HOW PATROL OFFICERS CONSTRUCT AND USE DEMOGRAPHIC MAPS TO NAVIGATE THE SOCIAL LANDSCAPES OF THEIR TOWNS OF EMPLOY

by

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In an effort to explain persistent racial disparities in criminal justice outcomes, this project investigates how patrol officers construct cognitive maps of various racial, ethnic, and class groups as a means of navigating the social terrain of their towns of employ. In particular, I explore how various structural and cultural features of local communities shape and condition officers’ social group schemata in order to determine the influence that communal contexts have on officers’ social cognition, and ultimately, their approaches to policing various racial, ethnic, and class groups. Drawing upon 49 ethnographic ride-along interviews and observations with officers in three suburban towns of varying racial, ethnic, and class diversity, I found that communal factors relating to power, culture, and space play a significant role in conditioning officers’ social group schemata, and that officers within a particular town collectively construct and share racial and other social group schemata that differ in important ways from those of officers in other towns. My findings regarding the substantial degree of between town variation in officers’ social group schemata challenges the notion that cognition relating to race and other social categories is a rather static, uniform process guided by subconscious racial, ethnic, and class stereotypes that are part of a macro-societal schema. In addition, my findings call into question conflict theory’s fundamental premise that police officers
routinely do the bidding of powerful groups at the expense of powerless groups. My findings demonstrate that even where officers in different towns share similar, negative, stereotypical views of certain racial, ethnic, and class groups, the structural constraints in some communities effectively preclude officers from targeting such groups or otherwise treating them inequitably. Above all else, my findings highlight how both social cognition and policing are heavily dependent on communal context.
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DEDICATION

To my parents, John and Barbara Reck
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CHAPTER 1: The Construction and Conditioning of Officers’ Social Group Schemata in Communal Contexts

Like all social actors, patrol officers are confronted with a wide array of social group information that they must sift through in order to make sense of and negotiate the various situations that they encounter. However, when patrol officers sort through social group information, the potential consequences are generally much more serious than when other actors do so. If officers view members of some social identified categories differently than others, this can lead to various forms of profiling (especially racial and ethnic) and a whole range of negative outcomes from arrest to eventual entanglement in the criminal justice system. Indeed, there is ample evidence to suggest that officers see the world in categorically skewed ways, most notably in terms of race and class (see, e.g., Bittner 1967; Cole 1999; Harris 2002; Websdale 2001). This dissertation sets out to identify and understand the ways that patrol officers sort through and process such social group information in the communal contexts within which they work. More specifically, this study examines how officers construct and utilize social group maps in order to navigate the social landscapes of their small, suburban towns of employ. Understanding such maps provides a means of seeing how communal contexts shape and condition how officers perceive and approach various social groups. In addition, cognitive mapping within communal contexts affords an opportunity to assess the extent to which such contexts alter or reinforce racial and other social group hierarchies in the larger society.

1.1. Social cognition: Schemas and stereotypes

In order to understand how it is that officers develop social group maps within the context of their towns of employ, it is first necessary to understand the process of social
cognition. Social cognition refers to the process by which people make inferences and judgments about the social world based on the information that is available in various social environments (Bakanic 2009:178). The process of gathering information, determining what is relevant, and using such relevant information to make decisions is complex and potentially cumbersome. Human beings are constantly bombarded with an onslaught of information or stimuli that must be simplified in order to make the complex social world more manageable (pp. 27, 66). In order to facilitate rapid and efficient decision-making, people often rely upon schemas (pp. 66, 180). Cognitive schemas are ordered, structured arrangements of images, ideas, and concepts that human beings use to categorize, organize, and interpret people, events, objects, and ideas that they encounter in their social world (pp. 28, 180). While schemas exist at various levels of abstraction, from the more specific level of a particular person or object to the more abstract level of a social category such as race or gender, schemas about groups and categories of people are most important in terms of their impact on social outcomes, such as encounters with police officers and entanglement within the criminal justice system (p. 180).

Schematic processing of experiences and information is largely a process of categorization (pp. 27, 180). Through the creation and use of categories police are able to process new experiences in terms of these experiences’ similarity to or contrast with other experiences or previously categorized information (p. 27). Accordingly, the process of categorization fundamentally involves the differentiation and sorting of phenomena (p. 66). By clearly differentiating people, objects, and events, categories thereby facilitate police decision-making.
While the process of categorizing people is similar to that of categorizing objects and events, the former involves a more pronounced process of differentiation than the latter. The process of human categorization does not simply rely on making distinctions between different socially designated groups, but also involves the magnification or oversimplification of similarities among members of out-groups (p. 66). The beliefs and expectations associated with these categorical simplifications and overgeneralizations are known as stereotypes (Bakanic 2009:27; Marger 2003:69). Although stereotypes are, by definition, inaccurate, in that they rigidly apply some simplified characteristic to all members of a particular socially designated category, stereotypes nevertheless assist decision-making by making differences between in-group and out-group members appear stark, and by providing a means of anticipating or predicting the behavior of others (Bakanic 2009:27, 66).

Stereotypes are also instrumentally involved in another important cognitive function of schemas, namely, the making of inferences. Inferences involves both the generalization of specific information to a larger group (e.g., assuming all members of a particular socially designated group partake in a given activity based on the observation of one member of that group engaging in said activity) (p. 178), and the deduction of other information associated with a group based on the presence of one piece of information (e.g., people who wear ten gallon hats are also likely carrying pistols). Very often people are confronted with situations in which they lack information based on observation. In order to make inferences about, and hence fill in, missing information, people rely on their schemas, including stereotypes and other constitutive pieces of information (Bakanic 2009:181; Sia et al. 1999:218). Observed information that appears
associated with part of a particular schema (e.g., the schema for a particular racial group) activates other information, both stereotypical and non-stereotypical, that is connected to that schema. While stereotypes help to fill in gaps in a people’s knowledge, and in doing so, enable people to make more confident inferences about who and what they are observing, the inaccuracy and biases inherent in stereotypes suggest that schematically-aided judgments are often premised on distorted information about social groups (Bakanic 2009:181; Sia et al. 1999). This distortion is exacerbated by the fact that schemas are often employed so quickly that cognitive processing occurs without conscious awareness, and that even when people are aware of such processing, they nevertheless have a tendency to uncritically accept ideas that fit schemas (Bakanic 2009:181; Devine 1989; Greenwald and Banaji 1995).

1.2. The content and indelible imprint of racial and ethnic stereotypes

While reliance on schemas and stereotypes is a product of the need to quickly process an abundance of information in a complex social world (Anderson and Klatsky 1987; Bakanic 2009:181; Fiske and Taylor 1991), the content of such schemas and stereotypes is determined by the larger social structural and cultural context in which cognitive processing is embedded (Bakanic 2009:7; Loury 2002:42). This structural and cultural context of a society serves as the backdrop against which socialization takes place. Racial and ethnic stereotypes and other schematic content is learned from both direct socialization (e.g., via familial teaching) and indirect socialization (e.g., via the mass media) (Bakanic 2009:75-76, 98; Marger 2003:73-76). The media are a particularly critical agent of socialization. The media not only constitute one of the central means by which people interpret the structures and events of their society, but also because they
present information about people, including role models, to which individuals might not otherwise be exposed (Marger 2003:73). Due to the pervasiveness of their techniques and ubiquity of their messages, the mass media’s influence in shaping racial and ethnic stereotypes may even supersede that of the family and the school (Marger 2003:73).

The mass media have not only been instrumental in exposing the overwhelming majority of people in the United States with the same general set of images and messages about racial and ethnic groups, but have played a central role in perpetuating longstanding, negative stereotypes that are deeply rooted in the legacy of slavery and presumptions of biologically-presumed moral inferiority of Blacks (Fishman 2002:177-179; Harriott 2004:31-32; Jones-Brown 2007; Loury 2002:67-70; Marger 2002:74). In particular, media have played a major role in entrenching and perpetuating stereotypes linking crime, especially violent crime and gang- and drug-related crime, with Blacks (Anderson 1990; Devine and Elliot 1995; Fishman 2002; Gilliam et al. 1996; Loury 2002; Marger 2002:74; Muharrar 1998; Reiman 1998; Rome 2002; Russell 1998; Smith 1991; Sniderman and Piazza 1993), as well as Hispanics (Castro 2002; Gilliam et al. 1996; Morales 1972, 1975; Mirande 1980, Portillos 2002; Rodriguez 2002). Stereotypes regarding Black male criminality are particularly ubiquitous and tenacious such that crime and Black men have become practically synonymous in the American mind (Devine and Elliot 1995; Fishman 2002:177; Reiman 1998:54-55; Russell 1998:3, 71, 77, 84).

Several studies have identified the continuing strength and prevalence of stereotypes associating Blacks, particularly Black men, with crime. For instance, Devine and Elliot (1995) found that negative stereotypes associating Blacks with crime are
pervasive, consistently clear, and well-known and understood by all Americans, regardless of an individual’s personal beliefs about Blacks. Gilliam et al. (1996) found that stereotypes regarding Black criminality are especially bolstered by local television news. Among other things, Gilliam et al. (1996) found that television viewers were so accustomed to seeing Black crime suspects on the local news that even when the race of a suspect was not specified, viewers tended to remember seeing a “Black” suspect. Moreover, Gilliam et al. (1996) found that when suspects’ images were manipulated using digital technology, viewers were both significantly more likely to remember seeing a “Black” suspect, and to falsely recognize “White” suspects as “Black” or “Latino”.

In light of the resilience of historically-rooted, widely circulated and known stereotypes of Black criminality, Loury (2002) argues that race operates as a stigma for Blacks. Borrowing from Goffman (1963), Loury (2002) contends that because the racial meanings attached to Blackness, including criminality and violence, stubbornly resist change, are widely shared, and deeply engrained in the structure and culture of American society, Blacks as a group suffer a seemingly permanent, disreputable, “spoiled collective identity” (pp. 66-67). The notion of a quasi-permanent “racial stigma” (Loury 2002:59) that is sustained by stereotypes that are deeply embedded and seared into Americans’ collective consciousness (Devine and Elliot 1995; Russell 1998:3) suggests that Americans, including police officers, share a macro-societal racial schema pertaining to Blacks (see also Mann 1993:165; Williams and Murphy 1990:2-3). Part and parcel of this schema is the presumed criminality of Blacks (Harriott 2004:26-32). This schema obviously can have particularly serious ramifications if it subconsciously guides the decision-making and actions of criminal justice actors such as police officers.
Morales (1972) and Portillos (2002) contend that there is a similarly negative, historically rooted, collective shared schema pertaining to the criminality of Hispanics, particularly Mexicans. Morales (1972) argues that American society has historically viewed Mexican-Americans as a “child race” and as having a biological proneness to criminality (33). Similarly, Portillos (2004) contends that Mexican-Americans, and by extension all Hispanics are tainted by historically rooted stereotypes pertaining to illicit drug activity and violence (Portillos pp. 193-194).

Consistent with Nisbett and Ross (1980), Loury (2002) argues that the long-term strength of the collectively shared schema with respect to Blacks resides in its taken-for-granted suppositions (p. 42). Loury (2002) points out that the firmly rooted, racially biased cognitions associated with this schema that the “typical American” views most Black-White crime-related disparities as “normal, about right, in keeping with what [he/she] might expect, consistent with the social world as [he/she] know[s] it” (p. 71). Loury (2002) suggests that notwithstanding alarming racial disparities and inequalities within the criminal justice context (as well as other contexts), the “typical American” does not view such disparities as “being disturbing, anomalous, contrary to his [or her] unexamined and perhaps not even consciously espoused presumptions about the nature of his [or her] social world” (p. 42). Similarly, the taken-for-granted quality of this racial schema is also demonstrated by Russell’s (1998) finding that “racial” hoaxes involving Whites’ allegations of crime falsely attributed to Blacks are, in comparison to other hoaxes, highly successful. Russell (1998) argues that the general public’s and authorities’ apparent credulity and readiness to accept Whites’ fabrication of allegations of victimization at the hands of anonymous Black perpetrators reflects the extent to
which people have internalized and unquestioningly embraced stereotypes of Black criminality as conventional wisdom.

Paradoxically, the strength and persistence of this macro-societal racial schema is in part due to overall *improvement* in Americans’ racial *attitudes* towards Blacks. As Loury (2002) and Devine and Elliot (1995) argue, racial attitudes or beliefs are not synonymous with racial cognitions, such as stereotypes. People may hold personal attitudes or beliefs that are positive or neutral with respect Blacks, but nevertheless have internalized negative stereotypes about Blacks (Loury 2002:70-71; Devine and Elliot 1995). As Harris (2007) notes, data shows that regardless of what Americans’ attitudes and beliefs are towards racial minorities, “most people harbor racial and ethnic biases on the unconscious level” (p. 8). The apparent existence of vastly improved, positive racial attitudes thus has served to obfuscate the persistence of negative stereotypes pertaining to Black criminality.

In a related vein, although different racial groups develop different worldviews and interpretations of events based on their different social experiences (Bakanic 2009:93-94; Blauner 1993, 1999; Jacobs 2007; Weitzer 1999), such differing worldviews and interpretations do not mean that only certain racial groups internalize racial stereotypes. For instance, although, as noted by Blauner (1993, 1999), Jacobs (2007), and Weitzer (1999), Blacks and Whites have distinctly different views on policing and other aspects of social reality, prejudice research nevertheless shows that Blacks are almost as likely to believe many anti-Black stereotypes (Bonilla-Silva 2010:173; Bobo and Johnson 2000). Moreover, as Carter (1995) points out, the mindsets of officers of color and White officers do not appear to be very different (*see also* Mann 1993:135).
Carter (1995) notes that some Black officers react just as harshly to Black civilians, particularly poorer Blacks, as White officers do. Carter (1995) suggests that the similarities between Black and White officers’ behavior with respect to inner-city Blacks appears to be due in part to the fact that an increasing number of racial minority officers have never lived in inner-city neighborhoods, and thus, like their fellow White officers, lack exposure to inner-city Blacks (as well as Hispanics). In turn, this lack of exposure implies that Black officers are increasingly relying on racial stereotypes in their dealings with inner-city Blacks. In sum, it appears that all racial groups share the same general macro-societal racial schema.

Notwithstanding improvements in racial attitudes, particularly those of Whites, in recent decades, the continuing existence and use of a macro-societal schema that is embedded with taken-for-granted stereotypes pertaining to the criminality of racial minorities, particularly Blacks, may potentially influence an individual’s decision-making and actions without his or her awareness (Bakanic 2009:181; Devine 1989; Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Quillian and Pager 2001:722). While theoretically we would expect stereotypes and the expectations that they generate to subconsciously affect the decision-making and actions of all actors (Harris 2007:8-11; Quillian and Pager 2001:722), studies such as Ruby and Brigham (1996) and Vrij (1993) provide evidence that police, when compared to non-police, are in fact more likely to apply a cognitive schema that views the ambiguous behaviors of Blacks as suspicious and potentially criminal. Ruby and Brigham (1996) suggest that this finding may be due to police officers’ disproportionate contact with Blacks during the course of policing, which serves to strengthen the association between Blacks and crime in officers’ schemata (see also Alpert et al. 2005).
The idea that police officers are guided by a racial schema is also supported Alpert et al.’s (2005) findings. Alpert et al. (2005), like Ruby and Brigham (1996) and Vrij (1993), found that police officers were more likely to view Blacks as suspicious in comparison to Whites, even when Blacks’ were engaging in seemingly innocuous behaviors (pp. 423, 426).

While the findings of Alpert et al. (2005), Ruby and Brigham (1996), and Vrij (1993) appear to provide strong evidence that police officers, including officers of color, have internalized and are influenced by a macro-societal racial schema that is laden with stereotypes of Black criminality, the question then becomes to what extent this schema is accessed in a direct, unfiltered way by officers in different situations. In other words, the important question is how, and if so, to what extent, this macro-societal racial schema is conditioned by particular factors in different situations. Are officers’ perceptions, and in turn, decisions and actions, guided in an unconscious, reflexive way by the macro-societal schema’s racial stereotypes as Portillos (2002) suggests (p. 194), or are there variables that condition and possibly reshape the contours of this schema?

1.3. Prior theoretical insights on the conditioning of a macro-societal racial schema

Prior research on policing and race generally provides support for the idea of a collectively shared macro-societal schema. This research, which primarily consists of individualistic, psychological-based approaches (see, e.g., Bayley and Mendelsohn 1969; Correll et al., 2002; Harris 1999, 2002; Vrij and Winkel 1992), symbolic-interactionist approaches (see, e.g., Anderson 1990; Black 1971, 1980; Black and Reiss 1970; Klinger 1994, 1996; Lundman 1994; Piliavin and Briar 1964; Skolnick 1966; Smith 1987; Werthmann and Piliavin 1967; Wilson 1968), and macro-level, conflict theory-based
approaches (Chambliss and Seidman 1971; Liska et al. 1985; Quinney 1970; Smith et al. 1984; Tittle and Curran 1988; Turk 1969), all document the disproportionate stops and arrests of racial minorities, particularly lower-class Black and Hispanic males. While all of these approaches are consistent with the proposition that patrol officers’ decision-making and actions are guided to some degree by racially-biased cognitive processing, each approach provides different insights into how this processing is conditioned by certain contextual factors. In other words, these prior approaches indicate that a macro-societal racial schema does not automatically translate into racially-skewed policing outcomes. Rather, the influence of this schema on officers’ decision-making and actions depends on particular features of the situations in which these decisions and actions occur.

The connection between a macro-societal schema and racially-skewed policing outcomes is most apparent in individualistic, psychological-based approaches, which focus on individual patrol officers’ cognition and how their interactions with members of different racial groups may be tainted by latent, subconscious prejudices (Bayley and Mendelsohn 1969; Correll et al., 2002; Harris 1999, 2007; Ruby and Brigham 1996; Vrij 1993; Vrij and Winkel 1992). Consistent with the idea of a macro-societal schema, individualistic, psychological-based approaches treat racial disparities in stops and arrests as being the product of patrol officers’ individual subconscious racial prejudices, which are assumed to be constituted by the negative, general societal stereotypes that officers have internalized while growing up in a racially, ethnically, and class stratified society (Harris 1999).
In elaborating on the connection between schematic processing and policing outcomes, these individualistic, psychological-based approaches indicate that there are several important situational features of police-civilian encounters that either inhibit or facilitate the expression of subconscious racial biases. In particular, these approaches indicate that subconscious biases are more likely to come to the surface and influence behavior in settings in which race is not made salient in some way, where the rules governing action are unclear, or where there is some other factor than race upon which decisions can be rationalized (Dovidio and Gaertner 1998; Harris 1999). Where race is made salient to the individual, where the rules governing action are clear, or where there is not some other factor upon which decisions can be rationalized, the social situation forces the individual to think of the racial implications of his or her actions, subconscious prejudices do not insidiously creep into and taint the individual’s treatment of members of different racial groups.

In a somewhat less apparent way than individualistic, psychological-based approaches, the symbolic interactionist approach presupposes the existence of a macrosocietal racial schema that influences police-civilian encounters. In general, the symbolic interactionist-based approach investigates the process by which meanings are symbolically communicated and created by individuals in micro-level exchanges with others. Symbolic interactionist-based studies have specifically examined the context of police-civilian encounters in order to identify patterns of behavioral and attitudinal traits of officers and/or civilians, certain apparent social characteristics of civilians (e.g., gender, age, employment status), relationships between offenders and victims, or the commission of certain types of offenses that contribute to racial and ethnic disparities in
stops and arrests (see, e.g., Black 1980). While the symbolic interactionist-based approach focuses on how meanings attached to both behaviors and categories of people are produced over time via numerous individual police-civilian encounters, it neither assumes that the meaning-creating process of symbolic communication occurs within a vacuum nor treats officers as entering such encounters with blank slates. Rather, this approach assumes that that police officers, like other social actors, bring knowledge about race (as well as other social characteristics) they have internalized from the larger society with them (Anderson 1990). In other words, the symbolic interactionist approach implicitly assumes that officers’ decision-making and actions in encounters with civilians are guided by a macro-societal racial schema.

Like individual, psychological-based approaches, the symbolic interactionist approach identifies a number of important situational factors that condition the macro-societal racial schema that officers utilize in encounters with civilians. In particular, researchers have identified demeanor or manner (Anderson 1990:196; Black 1980; Black and Reiss 1970; Piliavin and Briar 1964; Sherman 1980; Werthman and Piliavin 1967:74, 80, 86-87, 89), dress or clothing style (Anderson 1990:195, 197; Piliavin and Briar 1964; Werthman and Piliavin 1967:80, 82-83), hair style (Werthman and Piliavin 1967:80-82), grooming (Piliavin and Briar 1964), possession of an identification card (Anderson 1990:198-199; Werthman and Piliavin 1967:87-88), the carrying of a radio or suspicious bag (Anderson 1990:195), and pace or style of walk (Anderson 1990:195; Werthman and Piliavin 1967:80) that either confirm and activate negative stereotypes that constitute the macro-societal racial schema, or disconfirm and prevent the activation of such negative stereotypes. Accordingly, notwithstanding officers’ general tendency to treat Blacks,
especially younger, poorer Black males, in ways that are consistent with the negative stereotypes embedded in the macro-societal racial schema, officers’ encounters with Blacks are far more positive when Blacks exhibit a polite, deferential demeanor, wear conservative clothing like suits and ties, have short, conservative haircuts, are well-groomed, possess an identification card that shows a connection to some “legitimate” institution, refrain from carrying any “suspicious” bags, and walk at a medium pace without any exaggerated movements (Anderson 1990:194-199; Werthman and Piliavin 1967:80-89). In short, symbolic interactionist studies indicate that the symbolic meanings associated with certain behaviors and traits effectively preclude officers’ application of the macro-societal racial schema and its negative stereotypes to Blacks in certain encounters.

Macro-level, conflict-based theories also implicitly support the idea that officers collectively share a macro-societal racial schema. Conflict theory argues that the dominant group uses law enforcement to control subordinate groups (Quinney 1970 1975; Turk 1969). The social threat model is the most common variant of conflict theory that is used to explain racial disparities in policing. The social threat model posits that racial minority groups are disproportionately targeted by the police because these groups represent a threat to the political, economic, material, or moral interests of the dominant racial group (Quinney 1970, 1975; Tittle and Curran 1988; Turk 1969). In general, the social threat model contends that the more the dominant, powerful group perceives the behaviors of the powerless as conflicting with the interests of the dominant group, the more likely definitions of criminality will be applied to the powerless (Bell and Lang 1985:310; Quinney 1975:38). The other major variant of conflict theory used to explain
racial disparities in policing is the power-efficiency model. According to this model, racial minorities, especially minority youths, are targeted by police not because they pose a threat, but rather because they lack power and influence, and therefore are much easier to arrest and prosecute without repercussions (Chambliss and Seidman 1971). Regardless of which conflict-based model they employ, researchers have generally found that racial disparities in policing outcomes are tied to the larger structural features of the contexts in which police-civilian encounters are embedded (see, e.g., Green 1970; Liska et al. 1985; McCarthy 1991; Sampson and Laub 1993; Smith 1986; Smith and Visher 1981; Smith et al. 1984; Tittle and Curran 1988; Williams and Drake 1980). These racially-skewed findings are consistent with the idea that officers across contexts are similarly guided by a macro-societal racial schema.

While conflict-based approaches’ overall findings linking larger ecological, structural factors with racial disparities in policing suggest that a macro-societal racial schema operates across contexts, these approaches also specify particular structural features of macro-level contexts that condition this schema. Among the ecological/structural features that appear to condition this macro-societal schema are the degree of racial inequality in a county (Sampson and Laub 1993), the concentration of racial minorities in extreme poverty in a county (Sampson and Laub 1993), the percentage of racial minorities residing in a given jurisdiction (Blalock 1967; Cureton 2001; Dannefur and Schutt 1982; Liska et al. 1985; Smith 1984), a jurisdiction’s level of racial segregation (Blalock 1967; Liska et al. 1985; McNamara 2004), socioeconomic status at the neighborhood level (Smith et al. 1984; Werthman and Piliavin 1967), and the combined racial and class composition of a neighborhood (Alpert and Dunham 1988;
Smith et al. 1991; Weitzer 2000). While the macro-societal racial schema predicts that officers are uniformly more likely to stop and arrest racial minorities, particularly Blacks and Hispanics across all contexts, conflict-based studies reveal that such racially-skewed stop and arrest patterns are most apparent when there is a high degree of racial inequality in a county (Sampson and Laub 1993), the concentration of racial minorities in extreme poverty in a county (Sampson and Laub 1993), the percentage of racial minorities residing in a given jurisdiction (Blalock 1967; Liska et al. 1985), a jurisdiction’s level of segregation (Blalock 1967; Liska et al. 1985), socioeconomic status at the neighborhood level (Smith et al. 1984), and the level of bureaucratization of a police department (Smith et al. 1984).

1.4. Shortcomings of Prior Approaches to Race and Policing

Although individualistic/psychological, symbolic interactionist, and macro-level, conflict-based approaches each offer important insights into how various structural or individual-level characteristics condition officers’ macro-societal racial schema across contexts, all of these approaches suffer from two major shortcomings. First, all of these approaches suggest that we should expect the same conditioning effect on the macro-societal racial schema in all situations that contain the requisite structural or individual-level conditioning variables. Individualistic, psychological-based approaches predict that officers’ decision-making and actions should not be tainted by subconscious biases related to the macro-societal schema in every situation in which race is made salient to the officer, where the rules governing action are clear, or where there is not some other factor upon which decisions can be rationalized. The symbolic interactionist approach predicts that racial stereotypes associated with the macro-societal schema should be
similarly tempered or neutralized in *every* situation in which racial minorities’ exhibit a certain demeanor, type of dress, hairstyle, level of grooming, gait and pace of walk, and form of identification. Macro-level, conflict-based approaches predict that racial stereotypes associated with the macro-societal schema are less likely to be activated and salient in *every* context in which there is a certain percentage of racial minorities or poor people, level of inequality, or level of segregation. In effect, all of these approaches assume a static, uniform conditioning effect on the macro-societal schema when certain structural or individual-level variables are present.

The main problem with this assumption of static conditioning effects across contexts is that it ignores the fact that meanings associated with behaviors, objects, persons, and places are socio-historically and geographically variable. Cresswell (1996) alludes to this variability in meaning when discussing the phenomenon of graffiti:

> The meaning of both acts and places is historically variable. The same place (or the same act) may have opposite meanings at different times. Graffiti is not inherently or essentially “abnormal,” “dirty,” “disorderly,” or “sick.” Graffiti is not naturally “out of place.” (p. 49)

Each of the three main approaches to race and policing not only treat the various ecological and individual-level conditioning variables as having the same meaning across contexts at one moment in time, but also imply that that meaning does not change over time.

Second, none of these three major approaches to race and policing pays sufficient attention to factors that can potentially influence officers at the communal level. The importance of communal-level variables on policing is hinted at by research investigating the nexus between race, space, and policing. Although somewhat similar to conflict-
based studies that examine effects of ecological factors on policing, recent studies
examining the relationship of race, policing, and space (e.g., Bates and Fasenfest 2005;
Meehan and Ponder 2002) suggest the possibility of intra-communal variation in the
policing of racial minorities that is not neatly explained by any of the three major
approaches to race and policing. Although studies such as Bates and Fasenfest (2005)
and Meehan and Ponder (2002) find a general pattern of Black motorists being stopped in
“White” areas, there is not an automatic relationship between racial composition of an
area and policing practices. As noted above, the meanings, racial and otherwise,
associated with particular places are neither constant nor uniform throughout a particular
community or region (Cresswell 1996:49). Indeed Bass (2001), Herbert (1997), and
Portillos (2004) suggest that officers are more likely to aggressively patrol Blacks and
Latinos within spaces marked as “Black” or “Latino”.

The importance of communal, meso-level factors as potential conditioners of a
that communal-level is important because the community acts as a filter or mediator of
meanings between the larger society and the individual (p. 9). Sullivan (1989) argues
that the values, cognitions, and choices of the larger society are conditioned by
experiences of the inhabitants of a local community and how they define such values,
cognitions, and choices (p. 9). Sullivan (1989) states:

The community is seen as a locus of interaction, intermediate between the
individual and the larger society, where the many constraints and opportunities of
the total society are narrowed to a subset within which local individuals choose.
The local community is also the cultural milieu within which the worth of these
specific options is defined. The cognitions and values embedded in the
community context are not so much fundamentally different from those of the
wider society as they are more specific to the actual life experiences of local inhabitants. (p. 9)

By focusing on interaction at the communal- or meso-level, this enables us to see how it is that officers’ cognition regarding race, as well as ethnicity and class, is shaped by the particular constraints and opportunities present within a particular communal context.

Moreover, focusing on interaction at the communal level is important because it allows for an assessment of variation in officers’ schemata both within and between local communities (Sullivan 1989:9). Officers within a particular town can be compared to each other in order to ascertain whether there is any variation in officers’ schemata based on individual level variables such as officers’ residency, race, and class. Officers from different towns of employ can be compared to see whether towns’ unique communal features contribute to the officers in each respective town having a collectively shared schema that differs from that of officers in other towns.

The three main approaches to policing and race have fallen short of capturing the effects of communal constraints or opportunities on officers’ cognition, and ultimately behavior, due to a combination of these approaches’ theoretical and methodological shortcomings. Individualistic, psychological-based approaches, while providing valuable insights into how certain situational factors condition officers’ racial cognition, nevertheless fail to consider how communal-level constraints or opportunities might also condition cognition, and in some instances, override the situational factors identified by these approaches. Individualistic, psychological-based approaches such as Harris (2007), Ruby and Brigham (1996) and Vrij and Winkel (1992) assume that the situational factors (e.g., the clarity of decision-making criteria) that condition officers’ racial schemata
organically flow from the internal structure of a particular situation. These approaches do not entertain the possibility that constraints or opportunities shaped by communal factors that originate outside of a particular situation also play an important role in conditioning schemata. The theoretical limitations of individualistic, psychological-based approaches are reinforced by these approaches’ methodologies. Typically individualistic, psychological-based studies employ experimental designs, surveys, or highly structured interviews, all of which are generally limited to identifying the situational circumstances under which officers’ latent, subconscious prejudices are revealed. These highly circumscribed methods generally preclude officers from identifying possible local, structural communal variables that condition the officers’ social group schemata.

The symbolic interactionist approach, while theoretically having the potential to reveal how communal factors affect officers’ schemata through the context of officers’ micro-level interactions with civilians, generally falls short of documenting communal forces’ influence on officers’ cognitive processing. Although, as noted above, symbolic interactionist studies provide numerous insights into the various interactional cues that either counter or reinforce racial, ethnic, and/or class stereotypes, such studies focus on ascertaining the meaning of behavioral variables such as demeanor and individual-level variables such as the age, race, and employment status of civilians, rather than on how communal forces outside of particular encounters shape the meanings of those encounters. The theoretical limitation of the symbolic interactionist approach is often aided by an ethnographic methodology that focuses on close, meticulously detailed descriptions of behaviors and conditions that constitute police-civilian encounters (Sullivan 1989:8). For instance, it is not possible to ascertain many of the community-
derived symbolic meanings of spaces by simply observing micro-level encounters. Focusing on observations of the interactional dynamics of police-civilian encounters essentially limits an assessment of the meaning-creation process to what transpires in such encounters and the assumed macro-societal schemata officers and civilians bring with them.

While both symbolic interactionist and individualistic, psychological-based approaches have a focus that is too close to capture potential nuanced, communal influences on officers’ cognitive processing, macro-level, conflict-based approaches generally have a focus that is too distant to flesh out such communal influences. As noted above, conflict-based approaches have identified important ecological factors that appear to condition officers’ schemata across contexts; however, in identifying factors that either mitigate or enhance racial, ethnic, and/or class bias across broad contexts, these approaches obscure potential communal factors that contribute to variation in conditioning within such contexts. This theoretical shortcoming is reinforced by a reliance on quantitative methodologies that treat various structural, ecological features of communities as being static entities that have the same meaning and conditioning effect on policing in all contexts.

Although conflict theorists such as Quinney (1975) appear to acknowledge communal-level variation in how the police apply definitions of crime, these theorists nevertheless posit the same general power relationship between the powerless and powerful within a community, and generally do not elaborate on the mechanisms that contribute to such variation. For example, while Quinney (1975) indicates that “communities vary in their expectations of law enforcement and the administration of
justice” (p. 38), he basically argues that the police will always apply definitions of crime (meaning selective, harsher application of criminal laws) to the powerless to a degree that is proportionate to the level of perceived threat the powerless pose to the powerful or dominant group. Quinney (1975), as well as other conflict theorists such as Chambliss and Seidman (1971), thus not only fail to consider how other factors besides power and threat influence officers at the communal level, but also assume that power operates the same way in every communal context and that the police are aligned with and reflexively do the bidding of the powerful group in every such context.

1.5. The Need for Examining Environmental Features of Local Communities

Research examining on how patrol officers think and go about policing at the communal, meso-level has typically focused on either organizational or environmental factors (Crank 1990: 166). While some researchers have argued that officers’ approaches to patrolling are largely shaped by the police organizations in which they are enmeshed (see, e.g., Johnson et al. 1977; McNamara 1967; Niederhoffer 1967), and that increased bureaucratization and professionalism of such organizations has further limited the influence of external environmental factors on these officers (Bass 2000: 149; Ericson 1982), other researchers such as Wilson (1968) and Moran and Manus (2004) have posited that the situated, variable nature of patrol officer-civilian interactions precludes departmental hierarchies from exercising broad control over how patrol officers will handle encounters with civilians. It is simply not possible for police departments to come up with a compendium of rules and procedures that anticipate all of the circumstances and contingencies that patrol officers will face in civilian encounters outside the purview of superior officers. Moreover, as Moran and Manus (2004) point out, the “absence of
time to confer with others, research legal precedents, and review alternatives requires an officer to make decisions based upon his or her own knowledge, experiences, values, and judgment” (p. 93).

While patrol officers’ policing practices within a particular department are likely shaped to some degree by organization factors such as “the tastes, interests, and style of the police administrator” (Wilson 1968:83), both macro-level, conflict-based studies (e.g., Smith et al. 1984) and symbolic interactionist studies (e.g., Werthman and Piliavin 1967) have found that style of policing and the level of arrests depend on environmental/ contextual factors, but not organizational ones. Werthman and Piliavin (1967) found different styles of policing are foremost related to the perceived socioeconomic status of the neighborhoods in which police-citizen encounters occur (pp. 75-89). Similarly, Smith et al. (1984) found that police are more likely to arrest as the poverty level of a neighborhood increases, but that police arrest decisions are not affected by the level of bureaucratization of police agencies (p. 243).

In addition, officers’ approaches to patrolling appear to be particularly more sensitive to environmental factors than organizational ones in smaller, suburban and rural jurisdictions (Crank 1990; Liederbach and Frank 2003; Swanson 1978). Patrol officers are influenced by “the unique social and demographic climate” in smaller suburban and rural communities (Liederbach and Frank 2003) because these officers are “an integral part of [these communities’] tight-knit network of citizens, and … are often thought of as more than simply police officers in [these] communities (Liederbach 2007: 69; see also Benson 1995; Weisheit et al. 1994). In contrast to officers in larger, urban police
departments, it is difficult for officers in smaller, suburban and rural jurisdictions to remain part of an insular organization that is detached from the local community.

Given that patrol officers working in smaller suburban jurisdictions are closely tied to the communities that they patrol and spend large amounts of time interacting with community members, it is imperative for these officers to be attuned to the various groups within these communities and to develop a base of knowledge of these groups. Officers’ accumulation of knowledge of the demographics of their towns of employ is particularly important because it assists officers in determining “the ‘normal’ character of behavior” in the various parts of their jurisdiction (Rubinstein 1985: 25). Such demographic knowledge enables officers to not only know who their constituents are, but also where these constituents are situated in relation to each other and how they make use of space (Rubinstein 1985:25-26). Moreover, given that patrol officers are structurally positioned between the police administration and the community, officers’ social group knowledge of their communities helps to minimize potential complaints from residents, and in turn, avoid difficulties with the administration (Ericson 1982: 61).

Furthermore, as Sullivan (1989) suggests, uncovering the meanings of factors both within and between local communities requires an examination of the broader communal environmental influence on decision-making and actions. Communal structures constituted by the norms, values, and cognitions of the various inhabitants of local communities create constraints or opportunities for police actions. In their countless interactions with civilians in local communities, officers are compelled to pay heed to these structural constraints and opportunities. Given that police organizations themselves are situated within this context of local environmental structural constraints
and opportunities, it is problematic to attribute any communal-level variation in policing solely or primarily to organizational factors. Indeed, it is likely that some communal environmental influence on officers is not only direct, but is also mediated to some extent through police organizations, policies, guidelines, and subcultural norms.

The importance of the broader, communal environmental factors on police officers’ cognitive processing is reflected by numerous studies’ finding that police officers’ attitudes and prejudices reflect those of the community in which officers patrol (Banton 1964; Bittner 1970; Brown 1981; Matson and Duncombe 1992; Reiss 1971). As Meehan and Ponder (2002) note, this consonance between officers attitudes and prejudices and the citizens of the communities in which they patrol stems from the fact that these are the citizens whom officers must satisfy (p. 401). Prior research also shows that police orient toward “place” in ways that are shared by the community (Meehan and Ponder 2002; Alpert and Dunham 1988; Brown 1981), and that decisions to arrest are often influenced by “police perception of community standards and attitudes” (Mann 1993:138). All of these studies suggest that there are important structural and cultural dimensions of communal environments that condition officers’ schemata in fundamental ways.

1.6. Salient Communal Features that Influence Officers’ Schemata

As suggested by conflict theorists, communal factors relating to power should play a significant, if not preeminent, role in conditioning officers’ schemata within the local communities in which officers work. Consistent with Weber (1947), power is defined narrowly here as the ability to influence or manipulate another or affect outcomes (p. 328).
Conflict theorists such as Chambliss and Seidman (1971), Quinney (1975), and Sung (2002) suggest that the police should be particularly attuned to groups that possess power to affect outcomes and to the relatively powerless groups that potentially threaten the interests of the former groups. Chambliss and Seidman (1971) state:

In any world where policemen exercise uncontrolled discretion, the police will inevitably use their discretion in their own interests. It will never be in their interest to attack those who hold important power and privilege, for they are in a position to retaliate. The policeman’s discretion will necessarily be used primarily against the poor and the disinherited. (p. 218)

Thus, we should generally expect the police to do the bidding of powerful groups within a community not simply because the privileged, property-owning members of these groups “demand that their ownership and persons be secure from hostile or arbitrary acts” (p. 359), but because these group members possess the resources and influence to challenge officers and potentially put their careers in jeopardy.

While in some cases we should expect that officers do the bidding of powerful local communal groups because they potentially threaten the interests of the police themselves, in other cases we should expect officers’ interests to be aligned with such groups based on a sense of affinity, solidarity, and a shared stake in community. As Chambliss and Seidman (1971) point out, such affinity and solidarity is most likely where the dominant, powerful groups in a community are “lower-middle-class” and “blue-collar” groups (p. 218). Due to their perceived class solidarity with such groups, the police are likely to be particularly attuned to doing the bidding of such groups based on affinity (p. 218). This is particularly likely in areas where the majority of those constituting such lower-middle-class or blue-collar groups are homeowners with a stake in the community (p. 218).
More generally, we should also expect patrol officers to be mindful of and aligned with any groups or segments of the community that officers identify with “middle-class respectability” (Ericson 1982: 66). Although it is theoretically possible for any “citizens who uphold the virtues of middle-class respectability [to be] taken to symbolize the community interests police officers see themselves as standing for” (Sung 2002: 52), most studies have found that the still disproportionately White police force views “middle-class” and “public” as being synonymous with “White” (Alpert and Dunham 1988; Mayhall et al. 1995; Sung 2002). Thus, while patrol officers can, and sometimes do see themselves representing lower-status citizens who support the virtues of middle-class respectability (Ericson 1982: 66), these officers typically have a more difficult time in associating racial and ethnic minorities, lower-income persons, and others who are “at the bottom end of society’s ‘scheme of things’” (p. 66) with this category of middle-class respectability (Alpert & Dunham 1988; Ericson 1982; Sung 2002). Accordingly, we would expect officers’ schemata to be fairly consistent with the macro-societal racial schema in most contexts.

While we should expect officers to be generally attuned to the interests of powerful groups within their communities of employ, it is likely that officers will be specifically mindful of political structures, such as town councils, that represent these groups. As Chambliss and Seidman (1971) point out, police officers cannot afford to ignore politicians, particularly local ones, because of the sway these politicians hold over local police departments. Chambliss and Seidman (1971) state:

[T]he police are … highly dependent on the support of elected politicians. It is the politicians through the city council, and in the form of county supervisors, mayors, city managers, governors, and legislators, who control the resources of
the police department because, as publicly elected officials, they hold the public purse strings. Moreover, usually the chief of police is appointed by political leaders. Under these circumstances the police must satisfy the demands of these various groups, or their resources will be reduced. At the same time, if they are to avoid strain, the police must avoid at all costs aggravating persons who can influence the views of the legislators, councilmen, mayor, or governor. Just as “public arousal”11 is one of the phenomena that elected officials seek to prevent, so its avoidance is one of the guiding principles that dictate the activities of police departments. (p. 329)

Thus, given the control that publicly elected officials exercise over the resources of police departments and livelihoods of officers, we should expect that such officials play a critical role in conditioning officers’ schemata.

Moreover, officers must specifically pay attention to community residents who have “political clout” (p. 329). That is, officers must heed those residents who have connections with elected officials. As Chambliss and Seidman (1971) argue, officers must pay close attention to those residents who “have at their command … the ears of persons who can express ‘public arousal’” (p. 330), “are in a position to get the press to air their grievances” (p. 330), or “can contact someone ‘who knows someone in city hall’” (p. 330). In addition, officers must also pay attention to “[a]ny “respectable” member of the community [who] can, if he chooses to, create a “stink” which will cause strain for the organization and … ultimately influence the distribution of resources to the organization (p. 330).

While conflict theorists’ generally predict that officers will invariably “address their performance” to those powerful “[g]roups who share with the police the same vision of orderly community” (Sung 2002: 52) at the expense of powerless groups, some of these theorists suggest that power at the communal level is potentially more complex. For instance, Chambliss and Seidman (1971) note that police sometimes have to deal
with “important groups among the privileged, the moral entrepreneurs, who insist that due process … be observed in handling the poor” (p. 358). In a similar vein, Ericson (1982) argues that officers are likely to label powerful White politicians who support the interests of certain minority interest groups as “liberal” and see them as not sharing the officers’ vision of middle-class respectability (p. 66). Confronted with such situations, we would expect to see officers heeding the demands of such powerful groups and politicians not because the officers are aligned with the interests of these groups and politicians, but rather because officers are interested in avoiding potential challenges and/or reductions in resources. Given that communities have different demographic make-ups and different constituency groups that hold power, we should expect that officers’ social group schemata, and in turn, their approaches to policing, should vary from community to community in a more complex way than is suggested by conflict theory.

In addition to power-related information, cultural information should play a significant role in influencing officers’ schemata in the local communities in which officers work. Cultural information should be salient to officers because of the symbolic tie between culture and the concept of order. While cultural indicators can symbolically represent power in Weberian sense, in that officers associate particular cultural markers with groups that have the power to influence outcomes within a local community, such cultural indicators also can symbolically represent order irrespective of a group’s ability to affect outcomes. As Wilson (1968) points out, patrol officers are foremost concerned with maintaining order (p. 16). Given this concern about order, patrol officers should be highly attuned to cultural information that symbolically conveys a sense of orderliness or
lack thereof with respect to the various groups within the officers’ communities of employ. For instance, officers should be attuned to information about upkeep of properties because neatness implies order, which in turn implies an absence of criminal activity as well as the unlikelihood of such activity taking root (Wilson and Kelling 1982). Consistent with this neatness proposition, Werthman and Piliavin (1967) found that a “messy” house was one of several factors that increased the probability that a juvenile would be arrested (p. 73). Likewise, information about parental supervision and discipline should be salient to officers because it symbolizes the order-related concept of informal social control. This proposition is supported by Werthman and Piliavin’s (1967) finding of an increased probability of a juvenile being arrested when officers perceived that juvenile’s parents as having deficient “moral character” and as providing inadequate supervision (p. 73). In short, cultural information should be important to officers because it helps officers to discern to whom they do and do not need to pay attention.

Besides information about power and culture, spatial information in local communities should play a prominent role in conditioning officers’ schemata. Spatial information should be particularly salient to officers because of the symbolic nexus between space and legitimacy. While, as pointed out by symbolic interactionist studies, various objects such as an identification card or a three-piece suit can confer legitimacy to the possessor of such objects in particular situations (Anderson 1990:197-198), particular spaces or arrangements of a series of spaces can also confer legitimacy (Cresswell 1996:47). The meanings that officers’ attribute to people and behaviors within a particular space are not simply limited to who is in that space and what they are
doing, but also are dependent on the relationship of that space to other spaces, both within and outside of the local community.

1.7. A Cognitive Mapping Model for Assessing Communal Conditioning of Schemata

In order to examine how and to what extent communal variables relating to power, culture, and space condition officers’ schemata pertaining to race and other social groups, it is necessary to examine how police officers develop and use knowledge relating to their communities of employ. Prior research shows that “officers develop and use an intricate knowledge of place” (Meehan and Ponder 2002) or what is referred to as “area knowledge (Bittner 1970) or “territorial knowledge” (Brown 1981; Rubenstein 1985). For instance, officers learn to identify the “safe spots” and “danger spots” within the communities they patrol (Werthman and Piliavin 1967:76-77). An important part of the “commonsense geography” that officers acquire in the contexts of their towns of employ relates to information about race and class (Meehan and Ponder 2002:402). “Officers know which communities are whiter, blacker (or more minority), or some combination of the two and where in their own community racial, ethnic, and class composition differ” (Meehan and Ponder 2002:402; see also Brown 1981; Werthman and Piliavin 1967:75). Officers also construct meanings of the places they patrol by developing “typifications” of vehicles, persons, and spaces on the basis of their experience (Meehan and Ponder 2002:402; Sacks 1972; Van Maanen 1978). However, while prior research identifies some of the types of knowledge that officers develop about the communities in which they patrol, such research generally does not specify the processes and mechanisms by which officers gather such knowledge.
The theoretical concept of cognitive mapping provides a useful way to understand how officers go about gathering and organizing their social group knowledge of the people whom they encounter in their towns of employ. Cognitive mapping refers to the process by which people acquire, encode, organize, and retrieve information about the features and locations of phenomena within their spatial environments (Downs and Stea 1973:9; Kitchin and Blades 2002:1). The cognitive maps that result from this process are a collection and arrangement of shorthand symbolic representations of spatial environments (Downs and Stea 1973:9; Kitchin and Blades 2002:2). Cognitive mapping has largely been used by geographers to understand how people use their encoded knowledge of spatial environments to navigate the spatial landscape of these environments. Geographers have not only used the concept of cognitive maps to understand how people literally find their way through new and familiar environments, but also to determine where certain valued things are, and for the purpose of making decisions about where to live, work, and travel (Downs and Stea 1973:10; Kitchin and Blades 2002:2). In short, cognitive maps are useful for understanding how people’s symbolic representations of environments guide their decision-making and behavior within such environments (Downs and Stea 1973:9; Kitchin and Blades 2002:7).

Analogous to how people acquire, process, and use knowledge about spatial or physical environments in order to navigate such environments, people acquire, process, and employ knowledge of their social landscapes. Knowledge of these social landscapes, like knowledge of spatial environments, is symbolically encoded in a cognitive map. Goffman’s (1974) concept of a primary framework or schema of interpretation is an example of such a socially-based cognitive map. Goffman (1974) notes that such
framework or schema enables people to organize their social experiences and render meaning from them. As suggested above, the ability to gather and make sense of social information is indispensable to patrol officers, as they must deal with and are accountable to a wide range of people within the jurisdictions of their towns of employ. Just as cognitive maps of spatial environments enable people to adapt to, cope with, and survive the various contingencies in those environments, cognitive maps of social landscapes enable officers to respond to, cope with, and survive the various challenges that they face while patrolling such landscapes. Officers learn, for instance, to whom and what they need to pay attention, to whom or what they can ignore without harmful repercussions, who or what poses a threat to them, and who or what can provide assistance.

Given that officers’ cognitive maps or schemata are instrumental in guiding officers’ navigation of social landscapes, this dissertation explores how officers construct and implement such schemata within the local contexts of their towns of employ. In order to ascertain how such schemata guide officers’ approach to various demographic groups within contexts of their towns of employ, I have developed a model that explains how officers constitute and are influenced by social group schemata. This model considers the various sources of information that officers use to constitute social group schemata, how such schemata are conditioned by space and time, and how such constituted/ conditioned schemata affect patrolling practices.

In actively constituting demographic schemata within the context of their particular town of employ, officers acquire and use information from three principal sources. Consistent with Burnett and Briggs’s (1975) model regarding the acquisition of cognitive maps, these sources of information include information derived from the
environment of their town of employ, information derived from officers’ relation to that environment, and officers’ individual experiences outside of the context of that work-related environment.

The central source of information that officers acquire and use to constitute social group schemata within their towns of employ deals with the relationship of various resident and non-resident social groups they identify and encounter within those towns. Akin to how individuals acquire and process information about the relative location of phenomena within their spatial environments (Downs and Stea 1973:9), officers acquire and process information about the relative position of groups that they have identified within their towns of employ. However, unlike individuals’ positioning of relative location of spatial phenomena, officers’ relative positioning of groups is hierarchically arranged. Such hierarchical arrangements are based on officers’ assessments of groups’ relative power, influence, and other factors.

While information pertaining to the relationship of various socially identified groups is a fundamental part of the social group schema that the officer constructs within his or her town of employ, the officer’s own perceived experiences with and relationships to the various groups in town also plays an important role. As Goffman (1974) argues, different people have different interpretative frames of the “same” events based on their involvement in such events. Different officers’ may see themselves differently in relation to the same constituency group, or the same officer may see himself or herself differently in relation to different socially identified groups. Ultimately, how an officer perceives himself or herself in relation to different groups affects an officer’s understanding and approach towards those groups.
The third category of information that officers use to constitute social group schemata within their towns of employ deals with officers’ experiences outside of the context of patrolling. While officers’ schemata are heavily influenced by the information that officers gather within the contexts of their work, officers also bring with them a preexisting schema based on information culled from experiences in other contexts (Goffman 1974:9; Kitchin and Blades 2002:20) and is influenced by biases and prejudices (Downs and Stea). Even if an officer is from the same town in which he or she patrols, the information that he or she has gathered at other times, with different people, and in a different role, could be different than that which he or she gathers within the context of policing.

The synthesis of all of the information that officers gather and process from the three aforementioned sources does not directly constitute social group schemata, but rather this synthesized information is conditioned spatially and temporarily. In other words, how officers’ understand people and their behavior is contingent on particular spaces and times. Certain spaces at certain times activate meanings associated with various social groups (Rubinstein 1985:25). Certain spaces and times are also the principal vehicles by which contexts beyond that of the officer’s town of employ become salient to the officer.¹³ That is, a particular space and time may activate officers’ thoughts of the context of another town, region, or the entire nation. Space and time also play a more direct constitutive role with respect to officers’ social group schemata, as officers’ understandings of various groups are based in part on where and when officers see these groups in relation to each other. Ultimately the spatially and temporally conditioned information that constitutes officers’ schemata affect how officers will approach and
negotiate their patrolling of members of various socially identified groups within the context of his or her town of employ.

The model set forth here provides a vehicle for understanding the multiple, simultaneously interacting factors that shape how officers see and understand various social groups within their specific town contexts of employ. In offering an in-depth, nuanced reading of how officers’ understand and approach various groups that they have identified in specific spatial and temporal contexts, this model enables us to see that such understandings of social groups can vary not only across different local town contexts, but also within those contexts. Unlike many studies that have examined the relationship between policing and various social group characteristics, this study does not treat demographic characteristics like race and class as static entities that operate the same way across different spatial and temporal contexts. Moreover, this study offers an opportunity to assess to whether, if so how, officers’ schemata within a particular community diverge from the macro-societal schema pertaining to race and other social group characteristics. In doing so we can assess how particular communal contexts appear to condition this macro-societal schema.

In addition to providing a window into how officers’ understandings of various social groups vary across and within the local town contexts in which officers patrol, the model set forth here provides a way of understanding the spatial and temporal mechanisms by which extra-local contexts (e.g., all contexts outside of the jurisdiction of the officers’ town of employ) become salient to officers. Moreover, by exploring the spatial and temporal activation of such extra-local contexts, this model not only offers some insight into how officers distinguish “insiders” (residents) from “outsiders”, but
how such distinctions are colored by assumptions tied to demographic characteristics such as race and class.

The model employed here also is important because it does not treat the officer as a passive recipient of meanings associated with demographic groups, but rather as an active constructor of such meanings. This model treats the officer as an architect who is continually constructing and reconstructing the structure (schema) that guides his or her patrolling practices. Moreover, while many studies (e.g., Black 1971; Rubinstein 1985) treat police officers as a static, generic, fungible actors, this study recognizes that officers not only bring their own unique past experiences to bear on how they construct meanings associated with various demographic groups, but how their own experiences with these groups affect such constructions.

The remainder of this dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 sets forth the methods that were employed in this study and the rationales behind choosing such methods. In a setup for some of the concepts relating to officers’ processing of social group information that are discussed in Chapters 4 through 6, Chapter 3 examines how officers’ social group schemata are conditioned by “raw” demographic information. Chapter 4 focuses on how officers’ social group schemata are conditioned by power-related information pertaining to various groups within their respective towns of employ. Chapter 5 addresses how officers’ social group schemata are conditioned by culture-related information pertaining to various groups within their respective towns of employ. Both Chapters 4 and 5 emphasize how officers use information about social groups within their towns of employ to cognitively situate these groups within a hierarchy. Chapter 6 addresses how officers’ social group schemata are spatially and
temporally conditioned. Chapter 7 deals with how officers’ schemata are also constituted by information that officers have gathered and processed through their personal backgrounds and experiences, both inside and outside the context of policing. In particular, Chapter 7 examines the extent to which officers’ schemata vary within towns of employ due to differences in individual-level variables and experiences. Finally, Chapter 8 offers analysis as to how this study challenges and advances prior work on race and policing, as well as work on cognitive processing.

CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES

1 The argument here is that judgments based on appearance are first used to categorize people (e.g., “White”), and then stereotypes associated with a given category (e.g., White) are activated. However, Blair et al. (2002) found that having Afro-centric features, regardless of racial categorization, leads subjects to directly infer stereotypical traits. In other words, rather than being an indirect by-product of the cognitive process of racial or other group categorization, stereotypes are activated by certain physical cues apart from and prior to the placement of observed people into categories. While Blair et al.’s (2002) findings suggest that the processes of social cognition are complex and do not necessarily follow one straightforward causal pathway, they do not undermine my general contention below that certain racial stereotypes, particularly those pertaining to Blacks, are deeply ingrained in the minds of the majority of Americans and play an important role in social cognition (irrespective of the activation mechanism).

2 The same argument can be made regarding the taken-for-granted assumptions underlying the collectively shared schema with respect to Hispanics.

3 As Weitzer’s (1999) findings demonstrate, while Blacks and Whites generally have different views on policing, such views are further complicated by intraracial class and regional variation.

4 Although Alpert et al. (2005) found that the police view Black citizens more suspiciously than White citizens even when Black citizens are engaged in seemingly innocuous behaviors, such heightened suspicion of Blacks did not translate into officers stopping and questioning Blacks at a greater rate than that of Whites. However, Alpert et al.’s (2005) findings suggest that officers are more primed to stop Blacks if officers are presented with some additional information of potential lawbreaking, regardless how trivial that information may be.

5 While I am arguing that the focal point of this macro-societal schema is race, it also includes information about ethnicity and class as well, including the intersection of race, ethnicity, and class.

6 Although Sampson and Laub (1993) and Tittle and Curran (1988) focus on racial disparities in the justice system after the arrest stage, their social threat argument logically extends to and encompasses the practices of police officers as well.

7 Although Liska et al. (1985) did not find that the certainty of arrest was greater for Blacks than for Whites, their finding that arrests increased as the percentage of non-Whites increased and level of segregation decreased suggests that areas that have a greater non-White presence are associated with greater social control practices.
While Smith et al. (1984) found that the police were no more likely to arrest Black suspects than White ones, they point out that “the differential racial composition of lower-status neighborhoods creates a significant racial disparity in populations of arrested persons” (p. 246).

While Werthman and Piliavin (1967) fit more squarely within the symbolic interactionist framework, their finding regarding police behavior and neighborhood status context is consonant with macro-level, conflict-based approaches. Werthman and Piliavin (1967) argue that “residence in a neighborhood is the most general indicator used by the police to select a sample of law violators” (p. 76). More specifically, Werthman and Piliavin (1967) contend that police appear to be predisposed to arrest in “bad” neighborhoods, meaning “poor” neighborhoods (p. 76).

Styles of policing are discussed in Chapter 2.

Chambliss and Seidman (1971) define “public arousal” as “the hostility of white middle-class persons with political clout.” While Chambliss and Seidman (1971) specify those with political clout as being White, I am arguing that officers are likely to be mindful of any group, regardless of race, that wields power within a local communal context.

I focus on examining the local context of an officer’s town of employ or patrolling community because this communal context is most critical to such officer’s construction of social group schemata. Although the jurisdictional limits are, theoretically speaking, arbitrary because they are socially constructed, nevertheless, such limits have real meaning and consequences for patrol officers. Officers must deal with, and are accountable to, the people who make up the various constituency groups within these limits or boundaries, and thus officers must develop an understanding of these people in order to adequately perform their jobs. Although, as subsequently noted, the meanings associated with contexts beyond their towns of employ do affect officers’ constitution of social group schemata, the context of their town of employ is most central.

In some instances, officers’ own personal experiences are the vehicle by which outside contexts become salient to the officer. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 7, Coretown officers invoked the context of the neighboring town of Kingston for the purpose of comparing their relationship to the residents of Coretown to that between Kingston police officers and the residents of Kingston. Officers also sometimes bring in information about other contexts to make comparisons between resident groups and non-resident groups. For example, as noted in Chapter 5, Coretown officers referenced outside “Black” contexts for the purpose of drawing a comparison between Coretown’s Black residents and non-resident Blacks.

By “raw” demographics, I mean the percentages of various racial and ethnic groups that reside within Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro.

As will be discussed in Chapter 7, although officers bring with them a wealth of information from their past experiences in contexts outside of those encountered while patrolling, such information does not independently affect their social group schemata, but rather interacts with information that they obtain on the job in the contexts of their towns of employ.
CHAPTER 2: Research Methods

2.1. Selection of Methods

The data upon which this dissertation is based were gathered through a series of ethnographic interviews and observations that I conducted during the course of 49 ride-alongs with patrol officers in three suburban municipalities (Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro) in a northeastern state between July, 2006 and December, 2006. These methods appeared to be best suited to assessing whether, and if so how, cultural and structural community contexts constrain or modify the cognitive schemata that officers passively acquire from the larger macro/societal structures of which they are a part (Sullivan 1989: 9). Patrol officers, like all social actors, cognitively assemble and process information about the people with whom they interact in particular social, cultural, spatial, and temporal contexts. Ethnography provides a means to learn about a culture by listening and observing how members of that culture categorize their experience (Spradley 1979:9-10, 17). Accordingly, an ethnographic study that closely examines the meanings that officers assign to phenomena within their specific, work-related cultural and social milieus is the optimal way to discover how officers cognitively develop understandings of the various people whom they serve, organize such understandings into social group schemata, and then use such schemata to navigate the social landscapes of their towns of employ.

While each of the three selected police departments provided opportunities to interview officers higher up in their respective organizations’ chain of command, I chose to focus on patrol officers for several reasons. First, patrol officers are more likely than sergeants on up to actually interact with various members of the community in a broad
range of contexts and therefore are more likely to be attuned to various communal
dimensions and pressures. Moreover, higher-ranking officers not only spend
substantially less time out in the community as they move up the chain of command, but
it is more likely that their interactions with members of the community, unlike those of
patrol officers, will be exclusively negative in nature. Higher-ranking officers’
interactions with community members are likely to limited to complaints, whereas patrol
officers are more likely to encounter a mix of negative and positive interactions with
community members.

Second, patrol officers tend to be better informants than higher-ranking officers.
As Van Maanen (1988) argues, patrol officers, by virtue of their “lower caste” position
within a police organization’s hierarchy, generally reveal more than higher-ranking
officers because patrol officers “have less to lose objectively” than higher-ranking
officers by being forthcoming (p. 88). Patrol officers “are under less strain [than higher-
ranking officers] to appear faultless to either their internal [police organizational] or
external [communal] audiences” (p. 88).

Third, the environment in which patrol officers spend the bulk of their workdays
or shifts is more likely than that of higher-ranking officers to generate expansive, candid
responses. Higher-ranking officers spend a disproportionate amount of time at the
stationhouse, where the limited amount of privacy hampers forthcoming responses.
Moreover, higher-ranking officers generally have little time to talk during the course of
their workdays, which hinders establishing rapport with the officers and development of
complex responses. Lastly, the stationhouse obviously foreclosed any opportunities to
observe how officers interacted with community members out in the community.
In contrast, the environment of the patrol car during the course of a ride-along provided an ideal setting in which to obtain rich, nuanced, detailed, candid information about how patrol officers make sense of and categorize their experiences. Conducting ethnographic interviews with individual officers in each town over the course of three to five hour ride-alongs afforded ample opportunity to establish rapport with these officers in an environment in which they were completely in control and felt comfortable. Moreover, officers were likely to provide candid responses within the informal setting of the patrol car because, unlike at the stationhouse, officers did not have to worry about others—particularly superiors—overhearing them.

The patrol car’s informal environment also facilitated officers’ provision of candid, rich, highly pertinent information because I could connect and tailor interview questions to the officers’ natural work environment. Questions that were organically tied to and naturally flowed from incidents, people, places, and entities within this environment seemed relevant and appropriate to the officers. For instance, riding through different neighborhoods enabled me to ask the officer about the people in those neighborhoods and the kinds of dealings that he or she had had with them in the past. As a result, such organically-based questions precluded officers from being defensive in their responses, and enabled them to give more nuanced, expansive answers. Moreover, the various incidents, people, places, and other phenomena that I observed within this setting served as a basis for broaching sensitive topics that the officers otherwise might be reluctant to discuss.

The setting of the ride-along also provided environmental stimuli that organically triggered officers’ thoughts about various people, places, and events independent of any
specific questioning by the interviewer. Officers themselves often revisited prior topics and questions when stimuli they observed during the ride-along activated additional recollections and perceptions of prior incidents, people, places, and entities. Moreover, the range of different spaces covered at different times during the course of each ride-along provided a large reservoir of meaningful stimuli.

The three to five hour length of the ride-along also assisted in yielding richer, nuanced information. This time frame of the ride along allowed for the opportunity to revisit and clarify various points as well as approach them from multiple angles. For instance, officers’ multiple encounters with members of a particular identified group during the course of a ride-along provided the chance to ask the officer both follow-up questions about points that the officer had already made about the group, and questions about other, yet unaddressed aspects of this group. In short, the informal setting coupled with the lengthy time frame allowed for an iterative process in which officers continually clarified and expanded on various points. Moreover, unlike more formal interview settings, where asking a respondent multiple questions about a particular point can engender suspicion and/or annoyance, the informal setting of the ride-along allowed for multiple explorations of a particular point in a seemingly natural, nonintrusive way.

In addition to providing an ideal setting for eliciting detailed nuanced information from the officer, the ride-along also afforded the opportunity to compare the officers’ responses to questions or stimuli-induced comments to their actual practices. This setting made it possible to establish whether officers’ comments appeared to be consistent with their practices by observing how the officers interacted with various people and how and where they spent their discretionary patrolling time. Moreover, such observations
provided a vehicle through which I could assess officers’ apparent connections to and/or concerns about certain people and places based on whom and where they concentrated their patrolling time.

2.2. Research Site Selections: Choosing the Towns and Police Departments

In selecting towns in which to interview and observe patrol officers, it was necessary to first decide on the number towns that would be most fruitful for assessing the influence of communal factors on patrol officers’ social group schemata. While the choice of one town would have allowed for an assessment of both the relative influence of individual-level variables (e.g., officer’s residency and race) and communal-level variables, as well as any communal-level divergence from what we would anticipate based on officers’ larger macro or societal schemata, the selection of one town would have precluded ascertaining any pattern of between-town variation in officers’ social group schemata. Given my theoretical interest in examining variation both within and between local communities, it was imperative to study patrol officers in at least two towns as part of a comparative ethnography (Sullivan 1989: 9). Studying the patrol officers in two or more towns not only permitted an assessment of whether communal-level variables exert more of an apparent influence on officers’ schemata than that of individual-level variables (or vice-versa), but also allowed for comparisons’ of officers’ schemata between communities so as to discern whether or not unique communal structural and cultural characteristics played a significant role in molding officers’ schemata. Observing and interviewing officers in two or more towns allowed, for instance, an assessment of whether seemingly prejudiced officers acted similarly or differently in different communal contexts, and whether variably prejudiced officers...
within the same town acted either similarly or differently. If highly prejudiced officers
act differently across towns, or variably prejudiced officers act similar within the same
town, then this suggests that contextual, communal-level variables may trump individual-
level ones, particularly if police organizations are relatively similar across towns.
Moreover, by assessing the presence or absence of variation in officers’ schemata
between communities, comparative ethnography allowed for a clear means of examining
the extent to which the macro or societal schemata that all officers theoretically develop
and internalize prior to their work as patrol officers was modified in any way by the
particular communal context in which they work.

Although a comparative ethnographic study of two towns’ patrol officers would
have been sufficient to explore both within- and between-town variation in officers’
schemata, I chose to focus on three towns because they provided greater opportunities for
assessing how officers viewed and treated members of particular social groups. In
particular, three towns afforded more opportunities for between-town comparisons of
particular social groups that were similar in terms of race, ethnicity, class, and/or
immigration status. The presence of such similar racial, ethnic, class, and/or immigration
groups in different towns allowed me to hold each group’s constant in at least two towns
to see whether the different communal contexts contributed to patrol officers’ different
approaches towards these groups. For instance, as discussed below, both Longwood and
Middleboro contained similar poor, largely segregated, Black populations, and both
Coretown and Longwood contained poor, transient, immigrant Hispanic populations.
Three towns also provided greater opportunities to explore any differences in terms of
how officers viewed and approached various social groups within towns. For instance,
Coretown allowed for comparisons between how officers viewed and treated the fairly segregated lower-middle-class and upper-middle-class White populations, and Middleboro allowed for comparisons between how officers viewed and treated the segregated poor/working-class and middle-/upper-middle-class Black populations. In short, studying three towns allowed for richer contextual variation than studying two, which in turn offered greater opportunities to identify the extent to which the overarching macro/societal schema that all officers theoretically develop via socialization in the United States is conditioned and modified by communal structural and cultural variation within their towns of employ. In other words, studying officers in three towns allowed for examination of whether officers’ view of and approach towards various social groups is not merely a product of macro-level socialization as most of the prior theoretical work on policing and race and class has suggested, but rather is conditioned by the various features of community-level contexts.

In selecting specific towns in which to observe patrol officers I first used U.S. Census data to compile a list of potential towns with populations between 20,000 and 40,000 within fifty miles of my home. I chose suburban towns in this population range because, as noted in Chapter 1, patrol officers in such smaller, suburban towns are more likely than officers in larger, urban municipalities to be sensitive to and influenced by the constituents and other social forces within their towns of employ. In addition, I chose smaller towns because it would be easier to gain in-depth understanding of their social and cultural environments than those of larger municipalities.

After compiling this list I then sorted these towns into categories based on their degree of racial diversity. Although my research is not solely limited to investigating
officers’ cognitive mapping of race, I was foremost interested in examining officers’
mapping of race given its apparent significance in policing practices. Accordingly, I used
a town’s degree of racial diversity as my sorting criterion and divided my initial list of
towns into three categories. The first category consisted of towns where racial minorities
comprised less than ten percent of the population. The second category was comprised of
towns where racial minorities comprised more than ninety percent of the population.
And the third category included towns where racial minorities comprised between ten and
ninety percent of the population. Among these, I randomly selected a total of fifty towns
that could serve as potential research sites. I assumed that towns in which there was a
greater degree of racial diversity would be the most fruitful places to study because they
would afford the opportunity to see if and how intra-town racial group differences affect
officers’ schemata. Accordingly, I disproportionately selected towns where there was a
higher degree of racial diversity (the towns where racial minorities comprised ten to
ninety percent of the population). I chose thirty possible sites from among the towns
where racial minorities comprised ten to ninety percent, and ten possible sites from each
of the other two less racially diverse categories.

I wrote a standard letter of inquiry that set forth the purpose of my research and
mailed it to the chief of police or police director in each town (see Appendix A). I heard
back from thirteen of the police departments, and ultimately seven of these departments
granted me some type of access to patrol officers, but only five departments agreed to
allow me to participate in ride-alongs with patrol officers. Because I believed the ride-
along to be an indispensable part of my ethnographic work with patrol officers, I decided
to make my final research site selections from these five departments.
Prior to being granted final approval by the officials in these five departments, I had to arrange a meeting in which I discussed my research project with the chief of police or another high-ranking officer in the five respective departments (see below for discussion regarding the police organizational features). While I described to the chiefs or other high-ranking officers my interest in understanding the influence of communal factors on policing, I emphasized that I was particularly interested in looking at how such factors contributed to differences in the policing of juveniles and adults. Although I mentioned that I was interested in looking at race and class as two of many possible communal variables, I downplayed the centrality of these variables to my research question. I felt this deliberate oversight was necessary in order to present myself as non-threatening to the officers and their department. I later replicated this slight deception at the beginning of each ride-along when I explained to patrol officers about the purpose of my research.

In addition to meeting with at least one high-ranking officer in each of the five departments in order to secure my access, I also visited each of these five towns at least twice before beginning the main part of the ethnographic work in order to determine which three towns appeared be the most interesting to study both in terms of their internal characteristics as well as their characteristics in comparison to those of other towns. During these visits I spoke with town clerks and realtors about the racial, ethnic, and class diversity and level of racial, ethnic, and class segregation within each town. In addition, I drove around each of the towns alone in the evening but before dark, and roughly mapped the apparent racial composition of the various sections of each town.
After consideration of a variety of factors I ultimately decided to conduct my research with patrol officers from the police departments of Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro, all in the same northeastern state.

2.3. Descriptions of Three Research Sites: Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro

Of the three research sites, Coretown is the smallest, most racially homogeneous (see Table I), and has the highest median income and lowest rate of poverty (see Table II). Coretown is a predominantly White (see Table I), middle-class (see Table II) town of approximately 23,000 residents in a northeastern state. Coretown is largely a residential community with a fairly large commercial shopping district in the center of town and a small commercial area located in the southernmost part of town. The northern half of Coretown is comprised of residents who are middle- to upper-middle-class, whereas the southern half of Coretown is comprised of lower-middle-class to middle-class residents. The northern half of Coretown has undergone a substantial amount of turnover in residents since the late 1980s, while the southern half has not. As a result of the dearth of racial minority residents in town, the local government is controlled by Whites and the public schools are overwhelmingly White. There is a large county college, Orion County College, located in the northwestern quadrant of Coretown. Orion County College brings in several thousand students on any given day in which school is in session, and the majority of these students are non-residents. Unlike the overwhelmingly White population of Coretown, close to three-quarters of the students at Orion County College are racial minorities.

Longwood, which is located near Coretown in the same northeastern state, differs from Coretown in a number of important respects, including size, degree of racial and
ethnic diversity, and social class of residents. Longwood is a racially diverse (see Table I) and largely lower-middle-class (see Table II) town of approximately 40,000 residents in a northeastern state. Longwood has a mix of residential, commercial shopping, and light and heavy industry areas. The bulk of Longwood’s residential population resides in the northern half of the town. The northwestern part of town is predominantly White and is the town’s largest and most heavily populated residential area. Whites constitute approximately two-thirds of the town’s population and disproportionately control the town’s local government (e.g., all but one of the ten town council members is White).

The poorest section of town is the largely Black residential area in the northeastern part of town. Blacks constitute approximately one-quarter of the town’s population and are substantially more likely than Whites to be poor or working-class. Approximately one-seventh of the town’s population is Hispanic. Hispanic residents, who cover a diverse range of ethnicities, including Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Mexicans, Hondurans, Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Cubans, disproportionately live in the southern and north central parts of Longwood. The two largest immigrant groups in Longwood are the Poles and the Portuguese. As noted in Chapter 5, Longwood officers view these groups as being apart from the towns’ White and Hispanic populations respectively. With the exception of the town’s high school, all of the public schools are either disproportionately White or disproportionately Black.

Middleboro is similar to Longwood in terms of size and racial diversity, but is more closely in line with Coretown in terms of social class. Middleboro is a racially diverse (see Table I), largely middle- to upper-middle-class (see Table II) town of approximately 39,000 residents in the same state as Coretown and Longwood.
Middleboro is predominantly a residential community, but it also has three fairly large commercial shopping areas. Whites constitute the majority of the town’s residents (approximately sixty percent), while Blacks are the second largest resident group, comprising roughly one-third of the town’s residents. The Black population is starkly divided between the middle- and upper-middle-class Blacks who live in racially integrated neighborhoods in the central and southwestern parts of town, and the poor Blacks who live in the highly segregated southeastern part of town. The White population is also divided between the middle-to upper-middle-class Whites who live in the racially integrated central and southwestern parts of town, and the upper-middle-class Whites who live in the large segregated northern part of town. Unlike Longwood, Middleboro has virtually no Hispanic residents. In contrast to both Coretown and Longwood, Middleboro has a reputation for being a politically liberal and tolerant community. All of the public schools within town are racially mixed.1 Blacks and Whites share control over the Middleboro’s local government.

2.4. Factors of Importance in Selecting the Three Research Sites

The choice of these three towns provided opportunities for a number of interesting comparisons both within and between towns. In particular, the racial and class makeup of each town offered fertile ground for examining whether officers developed different cognitive maps with respect to various racial and class groups both within and between towns. Longwood and Middleboro are characterized by a significant amount of racial diversity (particularly given the general lack of racial diversity of most towns located in this northeastern state), whereas Coretown is predominantly White (see Table I). Both
Table I: Racial Makeup of Research Sites’ Towns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Category</th>
<th>Coretown</th>
<th>Longwood</th>
<th>Middleboro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic(^2)</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.35%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islander</td>
<td>.00%</td>
<td>.00%</td>
<td>.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>.00%</td>
<td>.10%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>.7%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or More Races</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2000)]

Coretown and Middleboro have large middle- to upper-middle-class populations, whereas Longwood is predominantly lower-middle-class (see Table II).

The racial diversity of each town (see Table I), coupled with their class variations (see Table II) provided an opportunity for a number interesting potential cross-town comparisons. For instance, both Longwood and Middleboro have a segregated, poor,

Table II: Class-Related Factors in Research Sites’ Towns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Median Household Income</th>
<th>% Below Poverty Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coretown</td>
<td>$76,338</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longwood</td>
<td>$46,345</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middleboro</td>
<td>$74,894</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2000)]
Black section, but only Middleboro has a large Black middle- and upper-middle-class population. Middleboro and Coretown both have large middle- to upper-middle class populations, but only Middleboro is racially diverse. Both of these cross-town comparisons allowed for an assessment of whether differences in the combined effect of race and class affect officers’ social group schemata.

The racial makeup of these towns also allowed for some interesting intra-town comparisons. For instance, Longwood has both fairly sizable Black and Hispanic populations, which offered an opportunity to see if, and if so how, officers differentially map groups that they identify as racial minorities. Likewise, although Coretown is predominantly White, the presence of the racially diverse, fairly large (9,000 students) Orion County College located near the center of Coretown not only provided fertile ground for assessing racial variations in officers’ social group schemata, but also allowed for the assessment of the combined effects of race and resident status.

In addition, Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro are interesting settings in which to comparatively assess police officers’ social group schemata because each has a different pattern of racial residential segregation. Residents’ racial composition is important here because there is a tendency among police to monitor and regulate the movements of young men of color, particularly in neighborhoods and areas that are racially marked as “Black”, often under the pretext of seemingly race-neutral efforts to curb gang violence or the drug trade (Anderson 1990; Bass 2001). Blacks in particular also are indiscriminately stopped and questioned in neighborhoods and communities that are racially marked as “White” (Bass 2001; Harris 1999). Both Longwood and Middleboro have a combination of racially segregated Black neighborhoods and sections
as well as integrated ones (although Middleboro is much more racially integrated overall), and thus provided fertile ground for comparing policing practices in spaces officers likely mark in racially distinct ways.

Another important factor in choosing police departments in Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro was their proximity to towns with different racial/class compositions. If one is interested in seeing how patrol officers’ racial perceptions are affected by the local context, then it is necessary to analyze towns in close proximity to the town in which officers are patrolling, as the racial/class composition of these towns likely plays some role in shaping officers’ racial perceptions and actions based on such perceptions. In particular, it is possible that this larger surrounding context might have some bearing on how officers patrol their town’s borders and treat those who are labeled as “outsiders.” In particular, Coretown, with its predominantly White population, was an interesting town in which to assess officers’ social group schemata because it is in close proximity to a number of towns with large, poorer, Black and Hispanic populations, and it is accessible via a major highway (the Expressway) and several large cross-town roads.

These towns also were interesting sites for assessing officers’ social group schemata because of how they might affect how officers saw themselves in relation to the residents of their respective towns of employ. In particular, Longwood and Middleboro provided interesting sites for comparing how perceptions of class shaped their perceived connections to their towns of employ. Although both towns are racially diverse, one would expect officers in Longwood to have a greater perceived connection to the residents of their town of employ because their class status more on par with that of the residents.
2.5. Organizational Similarity among the Three Towns' Police Departments

While the threshold issue in accepting these police departments as sites of study was the type of access they were willing to provide, namely, unfettered ride-alongs and interviews with patrol officers, these three departments also have a great deal of organizational similarity and I wanted to control for any influences that the police organizations themselves might have on officers’ schemata. Accordingly, I wanted to minimize any structural or cultural/ideological variation among the three departments.

Structurally each of the three departments is very similar in terms of its hierarchy, division of bureaus, and policies and procedures regarding patrol. Each department has basically the same rank structure (chief of police, deputy chief of police, captain, lieutenant, sergeant, detective, and patrol officer). The one exception is that Coretown’s Police Department has no deputy chief of police. Each of the three departments has the same bureaus or divisions, except that Coretown’s Police Department does not have a separate narcotics or vice bureau. Patrol-related policies and procedures regarding shifts and a roll call preceding each shift are indistinguishable among the three departments.

As noted above, an important structural similarity is found in how each of the three departments divides its respective town up into geographic patrol districts or zones. Officers assigned to particular zones or districts are responsible for calls in those districts or zones and for checking on certain sites within their assigned district or zone at some point during their shift. When not responding to calls or checking that certain sites are secure, patrol officers from each department have some discretion as to where they will spend their time on patrol, but it is tacitly understood that officers generally will stay within their assigned district or zone.
Each of the three towns also is structurally similar not only in terms of assignment of officers to geographic patrol districts or zones, but also in terms of the relative stability of assignment of officers to particular districts or zones as well as to particular shifts. In general, officers in all three of the towns kept the same shift for at least six months to a year. The absence of frequent rotation of districts and shifts both within and between towns is significant because it precludes the possibility that officers will develop different cognitive maps of their towns of employ simply by virtue of their district and/or shift rotations. Officers who have more variability in terms of districts and/or shifts as a result of more frequent rotations theoretically would have a more expansive view of their respective town of employ than those who have less variability. The similar district and shift rotation policies in Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro helps to ensure that any variations in officers’ cognitive maps either within or between towns is due to factors other than the frequency of district and shift rotations.

The three departments share two other structural features that relate to my dissertation’s underlying assumption that local community forces, particularly community constituencies, play a significant role in shaping officers’ social group schemata. First, with the exception of one patrol car in Longwood and one patrol car in Middleboro, all of the officers on patrol in each of the three towns patrolled in single-officer cars. This is important because officers in single-person cars are more autonomous from the influence of fellow officers, and without the distractions of a partner, an officer is more likely to be attuned to the assigned community. Second, each department’s funding and contracts are determined by the town council. This suggests
that the officers of each department have a stake in making sure that they address the
care of at least some community constituencies.

One notable structural difference between the Coretown Police Department and
the Longwood and Middleboro Departments is that the Coretown Police Department has
less than half the total officers in each of the Longwood and Middleboro Departments
(which corresponds to the larger overall populations of Longwood and Middleboro). The
Coretown Police Department has only fifty-two members, whereas the Longwood Police
Department has one hundred twenty-nine and the Middleboro Police Department has one
hundred twelve. A department’s level of bureaucratization appears to have some bearing on
the degree of equity in the administration of arrest discretion, with more
bureaucratization being associated with more equity in the administration of arrest
discretion, and hence a minimization of racial bias in arrest decisions (Smith et al. 1984).
However, notwithstanding its smaller size, the Coretown Police Department appears to be
very similar to the Longwood and Middleboro Departments in terms of how it is set up
and run. For instance, all three departments have similar procedures with respect to
assigning officers to patrol, holding roll car, assigning tasks to officers (e.g., traffic
enforcement and checking certain landmarks), processing arrests, promoting officers, and
dealing with citizen complaints. Moreover, in terms of the social group makeup officers,
the three departments appear almost interchangeable. The majority of officers in each
town are White (92% in Coretown, 91% in Longwood, and 84% in Middleboro) and male
(96% in Coretown, 98% in Longwood, and 92% in Middleboro). With the exception of
the Chief of Police in Coretown and a Captain in Middleboro, all of the highest ranking
officers in each town are White males.
In addition to these structural similarities, there are several cultural/ideological similarities among the three departments. Foremost among cultural/ideological factors is the three departments’ similar policing style or philosophy and approach to policing. Wilson (1968) outlines a general typology of police styles, which categorizes police by the ways in which they respond to the discretionary situations that they continually encounter in their daily rounds of activities (Slovak 1986:3). Wilson’s (1968) typology distinguished police departments by whether their approach to citizen encounters was watchman-like, legalistic, or service-oriented. The watchman-like style places primacy on order maintenance, and officers generally ignore minor infractions and judge the seriousness of infractions based more on their immediate and personal consequences rather than what the law says about them in a technical sense (Wilson 1968:140-141). The legalistic style emphasizes patrol officers “handl[ing] commonplace situations as if they were matters of law enforcement rather than order maintenance” (Wilson 1968:172), assumes that the officers act in accordance with a single, shared standard of community conduct, and expects officers to issue tickets and make arrests at high rates (pp. 172-173). The service-oriented style stresses that “police take seriously all requests for either law enforcement or order maintenance…but are less likely to respond by making an arrest or imposing formal sanctions” (Wilson 1968:200), involves frequent but not formal police interventions, and treats the police’s main task as being estimating the “market” for police services within the community and producing a “product” that meets that demand and satisfies the community (pp. 200, 203).

Of these three policing styles, the service-oriented style most closely approximates the style of policing professed and manifest by officers in Coretown,
Longwood, and Middleboro. Both higher-ranking officers and patrol officers in all three towns expressly made reference to “service” or “community service” when discussing the overall mission and focus of the police department. The three departments’ public espousal of community-oriented policing also is evident from their similar promotion of their community policing divisions or bureaus and their community outreach programs such as Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E).

The three police departments’ patrolling practices also are largely consistent with a service-oriented style. In general, patrol officers in each of the three towns take seriously all requests for law enforcement or order maintenance. The one notable exception is Longwood officers’ order maintenance-based, watchman-like approach with respect to Blacks in Longwood’s District 4 area, which discussed in more depth in Chapters 4 through 7. However, outside of District 4 Longwood officers generally appear to take seriously all requests for service.

Officers in the three towns also generally refrain from making arrests or imposing other formal sanctions in their frequent interventions. One exception to this is Coretown officers’ law enforcement-based, legalistic style with respect to motorists, particularly non-resident motorists. Coretown officers regularly issue a high number of traffic tickets to motorists, and claim to “give out more tickets than [any other officers] in the county”.

However, Coretown officers otherwise display a reluctance to administer any formal sanctions in their numerous encounters with residents and non-residents. Rather Coretown officers attempt to handle encounters by means of diplomacy, cajolery, or warnings, or some combination thereof.
Lastly, officers in the three towns also exude a service-oriented style through their seemingly omnipresent concern about providing the community, or at least certain segments of or groups within the community, with a “product” that satisfies its demands. Officers in each town appear to be particularly attuned to the concerns and opinions of the community (Wilson 1968:203), and are mindful of such concerns and opinions as they handle various matters. Thus, the three towns’ similar service-oriented style of policing not only shows that police organizational factors likely did not contribute to any variations in officers’ cognitive maps and approaches to various social groups, but also is consonant with the idea that communal factors play a significant role in shaping such maps and approaches.

Besides being similar in terms of their overall policing style, the three departments of Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro also are similar in terms of the composition of their respective corps of patrol officers. The three departments’ officers are not only similar in terms of their social group characteristics as noted above, but also are alike in terms of their professional socialization, educational backgrounds, and where they were raised. All of the officers from each department are graduates of the same police academy, which suggests they have been exposed to a similar professional outlook. There are slight differences among the samples from each department in terms educational attainment. Nearly three-fourths (73%) of Coretown officers had attended college, while slightly less than two-thirds (63%) of Middleboro officers and a little over half (56%) of Longwood officers had attended college. While a college education theoretically could contribute to a broader, more enlightened view of policing, the differences among the three departments in terms of college attendance do not appear
significant enough to have possibly contributed to any variation in officers’ cognitive maps between towns.

In addition to attending the same police academy and having roughly the same level of educational attainment, officers in the three towns generally were socialized in the same geographic region. The vast majority of officers in the three towns grew up and attended school in the same region of the northeastern state in which they currently worked. This fact, coupled with the three departments being located within twenty miles of each other, minimizes the possibility that regional differences might affect how they understand and approach policing. It is likely that the officers in these three departments largely have internalized similar ideas about race, ethnicity, class, and criminality while growing up, and that these officers bring a similar macro/ societal social group schema with them when they begin working as police officers in their respective towns of employ.

In sum, the structural and cultural/ ideological similarities of the three departments suggest that the organizations themselves should play a minimal role in directly shaping the schemata of their patrol officers. Accordingly, these three sites are appropriate choices for examining how it is that environmental features of the towns and communities directly and indirectly shape and mediate officers’ social group schemata, and in turn, affect how officers approach their patrolling of various groups.

2.6. How the Methods Were Employed

I rode along with and interviewed patrol officers in Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro typically after making arrangements with a captain or lieutenant in the police department of each town several days to a week in advance. In setting up the ride-alongs,
I was able to select which days and shifts I wanted to know about. In order to increase the variation among my observations, I chose to do ride-alongs on different days of the week and during different shifts (with the exception of the overnight shift between 11 P.M. and 7 A.M.). Conducting interviews and observations on different days mitigated against the data being unique to a particular day (e.g., more encounters with drunks on a Saturday evening) or to a particular shift (e.g., property checks and school-related issues during the morning and afternoon shifts). In addition, the selection of different shifts enabled me to have a broader sample of potential interviewees, and also helped to guard against the possibility of a bias associated with a particular shift. For example, several of the officers on two of the overlapping day shifts in Longwood communicated that they did not like dealing with the more serious problems associated with the two overlapping night shifts. Therefore, focusing on the day shifts alone would likely have yielded somewhat different overall data in terms of officers’ perceptions. Lastly, I selected days and shifts in a similar manner in each of the three towns in order to standardize my observations across locales. So for instance, I made sure that I had weekend days to compare in the three towns, and shifts overlapping with the afternoon hours so that I could observe how officers monitored dismissal at the high schools in the three towns.

In selecting ride-alongs I also standardized my observations across locales geographically. Each of the three towns is divided up into several police districts—four “posts” in Coretown, eight “districts” in Longwood, and three “zones” in Middleboro. Different districts have different mixes of residents, spaces that attract non-residents, and other features. Moreover, officers’ relationship to residents sometimes varies from district to district within a given town. For example, officers in Coretown identified more
with the more working-class White residents in posts 3 and 4 in Coretown than the more upper-middle-class White residents of posts 1 and 2. As a result, limiting ride-along to certain districts (e.g., posts 3 and 4 or 1 and 2 in Coretown) likely would have yielded somewhat different overall data in terms of officers’ perceptions of residents in their care and charge. Accordingly, in order to preclude tainting the data with district bias, I also requested ride-alongs in each patrol district in the three towns.

While I did not have a choice as to which particular officer I would be assigned to ride with in any of the three towns, I was able to request riding with a different officer each time so that I could have a more representative sample of officers. In order to standardize my observations among districts with regard to amounts of interactions observed, I chose to do a minimum of fifteen ride-alongs and a minimum of fifty hours in each town. Each ride-along lasted between three and five hours. In Coretown, I completed sixteen ride-alongs totaling fifty-four hours. In Longwood, I did eighteen ride-alongs totaling fifty-seven hours. And in Middleboro, I completed fifteen ride-alongs totaling fifty hours. No more than three, and no fewer than two ride-alongs were scheduled per week. By limiting the number of ride-alongs to a maximum of three per week, this allowed time for analysis of and reflection on my field notes.

All ride-alongs took place between July and December of 2006. This time frame enabled me to see how the intersection of time and space condition officers’ social group schemata. As explained in Chapter 6, how officers understand and patrol different social groups is conditioned by both space and time. By scheduling ride-alongs during the overlapping summer and fall months I was able to see, for instance, how the meanings associated with spaces shift with the grade school calendar (e.g., spaces associated with
schools have a different meaning and are patrolled differently in August, when grade school is not in session, than in September, when school is in session).

Prior to each ride-along I waited in a designated area within each police station house. Some of these waits involved a few minutes, whereas others were up to two hours depending upon the availability of patrol officers who would conduct the ride-along. While at the station house I spoke informally with officers who were there either writing reports or in between shifts. During about half of my waits I observed officers either taking statements from complainants or witnesses, or processing arrestees. Prior to approximately one quarter of my ride-alongs I sat in on roll call, which is a meeting held by the shift’s commander (usually a sergeant or lieutenant) that briefs the officers on events of the past day(s) and informs them of any special concerns that they should or must address while out on patrol. These observations at the station house were incorporated into my field notes as supplements to those from the ride-alongs.

2.7. Establishing an Interviewing Relationship with Officers

Weiss (1994) argues that in most cases the ideal interviewing relationship between the interviewer and the respondent is a “research partnership”, in which “[t]he interviewer and the respondent…work together to produce information useful to the research project” (Weiss 1994:65). As Weiss (1994) points out, the extent to which an interviewer is able to establish a research partnership is often tied to whether the interviewer’s various attributes make the interviewer appear as an “insider” or “outsider” to the respondent (p. 137). In general, Weiss (1994) contends that it is better for an interviewer to be an insider, that is, someone who shares attributes and experiences with the respondent, than an outsider (p. 137). However, Weiss (1994) notes that even if an
interviewer is an outsider vis-à-vis a respondent in some important sense, it is still possible to obtain first-rate, forthcoming interview data from that respondent by taking on the role of a “respectful student[]awaiting instruction” (p. 66) and appreciative of tutelage (pp. 137-138).

In general, I shared many characteristics with most of the officers, which made me an “insider” in many respects with these officers and facilitated my ability to establish rapport and a research partnership with these officers. Like the majority of the officers in the sample, I am male (47 of the 49 officers are male), White (40 of the 49 officers are White), appear to between 30 and 40 years old (42 of the 49 officers are close to this age range), appear to be lower-middle-class to middle-class, and grew up and resided in the northern half of the same state (48 of the 49 officers are from the northern half of this same state).

Although Weiss (1994) indicates that race generally has little effect on the quality of the interviewing partnership outside of possibly affecting a respondent’s initial reaction to the interviewer (Weiss 1994:139), my perceived racial similarity to the majority of the officers appeared to facilitate obtaining more candid, uninhibited responses, particularly with respect to sensitive topics such as race. In general, many people in the United States try to avoid talking about race in “mixed company”, that is, with people of another race, out of fear that they will be misunderstood or branded a “racist”. Accordingly, the White officers in the sample felt more relaxed in being candid about race-related matters in part based on my perceived racial similarity to them. Moreover, as Anderson (1990) notes, I likely benefitted from police officers’ general
default view of Whites as respectable, “law-abiding”, “trustworthy”, and “middle-class” (Anderson 1990:190, 194).

The few Asian and Latino officers in the sample also appeared to be very comfortable in talking about race-related matters. In part this may be attributable to these officers’ perception of Asians and Latinos as being racially proximate to Whites. These officers’ comfort in discussing race also may be due the fact that they appeared to equate race with “Black”, and therefore did not feel personally vulnerable or awkward in discussing a racial group outside of their own. In contrast to officers of all other racial groups, Black officers generally were somewhat more cautious and guarded in talking about a variety of topics, including race and community politics and power. This appears to be consistent with the proposition that people do not like to discuss race in “mixed company”.

While Weiss (1994) indicates that the sex of the interviewer generally does not affect the quality of an interview except where perceptions of a personal/ sexual relationship intrude into cross-sex interviews (Weiss 1994:140), my male status appeared to greatly enhance the level on candor on the part of many of the male respondents in the overwhelmingly male sample. Some male officer respondents appeared to view me as “one of the boys” with whom they could engage in “locker room” talk (e.g., crude and sexist remarks) without fear of judgment or disapproval. My male status did not appear to act as a hindrance in any way to interviews with the two female respondents in the sample, as these officers were just as forthcoming as the typical male respondent in the sample. The fact that these two female officers are used to working in an
overwhelmingly male work environment may have contributed to their sense of ease in being interviewed by a male interviewer.

As Weiss (1994) indicates, the age of an interviewer in relation to that of respondent can affect the nature of the interview relationship that is established if there is a wide variation between the age of the interviewer and that of the respondent (Weiss 1994:141). An interviewer who is appreciably younger than a respondent invariably takes on the role of someone who is less experienced than the respondent, whereas an interviewer who is older usually takes on the role of someone who is widely experienced, although not necessarily in the area of the interview (Weiss 1994:141). In general, even though I was at least five to ten years older than many of the officers (I was 40 years old at the time of the ride-alongs), my youthful appearance and demeanor, coupled with my status as a student, created a dynamic in which age was not at all salient or relevant. In my interactions with older officers I did, as Weiss (1994) recommends, take the role of someone less experienced than the respondent and in need of being enlightened.

Although my class status (upper-middle-class for the latter part of my childhood into adulthood) and my educational attainment (several advanced degrees) presented the biggest potential obstacles to my ability to establish rapport and an effective interviewing relationship with officers from the three towns, there were a number of things that I did in order to both minimize any potential class-related differences between myself and the officers and appear as non-threatening as possible. In general, I tried to present an externally conservative, clean cut, quasi-working-class image. I dressed professionally, but wore semi-“blue collar” slacks and collared shirts (without a tie). I wanted to make sure that I would be taken seriously, but I did not want my dress to appear too formal or
“white-collar”, as this may have alienated officers, some of whom openly identify themselves as “blue-collar”. In fostering this conservative, clean-cut image, I also made sure to keep my hair length relatively short. In addition to my conservative, yet “blue-collar” external appearance, I spoke to officers in a down-to-earth way and always exuded an assuming, easygoing, nonjudgmental, considerate, respectful, and professional demeanor. I toned down the way I spoke to avoid the perception of intellectualizing. I also avoided expressly mentioning that I was a doctoral student. While a handful of officers asked about my student status, the majority of officers did not, and appeared to assume that I was an undergraduate student. I purposely tried to downplay my own advanced educational background so as to prevent that from creating an image in the respondent officers’ minds that I was radically different from them.

