AN ANALYSIS OF HOMICIDE IN URBAN JAMAICA

by

PATRICE K. MORRIS

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and approved by

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ABSTRACT

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By Patrice K. Morris

Dissertation Director:
Professor Edem F. Avakame

This dissertation investigates the social structural factors associated with differential levels of homicide across neighborhoods in urban Jamaica, a Caribbean country with exceptionally high levels of homicide offending and victimization. It fills a void as most of the literature in homicide studies, and most research has been conducted in advanced industrialized countries, and very little in developing countries. Using homicide, census, and electoral data, this dissertation identifies the structural correlates of homicide in the Kingston Metropolitan Area. This dissertation further explores the applicability of two leading neighborhood-level theoretical models -- social disorganization and defended neighborhood perspectives -- in the Jamaican social context. Results suggest that political civic engagement and poverty are most salient in explaining homicides in urban Jamaica. Homicides are more likely in politically organized neighborhoods with high levels of informal social control and social cohesion. Unlike studies in the United States, this study finds that homicide in urban Jamaica is not related to neighborhood social disorganization. The dissertation concludes with the theoretical implications of the findings, policy suggestions, and directions for future research.
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION

Homicide is multi-dimensional and its related social causes and prevalence differ across cultures. For several decades criminologists have extensively studied the social and structural factors that influence homicides in the society. Notwithstanding this, the majority of homicide studies have been conducted in advanced industrialized countries. Not much scholarly attention has been directed toward the study of homicides in developing countries, specifically those with high homicide rates. This dissertation investigates the inter-neighborhood variations in homicide levels in Jamaica, a country with extremely high rates of homicides. The dissertation aims to do three things: (1) it is a macro-level analysis of homicide in a developing country; (2) it explains the differential levels of homicides across urban neighborhoods in Jamaica and offer empirical explanations for variations; and (3) it explores the validity and applicability of two leading macro-level theoretical models that were developed in advanced societies to explain neighborhood variations in crime and violence rates in less advanced societies.

A recent 2008 report from the internationally renowned newspaper The Economist described the Caribbean as “the world leader in violent crime” and Jamaica in particular, as “the world’s most murderous country” (The Economist, 2008). In fact, for several years, Jamaica has been listed among the top five countries in the world with extremely high annual rates of homicides. Yet, given Jamaica’s high rankings there have only been few empirical investigations that have directly examined the factors that influence such high homicide rates.

A review of the literature indicates that there is a need for more research to better understand homicides in Jamaica (Clarke, 2006; Eyre, 1984; Figueroa and Sives, 2003,
To fill this void in the literature, this study presents a macro-level ecological analysis of urban homicides in Jamaica. Crime data from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) shows that consistently high levels of homicides are concentrated in Jamaica’s largest city – the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA). Homicides in this city are not randomly distributed in space, but are instead spatially concentrated in certain neighborhoods. With this in mind, this study sets out to identify the neighborhood factors that influence the spatial variations in homicide levels in the Kingston Metropolitan Area.

This study builds on prior homicide research and advances the criminological literature in several important ways. First, it is a macro-level analysis of homicides in a developing country. It therefore extends the study of homicides to a different cultural and ecological environment. As such, from a cross-cultural perspective, this study attempts to shed new light on the macro-level factors that influence homicides and reveal that the structural covariates of homicides do in fact vary, significantly, across cultures. It is expected from the empirical findings of this study that the structural correlates that explain neighborhood-level variations in homicide rates in North America (specifically, the United States and Canada) will differ substantially in other regions such as Jamaica.

Second, the specific intent of the present study is to understand the differential levels of homicides across urban neighborhoods in Jamaica and offer empirical explanations as to why some neighborhoods in Jamaica’s major metropolitan region (the KMA) are susceptible to high levels of homicide. Over the past three decades, quite a number of neighborhoods in the KMA have become the most feared and socially isolated places in the entire country. As noted earlier, Jamaica has a long history of violence. A
distinctive aspect of lethal violence in Jamaica is its links to politics (Clarke, 2006; Eyre, 1984; Figueroa and Sives, 2003, 2002; Harriott, 1996; 2003; Headley, 2002; Henry-Lee, 2005; Levy, 2001; Sives, 2002; 2003). Some scholars attest that the high rates of crime and violence in Jamaica cannot be fully understood without reference to politics (Clarke, 2006; Headley, 2002; Harriott, 2003: xi; Sives, 2002). Furthermore, research indicates that politics plays an integral role in urban neighborhood life in Jamaica to the extent that civic engagement activities such as voting in government elections and active participation in national political affairs are regarded as extremely important social activities that are taken seriously by many Jamaican citizens (Levy, 2001; Figueroa and Sives, 2003; 2002; Sives, 2003; Stone, 1985). Primarily, because of the cultural significance and strong sentiments attached to electoral participation in urban neighborhood life in Jamaica, it is important to consider the effect of this form of neighborhood civic engagement on homicide levels.

Prior research conducted mainly in the United States has shown a strong negative relationship between community civic engagement (i.e., voter turnout) and homicide rates (Lee and Bartkowski, 2004; Lee, 2008; Rosenfeld, Messner and Baumer, 2001). These scholars contend that “high levels of civic engagement should strengthen social organization and promote informal social control, thereby yielding low levels of crime and violence” (Rosenfeld and colleagues, 2001: 286). Likewise, Lee and Bartkowski (2004) articulate that active engagement in civic activities such as voting in presidential elections predicts lower homicide rates because, “communities with high levels of voluntary participation create a civic infrastructure that is characterized by durable social networks, normative consensus, and a social climate in which trust can flourish” (p.31).
In essence, communities with high levels of voter turnout should have lower homicide rates because this form of civic engagement is indicative of shared commitments to community values, strong social networks, and interpersonal ties among residents (Lee and Bartkowski, 2004; Lee, 2008; Rosenfeld, Messner and Baumer, 2001). However, in Jamaica, based on the nature of the politics-crime relationship, it is expected that high levels of civic engagement will have a strong positive effect on homicide levels. The present study examines how a high degree of neighborhood civic engagement – which generally reflects a high level of social cohesion and informal social control among residents and which is evident through civic activities such as voter participation – may actually influence high levels of homicides.

Third, this study explores the validity and applicability of two leading macro-level theoretical models that were developed in North America to explain neighborhood variations in crime and violence rates. Most macro-level homicide research has found empirical support for two neighborhood-level theoretical models: the social disorganization perspective and the defended neighborhood perspective. This study does not present a reformulation or test of these theoretical models. Instead, its goal is to assess the cross-cultural applications of these theoretical assumptions in explaining spatial variation in homicide levels in Jamaica. This study therefore has important implications for the external validity of leading theoretical assumptions about the relationship between neighborhood structure and homicide rates.

With regards to the format of this dissertation, Chapter 2 discusses the importance of studying neighborhoods for understanding the spatial distribution of homicides. It also provides an overview of the leading theories on the social ecology of violence. In
particular, it provides an overview of the classical and systemic social disorganization theoretical perspectives as well the defended neighborhood perspective. A review of the empirical research literature on the structural factors that are associated with homicides is offered in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 concludes with the limitations of prior studies and further directions for future research particularly as it relates to the cross-cultural study of homicides. Chapter 4 provides in-depth overview violence in Jamaica. More specifically, it examines the social and political context of violence in Jamaica. As detailed in Chapter 4, in order to fully understand violence levels in urban Jamaica, it is important to first understand the Jamaican political process. Chapter 4 therefore provides a thorough review of the Jamaican political system and the relationship between politics and violence in urban Jamaica. Chapter 4 further provides a historical analysis of homicide trends in Jamaica and the connections with politics, neighborhood structural disadvantage, and violence.

Chapter 5 begins with a discussion on the potential research challenges faced when conducting ecological research in a developing country such as Jamaica. Concerns with respect to the reliability, accessibility, and availability of homicide data are discussed. This chapter describes the data sources, the conceptual and operational definitions of the dependent variable and predictor variables, and the analytical techniques used in the study. Chapter 6 presents the results from the descriptive analyses and the negative binominal regression estimates. Chapter 7 discusses the results and theoretical implications of the study. Chapter 7 also explores the connections with neighborhood structural disadvantage, norms of informal social control, social cohesion, and high homicide levels in urban neighborhoods with high levels of political civic
engagements. Chapter 8 provides a summary of the study, the importance of the research, policy suggestions, and directions for future research.
CHAPTER II – THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

This chapter presents an overview of the leading social ecology theories on crime and violence. In contrast to micro-level methodologies which focus on the traits and characteristics of individuals, macro-level research takes into account the characteristics and structures of neighborhoods. In other words, from a macro-level perspective, crimes such as homicides are products of the social structure of neighborhoods, not the characteristics of people who reside there (Kubrin and Weitzer; 2003; Sampson et. al, 1997; Shaw and McKay, 1942). There are several theoretical concepts that offer empirical explanations for the concentration of high levels of homicides in certain neighborhoods. This chapter discusses these theories, namely the traditional and systemic social disorganization theory, the defended neighborhood perspective, and the neighborhood subculture perspective.

The widely applied propositions of social disorganization theory has been used to explain why some neighborhoods are more crime prone than others. Additionally, its progeny, the systemic social disorganization perspective, provides an empirical extension of the main assumptions of the theory. Systemic social disorganization takes into consideration other important neighborhood social processes such as informal social control, social ties, public control, and collective efficacy, in understanding the relationship between community structures and crime rates (Paternoster and Bachman, 2001). Taken as a whole, both traditional and contemporary propositions of social disorganization theory share the notion that homicides are more likely in neighborhoods where residents are unable to maintain effective social controls, solve local problems, and achieve common goals (Kubrin et. al., 2009; Paternoster and Bachman, 2001).
In contrast to the social disorganization perspective, the defended neighborhood perspective offers an alternative explanation for the non-random distribution of homicides. The defended neighborhood perspective contends that high levels of homicides in some neighborhoods are not related to weakened social controls but are instead associated with heightened levels of informal social control. This chapter provides an in-depth overview of these leading theoretical perspectives on neighborhood-level violence as well as related empirical research and tests of these theories. First, this chapter discusses the significance of studying neighborhoods as one way to understand crime and violence in the society.

Studying Neighborhoods

Research has consistently shown that high levels of delinquency, crime, and violence are ecologically concentrated in certain neighborhoods (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Morris, 1957; Shaw and McKay, 1942). For nearly a century, scholars have conducted various studies that examine why some neighborhoods are more prone to high levels of violence than others (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Kubrin and Wadsworth, 2003; Kubrin and Weitzer; 2003; Messner and Tardiff, 1986; Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush, 2001; Sampson et. al, 1997; Shaw and McKay, 1942; Silver and Miller, 2004). For the purposes of this study, it is important to offer a criminological definition of the word neighborhood. According to Bursik and Grasmick (1993: 6), “a neighborhood is a small physical area embedded within a larger area in which people inhabit dwellings.”
Hallman (1984) has argued that although neighborhoods have many faces and take many forms, they have certain things in common. Neighborhoods are social communities where residents “share common interests and have similar values while still preserving opportunities for diversity and individual differences” (Hallman, 1984: 13). Neighborhoods are political communities and places where relationships and networks with government officials matter (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Hallman, 1984; Velez, 2001). Other interesting features of neighborhoods are that they are places where there is a “tradition of identity and continuity over time” (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993: 6), and places were cultural norms and values are transmitted from one generation to another (Shaw and McKay, 1942). Taking into consideration these definitions, it is understandable why scholars from different disciplines have studied neighborhoods. Over the course of several decades highly rated pieces of scholarship—which include studies conducted by Shaw and McKay (1942; 1969), Suttles (1972), Kornhauser (1978), Hallman (1984), Wilson (1987), Bursik and Grasmick (1993), Anderson (1999), and Sampson (2006)—have all underscored the importance of studying neighborhoods in order to understand societal crime and violence.

Since the early 1900s, criminologists and sociologists have been consumed with understanding the factors associated with neighborhood-level variations in crime and violence. Neighborhoods are shaped by social, political, cultural, and economic factors (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003a; Lanier and Henry, 2004; Park, 1915; Suttles, 1972). Neighborhoods are also powerful agents of social control where residents are able to establish strong networks and act collectively to solve common problems (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Hallman, 1984; Kubrin et. al, 2009; Paternoster
and Bachman, 2001; Suttles, 1972). However, some studies have shown that in some inner-city neighborhoods, strong ties and dense networks among residents can actually weaken efforts to control illegal behavior and crime levels (Johnson and Soeters, 2008; Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush, 2001; Shaw and McKay, 1942). There are also neighborhoods where crime and violence are chronic problems because of low levels of informal social control among residents and their inability to solve general problems and effectively deal with social ills in their neighborhood (Paternoster and Bachman, 2001; Kubrin et al., 2009; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994).

Stark contends that (1987: 893), “there must be something about places as such that sustains crime.” And indeed, based on the findings from a plethora of criminological studies, it is now a well-established fact that high levels of violence are ecologically concentrated in certain neighborhoods. As such, scholars have explored, in great depth, the neighborhood-level sources of crime and violence (Bellair, 1997; Block, 1979; Kasarda, 1992; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003a; Krivo and Peterson, 2000; Messner and Tardiff, 1986; Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush, 2001; Roncek, 1981; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Warner, 2003). Nonetheless, research continues to explore the structures, cultures, and the internal dynamics of neighborhoods that influence residents’ behaviors and levels of crime and violence.

In seeking answers to this question, some researchers have focused on identifying the neighborhood structural covariates that predict violence, while others have focused more intently on examining the effects of informal and formal social controls on neighborhood-level crime and violence rates (Avakame, 1997; Hannon, 2005; Kovandzic, Vieratis and Yeisley, 1998; Kubrin, 2003; Kubrin and Wadsworth, 2003;
Sampson, 1986a; Silver and Miller, 2004; Velez, 2001). There are a handful of studies that have attempted to examine the influence of factors such as social ties, social networks, collective efficacy, and sub-cultures on neighborhood-level violence (Anderson, 1999; Bellair, 1997; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003b; Messner and Tardiff, 1986; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001; Sampson and Byron Groves, 1989; Sampson and Morenoff, 2004; Warner and Rountree, 1997). Nevertheless, as the scope of research on neighborhood-level sources of crime and violence develops and expands, scholars continue to investigate the ways in which some neighborhoods are able to control and sustain low levels of violence and the ways in which other neighborhoods supply, promote, and harbor violence.

Social Disorganization Theory

The ecological school of thought has produced seminal pieces of work that richly add to our understanding of violence. Social ecology, a derivative of human ecology, is the scientific study of the relationship between people and the geographical social space they occupy. It is the study of the spatial arrangements and settlements of people, how they compete for space, and how they colonize these spaces (Lanier and Henry, 2004; Morris, 1957). Stated differently, social ecology theory is primarily “concerned with the relationships which exist between people who share a common habitat or local territory itself; it is the study of social structure in relation to the local environment” (Morris, 1957:1). This definition highlights the universality of the social ecology perspective in that it can be logically applied to the study of crime and violence in any country because it is concerned with two main factors: people and their geographical space/environment.
Early support for a social ecological approach to the study of crime and violence can be found as far back as the 1830s in studies conducted in Europe by A.M. Guerry, Adolphe Quetelet, Ettore Botti, and Henry Mayhew (Barnes and Teeters, 1943; Morris, 1957). European scholars were primarily interested in identifying, with the use of cartography, the location and spatial distribution of crimes. Guerry’s work, in particular, was the first known publication that produced maps that spatially displayed the extent of crime and its geographical location in France (Morris, 1957). His research was among the few ecological studies that were available in the 1830s which attempted to show the empirical connections between crime, geographic spaces and social problems such as poverty, lack of education, and population density (Morris, 1957).

Another study, done by Quetelet, expanded on the work of Guerry. Quetelet’s work yielded similar findings to Guerry’s studies. In particular, his study showed that crime rates were influenced by structural forces and social arrangements in the society and that there was in fact a relationship between specific geographical locations and crime rates. Although Quetelet’s research has been criticized for lacking depth and detail, it is credited for demonstrating that there is some connection between social spaces and crime rates (Paternoster and Bachman, 2001).

Robert Park and Ernest Burgess can be thought of as the founding fathers of the social ecology theoretical perspective in the United States. Both researchers worked at the University of Chicago and their work, along with other ecological studies done by scholars Henry Shaw and Clifford McKay, collectively became known as The Chicago School. The Chicago School came about mainly through the interest Park, Burgess, and other colleagues (1925; 1928) had in industrial growth and urbanization in the city of
Chicago. They subsequently began to study patterns of urban growth, industrialization, and social changes that were rapidly occurring in Chicago during the early 1900s. Out of their research came the idea of “concentric zones” and “zones in transition” and consequently the development of an urban ecology theory. Concentric zones (zone of transition, residential zone, and commuter zone) represented the ecological layouts of the city, the central business districts, and concentrations of the people within the city. This caught the attention of Shaw and McKay (1942) when they examined the work of Park and Burgess and used it to develop ideas for their study of juvenile delinquency in Chicago.

Similar to earlier scholarly work done in Europe, Shaw and McKay relied on official data and the cartographic method to manually map the location of delinquency and spatially analyze delinquent rates in Chicago and other cities in the United States. Their extensive studies on crime and delinquency showed that high rates were concentrated in certain areas of the city. Perhaps the most significant aspects of their findings were that—irrespective of the types of people who resided in these areas, and the urban changes that were rapidly occurring—crime and delinquency rates remained stable and high in the same areas over time. This led to the general conclusion that high delinquency rates were associated with the social arrangements and structural conditions of the areas, not the individuals who reside there.

Shaw and McKay’s (1962) *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*, and an earlier life history study that was conducted by Shaw (1930), *The Jack-Roller*, were two important and timeless pieces that showed that delinquency is rooted in the dynamic life of the community (Shaw and McKay, 1942: 435). According to Shaw and McKay (1942:
there is a direct relationship between conditions existing in local communities of American cities and differential rates of delinquents and criminals. Communities with high rates have social and economic characteristics which differentiate them from communities with low rates.” These communities were theorized as being socially disorganized areas that are characterized by ethnic heterogeneity, low economic status, and residential mobility.

Although the concept of social disorganization originated in the earlier works of Thomas and Znaniecki (1927), it was Shaw and McKay who applied this theoretical concept to explain the neighborhood variations in crime and delinquency rates. Since this time, other scholarly works have expanded and reframed the social disorganization perspective. Currently, a commonly used definition of social disorganization is the inability of a community to realize the common goals and values of residents, maintain effective social controls, and solve chronic problems (Kornhauser, 1978: 120; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003: 374).

Several studies have attempted to test and apply the theoretical assumptions of social disorganization theory in various ecological settings and with different units of analysis. Osgood and Chambers (2000), for instance, examined whether the propositions of social disorganization theory could be universally applied to rural communities. In essence, their main goal was to test the generalizability of social disorganization theory in environments other than urban areas and cities. To do this, the authors conducted a county-level analysis of youth violence in four states with fairly large rural populations in order to determine the structural factors that correlate with their dependent variable – the number of juvenile arrests for serious crimes pooled over a five-year period (Osgood and
This study found empirical support for the social disorganization model in rural settings. Specifically, female-headed households, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability were found to be positively associated with high rates of juvenile violence in non-metropolitan settings. Family disruption, measured as the proportion of female-headed households, was found to be the most significant predictor of high rates of arrest for violent offenses.

Based on this finding, the authors concluded that family disruption is an important structural indicator of social disorganization in non-metropolitan areas. Equally important in this study were findings that showed that poverty rates, economic status and unemployment were not associated with high rates of juvenile arrest for violent offenses. This, the authors argue, is fairly consistent with Shaw and McKay’s perspective that “it is not poverty per se that produces social disorganization, but rather associations of poverty with other structural factors that weaken systems of social relationships in a community” (Osgood and Chambers, 2000: 107). In their concluding remarks, Osgood and Chambers (2000: 109) recommended that future social disorganization research focus on “the size and strength of networks of social relationships” in communities and the effects these factors have on crime rates.

The social disorganization approach has been used to explain macro-level variations in crime and violence rates in other countries such as Canada. For example, Kennedy and colleagues (1991) used longitudinal data from the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) to examine homicide in urban Canada. In particular, the authors were interested in examining the effects of economic inequality, social disorganization, and regional location on levels of homicide across three time spans: 1967-71, 1972-76, and
1977-81. The results of this investigation showed that areas with higher levels of social
disorganization and economic inequality also had high levels of homicides. Kennedy and
colleagues (1991) also found significant variations across the different time periods with
regards to the effects of social disorganization and inequality on homicide levels.
Specifically, the authors found that inequality had a stronger effect on homicide rates
during the time period 1972-76, but not for the time period 1977-81. In addition, the
effects of social disorganization on homicide levels also varied across different time
periods.

To date, one of the most comprehensive tests of social disorganization was done
using data from the British Crime Survey (BCS). Sampson and Groves (1989) conducted
a study to directly test the propositions of social disorganization theory and develop a
community-level theory of social disorganization that combined the main predictor
variables of social disorganization theory – e.g., low economic status, ethnic
heterogeneity, residential stability, family disruption and urbanization – with other
intervening dimensions of social disorganization hypothesized to mediate the relationship
between structural factors and crime rates; for example, local friendship networks,
unsupervised peer groups and organizational participation. The logic behind this
important piece of work was to pay closer attention to the variables that were
hypothesized to mediate the relationship between community structure and crime.

Using self-reported data from 238 ecological areas in Great Britain, Sampson and
Groves (1989) sought to address two major drawbacks in the theoretical applications and
test of the social disorganization perspective; specifically, the frequent use of official data
and the exclusion of measures for mediating variables. The authors argued that by
addressing the shortcomings of prior social disorganization research, their study represented a more comprehensive replication of the theory (Sampson and Groves, 1989). Study findings revealed the importance of mediating factors in the community-crime relationship. The results indicated that high rates of crime and delinquency were found in communities with sparse friendship networks, unsupervised teenage peer groups, and low organizational participation (Sampson and Groves, 1989: 799). One of the main contributions of this work was that it represented one of the few studies that have provided an elaborate test of social disorganization theory. In fact, this study highlighted the pertinence of social disorganization theory in understanding societal crime.

