

MEASURING ACCEPTANCE OF IMMIGRANT GROUPS IN THE U.S.:
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALE IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

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Dedication

Although, in actuality, there are likely countless people who have played a role in my accomplishment of this doctoral degree, there are a few individuals who have had especially important, and immeasurable contributions in one way or another.

I would like to thank my parents, who have essentially been there since day one - helping me to become the independent, confident and overall person I am today. To my Father, who has always supported me and cared in his own quiet way. And to my Mother, who was always there for me – offering help in any way possible; from making me laugh and be strong through the hard times, to always simply being there whenever I needed her.

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- For everyone who has ever migrated to this country, and who has struggled in search of a better life not only for themselves but also, and more so, for that of their families...

Abstract

Immediately following the attacks of September 11th, 2001, prejudice and discrimination against particular immigrant/ethnic groups in the United States increased immensely. I sought to understand if this backlash was consistent with previous times of war and the degree to which college students in New Jersey would tolerate prejudice, discrimination and a lessening of civil liberties.

A literature review of existing materials helps provide a context for my findings. The two opening chapters discuss historical immigration to the United States, and provide a backdrop and context of the current situation surrounding prejudice, discrimination and civil liberties of immigrants. Chapter Three describes prejudice and discrimination post-9/11 in the U.S. And, Chapter Four examines the work of Emory Bogardus and subsequent sociologists, to understand under what circumstances prejudice correlates directly with discrimination.

Utilizing data from studies conducted between 1920 and 2001, I compare these to my own study of social distance. I also include a semantic differential measure of prejudice to use in conjunction with the social distance measure to get a more complete measure of prejudice towards various pan-ethnic groups. Including questions about civil liberties, I measure if respondents are accepting of prejudice and discrimination at the personal level and/or national/governmental level.

Primary conclusions of this study include:

- Respondents indicate greater allowances and acceptance of the hindrance of civil liberties during both times of war and perceived terrorist threats. These threats may or may not be real and one must not take an impediment on civil liberties

lightly given the potential of grave consequence (for example, the imprisonment of an innocent person for life without due process of law.)

- The realization that the Bogardus Social Distance Scale is not an effective measure by itself when calculating the degree of prejudicial attitudes towards a particular group. Since semantic differential measures can provide a more complete analysis of prejudicial attitudes by measuring the degree of positive and negative attributes towards that group, results from these two scales should be averaged together to provide a more accurate reading of a group's total acceptance into society.

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Introduction

“Twenty-seven years ago or so, I became President of the United States, a nation that was founded on the principle of human rights. One of the comments I made in my inaugural address was that the United States did not invent human rights; human rights invented the United States. We decided even before I was inaugurated, to escalate human rights to the top position on the agenda of our foreign policy. Never did I meet with a foreign leader that human rights was not on the official agenda. Every American Ambassador in the world was my direct human rights representative. Every embassy was designated by me personally, as a President, as a haven for those who were persecuted in foreign countries. This policy was looked on by some as naive or weak or a violation of commitments we had made to dictators and others who were very close allies with us in some of the global issues that we had to face. But it was a great challenge for the United States, and a great honor, to be recognized as the champion of human rights that never failed to raise high the banner of freedom and liberty and the absence of persecution.”

- Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, November 11, 2003

(www.cartercenter.org)

Immediately following the attacks of September 11th, 2001, there were deep divisions within the United States as to exactly how to respond. While some portions of the nation embraced and preached the notion of peace, others acted out in aggression. Whether it was in the form of legislation or “on the street” interactions, prejudice and discrimination against particular immigrant/ethnic groups in the United States increased immensely, with the F.B.I. reporting an substantial increase in hate crimes from 2000 to 2001 (refer to Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in Chapter 3.)

Both national and local news reports as well as reports from human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were quick to reveal the backlash encountered against particular immigrant/ethnic groups. Not only were those of Saudi Arabian nationality (the nationality of most of the 9/11 hijackers) targeted to be victims of hate crimes or prejudice – those in the U.S. with a “foreign appearance” often became the victim of such backlash. With the influx of peoples from across the globe,

anyone appearing to be Arab became a potential target of prejudice and discrimination following 9/11.

I sought to understand if this backlash against specific immigrant groups following 9/11 was consistent with previous times of war and whether the degree to which prejudice, discrimination and a lessening of civil liberties would be tolerated generally by Americans and, specifically by college students in New Jersey. My study is three-fold: I sought to measure a) the social acceptance of various ethnic groups b) the levels of prejudice against various ethnic groups, and c) the degree of acceptance of decreased civil liberties. Although the results of “a” could be compared to earlier social distance studies, both “b” and “c” were new types of questions and data that will be used in this study to benchmark results. I utilize data from studies conducted between 1920 and 2001 and compare these to my own study of social distance. I also include a semantic differential measure of prejudice to use in conjunction with the social distance measure to get a more complete measure of prejudice and acceptance of various immigrant groups. By including questions about civil liberties, I can better understand if respondents are accepting of prejudice and discrimination at the personal level and also at the national/governmental level, particularly in the context of “a perceived national security threat.”

A literature review of existing materials helped to form my study and provide a context for my findings. The following is an outline of the dissertation.

Chapter 1: U.S. Immigration &

Chapter 2: Prejudice & discrimination against immigrant groups throughout U.S. history

These two opening chapters explain how and why people immigrated to the United States, and also describe and explain the degree of prejudice and discrimination they encountered. We must also seek to understand the current treatment of immigrants in the U.S., these two chapters provide a backdrop and provide historical context of the current situation surrounding prejudice, discrimination and civil liberties of immigrants. These chapters further seek to understand the reasons for prejudice and explain possible causes of discrimination against immigrants. The data suggests that essentially every group that has immigrated to the United States has endured some degree of prejudice and discrimination. We must also take into account the factors that initiate these attitudes and actions against others: economic and social competitions; false stereotypes; misunderstood cultural attributes and wartime panic.

For my study I chose ethnic groups that were particularly affected by the 9/11 backlash: Middle Easterners, Indians and Pakistanis. To provide a historical context, I included other ethnic groups that emigrated from countries that had been at war with the U.S. in the past century: Europeans and Asians. I additionally included Hispanics/Latinos in this study due to this group's current high rates of immigration, and due to the animosity endured by many in this group as a result of the amount of illegal immigration from Mexico. In particular, I examined at the treatment of the following ethnic groups: *Asians*: Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Vietnamese, *Eastern Europeans*: Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians, *Hispanics/Latinos*: Cubans, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, *South Asians*: Indians, Pakistanis, *Middle Easterners*: Iranians, Syrians, Turks, *Western*

Europeans: French, Germans, and Irish. By selecting specific ethnic groups to discuss within each aforementioned geographic region, I sought to provide a more complete context for each pan-ethnic group.

As it was not feasible to discuss/analyze immigration from every area of the globe, some immigration from sectors of the world are not examined in this study, including: countries of Africa, Australia, Canada and Russia. In hindsight, immigrants from Russia could be included, however it did not easily fall into one of the six pan-ethnic groups I studied and I did not want to list separate ethnic groups for my project since I wanted to measure overall pan-ethnic trends.

Chapter 3: Post-9/11 America

Chapter Three focuses on what happened, and to what degree, regarding prejudice and discrimination post 9/11 in the U.S. In order to set the stage, the chapter begins with a narrative of events of September 11th, in order to “set the stage.” What occurred was a substantial increase in hate crimes (as documented by the F.B.I.) directed at those of Middle Eastern ethnicity and Islamic faith. Additionally, in the wake of 9/11, the Bush Administration pushed for the passing of the Patriot Act legislation. Human rights groups have argued that this legislation allowed and perpetrated the decrease of civil liberties, allowing for greater acts of prejudice and discrimination against various ethnic groups. Moreover, I seek to outline how far the Government was willing to go – in terms of what strains on the Constitution would be allowed, accepted and tolerated – in times of perceived national security threats in the name of “security.”

Chapter 4: Bogardus' study of prejudice and social distance

In this chapter, I examine the work of Emory Bogardus and subsequent sociologists, to more fully understand under what circumstances prejudice correlates directly with discrimination.

The replication of Bogardus' social distance study six times from 1926 to 2001 has led to a greater understanding of the trends surrounding ethnic tensions and relations in the United States. Although some social scientists believe that such attitudinal polling does not accurately reflect people's true beliefs, others suggest that the polls are generally representative of societal trends.

Chapter 5: Methodology

This chapter describes the procedures undertaken in this study.

Chapter 6: Data Analysis

This chapter contains the analytical results of my survey.

Chapter 7: Discussion

This chapter ties the literature review to the results of the study and describes key findings regarding prejudice and discrimination against immigrants in the U.S. and the degree of acceptance of declining civil liberties. Below are the primary conclusions of this study:

- As hypothesized, students in public universities/colleges located in northern New Jersey (within 40 miles of Ground Zero) exhibited greater degrees of prejudice and discrimination towards Middle Eastern immigrants than other pan-ethnic groups. The findings of earlier studies, that during times of war there is overall greater prejudice

and discrimination against the ethnic “enemy,” was replicated with the findings of this research.

- Respondents also indicated greater allowances and acceptance of the hindrance of civil liberties during both times of war and perceived terrorist threats. These threats may or may not be real and one must not take an impediment on civil liberties lightly given the potential of grave consequence (for example, the imprisonment of an innocent person for life without due process of law.)
- Males in this study have substantiated the role of “competition” in prejudice/discrimination – males generally reported significantly greater prejudicial attitudes as well as the tolerance/acceptance of discriminatory actions towards immigrants in the U.S.
- Additionally, my results led to the realization that although the Bogardus Social Distance Scale is an effective measure of general acceptance of various groups, this scale is not an effective measure by itself when calculating the degree of prejudicial attitudes towards a particular group. Semantic differential measures, however, can provide a more complete analysis of prejudicial attitudes by measuring the degree of positive and negative attributes towards that group. By averaging Social Distance and a collection of Semantic Differential scores, we can get a more accurate reading of a group’s total acceptance into U.S. society.

Lastly, this chapter discusses what I would have done differently, in hindsight, to improve my study, and additionally offers some proposals of future analyses and studies.

Chapter 1

U.S. Immigration

Colonial America was full of an array of cultures, colors, religions and diversities previously unknown to many of the new arrivals in their homeland. After a seemingly endless, and often perilous, journey aboard a crowded transport ship, new immigrants stepped onto the shore of North America and also stepped into a land where almost everyone was a “stranger” and only Native Americans could claim that they really belonged.

In the twenty-first century, what is now the U.S. is still comprised of a multitude of cultures, races and religions. Compared to the past, however, globalization has led to faster, cheaper travel and immigration laws are relatively open. The result has been a multi-dimensional blend of peoples to the sum of almost 300 million people: all of which (with the exception of Native Americans) are themselves immigrants or have ancestors from a distant homeland.

What was it that caused so many to leave their homes and all that was familiar to them, to come to a strange new land? And what was it about this new country that pulled the immigrants here, instead of anywhere else in the world? This chapter will seek to explain the reasons for immigration to the U.S. By exploring the immigration of different immigration groups, one can begin to understand how these people from across the globe may be so different in many aspects – yet often share similar reasons for leaving their homelands to come to the United States.

Part I

- U.S. Immigration Overview

“Separation of Church and State,” one of the United States founding principles, was able to be institutionalized with the writing of the Constitution primarily due to the lack of one single dominant religion at the time. Although white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) were the dominant group in 1790, the nation was nonetheless racially and culturally diverse. One out of every five people was a member of a racial minority and one out of every seven was an ethnic minority (Parrillo, 130.)

“Open Door” Immigration

From the nation’s founding until around 1880, the U.S. immigration policy was considered to be like an “open door;” not only were immigrants granted relatively easy entry to the country, but the United States often actively recruited immigrants to come through its borders. Between the years 1820 to 1880, approximately 10 million people emigrated to the U.S. (LeMay, 1.) It was Western Europe that greatly seeded the United States with immigrants during the country’s early years. Immigrants from Ireland accounted for nearly 44% of all U.S. immigration in the 1830s and rose to 49% of all immigration in the 1840s (Parrillo, 133.) The Irish, together with the Germans (25% of all immigrants in both the 1830s and 1840s) (Parrillo, 616), dominated the first “great surge” of immigrants to the U.S., which occurred between 1845 and 1854. These two groups continued to immigrate to the U.S. in significant numbers in the “second great surge” which lasted from 1865 to 1875. However, during the second period of abundant

immigration, the British and Scandinavians also came to the U.S. in considerable numbers (LeMay, 1.)

“Door Ajar” Immigration

U.S. immigration policy during the following forty years, from 1880 to 1920, has been dubbed the “door-ajar era” in which immigration took on more of a “restrictionist approach.” What this entailed were policies that only let people come to the country based on certain characteristics, such as, “literacy; medical conditions; moral turpitude; and an assessment of their likelihood of becoming public charges” (LeMay, 2.) The characteristics used to restrict certain individuals from entering the U.S. caused a significant shift in immigration patterns; although peoples from Western Europe comprised much of the U.S.’s earlier immigration, most of the 25 million immigrants during this era were from south, central and eastern European nations.

The United States sought to further restrict movement onto its soil by passing several laws. The first act to actively target one specific immigrant group was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which virtually stopped all immigration by Chinese laborers for ten years. In 1888 Congress amended the Chinese Exclusion Act with the Scott Act which extended the life of the act another ten years and “banned the return to the United States of any Chinese laborer who had gone back to China” (LeMay, 2.)

A depression occurred in the U.S. three years later, in 1891, which furthered the country’s desire to reduce all immigration. Asians were subject to stricter immigration policies, and from 1880s to 1920 there were specific concerns about Japanese immigration. It was these concerns that led the way for use of a literacy test as a tool to limit immigration. This test, advocated by such restrictionist advocate groups as the

American Protective Association, the Knights of Labor, the Asian Exclusion League and the Immigration Restriction League, was also supported by the Dillingham Commission. Chaired by Senator William Dillingham, this special immigration commission met from 1907 to 1922 to study immigration policy. Its report, issued in 1911, consisted of forty-two volumes that advocated for the U.S. to have an openly restrictionist policy and require incoming immigrants to pass a literacy test (LeMay, 2.)

“Pet-Door” Immigration

The next era of U.S. immigration was named the “pet-door era.” This era, from 1920 to 1965 was catapulted following the 1919 Red Scare and fear of Bolshevik radicalism. A series of laws were passed in 1921, 1924 and 1929 which based U.S. immigration on “quotas of national origin.” Although there were approximately 25 million immigrants who came to the U.S. during the “door-ajar era,” the number dwindled to a mere six million during the forty years of the pet-door era. As was the intent of these policies, the primary sources of immigrants came from the south, central and eastern European nations back to the northwestern ones that dominated the U.S. immigration during the open-door era (LeMay, 3.) The way that the immigration laws of the 1920s worked was quite simple: they reduced each country’s “annual quota” by 3 and then 2 percent of its emigrants already in the United States in 1890. Since the formation of the United States until the restrictionist era that began in 1880, most of the immigrants to the U.S. had come from Western Europe. Hence, a great majority of U.S. residents in 1890 had roots back to Western Europe. It should be no surprise then, that this group

would have the highest numbers emigrating to the U.S. after the passage of these immigration laws (Parrillo, 181.)

The Re-Opening of Immigration

The 1960s was a time of great social change in America, with the civil rights movement, women's movement, anti-Vietnam War movement and Vatican II all playing a part in making it a decade of changes. As increasing numbers of Americans became more impassioned and vocal about equal rights, pressure grew to reform the immigration system and remove the racial bias that existed within it.

The Kennedy family played a large role in placing pressure to disband the immigration quota-system. President John F. Kennedy expressed his favorable opinion of more immigration in a book he wrote while a Senator in 1958, *A Nation of Immigrants*. Although the Kennedy Administration had submitted a new immigration bill to Congress in 1963, it did not pass. One of the bills greatest and more passionate supporters was the President's youngest brother, Edward, who was also the Senator from Massachusetts. The bill's proposal was re-submitted in 1965 by President Lyndon Johnson. The "Kennedy immigration bill" encompassed five primary goals:

1. to preserve the family unit and reunite separated families;
2. to meet the need for highly skilled workers;
3. to help ease population problems created by emergencies, such as political upheavals, Communist aggression and natural disasters;
4. to better the understanding of people cross-nationally through exchange programs;
5. to bar from the United States aliens who were likely to represent adjustment problems due to their physical or mental health, criminal history, or dependency or for national security reasons (LeMay, 4.)

The bill became law as President Johnson signed it in front of the Statue of Liberty on October 3, 1965. Dubbed the “Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965,” the law brought about a turning point in the United States’ immigration policies. The “immigration doorway” transformed from a “pet-door” into something much more accessible. Hemispheric quotas, which allocated 120,000 immigrants from the Western Hemisphere and 170,000 from the Eastern Hemisphere to come to the U.S., replaced the national, race-based quotas (Parrillo, 181.) Additionally, the act replaced the former “national-origin quota system” with a system that allocated visas on the basis of the following “preferences:”

- 1st Preference: unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens
- 2nd Preference: spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens
- 3rd Preference: members of the professions and scientists and artists of exceptional ability
- 4th Preference: married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens
- 5th Preference: brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens
- 6th Preference: skilled and unskilled workers in short supply
- 7th Preference: refugees (LeMay, 4.)

In the decade after the passing of the Immigration and Naturalization Act immigration flow to the U.S. changed substantially. Total immigration increased by 60 percent, and the increase in immigration from some countries was colossal:

- Greece:	162 %
- Portugal:	382 %
- India:	3,000 %
- Korea:	1,300 %
- Pakistan:	1,600 %
-Thailand:	1,700 %
- Vietnam:	1,900 %

However, as immigration from Asia thrived, that from European countries greatly declined. Immigration reached its lowest levels from the United Kingdom, with a drop by 120 percent; other countries registering the largest negative percentages in immigration to the U.S. included: Norway by 85 percent; Ireland by 77 percent; and Austria by 76 percent (LeMay, 5.)

The following changes in immigration policies took place in the years after the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 to 1990s, and dramatically altered the number of immigrants allowed into the U.S.:

- 1976: A 20,000-per-country annual limit was established.
- 1978: Hemisphere quotas were changed to a world-wide limit of 290,000.
- 1980: The limit was decreased to 270,000 (excluding refugees and immediate relatives were admitted above the 270,000 ceiling). However, this brought annual legal immigration totals to over 500,000 annually in the 1980s.
- 1990: The new world-wide limit was set to 700,000.
- 1994: The limit dropped to 675,000 (Parrillo, 182.)

Refugees had become a major factor in shaping U.S. immigration law beginning in the 1960s. Although the provision in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, which set an annual preference limit at 10,200 refugees, seemed generous at the time, it would soon be greatly outdated. Perhaps the greatest oversight in the act's provision for refugees was that it defined refugees as "those fleeing communism or trying to leave the Middle East." It did not consider people who fled from dictators to be "refugees." Catastrophic events in Cuba, Vietnam and Haiti opened the floodgates as numerous refugees tried to flee to the U.S. In an attempt to adjust the immigration policy to better serve the time, the number of refugees allowed to enter the U.S. from Cuba had been

adjusted in 1966. With the new adjustment, in the twenty years from 1960 to 1980, more than 800,000 Cuban refugees immigrated to the U.S. (LeMay, 5.)

It was the Refugee Act of 1980 that sought to better address the mounting numbers of refugees that sought shelter in the U.S. One of the major steps the act took was to re-define the term “refugee” to include people from anywhere in the world (as previously it only considered them to be from Communist or Middle Eastern countries). Furthermore, the act allowed for greater numbers of refugees to enter the U.S.: it raised the annual limit for refugees to 50,000 and also increased total immigration to 320,000. Moreover, the Refugee Act of 1980 recognized a new category of refugee - the “asylum seeker” (LeMay, 6.) It was this category that allowed for 70,000 people to enter the United States annually because they had a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of: race; religion, nationality; membership in a social group; or political opinion.” From 1960 to 1985 the number of refugees fleeing persecution from all over the world was substantial:

Cuba:	800,000
Vietnam:	340,000
Laos:	110,000
Former U.S.S.R.:	70,000 (LeMay, 7.)

Without the Refugee Act of 1980 it is implausible that so many refugees would have ever safely arrived in the U.S.

But why did refugees from certain countries come to the U.S. and not go to other countries? Additionally, why is it that refugees from other countries did not immigrate to the U.S., but instead went to other place in search of shelter? As Michael LeMay, immigration scholar, pointed out, “Receiving nations tend to accept refugees from countries with whom they have had historic ties.” For example, in the five years from

1975 to 1980, the U.S. took in 677,000 refugees from the following places: Soviet Jews; South or Central America and the Caribbean; and the Indochinese from countries the U.S. had a military alliance with. Germany traditionally has taken in refugees from the Middle East, and England and Canada were the harbor for refugees from former Commonwealth colonial states. Moreover, it was much easier for refugees to immigrate to these industrialized host countries more-so than in the past due to “the world’s increasing economic and political interdependence, coupled with an easing of transportation and communication difficulties” (LeMay, 8.)

Following the “pet-door era” of immigration which ended in the 1960s, and aside from the refugee crises, U.S. immigration in the 1970s was immense. In this “fourth-wave” of immigration, illegal immigration became a pressing factor. Yet legal immigration itself rose dramatically to nearly 4.5 million during the 1970s and “net immigration” for the decade was estimated at 5.4 million. In 1978 it was estimated that the total illegal immigrant population in the United States ranged anywhere from 3.5 to 6 million. Approximately two-thirds of illegal immigrants were Mexicans who had crossed the border and one-third of illegal immigrants were “illegals who entered with papers (such as a tourist or student visa) and then simply overstayed and became illegal aliens” (LeMay, 9.)

Legal immigration in the 1970s reached the highest it has been since the years from 1910-1919. In this fourth-wave, the immigrants were primarily Asian and Latino: 34 percent came from Asia, 34 percent came from Central and South America, and 10 percent came from the Caribbean. The number of immigrants coming from Europe dipped to 16 percent and the remaining 6 percent of immigrants came from Canada and a

range of other places. Contrary to prior waves of immigration, this forth-wave was comprised of highly educated individuals, many of whom had college degrees. They were also more “urbanized” than previous generations of immigrants and almost all of them settled in metropolitan areas, concentrating in California, Florida, Texas, Illinois, New York and Arizona. However, it has been noted that this wave of immigrants was also much more diverse than earlier immigrants with significant cultural and social differences among them (LeMay , 10.)

In 1986, the Immigration and Reform Act (IRCA) was signed into law by President Reagan. This law, characterized as being “complex and often contradictory,” became difficult to implement. First of all, because provisions in the law accepted a number of documents as “valid demonstrations of a person’s eligibility to work,” many illegal aliens were able to use phony documents to gain work; moreover, employers could “knowingly hire” undocumented workers without fear of facing legal penalties if they were presented with the counterfeit documents (LeMay, 17.)

IRCA also dealt with the nation’s border. The law authorized a 50 percent increase in Border Patrol staff – yet the increases did not meet the goal due to difficulties in recruiting and expanding training staff and facilities. Moreover, the duties of the Border Patrol were increased as agents had to shift their emphasis from “alien apprehension and smuggling” to work with the Drug Enforcement Agency to keep illegal drugs from entering the country (LeMay, 17.)

Lastly, the IRCA was thought to increase discrimination. There was concern that the law’s employer-sanctions provisions might result in increased discrimination against “foreign-looking and –sounding individuals, particularly those of Latino heritage.” In

1990, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a study which found that the IRCA resulted in “widespread discrimination” since many employers began to hire only U.S.-born persons and not those with temporary work-eligibility documents (LeMay, 18.)

The Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) sought to fix some of the problems of IRCA. Under this law, total immigration was to be increased under a “flexible cap” of 675,000, beginning in 1995. The law revised grounds for exclusion and deportation of immigrants. The attorney general was given authorization to grant temporary protected status to undocumented alien nationals from countries subject to armed conflict or natural disaster. The Border Patrol was again funded to have a 1,000 person increase. Additionally, the IMMACT established a commission to do a mandatory and continued study of immigration. Although this law was hailed “the most extensive reform of immigration law since 1965,” the act left many problems unsolved and immigration reform was still necessary (LeMay, 21.)

In 1996 President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA). Although this act primarily contained stiff new work requirements and limits on the length of time people could receive welfare benefits, the act also contained several immigration-related provisions (Weaver, 1.) First of all, the act restricted federal benefits for which illegal aliens and legal non-immigrants could qualify; however, legal and illegal immigrants were allowed to receive emergency medical assistance. At the state and local levels, it was prohibited to provide benefits to most illegal aliens. Most legal immigrants became ineligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and food stamps until they became citizens; however, exceptions were made for: refugees; those granted asylum; those who had worked in the U.S. for ten

years; veterans or those on active duty and their spouses and unmarried children.

Moreover, PRWORA led to better tracking of illegal immigrants in the U.S. by requiring agencies administering SSI and welfare block grants to quarterly report the names and addresses of those who were unlawfully in the United States (LeMay, 26.)

Clinton further cracked down on illegal immigration with the signing of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996.

Although the IIRIRA enacted more than sixty provisions, the major highlights are listed below:

- authorization to double Border Patrol agents (from 5,000 to 10,000) by 2001;
- authorization to add 900 more INS agents;
- authorization to increase security at the U.S./Mexican border by constructing a fourteen-mile, three-tier fence;
- the Justice Department was granted increased wire-tap authority for immigration document fraud (and document fraud had increased penalties);
- and it required the Social Security Administration to develop a prototype tamper-proof identity card (LeMay, 26-27.)

U.S. immigration law has taken a more defensive stance following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. First of all, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has become the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) – part of the new United States' Department of Homeland Security. Inspection and visa procedures have been tightened and made more restrictive and all visas and entry documents are being given greater scrutiny by authorities. A person will no longer be able to change to Student Status (F-1) while in the U.S.; they must inform the U.S. Airport/Border Inspector of the possible plan to attend school here. U.S. consuls have increased scrutiny of nationals of Islamic and Arab nations; questioning their backgrounds and reasons for coming to, or being in, the United States (www.lawcom.com).

Additionally, in the past, Border and Airport Inspectors have had the discretion to excuse or forgive technical errors in visas or passports. Applicants for entry with even minor visa problems are now being taken into custody and immediately removed from the country. Any person who comes to the U.S. with no passport, with fraudulent documents, or who is believed to be entering in violation of the type of visa they hold, can be sent back immediately unless the person can show a credible fear of persecution in their homeland. Despite the often-sudden need for sheltered asylum into the U.S., all applications for asylum must now be made within one year of entering the country. Furthermore, nationals of specified countries must comply with Special Registration rules. The previous requirement to re-register annually has been dropped, but those subject to Special Registration must exit the U.S. only at designated ports and must report to a special officer at the airport before leaving. Special Registration further requires these individuals report any change of address, employment, or school to BCIS within 10 days. Failure to follow these rules can result in severe penalties, namely criminal prosecution (www.lawcom.com) The following chapter further discusses immigrants in the post-9/11 America.

Part II

- Push and Pull Factors of U.S. Immigration

It is a rare case that a person would chose to leave their homeland when they are secure economically, physically, and emotionally. What would cause a person to essentially pack up whatever they are able, and say goodbye to all the familiarities, comforts, friends and family they have known in their homeland? What would case such a person to completely start over and rebuild their entire life in a new land? Emigration from one's homeland and the subsequent immigration to a specific host country are caused by a variety of respective "push" and "pull" factors.

The following section conveys the circumstances surrounding several immigrant groups' reasons for leaving their homeland to immigrate to the United States. Their stories are told in sections, based on ethnic/geographic groupings, such as: Asian (i.e. East Asian countries); Eastern and Western Europe; Hispanic/Latino; South Asian (i.e. India/Pakistan); and Middle Eastern. While it is not feasible to discuss immigration from every region of the world, I selected these particular areas to discuss for reasons explained in Chapter 5 – Methodology. Note that the pan-ethnic group titles are discussed as they were utilized in this study's questionnaire. As it is not practical to discuss every ethnicity within each pan-ethnic group, 2-3 specific ethnic groups within each pan-ethnic group will be explored, in an attempt to provide general immigration knowledge of each region. While I acknowledge that obvious differences exist between these groups, I will discuss how most immigrants left their homelands and came to the U.S. for similar reasons – regardless of the fact that they were labeled Chinese, Mexican, Irish or Iranian.

“Asians” (i.e. East Asians)

Chinese

It was the California gold rush in the 1850s that made the Chinese first immigrate to the United States; although not in as great of numbers, the gold rush also enticed immigrants from Japan, Korea, and the Philippines to come almost fifty years later (Parrillo, 271.) Aside from the gold “pulling” the Chinese to the U.S. there were several forces pushing the Chinese from their homeland: many Chinese from the Kwangtung province had endured flood, famine and the Taiping Rebellion (which lasted from 1850 to 1864); for many Chinese there was little choice but to come to the United States. Most of the Asian immigrants came as sojourners (temporary workers) who intended to return home after earning enough money in the U.S. In the mid-1860s, the Chinese helped build the railroads. During the Civil War, with the shortage of available women and children, the Chinese were hired by the textile industry (Parrillo, 277.) However, the Chinese were only allowed to enter the U.S. for a relatively short while, which ended with the passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Parrillo, 271.)