I also tried to disarm the officers by proactively addressing any suspicions that they might have about me as a sociology student or about my research. When I introduced myself I indicated that I was a sociology student, but played up the criminal justice aspects of my academic work so as to appear less foreign and potentially threatening to the officers. As noted earlier, in presenting my research project I emphasized my interest in understanding communal influences on officers’ approaches to juveniles as compared to adults, and purposely minimized my particular interest in understanding how race and class affect officers’ approaches to various social groups. I engaged in this slight deception in order to avoid giving officers that I was going to be judging their attitudes towards and treatment of different social groups, particular racial groups, which likely would have caused the officers to become very guarded and would have greatly stymied any efforts to establish rapport.
In addition to presenting myself and my research in as non-threatening a way as possible, I also sought to establish a rapport and an interview partnership by demonstrating my connections to and/or knowledge of the respective towns of employ, and more generally, by seeking to establish common ground with the officers in whatever ways possible. For instance, in attempting to establish common ground with Longwood officers I indicated that I had lived in Longwood for seven years when I was a child. I also mentioned to a Black Longwood officer who was from Orion that my grandparents had lived in Orion for forty years, and told a White Longwood officer who lived in Ringdale that I had taught at Ringdale High School back in the 1990s. In trying to establish a connection with Coretown officers I indicated that I had regularly run in a four mile race in Northrup Park in Coretown on the Fourth of July, and mentioned some of the names of track stars from Coretown whom I knew from my days as an assistant track coach in nearby Ringdale. Similarly, I attempted to establish some connection with Middleboro officers by indicating that I had attended various cultural events in Middleboro over the years, and mentioned landmarks in town with which I was already familiar.

While all of aforementioned characteristics and efforts helped to make me an “insider” in the eyes of many of the officers, I nevertheless remained an “outsider” to the world of policing. Given my “outsider” status on this important dimension, it was to some extent necessary to take on the role of a “respectful student[]awaiting instruction” (Weiss 1994:66) rather than the role of a research partner at times. Rather than hindering my ability to establish rapport with officers, my status as an occupational outsider may have actually facilitated such rapport. As Weiss (1994) notes, in contrast to interviewers
who are occupational insiders, interviewers who are occupational outsiders are substantially less likely to be perceived by respondents as threatening because respondents see such outsiders neither as posing a potential competitive risk nor as being likely to share interview data with relevant others in the respondents’ occupational world (Weiss 1994:139). Thus, the fact that I had no connection to the officer’s occupational world, coupled with the fact that I expressly assured officers that my research in no way would subject them to any harm, occupational or otherwise, enabled officers to be relaxed and candid when discussing various topics relating to their work.

2.8. Interviewing

The interviews with officers during the course of the ride-alongs were informal, but were semi-structured in that these interviews loosely followed an interview guide (see Appendix B) that consisted of a list of general topics covering a range of patrolling issues pertaining to social groups in communal settings (Weiss 1994: 48). The guide itself was constructed to flesh out the dimensions of the general research question research question that I had identified: How do officers develop social group maps of their towns of employ in order to navigate the social landscapes of those towns? In addition to covering the topics listed on the interview guide, I also probed into any unexpected topics raised by the officers that seemed potentially significant (Weitz 1990: 26). Consistent with the premise that the ethnographic process is an iterative, reflective one in which the researcher does not start out with all of the research and interview questions and topics predetermined and tightly formatted, the discovery of any new topics that appeared to be important and salient led to revisions and refinements of the initial interview guide. Moreover, I continually refined specific questions pertaining to my general research
question after I analyzed my field notes, provided feedback to myself, and made adjustments—either modifications of prior questions/assumptions or the incorporating of new questions/topics (Herbert 1997: 7; Spradley 1979: 93-94). For instance, the initial guide was modified to include the topic of immigration status after that topic was brought up by two of the initial respondents. Likewise, the guide was later revised to include the topic of where children went to school in town after the issue of neighborhood versus random school assignment was made salient by officers in Longwood and Middleboro respectively. Any revisions to the guide were then incorporated into all subsequent ride-along interviews. In addition, following any substantive revisions to the interview guide, efforts were made to locate officers from earlier interviews who had not been asked about omitted topics in order to achieve balance across respondents and avoid inconsistencies in my data. In short, every effort was made to ensure that all respondents had an opportunity to address all of the topics in the revised versions of interview guide.

As Weiss (1994) suggests, interview guides should not be used rigidly because they may hamper or foreclose a respondent from commenting on matters for which he/she is especially able to report (p. 49). Consistent with Weiss (1994), I allowed respondents to talk about the matters that they wanted to talk about as long as such matters were within range of at least one of the topics included in the guide (pp. 48-49). Moreover, in covering the various topics included in guide, I did not follow a particular, sequential order or line of questioning as this would have disrupted the natural flow of conversation and possibly damaged my rapport with the officer. In addition, such rigid, linear questioning may have caused the patrol officer to feel uneasy and led him or her to raise his or her guard in a manner similar to that engendered by the asking of structured
questions. In light of these potential pitfalls, I attempted to bring up questions pertaining to various topics when they appeared to fit within the stream of conversation and were most germane and appropriate in terms of the context of events at a given moment. As long as each officer was presented with an opportunity to comment on all of the topics included in the interview guide, it did not matter precisely when I asked an officer about said topics. In general I avoided asking officers about quantitative items (e.g., whether the officer lived in his/her town of employ) until later in the ride-along because, as Weiss (1994) points out, the introduction of such factual type questions early in the interview might have inadvertently conveyed to the respondent that I was looking for terse, factual responses, rather than full and detailed narrative-type responses (p. 51).

While the three to five hour ride-along afforded the opportunity to cover the various topics in the interview guide at what appeared to be the most appropriate junctures, it also presented a potential problem in that officers were generally more effusive and candid after an initial period of establishing a degree of comfort and rapport. This means that topics covered in the early stage of the ride-alongs were likely to generate less comprehensive and revealing responses than those asked at the middle and later stages. In general, this did not appear to be a significant problem, as I was able to establish rapport with the majority of officers within a relatively short period time after the commencement of ride-alongs. However, in order to account for the possibility of earlier responses being terser and more guarded than latter ones, I made sure to do at least one set of follow-up questions for the topics pertaining to these responses later in the ride-along. This provided a second opportunity for officers to expound upon their earlier responses, and thus minimized the likelihood that data pertaining to the topics covered in
the earlier part of the ride-along were inferior to data gathered throughout the rest of the ride-along.

While the interview guide formed the substantive template for the ride-along interviews, the types of specific questions that I posed to officer-respondents closely followed those set forth by Spradley (1979) in his seminal work on ethnographic analysis. As Spradley (1979) indicates, questions posed to informants in an ethnographic study “arise out of the informant’s culture” (Spradley 1979:31). Accordingly, I employed a series of descriptive, structural, and contrast questions (Spradley 1979:60). Descriptive questions enable the ethnographer “to collect an ongoing sample of an informant’s language” (Spradley 1979:60). I used descriptive questions such as, “Could you describe what happened in that incident?” or “Could you tell me what the people are like in this neighborhood?” Structural questions “enable the ethnographer to discover information about domains, the basic units in an informant’s cultural knowledge” (Spradley 1979:60). Structural questions that I used include, “What are the different kinds of problems you have encountered in this neighborhood [or section of town]?” , “What are the different patrol districts in the town?” , and “What are the different groups that live is this district/section/ neighborhood?” Contrast questions “enable the ethnographer to discover the dimensions of meaning which informants employ to distinguish the objects and events in their world” (Spradley 1979:60). Some of the contrast questions that I employed were, “What is the difference between District 4 and District 5,” “What is the difference between [a particular racial group] people from district 4 and [a particular racial group] from district 8?”, and “What is different about the residents in town and the non-resident visitors?”
Although I made effort to standardize topics and questions as much as possible in order to avoid substantive inconsistencies across respondents, conducting interviews during the course of ride-alongs presented other potential problems, namely those associated with emergent situations. While, as noted earlier in this chapter, emergent incidents and events were fruitful in that they potentially generated new topics and jogged an officers’ memory, such incidents and events simultaneously presented the twin problems of selectivity and bias. Selectivity refers to how emergent incidents and events skew respondents’ responses in terms of what topics they discuss and the amount of time they devote to such topics. Bias refers to how emergent incidents and events affect respondents’ emotional state such that it colors and distorts how the respondents discuss such incidents and events and the people involved in or otherwise associated with those incidents and events.

In general, the overwhelming majority of the ride-along interviews in the three towns did not present selectivity and bias problems associated with emergent situations because there were relatively few such emergent situations. Most of officers’ responses were not given in the immediate or proximate aftermath of particular incidents. Rather, the majority of officers’ responses and commentaries were given during what would best be characterized as idle time, in which the officers were sober, relaxed, and reflective, and demonstrated complete control over their thoughts and emotions.

However, in order to minimize the potential problems selectivity and bias stemming from those emergent situations that did occur, I took several precautionary steps. First, as already noted, I made sure to ask officers about all of the topics on the interview guide. This mitigated the problem of selectivity. Second, in the wake of any
emergent situations, I allowed a five to ten minute “cooling off” period prior to asking the officer about such situations. This provided officers with an opportunity to “come down” from an incident and discuss it in a less animated state, and accordingly reduced the problem of bias. Third, I made sure to revisit at some point later in the ride-along any topics that officers discussed in the wake of emergent situations. I usually brought the topic from another angle in order to see if there were any inconsistencies in the officers’ initial and follow-up responses. In the event of an inconsistency, I pressed the officer for clarification of his discrepant responses. Lastly, I made sure to cross-check any responses given in the wake of an emergent situation with those of other officers in their department in order to ascertain if such responses were idiosyncratic and biased. In general, the apparent consistency of a given officer’s responses with respect to a particular topic during the course of a given ride-along suggests that my data is not tainted by the problems of selectivity and bias stemming from emergent situations. Officers’ responses after emergent situations were neither substantively nor affectively different from those responses given in the absence of any such situations.

During each ride-along I compiled data by jotting down shorthand notes of observations and officers’ interview statements in a notebook. While it would have been preferable to audiotape my interviews with patrol officers, none of the departments permitted audiotaping. Moreover, it is likely that audiotaping would have made the officers more self-conscious and less candid, as some topics were likely to result in revelations that put the officer or fellow officers in an unfavorable light (Weiss 1994: 55). The absence of audiotaping suggests that it is likely that interview data is missing some content and does not vividly capture officers’ speech patterns (Weiss 1994: 54).
In order to produce interview notes as close to verbatim as possible, I expounded my shorthand notes during every period in which the officer exited the patrol car to handle a particular matter or when there was a break (e.g., a dinner break). Within an hour after completing each ride along, I expounded on the notes by reading them into a tape recorder rather than transcribing them by hand. This afforded me a quicker means of creating a record of what was said and a better vehicle for recreating officers’ statements. I then later transcribed these audiotaped notes into text for purposes of analysis.

2.9. Coding, Sorting, and Analysis

In analyzing my interview and field notes, I followed the steps set forth by Spradley (1979). I searched the text for cultural symbols (Spradley 1979: 94). Cultural symbols refer to the native terms that social actors use to signify particular practices in a particular place at a particular time. For instance, in Coretown, officers made reference to a number of criminal practices that they appeared to view as exclusive symbols of non-resident Black and Hispanic visitors’ culture. Such practices included “dumping” (dropping off a stolen car and stealing a “better one”) and “shopping” (canvassing parking lots for cars to steal). This analysis then expanded to searching for symbolic categories or domains (Spradley 1979:100), which refer to the relationships among cultural symbols. For example, in Coretown, the cultural symbols “dumping” and “shopping” were subsumed under the domain “(assumed) criminal practices of non-residents.” In turn, this domain analysis led to the identification of larger themes that appeared across several domains and “serv[ed] as relationship[s] among subsystems of cultural meaning” (Spradley 1979:186; see also Weitz 1990:26). For instance, the domain “(assumed) criminal practices of non-residents” fit under the larger theme of
“distrust and suspicion of non-residents.” As suggested above, ethnographic analysis is conceived as an emergent product of a process of gradual induction. This inductive process leads to the eventual formation of grounded theory—hypotheses and theories grounded in the empirical data of cultural description (Spradley 1979:11)—which is then revised after the collection and analysis of subsequent empirical data (Spradley 1979:94).

In analyzing my empirical data I employed the manual “filing” method of coding described by Lofland and Lofland (1995). This method involves coming up with a list of codes for the cultural symbols, domains, and themes that I identified, marking these codes in the margins of copies of the field notes, and then cutting up the coded copies and placing the cut up strips into folders corresponding to each code. I then arranged and rearranged the coded strips in ways that were most logically consistent with my overall theoretical model on the influence of community structural and cultural factors on officers’ social group schemata.

CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES

1 There is a large state university located in the remote northwestern corner of Middleboro, but it has its own police force and Middleboro officers do not share concurrent jurisdiction with the university’s police force.

2 The term “Hispanic” is used by the U.S. Census Bureau as an ethnic term. It overlaps with the other racial categories and amounts to an ethnic descriptor rather than a separate racial category.

3 This comment was made by a White male Coretown officer who was discussing the high rate of traffic tickets issued by Coretown officers.

4 As noted above, the ride-along itself offered a fruitful setting for naturally and spontaneously generating discussion about various topics included on the interview guide without prompting by the interviewer.

5 Ericson’s (1982) findings demonstrate how the use of formal, structured interviews can preclude candid responses from patrol officers. When Ericson (1982) asked patrol officers a structured question at the police station regarding whom the officers felt they were serving, nearly sixty percent of the officers either did not indicate any particular groups or claimed that they served everyone. However, when the same officers were observed carrying out their
various policing tasks during the course of ride-alongs, Ericson (1982) found that the officers routinely differentiated among segments of the population. For instance, Ericson (1982) found that when officers’ performed property checks, many officers begrudgingly admitted that they foremost served the interests of the wealthier property owners whom they felt compelled to keep happy. Analogously, one would expect that a rigid, linear sequencing of ethnographic questions could preclude candid and detailed responses from officers.
CHAPTER 3: Officers’ Use of Raw Demographic Information in Mapping and Negotiating Social Group Hierarchies within Their Towns of Employ

Much of the prior work on race and policing not only assumes that patrol officers bring with them a set of stereotypes and biases about various racial and ethnic groups, but that such stereotypes and biases, many of which are subconscious, govern how such officers actually patrol various racial and ethnic groups (see e.g., Harris 2001; Marusza 1996; Regoli et al. 1988; Skolnick 1985). As discussed in Chapter 7, officers’ abiding beliefs about various groups stemming from their backgrounds and experiences have some bearing on how officers map out the social and physical landscape of the towns in which they work. However, information that officers acquire from the contexts of the local communities that they patrol plays a formative role in such mapping. As discussed in the next section, officers take this information, and through a relational process of lumping, splitting, and contrasting, mentally construct and differentiate an array of social groups and subgroups, and then rank such groups and subgroups within a hierarchy in terms of race, ethnicity, class, and immigration status. One of the important sources of social group information that officers use to construct the framework of this relational hierarchy is raw demographic information—information pertaining to the approximate, relative absence or presence of groups within a given town. This raw demographic information interacts with power-related information (Chapter 4), culture-related information (Chapter 5), spatial and temporal information (Chapter 6), and information pertaining to the officers’ personal backgrounds and experiences (Chapter 7), in conditioning and constituting officers’ social group schemata. Before taking a closer look at how officers’ social group schemata are conditioned by raw demographic
information, I briefly discuss the processes by which these schemata are cognitively constructed.

3.1. *Officers’ Relational Construction and Ranking of Social Groups*

Officers arrive at their identifications and rankings of racial, ethnic, and class groups and subgroups in their respective towns of employ via a highly relational assessment process. In particular, this process involves the three categorization processes of lumping, splitting, and contrasting. Lumping involves either situating similarly perceived groups in the same category [*e.g.*, Longwood officers’ situating Polish immigrants within the “White” category (discussed in Chapter 5)], or the clustering of groups in close proximity to one another within the town’s overall social hierarchy [*e.g.*, Longwood officers’ view of the Portuguese group as being similar to the White group (discussed in Chapter 5)] (Zerubavel 1991:16-17). Splitting refers to the division of an identified group into subgroups based on perceived differences within the group [*e.g.*, Middleboro officers’ view of Blacks in the southeastern part of town as being distinct from Blacks living in other parts of Middleboro (discussed in Chapters 4 through 6)] (pp. 21, 27). Contrasting involves distinguishing various groups through direct comparison [*e.g.*, Longwood officers’ view of Latinos as being very different from Blacks (discussed in Chapter 5)] (pp. 7, 9-10, 16-17).

Once officers have constructed a group-based hierarchy within their towns of employ, this hierarchy or social group structure affects how it is that officers think about, approach, and negotiate their interactions with members of various groups within the town. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, officers’ approaches towards various groups did not necessarily correspond directly to groups’ relative positions within the hierarchy.
Although officers in all three towns generally were most solicitous and/or cautious in how they approached members of groups that they perceived as being at or near the top of their respective town’s social hierarchy, nevertheless, higher-ranked groups, through their associations with lower-ranked groups, were able to shield these lower-ranked groups from less favorable police treatment in certain contexts.

3.2. *The Salience of Raw Demographic Information to Officers in Local Communities*

Officers in Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro were similarly highly attuned to demographic information in their respective towns of employment. Officers processed information about their respective towns’ raw demographics—the percentage of various racial, ethnic, class, and immigrant groups—in two ways. First, officers’ perceptions of their respective towns’ raw demographics contributed to officers’ constructions and rankings of various groups, which in turn affected officers’ approaches towards such groups. Second, officers’ processing of such demographic information affected officers’ approaches towards various groups independent of the groups’ position within a town’s hierarchy or the groups’ relationships to other groups in the hierarchy.

Apart from its effect on officers’ perceptions of a group’s power or lack thereof to affect outcomes, officers’ perceptions of the relative size of a given group’s population within the officers’ town of employ contributed in part to how officers viewed the group in three important ways. First, the perceived size of a group contributed in part to whether officers saw this group as having a legitimate presence within the community. Second, the perceived size of a group affected in part whether officers adhered to stereotypes regarding the group. Third, the perceived size of a group contributed in part to the extent to which officers exhibited concerns about racial profiling.
The influence of raw demographics on officers’ perceptions of the overall legitimacy of groups’ presence within their respective towns of patrol, and on officers’ adherence to group stereotypes, is best exemplified by Coretown and Longwood officers’ radically different perceptions of, and approaches towards, “Latinos” or “Hispanics,” notwithstanding the proximity of the two towns. In Coretown, where officers indicated that there were virtually no “Hispanic” residents, officers held highly negative stereotypical views of Hispanics and engaged in aggressive policing of Hispanics who either worked in or traversed through Coretown. In contrast, in Longwood, where officers indicated that there was a significant and growing percentage of “Hispanic” residents, officers generally viewed Hispanics in a benign, or at least non-threatening, light.

The perceived absence of Hispanic residents in Coretown, and conversely, the perceived presence of a significant Hispanic residential population in Longwood, affected officers’ perceptions of the overall legitimacy of Hispanics’ presence in the two respective towns due to the connections between residency and perceptions of familiarity. In both towns, officers’ discourse was rife with references to the importance of being familiar with people, and how residential status conveyed such familiarity. For instance, a White male Coretown officer stated:

It’s important to know what you’re dealing with. Some people have been here for several generations and there’s no surprises. I mean, yeah, even if a kid’s an asshole, you know where he came from.

Similarly, a White male Longwood officer commented:
The people who live in town, yeah some of ‘em are headaches, but you know what you’ve got. There’s nothing from left field. Even if it’s not good, at least you know what to expect.

While both Coretown and Longwood officers concurred in their assessment of the importance of residence to perceptions of familiarity, their perceptions of Hispanics widely diverged as a result of their application of this residency-familiarity linkage. For instance, another White male Coretown officer specifically referenced the importance of familiarity when describing his uneasiness in dealing with Hispanics:

These guys who work at the restaurants downtown, you don’t know anything about them. You don’t know anything about their families, where they live, nothing. They could be drug runners for all you know, but you just got no way of knowing….

In stark contrast, a White male Longwood officer explained why he saw Hispanics as being innocuous:

Yeah, I used to go that take-out place a lot when I was a kid, but now it’s mostly Mexicans who go there. There’s a lot of Mexicans that live over this way [District 8] now. You can tell by that Spanish sign in the window; I’ve got no goddamned idea what that says. But the Mexicans—the Hispanics, they’re alright. They don’t give us no problem. They just work all the time and they don’t complain. You can ride through their neighborhoods and it’s real quiet. I mean, yeah, sometimes you’ll hear some of that, what’s it called, salsa, but it’s nothing….

While the Coretown officer has no residential neighborhoods from which to develop a sense of familiarity with the Hispanics who work downtown, the Longwood officer is able to establish such familiarity through assessments of Hispanics’ neighborhoods and the places that they patronize, like the take-out restaurant.
The perceived residential absence of Hispanics in Coretown, and perceived residential presence in Longwood, is also significant in terms of its effect on the two towns’ respective officers’ stereotypes regarding Hispanics. It is clear that officers from both Coretown and Longwood harbored stereotypes pertaining to Hispanics. For instance, White male officers from both towns similarly expressed certain stereotypes pertaining to Hispanics’ reproductive habits:

Longwood Officer: Every time you see them walking down the street, they’ve got a cake in the oven.

Coretown Officer: You know someday they are going to be the majority in this country. I guess they have nothing else to do besides having babies.

Likewise, both Coretown and Longwood officers expressed stereotypical views of Hispanics’ dwelling habits, as reflected in the comments of these two White male officers:

Longwood Officer: It’s not like when I lived here. We had one family living in the house. One family. Now, you’ve got three or four families living under one roof, and grandma and cousin Jose, it’s just ridiculous.

Coretown Officer: Yeah there’s some Hispanics who live here. It’s easy to find ‘em ‘cause they all live in the same house down by the railroad tracks.

While both Coretown and Longwood officers expressed stereotypical views of Hispanics, only Coretown expressed criminal stereotypes regarding Hispanics and generalized crimes involving Hispanic individuals to the entire Hispanic population. Virtually all of the Coretown officers interviewed (fourteen out of sixteen), brought up an incident that had occurred several months earlier involving a Hispanic man who was arrested at approximately 2 A.M. while riding his bicycle on Night Avenue² after his shift
at a local restaurant had ended. One of the two arresting officers, both of whom were

White males, described the incident as follows:

So we’re driving down [Night] Avenue and it’s about two in the morning and it’s raining out; I mean you can’t see a goddamned thing. And then we spot this guy on his bike, and I’m like, “What the fuck is this guy doing? It’s raining out for Christ’s sake!” So we pull up to this guy and he starts saying something in Spanish, I’ve got no idea what he saying, and we just tell him to take it easy. The guy keeps saying something about a restaurant, and he’s acting all nervous like a deer in the headlights. Finally I tell the guy to get off the bike and show me some ID. The guy keeps yelling something in Spanish and starts pedaling again. [My partner] grabs him off the bike and puts him against the side of the [patrol] car. We keep telling the guy to shut up, but he keeps yelling and flailing his arms. Then I pinned him to the car and [my partner] frisked him. We founda bag of marijuana in one of his pockets and we took him down to the station…. When we got down to the station we noticed that our biker had a tattoo on his arm just like the tattoos that that MS-13 gang has.

When Coretown officers discussed Hispanic males, both those who had committed minor offenses and those who had not committed any offenses, the officers invariably referenced this particular story about the biker with the marijuana and the MS-13 tattoo as being emblematic of all Hispanic males. Indeed, as a result of this biker incident, Coretown officers appeared to be very suspicious of all of the Hispanic males who worked at the restaurants in the downtown area in the center of Coretown. For instance, one White male Coretown officer remarked:

A lot of those guys working downtown, it’s just a front. They’re probably in MS-13 or some other gang, and they’re running drugs between [Elmwood] (a town to the east of Coretown) and [Piedmont] (a town to the west of Coretown).

Similarly, after spotting a Hispanic man wearing an apron and a large gold-colored chain and smoking a cigarette outside of a restaurant in Coretown’s central downtown section, another White male Coretown officer made the following comments:
Look at that guy. I mean c’mon, where do think he got that chain? From washing dishes? Yeah, right.

Coretown officers’ suspicion of Hispanic males was not only bolstered by their belief that a lot of Latino males were affiliated with gangs, but that it was much more difficult for them to identify a Hispanic gang member as opposed to a Black gang member. Coretown officers indicated that Hispanic gang members were less visible and ostentatious, and more discreet, than Black gang members. For example, a White male Coretown officer noted the difficulty that he had in identifying Hispanic gang members:

It’s hard to tell [who’s a gang member] when you pull them over. They’re not flashy like other gangs. They can hide their tattoos and they keep a real low profile. There’s a lot of [Hispanic gang members] over in [Radnor]. That’s where a lot of the ones who work at the restaurants live. I’m not saying all of ‘em are MS-13, but you never know.

In contrast, Coretown officers claimed that they could identify Black gang members, such as members of the Bloods and Crips, relatively easily. For instance, a White male Coretown officer stated:

I went to the workshop they had on gangs and it was really helpful. They tell you all about the signs, colors, what they say. Like you can tell the Bloods not just by the red they wear, but by what they say. I stopped a car a couple of weeks ago and I knew right away they were Bloods when they said, “What’s poppin’?”

In sum, Coretown officers’ self-professed inability to identify who was and who was not a gang member amplified the officers’ suspicion of all Hispanic males. More generally, officers’ generalized, gang-related suspicion of Hispanic males reflects the extent to which Coretown officers’ cognitive maps were collectively constructed. In particular, these officers’ exchanging of the story regarding the suspected MS-13 gang member helped to bolster a collectively shared schema from which officers made
inferences about Hispanic male criminality. Such inferences were further strengthened by officers’ sharing of stories that contrasted suspected Black “gang members” with suspected Hispanic “gang members.”

Coretown officers’ generalized suspicion of Hispanic males was particularly manifest in the officers’ traffic enforcement practices along Night Avenue (an east-west road that bisects Coretown). Of the thirty-two motorists who were pulled over by one of five different Coretown officers who devoted substantial time to traffic enforcement along Night Avenue during the course of five respective ride-alongs, eighteen were Hispanic (approximately 56 percent), and sixteen of these eighteen motorists were Hispanic males. An even starker racial disparity was evident in terms of those motorists who received tickets. Of the motorists to whom Coretown officers’ issued tickets for traffic infractions, sixteen of the nineteen (approximately 84 percent) were Hispanic, and all but one of the sixteen was a Hispanic male. Stated differently, Hispanics received traffic tickets almost 89 percent of the time, whereas non-Hispanics (Whites and Blacks only) received tickets only 21 percent of the time. These percentages are particularly noteworthy given that Coretown officers expressly noted that the majority of people traveling on Night Avenue were White, followed by Blacks, and then Hispanics and Asians. So even though Hispanics constituted a minority of the motorists on Night Avenue, they nevertheless constituted the overwhelming majority of motorists whom Coretown officers stopped and ticketed.

Although Coretown officers engaged in traffic enforcement on other roads in Coretown, and Hispanics were stopped (11 percent) and ticketed (7 percent) at much lower rates on these roads than on Night Avenue, nevertheless Hispanics were still
substantially more likely to be stopped and ticketed in Coretown due to the fact that the bulk of traffic enforcement in Coretown was conducted along the easternmost and westernmost points of Night Avenue. Moreover, given that Coretown officers repeatedly discussed how Coretown, and more specifically, Night Avenue, was situated in the middle of a “drug corridor” between Elmwood and Piedmont, two towns with poor and working-class Hispanic populations, it appears that Coretown officers’ disproportionate stopping and ticketing of Hispanics along Night Avenue was tied to officers’ assumptions that Hispanics traveling on Night Avenue were possibly transporting drugs or other contraband.

Coretown officers’ apparent targeting of Hispanics also can be inferred from the officers’ self-acknowledged discretionary policies with respect to stopping motorists. All Coretown officers acknowledged that they had wide discretion with respect to pulling over a vehicle for a traffic infraction. For instance, a White male Coretown officer made the following statement with respect to pulling over motorists:

If you want to, you can pull just about anybody over. I mean, you follow somebody long enough, you’re gonna find something [to justify pulling over a motorist]. But you’ve got to pick your spots.

Given that Coretown officers acknowledged that there were justifiable grounds for pulling over just about any motorist, coupled with fact that the majority of motorists traveling through Coretown were non-Hispanic, further suggests that Coretown officers were selectively exercising their wide discretion in traffic enforcement to target Hispanics.

While it is likely that the apparent class status of Hispanic motorists contributed in part to Coretown officers’ decisions to pull over Hispanic motorists, as Hispanic
motorists generally drove cars that were in poorer condition than the cars driven by non-Hispanic motorists, the apparent Hispanic status of the driver nevertheless appeared to be the key factor precipitating a stop. Although Coretown officers indicated that one of the factors that they considered in determining whether to stop a vehicle was how “beat up” or “run-down” the vehicle appeared, Coretown officers generally did not describe vehicles driven by Hispanics in those terms. Indeed, of the eighteen vehicles driven by Hispanics on Night Avenue that they stopped, officers only identified two of them as being “beat up” or “run-down.” Moreover, officers generally ignored “beat up” or “run-down” vehicles driven by those who, based on my own observations, appeared to fit the officers’ phenotypic description of Whites, Blacks, or Asians.

Coretown officers expressly indicated that they pulled over “beat up” or “run-down”-looking vehicles because they assumed such vehicles were more likely to contain some form of contraband. More specifically, Coretown officers contended that they eyed “beat up” or “run-down” vehicles with a heightened sense of suspicion because such vehicles presented a greater deal of uncertainty or unpredictability. For instance, one White male Coretown officer stated:

When you see a car that’s all dented up and it’s got all kinds of garbage strewn all over the insides, you wanna know what else might be goin’ on….Who knows what the hell you’ll find in a vehicle like that.

Given Coretown officers’ apparent racial selectivity in pulling over “beat up” or “run-down” vehicles, it appears that the greater uncertainty or unpredictability fueling a disproportionate percentage of the officers’ stops of motorists along Night Avenue was driven less by the appearance of a vehicle and more by the apparent Hispanic status of the motorist. Again, it appears that as a result of the absence of a residential Hispanic
population in Coretown, Coretown officers generally were neither familiar nor comfortable with Hispanics. In turn, absent such familiarly and comfort, Coretown officers were not sure what to expect from Hispanic motorists, and accordingly were more suspicious of them and the contents of their vehicles.

In contrast to Coretown officers, Longwood officers did not criminalize Hispanics, particularly Hispanic men. Unlike Coretown officers, Longwood officers did not disproportionately stop and question Hispanics. Moreover, while Coretown officers generalized criminal suspicion to all Hispanic men and unambiguously expressed highly negative, criminal stereotypes regarding Hispanics, Longwood officers neither generalized particular criminal incidents to all Hispanics nor expressed criminal stereotypes regarding Hispanics. For instance, in discussing a fight at a “Hispanic” bar that led to a fatal stabbing of one of the patrons in District 3, Longwood officers were careful to avoid treating the three Hispanic men who were arrested in connection with the fight and homicide as being representative of other Hispanics in Longwood. A White male Longwood officer indicated that the three Hispanic men were “bad apples,” implying that they were exceptions to an otherwise law-abiding Hispanic population. An Asian male Longwood officer remarked, “that’s what happens when you have too much to drink,” effectively suggesting that anyone, regardless of race or ethnicity, was capable of the same type of behavior. Another White male Longwood officer was more direct in dismissing the fight and stabbing as anomalous events that were not representative of Hispanics in Longwood on the whole when he stated:

We don’t have too many problems with Hispanics. Every now and again you get some fight at a bar—the Mexicans, Hispanics, they like to drink—but it’s usually no big deal. We did have that stabbing at [Jose’s] (a Hispanic bar), but you don’t
see that kind of stuff here; not with Hispanics….Hispanics usually don’t give us any problems. They just keep to themselves.

The glaring discrepancy between Longwood and Coretown officers’ stereotypical views of Hispanics with respect to criminal behavior appears to be strongly connected to the perceived greater residential representation and rootedness of Hispanics in Longwood. In short, as a result of their familiarity and history with Hispanics in Longwood, Longwood officers knew what to expect from the Hispanic population. For instance, one White male Longwood officer noted:

You don’t see much with the Mexicans, Hispanics. They pretty much just work. Yeah, they do like to drink, but we don’t get much on that….You know how there are people who are nasty when they drink, well the Mexicans, they’re like happy drunks. They don’t really bother anyone. Once in a while we get a domestic [violence incident], but usually you just get the guy to cool off and that’s that. Yeah, that’s about it.

Officers’ perceptions of Hispanics’ greater residential presence and ties in Longwood not only reduce officers’ potential suspicion of Hispanics through greater opportunities to become familiar with Hispanics, but also provide experiential information that officers can use to disconfirm or offset whatever stereotypical information they may have received from outside the community or from prior socialization agents such as parents, teachers, or the media. Although Coretown and Longwood officers both harbored some stereotypes regarding Hispanics (e.g., stereotypes regarding reproductive and residential habits), Longwood officers, unlike Coretown officers, could reference a stockpile of firsthand experience information that told them that Hispanics were generally law-abiding and non-threatening. As a result, specific criminal incidents involving Hispanics in Coretown confirmed and validated Coretown officers’ stereotypes regarding
Hispanics’ criminality, whereas the potentially inflammatory effect of such incidents on officers’ preexisting stereotypes regarding Latinos was neutralized in Longwood by Longwood officers’ accumulated contact with Hispanic residents. More generally, this suggests that the ways communities are structured, and not officers’ personal prejudices, are key to understanding how it is that officers approach various groups in the towns in which officers work. Officers in both towns exhibited some degree of prejudice with respect to Hispanics, but the different demographic structures of Coretown and Longwood led to officers’ prejudices being amplified in Coretown and muted in Longwood.

While the perceived raw demographics or residential absence or presence of a particular group helps to explain officers’ discrepant approaches towards Hispanics in Coretown and Longwood, perceived raw demographics do not explain Middleboro’s laissez-faire approach towards Hispanics, notwithstanding the virtual absence of Hispanics in Middleboro. Although Middleboro and Coretown officers both worked in communities that lacked a Hispanic residential population that could potentially help to offset or neutralize whatever stereotypes officers may have harbored with respect to Hispanics, Middleboro and Coretown officers’ respective approaches towards Hispanics were shaped by radically different constituency pressures. In Middleboro, as discussed more fully in Chapter 4, officers confronted a dominant, powerful coalition of middle- to upper-middle-class Whites and Blacks whom officers perceived as being opposed to the harassment of any groups, including Hispanics. Middleboro officers’ perception of the majority of Middleboro residents’ support for Hispanics was clearly evident when the officers discussed the issue of Hispanic day laborers. As noted in the following exchange...
involving a White male Middleboro officer, Middleboro officers saw the dominant
coalition of Whites and Blacks as supporting the rights of such Hispanic laborers under
the rubric of promoting and safeguarding diversity.

Officer: In most places…the people are up in arms about these guys hanging out
on the corners looking for work. We don’t have that problem here, but
even if we did, the people here would see it as a good thing.

Interviewer: What do you mean by “seeing it as a good thing?”

Officer: I mean they love diversity here. It’s all about diversity. That’s why a lot
of people move here. So yeah, even if these guys were standing on the
street corners, they wouldn’t mind. They wouldn’t want us going near
them. If we tried chasing ’em out, the next thing you’d know they’d be
callin’ the ACLU. If you ask me, there’s too many damned lawyers
around here. It’s all about rights; I’ve got my rights, you’ve got your
rights, and diversity. It’s about rights and diversity.

As this Middleboro officer’s comments suggest, Middleboro officers felt that they had to
approach Hispanics, as well as other racial minorities, with kid gloves due to pressures
from the majority of residents to maintain a diverse community in which everyone’s
rights were respected and protected.

Other Middleboro officers simply stated that they had to be careful in how they
approached Hispanics due to the “liberal” leanings of the town’s dominant coalition of
Whites and Blacks. For instance, one White male Middleboro officer remarked:

No, there’s not that many Hispanics around here like in other places, but that
doesn’t matter. The people here are so liberal, they’re like, “He’s my brother.”
So yeah, they’d have a shitfit if we even went near [Hispanics] hanging out on the
corner. Yeah, this is like the liberal capital of the world.

Although Coretown officers did not express any pressures from the dominant
White middle- to upper-middle-class constituency to target Hispanics in Coretown,
Coretown officers, unlike Middleboro officers, did not experience any constituency pressures to leave Hispanics alone. Consequently, there were no checks or constraints on the policing of Hispanics in Coretown, whereas there were strong perceived checks on the policing of Hispanics in Middleboro. In sum, unlike Longwood and Middleboro, Coretown lacked structural constraints on officers’ patrolling of Hispanics.

While the absence of a Hispanic residential presence in Coretown contributed to Coretown officers’ heightened scrutiny and harassment of Hispanics, the relative absence of a Black residential presence had the opposite effect on Coretown officers’ policing of Blacks in some parts of the town. Coretown officers became noticeably concerned about racial profiling when encountering or even thinking about Black motorists while conducting traffic enforcement in certain parts of Coretown. Coretown officers’ concerns about racial profiling appeared to stem from a combination of the absence of Black residents in Coretown coupled with their equation of “race” with “Black.” For Coretown officers, Black motorists’ race became salient against the backdrop of demographically “White” Coretown, and in turn, Coretown officers became worried about the appearance of racial profiling. One White male Coretown officer expressed this concern after issuing a warning to a Black motorist on Night Avenue:

> You just try to do your job and the color of the driver shouldn’t matter, you know, you’re just doing your job. But you still gotta be careful. I mean, no one likes to admit it, but this is a White town. Yeah, there’s a few Blacks scattered here and there, but it’s still a White town. So I pull over a Black, say, who’s speeding. What are people gonna say? “Oh, he was speeding?” No, they’re gonna say, “What are you doing stopping a Black guy?”

As a result of this concern about the appearance of racial profiling, this officer, as well as the majority of Coretown officers, indicated that they thought twice about pulling over
Black motorists and issuing traffic tickets to those Black motorists whom they did pull over.5

Unlike the raw social groups in Coretown, the raw social groups in Longwood and Middleboro did not generate officers’ concerns about racial profiling of Blacks or any socially identified racial or ethnic groups. Given the sizable Black populations in Longwood (Blacks constituting approximately one-quarter of the town’s population) and Middleboro (Blacks constituting approximately one-third of the town’s population), not a single Longwood or Middleboro officer ever expressed any concerns that their encounters with Blacks would stand out as glaring anomalies against their respective town’s overall social group backdrops. Indeed, officers in both Longwood and Middleboro conveyed that stopping Blacks was normal and expected in their respective towns. For example, a White male Middleboro officer stated:

They may think I’m profiling or whatever, but what do you expect? If there’s Black people in town, you’re gonna stop ‘em at some point. That’s not being racist, that’s just who’s here.

In a similar vein, a White Longwood officer remarked:

You know I wish I didn’t have to deal with the shittums (young Black males from District 4). You know, if it was up to me, I’d just stay the hell away from them…. But there’s no way you can avoid ‘em. You’re gonna run into them sooner or later.

While both Longwood and Middleboro officers thought it was normal to have encounters with Blacks given the overall social group of the two respective towns, Middleboro officers nevertheless expressed concerns about profiling accusations due to perceived scrutiny from the town’s powerful coalition of White and Black middle- to upper-middle-class residents. Middleboro officers perceived that the powerful, vocal,
“liberal,” “pro-civil rights” coalition of Whites and Blacks would potentially interpret any stops or encounters with Blacks as constituting profiling and/or harassment. In contrast, Longwood officers rarely ever expressed any concerns about profiling. Indeed, as discussed in the next chapter, Longwood officers saw the town’s powerful, dominant White constituency group as supporting the targeting of Blacks, particularly Blacks from District 4.

3.3. Conclusion

Information about a town’s raw demographics plays an important role conditioning officers’ social group schemata in ways that differ between towns. As Coretown and Longwood officers’ starkly different perceptions of Hispanics demonstrates, the absence or presence of a particular group within a town influenced officers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of that group’s presence, and affected the extent to which stereotypes of Hispanic criminality from the macro-societal social group schema were suppressed or activated. The established presence of a fairly sizable Hispanic residential population in Longwood contributed to Longwood officers’ perceptions of Hispanics as legitimately present, and neutralized any potential criminal stereotypes associated with Hispanics. Moreover, as alluded to in this chapter and more fully developed in Chapter 5, the presence of derogated Black population in Longwood to which officers could contrast Hispanics also contributed to officers’ positive perceptions of Hispanics.

In contrast, the relative absence of a residential Hispanic population in Coretown contributed to Coretown officers’ perceptions of Hispanics as lacking a legitimate presence in town, and facilitated the activation of stereotypes pertaining to Hispanic
criminality. In turn, these criminal stereotypes and the perceived lack of legitimacy of Hispanics contributed to Coretown officers’ apparent profiling of Hispanics. However, Coretown officers’ apparent lack of profiling of Blacks, notwithstanding the absence of a significant minority Black population in Coretown, demonstrates that the meanings associated with raw demographic information do not condition officers’ schemata in isolation. Rather such demographic information acts in tandem with meanings derived from other sources, and these combined meanings then shape and condition officers’ social group schemata. In Coretown, the general lack of a residential population for a particular group coupled with officers’ association of “race” with “Black” led to raw demographic information acting as a structural constraint on officers’ profiling of Blacks, but not Hispanics.

The differences between Coretown and Longwood’s officers’ perceptions of and approaches towards “Hispanics” stemming in part from raw demographic information also highlights the extent to which officers collectively construct and share social group schemata. Information pertaining to a particular community’s demographic structures similarly constrains all officers working within that jurisdiction. Moreover, officers reinforce these structural constraints by constantly sharing and reminding each other about information that is tied to these constraints.

While raw demographic information pertaining to the relative size and/or presence or absence of groups conditions officers’ social group schemata in terms of the perceived legitimacy of groups, activation or suppression of group stereotypes, and concerns about racial profiling, such demographic information is also one of a number of factors that affect officers’ construction and ranking of social groups in terms of officers’
perceptions of these groups’ power to affect outcomes. The ways in which such power-related factors condition officers’ social group schemata is the explored and elaborated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES

1 Officers in Longwood generally used the term “Hispanics” to describe Spanish-speaking residents who had ancestral ties to Mexico and various countries in Central America. Some Longwood officers used the terms “Hispanic” and “Mexican” interchangeably, but as the officers themselves indicated, they were referring to a broader population of Spanish-speaking people beyond Mexico. As noted later in the chapter, Longwood officers occasionally used the term “Hispanic” to refer to Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans respectively. However, officers typically referred to these groups by their ethnic/national designations rather than by the term “Hispanic.” Accordingly, the following discussion comparing “Hispanics” in Longwood with “Hispanics” in Coretown is limited to officers’ perceptions of Mexicans and those from countries in Central America, particularly Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Coretown officers used the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” interchangeably to describe Spanish-speaking residents who had ancestral ties to Mexico and various countries in Central America. For purposes of consistency I will employ the term “Hispanic” throughout the subsequent analysis and discussion.

2 Night Avenue is one of two east-west thoroughfares bisecting the central part of Coretown.

3 Following each traffic stop I asked the officer who made the stop to clarify the race of the driver. Officers’ designation of “Hispanic” to describe a motorist appeared to be based on surname, phenotype, accent, and the motorist’s town of residence.

4 As noted later in this chapter, the majority of Coretown officers also were not familiar with “Asians,” but generally applied a “model minority” stereotype to Asians that insulated those categorized as Asian from the same kind of scrutiny that Hispanics faced.

5 As discussed in Chapter 5, Coretown officers’ concerns about racial profiling were spatially qualified. That is, Coretown officers expressed a concern about being accused of racial profiling only in select spaces within Coretown. In other spaces, Coretown officers not only expressed no concerns about profiling of Blacks (or other racial minority groups), but engaged in patrolling that was highly consonant with racial profiling.

6 This perceived powerful coalition of Whites and Blacks in Middleboro is discussed more fully in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 4: Officers’ Use of Power-Related Information in Mapping and Negotiating Social Group Hierarchies within Their Towns of Employ

4.1. *The Salience of Power-Related Information to Officers in Local Communities*

While officers pay attention to a wide variety of social group information when cognitively mapping racial, ethnic, and other social groups within their towns of employ, information pertaining to various social groups’ relative power should, as conflict theorists such as Chambliss and Seidman (1971) and Quinney (1975) predict, factor prominently in this cognitive mapping. The findings documented throughout this chapter indicate that in identifying and ranking groups, officers do, in fact, give considerable attention to information pertaining to the relative power of groups. This chapter sets out to explore the types of power-related information that officers cognitively collect, decode, and interpret within the communal context in which they work, and how officers then use such information to construct the social group hierarchy that serves as the principal framework of officers’ social group schemata.

In examining how officers’ cull and cognitively process power-related information from the social and cultural landscapes of their towns of employ, I focus on information pertaining to groups’ ability or lack thereof to affect and manipulate outcomes in their favor. While some theorists such as Foucault (1977) argue that power is inscribed in a wide variety of entities and practices, I am, consistent with Weber (1947), defining power more narrowly as the means to affect outcomes (here, within a given town). This narrower definition is in keeping with the way in which officers in the towns of Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro appeared to understand the concept of power.¹
There are several types of power-related information that play an important role in conditioning officers’ schemata within officers’ towns of employ. Officers foremost assess a group’s power in terms of its relative, approximate size, class position, level of organization and vocality (Chambliss and Seidman 1971:330), connections to and influence over the police and the court system (Sullivan 1989:197), connections to and influence over town officials and other local, regional, and state politicians (Chambliss and Seidman 1971:329; Sullivan 1989:197-198), and ability to access and make use of use of media and advocacy organizations and entities both inside and outside of town (Chambliss and Seidman 1971:330). While a group’s size and mean class status factor into officers’ identification and ranking of that group, the findings throughout this chapter show that such identification and ranking are particularly affected by officers’ perceptions of how organized and vocal group members appear to be, and most importantly, how much influence these group members appear to exert both within and outside of town. More specifically, officers are particularly attuned to how much influence groups appear to have with town officials, as well as with organizations and entities both inside and outside of town. These latter power-related factors are likely highly salient to officers because these factors directly relate to group members’ ability to manipulate outcomes with local communal contexts. These findings are consistent with those of Sullivan (1989), in that residents’ personal and familial connections in local communal contexts appear to be strongly related to group members’ ability to affect outcomes.

While officers’ approaches to various social groups is heavily influenced by the power-related information that they assemble and process within their towns of employ,
there is not a clear, straightforward relationship between officers’ perceptions of groups’ or subgroups’ relative power and how officers approach those groups and subgroups. The relative position of a group or subgroup within a particular town’s social group hierarchy is important, but it is not solely determinative of how officers approach and negotiate their interactions with the members of such socially designated groups or subgroups. How officers negotiate their patrolling of various groups and subgroups also depends on the relationships of various groups and subgroups within a town’s social group hierarchy, the ties that these groups and subgroups have to outside groups, and the interests and expectations of the groups that officers perceive as being more powerful. Although officers generally are more solicitous of and deferential to the powerful groups within each town, some less powerful groups benefit from an “umbrella effect”, whereby more powerful groups inside or outside of the town shield less powerful groups from potential harassment or targeting by the police.

The remainder of this chapter examines the various power-related factors that condition officers’ social group schemata in Longwood, Middleboro, and Coretown. While there are some similarities across towns in terms of the types of power-related information that is salient to officers, the particular types of power-related information that appear to be of most consequence to officers’ cognitive mapping vary from town to town. Such between-town variation in the salience of types of power-related information reflects the different communal structures within each town.

4.2. The Power-Related Conditioning of Officers’ Schemata in Longwood

While groups’ connections to town officials factored into officers’ assessments of group power in each of the three towns, the extent to which groups had connections to or
were able to influence town officials was most apparent in Longwood officers’ assessments of group power. In discussing the power wielded by members of the dominant White majority group in Longwood, all eighteen Longwood officers emphasized these White group members’ connections with and/or ability to influence the mayor, the deputy mayor, town council members, the police chief, and/or the deputy police chief, all but one of whom were White. In directly or indirectly citing Whites’ influence with respect to town officials, Longwood officers invariably provided specific examples of residents from both of the nearly all-White districts (1 and 2) in the northwestern part of Longwood, where the majority of Whites in Longwood live. For instance, while driving through a neighborhood in the heart of District 2, a White male Longwood officer stated the following about the neighborhood’s residents:

Officer: Everybody around here is connected.

Interviewer: What do you mean by “connected”?

Officer: I mean, everybody knows somebody. The lady who lives over there, she’s got it in with the mayor; she knows the mayor’s son. The guy over there he’s buddies with the [Johnny Garber] on the town council. That house over there, she’s the sister of the Deputy Chief [of police].

Similarly, while driving through a neighborhood in District 1, a White male Longwood officer commented:

That’s where [Olivo] on the town council lives. Anybody has a problem around here, they just go to him. His father used to be the president of the town council. One thing everybody knows in this town, you don’t fuck with [Olivo].

In discussing White District 1 and 2 residents’ connections to the powers that be, Longwood officers emphasized that such connections translated into a high degree of
responsiveness from the police. Although Longwood officers’ described District 1 residents in the most northwestern part of town as having a slightly higher socioeconomic status than that of District 2 residents—as evidenced by the quality and spacing of homes, and by District 1’s nickname, “Bright Acres”—nevertheless, officers viewed the residents of District 2 as the most powerful segment of the town’s White population because they were most likely to complain to town officials, including police officials, and the most likely to obtain desired outcomes as a result of their vocality.4 In particular, Longwood officers saw older, White female homeowners in District 2 as powerful constituents to whom the officers had to cater. For instance, one White male Longwood officer said the following about two White women in their seventies who lived in separate homes near a park a couple of blocks from Longwood High School in District 2:

The kids like to come and hang out in the park after school and sometimes they stick around ‘til it gets dark….You’re supposed to be out of the park once it’s dusk, but some of ‘em, you can’t get them to leave. I mean, I don’t really care. The kids aren’t doin’ nothin’. I don’t really give a shit. But if I see ‘em hanging around after dark, I gotta tell em’ to get goin’. There’s a couple of ladies who live near the park and they’re like on the goddamn phone to the chief every other day, and then the next thing you know I got the lieutenant on my back. Who needs that shit? Not me.

Likewise, another White male Longwood officer relayed the following about a White woman (Mrs. Smith) who lived in a house in the central part of District 2:

You see that house over there? This lady, Mrs. [Smith], lives there. She’s got some kind of in with the mayor and [councilman] [Rinaldi]….Last year there was this whole thing with a bus stop by her house. They put up this little shelter [by the bus stop], and she kept callin’ and complainin’. She said people were just hangin’ out, makin’ noise, leavin’ trash all over the place, guys peein’ in her yard, yellin’ at her daughter, you name it…. Anyways, it was all bullshit, but we didn’t want her callin’ the mayor, especially after what he did to the chief….5 One day
I’m riding by and I notice the shelter is gone, just gone. I came to find out that she got them to get rid of the bus stop.

Although this officer, like other Longwood officers, found noise and public disorder complaints from White residents like Mrs. Smith to be annoying, nevertheless he and other Longwood officers felt obliged to respond quickly to and show respect for these residents’ complaints due to these residents’ apparent connections to powerful Longwood officials such as the mayor and town council members.

The power of White Longwood residents, particularly residents of District 2, to obtain a swift and effective response from Longwood officers was most evident, however, not when Longwood officers responded to and commented about specific actual complaints, but rather when Longwood officers either proactively responded to circumstances that they observed during the course of patrol or spoke of feeling compelled to proactively respond so as to head off any complaints from powerful, vocal Whites. In particular, Longwood officers’ proactive talk and actions centered upon Black youth returning home to Districts 4 and 8 from Longwood High School, which is located in the northern, central part of District 2. Longwood officers repeatedly discussed how White residents, invariably middle-aged to older White women, constantly complained about Black Longwood High School students congregating and making noise near the complainants’ homes and in the streets of the complainants’ neighborhoods. As a result of this history of complaints, Longwood officers, including Black Longwood officers, routinely drove up to groups of Black youth that appeared to be lingering in District 2 neighborhoods to the east and south of Longwood High School and told the members of these groups that they needed to “move along.” Through their proactive prodding of
Black youth to disperse, Longwood officers appeared to be conditioned to “move along” such youth in District 2 after the 3 o’clock dismissal. Officers did not need an actual call for service or complaint to spring into action; rather, they responded almost reflexively to any groups of Black youth that appeared to be loitering. For instance, after spotting a group of five Black male and three Black female students who were standing in the street about a block and a half to the southeast of Longwood High School, a White male Longwood officer pulled up his patrol car and stated from the window of car:

You can’t have a block party here. It’s time to take the show on the road. Now let’s go. …. Let’s go guys.

Following this encounter this officer commented:

You tell [the Black students] a hundred thousand times to get out of the goddamn street, but it never does any good…. Now don’t get me wrong. Yeah, they shouldn’t be hangin’ out in the street. But when you look at it, it’s, it’s not really any big deal. But you know that if you don’t do anything, you know Mrs. [Jones] down on [Maple] Street, or Mrs. [Jackson] down on [Oak] Street, you know they’re gonna be on the phone with the Lieutenant, you just know it.

As this officer reveals, the anticipation of calls from White constituents who had the apparent power to obtain swift action from higher-ranking officers in the Longwood Police Department prompted patrol officers such as himself to proactively attempt to disperse Black youth congregating in District 2 after school.

While some of the proactive encounters between Longwood officers and Black youth in District 2 in the hour after dismissal from Longwood High School involved verbal exchanges like the preceding example, many encounters only involved nonverbal gestures, such as an officer motioning to youth with his head or hands. However, a majority of the time, officers were able to get Black youth to disperse by simply pulling
patrol cars near or up to the youth. One White male Longwood officer described this
proactive process as follows:

   It’s like a cat and mouse game with [Black youths]. You tell ‘em to move and
they move, and then the next thing you know, they’re having a tea party on the
next block. It never ends. You just get tired of it.

Although this officer expressed exasperation over his efforts to keep Black students
moving along after school, he nevertheless expressed a greater concern of avoiding
complaints from angry White District 2 residents:

   The people who live over here on [Maple] [Street], they go nuts if somebody
tramples on their flowers or leaves candy wrappers on their lawn. Now the ones
who’re at work, they can’t prove it’s [Black] kids from the high school, but when
they complain, you know who they mean. But the ones who are home [on Maple
Street], they’re like ready to pounce if you don’t keep these kids moving.
There’s this one lady who’s always flaggin’ us down, telling us that [Black] kids
are cuttin’ through her yard, messin’ up the place…. Another lady wrote a letter
to the Chief saying that [Black students from the high school] were blocking the
sidewalk and harassin’ her kids on the way back from [elementary] school….
Anyways, we got the message.

Again, as this officer suggests, Longwood officers’ proactive efforts to disperse Black
high school youth in District 2 highlights the power White District 2 residents wielded as
a result of either their connections to town officials, or these residents’ ability to
influence such officials to act on behalf of White constituents.

   Longwood officers’ perceptions of Whites’ connection-related power was not
only reflected in the officers’ proactive policing of Blacks in District 2 and officers’
solicitous responses to Whites’ calls for service, but also was reflected in officers’
discussions of how Whites who violated the law were able to override the officers’
authority in some instances. For instance, one White male Longwood officer discussed
how the son of a prominent resident was able to get a drunken driving charge dropped, even though it was a repeat offense. The officer stated:

See that restaurant over there, that’s owned by this guy [Gambezi]. He’s been here for over forty years. He’s always had it in with [Councilman] [Olivo] with [Mayor] [Carlucci]. [Carlucci] and [Gambezi] go way back…. [Gambezi’s] son, he’s a real fuck-up. His old man’s always bailin’ him out of something. And he’s a cocky son-of-a-bitch too. You know what I mean, like, “You can’t touch me.” About a year ago he cracked up another car along [Stilwell] Avenue. We get there and he’s all drunk and shit. The whole time he’s acting like, “You can’t arrest me, blah, blah, blah.” Anyways, I was like, “There’s no way this bastard’s gettin’ away with anything this time.” ….So we dropped him off over at the county [jail], and I thought it was all over and done with. We won’t be seeing that asshole for a while. Well whatta ya know. [Gambezi] gets on the phone with [Olivo], [Olivo] talks to [Carlucci], [Carlucci] calls his buddy over at the County, he talks to the prosecutor, and the next thing you know, the son-of-a-bitch is out….

As this officer’s account makes clear, officers’ perceived some White residents’ connections as basically insulating them from any accountability for their actions, even when those actions involve violations of the law. Although Longwood officers, like this officer, clearly resented the power that these highly connected Whites possessed to override officers’ authority, these officers nevertheless appeared to be impressed by such power, and reluctant to get in the crosshairs of those who wielded it.

The power of White constituents, particularly White District 2 residents, is put into even starker relief when these constituents are contrasted with Black residents, particularly Black District 4 residents, whom Longwood officers perceived as having virtually no power and influence, both within and outside of Longwood. In contrast to Longwood officers’ rather direct, unambiguous assertions of White Longwood residents’ power, particularly in terms of these residents’ local connections to the powers that be,
Longwood officers’ assertions of Black residents’ lack of power were somewhat more indirect and cryptic. Longwood officers’ discursively conveyed Black residents’ lack of power in two direct ways and one indirect way. The first direct discursive manifestation of Black residents’ relative lack of power involved assertions that Black residents were too disorganized to marshal complaints. For instance, one White male Longwood officer described several Black families living in two adjacent, rundown homes along Sylvester Boulevard (the northern border of District 4) as follows:

Every time I come by here there’s always somethin’. It’s like complete chaos. You don’t know what the hell is goin’ on. Last time I was here there was this one lady who starts blabbin’ about somebody messin’ up her porch. (Officer points with his finger) You see the steps over there, well she said somebody next door was drinkin’ out by her steps and busted two of the steps. Then another lady comes out from next door and starts cursin’ her out, sayin’, “You lie bitch, you lie!” (Officer laughs.) Then, see that old lady over there, see that lady, that’s the Raccoon Lady. She’s got this black shit around her eyes, just like a raccoon. Well in the middle of all of it, out steps the Raccoon Lady, spouting her mouth off. You’ve got no idea of what she’s sayin’, and once she’s gets goin’ you can’t get her to shut up. Like I said, it’s just complete chaos. You’ve got no way of knowin’ what’s goin’ on. Nobody can get their story straight, everybody’s cursin’ at each other….It’s just one big mess….

This officer’s description of this group of District 4 Black Longwood residents differs from Longwood officers’ typical description of White Longwood residents in several fundamental respects. This Longwood officer sees Black residents, unlike White residents, as being poorly organized and mobilized, and as lacking familiarity with the proper channels through which to voice their complaints. For this officer, Black residents, in contrast to their White counterparts, particularly District 2 White residents, are not capable of quickly and efficiently presenting their complaints through channels that will produce results. Moreover, this officer implies throughout his commentary that
the disorganization of these Black residents is compounded by their inability to clearly enunciate their complaints and concerns. In other words, this officer is suggesting that even if these residents were better organized and mobilized in presenting their complaints, the incoherence of such complaints would hamper their ability to elicit a quick and effective response from town officials, including police officials.

The second direct discursive manifestation of Black Longwood residents’ relative lack power involved assertions that Black residents simply lacked sufficient connections with the powers that be in Longwood. Besides perceiving Black Longwood residents as being disorganized in terms of articulating their complaints, Longwood officers, particularly White Longwood officers, saw Black residents as not having any influence with the mostly White municipal power structure. For instance, one White male Longwood officer made the following comments following the aftermath of a young Black man’s alleged assault of a young Black woman at a small park near the center of District 4:

You try to help out but [the Blacks] don’t want our help. You just can’t win. It was probably her boyfriend [who assaulted her], and now she doesn’t wanna get him in trouble…. If she doesn’t want my help, fine. But she doesn’t have to give me an attitude. I’m not the one who slapped her around. But it’s like I’m the bad guy. Whatta ya gonna do? .... That’s what really pisses me off. [The Blacks] say we don’t do anything, but then when you try to do something, they’re like, ‘get the ef outta here.’ Well let them go complain, who they gonna complain to?

By suggesting that Black residents essentially had no one to whom to complain, this officer is implying that Black residents, unlike White residents, lack ties with influential members of the local power structure.
Longwood officers’ perception that Black residents lacked influence with local officials, such as town council members, was more pointedly apparent in the another White male Longwood officer’s remarks following an encounter in which the officer issued a citation to a middle-aged Black man for jaywalking across Raymond Street along the border of Districts 3 and 4. During this encounter, the Black man told the officer that he was going to complain to his ward’s town council member, Councilman Davis. Immediately subsequent to this encounter, the officer had the following exchange with the interviewer:

Officer: You know I really hate that. The guy does somethin’ he’s not supposed to do, and acts all like he’s a victim or somethin’. He says he’s gonna call [Davis], let ‘im go ahead, see what I care.

Interviewer: Who’s [Davis]?

Officer: [Davis] is on the [town] council. His ward is over this way. Let ‘im go to [Davis]; [Davis] ain’t gonna do jack.

Interviewer: How do you know that?

Officer: [Becker] (the town council president), [Garber] (a longtime town council member), and [Olivio] (a longtime town council member) they wouldn’t hear that. And [Davis] ain’t gonna go against them. Trust me, [Davis] ain’t gonna do it. He wants those potholes to keep gettin’ filled.

In glaring contrast to Longwood officers’ perceptions of White residents being able to obtain action from a town council member at the drop of a hat, this Longwood officer assumes that Black residents lack the same ability to seek redress for their concerns. This belief stems in part from the officer’s assumption that Councilman Davis, the lone Black councilman on the eleven member town council, has relatively little power in relation to the other ten members, all of whom are White. The officer’s belief also is based on the
assumption that the White majority of council members would not support Black residents’ grievances against the mostly-White Longwood Police Department, and that Councilman Davis would not jeopardize funding for various services by challenging the White majority in race-related police matters. In short, this officer’s comments about councilman Davis suggest that Blacks have little influence over town officials because Whites control the local power structure. As a result, this officer, along with other White Longwood officers, feels insulated from potential complaints from Black residents. In turn, such feelings of insulation from attack translate into Longwood officers’ relatively low responsiveness to Black residents’ concerns.

In addition to these two direct discursive manifestations of Black Longwood residents’ lack of power, Longwood officers also conveyed Black residents’ lack of power through indirect discursive means. Longwood officers routinely employed a wide range of disparaging, racially-coded language to refer to Blacks, especially adolescent and young adult Black males. While many of Longwood officers’ disparaging terms such as “Shittums” and “Yo Yo Yo Yo Yo Yos” only were applied younger Black males, other demeaning terms or imagery applied to both males and females and to young and old. In particular, Longwood officers used a plethora of references to animal-related terms and imagery when discussing Black residents.

Many of these animal-related terms and images referred to Longwood officers’ practices directed at Blacks. For instance, various White and Asian male Longwood officers described their practices that applied to Black male and female students in the wake of dismissal from Longwood High School as “herding cattle”, engaging in a “cat and mouse game”, working in “the jungle”, and being “zookeepers.” Some officers more
directly applied animal-related labels to Black Longwood High School students leaving the school following dismissal. For instance, a White male Longwood officer referred to a group of five Black female and four Black male students as “a bunch of wild animals,” and indicated that “[one] could get the same if [one] turned on Animal Planet.”

Longwood officers also employed a range of animal-related nicknames, such as “the Raccoon Lady” and “Big Cat,” to older Black male and female residents. In a similar vein, Longwood officers equated older Black residents with body parts through the use of nicknames such as “Mr. Big Hands.” All of these body part- and animal-related nicknames implicitly conveyed that Longwood officers did not respect these Black residents or take them seriously.

Although Longwood officers had nicknames for a few of the White Longwood residents, none of these nicknames, like those employed for Black residents, reduced the objects of such naming either to animals or body parts. Some of Longwood officers’ nicknames for White residents conveyed the power of such residents to make things happen, such as “the terminator.” The “terminator” referred to a White woman in District 2 whom officers described as the leader of a vocal group of Longwood residents who successfully blocked the addition of a basketball court in a park near her home.

Longwood officers’ other nicknames for White residents referenced status symbols associated with higher socioeconomic status. For instance, as noted in the first part of Chapter 6, Longwood officers often received complaints from a White woman in District 2 to whom they referred as “the trellis lady.” The trellis represented part of an expensive garden this woman had created, and in referencing it, Longwood officers were indirectly acknowledging such higher status. In comparing the terms and imagery that Longwood
officers used for Whites and Blacks respectively, it is apparent that Longwood officers used significantly more pejorative and disrespectful terms and imagery when referencing Blacks, and in doing so conveyed that Blacks were relatively powerless.

Besides discursively conveying Black residents’ relative lack power, Longwood officers conveyed this perceived lack of power through patrolling practices. One of these practices involved officers’ response time in answering service calls. In contrast to the promptness with which Longwood officers invariably responded to calls that they identified as coming from White residents, Longwood officers, particularly White Longwood officers, often were slow to respond to similar calls for service from residents whom they identified as “Black,” and demonstrated virtually no concern about Black constituents potentially complaining about such inattentive service. For instance, after a White male Longwood officer received a call from a woman complaining about a group of strange men in a car in a neighborhood in District 4 that the officer marked as “Black,” the officer first went across town to pick up his dinner at a restaurant before responding to the call some forty plus minutes later. This officer stated:

Well, she’s just gonna have to wait. My dinner’s getting cold. Besides, they’ll probably be gone by the time we get there.

Similarly, after getting a call about some men who were allegedly dealing drugs on a corner of another “Black” neighborhood in District 4, another White male Longwood officer took approximately fifteen minutes to ride over to the corner and stated the following while taking, as he put it, “the long way” to get there:

Well, what else is new? You know, I’m just not in the mood for dealing with these shittums tonight…. We’re just gonna have to take the long way.
Longwood officers’ relative inattentiveness to and low prioritization of Black constituents’ calls for service reflect these officers’ perceptions of Blacks in Longwood being situated at the bottom of the town’s racial-/ethnic-/class-based hierarchy. In general, Longwood officers, particularly White Longwood officers, felt that they could provide poor, slow service to Black residents with impunity.

In addition to response time, Longwood officers displayed that they viewed Black residents as having little power through a variety of patrolling practices that conveyed disrespect. For instance, one White male Longwood officer described how his partner would sometimes wear a gorilla mask while patrolling Black neighborhoods in District 4:

So [my partner] [Johnny] says to me, “If we gotta work in the jungle, we might as well look the part.” So [Johnny], he wears this gorilla mask, it’s in September, and we’re ridin’ out by the railroad tracks. We’re getting’ all kinds of looks. They don’t know what to make of it. That shit was too funny.

Similarly, several White male Longwood officers had a routine practice of quickly riding up behind Black youth walking in the street and turning on the patrol car’s siren just as the car reached the youth. Longwood officers never engaged in practices similar to these in “White” neighborhoods or neighborhoods with a racial mix of residents.

Besides these rather blatant practices mocking Black residents, nearly half of the White Longwood officers also conveyed disrespect for Black residents more subtly through the use of appellations. These officers routinely addressed Black adult residents by their first name, rather than by a title such as Mr. or Ms., followed by the residents’ last names. While the officers’ use of first names when addressing Black adult residents is somewhat attributable to these officers’ familiarity with the residents, such familiarity does not adequately account for why the officers were more likely to use titles and last
names when addressing White adult residents, notwithstanding their familiarity with some of these residents as well. This racially skewed pattern of addressing residents suggests that Longwood officers felt more at liberty to address Black residents in a more informal way. Officers’ apparent lesser respect for Black residents implies that officers viewed Blacks as being less powerful on the whole.

4.3. The Power-Related Conditioning of Officers’ Schemata in Middleboro

In contrast to Longwood officers’ rather clear, dichotomous view of White/Black group power in Longwood, Middleboro officers’ view of racial groups’ power in Middleboro was far more complex. Although Middleboro, like Longwood, has a White majority of residents and a sizable Black minority of residents, officers’ assessments of White and Black groups and the groups’ comparative power in the two towns differed in several significant ways. Foremost among these differences is that Middleboro officers, unlike their Longwood counterparts, saw Whites and Blacks as relatively equal in terms of power. This perceived difference in the balance of power between Whites and Blacks in the two towns appeared to stem from perceptions about the two groups’ class status, size, political orientation, degree of organization, activism, and vocality.

Officers’ perceptions of Blacks’ average socioeconomic status in Longwood and Middleboro respectively played an instrumental role in shaping officers’ widely divergent views of Blacks’ power within the two respective towns. As suggested above, Longwood officers’ saw the Black Longwood population as being largely poor and working-class, and in doing so appeared to underestimate the percentage of Blacks who appeared to be middle-class. For instance, one White male Longwood officer stated the following:
Most Black, I mean African-American people, they live past [Washington] [Avenue], you know, on the other side of the railroad tracks. Yeah, it is definitely the other side of the tracks. (emphasis added)

In a similar vein, another White male Longwood officer, while trying to explain why a greater percentage of Black youth had contact with the police, stated:

I don’t think so much it’s a color thing. It’s just that the [Black] ones over in [District] 4, they don’t have much.

Both officers, like the majority of Longwood officers, appeared to associate the poorest Black Longwood residents who live in the northernmost part of District 4 with all Black Longwood residents.

Middleboro officers, on the other hand, saw the majority of Black residents in Middleboro as being middle- to upper-middle class. For instance, one White male Middleboro officer commented:

This ain’t exactly like the ‘hood. I mean yeah, we got the people over by [Norman] and [Monroe] Streets (in the southeastern part of Middleboro in Zone 3), and the Greenwood Apartments (in the southeastern part of Zone 2). But just take a look at some of these homes. You gotta have money to move here, plain and simple.

For this officer, as well as other Middleboro officers, the majority of Black residents in Middleboro were seen as being of middle-class status or higher based on their ability to afford relatively expensive single-family homes.

Both Longwood and Middleboro officers’ class-based assessments of Black residents’ power in the two respective towns was bolstered by officers’ distorted perceptions of the overall size of the Black population in each town. In both Longwood and Middleboro, officers’ overestimated the size of the indigenous Black population. In
Longwood, most officers put the town’s Black population at around 33 percent, which is
greater than the 2000 U.S. Census figure, which was just under 23 percent. In
Middleboro, the overestimation was even greater, with the majority of officers claiming
that Blacks constituted approximately 50 percent of all residents. For instance, a White
male Middleboro officer stated:

It’s about evenly divided here. About half-White/ half-Black…. It’s always been
pretty evenly divided since I’ve been here.

However, according the 2000 U.S. Census, Blacks made up only slightly more than 32
percent of Middleboro’s population.

Although officers in both towns overestimated the Black population, the effects of
such overestimation were different. Given that Longwood officers saw Longwood’s
Black residents as being largely poor and working-class, the officers’ overestimation of
this population had the effect of reinforcing the overall perceived powerlessness of
Longwood Blacks. Conversely, Middleboro officers’ view of Middleboro’s Black
residents as being largely middle- to upper-middle-class had the effect of reinforcing the
overall perceived power of Middleboro Blacks.

While the reasons for both towns’ officers’ overestimations of the Black
residential population are not as clear as the effects, nevertheless, these overestimations
appear to be a product of officers’ accumulated experiences with Black residents.
Virtually all Longwood officers complained about how a disproportionate share of their
time was spent dealing with Black males’ (“shittums”) criminal, delinquent, or nuisance-
related behavior. For example, one White male Longwood officer remarked:

This wouldn’t be such a bad job if I didn’t have to be dealing with these shittums
all the time. There’s never a break from ‘em.
Longwood officers’ apparently high, disproportionate amount of contact with Black Longwood residents, particular Black male youth from the northern part of District 4, may have caused these officers to inflate the size of the town’s Black population.

Middleboro officers’ overestimation of Middleboro’s Black residential population appears to be due not to the officers’ disproportionate contact with Black residents who were engaging in criminal, delinquent, or nuisance-related behavior, but rather due to the officers’ extensive contact with highly organized, highly vocal Black residents who routinely criticized local police practices. While Longwood officers generally saw Longwood Blacks as being disorganized and ineffectual in terms of registering complaints regarding the police or other concerns, Middleboro officers saw Middleboro Blacks as a powerful, mobilized force with which to be reckoned. For instance, after discussing how a group disproportionately made up of Black residents filed a complaint with the Middleboro Police Department for setting up a speed trap in the group’s neighborhood in order to catch motorists traveling over the speed limit, one White male Middleboro officer stated:

You gotta be careful. It’s like they’re looking for you to slip up, you know. No, they’re not like the people in [Norville]. I mean, the [Norville Blacks] have no clue, they don’t know what is goin’ on. No, they’ve got their shit together around here.

In elaborating on the power of highly organized, mobilized, and vocal Black residents of Middleboro, Middleboro officers focused on the Middleboro’s Blacks’ connections to or ability to exploit organizations and entities both within and outside of town other than the Middleboro Town Council and the local municipal power structure.
Unlike Longwood officers’ frequent characterizations of White Longwood residents’ connections to and ability to successfully exploit the local municipal power structure (e.g., the mayor and the Longwood Town Council), Middleboro officers only occasionally suggested that Black Middleboro residents exerted influence with local elected officials. Rather, Middleboro officers frequently made express references to Black Middleboro residents’ connections to other organizations and entities both within and outside of Middleboro, such as civil rights organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), or local residents groups. For instance, a Black woman in the middle of Zone 2 in a racially mixed neighborhood in the central part of town had the following heated exchange with a White male Middleboro officer following an incident in which her teenage son had been stopped and questioned by another Middleboro officer regarding a stolen bicycle.

Black woman: So what are you saying, my son looks like a thief?

Officer: No ma’am. It’s just that…

Black woman: Just what? They had no reason to stop him. No reason….If you’re not going to do anything about it, I’m sure the NAACP will be interested in this….

After this incident, the officer discussed his exchange with the Black woman as follows:

That’s the thing that really bugs me. They assume just because we stop an African-American kid that we’re profiling or something. Somebody took a bicycle and the kid met the description. That’s it, period. Why do [Blacks] always have to bring race into it. It has nothing to do with race. Someone took somebody’s bike; they could be red, blue, purple, or green, it doesn’t matter…. And why do they have to always be running to the NAACP or Al Sharpton or
whoever all the time? What the hell does the NAACP know? Are they gonna get that bike back?

Although this officer clearly resents the Black woman’s implied threat to complain about the police’s handling of her son to the NAACP, nevertheless the officer perceives this woman having the power to carry out this threat, and views the local NAACP as a powerful entity of which he, as well as other Middleboro officers, need to be mindful.

Besides making reference to Black Middleboro residents’ connections to a variety of civil rights organizations and their willingness to exploit such connections, Middleboro officers also made numerous references to Black Middleboro residents’ routine practice of lodging complaints with various media entities, particularly the local Middleboro Times newspaper, and a town website (Middleboro.net) on the Internet on which residents routinely posted often scathing critiques of the Middleboro police’s handling of various situations. For instance, after refraining from ticketing a middle-aged, professionally dressed Black woman for illegally parking outside of middle school in the southwestern part of Zone 1, a White male Middleboro officer stated:

You know, if I gave her the ticket, the next thing you know it’d be in the [Middleboro] Times, or on [Middleboro.net], or there’d be some goddamned march. I don’t need that.

Similarly, after a middle-aged Black Middleboro resident in the southwestern part of town argued for several minutes with a White male Middleboro officer about Middleboro officers driving through his neighborhood at high speed with their patrol cars’ sirens on the night before, the officer subsequently commented:

You know he’s gonna have something to say on [Middleboro.net]. You just know it…. It’ll read something like, “Cops go on rampage…..”
While it was clear that Middleboro officers viewed the majority of Blacks as being a powerful constituency group to which they had to pay attention, it was equally clear that Middleboro officers readily distinguished this Black majority of vocal, organized, highly educated, middle- to upper-middle-class Blacks from the poor, highly segregated Black minority that lived in a cluster of neighborhoods in the southeastern part of Middleboro in Zone 3, and a smaller area in most southeastern part of the central section of town encompassed by Zone 2. Middleboro officers’ regularly identified the hub of the poor, Black, segregated neighborhoods in the southeastern part of Middleboro as being Norman and Monroe Streets. Middleboro officers used “Norman and Monroe Streets” as a racially coded reference for Middleboro’s poor Black residents, and talked about these residents as if they were distinct from the rest of Middleboro’s Black residents. For instance, a Latina Middleboro officer stated:

Yeah, there are some Blacks around here [Zone 1 in the north], but they’re nothin’ like…, it’s not like [Norman] and [Monroe] [Streets].

This officer, like other Middleboro officers, distinguished “Norman and Monroe” Blacks from other Blacks in Middleboro in large part by perceived class. This officer, along with other Middleboro officers, routinely referred to the “Norman and Monroe Street” area as “the ‘hood”, “the ghetto”, and a “wasteland”, and in doing so conveyed a highly negative view of its Black residents that was quite similar to that expressed by Longwood officers of Blacks living in District 4 in Longwood. Middleboro officers expressly noted that “Norman and Monroe Street” residents, as well as the predominantly Black residents living at or near the Greenwood apartment complex in the southeastern part of the Zone 2, were poor and likely to be involved in illicit drug use and other low-level criminal
activities. Middleboro officers never used such characterizations to describe Black residents in other parts of Middleboro. Rather, Middleboro officers’ often made either laudatory comments (“he’s loaded”) or envious comments (“I’ll never be able to afford a house like that”) when describing the class status of Black residents in other parts of Middleboro.

Middleboro officers saw “Norman and Monroe Street” Blacks and Blacks from the Greenwood apartment complex and vicinity as distinct from, as well as less powerful than, middle- and upper-middle-class Black Middleboro residents living in other parts of the town, not only in terms of relative class status but also in terms of the differences in the likelihood and nature of complaints about the police or other issues. Similar to how Longwood officers viewed the complaints of Blacks from District 4 in Longwood, Middleboro officers viewed the complaints of poor Black adults from the Norman and Monroe Street area and the Greenwood area as being chaotic, quirky, disorganized, and random. For instance, one night when a White male Middleboro officer was responding to a call involving an assault on Park Street, which is a predominantly Black neighborhood, an older Black woman who was sitting with three other Black women outside of a Laundromat angrily yelled to the officer, “What the fuck ya doin’ comin’ in here?” After responding to the call, the officer rolled the patrol car up to the four women and the following exchange ensued:

Officer: I missed what you said back there.

Woman # 1: How come you comin’ around now?17

Woman # 2: Yeah, where was you the other day?
Officer: I don’t know, what was going on the other day?

Woman # 1: Never mind.

(Woman # 1 waves her right arm in a sweeping motion in disgust, gets up, turns her back and walks into the Laundromat.)

Woman # 2: Now you come.

Woman # 3: Yeah, now you come.

(Woman # 2, # 3, and # 4 get up and walk inside the Laundromat.)

In responding to what had just ensued, the officer commented to the interviewer:

You come here for a call, to help out, and it’s like they don’t want your help. You’ve got no idea what these people want. Why even bother.

This officer’s sense of confusion regarding the expectations and concerns of Black residents in Middleboro’s poorest neighborhoods was matched by the experience of another White male Middleboro officer who followed up on a complaint that an older Black woman had made during the officer’s prior visit to the Greenwood apartment complex in response to an unrelated call. During the officer’s prior visit, the older Black woman (Ms. James) had complained that young people in the complex were harassing residents at the complex’s entrance and dealing drugs. She had requested that the officer come back and investigate her allegations. After his return visit, the officer described his visit as follows:

So we went back over [to the Greenwood apartment complex] and we checked out the place, busted a couple of the ones out front for possession [of marijuana], nothin’ big, and we told ‘em we’d be watchin’ and we’d be back….So we’re getting’ ready to leave and out pops Ms. [James]. Now I thought she was comin’ over to thank me. But she starts in with this, “Why you harassin’ these boys, blah, blah, blah,” and I’m like, you have got to be kidding, lady. I mean, you told
us to come over here, and now we’re the bad guys! You’ve got to be fuckin’ kidding me! Turns out that one of them we busted was her great nephew or somethin’ like that. After that I just try to keep my distance….

This officer’s account, like the prior account, demonstrates that Middleboro officers saw the complaints of poor Black adults in the Greenwood and Norman and Monroe Street areas as lacking clarity, and as such, made officers feel less inclined to respond to them.

Moreover, Middleboro officers’ perceived the complaints of poor Blacks from the southeastern part of town as being far less effectual than those of middle- and upper-middle-class Blacks in other parts of Middleboro because the former, unlike the latter, were not expressly or implicitly backed up with threats to involve civil rights or other organizations or to go to the media. As a result, Middleboro officers did not see poor Blacks as either being savvy enough to “work the system” or as having sufficient ties within system. In turn, this translated into Middleboro officers’ perception that poor Black residents’ complaints need not be taken as seriously as those of wealthier Blacks.

Middleboro officers’ perceptions of poor, southeastern Blacks’ relative lack of power were further bolstered by their perceptions of how poor Black southeastern youths and young adults behaved when confronted by the police. In general, Middleboro officers saw southeastern Black youths and young adults as pushovers because of their almost Pavlovian evasive response to the approach of a patrol car or officer on foot. Officers described this phenomenon as “scattering” and demonstrated it on multiple occasions while driving through Norman and Monroe Streets. More specifically, “scattering” referred to how all of the youths or young adults who were sitting on or near a stoop or congregating in the street would scatter in multiple directions whenever a patrol car (or officer on foot) approached a group, such that by the time the car reached
the spot, everyone in the group was out of view. Typically, southeastern Black youths dispersed more slowly when an officer on foot approached them, and also were more likely to grumble something in protest as they turned their backs and walked away.

The only occasion during the course of the ride-alongs in which Black youths from the southeastern part of Middleboro engaged in a face-to-face protest with Middleboro officers was when two White male Middleboro officers told a group of about six Black male youth that they could not hang out on the sidewalk in front of the “Chicken Shack,” a take out chicken restaurant located about two blocks east of the upscale shopping area along Belton Avenue. Several in the group imconditionly complained, with one of the six stating:

How come you always raggin’\textsuperscript{19} on us. Why don’t you tell ‘em at [Benny’s].\textsuperscript{20} I don’t see you up on them, never.

Although, this particular occasion was atypical in that Black southeastern youth confronted Middleboro officers rather than fleeing or turning their backs and walking away, nevertheless the youths only protested for about half a minute before walking away in disgust. In addition, unlike the White northern youth discussed below, these Black youth made no express or implied threats to the officers.

Southeastern Black youth and young adults’ seemingly weak and ineffectual behavior in the presence of patrol officers was magnified by the response of other Black youth and White youth. Although, as discussed in Chapter 6, Middleboro officers had relatively few encounters with either Black or White youth in the central, most racially integrated part of town (Zone 2), nevertheless, when such encounters did occur, neither Black nor White middle- or upper-middle-class youth ever fled as officers approached
them. Moreover, both Black and White youth in the central part of town usually mildly defended themselves if the officers questioned their behavior. For instance, when a White male Middleboro officer pulled up to one White and two Black male adolescents in the central part of the town near the high school to ask them if they had been involved in a fight that had allegedly occurred earlier in the afternoon between two adolescents, one of the Black males responded:

Naw. We’ve just been hangin’ out over here. We try to stay outta that kinda stuff. We’ve just been ballin’ all day.

The apparent weakness of southeastern Black youths was even more pronounced when compared to the behavior of White youth in northern Middleboro, who, when confronted by the police, not only stood their ground, but almost invariably vigorously defended themselves in at least one of two ways. The first way involved White northern youth enunciating, usually in a highly defiant way, that they “knew their rights.” For example, two of the six White adolescent males whom a White male Middleboro officer and a Latina Middleboro officer stopped and reprimanded for skateboarding in an aisle of a parking lot in the northern commercial area had the following exchange with the two officers:

White youth #1: Oh come on, we’re not botherin’ anybody. Why are you gettin’ on us. I know my rights. You can’t take away my rights.

White male officer: C’mon guys, you know you can’t ride here; you can’t be riding in the parking lot and blocking traffic.

White youth #2: We’ve been riding here before and no one had a problem.

Latina officer: We’re not sayin’ that you can’t ride; you just can’t ride here. What about [riding at] the park?
White youth #1: Oh, that’s so corny. Man, why can’t you just let us ride?

Likewise, a White 18-year-old northern male made the following comments to two White Middleboro officers after the officers arrested him and searched his car in the wake of Middleboro officers breaking up a party at a large home in northern Middleboro involving about 75 adolescents and young adults, most of whom officers identified as White:

You’ve got nothin’ on me. You crossed the line here. I’m not stupid. I know what my rights are. I know from my law class in school [that] you’ve no right to search my car. You’ve got no probable cause.

This latter White 18-year-old also defended himself by threatening to have his father, whom he claimed was an attorney, sue the police. Threatening to have parents and/or other connections bring legal action against officers was the second common way in which in northern White youth and young adults defended themselves when confronted by the police. In continuing to defend himself, the aforementioned White 18-year-old stated:

My dad’s a lawyer…. He’s not gonna stand for this. Wait’ll you see…. He’s not gonna let you get away with this….

Similarly, another White male youth who was questioned by Middleboro officers in the wake of the aforementioned party posited:

Wait until [my parents] here about this. They’re gonna go ballistic…. They’ll sue you for this….

The unbridled defiance routinely exhibited by White northern youth and young adults reflected in these interactions with Middleboro officers reinforced not only Middleboro
officers’ perceptions of these youth as possessing some degree of power, but also the officers’ perceptions of Black southeastern youth as being relatively powerless. In particular, Middleboro officers saw White northern youth as being backed up by powerful, well-educated, wealthy, litigious parents and other connections, and Black southeastern youth lacking such connections to which they could immediately turn.\(^{21}\)

Notwithstanding their perceptions of southeastern Blacks as lacking power and connections, Middleboro officers saw these Blacks’ interests as being defended and protected in part by the middle- and upper-middle class Blacks who resided elsewhere in Middleboro. This protective “umbrella effect”, whereby wealthier Blacks shielded poorer Blacks from harassment by Middleboro officers, was, in the eyes of Middleboro officers, tied to Blacks’ perceived racial solidarity across different class groups. In explicating this “umbrella” phenomenon of wealthier Blacks looking out and standing up for poorer Blacks, several officers pointed to the response of wealthier Black Middleboro residents to an incident in which a White male Middleboro officer mistakenly arrested a poor Black southeastern male whom he thought fit the description of a suspect wanted for several robberies. The arresting officer described the response of Black middle-class and upper-middle-class residents:

Not long after I started here a couple of years ago I got into trouble. We’d had a bunch of robberies down over at [Lakeview] Plaza, and we were looking for a Black guy with an orange hat and a white shirt. I arrested a guy over by [Magnolia] [Street] who fit the suspect’s description. It turned out it wasn’t him. Well, let me tell you, people here went berserk, especially the Blacks. Oh, man, it was like World War III. Not so much with the [poorer] people from the south end, but [Black] people with money. There was this lawyer, Black lawyer (from the central part of Middleboro), who organized some rally. They had articles in the [Middleboro] Times about it, he was saying this was like apartheid. I mean, give me a break.
In recounting the response of Black middle- and upper-middle-class residents to this incident, another White male Middleboro officer indicated how wealthier Black residents saw this incident as evidence of a “police state.” More generally, Middleboro officers often noted that wealthier Black Middleboro residents perceived the arrests of any Blacks, including the poorest Blacks in the Norman and Monroe Streets area, as being “profiling” or “harassment.” Middleboro officers attributed this perception to wealthier Blacks’ “personalizing” every incident involving a Black person. A White Middleboro officer described this phenomenon:

[The wealthier Middleboro Black residents] take everything personally. If some shitbag gets arrested for god knows what, they treat it like it’s an attack on themselves.

Thus, while Middleboro officers clearly demarcated class differences among Black Middleboro residents, they nevertheless saw some racial solidarity among Blacks that became particularly salient in the context of resident-police encounters.

Middleboro officers’ views of the White population of Middleboro were, like their views of Middleboro’s Black population, fragmented. However, unlike their fragmented views of Black Middleboro residents, Middleboro officers’ views of White Middleboro residents hinged not on stark intra-racial class differences, but rather on intra-racial differences in terms of political views. Although Middleboro officers regularly referred to Middleboro Whites as being “liberal,” the officers nevertheless clearly differentiated between the Whites living in both the central (Zone 2) and southwestern (Zone 1) parts of town, and the Whites living in the northern part of town. Middleboro officers generally viewed Whites who lived in the central and southwestern
parts of Middleboro as being more liberal than the wealthier Whites living in the mostly
“White” northern part of town, particularly in terms of issues relating to civil-rights and
racial diversity. Although the majority of Middleboro officers described Middleboro’s
White residents as “pro-civil rights” or as “lov[ing] diversity”, these officers were careful
to qualify their remarks. In some instances, Middleboro officers qualified their remarks
by expressly distinguishing northern Whites from the rest of the “pro-civil rights”
Whites. For instance, a Black male Middleboro officer made the following statement
while patrolling part of Zone 1 in the northern part of Middleboro:

The White people, they’re very much about everyone being treated fairly; they’re
definitely for civil rights and all. But not so much over here. No, they’re mostly
interested in what happens to their own here.

In other instances, Middleboro officers qualified their remarks by specifying central
Whites as being the most “pro-civil rights.” For example, one White male Middleboro
officer made the following statement while driving through the heart of the central part of
Middleboro:

Yeah, these are not like the Whites in [Georgeville],22 no they’re real pro-civil
rights here. Especially over here in this part of town. Oh my god, they love their
diversity here. They’re all about that here.

In explicating central and southwestern Middleboro Whites’ “pro-civil rights”
stance, Middleboro officers recounted numerous police-civilian incidents in which these
Whites ardently defended and came to the aid of Blacks, especially Black youth.
Middleboro officers noted that these White residents’ interference in officers’ encounters
with Blacks was motivated by perceptions that the officers unfairly target and harass
Blacks. For instance, an Asian male Middleboro officer recounted an incident in the
central part of Middleboro in which a middle-aged White woman swiftly intervened on
behalf of a group of Black youth whom officers were questioning in relation to an alleged
fight that had taken place. The officer stated:

You’d think that just the Blacks would be the ones who care about the Blacks, but
here, the thing that’s different about this place is the Whites. I mean, you expect
the Blacks to look out for the Blacks, but the thing that blows you away is that it’s
the Whites [who are looking out for the Blacks]. One time we got this call that
there’s a group of Black kids fighting over on [Willow] [Street] (in Zone 2 near
the border of Zone 1 in central Middleboro), and one of them has a gun. We had
seven cars that responded. It turns out that it was just some kids screwin’ around
with a painted toy gun. The boy with the gun got scraped by one of the police
cars, but he jumped up. Well, as soon we got there, a bunch of people in the area
came over right away and start in with, “Why’d you hit him with your car?”
“Why do you need so many police?” “Why can’t you just let them play?” I’ll
never forget, in the middle of this whole thing, this one White lady says, “What
are you doing to these kids?” Then she turned to a couple of [the kids] and said,
“Are you okay, honey?” Meaning like we were hurting them or something…. Finally she left, but she tells us that we’d better not harass these boys, and that
she’d be watching us. Can you believe that, that she’d be watching us!.... And
she told us she’d talk to the NAACP!

White Middleboro residents’ apparent concerns about and vigilance of Middleboro
officers’ handling of Blacks were echoed by a White male Middleboro officer:

A lot of the White people, especially around here (the central part of town), they
watch you like, like they’re hawks. I remember we got a call that a couple of kids
had been fighting, and so when we got there we went up to these two Black kids
who were arguing with each other. So we go over to break ‘em up and noticed
this White lady, she was out on her porch, and as soon as we grabbed one of kids,
she comes running over and telling us to get our hands off of ‘em. I was like lady,
“Back off, you’re interfering with us doin’ our job.” But she was having none of
it. We told her she had to leave the scene, but she refused. And then she told us
we had no right to pick on this kid, and we were like, “Lady, we’re in the
middle of investigating this, will you please get the hell out of here?” Finally she
left, but she kept staring at us the whole time and she was talking to somebody on
her cell phone. She was probably callin’ the ACLU or somebody.
The officers’ recollections of White Middleboro residents’ defense of Black youth in the prior two accounts reflects officers’ acknowledgment of these residents’ power in two respects. First, both officers suggest that White residents in the central part of Middleboro are not only vigilant, but they back it up through a willingness to engage in direct, face-to-face confrontations with Middleboro officers. Second, both officers suggest that these residents, like Black middle- and upper-middle-class Middleboro residents, possess and display no hesitation in utilizing connections to powerful civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and the ACLU.

In their discussions of central and southwestern Middleboro Whites’ defense of Blacks, Middleboro officers also stressed these Whites’ use of the media. In particular, Middleboro officers saw these Whites as writing articles and letters to the editor in the Middleboro Times, and posting comments on the Internet website Middleboro.net. Although, as noted above, Middleboro officers saw middle- and upper-middle class Blacks as a powerful constituency in part because of their use of the Middleboro Times and Middleboro.net as vehicles through which to criticize Middleboro officers’ practices, Middleboro officers indicated that White Middleboro residents constituted the majority of those who used these media to criticize Middleboro officers’ practices.

Middleboro officers described the Middleboro Times as a “liberal rag” run by a group of “bleeding heart liberal” Whites. In particular, Middleboro officers contended that these “liberal” Whites often wrote scathing articles regarding Middleboro officers’ handling of Blacks, particularly Black juveniles. For instance, a White male officer described how an article in the Middleboro Times characterized an incident in which
Middleboro officers arrested three Black adolescent males for their alleged involvement in a huge brawl at a park in Zone 2:

The *Middleboro Times* never takes our side. It always makes us out to be the bad guys. Like we were called to this big fight over at [Veterans] Park after school; there must have been about seventy-five kids there. We had to call officers from [Vincent] and [Belton] to help us out. It turns out that these three brothers were the ringleaders, and after we arrested them the *Middleboro Times* wrote an article saying that we had no reason to arrest the three, that they were good kids, and that we beat them. Can you believe that? They turned *them* into victims! Unbelievable.

More generally, Middleboro officers suggested that the Middleboro Times treated any incident involving three or more officers as “harassment.”

In emphasizing central and southwestern White Middleboro residents’ defense of Blacks, Middleboro officers also noted these residents’ frequent Middleboro.net postings critical of Middleboro officers’ practices. Based on how often they referenced Middleboro.net, Middleboro officers appeared to be particularly sensitive to this website’s postings, which officers characterized as “Monday morning quarterbacking.” Several officers viewed White Middleboro residents as constituting between 75 percent and 80 percent of the posts on Middleboro.net, and that approximately 90 percent of the posts relating to police practices were unfavorable. For instance, after riding by the house owned by a White man in the southwestern part of Middleboro, a White Middleboro officer stated the following:

You know if people ‘round here don’t like something we do, it’s gonna end up on [Middleboro.net], you just know it. A couple of weeks back we had this guy, this Black guy, who had robbed some place and stole a car in [Edgarville], and there was a high speed chase into [southwestern] Middleboro. Oh man, the people were all up in arms about that. They were writing stuff on [Middleboro.net] like, “Is it necessary to drive at high speeds through our neighborhoods, you could hit
innocent children playing in the street, blah blah blah.’ Anyways, the guy junked the car over near [Georgeville]. He then ran down this way and hid under that lady’s porch across the street….The lady who lives there heard some funny noises and called it in, and we eventually cornered the guy under the porch. Anyway, you’d think everyone would be pattin’ us on the back and saying, “Good job.” But no. I’d say about 90 percent of posts were negative. See the [White] guy who lives over there, he’s always posting shit on [Middleboro.net]. Well after the chase with the guy from [Edgarville], he writes this long rant about how we used too much force to go after this guy, and we terrified his kids, and ripped up his flowers, and something about the [police] dogs peeing all over the place. Can you believe that, here we are trying to catch this, this dangerous ef’in criminal, who could’ve broke into this guy’s house, and all this guy is worried about is protecting this criminal and not messin’ up his property.

