PATH DIVERGENCE WITHIN CRITICAL JUNCTURES:

POLAND, 1956; UNITED STATES, 1963; SPAIN, 1975

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Path Divergence within Critical Junctures:

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Institutions exert an overwhelming pressure towards maintaining existing power

structures. However, during critical junctures, reformers have a window of opportunity

to enact sweeping changes. Poland in 1956, the U.S. in 1963, and Spain in 1974

experienced deaths of their leaders. New heads of state assumed power. Each new leader

attempted to change the dynamics of current power relationships by empowering

heretofore unempowered groups. The new leader has to adapt to the exigencies of the

controlling groups – power centers – within the polity. Bureaucracies and institutions

embedded in government and society exert their own pressures, aimed at maintaining

their power by stifling the air of change. Władysław Gomułka, the First Secretary of the

Communist Party of Poland, allowed Workers Councils to organize in factories, giving

workers a voice in management. Lyndon Baines Johnson, President of the United States,

launched the War on Poverty, which included community action programs intended to

empower the poor. King Juan Carlos I was Franco's named heir to the throne, with the

express mission of continuing the Franquist regime. Instead, he initiated a transition to a democracy.

In each case, success for the reform leader's agenda was reliant on his careful control over when each power center had access to reform policies. Dominating the sequence allowed the reform leader to build coalitions among enough power centers to offset oppositional groups. The perceived legitimacy of the new leader was paramount in overcoming unpredictable events and mistakes made by well-meaning agents that would affect the progress of reform. Once the various institutions settled into newly-established patterns, the critical juncture ended and more change became nearly impossible to enact. Comparative historical analysis of the three cases yields results that are a complex interweaving of the several factors that impacted the success or failure of change.

In memory of my two

beloved mentors:

My father, H. Weston Coolidge and

my teacher and friend, W. Carey McWilliams.

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Chapter 1:

Introduction

This study concerns itself with the process of societal change that empowers the disadvantaged during periods of critical junctures. Looking at any specific moment within a society's history, it often appears as a precarious balance of forces that are knit together into a fragile whole. Yet societies remain remarkably stable. The more philosophical question would be – why does that happen? Immanuel Kant postulated that because humans have the capacity for reason, it is required of them that they submit to living in society.[1] His argument is an elegant explanation of both our natural instinct, which may not choose to live in society and our propensity to express our capacity for rationality, which, according to him, necessitates social interaction. It is this very conflict that creates the fodder for development. The question that motivates this study, however, is more specific. How does a society, faced with a period of disequilibrium, change within its political arena? To begin to consider the question, it is necessary to outline the parameters of what aspect of society we are discussing. Society writ large combines cultural constructs, economic welfare, political interaction and domestic security. One of the concerns here is how political power is a determinant of stability and conversely, of change. Political power, which includes power brokers within and outside of government and sustains a society, is more complex than institutional power controlling society. This

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[1] "Reason, in a creature, is a faculty which enables that creature to extend far beyond the limits of natural instinct the rules and intentions it follows in using its various powers, and the range of its projects is unbounded. But reason does not itself work instinctively, for it requires trial, practice and instruction to enable it to progress gradually from one stage of insight to the next." H. S. Reiss, ed. *Kant Political Writings,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 42.

argument makes the claim that the public sphere is defined by a balance of 'power centers' within society that are responsible for maintaining the status quo. A shift in the balance of power among the power centers creates a new environment that allows a redefinition of what that society is and who has control. Change in this context occurs when stability is no longer guaranteed.

Power 'brokers' share influence to greater and lesser degrees. Each group establishes routine means through which it can exert some control. This may be accomplished through cultural reproduction of meaning, materially through wealth, or institutionally through rules and regulations. Historical antecedents are embedded in the justifications each gives to explain the relationships of the current power sharing.

Even with the pressure from power centers to maintain the status quo, social environments are not static. Time, interaction, exogenous factors, debilitating limitations, sudden alterations or new players from within bring about destabilization and the opportunity for change. Historical institutionalist theory offers a convincing argument for the overwhelming stability of the status quo across time through path dependence. Yet, durable change can occur when a confluence of factors forces the balance off-kilter. Institutionalists have offered the theory that critical junctures are just such points of disequilibrium. For a certain period of time, dictated by agency, context and circumstances, there is an opportunity to make significant change in a given society. This study looks specifically at change in the alteration of the balance of power among power centers that regulate three different societies. Here, a shift occurs when an elite forces a restructuring of the groups, which can have a say in defining the rules of society.

Change occurs from both intended and unintended consequences. The independent variables across the cases are sudden deaths of active leaders, the rise of a charismatic leader as their replacement, and a reform agenda attempting to empower a new power center. The dependent variable (in this articulation of the project) is the success of a newly empowered group to become part of the balance of forces in a given society.

The project includes three case studies – Poland in 1956; U.S. in 1963; and Spain in 1975; a post-totalitarian regime, a democratic regime and an authoritarian regime. All three states witnessed a crisis in the form of the death of a leader. All three therefore had new leaders assume power under tense circumstances that led to a "critical juncture," wherein more dramatic change was possible. During these periods, the three leaders sought to capitalize on their political opportunities by introducing policy changes that would shift the balance of power to include groups within their societies that had not exercised much influence heretofore. Major changes, however, *always* undergo alterations before they become institutionalized. The leaders initiate policies that are sent to the next institutional arena for approval or implementation. This critical 'gate' is where the initial path of the policy, based on its contents, is diverted to include the agenda of this new set of power brokers.[2] This altered policy – an amalgam of the initial policy along with the changes introduced at the first gate – moves to the next gate, whereupon the policy encounters another diversion, and so on. The three cases demonstrate different expressions of "path divergence", that is, the complicated trajectory of any major change, based on the institutional structure of their polities, the strategic

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[2] A simple example: a bill, initiated by a Congressman, is sent to a committee to review. In the committee – the first major gate in the bill's processing – the bill is altered by the members of the committee to reflect their views or agenda.

maneuvering of key actors, how successful the disempowered group is in mobilizing and what other groups – who already possess a degree of influence – join with them.[3] In the end, the changes introduced are considerably modified from the initial intention. How altered the initial policy is has to do with several factors, including the authority and legitimacy of the leader.

Clearly this study is deeply embedded in an historical perspective. The past places its ball and chain on the heels of the new paradigm. A length of chain may drag down any effort to make significant changes; certain antecedents may be able to dig their heels in and make it impossible to move forward. The directions available to enforce change are limited due to the past. These ideas are fuel for the historical institutionalists who study path dependence and the stickiness of bureaucratic modes of behavior. But these aren't the only hindrances. Attempts are made to alter structures and policies, yet invariably the pathway of the action butts against hindrances from opposing forces in the present. How strong the various forces are that intercept at this trajectory will dictate the new diverging path of the initiated change. As Charles Ragin claims, "It is the intersection of a set of conditions in time and in space that produces many of the large-scale qualitative changes, as well as many of the small-scale events," that this study attempts to address.[4]

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[3] "In fact, if one thinks about it, there are many political institutions that are interesting precisely because if we look at them today we are struck, simultaneously, by how little *and* how much they have changed over time." Kathleen Thelen. "How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis", *Comparative Historical analysis in the Social Sciences,* ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 211.
[4] Charles C. Ragin. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1987, p. 25.

Theory

The context of societal change must be recognized as a richly dense and three dimensional space. Although the 'model' forum realizes its limitations as an abstract concept, we cannot forget that *social* science is studying life. It should not be reduced to a flat surface with parsimonious, universalizing rules governing behavior. Within the framework of this project, the model of social process looks more like a helix – a voluminous spiral - than a line. That is, an initiating force acts upon the system and evokes a response from the other power brokers. The relationship among the social forces that exert power, changes in some fashion. The competition from forces that wish to maintain the status quo, or even to incorporate changes they prefer, alters the course of change initially set. Reactions against initiated changes do not simply return the state of society to a former equilibrium. Society accommodates the change that has been foisted upon it within the framework of the preconceived agenda. If power brokers wish to remain powerful, they need to force the more contentious elements of the changes wrought into a more palatable form for their constituents. Inevitably, it sets a new course of action to follow. A compromise of varying degrees is eventually reached and the public sphere becomes seemingly 'fixed' in the altered paradigm.

As the new changes become a part of the system, their inherent weaknesses become manifest.[5] In a less contentious environment, different sources provide

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[5] These weaknesses seem to be multiple. Firstly, no idea has thus far proven to be perfect; those who attempt to implement the changes are themselves imperfect in their ability as well as their understanding. As Vance claims, "not only are the new adherents indifferent as compared to the leaders, but the leadership itself changes. Idealists, honest and visionary, agitate for unpopular causes but when it appears that these causes are likely to win, practical men of affairs take over the movement and administer on the basis of business and politics as usual. Pp. 129-130.

moderating influences to the initial project to safeguard its original idea. In a more

contentious environment, however, its ability to create the atmosphere for which it had

aspired becomes marred. Reactionary forces act upon this changed system to reinstall

their concept of the best societal framework, having accommodated the changes the

initiator has been able to demand. An altered paradigm, different from both the original

system and from the second system, gains ascendancy.[6]   Some of the rules that had been

denied/dropped in an earlier incarnation are reinstituted. Thus, human society does not

function within a closed circle, but instead, incorporates some changes at each point. By

focusing on these points of interaction – these moments of path divergence – we can

study a fundamental process encoded in social behavior and look to see if there are

identifiable markers embedded in these moments of contingency.

Project

This project examines the theoretical underpinnings of change within a specific

period of transition, attempting to promote an understanding of how humans respond to

these changes and variations in a political environment.[7] What is the process of change

in these circumstances? Once implemented, why do changes to the status quo fail, or

why do they succeed? What are the mechanisms meant to stimulate change, and more

importantly, what processes support and/or hinder those efforts?

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[6] Martha Ellis Francois applies a similar frame of thinking on revolts in the late medieval and early modern Europe in an article by that name in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History,* Vol. 5, No. 1. Summer, 1974, pp. 19-43.

[7] The findings do not equal Barrington Moore's reflections on the creation of the modern world and its moral implications in his seminal work, (Barrington Moore, Jr. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World,* Beacon Press, Boston, 1993). It does, however, begin with questions that span the essence of human behavior with regard to how it functions in society.

This study combines an understanding of human social behavior with case studies that follow a mechanism/process orientation. It builds upon the methodologies of Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam in their studies of mechanisms in contentious politics and focuses more keenly on the contingencies they mention but do not directly address. It takes into account the path dependence that historical institutionalists recognize in their studies of the 'stickiness' of ideologies, procedures and even irrational functions that continue beyond their utility. It focuses on path divergence as it functions in those rare times when critical junctures within the lifetime of a society become manifest.

Poland, United States and Spain

Governments, whether democratic, authoritarian or communist, require citizen participation (or at least simulated participation) in public life for their long-term continuance. Democracies have citizen participation as a basic tenet.[8] Communist and authoritarian countries demonstrate a desire to legitimize their form of rule by claiming to have citizen participation as well. At the same time, citizen participation can be problematic. Differences tend to create conflict within the public sphere may appear, to a greater or lesser extent, as a repudiation of legitimacy of the ruling body. Participation creates a degree of chaos or at least the fear of such. Thus, elites walk a delicate tightrope of honoring the claim of valuing citizen participation while seeking to maintain control.

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[8] For more on political participation, consult Pippa Norris. *Democratic Phoenix, Reinventing Political Activism,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison,* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978, Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics,* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1995, Pateman, Carole. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970 and Dalton, Russell. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Mass Democracies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

As we have witnessed time and again with massive upheavals, revolutions, or social unrest, changes made may not become fixed in the institutions of government, or in the cultural milieu. Policies can easily be eroded - such as Johnson's Great Society in the United States, which suffered massive cutbacks; or changes in government may only be new window-dressing of much of the old, such as in Poland in 1957. Therefore, change cannot be ascertained simply by articulating the winners and losers of periods of contention; as soon as the context changes, new alliances will form that will change the dynamics among the groups. In 1953 and 1956, the Polish workers sought to gain higher standards of living and more control over the workplace through protest. Why would workers demonstrate on the streets in 1955-1956 and not display any signs of discontent a few years later? Part of the reason rests with a clever rearrangement of which groups had what degree of power, while splintering support for the workers' councils among the different segments of the workers themselves. Spain did not eliminate the various groups that define its society and culture. In fact, there was a surprising continuity in its institutional structure while its political life changed from an authoritarian government to a democracy. Yet, who had power in the public sphere was altered dramatically. While the conservative groups, containing those who follow a strict, authoritarian brand of Catholicism, members of the military, and members of Franco's Falangist movement, still have a voice in political affairs, their *share* of power is significantly less. They have to share the floor with the various groups on the left, as well as a newly-formed moderate middle ground. The paradox of social life, therefore, is that stasis and change occur at the same time.

Poland

A condition justifying the rule of a communist totalitarian government is a set ideology that promises ultimately to be in the interest of the citizens. In the case of Communist countries whose governments were formulated under the Lenin/Stalin articulation of communism, citizens would begin to reap the benefit of communist rule once the economic plans had begun to have the desired effect of altering economic life and when the populace displayed a socialist ethos.[9]

In 1953, Josef Stalin died, leaving a vacuum of power at the pinnacle of the Soviet Union. The crisis gave rise to a shuffling of elites; the three most powerful were Lavrenti Beria, Commissariat for Internal Affairs, Nikita Khrushchev, who became First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Georgy Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Beria was feared by many of those in the politburo and was arrested, tried and executed for his role during the Great Purge. Malenkov, linked to Beria, was forced to resign in 1955, leaving Khrushchev sole party leader. It was not until 1956, when Khrushchev had successfully weathered the power struggles, that he began a campaign to discredit Stalin and begin a new Soviet era. From 1953 to 1956, Polish workers began to register their complaints about the conditions in the workplace and the low level standard of living they endured. The Polish politburo sought to address the rising level of discontent without much success. The death of Boleslaw Bierut in 1956, General Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party and president of Poland, came on the heels of

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[9] R. J. Crampton. *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and After,* Routledge, London, 1997.

Khrushchev's Secret Speech denouncing Stalin.[10] Władysław Gomułka, with the overwhelming support of the Polish people, became General Secretary, in spite of Khrushchev's reluctance.

In order to address a growing and disturbing dissatisfaction with government, Władysław Gomułka sought to re-invigorate broad commitment to communist governance through several new policies. One such policy granted the right to workers to form Workers' Councils. Because of the structure of authoritarian rule in Poland, Gomułka and the Central Committee decreed that workers could form Workers Councils that would participate in the functioning of their factories. Factory managers and the ministries that governed them still had ultimate control, but dissatisfaction with policy decisions and day-to-day operations would be more public. Workers' Councils – the first gate for path divergence – sought to gain more political power than Gomułka wanted and did not provide the service to the economy for which Gomułka had hoped. As well, other organizations, such as unions and local communist party organs, did not align with the Councils, but sought to regain power that had been siphoned away to the Councils. When Gomułka reorganized the Councils to share power and responsibility with other factory organizations, the Councils did not have the support from other groups to mobilize in protest. Gomułka, at this time, still garnered the respect of a large portion of the population, so outside sources of influence were not interested in paying the price of support either. The opening of devolved power to the Councils died.

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[10] The Polish case is especially interesting because of the interwoven dynamics of Soviet and Polish political life. Poland was 'subjected to' the trauma of both leaders' deaths.

U.S.

In November, 1963, John Kennedy, 35th president of the United States, was assassinated. Lyndon Baines Johnson, vice president, was sworn in as president the next day. The transition of power was swift and peaceful, in accordance with the rules of the Constitution. However, the country reeled from the tragedy. Johnson, the consummate politician, grabbed hold of the opportunity to enact sweeping changes and introduced a deluge of programs and initiatives. He initiated his War on Poverty to provide needed goods and services to the poor and to give them the tools to extricate themselves from their plight. The Economic Opportunity Bill sent to Congress included a provision for Community Action Programs in major cities across the U.S. The first gate, then, was with Congress. Surprisingly, most of the bill was passed without major changes. In 1964, the Office of Economic Opportunity, under the aegis of the President's office, oversaw the funding and implementation of Citizen Action Programs in several major cities across the United States. The agencies that handled the implementation of the programs were the next gate. The organization of the programs, the personnel responsible for governing them, the relationship with the city and state government, and the mix of political activism and social welfare provision differed program to program. The inconsistency of functionality and success were problematic for Congress to assess and since Congress was footing the bill, there was a demand for accountability. Mayors, who had initially supported the Community Action Programs, were divided on its implementation. Because a significant proportion of inner city poor were black, the programs became associated with Civil Rights. Rioting by black communities aggrieved by unequal rights and opportunities, turned the larger, moderate white communities

against them and by association, the Community Action Programs. By 1966, Republican members of Congress opposed to the War on Poverty, began to exert pressure to minimize the programs. The war in Vietnam consumed huge sums and eroded Johnson's public support. All the policies for which he was responsible came under fire. Through the Nixon years, there were enough supporters among the members of Congress to protect the CAPs, but by the Reagan years, public sentiment and congressional support withered. Reagan diverted the power of control over the funds for CAPs to the states, effectively reducing them to a small number.

Spain

General Francisco Franco held the reigns of power in Spain from 1936 to 1975. Before he died, he named Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon as his successor. During Franco's lifetime, Juan Carlos had been consistent in his support for continuing the Franco regime once he became king. However, as the new ruler after Franco's death in 1975, the king set in motion the process of the transition of Spain from an authoritarian regime to a constitutional monarchy. In order to do that, he needed to quell resistance from the powerful members of the *Movimiento Nacional,* the sole legalized party of Spain, and from the military, which was overwhelmingly made up of Francoist supporters. The oppositional groups on the left did not trust the successor of Franco to make significant changes. Juan Carlos' first actions were to place key people in important positions to provide the necessary support. He chose members of the *Movimiento* who he knew were reform-minded to be able to bypass the scrutiny of the hardliners.

The first gate to begin the process of democratization was the Council of the Realm. Through shrewd, political maneuvering, Juan Carlos orchestrated the appointment of Torcuato Fernández-Miranda as president of the Council of the Realm. He in turn, was able to maneuver the members – all devout Francoists – into placing Adolfo Suarez on the list of three candidates for prime minister acceptable to the Council. Suarez had served the Franco regime well and oppositional forces were convinced that his appointment meant a return to rigid policies. What was crucial to the king's purposes was that the right wing also believed that Suarez would uphold the old order. Suarez proceeded along a course of action that took the sequence of events very seriously. He hoped to forge a democratic system through uniting a broad coalition of supporters. His first act was to release scores of political prisoners. A month later, Suarez met with oppositional leaders to gauge their strength. Because of the fear of a military coup, extremists moderated their positions to form a coalition with the rest of the oppositional parties. The king and Suarez replaced hardline generals controlling the military forces with more moderate generals, hoping to keep the army from a revolt.

The second gate to reform was the passage of a bill in the Cortes allowing for the legalization of other political parties and general elections. Miranda, as president of the Council of the Realm and of the Cortes, submitted the bill to the full session of the Cortes, bypassing a more secretive commission process. Because the general public favored reform, the Cortes was compelled to approve the bill. With the support of a wide swath of the nation, more extremist groups on both the right and the left were compelled to accept a more moderate course to the democratization process.

After general elections, the king presided over the writing of a Constitution that needed the cooperation of all the parties that had been elected. After the Moncloa Pact was created, it was submitted to a general referendum and was approved. Although the king did not maintain authoritarian powers, he was widely regarded as the stabilizing force behind the massive changes in government. By the time the military realized the extent of the reforms and the potential loss of power, their attempts at military coups were not supported well enough to succeed. Even though difficult relations continued within the public sphere – the discontent of the military and the terrorist activity of the ETA – respect for the king helped provide legitimacy to the fledgling democracy.

All three cases demonstrate the importance of the interaction of power brokers. While authoritarian governments are rightly viewed as more limiting than democracies, it is a mistake to consider any authority as monolithic. Legitimacy and authority actually may be important contributors to promoting durable change, as opposed to brute force. In other words, the case studies demonstrate the importance of a complex set of influences that converge on a moment to make their mark. Power centers whose influence has dipped are still there and will make a comeback, having incorporated a set of principles and policies that reflect the new environment. The parameters of social interaction are limited but that does not mean that they do not change.

In order to fully explore the dynamics of change within the three cases, it is necessary to consider at length the theories of social change and the political consequences of power. The approaches of historical institutionalism and contentious

politics help delineate the parameters of this study. Chapter two explores social change

and political power, and examines in depth the choice of approach for this project.

Chapter 2:

Theory

In order to consider the process of change within the case studies of elites empowering the disadvantaged, it is necessary to outline the theory and method by which to proceed. Therefore I have considered first the process of change, the history of thought concerning change and a model to help conceptualize how change occurs. Because this is a study about politics and change, it is also necessary to consider how power is organized, maintained and transferred. Power and change require an historical view to demonstrate and articulate the dynamics at work. Historical comparative theorists highlight history to demonstrate the dynamic process of change that impacts societies. Within that field of study, historical institutionalists and contentious politics theorists are exploring public politics in ways that include actors, institutions, and organizations that interact to form a dynamic of change. I review each of these approaches to determine their usefulness for my study of elite power transfers and their consequences in Poland, the United States, and Spain.

Change

The process of change and its dynamic interplay has occupied many thinkers. While change is the subject of this section, it is helpful to articulate a basic philosophical view of what motivates the actions of human beings. We cannot escape the fact that, while we are subject to the impulse of self-preservation in order to preserve ourselves, we

need others.[11] As Immanuel Kant recognized, the human species is subject to the

paradox of desiring society and yet fighting against it; what he termed humankind's

"unsocial sociability": "…that is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled,

however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society

up."[12] Thus, all social relationships are in a state of flux, constantly needing to re-

establish the purpose for which the members of a particular group have come together.

As time passes, the ideas that generated the purpose of the group are reworked; the

context within which those past parameters are functioning changes; different members

interpret what they believe to be the proper functioning of the organization; each member

alters his/her relationship to the ideas and to those who are articulating a certain

interpretation of those ideas and the many support or resist. This undermines a static,

abstract ideology almost immediately. "Wills are inconstant things, and anything built by

them will for that reason show an innate tendency to come apart."[13] Yet, if we subscribe

to the philosophical perspective of Aristotle, Rousseau (and Kant), we return to society as

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[11] In *Confessions,* St. Augustine begins his autobiographical exploration with his infancy, in which he states plainly this idea of need and relationships. "Little by little I began to realize where I was and to want to make my wishes known to others, who might satisfy them." This becomes the basis for a wonderful discourse on fundamental interrelatedness with which he proceeds to build his case of our relationship with God. R. S. Pine-Coffin. *Saint Augustine Confessions,* Penguin Books, London, 1961, p. 25. There is little option these days, but to participate in the social networks around one. Perhaps Rousseau was right that the times of living one's life free from the madding world were long gone a long time ago. Whether we wish to become part of the chaotic world of society or not, we are affected by who wields power to make decisions, consequences of those decisions, and efforts to clean up the mess all decisions leave behind. There are still those who believe that human society progresses, but a growing number of us look with some trepidation on what will happen with the next shift in the power structure. Certainly some things have changed. Human interaction is complex. Our worldview is significantly altered with the technological advances that make the world oh, so small. Yet certain universal aspects of human behavior react to new factors as well as new combinations of factors, relationships, policies, conflicts with the same impulses. Thomas Hobbes' claim that self-preservation is the primal motivating force for each individual is hard to refute. Max Weber recognized that status-seeking is a strong motivating force, as is Marx's economic well-being. As the French say, "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose."[Raymond Aron. *France: Steadfast and Changing,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960, p. 5.] This is the first paradox of social interaction. How are we to make any reasonable judgment? Do we try to reform the limitations we face and the difficulties to which we are subjected? Or do we avoid meddling with the status quo?
[12] Reiss*,* p. 44.
[13] Ibid, p. 7.

the basis through which humans are able to develop. "…what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty."[14] Are we talking about progress again? Kant would have us believe in the human potential, albeit sometime in the distant future.[15] Yet, for all our talk of developing institutions and laws that will govern behavior and the reliance on education to promote ideals, human development appears to be an individual process. This is the second paradox of social interaction. We seem to be destined to keep re-inventing human development, while we are subject to the context of our societies. This helps to explain why lessons learned a generation or two ago (and longer) don't seem to remain vibrant.

How are we to study the change within society? If we look at a society during a time of transformation, the major forces that undergird that particular society may appear to undergo change, to relinquish power to a new paradigm of social forces. The next point in time, however, reflects not only the changes that took place amidst the dynamic interaction of competing forces, but a repositioning of those forces, which alters the change.[16] If paradox riddles social interaction, then it would seem unlikely that the process of change progresses on a linear trajectory. Frequently analyzed inadequacies of the mono-linear theory of progress point to the need to view human society as evolving along a historically specific, dynamic, contingent and therefore messy, winding path.

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[14] Jean-Jacques Rousseau. *The Social Contract and Discourses,* The Everyman Library, London, 1999, p. 196.

[15] Mary J. Gregor. *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.

[16] Such an argument can be oriented in the numerous thinkers who have been interested in social dynamics. And in fact it may be that one could argue the inevitability of outcome based on factors present at the beginning. However, while Vilfredo Pareto posits a model based on a two-dimensional action-reaction cycle and Sorokin implies controls on the parameters of social systems by claiming that it has an Aristotleian fate to accomplish, later scholars focus on agents and their motives, preferences, cultural and psychological perspectives, and relational causes.

Isaac Newton's Third Law of Motion - for every action there is an equal and opposite

reaction - begins to argue the dynamics of change. The problem with Newton's law in

terms of its application to human social behavior is that we must consider more than two

forces. That is, social behavior cannot adequately be understood by reducing it to one

side opposing another one side. This is not to say that dichotomies do not exist; but those

dualities are impacted by factors other than simple opposition.[17] As Dennis Hale

comments, "Politics involves both 'configuration' and 'dynamics' – it is about 'where

different things stand in relation to one another' and 'how successive events arise from

one another."[18] A dynamic process by definition includes a sense of constant flux.[19]

Georg Simmel states: "Both in the succession and in the simultaneity of social life, the

two are so interwoven that in every state of peace the conditions of future conflict, and in

every conflict the conditions of future peace, are formed."[20] Societies are affected by

dramatic occurrences, changes in the status of resources, technological improvements,

new configurations of ideas, an accumulation of historical events, international pressures,

and regime change are some. However, powerful processes exist within society to

maintain a status quo: institutions, laws, bureaucracies, cultural icons, language, and

patterns. Bertrand de Jouvenel understood this dynamic process and appreciated the

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[17] The neat scientific application of like meets like – the amounts on both sides of the equation are equal – hardly bares out in the world of human society, subject to rational, irrational, emotional, physical, time, space etc. In fact, another analogy – the concept of nonlinear equations - may suit our purposes better. Nonlinear equations have values on either side of the equation that do not equal each other. One change in one value may produce numerous effects in the other. Joseph Juran's 'Pareto Principle' posits that 80% of subsequent effects comes from 20% of the causes.

[18] Dennis Hale, in his introduction to Bertrand de Jouvenel's, *The Pure Theory of Politics,* p. 3.

[19] Heraclitus has been accused of forwarding a philosophy of Universal Flux. Yet, he recognized the transformational nature of life. "…it is that law, eternally expounded by 'that which is wise' whereby unity and balance are achieved through the endless clash of the opposites comprising the real." Conflict does not interfere with life, but rather is a precondition of life. Heraclitus, T. M. Robinson. *Fragments,* University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1991.

[20] Georg Simmel. *Peace and Conflict,* It is argued as well, that Aristotle recognized this embedding of a state's downfall.

necessity of the balance of both. Ties of community or organization easily unravel.[21]

Human society, therefore, can be seen as an ongoing dance of forces exerting pressure on

one another; opposing the ascendancy of one over the other, re-equilibrizing – over time

– to regain power. Control over society, we can postulate, is not only in the hands of

individuals, it is as well governed by current and historical forces and their interaction at

any given time. An individual may be in the right place and have the ambition to grab

hold of the reins of power, in whatever form it presents itself.   Therefore, we are back to

considering how to accurately assess change, what, in fact, has changed, who or what is

responsible for it and whether a given change will become the status quo.   This presents

a complicated picture, for if we accept that change has taken place, then we are forced to

consider a reconfiguration of the dynamics of those forces that create a given public

space.

V. Pareto, in his effort to understand human social behavior, argues that societies

should be regarded as "a number of interdependent forces together constituting a system

in moving equilibrium."[22] This follows closely on the heels of Newton's Law of Motion

by claiming that changes introduced into the social system immediately evoke a reaction

to return to the former status quo. "Action and reaction follow one another indefinitely as

in a circle."[23] This is what produces an equilibrium. "Accidental movements arising in a

society are neutralized by the counteracting movement they provoke; and ultimately, as a

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[21] There is a call here to Kant's argument that humans suffer the contradiction of both being social beings, desirous of community and 'unsocial' in their individualist desire for power. Immanuel Kant. *Political Writings,* H.S. Reiss, ed. Cambridge University press, 2000, p. 44.

[22] Vilfredo Pareto. *Sociological Writings,* S. E. Finer, ed., Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, 1966, p. 13.

[23] Pareto, p. 31.

rule, they die away and society reverts to its previous state."[24] Societies, however, are

not stable, thus simply recreating themselves, but are in "continual motion: their

condition is one of *dynamic* equilibrium – society in its entirety being borne along by a

general movement which slowly modifies it."[25] This, according to Pareto, occurs because

human beings are governed by their innate desires, to which they imbue rationalizations

as justification for behavior. "Man as seen by Pareto is at the same time unreasonable

and reasoning."[26] This leads him to posit that the 'form' of society must remain stable to

exist. Normal change is accounted for in the movement of time through some mix of

those who desire uniformity (the residue of the 'persistence of aggregates') and those

who seek change (the residue of the 'instinct for combining').[27]

> It is evident that if the requirement of uniformity were so strongly active in all
> individuals in a given society as to prevent even one of them from breaking away
> in any particular from the uniformities prevalent in it, such a society would have
> no internal causes for dissolution; but neither would it have any causes for
> change.[28]

The argument concerning equilibrium is well-taken and in many ways anticipates

historical institutionalism's argument of enduring institutions and incremental changes.

Pitirim Sorokin takes on the challenge of accounting for all change, even normal change:

> The very performance of [an] act … generates a series of infinitesimal or great
> changes in the milieu, as well as in the system itself. After its performance, and
> due to it, the system ceases to be what it was before: it greatly or infinitesimally

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[24] Pareto, p. 32.
[25] Pareto, p. 32.
[26] Raymond Aron. *Main Currents in Sociological Thought,* Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 2009, p. 119.
[27] Pareto articulates six main classes of residues. See Vilfredo Pareto. *Sociological Writings,* S. E. Finer, ed., Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, 1966, p. 222-223.
[28] Vilfredo Pareto. *The Mind and Society,* ed. Arthur Livingston, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1935.

changes. Thus, among other consequences of the discharge of the act, there is the consequence of a modification of the system itself.[29]

Sorokin is making two important claims: a) that each act has consequences, and b) that the system itself is changed to a lesser or greater degree. The dynamics of the effects of change are immediately more complex. His next claim follows logically – that once an act is performed, the same action performed again will impact a slightly (or greatly) different system. Again, one can detect an underlying progressive scheme through Sorokin's combination of change and stasis. Something within the interplay remains constant, either the milieu or the stimuli, while the system and its reactions to the milieu continually change.[30] If both change and stasis occur in the intersection of event and system, then any system once created contains the "seeds of its change", because that system responds in a logical way based on its original components and how events/stimuli act upon it. Sorokin, then, presents an Aristotelian argument, albeit rather complex – the oak tree in the acorn – "any sociocultural system, as soon as it emerges as a system, bears in itself its future destiny."[31] External circumstances, according to Sorokin, may accelerate or retard, facilitate or hinder, reinforce or weaken the realization of a system's potentialities and thus impact the final outcome, but those potentialities are a system's blueprint.[32]

Sorokin's perceptions of change are valuable, yet at the core of his theory is an assumption of the impact of logical action and sequential experience. With regard to the first, few of the important phenomena of the 20th century can be seen as the result of

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[29] Pitirim Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* Porter Sargent, Boston, 1957. p. 1311.
[30] Sorokin, 1312.
[31] Sorokin, 1313.
[32] Sorokin, 1314.

logical actions. The responses from the general public to the various Fascisms,

Communisms, and Socialisms were not entirely logical. They included a visceral

reaction to perceived wrongs and hoped-for idealistic outcomes that were both

unreasonable and emotional. This sort of response is a major factor in all history, ancient

and modern.[33] The second issue – time as sequential experience – can be considered

through historical consequence. Revolution and subsequent regime change is an

excellent example of this. If the Russian czar and his heirs are dead, then life as Russians

knew it must be irrevocably changed. Yet American diplomats in the 1950s who were

stationed in the Soviet Union, found the remarks of the Marquis de Custine, a 19th

century French writer, offered insightful observations of how to interpret events and

responses by Soviet government officials.

> The exercise of sovereignty through fear, the omnipresence of the secret police,
> the operation of the bureaucracy, the absence of personal and public liberty, the
> uprooting and banishment to Siberia of whole populations, the repression of non-
> conformist artistic endeavor, the sudden imposition of drastic monetary reforms,
> the subjugation of the Church, the conquest of foreign lands; above all, the
> secrecy, deceit and hypocrisy--all these and hundreds of other phenomena are
> historic as well as actual.[34]

Alexis de Tocqueville argued convincingly that the French government after the

Revolution mirrored several modes of behavior of the *Ancien Regime.*

> Was the phenomenon (the French Revolution) in fact so extraordinary as
> contemporaries supposed? Was it as unprecedented, as profoundly subversive and
> world-changing as they thought? What was its true significance, its real nature,

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[33]Charles P. Curtis Jr. and George C. Homans. *An Introduction to Pareto: His Sociology,* Howard Fertig, New York, 1970, p. 5.

[34]Astolphe de Custine. *Journey for Our Time: The Journals of the Marquis de Custine.* Phyllis Penn Kohler, ed., Pellegrini & Cudahy, New York, 1951, pps. 12-13. It would be too simplistic to claim that Russian society did not possess multiple differences from a hundred years ago as well.

and what were the permanent effects of this strange and terrifying revolution? What exactly did it destroy, and what did it create?[35]

A good portion of the rest of de Tocqueville's book demonstrates how little had changed from the old style. Although *some* components of a polity's public sphere may undergo alteration, subsequent realignment of the societal forces does not signify change in a straightforward line. As Rupert Vance claims, "Generally, it can be said of all social movements … that while they tilt the social balance upward they are reintegrated in the social equilibrium."[36] Therefore, we may be observing the intransigent nature of social relationships that articulate differing levels of power with regard to one another.

Subsequent thinkers have taken up the concern for paradox by articulating models that move away from static, reified systems. Piotr Sztompka describes an alternative model: "Society should be conceived not as a steady state but as a process; not as a rigid quasi-object, but as a continuous, unending stream of events."[37] Once again, thinkers hearken back to Heraclitus.[38] The consequence of viewing social life as dynamic brings history back into consideration.[39] "Society is no longer viewed as a rigid, 'hard' system, but rather as a 'soft' field of relationships."[40] Relationships become the source of continuity and identity. Charles Tilly would further this model by focusing on first the political process and then the mechanisms that push action forward.

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[35] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution,* Doubleday, New York, 1983, p. 4.
[36] Rupert Vance. "Toward Social Dynamics," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 10, No. 2, 1944 Annual Meeting Papers (Apr., 1945), p. 129.
[37] Piotr Sztompka. *The Sociology of Social Change,* Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1993, p. 9.
[38] "For, according to Heraclitus, it is not possible to step twice into the same river, nor is it possible to touch a mortal substance twice in so far as its state is concerned. But, thanks to [the] swiftness and speed of change, it scatters and brings them together again, forms and dissolves, approaches and departs." Heraclitus, T. M. Robinson. *Fragments,* University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1991.
[39] For a discussion of the problem of historical selection bias, see Ian Lustick. "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias", *The American Political Science Review,* Vol. 90, No. 3, Sept., 1996, pp. 605-618.
[40] *Ibid.* p. 10.

> What really exists are constant processes of grouping and regrouping, rather than stable entities called groups; there are processes of organizing and reorganizing, rather than stable organizations; there are processes of 'structuration' (Giddens 1985) rather than structures; forming rather than forms; fluctuating 'figurations' (Elias 1978) rather than rigid patterns.[41]

Social change, in this context, requires an appreciation of its complexity; the historical components that promote a dynamic interplay among groups; the processes promoting disequilibrium and re-equilibrium; and the negotiations that establish who has power and who does not. To explore power requires us to move from society writ large to a more narrow analysis that focuses on its role in political change.

Power

The differences between forms of government in different societies and the changes of form within the same society are but the accidents, to borrow the terminology of philosophy, of the same essence. The essence is Power. Bertrand de Jouvenel[42]

In a society that is highly sensitive to changes in the equilibrium anything that touches the seamless web of power relations involves everything else. E.E. Schattschneider[43]

Social life, whether it is observed through political institutions, cultural organizations, economic enterprises, building projects or neighborhood communities entails the negotiation of different wills. In order to move in any direction, to accomplish even small joint endeavors, those involved need to follow a course of action initiated by one or in agreement with a few, with whom the group is compelled to follow. "If by social interaction we mean one actor affecting another, then every instance of interaction

[41] *Ibid.* p. 10.
[42] Bertrand de Jouvenel. *On Power: The Natural History of Its Growth,* Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1993, p. 19.
[43] E.E. Schattschneider. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America,* Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1960, 124.

and every social relationship involves the exercise of power."[44] All social interactions

involve power.[45] Sometimes, the course of action is set by someone who convinces

others of his/her natural authority to dictate through his/her knowledge, experience, or

strength of character. At times, the dominant will has the capacity to enact punishment or

provide rewards and that is the source of a leader's authority.[46] The success of any

enterprise or the endurance of any organization will be determined by the degree of

cooperation (either forced or willing) among the participants. This is the basic definition

of what is political. As Bertrand de Jouvenel states, the art of politics "is a technique for

the addition of human energies by the union of wills."[47] The study of social life is a

study of politics, which must take into consideration the expression of power.

In order to study the process of change within political organizations – both

formal and informal – it is necessary to recognize that every interaction is a negotiation,

either purposefully engaged or secretly manipulated. "If we start from the proposition

that competitive power relations are the key to politics, we might have less difficulty in

understanding why things have changed so rapidly."[48] Many would argue that the study

of power is assessing the discrete variables of resources available (to whom and to what

extent) and resistance applied.[49] This can yield information that makes sense of

outcomes, such as those that favor certain groups over others. It is also true that a single

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[44] Amos Hawley. "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," p. 422.
[45] See Max Weber's comments on politics and power, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1958.
[46] "Without exception every sphere of social action is profoundly influenced by structures of dominancy." Steven Lukes, ed. *Power,* New York University Press, New York, 1986, p. 28.

[47] Bertrand de Jouvenel. "The Nature of Politics", *The Nature of Politics, Selected Essays of Bertrand de Jouvenel,* Dennis Hale and Marc Landy, eds. Schocken Books, New York, 1987, p. 6.
[48] E.E. Schattschneider, p. 123.
[49] Marvin E. Olsen, ed. *Power in Societies,* Collier-Macmillan Limited, London, 1970, p. 4.

person or tightly bound group cannot monopolize power. "Most issues of interest in the

social arena are issues in which many persons and many groups have some degree of

power."[50] A coalition forms, implicitly or explicitly setting the standards for how the

rewards will be allocated in a stable environment. As Thomas Lancaster and Gary

Prevost claim, "The composition of a political system's decision-making coalition is thus

at the center of a political regime."[51] Any shift within the ruling coalition, either in

membership or in allocation of benefits, brings a reorganization of the functioning of the

institutions. Therefore, change happens by the very fact that we continually renegotiate

our understanding of those principles that we claim to live by. As Michel Foucault states,

"in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold relations of

power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of

power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the

production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse."[52] And, at the same

time, those who most benefit from past interpretations seek to maintain the status quo.

Additionally, time provides the influx of new generations, wherein those who come of

age do so under different circumstances and with different experiences than their parents.

As well, circumstances out of anyone's control favor some and undervalue others.[53]

People who gain access to positions of power vary in their intelligence, their commitment

to more universalist values or particularistic concerns, and their relationship with others

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[50] Alvin I. Goldman. "Toward a Theory of Social Power", Steven Lukes, ed. *Power,* New York University Press, New York, 1986. p. 168.
[51] Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost, eds. *Politics and Change in Spain,* Praeger Publishers, New York, 1985, p. 3.

[52] Michel Foucault. "Disciplinary Power and Subjection", Steven Lukes, ed. *Power,* New York University Press, New York, 1986. p. 229.
[53] We don't tend to appreciate Machiavelli's recognition that an aspect of outcomes is unknowable; what he termed 'fortune'. Maybe the closest relative to fortune, beyond religious views, would be the claim that coincidence provides the wild card.

who hold power. We have a vision of a complex confluence of variables that affect any

given moment in time.[54] And because these variables are pulling in all directions, social

life appears contradictory – changing and unchanging at the same time.[55]

Although this appears to be a paradox, the problem with viewing the process of

change may be a tendency to regard society as an either/or proposition: either society

progresses or it stagnates. Sztompka provides a much more nuanced typology of social

processes.[56] He articulates four: linear, multilinear, non-linear and oscillatory processes.

The first follows a gradual, incremental, directional path. The second denotes processes

that "follow a number of alternative trajectories, skip some stages, substitute others, or

add stages not typically found," which he calls multilinear.[57] "The opposites of linear

processes are those which proceed by means of qualitative leaps or breakthroughs after

prolonged periods of quantitative growth, passing specific thresholds (Granovetter 1978)

or effecting certain 'step-functions'. These are non-linear processes."[58] It is, however,

the oscillatory processes that offer a closer fit with the thesis here. Sztompka identifies

two oscillatory processes, which follow "discernible patterns of repetition or at least

similarity."[59] The first is circular, when stages recur virtually unchanged and the second

is spiral or cyclical, when different levels of complexity are observable. Following this

line of reasoning, I propose a third oscillatory process that helps interpret reality – a

helix. Through time, there are several variables that consistently impact an aggregate:

some observe weaknesses and push through reforms, which leads to the acquisition of

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[54] See Charles C. Ragin. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1987.
[55] Both de Tocqueville and Aron comment on the paradox of change and its lack in France.
[56] Stzompka, p. 13-17.
[57] Stzompka, p. 14.
[58] Stzompka, p. 14.
[59] Stzompka, p. 16.

different limitations with the change. Others react by attempting to undo the reforms,

correct the problems engendered by the reforms, or in some way return it to the way it

was. This is, of course, no longer possible (a circular 'stage' wherein there is virtually no

change is rare in society, as it is subject to space and time). Instead, the reactionary

forces push the functioning of the aggregate to a combination of the old and the new,

with positives and negatives of both. It is as though a barricade (gate in the language of

this project) is placed along the road and it becomes necessary to divert course until the

reform meets another power center and is subjected to another barricade, which again

diverts the course. By the time the reform/policy returns to the initiator, it has been

changed; it is both the same and different. To visualize this, the altered policy/reform

would be on the next rung of the helix. It may be possible to enact change, but we need

to appreciate an historical, dynamic process that includes a number of forces, some acting

in concert with one another and some in opposition. As Raymond Aron noted,

government is never perfect.[60]

Comparative Historical Analysis

Social scientists try to understand societal behavior to learn what worked and

what failed; what caused which results; and perhaps how to predict large-scale outcomes.

"Social science…is an effort to identify the causal factors (or variables) that tend to

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[60] Raymond Aron, Daniel J. Mahoney, Brian C. Anderson. *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations,* Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 2003, p. 754. "Aron thus sees politics much as he sees epistemology: as the acceptance of and working with a necessarily irresolvable dichotomy." Tracy B. Strong. "History and Choices: The Foundations of the Political Thought of Raymond Aron", *History and Theory,* Vol. 11, No. 2, 1972, p. 185.

produce a particular kind of outcome."[61] To write about society, one begins by bringing

to the process fundamental assumptions about the nature and character of social

interaction. Some prefer to explore universalizing concepts of social behavior that they

can claim underpins all action. Some seek statistical relevance through compiling data on

a large set of cases. Some eschew causal consequence in order to focus on how the

players, as well as the context, are constructed. There are those who perceive life as a

series of complex interactions where the outcomes are contingent on multiple factors.

This last group chooses methods of inquiry that often do not present simple or

parsimonious answers or predictions to the questions asked. The questions themselves

may contain messy complications that are hard to prove.   Many look to historical settings

to uncover laws of behavior that are applicable to the present. As James Mahoney

suggests "Certain universalizing programs have tended to generate ahistorical concepts

and propositions that are often too general to be usefully applied in explanation….by

contrast, comparative historical analysts are frequently able to derive lessons from past

experiences that speak to the concerns of the present."[62] Comparative historical analysis

serves as a broad niche that includes different methodologies that address varying

perspectives.

Comparative Historical Analysis has a long history. Niccolo Machiavelli

demonstrated his recommendations for realist politics with historical cases. "He was

able, using the traditional humanist literary forms, to pour into them a realistic political

spirit which his age was acting on but which had never before been so well expressed in

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[61] Peter Hall. "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research", *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences,* James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 391.
[62] Mahoney, p. 9

political thought."[63] One of Machiavelli's innovations in thinking was to write about

politics from a realistic viewpoint. He rejected theology and metaphysics and took his

recommendations for political action from historical accounts.

