NET POWER IN ACTION:
INTERNET ACTIVISM IN THE CONTENTIOUS POLITICS OF SOUTH KOREA

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Net power in action: Internet activism in the contentious politics of South Korea

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This study examines the ways in which the Internet is utilized for progressive civic action, focusing on a detailed case study of Internet activism of South Korea. The goals of this study are to examine: the ways in which the Internet is utilized for progressive civic action; the extent to which Internet activism is differentiated from preexisting social movements; and the ways in which the Internet affects movement repertoires and organizational forms of civic action. Toward this end, this study encompasses four main areas: (1) historical background of Korean Internet activism; (2) social agents of Internet activism; (3) movement repertoires and awareness of citizenship; and (4) theoretical implications of the Korean case. This study employs multiple research methods including qualitative framing analysis, in-depth interviews, and focus-group interviews as well as quantitative methods.

The findings of this study suggest that Korean Internet activism has had a huge impact on political and cultural environments. Korea’s liberal and critical younger generations have predominantly used the Internet, constituting amorphous and hybrid groups of Internet users who are aware of citizenship—namely netizens. Positing
themselves distinctly from preexisting activist groups including social movement organizations (SMOs), Korean netizens have utilized the Internet for resource mobilization, virtual struggles, and alternative knowledge production for progressive civic action. Through serial events from 2002 to 2007, Korean netizens and SMOs have collaborated on the one hand and contended on the other hand. Netizens have expedited horizontal and decentralized networks for communication and mobilization while SMOs have maintained hierarchical organizational forms and centralized leadership.

This study also found that Korean Internet activism has brought about noticeable changes in movement repertoires. Netizens have organically combined online and offline struggles, converged sub-cultural and political discourses, and constructed distributed trust and counter-hegemonic frames through interactive communications based on datgul [replies] and pumjil [copy-and-paste]. Different from Chadwick’s hybrid mobilization movement model based on Western experience, organizational innovations of civic action have mainly been led by netizens, rather than by SMOs. While many Korean SMOs have adopted new movement repertoires for resource mobilization, they have failed to internalize new values embedded in the netizens’ movement repertoires.
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When I left Korea in 2002 for study, I was exhausted and somewhat desperate. I could not understand what was wrong. Though many of my colleagues had dedicated themselves to progressive social movements for two decades since the dark age of Korea in the early 1980s, the healthy and happy world of which we had dreamed seemed still far away. Despite the toils and sacrifice of many people, new dominant power appeared and took the benefits of the democratization movement while human rights and economic justice we aspired to achieve seemed forever poised in some distant, unknowable future. My studies in the U.S. are a small step in long journeys for self-inquiry and for alternative ways to reach what we have dreamed of. It was my good fortune to meet with and learn from many knowledgeable and supportive scholars in the U.S. I am deeply grateful to my teachers, colleagues, and friends for inspiring me and providing me with invaluable support.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Research Background

Recent years have witnessed a heated debate as to whether new media technologies actually widen the opportunities of civic participation in public discourse and politics, or if such technologies merely act in the service of the corporate and capitalist interests responsible for their promulgation. In the late 1980s, when personal computers became affordable commodities for typical middle-class consumers, some scholars and futurists began to hail the emergence of an information age wherein new information and communications technologies (ICTs) would create innovative ways information could be disseminated directly to the public, with only rare intervention by traditional gatekeepers. They argued that citizens’ direct access to governmental services and public information would give rise to revolutionary social changes that would lead, logically, to more diverse and pluralistic societies. (Naisbitt, 1988; Toffler, 1990)

This new kind of future society—one which reinvents and revives ancient models of direct, participatory democracy—has been variously characterized as teledemocracy, cyber-democracy, digital democracy or E-democracy (Abramson et al. 1988; Elgin 1993; London 1995). Steven Clift, a consultant on E-governance and the founder of E-democracy.org, has argued that the “Internet, mobile communications, and other technologies in today’s representative democracy” will result in “greater and more active citizen participation [which will create] more participatory or direct forms of citizen involvement in addressing public challenges” (Democracy Online: DoWire. org., 2006). Clift claims that, through the broad use of the Internet in politics, advocacy, elections,
and governance, governments can strengthen mutual relations with citizens and create better-policy making. By tapping new sources of relevant information and resources, and by taking seriously the first-person experiences of citizens actively participating in the exchange of progressive ideas, the frequent sense of alienation existing between governors and the governed can be addressed, assuaged, and minimized.

This cyber-optimism, however, has encountered harsh criticism from those who foresee in the new ICTs’ potential sociopolitical problems, such as a growing digital divide, fragmentation, and adaptivity to dominant power groups (Katz & Rice, 2002; McChesney, 1996, 1999; Nie & Ebring, 2000; Papacharissi, 2002). The digital divide refers to the gap—often, but not exclusively, defined by socioeconomic status—between those who benefit from digital technology and those who do not (Digital divide.org 2007). As of December 2008, only 23.5 percent of the total world population currently uses the Internet; in the whole continent of Africa, the figure is as low as 5.6 percent (Internet World Stats 2009). The parameters of the digital divide also account for gaps in computer literacy and fair access to multimedia services. Researchers who have studied the issue of access report that relevant disadvantages can take such forms as lower-performance computers, lower-quality or high-priced connections, and overall difficulty in obtaining the Internet and technological advances in developing economies (Digitaldivide.org., 2008).

Fragmentation, meanwhile, refers to the tendency of Internet users to become subdivided into smaller, self-selecting discussion groups—rather than reach consensus as a whole—because their identities are derived from highly customized information resources designed to meet specialized political and cultural purposes (Bimber 2000;
Habermas 1998: 120; Papacharissi 2002: 17; Sunstein 2001). More fundamentally, some critics have argued that new ICTs are inherently subject to dominant hegemony, particularly in the context of global capitalism. As only those technologies capable of producing a commercial profit are selected, developed, and standardized across the world, innovative technologies are predisposed to serve the interests of existing dominant groups, such as IT companies and governments (Garrett, 2006; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Furthermore, some critics have contended that holding up the Internet as a public sphere of free debate and intellectual exchange is nothing more than utopian rhetoric (Papacharissi 2002). Such critics asserted that political and economic biases will continue or even increase on the Internet as its virtual spaces become virgin territories to be commodified and conglomerated (McChesney, 1996, 1999). This line of argument emphasizes that the economics of virtual space have relegated progressive Internet users to “the distant margins of cyberspace,” even if the Internet displays occasional examples of active citizenship. (McChesney 1999; Papacharissi 2002; Riley & Riley 2003).

However, new ICTs neither essentially nor necessarily offer effective tools to contribute to the development of democracy. In capitalist societies, it is true that most technologies are developed and redesigned under the direction of profit-oriented-corporations as McChesney (1996, 1999) has argued. Nevertheless, this does not automatically mean that technology is subject only to social imperatives and dominant hegemony. While new ICTs are not inherently emancipatory or democratic, space for discussion of progressive uses of new technologies is still open (Feenberg, 1999; Kahn & Kellner, 2004, 2005; Kellner, 2000; Salter, 2003). As the political implications of new ICTs are determined by the on-going struggles of those who utilize the technologies for
often dissident political ends, the ramifications of new ICTs cannot be reduced to the corporatist ways in which media can be cynically exploited or narrowly framed. The emergence of a tide of Internet-based activism in recent years well demonstrates the potential of the Internet for social movements.

Research Purpose

The Internet has played a key role in civic action at the global, national, and local levels, from the Zapatista movement of the early 1990s to anti-globalization demonstrations in cities ranging from Seattle, to Buenos Aires, from Quebec to Genoa, from New York to Hong Kong, not to mention in political campaigns and minority rights movements in gay and lesbian, women’s, and ethnic communities (Carroll & Hackett, 2006; Downey & Fenton, 2003; Juris, 2005; Kahn & Kellner, 2004, 2005; Salter, 2003; Warf & Grimes, 1997). Many activists have employed e-mail lists, web pages, and open software to organize and coordinate actions and disseminate their political agendas. Their active adoption and adaptation of the Internet have not only led to great changes in the forms, strategies, and agents of civic actions, but have made political participation viable for those disenchanted with conventional media.

Although the Internet neither essentially nor inherently offers democratic tools to contribute to the development of democracy, it does provide a contested terrain in which progressive and conservative forces alike emerge and compete for their own political ends, and whose future meaning is created by ongoing struggles between contradictory forces (Kahn & Kellner, 2005; Kellner, 2000; Salter, 2003; Warf & Grimes, 1997). While it is significant to recognize that the Internet has been developed mainly by dominant social
groups, such as IT corporations, governments, and militaries, it is equally necessary to realize that “people subvert the intended uses of these technologies towards their own needs” (Kahn & Kellner, 2005).

Focusing on the more subversive applications of these technologies, this study examines how oppositional social movements have employed the Internet for progressive ends. While social movements encompass a broad range of political and cultural movements—both conservatives and radicals—the present research focuses on radical and progressive social movements that “seek…a more equitable sharing of political, economic, social, cultural, and/or informational resources and status” (Carroll & Hackett, 2006) in opposition to dominant hegemony. The goals of the study are: (1) to examine how the Internet is utilized for civic action; (2) determine the extent to which Internet-based activism is differentiated from traditional social movements; and (3) investigate the ways in which the Internet affects movement repertoires and the forms of civic action. Toward this end, this research focuses on a detailed case study of Internet activism in South Korea to exemplify some key trends and characteristics of socio-politically progressive and counter-hegemonic uses of the Internet.

Korean Case Study

South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea) ranks at the top among OECD countries in terms of broadband penetration, with 77.1 percent of the population identified as users of the Internet (ISIS, 2009). Based on highly developed infrastructures of new ICTs, the Internet has been broadly used for progressive civic action and political campaigns in Korea. In particular, from the World Cup cheering of 2002, to the anti-American Candlelight Demonstrations and the 16th Presidential election in the same year, to the 17th
presidential election and the Taean Clean-Up campaigns of 2007, Korea has demonstrated tremendously dramatic changes in civic involvement through the Internet. Although there were some significant incidents between 2002 and 2007 (for example, the anti-Presidential Impeachment Demonstrations and the General Election in 2004), this study focuses on the years of 2002 and 2007 in order to better illustrate the historical change by comparing civic action in the similar political background.

The 16th presidential election of 2002 has been referred to as a victory for Roh Moo-hyun who was supported by radical Internet users centered on the online autonomous community “Nosamo [Those who love Roh Moon-hyun]”, and online independent media such as OhmyNews (www.ohmynews.com) and Seoprise (www.seoprise.com). Meanwhile, the 17th presidential election of 2007 has been often referred to as a reactionary movement fueled and driven by conservatives who sought to expand their influence on the Internet after encountering defeat in the 2002 election. Lee Myung-bak, the conservative presidential candidate of the Grand National Party (GNP), was extremely successful in using the Internet to mobilize his supporters in the 2007 election.

Along with the political elections, this research also pays special attention to three collective actions in 2002 and 2007: The World Cup Cheering in June 2002, Candlelight Demonstrations beginning from November 2002 and the Taean Clean-up Campaigns in 2007. While the World Cup Cheering announced beforehand the emergence of the younger generation as main agents of collective action, subsequent candlelight demonstrations provided a historical turning point that significantly demonstrated the upsurge in Internet activism in South Korea (as some previous studies have suggested).

1 The radical in Korea represent those who support peaceful coexistence with North Korea and justice of economic distribution. In contrast, conservatives in Korea include those who advocate anti-communist policies and deregulation for free market.
The Taean Clean-up Campaigns in 2007 exhibited more advanced form of Internet activism repertoires and novel ways netizens’ communication styles.

Focusing on these civic engagement, this research raises four main questions: (1) In what ways has new media technology been involved in oppositional social movements in Korea?; (2) Who are the main agents of Internet activism of Korea?; (3) What were the movement repertoires employed in Korean Internet activism?; and (4) What are the lessons and theoretical implications of the Korean case? To explore these areas, this study employs multiple research methods, including framing analysis, in-depth interviews, focus group interviews, and a quantitative method.

Significance of Study

While a number of previous studies have analyzed the political uses of the Internet, most tend to focus more on what recognizable individuals (such as politicians) and established institutions (such as political parties) are doing with the Internet and “less on what citizens and activists are doing on the Internet” (Silver, 2003, pp. 279-280). It is not easy, however, to clarify the boundaries among non-professional citizen activists, particularly on the web, and grasp fully their political and cultural characteristics (Van de Donk et al., 2004). Thus, previous studies tend to focus more on the Internet as a “tool” of mobilization mainly adopted by “established institutions,” including social movement organizations (SMOs) and political parties. But this tendency is likely to fail to explain new phenomena arising in Internet-based activism fields, namely: (1) individual Internet users who, not affiliated with any specific political organization, may appear as new agents of social movements; (2) the Internet’s impact on the internal structures and decision-making processes of preexisting
political parties and social movement organizations; and (3) the Internet’s reshaping of a
contested and often unbounded political landscape in which progressives and conservatives
struggle to meet their political ends.

The importance of this research lies in its potential to contribute to an understanding of
an innovative mode of collective action by individual activists who are emerging as new
agents of social movements in the new media age. While a case study cannot and should not
be universally generalized beyond the sociopolitical context in which it occurs, this Korean
study is expected to offer inspiring lessons in understanding the complex impacts and
dynamics of Internet activisms. Particularly, this research will importantly demonstrate how
new modes of collective action undertaken by individual movement entrepreneurs can be
differentiated from the activism of institutional agents of social movements.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

A significant body of extant literature has discussed the impact of the Internet on political elections and civic engagement in South Korea. These studies, most of which are empirical and historical rather than theoretical in their approaches, have raised questions as to whether new ICTs can boost civic involvement in politics, social movements, and journalism (Chang, 2005; Lee, Eun-mee 2003; Han, JongWoo 2002; Kang, 1998; Oh, 2004a, 2004b; Park, Sunhee 2001, 2004; Yun 2003). This literature review section begins with a critical review of Korean literature to analyze the impact of new media on political, social, and cultural landscapes. This section also introduces case studies and empirical studies focusing on new trends of civic action from 2002 to 2007, including the 2002 World Cup Cheering, the 2002 Candlelight Demonstration, the 2002 Presidential Election, the 2007 Presidential Election and the 2007 Taean Clean-up Campaigns. This research then delineates the theoretical limitations of previous studies and posits a new direction for further study.

Studies on Internet Activism in Korea

Along with a wide range of daily applications, the Internet has been broadly adopted and adapted for political campaigns and social movements (Chang, 2005; Cheon, 2004; Han, 2002; Oh, 2004b). With respect to the definition of Internet activism in general, some scholars have argued that Internet activism takes two primary forms: (1) social movements using the Internet as a tool and (2) social movements on the web (Baek, 1999; Chung, 2001; Kim Jong Kil 2005). However, it is not exactly clear what the ambiguous category, “social movements on the web,” is supposed to indicate, as a social movement can both actively “use”

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2 Baek Ugin (1999) loosely defined the movements on the web as “the movement to solve the problems arising on the net.” For example, he mentioned the protest regarding online privacy and digital copyrights.
the Internet and exist as an integral part of the Internet. Kang Myung Koo (1998) has proposed a more sophisticated distinction whereby Internet movements encompass two areas: the online extension of preexisting social movements, and newly emergent social movements, which are fundamentally different from preexisting movements.³

In addition, Kim Jong Kil (2005) has asserted that Korean non-governmental organizations have conducted two strategies in the Internet age: an instrumental strategy and a netizen strategy. The first refers to the strategy that uses the Internet as a mobilization tool; the second refers to the strategy that utilizes the Internet as a “novel space of social movements.” As examples of the netizen strategy, Kim Jong Kil cited Internet-based social movements such as the Civic Coalition for the 2002 General Election, netizens’ protests against Internet ranking regulations, and civic struggles against the Dong River Dam construction. All of these examples, however, exhibit institution-led or goal-oriented movements, rather than entrepreneurial movements or identity-oriented movements.⁴ As many researchers focus primarily on the instrumental use of the Internet by organizational carriers, they tend to neglect to illustrate how diverse forms of social movement agents coexist, converge, conflict, and interact on the web.

Many studies that have explored the impact of new media on society have argued that new media technologies in Korea have been effectively used in expanding the opportunities of civic journalism and promoting participatory democracy (Chang, 2005; Han, 2002; Park, 2001; Yun, 2003). Kim Seoung-Sun (2003) has identified two reasons why online alternative

³ This approach is similar with the idea of “Internet-enhanced movements” and “Internet-based movement” Vegh (2003) has addressed. It will be further discussed in the theory section.
⁴ Nip, J. Y. M. (2004) has proposed to distinguish social movements between two categories: strategy (goal)-oriented movements and identity-oriented movements. The first refers to the movements that seek to achieve political and/or social goals, while the latter refers to movements that seek to construct self- or collective identity. Gay/lesbian online communities exemplify such identity-oriented movements. This will be discussed in the theory section.
media have contributed to the development of participatory democracy: (1) alternative media’s freedom from power and capital and (2) the novel types of interpersonal interactions afforded by online communication. Kim and Johnson (2006), too, have examined the positive effects of online media on the political attitudes of Koreans. Examining the general election in 2004, they found that politically engaged Internet users rarely read print newspapers, and that there existed a negative relationship between a reliance on independent web-based news and printed newspapers. Kim and Johnson (2006) also noted that reliance on independent web-based news predicted positive attitudes concerning political involvement. In other words, those who prefer Internet news are less likely to read printed newspapers and more likely to participate in political action.

Some researchers, however, have reached different conclusions regarding Koreans’ online media use patterns. Lee Eunmi (2003), comparing Internet-news user groups and newspaper reader groups, concluded that those who access Internet news tend to read print newspapers more than those who do not access any Internet news. Park Sunhee’s (2004) comparison of Chosun.com users, OhmyNews users, ⁵ and those who use both news sites has demonstrated that the third group is the most progressive and most engaged in political action. She has added, interestingly, that the third group had the most favorable opinion of the online independent OhmyNews. These studies imply that progressive and active Internet users do not depend only on one single Internet news source but check more actively multiple sources, including mainstream print or online radial media. These empirical studies ultimately support the idea that Internet use does not necessarily result in fragmentation and social disintegration (Ellin, 2003; Pavlik, 2001).

⁵ In many studies, Chosun.com represents an extensive form of print version and politically conservative voices while OhmyNews.com represents an online-only news carrier and politically progressive voices.
Although most studies agree that the Internet (or alternative Internet news) has played a positive role in promoting public discussion and civic involvement, they tend to emphasize different aspects of cyber-culture. Some place great importance on the Internet’s technological advantages per se, such as interactive feedback and hypertextuality, while others emphasize the importance of the social agents who use these technologies.

Representing the first viewpoint, Park Sunhee (2001) has divided Internet news into two forms, online versions of preexisting print media and Internet-independent media. She has argued that the latter are more likely to be alternative media:

> The Internet news websites as an extensive form of preexisting press can hardly become a novel forms of news provider because they repackage the news framed already through established news production processes in the media institution. In contrast, Internet-only news websites exhibit unique systems of news production and new reception due to special features of the Internet. That is the reason that Internet-only news websites can be alternative media (Park Sunhee, pp. 118-119).

Like Park Sunshee (2001), Lee Eunmi (2003) has asserted that the biggest advantage of the Internet media is an interactivity and a hypertextuality which print media never did and never can have (p. 178). In their frames, all Internet-only media tend to be regarded as alternative media.

However, those studies are likely to neglect the fact that the majority of Korea’s online media, though exploiting interactivity and hypertextuality, are profit-oriented outlets, such as *Money Today, Inews24, and Edaily news*. Some online media have proven to be alternatives to mainstream mass media in Korea, of course, but certainly not all, and a news service’s status as “alternative” has more to do with maintaining an independent, participatory, and progressive voice than it does with engaging in cyber-technology for its own sake. In fact, mainstream media and commercial media have striven to expand and maintain their
dominance on the web, particularly since their “momentous defeat” (Yoon, 2003) in the 2002 presidential election. As a result, conservative online news outlets—such as online extensions of mainstream newspapers including Chosun, JoongAng, or DongA—and conservatives’ online communities—such as newright.net and Chogapje.com—have witnessed explosive growth since 2002. Meanwhile, progressives’ online spaces have been declining under the Roh administration, resulting in a so-called “reversal of the Internet” (Chosun Ilbo May 10, 2006; Daejabo 2006; Lee Chang-Eun, 2006).

Besides, as commercialization of the Internet has been accelerating since 2003, portal-affiliated news sites have been practically sweeping cyberspace. Currently, 88.1% of Internet users are using news services offered by the top five commercial portal sites, including Naver (www.naver.com), Daum (www.daum.net), Nate (www.nate.com), Yahoo (kr.yahoo.com), and Paran (www.paran.com), according to online survey agency Metrix (2006). New media technology can thus definitely serve dominant commercial media as well as noncommercial radical media.

Therefore, overemphasis on the Internet’s technological advantages may further result in technological determinism. As Chang Woo-Young (2005) has argued, “Online media in Korea have put themselves forward as new agents of democracy” (p. 925), and whereas established mass media offer “democracy-harming” politicization and commercialization, online media provide “democracy-enhancing” technological possibilities. Technological innovation itself, however, does not guarantee civically responsible journalism and participatory democracy. The same technology can be mobilized for either “democracy-harming” or “democracy-enhancing” ends. Chang’s statement neglects the social context in which the Internet has been utilized for progressive campaigns and alternative media in
Korea, and underestimates the role of people who devote themselves to progressive appropriations of the Internet. The key social agents are not online media but those who use the media to achieve their political goals. As Oh Yeon-ho (2004b) has argued, a key factor of the success of some online alternative media is “people” rather than technology:

The most important reason (of the success of OhmyNews) is that Korean citizens are prepared. Korea has [a] young, active and reform-minded generation, those in their 20s, 30s and early 40s. They are eager to reform Korean society. They were the most influential voters in the results of the 2002 presidential election and the 2004 general election. That generation is exactly the same as the core readers of OhmyNews. Almost 80 percent of OhmyNews citizen reporters and readers are in their 20s, 30s, and early 40s (p. 322).

Han Jongwoo (2002) has similarly asserted that information technology alone does not determine the successful evolution of democracy; “rather, it is social capital that produced unprecedented political revolution in Korea” (p. 2). The social capital Han identifies stems from radical Internet users mainly from the ranks of progressive younger generations. Han (2002) has argued that the disproportionately young and liberal users of the Internet have forged a new socio-political landscape that has witnessed a series of acts of Internet activism in 2002, including the World Cup matches, the candlelight demonstrations, and the 16th presidential election.

Korea’s Civic Action and the Internet

The 2002 World Cup Cheering in 2002

Korean netizens’ civic engagement in 2002 should be understood in the context of serial events occurring around that time. Many researchers have been interested in the implicit relationship among events like the World Cup, the Candlelight Demonstrations, and the 16th Presidential Election, all concurrent in the same year, 2002 (Cho et al., 2004;
The primary event in 2002 occurred during the World Cup Soccer matches held in May and June, prior to the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations in November. The 2002 World Cup provided many Koreans with the opportunity to use the Internet for large-scale collective gatherings and online-offline actions.

The “Red Devils,” an Internet-based fan club for the South Korean national soccer team, played a pivotal role in mobilizing collective actions to cheer the Korean soccer team. Throughout the World Cup games, the Red Devils mobilized 22 million people and organized cheers and celebrations, online and offline. The Red Devils mainly appeal to those in their teens and twenties, a generational demographic which had been presumed to be politically indifferent and apathetic. With no authoritarian leadership or hierarchical structure, the Red Devils carefully planned the massive cheering through online discussions and online voting (Kim, 2004). They determined cheering slogans, dress codes, cheering events for each match, such as card sections on the stadium and street cheering in major cities. Decision-making was considerably democratic and their repertoires were surprisingly creative and innovative (Cho-Han, 2004; Han, 2007).

When the Korean World Cup team had games, people gathered at the Kwanghwamoon square in downtown Seoul to cheer the Korean team, watching several big screens set on the square by the Red Devils. Led by Red Devil members and non-member volunteers following the Red Devil’s instructions, the cheering crowds sat down in orderly rows, sang some popular songs, shouted cheering slogans, danced with and hugged one another, wore red T-shirts (the unofficial uniforms of the Red Devils), and

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6 It started with 200 members in 1997. By the time of the world cup, it had 200,000 members. It has open membership: “Anyone who loves soccer can be a member of the Red Devils.”
held Korean flags. There was neither violent incident nor abusive language. After the street cheering, the members of the Red Devils autonomously helped to clean the streets.

Following the cheering instructions distributed online by the Red Devils, the crowds behaved in an orderly fashion and shared a sense of the national ethos, the “can-do spirit” (Han, 2002). The Red Devils exhibited new types of collective action that embodied the values of an “open-mind, diversity, coexistence, and respect for others” (Cho-han, 2004). Throughout the 2002 World Cup Game, the younger generation, which had been regarded as an extremely individualistic cohort group, emerged as a new agent of civic action, gaining confidence in their ability to express their voices and to network for collective action through the Internet (Cho, Yun Jung et al., 2004; Han, 2002). As many scholars have observed, the World Cup experience strongly encouraged people to utilize the Internet to mobilize online and offline actions in the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations (Cho-han, 2004; Lee Hyun-Woo, 2005; Song, 2003) and the following presidential election. Han Jongwoo (2002) has stressed that the World Cup cheering sections organized by the Red Devils offered an opportunity for an apolitical young generation to be empowered by the Internet, and thereby engaged them in the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations and the 2002 Presidential election, contributing to the unexpected victory of candidate Rho Moo-hyun.

As seen in the transition from the World Cup to the candlelight vigils in 2002, the flexible switch between political and apolitical arenas is also noteworthy. Kim Young-chul (2004), emphasizing the cultural impact of the World Cup zeal, has asserted that the locally managed cheering was transformed into a citizens’ cultural festival independent from capital, professional journalism, and government power. The bottom-up festival,
which had long been severely prohibited and censored under the authoritarian
governments, involved people in an “all-togetherness (Hamke-ham or Hamke-haki in
Korean)” that creates harmony among those of different ages, genders, social statuses,
and political orientations. The most crucial implication of the World Cup festival is the
“recapture of kwang-jang [the public square],” which had been taken by dominant social
groups for long. Before the June Civil Uprising in 1987, only government and
government-sponsored institutions had held public ceremonies, such as anti-communist
demonstrations and right-wing Christian rallies, in downtown squares. Kim Young-chul
has defined the kwang-jang culture in terms of openness, publicity, and freedom:

During the World Cup Game, kwang-jang was very smoothly recaptured
from the hands of dominant groups by the masses. People learned the power
of kwang-jang and the ecstasy of kwang-jang communitarianism throughout
the World Cup cheering demonstrations…Discovering others who can share
the same ideas and sentiments was a surprisingly great pleasure. For this
reason, the spirit of street cheering was easily transformed into into the
solidarity that informed a mourning rally (the 2002 candlelight
demonstrations) and to civic protest against outdated politics—an overall
movement fostered by the activism that arose from the World Cup fervor.
Those movements resulted from the (youths’) collective pride that “we could
handle socio-politics and culture on our own” (p. 246).  

Candlelight Demonstrations in 2002

In the summer in 2002, a tragic accident occurred in the small town of Euijingbu,
just north of Seoul, where the 2nd Infantry Division of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
stationed. On June 13, two middle-school girls, Mi-sun Shim and Hyo-soon Shin, were
crushed to death by a U.S. armored vehicle driven by two U.S. soldiers, Sergeant
Fernando Nino and Sergeant Mark Walker. In November 2002, a U.S. military tribunal in
South Korea acquitted the two soldiers of negligent homicide, and the soldiers left South

7 Translated by the author.
Korea soon after the judicial ruling. This case was adjudicated under the “Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)\(^8\)” signed in 1966 between the U.S. and South Korea, which allows the 37,000 U.S. service members (and their dependents) stationed in South Korea to be tried in a U.S. court.

The SOFA agreements are intended to define the legal status of U.S. personnel and property in the territory of host nations in which U.S. military forces are stationed. While the U.S. has had SOFA agreements with approximately 90 countries in the world, each SOFA has been negotiated separately with the host country, depending on “the nature and duration of U.S. military activity within the host country, the maturity of the relationship with that country, and the prevailing political situation in the host nation” (Global Security.Org., n.d.). The SOFA with South Korea represents the military and diplomatic relation between the U.S. and South Korea after the Korean War. Korean judicature rarely had legal right\(^9\) to exercise jurisdiction over the U.S. criminals under the aegis of SOFA, although there had been approximately 52,000 crimes—including rape, murder, and kidnapping—committed by 59,000 U.S. service members stationed in Korea from 1967 to 2002 (No Crimes by US Troops, 2009). Before this incident, some oppositional social movement organizations, such as No Crimes by US Troops (www.usacrime.or.kr) and Peace Korea (www.peacenetwork.org), had consistently contended unfairness and absurdity of the SOFA, demanding the revision of the SOFA. Most Korean citizens, however, rarely aired complaints and grievances openly, as anti-Americanism had been

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\(^8\) The full title is the “Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea.” This agreement was signed in 1966 as a supplementary pact of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and South Korea concluded at the end of the Korean War in 1953.

\(^9\) Until the 1990s, only 0.8% of legal cases were made by the Korean jurisdiction. The ratio has been increased to 7.0% in the 2000s.
long equated with pro-communism following the Korean War.

The deaths of Hyo-soon and Mi-sun, however, became a “tipping point”\(^{10}\) (Kim & Kim, 2005) to spawn anti-American sentiments in a mostly pro-American country (Han, 2007). While major newspapers and mainstream media paid little attention to this incident, an anonymous user of OhmyNews triggered the start of nationwide demonstrations against the U.S. juridical decision. On November 30, 2002, an OhmyNews citizen-reporter, known online simply as ‘Angma [devils]\(^ {11}\)’, first suggested holding candlelight vigils for the two girls in addition to posting a mourning badge on Internet users’ homepages. On the OhmyNews website, he expressed his condolences for the two victims and argued for the revision of the inequitable SOFA:

> It is said that dead men’s souls become fireflies. Let’s fill downtown with our souls. With the souls of Mi-Sun and Hyo-Soon, let’s become thousands of fireflies. This weekend 6:00 pm, let’s take our time for the two girls…Holding a candle and wearing black suits, let’s have a memorial ceremony for them…We are not Americans who avenge violence with violence. Even if only one person comes, I won't mind… I’ll go on, this week, next week, and the following week… Let’s fill downtown with our candle-lights. Let’s put out American violence with our dream of peace (OhmyNews. Nov. 30, 2002\(^ {12}\)).

Following Angma’s suggestion, a number of citizens began to gather each weekend at the Kwanghwa-moon square, close to the U.S. Embassy, demanding: (1) President George W. Bush issue a public apology for the deaths of Mi-sun and Hyo-soon to the bereaved families and the Korean people; (2) U.S. military army give up criminal jurisdiction in this case and hand it over to Korea; (3) the SOFA be amended to eliminate

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\(^{10}\) According to sociologist Morton Grodzins, a tipping point is defined as a previously rare phenomenon becoming rapidly and dramatically more common.

\(^{11}\) As he drew the attention of the media, he disclosed his real name and identity: Kim, Gibo, a white-collar salaryman in his 30s.

\(^{12}\) Translated by the author. Original post was written in Korean.
immunity from prosecution for U.S. soldiers who commit crimes against Koreans; and (4) equal relations between South Korea and the United States be established. The demonstrators blamed the Bush administration for a unilateral foreign policy which had presumably exacerbated unequal relations between U.S. and Korea, and which had threatened world peace. In particular, some protestors expressed concerns about the increasing military crisis in the Korean peninsula, arguing that Bush’s “axis of evil” statement targeting North Korea had been escalating the crisis. Faced with growing anti-American sentiment, Bush delivered a message to express his “sadness and regret” through the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. Though Korean mainstream newspapers, including Chosun, JoongAng, and DongA, reported that President Bush had delivered an “apology” to Koreans, such news coverage failed to appease outraged citizens.

Approximately 422 candlelight demonstrations were held for at least twenty months, from November 2002 through June 2004. With the number of demonstrators each week estimated at a maximum of around one-hundred thousand (Hangyoreh, March 5, 2003), these vigils constituted the largest anti-American demonstration in South Korea since the Korean War in the 1950s. In addition, the range of the demonstrators was unprecedentedly eclectic, including not only white-collar businessmen and college students, but also teenagers, housewives, factory workers and elderly citizens. Online networks that grew from these demonstrations began to attract the special attention of a public which had sought social reform and alternative politics.

As many previous studies have suggested, the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations revealed the nascent independence and alternativeness of Internet activism in South Korea (Chang, 2005; Han, 2002, 2007; Lee, Jinsun 2005; Oh, 2004a, 2004b). Above all,
it was the first movement triggered and spread mainly by individual movement entrepreneurs not affiliated with any established political or civic organization. While most of the mainstream news media did not pay attention to Angma’s post, it was rapidly delivered to millions of websites by “pumjil” [copy & paste] via thousands of Internet users. Within 24 hours after Angma’s posting of his suggestion, 90% of all Microsoft Messenger users in Korea had posted a mourning badge on their homepages (Han, 2007, p.66).

In addition, this movement exhibited new tactical forms of civic action. Lee Keehyung (2005) has pointed to the innovative forms of social movements found in the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations. While offline rallies during the democratization movement in the 1980s were typically accompanied by violent confrontations between demonstrators and the police, the candlelight demonstrations and Roh’s supporter-rallies in 2002 were unprecedentedly peaceful (Lee, Keehyung, 2005). This difference in tactical repertoires might result from the ways in which peaceful protestors differently mobilized. Lee Keehyung has argued that the participants were not mobilized through preexisting networks in the social movement sector; rather, they were motivated to participate in the demonstrations mainly through the horizontal interaction afforded by Internet media and online discussion sites. In that sense, Lee (2005) asserted, the participants can be identified as amorphous “smart mobs”13 (Rheingold, 2003). The Internet media has thus become a “new space of public expression and utterance where established social groups

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13 The term was coined by Howard Rheingold in his book Smart Mobs (2003) to describe groups of people equipped with high-tech communications devices that allow them to act in concert. Rheingold has argued that the convergence of new media technologies and widely distributed networks allow swarming on a scale that has never existed before. Through new media, people gather to cooperate, not knowing who knows whom. The anti-WTO protest in Seattle in 1999 and the subsequent anti-corporate-globalization movement exemplify the appearance of smart mobs.
and hierarchies are debunked, mocked, and admonished by willing netizens who utilize polemic, parodic, and satirical language.” (p. 18)

Arguing from similar assumptions, Kim Kyung-Mi (2005) has defined this movement as a pioneering “unconventional form” of political participation. Focusing on the inter-relationship between offline and online action, Kim’s study has examined what factors affected participation in the candlelight demonstrations. Kim found that:

…(t)he variables of previous experience in off-line and supporting networks significantly affected the participation in the demonstration and such influence was reinforced by the Internet. The influence on the participation of such variables as previous experience in online, the emotional responsiveness, and the structural exposure in on-line was found indirect and significant only through the on-line activities (p. 223).