In addition to highlighting Middleboro officers’ awareness and resentment of White Middleboro residents’ use of Middleboro.net as a medium through which to lambaste Middleboro officers, the latter incident highlighted Middleboro officers’ frustration with Middleboro’s “liberal” White, as well as Black, middle- and upper-middle-class residents. Officer after officer complained that Middleboro’s “liberal” White and Black residents expected to be protected from crime, but became upset if they perceived the slightest trampling of individuals’ rights/ civil liberties. A White male Middleboro officer summed up this frustration:

We’re caught between a rock and hard place. You know, you try to do your job, but somebody’s always unhappy. They don’t want any crime, but they don’t want you stopping or arresting anybody. You just can’t win for losing.

However, in expressing this frustration, Middleboro officers implicitly were acknowledging that both Middleboro’s “liberal” White and Black middle- and upper-middle-class constituencies were powerful forces to which they had to pay attention.

While Middleboro officers also viewed Whites in the northern part of Middleboro as being
“passive” liberals except when things involved themselves. For instance, when explaining the difference between northern Middleboro residents and central Middleboro residents, a Black male Middleboro officer stated:

Yeah, they’re liberal around here [in the northern part of Middleboro] too, but it’s different. They’re more passive; they don’t really complain much unless they think they’ve been done wrong. You don’t see them worried about anybody else. They’re not like the [White] people over on [Sanderson] [Street], or [Maple][Street] (in the central part of Middleboro). Those people are out in the streets at the drop of a hat. Shit, if a dog gets mistreated, they’re complainin’ about it.

In expanding on this theme of “passivity” on the part of northern Middleboro Whites, Middleboro officers suggested that northern Middleboro Whites differed from the rest of the White population in Middleboro in terms their support of Blacks and racial integration. While Middleboro officers gave numerous examples of White central and southwestern Middleboro residents’ defense of and support for Blacks, they rarely even alluded to such sentiments on the part of White northern Middleboro residents. Although virtually all of the Middleboro officers indicated that White northern Middleboro residents “tolerated” the presence of Blacks in their residential neighborhoods and in the northern commercial district, the officers nevertheless suggested that White northern Middleboro residents were not really that amenable to the idea of racial integration. In particular, Middleboro officers noted that unlike the Whites living in the central and southwestern parts of Middleboro, the Whites in the northern part of Middleboro lived in far more racially homogeneous residential neighborhoods. Moreover, several Middleboro officers implied that the increasing clamoring of a large segment of the predominantly White northern part of Middleboro for secession from Middleboro was
motivated by a desire to disassociate from Middleboro’s Black population concentrated in the central and southern parts of town. For example, a White male Middleboro officer stated:

Yeah, I think they want to secede, maybe, I don’t know, I know this isn’t politically correct, but I think they want to secede to get away from the Blacks. You know have separate schools, save on taxes, you know.

In discussing northern Middleboro Whites’ interest in seceding from Middleboro, Middleboro officers also alluded to a slight class difference between northern Whites and central and southwestern Whites. Middleboro officers suggested that northern Middleboro Whites wanted to secede from Middleboro in part because they perceived themselves as being slightly higher than other Middleboro residents in terms of socioeconomic status. Although Middleboro officers viewed Whites throughout Middleboro generally as being “well off,” nevertheless the officers saw northern Middleboro in a slightly different light. As one Latina officer put it, “everyone around [northern Middleboro] is rich.”

Notwithstanding these perceived differences between northern Middleboro Whites and central and southwestern Middleboro Whites, Middleboro officers perceived northern Whites, like their central and southwestern White counterparts, as being highly organized and likely to vocalize their complaints regarding patrol officers’ practices. However, as alluded to above, the complaints of the latter and the former were noticeably different in terms of the focus of such complaints. While central and southwestern Middleboro Whites complained about patrol officers’ practices affecting anyone in the town, including the poorest Blacks from the Norman and Monroe area in the southeastern
part of Middleboro, northern Middleboro Whites largely limited their complaints to practices affecting themselves, their children, and sometimes their immediate neighbors.

For instance, a White male Middleboro officer and a Latina Middleboro officer both discussed how the father of a White teen who was arrested for underage drinking at a party, came down to the station and threatened to file a lawsuit unless the charges against his son were dropped. The White Middleboro officer stated:

The kid’s dad, he’s some big corporate lawyer downtown [in New York City], he comes in all dressed up in his three piece suit and starts lashin’ into the lieutenant, sayin’ “My son’s not a criminal, why did you arrest him” and all. I think he used stronger language than that, but you get the point. I mean the guy was really goin’ off. I distinctly remember him saying the word “lawsuit” about a dozen times. And he wasn’t playin.’ No this guy was gonna tear the lieutenant’s balls off. Anyhow, when I came back on duty two days later, surprise, surprise, I found out they dropped the charges against the guy’s son.

As this particular incident suggests, Middleboro officers saw northern Middleboro Whites, like their central and southwestern counterparts as a powerful constituency group of which to be mindful.

Although Middleboro officers saw northern Middleboro Whites as a powerful constituency group and viewed this group as being slightly above central and southwestern Whites and Blacks in terms of socioeconomic status, nevertheless Middleboro officers perceived central and southwestern Whites and Blacks as the most powerful constituency groups within Middleboro. This perception was based on two interrelated factors. One factor deals with the various groups’ relationships to one another. While Middleboro officers saw northern Middleboro Whites as being rather discrete in relation to all other groups in Middleboro, whereas Middleboro officers saw middle- and upper-middle class Blacks and Whites in the central and southwestern parts
of Middleboro as being a strongly unified “liberal” coalition. For instance, one White
male Middleboro officer stated:

    The Whites and Blacks in around here [the central part of Middleboro], they’re all
    on the same page. This is not like other places; here, everyone’s got each other’s
    back. They all get upset about the same things, bitch about the same things. It’s
    no different. Black, White, it doesn’t matter here.

    The second factor that explains the greater perceived power of central and
southwestern middle- and upper-middle-class Blacks and Whites, to which this officer
alludes in the latter part of the preceding quote, involves the incidents over which various
groups became indignant, as well as the people whom various groups sought to defend
and protect. While, as noted above, northern Middleboro Whites appeared to only be
concerned about officers’ handling of northern Middleboro Whites, particularly northern
Middleboro White youth, central and southwestern Middleboro Blacks and Whites
appeared to be concerned about Middleboro officers’ treatment of anyone, including non-
residents. In other words, Middleboro officers only had to worry about the potential
complaints of northern Middleboro Whites when the officers interacted with northern
Middleboro Whites. In contrast, Middleboro officers had to worry about potential
complaints from the coalition of central and southwestern Blacks and Whites any time
the officers interacted with anyone, including poor Blacks from the southeastern part of
Middleboro.23 In sum, given that northern Middleboro Whites were not only smaller in
absolute size to the coalition of central and southwestern Blacks and Whites, but also
concerned about a substantially more limited range of police behaviors, Middleboro
officers saw the central and southwestern coalition of Blacks and Whites as being at the
top of Middleboro’s social group hierarchy.
Although Middleboro officers suggested that the central and southwestern coalition of “liberal” Blacks and Whites were concerned about the possible harassment or mistreatment of anyone, the officers noted that this coalition appeared to be most protective of Blacks, especially Black youth from the southeastern part of town, and least protective of northern White youth. Middleboro officers explained that this coalition of middle- and upper-middle-class Blacks and Whites viewed the poor and working-class southeastern Blacks as being relatively powerless and in need of protection. For instance, one White male Middleboro officer stated the following while driving on Norman Street in the southeastern part of Middleboro:

You’d be surprised. You’ve got a lot of bleeding heart liberals in this town. If we were to do some kinda sweep around here, all the bleeding hearts would be saying, “Oh, don’t you pick on those poor, defenseless people, you bullies.” You know, they could be sellin’ drugs, stealin’ shit, but it doesn’t matter, they’re still the goddamn victims, and we’re the bad guys. Go figure.

The issue of power also factored into the Black and White coalition’s more tempered sentiment regarding Middleboro officers’ handling of northern White youth. Middleboro officers suggested that central and southwestern Blacks and Whites appeared to have less sympathy for northern White youth because these youth were seen as privileged and sufficiently defended and protected by their wealthy White parents.²⁹ For instance, a Black male Middleboro officer stated the following about how others in town viewed northern White youth:

It’s hard to put it into words, but these kids are cockier, you know, more spoiled. I mean, these kids have everything and then some. These kids are set; their parents take care of everything…. Most people in town aren’t too worried about these kids…. If one of ‘em gets arrested, it’s not like anybody’s talkin’ about puttin’ together a demonstration or somethin’. No one gets too worked up about it ‘cause they know their folks will handle it.
As this officer’s comments suggest, Middleboro’s “liberal” Black and White coalition’s indignation regarding police practices was qualified by the status of those affected; wealthier northern White youth were, due to their perceived privileged status, not seen as “victims” in the same way that poor, southeastern Black youth were.

Although Middleboro officers perceived southeastern Blacks as being relatively powerless in their own right and being at the bottom of the social hierarchy in Middleboro, the protection afforded by the coalition of middle- and upper-middle-class Blacks and Whites in Middleboro helped to shield southeastern Blacks from targeting or harassment throughout most of Middleboro like an umbrella. In other words, this “umbrella effect” insulated southeastern Blacks from potentially harsher policing notwithstanding Middleboro officers’ apparent lack of concern about complaints and blowback from southeastern Blacks themselves. Moreover, even though the majority of Middleboro officers, but particularly the non-Black Middleboro officers, held a highly negative, stereotypical view of southeastern Blacks that was very similar to Longwood officers’ highly negative view of District 4 Blacks in Longwood, Middleboro officers, unlike their Longwood counterparts, generally employed a laissez-faire approach in their handling of poorer Black residents outside of their neighborhoods.

4.4. The Power-Related Conditioning of Officers’ Schemata in Coretown

In assessing group power as part of their construction of an intra-town social group hierarchy, Coretown officers, unlike Middleboro and Longwood officers, focused very little on perceived differences among identified racial groups. In general, as a result of the perceived absence of resident racial minority groups in Coretown, Coretown
officers rarely appeared to associate group power with race. There were only two types of situations in which Coretown officers seemed to think of group power in *racial* terms. The first type involved situations in which the absence of racial minority residents in Coretown forced the officers to think about the racial makeup of the town. As in Chapter 3, this was most evident in situations in which Coretown officers stopped Black motorists. For instance, in prefacing his concerns about being perceived as engaging in racial profiling, a White male Coretown officer stated:

Yeah, this is still pretty much a White town. I’m not sure why that is, but it is…. As far as I know, it’s always been like this.

The second type involved situations in which officers had confrontations with racial minorities in several visitor-related spaces (*e.g.*, officers’ stopping and questioning of Blacks, Latinos, and Asians at Orion County College, which is discussed more fully in Chapter 6). For example, following several encounters with Blacks, Latinos, and Asians at Orion County College, an Asian male Coretown officer stated:

It’s like culture shock when you come here. I mean, you’ve got a few minorities that live in town, but it’s mostly White. Like if you go to the high school, you can count the Blacks on your hand. But here, here it’s nothing like that. It’s like the United Nations.

Coretown officers thought about the dominant group’s White racial identity in both of these aforementioned situations because each situation made race salient to Coretown officers.

Although Coretown officers generally did not, unlike Longwood and Middleboro officers, engage in *racial* comparisons among *residents*, Coretown officers did, like Middleboro officers’ intra-racial assessments of both Middleboro Blacks and Whites
respectively, engage in class-based intra-racial comparisons among Coretown residents.

In particular, Coretown officers emphasized class distinctions between White residents in the southern and northern parts of town. In general, Coretown officers saw Whites in the southern half of Coretown as being working- to middle-class, and saw Whites in the northern half as being upper-middle-class. In addition, Coretown officers perceived southern White residents as being older, longtime residents who were supportive of the police, and northern White residents as being younger, newer residents who were less supportive of the police.  

Although, as discussed more fully in Chapter 7, Coretown officers generally expressed connections to and a sense of kinship with southern Coretown residents, the officers nevertheless saw northern Whites as increasingly possessing greater power within Coretown. This was most apparent in Coretown officers’ statements claiming that northern Whites were undercutting Coretown officers at the ongoing contract talks, and were ultimately responsible for Coretown officers’ absence of a contract. For example, one White male Coretown officer stated:

We don’t have a contract because of the new people who’ve moved in. They expect us to do everything for ‘em, but they don’t want to pay for it. Like they want to make new hires pay premiums for their health care. They want to do away with the benefits. We ain’t budgin’ on that.

Coretown officers’ view of northern Whites as being the more powerful White subgroup within Coretown also was evident by Coretown officers’ selective statements regarding their difficulties in pleasing residents. Of Coretown officers’ numerous statements regarding how it was difficult to please Coretown residents, nearly every
For instance, a White male Coretown officer stated:

The older [disproportionately southern] [residents]…. they don’t try to take advantage [of the police]….The new people movin’ in, they expect you to come runnin’ over for every little thing. Like we had this lady the other day who calls us because there’s a raccoon in her yard. I mean you shoulda seen this lady, she was hysterical, talkin’ about her daughter gettin’ rabies, it was crazy. Now we shouldn’t have to waste time on that, c’mon. But if you don’t come and check it out, you know what they’ll do, they’ll complain….I know you’ve got to try to keep up good will [with the northern residents], but it’s not easy….The problem I see, is that a lot of people here, they expect you to fix all their problems, like when the power goes out, they call us and say, “When am I going to get my power back on.” “Sorry lady, we’re not the electric company….” ….You know, whatever you do, it’s never enough.

As this officer’s comments reveal, Coretown officers not only saw themselves as having to work extra hard to cater to “new” northern Whites, but they also perceived these Whites as being more demanding and less appreciative than older, southern Whites. Coretown officers’ substantially greater fear of receiving complaints from northern Whites, coupled with the officers’ apparent uneasiness in trying to placate these seemingly fastidious residents, implicitly suggests that northern residents wielded greater power within Coretown than southern Whites.

4.5. Conclusion

In line with conflict theory, information related to the power of social groups in local communities is fundamentally involved in officers’ cognitive mapping of such communities. However, the influence that such power-related information has upon officers’ construction of social group schemata, and ultimately officers’ approaches to policing, is not as straightforward and cut-and-dried as conflict theory predicts. While, as
conflict theorists such as Chambliss and Seidman (1971) and Quinney (1975) contend, officers across towns generally do identify and attempt to accommodate the interests of the most powerful groups within their communities of employ, such accommodation does not invariably translate into disadvantageous outcomes for relatively powerless groups. Moreover, while conflict theory predicts officers’ being guided by the same schema across contexts, the findings contained herein demonstrate that officers in different communities develop different schemata in response to different structural constraints they encounter within those communities. This between-town variation in officers’ social group schemata not only challenges some of the assumptions of conflict theory, but also challenges the notion that there is an unfiltered macro-societal racial-, ethnic-, and class-based schema that similarly guides officers’ social cognition and approaches to policing across communities.

Longwood officers’ social group schemata appear to be most consistent with conflict theory’s expectations as well as with the idea of a macro-societal social group schema. The social group schema that Longwood officers construct from power-related information is largely a White/Black binary framework. Longwood officers see the town’s White population as being all-powerful and the town’s Black population as powerless. Moreover, this cognitively perceived power-disparity between Whites and Blacks is strengthened by officers’ sense of Whites’ connections to the powers-that-be within Longwood. For Longwood officers, Longwood’s White population is powerful because it is organically intertwined with the town’s power structure. Furthermore, this perception of the White group’s formidable power, coupled with the perception that powerful White residents did not want Blacks, particularly Black youth congregating in
their neighborhoods, cognitively predisposed officers to take a harsher approach towards Blacks in a manner consistent with both conflict theory and the idea of a macro-societal racial schema.

In contrast to the largely dichotomous racial schema that Longwood officers construct from power-related information, the racial schema that Middleboro officers construct is a complex tripartite framework, in which the seeming power and powerlessness of racial/class groups do not neatly translate into the outcomes expected by conflict theory and by a macro-societal racial/class schema. This tripartite hierarchical framework includes a powerful Black and White middle- to upper-middle-class coalition in the central and southwestern parts of Middleboro, a wealthy White group in the northern part of Middleboro, and a poor Black group in the southeastern part of Middleboro. Middleboro officers were particularly concerned about incurring the wrath of the large, vocal, vigilant, politically liberal coalition of Blacks and Whites that occupied the central part of town. The apparent power that this coalition had in shaping and conditioning Middleboro officers’ schemata and influencing how officers approached various groups, challenges some assumptions underlying both conflict theory and the idea of a macro-societal schema.

Middleboro officers’ apparent accommodation of this powerful bi-racial coalition’s interests challenges conflict theory’s assumption regarding whom the police serve, protect, and target. In contrast to conflict theory’s expectation that the police cater to powerful groups at the expense of powerless ones, Middleboro officers appeared to largely heed the Black/White coalition’s concerns regarding the protection and safeguarding of the rights of all residents, including poorer Blacks in the southeastern
part of Middleboro. Ironically, Middleboro officers saw this Black/White coalition as being a powerful entity with which to be reckoned precisely because this coalition scrutinized and protested officers’ handling of all residents.

Middleboro’s apparent laissez-faire approach with respect to poor Blacks in the southeastern part of Middleboro also similarly runs counter to what type of approach officers would take if they were guided by the macro-societal racial schema and its stereotypes of Black criminality. However, Middleboro’s apparent view of the Black/White coalition itself being a strange, counterintuitive entity actually reinforces the idea that officers bring this macro-societal racial schema with them. Consistent with Loury (2002:42, 71), the taken-for-granted quality of the macro-societal racial schema is revealed by Middleboro’s perceptions of a communal racial order that runs counter to what they see as “normal” and expected. Nevertheless, Middleboro officers’ general accommodation of the Black/White coalition’s concerns shows that Middleboro officers, albeit somewhat reluctantly and begrudgingly, developed a collectively shared schema that diverged from that of the macro-societal schema as well as the schema of officers from other towns such as Longwood.

Middleboro officers also feared the wealthy and powerful Whites in northern Middleboro, but less so than the central Black/White coalition because the officers saw these northern Whites as only caring about and looking after themselves. In contrast to the White majorities in Longwood and Coretown, this White subgroup generally was disconnected from the police and the overall power structure of the town. Nevertheless, Middleboro officers perceived these residents as being ready and able to defend
themselves, and as a result, approached this group with caution, even when the group appeared to be acting according to unwarranted self-interest.

The contrast between Middleboro and Longwood officers’ schemata highlights the extent to which different sets of communally-based, power-related information condition officers’ schemata differently between towns. In particular, Middleboro and Longwood officers’ starkly different racial schemata are evidenced by the officers’ widely divergent approaches to their town’s respective poor, Black populations. Notwithstanding the fact that both towns’ officers viewed their respective towns’ similar, poor, Black populations (District 4 Blacks in Longwood and Southeastern Blacks in Middleboro) in highly negative terms, only Longwood officers generally targeted their town’s poor, Black residents. This between-town variation in officers’ racial schemata demonstrates how communal contexts can condition officers’ schemata in ways that diverge from that of the macro-societal schema.

Power-related information similarly led to a different conditioning effect on officers’ schemata in Coretown. Confronted by a social landscape in which there was little racial residential diversity, Coretown officers, unlike both Longwood and Middleboro officers, did not conceive of residential groups’ power in racial terms. Rather, in the absence of any significant racial diversity, Coretown officers became highly attuned to power-related information relating to a class schism in the dominant White group. This schism involved the working- to middle-class Whites in the southern half of town, and the middle- to upper-middle-class Whites in the northern half of town.

Coretown officers were particularly sensitive to power-related information pertaining to this schism, because Coretown officers saw this schism as having personal
bearing on the officers themselves. While Coretown officers, the majority of whom were White, acted as if they were in sync with and empowered by the predominantly White residential population, the officers appeared to be increasingly ambivalent about their relationship to this population as it became more fragmented in terms of class. As the town’s upper-middle-class White population in the northern half of town expanded, Coretown officers appeared to become less sure of themselves and somewhat alienated. Unlike Longwood officers, Coretown officers did not feel that they had the unconditional support of the dominant White group, and as a result, exhibited a much more cautious, constrained approach to policing. Although power-related information appeared to factor more prominently in conditioning officers’ schemata in Longwood and Middleboro, such information was nevertheless important to the conditioning of Coretown officers’ schemata as well, albeit in less apparent ways.

CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES

1 Moreover, as I discuss in Chapter 5, while various cultural practices can be seen as symbolizing power, cultural practices can also symbolize order, which is not conceptually synonymous with power. Those who engage in cultural practices signifying order to the police are able to avoid close monitoring by the police, whereas those who engage in cultural practices signifying power are able to actively manipulate the police and other criminal justice actors to affect favorable outcomes.

2 One of the eleven members of the Longwood Town Council was Black. All other local officials were White.

3 “Johnny Garber” is a pseudonym. All names have been changed throughout the remainder of this dissertation so as to ensure anonymity.

4 The vocality and apparent influence of White District 2 residents, as well as officers’ apparent greater solicitousness to White District 2 residents than White District 1 residents is likely in part due to the routine presence of a large number of Black youth in District 2 during the school year and the general absence of Black youth, and more generally Blacks, in District 1. Given that Longwood High School is located in the north central part of District 2 and has a sizable Black population that hails mostly from the predominantly Black District 4, and racially mixed Districts 3 and 8, White residents in District 2, unlike White residents in District 1, are regularly confronted with a large Black student population that often is the source of White District 2 residents’ complaints.
The officer explained that the mayor, in retaliation for the Police Chief’s lack of support of the mayor’s reelection bid, created a Deputy Police Chief position and appointed someone who regularly undercut the Chief’s authority.

The majority of Black Longwood High School students walked in an east southeast direction back to their homes in District 4, whereas a smaller percentage of Black students walked south to their homes in District 8.

The apparent ability of Longwood Whites to use their connections to avoid or mitigate criminal sanctions is akin to that of the White youths in Hamilton Park that Sullivan (1989) describes.

The Longwood Town Council is made up of eleven members, including the Council President and one representative from each of the town’s ten respective wards. The council member to whom the Black man referred, Councilman Davis, was, as alluded to in Note 2 above, the lone Black member of the Town Council at the time data was gathered for this study in 2006. The other ten members, including the President, were White. Councilman Davis remains the only Black member of the town council at the time of this writing in 2009.

Animal Planet is a cable television channel that airs programs that exclusively deal with animals.

Longwood officers identified the race of a caller based on the neighborhood from which the call was placed.

While all Longwood officers demonstrated a prompt response to White constituents’ calls for service, particularly those living in the overwhelmingly White Districts 1 and 2, Black officers displayed a more timely response to Black constituents’ calls for service than that of White, Latino, and Asian officers.

By “middle-class” I am referring to those who owned their own small homes and their own relatively moderately priced cars. As discussed later in the chapter, Longwood officers’ view of Longwood Blacks was not completely monolithic in terms of class. For instance, Longwood officers discursively recognized subtle class differences in demeanor and dress.

U.S. Census Bureau (2000).

Norville is a large city of approximately 275,000 residents that is located approximately two miles from Middleboro. Approximately 60% of Norville’s residents are Black, approximately 30% live below the poverty line, and the median income for a household in Norville is more than three times below that of Middleboro [U.S. Census Bureau (2000)]. Norville has among the nation’s highest rates of property and violent crime [Uniform Crime Reports (2006)].

There are a few class-related behaviors, such as dress, demeanor, and appearance and maintenance of property, that are discussed in Chapter 5 for purposes of clarity.

Woman # 1 was the woman who previously had yelled at the officer.

However, as discussed below, poor Black Middleboro residents, unlike poor Longwood residents, were subject to less scrutiny and harassment from patrol officers as a result of an “umbrella effect.” A liberal coalition of middle and upper-middle-class Blacks and Whites concentrated in the large central part of town helped to shield lower-income, southeastern Blacks from police harassment.

“Ragging” means the same as harassing. Here the Black youth was suggesting that the Middleboro police are selective in terms of whom they harass.

Benny’s is, as several Middleboro officers described, a “White” nightclub that plays rock music and often has a large number of White youths congregating outside of it on several evenings throughout the week, but especially on Fridays and Saturdays.
Again, as noted below, such southeastern youth were, with the exception of the upscale commercial district on the western side of Belton Avenue in the southern part of Middleboro, insulated from possible harassment by officers due to an “umbrella effect”.

Georgeville is a small, almost exclusively White, upper-middle-class town that shares a border with Middleboro on the eastern side of Middleboro.

However, as noted in Chapter 6, Middleboro officers were more aggressive with respect to patrolling southeastern Blacks right along the border at the easternmost point of Belton Avenue. Officers’ seemingly contradictory patrolling at the borders was attributable to officers’ concerns about poor Black non-residents coming into Middleboro from neighboring towns and engaging in various criminal activities.

It is also plausible that some of this coalition’s apparent lack of concern for the welfare of northern White youth is tied to the secession issue. Central and southwestern Blacks and Whites may have felt less connected to and sympathetic towards youth from the northern part of town due to some northern Whites’ desire to secede from the rest of Middleboro.

The one notable exception to Middleboro officers’ laissez-faire approach towards southeastern Blacks is the officers’ patrolling of southeastern Blacks around the eastern border of the upscale commercial district situated along the western part of Belton Avenue in the southern part of Middleboro. This patrolling of the borders of the upscale commercial district is discussed at length in Chapter 6.

The issue of officers’ perceptions of residents’ support for the police is discussed more fully in Chapter 7.

At the time of the ride-alongs in 2006, Coretown police officers had been working without a contract for over a year and contract talks had stalled.

Coretown officers made many of these statements while referencing events that occurred in northern Coretown neighborhoods.
CHAPTER 5:  Officers’ Use of Culture-Related Information in Mapping and Negotiating Social Group Hierarchies within Their Towns of Employ

5.1. The Salience of Culture-Related Information to Officers in Local Communities

As shown in the previous chapter, patrol officers are highly sensitive to information relating to social groups’ power to affect outcomes within officers’ towns of employ, as such information indicates to whom officers must pay foremost attention. However, police officers are also very much attuned to culture-related information in that signifies important messages about social order in their communities of patrol, irrespective of groups’ power to affect and manipulate outcomes. For police officers, order represents conventional, civilized, tempered behavior that does not pose challenge authority and norms, especially mores. The findings documented throughout this chapter reveal that culture-related information factors prominently in officers’ differentiation and ranking of groups in a social group schema. This chapter investigates the various types of culture-related information that officers cognitively gather, read, and use to construct a hierarchically ordered social group schema within the communal context in which they work.

In examining how officers identify and process culture-related information from the social and cultural landscapes of their towns of employ, I focus on cultural information that symbolically relates to the maintenance of social order. As noted in Chapter 1, we expect police to be highly attuned to such practices because order maintenance is of utmost importance to patrol officers (Wilson 1968:16). While some theorists have directly or implicitly alluded to how power is often symbolically inscribed in various cultural practices or objects (see, e.g., Foucault 1977;
Henslin 2001), comparatively little attention has been paid to the ways that order is inscribed in such practices or objects. In focusing on the inscription of power in cultural practices and objects, theorists have suggested that certain practices and objects symbolically convey the ability of the person who performs such practices or controls such objects to affect outcomes. For instance, if person lives in a mansion or works on Wall Street, then police officers and other social actors are likely to perceive this person as having the financial means and social connections to affect outcomes in a way that is favorable to him or her. In a similar vein, the inscription of order in cultural practices and objects symbolically conveys whether the person who performs such practices or controls such objects poses a potential threat to the maintenance of order. Conceiving of cultural practices and objects as largely symbolic indicators of power misses the important ways such practices and objects symbolize order. Rather than effectively reducing culture to the expression (or lack thereof) of power, I take a more expansive view of culture in terms of its symbolic significance within the context of policing in local communities.

My findings indicate that there are several types of culture-related information that play an important role in conditioning officers’ schemata within officers’ towns of employ. Taken together, the findings from Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro suggest that officers foremost assess groups’ cultural practices and values relating to work, education, parenting, trouble (e.g., fighting, drinking, and domestic violence), demeanor and dress, and maintenance of properties. These particular types of cultural practices and values are particularly salient to officers in local communal contexts because officers see such practices and values as tied to social control, which in turn is
tied to the maintenance of social order. Officers come to see groups whose practices reflect a high degree of social control as being groups that officers need not worry about as a threat to social order. Thus, while power-related information foremost informs officers as to whom they must accommodate, culture-related information that symbolically conveys messages about order informs officers about whom they need not be concerned.

The remainder of this chapter examines the various types of culture-related information that condition officers’ social group schemata in Longwood, Coretown, and Middleboro. Special attention is paid to the key role such information plays in the lumping, splitting, and contrasting processes officers employ in cognitively constituting and mapping various social groups. While there are some similarities across towns in terms of the types of culture-related information that is salient to officers, the particular types of culture-related information that appear to be most central to officers’ cognitive mapping vary from town to town. Such between-town variation in the salience of types of culture-related information reflects the different communal structures within each town.

5.2. The Culture-Related Conditioning of Officers’ Schemata in Longwood

Of the three sets of officers, Longwood officers appeared to be particularly sensitive to culture-related practices and values. Culture-related practices and values were more significant and salient in officers’ constitutions and rankings of groups in a social group hierarchy in Longwood than in either Coretown or Middleboro because Longwood officers perceived far more ethnic and racial diversity in the town in which they patrolled than Coretown and Middleboro officers did. As a result, both the breadth
and depth of culture-related practices cited by Longwood officers is far greater than that of either Coretown or Middleboro officers.

While Longwood officers’ discussions of power-related phenomena mostly centered upon distinctions between Whites, whom officers unambiguously viewed as being the most powerful racial group in Longwood, and Blacks, whom officers viewed as relatively powerless, the officers’ discussions of culture-related practices and values were used to situate all of the racial and ethnic groups within a social group hierarchy in Longwood. Indeed, in many cases, Longwood officers’ discussions of culture-related practices centered more on groups that officers viewed as neither clearly “White” nor clearly “Black.” However, all of Longwood officers’ assessments of the culture-related practices of groups that were neither clearly “White” nor clearly “Black” implicitly involved some type of comparison and contrast of these groups’ practices with those practices that the officers saw as normative for “Whites” on the one hand, and “Blacks” on the other. As a result of their assessment of these culture-related practices and values, as well as the power-related phenomena discussed in Chapter 4, Longwood officers constructed a racial/ethnic hierarchy. Longwood officers situated Whites at the top of this hierarchy, followed by Cuban, Polish, Portuguese and Slovakian immigrants immediately below Whites, Central Americans, Dominicans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans below Cubans, Poles, Portuguese, and Slovaks but above Blacks, and Haitian and Jamaican immigrants and Blacks at the bottom.

Longwood officers frequently made reference to work-related practices and values as they constituted and ranked various racial and ethnic groups. Such work-related practices and values were particularly central in both Longwood officers’ lumping
of Portuguese and Poles with Whites, and “Hispanics”\[^{±}\] with Portuguese, on the one hand, and officers’ contrasting of Portuguese, Poles, and Hispanics with Blacks and Haitian and Jamaican immigrants on the other. Longwood officers often used the term “hardworking” as a racial codeword for “Whites.” Although Longwood officers did not see the Portuguese, Poles, and Hispanics as possessing Whites’ political clout and connections, the officers nevertheless viewed the Portuguese, Poles, and Hispanics as being “hardworking” like Whites. For instance, a White male Longwood officer stated the following about Longwood’s Portuguese population:

The Portuguese, they’re like workaholics, real quiet, real hard workers. They wanna do something, they just put their heads down and they do it….

Similarly, a White male Longwood officer stated the following about Longwood’s Polish immigrant population:

Polish people, they don’t come over here to fuck around; they work hard…. They do anything, sweep floors, dig ditches, whatever it takes.

Likewise, a White male Longwood officer stated the following about Longwood’s Hispanics, whom he conflated with Mexicans:

…Mexicans, yeah they, Hispanics, you don’t notice ‘em much. They’re always workin’. Yeah, they got a great work ethic. They’re just tryin’ to get a little of the American dream for themselves. You gotta give them that.

Although Longwood officers labeled the Portuguese, Poles, and Hispanics as being similar to Whites in terms of their embodiment and valuing of hard work, nevertheless Longwood officers generally only directly lumped the work-related habits and values of Portuguese and Polish immigrants with those of Whites. For instance, a White male Longwood officer stated:
You know if it wasn’t for the way they fix up their houses, you wouldn’t be able to tell the Portuguese apart from Caucasians [Whites]. I mean, they go to work, take care of business, their families, just like everybody⁵ else.

Similarly, a White male Longwood officer remarked:

The Polish, well they’re different from the people from here, from the Whites, but not really. They all work hard and try to take care of their families. So there’s really not much difference.

In contrast, when Longwood officers made positive comparisons of Hispanics’ work-related practices and values, such comparisons were exclusively made between Hispanics and Portuguese. For example, a Black male Longwood officer stated:

Hispanics…they’re a lot like the Portuguese. Real quiet. They’re just always working their asses off.

Thus, even though Longwood officers saw Whites, Hispanics, Poles, and Portuguese as “hardworking,” officers’ specific intergroup work-related comparisons suggest that officers saw Hispanics as being beneath Poles and Portuguese in relationship to Whites.

While the aforementioned references to Hispanic, Polish, and Portuguese residents’ work-related practices and values likened these groups to Whites in a laudatory way, other references to these groups’ work-related practices and values appeared to be intended to distinguish these groups from Blacks and denigrate Blacks’ work-related practices and values.⁶ As Martinez (1994) argues, laudatory comments about “model minorities” can also serve the insidious purpose of attacking the practices and values of other minority groups, particularly Blacks, that fail to match the standards of the “model” groups. In particular, Longwood officers presented Portuguese residents as model group
against which Blacks were measured. For instance, one male White Longwood officer stated:

The Portuguese, yeah, they’re real go getters. You don’t see them hangin’ out on the corner.

Although this officer does not expressly reference Blacks, he, as well as other Longwood officers, regularly made disparaging comments about Blacks who congregated on or near the streets at various places in the northern and central parts of District 4 as well as along Radnor Avenue (the border of Districts 3 and 4). Accordingly, in praising the Portuguese for not “hanging out on the corner,” this officer was indirectly putting down Blacks.

Similarly, another White male Longwood officer indirectly criticized Blacks in the course of directly praising Poles. This officer stated:

We’ve always had a lot of Poles. I guess they come here because they got people here…. [The Poles] don’t have it easy when they get here. They gotta learn the language, get used to everything and all. But they don’t whine about it; they don’t make excuses….

Once again, although this officer’s comments do not specifically reference Blacks, these comments, when placed together with some of this officer’s direct, unambiguously critical statements about Blacks, suggest that the officer is implicitly denigrating Blacks’ work ethic. For instance, this officer made the following statement referring to Blacks:

That’s the thing that gets me. I’m all for equal opportunity and all. But c’mon. They blame racism for everything. How ‘bout getting a freakin’ job.

Putting the officer’s two statements together, it becomes apparent that this officer is suggesting that Poles do not complain and make excuses like Blacks do. Rather, this officer is arguing that Poles, unlike Blacks, work hard instead of complaining.
Longwood officers’ direct and indirect references to various groups’ work-related practices and values strongly paralleled the officers’ references to various groups’ valuing of education. Longwood officers constituted and ranked groups in part by the extent to which they valued education, particularly in terms of whether a given group’s members stressed education with their children. As noted in Chapter 7’s discussion of officers’ racialized narratives, Longwood officers frequently invoked White families, often their own White families from Longwood, as being the exemplary normative standard against which other groups’ families were assessed in terms of a variety of parenting-related practices and values, including the valuing of education. While Longwood officers typically made implicit, taken-for-granted references to Longwood Whites’ valuing of education, the officers expressly praised Portuguese and Poles’ valuing of education. For instance, in discussing the Portuguese in Longwood, a Black male Longwood officer stated:

[The Portuguese] stay on top of their kids when it comes to school; they’re like the Jews that way…. They teach [their children] that gettin’ an education is what it’s all about.

Similarly, in discussing the Polish immigrants in Longwood, an Asian male Longwood officer remarked:

The Polish, they’re big on education; they know that without an education, you can’t do much…. For some of them, there’s a language thing, but they try make up for that by hittin’ the books… My brother was friends with this Polish guy; his mother always made sure he got his homework done….

Although Longwood officers also suggested that Longwood Hispanics valued education, such references were more indirect than those for either Portuguese or Poles.
For instance, a White male Longwood officer said the following about Hispanics after driving past the Longwood Library and noticing a woman and two children whom the officer identified as “Hispanic”:

That’s one thing I’ve noticed. There’s a lotta Hispanics that use the library. You even see the fathers with their kids. You gotta hand to ‘em, at least they look out for their kids, want what’s best for them….In all my years here, I don’t ever remember seeing a father—or even a mother—from [Chester] [Avenue] or [Union] [Street] [in District 4] over at the library….You’d know Hell had frozen over if someone from [Chester] or [Union] was [at the library].

This officer’s comments raise three important points. First, the officer is suggesting, that Hispanics, based on their patronage of the library, value education and are transmitting that message to their children. Second, this officer’s indirect praise of Hispanics’ valuing of education, in contrast to officers’ direct praise of Portuguese and Poles’ valuing of education, provides additional evidence that although officers lumped Hispanics with the former groups, officers nevertheless saw Hispanics as being beneath Portuguese and Poles in Longwood social group hierarchy.

Third, the last part of this officer’s comments, which include racially coded references to Longwood Blacks, namely, Chester Avenue and Union Street, shows that the officer is not simply lauding Hispanics, but also denigrating Blacks through a comparison of Hispanics’ and Blacks’ education-related practices. Analogous to some of Longwood officers’ laudatory statements regarding Portuguese and Poles cited above, this officer’s comments distinguish Hispanics from Blacks by simultaneously praising Hispanics’ practices while condemning Blacks’.

Unlike this indirect and somewhat cryptic criticism of Blacks’ education-related practices and values, many of Longwood officers’ criticisms of Blacks’ education-related
practices and values were direct and blunt. For instance, several Longwood officers, all of whom were White, made numerous disparaging remarks about Blacks’ education-related practices and values during the course of patrolling students in the wake of 3 o’clock dismissal from Longwood High School in District 2. While referring to a group that consisted of two Black male and four Black female Longwood High School students, a White male Longwood officer remarked:

Look at that. No books. You never see [Black students] with books. “It won’t look good in front of my homies, man.” You wonder why they even bother comin’ to school. What’s the point?

Given that Longwood officers never made any disparaging comments about students belonging to any of the other groups that the officers identified, the officers highly disparaging comments about Black students demonstrate that the officers viewed Blacks as being isolated at the bottom of Longwood’s social group hierarchy.

Besides education-related practices and values, Longwood officers also used assessments of two other parenting-related practices and values, those relating to parental discipline and supervision, in constituting and ranking various racial and ethnic groups in Longwood. The hierarchy that emerged through Longwood officers’ comments relating to parental discipline and supervision mirrored the one that emerged through their assessments of valuing education. Again, as officers’ racialized narratives discussed in Chapter 7 suggest, Whites were the paragons of parental discipline and supervision at the top of Longwood’s social group hierarchy. As with their references to Whites’ valuing of education, Longwood officers’ references to Whites’ parental discipline and supervision were generally implicit. For Longwood officers, Whites were the unstated, taken-for-grANTED normative model of parental discipline and supervision against which other
groups were measured. As exemplified by the case of a one longtime White Longwood officer whose son and son’s friend became “model” citizens after being “hellraisers” (see section 7.4 of Chapter 7), even where White youth appeared to go astray, Longwood officers appeared to have absolute faith in White parents and caretakers being able to rectify such errant behavior and steer White youth onto a straight and narrow path.

Longwood officers held a similarly exemplary view of Portuguese and Poles’ disciplinary and supervisory practices, and officers lumped Portuguese and Poles together with Whites based on such practices. However, unlike their generally unstated laudatory view of Whites’ parenting practices, Longwood officers expressly described Portuguese and Poles’ parenting practices in unambiguous details. For example, in lauding the disciplinary practices of Portuguese parents, a White male Longwood officer recounted the following story:

Man, the Portuguese, they don’t play. One time there was this [16 year old] kid who’d been fightin’ after school, he was a real pain in the ass. Mouthing off, trying to act all tough in front of his friends. The whole time he was down at the station he’s like, “You can’t do nothin’ to me. You got nothin’ on me.” We keep tellin’ him to shut up, but he just keeps acting like little Mr. tough guy the whole time…. Finally it comes time to drop the little shit off at home. I noticed that all of sudden he got quiet and didn’t say anything else the whole time on the way over to his house. So we get to the house and we walk down this driveway that goes to the back and there’s this big, heavy-set Portuguese woman and she’s sweepin’ with one arm. Her other arm is limp; she had a stroke or somethin’. While we’re walkin’ I notice that [the 16 year old boy] turns all pale like he’d seen a ghost, and he’s got his head down like he’s afraid to look at her. We walk up to her and she puts down her broom. Before we even get a chance to finish tellin’ her about the fight her son had been involved in, she turns, and I’ll never forget this, without a word, she turns and grabs the boy with her good arm and whacks him across his head with the limp one. All of sudden Mr. tough guy isn’t so tough. [I think to myself,] “What, are you gonna cry, tough guy?” Well, you know we never saw him again…. No, the Portuguese, they don’t stand for that [kind of behavior].
Similarly, a White male Longwood officer lauded the disciplinary practices of Polish parents by recounting an incident following a street brawl:

Some parents let their kids get away with anything. That’s one thing you know about the Polish, they don’t put up with anything. If their kid gets outta line, man, you know that kid’s gonna get the shit beaten outta him. Whether they want to or not, they’re gonna learn respect; yeah, that’s what it is, that’s big with the Polish, not showing disrespect, not embarrassin’ their parents. No, the Polish, they don’t like bein’ made to look bad…. We had this one Polish kid who’d been fightin’ and givin’ us all kinds of attitude, and so we go to take him back home [over near the border of Districts 7 and 8 in the southern part of Longwood], and you shoulda seen this kid. He’s like beggin’ us to keep him down at the station. Sayin’ he’d never give us problems no more…. We get over by the apartment, and the kid’s dad is outside, he had to leave work early, and you can see he’s fumin’. I mean, he looks like he’s gonna kill somebody. We walk over to him, and I’m thinkin’ he’s gonna say somethin’ to us, but he just grabs his son by the arm, I mean, I thought he was gonna rip his arm off, and he starts yellin’ at the kid and shakin’ him and [the son] is noddin’ and has this terrified look on his face. I actually felt a little sorry for the kid, you know. You know what was gonna happen next. All the neighbors watchin’ knew what was gonna happen. He was gonna get his ass whupped…. Yeah, the Polish, you know that they’re gonna keep their kids in line.

As both of these two latter accounts tellingly reveal, Longwood officers held a highly laudatory view of both Portuguese and Poles’ parenting practices foremost because these practices operated as effective informal social control mechanisms. That is, Longwood officers firmly believed that Portuguese and Polish parents adequately disciplined their children and “kept them in line” such that the officers, as well as the rest of the juvenile and criminal justice systems, would not have to worry about dealing with these youth again in the future. As an Asian male Longwood officer put it:

The Poles here, they’re like the [White] people over in Bright Acres. They like to take care of their own problems, you know, especially if they’re havin’ problems
with their own [children]. They don’t want us getting involved. No, they’d rather handle it themselves. Yeah, that’s what they do.

Longwood officers did not make any similar, direct, laudatory comments about the disciplinary and supervisory parental practices of any of the groups that officers labeled as “Hispanic,” but the officers also indicated, often in a dismissive way, that they generally did not have any problems with “Hispanic” youth, which included newer Mexican and Central American immigrant youths and second generation Puerto Rican and Dominican youth. Longwood officers’ brief, dismissive statements implicitly conveyed that Longwood officers at least viewed these “Hispanic” groups’ parenting as adequate. Accordingly, Longwood officers lumped Hispanics’ parenting practices together with those of Portuguese and Polish residents; nevertheless, the officers’ express and detailed laudatory comments regarding Portuguese and Polish parents’ disciplinary practices suggests that the officers ranked the groups above Hispanics to some extent.

Officers’ lumping of Hispanics with Portuguese and Poles, and in turn, all of these groups with Whites, becomes starkly more evident when the officers’ assessments of these groups’ parenting practices are contrasted with the officers’ assessments of Longwood Blacks’ parenting practices. Longwood officers generally saw Black parents as being unable to provide adequate discipline or supervision. For instance, after arriving at a scene of a fight involving two Black female adolescents and a large crowd of Black onlookers along the northernmost border of District 4, a White male Longwood officer stated:

It’s probably some he said, she said thing. It’s always something stupid like that. Like, “She took my man.” Once they get going it’s almost impossible to calm ‘em down. These girls are just so wild. They have no sense of how to behave. See
that girl, that’s her mother, the one who’s whoopin’ and hollerin.’ You can see that the apple doesn’t fall far from the tree. They live up in that shithole up there. We’re always getting calls from over here. It’s like the Wild West. Somethin’ goin’ on [here] just about every other day….

This officer’s comments suggest that these Black adolescent girls are “wild” and do not know how to behave because they do not have parents who adequately discipline them. Moreover, the reference to the one girl’s mother who is “whoopin’ and hollerin’” implies that even the parents of Black youth do not know how to behave. Furthermore, although Longwood officers confronted and described fights involving children and adolescents of all racial and ethnic groups, officers only described Black youth as being “wild,” which implies that these other youth could be “tamed” by their parents.

Longwood officers also implied that Black Longwood youth lacked parental discipline because they lacked parental supervision. Longwood officers made numerous references to Black children’s lack of supervision. Such references spanned the gamut from toddlers to adult children. For instance, a White male Longwood officer expressed his incredulity at responding to a call in a “Black” neighborhood in District 4 and finding a Black toddler wandering the street at four in the morning:

I get out of [patrol] car and I’m lookin’ down and I think it’s a dog or something. And then I realize it’s a baby wearing nothin’ but diapers! And it’s four in the freakin’ mornin’! I’ll tell you, you may think you’ve seen it all, but you haven’t until you’ve been over [in District 4].

Another White male Longwood officer similarly expressed a sense of incredulity after having a conversation with an older Black man about the man’s adult children near the corner of Chester and Sylvester Avenues in Longwood:

I asked him how his sons were doin’ and he had no clue that [his son] Bobby just got locked up; he’s over in the County [jail]. Can you believe that? And he says
he thinks James is somewhere down in Georgia. You know he ain’t gonna win no “father of the year” award.

In some instances Longwood officers clearly spelled out a nexus between Black parents’ inadequate supervision of their children and Black youth being out on the street. For instance, a White male Longwood officer described what happened to a 16-year-old Black male (Billy) who had been released to the custody of his mother:

That’s the problem sending these juveniles back home. You just know that they’re gonna be back on the street in no time. We had this one kid, Billy, he was sixteen, and he took some other kid’s bike. So we had him down at the station for a few hours and his mother finally comes to get him. She seems more annoyed with all the hassle and how she had a long day at work and doesn’t need this. So she picks up her son and then they leave. About an hour later, it’s about 10:30 [p.m.] and, I swear to God, whatta ya know, it’s Billy and two other boys walkin’ out by [Washington] [Avenue]. Just like that, like clockwork.

As reflected in this account, Longwood officers assumed that when Black youth were released to the custody of their parents, that these youth, unlike all other Longwood youth, would soon end up back on the streets because there was insufficient or no supervision and discipline at home. In the eyes of Longwood officers, Black parents, unlike all other Longwood parents, could not be counted on to provide adequate informal social control with respect to their children.

In turn, the immediately preceding accounts imply that Longwood officers associated a high degree of trouble-related behavior with Black youth and young adults. Given that officers perceived Black youth and young adults as lacking adult supervision and discipline, coupled with the officers’ perceptions of Blacks’ devaluation of education and work, Longwood officers assumed that Black youth and young adults were out on the streets engaging in problematic behavior. This association of trouble-related behavior
with Black youths and young adults, and more broadly with Blacks, was evident by officers’ references to where such behavior was disproportionately occurring. Longwood officers routinely suggested that the bulk of criminal and other problematic behavior occurred in District 4, which officers variously described as “the Black part of town,” “where the Blacks live,” or “the tracks.” Moreover, all Longwood officers invariably referred to the all-Black, poorer, northern section of District 4 as the “target area.”

Longwood officers noted that higher-ranking officers with the Longwood Police Department labeled the “target area” as such because of its allegedly higher rates of drug activity and violent crimes such as assault and robbery.

Longwood officers’ association of the “Black” “target area” with a disproportionate amount of trouble-related behavior was reflected by both the allocation of patrol resources and individual officers’ exercise of discretion. Typically the Longwood Police Department allocated six cars to patrol. Patrol cars’ numbers corresponded to the eight respective districts, and an officer was responsible for handling calls from the particular district assigned to the car (e.g., “2” car was responsible for responding to calls from within District 2). The only two constants regarding the allocation of patrol was the assignment of a car (“4 car”) to District 4 in the northern half of town, which includes Districts 1 through 5, and the assignment of at least one patrol car to the southern part of Longwood, which includes District 6 (a highway with many crowded commercial shopping centers) and Districts 7 and 8 (mostly residential areas with some commercial establishments). Typically four regular patrol cars were assigned to the northern half of town, and two cars were assigned to the southern half. In addition to being the only district that always had a patrol car specifically assigned to it, District 4
also was the only district to always have a car with two officers assigned to it (although District 6 often had a two officer car assigned to it at night). Moreover, a patrol car representing a joint anti-drug, anti-gang task force between Longwood and the town of Radnor regularly patrolled along the northern border of District 4.

The disproportionate allocation of patrol resources to District 4 was matched by Longwood officers’ exercise of discretion while patrolling. Although Longwood officers were responsible for handling service calls and checking certain areas and landmarks within the district assigned to their particular patrol cars, officers nevertheless exercised wide discretion as to where they patrolled when they were not responding to calls. For instance, officers assigned to Districts 3 and 5 generally spent one-third of their non-service call-related patrolling within their assigned district, another one-third patrolling along the border of their assigned district and District 4, and the remaining one-third within District 4. Such discretionary patrolling, which reflected concerns about activity within District 4 and along its border, further suggests that Longwood officers associated District 4’s predominantly Black residents with trouble-related behavior.

Longwood officers’ association of trouble-related behavior with Blacks also was evident by the officers’ references to encounters with Blacks. Consistent with the disproportionate allocation of resources devoted to patrolling District 4, all Longwood officers reported having disproportionate encounters with Blacks. For instance, in discussing his dealings with Black youth and young adults, to whom he disparagingly referred as “shittums”, a White male Longwood officer stated, “We never get a break from the shittums; it’s like 24/7 with ‘em.” Furthermore, nearly two-thirds of the non-Black Longwood officers expressly indicated that Blacks were the only group which they
were averse to patrolling. The following White male Longwood officer’s remarks were representative of other non-Black officers:

You know if it wasn’t for the benefits, I’d quit. I just can’t take dealing with shittums all the time.

Longwood officers pointed out that their aversion to dealing with Black young people was due to these young Blacks’ hostile, disrespectful demeanor. While approximately half of the non-Black Longwood officers made no apparent distinction between the demeanor of District 4 Blacks and that of those Blacks who lived in other parts of Longwood, the other non-Black officers expressly indicated that there were ascertainable differences in demeanor, talk, and dress between Blacks from District 4 and the rest of Longwood’s Black population. For instance, a White male Longwood officer explained how he could tell that a Black youth walking in District 1, which is a predominantly White, middle-class part of Longwood, was from District 4 rather than District 1:

Officer: Oh, it’s easy to tell if he’s a shittum.

Interviewer: How can you tell? Don’t a lot of the young people wear the same style of clothing?

Officer: Well, everything’s a little more worn out. The boots will be a little more scuffed, the jeans will be more faded. You know, just dirtier, messier, like they wear the same clothes everyday…. And they don’t look you in the eye. It’s the craziest shit. You try talkin’ to them and they look away and they’ll be singin’, rappin’, whatever to themselves like they’re in their own little worlds….And they always say, what is it, “Know what I’m sayin’?” after everything…. Yeah, you can tell pretty easy the difference [between Blacks from District 4 and Blacks from other parts of Longwood].
This officer’s account, like those of other Longwood officers, reflects a larger discursive pattern of using dress and demeanor to divide Longwood Blacks into “good,” “bad,” and “pathetic,” “bizarre,” or “circus-like” subgroups. Moreover, accounts like the preceding one reveal that officers’ distinctions based on dress and demeanor, and hence “good” and “bad” Blacks, ultimately hinged on class differences.

In addition to making discursive distinctions among Blacks in terms of class, Longwood officers also made such distinctions in terms of ethnicity and immigrant status. In particular, the majority of Longwood officers discursively separated Haitian and Jamaican immigrants, especially new immigrants, from Blacks. Longwood officers emphasized that unlike “American Blacks,” new Haitian and Jamaican immigrants generally were respectful of authorities. For example, a White female Longwood officer pointed out that new Haitian and Jamaican children were “very eager to learn at [the] D.A.R.E. [program]” and “very friendly to [D.A.R.E. officers].” A White male Longwood officer noted that new Haitian and Jamaican immigrant adolescents and adults were similarly friendly and respectful. The officer remarked:

The Haitians and Jamaicans, they’re different [than American Blacks]. They’ll actually say “Hello” and “Sir” and not give you any attitude. It takes you by surprise ’cause you’re not expecting it, but then you hear the accent and you’re like, “Okay, now I get it.”

In general, Longwood officers saw newer Haitian and Jamaican immigrants’ respectful demeanor as symbolic of these immigrants steering clear of trouble-related behavior. For example, a Black male Longwood officer stated:

You don’t see much with the ones up from the Caribbean, you know Haitians,
Jamaicans…. When [Haitian and Jamaican immigrants] get here they’re just trying to get a piece of the American dream, they’re not trying to stir up any trouble.⁹

Although Longwood officers’ characterizations of intra-racial variation among “Blacks” in terms of demeanor, dress, and trouble-related behavior discursively contradicts the officers’ generally monolithic representations of Longwood Blacks as being generally the same in terms of class, such class-, ethnic-, and immigrant status-based distinctions did not appear to translate into practice. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 6, Longwood officers routinely “herded” Black Longwood High School students out of District 2 between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. following dismissal from school during the school year without making any apparent distinctions among Black students based on dress, demeanor, or any other factors. Thus, while Longwood officers claimed to “see” differences among “Blacks,” such differences were not borne out in practice.

Although Longwood officers saw “Hispanic,” like “Black,” as a category fractured by ethnicity and class, Longwood officers saw “Hispanics,” unlike “Blacks,” as being similar in terms of their demeanor and trouble-related behavior. In general, Longwood officers saw various Hispanic ethnic groups, notwithstanding differences in class, culture, and immigration status, as exhibiting a respectful demeanor in the presence of authority figures, and as engaging in a minimal amount of trouble-related behavior, particularly in comparison to that of American Blacks.

While Longwood officers at various points lumped Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Cubans, and to the least extent, Portuguese¹⁰ under the “Hispanic” category, and referred to these groups as “immigrants,” Longwood officers, as noted earlier in this chapter, most frequently used both “Hispanic” and “immigrant” interchangeably or synonymously with
“Mexican.” Although Longwood officers described Mexicans as the poorest of the Hispanic subgroups, officers did not view Mexicans as exhibiting the disrespectful demeanor of Longwood’s poorest Blacks. Rather, like their view of the newer “Black” Haitian and Jamaican immigrant groups, Longwood officers saw Mexican immigrants, whom the officers identified as the newest of Longwood’s Hispanic immigrants, as displaying a respectful demeanor. Longwood officers saw Mexican children, like Haitian and Jamaican children, as being enthusiastic participants in the D.A.R.E. program. Longwood officers also saw Hispanic adolescents and adults as being substantially more reserved and deferential than the non-immigrant Black population.

For instance, one White male Longwood officer stated:

The Mexicans are real quiet. If you ask ‘em a question they don’t give you any attitude. It’s like night and day with the Mexicans and the Blacks. The Mexicans, Hispanics, don’t try to stare you down and look at you like, “What the fuck are you doin’ in my neighborhood.”

In turn, the majority of Longwood officers saw Mexicans’ respectful demeanor as signifying Mexicans’ minimal involvement in trouble-related behavior. Although, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, Longwood officers acknowledged some fights among Mexican men stemming from excessive alcohol consumption, nevertheless, the officers saw such pugilistic behavior as anomalous and minor in comparison to that of Polish immigrants. For instance, one White male Longwood officer stated:

[The Mexicans] pretty much stay to themselves. Yeah, they do like to drink, and every once in a while there’s a fight with some Mexicans, but it’s no big thing…. You wanna see rowdy behavior, go to one of the Polish bars…. The Poles make [the Mexicans] look like choir boys.
Moreover, as noted in Chapter 3, Longwood officers treated Mexicans’ criminal acts as isolated incidents that were not representative of the group as a whole.

Like their view of “newer” Mexican and Central American immigrants, Longwood officers saw “older” Puerto Rican and Dominican immigrants as generally exhibiting a respectful demeanor and as engaging in only a minimal amount of trouble-related behavior. However, there were subtle differences between Longwood officers’ accounts of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans and those of the “newer” Hispanic immigrants that suggest that the officers viewed the former in a less favorable light than the latter.

Although Longwood officers saw Puerto Ricans and Dominicans as generally cooperative and respectful when confronted by uniformed, on-duty officers, several officers described Puerto Rican and Dominican neighbors in Longwood as being “ornery” and “pains in the asses” when dealing with these neighbors in off-duty interactions. For instance, one White male Longwood officer described how he had an ongoing battle with two Puerto Rican families that lived next door to him in District 8 over parking in a handicapped spot reserved for the officer’s father. He stated:

> When I was growing up here we didn’t have the kind of problems that we have now…. I got this handicapped parking space for my dad ‘cause he’s got diabetes and he doesn’t walk well and all, and the spot, it’s clearly marked “handicapped,” but my neighbors kept on parking there. I asked them nicely, “Please don’t park here, my dad’s a diabetic and,” and they kept on parking there. They didn’t give a shit. You see that a lot with the Puerto Ricans, they just do whatever, they don’t care. Well, eventually I had their car towed and they started complainin’, “Fuck you, fuck you,” and I was like, “Fuck you; you had no right to park there.” Imagine that, they’re gettin’ all hot under the collar with me. The stinkin’ nerve. Who the hell do they think they are?!”

In addition, although Longwood officers generally viewed Puerto Ricans and Dominicans as having only minimal, trivial involvement in trouble-related behavior,
several Longwood officers intimated that Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, unlike
Mexicans, were engaging in problematic, even criminal, behavior beneath the radar. For
instance, one White male Longwood officer indicated that he suspected that his new
girlfriend, who was Puerto Rican, and her child were being supported by money from
drug sales. The officer remarked:

Nowadays, you don’t know your neighbors, you don’t know what they do. Even
with my girlfriend, she’s Puerto Rican, …we’ve been going out for a couple of
months now, I don’t know how she lives and she won’t tell me. I mean she’s
home all day and she’s got a kid, and she doesn’t work. She won’t tell me how
she gets by; something just ain’t right. How do you stay at home all day with
expenses, groceries, rent, and you don’t work? Where is she getting her money
from? I don’t have a good vibe about it. I’m not sayin’ she’s dealin’ drugs or
anything, but it does make you wonder why she’s bein’ so secretive. What’s she
got to hide?

As this officer’s comments suggest, Longwood officers’ viewed Puerto Ricans and
Dominicans with more suspicion than Mexicans. However, the officers’ views of Puerto
Ricans’ and Dominicans’ trouble-related behavior were mild in comparison to their views
of non-immigrant Blacks’ behavior. Unlike their views of Blacks’ behavior, officers
viewed Puerto Ricans’ and Dominicans’ behavior in an ambiguous light. Moreover,
officers saw Puerto Ricans’ and Dominicans’ behavior as being subterranean at best, in
contrast to Blacks’ blatant behavior. Nevertheless, Longwood officers’ somewhat
negative characterizations and suspicions of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans placed the
groups at the bottom of the “Hispanic” category, and closest to Blacks at the bottom of
Longwood’s social group hierarchy.

Longwood officers’ overall favorable view of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans,
notwithstanding the officers’ identification of some subtle signs of demeanor and trouble-
related behavior associated with non-immigrant Blacks, appeared to be aided in part by the officers’ subtle lumping of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, as well as Mexicans, Central Americans, Colombians, and Ecuadorians, with Cubans and Portuguese, whom officers viewed in a highly favorable light. Although most Longwood officers typically talked about Cubans and Portuguese apart from the “Hispanic” category, officers at times mentioned Cubans as being “Hispanic” and Portuguese as being “part Hispanic.” Longwood officers’ association of Cubans and Portuguese groups with other “Hispanic” groups, coupled with officers’ highly positive view of Cubans and Portuguese, appeared to cause the officers to see these other “Hispanic” groups in a more positive light.

In general, Longwood officers’ views of Cubans’ and Portuguese respectful demeanor and trouble-free behavior mirrored those of Whites. However, while Longwood officers’ views of Whites’ demeanor and behavior were often unstated and implied, particularly in the form of racialized narratives as discussed in Chapter 7, the officers’ views of Cubans’ and Portuguese demeanor and behavior were expressly communicated. A White male Longwood officer described the Portuguese as “hav[ing] the utmost respect for [the police].” Another White male Longwood officer stated:

The Portuguese, they’re very quiet, respectful, “Yes sir, no sir.” I like that about them. They don’t stand there and haggle with you. They just do what they’re supposed to do. No bullshit….

Similarly, a Black male Longwood officer described Cubans as “model citizens,” and a White male Longwood officer noted that Longwood officers “never [saw] any riff raff from [Cubans].” Although officers occasionally mentioned incidents involving Portuguese or Cubans who had gotten into some form of trouble, the officers, just as in
their accounts of Whites who had gotten into trouble, presented these incidents as anomalies that were swiftly straightened out by parents and families.\textsuperscript{14}

Longwood officers not only held Cubans and Portuguese in high esteem in terms of their demeanor and generally trouble-free behavior, but in some instances suggested that their demeanor and behavior were superior to that of “Whites.” For instance, one White male officer who lived in a neighborhood in District 8 that contained a mix of Hispanic and White residents remarked that his Cuban and Portuguese neighbors were “the best neighbors [one] could ask for.” The officer elaborated by stating:

The Cubans, Portuguese, they are very good people. They’re the best neighbors I’ve ever had. When it snows, I’ll come home from a long shift and they clear the snow for me. They know I live alone, and when I get back at night, they invite me over for dinner. And man they can cook. They feed me like I’m family. And when I was away, they took care of my dog, and they cared for her like a dog should be cared for, you know, walk her, feed her well. Yeah, I’m lucky to have such good neighbors.

This officers’ assessment of Cubans and Portuguese, like the assessments of other Longwood officers, suggested that Cubans and Portuguese were, in some cases, the most considerate and selfless people in Longwood.

Although Longwood officers saw Poles, like the Portuguese, as being similar to “Whites” in terms of a range of practices and values relating to parenting, education, and work, the officers’ assessments of Poles in terms of demeanor and trouble-related behavior were much more complex and seemingly antithetical to those of Whites (as well as Portuguese and Cubans). In particular, Longwood officers saw Poles, whom the officers perceived as the largest immigrant group in Longwood, as being radically
different from Whites in terms of their demeanor and engagement in trouble-related behavior.

Longwood officers frequently referenced a whole lot of trouble-related practices in which both Polish immigrant adults and youth engaged. In discussing Polish adults, Longwood officers emphasized problematic behavior tied to the excessive consumption of alcohol. One White male Longwood officer bemoaned:

[The Poles], a lot them are flat out alcoholics, lushes…. [A] lot of [the Polish] men get stone cold drunk. They’re just a bunch of panyees.

Longwood officers posited that Polish immigrant men’s alcohol consumption often translated into either “rowdy” behavior inside of or near bars, or domestic violence incidents. One White male Longwood officer stated:

You see lots of domestics with Poles. Usually the guy’s had a bit too much to drink and things then get out of hand.

Besides seeing a nexus between Poles’ alcohol consumption and domestic violence, Longwood officers saw a connection between such consumption and Poles’ racist behavior, particularly racist violent behavior. For instance, after discussing an incident at the train station in which two young adult Polish immigrant members of a neo-Nazi group nearly beat to death a Portuguese man on the station’s platform, a White male Longwood officer stated:

The Polish, they’re real, like prejudice. They especially don’t like the Blacks; [the two groups are] like oil and water. They just don’t mix…. You especially see [conflicts between Poles and Blacks] when the Poles drink [alcohol].

Longwood officers indicated that even in the absence of alcohol consumption,
Polish youth routinely engage in aggressive, violent, racist behavior. In particular, Longwood officers noted that Polish youth initiated numerous conflicts with Blacks at Longwood High School. A White female Longwood officer suggested that Polish youths' initiation of such conflicts was due to many Polish immigrants' lack of prior contact with Blacks and their internalization of negative stereotypes pertaining to Blacks that the immigrants had learned from their families and the media. This officer stated:

> A lot of [Polish immigrant youth], they’re FOB.¹⁷ For some of them, they never met a Black person until they came to the U.S. They only know about Black people from what their family tells ‘em and what they see on TV. They expect all Blacks to be slaves or jungle bunnies.

Longwood officers pointed out that Polish immigrant youths’ brash and confrontational demeanor with respect to Blacks was consonant with these youths’ demeanor towards the officers themselves. For instance, the same White female Longwood officer stated:

> [Polish immigrant youth] are cocky sons of guns. They act like they’re entitled, feel like they’re owed something.

Likewise, a White male Longwood officer remarked:

> The Polish [youth] are very rude…. They don’t show us any respect…. You ask ‘em a question and they keep talking to their friends like you’re not there….

In contrast to their view of Polish immigrant youth, Longwood officers saw Polish immigrant men as being generally respectful to the police and other authority figures.¹⁸ Longwood officers suggested that older, adult Polish immigrants were more respectful of and deferential to the police, and exhibited greater self-restraint in terms of their behavior, than adolescent and young adult Polish immigrants because of the fear of
the police that they brought with them from Eastern Europe. For example, one White male Longwood officer stated:

The older [Poles] when they come over here, they’ve got that fear of the police, the fear of the Gestapo. So when they see us, they show us respect. But the younger ones, they don’t know about that history [of policing in Europe], so when they see us it doesn’t make them fearful.

Notwithstanding their perception of the disrespectful demeanor of younger Poles and the various trouble-related practices of both younger and older Poles, Longwood officers nevertheless routinely described Polish neighborhoods as “good” neighborhoods. This “good” assessment of Poles’ neighborhoods, which effectively eclipsed any perceptions of Poles’ disorderly behavior, was in part due to the apparent neatness of Poles’ properties. While either driving through “Polish” neighborhoods or discussing Poles, Longwood officers made numerous references to well-maintained Polish residential and commercial properties. Longwood officers frequently used the word “neat” when describing or referring to Polish-owned or rented properties, and noted how Poles “cut the grass,” “swept the sidewalk,” and “[did not] leave trash all over the place.”

Several Longwood officers lauded Poles’ property maintenance practices by way of contrasting with those of Blacks. Although Longwood officers described both Poles and Blacks as engaging in a range of trouble-related behavior, the officers provided widely divergent descriptions of the two groups when discussing practices related to properties. While Poles trouble-related behavior was not reflected in the “orderly” upkeep of their properties and neighborhoods, Blacks’ trouble-related behavior appeared to mirror the disorderly condition of their properties and neighborhoods. This dichotomy was reflected in the following Asian male Longwood officer’s account:
Yeah, the Poles drink and fight a lot, but you wouldn’t be able to tell from their neighborhoods. Everything’s nice and neat, there’s no trash laying around, no junked cars. It’s not like a lotta the places you see over in [“Black” neighborhoods in] District 4. My god, you’ve got weeds growing everywhere, overturned shopping carts—What the hell is a shopping cart doing in somebody’s yard?—the paint’s peelin’, it’s just one big fuckin’ mess if you ask me. And the other thing you notice about the Polish [neighborhoods] is that they’re real quiet; you don’t have people hanging out everywhere, makin’ noise, doin’ god knows what. It’s not at all like in [District] 4 or the way it used to be in “Down [Longwood].”

This officer’s comments not only laud Poles by way of disparaging Blacks, but also suggest that there is a nexus between disorderly properties and disorderly behavior. Thus, although the Poles may engage in disorderly behavior that is similar to that of Blacks in some respects, the neatness of Poles’ properties and messiness of Blacks’ properties suggest that officers’ perceptions of property somewhat offset their perceptions of Poles’ trouble-related behavior, and reinforced their perceptions of Blacks’ trouble-related behavior.

Many Longwood officers directly criticized Blacks’ property-maintenance-related practices without making any express comparisons to other groups. Like their assessments of other groups’ property-maintenance-related practices, Longwood officers’ highly negative assessments of Blacks’ maintenance of their properties (whether owned or rented) appeared to attribute such poorly maintained properties solely or primarily to cultural choices. While a few Longwood officers acknowledged that the apparent state of properties was tied to residents’ socioeconomic status (e.g., a White male Longwood officer stated, “How could [Blacks] live that way?”), the majority of Longwood officers talked about Blacks’ maintenance of properties as being a cultural phenomenon, not a class-related one. Longwood officers suggested that Blacks either did not know how to
properly maintain their properties, or simply did not care. A White male Longwood officer gave examples of both of these cultural explanations when commenting on the decrepit state of the porch of a house occupied by two Black families on Sylvester Avenue, as well as a run-down house adjacent to that house, along the northern border of District 4 in Longwood. The officer stated:

Look at that [porch]; it’s about to collapse. You can see they tried putting some makeshift cement over on the left. But that’s not gonna hold. What were they thinking?... I’ll tell some people just don’t know what the hell they’re doin’. Some people just don’t know how to take care of things..... I guess at least they try. Not like [the people next door]. We call that the Addams Family house. See the shudder’s falling off, and I bet the thing hasn’t been painted in a hundred years. Hello! C’mon, how hard is it to splash a little paint on the goddammed thing. You know, they just don’t give a shit. They just don’t have a clue.

Although the officer makes disparaging comments about both properties, he offers two different cultural explanations. In criticizing the house with the dilapidated porch, the officer suggests that the porch is poorly maintained due to the ineptitude of the residents. In criticizing the “Addams Family” house, the officer suggests the poor maintenance of the house is a result of the residents’ insouciance. In neither case does the officer even hint at the possibility that the poor maintenance is a product of the lower socioeconomic status of the residents occupying the two dwellings.

The officer’s disparaging comments about slipshod maintenance of the porch and the neglect of the “Addams Family,” like many other Longwood officers’ comments about Blacks’ maintenance of properties, also strongly implied that Black residents were deviant in relation to non-Black residents. While some of this implied deviance related to messiness—overgrown lawns, debris in yards—the rest of it related to Blacks’ behaviors that the officers perceived as strange or outrageous. For example, a White male
Longwood officer made the following comments about a makeshift drainpipe wrapped around the side of a house in the northwestern part of District 4. The officer remarked:

Look at that. You see some of the craziest shit over here. They must’ve had water coming in over there and so they built that funnel; what an ungodly sight. It looks like an amusement ride.

Although Longwood officers generally associated property-related deviance with Blacks as a whole, at times officers singled out Haitian and Jamaican immigrants’ property-related behaviors. In particular, Longwood officers made reference to Haitian and Jamaican immigrants’ penchant for painting their homes in loud, bright colors that were inconsistent with those of other dwellings in their neighborhoods. For instance, one White male Longwood officer stated:

You always know if it’s a Haitian or Jamaican place. They like these wild, outrageous colors—purple and orange—you can’t miss it. And boy it pisses the neighbors off. Even the other Blacks don’t like Haitians, Jamaicans moving next door. Look at that place, it’s a mess. It looks like a circus.

Later during the same ride-along, this officer continued with the following:

Look, see that. That’s Jamaican. They bring that bright color shit with them from the islands. It’s got that real psychedelic look to it, like some kind of bad acid trip.

This officer’s comments reflect implied deviance in two respects. The officer not only implies that Haitian and Jamaican immigrants are deviant in terms of the “circus-like” color schemes that they use to paint their homes, but more insidiously suggests that such “outrageous” colors are reflective of deviant drug-related behavior.

While Longwood officers portrayed stark differences between Haitian and Jamaican immigrants on the one hand, and Polish immigrants on the other, the officers
presented even starker differences between “Black” immigrants and the Portuguese and Cubans. Longwood officers viewed the Portuguese and Cubans as being the polar opposites of Blacks in terms of property-related behaviors. For Longwood officers, Poles kept their property “neat,” but Portuguese and Cubans kept their property “immaculate” and “spotless.” Longwood officers particularly viewed the Portuguese as the exemplars of cleanliness and orderliness when it came to the maintenance of properties. While Longwood officers routinely identified Portuguese residents’ properties based on a combination of architectural design, landscaping, and the prominent display of a Virgin Mary statue, all of these identifications were accompanied by comments regarding the flawlessly clean appearance of such properties. For instance, a White male Longwood officer stated:

You can always tell where the Portuguese live. They like that stone and that wrought iron fencing; see how it winds up to the second floor. And you’ll always see a statue of the Virgin Mary, they’re real into religion, you know. And man, do they ever keep the place immaculate. You’ll always see ‘em sweeping.

Likewise, Longwood officers’ spoke glowingly of the inside of Portuguese homes. For instance, another White male Longwood officer commented:

And you should see the inside of [Portuguese] homes. The counters are sparkling and the floors are spotless. You could eat off those floors.

Although Longwood officers held a similar laudatory view of “Whites’” property-related behaviors, Longwood officers’ assessments of Whites’ properties, unlike their assessments of Portuguese and Cubans’ properties, were more general or implied. Longwood officers regularly referenced “White” neighborhoods, particularly those in Districts 1 and 2, as being “good,” neighborhoods, and made general comments about the
well-maintained properties in such neighborhoods. For instance, in describing the neighborhoods in “Bright Acres” (District 1), a White male Longwood officer stated:

We don’t focus too much on Bright Acres. It’s pretty quiet there. It’s the nicest part of town. Everyone keeps up their homes, mow the grass, keep their dogs on a leash; it’s a pretty boring place if you’re looking for action. You aren’t going to find much in the way of real policing there.

In some instances Longwood officers praised Whites’ property-maintenance behaviors by referencing an anomalous case in a given neighborhood. For example, a White male Longwood officer drove by his parents’ house in District 2 and apologized for the state of the property, particularly the debris in the backyard. The officer remarked:

Please excuse the mess; I’ve been meaning to clear some of this junk out of here, and my brother was supposed to get rid of that car. And I got to get around to mowin’ the grass. Who knows what else is under all that. Yeah, it’s really embarrassing; I guess we’re the eyesore of the neighborhood. I’ll bet lots of people are talkin’ all kinds of shit behind our backs. You remember that show Sanford and Son, yeah, that’s what it reminds me of.

Here the officer presents the disorderly appearance of his parents’ house as an exception to an otherwise neat and orderly neighborhood. The officer’s shame regarding the appearance of the property is magnified by the incongruence of the property’s condition with that of others in the neighborhood.

Longwood officers’ views of Puerto Ricans’ and Dominicans’ property-related behaviors fell somewhere in between the officers’ laudatory views of Whites’ behaviors (as well as those of Poles, the Portuguese, and Cubans), and condemnatory views of Blacks’ behaviors. Although Longwood officers implicitly lumped Puerto Ricans and Dominicans with other “Hispanics” for purposes of other types of behaviors, Longwood
officers clearly separated these two “Hispanic” groups from other “Hispanics” when assessing property-related behaviors. Several Longwood officers presented a similar narrative in which previously all-White neighborhoods in the southern half of Longwood experienced decline after Puerto Ricans and Dominicans moved in. A few Longwood officers emphasized that the overall decline resulting from the entry of Puerto Rican and Dominican families was tied to overcrowding. Longwood officers directly blamed such overcrowding on Puerto Ricans’ and Dominicans’ legal and illegal subdivisions of homes. A White male Longwood officer stated:

It used to not be like this. Not like when I was growing up here. What happened was [the Puerto Ricans and Dominicans] came in and started subdividing a lot of homes, and a lotta of it is illegal. But nobody does anything about it. So now there’s at least twice as many people here than when I lived here. I couldn’t take it anymore, so I moved out. There’s no place to park. It’s outta control if you ask me.

In addition to the problem of overcrowding resulting from Puerto Ricans’ and Dominicans’ often illegal subdivisions of dwellings, Longwood officers saw Puerto Ricans and Dominicans as contributing to the overall decline of the neighborhoods in District 8 through a wide range of property-related behaviors. Longwood officers suggested that Puerto Ricans and Dominicans were turning what was once an orderly, tranquil environment into a messy, chaotic one. For instance, another White male Longwood officer issued the following long list of grievances against Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in his old neighborhood in District 8:

[Puerto Ricans and Dominicans] they’re real different. They don’t shovel the snow off the sidewalk. They don’t mow the lawn and let the grass grow wild. They got a car that’s leaking oil in the street or a car with flat tires that’s been sitting on the street for weeks, and they just leave it there. See, see that car over there. They have music blaring late into the night. You know, you get home after
a long day’s work, you don’t want to hear that salsa shit, you just don’t. They got people always coming and going. There’s a lotta turnover. When I was growing up there were lifers. Now, before you can even get to know your neighbors, they’re gone. There’s litter and empty bottles everywhere. Is it that hard to put your trash in the trash can? It just makes the place look like shit. They got dogs off a leash that shit in the yard or go into other people’s yards. They never clean up their dog’s shit. They put a couch out for the garbage to take, but you know the garbage ain’t gonna take it, so it just sits out there stinkin’ up the curb, real mildewy smellin’. And a thing I’ve been noticin’ lately is the graffiti. They’ll be graffiti spray painted on the side of a house and they’ll just leave it there. They don’t try to wash it off or paint over it. They just leave it there. I mean, what the fuck is that; if that was my house I’d be pissed and I’d scrub that shit off right away.

While this officer, along with other Longwood officers, voiced criticisms of Puerto Ricans’ and Dominicans’ property-related behaviors that in some respects paralleled those of Blacks in District 4, these officers nevertheless saw Blacks’ property-related behaviors as being worse. This officer’s comments suggest that there is a slower, less stark process of deterioration occurring in the racially mixed neighborhoods in District 8 as a result of an influx of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans over the years. Although this officer is contending that the properties in his old neighborhood are more rundown since Puerto Ricans and Dominicans moved into the neighborhood, and that the overall character of the neighborhood has changed since these groups arrival, he does not suggest that these neighborhoods are “lost” or “hopeless” cases like “Black” neighborhoods in the northern part of District 4.

However, this officer’s comments nevertheless reflect an underlying concern of the majority of Longwood officers that other neighborhoods might become like those in the northern part of District 4. As discussed more fully in Chapter 5, White Longwood officers, who represented the majority of officers, blamed Blacks for changing the area
along Sylvester Avenue (the northern border of District 4) from a thriving commercial and residential area principally occupied by Jews, into a wasteland. In documenting the various negative property-related behaviors of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in his old neighborhood, the Longwood officer is implicitly expressing his concern that this neighborhood is in the process of transitioning to the decrepit state of “Black” neighborhoods in District 4.

In particular, this officer, as well as other Longwood officers, was concerned about how the slowly deteriorating social and physical conditions of the neighborhoods in District 8 were making it possible for crime to take root in these neighborhoods. This officer, as well as other Longwood officers, was alarmed by the increasing amount of graffiti appearing on various commercial and residential buildings in District 8 in the 2005-2006 time period. These officers saw this graffiti, which they assumed to be gang-related, to be a product of weakening informal social control mechanisms in slowly crumbling neighborhoods. In effect, these officers were implicitly invoking Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) “broken windows” theory, whereby minor, unchecked disorder and crime in neighborhoods where the informal social control mechanisms have broken down lead to more serious types of crime developing. Longwood officers’ comments regarding Puerto Ricans’ and Dominicans’ deficient care of their properties, coupled with the officers’ view of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans being more ornery, less cooperative, less civilized neighbors, reflected an underlying concern that more serious criminal activity, such as gang activity, could move into District 8 if current trends persisted.

Longwood officers’ apparent latent fear that Puerto Ricans and Dominicans would ultimately lower the quality of neighborhoods in a way that mirrored that of
Blacks in District 4 was most tellingly evident in several officers’ comments about “Bright Acres” or District 1. Although the officers indicated that “Bright Acres” was still predominantly “White,” they felt, as one officer put it, that “the good are movin’ out and the bad are movin’ in.” When asked to elaborate, this officer noted that Whites were slowly, but increasingly, moving out of “Bright Acres,” and selling or renting to Hispanics. This officer specifically noted that Cubans and Portuguese were good tenants, but that Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, most of whom were renters, were bringing down the quality of neighborhoods. This officer stated:

Of course a place is going to go down hill when you’ve got ghettofabulous movin’ in next door. You’ve got music blaring, the lawn’s overgrown, the place starts lookin’ like a dump.

Here the term “ghettofabulous,” which is a term from a hip hop song by a “Black” artist, racializes new tenants as “Black.” However, given that there were only a handful of Blacks living in “Bright Acres” in 2006, the officer’s use of this term suggests that the officer is, to some extent, racializing Puerto Ricans and Dominicans as “Black.” For this officer, as well as several other White Longwood officers, the entry of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans into “Bright Acres” represented the beginning of a potential transition from “good” White neighborhoods to “bad” Black ones.

Notwithstanding Longwood officers’ apparent concern about the effect that Puerto Ricans’ and Dominicans’ property-related behaviors might have on neighborhoods in Longwood, such concern was mitigated by both officers’ preoccupation with Blacks, and officers’ lumping of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans with other “Hispanics” for some purposes. Longwood officers’ obsession with Blacks from District 4, especially the “target area” in the northern part of District 4, left the officers with little
time and energy to worry about Puerto Ricans and Dominicans. Longwood officers’ lumping of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans with other “Hispanics” appeared to soften the officers’ overall view of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans as being potential problems or threats.

In comparing Longwood officers’ assessments of culture-related behaviors with those of power-related behaviors, there are two significant differences that emerge. The first is that officers use power-related behaviors to disproportionately constitute and rank Whites and Blacks within Longwood’s social group hierarchy, whereas the officers use culture-related behaviors to constitute and rank groups that are neither unambiguously “White” nor “Black.” The second is that there is more consistency within groups in terms of power-related behaviors than there is for culture-related behaviors. That is, whereas a given group either displays the various hallmarks of power or the lack thereof, that group may exhibit both positive and negative culture-related behaviors. For instance, Longwood officers saw Poles as exhibiting positive behaviors such as parental discipline, but also saw them as displaying a variety of trouble-related behaviors. Thus, although Longwood officers’ assessments of power-related behaviors appear to neatly correspond to the officers’ positioning of various groups within Longwood’s demographic hierarchy, the officers’ assessments of culture-related behaviors are much more complex and seemingly contradictory.

While Longwood officers reconciled their seemingly contradictory assessments of Puerto Ricans’ and Dominicans’ culture-related practices and values in large part by way of contrasting these groups with Blacks and lumping them with “Hispanics,” officers’ reconciliations of inconsistencies in their assessments of Polish, Haitian, and Jamaican
immigrants’ culture-related practices and values were more labyrinthine. Paradoxically, notwithstanding their numerous references to younger Polish immigrant males’ disrespectful demeanor and younger and older Polish males’ trouble-related behavior on the one hand, and to Haitian and Jamaican immigrants’ generally respectful demeanor and avoidance of trouble-related behavior on the other hand, Longwood officers ranked Poles near Whites at the top of Longwood’s demographic hierarchy, and Haitian and Jamaicans near Blacks at the bottom of the hierarchy. Longwood officers offered a number of rationales for their seemingly contradictory assessments of these immigrant groups, all of which were tied in part to overarching assimilation-related assumptions about the groups’ long-term trajectories.

Longwood officers’ assumptions about work-related practices and values played a significant role in the officers’ generally positive view of Poles notwithstanding the group’s endemic trouble-related behavior. In particular, Longwood officers suggested that Poles’ habits of hard work appeared to eclipse or even justify problematic behavior. A White male Longwood officer hinted at this when he commented, “The Poles work hard and play hard.” For this officer and other Longwood officers, Poles have some leeway in or license to “play hard” because Poles “work hard.” In contrast, Longwood officers did not see Haitian and Jamaican immigrants, whom the officers conflated with “Blacks” when discussing work-related behaviors and values, as being entitled to “play hard” because they did not sufficiently “work hard.”

Longwood officers’ perceptions of new and relatively new Polish immigrants’ work-related behaviors and values were not merely a product of a current snapshot of what Poles appeared to be doing as workers, but rather were largely shaped by the
officers’ knowledge, and in many cases, observation of Poles’ long history of work and assimilation in Longwood. In discussing the Poles in Longwood, Longwood officers often made reference to this history dating back to World War I. Longwood officers noted that Polish immigrants over the years had an accomplished history of assimilation, with many Poles eventually owning their own businesses or working as skilled tradespersons, such as carpenters, electricians, and plumbers. These officers stressed that Poles were “hard workers,” who, as a White male Longwood officer put it, “had made something of themselves from nothin’.” Another White male Longwood officer elaborated this point as follows:

When you look up and down [Main] Street, you got lots of Polish businesses. The Poles are real good at runnin’ their own businesses. They’ve been doin’ it for a long time here…. A lot of the Poles come over here, they can’t speak the language, a lot of them just have a suitcase, but they have that… drive to succeed…. They find a way to turn lemons into lemonade.

Given this perception of Poles’ history of successful assimilation, particularly in terms of economic integration, Longwood officers assumed that newer Polish immigrants would follow in their predecessors’ footsteps. Thus, although many of the Poles currently living in Longwood were relatively new immigrants, Longwood officers had a pre-existing mental template within which to understand and situate these new immigrants, and form expectations about their future trajectory.

In contrast, Longwood officers did not have a similar template within which to understand and situate relatively new Haitian and Jamaican immigrants. Not only were Haitian and Jamaican immigrants a much smaller population than Polish immigrants, but more importantly, Haitian and Jamaican immigrants did not have a long history of
successful work-related assimilation to which officers could refer. Several Longwood officers noted that Haitian and Jamaican immigrants only had begun settling in Longwood in the 1980s. Given the relatively short time in which these immigrant groups had resided in Longwood, officers used their knowledge of the employment history of non-immigrant Blacks, who had resided in Longwood in numbers comparable to or greater than that of Poles for nearly seventy years, to predict how Haitian and Jamaican immigrants would fare in the labor market.

Opposite of their glowing assessments of Poles’ history of work in Longwood, Longwood officers presented a gloomy assessment of Longwood Blacks’ work history. Longwood officers noted that many Longwood Blacks worked as menial laborers, and that Blacks were far more likely to be unemployed for large stretches of time than the members of any other groups in Longwood. Longwood officers did not expressly or implicitly argue or acknowledge that Blacks historically had faced greater discrimination and fewer opportunities in the labor market than Poles, and in effect faulted non-immigrant Blacks for their relative lack of success in the labor market. In turn, as a result of their conflation of newer Haitian and Jamaican immigrants with non-immigrant Blacks, Longwood officers used the relatively unsatisfactory employment history of non-immigrant Blacks to suggest that Haitian and Jamaican immigrants would ultimately share the same fate in the labor market. Moreover, Longwood officers implied that although Haitian and Jamaican immigrants generally were law-abiding, these groups would become less so as they struggled in the labor market.

More generally, Longwood officers saw different, highly racialized trajectories for these Polish, Haitian, and Jamaican immigrant groups as they became acculturated
and “Americanized.” Although Longwood officers saw Polish youth as being
disrespectful, rude, cocky, and engaging in a variety of trouble-related behaviors, the
officers nevertheless believed that as these youth became more “Americanized” they
would adopt the behaviors of “White” Americans and seamlessly blend into an
undifferentiated “White” category. For instance, a White male Longwood officer stated:

The young [Poles] don’t know how to act when they get here, and yeah, they do a
lotta stupid things. A lot of ‘em act like punks, but after they’ve been here a
while, they become, like, more American.

Here, given that the only time that this officer, as well as other Longwood officers, used
the term “American” was when discussing Whites, this officer’s claim that Poles become
“more American” as a result of acculturation is an indirect way of contending that Poles
become “more White.”

This point about Poles becoming “White” is more clearly articulated by another
White male officer in the following comments:

You wouldn’t know it, but there’s a lotta Poles that live in Bright Acres. You
can’t really tell them apart from anybody else. They’ve lost the accent and they
seem the same as everybody else there.

By claiming that Poles are just like “everybody else” in Bright Acres, which Longwood
officers otherwise describe as a “White” part of town, this officer is effectively stating
that Poles in Bright Acres have become “White.”

As a result of becoming “White,” Longwood officers saw young Polish
immigrants as eventually growing out of or shedding their trouble-related behavior.
For instance, a White female Longwood officer commented:
It takes a while for the new [Polish youth immigrants] to find their way. But they eventually get their act together after they’ve been here for a while. So, yeah, they’re a pain in the ass, but you have to take them with a grain of salt.

In effect, this officer, as well as other Longwood officers, is suggesting that Polish immigrant youths’ trouble-related acts should not be seen as indicators of these youths’ future propensity to engage in criminal or other problematic behaviors. Rather, this officer is contending that these newer Poles’ problematic behavior is symptomatic of their lack of familiarity with a new place and a new culture, and that after becoming sufficiently acclimated and acculturated, these seemingly wayward immigrant youth will cease being a problem.

In contrast, and paradoxically, Longwood officers saw newer Haitian and Jamaican immigrant youth, whom the officers generally perceived as respectful and as avoiding trouble-related behavior, as becoming more of a problem as they became more “Americanized.” Longwood officers offered two different rationales for this unpropitious anticipated trajectory of Haitian and Jamaican immigrant youth. The first rationale involved Haitian and Jamaican immigrant youths’ acculturation of non-immigrant “Black” cultural norms. Longwood officers assumed that the longer Haitian and Jamaican immigrant youth spent in Longwood, the more likely they would adopt negative cultural influences from non-immigrant Blacks, with whom Haitian and Jamaican youths regularly interacted in their neighborhoods and schools. For instance, a White male Longwood officer remarked:

You notice a difference with [Haitian and Jamaican immigrant youths] after a couple of years. They start to become, I don’t mean to be politically incorrect or anything, but they start to become more ghetto if you know what I mean. You can see it in the clothes, the attitude, it rubs off on them.
While the first rationale dealt with the acculturation of “Black” norms, the second rationale involved how Haitian and Jamaican immigrant youth would respond to non-Blacks’ treatment of such youth as “Black.” Longwood officers’ assumed that Haitian and Jamaican immigrant youth would become hardened, resentful, and disenchanted after having experienced discrimination as “Blacks.” A White female Longwood officer described this phenomenon as follows:

“It’s different [from the Polish immigrants] for the ones up from the Caribbean. They become more like the Blacks the longer they’re here ‘cause they start to experience prejudice, discrimination, and they start to become bitter, resentful. They get more of an edge to them.”

Thus, although Longwood officers see Haitian and Jamaican youth as initially exhibiting good demeanor and behavior, the officers see such demeanor and behavior not as indicators of future law-abiding behavior, but rather as phenomena that will dissipate as the harsh realities of “being Black” in Longwood/ America weigh on these youth.

Longwood officers’ differential expectations for younger, newer Polish, Haitian, and Jamaican immigrants reflect a process of racializing immigrants that leads to polar opposite anticipated group trajectories. On the one hand, Longwood officers expect Poles to become “White,” and in doing so, become docile, respectful, and law-abiding. On the other hand, Longwood officers expect Haitians and Jamaicans to become “Black,” and in doing so, become disobedient, disrespectful, and law-violating. Interestingly, while the officers acknowledge that Haitian and Jamaican immigrants may face discrimination, the officers’ own pessimistic expectations make it more likely that the
officers *themselves* will police these immigrants in ways that turn such expectations into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Besides factoring into Longwood officers’ different predicted trajectories for Polish, Haitian, and Jamaican immigrants, race also worked in Poles’ favor in terms of how officers racialized “gangs.” As alluded to in endnote 16, regardless of some younger Poles’ affiliation with a neo-Nazi entity that appeared to possess all of the trappings of a “gang,” including group-orchestrated violent behavior and specialized clothing and rituals, Longwood officers always referred to this entity as a “group” rather than a gang. In doing so, Longwood officers avoided associating the problem as gang-related behavior with Poles. Longwood officers did not broadly criminalize Polish youth as a result of actions of a few Polish individuals.

In contrast, Longwood officers freely associated gangs with Blacks, making almost exclusive references to the Bloods and Crips, two “Black” street gangs, when the officers discussed the topic of gangs. As a result, officers frequently speculated as to whether crimes committed by Black individuals were somehow related to gangs. Although Longwood officers did not expressly link either Haitian or Jamaican immigrants with gangs, the officers, through their comments that such immigrants would eventually become “Black” and disaffected, implied that such immigrants were, along with other “Blacks,” susceptible to the influence of gangs.

Longwood officers’ expectations that Polish immigrants would travel a different trajectory than that of Haitian and Jamaican immigrants, notwithstanding these immigrant groups’ current demeanor and trouble-related behavior, also was influenced by the officers’ assumptions about parenting, particularly the disciplining of children. Although
Longwood officers saw Polish immigrant youth as being unruly, the officers assumed that the youths’ parents would exert the necessary discipline or informal social control at home in order to neutralize and eventually eliminate such unruly behavior. By contrast, Longwood officers, who did not appear to distinguish Haitian and Jamaican immigrants from other “Blacks” for purposes of parenting, did not see Haitian and Jamaican immigrant parents as exercising the necessary social control at home. Moreover, Longwood officers implied that Polish immigrant adults, who, unlike young Polish immigrants, had fear-based memories of the police, would instill such beliefs in their children.

Longwood officers’ overall assessment of culture-related behaviors for those whom the officers labeled as “Hispanic” or “part Hispanic,” was similar to the officers’ assessments of Polish immigrants’ and Haitian and Jamaican immigrants’ culture-related behaviors, in that this assessment appeared to reinforce the idea of group trajectories organized according to a Black/White binary. For the most part, Longwood officers’ assessments of the Portuguese’s and Cubans’ culture-related behaviors were non-paradoxical and consistent with the officers’ anticipated trajectories for the two respective groups. Although Longwood officers viewed the Portuguese as “part Hispanic” and Cubans as “Hispanic,” the officers nevertheless perceived the two groups as being virtually identical to Whites in terms of behaviors and values pertaining to work, education, parenting, respect, trouble, and property maintenance. Accordingly, Longwood officers’ ranked these two groups close to Whites in Longwood’s demographic hierarchy.
Although Longwood officers’ assessments of culture-related behaviors of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans were favorable in some respects, the officers’ anticipated trajectory for these groups was the closest to “Blacks” among all of the groups that Longwood officers identified as “Hispanic.” While Longwood officers did not disparage either Puerto Ricans or Dominicans in terms of work, education, or parenting, the officers had a somewhat unfavorable assessment of the groups’ demeanor, had suspicion of some clandestine trouble-related behavior by these groups, and generally viewed the property-related behaviors of these groups in a negative light. Based on their overall assessments of Puerto Ricans’ and Dominicans’ behaviors, Longwood officers did not expect Puerto Ricans and Dominicans to become the same as Blacks, but the officers nevertheless saw these groups as approaching Blacks asymptotically. Like one of the rationales put forth explaining Haitian and Jamaican immigrants’ anticipated trajectory, several Longwood officers suggested that Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, unlike the “newer” Mexican and Central American immigrants, had become somewhat disenchanted as a result of the discrimination that they had encountered as “Hispanics” in the United States. Nevertheless, Longwood officers did not see Puerto Ricans and Dominicans as eventually occupying the same rung on the demographic hierarchy as Blacks, because, as one White male Longwood officer put it, “[Puerto Ricans and Dominicans] have more goin’ for them.”

