31.07; $p < 0.05$. When Kruskal-Wallis was applied to all three groups, results similar to those of other variables were found. Non-Destination and Both Source and Destination groups were not different from one another, χ^2 (1) = 0.35; $p > 0.05$, yet both were different from the Destination only group (D-S&D: χ^2 (1) = 11.32; $p < 0.05$; D-ND: χ^2 (1) = 38.56; $p < 0.05$).



Figure 31. Distribution of ranks for Human Development Index (HDI) for Non-Destination (ND), Destination (D) and Both Source and Destination (S&D) countries. Size of the bubble represents the number of cases at particular rank.



Figure 32. Distribution of ranks for Human Development Index for all Destination countries (smaller rank numbers indicate lower HDI index and lower quality of life).

A quangle plot was generated (Figure 33) using the rank data for all destination countries. One inflexion point can be detected at rank 110.5, which corresponds to HDI value of 0.79 (65th percentile). Next, the destination country is at rank 138, which is HDI value of 0.85 or 80th percentile. This may be interpreted as pointing to possible difference between destinations that are developed and those that are slightly more average. Perhaps it is possible that for countries that are below this rank, the mechanisms of human trafficking are somewhat different than for those that are above the rank.



Figure 33. Quangle chart of the HDI rank data for Destination countries.

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Figure 34 below shows the percentage of countries where sex work was criminalized and not criminalized by countries' destination status. Even when two types of destination countries are combined into a single category, distribution for Destination and Non-Destination countries remain a mirror image of each other. Regardless of whether Chi-square is computed for a 2X2 or 2X3 table, it yields statistically reliable results (for 2X3: χ^2 (2) = 11.67; $p < 0.05$; for 2X2: χ^2 (1) = 9.38; $p < 0.05$), indicating that the difference in distribution between the categories is reliable.



Figure 34. Freedom status for Non-Destination (ND), Destination (D) and Both Source and Destination (S&D) countries. Bubble size indicates the percentage of countries with a particular cell.

Multivariate Analyses

In order to test whether the five variables above predict whether country is a destination country or not, logistic regression was conducted using the ranks for all the continuous variables. Legal status of sex work is a binomial categorical variable (0 = *Not criminalized*; 1 = *Criminalized*). The dependent variable was coded as 0 for *Non-Destination* and 1 for *Destination* countries. Since it became apparent in the preliminary analysis that countries that are Both Source and Destination countries are somewhat different from countries that are *just* destination countries, separate analysis was also run. This included countries that are Destination only and excluded those that are Both Source and Destination in order to see whether it would generate a better model. Unfortunately, due to the small number of countries that are Both Source and Destination multinomial logistic regression could not be performed for them alone.

The method used was a stepwise backward LR logistic regression, which is the same method that was used in the analyses of source countries. Models generated in all the steps yielded significant results. The initial model that included all five variables (GDP rank, CPI rank, Net migration rank, HDI rank, and Legality of sex work) explains 44 percent of the variance in the dependent variable (χ^2 (5) = 46.05; $p < 0.05$). In the final model where only two variables with a significant effect (HDI rank and Net migration rank) were included, the R^2 was 0.43, χ^2 (2) = 44.85; $p < 0.05$. As can be seen from the Figure 35, which shows R^2 for each of the four models, exclusion of variables that were not significant reduced the overall explanatory power of the model by only about 1 percent.



Figure 35. Nagelkerke R^2 values for models that resulted at each step of the backward stepwise logistic regression for Destination countries.

Table 16 shows the summary of results for individual dependent variables for the first and the last (final) model. Two variables that were significant in the initial model (Net migration rank and HDI rank) remained the only significant variables in all other models. In the final model, odds ratio for these two variables was 1.02. This indicates that

moving up one rank for a country on either of these two variables increases the odds of being a destination country 1.02 times.

Table 16. Results of the full and the final model of the backward stepwise logistic regression with five main variables for Destination countries.

Model	Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Exp(B)
Full model	GDP per capita rank	-0.01	0.01	0.15	0.99
	CPI rank	0.00	0.01	0.21	1.00
	Net migration rank	0.02	0.01	9.65	1.02*
	HDI rank	0.03	0.01	3.34	1.03
	Legality of sex work	0.37	0.62	0.37	1.45
	Constant	-5.67	0.96	34.93	0.00*
Final model	Net migration rank	0.02	0.01	9.48	1.02*
	HDI rank	0.02	0.01	10.94	1.02*
	Constant	-5.60	0.94	35.58	0.00*

* significant at $p < 0.01$ level

Due to the high correlation between GDP per capita rank and HDI ranks there is a danger that high multicollinearity is biasing the results. This is not surprising since GDP is included into the formula for calculating HDI. In order to check for the possible effect of this collinearity between independent variables, excluding GDP, rather than HDI, from the model is reasonable because HDI is a composite index, which represents more variables and therefore, is a variable richer in information than GDP. The R^2 of the final model generated, after the exclusion of GDP per capita ranks from the analysis, was 0.43, $\chi^2(2) = 45.12$, $p > 0.05$. The final model included the same two variables (HDI rank and Net migration rank). Their slopes remained identical to what they were in the original analysis. These results indicate that elimination or inclusion of GDP per capita does not have any noticeable effect on the results of the logistic regression, and therefore, the original analysis can be accepted. Due to missing data, 138 cases were included into the

original regression analysis. As discussed previously, there were a relatively high number of cases with missing CPI or Net migration data, meaning that results above should be interpreted carefully. In order to test for possible bias that may have resulted from exclusion of so many countries from the analysis, an additional regression analysis was conducted, this time substituting two variables, CPI rank and Net migration rank, with dummies generated to indicate if data for these two variables are or are not available. In this analysis, 172 cases were included. In such a model, both dummies remained in the final model, along with HDI. R^2 of that model was 0.41, χ^2 (3) 47.88; $p < 0.05$, which means that it explained slightly less variance than the model with the original variables. However, the two dummies were not significant themselves. These results indicate that not having data for these variables is not an important issue, as having or not having data for those two variables (CPI ranks and Net migration rank) is not a good predictor of the destination status of a country.

In preliminary analysis, it became apparent that the distributions of ranks for Destination only countries and those that are also source countries is quite different. This may mean that the same model should not be used for these two categories. When countries that are both sources and destinations are excluded from the logistic regression, and only Destination-only countries are included, the results gain in strength. The same variables, HDI and Net migration rank, remain as the only two significant variables in the model. Their slopes are 0.4 and 0.3, respectively (with log odds ratios of 1.04 and 1.03, respectively). The R^2 of the final model generated for this redefined dependent variable through backward stepwise logistic regression was 0.60, χ^2 (2) = 57.29; $p < 0.05$. Improved robustness of the findings when only countries that are Destinations-only are

used confirms that countries that are Both Source and Destination countries should perhaps be studied separately in order to identify what are the variables that are the best predictors of that status.

Regional Analyses

World regions are very different from one another in terms of their level of economic and social development, as can be seen from Figure 36 below. It is possible that if we were to look at a single region, given that geographical distribution of source and destination countries is not even across world regions, results that were obtained in global analyses would not hold. While in this study particular paths of trafficking were not studied, it is important to explore whether within a region differences in independent variables can be associated with trafficking patterns.



Figure 36. Means of regional ranks for all rank variables used in the study.

Tables 17 and 18 below show the numbers of source and destination countries for each of the world regions. The only region in which there are a sufficient number of source and destination countries to conduct analyses is Europe and North America region.

Table 17. Number of Source countries across world regions.

	World Region						
Source country	South and Central Asia	Europe and North America	Middle East and North Africa	Central and South Africa	Latin America and Caribbean	East Asia and Pacific	All
No	8	32	19	45	28	27	159
Yes	8	14	1	3	5	7	38
Total	16	46	20	48	33	34	197

Table 18. Number of Destination countries across world regions.

	World Region						
Destination country	South and Central Asia	Europe and North America	Middle East and North Africa	Central and South Africa	Latin America and Caribbean	East Asia and Pacific	All
No	14	27	17	48	33	27	166
Yes	2	19	3	0	0	7	31
Total	16	46	20	48	33	34	197

Summary of Kruskal-Wallis test results for rank variables for source countries are shown in Table 19. Table 20 shows the cell frequencies for Freedom status across regions. These results indicate that the same two variables that were identified in the global analysis as predictors (GDP per capita rank and Population growth rank) are also

significant at regional level, at least in Europe and North America. Female unemployment, which was not a significant variable in the global analysis, is significant in this regional analysis.

Table 19. Summary of Kruskal-Wallis results for Source and Non-Source countries in Europe and North America region.

Variable	No. of cases		Mean		Kruskal-Wallis test results
	Source	Not-source	Source	Not-source	χ^2
GDP per capita rank	14	28	10.93	26.79	15.59*
Gini rank	12	25	16.00	20.44	1.36
Female unemployment rank	13	27	25.81	17.94	3.97
Population growth rank	14	32	9.07	29.81	23.26*
F/M enrollment ratio rank	14	29	20.04	22.95	0.51

* significant at $p < 0.01$ level

Table 20. Frequencies for Freedom status for Source and Non-Source countries, and results of Chi square test.

Freedom status	No. of cases	
	Source	Not-source
Free	9	29
Partially free	4	3
Not free	1	0
$\chi^2 = 5.46$; $p > 0.05$		

When it comes to destination countries, summary of means and results of Kruskal-Wallis test are presented in Table 21. Reliable difference between Destination and Non-Destination countries was found for Net migration with relatively strong significance level. This is also a variable that was significant in the global analysis. Another variable for which there was a significant difference between groups is GDP per capita, even though the significance level is not as strong. This variable was not significant in the global analysis. The HDI rank that was significant in the global analysis

yielded non-significant results here. Table 22 shows cell frequencies for Legal status of sex work for Destination and Non-Destination countries. Chi-square test yielded significant results indicating uneven frequencies between the cells, and pointing two a relationship between the variables. Legality of sex work was not among significant variables in the global analysis.

Table 21. Summary of Kruskal-Wallis results for Destination and Non-Destination countries in Europe and North America region.

Variable	**No. of cases**		**Mean**		**Kruskal-Wallis test results**
	Dest.	**Non-Dest.**	**Dest**	**Non-Dest.**	χ^2
GDP per capita rank	19	23	25.74	18.00	4.14*
CPI rank	19	23	23.55	19.80	0.97
HDI rank	18	23	25.06	17.83	3.68
Net migration rank	19	21	25.03	16.40	5.43*

* significant at $p < 0.05$ level

Table 22. Frequencies for Legality of sex work for Destination and Non-Destination, and results of Chi square test.

	No. of cases	
Legality of sex work	**Destin.**	**Non-Dest.**
Not criminalized	17	15
Criminalized	2	12
$X^2 = 6.06$; $p < 0.05$		

Summary of Results

In the regression analyses of factors that were associated with either source and destination status of a country on a global level, the independent variables included explained a substantive amount of variance in the dependent variables. This suggests that the basic approach to identifying independent variables was discerning. This is encouraging. Yet, it was only possible to include a small number of independent

variables and no control variables in this study, due to the small number of cases. This means that it is possible for the results to suffer from an omitted variable bias. This is a common problem in macro-quantitative studies, as discussed earlier. The high portion of explained variance, therefore, might be related to other variables, with which the variables that were included in the study co-vary. Nevertheless, the findings represent an encouraging step, as they at least indicate which variables differentiate between Source and Non-Source, and Destination and Non-Destination countries.

When it comes to source countries, the two major findings were that: a) GDP per capita is a variable that differentiates between Source and Non-Source countries; and b) Low or negative population growths, as opposed to positive population growth, are associated with a country being a source country for trafficking.

GDP per capita was a variable included in both analyses of source and destination countries. In the regression analysis of the source countries, GDP per capita was one of the two variables that was significant and that remained significant in the final model. These results indicate that an increase in GDP per capita ranks decreases the odds of a country being a source country. Yet, visual analysis of distribution of GDP per capita ranks within source and Non-Source countries indicates that countries with both high *as well as* low GDP per capita ranks may indeed be source countries. Only countries at the high and the low extremes were not found among source countries. To a degree, this supports the push-and-pull explanations, as in countries with very high GDP per capita migration potential is very small. People who live in such countries have little, if anything, to gain by moving to other countries. Yet, migration potential exists at all other levels, as there is somewhere better to migrate to or at least the migrant believes there is.

It is not clear from this study who exactly becomes a migrant or a victim. It is possible that those who become trafficking victims have lower than average annual incomes within their countries, which would further explain why at most levels of GDP per capita we can find source countries. It could be interesting to compare the incomes of persons who get trafficked across countries by looking at their income percentiles in their home country. If incomes of trafficked persons fall within a similar percentile range, regardless of the GDP per capita of the country or average income, it could be possible to say that the relative wealth and poverty of an individual is more important than the overall wealth of the nation. The fact that countries that have relatively high GDP per capita can also be sources indicates that relative, rather than absolute, deprivation could possibly be an important factor.

On the other hand, the finding that there were no source countries among the very poorest is contrary to the theory of how trafficking takes place that was developed in earlier chapters. It was proposed that in such countries, migrants have very limited options for migrating legally or illegally, since the services of migrant smuggles cost money. Consequently, they are more likely to agree to conditions set forth by traffickers and eventually to get trafficked. The results of this study, however, indicate that countries with the very lowest levels of GDP per capita are less likely to be sources than countries that are slightly better off. It would be interesting to look into GDP per capita growth rates and their association with trafficking. In countries that are poor but have growing GDP per capita, it could be said that economic mobility and overall improvement in purchasing power results in increased hopes that motivates people to seek even better

opportunities and migrate, even at greater risks. This is an issue that could be explored in future research.

Population growth was one the variables that differentiated between Source and Non-Source countries. However, the effect was opposite of what was predicted. It was proposed that high population growth would be associated with source countries, since high population growth is commonly associated with the declining overall wealth of a country. It is also associated with increased rural to city migration, which often leads to higher inequality and poverty rates in a society as a whole. In this study, however, a number of countries with negative population growth rates, including a number of those from Eastern Europe (Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Russian Federation), were identified as source countries, even though low population growth has historically been associated with prosperity. All the countries named above had negative, rather than *low positive* population growth rates. This is an interesting detail. The discussed theory refers to *slow growth*, rather than *shrinkage* of the population (that can happen due to a steep decline in fertility rates, and/or a sharp increase in mortality rates, or a combination of the two), which are two different occurrences. Sudden changes in fertility and high mortality rates often come along with dramatic crisis (Kharkova & Andreev, 2000), such as war and famine. In such situations, a decrease in fertility rates tends to be motivated by a sense of economic insecurity. Moving from a socialist regime and economy to capitalism in Eastern Europe not only lead to deepening poverty for a big chunk of the population, but it also resulted in a dissolution of the safety nets that the previous system provided, such as free education and healthcare. The population of those countries was, for the first time, left to

fend for itself - a rather new way of life. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the response of many was to “wait for better times” to have children. The result of this process is that Eastern Europe currently has the lowest birth rates in the world, and this pattern has been continuing ever since the 1990s (Bradatan & Firebaugh, 2007). This contributes to a shrinking population. Following this line of reasoning, negative population growth can be seen as a *reflection* of the sense of insecurity in a society, and a push factor for migration. At the same time, the reduction in birth rates starting with the 1990s means that there are many women that were born in the 1980s in those countries that still did not have children as of around 2003 (the year of this research) and therefore are more mobile and more likely to desire to migrate. Combined with a low GDP per capita, this can be a good motivator for potential migration. What our results indicate, however, is that countries with strong population growths as well as those with average population growth can become source countries as well. This signifies that more complex processes may be at play.

The Gini coefficient is a measure of the total economic inequality in a society in terms of the distribution of the total income across income groups. In countries with more inequality, there is more distance between those with low, average, and high incomes, while the difference is smaller in countries with less inequality. Preliminary analysis of Gini coefficient ranks suggests that source countries can be evenly found within different ranges of the Gini coefficient ranks. The means of ranks are somewhat lower for Source countries (meaning that Source countries are more equal that Non-Source countries), but the difference was not reliable. Results of the regression analysis did not indicate Gini coefficient ranks were an important predictor of a country’s status as a source country.

Since the Gini coefficient is a measure of relative deprivation for those with low incomes, it could be concluded that relative deprivation is not a factor that differentiates between countries. This is easy to understand conceptually, since people who live in a country do not limit comparing themselves *only* to other people in their own countries. A lack of ability to have one's desired quality of life in the country where one resides is only part of the problem. Thus, the possibility of better income and better life in *other* countries is a pull factor for those who want to migrate. From this point of view, equality rather than inequality may be a push factor, as in a more equal society, opportunities and possibilities may appear to be more limited to those living there while opportunities may appear plentiful in countries where ranges are much larger.

The problem of missing data with this variable should not be forgotten. The number of countries for which the Gini coefficient data were not available was rather large. More Non-Source countries were missing data than Source countries. Overall, data were derived from data spanning a decade, with different years being used for different countries, depending on the availability of the data. This increases the possibility of error even for the data that were available. Given all this, it can be said that no conclusive results can be reached at this time regarding the effect of inequality and whether it is a good way to distinguish Source countries from Non-Source countries. With the available data, it is not so; if data were more consistently available for a larger number of countries, the results might have been different. The only thing that can be concluded is that currently, there are source countries with both high and low levels of inequality.

According to the results of this study, female unemployment is not a good predictor of a country's source status. However, countries with very different levels of

female unemployment were among the source countries. It should be kept in mind that female unemployment rate is not a measure of the proportion of women that do not work. Rather, it reflects a percentage of women that are actively looking for work. It is possible that female unemployment rates do not reflect the situation properly in some countries. This may be due to countries having extensive grey economies, which is likely for many low GDP countries, with high official unemployment rates, but a larger number of people still employed. Also, it is possible that the female participation in the work force in some countries is low. This would not necessarily mean that women would not want to work, but it may be that they refuse to do so under the conditions offered to them in their countries, possibly because of sexual harassment at workplaces or the limited opportunities and low pay offered. Women who are not part of the work force in one country may decide that it only pays off to work in a different country. Thus, the relationship between participation in the work force, unemployment, and pay for women should be further studied as possible explanatory variables. Similarly to the Gini coefficient, data for this variable were missing for many countries.

When it comes to school enrollment, no significant difference was found between Source and Non-Source countries. However, there was a slightly higher number of source countries among those where the proportion of females enrolled in secondary schools was lower than the proportion of males enrolled. This seems to suggest that gender inequality, at least measured in this way, is not a variable that differentiates between Source and Non-Source countries. This measure can perhaps be considered a measure of equality in opportunity relative to the other gender. Instead, it may be more useful to study *gender specific* lack of opportunity. It is possible that women compare themselves with men and

that uneven opportunity pushes them. On the other hand, perhaps the relative deprivation theory does not hold here. Being better off than men may not be much of a consolation if you are still in a bad position. Thus, the questions of female inequality and its association with trafficking and the theory behind it should be reviewed as well.

Freedom status, as measured by categories assigned by Freedom House, was not found to differentiate between Source and Non-Source countries. Of course, freedom is a concept that is difficult to measure. The three-category variable used is surely a crude measure of what living freely is all about. Nevertheless, the fact that there were source countries in all three categories indicates that full freedom is not a guarantee that a country will not be a source country.

When it comes to analysis of destination countries, there were three major findings: a) That HDI, at the expense of GDP per capita, is the main predictor variable; b) That countries which are destinations for trafficking are also common destinations for migration; and c) That countries which are only destination countries are rather different from countries that are *both* source and destinations.

Even though there is a clear difference between Destination and Non-Destination countries when it comes to GDP per capita, regression analysis indicated that GDP itself is not a significant factor. Rather, when the Human Development Indicator was included into the regression, it was the variable predicting the destination status, and GDP per capita was no longer significant. This indicates that for overall quality of life is a more important indicator of which country is likely to become a destination country than the wealth of the country alone. These results need to be considered carefully. Among countries that were Destination only countries, the one with lowest HDI was at the 50th

percentile. While it was found that countries with HDI at or above the 73rd percentile are more likely to be destinations, HDI does not have to be astronomically high for a country to become a destination for trafficking. In other words, countries with a better quality of life are more likely destinations, but depending on the interplay of other factors, countries with lower HDI can become destination as well. Disentangling what those other factors are would constitute interesting research.

Net migration was also identified as a variable that can be used to differentiate Destination countries from Non- Destinations. The majority of countries that are destinations for trafficking are also destinations for regular migrants, whether legal or illegal. This means that trafficking routes do indeed follow migration routes. It is possible that criminal networks that are involved in trafficking are also those that are involved in migrant smuggling. This would make it easy for them to use the same routes, people, and resources to conduct trafficking activities. It is also possible that immigration results in a different dynamic of demand for sex workers in destination countries. This should be further explored.

Findings regarding the Corrupting Perception Index indicate that countries with high levels of corruption can be destinations, but countries with a low level of corruption are more likely destinations. This is contrary to the argument put forward by Bales (2005) that destination countries need to have certain levels of corruption because trafficking could not take place without it. This is not to say that low levels of corruption *invite* trafficking into the country. Quite to the contrary, findings suggest that corruption levels are irrelevant. It is likely that corruption levels are associated with other variables in the study, such as GDP per capita. Therefore, even though corruption levels are different

between Destination and Non-Destination countries, this is likely to be the case due to their correlation with other relevant variables. It should also be kept in mind that CPI is a measure of perceived corruption by business people, rather than by average citizens. Thus, it may not be measuring the kinds of issues that may be relevant for human trafficking. In a particular country, it may be necessary to pay a bribe to get a business license, but police might be under tighter control. This is why different measures of corruption should be considered before it can be claimed with certainty that corruption is or is not a relevant variable when trying to predict which countries are likely destinations.

The answer to the question of whether the legality (or lack of criminalization) of sex work creates a good environment for trafficking remains somewhat ambiguous. While in the majority of Destination countries sex work was not criminalized, in the majority of Non-Destination countries it was. The question that should be raised is that of the causal nature of the relationship that was found: whether non-criminalization is a policy adapted as a *response to* an existing problem of sex work (that trafficking is just one of many faces of) or if the prostitution and trafficking have become a problem *as a result* of such a policy of decriminalization. There is no simple answer to this question. First, different dimensions of criminalization and non-criminalization should be studied in more detail, and the history behind different policies should be explored before an answer can be reached. Results here suggest that there is no clear answer, since the effect of the legal status of sex work disappears when combined with other variables in the regression equation.

Finally, analysis of the situation in Europe raises new questions since it does not confirm the findings of global analysis. In this analysis, GDP per capita and population

growth ranks were still good differentiators between Source and Non-Source countries. Unfortunately, it was impossible to run regressions due to the small number of cases. So, we do not know how these variables would play out if included into the same analysis. When it comes to destinations, Net migration is again a clear differentiating factor. However, the interplay between GDP and HDI remains unresolved. The legal status of sex work becomes a differentiating variable, suggesting, once again, that this question needs to be explored further. Unfortunately, it is impossible to conduct similar analysis of other regions, so different methods need to be adopted. In-depth studies of different regional patterns need to be developed since the macro-quantitative analysis has failed to provide answers regarding other world regions.

Countries that are both sources and destinations are not very well understood. These countries share more with other source countries than with other destination countries. It would be important to study these countries separately in order to explore whether mechanisms that make them both sources and destinations are similar. They could also be studied to determine whether they are predominantly source countries where trafficking networks just benefit from established mechanisms in order to bring trafficking into the country. Furthermore, regional trafficking should also be considered, as it is possible that those countries are marked by trafficking that could be better described as regional rather than international. In either case, considering the small number of such countries, studying all of these countries in-depth is possible.

At this point, it is relatively clear that certain variables differentiate between source and destination countries relatively well. What would really need to be done in order to see whether these factors still remain important is to compare sources and

destinations with each other. In such an analysis, rather than simply comparing all sources with all destinations, a design where source countries are paired with their respective destinations should be developed. In this way, it would be possible to study not only the characteristic of countries that people are trafficked from and trafficked into, but how countries at the beginning and the end of the line are similar or different from one another. Such a study, nonetheless, would require very reliable information regarding trafficking paths.

CHAPTER VII THE CASE STUDY: CASE COUNTRY

The purpose of the second component of this research was to examine if and how macro-level factors translate into an actual trafficking problem on the ground, as well as to explore how particular social, economic, and political context that cannot easily be represented through national indicators factor in. This will generate knowledge on how macro-level factors determine the nature of the trafficking process in a local context. This case study will present its evidence "in extended networks of implications that (although never complete) are nonetheless crucial to (…) scientific evaluation" (Campbell, 2003: ix).

When selecting a country that will be the subject of a case study, common strategies are to select either the *most typical* or the most *atypical* country (or two similar or dissimilar countries in case of comparative research). It was difficult to use either one of those strategies mentioned, as the question of "What is a typical destination country?" is not a question with a known answer.

The case study was conducted is Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH[32]). This country has been identified as one of the major trafficking destination countries by a number of sources (United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina [UNMIBH], 2000; IOM, 2001), including the UNODC report (UNODC, 2006) used in the macro-quantitative component of this study. Countries of Western Europe, North America, and other developed or rich countries are usually considered to be typical trafficking destinations. BiH hardly falls into that category. The argument that BiH is *atypical* stems from the

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[32] "BiH" stands for "Bosna i Hercegovina" (Bosnian for "Bosnia and Herzegovina") and is used internationally as an abbreviated version of the country's name.

assumption that trafficking patterns follow migration patterns and that direction of trafficking is from poor to rich countries. Results of the macro-quantitative study also indicate that while destination countries tend to be wealthier on average than non-destination countries and tend to also be migration destinations, this is not always the case. It may be that the *atypical* nature of this country has contributed to it becoming a trafficking destination. In other words, the fact that this country may be considered atypical destination by some standards does not necessarily mean that it is a poor choice for a case study, nor does it really mean that country is actually atypical. Quite the contrary, by looking beyond simple wealth of the country, what contributed to a country becoming a destination will be studied. This may give us clues as to what should be considered a typical destination. The case study focuses on the time period up until the end of 2003, when the most of the data were collected (during the winters of 2002-2003 and 2003-2004).

Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Case

General Social, Economic, and Administrative Background

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a small country located on the Balkan Peninsula in Southeastern Europe. The map below shows its location in reference to the rest of Europe.

Figure 37. Map showing the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Europe.

BiH is among the countries that emerged from the break up of Yugoslavia in the 1990's. BiH announced its independence in March 1992, following a referendum that was boycotted by majority of Serbian population (who opposed the idea). The war started following the parting of BiH from Yugoslavia and in response to international recognition of BiH by EU countries in April 1992. While the war was characterized as a civil war by many, direct involvement of Yugoslav military, Croatian military, and paid mercenaries made this war international in nature. The war ceased towards the end of 1995 with signing of the The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina[33] (also know as Dayton Agreement, as peace talks were held in Dayton,

[33] For full text of the Dayton Peace Agreement, see http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380 .

Ohio). According to this agreement, BiH has kept its pre-war borders and it maintained its independence. Fourteen years following the signing of the Dayton Agreement; its implementation is still in progress.

BiH covers an area of a little over 19,200 square miles (about 51,129 square kilometers, slightly smaller than West Virginia) (CIA, 2008). According to BiH census data, population in 1991[34] was approximately 4.3 million (Federalni Zavod za Statistiku Federacije BiH, n.d.). No census has been conducted since 1991, but it is presumed that this number had changed significantly in the years during and following the 1992-1995 war. During the war, about half of the population was displaced, either domestically or internationally, and about 250,000 were killed in the war. Another 17,000 are still considered missing (BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, 2006). War and ethnic cleansing lead to a very widespread movement of population, resulting in areas that were virtually abandoned by one ethnic group and replaced by another. This significantly changed the ethnic landscape of the country. New urban centers emerged over short period of time to accommodate the transferred populations (for example, Siroki Brijeg and Pale were barely small towns prior to the war, but after have become significant urban centers for displaced Croat and Serb populations) (See map of BiH in Appendix D for locations of these towns). Ever since the end of the war in 1995, efforts to ensure the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their initial households have been continuing, with only modest success. Nevertheless, in 2008 World Bank estimated that population in 2007 was about 3.8 (World Bank, 2008), or close to the prewar level.

[34]For all official purposes, 1991 census data are still used in order to avoid distortions in population structure as a result of international and internal forced displacement.

Following the war, BiH has started to rebuild and recover with the help of large injections of international aid (over $ 6 billion since 1996; World Bank, 2008). Yet, more than a decade after Dayton, economic and other indicators paint a grim picture of BiH. While GDP per capita has been rising steadily since the end of the war in 1996 (as can be seen in the figure below), it remains at about a quarter of EU average (that was $ 23,500 in 2005), and at about a half of its neighboring Croatia, that went through a similar war during the breakup of Yugoslavia (EUROSTAT, 2007: 151). It is estimated that around one-fifth of population lives below the poverty line and another 30 percent barely above it (International Monetary Fund, 2004).



Figure 38. GDP per capita for BiH: For years 1997-2006 data obtained from United Nations Economic Commission for Europe statistical database (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, n.d.), and for 2007 the estimate was obtained from CIA Factbook (CIA, 2008). Unemployment rates were obtained from Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of BiH (2008).