Kim Kyung-Mi’s study suggests that Internet users involved in online communities were more likely to participate offline in the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations because of the emotional reinforcements that arise through online interaction.

Examining the emotional motivation of the candlelight movement, Kim Dongwhan and Kim Hunsik (2005) have proposed the concept of a “weakers’ circle” as a major driving force leading social change in Korea. By the weaker’s circle, Kim and Kim refer to the collective identity citizens construct to posit themselves as the have-nots in opposition to the haves. A majority of Korean publics tend to identity their socio-political status as being among the “weak” (i.e., the dominated) classes and define social justice as support for the socially weak (Kim & Kim, 2005). The opponents of the social weak may include big capital (chabol), the police, the government, the mainstream media, and superpowers including the U.S. This frame can be applied to the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations (Kim & Kim, 2005). Throughout the demonstrations, Internet users identified themselves as the social weak and fighting on the side of two dead girls, Mi-
sun and Hyo-soon, and framed the Bush administration, the Korean government, and Korea’s mainstream media as social opponents that improperly dominate the marginalized or subaltern groups through abuses of power.

With respect to online users’ framing of the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations, Lee Jinsun (2005) has analyzed posts in the online alternative news website OhmyNews (www.ohmynews.com), which had played a crucial role in developing this movement into a nation-wide rally. Her findings suggest that the online discussion participants constructed a counter-hegemonic frame which opposed Korean mainstream media and conservatives. The participants were critical of both the U.S. and South Korea governments, asserting that peoples’ protests to amend unequal relations between the two countries would contribute to social justice and world peace. Lee’s research concluded that in the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations, the Internet provided radical users with space to share political opinions as well as emotional sentiments. Based on a collective identity of “us,” online participants created their own framing to view the world, contesting the dominion of mainstream politics and journalism (Lee Jinsun, 2005).

Despite the movements’ novel mobilization forms and tactical repertoires, some researchers doubt that the candlelight movement represents a new mode of civic action completely differentiated from Korea’s preexisting social movements (Jung Yoojin, 2003; Kim Won, 2005). Kim Won (2005) has argued that the 2002 Candlelight Movement demonstrated a “compromised form” of civic action between new and traditional forms of social movements in Korea. On the one hand, that the movement exhibited online-based involvement which united eclectic segments of the population, does demonstrate a novel form of mobilization. On the other hand, however, the movement failed to provide
an innovative ideology or offer fresh relationships with preexisting activist groups. For example, ideologies revealed in the slogans of the movement encompass two particularly old-fashioned and conservative discourses: “nationalism” and “the image of females as victims:”

…[Throughout the candlelight movement]…participants Mi-sun and Hyo-soon have been symbolized as “innocent and chaste daughters of a nation,” and their deaths have been associated with a lack of national power and pride. In fact, while there had been many murders committed by U.S. servicemen, the victims of these incidents had not attracted as much attention as Mi-sun and Hyo-soon, probably because most of them had been males or prostitutes rather than “chaste daughters” of a nation14 (p. 144).

Kim Won (2005) has asserted that the ideologies advanced in the movement were little more than regurgitations of dominant ideology cloaked in the form of populism, rather than counter-hegemonic discourse defying dominant ideologies; the movement’s exploitation of sensational nationalism and equations of passive femininity and victimhood only reinforce regressive values. In addition, Kim Won (2005) has stressed that hierarchical forms of movement organization still persisted during the candlelight vigils. While some netizen groups called for completely autonomous and horizontal communication networks, preexisting activist groups, most of which included professional activists and members affiliated with radical social movement organizations, insisted that their leadership organize and mobilize the movement. Therefore, the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations, in Kim’s estimation, are not a “new social movement by the multitude or a smart mob” but rather represent “the social movement in transition from traditional modes to new modes.”

14 Translated into English by Jinsun Lee.
The 16th Presidential Election in 2002

Along with the 2002 World Cup Cheering and Candlelight Vigils, the 16th Presidential Election in the same year also demonstrated the vital importance of Internet use in shaping politics and culture in Korea. In December 2002, when a new face in the New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP), Roh Moo-hyun, brought off an unexpected win over conservative Grand National Party (GNP) candidate Lee Hoi-chang (who was backed by several major newspapers) with the support of progressive, Internet-savvy young voters, many analysts spoke of a “revolution by netizens” (Kim, 2003) and a “victory of new media” over old media such as major right-wing newspapers (Kim & Johnson, 2006; Rhee, 2003). In the beginning of the presidential campaigns, three major candidates were in the running: Rho Moo-hyun of the New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP), Lee Hoi-chang of the Grand National Party (GNP), and Chung Mong Joon of the National Alliance 21 Party. Later, Chung and Rho entered into an agreement that the winner of a poll would become a united front candidate; shortly thereafter, Rho emerged as the favorite in the poll.

A high school graduate without a college degree who managed to become a human rights lawyer and advocate for laborers and activists, Roh Moo-hyun became an icon of progressive change (Lee, Keehyung, 2005). Roh Moo-hyun surprised many when he defeated Lee Hoi-chang, a former prime minister and former chief judge of the Supreme Court, who, even more importantly, was fully supported by the “big three” outlets of the mainstream daily newspapers: Chosun, JoongAng, and DongA, the so-called kingmakers.

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15 In Korean, the New Millenium Democratic Party is Sae Chonnyeon Minjudang. It was a moderate liberal party, founded by President Kim Dae-jung, that served as a ruling party and a minority in the Korean National Assembly from 1997 to 2004.
16 In Korean, Grand National Party is Hannara Dang. It was the conservative opposition party, which had 150 seats of a total of 273 seats as of Dec. 2002.
in Korean politics. The victory was even more stunning in light of the fact that Roh Moo-
hyun steadily fell behind Lee Hoi-chang for most of the presidential campaign. Rho’s
secret weapon was his online-based supporters.

In 2000, Roh’s supporters voluntarily gathered online under the name of “Nosamo,”
a Korean acronym for “People who love Roh Moo-hyun” (Lee, Keehyung, 2005; Rhee
In-Yong, 2003). Nosamo started with only seven founding members, but its membership
rapidly grew to 45,486 by May, 2002 (Lee, 2005). The online independent news outlets
OhmyNews and Seoprise also played a vital role in drumming up support for Roh Moo-
hyun later in the campaign. Just on the eve of the election, only eight hours before the
polls were open, Roh’s political ally Chung Mong Joon, of the National Alliance 21 Party,
abruptly announced a withdrawal of his support for Roh, avoiding any comments on the
reason. In this dire situation, in which Roh feared losing the votes of Chung’s supporters,
“Nosamo orchestrated a last-minute mobilization of young voters” (Han, 2007). Nosamo
rallied support and spread the word using MSN Messenger, mobile phones, and urgent
messages posted on Internet boards, including those of OhmyNews and Seoprise.
Throughout the next eight hours (before the polls opened in the morning), the OhmyNews
website would play a central role, with 6.23 million visitors and 19.1 million page views
logged during that period alone (Han, 2007).

At last, Roh Moohyun gained 49% of the vote, barely beating Lee Hoi-chang’s 47%
share. When Roh Moo-hyun won the election, Chosun Ilbo labeled this election in terms
of the generation gap, calling it “the victory of 2030 [those in their twenties and thirties]
over 5060 [those in their fifties and sixties]” (Chosun, Dec. 26, 2002). On the other hand,
JoongAng framed the 2002 presidential election as “a rivalry between old media and new
media” (Monthly JoongAng, March 2003). In addition, *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* reported that the Internet was shaking up Korean political culture by mobilizing people in an unprecedented way and greatly contributed to the victory of the Rho Moo-hyun (Kim & Johnson, 2006). As Yun Young Min (2003), an expert on Information Sociology, observed:

No expert predicted that Roh Moo-hyun would be elected as the 16th President of South Korea thanks to the Internet. Also, there are few experts who hesitate to say that one of major factors of his victory was the Internet. Without thorough examination of the causality between Roh’s victory and the Internet, it would be wise for so-called experts to remain cautious about making concrete conclusions about such events in the future (p. 163).

Having witnessed surprising victory of Rho Moo-hyun, some researchers have examined the effect of the media during the 2002 Presidential Election. Identifying the 2002 Presidential Election as “the first (election) in which full-scale cyber-electioneering appeared and played a presumably decisive role in South Korea,” Yoon Young Min (2003) has argued that the Internet was so effective in winning supporters and the votes of fence-sitters that the existing press, political parties, and politicians critically lost their power in the election. Yoon has described the ways in which the conservative mainstream media, critical of candidate Rho, unexpectedly prompted a backlash (Yoon, 2003):

Those newspapers almost every day carried articles that both implicitly and explicitly criticized candidate Rho Moo-hyun during the presidential primary election of the NMDP. However, their attacks proved futile and can even be said to have actually produced quite contrary results. Thanks to the attacks of those newspapers, Roh earned the strong image of David who fought against Goliath, and in the end he won the election. South Koreans observed that the more offensive reports were printed in newspapers, the more voters entered cyberspace to seek alternative information; thereby, the major newspapers lost, all the more, authority in politics (p. 148).
Hwang Kuhn (2003) has proposed similar research results, suggesting that the election witnessed a sharp increase in the influence of the Internet and the declining influence of major conservative newspapers. In particular, the public mourning for the two teenage girls and demand for a revision of SOFA, despite having been played down by the mainstream media, emerged as major issues through the Internet in the closing phase of the election. Hwang emphasizes that many voters who lacked a framework for political interpretation used the Internet as “interpretive guidelines,” (p. 201) even though the Internet frequently provided inaccurate, partial, or agitative information.

By contrast, political scientist Yun Seoungyi (2003) has asserted that traditional media, such as television and newspapers remained much more effective than the Internet in delivering political news. He emphasized that 71.6 percent of respondents specified TV as their primary source of election-related information and 20.6 percent identified newspapers, while only 4.8 percent relied on the Internet. In addition, he argued, candidates’ online campaigns did not succeed in pulling younger citizens into the political arena, as shown in the relatively scarce access rate of homepages of politicians or political parties (Yun, 2003).

While Yoon (2003), Hwang (2003), and Yun (2003) have focused on comparing the wholesale effects of existing mass media and the Internet, some researchers have focused on the function of political discourse provided by electronic bulletin boards during the election. Yun Jung Choi, Cheolhan Lee, and Jong Hyuk Lee (2004) have examined how online users employed three functional utterances—acclaim, attack, and defense—when they provided support for candidates or criticized opposition candidates in the 2002 election campaigns. Their findings suggest that the advocates of both candidates used
attack utterances much more frequently than utterances of acclaim or defense. Explaining the frequency of attack strategies, they point to the anonymity of online discussions, and imply that Internet’s elisions of identity provide opportunities for offensive and even irresponsible statements.

However, greater frequencies of attacks may also result from prompt and direct interactions between discussion participants. As the authors describe (Choi et al., 2004), previous studies employing functional analysis tend to focus on less interactive media formats, such as television spots, newspaper advertising, radio advertising, radio talk comments, television debates, acceptance addresses at conventions, and candidates’ web pages. Those forms of media outlets, in which statements of acclaim were the dominant utterances (p. 107), may provide a framework for less disputable and less prompt audience responses. Thus, rather than simplifying online utterances with a few forms, exploring the context in which the online discussions occurred and analyzing the frames constructed on online boards may offer better understandings of the nature of online discourse.

Meanwhile, some researchers such as Kang Won-taek (2003) and Han Jongwoo (2002, 2007) have turned their attentions to the generation gap the 2002 Presidential Election exposed. Kang Won-taek (2003), in his book Electoral Politics in South Korea, has argued that Internet political groups played a vital role in the surprising “Roh Moo-hyun phenomena” that allowed candidate Rho to win the race, Kang identifies Internet political groups as being comprised of those in their 30s (as of 2002), who had actively participated in the radical student movement in the 1980s, who were born in the 1960s, and who are skillful in using the Internet—the so called the 386 generation. Contrasting
ideological differences between the younger and the older generation, Kang (2003) concluded that the radical 386 generation constructed their political agora in cyberspace, initiating public circulation of oppositional political discourse against mainstream newspapers and political conservatives throughout the election campaigns.

Han Jongwoo (2002, 2007) has also outlined the interrelationship, by age, between Internet access rates and a preference for candidate Roh (Table 1). The younger generation tended to more often access the Internet and support the candidate Roh compared to the older generation. Han (2007) has asserted that netizen groups, composed mainly of those in their 20s and 30s, have substantially developed Korea’s progressive social movements.

Table 1. Internet Use by Age in the 2002 Presidential Election*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age ranges (percent of total population)**</th>
<th>Internet access rate (%)***</th>
<th>Presidential preference (%)****</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20s (16.9%)</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30s (18%)</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40s (16%)</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50s (9.5%)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60s (12%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Simplified by Lee Jinsun based on Han Jongwoo’s study (2007).
** As of December 2002.
*** As of December 2001.
**** As of December 2002.

The 17th Presidential Election in 2007

Five years later, Grand National Party candidate Lee Myung-bak emerged victorious—by a wide margin—in the 17th Presidential Election. In December 2007, Lee Myung-bak garnered 48.7% of the vote, beating United New Democratic Party (the successor of New
Millennium Democratic Party) rival Chung Dong-young, who had 26.1% of the vote. A former CEO of Hyundai Engineering and Construction, Lee Myung-bak was expected to inaugurate a new honeymoon between the government and large companies with his emphasis on various “pro-business” policies, such as corporate tax-cuts. Most labor groups and activists expressed concerns that Lee’s pro-corporate approach would accelerate socioeconomic polarization by allowing only chaebol (a South Korean form of business conglomeration) to monopolize the benefits of economic growth (Koreatimes, Dec. 19, 2007).

Nevertheless, the electoral gap between Lee Myung-bak and Chung Dong-young was the largest since the direct presidential election system was revived by the June Civil Uprising in 1987 (Chosun, Dec. 20, 2007).

Rationalizing Lee’s huge victory, many people pointed to his camp’s active use of the Internet, a tool that had been used infrequently or ineffectively by conservatives in past elections. During his campaigns, Lee made overt appeals to the ways in which new ICTs could revitalize the conservative movement: “Let me take back the political power with the Internet, the means by which we had lost our power,” he said, while utilizing his homepage and many supporters’ websites (Yunhap News, Sept. 11, 2007). Observing a rapid upsurge of right-wing power on the web in the 2007 Presidential Election, some scholars have expressed their skepticism about the sustainability of progressive Internet activism (Lee Gihyung, 2006; Sisa Seoul, June 30, 2006; Yu Sukjin, 2006). Emphasizing contrastive election outcomes between 2002 and 2007, such scholars have argued that civic power on the Internet is only temporary and ephemeral (DongA, Dec. 18, 2007). On the other hand, dissenting critics have contended that citizen action can be revived and reconfigured on the net in the long term, despite the lack of centralized leadership and a strict membership on which the stability of
political mobilization has depended (Cho, 2008). Regarding this debate, it is notable that many progressive Internet users were actively involved in citizens’ voluntary campaigns in the same period—the Taean Clean-Up Campaigns.

**Taean Clean-Up Campaigns in 2007**

While Lee won the election by landslide, a great number of Internet users were actively participating in a non-political civic action, the Taean Cleanup campaigns. On December 7, 2007, twelve days before the presidential election, a terrible oil-spill occurred in the western coastal areas in front of Taean, South Chung-cheong province of Korea. An 11,800-ton barge owned by Samsung, a business conglomerate in South Korea, collided with the 146,000-ton Hong Kong-registered Hebei Spirit, after which the ecologically pristine coastline was drenched in oil, while oil clots drifted through the sea. The residents in Taean, where there had been abundant national parks and fish farms, reportedly lost more than half of the 544 oyster farms in that area. They demanded that Samsung apologize and compensate them for their loss, arguing that Samsung was more responsible for the accident than the Hong Kong oil tanker.

However, the mainstream media have portrayed this accident ambivalently. Some editorials have emphasized that both parties, Samsung and the Hebei Spirit, were equally responsible for the accident, while JoonAng, a daily newspaper owned by Samsung, had notably (and unsurprisingly) curtailed news reporting of the incident. Meanwhile, a large number of citizens established online communities and blogs to find ways to support Taean residents and share information to help them, including the establishment of the online community “Sarang-hae, Let’s Save Taean by Cleaning Up the Black Coast” (Sarang-hae: http://café.naver.com/greesea) only a few days after the spill. As of January
25, 2008, the community has 75,000 members (averaging 1,000 new members per day) and 9000 online posts in total (averaging 200 posts per day). Internet-based volunteers staged oil cleanup campaigns, for which a total of one million volunteers rushed to Taean in 32 days. As seen in Candlelight Demonstrations, there was no centralized leadership or fixed membership.

Although volunteers on the Sarang-hae website expressed a variety of concerns regarding environmental issues, practical information about how to find accommodations in Taean, and how to prepare for the cleanup, their online discussions reveal most tellingly highly critical perspectives about Samsung, mainstream media, and public authority, including the Korean Public Prosecutions Administration, which announced the shared responsibility of both parties. While the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations, linked to the subsequent presidential election, demonstrated the power of the Internet as an alternative space for progressives, the 2007 Taean Clean-Up Campaigns, driven by activist netizens, were relatively less involved in presidential politics. It remains questionable why politically conscious citizens were more interested in the Taean environmentalist campaigns than the concurrent presidential election.

Theoretical Shortcomings of Previous Studies

Despite many opportunities to witness innovative forms of civic action using the internet, Korean literature tends to lack theoretical approaches that can draw a big picture to characterize general trends of civic action in the digital age. These theoretical limitations are basically associated with misconceptions about “new” media and “old” media. Many scholars have attempted to examine whether new media or old media are
more effective (Chang, 2005; Hwang, 2003; Kim & Johnson, 2006; Yoon, 2003; Yun, 2003). While some research announced the victory of new media, other studies have claimed the predominant role that old media play in the areas of journalism and/or politics.

In a strict sense, however, the binary division between new media and old media may entertain a very common, if tricky, assumption. How exactly are “old” and “new” being imagined and defined? Do inherently “old” media currently exist in the contemporary age? If a medium is old in content yet new in form, does it qualify as old or new? Traditional media invented prior to the emergence of the digital age still use digital technology in the production, publication, and delivery of media content. A novelist writes his or her draft using a laptop, an editor works in office using digital publication software, and a reader orders a book after online information retrieval. In this media convergence era, the very concept of “old media” becomes untenable as long as all media adopt, and adapt to new media technology. Thus, the comparative study of media effects between new media and old media tends to ignore the phenomenon of media convergence.

In addition, audiences’ explorations of a variety of media outlets should be considered. Most audiences tend to willingly use both “new” media and “old” media, rather than exclusively selecting one or the other. The survey of Koreans’ Internet usage (NIDA, 2008) demonstrates that 63.3 percent of respondents use both online and offline media, while 36.5 percent use only offline media and 0.1 percent use only online media. It is also notable that 59.7 percent of Internet users read newspapers online, 33.2 percent watch movies, 30.6 percent read books and magazines, and 25.7 percent watch TV through the Internet (NIDA, 2008). In particular, politically radical Internet users, such as
OhmyNews readers, tend to use multiple media outlets—including conservative media, such as Chosun Ilbo, that represent opposing voices (Lee Eunmi, 2003; Park Sunhee, 2004). In this sense, Yoon Young Min’s assertion is noteworthy, as he has argued that one cannot simply ask which medium is more powerful because the so-called one-way mass media have constantly evolved, acquiring feedback and interactivity by adopting new media technology (Yoon, 2003).

Further, exclusive bifurcation between new media and old media is likely to fall into technological determinism. As shown in Chang (2005)’s study, which identifies the Internet as a democracy-enhancing technology, for example, some scholars tend to overestimate the technological advantages the Internet offers. From this perspective, however, it is hard to explain why the influence of progressives dwindled during the subsequent presidential election of 2007, when new media and online journalism had become even more advanced. Therefore, one must consider the historical context in which Korea’s mainstream newspapers have reflected dominant groups, and in which Internet has comparatively favored by progressive youths. In other words, rather than comparing old and new media (or democracy-harming and democracy-enhancing media), one must examine the Korean media environment to understand the cultural and sociopolitical impact of new media in Korea.

Another limitation of previous studies lies in the angles through which researchers have approached new media use. Many researchers have examined the ways in which “some institutions or recognizable individuals” have used the Internet for specific purposes. For instance, Yun (2003) and Hwang (2003) have examined how presidential candidates or their camps use the Internet, while Kim Jong Kil (2005) has focused on
social movement organizations’ Internet usage for mass mobilization. However, these studies are likely to fail to explain a variety of new trends accompanied with bottom-up civil action using the Internet. Rather than focusing on how successfully the Internet has been employed by some institutions, this study focuses on what phenomena have newly appeared, and what are the changes Internet utilization has brought to civic action. Rather than examining the impact of the Internet through the angles and biases of institutional social agents, new changes will be better captured by looking at motives and perceptions of individual Internet users who create a new, daily Internet culture that fundamentally transforms those environments in which political parties, politicians, and social movement organizations operate. To this end, the next section outlines concepts that inform, guide, and underpin the Internet’s impact on current politics and culture, and discusses the theoretical framework of Internet activism in the new media age.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
This following theoretical overview is composed of three subsections: (1) the political impact of the Internet; (2) social movements and Internet activism; and (3) the hybrid mobilization movement model. Beginning with a debate concerning the impact of new ICTs on the socio-political landscape, the first subsection examines the dynamics between technology and society and the issue of fragmentation. This subsection furthermore compares the virtual space and the public sphere to analyze the distinct characteristics of emergent Internet activism. The second subsection continues to explore the interrelationships between social movements and Internet activism by reviewing differing theoretical approaches to collective action and social movement theories. Then, drawing on three key factors addressed by McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), this subsection describes how new ICTs have influenced movements’ practices and organizational structures. Classifying and synthesizing new trends of Internet-based activism, this portion offers a preliminary conceptual framework of Internet activism focusing on the use of new media as (1) a mobilizing tool, (2) a site of virtual struggles, and (3) a discursive space for alternative knowledge production. The third and last subsection critically reviews Andrew Chadwick’s hybrid mobilization movement model and new digital movement repertoires, and goes on to examine whether Chadwick’s hybrid mobilization movements model is applicable to non-western societies, and whether potential limitations exist in its application to current social movements in South Korea.

Political Impact of the Internet
Dialectics of Technology and Society

There has been much controversy as to whether new ICTs can meaningfully contribute to the fostering of democracy. Some political economists and Marxist scholars have critiqued the democratic shortcomings of new, corporate-dominated ICTs, assuming that such technologies inevitably accompany inequities of access, represent only dominant powers, and perpetuate the more nefarious (i.e., corporatized) aspects of global capitalism. Such critics have contended that the Internet will never be free from systems of capitalist production, which can almost instantly commodify new media technologies, transforming them into inherently commercial enterprises uninterested in furthering social welfare or the public good. Moreover, computers still remain largely unavailable to those of lower socioeconomic classes and educational achievement.

Critics have referred to this gap between those who enjoy access to and benefit from digital technology and those who do not as the digital divide. (Digital divide.org., 2007). As of December 2008, only 23.5 percent of the total world population is currently using the Internet; in the whole continent of Africa, the figure is as low as 5.6 percent (Internet World Stats., 2009). The parameters of the digital divide also account for gaps in computer literacy and multimedia services, such as broadband network services and the quality and speed of connections. According to Internet World Stats (www. internetworldstat.com), which provides statistical internet usage data in 265 countries, “disadvantages [suffered by low-income users] can take such forms as lower-performance computers, lower-quality or high-priced connections, and difficulty in obtaining of the Internet and technological advances in developing economies.”17 Thus, the digital divide maintains online political discourse as the privilege of dominant elite groups (McChesney, 1996, 1999). Papacharissi (2002) has

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17 As of this writing, February, 2008
argued that “the virtual sphere is dominated by bourgeois computer holders much like the one traced by Habermas consisting of bourgeois property holders” (p. 21). Even if it is possible to construct counterpublic spheres on the Internet, the nonprofit and civic sectors are likely to be “relegated to the distant margins of cyberspace,” (McChesney, 1999, p. 183) as long as the commercialization of the global Internet places the power of electronic media in capitalist hands.

However, other researchers who place greater emphasis on users’ activities on the Internet prefer to view the Internet as a *contested terrain*, which can be and has been used by both progressive and reactionary groups alike to promote their respective agendas and interests (Kahn and Kellner, 2005; Kellner, 1998; Downey and Fenton, 2003; Salter, 2003; Warf and Grimes, 1997). As Kellner (1998) noted early in this debate, radical critics tend to point to the overtly commercial applications of the Internet and the blatant injustice of the digital divide, but downplay the fact that the Internet is becoming increasingly decentralized and, therefore, diversified. Kellner further argued that a significant number of progressive intellectuals have already made use of the Internet for their own political projects, as demonstrated by the Zapatista movements in Mexico and the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement in China. (Kahn and Kellner, 2004; Kellner, 1998) Presenting several cases of both conservative and progressive utilizations of new media, Warf and Grimes (1997) argued that the Internet does not necessarily serve either hegemonic or counterhegemonic purposes, and instead forms a “battlefield of discourse.” A similar position has been proposed by Salter (2003), who has suggested that “the Internet is not predefined in the technology itself but is open to definition by users” (p.138).
As Feenberg has asserted in *Questioning Technology* (1999), technology may inevitably influence the shaping of human life and social change, but people are also able to actively reshape and re-identify that technology. Feenberg argued that viewing E-democracy in the extremist terms of “technological determinism” overemphasizes a single aspect of the relationship between technology and society. By the same token, pessimistically viewing the Internet only in Marxist or politico-economic terms may result in an “economic reductionism” that neglects the activity and import of human agency. While technology in itself does not necessarily provide a groundwork for participatory democracy (as many E-democracy advocates propose), the technology is not wholly dependent on the economic bases of societies, because technology and society continually reconstruct one another (Kellner, 2000). As Feenberg (1991) has noted, this “mutual” reconstruction not only has a profound effect on our perceptions of technology, but can reflect upon our basic notions of bodily and environmental self-awareness:

We need a positive perspective on how technology should be transformed. There is an influential strand of “Green” and “ecofeminist” theory, represented for example by Carol Merchant, that formulates the project of technological reform in terms of the recovery of the body and bodily involvement in nature. This view seems to imply a kind of vitalist reenchantment of nature that contradicts the world picture of the physical and physical sciences. The potentialities to which these theorists refer would then [become] ontologically real dimensions of human beings and nature ignored by current science but identified by a reformed science of nature (p.19)

Building upon Feenberg’s claim, this study stresses that, rather than asking whether the Internet inherently serves the purposes of social domination or liberation, we must ask how it can be transformed into a non-commercial tool to serve progressive ends. The technology’s political potential is continually being shaped by the ongoing struggles that determine how, when, and where the technology can be applied. As Kellner (1998) has proposed,
intellectuals in the present moment must master new technologies “to develop and circulate new ideas, to do research and involve oneself in political debate and discussion, and to intervene in the new public spheres” offered by new ICTs. Addressing the possibilities for such participation in light of the digital divide, Pavlik (1994) has suggested designing more pragmatic strategies, including universal service policies, to enable more citizens to gain access to the information infrastructure, instead of “looking at a romantic past or utopian future” (p.142).

Drawing on the dialectical relationship between technology and human agency, this research draws attention to the connotations of current anti-globalization protests that make use of the Internet. While we acknowledge that the emergence of new ICTs has resulted in an often radical expansion of global economies and capitalist markets (even in the face of anti-globalization activism), the Internet has also notably “continued to evoke the potential for a participatory democracy that can be actualized when publics reclaim and reconstruct technology, information, and the spaces in which they live and work” (Kahn and Keller, 2005, p.711).

**Debate on Fragmentation**

Apart from the critiques of political economists, some political scientists and sociologists have proposed that new ICTs may cause the additional problem of fragmentation (Ayres, J.M., 1999; Habermas, 1998; Papacharissi, 2002; Sunstein, 2001). Fragmentation refers to the tendency of Internet users to become subdivided into smaller, like-minded groups—rather than reach consensus as a whole—because they self-selectively join groups based on predisposed interests while receiving highly customized, targeted information filtered and
framed by specific information providers. Discussing the many changes the advent of new media technologies have brought about, Habermas has pointed out the potentially dual impact of new media:

Whereas the growth of systems and networks multiplies possible contacts and exchanges of information, it does not lead per se to the expansion of an intersubjectively shared world and to the discursive interweaving of conceptions of relevance, themes, and contradictions from which public policy spheres arise. The consciousness of planning, communicating, and acting subjects seems to have simultaneously expanded and fragmented. The publics produced by the Internet remain closed off from one another like global villages (p.120).

Papachirissi (2002) has made similar assertions, characterizing Internet fragmentation as a constraint on the formation of a public sphere:

The number of people that our virtual opinions can reach may become more diverse, but may also become smaller as the internet [sic] becomes more fragmented…As the virtual mass becomes subdivided into smaller and smaller discussion groups, the ideal of a public sphere that connects many people online eludes us…A good amount of the information that we receive online is of a fragmented nature, presenting one aspect of an issue, snippets of information, or randomly assembled opinions or factoids (p. 17).

Some critics have added that Internet fragmentation may intensify political polarization and degrade the quality of social movements. (Ayres, 1999; Sunstein, 2001) Cass Sunstein, the author of the book Republic.com (2001), has stressed that online discussions lead to “cyberbalkanization,” wherein cyberspace’s overly specialized spaces and interests fragment and polarize public opinion rather than creating consensus. For example, email listservs allow groups of like-minded people to share information resources selected (or self-selected) specifically according to political orientation, instead of receiving information from more diverse sources that might hold opinions which are different, unpopular, or unlikely to flatter the targeted audience’s ingrained sensibilities. This lack of diversity and homogenization of opinion are exacerbated by members’ interactions within Internet groups, which can
ultimately lead to an intensification of conflict when no alternative viewpoints are permitted. (Bimber, 2000; Sunstein, 2001)

It is debatable, however, whether controls over information exposure necessarily result in political fragmentation and polarization. Realistically, Internet users tend to use the Internet to verify information filtered to them and actively check claims by comparing multiple sources, rather than passively relying only on given information (Elin, 2003). Some survey data actually demonstrate that Internet users are not wholly dependent on information resources filtered or derived from specific online interest groups (Garrett, 2006). As Pavlik (2001) has argued, the audience fragmentation that inevitably results from the Internet’s customized content does not necessarily translate into social disintegration and alienation because users “still want to know what is going on in the world” (p. 191).

Some empirical evidence also shows that such “fragmented groups” can successfully join together—in the form of networks—against a common target, such as global capitalism or mainstream culture. Norris (2004) has demonstrated that online community members develop existing social ties through online involvements that connect them to those with different yet compatible views. The anti-corporate globalization movement has revealed a variety of ways in which diverse individuals can build networks and develop collective identities (Bennet, 2003, 2004; Couldry, 2003; Juris, 2005; Kahn and Kellner, 2004, 2005; Salter, 2003). As Bennett (2003) has argued, while online communication in and through diverse networks may be ideologically “weak,” it is “rich” in terms of individual identity and the advancement of oppositional culture.

Fragmentation must also be properly understood within social context. The idea of political polarization proposed in the book Republic.com (Sunstein, 2001) is rarely
generalized in countries not rooted in two-party systems, and where there exist many nonpartisan swing voters. For instance, in Korea—which does not have an American-style two-party system—the Internet has become a primary tool to verify information disseminated by mainstream media outlets that have been deemed untrustworthy (Yun, 2003). The popular use of the Internet has promoted diverse political voices that in Korea would otherwise be marginalized or unrepresentable, activating on-line grass-roots movements that now flourish (Kang, 1998). No concrete evidence in Korea has demonstrated that the Internet has led to the polarization of public opinion, or is bifurcating Korea into a two-party system (Han, 2002, Yun, 2003); rather, the Internet’s political dynamics have helped the radical Democratic Labor Party, founded in 2000, to succeed in entering the National Assembly for the first time, after which it became a legitimate third party in the 2004 general elections. The issue of whether the Internet results in diversification or fragmentation, then, cannot be easily separated from the contentious politics of a particular social, political, or historical context.

Virtual Space and the Public Sphere

Many theorists and researchers have demonstrated how the Internet helps to construct collective identities and creates new forms of interactive communication, including web logs, wikis, and the killer application of email (Bennet, 2003; Juris, 2005; Kahn and Kellner, 2004, 2005; Kellner, 1998; McCaughey and Ayres, 2003; Silver, 2003). But while some scholars frame the Internet’s significance in terms of the public sphere (Dahlberg, 2001; Downey and Fenton, 2003; Salter, 2003; Salazar, 2003), others emphasize the postmodern characteristics of virtual space, which allows nomadic identities to incubate and flourish, and which foster

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18 Kang Myung Koo (1998) argued that the Internet in Korea has provided a basis on which grass-roots movements flourish by allowing people to publicly express their opinions online, not filtered by mainstream media and representative political systems.
decentralized networks of communication (Poster, 1995; Juris, 2005; Warf and Grimes, 1997).

Habermas (1989) has famously defined the public sphere as a realm of social life wherein individuals and groups can express, shape, and publicize opinions apart from, and in opposition to, coercive public authorities (Habermas, 1989). He has argued that the public sphere allows people to discover common interests and achieve societal consensus, allowing them to transcend narrowly construed self-interest and private opinions (Kellner, 2000). The virtues of the public sphere encompass free access to public dialogue, freedoms of speech and the press, decision-making based on productive discourse, and open debate that aspires to further the public good (Habermas, 1989; Kellner, 2000).