Of all of their assessments of the culture-related behaviors of “Hispanics,” Longwood officers’ assessments of Mexican and Central American immigrants’ behaviors were the most paradoxical and inconsistent with the officers’ anticipated trajectories for the respective groups. Although Longwood officers had a more expressly
laudatory view of the work- and education-related behaviors and values of Mexican and Central American immigrants than those of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, and saw Mexican and Central American immigrants, unlike Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, as unambiguously exhibiting a respectful demeanor and avoiding trouble-related behavior, nevertheless Longwood officers ultimately assumed that Mexicans and Central American immigrants’ trajectory would be closer to that of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans than that of the Portuguese and Cubans.

While Longwood officers, in particular, praised Mexican and Central American immigrants’ work ethic in much the same way they praised the work ethic of the Portuguese, Cubans, and Poles, the officers nevertheless did not see Mexican and Central American immigrants as ever enjoying the same upward mobility as these other groups for several reasons. First, unlike their view of Poles, and to a somewhat lesser extent their view of the Portuguese and Cubans, Longwood officers’ view of Mexican and Central American immigrants’ “hard work” was not buttressed by or seen in the context of a long, established history of successful assimilation, business ownership, and overall integration into the local economy. Second, unlike their view of Poles, the Portuguese, and Cubans, Longwood officers saw Mexican and Dominican immigrants as unskilled laborers who always did piddling work for others. Third, and most significant, Longwood officers believed that Mexican and Central American immigrants, although currently respectful, docile, and law-abiding, would, like Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Haitian and Jamaican immigrants, become more resentful and bitter over time after they had encountered discrimination and limited opportunities as “Hispanics.” Accordingly, although Longwood officers saw Mexican and Central American immigrants as not
currently posing any problems or threat, the officers nevertheless saw these groups as potentially presenting such problems in the future. Thus, Longwood officers saw Mexican and Central Americans on a trajectory that was eventually moving closer to that of Blacks than that of Whites. However, given the lack of any immediately apparent threat posed by Mexican and Central American immigrants, Longwood officers appeared to rank these groups in 2006 as slightly above Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, and as below the Portuguese, Cubans, and Polish immigrants.

5.3. The Culture-Related Conditioning of Officers’ Schemata in Coretown

Unlike Longwood officers, Coretown officers did not focus extensively on culture-related behaviors in constituting and ranking groups within a demographic hierarchy in Coretown. The chief reason for this difference is that Coretown officers, unlike Longwood officers, did not perceive much in the way of racial and ethnic diversity among residents, and as a result, did not focus on as many behaviors in order to situate residential groups in relation to each other. Coretown officers indicated that among Coretown’s racial minority population, there were small percentages of Blacks and Asians, and almost no Hispanics. As noted earlier in this chapter, Coretown officers did have a lot to say about racial and ethnic minorities, but the bulk of this commentary focused on racial and ethnic minority visitors (see Chapter 6). In the absence of what Coretown officers perceived as racial and ethnic residential diversity, Coretown officers, unlike Longwood officers, again focused more on the class-based differences among the majority “White” group.

In contrast to Longwood officers, Coretown officers said very little about work- and education-related behaviors and values. In general, Coretown officers made blanket
generalizations that implied that all of Coretown’s residents valued education and worked hard. With respect to education, Coretown officers noted that people moved to Coretown in part because of the “good schools,” which implies that Coretown’s residents care about education. In terms of work, Coretown officers indirectly conveyed that all residents were gainfully employed and worked hard. Coretown officers’ complaints about both house alarms going off and burglaries taking place during the day when residents were at work indirectly suggested that residents were gainfully employed. Coretown officers’ comments such as “residents’ hard-earned tax dollars shouldn’t go to waste,” also implied that Coretown residents were hard workers.

While Coretown officers suggested that there were no ascertainable work- or education-related differences among residents, Coretown officers indicated that there were significant differences in parental discipline and supervision between wealthier Whites in the northern part of town and lower-middle-class to middle-class Whites in the southern part of town. Coretown officers generally saw White northern Coretown parents as being more permissive than White southern ones. For instance, a White male Coretown officer stated the following about parents in Post 2 in the northeastern part of Coretown:

The problem with a lot of the kids around here is the parents let them do whatever they want. [The kids] have no limits. You want some booze, here, drink up. You want some weed, hey no problem. Basically it’s a free-for-all….

While some Coretown officers blamed such permissive and/or negligent parenting for northern youths’ marijuana usage, the majority of Coretown officers saw such parenting as contributing to an excessive amount of underage alcohol consumption. In discussing the nexus between permissive/negligent parenting and underage drinking,
virtually all Coretown officers made reference to a recent incident involving two 13-year-olds and a 12-year-old, all of whom had been drinking vodka in the basement of one of the youth’s parents’ home unbeknownst to the youth’s parents, who were home at the time. Most other permissive/negligent parenting-related underage drinking incidents referenced by Coretown officers involved either parents who left their homes unattended, or parents who provided alcohol to minors. For example, an Asian male Coretown officer made the following remarks while patrolling Post 1 in the northwestern quadrant of Coretown:

You see a lot of parties around this part of town. It’s usually at the big houses, when the parents are away. Sometimes the parents are there and they act like it’s okay to serve alcohol to teens. They’re like, “I’d rather ‘em do it here than out somewhere.”

As this officer’s comments reveal, Coretown officers saw White northern Coretown parents as being both passively and actively permissive. These northern parents were passively permissive in that they left their children and their homes unattended, and actively permissive in that they provided alcohol to minors. In either case, Coretown officers viewed these northern parents as providing inadequate supervision of their children.

Coretown officers also saw White northern parents as failing to provide adequate discipline. Typically Coretown officers commented on northern parents’ inadequate or completely lacking disciplinary practices when discussing how these parents would respond if they learned that their children had engaged in delinquent behavior. For instance, after discussing a group of White adolescent “potheads” who were walking to their homes in the northern part of Coretown after Coretown High School’s dismissal, a
White male Coretown officer responded to a question from the interviewer about these “potheads” as follows:

What would happen to them if their parents found out? Nothin’. Absolutely nothin’. For some of ‘em, they just don’t care. They’re too busy with work or whatever. The others think that their kids can’t do no wrong. It’s other people’s kids who have a problem, not my kids.

As evidenced by this officer’s comments, Coretown officers felt that many northern parents did not and would not provide sufficient informal social control at home.

Coretown officers’ perception that northern parents failed to provide sufficient informal social control at home was most apparent from the officers’ accounts of how northern parents reacted when Coretown officers arrested the parents’ children.

Coretown officers indicated that northern parents often were in denial of their child’s involvement in delinquent or criminal activity. For instance, in discussing the story of a 13-year-old White boy who had broken into over a dozen parked cars and stolen the cars’ stereo systems, a White male Coretown officer noted how the mother of the boy instantly denied that her son was involved in the break-ins. The officer stated:

We had this rash of break-ins in the downtown area, out by where the church is, that went on for almost a year, and we thought we had a real professional on our hands. The guy was breaking into cars, a lotta nice SUVs, and taking out the stereos, the DVD players, you name it. He would basically strip out the sound system. But we finally caught the little punk, he turns out to be this little 13-year-old. Can you believe that, 13! He’d made off with thousands and thousands of dollars worth of stereo equipment. It turns out that he was just doing it for kicks – his family’s loaded. He didn’t need all that shit. Well, we go over to tell his mom about it and immediately she starts in with this, “Not my kid. My boy’s an angel. He would never steal anything.” She kept that up until the kid confessed and showed her the stockpile of shit that he’d stolen.
Similarly, another White male Coretown officer described the reaction of the father of a 16-year-old White boy who had been arrested for possessing marijuana over at Turner Park (in Post 1 in the north). The officer remarked:

Most people here support what we do, but heaven forbid we arrest their kid, especially for a CDS [controlled dangerous substance] offense. They go nuts if it's a CDS [offense]. So we had this one smart-ass in the cell at the station and it's close to midnight. Finally, the little brat’s dad shows up, he's a real big guy, about six foot four, 240 [pounds], and I’m thinkin’, “Allright, now this kid’s gonna shut up; his dad’s gonna lay into ‘im.” But ya know what, [the boy’s father] immediately starts in with us, “You had no right to search my son, you had no right to arrest him,” and I’m like, “Whoa. Hold on there.” I mean this guy was steamin’....

In both of these accounts the officers implicitly suggest that given the parents’ defense of their children in the face of obvious evidence of guilt, it is unlikely that these parents would provide adequate discipline of their children at home.

In contrast to their perception of the northern White parents, Coretown officers generally saw the southern White parents as more cooperative and supportive of the Coretown police, even when these parents’ children got into trouble. For example, a White male Coretown officer discussed how the father of a 15-year-old boy from District 3 who was arrested for marijuana possession nearly assaulted his son when he came down to the station. The officer commented:

We had [the 15-year-old boy] in the cell with one of his buddies and they’re acting like it’s no big thing, laughing and joking. And I’m like, “Do you little bastards know where you are?” So then I tell him that his dad’s comin’ down for him, and then all of a sudden the kid’s like he’s seen a ghost. I mean he’s like terrified. His dad walks in and he starts cursin’ his son out and tellin’ him that he’s gonna kick his ass when they get home. He grabbed him by the collar and picked him clear off the ground. He didn’t really say much to us; he just kept cursin’ at his kid and starin’ at him when he wasn’t cursin’. I hate to admit it, but...
I actually felt a little bad for the kid. I mean you know it was gonna get ugly for him.

Here, unlike the scenarios in which northern Coretown parents defended their children and gave no indication that they were going to punish their children at home for their misdeeds, the southern Coretown parent unambiguously communicated to the officers that he not only supported the officers’ actions, but was going to informally provide adequate punishment of his son.

Although Coretown officers saw White southern Coretown parents as being more likely to discipline their children, the officers nevertheless conveyed that many White southern Coretown youth also lacked adequate supervision. However, while Coretown officers saw northern parents’ inadequate supervision being due to neglect and the parents’ own indulgences in expensive vacations and weekend getaways, officers saw southern parents’ inadequate supervision being attributable to factors beyond their control, such as single-parent families resulting from divorce, and parents having to work multiple jobs. Accordingly, Coretown officers appeared to excuse southern parents’ inadequate supervision, and condemn that of northern parents. For instance, a White male Coretown officer stated the following about a 14-year-old White male from the southern part of Coretown who had gotten into trouble several times:

I feel bad for [the 14-year-old’s] mom. She’s tryin’ to make it on her own, workin’ two jobs. It’s just tough to stay on top of [her son]…. She does what she can, but it’s hard because she just can’t be there to make sure he’s doin’ what he’s supposed to be doin’.

In sum, Coretown officers believed that southern parents had limits for their children, when able to do so, provided some informal social control at home. In contrast, the
officers saw northern parents as being permissive even when afforded the opportunity to monitor and discipline their children.

Given their acknowledgment of inadequate supervision among both White southern and northern Coretown parents, Coretown officers identified a lot of trouble-related behavior with both White southern and northern Coretown youth. Paradoxically, however, these officers maintained that the youth in town generally were “good” and law-abiding. Coretown officers maintained their perception of Coretown youth as “good kids” notwithstanding the prevalence of trouble-related behaviors that might suggest otherwise, due to both the officers’ rationalizations of such behavior and structural obstacles preventing the detection of such behavior.

Coretown officers proffered several different rationalizations of White Coretown youths’ trouble-related behavior, each of which enabled the officers to see these youths as “good”. Coretown officers’ view that the majority of White Coretown youths’ trouble-related behaviors were minor or trivial offenses was the most direct rationalization of such behaviors. Coretown officers indicated that the majority of Coretown youths’ trouble-related behaviors were status offenses, with underage drinking being by far the most common offense. Coretown officers suggested that these offenses were trivial and harmless because the underlying behaviors associated with these offenses were largely a “rite of passage” or a “phase” through which youths were going. According to this “rite of passage” or “phase” rationalization, Coretown officers dismissed Coretown youths’ trouble-related behaviors as being harmless rituals or stages in the life cycle that did not warrant intervention by the Coretown police. A White male Coretown officer’s statement captures this rationalization:
Yeah, there’s a lot of drinking and all, but that’s something you see with all kids that age. It’s kinda a rite of passage. Something that everyone does when they’re in high school. I mean, we don’t want them driving, but what are you gonna do, arrest them all?

As this account demonstrates, Coretown officers saw underage drinking, a status offense, as not only being trivial, but as something that White Coretown youth would obviously outgrow as they moved into adulthood.

Coretown officers also rationalized White Coretown youths’ trouble-related behavior based on both from where the officers perceived the youths as coming, and where the officers saw the youths as going. Coretown officers minimized White Coretown youths’ trouble-related behaviors in part because these youths came from “respectable” families. For instance, a White male Coretown officer stated the following about the residents of an all-White neighborhood near Coretown High School:

Some of [the White Coretown youth] are partyers, but things never get too outta hand. Yeah, we do get some CDS’s, but most of [the youth] are good kids…. It’s not like the trash you see on COPS; these kids come from respectable families….

In a similar vein, Coretown officers minimized White Coretown youths’ trouble-related behaviors in part based on their assumption that an overwhelming majority of these youths’ would be going to college. For instance, a Black male Coretown officer stated:

Yeah, a lot of [the White Coretown youth] like to have their fun, but just about all of them go to college; it’s not like they’re ending up in juvie or anything.
As reflected by this officer’s comments, Coretown officers saw White Coretown youths’ trouble-related behavior as being inconsequential because it did not derail these youths from a path to college, and presumably productive, successful lives.

In addition to rationalizing Coretown’s White youths’ trouble-related behaviors as being harmless and inconsequential, Coretown officers were able to maintain a view of these youths as “good” by rationalizing that youth outside of Coretown had negatively influenced Coretown youth. All Coretown officers emphasized that “outsiders” corrupted Coretown youth through “networking” either in person or through the Internet. Coretown officers noted that the majority of White Coretown youths had an increasing number of outside contacts whom they met in person at parties outside of town, shopping malls, and athletic events. Coretown officers also emphasized that these youths were meeting a lot of “outsiders” through social networking sites such as MySpace on the Internet. Coretown officers noted that younger youths, those in 10th grade and below made more of an effort than 11th and 12th graders to establish contacts outside of town, because unlike 11th and 12th graders, those in 10th grade and below could not drive. Coretown officers reasoned that increasing number of out-of-town contacts among these younger White Coretown youths was particularly problematic because these youth were more impressionable than older youth. By suggesting that “outsiders” were responsible for corrupting these Coretown youths, especially the younger ones, Coretown officers effectively absolved Coretown youths of much of the blame for the youths’ misbehavior.

Besides Coretown officers’ minimization of White Coretown youths’ trouble-related behaviors through the officers’ representations of and attributions of blame for such behaviors, these youths’ trouble-related behaviors were reduced by several
structural factors. One important structural factor had to do with where White Coretown youth, especially older youth, were engaging in trouble-related behavior. All Coretown officers noted that many 11th and 12th graders, as well as college-aged young adults, went out of town to drink alcohol at parties. For instance, a White male Coretown officer stated:

By 11th and 12th grade [White Coretown youths] become more mobile. Just about all of them have cars, or at least access to a car, and they go outta town to party.

Coretown officers indicated that not only did Coretown youths go out of town to drink alcohol at parties, but that these youths engaged in minor acts of vandalism and mischief outside of Coretown. Another White male Coretown officer remarked:

I got a buddy who’s a cop in Wheaton who says that he gets a lot of juveniles comin’ in from Coretown and Sunny Heights into town that get their kicks smashing pumpkins and vandalizing things. A lotta hit and run kind of stuff.

According to these accounts, older White Coretown youth, like the “Saints” in Chambliss’s (1973) “The Saints and the Roughnecks,” were able to in effect hide their trouble-related behaviors from Coretown officers. Although Coretown officers were somewhat aware of these youths’ problematic out-of-town behavior, the fact that the youths were able to take such behavior elsewhere nevertheless helped to minimize officers’ association of such behavior with White Coretown youth. Moreover, it appears that part of Coretown officers’ apparent focus on the trouble-related behavior of younger teens (those in 10th grade or less) was due to older teens’ ability to engage in trouble-related behavior outside of town.

Coretown officers indicated that older White Coretown youths’ and young adults’ excursions to other towns to engage in trouble-related behavior was not simply due to
these youths’ and young adults’ access to cars, but also attributable to the lack of public spaces in Coretown in which to congregate, as well as Coretown officials’ and officers’ discouragement of young people congregating in such spaces. Coretown officers indicated that outside of tiny areas around a clock and the post office in the downtown area, and a few small parks, there were very few public spaces in Coretown in which young people could congregate. Coretown officers noted that Coretown officials tried to limit the number of such public spaces to discourage young people from congregating. For example, Coretown officers pointed out that the Coretown Town Council had recently voted down the creation of a skateboarding park in Post 2 because Council members were worried that the park would attract “bad” young people, particularly from outside of Coretown. Regarding this point, a White male Coretown officer stated:

They were gonna have a PAL [Police Athletic League] skateboarding park over here [in Post 2], but the Town [Council] was worried about it attracting bad elements, especially from outta town. You know, like the Goth-type ones with the spiked collars. All the residents around here were up in arms, “Not in my backyard.” So [the Town Council] shot it down.

Besides limiting the number of public spaces in which young people could congregate, Coretown officials actively took steps to discourage young people from congregating in existing public spaces. For instance, Coretown officers noted that after liquor bottles and the remains of joints were found at a small park located about a half of a mile from Coretown High School in Post 1, Coretown officials removed all of the benches and tables from the park. Similarly, another White male Coretown officer indicated that Coretown officials erected several barriers between the parking lot and
walkway outside of a middle school in Post 2 in order to discourage young people from skateboarding in that area.

Town officials’ efforts to discourage young people from congregating in public spaces were reinforced by Coretown officers’ patrolling of these spaces. While Coretown officers discouraged youth from public spaces throughout the town, including Coretown’s public schools’ parking lots, where young White Coretown youth tried to skateboard, and Coretown’s municipal parks, where White Coretown youth sometimes gathered to drink alcohol and smoke marijuana, Coretown officers focused a disproportionate amount of their time and energy trying to discourage youth from congregating in public spaces in Coretown’s downtown shopping district located in the center of Coretown. Coretown officers’ preoccupation with public spaces in the downtown area was due in large part to pressures from town officials and business owners. Coretown officers noted that town officials and business owners were worried that groups of young people loitering in public spaces in the downtown area might hurt ongoing efforts to revitalize the downtown area. 25 While, as discussed in Chapter 6, Coretown officers’ patrolling of public spaces in the downtown area also was fueled by a particular concern of keeping these spaces free of young people from outside of Coretown, this patrolling nevertheless helped to deter Coretown youth from congregating in these spaces as well.

In patrolling the downtown area, Coretown officers particularly focused on discouraging young people from congregating in a small area with benches around a large clock, and a small area adjacent to the post office. Coretown officers accomplished
this not only through heightened, periodic monitoring of these spaces, but also by cracking down on trivial offenses committed at or near these areas. For instance, Coretown officers focused on “quality of life” type offenses like disturbing the peace, and ticketed vehicles that were parked more than eighteen inches from the curb.

As a result of both Coretown officers’ and town officials’ efforts to discourage young people from hanging out in public spaces, Coretown officers indicated that White Coretown youth and young adults had become more secretive and discreet when they engaged in various forms of trouble-related behavior within Coretown. For instance, while driving past a swimming pool complex in Post 2, a White male Coretown officer discussed how Coretown youth were climbing over the complex’s fence after dark and having sex, drinking alcohol, and smoking marijuana out behind one of the complex’s buildings. The officer stated:

This is one of the spots where [Coretown youth] get together. They climb over that fence there and go behind that wall. You can’t see it from the road. You’ve got kids coming over here to have sex, smoke weed, drink, you name it. We’ve found everything but the kitchen sink back there – condoms, beer bottles, blunts. We busted three juveniles we caught with weed, but we still keep finding stuff. It’s just hard to catch them red-handed.

Similarly, a White male Coretown officer discussed how a group of White males from Coretown High School had been gathering clandestinely at a park near the school to smoke marijuana and drink alcohol. The officer showed a spot behind a large fallen tree where he had found the remains of joints and an empty vodka bottle. Like the preceding officer, this officer lamented over how difficult it was to apprehend the White male students. The officer commented:

I know that they’re smokin’ over here. I even know who they are. But it’s almost
impossible to catch them. If they’re out behind the trees here, they can spot my
car and make out on foot through the back. We thought that after [town officials]
took out the benches and tables, they’d stop coming over here. But all it’s done is
make them better at hiding their shit.

In discussing White Coretown youths’ increasingly secretive and discreet
behavior in recent years, Coretown officers particularly emphasized how these youths
had become more stealthful in holding large house parties within Coretown. Coretown
officers noted that the Coretown police had cracked down on large house parties
involving underage drinking in the 1990s following a couple of drunken driving deaths,
but that in the last few years Coretown youths had devised clandestine ways of holding
such parties without detection by the Coretown police. Of these calculated, adaptive
ways of avoiding police detection, the most significant was Coretown’s youths’ walking
to parties instead of driving. A White male Coretown officer described this relatively
recent adaptation:

It’s different than it used to be. Now you have a lotta kids walking two miles to
go to a party.

As this same officer explained, this shift from driving to walking to parties was
significant because it made it both more difficult to detect parties and to identify and
apprehend underage partygoers. The officer remarked:

If they don’t bring their cars, then there won’t be a lotta cars parked around the
house [where the party is being held]. So it’s not as easy for us to detect that
there’s a party goin’ on there. And if they don’t bring cars, they can scatter on
foot before we get there.

Moreover, another White male Coretown officer added that detection and apprehension
had become more difficult because of “lookouts” at the house parties. The officer stated:
Even when we get wind of a big party that’s goin’ on in town, it’s almost impossible to nab anyone because they use lookouts to shut things down before we get there.

Lastly, Coretown officers contended that these youths’ stealthful tactics were compounded by the stealthful tactics of parents. Coretown officers indicated that parents, almost exclusively in the northern part of Coretown (Posts 1 and 2), were increasingly assisting youths so as to avoid detection.

Coretown officers lamented that these secretive, stealthful tactics largely had been successful. A White male Coretown officer noted that even when Coretown officers had information about parties, the officers still had a difficult time in busting up parties. This officer remarked:

I work as an accountant part-time and they hire some college interns, so I get the scoop on parties that are coming up on the weekend in town. But we don’t seem to be able to bust ‘em up. It’s hard to bust up parties. They’ve just become quieter, more secretive.

In sum, structural factors that limited Coretown’s youths’ ability to gather in public spaces in Coretown pushed some trouble-related behavior to other towns, and other trouble-related behavior indoors. As Coretown officers became more aggressive in busting up parties in which underage drinking was taking place, White Coretown youth developed more stealthful means of holding such parties, and in doing so were generally successful in avoiding detection. Although Coretown officers were aware of both of these phenomena, the ability of White Coretown youths to “hide” their trouble-related behavior made it less likely that Coretown officers would view these youths as “bad kids.”
Although Coretown officers generally maintained that Coretown youth were “good kids” notwithstanding the prevalence of “minor” trouble-related behavior, the officers nevertheless had a slightly less favorable view of White northern Coretown youths based on the officers’ perceptions of these youths’ demeanor. Coretown officers generally saw northern youths, particularly northern male youths, as being more arrogant, disrespectful, and unfriendly than southern youths. These perceptions were most starkly evident during Coretown officers’ monitoring of a group of northern “burnouts” who routinely smoked together upon dismissal from Coretown High School. While these perceptions of demeanor did not appear to translate into a greater amount of confrontations between Coretown officers and northern youths, in part, as discussed more fully in Chapter 6, because Coretown officers appeared to be reluctant to have to deal with these youths’ wealthy and powerful parents, the demeanor-related perceptions were significant in terms of officers’ proactive mentoring behaviors. As discussed more fully in Chapter 7, Coretown officers’ perception of White southern youths, specifically White southern male youths, as being more approachable and friendly than northern youths, resulted in Coretown officers’ almost exclusive proactive helping and mentoring of southern youths.

While Coretown officers talked a great deal about minor trouble-related behavior such as underage drinking among White Coretown youth, the officers generally did not see White Coretown adults as being involved in any trouble-related behavior. Coretown officers saw any trouble-related behavior involving Whites, such as an illegal “chop shop” being run by three White men in the southeastern part of Coretown, as involving people outside of Coretown. Although Coretown officers saw White northern adults as
being permissive parents, the officers otherwise viewed them as upstanding, 
hardworking, law-abiding citizens. For instance, while driving down a street with 
expensive homes in Post 2, a White male Coretown officer stated:

This is like the dead zone here; people are never around, always at work. If they 
wanna live here, that’s what they gotta do. We’ve had a problem with daytime 
burglaries, ‘cause it’s obvious no one’s around. But it’s not like we ever gotta 
worry about anybody around here doin’ anything they’re not supposed to be 
doin’.

For the most part, Coretown officers lumped “Asians” together with “Whites,” 
and generally said very little about Asians. Coretown officers described Coretown’s 
small Asian population as “quiet,” “respectful,” “smart,” and “hardworking.” In general, 
Coretown officers saw Asian youth, unlike White youth, as avoiding trouble-related 
behavior. As a White male Coretown officer put it:

The Asians aren’t much into partying. They’re probably home studying on a 
Saturday night.

As reflected in part by this officer’s comments, Coretown officers essentially viewed 
Asians as “model minorities” (Lee 1996; Martinez 1994).

However, when Asians appeared to contravene this “model minority” stereotype, 
Asians became highly visible to Coretown officers, and were treated very harshly, 
particularly in comparison to Whites. For example, a White male Coretown officer 
monitoring a groups of almost exclusively “White” “burnout” adolescent students 
congregating outside of Coretown High School after dismissal, spent a disproportionate 
amount of time excoriating a Chinese-American 15-year-old boy who had been 
suspended from school indefinitely for bringing a weapon to school. This officer stated:
You see the Chinese kid on the bike, that’s [Danny]; he’s a total fuck-up, a buffoon. His parents run this take-out restaurant downtown; they’re hardworking, very polite, they give us extra food for free. They came to this country with nothin’ and they’ve worked hard to make something of themselves. [Danny’s] nothing like them; it’s hard to believe he’s even related to them; he must be such a disappointment to them.

Although this officer also said negative things about some of the White “burnouts” who were smoking after school, this officer reserved his harshest comments for Danny. Moreover, when the group of burnouts blocked the sidewalk for some elementary school kids who were returning home from school, the officer physically grabbed the bike that Danny was sitting on and yelled at him, “Get outta here!” Danny was the only one in the crowd of fifteen or so on whom the officer used physical force. This officer’s apparent lesser tolerance for the “Asian” “burnout’s” behavior in comparison to that of “White” “burnouts” suggests that this officer held Asians to a higher standard of behavior than Whites. Alternatively, this suggests that Whites, as the dominant group in Coretown, have more leeway in terms of misbehavior.

While Coretown officers appeared to hold Asian residents to a higher standard of behavior than Whites, Coretown officers did not appear to have the same high standard of behavior from Black residents. However, like their general assessment of both White and Asian residents, Coretown officers generally viewed Black residents as “decent” or at least “okay.” Coretown officers indicated that they had had numerous problems with residents in a “Black” neighborhood in the most northwestern part of Post 1, but that they no longer had any trouble from the current residents. A White male Coretown officer explained the change that had taken place in this neighborhood:
This is where a lot of the Blacks live. We used to have a lotta problems over here, but all the troublemakers who were sellin’ drugs and doin’ whatever else got arrested and went to jail. It’s pretty quiet now; totally different from the way it used to be. We rarely get a call over this way. It’s pretty dead here…. The people here are okay. Nobody really bothers anybody…. Although Coretown officers did not currently identify trouble-related behavior with the residents of this “Black” neighborhood in Post 1, or the town’s other “Black” neighborhood in the most southeastern corner of Post 3, Coretown officers did voice suspicion about a few Black residents’ possible involvement in drug activity. In particular, Coretown officers appeared to pay a little extra attention to the house belonging to the only “Black” family on a street in the middle of Post 2, and to a condominium complex located in the most southeastern corner of Post 2 near Night Avenue. Coretown officers suspected illegal drug activity at both of these locations based on the extent of observed “traffic,” or people coming and going. Notwithstanding these suspicions, Coretown officers generally did not associate Black residents with trouble-related behaviors. The two aforementioned locations in Post 2 appeared to be isolated, anomalous cases involving suspicion of Black residents.

Moreover, while Coretown officers appeared to give some extra scrutiny to these two “Black” residential locations, Coretown officers were, as discussed more fully in Chapter 6, far more focused on monitoring Black non-residents in various visitor-related spaces throughout Coretown. In general, Coretown officers distinguished Black residents from Black non-residents. Coretown officers saw Black residents as “respectable” people who generally stayed out of trouble, whereas the officers saw Black non-residents as threatening, disreputable people who brought trouble with them into Coretown. For
instance, a White male Coretown officer stated the following while riding through the “Black” neighborhood in the most southeastern part of Post 3:

It’s not like Edgarville here; we don’t have drug dealers on the corner and shootouts and what have you. The [Blacks] here are not like that; they’re respectable just like everyone else. Color doesn’t matter here. Red, blue, or green, people are people here. Everybody who lives here is basically the same.

While this officer appears to be broadly suggesting that “color” does not matter in general, he is actually limiting his statement to the residents of Coretown. This officer effectively is saying that Black residents are no different from other Coretown residents, and that all of these Coretown residents are different from Black non-residents.

Coretown officers’ view of Black residents as being fundamentally different from and better than Black non-residents even appeared to apply to Black residents who had ties to problematic Black non-residents. For instance, two Coretown officers discussed a Black 16-year-old male Coretown resident who attended an alternative high school as being “basically a good kid”, unlike his older brother, who “[was] a Crip [gang member] in Norville.” Although these officers thought that this 16-year-old was a “good kid,” they nevertheless expressed concern that he would be corrupted by his brother and his brother’s fellow gang members.

Coretown officers’ overall favorable view of Black residents appeared to translate into favorable treatment. Just like White and Asian residents, Black residents appeared to benefit from Coretown officers’ openly acknowledged preferential treatment of residents. For instance, after pulling over a Black, female, middle-aged Coretown resident who was driving 46 miles per hour in a 25 miles per hour speed zone, a White male Coretown officer failed to issue this woman a ticket after she informed him that she was a resident
and worked at the municipal complex downtown. This officer’s leniency was particularly prominent in this case, in that the officer had issued speeding tickets to two non-residents, one Black and one White, earlier that evening, even though these other speeders were not going as fast as this Black female resident.

While officers in Longwood were able to identify a significant portion of Black residents in Longwood based on the conditions of their properties, officers in Coretown generally did not focus on the conditions of properties in identifying Blacks or any other groups of residents in Coretown. Coretown officers almost never mentioned property maintenance-related behaviors in either a positive or negative sense. Although Coretown officers expressly made reference to the multiple families living in single-family homes in a poorer “White” neighborhood by the railroad tracks in Post 4, the officers did not give this property-related feature the same degree of import as officers in Longwood did. Coretown officers generally saw properties as being uniform, stable, and disconnected from trouble-related behavior, whereas Longwood officers viewed properties as varied, in flux, and connected to trouble-related behavior.

Unlike Longwood officers, Coretown officers did not rely extensively on culture-related behaviors in constituting and ranking various racial and ethnic groups in a complex, multi-layered hierarchy. Coretown officers’ assessments of culture-related behaviors reveal that the officers did not see a significant difference between the dominant White majority group at the top of Coretown’s demographic hierarchy and the Asian and Black groups. This gap between Whites and other racial groups in Coretown’s demographic hierarchy appears to be smaller than the gap between Whites and other racial groups in Longwood largely because of Coretown officers’ strong pro-
resident bias. While Longwood officers fixated on a White/ Black divide, Coretown officers focused on a resident/ non-resident divide. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, Coretown officers’ assessments of “non-residents” are, nevertheless, heavily racialized.

5.4. The Culture-Related Conditioning of Officers’ Schemata in Middleboro

While Coretown officers used residents’ culture-related behaviors primarily to map out differences among Whites, Middleboro officers used residents’ culture-related behaviors predominantly to further amplify intra-racial differences among both Whites and Blacks respectively. Given Middleboro officers’ perceptions of a powerful White/Black coalition within Middleboro, coupled with the officers’ perceptions of marked class differences among Blacks, and differences among Whites based on area of residence and support for integration, these officers generally did not make comparisons between Whites and Blacks.\(^3^0\)

As in Coretown, behaviors related to work and education generally did not factor into officers’ constitution and ranking of groups in Middleboro. Although non-Black Middleboro officers\(^3^1\) disparaged poorer Blacks in the southeastern part of Middleboro in terms of parenting, demeanor, trouble-related behavior, and property-related behavior in ways reminiscent of Longwood officers’ disparagement of the poorest Blacks in Longwood, Middleboro officers did not disparage Middleboro’s poorer Blacks’ work- and education-related behaviors and values. Paradoxically, although, as noted below, Middleboro officers did not think the poorest Blacks in the Norman and Monroe Streets area in the southeast were “gonna make it,” Middleboro officers did not belittle this area’s youths or adults in terms of either valuing education or educational attainment.
One possible explanation for this difference between Longwood and Middleboro officers’ views of the two poor Black subgroups’ educational values is the different arrangements of the school systems in the two respective towns. As discussed more fully in Chapter 6, Middleboro’s school system, unlike Longwood’s system, randomly assigns students to schools throughout the town irrespective of where students live rather than based on proximity to a neighborhood school. As a result of these two arrangements, it is more likely that Middleboro’s officers will develop a view that the town values all children equally and provides these children with the same education. Consequently, Middleboro officers would be less inclined than Longwood officers to use education as a means of demeaning poor Blacks in the Norman and Monroe area of Middleboro.

Although Middleboro officers’ did not disparage poor southeastern Black parents’ educational values, Middleboro officers, including Black officers,32 did otherwise disparage these parents’ parenting, particularly these parents’ supervision and discipline of their children. Indeed, Middleboro officers viewed southeastern Black parents and grandparents, many of whom they identified as single caretakers, as being highly permissive parents who were virtually absent from their children’s lives. Consequently, Middleboro officers saw southeastern Black youth as being on their own and as having to fend for and raise themselves. For instance, while driving along Monroe Street, a White male Middleboro officer commented:

You can just look at [the children on Monroe Street] and tell that they’re not gonna make it. They’re like wolves without a den…. They don’t have anyone looking out for them.

Even when Middleboro officers acknowledged that Black southeastern youth had parents or other caretakers who were present in the children’s lives, the officers suggested
that these parents and caretakers could not sufficiently control the children. Middleboro
officers emphasized how Black southeastern parents and caretakers, unlike wealthier
Black and White parents in Middleboro, called the police for assistance in controlling
Black southeastern parents’ and caretakers’ children, even very young children. For
instance, a White male Middleboro officer remarked:

> After I’d been here for a while I noticed the weirdest thing. We were getting calls from parents [in the southeastern part of Middleboro] saying, “My child’s acting up, and I can’t handle him.” We had this one parent who called us because her 5 year old son was out of control. Can you believe that? 5 years old. Once these kids are 12, 13, forget it. Game over. [The parents] are like, “Nothing I can do.” You know, I can come in and try to scare some sense into the kid, but what is the kid learning? That I don’t have to answer to mommy?

As reflected by this officer’s comments, Middleboro officers basically saw almost no
informal social control mechanisms at home for Black southeastern youth.

Middleboro officers’ view of southeastern Black parents’ and other caretakers’
lack of supervision and discipline was reinforced by how these caretakers responded
when Middleboro officers arrested these caretakers’ children or grandchildren.
Middleboro officers noted that in about a third of these cases, southeastern Black parents
appeared to be wholly indifferent to their children’s or grandchildren’s arrests. For
example, a White male Middleboro officer noted that some Black southeastern parents
and caretakers had said, “That’s all he did?” after the officer had apprised them of their
child’s arrest. Middleboro officers indicated that in about a third of other cases, Black
southeastern parents seemed to be annoyed at the inconvenience caused by such arrests.
For instance, an Asian male Middleboro officer noted that the mother and stepfather of a
15 year old Black male did not care enough to come down to the station to pick up their son following an arrest. The officer stated:

[The southeastern Black youths’] parents just don’t give a shit. I arrested this one kid for assault and we called his folks and they couldn’t care less. The kid sat there for another two hours, and eventually they sent his 18 year old brother down to pick him up. Talk about family values.

Southeastern Black parents’ lack of supervision and, by implication, lack of discipline, also were implied by Middleboro officers’ accounts of what happened to southeastern Black youths after they were released to the custody of their parents or guardians following an arrest for some offense. For instance, a White male Middleboro officer described how he encountered a couple of Black juveniles from the southeast on the street the same night after the juveniles were released to the custody of their parents. The officer stated:

There was a fight involving several juveniles from Norman Street over by Belton Avenue. One of them actually struck [a Middleboro officer]. We arrested three of them and took them down to the station. I spent three hours writing the report. All of that for what? We released the three [juveniles] to their parents. I’ll tell you, nothing, I repeat nothing, happens to these little punks. When I went back out on the road that night, mind you, after being at the station for like four hours dealing with these shits, I spotted two of them walking by themselves like nothin’ had happened. If that doesn’t say it all.

Similarly, an Asian male recounted two similar episodes involving southeastern Black youth who were back out on the street soon after being released to the custody of their parents following arrests for breaking into and stealing cars. This officer commented:

You see it all the time. A kid will be released to his parents, and within no time, he’s back out on the street doin’ the same thing. Like there was these two boys from over by Monroe [Street], I think they were like fourteen, who stole a car. I spent hours writing up that report, but it was just a waste of time. We saw them back out on the street a couple of hours after they were released. And it’s not like
these kids learn their lesson. There was another case where there were three [Black male youth from the southeast] who were breakin’ into cars and stealing stereos and CDs. A couple of our officers saw them and the boys ran. They chased them on foot for a couple of blocks and caught two of them, but the third one got away. You would’ve thought [the third one] would be like, “Damn, they almost got me, I gotta stop doin’ this shit,” but no. Two hours later we got another call and arrested the third [youth] breaking into another car.

These accounts of Black southeastern youths being back on the street soon after being released to the custody of their parents not only imply that these youths had no supervision or discipline at home, but also suggest that these youths’ parents or guardians had not instilled in them fear of punishment by any authority figures.

Middleboro officers viewed Black southeastern youths’ lack of fear of parents/guardians, as well as the police, with a sense of incredulity. For example, in referencing the preceding example regarding the Black southeastern youth who tried breaking into another car after he and two of his associates had been chased by the police earlier in the evening, a White male Middleboro officer remarked:

My parents would’ve kicked the shit out of me if I did something like that. These kids seem to be completely unfazed by everything. They just don’t care. And they don’t seem to be worried if they get arrested or not. Can you believe that? When I was I kid, gettin’ arrested was like the worst possible thing. We feared the police. If a cop came up to you, you felt like you had the wind knocked out of you. With these kids, they just don’t give a shit.

Along with the other aforementioned indicia of permissive parenting, Middleboro officers saw these Black southeastern youths’ apparent insouciance with respect to authority figures and possible punishment as an indication that Black southeastern parents did not provide adequate informal social control. Much like Longwood officers’ views of Black parents in District 4 in Longwood, Middleboro officers generally did not
believe that Black southeastern Middleboro parents could keep their children out of trouble.

Like their view of poor, Black southeastern parents from Zone 3 in Middleboro, Middleboro officers saw northern, wealthy White parents from Zone 1 in Middleboro as being permissive. Middleboro officers viewed White northern parents, like Black southeastern parents, as “not [being] in touch with what [their] kids do.” In discussing various transgressions involving White northern youth, Middleboro officers emphasized White northern parents’ lack of knowledge about their children’s activities and/or whereabouts. For instance, after informing the mother of a 17 year old White northern male that her son had been arrested for having marijuana in his car, a White male Middleboro officer remarked how the woman was “utterly clueless” about her son’s involvement in drug activity, including with whom her son shared marijuana and where such exchanges took place. Similarly, another White male Middleboro officer discussed how White northern parents sometimes had no idea that their adolescent children were holding parties in the parents’ homes.

Although Middleboro officers saw both White northern and Black southeastern parents as permissive, the officers attributed this permissiveness to different sources for the two respective groups. Middleboro officers saw Black southeastern parents’ permissiveness as stemming largely from the struggles associated with poverty, whereas the officers viewed northern White parents’ permissiveness as being rooted primarily in overindulgence and wealth. Black southeastern parents appeared to not care for or set limits for their children because the parents themselves were overwhelmed with their own problems, while White northern parents set no limits because they either were wrapped
up in their own careers and social lives or they saw their children as being “entitled.” For Middleboro officers, both northern White and southeastern Blacks parents neglected their children, but Blacks “abandoned” their children or let them “fend for themselves”, whereas Whites “spoiled” and “coddled” their children.

Middleboro officers indicated that wealthy White northern parents’ “spoil[ing]” or “coddling” of their children was based on either a sense of entitlement or a sense of guilt. In elaborating on entitlement-based permissiveness, Middleboro officers contended that some White northern parents acted as if their children should have everything, including a right to “do whatever they want.” For instance, a White male officer stated:

A lot of the parents [in Zone 1] feel that their kids should have whatever they want, do whatever they want. It’s not just that they don’t know how to say, “No” to them, it’s that they don’t want to.

Middleboro officers indicated that in some cases White northern parents let their children “do whatever they want[ed]” because they felt guilty about not spending time with them. Middleboro officers noted that these guilt-ridden parents were too busy with their careers and their own social lives, and tried to alleviate their guilt by overindulging their children. For example, a Latina Middleboro officer stated:

Some of [White northern parents] give everything to their children, let them run wild, because they feel guilty about never being around for them. So they try to make up for it by buying them things, I mean, you should see some of the cars these kids drive. Whatever the kids ask for, they get it. It’s pretty sickening if you ask me.

Regardless of whether they viewed White northern parents’ indulgent and permissive parenting as being motivated by guilt or a sense of entitlement, Middleboro officers
viewed these parents as setting no limits for their children and as failing to provide informal social control.

In discussing the overindulgence of wealthy White northern parents, Middleboro officers particularly emphasized how many northern parents permitted their children to hold large parties with underage drinking in the parents’ homes. For example, a Black male officer noted how the parents of an adolescent female had knowingly allowed their daughter to hold a large, noisy party with lots of underage drinking in one part of the parents’ large house while the parents slept in another part of the house. Middleboro officers indicated that the wealthiest of the White northern parents appeared to be the most openly indulgent parents in Zone 1. Middleboro officers noted that these wealthiest White northern parents appeared to make light of any entanglements their children had with the police. An Asian male officer described these wealthiest parents’ attitude as follows:

The super rich [parents] simply don’t give a shit. If their kid gets arrested, they’re like, “Oh god, I can’t be bothered with this. Can’t I just write a check and have this over and done with?”

Thus, while the wealthiest White northern parents appeared to be similar to the poorest Black southeastern parents in not wanting to be “bothered” by their children’s arrests, the White northern parents’ lack of care, unlike that of the southeastern Black parents, flowed from their sense that they were too important and wealthy to have to pay much attention to such criminal justice matters.

In contrast to the wealthiest White northern parents, the majority of the rest of the “wealthy” White northern parents appeared to be highly “bothered” when their children were arrested and actively sought to protect their children. Although White northern
parents’ apparent granting of free reign to their children, as well as their apparent ignorance of their children’s activities, suggested that these parents were not actively monitoring their children, these parents nevertheless became actively involved once their children got into trouble with the police. Once their children got into any kind of trouble with the police, these White northern parents tried to prevent their children from suffering any consequences for their behavior. Middleboro officers indicated that White northern parents’ efforts to shield their children from any negative consequences stemming from the children’s behavior usually first involved some form of denial of the behavior in question. For instance, in the case of the mother who was “clueless” about her son’s marijuana-related activity, the officer noted that the mother stated, “That couldn’t have been his weed in the car.”

Following such denials, Middleboro officers indicated that White northern parents often attempted to make excuses for their children’s behavior. For instance, a Black male Middleboro officer pointed out that the mother of a 16-year-old male who had been arrested for possession of marijuana stated to the officer: “Oh, he was having a bad day. He’s been under a lot of stress lately.” In other cases, White northern parents tried to convince the officers to excuse the northern youths’ behavior for other reasons. For instance, the father of a 15-year-old male arrested for marijuana possession asked the arresting officer: “It’s just this one time. Can’t you cut him a break?” Similarly, the mother of 16-year-old girl who was charged with shoplifting stated to the arresting officer: “My daughter has so much homework to do. Can you let her go do it?”

Middleboro officers noted that instead of denying their children’s involvement in problematic behavior and seeking to have such behavior excused, some White northern
parents reacted with hostility. As an Asian male Middleboro officer commented, these White northern parents often attempted to shift the focus from their children’s behavior to that of the officers. This officer remarked:

What [White northern parents] do is try to turn things around on us. They try to make us out to be the bad guys, put us on the defensive. What did you do to my child. Like, “Why are my kids getting harassed?” Not like, “I’m sorry officer that my kid is such a little spoiled shit.”

In addition to effectively accusing the officers of harassing their children, these White northern parents frequently threatened Middleboro officers with legal action if they did not release their children. For instance, a White male officer stated:

You’ve got a lot of attorneys who live in town, and ones in [northern Middleboro], they’re the worst; there’s always a tension between them and us. It’s hard to describe; you can just feel it in the air. They’re the kinds who’ll sue you at the drop of a hat. It doesn’t matter if their kid is guilty as sin, they’ll fight you tooth and nail. Like there was this one guy, oh boy, he was a shark. We arrested his [17-year-old] son for supplying alcohol to this party where just about everyone was under 21. Now mind you, this was right after we’d had a drunk driving death, 18 years old, so we were trying to shut things down. Anyway, this guy goes eff’n ballistic when we arrested his son. He starts lecturin’ us on probable cause and all this other legalese bullshit, and then he drops the ess bomb on us, saying he’s gonna sue us for harassment and misconduct. It was quite a show. And it worked. I mean, he got to [the sergeant] and party boy got off scot-free.

In sum, Middleboro officers viewed the majority of White northern parents as actively pursuing various strategies, some of which were threat-based like the preceding one, to enable the parents’ children to “get away” with delinquent, criminal, or otherwise problematic behavior.

While Middleboro officers saw both White northern parents and Black southeastern parents as being permissive, Middleboro officers viewed White northern
parents as being doubly permissive. Middleboro officers saw White northern parents as not only being permissive in the sense of allowing their children to do whatever they pleased, but also as being permissive in enabling their children to get away with any transgressions. Although Middleboro officers perceived White northern parents, like Black southeastern parents, as not providing adequate informal social control at home, the officers saw White northern parents, unlike Black southeastern parents, as interfering with the ability of the police or other authorities to exercise formal control over youth. Following an incident involving a 16-year-old White male whose parents objected to their son’s arrest for a disorderly person’s offense outside of a large house party, a White male Middleboro officer referred to this interference as he stated:

[White northern youths’] parents don’t wanna discipline their kids, but they don’t want us to either. It’s all, “Why did you touch my child.” It gets real aggravating.

In contrast to their views of both White northern parents and Black southeastern parents, Middleboro officers saw both Black and White middle-class parents in the central part of Middleboro (Zone 2) as being conscientious parents who generally provided adequate supervision and discipline of their children. Middleboro officers’ assessment of these Black and White parents in central Middleboro was far more complicated than those for either southeastern Blacks or northern Whites. On the one hand, Middleboro officers, as noted under the prior section on power-related behaviors, saw the “pro-civil rights,” “liberal” coalition of Black and White middle-class residents in the central part of Middleboro as being the most vigilant of police practices and the most likely to publicly criticize the police for perceived unfair and inequitable treatment.
However, on the other hand, Middleboro officers viewed these residents/parents as being more “blue collar” than other Middleboro residents, and the most likely to support the police when these residents perceived the police as having fairly and justly arrested these residents’ children. In other words, Middleboro officers believed that as long as these White and Black central Middleboro residents perceived the police as having acted properly, these residents would cooperate with the officers and back up their actions.

Middleboro officers provided a wide range of examples demonstrating central White and Black parents’ cooperation with and backing of officers’ arrests of these parents’ children. These examples reveal that White and Black central Middleboro parents, unlike their northern White counterparts, focused on admonishing, and in some cases threatening, their children in the presence of the arresting officers rather than attacking and questioning the officers. For instance, an Asian male Middleboro officer noted approvingly how a White male central parent at the police station angrily grabbed his 15 year old son and yelled, “Yeah, when we get home you’re gonna get it.” Similarly, a White male Middleboro officer described how a Black female central parent excoriated her 16 year old son in front of the officer at the station. The officer quoted the Black woman as stating the following to her son: “You let me down. That’s it, that’s it. I’m not gonna stand for this.” Middleboro officers also indicated that White and Black central parents, unlike southeastern Black and northern White parents, sometimes actually apologized for their children’s behavior or made their children apologize to the officers. For instance, a Black male Middleboro officer remarked how two central White parents made their 15-year-old son write a letter of apology to the officer for being rude. Collectively, Middleboro officers took all of these examples of parental support and
backing of the police to mean that these central parents supplied adequate informal social control at home. Middleboro officers were confident that, unlike southeastern Black and northern White parents, central White and Black parents would supervise and discipline their children, and in doing so neutralize any potential problems.

Middleboro officers’ perceptions of trouble-related behaviors, particularly those of juveniles, were consistent with the officers’ perceptions of parenting. In general, Middleboro officers associated a lot of trouble-related behaviors with both southeastern Blacks and northern Whites, and virtually no trouble-related behaviors with central Whites and Blacks. Accordingly, Middleboro officers’ patrolling largely ignored the central part of Middleboro (Zone 2), and focused relatively evenly between the southern (Zone 3) and northern (Zone 1) parts of Middleboro. Although Middleboro officers saw both southeastern Blacks and northern Whites, particularly adolescents and young adults, as engaging in a lot of trouble-related behavior, Middleboro officers saw southeastern Black adolescents and young adults as engaging in relatively more trouble-related behavior, as well as relatively more serious trouble-related behavior such as assaults and robberies.

Middleboro officers viewed southeastern Blacks’ trouble-related behavior as largely being contained to the southeastern area of Middleboro centered around Norman and Monroe Streets. All Middleboro officers viewed Norman and Monroe Streets as being synonymous with both “poor Blacks” and “crime,” and described Norman and Monroe Streets to the south of Belton Avenue as being the worst, most crime-ridden places in Middleboro. Middleboro officers said Park Street, which is located on the northern side of Belton Avenue less than one half mile from Norman and Monroe Streets,
used to rival Norman and Monroe Streets, but indicated that the Park Street area had
become gentrified and had a relatively minor amount of criminal activity now.

Middleboro officers also identified some criminal activity with the Greenwood
Apartments located on the northern side of Belton Avenue about three quarters of a mile
from Norman and Monroe Streets, but saw this activity as being a small fraction of the
activity occurring on Norman and Monroe Streets.

In particular, Middleboro officers associated a lot of drug-related activity with
southeastern Blacks in the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area. One White male
Middleboro officer described Norman and Monroe Streets as “an open air drug market.”
As this officer’s description of Norman and Monroe Streets implies, Middleboro officers
viewed this drug activity as largely taking place outdoors. On average, Middleboro
officers estimated that 95 percent of service calls from residents of Norman and Monroe
Streets involved activity taking place outdoors—in the street, in yards, or on the stoops of
homes. For example, a White male Middleboro officer stated the following while riding
down Monroe Street:

I would say that close to one hundred percent of the [service] calls we get involve
stuff that’s goin’ on outside. It’s bizarre; we rarely have any calls here where we
go inside.

Middleboro officers also saw a lot of the drug activity, as well as other serious
trouble-related behavior, as being influenced by “Blacks” from other towns in proximity
to Middleboro. In particular, Middleboro officers suspected “Black” gangs from
neighboring towns to be involved in much of the criminal, especially drug-related,
activity in the Norman and Monroe Streets vicinity. So while Middleboro officers
believed that some of the poor Black southeastern residents were affiliated with gangs,
the officers nevertheless saw outsiders as being responsible for bringing gang-related activity to Middleboro.

Middleboro officers indicated that Blacks from other towns also sometimes prompted southeastern Middleboro Blacks, particularly adolescents and young adults from the Norman and Monroe Streets area, to venture to these other towns to engage in trouble-related behavior. Middleboro officers pointed out while the Black residents of Norman and Monroe Streets considered these streets as “Tha Hood” and tried to maintain a “tough street rep image,” Blacks from nearby “Black” towns—Inglewood, Edgarville, Omega, and Norville—perceived Middleboro Blacks as “soft,” and implicitly or expressly challenged Middleboro Blacks to “prove their toughness.” As a result, southeastern Middleboro Blacks sometimes traveled to these nearby towns to, as a Latina Middleboro officer put it, “prove how street gangster tough they are.”

Middleboro officers noted that southeastern Blacks’ excursions into these other towns in order to establish their “hard street credibility” invariably resulted in inter-town scuffles in which Middleboro Blacks lost. For instance, a Latina Middleboro officer recounted a recent incident in which five southeastern Black male adolescents and young adults went over to Edgarville in a car to “prove that they were not soft.” The five Black male Middleboro youths, who had claimed that some Black youths from Edgarville had “disrespected” them, were surrounded by a group of ten Black male Edgarville youths who beat up the five Middleboro youths, sending one of them to the hospital.

Black adolescents and young adults from the Norman and Monroe area also tried to establish their “toughness” or “hard image” by hanging out around various establishments along the eastern half of Belton Avenue within Middleboro as far as
Lakeview Plaza to the west (about one half mile from Norman Street). For example, a White male Middleboro officer described how Blacks from the Norman and Monroe Streets area routinely hung out at and in front of a Chinese restaurant located about a block west of Norman Street on Belton Avenue. This officer indicated that owners of the restaurant had called the Middleboro police several times to register complaints about Blacks who were cursing at and otherwise intimidating patrons, both inside and outside of the restaurant.

Notwithstanding southeastern Blacks’ apparent efforts to establish their toughness, Middleboro officers did not see these Blacks as being “tough.” In describing the southeastern Blacks who hung out by the Chinese restaurant, a Latina Middleboro officer commented:

They think they’re tough, but they’re really not. They’ll only hang out in front of places like [the Chinese restaurant] near [Norman] and [Monroe] [Streets] where they think they can get away with it. You’ll never see them too far from home ‘cause then they’re out of their comfort zone. No, they’re not tough at all.

As this officer suggests, Middleboro officers did not see Blacks from the Norman and Monroe Streets area as “tough” because these Blacks only ventured into spaces close to home where they felt comfortable, where it was least likely that they would be punished for any misbehavior, and where there was a quick and convenient escape back to their residential neighborhoods. Moreover, as noted above, Middleboro officers did not see these southeastern Blacks as “tough” because of how they reflexively scattered when Middleboro officers approached them outside of their residential neighborhoods.

Although Middleboro officers did not view southeastern Blacks as “tough,” Middleboro officers, with the exception of Black Middleboro officers, strongly disliked
interacting with southeastern Blacks. This intense dislike was based on the officers’ perceptions that southeastern Blacks hated them and resented their presence. For instance, a White male Middleboro officer sarcastically remarked, “We don’t get a lot of smiles on [Norman] and [Monroe] [Streets].” Likewise, after an acorn fell on the roof of the patrol car while driving down Monroe Street, a Latina Middleboro officer stated, “Even the squirrels don’t like us in this neighborhood.”

These Middleboro officers’ inferred this hatred largely from their perceptions of southeastern Blacks’ demeanor. All non-Black Middleboro officers saw southeastern Blacks as exhibiting a hostile and unfriendly demeanor in the officers’ presence. These officers indicated that southeastern Blacks, particularly in the Norman and Monroe Streets area, had “a look of loathing.” As these officers described, and ride-along observations confirmed, this “look of loathing” involved southeastern Blacks staring steely eyed at a police vehicle while mumbling something beneath a scowl.

While Middleboro officers, particularly non-Black officers, perceived Blacks from the Norman and Monroe Streets area as always being disrespectful and hostile, the level of disrespect and hostility depended on location. As noted above, Blacks from the Norman and Monroe Streets area usually dispersed rather quickly when officers approached them outside of their residential neighborhoods. In dispersing, these Blacks would show disrespect and hostility by turning their backs and mumbling words of disgust. An Asian male Middleboro officer described this phenomenon as follows:

If there’s a group of juveniles from [Norman] and [Monroe] [Streets], they’ll give a little lip, but they start movin’ right away. It’s like clockwork. We’ll pull up and immediately they’ll start scattering and turn their heads away sayin’ stuff like, “Fuck you, 5 – 0.”
In contrast to this timid, defeated display of disrespect and hostility, southeastern Blacks conveyed disrespect and hostility to the officers in a more defiant way in their residential neighborhoods, particularly along Norman and Monroe Streets. Although groups of Black adolescents and young adults usually dispersed if an officer stopped his/her patrol car in front of them or got out of the patrol car, the dispersal was much slower and not automatic. In some cases, Blacks on Norman and Monroe streets did not disperse and either tried to stare down the officer or stayed and argued with the officer. This was most evident when officers tried to move groups of Black youths off of stoops of houses where they did not live. For instance, a group of eight adolescent Black males and females argued with a White male Middleboro officer who told them that they had to get off of the stoop in front of an elderly Black woman’s home. Following the incident, the officer remarked:

These kids have no respect for us. When I was a kid, if a cop asked you to do something, it was the word of God.

Some Blacks, particularly younger Blacks, went even further by trying to initiate a confrontation with an officer on Norman and Monroe Streets. For example, after a White male Middleboro officer parked his patrol car on Monroe Street, a 13 year old Black male threw chicken bones towards the car. The officer confronted the 13 year old, who, as the officer put it, “gave [him] lip” and “showed complete disrespect” and “no sense of manners [or] how to behave.”

Notwithstanding their apparent resentment for what they perceived as southeastern Blacks’ generally hostile demeanor and disrespectful actions, Middleboro officers nevertheless tried to understand this demeanor and these actions. Middleboro
officers generally surmised that the hostile demeanor of southeastern Blacks, particularly younger Blacks, was a product of what these residents’ families had taught them about the police. For instance, a White male Middleboro officer stated:

The Blacks are taught that the police are bad. They’re the ones who took mommy, daddy, or big bro away.

While Middleboro officers recognized that their problematic relationship with southeastern Blacks was rooted in these Blacks’ accumulated negative experiences with the police, this understanding appeared to magnify, rather than lessen, the officers’ sense that their relations with southeastern Blacks would not improve. These officers saw their problematic relationship with southeastern Blacks as being a chronic problem that basically could not be solved. A White male Middleboro officer summed up this point: “It’s just a cyclical thing. They hate us, we hate them. It never changes.”

Non-Black Middleboro officers’ apparent hatred of southeastern Blacks, particularly youths, was closely matched by all Middleboro officers’ disdain for northern Whites, particularly youths. Akin to their view of southeastern Black youths, Middleboro officers associated trouble-related behavior and a disrespectful demeanor with northern White adolescents and young adults.

While Middleboro officers perceived both southeastern Black young people and northern White young people as engaging in a lot of trouble-related behavior, and saw most of this behavior as being contained to their respective residential areas, the officers nevertheless identified some notable differences between the two groups’ behavior. For one thing, although Middleboro officers identified both southeastern Black youths and northern White youths as engaging in “minor” “quality of life”-type offenses, such as
littering, loitering, and vandalism, the officers saw such offenses as constituting a much higher percentage of the White youths’ overall trouble-related activity. For instance, in discussing northern White youths’ trouble-related behavior, Middleboro officers disproportionately referred to these youths’ skateboarding violations, whereas the officers’ accounts of southeastern Black youths’ trouble-related behaviors disproportionately referenced illegal drug sales and assaults.

Moreover, Middleboro officers saw a disproportionate percentage of northern White youths’ “quality of life” offenses occurring in public spaces in northern Middleboro, particularly in the shopping district along Blair Avenue, as well as in Allison Park (located at the western end of Blair Avenue), whereas the officers identified the bulk of southeastern Black youths’ “quality of life” offenses as taking place in the residential area encompassed by Norman and Monroe Streets. Accordingly, even though both groups’ engaged in these “quality of life” offenses out in the open, northern White youths’ offenses were more visible and inconvenienced more people because they generally occurred in shopping and recreation spaces widely used by those living in northern Middleboro. These “public space” offenses included skateboarding on streets or in parking lots in the shopping district along Blair Avenue, rearranging traffic cones in the street, throwing debris from an alley out onto the sidewalk between two stores on Blair Avenue as part of a game, kicking out the spokes of a gazebo and spray painting graffiti on it in Allison Park, loitering in large groups and obstructing pedestrians on sidewalks in the Blair Avenue shopping district, and littering in all public spaces.

In committing “quality of life” offenses, northern White youth also differed from southeastern Blacks in terms of how they responded to the police. Unlike southeastern
Black youth, northern White youth did not disperse in public places when Middleboro officers approached them. Rather, as discussed more fully below, northern White youths typically stood their ground and often argued with Middleboro officers as to why they had to cease a particular activity or move to another location. Furthermore, unlike southeastern Black youths, northern White youths often quickly resumed the same trouble-related activity in the same space after being reprimanded by Middleboro officers. In particular, Middleboro officers had frequent, repetitive confrontations with northern White youths who were either skateboarding in the streets and parking lots, or loitering on the sidewalks in the Blair Avenue shopping district. After admonishing six northern White males and three northern White females for skateboarding in a parking lot adjacent to Blair Avenue, a White male Middleboro officer remarked:

There’s always this constant back and forth with [northern White youths]. It doesn’t matter what they say, you know they’ll be here again when we come back for second time. You can put your money on that.

Thus, while Middleboro officers’ confrontations with southeastern Black youth in public spaces were minimal and fleeting, the officers’ confrontations with northern White youth were a seemingly endless war of attrition.

Besides differences between northern White young people and southeastern Black young people relating to “quality of life” offenses, Middleboro officers also cited differences between the two groups with respect to illegal drug activity. While Middleboro officers associated illegal drug use with both southeastern Black youths and northern White youths, Middleboro officers described northern White drug use and sales as being less visible. Middleboro officers indicated that while a lot of southeastern Blacks’ drug activity took place outdoors in the Norman and Monroe Streets area, most
of northern Whites’ drug activity took place behind closed doors in “their big mansions.” As a result, Middleboro officers lamented that it was harder to detect northern Whites’ drug activity. One White male Middleboro officer remarked, “You need an O.D. to find out who’s doing drugs [in northern Middleboro].”

In addition to seeing northern Whites’ drug activity as less visible, Middleboro officers also saw these Whites’ activity, unlike that of southeastern Blacks, as being disconnected from outside influences. While Middleboro officers saw southeastern Blacks’ drug activity as being intimately connected to outsiders, particularly “Black” gangs from nearby “Black” towns, officers saw Whites’ activity as basically occurring in a vacuum.

Somewhat paradoxically, although Middleboro officers associated outside gang influences only with the drug activity of southeastern Blacks, the officers nevertheless associated the use of “harder” drugs such as cocaine and heroin with northern Whites. Middleboro officers explained that while southeastern Blacks primarily “smoked weed,” northern Whites used harder drugs in addition to “smoking weed,” ostensibly because they had the money to do so.

The other major difference between northern Whites’ drug activity and that of southeastern Blacks involved the types of social gatherings in which illegal drug use commonly took place. In contrast to southeastern Black young people, northern White young people often used illegal drugs, mostly alcohol, at large parties frequently attended by upwards of one hundred people. Middleboro officers suggested that northern White youths, unlike southeastern Blacks youths, had both the money and space to throw such parties.
Middleboro officers suggested that the large parties held in northern Middleboro, coupled with the more general phenomenon of indoor illegal drug activity, were particularly significant in terms of the likelihood that northern White youth, especially in comparison to southeastern Black youth, would end up being arrested for a drug-related offense. While the disproportionately indoor illegal drug activity of northern Whites and disproportionately outdoor illegal drug activity of southeastern Blacks made it more likely that Whites’ drug activity would not come to the attention of Middleboro officers, the existence of large parties in northern Middleboro made it logistically difficult for Middleboro officers to arrest illegal drug users whom they had strongly suspected. A Latina officer explained the difficulties that large parties posed for Middleboro officers in terms of making arrests for drug-related offenses, including underage alcohol possession and consumption:

When you’ve got a party with eighty, ninety, one hundred people, it becomes impossible for two officers to handle the situation. Say we find some beer in the cars. You got all these kids who come in different cars, we don’t know who came with who, how are we gonna logistically identify who was in what cars, who the beer belongs to, and then on top of that, how are you going to transport fifty arrestees down to the station? We don’t have a vehicle for that, and the county’s not gonna let us borrow one at one in the morning. But if we only arrest a handful, then we’re looking at lawsuits, like, “Why did you single out my little angel?” And forget about all that, who’s gonna write out all those reports? Not me!

Thus, even in cases where northern Whites’ illegal drug use spilled into the streets at the scene of large house parties and became highly visible to Middleboro officers, the logistics of the situation made it unlikely that northern Whites would be arrested for their drug-related behavior.
As in the case of southeastern Black youths’ trouble-related behavior, northern White youths’ trouble-related behavior was amplified by their demeanor and interpersonal behavior. All Middleboro officers held a highly negative view of northern White youths’ demeanor and interpersonal behavior, referring to such youths as “rude,” “disrespectful,” “ballsy,” “cocky,” and as “having a sense of entitlement.” Middleboro officers not only particularly resented northern Middleboro youths’ incessant, albeit “minor”, “quality of life”-type trouble-related behaviors, but also the manner in which these youths went about these behaviors and the way the youths interacted with the officers, particularly following the officers’ commands to cease activity or disperse. For instance, an Asian male Middleboro officer made the following comments regarding a group of northern White skateboarders near Blair Avenue:

These kids are the biggest pains in the ass. It’s like they never leave. You tell them that they can’t skateboard here, and they keep on skateboarding. Even if I parked my car over in the lot, they’d skateboard right on the car. They don’t care; they’re that arrogant. They’ll try to show off in front of their friends. They’re not at all intimidated by us; they’ll stay and argue. They give us a lotta lip. You know that they’re not simply going to move. It’s like dealing with termites, you just can’t get rid of them.

While Middleboro officers indicated that northern White youths generally “stood their ground” and “talked back” to the officers, they noted that these youths typically conveyed disrespect through one of three approaches. Officers labeled the first as “the deer in the headlights” approach. According to this approach, northern White youths acted as if they were entirely surprised by the arrival of the police, and tried to establish that their behavior was innocent. For example, after a Latina Middleboro officer told four 12 and 13 year old northern White males who were skateboarding in the parking lot
behind a restaurant along Blair Avenue, “We got a call about skateboarding,” two of the youths stated, “We just got here.” As this officer interpreted it, the youths’ denial of involvement represented an attempt to protest their innocence.

Unlike the “deer in the headlights” approach, in which youths tried to feign innocence and appeared somewhat contrite, the second approach, which Middleboro officers called the “sidewalk attorney approach,” involved a cocky, obnoxious, and fearless demeanor. This “sidewalk attorney” approach involved northern White youths arguing with officers about the youths’ “rights,” and often included implicit threats to bring legal action. For instance a 17 year old northern White male whom two Middleboro officers detained, along with approximately thirty other northern White youths, for underage drinking outside of a large party on Wayside Drive in northern Middleboro, exhibited both appeals to “rights” and implied threats of a lawsuit. In appealing to his “rights,” the 17 year old male challenged the two officers’ basis for searching his father’s car, which contained beer and some ashes that the officers suspected might be the remnants of marijuana. The 17-year-old stated:

I’m not stupid. I know what my rights are. You didn’t have any probable cause to search my car.

The 17 year old then made several implied threats of possible legal action, including, “This car belongs to my dad, and he’s an attorney,” and “You’re gonna have to let me go cause my dad’s a lawyer.”

Like the “sidewalk attorney” approach, the third approach, which Middleboro officers dubbed the “wiseass” approach, involved a cocky demeanor. Under the “wiseass” approach, northern White youth whom officers admonished or questioned
neither argued over the legality of the officers’ actions or attempted to establish their innocence, but rather conveyed to the officers that they did not take them or their commands seriously. For example, after a White male Middleboro officer asked a group of approximately twenty northern White adolescents to move off the sidewalk in front of a store on Blair Avenue, a White adolescent female sarcastically asked the officer, “Can you take us to the mall?” Likewise, after a White male officer ordered a group of northern White male adolescents to take down a ramp that they had built in an alley for purposes of doing jumps on their skateboards, one of the adolescents sarcastically asked the officer, “Can you show us your gun?” In sum, this third approach, like the other two approaches, demonstrated that northern White youths neither feared nor respected Middleboro officers.

Similar to Coretown officers, Middleboro officers gave little consideration to property-related behaviors in constituting and ranking various racial, ethnic, and class subgroups in a demographic hierarchy. Middleboro officers, including Black Middleboro officers, only used property-related behaviors to distinguish southeastern Blacks in the Norman and Monroe Streets area from everyone else residing in Middleboro. Middleboro officers commented on both the physical appearance of the properties in the Norman and Monroe Streets area, as well as the social activity associated with properties in this area.

In making assessments of the physical appearance and conditions of the properties in the Norman and Monroe Streets area, Middleboro officers typically made sweeping statements about the entire area. For instance, Middleboro officers referred to the area as a “mess,” a “dump,” and as a “landfill.” Several officers complained about the items that
residents left by the curb that were too big for the regular garbage service to pick up.

Two of these officers referred to several properties on Norman Street as being “junkyards.”

In commenting on the decrepit and “dirty” conditions of properties in the Norman and Monroe Streets area, Middleboro officers implicitly were conveying that they viewed the residents of these properties as being “dirty” as well. This connection between the officers’ assessments of properties and residents in the Norman and Monroe Streets area was reflected in a statement that a White male Middleboro officer made about cockroaches while driving down Monroe Street at dusk. This officer stated, “It looks like all the cockroaches are coming out of the woodwork tonight.”

Middleboro officers’ criticisms of the social activity associated with properties in the Norman and Monroe Streets area focused in part on the turnover rate in this area. The officers indicated that the Norman and Monroe Streets area, unlike the rest of Middleboro, had a high turnover rate. A Black male Middleboro officer stated the following while riding down Monroe Street:

You’ve got mostly renters here. People are always coming and going. You need a scorecard to keep track of it.

Middleboro officers indicated that this constant flux of residents in the Norman and Monroe Streets area presented at least two significant problems. First, Middleboro officers indicated that this high turnover rate made it difficult for officers to build relationships with residents of this area. The same Black Middleboro officer remarked:

You work hard to establish some trust with people in the neighborhood, and just when you think you’ve made some progress, they’ve up and gone. And then you’re back to square one. It’s really frustrating.
Second, Middleboro officers argued that this high turnover rate made the residents of the Norman and Monroe Streets area less invested in the community and less likely to take care of their properties. Commenting on this point, a White male Middleboro officer stated:

If people keep moving in and out, it’s like they never take root. They know that they’re not gonna be around long, so it’s not like they’re going to plant some flowers and say, “This is mine.” .... It’s not like the rest of [Middleboro]. Here, it’s more like just a place to stay, not a home. Not a place where you expect your grandkids will visit you someday.

In distinguishing between a “home” and “a place to stay,” this officer is not only suggesting that the residents of the Norman and Monroe Streets area have less of an incentive in maintaining their current residential properties, but that they, and their children, and (future) grandchildren have less of a stake in the upkeep of the entire community.

Besides focusing on the Norman and Monroe Streets area’s high turnover rate, Middleboro officers also concentrated on both the number of people “hanging out” in the area and where they were situated. Middleboro officers complained about how large groups of youths sitting on stoops in front of houses in these neighborhoods made these properties look “ghetto.” More importantly, Middleboro officers suggested that the human “traffic” or “congestion” in these neighborhoods was associated with or emblematic of criminal, or at least problematic, behavior. In particular, Middleboro officers contended that the high volume of people standing or sitting on properties within these neighborhoods was indicative of drug activity. Moreover, Middleboro officers suggested that this “congestion” was problematic in that it made it more difficult for the
officers to discern who was a resident. Thus, Middleboro officers felt that it was difficult to navigate these neighborhoods not only because of the high turnover rate of residents, but also due to the apparent constant flux of non-residents.

To summarize, while Middleboro officers’ assessments of power-related behaviors suggest that they were most concerned about how their actions might offend or at least displease the powerful Black and White middle- to upper-middle-class coalition residing in the central part of Middleboro, the officers’ assessments of culture-related behaviors and values paradoxically reveal that Middleboro officers focused a disproportionate amount of their patrolling on the poorer Black residents in the largely segregated southeastern part of Middleboro and the wealthier White residents in the largely segregated northern part of Middleboro. In particular, Middleboro officers’ assessments of behaviors and values relating to parenting, trouble, and demeanor led the officers to believe that they could virtually ignore the Black and White residents in the central part of Middleboro. The officers not only associated substantially less trouble-related behavior and a generally respectful demeanor with Black and White adolescents and adults in the central part of Middleboro, but the officers believed that if problems did arise, these central Black and White residents would be able to sufficiently handle such problems through their own informal social control mechanisms. In contrast, Middleboro officers saw little in the way of informal social control mechanisms in either the southeastern Black section or the northern White section, and consequently felt compelled to monitor the people, particularly younger people, in these sections relatively closely.

5.5. Conclusion
In combination with raw demographic and power-related information, culture-related information played a significant role in conditioning officers’ construction of social group schemata. Consistent with officers’ substantial concern about maintaining order within their communities of patrol, officers in Longwood, Coretown, and Middleboro all were highly attuned to cultural information that symbolically conveyed messages about groups’ threat or lack thereof to such order. While officers in each of the three towns made extensive use of communally-derived cultural information about various social groups in cognitively mapping these groups, the set of officers in each of town developed distinct, communally specific schemata. In other words, confronted with a unique communal context, officers developed a collectively shared schema within each town that varied from the schema of the officers in the other two towns.

While both culture-related and power-related information played significant parts in conditioning officers’ social group schemata, power-related information appears to be critical in establishing the overall framework of such schemata, whereas culture-related appears to help to flesh out, elaborate, and clarify the positioning of various social groups within these schemata. For instance, Middleboro officers principally relied upon culture-related information to cognitively amplify intra-racial distinctions among both Whites and Blacks respectively within the town’s tripartite hierarchy. Likewise, Coretown officers employed culture-related information largely for the purpose of expanding upon intra-racial differences among the town’s majority White population.

While Longwood officers used culture-related information to amplify intergroup differences between Longwood’s Black and White groups, these officers also used such information to hierarchically situate other groups that they generally omitted from
discussions of communal power. In situating these latter, disproportionately Hispanic groups, Longwood officers appeared to attempt to simplify and minimize the town’s racial and ethnic diversity by invariably emphasizing how these groups either approximated the White group or the Black group. While Longwood officers’ situation of Hispanic and other groups in relation to Whites and Blacks demonstrates that officers’ consideration of culture-related information did not alter the officers’ White/Black schematic framework, the fact that officers saw most of these groups as culturally distinct from Blacks suggests that this consideration of culture-related information shifted the schematic framework from a White/Black dichotomy to a Black/non-Black dichotomy.

Although culture-related information conditioned officers’ schemata in different ways across the three towns, nevertheless certain types of culture-related information were highly salient to officers in all three towns. Officers in each town were particularly attuned to information relating to parenting practices, trouble-related practices, and demeanor. The salience of these cultural practices, all of which are important indicators of social control and order, supports my general contention that officers paid attention to culture-related information because of its symbolic association with the maintenance of social order. Officers’ consideration of additional types of cultural practices and values, such as work- and education-related ones, appears to be tied in part to the number of social groups that officers had to cognitively situate within their schemata. Officers’ consideration of a wide range of cultural information in Longwood, compared to officers’ consideration of a narrower range of information in Coretown and Middleboro, suggest that officers considered a broader range of culture-related information when they had more groups to situate.\(^{35}\)
While certain types of culture-related information were salient in each town, such information did not condition officers’ schemata in uniform, straightforward ways across the three towns. For instance, although Middleboro officers linked poor parental supervision and discipline with both the poor Blacks in the southeastern part of Middleboro and the rich Whites in the northern part of Middleboro, and Coretown officers associated similar poor parenting with the upper-middle-class Whites in the northern part of Coretown, officers in both towns exercised caution with youth from these respective groups as a result of different perceived structural constraints. Middleboro officers were cautious with southeastern Black youth due to their concerns about angering the town’s powerful Black/White coalition, and exercised caution with northern White youth due to concerns about these youths’ powerful parents. Coretown officers exercised caution with northern White Coretown youth in part because of concerns about angering these youths’ parents, and in part due to a concern about incurring the wrath of town council members from the northern part of town.

In addition, officers’ processing culture-related information involved a holistic consideration of all available information. Even if officers identified highly negative information with a particular group, such information did not necessarily translate into an overall unfavorable assessment and ranking of a particular group. For example, although Longwood officers associated Poles, especially young Polish males, with trouble-related practices and hostile demeanor, officers nevertheless ranked Poles highly because of positive perceptions relating to work, education, parental discipline, and property maintenance. Conversely, officers’ association of positive traits with some groups did not necessarily translate into an overall favorable assessment. For instance, although
Longwood officers perceived Haitian and Jamaican youths as being docile and respectful, officers nevertheless generally unfavorably assessed Haitians and Jamaicans due to either offsetting cultural characteristics or overriding stereotypes of Blacks that originate in the broader culture.

Lastly, besides confirming the value that officers place on order, the findings regarding officers’ cognitive assessments of culture-related information show that each town’s officers’ schemata departed from the macro-societal racial and ethnic schema in important ways. In contrast to the stereotypical expectations of the macro-societal schema (see, e.g., Morales 1972; Portillos 2004), Longwood officers generally did not identify Hispanics as gang-related “criminals”. Similarly, in contravention of the macro-societal schema’s expectations, Coretown officers did not view Black residents as criminals. Finally, as discussed in the last chapter, notwithstanding their negative view of Middleboro’s poor, Black southeastern residents, Middleboro officers generally did not engage in harsher policing of these Black residents, and as discussed in the next chapter, were generally as responsive to these residents’ service calls as to those of wealthier White and Black Middleboro residents.

CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES

1 Longwood officers viewed the Portuguese, Cuban, Polish, and Slovak immigrant populations both as being close to, but distinct from, Longwood’s “White” population. Longwood officers frequently lumped Cubans with Portuguese, but generally did not reference Cubans when talking about practices and values relating to work, education, and parenting. Longwood officers expressly referenced Cubans when discussing other practices and values as noted later in this chapter. Most Longwood officers lumped Slovaks with Poles, but generally did not specifically reference Slovaks when discussing various practices and values. Officers’ lack of discussion of Slovaks appears to be related to fact that Slovaks constituted a very small percentage of Longwood’s population, particularly in comparison to Poles.

2 Although Longwood officers made reference to Haitians and Jamaicans as being “Black,” the officers nevertheless routinely distinguished Haitians and Jamaicans from Blacks.
Longwood officers rarely mentioned “Asians” or “Indians”. However, the few references to either “Asians” or “Indians” were highly laudatory. For instance, following an encounter with two “Indian” women who were unable to reach their father at his apartment, a White Longwood officer stated:

Yeah, we don’t have too many Indians around here, but they never give anybody a problem. Real polite, “yes sir, no sir” that kind of thing. And they, they’re hard workers. Yeah, I don’t know why we don’t got too many Indians here, it’s just the way it is, I guess.

These characterizations of Indians as being hardworking, law-abiding, model citizens were similar to the officers’ characterizations of the Portuguese (which are discussed throughout the remainder of this section of the chapter). Accordingly, Longwood officers ranked “Indians” and “Asians” at the same approximate level as the Portuguese within Longwood’s social group hierarchy. However, given their perception that Indians and Asians were virtually nonexistent in Longwood, Longwood officers never referenced either Indians or Asians for purposes of lumping groups together or contrasting groups from each other.

As noted in Chapter 3, Longwood officers associated “Hispanics” primarily with Mexican and Central American immigrants. Longwood officers occasionally identified Puerto Ricans and Dominicans as “Hispanic,” but generally identified Puerto Ricans and Dominicans as being separate from “Hispanics.” Longwood officers rarely referenced Puerto Ricans and Dominicans when discussing practices and values related to work, education, and parenting. The officers expressly referenced Puerto Ricans and Dominicans when discussing other practices and values as noted later in this chapter.

Here, given the context of the officer’s comments, the term “everybody” appears to signify “Whites.”

Although Longwood officers distinguished Haitian and Jamaican immigrants from “Blacks” when discussing some other practices and values, the officers lumped Haitians and Jamaicans in the “Black” category when discussing work-related practices and values.

“The tracks” referred to the railroad tracks along Washington Avenue that run in a north-south direction in the eastern part of District 4.

D.A.R.E. stands for “Drug Awareness Resistance Education,” which is a drug prevention program that involves police officers coming into elementary and middle schools to educate children about the perils of drug abuse.

However, as discussed later in this section, Longwood officers saw the chances of Haitian and Jamaican immigrants engaging in trouble-related practices as increasing with the passage of time.

Longwood officers characterized the Portuguese as being somewhere between “White” and “Hispanic.” One White male Longwood officer characterized the Portuguese as “part Caucasian, part Hispanic,” whereas another Longwood officer referred to the Portuguese as “not quite White, but not quite Hispanic either.”

Upon clarification, Longwood officers indicated that they saw “Mexicans” as being largely the same as Central Americans, such as Hondurans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans, and some South Americans, such as Columbians and Ecuadorians. Longwood officers viewed all of these groups as being the newest “Hispanic” immigrants.

Although Longwood officers saw Mexican immigrants like Haitian and Jamaican immigrants, as exhibiting similar respectful demeanor, the officers provided different attributions for such demeanor. Longwood officers saw Mexican immigrants’ quiet and reserved demeanor stemming from a fear that local authorities might pry into the immigrants’ immigration status, whereas the officers saw Haitian and Jamaican immigrants’ reserved demeanor as being largely a product of different cultures.
Although Longwood officers saw Puerto Ricans and Dominicans as “immigrants,” the officers viewed them, unlike “Mexicans,” as having been in the United States for a relatively long period of time.

See the incident described above under the subsection on parental discipline in which a Portuguese mother hit her son in front of two Longwood officers and one of the officers noted that “[they] never saw him again.”

Longwood officers’ discussions of Polish immigrants’ trouble-related behavior focused exclusively on men. Longwood officers only mentioned Polish immigrant women when discussing victims of domestic violence.

Longwood officers referred to this neo-Nazi entity as a “group” as opposed to a “gang,” an appellation which appeared to be reserved for Black entities.

As this officer explained upon clarification, FOB stands for “fresh off the boat.” FOB means that an immigrant has been in the U.S. for a short period of time.

However, as a White female Longwood officer noted, Polish adult men were “very chauvinistic” and disrespectful towards female officers. This officer remarked:

[Polish immigrant men] don’t expect women to be cops. They expect us to be barefoot and pregnant. If you respond to a call, they say, “I wanna talk to a male officer.” They don’t think they have to listen to you ‘cause you’re a woman.

However, given that women make up only .02 percent of Longwood’s police force, Polish adult males’ display of disrespect for female officers was overshadowed by their respect for male officers.

Longwood officers appeared to associate the orderliness of the Portuguese and Cuban properties with orderliness of their Christian beliefs. Although Virgin Mary statues also appeared in front of some “White” and “Black” properties, officers only appeared to notice and comment on such statues when they adorned Portuguese and Cuban properties. Longwood officers’ selective attention to the apparent religiosity of the Portuguese and Cubans may have contributed to the officers’ greater attribution of informal social control to both of these groups.

Based on a variety of contextual clues, Coretown officers’ reference to “Coretown youth” appeared to be synonymous with “White Coretown youth.”

“COPS” is a “reality” television show about police pursuit of criminals.

Every Coretown officer estimated that over 95 percent of Coretown’s youth population eventually went on to college.

“Juvie” is short for juvenile detention facility.

Wheaton is an upper-middle-class, predominantly “White” town that borders Coretown in two places on the western side of Coretown.

Coretown officers explained that town officials were “trying to turn Coretown into another [Wheaton].” The officers indicated that town officials wanted Coretown’s downtown business district to rival neighboring Wheaton’s upscale downtown shopping district. At the time of the ride-alongs in 2006, there were several major ongoing construction projects, each of which was part of a larger effort to attract higher-end retailers to Coretown’s downtown business district.

A blunt is a hollowed out cigar that is filled with marijuana.
Coretown officers claimed that they could distinguish Black residents from Black non-residents. The officers appeared to base this claim on their familiarity with the small percentage of Black residents in the town.

Classified students who were experiencing difficulty adjusting to the traditional school environment attended the alternative high school located in Post 3. Students at the high school came from districts all over Orion County in which Coretown is located. The students at the alternative school were disproportionately Black and Latino.

As noted in Chapter 3, Coretown officers did not perceive Hispanics as being residents of Coretown, and accordingly limited discussions of Hispanics to non-residents.

In discussing various culture-related practices and values, Middleboro officers did not reference either Hispanics or Asians.

Black Middleboro officers generally refrained from any kind of disparagement of poor Blacks in the southeastern part of Middleboro. The reference to “Middleboro officers” in the remainder of this section on culture-related practices and values applies only to non-Black Middleboro officers.

While all Middleboro officers viewed Black southeastern parents as being permissive, Black Middleboro officers were far more understanding of the family situations of Black southeastern youth than non-Black Middleboro officers. Black Middleboro officers’ greater empathy is reflected by the fact that they, unlike any non-Black officers, proactively mentored Black youth in the southeast. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 7.

“Rep” is short for “reputation.”

Given the overall context of officers’ remarks, the officer appears to describe a “chronic” problem rather than a “cyclical” one. Thus, his use of “cyclical” is taken to mean “chronic”.

In addition to the number of groups in town, officers’ consideration of some types of culture-related information, such as property-related information, may depend on the extent to which a town is segregated. It is possible that Longwood officers’ high degree of attention to poor, Black residents’ rundown properties, and Middleboro officers’ relative lack of attention to poor, Black residents’ rundown properties, is connected to the fact that Longwood’s poor, Black population is largely contained to a particular part of town, whereas Middleboro’s poor, Black population is not. In Longwood, officers’ concern about property maintenance may reflect a more general concern about Blacks spilling out into other parts of the town, whereas in Middleboro, officers know that poor, Blacks regularly visit other parts of the town due to the random assignment of students to schools. This latter point is discussed more fully in Chapter 6.

In cognitively constructing social group schemata or “maps,” patrol officers take in and process a variety of information over time from both the contexts in which they patrol as well as contexts outside of patrol. As discussed in Chapter 5, besides providing the general parameters within which officers construct a social group hierarchy in a given town, space and time are involved in officers’ relational constitution and ranking of specific groups. Officers distinguish groups in part by where and how these groups are spatially situated. Officers also come to associate particular characteristics with certain groups based on temporal comparisons of these groups’ behaviors with those of other groups. Apart from the constitutive role that space and time play with respect to officers’ social group maps, space and time play a significant role in operationalizing these maps. In other words, social group maps do not automatically influence officers, but rather such influence is conditioned spatially and temporally. Particular spaces and times, as well as overall spatial and temporal arrangements, trigger or activate social group maps, and reinforce, qualify, or counteract aspects of these maps. Accordingly, how officers negotiate patrolling of various groups they encounter during the course of patrol depends not only on the officers’ social group schemata or maps, but also on the spatial and temporal dimensions of various situations. In effect, space and time are instrumental in terms of how officers “read” the social group maps that they have pieced together.

Space conditions officers’ social group schemata in two important ways. The first involves officers’ association of particular spaces with particular groups. Prior work on race, space, and policing has identified a process by which officers’ marking of particular
spaces activates societal stereotypes about the groups associated with such spaces (see, *e.g.*, Anderson 1990; Bass 2001; Bates and Fasenfest 2005; Cresswell 1996; Herbert 1997; Institute on Race and Poverty 2001; Meehan and Ponder 2002; Portillos 2004). This dissertation argues that in addition to triggering general macro-societal stereotypes regarding particular groups, spaces activate a whole host of meanings that officers associate with groups based on the groups’ positions within a social group hierarchy in the particular towns in which the officers patrol. Particular spaces, which can vary in size from a street corner to an entire section of a town, trigger meanings pertaining to groups’ power, influence, vocality, and a whole host of other behaviors and values that officers associate with these groups. In turn, this activation of meanings associated with particular social group groups affects officers’ demeanor, attitude, readiness to act, and ultimately, how they interact with people in these spaces.

Besides activating meanings associated with the various resident groups that constitute officers’ social group schemata, some spaces either partially or exclusively activate meanings associated with particular non-resident social group groups. Certain cues in these spaces trigger officers’ thoughts about contexts beyond the town in which the officers are patrolling, particularly contexts associated with other towns and regions. The meanings associated with these out-of-town contexts and the particular non-resident groups associated with these contexts supplement officers’ social group schemata pertaining to residents.²

Certain spaces’ activation of larger, inter-town and regional comparative contexts is consistent with idea that spaces, particularly public spaces, can have simultaneous, possibly different meanings that are constituted at, and hence representative of, different
contextual levels or scales. As Ruddick (1996) argues, although people “think of public space as a local phenomenon, it is, in fact, constituted at different sets of articulated scales [e.g., local, regional, national, and international]” (Ruddick 1996: 140). “Public spaces…can become at once local and national spaces for the construction, mediation, and regulation of social identities” (Ruddick 1996: 140). For instance, as Ruddick (1996) notes, a public square “is simultaneously global and local in terms of the public realm that is invoked through it” (p. 140). An incident such as an assault that occurs in a public square may have symbolic meaning within citywide, nationwide, and/or international contexts.

Moreover, the scales of meaning engendered by a particular space, as well as how officers will go about patrolling the occupants of that space, depends on both the users of that space as well as the uses of that space (Ruddick 1996: 1940; Smith 1993: 105-107). Public spaces associated disproportionately or exclusively with visitors activated Coretown officers’ thoughts of contexts beyond Coretown, whereas public spaces associated with Coretown residents did not. For instance, as noted under a fairly routine gathering of White Coretown skateboarders in a parking lot in front of a middle school did not invoke officers’ thoughts of any contexts beyond Coretown. In contrast, as discussed under section 6.10, the presence of racial minority young adults and youth at the alternative high school and county college activated officers’ thinking about the town contexts of Piedmont and Elmwood and the county context of Edward. Similarly, as discussed under section 6.11, the presence of White youth and young adults from the towns of Longwood and Ringdale who occasionally congregated in a small, concrete park by a large clock activated officers’ thoughts about these other town contexts.
However, although both racial minority and White non-residents similarly engendered thoughts of contexts beyond Coretown, racialized differences in perceptions about contexts from which these perceived non-residents hailed, as well as perceptions regarding the length and nature of non-residents’ visits, led to substantially different policing approaches of White versus racial minority non-residents.

The actual or presumed uses of space also play a significant role in terms of both the spatial scale that that space invokes, and officers’ approaches to policing occupants of that space. As noted under section 6.12, whether particular spaces activated officers’ cognizance of a larger national context hinged on both the racial salience of such spaces and what officers’ perceived the occupants of such spaces as doing. The nearly all-White backdrop of Coretown made non-Black Coretown officers highly self-conscious about pulling over Black motorists for traffic infractions on most of the town’s roads. These road spaces not only made Black motorists’ race salient to the officers, but served as a vehicle through which officers became aware of a national context that was highly disapproving of racial profiling. However, Coretown officers’ lack of concern about profiling at and near the county college and alternative school reveals that what Blacks were doing in Coretown—passing through as opposed to stopping and interacting with others for a period of time—affects whether this national context condemning profiling became salient in officers’ minds.

While all cognitive assessments of space involve, at least implicitly, comparisons of one space to another, in some instances officers’ views of spaces depend more heavily on the meanings of space conferred by the overall arrangement of spaces for a particular social purpose, such as those relating to housing, education, recreation, commerce, and
transportation. These entire arrangements of space are particularly important in terms of conveying who is “in place” or legitimately present, and who is “out of place” or illegitimately present. For instance, as discussed in section 6.6, the random assignment of elementary and middle school students to public schools in Middleboro confers legitimacy to the presence of all social group groups throughout most of Middleboro, whereas the assignment of elementary and middle school students to neighborhoods schools in Longwood, which is marked by racial segregation in housing, contributes to the idea that some social group groups are out of place in some neighborhoods. The meanings associated with arrangements of spaces relating to particular social purposes operate simultaneously with, overlap, and sometimes conflict with the meanings associated with the arrangements of spaces relating to other social purposes. Although officers simultaneously process the meanings associated with arrangements of space relating to a variety of social purposes, spaces relating to particularly social purposes are analyzed separately by town in this chapter for purposes of analytical clarity.

The meanings associated with particular spaces or overall arrangements of space are qualified by time. Even when officers appear to always associate a given meaning with a particular space at all times in the present, it is possible that this meaning was different in the past, or that it will change at some point in the future. Temporal qualifications of space involve time(s) of day, day(s) of week, time(s) of year, and the past versus the present. Thus, officers’ social group schemata are activated and conditioned by space, which in turn is conditioned by time.

6.1. Housing-Related Spaces and Times in Longwood
Particular spaces relating to residential housing in Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro were instrumental in activating meanings associated with different aspects of officers’ social group schemata in the three respective towns. This meaning activation process involved two stages. Officers first associated a particular space and time with a particular resident group or subgroup, either as a result of a pre-existing mental association between that space and time and a particular group or subgroup, or due to certain cues within that space and time that prompted officers to think of a particular group or subgroup. For instance, in Longwood, officers associated nearly all spaces in Districts 1 and 2 with “Whites”, and associated nearly all spaces in District 4 with “Blacks”. Once officers identified a space with a particular group or subgroup, such marking then activated a range of meanings associated with this group or subgroup. For example, Longwood officers’ marking of “Portuguese” spaces activated officers’ perceptions of an absence of trouble-related behavior.

Housing-related spaces in the three towns foremost triggered meanings associated with resident groups’ power and/or potential threat (e.g., as manifest in terms of trouble-related behavior). The spatial activation of officers’ power- and threat-related thoughts about different groups was manifest by both the officers’ comments regarding how they should respond to a situation occurring in or near a given space, as well as the officers’ actual response. Following their identification of particular groups with particular spaces, officers’ manifest their power- and threat-related thoughts regarding these groups by how quickly they responded to calls for service pertaining to these spaces, or in the absence of calls for service, whether they acted proactively in these spaces, as well as how the officers handled whatever situations they encountered within these spaces.
The spatial activation of officers’ power- and threat-related images of groups was most clearly manifest by how Longwood officers responded to situations involving “Black” youth in “White” residential spaces. In particular, when “White” District 2 residents, usually older White women, called to complain about groups of Black youth loitering on or near these District 2 residents’ properties on their way home from Longwood High School, which is located in the northern central part of District 2, officers invariably responded to such calls in a prompt manner even though the officers often expressed annoyance with having to deal with these type of calls. For example, after receiving a call from a White woman in District 2 about a group of Black youths who were allegedly disturbing a trellis in a garden in front of her house, a White Longwood officer stated the following while en route to her house:

Oh shit, it’s the trellis lady again. She’s nuts about that goddamn trellis. We’ve been over there about what, four times since school started back up. The kids like to hang all kinds of shit from the trellis. One time we even found a pair of dirty socks hanging on it. I mean this is bullshit, but it’s people like her that pay our salaries.

