“When coldness traps this suffering clay”: mourning, death, and ethics in Sophocles, Shakespeare, and Joyce

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This dissertation is a project of mourning in Sophocles, Shakespeare, and Joyce. My theoretical approaches range from psychoanalysis, including works by Lacan, Freud, Abraham and Torok, to the deconstructive and ethical prism of Derrida. The chapter on Sophocles’ Antigone deals with the relationship between ethics and mourning. I demonstrate that at the heart of the Law is always an impossible injunction/desire. Antigone’s mourning in fact marks the failure of interiorization of this Law. In the Greek play, Antigone’s death drive connotes an ethical act that insists on her desire. A supplement of the written law, Antigone acts out her exorbitant faithfulness to that transgressive desire. The chapters on James Joyce’s “The Dead” and Ulysses focus on the politics of eating, closely linked to mourning and the question of hospitality. One must eat well to remain responsible to the others. Yet, in Joyce’s works, eating only disrupts the healthy process of mourning and builds an indigestible crypt within the psyche. In Ulysses, eating parallels incorporation of the love-object and implies incestuous scenarios. In “The Dead,” the haunted dinner party opens the absolute
hospitality between the living and the deceased. The inviting host is held hostage through vicarious mourning. In my third chapter, I discuss Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* through a Derridean and Levinasian lens. Mourning, as the relations between being-in-general and the face, is always an excess of ethical intersubjectivity. For Shakespeare, the revenge tragedy is manifested through an excess of substitution/mourning. The ghost anticipates mourning and engages with promises of expiation at the same time and also at the time of the other. As it turns out, the Danish prince’s fidelity to the dead father is nothing more than a performative insistence structured like endless apocalyptic writings.
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Above all, I thank my parents and many others who have supported me in their own ways.
There is death in every utterance, in the stalk, there, twined round a pole. There is death in the licked-up bleeding, death swims inside every cow.

There is death in their fruitless chasing, as if they were looking for thieves. From now on the milk will be scarlet that comes from the death-filled cows. They will take it in red, red lorries along roads which are scarlet, red, new-poured into red, red milk churns for red, red children to drink.

Death in their voices and glances. Round that collar sits death. Surely the town will repay them. Death is a burden for them. They'll have to be lifted, somehow. How can their grief be stilled? If a wedding is spoiled by a murder, does it mean the milk must be red?

--Joseph Brodsky, "Hills"
For my younger brother and the dead in my family--
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Introduction

In the Beginning There Is a Crypt...

In 1976, Maria Torok and Nicholas Abraham published *Cryptonymie: Le verbier de L’Homme aux loups*, later translated into English in 1986 as *The Wolfman’s Magic Word: A Cryptonymy*. Known for their definitions of the crypts and encryption, they explore Freud’s Wolf Man case, inaugurating a “theory of readability [that] does not define the act of reading but rather attempts to create avenues for reading where previously there were none” (li). Abraham and Torok textualize the primal scene, transforming it into a primal seme, and therefore read the somatic symptoms as a rhetorical figure.¹ Weaving the symptoms of repression into the linguistic fabric, Abraham and Torok elaborate on their cryptoaesthetics of “phantoms,” “hauntings,” and “anasemia”.

Not unlike Kristeva’s idea of melancholic asymbolia, a failure of language’s compensation for the loss, Abraham and Torok’s trace of the crypt (a secret place where the previously-loved-now-lost object hides) is located in the nucleus of the ego. They revise the Freudian predetermined psycho-sexual development and regard individuals as hyphenated in-dividuals. Thanks to the cut, an “un-divided entity [is] gradually defined by a constant process of differentiation or ‘division’ from a more primary union: the mother” (Rashkin, 16). In this way, the conceptualization of the in-dividual, like Freud’s fort-da game, begins with the
mother’s absence and necessitates the child’s detachment from the mother. However, this individuating process does not rid the child of the maternal origin; instead, the child “absorb[s] a cultural inheritance incorporating certain secrets, absences, or silences” from the former generations’ unconsciousness (Smith, 291).

In Abraham and Torok’s view, individuals inherit a certain “psychic traces” from their forebears. Retrospectively and anasemically, cryptology is a textual movement that always travels toward an origin. Where language attempts to take the place of the lost object, the crypt forms a broken symbol that hides the repressed trauma. In their decryption of the case studies of the Wolf Man, Abraham and Torok postulate that there is a verbal indeterminacy at work for our interpretation of the analysand’s witnessing of the primal scene. The inability to decide the meaning behind words, so to speak, is the founding ethics of psychoanalysis. According to Abraham and Torok, “repression may be carried out on a word, as if it were the representation of a thing...For this to occur, a catastrophic situation must have been created precisely by words” (20). A catastrophe is a breakdown of signification, a painful experience entombed within the psyche, manifested in the forms of silences, gaps, linguistic puns or anomalies. Buried in the ashes of unconsciousness, a crypt only marks traces in the signifying economy. Even a bodily pain is translated into a verbal maze. Faced with the analysand’s enigmatic discourse, the psychoanalyst aims to recover the “broken symbol” through uncovering the cosymbols, the symbol’s
complement, so that the meanings will reemerge. In other words, the process of overcoming trauma (i.e. the process of introjection) relies on the excavation of signification in the face of loss. As a result, loss becomes double inasmuch as the analyst is inevitably lost in translation.

To a great extent, Abraham and Torok’s theorization of the crypt plays with semes and an irreducible sameness in their seeking kinship between words. For Abraham and Torok, a crypt is the product of an imaginary incorporation or melancholic identification by which the traumatic loss is sealed inside the Self. At this time, a false sense of unconsciousness (an onomatopoeic I) pervades the subject in his or her identification with the object. The I camouflages the loss with a coded linguistic mechanism. Nicholas Rand, defining the fantasy of incorporation, says: “In setting up the fiction of being another, the subject creates himself as a dialogue or, more precisely, as a system of analogical references to a fictitious other. The status of the subject becomes poetic in that the dialogic structure can only be recognized through linguistic acts” (3). The patient’s signature, therefore, is none other than a fictitious invention during a ghostly dialogue.

In the essay “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud provides an often-cited psychoanalytic theory of melancholia based on the subject’s ongoing deprivation. He discerns two types of symptoms—the symptoms of mourning and those of melancholia. Freud defines melancholia as pathological vis-à-vis the healthy mourning. In both cases, “the reaction to the loss of the loved person, contains
the same feeling of pain, loss of interest in the outside world—in so far as it does not recall the dead one—loss of capacity to adopt any new object of love, which would mean a replacing of the mourned, the same turning from every active effort that is not connected with thought of the dead” (165). For a mourner, the lost love is an identifiable object, whereas for a melancholic, the object is not necessarily limited to an actual object—it might be something of “a more ideal kind” (e.g. the loss of ambition or a social status). Freud further distinguishes these two reactions to bereavement: in melancholia, “one cannot see clearly what it is that has been lost,” while in mourning, “there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious” (245). That is to say, the melancholic has the tendency to translate the object-loss into an ego-loss. He or she swallows up the object and then masquerades as the loved one. Following this argument, Abraham and Torok develop their theory about the process of introjection and the fantasy of incorporation.

In “The Lost Object—Me,” Abraham and Torok reformulate Freud’s account of melancholic identification. They transform the Freudian “ego in the guise of the object” into “the object in the guise of the ego” (SK, 141). For Freud, the melancholic identification results in a fractured ego, as if occupied by two topographically excluded parties. The ego’s object exists in the psyche like a parasite. Contrarily, Abraham and Torok claim that “the ‘object,’ in its turn, carries the ego as its mask” (141). It appears that there are two modes of identifications at issue. The first retains the object by an act of internalizing.
The second one, termed as “endocryptic identification,” is covered with a false identity forever disguised and denied. It marks “the ‘gaping’ wound of the topography” (142). By reversing the façade, Abraham & Torok posit that "endocryptic identification" produces a "sealed-off psychic place, a crypt in the ego" (141). However, if Abraham and Torok distance themselves from Freud from the topographical perspective, the paradox emerges when they mention elsewhere that “the wish the ego can only represent as an ‘exquisite corpse’ lying somewhere inside it” (“Illness of Mourning,” 118, emphasis mine). Along with Freud, the inside-outside differentiation is not clear-cut for Abraham and Torok. It seems, after all, Abraham and Torok’s statement of encryptment is closer to Freud than they are willing to acknowledge. Does the difficulty of fully accepting the Freudian legacy reflect that Freud’s complicated and sometimes incoherent psychoanalysis is itself a crypt that threatens from within?²

Taking their cue from Ferenczi, who introduces the term “introjection” as “the process of broadening the ego” (127), Abraham and Torok further explicate introjection (intro-jection, literally casting inside) as “a continual process of self-fashioning through the fructification of change” (14). The subject continually performs an inward mourning not just spatially, but also temporarily. He or she experiences a loss of time as well as a loss of the object. The subject seeks to re-represent the loss during the time when the work of mourning is completed. Nonetheless, such a task can be carried out only in a way that time itself loses totality. Is it even possible for mourning to have an end? At some level, the
psyche is in a constant but not orderly state of introjecting the absent. Further, the mourner tends to textualize the missing link and transforms it into words. In that case, language replaces the object; the words refill the empty mouth. Certainly, mourning is not outside the text. The psyche translates the pain in spite of its untranslatability—this makes an impossible case for the subject to cope with absences of any object, be it ideal or actual. Melancholics, in their inexpressible mourning, only express language that hides and eludes—“The words that cannot be uttered, the scenes that cannot be recalled, the tears that cannot be shed—everything will be swallowed along with the trauma that led to the loss. Swallowed and preserved” (“Mourning or Melancholia,” 130).

In fact, introjection and incorporation fail to demarcate each other since the contours of every in-dividual remain an un-rigid crosscut, a flowing surface only. As Derrida observes in his introduction to The Wolf Man’s Magic Word, “Introjection/incorporation: Everything is played out on the borderline that divides and opposes the two terms. From one safe, the other; from one inside, the other; one within the other; and the same outside the other” (“Fors,” xvi). The French fors is an archaism means 1) an interior. 2) the exclusion to an exterior (“barring,” “except for,” “save”). Playing on the shift between the interior and exterior, Derrida questions Abraham and Torok’s definitions of introjection and incorporation. The crypt, for Derrida, is like fors, a “no-place” that is the site of contradictions. It links the outside to the inside:
The most inward safe...becomes the outcast,...the outside (foris) with respect to the outer safe (the Self) which includes it without comprehending it, in order to comprehend nothing in it. The inner safe (the Self) has placed itself outside the crypt, or, if one prefers, has constituted ‘within itself’ the crypt as an outer safe. (xix)

The inner safe is an architecture undermined by its perpetual interplay of the exterior and the interior. It is “built...through the double pressure of contradictory forces: it is erected by its very ruin, held up by what never stops eating away at its foundation” (80). From the perspective that the crypt calls into question the construction of an edifice, Derrida suggests that the crypt, while involving encrypting, always requires the acts of decrypting or deciphering in order to resurrect the incinerated words.

If diverting from Freudian psychoanalysis is Abraham and Torok’s attempt to exorcise the effect of a transgenerational phantom, then their refusal to accept the Lacanian legacy indicates that such an exorcism is not about chasing away the ghost. Exorcism is about conjuring up spirits and communicating with the ghost, be it a hostile or a hospitable one. In her account of the interaction between Lacan and Abraham/Torok, Elizabeth Roudinesco recalls that Abraham “cultivated an ignorance of Lacan’s work. When he discovered the master's discourse at Sainte-Anne, he was repelled by the hypnotic nature of Lacan's relation to his students.” (qtd. Lane, 29). On the other hand, Lacan is anxious about the effect of Abraham & Torok’s Cryptonymy. The cryptic effect is, for
Lacan, an effect of producing monstrous openings. He writes, “it is an extreme and I am terrified of it, of finding that I am more or less responsible for having opened the sluices” (qtd. MacCannell, 81). To a certain degree, Lacan’s comparison of language with death images does seem to resonate Abraham and Torok’s cryptonomy. In “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” he suggests: “[t]he first symbol in which we recognize humanity in its vestiges is the burial” (101). The trace of the archi-symbol is functioning as a tomb. To analyze the trace is necessarily to distort the symbol, to create a co-symbol (à la Abraham and Torok). Despite their mutual aggression, Lacan, not far from Abraham and Torok, posits that the unconscious is constructed as a “fortified camp, or even a stadium” while the id is “[a] remote inner castle” (“Mirror Stage,” 7). The I is ensconced in a safe; the leakage is now sealed. This dream-like fantasy becomes a harbor for the haunted self. How do we decipher Abraham’s silence about the metaphor of self-as-chamber/fortress which comes from a Lacanian association, if not legacy? Does the metaphor maintain safely preserved in Abraham and Torok’s accounts by the repression of Lacan’s name?

Perhaps one can find the Lacanian crypt not just in Abraham and Torok, but also in the Derridean archives. In discussing the issue of the debt and inheritance, Derrida says, “[a]n inheritance is always the reaffirmation of a debt, but a critical, selective, and filtering affirmation...Even where it is not acknowledged, even where it remains unconscious or disavowed, this debt
remains at work” (SM, 91-92). In the unconscious, this debt remaining at work foresees that the ghost of Lacan will return to haunt the working of Abraham and Torok. The promise is carried out when Abraham and Torok practice Lacan’s method of analyzing language in their search for allosemes:

Each time we are obliged...to look for the signification of a word, the only correct method is to enumerate all of its usages. If you want to know the signification of the word main in the French language, you must draw up a catalogue of its usages, and not only when it represents the organ of the hand, but also when it figures in main d’oeuvre [manpower], mainmise [manumission], mainmorte [mortmain], etc. The signification is given by the sum of these usages. (Seminar I, 238)

Abraham and Torok, when analyzing Freud’s Wolf Man Case, take recourse to a Russian dictionary in order to trace the patient’s primal words. They compile a lexicon under the rubric of “verbarium.” As a rule, a dictionary aims to excavate a linguistic past. What we find in a dictionary is not a definite meaning, but referentiality. It functions for a lexicographer to discover the polysemic aspects of words. By looking up a dictionary, Abraham and Torok build up a blueprint for their own lexicon, a non-sensible dictionary to which the Red Queen refers. This construction of a “verbarium,” according to Abraham and Torok, is called the anasemic process. Anasemia, a neologism invented by Abraham and Torok, is anti-semantic or a-semantic in nature. However, anasemia is not a negation of meaning. It defies the architectonics of signification with a set of signifiers. The
“verbarium” deconstructs the arbitrary structure of signs and reveals the linguistic symptoms of the analysand’s incoherent discourse. During the procedure of deciphering Wolf Man’s magic words, Abraham and Torok look up the homonyms of the words and reexamine the possibility of semantic differences across German, English, and Russian. The case history, therefore, becomes a text deciphered through the synonyms (the other or different meanings) of a primal word tieret. These synonyms, as it were, are also called “allosemes” (allo: other, different; agorein: to speak publicly). In this way, the crypt is constructed through a concatenation of words—a displacement, distortion, or defacement of the taboo word. Abraham and Torok describe this operation thus:

...a displacement on a second level: The word itself as a lexical entity constitutes the global situation from which one particular meaning is sectioned out of the sum total of meanings...what is at stake here is not a metonymy of things but a metonymy of words. The contiguity that presides over this procedure is by nature not a representation of things, not even a representation of words, but arises from the lexical contiguity of the various meanings of the same words...(Wolf Man’s Magic Word, 19)

Cryptonomy takes place in translation. Based on the notion of interlinguistic and intralinguistic translation, anasemia provides a psychoanalytic reading of the designified words. It is a verbal displacement of a hidden word. The multiplicities
of interpretations are generated from the dialogue between the addresser (the analysand) and the addressee (the analyst).

Derrida, analyzing Abraham and Torok’s analysis of the Wolf Man, proposes that the word tieret does not only constitute the kernel of the patient’s secret desire, but also the analyst’s. What the magic word produces is a TR effect that recalls the name of Torok. The primal word is decomposable and decipherable. The Russian Trude is “derived” from the German Trud, meaning “force”. As Derrida may suggest, the game of anasemia is driven by the force of fors. A crypt yields homonyms and homophones, paronyms and paraphones—each contaminate and inseminate others. The crypts within crypts consequently allow language to “circulate and interbreed in a festival of equivocality” (Ulmer, 26). Ulmer points out that “cryptogam,” a kind of plants that reproduce not through visible flowers but through hidden spores, is akin to the coded operation of cryptograms. Word formation is botanically structured. Without the presence and acknowledgment of the presence of the father, the primal words gestate a galaxy of bastard words under the cover of a maternal Shell. The signifying chain is now set into motion through a detour of semes.

**Her Splendid Domes are One Dismantled Heap**

In Freud’s first case of hysteria, he delineates the occasion in which Emma von N, who once paid a visit to Rome, recollects two previously forgotten words:
She told me of a visit she had paid to the Roman catacombs, but could not recall two technical terms; nor could I help her with them....next evening, while we were talking about something which had no connection with catacombs, she suddenly burst out: “Crypt, doctor, and columbarium.” “Ah, those are the words you couldn’t think of yesterday. When did they occur to you?” “In the garden this afternoon” (SE 2, 98).

“Crypt” and “columbarium”—these words are reminiscent of Freud’s own dream of Pompeii. The burial of Pompeii, the metaphor for the site of repression, has functioned as a safe in which death is preserved within a psyche. In Freud’s reading of Jensen’s Gradiva, an essay written eight years before “Mourning and Melancholia,” the issue of mourning is tied up with childhood erotics. The novella depicts an archaeologist’s obsession with a bas-relief of Gradiva (the girl splendid in walking). At the heart of the story is the loss of the love-object, a repressed desire which triggers a transformation from the young man’s longing to his childhood sweetheart Zoe (meaning Life) to the pursuit of Gradiva’s ghost. The haunting of Gradiva, for Freud, is a psychic spookulization of desire, and for Derrida, the best illustration of archive fever. The ghost’s footsteps, a gait so singular that Norbert Hanold traces it throughout Italy, are imprints of an archive recorded on different places. Such a record maps ellipses and breaches. It obscures the datability of any singular historical epochality. That is to say, memories archived require an encrypted psychic aphasia.
What Freud does not point out is the encrypted nature of naming. Gradiva, an anagram of Gravida (she who is pregnant), refers to a secret carried inside. In mourning, one is pregnant with memories and desires for another. Derrida explicitly associates archive fever with an archive desire: “It is to burn with a passion. It is never to rest, interminably, from searching for the archive right where it slips away” (AF, 91). Madly in love with the archive, the archeologist follows the spectral footsteps, excavating the buried pile and attempting to dig up the undiggable. Isn’t it a disease we all suffer as a doctoral student? Promising to be scholars to come, we all tap into the arsonist syndrome that drives us to the allure of substrative ashes. The desire for archive is a desire to be pregnant: an anticipation yet-to-come. In endless pregnancy, a scholar gives rise to the encrypted and retains initial traumas at the same time. The archive, arkhe, a legal term that connotes both commencement and commandment, produces a scholar who opens a possible future. We crave for a burnt-out library, “a fire shut up in stone” (Boehme), a self-immolation necessary for the subjecthood of scholarship. It is with this dream that I start this project of ‘working through’. Following Freud’s concept that mourning is a working-through, Derrida argues that all works function as mourning. Mourning is like a labor, a pregnancy. And the work to excavate a crypt is to lay bare the passage from the unconscious to consciousness, if possible. Literally finishing this work in a past sanctuary, I sometimes feel that writing, perhaps all forms of writing, is a note from a hypogeum in which the living and the dead anticipate each other.
In Chapter One, I discuss desire as a precondition of mourning and the mourner’s relation to ethics. A paradigm of ethical responsibility, Antigone conceals and reveals a psychic trauma, a family shame passed down in the form of a transgenerational ghost. Antigone’s act embodies the signifier of her desire, an inveterate death drive that threatens to destroy the archive. The archon, the interpreter of the law, is in turn sentenced by the law of the house (oikos). Antigone’s hysterical fever brings catastrophe to the house (arkheion) under the injunction to mourn. As Lacan suggests, the ethics of desire transcends the superegoistic aspect of the Law. This chapter attempts to demonstrate that at the heart of the Law is an impossible injunction/desire. Antigone’s mourning in fact marks the failure of interiorization of this Law. I maintain that Antigone’s death drive connotes an ethical act that insists on her desire. Catherine Kellogg, in her discussion of Derridean justice and law, claims that “Antigone must function as the supplement to the Law” (366). A supplement of the written law, Antigone acts out her exorbitant faithfulness to that transgressive desire. Where the Law prohibits, there desire lingers.

The second and third chapters focus on James Joyce’s “The Dead” and Ulysses. For Joyce, the politics of eating is closely linked to mourning and the question of hospitality. As exemplified in Kant, the aesthetics of eating has been overloaded with ethical significance. One must eat well to remain responsible to the others. Yet, in Joyce’s works, eating only disrupts the healthy process of mourning and builds an indigestible crypt within the psyche. In Ulysses, eating
parallels incorporation of the love-object and implies incestuous scenarios. In “The Dead,” the haunted dinner party opens the absolute hospitality between the living and the deceased. The inviting host is held hostage through vicarious mourning. Contrary to the breakdown of Creon, the national archive of Ireland is preserved only in the sense that the national authority is no less vehemently questioned. As long as starvation remains a national trauma of Ireland, the nation building is predicated upon a need to forget the Great Irish Famine as well as a desire of cannibalism. At some level, the chapters on Joyce could be considered a response to Eagleton’s inquiry about Joyce’s position in the literature of Great Hunger. The hungry ghosts are everywhere in Joyce’s works. For Joyce, friendship is another name for cannibalism, which constitutes an absolute hospitality as well as an (un)welcoming party. We have two different examples: Molly Ivors, the only guest who refuses to eat with the host(ess), and Molly Bloom, who demands that her husband make breakfast. The symptoms of hunger remain undecidable as Christopher Morash notes: “it may be precisely this unimaginable, indeterminate element—the absence of a stable, empirical reality—which makes us constantly aware of the Famine dead whose defining characteristic is their absence” (4).

Finally, I put *Hamlet* at last, not according to any chronology, but to the aporetic structure of temporalization. In chapter four, I discuss Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* first in terms of Lacan’s mourning subject and then in terms of Derridean and Levinasian apocalyptic mourning. Mourning, while it marks a historical event,
comes from an uncertain future that anticipates a crisis of time itself. In *Hamlet*, mourning becomes a haunting demand from the other to have justice rendered. Foreshadowing another possibility of historicity, the ghost asks for a gift and offers a gift—a gift that disrupts the present being of time. As justice only exists in a spectral future, the gift is given under the principle of coming. That is, the ghost anticipates mourning and engages with promises of expiation at the same time and also at the time of the other.

In a way, the Danish prince’s fidelity to the dead father is nothing more than a performative insistence structured like endless apocalyptic writings. For Levinas, the future that waits for me is an ethical imperative. Oriented toward the future, the promised justice is predicated upon an alterity. “Thou art a scholar, speak to it, Horatio”—facing the ghost seeking justice, a scholar suffers aphasia in his or her beckoning of the textual arrivants. The archive is open to the otherness of the future-to-come. In the out-of-jointness of time, the coming of the future presupposes an unpredictability that calls into question all sending-of-beings. Inevitably, the being is indistinguishable from an apocalypse without apocalypse since it never fulfills its destiny. Hamlet, unable to claim his death as Juliet claims that “I keep my power to die” (3, 5, 242), is deprived of a solitary death. The tragic of the tragedy proves to be an impossibility of incommunicable solitude.
Endnote

1 In Primal Scenes: Literature, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, Ned Lukacher draws an attention to the words “scene” and “seme”. In a psychoanalytic context, listening to the patient’s words is the primal scene for any analysts. See p. 68.


6 Ulmer, p. 24.


8 The most prominent example that illustrates Irish national identity in relation to cannibalism would be Jonathan Swift’s uncanny joke in “A Modest proposal” in which he says, “I have been assured by a very knowing American of my acquaintance in London, that a young healthy child well nursed is at a year old a most delicious, nourishing, and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted, baked, or boiled; and I make no doubt that it will equally serve in a fricassee or a ragout” (265). See Jonathan Swift, The Works of Jonathan Swift, Edinburgh: A. Constable and co., vol. 7, 1824.

9 Terry Eagleton, in his Heathcliff and the Great Hunger, asks, “Where is the Famine in the literature of the Revival? Where is it in Joyce?” (13).
Chapter One
A Valediction: Forbidden Mourning in Antigone

I can’t stop for that! My business is to love. I found a bird, this morning, down—down on a little bush at the foot of the garden, and wherefore sing, I said, since nobody hears?