Japanese

It was in 1868 that the Japanese began to immigrate to the United States in low numbers as laborers. For 200 years before then, the emperors of Japan had forced the country to live in “government-enforced isolation” in which no one was allowed to leave the country and visitors were barred from entering; moreover, any attempt to emigrate from Japan was punishable by death. By 1900 the Japanese began to enter the U.S. in greater numbers, increasing to 111,000 in 1920. In the beginning most of the Japanese were, similar to the Chinese, males who came for economic reasons and to “make their

fortunes” (Parrillo, 286-287.) At the end of WWII, 25,000 Japanese brides of U.S. GIs immigrated and accompanied their husbands to the United States. Also following the war was U.S. occupation of the country, foreign-aid-based reconstruction and rapid social change (Parrillo, 293.) The Westernization and industrialization that followed fostered greater relations between the U.S. and Japan that still continues today – especially in financial markets.

Filipinos

After 1924 Filipinos were the only East Asians to not be affected by U.S. immigration-restriction laws. Following the Spanish-American War, the United States annexed the Philippines and declared that Filipinos were nationals with the right to immigrate to the United States in 1898 (Reimers, 14.) After Japanese emigration was reduced following the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1908, there was a shortage of plantation workers in Hawaii. The Hawaiian Sugar Planter’s Association then recruited replacement laborers from the Philippines. Filipino workers again had an opportunity to fill a “labor-void” in California, due to the state’s loss of Mexican labor following quota restrictions in the Immigration Act of 1924 (Parrillo, 295.) However, racism and discrimination towards the Filipinos led Congress to limit the number of this group to immigrate to the U.S. annually to 50 persons in 1935, and then to bar them completely in 1946 (Reimers, 14.) Following the Immigration Act of 1965, Filipino immigration has been relatively high; “push factors” included the unstable political situation at home (in the mid 1980s) with the overthrowing of the Marcos regime, and also the continuing economic limitations in the Philippines (Parrillo, 298.)

Vietnamese

War was also the factor which led many Vietnamese to immigrate to the United States. Following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, 127,000 Vietnamese refugees entered the United States (Parrillo, 303.) It was this mass exodus out of Vietnam that was the most monumental emigration movement in that country's history. Because the characteristics of Vietnamese emigration compliment those from China, Cambodia and Laos, they can singularly be better understood by discussing these countries together in an overview.

Asians - Overview

The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 opened a door to Asian immigration that had, through the nation's history been shut. The third "preference category" in the act was the primary route used by Asians to gain entry into the U.S. This provision for professionals allowed for "exceptionally large numbers" of Korean and Philippine health professionals to immigrate; by the late 1970s, more than 70,000 Filipino doctors had come to the U.S. Furthermore, Asian immigration increased even more as the act's provisions favoring families allowed for the new immigrants to bring their families to the new country (LeMay, 5.) Also, LeMay believed that Asian immigrants are more-likely to become citizens since they have come great distances, often through very difficult conditions which required a strong commitment; one such hardship caused from the great distance was that it was particularly hard to maintain contacts within their homeland. Furthermore, those immigrants that have left their homeland because they rejected the political systems, such as from Vietnam and China, may have felt that they had no possibility of returning "home" in the future. Moreover, using data from the 1996

Statistical Yearbook of the INS, LeMay pointed out that whereas Asians and Africans tend to naturalize soonest (followed by Europeans) and those from North America (mostly Mexico and Canada) were the slowest to naturalize (LeMay, 39-40.)

In the 1970s, several Asian countries were affected by communism. As South Vietnam's government fell and Cambodia and Laos were also overtaken by communism, hundreds of thousands of refugees escaped and immigrated to the U.S.; between 1975 and 1979, more than 200,000 refugees came just from Vietnam. And it was the Vietnamese that acculturated the most out of any other group from Asia; they were mostly well-educated and middle-class individuals (LeMay, 8.) Therefore, they were able to assimilate into the U.S. culture much more easily than other refugees who were more-likely to be less-educated, of lower socio-economic class, and typically laborers.

"Eastern Europeans"

Hungarians

In the late 1800s there was a need for industrial workers in the U.S. Although most of the Hungarian immigrants who arrived in this era were farmers, they seized the opportunities to work in the mines and steel factories. The exact number of Hungarians who came to the United States is unknown due to the fact that the U.S. government did not distinguish Hungarians from Austrians until 1905 (as it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918); however, it is estimated that more than 2 million Hungarians came to the U.S. between 1871 and 1920. Many of those who immigrated during this time had planned to be sojourners, yet half of the Hungarians eventually stayed (Parrillo, 195.)

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 led to many refugees fleeing to the United States. Although the prior Hungarian immigrants who came for economic reasons, most of those coming to the U.S. during the 1950's were political refugees. With the aid of the United States' airlifts, 30,000 refugees were able to come to the U.S. during this time. Additionally, since 1961 over 24,000 Hungarians have immigrated to the United States (Parrillo, 196.)

Poles

Fleeing poverty and seeking economic opportunities, 1 million Poles came to the United States between 1899 and 1914 (Parrillo, 185.) One of the main reasons for the mass emigration from Poland was that the country had been occupied by three states from 1795 to 1918: Russia, Austria and Prussia. The Poles had undertaken many revolts against the occupying forces and many political refugees sought shelter in other countries. Most of the Polish immigrants that arrived in the U.S. before 1920 had belonged to various subclasses of peasants and almost a third were illiterate. Polish immigration drastically dropped around 1924 due to a change in U.S. immigration law; following this time Polish immigration transformed as most of the immigrants were literate and sought jobs in industry. Polish immigration again increased following WWII as the U.S. government allowed more than 164,000 Poles to enter the country as persons "displaced" by the Soviets or Germans (Lopata, 128-130.)

Ukrainians

Although Ukraine did not gain independence from the Soviet Union until 1992, the history of their immigration to the United States has been documented. According to census data, church records and immigration reports, it is believed that about 700,000

Ukrainians have immigrated to the U.S. before World War I in 1914. Most Ukrainian immigrants settled in urban industrial centers in the Northeast and Midwest to work in factories and coalmines. With the passing of the Displaced Persons Act in 1948 (following World War II) approximately 85,000 Ukrainian refugees came to the United States. This wave of Ukrainians were better educated, more political oriented and more able to assimilate into the U.S. than the earlier Ukrainian immigrants. Another surge of Ukrainian immigration occurred with the creation of the independent Ukrainian nation; between 1992 and 1996 over 92,000 Ukrainian immigrants came to the United States (Parrillo, 193.)

Eastern Europeans – Overview

The immigration patterns from these three Eastern European countries are quite similar. Although they migrated to the U.S. during different time periods, work and economic opportunities were the main force that pulled Hungarians, Poles and Ukrainians from their homelands. The major push factor, which contributed to emigration from these three countries, was displacement. World War II caused Poles and Ukrainians to become displaced refugees; Hungarians held the same status following their 1956 Revolution.

“Hispanics / Latinos”

Cubans

Early Cuban immigration has not been properly recorded, since before 1950 the U.S. government listed Cuban immigrants in the same category as people from the West Indies. Since 1960, however, it is known that more than 710,000 Cubans have

immigrated to the United States (Parrillo, 431.) One major reason for the relatively high immigration during this era was the passing of the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act which “permitted hundreds of thousands of Cubans to come to the United States” (Reimers, 26.)

In 1996, sociologist Silvia Pedraza discussed Cuban emigration in regards to the Cuban revolution in several waves: those who wait; those who escape; those who search; those who hope; and those who despair. Dr. Pedraza added the concept that, “Overall, the Cuban migration is characterized by an increase relation between the date of departure and social class of the immigrants” (Pedraza, 264-273.)

The Cuba’s first wave of mass emigration, “those who wait,” began in 1959 with the revolution which overthrew the tyranny of Fulgencio Batista. As the revolution began to taken on a more radical phase, many of Cuba’s elite left the country for the U.S. as political immigrants. Different from typical emigrants, this group of emigrants left due to monetary reasons; although they were not bound to Batista’s old government, they had economically benefited under the old political and economic structures – benefits they lost as a consequence of the revolution. This group was characterized as “those who wait” because they came to the U.S. with the belief that their exile would be temporary and they would be able to return to their homeland after the United States overthrew Cuba’s new government. Many of these immigrants waited in vain to return home, as Castro remains in power to this day (Pedraza, 264-273.)

The second wave of immigration to the U.S. from Cuba came as political turmoil grew following the silencing of the Catholic Church after it denounced the revolution. Following the collapse of Cuba’s electoral system, the exodus out of the island doubled. This wave of immigration constituted mostly middle class individuals who felt they

needed to “escape an intolerable new order;” hence Pedraza labeled this group “those who escape” (Pedraza, 264-273.)

“Those who search” constituted the next wave of Cuban immigrants: the petite bourgeoisie. Following the passing of Johnson’s legislation to allow Cuban refugees to enter the U.S., hundreds of Cubans living in the U.S. took boats from Miami to their homeland to rescue thousands of relatives. Additionally, from 1965 to 1974 the U.S. and Cuban governments conducted daily “freedom flights” which transported, processed and resettled more than 250,000 persons to the U.S. It is important to note, however, that not every Cuban was allowed to leave their homeland; Cuba barred young men of military age, professionals, technical and skilled workers, and those in certain social services from leaving the island. Therefore, this phase of migration marked the end of the upper and middle classes leaving the island and was constituted of mainly Cuba’s “petite bourgeoisie:” employees, independent craftsmen, skilled and semi-skilled workers. This group was dubbed “those who search” because they essentially left home in search of greater economic opportunities in the United States (Pedraza, 264-273.)

The next wave of immigration came in 1980 with the chaotic flotilla exodus. This refugee exodus brought over 125,000 Cubans to the U.S. in a process that lacked order. As before, thousands of boats left Miami for Cuba as relatives sought to bring their family members back to the U.S. with them; at times they succeeded, however they often were forced to bring whomever Cuban officials put on their boats. Those Cuba sought to remove from the island included the country’s “social undesirables:” those who had been in prison, mental patients and homosexuals. The Mariel refugees, however, were not Cuba’s social undesirables and consisted of mainly young single men, working class and

blue-collar workers (mechanics, machine operators, carpenters and taxi drivers.) This group was of a different political generation than the earlier revolutionary immigrants and were called “those who hope” due to the sense that they were coming to the U.S. with the hope of finding more economic and political opportunities than they had in Cuba (Pedraza, 264-273.)

Following the Mariel exodus the doors to migration from Cuba to the U.S. closed until a new Migration Agreement was signed between the two countries in the mid-1980s. This agreement allowed for up to 20,000 Cubans and 3,000 political prisoners to enter the U.S. a year and further allowed for the U.S. to deport “excludable *Marielitos*” back to Cuba. But the next wave of immigrants who came to the U.S. did not come legally to the U.S. Following the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, Cuba’s economy was devastated. The economic crisis led to a dramatic rise in illegal immigration to the U.S. from Cuba, with people being so desperate that they attempted to sail to the U.S. on makeshift vessels (such as rafts or tires) called *balsas*. Those who attempted this treacherous journey were nicknamed the *balseros* after their method of transportation. Dr. Pedraza described the *balseros* as “those who despair” since they are in such dire conditions at home that they would attempt to sail to the U.S. in unsafe crafts; in search of “something better” they risked death due to starvation, dehydration, drowning or sharks (Pedraza, 264-273.)

A crisis ensued after thousands of *balseros* that tried to enter the U.S. and an abrupt U.S. policy change made the Cubans unwelcome. This crisis led to a new migration agreement, which in 1994 promised that the U.S. would give at least 20,000 visas a year for Cubans to immigrate to the U.S. (Pedraza, 264-273.)

Mexicans

During the second-half of the 19th century, there was a need for labor to help construct railroad lines and also to work on cotton, fruit and vegetable farms. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924 disabled immigrants from many countries to come to the U.S. to fill the empty laborer positions, and so many Mexicans were able to take the opportunity to leave their poverty-stricken homeland to come to the U.S. for work (Parrillo 416.) Furthermore, in the early 1920s, as immigrants from many countries were not allowed to come to the U.S., Mexico received no quota limit because of the desire to have a “ready supply of low-cost workers supplied from Mexico.” In the early to mid 1920s, Mexican immigration was nearly encouraged by the U.S. in that they had no national quota. Seen as a source of low cost workers, many Mexicans crossed the loosely guarded border to live and work in the United States. It was the Great Depression, which began in 1929, which put a halt to the “mesh screen” dividing the two countries. Many local governments sent Mexican immigrants back to their homeland because they were faced with “massive relief problems and long lines of unemployed workers.” Additionally, many Mexicans simply left of their own accord since they themselves were out of work and could find no hope of future prospects (Reimers 22-23.)

Although many Mexicans entered the U.S. illegally, and with relative ease across the mostly un-patrolled border (which was first patrolled in 1924) the Bracero Program allowed for many Mexican workers to come to the U.S. legally. This program allowed Mexican aliens to enter the U.S. on temporary visas for work purposes and they returned home after the harvest each year. The program benefited the U.S. by supplying the

country with relatively cheap labor without having to educate the workers' children and without having to extend welfare and other social services to them after the harvest in the "off-season." The Bracero Program, which lasted from 1942 until 1964, ended when: there were labor shortages in Mexico, farm mechanization cut down on the need for manual labor, and native Hispanics in the U.S. protested the program (Parrillo, 416.)

In the 1970s, Hispanic and Latino immigration to the U.S. was extremely high; 34 percent of 4.5 million "legal" immigrants were from Central and South America, and two-thirds of the 3.5-6 million "illegal" immigrants were from Mexico. A major factor contributing to the Mexicans immigration to the U.S. was purely economic: dire poverty and unemployment at home forced them to look to the U.S. in hope of finding work and a better life. Also, since many had either come themselves or have had family members that were "temporary workers" in the U.S. in the past, there was a familiarity with the country that made it a more likely place to relocate (LeMay, 9.) Moreover, similar to the Asian immigrants of the 1850s, many Mexicans took on a type of sojourner role of "temporary-worker" and did not stay permanently in the U.S. In contrast to the earlier Asian immigrants, since the U.S. and Mexico were so geographically close, many Mexicans were able to cross the U.S./Mexican border relatively frequently. They were therefore able come to the U.S. to work and then return home to Mexico and keep close ties to family, friends and keeping their culture intact (LeMay, 10.)

Puerto Ricans

Immigration from Puerto Rico has been different than that of other Hispanic and Latino groups due to the fact that the inhabitants of the island became U.S. citizens in 1917. After the Spanish-American War, Puerto Rico was annexed by the United States in

1898. Citizenship opened the door to migration since there was no need for passports, visas and quotas. By 1930 there was slightly more than 50,000 Puerto Ricans living in the U.S. Migration all but stopped during the Depression and war years, yet regained great strength following WWII (Parrillo, 423.)

“One of the most dramatic voluntary exoduses in world history” occurred in the 1950s, following the collapse of the Puerto Rican sugar industry. Despite the creation of thousands of factory jobs by the U.S. government through “Operation Bootstrap” the island was unable to sustain itself, causing 17 percent of Puerto Ricans (a total of 480,000) to migrate to the mainland. During this time, the island’s poor economy, the hope of jobs, inexpensive plane fares and easy entry to the mainland as U.S. citizens, were all contributing factors that led to the mass migration. The greatest period of Puerto Rican migration occurred from 1946 to 1964, in which the collapse of the sugar industry was centered, with the move of 615,000 persons to the mainland. Migration subsequently dropped after 1964 with the revival of the Puerto Rican sugar industry – caused in part by the U.S. boycott of all Cuban trade. Furthermore, the loss of thousands of jobs in New York’s manufacturing sector led to a decreased “pull” of the mainland being a vessel of jobs. Other factors contributing to decreased migration to the mainland included: increased U.S. government support on the island and relieved pressure on the island’s job market – because so many people left the island, there were more jobs available for those who remained. Immigration to the mainland was again enticed because of the recessions from 1980-1982 and 1990-1992; such economic difficulties led to 42 percent of Puerto Ricans living on the mainland rather than their home island (Parrillo, 423-424.)

Hispanics / Latinos - Overview

Although not all Hispanic and Latino immigrant groups could be discussed in this chapter, it is important to note that within the last four decades, legal immigration from Mexico, the Caribbean, Central and South America has been significant: 1.3 million in the 1960s; 1.8 million in the in 1970s; 3.4 million in the 1980s; and over 3 million in the 1990s (US – INS, 28.) Overpopulation throughout Latin America was a “pushing force” that let many to immigrate to the U.S. Sociologist Vincent Parrillo stated that “High birthrates, improved sanitation, reduction in child mortality, and negative cultural and religious attitudes about birth control have led to population booms in countries whose resources and habitable land cannot support so many people” (Parrillo, 403.)

The three countries discussed in this section share additional reasons for leaving their homelands to migrate to the United States. A major pulling force, which contributed to immigrants from Cuba, Mexico and Puerto Rico coming to the U.S., was the search for greater economic opportunities and work. The Cuban Revolution and near-collapse of Puerto Rico’s economic system led to many persons from these areas to come to the U.S. as refugees. One distinction, however, was that many of the Cuban immigrants were political refugees and the Puerto Rican immigrants were not; although the Puerto Rican refugees could essentially return home as its’ economy stabilized, the Cuban refugees were effectively barred from returning home until a change in political power occurred.

“Indians / Pakistanis” (i.e. South Asians)

Indians

Emigration from India occurred in two major phases. During the early 1900s several thousand poorly educated agricultural laborers came to the U.S. to work in the west coast; from 1901 to 1965 around 15,000 emigrated from India. The second wave of Indian immigration occurred in the 1970s and 1980s when over 400,000 peoples came to the U.S.; many in this group were well educated, professionally trained. Since then relatives of the earlier immigrants have arrived and have entered into family-owned businesses (Parrillo, 326.)

One of the most important push factors contributing to Indian emigration is the fact that India is the world’s second most populated country, with a population density seven times greater than that of the U.S. Furthermore, India has high rates of poverty, hunger and inadequate resources for such a high population. These factors have led to the fleeing of many of the country’s professional workers – physicians, dentists, teachers and skilled workers – those who can most afford to start a new life in a new land that is full of hope (Parrillo, 330.)

Pakistanis

Various forms of strife in Pakistan have encouraged many to seek a calmer environment in the West (usinfo.state.gov.) Among countries with large Muslim populations, Pakistan is the leading sender of immigrants to the U.S. over the past decade; it is followed by Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt (www.cis.org.) According to the 2000 Census, there was reported to be around 210,000 Pakistanis living

in the United States (www.census.gov); this is significantly higher than the 100,000 reported in the 1990 Census (Parrillo, 348.)

Many of the immigrants from Pakistan are educated professionals. Political and religious leaders of the Pakistani community are often employed in the medical and engineering fields (usinfo.state.gov.) Three out of five individuals are “white collar” workers with the others working as craftsmen, service workers or laborers (Parrillo, 348.)

The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 was a major force causing emigration (www.cis.org.) This war, between India and Pakistan, is also referred to the Pakistani Civil War and the Bangladesh Liberation War. In March of 1971 Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) declared itself independent from Pakistan (formerly West Pakistan). Shortly thereafter, India expressed support for the liberation of Bangladesh (while the U.S. aided its ally Pakistan with arms and supplies). The ensuing Pakistani civil war led to the mass movement of over 10 million refugees entering India; as this severely strained India, the country seemed to have no choice but to enter the conflict against Pakistan near the end of November. Pakistan soon surrendered on December 16 and India signed a ceasefire, resulting in the independence of Bangladesh. The war has been estimated to have killed between 1 to 3 million Pakistanis (West and East), devastating the country (Ganguly, 51-78.)

Religious persecution was the primary push factor causing members of the Ahmadi sect to leave Pakistan in 1974. Under the Islamic fundamentalist dictatorship of General Zia ul-Haq, the Ahmadi’s faith was deemed “not Islamic;” they and many other Muslims fled their homeland to escape the tyranny of Zia ul-Haq (www.cis.org.)

Indians / Pakistanis – Overview

Unlike the previous two sections, the immigration histories of Indians and Pakistanis show that peoples from these two countries did not necessarily come to the U.S. for the same reasons. While economic opportunities and overpopulation respectively pulled and pushed many Indians to the U.S. and from the homeland, the damaging effects of wars pushed many Pakistanis to emigrate.

“Middle Easterners”

Iranians

During most of the reign of Iran’s King (Shah) Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, from the 1950s until 1979, education was the primary pull factor of Iranian immigration. Annually, approximately 50,000 Iranian students came to the United States to study in American colleges and universities. Many of these students remained in the U.S. until the fall of the Shah in 1979 due to their fear of political repression under his rule.

Ironically, as the Revolution of 1979 opened the door for Iranian immigrants to return to their homeland, it also caused a flood of political refugees to emigrate from Iran. Although Iranian immigration in the 1970s totaled around 45,000, that number rose significantly to 116,000 in the 1980s (Parrillo, 343-344.) Most of the Iranians who emigrated after 1980 are similar to the Chinese, Vietnamese and Cuban immigrants who also left their homeland for political reasons and felt they were unable to return home.

Syrians

Syrian immigration to the United States was significant at the start of the 20th century. Beginning in the 1870s, Syrian immigration was caused by a combination of

factors. Harsh living conditions of hunger, poverty and disease and oppression by the Turks were the primary push factors of Syrian emigration. Furthermore, the Syrians were pulled to the U.S. after hearing reports from missionaries of the economic opportunities and religious and political freedoms the country had to offer. During 1913 and 1914 immigration peaked as many emigrated to avoid recruitment into the Turkish army, which was preparing for combat in WWI. From 1890 to 1914 an estimated 100,000 Syrians immigrated to the U.S. (Parrillo, 337.)

Turks

More than 440,000 Turks have immigrated to the U.S. since 1820, with the peak occurring since 1971 with the arrival of over 61,000. In 1912, with the start of the Balkan War, many young unmarried Turkish males came to the U.S. to avoid military service in their homeland. Only a few thousand remained in the U.S. after 1919 as 30,000 of these men returned to Turkey as peace was declared. Perhaps the greatest factor contributing to early low Turkish emigration was the passing of a law in 1923 in which Turkey barred any emigrant from ever returning, either to live or even as a visitor. This law remained until 1950. It was in 1965 that immigration to the U.S. increased; the pull to America was the strong military alliance between the two countries (Parrillo, 346.)

Middle Easterners – Overview

Immigrants from the three countries in this section have some similarities and many variations in their immigration histories. Unlike any of the countries discussed in this chapter, educational opportunities were the major force that pulled many Iranians to the United States. However, similar to the Cuban political refugees, many Iranians found themselves unsafe in the homeland and unable to return home after the 1979 Revolution

caused them to flee. Both Syrian and Turkish immigrants were pushed from their homelands in the early twentieth century as they tried to avoid recruitment into their warring nation's armies. However, whereas many Turks were pulled to the U.S. due to an outstanding military alliance between the two countries, economic opportunities and political and religious freedoms pulled countless Syrians to the U.S.

“Western Europeans“

French

Colonization by the French of North America was a primary factor contributing to early U.S. immigration from that country. In 1603, a Frenchman named Samuel de Champlain sailed the St. Lawrence River. This voyage was of significant value to the French as Champlain was able to make an alliance with the Algonquian Indians in Canada. This alliance was deemed to be “instrumental in securing a French power base in Canada.” Five years later Champlain founded the city of Quebec, which became the first permanent French colony in North America. After establishing themselves in Canada, the French moved southward; by 1620 they had spread their territory to encompass the Great Lakes, Michigan, Missouri and New Orleans (Robbins, 10-11.)

French emigration ignited in 1683 after King Louis XIV made France “only open to Catholics.” Not only had the king “eliminated religious liberty,” but the Huguenots (from the south of France) faced renewed persecution and extermination (Parrillo, 143.) When French Protestants were confronted with either converting to Catholicism or fleeing France, many chose to leave the country. However, because it was against the law for them to leave the country, many had to smuggle themselves out by using false

passports or by bribing border guards. Since both of these means of escape could be costly, as was voyage to America, most of those who fled France during this time were “well-to-do” and skilled (Robbins, 20-21.)

The French Revolution occurred around 1790 after France declared itself a republic. The ensuing war between Great Britain and the new French republic led to the arrival of French refugees in America; this was a likely destination of the French following the American-French alliance of 1778 (Robbins, 53-58.)

Germans

The nation that has supplied the most immigrants to the United States is Germany. Since 1820, more than 7.1 million have emigrated from Germany to the U.S., and today approximately 23 percent of Americans possess German ancestry (Parrillo, 146.)

In the seventeenth century, Germany was devastated by a series of long and horrific wars. Rival armies destroyed cities, crops and livestock – leaving a trail of starvation and disease in their wake. At the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648, as Germany’s population had been decimated to almost half, most Germans had lost all hope; and it was America that seemed a source of refuge (Robbins, 25-26.)

In 1671 and 1677 William Penn was “inspired with missionary zeal” and went to Germany in the attempt to “gain adherents for the faith of the Quakers.” Moreover, since he had recently acquired Pennsylvania from the British government, he wanted to recruit German immigrants. Penn actively engaged Germans about Pennsylvania by publishing information about the province; the publication also listed advantages for immigrants and was written in German (Huebener, 9.) Penn’s arrival in Germany, coming some twenty years after the end of the Thirty Years War, helped lead to the arrival of nearly 225,000

German immigrants in America by the start of the Revolutionary War in 1775 (Robbins, 27.)

German immigration during the 1800s was fueled by a variety of reasons. Immigration remained relatively low until 1832 when ten-thousand Germans immigrated to the U.S., followed by twenty-five thousand in 1837, and over five-hundred thousand from 1852 to 1854. Several factors contributed to the emigration out of Germany during the early to mid 1800s: censorship had been established in Germany, causing many to feel suppressed; heavy taxes were imposed; the rise of the factory system led to the unemployment of thousands of artisans; cities were overpopulated; and agricultural areas were overcrowded. Moreover, several factors led to the “pull” of emigrants to the United States: the states were enjoying economic prosperity and political freedom; rich, fertile land could be purchased for a low price; and trade and industry were booming. Economically, Germans were attracted to the states because “land was cheap, taxes were low, and workmen were needed” (Huebener, 61-62.)

The “Forty-Eighters” were political refugees who came to the U.S. following the failure of an attempted liberal revolution in Germany (Parrillo, 148.) Named for the year of their immigration, 1848, these Germans cherished the ideas of national unity and political freedom; and it was their yearning for political freedom that pushed them to “sacrifice their German background” and immigrate to the U.S. Although the exact number of “Forty-Eighters” is not known, and it is estimated that they may only account for a few thousand immigrants that came during that the mid 1850s, they remain a noteworthy group due to their political attitude (Huebener, 98.) Moreover, whereas most of the Germans who had arrived prior to 1848 were peasants and tradesmen, the Forty-

Eighters were mostly well-educated, and their professions consisted of mainly teachers, doctors, lawyers, editors, artists and musicians. Additionally, while the earlier German immigrants had avoided all aspects of political life, the Forty-Eighters were “primarily politically minded” (Huebener, 102.)

German immigration outnumbered that of every other country from 1851 until the last decade of the nineteenth century. The 1848 Revolution in Germany led to the subsequent immigration of nearly one million Germans to the U.S. in the 1850s. Other factors contributing to such wide-scale emigration from Germany during the mid to late 1800s were: poor economic conditions; the failure of many farm crops; improvements in travel (both ocean travel and also that of the railroads which opened the West to settlers). German emigration finally began to decline in the 1890s due to Germany’s “expansion in industry and material prosperity” (Huebener, 134-135.)

German emigration all but ceased following WWI until 1927, despite the multitude of factors that suggest emigration should have soared. In 1921, the Allied Powers had imposed “colossal and fantastic reparations” in a sum of thirty-three billion dollars. By 1923 Germany’s economy had completely broken down; six million were out of work, and a large portion of the German population was starving. Although these factors would normally cause emigration to skyrocket, this was not the case in Germany following WWI as the Allies had seized all of the country’s ships and curtailed all sea operations (Huebener, 152.)

The rise of Hitler to the position of German Chancellor in 1933 led to a mass wave of emigration from Germany. Over one hundred thousand Germans emigrated during the years of 1933 to 1938. Fleeing from the Nazi’s anti-Semitism, around 140,000

German Jews left their homeland from 1933 on; the largest number immigrated to the United States in 1938. This mass emigration consisted of many cultured and professionally trained individuals; perhaps Germany's greatest loss was that of Albert Einstein, who immigrated to the United States during the exodus (Huebener, 155.) During the last century, more than 1.6 million Germans have immigrated to the United States. The primary "push" factors are undoubtedly both World War I and World War II - two wars that Germany suffered greatly during and after (Parrillo, 149.)