Here there are spatial markers that activate meanings pertaining to both the power officers associated with White residents, and the threat officers identified with Black residents. The officer uses the trellis as a spatial marker to identify a residential space associated with a powerful White constituent (the “trellis lady”). The officer’s identification of this space with the “trellis lady” in turn activates thoughts about the power of Whites in Longwood more generally. In effect, the officer thinks of the “trellis lady” as a representative of Longwood’s powerful White majority.
The subject of “trellis lady’s” complaint/call for service, namely that youths are interfering with a trellis on the woman’s property, further activates thoughts regarding Whites’ power, but also triggers thoughts of Blacks’ threat. Although the officer’s comments occur before he actually arrives at the “trellis lady’s” property and encounters a group of seven Black youths (five male and two female) from Longwood High School, the officer assumes the youths as “Black” based on his memory of this past calls for service from this woman and other “White” people who live in the vicinity of this woman. This officer’s identification of these youths as “Black” in a “White” space in District 2 triggers thoughts about the district’s White residents’ spatially-related interests and expectations regarding police service. In particular, the presence of the Black youths activate thoughts of a White constituent who expects the police to remove Black youth from her property and/or the vicinity of her property. Here, the Black youths act as a spatial cue or reminder of Whites’ interests with respect to spaces in District 2 such as that of the “trellis lady”.

Upon receiving the “trellis lady’s” call for service, the officer not only assumes that the youths on the woman’s property are “Black,” but also that the youths are from District 4. This assumption is guided by knowledge of a pattern of behavior in certain spaces at certain times. The officer is aware that Black youths from District 4 move in a southeasterly direction through the “trellis lady’s” neighborhood as well as other District 2 neighborhoods from Longwood High School following dismissal at 3 P.M. on weekdays from the first week in September to the third week in June. Thus, this officer’s reading of this space is temporally conditioned, in that a particular time of day (after school hours), on certain days of the week (Mondays through Fridays), and a particular
time of the year (the time when school is in session), all affect the officer’s understanding of who is in the space and why they are there. Given that Black youths have to traverse through District 2 neighborhoods in order to return to District 4 after dismissal from Longwood High School, this officer, as well as all Longwood officers, tacitly understood that Black youths were legitimately present in these neighborhoods in the hour or so after 3 P.M. However, as discussed below, this legitimate presence was temporally and behaviorally qualified. Longwood officers expected Black youths to walk through these “White” neighborhoods without lingering within a certain window of time after school let out. When Black youths such as those in the case of the “trellis lady’s” service call engaged in behaviors that deviated from these expectations or stayed beyond the window of time that the officers afforded them, the Black youths’ presence shifted from legitimate to illegitimate.

The officer’s assumption that the “Black” youths in the “trellis” space are from District 4 in turn activates the officer’s threat-related thoughts about District 4 and its Black occupants. In essence, the presence of the Black youths by the trellis space activates thoughts that the officer associates with the entire space of District 4. This officer, as well as all other Longwood officers, marked District 4 as a poor “Black” area, and associated a range of pathologies with it. In particular, Longwood officers associated low-level drug dealing, property crime, and illegal gambling with District 4, to which they routinely referred as the “target area”.

The simultaneous activation of thoughts of “Black” District 4 trouble-related behavior or threat and “White” District 2 power and expectations of police control of this threat resulted in this officer’s prompt response to the “trellis lady’s” call for service.
Even though this officer thought the service call was frivolous to some extent, he nevertheless responded to it without hesitation, and eventually helped escort the group of seven Black youth away from this woman’s property and out of her neighborhood, in large part because the officer saw her as part of the powerful White constituency that “pa[id] [the officers’] salaries” and expected officers to neutralize any potential threats.

Longwood officers’ invariably prompt response to White constituents’ service calls regarding the presence of Black youths on or near their properties is even more striking given that virtually all officers indicated that most of the complainants typically exaggerated the behaviors in which they claimed these youths were engaging. For instance, a White male Longwood officer noted that White resident callers, especially those from District 2 in the after school hours between 3 P.M. and 5 P.M. frequently either greatly inflated Black youths’ trouble-related behavior, or completely mischaracterized what was in fact, in the officer’s eyes, wholly innocent behavior. This officer stated:

> We get a lotta calls from [the White residents in the eastern part of District 2] about Black kids, and usually [the kids] aren’t doin’ much. But that’s not what you think if you just go by what they say in the call. No, they won’t say there’s some Black kids hanging out in the street. No sir. They’ll say there’s a “mob” that’s “rioting.” You get there and the kids are just joking around. I mean, they might be talking loud, but that’s about it, they’re not really doin’ much. Or you’ll get a call, we always get this, that a bunch of kids are fighting. Yeah, we get that all the time. But then you get there and it’s just some kids walking down the street laughin’. You get tired of all the hysterics, but what are you gonna do? I mean, what if it turns out to really be a fight? So you’ve got to check it out.

The fact that Longwood officers responded promptly to White residents’ complaints regarding groups of Black resident youths notwithstanding the officers’ belief that many of these complaints were exaggerated or manufactured, is important not only because it
highlights the power that these White constituents wield, but also because it shows that the officers’ response to these youths is more conditioned on officers’ perceptions of White constituents’ power than on the officers’ perceptions’ of youths’ threat.³

While Longwood officers invariably did not hesitate when responding to even seemingly trivial calls for service regarding “Black” intrusion into spaces marked as “White” in either District 2 as well as District 1, the majority of the officers’ actions with respect to spaces marked as “White” took place proactively in the absence of any service calls. For instance, after spotting a group of Black youths who were making a lot of noise in a small park adjacent to the home of an elderly White woman (“Mrs. Jones”) in District 2, a White male Longwood officer stated the following before approaching the youths:

You know if I don’t break this [congregation of youth] up, Mrs. [Jones] will be on the phone with chief, or the mayor, and I’ll never hear the end of it. I don’t know why the hell she moved next to a park, I mean what did she expect? But if I don’t do something, I’m gonna be dealing with a bigger headache tomorrow, and I don’t need any more headaches.

Similarly, another White male Longwood officer stated the following prior to approaching a group of Black youth sitting on a bench near the home of another White woman (“Mrs. Smith”):

Oh here we go again. Ever since they put that bench in on that little island there, we get a call like every week from Mrs. [Smith], the lady who lives next door, complaining about kids hanging out on the bench and making all kinds of noise, fighting, doing god knows what. We know better now; any time we see kids hanging out there we just ride up and they usually get the picture.
In both of the previous two cases, the sight of Black youths in a space associated with White constituents who expect the police to keep Blacks out of that space, triggered proactive behavior on the part of the officers to remove the Black youths from that space. In essence, the Black youths’ presence in these spaces serves as a cue or a stimulus, which activates the officers’ social group schemata, and in turn, propels the officers into seemingly self-initiated action to disperse the Black youths.

Underlying officers’ responses to the presence of Black youths’ presence in “White” spaces is the notion that these youths are “out of place.” A White male officer conveyed this “out of place” notion when discussing the presence of Black youth in “White” neighborhoods in “Bright Acres” (District 1):

You can spot a Black kid from District 4 in an instant. You can just tell he’s not from the neighborhood. And then you think to yourself, “What the hell is he doing here?” [emphasis added]

Longwood officers’ seeing or even thinking about Black youths in “White” spaces triggered a comparison of the meanings the officers associated with “White” Districts such as District 1 and 2, and “Black” District 4 (and as noted below, to lesser extent, District 8). Black youths’ phenotypic characteristics, dress, demeanor, and gait conjured up images of District 4 in the officers’ minds, and activated a comparison of District 4 with District 1 or 2. Officers’ strong perceptions of dissimilarity between these largely segregated “Black” and “White” districts strengthened officers’ sense that these Black youths are out of place in “White” districts.

Longwood officers’ sense that “Black” youths were out of place in “White” districts was reinforced by the overall pattern of racially segregated residential housing in Longwood, particularly in the northern part of the town. This pattern of racially
segregated residential neighborhoods, which, as discussed in the next section, was reinforced by the pattern of largely racially segregated neighborhood elementary and middle schools, led officers to believe that Black youths would not likely have friends in “White” neighborhoods. Although Blacks and Whites attended racially integrated Longwood High School, Longwood officers saw entrenched residential and schooling patterns prior to high school as making interracial friendships between Black and White adolescents unlikely. Consequently, Longwood officers afforded Black youths traversing “White” neighborhoods in District 2 a rather narrow window through which to pass through. Longwood officers simply did not see Black youths as having any legitimate purpose in “White” neighborhoods beyond using the neighborhoods as an easement. Thus, the overall arrangement of residential housing coupled with officers’ starkly different perceptions of the largely segregated “White” and “Black” districts amplified officers’ sense that Black youths were “out of place” in “White” neighborhoods.

Although Longwood officers associated District 4 with trouble-related behavior, particularly that of adolescent and young adult Black males, Longwood officers’ response to service calls regarding, or observations of, such behavior in spaces within District 4 was radically different than their response in spaces within the “White” districts, especially District 2. In contrast to the alacrity with which Longwood officers responded to service calls regarding trouble-related behavior in spaces that the officers marked as “White”, officers often were slow in responding to similar calls for service in spaces that the officers marked as “Black”. While officers’ marking of a particular space as “White” activated officers’ thoughts of White residents’ high degree of power, the marking of a particular space as “Black” triggered thoughts of Black residents’ relative lack of power.
In turn, these dissimilar, spatially activated perceptions of Whites’ and Blacks’ respective power led to officers’ seemingly carefree, often delayed response to Black residents’ service calls, in stark contrast to the officers’ almost paranoid attentiveness to White residents’ calls. For instance, as noted in Chapter 4, after receiving a service call from a woman complaining about a group of strange men sitting in a car in a neighborhood in District 4 that the officer marked as “Black”, a White male Longwood officer first went across town to pick up his dinner at a restaurant before responding to the call some forty plus minutes later. Again, this officer stated:

Well she’s just gonna have to wait. My dinner’s getting cold. Besides, they’ll probably be gone by the time we get there.

Similarly, after receiving a call about some men who were allegedly dealing drugs on a corner in another “Black” neighborhood in District 4, a different White male officer took approximately fifteen minutes to ride over to the corner, and stated the following while taking, as he put it, “the long way” to get there:

Well what else is new? You know, I’m just not in the mood for dealing with these shittums tonight.

Longwood officers’ relative inattentiveness to spaces marked as “Black” in part reflects these officers’ virtual lack of concern about how Black constituents might respond to such subpar service. As suggested in Chapter 4, Longwood officers appeared to believe that Black residents were either too disorganized to complain to elected, non-police authorities or higher-ranking officers within the Longwood Police Department, or that if these residents complained, such complaints would not have any negative repercussions for the officers. For example, a White male Longwood officer who took
approximately twenty minutes to respond to a service call regarding loud music in a
“Black” neighborhood in District 4 made the following comments while en route to the
neighborhood:

   Oh, give me a break. So what? What’s the big deal? So, they’re playing their
music too loud. Big deal. So I’ll go over there and ask them to turn it down, then
they’ll turn it up again, and then they’ll call again, and all ‘cause of some stupid
music. Well, I’ll get there when I get there. Besides, what are they gonna do? Sue me?

This officer, like the officers in the two preceding examples, generally believed that he
could provide poor, slow service to residents of “Black” spaces with impunity. Calls for
service emanating from and relating to spaces officers marked as “Black” activated
officers’ thoughts of Blacks’ lack of power at the bottom of Longwood’s social group
hierarchy. Even though officers viewed many of Whites’ and Blacks’ service calls as
being frivolous, and even though many of these calls often similarly involved complaints
about Black youths’ behaviors, officers’ spatially activated thoughts pertaining to the
relative power of the two groups resulted in a noticeably disparate pattern of service.

   Longwood officers’ slow, almost indifferent response to Black youths’ behaviors
in “Black” spaces, and highly attentive response to similar behaviors in “White” spaces,
particularly “White” spaces in District 2, was not simply due to the officers’ view of
Black resident complainants as lacking power, but also how the overall arrangement of
residential housing spaces coupled with officers’ prioritization of constituent groups’
concerns contributed to how the officers’ saw and interpreted “threat”. Officers’
cognizance of the pattern of largely racially segregated residential districts in the northern
part of Longwood in conjunction with their perception of White residents’ interest in
keeping Blacks, especially Black youths, out of their neighborhoods, led officers to seek to contain Blacks from District 4 to District 4. Longwood officers’ containment predisposition vis-à-vis District 4 Blacks was reflected both in the officers’ comments about patrolling as well as their actual patrolling practices. As discussed more fully under section 6.4, several Longwood officers likened District 4 to a “cancer” that they wanted to control in order to prevent it from “spreading”. This containment strategy was reflected in officers’ highly vigilant, aggressive policing of Blacks, especially Black youths, outside of District or along its borders, and generally laissez-faire policing of Blacks within District 4. In addition to officers’ aforementioned prompt, almost reflexive response to Black youths in “White” spaces, officers routinely “herded” Black youths out of District 2 in the 3 P.M. to 4 P.M. hour after dismissal from Longwood High School (see section 6.2), selectively monitored Blacks engaged in extracurricular activities outside of District 4 (see section 6.2), and intensely monitored the borders of District 4 (see section 6.4).

In contrast to their highly attuned monitoring and regulation of Blacks’ activity and movement outside of District 4, Longwood officers exhibited an insouciant, seemingly indifferent approach with respect to Blacks’ activity within District 4, even though the officers regularly observed Blacks engaging in illegal activity such as smoking marijuana and shooting dice. For instance, a White male officer stated:

It’s ridiculous to chase them for shooting dice. I mean if they’re just doin’ it in front of their house, so what, big deal. They’re not really botherin’ anyone. And you’d just be chasing them to some other part of the district... and I’ll tell you, I don’t give a shit what they do in their own neighborhoods. I don’t live here....Besides we already don’t have too good a relationship with District 4 [residents]. [The relationship between the police and District 4 residents] is real
bad as it is. By letting that stuff go, you know, the weed, the dice, we’re saying, “We’ll respect you in your own neighborhoods; do your thing, as long as you don’t get out of hand, we won’t bother you. You don’t bother us, we don’t bother you.” …. As long as they keep that shit here, I don’t care.

Comments like these, when juxtaposed with Longwood officers’ patrolling of District 4 Blacks outside of District 4, suggest that Longwood officers were only concerned about Blacks’ quality of life-type offenses when Blacks committed them outside of 4. The officer’s contention that he and other Longwood officers did not go after dice-shooting District 4 Blacks because “they’re not really botherin’ anyone” gets at the crux of the explanation for the officers’ laissez-faire approach within District 4. In actuality, it is not that these Blacks in District 4 were not “bothering anyone”; indeed, the calls for service from Black District 4 residents belie this. Rather, it is that these Black dice shooters and “weed” smokers were not bothering any of Longwood’s powerful White constituents.

This officer, who in fact lived in “White” District 1, alludes to this point when he stated that he does not live there. The officer reasons that as long as Blacks’ trouble-related behavior stayed confined to District 4, then his fellow powerful White constituents would be content and not pressure the officers. When this officer indicated that he did not want to chase the dice shooters because it would just displace them to other parts of District 4, what he really was concerned about was possibly displacing them outside of District 4.

This officer, as well as other Longwood officers, ultimately was concerned about the dispersal of Blacks’ trouble-related behavior beyond the borders of District 4. As a result of this concern, officers adopted their seemingly laissez-faire approach to policing activity within District 4. It appeared that the officers and Black residents of District 4
had a tacit understanding that they would leave each other alone, or as the officer quoted above put it, that they would refrain from “bothering” each other.

Although the preceding officer provided other rationales for Longwood officers’ laissez-faire approach with respect to Blacks whom they observed engaging in quality of life offenses such as smoking marijuana and shooting dice, namely that it would have been logistically difficult to issue summonses to all the people whom they observed, and that the issuance of such summonses would have made already strained relations between the police and Black resident of District 4 even worse, neither of these rationales account for Longwood officers’ spatially contradictory policing with respect to the Black residents of District 4. If Longwood officers had been truly worried about the practical difficulties with respect to issuing summonses or straining relations between the police and Black residents, then the officers would not have exhibited seemingly zero tolerance of Blacks’ congregating in “White” residential spaces, even in the absence of any discernible trouble-related behavior. The officers’ generally high tolerance of obviously apparent trouble-related behavior in “Black” residential spaces appeared, in the end, to be primarily about appeasing powerful White constituents by keeping Blacks out of “White” residential spaces. Different spaces provided officers with different contexts for understanding social group-related information, and as a result, officers appeared to interpret similar behavior in vastly divergent ways.

While different residential housing spaces and the overall arrangement of these spaces in Longwood activated different, spatially contingent social group meanings, such meanings were not temporally static. Certain social group meanings were not only spatially activated at certain times of the day, week, or year, but the meanings associated
with particular spaces shifted over time. For example, all Longwood officers indicated that up until the early 1990s, they associated the eastern part of District 8, which was commonly known as “Down Longwood,” as being the most threatening and pathological “Black” section of Longwood. Officers described “Down Longwood” as being the “Wild West,” with, as one White male Longwood officer described it, “shootouts, drug dealing, robberies, [and] general mayhem.” Longwood officers suggested that while there were a few remnants of the problems associated with “Down Longwood,” it was now (2006) largely a “dead” area. One White male Longwood officer described “Down Longwood” as follows:

When I was coming up, I remember always hearing about “Down [Longwood].” That was the really bad part of town, shootings, crack houses, your hard core stuff. The Bloods [gang] was down there. But over the years things died down. Some of ‘em got locked up, a lot of ‘em moved out, outgrew all that. It’s nothin’ like it was before. Driving through here now, you’d have no idea of how bad it was. It used to be like the Wild West. Now it’s pretty much a ghost town. Once in a while you’ll hear about something, but we generally don’t worry too much about what’s goin’ on here.

In discussing how the threat they once associated with “Down Longwood” had largely evaporated, Longwood officers noted that since the early 1990s this threat had largely shifted northward to District 4. Longwood officers, especially White Longwood officers, indicated that they had long associated pathologies, particular drug-related ones, with Longwood’s poor, Black residents, but over time District 4 supplanted “Down Longwood” as the epicenter of these pathologies. In emphasizing how this spatial transfer of “Black” pathology was virtually complete, Longwood officers pointed out that most of the remaining “bad” residents from “Down Longwood” now routinely came up
to District 4 to hang out. In these officers’ eyes, District 4 had effectively replaced “Down Longwood” as the magnet area of “Black” pathology.5

Longwood officers’ association of “Black” threat with District 4 instead of “Down Longwood” also was reflected in the officers’ patrolling practices, particularly officers’ “herding” of Black students out of District 2 following dismissal from Longwood High School. While Longwood officers closely monitored groups of Black students heading east to District 4 from Longwood High School following dismissal at 3 P.M., sometimes as far as Radnor Avenue (the border of Districts 3 and 4), Longwood officers were less vigilant with respect to groups of Black students walking southward towards District 8, and never “herded” them as far as the District 8 border. These practices underscored Longwood officers’ perception of District 4 as being the epicenter of problematic activity.

6.2. School-Related Spaces and Times in Longwood

Like housing-related spaces, school-related spaces played an important role in conditioning officers’ social group schemata in Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro. The interaction of school-related spaces and housing-related spaces at particular times affected officers’ perceptions of various groups’ “in place” or “out of place” status, and either intensified or mitigated officers’ threat perceptions with respect to certain groups. In the racially diverse towns of Longwood and Middleboro, the key school-related spatial difference between the two towns was the overall arrangement of schooling for resident children. Longwood’s assignment of children to neighborhood public schools reinforced patterns of residential segregation, whereas Middleboro’s random assignment of students to public schools in various parts the town bolstered the residential integration that
existed throughout much of the town. This section and section 6.6 will address the nature of these spatial arrangements and the ways they affected how officers’ negotiated their patrolling of various groups. In the absence of any appreciable racial diversity among residents, the overall arrangement of schooling for resident children in predominantly “White” Coretown did not affect officers’ perceptions of various groups in the way that such arrangements did in Longwood or Middleboro. However, as discussed in section 6.10, the presence in Coretown of two school-related spaces that disproportionately catered to racial minorities from outside of town were highly salient to officers, and profoundly affected how officers approached various racial minority “visitors”.

Of the various spatial arrangements in Longwood and Middleboro, school-related spatial arrangements figured most prominently in how officers negotiated their patrolling of the two towns’ respective groups. Spatial arrangements relating to the assignment of resident children were of prime importance because they either reinforced or countered meanings associated with housing-related spaces. In doing so, these school-related spatial arrangements affected officers’ conceptions of who was “in place” or “out of place”. While such school-related spatial arrangements affected how officers oriented themselves towards all groups, such arrangements were particularly central to explaining the stark difference in how officers approached the respective towns’ similar, negatively viewed, poor, Black populations—Blacks from District 4 in Longwood, and Blacks from the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area in the southeastern part of Middleboro (Zone 3).

With the exception of Longwood High School, the assignment of students to Longwood’s schools was in accordance with a “neighborhood school” model. As officers explained, under this model, students’ assignment to schools was based on
geographic proximity. In other words, students attended schools closest to their place of residence. Longwood’s eight elementary schools only served students in the surrounding neighborhoods, while Longwood’s two regional middle schools only served students in the eastern and western halves of town. Given the existing patterns of residential race-based segregation in Longwood, these “neighborhood schools” reinforced officers’ associations of certain spaces with particular racial groups. The racial homogeneity of elementary schools, particularly in the northern half of Longwood, not only solidified officers’ views of these school spaces as largely “White”, “Black”, or “Hispanic”, but also strengthened officers’ racially homogenous marking of the residential spaces surrounding these schools. In turn, the predominantly “White” elementary schools that fed into the northwestern middle school in District 1, and the predominantly “Black” or “Hispanic” elementary schools that fed into the eastern middle school in District 3 near the border of District 4, reinforced officers’ general perceptions of western Longwood as a “White” bastion, northeastern Longwood as “Black”, and southern Longwood as disproportionately “Hispanic”.

By strengthening Longwood officers’ racial marking of spaces in residential areas, the spatial arrangement of elementary and middle schools contributed to officers’ perception that certain groups were “out of place” in certain spaces. In particular, officers did not expect Black children or adults to be in or around schools’ “White” spaces, or White children or adults to be in or around schools’ “Black” spaces. For a given racially marked space surrounding an elementary or middle school, officers did not expect children of other races to be attending such schools or these children’s parents and family members to be dropping off or picking up these children. Moreover, officers did
not anticipate seeing people of different races in these spaces because they did not expect to see interracial friendships among children. Consequently, these school arrangements worked against officers seeing any legitimate basis for the presence of members of other racial groups in the residential areas surrounding an elementary or middle school marked as “White” or “Black”. A White male Longwood officer alluded to these expectations when he commented on Longwood’s “diversity”:

> On paper this looks like a diverse place, but when you think about it, it’s really not. Everybody kinda keeps to themselves. The Blacks don’t have much to do with the Whites, and the Whites don’t have much to do with the Blacks. It’s always been that way…. The kids don’t really get to know each other, so you don’t even really see Blacks and Whites playing together. It’s not like it’s on purpose or anything, you just stay around what you know.

Unlike Longwood’s elementary and middle schools, Longwood High School (LHS), which is located in the northern central part of the predominantly “White” District 2, is characterized by a high degree of racial and ethnic diversity. A White male Longwood officer referred to LHS as the “United Nations”, and a Black male Longwood officer indicated that “it [was] the only place in town where you see Blacks and Whites coming together.” Notwithstanding this racial and ethnic diversity, Longwood officers indicated that there was little in the way cross-racial social interaction at the school and very few interracial friendships. A White male officer likened LHS’s diverse student population to salad in which none of the ingredients mixed. This officer stated:

> [Longwood] High School is pretty much like a big bowl of salad. You’ve got your tomatoes, your olives, your peppers, and all, but they don’t really mix. It’s always been that way.

Another White male Longwood officer was less metaphoric in his assessment of the lack
of racial and ethnic mixing among LHS’s students:

Everyone here pretty much keeps to themselves. The Blacks with the Blacks, the
Whites with the Whites, the Mexicans with Mexicans. It’s just the way they like it.

Longwood officers’ assessment of a lack of racial and ethnic mixing at LHS was
based on the officers’ observations, and in many cases, on the officers’ own personal
experiences at LHS as well. Officers regularly observed the majority of LHS students
congregating in racially and ethnically homogeneous groups at various spots outside of
LHS before and after the school day. In fact, officers identified particular spaces around
the school with particular racial or ethnic groups. Officers identified the entire western
side of the school as the “White side”, the entire eastern side of the school as the “Black
side”, the southwestern corner of the school as the “Polish corner”, and an area on the
southern side as the “Mexican hangout”.

The majority of Longwood officers (14 of the 18 officers in the sample) also
based their assessments of a lack of racial and ethnic mixing at LHS on their own
experiences at LHS as students. These officers indicated that by the time White and
Black students reached LHS, these students had formed rather entrenched, racially
homogeneous friendship networks based on prior patterns of racial segregation in the
elementary and middle schools coupled with largely racially segregated residential
neighborhoods. Only three of these fourteen officers, thirteen of whom were White and
one of whom was Asian, indicated having a “Black” friend while at LHS, and only one of
the officers indicated regularly socializing with a Black friend outside of school. In
describing his friendship with a Black male (Kenny) at LHS, this latter officer noted that it was not representative of general pattern of friendships that he observed at LHS:

I don’t remember any of my other friends being friends with Blacks. It wasn’t that they were prejudiced or anything, they just had their friends for a long time, it wasn’t racial. They all liked Kenny and we used to all hang out together and everything was cool. Kenny always came over my house though. My mom didn’t like me going over where he lived ‘cross town. Yeah we were good friends up through high school. We kinda lost touch after high school though; he went in the army and I went to college.

The extent to which these Longwood officers’ own friendship networks at LHS were segregated was put into even starker relief by several of these officers’ admission that they were not even aware of the large “Black” section in District 4 until they became police officers. For instance, a White male Longwood officer stated:

I had always heard stories about Down [Longwood], “stay away from Down Longwood”, but I didn’t even know there was a District 4. I just always assumed all the Blacks lived in the south[ern] [part of Longwood].

This officer, as well as several other White officers in the sample, had had such little contact with Blacks up through their years at LHS, that besides lacking any Black friends, the officers were not even able to identify where a substantial portion of Longwood’s Black population lived. Moreover, this lack of knowledge implies that the officers’ own spatial histories were marked by racial segregation and isolation. All of these officers were from Districts 1, 2, or 8, and their lack of familiarity with Blacks, notwithstanding attending LHS with numerous Blacks, suggests that they had had lived in largely exclusive “White” spaces in Longwood.

As a result of their own lack of interracial social ties while growing up in Longwood and attending LHS, as well as their observations of current LHS students’ lack
of any apparent interracial or interethnic socializing, Longwood officers did not expect LHS students of different races, particular Blacks and Whites, socializing together outside of school. Longwood officers did not expect White LHS students to venture into “Black” neighborhoods in District 4, and indicated that it was “rare” to see any White adolescents in these neighborhoods. While officers also did not expect Black LHS students to socialize with White LHS students in “White” neighborhoods in Districts 1 and 2, the officers confronted a daily scenario after 3 P.M. of every school day during the school year in which Black LHS students had to traverse spaces across “White” neighborhoods in District 2. Given that LHS was located in the virtually all-“White” District 2, and Longwood provided only a few buses for students, Black students who disproportionately lived in predominantly “Black” District 4 to east and the “Black” section of District 8 to the south had to walk through several “White” neighborhoods in District 2 in order to go to and return from LHS. Consequently, officers expected Black LHS students to be walking through District 2 on school days between approximately 7 A.M. and 8 A.M. in the morning, and between approximately 3 P.M. and 5 P.M. in the afternoon. Officers saw Black LHS students as legitimately present or “in place” in “White” District 2 neighborhoods during these windows of time. However, the officers viewed these Black LHS students as “out of place” in these “White” District 2 neighborhoods at all other times because the officers did not see these students as having social ties with these neighborhoods’ residents or as having any other legitimate purposes.

Longwood officers’ sense that Black LHS students were “out of place” in District 2 was further ratcheted up by the officers’ assumptions that some of these students were
linked with gangs and other problematic behavior. Nearly half of the Longwood officers in the sample made some reference, usually in subtle way, that some Black LHS students were involved gangs. Most commonly, these officers commented on the colors that Black LHS students were wearing. For instance, several Longwood officers suggested that Black male LHS students were members of the “Bloods” street gang based on the red colored clothing that the students were wearing. Although officers conceded that they had no concrete evidence linking any of these Black students to gangs, officers nevertheless remained highly suspicious of these students. Moreover, in light of officers’ view of District 2 spaces as being “gang free”, the assumption of Black students’ gang affiliation amplified officers’ sense that these students were “out of place” in these spaces.

Given their perception that Black LHS students were “out of place” in District 2 after the brief window of time following dismissal, coupled with their awareness of powerful White District 2 residents’ history of complaints regarding Black LHS students congregating in various spaces within District 2, Longwood officers displayed a disproportionate amount of concern regarding Black LHS students’ exodus of District 2 every afternoon after 3 P.M. of every school day during the school year. Officers’ concern was exhibited through a series of practices in which officers monitored and tried to expedite the exodus of Black students out of District 2 following dismissal from LHS at 3 P.M.

While most of these practices focusing on Black LHS students’ afterschool exodus appeared to be discretionary and prompted by Longwood officers’ concerns about avoiding complaints from White District 2 residents, some practices were
organizationally determined. One such organizationally determined practice was the positioning of four patrol cars outside of LHS for the purpose of monitoring dismissal. On a typical day, three of the four patrol cars that the Longwood Police Department assigned to monitor dismissal were positioned on the eastern or “Black” side of LHS where the majority of Black students temporarily congregated before walking either eastward or southward. Another such organizationally determined practice was officers’ wait time following dismissal. The Police Department required all officers stationed at LHS for dismissal to remain at LHS for at least fifteen minutes. Other than these two obligatory practices, officers had fairly wide discretion to carry out the Police Department’s general mandate to ensure an “orderly dismissal”, especially after their required fifteen minute stint at LHS ended at 3:15 P.M.

Following their encampment outside of LHS, Longwood routinely engaged in discretionary practices that almost exclusively targeted Black LHS students walking home. One or two patrol cars regularly followed groups of Black students as they moved eastward towards District 4. Officers typically followed these groups all the way to Ward Avenue (the border of Districts 2 and 3), and sometimes as far as Radnor Avenue (the border of Districts 3 and 4). One patrol car also followed groups of Black students as they moved southward to District 8. Officers typically followed these groups for between four and six blocks, or about halfway to the border of Districts of 2 and 8. In contrast, officers never followed groups of White students as the moved northward or westward, and generally ignored both White and Hispanic students who moved southward or eastward.
Longwood officers described their routine practice of monitoring Black LHS students’ movement out of District 2 as “herding”, which was short for “herding cattle”. As this “herding” reference implies, Longwood officers strongly emphasized Black LHS students’ proclivity for walking in groups. Several White male Longwood officers referred to these Black groups as “packs”. For instance, one of these officers commented:

[Black LHS students] like to roam the streets in packs. You’ll have a pack of 20 or 30 of them walking in the middle of the street, cursing, fighting, acting stupid, making all kinds of noise.

While Black students sometimes walked in groups that approximated twenty, the typical group of Black students actually ranged from four to eight in size. Just like their assessments of Black students’ gang affiliations, officers’ assessments of the size of Black student groups generally were distorted and exaggerated.

Officers typically drove very slowly behind groups of Black LHS students, whom officers claimed moved at a “snail’s pace”. Officers generally stared at these groups of students, but the students usually acted as if the officers were not in the vicinity, and tried to avoid eye contact with the officers. Although officers generally refrained from any verbal communication with students, officers invariably verbally admonished groups of Black LHS students when these students walked in the middle of the street. Following such admonishment, these students would slowly move to the sidewalk on either side of the street. After ordering a group of Black students to move out of the street, a White male officer stated:

Look at these kids; they sure like to take their sweet old time. Like I got all day…. They walk like they have a broken ankle or something.
Invariably groups of Black LHS students eventually crept back into the street after the admonishing officer moved down the street to keep watch on other groups of Black students. In discussing their efforts to keep Black LHS students from walking in the streets, one White male Longwood officer referred to it as a “constant battle”, while another described it as a “cat and mouse game.” A third Longwood officer described himself as a “shepherd” who was “tending to his flock.” While these officers generally appeared reluctant to enter into confrontations with groups of students who defied them, the officers nevertheless were not hesitant to issues summonses to students who walked in the street on repeat days.12

Besides reprimanding Black LHS students for walking in the street, Longwood officers also verbally or nonverbally chastised these students when the students engaged in behavior that either delayed their exodus from District 2 or otherwise seemed inappropriate to the officers. Officers most commonly reprimanded Black LHS students who stopped to talk to each other or to someone else on a cell phone for more than a couple of minutes. Officers would either verbally tell these students to move along or would make gestures with their hands and/or heads communicating that message.

For Longwood officers, Black LHS students not only had a narrow window of time in which they were legitimately present in District 2 neighborhoods, but also had narrow range of behaviors that officers deemed acceptable while in these neighborhoods. Officers forcefully verbally reprimanded any Black students who engaged in play-fighting, littering, or minor destruction of property (e.g., stepping on residents’ flowers) or vandalism (e.g., tampering with holiday decorations). Officers’ viewed all of these
latter behaviors as not only inappropriate in their own right, but as inappropriate because they delayed Black LHS’s students exodus from the “White” neighborhoods of District 2. Officers’ intolerance of these behaviors was not only due to their sense that they had to please White District 2 residents, but also was tied to their work-related need to move these Black LHS students along as quickly as possible. Officers had to attend to other work responsibilities, and wanted to make sure that these Black LHS students had vacated these District 2 neighborhoods before the officers themselves left the area.

The one exception to the narrow window of time that officers generally appeared to afford Black LHS students who remained in District 2 after school was when these students were participating in extracurricular activities either at LHS or at the school’s athletic field, which was located a couple of blocks south of LHS in the heart of District 2. However, even when officers knew that Black students were at LHS or the athletic field for some extracurricular purpose, these officers nevertheless appeared to be uneasy about these students’ presence in a way that was not evident when White students occupied the same spaces. For instance, following several basketball scrimmages and a charity game at LHS, officers, on their accord, stopped and monitored crowds of roughly twenty-five to thirty young people in the school’s parking lot. Officers identified the majority of these adolescents as Black. In contrast, officers never made discretionary stops at LHS following events where the majority of congregants in the parking lot were White. One White male Longwood officer confirmed this when he stated:

Most of the [LHS students] you don’t have to worry about. I mean like if it’s the bowling team or the band, like what the hell could happen with them. What are they gonna hit somebody with their clarinet? [laughs]
Longwood officers’ apparent uneasiness about Black LHS students’ presence was most pronounced before, during, and after LHS football games at the athletic field in the heart of District 2. Officers expressly indicated that they were concerned about fans coming in from District 4 and getting into fights. These concerns appeared to be greatest when a team from an outside “Black” town came to play Longwood. For instance, prior to Longwood’s game versus Inglewood, several officers expressed concern that there were going to be “fights all over the place” and that some people would “bring machetes” with them to the game. Officers’ heightened concern about the Longwood/Inglewood game was reflected by the discretionary patrolling of officers who had not been assigned to work the game. These officers spent most of their discretionary patrolling time repeatedly canvassing the neighborhoods around the athletic field. Officers did not engage in similar discretionary patrolling when the predominantly “White” team from Coretown played Longwood. This discrepant patrolling appeared to reflect a concern about the presence of Black fans from Inglewood or District 4 spilling out into the surrounding “White” neighborhoods.

In sum, the overall arrangement of schools in Longwood, in conjunction with residential patterns, officers’ perceptions of residents’ expectations regarding space, and the officers’ own expectations regarding social interaction and space contributed to officers’ perceptions that certain groups were “out of place” in certain spaces at certain times. Although officers recognized LHS as a racially integrated space, the meanings associated with that space did not spillover into the surrounding area. Patterns of racial segregation in residential neighborhoods and the school system’s neighborhood elementary schools and regional middle schools contributed to officers’ expectations of
racially homogeneous space, which in turn eclipsed any notions of racial integration beyond the immediate vicinity of LHS. While LHS’ racially integrated student body theoretically presented an opportunity for countering the patterns of segregation found in other parts of the school system and in residential areas, officers’ policing practices, particularly their routine “herding” of Black students out of District 2 following dismissal at 3 P.M. every school day, precluded LHS from altering these patterns.

6.3. Commercial Spaces and Times in Longwood

In contrast to housing-related and school-related spaces’ significant role in conditioning officers’ social group schemata in Longwood, commercial spaces had a more limited conditioning role. While the overall arrangement of housing- and school-related spaces contributed to officers’ understandings of who was “in place” or “out of place” across a broad swath of spaces in each town, the overall arrangement of commercial spaces did not carry any particular significance. The relationship of one shopping area or commercial district to another in a particular town did not contribute to officers’ understandings of who was “in place” or “out of place”. Rather, officers’ attached a unique set of meanings to each particular shopping area based on assumptions of whom they saw as owning, patronizing, or working for the businesses in that area. In addition, while the meanings associated with and activated by school-related spaces largely reinforced and overlapped with those associated with and activated by housing-related spaces in the three towns, the meanings associated with and activated by commercial spaces sometimes countered and effectively overrode those associated with and activated by both housing- and school-related spaces.
Commercial spaces did not appear to play as major a role in conditioning Longwood officers’ social group schemata as they appeared to do in both Middleboro and Coretown (see sections 6.7 and 6.11), but such spaces nevertheless conditioned Longwood officers’ schemata in important ways. Unlike commercial spaces’ conditioning effects in Middleboro and Coretown (see sections 6.7 and 6.11), such spaces’ conditioning effects in Longwood did not translate into patrolling practices geared at restricting certain racial minority groups’ access to particular commercial spaces. Commercial spaces in Longwood did not appear to condition Longwood officers’ social group schemata in a way that resulted officers seeing some groups as being “out of place” in such spaces. In contrast to both Coretown and Middleboro officers, Longwood officers did not see any racial, ethnic, immigrant, or class groups as being “out of place” in any of Longwood’s main commercial areas. Unlike their view of much of Longwood’s residential spaces, officers saw Longwood’s commercial spaces as multiracial, multi-ethnic, multi-class spaces that provided basic goods and services to all people. In contrast to Middleboro and Coretown, none of Longwood’s three main commercial districts along Sylvester Avenue, Forest Avenue, and Route 101, or any of its smaller commercial areas, were upscale shopping or dining areas, or were undergoing upscale redevelopment. As a result, Longwood officers expected to see all different groups frequenting in these spaces. Longwood officers saw all members of Longwood’s multiracial, multi-ethnic population as having a legitimate purpose for being in these commercial spaces. A White male Longwood officer’s comments about Forest Avenue, which represented Longwood’s “downtown” shopping area and also housed the
Longwood Police Department’s stationhouse, Town Hall, and other municipal buildings, reflected this inclusive view:

Once in a while you’ll get somebody shoplifting or a purse snatching, but we don’t have much to do with [Forest] Avenue. Everybody just goes about their business and so we don’t have too many problems. It’s pretty much just your run of the mill downtown area. You’ve got all kinds of stores, your Polish stores, Mexican stores, your Black barbershop, so you’ll find people from all over town on [Forest], and we get [people] coming from other places like Ringdale too. But you’re not gonna see much action there.

Given their view of Longwood’s commercial spaces as being inclusive ones in which all groups were legitimately present, officers appeared to view these spaces as not warranting special attention. This latter view was reflected in officers’ relatively perfunctory patrolling of Longwood’s three main commercial strips along Forest Avenue, (which also served as the border of Districts 2 and 3), Sylvester Avenue, (which bisected Districts 1 and 2, and served as the northern border of Districts 3, 4, 5), and Route 101, (which constituted all of District 6 in the southern half of Longwood).

Although Longwood officers engaged in more frequent patrolling of Sylvester Avenue than of either Forest Avenue or Route 101, this recurrent patrolling appeared to have little to do with the people patronizing commercial establishments along Sylvester Avenue. Rather, this heightened patrolling appeared to be focused on monitoring the activity along the northern border of “Black” District 4 and its vicinity, and making sure that the flow of Blacks between Radnor and District 4 in Longwood did not migrate to other residential areas in Longwood. Officers’ interest in monitoring Blacks from District 4 and Radnor and containing them to the areas adjacent to Sylvester Avenue was
reflected by the fact that officers spent the majority of their time patrolling the eastern part of Sylvester Avenue, where it served as the northernmost border of Districts 3, 4, 5.

When they did specifically patrol commercial spaces, Longwood officers, consistent with their rhetoric of inclusiveness, did not focus on any particular groups. In particular, unlike their apparent heightened vigilance of groups of Black youths in “White” residential spaces, Longwood officers generally ignored such groups when they congregated in commercial spaces. Most strikingly, while officers were highly attuned to Black youths presence in District 2’s residential neighborhoods or by LHS to the west of Forest Avenue, officers routinely appeared to pay no attention to groups of Black youths sitting on or standing near benches along Forest Avenue.  

Although Longwood officers appeared to view all groups as being “in place” or legitimately present in Longwood’s commercial spaces, officers nevertheless appeared to see these spaces as separate, contained islands. Officers’ views regarding various groups within these commercial spaces appeared to have no bearing on how officers saw these groups in other spaces. Some groups’ “in place” legitimacy in these commercial spaces did not appear to extend to other, non-commercial spaces, particularly residential spaces, because, as discussed in section 6.1, officers often saw these latter spaces as being associated with, and the exclusive domain of, one particular constituency group. In sum, while officers saw members of all groups as being “in place” in these commercial spaces because they had legitimate reasons for being in these spaces, officers did not see members of all groups as having legitimate reasons for venturing into residential and other spaces outside of these commercial spaces.

6.4. Border- and Road-Related Spaces and Times in Longwood
Border- and road-related spaces also played an important role in conditioning officers’ social group schemata in Coretown, Middleboro, and Longwood. In both Coretown and Middleboro, borders and roads were significant spaces in activating officers’ thoughts of non-resident contexts, particularly “Black” and “Hispanic” non-resident contexts (see sections 6.8 and 6.12). In Longwood, unlike Coretown and Middleboro, officers were almost exclusively concerned with monitoring “internal” borders and roads surrounding a residential section, and generally displayed little concern regarding non-residents’ entry into town.

While several of the “official” town border spaces in Coretown and Middleboro were highly salient and significant to officers in those respective towns, the spaces along Longwood’s “official” town borders, with the exception of the Radnor/Longwood border at the northernmost point of District 4 in Longwood, generally appeared to be of little consequence to Longwood officers. Rather, unlike officers in Coretown and Middleboro, Longwood officers appeared to attach great significance to intra-town sectional borders. In particular, Longwood officers were highly attuned to the borders surrounding District 4 and its predominantly Black, predominantly poor and working-class population.

Longwood officers’ general lack of concern regarding “official” town borders appeared to be largely attributable to their view of District 4, which was bordered by Sylvester Avenue to the north, Chester Avenue to the east, Elmwood Avenue to the south, and Radnor Avenue to the west, as a major internal threat. More precisely, officers especially saw the northern half of District 4, from Sylvester Avenue in the northernmost part of the district to Hewlett Street to the south of the district (approximately halfway between Sylvester and Elmwood Avenues), as a space that had
to be monitored and contained. In emphasizing their heightened concern about this northern half of District 4, nearly all Longwood officers suggested that this spatial area was like a “cancer”. For instance, a White male Middleboro officer stated:

The area over by [Radnor] and [Sylvester] [Avenue] is like a cancer. You can’t really get rid of it, you just try to stop it from growin’. The problem is, if you shut it down in one spot, it pops up in another. It may go back into remission for a little while, but it always comes back.

Given that they saw the northern half of District 4 as being a “cancer”, Longwood officers regularly commented on the need to contain the problems that they associated with the residents of this area. For example, a White Longwood officer stated the following while patrolling Ulysses Street (one block south of Sylvester Avenue) within District 4:

Some nights it’s calm here, but other nights it’s like a wildfire. Our job is to make sure it doesn’t get out of control.

Officers’ seemingly indelible sense that they needed to contain this area’s residents and problems was also reflected in their repeated, unquestioning use of the term “target area” to describe the area.

Longwood officers’ containment-related rhetoric regarding the “target area” was matched by their disproportionate, aggressive patrolling of this area. Somewhat paradoxically, while officers paid a disproportionate amount of attention to the “target area”, they focused primarily on the perimeter of the “target area” – Radnor Avenue, Sylvester Avenue, Chandler Avenue, and Henry Street. As noted above under section 6.1, officers generally seemed to not care much about what people did within District 4.¹⁶
A White male Longwood officer made this point while patrolling near Sylvester Avenue in District 4:

As long as nobody’s shootin’ each other, frankly, I don’t care what they do. They don’t bother me, I won’t bother them.

Officers’ frequent patrolling of the perimeter of the “target area” coupled with this apparent neglect of the interior of this area suggests that officers were almost exclusively concerned about making sure that this area’s problems did not spill over into the surrounding parts of the community.

Although officers disproportionately patrolled all four of the roads making up the perimeter of the “target area”, officers devoted the most attention to Radnor and Sylvester Avenues, and the least amount of attention to Henry Street. Officers seemed especially concerned about monitoring Radnor Avenue due to the past history of service calls from residents, particularly White residents who lived on the western side of Radnor Avenue. These residents had complained in the past about groups of Black youths and young adults congregating in the streets in the hours after school and evenings. Longwood officers, particularly White officers, also appeared to attach special significance to Radnor Avenue because they saw it as the part of the “target area” that was in closest proximity to the “White” Districts 2 and 1 to the west. This was evident from several officers’ reference to Radnor Avenue as “the front lines”. In light of these perceptions, all officers handling service calls in one of Longwood’s five northern districts frequently patrolled up and down Radnor Avenue during their shifts. In addition, the western side of Radnor Avenue was the only space within District 3 in which officers parked and monitored traffic, both vehicular and human, for extended periods of time.
In patrolling Radnor Avenue, Longwood officers focused in particular on the intersection of Radnor Avenue and Chambliss Street. Officers viewed this intersection as being the epicenter of activity involving Black residents from District 4. Officers focused on this intersection in part because it constituted a meeting place for Black LHS students walking back to their homes in District 4 after school. However, officers’ central reason for intently monitoring this intersection appeared to be the regular crowd of Black youths and adults, both male and female, by a corner store on the northeastern corner of the intersection. Longwood officers speculated that this corner store was a “front” for a “drug operation”. For instance, a White male Longwood officer stated the following about the corner store while parked across the street from it:

“It says on the sign that they sell apparel. Yeah right. They’ve got what, three shirts and a pair of shoes in there. All those kids aren’t goin’ in there to buy shirts. No, it’s gotta be a front for a drug operation…. We haven’t been able to bust them ‘cause they probably have a [police] scanner in the back that picks up calls that we’re comin’.

Given these suspicions of drug activity, officers thought that it was imperative for them to monitor the corner store very closely. In making this point, one White male Longwood officer stated, “You don’t want this turning into crack alley.”

In addition to their extensive patrolling of Radnor Avenue, Longwood officers engaged in a significant amount of patrolling along the stretch of Sylvester Avenue that served as District 4’s northern border. As noted under section 6.3, officers’ disproportionate patrolling of this stretch of Sylvester Avenue appeared to be tied in part to a concern about the potential westward movement of people from the “Black” areas of District 4 and Radnor to the “White” areas of Districts 1 and 2. However, officers’
bigger and more immediate concern was monitoring the flow of people between Longwood and Radnor.

Although Longwood officers had a highly negative view of the Blacks in Radnor who lived across the border from District 4, these officers did not, unlike their counterparts in Coretown and Middleboro, see these non-resident Blacks as being different from and worse than their town’s resident Black population. Longwood officers’ essentially viewed the “Black” area in Radnor across the border from District 4 as being an extension of District 4. Officers associated both of these areas with the same crime-related problems such as drugs and gangs, and did not distinguish between the residents of either area. As a result, officers saw the border between District 4 in Longwood and Radnor along Sylvester Avenue as being a fluid one, with people from Longwood and Radnor constantly shuffling back and forth across Sylvester Avenue as if there was no separation between the two towns. Given the fluidity of this border, Longwood officers felt that they were dealing with a bigger mass of criminogenic territory than simply the northern half of District 4. Consequently, officers felt an even more heightened need to make sure that the “target area” remained a contained space. A White male Longwood officer alluded to this point when he stated:

The target area is like a tumor—you got [Radnor] scum coming over here, and [Longwood] scum going over there, and it just grows and grows. At any time there are thirty or so from [Radnor] over here and thirty or so from [Longwood] over there…. But then somebody gets shot and everything calms down for awhile and everyone lays low—goes into hiding for a while, like after the shooting at [Joe’s] Bar. Either they think we’re looking for ‘em, or they’re worried they’re gonna be the next ones to get shot. You know, payback time. But a couple of months will go by, and then the next thing you know it’s like Grand Central Station again…. Back and forth, back and forth, it never stops….
Although officers devoted a disproportionate amount of their proactive patrolling to the “target area’s” Radnor and Sylvester Avenue borders, they also spent a fair amount of time patrolling along its eastern border, Chester Avenue. In contrast to their seeming disinterest in the activities going on within District 4, officers demonstrated heightened concern for activities that took place at Stevens Park in District 5 on the eastern side of Chester Avenue along the border of District 4 and 5. For instance, a White male Longwood officer who was responsible for handling calls for District 5 devoted a substantial amount of time patrolling a Pop Warner football game at Stevens Park while virtually ignoring a Pop Warner game that was taking place at the same time at another field in District 5 close to the Longwood/Elmwood border. In monitoring the game at Stevens Park, where virtually all of the participants and spectators were Black, this officer circled the field slowly over half a dozen times and parked at opposite ends of the field for twenty plus minute stints, including at the end of the game when people were leaving. In contrast, this officer only drove one time past the other field, where most of the participants and spectators were White. This suggests that officers saw activities occurring on the borders of the District 4, even unambiguously lawful activities such as a football game, as constituting more of a potential “threat” than those occurring within District 4 because the former were more likely to spill out into other parts of Longwood.

6.5. Housing-Related Spaces and Times in Middleboro

Like Longwood officers, Middleboro officers saw the residential areas that they patrolled principally in Black and White terms, and mentally partitioned the town accordingly. Middleboro officers spatially divided the town into three residential areas. Officers saw the central and southwestern portions of Middleboro, which represented the
largest swath of space and contained the largest population of the three areas, as one contiguous Black/White racially integrated, middle- to upper-middle-class residential area. Officers viewed the northern portion of town as a largely segregated White, upper-middle-class residential area, and the southeastern portion of town as a segregated Black, poor residential area.

Notwithstanding Middleboro officers’ identification of certain spaces with certain race/class groups, such identifications, unlike those of Longwood officers, did not translate into spatially and temporally variable patrolling. While residential space and time activated and reinforced officers’ stark White/Black distinctions and led to spatially and temporally differentiated patrolling of residential areas in Longwood, residential space and time generally muted officers’ distinctions between groups in terms of race and class and led to spatially, and for the most part, temporally undifferentiated patrolling of residential areas in Middleboro. In general, Middleboro officers responded similarly to service calls pertaining to residential spaces throughout the town, regardless of time of day, and refrained from proactive encounters with residents in residential spaces at most times other than late night/early morning.

The spatial and temporal differences between Middleboro and Longwood officers’ patrolling despite similar marking of residential areas in terms of race and class is in part due to the social group meanings activated by residential spaces at various times in the two respective towns. While spaces in both Middleboro and Longwood activated pressures associated with the group that officers perceived as being the most powerful in both towns, there was an important difference. The dominant White group appeared to be salient to Longwood officers primarily in “White” spaces in Longwood, whereas the
dominant Black/White coalition appeared to be salient to Middleboro officers in spaces throughout Middleboro. Although Longwood officers’ laissez-faire approach to problematic behavior in “Black” spaces in Longwood’s District 4 appears to have been guided in part by efforts to please White constituents by containing such behavior to District 4, Longwood officers’ did not expressly reference Whites when patrolling or even discussing these “Black” spaces. In contrast, Middleboro officers expressly communicated concerns about Middleboro’s dominant Black/White “liberal” coalition in residential spaces in the “Black” southeastern and “White” northern sections of Middleboro, in addition to the central and southwestern sections that they spatially associated with this coalition.

The omnipresence of this Black/White coalition in officers’ minds was reflected in the officers’ comments referencing the coalition in spaces in each section of Middleboro. Instead of directly identifying the coalition, officers referenced the coalition through the use of code words such as “liberals,” “bleeding hearts,” and “ACLU-types.” For instance, while driving down Monroe Street in southeastern “Black” section (Zone 3), a White male Middleboro officer stated:

Unless we get a call, we don’t go looking to dig up anything. We’re not too popular around here. It’s not like they lay out the welcome mat…. Besides, you got to be careful what you do. You don’t want the bleeding hearts complaining. [emphasis added]

Similarly, after driving past a group of White youths by a park in the northern “White” section (Zone 1), an Asian male Middleboro officer said the following regarding the youths:
You don’t want to have to deal with their parents, or worse, some self-righteous *ACLU-types* who always have something to say on Middleboro.net.  *[emphasis added]*

The officers’ “bleeding hearts” and “ACLU-types” references to Middleboro’s Black/White coalition in the preceding two quotes were consonant with another White male Middleboro officer’s “liberals” reference while driving through Middleboro’s central section (Zone 2), which all officers identified synonymously with this coalition. This latter officer stated:

[The residents] around here, they think you’re harassing them even if you just ask them a question.  Last week I was doing traffic detail by the train station [in the middle of Zone 2], they’ve been doing some construction over there, and there was this one guy who was wearing a suit and sandals who was such a pain in the ass.  I asked him to walk to the other side of the street and the guy starts in with me about how we’re just always harassing innocent people.  Anyways, the guy then complained to the [police] station.  You’re just trying to do your job, and the *liberals* here are always looking to get you.  *[emphasis added]*

In sum, meanings associated with the “liberal” Black/White coalition appeared to infuse residential spaces throughout Middleboro, and not just in the central and southwestern parts of town where members of this coalition resided.  This coalition was of principal concern to both the officer in the central area associated with the racially mixed coalition, as well as the officer in the “Black” southeastern area.  The officer on Monroe Street in the southeast perceived that the poor Black residents did not welcome his presence, but seemed more concerned about how any officer-initiated conflict with the residents would be viewed by the “bleeding hearts” comprising the Black/White coalition.  While the officer in the “White” northern area did appear to be foremost concerned with the northern White parents, whom, as noted in Chapter 4, officers also viewed as a powerful
group, he nevertheless expressed some concern about “ACLU-types”, indicating that the
Black/White coalition was also salient in his mind.

The ubiquity of Middleboro officers’ thoughts about the Black/White coalition, which almost every situation in every residential space at every time appeared to trigger, was most significant in that it helped to preclude officers from seeing/treating any groups as “out of place” in any residential spaces in town.\(^{18}\) As noted in Chapter 4, Middleboro officers saw this coalition as foremost concerned with defending individual liberties. Even though officers often thought the coalition’s defense of particular individuals’ liberties was unwarranted or excessive, nevertheless, officers were cognizant of the coalition’s power and tried not to antagonize it. A White male Middleboro officer described the caution and restraint that he and his fellow Middleboro officers exercised in order to avoid incurring this coalition’s wrath as follows:

> You don’t really have any margin for error here. Like I told you before, when I first got here I arrested the wrong guy, and like all hell broke loose. [The Black/White coalition] didn’t care that the guy fit the suspect’s description and was in the area. All they cared about was protecting some low-life from the big, bad cops. I’ll tell you, if you slip up, they’ll… it’s like leaving chum for the sharks. And you better know how to swim. They almost ate me up, but I learned a lot from the whole thing, I really did. I learned to be careful where I step….

As a result of the extreme caution that they exercised so as to preclude any potential run-ins with Middleboro’s powerful Black/White coalition, officers generally exhibited a laissez-faire approach to everyone in residential spaces, except between 11 P.M. and 5 A.M. Officers indicated that they were substantially more likely to stop and question anyone who was walking through or congregating in residential neighborhoods in “the overnight hours.” However, for other times of the day, Middleboro officers, unlike
Longwood officers, generally saw and treated all groups as being “in place” or
legitimately present in residential spaces that they patrolled.

Middleboro officers’ sense that all groups were “in place” in all residential spaces
during most of the day was reinforced by the overall pattern of racial integration that
encompassed a majority of the residential space in Middleboro, the pattern of school
assignment, and the ethos of “diversity” that pervaded the town. In contrast to
Longwood, Middleboro was constituted by a majority of racially integrated residential
neighborhoods. While racially integrated neighborhoods encompassed approximately
one-third of Longwood and only a small part of the northern half of Longwood upon
which officers disproportionately focused,19 such integrated neighborhoods made up
roughly two-thirds of Middleboro, including the entire, large central portion of the town,
which officers viewed as the “heart of Middleboro.” This residential pattern in
Middleboro contributed to officers’ normative view of racial integration. As Rubinstein
(1985) would suggest, Middleboro officers saw interracial interaction in residential
spaces as being part of the “‘normal’ character of behavior.”

Middleboro officers’ normative view of interracial interaction in residential
spaces was reinforced by the overall ethos of diversity that officers described as
pervading the town’s social climate. Officers regularly stressed residents’ “pro-diversity”
worldview, and how residents objected to any form of policing that they perceived as not
respecting diversity. For instance, an Asian male Middleboro officer remarked:

People love diversity here. That’s why a lot of them move here. You get a lot of
people coming from New York [City]. They want the diversity like they have
over there. That’s why some people say this is like the sixth borough of New
York [City].…. They even got upset when they started gentrifying Park Street.
You’d think they’d [ha]ve been happy that they were getting rid of some of the
trash that was living over there, but no. No, as crazy as it sounds, they want to have poor people here; they don’t want this to become just another milktoast town…. All of this makes it hard for us. They don’t want us messing up their diversity, but they don’t want any crime either. So we walk a fine line here.

Given this ethos of diversity, officers saw the presence of people of different races as being “normal” even in neighborhoods that the officers otherwise marked as “White” or “Black”. This stands in stark contrast to Longwood, where officers perceived diversity as being an anomaly rather than a norm.

While the overall pattern of racial integration in housing in Middleboro and the town’s ethos of diversity primed officers to see interracial interaction in residential spaces as normative, the town’s overall arrangement of schooling was the key to solidifying officers’ normative view of such interaction. As discussed in the next section, Middleboro randomly assigns public school students in all grades to different schools throughout town rather than sending students to schools in closest proximity to their place of residence. By attending racially integrated schools from an early age, children in Middleboro, including those from the racially segregated “Black” southeastern and “White” northern sections, have an opportunity to form interracial friendships. Aware of these patterns, Middleboro officers came to expect friendships between children of different races and different parts of the town, and consequently viewed everyone in town, regardless of race or neighborhood of residence, as being legitimately present or “in place” in any neighborhood. Regarding this point, a White male Middleboro officer stated:

You can’t assume anything….That Black kid from [Monroe] Street could be hanging out with his White friend across town. You never know. Everybody’s got a right to be everywhere.
Given officers’ expectations of interracial friendships across all residential spaces, the contrast between residential spaces in, for example, the southeast and the north, did not factor into Middleboro officers’ assessments of who was “in place”.

As suggested by the preceding quote, Middleboro officers viewed even poor Blacks from the Norman and Monroe Streets area in the southeastern part of town as being legitimately present in residential spaces throughout the town, notwithstanding the difference in their perceived class status and the class status of both Black and White residents in the rest of Middleboro. This is particularly noteworthy when one compares Middleboro and Longwood officers’ views of their two respective towns’ residentially segregated, poor, Black populations. Notwithstanding both towns’ officers’ generally similar, negative view of these segregated, poor, Black populations—Blacks residing in District 4 in Longwood, and Blacks residing in the Norman and Monroe Streets area in Middleboro—, constituency pressures, housing and schooling arrangements, and an ethos of diversity contributed to Middleboro officers’ view that poor, southeastern Blacks were entitled to be present in residential spaces throughout the town, even those marked as “White,” whereas constituency pressures, housing and school arrangements, and a perceived lack of support for diversity contributed to Longwood officers’ view that poor, District 4 Blacks were “out of place” in residential spaces marked other than “Black”.

A comparison of how space affects officers’ perceptions and patrolling of similarly identified poor, Black populations in Middleboro and Longwood highlights the importance of local contexts in understanding the relationship between space and race.
Prior work on race, space, and policing, such as Bates and Fasenfest (2005), Herbert (1997), Meehan and Ponder (2002), and Portillos (2004) suggests that officers’ racially differentiated marking of spaces invariably results in officers patrolling all members of a socially designated racial minority category in the same way either inside or outside of certain racially marked spaces. Herbert (1997) and Portillos (2004) argue that officers’ racially differentiated marking of space results in officers aggressively patrolling all members of a socially designated racial minority group within spaces identified with that group. Consistent with the idea of a macro-societal racial schema in which both Blacks and Hispanics are criminalized, Herbert (1997) argues that Blacks face more aggressive patrolling within “Black” spaces” than they do outside of them, and Portillos (2004) posits that Latinos are patrolled more aggressively in barrios or spaces marked as “criminal” and “Latino” than Whites are patrolled in spaces marked as “White”. Bates and Fasenfest (2005) and Meehan and Ponder (2002) both contend that Blacks are patrolled more aggressively when they enter spaces marked as “White”. The discrepant findings in these prior studies are likely due to these studies inadequate attention to how certain racial minority group members are patrolled across a wide range of spaces in different communal contexts.

Comparing officers’ patrolling of those whom officers identify as “poor” and “Black” in Middleboro and Longwood suggests that members of a given socially identified group may experience substantively different patrolling in different town contexts, and that this variation in patrolling may occur both inside and outside of spaces identified with that particular group. Longwood officers aggressively patrolled those whom they identified as “poor” and “Black” outside of residential spaces the officers
marked as “poor” and “Black”, whereas Middleboro officers did not. In addition, Longwood officers generally did not respond promptly to poor Blacks’ calls for service within “poor”, “Black” spaces, but Middleboro officers did. In sum, these findings suggest that officers’ similar marking of residential spaces in terms of race and class do not necessarily result in the same type of policing of members of a particular race/class grouping across contexts.

6.6. School-Related Spaces and Times in Middleboro

While Longwood’s overall arrangement of school-related spaces conditioned Longwood officers’ social group schemata in ways that promoted racially skewed patrolling practices, Middleboro’s overall arrangement of school-related spaces had the opposite effect. Indeed, Middleboro’s pattern of assigning residents to schools appeared to fundamentally contribute to Middleboro officers’ rather egalitarian patrolling practices throughout most of the town. Unlike Longwood’s process of assigning students to elementary and middle schools based on geographic proximity, Middleboro’s assignment process for students in kindergarten through 8th grade was done through a random selection process. An Asian male Middleboro officer explained the school assignment process in Middleboro as follows:

They’ve got a lottery system here for the schools, all the schools. You might live a block from a school, but you [actually] go to school across town. Your next door neighbor and you might go to totally different schools. There’re some people who don’t like it, but most people here do. They want to keep that diversity going here.

Middleboro’s school assignment process meant that children of all races and classes had an equal chance of attending an elementary or middle school anywhere in Middleboro.
Middleboro officers indicated that this assignment process essentially legitimized the presence of anyone throughout most of the town. The same Asian officer cited immediately above commented on this school-related legitimization:

The ways the schools are set up here, anybody could be anywhere. It’s not like you can say, “What is he doing in the neighborhood, or what is she doing in the neighborhood.” No, I mean, even if you can tell somebody’s not from the neighborhood, you can’t assume, “What are you doing here.” They might be visiting a friend, picking up their child, you never know. Because the kids all go to school with each other, they’ve got friends all over the place. It’s not like where I grew up, where you were pretty much just friends with whoever lived in your neighborhood. No, here, you *expect* kids to be hanging out outside of their neighborhoods. [emphasis added]

As this officer suggests, the random assignment of students starting at the beginning of their school careers not only conditioned officers to expect that children and parents or caretakers of different races and classes would be in various parts of the town related to school-related business and activities, but that children would develop friends who lived in other parts of the town and would socially get together with them. Accordingly, unlike Longwood officers, it did not strike Middleboro officers as being odd to see children or adults of different races and classes in residential neighborhoods that were homogeneous in terms of race and/or class. Children might be visiting friends in such neighborhoods, or their parents or caretakers might be dropping them off or picking them up.

Middleboro officers’ normative view of interracial and interclass social interaction was reinforced by some of the officers’ own experiences growing up and attending school in Middleboro. All four of the fifteen officers in the sample who grew up and attended school in Middleboro indicated that they had multiple friends of different races, including close friends. For instance, a Black Middleboro officer stated:
Come to think of it, I probably had more White friends than Black friends when I was a kid. It was no big deal, it was just who you were friends with. It’s still pretty much that way today. You see some of the White kids who keep to themselves, and some of the Blacks who stay together, but you’re more likely to see some kind of mix.

Likewise, a White male Middleboro officer remarked:

I’m not sayin’ that race doesn’t matter at all, but it’s not really an issue here. My best friend was Black and we’re still friends to this day. I even dated a Black girl in high school for awhile. If that’s what you grow up with, then you don’t really think much about it.

Given these officers’ personal experiences, which they likely shared with other officers who were not from Middleboro, the officers expected to see interracial social interaction irrespective where one lived in town.

Officers’ general expectation of interracial and interclass interaction coupled with their apparent desire to avoid agitating Middleboro’s powerful Black and White coalition, led to fairly uniform patrolling practices across Middleboro’s residential and school-related spaces. The difference between Middleboro officers’ relatively egalitarian patrolling across these spaces, and Longwood’s racially skewed patrolling was vividly manifest by the officers’ patrolling of students following dismissal at the towns’ respective racially diverse high schools. Although Middleboro High School (MHS) is roughly the same size as LHS, the Middleboro Police Department did not, in contrast to the Longwood Police Department, regularly assign any patrol cars to monitor dismissal. Rather, the two school resource officers assigned to MHS routinely came outside and monitored dismissal. Unlike Longwood officers’ preoccupation with Black LHS students exiting LHS, neither of the two resource officers stationed outside on opposite sides of
MHS focused on any particular student groups, which included mostly interracial groups in addition to some all-Black and all-White groups. The two resource officers monitoring dismissal typically remained outside of MHS for about twenty minutes and then went back inside. Unlike Longwood officers’ “herding” of Black LHS students out of District 2 following dismissal, Middleboro officers never followed or attempted to escort any students out of the vicinity of MHS during the course of the ride-alongs. It is likely that the location of MHS in the heart of the racially integrated central part of town (Zone 2) that is home to Middleboro’s powerful Black and White coalition likely contributed to Middleboro officers’ egalitarian and laissez-faire approach with respect to monitoring dismissal. However, given Middleboro officers’ view of all groups as being “in place” across residential and school-related spaces, it is not likely that the officers’ approach would have been any different if MHS had been located in a “White” space.

6.7. Commercial Spaces and Times in Middleboro

Of the three towns’ commercial spaces, those in Middleboro appeared to play the most significant role in conditioning officers’ social group schemata. Middleboro had three main commercial districts or shopping areas. The largest of the three was located along Belton Avenue in the southern part of Middleboro in Zone 3. The second largest was located along Blair Avenue in the northern part of Middleboro in Zone 1. The smallest of the three was located along Vine Road in the western, central part of Middleboro in Zone 2. Middleboro officers spent a disproportionate amount of their discretionary time patrolling the commercial districts along Belton and Blair Avenues respectively, and paid very little attention to the commercial district along Vine Road.
Middleboro officers spent the greatest amount of their discretionary time patrolling the commercial district along Belton Avenue. The two officers assigned to respond to calls from Zone 3 spent the majority of their discretionary time on or in the vicinity of Belton Avenue. The time these officers devoted to the Belton Avenue commercial district steadily increased as the day progressed, with Zone 3 officers spending approximately one-third of their discretionary time between 7 A.M. and 12 P.M., approximately one-half between 12 P.M. and 5 P.M., and three-quarters between 5 P.M. and 11 P.M. The two officers responsible for calls from Zone 2, and the two “floater car” officers who monitored and assisted officers in all three Zones, also devoted a disproportionate amount of discretionary patrolling time to Belton Avenue, especially during the evening hours from 5 P.M. to 11 P.M. Both Zone 2 and floater car officers sometimes spent close to half of their discretionary time in the late afternoons and evenings along Belton Avenue. As will be discussed below, all of these officers spent a disproportionate amount of this discretionary time specifically patrolling the upscale “Mainline” shopping and restaurant district in and around the western part of Belton Avenue. Although the superior officers required officers assigned to Zone 3 to do checks of certain parking lots and establishments in the Mainline district, these officers, as well as Zone 2 and “floater car” officers, repeatedly circled these lots and the streets surrounding and encompassing the district, and often parked at various points in and around the district to monitor the flow of people.

Middleboro officers devoted a disproportionate amount of time to patrolling the Belton Avenue commercial district relative to other commercial, as well as non-commercial, spaces for several reasons. First, Belton Avenue was the largest and most
crowded of Middleboro’s three commercial areas. Second, officers viewed Belton Avenue as being a main access road for disproportionately poor, Black non-residents from neighboring towns such as Belton, Omega, Edgarville, Inglewood, Norville, and Winslow. As discussed more fully under section 6.8, officers saw these “Black” outsiders as bringing a whole host of criminal problems into Middleboro. Third, and most significantly, officers were concerned about protecting businesses and patrons within and in proximity to the Mainline shopping district along western portion of Belton Avenue. This Mainline district, which also encompassed the horseshoe-shaped Chalk Street, and several side streets on both sides of Belton Avenue, consisted of numerous upscale boutiques and restaurants.

Officers’ preoccupation with safeguarding the Mainline district, appeared to be in large part in response to complaints from both the district’s business owners and well-to-do patrons. In particular, officers indicated that over the past ten years or so, store and restaurant owners had repeatedly complained about groups of Black youths congregating in front of or near their establishments. Officers noted that these complainants claimed that these groups of Black youths, whom officers invariably identified as being from the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area, loitered, made excessive noise, littered, and sometimes intimidated or harassed patrons. For instance, a Latina Middleboro officer described the complaints made by the owner of the Epicurian Café, which was located on the eastern fringe of the Mainline district, between Sullivan and Shaw Streets on Belton Avenue. The officer stated the following about the Café’s owner, Jose, who was also a retired Norville cop:
Every time I see [Jose] he tells me about these punks from the [Norman] and [Monroe] Street[s] who hang out in front of his café, making all kinds of noise, throwing their trash on the sidewalk, [and] basically actin’ a fool. He’s always tellin’ them they have to move, and when they don’t, he chases them down the block. He’s knocked a few of them down too…. We try to help [Jose] out as much as we can.

In addition, Middleboro officers’ heightened patrolling of the Mainline district appeared to be in response to a rash of car thefts in the wake of the district’s expansion in the 1990s and early 2000s. As a result of these car thefts, well-to-do patrons and the owners of establishments complained to the officers and demanded greater patrolling of the area. Although officers conceded that none of the car thefts had been linked to anyone from the southeastern part of town, officers nevertheless assumed that such thefts had been carried out by either lower-income Blacks from the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area, or by lower-income Blacks from one of the neighboring towns, such as Norville or Edgarville. Consequently, officers felt pressure to appease these establishment owners and patrons by keeping “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks out of the Mainline district and its surrounding vicinity.

Middleboro officers’ focus on “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks in the Mainline district and its surrounding vicinity was reinforced by officers’ own sense that Blacks from the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area were “out of place” in and near this district. Although the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area was located less than three-quarters of a mile east of the Mainline district, officers nevertheless did not expect residents of that economically depressed area to be patronizing the district’s high-end boutiques and restaurants. For instance, a White male Middleboro officer sarcastically stated the following while discussing the shops in the Mainline district:
These are really ritzy stores here. I mean, I couldn’t afford to shop here. You certainly don’t expect people from [Norman] and [Monroe] Streets window shopping on [Chalk] Street [just off of Belton Avenue]. Unless they won the lottery or something, they just wouldn’t be shopping here.

Likewise, another White male Middleboro officer sarcastically stated the following while discussing the restaurants in the Mainline district:

There’s no Popeye’s Chicken or Taco Bell over here…. It’s just a question of money. You’ve gotta have money if you want to eat here. Someone from [Norman] or [Monroe] [Streets] probably couldn’t afford an appetizer at one of these places.

Thus, while officers saw the overall arrangements of school- and housing-related spaces as conferring “in place” legitimacy to all groups, including poor, southeastern Blacks, officers did not see this “in place” status as extending to the commercial space of the Mainline district. Officers expected southeastern Blacks to have social connections to others throughout town as a result of the configuration of schools and residential areas, but did not expect these Blacks to be shopping and dining in the high-priced Mainline district.

As the preceding two comments suggest, officers’ sense that “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks were “out of place” in the Mainline district and its vicinity appeared to have a lot to do with these Blacks’ class status. Middleboro officers were not worried about the presence of Blacks per se in and near this district, but only those Blacks who appeared to be of lower-class status. Although Whites constituted the majority of patrons in the Mainline district, Blacks who appeared to be of middle- to upper-class status appeared to be of no concern to officers.
Middleboro officers contended that they could identify lower-class status, and hence distinguish between poorer Blacks from the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area and wealthier Blacks from other parts of town or outside of town, based on assessments of dress and demeanor. Officers equated shabby, baggy clothing, particularly jeans sagging below the waistline and “hoodies,” as well as a cocky, evasive, or loud demeanor, with “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks. Furthermore, officers associated any Blacks fitting this profile with the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area, regardless of where they actually resided.

Although Middleboro officers generally saw Blacks who fit the “Norman and Monroe Streets” profile as being “out of place” anywhere in the vicinity of the Mainline commercial district, this perception was temporally qualified. From approximately 3 P.M. to 4:30 P.M. on weekdays during the school year, officers expected groups of Black MHS students from southeastern Middleboro to be walking down Belton Avenue on their way back home from MHS. Following dismissal from MHS, Black students who lived in the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area typically walked in a southward direction down Midway and Pike Streets to Belton Avenue, just west of the Mainline district. These students then made a near mile trek eastward down Belton Avenue, cutting through the Mainline district on their way. Officers effectively saw these Black youths as legitimately present in the vicinity of the Mainline district during this time frame, and as a result, generally did not approach such youths or try to hasten their trek eastward.

With the exception of this relatively narrow window of time in which Black MHS students from the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area cut through the Mainline district, very few Blacks from this southeastern area of Middleboro actually assembled in this
commercial district or its surrounding vicinity during the course of the ride-along observations. Officers reasoned that Blacks from the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area did not venture into the Mainline district because these Blacks “fe[lt] out of their comfort zone”. As a result, officers rarely had any interactions with “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks within this district.

However, while “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks generally did not venture into the Mainline district, they did regularly congregate on the southern side of Belton Avenue between Sullivan Street, which was the unofficial start of the district, and Wysteria Street, which was located two blocks to the east. When “Norman and Monroe Streets” Black MHS students lingered along this stretch of Belton Avenue past 5 P.M., or when other “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks ventured into this eastern fringe of the Mainline district on weeknights during the school year, weekends year round, and afternoons and evenings during the summer months, Middleboro officers generally attempted to steer these Blacks out of the area in an eastward direction. In particular, officers appeared to try to keep these southeastern Blacks east of Wysteria Street.

In attempting to steer “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks out of the vicinity of the Mainline district, Middleboro officers primarily engaged in subtle, non-confrontational practices. In particular, officers exploited a phenomenon they described as “scattering.” As noted in Chapter 4, “scattering” referred to the seemingly Pavlovian way that southeastern Blacks quickly dispersed or scattered in multiple directions when a patrol car approached them. In general, officers attempted to “scatter” those Blacks whom they identified as fitting “Norman and Monroe Streets” profile in an eastward direction down Belton Avenue. Officers most frequently “scattered” “Norman and
Monroe Streets” Blacks on Sullivan Street, which officers viewed as the eastern border of the Mainline district. In what appeared in large part to reflect their concern about keeping southeastern Blacks out of the Mainline district, officers patrolled Sullivan Street, especially the intersection of Sullivan Street and Belton Avenue, more than any other street perpendicular or adjacent to Belton Avenue.

In addition to their non-confrontational practice of scattering, which did not require officers to exit the patrol car, Middleboro officers also appeared to attempt to push “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks out of the eastern vicinity of the Mainline district through more aggressive, confrontational practices while on foot patrol. Strikingly, the length of Sullivan Street and the two block stretch of Belton Avenue between Sullivan and Wysteria Streets were the only spatial locations in which officers regularly exited their patrol cars and patrolled on foot in the vicinity of the Mainline district.

While on foot patrol, Middleboro officers were by far most preoccupied with a small, inexpensive take-out restaurant called “The Chicken Shack.” The Chicken Shack was located on Belton Avenue near Shaw Street, which was one block east of Sullivan Street. Unlike all of the other establishments located on Belton Avenue between Sullivan and Wysteria Streets, the Chicken Shack regularly drew a predominantly Black clientele. While some of these predominantly Black patrons congregated inside the Chicken Shack, the majority of them gathered on the sidewalk in front of the Chicken Shack as well as on the sidewalks in front of several other adjacent and nearby establishments, including two cafes with outdoor dining areas.27 Some of the Chicken Shack’s regular clientele were
MHS students who lingered there on their way home from school. Slightly over half of the Chicken Shack’s clientele were male, middle-aged adult “regulars”.

Officers described the majority of the Chicken Shack’s predominantly Black patrons as fitting the “Norman and Monroe Streets” profile. This assessment was largely based on the way these patrons dressed and carried themselves. In particular, officers commented on Chicken Shack patrons’ wearing of “hoodies”, dressing “ghetto”, and posturing like “thugs”. For instance, a White male Middleboro officer made the following comments regarding the Black patrons congregating outside of the Chicken Shack:

> It’s gotta be what, close to ninety degrees out, and they’re wearing those stupid hoodies. What’s up with that? They cover their heads, but their pants are falling down and their asses are showing…. These guys try to act all tough and gangster-like, but they’re really pussies. It’s just like on Norman and Monroe [Streets]. You never see ‘em by themselves. [Sarcastically] They always need to be with their “posse”.

Officers frequently implied that the “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks who congregated at the Chicken Shack were there for reasons other than the food. In part, officers saw the Chicken Shack as a “Black” hangout. In making this point, officers commented on how patrons/congregants, several of whom were “regulars”, often stood outside the Chicken Shack for hours at a time conversing with each other or smoking cigarettes. In addition, officers frequently pointed out how those standing on the sidewalk did not have any food in their hands.

Officers also believed that at least some, if not all, of the congregants at the Chicken Shack were there for the more pernicious reason of engaging in illegal activities. In particular, officers claimed that the Chicken Shack’s owners, who were Black, used
the take-out restaurant as a front for illegal drug and gambling activity. Officers argued that this drug and gambling activity took place inside the Chicken Shack, and that the congregants on the sidewalks served as lookouts for the police.

Besides their own suspicions of illegal activity at the Chicken Shack, officers indicated that the Chicken Shack had become a lightning rod for complaints from surrounding business owners and patrons. In particular, the owners of the two nearby cafes with outdoor dining areas regularly complained to the officers about the crowds loitering on the sidewalk and making noise outside of the Chicken Shack. These owners told the officers that these “loiterers” were “scaring away customers”. Other nearby shopkeepers complained that the crowds outside the Chicken Shack were “ruining their businesses”.

In light of these complaints as well as officers’ own suspicions of illegal activities at the Chicken Shack, foot patrol officers engaged in an aggressive campaign in 2006 to disperse the crowds on the sidewalk outside of and near the Chicken Shack. In contrast to the typical scattering response of “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks, the Blacks hanging out by the Chicken Shack generally ignored Middleboro officers when the officers approached them on foot. Several officers indicated that the Blacks congregating at and by the Chicken Shack had claimed this space as “their turf”. For instance, a Black Middleboro officer stated the following while referring to the officers’ ongoing battle with the Black congregants outside of the Chicken Shack:

Yeah we got ourselves a regular turf war. These hardheads think that this place is their turf and that they can do whatever they want. Well, this ain’t Norville, so they can forget about all that turf crap. These are our sidewalks, not theirs. [emphasis added]
As the preceding officer’s comments suggest, Middleboro officers appeared to view their efforts to move the Blacks congregating by the Chicken Shack as somewhat of a personal crusade, or even a crucible. As a result, officers’ approach to these congregants was sometimes highly confrontational, in contrast to officers’ generally restrained, laissez-faire approach in other spaces throughout Middleboro. On several occasions officers got into heated verbal confrontations with groups of Black youths and adults standing on the sidewalk after the officers informed these groups that they could not loiter and block the sidewalk. On two particular occasions, some of the Black youth, in a manner reminiscent of that of White youth in the northern part of the town, defiantly asked the officers why they did not harass the White youths and young adults who congregated on the street outside of a night club (Benny’s Club) on the opposite side of Belton Avenue slightly east of the Chicken Shack. Notwithstanding the congregants’ protestations, all of these encounters eventually ended with the Black congregants moving eastward down Belton Avenue.28

While Middleboro officers displayed heightened concern about the presence of “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks at most times within the vicinity of the Mainline commercial district on the western side of Belton Avenue, officers demonstrated virtually no concern about their presence in commercial spaces such as Lakeview Plaza along the eastern side of Belton Avenue.29 For instance, as noted in Chapter 5, Blacks from the Norman and Monroe Streets area habitually congregated inside and outside of a Chinese restaurant located on Belton Avenue not far from Norman Street. Like the owners of the restaurants and shops in the vicinity of the Mainline district, the owners of the Chinese restaurant had complained in the past to officers about Blacks who appeared to be from
the Norman and Monroe Streets area. However, even though the Chinese restaurant’s owners’ complaints about these Blacks involved more openly threatening behavior such as cursing at and otherwise intimidating the owners and other patrons, Middleboro officers did not regularly and proactively patrol the Chinese restaurant like they did the restaurants and shops surrounding the Chicken Shack. Indeed, the only time that officers went to the Chinese restaurant was in response to an actual call for service. This discrepancy shows that officers’ concern about “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks was spatially contingent, and suggests the wealthier business owners and patrons along the western side of Belton Avenue carried substantially more clout with the officers. Moreover, officers’ lack of proactive patrolling along the eastern portion of Belton Avenue implies that officers were content to have “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks stay within that eastern commercial stretch of Belton Avenue as opposed to having them venture into the western stretch.

Officers’ particular apparent concern about displacing “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks who were in the vicinity of the Mainline district is brought into starker relief when officers’ handling of these Blacks in this area is compared to officers’ handling of “problematic” Whites. Like “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks, White youths and young adults generally did not congregate within the Mainline district. On Friday and Saturday nights, and sometimes other nights of the week, large groups of young adult Whites, sometimes as large as two-hundred people, gathered on the sidewalk in front of Benny’s Club, which was located near Wysteria Street on the northern side of Belton Avenue, approximately two blocks from the start of the Mainline district. Officers referred to Benny’s Club as a “grunge lounge”, and described the majority of its
White, middle-class patrons as “Goths” who wore “black wardrobes and black nails”. Although these “Goths” clearly blocked the sidewalk, loitered, made excessive noise, officers’ approach to these “loiterers” was completely opposite of their approach to the Chicken Shack “loiterers”. In contrast to their aggressive efforts to disperse the Blacks standing by the Chicken Shack, officers made no effort to disperse the “Goths” standing by Benny’s.

Officers appeared to defend their laissez-faire approach with respect to these “Goths” by suggesting that the “Goths” could lawfully congregate on the sidewalk because Benny’s was a legitimate business. Moreover, officers also indicated that while numerous business owners and patrons had complained about the Blacks congregating outside of the Chicken Shack, virtually no owners or patrons had complained about the Goths congregating outside of Benny’s. While it is likely that some underlying negative racial and class stereotypes account in part for the officers’ different approaches to the “Goths” by Benny’s and the Blacks by the Chicken Shack, it appears that officers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of the two respective businesses, and the expectations of influential constituents, contributed to these disparate approaches.

Officers’ comparative handling of White skateboarders in the vicinity of the Mainline district also highlights Middleboro officers’ particular preoccupation with displacing “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks from the vicinity of the Mainline district. On occasion officers stopped and scolded White pre-adolescent and adolescent skateboarders for riding on Belton Avenue or Chalk Street within the district, but their approach with these White skateboarders was far less confrontational than that with the Blacks by the Chicken Shack. Most importantly, unlike their efforts to displace Blacks
congregating by the Chicken Shack, officers did not try to displace the White skateboarders out of the area. Rather, officers told the skateboarders that they could skateboard anywhere except Belton Avenue and Chalk Street, and that they could remain in the district as long as they refrained from riding.

In contrast to their relatively tame approach to White youth and young adult loiterers and skateboarders in the vicinity of the Mainline district, officers’ approach to White upper-middle-class youths and young adults in the commercial district along Blair Avenue in northern Middleboro was much more contentious. While officers generally exhibited a laissez-faire approach with respect to northern White youths and young adults in residential spaces, officers regularly proactively confronted groups of Whites loitering on sidewalks and skateboarding in parking lots and on roads within the Blair Avenue commercial district. Like officers’ confrontations with Blacks outside of the Chicken Shack, officers’ confrontations Whites at various points within the Blair Avenue commercial district appeared to be prompted by a history of complaints from business owners and patrons. Although officers sometimes had heated confrontations with groups of young northern White loiterers and skateboarder that were similar to those that the officers had with Blacks outside of the Chicken Shack, officers’ confrontations with these Whites, unlike those with Blacks by the Chicken Shack, did not appear to be part of a larger effort to entirely displace them from the commercial district. Rather, in the case of both White loiterers blocking sidewalks in front of stores and White skateboarders riding in parking lots or streets, officers simply tried to move the Whites to a nearby space where they would not be disturbing pedestrians or drivers. For instance, as noted in Chapter 5, officers repeatedly told White skateboarders that they could ride in Allison
Park adjacent to the Blair Avenue commercial district. Likewise officers told groups of White loiterers, such as the group of six White males and six White females who were standing on the corner of Vine Street and Blair Avenue on one occasion, that they could congregate by some benches located in the center of the Blair Avenue district. Thus, although officers appeared to see groups of both young northern Whites and “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks as becoming a “problem” when they ventured into certain commercial spaces, officers nevertheless appeared to view the young northern Whites as being less “out of place” than the “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks. In effect, officers appeared to view the White groups in the north as a “nuisance”, whereas the officers viewed the Black groups in the south as more of a serious “threat”.

Unlike their extensive monitoring of both the Belton Avenue and Blair Avenue commercial districts, Middleboro officers paid virtually no attention to the smaller, less concentrated commercial strip along Vine Road in the central part of town (Zone 2). Other than taking food out to eat, the officers assigned to calls from Zone 2 spent little time along Vine Road. In addition, those officers assigned to “floater cars” generally ignored the western part of Zone 2, including Vine Road. Officers indicated that they devoted minimal discretionary patrolling time to Vine Road in part because they did not associate it with any ongoing problems. Officers pointed out that unlike business owners in the Mainline and Blair Avenue commercial districts, business owners along Vine Road did not complain about any groups loitering or otherwise interfering with their establishments.

Officers also suggested that the type of establishment along Vine Road commercial strip, plus its diverse clientele, worked against the need to proactively patrol
the strip. Officers indicated that unlike the Mainline and Blair Avenue commercial
districts, the Vine Road commercial strip had few “upscale” establishments. Rather,
Vine Road strip consisted of convenience stores like Wayne’s, inexpensive to moderately
priced take-out restaurants, and a string of small shops. As a result, officers expected
anyone to shop or dine in this district. Moreover, officers saw the Vine Road strip’s
racially heterogeneous mix of patrons as presenting fewer potential problems than the
“bolder” racially homogeneous groups found in the towns’ two larger commercial
districts.  

A comparison of Middleboro’s three main commercial spaces shows that some
commercial spaces activated meanings associated with particular interest groups that
were powerful enough to override countervailing pressures from the town’s powerful
constituency groups. While officers perceived the interests of business owners and
patrons in the Vine Road commercial strip as being consonant with the interests of the
town’s powerful Black/White coalition and northern White populations, officers saw the
the interests of business owners and patrons in and near the Mainline and Blair Avenue
commercial districts as being at odds with those of the town’s powerful constituency
groups. Although officers were generally reluctant to approach northern White youths in
residential and school spaces throughout Middleboro for fear of angering their wealthy,
powerful parents, officers routinely proactively confronted such youths along the Blair
Avenue commercial district due to the salience of business owners’ and patrons’ interest
in this area. In the Blair Avenue commercial district, officers viewed the interests of
business owners and patrons as being paramount, and these interests effectively eclipsed
those of northern White parents.
Conflicting interests of business owners and patrons were even more pronounced in the Mainline district and appeared to be the driving force behind officers’ aggressive patrolling of “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks in that district. Although the powerful, liberal, “pro-civil rights” Black/White coalition provided a shield for the poor Blacks in the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area throughout most of the town notwithstanding officers’ generally negative view of these Blacks, the coalition’s protective umbrella did not reach the Mainline district and its vicinity due to the salience of the interests of business owners and well-to-do patrons who objected to these Blacks’ presence. Moreover, given the salience of business owners’ and patrons’ interests in and near the Mainline district, the “in place” spatial legitimacy that the town’s overall housing and schooling arrangements granted to “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks throughout much of the town did not extend to the vicinity of the Mainline district.

6.8. Border- and Road-Related Spaces and Times in Middleboro

Border- and road-related spaces figured prominently in conditioning officers’ social group schemata in Middleboro. Such spaces were particularly significant in conditioning officers’ social group schemata with respect to non-resident racial minorities, especially non-resident Blacks. While, as noted in section 6.12, a variety of spaces in Coretown activated officers’ thoughts about non-resident contexts, border-related spaces appeared to exclusively activate officers’ thoughts about non-resident contexts in Middleboro.

Middleboro officers’ concerns about border- and road-related spaces appeared to be exclusively limited to the southern part of Middleboro. Middleboro officers never expressed any concerns about any of Middleboro’s other official borders, all of which,
unlike Middleboro’s southern borders, were shared with towns that had mostly White, middle- to upper-middle-class populations. Like Coretown officers, Middleboro especially saw lower-income, non-resident Blacks from neighboring “Black” towns or sections of towns as being “threats”. Given that all of the entry points for Blacks from these neighboring “Black” towns were located in the southern part of Middleboro, this part of town was most salient in officers’ minds.

In particular, Middleboro officers expressed and demonstrated concern about lower-income Blacks coming into Middleboro through two main southern entry points. One of these entry points was easternmost part of the aforementioned Belton Avenue. Officers were particularly concerned about this entry point because they saw it as the principal route used by many disproportionately lower-income Blacks from Norville, Edgarville, and Inglewood. Officers pointed out that not only did Belton Avenue run eastward through the disproportionately “Black” town of Belton, and the disproportionately lower-income “Black” city of Norville, but that it also connected up with the Expressway, providing quick access for people from other neighboring, disproportionately lower-income “Black” cities and towns such as Edgarville and Inglewood.

The other major entry point was the southernmost point in Middleboro on Omega Road. Officers referred to this space on Omega Road as “Five Points” because it was where the official borders of Middleboro, Winslow, Omega, Edgarville, and Georgeville met. In particular, officers were concerned about lower-income Blacks coming in from Edgarville, Omega, and the section of Winslow bordering Middleboro. Just the mention of “Five Points” activated Middleboro officers’ thoughts of these lower-income “Black”
contexts. Officers also were concerned that some Blacks from Norville and Inglewood used Omega Road as a point of entry. In addition, officers were worried about non-resident Blacks entering Middleboro via several other north-south roads close to and to the west of Omega Road. In particular, officers were concerned about non-resident Blacks entering Middleboro on either Hanover Avenue or Hilton Street, both of which connected up with a lower-income “Black” section of neighboring Winslow.

Middleboro officers focused on lower-income Black non-residents because they saw these non-residents as representing two types of major crime-related threats. First and foremost, Middleboro officers viewed non-resident Blacks as being directly responsible for a lot of the more serious crime in Middleboro. In particular, officers attributed the bulk of Middleboro’s burglaries and car thefts to non-resident Blacks. For instance, although Middleboro officers did not expressly refer to the race of those whom they thought were responsible for the string of burglaries that had occurred primarily in the southwestern and central parts of Middleboro in 2006, officers invariably suggested that these suspected burglars were likely from the “Black” towns of Omega and Edgarville. Officers saw the majority of these burglars as entering and exiting Middleboro via the southern entry points of Omega Road, Hanover Avenue, or Hilton Street.

Similarly, while Middleboro officers did not expressly refer to the race of those suspected of being responsible for a rash of car thefts primarily in the southwestern part of Middleboro, officers routinely implied that the suspected thieves were from “Black” cities and towns such as Norville, Edgarville, Omega, and Inglewood. In addition, officers also suspected that the majority of car thieves entered and exited Middleboro via
the southern entry points of Omega Road, Hanover Avenue, or Hilton Street. For example, a White male Middleboro officer stated:

   When they come into town to steal a car, steal headlights, hubcaps, whatever, they usually come up through Omega [Road], Hanover [Avenue], and Hilton [Street] and then make their way into town, and then shoot back down that way.

Besides attributing the majority of burglaries and car thefts to non-resident Blacks, Middleboro officers also attributed the majority of illegal drug sales to these non-residents. Officers claimed that non-residents from Norville, Edgarville, Inglewood, Omega, and Winslow came into Middleboro to sell illegal drugs to Middleboro residents in both the southeastern part of town near Belton Avenue, particularly in the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area, as well as the southernmost part of town, especially between Five Points and Nilson Park, which was located slightly under three quarters of a mile northwest of Five Points. In the southernmost area near Five Points, Middleboro officers suspected that non-residents were selling drugs at a gazebo by a bus stop on Omega Road. On one occasion, after repeatedly questioning four Black males who claimed to be eating chicken in the gazebo, a White male Middleboro officer implied that these men were selling drugs when he stated, “I bet they’ve got more than chicken and fries in those bags”. The officer’s suspicion of these four men appeared to increase not only because of the time that it was taking for these men to eat their chicken, but also after the officer learned through questioning them that two of the men were from Omega, one was from Edgarville, and one was from Winslow. Middleboro officers also suspected that non-residents were selling drugs out of four small stores across the street from the gazebo on Omega Road. Officers contended that these four stores were “fronts” for “drug peddling”.
Middleboro officers believed that the crime problems that they attributed to non-resident Blacks, particularly those occurring in the southwestern part of Middleboro, were exacerbated by Winslow police officers’ displacement of Winslow’s crime problems, such as burglaries and robberies, into the southwestern part of Middleboro. Middleboro officers argued that Winslow officers were intentionally pushing “criminals” from Winslow’s lower-income Black section along the Middleboro’s southwestern border into Middleboro. An Asian male Middleboro officer described this problem as follows:

The [Winslow] police got this cat and mouse game going on with the Blacks who live over on the other side of [Gideon’s] Cemetery. They tell [the Blacks] to keep moving ‘cause they don’t wanna have to deal with them. They push them over a block, then the Blacks try to push back, but [the Winslow police] keep pushing them. [The Winslow police] just keep pushing them right into [Middleboro]. And then they’re like, “You handle it.” It gets to be a real pain in the ass….

This officer further indicated that the Winslow police officers’ displacement of Black “criminals” into Middleboro had made it substantially more difficult for Middleboro officers to deal with the crime problems in the southern part of town not only because of the increased volume of crime, but also because of the greater difficulty in apprehending many of these displaced Winslow “criminals”. The officer explained that it was particularly difficult for Middleboro officers to catch many of these “criminals” from Winslow because these “criminals” entered and exited Middleboro on foot through Gideon’s Cemetery and the woods adjacent to both sides of the cemetery. As a result of these “criminals” entering and exiting on foot as opposed to by vehicle, officers had a much harder time trying to intercept them before or apprehend them after the commission of a crime.
While Middleboro officers saw some of the aforementioned crime problems, particularly burglary and car theft, as being largely attributable to the entry of non-resident Blacks through Omega Road, Hanover Avenue, or Hilton Street in the southernmost part of Middleboro, or through Gideon’s Cemetery in the southwestern corner, officers saw the problem of commercial crimes such as shoplifting along the Belton Avenue commercial district as being due in part to the entry of non-resident Blacks through the easternmost part of Belton Avenue. However, as noted in section 6.7, although officers believed that non-resident Blacks were responsible for some of the commercial crimes along Belton Avenue, officers tended to attribute most of these crimes to “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks.