—Letters of Emily Dickinson

The aim of this chapter is to treat mourning as a law that demands a deconstruction of the sovereignty itself. At central of my argument is the strange ethics of the sister. Whether an epitome of pure ethics (Hegel) or a pure poem (Heidegger), Antigone brings the question whether the sister is haunting philosophical thinking rather than purifying the domestic space. In their analysis of Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari propose two kinds of incests: Oedipal and schizo incest. Whereas the Oedipal incest “occurs, or imagines that it occurs...as an incest with the mother,” the schizo incest “takes place with the sister, who is not a substitute for the mother” (1986: 67). The sister, while belonging to the family, provides an anticonjugal line of flight and haunts the kinship relations of daddy-mommy-me. As a helper of the brother and a choreagapher of lines of escape, the sister, however, does not take flight from the household. Her dance of desire is disrupted. Reterritorialized and re-Oedipalized, she “oscillate[s] between a schizo escape and an Oedipal impasse” (15). Like the brother, she
wants a schizo incest, and perpetually seeks a way out. Seemingly a contrast to the schizo-sister, Sophocles' Antigone strives for returning home in exile. A creature born for love, the Greek heroine personifies the logic of incest, which is a plural logic confusing Oedipal sensibility with schizo love. Sticking to the role of the sister, Antigone abandons Ismene, and thus has no sister. Sorority, in its spectral existence, marks a chasm of the familial bondage. If matrimony is not a form of totalitarianism, but an example of introducing difference, it is necessarily and inevitably wounded. Instead of following Deleuze's nomadic science, I trace Antigone's flight towards the beloved mainly through Derridean philosophy. After all, isn't the deconstructive, shattered love already deterritorialized and nomadic?

I. Mourning Becomes the Law

In Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, a sister stands up against the sovereign law in order to save her brother. Upon Claudio’s request, Isabella has to sleep with Angelo, a crime the playwright associates with ‘incest’: “Is’t not a kind of incest, to take life / From thine own sister’s shame?” (3, 1, 138-39). To preserve her honor, Isabella is ready to bury Claudio. At first glance, she is, like Hegel’s Antigone, the guardian of familial norms. She is willing to sacrifice the living for the dead father’s will: “there spake my brother; there my father’s grave / Did utter forth a voice” (3, 1, 84-86).¹ The Law of the Father seems to justify
Isabella's defying the law of the government. Opposition between the suffering subject and the sovereign law becomes clear in this play. Both Isabella and Angelo are extremists. The former claims that she must wear the “impression of keen whips” as “rubies” and “strip [herself] to death” (2, 4, 101-02). The latter insists his victim must die in “ling’ring sufferance” (2, 4,168). Despite such reference to corporeality, the conflict between individuals and sovereignty always comes to light at the moment when power is transferred, as is the case in 
*Measure for Measure* and *Antigone*. Is the absence of the body of the person in authority the precondition of law? Behind the writ of *habeas corpus* (you shall have a body), isn't there a counter-law suspending the law itself? Angelo can only rouse the sleeping law to action when the Duke is absent. At some level, the law is institutionalized desire that originates from a lack. The law thus functions as prosthesis, substituting for a lost organ in the body politic (eg. the law demands Claudio’s head in compensation for Juliet’s lost maidenhood, and Isabella’s maidenhead for Claudio’s head).² Seen this way, it is noteworthy that the play begins with the Duke’s handing over “all the organs / Of [his] own power” to Angelo. Whether it is the law of justice, represented by Angelo, or the law of mercy, represented by Isabella, the ‘head’ of the law is constantly misplaced.

As in *Measure for Measure*, obsession with ideas of death, incest, and the split of the law are intertwined in Sophocles’ *Antigone*. If for Shakespeare the logic of transplantation proves the law’s inadequacy as an organless body, then
for Sophocles, the principle of replaceability suggests that “the family's nominating function is burial,” and since mourning is an impossible task, “marriage is [also] impossible” (Spivak, 1977: 34). Antigone's marriage-to-death makes her the bride of Haemon/hymen. She leads a polygamous marriage (to Hades and to Haemon)—yet remains chaste. The unconsummated wedding resembles a “Romeo and Juliet” scenario in which one lover dies after another in a crypt. In the play, Antigone and Haemon are never in the same place at the same time: they miss each other and finally end up dying reciprocal deaths. The Greek word \( \Upsilon \mu \nu \nu \) (hymen) means both marriage and the mucous membrane that forecloses something immanent. Derrida traces the word *humnos* (hymn) to “a weave, later the weave of a song, by extension a wedding song or song of mourning” (1981: 213). Moreover, the Derridean logic of the hymen is the “interval of the *entre***” (212). The hymen is something that “enters into the antre [cave],” eluding Hegelianism, but still caught in-between. The logic of the hymen entails a symptom of hysteria. Derrida writes that “[t]o pierce the hymen or to pierce one's eyelid (which in some birds is called a hymen) [is] to lose one's sight or one's life, no longer to see the light of day” (214).

Antigone screams like a bird. She mourns her brother “with the shrill cry / of an embittered bird” (Sophocles, 1991: 177). In Greek tradition, a bird illustrates both a mourning and prophetic figure. Avital Ronell relates birds with “harbingers of an uncertain future,” observing that they also surround the event of death, always coming from elsewhere, and, as the Greeks had it, birds are
bereft of proper burial, unaccompanied in the last instance by an evocation of cemetery (Aristophanes)” (1986: 164). In Sophocles, the mourning bird casts its shadow on the blind seer, a seer blinded because he prioritizes the feminine jouissance over the phallic. The bird does tell of a future to come, yet that future is uninterpretable to the seer—the prophecy has failed and the bird in this sense cannot be fully articulated by the symbolic castration. Antigone's hymen/hystera produces ambiguity—she sings the hymn to affirm the masculine assertion—“Yes, Yes, I belong to you,” but also sets up a barrier of that desire. Antigone is caught in the dialectic of renunciation and desire. She is, truly, the “everlasting irony of the community” (Hegel, 1977: 288).

In his interpretation of Antigone, Hegel maintains that the play revolves around the conflict between the human law of the state and the divine law of the family. The two protagonists, Antigone and Creon, act by fiat and respectively embody two polarized ethical authorities: the feminine/divine versus the masculine/human. While human law aims for universality or totality within the walls of the polis, divine law concerns family values, pursuing the domesticated “particularity of human existence” (Miller, 2000: 122). Dialectically contradictory to each other, neither of them is “by itself absolutely valid” (Hegel, 1977: 276). Both are supplements, we should say, to each other since the validity of each law is undecidable. Divine law depends on the community in order for families to achieve a higher level of self-actualization. And human law or universal law must acknowledge the family as a prerequisite to its own existence. According to
Hegel, the brother attains universality as an individual by leaving the family behind. The sister functions to enable her brother to enter the public sphere from that of private particularity. Unlike the roles of daughter and wife, the sister occupies the highest ethical status that could be attributed to women. Kelly Oliver explains that with Hegel, “not all family relations are ethical relations. Relations between husbands and wives or between parents and children are not ethical because they are always infused with emotions and natural feelings” (1996: 71, emphasis mine). A daughter or a son may act obediently, but this duty is hierarchically forced. A wife and husband may have reciprocal respect for each other, but this bond is sexually charged. If we consider that Creon comes to the throne because he is Jocasta's brother, woman qua sister is indeed the ethical agency that insures her brother's entry into politics and into the symbolic—only, in Sophocles' play, the family has bungled its mission and has instead created a 'bad' citizen as Creon turns out to be “a fine dictator of a desert” (Sophocles, 1991: 190).

By carrying out the burial rites, Antigone tries to settle Polyneices’ unpaid debt to the living community, redeeming him from being cast out in a traumatic upheaval. Her performance of burial rites thus endeavors to recover her brother's citizenship, while she herself remains within the site of darkness. The unburied body, like the corpse in Hitchcock’s The Trouble with Harry, is exposed in public, “present without being dead on the symbolic level” (Žižek, 1992: 27). The dead keep on dying no matter how much effort we put on the burial. Their
destination is not a closure. They defy the teleology of death which tends toward the symbolic and the universal. The body of Polyneices, as well as that of Harry, is buried and unburied several times through the end. At some level, death demands incessant mourning, as "[t]he god of death demands...rites for both [Polyneices and Eteocles]" (Sophocles, 1991: 181). While Hegel describes death as the "absolute Lord" (1977: 117), at the core of death is a refusal of symbolic representation. Contrary to Antigone’s claim about the non-substitability of Polyneices, I argue that what is irremediable is not the brother, but a rift forever irreparable—a Lacanian real rather than a Hegelian particularity. The law by which Antigone abides is that associated with the Penates and the family—a law that belongs to the tenebrous underworld.

In many of his articles, Žižek has pictured a clean and public decree smeared by its obscene supplement. According to him, "[w]hat 'holds together' a community most deeply is not so much identification with the Law that regulates the community's 'normal' everyday circuit, but rather identification with a specific form of transgression of the Law" (1994: 55). The law's very own raison d'être is its transgression. The court is just an empty space unless someone breaks the law. In breaking the law, we resurrect the dead letter. To summarize, the operation of the law is predicated upon its cancellation. As the law emerges from the disruption of the symbolic, it crosses the border of signification. It is at this moment of crossing border that Antigone turns to the flip side of the public decree, that is, the Real (or the traumatic loss) of the Law.
A remainder of the father, the law cannot be fully internalized through the agency of the superego. If the Law of the Father needs to be preserved as a crypt, it nevertheless indicates a failed mourning. To monumentalize the father successfully is to get rid of that father. Creon, who speaks with the language of the father's law and is indeed Antigone's father-in-law, turns out to spend all his life in incessant mourning. He marks the functioning of the symbolic in its malfunctioning. Lacan says that “the super-ego is at one and the same time the law and its destruction” (1988a: 102). There is “something in the very operation of the law [that] ‘splits' the paternal function into incompatible parts, one of which bears on a certain ‘trait of perversion’” (Shepherdson, online). As much as Creon's law commands “Thou shalt not mourn,” the obscene supplement from the other side demands the opposite of this interdiction. The law becomes an injunction to mourn. In this way, Antigone manifests the supplement of the law, a supplement that points to the lack in the system. The law, canceled by its supplements, is encrypted and transcribed into an obscene, disavowed ghost.

II. Incest within Family

From Hegel's vantage point, the family is a natural ethical community in which the members recognize each other as belonging to a social group. The family is characterized by love, which he defines thus:
[Love is] the consciousness of [one’s] unity with another...The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an independent person in my own right...The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person [daß ich in ihr gelte], who in turn gains recognition in me. Love is therefore the most immense contradiction... (1991: 199)

Sisterly love is the love par excellence, although it is never romantic in a Hegelian sense. For Hegel, the brother-sister dyad exemplifies the purest familial paradigm structured in kinship. “[The brother and the sister] are the same blood which has...in them reached a state of rest and equilibrium. However, they do not desire one another” (1977: 274). The brother-sister relationship is a-sexual, transcendental, and interdependent. As Derrida comments in Glas, “the sister, as sister, does not take any [pleasure]” (163). She is alienated from any form of desire and is defined only through her relation to the brother. Luce Irigaray also critiques the Hegelian dialectic and posits that “[Antigone's] jouissance finds easier recognition...She defies them all by/in her relationship to Hades” (1985: 218). The question Irigaray raises, “is mourning itself her jouissance?” (219), seems to suggest another question: Is mourning itself nothing but desire?

Despite Hegel’s insistence on the impossibility of incest between brother and sister, Derrida refers to Hegel’s relation to his sister Christiane within the context of an incestuous myth, the Phrygian legend of Cybele:
One would have to name here Christiane, Hegel’s sister, or Nanette, ‘the young woman who lodged in the family.’ If one is to believe a remark of Bourgeois, she ‘had inspired [in Hegel] a feeling perhaps first of love, but which the Frankfurt letters to Nanette Endel reveal as a feeling of sincere friendship.’ I do not know of what name Nanette was the diminutive. Nana could always play the sister. In the Phrygian legend of Attis, Nana is a kind of holy virgin. (1986b: 151)

As Nana can always play the sister, so can the eagle play the role of the brother. If ‘eagle’ is another name for Hegel, does he recognize himself in Polyneices, the brother who “like an eagle...flew into [the] country” (Sophocles, 1991: 165), and Christiane in Antigone? The crazy sister who shares a strikingly similar name with Hegel's mistress once apologizes for disturbing Hegel’s domestic economy. In a letter dated November 1815, Christiane writes to her brother: “I have disturbed the order of your house and am sorry about that; but not the peace of your house, and that comforts me” (1984: 411). Later she goes through a crisis of ‘hysteria’ and kills herself after Hegel’s death. In a way, Hegel’s comment on Antigone is anticipatory for his own sister: ”The loss of the brother is...irreparable for the sister and her duty toward him is the highest” (1977: 275).

George Steiner has suggested that the prevalent motif of sibling love in Romantic literature is one of the reasons for the popularity of the Antigone legend at that time (1984: 12-13). In her study of Romantic and Victorian sibling relations, Leila Silvana May argues that “[r]omantic sisters—from
Manfred’s Astarte to Laon’s Cythna—are nearly always rendered as (eroticized) mirror images of the narcissistic poet/brother” (2001: 22). “Everything about you is just like me,” says Thomas Mann’s Siegfried when he is about to make love with his sister. At this point, the figure of a sister is merely an erotically invested counterpart imago of the brother. Incest, within the closed system of insemination, is ultimately another form of narcissism. Doesn’t Narcissus fall in love with his twin sister before he becomes enamored with his own reflection? Notwithstanding Hegel’s dismissal of the sexual desire as Antigone’s motivation to bury her brother, he clearly considers the sister-brother bond one that reflects the mirror image of self: “the brother...is for the sister a passive, similar being in general; the recognition of herself in him is pure and unmixed with any natural desire” (1977: 275). In other words, recognition is what prevents the sister's desire. In Hegel’s view, recognition (Anerkennung) has to be understood as a double structure: the recognition of others and self-recognition. Even though desire is essential for recognition, the recognition based on sibling bond is removed from natural desire and therefore renders the incestuous relation impossible. Nevertheless, the same blood is not enough to reach the state of equilibrium. In ethical life (Sittlichkeit), recognition between same-sex siblings has no room. Sexual difference without sexual desire, i. e., indifference in difference, is necessary for an ethical act. If there are two brothers, they kill each other; if two sisters, one must hate the other. Derrida describes the Hegelian brother and sister as “two single consciousness that...relate to each
other without entering into war” (1986b: 149). Further, he posits that “[g]iven the generality of the struggle for recognition in the relationship between consciousnesses, one would be tempted to conclude from this that at bottom there is no brother/sister bond, there is no brother or sister” (149). Thus, the pure paradigm of sibling love, the recognition devoid of struggle, is actually excluded from the system of Spirit. The specter of incest, in a sense, only haunts when there is no incest.

III. Impossible Incest

Since incest is symbolic in Antigone, rather than literal as in Oedipus Rex, then how do we speak of incest when it could never take place? Why does the unspeakable/forbidden always presuppose a promised speech/breach? And what is the relationship between the conjugal crime and language, that is, how to commit the crime with words? While Hegel forecloses the circuit of brother-sister desire in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Jean-Jacques Rousseau explicitly evokes sibling sexuality as originary incest. In Essay on the Origin of Languages, Rousseau situates the brother-sister incest, instead of mother-son or father-daughter dyad, as the origin of languages and civilization. He portrays a bucolic festival where young boys and girls gather around a watering well. Their eyes meet, and passion bursts. This Rousseauian festival marks the passage from nature to culture. In the pre-festival world, “children of the same parents grew
up together and gradually they found ways of expressing themselves to each other...[t]hey became husband and wife without ceasing to be brother and sister” (1966: 45). The sibling incest is pre-social, pre-passion, and pre-writing. Derrida reminds us that Rousseau “does not mention the mother at all” (1974: 263)—“[t]he first men would have had to marry their sisters” (Rousseau, 1966: 45). Following the prohibition of incest, Derrida writes, there comes the age of supplement and signs. The Derridean supplement has a double meaning: 1) it supplements or replaces something and 2) it produces accretion, an accumulated surplus. This is a notion Derrida uses to characterize the way Rousseau sees writing as a supplement of speech. Writing, for Rousseau, is a substitute for self-presence. What Rousseau finds dangerous or threatening in supplementation is the seductive power of representation, the power that “permits us to absent ourselves and act by proxy” (Derrida, 1974: 147). At some level, the sister behaves like a supplement which “adds only to replace” (145). To replace what? Antigone's name bears the signature of the mother. It means 'in place of a mother'. The sister is mummified and entombed in an empty pyramid. She functions as a supplement in the chain of signifiers where the locus of the mother is nowhere to be found. When the sister fills the role of the mother, “it is as if [she] fills a void” (144). Antigone cannot fill the empty position Jocasta left since there is no mother in the first place. Jocasta, as Oedipus' mother, is in effect Antigone's grandmother. On one hand, the brother-sister relation seems to be simply a substitution (suppléance) for the Oedipal
mother-son paradigm, on the other hand, the non-substutability and disappearance of the mother, also renders the 'originary incest' impossible.

When we hold our sisters or mothers in our arms, “their names slide on their persons like a stamp that is too wet,” and hence it is impossible to “enjoy the person and the name at the same time—yet this would be the condition for incest” (Deleuze, 1983: 162). Deleuze and Guattari are right to posit that naming is the sine qua non of incest. Language, being the house of Being, is also the house of incest. Recall the affair between Hegel and Christiana Burkhardt, it is only in names can the sister be considered a mistress. The brother mistakes his bedfellow for his sister by means of a confusion of tongues. Located within an isomorphic structure, incest is a pun-ishable transgression which turns the crime into a joking mania. Roland Barthes, in analysing the Sadean hero, argues that “the crime consists in transgressing the semantic rule, in creating homonymy” (1976: 137). Incest, therefore, is “only a surprise of vocabulary” (138). Family is no more than a lexical construct where incest is made possible via a series of punning and wordplays.

In chorus's ode of eros, “νεῖκος ἀνδρῶν ξύναμον” ["strife among kinsmen"] results in a conflict where “[t]he winner is desire” (Sophocles, 1991: 192, trans. modified). The sentence plays the words on the names of Polyneices (Πολυνείκης / νεῖκος) and Haimon (Αἵμων / ἄνδρῶν). Through Sophocles' punning on Haemon and haima (blood), Antigone marries into her own blood. Like a pun, incest insists on both a logic of sameness and a play of différance.
Functioning as a linguistic trope, incest is endless and convoluted. It is in the indefinite chain of substitution that Antigone becomes “Antik? Oh, nee”. To consider another Freudian joke of the patient's response to the question whether he is involved with masturbation: “oh na, nee!” (onanie/onanism), Antigone's name is thereby assimilated into a special economy of desire: onanism. Isn’t it that, for Derrida, supplementarity is associated with masturbation? Writing, in order to be rhythmic, is masturbatory, repeating words with an invisible rubbing hand. As Anaïs Nin puts it, in the house of incest, “we only love ourselves in the other” (1989: 80).

Commenting on Rousseau's notion of fête, Derrida states that "[b]efore the festival, there was no incest because there was no prohibition of incest and no society. After the festival there is no more incest because it is forbidden” (1974: 263). In a way, incest only exists through mourning. Derrida points out that the crime is a nonexistent moment endlessly deferred, and emphasizes the unthinkable of incest. At first glance, originary incest and originary mourning, albeit both impossible, seem to collide with each other. In incest, we love the other like ourselves through mirror projection; in mourning, we love ourselves like the other through introjection. What kind of love does Antigone refer to when she claims love to be her motivation behind mourning? Perhaps we should first distinguish projection, introjection and incorporation. Projection puts the internal object outside the self, whereas introjection and incorporation are assimilation of the object into the self. Introjection, a process that “expands the
self” (Derrida, 1986a: xvi), is the prerequisite of normal mourning. The encrypted presence of the other is only metaphorical here since the subject learns to accept the loss of the object. Contrary to introjection's deference to reality, the fantasmatic aspect of assimilation is emphasized in incorporation by the subject's endocryptic identification with the other being. While introjection aims for an “enlargement of the Self” (xvi), incorporation results in self-laceration. To some extent, if incest is narcissistically structured, it is not simply a projection, but an introjection or incorporation through which the brother and sister mourn each other. From this point of view, incest is an ethical paradigm. The incestuous law is the divine ordinance: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself”. The love of the self in this sense is the love of the other.

IV. Encrypting Incest

In Abraham and Torok's analysis of the Wolf Man case, the name of the sister has been encrypted—“Tierka will be marked forever” (1986: 9). Tierka, Russian for little sister, the name he used to call Anna, recurs as a magic word in the Wolf Man's dream and later morphs into Sister Theresa, the woman with whom he falls in love. The primal scene/seme in the case history is the seduction of the sister who is possibly seduced by the father: the coitus a tergo is not the sodomitical sex between the Wolf Man's parents, as Freud interprets it. Instead, a tergo=the Russian a tiergo=Tierka. To Abraham and Torok, Anna is
the anus, a name annagrammatic and only fucks itself. They point to the “pack of six wolves” to the Russian *siestorka/shiestorka* (sister/sixter), arguing that six does not denote the number but the sister. But the number may still have its significance. Otherwise why would Freud name his sixth child Anna, who he himself dubbed Anna-Antigone? Freud once makes a numerical association of six to the German *Schuld* (guilt) in *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. The indomitable daughter is stigmatized, carries a burden of guilt—who? The name is so one-rous, and echoes Freud's other female patients. The name produces multiplicity. It transforms a traumatic secret into a thauematic word. Antigone's name, as that of the Wolf Man's sister, is anasemic and polysemic. If narcissistic incest for Antigone is understood only at the level of paronomasia or other linguistic tricks, it is because every narcissism, as Derrida puts it, is a relation to the multiple other (1995a: 199). The sisters are, so to speak, Creon's poly-nieces.

Notably, Hegelian philosophy is always already a philosophy of mourning. In mourning we prioritize the dead whose demise is essentially communal. Up to this point, Hegel's notion of death differs from that of Heidegger. Through the Heideggerian prism, death is singular insofar as no one can share my death. He broaches the non-substitutable mineness of death in *Time and Being*: “death is always...my own....it indeed signifies a peculiar possibility of being in which it is absolutely a matter of the being of my own Da-sein. In dying, it becomes evident that death is ontologically constituted by mineness and existence”
However, for Hegel, death is first and foremost subjected to the community. Sociality contaminates everything even death. He employs *Antigone* as a template for the development of the community or the higher forms of political affiliation. The social is founded on the ground of recognizing and overcoming the other by admitting or incorporating it into the movement of spirit (*Geist*), a notion that Hegel spells out as “I that is We and We that is I” (1977: 110). Human consciousness finds its highest form in an organic community.

Taking his notion of recognition from Fichte, Hegel punctuates the mechanism of ‘seeing oneself in another’ during the process of recognition: “self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself” (1977: 111). Self-consciousness is social, defined through its encounter with the non-I. He goes further to maintain that this ‘seeing oneself in another’ has a double significance: “first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being” (111). As Judith Butler indicates, this “experience of the Other’s similarity is that of self-loss” (1987: 47). What the inchoate self-consciousness attempts to supersede is merely the reflection of itself. At some level, the act of self-supersession is at the core of Hegel’s idea of recognition and precursory to Freud’s theory of narcissism and mourning/melancholia. According to Freud, narcissism is a normal stage of ego development. Initially, narcissism is conceived as an investment of libido in the ego, an objectless state where ego...
and id are undifferentiated and where the ego has no relation to the outside world. The later narcissism requires the transfer of the libidinal investment from the self to an external object and a reflux of the libido from the object to the self. In this stage, the love of self results from introjecting with an object. It functions as a denial of the subject's loss of the introjected object. In sum, the primary object-choice of the ego is narcissistic, an unavoidable error to be superseded by the superego or ego-ideal. In narcissism, the self-love is an "instinct of self-preservation" (1923a: 74)—it maintains itself by cancelling itself. To love means to love narcissistically and mournfully. That is to say, in order to be a lover, an "aufhebung of narcissism" is necessary (Kristeva, 33). Aufhebung (supersession), Hegel tells us, "has a two-fold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it means to cause to cease, to put an end to" (1969: 107). The word aufgeben means to cancel, to annul, and simultaneously, to preserve. Similiarly, in mourning, we preserve and annul the loved object at the same time. The crypt is developed toward an ambivalence. It is "exterior to the Self, but within it" (Derrida, 1986a: xix). It is a reflection of the subject and perceived as the cause of melancholia.