Irish

The Irish were the second largest group to immigrate to the United States. It was William Penn's recruitment in Europe that led to Irish immigration to the U.S. in the mid to late 1600s.

Immigration from Ireland after 1830 significantly increased. The primary "push" factor causing Irish Catholics to immigrate to the U.S. was their oppression under British rule. The famed "potato famine" in the late 1840s further contributed to the mass exodus of Irish from their homeland: during the seven years from 1847 to 1854, more than 1.2 million Irish emigrated – the peak of emigration was in 1851, when approximately 250,000 immigrated to the U.S. (Parrillo, 151.)

Another important factor contributed to such large-scale Irish immigration. As Ireland felt the pressures of overpopulation, many Irish immigrated to the U.S. for a "new start." As these new immigrants "glorified accounts of the opportunities that awaited the adventurous in the new country," those in Ireland with little hope for improved conditions set sail for the U.S. Additionally, relatives who had already made the journey were often

able to provide “passage money” so that their family members could join them in America (Fallows, 5.)

Large-scale immigration from Ireland occurred with the arrival of 1.9 million persons between 1871 and 1910. The majority of immigrants during this period came to the U.S. in search of employment. Contrary to early Asian immigration, immigration of Irish women outnumbered men during this era. Many unmarried women came to the U.S. to work in domestic maid services; others sought out work in textile mills and clothing factories. Irish men were able to find employment in a more wide variety of fields such as working in factories, mines, railroads, canals, business entrepreneurship, store clerking and teaching. Overall, however, most Irish labor was concentrated in low-status unskilled or semiskilled occupations (Parrillo, 154-155.)

Western Europeans – Overview

The immigration histories from these three Western European countries was quite different – yet the comparatively long immigration histories of these countries caused them to have a multitude of factors contributing to their immigrations to the U.S. Conversely, the countries that were discussed in the previous sections had relatively shorter immigration histories to the U.S. The establishment of French colonies in the 1600s led to the subsequent pull of many French to America. The French Revolution and ensuing war was a primary push factor and concurrent alliance between the U.S. and France was the pull factor of French immigrants. War was also a major theme in Germany’s immigration history, as a multitude of seventeenth century wars, and both World Wars pushed many Germans from their homeland. The 1800s saw further German emigration due to overpopulation and unemployment and the failed political revolution of

1848. A major pulling force of many German immigrants to the U.S. was economic opportunities and work. Irish immigrants were also pulled to the United States in search of work during the late nineteenth century. The primary factors that contributed to mass migration of the Irish to the U.S. during the 1800s were oppression under British rule, overpopulation, and the potato famine.

Chapter Overview

It is rare that someone who is safe, content and free at home would move to an unknown land. The United States was created with the arrival of immigrants who left their homeland for the unknown in America for a multitude of reasons. Push factors that led many to leave their homeland include: war; foreign occupation; poverty; political suppression; overpopulation, and lack of jobs. Factors contributing to why immigrants were pulled to the United States include: alliances between the homeland and U.S.; employment opportunities; religious and economic freedoms; equality; and democracy. Since the birth of the nation, the United States has become a type of quilt – sewn together with a multitude of intricately designed patches of voluntary and forced migration.

Chapter 2

Prejudice and Discrimination Against Immigrant Groups Throughout U.S. History

“We are a nation of many nationalities, many races, many religions, bound together by a single unity-the unity of freedom and equality. Whoever seeks to set one nationality against another, seeks to degrade all nationalities. Whoever seeks to set one race against another seeks to enslave all races. Whoever seeks to set one religion against another, seeks to destroy all religion. ” - Franklin Delano Roosevelt, November 1, 1940
(www.maritime.edu)

As we have learned in Chapter One, nearly everyone in the United States can be considered an immigrant – either they or their ancestors emigrated from another country. Yet despite this widely known fact, there are still some who claim that they are “more American” and therefore feel more entitled to certain rights and privileges than others. However, this is not a new phenomenon; in actuality prejudice and anti-immigration sentiments have been in existence in America even before the founding of the United States.

This chapter will examine prejudice and discrimination at their root causes; so often these terms are used without the understanding of their impact’s true feeling and consequences. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss not only what “prejudice” and “discrimination” may be defined as in a dictionary, but it is perhaps more important to demonstrate and give examples of how they can effect people and a society at a variety of levels. This chapter is a continuation of Chapter One as we again visit the history of specific immigrant groups. This time, however, the groups will be analyzed in terms of the prejudice and discrimination they have endured throughout history in the United States. As we begin to understand the patterns of prejudice and discrimination suffered upon immigrants throughout history, we can then more fully understand the need for greater tolerance towards immigrants in modern-day America – especially as the nation

has declared itself to be at war against terror, and tensions towards immigrants are rampant.

Part I

- Overview of Prejudice and Discrimination: The Whos, Whats, Wheres and Whys

Prejudice is a “negative feeling towards persons based on their membership in a group” (Brehm et al, 143.) In this case, a “group” may be an immigrant group, a religious group, a racial group, or even something such as an employment group (such as lawyers or sanitation workers.) In 1949, psychologist Bernard M. Kramer identified three levels of prejudice that exist: the cognitive level; the emotional level; and the action-oriented level (Kramer, 389-451.)

The cognitive level of prejudice encompasses a person’s beliefs and perceptions of a group, in either positive or negative characteristics. Prejudice at this level often arises from false perceptions of cultural or racial stereotypes (Parrillo, 75.) Common cognitive beliefs towards immigrant groups are similar to the previous examples listed: Irish are heavy drinkers, Mexicans are lazy, and Asians are intelligent. Usually in society, those in the majority group are cognitively perceived to have good characteristics while those in the minority group are perceived to have negative characteristics. Additionally, although a particular immigrant group may now have majority status and are viewed positively, their status throughout history may have been far different than what it is now. This idea further gives hope to those groups that are currently facing negative attitudes, that they will someday be more accepted by the majority group. Sociologist Vincent Parrillo verified this when he found that, “In the United States, the

Irish, Italians, African Americans, Mexicans, Chinese, Puerto Ricans, and others have at one time or another been labeled as: dirty, immoral, violent, and/or law-breaking” (Parrillo, 67.)

The second level of prejudice is the emotional level. This level is somewhat similar to the cognitive level due to the fact that it may be based on stereotypes used in the cognitive level. However, this level of prejudice refers to feelings towards a minority group (Kramer, 389-451.) Towards “Immigrant Group X,” one may feel negative or positive emotions such as: hate or love; fear or trust; condemnation or admiration.

“An action-orientation level of prejudice is the positive or negative predisposition to engage in discriminatory behavior.” This third level of prejudice is connected to the emotional level of prejudice because a person’s emotions (either positive or negative) towards a group may influence whether or not that person will act positively or negatively towards a particular group. However, this level of prejudice describes a person’s predisposition to act – not the actual actions themselves (Parrillo, 67.)

What factors may contribute to prejudice of one to another? The realistic conflict theory is based primarily on competition. Similar to Marx’s conflict theory between the “haves and the have-nots,” (i.e. socio-economic class struggle) who battle over the means of production, this theory also deals with economics and competition; as groups struggle for land, jobs or power the loser will become resentful whereas the winner will feel threatened and protective. Before long, conflict ensues.

One must understand, however, that in the realistic conflict theory, “competition for resources may in fact be imagined.” Additionally, resentment towards a group may arise because of their sense of “relative deprivation,” not because they believe that group

threatens their security or resources. Relative deprivation is the belief that one fares poorly when compared with others. This can be described in that someone is jealous of another's property and hence they are concerned of what they themselves do not have. Deprivation can also describe how someone may be concerned about the status of the group in which they belong. For example, someone in "Group A" may fear that they are socially or economically "falling behind" those in "Group B" (Brehm et al, 145.) Therefore, as a person feels threatened, they will possess greater levels of prejudice towards those whom they feel threatened by.

Competition and feelings of being threatened, therefore, have been common themes in terms of prejudice throughout history. Depressions, wars, and competition for scarce jobs all have contributed to prejudice in the United States. The effects of these factors will be illustrated in Part 3 of this chapter, when prejudice towards specific immigrant groups throughout U.S. history is discussed.

Whereas prejudice describes a person's feelings towards another or group, discrimination is the behavior directed against persons because of their membership in a particular group (Brehm et al, 129.) Discrimination ranges in levels of intensity and may be analyzed at five levels:

1. Verbal Expression – stating dislike for a group or using derogatory terms;
2. Avoidance – taking steps to avoid social interaction with a particular group;
3. Exclusion – excluding members of a particular group from certain jobs, housing, education, or social organizations;
4. Physical Abuse – violent attacks on members of a particular group;
5. Extermination – massacres or genocide conducted in an attempt to destroy the entirety of a particular group (Parrillo, 85-86.)

Prejudice and discrimination are closely related, as a person's feelings and actions are often closely related. However, it is important to note that prejudice may lead to

discrimination, and discrimination may lead to prejudice. Moreover, one may exist without the other. A person may feel intense prejudice towards a group without ever discriminating against it, and another may discriminate against a group without prejudiced feelings towards them. In 1949, sociologist Robert K. Merton classified four types of people in terms of prejudice and discrimination:

1. Non-Prejudiced / Non-Discriminator
(although some members of this group may be activists whom work to foster equality, most members of this group remain silent on the issues of prejudice and discrimination since they do not realize there is a problem);
2. Non-Prejudiced / Discriminator
(most members in this group may not feel prejudice yet they act in discriminatory ways such as: by supporting efforts that keep out certain immigrant groups from their neighborhoods because they fear those immigrants will bring down property values; and following the segregation laws before the U.S. Civil Rights Act – often members of this group feel guilt and shame because they are acting against their beliefs);
3. Prejudiced / Non-Discriminator
(members in this group are prejudiced and hostile towards certain groups yet do not act out their aggressions because of societal pressures to be tolerant and also because of the laws that forbid discriminatory actions);
4. Prejudiced / Discriminator
(members in this group openly express their prejudiced beliefs, discriminate and break the law when they feel necessary; moreover, they are proud of their actions and believe they are “virtuous”) (Merton, 99-126.)


Part II

- Prejudice and Discrimination towards Immigrants throughout U.S. History

Since colonial America, prejudice towards immigrants has flourished; this is quite interesting as the nation was founded with the arrival of immigrants. So often it has been said that the United States is a “melting pot;” a country brewing with people from all over the world that have come together to be “Americans.” But as countless scholars have argued, and as most Americans can easily agree – the United States’ population is quite divided among ethnic lines. However, one must take into account that the severity of these divisions have varied throughout the nation’s history, and have depended on several factors. Some factors that heightened ethnic tensions included: war, economic depression, and disease outbreak. Moreover, when and where prejudices and discriminatory actions existed, there appeared to be a process of inclusion that immigrant groups had to endure before becoming more greatly accepted into U.S. society.

As noted by Hess, Stein and Farrell (2001), minority groups in the U.S. move along a continuum of societal integration into the larger society, along a path of approximately five steps, as highlighted below:

Table 2.1



Segregation – or “exclusion” from interaction from society’s majority group, can be either *de jure* (meaning lawfully enacted) or *de facto* (meaning as a matter of fact, or socially/culturally practiced.)

Accommodation – occurs when *de jure* segregation is not in effect. As a minority group seeks to gain greater acceptance into the mainstream society, they adjust their lifestyles to include some dominant norms of society so that they can better “fit in.” However, minority groups in this phase of the continuum primarily seek to maintain and preserve their in-group culture and traditions.

Acculturation – is the next step of the continuum towards greater acceptance, in which the minority group “lets go” of many aspects of their cultural heritage, absorbing the norms and practices of the dominant society. However, although groups in this level of the continuum may be accepting of the dominant culture and norms, the dominant society is not yet completely welcoming/accepting of this minority group into it. Therefore, groups at this stage of acceptance appear to be in a type of societal “limbo” in which they are not completely a part of their cultural minority group, nor a part of the dominant group.

Assimilation – occurs when minority groups gain acceptance of the dominant group. To be more fully assimilated, often groups must share not only cultural similarities of the dominant group, but physical ones as well.

Amalgamation – is the full integration of a group into the larger society. Acceptance at this level often occurs through the process of intermarriage into the dominant group, as cultural as well as physical attributes become shared and divisions less distinguishable and definable (Hess et al, 139-142.)

Of course not every group which came to the United States had to start at the bottom of the scale, and depending on the aforementioned societal conditions it was possible for groups to both move upward as well as downward across the continuum. Additionally, as more groups entered the lower tier of the acceptance continuum, often there would be upward mobility/acceptance of other groups into the higher tiers. The following sections of this chapter as well as subsequent chapters will discuss historical and current examples of such mobility.

Before the founding of the United States, several factors led to opposition to newcomers: religion, economics, moral issues and nationality. The issue of nationality was most pressing with the large-scale immigration of Scots-Irish and Germans after 1717. The New England Puritans were said to have had “no desire to see any non-Puritans reside in their midst, especially if they were poor.” Thoughts and words turned to actions when in 1729, a Boston mob attempted to stop “non-Puritan” immigrants from coming off a ship. A few years thereafter, another Massachusetts mob nearly destroyed a Presbyterian church. It was during the colonial labor shortage, around 1740, that the English and other colonists became more tolerant towards immigrants. Tolerance further existed throughout the Revolution era (Reimers, 8.)

Economics weighed heavily on the minds of those opposed to immigration.

Around the 1840s, many Americans took note of the large immigrant populations living in the cities' poor houses and asylums. Nativists then accused European governments of "deporting their paupers so that the burden of their support might be placed on the American people." Furthermore, it was alleged that immigrants would drive down wages and the status of American workers (Reimers, 10.)

By the 1900s, resistance to immigration took on another scope: racism. In 1910, the Immigration Resistance League declared that, "A considerable proportion of immigrants now coming are from races and countries, or parts of countries, which have not progressed, but have been backward, downtrodden, and relatively useless for centuries. If these immigrants 'have not had opportunities,' it is because their races have not made the opportunities; for they have had all the time that any other races have had" (Reimers, 16.)

The Dillingham Commission report, published in 1911, consisted of forty-two volumes that were mostly devoted to economics; the focus was to try and determine the impact of mass immigration upon the American economy and its workers. What the report asserted was that "post-1890 immigrants were economically inferior to the older European types, and fewer unskilled newcomers should (be allowed to) come to America" (Reimers, 17.) Perhaps it was the earlier depression of 1891 which led to the commission to "clearly accept the racist theories of the Immigration Restriction League." (LeMay, 2.)

In the 1920s irrational fears led to prejudices against immigration. In 1921 a Congressional Committee told Congress that between 2,000,000 and 8,000,000 Germans

and 3,000,000 Jews of Poland wanted to come to the U.S. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) gained power and numbers, claiming millions of members, and also tried to curb U.S. immigration. Additionally, more respectable groups influenced Congress to lessen immigration, such as: the American Federation of Labor; the American Legion; and the Immigration Restriction League. The pressure placed on Congress led to the first quota law of 1921 (Reimers, 20-21.)

During WWII prejudice towards immigrants prevented countless lives from possibly being saved. In Congress, Edith Rogers (R-Mass) and Robert Wagner (D-NY) introduced a bill to bring 20,000 German children to the United States outside of the quotas. Although they generated sympathy, one witness during the hearings stated “if we are going to keep this country as it is and not lose our liberty in the future, we have to keep not only these children out of it but the whole damned Europe.” The German children were not allowed to come to the U.S. Moreover, while the U.S. could not have necessarily have prevented the Holocaust, several hundred thousand Jews could have been saved if the Roosevelt administration had “not dragged its feet.” Whereas in the past the U.S. had opened its doors to welcome immigrant workers, the traditional need for them during WWII was replaced by the fear that too many “criminals, diseased persons, paupers, undesirable and unfit immigrants” were coming from Asian and south-east Europe. U.S. immigration began to take a more relaxed stance post WWII as the economy boomed and tolerance grew (Reimers, 23-25.)

Following 1970 the U.S. restrictionist movement again gained strength. A major reason for this is the fact that the immigrants’ countries of origins changed drastically from the past. Whereas White Europeans had dominated earlier U.S. immigration, they

made up only 10 percent of those coming to the United States after the 1965 Immigration Act. Another factor contributing to the growing stance against immigration was the fact that almost 75 percent of post WWII immigrants settled in six states: California, New York, Texas, New Jersey, Florida and Illinois. The migration patterns put stresses on these states, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s when the nation's economy was unsteady. California was at the center of the national immigration debate when the state's economy spiraled downward (Reimers, 28-29.)

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been a rebirth of prejudice and racism in the U.S. towards immigrants. These "wartime" prejudices and discrimination undertaken by the United States government and citizens will be fully discussed in Chapter 3.

The next section of this chapter discusses prejudice and discrimination throughout U.S. history towards the same immigrant groups discussed in Chapter 1. Furthermore, using the concepts described at the beginning of this chapter, one can more fully understand what these immigrant groups experienced and why.

Part III
– Prejudice and Discrimination towards Specific Immigrant Groups in the U.S.

“Asians” (i.e. East Asians)

Chinese

Despite the overwhelming need for manual labor in the mid-nineteenth century, the Chinese seemed to face severe discrimination and prejudice as soon as they entered California: they were expelled from mining camps, forbidden to enter schools, denied the right to testify in court, barred from obtaining citizenship and some were even murdered. The Japanese, Koreans and Filipinos who came years later also faced similar discrimination as the Chinese (Parrillo, 271.) However, it was the Chinese who felt the ultimate rejection by the U.S. with the passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.

Even before the first Chinese immigrants came to the U.S. in the 1850s, the U.S. had ethnocentric distortions and exaggerations of them. Newspaper and magazine articles about the Chinese described them as being dirty, diseased, barbaric and immoral (Parrillo, 275.) It is, therefore, little wonder that the Chinese faced hostility and discrimination upon reaching the shores of the U.S.

Although the Chinese helped build the transcontinental railroad and filled provided a labor supply during the Civil War, their work would not be appreciated for long. It was at the end of the war that the Chinese were seen as “competition” in the workforce as veterans returned home to work, and labor-supply exceeded demand. The job shortage, along with worsening economic conditions throughout the country, led to the increased hostilities against Chinese immigrants (Parrillo, 276-277.)

In the 1860s opponents of Chinese immigration publicly played the “racial card.” Although German and Irish immigration had also been opposed to by many Americans, the two groups were now seen as “better” than the Chinese because, “at least they were physically similar to the Protestant northern and western Europeans” (Parrillo, 278.) Therefore, negative reactions to Chinese immigration actually helped improve acceptance of German and Irish immigration to the U.S.

For the variety of reasons discussed in the previous chapter regarding Asian immigration, there were disproportionately more Asian males than females in the United States until around 1965. In 1875, Congress banned the admission of prostitutes to the United States. Although the law banned prostitutes from all countries, it was aimed primarily at Chinese women (Reimers, 11.) Negative racial stereotypes resulted from racist whites whom expressed “moral indignation” at Asian males who either “patronized prostitutes or sought the company of white women who were not prostitutes.” Following this rise in hostilities, in 1940 fourteen states passed laws against miscegenation: “interracial intermarriage or breeding.” It was the Immigration Act of 1965 that helped begin to balance the number of sexes in the U.S.; the act’s provisions giving preference to relatives of U.S. residents ensured both sexes an equal opportunity to immigrate to the United States (Parrillo, 272-273.)

Not only had miscegenation laws been passed to ensure the separation of Asians and whites, but in the 1920s even Chinese children were confronted with segregationist actions. The children were expelled from white public schools in an effort to “preserve the purity and integrity of the white race, and prevent amalgamation.” This action was

upheld by the courts and Chinese children had to attend separate schools until the 1950s when they were once again allowed into white schools (Parrillo, 283.)

Filipino

Although Filipinos were U.S. nationals (following annexation of the Philippines after Spanish-American War) they still faced the same prejudice and discrimination as other Asians during the 1920s when they began to arrive in the U.S. in large numbers (Reimers, 14.) Although they were essentially recruited by the Hawaiian Sugar Planter's Association in 1908, and labored for California growers during a labor-shortage, the Depression of the 1930s drastically changed the picture for Filipinos in the U.S.

Once sought-after as a cheap labor source, Philippine immigrants were now being treated with severe hostility and prejudice by Americans as the Depression caused a lack of jobs. Race riots erupted in California, causing one Filipino to be killed and many more to be beat by "hundreds of white men." Additionally, cars and houses of Philippine immigrants, as well as the Filipino Federation of America Center, were vandalized and destroyed (Parrillo, 296.) Filipinos were further degraded in the U.S. when, in the 1920s, several western states passed laws prohibiting the immigrant group from marrying whites (Parrillo, 297.) Finally, in 1934 (at the insistence of labor unions and organizations such as the Native Sons of the Golden West and the Commonwealth Club) Congress set an annual quota of 50 Filipinos to come to the U.S. until 1946, when the country was supposed to gain independence. The plan was to then bar Filipinos from entering the U.S., along with the other Asians (Reimers, 14.)

Japanese

Similar to the Chinese and Filipinos, the Japanese also felt discrimination against them due to economic competition. In the late 1800s, Japanese immigrants came under attack for their willingness to work for lower wages in poor conditions. In California, members of the “shoemakers’ union” and the “union for cooks and waiters” attacked Japanese cobblers and restaurateurs. Japanese farmers also came under fire, however this was due to their “industriousness and knowledge of cultivation” which placed them in serious competition with white and Hispanic farmers. Although Japanese farmers did not come under physical attack, they were hit by the California legislature, which passed a law in 1913 that forbade “any person who was ineligible for citizenship from owning land in the state, and permitted such persons to lease land for no more than three years in succession.” By 1920, California legislature pressed the issue even further by prohibiting aliens from leasing any land at all. Despite this, the Japanese were still immensely successful at farming and raised 42 percent of California’s truck crops by 1941 (Parrillo, 288.)

Continuing in the early 1920s, the question of Japanese “assimilability” arose. Exaggerated claims that the Japanese would “overrun the country” were heard from fearful Nativists; they believed that the Japanese were unable to assimilate in the U.S. due to their race, lifestyle and embellished high birthrate.

It was Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941 that preceded the United States’ “worst wartime mistake” – the transference of Japanese Americans into “relocation centers.” More than 110,000 Japanese Americans were removed from their homes and placed in these camps, which were located in seven states: Arkansas; Arizona;

California; Colorado; Idaho; Utah; and Wyoming. Many of these immigrants were, in fact, second and third-generation Americans “with as little as one-eighth Japanese ancestry.” National security was the reason cited as the primary justification for the expulsion of the Japanese from the West Coast – yet there had been no evacuation of the 150,000 Japanese who were living in Hawaii (where the attack on Pearl Harbor had occurred). One must question whether the expulsion was indeed for “national security” or actually due to traditional anti-Asian sentiments and a horrid reaction to successful Japanese agricultural practices (Parrillo, 289.)

The relocation camps were essentially concentration camps, in which the Japanese were forced to live in sub-standard standards. Moreover, the evacuation brought many families financial ruin as they lost their property, savings, income and jobs. In 1944 the Supreme Court upheld the decision to keep the Japanese in the camps with a vote of 6-3. This decision was what Justice Francis Murphy referred to “the legalization of racism.” The Japanese were finally freed from the camps in 1945, this time by a favorable unanimous Supreme Court vote which ruled that “all loyal Japanese Americans be set free unconditionally.” Thirty-one years later, in 1976, President Ford signed an executive order to officially close all of the camps. Although the Japanese had irreplaceably lost much, the Evacuation Claims Act of 1948 repaid around 10 percent of actual Japanese losses. In 1988 new legislation brought a formal apology and awarded the former “internees” a tax-free payment of \$20,000 to each of the 60,000 surviving detainees (Parrillo, 290-293.)

Vietnamese

Even refugees can be seen as a source of economic competition. Following the Vietnam War, 127,000 Vietnamese and 4,000 Cambodian refugees entered the U.S. As they waited in relocation centers, public opinion polls found that most U.S. citizens (particularly the working class) believed the refugees would take away precious jobs. Additionally, labor and state officials voiced serious concerns about the aliens “flooding” into the labor market and welfare rolls. However, these refugees did not cause serious problems within the U.S. with their arrival, particularly due to the fact that many were: middle class; were well educated with marketable skills; could speak English; and immigrated due to political, rather than economic reasons. Later Vietnamese immigration had been remarkably different; in the 1980s and 90s, most Vietnamese immigrants spoke little English and had few occupational skills. These factors led to relatively more-difficult adjustment and economic self-sufficiency within the U.S. (Parrillo, 303.)

“Eastern Europeans”

Hungarians

In the late 1800s the Hungarian immigrants occupied jobs in the mines and industrial factories. During the labor problems of this era there were often violent disputes; in 1897 Pennsylvania there was a miners’ strike in which twenty-one Hungarian immigrants were killed and another forty were wounded. Moreover, there was reported to be a “general agreement that there would have been no bloodshed if the strikers had not been foreign-born” (Parrillo, 195.)

Poles

Early Polish immigrants experienced great economic hardships and thus had to compensate for that. In the early 1900s children of Polish immigrants were put to work to help their family survive. Many Americans were appalled by the fact that these children were working in mines and mills with their parents instead of going to school. The Poles were slow to rise up the socioeconomic ladder in the U.S. due to: their peasant background, economic deprivation, child labor and little education. They were therefore looked “down upon” by many Americans until they were able to have a higher socioeconomic status, which occurred approximately in the late 1960s (Parrillo, 183-184.)

Ukrainians

The first Ukrainian group to immigrate to America was discriminated against for several reasons. First of all, they did not understand any English. Secondly, their dress was colorful and quite different from what Americans had been accustomed to and they were “regarded as a curiosity.” Since they were unable to find housing in New York (where they arrived) they had to leave the city. As they traveled on foot to Philadelphia, their lack of English and ethnic attire led to many of them being forced to sleep outdoors because people were afraid to give shelter to “such curious strangers.”

Early Ukrainian immigrants often clashed with Irish immigrants. Prior to WWI, Ukrainian immigrants worked primarily in factories and coalmines. One particular group of Ukrainian immigrants arrived in the mining communities during a labor strike and went to work as “strike-breakers.” The old miners, mostly Irishmen, consequently turned against the Ukrainians and viewed them as a serious economic threat. There were

frequent assaults on the strikebreakers and riots ensued. Occasionally, Ukrainian miners were victims of “accidental” injuries in the mine and sometimes killed. Moreover, as the influx of fresh immigrants tended to keep wages low, tensions between the Irish and Ukrainians continued (Parrillo, 193.)

“Hispanics / Latinos”

Cubans

Cuban immigrants faced prejudice and discrimination mainly in the 1980s and 1990s. Clashes between the blacks and Cubans erupted in Florida. Job competition was at the heart of these clashes, as many blacks believed that Cubans and other Hispanic immigrants were taking their jobs. Resentment against Cubans led to riots in both 1980 and 1989, where stores owned by Hispanics and Latinos were burned (Reimers, 36.) In a few short months during the late 1980s more than 125,000 Cubans came to the U.S. – many of this wave of immigrants were urban working-class and lower-class people (Parrillo, 431.) These Cubans, who fled to Florida from the Cuban port of Mariel (dubbed the Mariel Cubans), were rumored to have among them criminals and mentally ill patients that Castro was “dumping” in the U.S. (Reimers, 80.) The idea that Castro sent “several thousand hardened and vicious criminals” to the U.S., caused a negative response towards the new immigrants by the new host country (Parrillo, 431.) A reactionary response occurred in 1993, when Florida’s Dade County expressed its feelings towards the Cuban immigrant population - by voting to “declare Florida an official English state” (Reimers, 120.)

Mexicans

Following the Great Depression, Mexican immigrants faced prejudice and discrimination in the U.S. In the 1930s, when many U.S. citizens were jobless, many Mexican immigrants were pressured by local residents to leave the country; those who did not leave willingly were often rounded up and deported.

In the summer of 1943 riots broke out in Los Angeles as prejudice against the Mexicans turned to violence. A group of sailors on leave had been attacked and claimed that Mexican youths had committed the assaults against them. When the police found no one to arrest in the area, 200 sailors decided to take the matter into their own hands; the sailors rode through the Mexican section of town in taxicabs and savagely beat every Mexican they found. Moreover, the police did nothing to stop the beatings. Four days later the violence escalated when a mob of several thousand soldiers, sailors and civilians sought to savagely beat every Mexican, Filipino and Black they could find.

In the mid 1950s the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service attempted to find and return all undocumented Mexican aliens with what they called “Operation Wetback” – the term “wetback” came from the fact that some Mexicans had crossed the Rio Grande River as they traveled to the U.S. Between 1954 and 1959 government officials expelled 3.8 million Mexicans – only 63,515 received a formal hearing. Moreover, not all of those expelled were undocumented; INS agents stopped and questioned many U.S. citizens “if they looked Mexican” and those unable to prove their legal status on the spot were arrested and sent ‘home’ without any further opportunity to defend themselves (Parrillo, 416-417.)