Drawing on a public sphere framework, Downey and Fenton (2003) have stressed the increasingly vital role alternative online media play in political activism. They asserted that the Internet permits radical groups to construct “inexpensive virtual counter-public spheres” to circumvent, resist, and rebuke mainstream ideology (p. 198). Although “alternative media have had a spectacular lack of success in reaching out beyond the radical ghetto, the Internet offers the potential to overcome limitations of the past alternative media,” Downey and Fenton maintained (p. 198).

On the other hand, Mark Poster (1995) has proposed viewing virtual space in fundamentally different terms than those proposed by Habermas’ original understanding of the public sphere:

For Habermas, the public sphere is a homogeneous space of embodied subjects in symmetrical relations, pursuing consensus through the critique of arguments and the presentation of validity claims. This model, I contend, is systematically denied in the arenas of electronic politics. We are advised, then, to abandon Habermas’ concept of the public sphere in assessing the Internet as a political domain.
In Poster’s (1995) view, the Internet creates “new forms of decentralized dialogue, new combinations of human-machine assemblages, and new individual and collective voices.” Unlike the public sphere, virtual space: 1) offers little hierarchy or structure in virtual communication; 2) posits “mobile identities” that can be newly invented on the web; and 3) eliminates traditional distinctions between the private and public (Poster, 1995). Not all scholars, however, view the Internet as a utopian solution to issues of voice and visibility. While Papacharissi (2002) supports Poster’s conception of the Internet as a postmodern space, she is more forthcoming about its limitations, asserting that “the disembodied exchange of text is no substitute for face-to-face meeting, and should not be compared to [it]” (p.17). Nevertheless, both Poster and Papacharissi believe the Internet will create not merely a “new” public sphere, but an entirely different mode of discourse.

As it relates to social movements, the Internet does, as Poster (1995) has suggested, evince some characteristics of a completely new alternative space marked by decentralized networking, horizontal communication, and new mobile identities. Jeffrey Juris (2005) also has demonstrated that the Internet produces new organizational structures—his ethnographic fieldwork on anti-globalization movements reveals that activists have used e-mail lists, Webpages, and open software to organize and coordinate actions and share information in a network form (p. 198). This horizontal network not only provides an effective tool for activists’ struggles, but also projects alternative political imaginaries idealized in the network (Juris, p.192). For instance, Independent Media Centers (IMCs, popularly referred to as Indymedia), a conglomerate of independent news websites first produced by media activists during the 1999 Seattle anti-globalization protests, exhibited radically democratic decision-making processes and interactive, grassroots news productions. Indymedia’s non-hierarchical
networks of journalists made it eminently possible to achieve “consensus-based decision making” among the participants despite their ideological diversity (Juris, 2005; Pickard, 2006). In light of its success, Pickard has argued that Indymedia’s most important innovation is its “actualization of radical democracy” (p. 19).

Negri and Hardt (2000) have analyzed this new network form in terms of counter-hegemonic activism. With the development of global economies and immaterial labor, they believe that both insurgency and counter-insurgency take network forms. (Negri and Hardt, 2004) As the old system of nation-states is transformed into a global power network—a so-called empire—a novel, non-imperious network emerges to challenge it, replacing the traditional unit of the nation-state with new (i.e., postmodern) subjectivities and new forms of social movements (Negri and Hardt, 2004, p. 83). Negri and Hardt have conceptualized the multitude as a new historical subject:

The members of the multitude do not have to become the same or renounce their creativity in order to communicate and cooperate with each other. They remain different in terms of race, sex, sexuality, and so forth. What we need to understand, then, is the collective intelligence that can emerge from the communication and cooperation of such a varied multiplicity (2004, p. 92).

Rejecting the view of virtual space as a mere extension or manifestation of the public sphere, Warf and Grimes (1997) have asserted that virtual worlds offer the opportunity for varied social groups to share a broad sense of social justice without being reductively, stably, and monolithically identified in terms of race, sex, age, religion, sexual preference, or other, often material, identity markers. The Internet thus becomes a counter-hegemonic space wherein “nomadic power” is diffused:

Nomadic power is diffuse power, with no location, and it maintains its autonomy through movement. Its valuables, electronic capital and electronic information, are located both nowhere and everywhere and cannot by
physically captured… Nomadic elite power can be countered by nomadic forms of electronic resistance in cyberspace. (Warf & Grimes, 1997).

The Internet, as a new, decentralized network positioned against dominant hegemony, can thus promote political ideals that oppose centralized governance and hierarchical organization forms. However, it is important to recognize that the boundaries between online and offline communications are not as clear as Poster initially assumed. Internet users are not confined to an online world but move fluidly back and forth between equally legitimate online and offline identities (Juris, 2005).

The interconnectivity between online and offline activisms has been frequently observed in Internet-based protests. As Juris (2005) has noted, virtual communication has complemented and facilitated face-to-face coordination and interaction rather than replacing them (p. 196). His Barcelona fieldwork described activists who not only used listservs to stay informed about activities and perform concrete logistical tasks, but to simultaneously deal with complex planning and political discussions within physical settings. His study therefore implies that human communication in reality cannot be demarcated neatly into online and offline spheres (Juris, 2005):

The Internet is also being incorporated into more routine aspects of daily social life, as virtual and physical activities become increasingly integrated. Despite the shrinking yet still formidable digital divide, the Internet facilitates global connectedness, even as it strengthens local ties within neighborhoods and households, leading to increasing “Glocalization.” Similar trends can also be detected at the level of political activity, where Internet use—including e-mail lists, interactive Web pages, and chat rooms—has facilitated new patterns of social engagement (p. 191).

In this sense, we have reason to doubt Poster’s (1995) overambitious claim that “the age of the public sphere as face-to-face talk is clearly over.” Virtual communication does not replace face-to-face communication, but coexists with it, as online and offline activities
become intermingled and interconnected in practice. Nevertheless, it remains worthwhile to consider Poster’s notion that virtual space, such as electronic cafes, bulletin boards, email, and electronic conferences, has rendered untenable Habermas’ binary division between private and public spheres. Instead of extending Habermas’ public sphere, Poster (1995) suggested exploring and reformulating virtual space from the perspective of the information age. Despite fundamental differences between Habermas’ public sphere and the new virtual spaces of the Internet, Poster’s conclusion is that new media will enhance democracy in ways never experienced before:

On the Internet individuals construct their identities, doing so in relation to ongoing dialogues not as acts of pure consciousness. But such activity does not count as freedom in the liberal-Marxist sense because it does not refer back to a foundational subject. Yet it does connote a democratization of subject constitution because the acts of discourse are not limited to one-way address and not constrained by the gender and ethnic traces inscribed in face-to-face communications (Poster, 1995).

The claims of the virtual space need to be elaborated further in relation to offline communications and activities. This research specifically concerns how to conceive of Internet-based social movements as being interconnected with offline social involvement. Having outlined the main issues relating to the political connotations of new technology, this study will now discuss the impact of new ICTs on politics and social movements in general, and will offer a framework in which Internet activism can be conceptualized.

Social Movements and Internet Activism

The pioneering use of the Internet in the Zapatista movement—which has been characterized as “the first informational guerrilla movement” (Castells, 1997)—has inspired social movement activists to adopt new ICTs to propagandize their agenda and mobilize
resources (Froehling, 1997; Kahn & Kellner, 2004; Warf & Grimes, 1997). Internet-fueled social movements had also gained considerable momentum at the Seattle anti-corporate globalization movement in 1999, which demonstrated an innovative pattern of transnational coordination among social movements. The Zapatistas and the Seattle protests, however, are but two examples of the various kinds of Internet activism that Kahn and Kellner (2005) see emerging at local, national and global levels: hacktivism, the alternative media movement, the anti-corporate globalization movement, the global anti-Iraq war movement, cyber-electioneering, minority-community construction, and other interactive forms of Internet media, including blogs and wikipedia.

Innovative Internet activism practices have prompted scholars in a wide range of disciplines—including political science, sociology, communication, and media studies—to investigate how, and in what contexts, we should understand this emergent social movement form. Does it represent an entirely new mode of engaging social movements, or is it merely the employment of new tactics to meet old ends? How does the adoption of new ICTs influence social movement environments? Are traditional theories of social movements applicable and adaptable to Internet activism? How, indeed, should we define the deceptively simple term “Internet activism”?

Responding to these questions, this section reviews relevant literature that draws upon definition and characteristics of Internet activism, beginning with a discussion of collective action and social movement theories from different perspectives. Then, drawing on three factors, addressed by McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, relevant to social movements (1996), it describes the impact of new ICTs on movements’ practices and organizational structures. Classifying and synthesizing new trends of Internet-based activism, this section outlines three
major domains of Internet activism: the use of the Internet as (1) a mobilizing tool, (2) a site of virtual struggles, and (3) a discursive space for alternative knowledge production.

Collective Action and Social Movement in the New Media Age

The term “social movement” generally refers to part of a collective action in which social actors synchronize their actions around common claims in sustained sequences of interaction (Tarrow, 1994). Collective action does not always develop into social movements because it can take diverse forms—it can be brief or sustained, institutionalized or disruptive. It is clear, however, that collective action offers a basis on which social movements can be construed (Tarrow, 1994). Social movements have been defined in a variety of ways, with special emphasis often placed upon distinct aspects of collective action, including psychological motivation, organizational carriers, and the communicative modes of collective action.

Some theorists have stressed socio-psychological factors involved in social movements, focusing primarily on people’s sentiments and sympathies, such as the grievances and frustrations that motivate people to become involved in collective action (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gamson, 2006). From this “hearts and mind” perspective (Gamson, 2006), a social movement can be defined as “a sustained and self-conscious challenge to authorities or cultural codes by a field of actors—organizations and advocacy networks—some of whom employ extra-institutional means of influence” (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). Similarly, Tarrow (1994) has identified social movements as “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities” (pp. 3-4). Scholars arguing along these lines tend to stress “cultural codes and
values” embedded in people’s minds, as a primary motivation for social movement involvement.

Starting from alternative theoretical perspectives, however, some scholars have emphasized how organizations act as carriers of social movements rather than individuals’ sentiments (Zald & McCarthy, 2006). They have contended that the socio-psychological approach likely fails to explain why some people are not engaged in social movements despite their preexisting discontent. They further stressed how organizations vitally define, create, and manipulate individuals’ grievances, and shape constituents’ discontentedness into active involvement in social problems. Simply put, individual sentiments do not result in movements unless movement organizations properly lead and mobilize people:

There is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite groups (Turner & Killian, 1972, p. 251).

According to this view, social movements are supported by and occur in institutional settings, and are interrelated with organizational activities—social movements are embedded in organizations, and vice versa (Gamson, 2006; Zald & McCarthy, 2006). Strongly emphasizing the organizational components of collective activity, institutionally-oriented critics define social movement as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements of the social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society” (Zald & McCarthy, 2006, p. 20). Zald and McCarthy (2006) further claim that a social movement organization is “a complex, or formal, institution that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals” (p. 20).
Some scholars have criticized this organizationally-oriented viewpoint, however, and propose viewing social movements in the context of communicative action (Bimber, Flanagin & Stohl, 2005; Flanagin, Stohl & Bimber, 2006). This position is based on the idea that existing theories do not take into account features of social movements associated with new media technologies. According to Flanagin, Stohl, and Bimber (2005, 2006), previous studies are inclined to ignore current organizations whose membership and leadership forms are fundamentally changing. They have claimed that while traditional social movement organizations posit formalized, largely one-way, and essentially prescribed relationships between fixed leaders and pliable members, contemporary organizations exhibit new modes of membership and engagement (Flanagin et al., 2006):

These [contemporary social movements] include self-organized protests and political actions in the absence of an interest group or other central coordinators, affiliation with a wide array of online organizations outside of formal “membership” procedures and incentives, and a vast scale of personal, voluntarily contributed informational goods for public use through the creation of Web content (p. 30).

Theorists oriented toward communicative action have also criticized social capital theory’s tendency to explain social movements as outcomes of the repeated “face-to-face engagement” associated with traditional civic organizations. Social capital theorists, such as Coleman (1990) and Putnam (2000), have asserted that social capital has eroded in the U.S. as traditional civic organizations depending on face-to-face communication have dwindled. The social capital approach, however, is inclined to underestimate the roles of virtual communities, which can successfully “substitute for traditional social capital-building associations,” as many empirical studies have demonstrated (Flanagin et al., 2006, p. 31). Many contemporary social movement organizations have both formal and informal communications, rather than fixed and predictable organizational structures.
Accordingly, Flanagin, et. al. (2006), has rethought collective action to focus on “what people do and how they communicate rather than on organizational structure per se” (pp. 38-39). This focus foregrounds a “collective action model” composed of a collective action space existing in two dimensions—the mode of interpersonal interaction and that of engagements that shape interaction (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Collective Action Model*

*Flanagin, Stohl & Bimber, 2006

In this model, the horizontal axis represents the mode of interaction as a continuum between personal and impersonal interactions. Here, personal interaction involves organized interaction with known others, while impersonal interaction involves no direct contact with other members despite their common pursuits, interest, and concerns. World Vision’s campaign to organize publics to donate money for starving children in Niger exemplifies the impersonal interaction mode. On the other hand, the vertical axis of the collective action space represents “the degree to which participants’ individual agendas may be enacted within
the group context” (p. 36). The entrepreneurial mode of engagement accounts for participants who are highly autonomous, and not controlled by a central authority. In this mode, “self-organizing mechanism[s] predominate, whereas bureaucratic mechanisms of coordination and control are minimal” (p. 37). By contrast, institutional engagement involves “a patterned set of normative rules of engagement and practices that are expected to be followed by all participants” (p. 37). In the institutional mode, individuals are embedded in a larger system in which organizational hierarchy plays a key role.

It is important to recognize, however, that many organizations have elements of both the interaction mode and the engagement mode (Flanagin et al., 2006). The organizational structure of Howard Dean’s 2003 presidential campaign offers a prime example. In this case, central campaign staffs had a hierarchical structure that allowed for both institutional engagement and personal interaction modes. Meanwhile, Dean’s campaign employed a “network-based periphery” that was explicitly uncoordinated from the center (Flanagin, et al., 2006, p. 38), allowing for both entrepreneurial engagement and impersonal interaction modes. Andrew Chadwick’s (2007) term “organizational hybridity” effectively illustrates how these new social movement trends take shape in the digital age. Following from the framework advanced by Flanagin et al., Chadwick (2007) has argued that the Internet encourages an organizational hybridity through which parties, interest groups, and social movement organizations appear to be converging. Dean’s presidential campaigns, composed of two heterogeneous layers, exemplify what Chadwick has identified as a “hybrid mobilization movement” rooted in organizational hybridity. His theoretical framework of hybrid mobilization movements and digital network repertoires will be discussed in detail in the following section.
This research supports the idea that traditional movement theories are likely to fail to explain contemporary social movements in which the distinction between private and public boundaries has been blurred (Bimber et al., 2005) and the forms of membership and leadership have been diversified (Flanagin et al., 2006). As Flanagin, et. al. (2006) has argued, “the formal, centralized organizations with identified leaders, prescribed roles, and quantifiable resources that are fundamental to collective action theory are no longer the only, nor even primary, means of contemporary organizing” (p. 47). Accordingly, the communicative approach suggested by Flanagin, et. al., and Chadwick is more likely to capture dynamic trends of collective action associated with new media technologies. It is also essential to note that the four quadrants divided along two dimensions—the mode of interaction and the mode of engagement—are not mutually exclusive. Rather, current social movements tend to demonstrate hybrid forms associated with more than one quadrant.

Three Factors of Social Movement

In explaining social movements’ emergence, development, and outcomes, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) have suggested a framework of social movement factors composed of: (1) mobilizing structures, (2) framing processes, and (3) political opportunities (Table 2). Mobilizing structures can be characterized as “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam et al., p. 3). This category includes social structures, including formal social movement organizations (SMOs) and informal friendship networks, and tactical repertoires which describe the forms of protest and collective action activists are familiar with and able to utilize (Garrett, 2006).
### Table 2. Framework of Social Movement Factors*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilizing structures</th>
<th>Social structures</th>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Informal</th>
<th>Tactical repertoires</th>
<th>Framing Processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Movement organizations, churches, etc.</td>
<td>Friendship, Activist networks, etc.</td>
<td>The forms of protest and collective action</td>
<td>Strategic attempts to craft, disseminate and contest the language and narratives used to describe a movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conditions in the environment that favor social movement activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(McAdam et al., 1996)*

Framing processes refer to “strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understanding of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam et al., p. 6). Through framing processes, activists deconstruct the language disseminated by mainstream institutions and articulate a new language and narrative of their own that clarify their agenda. Political opportunities refer to “attributes of a social system that facilitate or constraint movement activity” (Garrett, 2006, p. 212). For instance, social movement activists can have greater access to opportunities when the alignment of elites is fragmented than when it is stable and able to solidly resist opposition (Garrett, 2006).

Drawing on the three factors, we can reconsider the changes that new ICTs have brought to the fields of social movements. Garrett (2006) has proposed adopting the McAdam et al.’s framework to align and integrate the discussion about newly emerging practices and phenomena involved with Internet activism.

In terms of mobilizing structures, the Internet can promote and enrich supporters’ participation by “faster” delivery of “more” information in “cheaper” ways (Garrett, 2006; Smith 2000). Although some scholars have suggested that political fragmentation,
polarization, and continued political apathy have prevented the full realization of the
Internet’s potential (Bimber, 2000; Sunstein, 2001), many empirical studies have
demonstrated clear advantages of new ICTs in the mobilization of social movements (Elin,
2003; Norris, 2004; Smith, 2000). These advantages were especially apparent in global-scale
protests, including anti-corporate globalization movements and global anti-war protests. As
Smith (2000) has asserted, activists can mobilize rapidly and engage in “swarm-like”
challenges, taking simultaneous action on multiple fronts and in multiple ways. Describing
global activism, Bennett (2004) has claimed that “Internet use patterns affect the
organizational qualities of networks and can affect the internal development of member
organizations” (p. 131). As seen in the Seattle protest, the use of new ICTs can facilitate and
enhance collaboration between traditional social movement organizations, while
decentralized, non-hierarchical organizational forms are more apparent than ever before
(Bennett, 2004; Garrett, 2006).

With respect to mobilizing structures, the Internet is also able to foster collective
identity across a dispersed population and facilitate community creation. Melucci (1996) has
defined collective identity as an interactive and shared definition produced by several
individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with the orientations of action
and field of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place. Collective identity
is constructed through processes predicated on senses of boundaries, consciousness, and
negotiation (Ayres, M.D., 2003; Nip, 2004). Boundaries, which can be conceived of as a
“sense of we,” emphasize differences between the actors in a group and those in opposing
groups (Ayres, M.D., 2003). By consciousness, a group becomes aware of itself through a
series of self-reevaluations of shared experiences, opportunities, and interests (Taylor and
Negotiation, meanwhile, is the construction of an oppositional culture that thinks and acts freely from the constraints of dominant institutions, mainstream media or social norms (Taylor & Whittier, 1992; Ayers, M.D., 2003). The formation of collective identity contributes considerably to collective mobilization; indeed, many studies have highlighted the role the Internet plays in building collective identity among online community participants (Elin, 2003; McLaine, 2003; Myers, 1994; Nip, 2004). As Kahn and Kellner (2005) have argued, groups and individuals excluded from mainstream politics and cultural production (for example, gays and lesbians) have used the Internet to build solidarity among participants and develop their collective identity.

Framing processes provide cognitive bases for actors to build collective identity and participate in collective action. Garrett (2006) has argued that new ICTs have helped to create “new networks over which opponent frames can be propagated” (p. 214). Many scholars observing global protests using the Internet commonly note that the Internet offers activists an important degree of information independence from mass media (Bennett, 2004; Juris, 2005; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004). In addition, new ICTs promote construction of alternative media, which tend to be “independently operated and self-managed through horizontal participation,” bypassing the intervention of a gate-keeping center (Juris, 2005; Garrett, 2006). Indymedia, as a hub of the anti-corporate global movement, exemplifies such alternative news production (Garcelon, 2006; Juris, 2005). Created by independent media activists who gathered in Seattle to oppose the World Trade Organization meeting in 1999, Indymedia has successfully represented radical voices supporting global justice and media democratization movements, in opposition to transnational corporations and corporate-owned
media. As of April 2005, Indymedia comprises a network of over 150 cities in 50 countries (Pickard, 2006).

With regard to political opportunities, scholars have suggested that ICTs foster transnational activity and offer a geographically unbounded communication mode fundamentally resistant to state regulation (Garrett, 2006). While the Internet has been used to promote capitalist globalization, it also provides ways in which the global network can be diverted to and used for social movements beyond national borders. Kahn and Kellner (2005) have referred to the alternative globalization advanced by the use of new ICTs:

To capital’s globalization-from-above, subcultures of cyberactivists have been attempting to carry out alternative globalizations, developing networks of solidarity and propaganda oppositional ideas and movements through the planet (p. 711).

In sum, new media technologies offer the potential to mobilize more resources in more efficient, diversified, and unorthodox ways. They also affect the forms and decision-making processes of existing social movement organizations. On the Internet, groups and individuals can develop their collective identities through interactions in online communities and/or alternative media. The Internet provides a tool for struggles against corporate globalization, even if it may also contribute to globalized capitalism by facilitating the conglomeration of corporations.

*Conceptualization of Internet Activism*

While the differences among social movement theories have been clearly defined and argued, the definition of Internet activism has not been clearly delineated despite its significance in the contemporary age. Internet activism can be perceived as a subcategory of contemporary social movements in general. Many scholars, however, proposed that new
ICTs have led to the transformation of the social movement landscape—particularly in terms of mobilizing structure, agency, and framing processes—by changing the ways in which activists communicate, collaborate, and demonstrate (Carroll & Hackett, 2006; Kahn & Kellner, 2005; Garrett, 2006). By Internet activism—also known variously as online activism (McCaughey & Ayres, M.D., 2003; Vegh, 2003), cyberactivism (McCaughey & Ayres, M.D., 2003), cyberprotest (Van de Donk et al. 2004), online movement (Kang, 1998), E-movement (Earl & Schussman, 2003) and computer-supported social movement (Juris, 2005)—many scholars generally imply any “political activism using the Internet.” Wikipedia has defined Internet activism as “the use of communication technologies such as e-mail, web sites, and podcasts to enable faster communications by citizen movements” (Wikipedia 2006). Classifying the forms of online activism, Vegh (2003) has identified Internet activism as:

… [A] politically motivated movement relying on the Internet. The scenario is fairly simple: Activists now take advantage of the technologies and techniques offered by the Internet to achieve their traditional goals. Their strategies are either Internet-enhanced or Internet-based. In the former case, the Internet is only used to enhance the traditional advocacy techniques, for example, as an additional communication channel, by raising awareness beyond the scope possible before the Internet, or by coordinating action more efficiently. In the latter case, the Internet is used for activities that are only possible online, like a virtual sit-in or hacking into target Web sites (pp. 71-72).

In other words, Internet-enhanced strategies tend to characterize the Internet as an additional tool to mobilize supporters and coordinate actions, while Internet-based strategies treat the Internet as a new tactical site that can be utilized to protest targets online. Analyzing the Seattle protest in 1999, Van Aelst and Walgrave (2004) have argued, too, that the Internet and other new media were used not only as a mobilizing tool but also as a means of action in themselves. They have referred to the latter form of
Internet use as “an attack to [sic] the opponent from inside rather than on the street” (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004).

From this viewpoint, some theorists acknowledge hacktivism as a form of social movement (Kahn & Kellner, 2005; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004; Vegh, 2003). Vegh (2003) has called hacktivism a subcategory of Internet activism, composed of “a politically motivated single-incident online action or a campaign thereof, taken by non-state actors in retaliation to express disapproval or to call attention to an issue advocated by the activists” (p. 83). Although the term “hacker” usually conjures up ominous images of meddling computer nerds or illegal intruders, it originally harbored positive connotations, and indicated “a person of high technical literacy who could make socially beneficial improvements to computer software and hardware” (Kahn & Kellner, 2005). Kahn and Kellner (2005) have stressed that hacktivist movements have contributed to the reconstruction of the Internet by creating programs and codes that facilitate the sharing of knowledge and information resources (p. 704).

In addition to being a tool of resource mobilization and online action, the Internet has also been used as a site to produce and disseminate alternative knowledge and cultural frames. In a case study dealing with a lesbian online community, Queer Sisters, Nip (2004) has proposed to distinguish social movements into strategy-oriented and identity-oriented movements. While strategy-oriented movements are identified as instrumental movements with an external orientation such as political and/or social goals to achieve, identity-oriented movements emphasize predominantly intrapersonal orientations for identity construction (Kriesi et al, 1995; Nip, 2004). Drawing on this
classification, Nip (2004) has addressed two key functions of the Internet in social movements:

First, it (the Internet) helps communication in information dissemination, formal networking, and action coordination; second, it helps in building a collective identity among participants and potential participants of the movement (p 233).

Minority online communities, such as those catering to gays and lesbians, women, and people of color, exemplify identity-oriented Internet activism. Analyzing *Queer Sisters’* electronic bulletin board, Nip (2004) examined whether the participants bear collective identity among themselves. The study revealed that the online participants share an oppositional culture that develops their sense of solidarity, even if online interactions may not contribute directly to collective mobilizations that achieve instrumental goals (Nip, 2004, pp. 256-257). Nip’s findings imply that identity-oriented movements may not—or need not--aim at mobilization or consensus on specific issues. Nip explains that a *queer-dilemma* prevents internet solidarity from promoting offline participation:

Queer politics—upholding the inessential, fluid, multifaceted character of sexuality—tends to take on the deconstruction of identity as the goal. This seems to testify [to] the *Queer Sisters’* accommodation of the lesbian orientation and explain the lack of a *conscious* effort to build a queer identity on the bulletin board (p. 257).

Drawing on the previous discussion, this research suggests a preliminary map of Internet activism domains. Internet activism on the whole can be conceptualized as Internet-based collective actions linked to resource mobilization, virtual struggles, and alternative knowledge production (Table 3).
Table 3. Domains of Internet Activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Forms</th>
<th>Agents</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resource mobilization: To promote supporters’ participation and propagate agenda for specific goals</td>
<td>Using the existing website or opening new websites</td>
<td>SMOs, Political parties, Interest groups, Movement Entrepreneurs (MEs)</td>
<td>Anti-corporate globalization movement, anti-war movement, online-fundraising, and cyber political campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtual struggles: To protest or mobilize in the way that are only possible online</td>
<td>Hactivism</td>
<td>Technology experts</td>
<td>Peer-to-peer file sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Virtual demonstrations</td>
<td>Non-expert participants</td>
<td>Virtual sit-in, electronic-civil-disobedience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative knowledge production: To disseminate and to produce oppositional cultural frames</td>
<td>Alternative media</td>
<td>Activist, independent journalists, citizens</td>
<td>Indymedia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interactive media</td>
<td>Experts/non-professional individuals</td>
<td>Wikis, blogs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To deconstruct given identity and build collective identity</td>
<td>Minority movement</td>
<td>Gay/lesbian, women, race</td>
<td>Gay/Lesbian websites, feminist websites, ethnic communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To discuss long term &amp; short-term issues</td>
<td>Online communities &amp; forums</td>
<td>SMOs, Institutions, minorities, individuals</td>
<td>Online agora, Internet forums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resource mobilization to promote participation in a social movement and disseminate political agendas constitutes a primary form of Internet activism. Much of the extant literature has paid attention to how established institutions, such as political parties and social movement organizations (SMOs), have recently adopted online tactics to engage in anti-globalization protests, anti-war demonstrations, fundraising, and political campaigns. Earl and Schussman (2003) have argued, however, that the study focusing only on institutional adoption and adaptation of the Internet for social
movements likely overlooks the fundamental differences between “street protests” and “e-protest.” They have suggested that new ICTs have reduced the incentives of established groups like SMOs, allowing “movement-entrepreneurs” to emerge as the new agents of movements. Movement entrepreneurs (MEs) are nonprofessional individuals “who are motivated by individual grievances to undertake social movement activity and who rely on their own skills to conduct their actions” (Garrett, 2006, p. 211). The movements led by MEs have brought about significant changes in decision making processes (Earl & Schussman, 2003):

This more entrepreneurial movement infrastructure brought with it changes in decision making processes and concerns. Decision making became more discretionary, the importance of leadership declined, decisions about organizational forms became less problematic, and ideological and Internet-related concerns informed decision making in lieu of organizational or more standard social movement concerns (pp. 155-156).

Earl & Schussman have argued, furthermore, that the Internet is not simply a tool but a fundamentally different movement context. The emergence of MEs implies that new media technologies affect internal structures of SMOs and the communication channels of activists. The changes in decision making processes, in turn, may inspire activists to bear alternative political ideals influenced by anarchism and the logic of peer-to-peer networking (Juris, 2005).

Virtual struggles are part of new tactical repertoires enabled by the Internet. By virtual struggles, this study refers to protests that use the Internet as “a means of action,” whose forms include hacktivism, virtual sit-in, electronic-civil-disobedience, online-donation, and online-signature-collections, and online petitions. As new media technologies to create and edit pictures, photos, graphics, and music have rapidly developed, dissemination of satirical
text online have become a new way of virtual struggles. As Chadwick (2007) has argued, people are increasingly employing satirical graphics, audio, and video, photoshopped pictures, humorous animation, flash cartoons, or personal home movies—in other words, the paraphernalia of marginal subcultures—for citizen action on the net. “Culture jamming” has developed into an important strategy of virtual struggles and it is rising as an integral part of citizens' political expression in the Internet era.

In addition, alternative knowledge production should be regarded as one of the important domains of Internet activism. Web-based alternative media like indymedia, and interactive media like wikis and blogs exemplify Internet activism’s power to produce oppositional cultural frames. "Collective intelligence" is created, as Steve Johnson (2001) proposed, when the discursive context of the public, rather than that of a single authoritative source, provides timely and credible sources of information on the net. For example, minority movements of gays and lesbians can represent new ways of knowledge production by redefining the terms of “gender” and “marriage” of which meanings have been articulated by mainstream elites. As every single word has a frame (Lakoff, 2004) representing a standpoint of some groups, deconstruction of given meanings and re-articulation of new frames are a vital part of counter-hegemonic social movements. The Internet offers a space in which collective intelligence is constituted and counter-hegemonic knowledge is constructed and disseminated.

In sum, the Internet provides a contested terrain in which progressive and conservative forces alike emerge and compete for their own political ends, and whose future meaning is created by ongoing struggles between contradictory forces (Kahn & Kellner, 2005; Kellner, 2000; Salter, 2003; Warf & Grimes, 1997). While it is
significant to recognize that the Internet has been developed mainly by dominant social
groups, such as IT corporations, governments, and military armies, it is equally
necessary to realize that “people subvert the intended uses of these technologies
towards their own needs” (Kahn & Kellner, 2005). Focusing on the more subversive
applications of these technologies, this study has suggested a preliminary ways in
which resource mobilization, virtual struggles, and alternative knowledge production—
in all of their convergent and hybrid forms—can be used to map and conceptualize the
parameters of Internet activism. Needless to say, however, this conceptual framework
will be further enriched with and articulated by a variety of case studies whose
advanced theoretical approaches appreciate how Internet activism continually evolves
through the actions of social agents responsible for its ongoing construction.

Hybrid Mobilization Movement Model

Having reviewed the salient literature dealing with the Internet’s impact on social
movements, and having proposed a preliminary conceptualization of Internet activism, this
section further discusses Internet activism according to the theoretical framework advanced
by Andrew Chadwick (2005, 2007), who has focused on the concepts of "hybrid mobilization
movements” and “digital network repertoires." After introducing these two concepts, this
section examines the extent to which the hybrid mobilization movements and digital network
repertoires are applicable in non-western societies, and potential limitations that exist in
applying such models to current trends in South Korean social movements.
Hybrid Mobilization Movements

Andrew Chadwick (2005, 2007), a renowned political scientist at the University of London, has examined how Internet activism has led to organizational change among three traditionally political action groups such as interest groups, political parties, and social movement organizations (SMOs). He has characterized today’s social movements as “hybrid mobilization movements” that blend movement repertoires typically associated with three organizational types—parties, interest groups, and social movements (2007). Based on his case study of the 2003-2004 U.S. primary and presidential campaigns and newly emerging SMOs such as MoveOn, Chadwick has found that the features and policy impact of interest groups, parties, and SMOs are converging while traditional distinctions among them are declining (Chadwick, 2005):

Political scientists have long drawn distinctions between parties, interest groups and new social movements. Differences between the three have been mapped along several dimensions, but have usually been based upon variations in the levels and foci of participation and influence. In basic terms, the orthodoxy is that parties are distinguished by their roles as governments-in-waiting, interest groups by their insider status within established political institutions, and new social movements by their outsider roles as mobilization agents operating at a distance from policy elites. However, in the last decade or so, some have suggested that the utility of this distinction is declining (p.1)

Chadwick (2007) has suggested that the Internet is a major force blurring the boundaries among parties, interest groups, and SMOs, as the “organizational hybridity” the Internet fosters creates an environment where rapid institutional adaptation and experimentation become routine (p. 284). This organizational hybridity is two-fold. First, parties and interest groups undergo processes of hybridization by selectively transplanting and adapting the movement repertoires previously considered typical of, or particular to SMOs. For instance, in the 2004 U.S. presidential contests, Howard Dean's
campaign made extensive use of the Internet, borrowing methods mainly used in social movement organizations. His campaign used the Internet to bring people together in offline meetings through a website “Meetup.com” and successfully raised funds through an online donation campaign in which 280,000 individuals contributed an average of $145 each (Chadwick, 2007 p. 289). Linked with other political forums and activist groups, Dean was supported by an extremely large network of bloggers. These strategies differentiated his campaign from traditional party politics and demonstrated its "beyond-party" nature (p. 291).

