ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Feminist Scholarship: Excavating the Archive

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My dissertation addresses the question of how feminist scholars define their field of inquiry. Most feminist scholars rely on a stock narrative of the history of feminist scholarship, which purportedly defines its processes and outcomes by decades—the white liberal feminist 1970s; the women-of-color, postmodern 1980s; and the poststructuralist, difference-focused 1990s, which they assume is adequate. My contention is that this stock narrative fails to adequately grapple with the complicated mix of forces that came together, and continuously collaborate, to create the event of feminist scholarship’s emergence. This emergence is the object of investigation for this dissertation. The study of emergence includes not only that which is visible and tangible about feminist scholarship in terms of its central ideas, concepts, theories, epistemologies, and methodologies, but also that which is not immediately or readily visible, such as the field’s animating intellectual and philosophical presuppositions and their relationships to time, space, temporality, and geography.

Identifying and demonstrating the deficiencies of the stock narrative of feminist scholarship, my dissertation develops several alternative accounts of feminist scholarship in its formation, contrasting the explanatory possibilities of approaches drawn from the history of ideas, the sociology of knowledge, and the Foucauldian archaeology. These
three alternate accounts illuminate intricate and unexpected connections between academic feminism and geopolitical forces such as the Cold War, increased federal funding for higher education, changing priorities within philanthropic foundations, the emergence of development studies, area studies, and subfields such as Women in Development and Gender and Development. By complicating the narrative history of interdisciplinary feminist studies, the dissertation is able to offer a fresh interpretation of the centrality to academic feminism, particularly in postcolonial and transnational feminist scholarship, of key concepts advanced by U.S. scholars of color.
DEDICATION

For Selene
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title Page</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Scholarship: Excavating the Archive</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Feminism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the Socialization of Intellectual Production</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discerning the Social’s Reach into Feminist Field Formation</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Politics of Race in Feminist Scholarship:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Archaeological Approach</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: Revisiting the Secrets of Feminist Field Formation</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum Vitae</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Feminist Scholarship: Excavating the Archive

How do we understand the emergence of feminist scholarship as an intellectual field? How do prevailing accounts of academic feminism’s origins and development relate to the complex web of forces that have enabled feminist studies within the academy? What are the presuppositions of feminist scholarship, and how are they tied to particular institutional spaces and geographical places? How have these institutional spaces and geographical places changed over time, and how might feminist scholarship have effected those changes? How have the forces that animated feminist scholarship been sustained and reproduced over time? Does feminist scholarship cohere, dissipate, or multiply across its various departmental, programmatic, and institutional manifestations? What is the relationship between feminist scholarship and women’s studies? Should they be conceived as separate enterprises? If feminist scholarship and women’s studies should be conceptualized as separate, then what are the terms and conditions of their distinct intelligibility?

This dissertation will attempt to answer these daunting questions as it seeks to identify the intellectual presuppositions of feminist scholarship and assess their implications for knowledge production. Few feminist scholars have attempted to answer such foundational questions. Rather than subjecting the feminist intellectual project to intensive scrutiny, most feminist scholars take recourse to a stock narrative of the history of feminist scholarship, assuming that it provides adequate answers to these complex
questions. This stock narrative provides a heuristic that links the field’s origins to present and future feminist research. Yet, it does so in ways that foreclose rich understandings of feminist scholarship’s past, present, and future. By positing and accrediting one particular account of feminist field formation, the stock narrative renders invisible socio-political dynamics that demand interrogation.

This chapter will sketch key elements of the stock narrative of academic feminism and analyze their deficiencies. After calling into question central tenets of this narrative, I will lay the methodological groundwork for devising several alternative accounts of feminist scholarship, exploring the explanatory possibilities of approaches drawn from the sociology of knowledge, the history of ideas, and Foucaultian archaeology. My goal in adopting methodological pluralism is not to vindicate a particular analytical approach, but rather to situate academic feminism in relation to larger intellectual currents in the second half of the twentieth century that both enable and constrain feminist knowledge production.

Reexamining the Stock Narrative

Stock narratives have many attractions. They provide an agreed-upon account of what was and its relation to what is. Weaving together discrepant aspects of the past, stock narratives incorporate stories and contestations in ways that structure past conflicts such that the present gets accredited. Views that were originally articulated to challenge hegemonic accounts are folded within the stock narrative as a story of progression through lessons learned. By creatively incorporating dissenting accounts, the stock narrative affirms its own capaciousness while heightening claims of its accuracy and
legitimacy. Stock narratives can also play the valuable role of historical fetish objects, providing a phantasmatic stage upon which to project fantasies of the past that suggest how the past effects the present. Thus the stock narrative provides a shared point of reference for understanding the context and meaning of emergent scholarship. Operating within the contours of the stock narrative, scholars can situate their work without having to engage founding texts in any systematic way and without having to question omissions or distortions in the stock narrative’s account of field formation. Reference to the stock narrative saves academic time and labor, as scholars follow well-established citational practices and move forward with their own research, writing, and teaching.

Stock narratives gain credibility through repetition. As practices of historical revisionism have demonstrated, stock narratives have productive effects. As reiteration of a stock narrative generates a shared account of historical development, discordant beliefs grow increasingly suspect, and consensus emerges that things must have happened the way the stock narrative suggests. Over time it becomes increasingly difficult to question the stock historical narrative that circumscribes scholars’ self-understandings. Despite the difficulty of the task, it is particularly important to interrogate the stock narrative of feminist scholarship, for it posits a troubling opposition between feminist scholarship and women’s studies.

Evidence of a stock narrative of women’s studies can be found in almost any anthology of the field. Perhaps the best and most paradigmatic example is Linda Nicholson’s widely-taught anthology, The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory (1997). Nicholson’s collection illuminates assumptions characteristic of most anthologies in the field of women’s studies. Designed to introduce undergraduates to the
field, the anthology is intentionally structured to tell the chronological story of feminist scholarship. The title, denoting “second wave,” frames the historicity of feminist scholarship in a way that privileges a particular temporal schema, one which tells the story of the field in generational terms. This is not a neutral construction. It emphasizes and accredits particular ideas, theories, and politics, while neglecting others.

Nicholson’s anthology provides (even those feminists most skeptical of canonicity) a somewhat cohesive sense of a feminist canon. The first part of the anthology, “Early Statements,” contains a selection from the introduction of Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex*, Shulamith Firestone’s “The Dialectic of Sex,” Gayle Rubin’s “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex,” and The Combahee River Collective’s “A Black Feminist Statement.” These “early statements” comprise well-known attempts to find and name the origins of women’s oppression, whether those origins are deemed to be biological, social, and/or cultural in extent. They also explain how the “origins” of women’s oppression intersect with the origins of other forms of oppression. According to Nicholson, the second wave was initially animated by the search for origins, under the assumption that the correct identification of the origins of oppression would provide the key to eliminating that oppression.

Consistent with her contention in the introduction that feminist scholarship grew directly out of feminist scholars’ break with the academic Left and their eventual formation of the Women’s Liberation Movement, the second section of Nicholson’s anthology is entitled “With and Against Marx.” Works such as Heidi Hartmann’s “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union” and Michèle Barrett’s “Capitalism and Women’s Liberation” tell the story of how feminist
scholars attempted to determine the origins of women’s oppression by analogizing patriarchy with the Marxist structure of capitalism. Nicholson’s version of the stock narrative thus begins with feminist scholars attempting to identify the source of women’s oppression (i.e., biology, culture, society, etc.) and then moves to their attempt to identify the structure of women’s oppression (i.e., patriarchy, the sex/gender system, capitalism, etc.). The focus on structure also affords feminist scholars an accredited methodology—historical materialism—with which to pursue scholarly investigations.

In the third section of Nicholson’s anthology, “Gynocentrism,” the reader is introduced to various articulations of cultural feminism and standpoint theory and epistemology. The excerpts include the Radicalesbians’ “The Woman-Identified Woman,” Catharine MacKinnon’s “Sexuality,” Nancy Chodorow’s “The Psychodynamics of the Family,” Carol Gilligan’s “Woman’s Place in Man’s Life Cycle,” Nancy Hartsock’s “The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism,” and Patricia Hill Collins’s “Defining Black Feminist Thought.” Nicholson groups these pieces together to show how cultural feminism presupposed the possibility for standpoint (i.e., without the essentialist predications of women’s labor formulated in cultural feminism, standpoint might not have been imaginable). Moreover, cultural feminism and standpoint are constructed as critical responses to and engagements with socialist feminism (unified-systems theory à la Barrett, and dual-systems theory à la Hartmann), replicating the nineteenth-century notion of the canon as a continuing dialogue on eternal questions. Whereas cultural feminism (Radicalesbians, MacKinnon, Chodorow, Gilligan) gives sexual and/or gender difference primacy over all other forms of difference and maintains that the structure of
women’s oppression is exceptional in relation to all other forms of oppression, standpoint (Hartsock and Collins) further refines the socialist feminist position by crafting for it a theory of subjectivity that emphasizes the specific knowledges and ways of knowing that laboring women acquire through their performance of household, reproductive, or affective labors.

By the end of the first three sections Nicholson expects the reader to be adequately interpellated into the virtues of emphasizing women’s sameness for feminist politics and scholarship. Until this point she uses scholarly work, even by lesbians and women of color, that discusses components of being and knowing that can be universalized to all women, and the reader is seduced by the charming melody of collective self-sameness for women despite their many differences. Nicholson’s fourth section, “Theorizing Difference/Deconstructing Identity,” contains works like Elsa Barkley Brown’s “‘What Has Happened Here’: The Politics of Difference in Women’s History and Feminist Politics” and Norma Alarcón’s “The Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge Called My Back and Anglo-American Feminism,” and introduces difference as an epistemic crisis that permanently overturned and forever changed the course of feminist scholarship. If one reads Nicholson’s anthology from cover to cover, it almost seems that at this mid-1980s juncture in feminist scholarship the question of equality takes a back seat to the conceptual primacy of difference. Political concerns about equality suddenly appear to be incompatible with recognition of difference. Although a politics of equality and a politics of difference need not be mutually exclusive, the stock narrative makes them so, suggesting that the introduction of difference to feminist scholarship overturned central presuppositions about women’s shared experiences and their abilities to organize
for revolutionary change. In so doing, this stock narrative enables a particular generation of feminist scholars to proudly and assuredly accredit themselves for not failing to recognize the absolute significance of (typically racial, ethnic, national, or religious forms of) difference as earlier generations of feminist scholars putatively did. On this view, even if earlier generations recognized the existence of difference by complicating monolithic, universal, and unchangeable claims about women’s experience, they failed to realize fully the epistemological and methodological weightiness and effects that a ubiquitous introduction of difference entails.

What is important to note in terms of difference’s role in the stock narrative is not how it came to be so central to feminist scholarship, but rather its temporal placement and functioning. If the centrality of difference to feminist scholarship was only recognized after the proliferation of U.S. feminisms in the late 1960s through the mid-1980s (i.e., liberal feminism, radical feminism, Black feminism, radical lesbian feminism, ecological feminism, cultural feminism, Chicana feminism, etc.), then why would one even need to raise the question of difference in an earlier period of feminist scholarship? The chronology itself stipulates that the early treatment of difference was one-dimensional at best. If the academic feminist conceptualization of difference has more dimensions than it once did, then why not simply move forward toward the augmentation of difference’s multidimensionality now and in the future? Why take precious time to return to the messiness of the past if cleaning it up will only tell us what we already think we know anyway? By conceiving difference as an abrupt epistemic turning-point for feminist scholarship, the stock narrative grants feminist scholars priceless freedom from their own historicity of difference.
Nicholson’s final section, “The Question of Essentialism,” features works such as Luce Irigaray’s “The Sex Which is Not One,” Linda Alcoff’s “Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism,” Uma Narayan’s “Contesting Cultures: ‘Westernization, Respect for Cultures, and Third-World Feminisms,” and ends the anthology on a diagnostic note. Akin to the argument in Susan Gubar’s “What Ails Feminist Criticism?”, Nicholson suggests that what is ailing in feminist criticism is precisely the division between poststructuralist and deconstructionist feminists, on the one hand, and in Gubar’s terms, “African American as well as postcolonial materialists” (Gubar 1997, 880), on the other. According to both Nicholson and Gubar, this division comprises the main rift of our feminist present. In her consternation over this divide, Gubar asks, “What does it mean that otherwise sagacious proponents of these two at times antagonistic camps—African American as well as postcolonial materialists, on the one hand, and Foucauldian as well as Derridian theorists, on the other—have produced discourses that in various ways hinder the tolerance and understanding needed for open dialogue?” (Gubar 1997, 880–81).

Although Gubar is primarily interested in feminist literary criticism, her article offers the quintessential stock narrative of interdisciplinary feminist scholarship, as well as one that perfectly mirrors and affirms Nicholson’s chronological structuring of her edited anthology. In Gubar’s terms the history of feminist criticism is best characterized as occurring in three stages: critique, recovery, and the engendering of differences. She gleans the first two stages from Elaine Showalter’s “Toward a Feminist Poetics,” which appears in Showalter’s edited anthology The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on Women, Literature, and Theory (1985): “The first stage of feminist criticism, which Elaine
Showalter has called ‘critique,’ undercut the universality of male-devised scripts in philosophy as well as science, in intellectual as well as social history” (Gubar 1997, 882). Critique “was quickly followed by the second stage produced by the scholars Showalter dubbed ‘gynocritics.’ The recovery of female…traditions began in the late seventies” (882), popularizing and proliferating a feminist interdisciplinary phenomenon Gubar aptly terms “methodologies of recovery” (883). The third stage, and the stage in which we remain critical and crucial inhabitants, burgeoned in the eighties when:

Changes were taking place that laid the groundwork for the third phase of feminist criticism, which I will call the engendering of differences. Among people occupied in critique, more attention began to be paid to images not only of femininity but also of masculinity, not only of heterosexuality but also of homosexuality in historically specified sites in the past and in popular media of the present, including the electronic forms that saturate contemporary culture. Among people absorbed by recovery, the evolution of a series of distinctive subtraditions generated research and classes on Native American, Chicana, Asian American, and, especially, African American literary legacies. I use the verb engendering for the third stage because it engaged feminists in the activity of bringing gender to bear upon other differences: sexual and racial differences primarily, but also economic, religious, and regional distinctions. Antithetically, it also included thinkers bringing sexual and racial identifications (as well as economic, religious, and regional affiliations) to bear upon gender, thereby accentuating dissimilarities among women, divergences among men. (Gubar 1997, 884)

With the introduction of the intersectional–descriptive, analytical, and heuristic impulses of engendering, we finally arrive at the end of our stock narrative of feminist scholarship. Sketched briefly: The first two stages, critique and recovery, are concerned with identifying oppression, and finding, highlighting, and honoring women’s shared contributions to history, literature, math, the soft, hard, and social sciences. Critique and recovery deploy notions of shared oppression to cultivate historical anger (a deeply inspiring and highly motivating because it-has-been-held-for-so-long anger) at the traditional disciplines, their epistemologies and methodologies, for being so unabashedly
and persistently androcentric. Produced by and incorporating historical anger, feminist scholars generated field-shattering critiques and asked for altogether new ways of thinking, writing, researching, teaching, and being feminist scholars of women.

Frustrated by the inattention to women’s specificity and the various differences within and across feminist politics, several feminist scholars proposed difference as the central analytic through which to understand women’s experience. These difference feminists henceforth split into two camps. The first camp includes those difference feminists who follow Foucauldian genealogy or Derridian deconstruction and who typically use poststructuralist theories of language to complicate and augment the nuance of their understandings of sexual difference, actively repudiating referential theories of meaning (for simplicity sake let’s call them “poststructural feminists”). And the second camp consists of those difference feminists who emphasize the centrality of racial, ethnic, or national forms of difference and most often use neo-Marxist, post-Marxist, and postcolonial materialist analyses to discuss and analyze the lived experiences and material conditions of existence for many different women around the world (let’s call them “postcolonial materialist feminists”). The stock narrative counterposes these two camps of “third-stage” feminists at every turn, suggesting that there are only two camps (the stock narrative loves the descriptive and analytical easiness of binaries). The poststructural feminists are cast as failing to believe in reality prior to its predication in discourse while the postcolonial materialist feminists believe that it is precisely realities escaping or exceeding discursive codification that constitute the most crucial politics of survival. Furthermore, poststructural feminists are concerned with a politics of desire and postcolonial materialist feminists a politics of survival. Poststructural feminists subscribe
to a Nietzschean philosophical genealogy and postcolonial materialist feminists to a
Marxian analysis in the creation of their political philosophies. The list of alleged
diametrical oppositions could continue. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the only
thing these two camps share is a mutual distrust of the category “women”—the
poststructural feminists for its false promises to produce definite bodily referents, and the
postcolonial materialist feminists for its alleged referential limitations to U.S., white,
heterosexual, bourgeois women.

Despite their efforts to achieve scholarly rigor and comprehensive coverage,
neither Nicholson’s portrayal of the diversity of identities, political viewpoints, and
epistemologies (i.e., Early Statements, With and Against Marx, Gynocentrism,
Theorizing Difference/Deconstructing Identity, The Question of Essentialism) nor
Gubar’s temporal-categorical designations (critique, recovery, engendering difference)
provides a sustained account of the various intellectual presuppositions of feminist
scholarship. The failure to interrogate the presuppositions of feminist scholarship is
typical of most anthologies and encyclopedias of the field, even when these texts seek to
contest the stock narrative. Consider, for example, the scrupulous and recently published
Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives (2002). Co-editors Carole R.
McCann and Seung-Kyung Kim, cover nearly every base imaginable for a critically
engaged reader of feminist theory, including section headings such as “Definitions and
Movements,” “Theorizing Intersecting Identities: Race and Nation, Class, Sexuality,” and
“Theorizing Feminist Agency and Politics: Standpoints, Poststructuralist Theories,
Locations and Coalitions.” Similarly Marianne DeKoven’s edited collection, Feminist
Locations: Global and Local, Theory and Practice (2001) introduces a new classification
scheme featuring section headings such as “The Practice of Feminist Theory,” “Global Locations I: Postnational Politics,” and “Global Locations II: Body Politics.” Both attempt to bridge the gap Gubar identifies between sexual difference and postcolonial materialist feminists by trying to place a Foucauldian emphasis on bodies, discipline, and subjectification within a materialist postcolonial register. Neither succeeds in bridging the gap, however, because the central presuppositions of each so-called camp—their intellectual genealogies as well as the constitutive assumptions of their central ideas, concepts, theories, methods, and epistemologies—remain interred, unquestioned, unexplored, and intact.

The closest any anthology comes to discerning feminist scholarship’s intellectual presuppositions is Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology (2005), edited by Robin O. Andreasen and Ann E. Cudd. Although the editors use works that have appeared in numerous women’s studies anthologies, they organize these readings under field-founding questions such as “What is Feminism?” “What is Sexism?” “What is Gender?” “Is Knowledge Gendered?” “Is Value Gendered?” “What is Self?” and “What Would Liberation Be?” Andreasen and Cudd do not rock any intellectual feminist boats, however. Their strategy is one of pure affirmation—sexism, gender, knowledge, value, selves, liberation, and freedom constitute the conceptual landscape of feminist theory. Indeed, the editors position these defining concepts as essential and unchanging, allegedly tracing these notions back to the earliest thinkers of the field. Rather than exposing the conceptual tenuousness of these concepts by encouraging readers to question received philosophical understandings of the most basic terms and concepts of feminist theory, Andreasen and Cudd reaffirm their foundational status. Rather than
interrogating the most central presuppositions of feminist scholarship, the editors claim to trace dominant interpretations of sexism, gender, knowledge, value, selves, liberation, and freedom back to the times of Mary Wollstonecraft.

This stock narrative is replicated in virtually all the readers and anthologies of women’s studies and feminist theory. With disturbing similarity, these collections consistently construct a field without any effort to grapple with messy and unpredictable genealogies. The most any one of them accomplishes is a conceptual reframing of the putative division between feminist scholars working within the traditions of poststructuralism and those working within the traditions of postcolonialism and/or historical materialism. An oppressive uniformity pervades feminist scholarship’s understanding of its formation, conditions of intelligibility, and future potential, a uniformity that unites advocates of women’s studies and their critics.

The Stock Narrative and the Idiom of Failure

Constructed by the stock narrative as inseparable from identitarian politics, women’s studies has now suspiciously become interdisciplinary feminist scholarship’s favorite straw man. Consider, for example, how Biddy Martin begins her article “Success and Its Failures” in the special issue of differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies (1997), edited by Joan W. Scott, on the current state of women’s studies. I quote Martin at length because her description of women’s studies is quite typical.

If Women’s Studies has reached a point of stasis on some campuses, it is due in no small measure to its success. Women’s studies has succeeded in defining and delimiting objects of knowledge, authorizing new critical practices, significantly affecting scholarship in a number of disciplines, defining important political issues, and establishing itself as a legitimate academic and administrative unit on hundreds of college and university campuses. With these kinds of successes
come problems. Having delimited a proper object and carved our particular domains, having generated and disseminated specific analytic practices, having developed consensus about at least some key political problems, and having been institutionalized on equal footing with other academic and administrative units, Women’s Studies has lost much of its critical and intellectual vigor. Women’s Studies has now settled in. It has and is a location, and the business it conducts could not be more usual. (Martin 1997, 102)

The term “settled-in” resonates Martin’s view that in women’s studies “the terms of political analysis and debate, some key critical procedures, and our modes of interacting with one another across disciplines” (Martin 1997, 102) are fossilized by becoming impervious to any legitimate and sustained forms of self-criticism and reflexivity. Practitioners of women’s studies are characterized as the defensive and sometimes hostile guardians of the stable category of women. Indeed, they are characterized as the defenders of unmediated recourse to the category of experience and experience’s exceptional ability to link knowledge to truth in a way that no other epistemological category can accomplish. In Martin’s view this newfound gate-keeping status forces women’s studies to repudiate its critical edge entirely.

Wendy Brown affirms Martin’s concerns in that same special issue of differences by maintaining that, “Women’s Studies has come to be perversely useful to some academic feminists as ‘the other’ against which respectable feminist scholarship is defined” (Brown 1997, 97). In shifting the relationship the traditional disciplines have with their core epistemologies and methodologies, women’s studies has undoubtedly gone far beyond serving its institutional and intellectual purposes of emphasizing the importance of women’s contributions to traditional forms of scholarship historically and contemporarily and crafting a feminist lens through which to examine all aspects of the academy. According to both Martin and Brown, then, the time has come to lay women’s
studies to rest since it has come face to face with its own stagnation—a kind of stagnation it once claimed was reserved exclusively for the traditional disciplines.

Writing from the position of a newly-appointed Provost at Cornell University, Martin complains about how women’s studies literally sucks the university’s most valuable resources and limited monies that could be used to augment feminist scholarship within the traditional disciplines. She bemoans how problems regarding knowledge production, career advancement, and labor practices in women’s studies have become lodged within an identitarian register and codified according to various exclusionary practices built solely on the basis of identity. Steeped in positions of privilege, women’s studies scholars are depicted as so deeply mired in their own guilt that they fail to structure conversations, interactions, and projects among colleagues and students along lines that are more subtly nuanced in regard to identification and identity formation, indulging instead in practices of exclusion. “Righteousness,” Martin contends, “accrues to positions with apparent claims to marginality, while the privilege of unknowing continues to protect those who choose single-mindedly to pursue only their own career successes. Still others use guilt to absolve themselves of the responsibility to engage one another or themselves in ways that would change hopelessly rigid suppositions and rhetorical habits” (Martin 1997, 194).

As a companion article to Martin’s, Brown’s essay, “The Impossibility of Women’s Studies,” takes its reader through several complicated theoretical arguments to arrive at the claim that once feminist scholars have complicated the category of women, they will have a difficult time defending the coherency of the intellectual project of women’s studies, a project once seen as cohering around the universal components of
women’s experience of oppression. Brown locates the impossibility of women’s studies specifically in how the field inadequately deals with “the problem of the powers involved in the construction of subjects” (Brown 1997, 86). Not only is power conceptualized as a top-down phenomenon, as something that is held by a privileged few, in women’s studies, but its modality is imagined as monolithic. According to Brown, women’s studies can never be sensitive to power’s articulation through multiple differing modalities, which fluctuate according to various categories of identity and experience, and which articulate themselves through multiple intersectional differentials occurring in simultaneity across time and in different spaces:

For feminist theory, the most problematic dimension of this paradox is that grasping subject construction for different forms of social subjection (class, race, etc.) requires distinctive models of power, yet subject construction itself does not unfold according to any one of these models precisely because we are always more than one, even if we participate in the norms of some and the deviations of others. Not simply the content but the modalities of power producing gender, race, or caste are specific to each production—the mode of production and dimensions of state power that produce class, and the discourses and institutions of normative heterosexuality that produce gender, are largely noncomparable forms and styles of power. (Brown 1997, 87)

What fascinates me most about this criticism of women’s studies—criticism that is at certain select times exceptionally smart and well-formulated—is the question of how feminist scholars ever arrived at such a thinly-carved, one-dimensional understanding of the intellectual project of women’s studies in the first place? And, more intriguingly, why is it that so few feminist scholars come to the defense of women’s studies, especially regarding its highly productive and constitutive relationship with feminist scholarship? At a recent panel on the future of women’s studies presented at the 2006 National Women’s Studies Association Conference, for example, with one exception, the scholars on the panel, all of whom are fairly eminent and institutionally located in women’s
studies (i.e., they all have tenured positions actually in women’s studies), spoke energetically about why it is important for graduate students to receive a PhD in a traditional discipline—and not in women’s studies. Indeed, they argued that the future of women’s studies lies in feminist appropriations of the traditional disciplines, a view which seemed to win the assent of most members of the audience. Nearly every one of the panelists cited Martin and Brown, uncritically and unquestionably, affirming their straw man portrait of women’s studies as a now anachronistic discipline that made feminist work possible but that had outlived its intellectual and institutional heyday. They depicted women’s studies as a discipline that takes scarce and much needed and deserved resources away from those deserving feminists who are trying to build a home for themselves in the traditional disciplines, a discipline that can never succeed in adequately complicating its view of bodies, power, and subjection, a discipline hopelessly tied to the incoherent category of women upon which its field was founded.

What evidence sustains the case against women’s studies developed by Martin and Brown? Ironically, Martin’s and Brown’s evidence consists of analytic recourse to their own experiences as women professors in women’s studies, precisely the evidentiary ground they condemn in their attacks on women’s studies. Their use of their own experiences as evidence for case-building against women’s studies is ironic because both are claiming that what is most problematic about the intellectual project of women’s studies is the unmediated status it grants experience epistemologically. One could argue that the capacity for their experiences—however rarified, complex, nuanced, and privileged—to serve as the legitimate, natural, and unquestioned evidentiary centerpieces of their articles is a direct result of the epistemological and methodological successes of
women’s studies. In fact, neither of their articles cite any women’s studies scholarship. Martin bases her claims about women’s studies on her experience as dean, and Brown bases her claims about women’s studies on her experience as a women’s studies program director at the University of California Santa Cruz. Even if one were willing to grant that their limited women’s studies experience afforded them expertise in particular institutional contexts, it cannot support the validity of their claims regarding the intellectual dimensions of women’s studies. My goal in this dissertation is to explicate precisely these intellectual dimensions, tracing how particular epistemic grounds have come to be called “feminist scholarship,” a highly complex, multifaceted, fast–paced and ever–emergent intellectual field, which has, in some recent articulations, been positioned as another enemy of women’s studies.

Like many scholars within and outside women’s studies, Martin and Brown are not alone in their analytic recourse to the evidence of their own experience, however ironic such recourse may be in their cases. Despite their call for critical self-reflexivity, they appear markedly impervious to the limitation of their evidentiary claims, and to the ways in which the category of women’s experience, a category constructed and validated within women’s studies, informs the structure of their critiques. Nearly a quarter century ago, in their early attempt to anthologize women’s studies with the publication of Women’s Realities, Women’s Choices: An Introduction to Women’s Studies (1983), the Hunter College Women’s Studies Collective introduced the field as “not simply the study of women. It is the study of women which places women’s own experiences in the center of the process. It examines the world and the human beings who inhabit it with questions, analyses, and theories built directly on women’s experiences” (Hunter 1983,
This general definition of women’s studies is hardly unique, but its generality-masquerading-as-simplicity is highly deceptive. What does placing “women’s own experiences in the center of the process” entail epistemologically and methodologically? The answer to this question may well depend upon the traditional discipline within which a feminist scholar was originally trained. Regardless of the array of possible responses to this question, most scholarship arising from women’s studies involves discerning, describing, prescribing, analyzing, criticizing, problematizing, centering, decentering, recentering, ontologizing, epistemologizing, or revering of women’s experience as a primary animating technique both epistemologically and methodologically.

Yet, as most practitioners of women’s studies readily admit, the problem of precisely who is constitutive of the term “women” and what is constitutive of the term “experience” remains the field’s central referential problematic, and a critical site for any investigation of the status and progress of women’s studies as an intellectual field. While the definitional contours of both women and experience have expanded exponentially to include all those bodies, embodiments, corporealities, subjects, subjectivities, processes of subject formation, identities, processes of identification, processes of disidentification, taxonomies, (non)normativities, identity politics, postidentity politics, oppressions, subjections, subordinations, (s)exploitations (the list could, of course, go on and on) that wish to fall under their rubrics, the increased referential demands on these terms—and their apparently endless capacities to expand to meet the social, cultural, and political needs and desires of these demands—outwardly seem to cause them to lose the once powerful force of their meaning. But perhaps the force of the meaning of women and experience has actually intensified due to the terms’ referential multiplicity. And if this
intensification is in fact the case, its positive qualitative dimensions must be identified because in the meantime women and experience are conceived as only being weighed down by their continual interpretive capacities, stretched to the brink of utter meaninglessness. Once central to the early definition of women’s studies, the terms currently act as either (1) the scapegoats for the imminent dissolution of women’s studies or (2) the blank slates on which feminist scholarship might project its relationship to the future of women’s studies—two seemingly diametrically opposed tendencies I will further elaborate below. Whether they are acting as scapegoats or as blank slates for futurity, women and experience continue to be referentially central to discussions of women’s studies more generally.

Despite the considerable growth of feminist scholarship’s interpretive capabilities regarding its (purportedly) most central subject matter (women’s experience), as well as in its epistemologies and in its development of methodological tools regarding that subject matter, women’s studies remains hostage to a nearly quarter-century old definition of its project. And this hostage-holding is true for even the most cutting-edge scholarship emerging in the field today, as it not only consumes our sense of the present for academic feminism and women’s studies but also our sense of their pasts, however shared or disparate. Indeed, the concepts women and experience remain so central to women’s studies in its self-definition that their conceptual histories could nearly stand in for the history of the field entirely, or at least what has become the stock narrative of the field’s past.

To date, the intellectual presuppositions of feminist scholarship have received little, if any, sustained attention. Perhaps this should not be surprising given the political
and temporal urgencies that frame the intellectual projects of many feminist scholars, who hope to change the persons, communities, institutions, and cultural and social spaces they study. Whether the commitment to transformative scholarship stems from their own aspirations to effect change, the guilt of their own various forms of privilege, or increased pressure from colleagues and students to make their work politically substantial, many feminist scholars, including those who repudiate ontology on a philosophical level, cultivate a feminist ontology that ties their intellectual work to tangible, visible, and material forms of change.⁴ This pragmatic approach tends to foreclose interest in asking and valuing larger and less politically immediate questions about feminist scholarship and its relationship to its animating field, women’s studies. It is impossible, however, to establish the status of the field in the way that Martin, Brown, Gubar and others⁵ claim to have done without knowing more about the specific substance of feminist scholarship. Thus it is important to investigate how feminist scholarship coheres across its various departmental, programmatic, and institutional manifestations, the forces that have brought it into being and sustain it through time, and its precise relationship to women’s studies.

Even the most rigorous defenses against charges of the growing irrelevance of women’s studies rely too heavily on the existence of a stock narrative for feminist scholarship. Robyn Wiegman’s recent highly respected work on women’s studies and its relationship to feminist scholarship attempts to create some distance from the two camps identified in the stock narrative about the relationship between women’s studies and feminist scholarship. A strong proponent of continued institutionalization, professionalization, and augmentation of the field of women’s studies, Wiegman
nonetheless constructs competing camps. The first camp is epitomized by Martin’s and Brown’s call to repudiate women’s studies; the second camp consists largely of the works of scholars like Linda Gordon, Susan Gubar, Nancy K. Miller, Tania Modleski, Martha Nussbaum, and Naomi Schor, all of whom Wiegman claims “have expressed their regret about the failure of feminism’s present tense. For some of these feminist thinkers, failure is defined by measuring the present according to the ethos, intentions, and critical dimensions of a purportedly more activist feminist past, a time prior to both the academic institutionalization of feminism and its public-sphere decline” (Wiegman 2000, 807). In other words, this sense of regret consists of the frustration these academic feminists have in their inability to effect immediate and lasting change in the world outside of the academy through their intellectual work. In their inability to transform the world through their intellectual labor—that is, to demonstrate how their research, writing, and teaching is the means to an end of producing definite, concrete, and tangible feminist futures—these academic feminists have lost hope that work falling under the sign of feminist theory can simultaneously exist under the sign of the political. Rather than codifying this sense of regret, frustration, and confusion in terms of failure, Wiegman proposes that the agony of these affects is exactly what it means to “be in time with feminism” (2004). Being in time with feminism turns feminism into “psychic pedagogy” (Wiegman 2004, 161), where the “stress is less on ‘being’ as an ontological mediation than on the challenge of maintaining our political attachments to the temporal discordances of feminism in its simultaneous otherness and othering of historically progressive, psychically individual, or collectively transformative time” (165). The psychic agony that results from developing a new relationship to political time produces ways of
knowing, not knowing, and doing that impel us to reconfigure our relationships to the feminist political present in such a way that does not foreclose or delimit feminism’s vast futurity.

The idea of being in time with feminism is compelling, largely because of its productive prescriptions for the alienation many feminist scholars feel regarding their inability to effect tangible change. It gives political meaning and force to the negative affects associated with this sense of alienation. Being in time with feminism calls for a temporally dense relationship to politics, which is exemplified in how Wiegman introduces feminism to her introductory-level women’s studies class: “Feminism, I tell my introductory women’s studies class, must resist the impulse to reproduce only what it thinks it already knows; it must challenge the compulsion to repeat” (Wiegman 1999b, 371). I could not agree more with this injunction, but the phenomenon of repetition is complex, multilayered, and multidimensional. Repetition can occur within multiple different registers, both temporal and spatial in dimension, and occur in many divergent ways within those registers. In her characterization of being in time with feminism, Wiegman is so concerned not to repeat the academic feminist present that she fails to return to the present’s past referents in such a way that earnestly questions them, renders them problematic, and opens up conceptual room to see them differently. Theoretical concepts associated with feminist activism, for instance, such as consciousness, experience, agency, subjectivity, social change, social movements, coalitional politics, the political, material reality, public/private split, standpoint, outsider-within, oppression, and subjugation, to name only a few, have exceptionally intricate and unpredictable genealogies in feminist scholarship. Regardless of her intention, Wiegman’s
differentiation of “being in time with feminism” from more instrumental conceptions of feminist political time situates these concepts within a register that considerably flattens their temporal multidimensionality. In other words, there are numerous ways to be in time with feminism that are not solely about effecting immediate, tangible change.

Consider, for example, Gloria Anzaldua’s notion of the mestiza consciousness. Whether or not a student of her work lives or has lived in Mexico, many feminist scholars and, most especially, their students are multiply hailed by the notion’s split ontology, its offering of a vastly different way in which to understand the spaces one inhabits and the historical context within which one circulates. Anzaldua’s intents for her mestiza consciousness are almost spiritual in extent, and not purely in the sense of their being religious, but in their desire to give the so-called natives of mestiza consciousness an intangible and untraceable place, either within or beyond themselves, where they can return to be rejuvenated and find inspiration to encounter and embrace, with the utmost verve and awareness, the harshly political contents and realities of their lives. This is an excellent example of a productive way to be in time with feminism, yet it is a way that seems to be ruled out by Wiegman’s frame.

Alternative Accounts: The Event of Feminist Scholarship’s Emergence

None of the approaches to feminist scholarship and its relation to women’s studies discussed above grapple adequately with the complicated mix of academic, affective, cultural, economic, intellectual, institutional, material, political, psychic, psychological, and social forces that came together to create the event of feminist scholarship’s emergence. The notion event was first introduced by Foucault in “The Discourse on
Language,” a lecture given at the College de France on December 2, 1970. Developed at a moment when Foucault was reconsidering the possibilities of his archaeological method, in light of his close reading of Friedrich Nietzsche’s conception of genealogy, event captures the intricate interplay of discourse and power. For Foucault, archaeology attends to the external formation of discourse and the mechanisms that govern the internal regulation of discourse, but archaeology alone fails to pay adequate attention to the productive power of discourse. Through its inscription on bodies, discourse creates events that surpass any material instantiation. According to Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of the notion, an event is a sporadic and spontaneous eruption of forces, an action that brings about a sense that is incorporeal or beyond bodies. As such, the sense of an event does not exist within bodies, nor is it entirely bodily in scope (see Deleuze 1988). Events thus have a location in space and time independent of the subjects and objects that created them and thereby produce a sense that is noncorporeal but that is nevertheless material in its effects.