To Antigone, the lost family members she mourns are always 'mine'. She says to Ismene: "It is not for [Creon] to keep me from my own" (163). The notoriously ambiguous incipit starts with \"Ω κοινόν αυτάδελφον Ἰσμήνης κόρα\" ["Ismene, my dear sister, / whose father was my father"] (Sophocles, 1991: 161). Steiner translates thus: "O my very own sister's shared, common
head of Ismene” (1984: 208). He points out that the word κοινόν refers to 'common,' 'ordinary' or 'general'. Ismene “is mineness” and her head is recognized by Antigone as her own. Steiner is right to maintain that “Antigone's prolusion strives to...ingest Ismene into herself” (209). However, the totality of the family is shattered as Ismene refuses to be digested into the same kind and thus clings to her “non-mineness”. In her mourning of her sister, so to speak, her mourning of the other part of herself, Ismene still insists on absolute alterity. The sister gains a singularity in being unmournable. This necessity to mourn in spite of its unmournability propels an originary self-mourning. Derrida describes the experience of originary mourning thus: “if Jameinigkeit [my being as mine]...is constituted in its ipseity in terms of an originary mourning, then this self-relation welcomes or supposes...the other within its being-itself as different from itself” (1993a: 61). In a Derridean vein, I am defined as a singular person inasmuch as I am exposed to the other, but this singular is already a failure, an inaccessible dream. We all desire something that is mineness and “only happens to me” 1993b: 305). This auto-affection is under-mined by hetero-affection for desire always implies the other. Desire, even the incestuous one, is the 'inset' appearance of the other in me. The birth of desire originates in the “singularity of an imminence” that menaces immanence and exceeds my death (1992: 420). My death means the death of the other in (front of) me. For this reason, Ismene cannot declare her death until the death sentence of Antigone. As Derrida claims, “I love because the other is the other, because its time will never be
mine. The living duration, the very presence of its love remains infinitely distant from mine” (1992: 420). The singularity of mineness is divided and haunted, domestically unrecognizable on one hand, and intricate with other singularities on the other.

V. Poetic Antigone

Since German Idealism and Romanticism, the beauty of Antigone has dazzled and puzzled literary critics. Hölderlin, who praises Antigone’s divine madness, translates the play out of an “eccentric inspiration (Begeisterung), what is forbidden to the poet” (trans. Allen, 2007: 143). In his comparison of the Hölderlinian hymns to Sophocles’ Antigone, Heidegger claims that the play’s eponymous heroine is “the supreme uncanny” and “utterly unhomely” (1996a: 102, 103). Antigone is the Unheimlich. She has no place, and can only haunt the household. That is to say, Antigone belongs to the domain of oikos (household, tomb, crypt). As Heidegger tells us that “the hearth is the word for being,” the question concerning the nature of the hearth (Hestia) draws a connection between Hestia and Being (120). He who disobeys “the laws of earth...[and he who] dwells dishonor...may...never share my hearth,” says the chorus (Sophocles, 1991: 175). Which, in a way, implies that Creon is the one who would be excluded from the household. But Heidegger does not suggest that the Creon/Antigone conflict is an opposition between at-home and not-at-
home. The house she stands for is already intruded upon by some chthonic element. Antigone, a Being-unheimisch, exemplifies Dasein to which home is death. While Dasein is perpetually alienated, not at home and not able to be, it still strives to go back, to return home through death. To Heidegger, the issue of homecoming is at stake in the play. Antigone leaves home to seek what is impossible. When she comes back to Thebes, it is the moment of her death. She is a wandering tomb that makes a sedimental journey throughout the play.

In the opening dialogue between two sisters, Antigone responds to Ismene: “Let me alone and my folly with me, to endure this terror” (165). The original phrase “παθεῖν τὸ δεινὸν τοῦτο” is rendered by Heidegger as “to take up into my own essence the uncanny here and now appears” (1996a: 103). What Antigone endures is δεινὸν (uncanniness), a taking in of something foreign at home. Nonetheless, Heidegger does not regard Antigone’s endurance as passive. By translating παθεῖν as “to take up something into my essence,” he emphasizes Antigone’s action as a movement, the homewardness of Dasein. According to the oft-discussed Freudian principle, the uncanny is at once homely and unhomely. It introduces an unlivable conundrum of life where light and shadow coexist. Borrowing his definition from Schelling, Freud notes that the Unheimlich is “the name for everything that ought to have remained...secret and hidden but has come to light” (1923b: 224). The word connotes a coming of the hidden, the opening of the wound. Antigone is the guardian of family in the sense that
she keeps a secret, a wound already divulged. Buried alive, she becomes an architectural metaphor—a crypt of domestic space.

Heidegger, unlike Hegel, is not interested in the sororal role.\textsuperscript{12} The sister does not come-to-presence in \textit{Introduction to Metaphysics} and \textit{Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”} where he discusses the Greek tragedy in detail. Instead, Antigone is the embodiment of the “purest poem itself” (1996a: 119). As poetic, the sister is not gender specific. As pure, she is removed from the passage of desire. Although the chorus refers to human beings as the uncanniest (line 332-33), Heidegger singles out Antigone to be the paradigm of humankind. Antigone as the human Dasein is supposed to be sexually neutral. She is a poetic word, a wound silenced and yet speaks. However, contrary to Heidegger’s famous claim that Dasein transcends the two sexes, Kathleen Wright argues that Heidegger ‘sexualizes’ Dasein for Antigone’s sake. “Instead of neutralizing the sexuality of Dasein, Heidegger sexualizes Dasein. He implicitly masculinizes Dasein in [\textit{Introduction to Metaphysics}] and explicitly feminizes Dasein in [\textit{Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’}’ (1999: 164). As much as Wright’s statement may seem interesting, she is not clear about what she means by sexualization. As we know, Heidegger is unwilling to touch upon the issue of sexual difference due to his rejection of any fixed idea of sexual identity as men or women. He considers sexual difference a contingent modality, open to possibilities. Indifference for Heidegger is a radical notion of difference. In fact, he prefers the word dif-ference (with hyphen) than difference. The notion of dif-ference is another
name for pain. It is a rending dimension in language, a tearing apart, “infinitely
different from all being” (2002: 275).

In "Language in the Poem," he makes reference to incest in association
with an evil spirit: “the gathering power, spirit of gentleness, stills also the spirit
of evil. That spirit’s revolt rises to its utmost malice when it breaks out even
from the discord of the sexes, and invades the realm of brother and sister”
(1971: 185). What is evil is that which breaks into the household and spreads a
virus of sexual duality. The brother-sister relationship, the potential incest,
implies sexual difference in a rigid sense. However, even Heidegger cannot
avoid the haunting image of the sister. In his reading of Georg Trakl, he evokes
“the sister’s lunar voices forever ringing through the night [that] is heard by the
brother” (1971: 169). Only by becoming a foreigner, a stranger at home, one is
prevented from incest and the dualistic sexual conflict. Since Heidegger merely
makes an allusion to incest and maintains that the evil spirit should be neither
denied nor destroyed, but transformed, we might as well suggest that the evil
power, the dangerous incest, is incorporated into the benign spirit, the spirit of
gentleness.

Heidegger notes that ‘oneness’ is the only word stressed in the work of
Trakl the incestuous poet: “one generation (Geschlecht, also meaning sex and
family)...does not refer to a biological fact at all, to a ‘single’ or ‘identical’
gender....the word [Geschlecht] here retains the full manifold meaning
mentioned earlier” (195). Such is the multiple ambiguousness of the poetic.
Antigone, the pure poem itself, the anti-generation, anti-*Geschlecht*, is the poetic site where established definitions of sex, family, lineage are multiplied within one force of unison.\(^{13}\) The beaming of *Geschlecht*, the oneness of multiplicity, appears and disappears in a movement of folding and unfolding, concealment and unconcealment.

In spite of the polysemy of *Geschlecht*, “the word always refers to the twofoldness of the sexes” (195). Heidegger implies that primordial sexual difference, the “gentleness of simple twofoldness” (171), is sexual diversity. Nonetheless, the plurality of Heidegger’s One *Geschlecht* can fall prey to the opposition in-between. Which is the cursed kind of *Geschlecht*—“The discord is the curse” (170). This cursed *Geschlecht* occurs when the incestuous trouble is invited into the father’s house. Incest is contaminating inasmuch as it introduces sexual dissension and the issue of strangeness. In Trakl’s “Traum und Umnachtung” (“Dream and Derangement”), a brother encounters “his own blood and image...a moon-like countenance,” he then faints when “in a broken mirror there appeared a dying youth, his sister: night swallowed up the accursed race (*Geschlecht*)” (Trakl, 2001: 109, emphasis mine). For this, Heidegger imagines a flaming spirit that ameliorates the discord of *Geschlecht*. The flame is the “glow of melancholy” (1971: 180), pertaining to a wandering soul that is in pain. The painful poet “mourns, though with a ‘prouder mourning’ that flamingly contemplates the peace of the unborn” (184, trans. modified). The flame in mourning here recalls Antigone’s flame of the hearth. Heidegger suggests that
“[w]hat is essential to the hearth...is the fire in the manifoldness of its essence” (1996a: 105). In the gentler form of Geschlecht, brother and sister embrace each other harmoniously. Seen this way, Antigone is the cleansed Geschlecht, the poetic word that enunciates dif-ference. She is akin to the Traklean poet who mourns the unborn since she is the anti-generation. In her articulation of dif-ference (Unter-Schied, inter-cision, a cut between), she becomes the wounded language.\textsuperscript{14}

VI. Incest as Traumatic Light

Antigone's traumatic punctum is allied with incest. “You [the chorus] have touched the most painful of my cares...the fate of all our race [Geschlecht], the famous Labdacids” (Sophocles, 1991: 194). The endogamous tendency is painful insofar as it has a “multiple alterity inscribed within the individual” (Klossowski, 1998: 69). Antigone bears the fate of one Geschlecht, a signature of the multiple other. The rift of the dif-ference that “makes the limpid brightness shine” is the dawning of the poetic, the incipience of mo(u)rning (Heidegger, 1975: 202-03). The play begins with the two sisters meeting shortly before dawn, a penumbra between day and night. While Antigone is under the sway of the nocturnal law of the underworld, she is also tinted with the color of dawn. Antigone, especially Anouilh's Antigone, is insomniac, who sneaks out at night in the face of the nurse's caution: “It was still night. There wasn't a soul
out of doors but me, who thought that it was morning. Don’t you think it’s marvelous—to be the first person who is aware that it is morning?” (Anouilh, 1986: 7). The French Antigone, echoing her Greek ancestor, is unwilling to go to sleep due to her passion for the light. Provided in mourning one falls in love with what one must give up, Antigone’s final separation from light is in effect an incorporation of orgiastic sensuality, an enjoyment of immersing in the sun.

The parodos of the chorus sings the hymn to the dawning sun: “Sun's beam, fairest of all / that ever till now shone / on seven-gated Thebes / O golden eye of day” (Sophocles, 1991: 165). The stanza not only praises the sunbeams, but also introduces a series of word plays on φανὲν (have shone), φάος (light), and ἑφάνης (shone), all etymologically related to the verb φαίνομαι (to appear). The words that shed light on this poetic scene are cognates, that is, words that potentially commit incest. Here the βλέφαρον (eyelid) of the golden day is evoked. Antigone constantly opens her eyes and this insomniac restlessness makes her perpetually in wakefulness. In characterizing Celan’s poetry, Levinas postulates a kind of “insomnia in the bed of being, the impossibility of curling up and forgetting oneself” (1996: 45). The inability to forget and shut one’s eyes indicates a recurrence of memory and incessance of seeing. Levinasian insomnia is an ethical category, a nebulous border, a vigilance for-the-other. “Insomnia is disturbed by the other who breaks this rest...[t]he other is in the same, and does not alienate the same but awakens it” (1989a: 170). The insomniac opened unto otherness sits in the
“dark background of existence” and sees where there is nothing to see (1989b: 32). Neither subject nor object is perceived in insomnia. The insomniac is no longer a subject when the other haunts. Antigone is compared to Danae who “gave the light of heaven in exchange for brassbound walls” (Sophocles, 1991:197). She is locked up, detached from luminosity of light, and yet receives another dawning of light, the golden rain of Zeus. The light, an intrusion of the other that impregnates the enclosed daughter, is rather something from within. The light the insomniac eyes see is incestuous.

In the Levinasian vein, light is connected to jouissance: “all enjoyment [jouissance] is a way of being, but also a sensaton—that is, light and knowledge….Knowledge and luminosity essentially belong to enjoying” (1987, 63). In other words, vision and light precondition our existence and ask for pleasure. The absolute luminosity of jouissance thus illustrates an ethical relation to the other. The chorus sings of the light: “Here was the light of hope stretched / over the last roots of Oedipus’ house” (185). The light arising from the last root of Oedipus is unquenchable. However, the ensuing lines suggest that Antigone the light has to suffer a cut: “the bloody dust due to the gods below / has mowed it down” (185). Having found her root in the underground, Antigone is read as a nocturnal plant, a “singular entity that receives the gift of the light, the life-giving sustenance of the sun” (Critchley, 25). Derrida posits that a flower is “[a]lways to be cut—cuttable—culpable” (1986b: 17). The flower remains and strives to survive after cutting. If, as Derrida claims, “the plant is a
sort of sister” (245), this Antigone-sisterly-flower does not flourish without desire. Rather, it emblematizes the blossoming of desire. Antigone functions as a site of flowery, feminine operation. Even in nocturnal death, she keeps her eyes open and continues the ceaseless act of loving.

VII. Mourning Becomes Desire

As a surrogate eye of Oedipus, Antigone 'sees' the final resting place of her father outside Athens. The burial site later becomes a promise to bolster up the foundation of the city. Nonetheless, the site remains “what cannot be shared, a secret we know nothing about” (Derrida, 1995b: 80). The crypt forms a secret, the contratemps of mourning. In the circumstances Antigone is deprived of tears and thus exemplifies a figure who is unable to complete the task of mourning. She cannot mourn and yet she mourns. She is all heart and yet her heart is broken. The heart for Antigone is meant to be split as the law. In *The Inoperative Community*, Jean-Luc Nancy maintains that “it is the break itself that makes a heart” (1991: 99). The heartbeat, rhythmically violated, is orchestrated through a series of breaks. Within this context, the law of the heart dictates syncopation and endless mourning without closure. On a certain level, “contratemps,” the word Derrida identifies as the key word in *Romeo and Juliet*, also plays a crucial role in *Antigone*. In French it means ‘mishap’ and ‘syncopation’—the counter-time or a sound that goes against rhythm.16 As
desire in Shakespeare is blocked by unfortunate timing or the detour of the letter, the Sophoclean tragedy is also a result of untimeliness and belatedness. Had Creon not buried Polyneices first, Antigone might have been saved in time. To prioritize the ritual of mourning over Antigone’s life, the play foregrounds the imperative of mourning and its unavoidable failure.

The parallel between the community, the heart, and the law is crucial in the work of mourning. The heart is the sphere of my own that is constantly under the threat of the other’s intrusion. The heart is a place of memory, a crypt of mourning, an organ where the blood flows. In lamenting the family curse, Antigone exclaims, “[w]hat parents I was born of, o wretched at heart [ταλαίφρων]” (Sophocles, 1991: 194, trans. modified). The same adjective reappears immediately when she is about to be entombed: “No tears for me, no friends, no marriage. Brokenhearted [ταλαίφρων]” (195). A cut across subjectivity is what makes the heart broken. Antigone’s heart(h) is crushed. Earlier, Ismene tells Antigone: “You have a warm heart [καρδίαν] for...chilly deeds” (164). To this she replies, “I know I am pleasing those I should please most” (164). Antigone’s heart lies with the dead. She confesses that her psyche died long ago. Like a cardiac valve that controls the flowing of blood, Antigone is the guardian of family threshold. However, the family or the heart she guards is the one that presupposes breaking. Before Polynereices bids her not to mourn him, Antigone is already wretched as she cries out “My heart is broken [ὦ
τάλαντ᾽ ἑγώ]” (143). Her heart is a syncopated space, stressing on the interruption of the heartbeat rather than the continuous circulation of blood.

The metaphor of the heart prevails in Sophocles’ oeuvre. In Sophocles’ *Use of Psychological Terminology*, Sullivan indicates that *phrén/phrenes* could be described as “diaphragm,’ ‘lungs,’ or ‘pericardium,’ they seem best understood in their physical element as a composite of entities located generally within the chest region” (1998: 11). Notably, the word *phrén* (φρήν: heart) and its derivatives refer to Creon as well in the play. Creon publicly declares that the prohibition of Polyneices’ burial is his “[*phronéma*, Φρόνημα] in the matter” (Sophocles, 1991: 168). At first glance, Creon’s *phronéma* may succumb to the Hegelian Law of the Heart, defined as “the law of all hearts” (Hegel, 1977: 277). Nonetheless, a person who identifies his or her desire with universal well-being is inevitably driven into the Frenzy of Self-Conceit. The integration of the individual into the universal, pace Hegel, causes a wound, and leaves a scar behind. Witnessing Haemon’s death, Creon laments: “the mistakes of a foolish heart [*φρενῶν δυσφρόνων*]” (209, trans. modified). A heart can mistake and cause loss, if it lacks *phronein* (φρονεῖν: thinking, pondering). Against Creon’s heart, Teiresias blames him for the disaster of the city—“it was your heart [*φρένως*] / That brought this plague down on our city” (Sophocles, 2003: 46, trans. modified). The seer urges the king to think well (φρόνησον), to understand that erring is human nature. In this sense, Creon’s law is not the law of *polis* as he claims. It is only his desire to stand for the good of the state.
For Hegel, to speak of the law of heart is to situate one’s heart in line with other’s desire. Yet, Antigone does not care for “the universal pleasure of all hearts” in which “pleasure becomes a reality which absolutely conforms to law” (1977: 222, 223). Her heart seeks after a cryptic, unwritten source of pleasure. The question Samir Dayal asks in his discussion of Jane Campion’s *The Piano* remains moot for Antigone, “if the ‘heart’ asks pleasure first, what is the nature of its demand?” (2001: 35) To a certain extent, we might assume that Derrida would call Antigone’s heart poematic, a term he uses to describe the concept of poetry. In a short essay “Che cos’è la poesia?”, Derrida maintains that the poematic is experienced through the desire to “learn by heart [apprendre par coeur]” (1995a: 291). The heart is traversed by otherness. It cries out and pleads to be torn apart: “no poem that does not open itself like a wound” (297). This desire is inhuman and almost stupid. In the Derridean sense, what is poematic is the singular vow of love. Antigone, as a creature born for love, is poetic, poematic, or, a poem that is itself “a demon of the heart” (299). When the chorus accuses her of being inhuman, Antigone is already marked by the stupidity (*bêtise, bête*, beast) of her heart.

The chorus in the second *stasimon* warns against a light-hearted or thoughtless desire (κουφονόων ἐρώτων) (line 617) that points to Antigone and the Labdacid. The key term in this *stasimon* is ᾄτη (madness, fate), an inscription of incestuous desire passed down from generation to generation. Lacan specifies “[this] irreplaceable word,” postulating that ᾄτη “concerns the
Other, the field of the Other” (1992: 262, 277). Through this family ἄτη, Antigone occupies a singular position apropos of desire. As Hegel does with Antigone, Lacan orients the heroine to the realm of the ethical. The ethicality of Antigone is predicated upon a promise of desire. The Lacanian motto: “Do not cede your desire” indicates that “[t]here cannot be a collective jouissance of the community” (Gillespie, 2006: 202). Antigone personifies a pure desire in which the Other is excluded. While the Levinasian ethics is the responsibility for the other in me, according to Lacan, what is ethical constitutes the missing of the Other.

As Simon Critchley points out, Lacan and Levinas would concur that “[i]t is only by virtue of...a mechanism of trauma that one might speak of ethics” (1999: 190). The Levinasian face of the other is many ways the Lacanian das Ding. The ethical subjectivity relies on a traumatic relation/non-relation to the Other. Taking his cue from Freud’s *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, Lacan profiles das Ding (the Thing) as “the Other, the prehistoric, unforgettable Other” that elicits desire (1992: 53). The Thing is forever lost and has to be refound despite the absence of the signified object. In Lacan’s conceptualization, das Ding is “that which in the real suffers from the signifier” (125). Situated in the real, das Ding is traced in the paths of signifiers and survives as an aftermath of the signifying cut. Antigone’s ἄτη designates the curse of the family name, a madness of language that eludes representation. As far as linguistic otherness is concerned, ἄτη emerges and plays the game in which words infinitely replace one another.
At some level, the game of signifiers is the interplay of suffering and pleasure. It aims for a tryst where metonymy/desire and metaphor/symptom are intertwined like lovers.

Initially distinguishing metonymy from metaphor, Lacan claims that metonymy is based on a “word-to-word connexion” and metaphor a ‘word-for-word’ formula (2002: 156, 157). Whereas desire exists in the metonymic connection of signifiers, symptom is a repression of words or a metaphoric substitution of one signifier for another. Through the endless displacement of objects, desire is understood as a transitive, but always deterred and deferred. Through a series of linguistic burials, symptom is repressed and only manifested in the form of a password or switch-word. Elizabeth Grosz clarifies that “[m]etaphor relies on a relation of similarity between two terms, one of which represents while covering over or silencing the other. This process...is...the burial of one term under another” (1989: 24). That is to say, a metaphor is related to mourning and loss. When the loss cannot be articulated, mourning fails to substitute language for the lost object. In this sense, the process of incorporation is essentially considered antimetaphoric, while introjection remains a metaphorical activity.17

The antimetaphoric is not the opposite of the metaphor. Instead, it is a fantasy in which “the cryptophores...neutralize the metaphors of dejection...by pretending that these disgraceful metaphors are edible” (Abraham and Torok, 1994: 132). The mourner imagines literally swallowing up the lost beloved. As
Aeschylus’ Antigone asserts that “I will...carry [Polyneices] in the folds of my linen robe, and myself will shroud him” (1040), the grave she designs for her brother is inside her own body. It is not surprising that Antigone dies of asphyxia, the inability to swallow anything. In Sophocles’ play, the word θάλαμον (women’s room, nuptial chamber) is used as a metaphor for tomb. Death here takes on a metaphorical form of connubial bliss and ravishment. The apostrophized “[t]omb, bridal chamber, [and] prison forever” (1991: 195) constitute a psychic wall in Antigone’s crypt. In Abraham and Torok’s terms, a crypt is an entombment of language, an ellipsis that results from a psychic aphasia. Hermetically sealed, Antigone is deprived of a proper burial. She utters the language of the melancholic and becomes the embodiment of the Torokean antimetaphor, a figure that calls into question the process of metaphorization. Her equation between the tomb, the wedding chamber, and incarceration (ὦ τύμβος, Ṽ νυμφεῖον, Ṽ κατασκαφὴς) is rather an anaphora than an expression qua metaphor through which a signifier is internalized. Rhetorically, anaphora is a form of repetition, an echo (ἠχώ), etymologically meaning ‘carrying back’. Several lines later, the device of anaphora is introduced again as a link with Antigone’s incestuous desire:

    [W]hen I come
    to that other world my hope is strong
    that my coming will be welcome to my father,
    and dear to you, my mother, and dear to you,
my brother deeply loved. (1991: 195)

The parallel and reiteration of φίλη (beloved, dear) and προσφιλής (welcomed) indicates that the loved one is not replaced once for all but is perpetually displaced in splendid pirouettes. Trapped in her desire, she cannot generate a new family to substitute for the old one. For Antigone, her desire is also for her symptom. The difference between metonymy and metaphor runs riot. The crazy sister dances in mourning, in grief-stricken hysteria, as if she is on the brink of collapse.