In addition to viewing non-resident Blacks as being directly responsible for a disproportionate amount of the more serious crime in Middleboro, officers also viewed non-resident Blacks as posing a threat in terms of their negative influence on southeastern Black Middleboro residents. In particular, officers believed that many of the non-resident Blacks who entered Middleboro via Belton Avenue in the southeastern part of town spent a disproportionate amount of their time interacting with lower-income Black residents in the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area, which was located near the southeastern border on the southern side of Belton Avenue, and to a lesser extent, with lower-income Black residents in the Greenwood apartment complex on the northern side of Belton Avenue near the southeastern border. Officers were concerned that these southeastern Black residents’ interactions with non-resident Blacks would turn these residents into “harder”, more dangerous criminals, and would exacerbate these residents’ involvement in illegal drug and gang activity.
Of all of their concerns about social networking between non-resident Blacks and southeastern Black Middleboro residents, officers foremost suggested that these non-residents would make these residents into “harder criminals”. As noted in Chapter 5, officers generally saw Middleboro’s lower-income southeastern Black residents as being “softer” than, and relatively innocuous in comparison to, non-resident Blacks. However, officers were concerned that through sustained interactions with non-resident Blacks, southeastern Black residents’ behavior would come to approximate that of non-resident Blacks through modeling or non-resident Blacks’ “schooling” of Black residents. For instance, a Black male Middleboro officer expressed concern about younger southeastern Blacks’ modeling of non-resident Blacks’ “gangster ways” when he stated the following while patrolling on Monroe Street:

A kid from [Inglewood] or [Edgarville] who’s street-smart comes over to [Norman and Monroe Streets] and he becomes a supergangster. And then the next thing you know, you’ve got all these wannabes lining up to be just like him.

Similarly, a White male Middleboro officer voiced concern about southeastern Black residents’ not only imitating non-resident Blacks’ criminal ways, but their violent criminal ways:

You mostly get a lot of petty stuff with the [residents] over [on] [Norman] and [Monroe]. You know, your shoplifting, maybe an occasional purse snatching, like the one with that lady up by the [Lakeview] station last week, but it’s not your hardcore kinda stuff. It’s not like [Norville]. If he’s from [Norville], first thing you’re thinking is, “He’s probably got a gun, and he’s probably gonna use it.” That’s why it’s not good for [Norman] and [Monroe] [residents] to be mixing with [Norville] [residents]. It’s not that bad now, but you don’t want to wake up and see that [Norman] and [Monroe’s] turned into a shooting gallery.

In addition to their concern that non-resident Blacks would turn southeastern
Black residents into “harder”, more violent criminals, Middleboro officers were worried that such non-resident visitors would exacerbate the drug problem in the southeastern part of Middleboro. Officers were not simply worried that non-residents would come into Middleboro and sell drugs as mentioned above, but also that they would get more residents involved in the illegal drug trade as distributors. More specifically, officers were concerned that non-resident Blacks would, as one White male Middleboro officer put it, teach southeastern Black residents “the ins and outs of the drug trade”. For instance, while patrolling on Norman Street, a Black male Middleboro officer stated:

> It’s the ones from [Norville] and [Edgarville] that you’ve got to watch out for. They’re pros, not like [the people] here. But [the people here] learn fast. They watch how they operate and then all of sudden they think they’re real slick. Like they start hiding drugs in drain pipes…. And we had this one case where the kids had pot in a bag of Lay’s potato chips, just sitting in the garbage can, ready for a pick up.

Besides their worries about an exacerbation of the drug problem in southeastern Middleboro, officers also expressed a great deal of concern about what they described as a burgeoning gang problem. Such concerns only appeared to become salient when officers were patrolling spaces in the southeastern part of town near the border, such as the abandoned religious college’s buildings referenced below. Officers contended that while the gang problem in Middleboro was currently minimal, it appeared to be expanding, and they attributed such expansion almost exclusively to the influence of non-resident Blacks from neighboring towns. For instance, while patrolling the southeastern side on Magnolia Street near Norman and Monroe Streets, a White male Middleboro officer stated:
The gang/ Bloods problem has seeped into [Middleboro] from the outside; it’s all through outside connections. Maybe a former [Middleboro] resident moves to [Edgarville], [Omega], etc., or vice-versa, has family living over that way, or they meet up at the mall, and then before you know it, it’s spreading like crack. Once it comes in it’s like a tumor. If you don’t take care of it, it’s only gonna spread.

Similarly, while examining graffiti on the walls of a couple of abandoned buildings that formerly belonged to a religious college on Belton Avenue near Norman Street, a White male Middleboro officer also expressed both fear of an expanding gang problem, and like the preceding officer, a need to contain the problem by cutting off the influence of non-residents:

As you can see, there’s gang graffiti all over the place. You’ve got the Young Outlaws, Y.O.L., that’s what Y.O.L. means. That’s their symbol there, the crown with the three dots…. You can see the Bloods have been all over this place too. They cross out all the “C’s” in everything ‘cause of the “C” in Crips. They can’t even say words with a “C” in them. We’ve never had much of gang problem here, mostly wannabes. You can’t be sure if they’re wannabes or not. But you know that this is probably an outside job. Probably from [Norville]. They’re the ones bringin’ the gang lifestyle over here…. We have to find a way to make sure that this doesn’t become the real thing…. We’ve got to break up their parleyin’ before it gets out of control.

Besides spaces in the southeast in which officers identified gang graffiti, officers’ concern about a non-resident-induced expansion of the gang problem in the southeast became apparent when officers were patrolling Green Park off of Magnolia Street on the southeastern border (one block east of Monroe Street). In particular, this space activated officers’ gang concern when there were basketball games at the park that attracted outsiders, almost all of whom were Black, from Edgarville, Omega, Belton, and Norville. These games evoked officers’ thoughts about non-residents’ gang influence because
officers believed that gangs from these other Edward County cities and towns recruited new members at the basketball games.

In order to deal with the two major crime-related threats that they associated with non-resident Blacks, Middleboro officers disproportionately patrolled spaces along the southeastern border by Belton Avenue, and the southernmost border, especially between Five Points and Gideon’s Cemetery in the southwest corner of town. In particular, officers conducted a disproportionate amount of traffic enforcement at the southern entry/exit points on Omega Road (Five Points), Hanover Avenue, and Hilton Street, and the eastern entry/exit point on Belton Avenue.\(^{34}\)

Officers conducted the most traffic enforcement at Five Points, the southern entry/exit point on Omega Road, which is a north-south cross-town road. Officers both expressly and implicitly conveyed that they chose this point on Omega Road in order to monitor and possibly intercept suspicious non-resident (Blacks) from towns like Omega, Edgarville, and Winslow. For instance, a White male Middleboro officer indicated that he chose to do traffic enforcement at Five Points not only because he knew he would find a lot of non-residents from “Black” towns like Omega and Edgarville to pull over, but also because he would be able to possibly detect other, more significant problems. This officer stated:

I could set up [radar] on [Omega] [Road] and give out tickets all day…. I could do plate checks all day and half of ‘em would come up with a suspended license…. You get lots of cars comin’ in from Omega and Edgarville and you’ll probably find something on them…. It may be [a] minor [traffic violation], but you might stumble onto something bigger.
In a slightly different vein, after another White male Middleboro officer stopped and
issued a ticket to a Black male from Omega who, along with his three Black male
passengers, came through “Five Points” in a what the officer described as a “low rider”
with illegal “black front tints”, the officer indicated that he conducted traffic enforcement
at Five Points because it would enable him to prevent “outsiders” from bringing their
“dirt” into Middleboro. This officer stated:

This is good spot to do radar ‘cause you’ve got people coming and going from all
the different towns. If you’re gonna catch something, you’re gonna catch it here.
And if you do, it’s a good way to tell outsiders that they’re not welcome to bring
their dirt [into Middleboro].

This same officer went on to say that crime had dropped in Middleboro because there
were fewer “outsiders” coming into town.

In justifying their decision to conduct traffic enforcement at Five Points, other
Middleboro officers indicated that it was a good place to intercept “criminals” who were
heading back to towns like Omega and Edgarville. For instance, in explaining why he
never conducted traffic enforcement at the northern entry/exit points on Omega Road,
another White male Middleboro officer indicated that in all of his eight years as a
Middleboro patrol officer, car thieves had gone north up through the towns of Vincent,
Chestnut, or Colvin on only three occasions. This officer elaborated his point as follows:

Where they gonna go? [Vincent]? [Chestnut]? [Colvin]? C’mon, they’re not
gonna go there. That’s so far away from home, that’s the boondocks. Where are
they gonna go there? They wouldn’t go up there. You know they gotta come
home some time. They don’t have any of their peeps up there. You know that
they’re probably gonna go back the way they came—down [Omega] [Road],
[Hanover] [Avenue], or [Hilton] Street. They just gotta….
In short, this officer conducted traffic enforcement at Five Points at least in part to be in position to intercept car thieves who would be making their way back to towns like Omega and Edgarville.

For similar reasons, officers also conducted a substantial amount of traffic enforcement at the eastern entry point of Belton Avenue. For instance, in explaining why he chose to do traffic enforcement at that point on Belton Avenue, a White male Middleboro officer stated:

You need to show a presence; you’ve got to show the losers who want to come in and steal cars and sell drugs that we aren’t going to put up with that nonsense, period. You can’t just come in here and go wilding; this isn’t [Norville].

While this officer, like almost all of the other officers, did not expressly make any reference to race, it appears from his reference to the “Black” city of Norville and his use of the racially charged term “wilding”, that this officer wanted to “show a presence” to non-resident Blacks.

Although Middleboro officers, like Coretown officers, at times expressed concerns about accusations of racial profiling, Middleboro officers never raised such concerns while they were engaged in what appeared to be “profiling” of non-resident Blacks along Middleboro’s southeastern and southernmost/southwestern border areas. While Coretown officers’ concerns about racial profiling appeared to be driven by their consciousness of a social group disparity, which in turn activated thoughts of a critical national audience, Middleboro officers’ concerns appeared to be more directly driven by local constituency group pressures—particularly Middleboro’s powerful “liberal” Black/White coalition. However, Middleboro officers did not appear to be worried about this “liberal” Black/White coalition criticizing their patrolling practices in either the
spaces along the southern borders, or in and around the Mainline commercial district as discussed under section 6.7.

While the pressures and threat-based concerns of powerful business owners and patrons appeared to supersede those of the Black/White coalition in officers’ minds when the officers were patrolling the vicinity of the Mainline district, the salience of highly threatening outside “Black” contexts coupled with officers’ perceptions of the Black/White coalition’s own ambivalence towards “outsiders” appear to have eclipsed the salience of the coalition’s “pro-civil rights” pressures in officers’ minds when the officers were patrolling southern border areas. Spaces along Middleboro’s southern border not only activated Middleboro officers’ stereotypical thoughts of dangerous, criminogenic outside “Black” contexts such as Norville, Omega, and Edgarville, but they appeared to trigger officers’ thoughts about Middleboro’s otherwise “liberal” Black/White coalition’s mixed feelings about burglars and car thieves coming into Middleboro from other towns. On several occasions while patrolling spaces along Middleboro’s southern borders, officers indicated that while Middleboro’s “liberal” residents wanted the officers to safeguard civil liberties, these residents also wanted the officers to simultaneously protect them from “outside threats”.

As a result of their perception of the “liberal” coalition’s ambivalence towards “outsiders”, Middleboro officers, particularly when patrolling in the southern border areas, did not feel that they had to be cautious in dealing with non-residents in the same way that they were with residents (other than in the vicinity of the Mainline district). As noted in Chapter 4, Middleboro officers generally were cautious in their dealings with residents, including the poor Black residents from the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area
whom officers held in low regard, in part because of pressures they perceived from this Black/White coalition. However, given their perception of the coalition’s own ambivalence, officers did not see the protective umbrella that this coalition provided for poor “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks as extending to Black non-residents from nearby cities and towns such as Omega, Edgarville, and Norville. Thus, for instance, when a group of seven Black adolescents from Omega and Inglewood climbed over fence and jumped in a township pool (Nilson Pool) located less than one quarter mile from the Winslow/Middleboro border at 10 P.M. one evening, officers, without any hesitation, arrested all seven adolescents for trespassing. In contrast, when a group of about a dozen Black male adolescent Middleboro residents got into a bloody fistfight in the parking lot at Lakeview Plaza at approximately 8 P.M. on another evening, officers declined to arrest anyone. In effect, the meanings that officers associated with border-related spaces in the southern part of town led to officers’ less cautious policing of the non-resident Blacks whom they encountered in such spaces.

6.9. Housing-Related Spaces and Times in Coretown

Given the lack of racial diversity that they perceived among residents, Coretown officers, unlike Middleboro and Longwood officers, engaged in minimal racial marking of residential housing spaces. While Coretown officers’ marked one northwestern neighborhood in Post 1 and one southeastern neighborhood in Post 3 as “Black”, this marking appeared to have no bearing on patrolling. Officers indicated that they used to have some problems with some of the residents in the northwestern “Black” neighborhood in the past, but the “troublemakers” had either been “locked up” or had moved elsewhere. Officers now viewed these neighborhoods as being no different from
the mass of “White” neighborhoods constituting the rest of the town. Although Coretown officers also identified two “Black” properties in “White” neighborhoods in Posts 2 and 4, the officers’ disproportionate attention to these properties focused on the occupants’ ties to outsiders, as discussed below. Coretown officers generally did not distinguish residents’ properties based on the residents’ race absent any seeming ties to non-residents.

While Coretown officers generally did not mentally partition residential housing space in terms of race, the officers did partition such space in terms of class. Coretown officers saw the southern half of the town (Posts 3 and 4) as being comprised of lower-middle-class to middle-class or “blue-collar” residents, and the northern half of town as being comprised of upper-middle-class “white-collar” residents. Notwithstanding this class-based differentiation of residential spaces, Coretown officers responded to service calls or observed problematic or suspicious behavior with the same degree of alacrity in both the southern and northern halves of town. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, Coretown officers’ prompt attention to residents’ problems in the south was driven in part by the officers’ perceived affinity to southern Coretown residents, whereas the officers’ prompt attention to residents’ problems in the north was driven largely by the officers’ recognition of these residents’ power and influence within Coretown.

In addition to activating meanings associated with different residential social group groups in the three towns, residential housing-related spaces, most notably in Coretown, activated meanings associated with contexts beyond the borders of the towns in which officers patrolled. In some cases, activities that occurred in a random, happenstance way on or near certain residential spaces triggered officers’ thoughts of
outside contexts. In particular, acts of vandalism that occurred in seemingly random residential spaces in Coretown routinely activated Coretown officers’ thoughts of Galena, Kingston, and Raymond Heights. For instance, a White male officer commented on a series of acts of vandalism that had occurred during December of the prior year (2005). He stated:

You get a lotta these little punks from [Galena] and [Kingston] comin’ in and doin’ their little drive-bys. Like last Christmas we had this thing where they were comin’ in and poppin’ those inflatable balloon decorations that people put on their lawns. You know, people spend a lot a money and time to have a nice Christmas for their kids, and then you get some punks who wanna ruin some little kid’s Christmas. You know when you were a kid how much you liked Christmas? How would they like it if people came into their town and ruined their Christmas?

Similarly, in responding to a string of acts of vandalism involving people throwing pumpkins through car and bay windows, Coretown officers invariably attributed such acts to White youths from Raymond Heights, even though they lacked any specific evidence linking these youths to these acts. Another White male Coretown officer’s remarks were typical of those of other officers:

You know I’m really gettin’ sick of these pumpkin vandals. There’s a group of ‘em from Raymond Heights who like to come into town and get their kicks. They wouldn’t try that shit over there ‘cause they’re pussies. So they come over here and do their mischief.

Even when Coretown officers suspected that a Coretown youth was involved in acts of vandalism like the aforementioned ones, officers ultimately blamed this youth’s out-of-town friends and contacts as being primarily responsible for such acts. For example, a couple of Coretown officers suspected that a 16 year old, White male Coretown youth who lived near the border of Galena in Post 4 was one of the “pumpkin
vandals” or “the pumpkin vandal”. However, these officers maintained that the boy’s friends from Galena were probably “the ringleaders” or probably “put him up to it”. Thus, although Coretown officers believed, as they put it, that some Coretown youths were “bad apples”, the officers nevertheless suggested that non-residents were either the masterminds of any trouble-related activity, or responsible for corrupting Coretown youths.

While residential spaces served as the context in which acts of vandalism activated officers’ thoughts about other towns, the association between particular spaces and particular acts was temporary. In other words, fleeting acts of vandalism, such as those by the “pumpkin vandals”, did not create lasting associations between the vandalism and the targeted properties. In absence of repeated acts, these targeted properties lost their power to trigger thoughts of outside contexts with the passage of time.

In other cases, particular residential spaces appeared to have a lasting power to trigger thoughts of outside contexts due to a pattern of activity that officers associated with such spaces. When officers associated particular people or activities with particular properties or dwellings, such properties or dwellings were able to activate officers’ thoughts of outside contexts apart from officers’ actual observations of certain people or activities on or near these properties or dwellings. For instance, based on numerous prior stops and drug-related arrests at or near an old, rundown, faded purplish-grayish colored two-story house in a relatively poor area along the railroad tracks in Post 4 in Coretown, the sight or mention of this house alone activated Coretown officers’ thoughts of outsiders from the neighboring towns of Galena and Kingston. However, this house,
which officers called the “Marijuana House,” appeared to most strongly activate such thoughts when officers observed people, most of whom were White males, going in and out of the house. This traffic of what the officers described as “shady people”, as well as the house itself, served as cues that activated officers’ thoughts of Galena and Kingston and the low-level drug activity, mostly marijuana use and distribution, which the officers associated with these towns. The fairly regular pattern of drug-related activity at the “Marijuana House” led to officers’ seemingly indelible association between the house and such drug-related activity, and consequently the sight or mere mention of this house had a sustained power to activate thoughts of Galena and Kingston.

While some of Coretown’s residential housing spaces, such as the “Marijuana House,” activated officers’ thoughts of extra-town contexts associated with Whites, most of such spaces activated extra-town contexts that officers associated with racial minorities, particularly Blacks and Hispanics. For example, a rundown house that officers called “Danielle’s House”, which also was located by the train tracks in Post 4, activated Coretown officers’ thoughts of Piedmont, a “Black” and “Hispanic” town, as well as the “Black” southern section of another town, Sandy Peak. The sight of “Danielle’s House”, which officers’ named after a 14-year-old White girl who lived in the house, triggered thoughts of Piedmont and the “Black” section of Sandy Peak due to the frequent presence of Black and Latino males from these two places. While the sight of the house itself acted as a cue for these other contexts based on officers’ past experiences, the actual presence of Black and Latino males at or near the house fully activated officers’ thoughts of these other contexts. For instance, prior to stopping and questioning a 17-year-old Black male and a 17-year-old Hispanic male who were play-
fighting in the rain outside of “Danielle’s House”, a White male Coretown officer made reference to “Danielle’s shady friends from Piedmont and Sandy Peak.”

Besides their more frequent thoughts of extra-town contexts associated with Blacks and Latinos as a result of cues associated with residential housing spaces, Coretown officers also generally viewed these extra-town contexts as being substantively different than those associated with Whites. Although Coretown officers negatively described all of these contexts, irrespective of racial makeup, and similarly characterized the people associated with these outside contexts as “shady”, nevertheless these officers saw problematic “Black” and “Hispanic” outside contexts as being far worse than “White” ones. Coretown officers foremost associated outside “White” contexts with nuisance-type behaviors such as vandalism. While officers described such behaviors as “annoying” and “a pain in the ass”, the officers generally made light of them. For instance, in referencing a string of incidents in which vandals threw pumpkins through house and car windows, a White male Coretown officer jokingly remarked to a Black male Coretown officer at the station, “Those White kids from [Galena] and [Raymond Heights] are acting up again.” At best, Coretown officers appeared to see such acts of vandalism as “mischief” rather than as serious offenses.

Coretown officers also associated some drug use, especially marijuana use, with these outside “White” contexts, but also seemed to minimize its severity. For example, when discussing the aforementioned “Marijuana House”, a White male Coretown officer stated the following about Galena, a “White” town adjacent to Coretown along its western border:
You get a lot of potheads from Galena. They come over here lookin’ to bum some weed. They kinda keep to themselves though.\textsuperscript{38}

The officers’ implication here is that the “potheads” from Galena are relatively quiet and harmless, and therefore more of a nuisance than a serious threat.

In contrast, Coretown officers typically associated outside “Black” and “Hispanic” contexts with a litany of serious criminal activities, including gang-related activity, narcotics dealing and drug-related violence, robbery, car theft, and homicide. In particular, the presence of Black and Hispanic males on or near residential properties such as “Danielle’s House” prompted officers to think about gang activity in out of town contexts. After stopping and questioning the 17 year old Black male who was play-fighting outside of “Danielle’s House” as discussed above, the Coretown officer said, “He was wearing a lot of red,” as if to suggest that the Black male from Sandy Peak was affiliated with the Bloods gang.

Other residential properties activated Coretown officers’ thoughts of drug dealing in outside “Black” and “Hispanic” contexts. This was particularly evident when officers commented about the “shady” Blacks and Hispanics in “hip hop” attire who often congregated on the driveway or front porch of a house on Barden Street in an otherwise “White” neighborhood in Post 2. Several officers suggested that the regular flow of “[human] traffic” to and from this house was drug-related, and further surmised that drug dealers from Piedmont and Eastern were coming to this house to “sell their wares” and “do[] other shady things”, as one White male Coretown officer put it.\textsuperscript{39} On one occasion, another White male Coretown officer ran a license plate check on one of the cars parked in the driveway of this house, and after discovering that the car was registered a person in
the nearby town of Orion, this officer remarked, “He’s probably a courier.” The implication being that, people from the “Black” section of Orion were drug couriers.

Still other residential properties triggered Coretown officers’ thoughts of car theft. In particular, officers invoked out of town “Black” contexts when discussing the practice of “dumping” stolen cars at the Expressway Garden Apartments located near Wheaton Avenue. In routinely scouring this parking lot looking for either punched out car windows or key holes, Coretown officers indicated that car thieves from “Black” towns such as Norville, Edgarville, and Inglewood, came to the Expressway Apartments in a stolen car, usually between 1 A.M. to 4 A.M., and “dumped” or left the stolen car for a better car in the parking lot. In emphasizing how car theft was a “normal” feature of the landscape in Norville, Edgarville, and Inglewood, one White male Coretown officer stated:

For the kids in Norville and Edgarville, stealing cars is no big thing. There’s nothin’ to it. It’s like ridin’ a bicycle.

Although Coretown officers appeared to be particularly concerned about Blacks coming into Coretown from outside contexts that were rife with serious criminal activity, Coretown officers did not, as noted above, focus on either of Coretown’s two “Black” neighborhoods. These “Black” neighborhoods did not activate officers’ thoughts of outside “Black” contexts for two reasons. First, officers indicated that residential spaces in these neighborhoods, unlike a few residential spaces in town (e.g., the house on Barden Street) and two school-related spaces disproportionately associated with visitors (see section 6.10), were not “contact” or “rendezvous” points for Blacks from the outside towns that officers associated with serious criminal activity. Second, officers did not see
Coretown’s “Black” neighborhoods as manifesting any of the problems and pathologies that the officers associated with many of the “Black” towns or “Black” sections of towns in the regional area. In short, there was nothing in these Coretown neighborhoods that activated officers’ thoughts of other, more problematic “Black” contexts.

While some residential housing spaces triggered Coretown officers’ thoughts about outside, highly crime-laden “Black” and “Hispanic” contexts, nearly all of the few visitor-related housing spaces in town had a powerful effect in activating such thoughts. In particular, the Hearthwood Hotel, located in Post 3 near the Expressway, invariably triggered a seeming flood of pathologies that officers associated with outside “Black” contexts. The majority of Coretown officers indicated that Blacks from Norville, Edgarville, and Inglewood often come to the hotel for parties on Friday and Saturday nights. The officers indicated that many of these Black partygoers are members of either the Bloods or the Crips gangs, and that they also come to the hotel to steal cars or halogen headlights from cars, as well as to deal drugs.

Coretown officers’ highly more negative view of outside “Black” and “Hispanic” contexts appears to be fueled in part by officers’ lesser familiarity with and firsthand knowledge of these contexts. Upon questioning, Coretown officers admitted having almost no firsthand experiences in any of the “Black” or “Hispanic” towns, especially the “Black” towns of Norville, Edgarville, and Inglewood in Edward County. While some Coretown officers had briefly visited some of these outside “Black” contexts such as Norville, none of the officers had ever spent more than a few hours in these contexts. In contrast, Coretown officers were highly familiar with and had ample firsthand knowledge of many of the problematic “White” contexts, some of which, such as Galena and
Kingston, were directly adjacent to Coretown. Coretown officers regularly dealt with people from these latter “White” contexts, and some officers had spent considerable time interacting with people in these contexts. Consequently, Coretown officers relied on more stereotypical, secondhand information when making assessment of those whom they assumed to be from outside “Black” or “Hispanic” contexts.

While Coretown officers’ literal distance from outside “Black” or “Hispanic” contexts, particularly those in Edward County, contributed to the officers’ lack of familiarity with these contexts, the presence of the Expressway, a major highway that runs through the southern part of Coretown and connects up with towns such as Norville, Edgarville, and Inglewood in Edward County, made the threat officers’ associated with the people from these contexts appear to be more proximate and imminent. For instance, in discussing the threat posed by “Blacks” from Inglewood, Edgarville, and Norville, a White male Coretown officer stated:

“It’s crazy, but when you think about it, Inglewood, Norville, and Edgarville are like what, five minutes away? Just hop on the [Expressway] and you’re here in like nothin’ flat.”

Like housing-related space in Coretown, housing-related space in Longwood activated officers’ thoughts of outside contexts, but in a more limited, and substantively different way. While multiple housing-related spaces throughout Coretown often activated officers’ thoughts of outside contexts, only housing-related spaces within District 4 or the entire District 4 residential space in Longwood occasionally triggered Longwood officers’ thoughts of outside contexts, particular outside “Black” contexts such as Norville, Edgarville, and Inglewood. In addition, unlike Coretown officers, Longwood officers did not contend that visitors from outside “Black” contexts were
actually coming to these housing-related spaces. Longwood officers invoked these outside contexts not to suggest that housing-related spaces served as contact points for outsiders, but rather solely to point to the similarity of behaviors or conditions in District 4 with those in outside “Black” contexts. In other words, certain cues within District 4 spaces reminded Longwood officers of what they either knew or had heard existed in these other towns. For example, after unsuccessfully attempting to execute an arrest warrant for the son of a Black woman who lived in District 4, a White male Longwood officer recounted a story of how the Black family members of a suspect in Norville impassively ate their breakfast as if nothing was going on when the officer executed an arrest warrant at their apartment at 6 A.M.

Although there is substantially more visitor-related housing in Longwood than in Coretown, visitor-related housing spaces did not activate officers’ thoughts of outside contexts in Longwood as they did in Coretown. In part this appears to be attributable to Longwood officers’ view of these housing spaces, most of which were hotels and motels concentrated along Route 101 in the southern part of town, as being part of a self-contained “island”. Officers saw these spaces as sufficiently removed from residential housing spaces in Longwood, and consequently did not see the people or activity in these spaces as having much bearing on the rest of Longwood. Moreover, Longwood officers’ seemingly constant fixation with containing the people and activity of District 4 appeared to divert attention away from anything that was occurring in District 6 along Route 101.

In terms of activating officers’ thoughts of outside contexts, housing-related spaces in Middleboro shared some similarities with both Longwood and Coretown. As in Longwood, the only residential space that triggered officers’ thoughts of outside contexts
was the poor, “Black” section of town. Cues within spaces within the Norman and Monroe Streets area in the southeastern part of Middleboro activated Middleboro officers’ thoughts of outside “Black” contexts such as Norville, Omega, Edgarville, and Inglewood. However, while this activation of outside contexts was in part based on what Middleboro officers saw as similarities between the behaviors or conditions this southeastern area and those of outside contexts, most often such activation appeared to be tied to an actual concern about outsiders entering these spaces and making the perceived pathologies of this area worse. Thus, similar to Coretown officers, Middleboro officers worried about how residential housing spaces served as contact points through which outsiders could have a corrupting effect on residents.

6.10. School-Related Spaces and Times in Coretown

While the arrangements of residential school-related spaces in Longwood and Middleboro played a significant role in conditioning the officers’ social group schemata, the arrangement of residential school-related spaces in Coretown had no apparent similar conditioning effect. Although Coretown’s arrangement of neighborhood elementary and middle schools was similar to that of Longwood’s, Coretown’s arrangement, unlike Longwood’s, did not reinforce officers’ associations of certain races with certain spaces. Coretown’s school assignment pattern neither reinforced nor countered distinctions of residential space in terms of race or ethnicity because Coretown officers generally perceived no such residential spatial distinctions to begin with. Coretown officers saw Coretown’s residential spaces as largely one big “White” homogeneous mass and the arrangement of schools for residents simply had no bearing on that. Likewise, although officers viewed Coretown as being divided in terms of class, the arrangement of
elementary and middle schools did not appear to be of consequence in terms of how officers’ negotiated their patrolling of residents. Coretown officers’ did not see the town’s class differences in stark terms, and consequently class lacked the saliency that race appeared to have in residential and school-related spaces throughout much of Longwood.42

While Coretown officers’ perceptions of residents’ racial and ethnic homogeneity precluded the residential school-related spaces from having any apparent saliency or any bearing on how officers negotiated their patrolling of residents, these perceptions appeared to contribute significantly to the saliency of two school-related spaces that officers disproportionately associated with non-residents. An alternative high school (AHS) serving students from all over Orion County, which was located in a residential area in Post 3 in Coretown’s southeastern quadrant, and a county college [Orion County College (OCC)] serving students from both Orion County and neighboring Edward County,43 which was located in a residential area in Post 1 in Coretown’s northwestern quadrant, were highly salient to officers not only because they primarily attracted non-residents, but because Coretown officers saw both schools’ student populations as being disproportionately comprised of racial minorities, particularly Blacks and Hispanics. Through spatial comparisons of AHS and OCC to other spaces in Coretown and/or to the entire town, officers not only saw AHS and OCC as “non-resident” or “visitor” spaces, but also as “Black” and “Hispanic” spaces surrounded by “White” resident spaces.

Officers’ racial marking of AHS and OCC were evident in their descriptions of the two respective spaces. For instance, a White male Coretown officer remarked:
[AHS] sticks out like a sore thumb. It just doesn’t fit with the rest of the neighborhood. I remember when I first came on here, I went by [AHS] and I was like, “Whoa, where did these kids come from? How did we get the ‘hood in the ‘burb?” It just threw me for a loop.

Although this officer does not specifically refer to any racial groups when discussing AHS, it is clear from his reference to “the ‘hood”, as well as overall context of his remarks, that he was marking AHS as a “Black” space. Officers similarly made cryptic references to OCC as a “Black” and “Hispanic” space. For example, when discussing what OCC was like, another White male Coretown officer stated, “It’s okay, if you like diversity.” Again, while this officer does not specifically reference any particular racial groups, his reference to “diversity”, which was made while observing mostly Black and Hispanic students in one of OCC’s rear parking lots, is code for “Black” and “Hispanic”.

While officers’ spatial comparisons of the racial social groups AHS and OCC with the overall racial social groups of Coretown accounts in part for the salience of AHS and OCC to officers, the salience of these spaces involves a much more complex process than simple social group contrasts. For Coretown officers, the spaces occupied by AHS and OCC, just as some housing-related spaces associated with visitors, operated as mediums through which broader comparative contexts beyond Coretown became salient. Coretown officers did not merely associate such school-related spaces with non-resident racial minorities, but rather associated these spaces with the towns and regions with which the officers identified such racial minorities. When Coretown officers saw a racial minority at either AHS or OCC, they did not simply see a “Black”, “Latino”, or “Asian” person; rather, they “saw” towns like Piedmont and Elmwood and counties like Edward. In turn, Coretown officers saw these towns’ and counties’ visiting representatives as
embodiying all of the stereotypes that the officers associated with these towns and counties. Thus, Coretown officers did not simply compare the spaces of AHS and OCC with the surrounding “White” environs of Coretown, but instead compared stereotypes that they associated with Coretown with stereotypes they associated with towns like Piedmont and Elmwood and counties like Edward. In effect, AHS and OCC activated officers’ comparisons of all of Coretown with towns and larger regions racially marked as “Black” and/or “Hispanic”. Consistent with Ruddick (1996), these school-related spaces demonstrate how given spaces can have multiple meanings constituted at different contextual levels or scales.

By activating officers’ stereotypical thoughts about contexts beyond Coretown, AHS and OCC, as well as other spaces that officers associated with visitors, provided the principal basis upon which officers assembled social group schemata with respect to non-visitors. Although these latter schemata were in some sense an appendage to officers’ social group schemata pertaining to residents, officers’ non-resident schemata appeared to be clearly distinct from their resident schemata. In other words, officers had separate mental frameworks for understanding residents and non-residents. As such, officers did not lump non-residents together with residents in terms of race, ethnicity, or class. For instance, officers saw Coretown “Blacks” and non-resident “Blacks” in a completely different light; officers had a favorable view of Coretown “Blacks” and a highly negative view of non-resident “Blacks”.

Officers not only had a more favorable view of residents within every social group category, but ranked all residents above all non-residents, regardless of race, ethnicity, or class. However, as noted in section 6.9 and highlighted below in the discussion regarding officers’ patrolling of AHS and CC, Coretown officers
generally had a much more unfavorable view of non-resident racial minorities, particularly Blacks and Hispanics, than non-resident Whites.

Of the two major school-related spaces in Coretown that officers disproportionately associated with visitors, AHS not only provided a window for understanding officers’ social group schemata for non-residents, but through comparisons with Coretown’s “regular” high school, Coretown High School (CHS), also revealed fundamental differences between officers’ resident schemata and non-resident schemata. While AHS and CHS both serve high school students in grades 9 through 12, there are numerous differences between the two institutions, the spaces they occupy, and officers’ perceptions of these institutions and the spaces that they occupy.

AHS is an alternative high school that serves sixty youths from around Orion County who are unable to adequately function in traditional classrooms due to behavioral and/or learning problems. While a handful of the students at AHS are from Coretown, the majority of students come from other towns.\(^45\) Approximately two-thirds of AHS’s students come from lower-income families, and slightly over half are racial minorities.\(^46\) Slightly over one-third of AHS’s student body is Black, while one-sixth is Hispanic, and slightly less than half is White.\(^47\) Roughly a third of AHS’s students go on to college (usually community colleges), another third go on to technical schools, and the remainder go directly into the job market or the armed services.\(^48\) Although Coretown officers were accurate in their assessment of the percentage of AHS’s students who were non-residents, officers exaggerated the size of the AHS’s student population, the percentage of students who were from lower-income backgrounds, and the percentage of students who were racial minorities, and understated the percentage of students who went on to some type of
Officers generally estimated AHS’s student body as being between 100 and 200 students, claimed that close to 100 percent of AHS’s student body was “poor”, posited that the overwhelmingly majority of AHS’s students were “Black” and “Hispanic”, and assumed that the majority of students did not go on to college or other higher education.49

AHS is situated on a one square block space on Cumberville Avenue in Post 3 in the southeast quadrant of Coretown. Cumberville Avenue is a busy through street that connects to Sunny Avenue, one of Coretown’s major east-west roads, at its northernmost point, and to the Expressway, a major state highway, at its southernmost point. AHS is surrounded by modest single family homes as well as several two-family garden apartments on the opposite side of Cumberville Avenue. Officers referred to the surrounding residential area as “White”. One block south of AHS there is a small corner store on the opposite side of Cumberville Avenue that AHS students routinely patronize before and after school.

CHS differs from AHS in a number of important ways. CHS, with its student body of approximately 1,200, serves a much larger population than AHS, and all of CHS’s students are from Coretown. Unlike AHS’s student body, CHS’s student body is overwhelmingly White (87 percent) and middle- to upper-middle-class. According to Coretown officers, many of whom attended CHS, 99 percent of Coretown students go on to college, and only a handful of students have behavioral or learning problems.

Like AHS, CHS occupies a one square block space in a “White” residential area, but there are several spatial differences. CHS, which is located in Post 1 in the northwestern quadrant of Coretown, is fully ensconced within a residential neighborhood.
CHS is surrounded by four small residential streets, none of which are through streets to major roads in the town. CHS also is located in a wealthier part of Coretown. Both the homes and plots of land in the area surrounding CHS are much larger than those surrounding AHS. In addition, there are neither apartments nor commercial establishments within a half-mile radius of CHS.

Notwithstanding AHS’s substantially smaller student population than CHS’s, Coretown officers’ monitoring of students in and around the vicinity of AHS’s grounds both before and after school was far more intense, and exhibited substantially more concern, than that at CHS. Some of this apparent heightened concern regarding AHS can be attributed to the organizational priorities of the Coretown Police Department (CPD). In particular, the CPD determined the patrolling resources devoted to AHS and CHS respectively. Although AHS had only sixty students and CHS had approximately 1,200 students, Coretown officers devoted almost equal resources to patrolling AHS and CHS before and after school. On a typical day between approximately 7:00 and 7:30 A.M. and approximately 3:00 and 3:30 P.M., there were two one-officer patrol cars at both AHS and CHS, with one additional officer on foot at CHS.

Aside from determinations regarding resource allocation and patrolling time, patrolling decisions and practices at AHS and CHS appeared to be driven by officers’ exercise of discretion. Officers’ readings of these respective school-related spaces activated officers’ social group schemata pertaining to residents and non-residents, which in turn led to certain patrolling practices. Coretown officers’ discretionary patrolling was particularly evident in their differential monitoring of students within the vicinity of school grounds. With the exception of their monitoring of a group of fifteen to twenty
regular smokers outside of CHS in the morning, Coretown officers generally paid little to no attention to CHS students outside of the immediate area of school grounds. Both patrol cars stationed at CHS were parked on opposite sides of the school, immediately adjacent to school grounds, and these officers focused on students entering or exiting CHS. The one officer on foot usually kept an eye on the group of smokers as they moved to different locations near the curbs in front of homes as far as one block west of CHS in the morning before the commencement of school.

In contrast, Coretown officers were highly vigilant of any AHS students who ventured off of school grounds either before or after school. Although AHS students rarely walked beyond a one block radius of AHS, Coretown officers nevertheless typically followed any AHS students who left the immediate premises of AHS in order to see where the students were going. In particular, Coretown officers were highly attuned to AHS students who walked to the corner store located a block south of AHS to buy snacks and soft drinks. One officer was usually stationed between AHS and the corner store, and this officer routinely motioned AHS students to move along if they lingered anywhere between AHS and the store. Students who walked off school grounds, but did not go to the corner store, usually did so for the purpose of smoking cigarettes or using cell phones. These latter students typically did not venture far from school grounds; indeed, the majority of AHS smokers smoked their cigarettes on the edge of AHS’s property. Officers generally paid less attention to these students than those who ventured to the corner store, except when the former appeared to be wandering from the boundaries of AHS’s property.
Coretown officers’ differential monitoring of AHS and CHS students was even more glaringly apparent with respect to students’ movement beyond the vicinity of the two respective schools. Officers invariably stopped and questioned any AHS students who ventured more than a block from AHS, although, as noted above, few AHS students ever went that far. Officers essentially did not see AHS students as being “in place” beyond the vicinity of AHS. Given that the majority of students at AHS were from out of town, and all AHS students, including the handful of those from Coretown, relied on small bus or car transportation to get back and forth to school, officers concluded that AHS students had no reason, other than patronizing the corner store, to be on foot in the residential neighborhoods surrounding the school. A White male Coretown officer’s comments reflected this view:

[AHS students] get picked up [at AHS]. They don’t get picked up up the street, so they’ve got no business being over there. Besides, where are they gonna go? Are they gonna walk all the way back to [Piedmont]?

Coretown officers’ concern about AHS students’ whereabouts beyond the vicinity of the school sometimes extended to their exodus from AHS by car following dismissal. Coretown officers occasionally ran license plate checks of vehicles waiting to pick up students at AHS, and sometimes followed vehicles departing from AHS up Cumberville Avenue, either northward as far as Sunny Avenue, or southward as far as the entrance for the Expressway.

In contrast to their seemingly elevated concern regarding AHS students’ movements beyond the vicinity of AHS, officers exhibited virtually no concern about where CHS students went or what they did once they exited the vicinity of CHS following dismissal. While stationed at CHS after dismissal, officers only seemed to be
concerned about maintaining order on the school’s premises; they never followed, stopped, or questioned any CHS students, including the smokers whom they watched in the morning. In addition, officers neither ever ran license plate checks of the vehicles of those picking up students after school at CHS, nor followed such vehicles after they dispersed from CHS. Moreover, even though officers had strong suspicion that a group of CHS students sometimes gathered in a park three blocks west of CHS before and/or after school to smoke marijuana, officers never sought these students out before school or followed them home after school.

Coretown officers’ discretionary patrolling at AHS and CHS not only differed with respect to monitoring of students, but also in terms of the nature of officers’ interactions with students. In general, officers’ interactions with AHS students were more direct, uninhibited, and confrontational. Officers never hesitated in approaching AHS students, particularly Black and Hispanic AHS students, and were quick to admonish or threaten AHS students, especially when students did not immediately comply with the officers’ requests. Officers’ confrontational approach seemed to be foremost based on their belief that they were not accountable to these youths or their parents/guardians. For instance, in explaining how he dealt with AHS students, a White male Coretown officer remarked:

I don’t really care what [AHS students] think; they don’t live here, it’s a privilege for them to be here. If they don’t like it, well too bad. Their parents don’t pay my salary.

As this officer suggests, Coretown officers were not worried about whether their patrolling practices might offend AHS students’ parents because the officers did not see themselves as serving these non-resident parents.
In stark contrast to the ways in which they interacted with students at AHS, officers were very hesitant in approaching CHS students and generally tried to avoid any confrontations with them. Officers were even cautious with the seemingly most problematic group of CHS students—the regular group of smokers who convened near CHS before and after school. These smokers, whom officers disparagingly called “dirtbags”, had become somewhat of a nuisance to residents living within the one-block area encompassing Spring, Teacup, and Turnip Streets to the west of CHS.

Approximately twenty White CHS students regularly congregated before school on the grass near the curb in front of one of two houses located across the street from CHS on its western side. According to Coretown officers, this group of “dirtbags” had a history of both leaving cigarette butts, empty bottles and cans, and other litter on residents’ properties near CHS, and trampling residents’ lawns. The group of “dirtbags” usual meeting spot in the morning before 7:30 A.M. was at “Smoker’s Point”, which was on the edge of the lawn of the property across CHS on the corner of Spring and Teacup Streets. Officers generally kept their distance from this group, but after the owner of this property complained about littering and lawn damage, at least one of the officers monitoring CHS approached the group. Without any verbal or nonverbal commands from the officer, the group slowly moved up Teacup Street as far as a block away from CHS. This officer would continue to follow the group at a distance of approximately twenty feet until the group circled the block and headed down Turnip Street back to Spring Street and CHS. A White male officer who routinely monitored this group indicated that he “sometimes ha[d] to herd ‘em like a sheepdog,” and described himself as a “mother hen”. He indicated that he and other officers were engaged in a “constant
battle” with the “dirtbags” and, while the officers had been able to reduce the littering problem, they had made little progress in addressing the lawn damage problem because the group moved from property to property.

Coretown officers’ were very hesitant to approach the “dirtbags”, as well as other CHS students, and even more reluctant to issue tickets to them, because they were afraid of antagonizing these students’ parents. Officers indicated that virtually all of the “dirtbags” were “rich kids” from the northern part of Coretown, and officers believed that confrontations with these students would result in the students’ wealthy and influential parents complaining to town officials and ranking officers within the Coretown Police Department. For instance, a White male Coretown officer described the dilemma that Coretown officers faced in dealing with CHS students during the course of foot patrol outside of CHS:

So say you’re walking along [outside of CHS] and you see a kid littering. If you go up to him and ask him to pick up his shit and he says, “No”, then what are you gonna do? Where’s the conversation gonna go then? The situation has nowhere to go but to escalate. I’ll tell you, it’s a disaster waiting to happen. It’s a lose-lose situation. So is it worth chasing a kid over a dropped snickers wrapper? Hell no. You know their parents will be pissed. [They will say,]“Why you harassin’ my kid?” and “I gotta pay a $250 ticket!” You just don’t wanna have to deal with that, and you don’t wanna strain things between [the police] and [the residents], especially with the whole contract mess.34

In sum, Coretown officers’ reticence to initiate confrontations with CHS students, even “dirtbags”, and seeming lack of inhibition to do so with AHS students, appears to be in significant part due to whether the officers saw these students’ parents as constituents. Officers perceived CHS students’ parents as powerful constituents who could make life difficult for the officers. In contrast, officers did not appear to fear any potential
repercussions from the mostly non-resident parents of AHS students. Consequently, officers felt that they had free reign to, as one officer put it, to “get up in [the] face” of AHS students and verbally reprimand and threaten them, whereas officers generally felt straitjacketed in their dealings with CHS students.

The difference between Coretown officers’ approaches to CHS and AHS students also appears to be attributable to the intersection of officers’ perceptions of students’ race and resident status. At CHS, there did not appear to be any discernible race-related differences in the way officers patrolled students. Officers appeared to focus on students’ behavior, not students’ apparent race. Although, with the exception of one Asian student on occasion, the group of twenty or so “dirtbags” to whom officers devoted a disproportionate amount of attention before and after school was identified as “White”, officers focused on these students because of their nuisance-related behaviors such as loitering, littering, smoking, minor destruction of property, noisemaking, and trespassing. Officers generally ignored all other “White” students, who accounted for the vast majority of CHS students. Officers also did not pay any special, selective attention to CHS students whom they identified as “Black”, “Hispanic”, or “Asian”. Moreover, officers appeared to view these racial minority students as indistinguishable from CHS’s White students. Several officers described Coretown’s “Black” students, who made up 6 percent of CHS’s student body, as “good kids”, just as they regularly described the majority of White Coretown youths.

Contrary to their practices at CHS, officers patrolling AHS routinely exhibited a pattern of heightened scrutiny with respect to students whom they identified as “Black” and “Hispanic”. One indicator of officers’ racially selective scrutiny of AHS students
was the disproportionate amount of attention that officers gave to students who walked off school grounds to go to the corner store as compared to those who left the grounds to smoke a cigarette. Most of the AHS students who ventured to the corner store were Black, and nearly all of the students who went for a smoke were White. Moreover, officers not only spent a disproportionate amount of time scrutinizing the predominantly Black students who patronized the corner store, but also were much more confrontational with these students than with the White smokers. Officers frequently motioned to the mostly Black AHS students heading to or coming from the corner store, and also engaged in face-to-face verbal exchanges with these students, sometimes within arm’s length. In contrast, officers only occasionally motioned or issued verbal commands to the nearly all-White group of smokers, and such motioning and commands were typically made from a distance of between ten and fifteen feet. Even when White AHS smokers threw their cigarette butts in the street after being warned repeatedly by officers not to do so, officers nevertheless typically showed great restraint in reprimanding the students. Such restraint was a far cry from the unbridled hostility that officers invariably displayed when Black AHS students littered between the corner store and AHS.

Another indicator of officers’ racially selective scrutiny of AHS students was officers’ monitoring of vehicles picking up students after school. For one thing, of the vehicles on which officers ran license plate checks at AHS, nearly all of them were driven by a Black or Hispanic person. Officers’ occasional practice of following vehicles departing from AHS was even more racially selective. Every single vehicle that officers followed up to Sunny Avenue or the Expressway entrance was driven by a Black or Hispanic person and had picked up Black or Hispanic AHS students.
Officers’ heightened scrutiny of, and more confrontational approach towards, Black and Hispanic AHS students suggests that the overall difference between officers’ patrolling of CHS and AHS students is not simply due to the perceived resident status of the former and the perceived non-resident status of the latter. Although officers identified the overwhelming majority of White AHS students, like Black and Hispanic AHS students, as being non-residents, officers exhibited a much more laissez-faire overall approach when dealing with White AHS students. Moreover, this apparent racial selectivity in patrolling at AHS, but not CHS, suggests that officers’ social group schemata for residents and non-residents are differentially arranged. While the intersection of race and resident status yields a relatively uniform approach to patrolling, the intersection of race and non-resident status yields a racially skewed approach. As discussed below, the apparent race-related differences in officers’ patrolling of non-residents appears to be in large part due to the assumptions that officers make about the contexts from which different non-residents come.

On the surface, Coretown officers’ discursive characterizations and representations of AHS students appeared to run counter to their racially skewed patrolling of these students. In describing or referencing AHS students, officers rarely expressly mentioned race. Rather, officers spoke of generic “alternative school” students. However, in discussing these generic “alternative school” students, officers invariably identified them as being from three particular towns in Orion County, all of which had disproportionately Black or Hispanic populations. Officers routinely identified AHS students as being from predominantly “Black” Piedmont, predominantly “Hispanic” and “Black” Elmwood, and predominantly “Black” Radnor. Accordingly, officers’
seemingly generic discursive characterizations of and references to “alternative school” students appeared to be characterizations of and references to AHS’s Black and Hispanic students. In other words, the term “alternative school” was essentially code for “Black” and “Hispanic”.

Officers’ assumption that the generic AHS student hailed from Piedmont, Elmwood, or Radnor helps to explain officers’ divergent approaches towards White non-resident AHS students and Black and Hispanic ones. As suggested under section 6.9, the presence of certain people in certain places activated officers’ thoughts about contexts beyond Coretown. At AHS, the presence of Black and Hispanic students activated officers’ highly negative stereotypical thoughts about “Black” and “Hispanic” towns such as Piedmont, Elmwood, and Radnor, whereas the presence of White students activated milder stereotypical thoughts about “White” towns such as Galena, Kingston, and Raymond Heights. Given that officers’ spatially activated thoughts regarding “Black” and “Hispanic” towns were far more negative and salient than those of “White” towns, thoughts of the former appeared to eclipse thoughts of the latter. When officers saw or mentioned AHS, they only seemed to think about or “see” these “Black” and “Hispanic” towns and the problems and pathologies that the officers associated with these towns. In particular, officers’ discussions of AHS or AHS students invariably included some reference to crime-related problems, particularly drug- and gang-related problems, in Piedmont, Elmwood, and/or Radnor. For instance, when discussing a minor “shoving match” that had occurred among several AHS students outside of AHS, a White male Coretown officer stated:
Who knows what the hell they were fighting over. Probably somebody stole somebody else’s dope. They bring that shit in from Piedmont and Elmwood and try to deal it over here.

Although officers also spoke disparagingly about the group of White “dirtbags” at CHS and associated problematic behavior with these “dirtbags”, officers’ characterizations of CHS “dirtbags” and Black and Hispanic AHS students differed in three fundamental ways that appeared to be integrally tied to assumptions regarding students’ hometowns. First, officers associated Black and Hispanic AHS with harder criminal activity. For instance, while officers associated both groups of students with drug-related activity, officers described CHS “dirtbags” primarily as users and AHS students primarily as sellers. For Coretown officers, CHS “dirtbags” were passive “potheads” who “liked to get high”, whereas AHS students were “dealers” who actively distributed drugs to others. Officers not only saw AHS students as much culpable for their active distribution of drugs to others, but also saw them as being more dangerous due to assumptions of violence linked to drug dealing.

Similarly, Coretown officers only saw AHS students as being linked to gangs. In discussing Black and Hispanic AHS students officers sometimes alluded to gangs disproportionately associated with Blacks, such as the “Bloods”, “Crips”, and “OGs” (Original Gangsters), and those disproportionately associated with Hispanics, such as the Latin Kings. In contrast, officers never associated any CHS “dirtbags”, or any other CHS students for that matter, with gangs.

Second, officers saw CHS “dirtbags”, but not AHS students, as potentially redeemable. When discussing AHS students, officers made comments such as, “You know we’ll be seeing him again someday”, and “They’ll be joining their buddies over at
the County [jail]”, suggesting that officers expected AHS students to become criminals.

In contrast, officers described CHS “dirtbags” as pathetic, wayward souls who had lost their way. For instance, a White male Coretown officer described a heavyset White male CHS “dirtbag” (Timmy) as follows:

> See the kid over there. That’s [Timmy]. He’s a real fuck-up. [CHS officials] told me that he used to be a straight-A student, but he started taking antidepressants and then got in with dirtbags. He’s not really a bad kid, he’s just screwed up.

Implicit in officers’ descriptions of CHS “dirtbags” such as Timmy was the idea that these students, unlike AHS students, could turn themselves around. 58

Third, and related to the first, officers saw AHS students as a much more significant threat to other students and non-students. Officers repeatedly voiced concern about non-resident AHS students coming into Coretown and corrupting others through social networking. For instance, as noted above, officers were concerned that Black and Hispanic AHS students were distributing illegal drugs. In addition, officers seemed particularly concerned about these AHS students negatively influencing Coretown youths through the introduction of gangs and gang-related culture. This point was most tellingly evident in a story that nearly all Coretown officers recounted of a White male Coretown youth and AHS student who claimed to be a member of the “Crips” gang. One of the officers who had arrested this youth for his involvement in a fight behind an elementary school in Post 4 described how this youth apparently had become a “Crip” as follows:

> There were several kids from the alternative school who got into a big fight over in this field. One of the ones we arrested was this 16-year-old from [Coretown]. I started asking him what happened, and then, I’ll never forget this, he tells me that he’s a Crip. I’m like, “A Crip. You’ve gotta be kidding me?” But he was dead serious. Apparently he’d been hanging around with some kids from Piedmont
over at the alternative school who got him into that Crips thing….I did a “scared straight” talk with the kid, and told him, “You’re going down the wrong path. Try to hang out with somebody else. These kids you’ve been hanging with are no good.” He’s not a bad kid, he just tends to follow the crowd he’s with.

Effectively, this officer, like other Coretown officers, was suggesting that this White Coretown youth’s alleged affiliation with the Crips gang was a direct result of his association with Black AHS students. This officer reasoned that Black AHS students from Piedmont had brought the “gang influence” to AHS, and through social networking there, had corrupted a vulnerable Coretown youth who otherwise was “not a bad kid”.

Coretown officers’ concern about Black and Hispanic AHS students spreading the “gang influence” from towns such as Piedmont, Elmwood, and Radnor to Coretown youths was part of the officers’ broader racialized concern about the corrupting influence of what they described as the “hip hop culture”. Officers contended that some of the predominantly White Coretown youth population tried to emulate the “gangster life” that they heard in songs and saw in videos on television and the Internet. In explaining Coretown youths’ attraction to this “glorified gangster lifestyle”, a White male Coretown officer stated:

Why do the kids here idolize the gangster lifestyle? What do they like about rappers like Snoop Dogg?59 Hell, that’s easy. They’ve got money, they’re bold and brash, have no responsibility, can do whatever they want, and at the end of the day they’ve got a lawyer to bail them out.

Although officers suggested that Coretown youth who emulated the “hip hop” or “gangster” “lifestyle” “would not last but a few hours in the inner city”, nevertheless officers indicated that the worst youths in Coretown were the “gangster wannabees” who wore “hip hop fashions” and tried to imitate inner-city Blacks.
Besides what they saw as the direct harmful effect on Coretown youths’ behavior, officers seemed particularly concerned about how “hip hop culture” made Coretown’s predominantly White youths more susceptible to being negatively influenced by urban Blacks and Latinos with whom they came into contact. For instance, an Asian male Coretown officer stated:

You see more and more kids here who try to be cool by acting more like the ‘hood. They wanna be like the Blacks from [Norville] and [Inglewood]. So when [the Blacks from Norville and Inglewood] come here, [White Coretown youths] wanna hang with them, party with them. [White Coretown youths] think that if they hang with [the Blacks from Norville and Inglewood], then they’ll be cool too.

Given their apparent concern about non-residents of color, especially Blacks, coming into Coretown and negatively influencing Coretown’s predominantly White youths such as the “Crip wannabe” at AHS, Coretown officers were, unlike Longwood and Middleboro officers, generally suspicious of interracial groups. Unless officers could identify the members of an interracial group of youths as residents, officers appeared to operate under the assumption that outsiders of color were corrupting the “good” White Coretown youths.

Like AHS, the other major school-related space that officers disproportionately associated with non-residents, Orion County College (OCC), played a substantial role in both constituting and activating Coretown officers’ social group schemata with respect to non-residents. OCC, which was located in Post 1 in the northwestern quadrant of Coretown, was, similar to AHS, a highly racially diverse institution situated in between several nearly all-“White” neighborhoods. While, as elaborated below, there were a number of strong parallels in terms of how officers monitored and otherwise patrolled
OCC and AHS, officers clearly viewed OCC as Coretown’s most significant visitor-related space.

The significance that officers attached to OCC as a visitor-related space was reflected by the disproportionate amount of time and energy that officers devoted to both patrolling and discussing OCC in comparison to AHS and all other spaces that the officers associated with visitors. In particular, officers responsible for responding to calls in Post 1 devoted approximately one-third to one-half of the duration of ride-alongs patrolling OCC, and officers responsible for calls in the adjacent Posts 2 and 4 devoted approximately one-quarter to one-third of the ride-alongs doing so. Several officers indicated that they sometimes spent as much as three-quarters of their entire shift during the daytime (starting at 7:30 A.M.) and evening (until 11 P.M.) monitoring OCC. In contrast, officers assigned to patrolling AHS or CHS typically spent only a half hour monitoring AHS or CHS before and after school.

While some of Coretown officers’ patrolling of OCC was, like that of AHS and CHS, organizationally determined, the bulk of such patrolling appeared to be discretionary. The Coretown Police Department mandated that the officer assigned to calls in Post 1 make at least two drive-through “checks” of OCC’s four parking lots, and at least one walk-through of several of the campus buildings. The Department also required officers assigned to calls in Posts 2 and 4 to make at least one drive-through check of OCC’s parking lots, and to assist the officer assigned to Post 1 in conducting the walk-through on alternate days. However, as observed during the course of the ride-alongs, officers assigned to Posts 1, 2, and 4 spent a considerable amount of discretionary
time both driving through OCC’s campus, and monitoring each of OCC’s four parking lots from particular parked locations.

There are multiple reasons as to why Coretown officers devoted disproportionately more time and energy to monitoring OCC than AHS. Foremost among these reasons was the relative size of the two institutions. Although both OCC and AHS were salient to officers because of the high percentage of non-resident racial minority visitors, particularly non-resident Black and Hispanic visitors, whom officers associated with these school-related spaces, OCC stood out more prominently in officers’ minds because of its relative enormity. At the time of the ride-alongs in 2006, OCC, which is situated on just under fifty square acres, had a student population of slightly under 9,000 students.

Coretown officers not only saw OCC as a more threatening space than AHS because they perceived it as a much larger “Black” and “Hispanic” visitor-related space, but also because they saw it as attracting highly problematic Black and Hispanic students and their non-student friends from neighboring Edward County. While officers saw a good portion of OCC’s Black and Hispanic students, like AHS’s students, as hailing from “Black” and “Hispanic” Orion County cities such as Piedmont and Elmwood, and towns such as Radnor and Homestead, they also knew that an increasing minority of OCC’s Black and Hispanic students were coming from predominantly “Black” Edward County cities such as Norville and Edgarville, and towns such as Inglewood, as a result of an agreement between OCC and Edward County. Although officers viewed these latter “Black” Edward County contexts as sharing many of the same criminal and pathological features as the “Black” and “Hispanic” Orion County contexts, the Orion County
contexts generally were less salient than, and at times virtually eclipsed by, “Black” Edward County contexts when officers patrolled or discussed OCC. In other words, the sight or mention of racial minorities, particularly Blacks at OCC activated officers’ highly negative stereotypical thoughts about “Black” Edward County cities and towns.

The saliency of “Black” Edward County contexts and officers’ heightened concern about those assumed to be from those contexts appeared to be attributable in part to officers’ association of Edward County students with an alternative to incarceration program. Officers were aware that a number of students from Edward County cities such as Norville and Edgarville, and towns such as Inglewood, were attending OCC in lieu of serving time in jail as part of an alternative to incarceration program (AIP). Notwithstanding the fact that all of the students participating in the AIP program only had misdemeanor convictions, officers characterized AIP students, all of whom they identified as Black or Hispanic, as dangerous criminals. Officers frequently used the term “felon” to describe AIP students, and often referred to these students as “drug dealers” and “car thieves”. In addition, officers assumed that AIP students were affiliated with gangs, particularly the Bloods and the Crips. Officers used a variety of gang-related terms to describe AIP students, including “gang members”, “gangbangers”, “gangsters”, and “thugs”.

Coretown officers’ concern about visitors from Edward County was compounded at OCC by their perception that AIP students, as well as other students from Edward County, were bringing their non-student friends with them to hang out at OCC and engage in various criminal activities. Although officers indicated that non-students from “Black” and “Hispanic” Orion towns and cities were also a problem at OCC, officers
were particularly concerned about Edward County non-students, whom they had identified via a number of prior stops and a few arrests at OCC, because of sharp increase in crime that occurred at OCC after OCC started accepting students from Edward County some five years earlier. In particular, officers blamed the influx of Edward County students and their non-student friends and acquaintances for a spike in drug activity, car thefts, and gang activity on campus.

While, as discussed below, Coretown officers attributed illegal drug use at OCC to non-resident racial minority students and non-students from Orion as well as Edward Counties, officers clearly identified non-students from Edward County as being the primary drug sellers at OCC, and Edward County students as being the secondary sellers. Officers indicated that non-students, as well as some students, from Norville, Edgarville, and Inglewood in Edward County, and from Homestead in Orion County, distributed illegal drugs both inside and outside of campus buildings. Officers indicated that these sellers often made illegal outdoor drug transactions in one of OCC’s four parking lots or behind a wood fence in OCC’s arboretum. As proof of this, officers cited the fact that they had caught several Black non-students from Edward County “rolling joints” in OCC’s parking lots and arboretum over the past year.

Coretown officers indicated, however, that the bulk of illegal drug selling at OCC took place in the commons area of one of OCC’s main buildings. In particular, officers indicated that non-student and student “drug dealers”, many of whom officers also identified as gang members from Edward County, sold “packets of drugs” in a lounge that officers’ described as a “Black hangout”. Officers posited that this “Black” lounge area had become a “networking” site for drug dealers and buyers, and had gained a
reputation as such. For instance, officers recounted how a Black non-student from the Orion town of Centerville whom officers had arrested for buying marijuana in the lounge area, told the officers that he came to OCC to buy drugs because “he knew that OCC was the place to go to buy drugs”. Officers further indicated that as OCC’s reputation as a drug distribution center had grown, it had attracted more and more non-students looking to buy drugs.

In addition to blaming Edward County non-students and students for the bulk of illegal drug sales at OCC, Coretown officers also held Edward County non-students and students as primarily responsible for a rash of car and car part thefts in recent years. In particular, officers discussed how Edward County non-students and students regularly engaged in a practice known as “shopping”. An Asian male Coretown officer described “shopping” as follows:

You get a lot of ‘em from [Norville], [Edgarville], or [Inglewood] who like to come down here to do a little shopping. They’ll scope out the parking lots looking for cars to steal, like sports cars, SUVs. [Officer points.] See like they’d go for that Subaru, and we had an Infinity like that one stolen out of the back lot last spring. They caught them joyriding over in Norville. Anyways, they see cars that they like, and then they tip off their friends [from Edward County] who come down and take ‘em.

In addition to stealing cars, officers indicated that “shoppers” more commonly stole halogen headlights, tire rims and hubcaps, stereo system components, and other car parts. Officers pointed to the arrests of two non-students, one from Edgarville, and the other from Norville, as proof of the link between Edward County visitors and car theft.

Coretown officers also saw Edward County visitors, particularly non-students, as well as the AIP students noted above, as being gang members. When discussing OCC,
any mention of Edward County invariably led to officers’ references to gangs such as the Bloods, the Crips, and the Original Gangsters. Officers asserted that approximately three-fourths of the gang members at OCC were non-students from Edward County. Officers based this assertion on estimates from OCC’s public safety officers. Coretown officers noted that the Coretown Police Department had shown OCC’s public safety officers films pertaining to the identification of gang attributes, such as signs, tattoos, clothes, and graffiti, and that these public safety officers confirmed seeing members of a number of gangs, including the Bloods, the Crips, and the Latin Kings.

Coretown officers’ strong negative opinions about non-students and AIP students from Edward County, coupled with the fact that officers could not readily distinguish non-students and AIP students from non-AIP students, had the consequence of tainting all students from Edward County. Officers effectively assumed that all students from Edward County were involved in illegal drug activity, car theft, and gang activity. In turn, given that the officers assumed that Edward County students were Black, and to a lesser degree, Hispanic, and officers could not readily distinguish these “Blacks” and “Hispanics” from others, officers generalized their suspicion of criminal activity to all Blacks and Hispanics at OCC.

In effect, officers’ heightened suspicion of criminal activity among Black and Hispanic non-students and AIP students from Edward County led officers to question the legitimacy of all Black and Hispanic students’ status as “students” at OCC. Officers appeared to suggest that the main reason why many of the Black and Hispanic non-resident students came to OCC was not academics, but rather, as one White male officer put it, to “get high”, “sell drugs”, “steal cars”, and “hook up with their homeboys”. Upon
seeing or otherwise identifying “Black” and “Hispanic” students in the parking lots at OCC, officers routinely made comments such as, “What are these kids doing here?” and “I don’t know why these kids even bother coming here.” Officers also provided several anecdotes of known Black and Hispanic non-resident students’ poor academic performance as confirmatory proof that these students were not coming to OCC for legitimate academic reasons. For instance, an Asian male Coretown officer said the following about a 19 year old Black male student from Edgarville whom the officer had arrested for possessing marijuana:

A lot of them, it’s just a joke. I busted this one Black kid from [Edgarville] for having a stash of weed in his car, and I come to find out that this knucklehead had a 0.6 G.P.A. [grade point average]. How do you have a G.P.A. of 0.6 and you’re still here? I didn’t even know you could be a student with that G.P.A. I mean, c’mon, what is that kid doing at [OCC]?

Coretown officers’ generalized suspicion of criminal activity among Black and Hispanic students was reflected in both officers’ commentary and patrolling practices with respect to these students. Although officers also made disparaging remarks implying Black and Hispanic AHS students’ criminality, such remarks, unlike those officers made about Black and Hispanic students at OCC, were typically indirect, somewhat tempered, and often cryptic. In contrast, officers typically made blatantly racist comments that implied criminality with respect to the Black and Hispanic young adults whom they observed either in the parking lots or inside the campus buildings during the walk-through. These comments occurred most frequently when Blacks and Hispanics walked past the patrol car in either of OCC’s two rear parking lots. After spotting one or more Black or Hispanic young adults walking through one of the parking
lots, officers made derogatory statements such as, “Yeah, he’s probably a drug dealer”, or “I wonder what gang he belongs to.” Such comments were most likely if the passer-by had dreadlocks or cornrows, was wearing baggy clothing, and was not carrying any books. For instance, upon spotting a Black male who was sporting dreadlocks, wearing baggy jeans, and carrying no books, an Asian male Coretown officer stated:

Look at him running around like a fool. I bet you he’s looking for a car to steal. [Sarcastically] I better check the [patrol car’s] hubcaps before we leave.

Coretown officers generalized suspicion of criminal activity among Black and Hispanic students at OCC was also manifest by officers’ racially selective patrolling practices in both OCC’s four parking lots and inside OCC’s campus buildings. Although officers’ patrolling practices at AHS also similarly focused on Blacks and Hispanics, officers’ patrolling practices at OCC demonstrated an even more heightened concern about Blacks and Hispanics. Unlike at AHS, officers at OCC virtually ignored Whites, except when they were accompanied by those whom officers identified as “Black” or “Hispanic”. Officers’ nearly wholesale disregard of Whites was strikingly apparent from the officers’ monitoring of people sitting in, standing next to, or walking near cars in one of OCC’s four parking lots. Of the fifty-five groups of young adults that officers monitored for at least one minute during the course of seven ride-alongs in the afternoon and early evening hours, all but nine were made up of Blacks, Hispanics, or some combination of Blacks and Hispanics. Whites were part of seven groups, but six of these included at least one Black member, and the seventh included several Hispanic members. Two groups were constituted solely by four or more Asian males, but otherwise officers appeared to pay little attention to Asians.
Officers monitoring of single individuals for at least one minute was even more racially selective than that of groups. Of the twenty-three individuals whom officers monitored in the parking lots, sixteen were Black and seven were Hispanic. While officers sometimes momentarily looked at groups of Whites, particularly groups of Whites sitting in cars, officers appeared to not even notice single White individuals.

Officers’ computerized checks on license plates of vehicles in OCC’s parking lots were also unambiguously racially selective. Of the thirty-six vehicles that contained at least one occupant, only five contained White occupants. Each of these latter five vehicles had at least one Black or Hispanic male occupant. In other words, officers did not run license plate checks on vehicles with solely White occupants. Two of the five vehicles containing White occupants had White female drivers and at least one Black male passenger, while the other three vehicles consisted of a mix of White, Black, and Hispanic males. Of the vehicles containing Black or Hispanic occupants, those that the computer identified as being registered to an owner from Norville, Edgarville, or other Edward County cities and towns invariably elicited the most disparaging comments from officers. In particular, officers made comments about “bad neighborhoods” and “rough areas” about vehicles registered to owners in “Black” cities and towns in Edward County. Once again, this highlights officers’ heightened concern about individuals from Edward County.

Given that officers’ license plate checks and monitoring of individuals and groups in the parking lots were racially selective, officers’ stopping and questioning of people in these lots was also racially selective. Officers stopped and questioned twenty-six groups, all of which contained at least one Black or Hispanic member and only five of which
contained a White member. Officers also stopped and questioned seven single
individuals, five of whom were Black, and two of whom were Hispanic. Prior to
stopping and questioning individuals or groups, officers routinely tried to “stare down”
these individuals or groups. The goal of this “stare down” tactic was to disperse
individuals or groups without having to confront them face-to-face in a verbal exchange.
On average, officers “stared down” individuals or groups for approximately five minutes
before approaching them and asking them in a matter-of-fact, yet unfriendly way, what
they were doing. Officers then typically issued a statement indicating that these
individuals or groups could not loiter in the parking lot. While all of the individuals and
a majority of the groups dispersed quietly, approximately one-sixth of the groups
appeared to become agitated and asked the officers why they could not remain in the lots.

Officers’ racially selective practice of stopping and questioning individuals and
groups ran counter to the officers’ own claims regarding “suspicion”. Officers
emphatically claimed that their decision to stop and question people was based on
“suspicious behavior”. In the context of the parking lots at OCC, officers specifically
defined suspicion as either “aimlessly wandering around the lot without any books,” or
“sitting in a car with the windows rolled up [especially if there was a group and group
members were smoking]”. Yet officers routinely ignored Whites who were either
wandering through the parking lots without apparent books or school-related materials, or
sitting in cars with the windows rolled up.

While even smoking in groups in a vehicle did not trigger suspicion for Whites, it
did appear to do so for Asians. Although officers generally ignored Asians, much like
they did Whites, officers became highly suspicious of Asians when they smoked in
groups in cars with the windows rolled up. Both groups of Asians whom officers monitored and eventually followed, fit this description.

In contrast, officers appeared to view Blacks and Hispanics as “suspicious” regardless of what they did in the parking lots. Indeed, many of the Blacks and Hispanics whom officers stopped in OCC’s parking lots did not meet either of officers’ two self-proclaimed “suspicion” criteria. Based on their comments implying drug activity when they saw groups of Blacks and/or Hispanics congregating in the parking lots, officers appeared to view Black and/or Hispanic groups as “suspicious” in and of themselves. However, officers’ suspicion of Blacks and Hispanics appeared to be greatest when Blacks or Hispanics walked to OCC’s back lot on the westernmost part of campus across from Forest Lawn Cemetery. This heightened concern appeared to be connected to officers’ association of Blacks and Hispanics with car theft, as the handful of vehicles that had been stolen from OCC in the past five years had been parked in this back lot.

Besides what officers’ patrolling practices in OCC’s parking lots reveal about suspicion, these practices also signify officers’ apparent concern regarding interracial “networking”. As noted in the discussion of AHS, Coretown officers appeared to be concerned about non-resident racial minorities “corrupting” White Coretown youths. While officers did not proffer any explanations as to why they stopped interracial groups that included White members at OCC, the fact that officers only stopped Whites when they were in the company of Blacks and/or Hispanics suggests that officers viewed such associations as problematic. In other words, Blacks and Hispanics appeared to have a tainting effect on Whites at OCC.
While officers focused some attention on Whites who congregated with Blacks and Hispanics in OCC’s parking lots, officers appeared to ignore Whites altogether during the course of their daily walk-through sweeps of a nearly one-quarter mile corridor linking several OCC buildings every afternoon at some point between 3 and 6 P.M., and occasionally in the mornings as well. Officers devoted almost all of their attention to groups of Blacks while conducting these walk-throughs. In particular, officers focused a disproportionate amount of time monitoring a lounge in the commons area where Blacks regularly congregated. Officers usually devoted between twenty to twenty-five minutes of a forty-five minute walk-through to monitoring the thirty or so Black young adults in this lounge. Typically this lounge was the only point along officers’ quarter-mile walk-through where the officers actually stopped and watched people for more than a minute. Officers indicated that they focused disproportionate attention on this lounge because it had been the site of several drug possession and sale arrests approximately two years prior to the date of the ride-alongs. Moreover, as noted above, officers viewed this lounge as being a popular spot for non-students, especially those from Edward County, to congregate.

In addition to concerns relating to the overall size of OCC coupled with a perceived influx of problematic students and non-students from Edward County, Coretown officers devoted disproportionately more time and energy to monitoring OCC than AHS because they saw OCC as a less controlled environment than AHS. Officers saw OCC as being a less controlled environment than that of AHS in part because there was far less structure to students’ days at OCC and virtually no supervision of students’ time outside of class. In addition, unlike students at AHS, who arrived at the same
general time in the morning and departed at the same general time in the afternoon on school days, students at OCC were constantly coming and going from approximately 7:30 A.M. to 10:30 P.M. on school days. Moreover, while the school calendar for AHS ran from September to June with a winter break at the end of December, the school calendar at OCC was year round, with summer and winter sessions complementing the fall and spring sessions.

The constant flux of people in and out of OCC, coupled with students’ lack of supervision and loosely structured days, contributed to a number of officers’ principal concerns regarding OCC. First, chaotic flux of traffic in and out of OCC made it difficult for officers to discern who was legitimately present at OCC. With so many people coming and going all day at OCC, it was extremely difficult for officers to tell who was and was not a student. This difficulty appeared to be compounded by OCC’s employees’ general lack of monitoring of people outside of class.

Second, the constant flux of people and the lack of supervision made it hard for officers’ to keep tabs on what people were doing on campus. Coretown officers not only had a heightened concern about people engaging in crimes like drug distribution or theft, but also were worried about the greater opportunities that non-residents had to mingle and “network” with others.

Third, given the high volume of unsupervised young adults coming and going from OCC, officers were concerned about possible spillover into the community surrounding OCC. In particular, officers noted that in the two years prior to the ride-alongs in 2006, OCC students and their non-student friends, particularly those from
Edward County, had been increasingly venturing into Northrup Park, an Orion County park of just under 120 acres that is adjacent to OCC along OCC’s eastern border.

Confronted with a highly fluid, minimally controlled environment at OCC, officers appeared to be foremost concerned about containing any potential problematic behavior to OCC’s campus. A White male Coretown officer alluded to this containment strategy regarding OCC when he stated.

We try to keep an eye on things [at OCC] so they don’t erupt or overflow…. We had some problems [at OCC] a couple of years ago, but we were able to nip them in the bud…. This is still a nice place to live. You want to make sure people can walk their dogs in [Northrup] Park without having to worry about getting mugged or anything.

In order to safeguard against any problematic behavior spilling over into Northrup Park or the neighborhoods surrounding OCC, Coretown officers not only stepped up their patrol of the parking lots and campus buildings over the prior two years as described above, officers engaged in more aggressive patrolling of both the roads leading to and surrounding OCC, and of neighboring Northrup Park. For instance, officers alternately parked for twenty to thirty minute stints at strategic points along the entry road (Primrose Street) adjacent to the rear parking lot on the remote, western part of campus, the main entry road (Sanderson Avenue) on the eastern side of campus, and Kingston Avenue, which connects Sanderson Avenue with the Expressway.72 As officers indicated, they devoted a disproportionate amount of traffic enforcement to Kingston Avenue in part because it is the principal access road that students (and non-students) from Edward County, as well as much of Orion County, take to get to OCC.73
Taken altogether, Coretown officers patrolling practices at and around OCC appeared to reflect a two prong strategy to maintain order and control over the “Black” and “Hispanic” “non-resident” school-related space in their midst. First, by situating themselves at various strategic points along OCC’s access roads, officers saw themselves as being able to intercept some potential problems from ever reaching OCC. This was reflected in an Asian male Coretown officer description of his traffic enforcement practices along the roads leading into OCC:

You know that there’s going to be knuckleheads who head over to OCC just to cause some trouble, so you’ve got to try to keep that riffraff out. So, you stop somebody, see if they’ve got weed or [drug] paraphernalia on them. That way you keep that stuff from even makin’ it over there.

Second, by aggressively monitoring, stopping, and questioning of young adults on OCC’s campus, especially within the parking lots, officers saw themselves as being able to control some of the problematic individuals who were able to make it through officers’ sieve of traffic enforcement outside of OCC. A White male Coretown officer captured this sentiment when he stated the following while monitoring one of the parking lots at OCC:

You can’t be on top of everybody. But you’ve still got to try to get the slackers [non-students] and drug dealers out of here. If you keep chasing ’em out, at some point they’ll think twice about comin’ back and tellin’ their friends to come here.

In sum, Coretown officers’ heightened efforts to control Black and Hispanic non-residents at OCC appear to be large part due to the intersection of officers’ perceptions of OCC as minimally controlled environment, and of non-resident Black and Hispanic students as coming from highly criminogenic, pathological town and city contexts.
Moreover, it is the combined, seemingly synergistic effect of these two perceptions that explains why officers appeared to respond with so much more concern and fanfare when dealing with “problematic” Black and Hispanic non-resident visitors at OCC than when dealing with “problematic” White non-resident visitors in housing-related spaces, and as discussed in sections 6.11 and 6.12, commercial-related and border-related spaces. As argued above under section 6.9, officers appeared to be more concerned about Black and Hispanic non-residents than White non-residents because of assumptions about the respective town and city contexts from which these non-residents hailed. For instance, officers viewed Blacks from Piedmont or Hispanics from Elmwood as being more threatening than Whites from Galena or Kingston because officers saw Piedmont and Elmwood as much more dangerous, crime-plagued contexts than Galena and Kingston.

However, officers’ heightened concern about Black and Hispanic non-residents in the spatial context of OCC suggests that officers’ seemingly more restrained approach towards “problematic” White non-residents in spaces outside of OCC was also due in part to officers’ perceptions of what the respective non-residents did when they were in Coretown and how long they stayed in town. With the exception of non-resident Whites who visited the “Marijuana House, officers generally saw non-resident White visitors from towns such as Galena, Kingston, and Raymond Heights as having a fleeting presence in Coretown for the purpose of engaging in vandalism or some other type of hit-and-run type of mischief. By contrast, officers saw Black and Hispanic non-resident visitors at OCC, as well as at AHS, as being in Coretown for extended stays. In turn, officers saw these Black and Hispanic non-residents as having the potential of negatively
influencing others through social networking, whereas officers saw White non-residents as lacking such potential due to the transitory nature of their visits.

6.11. Commercial Spaces and Times in Coretown

While commercial spaces played a role in conditioning Coretown officers’ social group schemata, such spaces did not appear to have the same degree of salience for Coretown officers as they did for Middleboro officers. The presence of other highly salient spaces in Coretown, such as OCC and AHS, as well as several roads and borders (see section 6.12), precluded Coretown officers from focusing their attention on commercial spaces in a way comparable to that of Middleboro officers. Although other spaces occupied more of Coretown officers’ time and attention, Coretown’s fairly large, centrally located “downtown” commercial district nevertheless served as an important site through which officers made distinctions between residents and non-residents. Unlike spaces such as OCC and AHS, where officers assumed that they were dealing predominantly with non-residents, Coretown’s downtown commercial district presented officers with a more complicated mix of residents and non-residents. As a result, in order to negotiate their patrolling of people in this downtown commercial district, officers had to work hard at sorting through information pertaining to residents and non-residents.

In sorting through information pertaining to residents and non-residents, Coretown officers focused on the downtown spaces where young people gathered. Officers indicated that there were limited public spaces in which young people could assemble, and consequently youths and young adults gathered at several spaces in the downtown area. These spaces included a concrete mini-park surrounding a large clock in
the center of the downtown district, a parking lot behind a row of stores, and the area surrounding the Post Office.

Of all of the spaces in which young people gathered in the downtown commercial district though, officers focused a disproportionate amount of attention to the area surrounding the large clock in the center of the district. This “clock area” was a circular concrete patio that was approximately forty feet in diameter. This area included a large clock that was approximately twenty-five feet high located in the center of the patio, six fairly large wooden benches, and inner and outer rings of concrete and brick benches. Officers indicated that over the past year the clock area had become “a hangout” for young people, and concurrently there had been a spike in the number of quality of life offenses, such as loitering, littering, smoking, skateboarding, running or biking in the street and obstructing traffic, occurring in and flowing out of that space.

While officers acknowledged young people engaged in these quality of life-type behaviors in some of the other spaces in which young people gathered in the downtown area, officers indicated that such offenses were far more common in the clock area. More importantly officers noted that they focused more on the clock area than these other downtown gathering spaces because these other spaces, unlike the clock area, were located more on the periphery of the downtown area. In contrast, the clock area was located in the heart of Coretown’s downtown commercial district, and officers saw it as an important symbolic space that people could see from the platform of the train station. One White male Coretown officer indicated that “[The Coretown Police] want[ed] to stamp out the problem[s] [at the clock area] before it bec[a]me an eyesore”.
Coretown officers’ focus on the clock area, however, appeared to be foremost based on economic concerns. The clock area, unlike some of the other downtown gathering spaces, was surrounded by numerous businesses. Officers indicated that over the past year, business owners had complained to the Coretown Police Department about people loitering, littering, skateboarding, making excessive noise, and obstructing pedestrian and automobile traffic near the clock area. Moreover, officers’ proactive monitoring of the clock area was also fueled in part by the massive downtown revitalization project that was underway in 2006. Several Coretown officers indicated in an effort to become more upscale like the neighboring town of Wheaton, Coretown’s downtown area was undergoing major redevelopment, including the construction of several new, large retail and professional buildings. As a result of all that developers and town officials had invested in this downtown revitalization project, officers felt more pressure from these developers and town officials to, as one officer put it, “clean up the trash downtown”.

In addition to these economic concerns, Coretown officers’ focus on the clock area appeared to be galvanized by officers’ perception of this area as place in which non-residents came to socialize or “network” with Coretown youths and young adults. Officers remarked that over the past year the clock area had increasingly attracted young people from nearby Orion County towns such as Galena, Kingston, Longwood, Ringdale, Wheaton, Cline, and Raymond Heights. Officers claimed that the majority of these non-residents, who for the most part were young White males, came down to the clock area to “hang out”, “smoke”, and “hook up with Coretown girls”. Officers also noted that the clock area had recently begun to attract several non-resident Black males, including a 17
year old Black male from Edgarville in Edward County, who recently had been arrested for a “disorderly persons” offense after he ran around in the street and then ran away from Coretown officers.

Given Coretown officers’ concerns about non-resident “outsiders” potentially corrupting Coretown youths and young adults,76 coupled with the officers’ concerns these non-residents detracting from a positive business environment, officers proactively sought to discourage young people from gathering at the clock area. Officers employed both indirect and direct tactics to discourage gatherings at the clock area. Officers indirectly tried to discourage such gatherings by cracking down on trivial parking violations in the vicinity of the clock area, such as parking more than eighteen inches from the curb. Officers directly tried to discourage such gatherings by approaching the area on foot and verbally or non-verbally signaling those gathered to disperse. In addition, officers sometimes bought something to eat and then sat down in the middle of the group gathered by the clock. Once seated, the officers then would ask those gathered questions such as, “Where are you from?”, and invariably, those assembled would begin to disperse one by one.

While officers claimed that they tried not to be too confrontational in dispersing congregants by the clock area, in actuality, officers direct approach appeared to depend on whether they assumed or knew they were dealing with residents as opposed to non-residents.77 Officers generally displayed a more forceful, curt, unfriendly tone when they assumed or knew that they were dealing with non-residents. In contrast, officers not only had a friendlier tone when interacting with resident young people by the clock area, but also often tried to establish a rapport with them and “talk some sense into them”. 
Officers made no similar informal mentoring gestures to any non-resident young people during the course of the ride-alongs. Rather, Coretown officers only seemed to be concerned with non-resident young people dispersing the area as quickly as possible.

As discussed in Chapter 3, Coretown’s downtown commercial district also played a significant role in constituting and activating officers’ social group schemata with respect to non-resident Hispanics. Officers identified non-resident Hispanics or “Mexicans” as workers at many of the restaurants in the downtown business district. As previously mentioned, officers assumed that many of these Hispanic workers were also affiliated with gangs, such as MS-13. As a result of these assumptions, Coretown officers appeared to be highly vigilant of Hispanic motorists or cyclists traversing Night or Sunny Avenues to or from the downtown commercial district.

Besides their apparent heightened vigilance of Hispanics traveling to and from the downtown commercial district, Coretown officers also appeared to be concerned about limiting Hispanics’ presence in this commercial district. This was most evident when officers issued summonses for loitering to “Mexican immigrant” day laborers who congregated near a store or near the railroad station in the downtown area. Prior to issuing summonses on one occasion, a White male Coretown officer remarked, “We need to stamp that out right away.”

6.12. Border- and Road-Related Spaces and Times in Coretown

Of the border- and road-related spaces in the three towns, Coretown’s border- and road-related spaces appeared to play the greatest role in conditioning officers’ social group schemata. These border- and road-related spaces were especially significant spaces with respect to the activation of Coretown officers’ thoughts of other contexts,
including regional and national contexts as well as other local town contexts. In turn, the activation of particular contexts beyond Coretown had important ramifications in terms of how Coretown officers went about patrolling particular groups in particular spaces at particular times.

Of the three sets of officers, Coretown officers were by far the most attuned to their town’s official borders and roads. Indeed, Coretown officers’ half-jokingly revealed their attentiveness to borders by noting that they were known throughout Orion County as the “border patrol”. Although in some cases official border spaces predominantly activated Coretown officers’ thoughts about town contexts such as Galena or Kingston on the other side of the border, in most cases such border spaces were highly salient to officers because they saw these spaces as entry points for non-residents from multiple outside contexts. Given their aforementioned concerns about non-residents, Coretown officers disproportionately patrolled entry points on major roads as a way of monitoring and regulating non-residents’ access to Coretown. In particular, officers frequently monitored entry points at or near the borders on Night and Sunny Avenues in the central part of town, Kingston and Orange Avenues in the northern part of town, and Cumberland Avenue in the southern part of town. Officers disproportionately performed traffic enforcement at the eastern entry points of these roads in part because all of these roads linked up with exits off of a major State highway, the Expressway. Expressway exit 18 in Kingston fed into Kingston Avenue, which eventually led to Orange Avenue, exit 17 fed into Night Avenue, and exit 16 fed into Cumberland Avenue, which eventually led to Sunny Avenue. The importance officers attached to these exits
was reflected by the fact that officers often performed traffic enforcement right by the exits ramps for exits 16 and 17.

Coretown officers focus on the Expressway’s exits and the entry points along the eastern part of these access roads also appeared to be especially driven by their heightened concern about non-resident racial minorities coming into town. Officers perceived these exits and roads as being the principal means by which many non-resident racial minorities, including all racial minorities from Edward County, entered Coretown. Officers’ concerns about non-resident racial minorities were particularly evident from their patrolling of Sunny and Night Avenues in the central part of town, and Kingston and Orange Avenues in the northern part of town.

All Coretown officers devoted a disproportionate amount of time and attention to monitoring Night and Sunny Avenues, which were the two main east-west cross-town roads that ran through the downtown commercial district and effectively bisected the northern and southern halves of Coretown. As alluded to in Chapter 3, officers frequently referred to these roads as the “drug corridor” between the predominantly “Black” and “Hispanic” town of Piedmont to the west, and the predominantly “Black” and “Hispanic” town of Elmwood to the east. Officers claimed that “drug runners” went back and forth between Piedmont and Elmwood, particularly in the evenings. In addition, officers suggested that these roads also served as a “gang route” between Piedmont and Elmwood, with members of the Bloods, Crips, Latin Kings, and MS-13 street gangs regularly traversing these roads. Officers noted that they most frequently identified gang members traveling in cars on Night and Sunny Avenues during traffic stops between 12 A.M. and 2 A.M. Although the multiracial stream of motorists on
Night and Sunny Avenues was disproportionately “White” throughout the day and evening, the entry points of these two roads nevertheless activated officers’ negative thoughts about the “Black” and “Hispanic” contexts of Piedmont and Elmwood because officers knew that these roads eventually connected up with the latter towns.

Coretown officers’ concerns about the entry of non-resident racial minorities into Coretown also appeared to be the driving force behind the disproportionate amount of time officers’ devoted to monitoring traffic on Kingston Avenue in Post 1 and Orange Avenue in Post 2. Officers saw these roads as the two main routes that many non-resident minority students and non-students, including all non-resident racial minorities from Edward County, used to get to OCC on Sanderson Avenue from the Expressway. Officers explained that virtually all OCC students and their non-student friends who lived north of Coretown, which includes all of those who lived in Edward County, made their way to OCC by taking the Expressway to exit 18, which fed into Kingston Avenue. These OCC students and non-students then either proceeded west on Kingston and turned left onto Sanderson Avenue, or turned left onto Apple Avenue and proceeded southwest before turning right on Sanderson Avenue. In conducting traffic enforcement on these roads, officers not only expressly indicated that they were monitoring motorists going to and coming from OCC, but specifically mentioned that they perceived many of these motorists as being from Edward County. For instance, while conducting traffic enforcement from a parking lot in Northrup Park along Kingston Avenue, an Asian male Coretown officer remarked, “This is a good spot for keeping an eye on any riffraff from [Edward] [County]”.

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Coretown officers not only expressly conveyed that their disproportionate monitoring of traffic on Kingston and Apple Avenues was geared towards “keeping an eye on” people going to and coming from OCC, but that they made a concerted effort to select spots and times along these two roads that would minimize their chances of picking up Coretown residents for moving violations. For instance, while performing traffic enforcement on Apple Avenue, a White male Coretown officer indicated that he was moving his patrol car up a couple of blocks past a residential neighborhood in order to “do radar” (traffic enforcement) because “[he] [did not] want to upset residents”. This officer noted that from this particular spot, which was not far from intersection of Sanderson and Apple Avenues, a disproportionate percentage of the motorists passing by would be from OCC. Moreover, this officer also stated that he chose to do radar at this spot at 8 P.M. not only because he knew that there was a lot of traffic exiting OCC around that time, but also because he believed it would minimize the likelihood of ensnaring residents. This officer explained his rationale for selecting this time frame as follows:

You don’t want to do your radar afterschool [between approximately 3 P.M. and 4 P.M.] ‘cause you know you got a lotta parents out picking up their kids…. But you also don’t wanna do [radar] when people are getting back from work [between approximately 5 P.M. and 7 P.M.], so you’ve got to pick a time when you’re not gonna catch too many residents…. [The residents] pay our salaries; you don’t want to piss them off over speeding tickets.

While this officer’s decisions regarding traffic enforcement highlight the extent to which Coretown officers’ patrolling of roads was both spatially and temporally conditioned, more broadly such decisions reflect the extent to which officers’ different social group schemata for residents and non-residents are spatially and temporally conditioned.
Certain roads, such as those officers viewed as access roads to OCC, not only activated officers’ thoughts about contexts beyond Coretown, but also activated thoughts about residents within the context of Coretown. For example, Apple Avenue not only triggered officers’ thoughts about Norville, Edgarville, and other non-residential contexts, but also activated officers’ thoughts about Coretown and when and where Coretown residents engaged in particular activities.

Notwithstanding their ostensible focus on monitoring non-resident racial minorities, particularly Blacks and Hispanics from Edward County, going to or coming from OCC, the majority of Coretown officers at times paradoxically expressed a concern about others accusing them of engaging in racial profiling. Indeed, a higher percentage of officers expressly voiced concerns about accusations of racial profiling in Coretown (75 percent) than in either Middleboro (40 percent) and Longwood (less than 6 percent).

Although Coretown officers appeared to exhibit greater concern about racial profiling than the other two towns’ officers, Coretown officers’ voicing of such concerns was spatially selective. That is, Coretown officers only voiced concerns about racial profiling in certain spaces. Officers voiced the majority of their concerns about racial profiling while conducting traffic enforcement along Night and Sunny Avenues. More specifically, officers voiced such concerns when stopping or viewing Black motorists. Typically officers indicated that they were worried about how many Black motorists they stopped and ticketed. For instance, after deciding not to pull over a Black motorist whose vehicle had one taillight that was out, a White male Coretown officer, who had issued almost twice as many traffic tickets as any other officer in the department, stated the following while conducting traffic enforcement on Sunny Avenue:
You know, I’m just worried about how it’ll look…. I’ve got to admit it, I think twice about pulling somebody over if they’re Black. And unless it’s something flagrant, I just hold back…. I write more tickets than anybody else in this department, but I probably ticket the fewest Blacks.

In contrast, even though officers devoted a disproportionate amount of time patrolling Kingston, Apple, Sanderson, and Cumberland Avenues, Primrose Street (behind OCC), OCC, and AHS, officers never voiced any concerns about profiling while stopping or viewing Blacks or otherwise patrolling in these spaces. For example, the aforementioned White male officer who expressed his concern about issuing too many tickets to Black motorists never expressed any similar concern while ostensibly profiling Blacks in and around OCC.

Coretown officers’ concerns about racial profiling while encountering Blacks along Night and Sunny Avenues, and officers’ seeming lack of concern while encountering Blacks in other spaces, such as along Kingston Avenue or at OCC, suggest that “Blackness” became salient in the former spaces in a way that it was not in the latter spaces. Although all of Coretown officers’ interactions with Blacks in spaces throughout Coretown occurred against the same backdrop of overwhelmingly “White” Coretown, this social group backdrop only appeared to make the majority of non-Black Coretown officers self-conscious about profiling when they interacted with Blacks on certain roads or other spaces. In other words, while the dearth of Black residents in demographically “White” Coretown may have contributed to the salience of Blacks in officers’ encounters with Blacks in some spaces, this dearth alone cannot explain why officers voiced profiling concerns in some spaces but not others.
Coretown officers’ spatially selective concerns about accusations of racial profiling also do not appear to have been driven by how officers thought the local audience in Coretown would judge their behavior. As alluded to in Note 94, Coretown officers, unlike Middleboro officers, did not appear to be faced with any local constituency groups’ pressures to refrain from racial profiling. Coretown officers neither expressly nor implicitly suggested that Coretown’s large, dominant White majority frowned upon such patrolling, nor intimated that they were trying to avoid offending Coretown’s small Black population. In short, the spaces in which officers’ expressed profiling concerns did not appear to trigger officers’ thoughts of any local constituency pressures.