> Here we are in the presence of something little short of a revolution in political
> thinking. The humanists who had written books about princes had written in the
> idealistic and scholastic medieval tradition; they were ridden by theology and
> metaphysics. Machiavelli rejected metaphysics, theology, idealism. The whole
> drift of his work is toward a political realism, unknown to the formal writing of
> his time….Machiavelli was expressing the realism that characterized the actual
> politics and the popular ethos of his time.[64]

The endeavor, although controversial, pushed political theory to engage in empiricism.

The findings – also controversial – laid bare the complications and contingencies inherent

in leadership and action.

The Age of Reason moved us along several paths of comparative analysis –

thinkers who sought grand, universalist theory and those who examined different

societies through careful, empirical research. Alexis de Tocqueville and Max Weber

popularized comparative analysis through their insightful explorations of such epochal

transformations as democratization and institutionalization. Others followed, attempting

to plumb particular histories and eras in order to achieve broader, theoretical

generalization. "Practitioners of comparative history from Alexis de Tocqueville and

Max Weber to Marc Bloch, Reinhard Bendix, and Barrington Moore, Jr. have typically

been concerned with understanding societal dynamics and epochal transformations of

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[63] Max Lerner. "Introduction", *The Prince and the Discourses,* Niccolo Machiavelli, Modern Library, New York, 1950, p. xxxii.
[64] *Ibid*. p. xxxi

cultures and social structures."[65] Comparative historical analysis, then, has a long

tradition of providing valuable observations of political action that can be generalized to

provide insights into current social and political behavior.

James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer in their award-winning book,

Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, define this approach as,

"historically grounded explanations of large-scale and substantively important

outcomes."[66] They claim that three factors are necessary components of this approach: a

concern with causal analysis, emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic

and contextualized comparison.[67] Causal analysis is an effort to identify what factors

produce a particular outcome. Implied from the beginning is a time-dependent process

that is oriented in the past; the cause must be antecedent to what it causes. As Ragin

argues, however, identifying the cause is often less straightforward than it sounds.

Within the complex realm of multiple happenings, what can be isolated as a cause of

something else? What evidence can be supplied that proves that the causal relationship

one identifies is real? Branches of social science have called for falsifiable data in order

to replicate findings, as well as offer predictability. Such demands have been and still are

hard to produce while looking at a contextualized picture.

Although human and social behavior are not limitless, the combinations of factors

that include historical, cultural, contextual, exogenous, and endogenous components can

mix in ways that create different outcomes, even if two (or more) cases can be found

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[65] Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers. "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry'', *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* Vol. 22, No. 2, April, 1980, pp. 174-197.
[66] Mahoney, p. 4.
[67] Mahoney, 13

where all those particulars are equally present. Processes over time increase the complexity of outcome. The sequence of events can have a significant effect. Different relationships between and among factors arise depending on which precedes the other. For example, scholars studying democratization processes find that holding elections before or after writing a constitution impacts the transfer of power and the process of democratic consolidation. A policy or governmental structure may or may not change, yet as time passes and the context changes, the policy or structure may service society in ways for which it was not originally intended. A contextualized comparison requires a more in-depth look at periods across time and/or space. In order to gain some usable insights into historical cases, it is necessary to limit their number. This allows one to compare and contrast cases that share (or pointedly do not share) a limited number of antecedent components in order to understand particular processes, to move back and forth between theory and history to "formulate new concepts, discover novel explanations, and refine preexisting theoretical expectations in light of detailed case evidence.[68] The knowledge gained should be applicable to understanding social behavior more generally.

A fundamental worldview is shared by those who choose historical analysis: "That social causation is often both multiple and conjunctural is consistent with commonsense notions about how the world works."[69] Yet because comparative historical analysis embraces the complexities of social behavior, the methods adopted are varied. This makes sense given the tendency to derive theory from the historical experience studied. "Practicing comparative historical researchers are thus eclectic in

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[68] Mahoney, p. 13.
[69] Ragin, p. 25.

their use of methods, employing those tools that best enable them to address problems at hand."[70] As Skocpol and Somers argue, the efforts by Sewell, Lijphart, and Smelser to conflate comparative historical research into "a single methodological logic" of multivariate analysis is inadequate.[71] In fact, different methodological considerations have their own patterns of presentation, rules for case selection and strengths and weaknesses as explanatory tools.[72]

Skocpol and Somers identify three distinct types of comparative history – what they call macro-causal analysis, parallel demonstration of theory, and contrast of contexts. Macro-causal analysis embodies theory on a grand scale, using comparative history to make claims concerning macro-level structures and processes.[73] Barrington Moore, Jr. is recognized as following this approach. His classic work, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,* stems – according to him – from a long period of gestation, questioning the assumption that industrialism was the main cause of totalitarian regimes. From that consideration of a fundamentally accepted generalization, Moore looked at the historical development of agrarian societies in both East and West. He states his justification for this approach: "In the effort to understand the history of a specific country a comparative perspective can lead to asking very useful and sometimes new questions.… Comparisons can serve as a rough negative check on accepted historical

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[70] Mahoney, p. 12

[71] For more information on this, look at the following works: William H. Sewell, Jr., "Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History," History and Theory 6(2) (1967):208-18; Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Political Science Review 65(3-4) (1971): 682-93; and Neil J. Smelser, Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).

[72] Skocpol and Somers, p. 176.

[73] Skocpol and Somers, p. 181.

explanations. And a comparative approach may lead to new historical generalizations."[74]

Scholars like Moore combine theory and historical comparisons to provide novel

explanations. The Parallel Demonstration of Theory approach seeks to pose

generalizable theories that can be demonstrated across cases of comparative histories.

"The point of the comparison is to assert a similarity among the cases – similarity, that is,

in terms of the common applicability of the overall theoretical arguments" that are

presented.[75] The Contrast of Contexts approach seeks to place limits on theory and not to

generate new hypotheses. "[W]hat matters more in the Contrast-oriented type is that the

historical integrity of each case as a whole is carefully respected…each a complex and

unique sociohistorical configuration in its own right."[76]

Charles Tilly has his own formulation: Epochal Synthesis, Retrospective

Ethnography, and Critical Comparison. Epochal syntheses "depend on strong theories of

what drives human change and variation."[77] Retrospective ethnography, beginning with

Montesquieu, explains "historical events by reconstructing their participants' motives,

emotions, and states of consciousness."[78] Critical comparison, by contrast, which he

claims stems from Alexis de Tocqueville, sees social events taking place within a

framework of environmental and relational mechanisms and processes. If one can

identify the context as well as the confluence of variables that create an event, it is

possible to understand something about its presence. Skocpol, et al and Tilly are largely

identifying slight differences in similar projects. Macro-causal analysis/epochal

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[74] Barrington Moore, Jr. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World,* Beacon press, Boston, 1993, p. xix.
[75] Skocpol and Somers, p. 176-177
[76] Skocpol and Somers, p. 179
[77] Charles Tilly. "History of and in Sociology, Introduction to the Didactic Seminar on Methodologies of the History of Sociology", *American Sociological Association Annual Meeting,* Montreal, 2006, p. 1.
[78] Tilly, H&S, 1.

synthesis, parallel demonstration of theory/retrospective ethnography, and contrast of contexts/critical comparison all have similarities.

Comparative historical analysis utilizes the qualitative method and is an umbrella for more specialized approaches. According to King, Keohane and Verba, qualitative research focuses on "one or a small number of cases, [using] intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical materials, discursive in method, and concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some event or unit."[79] Within the field, there are a number of more defined arenas that attract scholars that center on particular bodies of theories, such as new institutionalism, social movements, and democratization, to name but a few. On top of that, there are proponents of particular models with clearly defined limits – historical institutionalist model or the rational choice institutionalist model; resource mobilization model of social movements or the political process model. It is possible to become narrowly confined within one of these approaches. My research indicated that none of these more narrowly defined models would adequately address my findings, which is why I moved further up the qualitative method chain to find an arena that allowed for an historical perspective that could borrow from multiple models to have more explanatory value.

The classic works of sociology, history and political theory sought to understand fundamental mechanisms and processes that create our social world, such as power, war, and change. Comparativists have moved from grand theory to address more bounded concerns – power as it is manifested within institutional frameworks; changes enacted

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[79] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, p.4.

through protest movements; resource mobilization within conflicts. This is producing scholarly works that are uncovering surprising truths about how political actions occur. Methods of inquiry such as historical institutionalism and social movement scholarship have articulated new theories that explain baffling factors within their arenas. Historical institutionalists are exploring how institutions handle efforts to create change, either through their resistance to change because of path dependent historical factors or their reconfiguration by new actors able to redefine the old concepts to fit a new context. Social movement scholars are looking at arenas of conflict to study how, why and when social movements are successful (or not). Some have moved to a broader field of study, examining the mechanisms that are implemented in all areas of contentious politics.

I am interested in change itself. In all three cases in this study, a change in policy has been enacted within the current institutions, but my primary focus is not on the institutions themselves, but more broadly on the responses of the power brokers within and outside of the institutions. Actors in all three cases engage in contentious politics, shifting the power differential to affect much of their societies; the impact on government institutions is part of the story. Therefore, I am borrowing concepts from both historical institutionalists and social movement scholars.

Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism is both new and old. In the early part of the 20th century, political scientists studied the details of governmental institutions, their patterns and history. Little effort was made to analyze their function or to explore explanatory

theories that could evaluate predictive behavior.[80] The behaviorist revolution post WWII

argued that people can consciously affect their social world and in fact, it is the

distributions of power and attitudes that shape politics. This too had limits in its scope

and could not explain constraints on agency. "The postwar mainstream paradigms were

in many ways discredited, positivism was under attack, and new political energies had

been set loose by the upheavals of the 1960s."[81] Certain key works from scholars like V.

O. Key, Walter Dean Burnham, James L. Sundquist, and David Mayhew, re-introduced

the role of history and cycles in the realignment of American political parties.[82]   These

works served as the basis of a refounding of historical impact on political development

that helped lead to the American Political Development movement and historical

institutionalism. In the incarnation of institutionalism, agency – human behavior and

power differentials – and the role of institutions is combined. "Institutionalism provides

the theoretical bridge between men who make history and the circumstances under which

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[80] "The general neglect of the analysis of political institutions during the behavioral period can be understood as a reaction against the lack of ambition towards positive theory in earlier political studies." Bo Rothstein. "Political Institutions: An Overview", Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds. *A New Handbook of Political Science,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. p. 140.

[81] Dorothy Ross, "The Many Lives of Institutionalism in American Social Science", *Polity,* Vol. 28, No. 1, Fall, 1995, p. 120. Also look at Goodin and Klingemann, "Theoretically, this renewed interest [in institutions] had several sources. One is perhaps intra-disciplinary – the failure of grand theory such as behavioralism, structural-functionalism, Marxism and so on to come up with workable hypotheses." P. 141.

[82] For more on realignment theory, look at V. O. Key, Jr. "A Theory of Critical Elections", *The Journal of Politics,* Vol. 17. No. 1, Feb., 1955, pp. 3-18. "A concept of critical elections has been developed to cover a type of election in which there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties, although the techniques employed do not yield any information of consequences about the mechanisms for the maintenance of a new alignment, once it is formed." P. 16. Walter Dean Burnham. *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics,* W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1970. "…eras of critical realignment are marked by short, sharp reorganizations of the mass coalitional bases of the major parties which occur at periodic intervals on the national level; are often preceded by major third-party revolts which reveal the incapacity of 'politics as usual' to integrate, much less aggregate, emergent political demand; are closely associated with abnormal stress in the socioeconomic system; are marked by ideological polarizations and issue-distances between the major parties which are exceptionally large by normal standards; and have durable consequences as constituent acts which determine the outer boundaries of policy in general, though not necessarily of policies in detail." P. 10.

they are able to do so."[83]   This synthesis of agency and institutional analysis allows for

examining both actors and institutions as objects and agents of the political environment

and their interaction. Although actors do have an impact on what happens, they are

constrained by the context within which they are operating. As Peter Hall states,

"organizational factors affect both the degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear on

policy and the likely direction of that pressure."[84]   This offers a method to explore the

complexity of dynamic interaction in social action that includes people, history, and

structural context. Historical institutionalism avoids the trap of modeling itself upon

scientific methodology that reduces human action to unrealistic universal laws, yet is able

to provide models that can be replicated to test its falsifiability.

The premise of Historical Institutionalism - that institutions already formed will

constrain the field of opportunities for change – allows us to assess more truthfully the

interplay of factors that impact variables within a given political moment.[85] As Steinmo

and Thelen state, "Conceptions of class, public philosophies, historical contexts, and elite

and public preferences intersect with institutional structures to produce particular policy

outcomes." These outcomes become the new arenas wherein future political and

institutional struggles are enacted.[86] But while historical institutionalism has successfully

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[83] Steinmo, Thelen, Longstreth, p. 10. also see, Stephen Skowronek and Matthew Glassman, eds. *Formative Acts: American Politics in the Making,* University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2007. "The appeal of building an actor-centered theory of politics has gone hand in hand with a growing sensitivity to gaps in the macro-level mechanics of prior historical theorizing. There is little patience in any quarter today with explanations that invoke disembodied historical forces or political processes….How to put the actor center stage and still keep open a view to the larger whole, how to assess changes effected in the moment against the standards of the longue durée – these are outstanding challenges." P. 2.
[84] Hall, 1986, p. 19.
[85] Goodin and Klingemann, "A central idea in all accounts of institutions is that they are enduring entities: they cannot be changed at once at the will of the agents." P. 152.
[86] Steinmo, Thelen, p. 27.

argued the constraining factors to change, it has had difficulty looking at change itself.[87]

As Skowronek and Glassman argue, "rather than treat them [institutions] as a set of

constraints, [they are] sites where the political ambitious vent their creativity and redefine

relations of authority."[88] The initial development of institutions has a lasting effect on

their functioning. Scholars have identified several forms of constraint to which an

institution is subject that fall under the umbrella of path dependency. "Path dependence

refers to dynamic processes involving positive feedback, which generate multiple

possible outcomes depending on the particular sequence in which events unfold."[89]

Thus, in one sentence, Pierson has combined the dynamic quality of institutional

development; its reliance on multiple experiences of positive reinforcement; and that

different outcomes are possible due to the sequence of experiences. In this conception of

causal trajectory, we focus on and gain insight into the ball and chain that wraps itself

around the structure that defines our political existence. Discomfiture, in this light, needs

to reach a threshold or a tipping point before change is possible.

What are those mechanisms? Different theorists have generated hypotheses to

explain and to explore change in such a context. In 1984, Stephen Krasner, borrowing

from evolutionary scientists, posed a model of punctuated equilibrium.

> In the absence of analytic tools to characterize and explain modes of gradual
> change, much of the institutionalist literature relies – explicitly or implicitly – on
> a strong punctuated equilibrium model that draws an overly sharp distinction
> between long periods of institutional stasis periodically interrupted by some sort

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[87] [87] Immergut, Structuring Politics, p. 57…."explaining change is a central problem for institutional analysis."

[88] Skowronek, Glassman, p. 3.

[89] Paul Pierson. Paul Pierson. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis,* Princeton University Press, 2004.

of exogenous shock that opens things up, allowing for more or less radical reorganization.[90]

Institutions are maintained over a long, stable period, punctuated by short bursts of change that resolve into a sometimes new pattern of functionality. During these dynamic episodic periods, previously latent institutions are revivified; new definitions are applied; exogenous influences make an effect and/or people alter their tactics to accommodate new contexts. Kathleen Thelen proposed a model of dynamic constraints that argues that major crises are not the only sources of institutional change. "Strategic maneuvering by political actors and conflict among them within institutional constraints (short of crisis) can influence the institutional parameters within which their interactions occur."[91] Actors have real agency and can act upon openings that surface. Shifts that occur within the social, economic and political realms impact the opportunities available for changes to the power structure. Such a model recognizes that although major, catastrophic transformations are rare, smaller alterations occur on a regular basis and the institution develops while remaining intact.

By theorizing a place for the role of individuals, new institutionalism can account for a more dynamic process within the political arena that allows for the passage of time and the entrances and exits of new and old players. "As in theater, the relevant action often plays out in separate scenes featuring a variety of characters and subplots; often it encompasses people in very different situations who are motivated by very different concerns; often the formative effect is lodged in a contingent alignment or juxtaposition

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[90] Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, eds. *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 1.
[91] STL, p. 15.

of actors, or in their reactions to one another in sequence over time."[92] Sometimes it is

the cultural milieu of new participants that sets the stage for alterations. New leaders,

seeking to place their stamp on the functioning of an institution will provide new

strategies in an effort to solve the chronic limitations that plague it. They may be

effective or ineffective; capable or inept; charismatic or alienating.   Even if those who

initiate changes are eminently qualified, they cannot control it.[93] The weaknesses

embedded in the structure or function of the institution often need to reach a threshold

before a significant enough number within the organization are willing to risk the

displacement of reforms. Initiation and support are both necessary. And what happens

once changes are enacted? Reforms do not occur within a vacuum. The rules of the

game are dynamically altered, the new policies molding themselves with the old to create

an amalgam.[94] This new 'creature' may create more problems than it solves or its

potential success may be dampened by the inclusion of underlying and embedded traits.

Time passes. Someone new attempts to address inadequacies; new policies are thrown

into the mix, now to interact with all the prior iterations that have survived. New actors

will attempt to redefine the rules in their own interest.[95] No wonder politics can never be

perfect.

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[92] Skowronek and Glassman, p. 3.

[93] For a more detailed discussion of the role of American presidents, see Stephen Skowronek. *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1993.

[94] Schattschneider recognized this years ago: "Inevitably the outcome of a contest is controlled by the level at which the decision is made. 1) There is a great probability that the original contestants will lose control of the matter. 2) A host of new considerations and complications are introduced and a multitude of new resources for a resolution of conflict becomes available; solutions inconceivable at a lower level may be worked out at a higher level. 1960, p. 11.

[95] Streeck and Thelen, "The resulting *ambiguities* in the rules that define institutionalized behavior provide space for political contestation over how rules should be interpreted and applied." P. 26. "…actors are strategic and even those not involved in the design of an institution will do everything in their power to interpret its rules in their own interest (or *circumvent* or *subvert* rules that clash with their interests)." P. 27.

That people can affect the process of change adds one more dimension of complexity to the growing pile of other factors that also contribute.[96] Besides human capacity, we also have human intent. As March and Olsen claim, "understanding the transformation of political institutions requires recognizing that there are frequently multiple, not necessarily consistent, intentions, that intentions are often ambiguous, that intentions are part of a system of values, goals, and attitudes that embeds intention in a structure of other beliefs and aspirations."[97]   Thelen agrees, claiming that institutions are "socially constructed in the sense that they embody shared cultural understandings of how the world works."[98] While March and Olsen are citing human intent as a complicating factor, Thelen recognizes its limiting effect. New institutional forms resemble the old partly because those who create the new are subject to the cultural environment within which they have developed.[99] Powerful actors play a part in determining which cultural 'scripts' are adopted. What is intriguing about following this line of thinking is to ascertain whether it is purely the exercise of power. Stinchcombe argues that "Legitimacy, not automaticity, explains why people follow scripts in the first place."[100] Therefore, powerful leaders are constrained by authoritative cultural systems. The model of constraint allows us to understand some of the complexities involved in the process of change, but we still need better tools to incorporate notions of change.

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[96] "Empirical observations of political systems…often stress the institutional complexity of modern states and identify a rather complicated intertwining of institutions, individuals, and events. March and Olsen, 1984, p. 742.

[97] James March and Johan Olsen. *Rediscovering Institutions*, Free Press, New York, 1989, p. 65-66.

[98] Kathleen Thelen. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics", *Annual Review of Political Science,* 1999.2:369-404.

[99] Socrates argued this limitation in requiring that his new republic would have to be constructed by those who had not been indoctrinated by the prior culture.

[100] Thelen, p. 387.

A move is afoot to consider the concept of Critical Junctures as a potential site for exploring change within institutions. "Path-dependent equilibrium is periodically ruptured by radical change, making for sudden bends in the path of history."[101] Critical junctures are short periods that define a period of significant change and produces distinct legacies.[102] Kathleen Thelen combines path dependency constraints with founding moments that set the stage for those future constraints.[103] She states,

> this approach includes two related but analytically distinct claims. The first involves arguments about crucial founding moments of institutional formation that send countries along broadly different developmental paths; the second suggests that institutions continue to evolve in response to changing environmental conditions and ongoing political maneuvering but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories.[104]

While Critical Junctures theory captures elements of sequencing and timing (what happens when), she claims that studies that articulate critical junctures do not specify mechanisms that "account for continuity over time".[105] Policy feedback literature demonstrates the process that enhances longevity of certain policies, but does not discuss the mechanisms that account for their success. Her claim is that by analyzing the reproduction mechanisms girding the functioning of the institutions, it will be possible to consider what external events will produce institutional change. Collier and Collier claim that a key component to studying critical junctures is their consequences.[106] Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen claim that "path dependence is a crucial causal

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[101] Streeck and Thelen, p. 7.
[102] Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 29.
[103] Thelen gives full credit to GJ Ikenberry, "History's heavy hand: institutions and the politics of the state". Presented at a conference on The New Institutionalism, University of Maryland, Oct. 14-15, 1994; cited in her article: "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics", *Annual Review Political Science,* 2:369-404, 1999.
[104] Thelen, p. 387
[105] Thelen, p. 388.
[106] Collier and Collier, 1991.

mechanism for historical institutionalists, and critical junctures constitute the starting points for many path-dependent processes."[107] Analysts in the macro-historical tradition study differences among their case studies at founding moments to demonstrate why the trajectories of institutions vary. They tend to focus on structural components. Agency and decisions within the critical juncture itself are bypassed. Beyond that, analysts have not paid much attention to critical junctures, or how to study them. "Most scholars invoking critical junctures have been rather casual users, simply referring to the concept as a model of change but not probing its meaning or developing methodologies associated with it."[108] They argue that since uncertainty is a core characteristic of such periods, "counterfactual analysis and narrative process tracing are particularly important and must be explicitly employed to study them."[109] For this period of time, actors and their decisions have a much greater influence on a reordering of institutional structures.

"Critical Juncture" theory is valuable for looking at founding moments. It also can be employed to look at periodic moments of crisis within the lifetime of an institution. Historical institutionalism considers historical components as well as the intersection of current conditions, which include structural as well as actor-produced decisions. Ongoing complex interactions eventually produce periods of disequilibrium for many reasons. One possibility has to do with the nature of time and repeated iterations. Human behavior is subject to minute alterations. The 'parlor game' of the whispered sentence passed from person to person is altered for more reasons than just lack of hearing. Each expression is told to someone who may interpret the meaning

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[107] Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen. "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism", *World Politics 59,* April, 2007, p. 342.
[108] Capoccia and Kelemen. P. 346.
[109] C & K, p. 343.

differently and alter the words to fit this new interpretation; or it is uttered in a slightly different environment that impacts understanding. It may take a long time before the overwhelming strength of the stability of the status quo is challenged enough to cause an imbalance; the power of path dependence.[110] The 'life' of an institution is punctuated with these periods.[111]

It is also possible that critical junctures may not lead to significant change, but rather, signify a short period of time when the power of the urge to maintain the status quo is only weakened. This explains why uncertainty is heightened. "Contingency implies that wide-ranging change is possible and even likely but also that reequilibration is not excluded."[112] Therefore, Capoccia and Kelemen focus on the necessity of examining decisions made by influential actors. This approach can deal with the high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability while still providing valuable research. "[F]or a brief phase, agents face a broader than typical range of feasible options and the notion that their choices from among these options are likely to have a significant impact on subsequent outcomes."[113] Thus it is possible to account for the multiple components that are acting on a period of flux – exogenous, endogenous, reactionary and reform elements.

Social Movement Theory and Contentious politics

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[110] According to Collier and Collier, There are "Three components of the *legacy*: a. *Mechanisms of production* of the legacy. The legacy often does not crystallize immediately after the critical juncture, but rather is shaped through a series of intervening steps. b. *Mechanisms of reproduction* of the legacy. The stability of the legacy is not an automatic outcome, but rather is perpetuated through ongoing institutional and political processes. c. The *stability of the core attributes of the legacy* – that is, the basic attributes produced as an outcome of the critical juncture…" p. 30-31.

[111] This is the basis of Stephen Krasner's model of punctuated equilibrium – "institutions are characterized by long periods of stability, periodically 'punctuated' by crises that bring about relatively abrupt institutional change, after which institutional stasis again sets in." *Structuring Politics,* p. 15.

[112] C&K, p. 352.

[113] C&K, p. 348.

Classic social movement models viewed protest as "irregular and irrational; their lens was a 'myth of the madding crowd' featuring a crowd mentality outside the range of normal human motivations and experiences."[114] A structural weakness in society would lead to an expression of social strain. That strain and/or disturbance would eventually reach a threshold of tolerance that would cause the formation of a social movement.[115] According to William Kornhauser, "Mass society is objectively the atomized society, and subjectively the alienated population."[116] Embedded in these models, was a conception of mass movements as "impulsive, irresponsible outbursts of self-indulgence."[117] In the 1960s, the structural-functionalist school argued that social movements were the side-effects of rapid social transformation.[118] By the 1970s, some scholars, such as Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, argued that collective behavior may not be common, but it is not pathological or irrational.[119] They did, however, ignore broader political structures and cultural traditions. Many critics argued that such a view was simplistic and even wrong. In response to these criticisms, new models were developed to explore intentional behavior and action on the part of members within social movements.

The two most dominant models were resource mobilization and political process models, which still anchor much of the Social Movement research. According to McCarthy and Zald, the *Resource Mobilization Model* "emphasizes the variety and

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[114] James M. Jasper. *The Art of Moral Protest,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997, p. 20-21.
[115] Doug McAdam. "The Classical Model of Social Movements Examined", *Social Movements: Perspectives and Issues,* Steven M. Buechler and F. Kurt Cylke, Jr. eds., Mayfield Publishing Company, Mountain View, 1997, p. 137.
[116] William Kornhauser. "The Politics of Mass Society", *Social Movements: Perspectives and Issues,* Steven M. Buechler and F. Kurt Cylke, Jr. eds., Mayfield Publishing Company, Mountain View, 1997, p. 92.
[117] DOC, p. 15
[118] Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani. *Social Movements: An Introduction,* Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1999, p. 4.
[119] Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian. *Collective Behavior,* Prentice-Hall, 1972.

sources of resources, the relationship of social movements to the media, authorities and other parties, and the interaction among movement organizations."[120] This model differs from the earlier models by taking into account individual agency, as well as pointing to more dynamic processes. "Their main contribution was to show that protest was a regular part of politics, that protestors were normal people pursuing reasonable goals, and that available economic resources helped determine what protestors could achieve."[121] The model draws attention to organizational processes in social movement politics. According to Porta and Diani, "The capacity for mobilization depends either on material resources…or on the non-material resources…available to a group. These resources are distributed across multiple objectives according to a rational calculation of costs and benefits."[122]

The *Political Process Model* follows on the heels of resource mobilization, identifying the degree of development within a social movement organization, the level of awareness within the minority community, and the structure of political opportunities available. Scholars "focused less on material resources and more on states, strategies, and political mobilization, thus leaving some room for grievances and ideologies and a lot for elite responses."[123] This was seen as an alternative to the classical and resource mobilization theories. The central focus, according to Porta and Diani, is the "relationship between institutional political actors and protest".[124] *Frame Alignment Processes* explore social construction of legitimizing frames by activists that justify their

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[120] John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory", Buechler, p. 149.
[121] Jasper, p. 29.
[122] Porta and Diani. P. 8.
[123] Jasper. P. 34.
[124] Jasper, p. 9.

actions. *New Social Movement* theories draw from social-psychological and cultural perspectives, eschewing structure and process. Many current scholars use an amalgam of these various theories to inform their research.[125]

Another area of study has focused on outcomes of social movement periods. Scholars such as Felix Kolb and Grzegorz Ekiert bring attention to types of change and demobilization processes. According to Kolb,

> …social movements can cause three principal types of institutional outcome. First, social movements can cause procedural change by altering their relationship with a political sub-institution. Second, they can cause intra-institutional change by altering the internal structure of a political sub-institution… Third, social movements can cause state transformation by altering the relationships between political institutions, or through the creation of new sub-institutions.[126]

It is not enough to examine the movements themselves, but they are being placed back into context in the ongoing march of time. For Ekiert, the protest movements in Eastern Europe in the 1950s, while they appeared to be unsuccessful, did alter the landscape of state politics. "As a result of de-Stalinization, however, the distribution of power and relations between major institutional orders of the party-states were altered."[127] These periods of renegotiation that followed protest caused a process of demobilization and "regime re-equilibration".[128] What is of interest to this project is his recognition that "demobilization policies were more or less innovative improvisations that were shaped and forced by the changing domestic and international political and economic conditions

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[125] MTT argue that "by the 1980s most North American students of social movements had adopted a common social movement agenda, and differed chiefly in their relative emphasis on different components of that agenda." P. 16.

[126] Felix Kolb. *Protest and Opportunities: The Political Outcomes of Social Movements,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007.

[127] Grzegorz Ekiert. *The State against Society: Political Crises and their Aftermath in East Central Europe,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, p. 10.

[128] Ekiert, p. 20.

and led to a variety of unanticipated political and social consequences."[129] Even though

the Communist Party reasserted its control over society, the 'rules of the game'

concerning the role that institutions played in the lives of the population was different.

Contentious Politics scholars would argue, however, that process-tracing was not enough.

"Scholar of contention have…long been interested in the dynamics of change –

particularly in the emergence, escalation and demobilization of social movements. But

they have generally sought to get at them by measuring the relationships among static

structural variables rather than specifying the mechanisms that link independent and

dependent variables."[130] We now turn to an explication of their argument.

In 2001, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly collaborated on a new

methodological theory concerning contentious politics. Their effort is an attempt to

move away from the confining compartmentalization of the study of politics by providing

a theory that crosses the boundaries of research agendae to provide new insights into

political action. Responsible for some of the widely used models in Social Movement

Theory, they became critical of the static quality of those models and sought to find an

approach that could account for the dynamic interaction of multiple actors. Rather than

look for cross-cutting laws that explain outcomes, they widened the doorway of research

to look at similar mechanisms and processes in a comparative mode that could shed light

on "contentious politics" in general. Their theory of the dynamics of contentious politics

hearkens back to comparative historical analyses that seek to explore the complexities of

human interaction. They abjure "simple linearity, this work takes durations,

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[129] Ekiert, p. 20.

[130] Doug Mcadam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. "Methods for Measuring Mechanisms of Contention", *Symposium on McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's "Measuring Mechanisms of Contention"*, Qualitative Sociology, p. 4.

discontinuities, branchings, and trajectories very seriously."[131]   The new contribution of their thinking is combining historical analysis with definable dynamic mechanisms that can be discretely identified and observed.   Their claims have certainly produced a plethora of critiques, but their model for contentious politics contains many gems to the overall procedure of scholarly inquiry.

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly argue that the weaknesses of the older 'social movement agenda' lies in its fixed, objectifying results. "Both because it is a static, cause-free single-actor model and because it contains built-in affinities with relatively democratic social movements politics, it serves poorly as a guide to the wide variety of forms of contentious politics outside the world of democratic western polities."[132] They believe that "dynamic, interactive sequences" will prove more salient and argue against the prevailing canon within political science of offering explanations that maintain that general laws can be applied to all social movement cases. "Such a doctrine rests on an implausible claim: that ultimately all political processes result from extremely general uniformities in the propensities of human actors, especially individual actors."[133] This, they argue, has not been demonstrated. "Despite more than a century of strenuous effort, political scientists have securely identified no such uniformities. But they have recurrently identified widely operating causal mechanisms and processes."[134]

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[131] Ira Katznelson. "Periodization and Preferences", *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences,* James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 272.
[132] DOC, p. 18-19.
[133] Charles Tilly. "Mechanisms in Political Processes", *Annual Review of Political Science,* 2001, Vol. 4 Issue 1, p. 25.
[134] "Mechanisms in Political Processes", p. 25.

The distinctive contribution of McAdam's, Tarrow's and Tilly's mode of research is its dynamic quality. Rather than focus on objectified endpoints or crystallized structures, dynamic contentious politics analysis zeroes in on processes. "Mechanism- and process-based accounts explain salient features of episodes, or significant differences among them, by identifying with those episodes robust mechanisms of relatively general scope."[135] By identifying similar mechanisms across case studies, the researcher can examine differences in outcomes. Mechanisms, according to MTT, "are a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations. Processes are regular sequences of such mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements."[136] An example of a mechanism they identify is 'brokerage'. This is the process wherein groups that had not been connected in the past form an alliance. In order to understand the rise of such a mechanism, it is necessary to explore the context within which two groups would choose to ally, as well as how the leadership identifies new components of their goals. What would motivate the members of each group to allow an alliance? What is the new rhetoric and why does it resonate? Thus, identifying a 'mechanism' demands an understanding of the complexities of past and present, as well as of the cultural, psychological, and strategic components. If two or three case studies exemplify similar mechanisms yet have different outcomes, what causes those differences? Mechanisms may combine with other mechanisms or recur at different intervals. The sequence of the rise of processes will have an impact on outcome. The mechanisms that arise in opposing groups and the methods they employ to

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[135] Charles Tilly. "Mechanisms in Political Processes", *Annual Review Political Science,* 4:21-41, 2001, p. 24.
[136] DOC, p. 27

counter conflict will have an impact on the outcome of the initializing endeavor.

Therefore contention within the public sphere introduces "new perturbations into an

interactive field" that is contingent not on general laws, but on circumstances.[137] "We

therefore make a bet on how the social world works: that big structures and sequences

never repeat themselves, but result from differing combinations and sequences of

mechanisms with very general scope."[138] It cannot be said that such a view of social

behavior is parsimonious or elegant in its generalizing theory.

The dynamics of contentious politics approach has received abundant criticism.

"The proliferation of research using mechanisms has led to criticisms of conceptual

vagueness, proliferation of mechanisms, and lack of methodological rigor in the

production of mechanism-based analyses."[139] They range from the broad claim that the

model does not explain anything scholars did not already know, to more directed

criticisms from structuralists concerning not taking structures seriously.[140] Conceptual

and methodological problems have been pointed out concerning the selection of case

studies for analysis and the ill-defined parameters of mechanisms.[141] Some argue that

good studies do already pay attention to dynamics and interactive mechanisms. The field

runs the risk of not providing challenging scholarship as much as a new vocabulary –

"Down with political opportunity and master frames; up with mechanisms and

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[137] DOC, p. 45
[138] DOC, p. 30
[139] Tilly, *APSR,* p. 2.
[140] For the former critique, see James B. Rule. "Review: McTheory", *Sociological Forum,* Vol. 19, No. 1, Mar., 2004, pp. 151-162. Richard Hogan. "Charles Tilly Takes Three Giant Steps from Structure toward Process: Mechanisms for Deconstructing Political Process", *Contemporary Sociology,* vol. 33, No.3, May, 2004, pp. 273-277.
[141] Maryjane Osa. "Review", *The Journal of Politics,* Vol. 66, No. 4, Nov., 2004, pp. 1324-1326.; Francesca Polletta. "Review: Dynamics of Contention", *Contemporary Sociology,* Vol. 31, No. 5, Sept., 2002, pp. 580-582.

processes."[142] Many argue against MTT's disregard for the analytic value of generalization. Some scholars point out that compartmentalized studies still provide a useful approach to theorizing.

There are, however, significant counters to the above criticisms. The postmodernists began the charge. Michel Foucault in the late 1970's complained,

> Intellectuals have got used to working, not in the modality of the 'universal', the 'exemplary', the 'just-and-true-for-all', but within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them… This is what I would call the 'specific' intellectual as opposed to the 'universal' intellectual.[143]

MTT claim that many different subfields in the social sciences are researching the same subjects. The lack of cross-pollination of these ideas is unfortunate. It would be valuable to promote a more inclusive approach to our studies, thereby benefiting from the work of others. "In recent years, specialized scholars have made substantial advances in describing and explaining…important contentious forms. On the whole, they have paid little attention to each other's discoveries."[144] They are not claiming that specialized studies no longer have a place. Some were disconcerted: "there are risks attached to dispensing altogether with the concept of social movement, and focusing instead on other mechanisms and processes…which can contribute to our explanation of specific episodes of contention".[145] Viewing this argument as a denigration of specialization in some ways continues the mistake they are railing against. Different scholars have different interests and different analytical strengths. This approach may be more of a challenge to scholarly

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[142] Osa, p. 1326.
[143] Stephen Eric Bronner, ed. *Twentieth Century Political Theory, A Reader,* Routledge, New York, 1997, p. 242.
[144] DOC, p. 9.
[145] Mario Diani and Ivano Bison "Organizations, coalitions, and movements", *Theory and Society,* 33: 281-282, 2004.

careers than to the pursuit of productive theory. As Maryjane Osa states, "researchers are institutionally vested in maintaining their disciplinary subfields".[146] The 'challenge' is not that we all become generalists, but that we take the work of others into consideration while we add to the scholarly conversation.

Eschewing general laws that inform social behavior is more tricky. King, Keohane, and Verba in their seminal book, *Designing Social Inquiry,* recognize that large events are the consequence of complex interactions. Causal sequences converge to produce specific outcomes. They recognize, as well, that chance seems to play a role. They argue, however, that one "way to understand such events is by seeking generalizations: conceptualizing each case as a member of a class of events about which meaningful generalizations can be made."[147] The dynamic contentious politics model, by avoiding generalizations and focusing on dynamic processes runs the risk of becoming too analytically elastic. "Theories that literally include everything about any subject matter would be about as useful as maps as extensive and as detailed as the territory being mapped."[148] Valuable explanations of social action could be lost in a morass of less meaningful data. Yet, MTT attempt to address this problem by focusing on mechanisms and processes. They do, in fact, have parameters that limit their endeavor.

To claim that McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly do not appreciate past works that take dynamics seriously is a weak argument. Within the broadly articulated genre of comparative historical analysis, Charles Tilly is often cited as a significant and important contributor. Those who claim that MTT are denying dynamic, interactive studies exist

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[146] Osa, p. 1324.
[147] King, Keohane, Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, p. 10.
[148] James B. Rule. P. 159.

are missing the point they are trying to make – that it is possible to conceptualize a model that would highlight and focus on dynamics, rather than static objects or structure.

One area of theoretical and methodological weakness is the specification of mechanisms. It may be difficult to zero in on causal mechanisms that truly provide analytical power. The effort to compare cases is still a priority and to add to our knowledge regarding social outcomes will require careful thought and investigation of causal factors.

While MTT argue against structural analyses, institutionalists have been able to incorporate mechanisms and processes without sacrificing their focus on the institutions they are studying. This is not to say that posing the argument against structuralism hasn't been useful. Part of the postmodern project reorients attention to the interactions between actors, highlighting contingent outcomes. How is it possible to account for those interactions within a method? The dynamics of contentious politics is attempting to do that.

This process of looking at contingencies leads to observing both the moments of reaction and subsequent reactions. It is a dynamic process that includes change and efforts to return to some semblance of the past. "We treat social interaction not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change. We have come to think of interpersonal networks, interpersonal communication, and various forms of continuous negotiation – including the negotiation of identities – as figuring centrally in the dynamics of contention."[149] The model of

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[149] DOC, p. 22

dynamic contentious politics enables the observer the opportunity to account for change in an atmosphere of continual negotiation and redefinition. In fact, Tilly outlined a number of mechanisms and processes that affect elite-initiated change. They are coalition formation, brokerage of coalitions, bureaucratic containment of opposition, and repression-bargaining cycles.[150]

Similarity between Contentious Politics and Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism has taken significant steps to consider the process of change in public politics. They maintain that institutions are major identities within the context of periods of change, as are the actors who attempt to place their stamp on the historical moment. This meshes well with the arguments of mechanisms set forth by theorists of contentious politics, such as McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly. While HI analysts provide valuable insights and methodological parameters that allow the researcher to explore stasis and change, they sometimes confine themselves to a particular worldview, with the institution as the final objective. Contentious politics theorists, who are focusing on the mechanisms of social movements and change, sometimes succumb to vague and ad hoc conclusions. The current work of many historical institutionalists is bridging that gap. The theoretical framework of the current project is an attempt to continue the process of bringing together insights from both methodologies.

Both approaches emphasize sequence and timing. Contentious politics scholars recognize, for instance, that when and which mechanisms surface and in what relationship they are to one another, has an impact on the trajectory of particular

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[150] Tilly, *APSR*, p. 34.

outcomes. Historical institutionalists recognize the power of path dependence – that is, the sequence of action will constrain the available choices of strategic actors. The institutions themselves play a part in negotiating the options available and limit the scope of action, as well as the cultural milieu that informs actors. This focus on the role of history and the confluence of complex variables in the moment is a dual project. As Peter Hall argues, "Traditional methods focused on identifying a set of independent variables that exert consistent causal effects on an outcome…the problems arise from interaction effects among causal or contextual variables that standard analyses tend to assume away."[151] Both historical institutionalism and contentious politics take discontinuities and trajectories seriously and avoid the limitations of linear thinking. Both approaches take the role of the strategic actor seriously. And they both have progressed in offering models to follow. Kathleen Thelen demonstrates the combination of the agenda of contentious politics – utilizing the model of mechanisms to attempt to overcome the theoretical weakness in looking at periods of change within institutions. I choose to follow that lead by using historical explanations that investigate the causal impact of variables upon the process of change by investigating the 'gates' located along the path policies take, manned by power centers that alter policies to accommodate their views and self-interests. This is a non-static view of continual renegotiation of impacting variables, changing, combining, separating, or falling aside; and examining how the paths of policies diverge.

In all three of the case studies in this work, the initiating impetus to bring about change is the death of a leader. A new leader demonstrates his recently acquired status

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[151] Structuring politics – p. 383.

by attempting to shuffle the other power players; to transfer power from one or several sources to a new player – one that has not had a significant role nor wielded much power in the past. The reasons why leaders make this move are multiple; self interest plays a part; an attempt to address pragmatic limitations of the prior paradigm; an understanding of the necessity of developing coalitions and alliances with groups, hungry to participate; or perhaps an effort to reward those who supported their ascendancy. Altruistic motives may even play a part. While the reasons have an impact on the outcome, leaders – like the other factors impacting change – must share the limelight and compromise their desires. The best of intentions may not yield a positive result. The initial impulse for action gives way to pragmatic considerations of how to move new policies forward through the morass of differing opinions and different agendae posed by the gate-keepers. The leader has the option to dictate how to act, and the process by which he attempts to implement the new environment contributes significantly to its success or failure. Yet any approach taken is only truly tested when it runs up against those who have power to stop its progress. The most dynamic 'moment' in the space and time of change is when the action butts against the wall of the past. Those groups who wielded power in the former iteration react against the implementation of a new paradigm. What their reaction is, who joins them to resist the change, how much room there is in the public sphere based on type of regime, how powerful the initiating forces are, affects the trajectory of the initial effort. This 'moment' of a "critical juncture" is the most volatile period for the outcome of an initiated change. In order to move forward, the policy must make accommodation for the opposing, backward-looking force. The policy becomes

something different in substance, form or inclusion. It is diverted. The initiator must account for this process in order to actually create change.

By using methodologies forwarded by historical institutionalists and contentious politics theorists, it is possible to take three case studies within three different regime types and articulate commonalities. Although regime change is not the premise of this study, the effect of changes on institutions within different regime types provides added insight into the process of political change. See figure 1 below.

Figure 1:

	Poland	**United States**	**Spain**
Initiator	Gomułka	Johnson	Juan Carlos
Gate 1	Councils	Congress	administration
Gate 2	Local elites	Local elites	Cortes
Gate 3	Gomułka	Opposing national Elites	Opposing groups
Gate 4			military

Chapter 3:

Poland

Introduction

Poland had been under the control of the Soviet Union for only eight years when the entire Soviet bloc system endured the shock of Khrushchev's Secret Speech at the Twentieth Congress. Shortly after, Bolesław Bierut, General Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, died.[152] The Communist Party leaders in Poland found themselves besieged; those in the Central Committee feared the demise of the Party's control. Extraordinary measures were required to mend the tear in the institutional fabric. This moment in the life of the Communist Party in Poland was a critical juncture, opening the doors to an intentional infusion of change. [153] Because of the nature of a totalitarian regime, most of the significant power centers were in the Party itself. The unrest of the people was extraordinary, but not surprising. Grzegorz Ekiert points out that during the 1950s, "state-socialist regimes experienced profound instability caused by the overlapping of the domestic economic and political crisis with geopolitical pressures and uncertainty. These situations generated splits and struggles within the ruling elites, led to the fall of powerful leaders, and created openings in the political space."[154] Within this

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[152] Speculation of the cause of death was suicide or poisoning. The official cause of death was a heart attack.

[153] "…de-Stalinization in Poland created an opening for political mobilization. The public acknowledgment by senior PZPR officials of the 'excesses' of Stalinism and of the wrongs done to individuals and to society fed turmoil within the ranks of the party and encouraged those outside to action." Osa, P. 30.