Additionally, Mexican immigrants have typically been negatively stereotyped in the U.S. Mexicans were once frequently referred to in the mass media as being lazy, unclean, treacherous, sneaky and thieving. Currently, Mexicans in the U.S. are stereotyped as being “undocumented aliens” or “members of street gangs” (Parrillo, 419.) In reality, as with most stereotypes, these supposed characteristics of Mexicans are unfounded and are meant to keep the immigrant group from rising up the socioeconomic ladder.

Puerto Ricans

Although Puerto Ricans have not been subjected to the same discrimination and prejudices endured by other immigrant groups in the U.S., some general socioeconomic characteristics of this group have led them to be viewed negatively by some Americans. “Of all the major racial or ethnic groups, Puerto Ricans have the highest poverty rate, averaging 36 percent in recent years.” A major cause of the group’s high poverty rate is limited employment opportunities for those with inadequate job skills and education. Furthermore, of all the Hispanic immigrant groups in America, Puerto Ricans have the highest percentage of families headed by women only (Parrillo, 429.) These socioeconomic factors may lead Americans to feel negatively towards Puerto Ricans if there is a fear that the social welfare system is being stressed.

“Indians / Pakistanis” (i.e. South Asians)

Indians

The first major wave of Indian immigrants, in the early 1900s, faced prejudice and discrimination due to economics and race. In Washington during 1907, several

hundred Whites attacked the homes of Indian workers and forced around 1000 of them to leave town or flee to Canada. Additionally, real estate brokers published in newspapers that they would not sell to “Hindoos;” they justified their actions with the belief that “wherever Indians settle, they depreciate the value of adjacent properties and injure the reputation of neighborhoods.” The reputation of Indian immigrants was further tarnished when the San Francisco-based Asiatic Exclusion League stated Indians were a “menace, untrustworthy, immodest, unsanitary, insolent and lustful.” The hostilities against this immigrant group grew so much during 1908 and 1910 that U.S. immigration officials rejected over 1000 Indians from entering the country when they should have been allowed. The same occurred between 1911 and 1920 when almost 2000 Indians were again disallowed to enter the U.S. “on the grounds that would become public charges” (Parrillo, 327.) Therefore, early Indian immigrants were not so different from other immigrant groups in that the American public pre-judged them to be societal burdens on welfare even before they stepped foot on U.S. soil.

Indian immigrants were also affected by the 1790 Naturalization Act; in 1923 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed an earlier decision made by a lower court and ruled that since Asian Indians were “nonwhite” they were ineligible for citizenship. This decision additionally prevented Indian immigrants from owning or leasing land in California since the state forbid aliens from landholding. Indians were finally permitted to become naturalized citizens after 1946 (Parrillo, 328.)

Pakistanis

Immigration from Pakistan was not significant until the 1970s and has continued to grow over the decades. Although the group has undoubtedly endured various forms of

prejudice and discrimination in the past thirty years, the most significant has occurred following the attacks on September 11th 2001. Accounts of the acts against this group will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

“Middle Easterners”

Iranians

On November 4, 1979, a group of radical Iranian university students took over the American embassy in Tehran (Ansari, 151.) The subsequent seizure of U.S hostages at the Embassy greatly affected Iranians living in the United States. Some politicians called for the “round up” and detention of Iranian students who were attending U.S. colleges. Remarkably, the calls were for the students to be placed in the same disgraceful detention camps the Japanese were placed in during WWII (Parrillo, 293.)

Iranian immigrants were also violently attacked in the U.S. during this time. They were subjected to: verbal abuses (even Iranian children were subjected to verbal abuse at school by other children), boycotts, arson against Iranian-owned businesses, and physical attacks against Iranian students on several college campuses. Moreover, the U.S. government expressed anti-Iranian views as President Reagan publicly declared Iran to be “barbaric, uncivilized and stupid.” And when the U.S. mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger plane in July of 1989 (claiming 290 victims) President Reagan wired to Iran that “we regret there were ten empty seats on the Airbus” (Parrillo, 344.)

As a result of the hostilities faced by Iranian immigrants following the hostage crisis, many Iranian immigrants tried to hide their ethnicity. Many Iranians changed their

names or tried to misrepresent their ethnic identity. Furthermore, many referred to themselves as “Persians” and not “Iranians” to try to avoid confrontation (Ansari, 153.)

Following September 11th of 2001, Iranian immigrants endured prejudice and discrimination once again. This was despite the fact that the terrorist hijackers were Arab and reportedly from Saudi Arabia, none of the terrorists were Iranian, and Iranians are not Arab. During this time of national fear and crisis, Iranian immigrants were grouped along with all Middle Easterners and Arabs as the “enemies” of the United States.

Syrians

In the early 1920s most of the new Syrian immigrants settled in areas where the Irish were moving socially and economically. This phenomenon, called “invasion-succession,” sometimes leads to hostilities between the old and new groups; this was the case between the Irish and Syrians as violence was prevalent between the two communities.

Additionally, Syrians encountered discrimination at the national level during the early 1900s. In 1909 the U.S. District Court in St Louis ruled Syrian immigrants to be “nonwhite” and therefore “ineligible for naturalization” on the basis of the 1790 legislation. Syrians were racially defined during this time based on their country of origin; ironically many of the Christian Syrians that immigrated were blond and blue-eyed (Parrillo, 338.) This ruling was reversed shortly thereafter in 1917 (Boosahda, 133.)

Turks

Early attitudes towards Turks were mostly negative despite the fact that relatively few immigrated to the U.S. before WWI. The Ottoman Empire’s political and religious repression were the primary factors contributing to the negative feeling towards Turkish

immigrants. Most notably, the Turkish massacres of thousands of Armenians in the 1890s and 1915 angered many Americans (Parrillo, 348.)

Similar to the Syrians, Turkish immigrants were also disallowed to become naturalized citizens based on their race. Deemed “Asiatic,” questions arose to what the race of Turks, Syrians, Palestinians and Armenians belonged to since they were “non-yellow immigrants of Asian birth.” In 1917 they were again proclaimed to be “white” (Boosahda, 132.) One must wonder if the before-mentioned dislike of the Ottoman Empire had any bearing on the courts prior decision to disallow Turks and others to become U.S. citizens.

“Western Europeans”

French

In the mid to late 1600s around fifteen-thousand French Protestants fled their homeland to America to escape religious persecution (Robbins, 21.) Although they did encounter distrust and some violence in the new land, early French immigrants did not endure significant amounts of discrimination. Several factors contributed to the lessened discrimination faced by this group. As mentioned in the previous chapter, most immigrants from France during this time period were wealthy and skilled - therefore they were not viewed by the dominant society as being a social burden. Secondly, many tried to “Anglicize” themselves quickly by changing their names and customs and learning to speak English. As Dr. Vincent Parrillo noted, “For them, assimilation and loss of ethnic identity were the desired goals.” And by 1750 the French Huguenots were no longer a distinct ethno-religious group (Parrillo, 143.)

In the early 1790s France had declared itself a republic, causing Great Britain to wage war against the new French government. Although there had been an alliance between France and America following France's immeasurable assistance during the American Revolution, America now chose to be neutral between France and England. America feared that "French extremism" would spread to its shores if they honored their commitment to the French. In 1797 a delegation of American commissioners were sent to France to negotiate a new treaty between the two countries; the French agents demanded a huge bribe before negotiations were even to begin. After the Americans refused to pay, they returned home with news of what had happened; when the occurrence was made public there was national outrage. These events led to the prejudice and discrimination against French immigrants – particularly refugees from the French Revolution – who were looked upon as a threat and potential enemies (Robbins, 53-39.)

Germans

During colonial times, Germans were faced with prejudice and discrimination. They were a highly visible immigrant group among the dominant WASPs since they had a different language, customs, and religion (Parrillo, 146.) There was the fear of U.S. natives that they "might Germanize America." Moreover, in response to German immigrants speaking their native language, some people questioned, "what would eventually happen if interpreters were constantly needed to translate German legal documents?" (Reimers, 7-8.) Overall, those in opposition to the German immigrants' way of life were not exactly against the immigrants themselves, but more so against their slow assimilation and lack of "Anglo-conformity" (Parrillo, 148.)

One of the most notorious incidents against German immigrants occurred on “Bloody Monday,” August 5, 1855. A mob in Louisville, Kentucky rioted in the Germantown section of the city; 22 men had been killed, several hundred were wounded and 16 houses had been burned (Parrillo, 149.)

World War I, which began in 1914, greatly affected U.S. immigration. The war substantially reduced immigration, but it also “fostered increased pressure to halt immigration and end potential disloyalty.” And it was German Americans that suffered against the fears and prejudices of many other Americans. Germans (once admired by Americans for their achievements in science, music, literature and intellect) were now viewed with hostility and suspicion (Reimers, 19.) German Americans were the targets of harassment, business boycotts, physical attacks and vandalism of their property. Additionally, the German language had been banned in several states and some towns changed renamed German-named streets (Parrillo, 149.) In an attempt to dispel any hostilities against them, German Americans took action: many Lutheran churches and German-language publications switched from using German to the English language; individual pastors proclaimed their support of the war effort; and many German Americans Anglicized their names, bought liberty bonds and publicly denounced Germany (Reimers, 19.)

The World Wars have clearly affected the levels of prejudice and discrimination endured by Germans in the United States from the early to mid 1900s. Germans who have immigrated after the 1950s have faced fewer hostilities than those who arrived earlier. One apparent reason for this, is that the United States has not been to war against Germany since WWII. Secondly, since one-quarter of Americans can claim German

ancestry, new German immigrants are not necessarily “strangers.” And perhaps the greatest difference between early and new German immigrants is that the more recent arrivals tend to assimilate fairly rapidly in the U.S. (Parrillo, 149.)

Irish

During the early-to-mid 1700s, the Scots-Irish endured great prejudice and discrimination in the colonies. Although religion and nationality were factors in the hostility directed towards the immigrants, economics was a key factor as many New Englanders feared that the Scots-Irish might “be paupers who would become wards of the public,” and that there were too many Irish “overwhelming their cities’ poor houses and asylums” (Reimers, 10.) However, the Irish Catholics had fared far worse than the Scots-Irish; “their religion, peasant culture, and rebelliousness against England marked them as strangers to the dominant culture and set the stage for the most overt discrimination and hostility any ethnic group had thus far encountered” (Parrillo, 151.)

In the mid 1800s, Irish immigration was of great concern to native-born Americans. Irish Catholics who fled British oppression and those Irish who fled because of the potato famine settled mainly in coastal cities in the U.S. Due to the fact that many of these immigrants suffered economically and were peasants, most settled in overcrowded “Dublin Districts” in which the living conditions were dreadful: cramped living quarters were poorly lighted, heated and ventilated – factors that contributed to the spread of many deadly disease, such as cholera. Although their living conditions were primarily out of their control, the Irish were seen as “inferior” by native-born U.S. residents (Parrillo, 151.)

Although contemporary definitions of race would not categorize the Irish differently than Anglo-Americans, the same was not true in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Irish were believed to be of a race “which preferred to live in the filth of hovels, which was innately contentious and brawling and criminal, and which showed few signs of being able to respond to civilizing influences” (Fallows, 6.)

Native U.S. citizens began to use the Irish as scapegoats; blaming them for the problems of the entire society. The Irish were said to be responsible for widespread poverty because of the “heavy burden they placed on charitable institutions.” Moreover, the Irish were stereotyped as being “inherently prone” to alcoholism, fighting, corruption and crime – which is why police vans had initially been nicknamed “paddy wagons” (Parrillo, 153.)

Prejudice against the Irish escalated following the Revolutionary War period of the late 1700s. Although hostilities were aimed at Irish immigrants, the focus was actually more against Irish Catholics. Overall, Irish immigrants suffered greatly during this time period: many were subjected to brutal beatings and even murdered in several U.S. cities and Anti-Catholic mobs burned churches and convents. Additionally, non-violent discrimination increased in social and economic realms as many places refused to hire Irish; job advertisements often included the phrase “No Irish Need Apply,” or more simply, “NINA.”

Although the focus of this chapter is to describe the prejudices and discrimination felt by various immigrant groups, it is important to mention hostilities the groups, themselves, felt. As the Irish began to assimilate and were more accepted by native U.S. citizens, “they often served as a middleman minority, aiding new European immigrant

groups in work, church, school and city life.” However, the Irish often clashed with the Chinese in cities and also in railway labor disputes. Additionally, in the mid 1800s the Irish fiercely resisted abolition (Parrillo, 154.) There are two main reasons for these prejudices: perhaps the most obvious reason for hostilities against the Chinese and Blacks is economic – both the Irish and Chinese were competing for employment on the railway and the freeing of the slaves would have increased overall job competition for the Irish; the second reason for prejudice and discrimination is that the Irish wanted to maintain their movement up the “acceptance” ladder. Although the Irish had been severely discriminated against by native U.S. citizens, they gradually began to “move up” in society – by joining in on the anti-Chinese sentiments of the time, the Irish were able to perpetuate keeping the Chinese lower than them on the societal ladder.

By the late 1800s and early 1900s Irish Catholics had made slow, but steady, progress in gaining acceptance in the U.S. society. Opposition to the Irish lessened for several reasons. First of all, as with every immigrant group, over time they gained a better command of English. Secondly, they were no longer looked down upon as their economic position improved. Additionally, the physical similarities between the Irish and English American Protestants made them more “acceptable” than many other immigrant groups arriving at the time (Parrillo, 157.)

Chapter Overview

Prejudice and discrimination are not new phenomenon in the United States, as they have surfaced at the founding of the country. All of the groups that have immigrated to the United States have endured some degree of prejudice and/or discrimination against

them; even the groups in power were not immune to hostilities from those with less power. Although many may question the ethics of prejudice and discrimination, one must also take into account the factors that initiate these attitudes and actions against others: economic and social competitions; false stereotypes; misunderstood cultural attributes; and wartime panic.

Chapter 3

Post-9/11 America

8:45 a.m. (all times are EDT): A hijacked passenger jet, American Airlines Flight 11 out of Boston, Massachusetts, crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center, tearing a gaping hole in the building and setting it afire.

9:03 a.m.: A second hijacked airliner, United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston, crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center and explodes. Both buildings are burning.

9:17 a.m.: The Federal Aviation Administration shuts down all New York City area airports.

9:21 a.m.: The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey orders all bridges and tunnels in the New York area closed.

9:40 a.m.: The FAA halts all flight operations at U.S. airports, the first time in U.S. history that air traffic nationwide has been halted.

9:43 a.m.: American Airlines Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon, sending up a huge plume of smoke. Evacuation begins immediately.

9:45 a.m.: The White House evacuates.

10:05 a.m.: The south tower of the World Trade Center collapses, plummeting into the streets below. A massive cloud of dust and debris forms and slowly drifts away from the building.

10:10 a.m.: A portion of the Pentagon collapses.

10:10 a.m.: United Airlines Flight 93, also hijacked, crashes in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, southeast of Pittsburgh.

10:22 a.m.: In Washington, the State and Justice departments are evacuated, along with the World Bank.

10:24 a.m.: The FAA reports that all inbound transatlantic aircraft flying into the United States are being diverted to Canada.

10:28 a.m.: The World Trade Center's north tower collapses from the top down as if it were being peeled apart, releasing a tremendous cloud of debris and smoke.

10:45 a.m.: All federal office buildings in Washington are evacuated.

1:04 p.m.: Bush, speaking from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, says that all appropriate security measures are being taken, including putting the U.S. military on high alert worldwide. He asks for prayers for those killed or wounded in the attacks and says, "Make no mistake, the United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts."

1:44 p.m.: The Pentagon says five warships and two aircraft carriers will leave the U.S. Naval Station in Norfolk, Virginia, to protect the East Coast from further attack and to reduce the number of ships in port. The two carriers, the USS George Washington and the USS John F. Kennedy, are headed for the New York coast. The other ships headed to sea are frigates and guided missile destroyers capable of shooting down aircraft.

4 p.m.: CNN National Security Correspondent David Ensor reports that U.S. officials say there are "good indications" that Saudi militant Osama bin Laden, suspected of coordinating the bombings of two U.S. embassies in 1998, is involved in the attacks, based on "new and specific" information developed since the attacks.

4:10 p.m.: Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex is reported on fire.

5:20 p.m.: The 47-story Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex collapses. The evacuated building is damaged when the twin towers across the street collapse earlier in the day. Other nearby buildings in the area remain ablaze.

8:30 p.m.: President Bush addresses the nation, saying "thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil" and asks for prayers for the families and friends of Tuesday's victims. "These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve," he says. The president says the U.S. government will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed the acts and those who harbor them. (www.cnn.com)

It was these events – the horrific attacks of September 11th, 2001 that would change life in America, and reactively countless other countries of the world.

Part I
- U.S. Immigration in Post-9/11 America

Despite the attacks of 9/11, the level of overall immigration to the United States has remained fairly steady since September 11, 2001. The number of new arrivals has remained relatively stable at about 400,000 annually. Nearly two-thirds of the immigrants who obtained legal permanent residence in 2002 were relatives of United States citizens or permanent residents. Over half of these immigrants came from just ten countries, including Mexico (219,000), India (71,000), China (61,000), the Philippines (51,000), Vietnam (34,000), El Salvador (31,000), Cuba (28,000), Bosnia-Herzegovina (25,000), the Dominican Republic (23,000), and Ukraine (21,000) (migrationpolicy.org.) In contrast, by 2003, the number of immigrants arriving from 22 Muslim countries had declined by more than a third. For students, tourists and other non-immigrants from these countries, the drop was even more dramatic, with total visits down by nearly half (www.nytimes.com.)

But starting in 2004, however, the numbers rebounded. The tally of people coming to live in the United States from Bangladesh, Turkey, Algeria and other Muslim countries increased by 20 percent. In 2005, more people from Muslim countries became legal permanent United States residents — nearly 96,000 — than in any year in the previous two decades. “The rise does not reflect relaxed security measures, but a higher number of visa applications and greater efficiency in processing them, said Chris Bentley, a spokesman for United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, part of Homeland Security” (www.nytimes.com.)

Despite the negativities facing this group of immigrants following the September 11th attacks, this period also produced something strikingly positive in the eyes of many Muslims: their political and social mobilization. Across the country, grass-roots groups expanded to educate Muslims on civil rights, registering them to vote and to be more politically active (www.nytimes.com.) It is likely that their increased socio-political involvement will eventually lead to this group's greater acceptance and assimilation into U.S. society – which has been the case with many other immigrant groups before them (as similar histories have been discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.)

Part II**- Prejudice and Discrimination Against Immigrants in Post-9/11 America****2001, the Year of Hate Crimes**

The United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has published national "hate crime statistics" since 1992. These figures are based on voluntary reports from law enforcement agencies around the country and average from 6,000 to 10,000 per year. The FBI lists the hate crimes into five primary groups (Race, Religion, Sexual Orientation, Ethnicity/National Origin and Disability) with each of those broken down into various descriptive sub-groups (www.fbi.gov)

For the purposes of this study, this section will discuss "Race", "Ethnicity/National Origin", "Religion", and its sub-group "Anti-Islamic". Although this dissertation is based primarily on prejudices and discriminatory acts committed against a person based on ethnicity, it is important to now also discuss religion due to the events of 9/11 and the subsequent backlashes that occurred in the U.S.

By comparing the four bias motivations by both the number of incidents committed and number of victims affected, one can see the patterns of discrimination throughout the past decade. The following table compares this information, as reported by the FBI, from the year 1995 to 2006. (Note: the "Anti-Islamic" numbers are a sub-set of the "Religion" category.)

Table 3.1
Number of Incidents of a Bias Motivated Hate Crime Committed each Year

	Race	Ethnicity / National Origin	Religion	Anti-Islamic
1995	4,831	814	1,277	29
1996	5,396	940	1,401	27
1997	4,710	836	1,385	28
1998	4,321	754	1,390	21
1999	4,295	829	1,411	32
2000	4,337	911	1,472	28
2001	4,367	2,098	1,828	481
2002	3,642	1,102	1,426	155
2003	3,844	1,026	1,343	149
2004	4,042	972	1,374	156
2005	4,691	1,144	1,314	146
2006	4,895	1,228	1,405	150

Table 3.2
Number of Victims of a Bias Motivated Hate Crime Committed each Year

	Race	Ethnicity / National Origin	Religion	Anti-Islamic
1995	6,438	1,044	1,617	41
1996	6,994	1,207	1,535	27
1997	6,084	1,132	1,586	32
1998	5,514	956	1,720	23
1999	5,485	1,040	1,686	34
2000	5,397	1,216	1,699	36
2001	5,545	2,634	2,118	554
2002	4,580	1,409	1,659	174
2003	4,754	1,326	1,489	171
2004	5,119	1,254	1,586	201
2005	4,737	1,233	1,597	192
2006	5,020	1,305	1,750	208

(www.fbi.gov)

According to the tables above, the most significant rise in both number of incidents and victims occurred during 2001. To better understand the effect of 9/11, it is best to discuss each bias motivation separately.

Race: Although hate crimes with racial bias were somewhat constant until 2001, the number of incidents as well as victims dropped by almost 1000 in 2002. Since then, however, the number of these hate crimes have continued to rise, to reach a level similar to those pre-9/11.

2000 to 2001 Increase of Incidents: 0.7%
Increase of Victims: 3%

Ethnicity/National Origin: Prior to 2001, hate crimes against persons based on their ethnicity or national origin remained relatively constant and reached a height of approximately 1200 crimes per year in both 1996 and 2000. This number more than doubled in 2001 to over 2600 victims of hate crime attacks. In the following years the number of incidents reported has continued to lessen to pre 9/11 levels.

2000 to 2001 Increase of Incidents: 130%
Increase of Victims: 117%

Religion: Hate crimes committed with a bias against ones' religion remained around 1700 prior to 2001 and jumped to over 2100 victims in 2001. Following this peak, the number of hate crimes committed with this bias dropped each year to reach a level below that of 2001.

2000 to 2001 Increase of Incidents: 24%
Increase of Victims: 25%

Anti-Islamic: The most substantial rise in hate crimes against a particular bias occurred from 2000 to 2001 against Islamic peoples. The numbers of victims in these hate crimes barely reached above 40 incidents per year before 2001; yet in 2001 the number of victims in these crimes rose to 554. As with the other three bias crimes discussed in this section, the number of anti-Islamic hate crimes continued to lessen after 2001 – yet in 2004 there were still over 200 victims reported: substantially more than pre-9/11 levels.

2000 to 2001 Increase of Incidents: 1618%
Increase of Victims: 1439%

Perhaps the most staggering of these bias motivated hate crime statistics is the following realization: although the FBI listed the attacks *per year* (i.e. 12 months), one must take into consideration that if the surge in hate crime attacks were a result of 9/11, then the reported substantial rise in hate crimes in 2001 occurred in the few short months from September to December – not the entire calendar year.

Part III **- The Patriot Act**

In post-9/11 America security remains at the forefront of national concerns. It is not uncommon, and at times widespread, to hear of “possible terrorist links” or some other random reminder of terrorism on the news. Whether these are factual reports or misconceptions conjured to keep the fear of terrorist attacks fresh in the mind of Americans is unknown; what is known is the effect of such reporting – and that is the rebirth or rekindling of peoples’ fear.

The Bill of Rights was created during the adoption of the United States Constitution in order to “prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers.” (usinfo.state.gov) During the “War on Terrorism,” the Bush Administration has sought legislation that will protect the country against further terrorist attacks; however, it is such legislation – passed during times of heightened passion and fear - that has the potential to erode the civil rights of Americans while remaining enacted with the promise “that the country will be protected.” The most prominent legislation that has received scores of criticism from civil rights groups, scholars, and the American public is the Patriot Act. One can best understand this law when they consider: what was occurring when the legislation was written and passed; what the legislation hoped to achieve; what the legislation caused to happen; and contrast both sides of the story – those for and those against the Patriot Act.

Before the Patriot Act is discussed, it is best to first understand the situation surrounding the passing of such legislation. First of all, times of war are different than times of peace in a multitude of fashions; one such way is how law is conducted. As

Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, stated, “In ordinary times, governments are bound by strict rules of law enforcement. For example, police can use lethal force only when facing an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Once a suspect is detained, he must be charged and tried. In times of war, these rules are supplemented by the more permissive ones of armed conflict. Under ‘war rules’ an enemy combatant can be shot without warning... regardless of any imminent threat. If a combatant is captured, he can be detained without charge or trial until the end of the conflict” (hrw.org.) It is therefore apparent that extreme caution needs to be exercised when national decisions are to be made when ‘war rules’ are in play – the proverbial trigger must not be pulled in haste without realizing the possible consequences of such action.

In actuality, the name “USA Patriot Act” is merely a nickname for H.R.3162; the complete title of this legislation is “To deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.” As stated by President Bush when signing this legislation into law, "With my signature, this law will give intelligence and law enforcement officials important new tools to fight a present danger" (www.whitehouse.gov.)

Passed by the House (357-66) and Senate (98-1) during the month following the tragic events of 9/11, this legislation was signed by President Bush October 26th of 2001 and officially became Public Law No: 107-56 (Thomas.loc.gov.) Although such widespread support for the legislation in both the House and Senate would make one assume that the members of Congress were greatly in favor of the measure, it has been noted that the 342 page Patriot Act was passed “with little debate from Congress, most of whom did

not even read the bill.” (aclu.org) Therefore, one should make note of the hurried passing of this measure; if it is true that many of the United States’ elected leaders did not even read the bill, could it be (1) possibly be un-Constitutional, (2) passed mainly as a reactionary measure from the prior month’s terrorist events, and (3) passed to appease the victims and victims’ families of the 9/11 attacks?

Upon examining the first question regarding the Constitutionality of the Patriot Act, perhaps it is best to discuss the Amendments that many prominent human rights groups claim have been violated. Below are the Amendments these organizations believe have been breached by the Patriot Act:

Amendment I guarantees, among other things, the “freedom of speech and the freedom of press.”

Amendment IV guarantees people security against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Amendment V protects people against being “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

Amendment VI states that in all criminal prosecutions, “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, and the assistance of counsel for his defense.”

Amendment VIII states that “no excessive bail or cruel and unusual punishment shall be imposed.”

Amendment XIV guarantees that “all persons (citizens and non-citizens) within the U.S. are entitled to due process and the equal protection of the laws”
(www.law.cornell.edu.)

President Bush gave a speech in April of 2001 which discussed homeland security and the Patriot Act. Appearing to answer any questions posed regarding the un-Constitutionality of the legislation, he stated:

“So the first thing I want you to think about is, when you hear Patriot Act, is that we changed the law and the bureaucratic mind-set to allow for the sharing of information. It's vital. And others will describe what that means.

Secondly, there are such things as roving wiretaps. Now, by the way, any time you hear the United States government talking about wiretap, it requires -- a wiretap requires a court order. Nothing has changed, by the way. When we're talking about chasing down terrorists, we're talking about getting a court order before we do so. It's important for our fellow citizens to understand, when you think Patriot Act, constitutional guarantees are in place when it comes to doing what is necessary to protect our homeland, because we value the Constitution" (www.whitehouse.gov.)

It would appear that, yes, the Administration had "changed the law;" but if the Constitution is truly "valued," as stated above, would the aforementioned six Amendments to the Constitution have been violated by the Patriot Act?

Despite the questionable civil liberties abuses caused by the Patriot Act, one must wonder if, in-fact, the law has performed as it was intended? But this may be a question that is not yet answerable at this time. Although it is true that there has not been a terrorist attack in the United States since the passing of the Patriot Act, this does not necessarily prove that any type of terrorist attack did not occur solely because of the legislation. One may argue that, in fact, there has not been any credible terrorist plans thwarted by the Patriot Act. For example, you may have a "stop sign" at an intersection but if no cars ever pass along that road then one cannot accurately argue that the sign has prevented an automobile accident because it properly directed traffic.

Another important point to consider is that although the Patriot Act was passed under extreme circumstances, it could enable the passing of more drastic legislations. One such legislation proposed was dubbed "Patriot Act II." However, once the details of this bill were leaked to the press (by the Center for Public Integrity in February of 2003) there was such up-roar by prominent civil liberties groups and scholars that the legislation was going "too far," the bill became abandoned and never actually introduced into Congress.

Section 201 of the Patriot II stated that the government would not be required to disclose the identity of anyone, “not even an American citizen,” detained in connection with a terror investigation – until criminal charges are filed, “no matter how long that takes.” Section 501 stated that the government could revoke the American citizenship even of native-born Americans and detain them “indefinitely.” Moreover, the *New York Times Magazine* added that if an American citizen was merely suspected of being part of a terrorist conspiracy, he could be held by investigators without anyone being notified. “He could just simply disappear” (www.aclu.org.) The passing of this type of legislation would likely stop many American citizens from speaking out against or questioning the Administration out of fear of what the repercussions may be. If someone questioned the Administration, for example, and the government perceived that questioning as unpatriotic and possibly dangerous to the country, then there could be a chance that person would be detained without anyone being notified since the detention would be classified.