Unemployment rates are extremely high, but these numbers should be considered carefully. On one hand, a number of those who are employed are not receiving wages or

are on "forced vacations" (unpaid leaves). On the other hand, a large portion of the economy is gray. It has been estimated that the gray sector accounts for 30-50 percent of national economy in countries of Balkan region (Hajdinjak, 2002), and BiH is no exception. This means that a large proportion of those who are officially unemployed *do* have an income. However, it can also mean that gray economy is a rule rather than exception.

In terms of administration and governance, BiH is probably one of the most complex countries in the world despite its unimpressive size. The country consists of two Entities: *Federation BiH* (FBiH) and *Republika Srpska* (RS). Federation BiH is actually a federation of 10 Cantons.

While some Ministries operate on State level (such as Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Foreign Affairs), others are Entity level ministries (Ministry of Social Policy, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, etc.). In Federation BiH, most of these Ministries also exist at Cantonal level, which adds an additional level of government (Canton–Entity-State). The Ministry of Interior that law enforcement agencies operate under is also an Entity level ministry, meaning that two Entities have two separate police forces with separate territorial jurisdictions[35]. Yet, there is also the State Ministry of Security and State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA[36]) that works under its auspices (similar to the FBI in USA), and Cantonal Police agencies. There are also two

[35] Efforts to eliminate entity level MOIs by uniting them into a single body have failed so far, due to the lack of political will. Unification of law enforcement agencies has been one of the requirement of EU accession, and there is great deal of pressure on the current government to proceed with unification.

[36] Interestingly, the abbreviation of the English name of the agency (SIPA) is most commonly used, rather than its Bosnian name (Drzavna Agencija za Informiranje i Zastitu). This points to the strong influence of the international community in the establishment of this agency.

parallel judiciary systems similar to the federal/state system in the USA: on state and on entity levels, along with Cantonal courts (usually for more minor issues).

Additional complication is brought about by existence of a small region Brcko, located at the north border between BiH and Croatia, which is under International Supervision due to inability of both local as well as international partners to rule on which entity Brcko should be part of.[37] The solution was to give Brcko a very peculiar status:

> The territory of the District belongs simultaneously to both entities, the Republika Srpska and the Federation, in condominium. Therefore, the territories of the two Entities overlap in the Brcko District. (…) the District is self-governing and has a single, unitary, multiethnic, democratic Government; a unified and multiethnic police force operating under a single command structure and an independent judiciary. (Office of the High Representative, n.d.).[38]

This means that Brcko also has its own ministries and police as well as courts and judiciary, further complicating the governmental structure of the country. The map below[39] shows the borders of Entities, Cantons, and Brcko District.

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[37] Status of Brcko was supposed to be decided through international arbitration, as decision could not be made during peace talks. The current status of Brcko is the result of that arbitration process.

[38] See Statute of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina for details at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/arbitration/default.asp?content_id=39069 .

[39] Map taken from Office of High Representative web site at: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps/images/federation-of-bih.gif .



Figure 39. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina, showing internal administrative borders for Entities, Cantons, and Brcko District.

BiH's internal borders roughly follow ethnic lines that emerged after the war. Also, the majority of Muslims[40] and Croats live in Federation, while majority of Serbs live in Republika Srpska, as can be seen in the map below.[41]

[40] In 1968, in former Yugoslavia, "Muslim" spelled with capital M was introduced as a new recognized nationality. Terms that denote religious identity are spelled with small letter, meaning that "musliman" would be a person whose religion is Islam, while "Musliman" would be a person's ethnicity. Since the break up of former Yugoslavia, in BiH, Muslim (as ethnicity) has been replaced to great extent with term "Bosnjak" (Bosniak) in order to define a Bosnian Muslim population without any religious connotations. Use of those terms is still rather complicated, as a Croat or a Serb person from BiH could also call himself "Bosnjak".

[41] Map taken from Office of High Representative web site at: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps/images/ethnic-composition-after-the-war-in-1998.gif



Figure 40. Ethnic profile of population of BiH, by municipalities.

The complicated administrative and governing structure results in fragmented, unsynchronized, and uncoordinated governance of the country. This is especially true when it comes to law enforcement. Law enforcement agencies do not have any authority beyond their respective jurisdictions (which are relatively small given the size of the country). This makes it very hard to conduct investigations and operations. The situation with the judiciary is similar. Information sharing is poor and building a common policy very difficult.

Up until recently, BiH also had large international presence, with a number of international bodies exercising different levels of authority within the country. The number of international institutions with presence in BiH was particularly high right after the war with a number of NGOs, charities, UN institutions, and others, in addition to

NATO's military contingent, opening offices around the country. Many of those institutions are now closed, and even those that did not stop their operations in BiH have significantly reduced their presence. Hence, the number of expatriates living and working in BiH has shrunk significantly and visibly over the last 10 years. The most significant of international institutions in BiH in the context of human trafficking due to their involvement in policy development include the Office of the High Representative, the International Police Task Force, the EU Police Mission, and the Stabilization Force.

The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is an international institution entrusted with monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The establishment of OHR is envisioned in Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The OHR has played very crucial role in post-war Bosnia because of its extensive powers. Article 2, paragraph 1(d) of the Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement states that "[The High Representative shall…] facilitate, as the High Representative judges necessary, the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation". This, combined with Article 5 (which states that "The High Representative is the final authority in thereafter regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement.") means that the High Representative has the power to do pretty much anything the he deems necessary in order to promote the implementation of the peace agreement. Hence, OHR has the power to pass laws by decree (and has done so numerous times in the past, from Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes to Law on Indirect Taxation. In fact, the majority of laws that passed since the end of the war were passed by decree by OHR, overruling the Parliamentary vote). It also has the power to remove any and all government

representatives and heads of political parties. Likewise, it has the power to fire public officials, such as judges and other similar figures. OHR has used these powers extensively, mostly due to constant deadlocks in the different branches of government where political parties preferred to leave action to OHR, rather than taking the responsibility for politically unpopular decisions. In an effort to force local political and government leaders to take on more responsibility, it has been said that the mandate of OHR will end within few years. OHR, while initially a welcomed partner and arbiter in the country, eventually came to be seen as an occupying power that rules the country with no accountability.

Stabilization Force (SFOR) was a military mission that was established after the mandate of Implementation Force (IFOR) expired as a continuation of international military presence in BiH (the IFOR was entrusted with bringing peace and ending hostilities in BiH). Both IFOR and later SFOR were established by NATO, based on Article 1A of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which covers the military aspects of the peace settlement, operated under direction and political command of North Atlantic Council, and operated through NATO chain of command. The mission of IFOR started in 1996, following the signing of the peace agreement, with the deployment of over 60.000 soldiers into the country. In the following year, IFOR was substituted with SFOR (actually, just the labels on the cars and uniforms had changed, while everything else remained the same). SFOR's mission was ended in December 2005, when the powers of SFOR were handed over to the EU military mission (called EUFOR). At that time, fewer than 7.000 soldiers[42] were still in the country. The presence of a large number of foreign

[42] IFOR and SFOR included soldiers from a variety of countries, including Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,

military was argued to contribute to the emergence of trafficking problem in BiH, as will be later discussed.

The International Police Task Force (IPTF) was established based on Annex 11 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which required the UN to establish a UNCIVPOL operation in BiH. IPTF's mandate included monitoring, observing, and inspecting law enforcement activities as well as advising and training law enforcement personnel, assessing threats to public order, and advising on the capability of law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats. It also included advising government authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies. In many ways, IPTF was a consultant to local law enforcement agencies as well as being their superior. IPTF was entrusted with certifying local policing officers. It had the power to remove them from their posts. IPTF also had the power to issue orders to local law enforcement agencies on when and how operations are to take place. Furthermore, IPTF was able to run its own operations, virtually acting as a parallel, but superior, law enforcement agency. Needless to say, the relationships between IPTF and local law enforcement were highly strained and cooperation was far from perfect. IPTF mission was finished in January 2003, when it was replaced by the European Union Police Mission (EUPM). The EUPM's mandate continues (expected to end by the end of 2009). EUPM was first civilian crisis operation undertaken by European Security and Defense policy (Gouy, 2002); its mandate is pretty much identical to the mandate of IPTF. IPTF initially had about 2000 staff (Clement, 2000), but at this time EUPM has a total of about 350 staff (European Union Police Mission [EUPM], 2008).

Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Chile, Morocco, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, Luxembourg, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia.

An additional interesting institution with international presence is the state level Prosecutor's office and its Special Department for Organized Crime**,** Economic Crime, and Corruption**.** Early in 2003, Law on the Office of the State Prosecutor of BiH was amended by a decision of a high representative to include the possibility of hiring foreign prosecutors in the department (Art. 4 of the Law Amending the Law on the Office of the State Prosecutor of BiH, 2003). This was an attempt to bring in prosecutors who would be more difficult to bribe, easier to remove from the country in the case of threats, and less likely to succumb to political pressure. These prosecutors (initially two Canadian and one from the USA) along with their teams have been involved in the prosecution of human trafficking cases in BiH at the state level.

Large number of stakeholders, both local and national, and a very complex mechanism of decision and policy making create a very particular context for human trafficking, at least from the perspective of the government's responses to it. Furthermore, the large international military presence and asymmetry of powers between international and local institutions have resulted in a degree of animosity among local authorities to anything "foreign" or "international". Since "foreigners", whether police, prosecutors, or representatives, were brought into the country based on the idea that "locals" were not willing or capable of doing the job well, the resentment is not surprising. All this has contributed significantly to how trafficking was identified as a problem and how it was dealt with in BiH. This will be discussed in the following chapters.

Overview of the Responses to Trafficking

The conference organized in 1998 in Tuzla (BiH) by the Council of Europe and UNHCHR, where NGOs and Ministerial representatives along with the representatives of international organizations were present, is seen as a first step towards recognizing and addressing the issue of trafficking in BiH (Wennerholm & Zillen, 2003; Save the Children -Norway, 2005; UNMIBH, 2000). In 1999, cooperation between IOM, IPTF, and UNHCHR on trafficking issue started to develop. UNHCHR took the responsibility of providing legal support to victims, IOM undertook the responsibility of providing sheltering and return, and IPTF helped with identification of victims (Wennerholm & Zillen, 2003). First, funds for IOM's shelter and repatriation project were provided by the U.S. Department of State (Kvinnoforum & Kvinna Till Kvinna, 2003: 48); later that year and again in 2000, the first IOM managed shelter for identified trafficking victims was opened. In 2000, BiH Government initiated an establishment of a Working Group that would develop a National Action Plan (NAP) for combating human trafficking (Akcioni Plan za Sprjecavanje Trgovine Ljudima, 2001: 5). It should be noted that the development of a NAP should not been seen as an independent effort of BiH government; rather, it was a reflection of a common policy of Stability Pack for Eastern Europe. Stability Pack for Eastern Europe was formed at EU's initiative in 1999 with NATO as a catalyst. Its intention was to create common ground for developing policy in Eastern European countries in the areas of economy, democratization and human rights, and security (Limanowska & Rosga, 2004). Developing and implementing such action plans can be seen as a reflection of the Stability Pact's policy, since the Pact aims to coordinate

these efforts at the regional level. Another significant development that should be noted is that, in 2000, the State Border Service was established (later to become the State Border Police, a separate law enforcement agency). At the time, the goal was to ensure that the Border Control Service controlled state borders by 2002 (Wennerholm & Zillen, 2003). Prior to this date, BiH's borders were highly porous and without proper border crossing points or border control checks. In 2000, BiH signed the Palermo Protocol and ratified it in April 2002.

In June 2001, IPTF and UN Mission in BiH initiated a so called "Special Trafficking Operations Programme" (STOP Programme), parallel with the implementation of the National Action Plan, that aimed to set coordination mechanisms and conduct joint actions in the field of combating trafficking (Save the Children-Norway, 2005). A partnership was established between IPTF and local law enforcement agencies. STOP was formed as a way to push the local law enforcement into action partially due to the reports that local police were not doing anything about the reports of trafficking. At the same time, reports emerged which suggested that some IPTF officers (even high level ones) were involved in local prostitution and trafficking (Vandenberg, 2002; Murray, 2003). Creation of STOP teams has been evaluated as an attempt to regain some respect and clarify the position of the IPTF on human trafficking, following the reported incidents of IPTF staff involved in trafficking during 2000 and 2001 (Limanowska & Rosga, 2004). During its existence, the STOP program mostly focused on organizing raids of suspect venues. This led to 713 raids of bars and venues (Save the Children-Norway, 2005) during the existence of STOP teams. However, the raids were later criticized for not producing desired results because very few women identified

themselves as trafficking victims. Furthermore, only a small number of prosecutions resulted from these operations (Firmo-Fontan, 2003). In addition, IPTF has been blamed for focusing more on public relations than the actual outcomes and victim protection. For example, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) organized a big press conference and issued a press release, stating that "177 women, mostly from Romania, Moldova, Ukraine and the Russian Federation were liberated during the raids" (UNMIBH, March 3, 2001). This followed an operation in cooperation with local police whereby a number of suspect bars and hotels were raided under the codename "Macro". This was acknowledged in March 2001 by IPTF. It later became apparent that only 13 victims were provided assistance and no one actually knew what happened with the rest of the victims. Moreover, only two criminal complaints resulted from the operation (UNHCHR, May 3, 2001).

In 2002, the State Commission for the Implementation of the NAP was formed. At the same time, international organizations with presence in BiH (including UNICEF, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), UN, Embassies, IOM and others) established their own Working Group to coordinate international assistance (Limanowska & Rosga, 2004). In that same year, a document known as *Temporary Instruction* was prepared and issued by the State level Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees. Temporary Instruction clarified procedures for identifying human trafficking victims. It also set forth what exactly the legal status of those victims was during, and immediately following, their identification (Limanowska, 2007).

2003 was a year of change, with UN Mission leaving and being replaced by EU Mission. EUPM replaced IPTF mission, and STOP teams got replaced with FIGHT teams

(Fight and Intervention Against the Human Trafficking teams). When leaving BiH, IPTF did not share any of its intelligence with EUPM, meaning that EUPM could not benefit in any way from the years of work conducted by IPTF (International Organization for Migration Counter-Trafficking Service, 2004; Mendelson, 2005). EUPM aimed to pursue a very different approach to combating trafficking by focusing less on quantity and more on quality (producing prosecutable cases). EUPM concluded that raids organized by IPTF were not effective, as large number of victims that were identified through raids either did not identify themselves as victims, did not seek assistance, or failed to provide information against traffickers. This made it very difficult to produce evidence that would result in prosecutions.[43] However, initial operations conducted by EUPM followed the same strategies used by IPTF and produced similar results (European Union Police Mission, January 18, 2003; European Union Police Mission, January 3, 2003). Later on, however, EUPM started to focus on technical support (International Organization for Migration Counter-Trafficking Service, 2004) and left more initiative to the local police.

In 2003, new Criminal Codes were adopted at both State and Entity levels. The new State Criminal Code defined the offence of trafficking in human beings (Article 186 of the CC) almost identically to the way it is defined by the Palermo Protocol. The law came into force on March 1st, 2003. It opened a path to prosecute traffickers on the State level.

In 2005, a Rulebook was developed under the initiative of State Coordinator for Combating Human Trafficking, bringing further clarification to the procedures for

[43] Results of an operation with a code name "Mirage" conducted by IPTF in August, 2002 illustrate this point. In this operation, IPTF raided 111 businesses; 212 women of foreign citizenship were found at these location. Yet, in the end, only two were identified as trafficking victims (UNHCHR, September 16, 2002).

identifying the victims of trafficking. The same document clearly indicated the rights and benefits that victims of trafficking in BiH are entitled to (Limanowska, 2007).

CHAPTER VIII THE CASE STUDY: SOURCES OF DATA

Information about the local context of trafficking in this study was compiled from a number of different sources. These include interviews with officials and other experts that are knowledgeable about the trafficking situation in BiH, data on trafficking victims collected by service providing agencies, official and internal documents issued by various stakeholders, and media clippings, in addition to academic and other reports. All those sources were used to analyze the scope and the nature of the trafficking problem in BiH. They were also used to identify and study the particular context that allows trafficking to take place.

Interviews

Representatives of law enforcement agencies and investigators from the immigration unit who are responsible for interviewing potential trafficking victims were interviewed. Additionally, NGO workers and service provides that work directly with the identified victims of trafficking, and representatives of governmental and international organizations that deal with trafficking issues, either through policy or through services, were interviewed.[44]

Initial contacts with some of the Experts were made during a preliminary trip to BiH in the winter of 2002-2003. During this preparatory visit, I had met with representatives of a few Government and International agencies that work on human trafficking issues, which allowed me to identify the main actors in the field. It should be

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[44] Participants from these groups will be referred to as "Experts" thereinafter. While some of these may actually be experts on trafficking, most are actually individuals who have been introduced to the trafficking topic through their work and who deal with trafficking related issues. They may not be experts in the true meaning of that word.

noted that being Bosnian myself, I had relatively easy access, since language did not represent a problem and being local created less suspicion.

Considering that BiH is a small country, only a limited number of people could be interviewed. There are only a few NGO workers, police officers, prosecutors, and other officials who have been actively involved with trafficking issues over last few years. Since the whole population is too small for any meaningful sampling, the goal was to ensure that interviews were as inclusive as possible. Additionally, the goal was to ensure that all NGOs that work on this issue, prosecutors who handled most cases, police officers who have been involved over the longest period of time, government officials who have been working on these issues, and representatives of the most relevant international agencies were included in the interviews.

Clearly, the Experts interviewed do not represent a homogeneous population. However, that is not a drawback when the purpose of this study is taken into consideration. The Experts are not meant to represent a sample from a single population. Instead, they should provide as many different points of view and opinions as possible. Assuming that individuals from different institutions, agencies and organizations have different sources and types of information, these interviews would make it possible to gain insight into different types of information on human trafficking. A total of 25 Experts were interviewed. Table 23 shows their institutional affiliations, and whether they were local or international Experts.

Table 23. Organizational affiliations and nationality of interviewees.

Interview No.	Organization	Nationality	Letter used in the text to identify this expert
1	IO	Local	A
2	NGO	Local	B
3	NGO	Local	C
4	NGO	Local	D
5	Law Enforcement	International	E
6	Law Enforcement	Local	F
7	NGO	Local	G
8	Law Enforcement	Local	H
9	Law Enforcement	International	I
10	Law Enforcement	Local	J
11	Law Enforcement	Local	K
12	Law Enforcement	Local	L
13	NGO	Local	M
14	International Organization	International	N
15	NGO	Local	O
16	Government Representative	Local	P
17	Law Enforcement	Local	Q
18	Law Enforcement	Local	R
19	Law Enforcement	Local	S
20	Law Enforcement	Local	T
21	Law Enforcement	Local	U
22	Law Enforcement	Local	V
23	Prosecutor	International	W
24	International Organization	Local	X
25	Law Enforcement	Local	Y

Interviews were conducted during the winter of 2003-2004. All Experts were contacted individually by phone, and then, an interview time was scheduled. Most of the Experts interviewed were in a position of power within their organizations, which gave me very little control over the interview process and made it very difficult to be systematic. In most cases, I was unable to negotiate the scheduling of the interview in any way. I was told what time to come and where to come to; in all cases, I was asked to come to the offices of the persons I was interviewing, even though I considered that to be

a wrong location for such interviews. I made every effort to read or at least explain the verbal consent script that was approved by the Rutgers' Internal Review Board (see APPENDIX E for English and Bosnian versions; the English version was used for international Experts) to the interviewees. However, this was not always easy. While I was trying to read the verbal consent script, participants would often rush me, tell me to move to the questions, or would simply not listen (ordering me coffee or doing something similar). In a few cases, Experts would ask other people to be present (thinking that this would help me, since I would get information from two persons at the same time), and my objections were sometimes rebuffed (I was once told not to take myself too seriously). While ethical reviews intend to protect the participants and ensure that participants are not harmed by their participation in the research, I often felt that I had to navigate very complicated turfs of power and influence where I was the powerless and the participants the powerful ones. In such a context, efforts to protect the best interest of the participant could actually be perceived as intentional humiliation and undermining of the participant's authority. This problem has been nicely summarized by Emerson (1981: 373), even though he was referring to the problem of consent in field research:

> In most field situations, the researcher neither possesses great power as perceived by those studied, nor exercises unilateral control over the setting, conduct, or interactional contours of the research encounter (Cassell, 1980). Informed consent then becomes not only formalistic, but also patronizing (M. Wax 1977; Klockars, 1977), assuming "ignorant, powerless, innocent subjects who become the victims of the sly maneuvers of crafty professors" (M. Wax 1977: 324).

The interview protocol (Appendix F) was developed with an idea of a semi-structured interview where the protocol was actually intended to be used as an interview guide. Experts who were interviewed were asked not to provide answers that reflect the

official position of the agencies that they work for, but rather to give their own opinions. I wanted to obtain information on their individual experiences, impressions, and the problems they face. This was emphasized, as officials are frequently uncomfortable about disclosing details of their work and may not be accustomed to the idea of research. The participants were asked questions addressing following themes:

- General information
    - Questions 1 – 2 are basic questions regarding the interviewee's involvement with the trafficking issue;
- Causes of trafficking
    - Questions 3 – 6 are somewhat structured, with the intention to explore some commonly reported causes of trafficking;
- Preventing and fighting trafficking
    - Questions 7 – 15 are dealing with anti-trafficking policies. Here, the participants were given an opportunity to express their position on current policies and suggest improvements. They were also asked about cooperation between different groups and agencies and how that affects their work;
- Nature of trafficking problem
    - Questions 16 – 23 were only for those who work directly with the victims. These questions had few different goals. Some of the questions were aimed at determining what kind of attitude towards victims was prevalent among practitioners and service providers (who are most likely to work directly with the victims). Also, the intention was to benefit from the

accumulated knowledge since service providers, NGO workers, and police can provide information about the trends in trafficking that they were able to observe.

This Protocol outlines the information that I had tried to obtain during the interviews, rather then the exact questions that were asked. Similarly, questions were not always asked in the same sequence. In some cases, participants provided information without being specifically asked in the context of a different question. As already discussed, it was often difficult to direct the interview, as Experts did not always answer my questions, but talked about issues they thought were relevant or important. It was often difficult to insist on asking questions that were not responded to without creating hostile atmosphere. In such situations, I did not insist on obtaining answers, but simply moved on.

Interviews were not tape recorded. Notes were taken by hand and transcribed as soon as possible following an interview. Interviews with local Experts were conducted in Bosnian language (my native tongue), while interviews with international Experts were conducted in English. Transcripts were made in the language that was used (transcripts were not translated). These texts were later analyzed using NVivo software. In the analysis, themes were identified that address the research questions of this study raised in Chapter VI. Relevant paragraphs and items were coded accordingly. Data coded in this way was used to illustrate how those research questions have been addressed by the interviewees. Special attention was paid to patterns that emerged consistently.

It should be noted that during the winter 2003-2004, when interviews were conducted, I was employed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

mission in BiH as a consultant with the job of mapping a legislative framework for the protection of human trafficking victims in BiH. I had encountered a number of Experts that were interviewed during this study in OSCE work related meetings, but I made every effort to ensure that my position with OSCE did not create pressure and that my duties vis-à-vis OSCE were separate from my research study. In this regard, I made sure to inform all participants right away that I also work for OSCE, so that they do not feel cheated if they encounter me in that context. I also made sure to explain that the interview was conducted for purpose of my research only and that information given to me would not be shared with OSCE. Finally, I kept my OSCE work related communication separate from my research related communication so that it would not create confusion.

Despite the fact that the Experts were asked to provide their own personal views, and despite the fact that they knew that the information they provided would remain anonymous, it is possible that their institutional agendas colored their responses. In social research, however, this is almost always the case, without smart manipulations that can often be seen in experimental design. It would be naive to assume that participants were able or even willing to bury their background, and provide "objective" answers. After all, their background is what shapes their knowledge and understanding of the problem, and cannot be separated from it. Hence, it is important to keep in mind that responses could potentially be reflecting their personal or professional agendas. Yet this does not render the information obtained through interviews valueless. In fact, in this particular research it was also important to compare answers provided by representatives of different types of agencies, as that helps us understand the institutional culture and how such agencies

see, and therefore deal with, the issue of human trafficking. Hence this very bias can also be seen as the object of the research.

Initially, interviews with victims of human trafficking were also planned. Victims were to be located through safe houses currently operating in BiH by IOM in order to obtain interviews. During a preliminary visit to BiH during the winter 2002-2003, an initial agreement was obtained from IOM. However, during the period when I was in BiH for data collection (a year later), no victims were accessible through shelters. As will be later shown, no victims were admitted to shelters between September 2003 and the end of 2003. It is also unclear whether any victims entered shelters in the first two months of 2004 while I was still in BiH. While it is possible that some victims were admitted during those two months in 2004, I made no further attempts to obtain access to victims because it was clear that I would not be able to conduct a meaningful number of interviews.

No attempts were made to contact victims outside of the shelters, such as in brothels and bars where they were held. In BiH, as will be described later, most victims were held in closed venues, mostly bars and strip clubs, commonly not patronized by women. Trying to enter such locations would be very difficult and would create a real threat to my own safety. Further, if I was able to somehow obtain access, I was concerned with putting victims in danger if somehow their pimps discovered that they had talked to me. Given the danger that consenting to the interview would put them in, it would also be unlikely that they would provide me with detailed and truthful information. Finally, victims would have only a limited amount of information, as they are unlikely to know a lot about larger scale issues. While this limited information would be a welcome addition to information already obtained through other interviews, the benefit of obtaining these

data would be only marginal, considering the questionable quality of information that would be obtained, and given the dangers associated with collecting it, both to myself, and to the victims. Finally, while I would have to guarantee confidentiality to the interviewees in order to respect the ethics of the research, I found it ethically problematic not to report to the police information that would perhaps lead to the rescue of trafficking victims. This is a very important issue considering that victims are held against their will and forced into prostitution, and therefore are not willing participants. Reconciling the ethical rules of research, with common human ethics I found it personally difficult and impossible in this particular research.

Victim Data

Data from two IOM databases have been used in this study. The first database was derived from MIMOSA database managed by IOM. MIMOSA stands for Migrant Management and Operational Systems Application, which is IOM's data management system. It commonly includes various identifying data and health data, as well as narrative case summaries of IOM beneficiaries. After the expansion of IOM's counter trafficking activities, necessary software was developed to include trafficking related cases into MIMOSA (Kvinnoforum & Kvinna Till Kvinna, 2003). Due to confidentiality issues, access to MIMOSA is limited to IOM case workers and other IOM staff. For research purposes, IOM can extract variables that are considered to be safe for public release on request without compromising identity of victims and without violating confidentiality agreements that IOM has with them. Such data were provided to me by IOM office in Sarajevo in 2004. I was not asked to sign any formal agreement regarding the use of the data, nor were any conditions attached to sharing of the data.

The database derived from the MIMOSA that I was provided with includes the following information regarding victims: Country of origin, location in Bosnia and Herzegovina (nearest city or municipality), date when found (month and year), whether the victims had a passport or not when found and if so, whether it was real or falsified, the age of the victim when found, whether she was minor when first entered Bosnia and Herzegovina, the length of stay in the shelter, whether she was repatriated or not to her country of origin, whether other type of assistance was provided, and the date when leaving IOM's shelter, whether she was repatriated or simply released.

MIMOSA database provided to me includes information on 717 victims assisted by IOM in BiH from March 1999, when IOM's anti-trafficking program started, until the end of 2003. The last victim that was entered into database was released from the shelter in October 2003. According to the database, no new victims entered the shelter from September 2003 to the end of 2003. I asked whether it is possible that some of the data were missing, but the answer I was given was that the database covers all months up until the end of 2003. This means that no new cases were identified during the last 3 months of 2003.

It is important to note that not all victims of trafficking benefit from IOM's anti-trafficking victim assistance program. Some victims may have been returned to their countries by traffickers, transferred to other countries by traffickers, or may have been assisted by local NGOs without IOM's involvement (although this is a rather rare occurrence - NGOs report that about 95 percent of victims that they provided services to enter IOM's victim assistance and repatriation program).

The second database that was used was the Counter Trafficking Module Database (CTM Database). Data without identifying information for victims trafficked into BiH during the period from 1999 until the end of 2003 were provided to me by IOM Geneva with restrictions. I was allowed to use the data only for this dissertation and for no other purposes. The sharing of data were not conditioned on IOM's right to review the dissertation, although IOM did express their desire to have access to unfinished version of the dissertation in order to provide me with possible comments. To avoid any potential conflicts of interest, or appearance of such conflicts, I have agreed to share only the final version of the dissertation with IOM. This was accepted.

Data that included in CTM Database was derived from three interviews conducted with each victim. Those are: a) the Screening Interview, which is a tool used to assess whether victim was eligible to receive assistance through IOM's counter-trafficking project; b) the Assistance Interview, which included more in depth questions about victim's trafficking experience; this interview was conducted once it was decided that the victim was eligible for IOM's assistance; and c) Criminal Intelligence Interview, which was conducted if victims was willing to share information with the authorities (Vermeulen, Balcaen, Di Nicola, & Cauduro, 2006). Forms used in the first two interviews (the interview protocols), Screening Interview Form and Assistance Interview Form, are available on file with the author. Third was not made available.