[154] Grzegorz Ekiert. The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, p. 6.

critical juncture, Gomułka allowed a degree of liberalization in society, redistributing power away from the Central Committee. Specifically, this study is concerned with his policies allowing the formation (or legalization) of Workers' Councils in enterprises throughout the country.[155]

Between 1956 and 1958, Workers' Councils developed to address several problems: "low living standards, bureaucratic controls, political oppression, and the technicians' rejection of inefficiency and waste".[156] When Gomułka became First Secretary, he supported the formation of councils. Because of the lack of intermediary power centers, nothing hampered the progress of the new policy. The first gate wherein policy changes were attempted was in the Councils themselves. The policy from Gomułka, however, did not intend to give any significant power to the councils.[157] Differences in motive and self-interest surfaced between the technocrats, that sought greater efficiency, and the workers, who wanted better wages. The second gate, the managers, unions and local party officials, were able to weather the period of council popularity and reasserted their influence as council support waned. By 1958 Gomułka,– who represents the third gate – effectively ended the councils by folding them into a 'conference of workers' self-government' that included the local party cells and the unions.

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[155] Adolf Sturmthal claims that the workers' councils were spontaneous – "While the Tito regime introduced the councils by decree, the Polish councils had their beginnings in voluntary movements in various plants and were only later, as a result of an almost revolutionary change, endorsed by the Polish Communist Party and the regime." Sturmthal. *Workers Councils: A Study of Workplace Organization on Both Sides of the Iron Curtain,* Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 119. It is true that they began as autonomous movements, but it was important to have the sanction of the Party and government.
[156] Sturmthal, p. 122.
[157] "From their very beginning, the councils suffered from the fact that their relationship to management was not clearly defined." Sturmthal, p. 132.

The year 1956 was a period of enormous uncertainty, where a variety of potential paths were possible. It did have its limits. From the onset, most Poles and certainly the Central Committee realized that the Soviet Union would only accept a limited degree of redefinition of fundamental government policies. Soviet troops, in fact, were deployed to the Polish borders to await commands. Khrushchev hoped for as little change in status as possible, as did the members of the Central Committee that were avowed Stalinists. A small number sought dramatic democratization policies, while still remaining under the mantle of Communism. Others tried to moderate between the two poles. Khrushchev's choice as new General Secretary was Edward Ochab, a faithful Stalinist on whom he could rely, yet a leader who had demonstrated his willingness to listen to protestors.[158] Ochab himself felt that he did not have the will of the people to maintain order. He also did not wish to be the General Secretary.[159] The Central Committee sought someone untainted by the Stalinist regime, yet a devoted Communist.[160] As luck would have it, Władysław Gomułka, former General Secretary of the Polish Communist Party before Bierut usurped his position, was still alive. Through the strength of his dedication to a nationally-specific – Polish – road to Communism and his dedication to maintaining a positive relationship with Khrushchev, Gomułka was able to step into the void and redirect Poland down the Communist path.

Workers' Councils, self-management organizations that had a legacy in Poland's factories, began to spring up with the Party's initial support. By initially allowing and

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[158] Ochab reprimanded the soldiers who had fired on the protestors in Poznan and led the Central Committee in admitting that mistakes had been made.
[159] It is hard to predict what might have happened had Ochab remained in the position of leader. More than likely, there would have been more violence. Gomułka was able to control the rioting only through the dint of his personal popularity.
[160] In Poland, quiet negotiations were underway to release former Communist leaders from prison and 'rehabilitate' them." Osa, p. 27.

even encouraging the formation of Workers' Councils, Gomułka increased his popularity

and achieved some legitimacy. Policies that he initiated legitimated their existence and

controlled the rules by which they could function and organize. The first gate whereby

Gomułka's policies entered a new institutional arena was on the ground level, in the

factories themselves.[161] The lack of clear lines of responsibility, as well as the vague

recommendations for the policies' institutionalization, led to variation, in-fighting, and

lack of standardized outcomes. The inability, i.e., the lack of controlling power, of the

Councils themselves to redefine the policies to suit their needs, de-legitimated them.

Once the Workers' Councils began functioning, the results were assessed by the

local organizations that were somewhat displaced by the Councils' formation – primarily

the unions. For them, the institution of the Councils was a zero sum game. The

empowerment of the Councils meant the weakening of their power. Individual members

within the organizations, as well as party members who had some merit in the eyes of the

workers, could participate in the Councils. Such members also contributed their

experienced expertise in negotiations. This promoted a weakening of the solidly-drawn

lines between each organization.[162] The de-legitimation of the Councils served to help re-

legitimize the local Parties and unions. The way was paved for begrudging acceptance of

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[161] Paczkowski argues that the self-management model was under significant pressure. "It seemed to many people, including Gomułka, that proposals to decentralize management, change the principles of price formation, and introduce some market mechanisms, as well as (cautious) musings on the consequences of abandoning the Marxist schema of the 'productive' and 'nonproductive' spheres of the economy, led straight to the 'free play of forces' in both the social and political sphere. Reformers were not helped by the renewal of polemics between Moscow and Belgrade,w hich caused the self-managmeent model to lose its ideological seal of approval. The horizon of systemic change in the economy was remarkably restricted." Andrzej Paczkowski. *The Spring Will Be Ours, Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom,* Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 2003, p. 287.
[162] See David Lane and George Kolankiewicz, eds. *Social Groups in Polish Society,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1973. p. 116.

Gomułka's "Conference of Workers' Self-Government" in 1958 that melded the three together, essentially reasserting the controlling power of the Party.

The upper echelon of Party elites contained a mixed bag of Stalinists, moderates and reformers. In order for Gomułka to consolidate his control within the Party, he had to negotiate among the minefields of Party members who were wary or hostile. He applied a clever strategy of currying favor with power centers outside of the Party who were willing to support him against the Party itself. These were the Soviet Union and the Polish people.

Gomułka was consistent throughout his Communist career in his belief in a Polish road to Communism and his respect for the Soviet Union. Although Stalin and those under his command abused him, he remained committed to the goal. What were his alternatives? The West and its liberal ideology had not engendered any trust.[163] The threat of the potential for a re-armed Germany to dispute Poland's western border remained salient through the 50s and 60s. His stand in October, 1956 was a gamble. The circumstances of unrest within the country and the beleaguered reputation of Soviet control meant that the Central Committee needed to find a leader the people would accept. They were attempting to remain in power if at all possible and had to acquiesce to some concessions. While Gomułka insisted on certain compromises from the Soviet Union, he was able to strike a deal with Khrushchev that satisfied the Soviet leader of Poland's continued allegiance. Gomułka then turned his attention to quelling the unrest

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[163] Nicholas Bethell. *Gomułka: His Poland and His Communism,* Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1969, p. 161.

on the streets and to garnering the favor of the people. Liberalization, which included Workers' Councils, was the tactic he used. It worked.

Armed with an agreement with the Soviet Union and the support of the Polish people, Gomułka then turned his attention to reinventing the Party at the top to accept him as its undisputed leader. His rule was threatened by both ends of the ideological spectrum. His efforts were twofold: he began to reorganize the appointments of Stalinists to move them away from the center and to attack the revisionists, who were a smaller, less powerful coalition. By the time he openly attacked the Stalinists, he had already diminished their numbers and then deflated their claims through his censure of the revisionists.

Time played its part. The vague language and lack of real de facto power for the Workers' Councils diminished their appeal and helped to de-legitimize them in the eyes of the workers. Gomułka no longer needed to curry favor with the people. In 1958, new policies folded the Workers' Councils into a conference of organizations that effectively ended their autonomy. They still existed, but no longer guaranteed an avenue of redress for the workers.

*The historic events that we call the Polish October [1956] were a source of hope that the
communist system could evolve. Adam Michnik[164]*

Historical Background

Communism as a political philosophy was radically altered with the ascent of

Vladimir Lenin during the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The vanguard of the

Communist Party would introduce the subsequent and inevitable phases of political

change, rather than allowing the process to work naturally. This one fundamental

alteration created a condition of rigid authoritarianism absent from Marx's original

ideas.[165] By the nature of the teleological process formulated by Lenin and Stalin, the

autocratic rule of the Party was a necessary condition of state rule that would eventually

lead to freedom predicated upon the absence of want and the availability of a private

arena.[166] Citizens at the very least had to be willing (or coerced) to follow the commands

of the centralized government in order for the speeded-up historically-mandated process

to work. The economy, the engine of material distribution, would be run by the

government (ostensibly an extension of the people) and property having to do with

economic transactions would be owned by the government. Manipulative power

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[164] Adam Michnik. "A New Evolutionism", *Letters from Prison and other Essays,* University of California
Press, Berkeley, 1985.

[165] Marx did not adhere to liberal democracy because he felt that parliaments allowed the ruling classes to
enslave the people. "Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to
misrepresent the people in Parliament". Karl Marx. *The Civil War in France,*
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1871/civil-war-france/index.htm However, he did not
advocate an authoritarian level of control, either. His endeavor was to create a classless society. "Marx's
political vision was one of radical democracy, one that included universal suffrage and insured full
participation. Since to Marx the state was an instrument of class conflict, the disappearance of class meant
the disappearance of the state and political power." Peter J. Boettke. *The Political Economy of Soviet
Socialism: the Formative Years, 1918-1928,* Springer, 1990, p. 66. One could argue that his dictatorship of
the proletariat clearly set the stage for authoritarianism, he thought it would be brief and then would
continue to what his end goal was – a classless, stateless society.

[166] The stated aim was to bring about the end of government through the intentional development of the
stages towards full communism. It is controversial whether any of the Communist elite intended to allow
the state to wither away, but that does not affect the rhetoric employed.

relationships having to do with material gain would be minimized. At the same time as economic life was experiencing massive changes, public life in general underwent major restructuring in order to create a citizenry that would "service" this new social arrangement.

Poland History

Poland had not participated in the first wave of industrialization that had determined the economic status of countries such as the U.S. and Britain. For over a hundred years, from 1795 to the end of the First World War, Poland was partitioned into three parts ruled by Russia, the German Federation and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Of the three, Russian rule had been the most oppressive. With Germany's defeat in 1918, Poland regained her independence – a goal fiercely pursued with every generation during the years of Partition – and attempted to form a democratic government, even though multiple border disputes raged for several years.[167] The gravest threat to Poland as an independent state was the Soviet War, ostensibly begun because of disputes over borders. From 1919 until an Armistice was signed in October, 1920, the Polish Army, led by Josef Pilsudski, fought a series of battles against the massive Soviet army. With defeat imminent and Warsaw in jeopardy, Pilsudski and his exhausted Polish troops were able to

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[167] Poland's independence was not a direct result of the Treaty of Versailles. Instead, Poland's borders were carved out of a series of concurrent wars: "The Ukrainian War, which started in Lwow in November 1918 and ended with the collapse of the West Ukrainian Republic in July 1919, established Polish control over East Galicia as far as the River Zbrucz. The Posnanian War with Germany which erupted on 27 December 1918 was settled by the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919; but the Silesian War, prosecuted intermittently through the three Risings – 16-24 August 1919, 19-25 August 1920, and 2 May-5 July 1921 – was not settled until the Silesian Convention, signed in Geneva in 1922. The Lithuanian War, which disputed possession of the city of Wilno, began in July 1919 and continued in practice to the truce of October 1920; in theory, in the absence of a formal peace treaty, it continued throughout the inter-war period. The Czechoslovak War, launched on 26 January 1919 by the Czechoslovak invasion of Cieszyn in abrogation of a local agreement, was terminated by Allied arbitration on 28 July 1920. Minor conflicts in Spisz and elsewhere in the Carpathians persisted till 1925." Norman Davies. *God's Playground: A History of Poland,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1982, p. 394.

save the day. Warsaw's defenses held while Polish forces encircled the Russian army. "Three Soviet armies were annihilated. The rest struggled eastwards in total disarray."[168] Lenin's effort to use Poland as a thoroughfare to spread the Revolution to the rest of Europe failed. Pilsudski's expertise and courage made him Poland's hero.

Simultaneously with the several border disputes, Poland had to integrate a diverse ethnic population. Only 68.9% of the total population was Polish; Ukrainians (14%), Yiddish-speaking Jews (9%), Byelorussians (3%), and Germans (2%) comprised the rest.[169] It did not help that economic conditions among the different ethnic groups were wildly different. Jews and Germans were overwhelmingly represented in commerce and the professions, while sections of Ukrainians and Poles were poor, illiterate peasants. Six currencies were in circulation; five regions had separate administrations; four languages were spoken among the army officers; three legal codes; two different railway gauges; and eighteen registered political parties.[170] Several coalition governments rose and fell, powerless to forge stability out of the disparate factions.

Pilsudski, dissatisfied with the paralysis of government, staged a military coup in 1926, in order to bring some order to the chaos. During this time and subsequently leading up to WWII, the Communist Party remained very small. Its association with the Soviet Union proved too unpopular with most ethnic Poles. Hostile relations in the past and more recently with the war of 1920 created a barrier to association.[171] "Loyalty to

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[168] Davies, p. 398.
[169] Davies, p. 404.
[170] Davies, p. 402.
[171] Clara Zetkin reported Lenin as saying, "In the Red Army, the Poles saw not brothers and liberators, but enemies. The Poles thought and acted not as in a social, revolutionary way but as nationalists, as imperialists." *Reminiscences of Lenin*, London, 1929, p. 19-22.

[the Soviet Union] must come above loyalty to Poland, a bourgeois and therefore transitional entity which had not existed two years before, and which might disappear any minute."[172] The KPP distributed leaflets in 1920 claiming that fighting against the Soviet Union was fighting "against the working class of the whole world…"[173] The KPP's allegiance to the Soviet Union alienated the group from the Poles, who welcomed parliament's policy of declaring the Party illegal. Stalin's collectivization policies of the 1930s further distanced the Poles, a largely agrarian population.

World War II brought enormous devastation to Poland. One third of the population was killed.[174] What little manufacturing Poland had, was largely destroyed by the war or the equipment stolen by Russian troops as they left. Hitler's Final Solution decimated the Jewish population. Because the national borders were redrawn on both the eastern and western sides following WWII, large numbers of Ukrainians were no longer part of Poland and the Germans living in the western section were forcibly relocated to Germany. Thus, when a new government was attempting to form, it was doing so in a country where the public sector had been catastrophically altered. A number of communists stayed in the country to work in the underground against the Nazis. This helped mitigate the Party's position, but it still remained very small. Many who sought asylum in Russia returned.

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[172] Bethell, p. 7.
[173] Bethell, p. 8.
[174] Norman Davies. *God's Playground: A History of Poland II,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1982, p.489.

Between 1945 and 1948, Poland gradually came under the influence of the hegemony of the Soviet Union.[175] Those within the Party who envisioned a Polish Communism distinct from the Soviet Union, were branded as traitors to the cause and imprisoned or killed.[176] The leadership bowed to the will of Josef Stalin.[177] The hallmark of ideological policy-making dictated that all aspects of public life were controlled:[178] Intellectual creativity was bound by the strict rules of Socialist Realism. The Catholic Church's representatives were persecuted, especially following the Vatican decree against Communism in 1949. With the advent of Rokossovsky as Minister of Defense, purges against those in the army and the general public who could pose a threat to Soviet control were instigated.

The economy was subjected to a Six Year Plan calling for accelerated development of heavy industry. Collectivization of agriculture was intensified. Commercial and industrial enterprises were controlled by the government.[179] Peasants left their farms to rapidly build a working class in newly and expanded urban settings. Housing, ordered and contracted by the central government was never able to fulfill the demand. The top-down organization of the Party developed bureaucracies to control all aspects of public life, as well as the economy. Public awareness was controlled. Wages

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[175] This was due to a concerted effort by Poles who gave their allegiance to Moscow as well as those sent by Stalin specifically to undercut the Polish nationalists within the Party. Also, Stalin's wartime and postwar nationalities and cadres policy, at least as applied to the Polish case, tended to prefer those who had taken Soviet citizenship and Soviet party membership as well as 'comrades of Jewish origins' to many important posts." L. W. Gluchowski. "The Defection of Jozef Swiatlo and the Search for Jewish Scapegoats in The Polish United Workers' Party, 1953-1954", http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/ece/research/intermarium/vol3no2/gluchowski.pdf

[176] At that time, the party was headed by Władysław Gomułka.

[177] Peter Raina. *Political Opposition in Poland 1954-1977,* Poets and Painters Press, London, 1978 "The political system in Poland after the Second World War was a legacy left to her by the Soviet Union" p. 21.

[178] Much of this statistical information comes from Harold D. Nelson, ed. *Poland: a Country Study,* Department of the Army, 1984.

[179] Leaving only family-run shops in the private sector, the government harassed such independent shopkeepers with bureaucratic requirements.

were tied to production, which suffered from faulty quota expectations, shortages and

antiquated machinery. Food supplies were not adequate and proved expensive. A typical

wage earner rarely had surplus earnings at the end of the month and worked long hours.

Under Soviet pressure, the goals for GNP growth were raised from 70% to 112.3%.[180]

Absentee-ism became a crime with the new Labor Laws passed in the Sejm. The newly

constructed apartment complexes to accommodate the immigration of workers from the

rural areas were organized to reflect Marxist/Leninist ideology and facilitate Soviet

enculturation.[181] Urban population rose from 8-12% pre-WWII to over 50% during the

1950s.[182]

By 1953, many of the programs instigated by the new government had proven

woefully inadequate. In October 1953 Boleslaw Bierut, Poland's Party leader, confessed

to the members of the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers' Party that the

Party leadership had committed policy blunders.[183] The current standard of living was

low, because industry had been disproportionately expanded to the detriment of consumer

goods and food production. Housing development had not kept pace with rapid

urbanization. Agriculture was lagging due to the lack of technological modernization and

inefficient administration. The six-year-plan had undergone several revisions in favor of

Soviet requirements, but not in accordance with Polish needs. Poland was required by

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[180] http://www.arts.gla.ac.uk/Slavonic/L1Hstal.htm

[181] Duane Merzga. "Open Space in Polish Housing Estates: Assessing the Application of Communist Social Engineering within the Urban Environment"
http://www.ssc.msu.edu/~laej/historypapers/mezga1/mezga1text.html
 "According to Soviet precedent, everyday personal interaction within the housing estate environment was to be monitored and directed by a system of government sponsored organizations. These organizations, such as trade unions and clubs, were to be located in the apartment complexes themselves. Residents were intended to socialize within these organizations along a formalized network of personal relationships which Marxist-Leninist sociologists called "categorical relationships"" (Mokrzycki 1969)

[182] Merzga,. (Gorynski 1962), (Stasiak 1992).

[183] Peter Raina. P. 23

the Soviet Union to sell raw materials at a price considerably lower than world market rates and received inferior military equipment in return.[184] Bierut proclaimed the start of a 'New Course'; one in which the welfare of the working masses would be paramount and conditions would improve.[185] Although the New Course brought some needed revisions, the changes were not enough.

At the third plenum of the Central Committee in January 1955, the leadership was surprisingly forthcoming in criticizing their progress, the first east European country to indict the Stalinist course of action. This was partly due to a perceived loosening of Moscow's strings.[186] They readily admitted that economic failures were due to deficient critical evaluations of their own policies. Party authorities, they claimed, were responsible for the lack of concern with the problems of implementation. During the plenum as well, they openly acknowledged the brutal suppression of the people by members of the secret police. Stanislaw Radkiewicz had been dismissed in December, 1954, after his barbarity had been revealed by Lt. Col. Jozef Swiatlo, a high official who had defected to the West. "His broadcasts over Radio Free Europe shocked even the members of the Politburo."[187] The rule of terror was to be replaced by the 'power of persuasion' and the demands of the people were to play an increasing role in Party policy, according to Jerzy Morawski, a Secretary of the Central Committee.[188]

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[184] Raina, p. 24
[185] Andrew Korbonski. P. 21
[186] See Paczkowski, p. 265.
[187] Raina, p. 31. Paczkowski contends that Swiatlo's revelations were so widespread that the party leadership felt compelled to act. "According to data collected by the Ministry of Public Security as part of its efforts to monitor the public mood, tens of thousands of people listened to Swiatlo's broadcasts. Essentially, the whole country knew about them." Paczkowski, p. 267.
[188] Korbonski. 23

Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' and Boleslaw Bierut's death proved to be the opening of a "critical juncture".[189] The overwhelming weight of the top-down bureaucracy and its grinding oppression could no longer stop the myriad expressions of non-acceptance of the status-quo. On top of the economic and standard-of-living inadequacies, the confession of atrocities perpetrated by Stalin (as well as Stalinists in Poland) broke the will of many believers. The old Stalinist Communist leaders lost their credibility. After Boleslaw Bierut's death, the Polish Central Committee sought to find someone untainted by the former regime, who could quell the unrest, yet allow the Communist Party to maintain power. Khrushchev dictated his choice early on – Edward Ochab, a long-time member of the Party and trusted by the Soviet elite. Ochab was regarded as a compromise candidate in order to restrain the process of change and attempt to heal the division within the Party.[190]

In June, 1956 the ZISPO (Zaklady Imieniem Stalina) locomotive plant in Poznan sent a delegation to Warsaw to bargain for improvements. By the end of the month, no news had been received and rumor had it that the delegates had been arrested.[191] The night and day shift of ZISPO organized a peaceful demonstration, marching to Party headquarters. A riot ensued, lasting two days.[192] The response by the police was brutal – more than 50 were killed and a few hundred suffered injuries.[193] This was the most

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[189] "Although [Khrushchev] did not attempt to analyze the system as such, the fact that he produced in public such a powerful litany of accusations and criticisms put an end to the authority of the late 'fourth founding father' of Marxism." Paczkowski, p. 270.

[190] Korbonski, 26-27.

[191] Johanna Granville, "Poland and Hungary, 1956: A Comparative Essay Based on New Archival Findings," *Journal Title: The Australian Journal of Politics and History*. Volume: 48, No. 3, 2002, p. 11; see also, Maryjane Osa. *Solidarity and Contention : Networks of Polish Opposition,* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2003, p. 33.

[192] Raina, p. 44.

[193] Bialesiak, p. 3.

extensive challenge to the regime and to the establishment anywhere in Eastern Europe;

more violent than the protests in East Berlin and Plzen in 1953.[194] Yet instead of

supporting the brutality unleashed by the police, Ochab and the Politburo responded by

condemning the violence and ordering that the workers' issues be addressed. In fact, at

the plenary session of the Central Committee in July, Ochab acknowledged that the

"callousness and bureaucracy of the authorities, both central and local" were catalysts to

the events.[195]

The Death of a Leader

Bolesław Bierut was a devout Communist during the interwar period and made

his way to the Soviet Union during the war.[196] Mollified by Polish assurances of fidelity,

Stalin agreed to reinstitute a Polish Communist Party – the PPR – in 1942. Membership

included those who had survived the Purge of 1938 in the Soviet Union, those who made

their way there during the war, and those who stayed in Poland. The Soviets, anxious to

have control of the Party, airlifted several of the Muscovite Communists into Poland to

serve as leaders of the fledgling Party, along with the 'natives', those who had stayed in

Poland.[197] In 1943, Bierut, brought into the country by the Soviets, became chairman of

the National Council of the Homeland, an underground parliament set up by the

Communists, claiming to represent the spectrum of political and social groups involved

in the resistance. Undoubtedly, his other role was to keep the native communists –

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[194] Korbonski, p. 28. Paczkowski, p. 273.
[195] Granville, p. 16.
[196] In 1938, Stalin claimed that the KPP had been infiltrated by agents of the Polish military intelligence and ordered that all its leaders be killed. The remaining members were sent to labor camps. Bierut escaped Stalin's purge of the Polish Community Party (KPP) because he was in a Polish prison at the time.
[197] Radio Free Europe News and Information Service. "Poland's Communist Party: Its History, Character and Composition", *Open Society Archives,* 1959-3-11, www.osa.ceu.hu.

Gomułka especially – in check. Through a series of maneuvers of subterfuge and misguidance, the KPP was able to claim a position of power.[198] In 1948, PPS, the socialist party that actually did have a following of Polish workers, merged with the KPP creating the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), which became a dominant force in Polish politics. Bierut, who had led a smear campaign against Gomułka, became First Secretary of the Party and President of Poland.

At Stalin's death in 1953, Bierut resisted pressure from the new Soviet leadership to loosen rigid control. Conditions in the country, however, were tense with protests among the workers. Bierut ordered collectivization slowed and the Five Year Plan revised. In 1956 while in Moscow, Bierut died suddenly. "The crisis of 1956 which rocked the whole communist world was launched by Krushchev's 'secret speech' to the Twentieth Congress… In Poland, it was compounded by the equally shocking news of Bierut's sudden death in Moscow, apparently, though not officially, by suicide."[199] Edward Ochab took control as the new First Secretary. Through his moderation, he was able to forestall open revolt of the Poles and the potential of Soviet invasion, but he did not wish nor did he feel he would be acceptable to the Polish people, allowing him to make the changes necessary to save Party control. He sought the appointment of Władysław Gomułka as the new leader.

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[198] "The Soviet model was used as a pattern for creating the 'popular democracies,' or people's republics, of the East bloc,…" Osa, p. 27.

[199] Norman Davies. *God's Playground: A History of Poland Volume II,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1982, p. 583.

Władysław Gomułka, the new First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party

Gomułka became a communist very early, with the blessing of his socialist father. As opposed to others in the KPP, Gomułka was willing to agitate the workers, organizing strikes and taking more risks. "While some Poles might see him as a dedicated champion of proletarian justice and workers' interest, others regarded him simply as … an ambitious political figure capitalizing on Poland's financial difficulties to further his own career, thereby making worse what was already bad."[200] In 1936, he was sentenced to seven years in prison, much of it spent in solitary confinement. He used his time to study and develop a coherent program of ideas. He believed that Socialism was the answer to Poland's problems. He turned to the Soviet Union as the first to embody those ideals. Because of this, he regarded the Soviet Union – even in the face of the 1920 war – as Poland's natural ally, both geographically and politically.[201] Where he split with the Soviet communists was his belief that Poland's route to communism was distinct. Stalin regarded the KPP as a threat and in 1938 orchestrated its dissolution, killing most of the elites. Gomułka (and Bierut) were in prison at the time and escaped Stalin's purge. Gomułka blamed the Comintern for the mass arrests and assassinations, casting a blind eye to Stalin's complicity.

World War II reoriented the political (and social and physical) environment. Gomułka was freed from prison, as were all political prisoners. During the war, Gomułka assisted in convincing Stalin to allow a new communist party to form in Poland – the PPR – in which Gomułka played a leading role. His insistence on maintaining

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[200] Bethell, p. 11.
[201] Bethell, p. 14.

some independence from Moscow helped increase support for the Party in Poland, at the expense of his standing with Stalin. By 1947 the PPR was a "considerable minority".[202] This was due to the efforts on the part of the native Communists as well as the Muscovites. It was at this time that Stalin sought to bring the disparate communist organizations under the umbrella of the Cominform.[203] Gomułka feared (rightly) that the stated purpose of the Cominform to create an avenue of mutual communication was a thinly disguised renewed bid for control by Stalin.[204] At the conference, Gomułka spoke against its formation, as well as a renewed effort at collectivization. He was the first leader within the satellite countries to defy Stalin.[205] However, his intent was not outright rejection. With Bierut as the General Secretary in Poland, he was not in a position to follow that course. It was his misfortune to offer resistance at the same time that Tito defied Stalin's control and broke away from the new Soviet Union empire. Stalin could not destroy Tito, but Gomułka was an easy target. Beirut and other Stalinists recognized that their chances of forcing a confession from such a hardened and committed revolutionary were slight. Instead, Gomułka underwent a lengthy process of public humiliation and eventual imprisonment.[206] He offered to recant and resign. "But he would not make the kind of public apology and self-abasement Stalinists now expected of their opponents."[207] It is miraculous that he was not killed.[208]

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[202] Bethell, p. 137.
[203] The Comintern was its predecessor; an international organization uniting communist parties committed to overthrowing the international 'bourgeoisie'. It was disbanded in 1943 to pacify the Soviet Union's allies in WWII.
[204] By this time, the Stalinists within the Party, headed by Bierut, had begun the process of weeding out the nationalists among them.
[205] Bethell, p. 138.
[206] Gomułka "spent three-and-a-half years in confinement, without confessing to anything." Paczkowski, p. 268.
[207] Bethell, p. 149.

New Possibilities

By 1956, conditions were significantly different.[209] The possibility of

maintaining the status quo of communist party rule had been ruptured by the discrediting

of Stalin, the dissatisfaction of economic policies and the death of Bierut. Change was

thrust upon the Central Committee, which had to consider making concessions to some of

the popular demands in order to stay in power. With Stalin's death in 1953 and the

subsequent removal of Beria, the more radically oppressive elites found far less support.

With the Poznan riots, a growing number of Party members agreed that it was necessary

to gain the people's confidence, to avoid further disillusionment and apathy, and to

prevent a general uprising.[210] At the Seventh Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee,

resolutions sought more decentralization and greater incentives in industrial production.

The Sejm was to be given more power.[211] In order to maintain power, several called for

Gomułka's rehabilitation and readmission into the Party. Having been out of the political

limelight for seven years, his reputation was not tainted with the miscalculations of the

Party.[212] The fact that Bierut had been unable or was unwilling to present the public with

a show trial in 1949 meant that Gomułka's reputation was relatively untarnished. His

popularity was growing, even though he did nothing to warrant attention. Many

maintained that letting him remain outside the Party was more dangerous than

rehabilitating him. In August, 1956, after several secret talks, the Party readmitted

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[208] Although many Communists were expelled from the party during the purges, few top Polish leaders were subjected to show trials and execution." Osa, p. 27.

[209] Beginning with Stalin's death and Swiatlo's revelations, pressure mounted to release Gomułka. "On 13 December, Gomułka was discretely released from house arrest, with the proviso that this move was to remain secret for the time being." Paczkowski, p. 268.

[210] James F. Morrison. *The Polish People's Republic,* The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, p. 86.

[211] Bethell, p. 206.

[212] Richard Staar. "New Course in Communist Poland," *The Journal of Politics,* Vol. 20, 1958, p. 66.

Gomułka. Their efforts to buy him off with a vice-premiership or position as a Party

Secretary of a province far removed from Warsaw were unsuccessful. He wanted to be

publicly cleared of the charges leveled against him in 1948 and he wanted to resume his

position as First Secretary, which he held during the War. The Central Committee

decided that the key to a successful transition could only be affected by Gomułka. They

gave him what he wanted – he was elected as First Secretary by a large majority of the

Central Committee. This came at a cost. On the morning of October 19, when the

Central Committee was meeting to appoint Gomułka, Khrushchev, "a large number of

CPSU Politburo members, and an impressive group of Senior Soviet Army commanders"

arrived with the intention of attending the meeting.[213] "Many parts of the country

reported that Soviet troops were moving toward the capital, and several units of the

Polish Army under the command of Marshal Rokossowski were put on a state of

alert."[214] His election was remarkable in the history of a communist country. "It was

…the first time that a Central Committee had submitted to the will of the masses."[215]

Gomułka's reinstatement signaled the potential for greater control of government by the

people.

The situation in Poland was still volatile through the remainder of 1956. Strikes

and demonstrations continued in Polish cities well after the Eighth Plenum in October.

Rallies took place in Gdansk, Szczecin, and other cities on October 22. A demonstration

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[213] Paczkowski, p. 275.

[214] Paczkowski, p. 275. According to Bethell, "It is known there were strong Soviet forces gathered on the Polish borders with East Germany and the Svoiet Union, raday to attack if need be. At the same time Svoiet units inside Poland were moving from their bases, mostly in the south-west corner of the country, towards Warsaw. Some were already in the outskirts of the capital at Bielany, Lomianki and Jablonna. Others were stopped on the main road from Poznan by Polish units of the KBW commanded by the newly appoint Waclaw Komar, a former victim of the Stalinist excesses." Bethell, p. 211.

[215] Raina, p. 57.

the next day in Wroclaw almost ended in violence. In Bydgoszcz, a spontaneous street demonstration broke out, during which people called for the "overthrow of the Stalinist regime in Poland" (i.e. Gomułka's) and protested against the coercion of Poland by the USSR.[216] Gomułka addressed over 400,000 people who had gathered in Parade Square to stop the demonstrations. His popularity among the people helped control further outbreaks.[217] In November, Gomułka was able to conclude a deal with the Soviet Union that cancelled Poland's debts to the Soviet Union, extended new credits, offered some control over Soviet troop deployment in Polish territory, and included repatriation of Polish citizens.[218] He had Cardinal Wyszynski released from detention and bishops returned to their dioceses.[219] A Joint Government-Episcopate Conference was held in December to restore religious education to schools.[220]

Although the Polish Communist Party essentially dictated the policies of government, Gomułka and the Central Committee made efforts to create a sense of participatory politics by allowing more expanded electoral policies. In October, during the massive unrest that plagued the new government, the Sejm passed a bill allowing more candidates to run for office than seats available. For the first time during Communism, multiple candidates campaigned for the same electoral seat; of the 459 seats available, there were 717 candidates.[221] While 51% of the candidates were Communist, the rest represented parties outside (but supportive of) the Communist Party. The risks were enormous from Gomułka's point of view. Moscow may have acquiesced

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[216] Granville, p. 75.
[217] see Paczkowski, p. 276.
[218] Jan B. De Weydenthal. *The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline,* Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1986, p. 93.
[219] Paczkowski, p. 276-277.
[220] Paczkowski, p. 277.
[221] Bethell, p. 228

to the Polish politburo by allowing Gomułka to be reinstated, but his leadership was probationary. Nagy in Hungary had overstepped the line Khrushchev would allow and Soviet troops rolled into Hungary to reclaim control. In fact, those in the upper echelons of the Polish power structure were wary. "They had never been loyal to Gomułka himself and accepted his return to leadership mainly because he was the only major communist political figure capable of salvaging the Party after the Stalinist debacle."[222] As well, Gomułka worried that Germany could become a threat once again. He and the Party bombarded the public with cautions against jeopardizing socialist rule. "An appeal to cross Communist Party candidates off the ballot paper means more than a simple appeal to cross out socialism. [It] means crossing out the independence of our country, crossing out Poland from the map of European states."[223] Gomułka and his Party of candidates needed to win. For the most part, the people were willing to grant them the opportunity to make good on their promises. Radio Free Europe and the Catholic Church recommended voting according to Gomułka's requests.[224] The outcome was overwhelmingly in his favor.

Gomułka promised the Polish people a brand of self-rule that galvanized support. The people expected less control exerted on public life, more say in government policies and greater economic development. For a short time, Gomułka liberalized the system.[225] A number of decisive moves did change the basic institutional arrangements. The moment of opportunity was thrust upon the state, allowing for significant institutional

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[222] Weydenthal, p. 117
[223] Published in *Trybuna Ludu* in Bethell, p. 228.
[224] Bethell, p. 228
[225] Jerzy Eisler. "March 1968 in Poland," *1968 The World Transformed,* Carol Fink, Philippe Gassert, and Detlef Junker, eds. Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 237.

path divergence to take place. Many restrictions on religious activities were removed, as

well as persecutions of clergy. Gomułka returned to a policy favoring private agriculture

and disbanded many of the collective farms.[226] He promised greater national

independence from Moscow and he approached the U.S. for credits and agricultural

surpluses.[227] He promised to abolish the Stalinist security forces (UB).[228] By January,

the powers allotted to the new security apparatus were considerably less. The mood of

the country was euphoric. Independent social groups sprang up spontaneously, which

threatened to truly democratize the public arena.[229] One such area of independent

formation was the Workers' Council.

Workers Councils

Poland had an active, well-organized labor union sector during the twenty years

of the Republic (1918-1939).[230] After WWII, the unions were revitalized in an effort to

contribute to the arduous process of rebuilding the industrial complex that had been

virtually destroyed by first the Germans and subsequently the retreating Russian

Army.[231] During this chaotic time, factories that were still standing,[232] were managed by

workers who had manned those factories before and during the War, and new workers

coming from the countryside in order to begin rebuilding the economy. Immediately

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[226] Jack Bielasiak. "Social Confrontation to Contrived Crisis: March 1968 in Poland," *East European Quarterly,* Spring, 1988, 22:1, p. 31. Over 80% of arable land was owned by private individuals.
[227] Morrison, p. 179.
[228] Bethell, 232. "On 4 November he had said in his address to the *actif*: 'We intend as soon as possible to reorganize the work of the public security apparatus. The competence of the security organs will be contracted and confined to fighting espionage, terror and other hostile activity directed against people's power and the interests of the state. The security apparatus will be subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Committee for Public Security will therefore be liquidated.'
[229] Bielasiak, p. 83
[230] Jiri Kolaja. *A Polish Factory, A Case Study of Workers' Participation in Decision Making,* University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, 1960, p. 2.
[231] Sturmthal, p. 384.
[232] Russian soldiers had dismantled many factories and taken the parts back to the Soviet Union.

after the war, labor unions began operating once again, basing their activities on the policies and labor laws in existence before the war. The Socialist Party (PPS) supported the independence of the labor unions during the period in which they were able to remain independent from the Polish Communist Party (PPR), vying for the support of the workers.[233]   Poland considered itself a popular democracy, as opposed to a dictatorship of the proletariat, because of the continuance of private farming, some private enterprise and the independence of the labor unions from political parties and the government.[234] This changed with the ousting of the "nationalist" Communists like Gomułka by the Stalinists and the forced merger of the Socialist Party with the Communist Party (PZPR).

After 1948, under the leadership of Bierut, the economy of Poland was patterned after the Soviet model. Trade unions became subservient to the rule of government, serving as an intermediary between government and the workers. "The Party effectively took over the day-to-day running of the factories, placing itself between the increasingly discontented workers and the equally frustrated lower management and technical intelligentsia."[235] Their role switched from providing independent political mobilization for workers' interests to mobilizing workers on behalf of government to increase production. They still were a conduit for social services, but this masked the fact that they had been co-opted by government and no longer stood as a barrier to governmental

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[233] Kolaja, p. 2.

[234] Adolf Sturmthal. "The Workers' Councils in Poland", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review,* Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor Relations, 1961, p. 380. See also, Kolaja, p. 2.

[235] Lane, p. 192.

control. Workers' committees within individual factories were eliminated and the plant manager ruled unopposed.[236]

By 1956, the meager standard of living led to unrest and upheaval. The workers wanted higher wages and better living and working conditions.[237] The Trade Unions were perceived as both arms of the central government and ineffective organs for addressing workers' complaints. After the riots at Poznan, factory workers began forming Workers Councils that could serve their interests.[238] Reformers within the Central Committee were aware that the grievances at Poznan were a product of their own making.[239] J. Cyrankiewicz, a member of the delegation that met with striking workers in June "admitted the justness of their grievances" while attempting to restore order.[240] The VII Plenum in July criticized the provincial party for its isolation from both the workers and the central party bureaucracy. To address the workers' concerns, the party promised to raise real wages of the workers by 30% and improve the housing conditions.[241] They also resolved to improve and expand the rights of the workers themselves. These changes, however, did not counter the policy of allowing the enterprise director sole authority.

The trade unions, which were the organs in place to address these concerns, held their Plenum in August. Resolutions were passed granting elections of officers, stressing

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[236] Sturmthal, p. 381.
[237] Morrison, p. 85.
[238] David Lane and George Kolankiewicz, eds. *Social Groups in Polish Society,* Columbia University Press, 1973, p. 102.
[239] Marx appears to have been right: if people are brought together and share a political position that is oppressed by management, they will form a self-aware class that will bond to form a politically powerful group.
[240] Lane and Kolankiewicz, p. 100.
[241] Lane and Kolankiewicz, p. 101.

the need for more independence from the Party. The Unions, however, had come to be viewed as ineffective; they had little credibility left. Workers were more drawn to the grassroots Workers' Councils that provided an independent organization. Spontaneous Workers' Councils sprang up in many plants. When Gomułka took over in October, he specifically addressed concerns of the workers by providing for an institutional place for Workers' Councils and other policies to relieve the poor living and working conditions. It looked as though the institution of the Communist Party as a whole was allowing for a significant path divergence that would grant autonomy to the workers. On November 19, the Worker Councils Act was passed by the Sejm and became law, allowing all nationally owned enterprises to form such councils.[242]

The evidence suggests that the impetus behind the formation of Workers' Councils occurred several weeks before the Poznan strike in June of 1956. Lechoslaw Gozdzik, secretary of the party cell in the Zeran plant was one of the early proponents for the Councils.

> When we learned the facts [through Khrushchev's Secret Speech] we understood what had happened to the Communist Party in Poland…We examined the ways which would permit the working class to have the feeling that it was really administering the enterprise….we thought that it would not be bad if we had in the plant a workers' council to direct the enterprise, to determine its economic administration and its organization and at the same time to guide it and make recommendations to the directors for execution.[243]

As early as 1955, the Central Committee recommended to the industrial plants that workers look to identify the problem areas in the system and make recommendations.[244]

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[242] Sturmthal, p. 126.
[243] Quoted in Sturmthal, p. 383, from *Nowa Kultura*, Oct. 20, 1957.
[244] Sturmthal, p. 383.

This was to be orchestrated by management and the unions, which could not provide an incentive to the workers to compel them to participate.

The protesters at Poznan demanded once again more autonomy in managing the factories by calling for 'industrial democracy'. At the time, the Workers' Councils received added support from Gomułka and those in the Central Committee committed to pulling away from the rigid control of the Soviet Union. During the 7th Plenum in July, the resolutions calling for decentralization as well as material incentives to workers had the dual goal of economic redress and political gain. As Wlodzimierz Brus stated, "Economic reforms were not only fundamental from the economic point of view but [provided] the basis of lasting *political changes*, as the essential condition of Socialist democracy."[245] The rising Communist elites counted on the support of those who favored decentralization in order to oppose the threat of Soviet intervention.

On October 20, 1956 Khrushchev and members of the Soviet politburo, along with the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, relented and allowed the Polish Central Committee to continue with their reform measures. Gomułka 's speech to the Central Committee continued the indictment against following the same Communist road as the Soviet Union. "The Poznan workers did not protest against People's Poland, against socialism when they went out into the streets of the city. They protested against the evil which was widespread in our social system and which was painfully felt also by

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[245] Sturmthal, p. 385, taken from J. M. Montias, "The Polish 'Economic Model'," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. 9, No. 2 (March-April 1960), p. 18. Emphasis added.

them, against the distortions of the fundamental principles of socialism…"[246] That same

day, Gomułka was voted as General Secretary.

Program

> *Workers' Councils in a modified form have come into their own in Polish
> factories since M. Gomułka returned to power last October. The Polish councils
> have been bold enough to call strikes in many factories when the workers'
> demand for a living wage had been too long postponed.[247]*

After Gomułka accepted power he declared,

> We must approve and welcome the initiative of the working class regarding a
> better organization of industrial management and working class participation in
> the management of the enterprise….The leading organs of our economy, of our
> political life and of the State must work intensively to assist the initiative of the
> workers and to make more general…the proposed forms of organization.[248]

At the VIII Plenum in October, 1956, resolutions were developed that allowed councils to

be party to decisions concerning norms and wages, "drawing up the production plan,

evaluating its fulfillment and prescribing plant expansion."[249] The Councils were to

identify problems of inefficiency and waste and attempt to improve quality and increase

productivity. Council representatives would participate in determining production norms

and wage schedules.[250] More importantly, they could engage in debate over the best

course of action for the enterprise. The plant manager did not have to abide by the

decisions of the Council, but at least controversy would be more transparent. Councils

were given the right to participate in appointing and dismissing enterprise directors.

These decrees were aimed at addressing the anemic level of productivity and quality, and

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[246]Provided by Jonathan Steele, *Eastern Europe Since Stalin,* David & Charles, Newton Abbot, 1973, p. 77.
[247] Elie Abel. "Gomułka Visits Yugoslav Plant," *The New York Times,* September 13, 1957, p. 8.
[248] Sturmthal, p. 385.
[249] Lane and Kolankiewicz, p. 104.
[250] Sturmthal, p. 386.

provide for a higher standard of living for the workers.[251] Business enterprises were

allowed to save raw materials in excess of what would be used to meet their specified

quota and were free to engage in ventures outside of the specified plan. This set the tone

of the real nature of the reforms offered. Substantive decision-making would still be

centralized and controlled, but engaging in side-line activities might allow for more

efficiency. The monies made – or so the thinking went - would then be funneled into

staff earnings. Subsequent decrees dictated the regulations by which the Workers

Councils were allowed to function and provisions for the extra funds received as bonuses

for profits beyond quota and as profits from side-line businesses.[252] These were in the

form of 'plant funds'. A percentage of the total profit would be earmarked for individual

bonuses or collective benefits. Within a limited parameter, the Councils would have

jurisdiction over distribution.[253]

The structure of the Workers Councils had elements suggesting a distribution of

power providing independence. The councils were required to be composed of at least

two-thirds manual workers (as opposed to more skilled workers) and every employee was

guaranteed access to council meetings. The chairman or vice chairman could not be the

plant director or the vice director. As well, the councils were not to be connected to any

outside body. The Party authorities could not influence the decisions of the council. In

practice, this independence was an illusion. In fact, access to individual councils was

available only through the party organs and unions associated with each factory.