In March 2006, the Patriot Act was renewed just days before sixteen provisions of the law were set to expire. Congress voted to renew the law by a vote of 280-138 in the House of Representatives and 89-10 in the Senate. Among the more controversial provisions in this law, the “roving wiretap” portion and the “sneak and peek” sections, allow the government to wiretap any phone a possible suspect uses, and allows federal investigators to get access to library, business and medical records without a court order. Despite these controversial provisions, both Congress and the President deemed the law as a necessary protection for the U.S. against terrorism. (www.cnn.com)

In a post-9/11 America, certain rights and liberties of the people have been eroded in order to “protect the country” under the Patriot Act. The questionnaire utilized in this study sought to measure the amount of acceptance people have regarding the loss of civil liberties as well as the breaching of some laws by the federal and local government in the name of national security.

Chapter Overview

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were the worst terrorist attacks to occur on U.S. soil. As a result of these attacks, the Bush Administration executed a multitude of measures as a means to combat terrorism and prevent future attacks against the U.S. However, as a means of trying to protect the country from further physical harm, one should also take into account the aforementioned many national and international laws that were previously enacted to protect the peoples’ civil rights and liberties.

Chapter 4

Bogardus' Study of Prejudice and Social Distance

“Few people are capable of expressing with equanimity opinions which differ from the prejudices of their social environment. Most people are not even capable of forming such opinions.”

- Albert Einstein

(www.quotationspage.com.)

Part I

– Attitudes and Prejudice as Interpreted by Bogardus

Chapter Two discussed the history of prejudice and discrimination directed toward certain immigrant groups. More specifically, the chapter cited examples of discrimination against immigrants; however, as it mentioned, discrimination may or may not stem from prejudice. In this chapter, we will examine the work of Dr. Emory Bogardus (and subsequent sociologists), to more fully understand under what circumstances prejudice correlates directly with discrimination.

Emory Stephen Bogardus (1882-1973) was a significant contributor to the field of sociology. Throughout his lengthy academic career, Bogardus wrote more than twenty-four books and contributed hundreds of articles to national journals regarding social theory, race relations, social research methods, personality and leadership, cooperatives, community organization, social control, social welfare and social work, and public opinion. It is important to note that in his works, Bogardus used the term “race” when discussing different immigrant groups. Although Germans and French persons would both now be deemed of the “white race” Bogardus would have classified them as different “ethnic races.”

Just as it is possible for prejudiced attitudes to change, Bogardus believed that there were seven primary reasons whereby a person's attitude would remain the same, or "static:"

1. An overwhelming fear and hatred of a dominant race
2. A consuming disgust for 'low' types of culture traits
3. Overmastering superiority complex and sense of dynamic loyalty to one's own race
4. Absence of knowledge
5. General knowledge about equally favorable and unfavorable traits
6. Brotherhood-of-man cosmopolitanism and idealism
7. Rationalized philosophy of judging all races on a basis of personal worth rather than of racial heredity (Bogardus 1971, 148-154.)

The first reason, an "overwhelming fear and hatred of a dominant race;" occurs under situation such as the following: If "Country Y" has been oppressed by "Country Z" for many years, Y is likely to have negative feelings towards Z. The second reason for negative static attitudes, "a consuming disgust for 'low' types of culture traits," relates to perceiving groups as unclean, over-breeding and violent. In some cases, the groups are believed to be "subhuman" and that there is no hope for them. Bogardus believed reasons one and two are fixed and defensive emotional patterns which provide security for some people (Bogardus 1971, 148-154.)

The next reason was also believed to be fixed but in an ethnocentric fashion in which a person seeks recognition. An "overmastering superiority complex and sense of dynamic loyalty to one's own race" lead to the third reason for static attitudes (Bogardus 1971, 148-154.) Even if someone is a third or fourth-generation "Country L" immigrant, they may still feel a kinship with and prefer to be around "their own type" of people of Country L ancestry, believing them to be superior and generally better than others.

“Absence of knowledge” is the forth reason for static attitudes. This lack of social contacts and racial experiences give many people attitudes of “permanent aloofness” from peoples they do not understand. The fifth reason for static attitudes, the “general knowledge about equally favorable and unfavorable traits,” occurs when a person may believe that people from “Country F” are intelligent and clean, but also sinister and violent – a person with this attitude will wait until they know more about people of Country F before they will change their minds. Bogardus believed that a person with this type of prejudice was the most open-minded and most likely to have their attitudes changed (Bogardus 1971, 148-154.)

The sixth and seventh reasons for a static, or unchanging, attitude are different from the previous ones in that these two cite reasons for an unprejudiced person to remain so. Whereas others may feel pressured to adopt the prejudiced attitudes from their social sphere, the following two reasons explain why a person would remain unprejudiced. “Brotherhood-of-man cosmopolitanism and idealism,” the sixth reason for static attitudes, was what Bogardus believed to be the “foundation of stable race friendliness;” essentially that friendly feelings arose from a long series of favorable experiences with certain races. He further believed that religious idealism could lead to similar friendly feelings for others. The last cause of static attitudes, “rationalized philosophy of judging all races on a basis of personal worth rather than of racial heredity,” causes people to judge others based on their individual characteristics and not whether they belonged to “Group C” or “Group M.” It is the people described by the sixth and seventh reasons, however, that Bogardus believed were most vulnerable to having their attitudes changed by a series of experiences (Bogardus 1971, 148-154.)

The idea of one's social status (as the personal rating given a person by others) was a central idea in much of Bogardus' work about prejudice. He discussed how public opinion affects the social status of a person or group; "Public opinion devastates status unjustly – it often mows status down for no adequate reasons and it may frequently be accounted for by the poorest of logic, facts or interpretation." He described how a person may also lose status by simply associating with or being seen with an individual or group that has previously lost their status (Bogardus 1971, 30.) For example, if "Group Z" is stereotypically believed to have negative characteristics (dirty, lazy, dangerous) society may view you more poorly if you are friends with, work with, sit near in a public place, or live next to someone who is a member of Group Z. As discussed in Chapter Two, this demonstrates how a person, out of fear of losing their own social status, may become a non-prejudiced discriminator. Bogardus further discussed how this fear may cause a person to go to extreme lengths of denouncing an "invading group" so that they may appear to be more "patriotic" (Bogardus 1971, 32) and a clear member of a high status group. This proclamation of patriotism was particularly prevalent in the United States during times of war and following September 11, 2001.

A person's prejudicial attitudes are affected by several external factors. Bogardus discussed six types of media in which "unfavorable race (or immigrant) experiences are transmitted from one person to another and by which they often become grossly distorted" (Bogardus 1971, 65.) By this, Bogardus is describing a type of real-life game of "telephone" in which information originates from one person or source and after a series of transfers through other people or media the original message is often grossly changed and distorted. The six types of media which transmit beliefs about groups of

people are: family, associates, motion pictures, newspapers and books, public speakers, and general hearsay and opinion (Bogardus 1971, 66-73.) Although these forms of media are also instruments in which compassion and positive attributes about others may be passed along, negative connotations are usually more-likely to be picked-up by the receiver. This effect is often exemplified by the effectiveness of political campaigns' "attack ads." After these ads invoke a particular negative attribute of a politician, it often seems that no amount of positive campaigning can erase those negative images.

Bogardus substantiates his idea by stating that when reversing race attitudes, "The change from antipathetic to friendly attitudes usually requires a time element; the shift from friendly to unfriendly attitudes, however, may be sudden" (Bogardus 1971, 118.)

Bogardus has clearly demonstrated how those around us affect our attitudes. Whether or not one has friendly or unfriendly attitudes towards particular immigrant groups depends on one's own experiences, the opinion of others, and by a multitude of external media. A combination of all these factors contributes to an individual's beliefs and attitudes (positive, neutral and negative) towards others. Emory Bogardus sought to further investigate how attitudes affect one's prejudices with a groundbreaking experiment that surveyed American's "social distance."

Part II

– Bogardus' Ethnic Distance Scale

One of Bogardus' most significant works occurred over forty-one years, beginning in 1926 and ending in 1967. His monumental study of "social distance," was the first project of its kind ever undertaken. With the help of professors from 39 colleges and universities, a total of 8,333 students were interviewed in 1926, 1946, 1956, and 1966 to survey their cultural and ethnic attitudes in the U.S. By performing the research every ten years, it was possible to track if any changes were occurring in racial and ethnic relations. (Bogardus was unable to complete the study in 1936 due to obligations he had to fulfill out of the country) (Bogardus 1967, 8.) Although Bogardus had admitted that the number of participants was not large enough to represent the United States as a whole, he stated that the findings still represented social trends and a general social movement (Bogardus 1967, 3-4.) Conclusions of the study were that "brotherhood and sympathetic understanding had increased progressively during that 40-year period" (www.usc.edu.)

The first survey was undertaken in 1926 and surveyed a total of 1725 Americans. Since the participants lived in different parts of the country (East, South, Mid-West, and West) the country was well represented. The participants were also of different religions, educational levels, and racial / ethnic descent. What the subjects shared in common was that they were all native-born Americans, "younger" middle class, and possessed either a high-school or college degree. Since Bogardus ultimately wanted "thoughtful and forward-looking Americans" to participate in the survey, he sought to exclude "narrow-minded, older, or conservative Americans" (Bogardus 1971, 23.)

The survey design was relatively simple, yet enabled a great wealth of knowledge to be obtained upon completion. It was Bogardus' belief that "The data reflect human reactions extensively at inner personal levels. They seem to spring from the unconscious levels of personality more than from opinions that change from day to day" (Bogardus, 1967, 4.) Participants were asked to give their reactions towards thirty different racial and ethnic groups by selecting which of the choices best fit their reactions towards each group. Bogardus' survey asked the subjects to select which of the following best described how they felt towards each of the forty primary ethnic and racial groups in the US:

1. Would marry them
2. Would be friends with them
3. Would have them as neighbors
4. Would work with them
5. Would allow them to be U.S. citizens
6. Would only allow them to visit the U.S.
7. Exclude them from the U.S. completely

An answer of "1" when describing a particular group would demonstrate close ties or acceptance, whereas an answer of "7" would describe greater social distance with that group. Bogardus took the average of all of the surveys' results for each racial and ethnic group to see how "America" felt in general about each of the forty groups and how much social distance existed in the country.

The first table below depicts some of the results from Bogardus' first survey in 1926. The answers are tabulated in percentages to better understand how many Americans felt favorably or unfavorably towards certain ethnic groups.

Table 4.1

Reactions of 1725 Americans to Different Ethnic Groups by Percentages

(Bogardus, 1967, 25.)

	Would marry into group	Would have as close friends	Would have as next door neighbors	Would work in same office	Have as speaking acquaintances only	Have as visitors only to my nation	Would debar from my nation
English	94 %	97 %	97 %	95 %	95 %	2 %	0 %
Irish	70 %	83 %	86 %	90 %	91 %	4 %	0 %
Italians	15 %	26 %	35 %	55 %	71 %	15 %	5 %
Poles	11 %	12 %	28 %	44 %	58 %	20 %	5 %
Syrians	4 %	14 %	18 %	31 %	41 %	21 %	9 %
Mexicans	3 %	12 %	12 %	77 %	46 %	31 %	15 %
Japanese	2 %	12 %	13 %	27 %	29 %	39 %	3 %
Turks	1 %	10 %	12 %	19 %	25 %	42 %	23 %

The following table lists the social distances of thirty ethnic groups and compares them throughout Bogardus' four studies in 1926, 1946, 1956, and 1966. The ethnic groups are listed in descending order of social distance using the results of the 1926 study. One can easily view how a particular group either moved closer, further, or remained the same social distance throughout the other studies by comparing the social distance results of the four columns (1926, 1946, 1956 and 1966). Note that both "Mexican Americans" and "Japanese Americans" were added after the 1926 study.

Table 4.2
Social Distances of 30 Ethnic Groups, Comparing Results of Four Studies
 (Bogardus, 1971, 28.)

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	1926	1946	1956	1966
English	1.06	1.13	1.23	1.14
Americans (White)	1.10	1.04	1.08	1.07
Canadians	1.13	1.11	1.16	1.15
Scots	1.13	1.26	1.60	1.53
Irish	1.30	1.24	1.56	1.40
French	1.32	1.31	1.47	1.36
Germans	1.46	1.59	1.61	1.54
Swedish	1.54	1.40	1.57	1.42
Hollanders	1.56	1.37	1.63	1.54
Norwegians	1.59	1.35	1.66	1.50
Spanish	1.72	1.94	2.08	1.93
Finns	1.83	1.63	1.80	1.67
Russians	1.88	1.83	2.56	2.38
Italians	1.94	2.28	1.89	1.51
Poles	2.01	1.84	2.07	1.98
Armenians	2.06	2.29	2.33	2.18
Czechs	2.08	1.76	2.22	2.02
Indians: American	2.38	2.45	2.35	2.12
Jews	2.39	2.32	2.15	1.97
Greeks	2.47	2.29	2.09	1.82
Mexicans	2.69	2.89	2.79	2.56
Mexican Americans	-----	2.52	2.51	2.37
Japanese	2.80	3.61	2.70	2.41
Japanese Americans	-----	2.90	2.34	2.14
Filipinos	3.00	2.76	2.46	2.31
Negroes	3.28	3.60	2.74	2.56
Turks	3.30	2.89	2.52	2.48
Chinese	3.36	2.50	2.68	2.34
Koreans	3.60	3.05	2.83	2.51
Indians: from India	3.91	3.43	2.80	2.62
Mean	2.14	2.12	2.08	1.92
Spread in Distance	2.85	2.57	1.75	1.56

Perhaps the most important findings of these studies are located in the last two rows of the chart above. Although particular ethnic groups may have gained or lost social distance throughout time, the emphasis of this study is on the totality of the findings; these are demonstrated in the mean and social distance spread of each year. The mean, or average, social distance of all of the thirty ethnic groups decreased over time from 2.14 in 1926 to 1.92 in 1966. Additionally, the spread in distances (subtract the shortest social distance given that year from the furthest social distance) also decreased throughout the study from 2.85 in 1926 to 1.56 in 1966. Both of these findings indicate that U.S. society had become more accepting and tolerant of immigrants and suggest the trend of more acceptance and toleration in the future.

The results of Bogardus' studies further showed that people from northern European countries rated high and had "close" social distances compared to persons from other places in the world. However, it is important to note that a primary reason for this is that the vast majority of the respondents were of northern European ancestry. When Bogardus controlled for the ancestry of the subjects, he expectedly found that people from "Country H" rated those from Country H high and those from "Country K" rated those from country K high (Bogardus, 1967, 23-25.) It is also important to note that particular ethnic groups received greater or lesser social distances over time due to assimilation in the U.S., and social and political factors. One such primary factor at both the social and political levels is a world war; persons with the same ethnic background as those countries the U.S. was fighting against in wars generally received distant social distances both during and in the years following wartime.

In both the 1956 and 1966 studies, Bogardus examined the influence of sex of social distance. He found that, for each of the thirty ethnic groups, women indicated somewhat greater social distances than did men. What factors contributed to the greater distance scores from women and why did the differences decrease from 1956 to 1966? The differences in the chart below indicate results found by subtracting the average social distance number reported by men by the average number reported by women. For example, in 1956, the average social distance reported by females was 0.20 greater than that reported by males. This social distance dropped slightly ten years later, with females reporting 0.12 greater social distance towards immigrant groups than males.

Table 4.3
Social Distance Differences by Sexes, 1956 and 1966
 (Bogardus, 1971, 35.)

Ethnic Groups	1956	1966
Armenians	.14	.16
Americans (White)	.00	.00
Canadians	.09	.02
Chinese	.29	.21
Czechs	.45	.19
English	.02	.02
Filipinos	.24	.14
Finns	.02	.09
French	.05	.10
Germans	.15	.15
Greeks	.21	.14
Hollanders	.17	.10
Indians (American)	.24	.14
Indians (from India)	.21	.24
Irish	.07	.10
Italians	.11	.10
Japanese	.47	.22
Japanese Americans	.26	.12
Jews	.16	.11
Koreans	.34	.18
Mexicans	.27	.16
Mexican Americans	.43	.10
Negroes	.10	.14
Norwegians	.15	.04
Poles	.28	.16
Russians	.52	.22
Scots	.16	.06
Spanish	.13	.08
Swedish	.09	.06
Turks	.37	.19
Mean Difference	.20	.12

By using material from limited interviews obtained during the 1956 study, Bogardus was able to identify several factors that may have contributed to the reason women reported greater social distances. First of all, during that time most young women did not have as many social contacts as did young men and were therefore not as acquainted with members of different racial and ethnic groups. Hence, these women were not able to feel as close to those groups as were the men. The second reason for the greater distance is due to the fact that contacts of many men with members of various ethnic groups involved business and trade, but are not distinctly social. Women, on the other hand, had contacts with people from other ethnic groups that were of a more personal and social nature, and may therefore be more strained and restricted. The third reason that women have reported greater social distances than men comes from fear of unwanted romantic advances. Bogardus wrote that although women have sometimes been credited with feeling more sympathy for members of minority groups and underprivileged individuals “a show of friendliness by a woman to men of a race with limited social contacts with American women may cause romantic advances that are resented by women” and hence led to more distant feelings.

Just as these factors have contributed to women reporting greater social distances in 1956 than men, one must also examine why the distances lessened in 1966. Bogardus found that in 1966 there were more women with increased interests in public affairs than there were in the last decade. Secondly, women’s involvement in the Civil Rights Movement and their entrance into the business fields and ensuing increase in cross-racial and ethnic contact may have contributed to women reporting lower social distance in this decade (Bogardus, 1971, 34-37.)

Part III
- Replicating the Ethnic Distance Scale in 1977

Following the death of Emory Bogardus in 1973, Carolyn A. Owen, Howard C. Elsner, and Thomas R. McFaul carried on Bogardus' legacy by replicating his national social distance study in 1977. The three social scientists conducted their study in a manner that was virtually identical to that of Bogardus in terms of selecting their respondents and in survey design. By using the same thirty racial and ethnic groups that were used in the earlier studies, Owen, et al. were able to more accurately track social distance trends throughout history.

The results of the 1977 study indicated a lessening in social distance and greater acceptance of racial and ethnic groups in the U.S. The 1,488 participants reported a lower overall mean and spread than were reported in the previous studies. For each of the five studies, the overall mean and the spread are listed in the table below.

Table 4.4

Year of Study	Overall Mean of Results	Spread of Results
1926	2.14	2.85
1946	2.12	2.57
1956	2.08	1.75
1966	1.92	1.56
1977	1.93	1.37

Owen, et al. used the above results as evidence to support their findings that social distance in the United States was continuing to decline. In 1977 they reported that their results “support the half-century trend toward decreasing social distance with respect to many of the thirty ethnic groups studied” (Owen et al, 80-98.)

Part IV
- Replicating the Ethnic Distance Scale in 2001

Following the 1977 ethnic distance study, no other social distance study was carried out on the national level until 2001. It was then that sociologist Vincent N. Parrillo sought to replicate Bogardus' studies as closely as possible in terms of participant selection and survey design, and surveyed 2,916 college students. However, the greatest distinction in his study was the removal and addition of specific ethnic groups in the survey. In updating the selection of racial and ethnic categories, Parrillo removed the following groups because he believed "they were either mostly assimilated and/or far less visible minority groups than others:" Armenians, Czechs, Finns, Norwegians, Scots, Swedish and Turks. He further removed "Japanese Americans" and "Mexican Americans" from the survey, yet kept "Japanese" and "Mexicans" to allow for greater consistency in the designation of all groups. (Bogardus' survey included "Japanese Americans," "Japanese," "Mexican Americans" and "Mexicans.") Furthermore, due to their "numbers and high visibility" Parrillo added the following nine groups: Africans, Arabs, Cubans, Dominicans, Haitians, Jamaicans, Muslims, Puerto Ricans and Vietnamese. In a footnote, Parrillo noted that the inclusion of Muslims as a distinct category was meant to "parallel earlier studies' inclusion of 'Jews,' in essence to measure acceptance of a large, visible religious minority that some perceive as 'different'" (Parrillo et al, 257-271.)

The table below lists the social distance results of Parrillo's 2001 study.

Table 4.5
Social Distance – 2001

Group	Score	Group	Score
Americans	1.07	Filipinos	1.46
Italians	1.15	Chinese	1.47
Canadians	1.20	Puerto Ricans	1.47
British	1.23	Jamaicans	1.79
Irish	1.23	Russians	1.50
French	1.28	Dominicans	1.51
Greeks	1.33	Japanese	1.52
Germans	1.33	Cubans	1.53
African Americans	1.33	Koreans	1.54
Dutch	1.35	Mexicans	1.55
Jews	1.38	Indians (India)	1.60
Indians (American)	1.40	Haitians	1.63
Africans	1.43	Vietnamese	1.69
Polish	1.45	Muslims	1.88
Other Hispanics/Latinos	1.45	Arabs	1.94
Mean	1.45	Spread in Distance	0.87

(Parrillo et al, 257-271.)

When comparing the results of the 2001 study to those of the earlier studies, Parrillo found that social distance further lessened: from 1977 to 2001 the average mean

dropped from 1.93 to 1.45 and the spread lessened from 1.37 to 0.87. Additionally, he found that:

1. As expected, non-ethnic Whites remained in the most accepted, top position, with other top ten slots filled by Canadians and various European groups, essentially continuing a 70-year pattern.
2. Africans, Puerto Ricans and Jamaicans (the three new groups added to the list) made a reasonably strong debut in the middle sector.
3. Most Hispanic groups – including Cubans, Dominicans, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Other Hispanic/Latinos – all received about the same score, suggesting a general consensus about this ethnic group.
4. Most, but not all, Asian groups were clustered together in the third sector.
5. However, the mean scores for Japanese, Koreans, Mexicans and Asian Indians were all lower than in previous studies.

Perhaps the most significant of Parrillo's findings was the placement of "Muslims" and "Arabs" into the furthest social distance categories. Parrillo pointed out that, "without question, the administration of this survey so soon after September 11th produced results tempered by the tragic events of that day." He further noted that when comparing the results of the 154 pre-9/11 responses collected with the remainder of his study collected after 9/11, the responses were remarkably different. Regarding the question of "accepting a member of that group marrying into ones' own family", pre-9/11 results showed that 75% of respondents would accept an Arab and 68% would accept a Muslim; post 9/11, 52% would accept an Arab and 49% would accept a Muslim. Additionally, prior to 9/11, no one had selected any groups to "bar from my country;" however, post 9/11 results indicated that almost 4% of respondents chose this option regarding Arabs. Unfortunately, the sample size of the pre-9/11 responses is fairly small in comparison to the complete study, yet Parrillo noted that, "Such a contrast in scores, even in this limited sample, suggests events may well have affected responses in the post-nine-eleven survey" (Parrillo et al, 257-271.)

There are other factors at play here, however. In Parrillo's study, the overall average score for Arabs (1.94) and Muslims (1.88) in 2001 was still lower than the average scores for eighteen groups in the 1977 study. He believed that this was significant because, "Despite the impact of such a traumatic external factor as nine-eleven, respondents generally declared a closer social distance willingness for Muslims and Arabs than respondents in 1977 did for nearly half of their choices (an assortment of European, Hispanic, and Asian groups)" (Parrillo et al, 257-271.)

So what possible reasons could there be for Arabs and Muslims receiving relatively low social distance scores, despite there still being obvious negative feelings towards them by many of the respondents? Furthermore, what else may cause the average social distance mean of all of the groups continue to lessen over time? Bogardus had believed that "Better communication, amelioration of conditions fostering negative attitudes towards other groups, and long-term education programs" were the solutions to reducing the remaining social distance among groups. Parrillo remarked that one must consider whether or not the respondents were answering in a way, which "reflects the contemporary norm of political correctness; if respondents feel they are risking criticism or sanctions for their opinions about other groups, an artificial bias towards reduced social distance may be taking effect" (Parrillo et al, 257-271.) He continued to add that this effect may be counteracted by assuring the respondents of their anonymity and confidentiality. Still, while many respondents indicated on paper that they would accept most of the groups marrying into their family, one must wonder what would be their reaction if such a marriage were actually to occur?

Part V
- Questioning the Levels of Integration

Although national polls have long suggested a lessening of prejudicial attitudes in the United States, one must question the validity of such polls and the honesty of the participants. Prominent Social Psychologist, Thomas Pettigrew, deemed that one major hurdle for psychologists who study racial attitudes are “other-directed individuals.”

Whereas some members of society are consistently tolerant or intolerant of other races or ethnic groups despite social norms, other-directed individuals “shift their behavior to keep in line with shifting expectations.” Since the need for conformity is predominantly important for these people, their answers on a social distance scale may not reflect their true attitudes, but rather that of what they feel is socially expected of them (Pettigrew, 132.) Pettigrew furthered this idea by saying that although polls taken from 1930 and later have suggested a trend of lessened prejudices, in reality the decrease has been in the poll-takers’ “readiness to admit bigotry” (Pettigrew, 169.) People are less willing to “swim against the current” and go against the trend of tolerance and acceptance.

Recently, Sociologist Eileen O’Brien offered the notion that prejudice may still exist, yet be masked differently; “contemporary forms and emphases of attitudinal expression are often different from traditional racial stereotypes and prejudices, particularly those articulated prior to the 1960s civil rights movements” (O’Brien, 97.)

Despite the before mentioned factors, Pettigrew believed that major shifts reported by opinion polls were, in large part, genuine. One primary reason for this is that people often feel more “safe” when confiding their opinion on vital issues to a stranger (poll taker) than they would to an acquaintance, who is more-likely to disagree or argue with them. O’Brien adds that if prejudiced people “think that those around them will not

censure them for acting in racially biased ways, they may act in such a fashion.”

(O’Brien, 20.) Secondly, if the results of these polls were, in fact, inaccurate, then they would not continue to have consistent results. Perhaps the most compelling reason to accept polling data is the fact that “The sharp diminution of anti-minority responses in the polls is completely consistent with the changes in the treatment of minorities over the same years;” although treatment of minorities is still far from equal. While polls may initially reflect the subjects’ expected answers, Pettigrew argues that the following five-step process occurs:

Lessened verbalized prejudice
speeds the erosion of discrimination,
which permits increased contact between groups,
and creates a basis of equality,
which ends in a decrease of prejudicial attitudes (Pettigrew, 169-171.)

Although it was previously believed in the realm of social psychology that “attitudes must change before behavior does” in the 1970s social scientists came to the realization that the opposite was true: individuals modify their ideas to fit their new acts – and are “often proving amazingly adaptable in doing so” (Pettigrew, 194.) Therefore, one must wonder what are the roles of anti-discriminatory laws? Do they lead a prejudiced person to become less prejudiced, or are these laws enacted as a result of non-prejudiced activists?

Chapter Overview

Bogardus lifelong dedication to studying and researching ethnic relations led to the ground-breaking “ethnic distance scale.” The replication of this study six times from 1926 to 2001 has led to a greater understanding of the trends surrounding ethnic tensions

and relations in the United States and points to the direction of increased ethnic harmony in the future. Although some social scientists believe that such attitudinal polling does not accurately reflect one's true beliefs, others suggest that the polls are generally representative of societal trends.

Now that we have examined the relationships between prejudice, discrimination and immigration to the United States, we can begin to consider the roles of anti-discriminatory laws. When and why were these laws enacted, and what role do they have in a post-9/11 America? Chapter five will seek to find these answers, as well as examine ethnic tensions in the U.S. during the “war on terrorism.”

Chapter 5 Methodology

Part I

- Purpose/Aim of Study

The purpose of this dissertation is to compare the treatment of immigrants' post-9/11 in the United States with the treatment of those who arrived throughout the nation's history prior to September 2001. In particular, I looked at the treatment of the following immigrant groups, which gives a global representation: (Asians) Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Vietnamese, (Eastern Europeans) Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians, (Hispanics/Latinos) Cubans, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, (South Asians) Indians, Pakistanis, (Middle Easterners) Iranians, Syrians, Turks, (Western Europeans) French, Germans, and Irish. As I examined the treatment they received, I looked at the various theoretical explanations for the treatment these groups received.

By examining the treatment of immigrants in the United States throughout the nation's history and comparing that to that to the data gathered from my own survey data of the prejudicial attitudes towards immigrants in a post-9/11 America, I sought to find the correlations between:

levels of prejudice and discrimination of the U.S. population towards immigrants
and:

- (1) governmental action (policy)
- (2) emotions during wartime

As discussed in the literature review, immigrants in the United States have been subject to prejudice and discrimination from the nation's founding to the present day. Furthermore, it was noted that certain factors increase the likelihood, magnitude and duration of the prejudice and discrimination directed towards immigrants; such factors include: competition for scarce jobs; feelings of being threatened; economic depression and war - these factors may or may not occur simultaneously. Would the United States' "War on Terror," therefore, have any impact on the prejudice and discrimination directed towards immigrants in the U.S.?