In treating the emergence of feminist scholarship as an event, I seek to examine not only that which is visible and tangible about feminist scholarship in terms of its central ideas, concepts, theories, epistemologies, and methodologies, but also that which is not immediately or readily visible, like the field’s animating intellectual and philosophical presuppositions and their relationships to time, space, and temporality. I seek to explore the field’s historicity, as well as its sense of its historicity. Toward that end, my dissertation draws analytical insights from three methodological frameworks—the sociology of knowledge, the history of ideas, and Foucauldian archaeology to trace the emergence of feminist scholarship. Postpositivist and feminist scholars alike have
demonstrated that analytic methods are never neutral. On the contrary, particular methodologies contribute to the production of distinctive understandings of their objects of investigation. By using these diverse methodological frames, I provide a more comprehensive view of the emergence of feminist scholarship, for each methodology illuminates facets of the emergence of feminist scholarship masked by alternative accounts.

**The sociology of knowledge**

As an intellectual movement variously traced to Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim (1936), the sociology of knowledge investigates interconnections among social realities, categories of thought, and knowledge claims. In its most rudimentary form, the sociology of knowledge aims to identify the social determinants of ideas. Although reductive accounts of the sociology of knowledge have been subjected to rigorous critique for their failure to identify precise correlations between particular ideas and their putative social determinants (Merton 1957, 460–88), contemporary sociologists of knowledge raise interesting questions about knowledge production, transmission, and reception. In particular, they examine how institutional power influences the social and material value attributed to particular knowledge claims; how specific forms of knowledge circulate and are accredited; how academic vocabularies gain social intelligibility; how certain kinds of knowledge become entrenched in public memory, while other modes are erased; and how particular social groups construct histories of concepts central to their worldview.

Borrowing analytic strategies from the sociology of knowledge, chapter two investigates the emergence of feminist scholarship in the context of the Cold War and its
complex ties to colonialism, neocolonialism, postcolonialism, and imperialism. The chapter situates feminist scholarship in relation to a host of changes in funding priorities and practices of the federal government and philanthropic foundations that had profound effects on higher education in the United States during the second half of the twentieth century. Contrary to assumptions that these changes affected only disciplines in the natural and physical sciences, I examine changing dynamics in the social sciences involving the emergence of area studies and development studies and their relationship to the emergence of academic feminism.

**History of Ideas**

In contrast to the sociology of knowledge, the history of ideas investigates the emergence, development, and transformation of intellectual concepts within and across historical periods (Lovejoy 1940). Within the framework set by a post–Hegelian history of ideas, the meaning of a concept has neither fixed determinants nor an unwavering telos. For this reason, individual scholars can play a formative role in shaping particular meanings under particular historical circumstances. Chapter three extrapolates from key methodological frames within the history of ideas to examine how the meanings of certain core feminist concepts were shaped by the new women’s studies journal, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* under the editorships of Catharine Stimpson (1975–1980) and Barbara Gelpi (1980–1985). Rather than focusing on the individual influence of these two distinguished feminist scholars, I investigate the formative role played by editorial collectives involving editors, editorial staff, editorial boards, the University of Chicago Press, and feminist program officers at the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. To demonstrate the effects of such collective intellectual labor, I focus
specifically on the meanings of “the international” within emerging feminist discourses and related conceptions of “third world women” and “Women in Development” (WID).

Archaeology

The archaeological method was developed by Michel Foucault to emphasize that “epistemes” (systems of thought and knowledge and their discursive formations) are animated by a set of laws operating largely beneath the threshold of individual consciousness, grammar, and logic, which literally define and produce the conceptual possibilities of what can and cannot be thought or said within a given disciplinary domain or historical period. By enabling the historian to distance herself from the rules of grammar and logic within which she is trained, Foucault hoped that the archaeological method would create a useful analytic tool to investigate historical artifacts in novel ways. Archaeology involves a double strategy to analyze changing epistemic formations over time, while also exploring underlying commonalities across diverse discourses within a particular time frame. In comparing disparate epistemes from varying historical periods, Foucault suggested that archaeology might expose the contingency of particular ways of thinking, acquiring knowledge, and subjecting knowledge to certain standards and regimes of truth. The point of archaeology, then, is not to demonstrate how thought has evolved teleologically through time, but to examine different epistemic frames across various knowledge formations within the same historical context. In this way, archeology may unearth shared but contingent presuppositions structuring diverse discourses (what Foucault calls the historical a priori), which change over time, but not according to the cumulative logic suggested by teleology. Epistemes that appear to differ on the surface may participate in underlying regimes of truth, which rupture at critical
moments of epistemic transformation. Where the history of ideas tends to emphasize the continuity of ideas through time, the archaeological method is interested in discontinuity.

Beneath the great continuities of thought…one is now trying to detect the incidence of interruptions. Interruptions whose status and nature vary considerably…. They suspend the continuous accumulation of knowledge, interrupt its slow development, and force it to enter a new time…they direct historical analysis away from the search for silent beginnings, and the never-ending tracing-back to the original precursors, towards the search for a new type of rationality and its various effects…they show that the history of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continuously increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient, but that of its various fields of constitution and validity, that of its successive rules of use, that of the many theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured. (Foucault 1972, 4–5)

One limitation of archaeological inquiry, however, is that it offers no insights into the forces that cause ruptures or discontinuity. What factors contribute to the emergence of new epistemes? How is the discursive intelligibility of discontinuity constituted? Focusing on the excavation and description of specific systems of thought, archaeology says little about the transition from one way of thinking to another, from one episteme to another. Understanding the forces that contribute to contingency and change remain fairly elusive.

Contingency may be best exposed in the event of transition, particularly transitions dispersed through space. To supplement archaeology’s silence in this area, Foucault devised a second analytic method drawn from his understanding of Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogy. Genealogy repudiates grand origin narratives and replaces them with accounts of multiplicity of mundane, seemingly inconsequential, and dispersed beginnings. Noting that what one finds in history is always linked to the questions one asks, genealogy generates explanations of changes in particular systems of thought in terms of contingent, arbitrary artifacts and episodes rather than notions of rational and
teleological evolution of thought toward some putative perfect state. Throughout the
dissertation, I use Foucauldian genealogy to augment an archaeology of the field of
feminist studies. Chapter four, in particular, juxtaposes texts from the Signs archive to
explicate particular shifts and transitions in the discursive field.

The archive

My analysis of feminist field formation is informed by Foucault’s conception of
the archive. Within a Foucauldian frame, an archive consists of the contingent and
changeable relations among a set of texts, statements (i.e., the most basic units of
discourse), and the institutions within which these texts and statements are produced and
circulate. The archive encompasses these relations, not simply the set of texts or
institutions that bring these relations into being (see Foucault 1972, 142–48). Following
Foucault, my study strives to identify the conditions of possibility and intelligibility in the
event of archival emergence. To capture the richness of a notion of a feminist archive,
the dissertation turns to a premier journal of feminist scholarship, Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society. As a journal launched to publish the “new scholarship on
women,” Signs provides an ideal venue through which to examine the emergence of the
interdisciplinary field of women’s studies. As an academic journal, Signs has been in
existence for thirty-four years, mirroring the tenure of feminist scholarship in the
academy. Each volume of Signs includes four issues, published quarterly.8

The thirty-five thousand pages of feminist scholarship that fill the volumes of
Signs constitute texts and statements of the archive, which also entails conditions of
possibility embedded in particular institutions that brought Signs into being and have
sustained it through time. Although I have examined the Signs archive since its inception, my dissertation focuses on the complex relations that framed the conditions of possibility for the journal during its first decade. Thus I concentrate on the first two academic institutions that housed the journal, Barnard College and Stanford University, as well as the University of Chicago Press, which publishes the journal. I also examine the role of philanthropic institutions, particularly the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, that provided outside funding for the journal during this first decade.9

To excavate regimes of truth operative in the feminist field, I consider how Signs presents and organizes the scholarship appearing in its pages; the types of feminist scholarship and scholarship on women appearing in the journal; and the concepts, themes, theories, and methodologies these articles emphasize, criticize, and utilize. As an archive, Signs provides insights into the scholarly works in interdisciplinary feminist scholarship that have helped to establish the terms of debate and frameworks that have been influential far beyond the pages of individual issues of the journal. In the following chapters, I attempt to analyze the Signs archive in its complexity, examining the conditions of intelligibility of academic, affective, cultural, economic, intellectual, institutional, material, political, psychic, psychological, and social forces constitutive of feminist studies. By investigating this archive, in its multiple dispersions and articulations, through the lenses of Foucauldian archaeology and genealogy, inflected by insights from the sociology of knowledge and the history of ideas, I provide a far different account of feminist field formation than currently circulates in the stock narrative.
Chapter 1

Academic Feminism and the Socialization of Intellectual Production

Are there any other special Signs projects that will improve our budget and our souls? We need suggestions.

—Margery Wolf

It is a pleasure to get such cooperation from the government!

—Catharine Stimpson

The social origins of academic feminism are typically associated with 1960s social movements, such as the Civil Rights, New Left, and women’s movements. Although these movements did not share identical political agendas, each borrowed and built upon similar strategies and tactics to bring about social, institutional, cultural, and juridical change. Female studies, as it was called in 1971, was to be the intellectual arm of the women’s movement, just as African American studies (or Black studies) was to be the intellectual arm of the Civil Rights Movement or, for some articulations of the field, the Black Power Movement. In the context of this account of academic feminism’s emergence, the field’s beginnings are largely restricted to the political and institutional insurrections that certain historically specific, albeit highly significant, social movements produced in higher education. This vision of emergence, however, is incomplete. For these social movements, which inspired students, faculty, and administrators to change university systems and structures, were themselves shaped by social, cultural, economic,
political, and geopolitical forces. In other words, the terms and conditions of changes produced in higher education were enabled by forces considerably broader in scope than the new social movements. The complex trajectories and interfaces of these forces can be traced at least as far back as the end of the Second World War, as they contributed to transformation in higher education throughout what is now known as the Cold War era (1945–1989). Accounts of academic feminism’s past that situate its emergence largely in relation to the new social movements of the 1960s overlook changes the Cold War produced in higher education—changes that circumscribed how and to what extent later social movements could succeed in modifying specific institutional, administrative, programmatic, departmental, and scholarly practices. Academic feminism was structured by a more complex web of forces than the women’s movement, in all its elegant diversity, could inspire. This chapter explores how the Cold War influenced the emergence of feminism as an academic enterprise.

During the Cold War era, nearly every academic discipline—from those in the hard sciences to those in the social sciences and the humanities—found the time, resources, and intellectual energies of leading scholars refocused on anything from developing weapons of mass destruction to studying the culture, psychology, behavior, and language of individuals living in communist countries. This research was subsidized by large contracts from the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It was also funded by certain prominent private philanthropic foundations and corporations willing to assist the federal government in meeting its Cold War foreign policy objectives—objectives geared toward winning the war and establishing U.S. global hegemony.
Tracing its origins to the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left, feminists often depict their intellectual project as inherently oppositional, eschewing any complicity with Cold War geopolitics. There is no question that a good deal of feminist scholarship advanced cogent critiques of the ravages of the Cold War across the global South (and even parts of the global North), and illuminated the roles played by area studies and development studies in that devastation. These explicit critiques of academic complicity with U.S. colonialism and imperialism, however, cannot exempt academic feminism from implication within Cold War power-knowledge constellations. My goal in this chapter is to trace power-knowledge constellations produced in the aftermath of the Second World War, which reordered the relationship between the federal government, philanthropy, and higher education, while also reshaping accredited understandings of the geopolitical order and its relation to market fundamentalism. This chapter lays the groundwork for analyzing how academic feminism is implicated in new knowledge projects emerging in conjunction with the global transition from embedded liberalism to neoliberalism.

Associated with the post–Second World War administrations of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson (1946–1969), embedded liberalism is a form of political and economic organization that accepts the legitimacy of state regulation of the market to avoid the worst excesses of economic recessions and depressions. As theorized by John Maynard Keynes and Oscar Lange, embedded liberalism endorsed deficit spending for job creation, full employment, and social welfare provision (Harvey 2007, 11). Consolidating during the economic upheavals of the 1970s, when the oil crises triggered global economic instabilities and massive inflation,
neoliberalism was devised by Chicago School economists such as Milton Friedman as a return to a form of market fundamentalism freed from state interference. Within the neoliberal worldview, state intervention into the market is compared to centralized state planning as an unacceptable authoritarian imposition. Freedom in neoliberal terms is reconceived as freedom from state regulation, a form of freedom that tends to promote “the interests of private property owners, businesses, multinational corporations, and financial capital” (Harvey 2007, 7).

Despite its aversion to Keynesian–inspired state intervention into the economy, neoliberalism has been associated with systemic interventions by international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Using their power to grant or withhold loans as a means to impose “conditions” upon the policy priorities of nations struggling with major economic crises, these international financial institutions have profoundly influenced national and global economies with dire consequences for the livelihoods of the majority of the world’s population. Endorsing reliance on an ever-increasing private sphere as the primary purveyor of welfare in civil society, neoliberalism nonetheless relies on the government—through policy formation, as well as the passage and implementation of certain laws—to protect market freedoms. Although neoliberalism shifted many power relations between public and private spheres, it deepened the synergistic relationship between the federal government and private foundations with important consequences for feminist scholarship.

The transition from embedded liberalism to neoliberalism was considerably more gradual and less complete than any specific designation of dates can capture. Nonetheless, academic feminism in the United States emerged in the 1970s at a moment
when neoliberalism was gaining ground. My goal is to investigate how feminist scholarship fits within the changing power-knowledge configurations associated with embedded liberalism and with neoliberalism. I fully acknowledge that conceptualizations of embedded liberalism and neoliberalism are heuristic abstractions that may attribute far too much coherence to a past that is altogether messy. Nonetheless, recourse to these conceptual heuristics illuminates connections between academic feminism and area studies, as well as development studies, fields that sought to galvanize the best minds and resources in higher education to actualize certain aims of U.S. foreign policy.

Contrary to the view that academic feminism was free from any taint of such Cold War partnerships between higher education and the state, I will demonstrate how one influential strain of women’s studies was influenced by changing relations between higher education, the U.S. government, and two key philanthropic foundations. The successful institutionalization of Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, one of the most prominent journals in the field of feminist scholarship, was enabled in large part by journal editors’ ability to capitalize on demands for new kinds of knowledge relevant to emergent neoliberalism. Successive Signs editors successfully marketed the journal to philanthropic foundations and the United States Agency for International Development (AID) as able to fill a knowledge void overlooked during the era of embedded liberalism. Offering new, more sophisticated and nuanced forms of knowledge, Signs editors suggested that methodologies that took women’s lives into account might contribute to the attainment of U.S. foreign policy aims. Since the data being produced by mainstream scientific methodologies were not securing desired foreign policy objectives, academic feminism might offer new approaches useful to the United States as it struggled for
hegemony in its global rivalry with the Soviet Union. Within the geopolitical architecture of the Cold War, academic feminists offered fresh approaches to the third world.

**The socialization of intellectual production**

Prior to the Second World War, most outside donations to colleges and universities came from private foundations. The federal government played only a minor role compared to the foundations in supporting higher education. As Rebecca Lowen (1997) has pointed out: “Private donations to universities reached almost $82 million in 1923–1924 and peaked in 1929–1930 at over $148 million. In comparison, support from the federal government remained exceedingly modest, restricted to small grants to the state universities for agricultural research” (23). During the Second World War, as the federal government began funding war-related research in the physical sciences, philanthropic foundations reevaluated their funding priorities, subtly shifting their role in relation to higher education and in relation to the federal government.

R. C. Lewontin refers to the mutually beneficial relationship that developed between higher education and the federal government during the Cold War as “the socialization of academic production” (Lewontin 1997, 8). Seeking research that might aid in the achievement of foreign policy objectives, the government willingly subsidized scholarly research. Freed from the imperatives of profit-making, research conducted in university settings did not share in the private sector’s urgency to translate findings into the accumulation of (intellectual) property interest. Spending on universities enabled the federal government to invest in research as “a process or service…rather than as a
competitive market commodity” (Lewontin 1997, 9). University settings also provided intellectual resources such as laboratories and libraries, which private corporations often could not match.

Richard Nixon’s reference to the United States as a “people’s capitalism” provides a useful image to illuminate the socialization of intellectual production. Nixon coined this phrase in the course of an impromptu “kitchen debate” on the pros and cons of capitalism and communism with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev on July 24, 1959. During the debate, Nixon demonstrated confidence that a democratically-managed capitalism could eradicate poverty. Celebrating the Keynesian-inspired socioeconomics that had inspired the Marshall Plan, Nixon endorsed the unlimited transformative potential of capitalism. By referring to the “people’s capitalism,” Nixon hinted at socialist tendencies necessary for capitalism’s wartime functioning, such as massive increases in state spending for infrastructure and employment creation. Within the militarized context of the Cold War, however, state spending did not translate into increased funding for healthcare or social programs to uplift the poor. As the “Defender of the Free World” and the “Arsenal of Democracy,” the federal government devoted its resources to the maintenance of a costly international military presence, as well as a stable domestic economy capable of mobilizing on a war footing at a moment’s notice (Hall 2003, 369). Although education is typically understood as a pillar of the welfare state, federal spending for higher education during the Cold War was less related to social well-being and more related to universities’ ability to produce knowledge deemed crucial for a U.S. victory over the Soviet Union.⁵
Peter C. Hall (2003) has noted that perceptions of the relation between the federal government and the private sector as always already oppositional are mistaken. From their earliest years, state and federal governments provided land grants, tax incentives, and fiscal policies to foster certain economic ventures. During the mid-1950s, the U.S. Congress again revamped tax policies to support a different kind of synergy between the federal government and the private sector. With the redrafting of the Internal Revenue Service Code in 1954, the government provided tax exemptions for corporate charitable donations. To encourage private corporations and philanthropic organizations to assume some of the burden of public welfare provision, the state granted generous tax exemptions. As Hall notes,

No one foresaw that once the government began using its economic power to favor certain kinds of activity through direct and indirect subsidies and differential tax and regulatory treatment, the relationship between government and private initiative would become increasingly synergistic—so that the increasing scope and scale of government stimulated corresponding increases in the scope and scale of private enterprises of every type. (Hall 2003, 369)

Nixon’s notion of the people’s capitalism provides a glimmer of this changing dynamic. Although federal monies were being spent on war efforts, a good portion of these funds were funneled to private corporations as war contractors. Profits generated by these lucrative contracts were exempted from taxation if corporations devoted funds to charitable causes, which could range from support of the arts to the alleviation of social inequalities. This distinctly American arrangement of the welfare state did not place the federal government and the private sphere in diametrical opposition. On the contrary, each sector became increasingly complementary—as the government concerned itself with the “Pax Americana,” the global role of guaranteeing peace in the period between 1945 and 1971, the private sector concerned itself with alleviating domestic social
concerns. And, alleviating domestic social concerns was a task much broader in scope and scale than the geographical and geopolitical confines of the U.S. nation-state.

Established by members of the most elite class of capitalists, the major American philanthropies were founded during the Progressive Era. According to Barry Karl and Stanley N. Katz (1987), “Many of those involved understood perfectly well that the new cooperative structures [foundations] might provide an alternative to socialism and the welfare state, both of which seemed inevitable in contemporary Europe” (6). From the beginning of the twentieth century, philanthropy played an important role in securing the interests of a government that, in turn, protected the freedoms of a growing capitalist private sphere. Ironically, the federal government extended its power and control by loosening its grip on several dominant institutions within the private sphere. The philanthropic foundations played a central role in enabling the American private sector to retain a dominant position in the formulation of public policy.

The exact role the philanthropic foundations played in this distinctly American arrangement of the welfare state shifted over time. In the early to mid-twentieth century, for example, the foundations played a direct and immediate role in promoting social reform. Historian Alice O’Conner suggests that this approach to reform resulted from early foundation investiture in “the concept of the social question” (O’Conner 2007, 1). “Very much tied to the exploited condition of labor,” foundation strategies were “fluid enough to be able to encompass a series of questions and problems—the urban problem, the poverty problem, Henry Demarest Lloyd’s problem of ‘Wealth Against Commonwealth,’ W.E.B. DuBois’ great problem of the ‘color line’—that all point to a fundamental disparity between social and economic conditions and political democracy”
From the early to mid-twentieth century, American philanthropy funded social scientific studies to identify solutions to these complex social questions. Although the foundations sought recommendations for immediate change, the changes envisioned were far from revolutionary. As a consequence of the Bolshevik Revolution, the idea of revolution became strongly associated with communism and as such a perceived threat to capitalism and the “American way of life.” Studies funded by foundations offered more incremental strategies to address problems arising from the abysmal conditions of labor within the capitalist system, strategies that ameliorated the conditions of workers without challenging the fundamental structure of the economy itself (see O’Conner 2007, 11–47).

Foundation interest in funding studies that recommended practical means of reform diminished with the end of the Second World War for two primary and related reasons. The first reason had very little to do with the foundations themselves. With the federal government’s founding of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950, the nature of “American social science” changed dramatically. As Lowen has noted, “in debates after the war over the formation of the NSF, the consensus was that the social sciences were insufficiently scientific to be included in the proposed funding program. This was a blow to the social scientists’ self-esteem, as this story is told. The enormous prestige, influence, and patronage enjoyed by their colleagues in the physical sciences after the war was another unhappy reminder of the relative lack of status of the social scientists’ own disciplines. The turn toward scientism thus represented a widespread and genuine desire among American social scientists to improve the reputation of their disciplines” (Lowen 1997, 192). Social scientists’ desire to improve the reputation of
their disciplines coincided with the circulation of positivist conceptions of value neutral research and the advent of computers, which, for the first time, allowed sophisticated analysis of huge data sets. Motivated by the prospects for NSF funding and eager to develop the potential of computer-analysis, economists, sociologists, political scientists, and psychologists contributed to the “behavioral revolution” in social science, a revolution that took the individual as the unit of analysis but used survey research and aggregate data analysis to provide a scientific basis for understanding individual choice and action. Research to promote social reform did not fit the emerging paradigm of value-free scientific inquiry.

The second reason that foundations moved away from funding studies oriented toward immediate social reform stemmed from a desire to avoid duplication of effort. The foundations sought to fund studies that would aid U.S. policy objectives but that would not replicate the contents of government-funded studies. If the hard sciences were slated for government support for weapons research ranging from nuclear warheads to germ warfare, the social sciences might be tapped to supplement these studies, exploring interpersonal dynamics that were also linked to the causes of war. The famous attempts of Frankfurt School theorists, Adorno and Horkheimer, to identify the components of the “authoritarian personality,” for example, was a long-term effort to deploy the social sciences to aid the U.S. government’s interest in avoiding the spread of fascism.

Foundation officials shared the view that policy-relevant social science should be modeled on the physical sciences, adopting methods that were objective, value-neutral, and beyond the fray of partisan politics. Foundation officials concurred in the view of leading behavioral social scientists that they needed to revise professional training
programs, develop and refine quantitative analytical tools, create data sources that could
describe whole populations, organize means of continuing data collection, and begin to
develop methodological sophistication and theoretical rigor comparable to the physical
sciences. The scientific study of social life was envisioned as a long-term, comparative
project that would enable systematic inquiry, hypotheses testing, and the discernment of
the “laws” governing the operation of social relations, which could contribute to the
construction of conclusive scientific theories about the nature and operation of societies.
The collection of comparative data would enable social scientists to provide insights
about the complex relations linking states, markets, and civil society, as well as the
intricate social problems emerging within these sectors across geographic and
geopolitical scales (O’Conner 2007, 21).

As the social sciences reoriented the tools of their trade, the conception of the
democratic public that informed their inquiry subtly shifted. From the late nineteenth
century through the Great Depression, a strong focus for social scientists was poverty
alleviation; hence they tended to study the working and unemployed poor. As computers
enabled population studies, social scientists turned their attention to studies of voting
behavior, opinion research, and life within corporate America. Despite the commitment
to value-free research, opinion studies unwittingly incorporated a new, more affluent
sense of the democratic public, as telephones became the medium of survey research and
public polling. “Ever more sophisticated, institutionalized, and national public opinion
polling technologies” (O’Conner 2007, 87) depended upon a device that the poorest
households in the nation were unlikely to include. Social scientific studies using
quantitative data often incorporated a systemic class bias, which in the United States also
involved racial bias. As O’Conner noted, “The idea of the representative or average American public was in reality based on highly selective samples that conformed to a vision of an affluent, consensus-bound society, and that systematically left out perspectives from low-income and nonwhite Americans” (O’Conner 2007, 87).

With the assistance of foundation funding, think tanks and official advisory agencies were launched to provide technical support in the development, implementation, and evaluation of government policies. The Fund for the Advancement of Education, the Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, the International Council for Educational Development, the Social Science Research Council, the African-American Institute, Education and World Affairs, the Overseas Liaison Committee of the American Council on Education, and the Overseas Development Institute, for example, hired professional staff equipped to complete short-term research projects under government contracts (Berman 1983, 9). With the emergence of a technocratic elite approximating an international capitalist managerial class, the focus of social science again shifted. As O’Conner has pointed out: “the public role of social science was becoming less and less about engaging with, educating, and…empowering an informed, democratic public. It was instead focusing more and more on speaking truth to power through institutionalized venues of expertise such as think tanks or official advisory agencies” (O’Conner 2007, 87).

According to Edward H. Berman, one of the main objectives of the foundations was “the creation through educational institutions of a worldwide network of elites whose approach to governance and change would be efficient, professional, moderate, incremental, and nonthreatening to the class of interests of those who, like Messrs,
Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller, had established the foundations” (Berman 1983, 15).

“People’s capitalism” within this framework retained a faith in the ability of capitalism to remedy social ills, but identification of appropriate remedies was assumed to be the job of a domestic elite, whose expertise was sufficiently expansive to afford solutions not only for the United States but for the developing world. Drawing lessons from the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe, policy elites in the United States could provide capitalist prescriptions for poverty reduction on an international scale. Within the overlapping circles of philanthropy and the academy, a tacit consensus emerged about the appropriateness of a top-down democratically managed capitalism, as Keynesian economics became the order of the day. In O’Conner’s words,

Of all that social science had to contribute to the postwar liberal project…none was more important or emblematic of a technocratic sensibility than Keynesian economics. It promised just the right combination of theory, analytic method, and confident expertise to provide a program of growth and prosperity with the help of fine-tuning fiscal policy tools. (O’Conner 2007, 87)

Foundations selectively funded social scientific venues that subscribed to the vision offered by Keynesian economics for creating a better world. Highly educated and technically trained academics endorsed a view of democratically-managed capitalism that subsumed their self-interest within a vision of global economic uplift. Philanthropic funding practices inspired a confidence that the social sciences could develop the “technical know-how to sustain shared prosperity, economic growth, and to avoid crippling recessions—as well as to bring the benefits of such know-how to the world” (O’Conner 2007, 88). By improving the economic conditions of the world population through capitalist interventions, social science was as important as any physical science could be to America’s prospects for winning the Cold War.
If capitalism were to defeat communism in nuclear, economic, and ideological battles waged by the superpowers, the conception of the new democratic public needed to be global in scale. To assist the government in its Cold War strategies, powerful institutions within the private sector turned their attentions abroad. Conceiving capitalism and democracy on a global scale, embedded liberalism suggested that social equality and individual access to basic resources within the borders of the U.S. nation-state required attention to the economy across the globe. Although some members of Congress dreamed of returning to more isolationist ways in the aftermath of the Second World War, expansive national security concerns triggered by the Cold War undermined those dreams. To foster continued economic growth and national security the United States took increasing interest in international affairs.

The Rockefeller Foundation funded one of the first studies to wed U.S. interests to a global geopolitical vision. In 1939, two years before the United States entered the Second World War, Rockefeller made several significant grants to the Council on Foreign Relations to study the underlying causes of the war and make recommendations for peace. The ultimate aim of the study was to prevent the possibility of a third world War. Known as the War-Peace Studies Project, this report linked economic prosperity and peace. The authors suggested that American economic growth could only be sustained through overseas corporate expansion and investment. For such expansion and investment to occur, the standard of living for those in Western Europe and in the third world must be raised. Western Europe would require immediate attention due to the comprehensive destruction caused by the war. Counterinsurgency efforts would be needed across the third world to quell anticolonial revolutionary movements. According
to the War-Peace Studies Project, decolonization movements would disrupt social and economic stability and impede the institution-building processes required for enduring improvements in living standards. This study laid the groundwork for the Marshall Plan, implemented at the end of the Second World War.

As recommended by the War-Peace Studies Project, the Marshall Plan prioritized the rebuilding of war-ravaged Europe. Under the direction of Paul Hoffman (who subsequently became president of the Ford Foundation after administering the Plan\(^7\)), the Marshall Plan, also known as the European Recovery Plan, sought to reconstruct Europe after the Second World War.\(^8\) European participants in the Plan included Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Over the course of the Plan, the United States lent participating countries more than $13 billion. By all accounts the Marshall Plan was a great success. By the time of the Plan’s completion, with the exception of Germany, all participating European economies had grown well past their prewar levels. In helping to rebuild Europe’s political and economic systems, the United States also shaped an international order of trade that eliminated obstacles to trade and finance resulting from restrictive trading zones (Heller 2006, 40). The Marshall Plan enabled the United States to find trading partners and foreign markets for the immensely expanded manufacturing productivity it had acquired during the Second World War. In accepting U.S. support in their rebuilding efforts, Western European countries accepted the emerging global order of trade and finance determined by the United States. As the Bretton Woods Agreement gave birth to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), which established the dollar as a world currency tied to set stable exchange rates, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov characterized the Marshall Plan as “dollar imperialism.”9 The institutions of the Bretton Woods system granted more voting privileges to the larger contributors (namely, Western industrialized countries), which further marginalized communist and third world countries.

The United States made a conscious decision to contain communism, which it construed as a dire threat to its economic and political systems. Rebuilding Europe as a capitalist market economy was integral to the U.S. containment strategy. A presumption of the Marshall Plan was that an economically vibrant Europe would be less vulnerable to the political and social appeal of communism. Thus the Marshall Plan linked U.S. economic interests with U.S. national security concerns.

Soon after the implementation of the Marshall Plan, President Harry S. Truman called for a supplemental Marshall Plan in the field of ideas. Building relationships between the federal government, the social sciences, and private foundations, President Truman launched “Project Troy.” His goal was to identify methods to infiltrate communism ideologically, that is, to capture the hearts and minds of people living behind the “iron curtain.” Anticipating discussions about how to maximize America’s “soft power,” the State Department awarded MIT $150,000 to investigate the dissemination of America’s democratic ideals as a means to promote national security.10 Submitted to the State Department on February 15, 1951, the Project Troy final report included technical recommendations about how to prevent the Soviet Union from blocking Voice of America radio broadcasts throughout Eastern Europe and the third world and how to
improve hot-air-balloon technology in order to drop pro-American and pro-capitalist pamphlets in these regions. The report proposed other vehicles with which to permeate the iron curtain, including films, travelers, libraries, and foreign exchange students (Needell 1998, 14), and documented the extent of permeation by mail, academic journals, and commercial publications (14). The authors of Project Troy also cautioned that great care be taken in depicting communism in the United States. They suggested that communism should not be portrayed as essentially evil. On the contrary, they suggested that Stalin’s draconian policies should be characterized as disloyal to the Marxist intellectual foundations of Soviet society (Needell 1998, 16). The report also warned against viewing Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Communist Party in China, and Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as mere pawns of Stalin.11

To distinguish Stalin’s political and economic interpretation of Marxism from Marxist theory more generally and to cultivate greater awareness of the specificities of indigenous versions of communism emerging within Asia, Project Troy recommended that Cold War efforts not be restricted to the physical sciences and engineering, but draw upon the resources of the social sciences as well—anthropology, economics, psychology, sociology, political science, and history. “Political warfare” was the animating concept of the report. According to the authors, the Cold War would be won only if the best minds from diverse disciplines worked together across institutional settings to launch an ideological offensive. As notions of political warfare, psychological warfare, “the minds race,” and nation building gained currency in the 1950s, university administrators realized that higher education could play a significant role in framing and fighting the Cold War. The federal government recruited scientists and engineers to develop more
sophisticated military technology, such as ballistic missiles, guidance systems, hydrogen bombs, and enhanced radar. NSC 68, for example, an April 1950 State Department report requested a massive military buildup and a concomitant quadrupling of the military budget. Social scientists were also recruited to formulate strategies and tactics for a war of ideas. Sophisticated studies were needed to investigate the comparative merits of the social, political, and economic systems of the United States and the Soviet Union, studies that could determine which system was the rightful heir to post-European Enlightenment. For the United States to triumph, it needed to prove that its version of Enlightenment, which celebrated the rationality of the free market, an unquestioned faith in science and technology, and an avowed anti-collectivism with its concomitant aversion to state power and communism, was far superior to the Soviet alternative.

An addendum to the Project Troy final report, written by Donald Marquis and Hans Speier, had more practical consequences for the social sciences than Project Troy itself. This addendum suggested that the State Department disaggregate communism. Rather than treating communism as an undifferentiated whole, scholarly attention should be devoted to the identification of target populations in China, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and among various Soviet-bloc defectors that might be recruited for capitalist projects. Recommending that priority be given to spaces where instability was rife, whether social, political, or economic, Marquis and Speier drew up a proposal for Program V. Funded by federal grants, Program V would involve social scientists in sustained research into non-democratic governments and the factors (particularly behavioral) leading to their stability or instability (Lowen 1997, 201).
Through Program V, the social sciences would devise two sets of strategies crucial for obtaining victory in the Cold War: immediate counterinsurgency strategies and long-term development strategies. Focusing on the third world would be optimal according to Marquis and Speier because rapid decolonization immediately following the Second World War made this vast region particularly volatile. In the context of such instability, populations across the global South were particularly susceptible to communist infiltration. Intensive scholarly attention from the best minds in American social science could identify myriad ways to thwart the spread of communism.

By emphasizing the connection between instability in the third world and research to promote the benefits of capitalist development as an alternative to communism, Marquis and Speier convinced the federal government that their foreign policy objectives could be attained only if the socialization of intellectual production incorporated the social sciences as well as the physical sciences. As conceived by the 1952 report of the President’s Materials Policy Commission, foreign policy goals such as protecting U.S. national security, maintaining access to lucrative overseas markets, and securing precious raw materials necessary to American industry could be achieved only with the combined efforts of experts in the social sciences and the natural sciences. Social scientists were needed to help secure the allegiance of third-world populations to the American schema of development—a schema based on the unprecedented success of the Marshall Plan, which emphasized slow incremental change, political stability, institution building, and the mobilization of elites. Research into the appropriate means to incorporate the third world into the capitalist sphere of influence required expert knowledge in the new scholarly fields of area studies and development studies. Given the appropriate amount of
time and money, the social sciences could help win the Cold War by securing third-world support for capitalist modes of development. Program V recruited the social sciences to the long-term project of third-world modernization—understood to entail commitment to Western notions of capitalism and democracy. Thus, social scientific knowledge would enable the United States to shape the world in its image. Failing to provide funds to the social sciences, on the other hand, could leave some two-thirds of the world’s population prey to communist influence.

Prior to Program V the federal government demonstrated little interest in funding the social sciences. Historians who have investigated the Cold War’s influence on higher education have tended to find Lewontin’s formulation of the socialization of intellectual production more relevant to the physical sciences and engineering than the social sciences. It is easy to see why this is the case. Substantial government grants to biomedicine (for the study of drugs, bacterial weaponry, and radioactivity), chemistry, communications technologies, computer ballistics, engineering, and physics generated immediate returns, enhancing American military capabilities and nuclear superiority. In contrast, returns from the federal government’s investment in the social sciences were not immediate. Indeed, they were exceptionally difficult to quantify and required research in places geographically and geopolitically distant from the United States. Moreover, federal funding of the social sciences was not always direct.

The federal government substantially increased its subsidy to the social sciences after the proposal of Program V, but so too did the most prominent private philanthropic foundations. The Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford Foundations worked closely with the government to supplement social science funding, sometimes funneling federal funds
through foundation programs. As the federal government preserved its primary focus on the physical sciences and engineering, the private foundations disbursed sizable sums to the social sciences. As Lowen (1997, 194) has noted, for example, Ford Foundation funding for the social sciences at Harvard University, the University of Chicago, and Stanford University was many times larger than the federal patronage each university received for the development of their social science programs throughout the Cold War era. Ford outspent federal patronage of area studies, for example, by donating “a total of $270 million to 34 universities for area and language studies from 1953 to 1966” (Cummings 1998, 163). Lowen has dubbed the major philanthropic foundation’s willingness to fund Cold War social science “strategic benevolence” (Lowen 1997, 195). “With the federal government supporting the physical and medical sciences at levels the private foundations could not match, foundation officers realized that if they were to make a recognized contribution to academic research, they would need to support fields for which patronage was not at the time available” (Lowen 1997, 195). Strategic benevolence suggests that the relationship between major private foundations and the federal government in the sphere of higher education was a microcosm of the relationship between the government and the private sector in the larger American welfare state. Through its generous tax exemptions, the federal government enabled the private sector to play a major role in shaping domestic and foreign policy.