The results of Sampson and Groves’ (1989) study were challenged in a study that re-analyzed the data from the British Crime Survey. Specifically, Veysey and Messner (1999) conducted a more detailed analysis of Sampson and Groves’ (1989) community-level social disorganization model by using a different statistical procedure – covariance structure modeling (LISREL). This statistical procedure “improves on the original study insofar as it uses all information about predicted relationships” (Veysey and Messner, 1999: 159). The results of this re-analysis found partial support for Sampson and Groves’ finding that the intervening dimensions of social disorganization do in fact mediate the relationship between neighborhood structural characteristics and crime rates. Veysey and Messner (1999) conclude with a compelling statement about the current state of social disorganization research. While they agree with Sampson and Groves’ conclusion that social disorganization has “vitality and renewed relevance” for criminological inquiry, they caution “that there is still much theoretical and empirical
work to be done before the processes underlying macrolevel variation in crime are fully understood” (Veysey and Messner, 1999: 172).

**Critiques of Social Disorganization Research**

Despite its prominence, social disorganization theory came under heavy scrutiny and criticism by scholars (Arnold and Brungardt, 1983; Bursik, 1998; Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003a) and at one point there was little interest in the scholarly propositions of the theory. Several issues have emerged from the critical discourse of social disorganization theory. Bursik (1998) contends that a general problem with this area of criminological research is the use of different measures of social disorganization. There is also the frequent use of cross-sectional data in social disorganization research. Cross-sectional data simply does not account for the high likelihood of changes in community structures over different time periods that may influence crime and violence rates. However, another issue facing this line of research is that studies that have used longitudinal data report inconsistent findings. Similarly, Byrne and Sampson (1986: 4) provide an elaborate list of the drawbacks with social disorganization studies that include problems such as: (1) the use of different data sources (Uniform Crime Report, Victimization Data); (2) the use of different types of analysis (bivariate, multivariate); (3) the use of different units of analysis (cities, metropolitan areas); (3) the numbers and types of predictor variables differ from study to study; and (4) the use of different measures of key explanatory variables.

Bursik and Grasmick (1993) further argue that there are several critical and missing components in social disorganization research. These include the role of external
actors, the political power base of neighborhoods, and the viability of local neighborhood organizations as agencies of formal and informal social control in influencing neighborhood variations in crime and violence rates (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993:27).

Other scholars shared a similar view by arguing that Shaw and McKay’s work produced “an overriding emphasis on the internal dynamics of local communities that wholly ignored the external contingencies that may be important in shaping the nature of these dynamics” (Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987). In other words, proponents of the social disorganization model have not adequately considered the effect external influences have on neighborhood-level crime and delinquency rates.

Another recognized limitation of social disorganization research is the lack of sufficient analyses on the variables that intervene and mediate the relationship between community structures and violence (Byrne and Sampson, 1986; Kornhauser, 1978; Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994). Likewise, not much is known about the role of neighborhood subcultures; particularly, how cultural factors influence neighborhood-level crime and violence rates. In fact, some scholars have argued that social disorganization studies have failed “to capture the intersection of structural and cultural factors” (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003b: 158). In the following section, I discuss relatively new directions in social disorganization research. Specifically, following the critical discourse on the empirical soundness of social disorganization theory, proponents of the theory have advance its propositions by extending its realm to include other important community dynamics that were missing from Shaw and McKay’s model.
Systemic Social Disorganization

Scholars have begun to examine the effects of other seminal neighborhood-level social processes on crime and violence rates in communities. These include important factors such as informal social control, collective efficacy, and public social control/politics. It was Kornhauser’s (1978) systematic reformulation of social disorganization theory that directed attention toward the importance of studying these other community processes which are hypothesized to intervene between neighborhood structural correlates and crime rates. One study that attempted to examine the effects of mediating factors was conducted by Sampson and Groves (1989). The authors, as discussed earlier, used data from Great Britain to develop a causal model that tested the effects social disorganization variables (low socioeconomic status, urbanization, ethnic heterogeneity etc.) and intervening variables (sparse local friendship networks, unsupervised teenage peer groups, low organization participation) had on crime rates. Following this study, other efforts have been made to further clarify the role of mediating factors in the relationship between neighborhood structures and crime rates.

Social Control

An elaborate study conducted by Elliot and colleagues (1996) attempted to examine the mediating role of organizational and cultural features of neighborhoods on neighborhood structural disadvantage and adolescent development and behavior. A noteworthy feature of this study was the use of multiple indicators to measure social ties and informal control. This research, similar to the study conducted by Sampson and Groves (1989), attempted to broadly test the propositions of social disorganization
theory. More importantly, however, the findings of the study showed that informal control (measured as neighborhood bonding, social control, institutional control, and mutual respect) was associated with neighborhood disadvantage and delinquency.

The social disorganization model stipulates that crime and violence will be higher in neighborhoods with low levels of informal social control. Studies that have examined the effects of informal social control on criminal violence have supported this theoretical proposition (Sampson, 1986; Silver and Miller, 2004). Informal social control is generally defined as internal neighboring processes whereby residents show interest in the each other’s safety, protection, and overall well-being in the neighborhood. Scholars note that neighborhoods where residents know each other, question strangers, intervene in local problems, supervise neighbor’s children, and strive to maintain order are places that exhibit high levels of informal social control and low levels of crime (Bursik, 1988; Kubrin et. al., 2009; Sampson, 1986a; Silver and Miller, 2004).

In an attempt to understand the sources and role of informal social control in neighborhoods, Silver and Miller (2004) examined the effects of four internal neighborhood mechanisms–social and organizational ties, legal cynicism, neighborhood attachment, and satisfaction with the police–on neighborhood levels of informal social control. The main rationale for this study was to empirically identify the key factors that led to the formation of informal social control in structurally disadvantaged urban neighborhoods. The findings of their study indicated that in these types of neighborhoods, low levels of informal social control are significantly associated with two of their indicators of informal social control; specifically, low levels of neighborhood attachment and a lack of satisfaction with the police (Silver and Miller, 2004: 572).
Warner and Rountree (1997) were interested in the extent to which social ties affect crime rates and whether or not social ties mediate between community structural conditions and crime rates. To do this, the authors used census data from 100 census tracts in Seattle, official crime burglary and assault data, and survey data from a sample of 5,302 local residents. Social ties were measured as to whether: (1) respondents had borrowed tools or food from neighbors; (2) had lunch or dinner with neighbors; and (3) had helped neighbors with problems (Warner and Rountree, 1997: 525). The authors first analyzed the effects of the main indicators of social disorganization (poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential stability) on local social ties. This was followed by an examination of the effects of the predictor variables, and their local social ties variable on crime rates. The findings from this study challenged the theoretical argument that local social ties mediate between structural conditions and crime rates. The authors found that local social ties decreased assault rates but the same was not found for burglary rates. In addition, for burglary and assault rates, the findings revealed that local social ties did not mediate the effects of neighborhood structural conditions on these crime rates. Based on these findings, Warner and Rountree (1997) calls into question the assumptions that social ties serve as intervening concepts in social disorganization.

Bellair (1997) was also interested in finding out the mediating effects of community social interactions and networks among neighbors on community characteristics and crime. Bellair (1997) was more focused on examining the frequency of interactions among neighbors and the effects these had on mediating the relationship between structural conditions and crime rates. Data for this study were derived from victimization surveys completed by residents from 60 urban neighborhoods in three states.
(New York, Florida, and Missouri). Measures of social interaction were constructed from a question that asks respondents how often they, or members of their household, get together with their neighbors either in their neighbor’s or their own home (Bellair, 1997: 687). The results of this study showed that irrespective of the low or high levels of frequency of the interactions found among neighbors, and the types of friendships neighbors have with each other, social interactions are important in establishing community controls and mediating the effects of community characteristics on crime rates. Overall, the findings from the above reviewed studies clearly indicate research should continue to explore the role of intervening variables in the relationship between neighborhood structural disadvantage and criminal violence (Bellair, 1997; Elliot et. al, 1996; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Veysey and Messner, 1999; Warner and Rountree, 1997).

Collective Efficacy

While some researchers have stressed the importance and significance of social networks and relationships and agents of formal and informal control in accounting for neighborhood variations in violence rates, others have added another dimension that goes beyond social networks to include mutual engagement and shared commitment of residents in their neighborhoods. Collective efficacy, a term used by Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997), involves the study of mutual trust, cohesion and solidarity among residents that enables them to exercise informal control and intervene in disorder or the unruly behavior of fellow residents. Collective efficacy is therefore presented as
an effective instrument for controlling and reducing crime and disorder in communities (Sampson, 2002).

Using both official homicide and survey data on violent incidences from 8,782 residents in 343 communities in Chicago, Sampson and colleagues (1997) studied the concept of collective efficacy and its association with differential levels of violence. The goals of this study were to empirically show that collective efficacy, “defined as social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good, is linked to reduced violence” (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997: 277). The authors used five-point/item Likert scales to measure neighborhood variations in levels of informal social control, social cohesion, and trust among residents (see study for more details, Sampson et. al. 1997). The findings of this research indicate that collective efficacy—informal social control, cohesion, and mutual trust—among residents are significantly associated with low rates of violence in Chicago’s racially diverse communities.

Public Social Control/Politics

Criminologists have paid very little attention to the impact of public social control and local government decisions on neighborhood-level crime and violence rates (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Stucky, 2003). In fact, Bursik and Grasmick (1993:57) argue that the lack of empirical attention given to the role of public control (i.e., ties to local public officials) and the ways in which political entities impact neighborhood organization and structure have been “a significant shortcoming of the traditional systemic approaches and has led to a seriously incomplete understanding of the neighborhood dynamics related to
crime and delinquency.” Therefore, largely excluded from the research on neighborhoods are the impact of governmental decision-making, ties to elected officials, and access to external resources (public social control) on crime and violence rates. Bursick and Grasmick (1993) poignantly argue that social disorganization research has not fully explored the effects of political dynamics on neighborhood crime rates. The systemic social disorganization perspective has, however, highlighted the importance of politics and public social control – defined as the ability of neighborhoods to secure external resources through ties with the local government – and its influence on crime and violence rates. Even so, only a few studies have taken into full account the impact of political and government decisions on violence levels in neighborhoods.

Among the few is a study conducted by Bursik (1989) that attempted to examine the connections with political decisions, public housing, and crime rates in Chicago. Bursik’s (1989) study found that an increase in crime and delinquency rates in neighborhoods already experiencing high levels of residential instability occurred when city officials constructed new public housing projects in the neighborhood. He further noted that residents were unable to prevent the construction of the housing projects because they had no political clout or bargaining power. This study highlighted two important factors concerning the political influences on neighborhood crime rates. It showed that decisions made by public officials can adversely affect neighborhoods and contribute to an increase in local crime and violence rates. It further pointed out the potential benefits residents in disadvantaged neighborhoods can gain from developing ties to city officials.
In terms of the second contribution of Bursik’s (1989) work, studies have begun to examine the potential benefits residents in disadvantaged neighborhoods can gain from establishing ties with public officials (i.e., public social control). In particular, Velez (2001), using a sample of 60 urban neighborhoods across different U.S. states, found lower rates of victimization in disadvantaged neighborhoods where residents received external resources from political officials. She also found that in extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods, strong ties with local public officials diminished the likelihood of criminal victimization (Velez, 2001). The hallmark of this study is that it highlighted the importance and benefits of public social control in reducing victimization rates in areas with high and extreme levels of disadvantaged residents.

Stucky (2003) applied a different approach in examining how politics and governmental decision-making affects crime and violence rates in local areas. His research focused on the impact of variations in local political structures on violence rates across 958 U.S. cities. Specifically, he was interested in the various ways the type of government structures in cities (mayor/council forms of government or council/manager structures) and the type of city council electoral system (cities with district-based electoral systems and at-large elections) influenced city-level violence rates. He was also interested in determining the impact of various political structures – cities with partisan elections, cities with traditional local political structures, cities with higher black council representation, and cities with black mayors – on violent crime rates in the different cities. Overall, the results of this study demonstrated that local politics does in fact have direct and conditional effects on violent crime rates (Stucky, 2003: 1123). Specifically,
Stucky (2003) found that cities with black mayors, cities with elected council members, and cities with mayor-council forms of government had lower violent crime rates.

**The Defended Neighborhood Perspective**

The longstanding view that neighborhoods with high crime and violence rates are usually social disorganized places where residents have lost the capacity to maintain effective controls has been challenged by another perspective – the defended neighborhood thesis. From a defended neighborhood perspective, crime and violence rates in some neighborhoods are less connected with internal social disorganization and are instead connected with organized responses to perceived external threats (Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987: 785; Lyons, 2007; Suttles, 1972). In his book, *The Social Construction of Communities*, Suttles (1972) resurrects the notion of defended neighborhoods in urban areas. He credited the work of Park and Burgess for shedding some light on the ways in which neighborhoods form and defend their boundaries and identities. He however argued that the defended neighborhood perspective has not been studied extensively and has been “dismissed as a sort of epiphenomenon” (Suttles, 1972: 22).

According to Suttles (1972), defended neighborhoods, generally found in urban areas, are places with defined restricted boundaries, where residents share a common plight and a contrived identity. Residents in defended neighborhoods share a common identity and make concerted efforts to retain neighborhood boundaries and protect the identity and/or homogeneity (racial and ethnic) of their neighborhoods (Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987; Lyons, 2007; Suttles, 1972). According to Suttles (1972):

The inner city is also the area where one finds most of the other obvious earmarks of the defended neighborhood. It is here that street-corner gangs claim a “turf”
and ward off strangers or anyone else not a proper member of the neighborhood. It is here that one finds vigilante community groups, militant conservation groups, a high incidence of uniformed doormen, frequent use of door buzzers and TV monitors. Not all these defensive tactics are equally available to all residents of the inner city, and in many instances one may replace the other. What they indicate is the general apprehensiveness of inner city dwellers, rich and poor alike, and the necessity for each of them to bound off discrete areas within which he can feel safe and secure (Suttles, 1972: 43).

Contrary to the social disorganization assumptions that neighborhoods with high levels of informal social control and social cohesion will correspondingly have low rates of crime and violence, the defended neighborhood perspective argues that high levels of specific types of crimes are more likely in internally organized, tightly integrated neighborhoods with high levels of informal social control (DeSena, 2005; Lyons, 2007; Suttles, 1972). A recent study conducted by Lyons (2007) on racially motivated hate crimes has found empirical support for the defended neighborhood perspective. More specifically, Lyons (2007) found that anti-black crimes were more likely in white neighborhoods with high levels of social cohesion and norms of informal social control. According to Lyons (2007), residents in these communities are more likely to encourage racial hate crimes in their efforts to maintain community boundaries and protect the neighborhood’s identity against any threat of racial invasion.

The notion that residents in neighborhoods that are internally organized and stable band together to ward off possible invasions and threats from outsiders were also supported in a study conducted by Heitgerd and Bursik (1987). The goal of this longitudinal study was to examine the effects of racial change and extracommunity dynamics on delinquency rates in local neighborhoods in Chicago. Heitgerd and Bursik (1987) found that changes in the racial composition of adjoining neighborhoods increased
delinquency rates in nearby areas. In particular, the authors found that the increase in delinquency rates occurred in stable, well-organized neighborhoods whenever there were external racial changes in adjacent neighborhoods. They further observed that delinquent behaviors such as aggravated assault, arson, and vandalism were supported by residents who felt threatened by racial invasions (Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987).

Another interesting study that found empirical support for the defended neighborhood perspective was an ethnographic study conducted by DeSena (2005). This study explored the response of residents in a predominantly white neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York, to ethnic changes in their neighborhood and the various measures they used to retain their neighborhood’s racial identity. According to DeSena (2005: 1) residents in Greenpoint created a defended neighborhood in their attempts to resist changes in the ethnic population and maintain a racially homogeneous neighborhood. DeSena (2005) observed that the majority of white residents in Greenpoint were not pleased with the rising numbers of Hispanics that were moving in their community. In response to this, residents collectively developed different strategies to solve what they believed to be threats to the culture, social cohesiveness, and identity of their neighborhood.

Three informal strategies were used as neighborhood defenses. First, by placing limitations on access to housing accommodations, residents were able to control and monitor who they allowed to rent or buy houses in the neighborhood. Second, DeSena (2005) observed that residents used the local church as a central meeting place to discuss neighborhood affairs. The church also played a role in maintaining the neighborhood’s identity by offering separate services for Hispanic and non-Hispanic residents and by
segregating ethnic groups at social events. Third, according to DeSena (2005), the women in the neighborhood were the most instrumental in creating a defended neighborhood. They were the main disseminators of information around the neighborhood and they were the ones who handled real estate in the neighborhood.

In short, defended neighborhoods generally arise when residents feel a need to maintain the identity of their neighborhood and guard against any potential threats such as racial invasions (DeSena, 2005; Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987; Lyons, 2007). The above review demonstrates that defended neighborhoods are generally socially organized areas with high levels of informal control and social cohesion (DeSena, 2005; Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987; Lyons, 2007). It further showed that the defensive postures used by residents to keep others out of their area can lead to an increase in crime and violence levels in defended neighborhoods (Lyons, 2007; Suttles, 1972). For instance, according to Suttles (1972: 35), in defended neighborhoods, cohesive groupings such as street-corner adolescent gangs form sharp boundaries around their neighborhood and use defensive measures to protect their turf. Furthermore, as noted by (Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987), adults in defended neighborhoods are more likely to encourage certain juvenile illegal activities that involve “a degree of protection of life and property from the “dangerous” residents of adjacent communities” (p. 758).

Neighborhood Subculture

Are some neighborhoods more prone to high levels of violence because of the presence of cultural values and norms that encourage violence? Or is it that in some disadvantaged neighborhoods criminal activities have continued because residents have gotten accustomed to high rates of crime and violence that have permeated their
community for years? In seeking answers to these questions scholars have turned their attention to studying the role of neighborhood subcultures and the influence of subcultural norms and values that promote and facilitate crime and violence in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Anderson, 1999; Kornhauser, 1978; Krivo and Peterson, 1996; Pridemore, 2002; Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967; Warner, 2003). Some scholars share the view that in some disadvantaged neighborhoods residents have become alienated and socially isolated from mainstream society and this has led to the development of an oppositional subculture that promotes criminal and gang activities and violence (Anderson, 1999; Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967).

Scholars have also argued that high levels of violence in some neighborhoods results from a combination of social structural disadvantage and the development of subcultural norms conducive to violence (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003a; Krivo and Peterson, 1996; Pridemore, 2002; Sampson and Wilson, 1995; Warner, 2003). Warner (2003), for instance, makes the theoretical argument that it is the combined effect of neighborhood disadvantage (social disorganization) and an attenuated culture (cultural disorganization) that gives rise to low levels of informal social control and the perception among residents that their neighbors do not hold conventional values. This, in turn, facilitates high levels of crime and violence in these neighborhoods. In tune with this, Sampson and Wilson (1995) also made a compelling argument that the “macro-social patterns of residential inequality give rise to the social isolation an ecological concentration of the truly disadvantaged, which in turn leads to structural barriers and cultural adaptations that undermine social organization and hence the control of crime” (p. 38).
Although studying the effects of neighborhood subcultures on crime and violence rates has been challenging for researchers, there is some consensus that “in certain structurally disorganized communities it appears that a system of values emerges in which violence is less than fervently condemned and hence expected as part of everyday life” (Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994: 63). A recent study conducted by Kubrin and Weitzer (2003b) supports this view. In this study, Kubrin and Weitzer (2003b) argue that retaliatory homicides in disadvantaged neighborhoods stem from the presence of cultural norms that influence how a person reacts and interprets situations deemed disrespectful or damaging to oneself or to one’s significant other. More specifically, Kubrin and Weitzer (2003b) found that in conjunction with structural disadvantage, retaliatory homicides were more likely in neighborhoods where there is community tolerance and family support for retaliation and neighborhoods where residents are more likely to use extrajudicial actions to retaliate rather than rely on the police for justice.

Chapter Review

Chapter 2 provided a thorough discussion on social ecology theory and what is currently known in the criminological literature about the relationship between neighborhoods and differential rates of crime. In particular, this chapter reviewed the general propositions of two leading neighborhood-level theoretical assumptions that offer different explanations concerning the relationship between community characteristics and crime rates. These were the social disorganization perspective (the classical and systemic social disorganization model) and the defended neighborhood perspective. The literature is inundated with scholarly works that have tested the main tenets of social disorganization theory and expanded on its propositions. Included in this chapter were
the major studies that tested and found empirical support for each neighborhood-level theoretical model.

In recent years, there have also been empirical studies that have examined the influence of other important social factors such as public social control and politics on neighborhood social organization and disorganization. Overall, the findings from these studies suggest that crime and victimization rates are generally lower in neighborhoods and cities that are involved in political affairs and places where residents maintain ties to local public officials. Chapter 2 also included a brief discussion on the development and influence of neighborhood subcultures on crime and violence rates. From the extant research, it is evident that a neighborhood’s crime and violence rates are influenced by two factors: social structural disadvantage and a subcultural tendency to resort to the use of violence to settle conflicts.

Although not as popular as the social disorganization perspective, the defended neighborhood perspective provides an alternative thesis about the relationship between neighborhood structure and violence rates. In contrast to social disorganization theory, the defended neighborhood perspective suggests that neighborhoods that are highly organized and internally stable with high levels of informal social control can actually have high crime rates (Hallman, 1984; Lyons, 2007; Suttles, 1972). Of particular importance in the present study is the cross-cultural application of social disorganization theory and the defended neighborhood perspective in the study of the relationship between neighborhood structural conditions and homicide in urban Jamaica.

As mentioned earlier, this study sets out not to test or reformulate these theoretical perspectives. Instead, one of its primary goals is to assess the applicability of North
American theoretical assumptions concerning the spatial distribution of homicide across urban neighborhoods in a different cultural and ecological setting. Specifically, this study probes whether or not social disorganization theory best explains differential levels of homicides in urban Jamaica, or does its counter-claim, the defended neighborhood perspective, provide a better framework for understanding variations in homicide levels across neighborhoods in the Kingston Metropolitan Area.
CHAPTER III: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON HOMICIDE

This chapter presents an overview of major homicide studies that have examined the ecological, demographic, and socio-economic factors that influence homicides. The majority of the studies reviewed in this section were conducted in North America. These studies have, for the most part, found race to be an important structural covariate in the neighborhood-homicide relationship. North American homicide studies have generally examined how two or more of the following structural covariates influence homicide rates: (1) population size and/or density; (2) percentage of black residents; (3) percentage divorced; (4) percentage of young males 15–29 years; (5) percentage of children 18 years old or younger not living with both parents; (6) percentage of persons with a college degree; (7) percentage of household on families living below the poverty level; (8) percentage of female-headed households; (9) the GINI index of family income inequality; (10) the percentage of unemployed residents; (11) percent of persons who have changed residencies in the last five years (residential mobility); (12) proportion of households occupied by white vs. nonwhite persons (ethnic and racial heterogeneity); and (13) civic engagement/voter turnout (Avakame, 1997; Kubrin, 2003; Land et. al., 1990: 927:931; Lee, 2008; Lee and Bartkowski, 2004; Osgood and Chambers, 2000).