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were considered by many to be the most horrific attacks against the U.S. This project sought to identify the subsequent consequences of these attacks towards immigrants in the U.S. By comparing the data from previous studies to my own data, I was able to examine the trends of prejudice and discrimination directed at specific immigrant groups. Additionally, I sought to find what discriminatory acts were committed against specific ethnic groups following 9/11? How did students in local New Jersey colleges and universities perceive immigrants in the four years following 9/11? Would these students possess prejudiced feelings and support discriminatory actions towards specific immigrant groups, and if so, which ones? Furthermore, what level of prejudice and discrimination would the students exhibit in their survey answers?

The answers to these questions were found using a quantitative study that surveyed four universities/colleges in northern New Jersey. Schools in New Jersey, in an area of 30 miles or less from where the primary attacks of 9/11 occurred (Ground Zero) were chosen to be studied for three reasons: (1) it would be impractical and inefficient to

survey the entire country (2) due to time and financial constraints, this sample was most convenient/practical (3) participants in this area were close enough to the Ground Zero to be affected by the attacks, but not immediately in the vicinity, therefore that they had some physical, and perhaps emotional, distance. Due to the close proximity of the research sites to Ground Zero, there was the likelihood that some of my subjects had either family members or friends who were harmed or lost in the attacks, and were likely to fear that a future terrorist attack may threaten or take their own life.

I chose to use surveys as the research method used in this quantitative study due to the sensitivity of the subject matter. Although, currently, many social scientists conduct qualitative studies on race, I would argue that a quantitative study more accurately reflects ones' true beliefs. If I had chosen to interview students and question their level of prejudice towards certain groups, I believe they would most-likely disguise any prejudice due to the lessened acceptance of prejudice in current-day America. Perhaps the subject would be ashamed or embarrassed to admit any prejudice, or they would simply want to hide the fact from a researcher who possibly does not share the same view. Two other reasons I chose to make this a quantitative study include: (1) by implementing a convenience sample, I was able to gather a greater sample size, and (2) it allowed me to more-accurately replicate previous social distance surveys.

Part II
- Sample

Four colleges/universities in northern New Jersey were selected to be surveyed based on the following criteria :

- 4-year public college/university
- accredited institution
- located in New Jersey
- 30 miles or less from Manhattan (World Trade Center/Ground Zero site).

I chose the criteria regarding the type of institution based on the belief students attending four-year, accredited colleges and universities are more likely to be more reflective of mainstream societal norms and also because I wanted to further replicate the earlier social distance studies that surveyed this type of institution. Additionally, I selected sites that were thirty miles or less from Ground Zero based on the reasons listed in the previous section. Below is a table containing a list of research sites:

Table 5.1

<i>COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY</i>	<i>CITY</i>	<i>UNDERGRAD. ENROLLMENT</i>	<i>MILES FROM GROUND ZERO</i>
Montclair University	Upper Montclair	11,819	16.5
Ramapo College	Mahwah	5,211	30.3
Rutgers University	Newark	6,784	13.5
William Paterson U.	Wayne	9,418	21.9

Initially, I had planned on surveying a total of 6 colleges/universities that fit my criteria; however, I was not granted allowance to conduct my survey by the institutions' administrations. Within each of the four research sites, subjects were selected based on the following criteria:

- Undergraduate student
- Attending "Sociology 101" course

I chose my subjects to be undergraduate students in a general-elective, basic-level “101” course to get as many first-year students as possible. The reason for this was to try to gain answers that were more reflective of those from members of the general society. For example, first-year students are more likely to have similar attitudes and prejudices as their families and friends from childhood. Students beyond the first year are more likely to have formed their own opinions and attitudes that are less reflective of their families due to meeting a wider-range of individuals (students and professors) as well as by being taught a multitude of subjects at the collegiate level.

Subjects were selected from the research sites’ Sociology classes for several reasons. First of all, this would ensure that the students did not have a sociology class at the collegiate level prior to this study; this is particularly important since topics typically taught in sociology courses include: culture, prejudice, discrimination and social acceptance. Therefore, students who have enrolled in a Sociology course would probably answer differently than those who had not taken such a course. Secondly, since a major theme of this dissertation is sociological, it seemed fitting to survey students in a sociology class rather than in a biology or math class. Additionally, I wanted to survey the same type of “101” class at each research site. Since sociology fell into a general elective requirement at each institution, surveying this type of course became the ideal site for my research. It is important to note that the classes chosen to be surveyed were all day classes and not classes which began after 6:00 pm; the reason for this was to also help ensure that the students would more-likely be younger, first-year students, since it is more typical for older students to enroll in night-time courses (due to the likelihood of

them working full-time during the day and having to enroll in courses after their workday).

Another factor of choosing subjects for my research was determining when in the year to survey them. I chose the very beginning of the fall semester for several reasons. As previously mentioned, I wanted to survey as many first-year students as possible; although none of the courses I surveyed contained only first-year students, they did have one other factor in common: they were “fresh” from their summer break. Even if some of the students had enrolled in summer courses in the months before I surveyed them, they would still have had several weeks off before the start of the fall semester. Therefore, by surveying the students at this time I helped ensure that they would answer the questions more as they naturally would and less as they would in the mind-frame of a student.

At each institution, the target number of completed surveys desired was approximately 100; therefore, since none of the schools had “Sociology 101” classes with enrollments of over 100 students, several classes had to be surveyed from each institution to ensure that enough surveys would be properly completed and therefore usable in this research. Due to access, I have acquired approximately 100 completed surveys at Montclair University, 90 at Rutgers University, 90 at William Paterson University and 30 at Ramapo College.

Part III **- Survey Design**

Several factors contributed to how I chose the countries to survey in my questionnaire. As previously mentioned, I wanted to question the participants about their attitudes and prejudices towards various ethnic groups. Because it would be extremely difficult to question the participants about every nationality in the world, I had to choose a limited number of ethnic groups to be included in my survey. Additionally, although I utilized the overall design of Bogardus' Social Distance Survey for a section of my own questionnaire, I chose not to inquire about specific immigrant groups, but rather pan-ethnic groups. Although this was done to partially minimize the length of my survey, I also chose to use pan-ethnic groups in order to track general trends of prejudice and discrimination towards immigrants from certain regions of the world.

There were six pan-ethnic groups I examined in this study. I chose to include "Western European" countries in my survey due to the fact that prior scholarly research has shown that this immigrant group that has achieved the highest acceptance and assimilation into the United States. (Countries in this region will be discussed below) I further chose to include the various groups that have been prejudiced and discriminated against since September 11th 2001 by sectors of the American public. Such groups include Middle Easterners, Indians and Pakistanis. Due to some physical and cultural similarities between these groups and others, I have chosen to include Hispanics and Latinos, and Eastern Europeans in my research. Consider walking on the street or even the first day in a new classroom – it is often very difficult to guess the ethnicity of the person beside you if that person is dressed in typical American clothing, you do not

know their name, and they do not speak to reveal an accent. Furthermore, there is often such variation among physical characteristics of the people from one ethnicity, that some individuals from country X can look very similar to those of country Y. It is even more difficult to try to guess a person's ethnicity if they have more than one cultural heritage (i.e. grandparents and/or parents of different ethnicities) – which is very common in the United States. Furthermore, I included Asian immigrants as part of the research because they are a highly visible immigrant group that has endured great prejudices and discrimination throughout the nation's history – particularly during wartime (i.e. the Japanese during World War II.)

I chose to divide Europe into “Western” and “Eastern” sections based on two factors. The first factor is purely geographic: looking at a map of Europe, a “central” vertical line can be imagined on the western border of Germany, and continuing down along Switzerland's and Italy's borders. Hence, the countries west of this imagined border are designated as “Western Europe” and those east of the border are considered “Eastern Europe.”

The second factor that contributed to the grouping of a particular country into the “West” and “East” is more conceptual; countries referred to as “Old Europe” are designated in this research as being Western Europe, and countries in the “New Europe” belong to the Eastern Europe category. The terms “old” and “new” essentially refer to how long ago the country was established as a state. (Note that many countries in the “New Europe” were formed following World War I.) The chart below clearly illustrates what countries fall into Western and Eastern Europe for the purposes of this research.

Please note that not every country in Europe will be listed here, since for the purposes of this work that would not be practical.

Table 5.2

<u>Western Europe</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>
Belgium	Austria
France	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Germany	Croatia
Ireland	Czech Republic
Italy	Hungary
Netherlands	Poland
Switzerland	Slovakia
United Kingdom	Slovenia

There are many ethnic groups that were studied in the earlier Social Distance Studies that did not fall into the six pan-ethnic groups of my study (i.e. Africans, Australians, Canadians, Haitians, Native Americans, Russians, etc.) – and I would have liked to have gotten a readable measure of acceptance/social distance of these groups. However, based on the scope of this study, I needed to keep it as centralized as possible around the primary focus of my study – the backlash towards specific immigrant groups in the U.S. post 9/11 (using the specific six pan-ethnic groups previously discussed.) Therefore I could not feasibly include every ethnic region of the globe in this study.

Part IV **- Questionnaire**

The survey measured the subjects' attitudes towards human rights of immigrants in the United States. The survey questioned attitudes and beliefs towards the following areas:

- The Bill of Rights
- The Patriot Act
- Discrimination in the workplace
- Prejudices and tolerances towards various ethnic/cultural/religious groups
- Human rights laws
- Powers of the Federal Government, FBI and local police

The survey itself contained 23 questions. The first page asked for general demographic information. Questions 1 through 21 asked questions based the subjects' attitudes on the afore-mentioned and had answers listed in the Likert-scale (students chose from one of five answers on a range, such as: "absolutely yes, yes, unsure, no, absolutely no"). Question 22 was a general replication of Bogardus' social distance scale and questioned the students' attitudes towards six different ethnic/cultural groups: Asian, Eastern European, Hispanic/Latino, (South Asian) Indian/Pakistani, Middle Eastern, Western European. Answers were selected from those available by circling as many answers as the students felt appropriate. Question 23 questioned the students on each of these groups again and measured the levels of stereotypes towards each of the groups. Answers were chosen by the student from those available based on a scale of 1 to 5, in which "5" represented a favorable attitude and "1" represented a negative attitude towards the ethnic/cultural group in a specific area. I used a five-point scale for most answers to the questions to (1) offer the students a greater choice of answers, and (2) I knew the students would more-likely answer honestly if there was a greater range of

answers. For example, if a student harbored extremely prejudiced feelings against “Group X” and I asked “Do you like members of Group X?” the respondent would more likely illustrate their true feelings in the top answer list #1, rather than the bottom answer list #2:

- | | | | | | |
|-----|------------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------|----------------------|
| (1) | <i>absolutely yes,</i> | <i>yes,</i> | <i>uncertain,</i> | <i>no,</i> | <i>absolutely no</i> |
| (2) | <i>yes</i> | <i>uncertain</i> | <i>no</i> | | |

By adding the choice “absolutely yes” there is a type of buffer; a student can answer “yes” without feeling they answered too extremely - whereas if there were only three choices (as in # 2 above) the same answer of “yes” would appear to be more extreme. Therefore, a prejudiced student may indicate they are “uncertain” because they are socially aware that extreme prejudice is generally unacceptable in modern-day U.S. society.

Throughout my education and adult life I have answered several surveys where there were only three answers available to answer a multiple-choice attitudinal question and felt extremely uncomfortable with the choice I made, feeling it did not accurately reflect my views. A prime example of this was when I was helping a friend who was a doctoral candidate in psychology at Seton Hall University. She was administering a psychological survey to me and each of the 100-or-so questions had a response similar to “Yes” or “No.” It was disturbing to me to answer the sensitive questions in this manner because the choices were so extreme. Perhaps that was part of the psychology of the survey – yet perhaps the person who developed the widely used survey was unaware of basic survey methods. I pondered how much more accurate the results could have been if even one more answer choice of “Maybe” was offered.

My survey, with its five-point answer choices, had been pre-tested during the spring semester of 2004 in an undergraduate-level Sociology class of twenty students at William Paterson University. The results of the pre-test concluded that the survey needed an average of 15-20 minutes to complete and was generally well understood with little or no confusion. Following the pre-test I re-worded two of the questions that the students had commented that they had slight difficulty understanding.

Part V **- Procedures**

The specific classes to be surveyed were discussed by and agreed to by both the Chairperson of each school's Sociology Department and myself. Chairpersons from each institution were contacted during the last week of April and first week of May of 2005 by phone to receive verbal agreement to participate in this study. During August of 2005, e-mails were sent to the Chairpersons to officially ask their permission to survey classes within their departments. At this time, they were also sent: my IRB approval letter from Rutgers; my survey; and a copy of the script that I read to the students to gain their permission to use them as a subject. Also during August of 2005, I sent e-mails to each professor whose class I surveyed. In addition to asking the professor's permission to survey their class, I forwarded them my IRB approval letter from Rutgers and survey to review.

Each institution was surveyed during the first or second week of classes during the Fall 2005 semester. The primary reason for conducting the survey at the beginning of the semester was to ensure that the students had as little of a relationship with their professors as possible; I felt that if a student had developed even a minimal bond or connection with their professor, they would answer their surveys in a way that was more socially acceptable. This was despite the fact of being told that their professor would in no way see or be told of any of their answers and that their anonymity was ensured.

The students completed the surveys at the start of their classes. I chose to survey the students at this time so that the students would take more time completing the survey; if the students were asked to complete the survey at the end of their class, they would

almost certainly rush through them (if they even agreed to answer the questionnaire) so that they could leave the classroom.

Upon entering the classroom I introduced myself to the professor and handed them a copy of my survey for them to review again if they so chose. After a brief introduction by the professor, I further introduced myself as a graduate student from Rutgers University and continued to recite the “script for consent” for the students. Essentially, I told them that the surveys would be completely anonymous, in no way would the students be asked for any identifying information and they were additionally told not to write their name or any other identifying information on the survey.

I used the script for only mild reference and tried to speak to the students professionally, but more on their level and in a comfortable tone. I further asked the students that although participation in the survey was completely voluntary and that they did not have to complete it, that they would be doing me a huge favor by completing it. My tone and words often got the desired response from the students of a welcomed smile and/or soft laugh, which led me to believe that not only would they complete the survey – but that they would also be comfortable enough to answer honestly.

After I distributed the surveys I asked the students to remain seated and that I would personally collect them once the entire class has finished. I felt that by distributing and collecting them myself, the students would answer more honestly than if they knew their survey could be looked at by the other students (i.e. if the students passed the completed surveys to the front of their row.) Furthermore, it was my intention to keep the distractions to a minimum; if the students got up and brought their completed surveys

to me, it would have put a psychological time-crunch on the students who had not yet finished.

The following Data Analysis chapter will discuss the statistically significant cross tabulation results, followed by the social distance results of six pan-ethnic groups, and frequency results of all survey questions.

Chapter 6 Data Analysis

Part I **- Variable Analysis**

The completed surveys' answers were personally coded, recorded and statistically analyzed using SPSS (version 10.0). Those surveys that were incorrectly or incompletely completed were shredded during the time of analysis of the usable surveys.

The survey responses were analyzed to test whether the following factors affect whether or not the student felt more or less prejudice and discrimination towards certain cultural / ethnic groups:

1. The student's gender
2. The student's year in college / university (i.e. 'first-year, second-year'...)
3. The student's major
4. The student's GPA
5. Whether or not the student was born inside the U.S.
6. Whether or not the student's parents were born inside the U.S.
7. Parent's education
8. The student's race / ethnicity
9. The student's religion
10. The student's family's social/economic class.

Upon completion of statistical testing, it was found that there were three (3) variables that had some statistically significant findings:

1. Gender
2. Whether or not the student's parents were born inside the U.S.
3. Mother's education level

The following sections (A-E) will discuss the statistically significant results of this study (90% statistical significance).

Section A: Gender

Significantly more male respondents indicate that the President should be able to order actions that would normally be considered illegal, if there were a perceived national security threat.

Table 6.1

Crosstab

		Sex		Total
		female	male	
During a perceived national security threat, do you feel the U.S. President should be able to order actions that, in times of peace, would be termed illegal?	yes	61 33.9%	60 57.7%	121 42.6%
	uncertain	67 37.2%	22 21.2%	89 31.3%
	no	52 28.9%	22 21.2%	74 26.1%
Total		180 100.0%	104 100.0%	284 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.710 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	15.777	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	9.911	1	.002
N of Valid Cases	284		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 27.10.

Significantly more female respondents believe those who are in the process of applying for citizenship should be protected by the Bill of Rights.

Table 6.2

Crosstab

		Sex		Total
		female	male	
Do you believe that all those who are in the process of applying for citizenship are entitled to the protections granted to them in the U.S Bill of Rights?	yes	134 74.4%	62 59.6%	196 69.0%
	uncertain	26 14.4%	18 17.3%	44 15.5%
	no	20 11.1%	24 23.1%	44 15.5%
Total		180 100.0%	104 100.0%	284 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.541 ^a	2	.014
Likelihood Ratio	8.317	2	.016
Linear-by-Linear Association	8.442	1	.004
N of Valid Cases	284		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.11.

Additionally, significantly more males believe a company has the right to deny hiring a person based *solely on the assumption* that the person is Middle Eastern and/or Muslim. Therefore, even though the applicant may be entirely qualified for the position, nearly 14% of males feel it is acceptable to not hire the person based on their ethnicity or religion (which is illegal under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).

Table 6.3

Crosstab

		Sex		Total
		female	male	
Do you feel that a company has the right to refuse to hire someone based solely on the assumption that the person is Middle Eastern and/or Muslim?	yes	10 5.6%	14 13.5%	24 8.5%
	uncertain	1 .6%	9 8.7%	10 3.5%
	no	169 93.9%	81 77.9%	250 88.0%
Total		180 100.0%	104 100.0%	284 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	19.070 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	19.093	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.327	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	284		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.66.

Although contrary to the Forth Amendment of the Constitution, significantly more males (47%) believe the government has the right to seize a person's property before due process of the law if they *suspect* the person has possible links to terrorism.

Table 6.4

Crosstab

		Sex		Total
		female	male	
If the government suspects a person has possible links to terrorism, do you feel the government has the right to seize the person's property before due process of law?	yes	50 27.9%	49 47.1%	99 35.0%
	uncertain	45 25.1%	19 18.3%	64 22.6%
	no	84 46.9%	36 34.6%	120 42.4%
Total		179 100.0%	104 100.0%	283 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.644 ^a	2	.005
Likelihood Ratio	10.516	2	.005
Linear-by-Linear Association	8.462	1	.004
N of Valid Cases	283		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 23.52.

Significantly more male respondents, nearly 1-in-5, believe it is correct for a person to be held by U.S. federal authorities based *solely on their appearance/ethnicity even if they have committed no crime*. This is clearly illegal according to the 4th Amendment of the Constitution, the Civil Rights Act and Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Table 6.5

Crosstab

		Sex		Total
		female	male	
During times of heightened national security, do you feel it is correct for a person to be held by the U.S. federal authorities based solely on their appearance/ethnicity, even if they have committed no crime?	yes	18 10.0%	20 19.2%	38 13.4%
	uncertain	15 8.3%	22 21.2%	37 13.0%
	no	147 81.7%	62 59.6%	209 73.6%
Total		180 100.0%	104 100.0%	284 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	16.869 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	16.441	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	12.673	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	284		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.55.

The number of males believing it is ok for local authorities to hold a person for questioning based *solely on their appearance/ethnicity* even if they have committed no crime, rises to 25% - significantly more than female respondents who believe such actions are permissible.

Table 6.6

Crosstab

		Sex		Total
		female	male	
During times of heightened national security, do you feel it is correct for a person to be held by local police for questioning based solely on their appearance/ethnicity, even if they have committed no crime?	yes	21 11.7%	26 25.0%	47 16.5%
	uncertain	15 8.3%	19 18.3%	34 12.0%
	no	144 80.0%	59 56.7%	203 71.5%
Total		180 100.0%	104 100.0%	284 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	17.510 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	17.128	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	15.210	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	284		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.45.

Again, clearly contrary to the 6th Amendment, nearly 40% of males (significantly more than females) believe it is ok for the government to hold a person *indefinitely* even if they are not officially charged with a crime.

Table 6.7

Crosstab

		Sex		Total
		female	male	
If the government is detaining someone is connection with a terror investigation, do you feel the government has the right to hold this person indefinitely, even if they are not officially charged with a crime?	yes	41 22.8%	41 39.4%	82 28.9%
	uncertain	50 27.8%	14 13.5%	64 22.5%
	no	89 49.4%	49 47.1%	138 48.6%
	Total	180 100.0%	104 100.0%	284 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	12.394 ^a	2	.002
Likelihood Ratio	12.656	2	.002
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.214	1	.073
N of Valid Cases	284		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 23.44.

Although the U.S. government officially apologized to the former internees for the WWII Japanese Internment Camps, nearly one-fifth of males in this sample believe the government was justified in placing Japanese Americans and those of Japanese descent in the camps – significantly more than females.

Table 6.8

Crosstab

		Sex		Total
		female	male	
Do you feel the U.S. was justified in placing Japanese Americans and those of Japanese descent in Internment Camps in the United States during WWII?	yes	9 5.0%	20 19.2%	29 10.2%
	uncertain	25 13.9%	25 24.0%	50 17.6%
	no	114 63.3%	53 51.0%	167 58.8%
	I don't know about the camps	32 17.8%	6 5.8%	38 13.4%
Total		180 100.0%	104 100.0%	284 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	25.749 ^a	3	.000
Likelihood Ratio	26.027	3	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	23.272	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	284		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.62.

Despite males exhibiting significantly more prejudicial beliefs and acceptance of discriminatory actions (as aforementioned), ironically, significantly more males also agree that an immigrant is entitled to question or say negative things about U.S. government policies and actions.

Table 6.9

Crosstab

		Sex		Total
		female	male	
Do you feel that an immigrant has the right to question or say negative things about the policies and actions of the U.S. government?	yes	90 50.0%	68 65.4%	158 55.6%
	uncertain	24 13.3%	6 5.8%	30 10.6%
	no	66 36.7%	30 28.8%	96 33.8%
Total		180 100.0%	104 100.0%	284 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.567 ^a	2	.023
Likelihood Ratio	7.886	2	.019
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.177	1	.041
N of Valid Cases	284		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.99.

Overall, males in this study exhibit significantly more prejudicial and discriminatory attitudes than females regarding a multitude of hypothetical situations and circumstances.

Section B: Whether or not the student's parents were born inside the U.S.

Significantly more respondents with U.S. born parents (more than 8-in-10) believe U.S. elected leaders and government officials should always follow and abide by the laws in the Constitution.

Table 6.10

Crosstab

		Were one or more of your parents born outside of the USA?		Total
		no	yes	
Do you believe that the elected leaders and government officials of the U.S. should always follow and abide by the laws listed in the United States Constitution?	yes	120 82.8%	98 70.5%	218 76.8%
	uncertain	14 9.7%	21 15.1%	35 12.3%
	no	11 7.6%	20 14.4%	31 10.9%
Total		145 100.0%	139 100.0%	284 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.109 ^a	2	.047
Likelihood Ratio	6.158	2	.046
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.795	1	.016
N of Valid Cases	284		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.17.

Although nearly all respondents agree that all Americans are entitled to protections in the Bill of Rights, significantly fewer respondents with U.S. born parents believe those *applying for citizenship* are entitled to those same protections.

Table 6.11

Crosstab

		Were one or more of your parents born outside of the USA?		Total
		no	yes	
Do you believe that all those who are in the process of applying for citizenship are entitled to the protections granted to them in the U.S Bill of Rights?	yes	88 60.7%	108 77.7%	196 69.0%
	uncertain	26 17.9%	18 12.9%	44 15.5%
	no	31 21.4%	13 9.4%	44 15.5%
Total		145 100.0%	139 100.0%	284 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.737 ^a	2	.005
Likelihood Ratio	10.964	2	.004
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.672	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	284		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.54.

Significantly more respondents whose parents are U.S. born believe it is ok for the government to hold someone *indefinitely* even if they are not officially charged with a crime.

Table 6.12

Crosstab

		Were one or more of your parents born outside of the USA?		Total
		no	yes	
If the government is detaining someone is connection with a terror investigation, do you feel the government has the right to hold this person indefinitely, even if they are not officially charged with a crime?	yes	52 35.9%	30 21.6%	82 28.9%
	uncertain	30 20.7%	34 24.5%	64 22.5%
	no	63 43.4%	75 54.0%	138 48.6%
Total		145 100.0%	139 100.0%	284 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.072 ^a	2	.029
Likelihood Ratio	7.144	2	.028
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.906	1	.015
N of Valid Cases	284		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 31.32.

Although respondents with U.S. born parents believe in the legal system and that U.S. elected leaders and government officials should *always* follow and abide by the laws listed in the Constitution, this group also exhibits significantly greater prejudice and acceptance of breaking various national laws than those with at least one foreign-born parent.

Section C: Mother's education level

Significantly more respondents whose Mother has a college education feel companies have the right to refuse to hire someone based solely on the assumption that they may be Middle Eastern and/or Muslim.

Table 6.13

Crosstab

		Mother's highest education level		Total
		No College Degree	College Degree	
Do you feel that a company has the right to refuse to hire someone based solely on the assumption that the person is Middle Eastern and/or Muslim?	yes	8 4.9%	16 13.2%	24 8.5%
	uncertain	8 4.9%	2 1.7%	10 3.5%
	no	146 90.1%	103 85.1%	249 88.0%
Total		162 100.0%	121 100.0%	283 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.919 ^a	2	.019
Likelihood Ratio	8.075	2	.018
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.663	1	.056
N of Valid Cases	283		

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.28.

Despite being against the 6th Amendment to the Constitution, more than 4-in-10 of those whose Mother has a college degree feel the government has the right to deny legal consul to someone until it has finished interrogating him or her.

Table 6.14

Crosstab

		Mother's highest education level		Total
		No College Degree	College Degree	
If the government suspects a person has possible links to terrorism, do you feel the government has the right to deny legal consul to the person until the government has finished interrogating him or her?	yes	39 24.1%	49 40.5%	88 31.1%
	uncertain	34 21.0%	23 19.0%	57 20.1%
	no	89 54.9%	49 40.5%	138 48.8%
Total		162 100.0%	121 100.0%	283 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.105 ^a	2	.011
Likelihood Ratio	9.076	2	.011
Linear-by-Linear Association	8.568	1	.003
N of Valid Cases	283		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.37.

More respondents who's Mother has a college degree exhibit greater prejudicial/discriminatory beliefs.

Part II**- Social Distance / Semantic Differential Measures****Table 6.15****How Much Do You Accept...**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Asians	283	1	4	1.40	.57
Eastern Europeans	283	1	4	1.37	.61
Hispanics / Latinos	283	1	6	1.32	.66
Indians / Pakistanis	282	1	6	1.70	1.00
Middle Easterners	279	1	6	1.78	1.07
Western Europeans	281	1	5	1.44	.75

Respondents ranked “Hispanics/Latinos” closest in terms of social distance, with an average acceptance score of 1.32. The order of acceptance of the six (6) ethnic in this sample are as follows (with “1” being the socially “closest”):

Table 6.16**Average Semantic
Differential Rank****Average Semantic
Differential Score**

1.	Hispanics/Latinos	1.32
2.	Eastern Europeans	1.37
3.	Asians	1.40
4.	Western Europeans	1.44
5.	Indians/Pakistanis	1.70
6.	Middle Easterners	1.78

** Note that for the following semantic differential scales are based on a five-point scale, where a “1” denotes an extreme positive attribute and a “5” denotes a corresponding extreme negative attribute.*

Table 6.17**Asians: Social Distance & Semantic Differential Scales**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
How much do you accept Asians?	283	1	4	1.40	.57
beautiful/ugly	278	1	5	2.45	.90
moral/immoral	278	1	5	2.12	.86
clean/dirty	278	1	5	2.18	.96
peaceful/violent	277	1	4	2.08	.90
intelligent/stupid	277	1	4	1.50	.78
close-knit family/distant family	277	1	5	1.73	.87
law-abiding/criminal	277	1	5	2.03	.87
good workers/bad workers	277	1	4	1.75	.78
polite/rude	277	1	5	2.10	.93

Asians have a social acceptance of 1.40, and an average attribute score of 1.99.

Table 6.18**Eastern Europeans: Social Distance & Semantic Differential Scales**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
How much do you accept Eastern Europeans?	283	1	4	1.37	.61
beautiful/ugly	277	1	5	2.34	.86
moral/immoral	277	1	5	2.48	.85
clean/dirty	277	1	5	2.50	.89
peaceful/violent	277	1	5	2.49	.82
intelligent/stupid	277	1	5	2.30	.84
close-knit family/distant family	277	1	5	2.38	.93
law-abiding/criminal	277	1	5	2.47	.83
good workers/bad workers	277	1	5	2.41	.84
polite/rude	277	1	5	2.44	.88

Eastern Europeans have a social acceptance of 1.37, and an average attribute score of 2.42.