Contrary to the received view, Lewontin’s account of the socialization of intellectual production has as much descriptive relevance for the social sciences as it does for the physical sciences and engineering. In their respective funding decisions, the federal government and private philanthropies developed complementary strategies to
fund certain intellectual projects for strategic purposes. The government was not
uninterested in the kinds of knowledge the social sciences could produce to assist the
Cold War objectives, but it considered philanthropy better suited to fund controversial
projects in which the social sciences were engaged. It is unlikely that lack of money was
the sole factor in the government’s decision to continue prioritizing the physical sciences
and engineering, while leaving “ideological warfare” to the private foundations. The
laboratory of the social sciences differed markedly from the laboratory of the scientists
researching the atomic and hydrogen bombs. Unlike the government-owned sites of Oak
Ridge and Los Alamos, the laboratories of the social sciences were autonomous countries
geographically and geopolitically distant from the United States. As a member of the
United Nations, the United States was officially committed to a policy of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. By devising tax policies that created a
means for private philanthropies to fund social science efforts related to
counterinsurgency, development, and modernization, the federal government promoted
desired ends while observing the non-intervention stipulation of the UN Charter. As
Gary R. Hess has suggested, foundations could function as “a nonofficial extension of
U.S. policy” (Hess 2003, 323).

The foundations enjoyed a prestige that gave them advantages over government
programs and enabled them to undertake initiatives that were beyond the scope of
official agencies. Their nongovernmental status and avowedly international and
humanitarian character enabled them to project a liberal image as nonideological
and responsive institutions. They were, of course, not dependent on the political
processes that governed Congressional authorizations; a foundation board could
earmark funds for a project that might have taken months, if ever, to get through
Congress. Foundation officials frequently enjoyed a stature in recipient countries
that was beyond the political capacity of their official counterparts. For instance,
the heads of both the Ford and Rockefeller programs in India had access to high-
level officials and influenced government policy in ways that would have been
unthinkable for any American official. Also, at times of stress in U.S. relations
with other governments, foundations were often able to continue their work without interruption and sometimes became the principal representative of U.S. interests. (Hess 2003, 323–24)

The financial resources of foundations were considerably less than those of the United States governments. “At the peak of foundation work in the Third World in the 1960s, Ford was devoting about $50 million annually to overseas programs, Rockefeller was spending about $10 million, and Carnegie about $1 million. At that time, U.S. government foreign assistance was about $2.5 billion annually” (Hess 2003, 324). Nevertheless, the foundations were often able to accrue greater benefits from their expenditures as a result of their more benign reputations abroad.15

The project of development

The Gaither Report (1957), an outgrowth of the War-Peace Studies Project, envisioned a distinctive role for the philanthropic foundations as partners of the government in combating the spread of communism. Indeed, the Gaither Report suggested that the foundations fund projects that would promote the American model of democracy and the capitalist model of development throughout the world. Dean Rusk, President of the Rockefeller Foundation and former Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, was fully supportive of the recommendations of the Gaither Report. Conceiving communist activity across the global South as a challenge that must be countered by American initiatives, he pledged the Rockefeller Foundation to efforts to promote a successful capitalist scheme of development in countries throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Linking the project of the Foundation to the goals of U.S. foreign policy, Rusk noted that Rockefeller “accepts a responsibility for doing what it can
to assist these countries to erect free societies, a task which is crucial to the purpose of the foundation itself” (Rusk quoted in Hess 2003, 321).

Similarly, the Ford Foundation responded to the Gaither Report by providing substantial funding to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to establish a Center for International Studies (CENIS), which became the home of Project Troy. Max Millikan, previously the director of economic research for the CIA, was appointed CENIS director. His vision of the mission of CENIS was to apply “basic social science research to problems of U.S. policy in the current world struggle [with] the ultimate aim of…the production of an alternative to Marxism” (Millikan quoted in Hess 2003, 322). As an alternative to the collectivist, agricultural approach associated with Marxist development in the global South, the U.S. model of development encouraged “intensive urban-based growth in both the private and the public sectors” and promised “the import of advanced consumer products and the latest technology through joining a capitalist market” (Westad 2005, 92). Characterized as a mode of “modernization,” the U.S. model of development sought to promote the growth of industry and technology while also cultivating a “Westernized” elite.

CENIS is perhaps best remembered as the institutional home of the renowned economist Walt W. Rostow, who wrote the influential book, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960), under the auspices of a grant from the Carnegie Corporation. More than any scholar at the time, Rostow stated clearly and concisely why the federal government, foundations, and social sciences should collaborate in the project of development in the third world. According to Rostow (1960, 142), the “explicit objective” of the “international Communist movement” was to
“takeover within the underdeveloped areas.” For this reason, “the most important single item on the Western agenda” was to “demonstrate that the underdeveloped nations…can move successfully through the preconditions into a well-established take-off within the orbit of the democratic world, resisting the blandishments and temptations of communism” (Rostow 1960, 134). By assisting in the large-scale, long-term program of capitalist development, an alliance of the federal government, foundations, and social sciences would contribute to winning the Cold War.

U.S. elites used the implementation of the Marshall Plan as a basis from which to fashion a model of development with a distinctly American stamp. Throughout the 1950s and the early part of the 1960s, Americans hailed the Marshall Plan as a model of economic development whose lessons could be applied to the problem of development throughout the third world. In the words of Paul Hoffman, Administrator of the Marshall Plan and later Ford Foundation President: “We have learned in Europe what to do in Asia, for under the Marshall Plan we have developed the essential instruments of a successful policy in the arena of world politics” (Hoffman 1951, 130). Put crudely, these instruments included, “the political and cultural seduction of local elites, access to local markets, and military aid and training” (Westad 2005, 25).

For proponents of the American model of development, one key tactic was to develop a class of indigenous elites who were educated in the United States or in American universities abroad and who could be trusted to uphold U.S. interests in their respective countries. Creating this new elite class was a mission for which the philanthropic foundations were particularly suited. Providing financial support for education had been a priority of organized American philanthropy since its beginnings.
As Ford Foundation President McGeorge Bundy observed, “The oldest and strongest of the ties that connect this foundation to other parts of society are those that bind us to the world of education” (Ford 1968, xvii). To extend the boundaries of educational outreach to an emerging global elite, the foundations developed strategies both within the United States and abroad. Within the United States they helped to create area studies programs and development studies programs at major U.S. universities that would attract students from the global South. They also subsidized new methodological approaches within long-standing departments, cultivating structural-functionalism within sociology departments, behavioralism and modernization theory in political science departments, and theorizations of human capital within economics departments. The theory of human capital suggested that investment in education generated a high rate of return through increasing labor productivity and technological innovation, while also enhancing equal opportunity.  

The foundations also supported area studies and development studies at various elite universities throughout the third world, some of which had been built by the foundations themselves. The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, established the University Development Program (UDP), which launched six UDP centers in 1963: three in Africa (University of Ibadan in Nigeria, University of Khartoum, University of East Africa); two in Asia (University of Philippines and a consortium of three universities in Thailand); and one in Latin America (University of Valle in Columbia). In perhaps their most ambitious collaborative educational initiative abroad during the Cold War, Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller came together to support the University of East Africa (UEA), which combined and strengthened the social sciences in three national
universities in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. Although prominent indigenous leaders wished to maintain the national distinctness of each university, “the foundations—together with official U.S., British, and international agencies—used their leverage to press for the federated regional universities” (Hess 2003, 330). The idea behind consolidating the three universities was to minimize duplicating their respective social scientific emphases “while maximizing Western influence in a critical region’s university system” (Hess 2003, 330).

By developing institutes of higher education in the third world that fostered social scientific expertise, the foundations produced Western-trained sociologists, political scientists, and economists, many of whom served in high-level governmental positions within their home nations. Despite strenuous efforts of these elites to implement capitalism from the top-down, peopling the governments of third-world countries with Western-trained elites was not sufficient to achieve the prime goal of capitalist development strategies—the eradication of poverty. By the early 1970s, foundation officials and academics alike realized that their careful attempts to promote American notions of civil society, public administration, and democratic governance, even in the most politically stable situations, were insufficient to generate economic prosperity. Poverty and hunger for the majority of the Third-World population was on the rise, as was anomic and organized violence. The old certainties of the 1960s “development decade” were called into question. The notion that education alone could achieve the benefits suggested by human capital theory was severely tested as poverty increased. The much touted success of the green revolution confronted growing levels of hunger and malnutrition. And claims of success in population control initiatives were countered by
dire revelations of sterilization abuse. Although Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller continued to support development programs, the foundations and their various donor agencies privately scrambled to address the criticisms of the development decade advanced by basic needs theorists and dependency theorists. Rockefeller, in particular, hosted several meetings at the foundation’s Villa Serbelloni in Italy to review the depressing evidence of continued poverty, starvation, unemployment, and illiteracy. Their deliberations resulted in the book-length study, *Education and Development Reconsidered* (1974).

In the early 1970s, the foundations and their allies in the federal government and higher education significantly revised their conceptualization of development. The patent failure of a coterie of educated elites to transform their nations from above, using centralized policies, necessitated a systemic reconceptualization of development strategies. If capitalist development could not be achieved from the top-down, new capitalist development strategies would have to be devised from the bottom-up. Government officials, foundation officials, and well-known academics turned their attention to a new puzzle—how impoverished people in the third world could be incorporated into developmental schemes that envisaged gradual, incremental, moderate, and nonrevolutionary means of modernization.

As the debt crisis and the OPEC-sponsored oil embargo fueled neoconservative concerns about large-scale proletarian revolution in the third world, the Departments of Defense and State were forced to admit that their top-down conceptualization of power in the implementation of development programs was not working. Renewing their efforts to assist the federal government in developing alternative approaches to the program of
capitalist development, Ford and Rockefeller provided substantial subsidies to the Washington D.C.–based Overseas Development Council. Established to reassess the roles of bilateral aid agencies, such as AID, in advancing Third-World development in ways to ensure regional stability, the Overseas Development Council also began to reassess how multilateral aid agencies and multinational corporations could improve their interventions to facilitate capitalist development throughout the third world.

Acknowledging that “Third-World development may be advanced by numerous strategies” (Berman 1983, 141), the federal government and the foundations began to explore and subsidize new methodological frames for understanding economic and political dynamics across the global South. The emergence in the 1970s of the basic needs, dependency, and Women in Development (WID) approaches involved critical departures from the commitments to structural-functionalist, behavioralist, and human capital development. Associated with academics on the Left, all three approaches offered detailed information about particular societies, often tracing critical cleavages and structures of domination at odds with the individualist focus of scientific approaches within the social sciences.

During the first half of the Cold War, it was almost unheard of for studies informed by a leftist orientation to receive federal or philanthropic funding. But growing awareness of the methodological limitations the social scientific approaches of the 1960s created an opening for different types of information that more radically-oriented studies could produce. Grounded in different theoretical frameworks, basic needs, dependency, and WID approaches involved not only innovative research design, data collection and interpretation, but a focus on quite different issues for investigation. Offering new modes
of knowledge, which might foster the aims of a changing U.S. foreign policy, these new approaches generated interest among funders. The federal government and the foundations developed more expansive funding guidelines open to scholars using innovative methodologies. As Berman noted (1983, 141–42): “The source of the data and the politics of the researcher were of less importance to the sponsors than the information generated.”

Funded by Ford and Rockefeller, the studies of the Overseas Development Council expanded to examine “the role of women in development, international commodity arrangements, the mounting external debt problems of Third-World nations, and, more generally, alternatives to the orthodox developmental models that evolved after 1945” (Berman 1983, 141). Informed by political orientations to the left of those of government and foundation officials, these studies were highly critical of intellectual endeavors previously supported by the foundations. Nonetheless, these studies produced a plethora of new information that could be incorporated into capitalist models of development. Select findings from these studies could be used to identify new ways to foster incremental change. Despite the intellectual frameworks of their authors, the appropriation of this work by the federal government and the foundations ensured that they in no way altered the fundamental presuppositions of the capitalist model of development. By funding more radical studies, the foundations did not necessarily endorse or adopt the authors’ political commitments or the politics of knowledge they presumed and produced. On the contrary, the foundations simply extended the range of subject matters, epistemologies, and methodologies that could inform U.S. foreign policy.19
By the early 1980s, the major philanthropic foundations had ended most of their direct funding for educational institutions in the third world (see Hess 2003, 336–39), focusing instead on expanding the range of disciplines involved in production of knowledge about the third world at U.S. universities. Knowledge generated by foundation-funded studies continued to be made available to the Departments of Defense and State, as well as to AID within the State Department to promote capitalist development across the global South. 20

Strategic benevolence took on a new form with the advent of neoliberalism. The socialization of intellectual production began to give way to the privatization of intellectual production, as the federal government and major philanthropic foundations loosened their ties to one another. The federal government gradually reduced its funding for higher education, which increased the pressure on scholars to seek grants from private philanthropic foundations. Drawing lessons from the failures of the 1960s development decade, the foundations moved away from direct involvement in efforts to promote capitalist development in the third world, although they remained committed to fostering economic development and democratic governance worldwide.

**Academic Feminism and the Cold War Agenda: Lessons from Signs**

In 1973, Jean Sacks, an editor in the journals division of the University of Chicago Press, began to explore the possibilities for a new journal that would publish “the new scholarship on women.” Emerging just as the first programs in women’s studies were being institutionalized at colleges and universities across the United States, *Signs* also materialized as embedded liberalism was losing ground to neoliberalism. 21
Arising at a moment of global economic crisis when unemployment and inflation (i.e., stagflation) were on the rise, plans for Signs developed just as increasing discontent in Eastern European and developing countries became a focal point of concern for the U.S. State Department. Published by the University of Chicago Press and housed at Barnard College–Columbia University for its first seven years, the editorial offices subsequently moved to Stanford University. From its inception, the journal was associated with three institutions of higher education with strong ties to major philanthropic foundations, particularly the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, as well as to the State Department, AID, and the United Nations.

With support from the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, as well as AID, Signs devoted considerable attention to the question of development and the experiences of women in the third world during its first decade of publication. Indeed, Signs was a primary site within which the Women in Development (WID) approach was defined, elaborated, and critically engaged. As the first editors of the journal sought funding needed to launch this academic venture, they found considerable interest in foundations and federal agencies that were rethinking the complex problem of development.

As Hugh Wilford (2008) has pointed out, in the late 1960s the U.S. government began developing heightened awareness of the tactical importance of women both in relation to development and in relation to success in the Cold War.

More acute male observers in Washington were also beginning to appreciate the growing strategic significance of women in the shifting terrain of the Cold War. Women’s traditional role as educators made them potentially powerful agents of development—“Educate a man and you educate an individual,” so the saying went, “but educate a women and you educate a family, a community, a nation.” Modernization also promised to liberate women as a political force, to enable them to go “from Purdah to Parliament.” The CIA understood this. “It is obvious that women are now a very important factor in the nation-building going on in a
large part of the world,” noted one intelligence officer. “The possibility of
developing new techniques to help them find their own role in the hopefully
growing democratic societies is becoming a greater factor all the time.” In other
words, the…engagement in network building, training, and letter writing, all of
which may be interpreted as evidence of a nascent international feminist
consciousness, might also be viewed as clever tactics in the Cold War. (Wilford
2008, 156–57)

As the foreign policy and intelligence establishments began to view women as
agents possessing the capacity to spread democratic and capitalist ideology, they became
keenly aware of the paucity of scholarship on women. If women were to become a
vehicle to reach the minds and hearts of men and children, then social science research on
women in third-world nations could be useful in mapping constructive approaches to this
new mode of ideological struggle. Social science could be tapped to generate better
understandings of the ideological rubrics women find most compelling; how women
partake in certain ideological practices; and how women transmit ideology to their
families. Women were becoming subjects of heightened scholarly interest outside of
feminist circles just at the time that Signs was created.

To avoid an excessive focus on Western women, the Signs editorial staff and
select foundation officials—particularly Mariam Chamberlain and Elinor Barber of
Ford—wanted to highlight scholarship on women from different areas around the world.
Toward that end, they commissioned special issues and sections of Signs on women in
developing countries. Many articles published in the journal were highly critical of
received views, including the WID approach. The scholarly work on women in the third
world that appeared in the pages of Signs was also intensely critical of neoliberal policy,
ideology, and governance. Despite such an explicit critical stance, Signs relied on
monies from private foundations and AID to cover the material costs of production for
most of their special issues. While this funding was given in large part because feminist program officers wanted to support the fledgling journal, the funding was enabled by Ford and Rockefeller Foundations’ conscious identification of “women” and the “third world” as areas of scholarly inquiry of special interest to U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War era. Quite independent of the objectives of journal authors, editors, and individual foundation program officers, Signs was connected to the complex collaborations that linked private foundations to attempts to advance the geopolitical interests of the United States.

The next chapter investigates substantive effects of foundation patronage for feminist scholarship, exploring in detail how philanthropic support for Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society during its first two decades influenced journal content. By illuminating the socialization of intellectual production, the sociology of knowledge lays the groundwork for a very different narrative of the emergence of feminist scholarship. In constructing this narrative, my goal is not to assess the effects of a scholarly focus on women in developing countries on U.S. foreign policy. I am interested in tracing how complex partnerships between philanthropic foundations and the federal government enabled the field formation of academic feminism.

Academic feminism was not built purely on the basis of the intellectual labor of individual minds. Institutions of higher education funded by the federal government and by private philanthropic foundations provided the context in which a new scholarship on women could emerge and circulate globally. Quite apart from the motivations of individual authors or the political commitments of editors or academic institutions, Signs was implicated in foundation-funded efforts to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives.
As a knowledge project, academic feminism was rooted in the geopolitics of the Cold War era. To demonstrate how those roots surfaced in journal content is the task of the next chapter.
Chapter 2

Discerning the Social’s Reach into Feminist Field Formation

What is insurrectionary consciousness in one instance becomes tragic vision in another.
—Edward Said 1983, 226

There is a sense of lack of alternative to the liberal ideology.
—Shirin M. Rai 2002, 109

I appreciate the openness of your response to my suggestion for co-operation between SIGNS and A.I.D. Let me recapitulate it.
—Catharine Stimpson, August 29, 1978

Freedom of ideas is a central tenet of liberal ideology, not only in the sense that government ought not regulate the beliefs or thoughts within a democratic polity, but also in the metaphysical sense that ideas are unfettered. Both the anti-censorship and the autonomy of ideas strands of intellectual freedom have also shaped understandings of feminist scholarship. Whether traced to religious precepts, German idealism, nineteenth-century Romanticism, Freudian stream of consciousness, or scientific claims about the logic of discovery, claims concerning the autonomy of ideas permeate liberal and feminist discourse. Arthur O. Lovejoy’s conceptualization of the history of ideas fits squarely within this tradition, insisting that ideas never move in a predetermined fashion
or direction. Rejecting Hegelian claims about an inherent dialectical movement of ideas, Lovejoy argued that ideas move in a more oscillating manner.

According to that older but now evanescent view, what we chiefly witness, in the temporal sequence of beliefs, doctrines and reasonings, is the working of an immanent dialectic whereby ideas are progressively clarified and problems consecutively get themselves solved, or at least advanced towards less erroneous or inadequate ‘solutions.’ Perhaps the strongest reason why we no longer find this picture of a majestic logical forward movement in history convincing is that we have become increasingly aware of the oscillatory character of much of the history of thought, at least of Western thought, outside the domain of strictly experimental science. (Lovejoy 1940, 20)

In Lovejoy’s view, ideas are not moving dialectically toward ever greater clarification or heightened validity. They have neither a fixed trajectory nor a fixed mooring within a socio-historical epoch. Indeed, in suggesting that ideas have their “own particular ‘go’,” Lovejoy assumes that ideas are unbounded, extending beyond the reach of the social (Lovejoy 1940, 23). The task of the historian of ideas is precisely to trace the oscillating logic of an idea wherever it may lead.

My goal in this chapter is not altogether faithful to Lovejoy’s conception of the history of ideas as an effort to map the underlying logic of particular ideas as they develop through time. Instead, I seek to explore certain feminist ideas in the complex social context of their emergence. In contrast to Lovejoy’s assumption that ideas possess an inherent logic that unfolds quite independent of prevailing socio-political relations within particular historical circumstances, I will show how certain feminist debates are intricately enmeshed in a specific social context—that of the Cold War. In contrast to Lovejoy’s idealist notion that a defining characteristic of ideas is precisely their capacity to extend beyond the boundaries any particular social formation (Lovejoy 1940, 23), I seek to investigate how free the play of feminist ideas has been by examining material
factors that contributed to the generation, publication, and circulation of one strand of feminist scholarship pertaining to discussions of third world women and development (WAD) and in development (WID). Drawing upon the correspondence of *Signs*’ first two editors, Catharine Stimpson and Barbara Gelpi, the editorial staffs between 1975 and 1985, Jean Sacks (the creator of *Signs* at the University of Chicago Press), various editorial boards, authors, private philanthropic foundations (particularly Ford and Rockefeller), and the United States Agency for International Development (AID), this chapter addresses the question of the social’s role in feminist knowledge production. To illuminate unexpected connections between an academic journal devoted to the study of women in culture and society and Cold War politics, I examine the contents of three special issues in *Signs*—*Women and National Development: The Complexities of Change* (Autumn 1977); *Women in Latin America* (Autumn 1979); and *Development and the Sexual Division of Labor* (Winter 1981)—as well as a special section on Women in China (Autumn 1976), and several interchanges on women and population studies appearing in Spring 1976, Summer 1976, and Summer 1977.

In tracing the emergence of development discourse in *Signs*, I will discuss instances in which the conceptualization of development appears over-determined, enmeshed in concrete objectives of philanthropic foundations and government agencies just as the sociology of knowledge predicts. But I will also identify points at which the discussion of development takes unpredictable turns. In those instances, I will follow Lovejoy’s lead and attempt to capture the “particular go” of these feminist oscillations. I will try to distinguish how the social may determine what topics are investigated (i.e., women in developing countries), while it cannot exhaustively determine how those topics
are studied. As a methodological framework, then, the history of ideas, may help illuminate contingencies that enrich our understanding of the scope and originality of feminist knowledge production, while also expanding understanding of what types of labor count as knowledge production.

In addition to assuming the autonomy of ideas, treatments of academic knowledge production in the humanities typically assume a mode of intellectual labor that is largely solitary. When knowledge production is attributed to authors, whether writing alone or in small cohorts, liberal individualist assumptions about creativity are reinscribed, while social aspects of knowledge production associated with editorial decisions and the financial exigencies of publication are masked. For an academic journal such as Signs, the boundaries delineating intellectual labor (authorship) from those labors necessary for publishing and circulating knowledge are messy. Editors, editorial boards, and staffs play critical roles in determining what gets published and thus what circulates as accredited feminist knowledge. Funding to subsidize the publication of special issues cannot easily be isolated from the creative content of the journal when funders play a role in shaping journal content. As I will document, Signs editors sought funds for special issues on topics that foundations identified as areas of particular interest. Foundations exercised a large degree of control over the topics investigated in special issues and a lesser degree of control over how those topics were studied. Throughout the special issue production process, certain foundation program officers remained in direct contact with the editorial staff concerning how the issue was shaping up. Acquiring outside funds, then, affected the development of ideas and theories in the journal. To explore how profoundly the acquisition of outside funding affected the journal’s content is the task of
this chapter. In addition to charting the extent of this intellectual influence on the journal’s pages, I will also consider the implications of this influence for feminist knowledge production more generally.

In tracing how external funding affected knowledge production about third-world women in Signs, I will examine questions concerning the larger interdisciplinary intellectual context in which certain ideas emerged; the nature and quality of relations among ideas, concepts, and theories about third-world women; and why certain ideas, concepts, and theories gained momentum while others fell into oblivion. I will argue that the concepts, theoretical frameworks, and methodologies that receive fairly universal tacit approval in contemporary feminist scholarship can be traced to editorial practices that have largely escaped scrutiny. I will argue not only that foundation funding has influenced the growth and development of feminist scholarship as an intellectual field, but also that the scholarly investigation of socialist models of development was foreclosed in Signs because of Ford and Rockefeller foundation-funding for special issues. Nuanced assessments of the capitalist model of development appeared in these special issues; accounts of socialist alternatives were largely absent. Their absence had multiple dimensions. Women’s experiences of and contributions to socialist developing countries were absent from these special issues as subjects of inquiry and women scholars from these states were absent as authors.

**Signs’ Construction of the International**

The contents of Signs challenge the stock narrative repeatedly. Signs’ early attentiveness to the international dimensions of women’s lives and politics is contrary to
the stock’s rendition that feminist scholarship was not internationally oriented until the late-1980s postcolonial turn in literary theory. Contrary to the received view, Signs published thirteen articles on women living outside of the United States—only one of which was based in Europe, Hélène Cixous’s “Laugh of the Medusa” (Summer 1976) and most of which were on women in China (Autumn 1976)—even before the publication of Women and National Development in the Autumn of 1977. The journal was only in publication for two years at that point. In its very first issue (Autumn 1975), Signs published two pieces by Hanna Papanek, an advisor to UNESCO.4 One concerns how to conduct research on women in Asia, and the other summarizes the UN Conference on Women in Mexico City. Each article is paradigmatic of Signs larger encounter with the international during the journal’s first ten years of publication—rife with contradictions that surfaced recurrently throughout the special issues on developing countries.

Typical of a liberal approach to the question of women and development, Papanek suggests that the best way to study third-world women is through examination of family planning, and the relationship between labor force participation, fertility, and population control (Papanek 1975a, 198). Yet Papanek identifies these concerns as distinctly Western in scope, acknowledging the possibility for different political concerns articulated by third-world women.

Despite the pressures some women exert in the societies of South and Southeast Asia in favor of changes similar to those sought by women in industrialized countries, there is little evidence that the ultimate vision of a new society is the Western industrial model. Women are eager for greater access to education, employment, contraception, protective legislation, etc., to the extent that they have a political voice and consciousness. They remain ambivalent about other changes. In fact, some of the most significant political tensions in these countries arise out of differing perceptions among various groups about how the role of external influences (e.g., “westernization”) affects individual life. (Papanek 1975a, 195)
She notes the importance of highlighting alternatives to the Western development model. Nevertheless, she deems existing alternatives inadequate, for they fail to be centrally concerned with women’s role. “The formulation of alternative models is a central concern of religious and political groups, but the alternatives posed rarely include a specific concern with women’s place in society” (Papanek 1975a, 195). Papanek dismisses these alternatives as a result. She justifies her dismissal on the basis that sexism should be women’s central political concern—regardless of their geographical or geopolitical locale—ironically reinscribing a presumption many third-world women find troubling. Third-world women often view sexism as secondary to political issues concerning poverty, U.S. imperialism, and neoliberalism.

Additionally, while third-world women’s social status matters in terms of their ability to obtain income, feed their families, and survive, a sole concern with social status overlooks the structural forces responsible for their extreme impoverished conditions. Although Papanek never directly addresses these structural forces in her analysis, she brings attention to how the global North creates the international division of labor. “As citizens of the industrialized nations, we do have a responsibility for the impact which our societies have on others, wittingly or unwittingly, through the export of goods and communications, through national or international aid programs, through technical assistance, and so on” (Papanek 1975a, 197). 5

Most of the articles Signs published on women living outside of the United States concern women in the developing world. Almost all of these articles were written by North American and Western European women. 6 In Signs’ first ten years, only five out of approximately forty-five non-special-issue articles on third-world women were written
by third-world women. While this figure excludes special issues, its ratio of first-world to third-world scholars is wholly consistent with them. The special issues and sections are paradigmatic of several larger scholarly trends of the journal concerning: (1) Signs’ discursive sense of the international; (2) the journal’s predication of the category third-world women; and (3) the epistemological and political relationship of third-world women to the category women of color in the journal’s first decade.

Nearly every article written about Western European feminism in the last decades of the twentieth century was written by a Western European scholar (and oftentimes translated by a U.S. scholar). There are fifteen articles about Western European feminism in the journal’s first ten years. Only four articles were written by American scholars; the rest were written by Western Europeans. Although there appears to be less scholarship on European feminism than on third-world women, the editors treated European academics as their scholarly equals, allowing them to shape the terms of their analyses and speak for themselves. By contrast, third-world women were more often treated as objects of inquiry rather than as scholars trusted to assess their own lives and politics. Both Stimpson and Gelpi indicate the ease with which they built scholarly networks with Western European feminist scholars. Gelpi contrasts the straightforwardness of publishing French Feminist theory in Signs \textsuperscript{7} with the near impossibility of cultivating scholarly connections in Iran.

The big point of connection, as we were getting going with the international, was France. I was noticing as I was going through Signs, how big France was! Certainly we were benefiting from networks that Catharine [Stimpson] set up. And I was going to tell you that one of the essays that we had as a backlog was an untranslated Julia Kristeva “Women’s Time.” But also there was a Hélène Cixous connection through Catharine, and […] we got the piece from Hélène Cixous. That’s what made Nan [Keohane] think that we would do a special issue on French Feminist Theory. It was Nan’s idea. So it was on the basis of
conference groundwork and connecting with friends that we had the material and the contacts to get the French Feminist Theory issue. I can remember, it was very, very hard, we knew that things were going on in the Middle East...to get some regular correspondence from there was very hard. We never got an international conference there.8

Stimpson’s meditation on Signs’ sense of the international was far less precise.

Nevertheless, Western Europe’s omnipresence in her reminiscence is notable, especially given the fact that she published two special issues on women in developing countries.

Stimpson recalls,

I lived abroad. I was an internationalist by inclination, internationalist by temperament, an internationalist by happiness. Domna [Stanton, Senior Editor of Signs while the journal was at Barnard] and I knew stuff was going on. I mean it was percolating across the Atlantic. It was there, and you had to be blind not to notice. Domna, of course, was an internationalist, Greek by birth, French by training. We knew things were happening. That’s what editors are supposed to do. We also knew that, in terms of feminism, things were happening elsewhere. Something else that I think is crucial is we were in New York, and people were coming through. It was a global crossroads. We knew people; we met people. We were at an international university [Barnard College–Columbia University]. It was a matter of conviction about where thought lay. We knew Hélène Cixous was writing; we knew Kristeva was writing; we knew Juliet Mitchell was writing; we knew the Italians were writing. We picked it up. We knew it was happening. We published the first English translation of Cixous, but that was Domna. We knew something was happening; we knew it was important.9

Although Western Europe figured prominently in Gelpi’s and Stimpson’s conception of the international, it would be inaccurate to suggest the journal privileged the study of Western European women and feminism. Articles with a European focus appear with far less frequency than articles on third-world women. But Stimpson and Gelpi framed the journal’s relationships with Western European scholars quite differently than their relationships with third-world scholars. Where European scholars were seen as part of existing American–operated international scholarly networks, third-world women were viewed as absent from and fairly impossible to include in scholarly networks. Thus,
the story goes, American and Western European scholars were left with no choice but to
describe and analyze third-world women’s conditions of existence (to engage third-world
women on an ontological level) rather than taking them seriously as intellectuals in their
own right (to engage them on a methodological and epistemological level).

Although Signs published a great deal of material on third-world women—and
thus on women of color living outside the United States—it published very little on U.S.
women of color. In its first five years, the journal published only four articles explicitly
pertaining to U.S. women of color: “A Response to Inequality: Black Women, Racism,
and Sexism,” by Diane K. Lewis (Winter 1977); “An Assessment of the Black Female
Prisoner in the South,” by Laurence French (Winter 1977); “The Dialectics of Black
Womanhood,” by Bonnie Thornton Dill (Spring 1979); and “Family Roles, Occupational
Statuses, and Achievement Orientations among Black Women in the United States,” by
Movement: A Case Study,” by Susan H. Hertz (Spring 1977), tangentially included a
discussion of U.S. women of color. During the subsequent five years, under Gelpi’s
editorship, the appearance of U.S. women of color did not much increase. From 1980 to
1985, the journal published only four articles pertaining to U.S. women of color: “Native
American Women,” by Rayna Green (Winter 1980); “An Interview with Audre Lorde,”
Audre Lorde and Adrienne Rich (Summer 1981); “Mexican-American Women in the
Social Sciences,” by Maxine Baca Zinn (Winter 1982); and “Black Matrilineage: The
Case of Alice Walker and Zora Neale Hurston,” by Dianne F. Sadoff (Autumn 1985).
Stimpson characterized Signs’ approach to diversity in terms of the international: “In
terms of international, we brought in enormous numbers of women of color through our
international board, and particularly through our women and development issue." Thus she presumed sufficient equivalence between women of color in the United States and women across the global South, that inclusion of one might off-set the absence of the other.

**Reconceptualizing Intellectual Labor**

The process of extricating texts from one set of sociohistoric contexts and presenting them for interpretation elsewhere involves complex institutional and organizational practices…[that include] scholars, journalists, state watchdogs, censors, reviewers, publishers, editors, translators, reading publics, accountants, marketing managers, and advertisers.

—Susan Gal 2003, 93–94

A study of *Signs* requires attention to the complex institutional and organizational contexts Gal catalogs. For *Signs*, these contexts include editors, the University of Chicago Press, and foundations, as well as authors. A study of *Signs* leaving out any of these dimensions would be incomplete. *Signs* was initially the brainchild of Jean Sacks, Assistant Director of the University of Chicago Press and Manager of its Journal Division. In the late spring of 1974, only one year before the journal began production, Sacks met Catharine Stimpson, Assistant Professor of English at Barnard College-Columbia University, at a conference titled “The Scholar and the Feminist,” held at Stimpson’s home institution each year during the 1970s. Sacks was, in the words of Stimpson, checking her out for her ability and willingness to edit *Signs*, an interdisciplinary journal on women. Stimpson tells the story of their meeting:

My meeting with Jean Sacks has entered the realm of personal mythology. I had organized “The Scholar and the Feminist Conference,” and Jean appeared….
Jean was at lunch, and I believe we met each other at lunch…. I had no idea that she was looking me over [to serve as editor-in-chief of Signs]…. The story, I think, is true…. As soon as [Sacks] started to check me out, we just got along. When she went to check me out [with other scholars]…the question was: Did I know anything about social science? Was I really interdisciplinary? And they put their little right hands up, they crossed fingers of their left hand—yes, yes, of course she does, of course she does, please, please know something about social science. I don’t know; I always prized curiosity as a child. I would read encyclopedias, so I guess I was not an altogether stupid choice to edit an interdisciplinary journal.11

Sacks eventually invited Stimpson to edit the journal, which at that point was tentatively titled Synthesis, and Stimpson agreed. Stimpson could not obtain leave from her teaching duties at Barnard to start-up the journal, however. Sacks advised Stimpson to write the Ford Foundation and request money to relieve her of teaching duties so that she could devote her time exclusively to the journal’s production. Stimpson followed Sacks’ advice and in early June wrote Ford Program Officer Miriam Chamberlain requesting money to relieve her from teaching for at least one year.12 The resulting correspondence marked the beginning of a mutually constitutive relationship between Signs and Ford that would last throughout the journal’s first decade. Stimpson ends her first letter to Chamberlain: “I would very much appreciate whatever ideas you might have on the subject [referring to scholarship on women] or about the journal in general. What, if I might put it this way, would you like to read?”

Chamberlain was a well-known supporter of women in higher education and women’s studies. Even so, she was reticent about the journal’s capacity for long-term success. Her reticence was compounded by the fact that foundations rarely, if ever, provided start-up funds for academic journals and never usually covered journal production costs.13 Referring to two already-existing journals on scholarship pertaining to women, Chamberlain asks Stimpson about Feminist Studies edited by Ann
Calderwood and Women’s Studies edited by Wendy Martin and how “the new journal relates to these and what specific need it is intended to fill.” 14 Stimpson dissociates Signs from these two journals by distancing the potential scholarly legacy of Signs from their more overtly feminist political tracks. 15 Stimpson did not want her journal regarded as feminist. Signs should preserve the category of women as its central focus but not be feminist-identified: “It was my belief, which I still subscribe to, that we could be rational and scholarly and no one could accuse us of polemic or ideology. Yes, we were feminist, but this was not a feminist journal. And it was that delicate balance we always struggled to create and to sustain.” 16 Stimpson’s response to Chamberlain’s queries must have been agreeable, as Chamberlain encouraged Stimpson to apply for the Ford Venture Grant, which Stimpson did. She successfully obtained Ford Foundation Grant # 745–0704 in the amount of $5,000.00 for the period of September 1, 1974 through August 31, 1975. 17

By initiating a relationship with Ford, Sacks and Stimpson instigated a form of labor accounting for the rapid initial success of Signs and sustaining the journal through its first ten years of publication: the securing of outside funding. 18 The labors of securing outside funding included: networking and developing special relationships with individual foundation program officers who shared the journal’s vision of field formation; authoring grant proposals according to the new, more rigorous standards set forth by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (TRA 1969); developing continued correspondence with foundation program officers by updating them on the progress of funded projects; and presenting foundations with a finished product. The editorial teams of both Stimpson and Gelpi actively took part in the various labors of securing outside funding.
Signs thus played a noteworthy role in animating a distinct form of labor power for feminist scholarship: the acquisition of funding from outside sources, most usually philanthropies, for start-up funds and continued financial assistance. Several grants funded extra pages for the journal; others contributed to production costs, author honoraria, and conferences from which papers for special issues would be published. From the period of 1974 to 1980, the Signs journal was awarded seven grants, three of which were from Ford and one each from Rockefeller, the Exxon Foundation, the Lilly Foundation, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).19 Even though Rockefeller awarded Signs only one grant during its first five years of publication, Rockefeller provided the largest portion of funds for the conference on Women and National Development at Wellesley College from June 2nd–6th, 1976. Papers selected from this conference eventually appeared in the renowned special issue Women and National Development: The Complexities of Change (Autumn 1977).