Barbara Johnson relates incest to “the perfect convergence of metaphor and metonymy” inasmuch as “the metonymic meeting between [brother and sister] takes place within a metaphorical bond of biological likeness” (1981: 27). On one hand, ἀδελφὸς (brother) and αδελφή (sister) are two words that commit incest in terms of their metonymic connection. On the other hand, the words repress the Other in terms of their common root δελφύς (womb). Like Creon who “honored the one, [and] dishonored the other [brother]” (Sophocles, 1991: 162), Antigone’s mourning is selective. However, at the level of signifiers, τὸν δ (the other), the same sex brother, lurks behind the phrase τὸν μὲν (the one). Incest thus shapes a “‘nodal point’ where the symbolic and the real are linked together” (Shepherdson, online). From this perspective, the incestuous fixation is bound up with Das Ding, the impossible object of desire that continually escapes the chain of signifiers. The missed encounter between Haimon and Antigone implies that incest and love (the two sides of one coin for
Antigone) have dwelled in the realm of the impossible. The lovers are unable to reach simultaneity. Haimon fails to meet his bride on time and then misses stabbing his loved-but-now-hated father. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the real is structured as an encounter that touches upon an inarticulable jouissance. This encounter is destined missed—it is "un rendez-vous auquel nous sommes toujours appelés avec un réel qui se dérobe" (1973: 53). _Se dérobe_: purloin, steal away. Antigone’s ethical act to love and bury Polyneices is an encounter with _das Ding_ that constantly slips away.

The real represents the cut introduced by the symbolic in the process of signification. In the post-symbolic real, there is something that evades the grasp of the signifying chain and yet clings to it. The real is the lack that forever laughs. Like the "real" letter in Poe’s "Purloined Letter," it is right under our nose, belonging to a place (le manque a sa place) and out of place (manque à sa place) at the same time. Lacan renders the letter spatiality, naming it the "localized structure of the signifier" (2002: 153). In Poe’s story, the major characters’ subjective positions are thereby defined in their relations to the letter. The letter is not the Law or the explicit message; rather, it is the little piece of the real, coming from a potentially obscene source—the Queen’s writing to another man. Whoever carries the letter shares a secret, unutterable jouissance. Thus, Colette Soler posits that the letter "does not 'represent' jouissance, it is jouissance. It has no referent, it is thus real" (2003: 92).
In translating Lacan’s King-Queen-Minister triangle into psychoanalytical terminology, Shoshana Felman assigns the position of the superego to the king, the ego to the queen, and the id to the minister. Following her diagram, I maintain that her analysis of the purloined letter is commensurate to the discussion of *Antigone*:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>King</th>
<th>Queen</th>
<th>Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUPEREGO</td>
<td>EGO</td>
<td>UNCONSCIOUS LINGUISTIC ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Blindness of the law)</td>
<td>(Looking at the other’s look; looking at oneself in the other’s eyes)</td>
<td>(Locus of substitution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REAList’s imbecility</td>
<td>IMAGINARY delusion</td>
<td>SYMBOLIC perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creon</td>
<td>Antigone</td>
<td>The dead body of Polyneices (The family)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The object of mourning in the circuit of the purloined letter is not the Phallus, the privileged signifier. More likely, the lost letter is the lost jouissance, the “neurotic’s unconscious” that will not forget (Lacan, 1988b: 47). In contrast to Creon’s blindness, Antigone sees that she must retrieve the body back to the earth. The unwritten law she seeks is the unconscious desire encoded within the message. Lacan regards Antigone an incarnation of ethics for she rejects Creon’s edict and adheres to her desire. Both Creon and Antigone adopt “a position or stance with respect to...jouissance” (Fink, 1995: 117), but the former
dissents from the latter in a way that her enjoyment is beyond the law and sided with pain.

In *Encore*, Lacan conceptualizes the idea of an Other jouissance (or jouissance of the Other) as opposed to phallic jouissance. The phallic jouissance is essentially idiotic, pertaining to the position of Creon or the gullible King. The Other jouissance, designated as feminine, is mystic and asexual since it is outside the phallic law. Néstor Braunstein summarizes the Other jouissance as “an ineffable mystery, beyond words, outside the symbolic, beyond the phallus. Its model is surfeit, a surplus, the supplement to phallic jouissance of which many women speak without being able to say exactly what it consists of, like something felt but unexplainable” (2003: 111). To a certain extent, Antigone experiences the Other jouissance which pursues a pure desire past the limits of the phallic. While the phallic jouissance (Jφ) lies in the overlap of the symbolic and the real, the Other jouissance (JA) is found in the confluence of the imaginary and the real. This foundness is rendered impossible in the circumstances that the relation of the One to the Other remains on an imaginary level. One is loved (if there is such a kind of affection) only when one is not there. In this vein, Antigone does not love Polyneices because of his particularity, but because of the impossibility to mourn him. What she seeks is not the complete work of mourning. By holding her desire forever at bay, Antigone gets access to perverse jouissance through this suffering.
Apropos of Antigone's joyful mourning, Hölderlin states this well in his epigram “Sophocles”: “Many have tried, but in vain, with joy to express the most joyful / Here at last, in mourning, wholly I find it expressed” (trans. Wright, 1993: 427). For Antigone, mourning the dead is a quest for pleasure. In mourning she finds the pleasure that speaks of her symptom/sinthome. In Lacanian terms, sinthome refers to “what allows the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real to be held together” (Lacan, qtd. Soler, 2003: 95). It is a Borromean knot that unites the three registers. Antigone commits suicide with a knot in her throat. She hangs with “a noose of muslin” (Sophocles, 2001: 207), a knot made of her clothing. The throat becomes an organ plagued with an echo. She not merely mimics the mother's hanging herself, but also the hysterics' typical throat symptoms. In discussing his hysteria case, Freud maintains that Dora's sexuality is “replaced by the innocent sensation of pressure against her throax” (1997: 23). In contrast to Dora's sometimes aphonia, Antigone is eloquent. Yet, her speech aims not for communication. Neither Ismene nor Creon is her addressee. The message she sends is coded and haunted, referring back to herself.

Under the pseudonym of Dora, Freud's hysterical little girl is also known as Ida Bauer. Bauer, bour, the Middle English for inner chamber, a space locked up.¹⁹ Both Antigone and Dora wind up with an encrypted knot. In the Lacanian graph, the knotted symptom is concomitant with jouissance as the figure below shows:
The topology of the symptomatic knot configures the holding-together of three registers: the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real. This looped curve forms three kinds of enjoyments: jouis-sens (jouissance of meaning), the phallic, and the Other (feminine) jouissance. The third kind, the feminine jouissance that sticks to an ethics of desire, is a jouissance of God. Lacan suggests that God's jouissance is fundamentally feminine: “it is insofar as her jouissance is radically Other that woman has more of a relationship to God than anything that could have been said in speculation in antiquity” (1999: 83). It is love, and her evocation of gods, that drive Antigone the little saint to what steals away. For Lacan, gods exist not in a religious sense, but in the real: “[t]he gods belong to the field of the real” (1981: 45). Antigone is akin to the divine for what she seeks is the real not retrievable in life.

Antigone’s mourning is a manifestation of her symptom. In her allegiance to the dead, Antigone acts according to the enactment of desire. As Freud
claims, “[s]ymptoms serve as a substitution for sexual satisfaction in the ill, they are a substitute for this satisfaction which is missing from their lives” (1923b: 273). An unresolved symptom, Antigone's dying posture suggests a thwarted mourning voice. However, in keeping the desire forever at bay, Antigone has achieved the peak of her painful pleasure.
Endnote

1 Here Isabella evokes the rhetorical figure of prosopopeia, an ascription of voice to the voiceless. It has to do with putting language into the mouth of the dead, a textual burial of the deceased. For De Man, prosopopoeia is the trope of autobiography by which the name is monumentalized and immortalized. In this way, autobiography is always thanatological.

2 As in Joseph Roach’s theorization, the genealogy of performance is a process of surrogation in which bodily or cultural substitution occurs in a social network of relations. See Cities of the Dead, Columbia UP, 1996.

3 In a note of “The Double Session,” Derrida mentions that “what is supposed to be found behind the hymen [is] the hystera” (182).

4 Sophocles, Sophocles I: Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus, Antigone, trans. David Grene, Chicago: The University of Chicago press, 1991, 177. All English translation of Sophocles in this paper comes from this edition unless specified in particular.


6 Both Robert Graves and Carol Jacobs elaborate on the etymology of the name of Antigone. See Graves. The Greek Myths. Vol. 2. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955, 380. In “Dusting Antigone,” Jacobs positions Antigone in a place of a mother bird: “Antigone is in a place of a mother whose engendering can only be conceived as already in the past and whose offspring is...the un reproduceable. She becomes mother in the figure of the bird who...returns to a nest already bereft of nestlings” (907).


8 Thomas Pynchon’s Oedipa, when ruminating on her late husband, makes a link between incest and a repetitive maze. See The Crying of Lot 49, Perennial, 1986, p. 5.

For instance, Irma, whether whose real name is Emma Eckstein or Anna Hammerschlag, is said to have a family name similar to the pineapple wine (Ananas). Also, the name of Freud’s wife, Martha Bernays, has shared a linguistic affinity with his first sister, Anna Bernays.

Ned Lukacher defines anaseme as “the unspoken word or sound that is always somehow adjacent to the spoken word, that is always 'over,' 'under,' or 'beside' the patient's speech” (157). At some level, to trace an anaseme is to locate the trauma in the process of anamnesis.


The name Αντιγόνη has carried ambiguity. It could be construed as Antigone (γόνη: generation), with a prefix denoting 'against' or 'in compensation of'. On one hand, she opposes what she opposes, and opposes what she stands for. On the other, she also both supplements what she opposes and stands for. For the etymology of the name, see Stathis Gourgouris, *Does Literature Think?*, Stanford, California: Stanford UP, 2003, 133.


Similarly, Butler argues in *Gender Trouble* that “introjection founds the possibility of metaphorical signification...[and] incorporation is antimetaphorical precisely because it maintains the loss as radically unnameable” (87).


Chapter Two

“The Shelley of my Age must lay his heart out for my bed and board”: Mourning Friends in Derrida and James Joyce

Friend, come! I wait for thee!—Deh, vieni! Ti aspetto!

--Mary Shelley, *The Last Man*

In the previous chapter, I explore mourning as a form of impossible desire. Whereas in *Antigone*, the impossible desire is conceptualized through the complex of the sister, in *Dubliners*, it is through the figuration of friendship that mourning constitutes a pact of absolute (in)fidelity. With a posthumous inflection, a friend appears to be a mourner as well. Can anyone invest in friendship without secretly wishing the other’s death? Can one not launch friendship on a schizophrenic itinerary? In a Derridean way, Joyce addresses these questions as to what is friendship. For Joyce, friendship is structured as a master-disciple relationship. A friend is “someone who wants to possess your mind…and longs to prove himself your disciple by betraying you” (Ellmann, 356). The friend, as we see in *Exiles*, follows his master by possessing the master’s wife. The love token from Joyce to his friend Prezioso, according to Hélène Cixous, turns out a public disgrace not out of the purpose of humiliating the friend, but perhaps, out of the master’s taking pleasure in self-laceration.¹
Central to the quasi-master-disciple friendship is always friendship’s opposite, an infidelity and betrayal mixing with erotic encomiums. In other words, the politics of friendship is nothing but the politics of jouissance that never reaches equilibrium.

In *Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity*, Simon Critchley proclaims that death is the precondition of friendship. “One is only a friend of that which is going to die” (270). One cannot have a friend unless he or she is dying. This is the law of friendship and thus of mourning. That is to say, we owe our friendship to necrophilia, and there is no friendship except for the kind of post-friendship or non-friendship. To experience friendship as a post-war phenomenon is to undergo a catastrophe—to learn how to survive. Francis Bacon, in his treatise on friendship, accentuates the duty of the survival: “Men have their time, and die many times in desire of some things which they...take to heart: the bestowing of a child, the finishing of the work...If a man has a true friend, he may rest almost secure that the care of those things will continue after him” (144). Friendship assures an almost secure promise. However the survival may face the ethical duty to fulfill the unfinished left behind, one will carry on mourning as an uncompleted work. As Derrida points out, “Survival—that is the other name of mourning whose possibility is never to be awaited” (PF, 13). The survivor does not live without mourning. For Derrida, the work of mourning is already at work as soon as friendship begins. To welcome our friends is to welcome death. To love is to love specters.
But what does love have to do with mourning? In every respect, love is implicated with mourning the lost beloved. The survivor, the legatee of the late friend, not only suggests a vertical (rather than horizontal) genealogy of friendship, but also makes explicit the link between lieben (to love) and leben (to live). For Freud, love is “derived from the capacity of the ego to satisfy some of its instinctual impulses auto-erotically by obtaining organ-pleasure” (“Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” 139). In conflict with its objects, an instinct may undergo a process of vicissitudes: 1) reversal to its opposites, or the replacement of the active with the passive; 2) turning back to the subject’s own self; 3) repression; and 4) sublimation. Freud postulates that there are three opposites of love or loving: hate, being loved, and indifference. Primarily narcissistic, the self’s feeling of love is intermingled with hatred due to the impingement of the external instinctual stimuli upon the self. Over the normal development of stages, the ego introjects its source of pleasure into itself and projects the unpleasurable feelings onto the external world. Nonetheless, it is possible and indeed quite common for an adult to direct both the senses of love and hate toward the same object if the love-hate paradox is not resolved during the genital stage. Although Freud never tackles the issue of friendship, can we still suggest that Freud, the master of his friends, would formulate a friendship theory under the rubric of Freund/Freude (friend/enjoyment)? It might be appropriate to recall Montaigne’s injunction concerning friendship here: “Love [the friend] as if you should one day hate him again. Hate him as if you should
love him again” (100). To a degree, friendship is classed under the love-hate relationship. We love our friends like we love our enemies. As a voucher for amity, enmity is already embedded within the discourse of hospitality.

In Joyce’s “The Dead,” the party where friends gather together becomes a party that invites the dead. Lily, the caretaker’s daughter, is a guest herself as she welcomes the guests into the house rented from Mr. Fulham. Despite the late arrival, Gabriel insists upon his sending himself “as right as the mail” (185). His generosity to Lily makes him take up the role of a host instead of a guest—a host taking up a wrong tone and whose gesture is prophesied as a failure. Later, Gabriel’s love towards his wife has to concede to her memory of a dead lover. Hospitality here, as it appears, invites death’s intervention of a love scene. Whereas the house is furnished with a picture of *Romeo and Juliet*, it is also hung with embroidery of murdered princes. Death obtrudes upon the party, the haunting place where love is constantly under some unpleasurable stimuli and transforms into something else. Humiliated and angry, Gabriel’s desire is instigated by darker emotions. Perhaps as Don Juan’s encounter with the ghost, a veiled woman, in his last dinner, Gabriel meets a dead end of his love at the Morkan’s party. The lover descends into the realm of the dead and gets caught in the vicissitudes of mourning.

Joyce attributes the characteristic of hospitality to Irishness. In a letter to Stanislaus, he says, “I have not reproduced [Ireland’s] insularity and its hospitality. The latter ‘virtue’ so far as I can see does no exist elsewhere in
Europe” (L, 166). Truly, the hospitality between the living and the dead is at the core of “The Dead”. The Irish hospitality, as a result, turns Irishness into the interplay of the foreign and the familiar. Ghosts dwells in the Morkan’s house as parasitic guests. Moreover, in praise of the radical hospitality as an Irish tradition, Gabriel is forced to accept the ghost, and finally identify with the dead. The brooding presence of the guest opens up the door for the intrusion of a love affair into the present. When looking at Gretta’s sleeping face, Gabriel feels a “strange friendly pity for her entered his soul” (234). Love, undifferentiated from friendship, marks an alterity within the self.

The word “friend,” derived from the Old English freond, promises a seal of freon (love). This idea of a beautiful friendship relies on a linguistic genealogy, and yet it disfigures and mutilates the love as such. Written after the scandal concerning De Man’s involvement with the pro-Nazi magazine Le Soir, Derrida adds the final part of his book, Memoires for Paul de Man, as a supplement to defend his life-long friend. A supplement to Derrida’s friendship toward De Man, “Like the Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell” has demonstrated a love that is never enough. Derrida, along with Hannah Arendt, puts himself in an impossible position to love the enemy. In his memory to the friend, Derrida develops the account of “interiorization” in the process of mourning and the failure of mourning in relation to its success. With an absolute, unreserved love, we swear fealty to the friend through mourning, but in doing so we incorporates the friend and thus cause the definite disappearance of the other. Friendship, or affiliation,
in a narcissistic sense, is structured “in our own ideal image” à la Cicero (PF, 4). A friend is imagined. He or she is deceased and yet not past. Our memory, when responsible for an other, contains a future within that infinitely points back toward ourselves.

In the section “Mnemosyne,” Derrida uses the proper name “Mnemosyne” as the synonym of “remembering and the memory” and further brings up the idea of Erinnerung (memory as symbolist introjection) and Gedächtnis (voluntary or thinking memory). For Derrida, there are two kinds of memories. While Erinnerung is a kind of remembrance by which the self assimilates the lost other, Gedächtnis “disrupts the simple inclusion of a part within the whole” (MPM, 38).

Closely linked to writing and inscription, Gedächtnis is a productive memory, a memory not yet happen:

The memory we are considering here is not essentially oriented toward the past, toward a past present deemed to have really and previously existed. Memory stays with traces, in order to “preserve” them, but traces of a past that has never been present, traces which themselves never occupy the form of presence and always remain, as it were, to come—come from the future, from the to come. (MPM, 58)

Like Hamlet, we write in order not to forget. This non-forgetting always comes before. Furthermore, the beforehandedness of mourning marks a failure of interiorization, a Gedächtnis without Erinnerung. While mourning produces a boxing-effect, it nonetheless de-boxes and in-boxes, enfolding both a ‘box in the
box’ and a ‘box outside the box’ (TP, 229). Derrida indeed is a philosopher of the inside. There is no dialectics between the inside and the outside. Our mourning relationship with a friend is not an external relationship—it consists in the deconstructibility of the internal. Mourning is doomed to be a failure, a failure necessitated from the inside of the formation of a nation or an individual. What we mourn is beyond ontological presence. And what we keep inside is already something that has no exteriority. In mourning, we experience an uncertainty of the border. Seen this way, mourning is an aesthetic phenomenon as well as it is an ethical category. Since mourning is an ethical question and ethics can be argued to be prior to ontology, we actually mourn the others before their actual death.

At certain level, the act of befriending someone is analogous to writing something into the future. Through Gedächtnis, ‘friendship to come’ bears witness to a singularity of our relations to the beloved. As Aristotle observes, it behooves for us to have a few friends since “one cannot live with many people and divide oneself up among them” (243). In Aristotle’s view, the number of friends should be limited to the number we can manage to live with. In other words, friendship is defined by a sense of ‘living together’. The friends live ‘in’ us as if friendship is constitutive of the community. Nonetheless, vital to the ideal of friendship is the work of mourning. The community becomes a ghostly presence and the ‘one’ friend who is coming approaches only in absentia. Although we mourn the other through memory and interiorization, mourning is
also “incapable of taking the other within oneself, as in the tomb or the vault of some narcissism” (MPM, 6). Would it be possible to respect the movement of the deceased other who is ‘in’ us? The other’s infinite remove, indeed, recalls the distance required for friendship. Never too close to your friend—Derrida suggests that the beauty of friendship lies upon a proximity in which the other remains forever elusive. From this perspective, “the law of mourning [or friendship]...is always promised,” but “it will never be assured” (WM, 144).

Moreover, naming and mourning are intertwined when it comes to the recognition of a friend. Friendship, instead of evoking a singularity of the name, weaves a network of names that functions as a singular plural. The name of a friend is not the Name of Father. Roland Barthes mourns his father only on the blackboard. Once the name is erased, death is no more. Yet, this non-existence also produces more and more deaths. The French idiom “plus de” (meaning both “more” and “no more”) has implied that the proclamation of a name is not only a proclamation of mourning, but also it gives birth to multiple deaths. Conferring a plurality to his essay, “Deaths of Roland Barthes,” Derrida traces death after death in the wake of the friend’s departure. The name is an encrypted cipher acting out a repetition of the loss:

When I say Roland Barthes it is certainly him whom I name, him beyond his name. But since he himself is now inaccessible to this appellation, since this nomination cannot become a vocation, address, or apostrophe, it is in
me that I name, toward him in me, in you, in us that I pass through his name. (WM, 46)

In a way, the necessity to name the unnamable introduces a kind of violence to ethics. To recall Gabriel’s letter to Gretta: “there is no word tender enough to be your name” (225), the letter from the past finally ignites Gabriel’s desire to call the previously unnamed lover. “Gretta”—he repeats the name more than once. And he longs to say the name in the future tense. Despite its singularity, the name, the signature, will always have come back repeatedly. We repeat the name albeit its unrepeatability. Through reiteration of the name, the friend is brought back to life. The name of Gretta metamorphoses into the name of Michael Furey, which stands for a spectral trauma. Not surprisingly, naming, in terms of its commemorative nature, is predicated upon a certain datability. Gretta remembers the day when she hears the death of the name; the pseudonym of Gabriel is recognized by Miss Ivors in The Daily Express. The name, therefore, becomes eligible according to the date of the newspaper.

In James Joyce’s Ulysses, the name of the nation is a name of a ghost-history. Stephen’s students demand him to tell a “ghoststory” (30) in a history class. In the Circe episode, Bello asks Bloom: “Tell me something to amuse me, smut or a bloody good ghoststory or a line of poetry, quick, quick, quick!...I give you just three second. One! Two! Thr...” (650). To answer these urgent and insatiable requests, one has to tell stories about ghosts, like the infinite yes, yes, yes. In this vein, history is seen as an infinite relation to the other. A
reconstruction of any historical event is inevitably a remapping of cinders. In *Witnessing*, Kelly Oliver maintains that “in order to open up different possible futures, more particularly to open up a future in which it is possible to think the impossible, we need to rethink history” (135-136). History, rather than a closed conception, is porous and full of openings. In historicizing the shaping of a nation-state, we no longer locate the historical event within a linear framework. So to speak, history is none other than a gathering of a host of ghosts disrupting the diachronic structure of temporality.

Then, another question poses itself: to what extent does the name of a nation and the name of a friend converge? When we inquire about the nature of a nation, are we also touching upon the question as to what is a friend? Nationalism, as well as friendship, involves imaginary relationships and solidarity analogous to the symbolic system of kinship. To a certain level, the dead connects and bonds citizens or friends more than anything else. The nationalist imagination is not only built upon commonality, a desire for inhabitants to be together, but also upon a necessity to forget. Benedict Anderson, in quoting Ernest Renan from ”Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?”, reminds us of the amnesias of nationalist imagining: “the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things” (Renan, 11). In the revised version Anderson later admits that his quote of Renan has omitted the imperative nature of national memory/forgetting. It is a civic duty to put the national past into oblivion—the citizens are “*doit avoir oublié* (not *doit oublier*)—
'obliged already to have forgotten’” (200). History is haunted by such a duty to forget what we share. Does that forgetting indicate inherited lacunae and aporias in history or does it make a peremptory erasure only in favor of the totality of national consciousness? Renan assumes that his reader does not remember St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre—to forget a traumatic past is to fortify the nation. In this way, forgetfulness is a precondition of healthy mourning, which constitutes national identity. And yet, for Joyce, nation is built upon vicissitudes of interminable mourning. Not a remembrance in order to forget, the Joycean memory is a perpetual Limbo between remembrance and forgetting, wakefulness and sleep.

This haunted history, for Joyce, is “a nightmare from which [Stephen as well as every Irishman] is trying to awake” (Ulysses, 52). Projected unto the future, history hassles the consciousness of Joyce’s protagonist. Through Lyotard’s idea of “Auschwitz,” an extreme traumatic experience that cannot be put into words, Christine Van Boheemen-Saaf examines Joyce’s works and suggests that “Joyce’s oeuvre is a ‘ghost story’..., a matrix of negativity, a chora of loss, the black hole of muted history” (15). The history that haunts is an Irish history. Joyce once declared: “Nations have their ego, just like individuals” (CW, 154). In order to gain a legitimate name, Ireland has to incorporate numerous dead. The identity of Ireland is built on the occasion of mourning. In Patrick Pearse’s 1916 speech near the graveyard of O’Donovan Rossa, he speaks of a hauntology of the nation: “[l]ife springs from death; and from the graves of patriot men and
women spring living nations” (42). The political propaganda, infused with the funereal ceremony, seeks a harbinger of a coming nation. As a limbo of the dead and the living, the topography of the new nation blurs the demarcation of any given region. Pearse further maintains, “[England has] left us our Fenian dead, and while Ireland holds these graves, Ireland ...shall never be at peace” (43). Ireland and England mutually haunts each other in a way that mourning is intersected with nationalism. On one hand, mourning as such becomes the means to secure the borders of the nation. For the nation to seek peace and gain autonomy, its border has to be secured. On the other hand, the two places are consigned to a commonality. Both countries identify themselves as a motherland. The legitimate children of the nations, as it were, feed off a maternal spectrality.