Table 6.19**Hispanics / Latinos: Social Distance & Semantic Differential Scales**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
How much do you accept Hispanics / Latinos?	283	1	6	1.32	.66
beautiful/ugly	277	1	5	2.10	.91
moral/immoral	277	1	5	2.64	.91
clean/dirty	277	1	5	2.60	.98
peaceful/violent	277	1	5	2.78	.99
intelligent/stupid	277	1	5	2.64	.92
close-knit family/distant family	277	1	5	1.99	.96
law-abiding/criminal	277	1	5	2.84	.97
good workers/bad workers	277	1	5	2.15	.97
polite/rude	277	1	5	2.60	.96

Hispanics/Latinos have a social acceptance of 1.32, and an average attribute score of 2.48.

Table 6.20**Indians / Pakistanis: Social Distance & Semantic Differential Scales**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
How much do you accept Indians / Pakistanis?	282	1	6	1.70	1.00
beautiful/ugly	277	1	5	2.73	1.02
moral/immoral	277	1	5	2.44	.96
clean/dirty	277	1	5	2.96	1.03
peaceful/violent	277	1	5	2.57	.99
intelligent/stupid	277	1	5	2.06	.98
close-knit family/distant family	277	1	5	2.09	1.04
law-abiding/criminal	277	1	5	2.38	.98
good workers/bad workers	277	1	5	2.21	.94
polite/rude	277	1	5	2.49	1.06

Indians/Pakistanis have a social acceptance of 1.70, and an average attribute score of 2.44.

Table 6.21**Middle Easterners: Social Distance & Semantic Differential Scales**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
How much do you accept Middle Easterners?	279	1	6	1.78	1.07
beautiful/ugly	277	1	5	2.65	1.00
moral/immoral	277	1	5	2.70	.97
clean/dirty	277	1	5	2.85	1.04
peaceful/violent	277	1	5	3.02	1.10
intelligent/stupid	277	1	5	2.39	.92
close-knit family/distant family	277	1	5	2.34	1.00
law-abiding/criminal	277	1	5	2.82	1.03
good workers/bad workers	277	1	5	2.45	.95
polite/rude	277	1	5	2.70	1.02

Middle Easterners have a social acceptance of 1.78, and an average attribute score of 2.66.

Table 6.22**Western Europeans: Social Distance & Semantic Differential Scales**

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
How much do you accept Western Europeans?	281	1	5	1.44	.75
beautiful/ugly	277	1	5	2.31	.87
moral/immoral	277	1	5	2.47	.85
clean/dirty	277	1	5	2.32	.84
peaceful/violent	277	1	5	2.52	.87
intelligent/stupid	277	1	5	2.32	.82
close-knit family/distant family	277	1	5	2.44	.93
law-abiding/criminal	277	1	5	2.47	.84
good workers/bad workers	277	1	5	2.42	.86
polite/rude	277	1	5	2.49	.89

Western Europeans have a social acceptance of 1.44, and an average attribute score of 2.42.

In terms of the semantic differential attributes, the ranking of the six ethnic groups becomes slightly reordered compared to that of the social distance scale:

Table 6.23

<u>Average Semantic Differential Rank</u>		<u>Average Semantic Differential Score</u>
1.	Asians	1.99
2.	Eastern Europeans	2.42
2.	Western Europeans	2.42
4.	Indians/Pakistanis	2.44
5.	Hispanics/Latinos	2.48
6.	Middle Easterners	2.66

Table 6.24

	<u>Average Social Distance Ranking</u>	<u>Average Semantic Differential Ranking</u>
Asians	3	1
Eastern Europeans	2	2
Hispanics/Latinos	1	5
Indians/Pakistanis	5	4
Middle Easterners	6	6
Western Europeans	4	2

The table above shows how Asians went from a third rank in terms of social distance to being ranked first in terms of positive attributes. Other groups that “moved up” include Indians/Pakistanis (5th to 4th rank) and Western Europeans (4th to 2nd rank). Conversely, however, is that Hispanics/Latinos fell from being ranked 1st in terms of social distance/acceptance to 5th in terms of positive attributes. Both Eastern Europeans and Middle Easterners ranks did not change when comparing the different scales.

Table 6.25

	<u>Social Distance Average Score</u>	<u>Semantic Differential Average Score</u>	<u>Shift</u>
Hispanics/Latinos	1.32	2.48	-1.16
Eastern Europeans	1.37	2.42	-1.05
Asians	1.40	1.99	-0.59
Western Europeans	1.44	2.42	-0.98
Indians/Pakistanis	1.70	2.44	-0.74
Middle Easterners	1.78	2.66	-0.88

Therefore, although all of the groups' scores shifted negatively, Asians had the least negative shift and Hispanics/Latinos had the greatest negative shift.

Below shows rankings based on an average of social distance and semantic differential scores:

Table 6.26

<u>Averaged Rank</u>		<u>Averaged Score</u>
1.	Asians	1.70
2.	Eastern Europeans	1.90
2.	Hispanics/Latinos	1.90
4.	Western Europeans	1.93
5.	Indians/Pakistanis	2.07
6.	Middle Easterners	2.22

Table 6.27

	<u>Average Social Distance Ranking</u>	<u>Average Semantic Differential Ranking</u>	<u>Averaged Ranking</u>
Asians	3	1	1
Eastern Europeans	2	2	2
Hispanics/Latinos	1	5	2
Indians/Pakistanis	5	4	5
Middle Easterners	6	6	6
Western Europeans	4	2	4

Part III
- Questionnaire Answer Frequencies

Table 6.28

Do you believe that the elected leaders and government officials of the U.S. should always follow and abide by the laws listed in the United States Constitution?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	85	29.9	29.9	29.9
	yes	133	46.8	46.8	76.8
	uncertain	35	12.3	12.3	89.1
	no	30	10.6	10.6	99.6
	absolutely no	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.29

Do you feel it is legal for any person or agency to act against the U.S. Constitution or Bill of Rights?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	6	2.1	2.1	2.1
	yes	44	15.5	15.5	17.6
	uncertain	55	19.4	19.4	37.0
	no	135	47.5	47.5	84.5
	absolutely no	44	15.5	15.5	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.30

During a perceived national security threat, do you feel the U.S. President should be able to order actions that, in times of peace, would be termed illegal?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	18	6.3	6.3	6.3
	yes	103	36.3	36.3	42.6
	uncertain	89	31.3	31.3	73.9
	no	54	19.0	19.0	93.0
	absolutely no	20	7.0	7.0	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.31

During a perceived national security threat, do you feel the F.B.I. should be able to act in ways that, in times of peace, would be termed illegal?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	12	4.2	4.2	4.2
	yes	108	38.0	38.0	42.3
	uncertain	78	27.5	27.5	69.7
	no	65	22.9	22.9	92.6
	absolutely no	21	7.4	7.4	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.32

Do you believe that all Americans are entitled to the protections granted to them in the U.S. Bill of Rights?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	145	51.1	51.1	51.1
	yes	114	40.1	40.1	91.2
	uncertain	8	2.8	2.8	94.0
	no	13	4.6	4.6	98.6
	absolutely no	4	1.4	1.4	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.33

Do you believe that all those who are in the process of applying for citizenship are entitled to the protections granted to them in the U.S Bill of Rights?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	69	24.3	24.3	24.3
	yes	127	44.7	44.7	69.0
	uncertain	44	15.5	15.5	84.5
	no	39	13.7	13.7	98.2
	absolutely no	5	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.34

During times of heightened national security, do you feel it is correct for a person to be held by the U.S. federal authorities based solely on their appearance/ethnicity, even if they have committed no crime?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	6	2.1	2.1	2.1
	yes	32	11.3	11.3	13.4
	uncertain	37	13.0	13.0	26.4
	no	112	39.4	39.4	65.8
	absolutely no	97	34.2	34.2	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.35

During times of heightened national security, do you feel it is correct for a person to be held by local police for questioning based solely on their appearance/ethnicity, even if they have committed no crime?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	6	2.1	2.1	2.1
	yes	41	14.4	14.4	16.5
	uncertain	34	12.0	12.0	28.5
	no	100	35.2	35.2	63.7
	absolutely no	103	36.3	36.3	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.36

Is it important for all the countries of the world to abide by the various international human rights laws, such as the principles specified in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	75	26.4	26.4	26.4
	yes	153	53.9	53.9	80.3
	uncertain	48	16.9	16.9	97.2
	no	6	2.1	2.1	99.3
	absolutely no	2	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.37

Should the United States abide by the various international human rights laws, such as the principles specified in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	75	26.4	26.4	26.4
	yes	140	49.3	49.3	75.7
	uncertain	54	19.0	19.0	94.7
	no	11	3.9	3.9	98.6
	absolutely no	4	1.4	1.4	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.38

Do you feel the U.S. was justified in placing Japanese Americans and those of Japanese descent in Internment Camps in the United States during WWII?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	4	1.4	1.4	1.4
	yes	25	8.8	8.8	10.2
	uncertain	50	17.6	17.6	27.8
	no	80	28.2	28.2	56.0
	absolutely no	87	30.6	30.6	86.6
	I don't know about the camps	38	13.4	13.4	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.39

Before takeoff, should someone have the right to request that another passenger on a plane be removed from the aircraft solely because that person appears to be Middle Eastern or Muslim?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	5	1.8	1.8	1.8
	yes	12	4.2	4.2	6.0
	uncertain	19	6.7	6.7	12.7
	no	121	42.6	42.8	55.5
	absolutely no	126	44.4	44.5	100.0
	Total	283	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.4		
Total		284	100.0		

Table 6.40

Do you feel that a company has the right to refuse to hire someone based solely on the assumption that the person is Middle Eastern and/or Muslim?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	9	3.2	3.2	3.2
	yes	15	5.3	5.3	8.5
	uncertain	10	3.5	3.5	12.0
	no	116	40.8	40.8	52.8
	absolutely no	134	47.2	47.2	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.41

If the government suspects a person has possible links to terrorism, do you feel the government has the right to seize the person's property before due process of law?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	21	7.4	7.4	7.4
	yes	78	27.5	27.6	35.0
	uncertain	64	22.5	22.6	57.6
	no	84	29.6	29.7	87.3
	absolutely no	36	12.7	12.7	100.0
	Total	283	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.4		
Total		284	100.0		

Table 6.42

If the government suspects a person has possible links to terrorism, do you feel the government has the right to deny legal consul to the person until the government has finished interrogating him or her?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	19	6.7	6.7	6.7
	yes	69	24.3	24.3	31.0
	uncertain	56	19.7	19.7	50.7
	no	109	38.4	38.4	89.1
	absolutely no	30	10.6	10.6	99.6
	22	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.43

If the government is detaining someone in connection with a terror investigation, do you feel the government has the right to hold this person indefinitely, even if they are not officially charged with a crime?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	15	5.3	5.3	5.3
	yes	67	23.6	23.6	28.9
	uncertain	64	22.5	22.5	51.4
	no	107	37.7	37.7	89.1
	absolutely no	31	10.9	10.9	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.44

Do you feel that an immigrant has the right to question or say negative things about the policies and actions of the U.S. government?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	absolutely yes	40	14.1	14.1	14.1
	yes	118	41.5	41.5	55.6
	uncertain	30	10.6	10.6	66.2
	no	64	22.5	22.5	88.7
	absolutely no	32	11.3	11.3	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Part IV
- Sample Demographic Frequencies

Table 6.45

Sex

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid female	180	63.4	63.4	63.4
male	104	36.6	36.6	100.0
Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.46

Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 17-20	219	77.1	77.1	77.1
21-29	57	20.1	20.1	97.2
30+	8	2.8	2.8	100.0
Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.47

Class level

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 1st year undergraduate	111	39.1	39.1	39.1
2nd year undergraduate	91	32.0	32.0	71.1
3rd & 4th year undergraduate	82	28.9	28.9	100.0
Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.48

Were you born outside of the USA?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid no	227	79.9	79.9	79.9
yes	57	20.1	20.1	100.0
Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.49**Were one or more of your parents born outside of the USA?**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid no	145	51.1	51.1	51.1
yes	139	48.9	48.9	100.0
Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.50**Family race/ethnicity**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Asian	15	5.3	5.4	5.4
Black (African, African-American, West Indian)	47	16.5	17.0	22.4
Eastern European	31	10.9	11.2	33.6
Hispanic / Latino	50	17.6	18.1	51.6
Indian / Pakistani	12	4.2	4.3	56.0
Middle Eastern	8	2.8	2.9	58.8
Western European	54	19.0	19.5	78.3
"white" or caucasian	26	9.2	9.4	87.7
Native American	1	.4	.4	88.1
Asian & Hispanic/Latino	2	.7	.7	88.8
Asian & Indian/Pakistani	3	1.1	1.1	89.9
Asian & Western European	2	.7	.7	90.6
Black & Hispanic/Latino	3	1.1	1.1	91.7
Black & Western European	1	.4	.4	92.1
Eastern European & Middle Eastern	1	.4	.4	92.4
Eastern & Western European	10	3.5	3.6	96.0
Hispanic/Latino & Middle Eastern	1	.4	.4	96.4
Hispanic/Latino & Western European	5	1.8	1.8	98.2
Middle Eastern & Western European	4	1.4	1.4	99.6
Hispanic/Latino & Middle Eastern & Western European	1	.4	.4	100.0
Total	277	97.5	100.0	
Missing System	7	2.5		
Total	284	100.0		

Table 6.51**Parent's combined annual income**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	more than \$120,000	46	16.2	17.3	17.3
	\$80,001-\$120,000	56	19.7	21.1	38.3
	\$60,001-\$80,000	60	21.1	22.6	60.9
	\$40,000-\$60,000	57	20.1	21.4	82.3
	less than \$40,000	47	16.5	17.7	100.0
	Total	266	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	18	6.3		
Total		284	100.0		

Table 6.52**Major**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	accounting	10	3.5	3.6	3.6
	biology	20	7.0	7.1	10.7
	business	22	7.7	7.9	18.6
	chemistry	4	1.4	1.4	20.0
	communications	4	1.4	1.4	21.4
	computer science	4	1.4	1.4	22.9
	education	7	2.5	2.5	25.4
	history	4	1.4	1.4	26.8
	journalism	2	.7	.7	27.5
	marketing	4	1.4	1.4	28.9
	math	6	2.1	2.1	31.1
	music	2	.7	.7	31.8
	psychology	31	10.9	11.1	42.9
	social work	9	3.2	3.2	46.1
	sociology	26	9.2	9.3	55.4
	undecided	55	19.4	19.6	75.0
	nursing	4	1.4	1.4	76.4
	graphic design	4	1.4	1.4	77.9
	criminal justice	22	7.7	7.9	85.7
	pharmacy	8	2.8	2.9	88.6
	engineering	3	1.1	1.1	89.6
	nursing	6	2.1	2.1	91.8
	art	6	2.1	2.1	93.9
	political science	2	.7	.7	94.6
	english literature	8	2.8	2.9	97.5
	physical education	6	2.1	2.1	99.6
	anthropology	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	280	98.6	100.0	
Missing	System	4	1.4		
Total		284	100.0		

Table 6.53**GPA**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A	60	21.1	21.1	21.1
	B	120	42.3	42.3	63.4
	C	20	7.0	7.0	70.4
	n/a	84	29.6	29.6	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.54**Religion**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Catholic	139	48.9	51.1	51.1
	Christian	53	18.7	19.5	70.6
	Jewish	15	5.3	5.5	76.1
	Muslim	11	3.9	4.0	80.1
	Protestant	9	3.2	3.3	83.5
	Hindu	14	4.9	5.1	88.6
	Sikh	1	.4	.4	89.0
	Apiscopalian	1	.4	.4	89.3
	Baptist	6	2.1	2.2	91.5
	none/agnostic	11	3.9	4.0	95.6
	Armenian Apostle	1	.4	.4	96.0
	atheist	4	1.4	1.5	97.4
	Greek Orthodox	1	.4	.4	97.8
	Buddhist	3	1.1	1.1	98.9
	Russian Orthodox	2	.7	.7	99.6
	Mormon	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	272	95.8	100.0	
Missing	System	12	4.2		
Total		284	100.0		

Table 6.55**Family social/economic class**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	middle/upper+	77	27.1	27.1	27.1
	middle	155	54.6	54.6	81.7
	middle/lower-	52	18.3	18.3	100.0
	Total	284	100.0	100.0	

Table 6.56**Father's highest education level**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	did not finish high school	40	14.1	14.4	14.4
	high school graduate	81	28.5	29.1	43.5
	some college / no degree	45	15.8	16.2	59.7
	Associates Degree	17	6.0	6.1	65.8
	Bachelors Degree	56	19.7	20.1	86.0
	Masters Degree	35	12.3	12.6	98.6
	Doctorate	4	1.4	1.4	100.0
	Total	278	97.9	100.0	
Missing	System	6	2.1		
Total		284	100.0		

Table 6.57**Mother's highest education level**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	did not finish high school	20	7.0	7.1	7.1
	high school graduate	80	28.2	28.3	35.3
	some college / no degree	62	21.8	21.9	57.2
	Associates Degree	19	6.7	6.7	64.0
	Bachelors Degree	66	23.2	23.3	87.3
	Masters Degree	35	12.3	12.4	99.6
	Doctorate	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	283	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.4		
Total		284	100.0		

Chapter 7

Discussion

The events of September 11th 2001 resulted in prejudiced and discriminatory backlashes against the religious/ethnic group of the men who carried out the terrorist attacks – Middle Eastern Muslims. For my dissertation, I sought to find out the extent of the backlash through data obtained in the literature review as well as students' attitudes towards Middle Easterners in the U.S. I also sought to better understand the issues surrounding such backlash namely how one sample of college students felt about civil liberties.

As explained in the literature review, nearly every group that emigrated to the U.S. has endured some degree of prejudice and discrimination against them. The histories of eighteen various ethnic groups, grouped into six pan-ethnic categories, were discussed to give examples of the prejudices/discriminatory actions committed against various immigrant groups and to show the existing patterns. For example, the majority of prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory actions have been a direct result of: economic and social competition; stereotypes; misunderstood cultural attributes and wartime panic. I researched the overall degree of prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory actions against Middle Easterners and Muslims following the September 11th attacks to determine if they were similar to how Americans had responded during previous times of war. Additionally, I tried to determine the type and degree of cross-ethnic tensions/prejudices exist in a post-9/11 society.

Part 1

- Re-Creating the Bogardus Social Distance Study in Northern New Jersey

As explained in Chapter 6, I chose not to study a multitude of specific ethnic groups in my own re-creation of the Bogardus Social Distance Study, but rather to study pan-ethnic groups. A primary reason I incorporated pan-ethnic groups instead of individual ethnic groups was to measure attitudes towards immigrants of particular ethnic regions of the world and to minimize questionnaire length. This was especially important given that my study incorporated many other questions (such as about civil liberties and a semantic differential section) than previous studies. By doing so I was able to get a more complete picture of the different aspects of prejudice and discrimination facing immigrants in the U.S., rather than just relying on the Social Distance Scale alone. However, the limitation of using pan-ethnic groups as opposed to individual groups is that direct comparisons of specific ethnic groups cannot be made from previous studies. Another limitation of my study is that it was only conducted in one state and cannot be fully compared to the previous social distance studies completed by Emory Bogardus and Vincent Parrillo, which were conducted on the national level.

- Section A: Wartime Panic as Measured by the Social Distance Scale

The prejudice and discrimination endured by those of German and Japanese heritage during WWII helps demonstrate the affects of wartime fear/panic against “the enemy” during wartime. As explained in Chapter 2, both immigrant groups in the U.S. were subject to prejudice and discrimination prior to WWII – yet tensions increased following the outbreak of the Second World War. Bogardus’ social distance measures of

Germans, Japanese and Russians in the U.S. from 1926, 1946, 1956 and 1966 – followed by Vincent Parrillo’s 2001 results:

Table 7.1

	(Bogardus)				(Parrillo)
	<u>1926</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>2001</u>
Germans	1.46	1.59	1.61	1.54	1.33
Japanese	2.80	3.61	2.70	2.41	1.52
Russians	1.88	1.83	2.56	2.38	1.50

The above chart demonstrates how, around WWII (1946) social distance scores of Germans and Japanese ethnic groups rose, and then began to decrease in 1956 (for the Japanese) and 1966 (for the Germans.) Russians, on the other hand, encountered a spike in social distance measures in the 1956 study, which waned slightly by 1966. It is likely that Germans did not have as large a social distance increase as the Japanese because 1) they started off with a lower social distance score in 1926 and 2) German-Americans were already more assimilated into American culture than Japanese-Americans and therefore were viewed as less “foreign” or threatening. By 2001, however, all three groups had fairly low social distance scores, indicating greater acceptance of these ethnic groups.

However, the results of my study indicate that some residual prejudicial feelings towards Japanese exist today. Although Japanese internment camps were recognized to be a national mistake, nearly 12% of respondents still believed the U.S. was justified in placing Japanese and those of Japanese descent in those camps during WWII. Eighteen

percent of respondents were unsure and nearly 60% felt that the internment camps were not justified. The remaining 13% of respondents indicated they did not know about the camps.

Results of the level of social distance of Germans and Japanese in my own study must be understood in the context that I studied pan-ethnic groups and not individual ethnic groups: therefore, Germans were examined under the “Western Europe” category, and Japanese within the “Asian” category. Below is a comparison of the afore-mentioned Bogardus and Parrillo studies, followed by my own results:

Table 7.2

	(Bogardus)				(Parrillo) (Koleser)	
	<u>1926</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>2001</u>	<u>2004</u>
Germans (Western Europeans)	1.46	1.59	1.61	1.54	1.33	1.44
Japanese (Asians)	2.80	3.61	2.70	2.41	1.52	1.40

The results of my study show how the Western European pan-ethnic group (which includes Germans), were rated at slightly greater social distance. The Asian pan-ethnic group (which includes Japanese), however, received slightly lower social distance scores. Although results of my study can be compared to the earlier studies, they must be examined in a pan-ethnic context. For example, while Germans (in the pan-ethnic Western European grouping) received slighter greater social distance measures, the score of “1.44” represents the pan-ethnic group and not Germans alone. The actual social distance of Germans by my sample might be slightly higher or lower than the 1.44 score

attributed to Western Europeans. The same can be said of Japanese within the “Asian” pan-ethnic group. I chose to incorporate pan-ethnic groups as opposed to a multitude of individual ethnic groups to lessen respondent fatigue (as I was asking more questions than simply social distance scale questions, such as the civil liberties and semantic differential sections) and moreover I wanted to measure general prejudices towards ethnic regions – while it is likely that people are generally not familiar/knowledgeable about every ethnic group in the world, it is more probable that they have basic knowledge about general ethnic/cultural regions of the world (i.e. Asian, European, etc.)

- Section B: Comparative Results – 1926-2004 Total Results

To better compare the results from the Bogardus and Parrillo studies with the results of my own study, I’ve reordered the groups cited in Chapter 4 into the pan-ethnic groups of this study. Those ethnicities that do not fall into one of the six pan-ethnic groups of my study are listed under the heading “Other Groups...” Additionally, I removed the Mexican-American and Japanese-American groups from this chart, as Parrillo had done, since Mexicans and Japanese were still included without being hyphenated. Below is a complete comparison of Borgardus’, Parrillo’s and my own social distance results:

Table 7.3
Comparison of Social Distance Results – 1926 to 2004

	(Bogardus)				(Parrillo)	(Koleser)
<u>Ethnic Group</u>	1926	1946	1956	1966	2001	2004
Asians						1.40
Chinese	3.36	2.50	2.68	2.34	1.47	
Japanese	2.80	3.61	2.70	2.41	1.52	
Koreans	3.60	3.05	2.83	2.51	1.54	
Filipinos	3.00	2.76	2.46	2.31	1.46	
Vietnamese	-	-	-	-	1.69	
Eastern Europeans						1.37
Czechs	2.08	1.76	2.22	2.02	-	
Poles	2.01	1.84	2.07	1.98	1.45	
Hispanics/Latinos						1.32
Cubans	-	-	-	-	1.53	
Hispanic / Latinos	-	-	-	-	1.45	
Mexicans	2.69	2.89	2.79	2.56	1.55	
Puerto Ricans	-	-	-	-	1.47	
Indians/Pakistanis						1.70
Indians	3.91	3.43	2.80	2.62	1.60	
Middle Easterners						1.78
Arabs	-	-	-	-	1.94	
Armenians	2.06	2.29	2.33	2.18	-	
Jews	2.39	2.32	2.15	1.97	1.38	
Greeks	2.47	2.29	2.09	1.82	1.33	
Muslims	-	-	-	-	1.88	
Turks	3.30	2.89	2.52	2.48	-	
Western Europeans						1.44
English / British	1.06	1.13	1.23	1.14	1.23	
Finns / Dutch	1.83	1.63	1.80	1.67	1.35	
French	1.32	1.31	1.47	1.36	1.28	
Germans	1.46	1.59	1.61	1.54	1.33	
Hollanders (Dutch)	1.56	1.37	1.63	1.54		
Irish	1.30	1.24	1.56	1.40	1.23	
Italians	1.94	2.28	1.89	1.51	1.15	
Norwegians	1.59	1.35	1.66	1.50		
Scots	1.13	1.26	1.60	1.53	-	
Spanish	1.72	1.94	2.08	1.93	-	
Swedish	1.54	1.40	1.57	1.42		

Other Groups...						
Africans	-	-	-	-	1.43	-
African Americans	3.28	3.60	2.74	2.56	1.33	-
Americans (White)	1.10	1.04	1.08	1.07	1.07	-
Canadians	1.13	1.11	1.16	1.15	1.20	-
Dominicans	-	-	-	-	1.51	-
Haitians	-	-	-	-	1.63	-
Indians: American	2.38	2.45	2.35	2.12	1.40	-
Jamaicans	-	-	-	-	1.79	-
Russians	1.88	1.83	2.56	2.38	1.50	-
Total Mean	2.14	2.12	2.08	1.92	1.45	1.50

Parrillo's 2001 recreation of the updated Bogardus Social Distance measure demonstrates how Middle Easterners and Muslims were widely accepted in the U.S. just prior to the September 11th attacks, and were greatly ostracized and mistrusted directly following 9/11. Additionally, the FBI hate crimes list shows how the number and percentage of hate crimes against this group spiked dramatically following 9/11, and began to subside in subsequent years. Three years later, when I completed my own survey, I found that this group was still somewhat mistrusted and held at a greater social distance than other pan-ethnic groups.

It is likely that the results of my 2004 study differ from Parrillo's 2001 study due to the demographics of our samples. Whereas Parrillo has a nation-wide college student sample, my sample was localized to 4 public universities/colleges in northern New Jersey – and had a higher than national average population of minorities.

- Section C: Social Distance and Semantic Differential Measures

In addition to social distance, I sought to utilize another measure of acceptance of the pan-ethnic groups in my study. Although social distance has been used as a measure of “acceptance” in the field of sociology for over half a century, I argue that it is not enough to measure attitudes towards a particular group and that it must be used in conjunction with a semantic differential measure.

Whereas the social distance scale can measure things like whether someone “would accept a member of group x marrying into their family” or if they “would accept someone of group x moving next door to them,” a semantic differential measure can address more intuitive attitudes and prejudices such as the degree a person perceives group x to be either “clean or dirty,” “intelligent or stupid,” or “law-abiding or criminal.” By collecting an average (mean) score of these attributes – positive or negative – one can more fully understand the prejudicial attitudes people harbor towards particular groups.

The demographic breakdown of my sample was as follows:

Table 7.4

<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Percent of Sample</u>
Asian	8%
Black (African, African-American, West Indian)	18%
Eastern European	15%
Hispanic/Latino	22%
Indian/Pakistani	5%
Middle Eastern	6%
Western European	28%

(note: students could select multiple ethnicities to describe themselves)

The results of my survey found that:

Respondents ranked “Hispanics/Latinos” closest in terms of social distance, with an average acceptance score of 1.32. The order of acceptance of the six (6) ethnic in this sample are as follows (with “1” being the socially “closest”):

Table 7.5

<u>Average Social Distance Rank</u>		<u>Average Social Distance Score</u>
1.	Hispanics/Latinos	1.32
2.	Eastern Europeans	1.37
3.	Asians	1.40
4.	Western Europeans	1.44
5.	Indians/Pakistanis	1.70
6.	Middle Easterners	1.78

Although one would likely assume that each group would rank themselves socially closest and that since Western Europeans had the largest population in this sample they would likely have the closest social distance ranking, the results indicate otherwise.

Essentially what the social distance scale measures are the groups one would most-accept marrying into their family. The likely reason the group with the largest population in this study (Western Europeans) was ranked 4th in terms of social distance is if

Hispanics/Latinos rated themselves “close” and if the other five pan-ethnic groups rated Hispanics/Latinos “closer” than Western Europeans. If both Hispanics/Latinos and other groups rank the former group “close” than this group would have a closer average score than the average score for Western Europeans. A more detailed explanation of this will be discussed in the following section.