The database includes data on six subtopics: Background, Exploitation, Pre-departure assistance, Reintegration, Assistance, and Monitoring. Background and Exploitation sections are most relevant for this research, as these sections include background information on the victim, her recruitment, and the type as well extent of

exploitation that she was subjected to. Other sections are concerned with the assistance provided to the victim, her progress in the program, which is not of interest in this particular study. When database was examined, it was noted that data were missing for a number of questions. Finally, a database used in this research was composed using variables that are of interest for this research and for which data were available. This database includes data on following questions/issues:

- Background
    - ID number; Interview Year (this is the year of identification; in the MIMOSA database, the month is also included, but in this database, only the year is included);
- Victim's demographics
    - Gender, age, nationality, country of birth, marital status, whether victim has any children (and if so, how many), living arrangements prior to leaving home country, perception of her/his family economic status, previous work experience, work experience in the country of origin, occupation, and level of education;
- Referral
    - Type of referring organization - NGO, IO, Law enforcement, or other agency;
- Type of trafficking
    - International or domestic;
- Recruitment

  - Was the victim kidnapped, (if NOT kidnapped, how was the victim recruited), what was offered to the victim (if a job was promised, what job), what the victim's employment status was prior to recruitment, which country the victim agreed to work in;
- Recruiters
  - Their gender, nationality, and relationship with the victims;
- Exploitation
  - Whether the victim was sold to other traffickers at any stage of the processes, the type of exploitation, how many customers the victim had to serve per day, type of working location;
- Clients
  - Foreign or domestic, military, police or civilian;
- Conditions of exploitation
  - Whether the use of condoms were allowed, number of working days per week, average hours, freedom to choose clients, freedom to choose which services to provide, freedom of movement, presence of others in a similar situation, physical, sexual and/or psychological abuse, and access to medical care while trafficked;
- Rescue
  - How was the victim freed, and whether the victim was assisted with temporary documents.

Data for 551 victims were available in this database. As has been previously discussed, this database is a *program* database developed to improve the monitoring and

the implementation of a particular program. It is not a database developed with research purposes. Consequently, it must be assumed that the database is not exhaustive. It is not completely clear what cases were included into this database, or what the criteria were for excluding cases. Some victims may be officially "identified" as victims, but they may have refused to receive assistance. Alternatively, they may not be identified as victims, but may still have been offered some kind of assistance through other IOM's programs.

Given that data included in both MIMOSA and CTM databases were collected by IOM, rather than myself, it is impossible to evaluate the circumstances under which the information was collected, and the particular methodology used in the interview process.

The two databases were compared after noting that the number of victims for which data were available in CTM Database was much lower than the number of victims that were covered by the MIMOSA database. What became apparent is that a number of victims in the MIMOSA database that were marked as being *repatriated* (as opposed to *assisted*) was almost identical to the number of victims included into the CTM Database, even when broken down by year. Due to the lack of identifying information in both databases, it proved impossible to match all the cases from the two databases. Yet, the very high level of similarity does mean that, for the most part, cases included in the CTM database were also included into the MIMOSA database. These are the cases identified as *repatriated*. This indicates that only victims that were repatriated were included in the CTM Database. IOM's repatriation program is voluntary; this tells us something about victims that are not included into the CTM Database. On the one hand, they were identified as trafficking victims but unwilling to be repatriated. Thus, they could not be a part of the IOM's voluntary repatriation program, which is the cornerstone of IOM's

victim services. On the flip side, it is possible that they were not admitted to the repatriation program because they did not fit IOM's criteria for being identified as trafficking victims. Since MIMOSA is a database used for monitoring other programs as well, it is possible that those individuals were provided assistance through other programs.

This raises questions as to how these data should be treated. In one of the reports on police raid operations, it is stated that two women were identified as victims, but four more women were provided "assistance" (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [UNHCRC], September 16, 2002: 4). Consequently, it is possible that all six victims would be included in the MIMOSA database, but that only two women were included in the CTM database after being identified as victims and determined eligible for repatriation. The question that arises is whether all cases included in the MIMOSA database in this study should be treated as "victims", given the possibility that they may not actually be victims. The fact, however, that they were referred to IOM in the first place indicates that law enforcement must have had a reason to believe that those individuals might potentially be victims when they were first encountered. These issues will be discussed in the next chapter when the scope of the problem and the nature of victimization are reviewed.

In addition to these two databases, IOM Geneva has shared aggregate CTM Database statistics for victims trafficked into BiH until the end of year 2007. Since years 2004-2007 were not included in the original CTM Database, these later aggregate data for those years were used in some of the tables and charts to present trends.

CHAPTER IX THE CASE STUDY: STUDYING THE CONTEXT

What is the Scope of the Problem and Who are the Victims?

Scope of the Problem

As with estimates of the global scope of the trafficking problem, various numbers have been cited when it comes to BiH, from 600 women at any given time to 2,000 (Vandenberg, 2007), or around 5,000 in the period between 2000 and 2003 (Mendelson, 2005). Data on human trafficking in BiH is extremely scarce. The only real source of information is the IOM and the data it collects in the process of victim assistance. Even IOM did not start its activities in BiH until 1999, meaning that its data are also relatively limited. Figure 41 shows data on number of victims from MIMOSA and CTM Databases.



Figure 41. Number of victims identified in BiH by IOM (from IOM's MIMOSA and CTM Databases).

The fact that the first cases of identified trafficking victims are from 1999 does not mean that this is when trafficking started to happen; rather, this was when the problem of trafficking had started to receive attention in BiH. Sexual violence and slavery has been

systematic and widespread during the 1992-1995 war, when mainly Muslim women captured by Serb forces were held in sexual enslavement, sometimes months at a time (Snyder, Gabbard, May & Zulcic, 2006). Yet, this has never been discussed in the context of human trafficking, even though it may be of importance to understanding its after-war emergence and nature. Furthermore, given the devastation of the country following the war, it is not surprising that it took a few years for the problem to be addressed. Immediately following the war, the government as well as citizens and international organizations became concerned with ensuring the survival of the population and basic reconstruction of the cities and villages. They were also concerned with getting the infrastructure that was extensively damaged up and running. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that trafficking was not even on the agenda of any of the agencies.

First reports of trafficking in BiH emerged in 1995 (Pallen, 2003). Initially these incidents appeared to be isolated cases that NGOs and UN institutions happened to come across (Limanowska, 2002), but as of 1999, IOM, police, and IPTF started to work on the issue. As a result, a number of victims were identified. The scope of the human trafficking problem is a hotly debated issue in both the international arena and within BiH. The questions of "How many victims?" has been addressed by a number of Experts who were interviewed. An inflation of numbers, exacerbated by lack of any real intelligence, was repeatedly mentioned as a problem. The manipulation of numbers to suit different agendas was also a common complaint. Some of these issues are illustrated by following statements:

> Expert N: Once we make assertion, everyone just repeats it. My feelings, and the information we get, show that NGOs talk about few same cases over and over again. La Strada [an NGO] maybe had 1-2 victims [in 2003], but they keep on giving out press releases.

> Expert D: I think that this is a complete fabrication of information, I mean it. There is really no data, I can state that. NGOs keep on *counting* something. But, I swear to God, those victims – there aren't any. I mean there are out there, but not with us, not with NGOs. When Mirage was about take place we let them know that we have capacity for 22 victims. None showed up.

These and other similar comments illustrate frustration with the lack of good information and data. They also illustrate skepticism regarding the scope of the problem. It should not be forgotten that interviews were conducted during the winter 2003-2004, and 2003 was a year when there was a significant fall in the number of identified victims. This, reportedly, was unexpected development; all stakeholders were struggling with making sense of the situation at the time. Most Experts, including law enforcement as well as service providers, referred to dramatic change in the number of identified victims. However, the reasons behind the reduction in numbers was perceived differently by different groups. One argument put forward by law enforcement representatives was that the trafficking problem has been reduced and that it had changed shape from trafficking and forced prostitution into voluntary prostitution:

> Expert L (law enforcement): Well, in the beginning, in 1999 and 2000, there were real victims. That is when all these activities started, to fight it, STOP teams appeared. More and more pressure was put on pimps.[45] Then it was also defined as an offence. Of course they [pimps] adapted immediately. They started giving them [victims] passports, giving them freedom of movement, at least to some of them. And some of them now go through five or six bars a year. Some of them praise their pimps now, now they even make enough money to send home, if pimp gives them a cut. Because, before they were forced, held imprisoned, but now they try to get them to do it by different means.

[45] When referring to pimps, Experts have almost exclusively used the word "gazda" (plural "gazde"), which has multiple meanings: manager, landlord, keeper, master, business owner, etc. Actual word for pimp, slang or otherwise ("svodnik" or "makro" (slang)), was only rarely used by the Experts. This is possibly due to the fact that pimps were also owners and managers of bar and hotels where the prostitution was taking place. Thus, they were seen primarily as "gazde" – the business owners. "Makro" would be a person that just pimps and does nothing else - a prototype of a street pimp.

Service providers generally argued that victims were harder to find because raids pushed pimps to move further underground:

> Expert X (IO): There are many reasons for change. First, frequent IPTF raids of Bars. No one really thought about long term effects. Pimps have now moved underground. They do not know how to do anything else.
>
> Expert A: It does not mean that they are not out there, it just means that we are not getting to them. Pimps are smarter. Now it is completely different. Before, it was, like, a bar and a poll. Now, they are sold from homes. Man goes to a pimp, gets into cab. Cab driver calls them, tells them to get ready. Brings the guy to the door, takes the money from him, and comes back to get him in four or five hours (….) They bring them food, everything, they do not leave these homes for months at a time.

In other words, while both groups acknowledge that there was a change in the number of identified victims, their explanations reflect their stakes in the problem. Law enforcement representatives explain the reduction of victim numbers as a reflection of a disappearance of the problem, claiming that law enforcement activities can be credited for it. Service providers, on the other hand, argue that victims are out there, but the police are not finding them. Considering that a number of service providing NGOs and IOs may be financially dependent on their anti-trafficking projects, accepting that the problem has disappeared would eliminate their *raison d'être*. Likewise, for the law enforcement agencies to accept NGOs' stance would be to admit that their activities were actually counterproductive and leave them with no strategies to further combat the problem.

Yet, while there appears to be an agreement that trafficking was a much bigger problem earlier than it was at the time of the interviews, disentangling when exactly the change started to take place from the data available is slightly more difficult because different databases include different data. It is also hard to tell how exhaustive these data are. There is a clear difference in the number of victims included into the two databases

(MIMOSA and CTM Databases). This is especially true for 2002, but less so for 2003. According to the CTM Database, the number of victims identified started to fall in 2002. Yet, when only repatriated victims from the MIMOSA database are considered (excluding those marked as only assisted), the difference between the CTM and MIMOSA case numbers almost disappears, as can be seen in Figure 41. This could mean that the profile of rescued women identified through law enforcement activities has changed in 2002. It can also mean that the eligibility rules for participation in IOM programs became more stringent around that time. Additionally, it is possible that repatriation program became less attractive for victims, who would rather remain in the country and try to work things out on their own, than go back home (Lindstorm, 2006). One of the Experts speculated that victims, by this time, had learned that all that they would be offered was repatriation and that was not what victims wanted:

> Expert H: Many go to NGOs, but then regret it. When they go, they think that [NGOs] will give them a job, a house, or arrange them transfer to third countries. When they realize that all NGOs can do for them is arrange return back to Moldova, they realize that they have nowhere to go. Then they ask to go back to pimps. They figure, "if I work a bit more, I can save a bit, so that when I go back, I will have at least some money".

Following 2002, numbers drop all together and according to aggregate data from CTM Database, the numbers remained low. It has also been speculated that even those who were identified are women who have been in the country for a while and that no new victims have been arriving any more (Limanowska, 2007).

Some differences emerge when comparing victims that were assisted and those that were repatriated using data from the MIMOSA database, although the differences are not dramatic. In terms of age, repatriated and assisted victims were not different from one

another (mean age 22.56 and 23.10 respectively; F (713, 2) = 1.66; p > 0.05). Furthermore, countries that they came from were similar, as can be seen in Figure 42.



Figure 42. Nationalities of repatriated and assisted victims, based on the MIMOSA database.

Data on passport ownership, however, was missing for a large proportion of victims that were only assisted, which was not the case with repatriated victims. This can be seen in Figure 43.



Figure 43. Passport ownership for repatriated and assisted victims, based on the MIMOSA database.

This is likely associated with the fact that victims who were only assisted spent much less time in the shelter than the victims who were repatriated. Repatriated victims spend on average 33.20 days in the shelter (SD = 23.52; median 26 days; raging from 2 to

289 days), while assisted victims spent on average 6.87 days in the shelter (*SD* = 36.56; median 1 day, ranging from 1 to 458 days[46]). Given that median length of stay for assisted victims was 1 day, these results potentially indicate that victims were accepted and released in the same day, possibly following their evaluation for eligibility for participation in the program. It is likely that no data were collected for those victims immediately determined to be ineligible. When length of stay in shelter is compared among assisted victim for whom this data were available and those from whom it were missing, the issue becomes clearer. Victims for whom passport data were not available spent 1.49 days on average in the shelter (*SD* = 2.43; median = 1 day), while those for whom this data were available spent 12.97 days on average in the shelter (*SD* = 17.45; median = 6). Again, it should be noted that data on passport ownership was not collected for those victims who spent just one day in the shelter. What is evident is that victims that did not have passports spent somewhat longer time with the shelter before being released (or before leaving): median of 8 days, compared to 3 days that victims that did have the passport spent in the shelter. It is possible that these victims spent longer time in the shelter since it may have taken longer to positively determine their identity. Nonetheless, they were not eligible for the program or did not wish to be part of it.

The proportion of assisted victims to total number of victims identified changed over time. Figure 44 shows cumulative percentages for assisted and for repatriated victims over the time period that data were available for. It is clear that victims that were only assisted, rather than repatriated, started to appear in larger numbers in mid-2002. In fact most assisted victims were identified between July 2002 and October 2002. These

[46] This one outlier was not included in other analysis, since it was skewing the distribution and could not be verified as an error in the data.

dates somewhat coincide with the time period when the earlier mentioned operation, "Mirage", was conducted by IPTF (August 2002). It also should be noted that these were the final months of the IPTF's mandate in the country before handing the mission over to EUPM, who pursued a rather different and less aggressive strategy. It is likely that the rescue operations were conducted somewhat less selectively in this final time period because they were under pressure to show good results prior to ending the mission, and it would also bump up the number of victims identified and assisted; it is possible that they knew that women found in the premises were not necessarily victims of trafficking. Alternatively, it is also possible that IPTF wanted to use all the intelligence that they had prior to handing the mission over in order to uncover as many victims as possible and create a big disturbance to the pimps. In this effort, venues that may not have necessarily harbored any victims might have been raided as well. Indeed, some of the raids performed by IPTF ended up in the identification of no victims whatsoever, as none of the victims were asking for any type of assistance (Limanowska & Rosga, 2004).



Figure 44. Cumulative percentages of victims repatriated and assisted over time (data from MIMOSA database).

When looking at the locations where victims were found in August 2002, the victims came from eight different towns. Forty three out of 60 came from two locations (Vitez and Kiseljak) and the remaining 17 came from additional six locations.[47] This may point to a concentrated effort, on the part of law enforcement, with focus on two locations (both of those are towns with a lot of commercial activities and wholesale markets). For victims identified and assisted in October 2002, location information was missing. All were accepted and released within a day or two.

NGOs and law enforcement reported that in 2002 they started to run into same women that they had encountered in previous raids. Such repeated encounters with the same victims, some of whom have been previously repatriated home, raised red flags regarding their victim status and created doubts about the value of continuing raids or even providing assistance to those individuals:

> Expert G: Some of them have been here for three years even. Somehow they have made peace with their destiny, they stop thinking that there might be something else that they could do with themselves.
>
> Expert X: What is going on now is not trafficking any more, according to me. Maybe that is what it was in the beginning. But now, these girls have been here for three - four years.

Some have argued that the repatriation scheme is being abused and that sex workers use it as a free ticket home for a vacation, planning to return to BiH afterwards. Some of the law enforcement agents supported this argument when there was decreasing willingness of the identified victims to provide any information against the pimps, reasoning that any

[47] MIMOSA database indicates the towns in which the victims were found. Two locations mentioned refer to two towns. This does not, however, refer to individual venues. Victims may have come from a number of venues, all of which were located within the same town.

victim would want her traffickers to be apprehended and would be more than happy to share information she has with the law enforcement.

Around 2002, the number of foreign soldiers and peacekeepers started to change. They were given much less freedom of movement and were not allowed to visit such establishments anymore (Limanowska, 2007). Of course this is not the only section of the market. Local demand had continued to exist, unchanged. It is possible that the local market had reached a certain level of saturation in 2002, meaning that no new sex workers were wanted. When pimps started to change their management strategies, what started out as trafficking in the first few years later perhaps became regular prostitution rings. There was less abuse and mistreatment for women, and this meant that women were less likely to identify themselves as victims once found. Thus, raids were more likely to end up with a number of women who did not identify themselves as victims, did not want to go back, or would rather stay in the country:

> Expert V: Before they had no passports, they were not even allowed to look out the windows. (….) [Pimp] used to make 1,000 KM[48] on them, now they make 400. [Victims] send money [back home], walk around, I doubt that any are locked down anymore. In 2001, those bars were horrific, dirty, no heating, AIDS… Now, each girl has her own room, toilet, lives nicely. Now when I ask "Are you abused, are you a victim" she says "Oh, for God's sake, get off my back."

It is possible that human trafficking has simply started to disappear in BiH, as pimps have found other, perhaps better, sources of income. According to members of the law enforcements agencies, some of the bars that were known to them for human trafficking have closed down, and some reportedly changed functions or became regular clubs.

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[48] KM is abbreviation for "Konvertibilna Marka" (convertible mark) which is an official currency of BiH. 1 KM equals approximately $ 0.8 and € 0.5.

Demographics of the Victims

The CTM Database includes more detailed data on the victims. These data are presented in the following paragraphs, but it is important to keep in mind that these data represent only a section of all victims that may have been identified. They also represent an unknown proportion of all victims.

As can be seen in Figure 45, the majority of victims were trafficked into BiH for sexual exploitation. Starting with 2004, the proportion of cases with missing data becomes much larger, making it harder to evaluate what was going on. It is impossible to study the cases for which this information is missing in more detail, given that data for years 2004-2007 was obtained from aggregate statistics derived from the CTM Database.



Figure 45. Type of exploitation that victims were subjected to, by year (CTM aggregate data).

The majority of victims included in the CTM Database were from three countries: Moldova (45.2%), Romania (36.8%) and Ukraine (11.4%). Other countries, including Russia, Serbia, Belarus and others, accounted for additional 6.6 percent of the victims.

Small variations withstanding, the national profile of victims did not change much in the period between 1999 and the end of 2003.

Figure 46 shows the age of the victims. The average age of victims was 21.98 (*SD* = 4.23). Although there were a few very young victims, the majority of them were age 17-25. Age of victims did not change significantly throughout the years, F (4, 546) = 0.53; $p > 0.05$.



Figure 46. Victims' age (CTM Database).

Age of the victims from different countries was different. Victims from Ukraine were the oldest with average age of 25, followed by Moldovan victims (22.03) and finally Romanian (20.89). These differences were significant, F (2, 512) = 25.32; $p < 0.05$, and post-hoc tests indicate that all groups were different from one another.

For all other demographic variables, data were missing for some victims and therefore, results should be considered with reservation. Missing data are an especially big problem for victims identified in 1999 and 2000, as data are missing in 80 percent or more of the cases for most demographic variables. In the following years, the proportion

for which data are missing is lower, but still quite significant. It is likely that in the first two years of the program in BiH, data were not collected systematically and extensively, and that the data started to be collected more systematically later, with the emergence of CTM Database project.

With regard to marital status, data were missing for 37 percent of the victims. Of those for whom the data were available, 65 percent were single, 13 percent married and 16 percent divorced. An additional 6 percent were separated or widowed. For 35 percent of the victims, data on whether they had children or not were missing. Of those for whom the data were available, 30.7 percent had children. Most had just one child. Of those that reported having children, 26.9 percent were single, 40.4 percent divorced, and 28.8 percent married. Victims who reported having children were significantly older than those who did not (age means were 25.14 and 20.57, respectively, F (1, 356) = 108.41; $p < 0.05$. The majority of victims (over 80 percent once the missing data cases are excluded) reported that they were living with their families prior to being trafficked.

Results obtained for perceived economic status are shown in the Figure 47. When 1999 and 2000 are taken out of consideration due to large proportion of cases with missing data, the results indicate that most victims do not considered themselves to be among the very poorest. Furthermore, up to 20 percent reported being *standard*, which could be translated as middle-class. This gives credence to the argument that it is not necessarily to poorest ones who decide to migrate, but rather those groups that expect to benefit the most from upwards mobility.



Figure 47. Reported economic status of victims' households, by year (CTM Database).

Similarly, the majority of victims reported being unemployed at the time just before their recruitment, which gives some credence to the push factor arguments (Figure 48). While information about previous employment and occupation was included, very high proportions of cases with missing data rendered these useless (data on previous work experience was missing for half the cases or more in different years; the situation was similar for occupation data, with 58 percent or more cases missing in various years). Nevertheless, it should be noted that only a few victims reported being sex workers in their country of origin. Given the fact that this information was missing for a majority of cases, not much can be concluded from these data.



Figure 48. Victim's employment status right before recruitment by year of identification (CTM Database).

Figure 49 shows education levels reported by victims. Data from years 2001-2003 indicate that only a very small portion of victims had education beyond high-school. In fact, close to half were graduates from middle school only (8 years of education).



Figure 49. Education attained by victims, by year of identification (CTM Database).

Victims from Ukraine were somewhat more highly educated than victims from the other two main source countries. However, this is likely associated with their age, as Ukrainian victims were also older than victims from Moldova and Romania, which can be seen in the Figure 50.



Figure 50. Education attained by victims, by country of origin (CTM Database).

These data paint a picture of a victim in her twenties, who is relatively poor and unemployed, but who is somewhat educated and not among the poorest in the society. She may have been married, and may have a child, but the majority of these women were single and without children. She may not be a sex worker (although this cannot be stated with confidence), but may be looking to migrate in the hope of finding a job to make some money. The number of identified victims peaked in 2000 and 2001. After these two years, the number has started to fall. It in unclear whether the decrease in the number of identified victims is a positive result of policies implemented during the time period (such as aggressive police raids of the bars and clubs where victims where held), an unintended consequence of those policies (disappearance of human trafficking because it

went further underground), a reflection of the poor job done by law enforcement in identifying victims, or a signal that trafficking has started to shrink as a problem after 2002 for different reasons.

What is the Modus Operandi? Do Women Benefit from Trafficker Services, What are Those Services?

Only a small minority of victims reported being kidnapped (3.6 percent of the total, with no missing data). Most women were recruited through personal contacts and newspaper advertisements. One of the Experts (Expert V) mentioned that there was a well known recruiter in Moldova who was posting newspaper advertisements, yet no one else mentioned any similar recruitment strategies. Another Expert mentioned that traffickers used to work through agencies (travel agencies), but that approach was not preferred because it was easy to track recruiters, so traffickers gave up on that strategy. In some cases, reportedly, women who work for pimps themselves would travel to recruit and transfer victims home. Reportedly, pimps also developed romantic relationships (or perhaps relationship based on interest) with former victims, who would then become recruiters themselves. According to Experts, some traffickers would go personally to Moldova to pick up girls from the recruiters and transport them themselves, while others (majority) would "order" them. Some victims were recruited and sold to local pimps after bring brought into the country.

CTM Database includes data on the gender of the recruiter. According to these data, recruiters were equally likely to be of male or female. Indeed, 43 percent of victims reported that they were recruited by a woman, while 39 percent reported being recruited by a man; 4.7 percent reported that both men and women were involved in their

recruitment. Data were missing for 13.2 percent of victims. In majority of cases, recruiters were of the same nationally as the victims. This was the case in 89 percent of Moldovan victims, 92 percent of Romanian victims, 71 percent of Ukrainian victims, etc. Close to half the victims reported that the person who recruited them was a stranger (48%), while 28 percent reported that it was their friend. Data were missing for 17 percent of the victims. Only a few were reportedly recruited by relatives or their partners.

The fact that most victims were not kidnapped means that recruiters had to offer or promise something to the victims that would be attractive enough for these women to take the risk and venture into such an international migration. A huge majority were offered jobs (86.4%), while only a few were recruited through offers of marriage, offers of travel, or something similar. It is clear that economic reasons were likely behind the victims' motivation to uproot and move to another country considering that the majority of victims were unemployed at the time of recruitment.

Unfortunately, data on what type of job was offered are rather incomplete and missing for 67 percent of cases. However, of those for whom the data were available, 43.6 percent were offered jobs as dancer or entertainers, 27.1 percent were offered domestic work, 14.4 percent babysitting or something similar. The fact that the majority were offered jobs as a dancer or entertainer is worth discussing because it gives us some insight into how victims see themselves. Recruiters could promise any job to a woman that they are trying to recruit. It is only reasonable that they would promise a job that would be most likely to generate interest. Therefore, the fact that most victims are offered to be a dancer or similar tells us that recruiters must have realized that this was the easier way to recruit. The fact that the job of a dancer is more attractive to those later trafficked

than the job of, say, a babysitter, tells us that victims feel that they can capitalize on their physical appearance. However, it also tell us that they are likely interested in "exciting" lifestyle, since jobs that carry connotations of such a lifestyle are the ones that they respond to. Finally, it may also be a reflection of low self-esteem if the victim feels that she can best do a job that does not require a lot of skill. It is possible that women with other skills are also more resourceful and, if interested in moving abroad, have the capacity to find their own way of doing it, without reaching out to recruiters and traffickers.

About one-third of victims thought that they would be going to Italy (33.2%); one-third were told that they would be going to BiH (28.3%). An additional 8.4 percent were told that they would be going to Yugoslavia, which may have been used as a generic name for ex-Yugoslavian countries, BiH being one of them. The rest were told that that they would be going to a variety of countries, including Greece, Germany, Romania, Turkey, Spain or other countries. It is unclear whether recruiters offered jobs in those countries to victims or whether victims were asking to be taken to these particular countries. In other words, it is unclear if recruiters simply played along with what victims presumed or wanted, or whether those countries are particularly attractive. When or how victims find out which country they are actually going to is not known. Some of the Experts claim that some victims are transported by boat from Serbia into BiH across river Drina, and once they get to the BiH side, they are told that they have arrived to Italy in order to ensure their cooperation. Other victims, however, apparently are told earlier or know from the start:

> Expert H: In principle, the way it works is like this: They advertise jobs in their countries, but it is all just 'collecting flesh'. They bring them to Serbia or

> Bulgaria, and this is where the process starts. This is where they take away their passport usually. They take away their clothes and give them different clothes, and tell them what will be happening from that point on. Some know exactly what will be happening, and some know exactly where they are going. Some think they are in BiH in transit, but then they get stuck here.

It is not clear from the data if women have been trafficked from other countries prior to their arrival to BiH. Information on trafficking paths into BiH indicate that women are trafficked into BiH directly, via Romania, Yugoslavia and Hungary, and that those other countries are simply transit countries. According to law enforcement agents, women from Moldova would be transferred to Budapest, where they would be picked up by a new trafficker for further transport. Traffickers from BiH and Serbia would pick up the women there. From there, they were reportedly transported into BiH via Serbia. Women from Romania were transported via Bucharest and Temisvar into Serbia and then, into BiH. Budapest, Bucharest, Temisvar and Belgrade were reported as transit points where hand-overs were taking place. Even though Croatia's border with BiH is longer than Serbia's border with BiH and even though it is equally porous, there have been almost no cases of women trafficked via Croatia.

Locations on the borders with Serbia, such as Pavlovica Most (near Bijeljina), Zvornik and Raca near Zvornik, and Brcko were reported as points of crossing into the country. Illegal crossings of Drina river, which is a border between BiH and Serbia, from Zepa until Sava River on the North, has been reported as a frequent point of illegal entry as well. While some women reportedly would cross illegally by boat during the night, other would simply drive across the border in a taxi, a bus, or a private car since borders were barely controlled and there was no visa regime until 2002, meaning that anyone with a passport could easily enter the country. Apparently, once the women entered the

country, they would sometimes change hands once again. The town of Bijeljina and Arizona market[49] near Brcko were mentioned as places where such exchanges would happen. Others, however, reportedly traveled on their own, sometimes by buses and even taxis. Some apparently would travel to BiH independently. They would approach pimps that they know have bars and nightclubs on their own upon arrival. Some victims reportedly arranged travel on their own, only being referred by recruiters to a particular bar.

It is possible that a reduction in number of victims after 2002 may have been associated with these trafficking paths. Starting with 2002, Romania and Hungary were starting to prepare for admission to EU, tightening borders, and reducing corruption in the public sector since these were high priorities on the government's agenda. With such developments, Romanian victims were probably harder to recruit, given that Romania's entry into EU was imminent (and with it, the possibility to travel freely and legally to anywhere in Europe). Additionally, the transport of victims from other countries may have become more difficult across territories of those two future EU countries. This may be why, reportedly, new victims were more likely to travel to BiH by plane in 2003 than by land. However, there are doubts as to whether these new women are trafficking victims or free lancing sex workers.