The second trend of organizational hybridity is seen in newly emerging organizational forms, such as “MoveOn (www.moveon.org),” a nonprofit civic organization founded in 1998 by Joan Blades and Wes Boyd, two former Silicon Valley entrepreneurs. With a staff of only fifteen, the number of MoveOn’s members reached 3.2 million across the United States and abroad as of February 2008 (MoveOn., Feb. 1, 2008). According to Chadwick (2007), "MoveOn sometimes behaves like an interest group, sometimes like a social movement organization, sometimes like the wing of a traditional party during an election campaign.” Since MoveOn launched an online petition to "Censure President Clinton and Move On to Pressing issues Facing the Nation" in September 1998, it has conducted a number of campaigns to stop the war in Iraq (March 2003), to reform the FCC and U.S. media (September 2003), to defend Social Security (March 2005), to support Katrina victims (December 2005), and to support Barack Obama in the presidential campaigns (February 2008).

MoveOn's diversity of issues and an organizational flexibility that enables fast issue-switching make it difficult to place MoveOn in a single organizational category (Chadwick, 2007). As Chadwick has argued, MoveOn exemplifies today's hybrid mobilization
movements which can best be understood as the social movements embedded within organizational hybridity based less on hierarchical and more on horizontal networks. To illustrate the main characteristics of the hybrid mobilization movement, Chadwick (2005, 2007) has emphasized the concept of digital network repertoires, which differentiate hybrid mobilization movements from traditional social movements.

*Digital Network Repertoires*

According to Charles Tilly (1995), a repertoire is defined as "a limited set of routines that are learned, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice" (p. 26). For example, in protests people break windows, stage marches, or tear down the homes of disgraced public figures because they learned to act in those particular ways to achieve a specific goal through some bureaucratic organizational discipline (Tilly, 1995; Chadwick, 2007). Chadwick (2007) added that a repertoire "has elective affinities with its broader goals, makes decisions, and appeals to its supporters and campaigns" (p. 285). The importance of movement repertoires lies in that they reflect the organization's values and ideological goals. Not simply as neutral tools, repertoires have played a significant role in sustaining collective identities among participants. Traditionally, different organizations adopted different repertoires depending on their values and goals. For example, political parties tend to use repertoires derived from electoral and parliamentary rules such as hierarchical organizations and election campaigns, because their ultimate goal is the formation of a national government based on inherently hierarchical structures. By contrast, SMOs typically eschew hierarchy, by favoring non-vertical, consensual, and participatory decision-making processes that encourage alternative paths toward grassroots democracy (Chadwick, 2005; 2007).
However, the emergence of the Internet is eliminating the traditional differences between the repertoires of parties, interest groups, and SMOs, as more and more parties and interest groups begin to adopt and adapt SMOs' less-hierarchical repertoires. Indistinct boundaries between private and public realms on the Internet are accelerating the creation of crossover repertoires (Chadwick, 2007; Flanagan et al., 2006), while online forums and blogs allow private and public domains to blend and mutually absorb one another. Borrowing McLuhan's famous "medium is a message" thesis, Chadwick (2007) has asserted that Internet-mediated communication substantially transforms traditionally hierarchical groups. Chadwick has suggested that, for parties and interest groups, "imitation is part of innovation" and the result of once-distinct groups absorbing one another’s repertoires is “organizational hybridity” (p. 286). Exploring what drives organizational hybridity in the digital age, Chadwick spoke of "digital network repertoires" characterized by four principles: (1) creating appealing and increasingly convergent forms of online civic action; (2) fostering “distributed trust” across horizontally linked citizen groups; (3) fusing sub-cultural and political discourses; and (4) creating and building upon “sedimentary online networks.”

In the first principle, digital networks create "convergent forms" of citizen action which combine online-offline convergence with repertoire convergence. Since the rise of transnational social movements using the Internet in the 1990s, a rich number of online political actions have been developed, including Email, chat, discussion forums, blogs, instant messaging, online donation, online voting, information-sharing, and online sit-ins. As online and offline actions have converged, the distinction between "being a citizen online" and "being a citizen offline" has started to erode (Chadwick, 2007). The online citizenship of
meeting in virtual communities leads to occasional face-to-face meetings; this, in turn, leads to the posting of opinions on blogs, which then prompts new face-to-face meetings, and so on.

In addition, regardless of organizational types, online repertoires are becoming increasingly similar. One of the most significant changes in organizational repertoires across the different organizational types is the innovation of membership systems. For example, Environmental Defense, an interest group which was once less concerned with mass mobilization, began to adopt social movement strategies in 1999, when it aimed to expand its base to include potential supporters and volunteers. Like social movement organizations, this interest group sought the ways to utilize the website to mobilize and inform its members as well as “nonmember supporters” alike, rather than focusing only on preexisting full members. In a similar vein, MoveOn has neither a fixed annual membership fee nor a formalized local branch structure, though it occasionally uses the term "member" to refer to its supporters and volunteers in its email newsletters. Now, political parties, which have traditionally placed much importance on membership, are using a wide range of ways to identify potential publics, and are attempting to encounter and recruit nonmembers along with maintaining fully committed supporters.

The second principle of digital networks is to foster a "distributed trust" among citizens within a horizontal relationship. Distributed trust implies that participants tend to more trust the outcomes of collective discussions on horizontal and decentralized networks than the claims produced by a single, authoritative information source. Internet activism often creates loose alliance networks of groups with neither hierarchical structures nor a geographic center. Internet activists also build online issue-networks that often have temporary forms and are almost leaderless, as seen in MoveOn's issue-oriented projects. In many cases, the factor that
increases the trustworthiness of an organization is not a specific, single source, but rather the "organization's collaborative endeavor and openness" to make consensus (Chadwick, 2007, p. 290). Dean's 2004 campaign demonstrated how blogger networks and online forums can become trustworthy sources for citizen participants. Citizen-to-citizen interaction as well as citizen-to-candidate interaction promotes people's perceptions of trust in an organization.

The third principle is that digital networks give rise to the fusion of subcultural and political discourses. People are increasingly employing satirical graphics, audios, and videos, photoshopped pictures, humorous animations, flash cartoons, or personal home movies to subvert, manipulate, and recontextualize original images to instigate civic action. As popular logos, photographs and videos can be easily imitated and transmitted across social networks in digital arenas, subversion of cultural and commercial images becomes an effective tool to spread counter-hegemonic discourse. An interesting example is the "culture jamming" technique begun by MIT graduate student, Jonah Peretti, who disseminated his email campaign against the sportswear manufacturer, Nike, in the late 1990s (Chadwick, p. 292). As Nike’s website allows visitors to create custom shoes bearing a word or slogan, Peretti ordered a pair of shoes customized with the word “sweatshop” (Peretti, 2001). As Nike rejected his request, Peretti began to forward his entire email correspondence to a dozen of his friends, which developed through the Internet into a global citizen action within a few weeks19 (Couldry & Curran, 203; Peretti, 2001). Peretti (n.d.) identified this strategy as an innovative form of social movements, namely culture jamming:

Culture jamming is a strategy that turns corporate power against itself by co-opting, hacking, mocking, and re-contextualizing meanings. For people accustomed to traditional politics, culture jamming can seem confusing or even counter-productive…. I agree that the Nike Sweatshop action is immature, in

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19 Peretti’s email spread rapidly until it was estimated to reach fifteen million people around the globe (Peretti, 2001).
the sense that the intervention is antithetical to the old ideological rallying cries of the political movements of the 1960s and 70s. Culture jamming is a younger movement that celebrates the possibility of ironic, humorous and contradictory political actions (p. 2).

Commenting on the novelty of the culture jamming movement, Nick Couldry and James Curran (2003) have referred to its “liberation from ideology” (p. 32). They have argued that culture jamming enables communication with broader publics by deemphasizing ideological discourse. As culture jamming is laden with “memes” by using familiar ideas captured by popular cultural and commercial images, there is “less need for the education, indoctrination, or physical force that often accompanies the spread of ideologies” (p. 32). Thus, in a global age when many people share cross-cultural images and media products, a culture jamming comparatively free from ideology creates the potential for global activism crossing many social, cultural, and geographical boundaries. Couldry and Curran (2003) identified this form of communication as the “viral” or “swarm” communication model (p.33) that demonstrates a networked and distributed flow of information, unlike the old step flow model assuming information flow from elites to group members.

According to the final principle, digital networks build upon "sedimentary online networks," which "reviv[e] or reconfigur[e]…older organizations, in response to new demands or a perceived desire to shift focus to new issue areas" (Chadwick, p. 294). By this term, Chadwick has asserted that Internet activism can exist in the long term despite a lack of centralized control.

Some scholars have questioned the permanence of Internet enabled forms of political mobilization. But while levels and intensity undoubtedly fluctuate, of more importance in the long term are what we might call the “sedimentary” traces of high-profile events. These exist in the form of loose but integrated communication infrastructures and, despite the absence of obvious leaderships, seem to persist over time (p. 293).
Although the network forms social movement adopt lack centralized leadership, their "relatively autonomous but highly connected subunits" (p. 294) can reconfigure old networks over time. Chadwick has argued that MoveOn is an excellent example of a sedimentary network. As mentioned above, MoveOn has switched its campaign issues very quickly and effectively, as seen in its stealthy transitions among political petitioning, election campaigns, anti-war protests, tax and media reforms, and environmental issues. With neither fixed membership nor centralized leadership, it has undertaken repertoire switches from local to transnational, from political to environmental, and vice versa. What makes this flexibility possible? MoveOn's autonomous yet highly connected units and their distributed trust in the organization seem to provide fundamentals with the right grass-roots ingredients with which to remobilize supporters and reorganize its network power.

In sum, the digital network repertoire framework elucidates the ways in which the Internet has modified the political landscape by blurring distinctions between public and private, between online and offline, and between political parties, interest groups, and social movement organizations. The significance of this frame lies in its "convergent" insight in explaining new trends in social movements and political practices across different sectors previously been regarded as genuinely exclusive. In the next section, this study discusses whether and how the Chadwick’s model can be applied to non-western societies, focusing on the different historical background in which social movements have been developed and evolved.
Limitations of the Chadwick’s Assumptions

Chadwick’s frameworks of hybrid mobilization movements and digital network repertoires are rooted in the assumption that social movement organizations are more likely to adopt non-hierarchical network forms and decentralized leadership than are political parties or interest groups. In Chadwick’s framework, innovation is mainly supposed to emerge from social movements, which then reach and branch out to parties and interest groups (Chadwick, 2007):

Digital network repertoires, first developed during the social movement organizations involving online tactics in the 1990s and early 2000, are now being adopted by more staid interest groups as well as those involved in party election campaigns (p. 286).

Although Chadwick has identified a number of examples demonstrating organizational hybridity across all three organizational types, the examples all operate in one direction, from the innovation of the SMOs to the others groups' imitations. Chadwick asserted that SMOs tend to eschew hierarchy and prefer nonhierarchical and participatory decision-making "because they have usually been excluded from participation in mainstream channels or because they have deliberately sought to work outside the system to avoid co-option" (p. 285).

However, the nature of social movement organizations cannot be generalized beyond the historical context in which social movements have emerged and developed. Chadwick's studies have focused mainly on "the national context of the contemporary US" (2005, p.3) and his examples are mostly limited to the 2003-2004 U.S. presidential election campaigns, MoveOn, and some SMOs and interest groups based in the U.S. In societies outside the U.S., the distinctive features of SMOs may be different from those Chadwick has described. In terms of historical development, current status, and long-term and short-term political goals,
Korean SMOs may have organizational characteristics that are quite different from those in the US and western Europe. For example, Korean SMOs have occasionally held more influence, rather than political parties, over politics in South Korea’s contentious modern history (Kang, 2003; Kim, Sunhyuk, 2000). Meanwhile, Korean SMOs tended to develop their hierarchical organizational forms similar to the conventional structures of political parties, rather than the more horizontal, spatially diffused forms currently favored by progressive Western SMOs.

Most of the SMOs in Korea first emerged during a harsh period of military dictatorship when opposing parties, as well as ruling parties, were criticized for being mere puppets of the dictators. To successfully continue the struggle against authoritarian governments, Korean SMOs developed extremely hierarchical organizational forms as strictly structured as those of the forms of the underground revolutionary parties. Their decision-making depended largely on a small number of group leaders, rather than "the consensual and participatory discussions of members" of the SMOs Chadwick has examined. While the June Civil Uprising in 1987, by which procedural democracy was attained, has led Korean SMOs to dramatically changes their political goals, issues, and membership systems (Kim, 2000), their repertoires have not significantly changed from those that existed before 1987. If Chadwick (2007) is correct to argue that "repertoires reflect the organizational values" (p. 286), then Korean SMOs' hierarchies, centralized leadership, and top-down flow of information reflect the basic authoritarianism that continues to permeate Korea’s entrenched

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20 Since 1987, Korean oppositional activists have bifurcated into two groups: “Minjoong-undong[people’s movement]” groups and “Simin-undong[citizens’movement]” groups. The former consistently pursues class-liberation by focusing on hegemony struggles to prompt the rights of the working classes, while the latter, newly emerging after 1987, emphasizes general citizen’s demands arising from everyday living conditions (Kim, 2000).
organizational structures (Hah Sung-chang, 2006). Therefore, a variety of ways in which social movement organizations and other movement agents are interrelated and converge in a different social context need to be considered to enrich Chadwick’s frameworks.

In addition, Chadwick failed to clarify the extent to which the convergence of citizen action repertoires brings about the change of internal structures and the values of existing parties and SMOs. The case study of Howard Dean's campaign demonstrates a mix of two distinct collective action modes: the entrepreneurial and institutional, or the impersonal and personal (Chadwick, 2005, 2007; Flanagan et al., 2006). However, even if some parties adopt innovative SMO repertoires, this does not necessarily mean an "immediate and automatic" shift of the values they maintain and advance. A large number of Korean SMOs, which have adopted the Internet as a tool of mass mobilization and mass propaganda, still tend to conservatively maintain values established two decades ago (Hah, 2006; Kim Gibo, 2006). In other words, a new form can contain an old content just as easily, theoretically, as it can contain a new one. While organizational convergence and hybridization are commonly major trends in the Internet activism era, the degree of hybridization and organizational transformation may vary. It remains unclear what determines the degree of organizational hybridity and whether that hybridity results in mechanical combination in the short term or chemical cohesion in the long term. By exploring research questions regarding the Korean case, this study aims to expand and elaborate the Chadwick’s frames on Internet activism.
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The goals of this research are to examine how the Internet is utilized for civic action, determine the extent to which Internet-based activism is differentiated from traditional social movements, and investigate the ways in which the Internet affects movement repertoires and organizational forms of civic action. This study also aims to investigate whether Andrew Chadwick’s theoretical framework of organizational hybrid mobilization movement is applicable to cases in Korean civic action and how the major principles of digital network repertoires have been embodied in a Korean social context.

Regarding the first research purpose, the first research question is asked to illustrate historical background in which subversive applications of new media have been developed. To delineate the extent to which Internet activism is distinct from traditional movements, the second question is asked to probe two main social agents of Korean civic action—newly emergent netizens and preexisting SMOs. This study then goes to the discussion of digital movement repertoires and organizational forms of Korean civic action: that is the area of the third question. In addition, the last research question is asked to investigate theoretical applicability of Chadwick’s model to the Korean civic action.

The relevant research questions can be summarized as follows:

RQ1.
In what ways has new media technology been involved in oppositional social movements in Korea? (Korean Media and Social Movements)

- In what ways have mainstream media dominated society throughout Korean history?
- How has online journalism emerged and evolved in Korea?
- In what ways have new media been employed for social movements in Korea?
- In what ways did Internet activism appear and develop in the initial stage?
RQ2.
Who are the main social agents of Internet activism in Korea? (Netizens and Social Movement Organizations)

- Who are the main Internet users and what are their characteristics?
- In what ways have SMOs led civic action in Korea?
- In what ways have netizens appeared and proliferated in Korea?
- What were the organizational forms adopted by the SMOs and the netizen groups?
- What were the differences of leadership between the SMOs and netizen groups?
- What were the organizational values expressed in their organizational forms and movement repertoires?

RQ3.
What were the movement-repertoires employed in Korean Internet activism? (Digital Movement Repertoires)

- In what ways have online and offline civic action interacted and integrated?
- What forms of subcultural discourses had been used in the 2002 and 2007 cases?
- In what ways has online discourse been developed and spread?
- What was the significance of datgul and pumjil in online agenda-setting?
- To what extent were the netizens’ movement repertoires similar to or different from the SMOs’ repertoires?

RQ4.
What are the lessons and theoretical implications of the Korean case? (Theoretical Implications)

- What is the impact of Korean netizen movement on parties and SMOs?
- To what extent has organizational hybridity affected Korea’s political environment?
- What are the theoretical implications of the Korean case in terms of the hybrid mobilization movement model?
- What are the lessons of the Korean case in understanding the evolution of social movements in the new media age?

First, this study considers the historical and social background in which the Internet began to be appropriated for oppositional social movements in South Korea. It describes the media environment in the context of the struggles between radical and conservative media and explores the ways in which Korean progressives dominated the net in the initial stages of
digital communication, during the PC tongsin [Personal Computer Communication]\(^{21}\) era. Then, this study goes to a discussion of the formative period of Internet activism in the 1990s. From the constructions of online networks of progressive activists in the early 1990s to the 2000 Election-Defeat-Campaigns led by the solidarity of netizens and Korean SMOs, this research outlines how oppositional online networks have been evolved and how these online actions have influenced subsequent Internet activism thenceforth.

Second, this study describes the social agents of Internet activism in South Korea, focusing on civic actions led by SMOs and so-called netizen groups in Korea. Netizens do not exist as a single and homogenous category: rather, they are in Korea not only movement entrepreneurs and members of online communities for specific issue projects, but Internet users actively involved in citizen action, or even simply interested in public affairs. Despite diversity and hybridity in their attitudes and goals, netizens have been regarded as a group differentiated from parties, interest groups, and social movement organizations in Korea. While SMOs tend to spearhead organizational innovations and non-hierarchical communication networks in the US, as described by Chadwick (2005, 2007), "netizens" in Korea have been characterized as the agents primarily responsible for pivotally creating new trends in Korea’s social movements (Cho, 2008; Cho-Han, 2004; Han, 2007; Kim Gibo, 2006). Many progressive and radical netizens who are critical of—and not wishing to belong to—existing SMOs have staged a number of bottom-up projects on their own, some of which successfully set agendas and reformed policies (Kang, W.T., 2003; Hah, 2006; Oh, 2004b). This research scrutinizes who the netizens are and how distinct they stem from traditional activist groups including the

\(^{21}\) PC tongsin refers to computer-mediated networks prior to the worldwide web. It has many similarities with US-based usenet newsgroups in the 1990s.
SMOs in Korea. Specifically, this study focuses on the 386 generation and the post-386 generation, which have been referred to as Korea’s most activist netizen groups (Han, 2007; Oh, 2004b), examining how their political and cultural characteristics, both distinct and common, have shaped Korean Internet culture and Internet activism. In addition, this section highlights the different forms of leadership between institutionalized SMOs and netizen groups. By comparing and contrasting their mobilizing structure, leadership, and movement repertoires, this study offers a critical examination of the organizational values embedded in different organizational forms.

Third, this research moves on to a discussion of movement repertoires exhibited in civic actions in 2002 and 2007. Drawing on the concept of digital network repertoires addressed by Chadwick, this study examines the convergent forms of civic action, the fusion of subcultural and political discourses, and the construction of distributed trust among netizens in Korean Internet activism. In particular, this section describes how online and offline civic action have interacted and integrated, what forms of subcultural discourses have been used, and how online discourse has been developed and spread. This study pays special attention to the functions of “Datgul [reply]” and “Pumjil [copy&paste]” in incubating and spreading online public agendas.

Fourth is a discussion of the theoretical implications of the Korean case. This study describes the ways in which the netizens’ autonomous movement has affected existing political parties and SMOs. This research delineates how mutually three groups—netizens, political parties, and SMOs have interacted and how organizational hybridity has appeared. This study then discusses whether Chadwick’s model has theoretical validity in the Korean case. In addition, the lesson of the Korean case is delineated. This
study describes how Korean Internet activism reflects new trends of the evolution of social movements in the new media age.
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODS

This research employs multiple research methods, including qualitative framing analysis, in-depth interview, focus group interview, and quantitative research. Qualitative framing analysis is employed to analyze a variety of online posts—including words, graphics, cartoons, pictures, songs, and videos. In-depth interviews were conducted to understand the history of Korea’s Internet activism and the relationship between netizens and SMOs. The interviewees were with three key Korean activists: Kim Gibo (known as his virtual identity, Angma) who had led the netizen movement in candlelight vigils, Kim Gisk, a former executive director of a major SMO, and Oh Yeon-ho, the founder of OhmyNews. Focus group interviews with four groups (forty-one participants in total) are employed, focusing on netizens’ interactive communication and their experience of Internet activism. In addition, quantitative methods are used to describe text-forms and user-interactions.

Qualitative Framing Analysis

Qualitative Approach

In a broad sense, “qualitative research” means any type of research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or any other means of quantification (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), qualitative research is used in many areas, such as Marxism, ethnography, feminism, phenomenology, and cultural studies. Qualitative researchers use a variety of research methods, including semiotics, observation, interviews, narrative analysis, content analysis, and discourse
analysis (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). All of these research practices provide important insights and knowledge (Nelson et al., 1992) and no specific method or practice can be privileged over any other (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Accordingly, qualitative research usually requires a *bricolage technique* using a variety of materials and approaches *without* the plan in advance (Neuman, 2002, p. 147). This means that qualitative researchers must be able to combine diverse materials and methods flexibly.

Despite differences among specific methods, all types of qualitative research are rooted in the basic assumption that “objective reality” does not exist (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 5). While positivists argue that reality is a singular, a priori, objective truth, qualitative researchers contend that “realities are socially constructed by human beings in their expressive and interpretive practices” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 11). According to Lincoln and Guba (2000), the criteria for judging either reality or validity is not absolutist, but “derived from community consensus regarding what is real, what is useful, and what has meaning” (p. 167). This constructivist position assumes that “there are multiple realities, and an enquirer and respondents co-create understandings” (p. 21).

Qualitative research does not posit a researcher *outside* of the world. Instead, it identifies the researcher as the *instrument* of the research (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). That is to say, the researcher is a *passionate participant* in the social phenomena rather than a *disinterested observer* free from the world (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). Rather than dealing with many cases, qualitative researchers usually focus on examining a wide variety of aspects of one or of a few cases (Neuman, 2000). As Neumann (2000) noted, “rich detail and astute insight into the case” are preferred to “the statistical analysis of precise measures across a huge number of cases found in quantitative research” (p. 148). Along
with emphasis on the cases, qualitative researchers also place importance on social context for the understanding and the interpretation of social phenomena (Neuman, 2000). Qualitative researchers believe that the meaning of a social action or statement depends on the context in which it appears (Neuman, 2000, p. 146). In sum, qualitative researchers start from the assumption that there are multiple realities and that meanings can be interpreted only in the social context. The main goal of qualitative study is to describe how people attach meanings to events and to analyze events from multiple perspectives (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Neuman, 2000).

Framing Analysis

Framing analysis can reveal what the social actors of the movement intended, how they participated in the movement, and how they perceived the movement. Geertz (1973) provided a theoretical framework regarding culture and human life, arguing that “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun” (p. 5). This implies that culture is composed of meanings and that cultural analysis seeks to interpret those meanings, unlike experimental science, which seeks to find objective laws. Hall (1982) argued that all things in the real world do not have their own, integral, single and intrinsic meanings. With respect with media and journalism, these perspectives are in opposition to the behavioral and positivistic notion that journalists are agents who convey facts and truth. Media represent events and things rather than reflecting reality, and accordingly, signification is a social practice (Hall, 1982).

Regarding signification processes, Gregory Bateson (1955) first used the term “frame.” Based on the legacy of phenomenological tradition, he argued that individuals
can intentionally produce framing confusion in those with whom they are dealing.

Theorizing Bateson’s notion, Goffman (1974) proposed frame analysis as a new research method. He stated that frames reflect organizational principles that govern events and our subjective involvement in these events (Goffman, 1974, p. 10). He added that, through primary frameworks, people “locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences” (p. 21) although they are unaware of the frameworks (Goffman, 1974).

Since Goffman’s study, framing research has developed in two different directions: the psychological approach and sociological approach (Zhang, 2001). While the psychological framing approach focuses on how individuals interpret incoming information at the micro level, the sociological approach focuses on how media construct information in the process of news production at the macro level (Zhang, 2001). These two approaches coincide with the notions of audience frames and media frames respectively (Entman 1991). While Goffman (1974) demonstrated audience framing analysis from the psychological position, Entman (1991, 1993, 2004) and Gamson (1989; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) exhibited media framing analysis from the sociological perspectives. Entman pointed out that media frames create particular understanding about events, influencing the readers’ perceptions of the events. He argued that, through repetition, placement, and the reinforcement of associations, the frame renders one basic interpretation more readily discernible and memorable than others (Entman, 1993). He also emphasized two functions of framing, selection and salience:

(To frame is) to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (p.52).
Gamson (1989) emphasized the importance of the mass media’s role in sponsoring frames. He identified news as telling stories embedded in a frame, which organizes the stories, makes sense of relevant events and suggests what is at issue (Gamson, 1989). He also argued that, although a particular media frame may favor the interests of a particular organization, the motives can be unconscious. In analyzing the news coverage about nuclear power, Gamson & Modigliani (1989) contended that media discourse, which provides frames to the public, appears not as individual items but as interpretive packages (p. 2) that have the task of constructing meaning over time, incorporating new events into their interpretive frames (p. 4). Gamson and Modigliani (1989) asserted that each package is displayed with eight devices which provide rhetorical bridges to the informational content of news reports: *metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, visual images, roots, consequences* and *appeals to principle* (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, pp. 3-4).

Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss and Ghanem (1991) described a media frame as “a central organizing idea for news that supplies a context and suggest what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (p. 5). Gitlin (1979) argued that the media relay patterned images of reality through frame. He defined frames as “persistent patterns of cognition; interpretation; and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (Gitlin, 1979, p. 12). He argued that journalists frame news based on the assumptions about what is salient and what is not according to notions consistent with a dominant–or hegemonic–vision of society (Gitlin, 1980).

Framing through mainstream media generates a *reality effect* (Hall, 1982, p. 74). By structuralizing and historicizing the use of language in a particular way, the media
creates the notion of the taken-for-grantedness or so-called common sense. Hall (1982) referred to the naturalistic illusion constructed by the media (p. 76). He said that the images produced through media framing reproduce the actual trace of reality in the images they transmit which is the naturalistic illusion (Hall, 1982, pp.75-76).

Procedure

This study employed framing analysis to analyze online texts whose forms include words, graphics, cartoons, pictures, and songs. In particular, OhmyNews viewers’ reply board and the Sarang-hae café’s bulletin boards were selected for further investigation. On the first vigil day, on November 30, OhmyNews viewers left 1,410 replies about the news report “Candlelight vigil for Hyo-Sun and Mi-Soon; Ten thousand people gathered in Kwanghwamoon” (Kim, J. & Kwon-Park, H., Nov. 30, 2002). Because the posts show a variety of fiery debate at the first stage of the 2002 vigils, that day’s posts are examined for this research. Among the 1,410 postings, the top 100 postings, which were most recommended by other viewers, are selected and frame-analyzed. OhmyNews enables viewers to recommend useful replies to other viewers. In this case, top 100 replies are assumed to reflect public opinions on the net.

In analyzing online text on the Sarang-hae website, this study focused on the text posted on “Sharing Knowhow,” “My Experience” “Protest to the Government,” and “Member-Created-Images” sections, because those sections represented a variety of text forms or a diversity of participants’ voices. Though this study focuses on a specific period from 2002 to 2007, online texts produced before 2002 or after 2007 were used as research data in cases when they can verify research findings. In addition, transcripts of
focus-group interviews and in-depth interviews are investigated through framing analysis.

In-depth Interviews and Focus Group Interviews

Interviewing

Interviewing is one of the most frequently used research methods for data-gathering in social science (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004). Although interviews have been used since the 19th century, it was during the 1920s and 1930s that interviews began to be used as part of the case study method in the social science at the University of Chicago (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004, p. 521). After World War II, interviews for the quantifiable closed-ended question survey became more common; However, qualitative interviewing has also developed as a key method, particularly in anthropology, and is being used today in all the social sciences (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004). The purpose of qualitative interviews with open-ended questions is “to obtain descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena” (Kvale, 1996, pp. 5-6).

The two main types of interviews are in-depth interviews and focus group interviews. While in-depth interviews emphasize the conversation with researchers and respondents, focus group interviews place importance on the group interaction of a specific topic (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002).

Procedure

Both in-depth and focus group interviews were used for this research. For focus group interviews, four groups (forty-one participants in total) were selected. Three groups had been active Internet users, most of whom were OhmyNews citizen-reporters or active
members of online communities. The first group was made up of eight interviewees, while the second group was made of twelve and the third nine. The other group was composed of twelve college students enrolled in a journalism course at Inchon University, Korea, as of June, 2006. Before the focus group interviews, a moderator introduced what questions would be given in general, and all the discussion processes were audio-recorded. Mainly, the interview questions focus on: the participants’ experiences of interactive communication on the net; their participation in civic action; their opinions of online-and-offline relationships; and their perceptions of the significance of Internet activism. Main questions were:

Interactive communication on the Internet
- Have you ever interacted with, shared any idea with, and argued against another netizen?
- Have you ever faced any supportive or objectionable replies or opinions for your post? How did you feel in each case?
- How did you feel when you were supported or criticized by other Internet users?

Political participation and the Internet
- Have you ever participated in political civic actions, such as demonstrations, petitions, political campaigns, etc.?
- Did your online activities affect any of your offline political actions?

Online progressive media and civic action
- How do you think about the mass media?
- How do you think about citizen participatory media, such as OhmyNews?
- Do you think citizens’ online communications have affected the mass media?
- Do you think your online communication can affect the political environment? Why do you think so?

Democracy and online civic action
- Do you think online discussion contributes to the development of democracy in society?
- What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of online discussion in relation to democracy?
In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with current key Korean internet activists: Kim Gibo (ID: Angma), who was an active member of progressive online communities from the 1990s, and who led a group of netizens in the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations; Oh Yeon-ho, the founder of the Korea-based online participatory news carrier OhmyNews; and Kim Gisik, a former executive director of PSPD (the biggest SMO in Korea). Answering open-ended questions, the interviewees delivered highly detailed information, including ideas about the history of online communication in its initial stages, the development of Korean online journalism, the relationship between netizens and SMOs, and the interrelations between Internet activism and democracy. The interviewees were conducted individually; follow-up interviews were conducted when necessary. Five interview meetings were held for twelve hours total. These interviews were audio-recorded, too. All the interviews were conducted in Korean and their scripts were translated into English after framing analysis.
CHAPTER 6: MEDIA AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: 1960s to 1990s

The progressive appropriation of the Internet in Korea has developed along with Korea’s democratization movement. This first finding chapter describes the historical and social background of Korea’s media environment, beginning with an overview of the media history during the authoritarian period before the June Civil Uprising in 1987, by which procedural democracy was attained. Under the previous military regimes, Kwanje Ullon\(^\text{22}\) (government-mouthpiece-media) had predominant status in the media market, while Minju Ullon (democratic media) had to struggle, effectively or not, against military control. This chapter then moves on to the history and development of media during the post-democratization period that followed 1987, in which coercive domination by military regimes turned into hegemonic domination mainly at the hands of commercial media and capital. In addition, the chapter introduces the history of online journalism in Korea, charting the five historical stages through which online journalism has emerged, evolved, and become commercialized. This study moves onto a discussion of the formative period of Internet activism in the 1990s. From the foundation of Bar-Tong-Mo (Barun-Tongsing-ul-wihan-moim [Meetings for good communications]) in 1990, to the subsequent constructions of online networks of progressive activists in the early 1990s, such as Jinbo-Net [Progress-Net], to the 2000 Election-Defeat-Movement led by the coalition of Korean SMOs, this research outlines how oppositional online networks and civic action have evolved and influenced the Internet activisms of the present day.

\(^{22}\) Directly translated, Kwanje Ullon means “government-made media” or “government-propaganda media.”
Media in the Authoritarian Period (1961-1987)

Until the Civic Uprising of June 1987\textsuperscript{23}, Korea existed under a dictatorship for four decades, following the establishment of the first republic in 1948. As the Korean government retained absolute authority over civil society, Korea’s mass media were subject to complete supervision and censorship by the government. From the early 1960s to the late 1980s—an authoritarian period ruled by military regimes—5,215 journalists were dismissed from their jobs for political reasons (Park Kisun, 1994, p. 56). The political pressure on media and journalists came to a head during the era of President Chun Doo Hwan, who had seized power by military coup d'état in December 1979, and who had maintained power through the Kwangju Massacre\textsuperscript{24} of May 1980, which suppressed the nationwide democratization movement of 1980.

The Chun regime used the carrot and the stick approach to domesticate media owners and professional journalists alike. On the one hand, Chun’s government administrated a policy that restructured Korea’s media industry through government-led mergers in August 1980, a few months after the Kwangju Massacre. In the name of “Social-Purification Campaigns [Sahue-Junghwa Undong],” sixteen news media institutions were compulsorily closed, 172 periodicals were banned, and 870 journalists were ejected from their jobs (Yang 1999). In addition, in December 1980 Chun’s regime enacted the “Basic Press Act [Ullon-

\textsuperscript{23} There were hundreds of public gatherings, street demonstrations, and signature-collection campaigns in 1986 and 1987, ultimately culminating in the June Uprising of 1987. In June 1987 alone, millions of Koreans participated in these pro-democracy protest campaigns, forcing Chun Doo Hwan’s administration to adopt some of the people’s demands, including direct voting for presidential elections and the expansion of press freedom (Kim, Sunhyuk, 2000).

\textsuperscript{24} When President Park Chung Hee was assassinated by Kim Jae Kyu, director of the Korean CIA, in October 1979, many people called for a transition from military dictatorship to liberal civilian government. The pro-democratization protests were nationwide. However, General Chun Doo Hwan carried out a military coup d'état, and violently suppressed pro-democracy protestors in Kwangju in May 1980, in which hundreds of civilians were killed and went missing.
kibonbop],” a sophisticated and comprehensive system of press censorship (Kim Sunhyuk, 2000; Yang, 1999), and covertly issued daily press guidelines, or “Bodo Jichim [Press instruction],” that defined what should and should not be reported.