Although the council was granted the right to approve the nomination of a new director

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[251] Lane and Kolankiewicz, p. 104.
[252] Sturmthal
[253] For workings of councils, also look at Stepancic, *Robotnik: A Short History,* p. 18.

or vice-director, the power to nominate remained in the hands of higher authorities. The

director and management in general retained the real decision-making power. The

director was regarded as an ex-officio member of the higher body within the councils,

which meant that he had the right to attend the meetings.[254] More importantly, the

director retained the ultimate authority within the factory and could veto measures passed

by the council. Disagreements between the council and the director could be taken to the

agency responsible for the factory, but they were the ones who had the power to nominate

the director in the first place. The workers were relegated to a co-managerial role that

was not supposed to include political dimensions. While on the one hand, the

Communist Party politicized the functioning of the economy by retaining control of it,

they in turn demanded that economic self-management be separated from political

mobilization.[255]

First Gate – Workers' Councils in practice

     The implementation of the policies legitimating Workers' Councils was initiated

by Gomułka and then passed to its first gate – the next arena whereby changes were

made. The policies, that were touted to produce a certain outcome, proved to function

differently than their original intent once they were put into practice. The 'path' of the

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[254] Kiri Kolaja studied a Textile Factory in Lodz in 1957, right after Workers Councils were initiated. The organization of the council included a presidium or decision-making body within the council that mirrored the organizational structure of the Party. The director was a member of both the presidium and the council. The following is taken from their Bylaws:
The workers' council will select from among its members a presidium consisting of 15 persons, including the chairman and the vice chairman.
The plant director is a member ex officio of the presidium and of the workers' council.
The presidium of the workers' council is the executive of the workers' council and is responsible to the workers' council.
Kiri Kolaja. *A Polish Factory: A case study of workers' decision making,* University of Kentucky Press, 1960, p. 147, 148.
[255] Lane and Kolankiewicz, p. 103.

policy diverged in a number of ways. Gomułka and the Central Committee provided a policy that would look like it was granting autonomy while in fact, would allow the Party to still retain control. This became evident with the effort to actualize the Councils. But the problems with the policies themselves were not the only difficulty. Disagreement among the factions within the workers' camp led to several versions of how the policies should be defined. The confusion worked against support.

Difficulties manifested immediately. Enthusiastic members of newly-formed councils demanded the right to participate in the day to day functions of the enterprise. This led to conflict with management, unaccustomed to justifying their decisions. The Councils became the focal point for workers' recommendations and complaints, many of which were impossible to grant. The workers themselves were divided into two sections: a newly rising core of educated technicians and unskilled laborers. The agenda of both groups tended to differ. Because the new policy was vague in many of the recommendations for action, variations among the different Workers Councils made assessment difficult. Outside factors, such as supplies available and transportation, were out of the control of anyone within the factories and contributed to creating hardships to solve the inefficiencies. Unions, with the help of local Parties, sought to undermine the strength of the Councils in order to reclaim their dominance. Without the ability to point to concrete advances, Workers Councils could not defend their record.

The relationship between the director of the plants and the Workers' Councils was fraught with incongruities from the start. The state authorities had the right to recall directors, with the agreement of the Workers' Council, yet the Council also had the "right

to make proposals regarding the appointment and the recall of the director and his assistants."[256] Who has what rights when? The Council was given the power to make major policy decisions, but the director could veto those decisions. In times of crisis, the director had the power to make decisions and simply notify the Council at the next meeting.[257] Thus, the authority of the Councils was limited, with the party-state and its appointees retaining ultimate control. The command of the director superseded any power legislated to the councils. According to Article 13, the director and his main assistants were "appointed and recalled by the proper state authority, in agreement with the workers' council.[258] The Workers' Councils, therefore, could make proposals regarding the appointment and the recall of the director and his assistants, but real decision-making lay with the ministries of the Party. Thus, the councils were not granted veto power, merely a consultative role. According to one council president in a plant in Wroclaw, "the results of the activity of the Workers' Councils depend many times upon the goodwill of the director of the enterprise. The council ought to have wider jurisdiction regarding the decisions of the directors."[259] The council was given the right to participate in making major policy decisions, but the director had the power to "decide urgent matters on his own, informing the council of his decisions."[260] From the beginning of the council experiment, the ambiguous legislation made it clear that Gomułka and the Party's concept of 'empowering the working class' was articulated within the contradictory logic of Leninist ideology. While the worker was the ultimate

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[256] From Sturmthal, Art. 16, p. 391
[257] Art. 16
[258] I think this is from Lane. Also, according to Sturmthal, rules and regulations were decreed on November 19, 1956. p. 126.
[259] Sturmthal, 132.
[260] Sturmthal, 132.

protagonist, the current 'model' did not have the necessary essential qualities of an evolved Communist Worker and required direction from above.

Workers Councils played an ambiguous role. Members within the councils complained that the legislation was insufficient and/or contradictory. They found themselves assailed by the demands of upper management to make significant changes in efficiency and accused by the workers of failing to provide greater remuneration. The two demands often created a zero sum game. Efficiency often required cuts among the workers in terms of pay gains and letting unproductive employees go. The workers did not prioritize efficiency, but immediate standard-of-living increases. In order for enterprises to work more efficiently, investment in the long-term health of the enterprise was required. This led to less pay in the short-term rather than more. Some councils probed the limits of politicizing economic policy by introducing systems that demanded the equal division of profit in which the defining factor was seniority.[261] Salary, in this scenario, would not be based on merit. Those occupying menial jobs may receive more than skilled workers. This concept of 'leveling' worked against the rational development of rewarding efficiency.

The increase in numbers of workers, better education opportunities, and the technological advances introduced led to a rise in skilled workers who were sometimes better qualified than their superiors. A growing conflict arose between those who were managers on the strength of their commitment to the Party and those who sought greater efficiency. Criticism by this growing number of technocrats was interpreted as an attack

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[261] Lane, 107

on the Party.[262] Those older Party-affiliated directors who were left after 1956 "were

warned that they must encourage an atmosphere of discussion and criticism and that

independence of the director and the enterprise went hand-in-hand with greater worker

participation."[263] This was a shrewd move as it built a bridge between the technocrats

and Party management, who had more in common than the white collar/blue collar

worker divide.

The pro-Council supporters were divided on the desired outcomes of Council

involvement. In the philosophical realm, the Councils were a stepping-stone to true

decentralization of power, allowing the Councils to actually manage the long-term

success of the plants, leading to greater democratization. "For the intellectuals and

technicians, the councils were to be the managers of the enterprises and, at the same time,

cornerstones of a new democratic order."[264] The workers themselves sought more

immediate gains in wage increases. Efficiency that would lead to layoffs was not in their

overall best interests. "The elimination of waste, the reduction of surplus labor, the

struggle against pilfering, the reorganization of the plants hurt, in the short run, a great

many workers and caused a decline in the earnings of working-class families."[265]

Understandably, without some recourse to correcting abuse of power through free

elections or worker protections guaranteed, long-term strategies did not make sense to the

average worker. The workers were concerned with the differences of earnings between

groups within the factory. The conflict between the agenda of the workers and the

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[262] Lane, 193.
[263] Lane, 194.
[264] Lane, 107 or Sturmthal, 132
[265] Sturmthal, p. 392.

intellectuals gave the discredited unions an opportunity to stage a comeback. "They appeared as defenders of working-class interests against the councils."[266]

Inevitably, since the nitty-gritty organizing was done on a local level, variations were rampant from plant to plant. In fact, only one-third of all the enterprises had Workers' Councils at all. "Practice varied from plant to plant on such matters as the number of councilors to be elected, the organization of the elections, and the election committee."[267] The laws specified that each Council would have a presidium, which would carry out most of the work.[268] The composition of the Council was required to have two-thirds of its members come from the manual laborer sector, but this regulation was largely ignored. On average, only half of the council members were production workers, with the percentages of blue-collar workers on the presidium even smaller.

Efforts to stimulate more efficiency suffered from the impact of outside influences. Individual plants relied on the greater network of supplies, communication and transportation from outside their boundaries and control. As indicated in the study of a polish plant by J. Kolaja, enterprises found themselves unable to meet their quotas, because a goodly portion of the materials they received were damaged or otherwise inadequate, late, incorrect, or the wrong number.[269] Without the protection of quality control demanded from neither the supplying plant nor the opportunity to choose from different suppliers, the workers could not produce what was required for the next phase.

[266] Sturmthal, 133.
[267] Sturmthal, 132.
[268] This mirrors the organization of the party, to which representatives are chosen from the bureaucratic level below to facilitate the role of the next level. The presidium in the Polish Communist Party is responsible for the daily affairs of the running of the party/government and thus wields more power. See Staar, Richard…
[269] Jiri Kolaja,

"Breakdowns in raw material supply, failures of electricity and transport, delays in ministerial decisions were usually far more important factors in determining results than anything the councils could do."[270] Furthermore, although the Councils were charged with the duty of identifying problem areas, they often could not make necessary changes by finding better suppliers or firing workers who were themselves inadequate.

With the growing difficulties in the spring and summer of 1956, the unions attempted to channel the workers' movement into their union shop committees. The hope was that the unrest might give the unions an opportunity to draft a series of new laws that would strengthen the committees in the plants. This was largely unsuccessful because of the attitude of the workers themselves. The unions were held in disdain by most of the workers. "In the eyes of most workers, the unions had become another governmental authority concerned with 'fulfilling the plan' rather than defending the interests of the workers."[271] Councils arose in factories that had well-entrenched unions. Many of these spontaneous councils had political ambitions to reorganize all the agencies of power - the state, the Party, and the unions - to pull control away from the bureaucracies. The Party, for its part, tried to bolster the dominance of the unions, which already had a well-developed bureaucracy connecting it to the local party. "In 1956 during the Seventh Plenary session of the Central Committee, the unions were given greater control over working conditions, the standard of living of the workers, the drafting of production plans, and the spending of surplus enterprise funds."[272] These were precisely the same areas that the newly-formed, independent Workers' Councils claimed. The workers

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[270] Sturmthal, 134
[271] Sturmthal, 125.
[272] Stefancic, 17.

largely disregarded the Party's attempts to orient decentralization toward its organ. They sought – and thought the climate warranted – a push for true decentralization, empowering the workers themselves.

The outcome of the experiment of Workers' Councils in Poland was mixed, even without taking into account the reluctance to give up power on the part of the elites in the Party. It is true that incompetent directors were dismissed, excess manpower laid off or used in developing new products, and the wage structure rearranged in some plants. In-plant training of personnel under council sponsorship contributed to an increase and an improvement of the production in some of the plants.[273] It is also true that at least some of the Workers' Councils sought qualified applicants from both inside their own organizations and from outside institutions or factories to fill posts vacated by ousted managers. At least in this area, the intellectuals and the workers could agree that they would benefit with qualified and experienced directors. This also changed the economic realm, helping to define its next iteration.

Part of the problem lay in the loosening of constraints of compulsory work without incentives available to take their place. After a year of Workers' Councils, absenteeism was greater than the year before. "A report on the FSO works in Zeran indicates that on one given day almost one quarter of the work force was absent."[274] Many workers demonstrated a low level of work discipline. On most of the issues, the council and at least some members of the labor force found themselves on opposite sides. Wages had gone up but contradictions arose with excessive spending on wages.

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[273] Sturmthal, 134.
[274] Sturmthal, 134.

Management used the plant funds to punish workers for inefficiencies that were due to many reasons, not just their lack of work discipline or irregular work attendance. Production costs soared with the increase of wages. Internal contradictions of the system helped to undermine the cause. Some factories refused to recognize the Workers' Councils, even though they had been mandated by the Sejm, under the express recommendations of the Central Committee. The direction of such enterprises remained firmly in the hands of the agencies in the upper management.

Different councils did reach out to broaden their scope in 1957. Open discussions, covering a wide range of topics, were open to the public. The authorities found this discomforting as political reform proved to be a very popular topic at these meetings. "The combination of increased independence of the industrial enterprise, the greater sphere of competence of the director, and the workers' council striving for control of both, provided a serious threat not just to the industrial management but the Party and the administrative bureaucracy as well."[275] The councils had not produced the unmitigated success that would have guaranteed support. Therefore, the Central Committee felt justified in curtailing further decentralization. The critical juncture was closing the doors.

Second Gate – Local Elites

In 1956, the unions were perceived by protesters as an arm of the government and were not in a position to garner their support. Workers' Councils arose spontaneously in factories that had active unions. As was stated earlier, Gomułka encouraged their

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[275] Lane, 107.

development during the time his power was precarious in the Party. But the trade union organization was too well entrenched to disappear. The head of the trade union council – a Stalinist – was replaced with one of Gomułka's followers. The new head, Ignacy Loga-Siwinski, improved the outward appearance of the unions and waited. As time passed, the workers became more discontented with the Councils as representatives of their needs. The Councils labored under policies that required their attention to efficiency rather than workers' demands. The vague wording of the rules made them ineffective. The workers came to see the Councils as more associated with management than as advocates for them. The unions weathered the initial popularity of the Councils and as the Councils became more enmeshed with problems, the unions were perceived as being "the real defenders of the interests of the workers."[276] In 1957, Gomułka began dismembering the power of the Councils.

Local Party organizations also found themselves undermined with the introduction of the Workers' Councils. Party activists had to prove their worth in the enterprises to participate in the course of events. This turn away from the Party was a matter of great concern. To counteract this trend, the Central Committee set up local Party branches with Party members who also were members of the local Workers' Councils, who were able to gain the confidence of the workers.[277] For their part, they upheld the positive role of the Party. The Party members maintained that their expertise was necessary to self-management because, "the demand that Workers' Councils should run the enterprise in sole partnership with the management exaggerated the extent of the

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[276] Lane, p. 115.
[277] Lane, p. 116.

workers' socialist consciousness."[278] The wedge between the less skilled workers and the budding intelligentsia promoted a return to the Party or at least an acceptance of their role in protecting their jobs.

At the 9th Plenum, Gomułka gave responsibility for general policy to the trade unions and allowed the Councils to retain their advisory role. Now that the duties of the unions and the Councils overlapped, Gomułka and the Party could reorganize the structure in the name of efficiency. In May 1958, the Workers' Councils were subsumed under the umbrella Conference of Workers' Self-Management, along with the trade unions, management and the Party.[279] "The influence of the Workers' Councils was on the wane and the activists slowly returned to the Party."[280]

Third Gate –Gomułka and Party Elites

For his part, Gomułka was treading on a fine line to maintain control of the government.[281] Most of the staff and members of the upper levels of the bureaucracy were there through appointments by the Stalinist powers before him. The discredit of Stalin and the Stalinist agenda had been catastrophic for the Party. It was necessary to rebuild a cohesive party organization. He began with consolidating his popularity with the people at large. In October, Gomułka announced that "the question whether we need Soviet Specialists and military advisers, and for how long we need their aid, will depend

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[278] Lane, p. 139.
[279] Stepancic, p. 19.
[280] Lane, 118.
[281] "The 'war at the top' was largely conducted behind the scenes rather than in full view of the public." Paczkowski, p. 271.

on our decision alone."[282] Soon after, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovski, Stalin's plant as

Minister of Defense in Poland, and several thousand Soviet officers were sent back to the

Soviet Union.[283] Gomułka probably would not have made such a bold move unless he

felt adequately convinced that Khrushchev would not send in troops.[284]

"Notwithstanding the apparent political drama of these steps, they seem to have been

fully accepted by the Kremlin leadership. Gomułka and Khrushchev remained in direct

communication through the period immediately following the October plenum and there

is little doubt that Gomułka's decisions were at least implicitly endorsed by the

CPSU."[285] Given his outreach to the people at large and his precarious position among

the Communist elites, it makes sense that a temporary liberalization policy would provide

enough popularity among the masses to quell any overt opposition from within the ranks.

Thus, in November, 1956 a network of workers' councils that had been created

spontaneously were legalized.   By releasing Cardinal Wyszynski from detention,

Gomułka was able to enlist the support of the Church. The elections, which included

more than one candidate for positions, further solidified his popularity.[286]

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[282] *Trybuna ludu,* October 25, 1956.

[283] Rokossovski was intensely unpopular in Poland. His actions of repression and the damaging exposé of his decisions in the Poznan riot may have been a bargaining chip between Khrushchev and Gomułka. While it seemed audacious of Gomułka to make such a defiant public statement, the final resolution of the October plenum stressed that "the interests of People's Poland as inseparable from the unbreakable principle of the Polish-Soviet alliance, and with the interests of the entire socialist camp." Weydenthal, p. 92.

[284] Gomułka's actions may not have been that radical. According to Paczkowski, "In the summer of 1953 Marshal Rokossowski, undoubtedly at the instigation of Moscow, proposed at a Politburo meeting that 'Soviet officers be gradually detached' from the Polish armed forces and that they be replaced by a system of advisers, similar to that existing in other countries of the Soviet bloc." P. 265-266.

[285] Weydenthal, p. 93

[286] "These measures were designed to 'improve the system,' strengthen Gomułka's position, and satisfy popular demands." Paczkowski, p. 277.

Stalinists, however, were reforming to demand a revival of the Party.[287] The

Natolin group, a mixed bag of Stalinists and nationalist communists, sought to impose

stricter censorship on the press and quell democratization processes.[288] The nationalists

in particular, wanted proportional representation by nationality, a thinly veiled attack on

the number of Jews in the upper echelons of power.[289] Revisionists, on the other hand,

were pushing for a "complete dissolution of the PUWP in its current form and replacing

it with another organization."[290] Gomułka could afford to let less powerful groups within

the society at large experiment with changes to the status quo. The Pulawska group –

revisionist communists within the Party – sought to continue the October Thaw and move

government to allow a more open, diverse public space. Such a move could derail the

tenuous truce with the Soviet Union.[291] Following the Soviet Union's invasion of

Hungary, there was little question that Gomułka's leadership was at the sufferance of

Khrushchev.[292]

Gomułka moved to silence both extremes.[293] His "position was that revisionism

was an unnatural product of dogmatism, and the two must be fought against as a single

enemy."[294] In March, 1957, he promoted three of his close aides to the Politburo and

dismissed 18 Stalinist opponents from the Central Committee, members of the Natolin

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[287] "Once Gomułka consolidated his power, the Communist elite unified under the new regime." Osa, p. 30.
[288] See Osa,– *Divided Elite*, p. 28-29.
[289] Richard F. Staar. "New Course in Communist Poland," *The Journal of Politics,* Vol. 20, 1958, p. 65.
[290] Weydenthal, p. 93.
[291] Paczkowski, p. 271.
[292] Johanna Granville. "Reactions to the Events of 1956: New Findings from the Budapest and Warsaw Archives", *Journal of Contemporary History,* 2003, p. 285.
[293] "Gomułka moved away from a program of liberalization in his determination to strengthen the party, eliminate elite divisions, and consolidate his regime." Osa, p. 39.
[294] Bethell, p. 237.

Group.[295] At the May Plenum, he openly attacked revisionists, claiming that they had

lost the true, ideological vision of socialism.[296] Several Stalinists criticized Gomułka for

his reformist policies, but his prior attack on the revisionists stole their thunder. In the

spring and summer months, 8,600 party staff members were transferred to state

administration jobs. "Gomułka's leadership style was to take advantage of the

differences among these political groupings to maintain a competitive balance among

them, enabling the First Secretary to create an authoritarian mode of political rule that

relied on the factions' ability to neutralize one another in the decision-making

process."[297] By 1958, Gomułka had finally reorganized and consolidated the Party,

allowing for centralization of power under his control.[298]

While Gomułka was successful with the Party elites, he was still caught between

the demands of the people to continue liberalization policies and the wary eye of the

Soviet Union. The Soviets regarded Poland as a conduit to the GDR, as well as a cushion

from the West for its own borders. They were willing to exercise more control if

necessary to protect that connection. Gomułka, for his part, had no desire to sever ties

with the Soviet power. The West still did not acknowledge the Oder-neisse border and

Gomułka harbored an enduring mistrust of the Germans. He felt he needed the Kremlin's

backing to protect the borders. Gomułka began to enlist the aid of those Stalinists he had

squeezed out of power in the mid-50s to maintain the support of the Soviet Union.[299] At

the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee, Gomułka "sharply attacked the 'revisionists,'

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[295] East European Dissent, v. 1 1953-64, p. 191-192.
[296] Weydenthal, p. 96. Also, see Paczkowski, p. 284-285.
[297] Jack Bielasiak. "Social Confrontation to Contrived Crisis: March 1968 in Poland," *East European Quarterly, XXII,* No. 1, March 1988, p. 84.
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[299] Bethell, p. 237

and, foregoing his promises of democratization, emphasized the need of restoring

discipline, obedience, and returning to a monolithic concept of the Party."[300] He argued

this strategy on the basis of the growing power of West Germany.

The End Game

"The Party considered the councils as an end unto themselves while the workers saw them as a beginning."[301]

The potential decentralization of the economic arena that the Workers' Councils

promoted did not last long. Gomułka had envisioned the self-management policies to

remain in the realm of economic improvement, not to spill into independent political

agendas. While some in the Councils were advocating regional associations of Workers'

Councils that would serve as a form of labor parliament, Gomułka rejected the idea.[302]

Clearly, his vision of nationalist communism did not include a move toward

democratization. In some respects, the overwhelming public attention and spontaneous,

independent activism led the authoritarian Gomułka to quell what he had allowed. New

limits were gradually imposed on cultural expression. By 1957, Gomułka was moving

away from the stance that the Workers' Councils were managers of the enterprises and

began referring to them as 'co-managers'. "Clearly, the political leadership was no

longer in favor of giving the Councils effective power, assuming that it had ever wished

to do so."[303]   The Workers' Councils, suffering from their own lack of direction, were

co-opted by state policies. Through constrictive policies, the councils were gradually

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[300] M. K. Dziewanowski. *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1959, p. 287.
[301] David R. Stefancic. *Robotnik,* p. 18.
[302] *Po Prostu,* January 6, 1957, reported in Sturmthal, p. 135.
[303] Sturmthal article, p. 393.

altered to no longer represent the workers against the directors and the state, but become one more force to motivate the worker to produce.

In April, 1958, Gomułka further reduced the substantive power of the councils by setting up "Conferences of Workers' Self-government" that re-established the Party as the control over the councils. This came as a surprise even to those in Poland.[304] The Councils were to allow workers – through their representatives – to *participate* in running the plants, along with the Party and its appointees. The workers, he claimed, had never been granted the right to administer the plants. The new term for workers' rights, Workers' Self-Government, was a concept that extended beyond the Workers' Councils and included the Party and the unions. The problems the councils were having in exercising their control over the functioning of the plants (due to the contradictions in power-sharing instituted by the regulations themselves) were used as excuses. Councils, the Party and unions within the shops were in conflict and limited their functioning. Gomułka envisioned the Workers' Councils as arms of the factory Party apparatus, sharing responsibility without intending a devolution of power. The workers' concept of focusing on immediate consequence and reward was more in line with the level of involvement Gomułka wanted. Certainly the mere threat of the Party losing absolute control over the development of the economy was quickly remedied. "The tasks of the Workers' Self-Government, according to the Communist leader, are twofold: organizational-technical and social-educational."[305] Any reference to the potential for political mobilization was not even denied; it was outside the realm of consideration.

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[304] Sturmthal, p. 135.
[305] Sturmthal article, p. 394.

More articulated, designated responsibilities were outlined, allowing the Party to take control.[306] All plants, even those without Workers' Councils, would have a 'Conference of workers' autonomy' that included members of the Workers' Council, members of the union and the shop Party. The presidium of this newly-defined Workers' Council would include the manager of the shop, the chairman of the union shop committee and a representative of the Party. "By being submerged in the Conference on Workers' Self-Government, the Councils were subordinated to the party cell and the union shop committee."[307] Autonomy from the Party no longer existed. In December, 1958, a new law was passed that diminished the Councils' role even further – "Workers' controls extend over the enterprise's economic activities as a whole, but may not interfere in its management."[308] The critical juncture was over. The new Conference would become part of the new configuration of the institutionalized economy.

Disempowered

After a brief 18 months, the experiment in workers' self-management was over. Gomułka never intended that the Workers' Councils provide decentralized power structures and when they threatened to broaden their scope, he quickly moved to close avenues through legislation. Many have argued that he co-opted the spontaneous uprising of councils to support his political goals. That seems likely, especially if one considers his precarious position among the Party elites. But it is probably true that he was willing to allow some devolution of power if it meant a more efficient economy and

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[306] "Limiting the Workers' Self-Government to the Workers' Councils makes it more difficult for the plant committees of the Party to assign to the Party a leading role in the plant." "Ost-Probleme," vol. 10, No. 12 (June 6, 1958, pp. 403407, as reported in Sturmthal, p. 394.
[307] Sturmthal article, p. 395.
[308] "The New Law on Workers' Controls," *Polish Perspectives,* No. 3 (11), March 1959.

as long as it did not veer into the political realm. Some of the Workers' Councils

engaged in open, anti-Communist rhetoric. Even if the anti-government agenda was

curtailed, it was possible that the Councils would become representative of working class

interests. This threatened the monopoly of the Party – "an effective defense of workers'

interests might have raised wages, reduced investment funds, and thus prevented the

achievement of the regime's principal objective – the rapid industrialization of the

country."[309] Gomułka was swift to clip its wings.[310]

Why did the people not rise up again with the clamping down by the government?

There are many factors that contributed to a re-evaluation of liberalization for several

groups. The Workers' Councils themselves had a mixed outcome. Efficiency was not

improved across the board. The workers as a group were not cohesive. The technocrats

sought to improve efficiency by cutting waste. This applied to overtime salaries as well

as over-employment. Many workers found their jobs in jeopardy. The concept of

professionalism came to be viewed as directly opposed to democracy. The technocrats

wanted decentralization in terms of more freedom from the centralized ministries

dictating policies for individual factories, but they did not conceive of decentralization as

providing complete egalitarianism. In fact, decision-making was best left to experts in

management.[311] "In time, the decision-making body of the Workers' Councils came to

be dominated by persons who maintained that since there was an inherent contradiction

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[309] Sturmthal, p. 137.

[310] "In short, since the early 1950s the Polish Communist regime has been facing a constant dilemma. …it
has had to cope with the frustrations of the population and with their concomitant expression, while at the
same time keeping the power structure intact. The only way out for the regime in periods of crisis has been
to pursue welfare politics. "The Logic of Development in Socialist Poland" Sten Tellenback *Social Forces*,
Vol. 57, No. 2, Special Issue (Dec., 1978), pp. 436-456 Published by: University of North Carolina Press.
[311] Eventually, the technocrats won a concession from government that managers (many of them Party
members without the necessary skills) were required to obtain a minimum of accreditation.

between 'professional management' and 'democracy' … there was no need for decisions to be taken by a body such as the Workers' Councils."[312] The workers were willing to allow skill requirements for specific jobs, as long as salaries were based on length of time employed and their jobs were secure. The Party was more willing to guarantee that security in return for political power.

It is true that the work of the Councils had some positive effects. Average wages and real income grew significantly. The production of consumer goods continued to grow, reaching a peak in growth in 1957 and thereafter, continuing to grow at a slower pace for a few more years. There was a growth in employment, which was an improvement for many even if some sectors began to feel the pinch. In a survey taken in 1960, unskilled, skilled, administrative-clerical workers and specialists felt they were better off in the second half of the 50s.[313] But the real gain was for the technocrats. After 1960, the buying power of wages decreased for the manual laborer.[314] Technical-engineering workers, however, continued to receive disproportionate increases in their wages. They argued that a merit-based system of rewards was necessary to continue technological development. When a drop in real wage growth did occur in the early 60s, the manual laborer was the hardest hit.

Gomułka controlled the extent of the Councils' real power from the beginning. In some ways, it is surprising they were able to have as much effect as they did; a testament to the power of the people's investment in a spontaneous, grass-roots liberalization. Their lack of power hampered their ability to make significant changes. The Councils

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[312] Lane, p. 119.
[313] Lane, 136.
[314] Lane, p. 121.

could not satisfy anyone. By the time the Councils were folded into the Conference of

Workers' Self-Management, many were disillusioned anyway. A shrewd move on

Gomułka's part, however, was to allow subsequent formations to keep the name of

Workers' Council.[315] By 1958, Workers' Councils did not resemble the grassroots

organizations of 1956. In fact, the Councils' power no longer emanated from the workers

themselves, but was an extension of the government. This same process takes place in

the United States ten years later. The Community Action Programs began as openings

for autonomous action on the part of the poor, only to be co-opted by local government

agencies a few years later.

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[315]"Do you belive that Workers' Councils should be true managers of the plant, an advisory body, or that they are altogether unnecessary?
In 1958, the majority of the respondents believed that the Workers' Councils should be the real managers in the plants. In 1961, although still the largest of five groups of respondents, those who so believed decreased by 16%. At the same time, the number of those who thought the councils ought to have an advisory function only increased (by 4%), as did the number of students who thought the councils were altogether unnecessary (by 1%). The 'don't know' and 'no answer' responses increased considerably by 10%, amounting to more than one-fifth of the sample." Impact of Poland's "Stabilization" on Its Youth, by Emilia Wilder *The Public Opinion Quarterly* © 1964 American Association for Public Opinion Research. Vol. 28, No. 3, Autumn, 1964, P. 451.

Chapter 4

United States

Introduction

The 1960 presidential election saw a record in voter turnout for two candidates that did not differ significantly.[316] John F. Kennedy won the 1960 presidency with the slimmest of margins. Both presidential candidates campaigned on a platform of moderate policies. The differentiating characteristics centered on Kennedy's lack of experience and religious affiliation. Nixon, as vice-president under Eisenhower, had competently served the administration, but he had acquired a negative reputation as an opportunist in his role as interrogator during the McCarthy era. He also suffered from his poor showing in the televised debates. Once Kennedy was in office, he was able to deftly promote popular support. Although he supported some social welfare programs, he was not particularly concerned with domestic policy. Therefore, much remained undone at the time of his death. His assassination in November, 1963, stimulated an overwhelming response from the people. The vice-president, Lyndon Baines Johnson, one of the 20th century's most effective legislators, became the next president under the protective veil left by the death of a popular president.[317] Although the government was not in danger of massive disruption as it was in Poland and would be in Spain ten years later, the U.S.

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[316] Pippa Norris. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism,* Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 42.

[317] "Johnson's presidency pressed harder than ever against the line separating an articulation of received premises from a reconstruction of them." Stephen Skowronek. *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 330.

society had suffered a disaster that unnerved the country and provided an opportunity – a critical juncture – ripe for changes.

LBJ capitalized on that momentum and initiated the War on Poverty, an ambitious program aimed at eradicating poverty. The Economic Opportunity Bill, which included a provision for Community Action Programs, passed through its first gate, Congress, largely intact. Once the CAPs began functioning, they suffered a setback at the second gate – opposition from local politicians and the surrounding communities. Local politicians had assumed that they would have some control over the expenditures and the implementation of the programs. Some within the programs sought to create political activism among the poor to sue for political gains. The local communities tended to conflate civil rights unrest with the neighborhood programs. With growing dissatisfaction in public opinion, Congress revisited the regulations and made changes that eventually gave local politicians more control over the programs. With the ascent of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the community action programs were effectively closed down by diverting diminishing allocations of funds to the states earmarked for social welfare. The juncture closed and a conservative agenda was dominant.

LBJ was much more interested in domestic policy than his predecessor. With his ascent to power, he invigorated the social welfare policy reforms Kennedy had begun.[318] With popular support and a party majority in Congress, Johnson pushed ahead with a tax cut to promote growth in the economy and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. With an

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[318] Lyndon Johnson. *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969,* Harper & Row, New York, 1976.

impressive win at the polls in November, LBJ embarked enthusiastically on an effort to overhaul government's roll in social welfare.

Walter Heller of the Council of Economic Advisors, worked on devising a set of policies to address poverty in the spring of 1963, before Kennedy was assassinated. Various departments weighed in with their proposals and attempts to acquire pieces of the pie for themselves. Labor wanted a focus on jobs and training; HEW pushed health and education; Agriculture wanted assistance to farmers; HHFA sought monies for public housing.[319] Little had been accomplished by the time Johnson became president. In late November, Heller presented the idea of a poverty program to LBJ. Johnson's own experience in Texas gave him a sympathetic ear. During his college days, Johnson served as teacher and principal of a small town school in Texas, with a population of mostly Mexican Americans. The lack of services, the disregard from professionals and the grinding poverty impressed him deeply. "The Cotulla experience buried itself deep in Johnson's soul."[320] The fact that Johnson was successful in providing services and educational skills that made a noticeable difference to the impoverished community supplied the impetus for later programs.[321] He endorsed an effort to devise a poverty program as his highest priority.

Poverty

The Great Depression was a turning point in the experience and the perception of poverty – its causes and its ramifications. Close to 25% of the population was

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[319] Irving Bernstein. *Guns or Butter: The Presidency of Lyndon Johnson,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, p. 94.
[320] Urwin Unger and Debi Unger. *LBJ: A Life,* John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1999, p. 27.
[321] Merle Miller. *Lyndon: An Oral Biography,* G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1980, p. 28.

unemployed.[322]   Poverty now became a topic of the mainstream and a prominent political

issue. The federal government, under FDR's administration, became an active participant

in the economy. The two prongs of FDR's policies – relief from poverty and reform

policies to address unequal economic distribution – allowed the traditionally poor

benefits and jobs. While this would last only as long as the effects of the depression were

felt, it changed the expectations of the American people toward the federal government in

a fundamental way.[323]   FDR, following in the tradition of TR and Wilson, re-

conceptualized liberalism to include government support.[324]

Following WWII, the American economy experienced an unprecedented boom.

However, poverty and racial inequity continued to be nagging problems. Several reasons

have been brought forward to account for continuing poverty – the migration of the poor

black population from the South to the North, new technological advances requiring a

more skilled workforce, and inadequate reform policies to help the desperately poor.

After the war, the process of technological growth and the educational

opportunities provided by the GI Bill to returning soldiers spurred increasing

automatization of the goods-producing sector of the economy. Thus, while the

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[322] Michael Harrington. *The Other America: Poverty in the United States,* Simon and Schuster, 1997, p.182.
[323] During the first hundred days of FDR's presidency, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Civilian Conservation Corps, creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the National Industrial Recovery Act. By 1935, FDR responded to criticism that his relief policies did not address the underlying problems of the economy by proposing a number of bills to address reform: the creation of the Works Progress Administration, the Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, and the Wealth Tax Act.
[324] "The process of redefining liberalism in terms of the social needs of the 20th century was conducted by Theodore Roosevelt and his New Nationalism, Woodrow Wilson and his New Freedom, and Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal. Out of these three great reform periods there emerged the conception of a social welfare state, in which the national government had the express obligation to maintain high levels of employment in the economy, to supervise standards of life and labor, to regulate the methods of business competition, and to establish comprehensive patterns of social security." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. *The Politics of Hope,* Riverside Press, Boston, 1962: http://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/50s/schleslib.html

availability of goods in the market increased, the number of people employed decreased.

White collar employees surpassed the number of blue collar workers. Fewer jobs were

available for unskilled and less-educated members of the population. The unemployed

tended to be disconnected, separated into smaller communal units. They were largely

disempowered, without anything to compel the business community to address their

needs.[325] The economic terrain moved from an industrial environment to what would be

regarded as a postindustrial one.

During the 50's, the poor black population from the South immigrated to the

North in droves.[326] Work as sharecroppers became scarce with the introduction of the

mechanical cotton picker. What had been a regional problem now became national.

Black families were relegated to ghettos with inadequate housing, services, employment

opportunities, and education. 'White flight' to the suburbs left cities to poor populations,

impeding the potential for laissez faire market principles to rejuvenate neighborhoods.

Jobs were scarce and pay was inadequate. The working poor became less of a problem

than the non-working poor. Organizations such as the Ford Foundation, the National

Institute of Mental Health, and Kennedy's President's Committee on Juvenile

Delinquency, studied communities to address inner-city neighborhood decline and

delinquency with the idea that they could find solutions. They concluded "that the

underlying problem was poverty and that the solution called for change at the federal as

well as the local level of government."[327] Writers and journalists contributed to the

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[325] See Michael Harrington.

[326] Irving Bernstein. *Guns or Butter: The Presidency of Lyndon Johnson,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, p. 85.

[327] Alice O'Connor. Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth Century U.S. History, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001, p. 124.

growing moral dilemma. Edward R. Murrow narrated "Harvest of Shame" on television,

which documented massive poverty among migrant workers.[328] Writers such as Harry

M. Caudill portrayed the suffering of poverty in the Cumberland Plateau in eastern

Kentucky with half a million people living in terrible conditions. "Secretary of the

Interior Stewart L. Udall placed Caudill's book alongside Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle,*

Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath,* and Agee's *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* in its

power to evoke the condition of the poor."[329] Michael Harrington in his book, *The Other*

America, published in 1962, argued that the poor lived in conditions that isolated them

from the political process. Walter Heller of the Council of Economic Advisors had

Robert Lampman update his 1959 statistics on the poor.[330] His findings were roughly the

same – 19 percent of the population lived in poverty.

John Kennedy (and subsequently Lyndon Johnson) took the stance that

government could provide programs that would directly address the disturbing rise of

unemployment and disenfranchisement. These studies provided the bases upon which

members of Kennedy's administration began to consider how the federal government

could develop policies to address poverty. Kennedy sought a companion program for his

proposed tax cut that would more broadly offer aid to the poor. Walter Heller began

devising such a program.

Social reform initiated by the government in the past had been linked with

business in a partnership that allowed a continued perception of a separate sphere of

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[328] Bernstein, p. 90.
[329] Bernstein, p. 90.
[330] Lampman had provided a study to the Joint Economic Committee in 1959 entitled, *The Low Income Population and Economic Growth.* His poverty threshold was $2500 for a family of four. He found 19% of the population fell below the poverty line. *Guns or Butter,* pp. 86-87.

power that could provide a common ground for conservatives and reformers.[331]

Roosevelt's vision of the New Deal was a "use of the authority of government as an

organized form of self-help for all classes and groups and sections of our country."[332]

Although his policies were landmark shifts to a greater role for government, the avenue

through which 'self-help' was supported was through the business community. Social

security – as an example - was a program providing funds for retirees, widows and the

disabled through payroll taxes to which both parties – the employee and employer –

contributed.   Johnson's war on poverty extended the vision of self-help by taking a

different direction that would sidestep the business community and have government

work directly with disempowered segments of the population. The logic for this

stemmed from the large numbers who did not have the training or skills to enter the

workforce in a meaningful way that would help them rise above the poverty line.

Kennedy

Kennedy's New Frontier Program meant to address a slightly sagging economy,

bolster international aid, increase domestic defense and the space program. Although his

"New Frontier" began as campaign rhetoric to garner support, the term came to

symbolize an array of policies that included both domestic and international foci. "We

stand at the edge of a New Frontier—the frontier of unfulfilled hopes and dreams. It will

deal with unsolved problems of peace and war, unconquered pockets of ignorance and

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[331] This was not without controversy. Powerful lobbies in Washington sought to undercut FDR's move toward regulation. The Wheeler-Rayburn bill, which sought to regulate utility companies, was under significant attack. Roosevelt claimed that the companies were using "investors' money to make the investor believe that the efforts of Government to protect him are designed to defraud him." Arthur Schlesinger. *The Politics of Upheaval, 1935-1936, the Age of Roosevelt,* Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003, p. 312.

[332] John Grafton. *Great Speeches,* Courier Dover Publications, Mineola, 1999, p. 78.

prejudice, unanswered questions of poverty and surplus."[333] Tensions stimulated by

grassroots organizations such as SNCC, CORE and SCLC, brought attention to racial

inequality.[334] Kennedy's plan was to provide a domestic program that would address

some of these problems through enlarging the role of the federal government. During

Kennedy's administration, Congress passed some of his ambitious programs, such as the

Omnibus Housing Act of 1961, which provided funds for refurbishing homes for low and

middle income families, an increase in the minimum wage, and an increase in funds for

the federal highway system. Many programs, such as federal funding for elementary and

secondary schools and health insurance for the elderly, failed to pass or became bogged

down in a legislative impasse.[335]

Civil Rights issues had surfaced in earnest during Eisenhower's administration

with the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka in 1954, the Montgomery bus boycott

in 1955 and the desegregation of Little Rock Central High School in 1957. Kennedy's

record on Civil Rights legislation before his presidency was mixed. He had supported the

position of Southern Democrats in amendments to the 1957 Civil Rights Bill. The South

saw him as a moderate alternative to Hubert Humphrey, the other Democratic

presidential candidate in 1960. He campaigned as an advocate for non-discrimination

policies.   When in office, however, he proceeded slowly with addressing racially based

practices. At the same time, the Civil Rights Movement, a coalition of activist groups

that promoted protests through sit-ins, marches and 'Freedom Rides', would not wait.

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[333] John F. Kennedy Acceptance speech at 1960 democratic convention.
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfk1960dnc.htm
[334] Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Congress of Racial Equality, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
[335] John A. King Jr. with John R. Vile. *Presidents from Eisenhower through Johnson, 1953-1969* Greenwood Press, Westport, 2006, p. 78.

When Kennedy's rhetoric was not enough, activists kept up a steady stream of protest to keep the issue in the public eye. The segregationist response to protests on local and state-wide levels forced the federal government to act. In June of 1963, Kennedy gave his Civil Rights Address, calling for legislation to guarantee civil rights to Black Americans.

Kennedy 'rewrote' a political persona through the use of television, creating a populist image that overrode the controls within the institution of the party.[336] He further undermined party control of his agenda by using his own people rather than the Democratic National Committee, setting the tone for gradual erosion of the power held by the political parties.[337] He was able to export that image to the European public as well. By more directly appealing to the public, and through a charismatic personality, he inspired a generation of new citizens to engage in political activities. "A new kind of liberal emerged out of this context: unorthodox, reform-minded, iconoclastic, and staunchly independent of Democratic Party tradition."[338] While historians and political scientists rate Kennedy's presidency as close to average, the public still views him as the potential savior of the country.[339]

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[336] Sidney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson. *The American Presidency: Origins and Development 1776-1993,* Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington, D.C., 1994.

[337] Roger G. Brown. "Party and Bureaucracy: From Kennedy to Reagan", *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. 97, No. 2, Summer, 1982, p. 288.

[338] William Schneider. "JKF's Children: The Class of '74," *The Atlantic,* March 1989, p. 39.

[339] His inspiration was even greater after his death. In a Gallup survey as late as 1999, 50% of the respondents believed that the Kennedy assassination was one of the most important events of the twentieth century, "ahead of the Depression, the fall of the Berlin wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the Vietnam War (Gallup Poll Release 1999)." In 1996, a CBS-*New York Times* poll registered more than twice as many would most want Kennedy to be running the country now than any other president. Sheldon Appleton. "Trends: Assassinations," *The Public Opinion Quarterly,* American Association for Public Opinion Research, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 496.

While Kennedy used television to help create an image, the events of his death were made more dramatic through that same medium. The American public watched his assassination, as well as the assassination of his alleged assailant.[340] Under this heightened scrutiny, Lyndon Baines Johnson became 37th president of the United States. In less than a year, based largely on his assurances that he would continue the Kennedy legacy, LBJ won a sweeping victory over his Republican opponent.[341]

Johnson

Johnson began his political career in 1931, as administrative aide to Representative Richard Kleberg. The following year, the country was devastated by the Great Depression and the constituents in Texas that Kleberg represented were hard-hit. Johnson, finding himself attached to a congressman willing to do little, found himself doing Kleberg's work as well as his own. When FDR became president in 1933, Johnson became an enthusiastic supporter. He accepted an appointment from FDR to direct the National Youth Administration in Texas. The program was designed to provide vocational training for unemployed youth and part-time employment for needy students. The experiences of the degradation of poverty would stay with Johnson throughout his career, as well as his admiration for FDR's policies to provide social reform. However,

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[340]The three networks stopped all other programming and had four days of continuous coverage. "Though multi-city Nielsens for prime time hours during the Black Weekend were calculated modestly (NBC at 24, CBS at 16, and ABC at 10), during intervals of peak viewership--as when the news of Oswald's murder struck--Nielsen estimated that fully 93% of televisions in the nation were tuned to the coverage." Thomas Doherty. "Assassination and Funeral of President John F. Kennedy," *The Museum of Broadcast Communications,* http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/K/htmlK/kennedyjf/kennedyjf.htm

[341] Certainly, Cold War fears ran deep and Johnson's adversary, Barry Goldwater made it clear in his acceptance speech of the Republican nomination that he would not shy from "using our strength" against "the principal disturber of peace in the world today." Goldwater's 1964 Acceptance Speech, from the archives of the Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwaterspeech.htm.

FDR's programs were possible because of the context in which he became president; drastic measures of what some would call social engineering were passed as legislation by a reticent congress caught in the midst of rampant unemployment and widespread suffering. A good number of programs FDR provided for the poor focused on putting them to work: the Civil Conservation Corps employed 3 million men to build reservoirs and plant trees; the Works Progress Administration employed more than 8.5 million Americans to work on the public infrastructure of roads, buildings, parks and bridges. Johnson began his long Congressional career fully supporting FDR in 1937.[342] By 1952 he was minority leader in the senate. His reputation for effective leadership was legendary. Becoming vice-president in 1960 largely proved to be a waste of his considerable talents. As president, he sought to accomplish the social welfare policies for which he had spent much of his career promoting. Although Johnson really was intending to continue the legacy of FDR, the circumstances under which poverty persisted, argued for a more comprehensive program that would offer direct aid from the federal government.