The relatively small monetary amounts of these grant requests were intentional and strategic, as smaller grants were much easier for foundations to award and administer. One of Stanford’s managing editors, Margery Wolf, devised a fitting name for this strategy of acquiring funds: the strategy of piecemeal. In a memorandum to the Stanford editorial team, she insists, “Smaller budgets go down better these days and it is conceivable that we can get funding for all of these projects piecemeal.”20

As Signs came into being in the 1970s, the relationship between philanthropies and their scholarly patrons was shifting rapidly. Foundations were using every avenue possible to shake their reputations as tainted in response to accusations of corruption, favoritism, and misspent funds. In 1961, amidst these accusations, the foundations
became subject to an eight-year inquiry initiated by Congressman Wright Patman into their grantmaking and management practices (Frumkin 1999, 70). In this context, Stimpson’s feminist colleagues called on her to address the tainted reputation of the philanthropies she used to fund Signs. Feminist Studies and Women’s Studies refused to accept, in the words of Stimpson, “tainted money.”

Stimpson elaborates on her controversial decision to accept money from Ford:

The question of the Ford Foundation was a fraught one because the women’s studies program at San Diego State had to turn down tainted Ford Foundation money. There was a real question of whether you should take tainted money. Remember this is coming out of the sixties, and the great majority of people in women’s studies came from the heartland. I had no qualms whatsoever. It wouldn’t have worked unless it could be financially self-sustaining. Was I going to go take axe-murderers’ money? No.

Stimpson explains that accepting outside funding marked her as “unsisterly”:

People were angry at us. The people from Feminist Studies were angry at us because it had been started by a woman named Ann Calderwood with no institutional backing. I remember Heidi Hartmann scolding me saying this was a sellout. You’re going with an institution. You should be giving all of your resources to Ann. And I said “no,” this is what it is. We have been asked to do it; we’re not going to give up this opportunity. I was quite, I will quote, “unsisterly.” I said “no,” we are trying to make a different kind of statement about the relationship of the new scholarship about women to existing scholarship. We are outside and inside simultaneously.

Analytically speaking, the taint critique reveals little about the actual relationships fostered between private philanthropy and agents of feminist field formation. In fact, it functions to conceal specific components of these relationships. During the time when Signs was initiating a relationship with Ford and Rockefeller in the 1970s, Patman’s investigation culminated in TRA 1969, which regulated foundation spending and facilitated foundations’ rapid professionalization. Through the imperative of “expenditure responsibility” (Frumkin 1999, 74), “foundations,” Peter Frumkin argues,
“were moving toward a more engaged grantmaking style in which grantees are closely monitored in their work and foundations offer support and resources to those carrying out programs” (Frumkin 1999, 78). This new relationship was regulated at every stage of the funding process, including: discerning which topics should receive funding; which proposals are worthy of funding; how and at which points the grantee should be evaluated throughout the period of the grant’s administration; and how the grantee should be evaluated at the end of the grant’s term. This more engaged grantmaking style emerging as a result of TRA 1969 translated into detailed grant proposals and more regularized correspondence between the foundations and the grantee at every phase of the philanthropic relationship. For Signs, this meant that Stimpson and Gelpi were in very close contact with Ford Program Officers Miriam Chamberlain and Elinor Barber and Rockefeller Program Officer Rebecca Painter.

After Signs moved from Barnard to Stanford, the Stanford editorial team published eight—an impressive number of—special issues, several of which received funding over the $30,000 mark. In its acquisition of these sizeable monetary amounts, Stanford’s Center for Research on Women (CROW) took the labor power of acquiring outside funds to an entirely new level, largely with the help of two individuals: John Ritchie and Ellen Williams. Ritchie and Williams worked in a division in Stanford’s administration known as “Sponsored Projects,” and their task was to advise faculty on the procedures for applying for grants. Ritchie and Williams came from a long history of Stanford expertise in obtaining outside funds. As Rebecca S. Lowen (1997) argues in Creating the Cold War University, Stanford quickly emerged as an elite university during the Cold War era because it successfully mapped its intellectual terrains to fit within the
needs of a U.S. foreign policy establishment willing to subsidize research aiding the war
effort.

Ritchie and Williams advised Gelpi to obtain funding from both Ford and
Rockefeller under the aegis of CROW, directed by Myra Strober. Philanthropies donated
large sums of money more willingly to research institutions than journals, Ritchie and
Williams said. In an undated memorandum Gelpi refers to the advice of Ritchie and
Williams as the “Ritchie/Williams suggestion.” She remarks: “All of you have been told
of the Ritchie/Williams suggestion that under the aegis of CROW Signs apply for seed
money to fund three conferences—one on violence, one on religion, and one on
biological theory—over the next three years.”29 Stanford’s CROW was able to obtain
seed money for more than just three conferences, which explains its prolific publication
of special issues. When Strober introduced the Ritchie/Williams suggestion to
representatives from Ford and Rockefeller, they were so taken with the idea they
suggested the possibility of mutually funding “a series of CROW/Signs conferences,”30
which would eventually be published as special issues. Following the Ritchie/Williams
suggestion, each grant Rockefeller made to CROW for Signs conferences ranged from
$32,000 to $35,000, grants substantially larger than Barnard’s editorial team obtained.31
The success of Gelpi’s editorial team in securing substantial monetary amounts from the
foundations demonstrates that institutional contexts matter concerning the labor power
involved in attaining outside funds.

The labors of securing outside funds required that Signs participate in an
exceptionally complex matrix of scholarly labor, far more complicated than typical
conceptions of scholarly labor encapsulate. Typical conceptions of scholarly labor view
it as being largely individual and atomistic, evoking images of the lone scholar hard at work in an archive, having no contact with the outside world. The scholarly labor bringing Signs into being involved the participation of several different persons and institutions. Only the journal’s authors could be said to mimic more typical conceptions of scholarly labor. The journal’s labor power was more collective in character, involving editors, the University of Chicago Press, foundations, and authors. Philanthropy was a crucial agent of this collective labor, providing material resources to launch the journal and to underwrite the journal’s production costs for select special issues. Major philanthropic foundations implicitly and explicitly guided certain of the journal’s scholarly contours.

Exploring the Consequences of a Capitalist Intellectual Collective

In the exceptionally small academic arena of journals publishing work on women, Signs was a pioneer in studying women in developing countries. During its first ten years of publication, the journal published three major special issues on the topic: Women and National Development: The Complexities of Change (Autumn 1977); Women in Latin America (Autumn 1975); and Development and the Sexual Division of Labor (Winter 1981). The publication of these special issues goes against the descriptive grain of the stock narrative. The stock narrative maintains that feminist scholars did not study women of color until after the publication of This Bridge Called My Back (1981), and that feminist scholars did not study women living outside of North America and Western Europe until the late 1980s after the postcolonial turn in literary theory. Signs was
studying women of color living outside North America and Western Europe as early as 1976.

*Signs*’ studies of women in developing countries were not disinterested, however. As acknowledged, the federal government and private foundations increasingly envisioned third-world women as primary ideological agents for capitalism in developing countries. To cultivate women’s potential as transmitters of ideology, studies were needed to understand how third-world women engaged certain ideologies in the context of their daily lives through the inculcation of belief-systems, ideological moorings, culture, ethnicity, nationality, and religion. To develop systemic overviews of women’s public and private lives across the global South would require interdisciplinary methodologies. Journals such as *Signs* could be optimal venues for the recruitment of scholars from different disciplines to publish their scholarship on third-world women. With these objectives in mind, Ford and Rockefeller provided funds for *Signs* to publish three special issues on women in developing countries

**The Wellesley conference**

The most renowned of the conferences-turned-special-issues was *Women and National Development* (1977). Rockefeller funded the conference, which was held at Wellesley College in 1975. Ford then funded production costs for the special issue published two years later. The Wellesley conference took place within the context of larger tensions occurring between first-world and third-world women. Reminiscent of the UN Conference on Women in Mexico City preceding it, the political and scholarly agenda of the Wellesley Conference reflected a conception of third-world women’s interests and needs based almost entirely on the perceptions of first-world scholars.
However sophisticated their analyses of the third-world women’s lives, first-world scholars oftentimes—but not always—prioritized the issue of gender inequality. Women from the third-world prioritized several political issues above gender inequality, however: class inequalities, neoliberalism (its structural adjustment policies), globalization (its production of the international division of labor, characterized by migrant labor, intensification of already-existing agricultural regimes of labor, and extreme exploitation by multinational corporations), neocolonialism, U.S. imperialism, racism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia. In its own distinctive way, the Wellesley conference replicated the problem of ventriloquism: American and Western European women spoke for third-world women whose voices were silenced. This ventriloquism set in motion discursive processes with long-lasting effects for *Signs*.

Several distinguished feminist scholars from the South, Nawal El Sadawi from Egypt, Fatima Mernissi from Morocco, and Mallica Vajarathon from Thailand published a cogent critique of the Wellesley conference that illuminated conflicts occurring on three levels: “The first level of conflict related to the content, or the choice of issues given priority by the conference organizers; the second level centered around the organization and the structure of the conference; and the third level was that of personal interaction, or the lack of it” (El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon 1978, 103).

The small number of third-world women represented at the conference challenged the possibility for meaningful international cooperation. According to El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon,

The number of women from developing countries involved at the levels of organizing, panel convening and paper giving was ridiculously small. Third World contribution was minor, especially if you take into account that most individuals involved on substantive levels were either Westerners based in or
outside of the U.S., or women from developing countries based in the U.S., often for many years. (El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon 1978, 104–105)

While there were approximately eighty-five papers presented at the conference, fifty-three were presented by scholars located in the United States. Scholars in attendance from third-world countries included Neuma Aguiar from Brazil; Keziah Awosika from Nigeria; Rafiqul Huda Chaudhury from Bangladesh; Elu du Lenero and Maria del Carmen from Mexico; Katherine Gilfeather from Chile; Rounaq Jahan from Bangladesh; Larissa Lomnitz from Mexico; Marjorie Mblinye from Tanzania (the only socialist country represented at the conference); Oey Astra Meesook from Thailand; Omolara Ogundipe-Leslie from Nigeria; Christine Oppong from Ghana; Heleieth I.B. Saffioti from Brazil; Lotika Sarkar from India; Dina Sheik el Din from the Sudan; Zenebework Tadesse from Ethiopia; and Mazida Zakaria from Malaysia. Third World scholars who attended the conference and whose papers were published in the special issue included Achola O. Pala from Kenya; Lourdes Arizpe from Mexico; Deniz Kandiyoti from Turkey; Fatima Mernissi from Morocco; Elizabeth Jelin from Argentina; Glaura Vasques de Miranda from Brazil; and Mary Chamie from Jordan.33

Mernissi, in particular, tried directly addressing this “second level” of conflict (El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon 1978, 103), which pertained to the absence of third-world women at the level of conference organization. Mernissi corresponded personally with Stimpson concerning the conference’s foreclosure of genuine “international cooperation.”34 When Mernissi spoke with one of the head conference organizers about her disappointment at not having a more central role in the conference’s administration, she met with the silencing accusation that she was simply hungry for international
academic fame. In a handwritten note to Stimpson, she recounts her unpleasant experience.

One of the organizers told me when I went to talk to her at the end of the conference that all I wanted, all that motivated my behavior[,] was personal enhancement of my career which takes the form evidently in her American academic world of a “scalping” of the colleagues. What she does not know is that in my academic system I am a civil servant who is given tenure automatically after two years and I don’t have to prove myself on the local scene. At age 36 I have reached the top. I don’t have to produce anything at all. I don’t have to scalp anyone because I am in a bureaucracy and most developed countries have a similar system. Her own personal academic surroundings prevented her from seeing what was happening was anything but a personal fight for “limelight.” These are some of the problems which could have been discussed in Wellesley on an international level with [the] academically trapped professional woman exposing her local structure and trying to see how we, as women, could change or influence and better the system. Most of what was happening with the international women’s gathering is due partially to the influence of [the] academic, financial, organization [of the] American internal [setup], because in the present conjecture the American woman’s contribution to voicing the women’s problem is vital and more important than any other. And this is itself a positive thing if American women succeed (with others) in tempering the negative interference of [the] “American way of life” in the nascent international cooperation [where distinguishing between carrier and course is vital. [It is almost impossible to change the American system unless] there is a will to change it. This is the broader context where Wellesley and its outcome, including the [Signs] publication, ought to be viewed.35

The conference organizers attempted to decontextualize Mernissi’s criticisms by framing them as strictly personal, even though what was personal was geopolitical. They failed to acknowledge that her correspondence took place within the context of vast differentials in global power, resources, and social, cultural, political, and economic capital. Mernissi reiterates this conference criticism in her co-written reflection:

The response of the organizers to dissident Third World participants was to criticize them on a personal level. By doing so, they gave the impression that what was preventing international dialogue between women was a matter of individuals and personality defects, rather than political differences and questions of global structures, values, choices and priorities. (El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon 1978, 106)
What El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon make clear is that third-world feminists attended the conference with the expectation that they would hear about capitalism’s production of the third world in the West.

One of the topics on which the Third World women expected information was how the development process, geared to the priorities of the multinational corporations, affected American women of different classes and races, and the mechanisms which make American women powerless in the system. (El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon 1978, 103)

This topic directs attention toward the underlying causes of capitalist inequality in an era of neoliberalism and interrogates how capitalism produces similar types of lived experiences for the most subjugated individuals living in both the first world and the third world. Instead, at the conference,

The women from industrially developed countries focused their attention on the oppressive conditions of women in developing countries; the causes of oppression became secondary. For example, discussion about the effects of so-called “development” and “modernization” on the degrading economic conditions of women in developing countries was not linked to economic/political factors such as the role of the multinational corporation. When Third World women tried to attract attention to the role of the multinationals, they were accused of being nonfeminist; of imitating the male in his political games; and “splitting the spirit of sisterhood in the Women’s Movement.” (El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon 1978, 103)

Much of El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon’s critique was directed at first-world conference participants who failed to hear third-world women and who ignored the intellectual frameworks and structural analyses emanating from the global South. By imputing venal motives to those who raised critical questions, conference organizers shored up liberal premises underlying academic debates at the conference. By invoking “the spirit of sisterhood,” conference organizers circumscribed the parameters of social change to the level of affect, a level at great remove from the structural transformations demanded by conference participants from the South. Mary Hawkesworth (2006) has
warned against liberal feminist efforts to fit the politics of third-world women too firmly
within a dialectics of voice, wherein the coming to voice of third-world women is viewed
as a political panacea.

The metaphor of subaltern speech may create the mistaken impression that all that is required for social transformation is to hear voices of the oppressed. By situating social change within a voluntarist framework, metaphors of speech and voice appeal to the individualist premises that undergird liberalism and neoliberalism. They support hypotheses attributing the failure to hear the voices of the South to attitudinal problems (indifference, hostility) or narrow self-interests of white, middle-class, Western feminists, masking the structural forces that constrain feminist activism. Thus they make it appear that poverty could be remedied if Northern feminists set their minds to the task. But even if every feminist in the world willed the end of poverty, structural forces operating beyond the level of individual intention would have far more influence on the fate of poverty than feminist good will. (Hawkesworth 2006, 138)

El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon’s critique of the Wellesley conference raises an additional concern about the politics of listening. Words unheard can entail a politics of erasure. Settling for token representation of third-world women in the context of ventriloquism, first-world feminists mask the profound structural forces shaping their interactions—such as neoliberalism and U.S. imperialism—while silencing voices that might disrupt the mock performance of global sisterhood.

The special issue

Stimpson and her editorial team selected papers “some months before the conference” (McAlpin, Stimpson, and Stanton 1977, ix) to be revised for publication in Women and National Development. These papers were chosen by a selection committee—appointed by the Signs editorial team, ostensibly on the basis of regional expertise—that included Ximena Bunster B., Carolyn M. Elliot, Michelle McAlpin, who served as the committee chair, Achola O. Pala, Hanna Papanek, Helen I. Safa, Stimpson, Niara Sudarkasa, and Roxane Witke. The selection criteria for which papers were
included in the special issue are not entirely clear, although Heleieth I. B. Saffioti, a conference participant whose article was not chosen for publication, has some ideas as to why her paper was excluded.

Saffioti’s omission from the special issue is noteworthy given the fact that, during the 1970s, she was considered one of the top three scholars working internationally in the field of women-and-development studies. Saffioti is best known for her scholarly work on how capitalism extracted women from the production process and marginalized them in the private sphere of the family as a reserve labor force. Saffioti wrote a response to Signs Managing Editor Sandra Whistler’s request for an abstract of her paper to be published at the end of the special issue, along with all of the other abstracts of papers not selected for publication. She refused to send an abstract and challenged the selection committee’s apparently capitalistic criteria for publishable material.

It is very easy to conclude, reading your letter, about the criteria used by the editorial committee in judging my paper. That is a shame to be obliged to recognize that the ideological criteria are predominant all over the world, even in the U.S. The whole “free world” is a huge dictatorship. I can understand this very well in terms of government, but it hurts to see the same phenomenon inside the heads of the so-called intellectuals.

Your letter was not a surprise. Observing the reaction of some influential people at the conference, I could anticipate this decision. I was invited to present a theoretical paper at the opening session of the Wellesley Conference by people who knew very well that I am a Marxist. What did they expect to hear and read from me? I played the role I was supposed to play. Was that too much for the American “democracy”? I am absolutely sure I can publish this paper here [in Brazil], under a military dictatorship.

I thank you so much, but I am not interested in the abstract.

The end of your letter is very cynical. What contribution do you expect from me in the future? Are all the members of the editorial committee praying in order to change my ideological beliefs and my conceptual universe? Give up this idea. Less than a month ago I lost the only son I had because he did not accept the social injustices of the capitalist world. He committed suicide because he, only 17 years old, could not wait for better times and had not had time to learn how to coexist with all the contradictions of our society. This will give me force to go on with my work, fight even more against the social injustices.
Don’t worry about me: 1) there are many important things in life besides
an article; 2) I can publish this paper in several countries.
The only thing, reading your letter again, that makes me feel very sorry is
your demonstration that you are all closed in your class position and very far from
the mental attitude that would permit you to help not only the process of liberation
of women but also the process of liberation of the human being.
I hope the committee can, at least, comprehend my position in this letter. I
can understand yours because I always knew that the class affiliation is much
stronger than pertaining (involuntarily) to a sex category. Your letter gave me
more data to confirm my thesis. Even intellectuals behave this way. Thank you
for the empirical data.
Please, show this letter to the whole committee.38

Saffioti’s critique of the selection criteria for the special issue goes beyond the critique of
El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon. Her critique hones in on the special issue’s refusal
to publish scholarly work falling outside the capitalistic purview. Explicit criticisms of
U.S. imperialism are unwelcome, Saffioti notes. Where El Sadawi, Mernissi, and
Vajarathon mention the existence of alternatives to capitalist development only briefly,
Saffioti focused her critique on the prerequisite of capitalist commitments as a condition
for publication in the issue. Any work that deviated from, much less challenged,
capitalist frameworks for development were excluded from the special issue. El Sadawi,
Mernissi, and Vajarathon had pointed out the absence of women from socialist states: “It
is worth mentioning that the regions of the world where change in women’s condition has
been a priority for their governments over the last decades, i.e., the socialist countries,
were hardly represented at all” (El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon 1978, 105). Their
absence from the conference ensured that there could be no discussion of how socialist
governments had improved women’s condition.
The absence of any serious discussion of alternatives to capitalist development at
the conference or in the pages of the special issue contribute to a mystification of the
causes underlying inequalities produced within the international capitalist system and the
effects these structural forces have on third-world women. The absence of socialist approaches creates the false impression that struggles over development and decolonization had little to do with the Cold War and the behemoth struggles between capitalism and communism.39 As Rai has noted, this impression is markedly distorted:

The process of decolonization took place within two overlapping contexts. The first was that of the Second World War and the emerging post-war world order, with the deepening ideological fissures between the socialist world and the western capitalist world. The second was that of the particular national movements, and of the process through which these achieved nationhood. (Rai 2002, 45)40

Within the colonized world, many framed their movements for national liberation through socialist discourse. Many third-world women developed their political priorities within the context of nationalist and socialist discourses. The absence of socialism from a special issue on third-world women renders these complex political commitments invisible.

Socialism: The Present Absence

The absence of socialism in Signs was not limited to Women and National Development, however. All but one special issue, Development and the Sexual Division of Labor (Winter 1981), which was funded by the Wenner-Gren Foundation rather than Ford or Rockefeller, ignored the prevalence of socialism, communism, socialist countries, and the socialist alternative to development.41 Even in the context of this special issue, only two articles, both by Elizabeth J. Croll, are devoted to the manifestation of socialist development in several countries: the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and Tanzania (see Croll 1981a; Croll 1981b). Given that a significant portion of the developing world was socialist, this is a curious omission.
Overlooking socialism may appear business as usual for U.S. feminist scholarship. Consider the near complete erasure of socialist feminist systems theories (single, dual, and unified), object relations theory, and certain versions of standpoint epistemology in contemporary feminist theory. Several feminist scholars have been critical of Marxism’s presumption of the dialectical movement of ideas and social formations teleologically toward a perfect socialist state. Numerous scholars have also repudiated Marxism’s granting the proletarian subject the epistemic vantage point of objectivity. But critiques of certain aspects of Marxian theory should not be conflated with a total rejection of Marxism and its philosophical presuppositions. My concern here is not whether socialism and Marxism are viable theories and methodologies for illuminating women’s oppression. My concern is when and under what conditions debates over such questions are allowed to arise in feminist academic circles.

In the 1970s the United States was involved in a Cold War that pitted the capitalist model of development and the socialist model of development against one another. As feminist scholarship was emerging, socialism was a viable alternative to capitalism and the dominant social reality for a large portion of the world’s population. Socialism afforded diverse schemes for development adopted in the specific circumstances of many nations. When the socialist model of development is not considered in the context of its national, geographical, and cultural peculiarities, the multiplicity of socialist experiences are erased. Socialism instead becomes a lifeless theoretical framework placing too much faith in historical materialism and making too little recognition of the spontaneity and contingency of socialist politics as lived phenomena.
What might contemporary feminist analyses of socialism be like if scholars addressed socialism as variously lived practices rather than as a singular mode of thought? Most historical studies of socialist feminism focus on women in European (usually Western European) countries prior to the Second World War. *Signs* published two such studies: “Socialism and Feminism in Imperial Germany” by Karen Honeycutt (Autumn 1979), and “Working-Class and Peasant Women in the Russian Revolution, 1917–1923” by Barbara Evans Clements (Winter 1982). In the Western European context, socialism generally referred to formal and informal activities comprising working-class movements, which were social democratic, communist, or anarchist. These movements comprised local units, youth groups, cultural organizations, trade unions, labor organizations, cooperative societies, and tenants’ associations. Socialism in developing countries involved a different set of definitional referents related to nationalist and anticolonial revolutionary movements, as well as decolonization.

Studies of Western European women’s participation in socialist movements are nevertheless useful in that they provide glimpses of how feminist scholarship has captured socialism’s complex and multilayered character in specific contexts. In principle, such attentiveness to complexity could be extended to studies of women and socialism in the developing world. These Western European studies highlight the relationship of working-class organizations to gender; the role accorded women by working-class movements, political parties, trade unions, and other Left associations; representations of women in socialist discourses; the relationship between socialist feminist rhetoric and socialist feminist realities; how definitions of femininity and masculinity are used as mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion in the workplace, at
home, and in the political arena; how socialist states’ sexual prescriptions are more often directed solely at women and not men; the relationship between liberal feminists (fighting for legal equality) and socialist feminists (fighting for social welfare); women’s failed attempt to create a Women’s International within the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) and the Communist International (Comintern); how women’s politics in socialist movements were more effective when women chose issues within their assigned spheres, such as maternity, women’s health and welfare, child care, and protective legislation; the increased rationalization of the private sphere (particularly concerning the question of whether socialist attempts to reform family life and health were steps toward increasing the welfare state or the authoritarian means of surveillance and control over women bodies); the devoted work of women’s organizations in exposing antidemocratic practices of working-class movements and parties (the growth and entrenchment of parties in bureaucratic practices, which lead to oligarchy, a growing intolerance of diverse views on movement tactics, and democratic centralism); and nationally specific articulations of socialist feminist struggles.43

Even Croll’s (1981a; 1981b) brief treatment of socialism in Signs demonstrates that the socialist model of development was extremely diverse in its administration in different developing countries. Given that the socialist model of development was frequently interarticulated with nationalist anticolonial revolutionary movements, studies of socialist administrations required cultural sensitivity from the very start. By contrast, it was only after the multiple failures of “development” in the 1960s that development agencies and foundations acknowledged the need for capitalist development programs to be administered with cultural sensitivity.
Socialism was not below the radar for either Stimpson’s or Gelpi’s editorial teams. Signs published a special section on The People’s Republic of China in Autumn 1976.44 One article by Phyllis Andors (1976), “Politics of Chinese Development: The Case of Women, 1960–1966,” affirmed “Chinese development” as an alternative mode of socialist development to the Soviet Union’s.45 Under Gelpi’s editorship, Signs appealed to Rockefeller for conference support and a special issue on women in socialist countries that was never published. In an undated memorandum from Marjory Wolf to the rest of the editorial staff, Wolf noted that,

> We would like to commission five to seven papers from Western scholars on research on women in the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe, Tanzania, Cuba, etc. We would then circulate those papers to some ten scholars from those countries and invite them to a conference at Stanford in which they could critique this research, add to it, revise it, and point to the new directions in their countries.46

In a letter to Rockefeller, dated April 3, 1981, Gelpi states,

> In early spring of 1983, we are making plans for another conference, this one on Women in Socialist Countries…. This subject would make it possible to address controversial questions about the relationship between feminist and socialist theory and to compare women’s situations in developing and industrial societies. We hope to exchange information on women in countries that are attracting a good deal of investigation (China, the Soviet Union, and Cuba) as well as those countries that have been insufficiently considered, such as the Eastern European nations, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Tanzania.47

Rockefeller never funded a conference on women in socialist countries.

Rockefeller program officer Rebecca Painter instead proposed that the conference on women in socialist countries be replaced by one on communities of women.48 The most notable component of this switch in topics—from a conference on women in socialist countries to one on women and communities—is the non-critical emphasis on private property Stanford makes in its proposal to Rockefeller. This emphasis is entirely
antithetical to the critique of private property at the core of socialist theory. Focusing on private property could not be analytically further from socialism’s concern with collective ownership of the means of production. Socialist theory would not view private property as a means to women’s empowerment, which is exactly how it came to be viewed at the Communities of Women conference.

In the proposal, private property is framed as a primary vehicle through which autonomy is actualized. “Property, a significant issue in all thinking about women, has an important relationship to autonomy since the site of a woman’s community may be a piece of real estate owned outright by its members…or may be the area such as that of a harem to which a community is assigned.”

Gelpi continues with questions that conference participants are encouraged to address in their papers:

Juxtaposition of concepts about autonomy with those related to property raises useful questions. To give just a few examples: What historically have been the economic and social conditions in which it is possible for women to hold property in their own right? How much does full ownership of its site affect a community’s sense of its autonomy? How closely is the ownership of property tied to the establishment of authority? What rationale for the acquisition of property by a women’s community has been most successful? Are women more likely to obtain property if their stated purpose in doing so is philanthropic? Religious? Economic? Political? Cultural?

Rockefeller ended up awarding Stanford slightly over $32,000 to cover conference and publication costs.

What is significant about Painter’s suggestion that Communities of Women concern itself with private property is her demonstrated interested in how women’s collectivities succeed through capitalist means of individualized private ownership, a staple of the capitalist model of development. In the 1980s, when the Gelpi-Painter interchange occurred, in the foundation worldview, capitalism provided the only feasible,
long-term solution to the problem of third-world development. On the one hand, the foundations maintained a disapproving posture toward socialism. On the other hand, the foundations were also developing a critical posture toward the rapid increases in poverty, starvation, homelessness, and illiteracy occurring amidst the growing contradictions of capitalist neoliberalism. Several foundations envisioned a new role, funding explorations of socially just alternatives to the United States’ latest solution to the problem of third-world development: neoliberal state formation. Through an examination of private property, Painter imagined the special issue as making a small contribution toward resolving the stark inequalities women experience in an era of unchecked neoliberalism.

**A capitalist fixation**

*Signs* received funding from Ford and Rockefeller Foundations to publish scholarship on third-world women, yet the methodologies used by *Signs* authors went well beyond the “Women in Development” (WID) approach that Naila Kabeer (2003, 27) has aptly described as “liberal feminism writ global.” WID surfaced in development policy discourse in 1974, one year before the UN World Conference on Women and the Wellesley conference. WID provides a liberal critique of the capitalist model of development for its failure to provide equal access to third-world women to capitalist development programs. WID does not question the rectitude of the capitalist system, nor does it interrogate larger structural forces that contribute to growing poverty, starvation, and illiteracy amidst conditions of apparent economic growth.51

Ester Boserup’s *Women’s Role in Economic Development* (1970) introduced the main tenets of WID: the equal incorporation of women into development will lead not only to the greater efficiency of the development process but also to an elevation of
women’s status. The benefits of modernization could be shared equally by men and women. Boserup argued that GNP must be conceived to incorporate the complex array of third-world women’s labor, ascribing these labors the appropriate market value. For without this reproductive labor reproducing the workforce, GNP’s growth is impossible. Women were the hidden hands propelling third-world economic growth and development forward. Understanding the productive aspects of women’s reproductive labor would enable policy makers to assess the extent of women’s actual contribution to the productive sphere and identify ways women could realistically be incorporated into the wage labor sector. Women’s reproductive labors already contributed to the efficiency of the development process.

Boserup demonstrated that development programs in Africa were having negative impacts on women—worsening rather than improving their status and well-being. This research convinced policy makers, scholars, and activists that for women to experience the lasting benefits of development and to help bring about the efficient actualization of the development process, women must be incorporated into development in culturally specific ways. Ignoring women, their labor, and the particular cultural lenses and differentials through which women’s status is viewed would be a detriment to the project of capitalist development.

By foreclosing an analysis of capital accumulation, WID failed to foresee that incorporating women into the formal economy would not necessarily improve their status or living conditions. With the advent of export-oriented industrialization and export-processing zones (EPZs) in the 1970s, thousands of jobs emerged overnight for many of the world’s poorest women. Because of their willingness to accept considerably lower
wages than their male counterparts, third-world women were the preferred employees for this new, highly profitable, exploitative, and unstable industrial sector.\textsuperscript{55} EPZs successfully tapped into a reserve female labor force, creating a transnational female proletariat.\textsuperscript{56} Third-world women’s swift incorporation into EPZs has demonstrated that incorporating women into the productive labor force and the industrial sector need not elevate their social status (Safa 1981, 432).

The three special issues on women in developing countries went well beyond WID parameters.\textsuperscript{57} The capitalist model of development came under repeated scrutiny throughout each special issue. Two primary elements of critique emphasized class analysis and dependency theory. In all three special issues, eleven articles argue that the task of identifying differentials in class must be analytically prior to that of identifying gendered discrepancies in the development process. In every instance class is viewed by each author as structuring the very form these gendered discrepancies take.\textsuperscript{58} If their analyses had been based in the methodological individualism of modernization theory—and modernization theory’s feminist counterpart, WID—prioritizing class analytics would not have been an option. Six authors identify themselves as dependency theorists,\textsuperscript{59} framing third-world women’s socioeconomic position within an international capitalist system that systematically underdevelops countries in the “periphery.”

Capitalism was not studied as “a single homogenous structure of surplus extraction” (Kabeer 2003, 62). Rather, these special issues explore how capitalist development manifests through “different regimes of [capital] accumulation which employ ‘qualitatively different’ mechanisms of exploitation” (Kabeer 2003, 62–63). The qualitatively different regimes of capital accumulation the special issues highlight include
the informal sector, subsistence agriculture, the plantation economy, small-holder commercial farms, labor-intensive industry, capital-intensive industry, export-oriented growth, and import-oriented growth. The special issues thus bring into closer view the differing spaces and times of capitalist development’s occurrence, highlighting qualitative differentials of capitalism’s emergence and dispersion. Development was not viewed as the sole possession of the traditional sector and its rather limited socioeconomic purview, especially regarding women’s work. Development was seen as occurring within every register of capital accumulation, whether industrial, agricultural, or informal.

Several articles examined development as it occurred within these different registers. Seven articles focused distinctly on the informal sector; ten articles concentrated exclusively on subsistence agriculture; Kandiyoti’s (1977) article concerned itself with competing plantation economies in Turkey; nine articles focused on small-holder commercial farms; eight articles concentrated on labor-intensive industry; six articles focused on capital-intensive industry; ten articles concentrated on export-oriented growth; and four articles focused on import-oriented growth.

These numbers reveal that in studying capitalism as a model of development empirically and not simply theoretically—in terms of neoclassical economic theory or modernization theory—the authors in *Signs* provided detailed views of how capitalism articulates itself variously in different geographical, cultural, and political contexts. Despite the homogenizing tendencies of global capital, the special issues demonstrate that capitalism’s manifestations are manifold, uneven, incomplete, and interwoven with preexisting cultural-economic regimes. These special issues provide a firsthand glimpse
of capitalism’s differential dispersion throughout the developing world. Although these unconventional approaches facilitate a multiple rendering of capitalism, they did not undo the special issues’ primary emphasis on the capitalist model of development. Even as it was criticized, capitalism was singularly emphasized; alternatives to the capitalist model of development were absent.

Implications for feminist field formation: Cold War analytics

When *Signs* began publication in 1975, it emerged in the context of growing contestation between the knowledge requirements of an embedded liberalism (with its failed top-down version of development) and the knowledge requirements of neoliberalism (which advocated drastic curtailment of state involvement with social welfare provision). In opposition to these dominant paradigms, *Signs* authors began to conceive development as capillary in reach. *Signs* produced knowledge tracing the vein-like extension of development’s most crucial capillaries that permeated the lives of third-world women in intricate ways. For a time, the foundations subsidized this scholarship. Thus the social—the geopolitical web connecting higher education and the foundations with the federal government’s aspirations—did not always produce knowledge that conformed to hegemonic frameworks. *Signs* authors did not uncritically adhere to WID’s liberal resolutions to the problems posed for women in development. Rather, the special issues critically interrogated various articulations of capitalism, and its impact on women, in diverse cultural and geographical contexts.

The social’s role in *Signs* is most present as an absence: the near total exclusion of socialist models of development from the pages of the journal. By tracing socialism’s
absence, this chapter deviates from a traditional history of ideas. Rather than tracing the logic underlying the appearance and development of certain concepts and theories, I instead capture the logic underlying conceptual erasure.

During the Development Decade of the 1960s, both the federal government and the foundations funded several studies of socialism. In the mid-1970s, however—after the economic fallout of the Development Decade reached a crescendo—studies of socialist development were increasingly discouraged. The development studies appearing in *Signs* were paradigmatic of this trend. While any effort to discern the motives of government officials and foundation officers lies beyond the scope of this chapter, the absence of comparative studies of socialist and capitalist modes of development have one clear consequence: similarities between the United States and the Soviet Union remain invisible. Like its Soviet counterpart, the United States is implicated in a long history of violent colonial practices. Administering capitalist and socialist modes of development from afar, both superpowers deployed development as a modified form of colonialism. Through the mechanism of development, both superpowers became directly involved in the (at times, brutal) governance of third-world countries.

Although both the United States and the Soviet Union were avowedly anticolonial at their founding, the interventions of both superpowers involved neocolonialist and imperialist measures. Odd Arne Westad (2005) maintains that even though both the United States and the Soviet Union envisioned “two historical projects that were genuinely anticolonial in their origins” (397), throughout the Cold War era, each superpower “became part of a much older pattern of domination because of the intensity
of their conflict, the stakes they believed were involved, and the almost apocalyptic fear of the consequences if the opponent won” (Westad 2005, 397). Although both the United States and the Soviet Union “remained opposed to formal colonialism throughout the Cold War” (Westad 2005, 397), the methods each used in imposing their “version of modernity on Third World countries were very similar to those of the European empires that had gone before them, especially their immediate predecessors, the British and French colonial projects of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (Westad 2005, 397).