Data from CTM Database indicate that 43.2 percent of victims needed to be assisted with temporary documents prior to their repatriation. This means that they did not have their passport or that the passports that they owned were not valid at the time

[49] The Arizona market was set up by IFOR in 1996, hoping that establishing a market where business can be done openly by all would lead to improvement of broken ties between three ethnic groups in BiH. Over time, however, Arizona became a center of criminal activity. It was a place where stolen cars, goods, and eventually women were being resold (Hajdinjak, 2002).

when they were rescued. It is possible that some of the women entered the country illegally without a passport, with the help of traffickers. As mentioned earlier, transportation of victims across the river Drina by boats was one of the ways that the women were smuggled into the country.

According to data from the MIMOSA database, about 6 percent of victims had fake passports. It is possible that recruiters and traffickers were the ones who arranged the fake passport for them. Experts have also reported that flight tickets were always issued by one of a few travel agencies for those victims who traveled into BiH by plane, indicating the possibility that traffickers worked with particular travel agencies repeatedly.

What is the Nature of Exploitation and Coercion? What are the Working Conditions?

Once a victim arrives into the country, pimps employ a variety of control mechanisms, from locations of the bars and motels where women are held, to violence and threats, to psychological manipulation, in order to coerce and exploit the victim to the extreme. It appears that pimps use a combination of strategies that follow a pattern roughly similar to a *good cop, bad cop* approach in interrogation by police. This *good pimp, bad pimp* strategy involves a combination of direct controls, such as violence and threats as well as manipulative strategies, such as promises, limited pay, or systematic elimination of victims' identities. Many things can become tools of control and manipulation. Simple things, such as locations of venues where victims are held, for example, can contribute greatly to victims' isolation and become important control strategies.

According to Experts, beatings and violence were used “to teach her a lesson” or “make her an example”, rather than as an everyday method of control. Victims were likely to be beaten upon arrival. If they arrived as a group, one would have been beaten for a minor infraction to instill fear among the others. In the words of Expert A, the message was that “those who do not create problems get 30 percent, those that do, get beaten up.” A pattern that emerges is that pimps prefer not to use violence that much. Rather, following initial violence and threats, victims are often given a pseudo choice: to comply, work, and get some pay, or to get beaten up. Victims are made to feel that they choose the situation they find themselves in and this may make their entrapment deeper due to a cognitive dissonance effect. They may feel threatened into agreeing to stay, but once they make this supposed decision to stay, the act of choice results in a feeling of dissonance. Dissonance is reduced by making the selected choice more attractive and making the rejected choice (leaving) less attractive (Brehm, 1956). In other words, once the choice is made, even if it was not a real choice, it becomes easier to live with it than if the victim was never given such a choice. One of the Experts summarized the situation when talking about one of the well known pimps as follows:

> Expert T: This is how he does it: Buys her, and then explains the situation to her. Do you accept or not? If not, into the airplane and back home. Zero went back! He manages to establish some kind of connection with them… They are girls from broken families mostly, here they make 200 KM per nigh. When she goes back she can buy a house with that money. What’s she going to do?!

The fact that a number of Experts reported that most victims did get some pay, rather than none at all, is in line with this comment and in line with previously developed arguments on why trafficked people remain exploited for so long. However small it is, pay represents a promise of improvement and a possibility to eventually leave on one’s

own terms. This makes the whole experience appear *worthwhile*. In that sense, pay can actually be a control mechanism and may contribute to exploitation, rather than be a signal or lack of exploitation.

In the CTM Database, data on whether victims suffered some type of abuse while trafficked were included and available for 91 percent of cases. According to these data, 62 percent of victims experience some type of abuse during their experience (physical, sexual, or psychological). This indicates that violence, whether physical, sexual, or psychological does happen. Brute force may not be the only tool, nor the most dominant one to control the victims. It could be said that violence is mostly used in the very beginning; right after the victim has been brought into the county. Following this period, victims reportedly start behaving as demanded from them, or, in case of some pimps, are sent back home because they are too hard to manage. Experts reported that threats are frequently used, especially against victim's family and children back home. As discussed previously, almost one-third of victims identified in BiH had children, which could be used to threaten or blackmail them.

Illegal markets are guided by the same economic principles as legal markets are, such as the maximization of profit (Liddick, 1999) and minimization of risk. They also operate in a similar fashion by selling goods and services, and trying to keep their best employees engaged (Schloenhardt, 2000; Moore, 1987). Pimps use *good pimp* strategies as a way of manipulating victims into staying and working the way they want them to work, creating an illusion that the conditions presented to her are good. Such strategies may include allowing victims freedom of movement (while actually monitoring them all the time) or telling them to take a break (after working for days in a row):

> Expert H: Some hold them locked and do not allow them to go anywhere. But some let them go out, take a walk, buy themselves what they want. But always with some escort. Let's say they go to Merkator[50], [bodyguard] sits down and drinks a coffee, and they go shopping. Usually one of the girls is pimp's girlfriend, a favorite, and she keeps an eye on them. Often pimp can tell when one is distressed, and then tells her 'come on, have some rest, don't work 3-4 days, go out, take a walk'.

Different strategies appear to be used by pimps in order to give the victims some sense of normalcy. This may result in their obedience, making them less likely to cause problems. For instance, some of the reported strategies involve taking them out for walks and allowing them to own clothes or other items. In 1999 and 2000, victims were never given any money in most of the cases. However, later pimps reportedly starting paying the victims, but then charged them separately for boarding, food, and other items. So in the end, a large chunk of money that victim would earn went back to the pimp. Nonetheless, the victim would feel that she is managing her own money. Pimps have also adapted strategies as they learned what works and what does not in order to better manipulate victims. These psychological manipulations probably created more manageable situations, meaning less violence and a lower likelihood that victims would run away or report pimps to the police. While pimps were perhaps making less money by using these strategies, they were also exposed to lower risks, so they were better off in the long run.

The location of bars and nightclubs can also be a way to control the women. The majority of such locations that were mentioned by Experts were on major roads or transit points. Important trade centers, such as Brcko, Vitez, Kiseljak, and Bihac area were among the locations most associated with such venues. I have visited a number of those

[50] Supermarket chain operating in BiH.

venues[51], and most were located outside cities, but close to the main entrances into cities (such as Rajlovac location near Sarajevo), on the main roads (such as Vitez-Travnik road), at cross points of two important roads (such as a point where the road to Tuzla crosses the main road that passes through Doboj), or even in small towns or villages (such as Busovaca). One thing that characterizes those venues is the fact that they were located in relatively isolated places. This is important, as isolation contributes to the victimization, since it makes it more difficult for a victim to obtain help or run away. Even if a victim wants to escape or successfully does so, she is unlikely to get far without being detected or noticed by someone. Only one of the venues that I had visited had high walls around it, and it looked more like a military compound. All other locations were simply houses or bars on the road, on the hill, or somewhere similar.

Taking victims' passports away and holding onto them was also one of the strategies used by pimps. Most, if not all, victims were in BiH without legal status and, as mentioned earlier, some had entered completely illegally. Experts reported that this was often used as a threat, and victims were told that they would be arrested and deported if they were found or went to the police. Given the fact that the only option that they had, if rescued, was to be returned back to their countries or be released in BiH without any further support or protection, the threat was actually not far from truth.

The fact that a huge majority of victims were foreigners also contributed to their manipulation, as they did not necessarily know where exactly they are or whom they can

[51] I was able to obtain a police report that listed venues and addresses associated with human trafficking in 2003. Additionally, Experts had mentioned a number of other bars and hotels. Out of curiosity, I have traveled by a personal car to see where those venues were located and what they looked like. I would only stop for a few seconds at each venue. I never got out of the car, I never entered any of those venues, and I never made my presence known. I did not encounter any persons, nor did I see anyone entering, leaving, or inside the premises. I have visited 19 such locations. They were not selected in any systematic way. Instead, I visited those that were most convenient to get to.

trust. Not knowing the language would make it harder for them to decide to escape and find assistance.

One other strategy that was mentioned by a few Experts was *stripping victims of their identity*. Traffickers and pimps would take away their passports, clothes, and all other possessions and give them new ones. Experts remarked that this was a way to push victims to break with the past and accept their new selves:

> Expert G: When [pimps] take away their identity, they take their whole life away from them, everything they were, what they did. [Victims] somehow forget that they had some normal life. When they are reminded of it [when rescued], they remember that back, and that is when fear sits in. Fear that she can never have that life back. That is a critical moment. It is at that moment that many decide to go back to their pimps, to stay. Because it is too hard to face the fact that it is all over, that she has lost the battle, that she is now a different person.

This strategy of changing the identity has been noted by Kathleen Barry and she concludes that the change of identity "separates the women from her past and focuses her totally on the moment in time when she belongs to this man (pimp)" (Barry, 1984: 94). This, along with the trauma of violence and potentially rape, creates a psychological environment in which the victim is likely to disassociate from her emotions as a method of coping with her experience. Ironically, the result of this dissociation is that victim copes better with her trauma, which, in turn, means that she is less likely to rebel, disobey, or refuse to cooperate. While this may prolong her exploitation, it may also help her survive the negative experience, both mentally and physically.

Only a few Experts mentioned debt bondage at all. This may be an indication that debt bondage was not among the main methods of control. What should be kept in mind is that interviews were conducted during the winter 2003-2004, and at that time, there were few new victims as more than a few Experts reported. It is possible that debt

bondage was more likely to be used in the beginning of the trafficking process and that Experts simply did not recollect older cases at the time of the interviews.

When it comes to working conditions, the CTM Database includes some information, however, due to missing data, these results should be interpreted with caution. Unfortunately, data on number of days per week and hours per day that the victims were expected to work were missing for a large majority of cases (94% for both questions), rendering the data useless. Data on the number of customers that a victim was expected to be with per day was available for 210 victims (38% of cases). 51 percent were expected to serve 3 customers or less per day, and 20 percent of victims were expected to be with more than 5. The average reported number of customers was 3.96 (*SD* = 2.62, minimum 1, maximum 18) per day. Few Experts who had knowledge on this issue reported that the victims are likely to have 4-5 customers per night. Data on whether the victims had freedom to decide which client she would serve and whether she could choose which sexual services she would provide were missing for almost all cases. However, data were available for 76 percent of cases for questions on whether victims had freedom of movement while in the country. Fifty percent of all victims reported that their freedom of movement was completely denied, 17.6 percent reported that they could go out accompanied, and 8.2 percent reported that no restrictions were imposed on their freedom of movement. While the percentages have been slightly changing over the years, it is hard to tell whether those changes are real or due to the missing data.

Experts have reported that victims do receive some proportion of the earnings in most cases. This, apparently, is used as a strategy by pimps to keep victims compliant. Reportedly, in the beginning, just after the arrival to the country, they may be given

nothing, but later on, the pimp would start giving them some money. This creates a sense that things are getting better for a victim. It may convince her to continue compliance. Experts have mentioned that victims receive different percentages, ranging from 20 percent to 50 percent of revenue. A victim's expenses would then be deducted from the cash she received. Prices that pimps were charging clients, as reported by Experts, varied (50-100 KM per hour, 60 KM for half hour, 100-200 KM per hour, 150 KM per hour), depending on the venue (some venues were known as more expensive), days of the week, busyness of the place, or client (reportedly foreign clients were charged more than local ones). This can be used to make an estimate of revenues. If the midpoint between all reported prices is taken (125 KM), using the base of 3 customers per night (median number of customers, according to data from CTM Database), a pimp would have a revenue of 375 KM per night from one victim. Calculating for 15 days a month (assuming that victims were given time off) means that the monthly revenue per victim comes to 5,625 KM. It is not clear what the average number of persons per venue were. Apparently, some venues had 2-3 victims, while some were much larger and had 10 or more victims. If we use 5 as basis for estimate, it means that the owner of the venue had approximate revenue of about 28,000 KM per month (close to $ 20,000). It should also be kept in mind that prostitution was not the sole source of income for these venues, since they also operated as bars and/or restaurants and clubs, generating earnings from food, drinks, and other charges. They were also often attached to a market, gas station, or similar small business. At the same time, it is likely that the demand was not identical every day, and that there were nights when few or no clients would appear. However,

even at ±20%, we are talking about a rather substantial amount of money, given the general economic situation in the country.

Of course, all the revenue is not profit. As mentioned, the majority of pimps were giving a percentage to the victims, at least after the initial few months. Operating costs of running a business should also be taken into consideration, as well as specific costs associated with running an illegal business (such a bribe pays, etc). As Expert A explained "it costs 150 KM to purchase information on when the raid will be". Not a lot, yet pimps would probably have to regularly bribe police and authorities in order to continue their business. Furthermore, recruitment of victims is also a cost. Reportedly, pimps were paying 700-5000 KM for a woman to a trafficker once she is in the country. According to Experts, the prices had started to go down near 2003. It is not exactly clear what was being paid for: were pimps paying for the transportation service or for the women herself? In other words, it is not clear whether traffickers and pimps have seen themselves as owning the victim. Either way, this was an initial cost that pimps had interest in balancing as soon as possible in order to minimize their financial risk. Threat of asset seizure is a real threat that illegal market players have to deal with (Reuter, 1985). Not only do players have to make sure that they are making a profit out of their operations, but they also have to go an extra mile to protect their profits. This risk is highest in the first few months: if victim is found and rescued soon after her arrival, the pimp cannot even cover his initial investment of bringing her into the country, let alone make any profit. As Expert S put it, "They buy a girl for 500KM, and then we take her the next day. Not profitable." This could also be the reason why pimps would not share any of the revenues with victims in the beginning, but after few months, were willing to

do so. At that point of time, the goal becomes to make as much profit as possible, which is easier with a cooperating victim. In contrast, the initial goal is to recover the original investment as fast as possible. In other words, in the first few weeks or months, the financial goal of the pimp is short-term; then, the goals and strategies used change.

Who are Traffickers and How are They Organized?

The term *Trafficker* is a complex term, as individuals involved in any stage of the trafficking process can be considered traffickers. This includes recruiters, transporters, and those who are involved in the final exploitation of victims. This, and different possible relationships between traffickers involved in various stages of the process, have been discussed in the Chapter II. Who recruiters are and how they are associated with the pimps (the exploiters) has been discussed in the context of recruitment of victims trafficked into BiH. In this section, the focus will be on how these individuals (*gazde*) and their associated networks run their illegal business.

Common sense dictates that traffickers and pimps are individuals involved in other lines of illegal activities. It is believed that trafficking follows the paths of other types of crimes, especially transnational crimes. It has been argued that the same networks involved in smuggling of migrants, drugs, or illegal weapons are also involved in trafficking (Savona, di Nicola, & da Col, 1998). The Balkan route has been associated with the smuggling of drugs, and to some degree, immigrants are assumed to be associated with trafficking paths, due to preexistence of organized crime networks. Indeed, there have been reports that border crossings in BiH used by traffickers were also used by drug smugglers (Madi & Mamytova, 2005). Yet, there is no information on whether the same networks were involved. Since there is very little research on this, it is

hard to say with certainty whether these claims are true. However, interviews with Experts give us some clues as to how pimps and traffickers are organized. They also suggest what kinds of criminal operations they run.

What needs to be kept in mind is that BiH's current crime problems are, in many ways, a reflection and a consequence of the war. An embargo on weapons that was imposed on BiH and neighboring countries during the war, combined with almost complete siege of the country, made it difficult to bring in even the most basic supplies and this gave rise to very extensive black markets. The smuggling and sale of goods during the war were important sources of income for a large majority of people, from regular citizens to politicians and crime figures (Hajdinjak, 2002). Even high level politicians were associated with smuggling businesses. Smuggling had become essential for the survival of the people. It had also become crucial for military operations in the country (due to weapon smuggling) and was perceived as almost heroic, rather than criminal. Furthermore, it brought heavy income to those involved. Involvement in this illegal gray economy was almost a norm in the other ex-Yugoslavian republics as well (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2003). In a way, almost all of the economy was gray, especially at the time of the war, as there were practically no ways of running any business or making any income in a completely legal way due to check-points, sanctions, siege, complete destruction of local production, and rampant corruption. Many of those smugglers, whether small thugs or more serious entrepreneurs, worked in contact with the authorities. This was because it was impossible to move goods around the country without the direct approval and support of the authorities (Andreas, 2005).

This organic triangle between crime, business, and political elites during the years of war lead to a boom of illegal economy and corruption, which continued after the war (Stojarova, n.d.). With the end of hostilities, some former smugglers have ventured into different activities that were legal, illegal, or borderline, as trade in arms and other goods died off (Hajdinjak, 2002). During the years following the war, state institutions were practically non-existent. The demand for all kinds of goods and services was strong and the economy finally had the chance to operate based on liberal market principles. The combination of these factors made it very easy for criminals, who already had local and international connections and accumulated capital, to continue to expand their operations. It was estimated that in 1998, almost three years after the war, gray and black economies accounted for 80 percent of all economic activity in BiH (Dziedzic, Rozen, & Williams, 2002). During the time of the war, services of smugglers were appreciated, and criminals who participated in the fighting as paramilitaries were seen as heroes. After the end of the war, their power and control of the economy became problematic for the authorities. Ever since, authorities have been struggling to undermine the power of these criminal groups and push them out of the economic life, with limited success. The routes and connections that were developed during the wartime and used to escape the embargo and the siege are now reportedly used by traffickers. They are also being used by others for business, whether legal or illegal (Lindstorm, 2004). For example, the Romanian suitcase trade that started with Serbia in 1990 during the period when Serbia was under economic sanctions, paired with connections between Serbian criminals on one (Serbian) and the other (Bosnian) side of the river Drina, can be seen as basis for Temisvar-Belgrade-Zvornik trafficking path.

Enterprise theory argues that organized crime is governed by the same economic principles that formal legal organizations are driven by, within the context of a marketplace (Halstead, 1998). Organized crime groups are illegal equivalents of business firms. They have identical goals and use similar means to reach those goals. According to this approach, all businesses operate on a scale of legality (Liddick, 1999). All products that a business is distributing or services that a business is providing, along with the tactics that a business utilizes, fall somewhere on this scale. In BiH, illegality and a gray nature of businesses were treated not only as acceptable by authorities, but such activities were also encouraged by those very same authorities during the war years. The illegality of their businesses and their tactics were not judged or questioned until after the war. In that sense, criminals were doing the same thing that they were always doing and were previously applauded for. However, the field of business was redefined at one point in a way that excluded illegal tactics from legitimate methods of running business.

According to Experts, there were three types of pimps: 1) Those who were versatile criminals and involved in other type of criminal activities; 2) Those who were small thugs and opportunists, and for whom this was a way to make quick money; 3) And those who were not connected with criminal networks, but who had bars and/or restaurants, and made such contacts with criminal networks in order to improve their income by bringing women in. According to Liddick (1999), organized crime is only an illegal extension of a legal business activity. The third type of pimp typology fits this model perfectly because venturing into illegal activity of human trafficking and pimping was simply an extension of their legal entertainment business.

According to Experts, all three types of pimps were represented in BiH. Yet, the second and third group did not last as long as the first group. The first group can be seen as criminals-entrepreneurs that operate a number of different businesses and for whom trafficking is just one of the branches of their activities. It is those pimps that have managed to last the longest. Yet, one of the Experts reported that groups known to traffic drugs and smuggle gasoline, and groups that are seen as major organized crime groups in BiH, have never been associated with traffickers. This indicates that these groups may be different types of criminal enterprises. Even though it is often stated that human trafficking is second to drugs in terms of profit, it appears that different groups are involved, at least in BiH. There has been no evidence revealed to suggest that drug rings and pimps in BiH are in any way associated with another. This is in line with some of the research from other countries (Vocks & Nijboer, 2000).

Pimps appear to be organized to a degree, but their organization does not resemble a stiff hierarchical structure. It would be more appropriate to say that they were in contact with each other and knew each other, than to say that they are all parts of a structured criminal organization. As Expert W described "It is a guy, who knows a guy, who knows a guy." Experts have reported that pimps have often been rotating trafficked women between themselves, indicating that they cooperate and do business with one another. But apparently there are also animosities, as there were times when they were stealing girls from one another, even if such occurrences were rare. Another Expert described these pimps, their trafficking, and other businesses as "mom and pop operations" (Expert E). Nevertheless, the fact that recruiters in other countries and pimps in BiH communicate and run a business that is international in nature effectively points to

a certain level of sophistication. However, such an operation can be run with a small number of people once the chain of recruitment and transportation into BiH is established. This is especially true when key people, including the authorities, are connected and do not require a large or particularly hierarchical structure.

The limited size of networks involved in trafficking can be explained by exploring how economics of scale affect the market for sex services. Economics of scale are profitable when the cost of production falls with each additional unit of the product. With such products, supply tends to be controlled by a small number of suppliers who can control the market (Reuter, 1985). In the context of trafficking, that would mean that total costs of running a trafficking based business would fall with each additional victim that is being exploited at a point of time. This does not appear to be the case. Trafficking, as well as some other illegal businesses, do not benefit from economics of scale. This is due to the growth of the business costs associated with running it. When such business grows and becomes visible, more people need to be bribed, and more people have to be rewarded for their loyalty. Since an illegal business can go bust with a single action of law enforcement, the risk becomes high. This can be exploited by corrupt authorities. Furthermore, it means that a larger number of victims need to be controlled, and each new victim is also a new risk. Thus, victims are not only assets for their pimps, but they are also liabilities. It is possible that pimps who operate bars and clubs where trafficked victims were exploited simply refused to grow, as growth turns a relatively risk free business into a much riskier venture.

Experts argued that bars, nightclubs, and prostitution are often just one of the activities of the pimps. They also argued that they are not "… dedicated to exploitation of

women. As soon as it becomes too difficult to do it, they move on to something else" (Expert N). This would characterize pimps as opportunists who are engaged into human trafficking because it is an easy way to earn money. One of the Experts involved in a number of investigations stated that his impression was that most pimps were planning to stop with these activities in a year or two, after generating sufficient cash to move into bigger but legitimate businesses.

Unfortunately there was not much opportunity to obtain more information on traffickers and pimps themselves within this research, leaving many questions regarding their structure and organization unanswered.

What is the Nature of Demand? Why can it not be Satisfied Locally?

As discussed earlier, demand is not a one dimensional concept because it is possible to discuss the demand of pimps in addition to the demand of the final customers. Here, both of those will be addressed.

The first question that needs to be addressed is the extent of local prostitution in the country. This would provide a better understanding of how trafficking fits into the local sex market. While in most former socialist countries time is divided into before and after the collapse of the eastern block, in BiH time is divided into before and after the war. Little is known about prostitution in the former Yugoslavia and in BiH prior to the war other than that it, unsurprisingly, did exist, despite all efforts of the socialist regime to eradicate it. It is also known that a majority of prostitutes were poor rural women from poorer parts of the country (Ramet, 1996). Foreign sex workers, however, are considered to be an after war phenomenon. In Croatia, there have been reports of foreign sex workers, even during war time; in BiH, however, there have been no reports of foreign

sex workers (whether voluntary or trafficked) during the war. This is likely due to the fact that fighting in BiH was much more widespread than in Croatia, where the fighting was concentrated in certain areas only. Almost the whole county was entangled in war and fighting in BiH, meaning that it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, and also very dangerous to enter the country. It would also have been very expensive and difficult to smuggle someone into the country, and there were many other ways to earn money fast.

Local prostitution during the war period was seen by the population as a natural occurrence because of the very difficult living conditions, scarcity of food and other goods, and the large presence of cash rich foreign military. The UN peacekeeping mission in former Yugoslavia alone counted close to 40,000 personnel in March 1995 (United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), close to 1 percent of the total population of the country. After the war, BiH has been called a country of *double transition.* This refers to a country where there is a transition from a socialist to a capitalist system, and at the same time, transition from war to peace (Hadzic, 2003). This complex process may have exacerbated the process of commoditization of sex, as people were learning what it means to be market society (Nicolic-Ristanovic, 2003) in a country where rule of law was practically non-existent and basic institutions of the state were not functioning. During war time, *anything goes* became the rule of the business, as so called businessmen (smugglers and war profiteers) cooperated across ethnic lines to buy and smuggle goods across borders. In such an economic and business environment, it is easy to understand that the reasons why women had become something that can be bought and sold; they were just another way to make fast money.

However, the question remains as to why foreign women are the ones who get trafficked. A common belief expressed by the Experts is that local prostitution has more or less disappeared after the war, except in what are considered extraordinary cases (such as prostitution by Roma women). There have also not been reports of Bosnian women traveling abroad for sex work. Experts claimed that being engaged in sex work presented a problem for local women as well as pimps because local women would easily be identified. Additionally, families would find out and be stigmatized for life. However, foreign women could go back home without anyone knowing anything about what had happened. These reasons were mentioned as factors behind this perceived disappearance of local prostitution:

> Expert K: This is a provincial area, when our girl does it, she cannot survive. Everyone immediately finds out. And she is not as attractive [for clients] as a foreign women. And these foreigners, she tells her family that she is working in a café, in a hotel, sends them money, and that's that. And it is an issue of the market. The number of foreigners here had increased, and they are the ones with money. That is where the profit is made, for both girls and the pimps.

It is hard to evaluate the truthfulness of these observations and therefore, it hard to claim that the local prostitution has, indeed, disappeared. If this is true, this may suggest that it has created a gap in the market for sexual services that needed to be satisfied through other sources.

On the other hand, it is also possible that those involved in sex markets have consciously decided to change the nature of the market. Perhaps pimps realized that they can generate higher profits with foreign sex workers, willing or trafficked, because they could be easier to control and would be satisfied with smaller profit cuts. These explanations would lead one to conclude that the demand for *foreign* women stems from

the pimps, rather than the customers; that it is the pimps who either prefer foreign women or cannot find local women willing to get engaged in this type of work. Finally, as discussed earlier, foreign women are easier to control. Just taking away their passports puts them into a vulnerable position, something that cannot be done with local women.

Another possibility is that the demand for foreign women stems from the customers, and that the pimps are simply responding to this demand. Some of the Experts claimed that the market for local sex workers appeared to disappear as demand for foreign sex workers perceived as more exotic emerged. This sentiment is expressed in the words of one of the Experts, illustrating how the exotic nature of what happens in those venues is a salient theme for the public (this Expert is female):

> Expert, B: On paper, we are all against trafficking. But when we go out in the evening, it is like "lets go to that and that place, there is a dancer there in a cage". And that is, like, interesting to everyone, like, exotic…the fact that she is in the cage. And when you look around, it is all supposed jet-set there!

Bars and nightclubs associated with trafficking were mentioned as places where gangsters and businessmen (which, at the time, was often the same in BiH) would seal their business deals, entertain their business partners, or simply show off. In such an environment, the ability to pay for a foreign woman becomes a demonstration of wealth and status, like owning a good car or an expensive watch. Considering the prices that the clients were charged, it is evident that this market was a luxury market. A display of purchasing power and ability to "buy anything" becomes a way to demonstrate status and success.

Another reason for disproportionate number of foreign trafficking victims and sex workers may be associated with the recent history of widespread sexual violence

during the war. Local men may be finding it more difficult to detach from the experience and may have assumed that the sex worker is a willing one, if she is local. As stories about mass and brutal rapes of local women were too recent and fresh in the memory, and men may have been feeling like they are continuing the violent legacy of the war. Foreign women, on the other hand, represent the *other,* for whom the rules of engagement were different. These women were not the parts of this tragic experience. As *others,* foreign women were also defined as different from local women. Therefore, they were subject to different kind of moral codes and behavioral norms:

> Expert N: Also a lot of victims here were from Former Yugoslavia and communist country blocks, and I think that people here have always had this feeling of superiority. Because we do much better here. That feeling has contributed to feeling of superiority to others, and so it was easy to not respond to problem, to not acknowledge it, because the women are from those countries. I have heard a lot of derogatory attitudes towards dirty foreigners. And that is reason enough not to see any outrage.
>
> Expert I: As far as sex work goes, society wants to think that "others" are bad, not themselves. "Our women do not do that" they say. It is easier for users, it is easier for all like this.

Albanese argues that nationalism, as an ideology, puts a lot of importance on the chastity of women, as they are the ones who ensure the survival of the group (Albanese, P., 2001). In BiH, ethnic based nationalism is the central political paradigm, and ethnic identity has become the most salient component of the people's sense of self. Under such circumstances, women of same ethnical background as the client would not be suitable for sex work in the eye of the client, as men are responsible for protecting the local women because they symbolically become the mothers of the nation (for example, victim Muslim-client Muslim, combination) . On the other hand, local women of different ethnical origin (for example victim Serb-client Muslim combination) were likely seen as

enemies and would evoke described associations with war time sexual violence. Foreign women remained neutral outsiders, outside of the ethnic and political milieu.

The presence of foreign troops is one of the main themes. It has been observed that bars and nightclubs were concentrated in the vicinity of the military barracks (Mendelson, 2005), which led officials as well as researchers to believe that trafficking is fueled by presence of foreign troops in the country. Without much other data or other evidence, many Experts and some academics (for example Pallen, 2003; Limanowska, 2007) were ready to assume that foreign soldiers were the main customers and directly associated with the demand. This is in line with the argument that the highest demand for sex workers is where "men congregate in large groups separate from home and family" (Barry, 1984: 70). A different explanation has been offered by one of the Experts:

> Expert I: Well, when it comes to military, local or foreign, it is always associated with prostitution. Actually I think that [foreign military] here have really strict rules. They cannot stay out, they cannot get leave at all! They are not even allowed to talk to locals! It is completely artificially and unhealthy social world! It produces certain need, and it is easily fed by prostitution. They do not care if she is local or foreign, a prostitute or a trafficking victim.