With the ground-breaking legislation of the Civil Rights Bill and the tax cut secured, Johnson turned his attention to the overall tensions within society caused by poverty. Unlike Civil Rights issues, however, the war on poverty lacked a grass roots movement that could be a focal point for generating change. The impetus came directly from the White House.[343] In a speech at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in

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[342] "Johnson's entire campaign strategy called for identification with Roosevelt." Unger and Unger, *LBJ, A Life,*
 p. 61.
[343] The idea of a comprehensive program was being considered before Johnson took office. Robert Lampman supplied facts and figures to President Kennedy, leading him to surmise that the tax cut alone

May, 1964, Johnson stated, "The challenge of the next half century is whether we have the wisdom to use [our country's] wealth to enrich and elevate our national life, and to advance the quality of our American civilization."[344] In a period of economic abundance, Johnson advocated a federal policy that would address quality of life. His aim was to significantly extend the baseline of opportunity by professing a potential role for governmental intervention in areas of private life that had not been addressed before, except in times of crisis. But rather than a period of crisis, the United States was experiencing a time of financial growth. There was not a significant body of the populace campaigning for governmental support for the impoverished. What Johnson was proposing, therefore, was a significant shift from the means through which change and reform had been enacted in the past. Although Johnson himself saw his efforts as an extension of FDR's reform methods, there were fundamental differences that would break the coalition of the Democratic Party beyond the differences of opinion regarding civil rights and the South.

Johnson's 'Great Society' further attempted to provide a moral authority adopted by government. The impetus for this had at least two sources. During the 1950s, the federal government could not easily address inequality because of the impasse created between states' rights and federal policies.[345] The significant public outcry against the

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would not remedy the poverty problem. Full development of the program would under Johnson however. Emmette S. Redford and Marlan Blissett. *Organizing the Executive Branch: The Johnson Presidency,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981.

[344] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, Book I (1963-64), p. 704-707. http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/great.html

[345] The court case Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 set the stage for federal involvement in states' issues. Orval Faubus, governor of Arkansas forced Eisenhower's hand when he called on the National Guard to prevent integration at Little Rock Central High School. Eisenhower upheld the Supreme Court decision by ordering the National Guard to return to their barracks and deploying 101st Airborne Division

inadequate welfare of 1/5 of the population during a time of plenty was the other. Many specialists in the field of social welfare sought the opportunity to solve social problems with policies devised by specialists. "In the heady atmosphere of the early 1960s, social scientists believed they could devise policies to eliminate poverty in all but the most extreme cases by joining the analytical capacity of social science with the programmatic potential of public policy."[346] The dye was cast for an attempt to provide the impetus to solving the world's problems through a top-down implementation of change.

Organization of the program – Community Action Programs

The Council of Economic Advisers had inherited the poverty program from Kennedy in 1963.[347] William Capron, an economics professor from Stanford and now a senior member of the CEA staff, called an interagency group of economists from Health, Education, and Welfare; Labor; and the Housing and Home Finance Agency.[348] This working group sought the input of Agriculture, Commerce, HEW, the Director of the Budget, and the Administrator of HHFA, to examine their existing programs and propose new ones. Parceling out portions of the overall program to separate departments only added to its fragmentation.[349] CEA, while still involved with the poverty program overall, gave responsibility for the development of the program to the Bureau of Budget, with William Cannon heading the task force. Cannon proposed ten demonstration areas

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to protect the students. This began a decade of hammering out parameters between state and federal authority.
[346] Andrews, p. 57.
[347] The CEA was established in 1946 by the Employment Act. Its purpose is to "provide the President with objective economic analysis and advice on the development and implementation of a wide range of domestic and international economic policy issues." http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cea/
[348] Bernstein, pps. 93-94.
[349] Richard M. Flanagan. "Lyndon Johnson, Community Action, and Management of the Administrative State," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 4, 2001, p. 589.

for "depressed areas, urban slums, Indians, migratory labor, and persons in institutions. These experiments would then form the basis for creating a new national poverty policy."[350] Their timid approach, while it may have snuck under the radar of other agencies with funding levels that did not arouse their attention, was not what the president had in mind. LBJ called for a more dramatic approach. He doubled the project in scope and funding, and, while still inadequate to address national poverty in a substantive way, used it as the basis of his bold, domestic program. In his State of the Union address in January, 1964, Johnson declared "war on poverty in America."[351]

Now it was necessary to try to develop a governmental structure that could function efficiently amid the numerous agencies that would become involved in different aspects of the program.[352] Harold Seidman of the Bureau of the Budget outlined three potential approaches to its organization. An independent agency, a new agency within the Executive Office, or the program could be subsumed by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).[353] All three possibilities had drawbacks. HEW, however, had the advantage of having multiple structures in place that could administrate the funds, but might find utilizing resources from other departments difficult. In the end, control by HEW was not considered by the president; he had already made up his mind. In order to control for the squabbling among the federal departments, Johnson decided to have someone head the program who would report directly to him.[354] "He did not want the Departments of Labor; Health, Education, and Welfare; or Agriculture to have pieces

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[350] Bernstein, p. 95.
[351] http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26787
[352] Mark R. Arnold. "The good war that might have been," *New York Times,* Sep 29, 1974, p. 285.
[353] Emmette S. Redford and Marlan Blissett. *Organizing the Executive Branch: The Johnson Presidency,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981, p. 82.
[354] Flanagan, p. 390.

of it."[355] Johnson wanted to bypass federal departments and agencies that would mar

services with bureaucratic red tape. Johnson asked Sargent Shriver, head of the Peace

Corps, to serve as a special assistant to the president, directing the activities of all

agencies involved with the anti-poverty program, as well as Johnson's representative to

Congress concerning any legislation.[356] The program would be administered out of the

Executive office, with responsibility for all the programs in the hands of the director.

Shriver set about his task with gusto. His task force consisted of seventeen

members and he consulted with many leaders and specialists in and out of government.[357]

Representatives, including members of the Bureau of the Budget and the Civil Service

Commission helped recruit administrative staff and set up offices. The result was the

Economic Opportunity Bill, a massive piece of legislation that included provisions for

Job Corps, work training programs, Community Action Programs, programs to fight rural

poverty, employment and investment incentives for small businesses, Work Experience

Programs and VISTA – a domestic peace corps. "Of the $962.5 million budgeted, $412.5

million was for youth programs, $315 million for community action, and $235 million for

the others."[358] Title II, the Community Action Programs, would provide services with

the goal of eliminating poverty, and would be coordinated at the federal, state, and local

levels. The programs themselves would be devised by the participants themselves, which

would allow them to address problems particular to their locality. This approach was

supported by the various studies done through universities as well as experiences of

philanthropic organizations such as the Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and the Ford

[355] Unger and Unger, p. 301.
[356] *Public Papers, 1963-64,* look at pp. 255, 272, 366-67, 379
[357] Redford and Blissett, p. 84.
[358] Bernstein, p. 103.

Foundation.[359] The hope was that by placing the responsibility for the organization of the individual programs at the local level, it would be "responsive to the demands of its clients and allow for the integration of social services in a single location."[360] The Office of Equal Opportunity would review the needs and resources of the poor, develop strategies to eliminate poverty and coordinate the implementation of all of these programs, through the Office of the President.[361] At the time, the taskforce did not find the Community Action Programs controversial. Those in BoB and the CEA, who initiated CAPs, focused their attention on budgetary hurdles to make them attractive to lawmakers.[362] Title II's broad definition allowed for wide interpretation. The lack of clarity, however, ended up fueling the most heated critique. But for now, they were ready to present the bill to Congress.

First Gate – Congress

Following the 1964 election, the Democratic Party held majorities in the senate and house. Johnson's initial efforts were to support legislation held over from the Kennedy administration – the Civil Rights Bill and the tax cut. This was in keeping with his campaign promises of continuing Kennedy's legacy. The 1964 Civil Rights Act addressed many inadequacies of prior practices. It expanded the right to vote by barring unequal voter registration requirements aimed at denying blacks. It guaranteed access to public accommodations without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. Racial discrimination was banned in any program receiving federal assistance. Equality of

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[359] Bernstein, p. 101
[360] Flanagan, p. 590.
[361] Clark, p. 43.
[362] Flanagan, p. 594.

opportunity in employment was granted by banning discrimination with regard to race. Even with the ongoing focus of national attention on protests of racial inequality, and even though Johnson was favored with a moderately compliant Congress, it took patience to override a two month long filibuster against the bill in the Senate and growing backlash from white voters.[363] The president utilized his honed skill as a legislator to smooth the way. "Whether courting the indispensable Everett Dirksen, the Senate Republican leader, or making public speeches, Johnson never ceased guiding the long legislative fight."[364] Dirksen's support helped overcome the intransigent Southern congressmen.

The 1964 tax cut was also a holdover of Kennedy's policies regarding the new budget. In early 1963, Kennedy sent a two-part tax bill to Congress that gave tax cuts for individuals and corporations and a massive reform of the tax structure.[365] By September, members of Congress would allow the tax bill only if domestic reforms were removed. The Kennedy administration accepted the inevitable. When Johnson assumed the presidency, however, he decided to reassess a major tax cut. Johnson was motivated for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Kennedy administration was regarded as irresponsible fiscally. LBJ wanted to foster a different image. More importantly, Johnson had his sights on major reform legislation and needed the backing of the people at large, enjoying a vibrant economy. The thinking behind the 1964 tax cut was to provide a trickle-down effect to stimulate production, which in turn would increase the gross national product,

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[363] Steven F. Lawson. "Civil Rights", Robert A. Divine, ed. *Exploring the Johnson Years,* University of Texas Press, Austin, 1981, p. 100.
[364] Lawson, p. 101.
[365] Irving Bernstein, *Guns or Butter,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, p.27.

create jobs, and boost personal income and corporate profits.[366]   The Johnson

Administration hoped that the growth in the economy stimulated by the tax cut would pay

for the social programs government implemented. In its first year, the gross national

product rose 10% and economic growth averaged 4.5% for the first four years.

Disposable personal income rose 15% in 1966 and federal revenues increased from $94

billion in 1961 to $150 billion in 1967. Unemployment was at 5.6%; a rate that steadily

diminished to 3.4% by the end of 1968.[367]   Although unemployment was relatively

moderate, the statistics of families living in poverty was much higher – 20% of all

American families were poor.[368]

Johnson was adamant that the war on poverty should not come out of tax dollars.

With the tax cut assured, Johnson, confident that he could sell the poverty campaign to

the white middle class, turned his attention to lobbying congress to pass the Economic

Opportunity Bill. The administration anticipated that it would be a hard sell, partly

because it looked like an economic redistributive program and partly because members of

Congress tend to resist legislation emanating from the executive branch. The argument

that revenue generated from the tax cut would help fund the program and that OEO

would award funds to locally-controlled CAPs helped dispel the concern that the

administration would create a political machine.[369] "…community action provisions

calling for local control and participation ensured that power was decentralized and that

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[366] John A. Andrew, III. *Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society,* Ivan R. Dee, Inc., Chicago, 1998, p. 14.
[367] Unemployment rate figures obtained from U.S. Department of Labor – www.dol.gov
[368] "In short, somewhere between 20 and 25 per cent of the American people are poor. They have inadequate housing, medicine, food, and opportunity." Michael Harrington. *The Other America: Poverty in the United States,* Simon and Schuster, 1997, p.182.
[369] Johnson was still accused of devising the war on poverty in order to build patronage organizations among the black urban poor. Francis Fox Piven, 1974.

the program content would be nonpartisan."[370] Democrats from the Northern states backed the legislation. Those opposed were the Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. The strategy of the White House rested on convincing the Southern democrats to side with their northern compatriots. To do that, those lobbying for the legislation had to make clear that the programs were not solely for the black poor, whom many from the South believed would abuse the system. The president and First Lady toured small towns with high populations of white poor and virtually ignored black ghettos. There were those on the hill who observed the tactic as dangerous to the growing desperation of Civil Rights groups around the country. But Johnson was more concerned with how it appeared to swing votes in Congress than to the public. Shriver was able to convince Rep. Phil Landrum of Georgia to steer the bill through the House. That Landrum was both a Southern conservative and a proven racist continued to push the perception of a bill for blacks off the radar. But Landrum's support came with a cost. Landrum helped draft the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959 that sought to curtail corruption within the unions.[371] Johnson contacted George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, to forestall an outcry from the labor unions. Landrum proved to be valuable in getting the bill through the House.

Since this was an election year, the Republicans were told to stand firm with the party. Therefore, they couldn't count on any Republicans crossing over to vote for the bill. Also, several conservative Southern democrats were opposed. They knew they had

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[370] Flanagan, p. 592.

[371] "Landrum, who was about to become the hero of the Democratic liberal wing, had been best known as co-author of the Landrum-Griffin labor reform bill, which the liberals despised. Landrum's bid for a seat on the Ways and Means Committee had been blocked by Democratic liberals in 1963 because of his conservative record (Bell, *The Johnson Treatment,* p. 97). In 1965, after the Landrum-McNamara (Senator Patrick McNamara of Michigan) bill had become the Economic Opportunity Act, he won his seat on that committee." James Sundquist. *Politics and Policy,* Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1968, P. 147.

203 votes in favor of the bill. They needed only 15 more. Before the House debate

opened, Shriver was called to the office of Speaker John McCormick, where a number of

representatives from the Carolinas had congregated. It became clear that in order to

assure their votes, the president would have to agree to forfeit Adam Yarmolinsky.[372]

Yarmolinsky had been working closely with Shriver as a key member of the task force.

There has been speculation as to why the southern congressmen objected to Yarmolinsky,

but there is little substantive proof. The House passed the bill on August 7, 1964. The

Senate began deliberations in the Senate Select Subcommittee on Poverty in June and by

July 23; the Senate passed the bill 61 to 34.

Implementation

A provision within the legislation for the Community Action Programs stipulated

that the program would be "developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum

feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served."[373]

This was an attempt to wrest the power of reform from the states and provide for a mode

of change that would be fostered at the local levels. Many of the participants of the

Shriver's taskforce that helped craft the bill considered the broad terminology of CAPs as

beneficial; it would give local communities the opportunity to focus on problems specific

to them rather than have it dictated by the national organization. Yarmolinsky, who

helped write the bill conceived of maximum feasible participation as a way to involve the

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[372] Adam Yarmolinsky was on leave from the Defense Department and served as Shriver's assistant on the White House task force. "Many southerners associated Yarmolinsky with the Defense Department's hardening line on integration, and a group of congressional members warned the White House that unless Yarmolinsky was blackballed from the new antipoverty agency, they would vote against the bill." Mark I. Gelfand. "The War on Poverty", *Exploring the Johnson Years,* Robert Divine, ed., University of Texas Press, Austin, 1981, p. 133.
[373] Charles Brecher, *The Impact of Federal Antipoverty Policies*; Praeger Publishers, 1973, p. 80.

local people in the process.[374] At the time, no one in congress questioned what was

intended by the authors of the bill. It proved, however, to be the source of considerable

debate and consternation. Jack Conway, appointed by Shriver in 1964 as head of CAP,

had been a labor organizer. He interpreted maximum feasible participation as a means to

generate political action within the neighborhoods.[375] "With few marching orders from

the White House and vague statutory intent, Conway crafted CAP to include as much

input from the poor as possible."[376] Many agree that the political empowerment of the

poor population was clearly intended.[377] The CAP Guide issued by the OEO states that

> Meaningful participation shall be a continuing objective of every Community
> Action Program, since it is through their own effective participation that the
> residents and groups to be served can most readily achieve the objective of a
> permanent increase in their capacity to deal with their own problems without
> further assistance.[378]

Exactly how such a course of action should be implemented was left vague within the

legislation, due at least in part to the reluctance on the part of the Office of Economic

Opportunity to dictate what was meant by 'maximum feasible participation'.[379] Each

CAP was left with articulating its agenda and organizing its implementation. Some

explicitly sought to organize the poor in their area to sue for services and recognition

from their local governments. However, relatively few CAPs considered this a primary

goal of their organization.

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[374] Bernstein, p. 105.
[375] Flanagan, p. 594 – oral history of Jack Conway.
[376] Flanagan, p. 594.
[377] "The task force did not foresee the potential conflicts that the encouragement of 'maximum feasible participation' by the poor in their cities;' community action programs would cause. Shriver thought there might be battles between mayors and the poor aligned together against …the traditional social agencies. But, Yarmolinsky wrote, 'the possibility of major conflict between the organized poor and the politicians in city hall was simply not one that anybody worried about.'" Bernstein, p. 103.
[378] Brecher, p. 81.
[379] Ralph Kramer. *Participation of the Poor, Comparative Community Case Studies in the War on Poverty,* Prentice-Hall, Incl. Englewood Cliffs, 1969, p. 3.

Some organizations required that a percentage of the members of their governing boards be representatives of the poor. Interpretations varied with boards consisting of differing percentages of municipal officials, professionals associated with welfare agencies and representatives of the local population. Some CAPs had few local representatives while other boards had a majority.[380] Initially, membership on governing boards did not demand representatives from within the community, but recommended their coordination be in the hands of a combination of private and public nonprofit agencies. In 1966, amendments to the bill required one third of the members on governing boards come from the communities they serve. This did little to change the actual composition, which continued to have little representation from the poor within the community. The poor themselves did not raise a cry of protest. In fact, representation was seen as preferable by many rather than direct democratic input. Those who had already had experience with managing centers were arguably better suited to run the action programs. Some programs experienced the rise of clientalist organizations as rising leaders from the communities themselves sought to benefit friends and family.[381] As their reliance on their positions increased, leaders of those communities had already acquired some degree of empowerment through a greater degree of activism, affluence and practice.

Three goals for political strategies of Community Action Programs centered around enhancing the political resources of the poor in their local communities,

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[380] Peterson provides details concerning CAPs in Philadelphia, Chicago and New York. Philadelphia allowed representatives elected by residents living in low income sectors. New York City allowed organizations to send delegates to a convention who then would choose representatives. Chicago appointed an executive director, who chose a director who appointed the neighborhood council. Paul E. Peterson. "forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program", *The American Political Science Review,* Vol. 64, No. 2, June, 1970, p. 495.
[381] Philadelphia's CAP experienced this.

increasing the areas in which poor citizens participate; and demanding issues concerning the poor become part of public discourse.[382] The actual outcome was a far cry from its intention.[383] Rather than the empowerment of the population intended, a backlash arose from the larger community against the conflict-laden approach of the disgruntled poor. Direct mass participation was immediately recognized as logistically impossible. As well, the guidelines from the EOA were intentionally vague, leaving ample opportunity to interpret the spirit of the law according to local conditions. Local results were varied. In three case studies – Philadelphia, New York City, and Chicago – the local power structures were able to impact how representation was provided, as well as the avenues available for the poor to participate in the power-sharing process.[384] Findings indicate that the arrangements of formal representation influenced the degree to which local residents, through their representatives, sought to have their concerns addressed by local authorities or whether neighborhood councils restricted their activity to providing services.

Chicago's program had the least actual representation of the local population. The formal arrangement of representation was handled by the mayor, who appointed an executive director, who in turn chose directors for the neighborhood councils.[385] Those directors chose representatives to the city poverty council. Such representatives had little

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[382] Brecher
[383] See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty,* Free Press, New York, 1970.
[384] See Peterson.
[385] Peterson, p. 495.

influence and no authority over local service centers. Only 2.2% of the funds allocated to the city for CAPs programs were given to local groups.[386]

New York City chose a moderate form of representation. Representatives from local organizations sent delegates from sixteen low-income regions to a community convention, which elected representatives to neighborhood councils.[387] The councils chose delegates to the City Poverty Council. The New York City neighborhood councils enjoyed the greatest representation. CAP funds allocated to neighborhood groups were as high as 46%. The neighborhood councils were able to increase their influence over their development.[388]

Philadelphia provided the greatest degree of local representation. Twelve representatives were elected to a neighborhood council in twelve low income sectors. Each neighborhood council elected one delegate to sit on the City Poverty Council. Although Philadelphia's representatives were the most directly elected, actual representation for the local organizations was not as high as those in New York City. In the first two years, 16% of CAP funds went to the neighborhood councils.[389]

Such findings offer insights into the viability of invigorating citizen participation from the top. Chicago's experience of low representation of the local communities and subsequent low vitalization can be directly linked to the lack of accompanying empowerment. The mayor's office held the reins from the beginning, directing through his representatives how CAP funds would be spent and how local neighborhood councils

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[386] Peterson, p. 501.
[387] Peterson, p. 495.
[388] Peterson, p. 497.
[389] Peterson, p. 497.

would be organized. Employees provided personal services to local populations, but did

not support mobilization for political demands.

Philadelphia and New York City offer an intriguing commentary on the process,

as the results are not as linear. While Philadelphia's process of election placed the

political power in the hands of local residents, the allocation of funds and local

mobilization for political purposes was much less than in New York City, where

representatives were chosen by professionals. In order to understand the outcomes, it is

necessary to look at the context within which the representatives of both cities found

themselves. In Philadelphia, representatives that were elected by their peers tended to

seek benefits for themselves and their friends by way of funds and employment. The

more universalistic claims for the general good were undervalued. In New York City,

traditional organizations and newly-formed organizations had supplied the

representatives to the councils. These interests were already more generally based, as the

organizations were initiated on the premise of a more widespread general good. Peterson

and his group found that, within the various legislative bodies allocating funds, the

competition for funds that would benefit the organizations rather than for patronage

purposes, led to creating the demand for accountability to the broader community. While

the conflict generated by the competition for funds and support fed the growing concern

in surrounding communities, a more distanced view seems to indicate that the conflictual

nature of competition among the CAPs was in fact a positive result.

Four arenas of participation by the poor vied for primacy within the vague

parameters set by the maximum feasible participation clause: policy making, program

development, social action, and employment.[390] Which approach CAPs chose had much

to do with the ideological slant of the founders of individual organizations.   To some,

traditional methods of welfare were ineffective because they did not address the class

dynamic perpetuated by giving to the poor. In order to facilitate change of status, the

poor needed to participate in the decision-making process. Thus, members of the local

communities were encouraged to become voting members of the governing boards.[391]

This would help avoid a paternalistic approach to problem-solving, which suffers the

consequence of lack of change. It was also argued that this would assist the formation of

policies that would be realistic in addressing local needs. Conflict arose with regard to

the process of power-sharing in which the line between participation and taking control

was blurred.

Many viewed the poor in the more traditional framework of consumers, which

attested to the more fundamental orientation of a business mentality. Local agencies

were established to deliver social services with limited input from their clientele.

Suggestions from their constituents were seen as valuable with regard to more efficiently

providing such services. Agencies might undertake educational services to train those

from the community who had the potential to assume leadership roles with the criteria

dictated by the professionals who ran the program. A political component to their

services tended toward serving as spokesman or negotiator with the wider community.

For those who conceived of the persistence of poverty as a condition of

powerlessness, an agenda for social action took shape. The poor were viewed as an

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[390] Kramer, p. 5.
[391] Kramer, p. 7.

underdeveloped political constituency that could promote their agenda by forming special interest lobbies through protest action.[392] Areas of conflict such as poor housing, lack of available jobs, services for working mothers became the focus, while self-help programs that utilized cooperative efforts within the community, such as day care centers and food coops were organized by the agencies.   Agencies with this ideological framework created the greatest controversy. Increased conflict disturbed the wider community's perception of security. Local governments felt the pressure to reassert control, which they sought for their own benefit as well as to assuage the concerns of the public. Constituents called upon their congressional members to curtail increasing protest actions by organizations that were being funded by the government. Organizers sought to address the growing concerns by limiting the focus of their political action to particular issues that had definable parameters or projects that focused more heavily on self-help such as neighborhood improvement associations. A tension rose as well between delivery of social services and promoting social action. To some extent, providing one limited accessibility to the other.

Lastly, local agencies provided employment within their organizations that did not require professional training or even pressed the boundaries of regulated skills. Representatives from the local community were given jobs in educational capacities, health, welfare, legal and correctional agencies. The idea was to offer economic benefit and to train workers a variety of skills from basic requirements of holding a steady job to skills applicable to a particular occupation. By employing members of the community,

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[392] Kramer, p. 15.

the agency itself would benefit from the unique perspective of local residents.[393] This in

turn would sensitize the professionals to a more realistic view of the problems their

constituents face. Tensions arose in the expectations of the various groups associated

with CAPs. The poor themselves tended to want jobs, not political power. The promise

of employment led to frustration with the actual number of entry-level or nonprofessional

jobs made available. Although there were efforts at job training, too often there were not

jobs available. Concerns arose with hiring those trained through unconventional

programs. Was the training adequate? Was the individual willing to conform to

expectations in the wider community? Once members within the community become

employees of the agency, their positions within the community become muddied.

Second Gate – Opposition from local politicians, surrounding community

Like Franklin Roosevelt before him, Johnson knew the importance of city mayors'

support for reform initiatives. "For Johnson, big-city mayors in the Democratic Party

represented key blocs of voters on whose support he depended. Mayors were a group he

courted conscientiously, both individually and through the USCM [United States

Conference of Mayors]."[394] Yet the taskforce headed by Shriver did not consult mayors

while devising the program. This was due to some extent, to the new recommendations

from specialists who felt that urban renewal, without including a more dynamic process

with the poor, would not work. Even though the mayors had not been consulted, they

were willing to support an initiative addressing poverty in order to benefit from the

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[393] Blecher, 82. In a study by a private consulting firm, Daniel Yankelovich, Inc. hired by OEO, in nine major cities, more than 5,000 local participants were employed. Their conclusion was positive: "a large number of previously unemployed or underemployed poor people without background or training …have been routinely hired…"
[394] Flanagan, p. 595.

national focus. Republican congressmen warned during House Hearings in 1964 that

public official participation was not guaranteed. Richard Daley, democratic mayor of

Chicago, responded by claiming that he felt that "the legislation allowed for this."[395]

Jack Conway, however, true to his labor organizing roots, went directly to the

neighborhoods, bypassing local political elites.[396] This caused power shifts. From the

local politicians' perspective, they were left with start-up programs receiving federal

funds without their oversight. Protest came from all sides. Mayors of large cities, with

concentrated populations of poor, feared that neighborhood agencies attempting to

promote participation by the community would fuel violence. At the USCM convention

in 1965, the democratic mayors from San Francisco and Los Angeles drafted a resolution

charging that OEO "had failed to recognize the legal and moral responsibilities of local

officials who are accountable to the taxpayers for expenditures of local funds."[397]

Johnson was stunned. He had assumed that when the CAPs were implemented, they

would be run by local governments.[398]

Hubert Humphrey was assigned the role of liaison between the administration and the

mayors. He assured the mayors that they could control the direction of the programs by

appointing representatives to the governing boards. In a memo to the president in late

1965, Humphrey cautioned that the mayors feared that the programs were creating

oppositional forces to city government.[399] General unrest, whether warranted or not, was

associated with the local anti-poverty agencies. Reports were filtering in that many

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[395] [395] Haider, Donald H. "Governors and Mayors View the Poverty Program," *Current History,* November, 1971, p. 274.
[396] Haider, p. 274.
[397] Franklin, Ben. "Mayors Challenge Anti-Poverty Plan," *New York Times,* June 1, 1965, p. 30.
[398] Flanagan, p. 596.
[399] Flanagan, p. 597.

projects were poorly managed and the funds, already stretched too thin, were being wasted. Cases of corruption and waste were sensationalized by the media. The impression that the urban programs were primarily benefiting minorities fueled the anti-civil rights crowd. The public was outraged. Members of government also were questioning the efficacy of the community action programs. Officials at BoB and CEA told the president that the agenda of the CAPs had changed from self-help to political organization, a move with which they did not agree. Aides to the president advised Johnson to distance himself from the anti-poverty programs by shunting OEO off into an independent agency.

OEO officials were active at the same time. They created a Public Officials Advisory Council (P.O.A.C.) with state governors, county and city officials appointed. Stricter oversight of the CAPs was instituted: project applicants had to clear proposals with local officials.[400] Shriver and his aides attempted to build support outside of the administration by highlighting the unique service its agency could provide. They focused on OEO's philosophical approach that empowering the poor would be more effective than the usual approach of welfare for the poor. It largely failed. Part of the reason was Johnson's dissatisfaction with its results, but also members in Congress on both sides of the aisle went on the attack. At this point, the only group in favor of the community action programs were the mayors. Now that OEO regulations had granted them positions on the governing boards, most CAPs were under their direction. While local elites acquired more control over community action projects, they found that they provided a useful conduit to access the poor and dissatisfied in their districts. "Satisfied with the potential

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[400] Haider, p. 277.

veto power over local agencies' policies and activities, … most local and state governments opted to keep local agencies in their private non-profit status."[401] This decision of convenience may have provided the next path to survival for many of the programs.

Third gate – Opposition from elites

By the end of 1966, OEO was besieged from all sides: the administration, Democrats and members of the left, and Republicans and Southern Democrats on the right. Johnson assigned a new task force, headed by Robert Wood, former chairman of MIT's Political Science Department and advisor to John Kennedy, to assess urban revitalization. The Wood task force decided that a different approach than OEO would work better. The Model Cities Program would "coordinate federal resources, concentrate funds in a few key demonstration neighborhoods, and mobilize the local elite – public and private – to assist federal efforts."[402] The administration threw its weight behind the effort to have the Model Cities Program passed in congress and abandoned OEO and CAPs.[403]

The administration's motive for forsaking community action programs was one of dissatisfaction, but others were motivated by their desire for power. In 1965 and '66, Adam Clayton Powell, a democrat from New York, sought to exert control over the implementation of CAPs through accusations of mishandling. He ordered investigations into the functioning of anti-poverty programs in many cities, claiming that city officials

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[401] Givel, p. 80-81.
[402] Flanagan, p. 599.
[403] Bernstein, p. 467.

were not allowing local residents the opportunity to control the decision-making.

Republicans mounted their own attack. Also in 1966, the Republican minority leaders in

both Houses sought to establish a bipartisan committee to investigate corruption and

favoritism in OEO and the programs it was funding.[404] The Senate Appropriations

Committee held hearings at the end of 1965, investigating CAPs in Mississippi.[405]

Several administrative irregularities surfaced and the rhetoric against Shriver and OEO

heated up. Congressional legislation ordered stricter regulations governing the CAPs and

controlled the budget through funding specific programs over others. The Green

Amendment (sponsored by Edith Green, Democratic Congresswoman from Oregon)

required that the boards of the agencies include one-third representatives from the

communities being served, one-third elected officials locally, and one-third

representatives from local businesses, labor, civic, and charitable organizations.[406]

"Essentially, the new administrative format allowed for federal to non-profit funding with

substantial veto power by local and state governments over the activities and even the

existence of local agencies."[407] Thus, the mayors had been able to gain oversight of the

programs through influencing the governing boards. The agencies themselves had to

accept the new reality that they would need to cooperate with the local officials to stay in

business. What began as an effort from the office of the president to provide self-

empowerment to the poor became a more traditional welfare program controlled by

Congress.

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[404] Flanagan, p. 600.
[405] Flanagan, p. 600.
[406] Michael Givel. *The War on Poverty Revisited: The Community Services Block Grant Program in the Reagan Years,* University Press of America, Lanham, 1991, p. 79.
[407] Givel, p. 79-80.

While Johnson's unprecedented domestic policies were sweeping through Congress and into the public domain, the Vietnam War heated up. By the fall of 1965, those in charge realized that it would not be over soon. Conservatives who favored the war cautioned that the administration should abandon the domestic programs of the Great Society in order to divert resources to the war effort. Johnson decided to do both. In his State of the Union address in 1966, he proclaimed, "This Nation is mighty enough, its society is healthy enough, its people are strong enough, to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while still building a Great Society here at home."[408]

The war had a major impact on the zeitgeist of America in the '60s. It cannot be held solely responsible for the growing dissatisfaction with Johnson's domestic policies, but in terms of perception, it came to define his presidency at the expense of everything else. The mire of Vietnam left the country hugely dissatisfied with governmental decision-making as well as with the monies diverted to pay war costs. Lyndon Johnson's approval rate [find out] was in tatters; he did not run for a second term. The Republicans swept back into power with Richard Nixon, who was ideologically opposed to centralized federal funding of programs like those governed by OEO.

Richard Nixon campaigned on the basis of unifying the country amidst factional turmoil. Johnson's tenure in office received the brunt of this accusation.[409] While the war galvanized popular opposition concerning foreign policy, racial violence became

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[408] Bernstein, p. 321.
[409] "We are going to win because at a time that America cries out for the unity that this Administration has destroyed, the Republican Party -- after a spirited contest for its nomination -- for President and for Vice President stands united before the nation tonight." Richard Nixon, Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speech, Republican National Convention, Miami, August 8, 1968. http://www.4president.org/speeches/nixon1968acceptance.htm

correlated with the Great Society programs, marring domestic policy. In 1969, D. Patrick

Moynihan, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor during Kennedy's and the early

part of Johnson's administration, published *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding:*

Community Action in the War on Poverty, a diatribe against the implementation of the

community action programs.[410] "The seven-year span that had seen the establishment of

community action programs…had witnessed also a rise of internal conflict and violence

that in truth was without precedent in American experience."[411] Because Moynihan had

been a party to the inception of the War on Poverty, his betrayal helped promote the

perception that the Community Action Programs were at the heart of urban unrest. "The

thrust of Moynihan's argument is that the CAP had no substantive effect and served only

to arouse antagonism and bitterness."[412] Some scholars claim that Moynihan's

evaluation of the CAP was over-generalized. His findings applied to only two cases of

the more militant CAPs and did not accurately represent many of the more moderate

organizations. However, Moynihan's voice of opposition was important for its impact on

the perception of the success of funding community action programs. This view was

compounded by the view from the Left that argued that violence in the impoverished

areas of cities was due to decreasing poverty programs.[413] "In the mind of the majority

white public, the Great Society programs became associated, most often unfairly, with

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[410] According to Jon Van Til, "This volume is not an attack on the Community Action Programs, which are called 'far the most notable effort to date to mount a systematic social response' to the fundamental problem of modern society, the involvement of citizens in the social process. Rather, this volume is an attack upon *certain* political leaders who drafted legislation Moynihan finds flawed, and *certain* social scientists, who acted upon theories Moynihan finds flawed." Review of *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty,* by Daniel Moynihan, *Social Forces,* vol. 48, No. 2 Dec., 1969, p. 285.

[411] Moynihan, p. xi.

[412] Brecher, 89.

[413] Jeremy Larner and Irving Howe, eds. *Poverty, Views from the Left,* William Morrow & Company, New York, 1968, p. 94.

violence and disorder in the inner cities."[414] The economic burden of attempting to conduct a war on foreign soil and provide unprecedented domestic, social support at the same time stimulated financial destabilization.[415] Yet, the popular perception that the Democrats were spent is belied by the election results – Nixon received 43.4% of the popular vote, Humphrey, the Democratic candidate, received 42.7%.[416] Congress stayed in the hands of the Democrats.[417] Although Nixon had promised in his campaign to abolish the Community Action Projects, the close election results and the Democratic Congress did not give him the power. Congress passed an amendment in 1969 to extend the OEO with few changes, at least until 1971.[418]

The next showdown was in 1971. Nixon vetoed the Economic Opportunity Act Amendment of 1971, yet Congress funded OEO by a continuing resolution.[419] It wasn't until 1973, after Nixon was elected in a landslide in 1972, that he felt his opportunity to dismantle OEO had come. In 1973, he appointed Howard Phillips as new acting director. Phillips began doling out funds on a month-to-month basis and ordered community action agencies to begin a slow process of closing down. Several agencies and supporters banded together to bring suit against Phillips and the federal government. By June, 1973,

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[414] Clark, p. 53.

[415] "Mistakes in fiscal and monetary policy have had serious repercussions, such as rapid inflation of prices, successive rounds of massive wage increases well beyond increased productivity, exceptionally high interest rates in the face of very swift expansion of the money supply, major reductions in output of essential industries like housing, and a deteriorating balance of payments." Irving Schweiger. "1968 Forecast of Gross National Product, Consumer Spending, Saving, and Housing," *The Journal of Business*, The University of Chicago Press, 1968.

[416] The National voter demographics are interesting as well. Nixon received the majority of votes from high income and middle income urban voters, as well as those in rural sections. Humphrey was the overwhelming favorite among low income urban, African-American, Jewish, Slavic and Unionized neighborhoods. **Source:** *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.* "Group Analysis of the 1968 Presidential Vote" XXVI, No. 48 (November 1968), p. 3218.

[417] Although the Republican Party picked up a number of senate seats, they were still outnumbered 57-43. The House of Representatives had 243 Democrats and 192 Republicans.

[418] Givel, p. 81.

[419] Givel, p. 81.

the courts, under Federal District Court Judge William Jones, ordered the government to reinstate OEO and oust Phillips instead. Nixon had to acquiesce. By the end of the year, however, he had successfully moved most of the programs out of OEO. The only programs left were the Community Action Program legal services, and Community Economic Development.[420] Each of his remaining years in office, Nixon did not include the Community Services Administration (successor organization to OEO) in his budget and each time, Congress voted to support funding.[421]

Why did Community Action Programs last through Nixon's (and subsequently Ford's) onslaught? While the Great Society was clearly begun by Johnson and was protected by its connection to the administration as opposed to Congress, subsequent battles back and forth between the executive and legislative branches caused a shift from presidential control to shared control by Congress and state officials. When Nixon attempted to dismantle the Great Society, it was protected by the laws passed by Congress, as well as its new supporters.[422]

It was not until the Reagan Revolution in 1980 that funding for the community action agencies was seriously affected. Reagan's ideological stance, which swept him into office, was hostile to supporting social welfare programs with federal funds. Nixon's experience regarding his attempts to close down OEO meant that another tack would be necessary. Reagan reoriented the focus of social welfare by creating block grants that would be awarded to the states for community services. This did have the effect of lessening the bureaucratic complexity and allowing for more autonomy. In

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[420] Givel, p. 83.
[421] Clark, p. 67
[422] William E. Farrell. "O.E.O. Gains Favor With Old Critics," *New York Times,* April 7, 1974, p. 27.

return, funding originating from the federal government diminished with each new tax

cut and responsibility for the continuance of community advocacy organizations fell to

the states and to private funding. The Bush Administration has followed suit. From 2002

to 2006, the Community Service Block Grant has decreased its awards by 10%.[423] The

Bush budget for 2007 does not include any monies to fund the CSBG for the upcoming

year.

Disempowered remain disempowered

Presidential power, within the context of the checks and balances of the American

system, is limited as to what an executive can accomplish.[424] However, Johnson was a

seasoned legislator. He knew that direct confrontation with Congress would entail

significant alterations to his ambitious programs. He therefore opted for approaches that

would bypass opposition. "Extra-governmental task forces were used throughout the

Johnson years to quickly import new ideas into government, override the bureaucracy,

and move policy-making power inside the Executive Office of the President."[425] When

he did have to work through the system, Johnson tried to move legislation quickly in the

hopes that institutionalizing his social welfare policies would give them a greater chance

of survival. Johnson "understood from past experience that, once a major government

program had been put in place, it would be easier for supporters to modify its workings

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[423] http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/csbg/
[424] "Political scientists have long recognized the limitations on presidential power. As Charles O. Jones noted, 'The plain fact is that the United States does not have a presidential system. It has a separated system.'" (Flanagan, p. 604).
[425] Flanagan, p. 604.

than for opponents to dismantle it."[426] Such an approach, however, failed to work when the programs required the cooperation of the government bureaucracy.

Although Johnson's approach to serving the poor through OEO has been roundly criticized for its top-down emphasis, the endeavor sought to correct a history of bureaucratic inefficiency. "As a matter of fact, the growth of diverse bureaucratic structures to offer specific services authorized by Congress increased the number of obstacles between the consumer and the delivery."[427] The intent behind the development of the community action programs was to provide services to the poor more directly and efficiently than the previous programs. Along with this efficiency, those who devised the bill hoped to stimulate social changes that could serve to correct the underlying factors that supported the continuance of poverty by involving the participants themselves. The inclusion of the concept of 'maximum feasible participation' of the poor granted that population the opportunity to actually become empowered in a way that could promote a more inclusive democratic experience. This was not Johnson's idea. He had assumed that the mayors of targeted cities would participate in managing the CAPs. When confrontations broke out between activists campaigning for the poor and mayors, Johnson was horrified. He began to waver on his support.

Studies show that most of the programs implemented in major urban areas utilized their resources primarily for job training and hiring its client population to provide jobs and training simultaneously. *Figure 2.* The programs did include some organizing that would empower the poor to mobilize their numbers to take political action. And even

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[426] Dallek, p. 80.
[427] Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty. *Examination of the War on Poverty: Staff and Consultants Reports*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1967, p.742.

though this was not the major use of time or financial resources, all concerned, as well as those on the outside, perceived the community action agencies as stimulating that activity. This tended to increase the animosity from local governmental agencies, who in turn, sought to curtail the power of the CAAs.

Johnson hoped that the funds for the ongoing operations of the program would be generated from the tax cuts. Johnson, a seasoned and accomplished politician, made a grave miscalculation. He provided a budget of almost a billion dollars for the initial stage of the poverty program. Yet, this would hardly make a dent. Robert Lampman, who was invited by Senator Paul Douglas in the late fifties to produce a study measuring poverty, argued that just paying the poor to bring them up to the poverty line would cost $11 billion a year, yet the War on Poverty began with a mere $1 billion.[428] When Michael Harrington, author of *The Other America,* heard the amount the president had allocated, his response was "you've been given nickels and dimes for this project."[429]

One of the problems with studying the effects of the Community Action Programs is the fluid nature of the identified population. Once employed with a reasonable income, they no longer fit the category of the poor and effectively lose their membership. In the case of a poor population, there is little to recommend remaining in that group. It is not a label that engenders pride. Therefore, "success" in a Community Action Program entails providing its members a way out. The choices individuals make to move away from poverty are extraordinarily diverse, making statistical assessment even more problematic. Under such circumstances, how is it possible to quantifiably justify ongoing funding?

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[428] Bernstein, p. 98.
[429] Bernstein, p. 102.

By 1966, congress granted $250 million dollars to funding community action agencies.[430] This included over 1600 local programs within 2,300 of the nation's 3,300 counties, primarily located in urban settings.[431] By the end of the year, OEO began to cut back its funding in accord with congressional mandates that attempted to bring standardization and accountability to the structure. In 1967, OEO requested $1.75 billion, but received only $300 million. "The vague legislation, the lack of clarity from the White House about the means and ends of CAP, and the delegation of authority to local communities meant that Johnson's White House would not enjoy strong control over the centerpiece initiative of the War on Poverty."[432] No one was fooled into thinking that it was enough to fulfill the goal of eradicating poverty. Already, it was becoming evident that reality would not be able to match the rhetoric that helped launch such sweeping programs.

While legislation had authorized organization and coordination of the community action programs from a national level, the programs themselves had to be implemented and coordinated at the local level. "National programs reached into communities and became intertwined with independent local administrations; this too created problems of collaboration, both horizontally at the community level and vertically with state and national structures."[433] With so many organizations between the national level and the intended recipients, a cohesive, coordinated approach was nearly impossible to navigate.

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[430] Clark, p. 298.
[431] Clark, p. 45.
[432] Flanagan, p. 593.
[433] Redford and Blissett. p. 89.

The internal management of the agencies themselves was another arena of dispute. The lack of bureaucratic oversight and standardization plagued agencies from the start. Many of the complaints addressed in the first few years by Congress centered around these issues. A number of agencies suffered from their own incompetence, turf-wars and corruption. Members at large of affected communities were questioning the efficacy of the community action programs. Reports were filtering in that many projects were poorly managed and the funds, already stretched too thin, were being wasted. As Charles Murray, a noted libertarian commented, "For every evaluation report that could document a success, there was a stack that told of local groups that were propped up by federal money for the duration of the grant, then disappeared, with nothing left behind."[434] Some organizations were unable to competently address the plethora of interrelated problems that plagued individual communities. Responsibility for ambiguous results could be widely shared. Grants earmarked for specific programs, such as Head Start, did not solve the problem of the lack of adequate kindergartens for Head Start graduates to attend.[435] Some agencies would focus their attention on providing services without addressing the entrenched social structures within which the poor found themselves entrapped. Notwithstanding, there were voices in support of the programs.

> [C]ommunity action in most cases constituted much less of an actual political challenge than originally believed. Local political systems proved more resilient to challenges than expected, more accommodating, cooperative and absorptive of OEO activities than the mayors had figured.[436]

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[434] Quoted in Clark, p. 56-57.
[435] S. M. Miller and Pamela Roby. "The War on Poverty Reconsidered", *Views from the Left,* p. 72.
[436] Haider, p. 277.

It is also true that the number of Americans below the poverty line fall significantly from 18 percent in 1960 to only 9 percent in 1972, even though funding had been inadequate.[437]

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, CAPs were responsible for educating a generation of minority leaders. In Brooklyn "much of the borough's legislative leadership on all levels of government began their careers at local CAAs."[438] But their voices were muted. By 1966, OEO had allowed local politicians the right to appoint a member to the governing boards, shifting the locus of power from the individual programs themselves (and ostensibly the poor) to local politicians. While local municipalities gained funds as well as political credibility through 'helping the poor', the conditions and issues related to poverty and the interrelated causes of continuing poverty no longer were newsworthy. Poor neighborhoods with transient populations did not coalesce into organizations with political clout. The effort turned from politicizing the institutional constraints that contributed to ongoing poverty and turned to working to move individuals as quickly as possible off the dole. With the neo-liberal agenda of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, the individual was prioritized, effectively cutting off the potential of group political action.