In this chapter I review the findings of leading homicide studies on the structural factors that influence homicides. I however limit this review to a discussion on the structural covariates that are most relevant in the present study. These are poverty (absolute and relative deprivation), family structure, population density, young male population, and civic engagement. This chapter concludes with the limitations of prior homicide studies and the prospects for cross-cultural homicide research.
Poverty

It is now well-established that poverty is one of the strongest indicators of social structural disadvantage, community disorganization, and homicide (Curry and Spergel, 1988; Kovandzic, et al., 1998; Land et. al., 1990; Loftin and Parker, 1985; Messner and Tardiff, 1986; Parker, 1989). Despite years of empirical debate on the nature of the poverty-homicide relationship, the majority of studies have shown a strong and positive relationship between poverty and homicide. However, scholars have debated whether it is absolute deprivation (poverty) or relative deprivation (economic/income inequality) that explains macro-level variations in homicide.

It was the findings of two studies–Blau and Blau (1982) and Messner (1982)–that stimulated the poverty-homicide and income inequality-homicide empirical debate. Specifically, Blau and Blau (1982), using data from 125 SMSAs across the United States, were interested in examining the relationship between inequality and violence. The authors used the Gini coefficient for family income as their measure of economic inequality. Their poverty measure was derived from the United States Social Security Administration poverty index which included data on family size, sex of family head, number of children, and farm-nonfarm residence (Blau and Blau, 1982: 120). They found that poverty was not associated with criminal violence when they controlled for economic inequalities in their model. The authors conclude by noting that it is economic inequality (relative deprivation) and not poverty (absolute deprivation) that has significant and positive effects on criminal violence.

Similarly, a study conducted by Messner (1982) also produced findings indicating that there was no significant relationship between poverty and homicide. Using 204
SMSAs as the units of analysis and 1970 census data and homicide data, Messner (1982) investigated whether it was absolute deprivation or relative deprivation that predicted homicide rates. In his study, poverty was measured as the percent of families below the United States Social Security Administration’s poverty line and relative deprivation was measured using the Gini coefficient of family income concentration (Messner, 1982).

The results of Messner’s (1982) analyses revealed a negative effect of poverty on homicide rates. The findings of these studies (Blau and Blau, 1982 and Messner, 1982) were challenged by Williams (1984) who highlighted incorrect specifications in poverty-homicide relationship, and by Bailey (1984) who questioned the units of analysis used (SMSAs). The findings of both studies were also challenged by Loftin and Parker (1985) who argued that the measures of poverty used in both studies contained measurement errors that produced biased estimates. Williams’ (1984) examination of the Blaus and Messner’s study detected that both authors failed to take into account a nonlinear relationship between poverty and homicide and this result in an incorrect specification about the nature of the relationship between the two variables.

The study conducted by Williams (1984) included similar measures and units of analysis (SMSAs) as the Blaus and Messner. The main difference with his work from the others was the procedures taken in the data analysis. Williams (1984) contends that his revised parameter estimates which corrected for the nonlinearities produced findings that showed that poverty was in fact a significant predictor of homicide. Bailey (1984), on the other hand, argued that cities rather than SMSAs (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area) are more appropriate units of analysis because they are more homogenous settings. His re-examination of Messner’s (1982) work using cities rather than SMSAs showed a
strong and positive relationship between poverty and homicide. However, similar to Messner’s (1982) study, Bailey (1984) found no significant relationship between relative deprivation (income inequality) and homicide.

Loftin and Parker (1985) further attempted to address the inconclusive findings concerning the poverty-homicide relationship. Loftin and Parker (1985: 270) argued that measurements of poverty used in prior studies contained errors as a result of flaws in specification or estimation and this has been the primary reason for inconsistencies in past studies. In light of this, the authors conducted a study that examined the relationship between poverty and homicide by using what they referred to as an instrumental variable estimate of poverty. Loftin and Parker (1985) used the infant mortality rate as their instrumental variable and as a proxy for poverty. The authors took their study a step further by disaggregating homicide into four categories in their analysis in order to ascertain the effects of poverty on different types of homicide. The findings of this study revealed a positive and significant relationship between poverty and all four categories of homicide.

Messner and Tardiff (1986) noted in their study on the relationship between levels of economic inequality and homicide that their variable, i.e., poverty, measured as the percent of the population with incomes below 75% of the poverty line was a significant predictor of homicide in Manhattan, New York. Economic inequality, measured as the Gini coefficient of income concentration, was found to have negligible effects on homicide rates. Quite similar to Messner and Tardiff (1986), Parker (1989), using disaggregate homicide data, found that poverty was the most consistent and important predictor for all homicide types in his analysis.
However, another study that used disaggregated homicide data to examine the effect of poverty on homicide rates found slightly different effects of the variable with different types of homicide. In particular, Kovandzic, et al., (1998) found poverty to have a positive and significant effect only for acquaintance homicide. The authors contend that while prior studies have shown a positive and significant relationship between poverty and homicide, the results of their study shows that the type of homicide matters. The authors further demonstrated that—contrary to the findings of most studies conducted in the 1980s concerning the effects of inequality on homicide rates—their recent study, conducted with data from a different economic time period in the United States, showed that income inequality was significantly and positively related to homicide. This was, however, not found across all homicide types. More specifically, their findings revealed that income inequality was significantly associated with family and stranger homicide.

The poverty/income/economic inequality debate in macro-level crime and violence research has lessened over the years as more studies have begun to statistically combine various measures of poverty and inequality into a “concentrated disadvantage” index. This concentrated disadvantage measure is a combination of highly correlated explanatory variables which usually include three or more of the following structural covariates: poverty, median family income, percentage of households receiving public assistance, percentage of children not living with both parents, percentage of female-headed households with children, percentage of single-parent households, percentage of blacks, and percentage of unemployed residents (Hannon, 2005; Krivo and Peterson, 1996; Kubrin and Wadsworth, 2003; Morenoff et. al., 2001). Using a concentrated
disadvantage index or what is otherwise called a “resource-deprivation/affluence component” (Land, McCall and Cohen, 1990), or a “neighborhood disadvantage” index (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003) is now common practice in most macro-level, social disorganization research. As expected, most studies that have included a disadvantage index in their models have found it to be positively and significantly related to homicide rates.

**Family Structure**

Sampson (1986) is credited for theoretically highlighting the role and importance of family structures on neighborhood-level violence. In his earlier works, Sampson (1986a, 1986b) empirically showed that high levels of crime and violence were more likely in communities with families that have been disrupted either by divorce or by single-parent/female-headed circumstances. Likewise, other studies have produced similar findings concerning the effects of family disruption on crime and violence rates (Blau and Blau, 1982; Kovandzic et al., 1998; Land et. al., 1990; Messner and Tardiff, 1986; Messner and Golden, 1992; Smith and Jarjoura, 1988; Wilson, 1987). Notwithstanding the different ways “family disruption” has been measured—e.g., percentage of black households with female heads, percentage of divorced males, percentage of divorced and separated individuals, percentage of married couples, percentage of single-headed households, percentage of female-headed households (with children)—it has been found to be positively and significantly correlated with homicide.

For instance, one of the most respected studies in macro-level research conducted by Land and his colleagues (1990: 947) found their measure of family disruption – the percentage of divorced males in the population – to be positively and significantly
associated with homicide rates across three time periods (1960, 1970, 1980). Avakame’s (1997) study on urban homicide in Chicago found family instability defined as the “percentage of households with married couples” to be a significant predictor of homicide. Likewise, two other studies, Shihadeh and Steffensmeier (1994) and Osgood and Chambers (2002) used similar measures of family disruption (the percentage of female-headed households with children) and found this variable to be the strongest predictor of juvenile violent crimes and homicide.

**Population Density and Young Male Population (15-29 years)**

Ecological studies have produced inconsistent findings concerning the relationship between crime and violence rates and population density (Osgood and Chambers, 2000). The main rationale for examining the effect of population density on macro-level crime and violence rates is that in more densely populated areas anonymity among residents is more pronounced and when this guardianship decreases, crime and violence rates increases (Roncek, 1981). Widely incorporated into neighborhood violence research as a structural covariate is the variable “young male population” (age 15-29 years). This variable has been found to be an important predictor of neighborhood crime rates in some studies, but insignificant in others (Kubrin, 2003; Hannon, 2005; Smith and Jarjoura, 1988).

**Civic Engagement**

The few criminological studies that have examined the relationship between civic engagement and homicide have relied on one or more of the following indicators as measures of civic engagement. These are (1) electoral/secular civic engagement
(participation in national elections); (2) voluntary civic engagement (participation in national voluntary organizations); and (3) religious civic engagement (participation in faith-based institutions). For instance, in a study conducted by Rosenfeld and colleagues (2001) the authors used civic engagement and social trust as indicators of their social capital variable to examine the relationship between social capital and homicide. They further used two indicators to capture their civic engagement variable – electoral participation (national elections) and participation in a national voluntary organization (the Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks). In addition to this, the authors also conducted a separate analysis of their civic engagement measure without the indicator voluntary membership in a national organization.

Overall, the findings from this study indicate that “depleted social capital contributes to high levels of homicide” (Rosenfeld and colleagues, 2001: 283). They further noted that their findings remained the same with and without the national voluntary participation indicator (Elks membership). In short, this study suggest that social trust and involvement in civic engagement activities such as voter participation influence low homicide rates.

Two other noteworthy studies used disaggregated measures of their civic engagement variable – religious forms of civic engagement and secular forms of civic engagement (voter participation) – to examine the relationship between civic engagement and homicide levels (Lee, 2008; Lee and Bartkowski, 2004). The main argument put forth by these scholars is that “communities with high levels of civic engagement are better off on a variety of civic welfare outcomes, including lower property and unemployment rates, higher median incomes, and lower violent crime rates” (Lee, 2008:
Both studies conclude with similar findings that suggest that electoral and faith-based civic engagement activities have a strong and negative effect on homicide rates net of the effects of other control variables such as measures of resource deprivation which include poverty, female-headed households, unemployment, percent black, and high school drop-outs.

Limitations of Prior Research and Prospects for Cross-Cultural Homicide Research

Chapters 2 and 3 showed that although criminological research on the neighborhood structural factors that predict differential rates of crime and violence has substantially expanded over several decades, largely missing in the literature are more studies that employ cross-cultural examinations of this type of analysis. Homicide is a crime that varies from one culture to another and the factors that influence this type of violent crime are not uniform across different societies. Homicide is also one of the most widely studied areas of criminological research. Yet, currently not much is known about the structural characteristics of neighborhoods that predict homicides in different countries specifically those in less industrialized and poorer nations. It is therefore evident that cross-cultural homicide studies are lacking. With this in mind, criminological homicide research that extends to other regions has the potential to shed new light on the neighborhood structural correlates that influence homicides in other cultures.

Currently, there are a handful of studies that have examined the social, economic, and political correlates of crime and violence in the Caribbean community. Nevertheless, criminological studies on crime and justice issues in the developing countries of the Caribbean are few and scanty focused. Ellis (1991: 255) argues that, “despite the problem of rapidly increasing, excessively high rates of certain types of crime in many
Third World countries, virtually nothing exists in the literature which might be regarded as theoretical explanations, developed from the systematic study of crime in these societies.” Likewise, Harriott (2003: ix), has pointed out the need for research that is “more empirically grounded, and more methodologically rigorous.”

There are quite a number of ethnographic, descriptive, and qualitative studies that have examined the nature and social causes of violence in Jamaica (Clarke, 2006; Eyre, 1984; Figueroa and Sives, 2003, 2002; Harriott, 1996; Headley, 2002; Henry-Lee, 2005; Levy, 2001; Sives, 2002; 2003). However, only a few studies have attempted to conduct a macro-level analysis of the social structural correlates of violence in Jamaica. Despite this, one study has attempted to identify the economic and socio-demographic correlates of crime in Jamaica (see Ellis, 1991). Using data from multiple government agencies, this study found a significant and positive effect of age (14-24 years) and the decline in the growth of the economy on crime rates in Jamaica (Ellis, 1991). Since the publication of this work, there has been a call for more research designs that employ quantitative methodologies to complement the rich data from the extant batch of qualitative examinations of crime and violence in Jamaica.

There are several incentives for conducting macro-level research in developing countries such as Jamaica; however, two are especially salient. First, criminological research in developing countries has the potential to advance and possibly reshape theory (Blazicek and Janeksela, 1978). Bennett (1980: 253) contends that “the cross-cultural method affords the researcher an opportunity to assess the power of a theory by either determining its scope and/or generalizability, or – and this is more important – by presenting comparison groups on the social system level not possible within one culture.”
Therefore, the study of lethal violence in a different cultural environment has the potential to facilitate the theoretical refinement of current approaches that provide explanations for the spatial dynamics of crime (Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987: 786).

Second, research on the macro-level factors associated with differential rates of crime and violence have been conducted in the United States (Avakame, 1997; Baller et. al., 2001; Kubrin and Wadsworth, 2003; Kubrin, 2003; Land, McCall and Cohen, 1990; Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush, 2001; Patterson, 1991), Great Britain (Sampson and Groves, 1989), and Canada (Kennedy, Silverman and Forde, 1991). Suffice it to say, not much is empirically known about the macro-level sources of violence in less industrialized countries.

Chapter Review

This chapter presented an overview of the leading homicide studies that have examined the relationship between neighborhood structural characteristics and homicide. Reviewed were studies that examined the effects of important structural covariates such as poverty, family structure, population density, young male population, and civic engagement on homicide rates. Most significant about this chapter is that it highlights a major shortcoming of criminological homicide research. That is, the bulk of homicide studies have generally been conducted in countries such as the United States, Canada, and Britain. Therefore, beneficial to the criminological literature would be more studies on the structural factors that predict homicides in other regions of the world.

Homicide is a multidimensional crime. There are multiple factors that are associated with this type of lethal violence. A macro-level analysis of homicide in other countries not only allows for a more complete understanding of this lethal form of
violence but also expands the current state of knowledge about homicides in modern societies. This dissertation has the potential to expand the breadth of knowledge “to ascertain whether similar social processes account for crime in technologically developed and less developed societies” (Marshall and Abbott, 1973: 1). This research takes into account that societies are culturally diverse and that there are certain characteristics of neighborhoods in developing nations that are not necessarily found in more developed countries. Moreover, there are marked cultural differences related to the development and social organization of neighborhoods. The present study highlights these cultural differences and expands our understanding of the neighborhood structural characteristics that are associated with variations in homicide levels in a developing country.
CHAPTER IV – THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF VIOLENCE IN URBAN JAMAICA

In order to fully understand lethal violence in urban Jamaica, it is important to first understand the Jamaican political process (Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Harriott, 2003; Headley, 2002). As mentioned earlier, one distinctive aspect of the Jamaican society is the significance placed on civic activities such as voter participation. This chapter documents why and how politics has become a valued form of civic engagement in urban Jamaica. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the social and political context of violence in the Jamaican society as well as a general discussion on homicides in the country. It further provides a historical overview of Jamaican politics and details how the early years of democratic governance influenced the current state of political affairs and levels of violence among the urban poor. Information on Jamaica’s political culture, the mandate and mission of the country’s two leading political parties and their battles for power and governance is provided. Information on voting behavior and the collateral effects of clientelist political practices and political corruption is also presented.

This chapter describes the origins of politically segregated neighborhoods and how the construction of government housing created political conflict and tensions among the urban poor. Also discussed are the historical and political context of violence in urban Jamaica and the impact of competitive and fiercely contested elections on violence levels in disadvantaged urban neighborhoods. This chapter further details the relationship between the international narcotics trade and neighborhood-level crime and violence. The chapter then concludes with an analysis on the motives for homicide in
urban Jamaica. Overall, the main goal of this chapter is to examine the impact of public social control and government decision-making on violence levels in urban Jamaica.

Located south of Cuba and approximately 500 miles from Florida, Jamaica is one of 18 English-speaking countries in the Caribbean. With a population of approximately 2.8 million people in 2009, this former British colony has in the past two decades been on the forefront of global attention because of unprecedented rates of violent crimes. Jamaica has 14 parishes. There are 3 major urban areas in the country: Montego Bay, Kingston, and urban St. Andrew. The north coast of the island is the main hub for the tourist industry and is internationally known for its beauty and cultural artifacts. South of this is the capital city – the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA) – which consists of the parish Kingston and urban parts of St. Andrew. The KMA region has been described as the primate city because of its rapid urbanization and economic development and its high numbers of migrants from rural areas (Headley, 2002). Similar to major cities in other countries, the KMA is the economic hub for most business and financial enterprises and the headquarters for all government departments.

**Homicide Rates in Jamaica**

Jamaica’s homicide rate was relatively low and stable from 1880 to 1970 with a moderate increase from 1971-1975 (Johnson, 1987). Similar to crime patterns in other developing countries in the Caribbean during the 1970s, property offenses were higher than violent offenses in Jamaica (Harriott, 1996). However, by the early 1980s, there was a sharp shift in the country’s violent crime rate, specifically with regards to homicides. As seen in Figure 1, in 1980, Jamaica’s homicide rate was 41 per 100,000. Thereafter,
the country’s homicide rate decreased for a few years but then it began to steadily increase as of 2002.

![Figure 1: Homicide rates in Jamaica (1976-2008)](image)

As of 2008, the homicide rate in Jamaica reached its highest at 59 per 100,000 persons (Jamaica Gleaner, 2009). When compared to other nations such as the United States, Jamaica’s homicide rate is exceptionally high. For instance, over a 55 year period (1950 – 2005), the highest homicide rate in the United States was 10.2 per 100,000 in 1980 (Fox and Zawitz 2007). By 2005, the homicide rate in the U.S. had substantially decreased to 5.6 per 100,000 (Fox and Zawitz, 2007).

Jamaica’s major urban region - the KMA - is known as the murder capital of the country. This is the primary reason why this study is focused on this area. Official crime statistics from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) show that, between 2000
and 2005, there were approximately 7,186 homicides in Jamaica, of which, almost half that number –3,151– occurred in the KMA. This number is exceptionally high for a city with a population of about 700,000. In 2000, the homicide rate for the KMA was 69 per 100,000 while the homicide rate for the remainder of the country was 21 per 100,000 (see Chang, 2001). With this in mind, this current study sets out to investigate the macro-level factors that are associated with the high concentration of homicide in this urban region.

Jamaican Politics: The Early Years

Jamaica gained independence from Britain in August 1962. This was a major accomplishment given the country’s history of slavery and its long battle to achieve emancipation from slavery and independence from British rule. Many regard August 6, 1962 as the day the nation of Jamaica was officially born (Nettleford, 1989). However, before the country became an independent nation, it had achieved other major accomplishments such as universal adult suffrage in 1944, and by 1959, the transition into full internal self-government. Jamaica is a democratic nation with a parliamentary system. Jamaica is a part of the British Commonwealth and the Queen of England is the head of state. The Queen is represented by a Governor General and the Prime Minister is the head of government. The two major political parties in Jamaica are the Peoples National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP). These political parties compete at least every five years for electoral votes, power, and control over government. Formed in the 1930s and early 1940s, both political parties have, since their inception, engaged in highly competitive and partisan political practices.
According to Stone (1989: 20), both political parties were part of a national movement for change that sought to represent the black majority and democratize a political system that was, at that time, dominated by white and light-skinned planters and merchants. Jamaica’s two dominant political parties emerged at a time when the country was experiencing labor rebellions and riots and citizens were calling out for change in the country’s system of governance (Clarke, 2006; Stone, 1989). Following the abolition of slavery in 1834, the majority of blacks sought to have their voices heard and be fully integrated in the affairs of the country. In the early 1900s, the government was controlled by the British and the majority of black citizens were excluded from any decision-making and political process. During this period, there was widespread racial tension and class segregation in Jamaica. Nevertheless, by the mid-1900s, with the formation of two political parties, and the inclusion of the poorer working classes in the electoral process, Jamaica began its journey toward creating a democratic government system.

The PNP and the JLP were instrumental in leading the country into full self-government and independence. They also shared similar views regarding social and economic policy issues. For instance, both political parties believed that social services and welfare programs for the poorer working classes should be provided by the state. Both parties were also vested in bringing about reforms in the educational and health care systems, providing housing for those in need, developing national insurance plans for retired workers, and allotting financial support to farmers (Stone, 1989). Nevertheless, there were clear policy and ideological differences between the two ruling political parties. These differences, outlined in Table 1, have generally remained the same since the inception of both political parties.
Despite the above-mentioned differences, both political parties had one main objective in common. They wanted to be political representatives for poor black working-class Jamaicans. In fact, one distinctive feature of Jamaican political culture has been the active participation of lower class citizens in the political process. Although both political parties represented the interest of the upper and middle classes and the white minority, they were acutely focused on attracting the working class poor. The leaders of the two political parties wanted to make life better for the working class majority and defend their interests and political rights (Clarke, 2006). In fact, both the PNP and JLP have been described throughout the years as the poor people’s parties.
(Stone, 1995). In the 1950s, both political parties received overwhelming support from Jamaican black citizens who rallied for political inclusion and a place to be heard. This also became evident in the numbers of poor people that were members of the political parties. According to Stone (1995: 50), 75 percent of party members in both political parties came from the bottom 40 percent of income earners.

Over time, the working class became the most loyal and active supporters of the two political parties in Jamaica. According to Stone (1989: 20), “in the eyes of the majority of the poorer classes, these mass parties represented their only means through which to influence the Jamaican power structure.” They believed that the political leaders gave them the respect and recognition they desired, that the parties were their only means of inclusion in governmental decision-making, and also that the parties were their primary source of economic survival (Clarke, 2006; Eyre, 1984; Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Sives, 2002; Stone, 1973; 1985). Whereas middle and upper class Jamaicans may switch votes between political parties depending on policies and proposed political agenda, the lower classes remained unwavering one-party supporters (Clarke, 2006).

The Electoral System: Constituencies and Voting

The first national election took place on December 12, 1944. The JLP led by Sir Alexander Bustamante defeated rival PNP party leader, Norman Washington Manley, in the first and second national elections. In these early years, the right to vote was taken seriously as many Jamaicans felt a sense of national pride to elect government leaders (Sives, 2002; Stone, 1985). Enfranchisement also served as a reminder of their independence and self-governance. As Stone (1985) explained:
…a majority of [Jamaicans] who identified something to be proud of referred to the Jamaican citizens’ right to vote. The right to choose political leaders periodically and to exercise choice regarding which faction of leaders should govern has been invested not only with feelings of pride but has become valued as a means by which ordinary citizens exercise real power over the political community (Stone, 1985: 49).