Comparative study of capitalist and socialist approaches to development in the context of cultural and geographical specificity might highlight distinct similarities in development schemes. A macro-level study of capitalism and communism might highlight the shared commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to industrialization as the optimal means of modernization. Viewing U.S. and Soviet development schemes at the capillaries of their administration might illuminate parallel modes of violent colonial practices. Comparative investigations, then, might challenge the United States’ prized “exceptionalism”—its claim that it did not engage in European-style modalities of colonialism to become a major superpower.

**Implications for feminist scholarship**

Extrapolating from the editorial practices and knowledge production of one journal to an entire intellectual field is necessarily a fraught enterprise. Nonetheless, it is useful to ask whether the marked absence of socialism from the pages of Signs resonates in U.S. feminist scholarship more generally? I would suggest that socialism’s absence has affected feminist field formation. Foreclosing avenues of scholarly possibility
concerning the socialist model of development is part of the discursive context within which feminist scholarship’s central concepts, theories, and epistemologies have emerged. Socialism’s absence haunts many presumptions, debates, and trajectories within feminist scholarship. The following enumeration is meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive:

- The gradual turn of some feminist scholars toward the logic of dispersion, and notions attendant to dispersion, such as force relations and analytics of power;
- The continuing turn away of many feminist scholars from the logic of dialectics, and notions attendant to dialectics, such as class and totality;
- The persistent inability of some feminists to creatively interweave notions of dispersion, force relations, and analytics of power with socialist theory;
- The gradual movement of the field toward identity and multiculturalism as organizing rubrics of politics and knowledge;
- The presupposed individualism of gender and queer performativities;
- The steady move away from socialism’s appeal to differentiated notions of community and collectivity beyond identitarian political rubrics;
- The construction of feminist studies in the United States as an identitarian knowledge formation and the concomitant conflation of feminist theorization of identity and processes of identification with identity and postidentity politics.

The comparative study of socialism across various temporal, geographical, and cultural contexts might have enabled a more nuanced rendering of socialist theory in
feminist scholarship. Rather than being banished at the moment of capitalism’s “defeat” of the Soviet Union in 1989, a more robust history of socialist feminism across the globe might have allowed socialist feminist theory to remain a viable player in contemporary feminist scholarship. In a good deal of U.S. feminist scholarship, socialist theory is misrepresented, often construed homogenously as a bygone theoretical modality unwilling to relinquish its totalizing analytics; or faulted for misconceiving the status of the subject or for uncritically appealing to Marxian epistemology and notions of ideology rather than discourse; or for inaccurately incorporating and conceptualizing difference; or for misunderstanding power as a purely hegemonic manifestation and misapprehending the fluid and changeable mechanisms of structural forces; or for overemphasizing the revolutionary class politics of the proletariat at the expense of a focus on difference and identity politics. Socialism and socialist theory are far more complicated and differentiated than many feminist scholars concede, and this persistent misperception might well be related to socialism’s marked absence from so much feminist scholarship.
Chapter 3

The Politics of Race in Feminist Scholarship:
An Archaeological Approach

The Western world must make up its mind as to whether it hates colored people more than it hates Communists or...Communists more than...colored people.

—Richard Wright, quoted in Hugh Wilford 2008, 209

Editorial boards need to reject the tokenism that has characterized them thus far, and they must strive to solicit and publish feminist scholarship from all corners.

—Maxine Baca Zinn, Lynn Weber Cannon, Elizabeth Higginbotham, and Bonnie Thornton Dill 1986, 290

The stock narrative explicitly situates women of color in two temporal relations to feminist scholarship. The first concerns their past role and the second concerns their present role. Construing feminist scholarship as the academic arm of second-wave feminism, the stock narrative draws parallels between women of color’s relation to feminist scholarship and their presumed relation to second-wave feminism as understood by certain white feminists. Chela Sandoval calls the link women of color supposedly had with second-wave feminism an “unusual affiliation”:

This unusual affiliation with the movement was variously interpreted as disloyalty, betrayal, absence, or lack: ‘When they [women of color] were there, they were rarely there for long’ went the usual complaint, or ‘they seemed to shift from one type of women’s group to another.’ They were the mobile (yet ever present in their ‘absence’) members of this particular liberation movement (Sandoval 1991, 13–14).
According to this account, white feminist scholars offered women of color opportunities for inclusion in conferences, journal special issues, and anthologies, but women of color choose not to participate. This facile account generally overlooks the fact that the scholarly concerns of white women set and dominated academic agendas, affording women of color opportunities to participate only within parameters fixed by white scholars. This omission is critical to the stock narrative for it affords an explanation of the absence of women of color that does not imply white racism or exclusionary practices. Attributing the choice not to participate to women of color also enables the stock narrative to characterize women scholars of color as “unsisterly,” unnecessarily critical of and hostile toward their white feminist sisters. The stock narrative thus blames women of color for their absence and marginalization in feminist scholarship.

As a narrative of progress, the standard account of feminist scholarship suggests that the publication of This Bridge Called My Back (1981) enabled white feminist scholars to begin to acknowledge the marginality of women of color within feminist scholarship and to act to rectify that problem. Advancing a tale of (identitarian) inclusion, the stock narrative cleverly situates women of color in relation to the telos of inclusive feminist scholarship. The full inclusion of women of color in feminist scholarship has been “hailed as the final frontier—as our [feminist scholarship’s] temporal and global end” (Lee 2002, 89). Thus the stock narrative “seduces both women of color and white women by holding out the promise of a victorious ending” (89). This seduction is deceptive, however, for constructed as telos, women of color’s complete inclusion and full representation in feminist scholarship is prematurely claimed as a
present accomplishment, when this goal would more accurately be described as perpetually deferred.

As Rachel Lee has pointed out, present and future blur into an unreachable horizon as women of color surface within the temporality of the stock narrative.

Characterized as that which has been left out of Women Studies’ and ethnic studies’ historical and current practices (the subject of multiple exclusions and the testament to Women’s Studies’ ‘exclusionary’ practices), women of color symbolize the potentiality of feminist studies’ critical future…. As the residual subject never fully spoken for in any program of action or knowledge formation … women of color remain eminently useful to the progress narrative Women’s Studies wishes to create for itself, where the fullness of women of color’s arrival within Women Studies is always “about to be.” (Lee 2002, 88–89)

Positing the inclusion of women of color as the “potentiality of feminist studies’ critical future” (Lee 2002, 89), feminist scholarship discursively defers engagement with the experiences and methodologies of women of color in the immediate moment. Always about to emerge, inclusion of women of color never fully materializes in the present. Nonetheless, the potentiality of full presence acts as a powerful myth sustaining the dream of an all-inclusive future for feminist scholarship. Women of color are given tenuous hope, as white women relinquish their guilt.

**Rupturing the “illusion of comprehensiveness”**

Feminists of color have been trying to disrupt central claims of the stock narrative concerning the politics of race within feminist scholarship for the past four decades. The *Signs* archive provides rich evidence to sustain their arguments. In this chapter, I excavate certain key texts from the archive to offer a far different account of the discursive construction of black women and women of color in feminist scholarship. By juxtaposing scholarly overtures and inactions involving black and white feminist scholars
in the work of *Signs*, I interpret textual evidence from the journal as a symptom of larger
discursive trends within feminist scholarship during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Texts always have contexts, so I begin by briefly noting demographic data
pertaining to editorial decision making during the first decade of *Signs*. During its first
ten years of publication, only one woman of color, Sylvia Yanagisako, served as an
associate editor of the journal, and only three women of color served on the editorial
board (see Baca Zinn et al. 1986, 293–94). Including women of color in editorial
decision making does not prevent the manifestation of racism in a journal, but it could
attenuate it. As Maxine Baca Zinn, Lynn Weber Cannon, Elizabeth Higginbotham, and
Bonnie Thornton Dill (1986) have pointed out:

> Women of color are rarely sitting around the table when problems are defined and
strategies suggested. They are not in positions to engage in the theoretical
discourse behind specific decisions on what will be published…. Even when
white feminists attempt to include women of color, there are often difficulties
because women of color reject the dominant paradigms and approach problems
from divergent perspectives. Typically, women of color then find their work
rejected on the grounds that it does not conform to the established ways of
thinking. (Baca Zinn et al. 1986, 294–95)

In developing a discursive analysis of selected texts from the *Signs* archive, my
goal is not to analyze the motives behind particular decisions or to attribute blame.
Following Foucault, I turn to the archaeological method because it enables analysis of
discursive formations at four levels: the formation of objects of discourse (i.e., how
discourse constitutes an object of inquiry for a given field of study); the formation of
enunciative modalities (i.e., how discourses position scholars such that they are able to
speak intelligibly); the formation of theoretical strategies; and the formation of concepts.
Foucault’s choice of the designation archaeology for his method is not coincidental. He
models his discursive analysis on archaeological field excavations, where artifacts are
unearthed in various places along a humanly constructed, contingently placed grid. Each layer of digging disinters artifacts of a similar historical period, culture, and geography. However dispersed or apparently different artifacts may be, those that share a horizontal layering within the grid are assumed to have a temporal relationship. By examining these artifacts in relation to one another, the archaeologist develops an account of the nature of the connections among the artifacts.

A central task of Foucauldian archaeology is to identify thresholds of emergence and disappearance for particular discursive formations. Thresholds are points at which discursive formations are transformed. In this chapter, I examine particular discursive formations pertaining to “black women,” “women of color,” and “third world women,” tracing how the emergence of these terms excludes alternative articulations or discursive enunciations from feminist scholarship. By focusing scholarly attention in particular ways, these discursive formations influenced not only what could be said, but also what could not be said explicitly in a particular discursive field. I am particularly concerned to make visible a threshold of disappearance (i.e., conditions of exclusion) that governed the archaeological relationship between scholarship on third-world women in developing countries and scholarship on black women in the United States. I trace a particular account of this archaeological relationship as it occurred in Signs.

As Foucault attempted to understand how power operated in and through discursive formations, he adapted Nietzschean genealogy to illuminate larger archaeological relationships. Repudiating any notion of determinate origin, any notion that the cause of an historical event could be traced to an exact starting point, genealogy posits that events have dispersed and inchoate beginnings. When historians select one
occurrence as a definitive origin, they mask many other occurrences that contribute to the emergence of an historical event, occurrences, which then fall below thresholds of visibility of particular discursive formations. The stock narrative of feminist field formation has constructed a troubling account of early relations between black and white feminist scholars. By juxtaposing selected texts from the Signs archive, I offer an alternate genealogy of discursive formations concerning race and geopolitics within feminist scholarship. In so doing, I hope to demonstrate exclusions and omissions from the stock narrative that call into question standard accounts of black feminist scholars’ unjustified hostility toward white feminist scholars who are innocently framed as simply trying to reach out, build coalitions, and cultivate understanding across various differences.

Overture and inaction

In 1979, Signs Advisory Board Member Bonnie Thornton Dill wrote to Signs’ founding Editor Catharine Stimpson to express her concern about black women’s invisibility in the journal² and to offer to co-edit with Elizabeth Higginbotham a special issue on black women’s studies. In the letter, Thornton Dill begins by lamenting reports of racism at the most recent National Women’s Studies Association (NWSA) conference. She then discusses how her experience of the NWSA conference contrasted with her experience at the First National Scholarly Research Conference on Black Women, sponsored by the National Council of Negro Women (NCNW). She reflects on her experiences at the NCNW conference, which then leads her to black women’s absence in Signs.

I heard some very good papers, met a number of scholars…who are doing interesting research on black women…. One of the occurrences which renewed
my concern about the direction of the [Signs] journal vis-à-vis Black women, was the response I received to my suggestion to several of the presenters that they submit their papers to Signs...several women doing research on women had never heard of the journal.

As I thought about why these obviously well-read, serious black feminist scholars knew nothing about Signs, I was again confronted with my own reaction to the limited presence of black females in women’s studies. It occurred to me that perhaps these and other black women scholars do not know about Signs because there is little in it to attract them...the material about black women is so limited that they do not pick up the journal....

I think it is time for a serious dialogue between black and white feminist scholars and I think Signs could and should be the vehicle for that dialogue. By dialogue, I do not mean a series of conversations or letters about why black women and white women have an ambivalent relationship. What I am proposing is a special issue of Signs devoted to scholarship about black women.

I think this would be of benefit to both white and black women and to the journal as well. White women need to know more about the work of black women. They need to know what concepts, issues, and questions we are struggling with so that we might aid one another in the process of developing a new field of scholarship, one which takes into account the variety of women’s experiences. Black women scholars...need to be intimately involved in the growth of women’s studies....Sexism has had its own special effects on black women....Black women [need to be encouraged] to see Signs as concerned about the ways in which both sex and race and have intersected in the lives of black women, and as a viable place to publish their material. A special issue devoted to the research on black women could launch this type of dialogue....

I have written at length about this because I feel strongly that while black and white women may never see some issues similarly there are many grounds for sharing and dialogue. Unless, some predominately white feminists are willing to demonstrate genuine interest and concern about these issues, we will remain separate and women’s studies will fail to be as rich and diverse a field of study as it could be. I think Signs could and should be the vehicle for beginning such a dialogue and I would like to work with you on developing this type of special issue.

Thornton Dill envisioned Signs playing a crucial role in publishing scholarship by and on black women. Publishing their work in Signs would provide black feminist scholars with a key vehicle for scholarly expression, visibility, and legitimacy. Most importantly, Thornton Dill believed that a special issue would set the tone for future collaborations between black and white feminist scholars in various venues of interdisciplinary feminist scholarship. Committed to the importance of this intervention, Thornton Dill offered her
scholarly expertise as a guest editor to redress Signs' persisting omission of black women’s studies.

Nearing the end of her Signs editorship, Stimpson initially scheduled a visit to Memphis State University to discuss Thornton Dill’s ideas concerning a possible special issue on black women, but she cancelled the trip due to back problems. In lieu of the visit, Stimpson sent a note:

I could not agree with you more about the need for white and black women to share their scholarship….Would it be possible for you to prepare a tentative outline of what an issue devoted to black women might be like, with ideas for essays and names of persons who might write them? Would it focus on the United States, or could its focus be expanded to include other countries and regions, e.g. the Caribbean? As you know, I will be handing over the editorship of Signs as of July 1, 1980….This means that I cannot do too much advance planning, but I would like to have a dossier on a possible special issue about black women ready to hand on. If there cannot be an entire issue, there might be a special section, as there was for Latin America in Volume 5, Number 1. Six months later, Stimpson wrote to Thornton Dill again: “I simply wanted you to know that today I am sending off a special file to Barbara Gelpi, the new Signs editor. It contains our correspondences about minority women. I have also told Barbara how very much I hope all this will be followed up.”

The file on Minority Women indicates that Thornton Dill’s correspondence ended with Stimpson. Neither a special issue on black women nor one on U.S. minority women was published under Gelpi’s editorship.

Gelpi provided an interesting account of her editorial team’s decision to distance itself from the debates emerging within feminist scholarship in 1981 after the publication of This Bridge Called My Back. “Well of course now, as you know, [This Bridge] is a feminist classic. But when it came out, it was experienced by white, middle-class, heterosexual women as violently confrontational, as an attack…even when you know
there is anger there, to see it on the page is something wholly different. It is right there, right in your face, an entirely different feeling.”7 Rather than considering the productive uses of discomfort, the Stanford editorial team framed their withdrawal from debates about institutional racism in terms that echo the stock narrative.

*Signs* was more interested in fostering sisterhood, trying to identify where the women writers were: where are the women writers? This was really pioneering work at the time. It was less emotionally fraught. Our authors had less of a problem with their identity and the need to endlessly, endlessly affirm their identity. The American feminists, the ones publishing in *Signs*, were in that sense doing a very different kind of work than the likes of Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa. The infighting in *Signs* was about who gets to write about these women writers. Soon everybody wanted to write about Emily Dickenson and Charlotte Brontë. But the question was who gets to do it and why? The infighting was scholarly, not emotional. Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa were making very different kinds of statements. They were calling for an ongoing critique of the status quo and an exhaustive critique of feminist theory in its entirety. Well certainly they made their point.8

Gelpi was keenly aware that the “Stanford feminist group, feminist studies, and CROW [Stanford’s Center for Research on Women], was dominated by white, liberal, heterosexual, bourgeois women,” but she claims that they “were conscious of giving voice to other groups.”9 Yet the discursive account of decisions to exclude scholars who were acting on emotion rather than matters of scholarship seems remarkably unaware of the politics of white privilege. Similarly, the discursive framing of “an ongoing critique of the status quo and an exhaustive critique of feminist theory” as outside the boundaries of legitimate scholarship renders invisible scholarly decisions that produce that suspect emotion—anger.

**Overture and rejection**

The *Signs* archive includes another early textual exchange that captures incompatible discursive formations advanced by white and black feminist scholars. In
the early years of her editorship, Gelpi wrote Higginbotham about a conference on Communities of Women, which was to give rise to a special issue. Inviting the renowned black feminist scholar to participate in the conference and contribute to the special issue, Gelpi specified that the central organizing concepts of the conference were autonomy and the autonomy spectrum. As conceptualized in CROW’s funding proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation for financial support for the conference and special issue, these notions had quite specific meaning:

Involved here is not only the autonomy of a community in relation to external society but the sense of autonomy experienced by its members as they live within a community. It is possible to visualize women’s communities as ranging across an ‘autonomy spectrum’: communities and institutions, such as harems or purdah, in which women live separately but under the control of men; others—such as women’s colleges, convents, African trading societies, or settlement houses—in which women having varying degrees of autonomy modified by interaction with a dominant male culture; and totally autonomous, separatist communities of women.

Gelpi’s letter of invitation asks Higginbotham to craft a piece that would fit within these conceptual terms. Higginbotham refused, sending a detailed explanation of her reasons for doing so.

I have seriously thought about how my own work might relate to this conference. Unfortunately, there are few links. I find your definition of women’s communities too narrow. The specific Black women’s communities which might fit nicely into this conference are not representative of social relations and values in the broader Black communities where women’s presence is truly felt. Unlike the experience of dominant culture women, Black women have played a key role in defining and keeping Black institutions alive. Therefore it is often within shared sex spheres that one finds they have left their mark.

For this reason I find your “autonomy spectrum” inappropriate for assessing the role Black (and other racial ethnic) women play in their communities. You assume a conflict between male and female values, etc., while racial ethnic communities are first of all in conflict with dominant culture people and their institutions. This larger conflict is the backdrop for shaping gender roles within the specific subculture. Therefore, the specific contributions of Black women will vary in form and content from those of dominant culture women.
To discuss communities of only women is to ignore the principle ways that Black women have kept alive values and indeed passed them on to others.

Bonnie Thornton Dill, who is on your editorial board, and I have given much thought to how dominant culture women define issues and then expect racial ethnic women to participate. We are interested in promoting settings where the research on racial ethnic women is discussed in a manner which appreciates the seriousness of racial oppression and the fact that there are actual differences in perspective. It is inappropriate to omit a racial dimension and expect racial ethnic women’s issues to be handled on the same plane as dominant culture women’s.15

In her editorial for the special issue that grew out of the conference, Gelpi provided background information about the initial planning for the issue and gave careful attention to Higginbotham’s criticism of the planners’ conception of the autonomy spectrum in relation communities of women. The discursive framing of Higginbotham’s critique is particularly instructive.

Our own experience of sisterhood…was a primary source of our interest in the topic communities of women….As scholars we recognized the need for an analytic assessment of the true nature of communities among women and their actual potential for bettering women’s lives….The planning stages of the conference were to start us on the process of this reevaluation by demonstrating some of our own misconceptions. Thus, in our original letter inviting prospective conference members to submit papers, we set up as a point of central interest the relationship between the comparative autonomy of a community of women—its degree of freedom from male resources and authority—and its effectiveness, whether political, artistic, economic, or psychological. We did not realize, until courteously yet explicitly advised of our failure of insight, that this focus might…limit the topic’s appropriateness to the interests of middle-class white women in their struggle against the dominance of white men. When women and men are oppressed because of class or race or both, women’s autonomy may not be a relevant issue. (Gelpi 1985, 633–34)

What follows in the editorial, however, indicates the special issue’s inability to take Higginbotham’s criticisms seriously within a methodological register. Gelpi notes that despite the editorial team’s initial failure of insight, it had to draw boundaries around its definition of community, even though there is always “a tension, even contradiction, in the drawing of boundaries: such boundaries can function as a supportive encircling of a
group’s activities, and yet, in some cases, prove restrictive to its members or exclusive toward outsiders” (Gelpi 1985, 634).

A series of critical conceptual slippages occur in Gelpi’s designation of boundaries as the conceptual ground on which issues pertaining to community formation are resolved. The editorial collapses a complicated matrix of issues concerning the epistemological engagement of communal boundaries with the single issue of membership (i.e., who belongs to the community and how and why do they belong). Gelpi quotes Nan Keohane’s keynote address at the conference, where this statement concerning membership is made most explicitly: “The most basic way of bounding a community is to define membership, who is in and who is out” (Gelpi quoting Keohane 1985, 635). Membership is generally perceived as a basic form of communal boundary formation, but it is not the only one. Boundaries pertaining to community formation can also be drawn around a number of phenomena, including the most basic definition of community; the modalities of organization, group, and togetherness considered to fit the definition of communities; which practices are considered communal practices; as well as who is included in certain communities and under what conditions they are included. By collapsing matters concerning community boundary formation under the singular sign of membership, the editorial exhibits the limitations of this white feminist conceptualization of community within a one-dimensional identitarian register. More complicated and multidimensional issues than the tensions between who is included and excluded and along identitarian lines (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, age, socioeconomic class) are masked by this discursive construction. Avoiding conflicts that go well beyond questions of membership, this tidy conception of community presumes the politics of
For Higginbotham, the politics of presence does not begin to address the substance of her concerns, which call into question the power to define intellectual issues within feminism. In suggesting that black feminists should not be expected to force their intellectual interests to fit white feminist agendas, she also raises methodological questions concerning the kinds of innovation needed to make intelligible the complex architectonics involved in the relations among (1) varying regimes of membership; (2) modalities of belonging within the dominant culture; and (3) modalities of belonging yet to acquire intelligibility within dominant culture. Methodological innovations are needed precisely because marginalized communities are always in the process of navigating power relations within dominant culture that have structured their exclusion. To address these power dynamics may require transvaluation of dominant-culture values and transformation of the manifestation of those values in social relations. Inclusive feminist practices would presuppose methodologies that could account for these various layers of community formation and the multiple registers within which community formation occurs.

In “The Costs of Exclusionary Practices in Women’s Studies” (1986), published in Signs immediately after Gelpi’s editorship, Baca Zinn, Weber Cannon, Higginbotham, and Thornton Dill provided their own discursive account of Gelpi’s invitation to Higginbotham to submit a proposal for the communities of women conference. They emphasize the unacceptable power dynamics created when white feminists set the
In 1981, the planners of a conference on communities of women asked Elizabeth Higginbotham to submit an abstract for a paper. The expectation communicated in the letter of invitation was that her research would demonstrate the applicability to Black women of a concept of women’s communities set forth by white feminists. Instead of attempting to alter her work to fit such a model, Higginbotham wrote to the organizers and challenged their narrow definition of communities of women” (Baca Zinn et al. 1986, 295).16

Subsuming the complexity of Higginbotham’s critique under the singular sign of membership may appear to be a small oversight, one that only inadvertently constrained the multiplicity of ways to engage community epistemologically and methodologically. But it is a symptom of white privilege that produces exclusion. Its apparent insignificance and triviality is precisely what enables the erasure of black feminist methodological and substantive innovations to occur and to be repeated, undetected and undeterred. Such repetitive erasures over time produce a threshold of disappearance within feminist scholarship. What disappears is not only black feminist engagement with community, but larger concerns of women scholars of color, especially black women’s, critical articulation of concepts central to interdisciplinary feminist scholarship.

White feminist privilege consists in part in an ability to choose when and under what conditions critical engagement with black feminist scholarship is fostered. White feminists may construct these choices as matters of cutting-edge scholarship, but feminists of color may experience them as intellectual marginalization and academic exclusion. Feminists of color have developed multidimensional ways of understanding the effects oppressive forces on their daily lives, as well as strategies to resist those oppressive forces, particularly those involving institutions of state surveillance. The
scholarly work of Moraga and Anzaldúa, which was discursively constructed as a matter of emotion, is paradigmatic of women of color scholarship and politics. Moraga’s (2000) conception of guerrilla warfare and Anzaldúa’s (2007) conception of mestiza consciousness engage the complexity of oppression, even as it permeates the subtlest realms of psychological interiority. Guerrilla warfare and mestiza consciousness also advance strategies for confronting oppression in its many manifestations.

Chela Sandoval (1991) contends that women-of-color scholarship has developed differently than suggested by the stock narrative’s account of the progressive stages of feminist scholarship. Where the stock narrative posits identitarian inclusion as the culmination of feminist scholarship, a culmination that reflects hard lessons learned, it fails to note that different racial and class “identities” are offered inclusion only as long as they fit within existing epistemological and methodological rubrics. As Sandoval points out and the Stanford editorial attests, white feminists avoid approaches that interrogate core practices defined by white scholars. Their notion of inclusion is only skin deep, extended to women of color as various racially marked bodies, but not as scholars who challenge existing methodological frameworks theories, standards for evidence selection and validation, epistemologies, mentalities, modes of consciousness, thought processes, or processes of identification.

**Tracing a threshold of disappearance**

The *Signs* archive provides clues to the disappearance of scholarship by and about black women in the United States that involves more than overtures, inaction, and rejection. In their treatment of third-world women, U.S. feminist scholars in the late
1970s and early 1980s set the discursive parameters for the category women of color, parameters that have important implications for black women’s studies. In the following analysis, I will demonstrate a point of diffraction within feminist scholarly discourse. A point of diffraction occurs when two incompatible discursive formations, both of which have similar conditions of emergence, occupy the same discursive spaces. As a result, one discursive formation tends to be conflated with or subsumed by the other. Both conflation and subsumption contribute to the disappearance of particular discursive formations, constraining their circulation and their power to fix the meaning of central concepts, epistemologies, and methodologies within a given field of inquiry.

This overlap of one discursive formation with another occurred in Signs as scholarship on third-world women in developing countries eclipsed black feminist scholarship. Developing in inverse relationship, as the frequency of scholarship on third-world women increased, the scholarship on black women grew increasingly absent. Following Foucault, I analyze the relationship of these distinct discursive formations as enunciative modalities. Enunciative modality connotes the position from which a scholar is able to speak within a given discursive formation. Bracketing the intentions of individual scholars, analysis of enunciative modalities is designed to discern the discursive conditions that govern the intelligibility of specific scholarly modes of analysis, affecting their emergence, circulation, and reproduction as accredited knowledge. By tracing the thresholds of emergence of discourses on third world women, I will show how this construction came to displace scholarship on U.S. black women. These two enunciative modalities are not inherently incommensurable. The particular ways power interfaces with discourse at the event of their emergence renders each
separate and unrelated, yet their circulation in *Signs* and in feminist scholarship more generally produced a point of diffraction. As Gayatri Spivak (1988) has pointed out, the conditions of intelligibility of enunciative modalities involves more than the discursive conditions within which one can speak. Equally important are the discursive conditions that enable one to be heard. Spivak’s distinction between speaking and being heard is central to the archaeological point of diffraction this chapter elaborates.

As articulated in and through *Signs*, both enunciative modalities—scholarship on third-world women in developing countries and scholarship on black women in the United States—emerged in the context of academic conferences. As noted above, the disappearance of black feminism from *Signs* was linked not only to inaction in response to the 1979 proposal for a special issue on Black Feminist Studies, but also to the *Communities of Women* Conference, held at Stanford’s CROW in 1983. As discussed in chapter three, the emergence of third-world women in *Signs* was linked to the *Women and National Development* Conference held at Wellesley College in 1975. As the Thornton Dill and Higginbotham texts make clear, black feminist scholars were interested in exploring processes of racialization, marginalization, discrimination, and exclusion in social, economic, political and academic spheres within the United States. Similarly, third-world women attending the Wellesley conference had expected to hear about how capitalist development negatively impacted the lives of the most economically disenfranchised persons in the United States, most of whom are women of color, and many of whom are black. Instead first-world feminist scholars presented scholarship on women living in countries geopolitically designated “the third world.” No attention was
given to women of color within Western nations who identified with the imagined community of “third-world women.”

The rendering of third-world women as geographically and geopolitically Other marked the beginning of a threshold of disappearance in feminist scholarship. The focus of Western feminist scholars on issues of development and underdevelopment only in the global South occluded the existence of related issues structuring the lives of impoverished communities of color in the North. Instead of cultivating parallel investigations and discourses, academic compartmentalization produced markedly different accounts of poverty in the geographical regions of the third world and the first world. As Angela Miles (1998) has noted, the same political issues that are discursively framed as development issues in the third world are considered social issues in the first: “What we call ‘development issues’ in the ‘third world,’ such as housing, education, health, child care, and poverty, are called ‘social issues’ in the ‘first world’” (Miles 1998, 169). The creation of two distinct discursive rubrics—third-world development issues and first-world social issues—overemphasizes the differences between these two geopolitical contexts and underplays their many similarities and shared connections to larger socioeconomic processes of globalization and neoliberalism.

Challenging feminists to break away from established geopolitical frames, Miles has suggested that in cultivating a better understanding of the experiences of economically disenfranchised women of color in the first world, feminist scholars could broaden their understanding of how development takes shape variously in differing geopolitical, economic, and cultural contexts. Yet Miles is not the first feminist scholar to argue that questions of development should not be considered only in the context of
the global South. Black feminist scholarship has long engaged the question of women’s role in the development of the so-called developed world.26 Although much of this scholarship has not been viewed as part of development studies because it examines exploitation and oppression within the United States, black feminist scholars have written extensively about the substantial role black women have played in U.S. capitalist development from slavery to share-cropping to their role as modern-day mammies.27

The invisibility of these accounts within development studies is related to narratives of American exceptionalism, as well as to academic boundaries that demarcate “American Studies” from international political economy and international relations. Contrasting capitalist development in the United States with histories of European feudalism and colonialism, the discursive construction of U.S. exceptionalism involves a near total erasure of slavery in the context of capitalist development. On this view, slavery was an aberration from American commitments to “free soil and free labor,” which fueled industrialization and the growth of the middle class. Modernization is conceived as a process of transformation from an agricultural society to an industrial and later postindustrial urban economy. Situated in the changes that began in the mid-nineteenth century at a point when slavery was disappearing, capitalist economic development in the United States is cordoned off from a longer history of enslaved labor, indentured servitude, and other forms of labor exploitation. Framed as part of an earlier historical epoch purged by the blood of the Civil War, these exploitative labor practices are characterized as unfortunate excesses that bear no necessary relation to capitalist development.
Insisting that U.S. capitalist development was achieved through free and honest hard work, the exceptionalist narrative is ingrained in the American mythos. A second premise of this mythic account is that modernization has improved the lives of everyone it touches, including those most economically disenfranchised. On this view, even the poorest people in the first world enjoy a quality of life far better than most persons living in the third world. Blurring class distinctions and entrenched structures of inequality, the exceptionalist narrative denies the existence of persistent inequities, the intensification of already-existing social inequalities and modalities of exploitative labor, and the creation new inequalities as integral to U.S. capitalist development. Exempting capitalism from the production of inequalities, the exceptionalist narrative holds that the solution to poverty is further capitalist modernization. Tying capitalist development in the United States to the same democratic principles upon which the nation was founded, proponents of American exceptionalism endorse notions of the “self-made man,” upward social mobility for all who work hard, and an expansive middle class that encompasses virtually all American citizens. In his aptly titled Toward a Theology of the Corporation (1981), neoconservative author Michael Novak coined the term “democratic capitalism” to describe the history of capitalist development in the United States. Any lived experiences failing to confirm this inherently democratic narrative of capitalist development tend to fall below the threshold of social, political, and institutional intelligibility in the United States.

Many black feminist scholars have devoted their intellectual labor to the analysis of the underside of capitalist development, challenging the hegemony of a narrative of U.S. exceptionalism that has erased the history of black exploitation, as well as the
history of black contributions to American economic development. This scholarship has not been adequately examined for its larger transnational and geopolitical implications, however; nor has this scholarship been viewed as relevant to transnational feminist scholarship. Generally restricted to conversations around the Black Diaspora in North America, the Caribbean, Mesoamerica, the Andean countries, and Latin America, transnational feminist studies have tended to focus on black women’s experiences in relation to domestic, agricultural, and informal labor, as well as migration. U.S. black feminist scholarship—black feminist scholarship by and on black women in the United States—has not played as significant of a role as it should in transnational feminist scholarship. Circulating in disparate discursive frames, these literatures seldom intersect.

Powerful discursive forces operate to keep these literatures distinct. The narrative of U.S. exceptionalism and the social policy it sustains have contributed to interpretations of the conditions of black women’s lives that secured the singular rectitude of the U.S. capitalist version of development as the very best means of modernization, precluding any sort of questioning or criticism to the contrary. Notions about individual effort as the key to upward mobility have contributed to accounts of downward mobility and entrenched poverty that accord explanatory power to supposedly inherent traits of black women and men. As essentialist rhetoric held blacks responsible for their failure to flourish, structural explanations of inequality, which expose various inadequacies of capitalist development are rendered invisible.

Black women’s peculiar brand of invisibility has been an effect of power’s penetration of the smallest nooks and crannies of their daily lives in painstakingly subtle and shockingly calculated ways. Rendering select aspects of their lives hypervisible
(e.g., their supposed individual responsibility for not achieving success in white capitalist society) and other aspects invisible (e.g., the structural forces that make success impossible), a dialectics of visuality has placed the minutiae of black women’s lives under constant surveillance.

Patricia Hill Collins (2000) has analyzed five controlling images of black women in relation to institutions of surveillance, regulation, and control. Normalizing a U.S. multicultural field of vision, grounded in inferentially racist discursive technologies, these controlling images demonstrate how the dialectics of visuality give meaning to the intricacies of black women’s lives and the social and structural conditions within which they live. Building on Collins’ argument, I would suggest that these controlling images are animated by more than U.S. policies and governmental institutions. They gain their interpretive force as discursive effects of an emergent neoliberal economic climate during the 1970s and the related growth in power, visibility, and resources of the neoconservative intellectual movement. The controlling image that best illustrates the intricate workings of the dialectics of visuality in the geopolitical climate of neoliberal economics and neoconservative ideology is the Welfare Queen.

When the staunch neoconservative Ronald Reagan accused black women on welfare of feeding off the public dole, he successfully burned the controlling image of the welfare queen into the nation’s psyche. The neoconservative stereotype of the welfare queen is one of a lazy black woman who has no desire to work and instead receives payments from the government. According to the neoconservatives, these payments (known as government handouts) encourage her to remain unemployed. What motivates her to return to work if she can remain home and receive government handouts?
Government handouts also encourage the welfare queen to carelessly have more children for whom she cannot possibly provide adequate economic or emotional support. If the government provides more welfare benefits for each child, what mechanisms are in place for discouraging the welfare queen from having more children?

The neoconservatives successfully fashioned the welfare queen into an image metonymically standing in for the excesses of an ever-increasing welfare state. In particular, welfare queen enabled neoconservatives to emphasize the unintended consequences—a terminology neoconservative intellectual Patrick Moynihan (1975) procured from Max Weber—of social welfare policies. Within the framework of unintended consequences, neoconservatives emphasized that social welfare programs failed to hold welfare recipients accountable for their actions once they receive government aid. Given that government aid is generally either dispensed from Washington or individual state capitals, after welfare recipients receive welfare checks, child care, public housing, food stamps, or job training, they oftentimes have no regular contact with those dispensing the aid. Without proper mediating structures in place guaranteeing that government assistance is utilized in a manner consistent with its intent, welfare reinforces a culture of poverty. Welfare promotes codependent structures inherent in a culture of poverty by failing to instill the skills, intelligence, and fortitude to enable welfare recipients to rise out of impoverished conditions. Although the intent behind the welfare state was to end the culture of poverty, it inadvertently contributed the growth of the culture of poverty. Rather than allowing these negative consequences to continue, neoconservatives advocated the eradication of welfare, a brutal intervention that
worsened the poverty of some of the most economically disadvantaged black women in the United States.

As neoconservative controlling images such as welfare queen circulate, black women’s heightened subordination at the hands of the state becomes invisible. The various ways that welfare facilitates multiple capillaries of state surveillance also fall below the threshold of visibility. As technologies of surveillance are cultivated to monitor and control government assistance programs, the state develops more refined mechanisms to control black women’s behavior. Through social welfare, the state determines which aspects of black women’s lives should be more creatively hidden and which should be more prominently featured. In order to obtain welfare, for example, a potential recipient must fill out a series of forms, granting the state access to various subjugated knowledges, including income, racial and ethnic background, marital status, number of children, age, physical and mental health condition, and citizenship status. Obtaining welfare also requires that the recipient be assigned a social worker, who prescribes workfare assignments required as a condition for receipt of benefits and who subsequently evaluates various spheres of the recipient’s life at regular intervals throughout the period of assistance.