The national subject is the one who wishes to assimilate their sacrificed dead to complete this mourning project. Nonetheless, the impossibility to fully digest the dead indicates that the formation of Irishness is an incomplete project. Pearse is executed in 1916 for circulating his essay, “Proclamation of the Irish Republic,” to his people. He sends this open letter from Dublin’s General Post Office. By simply sending a postcard to his nation, Pearse is sentenced to death. Why? John Brannigan asks this question in his “Writing DeTermiNation: Reading Death in(to) Irish National Identity” (61). The answer Brannigan provides is thus: As Pearse is sending the letter to an address that does not yet exist, it is stamped “address unknown” by the post office; the letter returns to kill the
author. This addressing to Ireland is a postal journey to the future—it comes back as a spectral assassination. The letter is an apostrophe that cries out loud: “Oh my nation, there is no nation!” Such nation established through mourning is a non-nation or a nation to come: \( \text{à venir} \).

It is Bloom who comments in *Ulysses* that “[t]he Irishman’s house is his coffin” (139). Despite Mr. Browne’s suggestion that “a comfortable spring bed” would do as well as a coffin, the house still remains “a house of mourning” (D, 211, 6), embalmed in “catacombs, mummies” (U, 139). The ‘home,’ the city depicted by Joyce is a “region where dwell the vast hosts of the dead” (235). In writing *Dubliners*, Joyce claims that his intention is to “write a chapter of the moral history of [his] country” (55). Joyce’s Dublin is full of ruins, monuments, and superannuated legacies. In “The Dead,” the falling snow, which lies “all over Ireland” (236) is juxtaposed with the Wellington monument. Prior to his speech on Irish hospitality, he ponders: “How pleasant it would be to walk out alone...The snow would be lying on the branches of the trees and forming a bright cap on the top of the Wellington monument” (201). The mention of the Wellington monument signals a historical trauma here. As Michael Murphy points out in “Political Memorials in the City of ‘The Dead,’” the monument is a memorial to the Duke of Wellington who defeats the Irish at Aughrim (112). If unconditional hospitality is a national heritage as Gabriel hails, Ireland indeed has to take the enemy/foreigner inside their territory. The boundaries between home/hostile territory, host/guest, and friend/enemy thus are breached through
violence. At a certain level, the monument is a “secret vault” built within the nation’s psyche (Torok, 8).

It is noteworthy that “The Dead” begins with the arrival of guests. Gabriel’s namesake is the Archangel, who announces the visitation of the Holy Ghost to Virgin Mary. Lily, in the hustle and bustle of welcoming the party guests, “was literally run off her feet” (183). In terms of the symbolic meaning of “Lily” (the flower of death) and “Gabriel” (the guardian of the gates of death), the mirth of welcoming is intertwined with the arrival of death from the outset. Death, the endopsychic alien, is introduced into the household. Later, the memory of Gretta’s former lover, Michael Furey, compels Gabriel to face the dead he has already carried inside. A forerunner of Gabriel, Michael Furey announces death and in such announcement, the body of the dead has vaporized into disembodied music.

The dead lover is first encrypted in the song “The Lass of Aughrim” which Michael Furey used to sing. Were it not for Mr. D’Arcy’s song, Gretta would have put the memory of the dead into oblivion. Nouri Gana argues that it is through this song that the defunct gets to communicate a message to the living: “this ghostly return, which falls on [Gretta] like an unbridled tidal wave, delivers what I would call the prosopopoeic jolt” (164). At some level, the ghosts exist in a musical form. They ventriloquize through the living person. Aunt Julia, who is imagined as dead, is conceived as pure voice when she sings. Likewise, Michael Furey’s voice continues to linger from beyond the grave. The song he sings is
about “mastery, domination, and mistreatment” (Cheng, 142). A girl raped and abandoned by Lord Gregory. She stands outside his house in the rain with a dead child, begging her Lord to let her in. Aughrim is a town in the West of Ireland near Galway, the place where Gretta and Michael Furey come from and where the battle with the Duke of Wellington occurs. Vincent Cheng thus regards Gretta/Michael as an allegory of Ireland’s past. In response to the spectral intrusion of Michael Furey, Gabriel feels “a dull anger” (230) at first—he is, after all, “the angel so much in love that he looks fiery” (Paradiso, 32:103-5). The furious angel, encrypted within the name of Michael Furey, finally recognizes the otherness of the dead. In his “generous tears” (235), Gabriel’s identity is liquefied. His body is figuratively engulfed by the memory of the departed. It is at this moment that he decides to accept Miss Ivors’ invitation and go to the West of Ireland. The journey toward the West, on one hand, is a journey to one’s home; on the other hand, is also an exile away from Ireland.

Like Gabriel, Joyce turns to the Continent in order to detach himself from the calls of Nationalist Ireland. Yet, his exile is not a flight away from home; rather, he carries Dublin within himself. The nation, indeed, becomes a crypt.

**Brotherhood in “The Sisters”**

Provided the formation of nation is founded on an imagined community and its relation to mourning, I attempt to further explore the politics of *jouissance* in
the erotics of friendship. Montaigne, when mourning his deceased friend La Boétie, translates friendship into a political paradigm by calling it “sovereign amity” (a term Laurie Shannon borrows for her book title). Friendship, sovereign and masterful, is entangled with a thousand strange knots through which “not only minds had…entire jouissance, but also bodies [would have] a share of alliance” (96). Women are excluded since they cannot endure the pull of these peculiar knots of love. Friendship, never a model of concord or parallelism, finds no female counterpart in gendered terms. While Joyce’s “The Dead” is only tinged with male friendship experienced by proxy, in “The Sisters,” sororal kinship concedes to male friendship in the context of pedagogy. The sisters, Nanny and Eliza, become the peripheraliest of peripheral shadows.

At the beginning of “The Sisters,” the words “paralysis,” “gnomon,” and “simony” have occurred in the boy narrator’s mind. To contrast the second version to the first edition published in the *Irish Homestead* in 1904, the crucial difference lies in the narrator’s meditation on a series of “signifiers for which there is no interpretation except strangeness and an undefined evil” (MacCabe, 34). Don Gifford points out that the term “paralysis” in Joyce’s time means “general paralysis of the insane,’ i.e., paresis, syphilis of the central nervous system” (29). In *Ulysses*, “general paralysis of the insane” is the condition Stephen Dedalus suffers according to Mulligan’s diagnosis (U, 5). As a response to his friend’s remark, Stephen looks into the mirror and wonders “who chose this face for [him]” (5). Notably, in mourning his paralytic friend, the boy
narrator also sees the “heavy grey face” that superimposes on his own face—“I too was smiling feebly as if to absolve the simoniac of his sin” (3-4). The reflection of the self in relation to the Other is at the core of the process of mourning. In a way, Flynn’s friendship with the boy is quintessentially narcissistic. By training the boy to priesthood, Flynn considers himself reflected in the boy’s expectations. The grotesque image of the priest has haunted the boy and left him an inexpressible impression: “[w]hen he smiled he used to uncover his big discoloured teeth and let his tongue lie upon his lower lip—a habit which had made me feel uneasy in the beginning of our acquaintance before I knew him well” (6).

Derrida postulates the topology of friendship in terms of the Aristotelian definition of amity as “[o]ne soul in twin bodies” (PF, 177). A friend is a spectral face, a figure of prosopopeia which “knows how to efface itself” (M, 26). Following Levinas’ proposition that the trace of the other is one’s ethical encounter with a face, Derrida declares that the face is a sovereign figure: “here is the figure, the visage, the face and the de-facement” (26). In memory of de Man, Derrida quotes his friend: “Voice assumes mouth, eye, and finally face” (27). To elaborate his impossible love for de Man, Derrida resorts to an act of ventriloquism, a voice-from-beyond-the-grave, a responding on behalf of the departed friend. Barbara Johnson acutely observes that Derrida’s elegy begins with a feminine voice.11 In telling a story of friendship, the friend invokes Mnemosyne, the mother of the Muses. The memoir is the only text in which
Derrida deals with music. Our friend is our psyche, the soul of a violin. The long essay, so to speak, is an apology for this impossible resonance. Already an effacement, the disfiguration of the other deep inside us suggests the possibility of a monstrous condition of friendship. A sovereign secret, friendship marks a signature which knows how to hide itself.\textsuperscript{12}

Notably, the friendship between Flynn and the boy is based on a face-to-face relation. Even though the boy pulls the blanket over his head, the Father’s face still follows him. He imagines that the face is confessing and waiting for him. Yet, he is unable to mourn his friend. When he hears of the news of the death of Flynn, he is nonchalant at first, then finds out that mourning is out of the question for him: “neither I nor the day seemed in a mourning mood and I felt even annoyed at discovering in myself a sensation of freedom as if I had been freed from something by his death” (5).

The dead other who lives in us, according to Derrida cannot be “the simple inclusion of a narcissistic fantasy in a subjectivity that is closed upon itself or even identical to itself. If it were indeed a question of narcissism, its structure would remain too complex to allow the other...to be reduced to this same structure” (22). In the Derridean narcissistic structure, the bereaved memory of the other suggests not only incorporation but also the emergence of the face. Through the Aristotelian lens, friendship, unlike love, requires reciprocity. In the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, Aristotle posits that “[t]o be friends...they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other” (194). Mutual
and equal love thus becomes the prerequisite for friendship. However, for Derrida, love between friends is essentially one-sided dissymmetry or non-reciprocity. Whereas friendship aims for a “phenomenon of an appeased symmetry, equality...between two infinite disproportions,” love “raise[s] or rend[s] the veil of this phenomenon” (F, 220). The friendly face-to-face structure is turning to an aporetic and narcissistic circuit. At some level, the invocation “oh my friends, there is no friend” is an apostrophe to and turning away from the friend. As Michael Naas claims, “[t]he friend is someone who is...‘just a turn away’—that is, someone who is not simply waiting...but someone whose very being as a friend consists in being just a turn away, perpetually turned to and in withdrawal” (152).

David Wills argues that the politics of friendship is also the politics of dorsality: “the force of ‘I love you’ [is] spoken from behind....It would involve a catastrophic turning ‘towards’ the other that means turning one’s back” (online). Wills suggests that the movement or choreography of friendship causes an erotics of corporality between two parties. Such an action breaks homogeneity and introduces interpellation within the self. Friendship mobilizes a spectrally erotic relation with the other inside us. To speak of friendship is to speak of a particular kind of love: philia. Derrida makes a claim that the question “what is friendship” is also the question “what is philosophy” (F, 240). Philosophy (philein to sophon) and friendship (philia) are connected closely. For Aristotle, friendship is the work of polis where friends gather together “in the study of philosophy”
(246). The coming of the friend brings up the ontological question of ‘what is’. On one hand, friendship occurs between those who live together; on the other, this is a relation in which we betray the others. Since one should not have as many friends as possible, the number of friends is in no way extended to the size of the whole city (Aristotle, 243). As we discussed earlier, friendship is exclusive and one cannot love many at the same time.

Derrida maintains that this principle of selection “reintroduces number and calculation into the multiplicity of incalculable singularities” (19-20). In this vein, the multiplicity of choices is impossible. Friendship is found in neither universal brotherhood nor singular individual—it constitutes civic equality or a community, but also undermines this fraternal bond. Derrida calls into question the relation between friendship and brotherhood. For him, friendship qua fraternity is a “bond between the political and autochthonous consanguinity” that may lead to “the worst symptoms of nationalism” (99). Nationalist ideology is nothing but an empty cenotaph, established upon heaps of the dead and the past. Nationalism is a symptom that indicates the problem of being together. As Blanchot says, the basis of communication, community and friendship “is not necessarily speech, or even silence that is its foundation and punctuation, but the exposure to death, no longer my own exposure, but someone else’s” (25). The death of the other is forever in proximity. And friendship, therefore, is understood as loss.
In “The Sister,” the diagnosis of the cause of Father Flynn’s dying is paralysis, a symptom manifested both politically and sexually. Some critics have taken Flynn’s paralysis as a symptom of syphilis. For instance, Thomas Staley indicates that the words “simony” and “paralysis” together suggest syphilis. However others read the theme of paralysis as Joyce’s critique of Irish nationalism. In *My Brother’s Keeper*, Stanislaus Joyce points out that Father Flynn is “a symbol of Irish life, priest-ridden and paralyzed” (17). The paralyzed Father, whose first name echoes Joyce’s own, functions as a beautiful corpse whose death is related to the failed duty of the Eucharist. From the sister Eliza’s point of view, he dies because of “the chalice he broke….That was the beginning of it” (D, 10). The boy recalls that the priest’s responsibility to the Eucharist is an impossible task that no one can undertake. Nouri Gana argues that what’s peculiar about Flynn is his “inability to accomplish the ritualistic task of mourning” (VM, 99). That is to say, priesthood, or brotherhood, belongs to a system in which interminable mourning is reciprocated.

The word *paralysis* seems to the narrator “some maleficent and sinful being. It filled [him] with fear, and yet [he] longed to be nearer to it and to look upon its deadly work” (D, 1). Father Flynn dies in the confession-room, with an unnamable sin. The mysterious laugh indicates his confessional secret that Old Cotter is unwilling to reveal: “there was something queer…something uncanny about him” (1-2). Even his sister Eliza recounts “something queer coming over” her brother (9). Notably, the sister’s remark reminds the reader of the
peculiarity of the Father as well as the strangeness of the story’s title. Why does Joyce entitle this story “Sisters” when the protagonists are two brothers/friends?

According to fraternal tradition, a friend must be a brother—"[s]isters, if there are any, are species of the genus brother” (Derrida, PF, 156). Friendship only opens to a sister when she is like a brother. At their brother’s wake, Eliza and Nannie attempt to perform a liturgical ritual by offering the guests some crackers (wafers) and glasses of wine. Nannie is disappointed when the boy refuses the cream crackers. The administration of the Eucharist involves the economy of sending a gift where the unilateral givenness from God is beyond measure. The structure between friends is “the necessary unilaterality of a dissymmetrical phileîn”—“a terrible but so righteous law of contretemps” of mutual mourning and friendship (23-24). Hillis Miller points out that the term host is “the name for the consecrated bread or wafer of the Eucharist, from Middle English oste, from Old French oiste, from Latin hostia, sacrifice, victim” (442). The wafer or the bread is connected with the notion of hostia. By refusing the bread and recalling his sending High Toast to Father Flynn, the boy breaks down the distinction between the host and the guest, and evokes the memory of a haunting ghost.

A guest is also a host, a stranger in the house who takes the master in hostage. The boy “visit[s] the house of mourning” (D, 6) and divulges the secret of his friend. Such a betrayal exposes the domestic enclosure of the hostile. Friendship disrupts the economy of the household and the economy of the gift.
It is out of economy (oikos-nomos, the order of the house) and out of the circulation of returning/exchange. The friend does not have a home. As an uncanny existence, the friend carries the attribute of oikeios:

[T]he friend is the friend of what he desires, but if he can desire only that which he lacks, and if what is lacking can only be that of which. He has been deprived..., then one must indeed imagine that before this feeling of privation,...friendship (philia) qua eros and epithumia, must indeed be found to be linked to what is proper, suitable, appropriate and familiar (oikeios) to it. (PF, 154)

That which is oikeios to someone is one’s own. The friend is the most familiar, unheimlichkeit and heimlichkeit at the same time, the one who has no place to dwell, and yet who has more than one place. With this unhomeliness, friendship is experienced as uncanny. A friend is what the self desires, the part that is missing. The Aristotelian paradigm of friendship, according to Derrida, resembles a trade more than friendship. Friendship disrupts economy and never achieves equilibrium or equality. Rather, the friendly other is the missing piece that constitutes asymmetrical topography.

As the title of Joyce’s story suggests, fraternity is lacking. Even the priest’s sisters become a metaphor for deficiency. While Nannie lacks speech, Eliza’s prattle is full of malapropism and lacks proper manner. The word “gnomon” appearing at the beginning of “The Sisters” refers to a geometrical figure in which something is missing. In Euclid’s definition, gnomon is “what is left once
one small parallelog is subtracted from a larger one” (Senn, 249). Garry Leonard further argues that the gnomon is a “feminine shape in the sense that what is missing is only imagined as lost (castrated) so that a masculine parallelogram may pose as complete” (49). Women are not men and don’t exist as friends. The word gnomon is associated with the Latin *nomen*, name. No man has a name: unnamable.

It is noted that the concept of gnomon is prevalent throughout *Dubliners*. The allusion to Euclidean geometry calls into question the plausibility of parallelogram as wholeness. As we have already discussed, a gnomon is what remains when a smaller parallelogram is removed from a bigger one (see the figure below):

The gnomon, the figure ABDGFE, is haunted by a figure of the other—a smaller parallelogram, which has an exactly same shape with ABCD. The spectral presence/absence of CEFG reminds us of the comment of the narrator’s uncle that the boy has to “box his corner” when facing the death of his friend (3). The
missing corner marks heterogeneity in the self, a hole within a whole. A gnomon is something incomplete, a cut or incision.

In discussing Celan’s poetry, Derrida relates the figure of gnomon with a date: “[a] date would be the gnomon of...meridians” (“Shibboleth,” 15). A circumcise-date, Celan’s poetic language tells the imagined addressee: “you do not exist, and July is no July” (Selected Poems and Prose, 398). Whatever date Celan writes on Heidegger’s guest book, the singularity of the date is no more. The gnomon of Paul Celan, therefore, is an effacement of the Other-I, an incision that structures the possibility of all poetry. With Celan, the Derridean concept of date functions as a form of encounter—the other-I encounter in which myself is like the other. Such a date/encounter is understood both temporarily and spatially. And the other we encounter is both singular and repeatable. A date in history is also an anniversary that comes back regularly. Memory is dated, with an inscription of the here-and-now. As a geometrical figure, gnomon is also a pointer that measures time. Etymologically, it means an indicator or a judge. Marian Eide argues that the word indicates “a necessary relationship to an other (who must be judged or interpreted and who in turn judges and interprets)” (34). The gnomonic relationship between the boy and Father Flynn suggests a traumatic encounter like a shadow cast on a square—“the reflection of candles on the darkened blind” (D, 1).

By saying “I am not long for this world,” the priest foreshadows his own death (1). The Father’s breakdown is an outcome of the failed brotherhood or
priesthood. Contrary to Eliza’s remark, “Ah, there’s no friends like the old friends...when all is said and done, no friends that a body can trust” (9), we can only have friends when all is said and done. A friend like Father O'Rourke can only offer friendship after Flynn dies. The friend who takes care of the funeral fails to be a friend when Flynn is alive. In his memory of Father Flynn, the boy looks back and unfolds what happened in the past and was yet to be discovered. Until the end, the revelation is still in suspension. We do not know the secrecy of the confessional. What causes the Father’s death, that is, what makes the dead friend a friend, is something yet to come. As Blanchot writes, friendship is essentially a posthumous gift, a promise that there will have been (qtd. Derrida, PF, 299).

An infinitely dying friend, a friend disfigured—the encounter with the beloved seems a distanced proximity with my dear friend. To bear witness to our friendship entails a giving-voice to silence. We need to make an appeal to prosopopoeia in order to speak of this catastrophic event. The friendship is also a war, a battlefield between the living and the dead. Be it your comrade or your enemy, the friend seeks to prove their love by knifing you in the back. Love is consummated through the detour of the back passage. Yes, yes, I can only love you from the back. What the survivor does, with an unreserved loyalty, is betraying, eliminating, eating, and incorporating the other, always in the name of friendship.
Endnotes

1 In 1913, when Joyce stays in Trieste, Roberto Prezioso, his best friend and admirer at that time, attempts to initiate an affair with Nora. It is reported that Joyce himself encourages the flirtation as some kind of experiment. See Ellmann, pp. 316-17. Also Hélène Cixous, *The Exile of James Joyce*, pp. 533-34. Drawing his source from Prezioso, Joyce creates Robert Hand in *Exiles*, who claims to have the faith in his friend, "faith of a disciple in his master" (46). In return, Richard answers that he, too, has the "faith of a master in the disciple who will betray him" (47).

2 In the shattered state of melancholia, Freud describes that melancholics "derive from the pros and cons of the conflict of love that has led to the loss of love" ("Mourning and Melancholia," 248). When love is lost, the psyche becomes a locus where hatred and love contend with each other.

3 Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," p. 126.


5 *Memoires for Paul de Man*, p. 3, 65.


7 Gopal Balakrishnan, in "The National Imagination," draws a parallel between nationalism and familial structure by claiming that the former is "the modern counterpart to kinship" (203). See *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso, pp. 198-213.

8 Moyra Haslett, "The girl, or woman, or whatever she is...: Femininity and Nationalism in Joyce," in *Re: Joyce*, ed. John Brannigan, Geoff Ward and Julian Wolfreys, p. 46.


Johnson, *The Wake of Deconstruction*, p. 60. In this discussion, Johnson interprets Derrida’s mourning for de Man as a man’s desire for another: “I am tempted to see the invocation of this female figure...as some kind of camouflage or relief from the pressures of homosocial desire that inevitably animate the project [of friendship].”

Not only is Derrida’s friendship to De Man erotic in nature, but also his long-term relationship with Jean-Luc Nancy. In *On Touching*, Derrida states his dreaming of kissing the lips of Nancy. With Novalis, he maintains that kissing is the principle of philosophy. At this point, Derrida is somewhat similar to Deleuze who also attributes friendship to Greek philosophy: “[w]ith the creation of philosophy, the Greeks violently force the friend into a relationship that is no longer a relationship with an other but one with an Entity” (What is Philosophy, 3). However, the difference between Derrida and Deleuze is that the latter is not speaking of real friends, but the concept of friendship. It is notable that in Deleuze’s view, philosophy has aversion to a friend who seeks for discussion or communication. Further, for Derrida, friendship and love are often the same thing, whereas for Deleuze, “a superior mind or even a great friend are worth no more than even a brief love” (Proust, 31). Unlike love’s irresistible power to allure one into the abyss, it is possible for us to remain skeptical and hesitant in front of friendship. For further elaboration on Deleuze’s idea of friendship, see Irving Goh, “The Question of Community in Deleuze and Guattari (II): After Friendship,” *Symploke*, 15, pp. 218-242.


From 1906 to 1908, Stanislaus Joyce records that James Joyce’s various ailments which seem to be unnamable and unrecognizable. In *James Joyce & the Burden of Disease*, Kathleen Ferris suggests that the symptoms are similar to those of syphilis (62-63).

Dated July 25th, Celan visits Heidegger’s cabin at Todtnauberg. With a hope for the word “pardon,” Celan is disappointed in this encounter (or misencounter, we should say). See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Poetry as Experience*, pp. 107-110. In “Meridian,” Celan remarks that every poem is a date: “perhaps we may say that every poem has its ‘20th of January’ inscribed? Perhaps what’s new for poems written today is just this: that here the attempt is clearest to remain mindful of such dates?” (Selected Poems and Prose, 408) Later Derrida accentuates the unreadability and undatability of the encounter between friends (or hosts and guests), say, the date of Todtnauberg, the question left answered at one summer’s day in 1967. The meeting between Celan and Heidegger marks
a date that witnesses a wound. In spite of the 'word' Celan expects from Heidegger, silence takes over their meeting which dates a failure of conversation.
Chapter Three
Derrida avec Joyce: The Principle of Eating the Other in *Ulysses*

4 kinds of flame—1. that whose excreta are the anorganic natures; 2. that whose excreta are plants; 3. that whose excreta are the animals; 4. that whose excreta are human beings. The higher the flame, the more full of artifice, the more complex the excrement that is form.

All devouring is a process of assimilation, binding, generation—

The flame is that which devours in and for itself.