Still, it has been suggested that foreign military and other foreigners accounted for a smaller but substantial chuck of the demand. Only about 30 percent of clients, as reported by rescued trafficking victims, were foreigners (Vandenberg, 2002). While there is quite a bit of missing data, CTM Database data indicates that foreigners may account for even smaller percentage of customers, as can be seen in the Figure 51.



Figure 51. Clients of victims, by year (CTM Database).

In fact, only a small number of victims reported that customers were mainly foreign men (total of 2.4%). While this information was missing to almost half of the victims, the small proportion of foreign customers can be interpreted to mean that claims insinuating that foreign military are the main driving force behind the demand should be reconsidered. Even if data were available for all victims, and if, in all those cases for which the data are missing, the customers were predominantly international clients, they would still barely be in the majority. This reveals that the local clients are also an important segment of the market.

This is surprising, considering the fact that economic situation in BiH following the war was, and still is, rather bad for local population. As argued by Danailova-Trainor and Belser (2006), "In the global market for trafficking victims, one major determinant is certainly the purchasing power of the population in the countries of destination" (Danailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006: 7). This is why it is hard to understand who could be the local clients, given the high unemployment and low income levels in BiH.

What needs to be kept in mind is that the presence of an international community in BiH created a spill-over effect, as it contributed to creation of an "artificial economy", in words of one of the Experts. This artificial economy in BiH was characterized by a huge influx of money into the economy through international organizations, peace missions, and substantive donations. International organizations and peace missions by renting office space, buying supplies, and hiring staff injected large amount of cash into the economy. It created income for many new businesses, big and small. The time period right after the war was the time when a large number of small businesses and associated individuals had an opportunity to earn large amounts of money over a short period of time and not much to spend it on, and thereby differentiate themselves from the rest of the population. This fast and sudden improvement in economic status of some sectors of the society, the *nouveau riche*, has been mentioned as one of the engines behind the local demand for sex workers. As one of the Experts put it:

> Expert V: This is something new that wasn't there before. If you have a small company, you easily earn 100 KM and easily spend as well. These are not people living off their retirement money. No one that lives off his monthly wage pays for this.

Existence of this artificial economy can explain how trafficking can blossom, even in relatively poor countries. Following statement from one of the Experts summarizes this explanation:

> Expert W: Cost of sex service is not related to general wealth of the country. It is sufficient that there is a small group of people who can afford it, it does not have to be accessible to all. My feeling is that economic situation in this country means that there is a sufficient number of people with money. Perhaps 10 percent of the whole population, but that is more than enough.

It can be concluded that presence of foreign troops and international presence in general, did not contribute to demand only directly, but contributed to the creation of the local

demand by improving the purchasing power of certain segments of the society (Friman & Reich, 2007).

Authorities and Stakeholders: How do they View Trafficking and how do they Cooperate?

Who *authorities* are in BiH is not a question with a straightforward answer because of overlapping spheres of influence in numerous governmental agencies and ministries, their many jurisdictions, and a strong and powerful presence of an international community. Even NGOs were enjoying a certain level of authority since aid money given to the state was often a conditioned upon the involvement of a civil society in the process. In turn, this gave NGOs the leverage when bargaining with government agencies. This is why NGOs have also been addressed as stakeholders, even though they are not authorities.

From the interviews two axes of tension become apparent: 1) NGOs and law enforcement, and 2) locals and internationals.

The tension between civil society and law enforcement is not surprising in BiH, given the fact that their approaches to and stakes in the problem of human trafficking are very different. Law enforcement focuses of the criminal aspect of the trafficking problem, such as combating trafficking and apprehending offenders. NGOs, on the other hand, focus primarily on victim protection.

The effect IPTF led raids of suspect venues had on the trafficking was one of the issues that caused strain between these stakeholders. Another issue, addressed by Experts, was the issue of identification of victims. Statements made by law enforcement Experts clearly indicate that they were thinking of the process of identification as the process of

collecting evidence, while NGOs saw it as the process of identifying which victims need protection. Law enforcement Experts were disappointed when rescued women did not offer intelligence, regardless of whether they were victims or not, while NGOs were disappointed when women refused assistance, regardless of whether they provided intelligence or not. In fact, NGOs have accused police of seeing the victims not as human beings, but rather as tools for obtaining intelligence. Statements below illustrate these positions:

> Expert K (law enforcement): These NGOs, they try to tell us what our job is. Girl, for example, tells us that she is not a victim. And then she [NGO worker] tells me "I had a chat with her and I could see in her eyes that she's a victim of trafficking". That, I think, is creating pressure. And what value does it have, what kind of evidence is that? What will I tell the judge - that I saw in her eyes that she was a victim?! (….) They come to us when they need a ticket back home, not because they want to cooperate with us, or testify.
>
> Expert B (NGO): I went along to those raids. We all storm in, there's screaming yelling, mess, police turning things over, breaking things around the bar… And then you see these girls sitting somewhere in the corner, poor girls, scared, no one is even looking at them.

Reportedly, the difference in the approach had an effect on victim cooperation with the authorities. NGOs blamed police for being aggressive with victims when questioning them, and for making it more difficult to reach out to them. They accused police of sexism and macho attitudes. Conversely, attitudes of law enforcement Experts expressed their belief that NGOs are doing something worthless and useless and they accused NGOs of being "girly" and emotional. On closer examination, comments made by both groups of stakeholders are of similar nature: they complained about situations when they did not receive what they needed in order to be successful and they somewhat blamed the other side for it. When victims did not cooperate, law enforcement had

nothing to work with. When rescued women did not ask for assistance, NGOs had nothing to do.

Their frustration is understandable, especially when the positions of these groups are evaluated in the context of power relations between local stakeholders and IOs. Local stakeholders, whether law enforcement or NGOs, were being closely observed by IOs, which could influence future funding and support. However, the two groups defined what success is differently; for police, it was arrests and indictment of traffickers while for NGO's it was assisting victims.

Experts from law enforcement agencies expressed a certain level of distrust and even skepticism regarding the victims. The fact that many victims were not willing to testify or did not want to share intelligence with them was seen as a sign that they are actually not victims. Moreover, they accused the victims of abusing the system. Most law enforcement Experts expressed their reservation with regard to distinction between prostitution and trafficking, if not directly denying that such difference exists. From their statements, it is clear that they considered that any type of consent given by the victims eliminates her trafficking status, even though the Palermo Protocol clearly states that consent is irrelevant to the trafficking issue. On the flip side, NGOs blamed law enforcement for ignorance and stressed their own sensitivity in working with the victims, especially their ability to open channels of communication "as woman to woman". There quotes reflect those positions rather well:

> Expert U (law enforcement): I don't get these *victims*. They have phones, they can call police, if someone is beating them up or something. They cannot make money back there [in their home countries], all they are interested in is making money. They spend 2-3 years here, save a few thousands, and then – victim! Some pimps send them back, and then they come on their own.

> Expert H (law enforcement): When they come, maybe they are forced. But after a year or two? It is a whole other story!
>
> Expert G (NGO): Sometimes they [victims] call us, and we meet with them, have a coffee, smoke a cigarette, have a chat. We ask her, how's she doing, if she wants to come [to the shelter]. (….) It isn't easy for them to admit it to themselves. This is why it is very important for us to make sure that she gets back to us again. If she calls again, this, for us, is a sign that she want to get out of it, that something broke inside of her. It is not our job to push them, but to help them the best way that we can, and to help *them* decide.

The fact that different actors approach the problem from different perspectives only means that they compliment one another. Their perspectives reflect the roles that they play in the anti-trafficking policy. However, these differences can also lead to tensions, misunderstandings, and power struggles, which can have a direct effect on the policy. For example, during the development of the previously mentioned National Action Plan, NGOs and law enforcement clashed on the issue of whether NGOs should be obligated to share the information that they receive from the victim with the law enforcement. NGOs complained that all law enforcement cares about is intelligence and that obligation to share information would discourage the victims from sharing their stories with their case workers, arguing that it would also violate confidentiality of the victims. Law enforcement insisted that NGOs share the information, claiming that anything less would undermine their efforts to combat trafficking. Eventually, an obligation to share information was included, which discouraged NGOs from cooperating with the law enforcement all together. Despite all this, NGO representatives reported going along with police to raids and participating in the victim identification on the spot. This indicates that cooperation between these groups still continues, even if the relationship is somewhat strained.

One police officer clearly recognized that these conflicting attitudes reflect differing perceptions, and that both sides operate within their understanding of the nature of the problem:

> Expert R: Trafficking and violence go hand in hand, more so than when it comes to prostitution. This is very important, when figuring out trafficking cases. These people from NGOs, I guess, have a different definition, and for them every woman in every bar is a victim. And for police every one is a hooker. These are all stereotypes. *I* am fighting to overcome these stereotypes.

Another one of the tensions that was apparent was that between locals and international staff, regardless of the type of organization that they are working for. Locals, whether working for law enforcement, NGOs, or IOs, complained that internationals were being patronizing and inconsistent in their cooperation with local police and other stakeholders. Locals also described internationals as stuck on details and unable to see the big picture. Comments by international Experts reflected how they perceive their role in the country: that of the nation building. They also reflect the Experts' disillusionment regarding the work of IOs and the conflicts of interest faced.

This line of tension, between locals and internationals, can be described as a problem of power and dominance. Internationals are superiors of the locals in most cases, either due to working with IOs (which have the power to direct policy, agendas, and funding) or due to their higher positions within IOs. However, the locals feel that this is undeserved. They also feel that internationals are out of touch with the local problems and stuck on meaningless detail. A statement by a local Expert working for an IO illustrates this frustration with internationals:

> Expert A (IO, local): Until now, our police was not allowed to do anything alone, not even move a finger without IPTF ordering them to do so, and now suddenly they need to do everything on their own, and these guys [EUMP] do not get

> engaged at all. And now *that* is a disaster for the system, just imagine! (….) And then these people from OSCE or UNICEF tell me "why did she not have an interpreter when she was in detention"! What are you talking about, what interpreter!? She comes to me all blue, can barely walk, forget the stupid interpreter! So now I just go to these meetings, and say nothing!

Comments of some of the internationals indicate that they perceive local police as unreliable and corrupt, thereby in need of supervision and guidance. NGOs have been described by international staff as "money scavengers", while being resented by those very same NGOs for being bullied into that position, as illustrated by a statement made by one of the local Experts: "Us, NGOs, have become mafia ourselves, constantly in wars with one another [over funding]" (Expert D).

Nonetheless, this attitude held by internationals was only to be expected, since the mandate of the IOs and their international staff was monitoring the locals in the process of nation-building, and their mission (even if poorly conceptualized) was to supervise, lead, and provide direction to the local government. This, however, did not reduce the tensions. Experts have expressed their anger at the whole international community, saying that it manufactures problems so that it can justify its presence. Furthermore, the international community has been criticized for not being honest in their support of the local institutions. Yet, the way this conflict of interest was handled by IOs was also source of anger among internationals themselves, as these statements illustrate:

> Expert N (IO, international): Loads of money are there and everyone developed [trafficking] as priority. And before you know we all worked on trafficking. [OSCE Special Representative on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings] had said "I'll give you money to shelter people from Mirage operation". At first I had no clue of all this madness, and I asked all these questions. Then [UNHCHR National Human Rights Officer] also got into the game. They have probably had some money, and then they had to develop programs to justify their presence. Their office was threatened with closure, and in December 2002, [Chief of the UNHCHR Mission in BiH] did not even know if she would get new contract, so

> there really was great pressure on them (….) And at that point I realized that for all of us it was comfortable to keep analyzing the problem, but trying to solve it was challenging.
>
> Expert W (international prosecutor): The madness of the international community is unbelievable. In terms of the amounts of energy and money that is spent, in relation to other issues, it is insane, especially since most of what is done are post hoc responses, rather than systematic change (….) Internationals have their own agendas, they have their projects and programs to finish, and this may not be the same as solving the problem. So that creates frictions (….) IOM has vast interest in managing their profit and keeping the system going. Their financial support depends on it.

There were also rifts between international organizations and law enforcement agencies in their approach to the issues. One of the main complaints of the local police officers was that "these foreigners", as they often referred to them, were imposing some new concepts in the work of the local law enforcement. For example, they complained that the prevention part of the so-called Three P strategy (prevention-protection-prosecution), which is the basis of both the U.S. and the E.U. anti–trafficking policy (see U.S. Department of State, 2008), was not conceived properly. Local law enforcement Experts argued that the prevention part of the policy was flawed because it focused on assisting the victims. They felt that the best way to prevent trafficking was, instead, to arrest the perpetrators, and that not enough importance was placed on that. This may be perceived as a turf struggle. By placing importance on assistance, the role of NGOs becomes more important while the role of law enforcement diminishes. In a way, law enforcement is complaining that they are being pushed aside and marginalized through this anti-trafficking policy imported by the IOs. But this is also a reflection of dissatisfaction with being subjected to stakeholders that are perceived as outsiders with power.

To summarize, two main tensions that could be identified were those between NGOs and law enforcement, and locals and internationals. Law enforcement mainly

considered trafficking as a criminal issue and perceived their role to be reactive rather than preventive. They focused on intelligence gathering and preparing cases for prosecution. For NGOs, trafficking was an issue of victim protection. NGOs believed they were saviors for the victims; they empathized and shared. At the same time, NGOs were aware that their work was morally compromised to a degree by the funding that they received, as it pushed them to play along with the expectations of IOs. IOs, finally, were more focused on what was being done about trafficking, rather than trafficking itself. It appears that the concern rests on what local stakeholders did, rather than the actual trafficking problem. They were also frustrated with their own sector and with the fact that the funding rules often dictated how a problem was defined, if defined at all. In general, stakeholders reported cordial relations and relatively good cooperation between different groups of stakeholder, although this was not always smooth. However, a lack of trust can be detected from their description of these relationships.

What Appear to be the Push Factors in Source Countries? What are the Pull Factors in BiH?

Given that this research focused on a destination country, little information is available on what exactly might have been the push factors when it comes to source countries. Data from the CTM Database indicates that most victims were unemployed at the time of leaving their home countries. At the same time, a number of Experts referred to very poor economic situation in victims' home countries as a possible reason for their desire to go elsewhere. A number of Experts mentioned that victims told them that with the money victims would potentially earn in BiH over the course of a year, they could "buy a house", "open a store", "buy a car", "educate her child" and similar things in their

home countries. However, this should not necessarily be considered a pull factor. As previously discussed, many victims do not know which country they are going to. Therefore, the fact that they can potentially make good money in BiH cannot be a pull factor. Yet, this can be considered an indicator of what push factors may be. Lack of a job, low skills, and relative poverty can all be considered as pushes.

In the macro-quantitative analysis, two variables were identified as strongly associated with being a destination country. When looking at those variables, no clear cut difference can be seen between BiH as a destination country and the source countries, as can be seen from the Figure 52.



Figure 52. HDI, Net migration, GDP and Population growth ranks of BiH and main source countries.

HDI ranks for BiH, Romania, and Ukraine were similar to one another (ranks 110, 114, and 100, respectively, with lower numbers indicating lower level of human development) while Moldova was lower in 63rd rank. When it comes to net migration, however, differences were more pronounced. BiH was the only country of the four to be an

immigration country. The other three countries have negative net migration, meaning that emigration is higher than immigration in those countries. When it comes to variables that were found to be associated with source country status, GDP and Population growth, the picture is unclear. Romania has higher GDP than BiH, yet BiH has higher population growth rate than the other countries, even though this difference is not dramatic. It is not necessarily surprising that these variables do not differentiate between BiH and the main three source countries. Macro analysis that derived these variables did not focus on identifying variables that differentiate between source and destination variables, but rather on variables that differentiate between Source and Non-Source, and Destination and Non-Destination countries. The fact that many of the victims believed that they are going to other countries, such as Italy, renders the overall economic situation of the actual destination country irrelevant.

Discussion: Why is BiH a Destination Country, and What Kind of a Destination Country is it?

There were multiple goals of this case study. One of those goals was to explore how variables identified in the macro factor analysis translate into a micro-level picture. Another goal was to go beyond macro-level indicators and study trafficking in its organic context in order to explore what other factors may be associated with trafficking. Here, the case was a destination country. Whether this country is a good one for a case study was previously discussed. The argument used to support a case study was that BiH is not what one would imagine a typical destination country: it is a poor country, in a post war period, unemployment is high, etc. The fact that it is atypical has made this country particularly interesting because it allowed us to go beyond common explanations and

study what *else* could be the factors related to making a country a destination for trafficking.

When it comes to BiH, it is clear that a convergence of many factors may have played roles in this country becoming a destination. BiH is a former socialist country that had undergone a change in the regime in the 1990's. It is a country that went through the war, which was both civil and international in nature. At the time of the research, it was a country with a disorganized government and weak law enforcement. Furthermore, it was a country swamped with international organizations that guided and monitored the local government and its agencies. BiH had porous borders, which were only recently taken under the control of the government. It is also a country that has been very militarized, but is in the process of becoming more civil. It is a country with crime networks that had emerged during the war, and where black and gray economies are the norm rather than an exception. It was and still is a poor country with a weak (but growing) economy, and with a significant influx of money due to international aid. It is a country surrounded by other former socialist countries; one at the time rather dysfunctional (Serbia), and one rather stable (Croatia). It is a country with a combination of a patriarchal society and a legacy of women's emancipation through socialist ideology. It is a country with a new and young civil society, which is also strongly supported by international funds. It is a country whose population is relatively poor, but has a small percentage of the population with relatively strong purchasing power. Finally, it is a country that is changing fast and being built with international aid and expertise in nation building. A combination of all of those factors has contributed to BiH becoming a destination country.

One thing that clearly stands out in the case of BiH is the time when trafficking appears to have become a visible problem - a few years following the war. It did not become a problem as soon as the socialist system fell apart in early 1990's, nor was it a problem during the war between 1993 and 1996, when number of troops local and foreign were the highest. Instead, it became a problem towards the end of 1990's. This indicates that the war and presence of foreign troops and disintegration of the state are not sufficient for emergence of this problem. Thus, it took a few years for the situation to consolidate.

The relevance of war is an issue that needs elaboration. As already mentioned, war in BiH was marked by sexual violence and slavery. However, the sexual violence that happened during the war has been since considered as a war crime, with dynamics very different from that of trafficking. Trafficking that started to happen after the war cannot be seen as a simple continuation or a reflection of this legacy of war-time sexual violence, as it involves very different conditions. During the war, sexual violence and slavery were used as tools of terror and to aid the ethnic cleansing, while after the war, trafficking was not instrumental sexual violence, at least not in the same sense. Motivations of traffickers and pimps are financial, rather than political. Thus, widespread sexual violence during the war should not be considered as a precursor of human trafficking that emerged later on. Kligman and Limoncelli summarize this by stating that "In Bosnia (…) militarization has been a key feature in the diversification of trafficking. Wars have facilitated trafficking – of women and girls, drugs, and arms under the auspices, to our knowledge, of competing mafias, traffickers and complicit, corrupt officials and individuals" (2005: 127). It can be concluded that the war was significant as

it set the stage for the development of criminal networks and, in many ways, mainstreamed the *illegal* into the everyday economy. Nevertheless, the war is not the only way for this to happen. Countries with failing economies or those exposed to economic sanctions can face similar situations.

The economy, legal as well as gray, had taken a few years to slightly stabilize and adjust to the post war conditions. Along with the economy, smuggling and criminal networks that were an integral part of this economy probably needed some time to reorganize and adjust to new types of markets, new goods, and new services that came into demand. Smuggled sugar, cooking oil, weapons, or fuel could now be obtained legally at much lower prices. In a way, smuggling rings that benefited from the siege of the country went out of business. Creating new lines of business and identifying new demands may have taken some time. This is a potential reason behind the gap between the end of the war and the emergence of trafficking as problem in BiH.

In a peace-time economy, different rules apply. Different goods are of value and there is a difference in the spheres of influence that need to be navigated. During the war, smuggling routes were controlled by the military. After the war, they were controlled by foreign military and the control was slowly handed over to the local authorities. Criminal networks had to develop new connections and adjust. Consequently, they started to shift into a more mainstream economy. Trafficking fits into this borderline economy. Women were pimped from venues such as bars, hotels, gas stations, supermarkets, or other legal businesses. In this manner, trafficking represents a marriage between legal and illegal, or a bridge from illegal to legal – a way for the criminal networks to improve their earning in a period of transition. The fact that trafficking in this form started to disappear after

2002 supports this argument. Continuing this activity stopped being a good way to run a business at the point in time when it became too difficult and after the initial capital was accumulated. At this point, pimps had their legal businesses that they could continue with. Insisting on trafficking would put their legal businesses at risk. If trafficking did go further underground after 2002, as it is often claimed (even though there is not much evidence to support this claim), this would mean that there was a separation of legal and illegal economy, which would actually be a natural continuation of the process that started during the war. During the war, legal and illegal economies were the same. Immediately after the war, they were parallel and interlocked. Now, they are separating.

Looking at the local context, it could be concluded that trafficking emerged in BiH because it was easy to do it. For instance, it was very easy to get women into the country because of porous borders. Dysfunctional state and confusion over all different levels of authority also made it a low risk business. Bickering and diffusion of responsibility was inevitable with so many stakeholders. With risks so low, even local thugs could easily make some profit from smuggling women across borders and pimping them off. As more organized policy started to emerge, risks increased, rendering this line of illegal business less attractive to all but the most organized.

The question of demand was very crucial for the analysis of trafficking in BiH. The presence of (foreign) military is assumed to be an important risk factor. In this case study, what becomes apparent is that the relationship is much more complex. While the military did create a demand for sexual services directly, it cannot be said that it created demand for trafficking in particular, nor can it be said that the whole, or even majority, of the demand for sexual services came from the military. Locals were found to represent a

significant portion of clients. A choice of traffickers and pimps was to respond to this demand by recruiting and trafficking women. Some possible reasons for this have been discussed, ranging from the fact that trafficked women are easier to control and easier to make money from, to the fact that foreigners represent a symbolic escape from the grim reality of BiH. Furthermore, when it comes to demand by locals, ability to buy a woman or *any* woman in particular carries a certain symbolism in a country where the new rich had very limited ways to demonstrate their wealth and influence. Therefore, trafficking should not be seen only as a result of commoditization of sex but of the commoditization of human beings as well.

It is possible to argue that trafficking in BiH became a problem at the same time it became apparent in the other European countries as well. It can also be argued that this time frame has less to do with the specific situation in BiH and more to do with the developments in source countries. Yet, it should be noted that Croatia, for example, right next to BiH, has never become a known destination country. This indicates that situations in destination countries are relevant, and trafficking should not be viewed as a phenomenon of source countries only.

This case study does not necessarily provide findings generalizable to other destination countries, but it does produce a basis for hypotheses that can be tested by looking at other destination countries with similar or different local contexts. As discussed previously, this case study should be seen as a data collection exercise, and it tells a story of one particular destination country. Using the same method in a number of different countries would produce a collection of information that could potentially reveal certain patterns and similarities. That remains to be done in future projects.

CHAPTER X CONCLUSION

This study had two parallel goals, one methodological, and one theoretical, both aiming to link the global and the local perspectives of human trafficking. From the methodological side, the contrast was drawn between a macro-quantitative methodology that studies the world as a whole, and a case study that focuses on a single country. In that sense, methods used in this study are not just tools of research, but also symbols of an argument regarding how trafficking needs to be considered. From a theoretical standpoint, economic and market theory were used as a base, helping us to identify whether associated variables can be used to differentiate between countries with and without a trafficking problem, and then studying the mechanisms through which trafficking does become a problem on a micro level. The study explored whether trafficking can be seen as a problem of global inequality and economy (by looking at macro-level variables), but it also addressed trafficking as a problem with very local roots (by studying the micro-level mechanisms in one country). The point of the departure, and the overall sentiment of this study, which approaches the issue of trafficking in human beings as a global and yet distinctly local phenomenon is nicely summarized by Lindstorm: "The trafficking trade is simultaneously de-territorialized and deeply territorialized, spanning the globe yet strategically concentrated in specific places" (2004: 46). The combination of two methods also provided an opportunity to explore if and how two different levels of explanation can be combined to provide a more complete picture of why trafficking is a problem is some countries, while in others it is not.

The findings of the two components of the research have already been discussed separately in Chapters VI and VIII, and those conclusions will not be repeated at length.

Rather, findings will be briefly summarized and brought together, along with the discussion of the strengths and the weaknesses of the methods used, and the reflections on implications for policy and future research.

For macro-level analysis the goal was to identify characteristics that differentiate the source and the destination countries from those that do not have a trafficking problem. Rather than haphazardly testing for many possible variables, potential differentiating variables were derived from the economic theory of migration and the market theory based on demand. GDP and negative population growth were found to be good differentiators for source countries. For destination countries, a high Human Development Index and immigrant country status were found to be good differentiators. Variables that are good differentiating variables are giving us a good base to explore how these macro factors cause trafficking from or into a country, and findings were not always in line with popular arguments regarding the trafficking patterns (for example GDP was not the most important differentiating variable for destination countries, and the direction of the relationship with the population growth was opposite from what theory suggests). Even when they were in line with such arguments (low GDP being a good differentiating variable for source countries), this study provides a sound base for those claims, beyond what may appear to be just common sense. Further, analysis pointed to some complexities that were not previously known. It was found that even relatively well off countries can become sources, which is in contrast to the common argument that trafficking stems from poor countries. Further it was found that the very poorest countries are not commonly sources. This suggests that poverty alone is not a sufficient condition, nor a necessary one, for a country to become a source country, even though it is often

relevant. Findings regarding population growth were interpreted by looking at countries that had negative population growth, as those were almost by rule source countries. This indicates that a sudden loss of welfare and sudden changes in economic situation in a country, that is associated with population decline, can be associated with trafficking, even if a country is not necessarily a very poor one. In other words, loss of the sense of security in terms of income and other services is a relevant factor, rather than the static situation in a country. This is very important when it comes to policy, as it suggests that sudden and dramatic changes in the economic situation and regime may trigger trafficking from a country, indicating that such countries should be given special attention in order to prevent them from becoming sources.

When it comes to destination countries, it was found trafficking patterns to an extent follow migration patterns even though arguably mechanisms of the two are very different. This suggests that perhaps some assumptions about how trafficking takes place might be faulty, or at least incomplete, and that perhaps the whole trafficking paradigm should be revisited. What was also found is that the overall quality of life is a more important factor than simply economics when it comes to the destination countries, suggesting that there is more to trafficking into the countries than simple economic theories of migration would suggest. Further it was found that countries that were just destination countries and countries that were both source and destinations were rather different from one another. Countries that were both sources and destinations were more similar to source countries than to destination countries. This is very important, as it indicates that such countries are likely in a whole different category, with different local context. It also suggest that it is possible perhaps being a source country puts a country at

risk of also becoming a destination, given the right conditions, while the opposite may not be the case. If indeed this was the case, then being a source country is not just a problem in itself, but also an alarm that the situation may escalate. This is why such countries need to be studied in greater depth.

One very important question that was not addressed by this research is how source and their destination countries compare with one another on these macro level indicators (as opposed to non-sources and non-destinations). Such comparison could help uncover what determines the paths and the links between a particular source and its destination countries.

The methodology used in the macro component had a number of limitations. First, macro-level data are very difficult to come by, and for every dependent variable, data were missing for a number of countries, though mostly small countries. To reduce the potential error stemming from a skewed distribution of the data, data were transformed and ranks were used. However, this means that some of the information has been lost and thus, results are less precise. A more fundamental problem is due to the information used to generate the dependent variables – country's status as Source or Non-Source, and Destination or Non-Destination. In this study, country ratings developed by UNODC based on other sources were used, and countries that were most consistently reported as sources and destinations were categorized as such for the purposes of this study. This means that some countries that were treated as Non-Source or Non-Destination may have actually been inappropriately categorized. Furthermore, the data itself were separated from the phenomenon they attempted to represent by a number of steps, increasing the risk of potential error. Data for this study were generated from UNODC ratings; UNODC

based its ratings on the information provided through third sources. It is hard to tell what the sources of the information provided by these third sources were. Even under ideal conditions, so many transformations of information are likely to result in some error. There is no doubt that some of the countries must have been categorized wrongly, even if it was impossible to tell which ones, given the nature of the trafficking problem and difficulties in obtaining good data. Unfortunately, there is little that can be done to fix the problem at this time, as data on the trafficking status of countries is not straightforward and not always available. The need for better data has been iterated many times in the literature on human trafficking. This proves, once again, just how hard it is to conduct good research without such data.

Given that macro-quantitative research on trafficking is very new, and this study is among the first or very few of this type, it sets forth new research strategies that can be further developed in the future and improved. Taking into account criticisms of the macro-quantitative research and methodological difficulties in executing such research, findings should not be seen as definitive answers, but rather as good pointers to "unobvious regularities" (Hoover, 2002: 173, as cited in Kittel, 2006: 657), that should be used as points of departure for further research into trafficking. Therefore, the question of particular characteristics of countries that are both sources and destinations, the association between trafficking and sudden and dramatic economic and social changes, the relationship between migration and trafficking patterns (and perhaps the need to reexamine the whole trafficking paradigm), and the relationship between quality of life and demand are all issues that should be addressed by further research at a more micro

level. The case study that was conducted in the context of this research can be seen as one such research project.