Jamaica’s electoral model is based on the first-past-the-post system and not proportional representation. This means that representatives from both political parties vie for constituency votes during parliamentary national elections. Constituencies are geographical political units. Jamaica has a total of 60 constituencies that are each represented by an elected Member of Parliament. Under the parliamentary system of democratic governance, the 60 elected Members of Parliament serve in the House of Representatives and the Senate is represented by 21 Jamaican citizens appointed by the Governor General. At election time, the political party with the most constituency seats becomes the governing party and remains in office until the next national election. For voting purposes, electoral divisions are divided into smaller units called polling divisions. Voting takes place at polling divisions.

Kingston, the capital city, is divided into three constituencies: Kingston Western, Kingston Central, and Kingston East and Port Royal. Figure 2 is a map of all three constituencies. These constituencies are notoriously known to be places where fierce political battles occur during election periods (Figueroa and Sives, 2002; Headley, 2002; Henry-Lee, 2005; Stone, 1985). In Kingston Western, the political party of choice is the JLP. The PNP dominates both Kingston East and Port Royal, and Kingston Central. There are 12 constituencies in St. Andrew. Of these 12 constituencies, nine of them—St. Andrew South, St. Andrew South Western, St. Andrew South Eastern, St. Andrew
Western, St. Andrew East Central, and St. Andrew West Central–have been identified as political party strongholds. In other words, the majority of the electorate in these areas tends to vote consistently for the same political party (Clarke, 2006; Figueroa and Sives, 2002).

Stone (1985: 58) notes that in these constituencies “the loyal party voters feel deep reverence for party top leaders, look to them for guidance on national political issues, and are generally supportive of the role the leaders and parties play in the political community.” These constituencies are also the most popular and highly contested political seats in the entire country. They have been at the forefront of national political attention because of high incidents of electoral fraud and malpractice, multiple voting, and voter intimidation (Clarke, 2006; Figueroa and Sives, 2003, Munroe, 1999).

Partisan political practices have been more pronounced in the structurally disadvantaged constituencies in Kingston and urban St Andrew. In these constituencies, neighborhoods are divided along clear political lines.

Political party affiliations have become a significant part of neighborhood identity among the urban poor so much that during national elections local streets are decorated with party colors (green for the JLP and orange for the PNP). The colors of the political parties are usually painted on walls, sidewalks, and buildings to clearly display the neighborhood’s party of choice. Moreover, in many of these areas, it is not possible to have a neighbor with a different political affiliation and, for the majority of people, the idea of voting for the opponent is simply not an option (Figueroa and Sives, 2002: 98; Sives, 2002: 85). Strong political affiliations, sharp political divisions, and party rivalries are defining features of Jamaica’s political culture. For some scholars, such aspects of
politics in Jamaica were the inevitable result of the development of clientelist political relationships formed between politicians and their loyal supporters who are largely residents from poor urban neighborhoods (Goulbourne, 1984; Sives, 2002; Stone, 1985).

**Clientelist Political Relationships**

“Clientelism” is a political term that has been used by scholars to describe “a complex chain of personal bonds between political patrons or bosses and their individual clients or followers” (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002: 2). In its extreme form, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002: 2) describe clientelism as the “politics of survival” for both politicians and the people they represent. According to Kaufman (1974:285), the clientelistic, patron-based relationship evolves between actors of unequal power and status, and is based on the principle of reciprocity; that is, it is a self-regulating form of interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of which depends on the return that each actor expects to obtain by rendering goods and services to each other and which ceases once the expected rewards fail to materialize.

Clientelism therefore occurs when the political patron who has access to material resources, state patronage, private or public wealth, distributes it to favored clients who are, to a large extent, the most disadvantaged and destitute in the society (Johnson, 2005; Sives, 2002: 69). In exchange for the material and economic assistance they receive from politicians, the beneficiaries offer their loyalties and votes. Clientelist political systems are generally found in developing countries with high levels of poverty, inequality, and electoral corruption, such as Mexico, Jamaica, the Philippines, India, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002; Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Kaufman, 1974).
It is usually the lower working class masses in Third World countries that are tied up in the patron-client relationship because of extreme levels of poverty and a lack of access to material and financial resources. However, this is not to say that clientelist-based politics is a distinctive feature of politics only in developing countries. The clientelism style of politics has also been a feature of political cultures in advanced industrialized countries. For instance, the political boss system and political machines were forms of clientelism that were once part of U.S. political history and culture. In fact, in the 1900s, U.S. politics was driven by patronage politics, urban political machines, boss rule, and extensive corruption (Elazar, 1998: xxviii; Stucky, 2003).

Table 2 provides an excellent comparison of the differences between the clientelistic style and the general principles of democratic governance. The table shows how clientelist political systems work and the nature of the political relationship that government leaders have with supporters. There are four key words that stand out in the table: loyalty, personal favors, personalities, and patronage. These key words clearly summarize what clientelism is all about in modern democracies. Clientelism, developed through political loyalties, personal favor, personalities, and political patronage, is deeply rooted in Jamaican politics. For some scholars, clientelism in Jamaica occurs on a community basis and not an individual level (Figueroa and Sives, 2002). It is whole communities, not individuals that benefit from state largesse and political patronage. This, in turn, generates large numbers of electoral supporters in these neighborhoods and ensures one-party dominance and rule.
The development of clientelism in Jamaica, according to Sives (2002: 74), is linked to populist personality politics. For Stone (1985: 81), it developed out of a system in which “political parties provide a channel by which the very poor and powerless can access political and economic benefits.”

### Table 2

**Comparisons of the Clientelistic and Democratic Style of Political Governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clientelistic</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority is personal, resides with individuals</td>
<td>Authority is institutional, resides with official roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal enrichment and aggrandizement are core values</td>
<td>Rule of law, fair elections and majority rule are core values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders tend to monopolize power and are unaccountable for their actions</td>
<td>Leaders share power with others and are accountable for actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders’ relationship to supporters is opaque and may be unreliable</td>
<td>Leaders’ relationship to supporters is transparent and is predictable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No regular procedures exist regarding leaders’ replacement</td>
<td>Regular procedures exist regarding leaders’ replacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders hold onto power by providing personal favors that secure loyalty of key followers</td>
<td>Leaders hold onto power by providing collective benefits that earn support of large segments of society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy decisions are taken in secret without public discussion or involvement</td>
<td>Policy decisions are taken in the open after public discussion and review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties are organized around personalities</td>
<td>Political parties are organized around stated programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society is fragmented and characterized by vertical links</td>
<td>Civil society is deep and characterized by horizontal links</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making standards are tacit and procedures impossible to follow from outside</td>
<td>Decision-making standards are explicit and procedures are transparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters’ interest guide decisions</td>
<td>Public interest guides decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensive scope exists for patronage Appointments</td>
<td>Limited scope exists for patronage appointments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

have some access to the levers of decision-making and can have their interests represented through the machinery of the political party that seeks their votes, their loyalty, their commitment, and their enthusiasm in being part of a coalition of interests that compete for control over the state or the public domain of power” (Stone, 1985: 51). In Jamaica, politicians would reward loyal supporters and the party faithful with valuable scarce resources such as money, land and housing contracts, and jobs in return for continued support and votes (Goulbourne, 1984; Johnson, 2005; Sives, 2003; Stone, 1985). The dependence on elected officials has led to the development of informal symbiotic relationships between voters and party candidates. Some scholars have argued that the clientelistic style of politics is somewhat of a “refined” form of class control (Sives, 2003:67) in poor urban neighborhoods.

Clientelism is largely based on the politicians’ access to state largesse and resources. In Jamaica, distributing political hand-outs to partisan party supporters is not regarded as corrupt political practice or the misuse of state resources but is instead justified as a legitimate show of appreciation to loyal voters (Sives, 2003). However, without access to political hand-outs (contracts, housing, jobs etc.) to supporters, the clientelistic political relationship is weak. As stated by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002: 4), “clientelistic relationships are vulnerable to anything that disrupts the flow of material benefits to clients and supporters.” In other words, clientelism decreases when politicians are no longer able to provide rewards, funds, and certain benefits to loyal voters.

Clientelism also diminishes when people become less dependent on politicians for assistance with housing and other scarce benefits (Sives, 2003). Although patron-client
relationships dominated Jamaican politics for over 40 years, it was not until the 1980s and beyond that there were substantial changes in the nature of the political patron-client relationship. Economic and policy changes in government expenditures and a decline in state resources greatly reduced clientelist-based politics in Jamaica. However, as Sives (2002) poignantly argues, despite the gradual decline of clientelism in Jamaica, clientelist-based politics will always be a part of Jamaican politics because political loyalties and party affiliations remain strongly rooted in Jamaica’s political culture.

**Poverty and Politics: Neighborhood Segregation of the Urban Poor**

One highly sought after scarce resource that politicians allocated to loyal supporters in poor urban neighborhood is housing: a place to live and call home. The beneficiaries of these housing accommodations were generally working class families with marginal education levels and low incomes. The Jamaican government began large scale construction of housing units for poorer working classes in the capital city, Kingston, in the early 1960s (Stone, 1989). The construction of housing units and the development of housing schemes in Kingston were largely based on political patronage and clientelist-based politics as many of these homes were given to supporters of the political party in state office at that time – the JLP. In 1959, the PNP won the country’s fourth general election and had initiated the construction of several housing units for the working class masses (Sives, 2002).

The JLP were, however, victorious in the fifth and sixth general elections that took place in 1962 and 1967 respectively. During these two terms in office, the JLP, as a reward to its voters, took over the construction of housing units initiated by the PNP. It is estimated that during these two terms, the JLP built approximately 1500 housing units per
annum (Stone, 1989). Not surprisingly, the construction of housing units for only JLP voters and supporters in geographic spaces once controlled by the PNP party caused tension and anger as loyal PNP supporters, the original beneficiaries, were now left without housing. What made matters worse was that PNP supporters were not given jobs, particularly jobs to work on the housing construction sites. They were also excluded from access to other scarce benefits and resources once the new party took office (Sives, 2002; Stone, 1985). According to Sives (2002: 75), “resentment and antagonism were strong between the new residents of the area and PNP supporters that had seen their homes destroyed, were not allocated housing, and were denied employment on the construction site.”

In the next two general elections that took place in 1972 and later on in 1976, the PNP won. By this time, the JLP had built hundreds of housing units and had geographically created politicized neighborhoods. Faced with pressures from dedicated party supporters, the winning party, the PNP, had to now meet the housing needs of their loyal voters and distribute political hand outs as rewards for high voter turnout for the party in the general elections. The PNP therefore began large scale construction of government housing that outpaced the numbers constructed by the losing party. According to Stone (1989:25), the PNP followed the construction of new housing “by building at an even higher rate of 2500 units per annum, accelerating from 1500 annual production over the 1972-74 period to 2800 per annum in the 1975-77 period and to 3400 per annum over the 1978 to 1980 period.” Again, this resulted in the creation of politicized neighborhoods with one-party dominance.
The PNP justified the building of housing schemes for its loyal supporters by “arguing that for the previous ten years JLP supporters had received the material benefits that come when one’s party control the resources of the state” (Sives, 2002: 78). After two consecutive terms in office, the PNP lost the 1980 elections. As expected, the JLP continued the construction of government-funded housing by building an additional 3000 units each year from 1981 to 1983 for its loyal supporters (Stone, 1989). By 1985, both political parties had created and firmly established political strongholds in several communities. In these neighborhoods, the majority of party supporters did not pay rent or mortgage expenses and they enjoyed free utilities and services (Figueroa and Sives, 2002; Harriott, 2003). It is worthwhile to note that large scale government-constructed housing units that took place between 1962 and 1980 were built in Kingston and St. Andrew. Such large scale, state-funded housing schemes were not built for loyal party supporters in any other parts of the island.

Throughout the years, both political parties had engaged in clientelist-based politics. Both political parties had rallied and gained loyal, hard core party membership from the poor working class masses through their populist leadership styles. In return for their support, the party faithful would receive more than government-funded housing. Political patronage included a wide range of benefits such as employment in government projects; contracts to carry out government projects in the building of new economic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, markets and water supplies; contracts to work on construction jobs; and highly sought after opportunities for overseas employment in contract labor schemes in the United States (Stone, 1985: 54).
Garrison Neighborhoods: Political Hotspots and Urban Violence

The mass construction of government-funded housing units that were allocated to party supporters in the city’s poorest neighborhoods created what has been termed “garrison” communities (Stone, 1985; Sives, 2002). The word ‘garrison’ originated in the work of famed political scholar Carl Stone. The word garrison is used to best describe extremely poor neighborhoods in Kingston and urban St Andrew that over the years have become political and military-style strongholds that maintain complete territorial authority, control, and protection over its residents (Chevannes, 1992; Henry-Lee, 2005; Stone, 1985). The strong impact of turf politics, defined as the process by which political parties seek geographic and positional control over given areas as part of their electoral strategy (Figueroa and Sives, 2002:86) and the clientelist system in Jamaica resulted in the formation, growth, and permanent existence of garrison neighborhoods in the KMA.

Of the 60 constituencies across the island, 8 have been officially identified as garrison constituencies (National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997). Moreover, six of the eight are located in the KMA. Five of these constituencies have been described as being completely dominated with garrison neighborhoods. These include: St. Andrew West Central, St. Andrew Southern, St. Andrew South Western, Kingston Western, and Kingston Central. In consecutive national elections, politicians have securely maintained their seats in parliament by controlling the votes in these constituencies. In garrison neighborhoods, political gangs guard and defend clearly defined political territories and neighborhood boundaries with high powered assault rifles and guns (Bertram, 2005; Stone, 1985). Political gangs in garrison neighborhoods developed out the collective
need to protect the neighborhood’s political identity from invasion by rival party supporters (Chevannes, 1992). Armed political gangs are also there to protect fellow residents from potential danger and harm from neighbors in rival adjacent communities.

Garrison neighborhoods are also ‘closed’ communities meaning that any significant social, political, economic or cultural development within the community can only take place with the tacit approval of the designated community leaders known as Dons\(^1\) or political officials (Figueroa and Sives, 2002: 85). Entry and exit in these communities are controlled by political gangs and other residents (Chevannes, 1992). In some of these communities, neighborhood boundaries are blocked off using large pieces of debris such as pieces of zinc and large concrete structures. Residents in garrison communities tend to vote exclusively for the political party that gave them free housing. Residents who do not vote for the neighborhood’s political party of choice are either burnt out or chased out at gunpoint (National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997; Stone, 1985: 57). Therefore, only those who fervently support the neighborhood’s political party are allowed to reside there. Individual and collective acts of violence have been used to achieve political homogeneity in these areas (Sives, 2002). Therefore, garrison neighborhoods in the KMA are individually known and identified only by their political affiliations.

Residents benefit a great deal from living in garrison communities, although this sometimes comes at a cost. By living in a garrison neighborhood, residents are able to receive aid from the community dons and politicians to raise their children and send them

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\(^1\) Dons are leaders in some communities in the KMA region that were either appointed by political leaders because of their strong political ties or by community members because of their fearless character and leadership styles. Community dons are also heavily involved in drug crimes and are considered gang leaders in their respective communities.
to school. Residents also receive help with food, clothing, and other living expenses. They are able to live rent-free and without paying light and water bills. In fact, utility companies are unable to collect monies for bills from garrison community residents because not only are they barred from entering these communities, but also because of the political connections in these areas, these companies simply do not interfere with non-payment of utilities bills from these areas (Figueroa and Sives, 2002; Harriott, 2002).

Elections and Voting Behavior

When national elections are called, registered voters in all 60 constituencies cast their votes in ballot boxes at various polling stations across the island. Elections in Jamaica have been marred and tainted by years of electoral malpractice and manipulation, illegal and criminal activities, partisan-political violence, and homogeneous voting (Clarke, 2006; Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Munroe, 1999; Sives, 2003). Different forms of electoral corruption in Jamaica have included: voter intimidation tactics; stolen ballot boxes; over-voting; politically motivated violence; flawed voters lists and misconduct of police personnel (Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Munrooe, 1999).

Jamaican elections have had numerous incidents of over-voting, which occurs in constituencies when the total number of recorded votes are more than the actual number of registered voters in a polling station (Figueroa and Sives, 2002). At some polling stations, ballot boxes have been stolen; in others, ballot boxes were brought in by unknown persons and poll books were confiscated. Most seriously of all, however, supporters armed with lethal weapons have invaded polling stations, and electoral
officers assigned to polling stations have been threatened and, in one known case, killed (Carter Center, 2003; Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Munroe, 1999).

Suffice it to say, elections in Jamaica have not always been free and fair. Jamaica’s democratic system has suffered greatly from a number of electoral malpractices. Up until 1997, registered voters were not mandated to show their national voters identification cards at polling stations (Figueroa and Sives, 2003). Not surprisingly, there were cases where unregistered persons voted and numerous cases of flawed voter lists (Munroe, 1999). Voter-buying, the stuffing of ballot boxes and the closing of polling stations on Election Day as early as 10 a.m. (only a few hours before they were opened) were other problems that corrupted the electoral process in Jamaica (Figueroa and Sives, 2002). Moreover, political parties and members of the police force were accused of being involved with acts of electoral malpractice and manipulation (Figueroa and Sives, 2003). Additionally, the practice of homogenous voting, defined as the process wherein one political party received either all the votes or all but ten or less votes in a ballot box, became one of the most problematic and corrupt features of the electoral process in Jamaica (Figueroa and Sives, 2002).

One-party electoral dominance has become the norm in these politicized neighborhoods where high levels of voter turnout, sometimes over 90 per cent of recorded votes in both local and general elections are received by the same political party (Figueroa and Sives, 2002; Harriott, 2003). Homogeneous voting and high voter turnout occurred in constituencies where 80 to 98 per cent of the votes were cast for one party (Figueroa and Sives, 2002; 2003). In advanced industrialized countries such as the United States, high voter turnout is viewed positively as a form of civic engagement
Coleman, 2002; Rosenfeld, Messner and Baumer, 2001). In Jamaica, however, it is more likely to be indicative of partisan politics, electoral manipulation, intimidation, and coercion. The table below gives an idea of voting behavior in some of Jamaica’s constituencies. In the three constituencies below, elected political representatives receive 76 percent or more of the votes over the course of three consecutive national elections (Henry-Lee, 2005). The table simply highlights the fact that, in some constituencies, the majority of residents have remained extremely loyal party supporters over the years.

### Table 3

**Voting Behavior in Three Garrisons in the KMA for the years 1993, 1997, and 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Percentage of votes received by the winner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston Western</td>
<td>Jamaica Labor Party (JLP)</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrew South Western</td>
<td>People’s National Party (PNP)</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrew Southern</td>
<td>People’s National Party (PNP)</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Decades of Lethal Violence in Jamaica**

There is really no debate as to whether or not much of the violence that occurred in Jamaica since its independence in 1962 is related to clientelist-based politics. Based on the foregoing discussion, it is well established that violence is geographically concentrated in core garrison communities in Jamaica’s metropolitan region. This section of the chapter traces the development of lethal violence in Jamaica. The goal is to provide a better understanding of the intersection between politics and lethal forms of
violence. One characteristic of clientelism is the use of partisan political violence (Clarke, 2006; Goulbourne, 1984; Sives, 2002). The competition for state power between the two rival political parties in Jamaica has always been bloody and dangerous in Kingston and urban St. Andrew constituencies.

The political fight for dominance and control over state government between the two major political parties created warfare among partisan party supporters in rival political communities created by government officials (Goulbourne, 1984; Sives, 2002; Stone, 1985). Supporters of one political party would engage in violent acts such as the stoning, stabbing, and killing of supporters of the rival party (Clarke, 2006; Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Sives, 2003). It is now clear that this occurs when the winning party in power distributes political patronage only to favored loyal supporters. This made supporters of the opposition party irate because they were no longer able to receive political patronage and government-funded housing units from political leaders.

Pre-Independence Violence (1940s to 1950s)

Jamaica’s two political parties, as discussed earlier, were formed in the 1940s and the country had its first national elections in 1944. During this period, both political parties began engaging in competitive politics and by the time the country had its second national elections in 1949, partisan political violence had been a feature of the democratic process (Headley, 2002; Sives, 2003). Several months before the December elections, media reports gave accounts of people being stoned, beaten, and killed because of their political affiliations (Sives, 2003). Political party meetings and rallies were also disrupted by members of the rival party who “threw stones at political meetings, attacked
and abused and insulted opponents” (Headley, 2002: 69). For instance, on 3 July 1949, JLP party supporters disrupted a PNP meeting with three hundred people by throwing stones at PNP party supporters (Sives, 2003). The next day, the PNP retaliated by invading a political meeting by JLP supporters (Sives, 2003).

Political attacks were not only targeted at supporters but also at political leaders. In a 1942 newspaper report, the then leader of the PNP, Norman Washington Manley, made claims that he had been abused, kicked and stoned by JLP supporters. He went on to further to accuse the then JLP leader Alexander Bustamante of instigating political acts of violence against PNP supporters (Sives, 2003). Political acts of violence were therefore used to intimidate members of the rival party and disrupt campaigning efforts. According to Sives (2003: 59), “by 1949 both political parties were engaged in violence to achieve political goals: the JLP to keep the PNP off the streets of Kingston and the PNP to force their way back, to campaign for their party and their union movement.” Moreover, during the 1950s, the strong dislike for rival party supporters started to become noticeable in local communities as members of one party refused to cohabit in certain sections with rival supporters (Headley, 2002).

*Post-Independence Violence (1960s to 1980s)*

Engagement in politics had great meaning for the poor working class masses. Politics was their road to social power and inclusion in government decision-making and national political affairs (Stone, 1985). In fact, political parties “gave people a sense of belonging (crucial given the colonial history of racism and exclusion), and in return the supporter voted for the party and made an effort to protect it” (Sives, 2003:74).
Protecting and securing party votes became an intrinsic part of the Jamaican political culture as “people were prepared to fight or kill to get their candidate elected and thus tap into the political-patronage network (Clarke, 2006: 428). It is not surprising then, within a 10 year period, between 1966 and 1976; the government of Jamaica twice declared a national state of emergency.