As the state expands its capillaries of surveillance, black women’s bodies are disciplined as a regime of visuality discursively regulates what can be seen and what remains unseen about black women’s lives. Harmful racial stereotypes circulate openly as state intrusion into the most intimate domains of life is rendered invisible. Black women’s needs and desires linger under the radar of social intelligibility, while their reliance upon social welfare grants to meet these needs are grossly exaggerated. As black
women are constructed as completely responsible as individuals for the racial, gender, and class inequalities that circumscribe their lives, the relation of capitalism to those inequalities are thoroughly masked.

Scholarship by and about black women disrupts this regime of visuality, revealing deep fissures in the country’s implementation of capitalist development. “Inferior housing, underfunded schools, employment discrimination, and consumer racism” (Collins 2000, 76) show a different view of capitalism, documenting that U.S. capitalist development fails many black women and men. Contesting mistaken notions about the cost of social welfare provision, prominent black feminist scholars frame the underdevelopment of African American communities in relation other wasteful government programs. As Gloria Joseph (1995) noted: “White racist violence is flourishing under the Reagan administration, which has gutted civil rights enforcement and slashed social service spending while pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into militarization and his pestiferous pet—nuclear star wars” (470).

As an academic journal Signs might have contributed to disrupting the dialectics of visuality associated with U.S. exceptionalism, neoliberalism, and neoconservatism. During its first decade, however, it largely did not. Instead it contributed to a point of discursive diffraction. It published fairly extensively about women in developing countries, but in ways that did not give voice to third-world women. The absence of third-world women scholars from the Wellesley conference and from the Signs special issue on Women and National Development (1977) remained a primary bone of contention for scholars from the global South (see El Sadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon 1978). The political needs of women in developing countries were made intelligible
through the articulations of first-world feminist scholars who identified the contours of those needs. Even as white women dictated which physiological, mental, and emotional urgencies counted as the “needs” of third world women, they kept those needs situated within a geopolitical frame at great remove from the pressing demands of impoverished communities of colors within Western nations. Within the pages of Signs, third-world women were being heard, but through the voices, imaginations, and conceptual frameworks of first-world feminist scholars.

Located within the same academic circuits as their white feminist counterparts, black feminist scholars spoke out about the conditions of African Americans within the United States with exceptional brilliance, insight, verve, and creativity. Several prominent U.S. black feminist thinkers innovatively carved out avenues for speaking the truths about black political needs and desires in a world largely indifferent and, at times, hostile to them. But black feminist scholars were seldom heard on their own terms. As the correspondence between Stimpson and Thornton Dill and Gelpi and Higginbotham makes clear, during the first decade at Signs black feminist scholars were not heard.

Revisiting the politics of location in capillary times

In a review article on black feminist literary criticism that appeared in Signs in 2007, Farah Jasmine Griffin noted that black feminist criticism offers a unique and under-explored angle of vision for understanding transnational feminist scholarship. This angle of vision is provided by “those whose positionality has made them experience physical, psychic, and economic violence at the hands of the United States from within its borders, provid[ing] a unique insight into the workings of this global, imperial power” (Griffin
Griffin connects the daily physical, psychological, and economic violence black women endure to the policies of the United States as a “global, imperial power.” Although she does not expound upon the nature, quality, or extent of these connections, her quote helps illuminate why this connective work has not taken place in feminist scholarship. The key to this puzzle lies in Griffin’s appeal to positionality and a desire for location coupled with her call for the critical interrogation of the position of black women within the boundaries of the U.S. nation-state.

Given their unique positioning as simultaneously intimate with the state and yet subject to its dialectics of visuality, black women often seek “safe spaces” (Collins 2000, 110) that enable them to temporarily slip beneath the capillaries of state surveillance and its racist representational praxis. Safe spaces require determinate locations and often separate spaces that exclude others (particularly white men and women), so that black women may cultivate their own safety, security, and well being. In its appeal to location and exclusion, the notion safe space is not always conceptually attractive to scholars working outside the purview of black feminism: “One reason that safe spaces are so threatening to those who feel excluded, and so routinely castigated by them, is that safe spaces are free of surveillance by more powerful groups. Such spaces simultaneously remove Black women from surveillance and foster the conditions for Black women’s independent self-definitions. When institutionalized, these self-definitions become foundational to politicized Black feminist standpoints. Thus, much more is at stake here than the simple expression of voice” (Collins 2000, 111). Not as a singular tactic, but as one tactic in a larger array of political tactics, seizing the territory of safe spaces makes sense for black feminists.
Such an explicit call for a politics of location stands in stark contrast to Rachel Lee’s (2002) astute characterization of the role the category women of color plays in contemporary feminist scholarship. According to Lee, as a category, women of color marks an extra-territorial roving position aligned with a politics of mobility (Lee 2002, 88). On this view, women of color circulate like Sandoval’s (1991; 2000) conception of oppositional consciousness, which dwells in multiple sites, but is never finally located in any one site, always selectively weaving between and among various oppositional ideologies (Lee 2002, 86). Lee recognizes the seductive nature of mobility for the category U.S. third-world women, especially because for U.S. third-world feminists, location is an illusory privilege. No one, not even those whose bodies enjoying the most privilege, is ever firmly or finally located. Women of color’s capabilities for incessant mobility mark their potential for implementing political modalities genuinely outside of domination. Lee analyzes the metaphor Sandoval uses to express inherent mobility:

Sandoval draws on the force of a vehicular metaphor, “the clutch of an automobile,” to describe the flexible practices that permit women of color to “select, engage, and disengage gears [or different programs of action, different oppositional ideologies] in a system for the transmission of power”….Notably, Sandoval does not argue for a separate gear for U.S. Third World feminists. Instead, “U.S. third world feminism represents a central locus of possibility, an insurgent movement which shatters the construction of any one of the collective ideologies [or gears] as the single most correct site where truth can be represented’….This mode of ‘consciousness’—also defined as an activity of border- or threshold-crossing—does not aim to fortify a ground, territory, or place to stand. (Lee 2002, 87)

Although it may at times be politically imperative to be located just long enough to garner intelligibility and recognition or, as black feminist scholars have argued, to create a momentary harbor of safety to escape technologies of surveillance, Lee maintains that interdisciplinary feminist scholarship remains “enthralled with this characterization of
women of color as an extra-territorial roving position, especially as that critical mobility might be tapped into on behalf of the field’s account of itself as an ‘outsider’ knowledge, as the embodiment (the incorporation) of that which has been excluded, and even that which it has itself excluded” (Lee 2002, 88).

In contrast to the discursive construction of U.S. third-world feminism as an extra-territorial roving, several black feminist scholars have defended a politics of location or, as Lee frames it, a territory seizing. Territory seizing is exemplified by Kimberlé Crenshaw’s (1989) conception of intersectionality, which deploys the metaphor of a physical site to highlight the distinct nature of injury experienced by black women resulting from their multiple oppressions.

If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination….Providing legal relief only when Black women show that their claims are based on race or on sex is analogous to calling an ambulance for the victim only after the driver responsible for the injuries is identified. But it is not always easy to reconstruct an accident: Sometimes the skid marks and the injuries simply indicate that they occurred simultaneously. (Crenshaw 1989, 149)

If the skid marks reveal multiple impacts occurring simultaneously, there may be no legal way to hold a particular driver responsible for the harm inflicted. Similarly, black women experience multiple forms of oppression simultaneously. As with a multiple collision car accident, it is unclear exactly who or what modalities of domination, subordination, and subjugation and/or juridical institutions are to be held responsible for redressing their injuries. Lee maintains,

It is precisely because Crenshaw’s essay does not shy away from seizing territory…arguing for a palpable material remedy, that we can tackle its narrowness, its embeddedness in a particular location. Forging the critical surplus of oppositional mobility, Crenshaw constructs a remedial agenda for black
women that seeks to redress vis-à-vis the U.S. political economy in the late twentieth century rather than celebrating “women of color’s” marginality to the state. (Lee 2002, 96–97)

In one of the most oft-cited critiques of Crenshaw’s conception of intersectionality, Wendy Brown (1999) faults the concept’s narrowness. Indeed, Brown argues that intersectionality presupposes that it is possible to isolate distinctive of components of identity and difference central to feminist scholarship, such as gender, race, socioeconomic class, and sexuality. On her view, intersectional territory seizing implies the analytical possibility of delimiting varying genealogies and disciplinary technologies corresponding to each respective category of subjectification. But the very process of differentiating invites comparisons. Thus gender becomes analytically, genealogically, and disciplinarily analogized with race; which becomes analytically, genealogically, and disciplinarily analogized with socioeconomic class; and so on. Through such analogies the intersectional rubric erroneously renders the histories of their subjectifying technologies interchangeable.

Brown also criticizes the concept of intersectionality for its reliance on Civil Rights discourses, which appeal to the state’s civil and juridical institutions for political redress of injuries. Where poststructuralists and U.S. third-world feminists eschew any appeal to the state, Crenshaw demands that state institutions accept responsibility for the intersectional effects of racism, sexism, and classism on black women’s lives. In so doing, Crenshaw covertly legitimates the nation-state as the site of rectification and reparations. But any appeal to the nation-state privileges citizenship as the ground for social justice. Even in a nation riddled by racism, citizenship confers rights and benefits on some while excluding others. When U.S. citizenship is a prerequisite for redress of
inequities, women of color who are dispossessed migrants or refugees are denied remedies. According to Lee, such exclusionary practices constitute a weakness of territory seizing as a political tactic for women of color.

One such skewed angle might be the U.S.-centrism of “women of color” writings and the reliance on civil-rights discourse in proposals for remedy. For instance the lack of inclusion in the U.S. legislative and judiciary processes is implicitly where Kimberlé Crenshaw aims her critique of her oft-cited essay “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex” (1989). Yet, dispossessed indigenous groups colonized by Anglo-European U.S. state might argue for land rights and territorial separation rather than for inclusion in the “civil rights” guaranteed by U.S. laws….One key blind spot in much “women of color” scholarship, then, is its own imbrication in civil rights discourse and modes of political redress attendant on a concept of justice inhering in rights and in possessive, capitalist individualism and subjectivity. (Lee 2002, 96)

Criticisms of territory-seizing tactics in relation to civil rights discourses overlook the specificity of black women’s positioning within the U.S. nation-state and the unique effects of U.S. imperialism on their lives. It is correct that their appeal for redress through civil rights discourse distances them from the varying political aspirations of other constituencies of women of color—political aspirations to which civil rights discourse cannot attend—and brings them incontrovertibly closer to the state. The appeal to civil rights does implicate black feminist political strategies in a politics of belonging in the context of U.S. citizenship, but that is particularly apt for citizens who have been so long dispossessed and deprived of their rights. Dismissing black feminist civil rights approaches because they would not work for all women of color, overlooks the many reasons that this framework with its pledge to redress social inequality within juridical and institutional registers appeals to black women in the first place.

Since the nineteenth century, Black feminists have criticized methodological individualism both for its mistaken account of sociability and for its mystification of the
structural forces producing poverty and racism. Methodological individualism is associated with atomistic conceptions of human nature that characterized eighteenth century republicanism of the Founding Fathers, nineteenth century liberalism of the self-made man, and twentieth century notions of upward mobility and equal opportunity. Methodological individualism also undergirds neoconservative discourses that situate black women within a dialectics of visuality, which erases the historical connections between their exploited labor and their manifold contributions to U.S. capitalist development—via slavery, share-cropping, various forms of informal labor, and their work as modern-day mammies in a number of venues. By invoking civil rights discourse, black feminists call the state to task for its long history of complicity in black women’s subordination, and for its continuing erasure of that subordination from public view. Black feminists demand that the state take responsibility for redressing this subordination enacted and sustained by statutes and constitutional law. In appealing to civil rights discourse, black feminists raise to the threshold of visibility the state’s long history of rendering invisible black women’s role in U.S. capitalist development—whether that role pertains to their labor power or to distorted ideological representations circulating in neoconservative and neoliberal discourses.

Many black feminists are committed to a politics of location, even as they are aware of any location’s impermanence. This commitment puts them at odds with metaphorical flows central to capillary discourses, with their presumption of fluidity. The incompatibility between metaphors of territory seizing and metaphors of extra-territorial roving positionality illuminate tensions between black feminist politics and women of color politics that have not been adequately theorized. Foucault uses the
biological metaphor of capillaries to denote the fluid, vein-like character of various
disciplinary technologies that reach into everyone’s lives—and perhaps, most especially,
into the lives of women of color. Using capillary metaphors, Foucault demonstrates how
prominent institutions, through the promulgation of extraordinarily subtle disciplinary
technologies, manage to make their way into the smallest crevices of our bodily gestures,
a penetration that captures experiences of U.S. black women as well as women of color
across the globe. But resisting the capillary nature of these disciplinary technologies
entails a conceptualization of a capillary mode of politics—equally fluid and vein-like in
scope. In staking a claim to seize territory (e.g., create safe spaces) and to demand
changes in law and social practice compatible with intersectionality, U.S. black feminists
challenge the adequacy of perennially fluid tactics for their political purposes. In so
doing, they challenge the hegemony of transnational feminist priorities that privilege the
needs of women of color across the geopolitical regions of the global South.³⁸

Re-examining the category women of color and its relationship to U.S.
multiculturalism

The interchanges in Signs explored in this chapter raise a disconcerting question
concerning the category women of color: do U.S. black women fit within its conceptual
rubric? I have argued that social, cultural, and intellectual discourses influencing
feminist field formation have eclipsed the political and intellectual demands of black
women. Frequently U.S. black women have been absent from the discourses circulating
in feminist scholarship, excluded by parameters that ill suit their historical and
contemporary experiences and knowledge. They have also been conflated with and
subsumed under the rubric of third-world women and the category women of color. The
politics of race within feminist scholarship is further complicated by the fact that the
demands of third-world women have often not been defined by third-world women
themselves. In the case of Signs, these demands were principally defined by first-world
women or by third-world women scholars living and working in the first world.
Although free of the ventriloquism of earlier formulations, Sandoval’s acclaimed
conceptualization of “U.S. third-world feminism” continues to conflate American black
women within the enunciative modality of scholarship on third-world women. Although
this precise enunciative modality encapsulates only a partial strand of contemporary
scholarship on and by U.S. black women or by third-world women, it circulates as the
dominant enunciative modality for women of color. Ironically, a political and scholarly
rubric initially deployed by black feminist scholars to create coalitions within and across
various racial, ethnic, and national differences, women of color now entails
presuppositions at odds with explicit political demands framed by U.S. black feminist
scholars.

Some might argue that the point of diffraction that erases U.S. black feminism is
uniquely caught up with the transnationalization of the category women of color.
According to this view, the category leaves black feminist scholarship behind because
black feminist scholarship is uncritically wedded to an anachronistic brand of U.S.
multiculturalism. Due to its intersectional commitments, black feminist scholarship is
frequently accused of being mired within a brand of multiculturalism homogenizing a
spectrum of identitarian differences. This multiculturalism methodologically parses out
various differences and then disciplines them into separate and distinct heuristic
categories, creating an inaccurate picture of the complex workings of subjugation on
individual (racialized) bodies and oppressive mechanisms in social relationships. It also crafts a fictional norm from which all social minorities are thought to differentiate gradationally depending upon the identitarian analytics in which they experience subordination. For instance, those individuals subordinated in just one identitarian analytic—gender, race, socioeconomic class, or sexuality—are thought to be equidistant from the norm. Furthermore, those individuals subordinated in two identitarian analytics are even farther away from the norm, but the same distance from the norm as other individuals experiencing twofold subordination. And so on. Thus this version of multiculturalism relies upon an additive account of oppression’s machinery: the more vectors of power that constrain a subject, the more oppressed s/he is. Bill Readings (1999) has described how identity and difference become homogenized in this multicultural rubric.

The logic that invokes the indigene as one name for difference, placed indifferently among a list of others (for fear of exclusion), gives voice to the indigene only at the price of self-recognition as one immigrant among others, at the price of the qualitative homogenization of the very differences that lists such as the following seek to note: “In keeping with our commitment to representation of those who have led the way in progressive educational change, most of the chapters are written by people of color—African-American, Latino and Latina, Asian-American, Indian, and Native Hawaiian—in addition to chapters by white women and gay and lesbian people.” I indicate the indigene as merely one victim of homogenization in such listings. In general, the effect of multiculturalism is necessarily to homogenize differences as equally deviant from a norm. (Readings 1999, 113)

Configuring the alienation of black feminist scholarship from feminist academic practices solely in relation to the problematic dynamics of a brand of U.S. multiculturalism fails to capture the complex connections that link U.S. black feminism to transnational feminist scholarship, particularly the scholarship of development and underdevelopment. As this chapter demonstrates, black feminist scholars have been
among the first to link development within the United States to transnational studies of
development across the global South. Black feminist scholars have explored the minute,
seemingly invisible global articulations of U.S. imperialism and foreign policy
manifested in the subtle visual techniques that establish the discursive parameters of
black women’s intelligibility within academic and public spheres. Thus black feminism
is highly cognizant of how global forces structure differences within the borders of the
U.S. nation-state—whether those differences pertain to gender, race, socioeconomic
class, or the intersectional articulations within, between, and among them.

Critiques of capitalism and imperialism have been at the heart of black feminism
since its beginnings. Careless associations of black feminist scholarship with an
unrefined U.S. multiculturalism submerge this intricate history. Black feminist criticisms
of capitalism and imperialism received early enunciation in the Black Women’s
Liberation Committee (BWLC) of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC), which later evolved into the independent Third World Women’s Alliance
(TWWA) (Anderson-Bricker 1999, 50). Since their inception, BWLC and TWWA
argued that the intertwining experiences of racism and sexism in the United States were
fashioned by larger structural forces pertaining to global capitalism and U.S. imperialism
(Anderson-Bricker 1999, 58). Interlacing analyses of racism and sexism with critiques of
capitalism and imperialism enabled BWLC and TWWA to craft a feminist politics that
“recognized the connection between Black Americans and third world peoples and
nations around the globe” (Anderson-Bricker 1999, 58). According to Kristin Anderson-
Bricker (1999), making connections between the ravages of capitalist development in the
third world with U.S. capitalist development enabled the emergence of a black feminist
consciousness in BWLC, spurring the subsequent formation of TWWA. “Understanding Black nationalism in its international context and rooting Black inequality in racism, capitalism and imperialism provided the intellectual environment necessary for Black women in SNCC to identify themselves not only as Blacks but also as women and workers” (58). For TWWA, any analysis of racism and sexism must incorporate an analysis of capitalism, but with the proviso that the question of development was at the very center of capitalism’s definition. By acknowledging the centrality of development to capitalism, “they [black feminists in TWWA] realized the need for third world solidarity” (Anderson-Bricker 1999, 60).

The histories of BWLC and TWWA are linked to the threshold of emergence of the category women of color, demonstrating black women’s awareness that the experiences of black women living within the United States were intricately tied to the experiences of third world women subjected to global capitalism and the effects of U.S. imperialism and militarism. These connections were not made to erase national, cultural, and geopolitical specificities of each geographical constituency. Rather, these connections identified how the capitalist model of development—even when implemented in culturally specific ways—harmed a majority of the world’s population (even if such harm occurred in dissimilar ways and to uneven extents).

The alienation of black feminist scholarship depicted in this chapter has a quite different source—embedded in a prominent enunciative modality within feminist scholarship that subsumes the specificity of U.S. black feminist scholarship under the singular enunciative modality for women of color. U.S. black feminist scholarship has much to offer transnational feminist scholarship on women of color, including insights
into varying geopolitical dispersions of capitalist development and significant qualitative
differentials among those dispersions. As detailed in this chapter, black feminists have
cultivated methodologies that enable comparisons across multiple modes of development,
but their eloquent articulations have not been heard by white feminist scholars. If
feminist scholarship is to benefit fully from the insights of U.S. black feminist scholars,
then far more attention must be paid to the complex politics of race within feminist
scholarship and how it shapes academic discourses.
Chapter 4

Conclusion: Revisiting the Secrets of Feminist Field Formation

The Signs board, to a large extent—and surely not everyone—had this intellectual trust and this willingness to celebrate in other people’s ideas. I mean that’s what an editor does really. You’re not putting forward your ideas. You’re celebrating someone else’s.

—Barbara Gelpi

The dissertation sought to trouble a disconcerting narrative that has gained ascendancy in feminist scholarly circles. Throughout I have called this account feminist scholarship’s stock narrative and argued that it incorrectly summarizes the past of feminist scholarship. The picture the stock narrative paints of feminist field formation is limited, inaccurate, and incomplete. Very importantly, the stock narrative renders invisible socio-political dynamics involved in feminist field formation, which demand further scrutiny for the multiple dispersions they effect in feminist scholarship. The dissertation accounts for some of these dispersions. The stock narrative functions to foreclose further scrutiny into the myriad socio-political referents of feminist scholarship because it misleadingly limits the social grounds of academic feminism to the 1960s new social movements and the changes these movements wrought in higher education.

The dissertation disrupts the interpretive hegemony of the stock narrative by developing three alternate accounts of feminist field formation. One account borrows analytical strategies from Karl Mannheim’s conception of the sociology of knowledge; the second makes use of Arthur O. Lovejoy’s approach to the history of ideas; and the
third employs Foucauldian archaeology. In documenting feminist scholarship’s past, I could have taken a more quantitative approach, surveying several women’s studies programs across the country or accounting for the copious contents of several English-language feminist journals. Some may argue that my decision to limit the dissertation’s archival purview to the first ten years of *Signs*’ publication marks a considerable sacrifice in intellectual breadth. My Foucauldian conception of the archive, however, encompasses not only the thousands of pages that fill the first ten volumes of the journal, but also: the multifaceted relations within, between, and among the academic institutions that housed the journal during its first ten years; the University of Chicago Press; the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations; and the UN and USAID. With its expanded notion of the archive, my dissertation demonstrates that what may be sacrificed in temporal breadth is compensated for in the creation of an entirely new sense of breadth—a dispersed and spatial breadth—encompassing the multidimensional (and not simply intellectual) forces responsible for feminist scholarly emergence.

The philosophical presuppositions informing my project are genealogical in the Nietzschean sense. I have sought to generate partial accounts of feminist field formation that open up different ways of relating to feminist scholarship and women’s studies at present and in the future. My ultimate hope is to breathe new life into the field by pointing to different methodological possibilities for feminist scholarly investigation.

Despite my use of competing methodological frameworks for each respective chapter, all of the chapters are interconnected in their findings. The dissertation begins by tracing academic feminism’s implication in knowledge projects emerging in conjunction with the global transition from embedded liberalism to neoliberalism, a
transition commencing roughly during the second half of the Cold War in the late 1960s. The socio-political context in which this transition occurred was marked by an American desire to contain Soviet communism and win the Cold War at all costs. During embedded liberalism, intellectual production became socialized: The federal government filtered millions of dollars into university sciences, generating immediate returns, enhancing American military capabilities and nuclear superiority. Building on the successful relationship between the academic sciences and the federal government, Program V, an addendum to Project Troy (a supplemental Marshall Plan in the field of ideas), recommended that federal funding extend to the social sciences. The social sciences could play a crucial role in identifying populations in the third world vulnerable to communist infiltration.

The social sciences received federal patronage, although they never neared the levels of federal support enjoyed by the sciences. Instead philanthropic foundations cultivated “strategic benevolence,” subsidizing social scientific studies that were not federal priorities. Strategic benevolence directly responded to the request made by the Gaither Report that America’s major private philanthropies contribute to the containment of communism. The foundations identified third-world capitalist development as a primary way to contain the spread of communism and one to which they could contribute liberally. Initially, the foundations supported existing top-down development strategies. As the failures of the 1960s Decade of Development grew readily apparent, however, philanthropies responded by actively searching for alternatives to top-down development strategies. The result was significant funding for innovative methodological frameworks that might help to revise existing development strategies. It was in this context of this
methodological pluralism that foreign policy and intelligence establishments began
viewing women as agents possessing the capacity to spread democratic and capitalist
ideologies.

*Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* was created just as foreign
policy and intelligence establishments became keenly aware of the paucity of scholarship
on women. Women were fast becoming subjects of heightened scholarly interest in
foreign policy circles for their potential to enable development from the bottom-up. I
have traced how *Signs* was connected to complex collaborations linking private
foundations to attempts to advance U.S. geopolitical interests through the study of third-
world women. Borrowing analytical techniques from the history of ideas, I contrast the
free play of feminist ideas with an examination of the social and material factors involved
in the generation, publication, and circulation of scholarship on third-world women and
development in *Signs*—material factors to which the sociology of knowledge drew
attention. In placing the sociology of knowledge and history of ideas in conversation, I
track just how far a particular conception of the social reached into the journal’s pages.
The free play of ideas is most evident in the journal’s multiple and highly critical
renderings of capitalist development in the third world. Journal authors drew detailed
portraits of numerous manifestations of capitalist development, sensitive to capitalism’s
varying geographical, cultural, and political dispersions in the third world. Their
criticisms illuminated the adverse effects of capitalist development on third-world
women. Although many of the analyses of capitalism were critical, capitalism was
singularly emphasized in *Signs*. Engagements with alternatives to the capitalist model of
development were largely absent. Thus a liberal conception of the social permeated the
journal, contributing to a marked absence of any studies of women in socialist developing countries. This inattention to women in socialist development ought to be further explored, I argue, for it may clarify why feminism’s intricate renderings of socialist theory (via the systems theories, standpoint theories, and object-relations theory) are all but absent from contemporary academic feminism’s most erudite renderings.

The heightened scholarly focus on the lives of third-world women during the second half of the Cold War had significant discursive consequences for feminist field formation. Through my juxtaposition of two significant interchanges from the Signs archive, I document a threshold of feminist scholarly disappearance, which governs the archaeological relationship between scholarship on third-world women in developing countries and scholarship on black women in the United States. This archaeological relationship marks a point of diffraction of discourse: as the frequency of scholarship on third-world women increased, scholarship on black women grew increasingly absent—fashioning enduring discursive consequences for the category women of color in feminist scholarship. This inverse relationship, I argue, mirrors the unique discursive positioning of both third-world women and U.S. black women as geopolitical agents of the U.S. nation-state. The quest for understanding of third-world women implicated women across the global South in capitalist ideological formations across public and private registers as comprehensive knowledge of various aspects of their daily lives were investigated, documented, and theorized. Knowledge about U.S. black women’s lives was generated through capillaries of state surveillance cultivated in conjunction with intrusive welfare policies. Circulating widely as noxious stereotypes that distorted structural features of U.S. capitalist development, this power-knowledge constellation
was largely absent from the pages of *Signs*; but also absent was scholarship by black feminists that challenged these noxious representations. A dialectics of visuality, which constructs black women as entirely responsible for the inequality circumscribing their lives, dominated public discourse as capitalism’s role in this inequality was thoroughly masked.

By linking U.S. development to transnational studies of development across the global South, black feminist scholars have advanced methodological innovations to explore how global articulations of U.S. imperialism and foreign policy manifest in the subtle visual techniques that establish the discursive parameters of black women’s intelligibility. As these insights remained absent from the emerging scholarship on women, a particular strand of scholarship on third-world women became the dominant enunciative modality for women of color. In its emphasis on mobility and capillary flows, this enunciative modality erases political appeals made by black feminists for location, positionality, and territory seizing. To contest hegemonic conceptions of women of color that conflate third world women and U.S. black women, my dissertation reconsiders (1) the complex archaeological conditions within which scholarship by and about U.S. black women have been erased; and (2) the discursive conditions within which the unique political claims of black feminists have been rendered unintelligible. By illuminating these processes of conflation and erasure, I hope to inspire a reconsideration of innovative concepts, such as intersectionality, developed by black feminist scholars, which have been losing critical purchase within the hegemonic enunciative modality women of color.
Reconsidering the relationship between feminist scholarship and women’s studies

My dissertation ends where it began, reconsidering the seemingly over-determined relationship between feminist scholarship and women’s studies. The stock narrative caricatures the relationship between feminist scholarship and women’s studies, defining them as opposing projects, while valuing the former and denigrating the latter. Feminist scholarship is configured as cutting-edge, experimental knowledge projects produced within and across the traditional disciplines. Due to its firm location within already-existing disciplinary structures, feminist scholarship is conceptualized as efficiently utilizing resources already in place. Women’s studies by contrast is said to wastefully require the creation of altogether new institutional spaces, regimes of labor, faculty lines, staff hires, etc. Feminist scholarship supposedly does not call for fundamental interrogation of the existing disciplinary structure of the university (for such a critique would be futile). For this reason, feminist scholarship is conceived as the low-maintenance and highly productive disciplinary offshoot of—and the more amenable contemporary alternative to—women’s studies. Construed as an institutional formation now anachronistic in its value, women’s studies is said to weigh down interdisciplinary feminist scholarship with unbridled commitments to a stable category of women and the evidence of experience.

With the exception of its institutional role in relation to diversity management—which could just as easily be performed in an ethnic studies program—the stock narrative positions women’s studies is a misfit in the corporate university, draining limited institutional resources, preventing cutting-edge feminist scholarship, and mistakenly privileging pedagogy over research. Since interdisciplinary research can occur within the
traditional disciplines, women’s studies is reduced to a purveyor of feminist pedagogy (and even that, it is argued, can be accomplished just as well within the traditional disciplines). According to the stock narrative whether and when a classroom is feminist depends on the individual professor—not the scholarly purview of the department. Those scholars who have been most active in disseminating the stereotypical association of women’s studies with pedagogy are those in academic positions granting them substantial leave from their teaching duties to pursue their own research. These scholars are not necessarily a representative sample of those most active in women’s studies departments and programs across the United States.

Straw-figure portraits of women’s studies result from inaccurate conceptions of knowledge production and acquisition as atomistic enterprises. These depictions are sustained because the corporate university presumes the intellectual property of individual scholars has primary value, thereby concealing the inherently collective character of knowledge production and acquisition. Even existing criticisms of the over-determined relationship between feminist scholarship and women’s studies fail to interrogate the valuation of individualism central to the corporate university structure. Instead these criticisms affirm that institutionalizing women’s studies marks the only guarantee that feminist knowledge endures as intellectual property.

In its comprehensive reconceptualization of the labor power involved in feminist scholarly emergence, my dissertation calls for a transvaluation of values concerning the intellectual—and many other forms of—labor enlisted in feminist field formation. What labors involved in field formation do feminist scholars value most and why? Do those labors reinscribe the individualism at the heart of the corporate university’s value system?
How might feminist scholars revalue labors involved in field formation that do not affirm individualism or atomism? If I remained wedded to an atomistic conception of academic labor, for example, this dissertation would have overlooked many correspondences and interpersonal and institutional relationships not directly appearing in the journal’s pages. As demonstrated, these correspondences and relationships played substantial roles in shaping what scholarship appeared in the journal. By extending my understanding of academic labor power beyond individual scholars—and adjusting my conception of the archive accordingly—I paved the way for identifying unexpected forces involved in feminist field formation. The dissertation follows these unexpected forces, showing how they challenge dominant discourses about academic feminism.

Feminist scholarship is only one outcome of collective intellectual labor, albeit a very important one, especially given its ready intelligibility in corporate university structures. Women’s studies instead names a dispersion of multidimensional labors—academic, intellectual, institutional, departmental, programmatic, pedagogical, political, personal—that sustain and renew feminist scholarship and pedagogy, feminist field formation, over time. Most of these labors of sustaining and renewal are invisible; but without them feminist scholarship would not have flourished in the past, and could diminish or indeed cease to exist in the near future. This is not to suggest that the relationship between feminist scholarship and women’s studies is best characterized as creditor-debtor. Interdisciplinary feminist scholarship does not owe women’s studies for enabling its existence. The stock narrative capitalizes on this ostensible creditor-debtor relationship, wherein feminist scholarship (debtor) must free itself from the cumbersome, guilt-ridden chains of women’s studies (creditor). With only a few histories of women’s
studies (Boxer 1982, 1998; Messer-Davidow 2000) in circulation, feminist scholars have a rather limited appreciation of the vast threshold of emergence women’s studies enables for feminist scholarship, not simply in the past but also presently. Significantly, this threshold is not merely scholarly in scope. In calling for the interment of women’s studies, feminist scholars may be inadvertently cutting off a highly constitutive, yet not readily visible, source of institutionalized creativity, resourcefulness, sustenance, and vision—modalities that qualitatively arrange, systematize, and nourish forms and patterns of labor power crucial to feminist field formation. Dual-systems theorists (socialist feminists) warned against the dire consequences of ignoring women’s invisible labor. Now is the time to heed their warning with regard to feminist field formation; relinquish our uniform and unquestioned affirmation of scholarly individualism; and instead affirm the multiplicity of qualitatively different labors involved in feminist scholarly emergence, labors we have come to call women’s studies.

**Beyond individualism: A different way to be in time with feminism**

Robyn Wiegman (2004) suggests that the agony marking feminist scholars’ alienation from changes they hope to effect in the academy and in the world beyond—changes that generally fail manifesting as initially imagined and hoped—is characteristic of “being in time with feminism.” This characterization of being in time with feminism, wherein the primary affective orientation is alienation, presupposes the isolation inherent in accounts of scholarly atomism from which my dissertation seeks distance. The gap characteristic of the separation between our scholarly and political actualities versus our scholarly and political aspirations need not be marked solely by alienation. Indeed, if this
gap is configured as pedagogical in character (as Wiegman suggests it is), then perhaps
its lesson is to teach us how to invest in scholarly, institutional, and political projects
beyond our individual selves and lifetimes? This “beyond,” however, does not
necessarily mark a martyred commitment to a temporally distant future in which feminist
scholars at present will never live to enjoy. Many feminist scholars actively invest in
scholarly and political projects beyond themselves with great frequency, requiring them
to connect with persons, organizations, belief-systems, and projects with which they may
not agree or wholly affirm—but this does not necessitate their alienation from these
persons, organizations, belief-systems, and projects. Even disagreement is a form of
connection across differences, which spurs many affects besides alienation. Given that
these investments often fail to manifest in published or other easily quantifiable forms,
they may fall outside the threshold of intelligibility set by individualism within the
corporate university.

Other than alienation, there are numerous affects marking the gap between what
feminism is and what we hope it becomes. Many feminist scholars exercise numerous
ways of being in time with feminism not characterized by alienation. Barbara Gelpi
offers one such alternative characterization. A very memorable moment of my
dissertation research occurred nearly two years ago during my interview with Gelpi. Her
recounting of the period of time in which she was asked to edit Signs eloquently points to
the collective character of feminist field formation.

When they [the feminist scholars working under the aegis of CROW, Stanford
University’s Center for Research on Women] asked me to be editor, my self-
esteeem was low. I was a half-time lecturer and clinging to that as my only source
of income. At the time, I said to Al, my life partner—who was an astute
academician, and an Associate Dean at Stanford, and who knew academic politics
very well—“I’ve been asked to this meeting [at CROW to discuss the possibility
of Signs coming to Stanford].” I said, “I’ll bring my tatting [her needlepoint] so that at least I’ll get something worthwhile done.” He said: “On your life you’ll take your tatting! You’ll look as if you take the meeting for granted. You’ll look completely out of it. Now stop that.” And so I never tatted again.\(^2\)

Gelpi continues by accounting for CROW’s interest in Signs:

The question was never: Was Signs a worthwhile project? Was this something we want to invest in, in which we want to place our energies? Is this something we want to do? That was never a question. It would be terrific to have Signs. We all wanted Signs. The question was always, who would edit it? All of the people already invested in CROW, except me, had full careers, and could not even dream of “stopping” to edit this journal, despite its prestige—I mean especially given what a journal of Signs’ stature demanded in terms of editorial practice. But I secretly think Myra [Strober] had it all choreographed out beforehand because she turned to me and said, “Now Barbara what about you?” My friends at the meeting said that “I should have seen my face. I always looked like a wallflower. And when Myra asked me to do it, suddenly it appeared as if the prince asked me to dance.” It was a glorious moment in my life, a moment I remember quite fondly. Nan [Keohane], as I recall, said, “Well, I’ve been waiting to see if I’ll sign on here. If Barbara’s going to be editor, I’ve signed on.” That was lovely, one of the loveliest moments of my life.\(^3\)

Gelpi movingly narrates a simple, yet commanding, phenomenon: women’s commitment to helping and supporting other women succeed in academe. To be sure, these types of strategies, particularly when they occur at elite universities, often mimic those of the old-boys-club model. That is, women who are successful and well-connected help women who demonstrate potential and who are willing to work within existing institutional structures. This can lead to tokenism. But Gelpi’s situation is different. CROW was seeking a collective intellectual endeavor that would give legitimacy and direction to its research projects. Gelpi’s colleagues were not simply asking her to present at a conference or publish in an anthology, accenting the value of her individual scholarship. Instead, in asking her to edit Signs, they entrusted her with providing direction to a group of exceptionally talented feminist scholars, all of whom were committed to working together collectively for a long period of time, and all of whom, as a collective, went on
to play a remarkably active role in feminist field formation. Gelpi’s recollection of how*Signs* came to Stanford and how she came to edit *Signs* thematically points to the transvaluation of values at the core of my dissertation: the repudiation of individualistic conceptions of scholarly production (and all that such repudiation entails). The future of feminist field formation relies on the success of this repudiation.