On the other hand, the government privileged a few media companies, allowing them to monopolize the Korean media market (Park Kisun, 1994). Deriving great benefits from compulsory mergers and administrative preferences offered by the government, the big three newspapers—Chosun-Ilbo, JoongAng-Ilbo, and DongA-Ilbo—expanded their market share, up to seventy percent in total (Rhee, 2003). Most notably, Chosun enjoyed a 400 percent increase in its annual total sales between 1980 and 1987 (Park, 1994) and continued to rank at the top of the Korean newspaper market afterward. Accordingly, some select journalists’ socio-economic status was remarkably improved, and journalists working for mainstream media subsequently emerged to take places among the nation’s power elite. The establishment of a public fund by Chun’s regime also helped journalists rise to the status of a privileged class in Korea (Joo, 2003).

Acting as mouthpieces of the regime, a few major newspapers took advantage of their exclusive government ties and were engaged in symbiotic relations with the military regime (Park, 1994; Yang, 2000). People called these privileged media “Kwanje Ullon [government-mouthpiece media],” which came to represent an extremely right-wing ideology that embraced aggressive anti-communism, anti-labor policies, and pro-Americanism. The big three, popularly abbreviated as “Cho-Joong-Dong,” have been indisputably representative of the right-wing Kwanje Ullon tendency. Meanwhile, radical activists, along with some of the

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25 Ilbo means "daily newspapers" in Chinese characters.
26 The Korea Broadcasting Advertising Corporation was founded in 1981. Its profits were used to financially support journalists and journalism institutions.
27 Many members of the extreme right wing argue that South Korea must conduct a war to overthrow North Korea.
dismissed journalists, began devoting themselves to the establishment of “Minju Ullon” [democratic media] during the “dark age” of the military regimes (Joo, 2003; Yang, 1999). Minju Ullon refers not merely to a general sense of liberality but more specifically to radical underground media that challenged the military regimes’ autocracy and disseminated news and information prohibited by the Bodo Jichim. The unregistered monthly magazine “Mal [Speaking],” published by a group of blacklisted journalists, exemplifies the Minju Ullon movement in the 1980s; it challenged the government’s control over the press by publicly disclosing the texts of Bodo Jichim instructions, which had been confidentially delivered to the editorial boards of news media institutions everyday. The Minju Ullon movement, many of whose journalist members had been arrested and imprisoned during the Chun period, represented a radically progressive trend that sought human rights, labor rights, and the peaceful reunification of North and South Koreas.

Media in the Post-Democratization Period (1987–)

The June Uprising of 1987 marked a historical turning point that witnessed Korea’s nascent transition toward democratic rule. Among Asian countries which experienced democratic transitions in recent decades, Korea is the first country to peacefully transfer power to an opposition party (Shin, 1999). After the Uprising, by which procedural democracy was increased (Kim Gisik, 2006), the military regime promised the abolishment of the Basic Press Act, thereby declaring freedom of the press. As civil liberties have been noticeably expanded since, over twenty thousand non-government organizations (NGOs) have newly emerged (Kim & Kim, 2005). Meanwhile, media activists and dismissed journalists engaged in the democratization movement formed Hankyoreh Sinmun [One
Nation newspaper] in May 1988. *Hankyoreh* is an independent daily newspaper owned by about 62,000 citizen shareholders, none of whom holds more than 1 percent of the total share. *Hankyoreh* has defined itself as “a progressive newspaper, decisively committed to journalistic freedom, democracy, peaceful coexistence and national reconciliation between South and North Korea” (Hankyoreh, 2008).

In addition, labor unions of journalists and media workers were organized in fifteen press and broadcast companies as of November 1988, an activist effort that sought social justice and independence from political censorship. While pressure from media owners beginning in the 1990s has caused the decline of the labor unions of many privately-owned newspapers, including Cho-Joong-Dong, some unions of public or semi-public broadcast companies, such as KBS (Korean Broadcast Station) and MBC (Munhwa Broadcast Corporation), have maintained a relative journalistic freedom and autonomy over their media productions. Sharp increases in investigative reporting and radical, activist TV documentary production was noticeable in this period. In particular, MBC, whose Kwangju branch had been attacked and fired upon in 1980 by demonstrating civilians antipathetic to MBC’s working as Kwanje-Ullon, held several strikes and street demonstrations for media freedom, during which critical reports were banned and producers fired. These strikes and protest won popular citizen support, prompting the powers-that-be to rehire the fired producers.

Despite the achievements of procedural democracy, however, the collapse of Korean authoritarianism did not mean the inauguration of unfettered media freedoms (Kang, 1998). The civilian government established after the June Uprising was, in fact, “cunning and sophisticated in its ability to manipulate the symbols of democracy” (Kang, 1998, p. 111).

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28 KBS is a government-owned station while MBC is owned and managed by a non-profit organization, Foundation for Broadcast Culture, established in 1988 after the June Civil Uprising.
The true change was merely a shift from “coercive” domination by military dictatorship to “hegemonic”\textsuperscript{29} governance by the civilian government. As Gitlin (1972) has argued, the mass media play a central role in the production and the distribution of a ruling class’ hegemony, wherein the media become “primary centers of capitalist enterprise, primary pipelines for capitalist values, (and) primary weapons of social control” by representing the dominant hegemony as a universal law (Gitlin, 1972, p. 363). It was precisely the civilian government’s exploitation of mass media as uncritical tools of capitalist propaganda that rendered the rise of Korean democracy less than truly revolutionary.

As the Basic Press Act was abolished and government controls over the media were, remarkably, abandoned, Korean media took greater advantage of the fruits of democratization than did any other social sector, as Yang Seung-Mock (2000) has argued. The majority of Koreans believed that media influence was increasing most under the civilian government, even though the media, particularly Kwanje Ullon, had not explicitly supported the democratization movement (Yang, 2000). The big three newspapers, including Cho-Joong-Dong, which had been called “Kwanje Ullon” under the dictatorship, actually witnessed an increase in their political influence under the civilian government by strengthening their political and economic ties with big Korean conglomerates such as Samsung, Hundai, and LG. As one critic has argued, “The Korean press has become a Frankenstein that creates a political power and exerts uncontrolled power arbitrarily” (Lee, Hyo-Sung., 1993). Comprising 70 percent of the newspaper market share, Cho-Joong-Dong

\textsuperscript{29}Gramsci (2001) has argued that a ruling class dominates subordinate classes not only by coercion but also by hegemony. According to Gitlin (1980), hegemony is the elaboration and penetration of ideology into the subordinate classes’ common sense and everyday practice (p. 253). Compared to the concept of coercion, hegemony is tantamount to “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gramsci, 2001, p. 44) that offers the “consensual basis of an existing political system within civil society” (Adamson, 1980, p.170).
ultimately emerged as “king-makers” in presidential elections (Lee, Keehyung, 2005, p. 11), and the owner of Chosun was called “the president in the shadow.” Media reformists and critical readers came to stage an “Anti-Chosun” movement in the mid 1990s, criticizing Chosun for its biased reporting and right-wing propaganda. The anti-Chosun movement, whose best-known slogan is “don’t write for and read Chosun,” is in effect a protest not only against Chosun but the “big three” that perpetuate a dominant hegemony throughout Korea.

**History of Korean Online Journalism:**
**Emergence, Evolution, & Commercialization**

While Cho-Joong-Dong, three right-wing conservative newspapers, still played a pivotal role in agenda-setting despite the ambitious challenge of Hankyoreh, new media began to rapidly spread throughout the nation, particularly among the younger generation. “PC tongsin” (PC communication), computer-mediated networks that existed prior to the Internet in Korea, first emerged in the late 1980s. Chollian, owned by Dacum, launched its bulletin board service in 1985, followed by Ketel (predecessor of Hitel and now Paran) in 1986 and Naunuri in 1994. Though the number of PC tongsin users as of 1990 was no more than one hundred thousand, most online participants, composed mainly of student activists and progressive white-collar workers, enthusiastically discussed pressing issues and shared information to bring about media reform and social change (Kim Gibo, 2003). The users in this initial period shaped some basic patterns in Korea’s Internet culture: the popular usage of bulletin boards, the prevalence of “datgul [reply or response]” to others postings, and politically and culturally radical tendencies. Although those online communities did not have their own online news outlets, the radical or progressive community members formed a critical audience for online journalism in the early Internet era.
From the mid-1990s, the Internet began to see a rise in popularity. Drawing on John Pavlik’s (1994) framework of three evolutionary stages of online journalism, Oh Yeonho (2004a), the founder of OhmyNews (www.ohmynews.com), a citizen-participatory news website in Korea, has suggested five historical stages in Korean online journalism. The five stages are characterized respectively as: (1) emergence, (2) progressives’ experimentations, (3) explosive expansion, (4) sharp competition, and (5) the boom of portal news (Table 4).

Table 4. Five Historical Stages in Korean Online Journalism*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1: Emergence</td>
<td>1995-1998</td>
<td>The emergence of online news derived from print content.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2: Progressives’ Experimentations</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>The emergence of online-only news representing radical activist views.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3: Explosive expansion</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td>Explosively increasing online-only news.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4: Sharp competition</td>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Sharp competition between mainstream and independent news sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 5: Boom of portal news</td>
<td>2003-present</td>
<td>Growth of portal-affiliated online news.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Media Outlets | JoongAng, Chosun, Hankyreh, DongA onlines | Danzi-ilbo, Daejabo | Money Today OhmyNews Inews24, Edaily, Ebnews, etc. | Media Daum Nocut news Cookey news |

*Revised model of Oh Yeonho’s (2004a) framework

The emergence of online journals repackaging content from regular print news characterizes the first stage, as it occurred from 1995 to 1998. The world’s first online news website was published by The Chicago Tribune in 1992 (Oh, 2004a). Three years later, JoongAng launched its first online news service, in March 1995. Before long, Chosun began

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30 John V. Pavlik (1994) has suggested seeing the evolution of online journalism in three stages. In stage one, online journalists mostly repurpose content from their regular print sources. In stage two, journalists create original content and augment it with hyperlinks, search engines, or other enhancements. In stage three, journalists create original news content designed specifically for the web (p. 36).
its online service, in November 1995, while *Hankyoreh* followed suit in April 1996, and then *DongA* in June 1996. In accordance with Pavlik’s (1997) definition of the first stage, most online content at this time was derived from print news, rarely using multimedia such as films, videos, or audio clips.

The second stage was marked by the emergence of specifically and exclusively online news websites in 1998 to 1999. Identifying itself as a radical, alternative media for the Anti-*Chosun* movement, the independent news site *Danzi-ilbo* (www.ddanzi.com) was established in July 1998. Produced by a few non-professionals, *Danzi-ilbo* updated itself biweekly and became known for its parodies of *Chosun*’s news stories and challenges to its biased, right-wing perspectives. Before long, *Danzi* became tremendously popular among critics of *Chosun* and dominant mainstream media, and the number of its website visitors reached ten million in its first year (Oh, 2004a, p. 87). Meanwhile, *Daejabo* (www.jabo.co.kr), an independent online news service, was launched in January 1999 by radical media activists who had led critical discussion on the PC tongsin of *Naunuri* and *Hitel* (*Daejabo*, 2008). *Daejabo* declared its aim “to become an online progressive medium to lead political, social, and media reforms and to network progressives seeking freedom from capital and dominant hegemony” (Oh, 2004a). The emergence of *Danzi* and *Daejabo* implies that the early users of online-only news were mainly progressive youths critical of mainstream media and dominant hegemony.

During the third stage, which also saw a boom in IT venture companies, the number of online-only news websites exploded, with *Money Today* (www.moneytoday.co.kr), *Inews24* (www.inews24.com), *Edaily* (www.edaily.co.kr) and *EBnews* (www.ebnews.co.kr) following each other in quick succession. While *Danzi* and *Daejabo*, during the previous
stage, were founded by non-professional journalists and activists, these online news websites in the third stage were mainly founded by business-oriented, former professional journalists, most of whom had worked for major newspaper companies, but who understood how to maximize the Internet’s interactive forms and multimedia capabilities, thereby differentiating online news from traditional newspapers (Oh, 2004a).

In addition, a great deal of progressive Internet news services appeared during the third stage: the citizen-participatory news website OhmyNews began its service in February 2000, and Issue Today (www.issuetoday.com) was launched by critical intellectuals and professors in March 2000. Voice of People (www.voiceofpeople.org), an oppositional social movement group, opened an Internet news website and video streaming in 2001, and Pressian (www.pressian.com) began to provide investigative reporting and features in the same year. Of these emergent Internet news carriers, OhmyNews was a particularly successful example. Oh Yeon-ho, the founder and CEO of OhmyNews, had been involved in the student movement in the 1980s, and had worked for the independent monthly magazine Mal [Speaking], published in opposition to the Chun’s regime. Oh expected that the founding of OhmyNews would create an opening for a “news-guerrilla movement” (Oh, 2004b). As of July 2006, 41,392 citizen-reporters—who registered themselves as volunteer news-guerrillas for OhmyNews—played a vital role in the site’s news production, contributing news articles, photos, and videos in a spirit of grassroots civic journalism. In 2000, shortly after it was launched, OhmyNews was ranked the 10th most influential news service in Korea, and subsequently became the 8th in 2001 and the 6th in 2005 (OhmyNews. Oct. 16, 2005).

As independent online-only news websites strengthened their roles in agenda-setting, mainstream media also began to adopt multimedia more aggressively into their online news
strategies. Sharp competition between independent online news and mainstream online news characterizes the fourth stage, which arose from 2002 to 2003. DongA and Chosun newly established departments of Internet news and strengthened online-offline cooperation among reporters and editors (Oh, 2004). In 2002, Chosun also began to offer readers’ bulletin boards, allowing the public to post their opinions of and responses to its news stories—a service OhmyNews had first offered in 2000. Despite mainstream media’s aggressive pursuit of experimental online-only media, however, online journalism during this stage was led mainly by independent, progressive online news sources, especially OhmyNews, Pressian, and Seoprise (www.seoprise.com), whose culminating influence was seen in the candlelight demonstrations and the presidential election of 2002.

Marked by the expansion of Internet commercialization that had occurred since the 2002 Presidential Election, the fifth stage witnessed the tremendous growth of online news providers affiliated with Korea’s portal sites, such as Yahoo Korea (kr.yahoo.com), Naver (www.naver.com), and Daum (www.daum.net). One of the leading portal sites in Korea, Daum (www.daum.net), launched “Media Daum” in March 2003, an enterprise consisting of twenty-five employees, including ten professional reporters. Portal sites began to provide their own news stories as well as news produced by other media institutions. While the portal sites have increased their influence in agenda-setting by editing main news sections on portals’ front pages, many progressive and radical independent news websites have faced financial difficulties and identity problems which have threatened their influence redundant.

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31 On March 2005 when a photo contents of government-offered lunch boxes for children in low income families were exposed in the Naver news section, the news caused a great sensation in the nation. As many people criticized the government for providing such poor meals for children, the government officials in charge of the free lunch project were disciplined and the Minister of Social Welfare announced improvement plans for the lunch project. This case exemplifies agenda-setting by portal sites.

32 For example, OhmyNews and Seoprise, which supported Roh Moo Hyun in the 2002 election, have been criticized for their pro-government and pro-Roh tendencies during the Roh period (2202-2007). Some
Concerned about the expansion of commercial portal sites’ on the Internet, some critics argued that such sites might lead to the rise in sensationalism and soft news (Cho Yunki, 2008).

It remains, however, controversial to claim that the boom in portal news services has effected a deterioration in online journalism. For instance, the remarks of some Korean college students who participated in focus group interviews for this study described their Internet use patterns regarding portal sites: (Lee, 2003)

A: In fact, many people use the portal news service not because they prefer a specific portal site but because they set it as a default page. Not only I, but most users my age, might access the Internet for no specific purpose. Habitually, I open the Internet window and see the portal news because it is there.
B: I didn’t remember how I made Naver my default.
C: I like the portal news, as it offers news from a variety of sources. I’d like to see multiple news sources at once.
A: It’s like a decision to drink either Coke or Pepsi. I don’t care what is my default. I could go beyond the default portal site and explore site to site to compare news.

These young users ultimately asserted that they can verify information by using multiple sources not passively determined by the information given by portal sites.

Meanwhile, many portal sites have adapted themselves to the taste of young Internet users, who prefer actively debating online current social, political, cultural issues. For example, Daum developed the “Agora” section, in which any users can suggest specific issues to discuss and express their own opinions. Some popular postings from Agora have been exhibited on Daum’s feature story board by the Daum editorial board. In addition, audiences’ are allowed to publicly reply on most portal sites. These interactive sections were provided with a benchmarking strategy inspired by some progressive online-only news carriers, including OhmyNews.

critics argued that this pro-Roh tendency might have hampered their original commitments to critiquing authority and checking political power.
In short, some key phenomena found in the history of Korean online journalism can be summarized as follows. First, online oppositional independent media have led to innovations in Korean journalism. Some progressive and oppositional media, such as Danzi, Daejabo, and OhmyNews, developed interactive and participatory forms of online news production whose unlimited length of serial reportage and satirical and parodic styles of news writing became basic trends in contemporary Korean online news. Second, these online independent media have exerted tremendous impact on other existing media. Inspired by the experimental news reporting and editing styles of the online-only news carriers, preexisting mainstream media began to adopt and adapt these innovative and participatory forms to their online news sites by establishing bulletin boards and allowing audience and user replies. Third, radical youth emerged as one of the major agenda-setting groups in Korea, constructing their own networks to share, produce, and disseminate information independently from (or in opposition to) the mainstream big three newspapers. Not only as a consumer of online news but as a content-producer of online news, young users effectively utilized online communities, bulletin boards, and reply sections to deliver, disseminate, and shape their own news.

Internet Activism in the Formative Period

The Foundation of Bar-Tong-Mo

The first indication of Internet activism in Korea is found in the appearance of an online network, “Bar-Tong-Mo” (Barun-Tongsing-ul-wihan-moim [The meetings for good communications]) in 1990. In the PC tongsin era, one of the online network service providers, Ketel, was repackaging news data from only two news outlets: Nae-Ue-Tongin, an
extremely-right-wing news carrier supported by the Korean Intelligence Service, and *Maeil-Kyungjae*, an economic news outlet. Some progressive Ketel users demanded that it extend news services to include *Hankyoreh-Sinmun*, by which they could access more politically progressive news and information. When their demand was refused by Ketel administrators, these Ketel users initiated an autonomous campaign to copy and post *Hankyoreh* news reports on the Ketel site by themselves (Min, 2002). Some activist participants involved in this campaign soon agreed to found their own network for progressive reform of cyberspace. On November 1990, about two hundred Ketel users declared the foundation of Bar-Tong-Mo, whose mission statement announced:

> Bar-Tong-Mo is an association of independent online users gathered to solve the problems in cyberspace…Based on a culture of right-thinking communication, we, the members of Bar-Tong-Mo, aim to develop our knowledge and information about society and technology. We will also strive to solve the problems of cyberspace by proposing democratic alternatives and solutions. We will construct spaces open to everybody to expand the democratic power of online communicators (Min, p. 102).  

Before long, Bar-Tong-Mo became a hub of progressive activists online. On the one hand, it embarked on the “consumer movement” to improve online service of IT companies and extend freedom of expression. It successfully directed, for instance, the protest against the unexpected suspension of network services for the “Hitel (renamed from Ketel) User Association,” organized online struggles opposing Ketel’s arbitrary deletion of users’ postings, and allied demonstrations to reject online censorship (Choi, 2006; Min, 2002). On the other hand, Bar-Tong-Mo also promoted “progressive social movements,” mobilizing support for political campaigns and petitions online and offline. In the presidential election of 1992, it dispatched its members to ballot-counting offices to monitor the counting processes

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33 Translated by the author
and prevent the rigged election some had anticipated. The ballot-counting processes were reported online in real time, and were compared with government reports by election management officials. In 1995, Bar-tong-Mo also led the first online signature-collection campaign to enact the law that would punish the principals of the Kwangju Massacre, the two former Presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae-woo.

One of the most notable changes Bar-Tong-Mo activated was the adoption of innovative styles of communication. Horizontal discussion and decision-making facilitated through open online chatting among members were primary rules that managed the organization. The decisions made through these processes were quickly disseminated to other websites and online communities by members’ autonomous “pumjil” [copy-and-paste]. The unconventional forms of communication Bar-Tong-Mo first advanced include the usage of “Nim,” an honorific suffix, in addressing the online parties with whom one is communicating. In a Korean society where honorific expressions have been traditionally reserved for respected elders, the designation of online acquaintances with Nim—regardless of age, gender, and social status—was a revolutionary action, promoting unconventionally horizontal relationships among all online users. Respect for oppositional opinions, usage of no more than one ID, and appropriate citation of sources of information copied from other sites were recommended as “netiquette” (net etiquette). One of the active users of PC-tongsin has emphasized the impact of Bar-Tong-Mo’s proposed netiquette on the creation of Korea’s non-hierarchical and democratic Internet culture:

The communication rules were so appealing. Regardless of age, gender, and social status, it was recommended to use honorific expressions for the other party and to equally add “nim” after the others’ IDs in addressing them. Based on the equal status achieved in this way, I could have very serious and deliberate discussions, even including my personal matters, with other members I met online. I used to meet many members offline after getting
familiar with them online. Pumjil—copy and paste—was not prohibited, but rather recommended for disseminating online agendas; however, citation of the information sources was strongly urged. To take responsibility for consistent and reliable discussions, using double IDs was prohibited. I was also encouraged to use only “ordinary people’s words,” not activists’ slang like hegemony, ideology, or propaganda. I’ve learned a lot in this initial stage of Internet activism (Kim Gibo, 2006).

While netiquette campaigns suggested by USENET in the U.S. merely tended to focus on effective and responsible ways of communication, such as avoiding cross-postings or using electronic signatures, the Korean netiquette proposed by Bar-Tong-Mo tended to stress horizontal and non-authoritarian ways of communications among online participants.

It is also notable that the activist PC tongsin members were asked to avoid specialist, elitist, leftist, and/or Marxist jargon that had been frequently used among activist groups. In those days, radical or progressive activists were collectively called “Un-dong-kwon [an activist circle],” which might give the impression of exclusivity and self-centeredness. Some terms of critical social science—including mass, hegemony, propaganda, and anti-these—as well as some abbreviated words—like PD (people’s democracy) or NL (national liberation)34—became signifiers of whether the speaker was Un-dong-kwon, and even of what ideological faction he or she belonged to (Kim Gibo, 2006). Aiming to share open discussions with anybody who might have different opinions—whether Un-dong-kwon or a layperson, PD or NL—the online community members agreed to restrict the use of factionalist language.

In addition, Bar-Tong-Mo introduced a variety of virtual struggles, of which tactics subsequently became popular in online Korean activism. Inspired by the Blue Ribbon

34 PD and NL represented two different activist groups: the PD group emphasized class liberation based on a Leninist revolutionary model, while the NL group stressed national liberation inspired by North Korea’s model.
Campaign\textsuperscript{35} for online free speech in the U.S., Bar-Tong-Mo first proposed the display of an iconographic black (or white) ribbon (▶ ◀) to symbolize mourning, condolence, or the death of democracy in a 1994 joint protest against online censorship (Choi, 2006; Min, 2002). Since then, placing a black ribbon at the head of online postings has become a very popular repertoire of civic action, as shown in the 2004 Anti-Presidential-Impeachment Protest (Figure 2). In addition, online signature collection campaigns and online sit-ins exemplify novel forms of movement repertoires inaugurated mainly by Bar-Tong-Mo.

Figure 2. Black Ribbons in MS Messenger in 2004

\textsuperscript{35} The Blue Ribbon Campaign was suggested by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) in the U.S. in 1996. EEF had asked all web users to display blue ribbon graphics on their servers to show support for freedom of expression, which was then threatened by the passage of the Telecommunication Act.
**Activists’ Online Networks**

Bar-Tong-Mo allowed online activist communities to flourish expeditiously in the early and mid 1990s. Following Bar-Tong-Mo on the Ketel (Hitel) site, many communities, such as Hyn-Chul-Yeon (Hyndai-Chulhak-Donghohwe [Modern Philosophy Forum]) on Chollian and Chan-Woo-Mul [Cold Springs] on Naunuri, were established, pursuing progressive social reform and online freedom of speech (Table 5).

Table 5. Online Activist Communities in the 1990s*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network Server</th>
<th>Online communities</th>
<th>Political orientations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hitel (formerly Ketel)</td>
<td>Bar-Tong-Mo [Meetings for good communications]</td>
<td>Social reform, Speech freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tonghap-K wahak [Integrated Science]</td>
<td>Progressive usage of IT science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chollian</td>
<td>Hyun-Chul-Yeon [Modern Philosophy Forum]</td>
<td>Radical social reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hee-Mang-Ter [Places of Hope]</td>
<td>Moderate social change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naunuri</td>
<td>Chan-Woo-Mul [Cold Springs]</td>
<td>Moderate social change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jinbo-Chungnyun-Donghohwe [Progressive Youths]</td>
<td>Radical social reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mae-Ah-Ri [Echo]</td>
<td>Moderate social reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These online communities were mainly composed of student activists, or former student activists, in their twenties or early thirties. While most communities pursue progressive social change, their ideological orientation was in a wide range. Some of the community members were very critical of “institutionalized and hierarchical” student movement organizations. A former member of Chan-Woo-Mul [Cold Springs] on Naunuri recalled:

…(b)ecause I didn’t have to reveal my real identity, I could share my honest opinions with other members of Chan-Woo-Mul. For instance, I could say, “Honestly, I don’t like the student association at my college,” and ask somebody in the community to advise me. I could more comfortably expose my raw ideas critical of extant student activism, which I could never share with
my peers and seniors at my college’s student organization…I could find many colleagues online, who had similarly critical opinions about the student movement in those days. We dreamed of a more democratic, anti-authoritarian, open-minded society (Kim Gibo, 2006).

Although the number of online participants was merely less than one million until 1995, these incipient forms of activist online networks were precursors that indicated the emergence of Internet activism stemming from preexisting social movements. Criticizing the authoritarianism of existing activist organizations and dreaming of alternative reform projects, these online communities maintained their enthusiasm for social reform. They were involved in online and offline protests against the Uruguay Round and participated in street demonstrations to support the labor movement (Kim Gibo, 2006). As these communities expanded along with an increase of online network users, six members of Hee-Mang-Ter and Hyun-Chul-Yeon were arrested for violating the National Security Law in 1993 and 1994. To protest their arrests, the activist online communities determinedly established the “Civic Solidarity for Anti-Online-Censorship Protest,” which transformed into Min-Tong-Hyup [The PC-tongsin Committee for Democratic Communications], and subsequently evolved into Jinbo-Net [Progress Net].

Meanwhile, as the Internet’s popularity soared in late 1990s, preexisting SMOs—including college student associations, labor unions, and civic activism organizations—rushed to adopt new media technologies for resource mobilization. Many SMOs began to create “Closed User Groups (CUGs)” for sharing information with their members, and launched homepages for effective promotion of citizens’ participation. According to a survey conducted by an SMO, Civic Action All Together (www.action.or.kr), 81.0 percent of Korean SMOs had their own homepages as of 2000; the major purposes of the homepages
include PR (63.8%), information sharing (14.9%), and communication among members (10.6%). To support these SMOs and promote civic engagement in the new media age, Jinbo-Net was launched in 1998, with the voluntary participation of highly computer-literate activist technicians. Identifying itself as a network providing oppositional and progressive SMOs with an integrated infrastructure and database systems, Jinbo-Net declared its mission thusly:

- We aim to construct social solidarity within a variety of sectors of SMOs, as well as between SMOs and citizens, by revitalizing communication in the midst of the information age.
- We dedicate ourselves to help progressive SMOs to solve the technical problems SMOs may encounter in utilizing online networks for the purpose of social change.
- We strive to create an integrated network of information sources provided or produced by each SMO and activist group.
- We recognize the necessity of an information network independent from state and capital, and struggle to achieve such an independent network. (www.jinbo.net)

In sum, there were two major agents of the formative period (i.e., the 1990s) of Korea’s Internet activism. One is the online communities autonomously constructed by activist members, such as Bar-Tong-Mo, Hyun-Chul-Yeon, and Chan-Woo-Mul, communities which introduced new forms of communication rules and movement repertoires. From the beginning of these online communities, online-and-offline conversion was not unusual: many online community members were involved in regular or irregular offline meetings, and some participated in online and offline demonstrations as well (Choi, 2006; Kim Gibo, 2006).

While community members actively participated in political struggles and the IT consumer movement, they often groped for new ways of civic action predicated on horizontal networks. Their pursuit for alternative social movement forms soon opened up a new era of civic action. The second agent is progressive SMOs. Having witnessed innovative Internet use at the hand
of online communities, preexisting SMOs strived to adopt and adapt new ICTs to their own movements. Recognizing the net’s potential for progressive social movements, both the online communities and the SMOs sought mutual support and collaboration, leading to a successful solidarity in the General Election in 2000.

The 2000 Election Defeat Campaigns

Three months before the General Election of 2000, approximately five hundred Korean SMOs and activist groups inaugurated a civic alliance named “Citizens’ Solidarity for the General Election” (CSGE, whose original Korean name is “Chongsun-Simin-Yeondae”). Pleading with voters and political parties neither to nominate nor support corrupt or unethical candidates, CSGE announced a blacklist of eighty-six candidates, regardless of their political party or affiliation. These CSGE Election Defeat Campaigns were successful to a great extent: fifty-nine, or 68.6 percent, of the candidates on the blacklist were defeated in the election (Min, 2002). In particular, within the districts of Seoul and its satellite cities, 95.5 percent of the listed candidates failed (Table 6).

Table 6. The 2000 Election Defeat Campaign Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Listed candidates (persons)</th>
<th>Defeated candidates among the listed (persons)</th>
<th>Elected candidates among the listed (persons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul &amp; satellites</td>
<td>20 (100%)</td>
<td>19 (95.5%)</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungchung &amp; Kangwon provinces</td>
<td>23 (100%)</td>
<td>18 (78.3%)</td>
<td>5 (21.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North &amp; South Kyungsang provinces</td>
<td>35 (100%)</td>
<td>16 (45.7%)</td>
<td>19 (54.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North &amp; South Chollar provinces</td>
<td>8 (100%)</td>
<td>6 (75.0%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>59 (68.6% in average)</td>
<td>27 (31.4% in average)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Surprised by citizens’ fervor for and active involvement in the campaigns, some commentators called the success of the Election Defeat Campaigns an “electoral revolution” or “the second June Civil Uprising” (Choi Jang-jip, 2000). The decisive factors of the success include specifically the effective utilization of the Internet and the flexible combination of online and offline campaigns (Choi Jang-jip, 2000; Min, 2002). Through effective use of a homepage (www.ngokorea.or.kr) launched on January 12, 2000, CSGE could orchestrate nation-wide campaigns, integrating a variety of civic groups and SMOs nationwide. From January 12, the first day of CSGE operations, to April 12, one day before the election, 856,090 persons had visited the CSGE homepage and had posted 45,674 opinions on its bulletin board (Hah, 2006). Considering the number of Internet users was approximately five million as of December 1999, the CSGE’s Internet use was an unprecedentedly eye-opening event. In addition, CSGE successfully staged convergent forms of citizen action both online and offline. On the one hand, for example, CSGE directed the National Bus Tour Project36 to raise awareness of the campaigns. On the other hand, mainly through the Internet, CSGE strongly encouraged young electors to participate in voting. As Korea University political scientist Choi Jang-jip contended;

…the 2002 Election Defeat Campaign demonstrated a novel form of civic action, combining Internet technology, which globalization had promoted, and the younger generation, which sought the values of democracy. In this sense, this campaign was a revolution (174-175).

As shown in the case of the 2000 Election Defeat Campaigns, 1990’s civic action on the Internet was mainly led by preexisting SMOs, in addition to a relatively small number of online community activists. Despite delicate differences in the forms of communication and

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36 CSGE held hundreds of local gatherings and street demonstrations for the election campaigns. To increase mobility from city to city, CSGE operated the National Bus project by which it was also able to continue to attract media’s attention throughout the campaigns.
leadership, SMOs and netizen groups maintained collaborative relationship in the formative period of Internet activism throughout the 1990s. Along with the expansion of Internet activism after 2000, however, netizens began to reveal voices differentiated from those of the SMOs. In the next section, this study elucidates the ways in which these two social agents—netizens and SMOs—have evolved and the differences which they have had in movement repertoires and organizational forms of civic action.
CHAPTER 7: NETIZENS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

This chapter explores the major social agents of Internet activism in Korea, focusing on two groups which have led progressive social movements in the new media age: netizens and social movement organizations. This chapter begins with the discussion of netizens, introducing the concept of netizens and demographic composition of Korean netizens. In particular, this study focuses on Korea’s younger generations—the 386 and the post-386 generations—which represent Korean netizens as driving forces of Internet activism in the nation (Han, 2007; Oh, 2004b). Examining their political and cultural characteristics, both common and distinct, this study describes the ways in which these younger generations have shaped Korea’s social movement landscape. This chapter then investigates how netizens have stemmed from preexisting activist groups, including Korean SMOs. This study scrutinizes the different forms of leadership and mobilization structures that nomadic netizens and institutionalized SMOs employ. By tracing the evolution of the debate surrounding the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations, this chapter delineates the different values embedded in the divergent strategies proposed by netizens and SMOs.

Defining the Netizen

The neologism “netizen,” drawing on the meanings of “Internet” and “citizen,” broadly refers to “people who use the Internet for a certain purpose” (Lee Byoungkwan et al., 2005). The definition of netizen, however, may be further narrowed when considered in specific cultural contexts. Hauben and Hauben (1997), who coined the neologism in their study on the impact of Usenet in the U.S., identified netizens as net users who are empowered by
collecting, creating, and sharing information and knowledge with others, and who, at a grassroots level, help make the world a better place. In their view, the net—including Usenet, Free-Net, email, electronic newsletter, and World Wide Web—is a “grand intellectual and social commune” which anybody on the globe can access “to improve the quality of human life” (p.3). Hauben and Hauben’s view, however, tends to overemphasize the technological advantages of the net, neglecting the potential (and probable) commercialization of the net. Focusing only on the unlimited online networks through which one can give and take information, they fail to illustrate what brings, creates, and develops the online citizenship of which Internet users are aware. One could argue that the “citizenry” aspect of the netizen must involve something more than mere Internet usage coupled with a jejune, ill-defined utopianism. To understand the varying meanings of the netizen, which may differ under relativistic conditions, one should examine the political and historical background in which online citizenship is constructed.