The first state of emergency was declared in May 1966, several months before the February 1967 general elections (Headley, 2002, Sives, 2002). During this time, the construction of state funded housing schemes was the major form of political patronage. Both parties had constructed hundreds of housing units for their loyal supporters. Over time, residents housed in these politicized spaces were forced to protect their property and neighborhood from members of the opposing party. Groups of men aligned themselves with political leaders and formed political gangs in these areas. These government-funded housing schemes, initially built in order to provide shelter for the poorer classes were eventually transformed in military headquarters where political gangs guarded and protected community residents (Clarke, 2006). Some argue that the use of violence during this time was largely an adaptive strategy for survival in these neighborhoods (Ellis (1987: 1).

It is said that politicians armed these gangs with lethal weapons and encouraged them to fight off political rivals to protect the neighborhood’s political identity (Gunst, 1995; Sives, 2002). In the 1960s, guns replaced machetes and political violence became a form of organized crime (Clarke, 2006). Neighborhoods in Jamaica’s capital city were now controlled by organized political gangs armed with high powered weapons who did not tolerate political differences (Sives, 2002). In 1966, conflicts between rival political
gangs caused national chaos and extensive violence, forcing the government to declare the country’s first state of emergency. Ten years later, in 1976, before and during national elections, widespread uncontrollable partisan political violence forced the government to declare its second national state of emergency. Although the increasing use of violence against voters of rival political parties created national crisis and mayhem in Jamaica, it was the sequence of events that occurred during the 1980 elections that left an indelible mark on the history of Jamaican politics.

Some scholars have described the intensity of violence that occurred in 1980 as a period of political Cold War in Jamaica (Clarke, 2006). Over 800 people lost their lives because of political conflicts and wars (Clarke, 2006; Headley, 2002; Sives, 2002); people were burnt out of their homes, and “whole communities were “cleansed” of supporters of the rival party” Sives (2002: 78). In fact, according to one study, an estimated 21,372 people were left homeless because of political battles; and a community that was populated with 55,000 residents in 1976, only had 32,000 by 1982 (Clarke, 2006: 431; Sives, 2002: 78). Free and fair voting was seemingly not a part of the electoral process during the 1980 election. People were fearful to go out and vote and were tight-lipped about their party of choice. During this election period, older people, women, and children were attacked and killed by political gangs (Headley, 2002). The massive destruction of homes in Jamaica’s capital city and the blatant contempt for supporters of rival parties along with political backing received from party leaders, electoral fraud and manipulation almost shattered the democratic process in Jamaica (Headley, 2002; Clarke, 2006).
The aftermath of the 1980 election left Jamaica in a state of political crisis. Politicians had simply lost control over their supporters (Sives, 2002) and the inter-party tribal war that took place in urban neighborhoods had escalated to uncontrollable levels. Neighborhoods were destroyed, people were displaced, and top-ranking leaders of political gangs began migrating, with the help of politicians, to the U.S., UK, and Canada (Clarke, 2006; Gunst, 1995). During the 1980s and 1990s, clientelism began to fade as the resources for state dispersal declined and the Jamaican government was faced with growing internal debt, high inflation, shortages of consumer goods, and a failing economy (Clarke, 2006; Sives, 2002; Stone, 1985). Party supporters were no longer able to depend on political patronage as contracts for government jobs ended.

Election-related violent incidents in Jamaica were not as widespread as previous years in the 1989, 1993, and 1997 elections. Although there were incidents of electoral malpractice and partisan-political violence in 1993 (Headley, 2002), it was the political gang violence that occurred in 2001 that led to the call for a national state of emergency (Clarke, 2006). The violence developed after three men were murdered in Kingston. Two of these men were notorious PNP political gang members. Allegations that the killings were politically motivated caused fellow PNP political gang members to retaliate against JLP supporters. This led to inter-community warfare and by the time peace was restored, 24 people had died and over 700 people were left without a home (Clarke, 2006; Headley, 2002).

The International Narcotics Trade

By the 1990s, dons and their gangs as well as residents in many of the inner-city neighborhoods in the KMA were no longer susceptible to political control (Gunst, 1995;
Sives, 2002). Soon, former political gang rivals now became drug rivals in the international drug trade (Gunst, 1995). With limited financial sources and mounting economic hardships, neighborhood dons began to search for alternate sources of financial survival. The smuggling of cocaine and marijuana to North America was now becoming a more lucrative option than payouts from political parties (Clarke, 2006’ Gunst, 1995). So too were different forms of criminal and illegal activities, such as extortion, bribery, gun trading, money laundering, fraud, illegal gambling and burglary (Gunst, 1995; Johnson and Soeters, 2008).

Jamaica became the major Caribbean transshipment country for cocaine and marijuana in the 1980s (Clarke, 2006; Gunst, 1995). During this time, Jamaican political dons who had migrated to Britain, Canada and the United States had formed drug strongholds and established sophisticated drug and gun trading rings. In the U.S., they were notoriously known as the Jamaican Posses and in the UK, they were called Yardies. While overseas posse members continued to maintain their political and social ties to Jamaica, as reported by Gunst (1995), profits made from drug sales and other illegal activities in the U.S. and the U.K. were used to financially support the two dominant political parties and home communities of posse members.

While in the U.S., their criminal networks and organized criminal involvements had grown to include illegal activities such as the production of fraudulent immigration documents, money laundering, and firearms trafficking (Leet et al., 2000). Two popular groups – the Spranglers posse who supported the PNP party and the Shower posse who strongly supported the JLP – became political drug rivals in the United States. By the
mid-1980s, these group of political gangsters collectively known as the Jamaican posse became one of the most organized and lethal drug gangs in the United States.

It is estimated that hundreds of Jamaican immigrants had joined different posses and were actively involved in the local and international drug trade between the United States and Jamaica. Posse groups were further involved in interstate and international transshipment of large quantities of high-powered guns that were used in killings in the U.S. and Jamaica. It is believed that the Jamaican posses were responsible for over a thousand murders in U.S. immigrant communities (Jamaica Gleaner, 2008a). They battled over money, power, and dominance in different U.S. states. Law enforcement investigations, studies, and reports on Jamaican posse groups have all revealed that it was their callous and torturous methods of killings that distinguished Jamaican posse groups from other criminal groups in the United States (Gay and Marquat, 1993; Leet et al., 2000; McGuire, 988).

Jamaican posses were viewed as a national threat and problem in the United States. It took a team of law enforcement agents and diligent work by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) in 1987 to eradicate several Jamaican posse groups. Operation Rum Punch, a nationwide raid that involved teams of federal, state and local law enforcement from different states and agencies, was specifically formed to arrest, prosecute, and dismantle the Jamaican posses (Gay and Marquat, 1993; Gunst, 1995; McGuire, 1988). The raid successfully led to the arrest and incarceration of hundreds of posse members and the permanent elimination of most posse groups in the U.S.
Although most of the criminal activities committed by the Jamaican posses have greatly declined, former members of the group remain active in the illegal trade of guns from Haiti to Jamaica and the trafficking of drugs from Colombia to the Bahamas and the U.S., the U.K. and Canada (Jamaica Observer, 2004). These illegal activities have turned into a billion dollar industry in which drug dons have accumulated millions of dollars. According to Johnson and Soeters (2008: 174), Jamaican dons make an estimated yearly income of up to 400 million Jamaican dollars which is equivalent to approximately 6 million U.S. dollars. This money has been used to assist residents in their neighborhoods; provide employment and income for their followers and, according to political scientist and government senator Dr. Trevor Munroe, finance political parties. Because there is no system of public financing for political parties, politicians rely heavily on donations from private sources and “given the shortage of resources, there can be little doubt that, despite formal denials and even opposition by party officials at the national level, drug money does get into party coffers” (Munroe, 1999: 65).

Motives for Homicides in Jamaica and the KMA

In the poor garrison neighborhoods, politicians were eventually replaced by drug lords as patrons; the politician don was now referred to as the drug don, and conflicts over neighborhood boundaries and political identities turned into disputes and battles over drug turfs and extortion rings (Clarke, 2006; Harman, 2006; Sives, 2002). From political fights across neighborhood borders over turf politics to warring over drug turfs, within three decades, Jamaica’s major metropolitan center had metamorphosed into one of the world’s most murderous cities. Political ‘wars’ and disputes between rival party supporters became turf ‘wars’ over drug and gun activities (Dowdney, 2003).
From the 1990s until today, in politically segregated neighborhoods in the KMA, there has been a substantial decrease in the number of politically-related homicides and a steady increase in drug and gang-related homicides. However, during election time, gang rivalries over drug turf are set aside and political gangs affiliated with the same party unite to fight traditional political rivals (Clarke, 2006: 434; Dowdney, 2003). As noted earlier, over 50 percent of all homicides in the country take place in and around garrison neighborhoods in the KMA. In terms of the motives for these homicides, Table 4 presents information on disaggregated homicide motives for the entire country and by police divisions in the Kingston and St. Andrew area.

Homicides in Jamaica are divided into 11 categories: drug-related, gang-related, domestic, reprisal, robbery, political, mob killing, rape, police/criminal confrontation, undetermined, and prisoner disturbances. Domestic homicides are cases in which an argument or fight between the victim and the perpetrator led to murder while reprisal homicides are revenge killings that have underlying causes such as previous robberies, disputes, drug or gang related activities (Lemard and Hemenway, 2006).

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2 I only had access to the 2001 disaggregated homicide data by police division and not by neighborhood level.
3 It is worth noting that drug/gang-related killings have been combined in some police recordings of homicides because most drug-related homicides have been associated with gang disputes. Another related issue is the overlap with drug/gang-related killings and reprisal killings. In agreement with Lemard and Hemenway (2006), the JCF’s disaggregation of homicide data categorized by motives are ambiguous.
Table 4
Motives for Homicide in Jamaica by Police Division (2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Entire Country</th>
<th>Kingston Central</th>
<th>Kingston Eastern</th>
<th>Kingston Western</th>
<th>St. Andrew Central</th>
<th>St. Andrew North</th>
<th>St. Andrew South</th>
<th>Total Kingston and St. Andrew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug Related</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang Related</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reprisal</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mob Killing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police/Criminal Confrontation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1139</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>661</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jamaica Constabulary Force Crime Review Period 1 Jan.01 to 31 Dec.01

As shown in the table, the majority of homicides in Jamaica are reprisal killings (N=368). The data further shows that island-wide, there are more domestic killings (N=331) than gang-related (N=180). However, in urban Jamaica – the Kingston and St Andrew area – there are more gang-related killings (N=155) than domestic killings (N=123). This is so given the presence of warring politically segregated neighborhoods that engage in gang battles over drug turf found only in this region of the country. Also not a surprise is the fact that all 8 homicides that have been classified as political occurred in Kingston.

Another interesting finding from the table is the number of police and criminal confrontations that have occurred. The data indicate that there have been a total of 5 reported killings in the country where police officers have shot and killed civilians, the majority of which took place in Kingston. This number seems quite small given the numerous accounts of police brutality and the excessive use of deadly force by law enforcement that have been reported by the local media and documented by human rights
organizations such as Amnesty International and Jamaicans for Justice. In sum, high levels of homicides are ecologically concentrated in the two parishes, Kingston and St Andrew. More specifically, in the St Andrew South police division, garrisons in constituencies such as St. Andrew South West and most of St. Andrew South recorded the highest number of homicides (Manning, 2008).

Taken together, politically segregated poor neighborhoods produce the highest levels of homicides that are more related to gang disputes, protection of drug turf, and reprisal killings than to political rivalry (Clarke, 2006; Henry-Lee, 2005; Sives, 2002). In these areas, drug dons use their political connections to keep the police and military forces out of their communities. These neighborhoods have become battlegrounds where gangs engage in disputes and revenge killings over drug turfs. In some of these neighborhoods, gang fights and killings take place outside the community. There are actually a few politically segregated neighborhoods that have no reported cases of crime and violence (Espeut, 2005; Johnson and Soeters, 2008). These tend to be the neighborhoods that are highly organized under the dominant rule and controls of a neighborhood don and heavily guarded by the ‘shottas’ (gangsters) (Espeut, 2005; Figueroa and Sives, 2002; Henry-Lee, 2005; Johnson and Soeters, 2008). Reprisal killings and gang fights take place close to the business district and in the more “open” neighborhoods that are adjacent to the highly politicized “closed” neighborhoods (Harriott, 2000; Levy, 2001).

Chapter Review

This chapter examined the social and political context of violence in urban Jamaica. Violence in Jamaica has been linked to politics (Figueroa and Sives, 2002;
As such, the main purpose of this chapter was to examine the nature and extent of the politics-violence relationship. This chapter presented a review of the early years of Jamaica’s political democratic style of governance, the practices and ideological differences between the two political parties, and the connections between violence and politics in urban Jamaica. It also documented how a clientelist based system and the political fight for power between the two leading political parties (the PNP and the JLP) created neighborhood segregation and conflict among the urban poor in the KMA.

Over the past 5 decades, partisan political practices in urban Jamaica led to development of what has been referred to as garrison neighborhoods. A symbiotic relationship developed between residents in highly politicized defended neighborhoods and their political representative. Once residents voted for a particular party in these neighborhoods, they were able to receive political largesse and access to scarce resources such as free housing, free utilities, and jobs. Residents in these highly politicized neighborhoods became loyal followers of the neighborhood’s political party of choice and guarded their neighborhood’s political identity from invasion and intimidation from rival political neighbors. Political affiliation therefore became a form of social identity among residents in poor urban neighborhoods in the KMA. During local and national elections mass support for elected officials are generally received by residents in these neighborhoods.

Political violence between rival neighborhoods also occurred during elections season. However, after elections, the violence does not cease in political hotspots. The poorer urban neighborhoods continue to engage in battles over political and gang
territory. In fact, as discussed earlier, a breakdown of the motives for homicides in the
KMA shows that most homicides are result from gang and reprisal killings. Additionally,
the majority of these killings tend to occur in and around highly politicized
neighborhoods of the KMA. In sum, the chapter examined the patterns in neighborhood-
level violence in urban Jamaica and the impact of public social control and political
decision-making on neighborhood organization, political segregation of the urban poor,
and violence levels. The next chapter outlines the design of the present study and the
data used in order to conduct a macro-level analysis of homicides in urban Jamaica.
CHAPTER V – RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

Research Challenges in a Developing Country

Conducting ecological research in developing countries can be a challenging and complex undertaking. One challenge in any research design is the availability of data, and more importantly, whether the available data are valid and reliable. In particular, concerns over the reliability of homicide data, as well as other official crime statistics collected in developing countries, are frequently discussed in the comparative criminological literature (Clinard and Abbott, 1973; Reichel, 1999). Developing countries have been criticized for the ways in which crime data are gathered and recorded and also for having inaccurate and unreliable data (Clinard and Abbott, 1973). Homicide data, however, are considered the most reliable of all crime data documented by the police in developing countries as under-reporting is usually not a problem (Reichel, 1999).

Another challenge concerns data aggregation, more specifically, the units of aggregation used by different data sources. For instance, data used in ecological research are generally from two main sources: the national census and official crime statistics. Data for the present study were obtained from three sources: the Jamaican census bureau (STATIN); the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ); and Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF).\(^1\) Using data from these three sources, albeit government

\(^1\) Although considered as public data, it was difficult to get data from all three agencies. In fact, data needed for this research were regarded as privileged by officials at the different government agencies. Formal permissions had to be granted in order to get access to data.
agencies, was particularly challenging because there is no uniformity with regard to how national data are collected and aggregated. The data used in this study were drawn from all three agencies which use different data collection and coding strategies for neighborhood-level data. In other words, JCF does not aggregate homicide data at the census tract level data—and the same problem was encountered in using electoral data. Thus, several steps had to be taken to aggregate data to the census tract level. Before these steps are explained, it is first necessary to provide a description of three government agencies and the data that are available for research purposes.

Data Description and Structuring

Data for the present study are from three sources: (1) the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) 2001 population and housing census data; (2) the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) three-year (2002 – 2005) homicide data; and (3) the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ) voter participation data for the 2002 general elections.

Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN): Census Data

The Statistical Institute of Jamaica has, as one of its mandates, taking the decennial census in Jamaica. Prior to 2001, twelve censuses have been taken in the country with the first one conducted in 1844. The scope of the Population and Housing census is based on the United Nations Principles and Recommendations and these were used as a guide to the construction of the two questionnaires: The Individual Questionnaire and The Household Questionnaire. In line with these guidelines, the individual questionnaire collects individual data on the following: age, sex, relationship to head of household, religious affiliations, ethnic origin, marital and union status,
educational attainment, chronic illness and disability, birthplace and residence. An important point to highlight about the Jamaica census is that, unlike censuses taken in the U.S., the data collected does not include information on income, labor force status and employment, occupation, industry and class of worker. The household questionnaire contains questions on household composition, infrastructure and basic amenities.

General information is collected on the characteristics housing units such as the type of housing unit, material of outer walls; and on the characteristics of household, that is, the number of rooms, land housing tenure, kitchen, bathroom and toilet facilities, method of garbage disposal, sources of water, lighting, fuel for cooking, the availability of telephone, and the use of a personal computer. There are also questions on migration and mortality, exposure to crime and violence and business activity in household.

STATIN has a unique way of collecting national census data. The island is divided into 5,235 geographic units known as enumeration districts (EDs). STATIN offers a thorough description of an ED:

Each ED is an independent unit which shares common boundaries with contiguous EDs. The number of dwellings/households contained in the ED (estimated before the census) was the primary determination of the size of an ED. This was approximately 150 dwellings/households in urban areas and 100 in rural areas. Each ED was designed to be of a size that would ensure an equitable work load for each census taker, and because dwellings are more widely spaced in rural areas than in urban areas, rural EDs usually contained fewer dwellings/households than their urban counterpart.

EDs are grouped together to form what are called special areas. Special areas are similar to what are referred to as census tracts in the U.S. Special areas (which are essentially the same as census tracts) are therefore the best proxies for neighborhoods as social and geographical units. Scholars have questioned the use of a census tract as the best
geographical representation of a neighborhood in ecological analysis (Messner and Tardiff, 1986). Nevertheless, most ecological studies have relied on census tract boundaries to territorially differentiate one neighborhood from another (Avakame, 1997; Hannon, 2005; Kubrin, 2003; Nielson et al., 2005). Data for the present study were obtained from the 2001 tract-level census data for Jamaica’s major metropolis – the Kingston Metropolitan Area.²

The United Nations stipulates that countries must establish their own definitions in accordance to their own needs as to what is considered as an urban or a rural area (STATIN Country Report, 2003: 146). The KMA region was therefore created by STATIN to geographically represent Jamaica’s major urban center. The KMA consists of two major urban areas: Kingston, the capital city, and the urban parts of St. Andrew, the neighboring parish.³ Similar to other metropolitan areas and cities in the world, the KMA is the most commercially and economically developed region in Jamaica. In fact, it is the largest and most populated city in Jamaica and the English-speaking Caribbean. As previously noted, KMA also has the highest numbers of homicides in the country. In 2001, when the last census was taken, the KMA had a population of 579,137 which constituted 22.2 per cent of the country’s total population.

² Although there are officially 108 census tracts in the KMA only 107 were used in the present study. One was excluded because of missing information when the data from all three sources were aggregated to the census tract level.

³ The parish of St. Andrew is divided into two parts: rural and urban. The rural areas of St. Andrew are not part of the KMA.
The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF): Homicide Data

There are two major law enforcement agencies in Jamaica: the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), the national police; and the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF), the military. The JCF is responsible for collecting and reporting all crime data. There is a specialized unit in the force that is responsible for managing the JCF homicide database. Unlike other types of violent crimes which maybe underreported, homicide incidents are most likely to be reported and recorded by the JCF. JCF employs approximately 8,500 law enforcement officials. In each of the 14 parishes, there are one or more police divisions. In total, there are 19 police divisions across the island, of which, six are located in the KMA. In Kingston, there are three police divisions – Kingston Central, Kingston Eastern, and Kingston Western; as well as three in St. Andrew – St. Andrew Central, St. Andrew North, and St. Andrew South. In each of these divisions, there are one or more police stations. Neighborhood-level homicide incidents are recorded at each police station and then aggregated to police divisions. Therefore, homicide data are not aggregated at the census tract-level in Jamaica.

Homicide data pooled from 2002 to 2005 were used in the present study. Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS), homicides with an identifiable street address were geo-coded to the special area/census tract in which the incident took place. It is worth noting that there were some homicide cases with unofficial and/or undocumented street names and addresses. One major research challenge in using homicide data for spatial analysis in a developing country is dealing with the fact that there are some places (streets, homes, etc.) that have not be officially mapped and in a few cases, unclear recordings of street names and locations for the homicide. Several attempts were made to
find the correct address and location of the homicides with unidentifiable addresses.\(^4\) In the end, 2,022 homicides were included in the analysis.

**The Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ): Voter Participation Data**

Jamaica gained universal adult suffrage in 1944, and one year earlier, the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ) was established to administer and oversee all local and government elections. Since the 1940s, the EOJ has been responsible for administering the 16 national elections that have occurred in Jamaica. The present study relies on voter participation data from 2002 national elections. Although three political parties participated in this election, only the votes cast for the two dominant and prominent political parties that have been competing for power over the past 60 years were used in the analyses. The third party, the National Democratic Movement (NDM) was officially formed in 1995. The NDM’s first participation in government elections was in 1997. However, because the NDM was so new and young in the political arena, they received extremely low votes in the 2002 national elections. For this reason, votes for the NDM were excluded from the analyses.

**Disaggregating Voter Participation Data**

Recall from Chapter 4 that electing members to parliament in Jamaica is done at the constituency-level and that in total, there are 60 constituencies of which 13 are located in the KMA. The EOJ collects voting data, which include the number of votes received by each party, and aggregates it to the constituency-level in the KMA. The

\(^4\) Several trips were made to Jamaica to obtain all the data for this study and to ensure data accuracy. During one trip, with help from staff at MonaGIS, efforts such as visiting different police stations were done to verify the street location of a homicide.
person with the highest number of constituency-level votes becomes a Member of Parliament. For the purposes of the present study, vote counts at the constituency-level had to be disaggregated and geo-coded to the census tract-level. In order to do this, several steps had to be taken. First, as explained earlier, each constituency is divided into several polling divisions where individuals go to cast their vote. Using electoral and census tract-level maps as a guide, I had to hand-code and assign an identifier number to each polling division in all 13 constituencies in the KMA. Second, using GIS, the identifier numbers were then geo-coded to match each census tract/special area in the KMA. Although time-consuming, this procedure was used to get the best estimates of census-tract level vote counts.

Research Questions

General Research Question
What neighborhood structural characteristics predict variations in homicide levels in the KMA, Jamaica?