It is important to note, however, that Gelpi’s editorial team did not push this transvaluation of values concerning scholarly individualism far enough. For instance, chapter four documents editorial practices that inadvertently excluded black women from the journal. White feminist scholars set the definitional parameters of women’s communities—thus unwittingly setting the terms of intellectual debate around the notion community—in ways that prevented the full scholarly participation of black feminists. Collapsing matters concerning community boundary formation under the singular sign of membership placed the politics of communal inclusion largely within a one-dimensional identitarian register. Such conception of community erroneously presumes the politics of presence as remedying problems of exclusion: with the inclusion of more and different bodies, exclusionary practices are remedied. The transvaluation of values concerning scholarly individualism repudiates this teleology of identitarian inclusion as the sole measure of inclusionary, collective scholarly production. Such repudiation entails detailed documentations and sophisticated theorizations of the multidimensional scholarly (especially methodological) and non-scholarly practices (and labors) involved in communal knowledge production.

The labors involved in editing *Signs* mirror those involved in building women’s studies. They are exceptionally time-consuming, non-glamorous, messy, difficult, and
often invisible, under-acknowledged, and under-appreciated—much harder to live and work through than to scrutinize from afar. Collective intellectual endeavors require enormous time commitments and patience because they involve a number of different people, each of whom has a distinct disciplinary background, personality, set of professional aspirations and political commitments. The more scholars involved, the more time it takes to arrive at partial consensus. Given its time-consuming nature, collective intellectual labor tends to fall under the corporate university’s radar of value, wherein time translates into money, recognition, and symbolic capital. My point is that collective labors require feminist scholars to revalue the generosity at their core, for generosity qualitatively coordinates existing labor power in crucial, future-oriented and life-affirming ways.

At the very end of my interview with Gelpi, she addresses the constitutive potentials of generosity for leading a (feminist) scholarly life. I ended the interview by asking her to detail a fundamental lesson she learned in living her life as a feminist scholar, a lesson she wished she knew in her twenties. In her response, she began by emphasizing her need to feel a sense of community, even if that community is not codified as feminist. It is then not surprising that generosity is her answer to what it means to be in time with feminism. I end with her words.

The sense of community—the joy, the intellectual good that that did us. At Harvard, when I was in graduate school at Radcliffe, I met this group of men, three men in English, in my second year, and we became “The Pals.”... I finally married one of them. These people are my best friends and have remained my friends for life. But the thing that was extraordinary about them was that in that highly competitive, highly defensive, really aggressive place—it was unpleasant, and some people said this was the profession, this is what you have to learn; people are out to get you; people are trying to trip you up. The pals had a housewarming, and I said “I like it here.” Very characteristically—this was 1958, of course—I said, “I can cook; I’ll cook for you.” Interestingly, they said, “We
cook. You can come live here; we’ll make you a fine meal.” We studied together…. We helped each other through our dissertations…. There was an immense intellectual trust between us, and with that, great happiness. I mean happiness in other people’s ideas, and their willingness to share those ideas…. So the point is that it should be possible for women to have enough self-confidence for them to take joy in other people’s ideas and also to trust other people so that they are willing to share their ideas to see if they work and if they’re good. And if somebody questions their ideas, to not get defensive—a combination of generosity and lack of defensiveness is, I think, the great secret of life, a feminist life, or of any kind of life.⁴
Endnotes for the Introduction, pp. 1–35


2 Brown’s confusion in response to women’s studies’ possibility after the feminist complication of the category of women is demonstrated perfectly in this passage: “Women’s studies as a contemporary institution, however, may be politically and theoretically incoherent, as well as tacitly conservative—incoherent because by definition it circumscribes uncircumscribable ‘women’ as an object of study, and conservative because it must resist all objections to such circumscription if it is sustain that object of study as its raison d’être. Hence the persistent theory wars, race wars, and sex wars notoriously ravaging women’s studies in the 1980s, not to mention the ways in which women’s studies has sometimes greeted uncomfortably (and even with hostility) the rise of feminist literary studies and theory outside its purview, Critical Race Theory, postcolonial theory, queer theory, and cultural studies. Theory that destabilizes the category of women, racial formations that disrupt the unity or primacy of the category, and sexualities that similarly blur the solidarity of the category—each of these must be resisted, restricted, or worse, colonized, to preserve the realm” (Brown 1997, 83).

3 For more on the specific ways women’s studies has affected the traditional disciplines see Sherman and Beck 1979; Spender 1981; DuBois et al. 1985; Farnham 1987; Paludi and Steuernagel 1990; Hartman and Messer-Davidow 1991; Kramarae and Spender 1992; Stanton and Stewart 1995; Morley 1999. It is also important to note that with the emergence of PhD programs in women’s studies, more and more professors will be trained directly in the institutional location of women’s studies. Just as importantly, though, is the reality that most current professors of women’s studies have received their primary training within a traditional discipline. This disciplinarily specific training does not mean, of course, that these scholars are not capable of or have not produced some of the most cutting-edge interdisciplinary methodologies, research, and pedagogical strategies.

4 Robyn Wiegman has discussed academic feminism’s and women’s studies’ ambivalent and troubled relationships to affecting change outside of the academy’s walls at length. In “Academic Feminism Against Itself,” she asks, staying off criticisms that her investiture in professionalizing women’s studies and in introducing high theory into its pedagogical rubrics stem from little concern for the politics, demands, and constraints of the so-called real world, “Does this mean, then, that I share no sympathy with those who critique the effects of institutionalization on feminist politics?...We are not, ‘academic feminism’ is not the solo referent for feminism as a political discourse and world building force, nor is social transformation as an historical process synonymous with social movement, strategies, and goals.

My argument for a distinction between academic feminism and feminist social movement arises
here: first, as an interruption into the political demand for the immediate political applicability of feminist thought, and second, as an insistence that a deeper consideration of the knowledge practices of the university be forged. This is not to dismiss the necessity of the kinds of practices that various feminists call for as part of ‘concrete’ political struggle, but it is to suggest that academic feminism needs that which its anxiety about institutionalization has come to foreclose: ideas without definitive evidence, critical thought without immediate actualization. Indeed, it seems to me necessary to recognize, so as to make politically useful, the differences within and between various modalities of social transformation, not to pit them against one another but to articulate the temporal processes, affects, and languages of institutionalization, grassroots organization, movement politics, and other transformative social forms. Such an agenda does not institutionalize a particular definition of the political as the disciplinary guarantee for academic feminism’s productivity” (Wiegman 2002, 25). See also Wiegman 2004.


6 For the works Wiegman is referring to see Gordon 1991; Schor 1995; Miller 1997; Gubar 1998; Nussbaum 1999.

7 When Foucault describes the archaeologist’s technique, he suggests something akin to a suspension of ordinary knowledge to enable exploration of alternative explanatory and epistemic frames. This distancing entails a simultaneous shortening of one’s gaze, a closeness, similar the sort Foucault calls for in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” which he terms “historical sense.” “Effective history, on the other hand, shortens its vision to those things nearest to it—the body, the nervous system, nutrition, digestion, and energies; it unearths the periods of decadence and if it chances upon lofty epochs, it is with the suspicion—not vindictive but joyous—of finding a barbarous and shameful confusion. It has no fear of looking down, so as long as it is understood that it looks from above and descends to seize the various perspectives, to disclose dispersions and differences, to leave things undisturbed in their own dimension and intensity…. Effective history studies what is closest, but in an abrupt dispossession, so as to seize it at a distance (an approach similar to that of a doctor who looks closely, who plunges to make a diagnosis and to state its difference). Historical sense has more in common with medicine than philosophy; and it should not surprise us that Nietzsche occasionally employs the phrase “historically and physiologically,” since among the philosopher’s idiosyncrasies is a complete denial of the body” (Foucault n. d., 155–56). I refer to this archaeological technique as “close distance.”

8 Glancing through a single volume of Signs can easily provide its reader with an exceptionally complex sliver of what was happening in the United States, and even to some extent transnationally, at any given moment during the last thirty years. In the journal’s earliest editorials, Catharine Stimpson and her editorial staff made clear their intentions to make the scholarship appearing in Signs international, as well as to develop an international Signs readership, thereby requiring the editorial staff to foster sensitivities to scholarly issues about women and feminism that were not U.S.-centric in their political concerns and theoretical and conceptual frameworks. For instance, in Spring 1976 1(3) several of the articles discussed nationalism in relation to the category of women and feminism as a political enterprise; in Autumn 1976 2(1) Karen Westmann Berg of Sweden and Nynne Koch of Denmark attempted to internationalize feminist scholarship under the rubric of something termed “feminology,” an ostensibly new and universal terminology for the study of women cross-culturally; and in Autumn 1977 3(1) Signs published its first truly international issue, where Catharine Stimpson’s
editorial team invited contributors from Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East for its special issue entitled *Women and National Development: The Complexities of Change*. For any given year, a subscriber can read approximately 1,200 pages of articles, book reviews, and other smaller contributions falling under vastly different rubrics such as (to be somewhat faithful to the chronology of past and present editorships), and certainly not limited to: “Letters to the Editor,” “Roundtable” or the current inter/transnationally-oriented “Symposia”; engaging vastly different concepts, subjects, and theoretical frameworks such as, and certainly not limited to: autobiography, Simone de Beauvoir (A special section entitled “Special Cluster: Simone de Beauvoir,” appearing in Autumn 1992, 18(1), honors the fiftieth anniversary of her publication of *The Second Sex*), capitalism, cyborg feminism, (international) development, discrimination, education, essentialism, feminist history and historiography, feminist literary theory, (domestic, international, and transnational) feminist organizations, feminist theory, French feminist theory, homosexuality, immigrant women, interdisciplinarity, lesbianism, men, methodology, motherhood, occupational segregation, patriarchy, psychoanalysis, psychology of mothering, pornography, power and powerlessness, production, queer theory, reproduction, reproductive freedom, rhetoric, science, separatism (Winter 1994, 19(2) had a special forum entitled “Separatism Re-Viewed”), sex differences, sexual difference, sexual division of labor, sexual harassment, sexual violence, sexuality, suffrage, technology, Third World women, violence against women, women’s movements (in the following different places: Brazil, France, Germany, Israel, Latin America, Malaysia, Russia, Spain, United States), Women’s Studies (in the following different places: China, Eastern Europe, Korea, United States); and receiving contributions from vastly different disciplinary and interdisciplinary locations such as, but certainly not limited to: African American studies, American studies, anthropology, architecture and urban planning, art, Asian American studies, biology, business management, classics, communication studies, comparative literature, critical science studies, cultural anthropology, cultural studies, dance, demographics, development studies, disability studies, economics, education studies, English Literature, evolutionary biology, film studies, folklore, gay and lesbian studies, history, holocaust studies, labor history, landscape architecture, language and linguistics, Latin American studies, lesbian studies, library science, literature, literary criticism, mathematics, media studies, medicine, medieval history and literature, Middle Eastern studies, military history, music, mythology, Native American studies, performing arts, performance studies, philosophy, political science, population studies, psychology, public policy, religion, romance languages and literatures, science studies, sexuality studies, sociobiology, sociology, theatre, theology, Third World studies, urban planning, urban studies, visual arts.

In subsequent years, the editorial offices of the journal were housed at Duke University (1985–1990), the University of Minnesota (1990–1995), the University of Washington (1995–2000), UCLA (2000–2005), and Rutgers University (2005 to the present). Although the conscious designs of those who work within an episteme technically lay beyond the archaeological frame, the intents and visions of the journal’s editors (Catharine R. Stimpson, Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi, Jean F. O’Barr, Ruth-Ellen Boetcher Joeres, Barbara Laslett, Carolyn Allen, Judith A. Howard, Sandra Harding, Kathryn Norberg, and Mary Hawkesworth) have clearly had effects on the content of the journal. In tracing the history of key organizing concepts at *Signs*, I grapple with the vision for the journal of the first two editors, Catharine R. Stimpson and Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi in Chapter 2.
Endnotes for Chapter 1, pp. 32–67

1 Typed memo, titled “Signs Associates.” Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 1, Folder: Transitions. Margery Wolf was a member of the Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society editorial staff when the journal was based at Stanford University.


3 In sociology, the term “socialization” generally refers to parents’—and particularly mothers’—socialization of children into specific social roles. For instance, gender socialization refers to the process whereby young males are socialized to be more independent men and young females are socialized to be dependent on males for their self-actualization. R.C. Lewontin’s phrase “the socialization of academic production” is disingenuous to socialization’s usage in sociology. In his use of socialization, he refers to a particular relationship developed between higher education and the federal government. My use of “socialization” in Chapter 1 is consistent with Lewontin’s usage.

4 The generic house was supposed to exemplify for the Russians a home that every American could afford. However, this exemplification was unrealistic, as the house was filled with the latest labor-saving and recreational technologies U.S. consumer capitalism could offer and, thereby, not affordable by working- and lower-class standards. Nevertheless, after Russia launched Sputnik 1 on October 4, 1957, the United States was lagging behind in the newly inaugurated space race between which super power could better deliver nuclear weaponry. As a result, the federal government felt it needed to prove to the Russians how their technological innovations actually produced real, tangible, positive effects in the daily lives of average Americans. Despite the merely ostensible democratic affordability of the house, the exhibition’s primary reason for emphasizing consumer technologies was to take American and Russian focus away from technological advances in nuclear weaponry and place it onto the lighter and brighter possibilities of 1950s time-saving household appliances.

5 Spending precious federal monies on research occurring within university settings or undertaken by university professors aiding in the war effort was prioritized over spending these same monies on governmental programs focused on the social redistribution of wealth and resources, like welfare and Social Security, or even spending these monies on fostering public education in primary and secondary schools.

6 Government spending in higher education found its greatest “success,” and its eventual institutionalization through the National Science Foundation (NSF), in the discovery of the atomic bomb and the government’s total dependence on university scholars for this innovation. Even though the locales where the atomic and hydrogen bombs were developed, Oak Ridge and Los Alamos, were government reserves, their research teams were made up entirely of professors, most of whom were European. As the Second World War drew to a close, President Franklin Roosevelt began acknowledging that for the federal government to have access to the
most cutting-edge research, it would have to institutionalize its access to universities, their researchers, and their vast wealth of intellectual resources. In November 1944, Roosevelt asked Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, to figure out how this relationship between the federal government and university sciences could be institutionalized. Bush eventually proposed NSF to then President Harry Truman, who, in turn, proposed NSF to Congress in 1946. As a result of the growing fears of a totalitarian science, where the terms and conditions of all scientific research would be dictated by the government, Congress did not approve of NSF until 1950.

7 The “revolving door” phenomenon between the higher echelons of the federal government and private philanthropy was long-term and widespread. Besides Hoffman, Dean Rusk, one-time Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs became president of the Rockefeller Foundation. Rusk would eventually go on to be President John F. Kennedy’s Secretary of State. Before President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower named John Foster Dulles Secretary of State, Dulles served as the chairman of Rockefeller’s Board of Trustees from 1950–1952. McGeorge Bundy, a close colleague of Rusk throughout the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations, would leave his post as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to become president of the Ford Foundation in 1966. After leaving his position as Director of the Agency for International Development (AID), David Bell was appointed head of Ford’s International Division. After serving as a vice president to the Rockefeller Foundation, Charles W. Cole became U.S. Ambassador to Chile (a post that would have later implications for the Rockefeller Foundation when it sought to build and administer a university in the country). Prior to serving as chairman of Ford’s board of Trustees as well as serving as a Rockefeller trustee, John J. McCloy was president of the World Bank, served as the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, and was the chairman of board of directors for the Council on Foreign Relations. The Council on Foreign Relations was an institutional setting in which considerable crossover can be traced. David Rockefeller served as a vice president of the Council on Foreign Relations. Henry Wriston, a trustee of Carnegie, served as a president of the Council on Foreign Relations. Vice president of the Carnegie Corporation, then subsequently director of Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan Bank, and finally president of the Ford Foundation–sponsored International Council for Educational Development, James Perkins, was also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations board of directors. Carnegie Foundation president, Whitney Shepardson, served as a president of the Council on Foreign Relations. A Ford and Rockefeller trustee, John Dickey served on the Council on Foreign Relations’ Committee on Studies, which designated the most pressing foreign policy issues for a given fiscal year. This list is merely a sampling of the revolving door between the council and the foundations. Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations also included such government bigwigs as former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter and director of the Central Intelligence Agency Allen Dulles.

8 The Truman Doctrine complemented the Marshall Plan militarily by offering to assist those fighting against the spread of communism in third-world countries, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) guaranteed that the United States’ security interests would be secured throughout Western Europe and in certain other regions of the world.

9 With the hopes of ascertaining a stable economic order, the victors of the Second World War met and drew up the Bretton Woods agreements, which sought world economic stability through such international institutions as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, and the Bank of International Settlements in Basle. Via the agreements, the U.S. dollar served as the global
reserve currency. The United States set the monetary standard for international free trade on the basis of the dollar’s ability to be converted into gold at a fixed price. Therefore, the only impediment to the U.S. dollar’s economic hegemony throughout the world was the Soviet Union and the Cold War.

Receiving funds from the State Department, a cabinet-level foreign affairs agency of the U.S. government, in 1950, just as Senator Joseph McCarthy began accusing the Secretary of State Dean Acheson of being communist, seemed risky for MIT, Project Troy’s home base. Nevertheless, when the State Department offered MIT $150,000 (almost $1.5 million in 2009), university president James Killian could hardly turn it down.

Needell quotes the Project Troy final report: “Communism in China and Southeast Asia does not constitute a simple extension of Soviet Power. Mao in China and Ho in Vietnam are not automatic tools of the Kremlin, but men with aspirations for their own countries who have embraced Communist doctrine as a formula for achieving progress in their own countries and who rely on Moscow for moral and military support” (quoted in Needell 1998, 18; originally appearing in Troy Report, Vol. 1, p. 65).

National Security Document number 68, Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense on “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”, April 1950, was one of the most important statements of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. NSC 68 put forth a policy of “containment militarism” (Sanders 1983) that called for a massive nuclear arms build-up to contain communism and deter the imperialistic aspirations of the Soviet Union. The statement viewed the Soviet Union as totalitarian and inherently expansionist, and it is for this reason that the neoconservative 1970s political pressure group, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), revitalized NSC 68 for their call to remilitarize the Cold War and put an end to détente and the SALT process. We will explore the workings of CPD in Chapter 3.

Ford donated $14 million to Harvard, $10 million to Chicago, and $3 million to Stanford (Lowen 1997, 194).

Ford’s work in Burma and Egypt is exemplary of the private sector’s ability to undertake initiatives that furthered official U.S. interests without the taint of being associated directly with the federal government. In the early 1950s, Burma requested a significant amount of funding from the State Department to build an international Buddhist university. While the State Department could not honor this request, since it was not permitted to fund an explicitly religious institution, the State Department asked Ford if it could allot the appropriate funding for building the university. Both the State Department and Ford were concerned that Burma’s request be fulfilled since they desired to cultivate friendship with Burma’s neutralist government. Therefore, Ford went ahead and established the Institute of Buddhist Studies in Burma in 1953. Even after Burma rejected bilateral aid from the United States later in 1953, Ford remained the “principal agency of American influence in the country, supporting various rural development, agricultural research, and public administration programs” (Hess 2003, 326). Ford acted similarly to mitigate bilateral strains between the United States and Egypt. After Secretary of State John Foster Dulles abruptly terminated federal support for the Aswan High Dam project in 1956, Ford continued supporting the project by sending substantial aid to the Aswan Regional Development Agency, which was established by Egyptian President Gamal Abdal Nasser. Even as Egyptian-Israeli tensions were escalating in 1967, and most foreign agency officials were rapidly leaving the country, Nasser requested that Ford staff remain.
The theory of human capital first received wide acclaim in economics after Theodore Schultz devoted his presidential address to the American Economic Association on the subject of investment in human capital. Berman argues, “With Schultz setting the pace at the University of Chicago and Gary Becker doing similarly at Columbia University, there developed an influential group of economists who viewed the theory of human capital as the panacea for developmental problems both at home and abroad. Briefly stated, these economists viewed human beings as a form of capital, in which certain investments could be made, thereby guaranteeing predictable outcomes. Education was soon identified as a largely underutilized form of investment. More appropriate educational investment would ensure significant returns beneficial both to the individual and to the society” (Berman 1983, 109).

In 1952, the Rockefeller Foundation established the Population Council, “which emphasized scientific research as a means of stimulating awareness of population issues and forcing assessment of policy options” (Hess 2003, 331). By 1954, the Ford Foundation became the Population Council’s chief financial backer. Starting in 1958–1959, Ford initiated several extensive birth-control programs overseas, focusing most pointedly on developing family-planning programs in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco. Ford creatively overcame the Roman Catholic Church’s opposition to programs in birth control and family planning in Latin America by concentrating on educating medical personnel in reproductive predicaments—rather than explicitly focusing on birth control—in Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay. By the mid-1960s, philanthropy was “contributing about half of all the international spending on population programs” (Hess 2003, 332). In addition, the green revolution—a phrase coined in 1968 by an AID official—marks perhaps one of the most significant impacts philanthropy had on the third world. The green revolution had its origins in the Mexican Agricultural Project (MAP), begun in 1943 under the direction of a future Rockefeller president, George Harrar. Funded exclusively by Rockefeller, its aim was to address Mexico’s chronic shortages of corn and wheat by executing sustained and focused HYV grain research, which sought ultimately to radically transform processes of food production. This research resulted in Norman E. Borlaug’s, a Rockefeller scientist, development of the HYV of wheat, winning him the Noble Peace Prize in 1970. As a result of MAP’s successes, Rockefeller established highly successful agricultural programs in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Ford followed suit with its launching, in 1960, of the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines.

All of the reasons for a shift in U.S. foreign policy during the second half of the Cold War will be briefly discussed in the final section of this chapter and then discussed at greater length in Chapter 4.

Berman discusses two other reasons why the foundations might be interested in the results of more radical research practices: “utilization of the results of radical research has the potential to deflect criticism concerning the foundations’ unwillingness to consider radical solutions to problems susceptible to no other approach. It also helps to domesticate the findings, to lessen their potential ability to effect radical systemic and structural change as part of a larger developmental effort” (Berman 1983, 159).

USAID is deemed as softer by foreign policy analysts because of its responsibility for administering nonmilitary, as opposed to military, forms of foreign aid.

Although Signs is one of the most prominent journals of feminist scholarship, it is only one journal in a vast field of academic feminism, which includes programs, departments, research institutes, academic and feminist presses, and a wide network of scholarly publications. In
drawing lessons from *Signs*. I do not mean to suggest that *Signs* represents a uniform or universal account of academic feminism. A vast amount of historical research is needed to map the growth of women’s studies programs and departments, as well as feminist scholarly publications, and feminist research centers and institutes. But I do want to suggest that, when undertaken, this research will reveal markedly different accounts than the stock narrative of the emergence of feminist activism. Those sectors of academic feminism that have relied on federal funds and foundation funding may also bear important similarities to the story that I will tell about *Signs*.

22 I do not mean to suggest a causal relationship between these events and the emergence of *Signs*, but rather to trace with precision the possible connections between these events and the early successes of the *Signs* journal.

23 *Signs* initially accepted money from AID to fund the production costs for their special issue on women and national development (Autumn 1977). However, when they found out that *Signs* was about to receive a significant amount of money from AID, certain members of the international advisory board and certain feminist scholars from the Wellesley Conference on women and development, whose papers were published in the special issue, were infuriated. After receiving word of these multiple protests against AID, the *Signs* editorial team promptly turned down AID’s funding offer with the idea that AID would purchase hundreds—potentially even thousands—of copies of the special issue. See the correspondence (dated August 29, 1978) between Catharine Stimpson and Dr. Elsa Cheney, Office of Women in Development, Bureau of Programs and Policy Co-Ordination AID, Washington, D.C. 20523. Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 1, Cb–Chi.

*Signs* made the same arrangement with AID’s Office of Women and Development for the special issue on *Women and Latin America* (Autumn 1977); AID was set to purchase 500 copies at minimum. See the correspondences (dated April 30, 1979; March 10, 1979; August 9, 1979) between Stimpson and Deborah Purcell, Office of Women and Development, Agency for International Development, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20523. Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 3, Folder: Po–Pz.

24 The Cold War changed the architecture and architectonics of patronage in higher education. Patronage relationships are often described through two metaphors: the metaphor of a puppeteer delicately pulling the strings of a puppet and the metaphor derived from the old adage “whoever pays the piper calls the tune.” Despite the powerful descriptive capacities of these metaphors, they prove inadequate, as their lack of sophistication implies that patrons have direct control over exactly how money gets spent; the types of questions asked and methodologies used in funded studies; and the philosophical, epistemological, and political presuppositions of scholars receiving funding. While it is certainly true that patrons exercise a modicum of control over funding recipients (the extent of which differs across patronage relationships), any form of control is mediated considerably. The original vision of patrons are modified significantly as they are translated into interdisciplinary programs of study, research institutions, think tanks, and scholarly journals, shaped by participating scholars, administrators, and students who may or may not partake in the patron’s worldview. Whoever pays the piper may call a tune, but calling a particular tune means very little when the piper is incapable or unwilling to oblige. Even if willing and capable, depending on the piper’s talents and creative potentials, the piper may improve upon the tune to the point that it becomes altogether new and better-sounding, or do just the opposite by playing it out of tune and incorrectly. No one metaphor can possibly
characterize with any finality all the fluid dynamics and multiple dimensions characteristic of patronage relationships. The knowledge production resulting from these relationships is highly variegated and multiple. Each relationship, therefore, needs to be viewed in its particularity.

Endnotes for Chapter 2, pp. 68–108

1 Catharine Stimpson stated this in a letter of August 29, 1978, to Dr. Elsa Cheney, Office of Women in Development, Bureau of Programs and Policy Co-Ordination, A.I.D., Washington, D.C. 20523. The original transcript of this letter can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 1, Folder Cb-Chi.

2 All of these correspondences are contained in the Signs archives in Special Collections at Alexander Library, Rutgers University.

3 These special issues and sections illustrate how feminist knowledge is produced by a larger intellectual collective than is typically understood. During its first decade, knowledge production at Signs involved editors, presses, university administrations, research institutes, philanthropic foundations, and authors. I do not intend to claim that these special issues exhaust the scholarly trends emerging in or animated by Signs. Publishing more than a thousand pages per year in multiple issues, Signs could illustrate many trends at odds with the stock narrative. I focus on these issues because the geopolitical and ideological aspects of feminist field formation have been so little studied.

4 This information about Hanna Papanek’s position with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO and the International Social Science Council is located in Gelpi’s handwritten notes of an editorial meeting held on December 8, 1980. This particular portion of the meeting regarded the discussion of which members of the Stimpson editorial board would be kept for Gelpi’s editorial board and which members would be asked to relinquish their position. Gelpi’s handwritten notes from this meeting can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 1, Folder: B.G.

Papanek played a considerable role in connecting the Signs editorial team with Ulrike von Buchwald, a representative from the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. The Barnard editorial team would subsequently send both of its special issues on women in developing countries (Autumn 1977 and Autumn 1979) to Ulrike von Buchwald who would, in turn, circulate them through the appropriate channels at the United Nations. All of the correspondences between the Signs editorial team and Ulrike von Buchwald can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 3, Folder: Mof–Mor.

I speculate that Papanek also played a significant role in connecting Stimpson with Elinor Barber at the Ford Foundation. Barber was responsible for identifying international topics of scholarly interest for Ford. Papanek’s husband, Gustav Papanek was a longtime “Ford associate and director of the Development Advisory Service” (Berman 1983, 84). Along with his wife, he likely identified the potential for Signs to produce the types of knowledge about development necessary in a neoliberal era when development policy priorities became capillary.
Papanek’s characterization of the UN Conference on Women in Mexico City is equally perplexing. On the one hand, she acknowledges a crucial division in the political concerns of first-world and third-world women, even if her characterization is simplistic. “In the poor countries, there is an emphasis on the survival of the family unit; the economic and legal roles of women are seen in this context. The importance of being integrated into a kinship network is inescapable, no matter how much a woman’s economic independence is emphasized in market trade or subsistence agriculture. In the industrial and richer countries, the focus is on the woman as an individual and on her changing relationships with other individuals...as well as centers of authority. This leads to the great emphasis on symbolic expressions of authority and status” (Papanek 1975b, 222). It is with considerable irony, then, that Papanek expresses frustration at the inability of all third-world women present at the conference to acknowledge sexism’s centrality. “Although a larger proportion than usual of such delegations were women, it was not at all clear how many of the delegates had experience in working on problems of women or had the interests of women uppermost in their minds” (Papanek 1975b, 219).


Signs has been credited, along with Toril Moi (1985), for introducing French Feminist theory to U.S. feminist circles in its renowned special issue on that topic published in Autumn 1981.

In an interview with Stimpson on October 23, 2007, in New York, NY, I asked her to briefly describe Chamberlain’s contributions to the field formation of feminist scholarship. Stimpson responded: “What Miriam did, as you know, she knew what it meant to build a field. Remember, she was an economist by training, and she was also a self-made woman. She was Armenian, came from an Armenian immigrant family, worked in a shoe factory and talked her way into Radcliffe. Florence Howe knows her very well. What did it mean to build a field? You supported a press, a feminist press; you started to build up a series of research centers, campus-based research centers; you supported a national council that coordinated those research centers; bring in folks to give talks to foundations on bodies of scholarship; and then quietly, modestly, and inexorably did what she did.”
Miriam Chamberlain asked this in a letter of July 4, 1974, to Catharine Stimpson. The original transcript of this letter can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 3, Folder Sp-Ste.

Both Women’s Studies and Feminist Studies began publication in 1972. Signs began publication in 1975.

Transcript of interview with Catharine Stimpson.

Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 1, Folder: B.G.

To give a sense of just how successful the journal was in its early publication: Just after its first year of publication, in Autumn 1976, Signs already had a circulation of 8,220, a circulation rate proving to be fairly consistent throughout its first ten years of publication. By the time the editorship shifted over to Gelpi at Stanford, the journal’s circulation remained steady at slightly over 6,500. This statistic comes from Joan N. Burstyn’s conference paper “‘Journal of One’s Own’ Signs in the Evolution of Women’s Studies, 1975–1980,” which was prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians, April 1–4, 1981. A copy of the transcript of Burstyn’s conference paper can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 1, Folder: The Transition: Notes.

The first Ford grant funded a leave from teaching for Stimpson so that she could focus on Signs. The second Ford grant, administered by Ford Program Officers Elinor Barber and Miriam Chamberlain, was also in the amount of $5,000.00 and funded extra pages for the Women and National Development (Autumn 1977) special issue. The third Ford grant, also in the amount of $5,000.00, underwrote a special issue on Women in Latin America (Fall 1979), which published papers from a conference held in Mexico, and underwritten by Ford. At Barnard, all but one grant hovered around the amount of $5,000. The grant from HUD was $37,000. It subsidized all production costs for the special issue Women and the American City (Spring 1980). All information on the Ford grants can be found in a memorandum written by Stimpson to Gelpi, dated July 23, 1980. The memo appears in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 1, Folder: B.G.

The vastly different monetary amounts of the HUD grant versus foundation grants are emblematic of the fact that the government had exponentially more money to give than foundations. Government patronage is considerably more lucrative. The University of Chicago Press did not spend a single cent in publishing this particular issue. Even the editorial labors at the Press were covered by the grant. Too much money, however, can augment the difficulties of administering the grant. In a memorandum from Stimpson, dated June 23, 1980, which sought to school Gelpi in acquiring outside funding, Stimpson reflects on the largesse of the HUD grant. She states, “The HUD grant underwrote an entire issue. We did not initiate the grant. HUD was supporting special issues about urban problems of several academic journals, and we were asked if we would submit a proposal for an issue about women and the city. The HUD grant was a nightmare for the Press to administer. Several University of Chicago Press offices began to compete for the chance to claim it, and it has literally taken years to work out.” This memorandum can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 1, Folder: B.G.
Criticizing foundation money for its “taint” is complicated, given that the exact reasons for the tainted nature of foundation money are unclear. Was foundation money tainted because the institution of philanthropy is deemed inherently patriarchal, hierarchical, racist, sexist, and classist? Perhaps foundation money is tainted because the increasing scope of philanthropy is deemed evidence of neoliberalism’s augmented privatization? In this instance, utilizing foundation funds might imply support for a rapidly decreasing welfare state. The sense of taint is vague, rendering the term lacking in critical purchase.

Only two months after the passage of TRA 1969, in February 1970, the Council on Foundations, the Foundation Center, and the National Council on Philanthropy formed a Committee on the Foundation Field (Frumkin 1999, 70). The Committee recommended changes that would quickly improve the damaged reputation of American philanthropy in the eyes of the American public. Some of the recommendations the committee made included: “(1) increased reporting and information dissemination by foundations; (2) support of independent research and publications on foundations; (3) continuation and extension of library services for the general public; (4) improved government relations; (5) development of voluntary standards of good practice; (6) provision of a central clearinghouse and forum to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation among foundations; and (7) development of a public relations strategy for the field as a whole” (Frumkin 1999, 72). According to the Committee’s recommendation, foundations should no longer simply write a check, stand back, and watch their vision come to fruition or fall to the wayside. Foundations had to take a more active role in making certain that the expenditure of their funds was accounted for and that the grantee succeeded in accomplishing the terms of the grant.

American philanthropy worked extremely hard to resurrect what many viewed as a tainted reputation. Prior to 1970, the general stereotype circulating about foundations was that foundations served as institutions through which the wealthy dodged taxes. (It is likely that many individuals still harbor this belief.) Through foundations, the wealthy pursued their private agendas tax-free. Foundations were viewed as exercising almost no accountability to the public regarding their expenditure of funds. However, since foundations were tax-exempt, public accountability of expenditures should have been a priority.

This new style spelled micromanagement on the part of the foundations, meaning that foundations entertained greater opportunities to be involved with and control their grantee’s projects. However, this micromanagement aspect made possible new forms of labor for the Signs editorial team. More regularized interaction between foundation program officers and their grantees produced significantly more work for both parties. Signs, for instance, had to actively foster a relationship with the foundations, which usually began with Stimpson personally contacting a program officer and discerning which areas of inquiry the foundations were most interested in funding. Once general areas of inquiry were identified, the Signs editorial team then authored detailed grant proposals, most usually for conferences that would be published as special issues. After the grant was awarded, the editorial team needed to maintain
regular contact with the foundation program officers to guarantee that funds would be properly spent, resulting in finished products befitting foundation standards. Once the timeframe of the grant reached completion, the editorial team authored a report evaluating the project. Although the recommendations of the Committee on the Foundation Field increased foundation accountability both to the public as well as to grantees, these recommendations also drastically increased the labor involved in obtaining outside funding. This labor is absolutely central to any conception of academic field formation, including feminist scholarship.

Special issues published at Stanford include: Studies in Change (Winter 1980); Development and the Sexual Division of Labor (Winter 1981); Feminist Theory (Spring 1982); Women and Violence (Spring 1983); Women and Religion (Autumn 1983); The Lesbian Issue (Summer 1984); Women and Poverty (Winter 1984); and Communities of Women (Summer 1985).

This undated memorandum from Barbara Gelpi to her editorial team, titled “Special Issues,” can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Unmarked.

This quote appears in the same memorandum from Barbara Gelpi to her editorial team, titled “Special Issues,” which can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Unmarked.

Information about the amount of money Rockefeller awarded Stanford’s CROW can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Special Issues: Planning Notes.

In the 1970s, after the visible failures of top-down modalities of economic development and modernization in the third world, the United States turned to third-world women in the hope that they would enable developing countries to modernize from the bottom up. Foundation money became more readily available for the study of third-world women in the 1970s.

All information regarding who presented papers at the Wellesley conference, as well as which countries were represented, can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Abstracts (Wellesley Conference).

This quote is found in a handwritten letter from Fatima Mernissi (Department of Sociology, Université Mohammed V, Rabat, Morocco) to Catharine Stimpson, dated October 16, 1976, in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Wellesley Staff in Chaos.

This quote is found in a handwritten letter from Fatima Mernissi (Department of Sociology, Université Mohammed V, Rabat, Morocco) to Catharine Stimpson, dated October 16, 1976, in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Wellesley Staff in Chaos. Please note: underlining appeared in the original version of the letter.

Lourdes Casal maintains that, “Wellesley participants could hear some of the great original thinkers in women-and-development studies (such as Ester Boserup, Ulla Olin, and Heleieth Saffioti)” (Casal 1977, 318). Interestingly, neither Olin’s paper nor Saffioti’s paper appeared in the special issue on Women and National Development.