The war in Vietnam significantly eroded the respect and authority of the president. Johnson's ambivalence once it became clear that the tax cuts could not adequately fund the various programs. Riots in urban settings refocused the attention of the community action programs as buying off the largely black population. The middle

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[437] Andrew, p. 93.
[438] Flanagan, p.606.

class perceived the impoverished as frightening and untrustworthy. The attempt to allow flexibility on the local level turned into a morass of poorly organized and fiscally irresponsible projects that served to sensationalize news reports. Taxes and inflation largely due to the war, became hopelessly entangled in the perception of Johnson's Great Society. The success in diminishing the number of poor went unnoticed and certainly unappreciated. A major influence on critics of the Great Society to dismantle it was the lack of support from the left. Daniel Moynihan is especially culpable for his part in heaping discredit on the programs that convinced many who might have supported it. If a number of these tensions could have been resolved, many of the programs started in the 60's could have continued. Many of them we are trying to create again.

As a democracy, the United States boasts a vibrant, civil and political society that allows for numerous power centers. It is because of their strength, however, that making changes society-wide is problematic. In the case of the community action programs, they did not have enough of a coalition of power centers to support them and allow them to continue. On their own, they were not powerful enough to withstand the pressure from the Republicans. In Poland, in a post-totalitarian regime, Gomułka held most of the cards and disempowered the Workers' Councils. In the United States, the opposing power center of the Republican Party was strong enough to close down most of the community action programs. Spain will different a case, wherein the initiator of change, Juan Carlos, was able to build coalitions with enough of the pro-democracy groups that together, they were able to withstand the onslaught by the hardliners.

Figure 2:

Elements of Community Action Programs in 51 Cities

Program Element	Number	Percent
Services	317	78.1
Educational	116	28.6
Social services	103	25.4
Job training	52	12.8
Health services	23	5.7
Housing	10	2.5
Legal services and delinquency	13	3.2
Community organization	34	8.4
Organization for program involvement	15	3.7
Organization in neighborhood centers	12	3.0
Settlement house organization	7	1.7
Other community action	55	13.5
Use of indigenous staff	23	5.7

Use of indigenous community groups	12	3.0
Training of local leaders	10	2.5
All other	10	2.5
Total	406	100.0

Source: Kenneth Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, *A Relevant War Against Poverty,* New York: Harper & Row, 1969, pp.64-65. Brecher

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Chapter 5

Spain

Introduction

When Francisco Franco died, Juan Carlos, prince of Spain and named successor to Franco, was crowned king. He had promised to continue the Franco regime. Opposition groups, who were growing ever-more vocal, expected to have to seize control of the government through force. The military and conservative supporters of Franco's strict, authoritarian rule, were confident that the king would uphold the regime, especially since his power was circumscribed by the Council of the Realm.[439] The king was uncertain whether he would be king for long. Juan Carlos did not disagree with much of Franco's rule, but he certainly was a product of the next generation.[440] He demonstrated that his commitment to the Franquist ideology was not as strong; he recognized the advantages to Spain if it could join the European community; and he possessed a sense of obligation to listen to the people. It is possible that he could have chosen several avenues to delineate his reign, and it is remarkable that he possessed such a commitment to democratizing.

Within a little over a year, Spain conducted their first free election since the early part of the 20$^{\text{th}}$ century. To get there, the process of democratization took a careful route

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[439] "Although the situation after Franco's death was different in that he had inherited some of his powers, Juan Carlos could still be held hostage by the government, the Cortes and the Council of the Realm, institutions over which he had relatively little control." Charles Powell. *Juan Carlos of Spain: Self-Made Monarch,* MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1996, p. 85.

[440] See Charles Powell. *Juan Carlos of Spain: Self-Made Monarch,* St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, 1996, p. 88-89.

through several minefields. The king himself chose to move away from direct

governance. This step afforded him a position that appeared to be neutral. As the keeper

of the Franquist faith, he made enormous efforts to speak to and for all Spanish factions.

The first gate in the Spanish case, therefore, was setting up a government that would be

committed to democratizing through the legal channels of the current legal system. He

was fortunate to have Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda as a mentor and extraordinarily able

politician to help orchestrate the legislation of policies that would bring about regime

change. Through his skill and the acumen of the prime minister, Adolfo Suarez, the new

administration was able to manipulate the Cortes into voting in a bill to allow political

associations. By careful negotiations with opposing groups, with the advent of the right

to legally form political parties, many opposing forces (the third gate) were willing to

compromise some of their demands in order to participate in government. At the same

time, members of Juan Carlos' government were able to avert opposition from the

conservatives through splintering their control at the top and compromising with some of

their demands. It wasn't until a new democratic government had been elected and a

constitution written by representatives of most of the new power centers in the country,

that the conservatives launched an attempted coup – the fourth gate. It was unsuccessful.

The rebalancing of power among newly empowered groups throughout the state became

institutionalized in a new, democratic regime.

Franco and his rule of Spain proved to be resilient against opponents and adverse

circumstances. From 1939 until Franco died on November 20, 1975, he ruled with a firm

hand. Only a select few were allowed power within the parameters of Franco's

Movimiento. Who shared power in the public arena, however, was fairly straightforward

and the legacy of those groups helped create the confluence of forces that allowed for the change to democracy in Spain. While Franco was in control, the military was the most ascendant power. The Falangist party combined many military and others who ascribed to a syndicalist ideology.[441] These included the Catholic Church, which at that time supported Franco's rigid, authoritarian policies and the monarchists who shared in the traditional, Catholic perspective of a united Spain. Those outside the public arena (and to the left of the public sphere) included Republicans, Socialists and Communists. Many members of the latter groups were killed or imprisoned during the Franco years and therefore, their numbers were small. What changed? The coalition of groups splintered over the 40 years of Franco's rule. By the time of his death, many conservatives identified with much more centrist views, and the Left was willing to compromise. The new dynamic allowed for an isolation of the military, the last Franquist holdout.[442]

Although often compared to a Fascist state, Franco relied heavily on the military, the Church, the monarchy, and the social elite.[443] By the time of his death, power had already devolved to the civilian technocrats. Even though they espoused allegiance to Franco, their commitment to his ideals had waned. Many of the original power centers had shifted their allegiance. The Church had undergone a realignment of values with the ascendancy of Pope John XXIII (1958-1963). The general population hoped to continue the rise in standards of living, brought about by the developing economy.[444] Young adults sought both more freedom as well as more opportunity to participate in politics.

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[441] A system by which workers are organized in trade unions that control the means of production. Of course, Franco's government controlled the unions.
[442] Franquist is synonymous with Falangist.
[443] Jan Michal Zapendowski. "Francisco Franco and the Decline and Fall of Spanish Fascism," *The Concord Review, Inc.,* Ralph Waldo Emerson Prize, 2004.
[444] Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua. *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy,* George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, London, 1981, p. 83.

Many in the military were disgruntled by the lack of modernization and reform.[445] The

king – Franco's handpicked heir – saw democratization as the only realistic route to

maintaining a monarchy in Western Europe. The period of 1975-1977 entailed enormous

change. The centers of power changed drastically in some respects and hardly at all in

others. The combination of the new dynamic of power centers, however, was crucial to

consolidating a new democratic government. The study of this critical juncture in

Spanish history and politics points the way to peaceful change while prompting serious

considerations about the structure of leadership.

History

The early 1920s and the events leading to the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)

changed the political landscape in Spain. Miguel Primo de Rivera seized power with the

backing of King Alfonso XIII in 1926 to institute state control of the economy and public

works. With the economic depression of 1929, Rivera lost the support of the people and

the backing of the military. He resigned in 1930. The fall of Rivera's government was

followed by a republican government that vacillated between socialist and communist

parties on the left and conservative and Fascist parties on the right. With the election in

1936, a coalition of left-leaning parties took control of the Cortes, and attempted to

undermine the power of the army. Casares Quiroga, the new president, banished leading

military generals, including General Francisco Franco. He and his cohorts swiftly

mobilized to take control of the government. Although the *coup d'etat* was intended to

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[445] See Felipe Agüero. *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy,* Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995, p. 101-131.

be swift, it took three long bloody years for Franco and his forces to overcome the republican and communist forces.

When Franco came to power in 1939, he did not declare the type of regime he intended to install. He was careful not to rule out the possibility of Spain remaining a monarchy, however he seemed to share the belief of many monarchists that the current king, Alfonso XIII, was unacceptable.[446] The officers who fought with him became his close associates during his years in power. Franco appointed a president of the government, who then appointed members of the Council of Ministers, the central executive organ of the state, responsible for approving government policy, issuing bills based on ministers' proposals, authorizing treaties and submitting nominations for other high offices within the government.[447] The army, navy and air force each had representatives on the Council who still maintained active status within the armed forces. In fact, one-third of all ministers over the life of Franco's regime were military officers.[448] This suited Franco's temperament as a military man himself. He and his senior officers shared a similar vision of a united Spain, governed with military order. These lucrative civilian posts served as an added benefit for the upper echelons of military hierarchy in an economy that was in shambles following the war. The larger (and loyal) army also guaranteed Franco's continued rule against any opposition.

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[446] Alfonso ceded control of the country in 1923 to the dictator, Miguel Primo de Rivera. When Rivera was dismissed in 1930, rather than government reverting to the king, a republic was established. Alfonso, with his family left the country in 1931, refusing to abdicate the throne. The uprising in 1936, orchestrated by Franco and other generals to overthrow the republic, was welcomed by the king and his designated heir, Don Juan, but even after Alfonso abdicated in favor of Don Juan, it became clear that Franco had no intention of allowing anyone else but him rule. Another source of historical background: Robert E. Wilson. "The Claim of Carlos Hugo de Bourbon-Parma to the Spanish Throne", *Background*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Nov., 1964), pp. 187-193.
[447] Felipe Agüero. *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective,* Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995, p. 45.
[448] Agüero, p. 46.

Throughout the duration of the regime, the army remained a staunch supporter and an important power center. Those members who espoused the *Movimiento's* conservative, authoritarian ideology found their careers enhanced, while those who voiced criticism could face dismissal. In fact, the army proved a viable threat to any democratizing influences beyond support for Franco's regime.

The Falange began as a youth group during the Second Spanish Republic in Spain, formed by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, the son of the ousted dictator. The Movement's ideological perspective was that of national-syndicalism, centered around the belief that the liberal democratic government would fall in a violent overthrow by the workers, who would create a corporatist political and economic system, uniting the classes. "Its aim was to create a national Socialist state, avoiding the pitfalls of bourgeois capitalism and Marxist socialism, the first of which created the class struggle which the other exploited."[449] Franco took over the movement during the war after Rivera was killed by the Republican government. In 1937, Franco combined the Falange with the Carlists, all army officers and civil servants, to form a synthesis of monarchical support, traditionalist values and syndicalist aims. Known as the *Movimiento Nacional* after 1945, Franco had effectively co-opted the fascist endeavor and rendered it harmless against his power. By the late 50's, the Falangists had accepted the requirement of political associations, as long as such a climate did not degenerate into 'inorganic democracy'.[450]

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[449] Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua. *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy,* George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, London, 1981, p. 25.

[450] This is developed in Torcuato Fernández Miranda *El Hombre y la sociedad* (1969 ed.). In democracies based on universal suffrage 'there can be no certainty about what is truth or error. . . . Everything is a matter of opinion. . . . Whatever the people want becomes legitimate. It is a doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the popular will, characteristic of the extreme liberalism that has been expressly condemned by the Catholic Church'. Organic democracy

They also sought to safeguard the vertical trade union organization that was at the heart of their ideology. The Falangist movement may have been diluted, but individual Falangists still wielded enough power to oppose any reformers in government.[451]

The Catholic Church served as another powerful ally to the Franco regime. As Spain's population was predominantly Catholic, Catholicism proved to be a conducive rallying point. To the average Catholic Spaniard, the church's blessing of Franco's rule in 1953 with the Spanish Concordat solidified his control far more than other associations. In return, the Church was given a monopoly on secondary education. In Spain, this meant a return to a conservative, nationalist brand of Catholicism, harking back to the Counter-Revolution period. As well, laws conformed to Catholic dogma.

Two Catholic organizations rose to power in the political arena: the ACNP and the Opus Dei. The ACNP was a lay Catholic association that trained Spanish elites for public life. The ACNP gave way to the Opus Dei, an organization with conservative views (its members were sworn to secrecy and obedience). By the 1960s, members of Opus Dei became associated with the technocrats, advocating rapid economic growth. Those who espoused technocratic development of a modernizing economy opposed the Falangists. The conservative Catholics became split: those who sought economic modernization hoped to wrest power from the Falangists in order to further their aims, while conservative Catholics sided with the Falangists against liberalism. With the rise of social welfare advocacy within the Church, the younger generation of socially-minded

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[451] Carr and Aizpurua, p. 27.

Catholics often clashed with the regime institutions. By the 1970s, both organizations were internally divided with reformers and conservatives.[452]

The Francoists were personal associates of Franco, fully committed to his political agenda. Many of them maintained the ideology that fueled the Civil War, fighting against Communists, Republicans, Protestants and "liberalism" in its many manifestations. Their numbers swelled with other veterans who stoutly defended the purity of the *Movimiento*. By the 1970's, many were elderly, but still powerful. The Monarchists were themselves divided between those who sought to reinstate Alfonso XIII to the throne and the Carlists, who rallied for a member of the Bourbon family to take over the monarchy. Those differences paled, however, when it became clear that Franco did not intend to relinquish his control of Spain to a monarch while he was still capable of ruling. He did, however, declare in 1947 that he regarded the monarchy as Spain's legitimate form of government. At this point, the difference between the monarchists' position centered on the type of monarchy likely to be installed whenever Franco felt like stepping down. Those who supported a constitutional monarchy feared (with good reason) that the subsequent government would be a creature of Franco's. Those who combined their monarchist hopes with a conservative, authoritarian ideology, were willing to cooperate with Franco's government. As a political group, they served to limit the agenda of the Falangists to create a syndicalist state subject to the party, rather than an eventual monarch. Juan Carlos, grandson to Alfonso XIII, was named heir-apparent. He promised fidelity to Franco and the *Movimiento* in 1969.

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[452] Although Opus Die fell out of favor in 1974 and ANCP inherited their position in the political landscape, technocrats that combined strong, Catholic, conservative views with efforts to improve the economy became a dominant force.

As Franco's policies of eliminating political participation took hold, the elite turned their attention to the acquisition of status and wealth. The class of professionals and civil servants grew. With the rise of Opus Dei among the monarchists, a group of professionals and technocrats emerged in the 1960s. They sought to foster economic prosperity as a substitute for ideological passion. Only those who were supportive of the regime had access to the opportunities of higher education . These elites shared a vision of conservatism, Catholicism and support for Franco that gave them a cohesive bond.

Franco was able to efficiently repress most expressions of opposition before the 1960s. There was little opposition after the Civil War anyway. Once his forces were victorious, many were exhausted from the fighting and were willing to allow the government to establish order, whatever the costs. As well, a large segment of the population supported the traditional morés advocated by Franco's combination of religious conservatism and social order; a cultural factor little appreciated by the Second Republic. By harnessing the conservative temperament of the populace with the agenda of syndicalism pushed by the Falangists, Franco was able to provide a platform wherein many could find something to their liking. With war brewing in Europe, Franco's decision to maintain a policy of neutrality was welcomed. In later years, Franco and his top aides sought to capitalize on a perception of international hostility to warrant support for his authoritarian control, but this thin argument began to wear over time. The 'Spain of conformity' based on repressive policies and the political indifference gave way to contestation by 1970.[453]

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[453] Carr and Fusi, p. 136.

The Civil War destroyed those unions and organizations that sided with the Left. Most of the leaders were imprisoned and many were executed in the 1940s. Franco determined that elections and parties needed to be purged to allow for organic democracy in the form of vertical syndicates to thrive. In order to assuage the workers, the first fundamental law was the Labor Charter that stressed the reciprocal duties of the state and citizens: Every citizen had a duty to work and the state had the obligation to provide work for everyone. Control was maintained by outlawing strikes, thus although the charter promised adequate wages and a limit to working hours, there was little redress for abuse. Later additions to the charter required that every worker and manager join the syndicate associated with that branch of the economy. Each syndicate was governed by a minister appointed by the state, whose role was to ensure worker discipline for the good of the state. Job security was guaranteed. This proved problematic in the 60s when the economy was growing rapidly and an effort was made to compete in the international arena. Dissatisfaction was controlled through the Labor Courts, where individual rights of workers were defended while collective rights were severely repressed.

Collective bargaining was given new life in 1958 with a revision of labor laws. Although syndicates still provided the framework through which workers and employers negotiated with the state, workers councils, with legitimated representatives from the workers, had the right to bring their demands to the table. From the perspective of the employers, they could negotiate demands for more efficient production. Strikes, however, were more likely with the exercise of collective power. In 1962, 45,000 Asturian miners struck for higher wages. They were joined by 70,000 Catalan and

50,000 Basque workers two months later. Over the next decade, there were over 5,000 strikes, even though it was against the Penal Code.[454]

Student unrest began as early as 1956, when Falangist activists attempted a rebellion against the student syndicate, the SEU. Although the unrest was relatively tame, it heralded discontent among the younger educated population. "Those of the younger generation interested in and capable of participation in political life were already alienated from the system."[455] The usual route for political careers had been through the military. A growing number of technocrats who benefited from extensive educational opportunities were already claiming a voice in government. With greater numbers moving through the universities, demands for greater participation increased.

Franco declared from the beginning of his regime that he envisioned Spain as a Catholic country. For those members of the Church who lived through the Civil War, Franco's victory was sent by God. Over 7,000 priests had been put to death by Republican forces, which included in their ranks the hated Communist atheists. Franco was their salvation with generous political policies returning confiscated lands to the Church, providing legal privileges to Church members and handing over secondary education to the Church's control, bolstered by state subsidies. Churches that had been damaged during the war were rebuilt by the state. Church dogma became the basis for laws of the land. Only Roman Catholicism had legal status. Marriage between Catholics and non-Catholics was prohibited; divorce and the sale of contraceptives were banned; Religious education was mandatory and Church lands were exempt from taxes. In return,

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[454] Carr and Fusi, p. 139.
[455] Carr and Fusi, p. 147.

the Pope agreed to a Concordat in 1953 that gave Franco the right to veto appointments

of bishops to Spain.[456] Such a close relationship guaranteed Church cooperation in

Franco's continued rule and offered international legitimacy to his regime.

Frictions existed between sections of the Church and the state from as early as the

1950s. The laws of the state were restrictive with regard to the creation of associations.

Only the Church or its representatives had more freedom than most to form associations,

as long as they furthered a religious aim. Some branches of Catholic Action such as the

HOAC (Hermandades Obreras de Accion Catolica) and the JOC (Juventud Obrera

Catolica), had at times extended their interests beyond religious support to assist workers

in their protests against low wages and poor working conditions.[457] This, however, was

not a criticism of Franco or the policies of his government, but social justice questions

they deemed necessary to address.

The 1970s brought two powerful, impacting changes to the context of the Spanish

Church. The first was that the cadre of bishops who had supported the nationalists in the

Civil War was dying out. Those who replaced them did not have the same ardor of

support for the authoritarian nature of the regime as their predecessors. More

importantly, Pope John XXIII changed the rules of the game. With the Second Vatican

Council during the mid-1960s, the church espoused religious pluralism, opening dialogue

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[456] "With the Concordat, the Caudillo got what he wanted…the regal right to 'presentation of bishops', by which he could choose from three names presented to him by the Nuncio…" Paul Preston. *Franco: A Biography,* BasicBooks, 1994, p. 622. "It was the blessing of the church, confirmed in the Concordat of 1953, not the ideology of the Falange, that sanctioned – almost sanctified – Franco's rule to the average Spaniard in the 1940s and after." p. 28. "In 1953 Spain and the Vatican signed a Concordat which seemed, at the time, to benefit both contracting parties….the Vatican recognized what amounted to control by Franco over the monination of bishops." P. 150, Carr.

[457] Jose Amodia. *Franco's Political Legacy: From Dictatorship to Façade Democracy,* Penguin Books, London, 1977, p. 181.

with representatives of other faiths. It highlighted general human rights, a new social

conscience, and freedom of religious association. The pope even suggested a dialogue

with the Communists.[458] Papal encyclicals were censored by Franco. Both Popes John

XXIII and Paul VI sought to influence Spanish Catholic thought and belief by supporting

clergy in Spain who would spread the new ideas. In the decade from 1964 to 1974, 53

new bishops were nominated to replace the Old Guard. Although Franco never

relinquished his right to veto appointments, bishops with more moderate views made

their way into Spain's Catholic hierarchy via the Vatican.[459] Younger and more activist

priests took this as a sign to support the growing opposition among students, workers and

regional separatists.

The regions demonstrated a microcosm of the various conjunctions found in

Spain as a whole: a mix of traditional, pre-liberal, pre-modern influences with rapid

industrialization and modernistic tendencies. In the one, a religious fervor bred from

those who relished the Inquisition in its position of protector of the one true faith from the

Moors at their back doors and in the other, the socialist, atheist propensities brought

about by modernity and the "collapse of the old social and cultural order."[460] Catalonia

and the Basque Country harbored secessionist hopes throughout the Francoist period.

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[458] Carr and Fusi, P. 152.

[459] "A renovation and rejuvenation of the hierarchy was accomplished with tact by the Nuncios Riberi and Dadaglio; between 1964 and 1974 they nominated fifty-three bishops." P. 153. "In 1969 Paul VI imposed Mgr Enrique y Tarancon as Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of Spain;…Cardinal Tarancon became Archbishop of Madrid and President of the Episcopal Conference. A liberal Catholic – a friend of Paul VI convinced that the decrees of Vatican II must be applied in Spain and that the church must seqparate itself from Francoism in decline – was now the visible head of the Spanish Church." P. 154, Carr and Fusi. Preston, *Franco,* p. 719.

[460] Shlomo Ben-Ami. *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 26, No. 3/4, The Impact of Western Nationalisms: Essays Dedicated to Walter Z. Laqueur on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday. (Sep., 1991), p. 497.

The Second Republic had granted some autonomy to both regions, but Franco proclaimed his intention to unite all the regions under one banner: "Spain One Great and Free".[461]

The Basque Country gained its separatist attitudes through a combination of geographical isolation, language difference, and pre-modern tribal culture. Half of the provinces in the Basque region sided with the Second Republic and half with Franco. "The political history of the Basque region was a history of clans, tribes, lineages, seigneurial domains, and eventually of partially self-governing individual provinces owing allegiance to the crown of Castile/Spain…"[462] Following the Civil War, nationalism subsided with only minor displays of cultural difference. Basque was not widely spoken and there was little in the way of culturally significant intellectuals or Basque artists. Clergy served the purpose of an educated, sympathetic class. Large numbers of non-Basques moved into the area and industrialization brought new wealth and rising mobility. Representation in the Cortes was significant and Basque ministers enjoyed positions of power. Yet, in 1959, with little support from the general populace, a nationalist/Marxist organization formed, calling itself the ETA(*Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna* – the Basque country and liberty).[463] Their ideology combined a perception of oppression from modern bourgeois forces against the independence of their unique culture. Although their terrorist tactics alarmed the general public, harsh repression from the government tended to galvanize support.

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[461] Even during the Second Republic, however, not all provinces within the Basque region sought autonomy. Two provinces were intensely conservative Catholic and monarchist. They favored connection to Spain. Stanley Payne. *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Nationalism and Separatism. (1971), pp. 595-596.

[462] Payne, p. 484.

[463] Carr and Fusi, p. 158.

Catalonia had a vibrant culture and language predating Franco's regime.

Education flourished, producing intellectuals, artists, writers and professionals. The

publishing houses were among the best in Spain.[464] Many of the most important cultural

movements started there during the 50s and 60s. Already by the turn of the twentieth

century, Catalonia "dominated Spain's domestic and international trade and was the main

focus of industrial development"[465] While Catalan nationalism did not manifest itself in

the creation of violent nationalist groups, the continuance of a distinctly Catalan

sensibility gave rise to a separatist, clandestine movement. Clandestine political groups

flourished in the late 60s. In a meeting held in 1971, members of all the separatist

organizations in Catalonia agreed to seek an autonomous government.

The reasons for the increasing call for change in the '70s stemmed from multiple

factors. The economy had grown immensely since the late 1950s, depending on tourism,

worker remittances, and foreign investment.[466] The rise in economic opportunities led to

rapid urbanization, Barcelona and Madrid accounting for 14% of the total population.[467]

Enrollment in universities grew 167% from 1960 to 1970, severely taxing facilities and

personnel.[468] The lack of proper classrooms and laboratories, as well as the inadequate

living standards of professors, leant itself toward moving the university population even

further toward the left. Conflict and protest grew steadily. Army personnel, who had

once been the bulwark of the government elite, took a more passive role toward politics

with time. Franco had wanted a loyal and thereby submissive following within the army,

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[464] Carr and Fusi, p. 157
[465] Stanley Payne. "Nationalism and Separatism", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 6, No. 1,. (1971).
[466] John F. Coverdale. *The Political Transformation of Spain after Franco,* Praeger Publishers, New York, 1979,
p. 4.
[467] Coverdale. P. 1
[468] Coverdale, p. 11

which he received. The result, however, coupled with the rise of a separate class of

technocrats who fostered growth in the economy, led to an army corps capable of

promoting the status quo, but unwilling to tackle complex, political dysfunctions.   The

Church, another stalwart supporter of the Franco regime, changed dramatically with the

advent of a reform-minded pope and the Second Vatican Council. With skillful

replacements of the old guard with younger bishops, critical of the social and political

conditions in Spain, the Church was poised to support the opposition. These factors were

exacerbated by a loosening of social control in the form of less censorship of the media,

lenience toward strike action by workers, and tolerance of the growth of underground

political associations. It is the debates concerning political associations that finally

forced the door to open opposition.

Debates regarding the legalization of political associations began in 1967 in

earnest. By 1969, with pressure from multiple segments of the populace, a Statute of

Associations was issued. This came at a volatile time, when factions within government

were vying for control. Career politicians attempted to outmaneuver Opus Dei

technocrats in order to oust them from power. Franco's adjudication of a financial

scandal within the government was characteristic of his style – he fired the key members

on both sides. With the vice president and head of the *Movimiento* gone, Franco

appointed Carrero Blanco, an old and trusted confidant to assume the role of vice

president (acting president) and Fernández-Miranda as Minister of the *Movimiento*.

They, with another twelve new ministers, were Franco's effort to move control back to

the conservative right. Miranda's first action was to squelch the new statute and attempt

to promote a watered down version he termed 'pluriformism'. Similarly, Carrero's agenda was to restore authoritarian control over all institutions with a heavy hand.

After Carrero established a more conformist cabinet, he set about realizing an ambitious program. He sought "the reform of education; a new Syndical Law; the restoration of the economy after the 1967-9 crisis; integration into the EEC; and …an improvement in the sadly deteriorated relations between the Church and State."[469] The successes were in the economic and diplomatic fields. The economy, although not robust, experienced a recovery envied by the rest of Europe. The new minister of foreign affairs, Lopez Bravo, facilitated an agreement with the EEC, opening up trade beyond Spain's borders. Diplomatic relations with China and East Germany resumed; relations with the U.S. began to thaw with a visit from President Nixon.[470] The other elements of Carrero's program concerning education, industry and the Church did not fare well at all. Education reforms helped ease the pressures, but did not quell resistance. New policies to address workers' dissatisfaction did not work. The Basque separatist group continued its terrorist attacks. Carrero's responses were heavy-handed police action against any unrest, serving to push opposition forces – including members of the Church – to support each other. In December, 1973, Carrero was assassinated by members of the ETA and Arias Navarro was named the new vice president.

Arias was not a reformer, but conditions throughout the country were deteriorating. Order needed to be restored; economic issues required acceptable solutions and the destruction of popular, political legitimacy needed to be halted. A new and

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[469] Carr and Fusi, p. 191.
[470] Carr and Fusi, p. 191.

creative approach was needed. In February, 1974, Arias promised reform. He proposed a new Statute of Associations, granting the right to form political associations immediately.   The press, with newly granted freedoms, stimulated a broad-based resurgence of political interest. Relaxation of censorship kindled artistic exploration. Yet, these newly granted freedoms were short-lived. The fall of the dictatorships in Portugal and Greece fueled fears of an overthrow. Franco and the right, aroused by the power of the reformists, began whittling away at the policies Arias had tried to set in motion. Labor and student unrest increased, as did the actions of the ETA. By the time Arias presented his Statute of Associations at the end of the year, it had been emasculated. But the opposition would no longer accept half-hearted measures. However, they too splintered into three discernible groups – the extremists, which included the Communist Party, adherents to Don Juan's claim to the throne as well as individual politicians; the moderates, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Socialists and Liberals; and the separatists.

The more extreme opposition factions formed a Junta with a platform demanding a democratic break with the Franco regime. They sought a provisional government with legalized political parties, democratic freedoms, and autonomy for the regions.[471] The moderates chose to keep their distance. The reasons, to some extent, are contradictory. Although the Junta advocated autonomy of the regions, Basque and Catalan representatives were not included. Some high-profile politicians with questionable motives had joined the Junta. While some professed republicanism, others were hoping for a constitutional monarchy. The presence of supporters for Don Juan in the Junta and

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[471] Carr and Fusi. P. 202.

a professed anti-Juan Carlos sentiment complicated the possible form of the next government. The army would not accept anyone other than Juan Carlos as heir to Franco. Reluctantly, because many believed that Juan Carlos would continue authoritarian rule, and concern for the radical agenda promoted by the Junta, the moderates formed their own association – the Platform of Democratic Convergence. The Arias government hoped it could monopolize on the split by appealing to the moderates to accept his weak democratization policies. Not only was he wrong, but members of the government rejected his Statute of Associations as representative of his whole program. By the time of Franco's death on November 20, 1975, reform or holding to the status quo was no longer possible. Now the question laid before Juan Carlos as the new leader of Spain was whether democratization would require a break with a potential of civil war, or whether he would have a short reign and someone from the ultra-right wing would step in to take his place.

The international community played its part in indicating its preference. At Franco's funeral on November 23, 1975, few representatives from the West attended. Four days later at the King's investiture, key figures of all the major democracies were there, including Presidents Giscard, Scheel and Prince Philip Mountbatten.[472] The message was clear: acceptance into the European/American community would be contingent on democratization processes.

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[472] Charles Powell. *Juan Carlos of Spain,* St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, 1996, p. 84.

A New Leader

Franco ruled Spain from 1939 until his death in 1975. During that time, he gradually established his concept of the regime as a Catholic monarchy, albeit one that would serve by his will. It was a clever move. Although his rule was a break from the past, he maintained a connection to Spanish traditions and values through his strong, conservative Catholicism and his respect for the throne. This did not mean, however, that he intended to return power to the former king. Military might is persuasive, as well as painful memories of the devastation wrought by the Civil War. On January 15, 1941, Alfonso XIII agreed to abdicate his position to Don Juan, his 27 year old son. Don Juan expected to be instated as monarch, willing to share power with Franco as the victor and guarantor of monarchical rule. Franco, however, clearly had no intention of sharing. After 1942, Don Juan began agitating against Franco, relying on his assessment of the success of the Allied Forces on the continent and his belief that they would invade Spain, unseat Franco and reinstate the monarchy. His open opposition alienated Franco, who became more obscure in his intentions. He would not declare his position concerning the monarchy, although he wrangled for control over Juan Carlos, Don Juan's son. Franco's decision concerning the monarchy was not clarified until 1947, when he decreed the Law of Succession, claiming that "Spain, as a political unit, is a Catholic, social and representative state, which, in accordance with its traditions, proclaims itself to be a kingdom."[473] By this time, Franco had decided to keep his options open and wait before proclaiming his successor. Even as late as February of 1968, Don Juan's actions of meeting with opposition leaders in Madrid reconfirmed Franco's hesitation. "It is

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[473] Powell, p. 8.

generally believed that Franco finally took the decision to nominate Juan Carlos in the course of the summer and early autumn of 1968."[474]

The experiences of Alfonso XIII and Don Juan set the parameters within which Juan Carlos navigated his relationship with Franco. Clearly, monarchical rule as conceived by the royal family in the nineteenth century would no longer be tolerated. Don Juan's open claims advocating a democratic monarchy would not suit Franco's authoritarian, militaristic call to order. If the Spanish monarchy was to be saved, Juan Carlos needed to abide by the wishes of Franco, who cultivated their relationship by controlling his education. To ensure that Franco remained in control, however, he did not settle the succession question until 1969. During the twenty years that Juan Carlos dangled on the end of Franco's chain, other contenders sought to win favor. Even after 1969, the future king was not assured he would be accepted by the government or the people once he finally stepped into his position.

At the same time that Juan Carlos stepped gingerly around Franco, he sought to remain allied with his father, Don Juan. Their relationship was considerably strained with his acceptance of succession. It was not clear whether Don Juan would still seek the throne as his rightful position, or whether others claiming their succession rights might stage a formidable opposition.[475] Remaining on good terms was politically prudent, although Juan Carlos demonstrated a concern for his father's approval beyond calculated

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[474] Powell, 35.
[475] The disputes of rightful king of the Spanish throne were legion. The *Carlists*, who sought to establish a separate line of the Bourbon family descended from Carlos V, arose in the early 1800s, when Isabella II was enthroned. The *Carlists* instigated several wars in the 19th century in their attempts to overthrow the Alfonsine line and still had a significant following. Besides Juan Carlos' cousins, there were older brothers, uncles and well as his father who could raise opposition against him.

maneuvers. Don Juan's political perspective of a democratic monarchy must have been part of his son's development.

Although Franco groomed Juan Carlos to become his successor, he did not allow him any significant role to play in government. The outcome of this, however, was to give Juan Carlos the freedom to explore the countryside. Through his travels, his interviews and his tours of towns and businesses, he became aware of a growing demand for political involvement from several sectors. His travels abroad led him to conclude that Spain would be best served if integrated into the Western European economy. To do that required some form of democratic government in order to gain access to the exclusively democratic regimes.

On November 22, 1975, Prince Juan Carlos was invested as king of Spain. Few expected any changes, but rather, assumed the king would continue the Franquist regime. Little was known of his ideas or capacity to rule, as Franco had expressly forbade him to take part in political life. "He was considered an enigma, having publicly sworn loyalty to the principles of Franco's National Movement while privately giving vague indications of sympathy for democratic institutions."[476] Many referred to him as 'Juan the Brief'.

First Gate – Setting Up a New Administration

The king faced formidable odds. He had decided that the democratization process needed to proceed through legal channels if there was to be a chance of peaceful transition. This meant that the government in place would have to orchestrate the demise of Franco's regime. In order to accomplish this, he needed to find members of the

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[476] http://countrystudies.us/spain/25.htm

current government who favored a transition to democracy, but who had not openly advocated such a position. "From the outset, the monarch strove to name reform-minded politicians to whom he could assign the task of implementing the democratizing process."[477] If the king hoped for a pacted transition, it was crucial to keep the hardliners – which included most of the military – satisfied that the government officials Juan Carlos chose would not undermine the regime.[478] One such official was Torcuato Fernández-Miranda.

Fernández-Miranda was an intellectual who had become one of the foremost political theorists in Spain. He was a deeply religious conservative and a moderate Francoist who recognized the precariousness of the king's power. With the current government, the king would have little power against the Cortes and the Council of the Realm to initiate and control the democratization process. A month before Franco's death, Juan Carlos sought to persuade him to accept the role of head of government.[479] Although tempted, Fernández-Miranda convinced the king that he would be of more use as president of the Council of the Realm and of the Cortes.[480] It is the Council of the Realm that approves the selection of the Head of Government (president), presidents of various councils, the twenty-five designated Cortes Members, and President of the Cortes, Spain's parliamentary body.[481] Miranda knew from the crisis of Carrero

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[477] Walther L. Bernecker. "Monarchy and Democracy: The Political Role of King Juan Carlos in the Spanish Transition", *Journal of Contemporary History,* Vol. 33, No. 1, 1998, p. 74.

[478] See Juan L. Linz & Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe,* Johns Hopkins University press, Baltimore, 1996.

[479] Fernández-Miranda had been tutor to the king for a long time. Although Franco thought well of him, he never fully trusted Miranda, who was a lukewarm supporter. He did not deny his brilliance nor his conservatism, assets which Franco thought well used by educating the prince.

[480] Powell, p. 76.

[481] The Council of the Realm also approves the successor to the Head of State. Before Franco could name Juan Carlos as his successor, he had to bring it before the Council to receive their endorsement.

Blanco's death in 1973, when he was rejected by the Council for the post of president

that he would have little chance of approval in any case. The Council of the Realm's

president was Alejandro Rodríguez de Valcárcel, also president of the Cortes.[482] Arias,

the current president, was no friend to the King.[483] However, Juan Carlos guaranteed his

continuation as president if he would assist in Miranda's appointment. Although

Miranda did not expect the Arias government to be effective, he could wait.

To the outside world, the appointment of Navarro Arias as president did not promote

a sense of regime change. In fact, "the repeated readings of Franco's political testament

in the media contributed to a growing fear that nothing would change under the restored

monarchy."[484] Arias had served as military prosecutor in Malaga during the Civil War

and as director general of security from the mid-50's to the mid-60's under Alonso Vega.

His repressive policies during that time distinguished him rather than his commitment to

liberalization.[485] His cautious program for providing policies for the right of political

association and to reform the syndical union system pleased no one. "It was soon clear

that Navarro was interested above all in improving the existing system rather than

introducing a radically new one. In spring 1976 it was ever more apparent that it was

impossible to expect the representatives of the old regime to bring about reforms."[486]

The ultra conservative politicians (known as the Bunker) were as incensed as the

opposition forces. From January to March, 1976, over 17,000 strikes immobilized Spain.

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[482] The king convinced Valcárcel, a devout Falangist who had been considering running for president in the formation of Juan Carlos' new government, to withdraw. This probably would not have been necessary, as Valcarcel died in November, 1976.

[483] Powell, p. 62.

[484] Alberto Aza. "Adolfo Suárez's Stewardship of the Transition – a memoir", *Consensus Politics in Spain: Insider perspectives,* Monica Threlfall, ed., Intellect Books, Portland, 2000.

[485] Powell, 63.

[486] Bernecker, p. 73.

The policies of the government waffled as clashes became more violent. Opposition

associations, although still outlawed, met openly. Arias was once again caught between

the intransience of the Bunker and the Reformers. He did not trust his advisors,

politicians who had either done battle with Arias in the past or younger men who did not

appreciate the personal loyalty of the older generation to Franco. Assailed from both

sides, Arias thought he could win the support of the Bunker through his allegiance to

Franco. The escalating violence from the opposition infuriated the military ministers. In

early July, 1976, General Santiago made it clear to the king that they would demand

Arias' resignation. Juan Carlos, for his part, knew that he needed to replace Arias even

before the military expressed their wishes. He used this opportunity to ask Arias to

resign.[487] In July, he resigned his post.

The next step was to maneuver a reasonable candidate onto the list that would be

submitted to the king from the Council of the Realm. Fernández-Miranda recommended

Adolfo Suárez, former Minister of the *Movimiento.* Suárez, who had been approached by

Fernández-Miranda, knew that to acquire the role of head of government, he would have

to be acceptable to the Council's conservative members. Suárez's political friends were

primarily from the *Movimiento*. His inclusion on the list of three by the Council, with the

support of Fernández-Miranda, guaranteed his appointment as president. Reformist

ministers were stunned; the public expected a return to Carrero Blanco's stern rule.

"Suárez himself has admitted that his appointment could have cost Juan Carlos his

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[487] The king called Arias to a private audience. Arias saw the writing on the wall and submitted his
resignation rather than be dismissed. Juan Carlos was enormously relieved and made him a marquis.
Powell, p. 109-110.

crown."[488] Yet, Suárez' deft, political maneuvering brought general elections to Spain in less than a year.

Second Gate: Legislature

The new government was suffering from increasing violence in the form of strikes across the country, as well as a disgruntled right wing, anxious for the new king to bring stability and order. The king was precariously holding all the forces at bay while Suárez and Fernández-Miranda hammered out a workable blueprint for reforms. The king, and those surrounding him, wanted a gradual transition. "The government had in mind a gradual evolution towards a Western-type democracy without a constitutional break; that is, using the Francoist institutions to reform Francoism."[489] To begin, Fernández-Miranda crafted the Law for Political Reform, which was a sweeping reformulation of governmental institutions. It allowed for an election of a bicameral Cortes based on universal suffrage; the king was granted the right to nominate up to a fifth of the members of the Senate; the Council of the Realm would be composed of ten members selected by the Cortes, with the president appointed directly by the king; the king could submit any matter directly to the people in the form of a referendum with binding results. The new bill was made public on September 10, 1976.

Because the bill changed or affected a number of Franco's Fundamental Laws, it needed the approval of two thirds of the existing Cortes and an endorsement by the people through a referendum. The opposition was lukewarm, concerned that the changes were not substantial enough. The real threat outside of government, however, came from

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[488] Powell, p. 114.
[489] Carr, 209.

the military. On September 8, before the bill was made public, Suárez met with a group of senior officers to plead his case for reform. Reassurances that the monarchy would still maintain control and the reforms did not adversely affect the role of the military, mollified them for the time. More importantly, the government was proceeding according to the Francoist institutional requirements. Besides, their options were few. "The control of the reform agenda by [the civilian democratizing elites] helped to preempt stronger military actions against democratization…"[490] General Santiago, a Franco supporter appointed as a military minister violently opposed the changes. He was replaced with General Gutierrez Mellado, one of the more reformist officers, who was instrumental in helping to quell objections from the military over the reforms.

While Suárez was paying attention to the military and seeking their 'patriotic support', Fernández-Miranda sought to circumvent the objections within the Cortes by bypassing the Mixed Commission that had been initiated by Arias to discuss reform and taking the bill directly to a full session of the Cortes. He had simplified the text of the bill, leaving the legislature the only option of approving or rejecting it. "[The Cortes] could not ignore the fact that a majority of the Spanish people, the King, the church and the democratic world favored reform."[491] The king, as Franco's representative, unequivocally supported the government bill, adding the authoritarian pressure of disobeying the will of Franco himself.

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[490] Aguero, p. 68.
[491] Carr, 221.

Not everyone within the Cortes was easily swayed. Manuel Fraga,[492] a long-time Francoist minister, began a conservative association in the summer of 1976 to restrain the Suárez government.[493] The *procuradores* of the *Alianza Popular* (AP) agreed to back the bill only after negotiating some compromises. On November 18, 1976, the bill was passed by 425 votes, with 59 opposed and 13 abstentions.[494]

The next step was to hold a nationwide referendum in accordance with the Law of Referenda of 1945. The *Plataforma de Organismos Democraticos* – a coalition of opposition groups that formed in October – demanded that the government comply with seven conditions for them to accept the bill. The main condition demanded was that the ban on political parties and labor organizations be lifted. The government was unable to meet their terms before the referendum. The *Plataforma* carried out a campaign to encourage voters to abstain from voting, but on December 15, over 75% of the population defied their ban. The vote was overwhelmingly positive, with 94% voting in favor of the Reform Law and only 2.6% voting against it.[495]

The significance of the Reform Bill and its acceptance by the Spanish people cannot be overstated. It was a clear confirmation of support for the king as legitimate ruler of Spain. Secondly, the military trusted the civilian government elites because of their support for Franco's regime prior to his death. Certainly the vote in the Cortes and the subsequent support by the population deterred open hostility against the reforms. Third, the radical members of the opposition also did not control the pace of reform.

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[492] At one point before Juan Carlos was named Franco's successor, Fraga was being considered instead.
[493] Powell, 122.
[494] Powell, 122.
[495] Powell, 125.

During the first six months of 1977, Juan Carlos and Suárez orchestrated further changes. In March more political prisoners were pardoned and independent trade unions replaced their syndical counterparts. The right to strike was granted. The most daring move was to approach the Communist Party and negotiate an agreement whereby the party would be legalized and could participate in the first elections. The potential for a military backlash was great. In March, the legalization of political parties took effect. Suárez dismantled the *Movimiento* in April.

The first elections since the Civil War took place on June 15, 1977. Over 81% of Spanish citizens participated. Although the new electoral laws allowed for proportional representation, only a few parties actually won a number of seats and none received a majority. The *Union de Centro Democratico* (UCD), a coalition of moderate, center-right groups received the most votes, winning almost 35% of the vote. Suárez, the leader of the party, became the first elected president. The leading opposition party, the *Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol* (PSOE), received 29% of the vote. The two most extreme parties, the *Alianza Popular* (AP) and the *Partido Comunista de Espana* (PCE) received less than 10% of the vote. The results supported the ascendancy of moderate parties, rather than the more radical right or left.

> The outcome of the first election, with its radically altered balance of forces, was evidently not part of any plan, not even of any contingency plan. The new-found strength which the voters gave to opposition actors, particularly the PSOE, and the way they weakened the post-Francoist conservatives, altered the terms of the negotiations during the constitutional debates, re-balancing left and right in a way that allowed the emergence of an awareness of a 'national community'.[496]

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[496] Threlfall, 8.

Such an outcome averted another civil war. It also can be cited as the necessary glue to

help legitimize the democratization process. "In our judgment much of the reason for

this lack of system blame was due to Spain's all-union elections."[497]

Third Gate: Opposition Groups

The Civil War that Franco fought was against the Republicans and Communists.