In South Korea, the netizen has diverse connotations. By netizens, some people refer to Internet-based protestors that are radical, “irresponsible, and inadvertent” (Lee, Y., 2005). For others, netizens represent “reform-minded” and participatory Internet users who have changed journalism and politics for the better (Oh, 2004b). Meanwhile, in the business world, netizens are potential consumers of various e-businesses, such as emailing, online shopping, and online banking (Daum Advertising Focus, 2006). Despite a wide range of definitions, Korean netizens tend to be recognized, in general, as presumably young Internet users who may have their own agenda-setting processes through online networks (Lee Byoungkwan et al., 2005).
This study operationally defines netizens as “amorphous and hybrid groups of Internet users who are aware of citizenship, and are actively or passively involved in a variety of collective actions, including online community construction, online agenda-setting, online discussions and debates, and online protest.” In particular, this research focuses on Korean netizens who reveal voices differentiated from institutionalized activist groups like SMOs, and compares and contrasts the critical differences between netizen groups and SMOs in Korea.

Korean Netizens

There is little doubt that many Korean Internet users are primarily composed of those in their twenties and thirties (Cho, 2002; Lee Keehyung, 2005; Han, 2002, 2007; Kang, 200). Statistical data as to Koreans’ Internet usage demonstrates that these two age groups occupy 43 percent of total Internet users. These Internet users, dubbed “the 2030 generation” (Lee Keehyung, 2005; Hyunwoo, 2005), can be divided into two subgroups: the 386 (born in the 1960s) and the post-386 (born after 1970) generations. Describing socio-cultural features of each generation, this section discusses how these two generations have interacted in shaping Internet youth culture in Korea.

Internet Usage in Korea

The total population of South Korea was estimated to be slightly less than 50 million people, of which 45.4 percent was composed of the youth population under the age of 25 (KSIS, 2009). Approximately 81 percent of the total population resides in urban areas. The high density of urban residency, Koreans’ aspiration for higher education, and the Korean
government’s support for the IT industry are often considered favorable factors in Korea’s ability to wire the country in a short time. In fact, Korea has been called one of the “most wired” countries in the world (*Koreatimes*, October 4, 2007). According to AC Nielson’s research (2007) on media use in fifty nations, South Korea ranks at the top both in PC ownership and in the prevalence of Internet connections. Eighty eight percent of South Koreans have at least one computer at home, the highest PC-ownership rate in the world, with Hong Kong (at 84%), Taiwan (81%), Singapore (77%) and the US (77%) following in the rankings. The study also notes that 80 percent of South Koreans connect to the Internet at least once a week, a proportion far higher than that of other internet-friendly countries such as New Zealand (66%), Australia (65%), the UK (60%) and the US (59%).

Another study, conducted by the National Internet Development Agency of Korea (NIDA, 2009) during June-July 2008, reveals that 35,360 thousand people aged six and over (or 77.1% of the population) use the Internet, and that the number increases to 36,190 thousand (or 76.5%) when the user age is lowered to include ages 3-5 (Figure 3). Of these Internet users, males use the Internet more than females. As of 2008, 53 percent (19,350 thousand) of Internet users are male and 47 percent (16,840 thousand) are female (NIDA, 2009).³⁷

³⁷ In the U.S., slightly more females use the Internet than males, as of July 2008 (Nielson Online, 2008). 52 percent or 85,443 million of Internet users are female, while 48 percent or 79.4 thousand were male.
According to the demographic data measuring age, the largest age segment to engage in Internet use is made up of those in their thirties, followed by those in their twenties (Table 7). The 30-39 age segment accounts for 23 percent of Internet users, while the 20-29 segment accounts for 20 percent. Comparatively, in the U.S., the most active age segment is 35-49 year old users (27 percent of the total Internet users in the U.S.), followed by the 55-64 year old users (20 percent) (Table 8).
Table 8. U.S Internet Users by Age Group*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>2-11</th>
<th>12-17</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-49</th>
<th>55-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number (thousand)</td>
<td>14,799</td>
<td>17,579</td>
<td>12,755</td>
<td>20,309</td>
<td>43,849</td>
<td>38,065</td>
<td>16,672</td>
<td>164,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition (percent)</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>10.66</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>12.32</td>
<td>26.59</td>
<td>23.09</td>
<td>10.11</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source data: Nielson-Online Research, 2008

Admittedly, straightforward and unqualified comparisons between the U.S. and Korea can be misleading because the two countries have differently proportional age demographics (with the U.S. having a far larger population over sixty), and because the data gathered uses different methods to divide age segments. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the proportion of youths among Korean Internet users seems higher than that among U.S. Internet users. While those aged between 20-39 years old most actively use the Internet in Korea, those aged between 35-64 years old in the U.S. are the mostly likely users. The high rate of Korean youths’ Internet usage is more clearly seen in the NIDA’s survey of Internet usage by age (Figure 4). Almost all teens and twenties use the Internet: 99.9 percent or 6,630,000 of teens and 99.7 percent or 7,170,000 of twenties go online. By contrast, Internet usage rate abruptly declines when we consider those in their fifties (48.9 percent).

Figure 4. Koreans’ Internet Usage Rate by Age*

*Source data: NIDA, 2009
The occupational group topping the list of Internet users is students, with a 99.9 percent usage rate, followed by 99.6 percent for white-collared office workers and 98.7 percent for professionals and managers (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Internet Usage Rate by Occupation*

On average, Korean Internet users stay online a weekly 13.7 hours (NIDA, 2009). Regarding the purpose of Internet use, over 90 percent of Internet users go online for leisure activities, such as the consumption of music, games, and videos (92.9 percent), for information searches (89.0 percent), and for communication through emails and instant messengers (85.2 percent). (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Purpose of Internet Use (Multiple Responses)  (Data: NIDA, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of Internet Use</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job search</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software upgrading</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil petition</td>
<td>85.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online banking</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home pages &amp; blogs</td>
<td>85.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online communities</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping/Sales</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication (email &amp; IM)</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping/Sales</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online communities</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping/Sales</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication (email &amp; IM)</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online communities</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping/Sales</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication (email &amp; IM)</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online communities</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Shopping/Sales</td>
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<tr>
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<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online communities</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 386 Generation

In the early stages of online communication in the 1990s, most Internet users in Korea were in their twenties and thirties, manifesting distinctive generational characteristics based on their common childhood (or adolescent) memories of the radical student movement that opposed the military regime in the 1980s (Cho, 2002; Han, 2007). As a generation that grew up after the Korean War, they did not harbor the anticommunist sentiments of their parents; cherishing an ideal of democracy, they played a vital role in leading the democratization movement throughout the 1980s. The media labeled them “the 386 Generation”—the “3” indicating that they were in their thirties, the “8” representing that they were college students critical of dictatorship in the 1980s, and the “6” signifying that they were born in the 1960s, in the midst of the rapid industrialization that followed the Korean War.

“386” is also—not coincidentally—the name of the latest CPU model developed in the 1990s, the Intel 386. The 386 generation therefore also refers to early adopters of new media
technology in Korea. For the 386 generation, the Internet has undoubtedly become a crucial instrument of their acquiring, disseminating, and sharing information, interacting and socializing with their peers, expressing their opinions and feelings, and pursuing various entertainment-related and pleasure-seeking activities (Lee, Keehyung, 2005, p. 8). Just as the Intel 386 symbolized cutting-edge IT technology at the time, so did the 386 generation signify a rising human resource that sought to restructure society with both computer skills and radical sociopolitical perspectives.

Within a short time, the Internet became, as a whole, the virtual communities of the 386 generation. Most online news media were built by them, and most virtual communities were created for their use (Kang, 2003). Accordingly, the Internet began to play a momentous and far-reaching role in oppositional political campaigns and civic actions (Han 2002; Lee, K. 2005; Yun, 2003). For instance, 48.4 percent of of the online community Nosamo [People who love Roh Moo-hyun] were made up of those in their thirties, followed by 28.47 percent in their twenties, 17.58 percent in their forties, and only 2.93 percent in their fifties. (Kang Wontaek, 2003). In addition, membership data of the independent progressive website OhmyNews reveals the 386s’s enthusiastic participation in oppositional online news production. (Table 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ages</th>
<th>Registered members**</th>
<th>Citizen reporter members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>8706 (persons)</td>
<td>1231 (persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>63510</td>
<td>12041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>98289</td>
<td>16271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>61945</td>
<td>8634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>19011</td>
<td>2514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>4556</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70+</td>
<td>1107</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>257134</td>
<td>41392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As of July 5, 2006
** Registered members have the privilege of creating their own blogs on *OhmyNews*, while anyone can access *OhmyNews* to read news and post their replies. Of registered members, approximately 16 percent registered themselves as citizen reporters whose news reports can be exhibited on the site.

This data effectively reveals how radical youths were predominately the Internet users of the time; conservatives would not realize the political potential of the Internet until progressives had already risen to positions of some prominence.

It is crucial to appreciate the historical factors that were decisive in shaping the 386s’ political and cultural orientations. Compared to older activist groups of the 1960s and the 1970s, the 386 generation pursued more radical social reform and experienced massive protest over more sustained periods of time. (Cho, p. 126). Many leading activists of the student movement in the 1980s were ideologically influenced by Marxism and leftist critical theories, including dependency theory, Leninism, Maoism, liberation theology, and the “Juche” [subject] ideology\(^{38}\) advanced by North Korea’s Kim Il Sung. Though its leftist tendencies have declined since the collapse of socialism in the 1990s, the 386 generation has maintained more radical and progressive ideals than had any previous generations. Emotional ties with lower classes, anti-Americanism, and a desire for communitarian culture characterize the 386’s collective identity (Cho Dae-yop, 2002, 2008; Lee Hyun-Woo, 2005; Kang Won-Taek, 2003).

On the other hand, the 386s were also saturated with authoritarian culture and patriarchic Confucianism. While their political target was authoritarian military power, their struggles were based on “another authoritarianism” (Kim Gibo, 2006). Due to the high risk of political struggles under a dictatorship, confidentiality in decision making, obedience to

---

\(^{38}\) Juche-Sasang was introduced to some student activist groups from the late 1980s. Juche-groups have emphasized national liberation from US cultural and political domination, while other Marxist groups have stressed class liberation.
organizational decisions, and patriarchic leadership were required in the student movement of the 1980s. Yet some student activists were critical of the hierarchical structure and authoritarian culture that remained among activists. Angma (whose real name is Kim Gibo), the activist who first suggested the candlelight vigil for Hyo-soon and Mi-sun, recalls his own experience when he was involved in the student movement in the early 1990s:

I worked as an executive committee member of the student association at my college. The organizational culture was extremely authoritarian and strictly disciplined. Before long, I noticed that the President of the student association confidentially received instructions from an underground organization to which he belonged. The executive committee was required to follow the orders delivered through the President. Secrecy, vanguardism, and top-down communication were major trends in the movement (Kim Gibo’s interview, 2006).

The hierarchical, patriarchic, and aggressive organizational culture of student activist groups in the 1980s was transferred to the social movement organizations in the 1990s. As Cho Dae-yeop (2008) observed, most social movement organizations which appeared after the June Civil Uprising were primarily led by the 386 generation. By playing a critical role in founding and supporting social movement organizations, the 386 generation has been called the “social movement generation” of Korea (Cho, 2002). Because it intensely distrusted mainstream politics and dominant media, and was sympathetic toward oppositional social movements, the 386 generation has contributed to the development of civic action and participatory politics since the 1990s. As revealed in Kang Won-Taek’s research (2002), the 386s’ attitude toward civic organizations demonstrates that they place greater trust in three forms of civic organizations—labor unions, environmental movement organizations, and social movement groups—than do other age groups (Table 10).
Table 10. Degrees of Trust in Civic Organizations by Generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Degrees of Trust in Civic Organizations*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labor Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>5.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>5.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>5.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*0 indicates not trust at all; 10 indicates a maximum level of trust

In sum, the 386 Generation was not only the first generation to begin using personal computers and the Internet in Korea, but was the first to have actually experienced political victory over authoritarianism in Korea, as demonstrated by the 386s’ key role in the June Civil Uprising. Because of its radical perspectives, the 386 generation has been severely criticized by conservatives: the Roh Moo-hyun administration supported enthusiastically by the 386 voters in the election has been labeled as “the 386 government” or “386 reds.” However, more significant challenges to the 386s have been issued by younger groups, the so-called post-386 generation.

The Post-386 Generation

Born in the 1970s and experiencing its adolescence in the wake of democratization, the post-386 generation represents liberalism, individualism, and globalized youth culture. This age segment has also been referred to as the N (Net) generation (Lee Hyun-Woo, 2005), the IT generation (Cho Dae-yup, 2008), or the New generation (Kim Young-chul, 2004), whose internalized nomadic identities and anti-authoritarian culture were enabled by the Internet. Lee Donghoo, Kim Youngchan, and Lee Keehyung (2004) have characterized the members of the 2030 generation as those who entertain “unconventional or networked forms of
individualism against Confucian collectivism,” cherishing personal autonomy, pluralistic values, and cultural diversity. While this age group shares some of the sociopolitical orientations of the 386s—support for radical social reform and high degree of computer literacy—it is markedly differentiated from the 386 generation, as Cho Dae-yup (2008) argued:

As this (the 386 generation) was the generation of political participation, the new IT generation, or internet generation, may be identified as the generation of cultural participation. The internet generation is characterized by its much freer expression of desires, and by the creation of an electronic public through the medium of online space in the era of culture and capital (p. 198).

Unlike the 386 generation, the post-386s tend to be relatively free from traditional Confucianism and hierarchical authoritarianism. While the 386 is identified as the “closet generation” which had suffered from a culture of secrecy and closed communications, the post-386 is characterized as the “open-square generation,” which enjoys open networks and straightforward expression (Kim Young-chul, 2004).

The 2002 World Cup Cheering, in which the post-386s played a crucial role, openly demonstrated their cultural power to break old customs and political routine. In the World Cup street cheering, it was not uncommon to see youths wearing kerchiefs or brassieres made from Korean flags. For the older generations, including the 386, such displays were flagrantly disrespectful, as these generations had been conditioned (even brainwashed) to cherish the national flag; it had to be saluted, was never soiled or crumpled, and citizens were to loyally salute the flag each morning and night until the early 1980s. For the post-386s, however, the national flag was not a symbol requiring subservient bows but a companion with which one could irreverently (if still patriotically) play.
In addition, the use of the color red—reminiscent of communism and North Korea—had been a taboo for several decades in South Korea, right up until the 2002 World Cup cheering. Every season, elementary schools held anti-communist poster contests, which often featured red, horned monsters as caricatures of the dreaded North Korean communists. Regardless of this “red complex,” the Red Devils chose as its official symbol a red goblin that appears in an ancient Korean myth. During the World Cup celebrations, city streets and the stadium itself were filled with the color red; even right-wing conservatives, following instructions from the Red Devils, did not think twice about wearing red t-shirts. It was therefore an empowering cultural phenomenon, rather than political critique or ideological warfare, that emancipated Koreans from a deeply entrenched cultural neurosis.

During the 2002 Candlelight Demonstration, the post-386 generation continued to offer culture shock to older generations, including the 386s, by rejecting absolute authority and meta-narratives, emphasizing on pathos and open-mindedness, and demonstrating antipathy toward standardized discipline. 386 cultural critic Jung Yoonsu compared the 386s and the post-386s by contrasting their attitudes, respectively, in the demonstrations of the 1980s and the candlelight vigils of 2002 (Kim Young-chul, 2004).

I was in my early twenties when I rushed into the Civil Uprising in 1987… So strained and scared of the police, I walked the street hanging my head down, as if I were not a demonstrator, because I was so afraid that I might be arrested and tortured… But the youths these days are completely different. In the candlelight demonstrations in 2002, I went to the vigil with my juniors in their twenties. While the police surrounded the square with tear gas guns, they went through without hesitation, boldly eating hamburgers and smoking cigarettes. They did not fear anything. They have never been frightened by any authority, a nation, America, the police, whatever. “Who the hell killed the two girls? How dare…,” they might think (pp. 260-261).

One of the 386 vigil participants described his similar experience:
I participated in the candlelight vigil with my wife and seven- and eight-year-old children. I had been involved in some street protests before the vigil, and I found in the 2002 vigil a new trend in civic protests. My generation judged actions according to a standard of absolute righteousness. In other words, our (386s’) actions were determined by our “cool heads.” By contrast, the youths (post-386s) were motivated more by personal desires and feelings. Their motives come from their “warm hearts.” (An OhmyNews citizen reporter in the focus group interview, 2006)

Jung Yoonsu has added that the straightforwardness and fearlessness of activists in their twenties might result from the economic abundance and cultural diversity they had been saturated with during their adolescence. Comparatively, the 386s might seem narrow-minded in their exclusion of ideologies and political cultures that veer from Marxism or other doctrinaire leftisms (Kim Young-chul, 2004). Having emerged as one of the leading groups of collective action during the World Cup in the summer of 2002, the post 386s evolved into major participants in demonstrations and election campaigns such as the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations and subsequently, the 2002 Presidential Election. Along with the 386s, the post-386s constituted newly arising social agents in Internet activism in Korea--netizens.

**The Joint Power of the 386s and the Post-386s: Netizens in Action**

Despite their ideological and cultural differences, the 386 and the Post-386 generations managed to jointly construct activist power on the Internet based on their common zeal for social change. Kang Won-taek’s survey (2003), conducted shortly after the 2002 Presidential Election, demonstrates that both the 386s and the post-386s identify themselves as progressives (Table 11).
Table 11. Political Ideology* by Age Demographic (As of December, 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ages</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
<th>ANOVA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>F=24.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>P&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1: Very progressive, 2: Progressive, 3: Moderate, 4: Conservative, 5: Very conservative

The data indicates that activists in their thirties rate a 2.55 on the scale of progressiveness and those in their twenties average a 2.62, while those in their fifties average a 3.09, those in their sixties a 3.17, with forty-somethings occupying a middle ground. In other words, the younger generations ally themselves with progressive ideals and the older generations (aged fifty and over) identify themselves with conservatism. The following table exhibits the similarities between political positions held by the two generations from policy to policy (Table 12).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>ANOVA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for North Korea</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>F=7.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>p&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revision of SOFA</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>10.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>p&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abrogation of the National Security Law</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>20.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>p&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s greater involvement in public positions</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>12.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>p&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deregulation of the market and increased market freedom</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>P=0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1: Completely agree, 2: Somewhat agree, 3: Somewhat disagree, 4: Completely disagree
The 386s and post-386s reveal their radical perspectives particularly their Relation to North Korea, Relation to the U.S., and the National Security Law. The 386 and the post-386 generation commonly recognize that South Korea needs to financially support North Korea for humanitarian purposes, that the unequal SOFA between the U.S. and South Korea should be revised, and that the National Security Law is an undemocratic regulation that limits freedom of thought and speech. Meanwhile, the two generations take less critical positions on the extent of governmental roles in market deregulation.

Based on a shared sense of political progressiveness, the 386s and the post-386s have influenced and learned from each other. Throughout the candlelight vigils and political campaigns in 2002, the post-386s were trained to be active and confident participants in both political arenas and cultural areas. One college student, speaking in a focus group interview, recalls what he had felt during the 2002 candlelight vigils:

I was so shocked to see the evening news on television. The anchor was reporting netizens’ collective actions in the candlelight vigils. Before then, all the news about netizens was something negative, like language abuse on the net, or something like that. I was surprised with mainstream media reporting about netizens in such a serious manner. OK, I thought, now you begin to pay attention to our voices. I was so proud. I felt confidence in myself (A focus group participant, 2006).

Observing the political solidarity between the 386s and the post-386s in 2002, Hankyoreh editor Kim Young-chul (2004) has asserted that these two generations began to exert new dynamic forces that were changing Korean society. Song Hoguen (2003) has suggested naming this social conglomeration “the 2002 generation” that newly emerged in 2002, thus combining the 386s and the post386s. As Lee Hyun-Woo (2005) has argued, solidarity between two generations proved to be a significant milestone of Korean history:
It is significant to recognize two heterogeneous generations as one integrated group categorized as the 2030 generation. [These] two age groups are the first and the second generations to use the Internet and embrace a common desire to radically change society and politics. In that sense, both of them are the “generations of innovation” (p. 41).

The solidarity of the 386 and the post-386s has led to the emergence of new agents of social change in Korea, so-called “netizens.” In the next section, this study discusses how these new actors and preexisting social agents (social movement organizations) have interacted with each other, and identifies the similarities and differences among their respective political visions and organizational forms.

Korean Social Movement Organizations

After the democratic transition in 1987, Korean civil society witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of social movement organizations. The most notable change in social movement organizations was two-fold: (1) an explosive increase in the number of SMOs; and (2) the bifurcation of SMOs into two different camps—namely the “people’s movement [Minjung-undong]” groups and “citizens’ movement [Simin-undong]” groups (Cho Dae-yop, 2008; Kim Sunhyuk, 2000). The June Civil Uprising of 1987 led directly to the explosion of social movement organizations: according to Korean NGO White Paper39 (Citizen News, 2000), as of the end of 1999, over 70 percent of Korean NGOs were founded in the 1980s and the 1990s (Figure 7).

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39 In this White Paper, NGOs include a wide range of non-profit organizations including interest groups and professional associations, as well as progressive SMOs. Of the NGOs, citizen movement organizations account for 25.2 percent, and environmental movement organizations account for 7.1 percent.
The number of NGOs has more sharply increased after 2000: the 4023 NGOs created before 2000 increased to 5556 in 2006 (Citizen News, 2000). Of the NGOs, 168 progressive social movement organizations were established in the 1980s and 566 were founded in the 1990s (Cho Heeyon, 2005).

Second, the emergence of new “citizens’ movement groups” has prominently changed the complexion of social movement organizations. Throughout the 1980s, oppositional SMOs and radical activist groups had played a crucial role in facilitating the breakdown of authoritarianism and transition to democracy (Kim Sunhyuk, 2000). After the achievement of procedural democracy, oppositional SMOs transformed themselves into legal or semi-legal associations, striving to expand their influence. Despite some changes in their organizational forms, however, preexisting SMOs maintained their radicalism, asserting that intrinsic social problems had yet to be solved. Stressing that class conflicts and national dependence on superpowers continued unabated, these SMOs argued that the Kim Young-Sam administration, which took power through a national direct election after the June Civil
Uprising, was no more than “civil Fascists taking off military uniforms” (Kim Gisik, 2006). These radical SMOs continued to propound their revolutionary strategies for class-liberation and national-liberation. Based on organizations of blue-collar laborers, peasants, the urban poor, and radical students, they pursued fundamental and structural reforms to overcome economic and political inequality under capitalism. The radical groups were called people’s movement groups. Some activist groups, however, contended that democratic transition was dramatically changing what people were demanding and how they were demanding it:

Preexisting activist groups had underestimated the significance of procedural democracy achieved by the Civil Uprising. They neglected the huge impact of the democratic transition on the public. Citizens who had struggled against military dictatorship before were now pursuing legal and non-violent ways for social reform. Citizens were returning from a “political front” to a “daily-life front” in which they could propose a variety of demands, including educational, environmental, and cultural issues. While some radical activist groups (people’s movement groups) still pursued structural social reform to eradicate political and economic inequality, most citizens sought to transfer their actions “from a driveway (illegal way) to a footway (legal way)” (Kim Gisik’s interview, 2006).

Contrasted to people’s movement groups that pursued fundamental and revolutionary social change, newly emergent groups which focused on the improvement of citizens’ daily life were called “citizens’ movement groups.” Citizen movement organizations established in the mid-1990s included the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice, and the Korean Federation for Environmental Movements. A founding member and former director of PSPD, Kim Gisik (2006), argued in an interview for this study that the citizens’ movement was committed to improving citizens’ real quality of life by correcting distorted and unjust socioeconomic problems, rather than ideologically opposing the capitalist system per se:
We strived to improve the “real” conditions (not symbolic or “sloganeered” conditions) of ordinary citizens, not only of working classes. It is true that the citizens’ movement was based mainly on the support of well-educated, white-collar workers in their thirties and forties. However, this does not necessarily mean that the citizens’ movement was only for middle class citizens. While the people’s movement aimed for a “class-based” social revolution, the citizens’ movement focused on “issue-oriented” social reform campaigns. PSPD has never agreed on civic actions that reject the importance of working classes in social movements.

Although the citizens’ movement and the people’s movement had different class-bases and distinct social reform strategies, both camps did not deny the priority of the working classes in leading social change. Reconciling some of their differences, both camps were eager to plan allied struggles against common targets such as chabol, the government, and conservative media. Unofficially and confidentially, several leaders representing the citizens’ movement and the people’s movement had regular meetings, usually once a week, and irregular meetings to adjust their allied protest plans (Kim Gisik, 2006).

Both camps were also similar in their organizational forms and leadership. Distinctions between leading executives and supporting members, as well as between the members and the masses, were still apparent in organizational communication: top-down decision making was common in most meetings and procedures. While the “new social movements” of Western Europe and other industrial and postindustrial societies emerged “as both a challenge and an alternative to the conservative labor movement” (Kim Sunhyuk, 2000, p.107), the Korean citizens’ movement did not identify itself as an alternative that would replace the people’s movement. Like new European social movements, the citizens’ movement camp expanded its areas into a variety of issues including peace, the environment, women’s rights, and racial minorities; however, its camp did not adopt new ways of organizational forms and leadership, unlike European new social movements.
Historically, leading members of the people’s movement and the citizens’ movement came from the same background: most of them were 386s who had been involved in the student and labor movements during the 1980s. As Kim Gisik (2006) explained, “we [the citizens’ movement leaders and the people’s movement leaders] were, once, the family who had shared meals from the same pot.” As the 386 generation embraced reformist and progressive political orientations as well as conventional hierarchism in their culture, the social movement organizations, whether the people’s movement or the citizens’ movement, were in an ambivalent position to some degree—politically radical yet culturally conventional. Voices that offered potential alternatives to this ambivalent tendency within SMOs would only appear in 2002, with the Candlelight Demonstrations.

Netizens and SMOs: Conflicts and Collaboration

Three day after Angma suggested (online) to hold a candlelight vigil in downtown Seoul, on November 30, 2002, the first such gathering was held in the Kwanghwamoon square. Among approximately two thousand participants, half voluntarily attended the vigil mainly motivated by Angma’s online posting, while the other half were organizationally mobilized by an allied SMO committee, “Bum-dae-wee,” whose formal title was the “Allied Committee to Solve the Problems Caused by US Camps in the Northern Kyeonggi Area” (Kim Gibo, 2006; Kim Gisik, 2006). Composed of several local SMOs based in the northern Kyeonggi area—where many US military camps are located—Bum-dae-wee had led protests against the US court decision on the Hyo-soon and Mi-sun case. Bum-dae-wee’s involvement in the candlelight vigil, however, was not deliberately planned in advance. On that day, November 30, 2002, Bum-dae-wee members were marching downtown after their demonstration in
Taehak-Ro, a few miles from the Kwanhwa-moon square. It was routine that activist groups
would hold public gatherings in Taehak-Ro, where demonstrations were legally permitted,
march a few miles across the downtown area, and announce the closing of the gathering near
the Kwanhwa-moon square, where any kind of demonstrations was forbidden (Kim Gisik,
2006). While Bum-dae-wee members were arriving at Kwanhwa-moon square, autonomous
candlelight holders were gathering in the same place, and Bum-dae-wee came to join the
candlelight demonstration in impromptu fashion.

While some members of Bum-dae-wee promptly managed the demonstration, most
voluntary speakers were lay citizens, not members of Bum-dae-wee. The first speaker was a
middle-school girl who had been a classmate of the two dead girls, Mi-sun and Hyo-soon; the
second was a high school history teacher in his thirties. He was followed by an old lady in
her sixties, and the above-mentioned Angma (real name: Kim Gibo), according to an
anonymous netizen’s “debriefing” posted at Angma’s homepage (www.angma.org). Most
impressively, the demonstration spotlighted ordinary citizens who might not have been
involved previously in any social movement organizations, but who here expressed
passionately their angry views spontaneously in the street. They spoke an untamed,
unorthodox, atypical language different from activists’ jargon, and offered vivid, humanistic,
and moving speeches. Angma has spoken of this unique, uncoordinated moment of
autonomous citizen action:

Though I was a suggester of the candlelight vigil, I did not intend to manage it
…because I didn’t think it was right…because all participants had equal right
to express their own opinion as they had on the Internet. I had just been
observing the vigil until I got an opportunity to speak as one participant (Kim
Gibo’s interview, 2006).
This unprecedented form of civic action was covered for feature stories by several online media, such as OhmyNews, and progressive newspapers, such as Hankyorech. Inspired by the unexpected success of the candlelight vigil, a number of radical or progressive SMOs decided to additionally join the struggle, and then to reorganize Bum-dae-wee, transforming it from a local to national organization. The director of PSPD, Kim Gisik, then joined the expanded, reformed Bum-dae-wee as Co-Chair of its executive committee. He has stressed how significantly the candlelight vigils had impacted Korea’s social movement history.

Until then, most public gatherings and demonstrations, hosted by SMOs, had some typical and routine forms. Standing on the podium, ten or more leaders representing their organizations or groups had delivered radical speech in an extremely agitated tone. All the participants would sit down according to the group they belong to. If somebody who did not belong to any group joined the demonstrations, they might have been embarrassed and felt uncomfortable, like strangers. There had been a kind of psychological border between organizationally mobilized participants and ordinary citizens. The first candlelight vigil, however, broke the boundaries between the SMOs and citizens. Non-organized citizens were encouraged to join the gatherings, inspired by other ordinary participants (Kim Gisik’s interview, 2006).

Kim Gisik has also added that since the first candlelight vigil on November 30, 2002, Bum-dae-wee has innovated greatly on the ways in which public gatherings and demonstrations are formed to involve more non-affiliated citizens. Bum-dae-wee made a decision to reduce the number of “podium speakers,” the veterans who had led social movements, and instead promoted citizens’ voluntary and extemporary speech. In addition, a variety of cultural events was increasingly introduced in the candlelight vigils, including satirical music and performance art by activist artists (Kim Gisik, 2006).

However, some doubt that Bum-dae-wee, the allied SMOs that including both the people’s movement and the citizens’ movement groups, had accurately perceived new trends in civic action that underlaid autonomous citizens’ zeal during the candlelight vigils. In fact,
the SMOs had paid little attention to the emergence of new forms of civic action at the beginning of the candlelight demonstrations. Choi Se-jin (2006), a former staff member of the Democratic Labor Union Association, one of the major organizations affiliated with Bum-dae-wee, critically asserted that the SMOs did not catch up with the netizen movement even after the first successful candlelight vigil:

Until the first day of the candlelight vigils, Bum-dae-wee had neither expectations of nor instructions about the vigil. Even after the first vigil, it submitted no official report about the vigil and had no plan for subsequent candlelight demonstrations in a few weeks….In fact, Bum-dae-wee might have been bewildered by the citizen volunteers unaffiliated with any SMO. Not only Bum-dae-wee but all the SMOs didn’t know what to do, just looking at what was happening in such an unexpected situation (pp. 255-256).

Choi Se-jin has further argued that, even after Bum-dae-wee decided to become actively involved in the candlelight vigils, it was considerably “idle and conservative” in accepting new waves of civic action:

Bum-dae-wee made a great mistake in understanding and recognizing citizens’ demands. Until the candlelight vigils, all the public gatherings had been directed by the instructions of the gathering hosts (SMOs). This candlelight vigil, however, was completely different. Nonetheless, Bum-dae-wee stubbornly adhered to extant SMOs’ routine ways of demonstrating, which finally separated the podium (SMOs) from the seats (the public)…Bum-dae-wee should have finished its own speech programs as quickly as possible, and should have moved on to an open forum in which any citizen could freely participate. That was the way many netizens had suggested online. But Bum-dae-wee didn’t do that (Choi Se-jin, pp. 261-262).

While many netizens demanded free discussion equally open to all participants, the SMOs still maintained a hierarchical leadership in mobilizing and directing the candlelight demonstrations. In the second vigil of December 7, 2002, a conflict between the SMOs and non-organized citizens surfaced. That day, the people’s movement groups—including labor unions and the Democratic Labor Party—were actively involved in the candlelight
demonstration, holding their flags and entering the square across from citizen participants. When Kwon Young-kil, presidential candidate of the radical Democratic Labor Party and supported by the people’s movement groups, delivered a speech, some citizen participants burst into complaint about his political scheme. Some online community members aired their critical opinions (Choi Se-Jin, 2006):

I don’t know why he (Kwon Young-kil) came here…To sincerely support the demonstration or to mobilize his supporters? I was really disappointed with Kwon Young-kil who appeared with two trucks covered with his large campaign posters…(ID: sear)

Another netizen wrote:

I don’t understand why they [Kwon’s supporters and the people’s movement groups] brought their flags to the candlelight vigil. Did they mean that all the citizens should support them because they showed up in the demonstration?... (ID: parlous)

In the midst of the debate on “flags versus. candlelights,” a well-known online commentator who uses the online ID “Ulcar-man” posted his observation on the progressive news carrier Daejabo:

A lot of their [SMOs’] flags blocking all the sights, [people were sitting in] a radial pattern around a podium, stunning speeches sounded through electric amplifiers, and VIPS engaged in routine agitationism…all of these movement repertoires were so tiresome and irritating…(ID: ulcar-man).

The symbolic contrast between flags and candlelights is noteworthy. While the flags might symbolize preexisting social movements in Korea, the candlelights might represent a new wave of civic action. In other words, while the masses become homogenized and are denied individuality when represented monolithically under a flag, candlelights are held individually
by each person, all enjoying the same status and remaining different in terms of gender, age, political affiliation, and socioeconomic status.