Specific Research Questions

1. What effect does political civic engagement have on neighborhood variations in homicide levels in the KMA, Jamaica?
2. To what extent does poverty explain variations in homicide levels in the KMA, Jamaica?
3. What effect do female-headed households have on variations in homicide levels in the KMA, Jamaica?
4. To what extent does low educational attainment explain variations in homicide levels in the KMA, Jamaica?
5. What effect does percent young male population have on variations in homicide levels in the KMA, Jamaica?
6. What effect does population density have on variations in homicide levels in the KMA, Jamaica?

There were a few cases where the polling division actually fell on the boundary of two census tracts. In such cases, I had to make a personal judgment using a GIS generated map, on which census tract the polling districts should be assigned to.
Variable Construction and Measures

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in the present study is homicide. As noted earlier, homicide counts were pooled from 2002 to 2005. The pooling of homicide data was done in order to gain a sufficient number of cases and also to control for possible fluctuations that may occur over the years (Krivo and Peterson, 1996; Kovandzic et al., 1998; Sampson and Morenoff, 2004).

Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses

In order to determine the neighborhood structural characteristics predict variations in homicide levels for 2002-2005 in the KMA, I used 2001 tract-level census data for the KMA along with 2002 voting data. In some ecological studies, census tracts with population sizes of 200 and less have been excluded from the analysis because they were too small for the construction of reliable rates (Kubrin, 2003; Nielsen, et al., 2005). This was, however, not an issue in the present study. The population size of all 107 census tracts ranged from 1,008 to 18,042. The explanatory variables reflect neighborhood-level variations in political civic engagement, public poverty, family disruption, education attainment, age composition, and population density\(^6\). These explanatory variables are consistent with those used in previous homicide studies (Hannon, 2005; Kovandzic et al., 1995; Kubrin, 2003; Lee, 2008; Lee and Bartkowski, 2004; Nielson et al., 2005).

\(^6\) It is worthy to point out that other commonly used structural correlates in social disorganization research such as median family income and unemployment were not included in the analysis. Normally, information for these variables is obtained from census data. The Jamaica census data does not collect information on these factors. Moreover, an attempt to use employment data from another source proved futile because of data aggregation problems. Notwithstanding these limitations, the present study makes an attempt to shed some light on the relationship between neighborhood structure and homicides in Jamaica.
**Political Civic Engagement**

One way to understand the impact of politics on neighborhood-level homicides is to examine levels of engagement in the electoral process (Chamblin and Cochran, 1995; Rosenfeld, et al., 2001). As noted by American political science scholar, Alan Monroe (1977: 71), “voter turnout is undoubtedly the most widely studied and substantively important measure of [political] participation.” In the U.S., high voter turnout is viewed favorably as a sign of civic engagement and active community involvement in the political process (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995; Coleman, 2002; Rosenfeld et al., 2001). Moreover, traditionally, higher levels of voter turnout tend to be “greater among those with adequate resources of time, money, and education” (LeRoux, 2007: 411). However, in Jamaica, as discussed in the previous chapter, homogeneous voting, active participation in the political process, and strong connections with politicians are distinctive features of inner-city neighborhoods in the KMA. Furthermore, high levels of voter participation in government elections are clear indicators of clientelist-politics and partisan-based competitive politics among the poorer classes in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Sives, 2002; Stone 1985).

The defended neighborhood perspective provides the theoretical context for understanding the influence of politics on homicide levels in Jamaica’s urban neighborhoods. According to Suttles (1972: 58) defended neighborhoods are primarily formed “as a response to fears of invasion from adjacent community areas.” Similarly, as noted by Lyons (2007: 847) defended neighborhoods are created when residents feel a need “to maintain boundaries in the face of external threats.” In their efforts to protect the identity and defend the boundaries of their neighborhoods, residents may resort to the
use of violence and other illegal activities to keep “others’ out (DeSena, 2005; Lyons, 2007; Suttles, 1972). For instance, according to Lyons, when there is a threat of racial invasion, defensive posturing and higher numbers of specific types of crimes such as anti-black hate crimes are mostly found in internally organized white communities with heightened norms of informal social control. In a similar context, based on the theoretical propositions of the defended neighborhood perspective, highly politicized neighborhoods in Jamaica will have higher levels of homicides as residents in these areas are more likely to resort to violence as means to maintain neighborhood boundaries.

Similarly, from a subculture of violence perspective, the use of violence during conflicts and disputes may result from the presence of oppositional culture in neighborhoods with extreme levels of voter participation. Some scholars posit that in disadvantaged neighborhoods because residents feel alienated and marginalized from mainstream society they have developed an oppositional subculture (Anderson, 1999). Likewise, others have argued that subcultural norms that promote and encourage the use of violence to solve interpersonal conflicts are more likely found in disadvantaged neighborhoods (see also, Anderson, 1999; Pridemore, 2002; Sampson and Wilson, 1995 Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967).

With reference to Jamaica, scholars have described neighborhoods with extreme levels of voter participation, also referred to as garrison neighborhoods, as ‘counter societies’ and states within the state where residents have become socially alienated from mainstream society (National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997; Johnson, 2005; Johnson and Soeters, 2008). Taking into full consideration the discussion in chapter 4, engagement in criminal activities and the use of violence are more likely to be considered
a norm and possibly a survival strategy in neighborhoods with high levels of political civic engagement.

Moreover, in these neighborhoods, residents who are under the control of the neighborhood don have developed their own system of governance and laws and an oppositional subculture where violence is used to solve disputes with rival neighborhoods (Harriott, 2002; Figueroa and Sives, 2002; National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997). With the above in mind, it is expected that homicides are more likely to occur in neighborhoods with extreme levels of political civic engagement. An extreme level of political civic engagement was characterized by neighborhoods where voting participation was one standard deviation above the arithmetic average. Thus, neighborhoods that were one standard deviation above the mean were assigned a 1 and all others were assigned 0. It is therefore expected that political civic engagement will be positively associated with homicides.

Public Poverty

Public poverty is one of the best measures for poverty (absolute/material deprivation) in Jamaica. The government of Jamaica defines public poverty as a condition in which a geographical area lacks basic amenities and infrastructure such as piped water, toilets, electricity, roads and sanitation (Henry-Lee, 2005:84). Most social disorganization studies have demonstrated that poverty has a strong and positive effect on homicide rates (Curry and Spergel, 1988; Kovandzic et al., 1998; Land et. al., 1990; Loftin and Parker, 1985; Messner and Tardiff, 1986; Parker, 1989; Williams, 1984).

Public poverty was measured using a composite index based on the percent of households

7 Extreme political civic engagement: mean (1221); standard deviation (989)
that do not get water from indoor plumbing, the percent of households that share toilet facilities with another household, and the percent of households with shared or no bathrooms. Reliability analysis was performed and a Cronbach’s alpha = .81, indicated that all three measures form a robust unidimensional construct (see also, Velez, 2001: 845).

As aptly noted by Kovandzic et al., (1998:589), one way in which poverty contributes to neighborhood-level crime and violence is based on the notion that people who live under material deprivation “will have greater need and motivation to engage in [illegitimate] activities that lift themselves out of poverty.” As a result of this, illegitimate opportunities that are more likely to involve the use of violence become more acceptable to residents of impoverished areas (Kovandzic et al., 1998). With this in mind, and similar to findings from prior homicide studies, it is expected that public poverty will have a strong and significant effect on neighborhood-level homicides. Therefore, the first hypothesis is: public poverty will be positively associated with homicides.

**Female-Headed Households**

Studies have consistently found strong positive associations between different types of family structures (percent of residents who are divorced or separated, percent female-headed or single-parent households) and homicide (Avakame, 1997; Messner and Tardiff, 1986; Sampson, 1987; Sampson and Groves, 1989). Family disruption is defined as the percent of female-headed households with children. This type of family disruption is an indicator of social disorganization. Social disorganization theory predicts that in
single-parent households, the strains and lack of resources of some working single
mothers usually leaves less time to supervise children (Sampson, 1985; Sampson and
Groves, 1989). Moreover, according to Osgood and Chambers (2000: 87), the fewer
parents in a community relative to the number of children, the more limited the networks
of adult supervision that are imposed on all of the children. This leads to the third
hypothesis: female-headed households will be positively associated with homicides.

Low Educational Attainment

Low educational attainment is predicted to be a key independent variable in
accounting for neighborhood-level variations in homicides in Jamaica. A
disproportionate number of residents in impoverished neighborhoods are more likely to
have low levels of education attainment. In fact, according to Gibbison and Murthy
(2003: 121) there are high levels of functional illiteracy, low achievement in mathematics
and English, and low skill levels in educational achievement across large numbers of
primary and secondary schools in Jamaica. Jamaica’s educational system is divided in
three major divisions: (1) the primary level of education begins at grades 2 and ends at
grade 6; (2) the secondary level runs from grades 7 to 12; and (3) the tertiary level
consists of two and four-year college institutions.

National data on educational attainment obtained from the 2001 Jamaica census
information showed that 25.5% of the general population had acquired primary level
schooling while 55.6% have some level of secondary education. In contrast, only a mere
12.3% of the total population have some level of tertiary education. Low educational
attainment is defined as the percent of residents age 15 years and over with only primary-
level schooling. The next hypothesis is: *low levels of educational attainment will be positively associated with homicides.*

**Young Male Population and Population Density**

The remaining two independent variables used in the analyses are young male population and population density. Both structural factors have been used, quite frequently, in ecological studies. In studies that have incorporated these variables, empirical findings of have been inconsistent (Hannon, 2005; Kubrin, 2003; Osgood and Chambers, 2000; Smith and Jarjoura, 1988). Young male population is defined as the percent of young males ages 15 to 29, and population density is defined as the number of persons per square kilometer. The remaining two hypotheses are: *young males and population density will be positively associated with homicides.*

Table 5 provides comparisons of the measures for each variable in the present study with measures commonly used in other ecological homicide studies conducted in the U.S.

**Table 5**

*Comparisons of the Empirical Measures Used in this Study with Measures Commonly Used in Other Studies*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study Variables and Measures</th>
<th>Commonly Used Empirical Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Homicide:</em> Homicide counts – geocoded to match the neighborhood in which the homicide occurred.</td>
<td><em>Homicide:</em> Aggregate homicide counts geocoded to match the neighborhood cluster in which the events occurred (Sampson et.al. 2001); assign each homicide to the census tract and aggregate tract level counts (Messner and Tardiff, 1986).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Public Poverty:</em> Percent of households living in public poverty (percent of households that do not get water from indoor plumbing; the percent of households that share toilets; and the percent of households with shared or no bathrooms plumbing).</td>
<td><em>Absolute and Relative Deprivation:</em> Percent of families/population living below the official poverty level; the GINI index of family income inequality; median income; percent of families receiving public assistance (Kubrin, 2003; Land et. al, 1990; Morenoff, et. al., 2001; Osgood et. al., 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Political Civic Engagement:</em> neighborhoods with extreme levels of voter participation in</td>
<td><em>Secular Civic Engagement(Participation/Voter turnout:</em> the fraction of the eligible population who</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analytical Procedures

As evident in most ecological studies there is a high likelihood of strong correlations among independent variables (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003; Land et al., 1990; Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2003). This is referred to as collinearity, and in any regression analysis using census data, it is important to determine if the independent variables are highly correlated (Kovandzic et al., 1998; Kubrin, 2003; Land et. al, 1990).

As noted by Walker and Maddan (2005: 291), high degrees of collinearity can influence and distort the results from significance tests and also standardized and unstandardized coefficients. Three tests can be used to determine if the independent variables are interrelated and to diagnose for potential collinearity: the Tolerance, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), and the Condition Index Number Test (CINT) (Walker and Madden, 2005: 292).

Tolerance gives a value that “tells how much of the variance of an independent variable does not depend on other independent variables” (Walker and Madden, 2005: 292).
An indication of collinearity is having tolerance values less than 0.25 in the regression output (Walker and Madden, 2005). In the present analyses, all tolerance values in the model were greater than 0.25 and this indicated no collinearity among the independent variables. Another trusted method used to diagnose for collinearity is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). VIF is considered an effective way of determine collinearity among the independent variables because it is able not only to show that collinearity is an issue but also, which variables are problematic, how severe the problem is, and what is the outcome when the standard error is high (Walker and Madden, 2005: 293). VIF of 4 or less indicates that collinearity is not a problem (Walker and Madden, 2005). In the present analysis, all VIFs were below 2.84. This indicates no problems with collinearity in the model.

Negative Binomial Regression

Similar with other studies using homicide data, analysis of the univariate distributions indicated skewness in the homicide rates in the present study. This was expected given the fact that there are some neighborhoods with very few homicides. Because of skewness in the homicide data, homicide counts and not rates are more suitable for the regression analysis and were therefore used as the dependent variable (Kurbin, 2003; Nielsen et al., 2005). However, when using count data of rare events such as homicide, ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is not the most suitable approach to use in the analyses. Osgood (2002) offers two problems that arise when OLS is used to evaluate count data. Osgood (2002: 22) shared that, because the precision of the homicide rate depends on population size, variation in population sizes across the aggregate units will lead to violating the assumption of homogeneity of error variance.
He further noted out that larger errors of prediction for per capita homicide rates based on small populations should be expected than for rates based on large populations (Osgood, 2002:22).

The other problem with the use of OLS for count data according to Osgood (2002) concerns the fact that normal or even symmetrical error distributions of homicide rates cannot be assumed when counts are small. Because the lowest possible crime count is zero, the error distribution must become increasingly skewed (as well as more decidedly discrete) as homicide rates approach this lower bound (p. 22-23). In light of the above, the most appropriate method used to examine homicide counts is the Poisson-based regression model. As noted by Kubrin (2003: 153) Poisson regression has the advantage of being precisely tailored to the discrete, often highly skewed distribution of the dependent variable. It is important to note that in Poisson regression, the Poisson estimator is restrictive because it assumes equal mean and variance (Stickley and Pridemore, 2007: 86). This is becomes problematic when using count data as there will be overdispersion in the data, that is, the variance exceeds the mean. Therefore, a more appropriate procedure to employ is the Negative binomial regression model.

The Negative binomial model is a variant of the Poisson-based model that allows for overdispersion. In the present analysis, the diagnostic for overdispersion in the homicide data did in fact show that the data are overdispersed. Therefore, following common procedure, the Negative binomial regression model is employed. A major strength of the Negative binomial regression is that it combines the Poisson distribution of event counts with a gamma distribution of the unexplained variation in the underlying or true mean event counts (Kubrin, 2003: 153-154).
The Spatial Dynamics of Homicide

The concept of spatial dependence in reference to homicide neighborhood-level research implies that there is a strong possibility that homicides in one neighborhood are related to homicides in nearby neighborhoods. Homicides are not randomly distributed in geographic spaces but instead, are spatially interrelated across neighborhoods (Morenoff et al., 2001). Moreover, homicides tend to be interpersonal crimes that are based on social interactions that crosscut census boundaries and are therefore subject to the diffusion process (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003a; Morenoff et al., 2001). Given this, it is important in homicide research that relies on census data that adjustments are made for spatial autocorrelation in the regression analyses. Positive spatial autocorrelation exits when events such as homicides are either clustered or when they are close together to have similar values than those that are further apart (Eck et al., 2005). When this occurs, it is important to control for spatial dependence. Messner et al. (2001) warns that studies that do not adjust for spatial autocorrelation can develop models that are false indicators of significance, biased parameter estimates, and misleading suggestions of fit.

In light of the above, the first step that was taken in this study was to test for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the homicide levels. A number of tests for spatial autocorrelation are available but a widely used test in macro-level homicide studies has been the Moran’s I. GeoDa\textsuperscript{8} – a software program for spatial data analysis –was used to carry out the Moran’s I test for spatial autocorrelation. Moran’s I compares the value at any one location with the value at all other locations (Eck et al., 2005). Moran’s I

\textsuperscript{8} GeoDa, developed by Dr. Luc Anselin, is the revised version of SpaceStat. GeoDa is a Windows-based application that provides several statistical applications for confirmatory and exploratory spatial data analysis (Eck et al., 2005).
indicates whether there is clustering (+1.0) or dispersion (-1.0) of values. Clustering of values shows the presence of spatial autocorrelation.

If spatial autocorrelation exists, a spatial lag or spatial error model is created to control for spatial dependence in the regression analyses. Kubrin (2003) explains the differences between the two models. She notes that the spatial error model evaluates the extent to which the clustering of homicide rates not explained by measured independent variables can be accounted for with reference to the clustering of error terms, that is, it captures the spatial influence of unmeasured independent variables (Kubrin, 2003: 154). On the other hand, the spatial lag model incorporates the spatial influence of unmeasured independent variables and indicates an additional effect of neighbors’ homicide rates – the lagged dependent variable (Kubrin, 2003: 154). The spatial lag model is more compatible with notions of diffusion processes because it implies that neighborhoods are interdependent and homicides in one neighborhood may actually increase the likelihood of homicide in adjacent neighborhoods (Baller, et al. 2001; Kubrin, 2003: 154). In accordance with this, I constructed a spatially lagged variable and included it in the regression model.

First, in order to test for spatial autocorrelation, and create a spatially lagged variable in GeoDa, I had to create a spatial weights file in order to construct a spatial weights matrix that identifies neighbors according to boundary relationships (see also Eck et al., 2005). Using this spatial weights file the next step was to create a spatially lagged variable which is a sum of the spatial weights multiplied with values for observations at neighboring locations (Anselin, 2004). I then exported the spatial lag variable from GeoDa into the regression model. Spatial lag variables are important in
this analysis because they capture the spatial dependence of homicides in a given neighborhood on homicides in nearby neighborhoods. Also, the significance of their coefficients in the regression model provides a test for spatial autocorrelation (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003a: 395).
CHAPTER VI – DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The results section begins with a map that shows the spatial distribution of homicides in the KMA. As shown in Figure 4, homicides are not randomly distributed in space but are instead acutely concentrated in certain geographical locations in the KMA, Jamaica. The map further reveals that homicides are more concentrated in the southern and south western parts of the metropolis. Again, the main concern in the present study is the neighborhood characteristics that are associated with the spatial concentration of homicides in Jamaica. I begin with the results from the descriptive statistics for all the measures used in this study.

Figure 4: The Spatial Distribution of Homicides in KMA Jamaica
Descriptive Statistics

Table 6 presents the means and standard deviations for the dependent and independent variables used in the analyses. As shown below, the mean number of homicides from 2002 to 2005 is 18.90. In terms of the structural predictors, the average public poverty level across neighborhoods was 31 percent in 2001. On average, 16 percent of the neighborhoods in the KMA had extreme levels of political civic engagement in country’s 2002 national government elections. In terms of family structure, the average percentage of female-headed families with children was approximately 19 percent. Turning to the other predictors of interest, the results show that 12 percent of the population in the KMA was between 15 and 29 years, and lastly, the average percentage of the population 15 years and older with only primary schooling was 15 percent.

Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations of All Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>18.90</td>
<td>20.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political civic engagement</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage public poverty</td>
<td>31.30</td>
<td>27.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage female-headed families with children</td>
<td>18.63</td>
<td>5.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage 15 years and over with only primary schooling</td>
<td>15.05</td>
<td>6.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage young males 15-29</td>
<td>12.33</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>5.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neighborhood Correlations of Homicide Counts

The results from the bivariate correlations presented in Table 7, shows the neighborhood structural characteristics that are associated with homicide counts in the
KMA, Jamaica. The correlation matrix shows that the central variable of interest, political civic engagement, is significantly positively associated with homicides \((r = .45)\). Likewise, percent public poverty \((r = .42)\) and percent female-headed families \((r = .39)\) are both significantly positively correlated with homicides.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.Homicide</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.452**</td>
<td>.420**</td>
<td>.392**</td>
<td>.276**</td>
<td>.217*</td>
<td>.350*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.Political civic engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.316**</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.457**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.Percent public poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.631**</td>
<td>.287**</td>
<td>.307**</td>
<td>.241**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.Percent female-headed families with children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.455**</td>
<td>.554**</td>
<td>.563**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.Percent low educational attainment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.432**</td>
<td>.251**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.Percent young males 15-29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.357**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.Population density</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\*\(p < .05\). \**\(p < .01\).

The correlations further show that the percentage of young males (15-29 years) is also significantly associated with homicides. In terms of the remaining two variables, the percent with low educational attainment and population density, both are also
significantly positively correlated with homicides \((r = .22\) and \(r = .35\) respectively). The most interesting finding from the bivariate correlations is that, in Jamaica, high levels of homicides in the KMA are in neighborhoods with extreme levels of political civic engagement. To further substantiate this finding, I used a negative binomial estimation procedure to determine the relationship between political civic engagement and homicide, net of the other neighborhood structural correlates.

**Neighborhood Structure and Homicide Counts: Regression Results**

The results from the negative binomial regression are displayed in Table 8. The results reveal interesting findings about the relationship between neighborhood structural correlates and homicides in a developing country. First, in terms of political civic engagement, it was hypothesized that extreme levels of voter participation in national elections would be positively associated with homicides. Interestingly, but as expected, the results did in fact support this hypothesis. The findings indicate a significant and positive relationship between political civic engagement and homicides in the KMA \((\beta = .695, p < .01)\). This implies that in the KMA, neighborhoods with extreme voter participation in government elections have higher levels of homicides. The coefficient of .695 indicates that a unit change in political civic engagement is associated with a 101 percent higher level of expected homicides, \((\text{percentage change} = 100 \times [\exp (.695) - 1])\), holding all else constant.

Consistent with findings from previous macro-level homicide studies (Curry and Spergel, 1988; Land et al., 1990; Loftin and Parker, 1985; Messner and Tardiff, 1986; Parker, 1989), the results reveal significant effects in the expected positive direction for public poverty on homicide levels in the KMA \((\beta = .008, p < .10)\). The coefficient of .008
indicates that a unit change in public poverty would increase the expected number of homicides by 1 percent.

### Table 8

**Negative Binomial Regression Results for Neighborhood Characteristics on Homicide Counts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political civic engagement</td>
<td>.695***</td>
<td>.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage public poverty</td>
<td>.008+</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage female-headed families with children</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage low educational attainment</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage young males</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial autocorrelation coefficient</td>
<td>.020**</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.284</td>
<td>.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-378.657</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood ratio test, alpha=0</td>
<td>714.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.

In terms of the other structural covariates, the findings suggest that female-headed households with children and low educational attainment (percent 15 years and older with only primary schooling) are not significantly related to homicide levels in the KMA. The results also reveal that the percentage of young males 15-29 years is not related to
homicides. This finding is consistent with prior homicide studies that have found no significant association with the percentage of young males and homicide (Kovandzic et al., 1998; Kubrin and Wadsworth, 2003; Nielsen, et al., 2005; Rosenfeld, et al., 2001). Lastly, the findings also indicate that population density is not significantly associated with homicide levels in the KMA.