--Novalis

Sarah Kofman once tells an anecdote in her childhood that her mother has forced her to eat as much as she can, whereas her father always gives a contrary order. Facing the maternal and paternal categorical imperatives, Kofman is situated in a double bind of eating and not eating. In “Eating Words: Antigone as Kofman’s Proper Name,” Tina Chanter draws an affinity between Antigone and the French philosopher.¹ Like Antigone who is condemned to starvation in the crypt, Kofman, after the traumatic experience during the Occupation, “could no longer swallow anything and vomited after each meal” (Kofman, 248). Here the oral testimony to holocaust is expressed through nausea. Memory of traumatic childhood is paired with bodily orifices. Kofman
recalls that she defies her Jewish mother’s order and becomes attached to another woman named Mémé. Following Mémé’s instruction of a new diet, Kofman abandons kosher food and assimilates another identity. This interminable process of assimilation and vomiting characterizes Kofman’s autobiographical writings, with the metaphor of mouth coming to the fore: “Generous mouth, spilling its offering of semen. Closed mouth, mouth sewed shut, pursed, sealed. Constipated.” (250) The mouth refers to both an opened and constipated body. It faces the dilemma of to eat or not to eat. In Kofman, the issue of proper eating brings about the question Diana Fuss poses years later: “what exactly determines what can or cannot be psychically incorporated? What distinguishes...an edible object from an inedible one?” (36)

The mouth is a contested site of ethical discourse. It is an ethics charged with death, hospitality, conviviality and hostility. In an interview with Jean-Luc Nancy, Derrida asks: “since one must eat in any case and since it is and tastes good to eat,...how for goodness sake should one eat well (bien manger)? And what does this imply? What is eating? How is this metonymy of introjection to be regulated?” (“Eating Well,” 282) Derrida explains that the injunction to ‘eat well’ is a replacement of “Thou shall not kill” as an ethical imperative. However, to eat is also a necessity to kill, an appropriation of the other. To some extent, Derrida's concern for eating is a remediation of the Kantian idea of taste. Kant posits that taste is a metaphorical social judgment. One learns table etiquette through the medium of food. Within this context, solitary eating is impossible
and unethical, while the cannibalistic experience is a form of openness. The shared meal, or voracity, appears to be a vehicle of social enjoyment. Based on a common criterion for ethical and aesthetical judgment, one takes pleasure in the dietary habits. Derrida, however, sees an auto-affective structure in the Kantian paradigm of taste, which he calls “exemplorality,” by asserting that “mouth...transforms everything into auto-affection, assimilates everything to itself by idealizing it with interiority, masters everything by mourning its passing, refusing to touch it, to digest it naturally, but digests it ideally, consumes what it does not consume and vice versa” (“Economimesis,” 20). He calls into question the border of this exemplorality. What decides what is indigestible for the mouth? What distinguishes the mouth of poetry and speech from the mouth of disgust and vomit? As we know, Joyce’s hungry hero eats all the time, and yet has no taste. The shared seedcake, the passionate kissing between Bloom and Molly, only bridges two “flies buzzed” (U, 224). A promise of marriage, a promise of disgust. The oft-discussed quote “he could feel my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I said yes I will yes” (U, 933), in a way, becomes a yes to the excremental.

In *James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses*, Frank Budgen records that Joyce once tells him about Bloom’s “hungrily abject amorousness” (20). In the encounter with perfumed bodies, Bloom is overwhelmed by a warm human plumpness: “with hungered flesh obscurely, he mutely craved to adore” (U, 214). To crave mutely, Bloom realizes that he “[m]ust eat” due to the evitable circuit
of digestion, imbibing and inhaling (214). Further, Joyce makes a link between telecommunication and food. Stephen Daedalus, placing a call to Eden via the umbilical cord/telephone network, considers Eve’s belly a “white heaped corn” (U, 46). Enmeshed within connections of naval cords, a communication from stomachs to stomachs, Joyce’s characters are engaged in some telepathic operation and always longing for swallowing the other. As Gray Kochhar-Lindgren puts it, “There is no such thing as a monologue, whether it be Molly Bloom’s or anyone else’s. There is, though, a telephony of the telepathic always at work in the soul” (online). The question of who is calling or who is eating whom is no longer important. One simply must say yes and must live by eating.

This function of telecommunication in eating, we might say, is also excommunication. Bloom calls the hour for eating “the very worst hour of the day” because it is “as if [he] had been eaten and spewed” (U, 208). The hungry stomach undergoes the process of mourning the loss. And gastronomics becomes a way of courting death. After all, “[a] corpse is meat gone bad” (U, 145). If cheese is the corpse of milk, Bloom’s remark that “cheese digests all but itself” also links the gorgonzola cheese he eats at Davy Byrne’s to something unassimilable, undead (U, 218). The “mawkish cheese” is reminiscent of the “mawkish pulp” transferred from Molly to Bloom during their kissing (222, 224). The scene in which they conceive their first daughter foreshadows the death of their son Rudy, a loss since Bloom and Molly have ceased their sexual relationship. The time of fathering is saturated with the sense of mourning and
loss. In his memory of the dead son, Bloom contemplates: “Could never like it again after Rudy. Can’t bring back time. Like holding water in your hand” (213). Bloom’s gastronomic need is understood in a temporal dimension. In eating we follow the ghostly logic, the logic of “eating with a stopwatch” (203)—it indicates a proper manner at the time-table. We are condemned to eat, to carry on the dead, to remember, and to forget. If we cannot bring back time, it is not because time progresses in a linear way, but because time is spectral. The past consists of numerous events. And the memory is the present, a multiplicity of “[f]amished ghosts” that feed on whatever “[t]ouched...senses” (U, 217, 224).

Bloom observes that we are the most vulnerable during the “pudding time” (U, 205). The act of eating constitutes the recollections of loss. The quotidian journey of Leopold Bloom that resembles Odyssey’s homecoming and survival is a process for creating new sensation or affects in order to forget or complete mourning. In Joyce’s Messianism, Gian Balsamo says, “Rudy’s constant remembrance cannot be exorcised; it turns the festive memory of his parents’ reciprocal incorporation into a burial meal. Ultimately, it is Leopold and Molly’s symbiotic kiss, exchanged sixteen years before and turned into a burial meal...that determines all of Bloom’s culinary feats and decisions on June 16, 1904” (106). However, Rudy is not the only trigger evoking Bloom’s memory. Even an egg is a ghost with poached eyes (U, 209). When Bloom stares at the postcard Mrs Breen hands to him, his eyes turns into oysters. Mrs Breen, the ex-lover of Bloom, emits a “[p]ungent mockturtle oxtale mulligatawny” that makes
him hungry, which suggests the father’s metaphorical eating of his daughter Milly at Mulligar (U, 200).

At this point, bodily cavities offer a space of mourning. Thanks to these inner safes, the loss is preserved as “an outcast outside inside the inside” (Fors, xiv). Derrida, explaining the logic of crypt as a function of keeping the foreign safe inside the self, points out that this site, the cryptic enclave, paradoxically “never stops eating away at its foundation” (xxiii). A crypt, the internal hysteria that sometimes manifests in the symptoms such as constipation, is a monumental effect of mourning and eating. A crypt is “a radically other locus of subjectivity that could not be opened by the instrument of language” (Lippit, 125). Food, as well as language, provides an oral moment in which the symbolic substitution is forever a “deferred filling” (Fors, xxxvii). In eating, Bloom’s cryptic subjectivity bears a trace of multiplicity. The hero attempts to hide from an acquaintance and exclaims “safe” at the end of “Lestrygonians” the culinary episode (U, 234). However, he endlessly keeps encountering other people and no longer maintains a rigid enclosure of the self. Eat pig like pig. For Bloom, as for Derrida, eating becomes an imperative and inevitably entails a negative enjoyment, a process of expulsion, vomiting. And although eating always involves incorporation of the other, vomiting is what renders the digestive process impossible. We swallow not in order to incorporate, but more importantly, to vomit, to constitute an unassimilable exterior-interior.
As Derrida says, the absorption of food is a progress of introjection/proper mourning, while the emetic is related to the fantasy of incorporation. He writes that incorporation of the lost object “involves eating the object...in order to vomit it...into the inside, into the pocket of a cyst” (Fors, xxxviii). In incorporation, the mourning subject swallows up and identifies with the lost beloved without digestion. The encrypted other resides within the self like a parasite. This interiorized subjectivity thus becomes characteristic of what Abraham and Torok term “endocryptic identification”. They write that in the case of endocryptic identification, the I “is understood as the lost object’s fantasied ego” (The Lost Object – Me, 148). In other words, the illusion of the I is established on a fantasy of incorporation, an invention of a crypt. The secret is folded up when mourning incessantly enfolds. The mourned object fails to be introjected successfully because it is only in imagination, in retrospection, that one subjectivity folds onto another subjectivity that folds onto another. Like an inner mouth, the parasites speak from inside through a kind of ventriloquism, a voice always plural, always in the process of becoming.

At some level, infinite mourning begets subjectivity that carries secrets. In his imagined pregnancy, Bloom the henpecked husband lays eight eggs and becomes a woman, a mother. The “Bloowho” becomes a flow-er, a broomflower (genêt) that has both a stamen and pistil (U, 331). Pondering on Stephen’s dietary habit, Bloom thinks, “Something substantial he certainly ought to eat, were it only an eggflip made on unadulterated maternal nutriment, or, failing
that, the homely Humpty Dumpty boiled” (U, 763). The word “egg,” associated with ovo, ovaries, and eier, German for testicles, connotes both female and male sexuality. Synthesis of men and women, animals (“Blood of the Lamb”) and vegetables (“languid floating flower”), Bloom is pregnant with secrets and performs a status of the feminine (U, 190, 107). Alias Henry Flower, he begins an epistolary affair with Martha Clifford. The secret lover sends a “yellow flower with flattened petals” (U, 94), which suggests the fin de siècle “boom in yellow” and incorporates the hero in a floral tomb. Bloom imagines himself in a womb, “oiled by scented soap” (107). His body is transformed into a flower. The yellow bloom, the sunflower that always heads towards a sun/son, finally delivers eight sons in the later episode. With his family name Virag (Hungarian for flower), Bloom carries the secret that transfers from the father to the son. Bloom’s father Rudolph, Rudy’s namesake, dies of an overdose of monkshood (aconite). Like his father, Bloom is under the influence of “[f]lowers of idleness” when he “walk[s] on roselaves[...t] trying to eat tripe and cowheel” (87). He is also a lotus eater oblivious to home, forgetting a singular origin. On one hand, Bloom identifies his flower body as phallic, “the limp father of thousands” (U, 107); on the other, the flower refers to female menstruation. In Joyce Effects, Derek Attridge argues that flowers belong to “the economy of flows” (112). The language of flowers crosses boundaries. Such language is floating and unvoiced. It remains foreign so that “no-one can hear” (U, 95). With the flowing language,
the mouth oozes “all flores of speech” that articulates porosity and plurality (FW, 143).

Following Nancy’s proposition that “Os, oris, bouche de d’oralité, c’est le visage lui-même (Os, oris, the mouth of orality is the face itself)” (162), we might as well assume that ethics has a mouth. However, Nancy distinguishes orality from buccality—“La buccalité est plus primitive que l’oralité (buccality is more primitive than orality)” (162). While orality concerns a face that seeks recognition, buccality is faceless, a mouth without a face and therefore deprived of sense. The buccal involves a series of movements, such as speaking, eating, or vomiting, and yet resists signification. This unrecognizable, buccal mouth operates prior to the Hegelian dialectic of desire. Without the face, the mouth functions as defacement of ethics. A gaping mouth is a wound unable to close or seal off (boucler), a wound that opens up the leakage of the ego. With the phrase “bouche bée” (mouth agape), Nancy proposes the possibility of infinite opening. Not unlike Nancy’s metaphor of heart that is shattered in love, the mouth is disfigured (it can metamorphose into the anus) and permanently opened. On a certain level, the mouth for Nancy is the face for Levinas. The mouth, according to Nancy, is “l’étendue d’un visage, la béance d’un non-lieu (the extension of a face, the opening of a non-place)” (161).

The mouth as a non-place belongs to the sphere of the il y a (there is) within Levinasian ethics which elicits the nonsense of being: “pain, an overflowing of sense by nonsense. Then sense bypasses non-sense—that sense
which is the-same-for-the-other” (OB, 64). Levinas asserts that the taking place of the ethical requires one to suffer for nothing. All sensible beings are exposed to the nonsense of suffering. Thus the sensible body becomes undermined by meaningless, nonsensical affect—“a surplus of nonsense over sense” (164). Whereas nonsense is associated with enjoyment/suffering, sense emphasizes ethics and responsibility. However, Levinas maintains that the distinction between the nonsense of the il y a (by-the-other) and the sense of responsibility (for-the-other) is ambiguous. How can we tell the difference between by-the-other (being eaten) and for-the-other (eating)? Simon Critchley describes the il y a as the “shadow or spectre of nonsense that haunts ethical sense” (276). Seen this way, the act of eating is already a modality of being eaten.

In “A Child Is Being Eaten: Mourning, Transvestism, and the Incorporation of the Daughter in Ulysses,” Joseph Valente discusses Bloom’s relationship with his daughter Milly in terms of the economy of eating and desire. For Valente, Bloom’s incorporation of food, along with his proclivity toward cross-gender masquerade, manifests an incestuous identification of the father with the daughter. Milly as a kiddy (U, 196) is related to the kidney which Bloom has for his breakfast in the “Calypso” episode. During this chapter Bloom leaves home for pork kidneys and while he returns, a letter from Milly is found on the threshold. As he reads the letter, Bloom continues eating “piece after piece of kidney” (U, 80). Recall Bloom’s monologue in which Milly is both a “[p]ert little piece” and “wild piece of goods” (76, 81), the analogy between the daughter and
the innards is made through the Joycean wordplays. Later in the chapter “Circe,” when Lynch embraces Kitty Ricketts, he chants “Dona nobis pacem” (U, 666), Latin for “Give us Peace”. Here the association of Milly/kiddy/Kitty/kidney is pieced together through the act of ingestion. As Valente puts it, “Milly becomes Meal-y” (25), and Bloom’s palate for innards becomes ersatz incestuous sexuality.

In his melancholic reverie, Bloom associates the Milly/Bannon affair with the tryst between Molly and Boylan. As Chester Anderson notes, the “Calypso” episode indicates “Bloom’s repression of his incestuous desire for Milly” (qtd. Neeper, 110). Bloom is anxious about Milly’s burgeoning sexuality. Ruminating on the daughter’s letter, Bloom feels a “soft qualm, regret, flowed down his backbone” (U, 81). The incest motif seems to resemble the Carrollian obsession with little girls. In describing Bloom’s affinity to Milly, Joyce pays a tribute to Lewis Carroll:

O, Milly Bloom, you are my darling.

You are my looking glass from night to morning.

I’d rather have you without a farthing

Than Katey Keoph with her ass and garden. (75)

Authors of nonsense literature, Joyce and Carroll share a proclivity toward nursery rhymes, puns, and rebuses without sharing the fascination with the young girl—Alice. In “Circe,” Bloom’s nighttown adventure mirrors Alice’s adventure in wonderland. The porcine transformation of Bloom recalls the
metamorphosis of a baby into a pig in the Alice books and the revulsion/attraction to pork in Kofman. Engaged in a compulsory runaway, he ducks into the butcher’s, and buys “a lukewarm pig’s crubeen, the other a cold sheep’s trotter, sprinkled with wholepepper” (U, 566). Facing the presence of his father, Bloom decides to hide the food instead of eating it. He declares that he will “get all pigsticky” if he eats the pig’s crubeen (U, 580). However Bloom gives away the crubeen and trotter to a dog (a retriever that becomes a wolfdog that becomes a setter that becomes a mastiff). Later, he loses his identity by becoming a pig. The father is also the daughter, the “Glory Alice” who occupies the position of a little girl (574). Bloom’s identity, in continuous process, breaks down the structure of the paternal. At some level, it is not the maternal, but the daughter who laughs at the name of the father. Indeed as Carroll and Deleuze recognize, it is only the daughter who could laugh at/mock the name of the father. By ‘girling’ the father, Joyce leaves his family paradigm ambiguous. It is neither Oedipal, nor non-Oedipal. In describing the edibalization of the daughter, Joyce creates another version of oedipalization. This punning effect, we might as well suggest, is the Joycean detour of sending the letter.

The letter, the “crumpled throwaway” (U, 291), is also a litter, a textual symptom of the author’s obdurate, almost eerie, expulsion of psychoanalysis—as he later incorporates the name of psychoanalytic fathers into Finnegans Wake by inserting the phrase “Jungfraud” (460.20). In diagnosing Lucia Joyce, Jung takes the daughter to be dementia praecox, an effect of the father’s
schizophrenic writing style. *Ulysses*, a book that Jung claims to “[turn] its back on [him],” deals with the anal, or annulment of psychoanalysis (qtd. Thurston, 135). Furious at Jung’s comments on *Ulysses* and Lucia, Joyce declares that “my daughter is not my self” (Ellmann, JJ, 676). The figure of the daughter, for Joyce, seems to manifest the locality of the other. Yet, to what extent does this declaration echo Derrida’s law of the daughter? Discussing Blanchot’s and Levinas’s works, Derrida notices the ambivalent status of the daughter. It is the daughter, rather than the son, who marks the madness of sexual difference for Deleuze as well as for Derrida. To further Levinas’s proposition that “the Other is what I myself am not” (TO, 83), Derrida proclaims the daughter as the Other is “the other sex” ("At This Very Moment,” 40). In contrast to the Law of the Father, the daughter’s law plays both a grammatical and a-grammatical sexuality. The daughter speaks the polysemy of madness: “my daughter, the law, is mad about me. I speculate on my daughter. My daughter is mad about me; this is law” ("Law of Genre,” 251). The daughter’s crazy love is the law (*la loi*), always feminine. In the daughter’s utterance of an excessiveness of yes, yes, she echoes with polysexual others, articulating “the inflectional contiguity of the I and the we, the *je* and the *nous*” 248).

The female schizophrenia, the madness of the law, has an impact on the father’s negation of psychoanalysis. Schizophrenia itself is a negation of psychoanalysis beyond its transferential logic. The law of psychoanalysis is taunted as the “law of the jungerl” (268 n. 3). Joyce’s denial of Lucia’s mental
illness and the daughter’s refusal of transference; however, is not outside the visceral economy of psycho-anal-ysis. The gesture of negation becomes a gesture of anal excrement. Bloom defecates right after reading Milly’s letter—“He allowed his bowels to ease themselves quietly as he read...Costive one tabloid of cascara sagrada” (U, 84). Molly, the stamp-collector’s daughter, keeps dancing in Bloom’s reverie. “Her head dancing. Her fansticks clicking” (84). As a little girl, rather than a wife, Molly creates a kinetic memory of betrayal. Bloom recalls the affair between her and Boylan in terms of the adulterers’ pas de deux. The husband wipes his buttocks. At the same time, “girls in grey gauze” and “the knees, the houghs of the knees” flash across his mind (85). The logic of the knee (genou), again, plays, the never-ending game of jel/nous. The recurrent yeses of the little girl now accede to a plural self: “as a girl where I was a Flower of the mountain yes when I put the rose in my hair like the Andalusian girls used or shall I wear a red yues and how he kissed me under the Moorish wall” (U, 932-933). Molly corresponds with herself. Like mother, like daughter. Milly sends the scattered amberoid necklace to herself as letters. The person who intends to write love letters all the time is in turn the addressee of a schizophrenic text.

Claire Culleton points out that the name of Alice has been inscribed in Bloom’s penis.6 In the cross-dressing scene, Bello, the whorehouse madam, tells Bloom that the petticoats he wears are “creations of lovely lingerie for Alice and nice scent for Alice” (648). The soubrette costume now bears a signature on the
part of the pelvis/penis: Alice. Despite an unassimilable little girl, the daughter is still a “piece,” a “saucebox” that serves her father when he “[sops]...dies of bread in the gravy and [eats] piece after piece of kidney” (U, 80). This edible status does not render Milly a victim of the patriarchal authority. Rather, the daughter is a disturbing figure, a metaphor for the obligation of eating. In “[t]he eating of the Other’s discourse..., what is transmitted is a pathological singularity, something impossible to incorporate or identify with comprehensibly” (Thurston, 158). Eating one’s own children, one’s own legacy, so to speak, is another form of eating up past and future. The obligation of eating, thus, is also an issue of intersubjectivity, or connections between bodies. A being, while remaining singular, is contaminated by an indigestible morsel. In that sense, to eat means to eat the other, the excremental, the filth. What we swallow as a secret is something secreted, like a ghost which we attempt to exorcise in order to conjure it up.

Spotting someone from the vegetarian restaurant, Bloom gives us a reprimand against carnivorism: “Don’t eat a beefsteak. If you do the eyes of that cow will pursue you through all eternity” (U, 210). The beef he eats makes him “on the run all day” (210). The meat becomes shit. All meals, in this way, partake of remnants and leftovers. The emetic effect is at core here in that one not only has to eat the good, but to eat what is inedible: “we stuffing food in one hole and out behind: food, chyle, blood, dung, earth, food: have to feed it like stoking an engine” (225). Rushing into the restaurant, Bloom feels that he
“[c]ouldn’t eat a morsel” (215) because of the dirty scene. Bloom’s feces are linked with absorption and resistance of ingestion at the same time considering his habit to read at stool. In spite of his preference for clean eating, the ghost of urine haunts Bloom at the beginning of “Calypso” as he enjoys the kidney with “a fine tang of faintly scented urine” (U, 65). Fascinated by this oral-anus encounter, his mouth is full of shit. The food that passes through the mouth decomposes quickly. For Bloom, death is incorporated and concealed in the fecality. Defecation, as well as constipation, concerns the process of concealing/revealing. Since a corpse has a mouth, it is “[m]uch better to close up all the orifices. Yes, also. With wax. The sphincter loose. Seal up all” (U, 123). The encounter with the dead, once again, anticipates the act of sealing and sending, a detour that starts backwards.

The opening passage of “Calypso” abounds with alimentary images—“inner organs of beasts and fowls…thick giblet soup, nutty gizzards, a stuffed roast heart, liver slices fried with crustcrumbs, fried hencod’s roes” (U, 65). This initial relish for inner organs leads to Molly’s inner room where she lies on the bed with “large soft bubs, sloping within her nightdress like a shegoat’s udder” (76). According to Joyce’s Linati schemata, this chapter’s symbol is vagina. By opening the chapter with images of dark inwards, Joyce introduces Bloom with a conflation of mouth and vagina. Throughout “Calypso,” Bloom’s pleasure is essentially oral—“Kidneys were [always] in his mind” (65). This carnivorous pleasure continues when Bloom recalls the kissing scene between him and Molly:
“Ravished over her I lay full lips full open, kissed her mouth. Yum. Softly she
gave me in my mouth the seedcake warm and chewed. Mawkish pulp her mouth
had mumbled sweet and sour with spittle. Joy: I ate it: joy. Young life, her lips
that gave me pouting” (U, 224).

The feeling of joy echoes Joyce’s signature: a plural joys, a joy that
repeats itself. Erin Soros acutely points out the series of puns on
Joyce/joys/joy/Freude/Friede/peace/piece. She argues that Bloom’s pleasure
not only lies in eating, but also in tearing. He splits open Milly’s morning letter
like he cuts slices of the burnt kidney. After Bloom reads the letter, he thinks of
“Seaside girls. Torn envelope” (U, 81), a reference to Milly and the piece of her
writing. The daughter is edible and so is the father. Bloom finds his pleasure in
oscillation between tearing and being torn, eating and being eaten. Confronted
with Bello, “Bloom squeals, turning turtle” (U, 645). The phrase is reminiscent of
Bloom’s kidney breakfast which he “turned it turtle on its back” (U, 79).

At some level, Milly, in Bloom’s fear of losing her, is a turtle-shell, or
rather, something that hides in the shell. Bloom describes the daughter’s onset
of puberty as “coming out of her shell” (80). The shell contains the matrix of the
sea, and reminds us of the song about seaside girls mentioned in Milly’s letter:
“Those girls, those girls, / Those lovely seaside girls” (U, 81). Milly is aligned
with the seaside girls whom Bloom encounters in the Nausicaa episode. The
equation “Milly Nausikaa” appears in an unused note that Joyce designs for this
episode. After Bloom’s risqué liaison with Gerty MacDowell on the beach, the
daughter’s image is superimposed upon the seaside girl and other street women. Bloom recalls “[b]eef to the heel” (U, 485), an expression first mentioned in Milly’s letter. In Bannon’s conversation with Mulligan, Milly is also described as “a skittish heifer, big of her age and beef to the heel” (U, 519). With Milly gone to Mulligar, Bloom feels anxiety about the nest now empty. Like the sound of the sea deep within a shell, as Derrida puts it, Milly produces a mourning effect that forms a psychic place in Bloom’s memory. The Milly-turtle emits a “mockturtle vapour and steam of newbaked jampuffs rolypoly...[which] tickled the top of Mr Bloom’s gullet” (U, 198). This edibility of Milly, to use the Joycean pun, becomes a result of the father’s “eatupus complex” (FW, 128).