The case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a very detailed overview of the trafficking problem in a single country. The local political, social, and economic contexts were discussed, along with data from agencies that provide assistance to victims. This was complimented by information that was provided by a number of local Experts who had direct experience with the trafficking problem in the country. All the information presented was used to develop a coherent story of how and why trafficking emerged as a problem in BiH. It also helped to identify what factors can be pinpointed as its causes.

What the case study revealed is that the problem of human trafficking in a destination country can be the result of very complex processes that are not isolated from other economic, social, or political processes that take place in a country, but are in fact their very result. In BiH, the war time economy, resulting criminal networks, artificial influx of money, the creation of new criminalized higher classes, porosity of the borders, collapse of the authority of the state, large number of stakeholders, all contributed to the emergence of trafficking as a problem in BiH. The complexity of the phenomena that set the stage for the emergence of trafficking testifies to the fact that trafficking needs to be studied in more depth. Simplistic explanations should not be accepted at face value. Perhaps the most important implication of these findings is that defining trafficking as a problem that emerges due to a single or a few factors is faulty and an oversimplification of the reality. While simple explanations may be appealing because they provide simple formulas for policy, such policies would have little chance of success. Voluntary

repatriation of the victims is a universally used approach, based on the assumption that all the victims want is to escape their traffickers, and this is just one example of how oversimplification can result in failed policy. Research here indicated that the situation is much more complex, that the victims sometimes prefer victimization over return to nothing, and that offers of repatriation actually make them less likely to cooperate with the authorities, making it harder to combat trafficking. Similarly, TIP Reports, produced by the U.S. Department of State also suffer from a similar problem. The goal of producing such reports was to create pressure on governments to do more about trafficking. Yet, in countries such as BiH, this can have only limited impact given that the decision making structure is way too complex and the possibility of diffusion of responsibility too large. Pressure to produce prosecutable cases (that are used as one measure of a country's success in combating trafficking in TIP Reports but also by EU), may have been behind the policy of raids, whose impact is at the best questionable.

It is hard to tell if the trafficking would have emerged in BiH if any of the factors identified as causal were absent, even though comparisons with neighboring countries provides some clues. This is the main drawback of the case study. With just one case, it is hard to conclude which, if any, of those factors were necessary, and what combination of the factors would have been sufficient for the problem to emerge, and therefore it is difficult to generalize. Countries of Western Europe likely have different combinations of conditions that lead them to become destinations, and countries such as the United Arab Emirates have others. Comparative small N studies with "most similar", and "most dissimilar" designs, which are actually more elaborate case studies, would allow further clarification with regard to which factors are necessary and sufficient, and which ones are

just co-occurrences. Further, in this case study, information obtained from different sources resembled pieces of a puzzle: on their own, small irregular pieces of information; when put together, they reveal what appears to be a coherent picture. A benefit of case studies is in the richness of the information that they provide, allowing a very intimate look into the problem that is being studied, and they allow that very different types of information (in this case qualitative interviews, quantitative data, intelligence reports, etc.) are all brought together. With such studies, however, introduction of other data, such as direct interviews with victims or pimps, would always add an additional layer of color that would reveal details and themes not otherwise identified. Unfortunately, it is possible that the one stone that remained unturned may have been a crucial one. Nevertheless, all efforts were made to balance and confirm information through different types of data in order to ensure that nothing has been completely overlooked or misunderstood.

When trying to combine the findings of the micro and the macro component of the research and interpret them in unison, the contrast between the simplicity of the findings of the macro component, and the complexity of the findings of the micro component becomes apparent. While macro-level findings appear to be more straightforward, they are also very abstract and detached from the micro-level phenomena. Using them to explain micro-level behaviors feels like trying to balance the earth on a pinhead. Economic difficulty in the source countries that was identified in the macro-level analysis as low GDP came through in the micro-level analysis. A similar reflection could also be found when it comes to the migration status of the country, although it is not as clear. Macro analysis revealed that immigration countries are more likely destinations, and the porous borders of BiH make it an easy, and arguably likely,

destination, despite its uninviting economic profile. Other variables that emerged as significant in the macro analysis are almost impossible to detect in micro-level behaviors and vice versa. This does not mean that either one of the two levels of analysis are useless, but rather that they explain very different things. Macro-level findings only provide hints as to what may be happening on the ground. This is natural, since macro-variables reflect aggregations of micro-behaviors (Kittel, 2006). It is much easier to develop hypotheses regarding macro-indicators based on micro-level data than the other way around, as aggregation is a process simpler than disaggregation, and the macro-level findings cannot be used in explaining micro phenomenon without disaggregation. This may appear obvious, but such explanations have been used before in the trafficking literature. Poverty of a country was equated with individual poverty, national crime rates were equated with individual victimization, etc. This study once again demonstrates that two levels of measurement may complement one another, yet must be treated separately. Macro analysis is more descriptive, while micro analysis more analytical, as it contributes more in terms of the explanations of what lies behind the phenomenon. Macro analysis describes what source or destination countries look like, while micro analysis tell us why and how trafficking takes place in a particular country.

APPENDIX A Technical description of small N and QCA methodology

Small-N studies, which are usually descriptive, are those in which the number of countries compared is small, usually smaller than 10. In such studies, countries that are selected for analysis are those that are considered to be of high importance for the phenomena that is being studied. Rather than each country representing a data point, qualitative in-depth analysis is used, by applying most similar /different outcome (MSDO), most dissimilar/same outcome (MDSO), or the most similar/same outcome (MSSO) strategies (Ebbinghaus, 2005). The MSDO and MDSO strategies are derived from Mill's methods of agreement and difference (Lieberson, 1991), while the MSSO strategy is a derivative.

These methods have been particularly useful for studying phenomena that occur only rarely, such as studies of revolutions, or for theory building studies, because it allows in depth analysis of how various factors lead to a particular outcome. Such studies have been criticized for the inherent problems of selection bias and difficulties in establishing causal relationships from such a limited number of cases (Ebbinghaus, 2005). Adler's study of low crime nations (1983) can be considered an example of such methodology.

Qualitative comparative analysis has been developed in an attempt to improve and systematize the use of the Small-N method, with a somewhat larger number of cases. In this type of analysis the presence and absence of dependent and independent variables under study is coded either dichotomously (in crisp-set or Boolean QCA), or pseudo-continuously on a scale of 0 to 1 (fuzzy set QCA). When data points are then plotted on a

scattergram, if all points fall above and to the left of the 45 degree line, relationship of sufficiency between independent and dependent variables is concluded. When all points fall below and to the right of the 45 degree line, relationship of necessity between independent and dependent variable is concluded (Kenworth & Hicks, 2008). These two situations are presented in Figure A1.



Figure A1. Illustration of QCA scatter plots that conclude sufficient relationship, necessity relationship, and neither, respectively (adapted from Kenworth & Hicks, 2008).

The general agreement (even though it is still debated) is that such causal conclusions can be reached only when all data points are on one side of the 45 degree line; otherwise neither sufficiency nor necessity rule should be argued. One major problem with QCA is that it allows for analysis of only one independent and one dependent variable at a time, making it impossible to control for other potentially relevant variables. Further it can only be used to reach deterministic conclusions, and trends and tendencies cannot be observed using this analysis.

APPENDIX B UNODC classification of countries according to their destination, source and transit status

Table B1. Countries by frequency of being identified as a source country.

Frequency of being identified as source country

Very High Frequency
Albania
Belarus
Bulgaria
China
Lithuania
Nigeria
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation
Thailand
Ukraine

High Frequency
Armenia
Bangladesh
Benin
Brazil
Cambodia
Colombia
Czech Republic
Dominican Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Ghana
Guatemala
Hungary
India
Kazakhstan
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Latvia
Mexico

Morocco
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Poland
Slovakia
Uzbekistan
Viet Nam

Medium Frequency
Afghanistan
Algeria
Angola
Azerbaijan
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Congo, Republic of
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong, China SAR
Indonesia
Kenya
Kosovo(Serbia and Montenegro)
Kyrgyzstan
Liberia
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mozambique

Niger
Peru
Senegal
Serbia and Montenegro
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovenia
South Africa
Sri Lanka
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Taiwan Province of China
Tajikistan
Togo
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania
Venezuela
Zambia

Low Frequency
Argentina
Bhutan
Botswana
Burundi
Canada
Cape Verde
Democratic Republic of Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Gabon
Gambia
Guinea
Iran(Islamic Republic Of)
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon

Lesotho
Madagascar
Maldives
Nicaragua
Panama
Rwanda
Republic of Korea
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Tunisia
United States of America
Zimbabwe

Very Low Frequency
Brunei Darussalam
Chad
Chile
Costa Rica
Egypt
Fiji
Jamaica
Macao, China SAR
Netherlands
Paraguay
Syrian Arab
Republic
Uruguay
Yemen

Table B2. Countries by frequency of being identified as destination country.

Frequency of being identified as destination country

Very High Frequency
Belgium
Germany
Greece
Israel
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Thailand
Turkey
United States of America

High Frequency
Australia
Austria
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Cambodia
Canada
China
Hong Kong, China SAR
Taiwan Province of China
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
France
India
Kosovo, (Serbia and Montenegro)
Pakistan
Poland
Saudi Arabia
Spain
Switzerland
United Arab
Emirates
United Kingdom

Medium Frequency
Albania
Argentina
Bahrain
Benin
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Curacao
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Finland
Gabon
Ghana
Guatemala
Hungary
Iceland
Iran (Islamic Republic Of)
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Latvia
Lebanon
Lithuania
Macao, China SAR
Malaysia
Mexico
Myanmar
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Panama
Philippines
Portugal

Qatar
Republic of Korea
Russian Federation
Serbia and Montenegro
Singapore
South Africa
Sweden
Syrian Arab Republic
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Togo
Ukraine
Venezuela
Viet Nam

Low Frequency
Aruba
Bangladesh
Belize
Brunei Darussalam
Congo, Republic of
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Egypt
Haiti
Indonesia
Iraq
Ireland
Kyrgyzstan
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Luxembourg
Mali
Niger
Oman
Paraguay
Romania
Slovenia
Sri Lanka

Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania
Uzbekistan
Yemen

Very Low Frequency
Algeria
Bhutan
Brazil
Burundi
Chad
Chile
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Djibouti
Dominica
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gambia
Georgia
Honduras
Jamaica
Liberia
Malawi
Maldives
Morocco
Mozambique
Republic of Moldova
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Slovakia
Sudan
Tajikistan
Trinidad and Tobago
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Table B3. Countries by frequency of being identified as transit country.

Frequency of being identified as transit country
Very High Frequency
Albania
Bulgaria
Hungary
Italy
Poland
Thailand

High Frequency
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Greece
Kosovo(Serbia and Montenegro)
Myanmar
Romania
Serbia and Montenegro
Slovakia
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Turkey
Ukraine

Medium Frequency
Belarus
Benin
Burkina Faso
Canada
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cyprus
Egypt
Gabon
Georgia

Hong Kong, China SAR
India
Kazakhstan
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
Russian Federation
Singapore
South Africa
Togo
United Kingdom

Low Frequency
Algeria
Austria
Azerbaijan
Botswana
Brunei
Cameroon
Costa Rica
Ghana
Indonesia
Lao's PDR
Latvia
Lithuania
Morocco
New Zealand
Nigeria
Republic of Moldova
Slovenia
Spain
Switzerland

Very Low Frequency
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belize
Cambodia

Chad
China
Colombia
Dominica
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Finland
Guatemala
Ireland
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Korea, Republic of
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Lesotho
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Nepal
Niger
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sweden
United Republic of Tanzania
Uruguay
Viet Nam
Zambia
Zimbabwe

APPENDIX C Availability of macroquantitative data, for all independent variables

Table C1. Countries for which GDP (PPP $) per capita for 2003 was available from World Development Indicators from 2007 database, and their respective values.

No.	Country	GDP per capita (PPP)	Year
1	Afghanistan	missing	2003
2	Albania	4674.12	2003
3	Algeria	5322.33	2003
4	Andorra	missing	2003
5	Angola	2782.63	2003
6	Antigua and Barbuda	12674.61	2003
7	Argentina	8742.74	2003
8	Armenia	3100.71	2003
9	Australia	31265.15	2003
10	Austria	31204.88	2003
11	Azerbaijan	3164.18	2003
12	Bahamas, The	23067.44	2005
13	Bahrain	28915.99	2003
14	Bangladesh	928.95	2003
15	Barbados	15917.17	2005
16	Belarus	6543.35	2003
17	Belgium	29036.50	2003
18	Belize	6850.57	2003
19	Benin	1150.88	2003
20	Bhutan	3158.32	2003
21	Bolivia	3362.23	2003
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	5064.05	2003
23	Botswana	10503.55	2003
24	Brazil	7556.05	2003
25	Brunei	45960.68	2003
26	Bulgaria	7688.25	2003
27	Burkina Faso	951.72	2003
28	Burundi	307.06	2003
29	Cambodia	1126.41	2003
30	Cameroon	1858.41	2003
31	Canada	31712.42	2003

32	Cape Verde	2244.12	2003
33	Central African Republic	615.49	2003
34	Chad	1031.81	2003
35	Chile	10540.75	2003
36	China	3214.34	2003
37	Colombia	5189.43	2003
38	Comoros	1067.38	2003
39	Congo, Dem. Rep.	236.73	2003
40	Congo, Rep.	2874.54	2003
41	Costa Rica	7713.11	2003
42	Cote d'Ivoire	1528.26	2003
43	Croatia	11487.69	2003
44	Cuba	missing	2003
45	Cyprus	22416.46	2003
46	Czech Republic	17243.04	2003
47	Denmark	30331.98	2003
48	Djibouti	1687.45	2003
49	Dominica	6383.33	2003
50	Dominican Republic	4556.13	2003
51	East Timor	2276.90	2003
52	Ecuador	5680.29	2003
53	Egypt, Arab Rep.	4115.89	2003
54	El Salvador	5027.68	2003
55	Equatorial Guinea	19982.60	2003
56	Eritrea	691.66	2003
57	Estonia	12938.14	2003
58	Ethiopia	462.70	2003
59	Fiji	3859.31	2003
60	Finland	27104.14	2003
61	France	28034.77	2003
62	Gabon	12910.31	2003
63	Gambia, The	978.33	2003
64	Georgia	2807.17	2003
65	Germany	28101.56	2003
66	Ghana	1022.62	2003
67	Greece	25609.56	2003
68	Grenada	8450.74	2003
69	Guam	missing	2003
70	Guatemala	4605.32	2003

71	Guinea	1020.32	2003
72	Guinea-Bissau	434.28	2003
73	Guyana	3071.12	2003
74	Haiti	1169.17	2003
75	Honduras	2964.53	2003
76	Hong Kong, China	29206.77	2003
77	Hungary	14651.85	2003
78	Iceland	29751.19	2003
79	India	1822.48	2003
80	Indonesia	2803.90	2003
81	Iran, Islamic Rep.	8264.33	2003
82	Iraq	missing	2003
83	Ireland	33816.37	2003
84	Israel	20040.00	2003
85	Italy	26307.54	2003
86	Jamaica	6656.01	2003
87	Japan	27317.17	2003
88	Jordan	3703.72	2003
89	Kazakhstan	6938.17	2003
90	Kenya	1231.37	2003
91	Kiribati	3420.84	2003
92	Korea, North	missing	2003
93	Korea, South	18570.99	2003
94	Kuwait	37745.83	2003
95	Kyrgyz Republic	1558.13	2003
96	Lao PDR	1551.01	2003
97	Latvia	10266.97	2003
98	Lebanon	8500.00	2003
99	Lesotho	1173.74	2003
100	Liberia	285.06	2003
101	Libya	9584.58	2003
102	Liechtenstein	missing	2003
103	Lithuania	11343.13	2003
104	Luxembourg	62044.65	2003
105	Macau, China	26005.91	2003
106	Macedonia, FYR	6464.06	2003
107	Madagascar	755.53	2003
108	Malawi	592.40	2003
109	Malaysia	10196.95	2003

110	Maldives	3679.72	2003
111	Mali	928.57	2003
112	Malta	18913.13	2003
113	Marshall Islands	6088.75	2003
114	Mauritania	1516.35	2003
115	Mauritius	8743.10	2003
116	Mexico	10241.23	2003
117	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	5476.03	2003
118	Moldova	1745.10	2003
119	Monaco	missing	2003
120	Mongolia	2137.36	2003
121	Morocco	3179.96	2003
122	Mozambique	572.40	2003
123	Myanmar	743.96	2003
124	Namibia	3989.17	2003
125	Nauru	missing	2003
126	Nepal	874.36	2003
127	Netherlands	31634.24	2003
128	New Zealand	22505.05	2003
129	Nicaragua	2325.77	2003
130	Niger	572.11	2003
131	Nigeria	1325.08	2003
132	Norway	42607.81	2003
133	Oman	17573.64	2003
134	Pakistan	1871.60	2003
135	Palau	11392.94	2003
136	Palestinian territories	3229.42	2003
137	Panama	7178.96	2003
138	Papua New Guinea	1633.36	2003
139	Paraguay	3498.38	2003
140	Peru	5566.56	2003
141	Philippines	2605.37	2003
142	Poland	11694.29	2003
143	Portugal	18692.09	2003
144	Qatar	57040.82	2003
145	Romania	7796.49	2003
146	Russian Federation	9719.71	2003
147	Rwanda	618.14	2003
148	Samoa	4326.71	2003

149	San Marino	missing	2003
150	Sao Tome and Principe	1238.01	2003
151	Saudi Arabia	18804.90	2003
152	Senegal	1369.00	2003
153	Serbia and Montenegro	7046.87	2003
154	Seychelles	13731.19	2003
155	Sierra Leone	517.94	2003
156	Singapore	35003.16	2003
157	Slovak Republic	13428.14	2003
158	Slovenia	19601.97	2003
159	Solomon Islands	1505.61	2003
160	Somalia	missing	2003
161	South Africa	7435.33	2003
162	Spain	24797.50	2003
163	Sri Lanka	2949.26	2003
164	St. Kitts and Nevis	11619.14	2003
165	St. Lucia	7890.89	2003
166	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	6017.86	2003
167	Sudan	1473.14	2003
168	Suriname	6103.96	2003
169	Swaziland	4122.77	2003
170	Sweden	28416.93	2003
171	Switzerland	32273.96	2003
172	Syrian Arab Republic	3606.45	2003
173	Taiwan	missing	2003
174	Tajikistan	1211.70	2003
175	Tanzania	813.58	2003
176	Thailand	6086.31	2003
177	Togo	709.24	2003
178	Tonga	4755.56	2003
179	Trinidad and Tobago	12449.91	2003
180	Tunisia	5554.81	2003
181	Turkey	6402.64	2003
182	Turkmenistan	4290.67	2005
183	Tuvalu	missing	2003
184	Uganda	758.58	2003
185	Ukraine	4509.76	2003
186	United Arab Emirates	28839.59	2003
187	United Kingdom	28435.43	2003

188	United States	37510.83	2003
189	Uruguay	7339.98	2003
190	Uzbekistan	1682.91	2003
191	Vanuatu	3090.14	2003
192	Venezuela	7394.69	2003
193	Vietnam	1777.36	2003
194	Western Sahara	missing	2003
195	Yemen	2015.81	2003
196	Zambia	1033.76	2003
197	Zimbabwe	2167.00	2003

Table C2. Countries for which Gini coefficient was available from World Development Indicators and Human Development Indicators Report for 2006, along with the year of the data and the respective value of the coefficient.

No.	Country	Gini	Year
1	Afghanistan	missing	
2	Albania	28.15	2002
3	Algeria	35.30	1995
4	Andorra	missing	
5	Angola	missing	
6	Antigua and Barbuda	missing	
7	Argentina	52.80	2003
8	Armenia	33.77	2003
9	Australia	35.20	1994
10	Austria	29.15	2000
11	Azerbaijan	36.50	2001
12	Bahamas, The	missing	
13	Bahrain	missing	
14	Bangladesh	33.42	2000
15	Barbados	missing	
16	Belarus	29.73	2002
17	Belgium	32.97	2000
18	Belize	missing	
19	Benin	36.48	2003
20	Bhutan	missing	
21	Bolivia	60.10	2002
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	35.79	2005
23	Botswana	missing	
24	Brazil	58.12	2003
25	Brunei	missing	
26	Bulgaria	29.21	2003
27	Burkina Faso	39.51	2003
28	Burundi	42.39	1998
29	Cambodia	41.71	2004
30	Cameroon	44.56	2001
31	Canada	32.56	2000
32	Cape Verde	50.52	2001
33	Central African Republic	61.30	1993

34	Chad	missing	
35	Chile	54.92	2003
36	China	46.90	2004
37	Colombia	58.83	2003
38	Comoros	missing	
39	Congo, Dem. Rep.	missing	
40	Congo, Rep.	missing	
41	Costa Rica	49.76	2003
42	Cote d'Ivoire	44.58	2002
43	Croatia	31.10	2001
44	Cuba	missing	
45	Cyprus	missing	
46	Czech Republic	25.30	1996
47	Denmark	24.70	1997
48	Djibouti	missing	
49	Dominica	missing	
50	Dominican Republic	51.88	2003
51	East Timor	missing	
52	Ecuador	53.55	1998
53	Egypt, Arab Rep.	34.41	2004
54	El Salvador	52.36	2002
55	Equatorial Guinea	35.78	2003
56	Eritrea	29.97	1999
57	Estonia	missing	
58	Ethiopia	missing	
59	Fiji	missing	
60	Finland	26.88	2000
61	France	32.70	1995
62	Gabon	missing	
63	Gambia, The	47.36	2003
64	Georgia	40.37	2003
65	Germany	28.31	2000
66	Ghana	30.00	1999
67	Greece	34.27	2000
68	Grenada	missing	
69	Guam	missing	
70	Guatemala	55.34	2002
71	Guinea	38.60	2003
72	Guinea-Bissau	47.00	1993

73	Guyana	43.20	1999
74	Haiti	59.21	2001
75	Honduras	53.84	2003
76	Hong Kong, China	43.40	1996
77	Hungary	26.82	2002
78	Iceland	missing	
79	India	36.80	2004
80	Indonesia	34.30	2002
81	Iran, Islamic Rep.	38.35	2005
82	Iraq	missing	
83	Ireland	34.28	2000
84	Israel	39.20	2001
85	Italy	36.30	2000
86	Jamaica	37.90	2000
87	Japan	24.90	1993
88	Jordan	38.84	2002
89	Kazakhstan	33.91	2003
90	Kenya	42.50	1997
91	Kiribati	missing	
92	Korea, North	missing	
93	Korea, South	31.59	1998
94	Kuwait	30.31	2003
95	Kyrgyz Republic	34.65	2002
96	Lao PDR	37.66	2003
97	Latvia	missing	
98	Lebanon	missing	
99	Lesotho	63.20	1995
100	Liberia	missing	
101	Libya	missing	
102	Liechtenstein	missing	
103	Lithuania	36.10	2003
104	Luxembourg	30.76	2000
105	Macau, China	missing	
106	Macedonia, FYR	38.99	2003
107	Madagascar	47.45	2001
108	Malawi	39.00	2004
109	Malaysia	49.15	1997
110	Maldives	missing	
111	Mali	40.10	2001

112	Malta	missing	
113	Marshall Islands	missing	
114	Mauritania	39.10	2000
115	Mauritius	missing	
116	Mexico	49.68	2002
117	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	missing	
118	Moldova	33.22	2003
119	Monaco	missing	
120	Mongolia	32.80	2002
121	Morocco	39.50	1998
122	Mozambique	47.29	2002
123	Myanmar	missing	
124	Namibia	70.70	1993
125	Nauru	missing	
126	Nepal	47.17	2003
127	Netherlands	30.90	1999
128	New Zealand	36.17	1997
129	Nicaragua	43.11	2001
130	Niger	50.50	1995
131	Nigeria	43.70	2003
132	Norway	25.79	2000
133	Oman	missing	
134	Pakistan	30.39	2002
135	Palau	missing	
136	Palestinian territories	missing	
137	Panama	56.80	2003
138	Papua New Guinea	50.90	1996
139	Paraguay	58.36	2003
140	Peru	52.20	2003
141	Philippines	44.53	2003
142	Poland	34.50	2002
143	Portugal	38.45	1997
144	Qatar	missing	
145	Romania	31.60	2003
146	Russian Federation	39.93	2002
147	Rwanda	46.79	2000
148	Samoa	missing	
149	San Marino	missing	
150	Sao Tome and Principe	missing	

151	Saudi Arabia	missing	
152	Senegal	41.25	2001
153	Serbia and Montenegro	30.20	2003
154	Seychelles	missing	
155	Sierra Leone	39.96	2003
156	Singapore	42.48	1998
157	Slovak Republic	25.80	1996
158	Slovenia	30.94	2004
159	Solomon Islands	missing	
160	Somalia	missing	
161	South Africa	57.78	2000
162	Spain	34.66	2000
163	Sri Lanka	40.17	2002
164	St. Kitts and Nevis	missing	
165	St. Lucia	42.60	1995
166	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	missing	
167	Sudan	missing	
168	Suriname	missing	
169	Swaziland	50.40	2000
170	Sweden	25.00	2000
171	Switzerland	33.68	2000
172	Syrian Arab Republic	missing	
173	Taiwan	missing	
174	Tajikistan	32.63	2003
175	Tanzania	34.62	2000
176	Thailand	41.98	2002
177	Togo	missing	
178	Tonga	missing	
179	Trinidad and Tobago	40.30	1992
180	Tunisia	39.80	2000
181	Turkey	43.64	2003
182	Turkmenistan	40.76	1998
183	Tuvalu	missing	
184	Uganda	45.70	2002
185	Ukraine	28.50	2003
186	United Arab Emirates	missing	
187	United Kingdom	35.97	1999
188	United States	40.81	2000
189	Uruguay	44.85	2003

190	Uzbekistan	36.77	2003
191	Vanuatu	missing	
192	Venezuela	48.20	2003
193	Vietnam	37.50	2004
194	Western Sahara	missing	
195	Yemen	37.70	2005
196	Zambia	50.80	2004
197	Zimbabwe	56.80	1995

Table C3. Countries for which Female Unemployment rates were available from Key Indicators of the Labor Market database 2006, along with the year of the data and the respective rate.