Turning now to the results from the spatial autocorrelation coefficient, the findings did indicate that spatial autocorrelation exists in the model. The Moran’s I coefficient for the homicides revealed a significant spatial pattern, that is greater than zero and significant at the p < .05 level (see also Kubrin, 2003). In addition to this, spatial dependence was detected in the regression model. The spatial autocorrelation coefficient is significant even after controlling for neighborhood characteristics. The results suggest diffusion effects for homicides across the neighborhoods and that neighborhoods with more homicides tend to be clustered in space. This indicates that homicides in one neighborhood influence homicides in adjacent neighborhoods net of structural neighborhood characteristics.

In sum, the results empirically confirmed that among the structural correlates that have been suggested to influence lethal violence in urban Jamaica, political civic engagement and poverty were the most important and significant predictors of homicides in the KMA. Most interesting, the results indicate that, net of the effects of the other neighborhood structural correlates of homicide, political civic engagement is the strongest predictor of homicide in the KMA. These results therefore suggest that politics is important for understanding neighborhood-level variations in homicides in Jamaica. The results make sense given the country’s political history, the practice of communal
clientelism, government allocation of housing to the poor, high levels of electoral and political corruption, and the competitive and fierce political battles for votes and political spoils that have gone on for decades in urban Jamaica.
CHAPTER VII – DISCUSSION

The goal of this study was to present a macro-level analysis of homicides in urban Jamaica. More specifically, this study set out to investigate the relationship between neighborhood structural characteristics and homicide levels in Jamaica’s largest urban region – the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA). Taken together, the discussion in Chapter 4 and the results from the regression analysis suggest that neighborhoods that are politically organized with extreme levels of political civic engagement are more likely to have higher levels of homicides. In these neighborhoods, residents rely on their elected representative for political largesse and assistance with housing and general living expenses. They also rely on their community leader for protection from rival political and criminal gangs from neighboring communities.

The findings from the data analyses indicate more support for a defended neighborhood perspective than it does for a social disorganization perspective toward an understanding of homicide in urban Jamaica. The main objective of this chapter is to provide a commentary on the findings from the negative binomial regression by exploring how some neighborhoods in urban Jamaica “fare as units of social control over their own public spaces” (Sampson, 2006:31). This chapter discusses how neighborhood civic engagement activities such as voter participation give rise to high levels of informal social control and social cohesion among community residents which in turn leads to high levels of homicides. To do this, the chapter discusses the role and influence of informal and formal agents of social control in selected neighborhoods with high levels of political civic engagement. Equally important, this chapter discusses the theoretical implications of the results from the regression analysis.
To review, following the aftermath of Jamaica’s bloodiest national elections in 1980, the political turmoil left the capital city in a state of anarchy and unprecedented social disorder. During this time, politicians from both parties had supplied residents in various neighborhoods within their respective constituencies with guns and told them to fight to defend their neighborhood from invasion and dominance by rival party supporters (Levy, 2001; Munroe, 1999; Sives, 2002). The inevitable result of this was the creation of neighborhoods that were sharply divided by party affiliation. In the 1980s and early 1990s, residents in these areas fought to protect their only means of housing and shelter, their personal property and families, and their neighborhood’s political identity. Violence therefore occurred between neighboring communities that supported the rival party (Clarke, 2006; Headley, 2002; Figueroa and Sives, 2003).

Naturally, as a result of the need to defend one’s political turf and valued possessions, residents band together and formed tight cohesive social networks. They became united in their struggles as inner-city residents who shared one common goal – to defend and protect their neighborhood (Charles, 2004). In their attempts to create a safe and secure place for themselves and their families, achieve neighborhood stability, and maintain effective defenses against political rivals, each neighborhood was managed by a community leader (Johnson and Soeters, 2008). This person is known as the area leader, the boss, but most popularly as, the neighborhood don. The primary responsibilities of this person were to ensure compliance with orders made by government officials, maintain peace and social order inside the neighborhood, and protect residents (Charles, 2004; Clarke, 2006; Henry – Lee, 2005; Johnson, 2005; Sives, 2002).
Informal Social Control

The Neighborhood Don

One way in which politicians were able to maintain political stability in their constituencies and ensure a safe seat in parliament during elections was to assign a neighborhood leader to defend political interest of the community, oversee the political affairs in their constituencies, and monitor and control residents voting in local and general elections (Henry-Lee, 2005). The political don is the most important person in neighborhoods with strong political affiliations to one of the two parties. Dons and their group of gangsters called “gunmen” or “soldiers” control all aspects of neighborhood life and are the decision-makers with respect to who resides in their neighborhood (Clarke, 2006; Dowdney, 2005; Harriott, 2000; Henry-Lee, 2005; Levy, 2001). Residents in these areas live according to the rules set out by the don and not the state (Figueroa and Sives, 2002; National Committee of Political Tribalism, 1997). One long-standing neighborhood rule has been not to insult, harm, or abuse fellow residents (Levy, 2001). Generally, those who do not comply with rules of the don are escorted, via force, out of the neighborhood (Jamaica Gleaner, 2006).

More interestingly, whenever neighborhood rules are violated and disregarded, or when women in the neighborhood are raped or abused, and if a crime is committed in the neighborhood, it is the don who decides who will be punished and what punishment the perpetrator should receive (Henry - Lee, 2005; Johnson and Soeters, 2008). Residents found guilty of committing a crime or breaking the rules of the community are banished, beaten, maimed, tortured with electric shocks, and at times, executed (Dowdney, 2005; Henry -Lee, 2005; Levy, 2001; Stone, 1985). Playing fields and local beaches are
popular spots used to carry out extra-judicial killings and executions (Levy, 2001). These extreme forms of punishment are used to “keep the dissidents and troublemakers in the community in line” (Stone, 1985: 57), and deter residents from violating the rules of the community. Neighborhoods dons have therefore replaced the state “as the main providers, benefactors, mediators, and representatives of justice” (Johnson, 2005: 537).

Johnson and Soeters (2008: 166) argue that the power and rule of dons in certain communities are not unique to Jamaica and that such control over the political and social organization of people resembles that of the godfather led criminal culture of the Italian Mafia. Similar to the Jamaican context in which neighborhood dons and his armed followers control and ensure homogeneous voting, the Mafia, acting as a kind of shadow government in Italy, had for several years, delivered votes on behalf of the Italian government (Johnson and Soeters, 2008). Moreover, according to Johnson and Soeters, (2008: 169), at one point in time, when the Italian government became too compromised and enfeebled to enforce the law or protect its own citizens, they had to rely on the Mafia to assume some of the functions they were unable to perform.

The transfer of some of the powers of the state to organized criminal groups was, as previously discussed in Chapter four, also evident in Jamaica in the 1990s when a decline in state resources decreased the distribution of state largesse (money, contracts, housing, and jobs) to loyal party supporters. With limited resources, the Jamaican state could no longer support the neighborhoods they controlled politically and economically. This led to an internal shift in power and social control in the neighborhood from the politician to the neighborhood don who took over the distribution of resources and became the main source of economic sustenance in the community (Clarke, 2006; Gunst,
Sives (2002: 83) notes that it is the access to scarce resources and the willingness to distribute them within the community that give dons in politically segregated neighborhoods the power and respect to maintain their positions as community leaders.

Jamaican dons are also similar to the Italian Mafia in the extent to which both have established and maintained efficiently operated and highly organized criminal enterprises and networks and in so doing, have created what has been described as ‘counter societies’ that compete with the higher legitimate authority of the state (Johnson, 2005; Johnson and Soeters, 2008). The rule and control of Jamaican dons have also been likened to other criminal groups such as the sophisticated and canny drug lords in Colombia, the vicious criminal gangsters in Brazilian favelas, and the internally organized Chinese triads and Japanese yakuzas (Johnson, 2005). These organized criminal networks often use lethal violence to settle disputes, create fear, and command respect. These groups have established and enforced their own norms, rules, and ways of dispensing justice, and in some countries, are regarded as powerful and threatening authorities (Johnson and Soeters, 2008).

Dons have become powerful forces in their respective neighborhoods because they control small militias of heavily armed men who guard their homes and serve as their body shields (Johnson, 2005). In some of these neighborhoods, the don and his team of gangsters use military-like bases to train recruits, store weapons and ammunition, and treat the wounded (Bertram, 2005). Neighborhoods under the control and surveillance of dons and gangs are usually barricaded with large concrete stones that surround each periphery of the neighborhood. This is done in order to prevent strangers
from entering the community and guard against drive-by shootings. In order to enter these neighborhoods, permission must be granted by the don (Johnson, 2005; Sives, 2002). As noted by Suttles (1972), in defended neighborhoods, “residents assume a relative degree of security on the streets as compared to adjacent areas” (p. 57). These types of measures found in some of the highly politicized neighborhoods in the KMA serve as an example of one form of defense mechanism used to keep others out of the community and ensure the personal safety and security of residents.

The powers of the dons are not only limited to residents. Members of the private sector and local business owners are also compelled to abide by the rules set forth by dons in their area. These people are often forced to pay extortion and protection money to neighborhood dons. Most business owners have reluctantly complied because of fears of attacks and reprisals (Bertram, 2005; Figueroa and Sives, 2002). Those who refuse to comply have been murdered. In fact, the murders of ten business men were connected with their refusal to co-operate and give-in to the demands meted out by extortionists (Johnson and Soeters, 2008).

**Social Cohesion among Residents**

For the most part, residents in highly politicized neighborhoods shared a strong sense of community responsibility for the safety and protection of their neighborhood don (Jamaica Gleaner, 2000). Whenever a neighborhood don is arrested or taken into custody by the police, residents from his community stage massive protests and demonstrations that, on quite a few occasions, have lasted for days. For example, in 1999, a popular and notorious don was arrested for his involvement in holding a man against his will, beating
and attempting to kill him because he had an outstanding bill from a local neighborhood bar (Jamaica Gleaner, 1999). The abused victim told authorities that the don, Donald ‘Zekes’ Phipps and his followers placed him in a grilled cage, held a trial over his unpaid bar bill, subsequently found him guilty, and sentenced him to death (Jamaica Gleaner, 1999). The accused was forced out the grilled cage and while being beaten was able to escape from the men. He reported the case to the police who then raided the community in search for the don and arrested him. Within hours of his arrest, neighborhood residents began protesting and threatening law enforcement officials. Mass community support was publicly staged for the don. The demonstrations were so violent that government offices and businesses in the downtown area of Kingston had to be closed for several days as protesters demanded the release of their don. Roads were blocked, people organized themselves into human barricades, and the tires of passing motorists were slashed while men armed with AK47 and M16 guns terrorized law enforcement agents (Johnson, 2005: 588).

In the end, there was widespread destruction in downtown Kingston. A number of people were shot and injured. Five persons lost their lives including a soldier from the Jamaica Defense Force, and military armored and police vehicles were set ablaze (Harriott, 2000; Johnson, 2005). In an effort to quell the social unrest and chaos that were spiraling out of control, law enforcement agents and politicians decided that the don was the person who could bring an end to the rioting. Zekes was therefore allowed to stand on the balcony of the police station to address the crowd of protestors. In his address to the crowd, the don asked the protestors to stop rioting and return to their normal lives in the community. He furthered informed them that he was being treated
fairly by the police and that he was fine. It was this public appearance and appeal by the neighborhood don that ended three days of civil unrest in Jamaica’s capital city.

The ‘Zekes’ case is just one of many violent street protests that have occurred in Kingston over the arrest or questioning of a neighborhood don by the police. There have been other incidents in which residents formed a human chain that blocked the main road leading to the country’s major international airport after police apprehended the don from their neighborhood (Jamaica Gleaner, 2000). The above recounts of a neighborhood’s don power and the open support he is able to receive from community residents were given in order to paint to clear picture of the authority of a neighborhood don, the strong social cohesion among residents, and the limited powers the legitimate authority of state (police, army, politicians) have over residents in these neighborhoods. It is for this reason that scholars, lawyers, politicians, and activists have described these neighborhoods as states within the state, where disputes have been settled, matters tried, offenders sentenced and punished, all without reference to the institutions of the Jamaican state (National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997). And where the Jamaican state has no authority or power except in as far as it forces are able to invade in the form of police and military raids (National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997). In short, it is the neighborhood don that exercises state power and social control over residents in his community.

Women and Children

In most neighborhoods with extreme levels of political civic engagement, the women and children suffer greatly because of frequent turf and political battles (Boyne,
They must also live with the frequent sounds of gun shots that are fired nightly in and around their neighborhood (Dowdney, 2005). Moreover, as Suttles (1972: 40) notes, although women and children “assume a relative degree of security” in defended neighborhoods, they are confined to their neighborhood largely because their personal safety is at risk when they venture outside neighborhood boundaries.

Being restricted to one’s neighborhoods is another feature of defended neighborhoods. For their personal safety and security, women and children in neighborhoods with extreme levels of political civic engagement are generally confined in their homes at nights while the men patrol neighborhood boundaries. Their movements are restricted and controlled by the don and his team of gangsters (Henry-Lee, 2005). Although this can be seen as a protective strategy given that they are also targets of retaliatory killings from rival political and criminal gangs, it does, however, affect their personal space and freedom to go wherever they please outside of the community.

Neighborhood dons distribute patronage such as tuition, fees, food, clothing, and payment for medical bills for the women and children in their respective community (Figueroa and Sives, 2002; Henry-Lee, 2005; Johnson and Soeters, 2008). This is one of the most commonly used measures to gain control over residents. As a show of gratitude but also as a sign of forced respect generated through fear and intimidation, women and children would protect their don and loyally abide by his rules and standards (Dowdney, 2005; Levy, 2001). This is evident during police raids in the community when women
and children use their bodies as shields to provide defense against the apprehension of neighborhood dons and gangsters (Bertram, 2005; Johnson, 2005).

The women in garrison neighborhoods are also victims of sexual abuse by the community don and his followers (Henry-Lee, 2005; Robotham, 2008). They are often times forced to comply with their orders for sexual engagement or they risk being kicked out of the community along with their children and other family members. For many of these inner-city women, the stigma associated with living in or close to a garrison neighborhood has limited their opportunities for work as employers are hesitant to employ people from their community (Harriott, 2000; Henry-Lee, 2005). Children in these areas also experience social exclusion and segregation. Typically, children who live in close proximity to politicized neighborhoods and those who live inside these areas have had poor records of attendance at school because of the on-going gang warfare in the area (Henry-Lee, 2005). Occasionally, the don or his followers would contact various schools to inform teachers to send the children home early as gang shootings were going to take place later in the day (Dowdney, 2005).

To many of these inner-city kids, early exposure to gun violence is part of life; so too is the constant violence with rival communities and the police. One study that investigated the life experiences of boys ages six to eight years who live in and around highly politicized neighborhoods found that these children were socialized to believe that rival political party supporters from surrounding neighborhoods hate them and are out to harm them (Jamaica Gleaner, 2008c). The study further found that parents, residents, dons, and politicians were all instrumental in shaping children’s thoughts about enemy territory and the use of violence to defend neighborhood political and turf identity
This study also found that although children are socialized at an early age to use violence to defend one’s neighborhood, in some highly politicized neighborhoods, children are not encouraged or allowed to take part in gun battles, but they do play essential roles as gun carriers and serve as look-outs (Dowdney, 2005; Harriott, 2000).

**Public Social Control**

As previously discussed, an important part of neighborhood life for residents in politicized neighborhoods is maintaining strong ties to public officials. Neighborhood dons are generally used to mobilize residents to vote for the neighborhood’s party of choice so that the politicians can securely keep their seat in parliament (Clarke, 2006; Figueroa and Sives, 2002; Henry-Lee, 2005; Sives, 2002). As clearly stated by Henry-Lee (2005: 96), “the don has become “the politician’s political guardian for the constituency.” In fact, Jamaica’s current Prime Minister, Bruce Golding of the JLP, and the leader of the opposition, Portia Simpson-Miller, are both political representatives in charge of the two most volatile and highly politicized constituencies in Jamaica (see also Jamaica Gleaner, 2008b).

Bruce Golding has been the Member of Parliament for Kingston Western for the past four years, while Portia Simpson-Miller has been the Member of Parliament for South Western St Andrew for the past 33 years. She has never been defeated in national elections in this constituency since 1976 (Jamaica Gleaner, 2008b). Neighborhoods in these constituencies are completely controlled by dons. Also noteworthy is the fact that the Prime Minister is the elected official for the neighborhood described as the “mother
of all garrisons” because it is the quintessential model of counter-societies within the state.

Whenever a don from a garrison neighborhood dies, public officials and Prime Ministers come out in full support to attend the funeral ceremony. One funeral service, in particular, received national attention because it was held in the country’s National Arena – a place used primarily for official funerals. This service was for notorious drug don William “Willie Haggart” Moore. Three PNP government ministers attended the remembrance service that was estimated to have cost a million Jamaican dollars (Ritch, 2001). The National Arena was colorfully decorated in orange – the official party color of the PNP – and was attended by over 5,000 people. Notwithstanding the fact that the deceased was a notorious drug don who had been extensively involved in illegal and criminal activities, former Member of Parliament, Dr. Omar Davies told the crowd at the service that the don was his good friend and a person who always supported him (Ritch, 2001).

A common practice at most funerals for political drug dons has been gun salutes and the firing of several gunshots by gangsters at the graveside. Such illegal tactics by gangsters have continued without disapproval from the police or elected officials. However, one of Jamaica’s former Prime Ministers, Michael Manley noted during his retirement that one of his greatest regrets as leader of the country was attending a funeral and a gun salute for a neighborhood don (Jamaica Gleaner, 2001).

**Formal Social Control**

The police, as the primary agents of formal social control, are not trusted in most politicized neighborhoods in urban Jamaica (Harriott, 2000; Headley, 2002; Levy, 2001).
The lack of trust in the police stems from years of alleged abuse and poor treatment of inner-city residents by the Jamaican police force (Amnesty International, 2003; Levy, 2001). In fact, there have been deadly encounters where citizens have been killed execution-style by members of specialized task force units and where neighborhood dons have been assassinated by policemen (Clarke, 2006). Police killings of civilians in concert with the paramilitary styles of patrol and police raids have created deep resentment and contempt for the police in many politically segregated neighborhoods (Harriott, 2005; Johnson, 2005). Inner-city residents have accused the security forces of over-policing their areas, harassing the young men in their neighborhood, and of being uninterested in their welfare and their rights as Jamaican citizens (Clarke, 2006; Harriott, 2005; Johnson and Soeters, 2008; Levy, 2001).

Based on series of interviews conducted with residents who live in the vicinity of garrison neighborhoods, Harriott (2000: 103) found that inner-city residents regarded police officers as uncivil, disrespectful, disregarding of procedural laws, brutal to citizens, corrupt, politically partisan in their actions, indolent, and unresponsive to their security needs. Also noteworthy, interviews done with police officers about inner-city residents in garrison neighborhoods showed that police officers perceived these residents as needy and dangerous people “who are totally responsible for generating the problems and conflicts that consumes their lives” (Harriott, 2000: 105). The police have also described garrison neighborhoods as “war zones” (Harriott, 2000) and as “bird bush” – a place they enter only to hunt and kill (Levy, 2001).

There are numerous reports that have provided accounts of the poor treatment residents receive from security forces. In one account, a young man was told to kneel
down while an officer repeatedly clicked his gun on the man’s face (Levy, 2001). In another case, it was the cries from a mother that saved the life of her son who was tied to a tree to be used as “target practice” for officers (Levy, 2001: 41). Police misconduct and abuse of power are also evident in cases where they have detained young men who they eventually drop off in “enemy land” – politically hostile rival neighborhoods – and told to walk home (Harriott, 2000; Levy 2001). Such blatant acts of injustice, extra-judicial killings, and the misuse of policing power have created not only distrust and alienation from the police but also a reason for many inner-city residents to keep in their possession high-powered rifles and weapons to use against the police (Boyne, 2008; Dowdney, 2005).

In fact, in some neighborhoods, political and drug gangs have become sufficiently organized, armed, and prepared to challenge the police (Bertram, 2005). According to Harriott (2000: 108), they have also developed elaborate warning systems designed to detect the entry of police patrols. Residents have erected sleeping policemen on some of their streets and have established observation posts that are both used to protect the community against drive-by shootings and monitor the movement of the police (Dowdney, 2005; Harriott, 2000). This is a common form of community defense mechanism used by residents not only to monitor police activity but also to protect neighborhood boundaries from political and gang rivals in adjacent neighborhoods.

For several years, residents have complained bitterly about the excessive use of deadly force by the police in their neighborhoods (Clarke, 2006; Harriott, 2000; Johnson and Soeters, 2008; Levy, 2001). They are not alone in their complaints. International human rights organizations such as Amnesty International have scolded the Jamaican
police force and government for its failure to effectively deal with matters that involve the use of deadly force by law enforcement agents in poor disadvantaged neighborhoods (Amnesty International, 2003). Likewise, a local human rights group, Jamaicans for Justice, have worked arduously to defend the rights of Jamaican citizens who are victims of police brutality.

An example of the use of excessive and deadly force occurred in 2001 during one of the country’s bloodiest battles between citizens and security forces. The police had entered politically segregated neighborhoods in West Kingston to conduct a raid and seize illegal weapons during which they alleged that they came under attack by residents in the community. This started a gun battle between members of the force and residents in the area that eventually ended with the death of 25 residents and 2 law enforcement officers (Amnesty International, 2003; Headley, 2002). For days, the corpses of some of victims of the attack were left on the streets and residents were locked in their homes because of the constant gunfire (Amnesty International, 2003; Headley, 2002).

In response to the deadly attacks, P.J. Patterson, a former Prime Minister and leader of the PNP, requested A Commission of Inquiry to investigate the excessive use of deadly force by the police and the army that resulted in the fatalities of innocent people including three persons 70 years and older, and a number of young women. It is important to point out that this incident took place in a neighborhood that is commonly referred to the “mother of all garrisons” because of the high levels of social cohesion among residents and the high levels of informal social control established by the don and his followers and upheld by residents (Espeut, 2005). Another noteworthy feature of this community is that since its establishment in the 1970s by the JLP, it has consistently
returned over three decades, nearly 100 per cent of votes for former Prime Minister and at
the time of its attack by security forces, leader of the opposition party, Edward Seaga.

After ten months of hearings (September 2001 to June 2002), the report of the
Commission of Inquiry was released. The findings of the report received scathing
criticisms from various human rights organizations. Amnesty International, in particular,
highlighted several weaknesses in Jamaica’s justice system and the disregard on the part
of the Jamaican government to human rights and as well as its failures to conduct
thorough investigations and prosecute security forces for excessive use of force.