Later, Bum-dae-wee decided to recommend its affiliated SMOs not to hold flags and pickets in the candlelight vigils. Bum-dae-wee, however, still identified itself as a centralized “control tower” leading the masses. Few SMO activists noticed how the Internet had changed the ways of communication among citizens. Angma (2006) argued that the SMOs’ stubbornness resulted from their conventional leadership, which was predicated on vanguardism and authoritarian, top-down decision making:

Many people on the net said that they would go to the vigil because they truly wanted to do anything for the dead girls, even though they didn’t like the “Undong-kwon (activist circle)”…They wanted to talk about their own stories as they did online. They wanted free and open discussion…But for Bum-dae-wee, those people were still “ignorant masses”—that is to say, the masses that had to be informed and educated by SMO leaders (Kim Gibo’s interview, 2006).

Having witnessed diverse online opinions, including criticisms of Bum-dae-wee’s dogma, Bum-dae-wee announced that it would include “representatives of netizens” in its executive committee. Encouraged by this announcement, Angma voluntarily attended the committee meeting as one of the netizens, even though he was not officially invited. Angma reported, however, that he was deeply disappointed with Bum-dae-wee’s decision-making processes:

I had expected then that I could suggest more exciting and creative programs to motivate more citizens. But the Bum-dae-wee meeting was wholly different from what I had expected. There were old “veterans” who had long led radical social movements and executive committee members representing major SMOs. The executive members suggested a plan, which might be negotiated in advance, and then the veterans approved it. In those conventional meetings, there was no room for me to intrude or object. When I suggested holding small group discussions of 100-200 persons, so that anybody could speak and debate on the demonstrations, they looked so embarrassed. They might have thought “What is this crazy guy talking about?” (Kim Gibo’s interview, 2006).
After the meeting, Bum-daee-wee announced that netizens agreed on the group’s decision. Although netizens were not institutionalized agents and had no official representatives, Bum-daee-wee tended to regard netizens as one of its affiliated SMOs (Choi Se-jin, 2006). In the following vigil on December 31, 2002, the conflict between some netizens and Bum-daee-wee was accelerated when the “Citizens’ Open Forum” program and an independent rock performance—“Peace Guerrilla Concert,” which had originally been scheduled at the suggestion of some netizens—were cancelled by Bum-daee-wee because of its prolonged podium speech and violent confrontation with the police. Finally, in the following vigil on January 3, 2009, Angma and about 250 netizens announced that they would hold independent vigils apart from Bum-daee-wee’s afterward. Their biggest complaint about Bum-daee-wee was a lack of open-mindedness and a refusal to accept diverse voices:

Bum-daee-wee should represent a diversity of voices. But it supports only the voice of a specific faction…Although Bum-daee-wee was expected to play an executive committee role, representing a variety of citizens’ opinions, it didn’t meet these expectation. For instance, it censored online opinions. It arbitrarily deleted some critical opinions about Bum-daee-wee leadership from its homepage bulletin board. Bum-daee-wee’s censorship uncovers that it is not open to any criticism (OhmyNews, Jan. 3, 2003, “Interview with Angma”).

Immediately, fierce debate followed Angma’s announcement: on Angma’s homepage alone, for example, about seven hundred pros and cons of the separation from Bum-daee-wee were posted within a day. Some supporters of Angma argued that the first candlelight vigil, which had been completely autonomous, open-minded, and voluntary, had exemplified the best model of civic action, while the subsequent struggles led by Bum-daee-wee had been disappointing because citizens’ potential for volunteerism had been suppressed. On the other hand, some netizens expressed concern about disunion, which might undermine the deeper solidarity progressive factions had worked to create. They contended that netizens should
have negotiated with Bum-dae-wee in spite of strategic or tactical differences, rather than
risk a schism in the allied front (OhmyNews, Jan. 2, 2003). Ultimately, the rupture between
some netizens and Bum-dae-wee was not easily repaired. The differences between them lied
not only in their communication styles and organizational forms but also in the ultimate
political goals they sought in the candlelight demonstrations.

Bum-dae-wee aimed to develop and transform these candlelight vigils into anti-
American mass struggles. Encouraged by the widespread anti-Americanism mounting
nationwide, Bum-dae-wee attempted to march toward the U.S. Embassy, demanding a
revision of SOFA and equal relations between U.S. and Korea. Because demonstrations
before the U.S. Embassy were strictly prohibited by Korean law, demonstrators could not
avoid confrontations with the police. What had been peaceful candlelight vigils were now
becoming violent agitations with the police. While conservative newspapers, including Cho-
Joong-Dong, reproached Bum-dae-wee for inciting anti-American violence, some moderate
citizens were reluctant to participate in the vigils. In opposition to the Bum-dae-wee’s
direction, Angma (and his online supporters) contended that the candlelight demonstrations
needed to focus more on anti-war and pacifist issues:

Our candlelight vigils should be directed toward anti-war protest and peace rally… Current candlelight vigils (led by Bum-dae-wee) fail to effectively deliver the message of anti-war world peace, clinging to the discourse of national independence…I object marching toward the U.S. Embassy. It unnecessarily causes violent struggles. Holding one candlelight is enough to convey our will to criticize the Bush administration. Now it is time to move on to the anti-Iraqi War protest, cooperating with international society beyond the boundaries of nation-states (OhmyNews, Jan. 3, 2003, “Interview with Angma).

The candlelight demonstrations began to decline gradually after the separation of the netizen
groups. It is noteworthy, however, that the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations offered an
opportunity for netizens and SMOs to collaborate on the one hand, and to conflict each other on the other hand. Their differences were revealed in the movement repertoires, organizational forms, as well as political directions (Table 13).

Table 13. Netizens and SMOs in 2002 Korea

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With respect to movement repertoires, while netizens suggested candlelight vigils as a new form of civic action, the SMOs represented themselves with their flags. In addition, while netizens preferred open-discussion in small group units, the SMOs preferred centrally integrated public gathering. In regard to organizational forms, netizens were based on loose and amorphous networks while the SMOs were rooted in hierarchical structures. In particular, the SMOs placed importance to a unitary struggle front constructed by federation among organizations. Regarding decision-making, while netizens stress bottom-up communications and diversity of opinions, the SMOs adopt a relatively top-down system and unanimous approval voting, particularly for the management of allied organizations.
Meantime, netizens and the SMOs shared common political goals at some degree: revision of SOFA, apology of the Bush administration, and the establishment of equal relations between the U.S. and South Korea. In regard to future direction of the candlelight demonstrations, however, while netizens insisted on anti-Iraqi war protest based on global citizenship, the SMOs focused on national independence from superpower, the U.S. These differences may be related to their background: while many netizen leaders had experienced horizontal and open discussion on the net at the initial stage of the PC tong-sin era, most SMO leaders had been involved in the radical student movement and labor movement under authoritarianism. Many, but not all, netizen leaders represent the post-386 generation, while core personnel of the SMOs were the 386 generation. Since the first cacophony between netizens and the SMOs in 2002, progressive netizens have arisen as new social agents of Internet activism, stemming from extant social movements in South Korea.
CHAPTER 8: DIGITAL MOVEMENT REPERTOIRES

As mentioned in chapter 3 (pp.33-39), Chadwick (2007) has outlined four principles which characterize the primary movement repertoires utilized in contemporary Internet activism: (1) the convergence of online and offline civic action; (2) the fusion of political and sub-cultural discourses; (3) the construction of “distributed trust,” or netizens’ trust in the outcomes of their collective discourse; and (4) “sedimentary networks” that enable the continuity of Internet activism in the long term. Drawing on the first three principles, this chapter investigates movement repertoires found in Korean Internet activism from 2002 to 2007. Beginning with a discussion of the convergence of online and offline civic action, this chapter examines how online bulletin boards have been used to suggest, promote, and evaluate offline civic involvement. This chapter then explores the ways in which political discourse and sub-cultural discourse have converged, particularly focusing on netizens’ black-humored use of satire and parody. This study also examines the functions of datgul [reply] and pumjil [copy-and-paste] in the construction of distributed trust and an awareness of citizenship through the net. This chapter finds that datgul and pumjil, as salient characteristics of Korean Internet culture, have made it possible for netizens to participate in agenda-setting in cyberspace and construct their own networks for knowledge production and information delivery.
Online-and-Offline Convergence

Virtual Struggles

From the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations to the 2007 Taean Clean-Up Campaigns, netizens and SMOs adopted various forms of virtual struggle to achieve their goals of socio-politic reform. The overarching term “virtual struggles” here signifies protests that use the Internet as “a means of action,” including hacktivism, virtual-sit-in, and electronic-civil-disobedience, as mentioned in chapter 3 (p. 69). While Angma suggested holding an offline candlelight vigil on November 30, 2002, other netizens proposed online demonstrations both to express Koreans’ collective mourning for the two fallen girls and to critique the Bush administration’s unilateral foreign policy neglecting Korean civilians. On November 25, 2002, some MSN users expressed netizens’ condolences for Mi-sun and Hyo-soon through a “Black Ribbon Campaign,” a variation on the Blue Ribbon Campaign in the U.S., which had been introduced to Korean netizens in the mid-1990s by Bar-tong-Mo. In this 2002 struggle, however, netizens insisted that it would not be appropriate to use the same symbols on the American mourning badges for an anti-U.S. protest: instead, they suggested displaying an icon (▫️ or ▪️) imitating Korea’s traditional mourning badge made with hemp, instead of the western symbol of a black ribbon (▪️ ▪️).

In addition, some netizens embarked on a cyber-attack campaign, aiming to down a server of the White House homepage, to demonstrate the Korean grievance and protest this incident ignited. Starting from the members of an online community, DC-inside (www.dcinside.com), this cyber-attack campaign was rapidly spread through hyperlinks on many online bulletin boards. At the top of the linked website the campaign organizers
created, the pictures of two girls were exhibited with the words of netizens’ condolences.

Announcing a “D-day” of December 1, 2002, the campaign promoters appealed to other netizens to simultaneously access and thereby overload the White House homepage at noon (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Netizens’ Homepage for the 2002 Cyber-attack on the White House

Although the cyber attack ultimately failed due to technical problems, many netizens, particularly the Post-386s, had actively participated in this virtual struggle. A daily newspaper, Maeil-Kyungjae, described the young netizens’ fervent support for this campaign:

...It was an unusual scene observed at some PC cafés at noon on December 1. Groups of three to five were, rapidly and repeatedly, pushing the F5 key on the keyboards all together. What they were doing might seem funny, but they were in fact very serious. They were engaging in cyber-terror against the White House, intending to down the server by
overloading it. Youths’ anti-U.S. sentiments, caused by two girls’ deaths, were being openly exposed in their action…(Maeil-Kyungjae, 2002)40

Meanwhile, Korean SMOs have increasingly utilized, too, the various virtual struggle tactics in their campaigns and civic projects. During the 2002 presidential election campaigns, an Internet-based civic group, the 2030 Voter Network (www.votefestival.org), was established for the purpose of increasing the voting rate of those in their twenties and thirties to 80.8 percent.41 Targeting the Post-386 Internet users, the 2030 Voter Network held an event to offer free gifts, by lottery, to those who had sent a vote-urging email to their friends. Supporting this campaign, the commercial portal site Daum (www.daum.net) urged netizens to place the campaign logo “▩ 80.8 ▼” before each online post title. The icon ▼ is symbolic of a voting stamp, while 80.8 indicates the target voting rate the younger generation hopes to reach.

Along with cyber-attack and cyber-banner tactics, online signature collection became one of commonest types of activists’ virtual struggles. For example, in the 2007 Taean Clean-Up Campaigns, many environmental groups and citizen networks, including the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement and GreenKorea, collected online-signatures, demanding that Samsung reasonably compensate Taean area residents for their losses in the fishery trade and that the government should establish new environmental regulations to prevent similar accidents in the future. Employed in a variety of civic actions, the collection of online signatures has methodically evolved and


41 In the previous presidential election in 1997 when the average voting rate had been 80.7 percent, only 68 percent of the 2030 generation (mainly post-386 generation) had participated in voting. Urging the younger generation to become a leading group to encourage people’s voting in the following presidential election on December 2002, the 2030 Voter Network symbolically aimed at the 2030 generation’s 80.8 percent of voting rate, 0.1 percent higher than the average rate in the 1997 election.
been developed: to eradicate the lack of credibility from which anonymous virtual signatures suffer, netizens began a trend of using their real identities (rather than virtual pseudonyms) during signature collection campaigns. Further, some activist groups introduced “face-photo-attachment” to assure the credibility of online signatures (Kukmin Ilbo, 200942). The ways in which the practice of online donations has evolved is also noteworthy. The portal site Daum has innovatively introduced methods by which the collection of online signatures can be coordinated with online donations. These online donation programs have been promoted by and facilitated through a variety of innovative programs that allow donors to give through cell-phone accounts, use cyber-money, and receive live, online reports about the total amount of donations.

**Online-and-Offline Convergence**

While netizens have increasingly adopted virtual demonstration tactics, many of them also recognize that offline participation can be a far more effective and crucial element in civic action than online-only protest. For instance, of the top 100 posts on the OhmyNews bulletin board on November 30, 2002, thirty seven posts strongly encouraged netizens to participate in offline candlelight demonstrations:

I don’t think it would be enough to express complaints, clinging to the computer in your room. It is time to take (offline) action. We have to demonstrate citizens’ autonomous and collective action, in more effective ways than the collective action during the 2002 World Cup, so that our voices can attract the attention of national and international media. I’m about to go out to buy a candle (ID: Our power, Nov. 30, 2002).

I have always complained about “netizens in no action,” who had been so passionate within online space. Now their passions are materialized, one by one, with increasing lights of candles, which show a gleam of hope for society (ID: Yesterdayparticipant, Nov. 30, 2002).

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Some netizens further suggested new movement repertoires through which more citizens could join the struggle:

If you are not able to attend the candlelight demonstration in the Kwanghwamoon square, you can join the struggle by stopping your cars and turning on indoor lights and the emergency lights of your cars. If you are driving on highways, you can turn on emergency lights at six o’clock to express your support for the candlelight vigil, which will be held at the same time downtown (ID: Old man, Nov. 30, 2002)

Let’s turn on the emergency lights of cars and blow loudly our horns when we pass by U.S camps or the U.S. Embassy…I will hold my own ceremony to tear up the official commendation I had received when I had been on joint duty with U.S. soldiers as a KATUSA (Korean Augmentation Troops to the U.S. Army). Dear Mi-sun and Hyo-soon, please forgive this poor man that cannot do any more than such a mere thing (ID: Big mountain, Nov. 30, 2002).

Through discussions and interactions on the online bulletin boards, netizens suggested creative ways to bolster offline action and encourage one another to participate in street struggles.

In the case of the Taean Clean-Up Campaigns, increasing citizens’ offline participation was a primary goal of online communities. For example, an online community, Sarang-hae, whose full title is “Let’s Save Taean by Cleaning Up the Black Coast,” (http://cafe.naver.com/greesea) was established to mobilize volunteers willing to clean Taean coastal areas ravaged by the oil spill. By offering regional sections containing eight distinct geographical areas of the nation, the Sarang-hae website enabled its members to physically meet one another and voluntarily organize their group trips to Taean. In addition, the front page of Sarang-hae exhibits a main menu bar whose “Sharing Knowhow” and “My Experience” sections (Figure 9) offer, respectively, practical information for volunteers, including posts such as “what you should bring with
you to Taean” and “effective tools to remove oil sludge,” and touching essays written by volunteers who wish to share their rewarding experiences in Taean. Between the day when this online café was launched, December 10, 2007, through April 2, 2008, 931 essays have been posted on the My Experience section, while 139 opinions have appeared on the Sharing Knowhow section. In particular, the personal essays on the My Experience section have motivated potential volunteers to more actively participate in the campaign.

Figure 9. The Online Community Sarang-hae

One member of Sarang-hae has posted pictures and an essay after participating in a cleanup excursion organized by the Sarang-hae executive committee:

After lunch, I worked with the Bandal brothers—other volunteers I had met here last week. Moving rocks, carrying them out, and washing them with water, I worked with several leading members of the Sarang-hae café. They were devoting themselves to the work for all of us. How beautiful they were…But, oh my god, look at my appearance. The oil contamination is so serious that I began to look terrible after only a few minutes. How will we clean up all the contaminated seashore?... (ID: Stealing Memory, Jan. 13, 2008).
Under his essay and pictures, several anonymous readers added their supportive and encouraging replies. One reader (ID: Dksthgus917) wrote, “Wow, it’s an interesting essay. What about your back pain? Do you feel better now?” while another (Duerangkun) added, “Good job. You will come again, won’t you?” suggesting that this replier once joined the Taean Clean-up. Responding to their replies, the author of the original essay (ID: Stealing memory) wrote, “Yes, I’ll go work there as many times as I can. Please keep up your concern. It’s such harsh and difficult work to revive the West Sea.”

Such interactive interpersonal communication demonstrates how online community members develop relationships through offline meetings and maintain those relationship through online interactions. As Juris (2005) has noted, “virtual activities” (online interaction) and “physical activities” (voluntary service in Taean) become integrated through serial interactive communication. From a similar perspective, Angma (Kim Gibo) has argued that any theoretical division between online and offline is no more than a fiction:

I don’t think there is a clear distinction between online and offline…What people share online explodes into offline spaces…The problem occurs, however, when some offline power groups (political parties or SMO leaders) snatch the benefits of civic action nurtured online. While horizontal relationships are maintained ideally online, they are abruptly transformed into centralized power offline…I don’t know how we can find the best way to equally share power with all participants in offline spaces (Kim Gibo’s interview, 2006).

Angma’s assertion highlights the dangers of online horizontal relationships being transformed into offline vertical hierarchies, especially when netizens’ power becomes appropriated by SMO’s centralized leadership. While Korean netizens rooted in online networks tend to pursue decentralized forms of offline civic action, extant Korean SMO leaders have emphasized that online actions need to be reorganized if they are to be
transformed into effective offline action. Kim Gisik, an SMO leader, has argued that decentralized civic power generated in online networks simply cannot sustain offline struggles:

Drawing on what I have seen in previous mass-mobilized social movements, I believe that citizens’ spontaneous involvement has a critical limitation per se when it encounters the physical forces of the police. In online space, it may be possible to see the expansion of autonomous civic action based on decentralized leadership. In the real spaces of society, however, loose networks of autonomous citizens would not be able to work unless we (SMOs) were to fight against the police to make room for citizens to hold their own ceremony—the candlelight vigils (Kim Gisik’s interview, 2006).

While online and offline civic actions are indisputably integrated in reality, netizens and SMO leaders continue to debate whether the centralized leadership offline would necessarily result in the deterioration of the horizontal and democratic civic networks online, or if centralization of civic power is necessary to maintain, promote, and embolden civic actions to better oppose the truly coercive forces of dominant social groups.

Sub-cultural Discourses: Satire, Parody, and Black Humor

The Internet’s technological advantages—particularly, hypertextuality—have diversified the forms of netizen-produced-text. Often delivered via hyperlinks, netizens’ posts have involved more satirical cartoons, songs, music, videos, and pictures. Diversity of the online text made it possible for netizens to enjoy more sub-cultural discourses in the form of satire, parody and black-humor, transcending the typically “agitative” political-rhetoric common in previous Korean social movements. (Choi Se-jin, 2006; Kim Gibo, 2006). During the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations, satirical songs and
performances made great impressions on netizens and vigil participants. An underground musician’s homepage, “Song and Life (www.songandlife.com),” won explosive popularity with his sardonic anti-American songs, including “Fucking U.S.A,” “Crazy Bush,” and “Brave Pretzel.” The punk rock song “Fucking U.S.A” in particular attracted an extraordinary amount of attention of the Post-386 generation. While some citizens lambasted this song for its “vulgar lyrics” (Citizen’s Press, 2002), the younger generation was attracted to the song’s satirical criticism of the Bush Administration and U.S. foreign policies. As the song spread through a hundred thousand websites within a few days, its composer, Yoon Minsuk, had a rush of offers to make music videos and requests to permit the use of this song for election campaigns (Danzi-ilbo, 2002). The sensational lyrics of this song represent the Post-386s’ pointed sarcasm and straightforward criticism of the U.S.:

…You (U.S.A) have the ability to steal everything and
Go on a rampage.
You are a monstrous thief.
Did anybody hear Bush’s violent threats?
Such an audacious country, Fucking U.S.A.
You threaten war in North Korea and
Intrude in our internal affairs.
You are a country of gangs.
But if America is such a righteous country,
Then why can’t we say what we want to say?
Have you made us into slaves of our own precious land?
So now we are yelling,
We are against America…(www.robponggi.com)

44 Translated by Rob Pongi, a Japanese online music library. This song has been rebroadcast at the Rob Pongi website in the form of music video with Japanese and English subtitles. The video is available at http://www.robponggi.com/pages/comboFUCKINGUSAHI.html
In addition, “Crazy Bush” criticized the pro-war policies of the Bush Administration, while “Brave Pretzel” ridiculed the embarrassing incident in which President Bush had choked on a pretzel in January 2002. Another popular song spread during the candlelight demonstrations was “Then, Accuse the Tanks,” sung by an activist underground music group, Urinara [My Country]. Protesting the U.S. court decision on the Mi-sun and Hyo-soon case, this song lampooned the impotence and subservience of the Korean government on the one hand, and the imperialist power-plays of the U.S. government on the other. The song also directly satirized the two U.S. soldiers who had fled Korea after the U.S. court decision that found them not guilty:

…If nobody is guilty, then accuse the tanks (which trampled down the girls).
I can’t bear it any more.
Just immediately, just today,
Arrest the tanks before they too fly away…

In the 2007 Taean Clean-Up Campaigns, sarcastic pictures, videos and songs were more frequently used than during the Candlelight demonstrations. Online communities for the Taean Clean-up, including Sarang-hae, have played a pivotal role in disseminating sarcastic critiques of Samsung and Lee Myung-bak’s pro-business policies. The Sarang-hae homepage (cafe.naver.com/greesea) allows its members to upload images, graphics, and videos on the “Member-Created-Images” section. As of April 2009, eighty seven graphics, videos, and photo-shopped pictures have been exhibited here, while more pictures and hyperlinked videos are available in the “My Experience” and the “Free Board.” Netizens have used these spaces to rebuke Samsung for disclaiming responsibility for the devastating oil spill and mock Lee Myung-bak for advocating only
on the behalf of “chabol” (a business conglomerate) such as Samsung and neglecting the
demands of marginalized Taean residents.

Some netizens posted a picture of campaign volunteers holding a parodic Samsung
flag on the contaminated Taean seashore (Figure 10). On the flag, a copy of “Made in
Samsung” was printed with a Samsung logo, implying that the contamination is “made in
Samsung.”

Figure 10. Protesting the Taean Contamination: “Made in Samsung*” (Jan. 2008)

*In addition to the “Made in Samsung” logo on the top, “Take responsibility, Samsung!” is written in
Korean on the bottom. Taean clean-up volunteers are hoisting the flag along the devastated Taean seashore.

Another netizen created a parody of the Samsung logo, which represented an image of
dying fish covered in black oil sludge (Figure 11).
The creation of such images adopts culture jamming techniques that imitate and subvert familiar cultural and commercial iconographies for counter-hegemonic discourse. The anti-Samsung parodies were highly successful, with many netizens not only replying to the posts but spreading them through online networks, delivering the damning images to Samsung‘s homepages in addition to many other blogs and online communities.

In addition, online networks enabled dissemination of parodic songs and music-videos for the Taean campaigns. One of the hit songs is a parody of “Tell Me,” originally sung by the teenage Korean pop group “Wonder Girls. The parody video of “Tell Me,” known as “Taean Tell-Me,” was produced by an environmental citizen organization and rapidly spread by hyperlinks to many online Taean volunteer communities, including Sarang-hae, progressive online media such as OhmyNews and Pressian, and online forums such as Daum Agora. In the video, an anonymous man wearing a protective suit and mask—the typical uniform of Taean volunteers—imitated ridiculously the Wonder Girls’ “Tell Me” dance, replacing the lyrics of the original with words demanding an apology from Samsung, while the original song’s popular—and thematically appropriate—refrain remained intact:

I didn’t know you [Samsung] were so brazen.
You’re too cheeky. How can you do that?
You brought about the accident.
Why don’t you apologize though?
You have neither idea nor conscience.
Don’t you see all the citizens rushing to Taean to work so hard?
You pretend not to see that.
Gosh, we’re getting crazy.
Tell me, Tell me, Tell, Tell, Tell, Tell, Tell me (refrain)
“I’m so sorry, I made a mistake, I will take the responsibility”
Tell me, Tell me, Tell, Tell, Tell, Tell, Tell me (refrain)
I can’t wait any more. Please tell me right now.

The Taean “Tell Me” music video has been posted on Sarang-hae’s bulletin board several times, and many replies—including seventy on Jan. 14, 2008 alone—followed whenever it was posted. In line with Andrew Chadwick’s (2007) framework of digital movement repertoires, Korean netizens have increasingly adopted sub-cultural forms of counter-hegemonic discourses, including the use of “gasagok [song parodies with altered lyrics], parodies of logos, and ridicule photos and pictures. In addition to traditional forms of street demonstrations and picketings, these satirical sub-cultural discourses have emerged as a new form of anti-hegemonic civic action.

Datgul and Pumjil

*Online bulletin boards in Korea*

Unlike most U.S. websites, most Korean websites provide some form of interactive bulletin board. From the Blue House (Korean President Office: www.bluehouse.go.kr) homepage to the websites of government departments and local administrations, to online media and SMOs’ homepages, most institutions hosting online websites offer online bulletin boards on which visitors can see the titles, times, and number of hits for each post, in addition to seeing the author’s (virtual and/or actual) identity. In particular, it is noteworthy that Internet users can selectively view posts according to the number of hits.
Major portal sites, such as Naver, Daum, and Yahoo Korea, provide service by which viewers can catch up with a list of most hit posts every minute. The Sarang-hae website operates its online board with the number of hits, too (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Sarang-hae’s Bulletin Board: Number of Hits

Further, some websites, such as OhmyNews, allow people to both add their replies to citizen reporters’ posts and see the number of hits for each reply as well as for original post (Figure 13). By examining the number of viewers who have seen a certain post or reply, netizens can narrow down their areas of interest. Presumably, posts that have received the most hits are more likely to attract the greatest amount of followers.45

Through viewers’ snowballing interactions, online bulletin boards can be regarded as a barometer of netizens’ public opinions.

45 Few empirical studies have examined how the number of hits affects viewers’ selections of posts to read. Further study is needed to assure the impact of exposing hit numbers to public view.
Extremely sensitive to numbers of hits, some political groups have been accused of committing “click fraud,” or manipulating the numbers of hits. Some progressive activists have argued that the conservative majority party, the Grand National Party (GNP), has hired part-time workers to post pro-government opinions to intentionally inflate the numbers of hits their posts accrue. (Daily Seoprise, March 18, 2009). Meanwhile, the Korean police, under the Lee Myung-bak administration, have arrested three young netizens well-known on the Daum Agora online forum (agora.media.daum.net) for click fraud, claiming that they had manipulated the hit numbers of their anti-government posts to display oppositional public opinion (Daily Seoprise, March 17, 2009). Because the manipulation of hit numbers is equated with the manipulation of public opinion, one can infer that online bulletin boards’ top posts are

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46 Daily Seoprise, “Pro-Myungbak supporters’ manipulation of public opinion should be investigated” March 18, 2009
47 Daily Seoprise “Police arrested three Agora netizens for manipulation of public opinion” March 17, 2009
regarded not as mere indicators of popularity but as groundworks and touchstones for netizens’ shared public opinions.

In the 2002 Candlelight Demonstration, for example, online bulletin boards were major routes of news production and news delivery. While the “Big Three” rightwing mainstream media, Cho-Joong-Dong, ignored Angma’s suggestion of holding a candlelight vigil, his post was spread widely throughout online bulletin boards of progressive online cafes, liberal online news outlets, and SMO homepages (Kim Gibo, 2006). In three days, the rapid dissemination of his post through online bulletin boards resulted in the unprecedented success of the first candlelight vigil, proving that online bulletin boards are not merely self-enclosed discussion forums but sites that play an actively journalistic role in news delivery and agenda-setting.

During the 16th Presidential Election campaigns, when Roh Moo-hyun ally Chung Mong Joon’s abruptly withdraw his support, online bulletin boards played a pivotal role in mobilizing young progressive voters. For instance, the bulletin board of “Nosamo,” an online community of Roh’s supporters, and the viewers’ bulletin board on OhmyNews functioned as a control tower delivering urgent instructions to mobilize civic action on the Election Day. Checking the online boards hourly and following some instructions posted on the boards, netizens made phone calls and sent messages using MSN Messenger to tell Roh’s supporters not to miss the poll, beginning eight hours prior to the morning the polls opened (anonymous participants in a focus group interview, 2006). Those cases exemplify the importance of Korean online bulletin boards in disseminating news information and organizing large-scale civic action.
Datgul [Reply]

Datgul [Reply or replies] is one of the most prominent elements in vitalizing interactive communication on online bulletin boards. Datgul literally means “words of response,” which are not only the ways of online discussion but also ways of making social acquaintances. If a post is impressive or controversial, a variety of datgul—including support, confutation, critical comments, and suggestions—typically follow the post. In the 16th and the 17th Presidential Elections, it was not uncommon to see thousands of viewers’ datgul to a news report or an opinion posting. Many netizens tend to regard an absence of replies (“no reply”) to their posts as a mark of dishonor or contempt for themselves. Some netizens have described their perceptions of other users’ datgul, and lack of same:

While I didn’t miss posting my datgul to others’ opinions, Why did you respond to my post with no datgul?... Everybody is eager to check who posted replies to him People reply to those who replied to them. If you want to attract the attention of other users, Remember that giving and taking datgul make friendship. (ID: ayemrok, June, 26, 200648).

A series of datgul show your interest in others Without physically being together, We can get together by datgul, the living words, Replies are gods’ bliss, Allowing people to communicate with one another Replies make connections between you and me Replies are hugs through language Replies are a river flowing, embracing you and me (ID: Kangsunghee, Nov. 9, 200749)

Much Korean Internet slang regarding datgul reflects how Korean netizens perceive its personal significance. For instance, “Mu-ple” means “no-reply,” while “Mu-ple Jiok [the

48 http://cafe.naver.com/xmrqyfck963.cafe?iframe_url=/ArticleRead.nhn%3Farticleid=7101
49 http://blog.daum.net/printView.html?articlePrint_13091016
hell of no reply] indicates the very worst situation, when no one at all bothers to leave
datgul to one’s post. “Sun-ple” indicates supportive or encouraging datgul, while “Ak-ple”
refers to spiteful or abusive datgul. Those who passionately reply to others’ posts are
called “Datgullers.” Some people encourage others to post any kinds of datgul to their
posts, saying that “Ak-ple is better rather than Mu-ple.” Some online café members have
jokingly established the “Association to Prevent No-reply,” whose members are
responsible for posting replies to one another.

While datgul is a significant way to develop interpersonal relationships on blogs and
online communities, it is also an important tool to gauge public opinion on online media.
According to a survey conducted by the Korea Press Foundation in 2008 (Na & Lee,
2008), the biggest reason users gave for reading others’ datgul about news articles on
online media is “to check others’ opinions,” followed by “to examine if there are
opinions different from those articulated in the news article” and “to hear behind-the-
scenes stories not reported by the news article.” The survey also demonstrates that those
with higher educational backgrounds and progressive perspectives tend to more often
read datgul to scrutinize public opinion.

Datgul, however, is not only a tool to strengthen (or weaken) the possibly tenuous
interpersonal relationships through online networks; datgul can also directly and
organically influence news production. In a focus-group interview with OhmyNews
citizen reporters (2006), some reporters said that they have been affected by viewers’
datguls:

When I reported the removal of Dachuri Elementary School, Dachuri residents added their datguls underneath my report every few minutes. Their datguls were like a live report about what was happening at the removal site. That is to say, their datguls became
another form of follow-up news reporting (Anonymous OhmyNews’ reporter I, 2006).

I have written a report about youths entering midnight saunas. I insisted that they should be prohibited because some of them had inappropriately expressed their sexuality… I thought that most people would share the same opinion with me. But I came to realize that many others have different opinions, reading their datguls to my report. More than one hundred datguls argued that youths deserve a right of privacy free from interference. Finally, I changed my mind. (Anonymous OhmyNews’ reporter II, 2006).

On the other hand, datgul has been criticized for dangerously spreading groundless rumors and unverified information. When a Korean famous actress, Choi Jinsil, became distraught over many online Ak-ples regarding her privacy and subsequently committed suicide on October 2008, politicians and netizens debated the introduction of laws to regulate online postings, including datgul. While the Grand National Party has proposed the establishment of a law to require Internet users to input their real identities (not virtual ones) before posting comments online, many netizens and the Democratic Party have opposed such restrictions, arguing that attempts to regulate cyberspace intend to eliminate anti-government posts. The debate is still ongoing, as of April 2009.

In addition, some Internet users have admitted that datgul is likely to cause unnecessarily emotional antagonisms among datgullers. Some college students in the focus group interviews have further argued that datguls tend to become a kind entertainment rather than a serious communication form for further, deliberate discussion.

I had been crazy to post my datgul regarding a specific topic. I’ve read an online post that two U.S. soldiers (who belong to USFK: United States Forces Korea) at drill had threatened a Korean farmer with their guns when the farmers asked them to move their military vehicles out of his farmland. I was so upset that I continued posting my datguls for an hour. I wrote more than twenty datguls… because somebody posted that the incident could be understandable because the USFK soldiers were drilled as hard as they were in actual
warfare…So, I wrote “Have you ever served in a military army? I did. I know what the drills would be like. If you have not served, don’t say anything” (Anonymous college student in the focus group interview, 2006)

Another student agreed that synchronized interactions via datgul might provoke excessively irrational and impulsive responses to other parties:

If somebody posts provocative words, I cannot help refuting [his or her] claims. While I’m focusing more and more on the debate, I feel I’m getting upset and impulsive. Serious conversation at the beginning deteriorates into irrational fighting at the end (Anonymous college student, 2006).

Despite such negative effects datgul may cause, it irrefutably plays a significant role in constructing horizontal communication networks among citizens. An OhmyNews citizen reporter in his thirties has argued that datgul has evolved with the diversification of online space.