When he formed his regime, it was with the understanding that those two political

ideologies were the problem. There was the true Spain, comprised of followers of

national Catholic traditions, and the anti-Spain, led by those who were contaminated with

foreign ideas.[498]

> Throughout his dictatorship, any mention of democratic pluralism was derided in
> official discourse as a dangerous conspiracy of 'reds' and 'freemasons'. In
> opposition to what he labeled the 'inorganic democracy' of other European
> countries, Franco promoted 'organic democracy', a 'natural order' based on
> traditional 'Spanish institutions' such as the Church and the family.[499]

Political associations were banned. Vertical syndicates gave the impression of addressing

needs of different groups, thus making trade unions unnecessary. Even during this

period, however, several groups emerged in the shadows of legality to organize

opposition to the Franco regime. The Socialist and Communist Parties continued; a

growing number of students rose up against the regime; a split within the Catholic

Church produced priests eager to support social welfare; and the growing discontent of

the Basque Country and Catalonia festered.

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[497] Linz, p. 126.
[498] Balfour and Quiroga, p. 21.
[499] Klaus Eder and Willfried Spohn. *Collective Memory and European Identity: the effects of integration and enlargement,* Ashgate Publishing Company, Burlington, 2005, p. 112.

By the 1950s, Franco's autarkic economic policies were showing signs of stagnation. Some liberalization within the economic sphere was necessary. Newer members of the elite, espousing a more free-market economic model, replaced Falangist ministers.[500] This young cohort of university-trained technocrats took over the ministries of finance and commerce in 1957 and the ministries of industry and planning in 1962.[501] Associated with Opus Dei, a conservative Catholic organization, they had the necessary credentials, but their allegiance was not to the *Moviemento*. "The right and center-right succeeded because the group had become, not so much a constituency for franquismo, but rather a constituency for capitalism."[502]   By focusing on the economic successes in Europe, Spain doubled its GNP in a decade. Industry increased by 10% per year.[503] Spain's burgeoning middle class became a vibrant part of society, supporting the moderate right-wing.

The economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s also had unexpected results, refocusing from a traditional, agrarian economy to an industrialized urban environment. Mass migrations from the countryside to newly industrialized cities led to considerable social and economic disruption. A new and impoverished working class fostered worker agitation, suing for changes in the labor law.   This actually began in the late 50s with the beginnings of the economic turnaround. The Syndicate responded with its "first Syndical Congress, which brought together appointed and elected delegates" of both government and workers' representatives to open a dialogue.[504] The new laws permitted the election

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[500] Balfour and Quiroga, p. 40. Bermeo,
[501] Bermeo, p. 225
[502] Bermeo, p. 224
[503] Bermeo, p. 221
[504] Foweraker, p. 82.

of factory committees. The Communist-led Workers Commissions (CCOO), in cooperation with Catholic workers' organizations, established permanent bodies to represent workers' interests.[505] The Socialists and Anarchists refused to participate in the early formations of committees within the Syndicate because they anticipated that the state apparatus would co-opt them.[506] This gave the CCOO an early advantage. "By the time the government fully realized the strength of the new union in the mid-1960s and outlawed it, the CCOO had established both a new tradition of unionism in Spain and an organizational base."[507] This clearly played a part in the harried negotiations for granting the Communist Party (CPE) legal status after Franco's death.

Besides the Republican/Communist opposition to the regime, regional nationalists also opposed centralized, authoritarian rule.[508] Madrid may perceive Spain as a nation with diverse regions, the Catalan and Basque nationalists believe "there is no Spanish nation, only a Spanish state composed of a number of ethnic nations."[509] Terrorist activity associated with regional nationalism proved both a support for democratization, as well as its potential derailment. Differences abounded among the political endeavors of different regions. Catalonia developed nationalist groups on both the left and the right. Repression of the Catalan language and political freedoms united Socialists, Communists

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[505] Lancaster, p. 126.

[506] Lancaster, p. 126.

[507] Gary Prevost. "The Spanish Labor Movement", *Politics and Change in Spain,* Thomas Lancaster and Gary Prevost, eds., Praeger Publishers, New York, 1985, p. 126.

[508] Balfour and Quiroga argue that there were three dominant discourses: Republicanism, National-Catholicism, and Regional Nationalism. Basque nationalism arose as a reaction to industrialization. "The Basque movement, confined at first largely to urban areas of the Vizcaya province, was a defensive response by sections of the middle class and small business to industrialization, which was sweeping aside small industry and sucking in large numbers of immigrants….The Catalan movement…was in part a response to the political and cultural hegemony of the Restoration elites, which continued to subordinate Catalan politicians to the dynastic parties." P. 9

[509] Robert P. Clark. "Madrid and the Ethnic Homelands: Is Consociational Democracy possible in post-Franco Spain?" *Politics and Change in Spain,* Thomas Lancaster and Gary Prevost, eds., Praeger Publishers, New York, 1985, p.67.

and Christian Democrats in their link of democratization with regional autonomy.
Basque nationalists, on the other hand, decried the loss of traditional lifestyles and sought
to disengage with an amalgam of "radical Basque nationalism, Marxism, and Third
World liberation."[510]

The rise of regional nationalism took place in the late 19th century, at a time when
the development of industrialization should have promoted further centralization of
power. The monarchy, however, did not create effective agencies to integrate either the
regional elites or the populace. A weak national education system contributed to
differentiation. Franco's regime was built on an ideology of Catholic Nationalism, which
did not acknowledge regional differences as a priority. The economic boom of the late
1950s led to massive displacement of the rural population. Newly migrated workers felt
alienated. By the 1960s, the ETA radicalized the debate by carrying out several
bombings. The heavy-handed response of the Franco regime tended to polarize the
Basque population against the center. With the efforts to transition to democracy,
terrorist attacks actually increased. Radicals hoped to spur the more moderate majority to
seek independence from Spain rather than mere autonomy.[511]

Democratization

It seemed as though the moderate voices on both sides could not prevail. The
king, however, was aware of the weaknesses of the Leftist opposition groups. While the

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[510] Balfour, p. 42.
[511] According to Martha Crenshaw, "a significant segment of the Basque public, including those who
supported more moderate stances and parties, saw ETA in a positive light, responded to ETA's view that a
war was being waged against the Basque people, and shared ETA's strategy of entering into negotiations
with the Spanish state." Martha Crenshaw. *Terrorism in Context,* Penn State Press, University Park, 1995,
p. 450.

opposition groups had some support from the international community, so did the king.

European governments, who had publicly acknowledged support for a democratic and

inclusive process, did not wish to have civil war at their back door. He also understood

that the different reform parties were less cohesive than they appeared. The Socialists

and Christian Democrats felt ill at ease with the more strident Communist party.[512]

Regional Nationalists' agenda by itself required recognition of separateness. The right

wing was too powerful to allow for a democratization process from below. Although

opposition groups were meeting openly, because they were illegal, they could not

participate in the political process. Many believed that the new king would simply

continue Franco's regime, requiring change to come "from below and driven by the

Left."[513] Juan Carlos needed to convince the opposition that he would promote their

inclusion in the process. Most importantly, the king had the support of the younger

members in the army's elite and could sway their response.

In early 1976, the Communists, Socialists and Christian Democrats united to form

Coordinacion Democratica. They claimed that "it was impossible to advance towards

democracy from within the system and the political institutions inherited from

Francoism."[514] Arias refused to meet with any of the opposition leaders, even the more

moderate. In order to break the impasse, Juan Carlos requested other ministers in the

government to contact Felipe Gonzalez, head of the Socialist Party, in his name. "In the

wake of his investiture the king succeeded in establishing contact with Gonzalez via the

Duke of Arion, one of his most trusted friends, who sought to convince the Socialists of

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[512] Powell, p. 98.
[513] Threl. P. 29.
[514] Powell, p. 115.

his democratizing intentions."[515] In public, the Socialists remained guarded. The

Communists negated government talks with the moderate opposition leaders as "nothing

but empty gestures," but they worried that the disagreements among the opposition

groups would break their fragile bond.[516] Santiago Carrillo, the leader of the Communist

Party, feared that the Party was poised to lose any influence in the democratizing process.

By the summer of 1976, Juan Carlos asked Arias to resign and appointed Adolfo

Suárez as the new president. The Communist opposition was now convinced that the

new government would block democratic changes. The Socialists, however, were more

hopeful: they "looked at Suárez' appointment as someone who comes from the

Movimiento and knows it so well that he may be the ideal architect to demolish it."[517]

From the king's perspective, however, the Socialists proved a thorny problem, because

they would not agree to accept the monarchy. This offered a reason for the government

to continue negotiations with the Communists.[518] Finally, Suárez convinced Juan Carlos

that legalizing the Communist Party would put pressure on the PSOE to conform. "If the

Communists could be made to acknowledge the monarchy – and by extension the entire

reform process, including the future elections – in return for their legalization, the PSOE,

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[515] Powell, p. 97.
[516] Powell, p. 102
[517] Powell, p. 113.
[518] The Socialists, for their part, continued to insist that the Communist Party be included. The seven conditions they established in November, 1976 to vote acceptance of the Law for Political Reform referendum was 1) immediate legalization of all political parties and labor organizations, 2) recognition and guarantee of all political rights, 3) dissolution of the *Movimiento* and political neutrality of the administration, 4) general amnesty, 5) fair access to state-controlled media, 6) negotiation of all electoral legislation, 7) institutionalization of regional political rights. Powell, p. 122.

would be deprived of much of its bargaining power and would eventually have to follow suit."[519]

The Law for Political Reform passed in the Cortes on November 18, 1976. As Suárez stated in his television address before the vote, "The constitutional modification will permit the Cortes to be elected by direct, secret, and universal suffrage as soon as possible….In this manner the people will … elect their representatives, and these representatives will make the decisions over the questions that affect the national community."[520] The stage was set to provide a political environment in which all parties could participate. Carrillo was willing to compromise.[521]

The Center

By the late 1950s, franquismo ideology had waned with the economy. Franco's generals and devout supporters gave way to a new generation of university-educated technocrats associated with the conservative Catholic organization, Opus Dei, which sought to energize the economy by moderating the autarkic policies. Franco was forced through necessity to relent. The boom was impressive. Over a ten year period, GNP doubled and industry grew by 10% per year.[522] This created a fairly large, modern middle class, with a significantly improved standard of living. In large part, most did not subscribe to a franquismo ideology per se. With the syndicalist policies modified, a more open-door policy internationally, and rhetoric that glorified a particularly Spanish brand

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[519] Powell. P. 127.
[520] Linz and Stepan, p. 94
[521] Carrillo was one of the few members of his party who were. At the party assembly, he had a difficult time convincing the members to agree.
[522] Bermeo, p. 221.

of Catholicism (as opposed to an unmediated cult of personality), the moderate majority

may not have been happy with authoritarian rule, but they were unwilling to suffer

massive unrest.[523] "As the Spanish *reforma* proceeded, the left opposition was largely

unsuccessful in its attempts to win over the new middle class. The right and center-right

succeeded because the group had become, not so much a constituency for franquismo,

but rather a constituency for capitalism."[524] The king was an amalgam of these various

principles. Once his commitment to democracy became clear, he came to represent the

moderate, conservative majority. As Franco's acknowledged successor, Juan Carlos

served as the bridge between a past that had mutated to include market forces and a future

that retained traditional, Catholic values.

The technocrats of the 50s gave way to a new generation of like-minded

ministers, but they looked to the West with an eye to study political organization. This

group of insiders became the basis of the king's supporters for democratization. "The

younger group was the semi-opposition which would ally itself with the king in directing

the transition to democracy and then become the leading force within the democratic

right."[525] They were aware that the European Union and NATO would remain closed to

Spain as long as an authoritarian regime was in power. "Entrepreneurs and industrialists

recognized that the integration of Spain into the European Community was in their long-

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[523] Prevost claims that there was not a significant push for change from the countryside. There was "a widespread desire for an end to the dictatorship, but political consciousness generally did not extend beyond those democratic sentiments." Prevost, p. 134-135.

[524] Bermeo, *Comparative Politics,* January 1987, p. 224.

[525] Bermeo, p. 225-226.

term economic interests."[526] How much they were willing to sacrifice came as a surprise to everyone.

Fourth Gate: the military and conservatives

The armed forces were the backbone of the regime. "For almost 150 years, the armed forces had been the guarantor of the power and influence of Spanish conservatism and its long-standing predominance over political life."[527] Franco was part of that tradition. After successfully defeating the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War, Franco brought together the various solidifying traditions of Spain that included military rule, conservative Catholicism and claim of monarchist rule.[528] The first period of the regime, from 1939 to 1959, was dominated by army officers who had served with the general. Military officers held at least half of the positions within the government. With the economic crisis of the 50s and with natural attrition, their numbers began to dwindle and civilians began to dominate all but the military ministries.[529] The military also had considerable independence with its share of the state budget. Without oversight, salaries became top-heavy and modernization was overlooked. "The failure to reform the army's structural defects had the unintended consequence of dividing the officer corps along generational and professional lines."[530] Three different factions arose within the officer corps in the mid-1970s – junior officers who were openly critical of state institutions, a moderate minority who favored modernizing military institutions and practices, and the

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[526] Prevost, p. 134.
[527] Threl, 32.
[528] This is especially interesting, because although Franco claimed that Spain was rightfully a Catholic monarchy, he refused to relinquish power to the legitimate king.
[529] Boyd and Boyden, p. 96.
[530] Boyd and Boyden, p. 99.

hardliners who wished to maintain the status quo. The king had served in the military for some time and was aware of the tensions, but he also knew that the hardliners remained a formidable foe to regime change.[531]

As the decades passed, many military officers left politics or became small bureaucrats, delegates within the provinces, and security personnel outside the core decision-making sites.[532] This was partly due to Franco's penchant of sacking anyone critical of his policies, as well as a genuine support for authoritarian rule. However, this is not to say that the military had lost its bite. The old guard still reigned in the Council of Ministers, which they anticipated would serve as a stop gap for significant change. The rise of terrorist activities by the ETA led to several states of emergency, wherein military jurisdiction over political offences took precedence.[533] Numerous security agencies monitored the public space for ideological purity. "As members of the *Movimiento,…*it was the duty of top military officers to preserve the fundamental principles of the Crusade, which was victorious in 1939."[534] After Franco died, several hard-line generals continued to claim that they were willing to fight another civil war if necessary to safeguard Francoism.[535]

The king and his new government took the innate power of the military very seriously and maneuvered around them. The military focused on two arenas that had traditionally proven conflictual: the debate concerning the unity of Spain and the

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[531] "At every stage of the transition he capitalized on their friendship and respect for him as Franco's chosen successor to make possible the political transformation, while at the same time he advised the government as to the limits of military tolerance." Boyd and Boyden, p. 102.
[532] See Linz and Maravall, p. 11
[533] Carr, p. 23.
[534] Aguero, p. 6.
[535] Carr, 23.

potential legalization of the Communist Party. Adolfo Suárez, president of the

government, met with the top military advisors in September before the vote in the Cortes

for the Law of Political Reform. He was able to assuage their concerns about both issues

and further quell their fears of undermining the Franquist regime. Miranda and Suárez

submitted the Law to the full Cortes, in accordance with legal procedures established by

Franco. While old military *procuradores* voted against the bill, military ministers

supported it. "Military ministers, however, had to vote with their president. The reasons

were plainly explained by Admiral Pita de Veiga, navy minister and member of the

National Council, right after the vote: 'My conscience is at peace, because democratic

reforms will proceed from Franquist legality.'"

The military understandably regarded their influence as unassailable. In July,

1945, 50% of the ministers in government were military officers. By March, 1975,

however, those numbers had dwindled to only 16%.[536] In the period just before Franco's

death, reformist members of the military sought to limit the power of the 'blue' generals

by recommending a new organic law that would create a single defense ministry.[537] In

January 1975, Diez Alegria, chief of the High General Staff of the armed forces and the

person who was pushing for change, was removed from his post and the law was

withdrawn. The timid reforms of Carrero Blanco and Arias Navarro were denounced,

effectively stopping their progress. In the first few months of the power shift to Juan

Carlos, Arias served as president again. He filled the four military ministerial posts with

hardline Franquists. Lieutenant General Fernando de Santiago, an old supporter of

Franco's, had been made vice president for defense within the cabinet. "As devoted

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[536] Aguiero, p. 46
[537] Boyd and Boyden, p. 100.

Franquists, all four military chiefs in the government had a clear notion of the role of the

armed forces as guarantors of the fundamental principles of *franquismo*."[538] Although

they realized that some changes were inevitable because of the widespread call for

liberalization from several quarters, they thought they could stall its progress. They

certainly had been successful before. While Arias was much more a supporter of

maintaining Franco's regime than the other members of the elite, (although the generals

were unaware of the extent of the liberalizing impulse) the ministers were uncomfortable

with Arias' lack of action toward the demobilization process in Spanish Sahara and the

multiple demonstrations taking place under the auspices of the Socialists and

Communists. To make matters worse, public opinion was turning against the military

because of their harsh reprisals against dissidents. They regarded Arias' dismissal in

July, 1976 as a welcome change.   Adolfo Suárez had the reassuring credentials of a

conservative Franquist with leadership skills proven in the prior regime. "In the eyes of

the military Suárez's credentials looked impeccable."[539]

Before the Law of Political Reform was brought to a vote in the Cortes, Suárez

met with the Bunker to discuss the new bill. During that meeting, he assured them that

the monarchy, Spain's unity and the armed forces would be safeguarded.[540] He also

promised that the Communist Party would not be legalized.[541] On that basis and because

they thought they could still control government action, the military acquiesced to the

new law. "The military felt it could rely on its own presence in the government to protect

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[538] Aguiero, p. 72.
[539] Aguiero, p. 76
[540] Powell, p. 119.
[541] Apparently, he stated that the legalization of the Communist Party would not occur with the current statutes in place, but that was not how it was interpreted by the generals. Powell, p. 120.

its institutional interests."[542] Two weeks later, the government proposed legislation that

would facilitate the legalization of trade unions. This meant that the Communists would

have some legal avenue to government policy, even if the Party itself was not legalized.

Santiago was furious. He submitted his resignation on September 22. Although the king

was irritated by Suárez' actions, the military understood the problem of having a vice

president that would not support governmental decisions. The appointment of Lieutenant

General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado as Santiago's replacement, however, was a blow.

The remaining three military ministers asked both the president and the king to stop the

appointment. But this was an important piece to continue reigning in the hardliners.

Mellado was known for his reformist stances.

Rising unrest served to push the decision to legalize the Communist Party.

Neither the king nor other members of government were comfortable with admitting the

PCE to the democratizing process, but several factors influenced that decision. Early in

1977, an ultra right-wing commando group was responsible for murdering four attorneys

with Communist sympathies. This swayed public opinion against the right. Peaceful

demonstrations were held in February and March. The other opposition parties

(particularly the Socialists) favored the inclusion of the Communists. Suárez wrestled

with delaying a decision in order to force it upon the new Cortes that would be elected in

July, or allow the Communists to compete in the election. "But, without the Communists

officially in the race, they would be likely to maintain high levels of mobilization, which

the government would then have had to repress, damaging the democratic credibility of

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[542] Aguiero, p. 77

the process."[543] Suárez had assured the military in their September meeting that he

would not legalize the 'Red threat'. With the Easter holiday approaching, the

government received a favorable ruling from the attorney general and swiftly registered

the PCE, bypassing a debate in the Council of Ministers. When the public (and the

military elite) learned about the legalization, it was a *fait acompli*. The military chiefs

were outraged. They felt betrayed by the king and the president. Delicate negotiations

allowed tempers to cool. Admiral Pita da Veiga resigned and Lt. General Alvarez-

Arenas, the army minister, almost followed suit. "They realized, however, that not one of

them would want to accept the ministerial post if Alvarez-Arenas resigned. As this

would leave the possibility open for the government to appoint a civilian, a possibility

that they found even worse, they decided to keep their minister in the government."[544]

Instead, they contented themselves with issuing a disgruntled statement disclaiming the

legalization and warning the government to tread carefully.

The military was able to stop one piece of legislature during the transition period

having to do with granting amnesty to those accused of political crimes. Before Franco

died, a small number of military officers formed a clandestine organization, the Union

Militar Democratica, for the purpose of promoting democratic ideas within the

military.[545] The Portuguese revolution prompted the military intelligence organizations

to investigate seditious activities within the ranks. Members of the UMD were arrested;

and several were sentenced to prison terms. After the new Cortes convened, several

sought to grant amnesty to those who had been punished for political crimes. Most

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[543] Aguiero, p. 81.
[544] Aguiero, p. 83
[545] Boyd and Boyden, p. 99

parties were in favor of granting amnesty to the members of the UMD. This would also mean that those officers could be reinstated into the military. Even moderates were opposed. Vice President Gutierrez Mellado "summoned the deputy who was chairing the congressional meeting while the law was being debated, to warn him, before a group of some twelve generals, about his inability to control the state of undiscipline which would be unleashed in the army if the amnesty was extended to include members of the UMD."[546] Fearing a coup, Congress dropped the UMD from the amnesty law that was passed in mid-October, 1977.[547]

Only a few years earlier, efforts to create a single defense ministry had failed. The rearrangement of power proved to be enormously effective. The president, with the backing of the king, the Cortes, and the decreased influence of the hardline generals was able to replace the military ministries with a single ministry in the summer of 1977. This pushed the military further to the sidelines. The development of a new constitution was placed in the hands of a constitutional committee formulated from members of the new Cortes. When they decided to keep their deliberations secret, this meant that the military was not included. The committee sought the advice of the military elite concerning sensitive issues and incorporated language and ideas that would be acceptable, but their influence was significantly reduced. This is especially evident with regard to the recognition of regionalism in the constitution. "What the military disliked most, however, was the recognition of different nationalities, with their own officially sanctioned languages and flags and their right to autonomy."[548] The unity of Spanish

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[546] Aguiero, p. 86.
[547] The UMD members were not granted amnesty until November, 1986. Aguiero, p. 197.
[548] Aguiero, p. 88.

territory had been a primary concern of all those who subscribed to the Franquist vision of Spain. The representatives of the Basque Country and of Catalonia, however, would not negotiate. This meant that the dynamics among the groups of power had changed dramatically. Because other parties wanted the regions to support the constitutional process, they were willing to isolate the military. The language passed, in spite of their objections.

Although the Basque region (along with Catalonia) received some regional autonomy, the ETA was unsatisfied. The winning coalition in the first elected government was the UCD, a coalition of center-right organizations and political figures. The centrist parties generally did not receive the popular vote in the regional elections of 1980. The ETA stepped up their terrorist activities in the hopes that it would provoke the military to respond. The relationship between the centrist government and the regional nationalists became more strained. As well, the economy was suffering through the oil crisis of the late 1970s. It was a widely held view that the military was on the brink of establishing a military junta. Suárez resigned amidst the multiple crises.

In February, 1981, Congress was attempting to elect a new head of government when a force of civil guards led by Lt. Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina stormed the building. The event was widely broadcast over the radio, giving "the signal for other conspirators to make their move."[549] Captain-General Milans del Bosch had already begun moving toward occupying Valencia, taking command of government. He notified other captains general in the hopes that they would follow suit. "In an edict Milans justified the mobilization of troops under his command as a response to the power

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[549] Aguiero, p. 163.

vacuum created by the takeover of Congress in Madrid and declared that the measures taken were in support of the king and Spain."[550] General Juste, who had been told that General Armada would be coordinating operations from the king's residence, contacted Juan Carlos to ask for the general. General Armada had been calling La Zarzuela to offer the king his protection and assistance, but General Juste's call confirmed the king's unease. He ordered the general to stay where he was. The king spent the rest of the evening confirming the loyalty of the other captains general. When the television stations were once more in government hands, Juan Carlos announced his full support of the democratic process: "the crown…cannot in any way tolerate the attempts…to interrupt by force the democratic process determined by the constitution and approved by the Spanish people by means of a referendum."[551] In the morning, Milans and Tejero surrendered. The military, which still contained many who were enraged by the level of plurality of the new government, could not stand united.[552]

Disempowered become empowered

In the span of only a few years, the configuration of Spain's power structure changed so dramatically that the authority at the top could usher in a transition to democracy. This meant that the power distribution had become significantly different. When Franco first established his regime, he had the full backing of the military, the Falangists and the Catholic Church to support him. Republican, Socialist and Communist forces were crushed in the Civil War of 1936-1939. He ruled with an iron fist for almost

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[550] Aguiero, p. 163.
[551] Powell, p. 172.
[552] According to Juan Linz, Tejero was allowed by the courts to organize a right wing party, Solidaridad Espanola, from his jail cell in the elections of 1982. Tejero's party received .13% of the total votes, a clear rejection of the hardline agenda. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* p. 99.

40 years.   However, by the end of his rule, several factors had caused a shift in support.

The Church, once a bastion of conservative nationalism, had shifted to the more tolerant,

humanitarian message of Pope John XXIII. Bishops that had applauded the 1953

Concordat, giving Franco the power to approve the assignment of bishops, retired. New

bishops with less ideologically rigid positions took their places. The economic stagnation

of the 50s led to a more open Spanish economy, wherein many began to want greater

economic and political ties with the rest of Western Europe. Tourism brought more

wealth and Western ideas to the general public. New generations of technocrats moved

up the rungs of government, who did not have the history with the Civil War. Their

commitment to Franco's ideology was superficial.[553] The connection with both the

tradition of Catholicism and Spanish monarchism helped anchor Franco's regime, yet

undermined his exclusive hold over the will of the people. Even though Juan Carlos was

handpicked by Franco to continue his legacy, the hardliners were taken by surprise with

the number of conservative elites who were willing to follow the king's lead toward

democratization.

It was not possible to perceive this at the time, but many of the centers of power

were willing to make the change. The new generations of government elites were not

wedded to the *Movimiento*; the left opposition parties had obtained a footing through the

factory councils; the Catholic Church, its organization and those who considered

themselves devout, turned toward a more tolerant stance; the regional nationalists had

garnered support through the oppressive measures of the armed forces towards their

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[553] Linz and Stepan's contribution to the legacy and development of totalitarian regimes moving to post-totalitarian regimes applies here to some degree. Although Franco pulled together traditional and ideological ideas to create his own brand of authoritarianism, there were definitely many who were committed to the *Movimiento.*

activism. Even the military was not united in its support for the old regime, partly

because policies and equipment were noticeably outdated and partly because there were

some members who espoused a more democratic vision. These various centers of power

were willing to isolate the hardliners and compromise among themselves to create

change.

Lastly, the timing and approach of the elites was essential to overcoming

opposition to the transition. Policies were put in place that helped change the dynamic

interaction of the different power centers. An example is the writing of the constitution.

Although there were policies that the military adamantly opposed, the solidarity of the

other groups in order to pass a constitution outweighed their objections. The elites

utilized open decision-making at times that would support the effort to democratize.

When the Law for Political Reform was drafted and was sent to the Cortes, its accessible

language and media coverage made it difficult for the Cortes to significantly alter its

intent. Secrecy was instrumental during the negotiations between the Communist Party

and the government to bring about an agreement that allowed both to support the other.

Allowing referenda for the important policies legitimated the process throughout the

state.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Comparison of All Three Case Studies

Theory

     This study has sought to explore the possibilities for change in society. To set the stage, it is necessary to consider the condition of societal life. Humans are governed by the paradoxical aims of personal gain and their need for social groups. Societies are formed and are subject to time. This causes a pull to create a static, predictable environment within the context of changing circumstances that include a vast array of components both endogenous and exogenous. Modes of behavior and processes of governance are institutionalized to establish stability. Self-interested individuals, formed through a combination of essential qualities and external conditions, seek like-minded individuals to protect some portion of their self-interest in the larger context of a political body. Power centers form to exert pressure on the general public sphere. These centers create society through a balance of power.

     My project is not to develop an independent, predictive theory. It is an analysis, via three case studies, studying historical legacies, elite manipulation, and power centers within each polity. It is furthermore a study of the shaping of policies and the way in which they were meant to enact reform. In this endeavor, I am calling upon the work of the comparative historical analysts to demonstrate the complexity of social life.

Historical institutionalist scholars argue that institutions hamper change by saddling current interaction and behavior with rules and regulations from the past or sufficing reconfiguration by incoming elites. However, the concept of critical junctures presents the possibility that periods of disequilibrium arise in the lifetime of an institution that provide a 'moment' where there is the potential for more significant change. Critical junctures are periods wherein change is possible; initiated changes and/or new policies must 'run the gauntlet' of institutionalized power centers (dependent of type of regime and historical legacy). Each gate - or power center - diverts the direction of the policy to include changes that will benefit them. The outcome of the policy is going to be different. Sequence and leader-legitimacy impacts how different the outcome is from the original policy. The window closes, and the new set of policies/circumstances/power centers become institutionalized. The three case studies have similar critical junctures, brought about by the death of the leader of the state. New elites take the opportunity to reform their societies in fundamental ways, by reordering the balance of power to include groups that have previously been unempowered.

The problem with attempting to enact change, even in periods that are open to it, is that change does not follow a linear trajectory. Similar initial formulations may "generate the same immediate effects" but "their contexts and concatenations matter; initial conditions, combinations, and sequences significantly affect outcomes on the large scale."[554] In order to follow shifts in the balance of power, it is necessary to consider the processes that promote or hinder the change agenda. Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly in their development of contentious politics methodology, argued for an

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[554] Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. *Dynamics of Contention,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 87.

approach that could account for the dynamic interaction of multiple actors – including time, institutions, groups and individuals. As Katznelson explains of their study, "this work takes durations, discontinuities, branchings, and trajectories very seriously."[555] The methodology, however, suffers from the 'all but the kitchen sink' problem. The value of their findings may not provide a distinctive observation of outcomes. One way to address this problem is by recognizing distinct points or 'gates' associated with the power centers where they influence the process/policy/agenda and alter its course.

If we accept the premise that large scale change occurs within critical junctures, then the initiation of the juncture is a starting point. It is necessary for an agent to recognize the potential of the disequilibrium prompted by the cause of the juncture. The agent devises a program that addresses the agent's concerns and articulates that program to the logical next set of agents who can promote the new agenda. This is the first gate. At that point, changes are made to the initial program to suit the aims (or address potential confrontations from other sectors) of this power center, altering the initial program slightly or significantly, diverting the original path of the program. The program moves to the next set of agents, who makes further alterations. The number of 'gates' to which the program is subjected depends on the complexity and number of power centers concerned. At some point, the critical juncture closes, having institutionalized the last configuration of the program that originated from the initial agent. Alterations to the program still continue, but at a much more glacial pace.

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[555] Ira Katznelson. "Periodization and Preferences", *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences,* James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 272.

The path taken by the program in question looks more like a helix, a three dimensional spiral. Such an image accounts for alterations to the original 'path' of the reform as well as the effect of change over time. During its creation, the reforming program is altered to account for compromises made by and for the different power centers that create the balancing societal milieu. Control of the agenda will be administered by the power center that has successfully minimized changes after its version. Additionally, it implies a cyclical nature that influences the dependent variable. An out-of-favor power center will eventually reassert control over the agenda of the reform, but it will do so in conditions and a context that is different from the last time it had dominance.

The three case studies, which follow the initiation of reforms intended to empower a segment of society, demonstrate the significance of the mechanisms utilized to promote reform. They highlight the importance of calculating for the response and influence of the power centers that existed and the balance among them that created a stable society. Initiating agents were more or less successful in seeing their agendae realized if they took (or did not take) into account the balance of power and the force that balance will exert to attempt to re-equilibrate. Also significant was the universality of the reform. Human society cannot be in agreement. A reform is possible if more power centers can benefit from it – either materially or psychologically – than do not. This promotes alliances among power centers that by the very fact that they are separate indicates that they do not fully agree with one another. If significant change is only possible if the balance of power shifts, an initiating agent must understand the need to affect the entire balance. It is possible to create a new equilibrium only if the initiating

agent and supporters can splinter and marginalize opposing power centers and build coalitions among other power centers that can benefit.

Inevitably, opposing groups will resurface. Time, endogenous and exogenous factors, and human imperfection play a part in undermining the new context. But opposing power centers can only manifest if they alter their platform to take into consideration the new environment. This means that they adopt some aspects of the reform and mix it with their own agenda. Life does not return to the same moment in the 'stream'. Change – it turns out – is a complex, non-linear process.

Cases

All three case studies offer a view of how different empowered groups play a part in the transference of power in three different regime types. They are examples of an agenda of the highest elites in their societies seeking to empower groups within their sphere of influence that have little or no power. In Poland, it is the workers; in the U.S., it is the poor, and in Spain, it is opposition groups. The process of attempting to intentionally redistribute power is fraught with the difficulties of having to maneuver around powerful groups who have a stake in the new dynamic of public discourse. Once a new power grid surfaces, all the partners to this political 'dance' immediately begin to reassess their positions and attempt to seek avenues for increasing their own power. In some cases, this creates a zero-sum game; some have to force others to lose influence in order to register gains. These tend to be groups that are directly connected to each other and are seeking the same opportunities or goods. Other groups, not directly connected to

the new process of power-distribution, seek to benefit from the new rules of the game by refashioning themselves to gain access to available political and economic goods.

The key players – First Secretary Władysław Gomułka of Poland, President Lyndon Johnson of the U.S., and King Juan Carlos of Spain – were the key authorities in their states. It is they who initiated programs that were intended to empower segments of their populations that could not gain power for themselves. The aims of the leaders varied. All three had self-interested motives, yet this does not necessarily discount their genuine intentions for those they sought to empower. In order to consider the outcomes of their policies, one needs to take into account the degree to which they sought self-empowerment in relation to how much independence they were willing to grant. As well, one would need to assess what constituted gain for them personally.

The causes of powerlessness differed in each state. In Poland, emerging from a totalitarian regime, power was concentrated in the highest rungs of government. However, even with oppressive control, the people required some degree of legitimacy. The promised wealth from the 5 year plan did not materialize. Workers were massively dissatisfied. Strikes had been plaguing the country for three years and further unrest threatened. The death of Beirut, following closely on the heels of Khrushchev's cataclysmic Secret Speech, set the stage for a new conceptualization of Communist governance, rendered along more nationalist lines. Workers Councils were arising spontaneously within a few factories. Gomułka promoted their development throughout the state and initiated policies for their regulation. The U.S. enjoyed the greatest degree of widespread liberty in a consolidated democracy, yet modes of exclusion were built into

the institutional structures of public life. While attention was being drawn to the persistence of racial inequality, it became evident that poverty among the general public served to isolate a significant percentage from public life. President Johnson moved forcefully to address a myriad of social dysfunctions, including proposing community action programs that would not only provide social services for the poor, but also training programs and political organizing to have a voice in local governmental policies. Upon Franco's death in 1974, his declared heir, King Juan Carlos, took control of an authoritarian government. Unrest had been on the rise even before the death of the Caudillo as the dynamics of the different power centers had shifted over time. Different groups began clamoring for more control in politics and others sought more regional autonomy. The regime seemed solidly in control, but the fate of the newly crowned king was uncertain. Although Juan Carlos had promised that he would continue to rule Spain according to the fundamental Organic Laws decreed by Franco, he rapidly used his power and influence to control a peaceful transition to a parliamentary government and constitutional monarchy.

The context of public space and its negotiated stability differed in each of the cases. Poland was dominated by the Communist Party. This limited different expressions of self-interest, but it was not monolithic. The unsettling exogenous factor was the power struggle in the Kremlin, launched with Stalin's death and culminating in his repudiation by Khrushchev. Internally, the Polish economy was weak and the poor standard of living prompted considerable unrest. Gomułka legalized the formation of the Workers Councils, satisfying the workers. With the Stalinists out of favor, Gomułka took this opportunity to marginalize their influence even further. After decreasing the threat

from the Stalinists, Gomułka marginalized the liberalizers. Once his power was secure, he splintered support for the Councils. Johnson rode into office on an enormous wave of support. The people marginalized the Republican Party in the next election, granting power to the Democrats. He initiated a plethora of reforms that had little opposition. The complexity and diversity of the programs limited effective coalition-building. Too many rocks in the pond made the 'ripples' collide. The war further eroded Johnson's legitimacy. King Juan Carlos assumed power with the support of the military. In order to begin the process of democratization, his supporters needed to keep the military acquiescent long enough to alter the public space. By the time the hardliners in the military staged an attempted coup, support for the King and the democratizing process was too ingrained to be unseated.

The similarities among the three case studies are powerful, yet the outcomes were different. The death of leaders and the ascent of reforming leaders prompted a critical juncture, open to reform. The agenda of the leaders, the sequence of their reform, the handling of the different power centers, the development of coalitions among those groups that would support change and the splintering of opposing power centers created different outcomes for the initial policies.

Death of Leaders

The critical junctures in all three cases centered around the deaths of the current leaders, leaving space for changes in the structure of institutions and policies. The circumstances in all three cases were significantly different. In Poland, Boleslaw Bierut had acquired his position as first Secretary through subterfuge. Stalin did not trust the

Polish Communists who had stayed in Poland during the war and certainly did not trust

Władysław Gomułka, who served as the deputy minister of the Party. Once the

communists took over government and solidified their position, Bierut's Stalinist faction

isolated Gomułka and charged him with right wing, reactionary behavior. Gomułka was

imprisoned during Bierut's reign from 1951 until 1955. Bierut died during the same time

that Nikita Khrushchev delivered his Secret Speech to the 20th congress, damning Stalin's

cult of personality. The Polish government, under the control of the Communist Party,

was leaderless and discredited. Continued control of government was at stake. Gomułka,

a devout Communist but unsullied by a connection to Stalinist practices, was

rehabilitated and returned to the Party as first Secretary General. Bierut had been

discredited and although the type of government did not change, the ruling faction within

the Party changed. In the United States, John Kennedy was elected president in 1960.

He was a charismatic leader, building populist support for his agenda, which focused on a

strong anti-Communist foreign policy and secondarily, on domestic policies that would

aid the poor and the elderly. The composition of Congress, however, stalled many of the

domestic programs he initiated. His assassination, aired on television, prompted an

atmosphere of overwhelming support for Kennedy's agenda. Kennedy's death galvanized

intense support for his successor. Lyndon Baines Johnson, Kennedy's vice-president,

took over the office of the presidency vowing to continue his policies.[556] In 1975,

Francisco Franco died after ruling Spain with an iron hand for over 30 years. His death

was not unexpected. Prior to his death, he had arranged for his successor, Prince Juan

Carlos de Bourbon, to take over as head of the government. While most assumed that

Juan Carlos would continue Franco's governing institutions, he set in motion a transition

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[556] "I considered myself the caretaker of both his people and his policies." Unger and Unger, p. 291.

to democracy. Franco remained in control until he died, but there were clear signs that continuity was not favored by the Spanish populace. All three governmental institutions faced a break in continuity, although the source of friction in all three was different.

Bierut had been the first Secretary General of the Polish United Workers Party from 1948 until his death in 1956. Although he was Polish, the Communist Party was divided between those whom Stalin trusted and those he did not. In fact, Stalin's relationship with the Polish Communist Party had been a troubled one at best.[557] In 1938 many of those who traveled to the Soviet Union were killed in the purges. Bierut – who was in prison at the time – escaped the purge.[558]

Bierut became President (and then Prime Minister) and First Secretary in 1948.[559] By 1950, the Communist Party had solidified control of the government. It enacted a Stalinist-style Six Year Plan that prioritized heavy industry. A campaign to force collectivization of farms was begun. Property owned by the Catholic Church was confiscated and efforts to sow discord were undertaken within its ranks.[560] But already by 1953, the newly forming class of workers was unhappy. In March of 1953, Bierut acknowledged to members of the Central Committee that the 6 year plan was not working. He initiated changes in hopes of addressing the low standard of living.[561] Little was accomplished and sections of the Polish population began registering their

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[557] Gomułka especially had been a thorn in Stalin's side for several years. Bethell has more on this.
[558] Gomułka also was in prison. Later, Bierut would attempt to purge Gomułka. While Gomułka was definitely a rival of Bierut's, the order to marginalize him probably came from Stalin.[558] For whatever reason – perhaps because Gomułka would not confess to treasonous acts against the Party in a public trial – he was not killed, but spent three years under house arrest, out of the public eye. Bethell.
[559] This was in no small part orchestrated by Gomułka, who was a firm supporter of the Soviet Union as the father of socialism.
[560] Davies, p. 580.
[561] Raina, p. 23.

discontent. Cultural producers criticized policies directed at censoring artistic endeavors; workers were grumbling about poor housing and lack of consumer goods; farmers resisted collectivization. By the time Khrushchev was able to consolidate power in the Soviet Union in 1956, Bierut was already battling Polish discontent.

Bierut left behind a compromised Politburo after his death. Edward Ochab, the new First General Secretary, recognized that the Party was in a precarious position.[562] In this case, the unrest of the people spurred massive changes in rule and institutional structure. Gomułka proved to be a compromise. He was a faithful Communist who had not been implicated in Stalinism, thus allowing the Party to continue to rule.[563] Hardliners in the Party did not have the support either with the general public nor with the military to retain control. Ochab, in the role of conciliator is rarely appreciated. His willingness to allow a peaceful transfer of power to Gomułka helped avert destabilizing war.

Conditions in the United States were considerably different in 1963, when John Kennedy was assassinated. In the presidential election in 1960, Kennedy won by the slimmest of margins. He was able, however, in the two and a half years he served as president, to create a positive image of leadership domestically and abroad. Americans imbued the First Family with the aura of profound change. Kennedy himself, however, did not foster significantly different policies. He thought of the presidency as a position suited to international affairs. As a Cold Warrior, intent on maintaining the policy of containment, Kennedy initiated the Space Race to counter the Soviet Union's gains in

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[562] Ochab had been associated with Gomułka before his removal from the Party.

[563] The Polish Central Committee faced a daunting task. Their legitimacy was sharply questioned in the state, but the Soviet Union was not about to lose control. Poland stood on the brink of invasion.

space exploration. He requested Congress to increase military spending when the Soviet Union demanded that the Western powers evacuate West Berlin in 1961. He demanded the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962.

Kennedy had little success shepherding domestic policies through Congress and expressed a greater interest in foreign affairs.[564] He is credited with favoring the Civil Rights Movement, but in truth, that had begun in earnest during the 50's. As more protests arose and activists began coordinating their efforts in the 60's, Kennedy acquiesced to their pressure when necessary.[565] His experience witnessing the poverty of the Coal Miners in West Virginia led him to consider domestic policies that would alleviate their suffering. He revamped his New Frontier to launch policies that would address affordable housing (the Omnibus Housing Bill of 1961), wages (the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1961), unemployment (the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962), mental illness (the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act) and medical support for the aged (Medicare). Only some of these bills made it through Congress.

Bierut and Franco died of reportedly natural causes. The response of their publics to their deaths was fundamentally different. With Kennedy's assassination, the U.S. public was traumatized. The natural psychological response to such a public tragedy is to unify and support a government that maintains a legacy. The life of John Kennedy became subject to mythmaking. Lyndon Johnson stepped into the presidency, knowing that Kennedy's legacy would be both a support and a hindrance. In large part, he carried

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[564] Arthur M. Schlesinger. *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House,* Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York, 2002, p. 424. See also King, p. 75.
[565] Katherine Tate. *From Protest to Politics,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 53.

forward the agenda Kennedy had outlined, with special emphasis on policy areas that

motivated Johnson. Kennedy's tentative step into domestic welfare policies allowed

Johnson to move more boldly in that same direction. Johnson's 'stamp' was the scope of

policy-making that ensued his first hundred days as a newly elected president in 1964.

The cornerstone of his domestic agenda were the two major pieces of legislation that had

languished in Congress before Kennedy's death – a major tax cut to stimulate the

economy and a sweeping Civil Rights Bill. Johnson then initiated a revamp of the New

Frontier by declaring his War on Poverty. Although Kennedy's administration had

started to explore a program that would address poverty, it was still in its initial stage of

planning at his death. Johnson was fully behind it as soon as he was informed of its

existence.[566]

U.S. interests in Vietnam had also begun under Kennedy. Johnson not only

extended U.S. support and presence, but maneuvered U.S. military operations to provide

the perception that U.S. forces were under attack. The costs of conducting a war halfway

around the globe and funding an ambitious domestic welfare program created an

enormous economic burden on the country.

General Francisco Franco had a long career in the military before the Spanish

Civil War. In 1934 he was responsible for suppressing a strike to defend the Republic.

The elections of the left-wing Popular Front in 1936 ushered in a period of civic unrest

that prompted the Spanish military to attempt a *coup d'etat.* While that failed, the parties

that supported the coup – the military, the Church, monarchists and the fascist Falangists

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[566] Unger and Unger, p. 293.

– coalesced against the Republic. Three years of bloody fighting ended with the anti-Republican forces, under the leadership of General Franco, declaring victory.

Franco ruled for the next 36 years, maintaining an alliance among the groups that supported him during the war. He controlled Spain, mirroring his experience as a military man; "his rule would be that of an all-powerful military colonial ruler. The enemy, the defeated Republicans, would be savagely crushed."[567] While the repression against the left was brutal, Franco offered something for each of the 'families' that supported his rule. With the blessing of the Church, Franco declared that he had restored the Spain of old – based on Catholic values. The military followed him with utmost loyalty; the monarchists waited patiently for the monarchy to be restored. He remained virulently anti-Communist and anti-liberal until he died. He was able to continue his authoritarian control throughout the myriad changes of the middle of the 20th century. But by the late 50s, economic stagnation forced some begrudging changes. The resulting economic prosperity altered the social milieu. A desire to strengthen connections with Western Europe in order to continue that prosperity helped create fissures in the burgeoning middle class. The Catholic Church hierarchy moved away from the rigid, authoritarian control and emphasized tolerance and social welfare. The rising politicians no longer passionately supported the *Movimento*, but viewed government from a more professional perspective. Only the military elite remained supportive, but they were aging, as was the Caudillo himself. Franco's death was perceived by many as the passing of an era. Most of the power centers in Spain looked for change. Juan Carlos knew that

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[567] Paul Preston. *Franco, A Biography,* Basic Books, New York, 1994, p. 327.

his rule would be precarious. He needed the support of the international community as well as the majority of the Spanish public. They wanted democracy.