According to a report prepared by Amnesty International there were high levels of cruelty
and human rights violations against many Jamaican citizens who live in politically
segregated neighborhoods. The results of the investigation conducted by Amnesty
International (2003: 4) revealed:

1. The West Kingston Commission of Inquiry has failed to fulfill its obligations
under international law to fully investigate the deaths of at least 25 people, killed
on a balance of probabilities by state agents.
2. The Inquiry finds no one responsible for the killings and fails to consider the
possibility of criminal proceedings, in violation of international standards.
3. The report of the Commission fails to deal with the international standards which
govern the use of lethal force, and the planning of the operation which
commenced in 5 July 2001 in West Kingston.
4. Impunity for state killings will persist whilst the voices of the victims and their
families are not heard, whilst there is no adequate explanation for the deaths and
where those responsible are not held to account before the law.
5. Prevented by a number of factors from hearing the crucial evidence of the victims
and the victim’s families, the Commission was structurally biased in favor of the
state.

The poor relationship the police maintain with inner-city residents in politically
homogenous neighborhoods have affected, in a number of ways, the quality of police
work in these areas. First, residents in these areas tend to settle disputes without
assistance from the police (Dowdney, 2005; Harriott, 2000). As discussed earlier, the don is the primary agent of formal social control in some neighborhoods. He is the person that is called upon to settle fights, arguments, property crimes, and violence among fellow residents. However, when conflicts and disputes escalate into gun battles, the police are eventually called upon to intervene and restore peace.

Second, relationships with the police have been severed because of police bias and affiliations with drug dons. In some communities, neighborhood dons have solicited and received help from the police to fight gangs from rival territories (Harriott, 2000). Equally damaging to residents’ trust in the police is the fact that there are some neighborhood dons who actually control local police stations and the activities of police officers (Johnson and Soeters, 2008). This adversely affects residents from rival neighborhoods as they unable to receive assistance from the police because they are controlled by the enemy.

Third, it has been difficult for the police to obtain information needed to solve cases as witnesses have refused to come forward (Harriott, 2000). Witnesses are reluctant because they are fearful of repercussions from the neighborhood don and they are also fearful of informants in the police force. Because of this, according to Headley (2002: 42), many inner-city residents have developed a “culture of silence” and do not co-operate with the police when they have witnessed serious crimes such as a homicide. This is further enforced as, in quite a number of cases, people have been killed after they were seen leaving a police station even though they might have gone there for other reasons other than to report or inform of a crime (Harriott, 2000).
Another related issue concerns the difficulty with searching for evidence and investigating homicides in garrison neighborhoods. Because the police are so disliked in these communities, whenever they conduct an investigation they are under the watchful eye of citizens and this makes it harder to get information to solve cases (Harriott, 2000). As result, the police have low conviction rates and low numbers of cleared up/solved cases and this is perhaps one of the reasons for ambiguity in their classification of crimes such as homicides.

Police involvement in the trafficking of drugs and illegal guns has also painted a negative view of law enforcement in the minds of many inner-city residents (Gunst, 1995; Johnson and Soeters, 2008; Levy, 2001). Harriott (2000) reports that in one garrison constituency, despite the presence of 11 crack houses that are close to a local police station, no formal arrests were ever made by the police for the selling or trafficking of drugs in the area. Police corruption is also widespread as some members of the police force have worked with drug traffickers with the flow of drugs in and out of the country (Harriott, 2000). Additionally, members of the police force are also known to actually compete with drug traffickers in the sale and distribution of drugs (Harriott, 2000). The police have also been paid to protect criminals and drug dealers (Clarke, 2006). Other members of the police force have also been known to indirectly engage in corruption simply by turning a blind eye on illegal and criminal activities (Johnson and Soeters, 2008).

**Theoretical Implications**

A significant benefit of cross-cultural macro-level research is that it is able to challenge or complement prevailing theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence.
The results from the regression analysis indicate that poverty and extreme levels of political civic engagement are significantly and positively associated with homicides in urban Jamaica. This chapter reviewed the various ways neighborhoods with extremely high levels of political civic engagement are able to maintain tight control over residents, achieve high levels of social cohesion, mutual trust, and shared commitment to defend the neighborhood’s political and gang turf. Collectively, the findings suggest that disadvantaged neighborhoods in urban Jamaica with extreme levels of political civic engagement, high levels of informal social control, and strong social cohesion among residents are more likely to have higher levels of homicides. These findings have important theoretical implications for comparative research on the neighborhood structural factors that predict homicide.

First, the above descriptions of ‘residential life’ in neighborhoods with high levels of political civic engagement and the findings from the regression analysis provides empirical support for the defended neighborhood perspective. Less support was found for social disorganization theory. Contrary to findings from most homicide studies, the present study suggests that homicides in urban Jamaica are more likely in neighborhoods with high levels of social and political organization. In other words, in urban Jamaica, higher levels of homicides are less connected with neighborhood social disorganization and are instead more associated with neighborhood political organization. Proponents of the defended neighborhood perspective would argue that this occurs because of perceived or actual threats to community safety and homogeneity (Suttles, 1972). Therefore, crime and violence can actually be higher in internally stable neighborhoods where residents
feel the need to ward off outsiders, defend the identity of their neighborhood, and retain neighborhood boundaries (Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987; Lyons, 2007).

With specific reference to Jamaica, neighborhoods with defined political boundaries, where organized criminal elements flourish, and where residents are controlled by criminal and political forces are examples of defended neighborhoods. In these communities, political and criminal gangs, as well as women and children use various defense mechanisms in order to protect the identity of their neighborhood and secure neighborhood boundaries from invasion by political gang rivals and the police. Since the 1970s residents in these disadvantaged neighborhoods have formed strong cohesive networks, developed mutual trust, and maintained high levels of informal social control in order to protect their neighborhood’s political identity. In these neighborhoods, residents are bonded and identified by their political affiliation and are integrated to achieve common goals such as feeling secure and safe in their neighborhoods.

Second, the extant research suggests that public social control, civic engagement, collective efficacy, and high levels of informal social control and social cohesion are associated with lower levels of crime and violence in neighborhoods (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Lee and Bartkowski, 2004; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 1997; Silver and Miller, 2004; Velez, 2001). On the contrary, although not directly tested, it is apparent that these neighborhood mechanisms may actually influence higher levels of homicide in urban Jamaica. In addition to this, it appears that homicides in urban Jamaica are also influenced by a cultural system that supports and resorts to the use of violence to solve disputes and problems.
According to the subculture of violence perspective, in some structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods, because of social alienation and isolation from mainstream society, residents develop an oppositional subculture that condones violence and gang activities (Anderson, 1999; Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967). Others have also posited that this subculture of violence tends to persist and is transmitted from one generation to another (Anderson, 1999; Shaw and McKay, 1942). In neighborhoods with extreme levels of political civic engagement, violence is largely used to settle internal and external disputes, avenge the death of community residents, defend neighborhood boundaries and gang turf, and protect political identities (Charles, 2006; Jamaica Gleaner, 2000; Johnson, 2005; National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997; Stone, 1985). Moreover, because the police are not trusted, disputes and conflicts are mainly resolved by the neighborhood don and his followers.

Third, recent research indicates that neighborhood crime is also associated with a combination of two factors: subcultural forces that promote violence and social structural disadvantage (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003a). Overall, the findings from the present study suggest that there is a connection between neighborhood disadvantage and subcultural values. Recall that from the early 1950s politicians began establishing strong ties with poor residents in need of government funded houses. Overtime, these residents resorted to the use of violence and were encouraged by elected officials to fight to protect their neighborhoods from invasions by rival political supporters. This sort of violence persisted throughout the years and resulted in politically segregated neighborhoods with clearly defined political boundaries. In these areas, residents continuously engage in political battles with neighboring rivals.
By the 1990s battles with rival political party supporters from neighboring communities gradually became battles over gun and drug turf with rival neighborhoods. Because these neighborhoods were transformed into closed restricted spaces where entry and exit are monitored by local gangs, residents developed their own system of justice and an oppositional subculture in which a designated community leader and his gang are regarded as important agents of social control and defenders of the community (Chevannes, 1992; Harriott, 2000; Johnson 2005; National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997).
CHAPTER VIII – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The dissertation was an attempt to understand homicide in urban Jamaica. In the U.S. and in similar countries most homicides occur either as a result of criminal activity or personal relationship difficulties. In Jamaica a different pattern is more common, and that is, homicide as an outcome of political contest. This is not civil war, but certainly civil disorder that is politically driven. As discussed earlier, the present study suggests that homicides in urban Jamaica are seemingly less connected with neighborhood social disorganization. Rather, there is a strong connection between neighborhood political organization and homicide.

The present study attempted to fill two major gaps in the study of homicides in modern societies. First, the extant research on homicide has been limited to developed countries. As such, most of what we know about homicide is based on research conducted in the United States, Canada, and Britain. Given that homicide is a global phenomenon, there is a need for more comparative research on the nature and extent of homicides in other countries. Currently, not much scholarly attention has been directed to the analysis of homicides in less developed countries. To address this void in the literature, the current study presented a macro-level analysis of homicide in a developing country. Specifically, it examined the structural factors associated with the differential levels of homicides across neighborhoods in urban Jamaica.

Second, the present study explored the validity and applicability of two leading neighborhood-level theoretical models – the social disorganization theory and the defended neighborhood perspective. This is important for criminological research as it informs, from a comparative perspective, the generalizability of these theoretical
propositions. The intent was not to directly test the generalizability of these theoretical models but instead use these theories to guide the framework of the study and facilitate the interpretation of the findings.

The island of Jamaica has been internationally recognized as a popular tourist destination. At the same time, this relatively small country has been, for the past decade, listed among the top five countries in the world with extremely high levels of homicide. To recapitulate, located in the southeast of Jamaica is the capital city and urban center – The Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA). Since the late 1970s, this region of the country has had extremely high homicide rates (69 per 100,000). This dissertation was an attempt to investigate the macro-level factors that predict homicides in this region of the country. As such, the research questions focused on the neighborhood structural characteristics that influence differential levels of homicides across urban neighborhoods in the KMA.

To review, it is clear that violence in urban Jamaica is connected to political civic engagement. From the early 1960s, the combined effects of clientelism and political corruption resulted in the geographical and political segregation of the socially disadvantaged in the KMA. Elected public officials took advantage of the poorer classes who were in need of material resources and government benefits by offering them rewards in return for votes. Over the course of several years, the majority of the urban poor became dependent on political hand-outs and relied heavily on politicians for access to scarce resources such as job contracts and housing.

One way in which politicians were able to ensure continued support from loyal supporters was to create political strongholds in certain neighborhoods. Because housing was such a prized commodity for the poor classes in Jamaica, the political party in state
power would allocate government constructed housing only to people who voted for the party. This continued when one political party lost an election and the winning party would then use government funds to construct housing schemes only for those who voted for their party. Such political practices and misuse of government funds inevitably created tension and conflicts among the urban poor especially those who lost their homes because their party of choice lost the election (Sives, 2002; Stone, 1985). In their attempts not to lose their homes residents developed defensive community mechanisms to protect and maintain their neighborhood’s political identity (Sives, 2002; see also Suttles, 1972).

One defense mechanism used was to exclusively vote for the political party that controlled the neighborhood and, at times, engage in various types of electoral fraud and malpractices during national elections (Figueroa and Sives, 2002; Munroe, 1999). High voter turnout ensured that the neighborhood’s party of choice remained in power. This ensured that residents could retain their only means of housing for their families and continue to reap benefits from public officials. The high levels of political corruption in urban Jamaica has not only affected the quality of democracy in the country, but has also created political mayhem and high levels of violence that has led to the loss of life for thousands of Jamaican citizens.

In order to sufficiently understand homicides in urban Jamaica, the present study employed negative binomial regression analysis while controlling for spatial autocorrelation. The results from the analysis of data for 107 census tracts in the KMA reveal that, of the theoretically informed variables used to predict homicides, only two – poverty and political civic engagement – were significantly positively associated with
homicides. Theoretically, in order to make sense of these findings, it was important to explore the neighborhood mechanisms that may intervene between structural conditions and violence levels. Although not directly tested in the regression model, findings from the analytical review of the various literature on social controls in poor neighborhoods with extreme levels of political civic engagement suggest that residents in these areas, under the control of a community leader, have developed and maintained close-knit relationships, strong bonds, and dense ties in order to effectively protect and defend the interest of their neighborhood.

These neighborhoods are internally organized around ensuring the safety and protection for residents as well as retaining control of political, gang, and drug turfs. Violence is often used to ward off political, drug, and gang rivals from neighboring communities. At the same time, the social organization of these neighborhoods have created “safe havens” for criminals who are protected from the law and have created restricted places where illegal activities can flourish with minimal inference from the state (Harriott, 2002; Figueroa and Sives, 2002: 65). It is not uncommon to find tolerance for engagement in illegal activities in socially cohesive neighborhoods (Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987; Lyons, 2007; Pattillo-McCoy, 1999; Suttles, 1972; Wilson, 1996). In fact, a study conducted by Pattillo-McCoy (1999) in Chicago neighborhoods found that dense social ties among residents actually facilitated instead of impeded criminal engagements such as drug and gang activities in the neighborhood. Additionally, work done by Lyons (2007) showed that hate crimes against minorities were higher in internally organized white communities with high levels of informal social control and social cohesion.
Proponents of the social disorganization perspective contend that crime and violence rates will more likely be higher in structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods with low levels of informal social control. According to this perspective, higher levels of crime and violence occur because social controls are weak and residents are not able to adequately solve chronic problems (Kornhauser, 1978; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003). In socially disorganized communities, there is usually little solidarity and a lack of community integration and social cohesion among residents (Kubrin et al., 2009). Conversely, the defended neighborhood perspective suggests that high levels of informal social control and social cohesion among residents in stable and internally organized neighborhoods may actually facilitate higher levels of crime and violence particularly when residents feel a need to maintain the homogeneity and identity of their neighborhood (Heitgerd and Bursik, 1987; Lyons, 2007; Suttles, 1972). Taking into consideration the empirical results and the findings from the discussion on neighborhood controls, it is apparent that neighborhoods in urban Jamaica that are politically organized with relatively high levels of informal social control are more likely to have high levels of homicides. These findings offer support for the defended neighborhood thesis. Such findings however, challenge social disorganization theory as an effective model for understanding the relationship between neighborhood structural characteristics and homicide in urban Jamaica.

Policy Implications

Although this study focused on homicides in urban Jamaica, its policy implications may be relevant to other countries with similar political and social
processes. Lessons could apply in countries where public officials are involved in criminal activities. In the context of urban Jamaica, there are several macro-level policies that can potentially reduce violence levels in highly politicized disadvantaged neighborhoods. These policies would require collective efforts from public officials, law enforcement, and citizens to address many of the social ills in neighborhoods with extreme levels of political civic engagement. In the next section, briefly discussed are public policy implications that are currently in place as well as future policy suggestions that can complement present initiatives. Table 9 provides a summary of current and future policy implications.

### Table 9
*Current and Future Policy Implications*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Current Public Policy Initiatives</th>
<th>Future Policy Suggestions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Amendments to the electoral law</td>
<td>Significantly improve police-community relations and programs</td>
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<td>Accountability of public officials</td>
<td>Direct more attention to police corruption and misuse of force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constituted Authority that oversees election malpractice</td>
<td>Eliminate the control of drug and gang networks in core neighborhoods</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training and educating law enforcement about electoral laws</td>
<td>Reduce residents’ reliance on neighborhood dons and gangs for protection and safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>International observers to monitor the election process</td>
<td>Expend more resources on community development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements in voter registration and identification systems</td>
<td>Direct more attention to children in highly politicized neighborhoods</td>
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Jamaica is faced with a challenging situation as top government officials are known to be involved in illegal activities in certain neighborhoods (Charles, 2006;
Munroe, 1999). Although partisan political violence and political corruption has slowly declined, homogenous voting continues to be a problematic sore in Jamaica’s attempt to heal its deep political wounds. However, in the 1990s, several factors contributed to substantive changes and reforms in Jamaica’s political system that was, for too long, crippled by years of political and electoral corruption, fiercely competitive politics, and violence. The JLP was again defeated by the PNP in the 1993 general elections. JLP political officials did not take their defeat lightly. They instead called for a “commission of inquiry” to investigate incidents of widespread electoral irregularities, fraud, and malpractice. The JLP brought national and international attention to the fact that elections in Jamaica were not free and fair but were instead marked with extensive electoral corruption, voter intimidation, and violence. They intensified the heat on the Jamaican government by boycotting parliament for several months and demanding major reforms in the electoral process (Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Munroe, 1999). The outcry from the opposition led to substantive changes in electoral law and the implementation of measures to reduce the problems with electoral violence and fraud.

Several amendments were made in electoral laws. Legislative reforms addressed the issues of voter-buying, over-voting, and voter intimidation (Sives, 2008). Politicians and their supporters could be sentenced to five years imprisonment for any involvement in electoral irregularities and fraud (Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Munroe, 1999). Public officials can also be held legally accountable for their involvement with drug and criminal gangs. Legislation was also passed that allowed a Constituted Authority body comprised of a retired judge, a member of the Privy Council and representatives from the Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC) to abort and void elections results in a constituency
if electoral fraud and malpractice were detected (Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Munroe, 1999). In such instances, the elections would be held again.

Another critical step taken by the Jamaican government in its efforts to transform the electoral system was to invite international observers to monitor the election process. International observers from the U.S. based group The Carter Center\(^9\), members from the Organization of American States (OAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) along with local election observers from The Citizens’ Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE) played an instrumental role in reducing election malpractice and fraud in Jamaica (Munroe, 1999). The presence of local and international election observers brought significant international media attention to Jamaica during Election Day (Munroe, 1999). As a result of this, and in conjunction with legislative and electoral reforms that were implemented, for the first time in decades, the 1997 national elections were the most peaceful in years with low levels of violence and no reports of widespread electoral malpractice (Munroe, 1999: 27).

By 2007, the electoral system and process had improved significantly. There had been major advancements in voter registration and identification. To deal with the problems of over-voting, electronic voting had been implemented and registered voters were given encrypted identification cards (Munroe, 1999). Presently, new computerized systems are used to match the fingerprints of registered voters during election time for verification purposes (Sives, 2008). Most importantly of all, violence prior to and during national elections in Jamaica had decreased substantially (Sives, 2008).

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\(^9\) Under the auspices of former United States President Jimmy Carter, the main mandate of the Carter Center has been to provide international assistance in countries that are trying to ensure fair, safe, and corruption-free elections.
Another intervention policy that may prove effective in controlling violence in politicized neighborhoods would be to significantly improve community – police relations and address problems with police corruption and misuse of force (Carter Center, 2003; Figueroa and Sives, 2002). Police officers have been accused of being involved in electoral malpractices and using deadly force in highly politicized neighborhoods. In response to these accusations, law enforcement officials have developed a comprehensive plan to minimize police corruption during national elections (Figueroa and Sives, 2003:87). Two major changes that have occurred involved training and educating police officers about electoral laws and making it mandatory that on Election Day officers wear identification tags with their names thereby allowing citizens to properly identify any officers involved in illegal acts (Figueroa and Sives, 2002).

While these measures have been successful, other measures to improve community – police relations and policing strategies to eliminate the control of drug and gang networks in politicized neighborhoods have been more challenging. Residents from highly politicized neighborhoods do not trust the police and to make matters worse, because they have developed their own system of formal social controls, law enforcement as the legitimate authority of the state has been replaced by community dons and his cronies (Harriott, 2000; National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997).

To deal with this critical issue, it is first important to reduce residents’ reliance on the neighborhood don and gangs for protection and safety. There is a need for more effective ways to eradicate drug and gang activities in core neighborhoods and lessen the control of the neighborhood don. Such measures would require (1) establishing community policing stations in these neighborhoods; (2) joined efforts by law
enforcement and public officials to work with neighborhood dons to develop peace initiatives; and (3) arresting key players responsible for drug and gun trafficking rings (Chang, 2008).

Macro-level policies should also focus on mass improvement in the social conditions of these communities. Non-partisan strategies would include improving the housing conditions for disadvantaged residents and investing more in the non-partisan creation of job opportunities and skills training programs. Lastly, it is equally important to focus on the socialization practices and the education of children in highly politicized neighborhoods. By focusing on the children, violence can potentially be reduced through education initiatives and teaching children about the importance of abiding by the law, not getting involved with gang and drug activities, and respecting other’s political interest.

**Directions for Future Research**

While the present study did not provide a complete test of social disorganization theory in Jamaica, future research should continue in this line of enquiry through the use of survey data to measure informal social control and other intervening concepts. It would also be more meaningful to replicate the present study in rural parts of the island. It is possible that homicides in these areas would be less connected to political civic engagement. In addition to this, a longitudinal study on the relationship between neighborhood structural characteristics and homicide in urban Jamaica that examines change in structural characteristics and social processes overtime would provide a more in-depth framework for understanding homicide (Bursik, 1988: Kubrin et al., 2009). Although extremely challenging given the quality of police work and the difficulty in
finding true motives for homicides and solving homicide cases, by disaggregating
homicide and studying the micro-environment of homicide, a better understanding of the
patterns, causes, settings, and correlates of homicides would be ascertained (Kubrin,
2003; Neilson et al., 2005).

On a final note, the findings from the current study reinforce the need to conduct
more comparative criminological research. Comparative research is critical in today’s
society largely because of globalization and an increased interest in understanding crime
and violence in other countries. In terms of the generalizability of criminological theories
developed in the US, such as social disorganization theory and the defended
neighborhood perspective, research should continue to tests these models in other
countries. Conducting more studies on homicides in different countries would make a
substantial contribution to criminological research. Not only, would there be more
avenues to test theoretical models, but also a better understanding of homicide would be
generated.
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VITA
Patrice K. Morris

1978  Born October 9 in Montego Bay, Jamaica.

1997  Graduated from Holy Childhood High School, Kingston, Jamaica.

2000  B.Sc. in Sociology and Psychology, The University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica.

2001- 2002  Employed as a Probation-Parole Officer for the Department of Correctional Services, Jamaica.

2004  M.A. in Criminal Justice, Rutgers University—School of Criminal Justice, Newark, New Jersey.


2004— 2009  Lecturer and Adjunct Professor of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University, Newark; Montclair State University, Montclair, New Jersey; and East Carolina State University, Greenville, North Carolina.

2009  Tenure-track Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice, College of Human Ecology, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina.

2010  Ph.D. in Criminal Justice, Rutgers University—School of Criminal Justice, Newark, New Jersey.