While the spaces in which officers’ voiced profiling concerns did not appear to activate thoughts of any pressures associated with Coretown’s local context, such spaces did appear to activate officers’ thoughts of pressures associated with a broader national context. Officers’ interactions with or even thoughts of Blacks in these spaces appeared to engender officers’ thoughts of being scrutinized and judged by a national audience extending far beyond the confines of Coretown. Consistent with Ruddick’s (1996) argument that a particular space can have meanings on multiple levels, Coretown officers not only appeared to see some spaces as having meanings associated with Coretown’s local context or a countywide or regional context, but also as having meanings associated with a much wider national context. For example, Coretown officers saw the eastern end of Night Avenue near exit 17 off of the Expressway as representing a local space in which many Coretown residents passed through commuting back and forth to work, but also as countywide or regional space in which “drug runners” passed through while
carrying out drug transactions between Piedmont and Elmwood, and as discussed below, as a national space in which disproportionately “White” officers possibly profiled “Black” motorists.

Coretown officers’ concerns about being evaluated within a national context were evident from their comments following or referencing interactions with Black motorists on Night and Sunny Avenues. For instance, after stopping a Black motorist on Night Avenue and letting him go with a warning, one White male Coretown officer remarked:

You know I just try to do my job. It don’t make a difference if you’re black, white, red, purple, or green. It’s all the same to me. But sometimes I worry about how it’s gonna look…. Is somebody gonna call up Eyewitness News if they see me pulling over some Black guy? And then what? Is Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson gonna be leading some demonstration down [Night] Avenue?

Similarly, another White male Coretown officer stated the following after discussing a Black motorist who had given him a hard time during a traffic stop on Night Avenue:

You gotta watch your ass these days. Everybody’s into this “gotcha” shit. You know, trying to make you look bad. You know most of the people I pull over and give tickets to are White, but it’s going to be that one Black I pull over that’s gonna get me on 60 Minutes. You know, you just gotta be careful.

Likewise, a third White male Coretown officer made the following comments when discussing the patrolling of motorists on South Avenue:

It’s like you walk a tightrope. You’ve gotta treat everyone fairly, but I think we actually go out of our way for the minorities. I mean we don’t want the NAACP coming over here and raising a stink. You know, but it pisses me off. Everybody thinks we [the police] are racists, but what do they know about policing? What does the NAACP know about policing?

In setting forth their concerns about accusations of racial profiling or racism, each of these three Coretown officers invoked symbols pertaining to a national context and
audience. The first officer’s references to two prominent national civil rights leaders, and the second officer’s reference to the nationally syndicated television program 60 Minutes suggest that the officers were thinking about how a broad, diverse national audience was examining the officers’ actions under a microscope. Although the third officer’s reference to the NAACP could have possibly referred to local chapters of the NAACP, both the absence of an NAACP chapter in Coretown and the officer’s generic references to the NAACP suggest that he was thinking of the NAACP as a broader, nationwide entity rather than a local gadfly organization.

Certain spaces’ activation of officers’ thoughts of national context in which the officers’ interactions with Blacks were critically scrutinized and judged appears to be attributable to Coretown officers’ assumptions regarding the use of space, coupled with their stereotypes regarding the users and the contexts from which officers assumed the users hailed (e.g., “Black” towns and regions). As Ruddick (1996) and Smith (1993) contend, both the meanings that actors associate with particular spaces as well as the contexts or scales of meaning activated by those spaces (e.g., local, regional, or national), depend not only on actors’ perceptions of the users of those spaces (e.g., Blacks vs. Whites), but also on actors’ perceptions of how such users in fact use those spaces.

As discussed above under sections 6.9 and 6.10, Coretown officers appeared to view most “Black” outside towns in both Orion County and nearby Edward County as criminogenic, dangerous contexts that were rife with drug dealing, gang activity, and other pathologies. Moreover, officers expressed concern about Blacks, particularly younger Blacks, from these contexts coming into Coretown for extended periods of time and corrupting Coretown’s predominantly “White” young people, as well as engaging in
various criminal or otherwise problematic behaviors. Officers’ concerns about Black non-resident visitors’ behaviors in certain spaces, particularly these visitors’ interactions with Coretown’s young people, suggest that officers’ assumptions regarding these visitors’ use of space were important factors in activating officers’ thoughts about “Black” non-residential contexts, and in turn, shaping how officers went about patrolling these visitors. Thus, the activation of problematic “Black” non-residential contexts at places like OCC and AHS was not simply due to who officers saw in these spaces, but was also due to what officers assumed these occupants of these spaces were doing.

Some spaces’ activation of officers’ thoughts of national contexts and concerns of accusations of profiling, and other spaces’ activation of officers’ thoughts of local and regional contexts and no apparent concerns about profiling accusations, thus appear to be explained by the nexus between the users of space, the uses of space, and the activation or salience of particular contexts. When Black motorists traveled on cross-town roads such as Night and Sunny Avenues, officers did not assume that they were heading to places like OCC and AHS for an extended stay; rather, officers saw these Black motorists as just passing through town. In assuming that these motorists’ presence in Coretown was fleeting, officers did not see such presence as posing any potential threat in terms of interacting with young people in Coretown. In the absence of such potential threat, these motorists’ presence on these cross-town road spaces did not activate officers’ thoughts about problematic “Black” non-residential contexts in Orion or Edward counties. Instead, a national context became most salient for officers in these spaces, as they more clearly thought about the significance of patrolling “Black” motorists against the “White” social group backdrop of Coretown.
In contrast, when officers encountered Black motorists on roads that they saw as access roads to OCC (e.g., Kingston, Apple, and Sanderson Avenues, and Primrose Street) or AHS (e.g., Cumberland Avenue), officers assumed that these motorists were going to be camping out at OCC or AHS and interacting with and negatively influencing Coretown’s young people. As a result of the potential for these Black motorists, whom officers assumed to be non-residents, to interact with Coretown’s young people at OCC or AHS, these motorists’ presence on these roads triggered officers’ highly negative thoughts about “threatening” “Black” non-residential contexts in Orion or Edward counties. The threats of drug and gang activity that officers associated with these “Black” town and regional contexts were so salient to officers on these roads and had such a powerful sway over them, that these threats essentially eclipsed any possibility of officers thinking about national contexts pertaining to profiling concerns. Even though officers were interacting with Black motorists against the same “White” social group background of Coretown in spaces along these roads like those along Night and Sunny Avenues, Coretown officers never mentioned Al Sharpton, 60 Minutes, the NAACP, or any other figures, programs, or entities that symbolized a national context and audience while patrolling these OCC or AHS access roads. Officers’ thoughts of “Black” local and regional non-residential contexts effectively crowded out any thoughts pertaining to a national context. As a result, officers did not appear to think twice about profiling Black motorists on these OCC and AHS access roads, even though they appeared quite apprehensive about the appearance of profiling while patrolling cross-town roads on which they assumed Black motorists were passing through town.
Besides their concern about entry points to Coretown on major roads, as well as access roads to places like OCC and AHS, Coretown officers exhibited some, albeit lesser, concern about border areas with adjacent towns such as Galena and Kingston. These border areas activated officers’ thoughts of the people and behaviors they associated with the contexts of these adjacent towns. Of all of the towns bordering Coretown, officers appeared to be most concerned about unwanted visitors coming in from Galena along Coretown’s western border. The spaces along the Galena/Coretown border area, which included residential neighborhoods and a relatively thin strip of woods, activated officers’ thoughts about the “White” working-class context of Galena. More specifically, as noted in section 6.9, when either patrolling or even thinking about this Galena/Coretown border area, officers thought about various problems they stereotypically associated with Galena, such as vandalism and underage drinking.

While Coretown officers appeared to be more concerned with unwanted visitors from Galena than those from any of the other towns bordering Coretown, officers spent far less time patrolling this area than any of the entry points or access roads on the eastern part of town. While officers did engage in heightened patrol of this area on some occasions, such as “mischief night” before Halloween, due to concerns about vandals coming into Coretown from Galena, officers generally saw the potential problems stemming from this area as more of a nuisance than as a serious threat. Even when officers happened upon Galena youths or young adults who were engaged in illegal activities in this border area, officers typically refrained from issuing summonses to these youths or young adults. For instance, when a White male Coretown officer stopped a group of White male Galena adolescents for discharging B-B guns without a license in
the woods along the Galena/Coretown border, the officer simply scolded the youths and let them go. In general, as previously noted, officers generally exhibited less concern about White visitors from places like Galena than Black and Hispanic visitors from places like Elmwood and Piedmont because officers neither saw “White” contexts like Galena as being as problematic as “Black” and “Hispanic” contexts like Elmwood and Piedmont, nor viewed “White” visitors, unlike their Black and Hispanic counterparts, as staying in town for extended periods of time and corrupting Coretown’s young people.

The other area bordering an adjacent town about which Coretown officers expressed some concern was the Kingston/Coretown border area in the northernmost part of Coretown. In particular, officers were concerned about illegal activity occurring in Laramie Park, which was located north of Kingston Avenue, and covered parts of both Coretown and Kingston. However, unlike their concerns along the Galena/Coretown border area, officers’ concerns along the Kingston/Coretown border did not center upon unwanted residents from the adjacent town. Rather, officers’ concerns about the Kingston/Coretown border focused almost exclusively on non-resident Whites from towns further north and west of Coretown, and non-resident Blacks and Hispanics from Edward County, who frequently stopped at a rest area off of a major state road, Route 13, on the other side of Laramie Park in Kingston. Officers claimed that many of the Whites making this “stopover” at Laramie Park were making their way back to northern and western “White” suburbs such as Nanning, Molina, and Salinas after purchasing drugs in Norville or some other town or city in Edward County to the north and east of Coretown. For instance, one White male Coretown officer stated:
You get a lot of these kids with money from Nanning, Molina, Salinas, who hop on [Route] [13] and go over to Norville to buy drugs. Some of ‘em are so strung out, they can’t wait ‘til they get home, so they stop at the rest area on [13] and get high.…

Officers also contended that many of the Blacks and Hispanics making this stopover were on their way back to Edward County after having sold drugs in the “White” towns to the north and west of Coretown. Given their assumptions that those making these stopovers possessed illegal drugs, Coretown officers monitored Laramie Park along the Kingston/Coretown border to make sure, as one officer put it, that these visitors did not “come into [their] neck of the woods”.

6.13. Conclusion

Space and time conditioned officers’ social group schemata or maps in complex ways in each of the three towns. In Longwood, overall patterns of racial segregation and the rigid racial marking of space in residential areas, coupled with officers’ interests in appeasing powerful White constituents associated with “White” residential spaces, contributed in large part to officers’ view of Blacks as being out of place in these spaces at most times. These patterns of residential segregation were reinforced by a system of neighborhood schools that further precluded officers from seeing Blacks as legitimately present in “White” neighborhoods. Longwood officers’ apparent view of Blacks as being “out of place” was most evident when officers routinely “herded” groups of Black LHS students out of “White” District 2 following dismissal.

In contrast to their seemingly aggressive patrolling of Blacks, particularly Black youths in “White” residential areas, Longwood officers virtually neglected Blacks within “Black” neighborhoods in District 4, as well as in the town’s various commercial areas.
These officers’ relative neglect of Blacks within “Black” neighborhoods in District 4, coupled with officers’ seemingly heightened patrolling of the borders of District 4, particularly Radnor, Sylvester, and Chester Avenues, suggests that officers’ patrolling was intended to keep the Black population of District 4 within the confines of District 4. However, officers’ view of commercial areas as “multiracial” and “downscale” spaces led officers to see all residents, including Blacks from District 4, as “in place” in such spaces.

In Middleboro, overall patterns of racial integration in housing bolstered by a school system in which students were randomly assigned to elementary and middle schools contributed significantly to officers’ view of all groups being “in place” throughout most of the town. Most notably, despite Middleboro officers’ highly disparaging view of the poor Black population clustered in the southeastern part of Middleboro, officers viewed people from this part of town being “in place” even in predominantly “White” well-to-do areas. The contrast between Middleboro officers’ approach to this poor Black population, and Longwood officers’ approach to a similar poor Black population within Longwood, indicates that the spatial arrangements of local contexts are important for understanding how officers negotiate their policing of various groups.

Although the overall configuration of residential and school-related spaces in Middleboro, in conjunction with officers’ concerns about appeasing the town’s powerful coalition of Black/White residents, effectively granted “in place” status to all residents in all residential areas, such status did not extend to all residents in the upscale Mainline commercial district in the southwestern part of town. In particular, officers’ viewed
Middleboro’s poor Black southeastern residents as “out of place” anywhere in the vicinity of this district because of the combination of pressures from powerful business owners and wealthy patrons of the district, as well as the officers’ own apparent views that these residents would not likely be patrons of the establishments in this district. Consequently, the alternative meanings that officers associated with this particular commercial space effectively eclipsed the protection that Middleboro’s Black/White coalition and its arrangement of schools afforded poor Blacks throughout other parts of the town.

While Middleboro officers generally exhibited a laissez-faire approach towards the patrolling of residential groups outside of the Mainline commercial district (as well as the Blair Avenue commercial district to some extent), these officers generally displayed an aggressive approach to patrolling Blacks whom they perceived as non-residents along the southeastern and southernmost borders. This more aggressive patrolling in part stemmed from these spaces’ apparent activation of officers’ thoughts of criminogenic, pathological contexts in adjacent and nearby “Black” towns. Officers’ patrolling was not only influenced by the salience of perceived outside “Black” threat in these spaces, but also by officers’ perception that Middleboro’s “liberal” “pro-civil rights” coalition were not opposed to such policing due to concerns about outsiders’ criminal potential.

In Coretown, officers generally appeared to view all residents, including the town’s relatively small population of racial minorities, as being “in place” throughout the town. Officers viewed the town’s small population of racial minority residents as nonthreatening, which coupled with officers’ apparent pro-resident bias, contributed to officers’ view of these racial minorities as being “in place” throughout predominantly
“White” Coretown. In contrast, such “in place” legitimacy did not extend to racial minority non-residents at the town’s two principal visitor-related spaces, the county college (OCC) and the county alternative high school (AHS). The presence of racial minority non-residents in these visitor-related spaces activated officers’ thoughts of criminogenic outside “Black” and “Hispanic” contexts, which in turn prompted officers to vigorously monitor these perceived “outsiders” in and around these spaces.

Notwithstanding Coretown officers’ apparently aggressive patrolling of those whom they identified as non-resident racial minorities in and around OCC and AHS, officers did not uniformly patrol those whom they identified as non-resident Blacks across all of the towns spaces. Officers displayed a more laissez-faire approach towards those whom they identified as “non-resident” Blacks on the towns two main east-west cross-town roads. This discrepancy appears to be due to officers’ assumptions about visitors’ usage of space. Officers appeared to see non-resident Blacks as less threatening because they assumed that these Black visitors, unlike those whom they perceived as traveling to OCC and AHS, were simply passing through town. Moreover, while Black non-resident visitors in spaces in and around OCC and AHS activated officers’ thoughts of nearby criminogenic “Black” local and county contexts, Black non-resident visitors on cross-town roads activated officers’ thoughts of a national context in which their patrolling might be perceived as racial profiling.

In each of the three towns, officers’ familiarity with people appeared to contribute to officers’ sense of who was seen as “in place”. In both Coretown and Middleboro, officers’ lack of familiarity with non-resident racial minorities seemed to heighten officers’ perceived threat of these non-residents. While Coretown officers generally
viewed all non-residents as posing some degree of threat, these officers’ greater familiarity with contexts from which White non-residents hailed appeared to reduce officers’ apprehension regarding these non-residents. Although Longwood officers’ lack of focus on non-residents appears to suggest that familiarity was not an issue for them, these officers almost all-encompassing preoccupation with containing an indigenous Black population that they viewed as threatening appears to have been driven in part by these officers’ apparent lack of familiarity with these Black residents. While Longwood’s predominantly White group of officers had grown up in Longwood, their own past isolated, segregated experiences within the town appears to have largely precluded these officers from developing a sense of familiarity and comfort with these Black residents.

CHAPTER 6 ENDNOTES

1 The contexts relating to officers’ backgrounds and experiences prior to and outside of their current patrolling context are explored in depth in Chapter 7.

2 Resident groups form the principal basis of officers’ social group schemata within a particular town because these groups are the ones to which officers feel they must answer. However, social group information about non-residents, which is most commonly activated by visitor-related spaces, supplements these schemata.

3 While Longwood officers themselves appeared to discount the threat posed by groups of Black youths, the officers nevertheless show deference to White residents’ threat perceptions with respect to these youths.

4 As noted in Chapter 7, many of the White officers personally supported this containment strategy due to their past and present social ties to Longwood.

5 As discussed under section 6.4, Longwood officers also saw District 4 as attracting drug dealers and other problematic individuals from across the border in Radnor.

6 Officers identified a disproportionate percentage of students in southern Longwood’s Districts 7 and 8 as “Hispanic.” Students from the elementary school in southwestern Longwood attended the middle school in the eastern part of Longwood.

7 Longwood officers did not talk about the friendship networks of Hispanics, Asians, or any specific ethnic groups.
The only two Black officers in the sample were from other towns, and therefore had no prior knowledge of District 4.

Longwood officers expected the majority of Black LHS students to be out of District 2 by approximately 3:45 P.M., but recognized that some Black LHS students left LHS later than 3 P.M. due to afterschool obligations.

Longwood officers never expressly or implicitly suggested that White or other non-Black students were affiliated with gangs even though these students also wore clothing that reflected the colors of particular gangs such as the “Bloods”.

While White Longwood officers were more zealous than other officers in carrying out these “herding”-related practices, all officers, including the two Black officers in the sample, partook in such practices. Accordingly, the spatial context of District 2 in the time period after school was more significant than any individual differences among officers.

While Longwood officers expressed some concern about the possible escalation of such confrontations, their concern, as discussed later in this chapter, was minimal in comparison to that of Coretown officers in their dealings with White Coretown High School students.

Route 101 was a large state highway that effectively bisected the southern half of Longwood. As alluded to under section 6.1, Longwood officers’ apparent lack of concern about the commercial strip along Route 101, which constituted all of District 6, also was attributable to the magnitude of the commercial establishments along the highway coupled with a lack of resources to patrol them, as well as officers’ view of Route 101 as an island unto itself. Typically one two-officer patrol car patrolled the entire east-west highway area, which included multiple large shopping areas and a variety of other commercial establishments. Longwood officers felt that they did not have sufficient patrol resources to do more than cursory patrolling of the area. As a result, the officers assigned to District 6 engaged in relatively little proactive policing. These officers typically waited for calls regarding accidents, shoplifting, or disputes at motels or restaurants. Moreover, Longwood officers’ reactive approach stemmed from their view of the entire stretch of Highway 101 as a self-contained foreign entity that split through the southern part of Longwood. Officers simply did not see the commercial strip along Route 101 as being part of the heart of Longwood in the way that they did the commercial strips along Sylvester and Forest Avenues. As noted under section 6.1, officers saw Route 101’s various commercial spaces as sufficiently removed from residential housing spaces in Longwood, and consequently did not see the people or activity in these spaces as having much bearing on the rest of Longwood. Furthermore, as noted above, Longwood officers’ seemingly constant fixation with containing the people and activity of District 4 in the north appeared to divert attention away from anything that was occurring in along Route 101 in the south.

While officers’ apparent lack of concern about Black youths’ presence on Forest Avenue is likely attributable in part to officers’ view of Forest Avenue as a commercial area in which all are welcome and legitimately present, it is also possible that this seeming lack of concern is due in part to officers’ perception of Forest Avenue as a highly controlled environment. Officers may have reasoned that no groups’ presence on Forest Avenue potentially presented any problems because the Longwood Police Station, Town Hall, and other municipal buildings were all situated on Forest Avenue. With all of these entities “authority figures” in the area, officers may have believed that Forest Avenue was a secure space.

These “district” borders were originally drawn up by Longwood’s town council and mayor in the 1950s. The Longwood Police Department has used the township’s eight district scheme as a basis for assigning patrol officers for over half a century.

Although Longwood officers generally appeared to express little concern about either non-residents’ entry into Longwood, or Black Longwood residents’ activities within District 4, there was one notable exception to both. Following an alleged meeting between members of the Bloods gang from Longwood and neighboring Ringdale at a park in the eastern part of the “target area”, Longwood officers regularly checked this park to make sure that, as one officer put it, “no gangbangin’ was goin’ on”. Thus, while Longwood officers generally displayed no concern about
what was going on along the Longwood’s shared border with Ringdale to the west, and generally exhibited a laissez-faire approach to residents’ activities within District 4, officers expressed alarm about the possibility of gang members from Ringdale joining forces with gang members from Longwood. Officers appeared to fear that such a meeting would cause the budding gang problem in Longwood to metastasize and explode like a powder keg.

17 Chambliss Street was one of the main east-west cross-town roads that Black LHS students used to walk back and forth to LHS in District 2.

18 As noted below, this was temporally qualified. Officers viewed members of all groups as being somewhat “out of place” between 11 P.M. and 5 A.M. in most residential spaces.

19 The only district in the northern part of Longwood where the majority of residential neighborhoods were not racially segregated was District 3, sandwiched between District 2 to the west and District 4 to the east. However, even though most of the neighborhoods in District 3 were racially mixed, the racial demographics of the overall district reflect a distinct racial pattern that is consistent with the segregated neighborhoods to the east and west of the district. The neighborhoods in the western part of District 3 tend to have a majority of White residents, whereas the neighborhoods in the eastern part of District 3 tend to have a majority of Black residents. Thus, rather than contravening the normative character of racial segregation in the northern half of Longwood, District 3’s residential pattern generally reinforces it.

20 Each town had one high school for students in grades 9 through 12.

21 No ride-alongs were conducted with Middleboro officers during the “overnight” shift hours between 11 P.M. and 7 A.M., but officers responsible for Zones 3 and 2 indicated that they devoted a good part of this time to monitoring the Belton Avenue area.

22 Officers assigned to the “floater cars” also spent approximately one-third of their discretionary time monitoring the Blair Avenue commercial district in northern Middleboro. As noted later in this chapter, these officers’ disproportionate discretionary patrolling of the Belton Avenue and Blair Avenue commercial districts in large part appeared to stem from a prior history of complaints by business owners and patrons in the two respective districts.

23 Although Middleboro officers had no way of knowing whether those Blacks whom they identified as being from the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area were in fact from that area (as opposed to some other part of Middleboro or some other town or city), officers assumed these Blacks were from that area based on both their dress and demeanor, as well as their invariable eastward dispersal down Belton Avenue towards Norman and Monroe Streets.

24 There did not seem to be any Whites, Hispanics, or Asians who met the officers’ criteria of a “lower-class” appearance in the Mainline district or its vicinity, so it is not possible to discern whether officers would have responded the same to “lower-class” Whites, Hispanics, or Asians.

25 “Hoodies” are sweatshirts with hood worn over the head.

26 Middleboro officers did not appear to consider the role that their own efforts in the vicinity of the Mainline district (discussed later in this section), as well as the efforts of some shopkeepers and restaurant owners (discussed above), might have played in shaping “Norman and Monroe Street Blacks’ “comfort zone”.

27 There were no outdoor tables or chairs upon which patrons of the Chicken Shack could sit.

28 In the end, Middleboro officers won their ongoing battle with the Black patrons/congregants of the Chicken Shack by default. In early November of 2006, the Chicken Shack abruptly closed, and remained vacant for the remaining month of my ride-alongs with the Middleboro officers. While it was not exactly clear as to why the Chicken Shack closed, it was very clear what effect its closing had on its predominantly Black clientele. As soon as the Chicken Shack closed, the groups of Black youths and adults congregating on the sidewalks in the surrounding area all but disappeared.
Blacks from the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area still congregated on Belton Avenue, but at “Black” commercial spaces much further to the east of the Mainline district.

29 In addition, as noted in Chapter 5, Middleboro officers displayed relatively little concern about what “Norman and Monroe Streets” Blacks did in their own residential neighborhoods.

30 As noted in Chapter 5, the one notable exception to this laissez-faire approach was officers’ handling of some large house parties where under-age drinking and other drug use was taking place.

31 Middleboro officers expressly indicated that racially homogeneous groups were problematic in ways that racially heterogeneous groups were not. Middleboro officers argued that the members of racially homogeneous youth groups reinforced and emboldened each other due to their cultural similarities, and consequently were more likely to engage in delinquent or otherwise problematic behavior. For instance, one White male Middleboro officer stated:

It’s like they feed off of each other. They’re all the same. I mean, they’re all into the same shit; they dress the same, listen to the same music, you know. They just prop each other up. It’s like there are no checks on them. When you’ve got a mix kids, they offset each other. If they’re all the same, it’s like a fuse ready to be lit. And once it’s lit, it’s hard to put it out.

As reflected by the comments of this officer, Middleboro officers generally saw racially mixed groups as being innocuous. Middleboro officers assumed that the members of racially mixed groups did not bolster other members’ anti-social impulses. For Middleboro officers, racially homogeneous groups were culturally homogeneous groups, and as such, were stronger groups that were more likely to rile members and challenge authority. Hence, officers assumed that the weaker cultural ties of racially diverse groups precluded such groups from engaging in defiant types of behavior.

Middleboro officers’ favorable view of racially mixed groups was also based on their assumption that the formation of such groups was often connected to some socially positive activity related to school or extracurricular events. Officers spoke glowingly of the interracial groups of students at MHS, indicating that they never had any problems with racially mixed groups involved in sports or other activities at the high school. As discussed under section 6.6, Middleboro officers’ approval of racially mixed groups was reflected by the officers’ laissez-faire patrolling practices around MHS.

Given Middleboro officers’ perceptions of racially homogeneous groups, it appears that the racially homogeneous makeup of the groups that the officers encountered in Middleboro’s Belton Avenue and Blair Avenue commercial spaces may have added to the contentious nature of their dealings with these groups.

32 The service calls in Zone 3 were more frequent than in either Zones 1 or 2. However, it was not just the absolute number of such calls, but rather the apparent severity of the calls that lead to officers’ greater focus on this area.

33 Middleboro officers’ contention that there were a lot of non-resident Black visitors in both the “Norman and Monroe Streets” area as well as the Greenwood apartment complex was based on the officers’ questioning of people out on the streets. Officers indicated that many of the people whom they questioned on Norman and Monroe Streets claimed to be from out of town.

34 Middleboro officers indicated that while they were expected to do at least one-half hour of traffic enforcement, their superiors did not require them to perform traffic enforcement on any particular roads.

35 “Wilding” is a term that many journalists, pundits, and politicians used to describe a group of Black youths’ alleged assault and rape of a 28-year-old White female jogger in Central Park in New York City in 1989.

36 Lakeview Plaza is located off of Belton Avenue, approximately one mile from Middleboro’s southeastern border with Georgeville.

37 The two males turned out to be from Sandy Peak.
As discussed in subsequent sections, Coretown officers also associated youths and young adults from Galena with a variety of nuisance-related behaviors, particularly vandalism. While Coretown officers perceived Galena’s “potheads” as relatively quiet, the officers saw Galena’s vandals and pranksters as relatively boisterous.

Interestingly, upon questioning, a Coretown officer indicated that he could not recall one service call regarding this property on Barden Street, and that no one associated with this property had ever been arrested for a drug offense.

Six of the sixteen Coretown officers in the sample were living or had lived in Galena, Kingston, or Raymond Heights, all of which were cited by the officers as being the sources of many of Coretown’s problematic “White” visitors.

As discussed under section 6.4, while District 4’s northern border area with Radnor activated Longwood officers’ thoughts associated with Radnor, officers generally saw the poor, “Black” area of Radnor bordering District 4 as contiguous and fluid with District 4, rather than as a separate outside context.

Moreover, Coretown officers saw residents as “in place” in various parts of the town due to the social ties they formed via town-wide recreational activities.

Edward is a county that is adjacent to and north of Orion County. Coretown is centrally located in Orion County.

Coretown officers claimed that they could tell who was a resident and who was not. In particular, due to the small number of racial minorities in Coretown, officers maintained that they were able to identify most of the town’s racial minority residents. Given this belief, officers assumed that the overwhelming percentage of racial minorities that they encountered at AHS, CC, and other visitor-related contexts were non-residents. Even in cases where officers did not realize that they were dealing with a resident, officers appeared to do a 180 degree turn when they discovered that the person was a resident. For example, as noted in Chapter 4, a White male Coretown officer declined to issue a ticket to a Black Coretown woman who driving more than twenty miles per hour over the speed limit upon learning that she was a Coretown resident, but issued a ticket to a Black non-resident woman who was driving twelve miles per hour over the speed limit.

Personal communication with the principal of AHS on October 3, 2006. [For purposes of anonymity, the principal’s name is omitted.]

Personal communication with the principal of AHS on October 3, 2006.

Personal communication with the principal of AHS on October 3, 2006.

Personal communication with the principal of AHS on October 3, 2006.

Coretown officers’ distorted perception of the percentage of Blacks and Hispanics at AHS may in part be due to the greater proclivity of Black and Hispanic students to congregate outside AHS, particularly between AHS and a corner store located a block south of Cumberville Avenue, both before and after school. Officers’ disproportionate monitoring of these Black and Hispanic students is discussed below.

Eleven out of sixteen officers in the sample attended Coretown High School.

Other than the corner store on Cumberville Avenue, there were no other commercial establishments within walking distance from AHS.

“Dirtbag” is a term that C officers used exclusively to describe the students at CHS who stood together and smoked cigarettes across the street from the western side of CHS every morning before school and every afternoon following dismissal. Although some AHS students appeared to engage in the same type of behaviors (e.g., smoking) as the CHS
“dirtbags”; C officers never used the term “dirtbag” to describe AHS students. This suggests that C officers viewed the CHS students as being distinct from the AHS students.

53 Coretown officers’ “herding” of CHS “dirtbags” differs from Longwood officers’ herding of Black LHS students in several respects. First, Coretown officers only targeted a small group of 20 or so students, whereas Longwood officers appeared to target all Black students exiting District 2. Second, unlike Longwood officers, Coretown officers were not trying to push any students out of the vicinity of school grounds; rather, Coretown officers were simply trying to make sure that the group of “dirtbag” smokers did not despoil any particular properties by congregating on lawns for extending periods of time. Third, Coretown officers only focused on where the CHS smokers gathered in the morning hours; the officers did not, unlike Longwood officers, follow any students after school. Fourth, unlike Longwood officers, Coretown officers were highly reluctant to approach students, and even more reluctant to issue tickets to them for littering, loitering, and other quality of life offenses.

54 The “contract mess” to which this officer alluded refers to the stalled contract talks between representatives of the police union and members of the town council. Coretown officers had been working without a contract for approximately two years at the time the ride-alongs were conducted for this study in 2006. Given that northern Coretown residents controlled a majority of the seats on the town council, officers were particularly sensitive to avoiding any practices that might antagonize or alienate these residents.

55 It is possible that some of what appears to be racially disparate treatment of AHS students is more of a function of where students were positioned when they stepped off of school grounds. As noted above, those AHS students who left school grounds to smoke a cigarette usually stayed relatively close to the borders of AHS’s property, whereas students who left to patronize the corner store were a block away from AHS. However, while this may account for the heightened monitoring of students who patronized the corner store, it still does not account for officers’ much more hostile, confrontational approach with these students versus that with the AHS smokers.

56 Although both Coretown and Longwood officers appeared highly concerned about the movements of Black students within the vicinity of AHS and LHS respectively, and monitored Black students’ dispersal from these respective schools following dismissal, Coretown officers’ afterschool monitoring practices were far less systematic and intense than Longwood officers’ “herding” practices for several reasons. Coretown officers were not only dealing with a much smaller population of students exiting AHS, but none of these students were exiting on foot through the neighborhoods surrounding AHS, and unlike the Black students departing LHS, the Black students leaving AHS dispersed in different directions to a variety of destinations.

57 Although Coretown officers associated criminal behavior, particularly drug-related behavior, with both AHS students and CHS “dirtbags”, officers indicated that very few youths from either group had ever been arrested.

58 Coretown officers’ perceptions of CHS dirtbags’ redeemability also was bolstered by the fact that many CHS “dirtbags” had eventually gone on to college in the past.

59 “Snoop Dogg” is a Black hip hop artist from the 1990s and 2000s.

60 Middleboro officers’ view of interracial groups as being nonthreatening is discussed under note 31.

61 These ride-alongs took place in the morning between 7:30 A.M. and 12 P.M., in the afternoon between 12 P.M. and 6 P.M., and evenings between 6 P.M. and 11 P.M. The percentage of time that various officers spent patrolling OCC was greatest during the afternoon hours. As will be discussed later in this section, officers devoted more time to monitoring OCC during the afternoon hours because they believed that there were more students and non-students from Edward County on campus at that time. Outside of the overnight hours (11 P.M. to 7 A.M.), when officers performed rather perfunctory checks of OCC’s parking lots, officers devoted the least amount of time monitoring OCC in the evenings after approximately 7 P.M. As discussed later in this section, officers spent less time to monitoring OCC during the evening hours because they perceived the students who attended OCC in the evenings to be more “serious”, and hence, less of a problem.
Although OCC, which is a county entity, has its own public safety officers, OCC also has a cooperative agreement with the Coretown Police Department, whereby Coretown officers and OCC’s public safety officers share jurisdiction. Typically only two OCC public safety officers were on duty at any one time, and generally these officers covered the various buildings on campus and spent little time monitoring the campus’s four parking lots.

According to the registrar at OCC, as of 2006, “Whites” represented 26 percent of OCC’s student population, “Hispanics” represented 22 percent, “Blacks” represented 22 percent, “Asians” represented 5 percent, and those in the “Other” category represented 25 percent. Although Coretown officers’ references to OCC as predominantly a “Black” and “Hispanic” space appear to be somewhat distorted, their assessment that the majority of students at OCC were racial minorities appears to reflect that of the registrar.

Personal communication with the registrar of OCC on September 15, 2006. [For purposes of anonymity, the registrar’s name is omitted.]

For Coretown officers, “Edward County” was largely synonymous with the disproportionately “Black” cities or Norville and Edgarville, and town of Inglewood.

At OCC, Coretown officers focused foremost on Blacks, particularly Black males, but they also paid disproportionate attention to Hispanics and Asians as well. Coretown officers appeared to be most suspicious of groups of Black, Hispanic, or Asian males. Officers only appeared to pay attention to Black, Hispanic, or Asian females if they were with Black, Hispanic, or Asian males.

Officers also described this alternative to incarceration program as a pre-trial intervention program. Under this program, the State gave those convicted of misdemeanor offenses the option of attending college as a condition to avoid serving time in jail. Those opting for the program had to maintain passing grades and regularly meet with an academic advisor as well as a probation officer.

While Coretown officers’ association of drug selling and car theft at OCC with Edward County visitors was supported by at least some evidence of arrests, the officers’ association of these visitors with gangs rested on murkier, unsubstantiated evidence relating to these visitors’ hand gestures, colored clothing, and tattoos. Officers lacked proof that any of Edward County visitors whom they stopped or arrested were affiliated with particular gangs.

Officers’ questioning of Black and Hispanic students’ status as students and motives for being on campus was also more indirectly reflected by several officers’ frequent use of the term “garbage” to refer in Blacks and Hispanics. In particular, five White male officers and one Asian male officer invoked the term “garbage” when they spotted groups of two or more Black males walking through one of OCC’s parking lots.

Coretown officers’ openly racist comments were almost exclusively directed at Black and Hispanic males. However, some comments were made in the presence of females, including White females, if they were with two or more Black or Hispanic males. Although officers monitored some groups of Asian males very closely, with the exception of one incident, officers did not make stereotypical comments about Asians being drug dealers, car thieves, or other criminal actors.

Coretown officers performed license plate checks on a total of fifty-seven vehicles during the course of seven ride-alongs in the afternoon and early evening hours. Nineteen of these vehicles were unoccupied.

Coretown officers indicated that they were less worried about monitoring the OCC campus in the evenings after 7 P.M. because they saw the students who took evening classes as being “more serious students”. However, as noted under section 6.12, officers intentionally set up their traffic enforcement along Kingston Avenue and other streets in the evening hours so as to minimize the number of residents they might potentially catch, and maximize the number of OCC students.
As discussed under section 6.12, although officers expressed concern about being accused of racial profiling when conducting traffic enforcement along various roads throughout Coretown, officers never expressly or implicitly conveyed such concern while conducting traffic enforcement at these strategic points along the access roads to OCC.

Officers racially selective “aggressive” patrolling of OCC seemed to be self-defeating in the sense that officers did not closely scrutinize White and most Asian students who might be bringing drugs and other contraband onto OCC’s campus.

As implied throughout a good part of this discussion on OCC, officers’ assumptions about Black and Hispanic non-residents at OCC appeared to so negative that they effectively precluded officers as seeing White non-residents at OCC as being “problematic” unless they associated with Blacks and Hispanics.

Although officers were worried about these predominantly White non-residents potentially corrupting Coretown young people through “networking”, officers’ concerns were far greater at OCC and AHS. While officers saw OCC and AHS as large spaces that provided extended opportunities for “networking” out of public view, officers viewed the clock area as a tiny space that only provided fleeting opportunities for networking well within public view. In addition, as discussed under section 6.9, Coretown officers appeared to be less alarmed by the presence of White non-residents than that of non-White non-residents. Although Coretown officers appeared to be suspicious of all non-residents, the presence of mostly White non-residents from predominantly “White” towns or sections of towns at the clock area did not trigger thoughts of criminogenic, pathological contexts in the way that the presence of Black and Hispanic non-residents appeared to do at OCC and AHS.

If officers were unable to identify whether a particular young person was a resident, they then assumed that they were dealing with a non-resident.

Coretown officers’ informal mentoring of Coretown youths and young adults is discussed at length in Chapter 7.

Officers in all departments attach some significance to “official” borders because these borders constitute the official limits of their jurisdiction. However, as the subsequent discussion makes clear, such borders are often highly salient to officers because they activate officers’ thoughts of multiple contexts.

Traffic enforcement involved parking and monitoring traffic with a radar gun for usually twenty to thirty minutes at a time. While the Coretown Police Department (CPD) required its officers to perform at least one hour of traffic enforcement per shift, the CPD did not specify where officers should perform such enforcement.

As discussed later in this section, only Night, Sunny, and Kingston Avenues had western entry points.

Coretown officers typically conducted traffic enforcement on Night Avenue in proximity to the ramp for the Expressway’s exit 17, which was very close to the Coretown-Raymond Heights border. Officers performed more traffic enforcement in this location than any other in Coretown. Officers usually conducted traffic enforcement on Sunny Avenue at the intersection of Sunny Avenue and Cumberland Avenue, which was located approximately three-quarters of a mile from the Coretown/Radnor border. Officers chose this intersection on Sunny Avenue because those coming off the Expressway at exit 16 made their way up to Sunny Avenue via Cumberland Avenue.

Coretown officers based their assertions regarding drug runners routinely traversing Night and Sunny Avenues between Piedmont and Elmwood on several “big drug busts” that they had made on these roads.

In part because they believed that gang members from other towns, particularly those in Edward County who made their way to Piedmont and Elmwood via the Expressway, officers conducted traffic enforcement at eastern points on Night and Sunny Avenues where they could potentially intercept gang members coming off the Expressway at exits 16 and 17.
Officers indicated that their gang identifications were based on how many occupants there were in the vehicle coupled with how these occupants spoke and were dressed.

Officers engaged in some traffic enforcement right on Sanderson Avenue, but generally preferred to conduct such enforcement on Kingston and Orange Avenues because the greater volume of traffic on Sanderson Avenue made it logistically more difficult for officers to conduct such enforcement without significantly disrupting the flow of traffic.

As will be discussed in Chapter 7, Coretown officers’ concern about “upsetting” residents appeared to be based in significant part on officers’ need for residents’ support as the officers’ struggled through negotiations with the Town Council for a new contract.

As noted in Chapter 4, even when Coretown officers did ensnare residents while conducting traffic enforcement, officers often issued warnings rather than tickets to the residents (e.g., the case of the middle-aged Black female Coretown resident who was driving approximately twenty miles over the speed limit on Apple Avenue).

As discussed in Chapter 3, Coretown officers’ concerns about accusations of racial profiling were racially qualified. While Coretown officers expressed a concern about profiling “Blacks”, they neither expressed nor demonstrated a concern about profiling “Hispanics”.

Twelve of the sixteen Coretown officers in the sample expressed concerns about accusations of racial profiling, whereas only six out of the fifteen Middleboro officers in the sample and one out of the eighteen Longwood officers in the sample did so. No Black officers from the three towns expressed concerns about profiling, which suggests that the race of the officer may condition the expression of such concerns across local contexts.

Coretown officers’ apparent greater expression of concern about racial profiling than that of Middleboro officers is quite striking given that Middleboro officers seemingly were confronted with tremendous constituency group pressures to refrain from such profiling, whereas Coretown officers seemingly were not.

Although spaces along Night Avenue generally appeared to activate officers’ thoughts of national contexts and concerns about racial profiling accusations, the parking lot outside of Dunkin’ Donuts, which was located on Night Avenue by the Expressway’s exit 17 near the border of Coretown and Raymond Heights, was a notable exception. Officers regularly described this Dunkin’ Donuts as a meeting place for non-residents and Coretown youths and young adults. Officers indicated that non-residents, particularly non-resident racial minorities, would either exit the Expressway or come up or down Night Avenue and make “stopovers” at the Dunkin’ Donuts. Officers suggested that this was one of the main spaces in which Coretown’s predominantly White young people “networked” with Blacks and Hispanics from Orion towns such as Piedmont and Elmwood, and Edward towns such as Norville and Edgarville. In particular, officers insinuated that these Black and Hispanic non-residents sold drugs to Coretown youths and young adults in the parking lot outside of Dunkin’ Donuts. Given these assumptions, this parking lot activated officers’ stereotypical thoughts about “Black” and “Hispanic” contexts in Orion and Edward counties in much the same fashion as spaces at OCC and AHS. Given the saliency of these local and regional “Black” and “Hispanic” contexts in officers’ minds, officers never appeared to be conscious of a national context or concerned about accusations of profiling while patrolling this particular space on Night Avenue.
CHAPTER 7: *Agents* on Patrol: How Officers’ Social Group Schemata Are Conditioned by Their Personal Backgrounds and Experiences

While officers assemble the social group schemata or maps that they use to navigate the social landscapes of their towns of employ from information regarding the relations of various groups within those towns, officers also constitute such schemata from information pertaining to how they situate themselves in relation to such groups. Officers’ perceptions of themselves in relation to these various resident and non-resident groups within their towns of employ are shaped by both their experiences outside of the context of policing and their experiences as an officer in their towns of employ. Given the importance that some statuses, such as residence, and some social identities, such as race, class, and gender, might possibly have on officers’ experiences both outside of and within the context of policing, this chapter examines whether, and if so, how, these individual-level variables condition officers’ perceived relation or connection to various groups in their towns of employ. In other words, the focus here is on how officers’ individual characteristics may play a role in constituting and conditioning their social group maps.

In examining how various individual-level variables may influence officers’ perceived connections to the groups within their towns of employ, this chapter first provides an overview of the three towns’ officers’ degree of connection. The remainder of the chapter explores the ways in which officers appeared to manifest connections to groups within their respective towns of employ, both discursively and through actual patrolling practices.

7.1. *Officer Characteristics and Connections to Towns of Employ*
There was a stark difference between Coretown and Longwood officers, who appeared to have a very strong connection to the respective towns they were patrolling and these towns’ White majorities, and Middleboro officers, who appeared to have a weak connection to the town in which they were patrolling. While this disparity is the product of multiple factors, the most significant factor appears to be whether the officers had grown up in and/or resided in the town in which they were patrolling. In general, officers who grew up in and/or currently or formerly resided in their town of employ appeared to have a stronger bond to the town and some of its residents than officers who had never resided in the town. Most Coretown and Longwood officers had resided in their respective towns at some point, and these officers generally appeared to have strong connections to their towns and the White majorities of those towns. Twelve out of the sixteen Coretown officers in the sample had grown up in Coretown and attended school there, and eleven of these twelve officers still resided in Coretown. Similarly, sixteen out of the eighteen Longwood officers in the sample had grown up in Longwood and attended school there, and fourteen of these sixteen officers still resided in Longwood. Conversely, only a minority of Middleboro officers had resided in Middleboro at some point, and these officers appeared to have a weak connection to the town and its residents. Only four out of the fifteen Middleboro officers in the sample had resided in Middleboro at some point.

Although officers who resided or had resided in the town in which they worked had greater bonds to the town than those who had not, there were nevertheless varying degrees of connectedness to the town among officers who had never resided in the town based on how officers perceived the town in relation to the towns in which they had
resided. Among officers who had never resided in the town in which they worked, those who had grown up in or currently lived in towns that they perceived as similar to the one in which they worked were more likely to express a stronger connection to their work town than those who were from towns that they perceived as dissimilar. For instance, as discussed under section 7.4, one White male Coretown officer appeared to be able to relate to youths in Coretown because he had grown up in a very similar town (Nailon) and had known adolescents in Nailon who were like the adolescents in Coretown.

Although White and Asian Coretown and Longwood officers’ apparent solidarity with residents, and Black Coretown and Longwood officers’ apparent lack of solidarity with residents, correlates with the fact that most White and all Asian officers resided or had resided in their respective towns of employ, and all Black officers had not, this difference in apparent solidarity does not appear to be solely attributable to officers’ current or prior residential status. Rather this difference also appears to be linked to officers’ perceptions of racial similarity and solidarity with the residents of their respective towns of employ. For one thing, White and Asian Coretown and Longwood officers’ solidarity with residents of their respective towns appeared to be racially selective. White and Asian Coretown and Longwood officers only appeared to express solidarity with the White majorities in Coretown and Longwood respectively. As alluded to in Chapters 3, 5, and 6, White and Asian Longwood officers generally expressed indifference towards Hispanic residents, and alternated between indifference and hostility towards Black residents. As noted under section 7.4, White and Asian Coretown officers generally appeared to ignore racial minority residents in Coretown, but, as noted in
Chapter 6, appeared to express a great deal of hostility towards Black and Hispanic non-resident visitors.

The interconnection of race, officers’ residential status, and feelings of solidarity with groups of residents also appeared to be evident in Middleboro. However, the nexus between race, residence, and solidarity in Middleboro appeared to involve Black officers rather than White and Asian ones. Like the majority of White and Asian officers in Coretown and Longwood samples, both Black officers in the sample of Middleboro officers had grown up in their town of employ and still lived there. In addition, like White and Asian Coretown and Longwood officers, these two Black Middleboro officers appeared to display racially selective solidarity with the residents of their town of employ. As suggested under section 7.4, these Black Middleboro officers appeared to express strong bonds only with Middleboro’s Black residents.

In contrast to their Black fellow officers, White, Asian, and Latino Middleboro officers generally appeared to lack any apparent solidarity with any groups of residents in Middleboro. Unlike the Black Middleboro officers in the sample, only two of the eleven White officers, and neither of the Asian or Latina Middleboro officers, had resided in Middleboro at some point. Thus, similar to Black officers’ apparent lack of solidarity with residents in Coretown and Longwood respectively, these White, Asian, and Latino Middleboro officers’ apparent lack of solidarity with residents in Middleboro correlated with the officers having never resided there.

Looking across the three towns, a consistent pattern emerges when race and officers’ residential status are considered together. Only those officers who resided or had resided in the town in which they patrolled appear to have expressed solidarity with
some residents, but this apparent solidarity was racially selective. Officers typically appeared to show solidarity only with those residents with whom they identified racially, or whom they perceived as being racially similar to them (e.g., Asian officers who felt solidarity with White residents in Coretown and Longwood).

Although race and officers’ residential status appear to have played a significant role in shaping officers’ perceptions of solidarity with particular groups of residents in their respective towns of employ, class also appears to have played an important role in shaping such perceptions. For instance, while Black Longwood officers’ apparent lack of solidarity with Longwood’s Black residents correlates with the officers’ lack of prior or current residential ties to Longwood, these officers, as discussed more fully in section 7.4, also suggested that they perceived themselves as being different from most of Longwood’s Black residents in terms of class. Although, unlike White and Asian Longwood officers, Black Longwood officers never used disparaging language to refer to Blacks, these Black officers nevertheless viewed a large portion of Longwood’s Black population as being beneath them. In sum, Black officers’ apparent lack of solidarity with Black Longwood residents appears to have been due in part to their perceived class dissimilarity with these residents.

While Black Longwood officers’ apparent lack of solidarity with Black Longwood residents appears to stem in part from their perceived class dissimilarity with these residents, White and Asian Longwood officers’ apparent solidarity with White Longwood residents appears to be based, in part, on their perceived class similarity with these White residents. White and Asian Longwood officers’ perceived class similarity is embedded in their family-based narratives discussed in section 7.4. While these officers
saw themselves as similar to what they perceived as the typical White family in Longwood, they also saw this typical White family as being lower-middle-class. This perceived class similarity was most apparent in these officers’ commentary about the economic circumstances and burdens that they and their families shared with the typical White family in Longwood. For instance, a White male Longwood officer stated the following about the people who lived in his parents’ all-White neighborhood in District 2:

They’re just ordinary people. You know, like my parents. They work hard, they take care of their families, try to keep up with their mortgages. They just do what they need to do. We weren’t rich, but we always had food on the table and a roof over our heads.

This officer’s alternating use of the terms “they” and “we” here signifies that this officer viewed himself and his family as dealing with the same economic issues and responsibilities as those of other Whites in District 2 in Longwood.

Although White and Asian Coretown officers also generally appeared to share feelings of solidarity with the White majority in their town of employ, this apparent sense of solidarity, unlike White and Asian Longwood officers’ apparent sense of solidarity with White Longwood residents, appeared to be fractured by the officers’ perceptions of class. While White and Asian Longwood officers appeared to see themselves as solidly unified with Longwood’s White majority in terms of class, White and Asian Coretown officers saw themselves as unified with only approximately half of the town’s White majority. Moreover, as discussed in section 7.5, these officers appeared to see themselves as becoming increasingly alienated from the town’s White residents in terms of class. This burgeoning class rift roughly corresponded to geography. Coretown
officers, including the two officers who currently lived in the northern half of Coretown, saw themselves as aligned with the “blue-collar” residents who lived in the southern half of Coretown. While non-Black Middleboro officers’ apparent lack of solidarity with Middleboro’s residents appears to have been based in large part on the fact that the majority of these officers had never resided in Middleboro, this apparent lack of solidarity also appears to have been bolstered by Middleboro officers’ perceptions of their class status vis-à-vis the majority of Middleboro’s residents. These officers saw themselves as being from a lower socioeconomic group than the majority of Middleboro residents, and as noted in section 7.2, this perception contributed to officers’ perceived tensions between themselves and many of Middleboro’s residents.

7.2. Officers’ Overall Assessment of Their Town of Employ

One of the ways in which officers manifest their connection or lack thereof to their town of employ was through their overall assessment of the town. All of the Coretown officers who had grown up in Coretown (twelve of the sixteen in the sample) had highly favorable things to say about the town. All of these officers made general laudatory remarks about the town, describing it as “a good place to live,” “a nice family town”, and “a good place to raise kids”, and as having “good schools” and “good people”. Officers also often described Coretown as a “small town” and a “close-knit community”. For instance, a White male Coretown officer stated:

[Coretown’s] a small town. Everybody knows everybody. And that’s good, ‘cause we can keep our eye on the bad apples and see what they’re up to….

Officers who had grown up in Coretown not only saw Coretown as a “close-knit community”, but saw themselves and residents as part of an extended family. Even an
officer who had grown up in nearby Sandy Peak and did not live in Coretown indicated that many of the officers in the department were “like family” to both each other and to many of the residents in town. This officer stated:

You know this is a real close-knit department, close-knit community. A lot of the officers are like family. We hang out together, go to our kids’ little league…. There’s a lot of officers who grew up here, they know people in town, known ‘em all their lives….

Given that many Coretown officers viewed themselves and residents as part of an extended family, it suggests that they perceived themselves as highly connected to the town and its residents.

These officers’ apparent strong bond to Coretown and its residents was foremost evident in the officers’ stated rationales for becoming a police officer. The majority of these officers expressly indicated that their fondness for the town was a major driving force behind their decision to become an officer. For instance, a White male Coretown officer who currently co-directed the Police Explorers program, and who had been a member of Police Explorers and Coretown’s auxiliary police, as well as a dispatcher, before becoming a police officer in Coretown, stated:

Some guys wanna become a cop for the excitement, thrill of it, or the money, the benefits, or whatever. I went into policing to be a [Coretown] cop. I didn’t just want to be a cop. I wanted to be a [Coretown] cop. I wanted to do this my whole life. I love this town, I love the people here. I wouldn’t want to be a cop anywhere else.

It appears that officers who had grown up in Coretown chose policing as a vocation in part because of a desire to keep the town a “nice place”.

While the four officers in the sample who did not grow up in Coretown expressed less enthusiasm for the town than the twelve officers who did, these four officers did not
express any negative sentiments regarding the town’s overall quality of life. These officers appeared to be far more detached from the town and its residents not only because they had not grown up in the town and were not as familiar with it, but also because they did not currently reside in town. As suggested in section 7.5, these officers appeared to harbor some resentment over the fact that they could not afford to purchase a home in town.

Although the majority of Longwood officers (sixteen out of eighteen in the sample) had grown up in Longwood, these Longwood officers, unlike Coretown officers who had grown up in Coretown, expressed ambivalent sentiments about their town of employ. While most of these officers, fifteen of whom identified as “White” and one of whom identified as “Asian”, had some positive things to say about Longwood, such as, “It’s still a pretty good town,” these officers also expressed a variety of negative opinions regarding the town and suggested that it was in decline. In particular, the majority of officers indicated that the school system was deteriorating, crime was on the rise, and property values were falling.

These officers’ seemingly paradoxical, contradictory assessments of the town appear to reflect their racially skewed perceptions of the town. As discussed in Chapter 4, Longwood officers appeared to view their town of employ largely in terms of a “White”/“Black” dichotomy. When these officers, all of whom had grown up in “White” neighborhoods in Districts 1, 2, or 8 in Longwood, gave positive assessments about Longwood, they effectively were referencing Districts 1 and 2, which were the town’s two remaining predominantly “White” districts. For instance, these officers
always described District 1, to which they colloquially referred as “Bright Acres”, as a “nice” part of town. For instance, a White male Longwood officer remarked:

“Bright Acres”, that’s still nice, quiet, we don’t ever have any problems over there…. They’re just good, hardworking people over there.

In contrast, when these officers gave negative assessments about Longwood, they effectively were referencing District 4, which was Longwood’s predominantly “Black”, disproportionately poor district. These officers routinely described District 4, particularly the “target area” in the northern half of District 4, in highly pejorative ways. For instance, one officer described it as “the forbidden zone”, implying that it was like the wasteland from the original *Planet of the Apes* movie. Another officer described a section of the “target area” near Sylvester Avenue as “the land that time forgot”.

These officers made the not so subtle link between their negative opinions about Longwood and District 4 and its residents by invariably indicating that the source of these opinions was “the shittums”, which as noted in Chapter 4, was a derogatory codeword that non-Black Longwood officers used to refer to Black male youths and young adults. For instance, a 39 year old White male Longwood officer, who had recently moved out of Longwood after living there for his entire life, stated:

This place is just not the same. It’s not all bad, I mean, there’s still some parts that are okay. It’s just the shittums. You get tired of dealing with the shittums. That’s why I moved out. It’s not a place that you wanna raise a family in. I’ve got two young kids and I wouldn’t want them going to the schools here. The schools are really shitty now. I wanted something better for them, so I moved to [Colesville].

Similar to many of the Longwood officers, the majority of Middleboro officers appeared to have a lukewarm overall assessment of their town of employ and its quality of life. However, unlike Longwood officers’ assessment of Longwood, Middleboro
officers’ assessment of Middleboro was not based on perceptions of a deteriorating school system, an increasing crime rate, or declining property values. Rather, Middleboro officers’ tepid view of Middleboro appeared to be tied to perceptions relating to class, politics, and residents’ lack of support.

Perceptions relating to class soured Middleboro officers’ overall assessment of Middleboro in two respects. First, as discussed in section 7.5, the majority of Middleboro officers expressed some resentment at not being able to afford to live in Middleboro due to the high cost of homes and property taxes. Second, as discussed in section 7.4, the majority of Middleboro officers perceived themselves as being beneath the majority of Middleboro residents in terms of socioeconomic class. As a result, these officers often expressed difficulties in relating to the residents, particularly younger residents whom they characterized as “spoiled”.

Middleboro officers also had a lukewarm assessment of Middleboro based on their perceptions of the political climate in Middleboro and a paucity of support among residents. As noted in Chapter 4, Middleboro officers disparagingly referred to Middleboro as a “liberal”, “pro-civil rights” town on many occasions. Moreover, as discussed under in section 7.5, Middleboro saw this political climate as being linked with residents’ generally negative views of the police.

7.3. Community Outreach Patrolling

Coretown officers’ connection to Coretown and its residents was manifest in part by their efforts to reach out and establish and maintain a good rapport and positive, cooperative relations with residents, just about all of whom were White. Officers’ community outreach efforts typically involved riding through neighborhoods and areas
around schools, and stopping and talking to both residents and other town employees, such as school crossing guards. In conducting such community outreach, officers often waved and said “hello” to residents and workers, and virtually all residents and workers waved or said “hello” in return. Officers indicated that residents appreciated the officers’ community outreach efforts. For instance, one White male officer stated:

The residents like it when we ride around the schools and make sure their kids are safe. They like to see that we’re around, that we care about their kids.

Overall, such community outreach efforts seemed to strengthen the ties between the officers and the majority of residents of Coretown.

Although, as noted under section 7.5, officers expressed some resentment at what they perceived as residents’, particularly newer residents’ expectations that officers handle residents’ trivial problems, officers nevertheless tried to take care of these trivial problems in part because they believed that it would help to maintain Coretown as a “nice place to live. For instance, a White male Coretown officer who was responding to a call involving a woman in Post 4 who claimed that vandals had strung toilet paper all over her property on “mischief night” (October 30, 2006) stated:

Some people might say why even bother about the TP. They’d say, don’t you have better things to do with your time. You know, go after some real criminals of something. But, you know, you show up, she’s all happy that you came, and she’ll say she had a good experience with the police. Is it worth it? Hell yeah. That’s what keeps [Coretown] nice.

Coretown officers’ apparent strong connection to Coretown and its residents was not simply reflected by officers’ perception of Coretown as a “nice place”, but rather was reflected by officers’ perception of themselves as playing an instrumental role in safeguarding and maintaining Coretown as a “nice place”.

Although Coretown’s Chief of Police expected officers to engage in some “public service policing”, Coretown officers’ community outreach efforts cannot simply be characterized as a response to an organizational mandate. Notwithstanding this mandate, there was a distinct difference between the community outreach efforts of officers who had grown up in Coretown and those who had not. In comparison to officers who had grown up in Coretown, those officers who had not grown up in the town did very little in the way of community outreach policing. Moreover, when officers who had not grown up in Coretown did engage in such community outreach efforts, such as monitoring dismissal at various elementary and middle schools, these non-resident officers, unlike resident officers, made no attempt to interact with residents, were not friendly, and seemed somewhat resentful that they were not doing “real policing” like traffic enforcement. For instance, while monitoring dismissal at a middle school, a White male Coretown officer from Elmwood who had been on the force for nine months stated:

*I know they want us to be doing this community service, but it’s bullshit if you ask me. I don’t need to be here. There’s nothing going on here. I could be out doing some real policing, not doing babysitting…. It’s all a bunch of PR [public relations] if you ask me. They just want to make it look good, but it’s all bullshit.*

As implied by the preceding officer’s comments, younger, non-resident officers’ approach to policing was far less community-oriented than that of older, resident officers. Older officers who had grown up in Coretown suggested that these younger, non-resident officers’ “hard-ass approach” to policing alienated residents. For instance, a fourteen year veteran White male stated:

*The young guys come in out of the [Police] Academy and they’re all jacked up and rarin’ to go, you know, all piss and vinegar, and they don’t really know how to deal with the residents. They don’t like to do community policing, handing out*
lollipops to kids and makin’ small talk with the old folks. No, that’s not real policing to them….

Similarly, another White male Coretown officer who had been an officer in town for nine years remarked:

These new guys, they’re like pitbulls. They don’t like doin’ any community service-type stuff ’cause that’s too soft for them. They’re lookin’ for policing like on [the television program] C.O.P.S. You know, car chases and cuffing people to the ground. But [community service policing] is policing too. They just don’t see it that way.

In contrast, veteran officers, almost all of whom had grown up in Coretown, seemed very much in their element doing such public service. These officers were very comfortable in making small talk with adults and children alike, and such gestures in turn appeared to strengthen their bonds to the community.

Unlike Coretown officers, Longwood officers engaged in virtually no community outreach-type policing. The central reason for this lack of community outreach appeared to be the officers’ seemingly all-consuming preoccupation with monitoring the Black residents who lived in the northeastern part of town in District 4. As a result of this virtually unidimensional approach, officers’ patrolling efforts appeared to produce and continually reproduce a hostile, distant relationship with the majority of Longwood’s Black residents. In referencing the Black residents of District 4, one White male Longwood officer stated:

It’s pretty simple. They hate us and we hate them. It’s always been that way. … They act like we owe them something, like, “Yo, where’s my forty acres and a mule?” Like I could do something about that. Listen, I just try to do my job, and if they have a problem with that, well fuck you. I didn’t create this mess. Don’t “fuck you 5-0 me.” …I just don’t see things gettin’ better between us and them. I really don’t.
On the surface, Longwood officers lack of community outreach to the town’s majority White population also appeared to preclude the strengthening of officers’ bonds with this population. However, as noted in section 7.5, the majority of White and Asian officers felt that by focusing their efforts on containing the Black residents of District 4, they were indirectly strengthening their bonds to the town’s White majority population.²

Although Middleboro’s Chief of Police, like Coretown’s Chief of Police, expected Middleboro officers to engage in community outreach policing, only four of the fifteen officers appeared to have engaged in such proactive community-based policing during the course of the ride-alongs. While the dearth of such policing appears in part to have been due to the officers’ disproportionate focus on monitoring the towns’ southern border areas as well as the Belton and Blair Avenue commercial districts as discussed in Chapter 6, the more central reason for this dearth of community policing seems to have been the non-resident status of most of these officers. Three of the four officers who appeared to engage in community outreach efforts had grown up in Middleboro, whereas ten of the eleven officers who appeared to refrain from engaging in any community outreach efforts had grown up in other towns and did not currently reside in Middleboro.

Of those officers who appeared to perform some type of community outreach policing, such policing efforts were geographically limited. A White male and an Asian male officer performed some community outreach policing primarily in the central, racially mixed part of town, whereas the two Black officers in the sample performed some community outreach policing primarily in the southeastern, primarily Black and poor part of town. None of these officers appeared to engage in any community outreach policing in the wealthy, disproportionately White northern part of Middleboro.
7.4. Officers’ Mentoring of Young Residents

Coretown officers’ apparent connection to Coretown and its residents was most tellingly revealed by these officers’ proactive efforts to mentor and counsel Coretown youths both on and off duty. While some officers in each of the three towns engaged in some form of mentoring, Coretown officers engaged in substantially more mentoring, both formal and informal, than Longwood and Middleboro officers did. In particular, Coretown officers, unlike Longwood and Middleboro officers, engaged in a significant amount of informal mentoring of youth during the course of patrol. Such mentoring typically involved an officer pulling his patrol car up to one or more youths on the side of the road and asking the youths in a friendly, folksy, and disarming manner what the youths had been doing as of late, whether they were staying out of trouble, how they were doing in school, what their plans were after they graduated from high school, and if there was anything with which the officer could help them. For instance, one White male Coretown officer (“Danny”) had the following exchange with a 17-year old (“Kevin”) White Coretown male:

Officer: Hey Kevin. How you doin’?

Kevin: Oh hey [Danny]. Yeah, I’m just comin’ back from Mikey’s. We were playing his new combat [video] game.

Officer: How’s Mikey doin’? You guys weren’t smokin’ now were ya? [Laughs]

Kevin: [Laughs] Naw, I gave that up. My girl said my breath stunk.

[Both laugh]

Officer: So what’s goin’ on with school. You stayin’ out of trouble?

Kevin: Oh heck yeah; it’s no big thing. I got one more year and then I’m outta there. It’s beat, but uh…. 
Officer: So whatcha gonna do next year?

Kevin: My uncle’s in the Navy. I’m thinking of doin’ that….

The aforementioned exchange between the Coretown officer (Danny) and the youth (Kevin) is emblematic of all such informal, mentoring-based exchanges between Coretown officers and youth, in that the participants are similar in terms of their race, class, and gender. Like the officers’ verbal statements expressing solidarity with Coretown residents, Coretown officers’ mentoring practices were racially particular, but even in a narrower sense. While the Asian Coretown officer, like nearly all of the White Coretown officers, verbally expressed feelings of solidarity with the large White Coretown majority, only White officers engaged in mentoring practices, and these practices were limited to White Coretown youth, such as Kevin in the above exchange.

The connection between a Coretown officer’s race and his proclivity to mentor youth also appeared to be strongly tied to whether he had resided in Coretown at some point. All eleven White Coretown officers who had resided in Coretown at some point engaged in informal mentoring of White youth, whereas only one of the three White Coretown officers who had never resided in Coretown did so. However, the lone Asian officer in the sample also had grown up in Coretown and had attended Coretown High School, yet he made no efforts during the course of the ride-alongs to informally mentor any Coretown youth. So while race alone does not fully explain officers’ behavior, neither does an officer’s residence in town of employment.

Like the lone Asian officer and two of the White officers who had never resided in Coretown, the lone Black Coretown officer in the sample did not make any efforts to
mentor any Coretown youths. While this Black officer’s reluctance to mentor any Coretown youth might be attributable to the officer never having lived in Coretown, it is also possible that officer’s lack of informal mentoring is in part tied to race. This officer’s lack of mentoring of White Coretown youths appears to be consistent with the proposition that officers only reached out to youth who resembled themselves. This officer’s lack of mentoring of Black Coretown youths may have to do with limited opportunities to do so. This officers’ opportunities to mentor Black Coretown youth not only were limited by Coretown’s small Black population (less than four percent), but also, as this officer noted, by the fact that Black Coretown youths tended to visit friends outside of town, and therefore were typically not around much. Moreover, this particular officer’s opportunities to mentor young people in town of any race were reduced by his having worked the night shift, which provided little time for interaction with young people, for most of his four years in Coretown.

Although White Coretown officers had interactions with some Black Coretown youths, and to an even lesser extent with Asian Coretown youths, such interactions were different from those with many White Coretown youths in two important respects. First, White Coretown officers’ interactions with Black and Asian Coretown youths were almost exclusively precipitated by a call for service or some observable justification for stopping the youths—e.g., an apparent altercation—, whereas, Coretown officers’ interactions with White Coretown youths typically lacked any apparent imminent law enforcement justification. In other words, when White Coretown officers stopped to talk to Black or Asian Coretown youths, the officers had a relatively obvious reason for doing so, whereas the officers often appeared to have no such reason for stopping and chatting
with White Coretown youths. Second, the White Coretown officers were far more cool, formal, and distant when speaking to Black and Asian Coretown youths than White Coretown youth. While White Coretown officers often addressed White Coretown youths by their first names, asked them about personal matters such as school, extracurricular activities, and family, and maintained a generally friendly give and take exchange with such youths, these officers generally did not ask Black and Asian Coretown youths about school, extracurricular activities, or family, and maintained formal, one-sided interactions, in which officers “talked at” the youths rather than with them, and peppered the talk with a series of admonishments.

While some, but not all, of the White Coretown officers’ verbal statements emphasized their greater, class-based connection to lower-middle-class to middle-class residents in the southern half of Coretown, nearly all of the White Coretown officers’ mentoring practices, particularly informal ones, reflected this class solidarity with southern Coretown residents. Of the White Coretown youths whom officers attempted to mentor and counsel informally, nearly every one resided in the southern half of the town. 8

Although roughly half of the southern Coretown youths whom Coretown officers attempted to informally mentor during the course of patrol had had either minor brushes with the law or problems in school, the officers’ decision to reach out and keep tabs on these youth was not based on the officers’ perception that these southern Coretown youths were more dysfunctional than northern Coretown youth and more in need of a watchful eye and a helping hand. Indeed, virtually all of the Coretown officers believed that the majority of youths who used marijuana (as well as harder drugs, such as heroin) resided in northern Coretown. For instance, several White Coretown officers identified
the crowd of “burnouts” who congregated outside of Coretown High School before and after school, as well as at a local park to smoke marijuana, as being from northern Coretown. Rather, White Coretown officers’ informal mentoring of southern Coretown youths was based on the officers’ perception of these youths as being similar to themselves.

White Coretown officers saw themselves as being similar to these White southern Coretown youths not simply in terms of race and class, but also in terms of a shared sense of place. Virtually all of these White Coretown officers (nine out of eleven) had grown up in the same neighborhoods as these southern youths, and these neighborhoods, unlike those in the northern part of town, had undergone relatively little turnover in residents since the late 1980s. These officers knew these youths’ families, their struggles, and their history. For these officers, these southern Coretown residents were like extended family. Not only did these officers address many of these southern residents, unlike northern Coretown residents, by first name, but they expressed a genuine sense of empathy for southern residents. This empathy was particularly evident in their comments about the increasing number of single parents, particularly single mothers, who were trying to make it on their own after a divorce. For instance, a White male Coretown officer made the following comments about the mother (“Irene”) of one of the southern youths (“Eddie”) whom he informally mentored:

Yeah, [Irene], she’s goin’ through a tough time, tryin’ to do it all by herself…. We went to high school together. She’s a good woman…. I just try to look out for [Eddie] here and there. Make sure he’s not gettin’ into any trouble…. It’s been tough for them since his dad’s been gone.
Thus, as a result of his sense of where this southern youth is coming from, this officer attempts to reach out to him in a paternal-like way.

Besides empathizing with southern Coretown youths, Coretown officers appeared, in a more profound way, to see likenesses of themselves in such youths. For instance, after stopping and chatting for several minutes with a 16 year old White male southern Coretown youth (“Brian”) who had gotten into a fight at school and had been issued a warning for underage drinking in the prior year, another White male Coretown officer stated:

Yeah [Brian], he’s basically a good kid. Sometimes he lets other people push him into things that he shouldn’t be doin’. But he’s alright, he’ll be alright. You know I was a bit like [Brian] when I was comin’ up. I thought some people were my friends, who really weren’t my friends. But things turned out okay for me, and things [wi]ll turn out okay for [Brian]. I just try to check up on him every once in a while. You know, make sure that he’s doin’ what he’s supposed to be doin’.

While this latter officer’s comments demonstrates how Coretown officers’ saw themselves to an extent in the southern Coretown youths to whom they reached out, it also importantly reveals that Coretown officers saw these southern youths as inherently redeemable. Coretown officers appeared to reach out to youths such as Brian because they sincerely believed that they could turn these youths around. These officers’ belief in redemption was based in part on their knowledge of past Coretown youths who had straightened themselves out. For instance, a White male Coretown officer who had lived his entire life in Coretown touched on this notion of redemption when discussing what had happened to “delinquent” White male youths with whom he had grown up. This officer stated:
You look at some of the kids here and you’d probably think, “Forget it. These kids are a lost cause.” But you’d be surprised. I went to my twenty year [high school] reunion and it blew my mind. Some of the biggest delinquents, total screw offs, were doctors, lawyers, bankers now. It was crazy. But they had straightened themselves out, got their shit together, and now look at them.

Coretown officers’ belief in the redemptive possibility of wayward youths was also was a product of an apparent tradition of reaching out to such youths. Officers described how there was a longstanding tradition in Coretown of police officers, teachers, and other potentially influential authority figures assisting wayward youths through a variety of informal and formal means. Given this precedent, officers saw youths who appeared to have gone a bit astray, particularly youths who reminded them of themselves or people whom they knew while growing up, as being salvageable.

For instance, a couple of Coretown officers saw the 16 year old White male “Crip wannabe” from AHS mentioned in Chapter 6 as being redeemable, and took it upon themselves to reform him through what they described as a “tough love” approach. Following their arrest of this youth, these officers did a “scared straight” talk with this youth in which they told him that he “not going down the right path”. While these officers obviously saw arrests as being punitive, they, unlike officers in either Longwood or Middleboro, also saw arrests as presenting a therapeutic opportunity to “talk some sense into [youths and young adults]”. These officers then periodically checked up on this youth in the months following his arrest, and assisted him with finding a part-time job. Given that the officers knew the family of this youth, who, like the officers, was from the southern part of Coretown, it appears that these officers’ apparent belief in the redemptive possibility of this youth was fueled in part by a sense of kinship.
Coretown officers’ apparent belief in the redemptive possibility of younger individuals appeared to extend to young adults well into their twenties. For instance, a White male Coretown officer who indicated that he saw young adults as old as thirty as capable of redemption, described how he had reached out to a twenty-five year old southern Coretown male whom he had arrested for several outstanding warrants following a traffic stop in which the twenty-five year old “act[ed] up in front of his friends”. This officer viewed the arrest of this 25 year old as an opportunity to talk to this young man and possibly turn him around. The officer stated the following about his talk with this 25 year-old White man:

I wanted to try to teach him some responsibility. That you can’t just depend on mommy and daddy anymore. You’ve gotta take responsibility for yourself. That really shook him up and I think he’s thinking about things differently now. There are still guys like him who are stuck in 13th grade, you know, they haven’t matured. They’re still stuck in their teenage years, and sometimes they just need somebody to set them straight.

Although Coretown officers never suggested that northern Coretown youths were incapable of redemption, Coretown officers, with one notable exception discussed below, generally avoided reaching out to northern youths. This avoidance appears to have stemmed in part from these officers’ inability to see likenesses of themselves or people with whom they had grown up in these youths. While officers described themselves as “blue-collar” and as having “worked hard” to attain their status in life, they saw northern youths as “rich kids” who “ha[d] it too easy”. In general, officers saw these northern youths as part of a new “spoiled” generation to which they had a difficult time relating.

Coretown officers’ apparent lack of affinity for these northern youths, and their seemingly high social distance with respect to these youths, was reflected in the officers’
interactions with them. Like their interactions with Black and Asian Coretown youth, White Coretown officers’ interaction with White northern Coretown youth generally were reactive rather than proactive, and characterized by a cold, formal, distant tone. Virtually all of White Coretown officers’ stops that involved White northern Coretown youth were for some apparent law enforcement-related purpose, and typically involved some type of threat of punishment if the youth did not comply with the officers’ dictates. Such encounters were generally tense, and lacked a give-and-take exchange as well as the folksy, friendly, even playful quality of the encounters between the officers’ and White southern Coretown youth. For instance, one White Coretown officer admonished several White Coretown youth who were illegally skateboarding in front of a middle school in District 1 as follows:

[Officer motions angrily with hands at youths to come over to the patrol car] How many times do we have to tell you guys that you can’t ride here? If we catch you here again were gonna confiscate your boards and hit you up with a big fine. You understand?

Although some of White Coretown officers’ encounters with White southern Coretown youths also involved implied or direct threats of punishment, and in several instances, for the same offense of illegal skateboarding, such encounters differed from those with White northern Coretown youths like those in the preceding example in that the officers not only presented the threat or warning to southern youths in a softer tone, but also typically included some personal, mentoring-type questions. White Coretown officers rarely asked White northern Coretown youths any personal questions or otherwise tried to connect with them. While the officers did appear to know most of the Black and Asian Coretown youths—possibly because the relative dearth of Blacks and Asians in
Coretown made it relatively easier to remember them—, the officers did not seem to personally know many of the White northern Coretown youths. This lack of personal familiarity appeared to be directly tied to the officers’ lack of effort in getting to know northern youths.

The one notable exception to this pattern of Coretown officer’s cold, impersonal, distant approach towards northern Coretown youths was the informal mentoring efforts of a White male Coretown officer who had grown up in the predominantly White, upper-middle-class town of Nailon in the northern part of the state. In contrast to all other Coretown officers, this officer made a regular, concerted effort to reach out to northern Coretown youths. Like other Coretown officers’ efforts to reach out to mostly southern Coretown youths, this officer’s efforts to reach out to northern youths appeared to be propelled by a sense of being able to relate to youths in a seemingly primordial way. In explaining why he reached out to these northern youths, this officer indicated that a lot of these reminded him of youths that he had known while growing up in Nailon. This officer stated:

[Coretown] is a lot like [Nailon], where I grew up. The kids here in [Coretown], they’re like the kids in [Nailon], they’re basically good kids, but they try to act like rebels. I mean look at the way they dress. They don’t know how to dress. Like the skateboarders with tight jeans and shirts all over the place. I try to talk some sense into them. Like, “What are you trying to do, what are you trying to prove? People aren’t gonna hire you looking like that…. They don’t want to conform, but they’re naive. They think they can avoid the real world…. They don’t get it. Some of ‘em think they can just go on smoking pot and laying around for the rest of their lives. These guys say they don’t need any money. They say, “Fuck the business world, fuck America.” But you know that ten years from now they’ll be hopping the train and going to Wall Street. You know I just try to talk some sense into them any chance I get. There’s this one kid who’s actually a real good student, but I always see him smoking and acting all rebel-like. I asked him what he was doin’ and what he was gonna do when he got older, and he says to me, “I’m gonna go live up in the stars. No one can bother you
there.” They just don’t get it. They just think they’re gonna play their music and tune out the world, and everything will be okay. They just don’t want any part of the business world, their parents’ world. They just think that they can rebel forever. We had kids like that back in [Nailon] when I was in school. They try to avoid reality for awhile, but eventually they come back down to earth. I just try to talk ‘em back down.

As this officer’s account suggests, some type of perceived affinity between an officer and youths appeared to be a key element to an officer’s proactive informal mentoring efforts. Although this officer was not from Coretown, he saw people with whom he had grown up in these northern youths, and as a result felt that he could reach out to them. Moreover, as he implies in this above account, this officer appeared to see these youths as salvageable. As a result of having seen similar wayward youths from Nailon who had straightened themselves out and were now “hopping the train…to Wall Street”, this officer believed that these northern Coretown youths were just going through a phase of nonconformity and would eventually redeem themselves.

The idea that White male Coretown officers sought to informally mentor those youths whom they perceived as being similar to either themselves or those with whom they had grown up is further bolstered by the fact that such mentoring was exclusively gender specific: only male officers sought to mentor only male youths. While officers did not expressly indicate why they did not reach out to female youths or young adults, even those from the southern half of Coretown, it is possible that they generally perceived female youths and young adults as not being “at-risk” in the same way as male youths and young adults. However, that perception does not square with the fact that officers were aware of and had expressly identified some young female residents possibly going down the wrong path. For instance, as noted in Chapter 6, Coretown officers
mentioned that the White female named Danielle who lived by the railroad tracks in Post 4 was “going to be a problem down the line”. The officers described Danielle as being “twelve, if that”, “physically mature”, and as “messin’ around with a lot of shady older boys”, especially from outside of Coretown. Officers also indicated that Danielle was being raised by her grandmother in a house with three other families because her father was dead and her mother was an addict. Notwithstanding their awareness of Danielle’s situation and her seeming need for some additional adult guidance, officers did not attempt to reach out to her or any other female youths or young adults whom they identified as “at-risk”.

Coretown officers not only did not reach out to those female youths and young adults whom they knew or suspected were having problems, but they made no effort to inquire about female youths’ and young adults’ problems in general. For instance, although there were many instances in which officers stopped small group of youths that included some females, officers always only directed questions to one or more of the males in the group. For instance, one White male Coretown officer (“Joey”) stopped a group of two White teenage males and two White teenage females in the central downtown area and then proceeded to have a conversation with both of the boys, Kenny and Chris, which began as follows:

Officer: Hey Kenny.
Kenny: Hey Joey.
Officer: Whatchu been up to?
Officer: How’s school goin’?
Kenny: Same old, same old. It’s alright I guess. At least I don’t have Mrs. Simpson no more. That lady’s crazy.

Officer: She’s still there? I had her for English.

Kenny: Yeah, she’s like a 100 or something.

Officer: So what’s up with you Chris? You still ridin’ [moto-cross]?

Chris: No, Joey. I got a job at Giuseppe’s [a sub shop].

Officer: How’s Stevie [Chris’s older brother]? Is he still with the Air Force?

Chris: He’s okay. He’s got a few more months left. At least they didn’t send him to Iraq….

At no point in the above exchange, which went on for several more minutes, did the officer ask the two girls a single question, and the girls did not initiate any conversation with the officer. While it is likely that the officer only knew the two boys, it is still noteworthy that the officer made no effort to engage the two girls in a conversation. This type of gender-skewed exchange was emblematic of all Coretown officers’ encounters with groups of youth made up of both genders.

Besides revealing the officer’s disinterest in the two female youth, this exchange is also noteworthy in terms of what it reveals about the officer’s familiarity with the two male youths. The officer’s familiarity with the male youths was reflected not only by his use of the two male youths’ first names, but also by his apparent knowledge of their interests and families (especially in Chris’s case). Moreover, the officer connected with the youths through his statement regarding having the same teacher, which implied that their experiences were similar, and that the officer understood what they were going through. The seeming connection this officer had with the two male youths was also
apparent from the high degree of ease and comfort that marked the exchange. Not only did the officer and the two male youths display a friendly demeanor throughout their exchange, but they all addressed each other by their first names. While youths’ addressing of officers by first name was virtually nonexistent in both Longwood and Middleboro, it was the norm in Coretown, especially among White male southern Coretown youths. This suggests that there was substantially less of a wall of authority separating youth and officers in Coretown than in either Longwood or Middleboro.

In reaching out to youth whom they perceived as being similar to themselves or those with whom they had grown up in terms of race, class, and gender, White male Coretown officers demonstrated that they had a selective concern about the well-being of Coretown youths. While Coretown officers purposely went out of their way to establish and maintain informal contact with southern White male youths in order to watch out for them and be in a position in which to help them, officers generally ignored other youths. The extent to which White male Coretown officers appeared to be genuinely concerned about White male southern Coretown youths who resembled themselves or those with whom they had grown up was not only reflected in the officers’ efforts to informally mentor and counsel such youth, but also was evident in these officers’ formal mentoring practices.

In contrast to both Longwood and Middleboro, Coretown offered extensive formal, structured, police-affiliated educational and mentoring programs for youths. Of the three towns, only Coretown offered a year-round Police Explorers program, which typically served between twenty and twenty-five Coretown youths, and a two week summer youth camp, which typically served between seventy and eighty Coretown
youths. While each of the three towns had outreach programs that brought officers into
the elementary, middle, and high schools, Coretown’s programs were more
comprehensive than both Longwood’s and Middleboro’s. Although both Coretown and
Middleboro provided a Junior police Academy (JPA) in which officers from the towns’
respective police departments’ various bureaus volunteered their time to teach youths in
school about the officers’ responsibilities, Coretown’s JPA met throughout the school
year and served between eighty and one hundred students, whereas Middleboro’s JPA
was only a one week program that typically served only ten to twenty Middleboro youth.
Like Coretown and Middleboro, Longwood offered a Drug Abuse Resistance Education
(DARE) program\textsuperscript{10} and a Police Athletic League (PAL), but, according to officers from
the three towns, neither of these youth programs encompassed or engendered much in the
way of police-youth mentoring. DARE is an educational anti-drug program whose focus
is on enforcement rather than mentoring. The PAL, which consists of recreational
baseball and basketball programs for youth, was only nominally affiliated with the police
departments in each of the three towns; it was actually an autonomous entity from each
town’s police department. Notwithstanding this independence, officers in Coretown had
far greater ties to the PAL, with approximately a third of them having served as PAL
volunteers. In contrast, only one officer in Longwood and two officers in Middleboro
had served as a PAL volunteer.\textsuperscript{11} Coretown officers’ involvement with the PAL reflected
their greater overall involvement in formal youth programs: over a third of Coretown
officers had been involved in formal youth programs, whereas only a handful of
Longwood and Middleboro officers had been involved in their towns’ respective formal
programs.
Coretown officers’ formal and informal mentoring practices were mutually reinforcing. Unlike officers in Longwood and Middleboro, officers in Coretown actively recruited youths for formal Police Explorers and Junior Police Academy programs through both informal contacts with youths on the streets and at PAL events. For instance, one White Coretown officer stated the following to White male Coretown youth after stopping him on the street:

….We got this Explorers program. They do a lotta cool things. You should think about joining. Teddy [a friend of the youth] just joined. You should talk to Teddy about it….

While the informal mentoring practices facilitated recruitment of youths to formal police-affiliated programs, such programs in turn enabled both officers and the youths who joined to exert influence over an expanding pool of youths.

Given that informal mentoring practices were an important vehicle through which Coretown officers recruited youths for formal programs, those youths whom officers recruited were disproportionately White males from southern Coretown. Such targeted recruiting was particularly reflected in the make-up of Coretown’s Police Explorers (as of September, 2006). Fifteen of the twenty-one youths in Coretown’s Police Explorers were White males from southern Coretown. In contrast, the formal Junior Police Academy program in Middleboro, where officers did not actively attempt to recruit youths, had a diverse group of youths (in terms of race, gender, and area of residence in town). Thus, while a diverse group of youths in Middleboro appeared to benefit from Middleboro’s more limited formal programs, White males from southern Coretown disproportionately benefited from Coretown’s formal mentoring programs, even though such programs were theoretically open to all youths.
Coretown’s formal programs not only reinforced informal mentoring practices through the ways in which officers recruited youth for such programs, but also by the degree of zeal that officers displayed in carrying out their roles within these programs. In contrast to both Longwood and Middleboro officers, who dispassionately described their responsibilities as DARE or JPA officers as just mundane tasks that had to be completed in much the same way that paperwork had to be filed, Coretown officers passionately described their responsibilities associated with Police Explorers, summer camp, JPA, and DARE as if they were part of a calling.

This impassioned view of formal mentoring responsibilities was most evident among the officers who were involved with Coretown’s Police Explorers program. The two Coretown officers who currently worked with youth in the Explorers program and one officer who formerly had been involved with the program all similarly described their work as being a “mission.” Akin to missionaries talking about the souls they had saved, each of these officers talked at length about the youths whom they had “rescued,” “saved,” or “kept on the right path.” For instance, one of the officers currently co-supervising the Police Explorers program proudly talked about how he had turned around one White male 16 year-old (“Davey”) from southern Coretown:

Before [Davey] was in Police Explorers he was all fucked up. I mean, you thought he was living down at lockup. He was into all kinds of shit—he stole a bike, beat some kid to a pulp, and on and on. I knew [Davey] since he was born. He’s not a bad kid, he just didn’t have a dad around—I mean don’t get me wrong, his mom’s a good woman, but—he needs to have a man in his life to look up to and keep in line. So, I started talking to him one day and I told him about the Explorers and at first he wasn’t interested, but then I made a deal with him that if he tried it and stayed with it for a month, I’d treat him to dinner. Well, he got the free dinner and he’s been with us for over three years now. He’s done a complete 180. I mean, you’d have no idea what this kid used to be like. That’s what we do with Explorers, we keep ’em on the right path.
In talking about “keeping youth on the right path,” these officers were clearly implying youth who either resembled the officers themselves or people with whom the officers had grown up. For instance, in describing another youth (“Jerry”) who had been “turned around,” the other officer currently co-supervising the Police Explorers program noted how he had known young people like this particular youth. The officer stated:

Yeah, I’ve known a lotta kids like [Jerry]. [Jerry] reminds me of this guy Joe that lived on my block [in Coretown]. Joe was always gettin’ into fights until the football coach took him under his wing. After that, Joe never got in trouble. He’s got his own business now. He’s doin’ real good.

While Coretown officers recognized the importance of reaching out and helping youth, these officers were selective in such outreach efforts. Although the Police Explorers program is nominally open to all Coretown youth, the Coretown officers coordinating the Explorers program saw it as a vehicle whereby they could assist youth with whom they identified.

Coretown officers’ passion for the Police Explorers program and their desire to recruit youth with whom they identified into the program was strongly reinforced not only by their present involvement with program, but also by the officers’ own involvement with the program as youth. Five of the sixteen Coretown officers interviewed for this study had participated in Coretown’s Police Explorers program during their teenage years, including the two current co-coordinators of the program. One of the current coordinators of the program stated that the Explorers program was “the best experience [he] [had] had.” All five of the officers who had participated in the program during their youth indicated that although they had some interest in becoming a police officer prior to joining the Explorers program, the program turned their mild
interest in policing into a strong one. Moreover, these officers noted that while not everyone who had participated in the Explorers program with them went on to become police officers, the program nevertheless had been instrumental in these other participants’ maturation into responsible adults. For instance, one White Coretown officer commented:

> Explorers was really good. We had a lot of fun, but it also taught you to have discipline, to stay out of trouble. We had this one guy A.J. who was a real knucklehead, but he eventually he got his shit together. I think Explorers did a lot.

The passion with which Coretown officers engaged in formal mentoring, especially through the Police Explorers reinforces the idea that White male Coretown officers’ informal mentoring of largely southern Coretown White male youth was motivated by a genuine concern for the well-being of such youth. In carrying out their formal youth-related responsibilities, these Coretown officers did not merely go through the motions; rather, they treated these responsibilities as part of a larger set of obligations to reach out to youth whom they perceived as being similar to themselves. As many of these Coretown officers themselves had been beneficiaries of the mentoring practices of prior generations affiliated with the Coretown Police Department, these officers saw themselves as obligated to carry on this tradition.

The passion with which White male Coretown officers engaged in both formal and informal mentoring of White male youth from the southern half of Coretown also suggests that such mentoring was not simply undertaken for the purpose of fulfilling the Coretown Chief of Police’s mandate that the officers engage in hands-on, service-oriented policing. Moreover, the fact that all of officers who engaged in such mentoring
were White, and only one had not grown up in Coretown, suggests that such mentoring and outreach efforts were driven by more than simply bureaucratic pressure. Furthermore, the fact that Chief of Police in Middleboro had issued a similar directive, yet the majority of Middleboro officers, whose mentoring behaviors are discussed later in this section, engaged in relatively little mentoring, intimates that organizational mandates alone do not explain officers’ helping behaviors.

Although the majority of Longwood officers, similar to majority of Coretown officers, appeared to have a strong sense of connection to their town of employ, Longwood officers, unlike their Coretown counterparts, engaged in virtually no proactive mentoring of youths or young adults. In particular, even though White Longwood officers, as well as the lone Asian officer\textsuperscript{14} in the sample, appeared to have a particularly strong affinity for Longwood’s White majority population stemming from their personal experiences growing up in “White” neighborhoods in Districts 1, 2, or 8, these officers rarely informally reached out to White youths or young adults in a manner similar to that of officers in Coretown.\textsuperscript{15} Generally speaking, Longwood officers did not ask White youths or young adults what their future plans were, or proactively take them aside and counsel them as to what they should and should not be doing. The only two instances of White and Asian Longwood officers’ proactive mentoring during the course of the ride-alongs involved a White male Longwood officer who took an interest in a seemingly wayward 16 year-old White male LHS student who was walking on the street outside of LHS, and an Asian male Longwood officer who tried to advise two young adult White males who owed several hundred dollars to someone else and feared for their safety.
Outside of these anomalous incidents, White and Asian Longwood officers did not appear to even notice White youths and young adults.

White and Asian Longwood officers appeared to not even notice White youths and young adults, for two central reasons. First, White and Asian officers’ seemingly all-encompassing focus on monitoring Blacks, particularly Black youths and young adults, effectively precluded these officers from seeing White youths and young adults or “White” dysfunction. For instance, as documented in Chapter 6, these officers virtually ignored White LHS students who congregated on the western side of LHS because the officers were so preoccupied with monitoring and herding Black LHS students.

Second, even when these officers did acknowledge and/or notice White youths or young adults who appeared to be dysfunctional in some way, these officers’ racialized narratives stemming from their personal experiences appeared to inform the officers that mentoring or otherwise providing informal help to these youths and young adults was unnecessary. Through their lifetime of experiences with family members and friends, these officers had developed these narratives or conceptual templates as a way to order and understand such experiences. Each narrative referenced an officer’s own “White” family and/or the “White” family of his/her friends and neighbors as an ideal type or normative standard. Officers then invoked these “White” ideal types or normative standards as a way of making sense of the White youths and young adults whom they encountered. In invoking these narratives, officers effectively were making assumption that all “White” families were similar to their own and/or those of their friends and neighbors.
Of the various narratives that White and Asian Longwood officers invoked in order to make sense of the situations of White youths and young adults, the two most common and important of these narratives centered upon the concepts of informal social control and redemption respectively. The “informal social control” narrative involved the idea that family members provided values and behaviors that were sufficient enough to preclude the need for formal intervention by state or private actors. According to this narrative, the prototypical “White” family provided values such as responsibility and respect for and obedience to authority, and behaviors such as supervision and discipline.

A White male Longwood officer who had grown up in a “White” neighborhood in Longwood’s District 2 invoked this narrative when he stated:

If I ever pulled a stunt like that [I knew] I’d get a beating. You knew the belt was coming out, so you didn’t play around…. And you knew you wouldn’t get away with anything. You knew that somebody in the neighborhood was always watching you, all the time, and they wouldn’t hesitate to tell your folks. And my dad, boy if he found out, he’d ream me.

A White male Longwood officer who had grown up in a “White” neighborhood in Longwood’s District 1 similarly invoked this narrative when he remarked:

We really didn’t get into trouble that much…. We didn’t want to let our mom and dad down. You didn’t want to disappoint them, make them feel ashamed of you. Like, “I taught you better than that, what the hell are you doing? Where’s your head at?” No, I just didn’t want to make them feel that way…. And you know, not in a million years would I have even thought about talking back to a cop or a teacher. You know, you just didn’t do that. That’s not how we were raised, how our friends were raised.

Both of these officers’ commentaries reflect this informal social control narrative, albeit in slightly different way. The first officer invoked the narrative by talking about how he was subject to extensive supervision by his parents and neighbors, as well as harsh discipline by his parents if he misbehaved. The second officer also invoked this
narrative, but he emphasized that his parents’ teachings regarding responsibility and respect for authority were what kept his behavior in line. In invoking this narrative, the officers were implying that White Longwood White youths’ and young adults’ families were similar to their own, and as such, would keep these youths’ and young adults’ on the right path.

In constructing their “White” family ideal type for this informal social control narrative, White and Asian Longwood officers selectively chose behaviors and traits from their own families or the families of friends or neighbors. These officers invariably emphasized behaviors and traits that supported the informal social control narrative, and played down or omitted those behaviors and traits that appeared to run counter to this narrative. In other words, these officers effectively whitewashed traits of members of their “ideal family” that were inconsistent with the theme of this narrative. For instance, although a White female Longwood officer had noted that her father had “a little drinking problem,” she nevertheless said he was “a great father” and indicated that his drinking never interfered with his ability to provide for his family and keep an eye on his children. Similarly, although a White male Longwood officer had discussed his wife’s periodic bouts with depression and had noted that he and his wife had struggled at times in keeping their adolescent son out of trouble, he nevertheless indicated that his wife was “always there for [their] children” and a “damn good mother.” Likewise, although a White male Longwood officer had mentioned that his stepfather had had a difficult time bonding with the officer’s younger siblings, he nevertheless maintained that his stepfather was “everything a father should be.” In general, notwithstanding their admissions of family members’ traits that implied at least a hampered ability to provide adequate
informal social control, these Longwood officers nevertheless were able to unequivocally present their families as paragons of informal social control.