During Bloom’s meal with Richard Goulding, the latter simply can’t help “harping on his daughter” (U, 351-352). This time Bloom orders his favorite liver, and Goulding eats steak and kidney. Off stage, we have Molly and Boylan consume Plumtree’s potted meat at the same time. By eating together, Bloom and Goulding “married in silence, ate” (347). This communal eating, with flowing music as background, serves as a model for what Bloom may call clean eating: “Clean tables, flowers, mitres of napkins” (349). Unlike the dirty eaters at the Burton restaurant, Bloom introduces a proper table manner here: “bite by bite of pie he ate Bloom ate they ate” (347). The bite-by-bite manner, in contrast to the ramming-a-knifeful-of-cabbage-without-digestion style at the Burton, implies a way of introjection or ideal mourning in which the object is successfully digested. Nonetheless, it is also the moment when Bloom’s
melancholy culminates due to Molly’s and Boylan’s tryst. The time is four o’clock. An echo of Bloom’s pudding time, the later declaration of Virag that “I’m the best o’cook” (U, 632), again, combines the culinary and time. What is past is preserved in the stomach. Four, fors, for—these words constitute Bloom’s ruminations on loss and its denial. Despite Molly’s saying that the appointment is at four, in “Hades” and “Lestrygonians,” all he can remember is that the time is in the afternoon, and thus fails to indicate the exact timing. As he fixes breakfast for Molly, Bloom counts, “Another slice of bread and butter: three, four” (U, 65), and “Everything on it? Bread and butter, four” (U, 76). The traumatic moment of four remains indigestible. It functions as a safe (fors) that saves something inside. The so-called clean eating in Bloom’s mind is not tenable insasmuch as he still feels “wind wound round inside” (U, 372). Hearing the music, Bloom claims, “Four o’clock’s all’s well! Sleep! All is lost now” (U, 374).

All is lost—Tutto è sciolto—a tenor aria from Bellini’s *La Sonnambula*. The song is about the lament of love. The musical phrase recurs over and over again in the chapter. About to finish his lunch, “Bloom askance over liverless saw. Face of the all is lost. Rollicking Richie once” (352). Richie’s face is described as the face of the all is lost. His daughter, Crissie Goulding, “Papa’s little lump of dung” (U, 109), is confused with Milly as they are both identified as the “wise child that knows her own father” (109, 352). It is not clear to whose daughter this sentence refers since in another draft Joyce writes “my daughter” instead of “his”. Analogous to Goulding, Bloom is despondent when all is lost at four. The
fors, the vault of the artificial unconsciousness, is occupied with plurality: the mourned is substitutable and yet remains singular. The beauty of music brings out Bloom’s memory of Milly, Molly, and Rudy: ”Milly young student. Well, my fault perhaps. No son. Rudy. Too late now” (367). The lunch time now is a period of mourning. Notably, eating foodstuff is interchangeable with listening or playing music for music has a mouth. Suffice it to say, “our relation to music is one of mourning” (Krell, 8).

The first sentence of the “Sirens” starts with “Bronze by gold”—the gold (or) is suggestive of an oral-cum-aural synthesis. On one hand, the act of synthesis produces contamination and alterity; on the other, synthesis is a process of incorporation. In the “Sirens” chapter, eating (the oral) and singing (the aural) sometimes overlap. Not only the deaf waiter Pat is someone who has “open mouth ear waiting to wait” (354), but also Bloom “seehears lipspeech” shortly before he is about to leave the restaurant (365). The eye, the ear and the mouth are all orifices. As Derrida states, “[f]or everything that happens at the edge of the orifices (or orality, but also of the ear, the eye—and all the ‘sense’ in general) the metonymy of ‘eating well’ (bien manger) would always be the rule” (“Eating Well,” 282). The necessity of orification is at stake here. One has to hear even without the ability to hear. The deaf Pat waits and listens. The ear is closed open (ouvert fermé). And the communication between Bloom and Pat is “the only language Mr. Dedalus said to Ben” (U, 359). The orifices of the body listen to the call from afar. The ear and the mouth are permanently open.
In spite of Simon Daedalus’s allusion that “You’d burst the tympanum of her ear...with an organ like yours” (348), bodily openings are hymenal bonds not simply dealing with penetration, but revolving around the process of infoldings and outfoldings. Above all, ears are “invaginated folds and involuted orificiality...restless cavity that is sensitive to all waves” (Derrida, EO, 36). In the name of eating well, one incorporates the flesh and blood of the other. For Bloom, the language of love turns out an internalization of semen: “[f]lood of warm jamjam lickitup secretness flowed to flow in music out, in desire, dark to lick flow invading” (354). The incorporation here becomes an audible process. Be there sound or not, the other is always audible. When we pick up a seashell, we hear a blood-wave: “a sea. Corpuscle islands“ (363).

Throughout this chapter, Joyce accentuates the image of the shell, a cryptic place for sound, a “cave. No admittance except on business” (363). A shell as a crypt is not enclosed but leaky. It is the most prominent body part, osmotic and ruptured. Bloom compares Miss Douce’s ear to a shell: “the peeping lobe there. Been to the seaside. Lovely seaside girls....Buttered toast” (363). In Joyce’s Book of Memory, John Richard says, “[s]hells in Ulysses are often associated with emptiness, hollowness, and absence of life” (94). Provided the shell is a tomb or crypt, we might as well posit that the shell is a signature of death. After Bloom attends Patrick Dignam’s funeral, he sees an “obese grey rat toddled along the side of the crypt” (U, 145). This little rat from the crypt later becomes a shelly creature in “Circe”. Crawling down through a coalhole,
Dignam’s ghost is followed by a turtle shell, “an obese grandfather rat on fungus turtle paws under a grey carapace” (U, 598). The figure of the shell reminds us of the Shelleyan signature, an inscription of the poet’s name that becomes encrypted in *Ulysses*. In *Defence of Poetry*, Shelley writes that the “footsteps” of poetry are “those of a wind over a sea, which the coming calm erases, and whose traces remain only as the wrinkled sand” (504). Hearing his own footsteps on “cracking wrack and shells,” Stephen contemplates “the ineluctable modality of the audible” (U, 45). The shell is first and foremost a musical trope. It encapsulates dead treasure and leaks it out in a form of flowing. Chamber music is everywhere. Or we should say, music is always chambered. As Bloom listens to the song of Sirens, “he heard more faintly that that they heard, each for herself alone, then each for other, hearing the plash of waves, loudly, a silent roar” (U, 363).

The whisper of the seashell is forever sought and lost, as well as “Human shells” (50). Human beings are enveloped with crusts that are “baked through” all the time (Freud, BPP, 29). On the surface of this psychical monument, a Humpty-Dumpty-like eggshell, memory-traces are found or stimulated via various forms of sensation. With this protective vesicle, the ego wards off the unwanted stimuli that it cannot introject (cast inside). In explaining Abraham’s and Torok’s substitution of the shell for the Freudian ego, and the kernel for id, Christopher Lane writes:
Abraham’s metaphor of the Shell connotes an object with a large open rim withdrawing into convex and inaccessible recesses. While this object’s shape is intriguing, Abraham implies that the Shell’s open rim is sufficient to “hear” and “receive” whatever “mysterious messages” the Kernel emits; unless repressed elements such as family secrets stand in the way, the drive reaches its destination in consciousness. (10)

In a way, the principle of eating and the principle of sending a letter coalesce when it comes to incorporation. The ego, the envelope, contains and incorporates a mélange of messages. It wears “a cap of hearing” on one side (Freud, EI, 18). A sealed envelope, the shell contains the Somatic and unfolds the kernel’s messages from inside. On this psychic membrane, the ghostly sender leaves a signature across the imagined boundary between me and the incorporated other. The I who sends the letter am nothing but a specter. Can one really send or receive a letter to/from the other? As much as the letter may never reach its destination, the assumed position of the sender remains. At some level, the circulation of messages is always an address to oneself. Like Molly’s self-addressed letters “so bored” (U, 898), all love letters are a kind of epistolary masturbation. Even in the phrase ‘Je t’aime’, the qui at stake here is the I, while tu is pluralized, unrecognizable. Without exception, the love letters are spam mails disseminated everywhere. Nonetheless, the destination of this sending the self is destined to be an inevitable tragedy. The letter returns to haunt. Derrida, in his argument about the detour of the letter, says: “It does not
succeed in having itself arrive to the other. This is the tragedy of myself, of the ego, in 'introjection': one must love oneself in order to love oneself, or finally, if you prefer, my love, in order to love" (Postcard, 195).

As Karen Lawrence observes, men in *Ulysses* play a “shell game in the many pockets of their suits” (163). Before cooking breakfast for Molly, Bloom buys a kidney: “His hand accepted the moist tender gland and slid it into a sidepocket” (U, 71). To prevent the floating kidney from wandering around, Bloom has to preserve it in his pocket (U, 571). In Bloom’s correspondence with Martha Clifford, he keeps the letter in his pocket while using the finger to “[rip] it open in jerks” (U, 88). He “took out the envelope, tore it swiftly in shreds and scattered them towards the road” (97). A moment earlier, he expresses the urge to tear up the letter: “Let everything rip. Forget” (96). The flowery message is ripped to pieces, disseminated, self-inseminated. The yellow bloom enclosed in Martha’s letter points to moly, the “yellow milk” (Letters, 147) flower Joyce mentions once, and also to the post part/posterior of Molly, the “mellow yellow smellow melons” (U, 867). Nevertheless, Bloom’s kiss on Molly’s rump is stamped yet never arrives at the ass. Bloom, at most, is merely an “[a]dorer of the adulterous rump” (U, 644). The destination is a betrayal. Deprived of full coition, he and Molly are en route to endless deferral of sexual satisfaction. In mourning, the couple cannot have any intercourse except kisses on the bottom. On the “adipose posterior,” the lover’s kiss is “obscure prolonged provocative” (867). The postal effect of the kiss delivers ambiguous meanings. If to kiss is to
heal the wound, then Bloom’s obsession with Molly’s bottom only reveals a forever rift wound, coldness, and deferral. “[A]ny man thatd kiss a womans bottom Id throw my hat at him after that hed kiss anything unnatural where we haven’t 1 atom of any kind of expression in us all of us the same 2 lumps of lard” (U, 925), complains Molly about the Bloomian stamp on her buttocks. Always two, always cold.

In a letter to Frank Budgen, Joyce depicts moly as “a nut to crack” which has “many leaves, indifference due to masturbation” (Letters I, 147, 148). It is the herb that Hermes gives to Odysseus to break Circe’s spell, to protect him from transforming into a swine. Joyce makes a link of the flower of moly to Bloom’s potato talisman. The potato contained in his pocket, the “hard black shriveled potato” (U, 599), is associated with the nuts off side, something indicating the symptomatic body of Bloom. He is, after all, diagnosed as “virgo intacta” because of amnesia caused by some family complex (U, 613). Asking Zoe to return the potato, he claims that the potato is a “relic of poor mama” (663). Full of personal memorabilia, Bloom’s pocket is a vehicle for incorporating food: lemon soap, kidney, bread, chocolate, etc. The pocketed secret is protean. As Erin Soros maintains, like Shakespeare who “carried a memory in his wallet,” Bloom too, carries secrets in his pocket (U, 244).\(^{11}\) Stashing away his treasure, the hero hides Martha’s letter in his pocket. Torn into pieces, the letter loses its signification, and deviates from its destination.
Under the control of Bella’s fan (folds), Bloom is still apathetic to the course of the postal: “I stand, so to speak, with an unposted letter bearing the extra regulation fee before the too late box of the general postoffice of human life” (U, 642). Albeit too late, one has to send the letter, to send oneself to oneself (s’envoyer), and by signing, to leave the oral mark. Interrogated by Bello, Bloom is surrounded by his sins of the past including adultery, voyeurism, and indulgence of a “nauseous fragment of wellused toilet paper” under the influence of “gingerbread and a postal order” (649). It is clear that Bloom is a sexual pervert, but he is, above all, a masturbator. Thanks to the masturbatory experience in “Nausicca,” he gains sexual release by “[putting] his hands back into his pockets” (U, 470). It is as if Bloom is ‘saved’ by the act of masturbation. His body feels the most comfortable when it is under the onanistic exposure. Saturated in the Turkish bath, Bloom fantasizes about masturbation: “Also I think I. Yes I. Do it in the bath. Curious longing I” (U, 105). The body undergoes a process of folding-up and longs to envelope itself, to incorporate one’s own flesh. Hence, eating, even eating the other, has an inclination toward me. Assigned an oneiric position, the letter is constantly on itinerary, swerving off from its intended destination. For Derrida, a letter is always wandering even when it seems to arrive somewhere. A missive never reaches the I, and it never has any specific sender or recipient.

In Ulysses, masturbating is often concurrent with sending the self. After Bloom finishes his lunch, he receives a “quiet message from his bladder” (U,
No sooner has the postal imperative occurred to his mind ("Postoffice. Must answer") than he begins a prelude of masturbation: "he slid his hand between waistcoast and trousers and, pulling aside his shirt gently, felt a slack fold of his belly. But I know it’s whiteyyellow" (U, 232-233). Later on, he finds a piece of paper on the beach, a quasi-letter that he cannot read. Trying to leave a message to his masturbatory partner Gerty MacDowell, he writes an “I” on the sands. The tracing of the I, the “AM. A” (U, 498), is never completed. A sending without closure comes back to the scene of eating. With his unfinished open-ended sentence, Bloom opens his mouth. Simultaneously, the clock cooes “cuckoo” when the priest and his guests take “tea and sodabread and butter and fried mutton chops with catsup” (499). The knell tolls at the hour of eating. The timepiece announces the husband’s cuckoldom and chimes in with a sense of being betrayed. However, perhaps the clock does not sound the hour of betrayal after all. It conveys a message that one sends to oneself, a signature that is lost on the way. Eating, the attempt to live on, turns out to be a kind of eating nothing but oneself.

Having mimicked Circe, Bello/Bella turns Bloom into a sow: "I shall have you slaughtered and skewered in my stables and enjoy a slice of you with crisp crackling from the baking tin basted and baked like sucking pig with rice and lemon or currant sauce" (U, 645). This association of ‘piece’ and alimentary pleasure is also seen in Stephen’s drunken evocation: “if desire act awfully bestial butcher’s boy pollutes in warm veal liver or omelette on the belly pièce de
“Shakespeare” (U, 673). While the Hamlet-like Stephen is identified with the omelette/homme-let, the word ‘joy’ appears to mark a signature peace of Joyce himself. John Cage, in Writing through Finnegans Wake, notices the tearing effect of the Joycean signature by linking ‘piece/peace’ to ‘joy’:

my lips went livid for from the Joy of feAr

like almost now. How? How you said how you’d givE me

the keyS of me heart.

Just a whisk brisk sly spty spink

spank sprint Of a thing

i pity your oldself I was used to,

a Cloud.

in peace” (Empty Words, 134)

Milly’s Christmas card also bears the author’s signature: “MAY THIS YULETIDE BRING TO THEE, JOY AND PEACE AND WELCOME GLEE: a butt of red partly liquefied sealing wax” (U, 849). The card carries Joyce’s signature, a signature multiplied and self-inseminated like a flower: “My joy is other joy. But both are joys. Yes, joy it must be” (U, 364). The signature is a yes. By answering ‘oui,’ the I/aye has become a ‘we’. Sending, although it does not aim for the other as the recipient, is “exposed to alterity prior to any intention to communicate” (Ziarek, 101). If to send oneself off is to have relation with one’s own death,
even in this singular death, we experience the counter-signature of the other. The card sent to Milly, whose name begets thousands (mill-), is somehow analogous to the imaginary number (AA001, 11001) Stephen calls to Edenville: “Aleph, alpha: nought, nought, one” (U, 46). Not the one, but many. The phone calls never get through. The internal connection from one yes to another yes has curled its way back.

Whether the letter from Milly or the kiss from Molly, the postal and the oral face a quandary of subjectivity. Subjectivity cannot be sustained through the subject’s overcoming of loss. In the act of sending and eating, the other remains forever mournable and untraceable despite any attempt at self-assertion. In Ulysses, characters are continually engaged in sending a sort of dispatch that Derrida calls “the Ulyssean circle of self-sending” (“Ulysses Gramaphone,” 304). At some level, to send something is to write on a planchette. Writing or calling, the affirmation of self-presence, is haunted by the absence of the other. As Derrida argues, the phone call is always from interiority—“Mr. Bloom phoned from the inner office” (U, 163). All the time, Bloom is hooked up to an incorporated telephonic device. The eaten has called from the inside of the belly, looking for some vent. To recall Bloom’s “pamphlet of which [he] received some days ago, incorrectly addressed. It claims to afford a noiseless inoffensive vent” (U, 656), the position of I has remained address unknown. Wherever the letter arrives, it is somewhere other than itself. What we have here is only a farting body, a body that answers yes yes yes.
Endnotes


4 For further elaboration on the figure of the mouth, see Sara Guyer, “Buccal Reading” in *CR: The New Centennial Review* 7.2: 71-87.


7 See *Ulysses annotated: Notes for James Joyce’s Ulysses*, p. 70.


10 Critics have noticed the importance of Shelley’s theory of the poetic in Joyce’s works. For instance, in *Reauthorizing Joyce*, Vicki Mahaffey points out that the image of the cave in Shelley’s “Prometheus Unbound” represents a poetic mind. The enclosed space, “a dim cave of human thought” (I, 659), is the house where poetry dwells.


12 See Christine Froula’s *Modernism’s Body: Sex, Culture, and Joyce*, p. 169.
The relation of the father’s name to joy is also seen in Joyce’s poem “Epilogue to Ibsen’s Ghosts”: “Paternity, thy name is joy / When the wise child knows which is which” (PE, 95).
He kills indifferently; or, at least, people die around him. The black presence of the doubter poisons the life out of every character...

-Mallarmé

In his 1905 essay “Psychopathic Characters on the Stage,” Freud claims that “[a]fter all, the conflict in Hamlet is so effectively concealed that it was left to me to unearth it” (SE 7, 309-310). What psychoanalysis seeks to discover in the Danish prince is a kind of revelation, an un-concealment of Hamlet’s motivation. Earlier, Freud has referred to Hamlet in a footnote written in The Interpretation of Dreams. He argues that Hamlet’s procrastination is due to his identification with Claudius who commits the crimes of fratricide and incest. Thus, for Hamlet, killing Claudius would be like killing himself. The hero struggles between his conscious impulse, to obey his father’s posthumous injunction, and his unconscious impulse, to identify with Claudius who fulfills his Oedipal wish. In Julia Lupton’s and Kenneth Reinhard’s After Oedipus: Shakespeare in Psychoanalysis, they point out that the discovery of Oedipus complex begins with a letter. In Freud’s letter to Fliess, dated 15 October 1897, he relates a childhood story concerning his fantasy of the mother being locked up:
My mother was nowhere to be found; I was crying in despair. My brother Philipp...unlocked a wardrobe [Kasten] for me, and when I did not find my mother inside it either, I cried even more until...she came in through the door. (qtd. Reinhard, 17)

The letter narrates a parental loss and its restoration: the child experiences the mother’s absence with an image of interiorization. The mother is locked up in the child’s fantasy. In a sense, the loss of the mother is future-oriented. It is the fear, rather than the actual loss, that results in the child’s imaginary internment of the beloved mother. The realms of trauma and revelation overlap. In between the moment of ‘already’ and ‘not yet’, the subject is caught up within a ghostly temporality. The work of mourning, so to speak, is “not fundamentally toward the recuperation of a past traumatic event but rather toward a future in which the islanded traumatic symptom will have been encompassed within a retrospective sense” (Saint-Amour, 63).

What distinguishes Lacan from Freud in terms of their interpretation of the tragedy is, first and foremost, a topological difference: for Freud, the mother is ‘in’ the son’s fantasy, whereas for Lacan, the maternal is the cortical envelope—the mother captures the son in her desire. In Lacan’s view, it is Gertrude’s desire that occasions Hamlet’s delay. As long as Hamlet aspires to identify himself with the object in Gertrude’s desire, his question is a question of being or not being the phallus. Since Gertrude cannot renounce Claudius, Hamlet cannot kill him. However, instead of Gertrude, Ophelia is the person first accused of the
cause of Hamlet’s madness. As the ‘originary’ cause, the name of Ophelia appears to be the primal word that triggers Hamlet’s mourning.

In Lacan’s account of the subject formation, desire plays its part in participating in the trajectory of subjectivity. The illusion of subjectivity always accompanies a feeling of loss. Moreover, this feeling of loss triggers desire for desire which is a desire for lack. John Muller explains the Lacanian loss in the following way:

What he or she must give up is being the phallus in the dual relation to the mother, and mourn its symbolic castration as the price paid for entering the symbolic order and submitting to the law of the father. The phallus, therefore, is the originally mourned object whose loss is recalled in later experiences of mourning. (159)

Mourning results from the loss of the phallus. And further, as mourning is structured like psychosis, it has nothing to do with the symbolic father. Paradoxically, mourning is the movement of phallic signifiers in the sense that the phallus is foreclosed. What is foreclosed comes back and ineluctably problematizes the notion of closure. The thetic function of mourning as the entry into the symbolic therefore is rehearsed over and over again.

While Freud considers Hamlet a melancholic, Lacan takes mourning as the central issue in the play. He introduces the play as “the drama of an individual subjectivity” (“Desire,” 12). That is to say, Hamlet typifies the equation of the subject with the mourner. So long as “the subject must mourn the phallus” (46),
the successful mourning preconditions the decline of the Oedipus complex. For the subject, what means by mourning is to accept the loss of the phallus instead of imagining becoming one. In *Hamlet*, Ophelia (O-phallus) is the object the prince must learn to mourn. As a flower-girl, she is a phanerogam rather than a cryptogam. In “Psychosis and Mourning in Lacan’s *Hamlet*,” John Muller writes, Ophelia is “a substitute for the phallus as lost object” (147). She is a “piece of bait” that elicits Hamlet’s desire (Lacan, 11). His love letter to Ophelia only expresses his love of the “desire for O”. Ophelia, along with Carroll’s Alice, is now at the core of the question “Che voui?”—she becomes an avatar of the little Phallus, the kernel we find when shrugging off the mortal coil.¹

Referring to her relationship with Hamlet, Polonius says, “Affection, puh! You speak like a green girl” (1, 3, 101). The green girl is also linked to the ‘green memory’ of old Hamlet’s death: “Though yet of Hamlet our dear brother’s death /The memory be green” (1, 2, 1-2). This green memory, be it for old Hamlet or for Ophelia, is an unmournable memory. In discussing the Hamlet-Ophelia relation, Lacan suggests that at first “[t]he object takes place...of what the subject is—symbolically—deprived of....The phallus” (15). Hamlet the ‘royal flower’ (Goethe) enters Ophelia’s boudoir, looking for what he has lost. At this stage, the object still remains a distance from the prince. Explaining Ophelia’s rejection by Hamlet, Lacan emphasizes her association with child-bearing. “Hamlet no longer treats Ophelia like a woman at all. She becomes in his eyes a disseminating flower, a future ‘breeder of sinners,’ destined to succumb to every
calumny” (22-23).² At the second stage, Ophelia as the phallus is “exteriorized and rejected by the subject” (23). She is rejected and scorned for being close to the maternal position. Rejected or not, the mad daughter insists on this implicitly sexual status and keeps giving flowers. Finally, at the third stage, which takes place in Ophelia’s burial, “something like a reintegration of the object a, won back here at the price of mourning and death” (24). Through a futile and roundabout pursuit, the flower girl proves to be unattainable. Thus the mourning relation is rendered impossible.

Why can’t Hamlet love Ophelia until her death? Why does he declare his love all of a sudden? Lacan makes it clear that “only insofar as the object of Hamlet’s desire has become an impossible object can it become once more the object of his desire” (36). By saying this, Lacan implies that one can only show fealty to the impossible. Knowing the impossibility of reaching the prize, Hamlet and Laertes begin a mourning/love competition to demonstrate their fidelity to the dead. Seen from this perspective, we might explain the reason why Hamlet cannot revenge and perform his mourning for the father unless Gertrude is dead.

For both Hamlet and Laertes, the death of Ophelia creates “a hole in the real” (“Desire,” 37). What the dead men’s fingers point to is a wound of love, a leftover of reality. Ophelia, as “a hole in the real,” “no longer corresponds to anything in reality” (37). It is the imaginary, before the symbolic, that introduces the lack. In the imaginary identification with the object, we put ourselves in a loving position and suffer the hallucination of an imaginary loss.
Lacan writes that in the experience of mourning “[t]he subject is plunged into the vertigo of suffering, and finds himself in a certain relationship” (Book VI, S18, 13). It is this relationship that defines Ophelia. She only exists in her relationship to the subject Hamlet. Reduced to the status of the letter O, Ophelia sometimes resembles the “gaping cunt” (Book VI, S15, 15) that receives ‘overness’. The O reminds us of O-thello whose name is the Greek verb ethelo (wish, desire). The O also resembles the garland with which Ophelia makes a coronet of the will-o-w tree. In her madness, she becomes a “murde’ring-piece” (4, 5, 94) that threatens Claudius’s kingship. In short, the O gives birth to all possibilities of death. As soon as Ophelia is drowned, Hamlet the newborn baby returns nakedly from the sea journey. While considered as a forever symbol of femininity, she stands between the threshold of virgin/wife. Ophelia’s “nothing” (3, 2, 110) is a refusal to be clearly defined. Even “her death was doubtful” (5, 1, 227). By dying a doubtful death, she sticks to no border or boundary, not able to reach any definite conclusion. Like Hamlet’s father, Ophelia is also a ghost, a black hole, a floating signifier pregnant with various signifieds.