In terms of the semantic differential attributes, the ranking of the six ethnic groups becomes reordered compared to that of the social distance scale:

Table 7.6

<u>Average Semantic Differential Rank</u>		<u>Average Semantic Differential Score</u>
1.	Asians	1.99
2.	Eastern Europeans	2.42
2.	Western Europeans	2.42
4.	Indians/Pakistanis	2.44
5.	Hispanics/Latinos	2.48
6.	Middle Easterners	2.66

The Semantic Differential score measures subconscious prejudicial attitudes towards specific pan-ethnic groups in terms of a positive/negative attribute scale. The variables incorporated into this measure included: beauty, morals, cleanliness, peacefulness, intelligence, degree of family closeness, degree of obeying laws, work ethic and politeness. Table 7.6 shows how Asians were rated most positively of the six groups in this study, with an average score of 1.99. Therefore, it is likely that modern positive stereotypes directed at Asians (i.e. being studious and intelligent) resulted in a more positive semantic differential score than the other five pan-ethnic groups in this study. Additionally, whereas more people in this study would feel more comfortable marrying someone in the Hispanic/Latino group, Asians receive a more positive ethnic attribute rating. It would appear, therefore that Asians have, on average, overcome the negative stereotypes of the 1850s in which they were stereotyped to be “dirty, diseased, barbaric and immoral,” with an “embellished overly high birth-rate” and moreover discriminated against attending school in the U.S. - as described in Chapter 2. Middle Easterners,

however, were rated least favorably of the six groups examined – likely due to the backlash lingering from September 11th.

Table 7.7

	<u>Average Social Distance Ranking</u>	<u>Average Semantic Differential Ranking</u>
Asians	3	1
Eastern Europeans	2	2
Hispanics/Latinos	1	5
Indians/Pakistanis	5	4
Middle Easterners	6	6
Western Europeans	4	2

Table 7.7 shows how Asians went from a third rank in terms of social distance to being ranked first in terms of positive attributes. This would indicate that people in this study have a positive view of Asians, they would not necessarily want to marry them. Other groups that “moved up” include Western Europeans (4th to 2nd rank) and Indians/Pakistanis (5th to 4th rank). Conversely, however, is that Hispanics/Latinos fell from being ranked 1st in terms of social distance/acceptance to 5th in terms of positive attributes. Both Eastern Europeans and Middle Easterners ranks did not change when comparing the two scales.

Table 7.8

	<u>Social Distance</u> <u>Average Score</u>	<u>Semantic Differential</u> <u>Average Score</u>	<u>Shift</u>
Hispanics/Latinos	1.32	2.48	-1.16
Eastern Europeans	1.37	2.42	-1.05
Asians	1.40	1.99	-0.59
Western Europeans	1.44	2.42	-0.98
Indians/Pakistanis	1.70	2.44	-0.74
Middle Easterners	1.78	2.66	-0.88

Table 7.8 shows the difference in the average social distance and semantic differential scores of each group, i.e. the “shift.” Although all of the groups’ scores shifted negatively, Asians had the least negative shift and Hispanics/Latinos had the greatest negative shift. Therefore, although Hispanics/Latinos are most accepted (i.e. into marriage) by respondents, this group must also be viewed heavily stereotypically, resulting in the highest semantic differential average score of all six groups studied. These results suggest that although widely accepted by many respondents, Hispanics/Latinos are still not fully amalgamated into society and are subjugated to negative stereotyping. Additionally, whereas Asians are generally viewed positively, they too are not fully amalgamated into society, likely due to the physical differences between this group and the dominant “white America.”

The following data indicates rank based on an average of the two social distance and semantic differential scores:

Table 7.9

<u>Averaged Rank</u>		<u>Averaged Score</u>
1.	Asians	1.70
2.	Eastern Europeans	1.90
2.	Hispanics/Latinos	1.90
4.	Western Europeans	1.93
5.	Indians/Pakistanis	2.07
6.	Middle Easterners	2.22

Table 7.10

	<u>Average Social Distance Ranking</u>	<u>Average Semantic Differential Ranking</u>	<u>Averaged Score Ranking</u>
Asians	3	1	1
Eastern Europeans	2	2	2
Hispanics/Latinos	1	5	2
Indians/Pakistanis	5	4	5
Middle Easterners	6	6	6
Western Europeans	4	2	4

Averaging the scores of the social distance and semantic differential measures for each group, as shown in Tables 7.9 – 7.10, yields a more complete understanding of acceptance/proximity to amalgamation of each group into society. Based on my data, I argue that the Bogardus Social Distance scale is not enough of a measure for social scientists to use when measuring acceptance of particular groups. Using only the social distance scale, I found that Hispanics/Latinos were the most accepted of the six pan-ethnic groups. Additionally, my results found that whereas Asians were ranked third of

the six groups, they were ranked first using a semantic differential scale average.

Furthermore, once the social distance and semantic differential scores were averaged together, Asians maintained their first-place ranking and Hispanics/Latinos averaged a second-place ranking alongside Eastern Europeans. As the social distance scale measures acceptance of marrying into a particular group and the semantic differential scale measures a multitude of prejudicial attitudes, I demonstrate that the combination of the Bogardus Social Distance scale and Semantic Differentiation scale provides a more accurate and complete measure of acceptance of a group than the social distance scale alone.

- Section D: Social Distance & Semantic Differentiation: Pan-Ethnic Group Breakdown

The results in the last section were based on total sample results. It could be hypothesized that members from each ethnic group would simply rate their own group most positively. To test this hypothesis, I cross-tabulated the social distance results of each pan-ethnic group in my sample in Table 7.11 below.

Table 7.11
Social Distance (Means)

Asians
(n=22)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
1.14	1.41	1.36	1.59	1.68	1.45

Eastern Europeans
(n=41)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
1.34	1.05	1.29	1.78	1.98	1.38

Hispanics/Latinos
(n=62)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
1.34	1.27	1.05	1.53	1.60	1.28

Indians/Pakistanis
(n=12)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
1.50	1.58	1.75	1.50	1.50	1.75

Middle Easterners
(n=14)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
1.64	1.43	1.64	1.71	1.29	1.64

Western Europeans
(n=77)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
1.35	1.19	1.42	1.66	1.68	1.12

Table 7.11 highlights how each pan-ethnic group rated members of their own group closest, or with the least social distance as hypothesized. However, those in the Indian/Pakistani group gave members in their own group the greatest social distance scores of all the pan-ethnic groups rating themselves – a 1.50; this is the same social distance score they gave Asians and Middle Easterners. A likely cause of this is the competition and tensions existing in this pan-ethnic group. Indians and Pakistanis (also referred to in this study as South Asians) are not only quite diverse, but also have experienced dramatic ethnic struggles for many years – escalating in 1971 with the Indo-Pakistani War (as discussed in Chapter 1) to the current day nuclear arms race and near-constant threat of war between the two countries.

Additionally, the cross-tabulated results of Table 7.11 help explain why the group with the largest population in this study (Western Europeans) was not rated socially closest. Asians rated Hispanics/Latinos socially closer than Western Europeans, Eastern Europeans rated Hispanics/Latinos second (and Western Europeans 4th), Middle Easterners rated Hispanics/Latinos, Western Europeans and Asians at the same social distance. Additionally, although each group rated themselves socially closest, Hispanics/Latinos appear to have the greatest social cohesion in this sample, as they rated themselves a “1.05”, compared to Western Europeans rating themselves a “1.12”. Table 7.12 below shows cross-tabulated semantic differential results of each pan-ethnic group. Note, that while the sample sizes of Asians, Indians/Pakistanis and Middle Easterners are too low to analyze statistically, the overall results of all groups will be examined to understand overall patterns.

Table 7.12
Semantic Differential (Means Across All Attribute Measures)

Asians
(n=22)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
1.63	2.15	2.39	2.05	2.41	2.22

Eastern Europeans
(n=41)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
1.99	2.16	2.56	2.48	2.79	2.35

Hispanic Latinos
(n=62)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
1.97	2.45	2.09	2.37	2.58	2.41

Indians/Pakistanis
(n=12)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
1.86	2.50	2.53	2.08	2.60	2.33

Middle Easterners
(n=14)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
1.91	2.45	2.64	2.14	2.27	2.37

Western Europeans
(n=77)

Asians	Eastern Europeans	Hispanics / Latinos	Indians / Pakistanis	Middle Easterners	Western Europeans
2.01	2.34	2.66	2.54	2.71	2.27

Predictably, with respect to social distance, all pan-ethnic groups rated their own group “closest” and were most accepting of their own group. However, as Table 7.12 shows, results for the semantic differential scale are quite different. As discussed in Chapter 6 and earlier in this chapter, the semantic differential scale measures the degree of positive and negative attributes of each pan-ethnic group. In this study, respondents from each pan-ethnic group rated Asians most positively – even more positively than their own pan-ethnic group!

It is this finding that indicated the necessity of combining results of a social distance scale as well as average of semantic differential measures when attempting to understand acceptance and prejudices of particular groups. For example, although each pan-ethnic group rated themselves “closest / most accepted” in terms of social distance, I suggest that this is really just a measure of which ethnic groups they would accept marrying into their family (as a score of “1” on a 7-point scale of extremes equates with “acceptance of marrying into this group.”) Not surprisingly, groups are most accepting of marrying into their own ethnic groups more than other groups. The semantic differential scale, however, measures more deep-seated/subconscious prejudicial attitudes by analyzing the degree of positive and negative attributes one assigns to a particular group. Therefore, I would argue that semantic differential measures are more important when determining the degree of prejudicial attitudes towards particular groups.

However, when the question refers as to the true degree to which a particular group is accepted in society, I would argue that a combination of these two measures is the best indicator of acceptance. By combining these two measures, one can get a sense

of 1) which groups respondents feel most-comfortable with (in terms of interpersonal relations) and 2) which groups are viewed most-positively and with the least prejudice.

- Section E: Attitudinal Measure on Civil Liberties in a Post 9/11 Society

In addition to studying social acceptance of ethnic groups, I also sought to understand the willingness of those in my sample to accept a possible constraint on civil liberties during a perceived terrorist threat. I sought to understand the extent of prejudice and discrimination people have and identify the circumstances in which constraints on the liberty become more acceptable. The purpose of this section is to see how respondents would accept discriminatory actions against immigrant groups, particularly during a perceived national security threat.

My results found a staggering contraction: although nearly 8-in-10 of respondents believed that U.S. elected leaders and government officials should “always” follow and abide by the laws of the U.S. Constitution, roughly half of the sample felt it was entirely acceptable during a “perceived national security threat” for the President to act in ways that would be considered illegal during times of peace. Additionally, 45% of the sample answered similarly regarding the F.B.I.

The afore-mentioned results likely stem from a fear of the “perceived national security threat.” However, the fact that it is “perceived” does not equate itself with being definite, and therefore may in-fact be non-existent. Therefore, we must be cautious not to give extravagant powers to the federal government due to the potential for abuse of power. If citizens deem it acceptable for their government to act in ways that are considered illegal during times of peace, the likelihood for abuse of power becomes

probable and any subsequent prosecution, improbable. Additionally, these results suggest that if the perceived threat is ongoing, nearly half of respondents believe the federal government can freely act “illegally” – with no apparent end nor judicial oversight.

Civil liberties, although protected by the U.S. Constitution, were also sacrificed during “perceived national security threats” for a variety of measures.

- Thirteen percent of respondents said it is acceptable for someone to be held by U.S. Federal Authorities based solely on their appearance/ethnicity even if they had committed no crime (with an additional 13% of respondents reporting they were “unsure” if this was acceptable to them.) With roughly one-quarter of respondents indicating the acceptance of authorities to detain someone based solely on that person’s appearance/ethnicity, they are essentially indicating that it is OK for authorities to simply “round up” innocent people of a particular minority group and subject them to questioning and detention. Additionally, forty percent of the respondents who believed it was acceptable for Federal Authorities to hold someone also indicated they thought the U.S. was justified in placing those of Japanese descent in WWII Internment Camps.
- Sixteen percent said it is acceptable for local authorities to detain someone in the afore-mentioned scenario (with an additional 12% who were “unsure” if this was acceptable.) Thirty-six percent of respondents who felt it is acceptable for Federal Authorities to hold someone also indicated they

thought the U.S. was justified in placing those of Japanese descent in WWII Internment Camps.

- Thirty-five percent said it is acceptable for the government to seize a person's property before due process of law if they suspect that person has possible links to terrorism. This indicates that these respondents believe that if Federal Authorities merely suspected possible links to terrorism of someone in that household, it would be acceptable for authorities to storm into someone's house and seize their property without a court order or warrant.
- Thirty-one percent said it is OK for the afore-mentioned person to be denied legal counsel until the government has finished interrogating him/her. Therefore, even though the U.S. Constitution declares the afore-mentioned to be illegal, these respondents would think it acceptable if Federal Authorities hold a potentially innocent person indefinitely.
- Twenty-nine percent said it was acceptable for the afore-mentioned person to be held indefinitely – even if they are not officially charged with a crime – if the government is detaining them in connection with a terror investigation. Therefore, nearly one third of respondents indicated that, based on the mere suspicion of terrorist-related activity (not actual proof), a person could be held by authorities for the rest of their life without any due process of law. A potentially innocent person could spend the rest of their life in jail without any outside contact or legal representation – likely to be eventually forgotten or ignored by authorities after enough time has passed.

Even though the examples cited above clearly violated U.S. Constitution, roughly 3-in-10 respondents approved of them once “terrorism” was included in the situation. For example, whereas only 13% of respondents felt it was acceptable for federal authorities to hold someone based on their appearance/ethnicity even if they had committed no crime, this percentage increased to nearly 30% when “terrorism” was included in the question. Moreover, as thirty percent of respondents said it is acceptable for someone to be held *indefinitely* without charge, the question must be raised as to whether these respondents understand the full meaning of the situation: that persons, who may be completely innocent of any crime, can be held by federal authorities for the rest of their life without due process of law based on the assumption or mere suspicion of terrorist links. Did these respondents understand the repercussions of potentially countless innocent people spending the rest of their lives in jail without any due process, or did these respondents act blindly and respond to the question accordingly when the notion of “terrorism” was introduced into the question? In the future, if this study were to be replicated, I would include a follow-up question to the afore-mentioned to determine if respondents understood/accepted that an innocent person could potentially remain in jail for the rest of their life without any jurisprudence.

Regarding beliefs and attitudes towards Middle Easterners/Muslims following 9/11, it would appear that respondents were not so much against this group as they were against “terrorists.” When asked if it is all right for passengers to be removed from an airplane simply because they appeared to be Middle Eastern and/or Muslim, only 6% of respondents said “yes.” The overwhelming majority, eighty-seven percent, said that was not acceptable. Additionally, when asked if it is acceptable for a company to refuse to

hire someone based solely on the assumption that person is Middle Eastern and/or Muslim, 88% said it was not, with only 9% saying it was acceptable. Therefore, fewer than ten percent of respondents would condone up to the 3rd level of discrimination (as discussed in Chapter 2): verbal expression, avoidance and exclusion.

Of course it is possible that some respondents may not have answered completely honestly. One reason for this would be if respondents were “prejudiced non-discriminators” as discussed in Chapter 2. If someone harbors prejudiced feelings but feels it is not socially acceptable to admit those prejudices, they will internalize any negative feelings towards a particular group and not act in any discriminatory way – such as by voting “positively” even though they may feel “negatively.” However, every precaution possible was taken to ensure the respondents be as honest as possible – such as using anonymous surveys that were handed out and collected by only the researcher with no interaction by the students’ professors. (All measures used to gain the most honest respondent answers are described in Chapter 5.)

- Section F: Gender & Competition

Emory Bogardus’ social distance studies’ results were discussed in Chapter 4. One finding of the 1956 study concluded that, “women exhibited more prejudicial attitudes than men.” However, Bogardus surmised that women expressed fewer prejudicial attitudes in the 1966 study than in the past due to the Civil Rights movement, their increased interest in public affairs, as well as their greater involvement in the business sector which likely led to increased cross-racial and ethnic contacts. It appears

that this trend has continued since 1966, as more women have entered the labor force, with women having even fewer prejudicial attitudes than males in my 2004 study.

Males exhibited statistically significantly more prejudicial and discriminatory attitudes than females in my study. A likely cause could be the notion of “competition.” As discussed in Chapter 2, the realistic conflict theory describes how competition leads people to harbor prejudicial attitudes against others if they feel they are competing over the same resources. When relating this example to 9/11, we must consider the economic instability the U.S. endured following those terrorist attacks. It is likely that males, who are generally socialized in the U.S. to be highly competitive, reacted more negatively and defensively to those responsible for the terrorist attacks.

Conflict theory suggests that the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (or the “haves” and the “have nots”) is essentially constant until an uprising of the proletariat eventually leads to change and greater equality. As males in the U.S. are more reflective of the bourgeoisie (with patriarchy persisting in the larger U.S. culture, workplace and economic structure), it is likely, therefore, that males would be more competitive and protective of their power. It is probable, therefore, that these factors led males to exhibit more prejudicial attitudes and acceptance of discriminatory actions than females in this study. Although competition existed during Bogardus’ studies and is not simply a recent occurrence, I would like to conduct a follow-up study to see if males continue to exhibit significantly greater levels of prejudice than females or if that gap has narrowed.

Part II

- Conclusions.

As hypothesized, students in public universities/colleges located in northern New Jersey (within 40 miles of Ground Zero) exhibited greater degrees of prejudice and discrimination towards Middle Eastern immigrants than other pan-ethnic groups. The trend of earlier studies has been continued, in which times of war lead to overall greater prejudice and discrimination against the ethnic “enemy.”

Additionally, respondents indicated greater curtailment of civil liberties during both times of war and during perceived terrorist threats. These threats may or may not be real but we must take the curtailment of civil liberties seriously – especially if those impediments go against both national and international human rights laws.

Opinions of males in this study have supported the role of “competition” in prejudice/discrimination – as more males reported significantly greater prejudicial attitudes as well as the allowance/acceptance of discriminatory actions towards immigrants in the U.S.

Additionally, my results led to the conceptualization that although the Bogardus Social Distance Scale is an effective measure of general acceptance of various groups, this scale is not an effective measure by itself when calculating the degree of prejudicial attitudes towards a particular group. Semantic differential measures can provide a more well-rounded analysis of prejudicial attitudes towards a particular group by measuring the degree of positive and negative attributes assigned to the particular groups. By averaging Social Distance and Semantic Differential scores, researchers can get a more accurate reading of a group’s total acceptance into society.

Part III
- Hindsight and Thoughts for Future Analyses.

There are many ethnic groups that were studied in the earlier Social Distance Studies that did not fall into the six pan-ethnic groups of my study (such as Canadians, Haitians, Russians and Africans.) I would have liked to have collected data on these groups and in the future would like to get a readable measure towards immigrants of these global regions.

The other major changes I would like to have made regarding this project would have been the division of my survey into two separate projects. I would have kept the Social Distance and Semantic Differential measures as part of this project, yet have used the attitudinal portion regarding civil liberties for a separate, though related, study. While I feel that the survey as it is provides a more “complete” study regarding prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior towards immigrants post 9/11, the amount of data is somewhat overwhelming and perhaps better understood separately. In the future I would like to develop and analyze the results from the aforementioned civil liberty attitudinal portion in greater detail.

Aside from re-creating my current methodology in the future to track for patterns, if I were to conduct a study at the national level there are slight changes I would make to my current methodology to improve it. I would likely ask only the Social Distance and Semantic Differential questions (keeping the afore-mentioned civil liberty attitudinal portion for a separate study). I would also divide my sample in two, utilizing a sequential monadic methodology in which half of respondents would answer the Social Distance section followed by the Semantic Differential section, and the other half of respondents

would complete the sections in reverse fashion. I would additionally rotate the order of pan-ethnic groups listed to lessen any respondent bias (i.e. by rating the first group more positively than the last.) Additionally, I would include the afore-mentioned ethnic groups to get a readable measure on these groups, resulting in more complete ethnic analyses. With more time and greater financing, I would like to increase my sample to include a sample of other states – to make my results more comparable to the previous Bogardus and Parrillo studies. Regardless of sample scope and study execution, I would like to continue to measure the combined results of the social distance and semantic differential scales to track a more-complete measure of immigrant groups' acceptance into the U.S.

Appendix

Questionnaire

Instructions:

Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.
 Circle only one answer per question, unless it specifically says so.
 Do not write your name or any other personal information on this survey;
 each survey must be completely anonymous.
 Thank you for your participation...

Sex: - Female - Male	Major: _____
Age: _____	GPA: _____
Class Level: - 1 st Year Undergraduate - 2 nd Year Undergraduate - 3 rd Year Undergraduate - 4 th Year Undergraduate	Religion: - Catholic - Christian - Jewish - Muslim - Protestant - Other _____
Were you born Outside of the USA? - No - Yes	Your Family's Social/Economic Class: - Upper - Upper/Middle - Middle - Lower/Middle - Low
Were one or more of your parents born Outside of the USA? - No - Yes	
Family Race / Ethnicity: (please mark as many as apply) - Asian - Black (African, African-American, West Indian) - Eastern European - Hispanic / Latino - Indian / Pakistani - Middle Eastern - Western European - Other _____	Father's Highest Education Level: - did not finish High School - High School graduate - some College / no degree - Associates Degree - Bachelors Degree - Masters Degree - Doctorate
Parent's Combined Annual Income: - more than \$120,000 - \$80,001-\$120,000 - \$60,001-\$80,000 - \$40,000-\$60,000 - less than \$40,000	Mother's Highest Education Level: - did not finish High School - High School graduate - some College / no degree - Associates Degree - Bachelors Degree - Masters Degree - Doctorate

1. Do you believe that the elected leaders and government officials of the U.S. should always follow and abide by the laws listed in the United States Constitution?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

2. Do you feel it is legal for any person or agency to act against the U.S. Constitution or Bill of Rights?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

3. During a perceived national security threat, do you feel the U.S. President should be able to order actions that, in times of peace, would be termed illegal?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

4. During a perceived national security threat, do you feel the F.B.I. should be able to act in ways that, in times of peace, would be termed illegal?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

5. Do you believe that all Americans are entitled to the protections granted to them in the U.S. Bill of Rights?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

6. Do you believe that all those who are in the process of applying for citizenship are entitled to the protections granted to them in the U.S. Bill of Rights?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

7. During times of heightened national security, do you feel it is correct for a person to be held by the U.S. federal authorities based solely on their appearance/ethnicity, even if they have committed no crime?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

8. During times of heightened national security, do you feel it is correct for a person to be held by local police for questioning based solely on their appearance/ethnicity, even if they have committed no crime?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

9. Is it important for all the countries of the world to abide by the various international human rights laws, such as the principles specified in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

10. Should the United States abide by the various international human rights laws, such as the principles specified in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

11. Do you feel the U.S. was justified in placing Japanese Americans and those of Japanese descent in Internment Camps in the United States during WWII?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no,

(or) I don't know about the camps

12. Before takeoff, should someone have the right to request that another passenger on a plane be removed from the aircraft solely because that person appears to be Middle Eastern or Muslim?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

13. Do you feel that a company has the right to refuse to hire someone based solely on the assumption that the person is Middle Eastern and/or Muslim?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

14. If the government suspects a person has possible links to terrorism, do you feel the government has the right to seize the person's property before due process of law?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

15. If the government suspects a person has possible links to terrorism, do you feel the government has the right to deny legal consul to the person until the government has finished interrogating him or her?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

16. If the government is detaining someone in connection with a terror investigation, do you feel the government has the right to hold this person indefinitely, even if they are not officially charged with a crime?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

17. Do you feel that an immigrant has the right to question or say negative things about the policies and actions of the U.S. government?

absolutely yes, yes, uncertain, no, absolutely no

18. Were you fearful of any immigrant / ethnic / racial group(s) before 9/11?

No

Yes _____ (please list)

19. Immediately following 9/11, were you fearful of any immigrant / ethnic / racial group(s)?

No

Yes _____ (please list)

20. Currently, are you fearful of any immigrant / ethnic / racial group(s)?

No

Yes _____ (please list)

21. Do you personally know any Middle Eastern and/or Muslim individuals?

None, 1-5, 6-10, 11-20, More than 20

22. **** For question # 22 only, you may circle more than one answer for each group.***

Asian

Would accept <u>marrying into</u> <u>my family.</u>	Would accept as a <u>personal friend.</u>	Would accept as a <u>neighbor</u> on my street.	Would <u>work</u> in the same office.	Would <u>ONLY</u> have as <u>visitors</u> to the U.S.	Would <u>BAN</u> from <u>even</u> <u>entering</u> the U.S.
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Eastern European

Would accept <u>marrying into</u> <u>my family.</u>	Would accept as a <u>personal friend.</u>	Would accept as a <u>neighbor</u> on my street.	Would <u>work</u> in the same office.	Would <u>ONLY</u> have as <u>visitors</u> to the U.S.	Would <u>BAN</u> from <u>even</u> <u>entering</u> the U.S.
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Hispanic / Latinos

Would accept <u>marrying into</u> <u>my family.</u>	Would accept as a <u>personal friend.</u>	Would accept as a <u>neighbor</u> on my street.	Would <u>work</u> in the same office.	Would <u>ONLY</u> have as <u>visitors</u> to the U.S.	Would <u>BAN</u> from <u>even</u> <u>entering</u> the U.S.
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Indian / Pakistani

Would accept <u>marrying into</u> <u>my family.</u>	Would accept as a <u>personal friend.</u>	Would accept as a <u>neighbor</u> on my street.	Would <u>work</u> in the same office.	Would <u>ONLY</u> have as <u>visitors</u> to the U.S.	Would <u>BAN</u> from <u>even</u> <u>entering</u> the U.S.
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Middle Eastern

Would accept <u>marrying into</u> <u>my family.</u>	Would accept as a <u>personal friend.</u>	Would accept as a <u>neighbor</u> on my street.	Would <u>work</u> in the same office.	Would <u>ONLY</u> have as <u>visitors</u> to the U.S.	Would <u>BAN</u> from <u>even</u> <u>entering</u> the U.S.
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Western European

Would accept <u>marrying into</u> <u>my family.</u>	Would accept as a <u>personal friend.</u>	Would accept as a <u>neighbor</u> on my street.	Would <u>work</u> in the same office.	Would <u>ONLY</u> have as <u>visitors</u> to the U.S.	Would <u>BAN</u> from <u>even</u> <u>entering</u> the U.S.
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23. Members of these groups, on average, are:

(please circle only one number for each description)

Asian	Beautiful	5-4-3-2-1	Ugly
	Moral	5-4-3-2-1	Immoral
	Clean	5-4-3-2-1	Dirty
	Peaceful	5-4-3-2-1	Violent
	Intelligent	5-4-3-2-1	Stupid
	Close-knit family	5-4-3-2-1	Distant family
	Law-abiding	5-4-3-2-1	Criminal
	Good workers	5-4-3-2-1	Bad workers
	Polite	5-4-3-2-1	Rude
Eastern European	Beautiful	5-4-3-2-1	Ugly
	Moral	5-4-3-2-1	Immoral
	Clean	5-4-3-2-1	Dirty
	Peaceful	5-4-3-2-1	Violent
	Intelligent	5-4-3-2-1	Stupid
	Close-knit family	5-4-3-2-1	Distant family
	Law-abiding	5-4-3-2-1	Criminal
	Good workers	5-4-3-2-1	Bad workers
	Polite	5-4-3-2-1	Rude
Hispanic / Latinos	Beautiful	5-4-3-2-1	Ugly
	Moral	5-4-3-2-1	Immoral
	Clean	5-4-3-2-1	Dirty
	Peaceful	5-4-3-2-1	Violent
	Intelligent	5-4-3-2-1	Stupid
	Close-knit family	5-4-3-2-1	Distant family
	Law-abiding	5-4-3-2-1	Criminal
	Good workers	5-4-3-2-1	Bad workers
	Polite	5-4-3-2-1	Rude

Indian / Pakistani	Beautiful	5-4-3-2-1	Ugly
	Moral	5-4-3-2-1	Immoral
	Clean	5-4-3-2-1	Dirty
	Peaceful	5-4-3-2-1	Violent
	Intelligent	5-4-3-2-1	Stupid
	Close-knit family	5-4-3-2-1	Distant family
	Law-abiding	5-4-3-2-1	Criminal
	Good workers	5-4-3-2-1	Bad workers
	Polite	5-4-3-2-1	Rude
Middle Eastern	Beautiful	5-4-3-2-1	Ugly
	Moral	5-4-3-2-1	Immoral
	Clean	5-4-3-2-1	Dirty
	Peaceful	5-4-3-2-1	Violent
	Intelligent	5-4-3-2-1	Stupid
	Close-knit family	5-4-3-2-1	Distant family
	Law-abiding	5-4-3-2-1	Criminal
	Good workers	5-4-3-2-1	Bad workers
	Polite	5-4-3-2-1	Rude
Western European	Beautiful	5-4-3-2-1	Ugly
	Moral	5-4-3-2-1	Immoral
	Clean	5-4-3-2-1	Dirty
	Peaceful	5-4-3-2-1	Violent
	Intelligent	5-4-3-2-1	Stupid
	Close-knit family	5-4-3-2-1	Distant family
	Law-abiding	5-4-3-2-1	Criminal
	Good workers	5-4-3-2-1	Bad workers
	Polite	5-4-3-2-1	Rude

~ Thank you again for participating in this survey. ~

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