While each case witnessed the death of its ruler, the perception by other centers of power varied. In Poland, Bierut's death, on the heels of discrediting Stalin and his regime, created a crisis for the ruling elite. They were able to weather the crisis by appointing a member of the ruling Party who was untainted by the past failures and could call upon a perceived degree of legitimacy from the public. One of Gomułka's first acts was to promise a separation from Soviet control. The president's assassination in the United States created a different circumstance, whereby the various power centers unified behind Johnson as the legitimate, constitutional authority. Johnson called upon the continuance of the legacy of the past to legitimize policies that had languished in Congress. King Juan Carlos navigated the dangerous terrain of having been approved by the former ruler, whose support was largely in the military, and of supporting other power centers that sought democratization. He was successful because he was able to isolate the right.

While the death of each ruler heralded a critical juncture, changes to the political and social institutions were not reliant on that factor alone. It is necessary to look at other components of those periods to assess why some failed and some succeeded.

Reforming Leaders

In 1956, the Communist Party of Poland had undergone attacks from several quarters. The riots at Poznan and unrest elsewhere highlighted the dissatisfaction among

the growing number of workers with the Six Year Plan, the economy in general, and the

standard of living. The connection between the elite within the Party and Stalin,

especially after Khrushchev's Secret Speech and the release of thousands of Polish

political prisoners in 1956, discredited their legitimacy in the eyes of the Poles.[568] Jakob

Berman was dismissed in May and Hilary Minc, the last of the triumvirate with Beirut

and Berman, resigned in October.[569] The defection of Lieutenant Colonel Jozef Swiatlo,

deputy director of the 10th Department of the Ministry of Public Security (responsible for

defending the workers' movement from enemies within the Party itself) in 1953, led to

revelations concerning atrocities carried out against the Polish population under the

direction of the Communist Party.[570]   Even some members of the politburo were

distressed by the extent of the brutality.[571] Gomułka rejoined the Party in order to help it

retain power. The changes made within the Party and the continuing public unrest

brought Khrushchev's attention.

With Soviet troops moving into position and Stalinists within the Party unhappy

with Gomułka's ascendancy, he maneuvered on three fronts. First, he went directly to

the people, promising Party rule separated from its Stalinist past. He would improve the

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[568] Davies, p. 584.

[569] Davies, p. 584.

[570] After Stalin death and Beria's execution, many believed that at least some of their oppressive excesses would have to be accounted for. "Poland's Jewish communists, particularly those who served as investigative officers in the vast security apparatus, quickly emerged as the major culprits for the so-called 'period of errors and distortions.'… The gross oversimplification and assault on memory concerning responsibility as well as the scale and nature of the crimes committed by communists in Poland during the Stalin years cannot go unchallenged. And while Poland's communists had been highly selective in their choice of Jewish scapegoats,…there is further evidence to suggest that Poland's communists had grown accustomed to placing the burden of their own failures to gain sufficient legitimacy among the Polish population during the entire communist period on the shoulders of Jews in the party."
L. W. Gluchowski. "The Defection of Jozef Swiatlo and the Search for Jewish Scapegoats in The Polish United Workers' Party, 1953-1954", p. 3,
http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/ece/research/intermarium/vol3no2/gluchowski.pdf

[571] Raina, p. 31.

economy and give more autonomy to sectors of the population as well as the country as a whole from the domination of the Soviet Union. Secondly, he placed a loyal associate, General Michal Komar as head of the Internal Security Corps, who placed troops in key buildings throughout Warsaw and patrolled the main roads.[572] With Gomułka's popularity with the public at a high, troops under Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, Minister of Defense, swore to uphold the borders for Gomułka, against Rokossovsky's direct orders.[573] Lastly, he convinced Khrushchev at the Plenum in October that he would support a continued relationship with the Soviet Union.

Once Gomułka had overcome the threat of Soviet intervention, he turned his attention to quieting the popular unrest. A flurry of policies liberalized several sections of public life, including the formation of Workers Councils mandated in factories throughout the country. As the public settled into the process of making transitions, Gomułka turned his attention to shoring up his power within the Central Committee. Gomułka was a devout Communist. His comfort with reform measures was slim. He considered liberalizers as dangerous to his position as hardliners and set about marginalizing both. By early 1958, Gomułka emerged as the undisputed leader, with few remaining in a position to challenge his power. When he returned his focus to the Workers Councils, he did not eradicate them, but folded the councils into a 'conference' of workers self-government that would include the unions and the Party cells.[574] By diluting the power center, he successfully removed their autonomy. His intent was not to empower the workers, but to make them think they had power.

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[572] Raina, p. 52.
[573] Rokossovsky was a Soviet pawn.
[574] Sturmthal, p. 136.

Johnson became president during a time of societal tragedy with the violent death of a young and charismatic president. He vowed to simply continue the policies Kennedy had initiated, and therefore, he could have pursued a steady adherence to a domestic policy agenda that sought to curb some of the more gross injustices. However, the period of upset created a unique opportunity to do more. The grinding machine of government had stopped short. The institutions were not in danger of collapse, but the shock of Kennedy's death created a 'moment' (or juncture) that allowed for the possibility of significant change. Johnson understood, as an accomplished, lifelong politician, that this was the dream: to be able to implement a slew of policies that would alter the structure, business and moral underpinnings of governmental institutions. "Johnson had the two years of the 89th Congress to put over his Great Society. The old southern Democratic-Republican coalition that had dominated the Congress since 1938 was temporarily disabled. He could get whatever he wanted, but he would have to hurry."[575] He needed to act swiftly and decisively before his 'window of opportunity' closed. He did. Congress passed over 180 bills, many of them focused on controversial civil rights and social welfare legislation.[576] Senator Mansfield, in his report on the 89th Congress to the president stated: "In just a few days, the curtain will ring down on 2 years of towering legislative achievement….In these two sessions, we have written into the statue books legislation whose scope and excellence have never been equaled in the history of the Republic."[577] He was justifiably proud of his accomplishment.

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[575] Bernstein, p. 155.
[576] Andrew, p. 13.
[577] Senator Mike Mansfield, "Remarks on the Accomplishments of the 89th Congress", October 15, 1966. John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, "The American Presidency Project, #524", *Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966: Book II,* http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27931

Johnson certainly proceeded with an ambitious agenda. He hoped to leave a legacy as one of the most important presidents in U.S. history. But to do that, he chose to initiate policies that he believed would extend FDR's New Deal. It is for this reason that Johnson is extraordinary. His Great Society stems from his conviction in progressive ideals. He is typified by his critics as an opportunistic wheeler-dealer, bent on satisfying his own political ambitions.[578]   But as Robert Divine states, "His detractors have shown that he pursued power ruthlessly, but their efforts to portray him as an opportunist without any principles have fallen on barren ground."[579] It seems clear from his record that – barring a period in the 50s when he pulled back from progressive ideals – he genuinely sought to further the goals of equality and social welfare.[580]

While many claim that LBJ's War on Poverty was begun at a time of financial stability, it would be a mistake to claim that there was not unrest.[581] Activists from grass roots organizations were increasingly vocal in their advocacy for racial and gender equal rights. While sweeping civil rights bills were passed under his leadership, he also extended welfare to the poor. Advocacy for the poor hardly existed and what did exist was subsumed under other agendae, notably civil rights. This meant two things: there were no powerful groups willing to protect CAPs and Johnson failed to develop support

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[578] See Robert Divine, "The Johnson Literature", *Exploring the Johnson Years,* The neo-Marxists, represented by Frances Fox Piven, argued that Johnson's motivation for community action programs was to mobilize the black urban vote for the Democrats and addressing poverty was only a secondary goal. Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward. *Regulating the poor: The Functions of Public Welfare,* Vintage, New York, 1993, p. 249.
[579] Divine, p. 21.
[580] See Jim F. Heath. *Decade of Disillusionment: The Kennedy-Johnson Years,* Bloomington, 1975, Joe B. Frantz. "Opening a Curtain: The Metamorphosis of Lyndon B. Johnson," *Journal of Southern History,* 45, February, 1979, 3-26., and T. Harry Williams, "Huey, Lyndon and Southern Radicalism," *Journal of American History,* 60, September, 1973, 267-293.
[581] Andrew, p. 9.

from outside power centers.[582] He expected that once legislation had been enacted,

programs would become institutionalized and make it difficult to dismantle. Had he not

become embroiled in the Vietnam War, perhaps he could have turned his attention to

building coalitions that would support the Community Action Programs.

Two days after the death of Francisco Franco in November, 1975, Juan Carlos

became King. At the age of 37, Juan Carlos had spent most of his life attempting to

remain on Franco's good side and, at the same time, not alienate his father, Don Juan,

who believed he was the rightful heir to the throne.   Although it appeared that Franco

favored Juan Carlos, he was certainly not the only possibility. There was, of course, Don

Juan, but the history of his oppositional maneuvers against Franco made him very

unlikely.[583] The complicated nature of the Spanish monarchy created other potential

heirs. There were supporters for Juan Carlos' cousin, Alfonso de Borbon, son of Don

Juan's older brother, Jaime.[584] Even though Franco had declared that Spain was a

Catholic Monarchy, he was not averse to 'delaying' the monarchy with another Francoist.

Once Juan Carlos became king, those who had been contenders before were still

potential rivals, most notably his father and cousin.[585]   The left swore they would not

accept a monarch at all. Western governments (especially the EU) would be willing to

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[582] Flanagan interprets Daniel Patrick Moynihan's argument of a lack of support on p. 586-587 "Lyndon Johnson, Community Action, and Management of the Administrative State."

[583] Stanley G. Payne. *Franco and Hitler,* Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008.

[584] Jaime had relinquished his right to the throne in 1933. However, in 1949, "Don Jaime unexpectedly reasserted his claim to the throne, on the grounds that his renunciation in 1933 had been null and void. This decision inevitably affected Don Jaime's eldest son, Alfonso, who had been mentioned as a potential successor to the throne by a Francoist aristocrat as early as 1947." Powell argues that this was Franco's doing; he was unhappy with Don Juan's stubbornness. Powell, p. 13. Support for this theory was undoubtedly strengthened when Alfonso married Franco's granddaughter. Powell, p. 64.

[585] Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the Communist Party, initiated overtures to Don Juan after Carrero Blanco's assassination in 1974 to throw the weight of the Communist Party behind Don Juan's bid for the throne. This was because Don Juan had claimed that he would support a democratic monarchy, while Juan Carlos had consistently claimed that he would continue the Francoist regime. Powell, p. 64.

open their doors to him (and to Spain) only if Spain were a democracy. The regions were clamoring for more autonomy. The Church hierarchy favored democracy. His main support came from the hardliners who accepted Franco's law and who expected him to continue Franco's policies. The moderate majority wanted more autonomy to pursue their own interests, as well as more of a voice in politics. His lack of experience in politics and in governance led many to believe that he would not last.

It would seem reasonable for a new ruler in Juan Carlos' position to move slowly toward reform. Most within the government recognized that in order to continue to develop their economy, they needed to become part of Western Europe.[586] The primary institutions of power within the government were in the hands of the hardliners. The military was by and large loyal to the Franco regime and would defend it. Juan Carlos, in order to retain his position, had to move toward reform without inciting the military to stage a coup. He took the position that democratization had to proceed through the Francoist system. Although no one was particularly happy with the decision, it had the effect of including all members of Spanish society who were interested in Spain as a political entity.[587] It also supported an approach toward democratization that helped to foster the legitimacy of the process and of the monarchy. Juan Carlos sought to protect the Spanish monarchy for himself and his family (both historically and in the future). He also sought to protect the people from civil war. In doing so, he legitimized his authority as monarch to the whole.

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[586] Some argued that even the oldtimers realized that they would have to allow some reform, but they expected it to take years. Carr and Fusi, p. 209.
[587] There were members of the fringe, such as the ETA, who had little desire in maintaining the Spanish state. In fact they sought to provoke civil war in order to acquire autonomy.

All three leaders sought personal gain from their reform processes. Personal gain, in and of itself does not diminish the value to society of reforms undertaken to empower groups that are under-empowered. Gomułka was able to retain his position as First Secretary by providing power to segments of the population that would support his leadership against other power centers that sought to undermine his rule. He maintained this approach of offsetting each power center by orchestrating an environment where they would cancel each other out and he would retain power. Johnson used his window of opportunity to more authoritatively push through policies that would support the under-privileged. For a variety of reasons, he did not follow the flurry of institution-building with forming coalitions among the formal and informal power centers to continue support. Juan Carlos proceeded with democratization by legitimating the process through current institutions. This had the effect of offering a position for each group in a newly-formulated public sphere that did indeed decrease power for some. Yet the process allowed a broad coalition to form that believed that they had no other choice if they wished to retain any power at all. The reasons why the three leaders embarked on the reform process certainly has an impact on the outcome, but the process by which they attempt to create change is far more important.

Opposing Power Centers

In Poland in 1956, the country was reeling from Khrushchev's disclosures of Stalin's cult of personality. Many communists took up Gomułka's banner as a means to salvage the Party, in their own eyes as well as of non-Party citizens. This translated into a marginalization of Stalinist diehards and a sense of unity within the country. Few

wanted a complete break from communism. Most wanted 'communism with a human face'.[588] Gomułka had a reputation for commitment to the ideals of communism. He had argued repeatedly for a Polish road to communism, demanding a relationship of cooperation with the Soviet Union, rather than one of servility. The deteriorating economy and the unrest among the workers had already prompted apologies from the more moderate elites.[589] Bringing an untainted outsider back into the fold gave renewed hope that the socialist experiment could work. Besides, most Poles recognized that the Soviet Union was not going to let Poland become completely independent and risk losing a buffer zone from the West.[590]

Workers Councils were an accepted form of organizing before the Stalinists took control of the Party. The poor showing of the 6 year plan prompted the Central Committee in 1955 to recommend that workers begin assessing conditions within some of the factories. "Some of the shortcomings of the 'administrative' system had become so obvious that as early as the fall of 1955 the Central Committee of the Communist Party recommended to the workers of the nationalized industrial plants that they seek out the sources of the troubles and make proposals to be considered in the elaboration of the new plan to cover the years from 1956 to 1960."[591] Deliberations at various plants tended to favor more autonomy for the workers. Unions already existed, but they were held in some contempt as puppets for management. After the Poznan riots, Workers Councils began springing up spontaneously in many factories. Gomułka sanctioned their

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[588] See Sturmthal, p. 122-123.
[589] Edward Ochab and Josef Cyrankiewicz showed restraint in handling the Poznan riots. See M. K. Dziewanowski.
[590] Khrushchev, for his part, had no real desire to invade Poland. The Poles had proved how difficult they can be in the war of 1921 and again in their resistance to the Germans during World War II.
[591] Sturmthal, p. 123.

existence because he saw them as part of his support base. "The supporters of the council idea were a political force that could be marshaled against the Stalinists within the party."[592] Gomułka proclaimed in October, 1956 that "We must approve and welcome the initiative of the working class regarding a better organization of industrial management and working-class participation in the management of the enterprise…"[593] He decreed in early November the legality of Workers Councils; laws passed later that month in the Sejm provided rules and regulations.

Even though unions were in disfavor, they were both too entrenched to disappear and Gomułka must have recognized their potential. He replaced the head of the trade union council, an avowed Stalinist, with one of his followers, Ignacy Loga-Siwinski. Siwinski made some changes and waited. The Councils had not been given any real power anyway, yet they were charged with increasing efficiency. This inevitably led to disaffection among the workers and they returned to the trade unions.

Local Party cells were also perceived to favor management.[594] Members left the Party or at least argued for the Councils' independence from the Party. In order to counteract the potential loss of control, the Central Committee reorganized local branches to favor Party members who were also members of their local Workers Councils. When the efforts to increase efficiency led to the possibility of workers losing their jobs, they returned to the party for protection.

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[592] Sturmthal, p. 126.
[593] Reported in Sturmthal, p. 126.
[594] See Kolaja.

Now there were three organizations that claimed to serve the interests of the workers – the trade unions, Workers Councils, and local Party branches. Policies emanating from Gomułka in 1957 split responsibilities between the unions and the councils. In May of 1958, Gomułka created the Conference of Workers' Self-Management, which served as an umbrella organization that included Workers Councils, trade unions and Party branches. Managers of factories were now included in the presidium of the councils, as were chairmen of the unions and representatives from the Party cells. By forcing a coalition of organizations, Gomułka effectively re-instituted control over the local level and destroyed the small amount of independence the Councils had with the 1956 reforms.

This was possible only after Gomułka had marginalized elites on both sides of the spectrum. Once the workers returned to the factories, Gomułka turned his attention to shoring up his control of the Central Committee. More of his supporters were elected to the Secretariat, while several Stalinist opponents were dismissed.[595] The reformers, inside and outside of the Central Committee, were pressing for more independence from Party control.[596] This threatened to seriously undermine the dominance of the Party and its unity. In May, 1957, Gomułka criticized revisionists in the Party. This had the effect of declawing Stalinists who complained about their loss of power. After the May plenum, Gomułka started reassigning thousands of Stalinist supporters to more provincial

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[595] According to Dziewanowski, this was not just Gomułka's doing. "Soon after the October revolution, eleven out of nineteen Provincial Committees were compelled to resign, not so much because of orders from Gomułka as because of the spontaneous pressure from the rank and file." M. K. Dziewanowski, p. 284.

[596] Dziewanowski argues that Gomułka was forced to give concessions to the Stalinists because of the need to placate the Kremlin. D. p. 287.   Weydenthal claims that Gomułka had no desire to liberalize at all, but allowing spontaneous movements toward more freedom in the public sphere helped solidify his popularity with the public. P. 94-95.

posts. At the same time, he reorganized the Party presses, demanding that they only deliver the Party's position. He closed down *Po prostu*, the most outspoken of the liberal journals. Commissions for the censorship of science, culture, and education were re-established.[597] After eliminating potential rivals in the Central Committee, Gomułka purged the rank and file: "in the period between November 1957 and September 1958, more than 261,000 party members, or about 20 percent of the total membership, were removed from the PUWP ranks."[598]

Gomułka was successful in undoing the autonomy of the Workers Councils because he allowed for a sequence of retaking power. He initially marginalized his rivals in the Central Committee. Once he was firmly in control, he combined local power centers in such a way that the Workers Councils were significantly weakened, eroding their effectiveness as independent organizations.

The Johnson Administration had brilliantly orchestrated the passage of the Economic Opportunity Bill. After its implementation, voices at the local level began to protest. Bureaucratic organizations within government disagreed with the political empowerment afforded by some of the programs. Congress, responding to their constituents as well as to local governments within their districts, called for greater oversight and standardization. Public figures on the left excoriated the community action programs for ineffectiveness. Republicans started an assault to whittle away the legislation of the War on Poverty programs.

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[597] Weydenthal, p. 97.
[598] Weydenthal, p. 97.

Johnson expected that the programs would wend their way through the local political organizations with their oversight.[599] The taskforce in charge of the development of the Community Action Programs, however, altered Johnson's plan to bypass local government and go directly to the neighborhoods. The mayors, for their part, were willing to support the initiatives as a means of receiving federal funds. The initial outcome of the implementation of CAPs, however, worried many – local governments, the moderate public and anti-civil rights groups. At the United States Conference of Mayors in 1965, democratic mayors protested that they had no oversight over the programs. Reports stated that many CAPs were poorly managed and funds were misused. Violence and unrest, largely having to do with civil rights issues, were associated with the programs as well. This meant that the two became intertwined in the minds of the public. The mayors' concerns were addressed by allowing them to appoint representatives to the governing boards.

Officials at BoB and CEA were dissatisfied with the agenda of the CAPs. It had changed from self-help to political organization. OEO officials, realizing that they were becoming isolated, created a Public Officials Advisory Council with state governors, county and city officials. Stricter oversight of the CAPs was instituted. Shriver and his aides attempted to build alliances throughout government, but it largely failed. Johnson was dissatisfied with the lukewarm results. Some politicians heightened the critical rhetoric because they had an eye on taking control. Democrats and Republicans in Congress, responding to public opinion, sought to clip the wings of the programs. The Green Amendment in 1967 curtailed political organizing and provided veto power to

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[599] Flanagan, p. 596.

local and state governments.[600] Now, only mayors were in favor because they had

acquired some controlling interest.

Already by 1966, before the Green Amendment, the community action programs

had few supporters, including Johnson. A new task force, headed by Robert Wood,

instituted the Model Cities Program, aimed at addressing the urban infrastructure.

Whereas the community action programs focused on job training, education, welfare and

political empowerment, the Model Cities Program attempted to address urban renewal

and housing for the poor. The purpose was to change the environment, including

"schools, parks, playgrounds, community centers, and access to all necessary community

facilities."[601] More money was designated to fund the Demonstration Cities and

Metropolitan Development Act. Republicans, already distressed by what they perceived

as corruption and cronyism with the Green Amendment toward the community action

programs, became more alarmed at the further increase of government power.

The war in Vietnam proved a decisive issue (although not the only factor) in both

raising the cost of government and undermining the legitimacy of the president. By

creating so many massive policies at the same time, Johnson succeeded only in muddying

the waters. Confused messages entered the public sphere. The community action

programs, the model cities program, the civil rights movement, violence in the cities,

protests against the war, as well as other programs in the War on Poverty umbrella,

merged to create an image of inter-relationship. It led to numerous critical perceptions

about them all. Certainly to some extent, urban violence was connected to members

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[600] Givel, p. 80.
[601] Andrew, p. 137.

participating in some of the community action programs, but studies have shown that there was far less involvement than assumed by the general public.

Juan Carlos promised to loosen the reigns of control held by Franco for decades. In the beginning, he and his like-minded ministers were a small group committed to democratizing through peaceful, legal means against both the right and left. The hardliners recognized that some changes were inevitable as pressure to allow political associations preceded Franco's death.[602] For the time, they were cautiously satisfied that Franco's wishes to install Juan Carlos as his heir had been accomplished. The left, however, was vehement in its condemnation of gradual change. They expected that the only way Spain would democratize would be through civil war. Therefore, the first need was to defuse the left without provoking the right.

As soon as Juan Carlos became king, protests from the left escalated, demanding a part in the political process. "They wanted the rapid and total liquidation of Francoism in a 'democratic break': amnesty for all political prisoners, legalization of all political parties, dismantlement of the Movement and syndicates, free trade unions, and free elections to a constituent parliament, which would decide upon the form of the new state."[603] The left, however, was splintered among the radicals, the moderates and the regional nationalists. Strikes throughout the country multiplied and intensified. The reasons were ostensibly the poor conditions for workers, but clearly, the rise of illegal but tolerated trade unions and opposition parties gave them a political agenda. Relaxed censorship allowed newspapers to kindle a broad-based political interest. Terrorist

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[602] Agüero, p. 69.
[603] Carr and Fusi, p. 209.

organizations such as ETA increased their attacks in order to provoke the military to take action.[604] Adolfo Suarez, the new prime minister, met with leaders of leftist factions, guaranteeing that the government would push for political reform in the Cortes that would allow political associations. The left, for their part, combined in a joint organization to present a united front.[605] The moderates in the organization eventually were able to sway the radicals to accept negotiating with the government, instead of having a more confrontational break.

The deteriorating public sphere prompted a reaction from the right. They were infuriated with what they perceived as incompetence on the part of the government to maintain order. If the left wanted a civil war, then they were prepared to oblige.[606] Juan Carlos, having been in the military, understood the state's precarious position. Before the decisive vote in the Cortes in November, Suarez met with military leaders to assuage their fears. The allowance of political associations would not undermine the rule of the king or the sanctity of a unified Spain. Furthermore, Suarez promised that the Communist Party would not be legalized. Given his background as a member of the *Movimiento* and with support of the king, the military was willing to vote for the reform bill. With General Santiago's resignation as one of the military ministers over the legalization of trade unions, the government had an opening to appoint a moderate as the new military minister. This proved a strategic blunder on the part of the right. Now the voice of the moderates was able to splinter the power of the military. The most controversial moves by the government were yet to come.

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[604] Robert P. Clark. *Negotiating with ETA: obstacles to peace in the Basque country, 1975-1988,* University of Nevada Press, Reno, 1990, p. 9.
[605] It was arguably not that unified; a fact that Suarez and Juan Carlos knew. Carr and Fusi, p. 222.
[606] Carr, 22.

In the first half of the new year, the regions were allowed more autonomy and the Communist Party was legalized. The military ministers felt betrayed. The king sent representatives to calm the waters. Torn between supporting the heir of Franco and recognizing the lack of support, they begrudgingly acquiesced. The General Secretary of the Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo, was now in a considerably weakened position. The left had united behind the moderates and the Party could be left outlawed and marginalized. He agreed to accept the monarchy in order to win legalization. The stage had been set for the first democratic election. The king and his representatives worked to create a broad coalition with the left and splinter the right in order to orchestrate a favorable public arena for democratization.

Gomułka and Juan Carlos were more successful in taking into account the prolonged effort to manage the opposition. Johnson failed, because of the sheer magnitude of the reforms he sought. He hoped that the rising power centers would do battle and form the appropriate alliances that would anchor them in the public sphere. When they were perceived to perform poorly, he abandoned them for other programs that could take on the battle. The war further eroded his support base.

Solidarity of Unempowered Group

Poland's Workers Councils began experiencing difficulties from the start. Part of this had to do with the divisions within the movement itself. Increased opportunities for education led to a rising cadre of technically sophisticated workers who chafed at the inefficiencies inherent in the Polish economic system. Without a market to work as a check against ineffective business practices, waste, abuse and laziness were rampant.

Short-term effects from improving factory performance, which would include

reorganization, reduction of surplus labor and effective policies to decrease petty thievery

would diminish the gain for the blue collar workers. Unskilled laborers, however, were

more interested in increased wages than in efficient use of resources. And certainly they

clashed with regard to letting workers go who were unproductive.[607] The Polish

intelligentsia who became involved with the Councils sought to use them as stepping

blocks to greater liberalization policies. Greater demands for more control of the factory

led to power struggles with local Party branches and central ministries, as well as

management. The ambiguity of the powers granted to Workers Council by the rules and

regulations made it a no-win. The Councils really only had the ability to recommend

changes to the management or of the management. While the Councils had the right to

make major policy decisions, it was circumscribed by powers of management or central

authorities that could override their decisions. By the time the Workers Councils were

folded into the Conference of Workers Management, they had already lost favor.

The community action programs were an attempt to empower the poor through

programs that would allow them to develop skills aimed at pulling themselves out of

poverty. Such organizations were also meant to allow the poor a voice in the public

environment in order to articulate their needs. The task force that developed the program

hoped to allow flexibility among the different programs to address specific needs. It

proved too unwieldy to control. Without safeguards against power-grabbing and

corruption, many programs failed. Those that succeeded became tainted with the

checkered record overall. In any event, CAPs could not live up to Johnson's hype.

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[607] Surplus labor was estimated variously at between 10 and 40 per cent of employment at a national average. Sturmthal, p. 133.

Voices on the left decried the lack of progress; voices on the right criticized the waste of funds and lack of supervision. With the growing dissatisfaction of Johnson's presidency, the Republicans united to dismantle the democrats' reforms. Johnson was right that once reforms became law, they would be harder to undo. It took several years before President Reagan was able to shift the onus of funding to the states, whereby community action programs became fewer and fewer. The slow eating away at funding had done its job; the size of the opposition in favor of continuing the programs dwindled. They still exist, but few in number and mostly funded through private sources.[608]

Another problem, however, was that the plethora of reforms initiated by the Johnson administration made it difficult to truly ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of any one of them. Support for the reforms set in motion tended to be splintered. Civil rights activists, anti-war activists, those who promoted elder care, early child education and many other programs supported the War on Poverty, but were busy promoting their own causes. The most power opposition – the Republican Party – needed to focus only on their distrust of big government. Different power centers could coalesce, even if they disagreed on substantive issues, as long as they could support the overarching theme of shrinking the federal government.

Juan Carlos and his representatives were able to foster a coalition among the left opposition, as well as a willingness to work with the moderate right. The left took the position that they would only support the government-induced democratization process if all the left parties were included. Yet, there were significant differences in their agendae. The regional nationalists, although mostly interested in more autonomy, were thrown into

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[608] See Givel.

the left camp by the unified Spain campaign of the right. Segments of that group did not

wish to continue association with Spain in the first place, but they were gradually

marginalized from the rest. This did not diminish their zeal. Terrorist attacks continued

even after Spain became a democracy. The socialists were not at all wedded to the

platform of the Communist Party. In fact, the two factions were in competition for power

wielded by their separate trade unions. The socialists were intransigent with regard to

accepting the monarchy. Carrillo and the Communist Party came out in support of the

king, prompting Juan Carlos and his representatives to favor (reluctantly) the admission

of the Communists, to offset the Socialists.

The key to success, however, was who the moderate conservatives would support.

The brutal history of the Civil War was still a reminder of the deep fissures between the

Socialists (broadly defined) and the conservatives. Time had supplied a different context

for those concerns. The Church had switched sides. The technocrats in government

educated in the universities in the 50s, were less committed to ideology of the early 20th

century and more amenable to flexibility within the economic realm. The international

community held out the carrot of trade agreements and the stick of demanding

democratic institutions. States like Portugal and Greece were lessons in the upheaval

caused by regime change. Yet on the other side, democracy was messy. Conflict among

factions was more the condition of politics, rather than the sense (illusion) of peace and

consensus fostered by Franco's tightly controlled political society. The Communist Party

still frightened many, but the fact that it was hardly represented in the first election (and

subsequent elections) helped to quiet those fears. Conservatives could still feel that they

were upholding their faith and the desire of the Church hierarchy, even though they may

have questioned its reforms. No one, except the most militant, wanted to see another civil war.

Democracy succeeded because of several factors. The king was able to bring together different factions of those favoring democracy into a coalition. In order for the factions to agree to that, it was necessary for the moderates to take control. By defining his goal in terms that would benefit the most people, Juan Carlos was able to marginalize the various segments that would impede the progress of democratization. Although the king sought personal gain, his demands were modest. He allowed circumstances that he did not favor (admittance of the Communist Party is one example) because they would still further his aim. He was willing to relinquish his own level of power for the sake of the whole. By maintaining a level of integrity, he provided a legitimacy to the new regime that helped sustain it during difficult times.

Regime Type and Gates

As noted above, the three cases examined here represent three different regime types. The analysis of and the comparison among them adds another perspective to this project. It is particularly useful insofar as regime type impacts what power centers exist in each polity. The typology of Linz and Stepan introduces criteria by which we can assess the qualities of the three different regimes. Poland in 1956 is an example of a post-totalitarian regime; the U.S. in 1963 is a consolidated democracy; and Spain in 1975 is an example of an authoritarian regime. The classifications are based on four

dimensions: pluralism, ideology, mobilization and leadership.[609] For the purposes of this study, mobilization is not an important component.

Poland as a post-totalitarian regime had limited social, economic and institutional pluralism and almost no political pluralism because of the dominance of the Communist Party. Communist ideology during this period was still maintained. In fact, for a short time, many who had been critical of the Stalinist regime believed that it might be possible to maintain communism in a more liberalized setting. Leadership in 1956 was clearly divided regarding the interpretation of governance and the value of liberalizing policies.

With the death of Stalin and the change of leadership in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe had the opportunity to move away from the extreme oppression of a totalitarian state. In Poland, with the death of the Stalinist leader, Boleslaw Bierut, the new leader would have some room to redefine the type of regime. Elites within the Communist Party worried that another Stalinist leader would provoke continued unrest. Hungary's experience of more serious liberalizing policies proved too extreme for the Soviet Union to accept. Besides, many within the various groups in Polish society were willing to give Communism another chance to incorporate more humane policies. Gomułka proved to be a reasonable candidate for maintaining the Party's dominance while redefining some of the goals of government. With his leadership, Poland moved from a totalitarian to a post-totalitarian regime.[610]

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[609] The dimensions and their definitions come from Linz and Stepan, p. 44-45.

[610] See Linz and Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996.

Power in Poland largely rested with the elite within the Communist Party. The riots of Poznan and general unrest, however, indicated that even a strongly controlled government is subject to a degree of legitimacy awarded by society. During the critical juncture of 1956, Gomułka sought to undermine the different power centers (the Stalinists and revisionists) within the Central Committee by extending his legitimacy to workers, farmers and non-Party members. Because power was held so tightly, Gomułka's policies towards Workers' Councils had few gates to travel through. He decreed their right to exist; his policies were passed by the Sejm; and the next arena or the first gate was the councils themselves. Therefore, the path of his legitimation of Workers' Councils went from him to the councils, to local elites (the second gate) and back to Gomułka. The Councils did not possess enough power to require policies to be altered in their favor; nor did the local elites. Gomułka had not intended on relinquishing real power anyway, but sought to destabilize those who did within the Party by having the support of the people. Once he had successfully undermined his opposition within the upper echelons of the Party, he rescinded his support for the councils and folded them into a broader organization that included the unions and the local parties, which had always been overseen by the Party at the center. The initiator shuts down the other gates. Had they remained open, the system would have lost its identity. The first gate – the Councils – never had enough power to make significant changes to the policy that would demand more power. The balance of power is reorganized, but the unempowered remain unempowered.

The United States in 1963 continued to be a consolidated democracy. Responsible, political pluralism was reinforced by autonomy within the greater society. Philosophically, the U.S. subscribed to a commitment to citizenship and procedural rules of contestation, as well as respect for and adherence to the rule of law as devised by Congress. The president abided by the constitutional limits provided by the constitution.

The circumstances under which Lyndon Johnson became president were significant and stressful for the country (the assassination of the former president, John Kennedy), but at no time was the government subject to massive change. Johnson assumed the office of the presidency according to the rules set forth in the constitution. His legitimacy was never questioned. The country was not experiencing heightened unrest nor was it threatened by an external force. Johnson's opportunity for reform lay in the unification of support prompted by Kennedy's death. With this in mind, Johnson's endeavor to significantly change the face of American society is extraordinary.

Power in the United States is much more diffuse because of its regime type. The president wanted to provide policies for the poor to empower them. In order to fund his massive project, it had to pass through Congress, the first gate. At the time, enormous public support that included elections of democrats to Congress meant that the initial gate did not require significant changes to the policy for the community action programs. The second gate, however – the local politicians – did have a great deal of power to wield. The opportunity within the community action programs to stimulate political activism was hotly contested by local politicians and the broader community. Their disgruntled cries against the community action programs empowered Congress to regulate the CAPs

and place them under the governance of local politicians. Finally, when Ronald Reagan became president, support for community action programs was low. By diverting dwindling packages of funding to the states, many community action programs could no longer continue.

Spain under Franco was ruled by his authoritarian regime. Franco allowed little political pluralism and in fact, political associations were banned. Society contained more extensive levels of pluralism, with a developing economy and a vibrant Catholic religious life. Franco's brand of ideology was a convenient mix of traditional legacies that included respect for the Spanish monarchy and devotion to the Catholic Church, an adherence to military rule and a syndicalist economic organization. His personal rule, along with a handpicked group of military compatriots, governed Spain for 36 years.

Spain had been ruled by an authoritarian leader for 36 years. Who would lead after him had been a concern for many years. Franco chose Juan Carlos as his successor in 1969, someone he had groomed from an early age to continue the Franquist regime. Juan Carlos became king of Spain upon Franco's death in 1975. His ascent to the throne was expected, as was Franco's death (he had been ill for a long time). Whether the king would remain at the head of the state, however, was uncertain. Most within the country expected some form of change and various groups advocated different levels, from a continuance of authoritarian leadership with slight modifications to allow degrees of political participation to massive regime change.

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levels, from a continuance of authoritarian leadership with slight modifications to allow

degrees of political participation to massive regime change.

Because Spain was an authoritarian regime, power resided in a few elite centers –

the king and his administration, the Council of the Realm, and the military. Juan Carlos

was concerned for several reasons. The unempowered opposition groups were claiming

that only a complete break with the Franco regime would be acceptable. The Council of

the Realm and the military were willing to entertain some changes, but they expected

them to proceed slowly. Europe would only allow Spain to participate in the European

economy and acknowledge the Spanish monarchy if it was based on a democratic

government. It was quite possible that the king would not be king for long.[611] The first

gate to the democratization process was the creation of an administration that would be

favorable to democratizing through legal channels. This was under Juan Carlos' control.

Once that was accomplished, members of his administration controlled the next gate, the

legislature, by introducing the bill to allow political associations. This step empowered

opposition groups to become lawful political parties that would participate in the political

process on an equal and legal footing. Once they chose to become part of the political

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[611] "Today the king is often referred to as *el piloto del cambio* (the pilot of change). However, it is useful to remember that, in Spain, the king by his actions legitimated the monarchy more than the monarchy legitimated the king." Linz and Stepan, p. 89.

environment, it de-legitimized those who wished to break completely with the state. This shifted the balance of power considerably. While this was occurring, Juan Carlos, reformist members of the military and other representatives were able to keep the military from responding. By the time the military and hardline conservatives did respond to the changes in power, the rebalancing had already occurred; the new power centers had become institutionalized. Their power diminished while the power of new political associations increased significantly.

The result of all three cases is as follows: 1) In Poland – power centers are rebalanced, but the Councils (the unempowered) remain unempowered. 2) In the U.S., the power centers do not remain rebalanced, but swing to the conservatives before the juncture closes and the unempowered (the poor) remain unempowered. 3) In Spain, power centers are rebalanced and include the unempowered – the political associations. Thus, a new perspective emerges adding further complexity to critical junctures and the description of gates in each of these three cases. Viewed through Linz and Stepan's typology, we see that diverse regime types produce surprising differences. Only in Spain does a new power center become institutionalized in a rebalancing of the significant forces in that society. The juncture in the United States does not support a change in the power structure. Thus, the intuitive sense that a democracy may yield a better opportunity for the unempowered is not confirmed. Counter-intuitively the authoritarian case results in successful empowerment. The post-totalitarian case confirms intuition, but has interesting dimensions of its own, viewed through the lens of dynamic interaction and control of the sequencing of events.

What could have been different?

Part of the failure of the Workers Councils has to do with the lack of commitment by Gomułka. He was willing to allow liberalizing processes as long as he did not have solid control over the powerful Stalinists in the Party. Once he marginalized those who posed a threat to his power, he began to dismantle the Councils. The rules by which the Councils were to function were vague and ambiguous, making long-term success difficult in any case. The only possibility for their success lay in the cohesiveness of those who were in favor of their existence. Without solidarity among the opposition groups – the intelligentsia and the skilled and unskilled workers –Gomułka could deflect their cause by forcing the Councils into a coalition with government agencies that could dilute their impact. Even if they did work together and were willing to compromise their demands in order to have a showdown with government, they probably would have lost the fight. The Councils were too small a power sector. There would have to be grassroots organizing among Councils in different factories to build a network large enough to counter the unions, the Party, the ministries and the government. Polish dissidents would not attempt that until the development of KOR and Solidarity.

Most of the literature concerning Johnson's Administration claims that involvement in the Vietnam War devastated the War on Poverty programs. Certainly, the war had an enormous impact on the cost in materials, lives and legitimacy. It might have been difficult for his domestic programs to succeed in any case because of their sheer number. Although the War on Poverty served as a focal point for domestic reform, the multiplicity of policies undercut coalitions among supporters. The administration didn't

have the time or resources to adequately build coalitions among the different power centers. And it did not adequately assess the timing to allow for one development to support taking the next step toward more reform.

Many argue that Spain's democratization process was not that difficult.[612] Failure would have been easy. Had the military realized the extent of the reforms being implemented sooner, hardliners could have staged a military coup that may have been successful.[613] Certainly ETA was doing its best to elicit such a response. Had the Socialists refused to offer allegiance to all leftist parties, it would have been easier to continue ostracizing the Communist Party, which would have alienated those involved in the Communist trade unions in many factories. As it was, the continued pressure from the regions for more autonomy had the potential of splitting the country into smaller states. If that were to happen, the chances of support for military action would have increased. The timing of the events as they unfolded was crucial to its success.

Conclusions

The beginning of this project claimed to be the study of the transfer of power and how it induces change. The dependent variable, in this case, would be whether the transference of power was successful. The conclusion would have to be that the empowering of an under-powered group failed in two of the three cases – Poland and the United States. Only in Spain was the reform – democratization – largely successful. Another way to look at this same project, however, is whether the initiating agent's agenda was successful. Herein we gain a more nuanced and complex picture of the usage

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[612] See Linz.

[613] A few top military personnel did attempt a coup in 1981. See Linz and Stepan, Chapter 4: Spain.

of power to orchestrate political change. With these parameters, we would have to include Poland as a success story. Gomułka allowed the Workers Councils because they helped solidify an important support base when his position in the upper echelons of the Party was precarious. It is evident from the beginning that he did not really intend to empower the workers. The regulations imposed on the Councils did not give them real power. The laws enacted gave them an advisory role in the functioning of the factories. Hiring and firing of management remained in the hands of the ministries.[614] Without real power, the Councils were doomed to disappoint. At the same time that the Workers Councils were testing the limits of their abilities and opportunities, disagreements arose between the skilled and unskilled workers, further splintering support for the cause. The unions, which should have been representing the workers, were perceived as part of management. Long before the unions resurfaced as a power contender, Gomułka replaced the Stalinist director of the unions with a supporter. It seems reasonable to conclude that he was both continuing his purge of the Stalinists and setting up a power center that could subsume the Councils when the timing was right.

Johnson initiated a massive array of programs within a finite window of opportunity. This colored the way he envisioned the progress of reform; he did not take into account the necessity to declaw the opposition by placing wedges between their different supporters. The number of programs passed, although under the umbrella of the Great Society, was in such diverse arenas that it weakened the potential for coalitions, while the opposing power centers could focus on one, unifying issue – critique of big

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[614] " …the council could express its views on the plan of the enterprise during the process of its formulation by higher authority and then translate the definitive plan into detailed decisions….From the beginning of the council experiment this fundamental ambiguity was created by the reluctance of the authorities to give the enterprises full autonomy." Sturmthal, p. 133.

government. There were too many balls in the air for Johnson to support and he overestimated the potential of newly developing power centers to carve out their space. Hoping to find the magic formula, Johnson did not support programs for long, but attempted to create their replacements. The Vietnam War has long been blamed for derailing Johnson's domestic policy. It certainly further alienated power centers that might have been brought into a coalition, decreasing the amount of support. The enormous drain on the economy of funding domestic programs at the same time as financing a war had serious consequences, eroding legitimacy. But there was bound to be a backlash because of Johnson's failure to continue working on rebalancing the power centers.

Juan Carlos recognized that his position was vulnerable to all the power centers. He set in motion the democratizing process and then removed himself from the politicking process by assigning that role to his mentor, Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, President of the Council of the Realm, and Adolfo Suárez, his prime minister. They too approached the process from a sequential perspective, working first to woo the various groups that made up the opposition to the Franquist regime and placate the hardliners long enough to pass the Law for Political Reform. Once passed, the opposition had a stake in maintaining a peaceful transition. The king stayed involved to the extent that he addressed whichever power center became agitated with current events or sent representatives to do that for him. The ETA attempted to derail the peaceful process, but the government, which represented a large sector of the state, bargained and cajoled the military and police forces to show some restraint. The other opposition groups kept their adherents in check. The inclusion of the Communist Party was the only policy that the

government pushed through over the heads of the military and the hardliners. The country was poised for harsh response. It did not happen. Once elections were held, the government included representatives from *all* the power centers, requiring compromises from all and at the same time, embedding them in the process. A coup was attempted in 1981, but by that time, the balance of power centers creating societal stability had been rearranged sufficiently to overcome the hardliners.

The Lesson

The cases would support the view that public space is created by a number of power centers. These power centers together negotiate a balance of power that dictates the formal and informal rules by which a given society functions. Change is possible only when there has been a significant upset to jolt the stability of society; a critical juncture. An initiating agent must take into consideration the power centers that have historically participated in defining society, even if they are currently out of favor. At some point, they will reconstitute themselves to play a part once again. It is possible to irrevocably alter the rules of the game, forcing opposing groups to redefine themselves and accommodate the changes made, but it would be naïve to think that they disappear altogether. We have seen examples of this in more recent times. The Communist Party in Russia is one of the more vibrant political parties in the post-communist era. The neo-liberal consensus had a spectacular run in the West, promoted by Ronald Reagan, president of the United States and Margaret Thatcher, prime minister of Great Britain. Both leaders came to power during a time when big government policies were in disarray and in disfavor. Their agenda was simple and universalizing; allowing a number of

different groups to support it, while maintaining significant differences.   Spain has alternated between socialist and conservative prime ministers, yet maintained a democracy.

The new president of the United States, Barack Obama, entered office during an economic crisis. The neoliberal agenda is in disfavor; the international perception of the legitimacy of the U.S. as the dominant world power is at a low. This may be a critical juncture, a time when real reforms are possible. Obama favors an approach to controversial positions with compromise. Certainly this will go a long way in drafting policies that will provide something for more of the power centers that fill the public space. It would be wise to consider the timing of introducing different policies and to whom those policies go first. Recognizing that alterations to reforms are inevitable can facilitate drafting proposals that can pass through the gates at the doors of the different powerful groups. But along with compromise and timing, it would be politick to continue building alliances with groups that can throw the weight of their support behind them and to splinter the opposing forces.

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