No.	Country	Year	Female Unemp. rate (%)	Age
1	Afghanistan	9.5	2005	15+
2	Albania	18.3	2003	15+
3	Algeria	25.4	2003	15+
4	Andorra	missing		
5	Angola	missing		
6	Antigua and Barbuda	missing		
7	Argentina	18.7	2003	15+
8	Armenia	34.4	1997	15+
9	Australia	6.1	2003	15+
10	Austria	4.1	2003	15+
11	Azerbaijan	9.5	2005	15+
12	Bahamas, The	11.7	2003	15+
13	Bahrain	10.0	2001	15+
14	Bangladesh	4.9	2003	15+
15	Barbados	12.6	2003	15+
16	Belarus	missing		
17	Belgium	8.0	2003	15+
18	Belize	15.3	2002	14+
19	Benin	missing		
20	Bhutan	missing		
21	Bolivia	6.8	2002	15+
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	missing		
23	Botswana	26.3	2003	12+
24	Brazil	12.3	2003	15+
25	Brunei	missing		
26	Bulgaria	13.2	2003	15-69
27	Burkina Faso	2.6	1998	10+
28	Burundi	missing		
29	Cambodia	2.0	2001	15+
30	Cameroon	6.7	2001	15+
31	Canada	7.2	2003	15+
32	Cape Verde	missing		
33	Central African Republic	missing		

34	Chad	missing		
35	Chile	8.3	2003	15+
36	China	missing		
37	Colombia	18.5	2003	10+
38	Comoros	missing		
39	Congo, Dem. Rep.	missing		
40	Congo, Rep.	missing		
41	Costa Rica	8.2	2003	15+
42	Cote d'Ivoire	missing		
43	Croatia	15.6	2003	15+
44	Cuba	3.4	2003	17-55
45	Cyprus	4.6	2003	15+
46	Czech Republic	9.9	2003	15+
47	Denmark	5.7	2003	15+
48	Djibouti	missing		
49	Dominica	9.4	2001	15+
50	Dominican Republic	26.6	2003	10+
51	East Timor	missing		
52	Ecuador	15.0	2003	15+
53	Egypt, Arab Rep.	24.2	2003	15-64
54	El Salvador	3.5	2003	15+
55	Equatorial Guinea	missing		
56	Eritrea	missing		
57	Estonia	9.9	2003	15-74
58	Ethiopia	31.2	2004	15+
59	Fiji	missing		
60	Finland	8.9	2003	15+
61	France	11.0	2003	15+
62	Gabon	missing		
63	Gambia, The	missing		
64	Georgia	11.5	2003	15+
65	Germany	8.8	2003	15+
66	Ghana	10.7	1999	15+
67	Greece	14.3	2003	15+
68	Grenada	21.3	1998	15+
69	Guam	missing		
70	Guatemala	4.9	2003	10+
71	Guinea	missing		
72	Guinea-Bissau	missing		

73	Guyana	14.3	2001	14+
74	Haiti	8.3	1999	15+
75	Honduras	6.4	2003	15+
76	Hong Kong, China	6.2	2003	15+
77	Hungary	5.6	2003	15+
78	Iceland	3.1	2003	16+
79	India	5.3	2004	15+
80	Indonesia	13.0	2003	15+
81	Iran, Islamic Rep.	22.4	2002	10+
82	Iraq	16.0	2003	15+
83	Ireland	3.9	2003	15+
84	Israel	11.3	2003	15+
85	Italy	11.6	2003	15+
86	Jamaica	16.7	2003	14+
87	Japan	4.9	2003	15+
88	Jordan	19.7	2003	15+
89	Kazakhstan	10.4	2003	15+
90	Kenya	missing		
91	Kiribati	missing		
92	Korea, North	missing		
93	Korea, South	3.3	2003	15+
94	Kuwait	missing		
95	Kyrgyz Republic	10.5	2003	15+
96	Lao PDR	1.4	2005	15+
97	Latvia	10.5	2003	15-74
98	Lebanon	missing		
99	Lesotho	47.1	1997	15+
100	Liberia	missing		
101	Libya	missing		
102	Liechtenstein	missing		
103	Lithuania	12.1	2003	15+
104	Luxembourg	4.6	2003	15+
105	Macau, China	4.7	2003	14+
106	Macedonia, FYR	36.3	2003	15+
107	Madagascar	6.2	2003	15+
108	Malawi	0.6	1998	10+
109	Malaysia	3.6	2003	15-64
110	Maldives	2.7	2000	15+
111	Mali	10.9	2004	15+

112	Malta	8.2	2003	15+
113	Marshall Islands	24.3	2005	16+
114	Mauritania	missing		
115	Mauritius	12.6	2003	12+
116	Mexico	2.6	2003	15+
117	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	missing		
118	Moldova	6.4	2003	15+
119	Monaco	missing		
120	Mongolia	14.1	2003	15+
121	Morocco	13.0	2003	15+
122	Mozambique	missing		
123	Myanmar	missing		
124	Namibia	35.9	2001	15+
125	Nauru	missing		
126	Nepal	10.7	2001	10+
127	Netherlands	4.5	2003	15+
128	New Zealand	5.0	2003	15+
129	Nicaragua	8.1	2003	15+
130	Niger	missing		
131	Nigeria	missing		
132	Norway	3.9	2003	16+
133	Oman	missing		
134	Pakistan	16.5	2003	10+
135	Palau	missing		
136	Palestinian territories	18.4	2003	10+
137	Panama	18.8	2003	15+
138	Papua New Guinea	1.3	2000	10+
139	Paraguay	10.0	2003	15+
140	Peru	11.9	2003	15+
141	Philippines	10.3	2003	15+
142	Poland	20.4	2003	15+
143	Portugal	7.3	2003	15+
144	Qatar	12.6	2001	15+
145	Romania	6.4	2003	15+
146	Russian Federation	7.2	2003	15-72
147	Rwanda	0.4	1996	15-64
148	Samoa	missing		
149	San Marino	missing		
150	Sao Tome and Principe	17.8	2000	10+

151	Saudi Arabia	11.5	2002	15+
152	Senegal	missing		
153	Serbia and Montenegro	16.4	2003	15+
154	Seychelles	missing		
155	Sierra Leone	missing		
156	Singapore	5.3	2003	15+
157	Slovak Republic	17.7	2003	15+
158	Slovenia	7.0	2003	15+
159	Solomon Islands	missing		
160	Somalia	missing		
161	South Africa	35.2	2003	15+
162	Spain	15.9	2003	16+
163	Sri Lanka	14.7	2003	15+
164	St. Kitts and Nevis	missing		
165	St. Lucia	30.7	2003	15+
166	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	missing		
167	Sudan	missing		
168	Suriname	20.4	1999	15+
169	Swaziland	26.0	1997	15+
170	Sweden	5.2	2003	16+
171	Switzerland	4.5	2003	15+
172	Syrian Arab Republic	28.3	2003	15+
173	Taiwan	4.3	2003	15+
174	Tajikistan	missing		
175	Tanzania	5.8	2001	10+
176	Thailand	1.4	2003	15+
177	Togo	missing		
178	Tonga	missing		
179	Trinidad and Tobago	13.8	2003	15+
180	Tunisia	16.2	2003	15+
181	Turkey	10.1	2003	15+
182	Turkmenistan	missing		
183	Tuvalu	missing		
184	Uganda	3.9	2003	10+
185	Ukraine	8.7	2003	15-70
186	United Arab Emirates	2.6	2000	15-64
187	United Kingdom	4.1	2003	16+
188	United States	5.7	2003	16+
189	Uruguay	20.8	2003	14+

190	Uzbekistan	missing		
191	Vanuatu	missing		
192	Venezuela	20.3	2003	15+
193	Vietnam	2.6	2003	15+
194	Western Sahara	missing		
195	Yemen	8.2	1999	15+
196	Zambia	12.0	1998	12+
197	Zimbabwe	6.1	2002	15+

Table C4. Countries for which Population Growth Rates were available from World Development Indicators Database.

No.	Country	Pop. Growth Rate	Year of the data
1	Afghanistan	missing	
2	Albania	0.56	2003
3	Algeria	1.49	2003
4	Andorra	0.30	2005
5	Angola	2.96	2003
6	Antigua and Barbuda	1.50	2003
7	Argentina	0.96	2003
8	Armenia	-0.41	2003
9	Australia	1.24	2003
10	Austria	0.42	2003
11	Azerbaijan	0.76	2003
12	Bahamas, The	1.27	2003
13	Bahrain	2.21	2003
14	Bangladesh	1.91	2003
15	Barbados	0.38	2003
16	Belarus	-0.52	2003
17	Belgium	0.42	2003
18	Belize	3.15	2003
19	Benin	3.27	2003
20	Bhutan	2.77	2003
21	Bolivia	1.99	2003
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.41	2003
23	Botswana	1.12	2003
24	Brazil	1.41	2003
25	Brunei	2.29	2003
26	Bulgaria	-0.59	2003
27	Burkina Faso	3.25	2003
28	Burundi	3.41	2003
29	Cambodia	1.72	2003
30	Cameroon	2.33	2003
31	Canada	0.85	2003
32	Cape Verde	2.36	2003
33	Central African Republic	1.54	2003
34	Chad	3.73	2003

35	Chile	1.11	2003
36	China	0.62	2003
37	Colombia	1.51	2003
38	Comoros	2.11	2003
39	Congo, Dem. Rep.	3.01	2003
40	Congo, Rep.	2.39	2003
41	Costa Rica	1.92	2003
42	Cote d'Ivoire	1.63	2003
43	Croatia	-0.03	2003
44	Cuba	0.22	2003
45	Cyprus	1.74	2003
46	Czech Republic	0.01	2003
47	Denmark	0.24	2003
48	Djibouti	1.82	2003
49	Dominica	0.19	2003
50	Dominican Republic	1.59	2003
51	East Timor	5.36	2003
52	Ecuador	1.18	2003
53	Egypt, Arab Rep.	1.82	2003
54	El Salvador	1.43	2003
55	Equatorial Guinea	2.33	2003
56	Eritrea	4.31	2003
57	Estonia	-0.38	2003
58	Ethiopia	2.59	2003
59	Fiji	0.63	2003
60	Finland	0.24	2003
61	France	0.93	2003
62	Gabon	1.74	2003
63	Gambia, The	3.12	2003
64	Georgia	-1.09	2003
65	Germany	0.04	2003
66	Ghana	2.26	2003
67	Greece	0.33	2003
68	Grenada	1.07	2003
69	Guam	1.75	2003
70	Guatemala	2.49	2003
71	Guinea	1.83	2003
72	Guinea-Bissau	3.10	2003
73	Guyana	0.21	2003

74	Haiti	1.61	2003
75	Honduras	1.95	2003
76	Hong Kong, China	0.37	2003
77	Hungary	-0.29	2003
78	Iceland	0.54	2003
79	India	1.49	2003
80	Indonesia	1.34	2003
81	Iran, Islamic Rep.	1.55	2003
82	Iraq	2.84	1999
83	Ireland	1.61	2003
84	Israel	1.81	2003
85	Italy	0.78	2003
86	Jamaica	0.49	2003
87	Japan	0.21	2003
88	Jordan	2.47	2003
89	Kazakhstan	0.34	2003
90	Kenya	2.60	2003
91	Kiribati	1.75	2003
92	Korea, North	0.55	2003
93	Korea, South	0.49	2003
94	Kuwait	2.60	2003
95	Kyrgyz Republic	0.91	2003
96	Lao PDR	1.56	2003
97	Latvia	-0.54	2003
98	Lebanon	1.24	2003
99	Lesotho	0.93	2003
100	Liberia	1.36	2003
101	Libya	2.04	2003
102	Liechtenstein	1.02	2004
103	Lithuania	-0.43	2003
104	Luxembourg	1.44	2003
105	Macau, China	1.50	2003
106	Macedonia, FYR	0.23	2003
107	Madagascar	2.82	2003
108	Malawi	2.53	2003
109	Malaysia	1.92	2003
110	Maldives	1.53	2003
111	Mali	3.00	2003
112	Malta	0.67	2003

113	Marshall Islands	3.69	2003
114	Mauritania	2.91	2003
115	Mauritius	1.04	2003
116	Mexico	1.01	2003
117	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	0.68	2003
118	Moldova	-1.38	2003
119	Monaco	0.31	2004
120	Mongolia	1.26	2003
121	Morocco	1.14	2003
122	Mozambique	2.46	2003
123	Myanmar	0.86	2003
124	Namibia	1.34	2003
125	Nauru	missing	
126	Nepal	2.06	2003
127	Netherlands	0.47	2003
128	New Zealand	1.97	2003
129	Nicaragua	1.31	2003
130	Niger	3.51	2003
131	Nigeria	2.50	2003
132	Norway	0.59	2003
133	Oman	0.62	2003
134	Pakistan	2.41	2003
135	Palau	1.51	2004
136	Palestinian territories	4.11	2003
137	Panama	1.82	2003
138	Papua New Guinea	2.42	2003
139	Paraguay	1.97	2003
140	Peru	1.21	2003
141	Philippines	2.09	2003
142	Poland	-0.09	2003
143	Portugal	0.70	2003
144	Qatar	5.64	2003
145	Romania	-0.28	2003
146	Russian Federation	-0.48	2003
147	Rwanda	1.70	2003
148	Samoa	0.63	2003
149	San Marino	0.71	2005
150	Sao Tome and Principe	1.71	2003
151	Saudi Arabia	2.13	2003

152	Senegal	2.61	2003
153	Serbia and Montenegro	-0.25	2003
154	Seychelles	-1.08	2003
155	Sierra Leone	4.73	2003
156	Singapore	0.24	2003
157	Slovak Republic	0.01	2003
158	Slovenia	0.09	2003
159	Solomon Islands	2.57	2003
160	Somalia	2.98	2003
161	South Africa	1.22	2003
162	Spain	1.66	2003
163	Sri Lanka	1.29	2003
164	St. Kitts and Nevis	0.00	2003
165	St. Lucia	0.93	2003
166	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.55	2003
167	Sudan	1.95	2003
168	Suriname	0.70	2003
169	Swaziland	1.58	2003
170	Sweden	0.36	2003
171	Switzerland	0.74	2003
172	Syrian Arab Republic	2.73	2003
173	Taiwan	missing	
174	Tajikistan	1.15	2003
175	Tanzania	2.59	2003
176	Thailand	0.73	2003
177	Togo	2.80	2003
178	Tonga	0.25	2003
179	Trinidad and Tobago	0.34	2003
180	Tunisia	0.59	2003
181	Turkey	1.55	2003
182	Turkmenistan	1.45	2003
183	Tuvalu	missing	
184	Uganda	3.20	2003
185	Ukraine	-0.81	2003
186	United Arab Emirates	4.77	2003
187	United Kingdom	0.47	2003
188	United States	0.92	2003
189	Uruguay	-0.15	2003
190	Uzbekistan	1.16	2003

191	Vanuatu	2.63	2003
192	Venezuela	1.78	2003
193	Vietnam	1.46	2003
194	Western Sahara	missing	
195	Yemen	2.98	2003
196	Zambia	1.81	2003
197	Zimbabwe	0.64	2003

Table C5. Countries for which Freedom Status data were available from Freedom in the World database. Data is for year 2003. (NF=Not Free, PF= Partially Free, F=Free).

No.	Country	Freedom Status
1	Afghanistan	NF
2	Albania	PF
3	Algeria	NF
4	Andorra	F
5	Angola	NF
6	Antigua and Barbuda	PF
7	Argentina	F
8	Armenia	PF
9	Australia	F
10	Austria	F
11	Azerbaijan	NF
12	Bahamas, The	F
13	Bahrain	PF
14	Bangladesh	PF
15	Barbados	F
16	Belarus	NF
17	Belgium	F
18	Belize	F
19	Benin	F
20	Bhutan	NF
21	Bolivia	PF
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	PF
23	Botswana	F
24	Brazil	F
25	Brunei	NF
26	Bulgaria	F
27	Burkina Faso	PF
28	Burundi	PF
29	Cambodia	NF
30	Cameroon	NF
31	Canada	F
32	Cape Verde	F
33	Central African Republic	NF
34	Chad	NF

35	Chile	F
36	China	NF
37	Colombia	PF
38	Comoros	PF
39	Congo, Dem. Rep.	missing
40	Congo, Rep.	NF
41	Costa Rica	F
42	Cote d'Ivoire	NF
43	Croatia	F
44	Cuba	NF
45	Cyprus	F
46	Czech Republic	F
47	Denmark	F
48	Djibouti	PF
49	Dominica	F
50	Dominican Republic	F
51	East Timor	PF
52	Ecuador	PF
53	Egypt, Arab Rep.	NF
54	El Salvador	F
55	Equatorial Guinea	NF
56	Eritrea	NF
57	Estonia	F
58	Ethiopia	PF
59	Fiji	PF
60	Finland	F
61	France	F
62	Gabon	PF
63	Gambia, The	PF
64	Georgia	PF
65	Germany	F
66	Ghana	F
67	Greece	F
68	Grenada	F
69	Guam	missing
70	Guatemala	PF
71	Guinea	NF
72	Guinea-Bissau	PF
73	Guyana	F

74	Haiti	NF
75	Honduras	PF
76	Hong Kong, China	missing
77	Hungary	F
78	Iceland	F
79	India	F
80	Indonesia	PF
81	Iran, Islamic Rep.	NF
82	Iraq	NF
83	Ireland	F
84	Israel	F
85	Italy	F
86	Jamaica	F
87	Japan	F
88	Jordan	PF
89	Kazakhstan	NF
90	Kenya	PF
91	Kiribati	F
92	Korea, North	NF
93	Korea, South	F
94	Kuwait	PF
95	Kyrgyz Republic	NF
96	Lao PDR	NF
97	Latvia	F
98	Lebanon	NF
99	Lesotho	F
100	Liberia	NF
101	Libya	NF
102	Liechtenstein	F
103	Lithuania	F
104	Luxembourg	F
105	Macau, China	missing
106	Macedonia, FYR	PF
107	Madagascar	PF
108	Malawi	PF
109	Malaysia	PF
110	Maldives	NF
111	Mali	F
112	Malta	F

113	Marshall Islands	F
114	Mauritania	NF
115	Mauritius	F
116	Mexico	F
117	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	F
118	Moldova	PF
119	Monaco	F
120	Mongolia	F
121	Morocco	PF
122	Mozambique	PF
123	Myanmar	NF
124	Namibia	F
125	Nauru	F
126	Nepal	PF
127	Netherlands	F
128	New Zealand	F
129	Nicaragua	PF
130	Niger	PF
131	Nigeria	PF
132	Norway	F
133	Oman	NF
134	Pakistan	NF
135	Palau	F
136	Palestinian territories	missing
137	Panama	F
138	Papua New Guinea	PF
139	Paraguay	PF
140	Peru	F
141	Philippines	F
142	Poland	F
143	Portugal	F
144	Qatar	NF
145	Romania	F
146	Russian Federation	PF
147	Rwanda	NF
148	Samoa	F
149	San Marino	F
150	Sao Tome and Principe	F
151	Saudi Arabia	NF

152	Senegal	F
153	Serbia and Montenegro	F
154	Seychelles	PF
155	Sierra Leone	PF
156	Singapore	PF
157	Slovak Republic	F
158	Slovenia	F
159	Solomon Islands	PF
160	Somalia	NF
161	South Africa	F
162	Spain	F
163	Sri Lanka	PF
164	St. Kitts and Nevis	F
165	St. Lucia	F
166	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	F
167	Sudan	NF
168	Suriname	F
169	Swaziland	NF
170	Sweden	F
171	Switzerland	F
172	Syrian Arab Republic	NF
173	Taiwan	F
174	Tajikistan	NF
175	Tanzania	PF
176	Thailand	F
177	Togo	NF
178	Tonga	PF
179	Trinidad and Tobago	PF
180	Tunisia	NF
181	Turkey	PF
182	Turkmenistan	NF
183	Tuvalu	F
184	Uganda	PF
185	Ukraine	PF
186	United Arab Emirates	NF
187	United Kingdom	F
188	United States	F
189	Uruguay	F
190	Uzbekistan	NF

191	Vanuatu	F
192	Venezuela	PF
193	Vietnam	NF
194	Western Sahara	PF
195	Yemen	missing
196	Zambia	PF
197	Zimbabwe	NF

Table C6. Countries for which female to male secondary school enrolment ratios were available from World Development Indicators, along with the year of the data and the respective values.

No.	Country	Female to male secondary enrollment ratio	Year
1	Afghanistan	35	2003
2	Albania	98	2003
3	Algeria	107	2003
4	Andorra	105	2003
5	Angola	78	2001
6	Antigua and Barbuda	missing	
7	Argentina	107	2003
8	Armenia	102	2003
9	Australia	97	2003
10	Austria	95	2003
11	Azerbaijan	97	2003
12	Bahamas, The	102	2003
13	Bahrain	107	2003
14	Bangladesh	111	2003
15	Barbados	102	2003
16	Belarus	103	2003
17	Belgium	110	2003
18	Belize	105	2003
19	Benin	47	2003
20	Bhutan	83	2002
21	Bolivia	97	2003
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	missing	
23	Botswana	107	2003
24	Brazil	111	2003
25	Brunei	106	2003
26	Bulgaria	97	2003
27	Burkina Faso	68	2003
28	Burundi	68	2003
29	Cambodia	64	2003
30	Cameroon	70	2003
31	Canada	100	2002
32	Cape Verde	109	2003
33	Central African Republic	missing	

34	Chad	32	2003
35	Chile	101	2003
36	China	97	2003
37	Colombia	110	2003
38	Comoros	83	2003
39	Congo, Dem. Rep.	58	2003
40	Congo, Rep.	68	2003
41	Costa Rica	108	2003
42	Cote d'Ivoire	55	2002
43	Croatia	102	2003
44	Cuba	98	2003
45	Cyprus	102	2003
46	Czech Republic	103	2003
47	Denmark	105	2003
48	Djibouti	66	2003
49	Dominica	104	2003
50	Dominican Republic	121	2003
51	East Timor	missing	
52	Ecuador	102	2003
53	Egypt, Arab Rep.	93	2003
54	El Salvador	102	2003
55	Equatorial Guinea	57	2002
56	Eritrea	64	2003
57	Estonia	104	2003
58	Ethiopia	57	2003
59	Fiji	108	2003
60	Finland	111	2003
61	France	101	2003
62	Gabon	86	2000
63	Gambia, The	84	2003
64	Georgia	99	2003
65	Germany	98	2003
66	Ghana	85	2003
67	Greece	102	2003
68	Grenada	99	2003
69	Guam	missing	
70	Guatemala	89	2003
71	Guinea	47	2003
72	Guinea-Bissau	54	2001

73	Guyana	103	2002
74	Haiti	missing	
75	Honduras	missing	
76	Hong Kong, China	99	2003
77	Hungary	100	2003
78	Iceland	106	2003
79	India	81	2003
80	Indonesia	99	2003
81	Iran, Islamic Rep.	94	2003
82	Iraq	71	2003
83	Ireland	109	2003
84	Israel	98	2003
85	Italy	99	2003
86	Jamaica	102	2003
87	Japan	100	2003
88	Jordan	102	2003
89	Kazakhstan	101	2003
90	Kenya	102	2003
91	Kiribati	119	2003
92	Korea, North	missing	
93	Korea, South	99	2003
94	Kuwait	104	2003
95	Kyrgyz Republic	101	2003
96	Lao PDR	74	2003
97	Latvia	100	2003
98	Lebanon	108	2003
99	Lesotho	127	2003
100	Liberia	72	2000
101	Libya	106	2003
102	Liechtenstein	88	2003
103	Lithuania	98	2003
104	Luxembourg	92	2003
105	Macau, China	104	2003
106	Macedonia, FYR	98	2003
107	Madagascar	missing	
108	Malawi	78	2002
109	Malaysia	112	2003
110	Maldives	111	2003
111	Mali	53	2003

112	Malta	99	2003
113	Marshall Islands	104	2003
114	Mauritania	84	2003
115	Mauritius	99	2003
116	Mexico	105	2003
117	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	missing	
118	Moldova	104	2003
119	Monaco	missing	
120	Mongolia	116	2003
121	Morocco	82	2003
122	Mozambique	66	2002
123	Myanmar	95	2003
124	Namibia	112	2003
125	Nauru	missing	
126	Nepal	77	2003
127	Netherlands	98	2003
128	New Zealand	111	2003
129	Nicaragua	113	2003
130	Niger	62	2003
131	Nigeria	missing	
132	Norway	102	2003
133	Oman	96	2003
134	Pakistan	79	2003
135	Palau	118	2003
136	Palestinian territories	106	2003
137	Panama	107	2003
138	Papua New Guinea	missing	
139	Paraguay	101	2003
140	Peru	100	2003
141	Philippines	110	2003
142	Poland	96	2003
143	Portugal	109	2003
144	Qatar	105	2003
145	Romania	102	2003
146	Russian Federation	100	2003
147	Rwanda	89	2003
148	Samoa	114	2003
149	San Marino	118	2003
150	Sao Tome and Principe	93	2003

151	Saudi Arabia	69	2003
152	Senegal	missing	
153	Serbia and Montenegro	missing	
154	Seychelles	104	2003
155	Sierra Leone	71	2001
156	Singapore	102	2003
157	Slovak Republic	101	2003
158	Slovenia	99	2003
159	Solomon Islands	82	2003
160	Somalia	missing	
161	South Africa	107	2003
162	Spain	105	2003
163	Sri Lanka	106	2003
164	St. Kitts and Nevis	106	2003
165	St. Lucia	114	2003
166	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	109	2003
167	Sudan	92	2003
168	Suriname	134	2003
169	Swaziland	101	2003
170	Sweden	118	2003
171	Switzerland	94	2003
172	Syrian Arab Republic	93	2003
173	Taiwan	missing	
174	Tajikistan	83	2003
175	Tanzania	missing	
176	Thailand	101	2003
177	Togo	47	2003
178	Tonga	112	2002
179	Trinidad and Tobago	109	2003
180	Tunisia	109	2003
181	Turkey	75	2003
182	Turkmenistan	missing	
183	Tuvalu	missing	
184	Uganda	81	2003
185	Ukraine	100	2003
186	United Arab Emirates	103	2003
187	United Kingdom	103	2003
188	United States	100	2003
189	Uruguay	115	2003

190	Uzbekistan	97	2003
191	Vanuatu	84	2003
192	Venezuela	115	2003
193	Vietnam	93	2003
194	Western Sahara	missing	
195	Yemen	45	2003
196	Zambia	83	2002
197	Zimbabwe	91	2003

Table C7. Countries for which Corruption Perception Index values were available, along with the year of the data and the respective value.

No.	Country	CPI	Year
1	Afghanistan	2.5	2005
2	Albania	2.5	2003
3	Algeria	2.6	2003
4	Andorra	missing	
5	Angola	1.8	2003
6	Antigua and Barbuda	missing	
7	Argentina	2.5	2003
8	Armenia	3	2003
9	Australia	8.8	2003
10	Austria	8	2003
11	Azerbaijan	1.8	2003
12	Bahamas, The	missing	
13	Bahrain	6.1	2003
14	Bangladesh	1.3	2003
15	Barbados	7.3	2004
16	Belarus	4.2	2003
17	Belgium	7.6	2003
18	Belize	4.5	2003
19	Benin	3.2	2004
20	Bhutan	missing	
21	Bolivia	2.4	2003
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.3	2003
23	Botswana	5.7	2003
24	Brazil	3.9	2003
25	Brunei	missing	
26	Bulgaria	3.9	2003
27	Burkina Faso	3.4	2005
28	Burundi	2.3	2005
29	Cambodia	2.3	2005
30	Cameroon	1.8	2003
31	Canada	8.7	2003
32	Cape Verde	missing	
33	Central African Republic	missing	
34	Chad	1.7	2004
35	Chile	7.4	2003

36	China	3.4	2003
37	Colombia	3.7	2003
38	Comoros	missing	
39	Congo, Dem. Rep.	2	2004
40	Congo, Rep.	2.2	2003
41	Costa Rica	4.3	2003
42	Cote d'Ivoire	2.1	2003
43	Croatia	3.7	2003
44	Cuba	4.6	2003
45	Cyprus	6.1	2003
46	Czech Republic	3.9	2003
47	Denmark	9.5	2003
48	Djibouti	missing	
49	Dominica	missing	
50	Dominican Republic	3.3	2003
51	East Timor	missing	
52	Ecuador	2.2	2003
53	Egypt, Arab Rep.	3.3	2003
54	El Salvador	3.7	2003
55	Equatorial Guinea	1.9	2005
56	Eritrea	2.6	2004
57	Estonia	5.5	2003
58	Ethiopia	2.5	2003
59	Fiji	4	2005
60	Finland	9.7	2003
61	France	6.9	2003
62	Gabon	3.3	2004
63	Gambia, The	2.5	2003
64	Georgia	1.8	2003
65	Germany	7.7	2003
66	Ghana	3.3	2003
67	Greece	4.3	2003
68	Grenada	missing	
69	Guam	missing	
70	Guatemala	2.4	2003
71	Guinea	missing	
72	Guinea-Bissau	missing	
73	Guyana	2.5	2005
74	Haiti	1.5	2003

75	Honduras	2.3	2003
76	Hong Kong, China	8	2003
77	Hungary	4.8	2003
78	Iceland	9.6	2003
79	India	2.8	2003
80	Indonesia	1.9	2003
81	Iran, Islamic Rep.	3	2003
82	Iraq	2.2	2003
83	Ireland	7.5	2003
84	Israel	7	2003
85	Italy	5.3	2003
86	Jamaica	3.8	2003
87	Japan	7	2003
88	Jordan	4.6	2003
89	Kazakhstan	2.4	2003
90	Kenya	1.9	2003
91	Kiribati	missing	
92	Korea, North	missing	
93	Korea, South	4.3	2003
94	Kuwait	5.3	2003
95	Kyrgyz Republic	2.1	2003
96	Lao PDR	3.3	2005
97	Latvia	3.8	2003
98	Lebanon	3	2003
99	Lesotho	3.4	2005
100	Liberia	2.2	2005
101	Libya	2.1	2003
102	Liechtenstein	4.7	2003
103	Lithuania	8.7	2003
104	Luxembourg	missing	
105	Macau, China	missing	
106	Macedonia, FYR	2.3	2003
107	Madagascar	2.6	2003
108	Malawi	2.8	2003
109	Malaysia	5.2	2003
110	Maldives	missing	
111	Mali	3	2003
112	Malta	6.8	2004
113	Marshall Islands	missing	

114	Mauritania	missing	
115	Mauritius	4.4	2003
116	Mexico	3.6	2003
117	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	missing	
118	Moldova	2.4	2003
119	Monaco	missing	
120	Mongolia	3	2004
121	Morocco	3.3	2003
122	Mozambique	2.7	2003
123	Myanmar	1.6	2003
124	Namibia	4.7	2003
125	Nauru	missing	
126	Nepal	2.8	2004
127	Netherlands	8.9	2003
128	New Zealand	9.5	2003
129	Nicaragua	2.6	2003
130	Niger	missing	
131	Nigeria	1.4	2003
132	Norway	8.8	2003
133	Oman	6.3	2003
134	Pakistan	2.5	2003
135	Palau	missing	
136	Palestinian territories	3	2003
137	Panama	3.4	2003
138	Papua New Guinea	2.1	2003
139	Paraguay	1.6	2003
140	Peru	3.7	2003
141	Philippines	2.5	2003
142	Poland	3.6	2003
143	Portugal	6.6	2003
144	Qatar	5.6	2003
145	Romania	2.8	2003
146	Russian Federation	2.7	2003
147	Rwanda	3.1	2005
148	Samoa	missing	
149	San Marino	missing	
150	Sao Tome and Principe	missing	
151	Saudi Arabia	4.5	2003
152	Senegal	3.2	2003

153	Serbia and Montenegro	2.3	2003
154	Seychelles	4.4	2004
155	Sierra Leone	2.2	2003
156	Singapore	9.4	2003
157	Slovak Republic	3.7	2003
158	Slovenia	5.9	2003
159	Solomon Islands	missing	
160	Somalia	2.1	2005
161	South Africa	4.4	2003
162	Spain	6.8	2003
163	Sri Lanka	3.4	2003
164	St. Kitts and Nevis	missing	
165	St. Lucia	missing	
166	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	missing	
167	Sudan	2.3	2003
168	Suriname	4.3	2004
169	Swaziland	9.3	2003
170	Sweden	8.8	2003
171	Switzerland	3.4	2003
172	Syrian Arab Republic	5.7	2003
173	Taiwan	1.8	2003
174	Tajikistan	2.5	2003
175	Tanzania	missing	
176	Thailand	3.3	2003
177	Togo	missing	
178	Tonga	missing	
179	Trinidad and Tobago	4.6	2003
180	Tunisia	4.9	2003
181	Turkey	3.1	2003
182	Turkmenistan	2	2004
183	Tuvalu	missing	
184	Uganda	2.2	2003
185	Ukraine	2.3	2003
186	United Arab Emirates	5.2	2003
187	United Kingdom	8.7	2003
188	United States	7.5	2003
189	Uruguay	5.5	2003
190	Uzbekistan	2.4	2003
191	Vanuatu	2.4	2003

192	Venezuela	missing	
193	Vietnam	2.4	2003
194	Western Sahara	missing	
195	Yemen	2.6	2003
196	Zambia	2.5	2003
197	Zimbabwe	2.3	2003

Table C8. Countries for which information on the legal status of sex work was available, and their respective codes.