As a reserve labor force, women could be “drawn upon or discarded according to economic exigencies, [used] to hold down wages and divide the working class, and [used] to mystify for both women and men the structure of capitalist exploitation” (Leacock 1981, 481).
This letter from Heleieth I. B. Saffioti to Sandra Whisler, dated September 25, 1976, can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Wellesley Staff in Chaos.

Struggles for decolonization were invariably framed by the behemoth bipolarity of the Cold War superpowers. These superpowers oftentimes used third-world countries as pawns to achieve their geopolitical ends. Both the United States and the Soviet Union funded nationalist insurgencies so that developing countries could achieve national independence. The price tag was an allegiance to the geopolitical needs of the superpower, which included access to markets and raw materials as well as military assistance in buffering hostile neighbors. As Odd Arne Westad maintains, “Very different from the nineteenth-century system of states and from the process of colonial expansion, the Cold War was bipolar to the point of exclusivity, meaning that if one’s enemies were supported by one superpower, there was always the chance of getting aide from the other” (Westad 2005, 89).

Odd Arne Westad elaborates: “As the powers in Europe completed their self-destruction in World War II, most revolutionary movements in the Third World were coming of age. And the revolutions that gave most Third World countries their freedom happened after World War II, when the Cold War had already become a fully-fledged international system. In other words, the forming of anticolonial revolutionary movements and of new Third World states is inextricably linked in time to the Cold War conflict and to Cold War ideologies. Though the processes of decolonization and of superpower conflict may be seen as having separate origins, the history of the late twentieth century cannot be understood without exploring the ties that bind them together” (Westad 2005, 74).

The Wenner-Gren Foundation provides funds for the anthropological study of developing countries.

For more on single-systems theory, see Dalla Costa and James 1975. For more on dual-systems theory, see Hartmann 1997. For more on unified-systems theory, see Young 1981; Barrett 1985. For an excellent summary of the history of socialist feminist systems theory in feminist scholarship, see Weeks 1998, 73–86. For more on object relations theory, see Chodorow 1978. For more on socialist feminist predications of standpoint, see Hartsock 1983, 1985.

For instance: Socialist women in Austria fought for mass municipal housing, public facilities for health and recreation, and the transformation of schools (see Gruber 1998b). Socialist and communist women in Germany fought for increased welfare, maternity, infant and children care, women’s employment, and decriminalizing abortion (see Grossman 1998; Saldern 1998). Social democratic women in the British Labour Party fought for free and unlimited access to information about birth control (see Graves 1998). Socialist women in Belgium fought for family allowances, rights for unwed mothers, equality of opportunity in education, equal pay, and birth control (see De Weerdt 1998). Women in the French Communist Party advocated for women’s suffrage and promoted women’s entry into the trade unions (see Bard and Robert 1998; Gruber 1998a). Socialist women in Sweden backed the ability to participate in parliament, city councils, and trade unions, as well as access to mother’s insurance, maternity leave, and support for single mothers (see Frangeur 1998). Women in the Norwegian Labour Party promoted the creation of family planning centers (see Blom 1998). Women in the Danish Social Democratic Party formed Denmark’s Association of Women Workers and fought for married women’s right
to work, birth control, kindergartens, equality in wages, and equal civil rights (see Romer Christensen 1998).

44 Interestingly, the issue was supposed to be a special issue on China, funded by Rockefeller. The funding never came through, so Stimpson ended up publishing the already-commissioned articles as a special section.

45 Andors (1976) at times even implies support for the very project of socialism with statements such as, “It was increasingly clear that the two revolutions—women’s and the socialist—were indeed closely related” (Andors 1976, 94). Andors details how women were vigorously and variously incorporated into the productive process during China’s Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) and during the immediate post-Leap period. The challenge China faced, she maintains, was not how to incorporate women into production but how to address the question of collectivization and its extent. Throughout the Leap period, China succeeded somewhat in directly addressing the extent to which reproductive labors traditionally undertaken by women could be collectivized. (Interestingly, in another Signs article, in the special issue Development and the Sexual Division of Labor (Winter 1981), Elisabeth J. Croll describes just how difficult reproductive labor was for Chinese women, particularly in the most rural parts of China. Croll maintains, “Domestic labor was traditionally time-consuming and onerous in rural China, where in addition to the daily washing, cooking, and child care, water had to be fetched and carried, grain ground by a stone, fuel gathered from the hills, clothes and shoes sewn, and vegetables pickled or dried for the long winter months” (Croll 1981b, 384).) Andors further illustrates how China reformed its policies so that a range of reproductive labors, typically viewed as private, became social and collectivized, such as the preparation of meals, childcare, laundry, sewing, and grain-processing. In order for China to effectively incorporate women into both the industrial and agricultural labor sectors, China realized women’s reproductive labors would need to be collectivized. It is only through collectivization of reproductive labor that women could be partially freed to focus primarily on their paid labor. These attentions to collectivization ultimately failed, as funneling money into labor that was once unpaid proved too costly for a developing China. In the end, the Great Leap Forward has been deemed by many historians as one of the greatest humanitarian failures in history, with an estimated 14 million people dying of starvation.

46 This memorandum appears in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 1, Folder: Signs’ Assessments.

47 In a memorandum written by Gelpi to Myra Strober, dated April 22, 1981, and titled “Special Issues of Signs and related conferences,” Gelpi intimates that plans for a conference on women in socialist countries are already in the works. She is even concerned not to interfere with Sharon Wolchik’s conference on Changes in the Status of Women in Eastern Europe at The George Washington University. Gelpi affirms, “We are also planning a conference on women in socialist countries. In the fall Sharon Wolchik is organizing a conference on Changes in the Status of Women in Eastern Europe at The George Washington University. I plan to be in touch with her so that our projects might dovetail instead of conflicting, for untouched by that conference would be countries with socialist governments in both Latin America and Africa—as well as China, of course: developing countries of particular interest to feminist political, social, and economic theory.” Gelpi’s letter to Rockefeller concerning her plans for the conference and this memorandum appear in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Special Issues: Planning Notes.
Such conference would be concerned with “harems, convents, extended families, women’s colleges, consciousness-raising groups, lesbian societies, covens, political organizations…. It will point [out] differences and resemblances, for instance, between the goals and strategies of women in developing nations and those of the industrialized West.” This quote appears in a letter from Gelpi to Miriam Chamberlain of Ford, dated March 24, 1981. The letter can be found in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Special Issues: Planning Notes.

The proposal to Rockefeller for funding for the women and communities conference appears in the Signs archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 1, Folder: Signs Retreat 5/14/82. The quotes appear on pages 2 and 3 of the proposal. Chapter 4 will discuss the special issue on Women and Communities (Summer 1985), which published the papers from the Rockefeller-funded conference, at greater length.

Several scholars have argued that by focusing strictly on questions of access, WID never gives processes of capital accumulation begun during the colonial period the critical attention they require (see Benería and Sen 1981; Rai 2002; Kabeer 2003). These criticisms subsequently laid the groundwork for the Gender and Development paradigm, which examines the ways in which processes of capital accumulation structure gender relations. Gender and Development considers not only how the sexual division of labor structures labor in such a way that divides and separates productive and reproductive spheres—whereby men are associated the productive sphere and women the reproductive sphere—but also how a sexual division of labor structures the productive sphere. Thus the allocation of more labor-intensive work in the productive sphere to women is a consequence of how processes of capital accumulation structure gender relations.

Although Boserup’s well-known Women’s Role in Economic Development (1970), which is considered WID’s animating text, appeared four years earlier, it was “rediscovered” in 1974 after appearing in a bibliography composed by the Society for International Development’s Women in Development group (Rai 2002, 60). Prior to WID, women were brought into development policy strictly on the basis of their gender-specific roles as wives, mothers, and potential reproducers. Since neoclassical economic theory views women’s reproductive labor as not making any valuable contribution to GNP, women were relegated to the welfare sector of development policy. Any assistance women received from development agencies was viewed as a charitable hand-out. This welfare conception of reproductive labor as bereft of (market) value is doubly disturbing given the labor-intensive nature of such labor in the third world. Consider Deniz Kandiyoti’s (1977) discussion of the daily reproductive labors of a typical rural Turkish woman. These labors were performed on top of childcare and any agricultural work she may be expected to perform for the household. According to Kandiyoti, “She also prepares the food, carries the water and firewood to the tent, which may involve miles of walking, feeds the animals, keeps their quarters clean, and weaves both all the family’s clothing and the tent itself, which needs renewal and upkeep” (Kandiyoti 1977, 59). None of these labors generate the kind of visible market value enabling contribution to the growth of a nation’s GNP. For this reason, any assistance given to women throughout the development process was seen as strictly charitable in nature. Contrarily, men were observed as duly earning the benefits of development because they were more quickly and easily incorporated into the wage labor sector where they contributed directly to the growth of GNP.
Now the task of policy makers would be to discern how women could be incorporated into the productive sphere of the development process, furthering its efficiency. Thus, with WID the focus on women in development policy shifted from welfare to efficiency. Although the efficiency argument was eventually taken to the extreme by B. Rogers (1984), who held that the central question for policy makers was not what development could do for women but what women could do for development, Boserup’s primary concern remained figuring out how development could be most beneficial to women. Development influenced the status of women because women’s status, according to Boserup, varies with the nature of the productive activities women perform and the extent of their involvement in those productive activities.

One of the lasting effects of WID has been its correlation of women’s work with their status in the development process. Boserup wrote a short preface for Women and National Development (Autumn 1977), which simply reiterates a series of WID tenets she already elaborated in Women’s Role in Economic Development: “The study of women’s status…should have priority over labor market studies” (Boserup 1977, xi); “It is more difficult for women to adapt to new conditions [brought on by development] because (1) family obligations make them less mobile than men, (2) their occupational choice is more narrowly limited by custom, (3) they usually have less education and training, and (4) even without these handicaps they often face sex discrimination in recruitment” (Boserup 1977, xii); and “Because of the speed of technological change in many developing countries, we must train both women and men, not for the labor market structure of today but of tomorrow” (Boserup 1977, xii).

To analyze third-world women’s differential status within and across regions, Boserup set out to characterize the relationship between capitalist development and women’s status with detailed attention to cultural specificity. Because mechanizing agriculture was one of the primary means of modernization, Boserup documented how women’s social status was changing with the mechanization of agriculture. She demonstrated that women’s agricultural labor steadily diminished as agriculture was mechanized. Mistakenly assuming that farming was exclusively men’s work, development experts in Africa, for example, recruited and trained men in the use of sophisticated farm technology, contributing to women’s removal from the agricultural labor and to a decline in their social status. Boserup devoted considerable effort to demonstrating that third-world women were involved in agricultural production, cultivating various crops across the global South. Women tend to be involved in the cultivation of more labor-intensive crops, or at least the more labor-intensive parts of the cultivation process (see also Chinchilla 1977). This situation is exacerbated as certain parts of the cultivation process become increasingly mechanized.

Helen I. Safa (1981) maintains that the emergence of this international female proletariat marks the highly visible materialization of the new international division of labor. While Safa’s (1981) article is the first in Signs to render the international division of labor into an analytic for feminist scholarship, hers is not the first article to mention the phrase. The phrase “the international division of labor” (de Leal and Deere 1979, 60) is first mentioned in Signs in Magdalena Leon de Leal and Carmen Diana Deere’s (1979) article “Rural Women and the Development of Capitalism in Colombian Agriculture.” This article appeared in Women and National Development.
One article that is paradigmatic of the WID approach, however, is Nancy Birdsall’s (1976) review essay on “Women and Population Studies,” in which she emphasizes women’s fertility as the singular variable affecting population trends. She not only ignores men’s role in fertility. But she also entirely overlooks the larger social and economic conditions affecting population growth, like patterns of property ownership, the social control of the means of production, migration patterns, and the consumption patterns of the affluent global North. By placing the responsibility of population growth strictly on the shoulders of individual third-world women, Birdsall is consistent with the methodological individualism of population initiatives set forth by Rockefeller and Ford during the 1950s and 1960s. These population-control initiatives blamed population growth solely on the failed fertility practices of individual women and are consistent with the individualistic emphasis of top-down models of development that have the aim of educating individuals about making more economically viable reproductive choices. By averring that changing a woman’s “status, employment, and education” will reduce “fertility” and increase her “use of contraception” (Birdsall 1976, 700), Birdsall does not interrogate her presupposition of the linkage between indicators of women status, such as education and labor-force participation, with fertility rates.


Dependency theory is the structuralist opposition to modernization theory and maintains that the capitalist model of development is merely the “development of underdevelopment” (Frank 1969), meaning that the third world only became underdeveloped upon its incorporation into the international capitalist system (Rai 2002, 77). Discursively, dependency theory frames the United States and Western Europe as the center and the third world as the periphery. The relation between center and periphery is one of homogenizing dependency in which the countries that are constituents of the center are dependent on their satellite economies in the third world for their continued economic hegemony. Thus, according to dependency theorists, the center’s implicit aim is rendering the third world ever deeper within the register of perpetual underdevelopment. It is important to note that while dependency theory resonated with neo-Marxists, “it did not emanate from a Marxist analysis of colonialism and imperialism” (Rai 2002, 77). In fact, in several countries, including the United States, dependency theory was the closest scholarly analysis to Marxism that could get published. Dependency theory received its first elaboration in Latin America under the rubric of dependencia, or structural dependency, by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto in Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina.
(1969) As Cardoso and Faletto envision it, structural dependency is “Based on a critique of development theories from Marx to Rostow which rejects them as mechanistic transpositions that do not take into account the specificity of Latin America, the approach proposes a redefinition of capitalism as it operates throughout the continent—that is, dependent capitalism as a historical-structural process, inherently dialectic, which creates social structures with particular internal as well as external contradictions” (Navarro 1979, 115).


See Arizpe 1977; Chinchilla 1977; Papanek 1977; Stoler 1977; Leon de Leal and Deere 1979; Leon de Leal and Deere 1981; Safa 1981; and Wong 1981.


Capitalism was also engaged in both theoretical senses in Signs. For engagements with neoclassical economic theory, see Clignet 1977; Beneria and Sen 1981. For engagements with modernization theory, see Andors 1976; Clignet 1977; Elliot 1977; Youssef 1977; Afonja 1981; Beneria and Sen 1981; Fernández Kelly 1981; and Leacock 1981.

Consider, as an example, the vast geographical diversity of the papers presented at the Wellesley conference and in the subsequent special issue. While I do not mean to suggest that regions were studied as they are in area studies, as homogenous units, for purely illustrative purposes I will note that in the special issue, six papers were published on Africa, three papers on Asia, six on Latin America, and three on the Middle East. At the conference, twenty-three papers were presented on Africa, seventeen papers on Asia, twenty-one on Latin American, and eight on the Middle East.

Westad describes these methods of imposing modernity on the third world as follows: “These methods were centered on inducing cultural, demographic, and ecological change in Third World societies, while using military power to defeat those who resisted” (Westad 2005, 397).

Endnotes for Chapter 3, pp. 109–46

1 The phrase “illusion of comprehensiveness” is taken from Baca Zinn et al. 1986, 297.

2 Six articles on U.S. black women were published during the journal’s first ten years: “A Response to Inequality: Black Women, Racism, and Sexism,” by Diane K. Lewis (Winter 1977); “An Assessment of the Black Female Prisoner in the South,” by Laurence French (Winter 1977); “The Dialectics of Black Womanhood,” by Bonnie Thornton Dill (Spring 1979); “Family Roles, Occupational Statuses, and Achievement Orientations among Black Women in the United States,” by Walter R. Allen (Spring 1979); “An Interview with Audre Lorde,” Audre Lorde and


It is not entirely clear from the archival materials whether she and Thornton Dill ever had the chance to meet in person and discuss the special issue, although Stimpson does begin her response to Thornton Dill by saying, “Many thanks for your enormously interesting letter. I was very glad to get it. It stimulated a lot of thoughts, some of which I would like to discuss with you when my visit to Memphis is re-scheduled.” Catharine Stimpson, Typed letter, dated November 28, 1979. Signs Archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Minority Women.

Catharine Stimpson, Typed letter, dated November 28, 1979. Signs Archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Minority Women.


Transcript of interview with Barbara Gelpi, Stanford University Faculty Club, Palo Alto, California, 12pm–3pm, Friday, November 9, 2007.

Both the conference and special issue were funded by the Rockefeller Foundation.

Elizabeth Higginbotham continues: “In the face of serious cultural assaults it took the strength of every Black person to support ideals, values, and institutions. Often Blacks were involved in seizing control from whites, as in the history of many traditionally predominantly Black colleges.” Elizabeth Higginbotham, Typed letter, dated March 2, 1982. Signs Archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Communities of Women.

Elizabeth Higginbotham continues: “The establishment of such settings was essential for validating the full humanness of all community members. This validation was not forthcoming in spheres controlled by dominant culture members.” Elizabeth Higginbotham, Typed letter, dated March 2, 1982. Signs Archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Communities of Women.

Elizabeth Higginbotham continues: “For example, the Black church is an institution which Black women have kept alive and within which they have modeled roles for Black males. We can attribute the fact that the Black church nurtures to the presence of women. But there is little sex segregation here.” Elizabeth Higginbotham, Typed letter, dated March 2, 1982. Signs Archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Communities of Women.
A definition of autonomy that presumed the primacy of sexism, above all other isms, was one primary reason the conference was irrelevant to her scholarship; thus Higginbotham neither presented at the conference nor published in the special issue. Rather than simply turn down Gelpi’s proposal, Higginbotham requests that her letter instigate authentic dialogue between them: “I hope you take these comments seriously—they are made in a genuine attempt to bridge a gap.” She instead suggests Cheryl Gilkes, a sociologist at Boston University: “She is doing unique work on Black women in the Black church, but again I think she might need a wider definition than your initial call for papers.” All citations from Higginbotham’s letter are contained in Elizabeth Higginbotham, Typed letter, dated March 2, 1982. Signs Archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University, Alexander Library. Box 26, Folder: Communities of Women. Rather than engage Higginbotham in dialogue and subsequently revise her conception of community, Gelpi contacts Gilkes, who agrees to present at the conference and publish in the special issue. Gilkes’ rarefied conception of a black community of women was amenable to Gelpi’s existing definition. Gilkes’ study of women’s community is set within the Black Episcopal Church, whereby black women, who experienced varying degrees of gender subordination within the Church, cultivated agency in a patriarchal church structure wherein men were clearly dominant. I label her conception rarefied for a black feminist scholar because her article primarily emphasizes gender subordination, given that she is focused on women’s community formation within the black church. Her emphasis is not on how black men and women worked together to carve out their own space of worship in a white-dominated religious institution (although she very briefly references this history). Rather, her emphasis is on how black women organized communities in their Black Episcopal Church in response to experiences of sexism, not racism.

Concerning Higginbotham’s experience, Baca Zinn, Weber Cannon, Higginbotham, and Thornton Dill (1986) continue, “Higginbotham noted that, unlike their white sisters who are often excluded from male-dominated spheres or retreat from them, the majority of Black women are ordinarily full participants in mixed-sex spheres and make unique contributions both to the definitions of problems and solutions. Typically, Black women’s vision of their situation leads them not to seek solace from Black males but to create spheres where men, women, and children are relatively protected from racist cultural and physical assaults. Historically, white people, male and female, have rarely validated the humanness of Black people; therefore, it was and is critical for Black people and other people of color to nurture each other. This is a primary fact about the communities of racially oppressed peoples. Thus, as white feminists defined the focus of the conference, only the research of a few Black scholars seemed appropriate—and that research did not necessarily capture the most typical common experiences of Black women” (295).

Sandoval (1991) labels these stages as equal rights, revolutionary, supremacist, and separatist (2–3). Serving as her epistemological designation for radical U.S. women of color feminist scholarship, her fifth stage is “differential consciousness.” Differential consciousness simultaneously engages these other four stages and yet also works most forcefully and effectively outside of them.

Interrogating feminist scholarship’s most central presuppositions for their inferentially racist technologies, for example, is uninvited.
19 Being attentive to different processes of identification is different than being attentive to different identities. There is enormous definitional slippage between more stable articulations of identity and more fluid articulations of processes of identification.

20 Points of diffraction are themselves discursive effects of already existing archaeological relationships between discursive formations.

21 Even if one is heard not exactly in the way one intended to be heard.

22 Under the editorship of Jean O’Barr at Duke University, Signs published as special issue, Common Grounds and Crossroads: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in Women’s Lives in 1989. The special issue contained articles by Patricia Hill Collins, Aida Hurtado, Maxine Baca Zinn, Darlene Clark Hine, and Elsa Barkley Brown. Although Thornton Dill and Higginbotham did not publish in the issue, it is likely that its publication was at least an approximation of what they had in mind.

23 In “‘Under Western Eyes’ Revisited: Feminist Solidarity through Anticapitalist Struggles,” Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003) writes at length about the complex and subtle terminological distinction between western and third world, global North and global South, and One-Third World and Two-Third’s World, detailing how each pair of terms captures a different set of socioeconomic and geopolitical realities. No pair is comprehensively representative of all the varying lived experiences across the globe in an era of globalization. I would, however, like to briefly quote her judicious reflections on each pair of terms. I quote Mohanty at length because her article nicely summarizes the three most significant thematics used to understand and characterize the geopolitical and socioeconomic organization and flows of our contemporary world.

She says of western and third world: “The terms Western and Third World retain a political and explanatory value in a world that appropriates and assimilates multiculturalism and ‘difference’ through commodification and consumption. However, these are not the only terms I would choose to use now. With the United States, the European Community, and Japan as the nodes of Capitalist power in the early twenty-first century, the increasing proliferation of Third and Fourth Worlds within the national boundaries of these very countries, as well as the rising visibility and struggles for sovereignty by First Nations/indigenous peoples around the world, Western and Third World explain much less than the categorizations North/South or One-Third/Two-Thirds Worlds” (Mohanty 2003, 505). One of the primary explanatory inadequacies of these terms is their failure to capture the reality that the geopolitical and socioeconomic experiences of the third world appear in the geographical context of the first world. Oftentimes, but not always, the distinction between third world and first world presumes that certain geopolitical and socioeconomic realities are essentially connected to particular geographical places. Whereas, it is more accurate to suggest that, in an era of globalization, the geopolitical and socioeconomic realities of any given geographical place are considerably dispersed, heterogeneous, and variable.

Mohanty remarks on the distinction between the global North and the global South: “North/South is used to distinguish between affluent, privileged nations and communities and economically and politically marginalized nations and communities, as is Western/non-Western. While these terms are meant to loosely distinguish the northern and southern hemispheres, affluent and marginal nations and communities obviously do not line up neatly within this geographical frame. And yet, as a political designation that attempts to distinguish between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-notes,’ it does have a certain political value. An example of this is Arif
Dirlik’s formulation of a *North/South* as a metaphorical rather than a geographical distinction, where *North* refers to the pathways of transnational capital and *South* to the marginalized poor of the world regardless of geographical distinction” (Mohanty 2003, 505).

She ends with the One-Third World/Two-Thirds World distinction, which she suggests, when used with the two previously outlined thematics, augments their descriptive accuracy: “I find the language of *One-Third World* versus *Two-Thirds World* as elaborated by Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash (1998) particularly useful, especially in conjunction with *Third World/South* and *First World/North*. These terms represent what Esteva and Prakash call social minorities and social majorities—categories based on the quality of life led by peoples and communities in both the North and South. The advantage of *One-Third/Two-Thirds World* in relation to terms like *Western/Third World* and *North/South* in that they move away from misleading geographical and ideological binarisms…. By focusing on the quality of life as the criteria for distinguishing between social minorities and majorities *One-Third/Two-Thirds World* draws attention to the continuities as well as the discontinuities between the haves and the have-nots within the boundaries and nations and between nations and indigenous communities. This designation also highlights the fluidity and power of global forces that situate communities of people as social majorities/minorities in disparate form” (Mohanty 2003, 506). The designation One-Third/Two-Thirds World allows for more geographical and geopolitical flexibility, elasticity, and dispersion concerning the location of the third world, so that the third and first worlds are not geographically wedded to particular predetermined regions of the world.

To be sure, when I first read the early contents of *Signs*, I was pleasantly surprised by what I viewed as its attentiveness to the differentials of race, class, and sexuality. This attentiveness seemed to shatter the stock narrative’s characterization of the 1970s as essentialist. With two issues on development in its first five years of publication (Fall 1977; Fall 1979), for instance, I saw *Signs* as repudiating two central assumptions of the decade predication of the stock narrative. First, the special issues on development illustrate that *Signs* was indeed engaging scholarship on and (in some instances) by women of color. Second, this scholarship was not usually about U.S. women of color but mostly about third-world women of color. During the 1970s, feminist scholars in academia were studying women of color on an international scale. This reality is contrary to the stock’s belief that a scholarly concern for women of color did not emerge until the early 1980s, and that U.S. feminist scholarship did not develop international concerns until its archaeological encounter with the postcolonial turn in literary studies in the early 1990s.

Even disciplinary lines bolstered these distinctions. Although structural critiques of U.S. domestic poverty and third-world underdevelopment and dependency were occurring contemporaneously, these scholarly discourses were compartmentalized. For instance, scholars working on international relations, comparative politics, and WID rarely if ever appeared on the same panels at conferences as those scholars working on U.S. social issues pertaining to sexism, racism, classism, and heterosexism.

As have other modalities of women of color scholarship. Black feminist scholarship is my focus here, however.

For black women’s role as modern-day mammies, see Collins 2000, 65; Dumas 1980; Higginbotham 1994; Higginbotham and Weber 1992; Kaplan 1997, 154; Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Omolade 1994; Vanneman and Cannon 1987, 57. For black women’s role in capitalist development more generally, see Alexander 1995; Anderson-Bricker 1999; Beale 1995; Black

28 Novak’s aim in crafting the phrase “democratic capitalism” is to capture in soundbyte form what he views as capitalism’s inherent values. His Toward a Theology of the Corporation (1981b) is hailed by neoconservatives as their treatise on the intrinsic values of capitalism. Throughout Novak makes two crucial claims: first, capitalism is a mode of production actualizing the will of God; and, second, the natural logic of capitalism results in pressures toward democratization. Concerning the first claim Novak maintains, “Capitalism is intrinsically related to some core values: to liberty in the sense of self-discipline; to invention, creativity, and cooperation, the root of the corporation; to work, savings, investment in the future; to self-reliance, etc.” (Novak 1981a, 72). Novak even argues that multinational corporations in the third world “mirror the presence of God” (Novak 1981b, 41), not by fostering entrepreneurship but by cultivating a “communal focus of [a] new ethos: the rise of communal risk taking, the pooling of resources” (Novak 1981b, 42) to spread a sense of communal-religious character across the globe in the way that only capitalism can. Novak conveniently believes corporations “offer metaphors for grace, a kind of insight into God’s ways in history” (Novak 1981b, 43).

Even though many scholars on the left have dismissed Novak for his essentialist association of capitalism with Christianity, disassociating the discursive connections he made between democracy and capitalism will prove a much more difficult task in the long term. Many intellectuals know rather well the staying power of very loose theoretical connections that sound good and seem correct on the surface. The association of democracy with capitalism is one such connection that superficially sounds good but cannot hold its own in the face of more thorough interrogation. Gary Dorrien (1993) questions the accuracy of Novak’s formulation: “There was an important connection between the historical emergence of capitalism and the rise of modern democracy. The question was, What kind of connection? Was capitalism the cause of democracy? Was it a necessary cause? Did capitalism and democracy maintain the same relationship through all the stages of their development?” (Dorrien 1993, 236). Dorrien relates the phrase to its namesake, democratic socialism: “The phrase ‘democratic socialism’ was grammatically coherent for the very reason that democratic capitalism was not. In the case of democratic socialism, the adjective did describe and define the noun” (Dorrien 1993, 237).

29 See Collins 2000, 65, 101, 168, 203–204, 223, 228, 235–36. This chapter details the controlling image of the welfare queen. The other controlling images Collins specifies include the mammy, the matriarch, the black lady, and the hoochie. The controlling image of the mammy is that of a desexualized black female mother figure. It conceals how black women have historically been forced to rely on the informal labor sector (domestic labor being a primary component of the informal labor sector) for their income because they could not get jobs in industry and yet had no choice but to work. The controlling image of the matriarch is that of an overly (read: unnecessarily) strict black mother. It masks how, generally due to circumstances outside of their control (including their husband’s leaving the family and/or his inadequate income), black women have had to assume primary parenting responsibility on top of working full-time or more. They are also responsible for schooling their children in the art of delicately balancing an intricately racist society. The controlling image of the black lady is that of a black woman who experiences success in her career, principally due to affirmative action, and is, as a
result, forced to remain single since black men cannot compete with her successes. This controlling image camouflages the societal belief (shared by the black community) that black women are supposed to step aside and let black men be successful, especially given that dominant white society has adopted a narrative of family pathology concerning the overbearing black woman/mother who has emasculated her husband. This narrative of family pathology was developed by E. Franklin Frazier in *The Negro Family in the United States* (1966) and most notoriously espoused by Daniel Patrick Moynihan in *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (1965), otherwise known as the Moynihan Report. Finally, the controlling image of the hoochie is that of a black woman who uses sex to get by because she ostensibly has no other talents. This controlling image conceals the socioeconomic conditions that constrain her such that she needs to choose between having sex for money or going hungry or homeless.

30 Stuart Hall (2003) distinguishes between overt racism and what he terms inferential racism. Overt racism includes “those many occasions when open and favourable coverage is given to arguments, positions and spokespersons who are in the business of elaborating an openly racist argument or advancing a racist policy or view” (Hall 2003, 91). Contrarily, inferential racism refers to “apparently naturalized representations of events and situations relating to race, whether ‘factual’ or ‘fictional,’ which have racist premises and propositions inscribed in them as a set of unquestioned assumptions. These enable racist statements to be formulated without ever bringing into awareness the racist predicates on which the statements are grounded” (Hall 2003, 91).

31 Indeed, the urgency granted to strengthening the existing welfare state was merely a discursive fiction manufactured by a class of individuals neoconservatives patronizingly termed the New Class, otherwise known as the liberal intelligentsia and the fashionable liberal elite. The New Class created a culture of poverty (another neoconservative phrase) to justify their existence to the American people. The New Class deals with poverty bureaucratically but not practically, according to neoconservatives: “Armies of social workers, welfare bureaucrats, and other knowledge workers are employed by the government in order to deal with poverty problems” (Gerson 1996, 225). So as to remain employed, the New Class has “a professional investment in the maintenance of poverty, or at least in the status quo methods of dealing with it” (Gerson 1996, 225). Gary Dorrien (1993) provides a comprehensive neoconservative definition of the New Class: New York intellectual critic “Bazelon argued that corporate capitalism had created a New Class of non-property-owning managers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals ‘whose life conditions are determined by their position within or in relation to the corporate order.’ Owning property was no longer the key to attaining status or power. The New Class was not out to accumulate capital. It gained status and power not through economic productivity, but through organization position. To understand what was happening in America, Bazelon argued, one needed to grasp the peculiar interests of this recently burgeoning class. What was called ‘liberalism’ in America was largely a rationalization of the interests of New Class managers, lawyers, bureaucrats, social workers, consultants, and academics. Liberalism rationalized the creation of an ever-expanding welfare state, providing meaningful employment and ego gratification for the hordes of newly educated consumers. It also rationalized massive investments in higher education, and thus provided prestigious employment for the scribbling set. Conservatives fought the welfare state in the name of commerce and traditional values—while playing the same game in their own ways. From his perch at the radical Institute for Policy Studies, Bazelon put a Madonald-like spin on his argument, claiming that liberals and
conservatives alike were creating a vast bureaucratic state designed ‘to administer everybody and
everything’” (Dorrien 1993, 14).

In themselves, controlling images place black women’s lives under surveillance, as they filter what society sees and cannot see about black women and play manipulatively on the ensuing tensions between the seen and the unseen. On the exterior level of discourse, welfare queen demonstrates the alleged generosity of the state—read here as the generic white, middle-class, hard-working, tax-paying public—in providing basic welfare for food, shelter, monthly subsistence, and legal protection. The underlying message of welfare queen is that with welfare, the state takes financial responsibility for women who had every opportunity to become upwardly mobile (via affirmative action) and yet who still fail to succeed in a benevolent white man’s world. Thus the ideological function of welfare queen manifests most fervently in its attempts to quell critics of the United States concerning the ways it distributes its income and assists its economic minorities. The discursive function of welfare queen is more multilayered, however. The set of conflicts produced in welfare queen’s ideological function—the conflicts between a fictional general public standing in for the state, on the one hand, and black women presumably living off this public’s hard-earned income—masks a far more commanding and prevalent set of disciplinary technologies linking black women to the U.S. nation state. The discursive function of welfare queen discloses welfare as a Trojan horse, given that through welfare black women become further entrenched in the disciplinary technologies of the state.

Collins (2000) details how welfare and other government-sponsored programs ostensibly promoting equality and/or diversity become translated into complex modalities of surveillance of black women’s lives. Despite their ostensible munificence, welfare programs can be a double-edged sword, as they rely on “bureaucratic hierarchies and technologies of surveillance, [whereby] the disciplinary domain manages power relations. It does so not through social policies that are explicitly racist or sexist, but through the ways in which organizations are run” (Collins 2000, 280). Welfare succeeds in acting as a bureaucratic arm of capitalist surveillance: “In this bureaucratic context, surveillance has emerged as an important feature of the disciplinary domain of power. There is a marked difference between merely looking at Black women and keeping them under surveillance. Whether the treatment of Black women on the auction block, the voyeuristic treatment of Sarah Bartmann, or the portrayal of Black women within contemporary pornography, objectifying black women’s bodies has meant that members from more powerful groups have all felt entitled to watch black women. Surveillance now constitutes a major mechanism of bureaucratic control. For example, within prisons, guards watch Black female inmates; within business, middle managers supervise Black women clerical staff; and within universities, professors train ‘their’ Black female graduate students within academic ‘disciplines.’ The fact that prison guards, middle managers, and professors might themselves be Black women remains less important than the purpose of this surveillance. Ironically, Black women prison guards, middle managers, and professors may themselves be watched by wardens, business executives, and university deans. In these settings, discipline is ensured by keeping Black women as a mutually policing subordinate population under surveillance” (Collins 2000, 281).

I am not suggesting that third-world women entertained a more auspicious position in feminist scholarship vis-à-vis U.S. black women. Both groups of women were silenced in different ways, foreclosing different registers of expression within which each could come to voice. I am merely trying to account for the specificity of each respective discursive technology of silencing. Third
World women had their political needs and desires spoken for them by first-world feminist scholars. Contrarily, U.S. black women spoke their political needs and desires but were not given adequate opportunities by those wielding power to be properly heard.

Collins theorizes a conception of safe spaces for black feminist thought: “Historically, safe spaces were ‘safe’ because they represented places where Black women could freely examine issues that concerned us. By definition, such spaces become less ‘safe’ if shared with those who were not Black and female. Black women’s safe spaces were never meant to be a way of life. Instead, they constitute one mechanism among many designed to foster Black women’s empowerment and enhance our ability to participate in social justice projects. As strategies, safe spaces rely on exclusionary practices, but their overall purpose most certainly aims for a more inclusionary, just society” (Collins 2000, 110).

This multiplicity of location enables them to supercede “any singular political agenda” (Lee 2002, 86). Women of color are “characterized as situated at or between physical, often national, borders—in no one territory…. In this scenario, women of color fall into a ‘no-place’ of political nonrecognition precisely because of the inability of both the state and progressive countermovements to see ‘the intersection’ (Creshaw 1989), ‘the borderlands’ (Anzaldúa 1987), or ‘the interstices’ (Kim 1998), as, indeed, types of places” (Lee 2002, 86).

In Sandoval’s own words: “U.S. third world feminism represents a central locus of possibility, an insurgent movement which shatters the construction of any one of the collective ideologies as the single most correct site where truth can be represented…. Without making this move, any liberation movement is destined to repeat the oppressive authoritarianism from which it is attempting to free itself and become trapped inside a drive for truth which can only end in producing its own brand of dominations” (Sandoval 1990, 14).

Many black women, brought here not by their choosing, have, since slavery’s end, been forced to negotiate a relationship with the state in the hope that it would provide some form of relief. It is true that appealing to Civil Rights discourse brings them only closer to the state and exercises a privilege that not all women of color entertain. But not all women of color are subject to the state’s dialectics of visuality in the particularly intense ways black women are.

Even Collins (2000) admits to the dearth of black feminist studies examining the affects of U.S. foreign policy on black women’s lives. “In the absence of studies that examine U.S. Black women in a global context, such work can foster the assumption that U.S. foreign policy is not important for African-American women” (Collins 2000, 231). Surely the effects of U.S. foreign policy are not only to be found elsewhere.

The quote within Readings’ block quote can be found in Thompson and Tyagi 1993, xxx.

Endnotes for Chapter 4, pp. 147–61

1 Transcript of interview with Barbara Gelpi, Stanford University Faculty Club, Palo Alto, California, 12pm–3pm, Friday, November 9, 2007.
2 Transcript of interview with Barbara Gelpi.
3 Transcript of interview with Barbara Gelpi.
4 Transcript of interview with Barbara Gelpi.
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195


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