The second narrative that White and Asian Longwood officers invoked in order to make sense of the situations of White youths and young adults dealt with the concept of redemption. According to this narrative, even if a family member had gone astray, he or she eventually was able to straighten himself or herself out. Although this redemption narrative appeared to contradict the logic of the informal social control narrative, in that families’ informal social control mechanisms had failed to prevent children from going astray, the redemption narrative was, in fact, consistent with the informal social narrative in terms of its underlying faith in the power of “White” families. While the informal social control narrative emphasized how the ideal “White” family’s foundation of values, guidance, and support prevented children from going astray, the redemption narrative attested to how such familial foundations enabled children who had gone astray to return to the fold. For instance, a White male Longwood officer who had grown up in a “White” neighborhood in Longwood’s District 2 invoked this narrative when he discussed his younger, 21 year-old brother, who had had several “run-ins with the law”. This officer indicated that even though his brother had some current charges pending against him, including receipt of stolen property, his brother was going to “beat the charges” and was going to “be alright” because he was “a good kid” and his family was “a 100 percent behind him.” Moreover, this officer indicated that his brother was already “straighten[ing] himself out” and “finally turn[ing] things around”. As evidence of this alleged transformation, this officer optimistically cited the fact that his brother had found a steady job and broken off a toxic relationship with a woman with whom he had shared a
drug habit. Once again, this officer attributed this redemptive transformation as a testament to his family’s unrelenting patience and bedrock support. The officer stated:

We never gave up on [my brother]. We always looked out for him, and knew that someday he’d get his act together…. That’s what families do, they don’t give up on you.

This redemption narrative was evident in the accounts of several officers who talked about inevitable reformation and redemption of their adolescent and young adult children. For instance, a thirty-three year veteran White male Longwood officer described how his son had gone through a rebellious stage during adolescence, but that the officer and his wife had tirelessly worked to get their son on the right track. In particular, this officer spoke of how he had finally gotten his son into woodworking as a way of instilling responsibility in him and keeping him off the streets.

Similarly, a twenty-five year veteran White male Longwood officer discussed how both his son and his son’s best friend had been “hellraisers” who often got into trouble for their various “wild”, delinquent acts such as vandalism, underage drinking, and fighting when they were in the teens, but that they eventually “got [themselves] together” and became respectable, hardworking, productive, law-abiding adults.\(^\text{19}\) This officer, like the aforementioned thirty-three year veteran officer, talked about how he had assisted his son in getting on the right track. In particular, this officer mentioned how he had been able to secure an apprenticeship for his son with a friend who owned an auto body shop. Furthermore, the officer noted that he did whatever it took to get his son into something productive, such as providing him with tools and space at home so that he could work on remodeling and repairing cars. This officer proudly noted that his son was now a successful mechanic. He also mentioned with a degree of pride how his son’s
friend, who had gotten kicked out of the college that he was attending after several incidents of rowdy behavior, also had “straightened himself out” and become a successful businessman with the assistance of his father. Moreover, as if to present the ultimate proof that his son’s friend had completed a 180 degree turn from “delinquent” to “model citizen,” this officer made a point to note that his son’s friend was running for a seat on the Longwood Town Council in the upcoming election.

All of these Longwood officers’ stories of redemption emphasized that regardless of how and why a child or sibling had gone astray, the strength and supportiveness of the child’s or sibling’s family enabled him or her to eventually straighten himself or herself out and become a respectable, productive, law-abiding citizen. In most cases, Longwood officers, unlike Coretown officers, felt that it was not necessary to reach out to White youths and young adults whom they encountered during the course of patrolling Longwood because these youths and young adults likely had adequate informal social control mechanisms at home. Moreover, they believed that even if such mechanisms did not appear to working at the moment, eventually these youths and young adults would, with the assistance of families, friends, and loved ones, get their lives in order without any formal intervention by the police or actors.

Besides not even noticing Whites and “White” dysfunction or rationalizing such dysfunction through racialized narratives of informal social control and redemption, White and Asian Longwood officers also did not reach out to White youths and young adults because, unlike in Coretown, there was neither a tradition or precedent of such informal mentoring, nor virtually any formal mentoring structures such as Police Explorers, in Longwood. In contrast to Coretown officers, Longwood officers spoke of
no tradition of officers reaching out to prior generations of youths. As the officers’ informal social control and redemption narratives imply, officers saw families’ private handling of their children’s problems as being normative. Moreover, as noted under the discussion of Coretown officers’ formal mentoring efforts, Longwood, unlike Coretown, did not have either a Police Explorers program or a Junior Police Academy. Thus, there were few formal mentoring opportunities for Longwood officers that might serve as a basis for more informal mentoring.20

Although White and Asian Longwood officers did notice Black youths and young adults and generally viewed them as being “at-risk”, these officers made no efforts to reach out and mentor or counsel such youths and young adults. These officers’ lack of mentoring of Black Longwood youths largely appears to be due to the officers’ perception that such mentoring would be futile, coupled with the officers’ perception of being so different from these youths. These officers conveyed these perceptions by invoking a “neglect” narrative that referenced a negative poor Black family ideal type.21 The gist of this “neglect” narrative was that poor Black parents and caretakers were highly negligent with respect to the care of children, effectively leaving these children to fend for and raise themselves.22 For instance, a White male Longwood officer invoked this narrative after responding to a call involving a fight between two Black teenage girls outside two rundown apartment complexes in the heart of the “target zone” near Sylvester Avenue Longwood’s District 4:

You know these people23 don’t know how to raise their kids. I mean, there’s no supervision. The kids do whatever the fuck they want. They just don’t care. You’ve got cockroaches running up and down the walls, and babies crawling on the floor after the cockroaches. I just can’t imagine livin’ in such a shithole. I
really can’t…. You can see why a lot of these kids are so messed up. How could you turn out any other way, growin’ up like that….

Officers’ constructions of this “neglect” narrative appeared to be based on a combination of hearsay accounts that the officers picked up from other officers or non-work sources such as mass media accounts, and selectively chosen firsthand experiences with particular Black families during the course of policing. White and Asian officers’ reliance in part on stereotypical information from hearsay accounts likely stemmed from the officers’ own relatively segregated, isolated upbringings. Although, as noted in Chapter 6, the majority of White and Asian Longwood officers had grown up and attended school in racially diverse Longwood, virtually all of these officers described having relatively little meaningful contact with Longwood’s Black residents until they became police officers. All of the officers who had grown up in Longwood had lived in “White” neighborhoods in Districts 1, 2, and 8, and had attended predominantly “White” elementary and middle schools. Although these officers went to high school with Blacks at racially diverse LHS, the majority of officers’ segregated friendship networks established prior to high school hindered the formation of friendships with Black students. Consequently, the majority of these White and Asian Longwood officers indicated that they were not very familiar with Longwood’s Black residents. As noted in Chapter 6, some of the officers did not even know about the “Black” District 4 area until they became police officers. Given their lack of firsthand experiences with Longwood’s Black residents prior to becoming an officer, many of these officers had relied on stereotypical secondhand information in forming their ideas about the “Black family”.
Officers’ also constructed this “neglect” narrative by selectively taking bits and pieces of information from one or more of their firsthand experiences with particular Black families during their work as officers. All of these officers always cited at least one specific prior on-the-job incident when invoking this narrative. For example, White male Longwood officers cited on-the-job incidents such as an unattended Black toddler in diapers wandering in the middle of the street at 4 A.M., a houseful of young Black children sleeping on urine soaked mattresses with no food in the refrigerator while the children’s mothers got high on drugs in the next room, and Black adolescents who were back on the streets within an hour of being released to the custody of their parents following an arrest. In elaborating on these firsthand incidents while presenting this “neglect” narrative, officers appeared to strengthen whatever stereotypical information they had culled from secondhand accounts of Black families.

Moreover, White and Asian officers’ documentation of this negative poor Black family ideal type referenced in this “neglect” narrative not only showed that officers inductively created this ideal type from various particular incidents, but also revealed that officers consciously omitted or downplayed incidents and facts that appeared to contradict this ideal type. For instance, several White Longwood officers lauded some Black grandparents who were raising their grandchildren despite limited resources and difficult circumstances. However, when referencing the pathological/ dysfunctional Black family ideal type, officers either made no mention of the grandparents’ strength, caring, and resiliency, or put a negative spin on grandparents’ raising of their grandchildren by emphasizing the absence of the children’s parents and the circumstances that led to such absence. Thus, officers appeared to have taken the
seemingly positive attributes of poor Black families and presented them as pathological in order to create a consistent negative poor Black family ideal type.

Through their invoking of the “neglect” narrative and its dysfunctional Black familial ideal type, White and Asian officers implied that they held very low expectations regarding Black youths. Based on what they saw as a lack of proper supervision, moral guidance, and support at home, White and Asian officers appeared to assume that Black Longwood youths would not amount to anything. These officers conveyed such low expectations by routinely demeaning such youths’ intelligence and work ethic. For instance, a White male Longwood officer demeaned the intelligence of a group of Black youths who walking in the middle of the street by stating afterwards, “I guess they haven’t figured out where the sidewalk is yet.” As noted in Chapter 6, several White male Longwood officers demeaned Black LHS students’ work ethic with comments such as, “Why do they even bother coming?”

White and Asian Longwood officers also demonstrated their low expectations regarding Black Longwood youths by suggesting that these youths would become criminals. For example, after spotting a group of Black children between the ages of five and ten playing with a pair of handcuffs on the steps in front of a house in District 4, a White male Longwood officer sarcastically remarked, “They’re probably trying to figure out how to get out of them for when they get older.” The implication being that these young Black children would someday be arrested and handcuffed.

More generally, White and Asian Longwood officers conveyed their low expectations for Black Longwood youths through comments suggesting that these youths’ situation was hopeless. In particular, these officers saw Black Longwood youths
from District 4 as being “lost causes” and as “hav[ing] no future”. For instance, while
driving through District 4, a White male Longwood officer made the following remarks
about the plight of Black District 4 youths:

It’s not that these kids have no hope, there’s always hope. But really, when you
think about it, what do they have? They go to shitty schools, there’s nothing for
them to do when they’re outta school, their families are fucked up, they don’t see
anybody from their neighborhood making anything of themselves. I’d be lying to
‘em if I said things are going to get better, ‘cause they’re not. What am I gonna
tell the kid, “Keep your chin up, things are gonna get better?” They’d laugh in
my face. I mean they see Uncle Willie out on the corner…. It takes decades to
change a place. [District 4] isn’t gonna change for the better, and the kids know
it. The odds are against them, that’s just the way it is.

Similarly, as noted in Chapter 5, Longwood officers conveyed their sense of fatalism and
despair regarding the situation of Black Longwood youths by describing these youths as
being trapped in a “cycle” of pathology. For instance, another White male Longwood
officer stated:

It’s like a cycle, it just repeats itself, over and over. Generation after
generation…. They’re locked into gettin’ fucked up.

As a result of all of their low expectations regarding Black Longwood youths and
the assumptions that their familial and communal environments would not provide the
necessary nurturance or needed corrective, White and Asian Longwood officers generally
did not view such youths as being redeemable. Unlike their view of White youths who
had deviated from what the officers saw as socially acceptable behavior, these officers
did not see Black youths who similarly deviated as being capable of redemption. For
instance, after arresting a 15-year-old Black male from District 4 for allegedly having
stolen a bicycle from a home near the border of Districts 2 and 3, a White male
Longwood officer stated:
The way he’s headed, I don’t see much hope for him. It looks like he’s on his way. You’ll be seeing him at the County [jail] not before long. It’s just a matter of time.

Given their general view that Black youths were not capable of redemption, White officers appeared to see no point in reaching out to such youths and trying to turn them around, notwithstanding the fact that several of these officers conveyed that they “fe[lt] sorry] for these youths’ plight. For instance, a White male Longwood made the following remarks while observing a group of Black youths hanging out on the corner of Ulysses and Chester Streets in District 4:

I feel sorry for a lot of them. I really do. But there’s not much you can do. What are you gonna do? Besides, why would they listen to me? They’re not gonna listen to me. Are you kidding? [emphasis added]

As this officer’s comments suggests, White and Asian Longwood officers were not only reluctant to reach out to Black Longwood youths due to a belief that these youths were not salvageable, but also because these officers saw themselves as being so fundamentally different from these youths. The officer in the preceding example does not make a blanket statement that these youths would not listen to anyone, but rather, specifically indicates that they would not listen to him. In effect, this officer was suggesting that he, as a middle-aged, middle-class White male, would not be able to relate to these youths, nor would they be able to relate to him.

White and Asian Longwood officers’ perceived inability to relate to Black Longwood youths stems from the broader cultural chasm that these officers’ perceived as existing between Whites and Blacks. This perceived cultural chasm was particularly evident in these officers’ starkly different narratives regarding White and Black families. Officers’ markedly different view of the “White” families referenced in the “informal
social control” and “redemption” narratives as compared to the “Black” families referenced in the “neglect” narrative, suggests that these officers saw themselves as being worlds apart from Longwood’s Black youths.

White and Asian officers’ sense of being worlds apart from Black Longwood youths and young adults was foremost manifest in these officers’ assessments of such youths’ and young adults’ seeming priorities. In particular, White and Asian Longwood officers frequently expressed incredulity at what they saw as the inability of Black Longwood youths and young adults to grasp the magnitude of certain high stakes situations. For instance, a White Longwood officer indicated that he was flabbergasted when a Black male from Longwood in his early twenties tried to pass a cigarette to another young adult Black male in the courthouse while standing before a judge and asking the judge for leniency in his case. Another White male Longwood officer expressed exasperation over the apparent priorities of a 17-year-old Black male who had been arrested for theft and unlawful possession of a weapon: The officer stated:

You should’ve seen him. He just kept on whining [in the holding cell] about this big football game that he was going to miss…. The big football star’s lookin’ at some big charges and all he’s worried about is missing some goddamned game. Maybe if he’s lucky, they’ve got a team in prison.

The officer’s sarcasm shows that he was taken aback by the Black arrestee’s seeming lack of concern about the potential criminal sanctions that the arrestee was facing.

Similarly, another White male Longwood officer discussed at length the reactions of several Black youths and one Puerto Rican youth following a melee in which several of the youths physically fought with Longwood officers.24 The Longwood officer was particularly dumbfounded by the reactions of a 13 year old Black male and a 14 year old
Puerto Rican male, both of whom had assaulted two of the officers. With a tone of incredulity, this officer indicated that the only thing the 13 year old Black male was concerned about was that he was not going to be able to go to the mall to go shopping for a new jacket with his mom. In a mocking tone, the officer indicated that the boy stated:

“C’mon man. My mom’s supposed to take me to get a new jacket. Yo, I got to get a new jacket. Everybody say my jacket’s so old school.

This officer described a similar post-arrest response by the 14 year old Puerto Rican male whom they arrested. The officer indicated after he arrested the Puerto Rican male, the 14 year old was only upset about the fact that the leather Timberland tag had fallen off one of his boots when he was wrestling with the officer in the snow. The officer sardonically noted that the Puerto Rican male despairingly stated, “Yo, they’re gonna think my shit’s fake,” and pleaded with the officer to help him find his Timberland tag in the snow. In recounting what he saw as the highly skewed priorities of these two youths, this officer emphasized how these youths were neither worried about possible entanglement with the juvenile justice system, nor concerned about upsetting their parents, but rather, were worried about how their peers would assess their clothing.

As implied in the preceding example, White and Asian Longwood officers’ lack of mentoring or reaching out to “Black” youths was not simply due to these officers’ perception of not being able to relate to these youths in terms of priorities, but also was due to their perception of these youths as being hostile and disrespectful to them. Officers not only indicated, as mentioned in Chapter 5, that Black Longwood youths “tuned them out” by “rapping” in an officer’s presence, but that these youths also engaged in behaviors that the officers perceived as more aggressively disrespectful, such
as spitting on the ground near an officer. Moreover, these officers perceived that these youths’ hostility was so great that it sometimes led to physical confrontations with the officers such as the one described above. Given their perception of hostility coming from unsalvageable youths to whom they could not relate, White and Asian Longwood officers were reluctant to reach out to these youths.

Like their White counterparts, the Black Longwood officers in the sample generally did not attempt to reach out and mentor any Longwood youths. These officers’ lack of proactive mentoring with respect to young people from Longwood’s majority White population is in part likely due to the fact that they, like their fellow White and Asian officers, were focused on monitoring Longwood’s Black population. Accordingly, they had less opportunity to see “White” dysfunction. In addition, unlike the majority of White and Asian Longwood officers, these officers were neither from nor resided in Longwood. They lack of familiarity with Longwood’s White residents, coupled their perceptions of racial dissimilarity with respect to these residents, may have contributed to their seeming lack of interest in reaching out to White Longwood youths.

While these Black Longwood officers’ non-residential backgrounds also may have contributed to their lack of mentoring of Black Longwood youths, these officers’ own racialized narratives, coupled with Black Longwood youths’ apparent resistance to such mentoring efforts, appear to have played a more significant role. Like White and Asian Longwood officers, these Black Longwood officers invoked racialized narratives that appear to partially explain their lack of mentoring of Black youths. Although Black officers, like their White and Asian counterparts, also invoked a “neglect” narrative that referenced a negative “Black” family ideal type that they pieced together from their
knowledge of particular Black families, these Black officers, unlike White and Asian officers, expressly recognized intraracial distinctions among Blacks.

Black Longwood officers’ principal “Black” narrative essentially involved a contrast between what they perceived as “functional” and “dysfunctional” Black families. Although Black Longwood officers, like their non-Black counterparts, appeared to assume that the quintessential dysfunctional family was “Black”, these Black officers made distinctions between Blacks like themselves whom they perceived as having functional families, and Blacks, usually poor and urban, whom they perceived as not. Both Black officers referenced divisions within their own families to illustrate intra-racial distinctions among Blacks. For example, one of the Black officers distinguished himself and his wife and children, from the family of his sister, whom he described as someone who had “got in with the wrong crowd,” had battled drug addiction, and had had children with four different men. Similarly, the other Black officer emphasized how his own children were different from his nephew, who was “out there, running the streets.”

While these Black officers’ may have provided these familial accounts in part for the narrow, self-serving purposes of distancing themselves and their in families from dysfunctional relatives, and communicating the message that all Blacks are not tangled in pathology, the fatalistic tone of these familial stories, particularly when contrasted with the aforementioned familial stories of White officers, conveyed a much more fundamental message about Black dysfunction. Although, as noted above, some White officers also made reference to siblings, children, and other relatives who had violated some norms or criminal laws, the personal familial accounts of the Black officers differ from those of White officers in the sense that Black family members who had gone astray
were seen by the Black officers as being lost causes who would not eventually straighten
themselves out. Unlike White officers, Black officers did not relate stories about family
members who had “turned [themselves] around”, or expressly state that there was a
possibility that such family members would “turn themselves around” any time soon. In
short, unlike White officers’ familial stories, Black officers’ familial stories did not
convey an expectation or even hope of redemption. These Black officers’ apparent lack
of belief in the possibility that family members would eventually redeem themselves
suggests that, even in the minds of the Black officers, there was a sense that “Black”
pathology was fundamentally different than “White” or “Asian” or “Latino” pathology.
Given this view, it is possible that these Black officers’ variant of the “neglect” narrative
may in part explain their lack of mentoring Black Longwood youths. These officers may
have felt a sense of futility in responding to Black Longwood youths, who through their
speech, dress, demeanor, or other situational cues, activated these officers’ thoughts of
this neglect narrative.

While Black Longwood officers’ variant of the “Black” “neglect” narrative may
have contributed to these officers’ lack of mentoring of Black Longwood youths, these
youths’ resistance to Black officers’ efforts to reach out to them also appears to have
contributed to the dearth of such outreach and mentoring. Although Black Longwood
youths, particularly the majority of such youths who lived in District 4 appeared to have a
generally hostile view of the police, these youths nevertheless seemed to be more
comfortable interacting with Black officers than White ones. Indeed, whenever there was
a crisis or emergency situation in District 4, Black youths specifically asked for or sought
out Black officers. For example, when a fight broke out between two Black teenage girls
near Sylvester Avenue and expanded into a larger melee between the two girls’ families and friends, several Black youths told five of the White officers who were present that they wanted to speak to the Black officer who had just arrived on the scene.\textsuperscript{27} 

However, notwithstanding their general preference for Black Longwood officers when dealing with crisis situations or other problems, Black Longwood youths appeared to display a lack of receptivity to any of these officers’ mentoring-type overtures. In general, these youths maintained a cautious distance from Black officers, thereby making it difficult for the officers to establish any type of informal mentoring relationship with them. For instance, some Black youths in District 4 routinely “tuned out” Black officers (as well as non-Black officers) when the officers spoke to them, by rapping to themselves. Other Black youths in District 4 sometimes walked away when a Black officer started asking questions about school and other matters. Faced with such perceived resistance on the part of Black youths to any type of mentoring, it is likely that some Black officers did not even bother trying after a while.

In contrast to Black Longwood officers, Black Middleboro officers engaged in both formal and informal mentoring-type behaviors with youths. Similar to White Coretown officers, Black Middleboro officers’ mentoring practices seemed to be based on both familiarity with the town and perceived affinity with youths. Both Black Middleboro officers in the sample had grown up in Middleboro, and thus were familiar with the town and its residents. However, given that Black Middleboro officers largely appeared to reach out to Black youths, these officers’ mentoring also seems to be tied to a sense of race-based kinship with certain youths.
This apparent sense of race-based kinship with Black Middleboro youths, particularly Black youths from the southeastern part of Middleboro, was reflected by the fact that these Black Middleboro officers perceived themselves as role models to Black Middleboro youth. For instance, a Black Middleboro officer who volunteered as a coach and a mentor at a recreational program at Green Park in the almost exclusively Black and poor southeastern part of Middleboro, discussed the importance of being a role model to Black youths:

A lot of these kids around here [in the southeastern part of Middleboro] have no role models. Somebody’s gotta step up for them…. What I do here keeps them off the streets. It also lets ‘em know that you can be a man without hustlin’, dealing drugs.

While Black Middleboro officers’ efforts to reach out to Black youths in the southeastern part of Middleboro, particularly through their volunteer recreational activities at Green Park one block east of Monroe Street, these officers’ efforts appear to be heavily influenced by class as well as race. For one thing, these officers did not appear to reach out to Black youths in the wealthier parts of Middleboro. Secondly, in explaining why they did not reach out to White Middleboro youths in the northern part of Middleboro, these officers implied that it was because of these youths’ absence of need. Another Black Middleboro officer stated:

The kids around here [the southeastern part of Middleboro] need us. The kids over in [the northern part of Middleboro], they have everything…. We’d be wasting our time up there….

Thus, although these officers’ mentoring efforts focused on Blacks, the officers’ lack of mentoring of White youths appears to have been affected in part by their perception of these youths’ higher class status.
Like non-Black officers in Longwood, non-Black officers in Middleboro, especially White officers, did not demonstrate much concern for any young people, regardless of race. With the exception of an Asian male Middleboro officer, non-Black Middleboro officers generally did not verbally express concern about particular young individuals or engage in the mentoring-type behaviors that the Coretown officers exemplified. While Coretown officers’ familiarity with Coretown helped to explain their racially skewed affinity to youth, non-Black Middleboro officers’ general lack of affinity towards all Middleboro youth goes beyond the fact that the majority of Middleboro patrol officers did not grow up in Middleboro.

In terms of these non-Black Middleboro officers’ lack of affinity with Black youth, it appears that like most of the non-Black Coretown and Longwood officers, many of the non-Black Middleboro officers had had little in the way of social interactions with Blacks while growing up, and accordingly did not relate to or identify with Black youths, especially the Black youth from the southeastern part of town. Moreover, these officers’ lack of concern for Black youths from the southeastern part of Middleboro also appeared to stem from the officers’ perception that there was not much they could do for these youth. The officers’ references to these youth being “lost to the streets” or “stuck in the ‘hood” suggest that the officers viewed these youths as not being reachable. Consequently, notwithstanding their identification of Black youths from the southeastern part of the town as being the most “at-risk” youths in Middleboro, non-Black officers generally did not attempt to reach out to these youths or express an interest in doing so. However, even if the officers had expressed such an interest, they were not presented
with many opportunities to engage in mentoring-type behaviors with these youths because southeastern Black youths typically scattered at the sight of a patrol car.

In contrast to White Coretown officers, non-Black Middleboro officers generally did not express concern about or engage in mentoring-type behaviors with White youths, even though these Middleboro officers were presented with ample opportunities to do so. Unlike the Black youth from the southeastern part of town, White youths did not flee at the sight of a patrol car. Although White youths typically remained present when officers approached them, officers rarely engaged in any mentoring-type behaviors analogous to those of the Coretown officers. Rather, these non-Black Middleboro officers typically chastised these youths, particularly northern White youths in Zone 1, and kept their communications with these youths terse, formal, and distant. For instance, in their repeated interactions with northern White youths who were illegally skateboarding in the Blair Avenue commercial district in Zone 1, non-Black officers typically limited their interactions with commands like, “Take it to the park” or “You gotta move it off the street.”

Non-Black Middleboro officers’ apparent lack of concern for White youths, particularly White youths from northern Middleboro, was not based on the notion of whether these youths were reachable, but rather was attributable, at least in part, to the officers’ overall feelings of resentment towards these youths. These Middleboro officers frequently described these White youths of “having a sense of entitlement,” and of being “privileged,” “spoiled,” and “cocky.” As these pejorative characterizations imply, these Middleboro officers’ resentment of these youths appears to have been based on the officers’ perception of these youths’ class status. Despite the fact that many of these non-
Black officers had grown up in predominantly White neighborhoods and communities, they generally did not appear to relate to White Middleboro youths due to perceived class differences. Non-Black Middleboro officers saw many of the Whites in Middleboro as being upper-middle class, whereas most of these officers identified themselves as being from working-class or “blue-collar” backgrounds. As a result of this class divergence, the non-Black officers generally did not see themselves or others they knew reflected in the White youths whom they encountered. Given such perceived class differences, White and other non-Black Middleboro officers did not express a sense of kinship with these White youths, and never expressed any interest in reaching out to them in any way.

7.5. Officers’ Perceptions of Change, Threat, and Support

Officers’ sense of connection to their towns of employ also was manifest by the officers’ perceptions of change, threat, and support within these towns. While some of officers’ personal experiences outside of work played a role in shaping these latter perceptions, officers’ experiences as officers within these particular towns contributed heavily to these perceptions.

Although Coretown officers, especially those who had grown up in Coretown, generally felt a strong connection to Coretown and its residents, officers nevertheless spoke of changes in Coretown that were threatening to erode their bonds to the town and its residents. In particular, officers identified changes in the housing market within town that not only threatened to price officers, especially newer officers, out of town, but more importantly, had brought in newer, wealthier residents whom officers saw as being less supportive of them.
Coretown officers indicated that the most significant change that had taken place in Coretown had been the social group shift from a predominantly “blue collar” or “lunch pail middle-class” population who “belonged to unions”, “drove Buicks”, and “vacationed in the Poconos”, to a population that was increasingly made up of “New York yuppies” or “Wall Street-types” who “wore suit and ties”, “drove BMWs”, and “vacationed in the Caribbean”. As noted in Chapter 4, officers indicated that this class shift from “blue collar” to “rich” had mainly occurred in the northern half of town, where the homes and properties historically had been somewhat larger than those in the southern half of town. Officers traced the beginning of this social group shift in the northern half of town to the late 1980s. They indicated that not long after Coretown appeared in a magazine as one of the twenty-five best towns in which to live in the United States, the price of homes in the northern half of town began to skyrocket, which in turn led to an increase in the town’s property taxes. Officers noted that many longtime elderly residents either did not want or could not afford to pay the property taxes, and as a result, many of them sold their homes to younger families. Officers suggested that with the continuing upsurge in the price of homes, this encouraged a lot of “flipping” of homes, whereby people purchased homes chiefly or solely for the purpose of turning a profit on them. All of this activity had caused such a spike in the price of homes in Coretown, particularly in the northern half of town, that by 2006, homes in Coretown had become unaffordable for newer officers in the department.28

While Coretown officers felt threatened by this housing-related change in terms of being priced out of town, they felt even more threatened by the town’s newer, wealthier residents, whom they saw as more demanding and fastidious, and less
supportive, than Coretown’s historically “blue-collar” residents. Coretown officers routinely groused about how residents, almost all whom lived in either Post 1 or Post 2 in the northern, wealthier half of Coretown, expected officers to take care of what officers described as “trivial” and “ridiculous” problems. Some of the problems included, “a strange cat [that] ran into someone’s yard”, “a raccoon in [a resident’s] garage”, people “shoveling or blowing snow onto [a resident’s] property”, and people “moving a couch into the middle of the road”. Coretown officers’ felt that these residents were not only presumptuous, but too dependent on the police and others to solve their problems. For instance, an Asian male Coretown officer stated:

A lot of these [wealthier] residents in Posts 1 and 2 expect us to handle everything. You know if somebody’s dog gets off its leash, find the owner, don’t call us. If somebody’s blowin’ leaves on your lawn, you work it out with your neighbor. Don’t get us involved. Learn to handle your own problems. You know the poor people in places like [Elmwood], they learn to take care of their own business, handle it themselves. [The Elmwood police] would laugh in your face if you called and asked them to help you find your dog. The people over here are too coddled; they expect too much.

Furthermore, officers indicated that some of these residents not only “expect[ed] officers to fix everything”, but that they approached the officers with a “demanding tone”. For instance, a White male Coretown officer stated:

Some of [these residents in Post 2] expect you to fix everything, and they’ll come up in your face with this real demanding tone: “You’re gonna fix this, that, and that.”

In a related vein, Coretown officers saw these newer, wealthier residents who disproportionately lived in the northern half of Coretown as being difficult to please. For instance a Black male Coretown officer described an incident involving a couch that some person or persons had repeatedly moved off of a curb into the middle of a
residential street located in Post 2 on a night before the town’s large item garbage pick-up:

Every month we have this large item garbage pickup, and it’s always a pain in the ass. You’ve always got some kids who think they’re real comedians who like to move things into the street. Last month there was this couch on [Peach] Street, over by [Evans] Pool [in Post 2], and some jokers moved it into the middle of the road. So we get a call and go and move it and that’s that. That was about 10 P.M. About a half hour later we get another call, it’s from the same guy complaining about the same couch bein’ in the road again. So we head over there again, move the stupid couch and go over and talk to the guy. He starts in with tellin’ us that he has to leave for work early in the morning and that couch better not be blockin’ his way, blah, blah, blah. And I’m thinkin’, I didn’t say this, I was just thinking, “Listen buddy. I’m not standing guard over a couch. I don’t do couch security. I moved the couch; that’s the best I can do.”

As this incident suggests, despite their solicitous, accommodating service to wealthier residents, Coretown officers felt that at least some of these residents were never satisfied or appreciative.

While Coretown officers saw it as being increasingly difficult to please and satisfy the expectations of the newer residents disproportionately moving into the northern part of Coretown, they felt most threatened by what they perceived as these newer residents’ seemingly lukewarm and increasingly tenuous support. Officers, particularly the more veteran officers, lamented how Coretown’s residents used to unconditionally and unquestioningly support the police, but now things were changing. In particular, officers drew comparisons between Coretown and neighboring Kingston. The officers indicated that Coretown used to be like Kingston, where the people are “blue-collar” and still reflexively support their police.

Coretown officers identified a slipping of residents’ support both in non-material and material terms. Although officers maintained that residents still generally supported
them, officers nevertheless indicated that residents, especially the newer northern
residents, were increasingly challenging the officers’ word and authority. In particular,
as noted in Chapter 5, officers posited that residents were most likely to challenge the
officers’ authority when the officers accused these residents’ children of wrongdoing.
Officers pointed out that in the past, virtually all residents treated the officers’ words and
actions as “the gospel”—residents would not question or challenge the officers, even
when they implicated these residents’ children in wrongdoing.

Coretown officers also indicated that residents were increasingly challenging
officers’ authority with respect to seemingly minor things. For instance, a White male
Coretown officer became unnerved when several residents argued with him after he
asked them to move their illegally parked vehicles at a Halloween parade by an
elementary school in Post 1. In particular, this officer resented the comment of a White
male resident, who sarcastically quipped, “What are you guys getting paid by
commission to issue parking tickets”, as he moved his vehicle that was blocking a fire
hydrant. In later reflecting on this seemingly trivial incident, this officer stated:

It’s different here now than when I was growing up. Back then, a cop asked you
to jump, you jumped. There was no discussion, no, “Let’s talk about this”. No,
no, no. But now you get this, this smartass whining. I’m not sayin’ all the time,
but it’s there. It just gets aggravating. You know, just shut up and move your
damn car.

For this officer, as well as other Coretown officers, residents’ challenging of the officers’
authority, even for seemingly trivial things, symbolically indicated that residents’ support
was no longer absolute and unconditional.

While Coretown officers fretted to some extent over what they perceived as a
slight erosion of their authority in town, the officers were most upset about what they
perceived as a decline in residents’ material support of them. Officers noted that in the past the Coretown Police Department “basically got whatever [it] wanted” in its budget request. Now officers indicated that members of the Town Council, as well as some vocal residents, questioned each and every specific budget request. For example, a White male Coretown officer stated:

In the past, whatever budget the chief submitted, it slid through like butter. But now, the [town council], they’re always tryin’ to nickel and dime us. Questioning why we need new vests, new computers. They expect us to be at their beckon call, but they don’t wanna pay for it. Some of them are cheap asses.

While Coretown officers perceived a decline in material support based on battles over the annual budget, officers foremost perceived such decline based on their stalled, ongoing contract negotiations with the town council. At the time of the ride-alongs in 2006, Coretown officers had been working without a contract for well over a year, and officers saw this as the most significant sign that residents no longer supported them unconditionally. In discussing their difficulties in securing a new contract, most officers compared their situation with the officers in neighboring Kingston. These officers noted that the Kingston officers had just received a raise and had a “great contract” with “great benefits”. For instance, a White male Coretown officer stated:

Over in [Kingston], they always get what they want. They love the cops there. They just a four and a half percent raise…. They support [the police] unconditionally. Whatever they want, they get…. [The Kingston police] are like one with the people there.

In explaining why they were having difficulty in securing a new contract without reductions in benefits or salary, officers focused on the influence that newer, wealthier residents exerted over the Town Council. Officers indicated that a majority of those on the Town Council were newer, wealthier residents from the northern half of Coretown,
and argued that northern “professionals” had “more clout with the town council” than southern “blue-collar” residents. Officers explained that this disparity was significant because the southern “blue collar” residents supported the officers more than the northern “professional” residents. As alluded to earlier in this chapter, part of this perceived support was linked to a sense of kinship or affinity stemming from the fact that many Coretown officers had grown up in the southern part of Coretown or currently lived there.

More generally, officers tied what they perceived as a decline in residents’ material support of the officers to a change in the town’s overall class composition. Officers noted that as the town had moved from a predominantly working-class or “blue-collar” town to a more upper-middle-class or “white-collar” town, residents’ support of officers, which previously had been enthusiastic and unconditional, had waned. Officers attributed this waning of support to a change in their status and role vis-à-vis residents. As a White male Coretown officer explained, when Coretown was a mostly “blue-collar” town, police officers occupied the same status as residents, and as a result were more like equal “comrades”. However, he indicated that as the town became increasingly “white-collar”, officers were below many of the residents in status, and effectively had become these residents’ “servants”. This fourteen-year veteran officer stated:

Oh god, things have changed a lot since I’ve been here. Before the people in town and the cops, we were like comrades, you know, no difference, everybody the same. We were all blue-collar. All brothers. But it’s different now, now that’s more white-collar. Now, we’re more like servants to the rich. They don’t see us as brothers. No, instead we’re seen as the hired help. You know, no different than the guys they hire to mow their lawns and clean the drains.

Notwithstanding their perceptions of eroding support, Coretown officers still felt relatively connected to the town, and believed that residents were generally supportive of
them. For instance, while driving along a relatively secluded residential neighborhood on the eastern side of Northrup Park adjacent to a river and a walking path, a twenty-four year veteran White male officer indicated that the residents of this area regularly expressed their gratitude to him for patrolling there. This officer stated:

They really appreciate us coming back here. You’ve got people walking back here, it’s kinda secluded. They always thank us for riding through, checking things out….

Most Coretown officers’ continuing, relatively strong, perceived connection to Coretown and its residents appeared to be especially bolstered by their sense that they and Coretown’s residents were united in their concern about the encroachment of racial minority “outsiders”. As discussed in Chapter 6, Coretown officers were especially worried about encroachment of “Black” and “Hispanic” outsiders, whom they saw as being responsible for a disproportionately amount of the crime, particularly more serious crime such as burglaries. In short, officers, particularly the more veteran officers who were from the town and still lived in the town, felt united with Coretown’s residents because they shared a common enemy.

Officers’ fear of this outside racial threat was magnified by what they saw as happening in nearby towns. For instance, some officers were concerned that Coretown might become like neighboring Radnor, which officers suggested had declined dramatically after the population shifted from mostly “White” to mostly “Black”. Likewise, while on patrol at AHS, a White male officer who had grown up in Sandy Peak mentioned how Sandy Peak, a predominantly “White” town located two towns over to the west of Coretown, was being “infiltrated” by people from predominantly “Black”
Piedmont who were illegally staying with relatives in order to go to school in Sandy Peak.

These accounts of racial threat from nearby towns, coupled with Coretown officers’ seemingly aggressive patrolling of Blacks and Hispanics whom they perceived as non-residents at places like OCC and AHS, suggest that the officers’ perceived threat of racial minority outsiders outweighed and eclipsed the officers’ perceived threat of reduced support from newer northern residents. In particular, this racial outsider threat appeared to be most salient for Coretown officers who had grown up and lived in Coretown. While all Coretown officers seemed to aggressively patrol non-resident Blacks and Hispanics, those officers who were from Coretown appeared to go about such patrolling with more passion and zeal. For these latter officers, these “outsiders” were threatening “their” town and “their way of life”. A White male Coretown officer who had grown up in Coretown captured this sense of personal threat when he stated:

This is not like the inner-city. We don’t have gangs and shootouts and crackhouses. This is a nice, quiet family town. The kind of place where you’d wanna raise your children. You don’t want that kinda [inner-city] stuff here…. This is my town too. I don’t want anybody coming in and messin’ up my town. If they wanna do that kinda stuff, take it over to [Elmwood]…. [emphasis added]

As in Coretown, perceptions of change, threat, and support played an important role in shaping the majority of Longwood officers’ perceived connections to their town of employ. Like Coretown officers who had grown up in their town of employ and who identified as “White” or “Asian”, Longwood officers who had grown up in their town of employ and who identified as “White” or “Asian” generally appeared to feel a stronger connection to their town of employ and its dominant constituency group based on a sense
of shared threat involving certain racial minority groups. As documented in Chapter 6, in Coretown, that shared threat was “Black” and “Hispanic” non-resident visitors, while in Longwood, that shared threat was Longwood’s indigenous “Black” population in Longwood’s District 4. While perceptions of change factored heavily in both town’s officers’ perceived bonds to their towns of employ and these towns’ dominant constituency groups, the most salient of these perceptions of change weakened these Coretown officers’ perceived bonds and strengthened those of these Longwood officers. Unlike these Coretown officers, these Longwood officers did not perceive an erosion of support from the dominant constituency group in town. Quite to the contrary, these Longwood officers felt fully supported and buoyed by the dominant White constituency group. Moreover, unlike “White” and “Asian” Coretown officers’ concerns about the intrusion of racial minorities who might alter the character of the town, “White” and “Asian” Longwood officers’ concerns were based on what they saw as a more immediate, less hypothetical threat from a racial minority group that they perceived as having already changed the character of parts of the town.

While the majority of Coretown officers’ perceived threat of change resulting from the intrusion of certain racial minorities was based on what they perceived as having happened in other nearby towns such as Radnor and Sandy Peak, the majority of Longwood officers’ perceived threat of change from racial minorities, particularly Blacks, was based on what they perceived as already having happened or starting to happen within their town of employ, as well as what they perceived as having happened in other nearby towns.
In general, Longwood’s majority of White officers (fifteen out of the sample of eighteen) implied that Longwood had declined over the years as the presence of racial minorities, especially Blacks, and to a somewhat lesser extent Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, had grown. For instance, a White male Longwood officer who had grown up in a section of District 8 that he had described as having changed from predominantly “White” to a mix of White and Hispanic, particularly Puerto Rican and Dominican, stated that the “good people [we]re moving out” and the “bad people [we]re moving in”. Similarly, a thirty-nine year old officer who had spent his entire life in Longwood until recently moving to a nearby, predominantly White suburb, stated:

This used to be a great place to live, but it’s not the same. The schools have gone downhill, crime is going up, it’s just not the same…. It’s been sliding in the wrong direction for a while now. There’s just too many shittums.

Given that this officer, as well as several other White male Longwood officers used the term “shittums” to derogatorily refer to younger Black males, this officer was attributing Longwood’s decline to an increase in Longwood’s Black population.

These Longwood officers’ concerns about the encroachment of racial minorities, particularly Blacks, and to a lesser extent Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, were based in large part on what they saw or heard as having happened in Longwood. In expressing their concern about “Black” encroachment, several White male Longwood officers indicated how they had learned from their parents and other relatives how the commercial and residential section of Sylvester Avenue along the northern border of District 4 had been a “nice Jewish area” with “thriving businesses” up until the early 1960s, but that the area had declined rapidly after Blacks starting moving into the area in large numbers at that time. For instance, a White male Longwood officer stated:
The target area wasn’t always the target area. My parents told me that back in the fifties you had a lotta Jewish money over there. Lotta businesses, it was clean, no problems. It’s hard to imagine now. But then the Blacks started comin’ in in the sixties and the Jews started leaving, going out to [Orion] and [Salinas], places like that. But it got rundown real fast…. It’s not at all like it used to be…. 

Other White Longwood officers lamented how the formerly “White” western and southern parts of District 8 in the southern part of Longwood had changed over the past decades due to the influx of racial minorities, particularly Puerto Ricans and Dominicans. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 5, a White male Longwood officer who had formerly lived in District 8 indicated that the properties in his former neighborhood had become “rundown” after Puerto Ricans and Dominicans started moving into the neighborhood. This officer, as well as other White officers, also attributed the spread of graffiti and an increase in petty crimes to this influx of racial minorities.

Besides expressing concern about the change that they saw as already having taken place in Longwood as a result of the encroachment of Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans, the majority of Longwood also voiced concern about change that they saw as currently happening, particularly in the remaining “nice” “White” areas such as “Bright Acres” in District 1. For instance, as noted in Chapter 5, a White male Longwood officer’s comment about a person in “Bright Acres” waking up and finding out that “Ghettofabulous” had moved next door, implies that he saw racial minorities, particularly Blacks, as creeping into the “White” domain of “Bright Acres”. Another White male Longwood officer, with a sense of incredulity, described his reaction when he had realized that the small, self-contained McDonald apartment complex in “Bright Acres” had gone from being “all-White” to practically “all-Black”. This officer stated:

It’s like you have the ghetto right in the middle of [Bright Acres]…. It used to be
all older Jews living there. And then, like overnight, it was like almost all Black. You know it was like, “When did this happen? How did this happen?”… We never used to get any calls over there, but now we get some….

As this officer’s comments suggest, White Longwood officers’ were concerned that “Black” encroachment into “White” areas could happen “overnight”

Like Coretown officers, these Longwood officers also based their fears of “Black” encroachment on what they viewed as having happened in other nearby towns. In particular, virtually all of these officers mentioned how the bordering town of Radnor had gone from being predominantly “White” to predominantly “Black” in a relatively short period of time. In discussing this social group shift, officers always concomitantly mentioned that they saw the conditions in Radnor as having deteriorated. For instance, a White male Longwood officer made the following comments about Radnor:

At first it started out slowly. You know, just a few of the Whites left and most of the Blacks just lived in this one area in town. But then they started sending kids to [regional] schools around town, and people didn’t like that. Some more Whites left, then more Blacks starting movin’ in all over the place, and before you knew it most of the Whites were gone…. Things have really gone downhill there…. Trust me, you wouldn’t wanna send your kid to school there….

In sum, based on their racially-tinged perceptions of decline in Longwood and elsewhere, Longwood’s majority of White officers appeared to be very worried about the possibility of further “Black” encroachment in Longwood.

White Longwood officers not only perceived a threat of “Black” encroachment, but perceived that they shared this threat perception with the town’s White majority and power structure. In part based on this perceived shared threat, these officers felt a strong sense of kinship with the town’s White majority. Most of these officers grew up and still lived in the town’s remaining two “White” districts (1 and 2), and like White male
Coretown officers’ apparent attachment to southern Coretown, felt a strong sense of connection to place. These Longwood officers perceived themselves as not simply patrolling a town, but as patrolling their home turf.

Given this apparent affinity with the White residents of Districts 1 and 2 in Longwood, this White majority of Longwood officers felt highly supported by the residents. In contrast to Coretown officers, these White Longwood officers felt that their interests and the interests of the White majority were in sync. These Longwood officers not only shared the same racial identity with these residents, but also shared the same perceived class identity as well as a similar connection to place. As a result of this sense of shared identity, these Longwood officers felt that the White majority’s support of them was unconditional and unwavering.

The majority of Longwood officers’ perception of White majority residents’ unconditional, unwavering support was reflected in these officers’ seeming lack of concern about accusations of racial profiling. Unlike Coretown and Middleboro officers, who, as noted in Chapter 6, expressed concerns about people accusing them of engaging in racial profiling, Longwood officers never voiced any apparent worries that their actions, particularly with respect to the patrolling of Black residents from District 4, might be viewed as racial profiling. Indeed, several officers expressly stated that the majority of White residents living in Districts 1 and 2 wanted officers to aggressively contain District 4’s Black residents. For instance, a White male Longwood officer stated:

The people over [in District 2], they don’t want that shit [from District 4] over there. They want us to keep it over there. They’re like, “Better over there than here”…. They don’t want the target area over this way.
While perceptions of change played a significant role in shaping officers’ perceived connections to their towns of employ in both Coretown and Longwood, perceptions of change played a relatively minor role in shaping such perceived connection in Middleboro. Similar to Coretown officers, Middleboro officers indicated that officers, especially newer officers, were being “priced out of town” due to rising home prices and property taxes. For instance, a White male Middleboro officer who had been with the Middleboro Police Department for eight years remarked:

The middle class is disappearing in [Middleboro]. You’ve got mostly rich and poor left. If you’re just starting up with the [Middleboro Police] Department, you’re probably not gonna be able to buy a house here.

Although both Middleboro and Coretown officers perceived the costs associated with housing as increasing beyond the reach of newer officers, Middleboro officers, unlike Coretown officers, indicated that this had occurred some time ago. Thus, this perception of change related to housing appeared to have a greater potential effect of weakening Coretown officers’ connection to their town of employ.

As in the other two towns, Middleboro officers’ perceived connection to the town in which they patrolled was also shaped by their perceptions of both threat and support. Like both Coretown and Longwood officers, Middleboro officers perceived some racial minorities as posing a threat. In particular, similar to Coretown officers, Middleboro officers saw non-resident racial minorities, specifically Blacks, as threatening. However, Middleboro officers, unlike a majority of their Coretown and Longwood counterparts, did not appear to view this threat as a personal threat to “their” town. In other words, unlike Coretown and Longwood officers, Middleboro officers did not appear to have a personal stake in combating the encroachment of “threatening” racial minorities (non-resident
Blacks and Hispanics in the case of Coretown, and resident Blacks in the case of Longwood. In contrast to Coretown and Longwood officers, Middleboro officers did not appear to be worried about these racial minorities coming into the town and changing the character of the town; rather, they appeared to be solely worried about how these racial minorities make their job in combating crime and maintaining order more difficult.

Middleboro officers did, however, like their Coretown counterparts, appear to feel personally threatened by the dominant constituency group in their town of employ. Although both Middleboro and Coretown officers expressed concerns regarding their relationship vis-à-vis the dominant constituency group in their town of employ, Middleboro officers’ concerns were more extensive. As noted in Chapter 4, Middleboro officers, unlike officers in either Coretown or Longwood, perceived members of the dominant constituency group in their town of employ as being highly critical of their policing. In particular, Middleboro officers perceived members of Middleboro’s powerful Black/White coalition as being critical of the officers’ policing for violating or trampling on residents’ civil rights/ liberties or otherwise being too excessive (e.g., high-speed car chases through residential neighborhoods). Officers claimed that residents’ civil liberties-based complaints were unfair, and contended that residents judged officers’ actions without having all of the facts. For example, in describing residents’ barrage of criticism on Middleboro.net following the incident described in Chapter 4 involving the Black boy with the painted gun who was struck by a police car, a Latina Middleboro officer stated:

Everybody had something to say, everybody was ready to jump the gun, but they didn’t have the whole picture…. I hate that Monday morning quarterbacking. If you weren’t there, then how do you know what was goin’ on? You know if you
just read the stuff on [Middleboro.net] you’d think we went in and attacked these kids. It wasn’t like that at all….  

In addition to viewing residents of their town of employ as being primed to criticize them for civil liberties-related deprivations, Middleboro officers, unlike officers in Coretown and Longwood, saw these residents as being hypercritical of the officers’ practices with respect to what the officers described as “little things”. For instance, one White male Middleboro officer noted that a resident complained to the officer’s superiors about the officer “scraping a curb” with his patrol car, while another White male Middleboro officer indicated that a resident complained to his superiors about the officer’s request of that resident to walk on the other side of the road near a construction site.  

While they differed in terms of their perceptions of residents’ criticisms of their policing, both Middleboro and Coretown officers’ shared a perception of the residents of their respective towns of employ as being overly demanding and fastidious. Middleboro officers frequently complained that residents, particularly in the central and northern parts of Middleboro, expected the officers to handle either trivial problems, such as finding a lost dog, or problems that went beyond the scope of the officers’ duties, such as getting the electricity up and running again after a power outage during a storm. Middleboro officers expressed resentment over what they described as residents’ “overly high expectations” and “sense of entitlement”. In describing his sense of exasperation in dealing with residents’ overly high expectations of service, a White male Middleboro officer stated:

You know we’re only human. We put our pants on one leg at a time, just like everybody else…. You can’t expect us to part the sea. We’re not miracle
workers.

Middleboro officers also saw residents as being very difficult to please. In particular, officers indicated that residents “expect[ed] perfection”. For instance, a White male Middleboro officer explained how numerous residents criticized him for mistakenly arresting a male resident who fit the description of a man wanted for a robbery at Lakeview Plaza. This officer stated:

[The residents] “don’t tolerate mistakes”; one slip up and they’re on you like flies on shit. Even if it’s an innocent mistake, they don’t care….

Similarly, an Asian male Middleboro officer indicated that officers had “no room for error”. On one occasion after running a red light, this officer remarked:

Uh oh, hopefully someone’s not gonna call that one in. You know, they’ll say something like I almost ran over a lady with a baby in the street…. [The residents] are always trying to find some way to make life difficult for us…. It’s like they’re always looking for something to pounce on, you know, “Like watch your step or I’ll sue you.”

As this officer’s comments imply, Middleboro officers appeared to always be wary of residents looking over their shoulders. Unlike both Coretown and Longwood officers, Middleboro officers acted as if residents were constantly watching them and waiting for them to “slip up”.

In addition to their perceptions of residents as being hypercritical, overly demanding, and fastidious, Middleboro officers saw residents as being unsupportive of the officers. In particular, Middleboro officers, like Coretown officers, saw their town’s most powerful residents as personally threatening the officers in a material sense by not supporting the Middleboro Police Department’s budgetary requests. For example, officers pointed out that Middleboro’s Chief of Police had requested eleven new officers
for the new fiscal year, but that the town council only approved one. In addition, officers noted with a high degree of resentment, that the town council had approved funding for the building of a new multimillion dollar firehouse for Middleboro’s fire department, but had repeatedly turned down the police department’s request for a new stationhouse, notwithstanding the decrepit conditions of the current one. For instance, a White male Middleboro officer stated:

> I thought the new town manager was pro-cop, but we still got shafted with the budget. We need more officers, equipment, a new headquarters, but what did they do? They built a new multimillion dollar fire department headquarters with all kinds of state of the art equipment, while we’re stuck in the same shithole with asbestos all over the place. You saw that hole in the ceiling when you walked in the place—we have to make do with duck tape and a leaking ceiling, and [the fire department] has got its fancy new palace. They respond to what, like three major fires a year and some little kitchen stove fires? While we’re out here dealing with shit everyday….

Similarly another White male Middleboro officer stated:

> Some of the people on the town council just hate us. As far as they’re concerned we can never do right. They won’t give us an extra penny. Pretty soon we’ll have to start payin’ for our own gas. But the fire department, they get whatever they want. “You need a new station? No problem. You need a new truck. No problem.” But us, forget about it.

Besides expressing resentment at what they perceived as a lack of official support from the members of Middleboro’s town council as well as other public officials, Middleboro officers also voiced resentment over residents’ lack of “unofficial” material support. In particular, officers indignantly mentioned how residents displayed their gratitude to the fire department by showering them with expensive gifts, but had never demonstrated similar gratitude to the police department. For instance, a White male Middleboro officer stated:
Middleboro residents just love the fire department. Everybody loves heroes. After the fire department moved into its new headquarters, a bunch of residents got together and chipped in and bought ‘em a sixty-five inch big screen TV and a pool table…. And they bring them home-cooked dinners. We’re lucky if we get some leftover pizzas.

Middleboro officers attributed this apparent lack of official and unofficial support to Middleboro’s “liberal” residents’ “anti-police bias”. As one White male Middleboro officer put it, officers believed that the “residents view[ed] [them] as a necessary evil”.

Accordingly, officers felt that it was virtually impossible for their situation in Middleboro to improve. For instance, one officer half-jokingly stated:

You could take a bullet and save somebody’s life and it still wouldn’t make a difference. You’re still just a hired gun to [the residents]. Somebody to do their dirty work. That’s all.

While Coretown officers felt that their support was eroding, Middleboro officers felt that they had never had such support and never would.

7.6. Conclusion

Patrol officers’ perceptions of themselves in relation to the various resident and non-resident groups that they encountered in their towns of employ constituted a key component of the social group schemata or maps that these officers constructed and used to navigate the social landscapes of their towns of employ. How officers thought and went about patrolling was not only affected by their understandings of the relationships of various resident and non-resident groups to each other, but was also simultaneously affected by how they saw themselves as situated in relation to all of these groups.

Officers’ perceptions of themselves in relation to these various groups was based on the complex interaction of their experiences outside of the context policing and their experiences as an officer in their towns of employ. In contributing to officers’
construction of social group maps of their towns of employ, the information from these various experiences both within and outside the context of policing led to various patrolling practices skewed in terms of race, class, and gender, which in turn, contributed to the reconstitution of officers’ social group schemata.

Of officers’ experiences outside of the context of policing within their town of employ, officers’ prior and current residential experiences were particularly significant in constituting officers’ perceived relations to various groups within their town. Officers who had grown up in and resided in their towns of employ had much stronger overall connections to their towns as well as to specific groups within the towns. Such residential experiences within their towns of employ not only made these officers more familiar with the residents of these towns, but also promoted a sense of kinship, empathy, and shared purpose with at least some of these towns’ residents. Both Coretown and Middleboro officers who had grown up in their respective towns of employ were more likely than non-resident officers to engage in community outreach policing and informal and formal mentoring of residents. Also, as discussed below, Longwood officers who had grown up in Longwood were more likely than non-resident officers to perceive a sense of shared threat and fear of change with residents. Although officers’ seeming kinship with blocs of residents in each town was expressed differently depending on the dynamics of the particular town—e.g., community outreach and mentoring in Coretown, and protection of neighborhoods in Longwood—, officers’ sense of kinship appeared to be strongly affected by past residential experiences in their respective towns of employ.

In addition to officers’ past experiences tied to residence, officers’ experiences with respect to their various perceived social identities, particularly race, class, and
gender, also played a major role in constructing their sense of perceived familiarity and kinship. Experiences tied to these social identities, coupled with officers’ residential experiences, led to a selective sense of kinship, as officers perceived bonds with those whom they saw as being similar to themselves in terms of race, class, gender, and geography. Although White Coretown officers who had grown up in Coretown expressed a general sense of kinship to all of Coretown’s residents through community outreach efforts, these officers highly selective mentoring practices suggest that they had a particularly strong sense of kinship with White, working-class male youths and young adults from southern Coretown. These officers’ own experiences as White, working-class males growing up in southern Coretown resulted in an apparently strong sense of affinity with these particular young White males. Likewise, Black Middleboro officers’ selective mentoring of poor and working-class Black males from the southeastern part of Middleboro reflected these officers’ sense of affinity based on race, class, gender, and place of residence. In short, officers’ perceived social locations affected their perceptions of similarity and kinship with members of certain social groups with whom they identified within their towns of employ.

Officers’ past experiences tied to their perceived social identities also contributed to their sense of kinship or lack thereof with residents in their towns of employ through the narratives that officers constructed based on these experiences. White Longwood officers constructed narratives referencing an ideal White, middle-class family based on their experiences growing up in relatively isolated, segregated neighborhoods in the town’s “White” Districts 1, 2, and 8 in Longwood, whereas Black Longwood officers constructed narratives contrasting a functional Black middle-class family with a
dysfunctional poor Black family based on their divergent paths taken by themselves and other family members. These narratives conditioned these officers’ social group schemata, and in turn, affected how they perceived and responded to seemingly wayward youths.

Officers’ bonds to their towns of employ and certain segments of the population within those towns also were shaped by experiences in the context of policing with both residents and non-residents. While some factors, such as officers’ perceived support or lack thereof from residents appeared to have a similar effect on officers, other factors, such as perceived threat from non-residents or residents, did not. Officers in both Coretown and Middleboro generally appeared to be disconcerted about the level of residents’ support of the police in their respective towns, whereas officers in Longwood generally appeared to express satisfaction with residents’ support. Officers’ similar view of perceived support or lack thereof from residents in their town of employ is likely because all officers, regardless of race, class, gender, or residential status, are affected by such support or lack thereof in a similar way (e.g., all officers working without a contract in Coretown).

In contrast, officers’ perceptions of threat associated with certain groups did not appear to carry the same weight for all officers within a given town. For instance, while all Coretown officers appeared to aggressively patrol Black and Hispanic outsiders at or near OCC and AHS, non-resident officers, unlike officers who had grown up and resided in Coretown, did not appear to be motivated by a sense of personal threat. It appeared that White Coretown officers who had grown up and lived in Coretown had more of a stake than non-resident officers in keeping out unwanted racial minority visitors.
Similarly, although all Longwood officers participated in the “herding” of Black LHS students out of “White” District 2 following dismissal from LHS, White and Asian officers appeared more worried than Black officers about change resulting from the encroachment of Blacks, and to a lesser extent, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans. These non-resident Black Longwood officers, like non-resident Coretown officers, appeared to be less connected to their place of employ, and therefore had less of a personal stake in keeping certain groups out of certain spaces.

Officers’ perceptions of threat relating specifically to non-residents also affected officers’ perceived bonds to residents in different ways depending on the nature of officers’ preexisting bonds with residents. In the case of Coretown, the majority of officers’ fear of Black and Hispanic non-resident visitors strengthened their preexisting solidarity with residents due to the officers’ perceptions of shared racial identity and residential status. White Coretown officers who had grown up and lived in Coretown felt that they and the majority of White residents had a shared stake or interest in keeping undesirable Black and Hispanic non-residents out of Coretown. In the case of Middleboro, although officers and residents alike appeared to share an interest in keeping out Black non-residents along the southern border of Middleboro, such shared interest did not reinforce their bonds with residents, because unlike the majority of Coretown officers, the majority of Middleboro officers had weak bonds with which to begin. The majority of Middleboro officers not only had not grown up or lived in Middleboro, but also saw themselves as different from the majority of Middleboro residents in terms of class and political worldview. Moreover, whereas Coretown officers generally saw the majority of Coretown residents as supporting them notwithstanding difficulties in
securing a contract and getting budgets passed, the majority of Middleboro officers saw the majority of Middleboro residents as being highly critical and unsupportive of them. Consequently, although officers in both towns appeared to see certain racial minority non-residents as threatening, the effect of such threat on officers’ perceived solidarity with residents was conditioned by other factors.

While some factors pertaining to officers’ relations to groups in their towns of employ, such as perceived support from residents, are consistent with the idea that officers’ perceptions are conditioned by the local contexts of their towns of employ, a number of the findings presented in this chapter suggest that individual-level variables, such as an officer’s residence status, race, class, gender, sometimes take precedence over environmental ones. For instance, although all Middleboro officers patrolled the Mainline commercial district and the southern borders in a relatively similar fashion, residents officers disproportionately engaged in community outreach policing and only Black Middleboro officers engaged mentoring-type behaviors with youths. Moreover, the findings in this chapter also suggest that individual-level variables can trump organizational ones. Although there was an organizational mandate to perform community outreach policing in both Coretown and Middleboro respectively, the majority of such policing was performed by officers who had grown up and lived in those respective towns. Thus, while various structural features of the towns’ respective local contexts appear, as documented in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, to have affected officers in similar ways irrespective of the officers’ individual characteristics, the officers’ personal experiences relating to particular individual characteristics such as racial identity or residential status sometimes play a greater conditioning role.
CHAPTER 7 ENDNOTES

1 “TP” is short for toilet paper.

2 While Longwood officers also engaged in virtually no community outreach-type policing in the southern, disproportionately Hispanic part of Longwood, they did not see such neglect as either hurting or helping their relations with these residents.

3 As noted below, all of the officers engaging in such mentoring were male.

4 The youths were typically between 13 and 18 years old.

5 There were no observed interactions between White Coretown officers and Hispanic Coretown youths on the streets during the course of the ride-alongs.

6 As noted below, Coretown officers’ interactions with White Southern Coretown youth generally were substantively different from those with Northern Coretown youth.

7 Although White Coretown officers generally were cold and indifferent in their interactions with Black and Asian youths in comparison to their interactions with White Coretown youths, their interactions with Black and Asian Coretown youths were far more cordial than the officers’ interactions with Black, Hispanic, and Asian non-Coretown youths.

8 While half of officers’ mentoring-related encounters with southern Coretown youth took place in the southern portion of Coretown, approximately one-quarter took place in the town’s commercial district separating the southern and northern portions of town, and another one-quarter took place in the northern portion of town, especially in the neighborhoods in close proximity to Coretown High School.

9 While Coretown officers had a sympathetic view towards single-parent families, Longwood officers appeared to harshly condemn them. This discrepancy seems to reflect both race and officers’ assumptions regarding the cause of such families. While Coretown officers viewed these families as “White” families that were the products of divorce or legal separation, Longwood officers saw such families as “Black” families that had formed as a result of out-of-wedlock births.

10 Outside of DARE, Longwood offered no formal youth programs.

11 However, there were also a few officers in Longwood and Middleboro who were also involved in non-police-affiliated recreation programs within their respective towns of employment.

12 Of the remaining six Police Explorers members, four were White males from Northern Coretown, and two were White females from southern Coretown.

13 While most of the informal exchanges between Coretown officers and Coretown youths appeared to be motivated by the officers’ genuine concern for the youths, some officers nevertheless appeared to have ulterior motives in stopping and engaging Coretown youths on the street. While, as noted above, officers’ use of such stops for purpose of recruiting largely White southern male Coretown youths into Coretown’s Police Explorers program was consonant with the officers’ desire to mentor such youths, officers also used such stops for crime-solving and crime-prevention purposes. In roughly half of these informal officer-youth exchanges, officers sought out information about minor crimes or acts of delinquency that had occurred, or information pertaining to minor possible future acts, such as underage drinking or illicit drug sales. For instance, a White male Coretown officer asked a 16 year-old White male Coretown youth (“Jimmy”) about a string of acts of vandalism:

    Officer: Hey Jimmy. How ya doin’?
    Jimmy: Okay, alright.
    Officer: What you been up to? [Jokingly] You haven’t been riding [a skateboard] at St. [Mark’s] now, have you?


Jimmy: [Sheepishly] Naw. I’ve just been…

Officer: [Laughs] Okay. Listen Jimmy, have you heard anything about these guys who’ve been going around smashing windows, you know, with the pumpkins?

Jimmy: You mean over on [Pine Street]?

Officer: Yeah, yeah. And a few other places. They’ve been doin’ drive-bys at night.

Jimmy: Yeah, I heard about it, but I don’t know…It’s probably [someone] from [Raymond Heights].

Officer: Okay. Well if you hear anything, let me know…. And tell you mom I said, “Hello”.

14 Although the lone “Asian” officer officially identified himself as “Asian”, he also noted that he was of mixed racial heritage. More specifically, this officer mentioned that his mother was Asian (Chinese ethnicity) and that his father was White (Irish ethnicity). He also noted that he grew up in a “White” neighborhood and identified with the people from that neighborhood.

15 The two Black Longwood officers did not attempt to informally mentor any youths or young adults. These Black officers’ did not reach out to non-Black youths and young adults in part because they, like the White and Asian Longwood officers below, were focused on dealing with Black youth from District 4. However, these Black officers’ lack of mentoring of non-Black youths also appears to be in part due to their lack of affinity with such youths. These officers not only did not share perceived common experiences based on race with these non-Black youths, but also had grown up and lived in other towns. These Black Longwood officers’ lack of mentoring of Black Longwood youths and young adults is discussed later in this section.

16 These officers also did not appear to notice Hispanic and Asian youths and young adults. Given that Longwood officers generally appeared to distinguish Blacks from Hispanics and Asians, it is likely that the officers’ disproportionate focus on “Black” dysfunction effectively eclipsed “Hispanic” or “Asian” dysfunction as well as “White” dysfunction. Officers’ apparent failure to notice Hispanics and Asians also possibly could be due to the officers’ general view of Hispanics and Asians as being “model minorities” to some extent. As discussed in Chapter 5, Longwood officers in particular saw non-Black racial and ethnic minority families as providing sufficient informal social control (e.g., the Portuguese mother with a limp arm who “whacked” her 16 year-old son in front of a Longwood officer). Accordingly, this suggests that Longwood officers employed a variant of the informal social control narrative discussed below to understand the situations of non-Black racial and ethnic minorities.

17 As discussed below, Longwood officers also often invoked a “neglect” narrative that referenced a negative “Black” family ideal type. This “Black” family ideal type was virtually the polar opposite of officers’ positive “White” family ideal type. Longwood officers’ use of such starkly contrasting “White” and “Black” family ideal types appears to reflect these officers’ overarching view of the world in Black/White terms. While some Coretown and Middleboro officers also referenced some variants of both of these ideal types, they neither figured as prominently in these officers’ understandings of their respective constituents, nor reflected as stark a contrast as those referenced by Longwood officers.

18 My argument here is not that White and Asian officers necessarily outwardly conveyed these narratives when they encountered a particular White youth or young adult, but rather that their seeming general disregard of White youths and young adults was guided by these narratives.

19 This officers’ repeated assertion that notwithstanding the two boys’ “wild”, “rowdy”, and “delinquent” tendencies, they were nevertheless still “good kids”, is consistent with Ferguson’s (2000) description of “good bad boys” who are entitled to be somewhat naughty without such behavior having any stigmatic effects. See Ferguson, Ann Arnett. 2000. *Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

20 One might argue that the discrepancy between Longwood and Coretown officers in terms of mentoring efforts was also due in part to the two towns’ respective crime rates. Given that Longwood’s violent and property crime rates were more than three times those of Coretown’s according to the 2006 Uniform Crime Reports, it is possible that Longwood officers were simply much busier than Coretown officers, and therefore did not have as much time to engage in
proactive mentoring-type behaviors. However, based on ride-along observations, Longwood officers appeared to have approximately the same amount of discretionary time as Coretown officers. The only noticeable difference was in how the officers chose to use that time.

21 This negative Black family ideal type was most commonly triggered by officers’ driving through a poor neighborhood that was disproportionately or exclusively Black in District 4, or by officers’ discussion of incidents involving Blacks, particularly younger Black males, from District 4.

22 Although they described this prototypical Black family as “poor”, White and Asian Longwood officers nevertheless appeared to generalize this “neglect” narrative to most Blacks. This could be due in part to the officers’ relatively isolated, segregated upbringings, which are discussed below. While these officers knew and occasionally mentioned Blacks whose families were “exceptions” to the ideal type referenced in this narrative, these “exceptions” never appeared to find their way into any of the officers’ narratives.

23 By “these people” the officer means Blacks.

24 The melee involved four Longwood officers and a group of approximately twenty 13 and 14 year olds, all of whom were Black males with the exception of one Puerto Rican male. The officer who recounted the story was responding to a complaint from a resident about a fight amongst a group of boys who were walking home from a middle school located along the border of Districts 3 and 4. When the officer, along with a second officer in another patrol car arrived on the scene, the officers told the boys, who were playing fighting in the middle of the street, that they had to get out of the middle of the street and “move along.” The boys ignored the two officers. The officers then walked up to the boys and told them again that they had to get out of the middle of the street and be on their way. At this point a few of the boys began to argue with the officers, basically demanding to know why the police were always harassing them. The officer tagged at the jacket of a 13 year old Black male who was lingering in the middle of the street, and the 13 year old cursed at the officer. The officer cursed back at the 13 year old, who responded by shoving the officer against a fence adjacent to the sidewalk. The other officer came running over and he, along with the officer who had been shoved, tackled the 13 year old. Immediately, several of the other boys who were part of the group began shouting at the officers. The only Hispanic in the group, a 14 year old Puerto Rican boy, came over to the officer and said, “Why’d you gotta do my boy that way.” The officer told the Puerto Rican boy to back off, but instead the Puerto Rican boy came over and punched the officer as several of the other boys cheered him on. Several of the other boys who were present were chanting things like, “He’s my boy” and “Yo, get off of him”. The officer wrestled the Puerto Rican boy to the ground, at which point other boys and two additional officers joined in what became a melee. The officers subsequently arrested several of the boys, including the 13 year old boy involved in the initial physical confrontation, and the 14 year old Puerto Rican male.

25 Although, as discussed in Chapter 5, Longwood officers typically viewed Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics as “non-Black” due in part to their association with the “model” Portuguese, their dispersal throughout the town, their absence in the “Black” sections of town in Districts 4 and 8, and their general lack of interpersonal contact with Blacks, there are several contextual factors here that suggest that this Longwood officer racialized the 14 year-old Latino male as “Black” in this instance. Two contextual factors were the boy’s association with an otherwise all-Black peer group, and his residence in a “Black” neighborhood in District 4. The officer’s use of the term “shittum” to describe the Puerto Rican male also signified that he perceived the boy as being quasi-“Black”, as this was a term that the officers otherwise only used to refer to the young Black males who lived primarily in the northern half of District 4. In addition, the Puerto Rican male’s own behavior during incident helped to bolster the officer’s perception of him as “Black,” including the boy’s coming to the aid of the Black boys accompanying him, and his statement, “Why’d you gotta do my boy that way”, regarding the officers’ grabbing of the 13 year-old Black male during the encounter. Accordingly, this officer’s racialization of the Puerto Rican male as “Black” makes the officer’s description of the 14 year-old Puerto Rican’s post-arrest concerns consistent with the officers’ overall perceptions of “Black” youths as having misplaced priorities.

26 These two Black Longwood officers were from the neighboring towns of Orion and Ringdale respectively.

27 In a mocking tone, one of the White Longwood officers on the scene sarcastically stated to this Black officer, “Your peeps want you.”

28 Officers also resented the price of homes going up in Coretown for a more indirect reason. Coretown officers indicated that as a result of the increase in the price of homes, both parents in most households now had to work. In turn, the fact that both parents had to work led to more work for the officers in two respects. First, officers attributed the rise in daytime burglaries to many homes being unattended during the day. Second, the absence of both parents...
during the day meant that more children were “latch-key” kids, and more likely to get into trouble. In other words, the officers saw a reduction in informal social control.

29 Coretown officers expressly noted that they “tr[ied] to go easy on residents” because they knew that they needed residents’ support in order to secure a new contract.

30 Although Radnor bordered the southeastern corner of Coretown, officers generally did very little patrolling of the Coretown/Radnor border because this area constituted a very small slice of Coretown that was cut off from rest of Coretown by the Expressway. So, even though officers occasionally described Radnor in threatening terms, they were not particularly worried about people from Radnor coming into the rest of Coretown.
CHAPTER 8: Extending and Challenging Research on Social Cognition and Social Threat

While some of the findings presented in Chapter 7 of this dissertation demonstrate some degree of intra-town variation in officers’ social group schemata based individual-level variables such as race and prior and current resident status of the officer, the overall findings documented in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 present compelling evidence of between town variation in officers’ social group schemata. Officers’ social group schemata in Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro are not simply mini-versions of the macrosocietal social group schema, but rather are conditioned by the structural and cultural features of the communal milieu in which officers are embedded. Consistent with Sullivan’s (1989) findings regarding the nexus between cognition and communal values and needs, my findings indicate that officers’ cognition adapts to and is sync with the cognition, values, and mores, needs, and interests of their respective patrolling communities’ resident groups (p. 9). More specifically, the between town variation in officers’ social group schemata documented throughout this dissertation extends, refines, and challenges prior research on schema-based social cognition, police socialization and police subculture, and conflict theory, particularly the theory’s social threat perspective. The findings herein present a more nuanced, complicated picture of race-based cognitive processing and social threat than other work that has examined these phenomena both within and outside of the context of policing.

8.1. Extending and Challenging Research on Social Cognition and Police Subculture

This dissertation’s findings regarding social cognition extend and problematize prior research on cognition and race in the areas of both schema development and
stereotype suppression. Prior research that has examined how people cognitively process information about racial groups has emphasized that people develop schemas through their own social and media-related experiences (see, e.g., Devine 1989; Dovidio and Gaertner 1998; Harris 2007). This research assumes, for the most part, that people learn information pertaining to racial schemas, such as racial group stereotypes, apart from the influence of any specific local, structural contexts. All people are assumed to have similar interactions with, and to be similarly influenced by, the larger social world. Although this research implicitly suggests that all people ultimately internalize the same set of racial stereotypes and end up with generally the same macro-societal racial schema due to exposure to similar messages and images embedded in the larger social structure (Bakanic 2009:129-131), it nevertheless treats the process of schematic development as an atomistic one.

However, this dissertation’s central finding—that officers’ social group schemata are communally conditioned—suggests that the learning of racial (as well as other social group) schemata is a collective process, not an isolated, individual one. Like all social actors, police officers learn and organize information about racial and other social groups into a cognitive schema based on the roles that these actors play and the features of social contexts in which they carry out those roles. The communally specific, collectively constructed schemata that officers exhibited within each of the three respective towns—Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro—were a product of both these officers’ status as police officers and the particular structural and cultural features of the officers’ towns of employ. By virtue of their status as patrol officers, officers have a shared relationship to the same set of structural and cultural constraints or facilitators within the community
they patrol. As a result, officers who work within a given community develop a social
group schema that may differ to some degree from that of other actors occupying
different roles within the community (as these other actors may face different communal
pressures or face the same pressures in a slightly different way), and that will likely differ
somewhat from the social group schema of officers in other towns who face different
structural and cultural constraints and/or facilitators. Moreover, the findings from
Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro suggest that officers are likely to collectively
*share* a social group schema not only because they are exposed to the same communal
structures and conditions, but also because these officers continually interact with each
other and reinforce each other’s knowledge regarding these structures and conditions
(McNamara 2004).

My finding that officers collectively develop a shared, community-specific
schema not only extends and challenges prior individual-based research on schema
development, but also builds upon and challenges assumptions underlying research on
police socialization and police subculture. Much of the research on police socialization
has focused on the group and professional socialization of police officers (McNamara
2004; Stoddard 1968; Van Maanen 1973). Prior research on police socialization has
posited that officers learn and internalize the norms and values of their occupation and
develop occupationally distinct cognitive tendencies through training and exposure to the
demands of police work (Crank 1998; Kenney and McNamara 1999; McNamara
2004:16; Skolnick 1970:133). Moreover, these distinct cognitive tendencies, which
Skolnick (1970) describes as constituting officers’ collectively shared “working
personality” (p. 133), are bolstered by what officers learn from their peers. Previous
research on police socialization has emphasized that officers learn values, behavior patterns, and traditions from their fellow officers, especially experienced officers (McNamara 2004:17). Many researchers argue that as a result of both peer socialization and the isolating nature of police work, officers become part of a closely knit subculture (Bittner 1970; Kirkham 1976, 1984; Mann 1993:135; McNamara 2004:17; Moran 1978; Rokeach et al. 1971; Westley 1970). This police subculture “is protective and supportive of its members while sharing similar attitudes, values, understandings, and views of the world” (McNamara 2004:17).

Although my findings support the idea that officers socialize one another and develop a subculture, my findings differ from prior work on police subculture in two important, interrelated ways. First, whereas prior research such as Bittner (1970) implies that there is a general, seemingly monolithic police subculture that transcends communities, my findings suggest that each town has its own somewhat unique police subculture that is shaped by the town’s structural and cultural context. Even though some aspects of police work (e.g., dealing with dangerous situations and disrespect from civilians) may generate similar cultural responses (e.g., distrust of civilians) by officers across departments (Kirkham 1984), my findings show that the cultural understandings officers develop during the course of their work can differ in fundamental ways notwithstanding the similar aspects of police work. For instance, officers in Middleboro were generally detached from residents, whereas officers in Coretown were generally connected to and friendly with residents, particularly in the southern half of Coretown. These starkly different aspects of police subculture in these two towns reflect the
significantly different communal contexts to which officers in each town were responding.

Second, prior research not only assumes a universal, monolithic police subculture, but also treats this police subculture as a largely insular entity that is clearly separate and detached from civilian culture. In contrast, my findings suggest that each town’s department’s police subculture was porous with respect to various communal influences. For example, officers Longwood generally expressed a sense of solidarity with local elected officials, officers in Middleboro showed a sense of resentment for and hostility toward both local elected officials and powerful residents, and officers in Coretown demonstrated a sense of ambivalence towards local elected officials and powerful, upper-middle-class residents. Rather than being a disconnected entity unto itself, each town’s police subculture was attuned to and shaped by the town’s unique structural and cultural landscape. Thus, my findings suggest that while police in a particular community generally appear to be enmeshed in a subculture with its own norms and values, this subculture will vary from that of the police in another town due to the particular communal influences on that subculture.

Besides extending and challenging prior research on schema development and police socialization and subculture, my findings also add to and complicate prior work on stereotype suppression. Prior research on stereotype suppression, such as Devine (1989), Dovidio and Gaertner (1998), and Harris (2007), suggests that while everyone has internalized and knows stereotypes associated with racial and other social groups (what I have labeled as constitutive parts of a macro-societal social group schema), certain situational factors, such as the clarity of decision-making criteria or the ability to monitor
prejudice, make individuals conscious about such stereotypes. In turn, this awareness of stereotypes, which causes individuals to worry about whether they will be scrutinized and judged as a racist by others, helps both high- and low-prejudiced people alike to suppress such stereotypes and engage in relatively unbiased, stereotype-free decision-making and actions (Devine 1989; Dovidio and Gaertner 1998).

Although my findings do not necessarily invalidate the findings of prior research on stereotype suppression, they do call into question some of the underlying assumptions of prior research and suggest that stereotype suppression is a more complex phenomenon than this research implies. In particular, my findings challenge both the premise that stereotype suppression is largely an individual-based process, as well as the assumption that situational-based factors that make race, racial prejudice, or specific racial stereotypes salient to a social actor are the only and most potent type of stereotype suppressors.

Prior research on social cognition assumes that stereotype suppression, like schema development, is largely an individual, person-centered process. This research presents cognition as being the result of an individual’s one-on-one interaction with stimuli in his or her environment. In contrast, my research presents cognition, including stereotype suppression, as a collective, social process. Officers in concert learn what the particular structural constraints are within their towns of employ and reinforce these constraints in each other. Moreover, while prior research assumes that stereotype suppression is essentially a subconscious process in which the saliency of information about racial prejudice or stereotypes causes an individual to (subconsciously) worry about whether others will perceive him or her as “racist” (Dovidio and Gaertner 1998).
my findings suggest that the structural constraints in certain communities such as Coretown and Middleboro compel officers to consciously think about how their actions will be judged by others with respect to race. For officers, stereotype suppression is akin to mental discipline—officers collectively develop a sense of the social order of the communities in which they patrol and consciously align their patrolling practices with this order. Although officers in Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro expressed varying degrees of prejudice within each town—the extent to which they appeared to believe in stereotypes associated with the macro-societal schema—, these officers learned to tailor their policing to the needs and wishes of the communities they patrolled regardless of whatever individual prejudices they harbored.

In addition to indicating that stereotype suppression can be a collective rather than individual-based process, my findings also suggest that in certain circumstances communal factors beyond those that make racial and other social group stereotypes salient (that force the social actor to think about race and monitor prejudice and stereotypes) are involved in stereotype suppression or the lack thereof and can potentially override the situation-based factors identified by prior research on stereotype suppression. In other words, my findings demonstrate that contextual factors condition whether stereotypes are suppressed when they are salient to officers. In investigating stereotype suppression, and more generally social cognition, prior research such as Devine (1989) and Dovidio and Gaertner (1998) have not paid adequate attention to the particularized, unique, local communal context in which cognitive processing occurs. As a result, this prior research has not fully fleshed out the constraints and enablers of latent, subconscious stereotypes. While it may be generally true that social actors suppress
subconscious stereotypes when these stereotypes become salient, my findings suggest communal structural and cultural constraints or facilitators exert a powerful influence on the expression or suppression of stereotypes. Further research needs to address the interaction between such communal influences and situational factors that make racial and other social group stereotypes salient to officers in order to clarify which factors are most influential on stereotype suppression.

While my findings suggest that officers develop collectively shared, communally conditioned schemata rather than, as prior research implies, all similarly possessing and applying a macro-societal schema, my findings do not suggest that this macro-societal schema and its attendant stereotypes are permanently altered by the communal features of a particular town. Rather, based on the fact that social group schemata are largely products of communal adaptation, we would expect that officers’ schemata would be modified in ways that are either more or less consistent with that of the macro-societal schema if officers were to work in another community. Stereotypes relating to the macro-societal social group schema that are suppressed in one communal context would likely be expressed in another communal context in which there are no apparent communal constraints inhibiting their expression. This was most evidenced by Middleboro officers’ apparent suppression of negative Black stereotypes, and Longwood officers’ expression of such stereotypes.

8.2. Extending and Challenging Research on Conflict Theory

This dissertation’s findings regarding the communal conditioning of officers’ schemata challenge and modify the assumptions of conflict theory, particularly the social threat perspective. In particular, my findings challenge conflict theorists’ assumptions
about how power operates in officers’ patrolling of various social groups, and suggest that conflict theorists pay inadequate attention to the role of culture and to spatial and temporal variability of ecological influences when assessing such patrolling.

Conflict theorists such as Chambliss and Seidman (1971), Quinney (1975), and Sung (2002) argue that the police officers’ differential patrolling of various social groups is largely a result of the differences in power among such groups. As noted in Chapter 1, these theorists essentially argue that the police effectively serve the interests of dominant, powerful groups at the expense of powerless groups. More specifically, these theorists argue that officers engage in harsher policing of powerless groups when the dominant group or groups perceive these powerless groups as threatening dominant group interests. Moreover, conflict theorists assume that in enforcing the interests of dominant groups, the police see their own interests as consonant with those of the dominant groups. While my findings are consistent with conflict theory insofar as they demonstrate that officers generally do the bidding of the most powerful groups within their towns of employ, my findings also present a more complex view of how power operates within local contexts. In particular, my findings challenge the assumption that officers’ interests are consonant with those of the dominant group, as well as the assumption that officers always do the bidding of dominant groups at the expense of and to the detriment of powerless groups.

In contrast to the claims put forth by conflict theorists such Chambliss and Seidman (1971), Quinney (1975), and Sung (2002), my findings demonstrate that officers’ interests are not necessarily consonant with those of dominant group. Although officers in Coretown, Longwood, and Middleboro engaged in practices that were generally in line with the expectations and demands of the powerful groups within those
three towns, officers in the three towns did not uniformly and reflexively see their own interests as coinciding with those of the powerful groups. While Longwood officers, particularly the majority of White officers, generally did see their own interests as resonating with those of the powerful White residential majority in Longwood, Middleboro officers often saw their own work-related interests as being at odds with the civil libertarian interests of the powerful Black/White middle- to upper-middle-class coalition of Middleboro residents. In the most ambiguous situation of the three towns, Coretown officers generally saw themselves as aligned with the dominant White residential population, but were becoming increasingly ambivalent about their relationship to the powerful upper-middle-class White population in the northern part of Coretown. While my findings do not contradict conflict theory’s contention that the police basically operate as agents of the dominant classes (Quinney 1975:38), these findings do highlight an underlying tension that exists between officers and powerful resident groups in some communities.

In addition to challenging conflict theory’s assumption that officers’ interests are always consonant with those of the dominant groups within their towns of employ, my findings also bring into question conflict theory’s fundamental premise that officers serve the interests of the powerful groups at the expense of the powerless groups. Again, although my findings show that officers generally serve the interests of powerful groups within their towns of employ, my findings do not support the idea that such solicitousness of dominant group interests directly corresponds to harsher and/or less solicitous policing of powerless groups. My findings suggest that officers’ patrolling of powerless groups is based on a reading of both how the dominant groups appear to view such powerless
groups and how the officers themselves assess powerless groups. For instance, Middleboro officers generally refrained from harsher policing of the town’s poor, Black resident population based in the southeastern part of Middleboro and were equally solicitous of this population in terms of calls for service due in large part to officers’ view that the town’s powerful Black/White middle- to upper-middle-class coalition not only did not see this poor, Black residential population as threatening to the coalition’s interests, but actually expected officers to treat this poor, Black population equitably. Similarly, Longwood officers generally refrained from harsher policing of Longwood’s poor, Mexican-American and Central-American Hispanic population in part due to the officers’ view that the powerful White, lower-middle-class majority did not see this population as threatening. Moreover, Longwood officers also refrained from harsh policing of this poor Hispanic population due to the officers’ own culturally-based assessment of this population as not posing a threat to the social order in Longwood. Thus, these findings demonstrate that officers policing of powerful versus powerless groups is not, as conflict theory implies, a zero-sum game. It is possible within some communal contexts for officers to serve the interests of the powerful without simultaneously trampling upon the interests of the powerless. My findings regarding the “in place” status of Middleboro’s poor Black population further suggests that more equitable policing of the powerless is a complex product of the interaction of power-related factors and geographic ones.

In addition to qualifying conflict theorists’ assumptions about how power operates in officers’ patrolling of various social groups, my findings also extend the social threat perspective’s constitution of threat largely in terms of power. In particular, my findings
suggest that the social threat perspective pays inadequate attention to how officers assess 
relative threat by reading the social landscape for cultural information pertaining to social 
groups within their respective towns of employ. As noted in Chapter 5, officers pay a 
great deal of attention to various types of cultural information regarding social groups 
within their towns of employ as they navigate their respective town’s social landscapes. 
Such cultural information is important to officers in part because it provides clues about 
order. Information about certain cultural behaviors, such as parenting practices or 
property maintenance, serves as symbolic indicator of order. In turn, officers see 
information pertaining to order as an indicator of potential threat.

While researchers employing a social threat perspective disproportionately have 
conceived of threat in terms of power, several researchers who have utilized a social 
threat perspective have presented a model of threat that incorporates some cultural 
components. These researchers (e.g., Leiber and Mack 2003; Sampson and Laub 1993; 
Tittle and Curran 1988)² have examined how racial minority groups, especially poor 
racial minorities, pose a “symbolic threat” to the interests of the dominant (White) group. 
In exploring justice system decision-makers’ perceptions and treatment of racial 
minorities, particularly minority youth, researchers such as Leiber and Mack (2003), 
Sampson and Laub (1993), and Tittle and Curran (1988) have emphasized the idea of 
symbolic threat that these racial minorities pose to White middle-class standards and 
sensibilities (Leiber and Mack 2003:37; Tittle and Curran 1988:53) and to “mainstream 
America” (Sampson and Laub 1993:289). In particular, these researchers have argued 
that symbolic threat is manifest by certain cultural behaviors, such as drug dealing 
(Sampson and Laub 1993:290), and characteristics such as aggressiveness, sexual

While researchers such as Leiber and Mack (2003), Sampson and Laub (1993), and Tittle and Curran (1988) have provided a broader view of social threat than that of prior researchers who have largely conceptualized threat in terms of power, Leiber and Mack (2003), Sampson and Laub (1993), and Tittle and Curran (1988) nevertheless conceive of symbolic threat in relatively narrow cultural terms. More specifically, these researchers generally equate symbolic threat with behaviors that are directly or closely related to criminal and/or delinquent activity. In contrast, my dissertation presents a more expansive view of culturally-based symbolic threat by examining how officers assess cultural behaviors and conditions that are linked to a sense of order, regardless of how direct or close such behaviors are to criminal and/or delinquent activity. For instance, my dissertation examines how officers assess social group information pertaining to parental discipline and supervision and neatness of property. As noted in Chapter 1, although neither parenting practices nor property maintenance are directly related to the issue of criminality, nevertheless these two categories of behavior convey important information about order that officers see as indirectly related to potential threats of criminal activity. Parental discipline and supervision connote information about informal social control, which in turn conveys information about who does and does not pose a potential threat of getting into trouble. Neatness of property connotes a sense of order, which in turn informs officers about spaces that appear to be more or less associated with various forms of criminal activity. While my findings illuminate that there is a broader parameter of cultural behaviors and conditions that officers assess when
making determinations of social threat than heretofore has been identified, my findings also demonstrate more generally that many of the behaviors and conditions within local communities that hold significance for officers, irrespective of their connection to criminal activity.

Besides inadequately assessing the role that cultural information plays in officers’ assessments of social threat, researchers employing the social threat perspective of conflict theory have also paid insufficient attention to how various ecological factors’ influence on patrol officers’ social group schemata is conditioned by space and time. In general, researchers such as Liska et al. (1985) and Smith et al. (1984) have treated ecological factors such as percentage of racial minorities or degree of racial segregation within a particular area as having the same effect on policing across contexts. As my findings in Chapter 6 reveal, while ecological, structural features of local communities are important, the meanings of such features vary by time and space both within and between communities. For instance, the presence of Black students in “White” neighborhoods and the presence of Black customers in business districts hold different contextual meanings for officers in Longwood and Middleboro respectively. Different structural factors in each community, such as the assignment patterns of students to schools and the types of commercial areas shape officers’ divergent interpretations of the same social cues in the two respective towns. As a result of these different structural factors, Longwood officers generally saw Blacks as legitimately present in commercial spaces but not “White” residential spaces, and Middleboro officers generally saw Blacks as legitimately present in all spaces except certain upscale commercial ones. Thus, it is
highly problematic to assume that a general trend of policing associated with a particular racial or other social group is similarly exhibited across all spaces at all times.

In addition, my findings also suggest that prior work on race, space, and policing (see, e.g., Bass 2001; Bates and Fasenfest 2005; Cresswell 1996; Herbert 1997; Institute on Race and Poverty 2001; Meehan and Ponder 2002; Portillos 2004) has not fleshed out the complexities of the relationship between these three phenomena. In part, this prior research has not adequately captured the complicated relationship between race, space, and policing due to two general methodological shortcomings. In some cases, researchers have presented a rather uniform view of the policing of racial minorities because these researchers have focused on policing within certain racially homogeneous spaces (see, e.g., Bass 2001; Herbert 1997; Portillos 2004). In other cases, researchers have made relatively simple comparisons between how racial minorities are policed in two different racially marked spaces (see, e.g., Bates and Fasenfest 2005; Meehan and Ponder 2002). Unlike the spatial analysis encompassed in this dissertation, the spatial analysis of these other researchers has not examined how various racial minority groups are policed across a wide range of spaces and times within a particular community (not just a neighborhood or section of a community), and between different communities. My findings show that officers’ associations of racial and other social group meanings with particular spaces not only vary from community to community, but also carry different degrees of significance within a particular community. Future research exploring the spatial and temporal conditioning of officers’ racial and other social group schemata within local, community contexts must be sure to examine how a broad range
of spaces and times within and between communities shape such schemata, and
ultimately, affect officers’ patrolling of various social groups.

CHAPTER 8 ENDNOTES

1 Prior studies’ failure to pay adequate attention to the particularized, unique, local communal context in which
cognitive processing occurs is methodologically reinforced by these studies’ experimental design.

2 Leiber and Mack (2003), Sampson and Laub (1993), and Tittle and Curran (1988) all examine the effect that symbolic
threat has on actors in the justice system after the arrest stage. Although these studies do not directly deal with police,
the logic of the social threat argument logically extends to police officers as well.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Letter to Police Chiefs

April 26, 2006

Xxxx Xxxxxxxx, Chief of Police
Yyyyyyy Police Department
435 Zzzzz Street
Yyyyyyy, Wwwwww 00000

Dear Chief Xxxxxxxx:

I am a doctoral student in sociology at Rutgers University and I am in the process of putting together a dissertation project that will focus on police/ juvenile interactions in a community setting. My dissertation project will examine police/ juvenile interactions in several municipalities to ascertain how the quality of police/ juvenile interaction and police discretion vary by both departmental factors, such as organizational structure, resources, and philosophy, and community characteristics, such as socioeconomic status, racial and ethnic makeup, family structure/ parental supervision, and level of gang involvement. In addition, I am interested in exploring how officers’ handling of juveniles differs from their handling of adults.

In order to fully address these research questions, I would like to do ride-along observations and informal interviews officers about their experiences dealing with juveniles. The interviews would be tailored to address the specific interests that the Department may have with respect to police/ juvenile interactions. All such observations and interviews would remain strictly confidential and anonymous, and would be subject to oversight by the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers and my dissertation committee.
members. I would like to conduct these observations and interviews at some point between July and December, 2006. Upon the completion of the project I would gladly share any written products with you. Unless you prefer otherwise, no products of this research will reveal the name of your police department.

Please let me know if it would be possible to set up a brief meeting with you to discuss the project. I can be reached by phone at (732) 946-2648, and by e-mail at reck@rci.rutgers.edu. Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

Paul Reck
Sociology Department
Rutgers University
54 Joyce Kilmer Avenue
Piscataway, NJ 08854-8045
APPENDIX B: Interview Guide

I. QUALITATIVE ITEMS

1. WHAT OFFICER TYPICALLY DID ON PATROL
   a) What do you do on a typical day?
   b) Where do you patrol? For how long?

2. PRACTICES AND POLICIES OF DEPARTMENT
   a) Where are the different patrol districts or zones in town?
   b) What practices are required by the department? For instance, what entities must be checked out and for how long?

3. RESIDENT SOCIAL GROUPS
   a) Who lives in the town? Where do they live? Where do their children go to school?
      1) Elaborate on racial, ethnic, immigrant, and class makeup.
   b) How do the various groups in town get along?
   c) Who is most likely to complain? About what/whom? How often?
   d) Who is most supportive of the police? How so?

4. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
   a) What types of problems do you encounter? What are some recent incidents that you handled? How were they similar to other incidents?
   b) With whom do you have problems? With whom do you not have problems? What is the relationship between these groups and the police?
   c) What differences do you notice between juveniles and adults?
d) What differences do you notice between residents and non-residents?

5. INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL
   a) Who exercises informal social control, such as parental discipline?

6. VISITOR SOCIAL GROUPS
   a) Where do outsiders visit when they are in town? For how long?

7. WHAT SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES ARE LIKE
   a) What are the relations between this town and neighboring towns? Are there any particular issues or conflicts between the towns.

8. WHAT IS POWER STRUCTURE OF TOWN
   a) Which groups disproportionately wield power and how?

9. HOW TOWN HAS CHANGED
   a) In what ways has the town changed, both demographically and otherwise?

II. QUANTITATIVE ITEMS

1) HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU BEEN ON THE FORCE?

2) WHERE DID YOU GROW UP AND GO TO SCHOOL?

3) WHERE DO YOU CURRENTLY LIVE?

4) WHERE DID YOU ATTEND THE POLICE ACADEMY?
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PREVIOUS PUBLICATIONS
None of the material appearing in this dissertation has been previously published, in whole or in part, in other locations.
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CURRICULUM VITAE
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EDUCATION

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