To fill the hole in the real, one needs a completed mourning to accomplish this totality. And yet, can any performance or ritual successfully conjure up the ghost with the purpose to let it go? None of the dead persons in Hamlet seem to be properly buried. Old Hamlet is buried yet not mourned enough. Polonius is buried in “hugger-mugger” (4, 5, 83). Ophelia is buried in “maimed rites” (5, 1, 205). In that sense, Hamlet is indeed a tragedy of insufficient mourning. A few
paragraphs after the discussion of the Hamlet-Ophelia relationship, Lacan associates mourning with Verwerfung (foreclosure), proclaiming that “mourning is like psychosis” (13). According to him, mourning and psychosis intersect at the level of a fantasy: the “swarms of images” assumes the phallic position in a mode of hallucination (“Desire,” 38). In Hamlet’s mourning, he compares the image of his dead father with that of Claudius’s: “Look here upon this picture, and on this, /The counterfeit presentment of two brothers” (3, 4, 53-54). The father is the image and nothing else. For Hamlet, the paternal metaphor fails to substitute the desire of the Mother and hence is foreclosed. As a ghost always haunts the place where it is excluded, the return of the ghostly father seems inevitable. The father tells Hamlet that with a revenge code (an-eye-for-an-eye), the work of mourning might be completed. Following the rule of substitution and repetition, Hamlet begins his career as a serial killer.

According to Žižek, the successful mourning functions to kill the dead a second time (“Melancholy and the Act,” 658). Hamlet kills Polonius, the substitute for Claudius—“Thou wretched, rash, intruding fool, farewell. /I took thee for thy better” (3, 4, 31-32). By the time he kills Claudius, revenge is already a repetition. Notably, the father’s demand for justice puts the idea of complete mourning into question. Given that killing is Hamlet’s means to mourn, we will always have the responsibility to the other. Inasmuch as we cannot put an end to our responsibility to the other, we will never mourn enough. As T. S. Eliot puts it, “Hamlet...is dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible,
because it is in excess” (48). Gertrude typifies this plethora of mourning. By sticking to the principle of substitution and acting it out too well, she actually parodies the norm of mourning. Her tears cascade at first: “like Niobe, all tears” (1, 2, 144). While compared to Niobe, the figure of excessive Gertrude challenges the notion of ‘healthy’ mourning. Joan Copjec has suggested that the logic of tears demands more and marks an “inability to close itself off” (258). In Copjec’s reading, this “more” features an excess that expresses a lack in what narrative can do and say. Positing that crying is an invention of the eighteenth century, Copjec emphasizes the perspective of feminine jouissance in sentimental melodrama. The gesture of crying, the seriality of tears, is regarded as excessive affection which overflows an impotent symbolic. This inadequacy of the symbolic underscores an absence of limit rather than a whole. In terms of the inability to come to an end, the Renaissance revenge tragedies have shared an affinity with the eighteenth century melodrama.

In revenge tragedies, mourning seems inevitably the law of genre. The delay of the protagonist’s action, in a sense, is the result of necessary overkill. The prince has to kill Polonius and Laertes, among others, before Claudius’s death. For Hamlet, the ghost’s injunction to mourn and to kill is associated with the Law of the father that pronounces its own death. The father’s “commandment” becomes Hamlet’s “word” (1, 5, 102; 110), his contract to the Other. If successful mourning constitutes the normalization of the subject, Hamlet can only achieve this goal by death, by a series of killings. As a
mourning/killing machine, Hamlet is obliged to revenge. While a subject is responsible for the other, it also recognizes the other as an object of revenge or an avenger. In other words, a law that constitutes a community requires a breach of the law. The society, structured by the law on one hand, is haunted by an inherent transgression as well, or an excess always already too much, like Hamlet’s “obstinate condolement” (1, 2, 93).

Following Lacan’s argument that “the work of mourning is accomplished at the level of the logos” (38), I propose that language exemplifies the process of endless mourning, and further, language for Hamlet is an excess since he has been doing nothing but quipping and nagging throughout the play. A chatter-box, Hamlet is the very manifestation of a writing machine which constantly produces mourning letters. “Words, words, words” (2, 2, 191). Writing is indeed Hamlet’s way to revenge. The king is a word-thing that Hamlet attempts to relinquish and yet by this killing Hamlet erases his own autobiographical signature. No doubt, what he cannot do is to name himself. In this case, the son’s name is also the name of the father. It is until Ophelia’s death that he mourns and claims: “This is I, /Hamlet the Dane!” (5, 1, 243-233) No sooner has he named himself than he gives the name away. By giving the kingdom to Fortinbras, Hamlet wipes out the father’s name once again. The name loses its legitimacy without the transference of power from the father to the son.

In Hamlet, everything is about haunting. The play opens, not with any of the main characters, but with frightened guards on the qui vive, men who are
being haunted. In the first quarto of *Hamlet*, the opening scene starts with a nameless sentinel’s interrogation: “Stand! Who is that?” To this, Barnardo answers: “’Tis I” (1, 1, 1-2). Different from the first quarto, the answer to this question in the second quarto turns out to be “Long live the King” (1, 1, 3). The announcement of the ‘I’ is syncopated, and replaced by an ambiguous answer. The King no longer lives, and the one occupying the throne is not a legitimate successor. Does that mean the question “Who’s there” (1, 1, 1) is impossible to answer and it only makes us absurd to ask for any identification paper from the Other? After all, the singular is none other than an excessive plural. We live in an ethical relation to Others, partly hidden and partly disclosed. When Horatio is asked to reveal his identity, he only reveals “a piece of him” (1, 1, 19). With “Long live the king” as the password, the subject’s entry into the symbolic is predicated upon the Name of the Father. It may seem strange that Barnardo refers to himself as “He” (1, 1, 5), but it is noteworthy that the ghostly existence of the letter H has been wandering throughout the play. The father’s name is truncated and wounded at the beginning. Subjects are h-аunted, and their encountering with the Other is necessarily steeped in mourning.

**The Letter Killeth**

In *William Shakespeare*, Terry Eagleton has pointed out Hamlet’s “reluctance or inability to enter the symbolic order” (74). At some level, the
symbolic letter in *Hamlet*, whether in a form of punning or a missile/missive, foreshadows the bursting-forth and bombing-out of subjectivity. The future is a deluge of incoming mail whereas the birth of beings is a promise never delivered. In the following section, I argue that Hamlet’s act of posting and his tendency to postponement function to link up mourning with prophecy. Further, given that the psychotic desire of Hamlet’s is prophetic in nature, how does prophecy function as an intrapsychic process in Shakespeare’s play? The subject, within a context of Derridean philosophy, adopts an apocalyptic tone through which every post s/he sends out aims for death. “My hour is almost come” (1. 5. 2)—the portentous figure brings out a ghostly message that almost and yet never comes. For Hamlet, prescience is trapped within the postal system, always to come. In other words, at work in our hero’s mourning is the impossibility of this deadly and prophetic destination.

In his mourning of the father, Hamlet resorts to a gesture of writing. Words are conceived as hypostatization of recollection. By willfully remembering the ghost, the prince runs a risk of radical amnesia: “I am glad to see you well. / Horatio, or I do forget myself” (1. 2. 160-61). His act of vengeance is analogous to writing a series of letters that pronounce death. When he is about to take actions, Hamlet first returns to Denmark in the form of a letter: “I am set / naked on your kingdom” (4, 7, 43-44). The naked letter, with its apocalyptic tone, unveils Hamlet’s whereabouts and veils his intention at the same time. Both Claudius and Laertes are unable to decipher the meaning of Hamlet’s letter.
In answering Claudius’s question, Laertes says, “I am lost in it, my lord. But let him come” (4, 7, 54). The cryptic message returns, as Russell Samolsky points out, in a circuit of self-sending. Why does Claudius receive the letter from Claudio and why does Hamlet obtain the message from another Hamlet? In a way, the mode of self-sending is what Heidegger terms Being-toward-death. Insofar as human existence is understood in its relation with the future, Dasein is made possible between the past and a future-not-yet: “Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being, is always coming toward itself” (325).

Whereas the relation of cannibalism to vengeance is explicit in *Titus Andronicus*, the act of eating the other is only implicit in *Hamlet*—“Now could I drink hot blood / And do such [bitter business as the] day / Would quake to look on” (3, 2, 369-71). Raymond Rice, in a discussion of revenge tragedy within the context of cannibalism, proclaims that the act of vengeance is the “‘impossible Real’..., sealed off and circumscribed by language, it nonetheless serves as the very gesture—the Act—that produces the ‘legal Order’ of revenge” (305). The avenger’s discourse is the flip-side of the licensed law. The hungry ghost emerges not for defending the written, symbolic law, but to elicit an obscene pleasure of revenge. In response to the apparition, Hamlet assumes the role of a transcriber. He calls for the tables, a sort of Freudian mystic pad, to write down the memoir of the dead. Here, taking vengeance is akin to bearing remembrance. And remembrance, imprinted “[w]ithin the book and volume of
[Hamlet’s] brain” (1, 5, 103), adopts the form of language. Like the signet ring that seals the letter, memory is inscribed, enveloped, and sent to the future.

Aiming for vengeance as the closure, Hamlet’s final concern is somehow prophetic. He pronounces his own death and bids his friend to tell the story: “Horatio, I am dead, / Thou livest. Report me and my cause aright / To the unsatisfied” (5, 2, 320-22). In a strikingly similar way, Hamlet’s dying voice, “If thou didst ever hold me in thy heart...tell my story” (5, 2, 328-31), is reminiscent of the ghost’s injunction, “if thou didst ever thy dear father love-” (1, 5, 23). With Horatio’s promise to deliver the story truly, what the “prophetic soul” (1, 5, 40) of Hamlet foresees is an ongoing deliverance, a tale/tell that resists a closure. After all, apocalypse is about disclosure, rather than closure. And the way Hamlet delivers his prophecy is through a detour of letters—both the letter from the ghost and the letter sent to England. The series of envois means to kill but always loses its signification after sending the message. Perhaps the afterness is crucial here. Perhaps every apocalypse is simply another form of elegy. Like Hamlet, Laertes foretells his act of vengeance: “my revenge will come” (4, 7, 29). The message of justice, pronounced at the moment of mourning, has been swerved from its supposed destination as always. The sword of Laertes turns back to himself. Hamlet, failing to kill his enemy “with wings as swift / As meditation” (1, 5, 29-30), has recourse to suicide, rather than murder, as the aim of his final action.
For Derrida, missivity involves “nuclear rhetoric” (“No Apocalypse,” 24). On one hand, an apocalyptic letter sends and loses itself during the bombardment of dispatches. On the other, the delivery of missives invents and proclaims nuclear catastrophe. It anticipates a work of mourning, the “total destruction of the archive” (28). In the convoluted transmission of plural voices or envois, what is veiled/revealed is “the apocalypse that sends itself” (“Of an Apocalyptic Tone,” 26). The connection between apocalypse and sending is explicit in the biblical proclamation of the prophet: “Here I am! Send me” (Isaiah 6:8). In the Levinasian vein, prophecy becomes an essence of being; it is predicated upon the ethical relation of the I to an other. The statement of here I am for the other as a prophetic position opens up the potentiality of an ethics. A soothsayer foresees a future that is a “time of prophecy which is also an imperative” (Entre Nous, 115). “Here I am”—the name of Hamlet seems to play the letters that declare a prophetic soul possessed by the other in me. The hero is taken as hostage, obliged to respond to the call from the dead.

A prophet-avenger, Hamlet forestalls the possibility of following the rhythm of time: “we defy augury....If it be [now], ‘tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it [will] come—the readiness is all....let be” (5, 2, 202-205). In this “readiness,” or “haste” (1, 5, 29), the out-of-jointness of time is revealed. Prophecy amounts to the readiness to serve the other. It always points to what is other than itself. Hamlet’s misgiving about the upcoming duel with Laertes, an encounter with the other, follows the logic of the
apocalypse without apocalypse. As a let-ter, Hamlet prefigures an apocalypse without destination. The hero sets off his journey with “inky cloak” (1, 2, 77). He wanders and travels like an intransitive verb (from Wittenberg to Denmark to England, and then back to Denmark), lost in his apocalyptic desire. One pushes the button of the Hamlet machine (the enigmatic signature in the prince’s letter to Ophelia), and launches a nuclear missile that always arrives at the wrong place. Even Ophelia, whose name starts with an ending (omega) and ends with a beginning (alpha), has rambled about like a killing letter, “a murd’ring piece, in many places/ Gives [Claudius] superfluous death” (4, 5, 93-94). In mourning, Ophelia becomes a prophetess: “Go to thy death-bed/ He never will come again” (4, 5, 190). In madness, her Highness expresses an apocalyptic desire: “without an oath I’ll make an end on’t” (4, 5, 57). Following this line, she sings of a failed promise, a promise that will only be achieved by not coming: “[if] thou hadst not come to my bed” (4, 5, 66). The possibility of coming, thus, is postulated on difference and undecidibility. A prophet, a psychotic subject, forecloses the symbolic order and announces the future as interminable progress.

It is Hamlet’s observation that human beings are like angels, a species who are sent for a mission (as in Rosencrantz’s and Gildenstern’s case), or who forward ambiguous mails which only submit to misinterpretation (e.g. Ophelia the ministering angel in Laertes’ praise). Sending himself out, Hamlet arrives at a certain dead letter office. Yet, the apocalyptic text does not mark the promised end of history. At some level, an apocalypse is a proleptic mourning.
It is a task that cannot be properly completed, encoded and undecipherable. The last prophecy Hamlet predicts is itself a crypt (fors): “I do prophesy th’
election lights / On Fortinbras, he has my dying voice” (5, 2, 336-337). Fortinbras, whose name has implications of fors, forecast, or fortune telling, becomes a manifestation of prophecy, a prophecy in which the father’s words are lurking around, forever in the process of coming. With his promise to tell the story, Horatio says to the succeeding king, “All this can I/ Truly deliver” (5, 2, 367-68). Prophecy, the father’s legacy, and genealogy are strangely folded together within the postal network. In response to this storytelling, Fortinbras insists that “[l]et us haste to hear it” (5, 2, 367-68). As if unwilling to hear the full version of the tragedy, Fortinbras receives the message only partially. The dying words of Hamlet become a letter that resists full delivery. “[S]o shal I/n the secret parts of Fortune” (2, 2, 232), Rosencrantz and Gildenstern are sent to Denmark, held in prison by the “strumpet Fortune” (2, 2, 478). Tom Stoppard has cleverly started Rosencrantz and Gildenstern Are Dead with his heroes tossing up a coin. Whatever reason that provokes Claudius’ “hasty sending” (35), Rosencrantz and Gildenstern cannot
make a head or tail of the player’s prophecy: “a twist of fate and cunning has put into their hands a letter that seals their deaths” (82). Although the letter is well explained, the message they count on is enigmatic and Delphic—every pli needs to be ex-pli-cated. In the sending system, there is always a chance of miscarriage, the possibility of death’s death.

The apocalyptic desire, so to speak, plays with a game of chance, an act of throwing a dice. The apocalyptic movement is a “gesture of denuding” (“Of an Apocalyptic Tone,” 5). It is about veiling and unveiling, about making the private parts public. In a way, the postman of nuclear catastrophe is a crustacean that carries an encrypted desire inside. Incarcerated, Hamlet is bounded in a nutshell, in an infinite space where he is a king (2, 2, 249-50). He tells Polonius that “yourself...shall grow old as I am—if like a crab you could go backward” (2, 2, 201-02). Earlier, he “lets [Ophelia] go” as he stares at her backwardly (2, 1, 93). The object of desire is let loose and yet hindered from reaching any destination. The double meaning of ‘let’ (both as an imperative and impediment) is nicely played in Hamlet’s proclamation “I’ll make a ghost of him that lets me” (1, 5, 85). The destinality of this messianic promise seems to set beings in motion towards death. Death is anticipated, while remaining uncertain, differed and deferred. It is precisely “that which cannot be anticipated” (Derrida, Memoirs, 595). Ophelia’s death is doubtful. Polonius’s burial is over-hasty. The rest (of the play) is silence—the prophet’s final words lead to deadly stillness. The hero misses his target for revenge (as Hamlet
mistakes Polonius for Claudius). Throughout the play, death seems substitutable, albeit interminable and indeterminable. Neither absence nor presence, the dead produces a spectral proximity, an anticipated coming that disrupts temporality.

The words ‘let’ and ‘come’ stand in the foreground whenever something seems to be revealed. With Gertrude’s “Let her come in” (4, 5, 16), Ophelia enters and utters her prophecy. Polonius beckons his daughter to follow when he is about to disclose Hamlet’s lovesickness: “Come.../This must be known.../Come” (2, 1, 114-117). Near the end of the play, Hamlet claims that “I will prophecy, he comes to tell me” (2, 2, 375). Forever in the process of coming, the Being declares itself in an apocalyptic tonality: “I am coming,” “I shall come”. In his analysis of Joyce’s phrase “he war” in the *Wake*, Derrida writes: “HE WARS—he wages war, he declares or makes war, he is war...He war: he was—he who was (‘I am he who is or who am’, says YAHWE)” (145). The being wages a war in the name of a prophetic God. The war/was reveals the being as he who was true (a being in the past tense and in war, a being comes to pass). However, the Yah-We, rather than an affirmation of yes-we (oui-we), questions the legitimacy of the being’s existence. Hamlet has a foreboding which comes as “a kind of fighting / That would not let [him] sleep” (5, 2, 4-5). The being revealed is a being on a war footing whose origin is questionable, a being without any progenitor or progeniture. Seemingly, the dead father’s war-like apparel is the form through which the son can identify and find out the truth.
Upon hearing Horatio’s words, Hamlet exclaims: “My father’s spirit—in arms!...Would the night were come! / Till then sit still, my soul. [Foul] deeds will rise / Though all the earth o’verwhelm them, to men’s eyes” (1, 2, 254-557). It is not until later that he realizes the being is pulverized while pluralized. The coming of the war (or the was of being) is not a warrant as Horatio suggests (I warr’nt it will). And a king is merely a thing, after all.

The peculiar expression “I am dead” announces the death of the I. As Hamlet “folded the writ up in the form of the other” (5, 2, 51), the self that one sets as the ‘end’ no longer remains pristine. While the logic of posting in Hamlet follows “the sport to have the enginer / Hoist with his own petar” (3, 4, 206-207), something Hamlet already foresees before Claudius sends the commission, the letter has always missed its destination. In spite of the ambassador’s message that the “commandment is fulfill’d, / That Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead” (5, 2, 352-53), the mission of any epistles can never be fulfilled. In his definition of apocalypse, Derrida says, “as soon as one no longer knows who speaks or who writes, the text becomes apocalyptic” (“Of an Apocalyptic Tone,” 27). The message from England, arriving at the scene of Claudius’s death, indicates a glitch of the delivery mechanism. There is always something wrong with the detour. If the destination of a letter that killeth is impossible to reach, does that mean murder or destruction is also impossible?

This failure of destination, to put within the Levinasian context, has everything to do with “the impossibility of annihilating oneself” (Time, 73).
Claiming that Hamlet is a tragedy “beyond tragedy or the tragedy of tragedy” (50), Levinas posits that the tragedy of Denmark’s prince lies not in the question as to “to be or not to be,” but in the impossibility of committing suicide, to reduce being into absolute nothingness. Axiomatically, one cannot not to be. Hamlet speaks of the hindrance to death—“ay, there’s the rub” (3, 1, 64). The rub, the enigmatic cryptogram, functions as a magic word in the Wolf Man case which encrypts the brother’s desire—“Sis, come and rub my penis” (Torok, 19).

*Tieret*, to rub, scrub, wax, to finish, to move back-and-forth, is to ponder an existence of after-death. The Wolf Man rambles around Terek River (which Abraham and Torok associate with *tieret*) with his suicidal thought after his sister’s death. Likewise, Hamlet ‘rubs’ himself when intrigued with an endless game of mourning. Hamlet wishes he had never been born. The existence, while enduring “[t]he slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,” faces the impossibility to “end them” (3, 1, 57-59). Hamlet articulates his desire to end: “by a sleep to say we end / The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks / That flesh is heir to; ‘tis a consummation” (3, 1, 60-63). And yet, he comes to the convergence of the impossibility of ending and the impossibility of committing suicide. He waxes and seals himself up in a deathly and failed promise of (not) being there. Between the promise and its fulfillment, death is only anticipated while beyond negation. It is a play of foreclosure and disclosure, veiling and unveiling, an impossible play as characterized by Beckett’s *Endgame*. In a way, Hamlet might murmur as Clov does in his opening line: “Finished, it’s finished, nearly finished,
it must be nearly finished” (1)—the anticipation of “a divinity that shapes our ends” is forever nearly finished (5, 2, 10).

The work of infinite dying and mourning reveals the alterity and plurality of future. Such a future, as Simon Critchley nicely puts it, “is never future enough for the time of dying, which is a temporality of infinite delay...Dying thus opens a relation with the future which is always ungraspable, impossible and enigmatic...it opens the possibility of a future without me, an infinite future, a future which is not my future” (111). In Hamlet’s dying, he sees not his future but that of someone else’s. The heap of bodies appears to be accumulation of excessive death. At the end, the prince orchestrates a scene in which the greatest horror lies in the impossibility of finite death.
Endnotes


2 Esther Rashkin has pointed out that Ophelia, when considered a plant-girl, is associated with Polonius, the poison. She is the incarnation of hebona, the poison that causes King Hamlet’s death. See *Family Secrets*, pp. 39-40.

3 Joel Fineman, in “The Sound of O in Othello,” has called the play a tragedy of desire. He relates Othello’s name to the Greek word *ethelo* (wish, desire, will) and analyzes the letter O as the materialization of desire. See *The Subjectivity Effect in Western Literary Tradition: Essays Toward the Release of Shakespeare’s Will*, pp. 143-164.


6 In “Nuclear Piece: Memoires of Hamlet and the Time To Come,” Nicholas Royle expounds the relationship between mourning and the nuclear war in Derrida’s works.

7 Avi Erlich has discussed the word ‘let’ in *Hamlet’s Absent Father*, Princeton UP, 1972, pp. 57-58.

8 See *The Wolf-Man By the Wolf-Man*, 26-34.
Coda

Perhaps the functioning of mourning has its affinity with the nature of cinema. The director Kore-edo Hirokazu contemplates this question in his 1999 film *After Life*. In order to live on, the dead chooses one moment in life and recreate this memory. Cinema becomes a mourning machine that marks a niche of a singular event. The filmic cuts constituting continuous movements contain a layering of ongoing deaths that preconditions the desire to live on. Derrida’s assertion that “[f]ilm is a ‘phantomachia’” (Echographies, 114) reminds us that the funereal quality of visual imagery is indeed a kind of afterlife. In cinema, we share the experience of being haunted here and now, which anticipates a production of future images. In this sense, future opens itself to specters. And filmmaking, considered a form of writing, inscribes multiple takes that are out of joint and remembered at the same time.

On top of that, Hirokazu illustrates love as the pivotal point of mourning. The significance of love underlying this project of mourning may suggest that Derrida, in all his discussions on death, friendship, incorporation, or futurity, has put an originary love in the foreground of deconstructive theories. What would Derrida have to say about Kant’s idea of love as an “indispensable supplement”? If it is a supplement, then love is already a surplus, an extra, an outside. Love, as it marks exteriority, delineates a spatiality of affects, a spatiality of our lives. Moreover, this outside of space is commensurate with the outside of time. The
supplement is beyond the end or the death of man. A supplement of mourning, 
love is sent and spread without arriving. It is dangerous in a way that anthrax 
might cause an archival fever. By presenting this work of mourning, I would like 
to open an archive of more future engagements, not a conclusion, but a start, of 
my sending a book into the world.
Bibliography


Curriculum vita

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