I have been involved in many online community activities, including Hitel pc-tongsin in 1995, Chollian afterwards, and OhmyNews, which I work for now. I have noticed that datgul culture has been changing little by little for over a decade. I don’t think datgul is exactly reflecting public opinion, but I can read in it some evolutionary changes in public discourse and open discussion. In the beginning, pro-Chosun readers posted their datgul only on the Chosun-ilbo website, while pro-OhmyNews readers posted their datgul only on the OhmyNews site. There was rare interaction between them [between conservatives and progressives] in the past. Now, datguls written by both conservatives and progressives can be found on any website. People with different perspectives coexist, often debating or compromising with each other, on one site (OhmyNews reporter, 2006).

The founder of OhmyNews, Oh Yeon-ho, has argued too, that datgul has promoted citizen journalism in Korea and will continue to develop:

OhmyNews first introduced viewers’ datgul to news reports. Since then, most media have adopted datgul in their news reporting—for example,
Naver, and Cho-Joong-Dong…Citizens are now directly participating in news production….It is a responsibility of the media to offer more alternative ways in which citizens can participate in agenda-setting and news delivery for the public good.

By adding datgul which may support, oppose, or divert a given text, the original text may lose its absolute authority. While viewers read news articles and their datgul simultaneously, the meanings of the news articles are de-articulated and re-articulated by critical viewers. Civic participation via datgul destroys dominant hegemony embedded in a given text, and allows viewers to reinterpret the text through the construction of a two-way discourse. Thus, datgul promotes interpersonal relationships, enables people to grasp and gauge public opinions, and, perhaps most importantly, affects the very nature of news production by reconstructing journalism as a mutual, organic interaction between both readers and content providers and between readers and other readers.

_Pumjil [Copy-and-Paste]_

Among countless posts and replies, viewers are likely to pay special attention to texts with the highest number of hits. If viewers want to engage in extensive discussions about a text, they deliver it to other websites via “pumjil [copy-and-paste],” which in Korean literally means the “scooping up” of information from a source. Having witnessed the powerful influence of pumjil, a right-wing scholar, Hwang Intae, asserted in a policy forum held by the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) after its defeat in the 16th Presidential Election:

While the big three newspapers, Cho-Joong-Dong, influence their seven million subscribers, the online-based Nosamo influences 2.5 billion netizens. Though the number of Nosamo members is no more than fifty thousands, the members perform work as much as a square of fifty
thousand—2.5 billion—people can do, by interactive datgul and pumjil (Daejabo, 2006).50

As Hwang argued, activist netizens tend to recommend pumjil as an efficient way to further civic action. At midnight on November 27, 2002, Angma had first suggested a candlelight vigil by posting his opinions to the bulletin boards of four websites: Hankyoreh (a progressive daily newspaper), the online café of the portal site Daum, the Bum-dae-wee homepage, and OhmyNews (Kim Gibo, 2006). When he returned home after his work on the evening of the following day, he found that his suggestion had been delivered to one of his like-minded online clubs by another Internet user (Kim Gibo, 2006). Considering his post on Hankyoreh received no more than eighty clicks, or hits, (Han, 2007), it was assumed that his online suggestion had mainly been spread site-to-site by pumjil. In addition, on November 30, 2002 when OhmyNews reported the first vigil, many viewers delivered texts from other sites and posted them on the OhmyNews viewers’ reply board. Among the top 100 best replies on OhmyNews, twenty seven replies include the text delivered from other sites by pumjil.

Even within copied-and-pasted texts, however, many users tend to add their own opinions, whether supportive or oppositional, and embellishments for purposes which may diverge from those of the original text. One netizen delivered a cartoon from Chosun-Ilbo by pumjil to the OhmyNews reply board, to criticize the right-wing newspaper for its subservient attitude toward the Bush administration (Figure 14). Citing the source of the cartoon, this OhmyNews viewer added his opinion to the reply board:

50 Daejabo, “Conservative’s project to capture the Internet,” June 21, 2006. The quoted speech was addressed by Hwang In-tae, the Vice President of Seoul Digital University and digital advisor of GNP.
Figure 14. Pumjil for Critical Interpretation

ID: Cho, Hyung-Jin. 11/30/2002. 2:18:10 pm
Post # 324: The Chosun cartoon is killing Hyo-Soon and Mi-Sun once again.

This is a cartoon in Chosun-Ilbo on Nov.28. It portrays Bush apologizing to such a great extent. In fact, he never did apologize. He just said that he felt “sadness and regret.” While anti-American sentiments have increasingly been spread, the retroactive Chosun has kept silent, failing to cover the Mi-sun and Hyo-soon accident. Now, it [Chosun] starts to say that the “U.S. army held a memorial ceremony for two girls,” thus supporting and sympathizing with US military forces. Hey, guys!—let’s go to the Chosun-Ilbo building and hold a protest after today’s vigil. Let’s say that Chosun is killing Hyo-Soon and Mi-Sun all over again. (OhmyNews viewers’ reply board, Nov. 30, 2002)

On the other hand, pumjil can be used to disseminate information and knowledge rarely reported by mainstream media institutions. Some netizens linked the photo of Mi-sun and Hyo-soon’s miserable accident, which had not been aired in mainstream news media, suggesting pumjil of this picture to as many other websites as possible. The sources of information for pumjil vary: from a long report of a media activism
organization, “The Citizens’ Federation for Democratic movements,” to a few lines in an opinion post from a personal homepage, the forms of pumjil-ed content are various.

In Taean online communities, pumjil was frequently used, too. From the first day of the online café Sarang-hae on December 10, 2007, to the Inauguration Day of President Lee Myong-bak, 152 opinions were posted on the “Protest to Government” section of the Sarang-hae website, of which 17 included texts copied-and-pasted from other sites. The number of pumjil-ed texts increases, counting more posts, on the other sections, such as the “Free Opinion Board” and the “Sharing Knowhow” sections. Notably, the range of information sources for pumjil—including blogs and file-sharing communities—were explosively expanded. For example, hypertextual forms of text—including graphics, photos, videos, and music—were copied and pasted from SMO sites, including Green Korea (www.greenkorea.org), which produced the Taean “Tell Me” video, or video-sharing sites such as Pandora TV (www.pandora.com) and MNcast (www.mncast.com). Posts containing hyperlinked videos introduce detailed instruction to copy and deliver the source-videos:

- Please deliver this video to as many [websites] as possible. This music video is a parody of a recent hit song, “Tell Me,” by Wonder Girls. This is the second series of videos targeting the shameless Samsung corporation.
- How to do pumjil: Copy the URL of http://www.greenkorea.org/contents/onair/080107.wmv. Then paste it into your address window and click the enter key.
- If you are using the Gom player: it will ask you if you want to save it. Then answer yes.
- If you are using Windows Media: it will automatically be played. So save it with another file name (ID: sje115, Jan. 8, 2008, Sarang-hae cafe).
**Awareness of Citizenship**

Online discussion led by lay citizens caused a chain reaction to raise awareness of citizenship. Through online bulletin boards, blogs, and online citizen participatory media, netizens communicate one another based on horizontal and decentralized networks. Virtual identities promoted the online participants to expose their candid opinions irrespective of age, gender, and educational background (Cho Dae-yup, 2008; Kim Gibo, 2006). Rather than political speech by professional activists or recognizable political leaders, humble and sincere confession of lay citizens might be more effective to appeal to other citizens and make a sense of “we” with them:

Yesterday, I’ve been to the Kwanghwa-moon square with my wife and my 100 day-old son. Though I was worried about my son because he had to have a long trip from my town Namyangju, some netizen’s sincere post was so touching that my wife and I decided to go. I told my son, “Hello boy, you must be the youngest anti-U.S. protester! Then, my wife smiled and added, “We’re teaching you what PEACE is.” She looked truly beautiful with a candlelight’s reflecting glare on her face (ID:Galmaenamu, post#985).

Twenty two datguls of the 100 best datguls in the candlelight vigils include a form of “confession” and “repentance” in their content. The netizens portrayed themselves as those who committed sin by approving tacitly social injustice (Korea’s unequal and humiliating relation with the U.S.) with no action until the vigil began. They posted: “Mi-sun and Hyo-soon, please forgive me, this wretched fellow (ID:Bigmount, post#1447),” “May two girls rest in peace! From an stupid old man holding a candlelight (ID:Iprosecutor, post#671),” and “I’ve almost cried to see the vigil, reconsidering what I had been doing in my life (ID:Yesterdayparticipant, post#1345).
The awareness of citizenship beginning from “the sense of guilt” and “confession” developed into recovery of pride in self and community by active participation in candlelight vigils:

I’m so proud of my country. Looking at others’ posts and datguls, I really take pride in my country and my people. Korea must be the only country where such many people gather nation-wide by one netizen’s post…We are now awakening. I have lived with blind eyes and blocked ears, and I began to see the truth thanks to the Internet (ID: Citizen, post#501).

Candlelight vigils were so beautiful and moving. The reason why I copied and pasted (did pumjil) a flyer of candlelight vigils to many websites was that it was candlelight vigils (not violent) and managed by the power of autonomous citizens. Looking at thousands of candlelights, I cried. I’ve never seen such peaceful demonstrations.

Through interactive communication by datgul and pumjil on the net, netizens constructed a sense of collective identity in opposition to the traditionally dominant information sources (the government and mainstream media) and develop distributed trust in the outcomes of their collective and interactive discourse. The netizens also prompted awareness of citizenship with confessional forms of posts and sublimated their sense of guilt in the recovery of pride and self-confidence.

In sum, by the means of datgul, netizens are empowered to challenge the authority of a given text and can re-articulate, subvert, and/or transform its meanings. By the means of pumjil, the frames through which netizens filter events and people can be disseminated to increasingly large communities of netizens. While datgul is a new form of news production and agenda-setting, pumjil is a new way of information delivery that challenges the authority of a text in the same moment as that text is disseminated. As long as other replies are allowed to follow the delivered posts, the de-articulation and re-articulation of a pumjil-ed text become nearly indistinguishable or interchangeable
processes. Through a series of datgul and pumjil processes, Korean netizens select, filter
and frame select information for their trustworthy internet comrades, thus challenging the
authoritarian frames of right-wing, mainstream news media and fulfilling Andrew
Chadwick’s (2007) argument that distributed trust is fostered through citizens’ horizontal
networks of online communication. As the traditional relationship between news provider
and news audience is destroyed, netizens become increasingly empowered.
CHAPTER 9: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

This chapter illustrates the theoretical implications and lessons found in the present case study of Korean Internet activism. This chapter begins with a discussion of the impact of the Internet on Korean political landscapes that encompass political parties, SMOs, and lay citizens. While parties and SMOs have strived to co-opt netizens—new agents of civic action—by expansively using the Internet in their mobilizations, they have not been innovative enough to fundamentally absorb the progressive values embedded in new Internet activist trends. This chapter then describes the ways in which Internet activism has contributed to the evolution of social movements in Korea. In particular, this study suggests distinct features Korean Internet activism has revealed, in contrast to the Western organizational hybridization movement model proposed by Andrew Chadwick.

Organizational Hybridity: Netizens, Parties, and SMOs

Andrew Chadwick (2007) has asserted that “traditionally more hierarchical, less innovative organizations,” such as political parties, are experiencing “Internet-fueled increases in grassroots influence” through methods of organizational hybridization based on the selective transplantation and adaptation of digital network repertoires. Reminding of McLuhan’s claim, Chadwick has stressed that “repertoires reflect the organization’s values, and the medium is the message” (p. 286). In other words, organizations’ selective adaptation of digital network repertoires leads to grassroots-oriented innovations in traditionally hierarchical organizations. While Korea’s traditional political action groups—political parties and SMOs—have eagerly adopted and adapted digital network
repertoires, and in particular Internet mobilization techniques, these technological innovations did not create significant change in organizational values and forms.

Korea’s progressive netizens were at the forefront in innovating mobilization structures and organizational forms of civic engagement. Not affiliated with existing parties or SMOs, autonomous lay citizens created their own mobilizing structures on the Internet, through which they horizontally could network with one another, as the Red Devil and Nosamo phenomena exemplified. Existing political parties and candidate camps, as shown in the 16th and 17th Presidential Election, strived to adapt these new trends of civic action to their campaigns and public relations efforts, promoting expansive usage of the Internet for effective mobilization of their supporters.

However, political parties failed, either through incompetence or indifference, to innovatively steer their organizational values toward new governance paradigms based on interdependent and collaborative relationships with civic sectors. Despite its motto of the “participatory government,” the Rho administration was criticized for its self-righteousness and bigotry. During the Rho administration, the gaps between the haves and the have-nots actually increased (Korean Economics, 2008), and U.S.-Korea relations were improved far less than his supporters had expected. The Roh administration and newly elected 386 politicians, who had been expected to expand participatory democracy, were labeled as incompetent, authoritarian power groups—the “new privileged elites” (Kyunghyang, 2008).

As a result, in the 17th Presidential Election in 2007, progressive netizens tended to cynically respond to political involvement. While many netizens involved in the candlelight vigils, a month ahead of the 16th presidential election, expressed their
enthusiastic support for candidate Rho and harshly criticized Lee Hoi-chang on the reply board of OhmyNews, most netizens in the 2007 Taean campaigns did not reveal any support for either party’s candidate. Sentiments during the 2002 election can be encapsulated by the following comments:

Chang (Lee Hoi-chang)! I loathe you. You support Bush’s aggressive policy toward North Korea. So I hate you as much as I hate Bush. Once you seize power, you will sweep away these irritating vigils! (ID: Kwanghwamoon, Nov. 30, 2002)

Rho Moo-hyun probably would love to come here since he has asserted a desire to revise SOFA and enforce equal relations with the U.S. Because of his assertion, he has suffered ideological attacks at the hand of Cho-Joong-Dong. Hi, Lee Hoi-chang, what would you tell us if you were to come? You might like to say that we have to keep an alliance with the U.S. for the sake of your family because your granddaughter is an American citizen and most of your relatives are living in the U.S. (ID: Beforegoing, Nov. 30, 2002)

In contrast to many supportive posts for NMDP candidate Rho in 2002, the posts on the Sarang-hae site in 2007 cynically criticize both Uridang (successor of NMDP) candidate Chung Dong-young and GNP candidate Lee Myung-bak. From December 10, when the Sarang-hae site was launched, to December 19 Election Day, forty-two opinions regarding the 17th presidential election were posted on the “Protest to Government” section of the website. None of the posts expressed support for either candidate, while they bitterly, even sardonically, expressed critiques of both:

Dear respected candidates, I love you who love this country so much…Anyway, either one of you will become President…So, please send your all used banners to Taean (so that we can recycle them into mops for cleaning). I believe you will because I believe in your patriotism (ID:Nuribom, Dec. 16, 2007).

Trouble is always made by a small number of power-hungry people, while solutions are always charged to lay citizens. The Taean case is no exception. I’m getting crazier watching these presidential election
campaigns. I know who the candidates are. So you don’t have to stump any more. If you have time for stumping, rather spend it at the Taean cleanup service. Instead of giving money to your hired supporters, donate the money to Taean residents (ID:hanelmot, Dec. 17, 2007).

Meanwhile, Korean SMOs have strived, too, to utilize the advantages of new media technologies to expand their influence, developing a variety of online mobilization tactics such as online donations and online-signature-collections. However, while Chadwick assumes that SMOs tend to be at the forefront of innovatively organizing civic action, Korean SMOs are far behind netizen groups in the area of innovation. The SMOs’ adoption of and adaptation to new media technologies did not automatically lead to fundamental changes in organizational forms and values. As revealed in the rupture between netizen groups and Bum-dae-wee during the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations, the traditionally hierarchical and centralized communication forms SMOs employ were not replaced with the emergent horizontal and decentralized network forms advanced by netizens. Rather, SMOs were eager to co-opt netizens’ emergent power to increase their political influence, in a sense absorbing a new content into their old form. As Angma (Kim Gibo, 2006) had asserted, SMOs might become new hegemonic groups that “allocate freedom of expression only to those” who supported their leaderships. Cho Dae-yup (2008) has argued that major Korean SMOs came to a deadlock due to their bureaucratic institutionalization:

Leading civic organizations increased in size and began to operate in a more systematic way, to the extent that they can be said to have become pseudo-political parties which handled comprehensive issues. This trend of systemization was in response to the centralized and authoritarian political power structure (p. 202).
Previous literature about Korean Internet activism has tended to neglect how dynamic correlations among netizens, parties, and SMOs at the macro-level shape Korean political environments. Fascinated by the successes of progressive online media and the victory of a netizen-supported candidate in the early 2000s, some scholars optimistically fantasized about the technological advantages of the Internet, arguing that new media will enhance democracy. By contrast, overwhelmed by a rapid upsurge of right-wing reactionary power in 2007, some intellectuals expressed skepticism about the sustainability of progressive Internet activism, arguing that civic power on the net is both ephemeral and inherently co-optable. Both utopian phantasm and skepticism are incorrect. When extant political institutions—political parties and SMOs—neglect to adopt organizational values and communication styles embedded in newly arising Internet activism, focusing only on superficially imitating mobilization strategies, the politico-cultural gap between netizens and institutionalized political groups will increase. This gap may ultimately cause the loss of a bridge through which netizens’ desires and grievances can be delivered to offline political systems.

For instance, despite salient thematic differences between the candlelight vigils and the Taean campaigns, there was little distinction between the counter-hegemonic frames collectively produced by the netizens at each site. In both sites, netizens were critical of dominant social groups—mainstream media, chabol, superpower, and conservative politicians. Moreover, in the five years that had passed in the interim between the two demonstrations, new media technologies had become far more advanced, and netizens’ spheres of influence had been definitely expanded. Despite more activist netizens with more technological advantages, the political outcomes between 2002 and 2007 elections
were radically different. Why? Activist netizens’ apathy about the 2007 election can be partly attributed to a lack of leading political groups that could represent their voices in offline space. While Andrew Chadwick (2007) has argued that “imitation is a part of innovation,” (p. 286) Korean parties and SMOs remain frozen and moribund in their imitative mobilizing strategies, never progressing to a point at which they can introduce systemic, far-reaching, and truly revolutionary organizational innovations. Though netizens’ potential to reshape politics has not disappeared entirely, it has been enervated, trivialized, and demoralized through the appropriation strategies of political parties and SMOs.

The Evolution of Social Movements

The emergence of online-based netizen groups has exerted a great impact on social movements. First, the political and cultural influence of traditional mainstream media has suffered a relative decline. Despite the ceaseless resistance of conscientious journalists and intellectuals, mainstream media and pro-government intellectuals have maintained an exclusive status in producing dominant knowledge and discourse for over a half century. Emergent Korean netizens, however, have challenged the exclusive authority of mainstream media and conservative intellectuals by producing and distributing their own discourse and deconstructing texts produced by mainstreams. Netizens led, in opposition to mainstream media, collective action in the 2002 Candlelight Demonstrations and the 16th Presidential Elections. While mainstream media were eager to advocate President George W. Bush and to maintain traditional relations between the U.S. and Korean governments, netizens constructed critical framing against the unilateral foreign policy of
the Bush administration, distributing critical posts and sarcastic songs. In the Taean campaigns, mainstream media supported the Taean volunteers in sensationalistic, apolitical terms, portraying their involvement through humanistically moving stories rather than anti-corporate critiques. Regardless of the media’s framing of the campaigns, however, most netizens condemned Samsung for contaminating the Taean area, while mainstream media rarely (even never) blamed Samsung directly. These counter-hegemonic discourses by netizens were promoted by datgul and pumjil across online bulletin boards.

Second, the distinctions between political and subcultural discourses, struggles and entertainments, and demonstrations and festivals have been blurred. Netizens—particularly the post-386s—openly expressed their anti-authoritarianism by producing and using satirical image-graphics, black-humored songs, and parodic music videos to criticize and deconstruct dominant hegemony. Through sharing and distributing those sub-cultural texts, netizens constructed a sense of solidarity in opposition to the pro-American or pro-business government and chabol. As political and subcultural discourses have converged, the traditional boundaries between struggles and entertainments have also become destabilized. For the post-386 generation, the 2002 candlelight vigils and the 2007 Taean campaigns were kinds of exciting adventures, even field-trips, rather than grave struggles. Many netizens participated in the events by bringing along their children on the weekends, equipped with lunch boxes and snacks. Political struggles were no longer defined—as they had been in previous generations—by street protests concomitant with violent clash with the police. While this new form of “entertaining” civil action may at first seem frivolous, it has actually provided more secure social platforms on which
participants can exchange critical opinions and engage in horizontally, and autonomously organized civic actions (songs, artistic performances, public discussions) that do not require recourse to hierarchical, elitist leadership structures.

Third, the Internet activism, thus, has prompted novel forms of leadership. Horizontal communication forms, democratic decision-making, and non-hierarchical and decentralized leadership have newly appeared to challenge vertical organization. While it is true that, as Chadwick has asserted, SMOs in Western countries have introduced some innovatively “non-hierarchical” forms of organization, in Korea it has been netizens who have offered alternatives to SMO’s beholden to hierarchical, pseudo-political-party forms. Unlike European countries, where representative democracy and party politics had been introduced long ago, Korean society is still recovering from a decades-long authoritarianism, and Korean political parties and radical SMO’s are still leaning on the centralized leaderships that arose during the authoritarian regime.

Korean Internet activism led by lay netizens shares many aspects with “new social movements” that first emerged in Europe. Just as European new social movements emerged in opposition to the institutionalized labor movement and bureaucratic political parties, Korean netizens’ movement appeared in distinct contrast to the institutionalized SMOs and authoritarian parties (Jeong Taesuk, 2006; Kim Sunhyuk, 2000). Alberto Mellucci (1994), one of the scholars who introduced the term “new social movements,” has described one of the distinct features of new social movements as:

…the forms of organizations and action as modalities of conflict expressed not in the content but in the form and in the process of collective action. The structure of mobilization is provisional and reversible; it is based on direct participation, which is considered a good to be used regardless of the results it achieves; it is designed to meet the needs of individuals who long longer between work time and leisure time (p. 123).
Emphasizing collective action and the de-professionalization of activist movements, Melluci’s description of new social movements is aligned closely with the ways in which Korean netizens have operated.

Despite many innovative features of Korean Internet activism, however, it is doubtful that this activism has lead netizens to an awareness of global citizenship beyond national boundaries. As shown in the debate between Angma and Bum-dae-wee in the 2002 vigils, some progressive netizens strived to move on to the globalized rally to protest the Iraq War and express sentiments of global peace, while Bum-dae-wee insisted on focusing on Korea’s political and military independence from the U.S and the establishment of equal relations between the two nations. Though many netizens expressed a reluctance for Bum-dae-wee’s centralized leadership, few dissident voices were raised when he expressed his nationalistic goals. Rather, the post-386 netizens further gave voice to their strong sense of nationalism and antipathy toward the U.S. Unlike the multitude, which Negri and Hardt (2004) have identified as a new historical subject beyond the boundaries of nation-states in the global age, Korean netizens tend to adhere to nationalism as a bulwark against encroaching superpowers. The long-term domination of the U.S. on the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War might have been a big obstacle that prevents Korean netizens from realizing a sense of transnational citizenship.
Summary of Theoretical Implications

The Internet as a contested terrain, wherein both conservatives and progressives struggle for their own political goals, was a notion primarily adopted by Korean younger generations—the so-called 386 and the post-386 generations. The younger generations constituted progressive netizen groups, positing themselves distinctly from existing political action groups such as political parties and SMOs. They have utilized the Internet for “resource mobilization, virtual struggles, and alternative knowledge production” as discussed in chapter three, to embolden progressive civic action in Korea. In terms of resource mobilization, netizens have introduced horizontal and decentralized networks to facilitate civic, autonomous participation. In terms of virtual struggles, netizens have adopted and adapted a variety of online tactics to further their actions. In terms of alternative knowledge production, netizens have developed datgul and pumjil cultures, by which distributed trust is created.

As revealed in serial events of Internet activism from 2002 to 2007, Korean netizens have constructed counter-hegemonic frames to re-project their grassroots ideas, removing the traditional boundaries between politics and culture, struggle and entertainments, demonstrations and festivals, and, ultimately, public and private. Because they equally reject institutionalized social movements and their hierarchical politics, Korean Internet activism coincides with Western-based new social movements. However, a lingering nationalism traceable to American domination has prevented Korean netizens from completely internalizing a sense global citizenship beyond national borders.
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION

Summarizing conceptual discussions and findings of this study, this concluding chapter describes the significance and admitted shortcomings of this research. While this Korean case study offers some significant lessons inspiring people to consider better ways to be engage in participatory democracy and civic journalism, it does not explain how multiple outlets of media might have interacted to either promote or repress netizens’ social involvement during 2002-2007. In addition, this study does not focus on the influence of Internet activism on the internal structure of parties and SMOs. For future study, this chapter suggests three main areas: a historical approach to examine sedimentary networks; a study on the correlation between the numbers of hits posts receive and viewers’ selective reading practices; and an inter-cultural comparative study focusing on the respective uses of the Internet during Korea’s 2002 Presidential Election and the U.S. 2008 Presidential Election campaigns.

Summary of the Study

This study has examined the ways in which the Internet is utilized for progressive ends, focusing on a detailed case study of Internet activism in South Korea. The purpose of this study was to examine: (1) the ways in which the Internet is utilized for progressive civic action; (2) the extent to which Internet activism is differentiated from preexisting social movements; and (3) the ways in which the Internet affects movement repertoires and organizational forms of civic action. To meet these goals, this study has investigated: (1) the historical background of Korean Internet activism; (2) the social agents of Internet
activism; (3) movement repertoires and the growing awareness of citizenship those repertoires engender; and (4) the theoretical implications of the present Korean case.

This study began by critical reviewing extant literature regarding the Korean cases, pointing to theoretical shortcomings, particularly a lack of meta-analysis, misconceptions about new media and old media, and the tendency toward technological determinism. In the theory chapter, discussing the impact of the Internet on politics and culture, this study identified the Internet as a contested terrain shaped by ongoing struggles among a variety of contentious political groups. Drawing on previous studies and theoretical frameworks, this study then suggested a preliminary conceptual map that describes major areas of Internet activism including resource mobilization, virtual struggles, and alternative knowledge production. In addition, this research has considered the theoretical framework proposed by Andrew Chadwick (2007), adopting his model of organizational hybrid mobilization movement and new digital movement repertoires to examine research questions relating to social agents and movement repertoires in Korea. This study has employed multiple research methods, such as a quantitative method for data description, qualitative framing analysis of online posts and interview scripts, in-depth interviews with three leading members of Korean civic action, and focus-group interviews with forty-one participants, including college students and OhmyNews citizen reporters.

The findings of this study suggest that Korean Internet activism has been exerting a huge impact on political and cultural environments. Korea’s liberal and critical younger generation has predominantly used the Internet, constituting amorphous and hybrid groups of Internet users who are aware of citizenship—namely netizens, mainly led by
the 386 generation and the post-386 generation. The emergence of netizens in Korea represents a challenge to both oppositional SMOs as well as dominant conservative groups. Korean SMOs, which had played a pivotal role in struggles against the military dictatorship in past decades, have maintained hierarchical organizational forms and centralized leadership, while netizens have constructed horizontal and decentralized networks for civic action. This has led to an ambiguous, sometimes contentious relationship between netizens and SMOs, who sometimes collaborate to achieve similar progressive goals but at other times sharply differ over methods, structures, and organizational ideology. While netizens have criticized the authoritarian leadership of SMOs, the SMOs have questioned the continuity and sustainability of Internet activism in the absence of centralized leadership.

This study also found that Korean Internet activism has brought about noticeable changes in movement repertoires. Netizens have organically combined online and offline struggles to maximize their voices, proposed creative tactics based on open and horizontal relationship among lay citizens, and effectively used satire and parody to deconstruct hegemonic culture. Datgul has promoted interactive communication among netizens, while pumjil has widely distributed netizens’ own messages across websites. Datgul and pumjil have contributed to the construction of netizens’ public opinion and the creation of distributed trust. Through such interactive communications, progressive netizens have created counter-hegemonic frames in opposition to dominant social groups. Distinct from Andrew Chadwick’s assumption proposed in the western context, Korea’s organizational innovations of civic action have led mainly by netizens, rather than by SMOs. Although many SMOs in Korea are adopting the Internet as a tactical tool, they
have failed to adopt the deeper values of direct democracy embedded in the netizens’ movement repertoires. Meanwhile, Korea’s Internet activism also shares similarities with European new social movements, as both are opposed to the institutionalization of political and social movements. However, Korean netizens tend to still harbor a strong sense of nationalism based on antipathy toward the U.S.

Limitations

While many previous studies have tended to focus on how established institutions and recognizable individuals have used the Internet as a means of resource mobilization, this study has explored a wide range of civic actions that Internet activism has newly activated. In particular, this study has focused on the ways in which lay citizens, with no ties with institutionalized political groups, have appeared as new agents of civic action. However, this study does not entirely explain the full dynamics of the social contexts in which Korean activism occurs.

First, this research did not explain how multiple media outlets had interacted in promoting or repressing netizens’ social involvement during 2002-2007. As Byungkwan Lee et al. (2005), has asserted, netizen agenda can be influenced by the existing media agenda and vice versa. In particular, as described in chapter 6, the independent daily newspaper Hankyoreh and the semi-publicly owned MBC broadcasting station have maintained strong ties with progressive netizens by the media’s relatively favorable news coverage about progressive netizens. Meanwhile, mainstream media, including Cho-Joong-Dong, have interacted with netizen agenda in more complicated ways. Their saliently reactionary news portrayals often brought about an unexpected backlash as
Yoon (2003) asserted in the 2002 election, while they have deranged netizens’ struggles on some occasions. This dynamic and complex interactions among media was not fully investigated in this study.

Second, this study did not describe how the emergence of Internet activism has affected the internal structures of political parties. This study has suggested that political parties have strived to selectively adapt new media technology to their campaigns and to expand their influence in cyberspace. However, this research did not probe whether and how parties’ adoption of and adaption to the Internet have influenced the internal structures and values of the political parties. For instance, deeply impressed by Nosamo’s support for candidate Rho Moo-hyun, Uri party (the successor of NMDP) had introduced in 2006 a new reformatory party-membership to expand the participation of young progressive citizens, and repealed it in a year due to blustering repulsion within the party. This study did not explore a variety of debate, ignited by the netizen movement, in political parties.

Future Research

For further studies, additional research agenda should be considered. First, as a follow-up study, a historical approach is needed to examine the continuity of Internet activism. In addition to the events examined in this study, other large-scale civic actions—including the 2004 Candlelight Vigils for Anti-Presidential Impeachment, the 2004 General Election, and the 2008 Candlelight Vigils protesting the indiscreet import of U.S. beef—need to be explored. Drawing on the concept of “sedimentary networks,” which Chadwick (2007) has suggested as a fourth principle in digital network repertoires,
the future study will investigate whether netizens’ autonomous networks can be revived and reconfigured over time, and how older networks affect the construction of newer networks. For this study, longitudinal approaches and cohort studies can be employed, focusing on the traces of Nosamo, OhmyNews reporters, and Taean café members.

Second, a study of the correlation between the number of post hits and viewers’ selective reading processes needs to be conducted. This study has assumed that posts with the largest number of hits are likely to be read by more viewers. In addition, it has been assumed that posts with bigger number of replies are likely to be selected by more viewers. However, few empirical studies exist on this subject. Using surveys and experimental methods, a future study will examine how other viewers’ selections of posts influence subsequent viewers’ selection of readings, and how these processes affect the construction of public opinion.

Third, an inter-cultural comparative study will be conducted, focusing on the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election and the 2002 Korean Presidential Election. By comparatively examining the election campaigns of Barak Obama in the U.S. and that of Roh Moo-hyun, nicknamed the first Internet President in Korea, this study would contribute to a better understanding of the impact of the Internet in different social contexts. Specifically, this future study will focus on a comparative study between the U.S.-based online civic network MoveOn (www.moveon.org) and Korea’s online community of Roh’s supporters, Nosamo (www.nosamo.com). Both organizations are non-profit, independent, voluntary citizen groups. Both have been involved not only in election campaigns, but in a variety of civic actions at local, national, and international levels to pursue progressive
social change. The future study will compare their missions, memberships and organizational forms, major agendas, and movement repertoires.
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Appendix A

Focus Group Interview questions I

For the OhmyNews citizen-reporters
who have been engaged in the production of news report and/or replies to the news

1. Involvement in OhmyNews (www.ohmynews.com)
   • In what way have you ever been involved in OhmyNews?
   • When did you begin to work for OhmyNews?
   • How many articles did you produce on OhmyNews?

2. Interactive communication on the Internet
   • Have you ever faced any supportive or oppositional replies or opinions for your article? How did you feel in each case?
   • Have you ever interacted with, shared any idea with, and argued against another OhmyNews viewer?
   • To what extent do you think you have reached consensus with other Internet users, through online discussion?

3. Political participation and the Internet
   • Have you ever participated in political actions, such as demonstrations, petitions, political campaigns, etc.?
   • Did your online activities affect any of your offline political actions?

4. OhmyNews and civic movement
   • How do you think about mass media?
   • How do you think about OhmyNews?
   • Do you think that citizens’ online communications on OhmyNews has affected mass media?
   • Do you think you online communication can affect political environments? Why do you think so?
Appendix B

Focus Group Interview Questions II

For Internet users
who have ever read or written any forms of online texts

1. Interactive communication on the Internet
   - Have you ever interacted with, shared any idea with, and argued against another Internet user? Please tell us your experience.
   - To what extent do you think you have reached consensus with other Internet users, through online discussion?
   - How did you feel when you were supported or criticized by other Internet users?

2. The relationship between online and offline activities
   - Have you ever participated in political actions, such as demonstrations, petitions, political campaigns, etc.?
   - Did your online activities affect any of your offline political actions?

3. Mass media and online alternative media
   - How do you think about mass media?
   - How do you think about citizens’ participatory media such as OhmyNews?
   - Do you think citizens’ online communications has affected mass media?
   - Do you think your online communication can affect political environment? Why do you think so?

4. Democracy and online activity
   - Do you think online discussion contribute to the development of democracy in society?
   - What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of online discussion in relation to democracy?
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