No.	Country	Sex work	Year
1	Afghanistan	criminalized	2005
2	Albania	criminalized	2004
3	Algeria	criminalized	2004
4	Andorra	criminalized	2004
5	Angola	criminalized	2005
6	Antigua and Barbuda	criminalized	2004
7	Argentina	missing	
8	Armenia	not criminalized	2004
9	Australia	not criminalized	2004
10	Austria	not criminalized	2004
11	Azerbaijan	not criminalized	2004
12	Bahamas, The	criminalized	2004
13	Bahrain	criminalized	2004
14	Bangladesh	not criminalized	2004
15	Barbados	criminalized	2004
16	Belarus	criminalized	2005
17	Belgium	not criminalized	2004
18	Belize	not criminalized	2004
19	Benin	criminalized	2004
20	Bhutan	missing	
21	Bolivia	not criminalized	2004
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	not criminalized	2004
23	Botswana	criminalized	2004
24	Brazil	not criminalized	2004
25	Brunei	criminalized	2004
26	Bulgaria	not criminalized	2004
27	Burkina Faso	not criminalized	2004
28	Burundi	criminalized	2004
29	Cambodia	criminalized	2004
30	Cameroon	criminalized	2004
31	Canada	not criminalized	2004
32	Cape Verde	missing	
33	Central African Republic	criminalized	2004
34	Chad	criminalized	2004
35	Chile	not criminalized	2004

36	China	not criminalized	2004
37	Colombia	not criminalized	2004
38	Comoros	criminalized	2004
39	Congo, Dem. Rep.	not criminalized	2004
40	Congo, Rep.	criminalized	2004
41	Costa Rica	not criminalized	2004
42	Cote d'Ivoire	not criminalized	2004
43	Croatia	criminalized	2004
44	Cuba	not criminalized	2004
45	Cyprus	not criminalized	2004
46	Czech Republic	not criminalized	2004
47	Denmark	not criminalized	2004
48	Djibouti	criminalized	2004
49	Dominica	criminalized	2005
50	Dominican Republic	not criminalized	2004
51	East Timor	not criminalized	2004
52	Ecuador	not criminalized	2004
53	Egypt, Arab Rep.	criminalized	2004
54	El Salvador	not criminalized	2004
55	Equatorial Guinea	criminalized	2004
56	Eritrea	criminalized	2004
57	Estonia	not criminalized	2004
58	Ethiopia	not criminalized	2004
59	Fiji	criminalized	2004
60	Finland	not criminalized	2004
61	France	not criminalized	2004
62	Gabon	criminalized	2004
63	Gambia, The	criminalized	2004
64	Georgia	not criminalized	2004
65	Germany	not criminalized	2004
66	Ghana	not criminalized	2004
67	Greece	not criminalized	2004
68	Grenada	criminalized	2004
69	Guam	missing	
70	Guatemala	not criminalized	2004
71	Guinea	missing	
72	Guinea-Bissau	criminalized	2004
73	Guyana	criminalized	2004
74	Haiti	criminalized	2004

75	Honduras	not criminalized	2004
76	Hong Kong, China	not criminalized	2004
77	Hungary	criminalized	2004
78	Iceland	not criminalized	2004
79	India	criminalized	2004
80	Indonesia	not criminalized	2004
81	Iran, Islamic Rep.	criminalized	2004
82	Iraq	criminalized	2004
83	Ireland	not criminalized	2004
84	Israel	not criminalized	2004
85	Italy	not criminalized	2004
86	Jamaica	criminalized	2004
87	Japan	criminalized	2004
88	Jordan	criminalized	2004
89	Kazakhstan	not criminalized	2004
90	Kenya	criminalized	2004
91	Kiribati	not criminalized	2004
92	Korea, North	missing	
93	Korea, South	criminalized	2004
94	Kuwait	criminalized	2004
95	Kyrgyz Republic	not criminalized	2004
96	Lao PDR	criminalized	2004
97	Latvia	not criminalized	2004
98	Lebanon	not criminalized	2004
99	Lesotho	criminalized	2004
100	Liberia	criminalized	2004
101	Libya	criminalized	2004
102	Liechtenstein	not criminalized	2004
103	Lithuania	criminalized	2004
104	Luxembourg	not criminalized	2004
105	Macau, China	not criminalized	2004
106	Macedonia, FYR	criminalized	2004
107	Madagascar	not criminalized	2004
108	Malawi	not criminalized	2004
109	Malaysia	criminalized	2004
110	Maldives	criminalized	2005
111	Mali	not criminalized	2005
112	Malta	criminalized	2004
113	Marshall Islands	criminalized	2004

114	Mauritania	criminalized	2004
115	Mauritius	criminalized	2004
116	Mexico	not criminalized	2004
117	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	criminalized	2004
118	Moldova	not criminalized	2004
119	Monaco	not criminalized	2004
120	Mongolia	criminalized	2004
121	Morocco	criminalized	2004
122	Mozambique	criminalized	2004
123	Myanmar	criminalized	2004
124	Namibia	not criminalized	2004
125	Nauru	criminalized	2004
126	Nepal	criminalized	2005
127	Netherlands	not criminalized	2004
128	New Zealand	not criminalized	2004
129	Nicaragua	not criminalized	2004
130	Niger	criminalized	2004
131	Nigeria	criminalized	2004
132	Norway	not criminalized	2004
133	Oman	criminalized	2004
134	Pakistan	criminalized	2005
135	Palau	criminalized	2004
136	Palestinian territories	missing	
137	Panama	not criminalized	2004
138	Papua New Guinea	criminalized	2004
139	Paraguay	not criminalized	2004
140	Peru	not criminalized	2004
141	Philippines	criminalized	2004
142	Poland	not criminalized	2004
143	Portugal	not criminalized	2004
144	Qatar	criminalized	2005
145	Romania	criminalized	2004
146	Russian Federation	not criminalized	2004
147	Rwanda	criminalized	2005
148	Samoa	criminalized	2004
149	San Marino	criminalized	2005
150	Sao Tome and Principe	criminalized	2005
151	Saudi Arabia	criminalized	2004
152	Senegal	not criminalized	2004

153	Serbia and Montenegro	criminalized	2004
154	Seychelles	criminalized	2004
155	Sierra Leone	not criminalized	2004
156	Singapore	not criminalized	2004
157	Slovak Republic	not criminalized	2004
158	Slovenia	criminalized	2004
159	Solomon Islands	criminalized	2004
160	Somalia	criminalized	2004
161	South Africa	criminalized	2004
162	Spain	not criminalized	2004
163	Sri Lanka	criminalized	2004
164	St. Kitts and Nevis	criminalized	2004
165	St. Lucia	criminalized	2004
166	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	not criminalized	2004
167	Sudan	criminalized	2004
168	Suriname	criminalized	2004
169	Swaziland	criminalized	2004
170	Sweden	not criminalized	2004
171	Switzerland	not criminalized	2004
172	Syrian Arab Republic	criminalized	2004
173	Taiwan	criminalized	2004
174	Tajikistan	criminalized	2004
175	Tanzania	criminalized	2004
176	Thailand	criminalized	2004
177	Togo	criminalized	2005
178	Tonga	not criminalized	2004
179	Trinidad and Tobago	criminalized	2004
180	Tunisia	criminalized	2004
181	Turkey	not criminalized	2004
182	Turkmenistan	criminalized	2004
183	Tuvalu	criminalized	2004
184	Uganda	criminalized	2004
185	Ukraine	criminalized	2005
186	United Arab Emirates	criminalized	2004
187	United Kingdom	not criminalized	2004
188	United States	criminalized	2004
189	Uruguay	not criminalized	2004
190	Uzbekistan	criminalized	2004
191	Vanuatu	criminalized	2004

192	Venezuela	not criminalized	2004
193	Vietnam	criminalized	2004
194	Western Sahara	missing	
195	Yemen	criminalized	2004
196	Zambia	criminalized	2004
197	Zimbabwe	criminalized	2004

Table C9. Countries for which migration flow data was available. Positive value indicates larger immigration than emigration, and vice versa for negative value.

No.	Country	Net migration
1	Afghanistan	0.80
2	Albania	-19.00
3	Algeria	-1.80
4	Andorra	missing
5	Angola	-1.40
6	Antigua and Barbuda	missing
7	Argentina	0.70
8	Armenia	-2.50
9	Australia	5.10
10	Austria	0.60
11	Azerbaijan	-0.80
12	Bahamas, The	missing
13	Bahrain	6.60
14	Bangladesh	-0.50
15	Barbados	-0.90
16	Belarus	1.50
17	Belgium	1.30
18	Belize	-2.30
19	Benin	-3.20
20	Bhutan	-0.50
21	Bolivia	-0.90
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	27.00
23	Botswana	-0.60
24	Brazil	missing
25	Brunei	2.60
26	Bulgaria	-4.90
27	Burkina Faso	-5.50
28	Burundi	-12.90
29	Cambodia	0.70
30	Cameroon	0.10
31	Canada	4.80
32	Cape Verde	-2.50
33	Central African Republic	0.50
34	Chad	2.70

35	Chile	-0.70
36	China	-0.30
37	Colombia	-1.00
38	Comoros	missing
39	Congo, Dem. Rep.	-7.10
40	Congo, Rep.	-0.30
41	Costa Rica	5.30
42	Cote d'Ivoire	0.80
43	Croatia	missing
44	Cuba	-1.80
45	Cyprus	3.90
46	Czech Republic	1.00
47	Denmark	2.70
48	Djibouti	6.80
49	Dominica	missing
50	Dominican Republic	-1.40
51	East Timor	missing
52	Ecuador	missing
53	Egypt, Arab Rep.	-1.20
54	El Salvador	-1.30
55	Equatorial Guinea	missing
56	Eritrea	0.60
57	Estonia	-8.00
58	Ethiopia	-0.10
59	Fiji	-8.80
60	Finland	0.80
61	France	0.70
62	Gabon	4.30
63	Gambia, The	9.10
64	Georgia	-5.70
65	Germany	2.30
66	Ghana	-1.20
67	Greece	3.30
68	Grenada	missing
69	Guam	-9.50
70	Guatemala	-2.80
71	Guinea	-6.20
72	Guinea-Bissau	-2.90
73	Guyana	-10.60

74	Haiti	-2.70
75	Honduras	-0.70
76	Hong Kong, China	15.10
77	Hungary	-0.70
78	Iceland	0.20
79	India	-0.30
80	Indonesia	-0.90
81	Iran, Islamic Rep.	-1.40
82	Iraq	0.40
83	Ireland	4.90
84	Israel	9.10
85	Italy	2.00
86	Jamaica	-7.40
87	Japan	0.40
88	Jordan	-0.70
89	Kazakhstan	-12.20
90	Kenya	-0.10
91	Kiribati	missing
92	Korea, North	missing
93	Korea, South	-0.40
94	Kuwait	11.10
95	Kyrgyz Republic	-0.50
96	Lao PDR	-0.30
97	Latvia	-2.00
98	Lebanon	4.80
99	Lesotho	-3.40
100	Liberia	36.50
101	Libya	-0.40
102	Liechtenstein	missing
103	Lithuania	missing
104	Luxembourg	9.40
105	Macau, China	6.50
106	Macedonia, FYR	0.50
107	Madagascar	0.00
108	Malawi	-0.80
109	Malaysia	0.40
110	Maldives	missing
111	Mali	-4.70
112	Malta	1.40

113	Marshall Islands	missing
114	Mauritania	3.40
115	Mauritius	-2.00
116	Mexico	-3.30
117	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	missing
118	Moldova	-2.50
119	Monaco	missing
120	Mongolia	missing
121	Morocco	-1.50
122	Mozambique	0.80
123	Myanmar	0.10
124	Namibia	0.60
125	Nauru	missing
126	Nepal	-1.10
127	Netherlands	2.10
128	New Zealand	2.10
129	Nicaragua	-2.50
130	Niger	-0.10
131	Nigeria	-0.20
132	Norway	2.00
133	Oman	1.70
134	Pakistan	-0.50
135	Palau	missing
136	Palestinian territories	missing
137	Panama	-1.00
138	Papua New Guinea	missing
139	Paraguay	missing
140	Peru	-1.10
141	Philippines	-2.60
142	Poland	-0.50
143	Portugal	1.30
144	Qatar	3.70
145	Romania	-0.50
146	Russian Federation	2.00
147	Rwanda	62.80
148	Samoa	-22.80
149	San Marino	missing
150	Sao Tome and Principe	missing
151	Saudi Arabia	4.30

152	Senegal	-1.10
153	Serbia and Montenegro	-1.90
154	Seychelles	missing
155	Sierra Leone	-7.80
156	Singapore	19.60
157	Slovak Republic	0.30
158	Slovenia	0.50
159	Solomon Islands	missing
160	Somalia	1.70
161	South Africa	-0.10
162	Spain	0.90
163	Sri Lanka	-1.70
164	St. Kitts and Nevis	missing
165	St. Lucia	-7.00
166	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	missing
167	Sudan	-2.60
168	Suriname	-10.30
169	Swaziland	-1.20
170	Sweden	1.00
171	Switzerland	0.60
172	Syrian Arab Republic	-0.20
173	Taiwan	missing
174	Tajikistan	-10.30
175	Tanzania	-1.40
176	Thailand	-0.10
177	Togo	6.10
178	Tonga	missing
179	Trinidad and Tobago	-3.10
180	Tunisia	-0.80
181	Turkey	-0.80
182	Turkmenistan	2.20
183	Tuvalu	missing
184	Uganda	-0.60
185	Ukraine	-2.00
186	United Arab Emirates	8.10
187	United Kingdom	1.60
188	United States	4.50
189	Uruguay	-1.00
190	Uzbekistan	-0.70

191	Vanuatu	-0.90
192	Venezuela	missing
193	Vietnam	-0.50
194	Western Sahara	8.60
195	Yemen	0.10
196	Zambia	1.40
197	Zimbabwe	-0.20

Table C10. Countries for which HDI data were available, and their respective HDI values.

No.	Country	HD index 2003
1	Afghanistan	missing
2	Albania	0.78
3	Algeria	0.72
4	Andorra	missing
5	Angola	0.45
6	Antigua and Barbuda	0.80
7	Argentina	0.86
8	Armenia	0.76
9	Australia	0.96
10	Austria	0.94
11	Azerbaijan	0.73
12	Bahamas, The	0.83
13	Bahrain	0.85
14	Bangladesh	0.52
15	Barbados	0.88
16	Belarus	0.79
17	Belgium	0.95
18	Belize	0.75
19	Benin	0.43
20	Bhutan	0.54
21	Bolivia	0.69
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.79
23	Botswana	0.56
24	Brazil	0.79
25	Brunei	0.87
26	Bulgaria	0.81
27	Burkina Faso	0.32
28	Burundi	0.38
29	Cambodia	0.57
30	Cameroon	0.50
31	Canada	0.95
32	Cape Verde	0.72
33	Central African Republic	0.36

34	Chad	0.34
35	Chile	0.85
36	China	0.76
37	Colombia	0.79
38	Comoros	0.55
39	Congo, Dem. Rep.	0.39
40	Congo, Rep.	0.51
41	Costa Rica	0.84
42	Cote d'Ivoire	0.42
43	Croatia	0.84
44	Cuba	0.82
45	Cyprus	0.89
46	Czech Republic	0.87
47	Denmark	0.94
48	Djibouti	0.50
49	Dominica	0.78
50	Dominican Republic	0.75
51	East Timor	0.51
52	Ecuador	0.76
53	Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.66
54	El Salvador	0.72
55	Equatorial Guinea	0.66
56	Eritrea	0.44
57	Estonia	0.85
58	Ethiopia	0.37
59	Fiji	0.75
60	Finland	0.94
61	France	0.94
62	Gabon	0.64
63	Gambia, The	0.47
64	Georgia	0.73
65	Germany	0.93
66	Ghana	0.52
67	Greece	0.91
68	Grenada	0.79
69	Guam	missing
70	Guatemala	0.66
71	Guinea	0.47
72	Guinea-Bissau	0.35

73	Guyana	0.72
74	Haiti	0.48
75	Honduras	0.67
76	Hong Kong, China	0.92
77	Hungary	0.86
78	Iceland	0.96
79	India	0.60
80	Indonesia	0.70
81	Iran, Islamic Rep.	0.74
82	Iraq	missing
83	Ireland	0.95
84	Israel	0.92
85	Italy	0.93
86	Jamaica	0.74
87	Japan	0.94
88	Jordan	0.75
89	Kazakhstan	0.76
90	Kenya	0.47
91	Kiribati	missing
92	Korea, North	missing
93	Korea, South	0.90
94	Kuwait	0.84
95	Kyrgyz Republic	0.70
96	Lao PDR	0.55
97	Latvia	0.84
98	Lebanon	0.76
99	Lesotho	0.50
100	Liberia	missing
101	Libya	0.80
102	Liechtenstein	missing
103	Lithuania	0.85
104	Luxembourg	0.95
105	Macau, China	missing
106	Macedonia, FYR	0.80
107	Madagascar	0.80
108	Malawi	0.50
109	Malaysia	0.40
110	Maldives	0.80
111	Mali	0.75

112	Malta	0.33
113	Marshall Islands	0.87
114	Mauritania	0.48
115	Mauritius	0.79
116	Mexico	0.81
117	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	missing
118	Moldova	0.67
119	Monaco	missing
120	Mongolia	0.68
121	Morocco	0.63
122	Mozambique	0.38
123	Myanmar	0.58
124	Namibia	0.63
125	Nauru	missing
126	Nepal	0.53
127	Netherlands	0.94
128	New Zealand	0.93
129	Nicaragua	0.69
130	Niger	0.28
131	Nigeria	0.45
132	Norway	0.96
133	Oman	0.78
134	Pakistan	0.53
135	Palau	missing
136	Palestinian territories	0.73
137	Panama	0.80
138	Papua New Guinea	0.52
139	Paraguay	0.76
140	Peru	0.76
141	Philippines	0.76
142	Poland	0.86
143	Portugal	0.90
144	Qatar	0.85
145	Romania	0.79
146	Russian Federation	0.80
147	Rwanda	0.45
148	Samoa	0.78
149	San Marino	missing
150	Sao Tome and Principe	0.60

151	Saudi Arabia	0.77
152	Senegal	0.46
153	Serbia and Montenegro	missing
154	Seychelles	0.82
155	Sierra Leone	0.30
156	Singapore	0.91
157	Slovak Republic	0.85
158	Slovenia	0.90
159	Solomon Islands	0.59
160	Somalia	missing
161	South Africa	0.66
162	Spain	0.93
163	Sri Lanka	0.75
164	St. Kitts and Nevis	0.83
165	St. Lucia	0.77
166	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.76
167	Sudan	0.51
168	Suriname	0.76
169	Swaziland	0.50
170	Sweden	0.95
171	Switzerland	0.95
172	Syrian Arab Republic	0.72
173	Taiwan	missing
174	Tajikistan	0.65
175	Tanzania	0.42
176	Thailand	0.78
177	Togo	0.51
178	Tonga	0.81
179	Trinidad and Tobago	0.80
180	Tunisia	0.75
181	Turkey	0.75
182	Turkmenistan	0.74
183	Tuvalu	missing
184	Uganda	0.51
185	Ukraine	0.77
186	United Arab Emirates	0.85
187	United Kingdom	0.94
188	United States	0.94
189	Uruguay	0.84

190	Uzbekistan	0.69
191	Vanuatu	0.66
192	Venezuela	0.77
193	Vietnam	0.70
194	Western Sahara	missing
195	Yemen	0.48
196	Zambia	0.39
197	Zimbabwe	0.51

APPENDIX D Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Map by United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section, Map No: 3729 Rev. 6, March 2007.

APPENDIX E Verbal Consent Script (in English and Bosnian)

English Version

Hello. My name is Galma Jahic, and I am a Doctoral student at Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice, New Jersey, United States. I am conducting research for my dissertation here in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose of my research is to identify variables that are associated with trafficking, but also to identify problems with combating trafficking that are experienced in this country. As a part of my research I am interviewing victims of trafficking, collecting secondary data, and also interviewing local and international trafficking experts on their views and opinions. I plan to interview about 30 individuals from each group.

I am particularly interested in what you, as an expert on this issue and someone who has been working on this topic, think about the current trafficking situation in this country. I will ask you about what you think the most urgent needs are, what has been done well, and what is going wrong with regard to combating trafficking. I will also ask you about your perceptions regarding the seriousness of this problem, and what you think would be the most effective ways to address it.

If you agree to be interviewed, we will meet any time that is convenient for you, at location of your choice. We can meet in your office, outside in a coffee shop, or elsewhere where you feel comfortable. The interview will last no more than 2 hours.

I understand that you may feel uncomfortable disclosing some of your own points of view, especially if they are contrary to those of organizations that you are working for. However, these interviews will be anonymous. First, I will ask you to give your self an alias which I will use in my notes. I will not write your real name anywhere, so it would be very difficult to link your responses back to you. I will not tell other participants what you have told me, and I will not tell you what they have told me either. In my report you will never be identified by your real name nor by your affiliation. You will at most be identified as _____ (law enforcement officer, government worker, NGO worker, journalist, researcher or international expert). This is to ensure that what you tell me cannot be used to cause you problems or hurt your professional reputation. I hope that this will allow you to be as open as possible with your answers.

This interview with you will be only for the purpose of my research. This has no connection to the police or local or international government or any other agencies, and I will not share any information that you give me with them, or anyone else. I will not show my notes to anyone other than my professors back at Rutgers University, who are helping me with this research, and who are also not affiliated with any relevant agencies. I will keep my notes in a locked closet here at my home. When I go back to the United States, I will take the notes with me and keep them in the locked closet in my office at the University.

Your participation is voluntary. If any questions make you feel uncomfortable, you do not have to answer them. If you feel uncomfortable, you can skip questions, we can take a break, or discontinue the interview all together.

There will be no benefits to you from this interview. However, this research, and your answers, may be helpful in developing anti-trafficking and prevention policies.

If you have any questions after this interview regarding the research you can contact me. At the end of this interview I will give you a card with my contact information.

Please, now tell me if you agree to participate in this research, or if you have any questions.

Documentation of informed consent:

I, Galma Jahic, have delivered this notification to subject ____ who is identified by the pseudonym _____ in my reports.

Signature of researcher: _____

Date: _____

Bosnian Version

Dobar Dan. Ja se zovem Galma Jahic, i ja sam student doktorant na Rutgers Univerzitetu, odjeku za Criminologiju, u New Jersey-u, SAD. Trenutno ovdje u Bosni I Herzegovini radim na istazivanju za moj doktorski rad. Cilj ovog istrazivanja je da identificiram faktore koji su vezani za pojavu trgovine zenama, kao i probleme vezane za borbu protiv trgovine u ovoj zemlji. Kao dio moj istrazivanja, intervjuisem zrtve trgovine, prikupljam druge prodatke, i razgovaram sa lokalnim i medunarodnim expertima o njihovim misljenjima i pozicijama vezanim za ovu temu. Planiram da obavim oko 30 razgovora za zrtvama trgovine, i isto toliko sa ekspertima.

Mene narocito intersuje sta vi, kao strucnjak i neko ko se vec bavi ovom temom, mislite o trenutnoj situaciji u ovoj zemlji vezano za ovu problematiku. Tokom intervjua pitacu vas sta mislite da su prioritetne potrebe, sta je dosada dobro uradeno u brobi protiv trgovine, a sta su bile greske. Takode cu vas pitati sta je vase misljenje sto se tice ozbiljnosti ovog problema, i sta su po vama najefekasniji nacini da se ovaj problem eliminise.

Ako pristanete da vas intervijuisem, sastacemo se kada vama odgovara. Mozemo se sastati u vasem uredu, vani u nekom kafeu, ili negdje drugo gdje se vi osjecate ugodno. Intervju nece trajati duze od 2 sata.

Razumijem da vam moze biti neugodno da podjelite samnom vasa misljenja, narocito ako se ona ne slazu za pozicijom institucije za koju radite. Medutim, zelim da imate na umu da su ovi intervjui anonimni. Ja cu vas prvo zamoliti da izmlislite za sebe neko ime koje cu ja koristiti u svojim biljeskama umjesto vaseg pravog imena. Posto vase pravo ime nigdje nece biti zabiljezeno, bilo bi vrlo tesko da neko sazna da su to vasi odgovori. Drugim ucesnicima necu reci sta ste mi vi kazali, niti cu vama reci sta su mi oni ispricali. U mom raportu vase pravo ime nece uopste biti koristeno, kao ni vasa afiliacija, tako da cete u najgorem slucaju biti identificirani kao _____ (radnik MUP-a, vladin radnik, radnik iz NVOa, novinar, akademik, ili medunaroni ekspert). Na ovaj nacin cu osigurati da informacije koje mi date ne mogu biti koristene da vam naskode profesionalno ili na neki drugi nacin. Nadam se da ce ovo omoguciti da budete sto iskreniji u vasim odgovorima.

Ovaj intervju cu koristiti iskljucivo za iztrazivanje – on nema veze ni sa policijom ni sa drugim organizacijama, lokalnim ili medunarodnim. Informacije koje cu dobiti necu ni dijelti niti pokazivati policiji ili drugim organizacijama, kao i nikome drugome. Moje zabiljeske nece vidjeti niko sem mojih profesora sa Rutgers Univerziteta u SAD-u, koji takode nisu vezani za bilo koje relevantne organizacije i institutcije. Sve zabiljeske cu cuvati u zakljucanom ormaru u mom stanu ovje, a kada se budem vracala u SAD ponijecu ih sa sobom, i tamo cu ih takode cuvati u zakljucanom ormaricu u mom uredu na univerzitetu.

Vase ucesce u ovom istazivanju je dobrovoljno Ako vam neka pitanja budu neugodna, nemorate ih odgovoriti. Ako se budete osjecali neugodno, mozete preskociti moja pitanja, mozemo napraviti pauzu, ili mozemo prekinuti intervju.

Vi necete dobiti nikakve prednosti ili beneficije od ovog intervjua. Medutim, ovo istrazivnje, kao i vasi odgovori mogu biti od pomoci u razvijanju novih pristupa ovom problemu i brobi protiv trgovine zenama.

Ako imate bilo kakva pitanja nakon ovog intervjua vezana za moje istrazivanje, slobodno me kontaktirajte. Na kraju naseg razgovora dacu vam karticu sa mojim brojem telefona. Molim vas, sada mi recite da li zelite da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju, ako nemate dodatnih pitanja.

Documentation of informed consent:

I, Galma Jahic, have delivered this notification to subject ____ who is identified by the pseudonym _____ in my reports.

Signature of researcher: _____

Date: _____

APPENDIX F Interview Protocol for Experts

General information

1. How did you get introduced to the topic of trafficking?

2. What kind of activities are you involved in?

Causes of trafficking

3. Why do you think trafficking is a problem in THIS country?

4. Do you think that it is associated with the presence of the foreigners? How? Do they help?

5. I will read some problems that this country may have, and let me know if you think these are somehow related to the trafficking problem that we have, and how they are related.
- Poor policies
- Economic problems
- Lack of law
- Political turmoil
- Weak courts
- Corruption
- Anything else you think is important?

6. Who do you think is the most responsible for trafficking problem – women, customers, traffickers, or the government? Why?

Preventing and fighting trafficking:

7. What do you think are some major obstacles to preventing and fighting trafficking in this country?

8. Do you think that everything that can be done is being done? Why are some things not being done?

9. What do you think would have to be done immediately?

10. How about long term?

11. What were some good steps that were taken with regard to fighting trafficking?

12. What were some mistakes?

13. Who do you think should take most responsibility for solving the problem: government, NGOs, law enforcement, or international organizations? Why should they take the burden?

14. What is the level of cooperation between different anti-trafficking groups now?

15. What are some problems that you face when trying to do your job?

For those who work directly with victims:
16. How many victims did you work with in the last year? (approximately)

17. What, in general, to they have to say about how and why they became trafficking victims? Who do they blame? Do they say much about traffickers?

18. Do you trust what they say? Why?

19. What is your view of reality? Are these women really working against their will? How many are really trafficked, and how many know what will be expected of them when they come here?

20. How do you think the government should treat victims? Benefits, residence?

21. What do you think should be done with traffickers, with pimps, with customers?

22. What are the biggest needs right now?

23. What can you tell about trafficking from your work with victims, is it an organized activity, or not? What makes you say that?

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